Court Opinion

ID: 9897267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:27.612146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.000874
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Oct 05 2023, 9:18 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Kelley J. Johnson                                          ANONYMOUS HOSPITAL,
Law Office of Kelley J. Johnson                            ANONYMOUS M.D., AND
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      ANONYMOUS EMERGENCY
                                                           PHYSICIANS, INC.
Zachary J. Stock                                           Robert J. Palmer
Zachary J. Stock, Attorney at Law, P.C.                    May Oberfell Lorber
Carmel, Indiana                                            Mishawaka, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
                                                           ANONYMOUS MEDICAL
                                                           FOUNDATION, INC.
                                                           Michael G. Getty
                                                           Hunt Suedhoff Kearney LLP
                                                           South Bend, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jasmine McNeil, individually                               October 5, 2023
and on behalf of Arth’dara
                                                           Court of Appeals Case No.
McNeil, Chyna Brown, and
                                                           22A-CC-2209
Imoni Brown, Minors,
Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                     Appeal from the
                                                           St. Joseph Superior Court
        v.
                                                           The Honorable
                                                           Mary Beth Bonaventura,
Anonymous Hospital,                                        Judge Pro Tempore
Anonymous M.D., Anonymous
Emergency Physicians, Inc.,                                Trial Court Cause No.
Anonymous Medical                                          71D07-2107-CC-2058

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023                              Page 1 of 34
      Foundation, Inc., and Amy L.
      Beard, in her capacity as Acting
      Commissioner of the
      Department of Insurance,
      Appellees-Defendants.

                                      Opinion by Senior Judge Najam
                                      Judges Bailey and Crone concur.

      Najam, Senior Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   Jasmine McNeil, individually and on behalf of her three children, submitted a

      proposed complaint to the Indiana Department of Insurance against

      Anonymous Hospital and other qualified health care providers (the
                                                                                   1
      “Hospital”). Appellants’ Conf. App. Vol. II, pp. 52-56. McNeil accuses the

      Hospital of medical malpractice based upon incorrect laboratory test results

      which led to a misdiagnosis and which caused an erroneous report of child

      abuse to be created. In her proposed complaint McNeil claims that the

      1
        McNeil notes that all parties named in the trial court are considered parties on appeal, see Ind. Appellate
      Rule 17(A), but states that “this appeal is taken against one party – the Hospital” and that she “is not taking
      issue with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the attending physician, the employer of the
      attending physician, or anyone else other than the Hospital.” Appellants’ Br. pp. 4, n.1; 10, n.8. Citations to
      the Appellees’ Brief will refer to the brief submitted by Anonymous Hospital.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023                                Page 2 of 34
      Hospital’s alleged malpractice was the proximate cause of the emotional

      distress and other damages she and her children have suffered as a result of an

      unsubstantiated child abuse investigation caused by the Hospital. Id. The

      gravamen of the complaint is that the Hospital laboratory produced negligent,

      inconclusive, and incorrect test results. McNeil requested that a Medical

      Review Panel be convened to conduct a thorough inquiry.

[2]   The Hospital sought an initial determination of law and asked the trial court to

      enter summary judgment against McNeil as to all claims raised in the proposed

      complaint. Id. at 20-21. The Hospital argued it enjoyed statutory immunity

      from McNeil’s claims under Indiana Code § 31-33-6-1(a) (2018), which

      generally grants qualified immunity to a person who makes or causes to be

      made a report of child abuse or neglect (the “reporting statute”). McNeil

      countered that under Indiana Code § 31-33-6-1(b) (2018), the immunity

      provided under the reporting statute does not apply to a qualified health care

      provider defending an action for medical malpractice. Appellants’ Br. p. 5.

[3]   The trial court granted the Hospital’s Motion for Preliminary Determination

      and Motion for Summary Judgment, and McNeil filed a motion to correct

      error, which the court summarily denied. McNeil now appeals.

[4]   We reverse and remand.

      Question Presented
[5]   This appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation. We are asked to

      determine the meaning, operation, and effect of Indiana Code Section 31-33-6-
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023     Page 3 of 34
      1(b) (“subsection (b)”), a provision which our legislature added to the child

      abuse or neglect reporting statute in 2018. The specific question presented is

      whether under the reporting statute, as amended by subsection (b), a qualified

      health care provider who has not acted with gross negligence or willful or

      wanton misconduct, retains immunity under Indiana Code Section 31-33-6-1(a)

      from a medical malpractice action for making or causing to be made a report of

      child abuse or neglect “even if the reported child abuse or neglect is classified by

      the department [of child services] as unsubstantiated.” Indiana Code § 31-33-6-

      1(a)(1)-(6). And a necessary corollary to this question is whether the holding in

      Anonymous Hospital v. A.K., 920 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) survived the

      2018 amendment of the statute.

      Standard of Review
[6]   The parties agree that for the purpose of this appeal, there are no genuine issues

      of material fact. As such, we are presented with a question of statutory

      interpretation, which is a question of law reserved for the court and is reviewed

      de novo. Vanderburgh Cnty Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cnty Democratic Cent.

      Comm., 833 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In this case, our review is de

      novo for the additional reason that this is an appeal from the grant of a

      summary judgment. See Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc., 24 N.E.3d 421, 423 (Ind.

      2015). And where, as here, evidence accompanies a motion for preliminary

      determination under Indiana Code Section 34-18-11-1 (1998), the motion is

      subject to the same standard of appellate review as a summary judgment

      motion. Haggerty v. Anonymous Party 1, 998 N.E.2d 286, 294 (Ind. Ct. App.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023         Page 4 of 34
      2013). Finally, when appellate courts review questions of law under a de novo

      standard, we owe no deference to a trial court’s legal conclusions. B P Amoco

      Corp. v. Szymanski, 808 N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the

      drafter by giving effect to the ordinary and plain meaning of the language

      used.” T.W. Thom Const., Inc. v. City of Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Ind.

      Ct. App. 1999). “Thus, we are not at liberty to construe a statute that is

      unambiguous.” Id. “[W]e must give an unambiguous statute its clear and plain

      meaning.” McCabe v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 949 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind.

      2011). “When a statute is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to engage in statutory

      construction in an effort to determine and give effect to legislative intent.” Id.

      And under Indiana Code Section 1-1-4-1(1) (1991), “Words and phrases shall

      be taken in their plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.”

[8]   This is our first occasion to consider the child abuse or neglect reporting statute,

      Indiana Code Section 31-33-6-1, since it was amended in 2018 by the addition

      of subsection (b). The statute as amended in 2018 reads as follows:

              (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and section 2 of this
              chapter, a person, other than a person accused of child abuse or
              neglect, who:
              (1) makes or causes to be made a report of a child who may be a
              victim of child abuse or neglect;
              (2) is a health care provider and detains a child for purposes of
              causing photographs, x-rays, or a medical examination to be

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023         Page 5 of 34
              made under IC 31-33-10;
              (3) makes any other report of a child who may be a victim of
              child abuse or neglect;
              (4) participates in or assists with an investigation by the
              department or a law enforcement agency resulting from a report
              that a child may be a victim of child abuse or neglect, including
              by transferring photographs, x-rays, or medical examination
              records completed under subdivision (2);
              (5) is a health care provider and provides professional
              intervention resulting from a report that a child may be a victim
              of child abuse or neglect, including:
              (A) providing care or treatment to the child;
              (B) participating in a case review concerning the child;
              (C) providing advice or consultation concerning the child;
              (D) disclosing medical records and other health information
              concerning the child, in accordance with federal or state law
              governing the disclosure of medical records;
              (E) providing information to a child fatality review team; or
              (F) recommending judicial action concerning a child; or
              (6) participates, including testifying as a witness, in any judicial
              proceeding or other proceeding:
              (A) resulting from a report that a child may be a victim of child
              abuse or neglect; or
              (B) relating to the subject matter of the report;
              is immune from any civil or criminal liability that might
              otherwise be imposed because of such actions, even if the
              reported child abuse or neglect is classified by the department as
              unsubstantiated.

              (b) Subsection (a) does not apply to an action brought against a
              qualified health care provider for medical malpractice under IC
              34-18-8.

[9]   McNeil contends that subsection (b) is unambiguous. She notes that it is only

      when a statute is ambiguous that a court resorts to construction or

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023            Page 6 of 34
       interpretation, and that a statute is not ambiguous unless its words and phrases

       when taken in their plain, or ordinary and usual, sense are susceptible to more

       than one reasonable interpretation. Appellants’ Br. p. 12; see Indiana Code

       Section §1-1-4-1(1); see also Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. 2016)

       (“Under well-established principles of statutory interpretation, a statute is

       ambiguous when it allows more than one reasonable interpretation.”). McNeil

       argues that “it is difficult to see how anyone can find ambiguity in § 31-33-6-

       1(b)” or “be misled by the words ‘does not apply.’” Appellants’ Br. p. 13.

       Thus, she concludes, “The [reporting] immunity defense simply ‘does not

       apply’ to a malpractice lawsuit” and that to find ambiguity in the statute would

       require that we read words into the statute that are not there. Id.

[10]   Thus, McNeil contends that the reporting statute, as amended, does not bar a

       medical malpractice claim where the examination, tests, or diagnosis

       underlying the report support such a claim. Stated another way, McNeil

       contends that while Indiana Code § 33-31-6-1(a) grants broad immunity for

       reporting child abuse or neglect and for acts in furtherance of child abuse

       investigations, § 33-31-6-1(b) makes clear that this broad immunity does not

       include acts of medical malpractice. In addition, McNeil contends that an

       action for malpractice leading to a report seeks civil liability for the malpractice,

       not liability for an erroneous report and, thus, that, “[T]his appeal does not take

       issue with the report of suspected child abuse in and of itself.” Appellants’ Br.

       p. 10, n. 8.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 7 of 34
[11]   The Hospital counters that “The legislature’s amendment to Ind. Code 3-33-6-1

       creates an ambiguity in the statute because it emasculates the legislative intent

       expressed in the same statute and by this Court.” Appellees’ Br. p. 5. The

       Hospital emphasizes that the legislature is presumed to have intended its

       language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the underlying goals

       and policy of the statute. Id. at 5-6. And the Hospital contends that McNeil’s

       argument would create the “illogical situation” of first providing broad

       immunity in one subsection of the statute [subsection (a)], including immunity

       for a negligent misdiagnosis leading to an unsubstantiated report of abuse or

       neglect, and then removing that same immunity through another subsection of

       the statute [subsection (b)]. Id. at 6.

[12]   The Hospital asserts categorically that “The only logical construction of the

       Indiana reporting statute is to give a healthcare provider immunity from any

       acts leading to the creation of a report, including a negligent misdiagnosis,

       unless those acts were grossly negligent or willful and wanton.” Id. at 18.

       Stated another way, according to the Hospital, the Indiana immunity statute

       “provides complete immunity for reporting but does not provide immunity or

       change the method for claims regarding the doctor’s treatment of abuse victims

       unrelated to the reporting.” Appellants’ Br. p. 5; Appellants’ App. Conf. Vol.

       III, p. 196 (Hospital’s reply in support of motion for summary judgment). This

       argument rests upon the Hospital’s premise that “the addition of subsection (b)

       creates an ambiguity in the statute.” Appellees’ Br. p. 11.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 8 of 34
       The Plain Meaning Rule
[13]   “If the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial

       interpretation and must be held to mean what it plainly says.” In re Estate of

       Bricker, 212 N.E.3d 712, 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). And “we may not add new

       words to a statute which are not the expressed intent of the legislature.” Ramey

       v. Ping, 190 N.E.3d 392, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “However,

       when the language is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, we

       must construe the statute to determine the apparent legislative intent.” Avco

       Fin. Servs. of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Metro Holding Co., 563 N.E.2d 1323, 1328 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1990). “Statutory provisions cannot be read standing alone; instead,

       they must be construed in light of the entire act of which they are a part.”

       Deaton v. City of Greenwood, 582 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). “When

       construing a statute, we will presume the legislature intended the language of

       the statute to be applied in a logical manner, consistent with its underlying goals

       and policy.” Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans.

       denied.

[14]   Thus, the parties dispute whether the plain meaning rule controls or whether

       the statute, as amended by the addition of subsection (b), is ambiguous and

       requires interpretation or construction. Resolution of that question is essential,

       but not the only consideration in determining whether a qualified health care

       provider is immune from a medical malpractice claim under subsection (a)

       where negligence is alleged to have occurred in the examination, testing, or

       diagnosis leading to the creation of a report of child abuse or neglect.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023         Page 9 of 34
       Subsections (a) and (b) Can be Harmonized

[15]   Both subsection (a) and subsection (b) concern the scope of immunity under the

       statute. Subsection (a) grants broad immunity in child abuse or neglect

       reporting, while subsection (b) declares an exception to that grant of immunity.

       These subsections complement one another. One subsection is simply an

       exception to the other subsection. Our Supreme Court has said that, “When

       two statutes on the same subject must be construed together, a court should

       attempt to give effect to both and must attempt to harmonize any

       inconsistencies or conflicts before applying any other rule of statutory

       construction.” Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1137 (Ind. 2014).

       “[P]aramount consideration must be given to the basic principle that two

       statutes that apply to the same subject matter must be construed harmoniously,

       if possible.” McCabe, 949 N.E.2d at 820. “This rule takes precedence over other

       rules of statutory construction.” Id. And this rule also applies where, as here,

       there are two subsections within the same statute covering the same subject.

       State v. Universal Outdoor, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 1188, 1189-91 (Ind. 2008)

       (harmonizing subsections (a) and (c) of Indiana Code section 32-24-1-11

       regarding timing of exceptions to appraisers’ report in eminent domain

       proceedings).

[16]   We conclude that subsection (a) and subsection (b) can easily be harmonized

       and reconciled. Clearly the legislature did not intend for the subsection (b)

       exception to swallow the subsection (a) rule as the Hospital alleges when it

       contends that the subsection (b) amendment “emasculates the legislative intent

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 10 of 34
       expressed in the same statute and by this Court.” Appellees’ Br. p. 5. Rather, it

       is apparent that the legislature determined that both reporting immunity under

       subsection (a) and an action for medical malpractice allowed under subsection

       (b) are mutually exclusive and can co-exist within the same statute.

[17]   As our Supreme Court has explained, “If the two statutes can be read in

       harmony with one another, we presume that the Legislature intended for them

       both to have effect.” Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2009) (internal

       quotations omitted). “Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in

       pari materia [on the same subject] and should be construed together so as to

       produce a harmonious statutory scheme.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

       We conclude that subsection (a) and subsection (b) are not irreconcilable and

       can be harmonized.

[18]   Subsection (b) declares that “Subsection (a) does not apply to an action brought

       against a qualified health care provider for medical malpractice” and, as such,

       carves out an unqualified exception to the immunity provisions of subsection

       (a). In its operation and effect, subsection (b) simply means that the qualified

       immunity provided under the reporting statute does not preclude an otherwise

       cognizable medical malpractice claim arising out of the same facts, evidence,

       and circumstances. Notwithstanding the qualified immunity provided under

       the reporting statute, under subsection (b) both a qualified healthcare provider’s

       contribution to a report of child abuse or neglect and the care and treatment of

       an alleged child victim unrelated to the reporting are subject to the applicable

       standard of medical care.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023      Page 11 of 34
[19]   Under subsection (a) of the reporting statute a person who makes or causes to

       be made a report of suspected child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or

       criminal liability, provided that the person has not acted with gross negligence

       or willful or wanton misconduct. See Ind. Code §31-33-6-2 (2018). But under

       subsection (b), on a proper set of facts, a qualified health care provider who

       makes such a report or causes such a report to be made can be liable for medical

       negligence.

[20]   That is the plain meaning of subsection (b). Thus, we hold that the qualified

       immunity provided under subsection (a) does not preclude a cause of action for

       medical malpractice as provided under subsection (b) arising from the same

       facts. In other words, where medical negligence causes or contributes to an

       otherwise lawful report of suspected child abuse or neglect, the reporting statute

       does not preclude a medical malpractice claim arising from the same facts,

       evidence, and circumstances leading to the report. Subsection (a) and

       subsection (b) can be harmonized and, thus, the reporting statute and the

       Medical Malpractice Act are mutually exclusive. “Recognizing that a valid

       interpretation exists so as to reconcile and harmonize both provisions in the

       present case, we will – and must – give effect to both provisions.” Rodriguez v.

       State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 796 (Ind. 2019).

       Anonymous Hospital v. A.K.

[21]   The next question is whether the subsection (b) amendment to the reporting

       statute abrogates our opinion and compels us to depart from our holding in

       Anonymous Hospital v. A.K., a case of first impression that was well-reasoned and
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023     Page 12 of 34
       correctly decided before the 2018 amendments to the child abuse or neglect

       reporting statute. In the instant case we must determine whether the 2018

       subsection (b) amendment affects our holding in Anonymous Hospital that the

       immunity provided “pursuant to Ind. Code §31-33-6-1 includes immunity not

       only for the report to authorities of the suspected abuse . . . but also for the

       underlying examination, tests, and diagnosis that triggered such report.” 920

       N.E.2d at 710.

[22]   In Anonymous Hospital v. A.K, parents brought a medical malpractice action

       alleging that the hospital had failed to confirm the accuracy of laboratory test

       results, which caused the hospital to make an erroneous report of possible child

       abuse or neglect and nullified the hospital’s statutory immunity. In interpreting

       the language then contained in subsection (a), we rejected the medical

       malpractice claim. We reasoned that, “the examination, testing and diagnosis

       of the child are inextricably linked with the making of the report because

       without the examination, testing and diagnosis, there would be no report.” Id.

       at 708-09. And we held that under subsection (a), the hospital was afforded

       immunity from a medical malpractice action “for the good faith reporting of

       suspected child abuse, as required by statute, and . . . that such immunity

       extends to the underlying diagnosis. . . .” Id. at 711.

[23]   The Hospital now contends our opinion in that case is controlling and “should

       not be overruled.” Appellees’ Br. p. 6. In Anonymous Hospital v. A.K., we

       addressed the essential elements of a child abuse report as follows:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023       Page 13 of 34
               Upon review of the statute’s plain language, it is clear that the
               statute provides immunity for any individual making a report, as
               well as for any individual participating in any actions that cause
               the report to be made. The phrase “causes to be made” in the
               statute necessarily includes the examination, testing and
               diagnosis of the child by health care providers. The results of the
               initial examination and testing are what produce the diagnosis
               that then causes the report of suspected abuse to be made to the
               authorities. Thus, the examination, testing and diagnosis of the child
               are inextricably linked with the making of the report because without the
               examination, testing and diagnosis, there would be no report.

       920 N.E.2d 708-09 (emphasis added).

[24]   And we held that:

               the immunity provided to Hospital pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-
               33-6-1 includes immunity not only for the report to authorities of
               the suspected abuse of [the child] but also for the underlying
               examination, tests, and diagnosis that triggered such report. In so
               holding, we join the ranks of several courts across the country
               that have determined that statutory immunity applies not only to
               the report of suspected child abuse, but also to the underlying
               diagnosis.

       Id. at 710 (emphasis added).

[25]   In sum, we held that the precursors, which lead to the creation of a report, are

       not severable from the report itself and that both enjoy statutory reporting

       immunity.

[26]   Anonymous Hospital was decided in 2010, and our legislature added subsection

       (b) to the reporting statute in 2018. For that eight-year period, immunity under

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023            Page 14 of 34
       the reporting statute included immunity “not only for the report to authorities

       of suspected abuse . . . but also for the underlying examination, tests, and

       diagnosis” which predicated the report and which we concluded “are

       inextricably linked” to the report and without which “there would be no

       report.” Id. at 708, 710. “The legislature is presumed to have had in mind the

       history of the statute and the decisions of the courts upon the subject matter of

       the legislation being construed.” Sightes, 684 N.E.2d at 227; also see, Holmes v.

       Jones, 719 N.E.2d 843, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Ind. State Bd. of Health v.

       Journal Gazette Co., 608 N.E.2d 989, 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). This rule was

       followed by our Supreme Court as early as 1937 in Stith Petroleum Co. v. Dep’t. of

       Audit & Control of Indiana, 211 Ind. 400, 5 N.E.2d 517 (1937), in which the

       plaintiff challenged the State’s regulation of petroleum products. In that case,

       our Supreme Court said that, “[a]t the time of the enactment of [the challenged

       legislation], the Legislature is presumed to have had before it and to have had in

       mind the history and decisions of the courts upon that subject.” Id. at 519.

[27]   Thus, we must presume that when the legislature enacted subsection (b) it was

       aware of our opinion in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K. that statutory reporting

       immunity includes not only immunity for making or causing a report to be

       made but also for the precursors essential to the report – the underlying

       examination, testing, and diagnosis incorporated in the report and, as we said

       in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K., without which “there would be no report.” 920

       N.E.2d at 709. In other words, we must assume that the legislature enacted

       subsection (b) in contemplation of existing case law.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023      Page 15 of 34
[28]   Indiana does not recognize audio or video coverage of legislative activities as

       evidence of legislative intent. Ind. Code § 2-5-1.1-15 (2002). Nevertheless,

       before the trial court the Hospital argued that its interpretation was supported

       by legislative history, cited video recordings of three legislative hearings, and

       quoted an author of Senate Bill 431. Appellants’ Conf. App. III, pp. 196-198.

       Anticipating that the Hospital would repeat its legislative history argument on

       appeal (which it did not), McNeil states preemptively that our legislature has

       disapproved of such “legislative archeology” and that we are prohibited from

       considering audio or video coverage of legislative deliberations or statements

       made by individual legislators as evidence of legislative intent. Appellants’ Br.

       p. 12. We agree.

[29]   We also recognize that when voting on Senate Bill 431 some legislators may

       have believed and even expressed an opinion that the subsection (b) exception

       to statutory reporting immunity would not disturb the status quo and would

       apply only to an action for medical malpractice unrelated to the reporting. But our

       Supreme Court has said that, “[i]n interpreting statutes, we do not impute the

       opinions of one legislator, even a bill’s sponsor, to the entire legislature unless

       those views find statutory expression.” Utility Center, Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne,

       868 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Ind. 2007) (quoting A Woman’s Choice–East Side Women’s

       Clinic v. Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. 1996)). In Utility Center, the trial

       court, the Court of Appeals, and our Supreme Court all declined to consider the

       author’s intent as expressed in his affidavit, and the Supreme Court stated it

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 16 of 34
       was unable to conclude that the author’s intent [to restrict the eminent domain

       powers of a municipal utility] was enacted into law. Id.

[30]   While resort to legislative history is out of bounds, we can consider statutory

       history. See Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc., 9 N.E. 3d 1257 (Ind. 2014)

       (reciting the history of legislation concerning the fraudulent concealment

       doctrine). The statutory history of Senate Bill 431 tracks the bill and its

       iterations during the 2018 legislative session from its first reading through its

       enactment. See Indiana General Assembly Website,

       https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2018/bills/senate/431/details. This “paper

       trail” demonstrates that subsection (b) was not included in Senate Bill 431 when

       it was introduced and referred to the Senate Civil Law Committee and that the

       Committee did not vote on the Bill at the first meeting when it was considered.

       At the next meeting, after a Proposed Amendment (SB 431 #5) including

       subsection (b) was added to the bill, the Committee approved Senate Bill 431,

       as amended, and reported the bill favorably with a “Do Pass” recommendation
                                                                           2
       to the Senate, and the bill was ultimately enacted. This statutory history

       2
         The Digest of the amendment approved by the Civil Law Committee, the Synopsis of the bill as it passed
       through the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the Digest of the Bill as enacted state that the bill
       “Provides that the immunity provisions do not apply to actions brought against qualified healthcare providers
       for medical malpractice.” However, the Synopsis and Digests are not part of the bill any more than a West
       synopsis or headnotes are part of an appellate opinion, and we have not relied upon them in this opinion.
       We note that the House also adopted and the Senate concurred in a different amendment to Senate Bill 431
       (SB 431 #6) which is immaterial to our discussion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023                             Page 17 of 34
       indicates that the subsection (b) amendment to Senate Bill 431 was an overt and

       deliberate action taken by our legislature.

[31]   In a case of statutory construction remarkably similar on its facts, Dept. of Public

       Welfare of Allen Cnty v. Potthoff, 220 Ind. 574, 44 N.E.2d 494, 498 (1942), our

       Supreme Court invoked “the history of the statute” when it decided whether the

       legislature had intended for the statute to preserve or cancel existing old age

       assistance liens. In Potthoff, the statutory history disclosed that after a Senate

       committee had recommended amendments which would have preserved

       existing liens, the Senate rejected the amendments, and the bill was restored to

       the form in which it had passed the House and was enacted. Id. Our Supreme

       concluded that, “On the record both houses were charged with knowledge of

       the effect of the bill” which “indicated quite conclusively that the General

       Assembly had before it, considered and rejected” the proposed Senate

       amendments. Id. Here, in a mirror image, the amendments were not rejected

       but approved. The Senate Civil Law Committee recommended amendments to

       Senate Bill 431, including subsection (b), which were included in the final bill

       passed by both the Senate and the House. Here, just as in Potthoff, “both houses

       were charged with knowledge of the effect of the bill.” Id.

[32]   But that does not end our inquiry. The question remains whether the

       legislature intended to abrogate our opinion in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K. or

       intended for our opinion to remain intact notwithstanding the enactment of

       subsection (b). Our Supreme Court has provided a rule to be applied and guide

       us under these circumstances:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 18 of 34
               First, there is a presumption that when the legislature enacts a
               statute, it is aware of the common law and does not intend to
               make a change unless it expressly or unmistakably implies that the
               common law no longer controls.

       Daniels v. Fanduel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 394-95 (Ind. 2018) (emphasis added).

[33]   Here, we are asked to address a different statute, an amended statute that

       concerns the very question we decided in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K. where we

       held that the Medical Malpractice Act did not apply to a child abuse report or

       its precursors (examination, testing, and diagnosis) “inextricably linked” to it.

       920 N.E.2d at 709. But the current statute categorically states the opposite, that

       statutory child abuse or neglect reporting immunity under subsection (a) “does

       not apply” to an action brought against a qualified health care provider for

       medical malpractice. Indiana Code § 31-33-6-1(b).

[34]   The Hospital asks that we construe subsection (b) beyond its plain meaning to

       accommodate the Hospital’s theory that, as this Court concluded in Anonymous

       Hospital v. A.K., “the examination, testing and diagnosis of the [putative] child

       [victim] are inextricably linked with the making of the report because without

       the examination, testing and diagnosis, there would be no report.” 920 N.E.2d

       at 708-09. The theory advanced by the Hospital is that Anonymous Hospital v.

       A.K. survived the enactment of subsection (b) intact even though subsection (b)

       contains an unequivocal exception to subsection (a). To accept the Hospital’s

       theory would require that we entirely ignore the 2018 amendments, which

       added subsection (b). The Hospital’s theory finds no expression in the statute.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023          Page 19 of 34
       It is readily apparent that we would not give full force and effect to the plain

       meaning of subsection (b) if we were to engraft our holding in Anonymous

       Hospital v. A.K. onto the statute, as amended, which we cannot do. We must

       adhere to the plain logic and text of the statute which declares a specific

       contrary intent and which “unmistakably implies” that our holding in that case

       no longer controls. See Daniels, 109 N.E.3d at 395. Subsection (b) is an

       unambiguous, simple, declarative sentence which is not susceptible to more

       than one reasonable interpretation.

[35]   Thus, we hold that Senate Bill 431 abrogated our holding in Anonymous Hospital

       v. A.K. Under subsection (a) of the reporting statute, as amended, where the

       person creating the report has not acted with gross negligence or willful or

       wanton misconduct, the act of making or causing a report to be made is

       immunized. And under subsection (b) of the reporting statute, as amended, the

       same underlying facts may nevertheless support an action for medical

       malpractice, which is not immunized, and such an action would be an action

       for the underlying medical negligence, not an action for creation of the report.

       The Hospital’s Contentions
[36]   As we have noted, the Hospital contends that the subsection (b) amendment

       creates an ambiguity in the reporting statute. We have determined, however,

       that subsection (b) means what it says and requires no interpretation or

       construction, that there is no ambiguity in the text, grammar, or structure of

       subsection (b), whether standing alone or in relation to subsection (a), and that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023      Page 20 of 34
       subsection (b) abrogated our holding in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K.

       Nevertheless, we will address the Hospital’s arguments that subsection (b) is

       inconsistent with subsection (a) and that the addition of subsection (b) leads to

       various “illogical” and ambiguous outcomes.

[37]   The Hospital makes at least four distinct contentions: (1) “it would be illogical

       to construe subsection (b) to emasculate the legislative intent expressed in

       subsection (a);” (2) subsection (b) is inconsistent with subsection (a) because it

       applies only to qualified health care providers rather than to all health care

       providers; (3) courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes have held that

       their statutes provide absolute immunity for child abuse and neglect reporting

       but not for malpractice unrelated to the reporting; and (4) federal law requires

       absolute immunity for good faith reporting. Appellees’ Br. pp. 12-17. We will

       consider each contention in turn.

       First Contention: It Would be “Illogical” for Subsection (b) to Defeat the
       Legislative Intent Expressed in Subsection (a)

[38]   The Hospital first asserts that “it would be illogical to construe subsection (b) to

       emasculate the legislative intent expressed in subsection (a).” Id. at 12.

       Specifically, the Hospital continues, it would be illogical to provide broad

       immunity under subsection (a), “including immunity for a negligent

       misdiagnosis leading to an unsubstantiated report of child abuse or neglect,”

       and then to “remove that immunity” by the addition of subsection (b) of the

       same statute. Id. The Hospital notes correctly that the legislature is presumed

       to have intended its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023       Page 21 of 34
       the underlying goals and policy of a statute. See Sightes, 684 N.E.2d at 227.

       Thus, the Hospital reasons this presumption means that subsection (b) must

       apply only to medical malpractice claims unrelated to the reporting.

[39]   The Hospital contends that the subsection (b) exception to subsection (a) does

       not apply to acts leading up to the filing of a report of abuse or neglect, even if

       the report was caused by a misdiagnosis, and applies only to acts of medical

       malpractice occurring subsequent to the creation of the report or otherwise

       unrelated to the reporting. But the amended statute does not make that

       distinction, and there is nothing in the plain text of subsection (b) to support this

       theory. As we have already noted, ‘“[a] statute that is clear and unambiguous

       must be read to mean what it plainly expresses, and its plain and obvious

       meaning may not be enlarged or restricted.”’ IABR, Inc. v. Alcohol and Tobacco

       Comm’n, 945 N.E.2d 187, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Ind. Mun. Power

       Agency v. Town of Edinburgh, 769 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans.

       denied. And, again, we may not engraft new words into the statute at will. State

       ex rel. Monchecourt v. Vigo Circuit Court, 240 Ind. 168, 172, 162 N.E.2d 614, 616

       (1959).

[40]   We must assume that the legislature means what it says and that the legislature

       “chose the language it did for a reason.” State v. Prater, 922 N.E.2d 746, 750

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Subsection (a) begins with the words “except

       as provided in subsection (b), and subsection (b) begins with the words,

       “Subsection (a) does not apply.” Ind. Code § 31-33-6-1(a), (b). The

       relationship between subsection (a) and subsection (b) is unambiguous. These

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023       Page 22 of 34
       two subsections are reciprocal. Subsection (a) refers to subsection (b), and

       subsection (b) refers to subsection (a). And we may not substitute another

       meaning merely because the statute as written is alleged to yield unintended

       consequences.

[41]   The Hospital continues that if subsection (b) were construed to allow medical

       malpractice claims in connection with reports generated under subsection (a), it

       would defeat the legislative purpose of the reporting statute, which is to

       encourage effective child abuse or neglect reporting and even to err on the side

       of over reporting. C.S. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 668, 683 (Ind. 2014) (the statutory

       scheme is designed, if anything, to err on the side of over reporting suspected

       child abuse or neglect). Indeed, under subsection (a), which provides statutory

       reporting immunity, “the General Assembly has protected those who report

       and are mistaken. . . .” Id. However, support for this policy argument cannot

       be found within the plain text of subsection (b), which carves out an exception

       for medical malpractice in a simple declarative sentence.

[42]   We conclude that subsection (b) is not “illogical” simply because it removes

       medical malpractice claims from the scope of subsection (a). These two

       subsections are not incompatible and can co-exist. By its very terms, the

       immunity under subsection (a) is qualified by two exceptions. Under

       subsection (b) an action under the Medical Malpractice Act, Indiana Code

       Section 34-18-8, is permitted where the facts underlying the report, if

       established, would support a medical malpractice claim. Likewise, under

       Indiana Code Section 31-33-6-2 (“Section 2"), a civil action for damages is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023       Page 23 of 34
       permitted where the person making the report has acted with gross negligence
                                                   3
       or willful or wanton misconduct.

[43]   Subsection (b) is inconsistent with subsection (a) precisely because an exception

       is, by definition, inconsistent with the general rule that precedes it. The fact

       that subsection (b) deviates from the immunity provided under subsection (a)

       does not render the reporting statute illogical or ambiguous and subject to more

       than one reasonable interpretation. Subsection (b) means that the child abuse

       or neglect reporting statute and the Medical Malpractice Act are mutually

       exclusive and that the reporting statute does not preempt or preclude an

       otherwise valid medical malpractice claim. Qualified statutory immunity from

       civil liability attaches to a health care provider’s report of possible child abuse or

       neglect where the reporter has acted without gross negligence or willful or

       wanton misconduct, but under subsection (b), the immunity provisions for child

       abuse or neglect reporting under subsection (a) do not preclude an action under

       the Medical Malpractice Act. We conclude that the subsection (b) exception is

       not illogical and does not create an ambiguity in the reporting statute.

       3
        We note that when Senate Bill 431 added subsection (b) to the reporting statute, the Bill also amended
       Section 2, replacing the words “who has acted maliciously or in bad faith” with the words “who has acted
       with (1) gross negligence; or (2) willful or wanton misconduct.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023                           Page 24 of 34
       Second Contention: The Statute as Amended is Illogical Because Subsection
       (b) Applies Only to Qualified Health Care Providers

[44]   The Hospital maintains that the reporting statute provides immunity for all

       Indiana health care providers. Thus, the Hospital contends that subsection (b)

       is illogical and creates an ambiguity in the reporting statute because it applies

       only to “qualified health care providers” and refers only to an action for

       medical malpractice under Indiana Code Chapter 34-18-8 (1998), although not

       every health care provider is qualified or covered by Indiana Code Section 34-

       18-3-1 (1998). The Hospital asserts that this “creates a great divide between

       qualified health care providers and other healthcare providers when dealing

       with” the reporting statute. Appellants’ Conf. App. Vol. III, p. 195. And the

       Hospital notes correctly that the remedy of an aggrieved patient against a health

       care provider who is not qualified under the Act is an ordinary civil action.

       Thus, the Hospital observes that subsection (b) retains reporting immunity for

       health care providers who are not qualified under the Act but weakens

       immunity for qualified health care providers and that the legislature could not

       have intended such an illogical result, reasoning that “those with equal

       responsibilities should receive the same immunity protection.” Id.

[45]   The Hospital has identified an apparent disparity in the treatment of qualified

       health care providers and health care providers under the reporting statute, as

       amended, but this circumstance provides no support for the Hospital’s

       contention that such disparate treatment creates an ambiguity in the statute.

       Our determination that subsection (b) does not create an ambiguity in the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023      Page 25 of 34
       statute is unaffected by whether or not subsection (b) results in disparate

       treatment between qualified health care providers and other health care

       providers with respect to the immunity afforded under the statute. This is not

       an ambiguity. We cannot declare the statute is “illogical” and subject to more

       than one reasonable interpretation simply because the legislature could have

       written a different statute without making any such distinction. Even if we

       were to question this disparity, it would not be our prerogative to second guess

       a policy decision made by our legislature and disregard the statute as written.

       “[S]tatutory revision is beyond our authority.” Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund

       and Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Diego Morales, et al., No. 23S-CQ-108, slip op. at *11

       (Ind. September 25, 2023). Of course, if the legislature desires a different result,

       it may revisit and amend the statute.

       Third Contention: Other States Have Recognized Immunity for Acts Leading
       to the Making of a Report and Medical Malpractice

[46]   The Hospital urges that we adopt the approach taken by other states that “have

       mandatory reporting statutes similar to Indiana which provide immunity for

       acts leading to the making of a report while, at the same time providing no

       immunity for medical malpractice.” Appellees’ Br. p. 13. The Hospital

       maintains that we should resolve the alleged ambiguity in Indiana’s reporting

       statute by modeling our interpretation of the statute after opinions in other

       states, in particular Michigan and Tennessee, which “have drawn the line

       between acts related to the report itself,” which have immunity, and “acts

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 26 of 34
       related to treatment of the child causing direct injury,” which may be subject to

       a medical malpractice claim. Id. at 15.

[47]   While the statutes from other states cited by the Hospital may be similar to

       Indiana’s, they also differ on the dispositive issue, namely, the extent to which

       the relevant provisions differentiate between the immunity provided for

       mandatory child abuse or neglect reporting and liability for medical malpractice

       claims. The flaw in the Hospital’s argument is simply that there is a substantial

       and material difference between those statutes and Indiana’s statute. Most

       importantly, our legislature has already “drawn the line,” and it is not our

       prerogative to draw a different line.

       The Michigan and Tennessee Statutes

[48]   The Michigan reporting statute provides, in relevant part, that:

               A person acting in good faith who makes a report [of child abuse
               or neglect] or assists in any other requirement of this act shall be
               immune from civil or criminal liability which might otherwise be
               incurred thereby. A person making a report or assisting in any
               other requirement of this act shall be presumed to have acted in
               good faith. This immunity from civil or criminal liability extends only
               to acts done pursuant to this act and does not extend to a negligent act
               which causes personal injury or death or the malpractice of a physician
               which results in personal injury or death.

       Mich. Comp. Laws §722.625 (2022) (emphasis added).

[49]   In Awkerman v. Tri-County Orthopedic Group, P.C., 373 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Mich.

       Ct. App. 1985), the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the parents’ contention

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023           Page 27 of 34
       that Michigan’s child abuse reporting statute “does not preclude recovery of

       damages for filing an erroneous child abuse report if that filing was the result of

       the malpractice of the defendant.” The Court held that the Michigan statute

       “clearly and unambiguously provides immunity to persons who file a child

       abuse report in good faith.” Id. And the Court continued:

               the reports were filed due to an allegedly negligent diagnosis . . .
               Such an allegation cannot, as a matter of law, successfully avoid
               the immunity provided by the child abuse reporting statute.

       Id. And in also rejecting the parents’ claim for consequential damages, the court

       concluded that “the statute was not intended to apply to personal injuries

       resulting from the filing of an erroneous report, but rather to injuries which result

       directly from the malpractice.” Id.

[50]   The Michigan statute addressed in Awkerman contains an explicit dichotomy.

       First, the statute describes the immunity from liability included, that the

       immunity “extends only to acts done pursuant to this act,” and then describes

       the immunity excluded, “a negligent act which causes personal injury or death

       or to the malpractice of a physician which results in personal injury or death.”

       Mich. Comp. Laws §722.625. There is no such distinction, express or implied,

       in the Indiana statute. When read together, subsection (a) and subsection (b) of

       the Indiana reporting statute provide that the immunity granted under

       subsection (a) of the statute does not include claims which may be brought

       under the Medical Malpractice Act.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 28 of 34
[51]   The Hospital contends that we should apply the Michigan court’s reasoning to

       the Indiana statute given that in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K. we cited Awkerman

       with approval. See 920 N.E.2d at 710. But, here, we are presented with a

       different statute, which contains a medical malpractice exception and does not

       make the distinction clearly expressed in the Michigan statute.

[52]   The Hospital next relies upon Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt University Inc., 974 F.

       Supp. 1127 (M.D. Tenn. 1997), a federal court opinion applying the Tennessee

       reporting statute to an action for damages arising from reports of suspected

       child abuse. The Tennessee statute contains the following explicit exception to

       immunity for health care providers:

               Nothing in this subsection (a) [granting report of harm immunity
               to health care providers] shall be construed to confer any
               immunity upon a health care provider for a criminal or civil
               action arising out of the treatment of the child about whom the report of
               harm was made.

       Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-410(a)(4) (2010) (emphasis added). This provision is

       analogous but not equivalent to subsection (b) in Indiana’s reporting statute.

[53]   The Bryant-Bruce court first described in general terms the nature and extent of

       statutory reporting immunity under the Tennessee statute. Citing a Tennessee

       state court opinion, the federal court recited the general rule under the

       Tennessee statute that, “a physician receives protection from diagnosing,

       reporting, and testifying regarding suspected abuse,” but that “a physician is not

       immune for those actions unrelated to a physician’s duty to report child abuse.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023            Page 29 of 34
       1127 F. Supp. at 1141. The court then addressed the same dichotomy under

       Tennessee law which the Hospital contends applies in Indiana, the distinction

       between actions of health care providers “arising from the reporting of child

       abuse,” which are protected, and claims arising “under a theory of malpractice

       or negligence, rather than from reporting a medical condition based on

       suspected child abuse,” which may be actionable. Id. In other words, the court

       explained, immunity does not extend to “other improper actions taken beyond

       the reporting requirement,” and the Tennessee reporting statute provides

       immunity for physicians “only to the extent that their conduct arises from their

       duty to report suspicions of child abuse. . . .” Id.

[54]   The federal court granted the Vanderbilt Defendants’ motion for partial

       summary judgment “for the actions taken in compliance with Defendants’ duty

       to report suspicions of child abuse under [the Tennessee reporting statute] . . . .

       974 F. Supp. at 1148. And the court denied the Defendants’ motion “to the

       extent that Defendants’ actions were not taken pursuant to said legal duty or

       may have exceeded such duty. . . .” Id. The court then allowed the

       professional negligence count, the medical malpractice count of the plaintiffs’

       complaint, to go forward for trial on disputed facts.

[55]   Here, the Hospital argues that, notwithstanding the enactment of subsection (b),

       we should embrace the Bryant-Bruce analysis and continue to differentiate

       between statutory reporting immunity for the conduct of health care providers

       when creating the report and liability for conduct unrelated to the reporting.

       But by its terms the Tennessee health care provider exemption from reporting

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023       Page 30 of 34
       immunity applies only to “a criminal or civil action arising out of the treatment

       of the child about whom the report of harm was made.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-

       1-410(a)(4) (emphasis added). In contrast, the Indiana subsection (b) medical

       malpractice exemption from reporting immunity is not limited to “the treatment

       of the child.” Subsection (b) is unqualified. It does not differentiate between

       creation of the report or the care, treatment, or other professional health care

       services rendered to the putative child victim unrelated to the reporting.

[56]   Under subsection (b), there is no immunity for medical malpractice whether a

       qualified health care provider makes or causes a negligent report to be made, or

       renders care, treatment, or other professional services to the child. A qualified

       health care provider, who is subject to the Medical Malpractice Act, is subject

       to the same standard of care and potential liability as might otherwise be

       imposed upon them in another context, whether the claim is that the provider

       made or caused to be made a negligent report or that the provider was negligent

       when providing “professional intervention” under any of the categories
                                                                                         4
       enumerated under Indiana Code Section 31-33-6-1(a)(5).

       4
           Section 31-33-6-1(a)(5) was also added to Senate Bill 431 and reads as follows:
                (5) is a health care provider and provides professional intervention resulting from a report that a
                child may be a victim of child abuse or neglect, including:
                (A) providing care or treatment to the child;
                (B) participating in a case review concerning the child;
                (C) providing advice or consultation concerning the child;
                (D) disclosing medical records and other health information concerning the child, in accordance
                with federal or state law governing the disclosure of medical records;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023                                  Page 31 of 34
[57]   We conclude that the Michigan and Tennessee statutes differ significantly from

       the Indiana statute and are not helpful in understanding the Indiana statute.

       The Indiana statute, including subsections (a) and (b), does not make the

       distinctions which appear in the Michigan and Tennessee statutes. The

       immunity provided in the Indiana reporting statute was not intended to shield a

       qualified health care provider from an action for medical malpractice that

       would otherwise apply on the same facts in any other context.

[58]   Subsection (b) means that Indiana’s abuse or neglect reporting statute does not

       preempt the Medical Malpractice Act, and, again, in that respect, subsection (b)

       supersedes our opinion in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K. Subsection (b) simply

       means that there can be liability for medical negligence arising from creation of

       an abuse or neglect report as well as the subsequent “professional intervention

       resulting from a report,” including but not limited to “care or treatment to the

       child” who may be a victim of child abuse or neglect. See Indiana Code Section

       31-33-6-1(a)(5)(A)-(F).

       Fourth Contention: Federal Law Allows for Only One Reasonable Statutory
       Interpretation

[59]   Finally, the Hospital contends that immunity for all acts leading to the making

       of a child abuse or neglect report is necessary to comply with federal law under

       the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §5101-5106,

             (E) providing information to a child fatality review team; or
             (F) recommending judicial action concerning a child; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023     Page 32 of 34
       enacted in 1974. The Hospital cites a 1983 Alabama Supreme Court opinion,

       Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435 So.2d 1207, 1213 (Ala. 1983), which states that

       “Section 5103(b)(2) expressly provides that states must grant the required

       immunity for mandatory reporting and permissive reporting of known or

       suspected child abuse or neglect in order to qualify for assistance.” Appellees’

       Br. p. 17. However, 42 U.S.C. § 5103, cited in the 1983 Alabama Supreme

       Court opinion, was repealed in 1996. In addition, the Alabama case would not

       otherwise be on point given that the court cited the federal statute only to reject

       a state constitutional challenge to that state’s Child Abuse and Reporting Act.

[60]   The Hospital asserts that it is “illogical for the Indiana legislature to pass a

       mandatory reporting statute in order to qualify for federal financial assistance

       and then remove that immunity in a subsequent subsection of the same

       statute.” Appellees’ Br. p. 18. But subsection (b) does not “remove” the broad

       grant of statutory immunity under subsection (a). Rather, it creates an

       exception for medical malpractice, an exception which simply requires that

       when participating in child abuse or neglect reporting, a qualified health care

       provider must observe the same standard of care as they would otherwise

       observe.

[61]   Whether Indiana is in compliance with federal law is not a question presented

       in this appeal, and we decline to offer a gratuitous opinion on whether the

       Indiana statute complies with the current federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a

       (concerning federal grants to states for child abuse or neglect prevention and

       treatment programs). Even if, for the sake of argument, Indiana’s reporting

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 33 of 34
       statute were deemed not to comply with federal grant conditions, that

       determination would not alter the intent of the legislature as disclosed by the

       text of the statute. The Hospital confuses “legislative intent” with “legislative

       result.” See State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 1, 259 Ind. 647, 650,

       291 N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ind. 1973) (legislative intent and legislative result “are not

       always one and the same thing.”). The legislative intent and the statute’s

       meaning would remain intact notwithstanding any possible unforeseen or

       unintended side effects. See id. (“Once having determined such intent . . . . we

       are no more at liberty to adopt a construction that will not give effect to such

       intent . . . notwithstanding that . . . we perceive undesirable side effects

       apparently not envisioned at the time of passage.”).

       Conclusion
[62]   We conclude that subsection (b) represents a deliberate legislative policy

       determination that notwithstanding the reporting immunity provided under

       subsection (a), the standard of care for qualified healthcare providers under the

       Medical Malpractice Act applies to child abuse reporting. Thus, we reverse the

       trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the Hospital, direct the trial court to

       deny the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, and remand for further

       proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

[63]   Reversed and remanded.

       Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CC-2209 | October 5, 2023        Page 34 of 34