Court Opinion

ID: 9852575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:32:59.629474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:30.034606
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the Legislature clearly intended for the in personam forfeiture provision of OCGA § 16-14-7 (m) to provide for a civil, and not criminal, sanction, I must dissent from the majority’s erroneous conclusion that OCGA § 16-14-7 (m) is unconstitutional.
The plain language of OCGA § 16-14-7 indicates that the Legislature intended for in personam forfeiture proceedings to be “had by a civil procedure known as a RICO forfeiture proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-14-7 (a), (m). The Legislature has further underscored this intent by requiring that in personam RICO proceedings “be governed by Chapter 11 of Title 9, the ‘Georgia Civil Practice Act,’ except to the extent that special rules of procedure are stated in this chapter.” OCGA § 16-14-7 (b). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 402 (58 SC 630, 82 LE 917) (1938) (“That Congress provided a distinctly civil procedure for the collection of the additional [fee] indicates clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal, sanction. Civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted rules and constitutional guaranties governing the trial of criminal prosecutions, and where civil procedure is prescribed for the enforcement of remedial sanctions, those rules and guaranties do not apply.”). Despite this clear language and the “strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of this [statute]” (Bryan v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm., 238 Ga. 572, 575 (234 SE2d 784) (1977)), the majority largely ignores the plain language of the statute in order to strike down the in personam forfeiture provision contained therein.
The majority reasons that “[t]he overwhelming weight of this country’s jurisprudence establishes by the clearest proof that in personam forfeitures of assets are criminal proceedings.” Maj. Op. at 660. However, the relevant focus of the analysis in this case should not be on the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, but on whether the specific statutory scheme in this State is “so punitive either in *665purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93, 99-100 (118 SC 488, 139 LE2d 450) (1997) (the factors for determining whether statute imposes criminal penalty “must be considered in relation to the statute on its face”) (citations and punctuation omitted). The relevant factors that serve as “useful guideposts” (id.) in making this determination are:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 99-100. However, “no one factor should be considered controlling as they may often point in differing directions.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 101.
A focus on the statutory language here shows that the civil in personam forfeiture proceedings authorized by OCGA § 16-14-7 (m) are not so punitive in purpose or effect as to “transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hudson, supra, 522 U. S. at 99. Specifically, OCGA § 16-14-7 (m) states in relevant part that “the state may bring an in personam action for the forfeiture of any property subject to forfeiture under subsection (a) of this Code section.” Subsection (a) of the statute provides that “[a]ll property of every kind used or intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through a pattern of racketeering activity is subject to forfeiture to the state.” Looking to the first Hudson factor, supra, the sanction imposed by Georgia’s statutory scheme “do[es] not involve an affirmative disability or restraint ... [as it] is certainly nothing approaching the infamous punishment of imprisonment.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 104. Furthermore, even though in personam forfeiture has historically been regarded as punishment, this factor alone does not automatically turn a Georgia civil in personam forfeiture proceeding into one that imposes criminal punishment, because the focus of our inquiry is on the sanction imposed (see Hudson, supra), and not the nomenclature of the proceeding. In this regard, “forfeiture . . . serves a deterrent purpose *666distinct from any punitive purpose . . . [by] rendering illegal behavior unprofitable.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 452 (116 SC 994, 134 LE2d 68) (1996). This deterrent purpose is consistent with a civil, rather than criminal, sanction. Id. Moreover, in relation to the seventh factor, the civil in personam provisions in the statute reduce the likelihood of an excessive penalty being imposed, because the State is limited to forfeiting the criminal assets of the actual owner of the criminal property being used in a pattern of racketeering activity. OCGA § 16-14-7 (a), (m). It does not reach any further than is necessary to render any illegal behavior of the specific individual involved unprofitable. Indeed, in this sense, the in personam forfeiture provisions of OCGA § 16-14-7 are even more limited in scope than the in rem provisions contained in the same statute. In an in rem proceeding, unlike in an in personam proceeding, regardless of who may actually own the alleged criminal property, the property itself can be seized merely because it has apparently been used by someone, not necessarily just the owner, in connection with a criminal enterprise. OCGA § 16-14-7 (a), (c). Finally, this Court has previously held that a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding that accomplishes the same types of goals as OCGA § 16-14-7 “is legitimately a civil sanction and does not constitute punishment.” Murphy v. State, 267 Ga. 120, 121 (475 SE2d 907) (1996) (forfeiture of property and controlled substances under OCGA § 16-13-49 (d)). The same result should obtain here, especially where the in personam provisions of OCGA § 16-14-7 provide for a more focused forfeiture of the property of a single individual than the in rem provisions in the same statute that have potentially broader application.
Decided June 15, 2009 —
Reconsideration denied June 30, 2009.
Alston & Bird, Peter M. Degnan, Gregory B. Mauldin, Zipperer, *667Lorberbaum & Beauvais, Alex L. Zipperer, for Cisco.
*666In light of the clear Legislative intent to impose a civil sanction through the in personam forfeiture procedures of OCGA § 16-14-7 (m), and in light of the fact that “there simply is very little showing, to say nothing of the ‘clearest proof’ . . . that [the] sanctions [imposed by the in personam forfeiture process] are criminal” (Hudson, supra, 522 U. S. at 105; Murphy, supra, 267 Ga. at 121), I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that OCGA § 16-14-7 (m) is unconstitutional for “depriving] in personam forfeiture defendants of the safeguards of criminal procedure guaranteed by the United States and Georgia Constitutions.” Maj. Op. at 658.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley joins in this dissent.
*667Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner & Carter, Terry L. Readdick, Steven G. Blackerby, for Moore et al.
Stephen D. Kelley, District Attorney, Jacquelyn L. Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, John E. Floyd, John J. Ossick, Jr., Savage, Turner, Pinson & Karsman, Robert B. Turner, William B. Johnson, Durham, McHugh & Duncan, James B. Durham, Ekonomou, Atkinson & Lambros, Michael G. Lambros, Oliver, Maner & Gray, Timothy D. Roberts, Greenberg Traurig, Richard A. Serafini, Terry A. Dillard, Clark & Williams, Nathan T. Williams, for State of Georgia et al.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, David S. McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney General, J. Scott Key, Koehler & Riddick, Christine A. Koehler, Laura D. Hogue, amici curiae.