Court Opinion

ID: 9638539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:46:24.982725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:07.612438
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
CAMPBELL, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for rape. Punishment is three years imprisonment. On original submission a divided panel held that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support conviction. On the State’s motion for rehearing the court en banc reversed and remanded the cause holding fundamental error existed in the jury charge. On State’s motion for rehearing the court expressly held sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction. Due to our disposition of this cause on the State’s motion for rehearing, we now find it necessary to address a ground of error which was previously unanswered due to the panel’s resolution of the case.
In his motion for rehearing appellant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence appellant’s confession because it was procured involuntarily. Additionally, appellant contends that this court erred in holding that sufficient evidence was presented to establish that the sexual intercourse took place without the victim’s consent and that the victim was unable to resist.
On July 3, 1977, the victim, L_C_, while in the Haskell city park became sick or ill, in the presence of Frank Enriquez, Crispin Martinez, and Robert Martinez. L_C_ left the park on foot, staggering until she fell down in a nearby vacant lot. After collapsing in the vacant lot the victim was loaded into the appellant’s automobile by the appellant and Crispin Martinez. Appellant drove the victim to a secluded location near the city swimming pool. There the appellant and Crispin Martinez had sexual intercourse with L_C_
*620On July 4, 1977, the naked body of L-_C-was found at the same location appellant and Crispin Martinez had had intercourse with L_C_Tes-timony at trial established that she had died sometime after having intercourse with the appellant. The probable cause of death was diabetes mellitus.
On July 5,1977, appellant was questioned by the Haskell police and district attorney. After giving a statement admitting his involvement in the abduction and rape of L-C-appellant was arrested.
The appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his confession. Specifically, appellant maintains that the confession was rendered involuntary because it was induced by the district attorney’s promise that he “could probably go home” after giving a statement.
It is an established rule of law that a confession based upon an inducement by a promise1 made or sanctioned by a person in authority is inadmissible. Pitts v. State, 614 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (rehearing denied 1979). Generally, determination of whether a confession was voluntarily made or not depends upon examination of the totality of the circumstances. Berry v. State, 582 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Farr v. State, 519 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
During the investigation of the victim’s death the appellant had been implicated in the assault. Prior to arrest appellant was requested to voluntarily come to the courthouse for questioning, which he did. He was twice advised of his rights before any questions were asked. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The district attorney testified that appellant was very concerned that he was suspected of killing L_C_At the time of questioning, the district attorney had just returned from witnessing the autopsy of L_C_Although a cause of death had not been established, a violent death had been ruled out. With this information in hand, the district attorney said to appellant, “From what evidence I know now, go ahead and give the statement. Let’s get this thing all straightened up and you can probably go home.”
Because of the inclusion of the term “probably” in the district attorney’s comment it is doubtful whether the remark represented a “promise.” Assuming ar-guendo that the remark did constitute a promise, the record fails to show that the remark was relied upon by the appellant in giving his statement.
Appellant’s incentive for confessing appears to be a desire to avoid implication in the murder of the victim. The record clearly indicates by appellant’s own testimony that this motivation was paramount if not exclusive:
“Q. [PROSECUTOR]: Did you become fearful?
“A. [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. When I went in there, the thing that was concerned me more was that people were saying that she had been murdered.

“Q. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Was that a further inducement to you to sign the written statement?
“A. [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir, because I told Mr. Beauchamp that I wanted this thing settled pretty quick because I was thinking about my wife. I knew I had been out with a girl, but I knew that I hadn’t done anything bad to her or anything. That’s why I wanted— you know, about that it would be settled without her knowing anything about it, I went ahead.”
Furthermore, the appellant’s motivation for making a confession may be ascertained directly from the statement itself:
“... We heard that she had been cut up or stabbed but she was not hurt in any-. way when we left her in the park ... But none of us four hurt her anyway.”
*621Clearly, examining the totality of the circumstances, the prosecutor’s remark was not the primary incentive behind appellant’s confession. We hold the confession was voluntary and therefore admissible.
Appellant was indicted under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 21.02(a) and (b)(3). In pertinent part, the indictment alleged that the appellant did:
“intentionally and knowingly have sexual intercourse with L_A._, a female not his wife, the said L-A- not having consented thereto and the said [appellant] knowing that the said L_A_was physically unable to resist.”
The statutory provisions of Sec. 21.02 which was relied upon in the indictment prescribe:
“Sec. 21.02. Rape.
“(a) A person commits an offense if he has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife without the female’s consent.
“(b) The intercourse is without the female’s consent under ... the following circumstances:
U * * *
“(3) She has not consented and the accused knows she is unconscious or physically unable to resist.”
On rehearing, this Court, in an opinion by Judge Odom, held that the confession of the appellant “is sufficient to prove the deficiencies found by the panel, and hold the evidence supports the conviction.” The confession which was introduced at trial provides:
“On the night of Sunday, July 3rd, 1977 about 10:00 or 10:15 P.M., I left my house in my car and drove around some in Has-kell. I went to the old South Side grocery store where I saw Frank Enrique and L_C_, and two other boys which I know but do not know their names at the South Side Grocery. I stopped and one of the boys, the taller of the two, and L_C_got into my car, we had to help L_get into the back seat, and we told the other boys to meet us in the park, I then drove down by the old depot and into the park where we stopped on the hill above the rest rooms. We all got out, and had to help L_get out and she layed down on the ground and me and the other boy undressed her. She had on a white blouse with black stripes and a pair of pants, and some kind of shoes. She did have on panties and a bra which we also removed. She was kind of moving some but she was awful drunk or something. I had sexual intercourse with L_and then the other boy did. After we had got through she was passed out and I took some beer that I had and poured it on her head to try to wake her up but we could not. She was breathing kind of like she was snoring. Me and the other boy got into my car and pulled down into the park by the rest rooms where we saw Frank Enriquez and the other boy’s brother by the rest rooms. We all four walked back up the hill and looked at L_and one of the brothers felt of her heart and said it was still beating and I could hear her breathing, sorta like she was snoring again. None of us knew what to do so we just decided to leave her there because we thought she was just drunk and would wake up in a couple of hours. We all walked back down to where my car was parked and I got in it and drove to the Colonial Food Store and got some cigarettes and then went home. I got home right at 11:00 P.M. During the time we were with L_we had to help her in and out of the car and she was either real drunk or something, because I don’t think she knew what was happening, she was real sick or something. Frankie Enriquez told me that he thought something was wrong with her because she had got worse the longer he was around her during the day. On July 4th, 1977 me and a bunch of my kinfolks went to the park North of Knox City, Texas about 5:00 P.M. and come back about 9:00 P.M., when we got back to Mother-in-laws she told us that L_C_had been found dead in the park. We heard that she had been *622cut up or stabbed but she was not hurt anyway when we left her in the park. She was just drunk or doped or sick, I don’t know which. But none of us four hurt her anyway. We just left her where she was laying because we thought she would get all right in a couple of hours.”
From a thorough review of both the appellant’s confession as well as the trial court record it was reasonable for the jury to infer appellant was aware of the victim’s incoherency as prescribed in Sec. 21.02, supra. Clearly, the appellant realized that the female “was unable to resist.” This element can be directly inferred from the appellant’s admission in the confession that:
“During the time we were with L_ we had to help her in and out of the car and she was either real drunk or something, because I don’t think she knew what was happening, she was real sick or something.”
Our inquiry is therefore now directed to the sole issue of determining whether or not sufficient evidence was presented to establish the victim “has not consented” per Sec. 21.02(b)(3), supra. The Penal Code provides the following general definition for “consent”:
“ ‘Consent’ means assent in fact, whether express or apparent.” Sec. 1.07(9), Y.T. C.A. Penal Code.
In the instant situation testimony introduced at trial established that the victim was suffering from acute diabetes mellitus. Prior to, during, and after having sexual intercourse L_C_ was lapsing into a diabetic coma. Her condition was analogized to intoxication by Dr. Williams, the pathologist who performed the autopsy:
“Q. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... At certain stages of intoxication [a person suffering from diabetes mellitus] develops lethargy and the same symptoms, does it not?
“A. Oh yes. I think in that respect, the symptoms could easily be confused.
$ % * ⅝! # ⅜
“Q. Now, a person suffering from an undiagnosed case of diabetes mellitus could appear to be sleepy, could they not?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Drowsy, or might have some difficulty walking?
“A. These are all — these can all be, I think, housed in the word lethargic.

“Q. Now, this — once you advance to the lethargic stage, of the diabetes melli-tus, the nervous system is affected, is it not?
“A. Yes, because the body then goes into what’s called a coma — state of coma, which is a more advanced form of lethargy where breathing may become very slow and eventually may cease. The body develops what is called in medical terms an acidosis, and then this acetone breath becomes quite profound.
“Q. But it’s principally the, effecting the nervous or mental system, is it not?
“A. The vital centers, yes.”
Additionally, the victim’s lack of consent is demonstrated by the testimony of eyewitness Frank Enriquez. Witness Enriquez testified regarding the victim’s apparent physical condition as well as her abduction and rape. The witness stated that he met the victim in the park on July 3 at approximately 5:00 p.m. and engaged her in conversation. When he first approached her she appeared physically normal. However, as their conversation progressed the victim began “staggering all over the place.”
Enriquez testified that the victim became so unsteady that Robert Martinez had to help her walk.
“Q. [PROSECUTOR]: How was he helping her?
“A. [WITNESS]: He put his hand around her — grabbed her so she wouldn’t fall.
“Q. All right did L-ever mention that she was sick?
“A. Yes, sir, when she got out of the monkey cage—
⅛! # ⅜ * # Sfc
“Q. Did L_ ever indicate to you that she was sick?
*623“A. Yes, sir, she did.
“Q. Did she ever ask you to take her home or help her in any way?
“A. She told us to take her home.”
Enriquez continues to testify regarding the deteriorating physical condition of the victim prior to the appellant’s arrival on the scene.
“Q. [PROSECUTOR]: What did you do when you got to the South Side Grocery?
“A. [WITNESS]: We stayed there a little while and then Crispin went up there where they was, and L_she was sweating real bad, you know. She barely had her eyes open.
“Q. What do you mean sweating real bad?
“A. She had a lot of sweat on her face.
“Q. Did she ever say anything?
“A. No sir.
“Q. How was she located — standing up or laying down?
“A. Laying down.
“Q. On her stomach or on her back or—
“A. On her back.
“Q. In other words, Frank, how would you describe her condition — was she awake or passed out or—
“A. Passed out.”
Witness Enriquez continues by describing the events that occurred upon appellant’s arrival at the location where the victim had collapsed.
“Q. Then what did he do?
“A. He and Crispin — he picked L_ up and they put her in the car.
“Q. You said ‘they put her in the car’— what do you mean?
“A. They grabbed her and they put her in the car.
“Q. Grabbed her and put her in the car? ******
“Q. L_ didn't walk to the car?
“A. She didn’t walk.
“Q. Are you sure?
“A. I’m sure.”
Enriquez then described the victim’s condition after the appellant had intercourse with her:
“Q: Did L_have any clothes on?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Was L_awake?
“A. No, sir.
******
“Q. Did she ever raise up?
“A. No.
“Q. Did she ever move?
“A. No, she was just breathing.
“Q. Just breathing.
“A. Breathing hard.
“Q. Was she having a hard time breathing?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you try to help L-in any way, Frank?
******
“Q. Did you ask anybody else to help her?
“A. I asked Alberto and them to put her clothes on and Alberto he just picked them clothes up and dropped them on her like that.
“Q. What did Alberto say then?
“A. He said ‘let’s go’, so we left.
“Q. And where did you go to?
“A. We went down where his car was, and he got in his car and left and went on to Elsie’s.”
From the record it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the victim was so impaired both mentally and physically that she could not effectively resist the advances of appellant. Under the circumstances presented in the instant situation the requisite of lack of consent was demonstrated by impossibility. The severity of the victim’s impairment was graphically demonstrated by the fact that she died at the scene of the attack shortly after having intercourse with the appellant.
In the instant situation the State demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was so severely impaired by diabetes mellitus prior to, during and after the attack that it would have been impossible for her to have voluntarily consented to any*624thing including sexual intercourse.2 Sufficient evidence is presented in the record to convict.
Judge Odom’s opinion on the State’s motion for rehearing reached the proper conclusion:
“We have found fundamental error in the jury charge that requires reversal. There is no paragraph in the charge applying the law to the facts. This requires reversal. Williams v. State [Tex.Cr.App.], 547 S.W.2d 18; Harris v. State [Tex.Cr.App.], 522 S.W.2d 199.”
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
TEAGUE, J., concurs in the result only.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. We expressly note that the factual context of this case is unique. We reserve ruling on conceivable situations where the victim was coherent and gave effective consent and prior to the completion of the act of intercourse a physical or mental impairment arose.