Court Opinion

ID: 9918965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 23:05:57.250937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:55.728025
License: Public Domain

01/16/2024

                                           DA 22-0545
                                                                                             Case Number: DA 22-0545

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                           2024 MT 6N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

LINDSAY B. GOUDREAU,

                Petitioner, Appellee,
                and Cross-Appellant,

         and

JEFFREY A. GOUDREAU,

                Respondent, Appellant,
                and Cross-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM:            District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
                        In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DR-15-2020-064
                        Honorable Robert B. Allison, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                 For Appellant:

                        Penni L. Chisholm, Dean Chisholm, Chisholm & Chisholm, P.C.,
                        Columbia Falls, Montana

                 For Appellee:

                        David F. Stufft, Attorney at Law, Kalispell, Montana

                                                     Submitted on Briefs: May 24, 2023

                                                                 Decided: January 16, 2024

Filed:

                                        ir,-6m---if
                        __________________________________________
                                          Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1      Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve

as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2      Jeffrey A. Goudreau (“Jeff”) appeals from the Eleventh Judicial District Court’s

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution (“Decree”) and Final

Parenting Plan. Lindsay B. Goudreau (“Lindsay”) cross-appeals.

¶3      Jeff and Lindsay married in October of 2013. They have two children together.

Lindsay has a child from a previous marriage. They have lived separately since January 10,

2020. On January 21, 2020, Lindsay filed a petition for dissolution. The District Court

held a two-day bench trial, after which it issued the June 7, 2022 Decree and Final Parenting

Plan.

¶4      Prior to their marriage, Jeff owned property on Eckleberry Drive in Columbia Falls.

In December of 2014, Jeff sold the Eckleberry Drive property and received net proceeds

of $199,291. Lindsay helped to avoid a real estate commission by assisting in the

marketing of the Eckleberry Drive property. Two weeks later, the parties jointly purchased

a parcel of land on Oakmont Lane for $118,500. Jeff and Lindsay bought the Oakmont

Lane property and built their home on it, financed from the proceeds from the sale of the

Eckleberry Drive property, $49,000 from Jeff’s savings, and a March 2016 loan of $73,190

in Jeff’s name. Jeff and Lindsay also rented out a site on the property for RV and tent

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camping, with plans to use the property for additional income and Lindsay’s budding

photography business.

¶5       Less than two months after separating, Lindsay purchased a $350,000 home on

Second Avenue West in Columbia Falls using a $220,000 loan and most of a $169,000

payment from her grandmother. The purchase and bank loan were in Lindsay’s name

alone.

¶6       The parties reached an interim financial agreement (“Interim Agreement”) approved

by the District Court on May 5, 2020. Pursuant to the Interim Agreement, Jeff paid Lindsay

a single installment of $30,000 and $900 per month for temporary family support. The

Interim Agreement also included an interim parenting plan which provided that the parties

would share parenting time with their two children, with Lindsay receiving eight nights

and Jeff receiving six nights during every two-week period. Jeff received additional time

when Lindsay traveled to exchange her oldest child with his father and paternal

grandparents.

¶7       After trial, the District Court adopted the interim parenting plan without any

changes. The Decree allowed Jeff to choose between retaining the Oakmont Lane property

or selling the property.     The District Court valued the Oakmont Lane property at

$1,075,000 and awarded Lindsay half of the net equity of the property after accounting for

Jeff’s premarital contributions and two outstanding encumbrances, which Jeff was to

assume in full if he elected to retain the Oakmont Lane property. The Decree calculated

this amount to be $406,900 should Jeff choose to retain the property. Both parties filed

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post-judgment motions seeking amendments to, and clarifications of, the Decree. The

motions were deemed denied after the District Court did not rule on either within 60 days.

¶8     A district court’s ruling on a discovery matter is reviewed to determine whether the

district court abused its discretion. In re S.C., 2005 MT 241, ¶ 16, 328 Mont. 476, 121

P.3d 552 (citation omitted).     “A district court’s valuation of a marital estate is a

discretionary ruling that we review for an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Hutchins,

2018 MT 275, ¶ 8, 393 Mont. 283, 430 P.3d 502 (citation omitted). “A district court’s

apportionment of the marital estate will stand unless there was a clear abuse of discretion

as manifested by a substantially inequitable division of the marital assets resulting in

substantial injustice.” Marriage of Hutchins, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). “We review a district

court’s division of marital property to determine whether the court’s findings of fact are

clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct.” Marriage of Hutchins,

¶ 7 (citation omitted). A district court’s award of child support will not be overturned

absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Anderson, 2014 MT 111, ¶ 11, 374 Mont.

526, 323 P.3d 895. “A district court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without

conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.”

In re Marriage of Frank, 2022 MT 179, ¶ 32, 410 Mont. 73, 517 P.3d 188 (citation

omitted).

¶9     A district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Marriage of Frank,

¶ 32 (citation omitted). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by

substantial evidence, if the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence or our review

                                             4
of the record convinces us that the district court made a mistake.” Marriage of Frank,¶ 32

(citation omitted). “If the findings are not clearly erroneous, the court’s division of

property will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion.” Marriage of Frank, ¶ 32 (citing

In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 6, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39).

¶10    We address the following issues: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion

on several discovery rulings and by declining to sanction Lindsay incident to Jeff’s motion

to compel; (2) whether the District Court’s findings regarding the valuation of the marital

estate were clearly erroneous; (3) whether the District Court abused its discretion regarding

the valuation and division of the marital estate; (4) whether the District Court abused its

discretion in adopting the Final Parenting Plan; (5) whether the District abused its

discretion in its award of child support; and (6) whether the District Court abused its

discretion in denying the parties’ post-judgment motions for clarification of and

amendments to the Decree.1 We affirm in part and remand for correction of clerical errors

in the Decree.

Discovery Rulings

¶11    Jeff argues that Lindsay’s tax returns and profit-loss reports, provided in discovery,

were not sufficient for the District Court to determine her income for purposes of its child

support calculation and therefore the District Court’s denial of Jeff’s motion to compel

1
  Lindsay requested at trial, in her proposed findings, and in her post-judgment motion that the
District Court restore her maiden name of Lindsay Beth Dahl. Section 40-4-108(5), MCA, states
that “[u]pon request by a party whose marriage is dissolved or declared invalid, the court shall
order the party’s maiden or birth name or a former name restored.” Jeff does not contest this issue
on appeal. We remand for correction of this oversight.

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additional information was an abuse of discretion that prevented Jeff from effectively

presenting his case at trial. Jeff relies on Admin. R. M. 37.62.105(2)(b) (2021), which

provides that income for a self-employed parent is calculated as “gross receipts minus

reasonable and necessary expenses.”

¶12    In response to Jeff’s discovery requests, Lindsay provided tax returns for the years

2019 and 2020. Her 2019 tax return reflected a net business income of $20,746. Her 2020

tax return reflected a net business income of $16,604. Although Lindsay did not have a

2021 tax return to provide, she provided a profit and loss report for 2021, which reflected

a substantial increase of her net income over the previous two years of $31,655.16. Admin.

R. M. 37.62.105(1) (2021) provides that the determination of income for child support

calculations must “fairly reflect[] a parent’s resources available for child support.”

“Interpreting this framework, this Court ‘has recommended consideration of at least two

years of income taxes when a district court is determining gross income.’” Marriage of

Anderson, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). Not only did Lindsay’s tax returns provide estimates of

business-related deductions, but her profit and loss statements helped to paint an even more

complete picture by listing expenses for advertising and marketing, computer and internet

expenses, third-party contractors, graphic design, home office expenses, insurance,

software, telephone, and website expenses between January 1, 2021, and December 31,

2021. Although Jeff may find Lindsay’s 2019 and 2020 tax returns and her 2021 profit

and loss report inadequate, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jeff’s

motion to compel in this regard.

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¶13    Jeff next asserts the District Court abused its discretion by allowing Lindsay’s

expert witness, Brian Murphy, to testify regarding his valuation of the Oakmont Lane

property. Jeff argues that he was prejudiced because Murphy did not provide a curriculum

vitae, because Murphy was allowed to testify as to the gross amount of his real estate sales

in the previous year, and because Murphy was allowed to testify that he was a developer

of a subdivision near the Oakmont Lane property.

¶14    Murphy was called to testify to his opinion that the Oakmont Lane property was

worth $1.45 million based on his comparable market analysis (“CMA”), which was

disclosed in discovery. Although Murphy did not have a curriculum vitae to provide, Jeff

does not dispute that Murphy is a realtor in the Flathead Valley who was qualified to

conduct a CMA. While Murphy’s testimony about how much real estate he sold in the

previous year and his role as a developer of a nearby subdivision may possibly bear

tangentially on the substantive aspect of his testimony—his estimated value of the

Oakmont Lane property—the District Court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Jeff’s

objections to the testimony.

¶15    Jeff next argues the District Court erred when it denied his motion to reopen

discovery and to compel Lindsay to produce information regarding her previous custody

litigation with her ex-husband, the father of her oldest child. Jeff specifically requested

information regarding the child’s mental health and medications he may be taking, and the

parenting order and final parenting plan that Lindsay and her ex-husband had entered into,

which were in a sealed court record in Missoula County. Lindsay objected to the requests

                                             7
on the basis that the documents were privileged. In his motion to reopen discovery, Jeff

sought leave to serve a subpoena duces tecum on Lindsay’s ex-husband for the documents

and if he refused to produce them pursuant to the subpoena, Jeff requested the opportunity

to obtain the documents from the Missoula County Clerk of Court which, as Jeff noted,

“has refused to provide the documents because the file is sealed.” Jeff’s stated basis for

seeking the Missoula County documents was that he “believe[d] that statements [Lindsay]

made in that litigation will contradict statements made by [her] in this parenting litigation.”

¶16    The District Court denied Jeff’s motion, holding: “[T]he Court will disallow access

to Lindsay’s dissolution file in Missoula County given that the simple statement that she

might make contradictory claims is insufficient to allow access to such information if

sealed by the court in Missoula.” Whatever possible impeachment benefit Jeff believed he

may have gained from access to this information, liberal discovery does not include delving

into a minor’s medical history and sealed court records based on a summary assertion that

a party “believes that statements . . . made in that litigation will contradict statements”

made by the opposing party in the pending litigation. The District Court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Jeff’s access to these records.

¶17    Jeff next contends the District Court erred by failing to impose sanctions under

M. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A), which provides that a court must order the payment of

reasonable expenses by the party whose conduct necessitated the motion to compel if the

motion to compel is granted. M. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Jeff argues, “[a]n award of Jeff’s

attorneys’ fees and costs was mandatory because it is undisputed that Lindsay was

                                              8
compelled to provide some supplemental responses.”            The operative word in Jeff’s

argument is “some.” M. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C) provides that the court may order the

payment of reasonable expenses if the motion to compel is granted in part and denied in

part. M. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added). Jeff’s motion to compel alleged Lindsay

had “failed to provide full and complete responses” to nine interrogatories, four requests

for production, and one request for admission. Jeff’s motion to compel also alleged

Lindsay had not yet supplemented her answers to five other interrogatories and six other

requests for production. The District Court granted Jeff’s motion to compel as it pertained

to five of the interrogatories and six of the requests for production. Since Jeff’s motion

was not granted in full, the District Court was not mandated to award Jeff his attorney fees

and costs.

The District Court’s valuation and division of the marital estate.

¶18    Both parties raise claims regarding the District Court’s valuation and division of the

marital estate. Jeff argues the District Court erred in valuing the Oakmont Lane property

at $1,075,000 as of the time of dissolution because: (1) the valuation relied on evidence

that should have been excluded due to discovery abuses;2 (2) the District Court’s finding

that the Interim Agreement was an ongoing “joint venture” was not supported by

substantial evidence; (3) the District Court failed to properly credit his expert’s appraisal

2
  Having already rejected Jeff’s argument that the District Court did not err by excluding Brian
Murphy’s CMA as to Oakmont Lane property (see Opinion, ¶¶ 13-14), we need not address the
issue again as it relates to the District Court’s factual findings of the property’s valuation.

                                               9
of the Oakmont Lane property; and (4) our holding in Marriage of Frank requires valuation

at the time of separation to achieve an equitable distribution of the estate.

¶19    Lindsay claims valuing assets other than the Oakmont Lane property as of the time

of separation results in a windfall for Jeff and we should remand with instructions to value

all assets at the time of dissolution.

¶20    Jeff contends that because the District Court found that it could not give equal

weight to Murphy’s opinion relative to the appraisal of Jeff’s expert, Gene Lard, its

valuation of the Oakmont Lane property at the midpoint between Lard’s appraisal and

Murphy’s CMA was not supported by substantial evidence. Lindsay contends that the

value of the Oakmont Lane property should have been consistent with Murphy’s CMA.

Both parties are incorrect.

¶21    “A district court may adopt any reasonable valuation of property supported by the

record.” Marriage of Hutchins, ¶ 50 (citations omitted). Although both Jeff and Lindsay

are critical of the District Court’s final valuation of the Oakmont Lane property, the District

Court’s Findings of Fact reflect that it rendered a thoughtful decision based on the facts

presented to it by both parties. The District Court noted that it was troubled by two experts

with significant backgrounds on valuing property coming to such vastly different

conclusions on the value of the property. Ultimately, the District Court recognized that the

only true measure of the property’s fair market value is determined by the free market, but

it considered the equitable value of Jeff being allowed to retain the property for his and the

children’s benefit. While both parties take issue with what they perceive as the District

                                              10
Court simply splitting the difference between their experts’ respective opinions—both of

which find support in each expert’s testimony regarding the bases of their opinions—we

cannot say the District Court’s findings were unsupported in light of the vastly differing

estimates.

¶22    Turning to the parties’ interpretations of our decision in Marriage of Frank, there

we affirmed that district courts have “broad discretion to equitably apportion the marital

estate in a manner equitable to each party according to the circumstances of each case.”

Marriage of Frank, ¶ 35 (citing Marriage of Funk, ¶¶ 16, 19). We explained that

“[g]enerally, valuing the property near the time of dissolution results in equitable

apportionment, but unique circumstances may call for valuation at a different time.”

Marriage of Frank, ¶ 39 (citation omitted). We also explained that “[w]hen conflicting

valuation evidence is presented the district court must indicate the basis for its

determination” and that “[a]s long as the court’s valuation is reasonable in light of the

evidence submitted, we will not disturb the finding on appeal.” Marriage of Frank, ¶ 39

(citations omitted). In Marriage of Frank we upheld the district court’s decision to value

different assets at different times. Marriage of Frank, ¶¶ 67-71. That holding was

consistent with long-standing precedent. See In re Marriage of Walls, 278 Mont. 413, 417,

925 P.2d 483, 485 (1996) (recognizing that “under [some] circumstances, selection of a

single evaluation point for determining net worth of the parties could create an inequitable

disposition”); see also In re Marriage of Milesnick, 235 Mont. 88, 96, 765 P.2d 751, 756

(1988) (explaining that “[i]f a single valuation date would lead to an inequitable

                                            11
distribution of property, the District Court may choose several different times for

valuation.”).

¶23    Considering the principles articulated in Marriage of Frank and the circumstances

presented here, Jeff’s argument that Marriage of Frank requires the District Court to value

the Oakmont Lane property at the time of separation is unavailing. The same holds true

for Lindsay’s arguments regarding other assets that were valued as of the time of

separation. The District Court reasonably explained in its detailed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law that because Jeff and Lindsay were completely financially separated

by January 10, 2020, valuing the marital estate at the time of separation for all assets other

than the Oakmont Lane property was equitable.

¶24    As for the Oakmont Lane property, the District Court noted that Jeff and Lindsay

agreed to split any profits received from operating the property consistent with their

previously professed intent to derive passive income by renting sites on the property.

Based on this ongoing venture, the District Court determined that an “ongoing financial

partnership” existed which warranted excepting the Oakmont Lane property from the other

property which was valued as of the date of separation. The District Court provided a

reasoned basis for this exception that finds support in the record. The District Court did

not abuse its discretion in valuing the Oakmont Lane property at the time of dissolution

while valuing all other parts of the marital estate at the time of separation.

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Parenting Plan

¶25    Jeff appeals the District Court’s Final Parenting Plan on the grounds that: (1) the

District Court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous; (2) the District Court erred in

failing to enforce § 40-4-234, MCA, which requires parents to submit proposed final

parenting plans; and (3) the Final Parenting Plan here runs afoul of a parent’s

constitutionally protected right to parent under § 40-4-227, MCA.

¶26    The Final Parenting Plan provided that Jeff would receive parenting time weekly

from Thursday evening to Saturday morning, which was extended through Monday

mornings every other weekend.3 Under this schedule, Jeff received six overnights with the

children every two weeks, with Lindsay receiving the remaining eight days. The Final

Parenting Plan noted that Jeff was to receive additional time when Lindsay traveled to

exchange her oldest child with her ex-husband, and the court explained at length that the

parties were free to deviate from the plan by mutual agreement.

¶27    After reviewing the record, we are not convinced the District Court’s findings

regarding the Final Parenting Plan were clearly erroneous or that Jeff has been deprived of

his right to “regular and ongoing parental contact” with his children.            Northcutt v.

McLaughlin (In re G.M.N.), 2019 MT 18, ¶ 12, 394 Mont. 112, 433 P.3d 715. Jeff’s

argument that Lindsay’s alleged failure to file a proposed final parenting plan mandated

that the District Court adopt his proposed plan similarly misses the mark. The record

clearly demonstrates the District Court fulfilled its essential mandate to consider all of the

3
 This feature of the plan reflected Lindsay’s undisputed testimony that Jeff’s work schedule did
not require him to work on Fridays.
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“best interest of the child” factors enumerated under § 40-4-212(1)(a)–(m), MCA. See

Penderson v. Orvis (In re G.M.O.), 2017 MT 116, ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 390, 394 P.3d 913. That

the District Court placed emphasis on the “continuity and stability of care” factor when

adopting the parties’ interim parenting plan as the Final Parenting Plan does not provide

grounds for reversal.

Child Support

¶28    Jeff appeals the District Court’s determination of Lindsay’s income for child support

purposes and the District Court’s denial of his M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion based on newly

discovered evidence of additional income derived from short term rentals of her post-

marital home, which Jeff asserted in his post-judgment motion “adds up to $33,000 of

income from the end of June and all of July.” Jeff asserts the District Court’s “finding was

based on speculation and should be reversed” considering evidence at trial regarding

Lindsay’s gross income from her photography business and an unusual reference to

Lindsay’s propensity to ski.

¶29    Based on the evidence at trial, the District Court made oral findings regarding

Lindsay’s business practices, expenses, and ability to work. As discussed previously

regarding Jeff’s arguments on his discovery claims, the information provided by Lindsay

was sufficient for the District Court to calculate her income.           See Marriage of

Anderson,¶ 14. The District Court also emphasized the difference between a party’s net

and gross income figures, especially in the context of a self-employed person such as

Lindsay. Lindsay provided information on her business expenses in both her tax returns

                                            14
and profit and loss statements, which contained itemized representations of the costs

associated with the way Lindsay does business. Further, in finding Lindsay’s net income

was $32,000, the District Court implicitly rejected Jeff’s other attempts to extrapolate her

income based on his assumptions regarding her income, which included assertions that

Lindsay’s gross income should have been found to exceed $98,000.                Jeff has not

demonstrated the District Court abused its discretion regarding its calculation of Lindsay’s

income for child support purposes, or its denial of Jeff’s Rule 60(b) motion based on

conclusory assertions of “newly discovered evidence.” We accordingly decline to disturb

the award of child support in the amount of $713 per month.

Clerical Errors

¶30    Both parties raise claims regarding clerical errors and oversights by the District

Court, which the District Court failed to correct pursuant to the parties’ post-judgment

motions. First, Jeff claimed in his Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Mont. R.

Civ. P. 59 and 60 that the District Court erroneously credited him with only $118,500 for

his contribution to the purchase and construction of the Oakmont Lane property, instead of

the full $199,291 he received from the sale of the Eckleberry Drive property. Jeff is correct.

¶31    The District Court concluded that “Jeff should receive credit for his financial

investment in the property with pre-marital assets that are directly traceable, specifically

the proceeds from the sale of the Eckleberry Drive property to the extent those were

contributed, and also the money from his pre-marital savings.” Jeff testified, and the

District Court found in the Decree, that Jeff received $199,291 in net proceeds from the

                                             15
sale of the Eckleberry Drive property. The District Court also found that the Oakmont

Lane property was purchased for $118,500; that the Oakmont Lane property “was

purchased with proceeds from the sale of the Eckleberry Drive property”; and that “Jeff

used the remainder of the proceeds and over $49,000 from his savings to build a house on

the property.” (Emphasis added.) These facts were uncontroverted at trial, and the District

Court made no findings indicating an intent to give Jeff credit for less than the full proceeds

of the Eckleberry Drive property sale. Jeff’s pre-marital contributions total $248,291,

instead of $168,500. Given that the District Court ordered Jeff to assume responsibility for

the outstanding encumbrances against the Oakmont Lane property, the total deductions are

$341,709, the net theoretical equity of the home is $733,291, and Lindsay’s payment,

should Jeff choose to retain the Oakmont Lane property is $366,645.50.4 The District

Court’s denial of Jeff’s post-judgment motion for relief on this issue was an abuse of

discretion and should be corrected on remand.

¶32    Jeff also asserts the District Court should have deducted the $23,000 he paid

Lindsay pursuant to the Interim Agreement from the sum owed to her either under the

buyout provision or the sale of the Oakmont Lane property. Jeff points to the portion of

the Interim Agreement which provides:

       The remaining $23,000.00 may or may not be considered an advance or
       offset toward any future settlement or judicial determination on the issues of
       property/debt division in this matter, and each party reserves their right to

4
 Jeff also asserts the District Court erred in failing to set forth the disposition of funds should Jeff
elect to sell the property instead of buying out Lindsay’s share. Pursuant to the Decree, Lindsay
would receive half of the net proceeds of the sale, after accounting for Jeff’s contribution of
pre-marital funds totaling $248,291.
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       present their position regarding the same in settlement negotiations or any
       future hearings or trial in this matter.

Jeff testified at trial that his property settlement payment should be reduced by $23,000.

The explicit terms of the Interim Agreement vested the District Court with discretion on

the issue and exercising that discretion in a manner disagreeable to one party does not

establish an abuse of this vested discretion.

Personal Property Items

¶33    The final contested issue before us is Lindsay’s claim on cross-appeal that Jeff

should be ordered to return specific items of personal property. On the issue of specific

items of personal property, the District Court stated in the Decree that:

       The Court finds that there was significant co-mingling of personal property
       and that trying to separate it out is impossible based on the evidence
       presented. The Court is not going to assign values to any item of personal
       property, including the so-called business assets involving Lindsay’s
       photography activities. The Court believes that each party has received a fair
       and equitable share of the personal property owned by them, regardless of
       when acquired, and that those offset and neither is indebted to the other. Each
       shall receive and have, free from any claim of the other, the personal property
       currently in his or her possession with the exception of the items listed in
       Finding 52 above, and the excavator which will be sold and the proceeds
       divided.

The District Court’s determination regarding the division of Jeff and Lindsay’s property is

supported by substantial evidence. Testimony at trial established that through their time

together, Jeff and Lindsay comingled personal property. Testimony also established that

much of this property was lost or unaccounted for. That the District Court made this

finding and the accompanying practical conclusion that parsing through the parties’

                                                17
property on an item-by-item basis was an exercise of futility does not demonstrate an abuse

of discretion.

¶34    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

                                                 /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur:

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE

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