Court Opinion

ID: 9573216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:49:58.754961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:12.233079
License: Public Domain

IRWIN, Justice
(dissenting).
One of the primary issues herein presented, and one of first impression, is the constitutionality of that portion of the 1965 legislative enactment (Title 69 Ó.S.1965 Supp. Sec. 669), which authorizes the Authority to issue turnpike revenue bonds for the combined purpose of refunding any outstanding turnpike bonds and paying all or any part of the cost of any additional turnpike projects.
In my opinion, one of the fundamental questions which would have to be determined first is whether or not the State of Oklahoma, as distinguished from the Authority, has any right, title and interest in the projects to be refunded.
If the State of Oklahoma has any right, title and interest in the projects I am of the opinion that that portion of 'Sec. 669, supra, above mentioned, contravenes Article X, Sec. 15, of the Oklahoma Constitution, which provides:
“The credit of the State shall not be given, pledged, or loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or association, municipality or political subdivision of the State; nor shall the State * * make donation by gift, * * * or otherwise, to any company, association, or corporation.”
In my judgment, the State does have some right, title and interest in the bonds to be refunded for the following reasons.
Although the Turner, Bailey and Eastern “A” Turnpikes are sought to be refunded, I will confine my views to the Turner Turnpike. Turner is a highly successful turnpike proj ect and has reduced its bonded indebtedness from $38,000,000 to $24,698,-000, or approximately 35%. Under the legislative enactment under consideration, if the Legislature can constitutionally authorize the Authority to refund Turner in the present proceeding, it could constitutionally authorize the Authority to refund Turner if there remained outstanding only 1, 5 or 10% of its original bonded indebtedness. In other words, if there remained outstanding only $1,000,000 of Turner bonds, and the above enactment is constitutional, the Authority could refund Turner and combine it with any additional turnpike proposed to be constructed. At the present time, Turner is burdened with a $24,698,000 bonded indebtedness and when the bonds are issued herein, the same will be burdened with a $190,000,000 bonded indebtedness.
Turner and each of the present existing turnpikes and their bonds are the result of separate projects of the Authority, with their own individual rate of interest, principal amounts, maturity dates, redemption privileges and security. When all of the existing bonds were issued they were issued under Title 69 O.S.1961, Sec. 669, which provided that “Each refunding issue shall be limited to the project in connection with which the bonds being refunded were issued and revenues pledged to pay any such refunding issue shall be limited to the revenue derived from said separate project.” The 1965 Legislature amended Sec. 669, supra, and by such amendment the Authority was authorized to provide for the issuance of its turnpike revenue bonds for the combined purpose of refunding any bonds then outstanding and paying all or any part of the cost of any additional turnpike projects. It is this amendment which removes the restriction of limiting refunding bonds to the project for which the bonds were issued that in my opinion is unconstitutional.
Not only were the bonds of Turner and all present existing turnpikes issued with the limitation on refunding as prescribed by Sec. 669, supra, but such bonds were also issued under Title 69 O.S.1961, Sec. 667, which, inter alia, provides:
•“When all bonds issued under the provisions of this Act and the interest thereon *883shall have been paid or a sufficient amount for the payment of all such bonds and the interest thereon to maturity thereof shall have been set aside in trust for the benefit of the bondholders, such projects, if then in good condition and repair to the satisfaction of the State Highway Commission, shall become part of the State Highway System and shall thereafter be maintained by the State Highway Commission free of tolls. * *
Section 667, supra, contains a further proviso to the effect that when all the bonds for any turnpike project and interest thereon shall have been paid in full, such project shall continue to be operated as a toll facility until all bonds issued by the Authority and the interest thereon shall have been paid or such provisions for payment made. The constitutionality of a similar proviso was upheld in Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 348 P.2d 510.
In my opinion, there is a clear-cut distinction between pledging the tolls of a paid out turnpike project, and refunding an existing turnpike project and combining it with a project to be constructed. Apparently the Legislature recognized this distinction for it authorized the pledging of tolls of paid out projects in 1955 and did not authorize the refunding of an existing turnpike project and combining it with other projects until 1965.
In my judgment, when bonds for a turnpike project have been issued under a statutory provision that such project shall become a part of the State Highway System when such bonds and interest thereon are paid in full, the State of Oklahoma has some right, title and interest in such project prior to the time the bonds and interest thereon are paid in full. Having such right, title and interest, the Legislature could not authorize the hypothecation thereof.
In my opinion, Application of Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board, Okl., 274 P.2d 61, is not applicable. When the bonds were originally issued there, they were issued under Title 74 O.S.1961, Sec. 356.16, which provided “The Board may issue bonds hereunder for the purpose of refunding any obligations of the Board theretofore issued hereunder, or may authorize and deliver a single issue of bonds hereunder in part for the purpose of refunding such obligations and in part for the acquisition of additional properties or improvements * * *.” The instant bonds to be refunded were issued under a statutory provision that “Each refunding issue shall be limited to the project in connection with which the bonds being refunded were issued and revenues pledged to pay any such refunding issue shall be limited to the revenue derived from said separate project.” They were also issued with the proviso that they shall become a part of the State Highway System when the bonds had been paid.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that that portion of Title 69 O.S. 1965 Supp. Sec. 669, which authorizes the Authority to issue turnpike revenue bonds for the combined purpose of refunding any outstanding turnpike bonds and paying all or any part of the cost of any additional turnpikes is unconstitutional.
Assuming however, the above legislative enactment is constitutional with reference to the issues above discussed, I would still be of the opinion that we could not approve the constitutionality of the enactment.
In my judgment, the Legislature has delegated to the Authority legislative powers by authorizing the Authority to issue revenue bonds for the combined purpose of refunding any outstanding bonds and paying all or any part of the cost of any additional projects without any guide lines or standards upon which to exercise such authority. In my opinion, the Legislature has reposed in the Authority an absolute, unregulated and unbridled authority to exercise its discretion without guide lines or standards.
A legislative enactment which in effect reposes an absolute, unregulated and undefined discretion in an administrative body bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful delegation of legislative powers in viola*884tion of the Constitution. See Seltzer v. Commissioners of Land Office, Okl., 258 P.2d 1172.
In my opinion, this proceeding is controlled by the above case.
This Court has previously sustained the constitutionality of the apportionment of the motor fuel tax and the continuation of tolls an all turnpike projects until all the principal and interest on all turnpikes have been paid. My views on the constitutionality of these matters were set forth in my dissenting opinion in Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 348 P.2d 510.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent to the views promulgated by a majority of my associates.