Court Opinion

ID: 9777620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:17:14.236748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:31.781055
License: Public Domain

NYE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The jury found that the defendant violated Art. 6701d by driving his vehicle on the left side of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of intersecting Texas Highway 359 and Farm to Market Road 796. The jury further found that this was a proximate cause of the accident in question. The majority of this Court have held that there were issues of fact raised by the evidence which would justify the violation of the statute. Therefore, they reason, the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial for the sole reason that the trial court did not also require the plaintiffs to submit and prove that the defendant, in violating the statutory duty, was also negligent.
The Texas courts follow the general rule that a violation of a statutory duty resulting in an injury of the type the statute sought to prevent, to one for whose advantage it was enacted, is negligence per se. This requires only a finding that the violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, to establish a defendant’s liability or to bar the plaintiffs’ claim as the case may be. This rule is not inexorable. Even with a finding of negligence as a matter of law, such findings may be precluded if there exists only a technical violation of the law, or under the circumstances, an excuse or justification for the violation is proved as an issue of fact.
In an early leading case, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals recognized a justification for the violation of a penal article. The Court held that once the statute has been adopted as a standard for determining civil liability, the sufficiency of the evidence of excuse is a preliminary matter for decision of the trial court. Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1952, ref. n. r. e.). Judge Norvell, in Phoenix said that “ * * if the evidence fairly raises the issue of excuse,” the reasonably prudent man standard of negligence should be submitted. In Hammer v. Dallas Transit Company, 400 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Sup.1966), Judge Pope, speaking for the Court, stated that the one charged with the violation of such a statute may go forward with the evidence and show excuse or justification. If he does so, he thrusts upon the opposition the burden to obtain a finding that the violation constituted negligence or contributory *272negligence under the common-law standard. More recently, in Christy v. Blades, 408 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Sup.1969), the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Judge Walker, stated that if a legal excuse for the violation of such a statute is established as a matter of law, or by a finding of fact, the other party will then need a finding of common-law negligence.
In the case at bar, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court for the following reasons: (1) It was undisputed that there was no justification or excuse proven as a matter of law or by a separate finding of fact and none was requested. (2) There were no pleadings by the defendant setting up the defense of excuse or justification that would have entitled the defendant to such an issue in any event. (3) The defendant did not assume the burden of going forward with the evidence and prove justification for the violation. (4) Even if there was some evidence (more than a scintilla) the trial court’s judgment cannot be reversed for the failure to submit proper excuse issues since the defendant did not request any issues or instructions. Rule 279 and Rule 273, T.R.C.P. (5) The evidence relied upon as an excuse or justification is not such conduct that will in fact or law excuse the statutory violation. This was so determined as a preliminary matter by the trial court who heard the evidence.
The appellants admit the violation of the statute and do not challenge the jury’s findings that this violation was a proximate cause of the accident. If the law is now, as the majority opinion states that it is, to the effect that only an issue of fact need be raised to require the appellees to submit and prove the additional issue of common-law negligence, then the facts of this case become extremely important.
The plaintiffs were passengers occupying the rear seat of an automobile that was struck on the side by a truck driven by the defendant as he was attempting to pass the car and the car was attempting to turn off of Highway 359 at the intersection of Highway 359 and FM 796. The car was driven by J. T. Hall. There were five people in the Hall car. Mr. and Mrs. Hall, riding in the front seat, were killed. Mr. and Mrs. Grover Impson and their daughter Ida Frances LeBourveau were riding in the rear seat. Mrs. Impson was also killed. Mr. Impson and his daughter are the plaintiffs here. They were severely injured. It was undisputed that the plaintiffs were not negligent in any way. Their basis for recovery of their damages was based upon the negligent conduct of the defendant truck driver.
The plaintiffs plead, among other things, that the defendant truck driver violated Section 57 of Art. 6701d, V.A.C.S., by driving his truck to the left side of the highway when he was approaching within one hundred feet of and traversing within the intersection of said Highway 359 with FM 796. The case was tried, on the theory that the defendant truck driver had violated the law, that he had failed to keep a proper lookout, and had failed to give a warning that he was passing. The fact that the defendant violated the law was undisputed. This was undisputed by the physical evidence and by defendant’s admission to the Justice of the Peace at the scene of the accident. The Justice of the Peace asked the defendant driver: “ * * * ‘Are you the driver of the truck?’ And he said, ‘Yes, sir. I am.’ I said, ‘What rate of speed was you traveling at the time you hit the car?’ and he said, ‘Somewheres in the neighborhood of fifty or fifty-five miles an hour.’ I asked him, I said, ‘Didn’t you know it was against the state law to pass another vehicle where there is two highways intersect?’ And he said, ‘Yes, sir.’ ‘* * * I thought the man heard me blowing my horn, because I was blowing my horn and I thought he heard me blowing my horn.’ ”
Other undisputed factual evidence was that the defendant driver was familiar with the highway and with the Town of Tynan. He had known of the intersection in question, having observed it on previous oc*273casions. The Town of Tynan is a very small south Texas farm community fronting on State Highway 359. This highway runs east and west. Most of the buildings are on the north side of the highway. The railroad track and elevators are on the south side' of the highway. FM796 enters the center of Tynan from the south. It crosses the railroad tracks and intersects with Highway 359 at right angles. It then follows on Highway 359 for approximately three or four blocks to a point where it turns north. It is at this latter point on the east edge of Tynan where the accident took place.
The defendant truck driver was traveling east as he entered the town. He observed the Hall vehicle in which the plaintiffs were riding. It entered Highway 359 from the south ahead of the truck. The Hall vehicle then traveled east on Highway 359 for 1031 feet to where FM796 turns north toward Beeville. The defendant truck driver stated that he entered Tynan traveling fifty to fifty-five miles per hour. He slowed down to some degree, pulled out into the left-hand lane and started passing the Hall vehicle. The Hall vehicle had picked up some speed from the time it entered Highway 359 until it started its turn several blocks east of where they entered Highway 359. When the defendant was within 20 or 30 feet of the rear of the Hall vehicle, but over 100 feet back from the intersection, he determined that the Hall vehicle was going to turn to the left. He applied his brakes, slid some fifty feet and struck the Hall vehicle on its left side causing the injuries and damages complained of.
The defendant’s excuses for violating the law are taken from portions of the evidence which he deems most favorable to him. They are: (1) That had the Hall car not speeded up as it entered Highway 359 during the quarter of a mile that it traversed Highway 359, he could have passed the car before it reached the intersection; (2) that there was no yellow stripe on the highway prohibiting him from passing; (3) that it was dark and trees and a house obscured the intersection; (4) that there was actually no indication that FM796 went off to the left from Highway 359 except for some small signs, the one with the arrow was directly opposite the intersection; (5) that although he had traveled over this highway five or six times in the past three or four years, he did not recall the exact location of this particular intersection; and (6) that since the Hall vehicle was on the extreme right-hand side of Highway 359 he did not believe it would turn left.
The defendant did not plead justification or excuse for the violation. He only filed a general denial. When the defendant attempted to bring up excuse, it was promptly objected to by the plaintiffs. No trial amendment was offered during the course of the trial.
Appellant says that these six reasons above set out, raise an issue of fact of excuse anyway, and these reasons excuse or justify the violation of this statute. Therefore, appellant says, the plaintiffs are required to prove that the defendant’s act of passing at the intersection was negligence, using the reasonably prudent man test.
These six reasons are either untrue, or they seek contributory negligence of plaintiffs’ driver indirectly as an excuse, or they are not an excuse as is contemplated by law. For instance, the fact that there was no yellow line on the pavement at the point where defendant was passing, is no excuse for violating this particular statute. Defendant says, except for the fact that plaintiffs’ driver picked up speed, he could have passed. It would be just as logical for the defendant to argue that: If plaintiffs’ driver had stopped he would have passed them easily; or if the defendant had been driving his truck faster he could have passed the plaintiffs before he got to the intersection. Again, the fact that defendant forgot that this intersection was there, or the fact that he blew his horn and thought plaintiffs’ driver knew he was going to pass them, is no excuse.
*274There was no blowout on the truck forcing the defendant into the left side of the highway. There was no misleading center-line. He didn’t swerve to miss a pedestrian. He says that he thought the signs were too small to properly observe the intersection, yet he was a professional driver and the signs at Tynan were the same size as all other similar signs all over the state of Texas. The photographic evidence, which is undisputed, shows four signs on the south side of the highway, one indicating where FM796 intersects with Highway 359 from the south, two signs as FM796 coincides with 359 for a short distance to the east, and a fourth sign where it leaves Highway 359 to the north. One photograph shows undisputably that the intersection at night was not at all obscured from a point over 100 feet away from the intersection. Another exhibit shows that the house in question was 50 feet north of Highway 359 and 75 feet west from FM796, the place where the accident took place. Actually, the defendant driver thought up a new excuse each time he was asked why he passed the Hall vehicle at the intersection. Once he was asked: “Q Why was it that when he (Hall) started picking up speed, you were not going to be able to pass him, that you didn’t slow down and pull in behind him ? A Because I thought to my thinking they were going to go straight, I mean, they weren’t going to make no left turn or nothing on account of they was way off on the righthand side. Q Well, I thought you were worried about them maybe turning left. A Maybe turning, maybe going straight. Q All right. Now, that being true, is there any reason that you can think of, why you didn’t, when they started picking up speed and when you didn’t know exactly what they were going to do, why you didn’t slow down and get back in on the righthand lane again? A No, sir.”
Another time he was asked: “Q Well, if you were two hundred feet away from the intersection and he was picking up speed, then why was it that you didn’t get back in the righthand lane? A Because I was already too far out for me to back up.”
The defendant driver admitted that he didn’t see the signs. He admitted that he knew he was not supposed to pass at the intersection. He was asked the question: “Q Now, at that — prior to that time you had known about Farm to Market Road 796, hadn’t you? A Not at that instant. Q Prior to that time? A Prior to that, yes, sir. Q I think you told me that when you saw the Hall car pull out on the Highway 359, you had just forgotten about Farm to Market Road 796 being up there to your left, is that correct? A That is correct. Q And regardless of whether or not there was any yellow stripe on the highway, at an intersection you knew that you were not supposed to pass within a hundred feet of an intersection, didn’t you? A Within a hundred feet, yes, sir. Q You knew that? A I knew that, but I just forgotten about it too.”
The defendant truck driver was asked why he didn’t see the sign and he said he was concentrating on watching the Hall vehicle. “Q Well, you were worried about where the (Hall) car was going. A Yes, sir. Q And you were worried that they might pull to the left? A Yes, sir. Q And you were worried about that before you started passing? A I worried — I was afraid they was going to turn after I seen the signs on that Farm to Market Road. Q Oh, you did see the signs? A After I was within a hundred feet from it.”
Another time he was asked whether or not he knew he was violating the law. The question put to him on cross-examination : Q Now, you knew you weren’t supposed to be passing in the intersection, didn’t you? A I didn’t recall it then. Q You didn’t? Well, if you had known or remembered that the intersection was there; would you have passed there? A Not after I was a hundred feet from it, no, sir. Q Because at that time you knew that you shouldn’t be passing in the inter*275section, right? A Not within a hundred feet, no, sir.”
He summarized the reason why he was not watching the signs: “A I was worried they were going to turn right off. I didn’t remember about the Farm to Market road that was there. Q All right. A My main reason was the way — the way they were driving on the paved shoulder. Q All right. And of course, if you had remembered about the Farm to Market road you wouldn’t have been trying to pass? A I don’t think so.”
Article 6701d, Sec. 57, is a penal statute. It fixes the standard of care. Its object is to prevent the type of accident that occurred on the occasion in question. The failure to conform to such standard is negligence per se. The statute states: “(a) No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:
j|c ⅜ ⅜ if: ⅜ ⅜
2. When approaching within one hundred (100) feet of or traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing
The generally accepted view in Texas and elsewhere is that the violation of this type of a statutory duty constitutes negligence as a matter of law. This is the reason that the violation of what the Legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution, is failure to observe that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would observe. When the Legislature regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, the doing of the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19(3). When a violation of Article 6701d, Sec. 57 has been established by findings similar to those in this case, it is not proper to submit ordinary negligence to determine whether the truck driver exercised ordinary care, absent pleadings and proof of justification. This method of submission urged by the defendant would make the violation nothing more than evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury. Christy v. Blades, supra. In the Christy case the Court stated that there are cases in which the existence of excuse or not can fairly be made to turn on the jury’s conclusion as to whether the actor was negligent by the reasonably prudent man standard. This is limited, however, to cases where the statutory requirements are generally known and accepted as the minimum standard of care, and the nature of the claimed excuse is such that a technical violation will not constitute negligence if a person of ordinary prudence would have violated the statute under the same or similar circumstances. But this was not the situation in the Christy case nor in the case at bar. In the Christy case the Court had under consideration Article 6701d, Sec. 86(d) which was also a “Thou shall not” type of statute.
Where a legislative body has acted to declare what shall or shall not be done, the triers of fact no longer determine the negligence or non-negligence of a party by comparison with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, but whether or not the expressed legislative will has been complied with. If there has been a violation of the legislative will then negligence is established not by comparison, but as a matter of law, absent proof of justification. 45 C.J. 720; 65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 19(3), 624.
In Hammer v. Dallas Transit Co., supra, the Supreme Court stated that the one charged with such a statutory violation, may then go forward with the evidence and show excuse or justification for the violation. But it is the one seeking to justify or excuse the violation who has the burden of going forward with the evidence. For instance, the Court said “ * * * The burden was upon the defendant Transit to go forward with the evidence to prove not merely its own loss of control hut that the loss of control was excusableAgain in Hammer the Court said that in Phoenix “ * * * He proved an excuse for being *276on the wrong side of the road * * (emphasis supplied). The Court, in distinguishing the Dallas Transit v. Tolbert case (337 S.W.2d 617, Tex.Civ.App.1960, ref. n. r. e.) said; “ * * * ⅛ our opinion Tolbert does not support Transit’s contention, because in that case, the one charged with being on the wrong side of the road proved that his vehicle was excusably out of control. * * * ” (emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court went on to say that when he proves excuse or justification, he then thrusts upon the other party the burden to obtain a finding that the violation was a negligent act under the common-law standard. The Supreme Court in Christy, after quoting the above rules from the Hammer case said, that if a legal excuse for the violation is established by the evidence as a matter of law or by a finding of fact then the party will need a finding of common-law negligence. In the case before us there was no excuse established as a matter of law nor was there a request, nor was there a finding of fact justifying the violation. It has been said that the Christy v. Blades case changed the burden upon the party attempting to establish the defense of excuse, from a burden of producing evidence to a burden of persuasion. See 49 Texas Law Review, pp. 175-180.
The defendant’s theory in our case was that the plaintiffs, not only had to prove statutory violation and that such act was a proximate cause of the collision, but also the plaintiffs were required to prove that such act was negligence on the part of the defendant. The Supreme Court in Christy rejected this theory. It stated that this method of submission would make the violation nothing more than evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury.
The feeble reasons offered as legal justification to pardon the defendant for his violation of the statutory law do not stand up to the legal justification contemplated by the law. 41 Tex.Law Rev., pp. 104-120; The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 Columbia Law Review 21; Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harvard Law Review 317; Sufficiency of Excuse to Warrant Jury Question, 27 Texas Law Review 866; Violation of Statute— Excuse Violation, 25 Tex.Law Review 424; 40 Tex.Jur.2d, Negligence, Sec. 15. There are cases that hold that the violation of a statute while acting in an emergency may be justified, or in order to avoid a hazard or serious danger, so long as such violation is not the product of the maker’s own negligence. 34 Texas Law Review 977, see footnotes 14 and 15.
In our case the defendant entered the left-hand side of the road voluntarily. It was his own decision to attempt to pass the Hall vehicle. It was his own forgetfulness that caused him not to remember the intersection in question. It was his own carelessness, by his own admission, that caused him to fail to observe the intersection. It was his own volition to pursue the passing of the Hall vehicle even after he determined in his own mind that he was not sure what the vehicle was going to do. The purpose of Art. 6701d, Sec. 57, is to prohibit the driving on the wrong side of the road when approaching an intersection. It is to protect all persons using the highway at or near the intersection, regardless of which way they are traveling. Martinez v. Hernandez, 394 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1965, wr. ref. n. r. e.); Harbert v. Mathis, 230 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1950). The defendant has not offered a legal excuse for violating the statute that was not the product of his own making.
The defendants do not contend that there was a legal justification as a matter of law. It is undisputed that they sought no special issue or instruction of excuse or justification. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment cannot be reversed for the failure to submit a proper excused violation. Rule 279, T.R.C.P.
The judgment of the trial court should be Affirmed.