Court Opinion

ID: 9368077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 18:08:08.683878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.412647
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re T.Y., 2023-Ohio-317.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE T.Y.                                    :
                                              :            No. 111997
A Minor Child                                 :
                                              :
[Appeal by B.Y., Mother]                      :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 2, 2023

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                    Juvenile Division
                                 Case No. AD20906213

                                       Appearances:

                 Michael E. Stinn, for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Mother-appellant, B.Y. (“Mother”), appeals from the juvenile court’s

judgment granting permanent custody of her minor child, T.Y., to appellee,

Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the

agency”). Mother raises the following assignments of error for review:
      1. The trial court’s award of permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS
      is not in the best interest of the child. The child could be and should be
      returned to her mother’s care within a reasonable time. The trial
      court’s order granting permanent custody to CCDCFS should be
      reversed.

      2. The trial court’s consideration of matters that were not admitted into
      evidence denied the child’s mother due process. Therefore, the trial
      court’s order granting permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS
      should be reversed.

             After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the

juvenile court’s judgment.

                       I. Procedural and Factual History

             Mother is the biological parent of the minor child, T.Y. (d.o.b.

03/09/2007). The child’s biological father, E.S., is deceased.

             On July 22, 2020, CCDCFS filed a complaint for temporary custody,

alleging that T.Y. was dependent as defined in R.C. 2151.04(C). The complaint

stemmed from a dispute between T.Y and Mother on July 10, 2020, that resulted in

delinquency proceedings.        In support of the complaint, CCDCFS alleged the

following set of particulars:

      1. On July 10, 2020, the child was committed to the emergency custody
      of CCDCFS by [a] magistrate. See Case No. DL-20105895.

      2. The child has significant emotional and behavioral issues which
      mother is unable to adequately manage, and which compromises the
      safety of the child and other siblings in the home.

      3. Mother is overwhelmed with the child’s behavior and is currently
      unwilling to provide care for the child in the home.

      4. Mother has five children, including T.Y., that were previously
      adjudicated neglected due in part to educational neglect and lack of
      supervision and committed to the protective supervision of CCDCFS.
      See Case No. AD-19903326-30.

      5. Father is deceased.

            Following a hearing held on September 15, 2020, the child was

committed to the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS. Thereafter,

Mother entered admissions to an amended complaint1 and the court found the

allegations were proven by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, T.Y. was

“adjudicated to be dependent” on October 23, 2020.

            On November 4, 2020, the juvenile court committed T.Y. to the

temporary custody of CCDCFS and approved a case plan for reunification. The case

plan was developed by CCDCFS to address concerns with T.Y.’s behavior and the

ongoing conflicts between Mother and T.Y. In pertinent part, the case plan required

Mother to participate in counseling services with the child and to “work with

[CCDCFS] and service providers on parenting skills.”

            On May 21, 2021, CCDCFS filed a motion to extend T.Y.’s temporary

custody for a period of six months pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(G), 2151.415(A)(6),

2151.415(D)(1), and Juv.R. 19. The extension was approved by the juvenile court on

July 14, 2021.

            On December 9, 2021, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify the order of

temporary custody to an order of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.413. The

      1 The amended complaint removed allegation No. 3, which alleged that Mother
was overwhelmed and unwilling to care for the child.
motion was supported by the affidavit of CCDCFS social worker, Jillian Blackwell

(“Blackwell”), who averred, in pertinent part:

      7. A case plan was filed with the Juvenile Court and approved which
      required that [Mother] engage in services to improve her parenting
      skills to be better able to manage the child’s needs and to participate in
      counseling/therapy sessions with the child as recommended.

      8. Despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by CCDCFS to
      assist her in working toward reunification, Mother has failed to
      successfully complete services as referred and has failed to consistently
      engage in recommended services.

      9. Mother has failed to maintain consistent contact/visitation with the
      child.

      10. The conditions that led to the child’s removal from the home have
      not been sufficiently resolved and continued risks prevent reunification
      of child with mother.

      11. Father is deceased.

      12. No relatives have been identified who are both willing and able to
      provide appropriate care for the child.

             On August 29, 2022, a hearing was held to address the agency’s motion

for permanent custody.      At the hearing, Caprisha Sinkfield (“Sinkfield”), an

extended-services worker employed by CCDCFS, testified that she was assigned to

the child’s case in December 2021. Sinkfield outlined her familiarity with the parties

and explained the circumstances that caused the child to be removed from Mother’s

care in July 2020.     According to Sinkfield, “the initial circumstances were a

parenting conflict with [T.Y.] and her mom [and] concerns that there was some

domestic violence happening between the two.” (Tr. 9.)
              Once the child was placed in the temporary care of CCDCFS, a case

plan for reunification was developed to assist Mother in addressing the issues that

led to the child’s removal. Sinkfield testified that the case-plan objectives required

Mother to participate in a parenting-education program and to participate in

recommended counseling services with T.Y. Despite the agency’s efforts to assist

Mother in addressing her issues, Mother failed to complete a parenting education

course and did not successfully complete the counseling component of the case plan.

              Sinkfield confirmed that Mother attempted to participate in the

required counseling with T.Y on two separate occasions. The first attempt at

counseling occurred “at the beginning of 2021,” but was discontinued because

“[Mother] did not call in” to the virtual appointments. (Tr. 15.) The second attempt

at counseling occurred after the motion for permanent custody was filed. Sinkfield

explained that the counseling sessions were again discontinued due to Mother’s

failure to appear, stating:

      [I]t was kind of a repeat of no one calling in or miscommunication, so
      the counseling was stopped again.

(Tr. 16.) Sinkfield further clarified that Mother possessed all of the necessary

information to contact the family counselor to resolve any technological issues she

may have encountered when attempting to access the virtual sessions.

              Between February 2022 and the date of the permanent-custody

hearing, Mother and T.Y. participated in approximately three or four counseling

sessions together. Sinkfield testified that no additional progress has been made
towards the counseling component of the case plan since the last counseling session

occurred.    When the agency made additional attempts to reinitiate family

counseling, T.Y. expressed that she “was not interested in doing it because * * * she

didn’t want to start counseling and mom [did] not call in, so she was kinda hesitant

to start it.” (Tr. 15-16.) Sinkfield testified that Mother also did not wish to continue

with family counseling “just with her trouble calling in or having good dates.” (Tr.

16.) Thus, while Sinkfield acknowledged that some progress had been made towards

the counseling component of the case plan, she opined that Mother and T.Y. have

not “gotten to a level where they can effectively communicate with each other.” (Tr.

17-18.)

              Regarding Mother’s interactions with the child, Sinkfield testified that

Mother has frequently engaged in visitation and has had positive interactions with

T.Y. during supervised visits. (Tr. 25.) T.Y. also shares a strong bond with her

siblings and has positive interactions with them during visits at Mother’s home.

Nevertheless, when the agency began discussing the possibility of granting Mother

unsupervised overnight visits, T.Y. expressed that she was unwilling to participate

in overnight visits because she did not feel comfortable with Mother. T.Y. also

expressed to the agency that she did not wish to return to Mother’s home on a

permanent basis. Sinkfield testified that T.Y. was “pretty adamant” about her

wishes. (Tr. 25.)

              Sinkfield also provided extensive testimony concerning T.Y.’s current

placement in a group home. Sinkfield stated that T.Y.’s behavior has improved and
that there have been “no concerns with her behavior other than kind of being a

teenager and talking back here and there.” (Tr. 14.) T.Y. is actively participating in

individual and group counseling, is currently seeing a psychiatrist, and is beginning

to open up and engage in the referred services.

              Finally, Sinkfield testified that the agency investigated suitable

relatives for placement during the pendency of the temporary-custody order.

Sinkfield explained that the agency attempted to explore the child’s adult sister for

placement but was unable to contact her. Additionally, although the child’s paternal

grandmother was previously approved for placement, T.Y. “expressed that she did

not feel comfortable with going to legal custody of grandma.” (Tr. 20.)

              Based on the foregoing, Sinkfield opined that permanent custody in

favor of the agency was in the child’s best interests. Sinkfield reiterated that Mother

did not successfully address her case-plan objectives for counseling- and parenting-

education and that the agency was concerned that the conflicts between Mother and

T.Y. would resume if the child was returned to Mother’s care.

              On cross-examination, Sinkfield confirmed that Mother currently has

two minor children under her care and that the agency has no concerns with her

ability to care for these children. Regarding the family-counseling component of the

case plan, Sinkfield acknowledged that Mother’s first attempt to engage in

counseling with T.Y. was discontinued because Mother “was not calling in” and T.Y.

no longer wished to participate. (Tr. 32.) Sinkfield further acknowledged that,

according to Mother, the second attempt to engage in counseling with T.Y. was only
discontinued because Mother “was having technological issues” and could not call

into the virtual sessions. (Tr. 32.) Finally, Sinkfield testified that she did not have

“any safety concerns with the way that Mother is parenting her child.” (Tr. 36.)

              At the close of trial, child’s guardian ad litem, Paul Daher, Esq. (the

“GAL”), was called as if on cross-examination by counsel for Mother. The GAL

explained that the agency became involved in this matter following a physical

altercation between Mother and T.Y. Mother initially expressed that she did not

want to let T.Y. back into her home, accordingly T.Y. was placed into a group home

in Youngstown, Ohio. The GAL reiterated the social worker’s testimony that T.Y.

has made significant emotional and behavioral progress while under the agency’s

care. The GAL explained that T.Y. is doing well in school, is participating in

extracurricular activities, is taking her medication, and is engaged in counseling.

Despite T.Y.’s individual progress, however, the GAL opined that the underlying

issues between Mother and T.Y. have not been resolved and, therefore, he did not

feel comfortable returning the child to Mother’s care. The GAL explained his

position as follows:

      It’s just, there hasn’t been enough consistency where a counselor says,
      hey, this is a good idea, and it’s just unfortunate, but I think [T.Y.] will
      continue to have contact with her mother and her siblings. * * * And I
      would encourage it even though there is permanent custody, but I
      would encourage it.

(Tr. 43.)

              In a journal entry dated August 31, 2022, the juvenile court granted

the agency’s motion for permanent custody. The juvenile court found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the child has been in the temporary custody of a public-

services agency or private child-placing agency for 12 or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period. The court further concluded that it is in the child’s

best interests to be place in the permanent custody of CCDCFS. In support of its

best interests determination, the juvenile court made alternative findings pursuant

to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2).

               Mother now appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment.

                               II. Law and Analysis

                              A. Standard of Review

              In the first assignment of error, Mother argues the juvenile court erred

and abused its discretion in finding that clear and convincing evidence supported

the decision to terminate her parental rights and grant permanent custody of the

child to CCDCFS.

              We take our responsibility in reviewing cases involving the

termination of parental rights and the award of permanent custody very seriously.

A parent has a “‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody and management”

of his or her child, In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990),

quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599

(1982), and the right to raise one’s own child is “‘an essential and basic civil right.’”

In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, quoting In re

Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997). However, this right is not

absolute. It is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the
polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86

N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106,

391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).

              Because the termination of parental rights is “‘the family law

equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case,’” it is “an alternative [of] last

resort.” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In

re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14; In re Gill,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79640, 2002-Ohio-3242, ¶ 21. It is, however, “sanctioned

when necessary for the welfare of a child.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.

101693 and 101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 7, citing In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619,

624, 645 N.E.2d 812 (9th Dist.1994). All children have “‘the right, if possible, to

parenting from either natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care,

discipline, protection and motivation.’” In re J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock,

120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102, 696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th Dist.1996). Where parental rights

are terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life” for dependent children and

to “facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.” In re N.B. at ¶ 67, citing

In re Howard, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 85 A10-077, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860,

5 (Aug. 1, 1986).

                       B. Permanent Custody Standard

              R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by a juvenile

court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018-Ohio-2523,

115 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). This first prong of this
statute authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the

public agency if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing

evidence, that any of the following factors apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or

orphaned, but the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time

or should not be placed with the child’s parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the

child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take

permanent custody; (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more

public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more

months of a consecutive 22-month period; or (e) the child or another child in the

custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has

been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate

occasions by any court in this state or another state. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).

              In accordance with the second prong of R.C. 2151.414, when any one

of the above factors exists, the juvenile court must then analyze whether, by clear

and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent

custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).

              “A juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains

some competent, credible evidence from which the court could have found that the

essential statutory elements for permanent custody had been established by clear

and convincing evidence.’” In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-

1533, ¶ 62, quoting In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16.
“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that ‘will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be

established.’” In re T.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99931, 2014-Ohio-2051, ¶ 28,

quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954).

     C. Whether T.Y. Has Been in the Agency’s Temporary Custody
        for 12 or More Months of a Consecutive 22-Month Period

             With respect to the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, we

find competent, credible evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding pursuant to

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) that T.Y. has been in an agency’s temporary custody for 12 or

more months of a consecutive 22-month period.

              For purposes of calculating time under subsection (d), R.C.

2151.413(D)(1) provides that “a child shall be considered to have entered the

temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated

pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after

the removal of the child from home.” In this case, T.Y. was initially removed from

her Mother’s care on July 10, 2020. She remained in the agency’s emergency

custody until she was adjudicated dependent on October 23, 2020, and committed

to the temporary custody of the agency on November 4, 2020. Applying either date

contemplated under R.C. 2151.413(D)(1), the record confirms that T.Y. had been in

the temporary care of the agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month

period at the time the motion for permanent custody was filed on December 9, 2021.

Because the time requirements under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) were satisfied, it was
unnecessary for the court to determine whether any additional factor under R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) was applicable to the circumstances presented in this matter. See In

re M.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111144, 2022-Ohio-1077, ¶ 29, citing In re L.W., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107648, 2019-Ohio-1344, ¶ 15, citing In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d

163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 21.

                        D. Best Interests of the Child

              Turning to the second prong of the permanent-custody analysis, we

recognize “[t]he discretion that the juvenile court enjoys in [deciding] whether an

order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the

utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s

[decision] will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” In re Awkal, 95 Ohio

App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th Dist.1994). Thus, we review a juvenile court’s

determination of a child’s best interests under R.C. 2151.414(D) for abuse of

discretion. In re D.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95188, 2010-Ohio-5618, ¶ 47.

              An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in

an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

Such an abuse “‘“implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable.”’” State v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 135,

quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983),

quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). This court

has held that an abuse of discretion may be found where a trial court “applies the
wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly

erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-

1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). When applying the abuse-of-discretion

standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court. Vannucci v. Schneider, 2018-Ohio-1294, 110 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

              “In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court ‘may apply

one of two different tests.’” In re S.C., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-203, 2022-Ohio-

356, ¶ 38, quoting In re J.P., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-834, 2019-Ohio-1619,

¶ 39. “‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court weighs multiple factors * * * to

decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of a child is in that child’s

best interest.’”   Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.       “By contrast, ‘under R.C.

2151.414(D)(2), if the juvenile court makes [each of] the four enumerated findings,

permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest and the court “shall” commit

the child to the permanent custody of the agency.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.

“These two provisions ‘are alternative means for reaching the best-interest

determination.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 40.

               In determining the best interests of a child pursuant to R.C.

2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including, but

not limited to, the following:

      (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
      parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
      providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
      (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
      the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
      child;

      (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
      been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
      agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
      a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;

      (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
      whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
      permanent custody to the agency;

      (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
      apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

              Although a juvenile court is required to consider each relevant factor

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), “there is not one element that is given greater weight

than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-

Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has clarified

that R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each

of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). “Consideration is

all the statute requires.” In re A.M., 166 Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102, 184

N.E.3d 1, ¶ 31.

                  In turn, R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) provides as follows:

      If all of the following apply, permanent custody is in the best interest of
      the child, and the court shall commit the child to the permanent
      custody of a public children services agency or private child placing
      agency:

      (a) The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or
      more of the factors in division (E) of this section exist and the child
      cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable
      time or should not be placed with either parent.

      (b) The child has been in an agency’s custody for two years or longer,
      and no longer qualifies for temporary custody pursuant to division (D)
      of section 2151.415 of the Revised Code.

      (c) The child does not meet the requirements for a planned permanent
      living arrangement pursuant to division (A)(5) of section 2151.353 of
      the Revised Code.

      (d) Prior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or other interested
      person has filed, or has been identified in, a motion for legal custody of
      the child.

              Significantly, if the factors enumerated under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) are

applicable, permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest and the juvenile

court is required to commit the child to the permanent custody of the agency. In re

G.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108932, 2020-Ohio-2949, ¶ 61, citing In re J.R., 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-698, 2018-Ohio-1474, ¶ 41.

              As previously stated, the juvenile court made alternative findings

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2) in determining that an award of permanent

custody to the agency was in T.Y.’s best interest. Under such circumstances, this

court has held that it is unnecessary to determine if the court correctly applied the

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors because “[a] finding under section (D)(2) of R.C.

2151.414 mandates that the trial court find it is in a child’s best interest to be placed

in the agency’s permanent custody.” In re A.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110422 and

110472, 2021-Ohio-3829, ¶ 42, citing In re G.A. at ¶ 59. Accordingly, our review

focuses on the court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2).
               In this case, the juvenile court made the following findings in support

of its determination that, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), permanent custody was

in T.Y.’s best interests:

       There is evidence that one or more of the factors in division (E) of this
       section exist and the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s
       parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either
       parent[;]

       ***

       The child has been in the custody of the agency for two years, and the
       court cannot legally grant any further extensions of temporary custody.
       She does not qualify for a planned permanent living arrangement, and
       no one has filed for or been identified in a written motion for legal
       custody. The court finds the agency has made intensive efforts to locate
       relatives pursuant to R.C. 2151.416. The only options before this court
       are reunification or permanent custody.

               For the reasons that follow, we find there is competent, credible

evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s reliance on the factors set forth

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) and its conclusion that permanent custody to the agency

is in child’s best interests.

               To ascertain whether R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(a) applies, we must look to

R.C. 2151.414(E) because determining “that a child cannot be placed with the

parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with them, the court must

find, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one of the factors in R.C.

2151.414(E)(1)-(16) is present.” In re G.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108932, 2020-

Ohio-2949 at ¶ 62, citing In re S.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108036, 2019-Ohio-

3664, citing In re S.W., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2017-A-0089, 2018-Ohio-1672.
               In this case, the juvenile court included findings under R.C.

2151.414(E)(1), (4), and (16), stating as follows:

      (E)(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home
      and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by
      the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
      caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
      continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
      causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.

      (E)(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the
      child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the
      child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness
      to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.

      (E)(16) Other relevant factors: In this case are the circumstances of
      [T.Y.’s] removal, the wishes of the child, the in camera interview, the
      child’s progress in treatment, and the potential risks of disruptions if a
      reunification does not work out.

              The court further explained its reliance on these factors as follows:

      At 13 years of age, the child was charged with domestic violence and the
      mother would not allow the child to return home. The child was placed
      in the custody of CCDCFS. The child has been in the agency’s custody
      for over two years. The case plan required the mother to complete
      parenting [classes] and to participate in family counseling. She has not
      done either of these things. The testimony of the social worker and the
      child’s GAL established that the child was hurt by the mother’s failure
      to participate in counseling. Over the course of the last six months, the
      child has been doing very well in her placement. She has a 3.0 grade
      point average, is using the skills she learned in therapy, and is working
      on being a positive leader in her placement. Meanwhile, the issues that
      led to the child’s removal remain unaddressed. The court is concerned
      that if the child is reunified [with Mother] and those issues resurface,
      the child will be blamed for the removal, and the child will bear the
      brunt of the emotional fallout from any future disruptions. She has
      been diagnosed with depression and PTSD and has been working on
      her coping strategies for over two years.

      The issue before the court is not whether 15-year old T.Y. will have a
      relationship with her biological family as she is clearly capable of
      reaching out to them. The issue before the court is her legal status with
      the agency, and whether she will be able to continue to grow into a
      healthy adulthood in a safe way that gives her hope and agency.

               In support of the foregoing findings, the court relied substantially on

the testimony of social worker Sinkfield. In pertinent part, Sinkfield testified that

Mother failed to successfully complete the requirements of her case plan and,

therefore, failed to remedy the significant issues that caused T.Y. to be removed from

her care. Mother took no actions to complete the necessary parenting-education

courses and failed to consistently engage in family counseling to address the issues

that predominated the conflicts between her and her child. On appeal, Mother

suggests that she was willing to continue counseling but was prevented from doing

so based on the agency’s deference to the wishes of T.Y. Mother’s position, however,

ignores the legitimacy of T.Y.’s emotional reaction to Mother’s failure to appear at

counseling, and further attempts to diminish her own failures to resolve the alleged

technological issues that allegedly caused her to miss sessions. Mother’s position

further conflicts with Sinkfield’s testimony that Mother informed the agency that

she no longer wished to continue with family counseling because of the technological

issues and scheduling conflicts. (Tr. 16.) Similarly, when questioned by the court,

Sinkfield reiterated that the parties’ failure to complete family counseling in this case

“was not because of the child’s actions,” but “was because of the parent’s actions.”

(Tr. 38.)

               The record does demonstrate that Mother routinely visited and

communicated with T.Y. when able to do so. Sinkfield acknowledged that Mother
and T.Y. have “interact[ed] pretty well” during visits, and that “Mother and [T.Y.]

speak more often than they did prior” to T.Y.’s removal. (Tr. 17, 25.) Nevertheless,

Sinkfield opined that permanent custody was in the child’s best interests based on

Mother’s unwillingness to significantly address or otherwise rectify the issues that

caused disputes between Mother and T.Y. in the past. Because Mother failed to

demonstrate a willingness to comply with her case plan, Sinkfield testified that

Mother and T.Y. “have [not] gotten to a level where they can effectively

communicate with each other.” (Tr. 17-18.) Thus, the agency was concerned that

the issues that led to T.Y.’s removal would resume if she were to be returned to

Mother’s care. T.Y. shared these concerns and repeatedly expressed that she did not

wish to return home.

               In contrast to Mother’s unwillingness to comply with her case-plan

objectives, the record reflects that T.Y. has excelled in her current placement and

has successfully engaged in the services contemplated for her in the case plan. T.Y.

has improved in school, has consistently taken prescribed medication, and has

actively participated in individual and group counseling. While T.Y.’s personal

achievements are commendable, they do not relieve Mother of her obligation to

accept personal accountability and satisfactorily address the conditions that cause

T.Y. to be removed from her care.

               Viewing this evidence in totality, we find the record clearly and

convincingly supports the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(a) and

(E)(1), (4), and (16).
              We likewise find the evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(b), (c), and (d). As stated, T.Y. was removed from

her Mother’s home in July 2020, and remained in the agency’s custody throughout

the pendency of these proceedings. Accordingly, as of the date of the permanent-

custody hearing, T.Y. had been in the agency’s custody for two years or longer and

no longer qualified for an extension of temporary custody. In addition, T.Y. did not

meet the requirements for a planned permanent-living arrangement (to do so, a

child must be at least 16 years old) and the agency was unable to identify any

relatives who could take legal custody of her.

              Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the juvenile court acted

unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in determining that it was in T.Y.’s best

interest to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2).

Accordingly, we find, the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to CCDCFS is

supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

              The first assignment of error is overruled.

                        E. Due Process Considerations

              In the second assignment of error, Mother argues the juvenile court

committed reversible error by considering matters that were not admitted into

evidence at the time of the permanent-custody trial. Specifically, Mother contends

that the juvenile court violated her due-process rights by citing facts contained in

the GAL’s written report and information gathered during the child’s in camera
interview. For instance, Mother asserts that it was inappropriate for the juvenile

court to reference T.Y.’s 3.0 grade average because this information was only

contained in the GAL’s written report.

              It is well settled that “in permanent custody proceedings, parents

must be afforded due process before their rights can be terminated.” In re Hoffman,

97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, at ¶ 15. “Due process requires

both notice and an opportunity to be heard.” O’Malley v. O’Malley, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 98708, 2013-Ohio-5238, ¶ 16, citing In re Thompkins, 115 Ohio St.3d

409, 2007-Ohio-5238, 875 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 13.

      “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
      proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
      calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
      the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
      their objections.”

Thompkins at ¶ 13, quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.

306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

             After careful consideration, we find no merit to Mother’s due-process

argument. In this case, the record contains ample testimony concerning T.Y.’s

wishes, her improvements in school, and the recommendations of the GAL. These

issues were thoroughly discussed during the permanent-custody hearing and

counsel for Mother was provided the ample opportunity to further explore these

issues during cross-examination. And, in fact, these issues were the substance of

counsel’s cross-examination of Sinkfield and the child’s GAL.           Under these

circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the juvenile court violated Mother’s
due-process rights by referencing information that was cumulative to the evidence

adduced at the permanent-custody hearing.

             The second assignment of error is overruled.

             Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR