Court Opinion

ID: 9693005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:15:25.475725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:01:09.534794
License: Public Domain

CANE, P.J.
(dissenting). My dissent is only to that portion of the opinion holding that it was error to strike Dr. Lorenz’s testimony. It was not error. Under Simpson, "antisocial personality disorder” is excluded from the definition of "mental disease or defect” under sec. 971.15(2). Simpson, 62 Wis. 2d at 612, 215 N.W.2d at 439. Lorenz’s diagnosis of Werlein as suffering from an antisocial personality disorder precludes Werlein from using the mental responsibility defense.
More importantly, after reviewing Lorenz’s testimony in a light most favorable to the defense, I would conclude as a matter of law that Werlein was not *459suffering from any mental disease or defect such that he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Section 971.15(1), Stats. Whether certain facts fulfill a particular legal standard is a question of law. Department of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 713, 281 N.W.2d 94, 101 (1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
Lorenz used the term "organic dysfunction” to mean that when a person has learned something wrong, it will remain wrong in the person’s mind unless it is corrected early in life. He also calls this an "attention deficit.” In Lorenz’s opinion, Werlein’s behavior is a product of the antisocial personality disorder created early in childhood by attention deficits. Simply stated, his behavior is a result of his environment. Werlein does not have any hallucinations or retardation. His EEG, CAT-scan, and electro-myography test results were all within the normal limits indicating that he had no neurological symptoms. He is intelligent, but compulsive. He is capable of appreciating right from wrong but, according to Lorenz, because of an attention deficit during childhood, he has a "lack of judgment” in conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.
Lorenz describes the common symptoms of the antisocial personality disorder as people who seldom hold a job, are not loyal to any person, group, code or religion. They basically have an undeveloped conscience and they have no super ego. This is all founded on the theory that the "disorder” started early in life and remained uncorrected. Consequently, the sufferer becomes a product of his or her environment.
The result is that persons such as Werlein are able, but fail to accept the social norms with respect to *460legal behavior. I suspect that a "spoiled brat” who turns to crime as an adult would fit Lorenz’s description of a person with an antisocial personality disorder unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Also, a person who is raised in a criminal environment would probably fall within a similar diagnosis. As Lorenz states, since Werlein is over the age of eighteen, his disorder is no longer termed an attention deficit disorder, but rather is termed an antisocial personality disorder.
Wisconsin has not, and should not, recognize this type of "disorder” as a legal defense under sec. 971.15. The trial court therefore correctly refused to recognize Lorenz’s diagnosis of Werlein as one falling under sec. 971.15(1). Rather, it correctly reasoned that the disorder was an abnormality as excluded from the mental disease or defect defense by sec. 971.15(2).