Court Opinion

ID: 9463995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:22:36.835371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:24.358711
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because the appellant Ramsey Clark originally presented a ripe justiciable case and controversy to this court, involving an issue the majority admit has been evading review for 40 years (Maj.op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 559 F.2d at 649), it is my view, even if his loss in the primary election did moot his case as a candidate, that we should decide the merits of this case because of his standing as a voter. We have authority in certain instances to decide cases where our initial jurisdiction is lost, if the issue is one that is capable of repetition and likely to evade review. Also because Clark has standing as a voter and the facts relevant thereto do present a ripe justiciable case and controversy, it is my opinion that we should not exercise an adverse discretion to refuse to decide the important issues. If further briefing is desired that can easily be requested. I see no reason to avoid reaching the merits just because the defendants refused to brief the principal question adequately.
The majority entirely ignores a most important part of plaintiff’s case. This is that, even if no veto power is actually exercised, the regulations that the FEC will propose are necessarily the result of the congressional threat to employ an unconstitutional legislative scheme. The reason is simple: with a potential veto to its regulations by either house, the Federal Election *679Commission (FEC) knows that it is useless to send over proposed regulations that a bare majority of a quorum in either house disapproves. To avoid this, the Commission as a practical matter is required to consult with members of each house, which here resulted in bringing in the members of Congress as participants in the actual drafting of the regulations of a supposedly independent agency that are to be applied to congressional and presidential elections.1 Such consultation actually happened here (Brief for Appellant at 58-59) and is uncontested on the record.
The majority comments:
Significantly, the United States did not claim that the regulations which were propounded and referred and recently lay before Congress under the challenged review provisions are tainted with political interference.
Maj.Op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 647. But the compelled consultation produced the taint. To require proof of actual interference with the content of specific regulations is far too severe a burden to impose in this case. To the extent that any congressional influence is successful, it may be too subtle or too involved with lengthy discussions to pinpoint.2 Influence may even result from suggestions inferred from casual statements made by Congressmen without any formal discussions. Legislation can be like that.
The point is that the congressional veto scheme, whether exercised or not, makes Congress a working party in the executive functioning of the agency, impinges upon the free judgment of the Commission, and necessarily operates to make the Commission subservient to views that may be communicated directly or indirectly from Congress, to such an extent that an agency that is held out as being free to regulate federal *680elections in the public interest is actually obstructed in that task by some of the parties its regulations are supposed to govern.
The plaintiff and intervenor have alleged that they are harmed by the veto provision of the statute, and that allegation must be assumed to be accurate at this stage. If the statutory existence of that naked power is illegitimate, its influence leading to palpable harm must be stopped. That is not to say that a case of arm-twisting must be made out; it is patent that the very scheme of having to please practically every member of both houses because a bare majority of a quorum of each house of Congress can eventually veto any regulation, leads the Commission into the possibility, or temptation, of subordinating its best executive judgment to that of Congress.
Hence, even without the actual exercise of a single-house veto, the structure the statute requires for adopting regulations, and the instant factual circumstances, present all the facts necessary to find the veto scheme to be constitutionally impermissible. No further “full-bodied record” is necessary to present the issue in concrete form for judicial decision. Note first the present harm of which plaintiff complains.
I. THE HARM FROM THE FEC PROPOSED REGULATIONS
The Federal Election Commission, following oral argument, publicly announced that it intends to enforce the proposed regulations as advisory, quasi-regulations.3 If the majority contends that even after that fact there is insufficient present impact to afford standing, it should be noted that the very fact that the regulations are not actually in full force provides sufficient adequate present harm for standing purposes. Plaintiff Clark, as a voter, has a right to participate in an election conducted either according to FEC regulations or not, as a proper, constitutional process might determine to be appropriate. Halfway measures are not sufficient. Such entitlement is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ... by the statute.” Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (hereafter, ADP v. Camp). Clark has been harmed as a result of having the FEC regulations delayed to the extent that they never came into existence during the past election (Brief for Appellant at 57-58).
To argue that there is nothing the matter with the lay-over provision itself and that the delay only stems from the lay-over period prescribed by that provision is to fail to deal with the full impact of the statute. There is (and was) delay before the FEC even sends its recommendations over to the houses of Congress. This delay is occasioned because of the potentiality of the one-house veto and the additional consultation with Congress that the Commission considers it must take to obviate it. If the only provision for review were the lay-over provision with the possibility of subsequent legislation (as in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., *681312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941)), then the regulations would become effective unless both houses of Congress disapproved, and the President signed their alternative legislation. If he vetoed the congressional action it would take a two-thirds vote of both houses to impress the congressional will upon the Commission’s action. That is the nature and extent of the influence assigned by the Constitution to Congress in the affairs of other agencies.4 The one-house veto scheme violently disturbs the constitutionally prescribed congressional-executive balance intended to apply in such situations.
Considering the greatest power that the Constitution confers on individual members of Congress, the constitutionally prescribed process would permit one third of the members of a bare quorum in one house (18 Senators or 73 Representatives) to sustain a presidential veto of a bill setting aside any regulations. To sustain the FEC regulations under the one-house veto provision would, at a minimum, take a majority of a quorum of both houses (26 Senators and 110 Representatives), and if all members voted, 51 Senators and 218 Representatives. This is a tremendous shift in voting power. Thus, if the constitutionally established legislative procedure was followed, a commission would very logically anticipate reversal of its regulations in far fewer cases than if a bare majority of a quorum of just one house of Congress (26 Senators or 110 House members) could possibly defeat its proposed regulations. Hence, under the one-house veto provision of the instant Act there is more need for the Commission to confer with and defer to a single house of Congress than in the case of a simple layover provision. The one-house veto greatly increases the authority of a small minority of the entire Congress to achieve a legislative result, when compared with the constitutionally prescribed legislative procedure.
Harm to the constitutionally devised legislative process also results from both conferring with and deferring to Congress in advance of agency action. The majority opinion raises the question, in footnote 10, that the one-house veto might reflect no greater intrusion than the usual relationship between a regulatory commission and its funding congressional committee. As above pointed out this assertion is wide of the mark. If that were all that was intended the elaborate veto scheme, and the other control features, need never have been enacted. But from the very beginning the Act was dripping with features that sought to exert congressional control over the normal functioning of the Commission. Congress’ appointing a majority of four of the six members of the original Commission was just one example of the intent to intrude into the actual freedom of the Commission to follow the statute.
On the point of the congressional interference with agency functions, Chief Judge Bazelon in D. C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 459 F.2d 1231 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1290, 31 L.Ed.2d 489 (1972) (in an earlier opinion in which case, Judge Wright joined, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 434 F.2d 436 (1970)), held agency action was unlawful where it was allegedly influenced by a sin*682gle Congressman : “Even if the Secretary [of Transportation] had taken every formal step required by every applicable statutory provision, reversal would be required, in my opinion, because extraneous [congressional] pressure intruded into the calculus of considerations on which the Secretary’s decision was based.” 148 U.S.App.D.C. at 221-222, 459 F.2d at 1245-6 (emphasis added). Yet here the majority do not even take cognizance of much greater intrusion.
Even at its worst, the normal congressional relationship always acts in futuro. A congressional committee can tell the Commission to adopt particular activity or its next appropriation would be reduced. Such does not involve any immediate intervention into regulatory action. The veto scheme in the Federal Election Campaign Act does. And that difference is crucial. The delay of which plaintiff here complains resulted directly from the extra time taken by the Commission to confer with members of Congress on these very proposals and the admitted effect of this scheme is that “extraneous pressure intruded into the . decision . . .a tactic which the court found so wrongful in D. C. Federation, but ignores here. In the normal functioning of agencies, there might be some conferring with Congress, but a failure to do so, or to conform to congressional requests, could only involve future adverse legislation involving the Commission. It would not absolutely prevent a Commission from promulgating timely rules it considered to be necessary in the public interest.
Plaintiff also complains of the potential that the regulations will favor incumbents if a greater amount of consultation with Congress is required. Here again, the one-house veto provision creates a special harm. There is always some deference to Congress, but the personnel of its committees do not have life-and-death power over an agency’s ability to adopt precise regulations it considers to be necessary. If the committee threatens to retaliate unless a commission takes a particular point of view, the commission weighs that threat in light of its application only in the future, and the myriad intervening political factors or accommodations that could still prevent adverse legislation. Indeed, the Commission could seek to have an appropriation bill amended when it came to the floor, to reinstate the cut-off funding (a difficult matter against a Rules Committee rule, but far less difficult on the Senate floor). None of this saving-potential is available in the one-house veto case. When exercised by a majority of a quorum of one house only, the regulation is dead. Congress has made itself a virtual partner with the Federal Election Commission in the adoption of every regulation. That naked intrusion violates the basic three branch constitutional scheme for our Government and the legislative scheme provided by art. I, sections 1, 7 of the Constitution.
II. IS THE HARM SUFFICIENT TO GIVE STANDING?
No regulations have been finally promulgated under authority of the present Commission. The only proposals to date failed by two days to become law.5 The only exercises of the one-house veto power by a house of Congress fell on regulations proposed by the old Commission, which was improperly constituted. Nevertheless, this shows the potential for congressional disagreement with rules the Commission considers to be essential to fair elections. If Congress would exercise its veto powers over regulations issued by a commission of which it appointed a majority of the members, the potentiality for a veto of regulations issued by a constitutionally appointed independent commission is even more likely.6
*683The harm complained of, therefore, is not that any regulation is now in force that violates the Constitution by excluding the President and the Congress from their prescribed participation. It is rather that no regulations are now in force and that the scheme of the Act makes it possible for a bare majority of a quorum (which frequently occurs) in either house of Congress to influence regulations constituting “rules of law,” while completely depriving the President, possibly one house of Congress, and one-third plus one of the members of each house, from exercising legislative power supposedly vested in them by the Constitution. Short reflection upon the enormity of these constitutional violations will convince anyone of the tremendous harm they cause to the basic procedures that the Constitution provides for the enactment of legislation to govern the Nation.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), held that “Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. Ill federal courts to render advisory opinions . . . [b]ut where a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the litigant is a ‘proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue,’ . . . is one within the power of Congress to determine.” 405 U.S. at 732 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. at 1365 n. 3 (1972). Here, 2 U.S.C. § 437(h) has given standing in the Sierra Club sense to any eligible voter. As noted above, this is a very clear case of what ADP v. Camp, supra, meant by a statute creating a zone of interests to be protected. Hence, if the controversy satisfies the Article III requirement, there should be no quibble over permitting Clark, as voter, to bring this action, arguing the voter’s interest in constitutional regulations constituting rules of law governing elections of Presidents, Senators and Representatives.
One problem with seeing this controversy as within Article III is, once again, the fact that no regulations have been adopted. But Clark is not objecting to any particular regulation. His objection is to the unconstitutional statutory procedure to which any and all proposed Commission regulations have been and will be subjected. He complains that that portion of the statute is facially invalid. The complained of procedure has run its course. The potential for congressional influence on the proposed FEC regulations has operated. And, most importantly, the issuance of the regulations was delayed and the past election was conducted without them. The complaint fairly alleges that the FEC would have sent its recommendations over two days earlier except for the extra consultation time considered necessary because of the possibility of a one-house veto.
Voter Clark contends that the Federal Election Campaign Act was intended to provide such regulations (constitutional regulations, not reflecting undue influence of a single branch) as the Commission considered necessary for the protection of his franchise. The protection of an unadulterated franchise was precisely the interest deemed sufficient to give standing in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). But Clark and all other voters were forced to do without having the benefit of the fair play of the election regulations which the properly constituted regulatory commission found necessary for this election. The Commission with respect to its regulations is thus always completely subservient to a bare majority of a quorum of one house. Such a bare majority is given the power to accomplish what the Constitution otherwise requires of a two-thirds majority in both houses. This enhanced legislative authority for a bare majority of a quorum of one house to take positive legislative action clearly violates the constitutional requirement that legislation should be passed by both houses7 and be signed by *684the President.8 Art. I, sections 1, 7. The Constitution confers “All legislative powers” on both houses and does not permit a single house to usurp the constitutional legislative power of “Congress.”9
That the failure of these regulations to become effective was prejudicial to plaintiff, as a voter, is also apparent from an examination of the complete set of regulations, governing the conduct of federal elections, which the Commission filed on August 3,1976. An examination of those regulations discloses numerous proposed features which would have benefited candidates who opposed incumbents, including limitations on honoraria for federal elected officials,10 a strict accounting requirement for use of facilities furnished by labor organizations (which are generally considered to have the support of a larger number of favorable incumbents than in any Congress in recent history),11 the necessity for reimbursement in advance of airplane travel services furnished by a corporation or a labor organization,12 and the necessity to report all in-kind contributions.13 Incumbents generally find it easier to obtain con*685tributions than do challengers. While less harsh than they might have been, absent congressional influence, these proposed regulations were still sufficiently onerous that the incumbents might well have preferred postponing their official applicability; and their existence might have exposed information that would have changed election results.
Clark has standing as a voter. The statute specifies that voters are proper persons to challenge its constitutionality.14 He has been denied the statute’s intended benefit: an election guided by regulations which an independent Commission thought were necessary, when that Commission thought they were necessary.
The delay was directly connected with the legal infirmity alleged: an unconstitutional potential for the Commission’s deference to Congress during the time the issuance of the regulations was being delayed by congressional consultations. Even while recognizing the regulations’ possible reflection of congressional influence, Clark prays for the issuance of some regulations. A holding by this court that the one-house veto is unconstitutional, and severable from the rest of the Act, would immediately make operative the FEC regulations, thus affording Clark the relief he seeks — though belated. They would immediately cover special congressional elections such as to fill Representative Bergland’s slot in Minnesota when he resigns to take office as Secretary of Agriculture. Clark’s interest as a voter has not changed.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ONE-HOUSE VETO
In one of the concurring and dissenting opinions in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the following is stated:
I am also of the view that the otherwise valid regulatory power of a properly created independent agency is not rendered constitutionally infirm, as violative of the President’s veto power, by a statutory provision subjecting agency regulations to disapproval by either House of Congress. For a bill to become law it must pass both Houses and be signed by the President or be passed over his veto. Also, “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary . . . ” is likewise subject to the veto power. Under § 438(c) the FEC’s regulations are subject to disapproval [by one-house of Congress]; but for a regulation to become effective, neither House need approve it, pass it, or take any action at all with respect to it The regulation becomes effective by non-action. This no more invades the President’s powers than does a regulation not required to be laid before Congress. Congressional influence over the substantive content of agency regulation may be enhanced, but I would not view the power of either House to disapprove as equivalent to legislation or to an order, resolution or vote requiring the concurrence of both Houses.
424 U.S. at 284-85, 96 S.Ct. at 757 (White, J.) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). The relevance of this statement to the issues here involved, the sense of finality it imports, and the prominence of the author, require an analysis of its grounds if anyone is to assert a contrary position. The key phrase in that opinion (hereafter “concurring opinion”) asserts that under section 438(c) for an FEC regulation to become effective “neither House need approve it, pass it, or take any action at all with respect to it.” To so state is to ignore the actual situation created in Congress by the scheme of the Federal Election Campaign Act: (1) What section 438(c) really means in congressional practice is that, for an FEC regulation to become effective both houses must approve it by voting not to veto it. (2) Under the statutory scheme of the Federal Election Campaign Act, that is the legislative equivalent for that house of “passing” the regulation. (3) And to state that a proposed regulation may become ef*686fective without any house taking “any action at all with respect to [the regulation]” (emphasis added) is to assume that Congress will act irresponsibly and fail even to consider regulations embodying “rules of law” that Congress has statutorily required be submitted to it, subject to “appropriate action.” (Section 438(c)(2)).15 The congressional procedures are fully described in note 17 infra.
The next assertion in the concurring opinion is that, “The regulation becomes effective by nonaction.” (Emphasis added.) This is merely a reiteration of the preceding sentence, discussed supra, and embodies the same fallacious factual assumptions just described. To term the action of Congress in affirming a regulation by not vetoing it as “nonaction” is to ignore that somewhere along the congressional pipeline it always takes some sort of affirmative action by Congress to create such result.
Then comes the statement that, “This [failing to veto a regulation] no more invades the President’s powers than does a regulation not required to be laid before Congress.” Fifty per cent of this statement amounts to a truism, based on a false assumption. The remaining 50 per cent of the situation, that the statement does not deal with, renders the entire statement nugatory.
*687As for the first 50 per cent — of course if Congress does nothing, it will never invade any powers of the President16; but to assert that Congress does nothing when the vote or action of Congress is to not veto a regulation is merely to play with words and to deny reality. Such interpretation of the legislative situation incorrectly describes what happens when Congress decides to not veto a regulation. That result is definite action — not “nonaction.” It is not true that Congress does not act when it votes not to exercise its veto — in such cases it may act affirmatively by a majority vote to approve or the resolution to veto may not carry by the required majority. Either procedure would constitute an act or vote of approval for that house. In both instances votes are cast in the normal legislative manner by Congressmen elected to exercise “[a]ll legislative power.” These two examples cover those situations where votes are cast on main motions (1) to veto, or (2) to approve (not veto), regulations transmitted by the Federal Election Commission. Set forth in the margin is a short summary of the congressional action which was taken when two regulations of the initial Commission were vetoed, one by the House and one by the Senate.17 In both situations the indi*688vidual house plainly acted. Each house voted and if these votes had gone the other way and the regulations had become effective, would anybody say such result had occurred by nonaction ? The mere fact that there were insufficient votes cast to approve does not permit a conclusion that either house did not act, i. e., that the “regulation[s] became effective by non-action.”
A third procedure may eventuate under a one-house veto provision — it might happen that neither house would take a direct vote on the regulations within a statutorily set time period and the regulations would become effective on the last day of the period within which the statute required either house to act. This may be the situation that the concurring opinion mistakenly assumed would always occur when either house did not veto the proposed regulations. Under such circumstances the refusal of either house to act is just as much legislative action as if there had been affirmative majority votes of either or both houses to approve or to veto. The scheme of section 438(c) of the organic act of the FEC, operating on established congressional procedures, makes the refusal to act within the prescribed time schedule the equivalent of an affirmative legislative act.
In such cases, where neither house takes any action to affirmatively approve or to veto, there may however be any number of votes by either house that determine that neither house would take further action. These votes might be in subcommittee, committee, the committee of the whole, the Rules Committee, or on the floor of either house, and might be taken on procedural motions or to defer consideration of the main motion to approve or veto. Voting down a Rules Committee rule calling for a debate on the proposed regulation and a subsequent vote on approval or veto might also be the action taken. A negative vote in all such circumstances would obviously be effective legislative action. So would an affirmative vote to adjourn either house or a committee when the effect of the vote would finally prevent either body from taking other action to approve or veto a proposed regulation in whole or in part.
The second 50 per cent of the statement in the concurring opinion wholly ignores the other side of the coin, i.e., that section 438(c) confers the power on one house to veto regulations as well as to not veto them, and when one house does veto a regulation, it definitely is not engaged in “nonaction.” Even the concurring opinion would admit this.
The concurring opinion states, however, that it does “not view the power of either House to disapprove [agency regulations] as equivalent to legislation or to an order, resolution or vote requiring the concurrence of both Houses.”18 If taking action to approve or disapprove any agency regulation, *689which constitutes a “provision or series of interrelated provisions stating a single separable rule of law” (2 U.S.C. § 438(c)(5), 90 Stat. 486) (emphasis added), is not “the equivalent of legislation” what is it? (Judge Leventhal’s opinion here contends it is legislative action (n. 13)). If it is not legislative action where does Congress derive its power to act? What provision of the Constitution gives Congress power to take action to approve or disapprove a “rule of law” if it is not its legislative power? (id.) Practically all of Congress’ powers to act are limited to acting by legislation and that is the precise power that Congress is attempting to exercise when it passes- on any regulation amounting to a “rule of law” under a one-house veto provision, whether by action or so-called “nonaction.” Further, all legislation must conform to the two-house constitutional procedure required for legislation. See art. I.
The concurring opinion analogizes such a veto to the case of a bill passed in one house which fails in another. 424 U.S. at 285, n. 30, 96 S.Ct. 612, n. 30. in the latter case, however, each house of Congress is taking affirmative “action” that is specifically authorized and required by the Constitution, while the one-house veto of agency regulations is not. Furthermore, a bill that fails in one house does not automatically become law otherwise. It requires the approval of both houses and the President. A vote on a bill in one house is just part of the constitutional legislative process, while under the Constitution it takes the entire legislative procedure to repeal a regulation adopted by an agency. This difference is most simply understood by reference to the basic rule of the Constitution: laws must first pass both houses of Congress and be signed by the President. The Commission’s regulations can become effective if neither house acts only because both houses of Congress have established certain standards and authorized the Commission to promulgate rules that conform thereto. That distinguishes the position of the Commission from that of a mere proposer of legislation. What are sent over by the Commission are not items in a proposed budget, but regulations which, because they conform to the standards prescribed by law, are capable of having the full force of law with nothing more happening. Hence, to set aside those regulations also requires an Act of Congress having the full force of law.
So, if something more than “nonaction” is required, section 438(c) definitely does provide for such action. And to circumvent his veto power does invade the President’s powers, because permitting one house to veto a proposed regulation is action which results in a situation that could only be accomplished under the Constitution by two houses passing a bill with the President’s approval and subject to presidential veto and override. It is therefore clear that section 438(c) definitely invades presidential powers in authorizing a one-house veto, or as would be more appropriately stated, in authorizing FEC regulations to become effective by approval of both houses without reference to presidential action thereon. Moreover, it is plain that section 438(c) also violates art. I, section 1 of the Constitution which definitely places “[a]ll legislative power” in a Congress of two houses, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, and does not permit one house alone, without the intervention of a presidential veto, to legislate as to what should or should not be the applicable “rule of law ” embodied in a vital agency regulation.
The concurring opinion is also based on the assumption that, when a regulation becomes effective by what it terms “non-action” of Congress, nothing happens in Congress. As shown above this is just not the fact — a great deal happens in Congress — and that is all “action.” The FEC regulations are just not delivered to Congress sub silentio and then ignored until they take effect. During the period that proposed regulations are “laid-over” they are continually accessible to each member of Congress and to the action of its committees and the subcommittees of each House. See note 17 supra. The regulations are under constant consideration. The first action is to refer the proposed regulation to the appropriate committees in the House *690and Senate and if nothing further happens, that action is dispositive of the fate of the regulation.
Section 438(c) does encompass the extremely unlikely possibility that Congress may do nothing more than refer the proposed FEC regulations to the appropriate committees which may refuse to act further; but is also presents the practical certainty that Congress will be responsible and, as it already acted on the two past occasions when regulations were proposed by the first Commission, that it will vote to determine whether to approve or veto the regulations. It is submitted that the validity of the regulation should be determined on the assumption that Congress will generally act in the latter manner.19 A practical certainty is generally to be preferred over an unlikely possibility. It thus does not accord with congressional procedures, or the scheme of the Federal Election Campaign Act, to base an opinion on the constitutionality of the one-house veto on the premise that FEC regulations become effective by nonaction of the Congress.
In approving regulations submitted by the FEC the concurrence of both houses is necessary, since if one house disagrees, the regulations are killed. Hence, such regulations must be presented to the President, in accordance with art. I, § 7, cl. 3: “Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be necessary shall be presented to the President of the United States . . . according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.” (Emphasis added.) Congress cannot establish “rules of law” by a legislative scheme which by-passes the constitutional role of the President in law making.
The harms specifically felt by plaintiff Clark are sufficient to give him standing to challenge the unconstitutionality at the core of the one-house veto device: the subversion of the constitutional legislative process.20 Whether or not Clark’s arguments would prevail over the view taken in the concurring opinion above quoted, “the issue tendered is a purely legal one,” as in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), and no further factual background is required to resolve it.
IV. A JURISDICTIONAL “STAYING OF HANDS”
Clark seeks declaratory relief in this suit which if granted, will resolve the rights of all similarly situated candidates under this Act.21 On that basis alone, he must be *691found to have sufficient ripe standing to have his case heard.
In addition, however, Clark makes out a convincing argument that as a voter (which he undoubtedly continues to be at this moment) he has a ripe cause, and adequate standing to bring it. While conceding at least this latter point, the concurrence by Judge Leventhal still maintains that there is a “jurisprudential” role to be played in not deciding this case.
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), Maj.op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 559 F.2d at 650, Conc.op. 182 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 559 F.2d at 662, does not require a jurisprudential deferring on deciding this case. Samuels explicitly dealt with the permissive, discretionary “may ” grant relief provision of the Declaratory Judgment Act. 401 U.S. at 70, 91 S.Ct. 764. Here, we deal with a statute expressing in the clearest terms of which Congress is capable that challenges to the act should be decided by the courts, and as expeditiously as possible. That legislative pronouncement overrides the jurisprudential power. Samuels discussion of equitable notions is inappropriate here.
The concurring opinion by Judge Leventhal suggests that, in enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act, Congress did not remove the discretionary elements from a court’s determination of ripeness and standing. He relies on the Act’s reference to declaratory judgment relief. Conc.op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 559 F.2d at 660. The dissent of Judge Robinson very comprehensively refutes this position as a matter of the intent of Congress, and as construed by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). In this connection, it is also useful to note the opinion written by Judge Wright for this circuit in Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 545 F.2d 169 (1976), which found that Congress had removed all but the minimal constitutional requirements for standing in Title VII litigation:
In addition to its constitutionally based requirement, standing doctrine incorpo*692rates a prudential limitation on the judicial power . . . In some statutory schemes, however, Congress has itself determined that standing should be granted to anyone who satisfies the constitutional requirements. Title VII is such a statute. “The use in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 of the language ‘a person claiming to be aggrieved’ shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971). Thus, since plaintiffs have claimed injury in fact as a result of defendants’ allegedly illegal practices, they have standing to sue under Title VII. [footnote:] The result is the same under § 1981. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975).
Judge Wright rested on the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), which allows that “a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.” If the language is to be viewed as determinative, there is no effective difference between Title VII’s phraseology and that under the Federal Elections Act: “The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President of the United States may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States.” 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (Supp. V, 1975) (emphasis added).
Most significantly, Title VII includes explicit reference to “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). That language evokes equitable principles far more convincingly than a mere reference to declaratory judgment, without even the words “as the court deems appropriate.” Hence, Judge Leventhal’s insistence on the “jurisprudential” aspects of standing is directly contradictory to this court’s Gray v. Greyhound decision.
Even if Mackell were proper precedent, and even if, through some construction, the mandatory language of the Federal Election Campaign Act were analogized to the permissive language of the Declaratory Judgments Act, we must ask exactly why is it better to wait?
It is not sufficient to answer, “Let’s wait until a one-house veto is actually exercised.” The cause of complaint, of which the majority opinion fails to take account, exists even if the veto power were never actually exercised. A great deal of the harm comes from the threat, the potential of a one-house veto. Indeed, if the system works the way plaintiffs allege, all either house of Congress would have to do is to influence the' FEC’s proposed regulations so that they always came out favorable. Then, piously, each house could refrain from any legislative action incanting, “If that’s the way the FEC wants it, so be it.”22 Harm would then come to voters who had been denied the fair and neutral reform regulations promised by the Act, to the President who had been' denied the right to exercise his constitutional power, to Congressmen who were denied the voting power that the Constitution gives them on regulations constituting rules of law, and to candidates who challenged incumbents, if any were available to bring suit and obtain a judgment before an election “mooted” their claim.
The majority suggests that more briefing might be appropriate on the constitutional challenge. (Maj.op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at -, n.8, 559 F.2d at 649 n.8). Why, then, does this court not order more briefing? It is not the circumstances of the case, which are entirely adequate to resolve the constitutional question at issue, but the de*693fendants’ voluntarily chosen tactics that account for the poor defense made for the one-house veto on the present record. As the previous section indicates, whether the one-house veto is upheld or struck down, the elements of the constitutional issue (separation of powers, presidential prerogative, congressional prerogative) are now capable of discussion and resolution.
The nature of the challenges here do not require a setting grounded in actual regulations which have become law or have been vetoed. Neither plaintiff nor intervenor is challenging a particular regulation. Neither alleges that any one regulation would be more favorable or unfavorable than another to any party. Rather, both complain of an unconstitutional scheme, whose development is already quite clear. Most importantly, the harm complained of here might very well never be more clearly expressed. The majority opinion simply sweeps away an entire area of harm with its statement, “Until Congress exercises the one-house veto, it may be difficult to present a case with sufficient concreteness as to standing and ripeness to justify judicial resolution of the pervasive constitutional issue which the one-house veto provision involves.” (Maj. op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. at --, 559 F.2d at 649). I dissent from the refusal to act on this premise. It is the unconstitutional hurdle to effective regulations and not any particular regulation that presents the specific vice.
A final fear of the majority opinion is that a holding of unconstitutionality here might involve over 200 other statutes that contain some form or another of one-house vetoes. In view of the weak defense presented for the one-house veto here that might well be the case. If that would result, so be it. That, instead of being a reason for not considering the issue, is a strong reason why the case should be heard. If the improper practice is that far-reaching courts should take quick steps to eradicate its evils.
At the Congressional Research Service document cited (Maj.op., 182 U.S.App.D.C. - n.10, 559 F.2d at 650 n.10) indicates, however, a great many of these provisions are functionally inoperative. Also, the impact of such a holding will depend upon the precise nature of each congressional act, particularly as to whether the one-house veto provision is severable or not. Each of these statutes can be evaluated by these standards when and if it is challenged. at
The standing requirement is imposed to guarantee “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of different constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The positions in this case could not be more adverse. Congress, with its incumbents in office, and the FEC, are opposed by a voter; and his attack is supported in large part by the Department of Justice that has a very definite separate interest, i. e., to assure that federal elections are conducted under rules of law constitutionally enacted.
The fact that adjudication of a scheme for promulgating legislation will take place before the implementation of a regulation is no bar to Article III jurisdiction. The Voting Rights Act is a perfect example. In those cases the state-proposed voting qualifications are adjudged constitutional or not in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, before there is any possibility of obtaining evidence of how those regulations would function in actual practice.23 Indeed, that law suspended the state laws until theoretical determination could be made, and similarly prevented the implementation of new voting regulations. The law was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). And we are presented in this case with harm of the most serious proportions that might never present itself in more ripe context.
*694V. ADEQUACY OF THE RECORD
The two opinions that control the disposition of this case, and find that the court did not have jurisdiction, rely heavily upon what they term the lack of a “full-bodied record” with ripe concrete issues. Complaint is also made that the issues are novel and that reflection and development are necessary before a rush to judgment.24 When the underlying reasons for these asserted conclusions are examined they add up principally to the fact that Congress has not vetoed any proposed regulation of this Commission and that we need to know more about the operation of the veto mechanism. It is also suggested that if a regulation had been vetoed the court might examine the reasons Congress gives for its action. But such examination could not result in altering the congressional action whether the court approved or disapproved of the reasons it concluded motivated the result. It is extremely difficult to determine the true motivation for the actions of any legislative body. Motivations are as diverse as the membership and, whatever reasons may be stated, subjecting legislative reasons to inquiry, except in rare circumstances, is beyond the proper scope of judicial review.25 Inquiry into reasons is thus an extreme suggestion and the argument that the lack of a veto of a specific regulation should operate to foreclose this court from deciding the facial validity of the Act overlooks the nature of appellant’s objection.
Appellant’s principal complaint is not that a particular regulation was, or was not vetoed,26 but that as a voter he has been harmed by the scheme of the statute which subjects all regulations of the Commission to an unconstitutional procedure with inherent damage that has improperly influenced, delayed and admittedly tainted the pending regulations, impermissibly taints the promulgation of all regulations under this statute, and has resulted in one house of Congress, in two instances, vetoing regulations proposed by the first Commission. When one house vetoes a proposed Commission regulation, it acts as an integral part of the independent executive agency and thus plainly trespasses beyond its constitutional legislative orbit prescribed by art. I, section 1 of the Constitution.
When the votes of two houses approve a proposed Commission regulation, by voting not to veto it, and such action results in the establishment of a “rule of law,” the two houses act legislatively and clearly violate art. I, section 7, clause 3, which requires the President’s approval to each such “vote.”
The principal underlying cause of the absence of the “full-bodied record” my colleagues seek here is the refusal of Valeo to brief the major issue in the case, i. e., the validity of the one-house veto. By this maneuver Valeo now, because of the concurrence of my colleagues, denies jurisdiction to this court to consider and decide that issue. This is the first instance to my knowledge where a court has elevated such conduct on the part of a defendant into a jurisdictional defect. It is submitted that this stratagem on the part of the defendant should not succeed and, since that alleged defect is easily capable of rectification by this court, that the court should order full briefing, if it considers same would be necessary and helpful before deciding the issue. No hurry exists about the case, though it does have a statutory priority, and the *695court is not prevented from taking all the time necessary to have the case fully presented, briefed and argued. There is no justifiable judicial reason for having our jurisdiction thwarted by the acts of the defendant when the means of correction are easily within our grasp. To assert that future actions which are promptly begun and vigorously prosecuted can provide a timely decision is belied by the results in this case. The normal period in most states between the close of primary filings for candidates and the date of the primary election is insufficient time within which to commence a suit and obtain a decision under normal trial and appellate procedures. If a “full-bodied record” is desired, and something more than is here present is considered necessary before deciding the issue, this is the case in which to get it.
I respectfully dissent.

. There is a substantial difference between congressional influence in promulgating regulations for executive agencies which apply to the general public and to those which apply to the election of its own members.

. The subtle nature of congressional influence and the possible subservience of the Commission to congressional control is evidenced by the present situation. The law provides that the Commission may promulgate regulations and file them with Congress and if Congress does not act upon them within 30 days of actual sessions they shall become effective. 2 U.S.C. § 438(c); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9009(c), 9039(c) (no provision for approval). Within this statutory time framework the Commission after long consideration on August 3, 1976 (Joint Stipulation fij] 73, 79) issued its regulations and filed copies thereof with the Congress to lay over for 30 days. However, Congress adjourned “early on October 2nd.” N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 4. This overrun into October 2nd was a continuation of the last legislative day of October 1, 1976. Thus the election regulations that the Commission had worked on so diligently and for so long a time never became effective; and of course the majority argue the makeweight that Congress never vetoed them. This is all correct but the true meaning of these circumstances is obscured.
The Commission knew as early as January 22, 1976, that the Congress intended to adjourn on October 2nd. The Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mansfield, had inserted that fact in the Congressional Record on January 22, 1976, as part of the majority conference statement of the Majority Leader. His statement on that included the following:
We will have six recesses, including two for the national conventions, between now and October 2, the date on which we expect to adjourn for the national elections campaign.
122 Cong.Rec. S368 (daily ed. Jan. -22, 1976).
It is thus very apparent that when the Commission filed its regulations on August 3, all Congress had to do to avoid them was to do nothing and jockey a couple of legislative days; and that is what happened. It was known on August 3 that the congressional schedule for the remainder of the session until October 2 left 44 possible legislative days. The first day of the layover would not begin until the day after the filing. Next, eight days were absorbed by the Republican Convention. An additional recess during the Labor Day weekend consumed another 2 legislative days. There were 3 days when the Senate sat but the House did not and there was one day when the House sat but the Senate did not. This accounts for 15 days which are subtracted from the 44 legislative days that were available leaving 29 days and thus one day short of the 30 days. Thus regulations that the Congress did not wish to become effective did not become effective by virtue of circumstances wholly within the control of Congress. Just convening the House for one day of the three when the Senate was sitting would have caused the regulations to become effective. Thus, the temporary effect of a veto was accomplished not by a naked veto but by subtle indirection.

. An alternative view of the entire question might be that the quasi-regulations have sufficient present force, in the sense of affecting conduct, to present a ripe challenge as to their validity. If the FEC is successful in its proposed enforcement of these regulations at least to the extent of making candidates, who are wary of the appearance of skirting the new election requirements, abide by their provisions, then ample present impact would have been alleged. That the regulations are not officially in force would present a situation analogous to that in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), where the Supreme Court took cognizance of the fact that “petitioners deal in a sensitive industry, in which public confidence in their drug products is especially important.” 387 U.S. at 153, 87 S.Ct. at 1518. For that reason, ripeness was found, since it was unlikely that any drug company would risk the public reaction from being the test case. Similarly, few candidates could be expected to flout even the quasi-regulations of the FEC, lest they leave themselves open to attack from their challengers. See also National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 279-80, 283 , 443 F.2d 689, 694-95, 698 (1971) (involving an interpretative letter as to the potential applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the petitioner’s industry; ripeness and standing both adequate).

. Footnote 6 of the majority opinion resorts to an incorrect comparison of Sibbach, supra, and the instant case, and ignores their complete dissimilarity. This case has a lay-over and a one-house veto. There is nothing wrong with a lay-over provision, be it 30 days or six months. This can allow Congress to act in a constitutional manner through both houses and the President and that is permissible. But the one-house veto is not a “difference ... of degree” — it is a completely different method of accomplishing a legislative result by a congressional procedure not authorized by the Constitution; i. e., by one house instead of by two houses and the President.
That the unconstitutional procedure (the one-house veto, not the lay-over) may also influence legislation is not to be equated with the influence or action that Congress may exercise or resort to during a simple lay-over provision. There may be a difference only in degree between the influence of a 30 day lay-over and a six months lay-over, but there is a radical difference in kind between the influence of a one-house veto and any simple lay-over provision. The former is invalid, the latter is valid, for the reasons herein outlined.

. Nevertheless, harm has resulted from not having those regulations which the unconstitutional scheme prevented from becoming effective, see note 2 supra.

. Judge Leventhal’s concurring opinion contends (182 U.S.App.D.C. at-n.1, 559 F.2d at 658 n.1) that if the Commission has greater independence from Congress then Congress is less likely to exercise its veto power. However, it is more likely that if the Commission is *683a fully independent agency its regulations will be less responsive solely to the interests of Congressmen and hence will call for greater exercise of the one-house veto and the influence it breeds.

. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
U.S.Const. art. I, § 1.

. 2. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a law, in a like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. 3. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.
U.S.Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.

. Judge Leventhal’s concurring opinion at n. 13 relies on its conclusion that the Congress and the Commission, as its agent, are exercising “legislative power.” The trouble with this construction is that while Congress may have agents to inform it of facts so as to better exercise its legislative power (as does the office of the Comptroller General), it may not directly share with an agent the exercise of the legislative power conferred solely on Congress by the Constitution. It is thus impermissible for Congress in effect to confer the status of a congressional enactment upon any agency regulation which both.houses approve either by an affirmative vote to that effect, or by a majority vote of both houses that refuses to veto the “rule of law” in any regulation. When Congress so acts it effectively confers the status of a “bill” on the proposed regulations, and constitutes them “rules of law” without subjecting them to the legislative procedures required before a “bill” may become a “rule of law.” The Commission in so proposing regulations exercises greater power than any Senator or Representative. Their bills must be passed by both houses, approved by the President, etc.
In National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341-342, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974), the Supreme Court held that if what the statute attempted was in effect a delegation of the legislative taxing power in the guise of setting fees for regulated companies, even though the statute contained “standards,” serious constitutional problems would be raised.
Under the legislative scheme here and established congressional procedures, “the concurrence of the [votes of the] Senate and House of Representatives [to any regulation] [is] necessary . . . ” in some form before any regulation may become effective, and therefore the statute violates art. I, section 7, clause 3 (see note 7) because it provides for regulations that have passed such procedure to become effective as “rules of law” without being “presented to the President of the United States [etc.].”

. Proposed FEC Reg. § 110.12, 41 Fed.Reg. 35952 (Aug. 25, 1976).

. Proposed FEC Reg. § 114.9(b), 41 Fed.Reg. 35961 (Aug. 25, 1976).

. Proposed FEC Reg. § 114.9(e), 41 Fed.Reg. 35962 (Aug. 25, 1976).

. Proposed FEC Reg. § 104.3, 41 Fed.Reg. 35942 (Aug. 25, 1976).

. 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (Supp. V, 1975).

. The veto provisions of the Act are contained in 2 U.S.C. § 438(c), as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 486:
(c) Proposed rules or regulations; statement, transmittal to Congress; Presidential elections and Congressional elections; “legislative days” defined
(1) The Commission, before prescribing any rule or regulation under this section, shall transmit a statement with respect to such rule or regulation to the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. Such statement shall set forth the proposed rule or regulation and shall contain a detailed explanation and justification of such rule or regulation.
(2) If the appropriate body of the Congress which receives a statement from the Commission under this subsection does not, through appropriate action, disapprove the proposed rule or regulation set forth in such statement no later than 30 legislative days after receipt of such statement, then the Commission may prescribe such rule or regulation. In the case of any rule or regulation proposed to deal with reports or statements required to be filed under this subchapter by a candidate for the office of President of the United States, and by political committees supporting such a candidate both the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have the power to disapprove such proposed rule or regulation. Whenever a committee of the House of Representatives reports any resolution relating to any such rule or regulation, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. The motion is highly privileged and is not debatable. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not .in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
The Commission may not prescribe any rule or regulation which is disapproved under this paragraph.
(3) If the Commission proposes to prescribe any rule or regulation dealing with reports or statements required to be filed under this subchapter by a candidate for the office of Senator, and by political committees supporting such candidate, it shall transmit such statement to the Senate. If the Commission proposes to prescribe any rule or regulation dealing with reports or statements required to be filed under this subchapter by a candidate for the office of Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, and by political committees supporting such candidate, it shall transmit such statement to the House of Representatives. If the Commission proposes to prescribe any rule or regulation dealing with reports or statements required to be filed under this subchapter by a candidate for the office of President of the United States, and by political committees supporting such candidate it shall transmit such statement to the House of Representatives and the Senate.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “legislative days” does not include, with respect to statements transmitted to the Senate, any calendar day on which the Senate is not in session, and with respect to statements transmitted to the House of Representatives, any calendar day on which the House of Representatives is not in session, and with respect to statements transmitted to both such bodies, any calendar day on which both Houses of the Congress are not in session.
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘rule or regulation’ means a provision or series of interrelated provisions stating a single separable rule of law.
(Emphasis added.)

. It must also be emphasized that the President is not the only party with an interest in the veto power. As explained above, 182 U.S. App.D.C. at---, 559 F.2d at 644-645, a presidential veto also greatly enhances the power of individual Congressmen. With a bare quorum voting it is within the power of a third of the members of each house (17 Senators and 73 Representatives) to uphold a presidential veto. If rejection of Commission regulations were to be accomplished by legislation, those few Congressmen, in either house, could prevent that rejection with the President’s approval. But under the one-house veto scheme, it would minimally require a majority of a quorum (26 Senators and 109 Representatives) to prevent the rejection, even if the President were in agreement with them. The vices of the one-house veto scheme are as subtle as they are numerous.

. Before Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), invalidated the former Federal Election Commission, there were two instances in which the one-house veto power was exercised. The congressional history of these two actions displays the full panoply of the law-making process, including committee reports, procedural motions, and final votes.
On August 1, 1975, the Chairman of the Federal Election Committee transmitted to the Speaker of the House proposed regulations to govern the location at which candidates would be obliged to file campaign reports and other documents to the Commission. 121 Cong.Rec. H8185 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975). The Speaker referred the proposal to the Committee on House Administration. On October 8, 1975, Congressman Wayne Hays submitted House Resolution 780 to veto those regulations. 121 Cong.Rec. H9889 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1975). The Committee reported the next day, favoring approval of H.Res.780, in House Report No. 94-552. 121 Cong.Rec. H10035 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975). The Report was referred to the House Calendar. On October 20, 1975, Congressman Hays moved to suspend the rules to bring up H.Res.780 at once. 121 Cong.Rec. H10065 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1975). The motion failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote. 121 Cong.Rec. H10071 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1975). The next day, the motion to bring up the veto as a special order was made by Congressman Pepper. 121 Cong.Rec. H10181 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1975). That motion was agreed to the next day. 121 Cong.Rec. H10185 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975). Thereupon, Congressman Hays called the resolution up for debate, 121 Cong.Rec. H10187 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975), following which it was approved by the House, 121 Cong. Rec. H10198 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975); i. e., the proposed regulation was vetoed by the House.
The other exercise of the veto power was in the Senate. It concerned disclosure of contributions to, and accounting of expenditures from, office accounts of Senators and Representatives. The Federal Election Commission had transmitted a proposed regulation to the President of the Senate on August 1, 1975. 121 Cong.Rec. S14944 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975). On October 6, 1975, another regulation on this topic was received by the President of the Senate. 121 Cong.Rec. S17553 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1975). The journal of proceedings in the House recorded this communication on October 1, 1975, and characterized it as “a revised proposed regulation pertaining to accounts used to support the activities of federal office holders.” 121 Cong.Rec. H9439 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1975). The proposal was sent to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, which, after holding hearings, recommended Senate Resolution 275 to disapprove both the initial and the “new or revised” regulation. 121 Cong.Rec. S17553 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1975). S.Rep.No.409, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975). The.Committee Report was made by Senator Byrd, for Senator Cannon. On October 8, 1975, Senate Resolution 275 came up for debate. Senator Clark proposed to amend the resolution so as to approve the proposed regulations. 121 Cong.Rec. *688SI7876 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1975). The amendment was defeated by vote of 47 yea, 48 nay. Id. at SI7888. Thereupon, the resolution to veto was carried by voice vote. Id. at SI7889.
After all this, suppose that the final vote in each instance went the other way. Most realistically, suppose that Senator Clark’s amendment had one more vote in its favor and the regulations were approved, i. e., not vetoed. Could it then be said, as the concurring opinion states, that the entire proceedings were “non-action”? “Nonaction” is an incorrect description of what happens in the legislative process when Congress acts to approve regulations by not vetoing them. In each case, a single house of Congress determines whether a regulation would go into effect or not. A vote yes, just as a vote no, would follow significant congressional action. A vote yes, just as a vote no, would have a legislative result. The conduct of federal elections would be affected by either vote.
In the case of the Senate, the result is even clearer because of the submission of an original, followed by a revised, regulation. The Committee on Rules and Administration plainly considered itself as able to choose either, or neither, of the proposals. Had it recommended a veto of only one alternative, the other would have gone into effect and influenced conduct. (Actually, the Committee approved neither al- • ternative, but in a move lending further sup-' port to the earlier discussion in this opinion of one-house influence upon the FEC, the Committee concluded its report with a list of guidelines that the FEC should follow if it wanted its recommendations approved (certainly an affirmative act) in the future. S.Rep.No.409, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1975)).

. 424 U.S. at 285, 96 S.Ct. at 757 (concurring and dissenting opinion).

. See note 17 supra. Even in the rare case where Congress did nothing regarding a veto, unconstitutional influence upon a supposedly independent commission from the threat of action, as discussed earlier in this opinion, is still a realistic possibility.

. “[E]ven a miniscule stake [there, a pecuniary one] of the litigant may be sufficient if he provides a suitable and effective vehicle for vindication of larger values.” National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, supra note 3, 143 U.S.App.D.C. at 278, 443 F.2d at 693.

. In Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 90 S.Ct. 206, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969), a plaintiffs challenge to a signature requirement for nomination was ruled to be moot. The Court found that the particular plaintiff had not asked for any relief which would inure to the benefit of others, and had himself lost standing by the passing of the election. Four distinct routes were suggested whereby the plaintiff might have been able to sustain his standing:
Rather, in view of the limited nature of the relief being sought, we think the case is moot because the congressional election is over. [1] The appellant did not allege that he intended to run for office in any future election. [2] He did not attempt to maintain a class action on behalf of himself and other putative independent candidates, present or future. [3] He did not sue for himself and others similarly situated as independent voters, as he might have under Ohio law ... [4] He did not seek a declaratory judgment, although that avenue too was open to him.
396 U.S. at 43, 90 S.Ct. at 207 (numbers inserted).
In the instant case, plaintiff Clark does sue for declaratory relief. By its nature, a declaration of the statute’s invalidity will work to the benefit of all other candidates. Had Clark been interested in only his own relief, an injunction alone would have sufficed. In the area of election rights, the necessarily expansive nature of a suit for declaratory judgment (the fourth alternative in Brockington) has been held sufficient to give standing even after the particular *691plaintiff’s claim was moot. No requirement for a class action was imposed in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), where the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine prevented a dismissal for mootness. In Moore v. Ogilvie, the petitioners sought to be placed on the Illinois ballot as candidates for presidential electors in the 1968 election. They did not sue as a class. In deciding to review the electoral challenge despite the fact that the election had occurred before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court did not discuss the likelihood that the twenty-six individual candidates would again run for Presidential or Vice-Presidential elector. Rather, the Court stated:
But while the 1968 election is over, the burden . placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections, as long as Illinois maintains her present system as she has done since 1935. The problem is therefore “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310.
394 U.S. at 816, 89 S.Ct. at 1494.
While Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), was a class action, the Court did not stress that fact in finding standing. The appellant there complained of a residency requirement for voting; but by the time of the appeal to the Supreme Court, he had fulfilled the necessary conditions. The Court held:
At the time the opinion below was filed, the next election was to be held in November 1970, at which time Blumstein would have met the three-month part of Tennessee’s durational residency requirements. The District Court properly rejected the State’s position that the alleged invalidity of the three-month requirement had been rendered moot, and the State does not pursue any mootness argument here. Although appellee now can vote, the problem to voters posed by the Tennessee residence requirements is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Moore v. Ogilvie, [citation omitted], Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC [citation omitted],
405 U.S. at 333, n. 2, 92 S.Ct. at 998, n. 2.
In light of this history regarding election challenges, and the fact that the relief of declaratory judgment unavoidably extends its benefits to those situated similarly to the plaintiff even if not formally in a certified class with him, the applicability of Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) is questionable. It is rather unlikely that the language in Weinstein v. Bradford without saying so was intended to overrule the fourth of the standing alternatives offered in Brockington v. Rhodes.

. The majority would like an instance where an FEC regulation was “clearly trimmed” out of deference to some of the leaders of a single house of Congress. (Maj.op., 182 U.S.App. D.C. at-n.10, 559 F.2d at 650 n.10). Yet if the influence is as alleged, evidence that the Commission “clearly trimmed” a particular rule will never arise, or be as difficult to prove as a criminal charge of influence-selling. The logic of Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), is compelling here, that the harm complained of complicates review because of its transitory nature.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).

. Novel issues are not a novelty with this court and the time encompassed in disposing of this case in this court has allowed more than sufficient opportunity for reflection and development.

. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 129-131, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810); D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 223, 459 F.2d 1231, 1247 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1290, 31 L.Ed.2d 489 (1972); cf. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 231, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-225, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The present situation is a case in point. Why did one house of Congress not meet on the extra day or two necessary to permit the presently proposed regulations to become effective for the past national election?

. When objections to specific regulations arise they can be decided separately.