Court Opinion

ID: 9468389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:13:43.190612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:50.960485
License: Public Domain

CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Assuming that the majority is correct in holding that the charge to the jury does not accurately reflect the indictment, I would hold that permitting the jury to convict if it found that defendant used threats of physical harm did not so change the basic theory of the alleged conspiratorial agreement as to constitute an amendment. Our Circuit has stated the purposes underlying the rule against constructive amendments: notice to the defendant of the charges he will face at trial; notice to the court so it may determine whether the facts alleged are sufficient to support a conviction; prevention of further prosecution for the same offense; the assurance that a group of independent citizens have reviewed the allegations and determined that there is enough of a case to send to the jury. United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1978). The crime charged in the indictment, particularly with respect to the conspiracy, was the same as described in the charge to the jury. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66, 62 S.Ct. 457, 463, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942):
*720The particularity of time, place, circumstances, causes, etc., in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of a conspiracy for which petitioners contend is not essential to an indictment.
Nor was there any surprise here. The government’s opening statement, as well as defendant’s opening statement made immediately thereafter, disclosed that at least at that time both parties expected the government to attempt to prove that Mr. Meli’s reputation in the community, a reputation as a high ranking member of organized crime with all of the implications of that association, was a contributing factor in the drivers’ acquiescing in the 11% agreement. No one suggests that the variance affects defendant’s right to be protected from being placed twice in jeopardy.
Because none of the policies underlying the rule were frustrated here, I would hold that the charge to the jury was not a constructive amendment.
Rather, . . . [it] constituted a variance which did not alter the crime charged, nor unfairly surprise the defendants], nor create an opportunity for the Government to prosecute the defendants] again for substantially the same offense.
United States v. De Cavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1272 (3d Cir. 1971). See also, United States v. Fruehauf Corp., 577 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978), and United States v. Goldfarb, 643 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1981), distinguishing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960).*
Alternatively, I would hold that the jury instruction does track the indictment. The indictment charges that the victim owner-drivers were forced to make their employer’s contributions to the Health and Welfare and Pension Funds. The indictment further charges that “their consent [was] induced by the wrongful use of force and fear . ...”
The jury instructions permitted a conviction based solely on the wrongful use of physical force to induce consent. Since threats of physical harm are encompassed in “the wrongful use of force,” I would hold that the jury instructions did not amend the indictment. In holding that the words following “induced by the wrongful use of force and fear” limit the indictment to fear of unprofitable loads, the loss of their jobs, etc., the majority has unduly restricted the word “force.”
The indictment is poorly drafted. While a narrow reading of this poorly drafted instrument lends support to the majority’s position that the extortion was accomplished only through economic force, I believe that the grand jury would be surprised by the majority’s holding that it did not charge defendant with using physical force to obtain the drivers’ consent to the extortionate payments.

 Other circuits have distinguished and limited Stirone. United States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166, 1173 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 311-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986, 99 S.Ct. 581, 58 L.Ed.2d 659 (1978); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977); United States v. Cirami, 510 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 1952, 44 L.Ed.2d 451 (1975); United States v. Hand, 497 F.2d 929, 935 (5th Cir. 1974), aff’d, 516 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 1427, 47 L.Ed.2d 359 (1976); United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 744 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832, 95 S.Ct. 56, 42 L.Ed.2d 58 (1974); United States v. Biondo, 483 F.2d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 947, 94 S.Ct. 1468, 39 L.Ed.2d 563 (1974); United States v. Smith, 474 F.2d 844, 846-47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 2162, 36 L.Ed.2d 692 (1973); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914, 93 S.Ct. 233, 34 L.Ed.2d 176 (1972); United States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917, 92 S.Ct. 1766, 32 L.Ed.2d 116 (1972); United States v. De Cavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1271-72 (3d Cir. 1971); Jackson v. United States, 359 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1966).