Court Opinion

ID: 9529767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:00.528981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:54.922771
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring: I agree with both the majority’s conclusion that there was a common-law dedication of the subject planting strip, as well as its determination that the strip’s use as a parkway was consistent with the designated use. Thus, I concur with the majority’s decision that the property does not have the required frontage on a public road. However, I do not agree with the majority’s view that a statutory dedication occurred here. In Emalfarb v. Krater, 266 Ill. App. 3d 243 (1994), this court wrote: "Pursuant to section 3 of the Plat Act (765 ILCS 205/3 (West 1992)), a statutory dedication occurs when the owner of property files or records a plat which marks or notes on the plat portions of the premises as donated or granted to the public. [Citation.] In order to effect a statutory dedication, the provisions of the Plat Act must be fully complied with, and the plat must clearly indicate a donation to the public of the real estate in question. [Citations.] In determining whether there was a valid statutory dedication under the Plat Act, a court is limited to an examination of the plat and the marks and notations appearing on. the plat.” 266 Ill. App. 3d at 252. The instant plat does not contain the language necessary to create a statutory dedication. The term "reserved for owners for planting purposes” does not indicate a donation to the public of the subject strip. Accordingly, I would decide this case solely on the basis of a common-law dedication having occurred. Finally, I note that it is unfortunate that the parties’ arguments tended to obscure the issue of what entity actually owned the subject strip. If that matter had been better clarified, this court’s determination of the case would have been much simpler to achieve.