Court Opinion

ID: 9910137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 20:09:57.991654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:00.895148
License: Public Domain

J-S39016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C.C.T., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.T., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 859 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 18, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                                  88331

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 14, 2023

       J.T. (“Father”) appeals from the decree terminating his parental rights

as to his minor child, A.C.C.T. (“Child”). We affirm.

       Child was born in January 2022. N.T., 5/15/23, at 15. At that time, Berks

County Children and Youth Services (“BCCYS”) had an open case with Child’s

mother (“Mother”)1 and Father as to Child’s sibling. Id. at 17. Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to that child in August

2021. After BCCYS received a report that Child was born, it took emergency

custody of Child due to the parents’ noncompliance with any services for

Child’s sibling and the fact that their parental rights were recently terminated

as to Child’s sibling. Id. BCCYS had concerns with the parents’ lack of

parenting skills, mental health, domestic violence, and drug and alcohol

____________________________________________

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
J-S39016-23

issues. Id. at 18. Child was placed in a foster home and has lived in the same

home since the inception of this case. Id.

       In September 2022, BCCYS filed a petition for the involuntary

termination of Father’s parental rights. The court held a hearing on the petition

on May 15, 2023. Father represented himself at the hearing.2

       BCCYS presented the testimony of case supervisor Angeline Knarr.

Knarr testified that Father’s goals were to attend parenting education classes,

undergo mental health and domestic violence evaluations and follow any

recommended treatment, attend supervised visits with Child, and submit to

random drug screens. Id. at 19. Knarr stated that Father initially participated

in parenting education classes but was subsequently discharged for

noncompliance. Id. at 25-26. She stated that Father participated in a mental

____________________________________________

2  Father was represented by court-appointed counsel throughout the
proceedings in this case leading up to the termination hearing. However, at a
hearing in December 2022, Father requested that his counsel withdraw, and
the trial court granted his request. See Order, 12/19/22.

At the outset of the termination hearing on May 15, 2023, Father reiterated
his request to proceed pro se. N.T. at 5-6. In response, the trial court
conducted a thorough colloquy on the record, in which the court informed
Father of his right to be represented by an attorney without charge, his right
to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, the fact that he did not
have the burden of proof, and that he would be held to the same standards
as an attorney despite being pro se. Id. at 8-12. Accordingly, Father
knowingly waived his right to counsel and the trial court properly permitted
him to proceed pro se at the termination hearing. Cf. In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1,
7 (Pa.Super. 2014) (vacating termination decree and remanding where
mother was never advised of her right to counsel in termination proceedings).
We further note that Father is represented by counsel in this appeal and did
not raise an issue with Father proceeding pro se at the termination hearing.

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health evaluation, which recommended that he attend individual therapy. Id.

at 27. However, he failed to follow up with individual therapy. Id. 27, 31.

Knarr also stated that Father failed to undergo random drug screens. Id. at

38.

      Knarr further testified that Father underwent a psychological evaluation

for parental fitness conducted by Dr. Laura M. Fritts. Id. at 32. Dr. Fritts

opined that Father would not benefit from a mental health program because

he did not perceive himself as having any mental health issues. Id. at 34. Dr.

Fritts recommended that Father maintain employment and housing, attend

supervised visitation, and continue parenting education. Id. at 35. Dr. Fritts

also opined that Child should remain in her current foster home. Id.

      Knarr testified that Father visited Child “[v]ery sporadically.” Id. He last

visited Child in September 2022, over seven months before the termination

hearing. Id. at 36. Knarr stated that Father participated in approximately 16

full visits and 16 partial visits out of 124 visits offered to him. Id. at 58-59.

The visits were always supervised at the agency and never progressed to

unsupervised visits. Id. at 24. Knarr stated that there were no concerns with

the visits when Father attended visits. Id. at 56. However, Child would

sometimes cry during the visits because she did not recognize Father due to

the time between visits. Id. at 69. Knarr testified that Father had not sent any

cards, gifts, or letters to Child since she had been in foster care. Id. at 37.

      Knarr indicated that at one point, Father informed BCCYS that he had

concerns because Child had bruises and bug bites on her at a visit. Id. at 62.

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Knarr stated that a ChildLine report was made, but it was later determined to

be unfounded for any type of child abuse. Id. at 63-64.

      Knarr did not know if Father’s housing was appropriate because Father

refused BCCYS from entering his home. Id. at 23. Knarr stated that Father

reported he was employed but had not produced any documentation verifying

his employment. Id. at 40. Knarr testified that Father was discharged for

casework services for noncompliance by at least five providers. Id.

      Knarr stated that Child is thriving in her foster home, which is a pre-

adoptive home. Id. at 42. She testified that Child has a very loving,

affectionate, and close bond with her foster parents, and they meet all her

needs. Id. at 42-43, 69. Knarr indicated that Child’s older sibling also lives in

the same foster home. Id. at 68-69. Knarr stated that since Child was born,

she has never been in her biological parents’ care and likely would not

recognize them at this time. Id. at 41, 69. Knarr opined it was in Child’s best

interest if Father’s parental rights were terminated and Child would suffer no

detrimental impact. Id. at 43, 69-70.

      Father testified on his own behalf. He stated that he has a total of nine

children, but none of them live with him. Id. at 73, 79-80. However, he

testified that he loves his children and “will continue to fight for [his] children.”

Id. at 72-73. At the time of the hearing, he was incarcerated for failing to pay

child support. Id. at 83. Father stated that prior to his incarceration, he had

been employed as a handyman at an appliance store for five months. Id. at

75, 83. Father’s plan was to move with his children to his home in Puerto Rico.

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Id. at 82. Father testified that he sometimes could not attend visits with Child

because of his work schedule. Id. at 72. Father could not recall the last time

he visited Child. Id. at 79.

      After the hearing, the trial court found that BCCYS proved by clear and

convincing evidence that Father’s parental rights should be terminated under

Section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (5) and Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act.

      Father filed a notice of appeal and raises the following issue:

      Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and/or erred as a
      matter of law in determining that the parental rights of [Father]
      should be forever terminated under Title 23, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
      2511(a)(1), (2) and (5) (Supp. 2023)?

Father’s Br. at 7.

      Father argues BCCYS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to

warrant the termination of his parental rights because he participated in at

least some of his court-ordered services. Id. at 9. He maintains he attended

parenting education classes in the beginning and attended visitation with Child

until September 2022. Id. at 15-16. He points out that BCCYS agreed that

there were no safety or parenting concerns during his visits with Child. Id. at

16. Father also highlights that he unilaterally brought to the attention of

BCCYS his concerns that Child had bruises at one of the visits and made a

ChildLine report. Id. at 16-17. He further stresses that although he did not

follow up with individual therapy, the psychologist who conducted his mental

health evaluation determined he would not benefit from further mental health

treatment because Father did not perceive that he required it. Id. at 16.

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Father also points to his testimony that he can financially support Child due

to his employment. Id. at 17.

      We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an

abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018). We

“accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if

they are supported by the record.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)

(citation omitted). “If the factual findings have support in the record, we then

determine if the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion.”

In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018). We will reverse

a termination order “only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,

826 (Pa. 2012).

      A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of

establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re

Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473. Clear and convincing evidence means

evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this

provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to

terminating parental rights:

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      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted). To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court

need only affirm the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

      Here, the court found termination proper under Sections 2511(a)(1),

(2), and (5), as well as under Section 2511(b). As only one basis for

termination under 2511(a) is necessary, we will focus on the court’s

termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). That section

provides that a parent’s rights to a child may be terminated if:

      The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
      months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has
      evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a
      child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

      Under Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce clear and

convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental

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duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008). A parental

obligation is a “positive duty which requires affirmative performance” and

“cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child.”

In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Notably,

      [p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
      good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in
      order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his
      or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize
      all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
      must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
      the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
      rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
      convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
      others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional
      needs.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

      Here, based upon our review of the record, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in finding BCCYS established grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a)(1) by clear and convincing evidence. Child has been in the

custody of BCCYS since shortly after birth and has been cared for since then

by foster parents. Father had not visited Child since Child was less than nine

months old and only attended approximately 32 out of 124 visits. The last

time Father saw Child was more than seven months before the termination

hearing. Father also did not send any cards or gifts to Child, and Child has

never been in Father’s care. The evidence was sufficient to establish

termination under Section 2511(a)(1) due to Father’s failure to perform

parental duties for at least six months before the filing of the petition.

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      The evidence was likewise sufficient to support termination of Father’s

parental rights under Section 2511(b). The focus under Section 2511(b) is not

on the parent, but on the child. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508

(Pa.Super. 2006). Under Section 2511(b), the trial court must consider “the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” to

determine if termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This inquiry involves assessment of “[i]ntangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,

1287 (Pa.Super. 2005). The court must also examine the parent-child bond,

“with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that

bond.” Id. However, the “mere existence of an emotional bond does not

preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103

(Pa.Super. 2011). Rather, the court must consider whether severing the bond

“would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id.

(citation omitted). The trial court must also examine any pre-adoptive home

and any bond between the child and the foster parents. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 268.

      Here, the trial court determined that BCCYS had established by clear

and convincing evidence that termination was proper under Section 2511(b).

The record supports the court’s finding. Knarr testified that Child is thriving in

her foster home, which is a pre-adoptive home. She indicated that Child has

a close and loving bond with her foster parents, with whom she has lived with

her entire life, and looks to them to have her needs met. Child’s older sibling

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also lives in the same foster home. Although the court recognized that Father

loves Child, it determined that there was very little bond between them since

Father has had minimal contact with Child since she was born. See Amended

1925(a) Opinion, filed 8/3/23, at 4. Indeed, Knarr said Child would not

recognize her biological parents. The evidence showed that Child would suffer

no detrimental impact if Father’s parental rights were terminated. Accordingly,

we agree with the court’s finding that BCCYS proved by clear and convincing

evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best

interest.

      Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2023

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