Court Opinion

ID: 9908660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 16:12:29.059905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:25.349438
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                            2023 WY 120

                                                                  OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                         December 11, 2023

YVONNE PATRICE KESSEL,

Appellant
(Defendant),

v.                                                                      S-23-0059

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee
(Plaintiff).

                       Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County
                           The Honorable Daniel L. Forgey, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public
      Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen
      R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Ingrid G. Bent, Student Intern.
      Argument by Ms. Bent.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Yvonne Patrice Kessel was involved in a fatal car accident that killed Cruz Cane
Paulsen. A jury convicted Ms. Kessel of one count of aggravated vehicular homicide. She
contends the district court erred by denying her proposed jury instruction, which she
claims was a theory of defense instruction whose denial would constitute error per se.
She further asserts even if the instruction was not a theory of defense instruction, the
district court abused its discretion by failing to give it. We conclude Ms. Kessel’s
proposed jury instruction was not a proper theory of defense instruction, and the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proposed instruction. We affirm.

                                         ISSUES

[¶2]   Ms. Kessel raises one issue comprised of two parts on appeal, which we rephrase:

              1.    Did Ms. Kessel’s proposed jury instruction assert a
                    proper theory of defense?

              2.     Did the district court abuse its discretion when it
                     denied Ms. Kessel’s proposed jury instruction?

                                         FACTS

[¶3] Around 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, November 7, 2021, Yvonne Patrice Kessel drove
her minivan to the nearby Albertsons. To reach the store, Ms. Kessel made a left turn.
She entered the turn lane, and as she initiated the left turn, 25-year-old Cruz Cane
Paulsen was approaching on his motorcycle in the opposite direction. A private dashcam
shows Ms. Kessel did not stop before turning. She cut the turn short, crossed over the
double yellow lines of the road, and Mr. Paulsen hit the passenger side of Ms. Kessel’s
minivan.

[¶4] Ms. Kessel pulled her minivan into a nearby parking lot, left her vehicle, and
approached Mr. Paulsen, who was lying on the pavement, unconscious and bleeding
severely from his head. A bystander told Ms. Kessel to go sit in her car and wait for
police officers to arrive.

[¶5] Ms. Kessel returned to her minivan, located a Bacardi rum bottle, and drank until
only a “small remnant” of alcohol remained. Law enforcement later found it tucked under
the front passenger seat of the minivan. Ms. Kessel exited her minivan after police
officers and medical first responders had arrived on the scene of the accident. She walked
away from the scene and down the hill to a liquor store. While in the liquor store, she did
not ask for assistance, nor did she use a phone to call for help. Instead, she bought a
bottle of vodka, sat outside Albertsons, and drank a sip.

                                            1
[¶6] A bystander who witnessed the accident saw Ms. Kessel walk out of the liquor
store. When the bystander approached Ms. Kessel, she noticed Ms. Kessel was holding a
bag with alcohol in it. The bystander told her she needed to speak with the officers, and
Ms. Kessel said the officers were going to think she had been drinking and started crying.
The bystander escorted her to Officer Brownell at the accident scene.

[¶7] Officer Brownell conducted five field-sobriety tests, and Ms. Kessel showed
numerous signs of impairment. Officer Brownell placed Ms. Kessel under arrest. Ms.
Kessel consented to a blood draw, which indicated her blood alcohol concentration was
0.211, nearly two and a half times the legal limit. Ms. Kessel claimed she did not drink
any alcohol before the accident and typically drank alcohol in response to trauma. She
later admitted she drank alcohol earlier in the day with her husband.

[¶8] Mr. Paulsen died from the head injuries he sustained in the accident, and the State
charged Ms. Kessel with one count of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i)(ii). Mr. Paulsen had a blood alcohol concentration of
0.17 and tetrahydrocannabinol in his system at the time of his death. The defense’s main
argument at trial was Mr. Paulsen—through his speeding; intoxication; lack of proper
license, safety gear, and poor tire tread—was the proximate cause of his death, not Ms.
Kessel.

[¶9] The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty for one count of aggravated
vehicular homicide. The court sentenced Ms. Kessel to a prison term of thirteen-and-a-
half to sixteen years, with credit for time served. Ms. Kessel timely appealed.

                                     DISCUSSION

I.    The district court did not commit reversible error by denying Ms. Kessel’s
      proposed jury instruction because the instruction did not assert a proper theory
      of defense.

A.    Ms. Kessel may raise this issue on appeal.

[¶10] The State argues we should not consider Ms. Kessel’s theory of defense argument
because she did not offer her proposed instruction below as a theory of defense. We
disagree.

[¶11] This Court will “not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” Borja v.
State, 2023 WY 12, ¶ 24, 523 P.3d 1212, 1218 (Wyo. 2023) (citing Rogers v. State, 2021
WY 123, ¶ 14, 498 P.3d 66, 70 (Wyo. 2021)). “This rule holds true ‘whether it be legal
theories or issues never formally raised in the pleadings nor argued to the trial court.’”
Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40, ¶ 32, 415 P.3d 666, 678 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Crofts v.

                                            2
State ex rel. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4, ¶ 19, 367 P.3d 619, 624 (Wyo. 2016)).
“Parties are bound by the theories they advance below because it is ‘not appropriate for
this Court to reverse a district court ruling on grounds that were never presented to it.’”
Rogers, 2021 WY 123, ¶ 14, 498 P.3d at 70 (quoting Miller v. Beyer, 2014 WY 84, ¶ 34,
329 P.3d 956, 967 (Wyo. 2014)).

[¶12] Although Ms. Kessel did not refer to her proposed instruction as a theory of
defense when she offered it below, the district court apparently understood it to be her
theory. In rejecting the instruction, the court stated: “I don’t see how the existing
instruction would preclude the defense from arguing its theory of defense as to proximate
cause.” Even though Ms. Kessel did not identify her proposed instruction as a theory of
defense, the district court recognized those grounds, and we will address the threshold
question of whether her proposed instruction asserted a proper theory of defense.

B.     Standard of Review

[¶13] “A defendant has a due process right to a theory of defense instruction.” Harnetty
v. State, 2019 WY 21, ¶ 27, 435 P.3d 368, 374 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Bouwkamp v. State,
833 P.2d 486, 490 (Wyo. 1992)). Thus, “[a]n erroneous refusal of a theory of defense
instruction is ‘reversible error per se.’” Black v. State, 2020 WY 65, ¶ 22, 464 P.3d 574,
579 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Swartz v. State, 971 P.2d 137, 139 (Wyo. 1998)). “We review
a district court’s rejection of a proposed theory of defense instruction de novo.” Harnetty,
2019 WY 21, ¶ 27, 435 P.3d at 374 (citing McEuen v. State, 2017 WY 15, ¶ 22, 388 P.3d
779, 784 (Wyo. 2017)).

C.     Ms. Kessel’s proposed jury instruction did not assert a proper theory of
       defense.

[¶14] Ms. Kessel argues her proposed jury instruction would have instructed the jury it
could specifically take into consideration the victim’s actions when deciding the
proximate cause of her charged crime. Her proposed instruction stated: “The actions and
conditions of the deceased may be considered by the Jury in deciding the question of
whether the defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of the deceased’s death.” The
district court rejected the instruction. Ms. Kessel argues the court erred because the
instruction asserted a proper theory of defense. We disagree.

[¶15] “The law in Wyoming is well settled with respect to instructing a jury on a
defendant’s theory of the case.” Nelson v. State, 2010 WY 159, ¶ 14, 245 P.3d 282, 285
(Wyo. 2010). “Fundamentally, the instruction must in the first instance be a proper theory
of the case, or theory of defense, instruction. That is, the offered instruction must present
a defense recognized by statute or case law in this jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 14, 245 P.3d at
286 (citing Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d at 490).

                                             3
[¶16] “It is established law in this Court and the United States Supreme Court that the
State is required to prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt[.]” Hernandez v. State, 2007 WY 105, ¶ 11, 162 P.3d 472, 476 (Wyo. 2007) (citing
Krucheck v. State, 671 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Wyo. 1983); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 512, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)). Because the burden is on the State to
prove every element of the crime charged, this Court does not recognize a “failure of
proof” defense, or a “claim of innocence,” as a proper theory of defense. Dennis v. State,
2013 WY 67, ¶ 39, 302 P.3d 890, 898 (Wyo. 2013) (finding defendant’s proposed theory
of defense to be a “claim of innocence” because the defendant argued “the State simply
had not met its burden of proving the specific intent element of aggravated burglary”);
Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67 (Wyo. 1996) (defendant’s “claim of innocence
is a failure of proof defense . . . we do not believe that such an obvious concept can be
elevated to a theory of defense and, therefore, such an argument does not necessitate a
special instruction”); see also Wyo. Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 8.01 (2022) (“A
claim of innocence based on a failure of the evidence to prove the crime charged does not
require a theory of the defense instruction.”).

[¶17] For a jury to convict Ms. Kessel of aggravated vehicular homicide, the State had to
prove the element of proximate cause; that Ms. Kessel’s conduct was the proximate cause
of Mr. Paulsen’s death. Ms. Kessel denied her actions caused Mr. Paulsen’s death and
claimed instead that his actions were the proximate cause of the accident and his death.
She essentially argued the State failed to prove the proximate cause element of the
charged offense. Her defense was thus a “claim of innocence” or “failure of proof”
defense that did not warrant a special theory of defense instruction. Dennis, 2013 WY 67,
¶ 39, 302 P.3d at 898; Chavez-Becerra, 924 P.2d at 67. Because Ms. Kessel’s proposed
jury instruction was not a theory of defense instruction, we review the trial court’s refusal
to give it under an abuse of discretion standard.

II.    The district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused Ms. Kessel’s
       proposed jury instruction.

A.     Standard of Review

[¶18] “If an instruction is not a theory of defense instruction, the district court’s decision
to give the instruction is discretionary.” Hurley v. State, 2017 WY 95, ¶ 14, 401 P.3d 827,
831 (Wyo. 2017) (citing Tingey v. State, 2017 WY 5, ¶ 40, 387 P.3d 1170, 1181 (Wyo.
2017)). “The refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Dennis, 2013 WY 67, ¶ 36, 302 P.3d at 897 (quoting Mowery v. State, 2011
WY 38, ¶ 13, 247 P.3d 866, 870 (Wyo. 2011)). The trial court’s decision is afforded
significant deference on appeal. Haire v. State, 2017 WY 48, ¶ 28, 393 P.3d 1304, 1311
(Wyo. 2017) (citing Gonzalez-Ochoa v. State, 2014 WY 14, ¶ 18, 317 P.3d 599, 604-05
(Wyo. 2014)).

                                              4
B.     The given instructions adequately advised the jury.

[¶19] Ms. Kessel argues that even if the proposed instruction was not a theory of defense
instruction, the district court should have given the instruction because it was a “proper
statement of the law and required to adequately advise the jury.”

[¶20] Trial courts have “wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the
instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue,
reversible error will not be found.” Dennis, 2013 WY 67, ¶ 36, 302 P.3d at 897 (quoting
Mowery, 2011 WY 38, ¶ 13, 247 P.3d at 870). Further, “[i]nstructions are sufficient if
they correctly state the law, they are not misleading, and they permit the parties to argue
their respective theories of the case.” Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 32, 476 P.3d 224,
237 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Merit Energy Co., LLC v. Horr, 2016 WY 3, ¶ 22, 366 P.3d
489, 496 (Wyo. 2016)).

[¶21] In Ms. Kessel’s case, the jury received Jury Instruction 14, which stated:

                     The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which in
              natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an independent
              and intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
              the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the
              natural and probable consequence or result of the wrongful
              act. The proximate cause must be a substantial factor in
              bringing about the injuries or death.

[¶22] Jury Instruction 6 provided:

              [T]he parties have agreed upon the following facts . . . Mr.
              Cruz Cain Paulsen had a blood alcohol content of 0.17 and
              detectable amount of tetrahydrocannabinol in his system. This
              stipulated fact is not an admission of fault, or an agreement as
              to causation of the accident. That question remains a matter
              for your deliberations.

[¶23] The instructions given adequately advised the jury as they correctly stated the law,
covered the relevant issue, and were not misleading. We are not persuaded otherwise by
Ms. Kessel’s reliance on Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1992). In Buckles, a jury
convicted the defendant of one count of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of
aggravated driving under the influence after the defendant drove intoxicated and, as a
result, killed the driver of another car. Id. at 704. A post-death drug test revealed the
deceased driver had cocaine metabolites in his system. Id. The jury was given the
following jury instruction:

                                             5
                You are instructed that any negligence on the part of a victim
                is not a defense to criminal prosecution and does not excuse
                any criminal acts on the part of a Defendant. The state is
                required to prove that it was the criminal act on the
                Defendant’s part that caused the death[.]

Id. at 707.

[¶24] On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred because the instructions
failed to advise the jury the victim’s actions may be considered in determining the
proximate cause of the accident. Id. This Court agreed the instructions were lacking
because they did not give the jury “the opportunity to decide whether [the victim’s]
conduct was an efficient, intervening cause that relieved [the defendant] of liability.” Id.
at 708-09. It held the trial court committed plain error “when it failed to inform the jury it
could consider [the victim’s] negligence for its bearing upon [the defendant’s] conduct
and upon whether [the defendant’s] conduct was the proximate cause of [the victim’s]
death, and when this jury was given an incomplete definition of proximate cause.” Id. at
709-10.

[¶25] This Court also provided “some guidance . . . for a jury instruction on proximate
cause.” Id. at 709. In doing so, it cited with approval a proximate cause instruction from a
Kansas case, which was nearly identical to the proximate cause instruction given in the
present case. 1 Id. (citing State v. Woodman, 735 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987)).
The district court recognized this precedent when it rejected Ms. Kessel’s proposed
instruction:

1 The favorable proximate cause instruction:

                        In order to find the Defendant guilty as charged in Count I of
                aggravated vehicular homicide, the State must establish that the decedent
                died within one (1) year from the 8th day of May, 1985, and that the
                death was the proximate result of the operation of the vehicle by the
                Defendant while under the influence of alcohol.

                        The ‘proximate cause’ or legal cause of an injury is that cause
                which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
                intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury
                would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable
                consequence or result of the wrongful act.

State v. Woodman, 735 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).

                                                   6
              I did review the Buckles case. Seems like we have a different
              issue here in terms of how the Court’s instructing then was
              done in that case.
                      The existing proximate cause instructions, I believe,
              are a correct statement of the law even according to Buckles,
              that’s what they were based on, it appears.

[¶26] Unlike in Buckles, the jury in Ms. Kessel’s case was adequately advised. The
district court gave the jury a complete definition of proximate cause in Jury Instruction
14. Additionally, Instruction 6 referenced Mr. Paulsen’s BAC, the presence of THC in his
system, and instructed that causation was a matter for its deliberations. The instructions
clearly gave the jury “the opportunity to decide whether [the victim’s] conduct was an
efficient, intervening cause that relieved [the defendant] of liability.” Id. at 708-09. Thus,
the instructions, in addition to correctly stating the law as referenced by the district
court’s statement, covered the relevant issue of proximate cause and were not misleading.

[¶27] Moreover, the instructions allowed the parties to argue their respective theories of
the case, as defense counsel conceded during the instructions conference. Mitchell, 2020
WY 142, ¶ 32, 476 P.3d at 237. The parties extensively addressed proximate cause, and
each party highlighted proximate cause in closing argument.

[¶28] The jury received sufficient instructions and was adequately advised because the
trial court gave instructions that correctly stated the law, covered the relevant issue, were
not misleading, and allowed the parties to argue their respective theories of the case.
Dennis, 2013 WY 67, ¶ 36, 302 P.3d at 897; Mitchell, 2020 WY 142 ¶ 32, 476 P.3d at
237. For these reasons, we conclude the district court properly instructed the jury on
proximate cause and did not abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Kessel’s proposed
instruction.

[¶29] Affirmed.

                                              7