Court Opinion

ID: 8408511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-02 16:43:57.630882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:46:42.412119
License: Public Domain

KATZMANN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority’s opinion insofar as it affirms the judgments of conviction and sentences of the District Court by concluding that: (1) § 1346 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendants before us; (2) the evidence adduced at trial sufficiently supports their convictions; and (3) the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of the crimes. I respectfully disagree, however, with the manner in which the majority addresses the constitutional question of whether § 1346 is vague on its face.
I recognize that this Court invited the parties to brief the constitutional issue of the facial vagueness of § 1346. But we should be ever mindful of the firmly entrenched tenet of constitutional adjudication that courts should “avoid[] the premature adjudication of constitutional questions.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). The Supreme Court has counseled that “ ‘[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.’ ” Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944)).
In the present case, we can easily avoid adjudicating the constitutional issue of § 1346’s facial vagueness. The defendants did not present a facial challenge to § 1346 before either the District Court or the original panel. Therefore, as the majority observes, we apply the plain error standard of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). That standard requires that before we exercise our discretion to correct a forfeited error, there be (1) error that is (2) plain, that (3) affects substantial rights, and that (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, *148123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). It cannot be said that any error with respect to facial vagueness is plain under current law, in a circumstance where “every circuit court to address the specific question of [facial] vagueness since the phrase ‘honest services’ appeared in the statute has found § 1346 to be constitutional on its face.” United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 114 (2d Cir.2002) (Feinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the majority itself acknowledges that it is not clear whether it is proper for us to decide whether § 1346 is facially invalid because First Amendment concerns are not implicated. Maj. op. 144; see, e.g., United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir.1993) (“[V]agueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute’s facial validity.”). Accordingly, even if there were error, it was surely not plain. It was thus unnecessary for the majority to consider the standard to be applied in evaluating facial vagueness challenges.
I therefore do not join sections II.A and V.E of the majority opinion. I concur, however, with the remainder of the majority opinion.