Court Opinion

ID: 9848638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:23:53.385314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:32.755006
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C. J.
(dissenting). The prosecuting attorney is an executive officer whose powers and discretion we must "jealously separate” from the courts. People v Dickerson, 164 Mich 148; 129 NW 199 (1910).
"For the judiciary to claim power to control the institution and conduct of prosecutions would be an intrusion on the power of the executive branch of *590government and a violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Const 1963, art 3, § 2. It also violates our fundamental sense of fair play.” Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672, 684; 194 NW2d 693 (1972).
Certain inroads into the prosecutor’s discretion have, however, been recognized in order to prevent abuses of his discretion. Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, supra, majority opinion. One such is the requirement that judicial approval be obtained before the prosecutor may formally discontinue a prosecution, found in MCLA 767.29; MSA 28.969. In enacting this provision, it was not the intention of the Legislature to in any way hamper the prosecutor’s discretion to enter nolle prosequi in a case. Rather, the statute is intended for the protection of the defendant by preventing repeated dismissals and subsequent reinstitution of the charges against him resulting in "endless vexations in the prosecution of criminal cases.” People v Curtis, 389 Mich 698; 209 NW2d 243 (1973).
In the record there is no hint of improper motive on the part of the prosecuting attorney. The defendant himself has vigorously urged both this Court and the trial court to allow the dismissal. There is nothing which would permit the conclusion that his interests are in jeopardy should the motion be allowed.
The language of the second Genesee Prosecutor case quoted on page 585 of the majority opinion establishes that the trial court may intercede to prevent entry of a dismissal only in instances where an abuse of the prosecutor’s discretion can be found. Abuse of discretion is defined as follows:
"(R)esult * * * so palpably and grossly violative of *591fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.” Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959). People v Charles O Williams, 386 Mich 565, 572; 194 NW2d 337 (1972).
The prosecutor’s motion was prompted by the staleness of his case and the fact that the defendant could not, in any case, be further punished. Applying the test of Charles O Williams, supra, to these considerations I can find no abuse of discretion.
I would reverse.