Court Opinion

ID: 9757309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:30:23.597464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:37.922656
License: Public Domain

*555Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
The majority concludes that Section 3103(a) of the Vehicle Code is unconstitutionally vague, and thus, declines to reach the question of whether that provision violates the non-delegation doctrine. .Because I believe that Appellees’ vagueness challenge cannot be sustained on the present facts, I would invalidate Section 3103(a) on the sole basis that it impermissibly delegates a legislative function to the judiciary.
The prohibition against driving while intoxicated is clearly capable, by its nature, of application to individuals riding horses; Appellees do not dispute this. Hence, Appellees’ vagueness claim is facial, rather than “as-applied,” in nature. Notably, however, in cases that do not implicate First Amendment freedoms, this Court has rejected facial vagueness challenges where the defendant’s conduct is clearly prohibited by the statute in question.1 See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 467-68, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (2003); Commonwealth v. Cook, 468 Pa. 249, 253, 361 A.2d 274, 276-77 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 468 Pa. 502, 508, 364 A.2d 306, 309 (1976); Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 4, 354 A.2d 244, 245 (1976); see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 714, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (“It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.”). This is because the vagueness doctrine stems from due process concerns, namely, that citizens must be given fair warning of what conduct is prohibited. See Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. at 5, 354 A.2d at 246 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). If a defendant’s conduct was clearly prohibited by the challenged statute, he received fair warning even though there may doubts about the statute’s applicability in other situations.2
*556On the other hand, where the contention is that the statute improperly delegates legislative authority, the provision is asserted to be void ab initio for reasons distinct from due process. In this light, Appellees’ facial attack upon Section 3103(a) is less problematic than it would be in the context of a traditional vagueness dispute, particularly as courts are generally willing to entertain facial challenges to legislation based upon separation-of-powers precepts, see, e.g., Blackwell v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Comm’n, 523 Pa. 347, 354, 567 A.2d 630, 634 (1989); Samuel v. WCAB (Container Corp. of Am.), 814 A.2d 274, 277 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F.Supp. 321, 341 (D.D.C.1976), aff'd 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), which include the non-delegation doctrine embodied in Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.3 See Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 380, 839 A.2d 265, 274 (2003); Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm’n, 492 Pa. 92, 95, 422 A.2d 487, 489 (1980). Moreover, there is little imprecision in the text of Section 3103(a) itself, and hence, the asserted vagueness relates only to the question of which other provisions of the Vehicle Code may be combined with it to regulate transportation by animal. Thus, Appellees’ position is best understood, at bottom, as a contention that Section 3103(a) imposes upon the judiciary an essentially legislative task.
On the merits of the constitutional issue, I agree with the majority that there are a number of aspects of the Vehicle Code which may or may not, by their nature, be capable of application to animals. These questions are best suited for the Legislature to resolve, as that body, by design, is able to solicit empirical information and is responsible to make policy *557decisions where necessary. Thus, in my view, Section 3103(a) violates the non-delegation rule, and this defect renders the provision void in its entirety. As this conclusion is fatal to the Commonwealth’s case, I agree with the majority that the trial court’s order should be affirmed.
Justice NEWMAN joins this concurring opinion.

. Appellees do not maintain that this matter involves First Amendment protections.

. This Court has additionally explained that, measuring a statutory proscription against hypothetical conduct that its language could possi*556bly embrace "would require us to adjudicate the rights of parties not presently before the Court, at the insistence of a party who does not have standing to assert such rights.” Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. at 4, 354 A.2d at 245. This limitation is applicable here, as the uncertainty that Appellees allege pertains to aspects of the Vehicle Code with which they were not charged.

. That provision states, “The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” Pa. Const art. II, § 1.