Court Opinion

ID: 9473864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:41:37.354318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:46.439069
License: Public Domain

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the result reached by the majority but I write separately to briefly discuss the extent of the proof of constructive discharge in this case and to emphasize the proper allocation and nature of burdens of proof and production in age discrimination cases.
The majority correctly concludes that the jury could have reasonably determined that Caterpillar constructively discharged Williams. As the majority explains, a finding of constructive discharge requires a determination that “working conditions could have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” See Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 996 (6th Cir.1984). In citing evidence which supports the jury’s finding of constructive discharge, the majority emphasizes the increased amount of physical exertion which would have been required of Williams had she accepted the mail delivery position. More persuasive support for a determination of constructive discharge lies in the fact that Williams’ demotion from her position as a disability benefits clerk to a mail clerk entailed a significant change in job duties, a reduction in classification from “grade 10” to “grade 2” and a corresponding reduction in salary which Williams understood to be “the lowest salary of any of the office employees.”
With regard to the nature of proof sufficient to show age discrimination, I wish to reiterate the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and expounded upon in Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1084, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
By carrying the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Bur-dine, 450 U.S. at 254, and n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, and n. 7. Thereafter, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. To succeed in carrying this burden of production, “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” 450 U.S. 253-54, 101 S.Ct. 1094 (citation and footnote omitted). If the defendant carries this burden of production, “the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted,1 and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.” 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. Placing the burden of production on the defendant “serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demon*52strate pretext.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.
At all times, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. After the employer sufficiently articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the plaintiff must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision:
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095, (emphasis added) citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-26.
As the majority concludes, Williams carried her burden of establishing a prima facie case. Caterpillar then articulated a nondiscriminatory reason; it suggested that it demoted Williams for disclosing confidential information, for failing to conduct an investigation and for erroneously preparing an article. The presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case was, therefore, rebutted. Accordingly, at the third and final stage of trial, Williams could prevail only by carrying the merged burdens of demonstrating that the employer’s proffered reason was not its true reason and that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. She could accomplish this ultimate burden “indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of credence.” See id.
Williams produced evidence tending to show that Caterpillar’s proffered reason was “unworthy of credence.” See id. As the majority observes, Williams introduced evidence indicating that Fonner, her supervisor, was aware that confidential disclosures could be overheard by those situated in close proximity to Williams’ desk; that although Williams did not investigate a particular employee’s claim, she had told Fonner that such an investigation should be performed; and that Fonner admitted that he had destroyed the allegedly erroneous article and conceded that Williams had satisfactorily prepared an article at another time.
Accordingly, the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could properly conclude that Williams successfully demonstrated that Caterpillar’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for her constructive discharge were “unworthy of credence” and, accordingly, that she carried her “ultimate burden of persuading the court that she had been the victim of intentional discrimination.” See id. The “McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail where at the third stage ... of trial [he or she] demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment decision.” United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (Black-mun, J., concurring).

. In Bur dine, the Supreme Court explained the effect of rebuttal of the presumption that had been raised by the prima facie case:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff’s initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff’s initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant’s explanation.
450 U.S. at 256 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 n. 10.