Court Opinion

ID: 9897221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:50.315375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:51.906921
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                           May 17 2023, 11:41 am

                                                                CLERK
                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                     IN THE                                    Court of Appeals
                                                                 and Tax Court

Indiana Supreme Court
       Supreme Court Case No. 20S-LW-620

        Joseph Albert Oberhansley,
             Appellant (Defendant below)

                          –v–

                State of Indiana,
               Appellee (Plaintiff below).

     Argued: April 6, 2023 | Decided: May 17, 2023

      Direct Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court
                 No. 10C04-1409-MR-1
       The Honorable Vicki L. Carmichael, Judge

               Opinion by Justice Goff
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Molter concur.
           Justice Slaughter concurs in part.
Goff, Justice.

   Joseph Albert Oberhansley was convicted of burglary and the murder
of his former partner, Tammy Jo Blanton—crimes he concedes were
“horrific and brutal.” 1 The jury recommended, and the trial court
imposed, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
(LWOP). In this direct appeal, Oberhansley argues that the jury failed to
determine that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances—a statutory prerequisite for an LWOP sentence. We
conclude that the jury’s LWOP recommendation implicitly reflected the
necessary determination and, thus, the trial court did not err in imposing
the sentence. Oberhansley also claims that his sentence was inappropriate
in light of the severe mental illness he was suffering when he committed
these crimes. Considering his character and the nature of his crimes, we
cannot agree with him. Consequently, we affirm his sentence.

Facts and Procedural History
   Oberhansley’s childhood in Utah was, by his own description, “good,
or better than most.” App. Vol. X, p. 35. Nevertheless, he accumulated a
string of juvenile adjudications for acts including assaults and burglaries.
When Oberhansley was sixteen, his half-brother and his father both died
by suicide. At around age seventeen, Oberhansley had a son with his
then-girlfriend. He shot his girlfriend and his mother a few days after the
birth, killing his girlfriend. He also shot himself in the head during this
incident. Oberhansley’s suicide attempt left him with traumatic brain
injuries. In 2000, he pled guilty to manslaughter and attempted murder.
He served time in prison, during which he complained about hearing
voices. In 2012, he was released on parole, which he transferred to
Indiana, where he lived with family.

   During his time in Indiana, Oberhansley’s mental health struggles and
trouble with the law continued. He was employed for a while at a car

1   Oral Argument at 02:07–08.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023          Page 2 of 15
dealership. But, in 2013, he was charged with strangulation and resisting
law enforcement. In 2014, he reported to police that his family was trying
to kill him and, when police officers found him driving recklessly, he
attempted to evade them, leading to charges of criminal recklessness and
resisting law enforcement. After being taken to a hospital because of his
mental state, Oberhansley claimed the FBI was following him, he asked
nurses to shoot him or give him a gun, he referred to himself as “Zeus,”
and he bit his own wrist. App. Vol. V, p. 81. A few days later, he was
taken for inpatient psychiatric treatment, where he was prescribed
medication. After bonding out of jail, he sought medical treatment once
more and was found to be “paranoid and delusional.” Id.

   Meanwhile, Oberhansley had begun dating Tammy Jo Blanton. In June
2014, he moved into Blanton’s home. It was evident to a coworker of
Blanton that Oberhansley was mentally ill, as he was hearing voices,
hallucinating, and saying he was a god. One Monday in September 2014,
Blanton told the coworker that Oberhansley had assaulted her over the
weekend. Blanton did not go home that Monday night, but ended her
relationship with Oberhansley by text message, saying: “No one, and I
mean no one, gets to terrify me the way [you] did on Sunday.” Tr. Vol.
VII, p. 212. She told him to take away his belongings and that the locks
would be changed. The next day, Oberhansley visited Blanton at work,
but left because Blanton did not want to talk with him. On the day after
that, with new locks installed, Blanton returned to her home. Oberhansley
tried to enter and retrieve his belongings, but Blanton did not let him in.
Later, in the middle of the night, Blanton called the police, telling them
that Oberhansley was trying to kick her door down. Jeffersonville Police
Department Officer Brandon McGhee responded. Outside Blanton’s
home, he found Oberhansley complaining about not being able to get in.
After talking with officers, Oberhansley agreed to leave the scene.

   In the morning, Blanton did not show up for work. Her coworker called
her again and again. Eventually, Oberhansley picked up, claiming to be
Blanton’s brother and saying that Blanton had gone to care for their father.
Suspicious of this explanation, another coworker asked police to conduct a
welfare check. Officers went to Blanton’s home and knocked on the door.
When Oberhansley opened it, he had a cut on his hand. A pat-down

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search revealed a brass-knuckle knife in Oberhansley’s pocket, which had
hair and blood on it. Officer Connie Viers entered the home and found
“blood everywhere, everywhere” in the bathroom and a “bloody mound”
in the bathtub. Tr. Vol. V, p. 159. She also noted that the back door of the
home had been forced. On closer inspection, Officer Viers and other
officers discovered it was Blanton’s body in the bathtub, under a shower
curtain. There was a hole in Blanton’s head and brain tissue falling out.
Part of her skull lay by her knees. Blood was scattered around the house
on and near various tools and cooking implements. In and around the
kitchen sink were knives, cooking and eating utensils, and dirty plates
with blood on them. Body tissues were found in a trash can under the
sink. An autopsy found that Oberhansley had inflicted on Blanton twenty-
five “sharp force injuries,” including eight stab wounds. Tr. Vol. VII, p.
133. Several of them had been inflicted while Blanton was alive.

   Officers arrested Oberhansley and interrogated him at the station. He
spoke of “tingling,” being “electrified,” wanting to “restore the balance,”
and “Zeus” falling. Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 110–11, 180. At one point, he claimed
that two “black guys” killed Blanton. Id. at 177–78. He said these men
wanted to eat his brain and take the “third eye” from “the center of the
forehead.” Id. at 194. And he admitted eating part of Blanton’s brain to get
the “third eye.” Id. at 212–13. In a later interrogation, Oberhansley also
admitted eating Blanton’s heart and mentioned “demons coming out.” Tr.
Vol. VII, pp. 4, 8.

   The State, in its final amended information, charged Oberhansley with
murder, Level 4 felony burglary, and Level 3 felony rape. 2 The State also
requested the death penalty, alleging three statutory aggravating factors:
the murder being intentionally committed during a burglary, the murder
being intentionally committed during a rape, and the dismemberment of
Blanton’s body. 3 Before trial, Oberhansley was found incompetent to
stand trial. After around nine months in a hospital, he was restored to

2   See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2014); I.C. § 35-43-2-1(1); I.C. § 35-42-4-1.
3   See I.C. §§ 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(B), (1)(F), (10).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023                     Page 4 of 15
competency. After a second suggestion of incompetence, he was found
competent. Oberhansley initially filed a notice that he would plead the
defense of insanity. However, the parties reached an agreement under
which Oberhansley would withdraw his insanity defense and the State
would seek LWOP instead of the death penalty. The trial court ordered
that, because Oberhansley had withdrawn his insanity defense, he could
not present any mental-health defense evidence in the guilt phase of the
trial. A first trial ended in a mistrial. A second attempt to empanel a jury
failed when insufficient jurors were available. Then, once more,
Oberhansley was declared incompetent and his competency was again
restored.

   At the third trial, the jury found Oberhansley guilty of murder and
burglary, but acquitted him of rape. During the LWOP sentencing phase,
the State pointed to the evidence presented in the guilt phase and argued,
as aggravating circumstances, that Oberhansley had committed murder
while committing burglary and that he had dismembered Blanton’s body.
Oberhansley presented the testimony of two mental-health experts and
claimed, as mitigating circumstances, that he had acted under extreme
mental disturbance and that mental illness impaired his capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
law.

   The trial court instructed the jury that, before it could recommend an
LWOP sentence, it had to find one or both aggravating circumstances
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that any aggravating
circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. The jury was
further instructed that the court would provide verdict forms. The
purpose of these forms, the court advised, was threefold: first, to show
whether the jury found each alleged aggravating circumstance proven;
second, to show whether any aggravating circumstances it found
outweighed the mitigating circumstances; and, third, to show whether it
recommended LWOP or a term-of-years sentence. Despite these
instructions, the jury did not receive a verdict form for the weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The jury returned forms
indicating it found both aggravating circumstances proven and
recommending an LWOP sentence. The trial court noted verbally that the

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jury had found the aggravating circumstances proven and recommended
LWOP. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court found “sufficient evidence
to support the jury’s decision” and imposed an LWOP sentence. App. Vol.
X, p. 59.

  Oberhansley sought direct appeal to this Court. See Ind. Appellate Rule
4(A)(1)(a). Additional facts are discussed below as necessary.

Standards of Review
   As this Court stated in Cardosi v. State, another case concerning an
LWOP sentence recommended by a jury, we recognize the trial court’s
“wide discretion in sentencing” and will reverse a sentence “‘only upon a
showing of a manifest abuse of that discretion.’” 128 N.E.3d 1277, 1289
(Ind. 2019) (quoting Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 19 (Ind. 2015)).

   When we review a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), we show the
trial court “considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1222 (Ind. 2008). This “deference should prevail unless overcome by
compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the
offense” and “the defendant’s character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d
111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

Discussion and Decision
   Oberhansley argues that the jury, lacking the verdict form for weighing
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, failed to make a
determination on this issue, and, thus, that the trial court lacked the
authority to impose an LWOP sentence. He further claims that imposition
of the LWOP sentence without the necessary jury finding violated his
right to due process under the federal constitution. Oberhansley also seeks
revision of his sentence, asserting that it was inappropriate because he
committed his crimes due to severe mental illness.

   While we reject the State’s assertion that Oberhansley waived his claims
of sentencing error, our review of the record convinces us that the jury
did, in fact, make the necessary weighing determination. And reviewing

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Oberhansley’s sentence, we do not find compelling evidence casting his
crimes or his character in a positive light. Consequently, we decline to
revise his LWOP sentence.

I. The jury’s LWOP recommendation reflected its
   determination that the aggravating circumstances
   outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
   When a defendant is convicted of murder after a trial by jury and the
State seeks an LWOP or death sentence, the jury reconvenes for a
sentencing hearing. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(d) (2014). The statute lists
several “aggravating circumstances” which make defendants eligible for
these penalties. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. 2004) (citing I.C. §
35-50-2-9(b)). Before the jury may recommend LWOP, it must:

        (1) find at least one aggravating circumstance proven
        beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) provide a special verdict
        form for each aggravating circumstance alleged, and (3) find
        that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating
        circumstances.

Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1253 (Ind. 2008) (citing I.C. §§ 35-50-2-
9(d), (e), (l)). The weighing determination is regarded as “essentially a
discretionary function” of the jury, rather than as a “factual
determination.” Id. (citing Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 268). The statute does not
require a special verdict form for the weighing determination. The jury’s
penalty recommendation is binding on the court “except where the
traditional allocation of functions between judge and jury authorize or
require the judge to set aside the jury’s findings.” Id.

   Here, Oberhansley claims that the jury failed to take the third required
step and find that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances. His argument comes down to the omission of a
form that the trial court told the jury it must return. Oberhansley argues
that the form in question was not given to the jury, that the jury did not
manifest its weighing determination in any other manner, and, therefore,
that the record does not show the jury found the aggravating

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circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. He raises this
issue under two legal theories, alleging violation of the LWOP statute and
deprivation of his liberty without due process.

   A. Oberhansley’s claims of sentencing error are
      reviewable.
   As a preliminary matter, we do not find that Oberhansley has waived
his statutory or due process claims of sentencing error, as the State argues.
The State’s brief cites two cases in which this Court has found waiver of
claims based on omitted verdict forms. In Schiro v. State, the defendant
was convicted of murder while committing or attempting to commit rape.
451 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (Ind. 1983). The trial court provided the jury with
ten verdict forms, including forms for finding the defendant “Guilty of
Murder/Rape,” “Guilty of Murder but mentally ill,” “Not Guilty,” and
more. Id. at 1062. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by
failing to provide two other forms, including one for “Guilty of Murder
while committing and attempting to commit rape, but mentally ill.” Id.
This Court held that there could be no reversible error based on the jury
retiring “‘without sufficient forms of verdict’” when the defendant failed
to timely request the omitted forms. Id. at 1062–63 (quoting Himes v. State,
273 Ind. 416, 424, 403 N.E.2d 1377, 1382 (1980)). In Pope v. State, the
defendant was convicted of two murders and other crimes. 737 N.E.2d
374, 376 (Ind. 2000). He argued that the trial court erred in failing to
provide the jury with a penalty-phase verdict form “specifically advising
that it could recommend the defendant be sentenced to a term of years
even if the State carried its burden of proof.” Id. at 380. This Court held the
claim was waived because the defendant did not object to the verdict
forms at trial. Id. (citations omitted).

   Oberhansley’s claims implicate a missing form, yet they differ subtly
from the issues addressed in Schiro and Pope. Those cases involved the
omission of forms for rendering verdicts other than those that were
rendered. The defendants claimed, essentially, that if the forms had been
provided, their juries might have reached different verdicts. Oberhansley,
conversely, claims that his jury failed to return a form showing it made a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023           Page 8 of 15
weighing determination that was an essential prerequisite for the LWOP
sentence that was imposed. The omission of the form matters, he argues,
because “nothing in the record reflects” that the jury made the necessary
determination at all. Reply Br. at 9. As he puts it, “this is not an issue
about verdict forms. It is an issue about findings – or rather, the lack
thereof.” Id. He is making claims of improper sentencing by the trial court,
not simply prejudice from the omission of a verdict form.

   It is an essential principle of appellate procedure that “a claim is not
normally available for review on appeal unless first made at trial.” Kincaid
v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. 2005). However, our precedents have
carved out an exception, under which “[c]ounsel need not object to
preserve a sentencing error for review.” Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189,
1194 (Ind. 2006) (citing Kincaid, 837 N.E.2d at 1010). As this Court
observed in Kincaid, we “review many claims of sentencing error”—e.g.,
reliance on an improper aggravating circumstance or failure to consider a
proper mitigating circumstance—“without insisting that the claim first be
presented to the trial judge.” 837 N.E.2d at 1010. Kincaid held that Blakely
claims, asserting the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury of facts that
increase a maximum permissible sentence, may be raised for the first time
in an appellant’s initial brief. Id. (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004)). And, in Weisheit, we reviewed on appeal a claim that an LWOP
sentencing jury and trial court failed to consider and weigh the mitigating
circumstances offered by the defendant. 26 N.E.3d at 20. Here,
Oberhansley claims he was sentenced to LWOP without the prerequisite
weighing determination having been made by the jury. Whether framed
in statutory or due process terms, this claim of sentencing error bears a
broad resemblance to the claims reviewed in Kincaid and Weisheit, which

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023             Page 9 of 15
also concerned the jury’s role in sentencing. We will review the matter
irrespective of preservation at the trial court level. 4

    B. The record indicates that the jury made the necessary
       weighing determination.
   Turning to the merits of the statutory issue, we are satisfied that the
record shows the jury did make the required weighing determination.
First, both the preliminary and final instructions to the jury repeatedly
hammered the point that the jury could not recommend LWOP without
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. App. Vol. IX, pp. 228–29, 239, 241, 247; App. Vol. X, p. 11.
The instructions also specifically identified the statutory mitigating
circumstances Oberhansley was asserting. App. Vol. IX, p. 237; App. Vol.
X, p. 3. Oberhansley concedes that the jury was properly instructed.
“When the jury is properly instructed, we will presume they followed
such instructions.” Weisheit, 26 N.E.3d at 20 (internal quotation marks
omitted). To be sure, the jury might have asked the trial court to send in
the missing form which it was instructed to return. But just because a jury
does not expressly document every finding necessary to a verdict does not
mean that those findings were not made. For example, a jury’s failure to
identify the mitigating circumstances it considered “does not mean” it
failed to consider and weigh them. Id. Nor does the LWOP statute require
a special verdict form for the weighing determination.

   The record of the sentencing process relieves any lingering doubt as to
whether the jury properly determined the issue. Oberhansley’s case in the
sentencing hearing was dedicated to showing that his mental illness

4We are mindful that LWOP sentences are largely “subject to the same statutory standards”
as death sentences and, like the latter, trigger a “heightened-reliability interest.” Wright v.
State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 261 (Ind. 2021) (internal citations omitted). Regardless of a defendant’s
attempt to waive a sentencing appeal, “the death sentence cannot be imposed on anyone in
this State until it has been reviewed by this Court and found to comport with the laws of this
State and the principles of our state and federal constitutions.” Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 157–
58, 416 N.E.2d 95, 102 (1981).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023                            Page 10 of 15
constituted mitigating circumstances. Tr. Vol. VIII, pp. 162, 181, 245–46.
He offered expert testimony that his mental illness deprived him of the
capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his actions. Id. at 163, 229. The
State, in its closing argument in the penalty phase, specifically asked the
jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to find
that “these aggravators outweigh the mitigated factors of his mental
illness.” Id. at 237. All in all, we do not doubt that the jury was conscious
of its duty to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that it
made the determination it had to make, and that its final recommendation
of LWOP reflected this. The trial court did not manifestly abuse its
discretion in imposing an LWOP sentence.

   C. Due process was satisfied because the jury made the
      determination required by statute.
   Oberhansley claims that the trial court deprived him, without due
process, of a “liberty interest” in not receiving an LWOP sentence “absent
the jury finding required” by statute. Appellant’s Br. at 34. He cites as
authority Hicks v. Oklahoma, in which the Oklahoma courts denied the
defendant the opportunity, required by state statute, to have a jury
determine his sentence. 447 U.S. 343, 345 (1980). The United States
Supreme Court held that, when a state leaves sentencing to the discretion
of a jury, the defendant “has a substantial and legitimate expectation that
he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury
in the exercise of its statutory discretion.” Id. at 346. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court explained, a defendant may not be arbitrarily
deprived of this liberty interest without “due process of law.” Id.

   As in Hicks, Oberhansley had “a statutory right to have a jury fix his
punishment in the first instance.” See id. at 347. But here, unlike in Hicks,
the issue was submitted to the jury. And we have already inferred from
the instructions and the trial record that the jury did make the necessary
weighing determination. Thus, Oberhansley’s due process claim
necessarily fails.

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II. The LWOP sentence is not inappropriate.
   Oberhansley asks us to review and revise his sentence. We “may revise
a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial
court’s decision, [this] Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind.
App. R. 7(B). “Whether we find a sentence inappropriate ‘turns on myriad
factors that come to light in a given case’ and ultimately ‘boils down to
our collective sense of what is appropriate.’” Stidham v. State, 157 N.E.3d
1185, 1195 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind.
2017)). Our review is not limited to the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances found by the factfinder below. Id. However, deference to
the trial court prevails “unless overcome by compelling evidence
portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as
accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent
examples of good character).” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Our principal
concern is to “‘leaven outliers rather than achieving a perceived correct
sentence.’” Stidham, 157 N.E.3d at 1195 (quoting Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d
204, 215 (Ind. 2016)).

    A. The crimes involved extreme brutality and deviousness.

   As to the nature of the murder in this case, Oberhansley himself
characterizes it with these words: “Gruesome. Horrific. Brutal.”
Appellant’s Br. at 43. His brief points to no aspects of his crimes which
might alleviate their severity. Indeed, no “positive light” can be cast on
them. The crimes, involving dismembering and eating parts of the victim’s
body, were extreme. They were inflicted on a frightened former partner
who had locked Oberhansley out of her home. Like the murder, sexual
assault, and dismemberment we reviewed in Gibson v. State, the offenses
in this case were “beyond horrendous.” See 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015).

  We acknowledge the penalty-phase testimony indicating that
Oberhansley was suffering an extreme mental disturbance and “could not
appreciate” the criminal nature of his acts in Blanton’s home. Tr. Vol. VIII,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023         Page 12 of 15
p. 163. As this Court has stated previously, we “cannot foreclose the
possibility” of considering for 7(B) purposes “the role of a defendant’s
mental illness in the commission of a crime.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d
225, 229 (Ind. 2015). Yet, this case does not present the “exceptional and
extraordinary circumstances” in which such consideration is warranted.
See id. Although Oberhansley acted under delusions created by his mental
illness, he “did not show restraint or a lack of brutality,” nor “any regard
for human life.” See id.

  Oberhansley also acted deviously. When he tried to visit Blanton at
work he dressed like an employee, not in his usual clothes, and thus
gained access to her workplace. During the crimes, he left his cellphone at
his mother’s house. He lied in an attempt to mislead friends who were
worried for Blanton’s safety. After being moved along by police from
Blanton’s home, he parked his car nearby and returned. And he lied to
police, telling them that two “black guys” killed Blanton. Tr. Vol. VI, pp.
177–78. He maintained this fiction at trial. “[D]eceptive behavior” and
efforts to “shift the blame” aggravate the nature of an offense. See
Washington v. State, 902 N.E.2d 280, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We find
nothing on this point to justify revision.

   B. Oberhansley offers no record of positive character traits.
    As to Oberhansley’s character, we are presented with no evidence of
virtues or examples of his goodness. We thus find a “lack of redeeming
character traits” of a positive nature. See Gibson, 43 N.E.3d at 241.
Certainly, he suffered the tragic loss of close family members during his
youth. But, usually, “‘evidence of a difficult childhood is entitled to little,
if any, mitigating weight.’” Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 269 (Ind. 2021)
(quoting Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (Ind. 2013)). The suicides of
his father and half-brother may have marked a “significant turning point”
in Oberhansley’s life. See Appellant’s Br. at 44. But this experience does
not mitigate his subsequent record of violence against his own mother and
intimate partners.

   Oberhansley lives with a severe mental disorder that was affecting him
at the time of his crimes. Yet, his juvenile record of delinquent acts goes

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023          Page 13 of 15
back to the time before his mental illness was first revealed. Likewise, his
attack on his girlfriend and mother predated the first recorded signs of
psychosis. Even worse, Oberhansley took methamphetamine on the day of
those attacks. We cannot ignore the fact that Blanton is the second partner
whom Oberhansley has killed and the third person he has attacked with
deadly force. Oberhansley also had a strangulation charge and other
charges pending when he committed his latest crimes. His “history of
criminal conduct” weighs against relief. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on rehearing, 875 N.E.2d 218
(Ind. 2007).

   In short, neither the nature of Oberhansley’s crimes nor the content of
his character mark this case as an outlier warranting revision of his LWOP
sentence.

Conclusion
   Oberhansley’s penalty-phase jury determined, as required by statute,
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. His LWOP sentence is not inappropriate. Consequently,
the sentence is affirmed.

Rush, C.J., and Massa and Molter, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., concurs except as to footnote 4.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Brooklyn, Indiana

Victoria Bailey Casanova
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-LW-620 | May 17, 2023        Page 14 of 15
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Kelly A. Loy
Office of the Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

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