Court Opinion

ID: 9702939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:33:34.345779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:16.767686
License: Public Domain

Davidson, J.,

dissenting:

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964), the United States Supreme Court established as *133a constitutional requirement that, in order to recover damages in a defamation action, a public figure must prove that a false defamatory statement "was made with 'actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974), the Supreme Court determined that the New York Times standard does not apply when a private individual seeks to recover damages for a false defamatory statement. There, that Court held that under such circumstances, "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010.
In allowing a lesser standard of liability, the Supreme Court recognized that private individuals who have not "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood” are entitled to a greater degree of protection than public figures. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. The Supreme Court further recognized that "[t]he largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 3011-12. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held "that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. In explicating this holding, the Supreme Court said:
”It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintaiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We need not defíne ’actual injury, ’ as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket *134loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inñicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50, 94 S.Ct. at 3012 (emphasis added).
In Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976), this Court considered the appropriate standard of fault to be applied when a private individual seeks to recover damages for a false defamatory statement. In reviewing the historical evolution of the Gertz standard, this Court said:
"The Supreme Court, with a majority of five, held that the constitutioal privilege articulated in New York Times does not extend to defamatory falsehoods concerning an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure. Rather than expand the New York Times standard to falsehoods relating to private persons when made in connection with events of public interest, as the Rosenbloom [v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 91 S. Ct. 1811 (1971)] plurality had done, the Court applied a number of restrictions to the law of libel designed to accommodate freedom of the press with the state’s interest in protecting a private person’s reputation. The Court held that in cases of defamation of private persons (1) the state may not impose liability without fault, but with that limitation may adopt any other standard of media liability, and (2) in cases where the New York Times test of knowing or reckless falsity is not met, the state may permit recovery for 'actual injury’ but not presumed or punitive damages. Such 'actual injury’ *135was not confined to out-of-pocket loss, but may include 'impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’” Jacron Sales Co., 276 Md. at 587, 350 A.2d at 692 (emphasis added).
This Court held that in Maryland a negligence standard was to be applied. Moreover, this Court said:
"Unless a conditional privilege is found to have existed, the plaintiff shall be required at the new trial of this case to establish the liability of the defendant through proof of negligence by the preponderance of the evidence, and may recover compensation for actual injury, as defined in Gertz and outlined earlier, but neither presumed nor punitive damages, unless he establishes liability under the more demanding New York Times standard of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” Jacron Sales Co., 276 Md. at 601, 350 A.2d at 700 (emphasis added).
Thus, this Court indicated that in a negligent defamation action, once a right to recover has been established, recoverable damages are limited to compensation for proven actual injury, such as impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, resulting out-of-pocket loss, or any other resulting loss. Presumed or punitive damages cannot be recovered. The question whether Maryland law requires proof of a specific type of actual injury — impairment of reputation — in order to establish a right to recover was not raised, considered, or determined by this Court.
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1805, AFL-CIO v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475, 379 A.2d 1223 (1977), this Court stated that in a negligent defamation action federal constitutional law did not require proof of impairment of reputation in order to establish a right to recover damages for actual injury, including damages for impairment of reputation, emotional distress, resulting *136out-of-pocket loss, or any other resulting loss. However, this Court additionally said:
"Appellant’s sole contention here is that federal constitutional law precluded the damages [for emotional distress] awarded appellee, absent proof of actual injury to his reputation. Since the union does not attempt to argue that, constitutional considerations aside, state law would nevertheless have barred the damage award returned here, we do not reach that question.” Mayo, 281 Md. at 482 n.4, 379 A.2d at 1227 n.4.
Thus, this Court explicitly left undetermined the question here, whether in. a negligent defamation action Maryland law requires proof of impairment of reputation in order to establish a right to recover damages for emotional distress.
In Metromedia, Inc. v. Hillman, 285 Md. 161, 400 A.2d 1117 (1979), this Court Considered the question whether subseqúent to Gertz Maryland law continued to recognize any distinction between libel per se and libel per quod. This Court held that the only remaining distinction is that in ah action for libel per quod, a private individual must allege and prove extrinsic facts showing that the publication is defamatory, whereas in an action for libel per se, no such allegation and proof is necessary. In reaching its result, this Court articulated what it then considered to be the minimal standard of pleading and proof in a defamation action. There, this Court said:
"Suffice it to say the effect in Maryland of Gertz and Jacron is that in order for a declaration alleging libel in a Maryland court to withstand the test of a demurrer it must allege:
"(1) a false and defamatory communication
a—which the maker knows is false and knows that it defames the other, or
b—that the maker has acted in reckless disregard of these matters, or
*137c—that the maker has acted negligently in failing to ascertain them, and
"(2) that the statement was one which appears on its face to be defamatory, as, e.g., a statement that one is a thief, or the explicit extrinsic facts and innuendo which make the statement defamatory, and
"(3) allegations of damages with some particularity, since Gertz and Jacron forbid presumed damages.
In other words, as to (3) in Maryland a pleading to be sufñcient must show a basis for believing that the plaintiff has sustained actual injury as defíned in Jacron.” Metromedia, Inc., 285 Md. at 171-72, 400 A.2d at 1123 (emphasis added).
The minimal standard expressed in (3) above was nothing more than a reiteration of the principle expressed in Jacron — that once a right to recover has been established, recoverable damages are limited to compensation for proven actual injury and that presumed or punitive damages cannot be recovered. That standard indicated only that, in the wake of Gertz and Jacron, it was necessary not only to plead and prove a right to recover, but also to plead and prove a recoverable damage — actual injury. Moreover, although the minima] standard expressed in (3) did not restrict the type of actual injury required to be pleaded and proven to impairment of reputation, this Court nonetheless did not determine the question here, whether under Maryland law it is necessary to prove impairment of reputation in order to establish a right to recover, because that question was neither raised nor considered. Under these circumstances, the question not reached in Mayo or Metromedia, Inc., whether, in a negligent defamation action, it is necessary to prove impairment of reputation in order to establish a right to recover, remains to be determined here.
The majority here concludes that under Maryland law proof of harm to reputation is not essential to an action in *138negligent defamation. Even a cursory examination of the majority’s lengthy but sophistical analysis reveals that its conclusion is not affirmatively supported by any direct authority.
The majority relies essentially upon an analogy premised upon the post-Gertx position of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 620 (1977) (Restatement) on nominal damages.1 Section 620 of the Restatement does, after Gertz, retain the previous common law rule that "[o]ne who is liable for a slander actionable per se or for a libel is liable for at least nominal damages.” However, § 569 comment c of the Restatement explicitly states that "[t]he constitutionality of the common law rule that nominal damages may be recovered for a defamatory communication that is actionable per se, even in the absence of proof of harm to reputation, is now somewhat uncertain.” Thus, . the Restatement itself acknowledges that in the wake of Gertz its stated common law rule may no longer be constitutionally viable.
More important, the Restatement’s post- Gertz view with respect to the continued existence of nominal damages is directly contrary to post- Gertz statements made by this Court, albeit in dicta, in Metromedia. There, writing for a unanimous Court, Judge Smith on two separate occasions unequivocally and without qualification stated that in the. wake of Gertz nominal damages for a defamatory communication that is actionable per se no longer exist in Maryland. Thus, Judge Smith initially specifically said:
"Since nominal or presumed damages no longer exist, in all libel actions Maryland pleading principles require the same type of pleading as to damages as was formerly necessary in libel per quod.” Metromedia, Inc., 285 Md. at 163, 400 A.2d at 1119 (emphasis added).
*139Subsequently, Judge Smith even more specifically said:
"[Ujnder Gertz we were no longer permitted to impose liability on the media without fault, as, e.g., by permitting recovery of nominal damages for calling a person a thief....” Metromedia, Inc., 285 Md. at 168, 400 A.2d at 1121 (emphasis added).
Manifestly, the Restatement’s post- Gertz rule on nominal damages is not only considered by the Restatement itself to be of questionable constitutional validity, but is also of questionable validity under present Maryland law. Under such circumstances, an analogy premised upon that rule can hardly provide adequate affirmative support to justify the majority’s conclusion that under post-Gertz Maryland law it is not necessary to prove impairment of reputation in order to recover in a negligent defamation action.
Moreover, in my view, the majority’s conclusion not only is antithetical to Maryland’s historical concept of the nature and purpose of defamation actions, but also creates an internal inconsistency within Maryland tort law. Courts have long recognized that the gravamen as well as the fundamental purpose of defamation actions is to permit recovery for impairment of reputation. As long ago as 1605, in The Case of de Libellis lamosis; or of Scandalous Libels, 5 Coke 125 (1605), it was reported:
"He who kills a Man with his Sword in Fight is a great Offender, but he is a greater Offender who poisons another; for in the one Case he, who is openly assaulted, may defend himself, and knows his Adversary, and may endeavour to prevent it: But poisoning may be done so secretly that none can defend himself against it; for which Cause the Offense is the more dangerous, because the Offender cannot easily be known; and of such Nature is libelling, it is secret, and robs a Man of his good Name, which ought to be more precious to him than his Life ... and therefore when the Offender is known, he ought to be severely punished.”
*140Similarly, in Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54, 59, 6 N.Y.S. 196, 197 (1858), the New York Court of Appeals said:
"The action for slander is given by the law as a remedy for 'injuries affecting a man’s reputation or good name by malicious, scandalous and slanderous words, tending to his damage and derogation.’ It is injuries affecting the reputation only which are the subject of the action. ’’(Citations omitted) (emphasis added).
More recently, in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275, 91 S.Ct. 621, 627 (1971), the United States Supreme Court said:
"[Djamage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel.”
Commentators too have recognized that the gravamen as well as the fundamental purpose of defamation actions is to permit recovery for impairment of reputation. Thus, in W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 737, 739 (4th ed. 1971), it is stated:
K[D]efamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is a 'relational’ interest, since it involves the opinion which others’ in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Consequently defamation requires that something be communicated to a third person that may affect that opinion. Derogatory words and insults directed to the plaintiff himself may afford ground for an action for the intentional infliction of mental suffering, but unless they are communicated to another the action cannot be one for defamation, no matter how harrowing they may be to the feelings. Defamation is not concerned with the plaintiff’s own humiliation, wrath or sorrow, except *141as an element of'parasitic’ damages attached to an independent cause of action.
Defamation is rather that which tends to injure 'reputation’ in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.” (Footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Recognizing that the gravamen of the tort of defamation is impairment of reputation, courts in some jurisdictions have held, after Gertz, that in a negligent defamation action it is necessary to prove impairment of reputation in order to establish a right to recover damages for emotional distress. See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1982); France v. St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Center, 82 A.D.2d 1, 6, 441 N.Y.S.2d 79, 83 (1981); Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., 77 A.D.2d 501, 502, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (1980). But see, e.g, Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So.2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976); Freeman v. Cooper, 390 So.2d 1355, 1360 (La.App. 1980), aff'd, 414 So.2d 355 (La. 1982). Thus, in Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1982), the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
"We conclude that in this state, damage to one’s reputation is the essence and gravamen of an action for defamation. Unless injury to reputation is shown, plaintiff has not established a valid claim for defamation, by either libel or slander, under our law. It is reputation which is defamed, reputation which is injured, reputation which is protected by the laws of libel and slander.” (Emphasis added.)
*142The rationale underlying the concept that impairment of reputation must be proven in order to establish a right to recover damages for a false defamatory statement was stated as long ago as 1858 in Terwilliger; 17 N.Y. at 60-61, 6 N.Y.S. at 197-98. There the Court of Appeals of New York explained why, in a defamation action, humiliation and mental anguish are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to establish a right to recover. There, that Court said:
"it would be highly impolitic to hold all language, wounding the feelings and affecting unfavorably the health and ability to labor, of another, a ground of action; for that would be to make the right of action depend oñen upon whether the sensibilities of a person spoken of are easily excited or otherwise; his strength of mind to disregard abusive, insulting remarks concerning him; and his physical.strength and ability to bear them. Words which would make hardly an impression on most persons, and would be thought by them, and should be by all, undeserving of notice, might be exceedingly painful to some, occasioning sickness and an interruption of ability to attend to their ordinary avocations. There must be some limit to liability for words not actionable per se, both as to the words and the kind of damages; and a clear and wise one has been fixed by the law. The words must be defamatory in their nature; and must in fact disparage the character; and this disparagement must be evidenced by some positive loss arising therefrom directly and legitimately as a fair and natural result. In this view of the law words which do not degrade the character do not injure it, and cannot occasion loss.” (Emphasis added.)
I agree with those courts that now require proof of impairment of reputation in order to establish a right to recover in a negligent defamation action.
*143In Maryland, this Court has frequently recognized that the gravamen of the tort of defamation is impairment of reputation. Bowie v. Evening News, 148 Md. 569, 572, 129 A. 797, 798 (1925); Goldsborough v. Orem & Johnson, 103 Md. 671, 680, 64 A. 36, 39 (1906); Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 175 (1883). Thus, in Goldsborough v. Orem & Johnson, 103 Md. 671, 680, 64 A. 36, 39 (1906), this Court said:
"Unjustifiable assaults upon private character are most detestable, and in many instances are treated by the Courts as actionable wrongs, and sometimes are punished as criminal offenses. ’Reputation and honor are no less precious to good men than bodily safety and freedom. In some cases they are dearer than life itself. It is needful for the peace and welfare of a civilized commonwealth that the laws should protect the reputation as well as the person of the citizen. In our law some kinds of defamation are the subject of criminal proceedings, as endangering public order or being offensive to public decency or morality. Vice Chancellor Malins in Dixon v. Holden, L.R. 7 Eq. 492, declared a man’s reputation to be his property, and, if possible, more valuable than any other property. Chief Justice Best in DeCrespigny v. Wellesly, 5 Bing. 406, said that, if we reflect upon the degree of suffering occasioned by the loss of character, and compare it with the loss of property, the amount of the former injury far exceeds the latter. It was said by Fortescue, J., in Button v. Hayward, 8 Mod. that 'it was the rule of Holt, Chief Justice, to make words actionable whenever they sound to the disreputation of the person of whom they were spoken, and this was also Hale’s and Twisden’s rule, and I think a very good rule.’
"It is therefore the duty of everyone to forbear to speak, or write and publish false defamatory words of another, because he thereby commits a breach of duty which he owes to the other.” (Additional emphasis added.)
*144Similarly, in Bowie v. Evening News, 148 Md. 569, 572, 129 A. 797, 798 (1925), this Court said:
"It may be stated generally that the right of the individual citizen to rest secure in the possession of his good name, fame and reputation is a valuable privilege, of which no one may deprive him through falsehood and malice without liability to him for the injury.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, this Court has traditionally defined as defamatory:
"[A]ny publication which tends to injure one’s reputation, and expose him to hatred or contempt, if made without lawful excuse....” Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 175 (1883) (emphasis added).
Thus, this Court has recognized that the purpose of defamation actions is to permit recovery for impairment of reputation. It is consonant with that purpose to require proof of impairment of reputation in order to establish a right to recover in a negligent defamation action.
Moreover, to permit recovery for emotional distress in a negligent defamation action without proof of impairment of reputation would produce anomalous results. In The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va.L.Rev. 1349 (1975), Joel D. Eaton described the difficulties inherent in permitting recovery in a negligent defamation action without requiring proof of impairment of reputation. There, he suggested that the application of such a principle would "work considerable mischief in the law of defamation.” He pointed out that if such a principle is applied in a defamation action, "the insult, not the injury is the cause of action,” a result that would constitute "a fundamental change in the underlying premise of the tort itself.” In explanation of this conclusion, he commented:
"Despite the myriad complexities in the common law, 'damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel.’ A claim that one has been defamed is a *145claim that his reputation has been injured, not that a falsehood has been published about him; it is the damage and not the insult which is the cause of action. The common law maintained this theoretical underpinning by presuming injury to reputation ....
Negligent infliction of mental distress by publishing a falsehood may well be a tort, but it is not the tort of defamation. Defamation is injury to reputation. If the essence of the law of defamation is to be preserved ... a defamation plaintiff must first prove impairment of reputation before he is entitled to recover for personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering.” 61 Va.L.Rev. at 1437, 1438-39 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
There is still another difficulty inherent in the application of a principle permitting recovery in a negligent defamation action without proof of impairment of reputation. In Maryland, a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress exists. In such an action, damages for emotional distress ordinarily can be recovered without showing any physical injury. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977). In Maryland, a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress also exists. However, where the only damages sought result from the negligent infliction of emotional distress, damages ordinarily cannot be recovered without proof of physical injury, " 'as manifested by an external condition or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state.’ ” Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 733 (1979); see Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933). Thus, ordinarily, where the only damages sought result from the infliction of emotional distress and there is no proof of "physical injury,” damages can be recovered only if an intentional tort is shown. To permit the recovery of damages for the infliction of emo*146tional distress without proof of physical injury in a negligent defamation action is logically inconsistent with this general principle. It permits recovery for emotional distress resulting from a negligent act under circumstances ordinarily requiring an intentional rather than a negligent act.
In the wake of Gertz’s and Jacron’s elimination of presumed damages for impairment of reputation in negligent defamation actions, I am persuaded that in such actions, impairment of reputation must be proven in order to establish a right to recover. Such a result is mandated by Maryland’s historical recognition that the fundamental purpose of defamation actions is to permit recovery for impairment of reputation. Additionally, to permit recovery for emotional distress in a negligent defamation action without proof of impairment of reputation would result in a fundamental change in the basic nature of the tort itself, a change that is antithetical to Maryland’s historical recognition that the gravamen of the tort of defamation is impairment of reputation. Moreover, to permit recovery for emotional distress in a negligent defamation action under circumstances other than those ordinarily required in other types of negligence actions, creates an internal inconsistency within Maryland tort law.
In short, while federal constitutional law does not preclude recovery of damages for actual injury in a negligent defamation action despite the absence of proof of impairment of reputation, Mayo, 281 Md. at 482, 379 A.2d at 1227, in the wake of Gertz, I would hold that under Maryland law in a negligent defamation action it is ordinarily necessary to prove a specific type of actual injury — impairment of reputation — in order to establish a right to recover damages for emotional distress.
Here the record shows that in a negligent defamation action, Hughes proved emotional distress but failed to prove *147impairment of reputation. Under these circumstances, Hughes was not entitled to recover. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Judge Eldridge authorizes me to state that he joins me in the views expressed herein.

. In addition to § 620 of the Restatement, the majority cites only two other treatises — L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation § 95.b, at 541 (1978) and R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § VII.2.1, at 345 (1980). Both of these treatises do virtually nothing other than quote extensively from and rely upon the Restatement.