Court Opinion

ID: 9702514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:15:04.508709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:38.252251
License: Public Domain

Hallows, J.
(on motion for rehearing, dissenting in part). I see no reason why the extended explanation of the per curiam opinion is limited to a partition suit between husband and wife. A brother and sister, and a parent and child relationship may give rise to joint tenancies in form which are not intended to be such in fact. In those cases the form of tenancy should not preclude the court from determining the substance — it never has in the history of the courts of equity. This is the true ground upon which a partition should be made, not that public policy should prevent a spouse from obtaining a greater share of the jointly held *406fassets than such spouse normally would receive in a divorce proceeding. Principles applied to a division of property in divorce are entirely different than those applicable to a partition.
I point out an apparent inconsistency in the per curiam opinion. It is intimated that if the real estate involved had been partitioned in kind, dower could have been barred in the land set off to her husband and the value of the inchoate right of dower determined, presumably under sec. 276.36, Stats., and given to the wife in addition to whatever interest she had in the property. However, in the case of sale, the court would deny such interest to the wife. In view of this decision, it behooves husbands to seek a partition by sale; and wives, a division in kind.
I am authorized to state Mr. Justice Fairchild joins in this opinion.