Court Opinion

ID: 9631044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:27:36.291644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:17.574323
License: Public Domain

*111
Levine, J,

concurring:
Today the Court properly concludes that evidence adduced at appellee’s trial establishing her complicity in the murder of her husband as an accessory before the fact was not inconsistent with the terms of an indictment framed in accordance with the abbreviated form prescribed by Code (1957,1976 Repl. Yol.) Art. 27, § 616 (a). In basing its decision on this narrow ground, the majority has found it unnecessary to reach the pivotal question certified for review in the writ of certiorari: whether Maryland should abandon the ancient common law distinction between principals and accessories before the fact. Because of the great importance of this issue to the administration of criminal justice in this State, I wish to register my disapproval of the common law classifications with the modest hope that the views expressed here might lead to their early demise.1
Maryland enjoys the unique status of being the only jurisdiction in the United States (and perhaps the only common law jurisdiction in the world) that has retained the common law doctrine of accessoryship in virtually the same form as it existed at the time of William Blackstone in the 18th century.2 Unlike our sister states, there are no statutes in Maryland which purport to modify the common law rules, although several provisions in Article 27 do allude indirectly to the ancient categories with respect to particular felonies.3 Nor have the decisions handed down by this Court and the Court of Special Appeals effected any substantial change in *112the common law doctrine or its procedural idiosyncracies. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217-19, 117 A. 2d 549 (1955); Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 369-71, 189 A. 248 (1937); Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 45-47 (1873); McBryde and Bland v. State, 30 Md. App. 357, 359-61, 352 A. 2d 324 (1976); Huff v. State, 23 Md. App. 211, 214-16, 326 A. 2d 198 (1974); Butina v. State, 4 Md. App. 312, 316-19, 242 A. 2d 819 (1968); Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. 278, 280-83, 234 A. 2d 284 (1967).
Since accessories and principals at common law were deemed to be equally culpable and therefore subject to the same punishment, Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. at 281; 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law *267 (1819); Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes § 8.05, at 522 (7th ed. 1967), the classification of parties as principals and accessories, had little, if any, substantive significance.
On the other hand, the common law doctrines of accessoryship did give rise to several highly technical procedural rules which, as one recent commentator has stated, “tended to shield accessories from punishment notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of their criminal assistance.” W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 63, at 498-99 (1972). These rules make their appearance in essentially three areas: 1) jurisdiction; 2) trial; and 3) pleading. As to the first, jurisdiction, the rule was that an accessory could be put on trial only in that jurisdiction in which the act of accessoryship was committed, irrespective of the situs of the felony itself. State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 566 (1856); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 671 (2d ed. 1969).
Insofar as trial procedure is concerned, an accessory before the fact at common law could not be tried before the principal. Thus, if the principal were acquitted or his identity never established, an accessory to the felony could never be brought to trial, thereby escaping punishment altogether. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 423, 425 (1820); L. Hochheimer, The Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure § 38, at 23 (1897).
Finally, the rule as to pleading, invoked by the Court of Special Appeals to reverse appellee’s conviction, has produced the result that one charged with the commission of a felony *113as a principal cannot be convicted of that crime if the evidence actually produced shows only that the accused had acted as an accessory before the fact. Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. at 284. Conversely, if an individual is charged in the indictment solely as an accessory before the fact, subsequent proof of his guilt as a principal will not result in a conviction. McBryde and Bland v. State, 30 Md. App. at 360.
Inasmuch as the preceding rules have never been altered by statute or judicial decision, it would appear that they represent the law of Maryland at the present time. There is nothing in the majority opinion to the contrary.
The reason for the development of these rules is obscure at best. Professor Perkins has speculated that they were devised by 14th and 15th century English common law courts as a means of alleviating the harshness of the death penalty in felony cases. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 669 (2d ed. 1969); and see W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 63, at 499 (1972). If this theory of the historical provenience of the common law categories and procedures be correct, it is now beyond question that the rules have outlived their purpose, in light of the universal rejection of capital punishment for any but the most heinous felonies and the manifold constitutional restrictions placed upon application of the death penalty in recent years. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
The common law principles of accomplicity and their procedural counterparts, in my opinion, have injected a most undesirable hypertechnicality into the law of accomplice responsibility, which not infrequently operates to thwart justice and reduce judicial efficiency. See Note, 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 96 (1962). As this Court candidly stated in Watson v. State, 208 Md. at 218:
“ ‘ This distinguishing of the accessory before the fact from the principal is a pure technicality. It has no existence either in natural reason or the ordinary doctrines of the law. For in natural reason the procurer of a crime is not chargeable differently *114from the doer; and a familiar rule of the common law is that what one does through another’s agency is regarded as done by himself____Likewise in morals, there are circumstances wherein we attach more blame to the accessory before the fact than to his principal; ....’” (Quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law § 673, at 486-87 (9th ed. 1923)).
The time has come in my opinion to discard the common law distinction between principals and accessories before the fact and to replace these categories with an all-encompassing doctrine which would treat all those who knowingly procure, command, counsel, encourage, aid or abet a felon in the commission of a crime as principals regardless of whether the aider or abettor was actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime. To adopt such a rule by judicial fiat would not, as I see it, result in any unfair prejudice towards defendants.4 For example, an indictment accusing one with the commission of a crime provides sufficient notice of the nature of the proceeding even when the defendant may have participated solely as an accessory before the fact. Additionally, it is significant that the traditional rules pertaining to jurisdiction and trial of accessories have been abrogated by statute in the vast majority of American jurisdictions without unfairly prejudicing defendants and without running afoul of their constitutional rights.
It is argued in rebuttal that the common law accessoryship rules have become too fundamental to Anglo-American jurisprudence to be abolished and that if change is in order, it should be made by the General Assembly. See 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law % 673, at 487 (9th ed. 1923). The common law, however, is not a static body of absolute and unyielding principles. Rather the genius of the common law lies in its capacity to respond to the ever-changing needs and conditions *115of human society. State v. Rush, 46 N. J. 399, 217 A. 2d 441, 446, 21 A.L.R.3d 804 (1966); see State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 366 (1821) (Chase, C. J., concurring).
When all is said and done, the sole justification advanced for retaining the common law categories is the sheer antiquity of the doctrine. Consequently, in my view, the burden falls upon those who seek to perpetuate the anachronism to defend it.
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was so laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it is laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
For these reasons I respectfully concur in the judgment of the Court. Judge Eldridge authorizes me to state that he joins this opinion.

. Definitions of the common law categories of accomplices are set out in the majority opinion and need not be reiterated here. It should be noted that the common law did not recognize degrees of accomplicity where the offense involved was a misdemeanor or high treason — parties to such crimes being deemed principals for all purposes. Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490, 503-504 (1876); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *35 (1765).

. For a catalogue of state statutes modifying the common law rules of accessoryship see Model Penal Code § 2.04, Appendix (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953); and see W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 63, at 500 (1972). Significantly, England, the birthplace of the common law rules, pioneered their curtailment as early as 1861. The Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet. c. 94.

. See, e.g., Code (1957,1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 6 (arson); Art. 27, § 29 (burglary); Art. 27, § 30 (breaking and entering); Art. 27, § 44 (forgery); Art. 27, § 128 (embezzlement); Art. 27, § 337 (kidnapping); Art. 27, § 340 (larceny); Art. 27, § 384 (maiming); Art. 27, § 486 (robbery); Art. 27, § 488 (armed robbery).

. Contrary to appellee’s assertions, such a judicial abolition would not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Md. Decl. of Rights, art. 17, since eliminating the categories would not in any way alter the elements of the substantive criminal offense — the only change being procedural in nature. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 293-94, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977); Splawn v. California, 431 U. S. 595, 601, 97 S. Ct. 1987, 52 L.Ed.2d 606 (1977).