Court Opinion

ID: 9955108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 18:02:25.646767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.317365
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/24

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                 D081369

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                  (Super. Ct. No. SCD102568)

 DAVID D. MCCLELLAND,

         Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed.
       Barbara A. Smith and Leslie A. Rose, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, James M. Toohey, and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       David D. McClelland appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing.
He argues the trial court violated his due process rights because he was not
present at what he misconstrues as the evidentiary hearing. However, he
was present at a hearing, which we conclude—looking to its substance and
effect rather than its label—was the evidentiary hearing. We therefore
affirm.
                                       I.
      In 1994, McClelland pled guilty to second degree murder and was
sentenced to a state prison term of 15 years to life. In 2019, he filed a Penal

Code section 1170.951 petition. The People conceded McClelland made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. The trial court thus issued an
order to show cause (OSC) and scheduled an evidentiary hearing, which was
continued and reset repeatedly at the parties’ request.
      In January 2022, the People submitted a return to the OSC, indicating
that, at the evidentiary hearing, they intended to rely on (1) the grand jury
transcript as the record of conviction, and (2) McClelland’s statements in
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) records.
They argued this evidence established McClelland’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt of second degree murder as an aider and abettor of an
implied malice murder.
      In June, McClelland submitted his evidentiary hearing brief. He asked
the court not to consider certain hearsay testimony in the record. He also
argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt and urged the court to consider his youth in evaluating his
actions.
      At the June evidentiary hearing, with all parties and counsel present,
McClelland’s counsel requested another continuance. The court then set a
“[s]tatus [h]earing” for September.

1     Assembly Bill No. 200, effective June 30, 2022, amended
section 1170.95 and renumbered it section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) We refer to the statute by its current number in this opinion.
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      Counsel for both parties and McClelland appeared at the September
hearing. The court noted it had read the parties’ briefing and the grand jury
transcript. The prosecutor asked the court to admit and consider two
additional exhibits: (1) pages from McClelland’s CDCR “C-file” related to a
Board of Parole hearing relevant to “his participation in this murder,” and
(2) McClelland’s certified change of plea form. The court confirmed with
McClelland’s counsel that she had seen the documents, and she did not object
to their consideration.
      The court then offered to “set a date in four weeks.” Instead of
accepting a future hearing date, McClelland’s counsel said it would be “fine
too” if the court “want[ed] to issue a written ruling” and “[j]ust submit it to
the parties.” McClelland’s counsel asked the court “to exercise caution when
examining the statements” in McClelland’s C-file and “be mindful of Mr.
McClelland’s age at the time of this offense and take that . . . into
consideration when looking at his reckless indifference.” McClelland’s
counsel otherwise submitted on the record. The prosecutor responded that
the statements in the C-file were “enlightening” for purposes of determining
McClelland’s reckless indifference and implied malice.
      McClelland’s counsel then inquired: “Do you want us back, Your Honor,
or are you just going to send us an order?” The court responded it would
“[s]end . . . an order,” and McClelland’s counsel replied, “Perfect.”
      The hearing minutes show the case was called for a “[m]otion” for “[r]e-
sentencing pursuant to [section] 1172.6.” They reflect three exhibits—the
grand jury transcript, a comprehensive risk assessment from a Board of
Parole hearing, and a change of plea form—were received in evidence. The
hearing minutes state: “The Defense requests the court to take this matter

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under submission. This request is granted,” and “[t]he court will submit a
written ruling by October 14.”
      An ex parte court order dated November 15 denied the petition. The
contemporaneously issued written order noted that counsel for both parties
“stipulated to the [c]ourt taking this matter under submission without an
evidentiary hearing.” The order concluded that “the evidence shows, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner David McClelland did, with the intent to
kill, aid and abet the actual killer in the commission of second degree
murder,” thus rendering McClelland “ineligible for resentencing” under
section 1172.6.
                                      II.
      McClelland does not argue the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
this ruling; rather, his sole contention on appeal is that he was denied due
process. He argues the September hearing he attended was a “pre-
evidentiary hearing.” According to McClelland, the evidentiary hearing
occurred in November, when the court denied his petition. He claims that
because he had a constitutional right to be personally present at that
hearing, and because his absence was not harmless error, reversal and
remand for a hearing at which McClelland is personally present is required.
      The People counter that the September hearing—at which (1) the
prosecutor offered additional evidence and McClelland and his attorney were
present, and (2) both parties agreed the matter should be taken under
submission—was the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
      Having reviewed the record and McClelland’s claim de novo (People v.
Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1230), we agree with the People.

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                                        A.
      Effective 2019, the Legislature amended the Penal Code to provide that
a defendant who participated but was not the principal in a murder cannot be
convicted of murder based on imputed malice. (People v. Basler (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 46, 54 (Basler).) Rather, a murder conviction requires the
defendant’s personal actions and subjective intent. (Ibid.) Section 1172.6
provides a mechanism for defendants who, like McClelland, were “charged
with murder and who would have been subject to prosecution for murder
under a . . . theory of imputed malice” but instead pled guilty to murder or a
lesser offense to seek relief from their convictions. (People v. Gaillard (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211.)
      If a defendant files a section 1172.6 petition and makes a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, “the court shall issue an” OSC. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) The court must then “hold a hearing to determine whether to
vacate the murder . . . conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence”
the defendant. (Id., subd. (d)(1).) Both the prosecutor and the defendant
“may also offer new or additional evidence,” and the court generally may
admit evidence at the hearing in accordance with the Evidence Code. (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).) The prosecutor bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant guilty of murder. (Ibid.)
      This hearing is a “critical stage[ ]” of the proceedings. (Basler, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.) The defendant has constitutional due process rights
to be personally present at the hearing absent “a knowing, intelligent[,] and
voluntary waiver.” (Ibid.) A defendant not given the opportunity to
participate in the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing cannot decide whether,
in light of the People’s evidence, to testify or present other evidence. (Ibid.)
Nor can an excluded defendant provide “input to . . . counsel on the People’s

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presentation and arguments, resulting in . . . counsel drawing different
inferences from the trial evidence or doing more than submitting on the
papers.” (Id. at p. 60.)
                                        B.
      Having contextually reviewed the record, we conclude the September
hearing satisfied the criteria of section 1172.6(d)(3). Thus, as McClelland
was present, no error violated his due process rights.
      As an initial matter, contrary to McClelland’s position, there was no
November evidentiary hearing for which the September hearing could have
served as a “pre-evidentiary hearing.” At the September hearing, the trial
court merely indicated it would submit its ruling to the parties. That is what
happened: in November, the trial court issued a reasoned, written ruling and
an ex parte order. The record is devoid of any minutes for a November
hearing.
      McClelland claims the trial court’s statement, in its order denying his
petition, that the parties submitted on the papers “without an evidentiary
hearing” means no evidentiary hearing occurred, as “[s]urely a court
conducting a hearing is in the best position to characterize the nature of that
hearing.” We disagree. We look to the substance and effect of the September
hearing, rather than its asserted label, to determine if it satisfied the
requirements of section 1172.6(d)(3).
      In this regard, McClelland argues the September hearing cannot
possibly have been the statutorily required hearing because “there were no
arguments made in appellant’s presence; there were merely discussions of
what evidence would be heard at a future date, with no discussions in
appellant’s presence, regarding the import of those matters.” We are
unpersuaded.

                                        6
      First, there were no discussions at the hearing about evidence to “be
heard at a future date.” Instead, the court admitted the evidence submitted
by the parties. Both parties wanted the grand jury transcript admitted. The
prosecutor requested the court to consider, and the court admitted, two
additional exhibits, without objection from McClelland’s counsel, who did not
offer any additional evidence despite having the opportunity to do so.
McClelland, who was present, could have conferred with his counsel and
requested a further hearing at which he could testify or offer the testimony of
other relevant witnesses or additional evidence. But he did not do so.
Instead, his counsel submitted on the evidence and the parties’ briefing. In
fact, she suggested the court follow this procedure when the court offered to
set an additional hearing. The court thus had before it all the information
McClelland, his counsel, and the prosecutor wanted considered in
determining whether McClelland was entitled to relief. That is all that
section 1172.6(d)(3) and due process require.
      To the extent McClelland claims the record should reflect some on-the-
record discussion of his rights and the importance of the evidentiary hearing,
we disagree. Counsel has a duty to consult with clients and keep them
informed. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.4.) Courts generally presume that
counsel acts competently. (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1105.)
McClelland points to no record evidence undermining this presumption and
cites no legal authority that the court has similar duties to a criminal
defendant.
      Further, contrary to McClelland’s claim, substantive arguments were
made in his presence at the September hearing. The court acknowledged
having read the parties’ briefs, which provided their legal arguments as to
McClelland’s entitlement to relief. At the hearing, McClelland’s attorney not

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only urged the court to exercise caution in its reliance on some of the evidence
the prosecutor submitted, but she also asked the court to consider
McClelland’s age at the time the crime was committed in assessing his
culpability. In response, the prosecutor briefly argued the import of the same
evidence. Rather than substantively respond, McClelland’s counsel asked if
the court “want[ed them] back,” having already said she was “fine” with the
court issuing a written ruling instead of setting a further hearing. As
McClelland was present, he could have conferred with his counsel and
requested an opportunity to present further evidence or argument. He did
not. On this record, the court was not required to do anything further to
fulfill its obligations under section 1172.6(d)(3).
      We thus conclude the September hearing conformed to
section 1172.6(d)(3)’s requirements. The parties had an opportunity to offer
additional evidence relevant to McClelland’s guilt under current law and
argue the merits of McClelland’s petition. As McClelland was personally
present at the hearing, he was not denied due process.
                                        III.
      We affirm.

                                                                 CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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