Court Opinion

ID: 9353158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 01:00:31.098244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:56.942138
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40020        Document: 00516605438             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/10/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-40020
                                                                           FILED
                                    Summary Calendar
                                                                    January 10, 2023
                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                               Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Clay Melton Denton,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:19-CR-241-1

   Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Clay Melton Denton was found guilty by a jury of distribution of child
   pornography, receipt of child pornography, and possession of child
   pornography involving a prepubescent minor. He was sentenced within the
   applicable guidelines range to 240 months of imprisonment, followed by
   eight years of supervised release. On appeal, Denton challenges the district

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40020      Document: 00516605438          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/10/2023

                                    No. 22-40020

   court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his indictment and its rejection of his
   requested spoliation jury instruction. He also contends that the district court
   procedurally erred in its analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and failed to
   consider disparities among defendants nationwide in denying his request for
   a downward sentencing variance.
          We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an
   indictment de novo and the underlying factual findings, including a bad faith
   determination, for clear error. United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 868-
   69 (5th Cir. 2010). To prevail on his motion to dismiss his indictment,
   Denton was required to show that potentially useful evidence was lost or
   destroyed by the Government in bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
   U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988) (government’s failure to preserve “material
   exculpatory evidence” constitutes a denial of due process irrespective of
   good or bad faith but “merely potentially useful evidence” requires a
   showing of bad faith); McNealy, 625 F.3d at 868. There is no evidence that
   law enforcement personnel intentionally lost or destroyed any digital
   evidence in order to impede Denton’s defense. Rather, the record reflects
   that the search team followed what they believed to be standard procedures
   and conducted a risk analysis before powering down and seizing devices at
   Denton’s home. Denton therefore has failed to show that the district court
   clearly erred in determining there was no bad faith and denying his motion to
   dismiss. See McNealy, 625 F.3d at 868-70.
          Next, we review the district court’s denial of a spoliation jury
   instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 239
   (5th Cir. 2016). “[T]he party seeking the instruction must demonstrate bad
   faith or bad conduct by the other party.” Id.; see United States v. Wise, 221
   F.3d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 2000). “Bad faith, in the context of spoliation,
   generally means destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse evidence.”
   Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 2015) (addressing spoliation in

                                         2
Case: 22-40020      Document: 00516605438          Page: 3    Date Filed: 01/10/2023

                                    No. 22-40020

   the civil context). Although Denton urges this court to adopt a lesser
   standard of culpability, such as negligence, we are bound by the rule of
   orderliness. See United States v. Berry, 951 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (later panel cannot overrule an earlier panel’s decision). Denton maintains
   that the agents failed to properly power off his devices, seize all components
   of his computer system, and map the system. Nothing in the record,
   however, establishes that the agents intentionally failed to do these things for
   the purpose of hiding exculpatory evidence. Thus, because Denton failed to
   show bad faith, we find no abuse of discretion. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 239.
          Because Denton did not preserve his claim of procedural error, our
   review of his sentence is for plain error. See United States v. Mondragon-
   Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). In support of his argument that
   the district court improperly limited its analysis and construction of
   § 3553(a)(6), and failed to consider disparities among defendants nationwide,
   Denton relies on the district court’s remarks that it had never granted a
   downward variance in a child pornography case based on the nationwide
   statistics submitted by Denton. This argument, however, fails to recognize
   that the district court’s remarks were made in response to Denton’s
   contentions—in support of his requested downward variance—that
   inconsistencies in child pornography sentences exist across the federal
   districts and that application of the Sentencing Guidelines in his case is
   against public policy. Denton has not shown that the district court committed
   a clear or obvious procedural error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
   135 (2009).
          To the extent that Denton’s arguments may be viewed as a challenge
   to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, our review is for abuse of
   discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67
   (2020); see also United States v. Douglas, 957 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2020).
   Denton’s argument that the district court erred by not considering the

                                          3
Case: 22-40020        Document: 00516605438        Page: 4    Date Filed: 01/10/2023

                                    No. 22-40020

   nationwide sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants is
   unpersuasive. See United States v. Waguespack, 935 F.3d 322, 337 (5th Cir.
   2019); United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 379 (5th Cir. 2011). Denton
   is essentially asking us to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors, which we will not do.
   See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Moreover, his argument
   does not suffice to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that applies to
   his within-guidelines sentence. See United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 398
   (5th Cir. 2010).
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

                                          4