Court Opinion

ID: 9715730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:13:11.286928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:37.637773
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I dissent.
*101The statute in question in this action is 1965 PA 198, as amended by 1968 PA 223; MCLA 257.1118; MSA 9.2818. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 18. In all actions in which recovery is to be sought against the fund, said action must be commenced within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrues. Recovery from the fund shall not be allowed in any event unless notice of intent to claim against the fund is served upon the secretary, on a form prescribed by him, within 6 months of the date that the cause of action shall accrue.” (Emphasis added.)
The essence of our Court’s holding today is:
"The failure to give notice may result in prejudice to the fund according to whatever reason justifies the notice requirement. Whenever the Secretary claims to have been prejudiced by the lack of notice, he should be afforded the opportunity to show such prejudice.
"While we decline to declare that the notice requirement of § 18 is constitutionally defective, we hold that only upon a showing of prejudice by failure to give such notice, may the claim against the fund be dismissed.”
To summarize:
The statute requires that a notice of claim be made to the Secretary of State within six months of the date of the cause of action.
The statute says that no recovery may be had from the fund unless the notice is given.
Our Court declines to hold that the statute is unconstitutional. But we go on to say that this constitutionally valid and plainly stated requirement for a notice of claim within six months, does not really mean what it clearly says.
The Secretary will have to show, on a case-by-case basis that the fund has been somehow prejudiced by each individual failure to give the required notice.
*102Now the curious thing is that while the Court has conceded that there are—or at least there may be—valid reasons for the requirement of notice, that requirement is not binding in any case where the reasons do not directly apply.
The rationale of the Court displays a total disregard for the fundamental power of the Legislature to make binding, uniform rules of human conduct. By the reasoning in this case, it may fairly be concluded that no law is binding upon any citizen unless he or she may be found guilty of the mischief intended to be avoided by the adoption of the law.
Thus a statute prohibiting motorists from proceeding through red lights is a valid exercise of the police power, founded in reason and logic and designed to move traffic and prevent collisions between vehicles approaching intersections from different directions. Under the rule of the case before us, the citizen has committed no offense unless, by proceeding through a red light he has interfered with traffic coming from the other direction.
Endless other examples come to mind.
Statutory law must always be expressed in terms clearly defining the conduct which is prohibited or required.
The power to legislate necessarily includes the power to declare the boundaries of prohibited or required conduct.
Moreover, legislation which does not declare such boundaries is constitutionally infirm. Citizens must be able to know what their legal rights and duties are.
By the rule of the case decided here, a claim against the Uninsured Motorists’ Fund is not barred per se by failure to give the notice, but only *103by prejudicial failure to give notice. Further, our decision does not even create a presumption of prejudice from failure to give notice. The Secretary is put to the burden of proof to show that prejudice has in fact occurred.
Our decision emasculates the statutory notice requirement. The Court’s candor in conceding distaste for time limitations is no justification for judicial legislation.
M. S. Coleman, J.. concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.