Court Opinion

ID: 9703484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:58:24.559448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:49.756516
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree that the approval of a subdivision plan subject to approval by a coordinate governmental agency is not an “approval” within the meaning of § 8-26 or that this action constitutes a “failure to act” within the meaning of the inferred approval section of the statute. To hold as the majority does is to depart significantly from existing law1 and to make a major policy decision without the reasons for this change in the court’s position being given.
I would point out first that § 8-26, by its terms, neither expressly permits nor prohibits the imposition of conditions upon a planning commission’s approval of a subdivision plan. In my view the language of § 8-26 which authorizes a commission to “modify and approve” subdivision plans and the broad police powers as to traffic, health, safety and welfare conferred on planning commissions by § 8-25 clearly imply the existence of authority to impose reasonable conditions upon a grant of subdivision approval.
*600It is well settled law in this and other jurisdictions that the imposition of conditions upon a grant of subdivision approval is permissible as long as the conditions imposed are authorized by the enabling statutes and the subdivision control regulations duly adopted by the planning and zoning commission. Langbein v. Planning Board, 145 Conn. 674, 146 A.2d 412 (1958); Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park & Planning Board, 344 Mass. 329, 182 N.E.2d 540 (1962); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964). In his treatise on the law of zoning, Anderson states that subdivision approval may properly be conditioned upon approval by coordinate municipal agencies when the enabling statutes expressly so provide, or, in the absence of express statutory authorization, when the enabling acts include references in their statement of purpose to the particular subject of subdivision control involved, in this case, for example, the prevention of traffic hazards. 4 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d Ed.) § 23.14, p. 74.
The question of the validity of a planning and zoning commission action made subject to approval by other coordinate agencies was before this court in the 1971 case of Lurie v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 160 Conn. 295, 278 A.2d 799. In that ease, the defendant planning and zoning commission rezoned a sixty-two acre tract from a residential to a design development district and granted a special permit to the defendant Famous Artists Schools, Inc., to use the area for its corporate purposes. The plaintiffs argued that the commission, in granting the special permit, acted illegally by conditioning its approval upon the effectuation of certain offsite highway and traffic changes, requiring action or approval by municipal agencies over which the com*601mission had no control. As authority for this proposition, the plaintiffs cited the case of Stiles v. Town Council, 159 Conn. 212, 268 A.2d 395 (1970), where this court had held (p. 221) that “a change of zone which is dependent for its proper functioning on action by other agencies and over which the zoning commission has no control cannot be sustained unless . . . the necessary action appears to be a probability.” After examining closely the history of the rule enunciated in Stiles and relied on by the plaintiff, this court in Lurie, speaking through House, J., concluded (p. 307) that the strict application of that rule “to instances of exceptions and special use permits may often prevent desirable changes where the accomplishment of the change depends on cooperative or dependent action by the zoning authority and other municipal agencies over which it has no control. ... In many circumstances . . . other municipal agencies may properly be reluctant to commit themselves to a course of action before knowing that if such a commitment is made it will meet such conditions as the zoning authority will deem advisable. . . . Under such circumstances, where cooperative action is necessary to accomplish a desirable result, a stalemate can best be avoided by approval which may be conditional. We would, accordingly, hold that where an exception or a special permit is granted and the grant is otherwise valid except that it is made reasonably conditional on favorable action by another agency or agencies over which the zoning authority has no control, its issuance will not be held invalid solely because of the existence of any such condition.”
On a number of occasions, this court has expressly upheld subdivision approvals made subject to con*602ditions over which, the applicant had no control. In Crescent Development Corporation v. Planning Commission, 148 Conn. 145, 168 A.2d 547 (1961), for example, the New Canaan planning commission approved a subdivision plan subject to the condition that no roadway would be constructed in the New Canaan portion of the subdivision unless and until the Stamford portion of the subdivision was provided with access to public highways in Stamford. This court (King, J.) rejected the plaintiff’s claims that the commission’s action constituted an invalid attempt to regulate a subdivision in another town and that the commission’s action was illegal because not expressly authorized by the enabling statutes or the zoning regulations of New Canaan. Observing (p. 151) that “[t]he power of a planning commission to modify a plan before approving it is expressly given in § 8-26 of the General Statutes,” the court concluded (p. 148) that “[t]he practical effect of the defendant’s action [in approving the subdivision plan subject to the above listed conditions] was to approve the plan after modifying it.” The plaintiffs’ claim that the particular condition imposed was unauthorized was summarily dismissed by the court on the basis of the language in § 8-26 authorizing a planning commission to enact regulations governing the layout and construction of streets and highways in proposed subdivisions.
In Nicoli v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 171 Conn. 89, 90, 368 A.2d 24 (1976), the defendant commission voted to approve the plaintiff’s subdivision plan subject to the following condition to be printed on the final record map: “No zoning approval or building permit shall be issued for the *603construction of any residential building within this subdivision until such time as the proposed public road within the subdivision is connected to a public street or highway in the town of Easton.” The Court of Common Pleas held that the conditional approval by the defendant was invalid and modified the decision to the extent of eliminating the imposed condition. The decision of the trial court was reversed by this court, which held (p. 96) “that the defendant’s conditional approval constituted a valid exercise of its police power.” (Emphasis added.) This court, citing 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 19.04, p. 392, stated (p. 95) that “[t]he imposition of subdivision controls is an exercise of the police power . . . [which] seeks to accomplish the orthodox ends of the police power by serving the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.” In that case we held (p. 91) that the commission’s action in approving the subdivision plan, subject to the condition that the proposed public road in the subdivision be connected to a public street or highway in the town, was valid as an exercise of the commission’s authority to “provide . . . for present and prospective traffic needs.”
In both Crescent and Nicoli the planning commission actions held to be valid by this court involved subdivision approvals under § 8-26 and in each case the commission’s approval was made subject to conditions over which the applicant had no control. To hold as the majority does is, therefore, to depart significantly from the holdings in the above line of cases. If those cases are to be overruled on policy grounds or otherwise, the opinion of the court should explicitly so state, and give the reasoning for this major change in the court’s position.
*604I would hold that the action of the commission in approving the defendants’ subdivision plan subject to approval by the highway superintendent does not constitute a “failure to act” within the meaning of § 8-26 and that such action does not therefore trigger the inferred approval provisions of this statute.
I would find error and would order that the judgments be set aside and the cases remanded with direction to overrule the pleas in abatement and then to proceed according to law.

 Nicoli v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 171 Conn. 89, 368 A.2d 24 (1976); Lurie v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 360 Conn. 295, 278 A.2,d 799 (1971); Crescent Development Corporation v. Planning Commission, 148 Conn. 145, 168 A.2d 547 (1961).