Court Opinion

ID: 9732281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:13:49.700873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:25.792323
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would find the evidence sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction of murder in the first degree. However, I would find that the presence of the decedent’s widow at the counsel table of the Commonwealth requires a new trial. I state my reasoning briefly as follows.
I.
The majority concludes that a verdict of guilt to a charge of murder in the first degree may not be based solely upon the presumption which arises from the use of deadly force on a vital organ when a defendant asserts a claim of self-defense. I would not reach that issue, as I do not find it presented by the facts of the instant case. Succinctly, I find that the totality of the evidence was sufficient to *279sustain the verdict, and that the majority has failed to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give the Commonwealth the benefit of reasonable inferences arising from the evidence.
Appellant admitted stabbing the decedent with an 11-inch knife which she was carrying in her purse, but claimed that she did so in self-defense when the decedent attempted to abduct and sexually assault her. However, the details of appellant’s trial version of the incident were inconsistent with the details of various prior statements made by appellant, with physical evidence discovered at the scene, with the probable (but not certain) effect of the wounds inflicted on the decedent, and with the considerable opinion evidence presented as to the decedent’s reputation as a non-violent, law abiding, and happily married young man. Evidence also indicated that appellant had twice returned to the scene of the crime to remove evidence linking her to the crime, had otherwise acted in a calm, ordinary manner on the day following the incident, and had failed to report the incident to the police.
In its instructions to the jury, the trial court correctly explained:
When the actor uses a deadly weapon on the vital part of the body of another, you may regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence from which you may infer that the actor had the specific intention to kill required in first-degree murder. Notice I said ‘you may.’ You don’t have to. You may think it doesn’t show an intention to kill when you wrap it up and consider it with all of the circumstances in the case.
The Commonwealth contends that the evidence here supports a finding of malice-of intentional malice-as is required in first-degree murder, that there is no mitigation, there is no justification; and the defense contends that the evidence does not warrant a finding of such malice because the defendant was lawfully justified in acting in self-defense.
(N.T. 4/4/85 at 10). Thus, the jury was specifically instructed to consider “all the circumstances of the case” *280before deciding whether appellant acted with “malice” and was not invited to find malice based solely upon the use of a deadly weapon on a vital organ.
The jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and to draw reasonable inferences arising therefrom. Apparently, the jury accepted appellant’s admission that she stabbed the victim and rejected as not credible her proffered justification that he was attempting to abduct and sexually assault her. I would not substitute our assessment of the appellant’s credibility and the weight to be accorded the evidence for that of the jury. Rather, I find the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict, and therefore dissent.
II.
The majority does not reach appellant’s contention that a new trial is required as the result of the prejudice to appellant arising from the conspicuous presence of the decedent’s widow at the prosecutor’s table within the bar of the court during voir dire and throughout trial. Initially, I would find that a challenge to her presence was properly preserved, and that repetition of the objection at each stage of the proceedings was not required. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hanes, 361 Pa.Super. 357, 365, 522 A.2d 622, 626 (1987) (evidentiary ruling by trial court foreclosed further inquiry on the subject, repetition of motion was not necessary to preserve the issue). I find that a substantial risk of improper prejudice affecting juror deliberations was created by the emotionally evocative presence of the widow within the bar of the court during voir dire and throughout trial. No legitimate reason for her presence has been proffered, nor could I imagine any. Consequently, I would vacate the sentence and remand for a new trial on all charges.