Court Opinion

ID: 9819079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:18.973641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.111696
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: At issue in this appeal is whether the one-year limitations period in section 8 — 101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 (West 1998)) or the eight-year statute of repose in section 13 — 212(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(b) (West 1998)) applies to a medical malpractice wrongful-death claim brought by a minor against a local governmental entity or its employees. The majority, relying upon this court’s severely split decision in Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186 (1999), holds that the one-year limitations period of the Tort Immunity Act applies. For the reasons more fully set forth in my dissenting opinion in Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 201 (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.), the majority’s decision today continues an unwarranted and unprecedented departure from our traditional jurisprudence. I therefore respectfully dissent. In Tosado, this court was asked to decide whether the two-year limitation period in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a) (West 1992)) or the one-year limitation period in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to medical malpractice actions brought by adults against local governmental entities and/or their employees. Although four members of this court agreed with the disposition that the one-year limitations period in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to these actions, there was no majority agreement on the basis for that result. A plurality opinion, authored by Justice Miller and joined by Justice Bilandic, found that section 8 — 101 applied because it was more specific than section 13 — 212(a). In separate concurring opinions, Justice Heiple and then-Chief Justice Freeman reasoned that section 8 — 101 applied because the Illinois General Assembly had intended to make this general act controlling. In the matter at bar, we are presented with a question similar to that in Tosado: we must determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions controls. Specifically, we must decide whether the eight year statute of repose contained in subsection (b) of section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the one-year limitation provision in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to medical malpractice wrongful death claims brought by a minor. The majority concludes that, upon the minor’s attainment of the age of 18, the one-year limitations period of section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies. Recognizing the fragmented nature of this court’s decision in Tosado, the majority in the matter at bar employs the reasoning found in both the Tosado plurality opinion1 and in the Tosado special concurrences to support its result. This approach is unpersuasive and may result in further uncertainty with respect to the appropriate analysis to be employed. The plurality opinion in Tosado focused exclusively on the nature of the defendants in determining which of the two statutes more specifically applied to Tosado, the plaintiff before the court. The plurality concluded that section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act was more specific than section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure because the former provision applies to defendants which are local governmental entities and their employees, a category of defendant which, in the plurality’s view, was more specific than the broader group of physicians, dentists, registered nurses or hospitals described in section 13 — 212(a). Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 195. In dissent, I observed that, traditionally, in determining which of two statutes is more specifically applicable to a particular controversy, most courts have looked primarily to the nature of the plaintiffs cause of action and the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff. Applying these traditional rules of analysis, it was my opinion that section 13 — 212(a) was more specifically applicable because it more narrowly defined the plaintiffs, their injuries and the nature of their claims. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 202-04 (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.) I farther observed that, absent either explanation or citation to authority, the plurality shifted the analytical focus to the nature of the defendant. It was only by altering the focus of the analysis that the plurality could escape the conclusion that section 13 — 212 was more specifically applicable. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 204-05 (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.). I continue to adhere to my previously articulated view. In the instant cause the majority, applying the reasoning of the Tosado plurality opinion, finds that section 8 — 101 is more specific than 13 — 212(b) because it applies to a more narrow class of defendants, namely, local governmental entities and their employees. 202 Ill. 2d at 312. In accordance with the reasons stated in my dissent in Tosado, I submit that section 13 — 212(b) controls because it more narrowly defines the plaintiffs, their injuries, and the nature of their claims. Specifically, section 13 — 212(b) applies only “where the person entitled to bring the action was, at the time the cause of action accrued, under the age of 18 years,” and specifies that the cause of action must involve damages for “injury or death *** arising out of patient care.” 735 ILCS 5/13— 212(b) (West 1994). Applying the traditional modes of analysis, it is evident that the provisions of section 13— 212(b) are far more specific than those of section 8 — 101, which apply to a “civil action” for “any injury.” 745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 (West 1994). In addition, as. more fully explained in my Tosado dissent, the conclusion that section 13 — 212(b) is more specifically applicable to the cause at bar is further supported by the fact that section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted subsequently to the enactment of section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 13 — 212 was enacted in 1982 and the provisions at issue in subsection (b) were enacted in 1987 (735 ILCS Ann. 5/13 — 212, Historical and Statutory Notes, at 366 (Smith-Hurd 1992)), more than two decades after section 8 — 101 was enacted in 1965 (745 ILCS Ann. 10/8 — 101, Historical and Statutory Notes, at 882 (Smith-Hurd 1993)). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. It is well established that in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, “[i]t is presumed that the legislature, in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and with full knowledge of all previous enactments.” State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247-48 (1990). Inasmuch as section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted subsequently to section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act, it may be presumed, pursuant to well-settled rules of construction, that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the limitation period in section 8 — 101. In support of its result in the matter at bar, the majority also relies upon the reasoning of Justice Heiple and then Chief Justice Freeman in their separate special concurrences in Tosado. Justices Heiple and Freeman agreed with the plurality that the one-year statute of limitations in section 8 — 101 applied, but found “unpersuasive” the plurality’s characterization of the Tort Immunity Act as being the more specific statute. Instead, the two specially concurring justices concluded that, although section 8 — 101 is more general than section 13 — 212(a), this was an instance where the legislature intended to make the general act controlling. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 199 (Heiple, J., specially concurring); Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 198 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). However, as explained in my dissent, scrutiny of the case cited in support of their proposition, Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review, 151 Ill. 2d 257, 266 (1992), revealed that the proposition was untenable. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 209 (McMorrow, J, dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.). I continue to adhere to my position in the instant cause. In the matter at bar, the majority, applying the rationale used by Justices Heiple and Freeman in their Tosado special concurrences, concludes that the legislature intended that section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act apply broadly to any possible claim against a local public entity and its employees. Again, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Tosado, I conclude that there is no support for the holding that this case presents an instance in which the legislature intended to make the general provision controlling. In sum, the majority’s decision today continues its unwarranted departure from traditional modes of analysis. In my dissent in Tosado, I observed that the plurality opinion left many questions unanswered, and wrote that “[t]he plurality’s newly conceived approach in determining the specificity of conflicting statutory provisions needlessly upsets long-established principles and may result in uncertainty among members of the bench and bar regarding which analysis should be employed.” Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 206 (McMorrow, J. dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.). The majority’s opinion today does not alleviate this concern. Indeed, the majority’s use of the reasoning of both the Tosado plurality and the Tosado special concurrences, absent an imprimatur of approval as to either approach, leaves the bench and bar with new uncertainties regarding the appropriate analysis to be employed. For the reasons stated, I dissent from the opinion of the majority. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and JUSTICE KIL-BRIDE join in this dissent.  Indeed, the precedential value of a plurality decision is limited, as “plurality decisions of a state supreme court, in which no majority agrees to the reasoning, are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis; if a majority merely agrees to a particular result, without agreeing as to the grounds for a decision, the parties are bound by the decision but the case provides no binding authority beyond the immediate parties. Such decisions do not overrule prior or inconsistent decisions, and are not authority on any point concurred in by less than a majority.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 602, at 298 (1995).