Court Opinion

ID: 9704515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:37:50.978323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.618044
License: Public Domain

Coleman, J.
(concurring in result). In an effort to alleviate an untenable situation, my colleagues have determined that the "same transaction” theory is inapplicable to certain situations and I agree with the results of both opinions.
Const 1963, art 1, § 15, provides:
"No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.”
In People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), and perpetuated in these cases, is the notion that any number of offenses (e.g., rape, murder, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) in any number of jurisdictions may constitute one offense for which one cannot be placed twice in jeopardy. Therefore, all offenses must be contained in one information and set for trial in one jurisdiction.
Although my colleagues offer stop-gap solutions, they do not approach the fundamental problem. A sound constitutional protection has been strained *519beyond reasonable accommodation to jurisprudential limits.
The wisdom of former Justice Brennan’s dissent in White is made more apparent by the resultant legal snarls, some of which we now address. Justice Brennan said:
"My disagreement with the majority lies not in the objective* of curbing prosecutorial discretion. It is, rather, with the logic of the route chosen to achieve the objective.
" While I would support an amendment to the court rules mandating joinder of related offenses, I would affirm the conviction at bar, the same having been obtained in accordance with the procedural rules extant at the time of the proceedings below.” (Emphasis added.)
It is the "route chosen to achieve the objective” in White that has led to the rationalization deemed necessary to avoid absurd results.
Ostensibly, the majority in White sought to curb prosecutorial harrassment of defendants by eliminating seriatim prosecutions. However, the Court could have achieved this objective through an amendment1 to the court rules mandating joinder of related offenses as Justice Brennan advocated in his dissent.
Because mandatory joinder does not rise to the dignity of a rule of constitutional law, the Court could carve out exceptions to the rule and permit *520severance of counts for trial without arbitrarily-determining that a rule of constitutional law is inapplicable to certain crimes.
Every desirable practice need not rest upon further expansion of our elastic constitution which, if it can be interpreted to encompass everything, may eventually mean nothing.
I concur in affirming the district court in Cramp-ton. I also concur in reversing recorder’s court and remanding for trial in Hudgins, Allen and Jones.

 Const 1963, art 6, § 5 provides:
"The supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state * * * .”
In Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 478—479; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), we stated:
"We have recognized that art 6, § 5, Michigan Constitution of 1963, and its predecessors, must be liberally construed in order to aid in the efficient administration of our judicial system.”