Court Opinion

ID: 9451189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:09:22.472587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:36.435488
License: Public Domain

GEWIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
With deference I must disagree with my Brothers. The litigants and the trial court evidently felt that the law dealing with the subject of firearms is vague and ambiguous as it relates to the weapon under consideration here. For example, the libel of information described it as a “J. Stevens .410 gauge shotgtmpistol.” In my view, the statutes are so vague as related to the weapon in question as to require a factual determination as to the type of weapon here involved.
There was a wide variance between the testimony of experts for the Government and the claimant. There was ample evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that the weapon in question is a pistol. Several experts so testified. Stoeger’s Catalog, referred to by the experts as the “shooter’s bible,” lists the weapon under the heading “Stevens Single Shot Target Pistols” and more specifically refers to it as “auto-shot.” The catalog further characterizes it as “a very satisfactory pistol for camping and automobile trips.” (Emphasis added.) The manufacturer called it a pistol and indicated that single ball ammunition could be fired from it.
Moreover, it does not appear that the administrative construction of the Act has always been consistent. At one time, Internal Revenue Service concluded that a pistol which had been altered so that it had become a smooth bored weapon nevertheless remained a pistol. Later it was decided such an alteration did change the basic character of the weapon. The record shows that originally all pistols were smooth bored weapons. The record testimony demonstrates that shot shells can be purchased on the market for almost any caliber pistol. The law simply does not accurately describe the weapon under consideration. Factual considerations are necessarily involved, and the witnesses testified as to pertinent facts with reference to the weapon’s characteristics and capabilities. Some of the witnesses described the weapon as a “snake gun” often carried by fishermen or other sportsmen. The trial judge had to make a choice and resolve the conflict in the testimony.
Forfeiture is also involved. Property should not be forfeited unless the facts, the law, or both, clearly authorize such a forfeiture. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, etc., 307 U.S. 219, 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249 (1936); Baca v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., (5 Cir. 1964) 326 F.2d 189; Rush v. United States, (10 Cir. 1958) 256 F.2d 862. The forfeiture of a Cadillac automobile in the circumstances here presented is drastic, harsh, unreasonable, and in my view, not within the contemplation of Congress in the exercise of its taxing authority, or in the enactment of legislation authorizing *400the forfeiture of vehicles used to transport contraband. Forfeitures are not only required to be within the letter, but also within the spirit of the law. This standard has not been reached in this case.