Court Opinion

ID: 9385166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 07:22:18.689782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.126658
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                      EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                           EL PASO, TEXAS

    MICHAEL JAMES SPITZER,                                  §                  No. 08-22-00059-CR

                                     Appellant,             §                     Appeal from the

    v.                                                      §              394th Judicial District Court

    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                     §               of Brewster County, Texas

                                     Appellee.              §                     (TC# CR04955)

                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

         A jury convicted Appellant Michael James Spitzer of continuous sexual abuse of a child.

Appellant appeals his convictions in two issues, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion

by allowing a sexual-assault nurse examiner (SANE) to testify as an expert witness, and (2) the

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                           I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         A. Initial events

         The victim in this case, Child, was ten years old at the time of trial. 1 In April 2018, Child’s

biological mother placed Child and her younger brother in the custody of Appellant and his ex-

1
  In order to protect the victim’s identity, we refer to her as “Child” in place of her true name. See TEX. R. APP. P.
9.10.
wife, Jessica Galindo (or Spitzer), who became the children’s guardians. Child was six years old,

and her brother was two years old when they were placed with Appellant and Galindo while they

were living in Marfa, Texas. In October 2018, Appellant, Galindo, Child, and her brother moved

from Marfa to Marathon, Texas.

        One night in March 2019, Galindo observed Child playing with her brother’s penis while

they were bathing together. Concerned about her behavior, Galindo went to Child’s school and

met with her teacher on March 19, 2019. According to testimony from Child’s teacher, Galindo

told her during the meeting that Child occasionally exhibited strange behaviors, including seeking

attention from males, “humping” and “grinding” while she was sitting on other people’s laps, and

possibly being sexually inappropriate with boys her age. Child’s teacher made a call to Child

Protective Services (CPS) regarding Child’s unusual sexual behavior. On March 21, 2019, CPS

Worker Jessie Almance-Molinar went to Galindo’s house and spoke to Child, who told Almance-

Molinar that Appellant “touches [her] privates” and “was putting in his privates into her privates.”

After Almance-Molinar met with Child, she confronted Appellant with these allegations, and he

became angry and said “this is a lot of B.S. . . . [and] stormed out of the house.” 2

        On March 25, 2019, Galindo took Child to the hospital for a SANE examination performed

by Bianca Barrientos, a SANE nurse. During the examination, Child told Barrientos that Appellant

had touched her vaginal area, rectum, and anus, and he had penetrated her vagina and anus with

his penis. A physical examination of Child’s vagina showed a “notch” in her hymen and a scar on

the lower portion of the vaginal entrance, which, based on her training and experience and Child’s

2
 Almance-Molinar testified as an outcry witness pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072. Appellant
does not challenge the designation of Almance-Molinar as an outcry witness on appeal.

                                                     2
allegations, Barrientos opined could be consistent with penile penetration through sexual assault.

Following a law enforcement investigation, Appellant was arrested for sexually abusing Child.

        B. Child’s trial testimony

        At trial, Child testified that she and her brother lived with Appellant (whom she called

“Grandpa”) and Galindo in Marathon and Marfa. Child related that while she lived with Appellant

in both places, he did “bad things” to her. When asked what she meant by “bad things,” Child

stated that Appellant “would make . . . [her] touch his . . . front part” by “mak[ing her] pull it front

and back,” causing “[w]hite stuff” to come out of it. Appellant also “[p]ut it in [her] private part

and, like, back.” Child agreed that she was talking about Appellant’s “front private part” or

“penis,” and she clarified that her “front private part” meant vagina. Child agreed that “back private

part” meant her “rear end” or “anus.”

        Appellant committed these acts “[m]ore than five times . . . [i]n the -- early in the morning

or at night” while they were living in Marathon. Appellant also “put his front private part in [her]

private part” and made Child “pull on his private part” on more than one occasion while they were

living in Marfa. When Child pulled “front and back” on Appellant’s “private part,” “white stuff”

would come out of it. Appellant also put his “front private part” in Child’s mouth and made her

“go forward and backwards,” causing “white stuff [to] come out of it.” Appellant also put his

fingers in her “front private part.” These acts occurred when Child was asleep, and sometimes

Appellant kept his clothes on during the incidents. The final incident of abuse occurred “the day

before [Appellant] went to jail.”

        Although Child was afraid of telling anybody about the abuse because Appellant told her

that she would get into trouble if she did, Child eventually made an outcry of abuse to her teacher

                                                   3
because her teacher was concerned that Child was not acting like herself. Child also recalled

describing the abuse to a CPS worker.

          C. Procedural history

          The State of Texas charged Appellant with continuous sexual abuse of a young child,

alleging that Appellant committed multiple acts of sexual abuse against Child between

September 1, 2018 and March 21, 2019. In addition to the evidence above, the State offered

Barrientos’s testimony as an expert witness regarding the nature of Child’s injuries and whether

her injuries could possibly be consistent with penetration in the manner alleged by Child.

Following a Daubert hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court allowed Barrientos to

testify as an expert witness on those matters. 3

          Appellant testified in his case-in-chief, and denied penetrating Child, engaging in sexual

touching with Child, and going into her room during the night while they were living in Marathon.

The jury found Appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child, and the trial court assessed

punishment of sixty years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. Appellant challenges his

conviction in two issues, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Barrientos

to testify as an expert witness, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction based

on Judge Newell’s concurring opinion in Ex parte Kelley, No. WR-87,470-01, 2019 WL 5788034

(Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2019) (not designated for publication) (Newell, J., concurring). We

address each issue in turn.

                                           II. EXPERT WITNESS

3
    See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

                                                         4
       In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing

Barrientos to testify as an expert witness under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 because Barrientos

(1) lacked expert witness qualifications, (2) did not utilize reliable techniques, and (3) rendered an

opinion that was not relevant to the issues in the case.

       A. Factual background

       At trial, the State announced its intent to offer Barrientos as an expert witness to testify

about the findings from the SANE examination she performed on Child. During an admissibility

hearing outside the jury’s presence, Barrientos testified that she had been a registered nurse since

2016 and a certified SANE nurse in Texas since 2018. Barrientos received her registered-nurse

degree from Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center in Odessa, Texas. Barrientos received

specialized training in performing forensic examinations on sexual-assault victims, which included

eighty hours of classroom training pertaining to adults and children. Barrientos had to perform

eighteen SANE examinations with another SANE nurse before receiving her certification. Her

training included performing physical examinations, including vaginal examinations. Barrientos

recalled that several medical doctors supervised her well-child and vaginal examinations, but she

could not testify regarding where they received their education or training. Barrientos could not

recall the titles of her written training materials and did not bring any of the materials with her to

court. Barrientos was also trained in providing courtroom testimony. At the time of trial,

Barrientos’s SANE nurse certification, which she was required to renew every two years, was

current. Barrientos testified that she had gone through a peer-review process in which she

conferred with a medical director and other SANE nurses. Barrientos had not attended any

professional conferences for SANE nurses, but she had attended continuing-education courses as

part of her license-renewal process and had read articles and watched approximately twenty hours

                                                  5
of training videos during the courses. At the time of trial, Barrientos had conducted approximately

sixty-five SANE examinations (one to two per month on average), about half of which were on

children. Barrientos had testified in court four times prior to this case. The State also presented

Barrientos’s curriculum vitae and a copy of her SANE nurse certificate of registration from the

Office of the Attorney General of Texas. Regarding her methodology, Barrientos testified that she

used the same basic process for every examination and tailored her examinations to specific

patients’ needs when necessary. This methodology was the same for all SANE examinations

occurring in Texas.

       At the conclusion of Barrientos’s admissibility hearing testimony, the State argued that

Barrientos was qualified to testify as an expert witness because she had performed a SANE

examination on Child and had the appropriate certifications, training, and experience. Appellant

responded “that she is not qualified to be an expert under the rules and [he] would ask her to not

be certified” because Barrientos was unable to describe the training materials she used and had not

brought them to court and because watching twenty hours of videos per year was insufficient

training. Defense counsel did not object that Barrientos’s opinion was unreliable or irrelevant. The

trial court asked the prosecutor what issues he intended to elicit expert testimony from Barrientos

on, and the prosecutor responded that he would limit Barrientos’s expert testimony to (1) a medical

description of the SANE examination performed on Child and (2) Barrientos’s findings of injuries

to Child’s vagina that provided “some indication” of consistency with the Child’s allegation of

penile penetration by Appellant. The prosecutor acknowledged that Barrientos could not testify

definitively about whether Appellant committed the alleged acts but only that Child’s injuries were

consistent with the allegations. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection and allowed

Barrientos to testify before the jury as an expert witness on those matters.

                                                 6
        During the State’s case-in-chief, Barrientos testified that Child told her Appellant

penetrated Child’s vagina with his penis. Barrientos stated that she found no trauma on Child’s

labia majora and minora, but she found a small “notch” or “indentation” in her hymen and a scar

on the lower portion of the vaginal entrance. Barrientos could not say with certainty when or how

these injuries occurred, but she stated that based on what Child told her, Child’s injuries could be

consistent with penile penetration.

        B. Standard of review and applicable law

        A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. See Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We do not disturb

that ruling if it lies within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Russeau v. State, 291 S.W.3d 426,

438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Stated otherwise, a trial court abuses its discretion when it acts

unreasonably or arbitrarily without reference to any guiding rules or principles. State v. Hill, 499

S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

        For expert testimony, those guiding rules and principles are found in the Texas Rules of

Evidence, including Rule 702, which provides that “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or

otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” TEX. R. EVID. 702. Case law has

clarified that for “expert testimony to be admissible under these rules, the proponent of the expert

scientific evidence must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony is

‘sufficiently reliable and relevant to help the jury in reaching accurate results.’” Wolfe v. State, 509

S.W.3d 325, 335–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1992)). The proponent of expert testimony must demonstrate the following: (1) that

                                                   7
the expert is qualified; (2) that the testimony is based on a reliable scientific foundation; and (3)

that the testimony is relevant to the issues in the case. Id. at 336; Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128,

131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). These conditions are often called qualification, reliability, and

relevance. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131.

           The trial court serves as a gatekeeper and must decide preliminary challenges to witness

qualifications and evidence admissibility. TEX. R. EVID. 104(a); Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131. In

discharging its gatekeeper role, the trial court is vested with the often-difficult task of determining

what is irrelevant or likely to confuse the jury in its decision-making process. See Coble v. State,

330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Nonetheless, the trial court’s gatekeeping role “does

not supplant cross-examination as ‘the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but

admissible evidence.’” Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 336 (quoting Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet,

Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 728 (Tex. 1998)).

           C. Analysis

           Appellant challenges Barrientos’s qualifications to testify as an expert, the reliability of her

testimony, and the relevance of her testimony to the issues in the case. We consider each challenge

in turn.

                  1. Barrientos was sufficiently qualified

           First, we determine whether Barrientos was sufficiently qualified to render an expert

opinion. 4 See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131. A party offering expert testimony has the burden to show

4
  The State argues Appellant failed to preserve his argument that Barrientos was not qualified to testify as an expert
witness. We disagree. Appellant specifically objected in the trial court that Barrientos was “not qualified to be an
expert under the rules,” and the trial court overruled his objection and allowed Barrientos to testify as an expert. Thus,
Appellant has preserved this argument for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (an appellate complaint must be
preserved by a party’s timely and specific objection at trial, as well as an express or implied ruling on the matter by
the trial court).

                                                            8
the witness is qualified to testify on the matter in question. TEX. R EVID. 702; Penry v. State, 903

S.W.2d 715, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The type of specialized knowledge that qualifies a

witness to offer an expert opinion in a particular field may derive from a variety of sources,

including the witness’s “specialized education, practical experience, a study of technical works or

a combination of these things.” Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669. In addition to having an acceptable

background in a particular field, the trial court must determine that the witness’s background is

“tailored to the specific area of expertise in which the expert desires to testify.” Id. (quoting Vela,

209 S.W.3d at 133). An expert witness is not required to always demonstrate formal training, and

the expert may instead gain expertise in a particular field solely through their own personal

experience or research. See Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

       To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in ruling on an expert’s

qualifications, an appellate court may consider (1) how complex the field is, (2) how conclusive

the expert’s opinion is, and (3) how central the area of expertise is to the resolution of the case.

Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669–670 (citing Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006)); see also Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131. In general, greater qualifications are required for more

complex fields of expertise and more conclusive and dispositive opinions. Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at

669. However, in areas where the “expert evidence is close to the jury’s common understanding,

the witness’s qualifications are less important than when the evidence is well outside the jury’s

own experience.” Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 528.

       Here, Barrientos testified that she had received a degree as a registered nurse in 2016 and

had been a state-registered SANE nurse since 2018. To become a SANE nurse and maintain her

registration, Barrientos had to undergo course work, perform eighteen SANE examinations under

another SANE nurse’s supervision, and participate in continuing-education courses. Barrientos

                                                  9
also participated in a peer-review process with similarly qualified colleagues to share experiences

and learn from each other. At the time of trial, Barrientos had been a SANE nurse for

approximately four years and had performed approximately sixty-five SANE examinations. As

such, Barrientos’s education, training, and experience were sufficiently tailored to her testimony

regarding her SANE examination of Child. See Maillart v. State, No. 08-20-00232-CR, 2022 WL

970334, at *11–*12 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 31, 2022, pet. ref’d) (not designated for

publication) (holding that a psychologist with relevant education, training, and experience in the

field of psychological therapy was qualified to testify in the area of therapy).

       Barrientos’s testimony regarding the injuries she found on Child’s vagina, though of a

medical nature and important to corroborate Child’s accusations against Appellant, was not

significantly complex or technical in nature. Moreover, Barrientos testified that she could not say

with certainty the cause of Child’s injuries but rather that Child’s injuries could be consistent with

penile penetration based on what Child had told her. Neither could Barrientos say with certainty

when Child’s injuries had been caused. Thus, Barrientos’s opinion that Child’s injuries were

consistent with—but not definitive proof of—Appellant’s alleged penetration of Child’s vagina

with his penis was not conclusive or dispositive. The trial court could have reasonably found that

Barrientos’s testimony was of diminished importance in resolving the case in light of the other

evidence. See id. at 11 (stating that a therapist’s opinions that were not dispositive or conclusive

weighed in favor of the trial court’s admission of his testimony as an expert).

       For these reasons, we conclude that the record contains sufficient information for the trial

court to have found Barrientos qualified to testify in the area of SANE examinations and the

examination she performed on Child as well as render the provided opinion. See Escamilla v. State,

334 S.W.3d 263, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref’d) (stating that a SANE nurse who

                                                 10
testified that she had conducted approximately one hundred SANE evaluations, underwent a peer-

review process with other SANE nurses, and had received training through the Attorney General’s

Office was sufficiently qualified to testify regarding a SANE examination she performed on a

child-victim).

                 2. Appellant has not preserved his challenges to the reliability and relevance of
                 Barrientos’s testimony

       Next, we determine whether Barrientos’s opinion was sufficiently reliable and relevant.

See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131. Prior to addressing these contentions, we must determine whether

Appellant preserved these arguments for our review. See Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009) (error preservation is a threshold issue that a reviewing court must address, even

if neither party raised the issue on appeal). An appellate complaint is properly preserved for our

review by a party’s timely and specific request, objection, or motion in the trial court. TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a). A party’s failure to timely and specifically object results in forfeiture of the argument

on appeal. See id.; Henderson v. State, No. 08-21-00174-CR, 2022 WL 3443699, at *5 (Tex.

App.—El Paso Aug. 17, 2022, no pet.) (not designated for publication). To that end, “[a]n

objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal.”

Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

       As stated above, Appellant specifically challenged Barrientos’s qualifications as an expert

witness, but he did not argue that her opinion was unreliable by attacking the scientific

methodology underlying her opinion. Nor did Appellant argue that Barrientos’s testimony would

be irrelevant to the issues in the case. Because Appellant did not object or otherwise argue in the

trial court that Barrientos’s opinion was unreliable and irrelevant, Appellant has not preserved

these arguments for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also Martinez v. State, No. 08-17-

                                                 11
00165-CR, 2019 WL 4127261, at *14 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 30, 2019, no pet.) (not designated

for publication) (recognizing that qualification, reliability, and relevance “raises distinct questions

and issues, and an objection based on one requirement does not preserve error as to another.”)

(citing Shaw v. State, 329 S.W.3d 645, 655–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet.

ref’d)); Urquhart v. State, 128 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding

that a defendant’s objection solely to the relevancy of an expert witness’s testimony was

insufficient to preserve for review the defendant’s appellate argument that the expert’s opinion

was not reliable).

          In sum, because Appellant has not shown that the trial court’s decision to find Barrientos

qualified was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement, and because he has not preserved his

arguments that Barrientos’s opinion was unreliable and irrelevant, we conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by admitting her testimony as an expert witness.

          D. Any error was harmless

          Finally, even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Barrientos’s expert

testimony, any error would have been harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). In determining

whether Appellant was harmed by the erroneous admission of evidence, we would consider the

following: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be connected to other evidence;

(2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional

evidence showing guilt; and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained-of error. Maillart,

2022 WL 970334, at *17 (citing Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 762–63 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003)).

          As set forth above, other evidence besides Barrientos’s testimony supported Appellant’s

conviction, including Child’s testimony that Appellant repeatedly penetrated her vagina, anus, and

                                                  12
mouth with his penis and fingers as well as her descriptions of those acts. The State also presented

Almance-Molinar’s testimony that Child told her that Appellant penetrated her vagina with his

penis. And although the prosecutor referred to Barrientos’s testimony in passing during his closing

argument, we cannot say that the State emphasized it. Accordingly, any purported error by

admitting Barrientos’s expert testimony on Child’s SANE examination and her injuries would

have been harmless. See Escamilla, 334 S.W.3d at 269 (holding that the trial court’s error in

designating a SANE nurse as an expert witness and receiving her testimony regarding a child-

victim’s injuries being consistent with sexual abuse was harmless because the State presented other

evidence supporting the verdict, including the victim’s testimony describing the offenses and her

mother’s testimony regarding her outcry of sexual abuse).

       Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

                           III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his

conviction under Judge Newell’s concurring opinion in Ex parte Kelley, 2019 WL 5788034, at

*37–*38. Appellant contends that Judge Newell’s concurrence “changed the way the courts should

evaluate sufficiency [of the evidence] arguments in child sex cases” and that we should utilize that

opinion in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions in those types of cases.

       Appellant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, Ex parte Kelley is an unpublished opinion

from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, unpublished

opinions from that court cannot be cited as authority and have no precedential value; thus,

Appellant’s reliance on Ex parte Kelley is misplaced for this reason alone. See TEX. R. APP. P. 77.3

(stating that unpublished Court of Criminal Appeals decisions “have no precedential value and

must not be cited as authority by counsel or by a court.”). Second, the Court of Criminal Appeals

                                                13
has repeatedly iterated that the only standard of review for the legal sufficiency of the evidence is

the well-known Jackson v. Virginia standard. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16

(1979); see also Carter v. State, 620 S.W.3d 147, 149–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (applying the

Jackson v. Virginia analysis for legal sufficiency post-Ex parte Kelley); Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (establishing the legal sufficiency review under Jackson

v. Virginia as the only standard of review of the evidence in criminal cases). Thus, Appellant’s

argument that the analysis promulgated in Ex parte Kelley has in any way supplanted or modified

the Jackson v. Virginia analysis, including in child-sexual-abuse cases, must fail for this additional

reason.

          A. Standard of review and applicable law

          Although Appellant does not argue the correct standard in challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting his conviction, we will conduct a legal-sufficiency review of the evidence

under the Jackson v. Virginia standard in the interest of justice. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due

process guarantee dictates that every conviction must be supported by legally sufficient evidence.

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315–16; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912. In a legal-sufficiency challenge, we

focus solely on whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, would

permit any rational jury to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912.

          Applying that standard, we recognize that our system designates the jury as the sole arbiter

of witness credibility and the weight attached to witness testimony. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d

847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Only the jury acts “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778

                                                  14
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In doing so, the jury may choose to

believe or disbelieve any testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts

in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170 (citing Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319). In conducting a legal-sufficiency review, “[w]e are not to sit as a thirteenth juror

reweighing the evidence or deciding whether we believe the evidence established the element in

contention beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” Blankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1988). Instead, “we test the evidence to see if it is at least conclusive enough for a reasonable

factfinder to believe based on the evidence that the element is established beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318).

       Here, Appellant challenges his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child.

As it pertains to this case, a person commits that offense if (1) during a period of thirty days or

more in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse and (2) at the time of the

commission of the acts, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child younger

than fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b)(1)–(2). “If a jury is the trier of fact,

members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse

were committed by the defendant or the exact date when those acts were committed. The jury must

agree unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 30 or more days in duration,

committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.” Id. § 21.02(d).

       An “act of sexual abuse” means any act that is a violation of several different sexual

offenses, including aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by contact. Id.

§ 21.02(c)(2), (c)(4). A person commits aggravated sexual assault if he intentionally or knowingly

causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means, or if he causes the

                                                  15
penetration of the mouth of a child by the person’s sexual organ. Id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii). As

it pertains to the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child, a person commits indecency

with a child if the person engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in

sexual contact other than by the touching of the child’s breast. Id. §§ 21.02(c)(2), 21.11(a)(1).

Relevant here, “sexual contact” means the following, if done with the intent to arouse or gratify

the sexual desire of any person: any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of

the anus or genitals of a child and any touching of any part of the body of a child, including

touching through clothing, with the genitals of a person. Id. § 21.11(c).

       B. Legally sufficient evidence supports Appellant’s conviction

       On appeal, Appellant does not specifically challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting any particular element of the offense. Even so, our review of the record shows that the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is legally sufficient to support each

element of the charged offense. Child identified Appellant in the courtroom and testified that he

was the person who sexually abused her. According to Child, Appellant began sexually abusing

her when she was six or seven years old while she and Appellant lived in Marfa. The abuse

continued after they moved to Marathon in October 2018, with the final act of abuse occurring the

night before Appellant was arrested in March 2019. Although Child did not testify regarding the

specific dates on which the abuse took place, the evidence supports a finding that the acts of sexual

abuse occurred over a period of thirty days or longer. See Kappes v. State, No. 08-22-00095-CR,

2023 WL 1972015, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 13, 2023, no pet.h.) (holding that a child’s

testimony that sexual abuse occurred on many occasions when she was different ages but did not

include specific dates that sexual abuse took place was nonetheless sufficient to establish thirty-

day requirement of the continuous-sexual-abuse offense, reasoning that the offense was created in

                                                 16
response to young children who could not identify the exact dates of the offenses) (citations

omitted).

       Regarding the nature of the abusive acts, Child testified that Appellant repeatedly

penetrated her vagina, anus, and mouth with his penis, and that on at least one occasion he

penetrated her vagina with his fingers. When Appellant orally penetrated Child, “white stuff”

would come out of his “private part.” These acts constitute aggravated sexual assault of a child.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii). Child also agreed that on at least one

occasion, Appellant caused Child’s hand to contact his penis and forced her to “pull it front and

back” on his “private part,” causing “[w]hite stuff” to come out of it; this act constitutes indecency

with a child by contact. See id. § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(2). Barrientos also testified that she observed

injuries to Child’s vagina during the SANE examination that were consistent with penile

penetration and that Child told her that Appellant touched her vagina, anus and rectum, and that

he penetrated her vagina and anus with his penis. And Almance-Molinar, a CPS worker, also

testified that Child told her that Appellant had penetrated her vagina with his penis.

       Appellant argues that inconsistencies in Child’s testimony and other evidence, including

his own testimony denying that the abuse took place, undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.

But under the correct standard of review, we cannot substitute our judgment of the evidence for

that of the jury’s or reweigh the evidence, and we presume that the jury resolved these conflicts in

favor of the verdict and defer to their determination. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Blankenship,

780 S.W.2d at 207.

       Given this evidence, any rational jury could have found each of the elements of the charged

offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and we conclude that legally sufficient evidence supports

Appellant’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child.

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       Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

                        IV. CERTIFICATION OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

       We note that the trial court has certified Appellant’s right to appeal in this case, but the

certification does not bear Appellant’s signature indicating that he has been informed of his rights

to appeal and to file a pro se petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). We thus find that the certification is defective and that neither

Appellant’s attorney nor the trial court has corrected the defect.

       The Court ORDERS Appellant’s attorney, pursuant to Rule 48.4, to send Appellant a copy

of this opinion and this Court’s judgment, to notify Appellant of his right to file a pro se petition

for discretionary review, and to inform Appellant of the applicable deadlines. See TEX. R. APP. P.

48.4, 68. The Court further ORDERS Appellant’s attorney to comply with all the requirements

of Rule 48.4. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4.

                                          V. CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment supporting Appellant’s conviction.

                                               LISA J. SOTO, Justice

March 30, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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