Court Opinion

ID: 9406518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 21:01:26.042472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:31.024482
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4383

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        KIJUAN HAASSAN SHARP,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00384-FL-1)

        Submitted: June 5, 2023                                           Decided: June 29, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Kijuan Haassan Sharp appeals his conviction and 135-sentence imposed pursuant

        to his guilty plea to bank robbery. On appeal, Sharp’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to

        Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that, given the appellate waiver in

        Sharp’s plea agreement, there are no meritorious issues for appeal. However, counsel

        questions whether Sharp’s plea was voluntary, arguing that the Government made promises

        to Sharp that were not fulfilled.     Counsel also contends that the supervised release

        warrantless search condition was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.           The

        Government declined to file a brief, but filed a motion to dismiss the portion of Sharp’s

        appeal that falls within the scope of the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. Sharp

        concedes that his waiver was knowing and voluntary and that his challenge to his

        supervised release fell within the scope of the waiver. However, he opposes the motion to

        dismiss contending that Sharp’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and involuntary guilty

        plea were not within the scope of his waiver. We grant the motion to dismiss, dismiss the

        appellate issues falling within the scope of Sharp’s waiver, and affirm the remaining issues

        on appeal.

               This court “review[s] the validity of an appellate waiver de novo.” United States v.

        Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2021). “Where the Government seeks to enforce an

        appeal waiver and the defendant has not alleged a breach of the plea agreement, we will

        enforce a valid appeal waiver where the issue being appealed is within the scope of the

        waiver.” United States v. McGrath, 981 F.3d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 2020). “A waiver is valid

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        if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.” Soloff,

        993 F.3d at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Neither counsel nor Sharp questions the validity of the appellate waiver. Moreover,

        the language of the appellate waiver in the plea agreement was unambiguous, and Sharp

        averred at his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing that he understood the waiver. In addition,

        although Sharp proceeded pro se below, he had the benefit of standby counsel who

        reviewed the plea agreement with him multiple times. Thus, we conclude that Sharp

        knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.            Accordingly, we grant the

        Government’s motion to dismiss any claims falling within the scope of the waiver.

               The sentencing issue regarding the supervised release condition raised in the Anders

        brief falls squarely within the scope of the waiver, and Sharp does not assert otherwise.

        However, both parties agree that Sharp’s challenge to his guilty plea falls outside the scope

        of the waiver, and we agree.

               In that claim, Sharp asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the

        Government made oral promises to him, not included in the plea agreement, that were not

        honored. Specifically, he contends that the parties agreed that any enhancements not

        specifically mentioned in the plea agreement would not apply. At sentencing, however,

        the district court imposed additional enhancements.

               To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show (1) that

        the prosecutor's conduct was, in fact, improper and (2) that such conduct prejudiced the

        defendant to such an extent as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Allen,

        491 F.3d 178, 191 (4th Cir. 2007). “[A] properly conducted Rule 11 plea colloquy raises

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        a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.” United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d

        375, 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v.

        Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A defendant’s solemn declarations in open

        court affirming a plea agreement carry a strong presumption of verity because courts must

        be able to rely on the defendant’s statements made under oath during a properly conducted

        Rule 11 plea colloquy.” (cleaned up)).

               Prior to accepting Sharp’s guilty plea, the district court inquired into whether there

        were any promises made to Sharp that were not included in the plea agreement. Sharp

        denied that there were any such promises. In addition, the plea agreement stated that it was

        the full and complete agreement between the parties. Thus, there is no support in the record

        for the conclusion that the Government made any improper promises.

               Moreover, even if the Government acted inappropriately, the record does not

        support the conclusion that Sharp was prejudiced by any such misconduct. Notably, upon

        learning that the Government would not honor its alleged promises, Sharp did not move to

        withdraw his plea. Further, any agreements by the parties regarding enhancements were

        not binding on the district court, and Sharp conceded that the enhancements were properly

        applied to his conduct. Therefore, even had the Government not argued in favor of the

        enhancements, 1 the district court would still have been free to apply them. Finally, the

        record does not provide any reason to believe that, had the Government not made the

               1
                In fact, the Government merely stated that it believed the presentence report was
        correct. The Government did not present independent argument in favor of the
        enhancements, likely because Sharp did not contest the fact that they applied to his conduct.

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        alleged promises, Sharp would not have pled guilty. Thus, we reject Sharp’s claim of

        prosecutorial misconduct, which is unsupported by the record on appeal. 2

               We have reviewed the record in accordance with Anders and have found no

        nonfrivolous grounds for relief falling outside the scope of Sharp’s valid waiver.

        Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss all claims falling

        within the scope of the waiver. We affirm the district court’s ruling accepting Sharp’s

        guilty plea as knowing and voluntary. This court requires that counsel inform Sharp, in

        writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.

        If Sharp requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be

        frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

        Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Sharp. We dispense with

        oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                               DISMISSED IN PART,
                                                                                AFFIRMED IN PART

               2
                 Moreover, “[a] reviewing court on direct appeal is limited to the record of trial and
        cannot consider any extrinsic evidence.” Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001, 1007
        (7th Cir. 2002). While this claim might be amplified by extrinsic evidence (like affidavits
        from Smith and Sharp and recordings of phone calls and meetings that appear to exist (J.A.
        139-46), such evidence should have been submitted in a motion to withdraw the guilty plea
        or may be presented in the future in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. United States v. Phillips,
        914 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1990).

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