Court Opinion

ID: 9673805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:18:44.377446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.228521
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority opinion. It is wrong because the New York law governs by policy provision and by agreement of counsel. The majority opinion does not cite any applicable New York case, while the rule upholding the ninety-day proof of loss requirement has been upheld in many cases.
In MacKay v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 281 N.Y. 42, 22 N.E.2d 154, it was held that the proof of loss required by the policy provisions must be given within the ninety-day limit and therefore recovery should be refused. In Maryland Casualty Company v. Massey, 6 CCA, 38 F.2d 724, 71 *150A.L.R. 1428, proof of loss filed one day late was held to be too late and recovery was denied. Both of these cases were cited with approval in a 1965 case, Bland v. Trevvett, 23 A.D.2d 534, 256 N.Y.S.2d 644, in which the failure to comply with the ninety-day provision as to proof of loss was held to bar recovery. See also Whiteside v. North American Insurance Company, 200 N.Y. 320, 93 N.E. 948, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 696; Wachtel v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N.Y. 345, 194 N.E. 850; and Foulis v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association, 37 Misc.2d 743, 236 N.Y.S.2d 82.
The Bland v. Trevvett case involved the identical policy provision since the action was against Trevvett as treasurer of appellant. There, proof of loss was furnished five and one-half months late. The claimant sought to excuse her delay because of her “inability to secure a statement from a passenger in the automobile at the time of the accident who had been hospitalized by reason of serious injuries.” She also urged that the insurer “was estopped to deny that the proof of loss was timely furnished for she had cooperated fully with an agent of appellant shortly after the accident and had given him full details and a copy of her attorney’s file.” Recovery was denied. It was held that the “reasonably possible” provision was not a part of the policy and did not apply, citing three of the cases above cited. The court said: “Neither the doctrine of estoppel nor the public policy of liberal construction can be invoked in support of respondent’s position. The failure to comply with the policy and the statute controlling it require a dismissal of the complaint.”
James Witte died November 13, 1958. Soon thereafter appellee was charged with and subsequently indicted for voluntary manslaughter by reason of Witte’s death. Her brother-in-law engaged Harry Luedeke and Malcolm Rhoads, partners in the same law firm, to represent the estate and appel-lee, respectively. On December 12, 1958, Luedeke gave appellant notification of Wit-te’s death. In the letter he used the pronoun “We,” referring to his firm, including Rhoads. On December 17, 1958, his firm received proofs of loss. Luedeke testified that he advised appellee in December 1958 that the firm had the policy and that she was the beneficiary. He also said that his firm was not asked by appellee to collect on the policy until April or May 1959. Willaim Sorgs testified that Luedeke told him in December 1958 that he represented appellee. Appellee admitted that she became aware of the policy and that she was the named beneficiary at a meeting on January 15, 1959, with Luedeke, Rhoads, and another attorney named Hopkins, who had been employed to assist in representing her on the criminal charge.
Inasmuch as evidence that she was the beneficiary of a $10,000 insurance policy on the life of the man whom she was charged with killing would have been evidence of a motive and would have been condemning, it is fair to assume that the insurance policy and its beneficiary provision were thoroughly discussed at this meeting.
The further significance of this is that there was a serious question whether appel-lee could have collected as beneficiary under the policy if she had been convicted of the felony. Soon after the trial was over on April 22, 1959, and appellee had been freed of the felony charge, the proof of loss was processed at her direction by Luedeke and filed with appellant. This accounts for the delay for which appellant should not be charged and which is not justified under the New York law. Bland v. Trevvett, 23 A.D.2d 534, 256 N.Y.S.2d 644; Allstate Insurance Company v. Manger, 30 Misc.2d 326, 213 N.Y.S.2d 901.
The majority opinion seeks to justify in part its holding of waiver of the filing of proof of loss with appellant by indicating that the insurance company made its own investigation by means of a private detective and thus rendered the filing of such proof of loss unnecessary. Such a position is absurd on its face to suggest that an in*151surance company waives the right to have a claimant submit a proof of loss because of the insurer’s investigation of the claim.
For these reasons I think that the appellant should win because of appellee’s failure to file proof of loss within ninety days of the death of James Witte, because appellee was fully cognizant of her rights as beneficiary under the policy by reason of notice and advice of her own counsel well within the ninety-day period, and because appellant did not waive its right to the proof of loss, all of which should bar recovery by her.
HILL, J., joins in dissent.