Court Opinion

ID: 9734746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:44:56.461452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:50.981076
License: Public Domain

*606Dissenting and Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell:
The majority have utterly failed to decide the two most important questions involved in these cases:
(1) Should there be a grand jury investigation; and
(2) Who should conduct it?
It is clear as the noonday sun in a cloudless summer sky:
(1) A grand jury investigation of all the alleged sale of legislation by members of City Council, and the alleged widespread graft, corruption and crime by important public officials in Philadelphia’s City Government, and by members of the Democratic City Committee, and others who allegedly conspired with them, is imperatively required to protect the public interest and in order to ferret out the crimes and the criminals.
(2) This grand jury investigation, which should have been commenced months ago, must not be impeded any longer by “stalling” tactics which are employed by those who are about to be investigated, or by dilatory court proceedings which deliberately or unintentionally seriously delay the investigation and allow guilty persons to cover their tracks and/or to escape punishment through the running of the statute of limitations. Such court proceedings necessarily jeopardize or deny Justice.
(3) The grand jury investigation must be conducted under the direction and supervision of able lawyers who are completely independent and impartial and have no close connections with any of the parties who are or may be involved.
(4) District Attorney Crumlish is disqualified from conducting any grand jury investigation into the aforesaid alleged widespread corruption and crime:
*607(a) because of his incapacity in this very important matter, or long and inexcusable failure to investigate the charges of the alleged criminal conduct of the “higher-ups” in the City Administration and of the Democratic party, as well as the alleged corruption in City Council — an unjustifiable failure which in spite of his denials is a matter of common knowledge in Philadelphia; and
(b) particularly because of his strenuous opposition for months to any such investigation, and Ms allegations of record that a grand jury investigation was — - until recently — •“entirely unnecessary”. Crumlish’s last minute conversion to the necessity for a grand jury investigation, provided he is the investigator (after the cases had been orally argued in this Court) cannot blot out his prior vigorous opposition or give any reliable assurance that he can and will conduct a speedy, thorough and impartial investigation of his friends and supporters in City Council and in the higher echelons of the Democratic party.
To permit District Attorney Crumlish to conduct such an investigation — which, we repeat, he has until a few weeks ago so strenuously opposed publicly and in the Courts as absolutely unnecessary — would not only be “improper”, but would make a mockery of the law and be a travesty on Justice: Cf. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397, 406; Commonwealth v. Havrilla, 38 Pa. Superior Ct. 292, 295; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Irvin, 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 387, 393, 168 A. 868.
The necessity for an immediate, impartial and speedy investigation of alleged sale of legislation, widespread graft and corruption, conspiracies and other crimes is not only a matter of public common knowledge in Philadelphia (of which the Courts can take judicial notice) but even more important it is a matter of Court records. The reasons for such a grand jury investigation are set forth at length in my dissent*608ing opinion in Hamilton Appeal, 407 Pa. 366, 382-412, and in Judge Alessandront’s opinion dated July 11, 1962, in which he ordered a special grand jury investigation, and in District Attorney Crumlish’s new petition praying for a grand jury investigation which he presented as recently as September Uj,* 1962, in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, September Term, 1962. In that petition requesting a grand jury investigation, Crumlish pertinently said:
“At the oral argument before the Supreme Court on September 12, 1962, the necessity for a Grand Jury investigation was not challenged.
“As a result of the Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on September 13, 1962, refusing to supersede the Order of Court of Common Pleas No. 6 enjoining the further payment of funds, the Special Grand Jury ceased its operations entirely.
“A Grand Jury investigation is necessary to restore public confidence in City government,** law enforcement and the Judicial system generally because of: “(A) The charges and counter-charges about corruption in city government;
“(B) The undermining of public confidence in law enforcement;
“(C) The undermining of public confidence in the ability of the Courts to arrive at judicial decisions without political considerations; . .
I would further specifically hold:
(1) The decree issued by Court of Common Pleas No. 6, in an opinion by Judge Gold — which voided the Orders of Judge Alessandroni without the joinder of indispensably necessary parties who had vital adverse interests, some of whom had petitioned and were re*609fused permission to intervene — was null and void, and its decree should he vacated!
(2) The Order of Judge Alessandroni as Quarter Sessions Judge, ordering a special grand jury investigation of the above mentioned widespread corruption and crime was never appealed from by anyone, and was valid.
(3) A grand jury investigation of all the alleged corruption and crime can be made (a) either by a special grand jury specially charged to investigate these alleged crimes or (b) by a regular grand jury specially charged to investigate these alleged crimes, even though such regular grand jury is specially convened prior to its monthly term or held over after its monthly term is ended.
(4) Under the exceptional circumstances which have developed in these cases, either the Attorney General of Pennsylvania or Court approved counsel can and should conduct these investigations.
(5) In the matter of the Appeal of D’Ortona et al. (members of City Council) I agree with the majority that City Council under its resolution could not investigate Griffin. City Council cannot select who may investigate it; it cannot displace, limit, restrict, remove or disqualify Griffin, or compel, directly or indirectly, Judge Alessandroni or any Quarter Sessions Judge to restrict, remove or disqualify Griffin. However, in my judgment, City Council has the right and power to criticize Griffin, subject to the laws of slander and libel, and has the right and power to investigate Griffin at a proper time and for a legitimate purpose. Such legitimate purpose would be a consideration of pending or prospective or amendatory legislation,* or future appropriations of money for payment of the costs and expenses of an investigating grand jury proceeding, *610even if the underlying motive was to delay or discredit the grand jury investigation.*
Perhaps I should add that I am certainly glad that the majority has strongly recommended what I have long and ardently urged, namely, that the seven separate Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County should he consolidated into one Common Pleas Court with one President Judge. This will obviously expedite litigation, promote Justice and, incidentally, eliminate many confusing situations of which the instant cases are a striking example. However, I believe that some of the majority’s criticism of the Common Pleas Judges is unwarranted.
The reasons for each of the aforesaid holdings will be hereinafter set forth in detail and the soundness thereof demonstrated.
Since a number of the principles enunciated by the majority Opinion in my judgment are squarely in the teeth of many decisions of this Court, as well as with approved Court procedures and with Justice, I deem it necessary to review at some length the pertinent facts and the pertinent principles of law which govern these cases and should govern all future grand jury investigations.**
*611Summary of Important Facts
It is important to note at the very beginning that no appeal was ever taken by anyone from Judge Alessandkoni’s Orders (except his Order with respect to City Council which was hereinbefore mentioned and which will be hereinafter more fully discussed). On the contrary, Judge Alessandronj’s Orders were declared null and void (as a result of a collateral attack thereon) by a decision of a Court of co-equal jurisdiction, namely, the Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia County, in an amicable taxpayer’s suit of which No. 6 Court had absolutely no jurisdiction because none of the indispensable parties (such as White, Griffin and others who had a direct, immediate and pecuniary interest) were joined as parties and even the memorialists were prohibited by Common Pleas Court No. 6 from intervening.
All of these cases and petitions involved or arose out of proposed grand jury proceedings and other proposed investigations of alleged widespread graft, conspiracy, corruption and crime in the high echelons of Philadelphia’s municipal government and in City Council and in the Democratic City Committee. They resulted from a barrage of petitions, counter-petitions, charges and counter-charges, as well as delaying and diversionary tactical procedures, many of which were so highly technical, or so obviously political and irrelevant, that they reflected no credit on the bar. Moreover, they undoubtedly, although unintentionally, caused confidence in the Courts as well as in the bar to be temporarily diminished, a result which everyone agrees was deplorable. Furthermore, the welter of legal suits, petitions, charges, counter-charges and the conflicting decisions by the Courts of Philadelphia County, produced tremendous confusion and near chaos in the Orderly Administration of Law and Justice. An aura of politics was generated which enveloped all the *612cases and successfully hid from public and sometimes from legal view the very important legal questions which were raised in and by the various petitions and suits. In order to dispel this political fog and to bring the important legal questions into proper focus, disentangled from irrelevant facts and arguments and from many highly technical points which, although not controlling, served to becloud the main issues, we shall recite the most important material facts in chronological order.
Early in 1961, Oily Controller Alexander Hemphill unearthed and made public a conspiracy and fraudulent conduct which resulted in a loss to the City of Philadelphia of nearly a million dollars. This was known as the “Frankford El” or Elevated railway scandal. The Philadelphia newspapers thereafter commenced or (continued and) intensified their investigations to attempt to discover whether there was widespread graft, corruption and crime in Philadelphia, and if so, to expose the corruption and those involved therein. As a result of their investigations, the newspapers of Philadelphia — all of which were independent, although supporters of the so-called Dilworth City Administration — proclaimed that there was widespread graft, payola, corruption and crime in the City Administration, especially among the higher echelon, and for many months constantly demanded a grand jury investigation. Finally, prominent residents, citizens, electors and taxpayers of Philadelphia, early in June, 1961, filed separate petitions or memorials* alleging *613widespread graft, corruption and crime in tlie City government and requesting that a special grand jury be convened to make a full and complete investigation of the aforesaid matters. They further averred that “District Attorney James C. Crumlish, Jr. has failed and refused to act despite adequate staff with which to do so,” and prayed “that the Court appoint for the purpose of conducting a special investigation an intelligent special prosecutor of high legal standing and ability and of fearless and forthright character.”
These petitions were presented to the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County which was then presided over by Judge Alexander, sitting in the Miscellaneous Division of that Court. We note that pursuant to an arrangement and agreement in effect between the 21 Judges of the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, each of whom is a member of the Quarter Sessions Court, several Common Pleas Judges are assigned each month to criminal business in the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County. One Judge supervises the regular monthly grand jury and likewise hears criminal cases in the Quarter Sessions Court in a Court or courtroom known as “Quarter Sessions No. 1.” Another Judge presides over the (so-called) “Miscellaneous Division” of the Quarter Sessions Court and hears miscellaneous petitions and matters, and also hears criminal cases (mostly bail cases). This Court is known as “Quarter Sessions No. 4.” Criminal trials are also simultaneously conducted in other courtrooms in Philadelphia by other Quarter Session Judges. This statement of the customary practice and procedure in Quarter Sessions Court in Philadelphia County is made for the benefit of Judges who are unfamiliar with the practices and procedures in that County, and to make absolutely clear that whether Judge Alessandroni, Judge Alexander or any particular Quarter Sessions Judge presided *614over and directed a grand jury investigation is— as all the Quarter Sessions Judges of Philadelphia agree — a matter solely for the internal management of the Quarter Session Judges themselves. We may add that any decision they might make in this internal management will be reversed by an appellate Court only for fraud.
The District Attorney of Philadelphia, James C. Crumlish, Jr., the then Mayor of Philadelphia, Richardson Dilworth, the President of City Council, James H. J. Tate, and six other city officials who were named as respondents in the aforesaid petitions, filed a written answer in which they denied virtually all the charges and vigorously opposed any grand jury investigation. The Mayor and the District Attorney, and the City Solicitor (as counsel for the Mayor and the District Attorney) also strenuously opposed any grand jury investigation in oral arguments before Judge Alexander — and urged the Court to dismiss the petitions on the ground that a grand jury investigation was entirely unnecessary. It is important to note, as will hereinafter more fully appear, (a) that Judge Alexander presided in the Miscellaneous Division of the Quarter Sessions Court, and (b) his right to decide said petitions after his term therein had expired was acquiesced in by the Judge who presided in Quarter Sessions No. 1 in June and in July, and (c) that none of the parties-respondents alleged, nor did Judge Alexander hold, that a special grand jury proceeding was unknown to the law or illegal.
Judge Alexander, after careful consideration of all petitions, answers and oral arguments, dismissed the memorialists’ petitions. An appeal from Judge Alexander’s decision was quashed by this Court (in a 4 to 2 decision) upon the ground that the memorialists had no legal standing or right to appeal: Hamilton Appeal, 407 Pa. 366, 180 A. 2d 7822. Justice Jones, one *615of the aforesaid four majority-Justices, filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority that the appellants lacked any legal standing to take an appeal, but was convinced that the prayer of the petition should have been granted by Judge Alexander. Justice Cohen, another one of the four majority-Justices, filed a concurring opinion in which he expressed the opinion that the memorialists had no standing as litigants to petition for a special grand jury in the lower Court or to take an appeal, and that Judge Alexander had no jurisdiction over the grand jury and that the appeal was moot and for this reason should be dismissed. I wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion which was joined in by Justice O’Brien, which vigorously asserted (1) that an investigation by a special grcmd jury was imperatively needed, and (2) that Judge Alexander’s decision and opinion were erroneous and were based upon a fundamental misconception of the applicable principles of law, and (3) that a grand jury investigation should have been ordered by Judge Alexander !
It is very important to note, as will hereinafter become strikingly apparent, that in the Hamilton case three of the Justices held that a- special grand jury investigation was imperatively needed, while no Justice asserted in that case — as the majority now do in this case — that a special grand jury was unknown to the law and could not be convened. We may further note that neither the City Solicitor nor any of the respondents contended at that time that a special grand jury was unknown to the law or illegal.
Thereafter another petition was filed by 13 petitioners or memorialists who were citizens, residents, taxpayers and electors of Philadelphia asking the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia to instruct a special grand jury to investigate alleged widespread graft, corruption, conspiracy and crime — by and among high City *616officials and Councilmen and persons occupying important positions in the Democratic City Committee including, inter alia, the alleged sale of legislation and particularly of zoning ordinances by members of the City Council of Philadelphia — in the light of the new facts and circumstances which were set forth in this new petition.* The petitioners further averred, inter alia, “that there has been a complete breakdown on the part of the District Attorney of Philadelphia, James C. Crumlish, Jr., in performing public duties and functions in this regard. The said James C. Crumlish, Jr., has in fact wilfully and deliberately failed and refused to vigorously investigate and prosecute the principal wrongdoers involved in this conspiracy between the City Council of Philadelphia and the Democratic City Committee.” The petitioners also prayed that special attorneys not connected with the present City or State Administration in any way should be assigned and appointed to conduct this special grand jury investigation. Crumlish filed an answer denying these charges.
In accordance with the custom in Philadelphia County, the petition was presented to the Judge presiding in the Miscellaneous Division of the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County. The Judge who was then presiding in the Miscellaneous Division of the Quarter Sessions Court was Judge Charles L. Guerin. Judge Guerin fixed April 27, 1962, as the time for a hearing on the petition. The hearing on this petition and on the answer thereto (which was filed by the City Solicitor on behalf of the District Attorney) was held on that date by Judge Alessandroni who succeeded Judge Guerin and in the month of April was the presiding Judge in the Miscellaneous Division of the Quarter Sessions Court.
Judge Alessandroni, after careful consideration, on July 11, 1962, filed an Order ordering the conven*617ing of a special grand jury on September 4, 1962, to investigate the aforesaid charges of widespread graft, corruption, conspiracy and crime, particularly with respect to City Council and members of the Democratic City Committee. Judge Adessandroni in his opinion, aptly said:
“. . . It cannot be argued that the incidents mentioned above are not serious in nature. There is reasonable ground to believe that the charges have merit and indicate the existence of impropriety at the very core of the government of the City of Philadelphia, the natural and probable effect of which is to undermine the confidence of the public generally. . . .
“We recite the brief summary merely to indicate that the charges of corruption are of a grave nature. The very existence of democratic government by the people is at stake. An indication of the gravity of the situation and perhaps the most serious reflection of all, was a statement by the publicity director of the Democratic City Committee that all questions concerning charges of fraud and ‘payola’ received by members of City Council would be referred to the City Committee; there they would be screened and if it were deemed desirable the committee would provide answers to the various news media. . . .
“Mere mention of the charges is sufficient indication of the gravity of same. If corruption exists it is not cured merely by a few arrests and prosecution [of several “small fry”]. There is ample reliable evidence to establish at least prima facie the sale of legislation. ITnreported contributions coincidental with the passage of legislation or the acceptance of proposed amendments is more than mere suspicion that a quid pro quo is involved.
“That this is a shocking betrayal of the public trust in the officials involved is beyond question. . . .
“When a serious malady afflicts the body politic, a remedy must exist. This is particularly so when for *618a number of vital reasons, at least to the opponents of the probe, the usual petitioner, the District Attorney is unwilling or unable to institute the proceeding. A good reason ewists in the instant case when there are reasonable grounds for the belief that elected public officials have been effectively muzzled by the political high command.
“Upon all of the facts alleged in the petition which give rise to reasonable ground to believe a serious and grave corruption has attacked and infested the government of the City of Philadelphia, we summarize as follows: (1) citizens can petition for the granting of a grand jury investigation; (2) the facts of the petition must be sufficient to support a reasonable belief that crimes have been committed, and we deem the facts to be sufficient; (3) the only pleadings or documents to be considered are the petition [and matters of public knowledge]. We accordingly dismiss the answer and motion to dismiss without further comment.
“We are completely aware of the gravity of the institution of an investigation and we do not reach the conclusion lightly. Our determination is that an investigation must proceed in order that the alleged corruption may be excised from the body politic to the end that the confidence of citizens of Philadelphia may be restored.”
Thereafter no opposition was made to Judge Alessandroni's Order by the District Attorney or by the Mayor or by City Councilmen or by anyone connected with the City Administration; nor was any writ of prohibition filed challenging a grand jury investigation, or any appeal ever taken therefrom by anyone.*
*619The next day, July 12th, City Solicitor Berger, on behalf of District Attorney Crumlish and of the City Administration of Philadelphia, publicly announced, and it appears as a matter of record in these cases that, despite their previous opposition to a grand jury investigation, (1) they would not further oppose the Order made by Judge Alessandroni, and (2) urged that the convening of the special grand jury be expedited and (3) that “a special counsel of eminence be appointed by the Court” to formally conduct the investigation. There has been and can be no denial of these facts.
Thereafter, on July 18, 1962, Judge Alessandroni appointed W. Wilson White,* Esq., as special prosecutor, and on July 25, 1962, P. Hastings Griffin, Jr.,* Esq., assistant prosecutor, with directions to conduct the special grand jury investigation in accordance with Judge Alessandroni’s previous Order and Opinion. Thereafter, Judge Alessandroni appeared before City Council and on August 18, 1962, with the assistance of City Solicitor Berger, obtained an appropriation from City Council of $112,000 to cover the estimated cost of the investigation for a period of approximately 6 months. The City Solicitor then collaborated with White in the renting of offices in the Widener Building and in the equipment thereof, and District Attorney Crumlish, in his turn, publicly offered to turn over to White, copies of whatever files White might request.**
*620We repeat: No appeal was ever taken by anyone at any time from the Orders or from any decision by Judge Alessandeoni, except Ms later Order temporarily restraining City Council from investigating Griffin.
TMs era of cooperation and orderly administration was ended on August 21st when Beatrice Smith, a taxpayer, filed a complaint in the nature of a taxpayer’s suit against the City’s fiscal officials who were responsible for the payment of city moneys, praying for an injunction restraining them from the payment of any money for the cost of the investigation ordered by Judge Alessandeoni.
Beatrice Smith’s complaint to enjoin the payment of taxpayers’ money was docketed in Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Philadelphia County, but because that Court was in summer recess the case was referred to Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia County, the so-called summer Court, which at that time was composed of Judges Gold, Kelley and Blanc. Since Common Pleas No. 5 and Common Pleas No. 6 were Courts co-equal in stature and jurisdiction, comity would have dictated the transfer of the Smith suit by Common Pleas No. 6 to Common Pleas No. 5, as without any doubt it constituted a collateral attack on the decision of Judge Alessandeoni, President Judge of No. 5 Court. If that had been done, all the present questions could have been settled on appeal to this Court by the losing parties in No. 5 Court, and all the confusion of conflicting decisions which temporarily impaired public confidence would have been avoided.
Neither the memorialists for a special grand jury investigation — which had been allowed by Judge At.essandboni and thereafter approved by the Mayor, the City Solicitor and the City Council of Philadelphia, as aforesaid — nor the prosecutors White and Griffin, and other members of the investigating staff, many of whom had given up permanent jobs in order to aid as *621a civic duty in a public investigation of alleged crime and corruption, and who were then owed salaries or wages by the City, were made parties to the suit. If Smith, who had an interest amounting to a few cents or at most a few dollars, was a proper party — as she was — certainly White et al., were proper and necessary parties. Furthermore, when the memorialists filed a petition to intervene, — after being invited by Judge Gold to do so — their petition was refused by No. 6 Court, with Judge Kelley wisely dissenting. We also note that Judge Gold wrote to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania asking him if he wished to intervene or take part in the case. The Attorney General, whose work for the Commonwealth is not only statewide, but tremendous, replied of record declining to intervene.
It is astonishing to note that in this case before No. 6 Court, the City Solicitor “reversed his field” and agreed with Smith, the complainant, that Judge AlesSANDronFs actions and Orders which he had theretofore approved, were illegal, null and void.* The net result was that there was no person, party or lawyer to oppose the taxpayer’s suit or to protect any of the parties who had a direct, immediate and pecuniary interest in the suit. Common Pleas Court No. 6, in an opinion by Judge Gold, thereupon entered an Order (1) enjoining the financial officers of Philadelphia from paying any of the money which Council had appropriated as aforesaid for the grand jury investigation and (2) declaring illegal, null and void each and every one of Judge AlessandronFs aforesaid Orders. Judge Gold filed the decision of Court of Common Pleas No. 6 on September 5, 1962, and since there was no adversary party to take an appeal, Berger, the City *622Solicitor, to bis credit, immediately took an appeal to this Court.
Tbe Orders and tbe Decree issued by Court of Common Pleas No. 6 per Judge Gold were absolutely null and void because of lack of indispensable parties. Neither tbe memorialists nor any indispensable parties were included as parties defendant, nor were tbe memorialists permitted to intervene in that Court. White, Griffin, and all tbe members of tbe investigating staff* bad a direct, immediate, substantial and pecuniary interest** in tbe Smith suit — Hartley v. Langkamp and Elder, 243 Pa. 550, 555-556, 90 A. 402; Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 95, 114 A. 2d 491; Fineman v. Cutler, 273 Pa. 189, 116 A. 819; see also: Keystone Raceway Corporation v. State Harness Racing Commission, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A. 2d 97; Ritter Finance Company, Inc. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A. 2d 246— and consequently were indispensable parties in tbe Smith suit in tbe Court of Common Pleas No. 6. Judge *623Alessandroni was also an indispensable party according to the petition of District Attorney Crumlish, because he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against Judge Alessandroni, and also against W. Wilson White.
In Hartley v. Langkamp and Elder, 243 Pa., supra, the Court said (pages 555-556) : “. . . A party is indispensable when he has such an interest that a final decree cannot be made without affecting it, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. That is to say his presence as a party is indispensable where his rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made between them without impairing such rights. . . . The rule as to indispensable parties is neither technical nor one of convenience; it goes absolutely to the jurisdiction, and without their presence the cou,rt can grant no relief. . . .’ ”
In Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa., supra, the Court said (pages 95-96) : “. . . In Fineman v. Cutler, 273 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 193) : ‘ “One must be joined who otherwise, not being bound by the decree, might assert a demand . . . which would be inequitable after the performance of a decree in favor of the plaintiff”; and, again “A party is indispensable when he has such an interest that a final decree cannot be made without affecting it or leaving the controversy in such a condition that the final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience”; . .
It is well settled law that No. 6 Court had no jurisdiction and its orders and decrees must be vacated for lack of indispensable parties: Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Adv. Co., 396 Pa. 320, 152 A. 2d 894; Powell v. Shepard, 381 Pa. 405, 412, 113 A. 2d 261; Dozor Agency v. Rosenberg, 403 Pa. 237, 240, 169 A. *6242d 771; Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 405 Pa. 613, 617, 177 A. 2d 94; Keystone Insurance Company v. Warehousing and Equipment Corporation, 402 Pa. 318, 165 A. 2d 608; Geesey v. City of York, 254 Pa. 397, 99 A. 27; Hartley v. Langkamp and Elder, 243 Pa., supra.
In Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Adv. Co., 396 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 326) : “Plaintiff’s failure to join these indispensable parties in the present suit leaves a Court of Equity without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for or any substantial relief Avhatever, and the appeal must be quashed.
“In Powell v. Shepard, 381 Pa. 405, 113 A. 2d 261, the Court said (page 412) : ‘The absence of indispensable parties “goes absolutely to the jurisdiction, and without their presence the court can grant no relief”: Hartley v. Langkamp and Elder, 243 Pa. 550, 556, 90 A. 402. . . . And, a party is indispensable where his rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made between them Avithout impairing such rights: . . .’
“In Hartley v. Langkamp and Elder, 243 Pa. 550, 90 A. 402, the Court said (page 556) : ‘It is a settled rule of equity jurisprudence that as the absence of an indispensable party goes to the jurisdiction of the court, an objection to the proceeding on that ground may be raised at any time, during the hearing or on an appeal from the decree of the trial court . .
The majority can not escape by any glossing over this question of indispensable parties and the dozen cases of the Court which answer it — adversely to the majority. How often does this Court have to establish and iterate and reiterate a principle of law before it becomes the established law of Pennsylvania?
It is clear, therefore, that the Orders and Decree of the Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia *625County are null and void, with the result that the Orders made by Judge Alessandroni as hereinabove mentioned, directing a special grand jury investigation, from which no appeal was ever taken by anyone, were in full force and effect and could not be challenged in the Smith suit. It follows that the only proper Order which this Court can make in the Smith suit is to vacate the Orders and the Decree made by the Court of Common Pleas No. 6.
However, the questions raised and involved in these cases are so important for the protection of the people of Philadelphia, and likewise for the clarification of all future grand jury investigations or proceedings, that I will assume arguendo that all indispensable parties had been joined.
It is contended that Court of Common Pleas No. 6 had neither the jurisdiction nor the power to consider the Smith complaint or to invalidate the Orders of Judge Alessandroni because the Smith bill in equity constituted a collateral attack upon the Orders and judgment of the Quarter Sessions Court made as aforesaid by Judge Alessandroni. The general rule is that where a Court of Quarter Sessions or any Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, an order or judgment which it makes is not subject to review in a collateral proceeding in a Court of Common Pleas or in any Court of coordinate jurisdiction: Northrup v. Pike Township, 242 Pa. 1, 88 A. 781; Moeller v. Washington County, 352 Pa. 640, 644, 44 A. 2d 252; Tenth National Bank v. Construction Co., 227 Pa. 354, 76 A. 67; Doyle v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 20 (where the Court said, “[If] one court can modify or set aside the judgment of another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction . . . the most deplorable consequences would likely ensue.”); Kennedy v. Baker, 159 Pa. 146, 28 A. 252; In re Cottesfeld, 245 Pa. 314, 91 A. 494; Dauberman v. Hain, 196 Pa. 435, 46 A. 442; Plains Township’s *626Appeal, 206 Pa. 556, 56 A. 60; Haines v. Hall, 209 Pa. 104, 58 A. 125; Randal v. Gould, 225 Pa. 42, 51, 73 A. 986.
While there is no doubt about the general rule, I believe there is and should be one or more exceptions thereto, and one of these exceptions is a taxpayer’s suit to restrain the payment of money* by a municipality provided, of course, that indispensable parties were joined or appeared therein. I would therefore hold that this general rule would not of itself oust the jurisdiction or invalidate the decree of Court of Common Pleas No. 6.
Many decisions of this Court hold that the right to office of de jure and de facto officers cannot be tested or invalidated by injunction or mandamus or by any action except an action of quo warranto: Pleasant Hills Borough v. Jefferson Township, 359 Pa. 509, 59 A. 2d 697; Brinton v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62, 181 A. 569; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429, 434, 175 A. 389; Williams’s Appeal, 312 Pa. 477, 167 A. 587; Commonwealth ex rel. Palermo v. Pittsburgh, 339 Pa. 173, 178, 13 A. 2d 24; Commonwealth v. Snyder, 294 Pa. 555, 559, 144 A. 748; Commonwealth v. Blume, 307 Pa. 406, 413-14, 161 A. 551. See also to the same effect: Spencer v. Snedeker, 361 Pa. 234, 64 A. 2d 771. In Pleasant Hills Borough v. Jefferson Township, 359 Pa., supra, Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Steen said (pages 512-513) :
“... A person in possession of an office and discharging its duties under the color of authority, — that is, authority derived from an election or appointment however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer, — is a de facto officer, and his acts are good so far as respects the public; attacks up*627on the right of such incumbent to serve must be instituted by the Commonwealth in a direct proceeding for that purpose and cannot be made collaterally: King v. Philadelphia Co., 154 Pa. 160, 168, 169, 26 A. 308, 309, 310; Krickbaum’s Contested Election, 221 Pa. 521, 526, 527, 70 A. 852, 854; Commonwealth ex rel. Raker v. Snyder, 294 Pa. 555, 559, 144 A. 748, 749; Commonwealth ex rel. Palermo v. Pittsburgh, 339 Pa. 173, 177, 178, 13 A. 2d 24, 26; Commonwealth ex rel. McCreary v. Major, 343 Pa. 355, 364, 22 A. 2d 686, 690, 691; Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 107, 112, 113, 14 A. 2d 907, 910.”
It would appear that White and Griffin are de facto officers and come within the foregoing authorities. However, I make no decision on this point because I prefer, in view of the very important public questions involved, to place my decision on broader grounds.
I therefore turn next to a consideration of Judge Alessandront’s Orders which Court of Common Pleas No. 6 enjoined and decreed to be null and void. Philadelphia County, unlike any other County in the State, convenes a (so-called regular) Grand Jury every month. Other Counties have a regular Grand Jury convene three or four times a year, and the term of service of these jurors usually extends for a period of three or four months. Those who are unfamiliar with the practices and procedures in Philadelphia County which are necessitated by the tremendous number of crimes which occur monthly, fail to realize (a) the functions and the enormous amount of work performed by a regular monthly grand jury in Philadelphia County; and (b) the necessary assignment of several Judges to dispose of this enormous volume of criminal cases and miscellaneous criminal matters which must, whenever reasonably possible, be tried or heard each month. There is no such problem and there are no such divisions of the Quarter Sessions Courts in any other County in the *628State, and no unbiased person who is conversant with practices and procedures in Philadelphia County would question Judge Alessandroni’s hearing and right to determine the memorialists’ petition which was presented to the Miscellaneous Division of the Quarter Sessions Court over which he presided in April, 1962. This was, we repeat, a matter of internal management of the Quarter Sessions Court by the 21 Quarter Sessions Judges of Philadelphia County. As Judge Gold, speaking for the Court of Common Pleas No. 6, so aptly said “After careful consideration [of the fact that Judge Alessandroni did not preside by “designation” in the Court of Quarter Sessions during the months of May, June, July or August and had not been “designated” to preside as a Judge in said Court during the month of September] we conclude that he had such right [to consider and determine the petition of the memorialists], although . . . for the reasons stated in this opinion, that there is no authority in law which supports the orders [for a special grand jury investigation or for the appointment of special prosecutors] which the Court made.
“The fact that Judge Alessandroni had not been designated to sit in any of the several Quarter Sessions Courts subsequent to April, 1962 did not prevent him, after hearing on the petition, to defer his adjudication until later, when [after careful and necessary study of the very many important legal questions involved] he had come to a decision [on the issues raised].
“Motions and petitions, deferred adjudications and sentences, which have been before a judge sitting as a designated judge in a Court of Quarter Sessions may be and are disposed of later when he is no longer sitting as a designated judge. [The volume of trials, arguments and miscellaneous matters in Philadelphia County make this absolutely necessary in the orderly *629administration of law and Justice]. He is still a judge of Quarter Sessions.
“In re Kensington v. Oxford Turnpike Road Company, 12 Phila. 611, at 617, it is said: ‘That the cause is in the Court of Quarter Sessions of the county is not denied. What particular judge or judges hold that court, if duly commissioned, is of no importance to any one save the judges themselves .... The several courts, therefore, as the public business demands, detail one or all of their number to hold said court. The public or suitors, therefore, have nothing to do with the schedule or assignments of the judges to hold said courts. It is made by the judges for the convenience of the general business of all the four (now seven) courts, and may be changed at any moment.’
“See also Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa. 531 at page 540 (1889), [which, we note, amply supports the Kensington case, supra, and Judge Gold’s position on this point.]
“Therefore, for the reasons stated, we hold that Judge Alessandroni lawfully considered the memorial for an investigation by a grand jury presented to Judge Guerin on March 22, 1962, and by the latter turned over to Judge Alessandroni as his designated successor in Quarter Sessions Court No. 4 for April 1962.”
A “Special” Grand Jury Is a Lawful Body
The majority hold that there is no body known to the law as a special grand jury, and if we understand their opinion correctly two Grand Juries cannot exist and operate simultaneously. This is so contrary to realities and to many prior decisions of this Court that it seems incomprehensible. The majority admit, as they must, (1) that a regular monthly grand jury could investigate, if specially charged by the presiding Quarter Sessions Judge, the charges made in the memorial*630ists’ petition before Judge Alessandroni and (2) that such an investigating jury can be convened in advance and/or can be held over for many months after its term of regular monthly service was ended, and (3) that such jury could continue to investigate these charges for many months after its regular monthly term ended. All of these propositions were specifically approved in Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A. 2d 298, and we repeat are admitted by the majority of the Court. The majority likewise agree with me that after the monthly term of a regular grand jury is ended it becomes thereafter a special investigating Grand Jury which presents its findings, recommendations and reports or presentments to the Quarter Sessions Court for subsequent consideration by the then functioning or subsequently convened regular monthly Grand Jury which is, as we all know, the indicting Grand Jury.
A regular Grand Jury is both an indicting and an investigating grand jury. It considers evidence to determine whether to find a true Bill of Indictment or ignore a Bill of Indictment against persons accused of crime, and it also investigates anything and everything which the presiding Quarter Session Judge may direct. However, we repeat, only the so-called regular Grand Jury can indict during its term, and if a particular grand jury holds over thereafter for investigation purposes it can continue its investigation and report its findings and presentments, but it cannot indict. The only difference — absolutely the only difference — -between such an investigating regular grand jury and the special investigating grand jury which was convened in this case, is that in this case a special venire of jurors was convened with the sole purpose of investigating the charges set forth in the memorialists’ petition.
The majority rely upon the Act of March 18, 1875, as amended by the Act of April 27, 1927, P. L. 420, *631Section 2, 17 P.S. §1351, which provides that a grand jury may he summoned to meet at such time prior to the holding of its term, that the Judges of the Quarter Sessions Court shall deem expedient, and “may be detained for an additional week without the issuing of a new venire” and may be held over “until the grand jury of the next succeeding term is assembled . . . .” It is clear that this is directory and not mandatory or exclusionary. For example Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa., supra, and other authorities hold, and the majority Opinion concedes that even a so-called regular monthly grand jury may be summoned in advance and if its investigation is not completed may be held over for a reasonable period of time to terminate its labors* ■ — not only until the grand jury of the next succeeding monthly term is assembled, but may be held over after numerous monthly grand juries have been assembled and their terms have expired.
In Shenker v. Harr, supra, the Court said :**
“The question here presented is whether a grand jury, convened for a regular term of court, can continue to function as to uncompleted business beyond such term and remain in session concurrently with grand juries summoned for succeeding regular terms. . . .
“Even, however, if these acts [Act of March 13, 1867, Act of March 18, 1875, Amendatory Act of April 27, 1927] were to be construed as fixing a time limit upon the session of a grand jury for all purposes, their provision to that effect must be considered as directory and not mandatory. . . .
“Plaintiff contends that if a grand jury functions during an adjourned session of the court after a succeeding regular term has brought with it the conven*632ing of another grand jury, the result will be that two grand juries will be operating in the county at the same time. Neither in law nor from a practical standpoint, however, is there any serious objection to such a situation.”*
I also note that the majority rely upon the Act of March 13, 1867, P. L. 420, 17 P.S. §472. This requires the convening of 24 grand jurors for each regular (monthly) session of the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County. This has always been considered to be directory and non-exclusive. Were it otherwise, a grand jury often could not act, because, inter alia, of the fact that so many grand jurors would or might be excused for legitimate reasons, with the result that less than 13 grand jurors might be available for duty. Such a grand jury would be legally inadequate, with the result that a new venire would have to be summoned. How it is possible for the majority to ignore these realities, I do not understand.
To repeat, the majority holds that a grand jury, meaning a regular monthly grand jury, can be validly convened prior to its term for the special purpose of charging it to investigate alleged widespread corruption and crime and can be validly held over for months thereafter to complete its investigation. The majority then holds that a special grand jury cannot be validly convened for the special purpose of charging it to investigate alleged widespread corruption and crime and cannot be validly held over for months thereafter to complete its investigation.
What a difference there can be ’twixt tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee.
Assuming that there is a material difference between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee, the realities and *633the prior decisions of this Court legalize, support and justify a special grand jury.
Realities
The realities of Court business in Philadelphia make a special grand jury (under exceptional circumstances) absolutely necessary. One of the advantages of a special grand jury proceeding and one of the customary results is that the investigation which is made by a special grand jury — and because of the lack of time usually cannot be made by a regular monthly grand jury — is the ferreting out of crime and criminals which the ordinary processes of the law cannot readily discover or adequately cope with.
A regular grand jury, we repeat, hears witnesses and thereafter decides whether a prima facie case of a crime exists, and on that basis finds or ignores a Bill or Bills of Indictment. A regular Grand Jury likewise investigates any matter which the presiding Quarter Sessions Judge directs it to investigate. In the year 1961, the regular monthly grand jury in the County of Philadelphia considered an average of 1828 bills of indictment which were presented, together with supporting witnesses, by the District Attorney and his staff. Of these 1828 monthly bills, the grand jury finds on the average 1668 true bills every month, and ignores approximately 160 bills. Furthermore, the regular monthly grand jury is, we repeat, under a duty to investigate whatever matters the presiding Judge of the Quarter Sessions Court directs. If, in addition to all of this — hearing witnesses, indicting persons accused of crime, and investigation of whatever matters the Judge directs — a regular monthly grand jury would have to investigate in Philadelphia the charges of widespread corruption and crime throughout the City, indictments and trials of criminals will be grievously retarded, witnesses will become lost or move, their recol*634lection may become hazy or obscured, statutes of limitation may run, and criminals will have further opportunity to “cover their tracks”. The net result would be that protection of law abiding citizens would be further weakened and Justice not only delayed but jeopardized. A law abiding community can be protected from criminals only by an adequate police force and the speedy arrest, indictment, trial and conviction of criminals, and the prompt and adequate sentencing of them by the Courts. The crime wave in Philadelphia and the backlog of untried criminal cases is alarming; moreover, crimes and backlog are constantly increasing. On September 1, 1961, there was a backlog of untried criminal indictments in Philadelphia County of approximately 12,700. On September 1, 1962, the backlog of untried criminal indictments was nearly 17,-000. To require a regular monthly grand jury to hear witnesses and dispose of approximately 1800 or more bills of indictment each month, and at the same time to specially investigate whatever the presiding Quarter Sessions Judge may direct, and also to investigate for a four to six months period charges of widespread graft, corruption and crime in the higher echelons of Philadelphia’s government, is so impractical and unrealistic as to be fantastic.
Prior Decisions Approve a Special Grand Jury Investigation
However, even if realities are ignored, the prior decisions of this Court and of the Superior Court which have approved time after time a special grand jury investigation can not be ignored or repudiated, if speedy Justice and the certainty and stability of the Law are to prevail in Pennsylvania.
A special grand jury investigation of alleged widespread corruption and crime was approved in Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), *635332 Pa. 289, 2 A. 2d 783; in Special Grand Jury Case, 397 Pa. 254, 154 A. 2d 592; in Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Superior Ct. 179, 196, 154 A. 2d 57; in Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa., supra; in Commonwealth v. Hershman, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 134, 90 A. 2d 314; in Commonwealth v. Antico, 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 293, 312, 22 A. 2d 204; in Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 107, 14 A. 2d 907; in Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa. Superior Ct. 423, 107 A. 2d 179; in Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 85, 92 A. 2d 251; and in Manko Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 177, 77 A. 2d 700.
In Special Grand Jury Case, 397 Pa., supra, in Commonwealth v. Cross, 172 Pa. Superior Ct., supra; in Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Superior Ct., supra; in Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa. Superior Ct., supra; in Commonwealth v. Hershman, 171 Pa. Superior Ct., supra; and in Manko Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, “a special investigating grand jury was convened” In the other eases, supra, the so-called regular Grand Jury was convened before its term and/or held over long after its term, and in all these cases such jury was known and referred to by this Court or by the Superior Court as a special grand jury — and its powers and duties thereafter were limited as in the instant cases to investigation without power of indictment — and the validity of the acts of such jury, although vigorously challenged, was sustained by this Court or by the Superior Court.
In Special Grand Jury Case, 397 Pa. 254, 154 A. 2d 592, Judge Gold — who now asserts there is no such body as a special Grand Jury — convened “a Special Grand Jury ... to investigate certain alleged criminal situations” existing in the ranks of Local 107 of the International Brotherhood. This Court issued a writ of prohibition directing Judge Gold “to discharge the Special Grand Jury convened by him on September 3, *6361959” — not because a special grand jury was unknown or illegal, but only because the petition for an investigation did not support any allegation of widespread crime. Moreover, the Court specifically recognized the validity and legality of an investigation by a special grand jury when it said (pp. 260, 261), “We do not condone the acts darkly suggested in the petition, and we do not say that if the situation worsens a special grand\ jury may not properly be convened to investigate it. . . .” “. . . [A] writ of prohibition is issued, directed to the Honorable Joseph E. Gold and requiring him forthwith to discharge the Special Grand Jury convened by him on September 3, 1959, to investigate Local 107 and to terminate all proceedings in connection with it.”
In Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa., supra, which was probably the most bitterly fought grand jury investigation in the history of the Commonwealth, this Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Kephart, said (page 293) : “On April 29, 1938, the District Attorney of Dauphin County, on the eve of a primary election, presented to the Court of Quarter Sessions of that county, a petition requesting that a special grand jury be convened to investigate charges made during the campaign against certain public officials and private individuals.” And (on page 298) : “The genesis of this call for the special grand jury was the petition or suggestion of the District Attorney.”
In Commonwealth v. Hershman, 171 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, the Court said (page 135) : “On petition of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County directed that a special grand jury be impaneled to investigate alleged lack of law enforcement in certain boroughs within the County of Allegheny.”
*637In Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, the Court said (pages 88-89) : “The presentment was prepared and filed by a special investigating grand jury summoned upon the petition of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, . . .”
In the exceptionally bitterly fought case of Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, (which was afterwards affirmed by this Court in 399 Pa. 387), the record shows the following prayer in the petition which was presented by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania to the Quarter Sessions Court of Dauphin County:
“Wherefore, your petitioner [Attorney General, now Justice Herbert B. Cohen] prays that this Court make an Order directing a Special Grand Jury* to be convened and to have summoned before it such witnesses as it may require for making a complete and full investigation of the aforesaid matters and making a full report thereof to this Court, reserving unto petitioner the right to expand and enlarge upon the scope of said Grand Jury investigation by supplemental petition or petitions to be presented to this Court.”
Following an investigation by the Special Grand Jury which was convened in accordance with such prayer, the Dauphin County Quarter Sessions Court entered the following order:
“And Now, January 21, 1957, the District Attorney is herewith directed to prepare and submit to the regular January, 1957 Grand Jury now in session, bills of indictment covering all the matters contained in the *638presentment of the Special Grand Jury of Investigation made to the Court on Friday, January 18, 1957.”
. In the opinion of the Superior Court, President Judge Rhodes, speaking for the Court, said (page. 196) :
“1. The Validity of the Indictments.
“On October 22, 1956, upon the petition of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, [Herbert R. Cohen] dated September 1, 1956, in which the District Attorney of Dauphin County had joined, a special investigating grand jury was convened. The matters disclosed by the presentment of the investigating grand jury formed the basis for the bills of indictment submitted, at the direction of the Court, to the regular grand jury for the January Sessions of 1957. On January 23, 1957, the regular grand jury returned indictments against the nine defendants, five of whom have appealed after conviction, and four of whom were acquitted. . . .
“A further consideration is that the investigating grand jury and the indicting grand jury are separate legal bodies. Although both may have considered the same alleged crimes involving the same individuals, their proceedings, deliberations, and presentments are distinct. Extraneous matters affecting one may not influence the other, and irregularities before one are not always present in the other; the two bodies are unrelated in this respect. Consequently, an indictment by a regular grand jury is not necessarily tainted by some irregularity or improper influence alleged to have affected the investigating grand jury . . . .”
In Commonwealth v. Antico, 146 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, which involved indictments charging conspiracy to violate the provisions of the Election Code, the Court said (pages 312-313) :
*639“Special Grand Jury Investigation
“The questions raised concerning the propriety of the court’s ordering a special grand jury investigation and the conduct of the same, as bearing on the trial now under consideration, are disposed of adversely to appellants in the recent opinions in Com. v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 107, 14 A. 2d 907; Com. v. Kirk et al., 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 123, 14 A. 2d 914; affirmed, 340 Pa. 346, 17 A. 2d 195; McNair’s Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498; Com. v. Brownmiller, 137 Pa. Superior Ct. 261, 267, 9 A. 2d 155, 158, and the cases cited in them. The offenses charged dealt with matters of a grave public nature of importance to the well-being of the Commonwealth. They were peculiarly proper for investigation by a special grand jury and for the presentation by the district attorney of bills of indictment as directed by the grand jury.”
In Manko Appeal, 168 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, the Superior Court, speaking through Judge, later Justice, Arnold, said (page 178) : “A special investigating grand jury was summoned in Allegheny County upon the petition of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania . . . .”
How often does this Court and the Superior Court have to assert, establish, iterate and reiterate a proposition for it to be recognized and maintained as the law of Pennsylvania? How can lower Court Judges and public officials know their powers and limitations, how can law abiding citizens be protected, how can men safely make contracts or deeds or wills, if the law or its meaning is frequently changed?
A District Attorney May Be Superseded When Certain Unusual Circumstances Exist and the Interests of Justice Require It
Special or unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist and the interests of Justice require supersession *640of a District Attorney, for example whenever a District Attorney is ill, or too complacent or lazy or incompetent, or mistaken about the law or his powers or duties, or should be disqualified because of a personal or family or legal interest, or where it reasonably appears that his failure to promptly take appropriate and adequate action is due to political considerations or close political ties, or whenever for any reason whatsoever his failure or refusal to act promptly, impartially and adequately will likely result in imperiling the public interest and jeopardizing Justice. Where any of these unusual or extraordinary conditions exist, a District Attorney can be superseded (1) by the proceedings authorized by statute* and/or (2) by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania under his broad common law powers and/or (3) by Court appointed counsel under the inherent power and right of a Court to protect the law abiding community and to preserve and promote Justice. It is astonishing that the well established principles of law set forth in (2), supra, have been challenged by the District Attorney and by the City Solicitor and by the Democratic City Committee, and by others in spite of the many decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which have sustained and reaffirmed these principles and many times rejected the same contentions which are made by the present District Attorney. The District Attorney’s contentions are based fundamentally on the proposition that since the District Attorney is a constitutionally ordained officer who is elected by the people, he can never be superseded as to any of his functions except under Section 907 of the Administrative Code or by the Act of May 2, 1905.
*641Supersession by Statute
Legislative Acts providing for supersession of a District Attorney under certain circumstances have been sustained over vigorous protests by a District Attorney: Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397; Commonwealth v. Havrilla, 38 Pa. Superior Ct. 292; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Irvin, 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 387, 168 A. 868.
In Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 406) : “It was urged, however, that the indictments were properly quashed because not signed by the district attorney. They were signed by Guy E. Parquhar, Esq., who was specially appointed by the court to try these cases, under the Act of 12th March 1866, Pamph. L. 85. The appointment appears to have been regularly made in accordance with the provisions of said act, and was eminently proper, as the district attorney was a candidate at the general election at which the alleged frauds were committed, and which frauds, it is stated, increased his vote. It would therefore have been a breach of professional and official propriety for him to have acted as district attorney in these cases. But it is said the appointment was illegal because the Constitution adopted since the act of 1866 was passed, makes the district attorney a constitutional officer, and as such he cannot be stripped of his powers by the legislature. There is little force in ibis suggestion. While the legislature may not abolish the office, it can control the officer. They can regulate the performance of his duties, and punish him for misconduct, as in the case of other officers. And where he neglects or refuses to act, or where, from the circumstances of a given case, it is improper and indelicate for him to act, it is competent for the legislature to afford a remedy. This is all that the Act of 1866 does, and we think its provisions are not obnoxious to any constitutional provision.”
*642Supersession of District Attorney by Attorney General Under and by Virtue of the Broad Common Law Powers of the Attorney General
Even more astonishing is the present contention of the District Attorney and the City Solicitor and counsel for the Democratic City Committee and others that an Attorney General, unless specifically authorized by statute, has no power to supersede a District Attorney. This contention has been rejected and dismissed over and over and over again by this Court. See the following cases which are specifically and directly in point and in the clearest language reject and refute the District Attorney’s contentions: Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 30, 188 A. 524; Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289, 298, 2 A. 2d 783; Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 3), 332 Pa. 358, 362, 2 A. 2d 809; Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 200, 88 A. 2d 892; Margiotti Appeal, 365 Pa. 330, 332, 75 A. 2d 465; Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 261, 81 A. 2d 891; and Commonwealth v. Fudeman, 396 Pa. 236, 238, 152 A. 2d 428.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Orsini, 368 Pa., supra, the Court said (pages 260, 261-262) : “The Attorney General of Pennsylvania superseded the District Attorney of Allegheny County in the investigation of alleged widespread criminal activities in that County and in the direction and control of a grand jury investigation of alleged violations of the law by public officials and public employees. The supersession of the District Attorney by the Attorney General in that particular matter was sustained by this Court in Margiotti Appeal, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A. 2d 465.
“. . . The authority of the Attorney General to investigate criminal acts is clearly set forth in Com. ex *643rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524; Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289, 2 A. 2d 783; Margiotti Appeal, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A. 2d 465. In Com. ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, supra, Mr. Justice Schaffer said (pages 30, 31) : ‘We conclude from the review of decided cases and historical and other authorities that the Attorney General of Pennsylvania is clothed with the powers and attributes which enveloped Attorneys General at common law, including the right to investigate criminal acts, to institute proceedings in the several counties of the Commonwealth, to sign indictments, to appear before the grand jury and submit testimony, to appear in court and to try criminal cases on the Commonwealth’s behalf, and, in any and all these activities to supersede and set aside the district attorney when in the Attorney General’s judgment such action may be necessary.’* In Margiotti Appeal, 365 Pa. 330, supra, this Court quoted with approval the following language from the opinion of Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289, supra, (page 298) : ‘But the Attorney General, with his vast powers, recognized by this Court in Commonwealth ex rel. v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, may supplement and supervise the grand jury in any investigation; he may, — and it is his duty to do so if he believes the government is to be hindered in the lawful conduct of its affairs to the detriment of the security, peace and good order of the State, — supersede the District Attorney in the conduct of the entire investigation. . . .’ ”
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Fudeman, 396 Pa., supra (1959), the Court said (pages 238-239) : “There is no doubt that under the common law and the *644statutory* and decisional law of Pennsylvania, the Attorney General has the power and, under certain circumstances, the duty to investigate any violations or alleged violations of the laws of the Commonwealth and to supplement and supervise a Grand Jury, and he may, under proper circumstances, supersede or act in conjunction with a district attorney.
“In Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892, the Court pertinently said (pages 200-201) : ‘“We conclude from the revieiv of decided cases and historical and other authorities that the Attorney General of Pennsylvania is clothed with the powers and attributes which enveloped Attorneys General at common law, including the right to investigate criminal acts, to institute proceedings in the several counties of the Commonwealth, to sign indictments, to appear before the grand jury and submit testimony, to appear in court and to try criminal cases on the Commonwealth’s behalf, mid, im, any and all these activities to supersede and set aside the district attorney when in the Attorney General’s judgment** such action may be necessary.”
“ ‘These vast powers of the Attorney General were further recognized in our opinions in Dauphin County Grand Jury Proceedings No. 1, 332 Pa. 289, 298, 2 A. 2d 783; in Dauphin County Grand Jury Proceedings No. 3, 332 Pa. 358, 362, 2 A. 2d 809; in Margiotti Appeal, 365 Pa., [330], and in Com. ex rel. Margiotti v. Orsini, 368 Pa., [259], in each of which we reiterated that the Attorney General may supplement and supervise a grand jury and may under proper circumstances supersede or act in conjunction with a district attorney; and then said: “. . . and it is his duty to do so if *645lie believes the government is to be hindered in the lawful conduct of its affairs to the detriment of the security, peace and good order of the State ....”’”
Furthermore, the Statutory and Common Law power of the Attorney General to supersede a District Attorney wag recognized and reasserted by the present Attorney General of Pennsylvania. Attorney General David Stahl gaid in hig letter in reply to Judge Gold, who asked him to intervene in this very cage: “In my opinion [the] adjudication could in no way affect or detract from the statutory and common law powers of the Attorney General, particularly the authority to supersede and set aside a District Attorney in proper cageg or the digcretionary power to appoint gpecial coungel in criminal investigationg or other criminal proceedingg when requested to do go by the Pregident Judge of a Court. None of thege powerg appear to be in iggue here.”
In the light of these repeated declaration and reiteration by thig Court of the well gettled law of Penngylvania, it ig incomprehengible that a Digtrict Attorney or anyone can contend that an Attorney General hag no power, apart from a statute, to ever gupergede a Digtrict Attorney.
What happeng to the public interegt gafety and welfare, when for any reason whatsoever both a Digtrict Attorney and an Attorney General* are digqualified or fail to act promptly, impartially and adequately in the *646circumstances? Are the people of that County to be left unprotected? To answer “yes” would be ridiculous. Yet unless the Courts have inherent power — under those unusual circumstances — to appoint special investigating and/or prosecuting attorneys, an entire law abiding community can be left without adequate protection and redress against erime and corruption. Can any person believe that Courts are so impotent and so oblivious of obvious public duty that they cannot and will not do whatever may be necessary to require a prompt and impartial investigation in order to protect the public?
Under Certain Circumstances a Court Can Appoint Special Investigating and/or Prosecuting Attorneys to Supersede a District Attorney
In Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 107, where the Secretary of Highways was indicted and convicted of wilfully and corruptly using the funds of the Commonwealth for political purposes, the Superior Court granted the petition of the District Attorney for the appointment by the Court of additional assistant district attorneys for the preparation of the case. The Court said (pages 111-112) : “the president judge of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin County appointed additional special assistants to the district attorney . . . [and] also authorized the district attorney to engage, . . . stenographers, typists, a county detective, three, investigators, a filing clerk, and a photostat operator.
“The courts under our Constitution have certain inherent rights and powers which do not depend solely upon express constitutional or legislative grants. They may do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their ju*647risdiction: 14 Am. Jur., Courts, §171. Judge Maxey now Justice of the Supreme Court, recognized that rule when presiding in Lackawanna County in Re Surcharge of County Commissioners, 12 D. & C. 471. In an elaborate opinion which included a discussion of inherent powers of the courts of record, he held that it is within the scope of the court’s jurisdiction to order the payment of the salary of an employee who was required by a judge to assist him in the administration of Justice, as that is within the court’s inherent powers. See, also, Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 178 Pa. 409, 35 A. 924; Edwards v. Prutzman et al., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 184, 165 A. 255; Lycoming County Commissioners v. Hall, 7 Watts 290; 15 C. J. §205, p. 871.”
In Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pennsylvania Company, Inc., 378 Pa. 359, 106 A. 2d 239, this Court said (page 369) : “We do not hold that because of the statutory coverage of such appointments a court is confined thereto and wholly without power to appoint an attorney to act as an assistant to the district attorney. Such inherent power has been recognized (see Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 107, 14 A. 2d 907).”
In Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 3), 332 Pa., supra, where the Governor of Pennsylvania and several members of his cabinet were subjected to a special grand jury investigation, this Court not only sustained the power of the Attorney General to supersede a District Attorney, but directed the lower Court to appoint an attorney-at-law to perform the duties of a district attorney in lieu of the Attorney General. The Court said (page 367) : “The Attorney General is an appointee of the Governor and subject to dismissal by him. Under such circumstances ordinary sentiments and impulses would necessarily tend to interfere with the Attorney General’s freedom of action, even though he might not in fact *648succumb to the temptations which would confront him. To permit him to conduct the investigation in such a case would be contrary to all standards of professional ethics, as the Attorney General himself commendably recognizes, for, in the brief presented by him to this court, he disclaims any intention of handling the proceedings personally. In the event, therefore, that the court below shall decide that the district attorney has been properly superseded, it will thereupon appoint an attorney at law resident in another county to perform his functions.” How can such an obviously necessary inherent power be doubtedf
But we do not need to rely solely on necessity, or on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to support and justify this inherent power of a Court to maintain, promote and preserve Justice! The Supreme Court of the United States has recently once again strikingly proclaimed the broad inherent rights and powers of a Court to protect the public interest in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186. In that case the Supreme Court held that a Federal District Court had jurisdiction to consider and determine whether a citizen of Tennessee had been denied the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, by reason of the failure of the General Assembly of Tennessee to reapportion the State’s 95 Counties and particularly the County in which the complainants resided. Many decisions of the Federal District Courts have held that a Court has inherent power to void a reapportionment legislative act and to direct an election at large of Congressional and State representatives or to order such an election if the Legislature does not validly and constitutionally promptly reapportion the Districts and Counties in the State. It is clear, therefore, that whenever reasonably necessary for the protection of Constitutional rights or the preservation of Justice, a Court having general ju*649risdiction of the subject matter has the inherent right and power to order and direct all things that are reasonably necessary for the protection of the people and the preservation of Justice.
The majority have, in my judgment, not only made a major mistake in holding that the Courts have no inherent power ever to supersede a District Attorney,* but have also made another mistake.
There is absolutely no merit in the contention that Crumlish has been removed (or ousted) from the office of District Attorney. The majority assert that no court may remove a District Attorney except in accordance with a statute, and the following language from Snyder’s Case, 301 Pa. 276, 288, 152 A. 33, is quoted to support their contention: “Where the Constitution or statute points out a method for the removal of a public officer, that is exclusive of other methods: . . .” Apart from the extraordinary circumstances which exist in this case and which justify super-session of the District Attorney** by Court appointed *650investigators and prosecutors, it is an indisputable fact that Crumlish has not been removed or displaced as District Attorney of Philadelphia County.
Crumlish is still District Attorney of Philadelphia County and he still has all the powers — except for conducting this one investigation — of a District Attorney, and he still has his salary as District Attorney. Furthermore, he still has voluminous duties to perform. For example, he and his staff have to prepare approximately 1,800 indictments every month, intervieAV witnesses in connection therewith and present them and other evidence to the regular monthly grand jury. Crumlish, with the aid of his staff, still has to try several hundred criminal cases every month} and Crumlish has the further important duty of disposing of or substantially reducing the constantly increasing backlog of criminal indictments which now total over 17,000.
Appeal of D’Ortona
The last questions worthy of discussion are raised by the Appeal of D’Ortona et al. from the order of the Quarter Sessions Court made by Judge Alessandroni who, without notice to the City Solicitor, enjoined, for a period of three days, a hearing by a committee of City Council of its charges against Griffin. One or more City Councilmen publicly charged that Griffin was disqualified to act as an Assistant Special Counsel to investigate members of City Council because of his alleged bias.
Griffin’s petition to the Quarter Session Judge Alessandroni for an order restraining City Council from conducting an investigation of him alleged, inter alia, that such investigation was illegal and unconstitutional. Each side contends that the actions of the other side were illegal and Adulated one or more provisions of the Constitution. It has been the history of our Country that similar questions have been raised— *651particularly in Washington — one or more times a year for a century, i.e., (a) questions involving the right of a legislative body to investigate and cross-examine witnesses, and (b) questions involving the alleged encroachment by one branch upon another branch of the Government, and the alleged usurpation of powers and jurisdiction by the Executive or by the Legislature or by the Courts.
The genius and success of our Constitution — which has been aptly described by distinguished British Prime Ministers* and distinguished Americans** as the greatest document ever written — is that our Government, with its system of checks and balances, is divided into three great branches or divisions of Government which are co-ordinate and co-equal — the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial. It has been found impossible to draw a line which clearly and sharply divides these great divisions of Government, and necessarily there may be from time to time an overlapping or a concurrent jurisdiction.*** Furthermore, there have been and often will be borderline cases and each of these must be decided on its own particular facts.****
The instant case is not a borderline case. It is clear that Courts have the right and power to issue temporary restraining Orders without notice, in order to preserve the status quo or to protect the Orders which they have made — even when the Court’s jurisdiction is challenged : United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 266, 290; United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 573. Moreover, the scope of this Court’s review in the Appeal of D’Ortona et al. is limited to *652deciding whether there was any reasonable ground for the temporary restraining order of the Quarter Sessions Court: Cf. Slott v. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., and cases cited therein, 402 Pa. 433, 167 A. 2d 306; Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 385 Pa. 342, 123 A. 2d 626. Whether considered in the light of Council’s Resolution, or considered in conjunction with that Resolution and all the surrounding circumstances, the Court’s temporary restraining Order was undoubtedly supported by reasonable grounds; it was not an abuse of discretion; indeed it was imperative.
This Court is unanimously of the opinion that Council’s Resolution set forth no proper or legitimate legislative purpose and was therefore invalid»

 Two days after the issue of a grand jury investigation was argued in this Court.

 Italics throughout, ours.

 See. 2-400 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter,

 City Council adopted tactics similar to those employed in the Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation cases (infra) of cabinet members and high State officials, by virtue of which the hunted became the hunters and the accusers became the accused. However, Council’s investigatory powers for proper purposes are supported in principle by Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2), 332 Pa. 342, 344, 2 A. 2d 802; its limitations are delineated in McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310, 322, 164 A. 2d 424.

 The magnitude of the work required in these cases is apparent from the record which totals over 600 pages and the briefs which total more than 250 pages, and the number of prior decisions, text authorities and statutes cited or quoted (plus those discovered by my independent research) which required examination or restudy, exceeded 200.

 The first petition or memorial was filed by Virginia Knauer and Wilbur H. Hamilton, on behalf of themselves and all other residents, citizens, electors and taxpayers of Philadelphia who might wish to join, and the second petition was filed by Donald C. Rubel, Walter P. Miller, Jr., and other prominent citizens, residents, electors and taxpayers of Philadelphia, and as members of the Republican Alliance.

 Sometimes referred to as the Leonard petition.

 Although the question was not raised below, I agree with the majority that the scope of the investigation was too broad. For example, the Republican Alliance has not been accused of any crime and therefore cannot be investigated by a grand jury. Cf. McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa., supra, and Special Grand Jury Case, *619397 Pa., supra. The scope of the investigation could be properly limited by this Court on an appeal or by a petition for a writ of prohibition. Act of May 20, 1891, Section 2 P. L. 101, 12 P.S. §1164; Adams v. New Kensington, 374 Pa. 104, 97 A. 2d 354; Smith v. Allegheny County, 377 Pa. 365, 105 A. 2d 137.

 From a panel of attorneys submitted to the Court by the Chancellor and former Chancellors of the Philadelphia Bar Association.

 Needless to say, all of this was both proper and wise,

 Knowing Berger, as we do, we believe be acted in accordance witb bis conscience.

 These parties should have been made defendants sub nomine, White, Griffin et al.

 The $112,000 appropriation made by Council approved a salary for White for a period of approximately six months at a rate of $20,000 per year and for Griffin at the rate of $17,500 per year, as well as wages for investigators, secretaries, etc. At the time of the decision of Court of Common Pleas No. 6, White had been working since July 18th and Griffin since July 25th without any compensation whatever. As of September 5th and as of September 12th, the date of the argument in this Court, some members of the staff were owed salaries and wages for their services in connection with the investigation. One investigator employed by contract at $150 per week was owed $000. Hence, if the judgment of Court of Common Pleas No. 6 in the Smith case should stand, the individuals mentioned will never receive the compensation now owed them under an Order of a Court which was approved by City Council as aforesaid. Moreover, some of these persons had relinquished permanent jobs to render a public service, which the Quarter Sessions Court had ordered and the City Administration had previously approved.

 Another familiar exception is a habeas corpus proceeding which attacks the validity of a petitioner’s conviction and/or sentence in a criminal case.

 In Shenker v. Harr 1he investigating grand jury was permitted to continue its investigations for 14 months.

 A unanimous opinion written by Justice, later Chief Justice, Horace Stern.

 I note further that the Courts have repeatedly approved such procedure and the presentments made by such a grand jury.

 Justice Herbert B. Cohen and Thomas McBride, Esq., who succeeded him as Attorney General of Pennsylvania and conducted with the District Attorney the investigations made by the Special Grand Jury, and who is now counsel for the Democratic City Committee, now assert that there is no such body known to the law as a special grand jury.

 Article IX, Section 907 of the Administrative Code of April 9, 1929, P. L. 177, 71 P.S. §297, or the Act of May 2, 1905, P. D. 351, 71 P.S. §§817, 818.

 Of course the Attorney General’s judgment as to the necessity for supersession is subject to review by this Court for an abuse of discretion.

“* The Administrative Code of 1929, P. L. 177, §904, 71 P.S. §294.

The reasonable exercise of which is subject to judicial review.” ,

 An Attorney General lias heavy burdensome statewide duties to perform, including daily requests from the Governor or members of his cabinet or members of the legislature or members of commissions for an interpretation of Statutes and their powers and duties thereunder. For these reasons it is difficult and ofttimes impossible for him to be a watchdog over all the acts of 67 District Attorneys in 67 separate counties in the State. Furthermore, he may be disqualified because of personal or professional interests, or for any of the reasons hereinbefore set forth for the disqualification of a District Attorney.

 Supersession by a Court of Quarter Sessions, like supersession by the Attorney General, is, we repeat, of course subject to review in this Court where the test is an abuse of discretion and/or error of law.

 The Quarter Sessions Court did not have to hear testimony to determine the truth of the averments by the District Attorney that he was ready, able and willing to conduct a proper investigation. In this case, the District Attorney’s failure to promptly investigate the allegations of sale of legislation by City Council, and the alleged widespread graft, corruption and crimes by important officials in the City administration, and by members of the Democratic City Committee, was so glaring, and his dereliction of duty in this respect was a matter of common and widespread knowledge in Philadelphia, that under these circumstances his super-session by Order of the Quarter Sessions Court was thoroughly and unquestionably justified. Furthermore, the Leonard petition was, according to the majority, not an adversary proceeding and consequently only the averments of the petition and matters of common knowledge in Philadelphia can properly be considered.

 William Pitt, William E. Gladstone; also Lord Bryce.

 Among them, Alfred E. Smith.

 See, for example: Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. %), 332 Pa. 342, 355-356, 358. ,

 See, for example: McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310, 164 A. 2d 424.