Court Opinion

ID: 9372955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:46.961397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.423485
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     COREY DEMOND STOGLIN,                           DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          CH-3330-17-0105-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: February 1, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Corey Demond Stoglin, Minneapolis, Minnesota, pro se.

           Douglas Mark Livingston, Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the i nitial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in connection with his appeal under the
     Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA) and dismissed for lack of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
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     jurisdiction his appeal under the            Uniformed Services Employment and
     Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).
¶2           For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for
     review, VACATE that portion of the initial decision addressing the USERRA
     appeal, AFFIRM the portions of the initial decision addressing the appellant’s
     VEOA, race discrimination, and whistleblower retaliation claims, and REMAND
     the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                         BACKGROUND
¶3           The appellant is a 30% disabled preference-eligible veteran. Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 4 at 12, 14.        On March 28, 2016, the agency issued vacancy
     announcement CIS-1659155-EO1 for the position of Equal Employment
     Opportunity Manager (Deputy Chief), GS-15, IAF, Tab 6 at 13-15, and the
     appellant applied. Subsequently, he was notified that, although he was one of the
     referred and considered applicants, another applicant was selected for the
     position. Id. at 5.
¶4           On October 12, 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL), Veterans’
     Employment and Training Group (VETS), acknowledged receipt of                     the
     appellant’s VEOA complaint. 2          IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8.       Unable to resolve the
     complaint, DOL VETS advised the appellant on November 15, 2016, of his right
     to appeal to the Board, id. at 9, which he did. In claiming that he was denied the
     right to compete for the position, the appellant alleged that the agency retaliated
     against him because he had another VEOA/USERRA complaint pending before
     DOL, 3 the appeal of which was currently before the Board, MSPB Docket
     No. CH-3330-16-0616-I-1, that the agency engaged in racial discrimination, and

     2
         The appellant did not submit a copy of the complaint he filed with DOL.
     3
       The appellant asserted that his “DOL complaint was originally filed as a USERRA
     complaint.” IAF, Tab 4 at 8.
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     that the appeal should be treated as a claim that the agency violated the
     Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). IAF, Tab 1 at 5. He requested a hearing .
     Id. at 2.
¶5         The administrative judge issued an order on VEOA jurisdiction and notice
     of proof requirements in connection with the appellant’s VEOA appeal.             IAF,
     Tab 3. In his response, the appellant alleged that, in failing to select him for the
     position in question, the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights and that it
     also denied him the right to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). IAF, Tab 4
     at 4-7.     The appellant reiterated his claim that the agency’s action was in
     retaliation for his other pending VEOA/USERRA claim, and he also raised the
     possibility that, as to the nonselection, the agency violated his rights under
     USERRA by not properly crediting the experience he earned while he was in the
     military. Id. at 6. The agency moved that the appeal be dismissed for lack of
     jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 6.
¶6         In an initial decision based on the written record, the administrative judge
     first addressed the appellant’s claim under VEOA regarding his nonselection,
     finding that he did not show that the agency violated a statutory or regulatory
     provision related to veterans’ preference, noting that he did not dispute that he
     was referred for consideration under the vacancy announcement at issue. IAF,
     Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-5. The administrative judge further found that,
     in the context of his VEOA appeal, the Board lacks authority to review the
     appellant’s racial discrimination claim. ID at 5. Regarding the appellant’s claim
     of   retaliation   for   having   pursued   another   VEOA/USERRA       matter,    the
     administrative judge stated that he could file a retaliation complaint with the
     Office of Special Counsel (OSC). The administrative judge then addressed the
     appellant’s claim of retaliation under the WPA, finding that he failed to show that
     he exhausted his remedy before OSC. ID at 6. As to the appellant’s USERRA
     claim, the administrative judge found that the appellant “failed to make an initial
     showing, by preponderant evidence, that his military status was at least a
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     motivating or substantial factor in the agency’s decision to select another
     candidate for the positon at issue.”      The administrative judge denied the
     appellant’s request for corrective action under VEOA and dismissed his USERRA
     claim. ID at 7.

                                        ANALYSIS
     The appellant’s VEOA appeal
¶7        On review, the appellant does not specifically challenge the administrative
     judge’s decision denying him corrective action under VEOA. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 3-5.    We discern no error in that regard.      The agency
     advertised the position in question by a vacancy announcement, which indicated
     that it was open to the following classes of persons: “Current or Former
     Employees with Competitive Status; Reinstatement Eligibles; OPM Interchange
     Agreement Eligibles; VEOA, Disability, Surplus/Displaced Eligibles.”         IAF,
     Tab 6 at 27.      The appellant was found qualified for the position and his
     application was referred to the hiring official under the Schedule A (30% disabled
     veteran) hiring authority.   Id. at 18, 22.   Because the agency exercised its
     discretion to fill the vacancy under the merit promotion process, the ranking and
     selection rules that apply to the competitive-examination process, including
     veterans’ preference, do not apply.      Joseph v. Federal Trade Commission,
     505 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Perkins v. U.S. Postal Service,
     100 M.S.P.R. 48, ¶ 9 (2005). Moreover, although a preference eligible is entitled
     to have a broad range of experience considered by the agency in reviewing his or
     her application for a position, how the agency adjudges and weig hs those
     experiences is beyond the Board’s purview.       See, e.g., Asatov v. Agency for
     International Development, 119 M.S.P.R. 692, ¶ 7 (2013) (stating that the matter
     at issue in a VEOA appeal is not whether a particular agency action is proper and
     should be sustained), overruled on other grounds by Dean v. Department of
     Labor, 122 M.S.P.R. 276, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 808 F.3d 497 (Fed. Cir.
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     2015). The appellant has not established that his nonselection violated his rights
     under a statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference,                5 U.S.C.
     § 3330a(a)(1)(A), and, to the extent he claims that there were irregularities in the
     selection process, such claims do not compel a contrary result.
¶8         Nor has the appellant shown that he was denied the right to compete under
     that part of the VEOA statute.        5 U.S.C. §§ 3330a(A)(1)(B), 3304(f)(1).        He
     applied for the position, and his application was referred noncompetitively to the
     hiring authority for consideration.       Nothing more is required.         Scharein v.
     Department of the Army, 91 M.S.P.R. 329, ¶¶ 9-10 (2002) (emphasizing that
     VEOA does not guarantee a preference eligible a positon of employment), aff’d,
     No. 02-3270, 2008 WL 5753074 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2008). While the appellant
     questions whether his application was actually forwarded to the hiring official,
     PFR File, Tab 5 at 3, he has submitted no evidence in support of his claim, and
     evidence submitted by the agency supports the administrative judge’s contrary
     finding, IAF, Tab 6 at 18, 22. Even though the appellant in this case was not
     selected, we agree with the administrative judge that he was not denied the right
     to compete under VEOA. 4 Joseph, 505 F.3d at 1383-84.
¶9         The appellant argues on review that he was denied a hearing. PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 3.    He has not, however, shown error in the administrative judge’s

     4
       The appellant suggests on review that he has evidence that shows that the documents
     submitted by the agency may have been altered or created after the start of the appeal.
     He also states that he was, and is still, waiting for information to be verified that may
     show that the agency has submitted false evidence. PFR File, Tab 5 at 3. However, he
     has not submitted any additional evidence that is new and material, despite the fact that
     the Acting Clerk of the Board granted him an extension of time in which to submit a
     single supplement to the reply to the agency’s response to his petition for review. PFR
     File, Tabs 6-7. The emails the appellant submitted on review, PFR File, Tab 5 at 4 -5, 8,
     are not new. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980) (holding that
     the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the
     petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the reco rd was
     closed despite the party’s due diligence). Further, to the extent the appellant argues
     that “the record [below] was abruptly closed without notice,” PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, his
     claim is not borne out by an examination of the record, IAF, Tab 2 at 6, Tab 3 at 7.
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      finding that none was required because there is no genuine dispute of material
      fact in this VEOA appeal and one party, here, the agency, must prevail as a matter
      of law. Davis v. Department of Defense, 105 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 12 (2007); ID at 2
      n.1.

      The appellant’s USERRA appeal
¶10          To establish jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), an appellant must
      allege that:    (1) he performed duty or has an obligation to perform duty in a
      unformed service of the United States; (2) the agency denied h is initial
      employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or any benefit of employment;
      and (3) the denial was due to the performance of duty or obligation to perform
      duty in the unformed service.        Williams v. Department of the Treasury,
      110 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 8 (2008).      Despite language in the initial decision that
      appears to suggest that the administrative judge adjudicated this claim on the
      merits, he concluded that the Board lacks jurisdiction to address it and he
      dismissed it. ID at 9. Although we acknowledge th at USERRA claims should be
      broadly construed, Williams, 110 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 8, we nonetheless conclude that
      the administrative judge’s jurisdictional finding regarding 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) is
      correct.
¶11          The appellant’s claim of discrimination is based solely on the fact that his
      relevant experience for the position in question was derived from his time in the
      military, and he assumes that the hiring official would have been aware that this
      was the case. IAF, Tab 4 at 8. Notwithstanding, the appellant’s bare assertion
      that the hiring official did not select him for the posit ion due to his military
      service does not rise to the level of a nonfrivolous allegation.        Under the
      circumstances, we agree with the administrative judge’s ultimate disposition
      dismissing the appellant’s USERRA appeal under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) for lack of
      jurisdiction.    Absent a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction under
      38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) of the USERRA statute, the appellant was not entitled to a
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      hearing in connection with that provision.     Downs v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶¶ 17-18 (2008).
¶12        However, there is another provision of USERRA, section 4311(b), which
      provides that an employer may not retaliate against an individual for pursuing or
      assisting another individual in pursuing his USERRA rights.          The appellant
      argues on review that, in connection with his USERRA appeal, he raised a claim
      of retaliation below, PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, alleging that, when he was under
      consideration for the GS-15 position, he had a pending complaint with DOL
      alleging a USERRA violation regarding his nonselection for a GS-14 position,
      IAF, Tab 1 at 7.
¶13        According to 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b):
            An employer may not discriminate in employment against or take
            any adverse employment action against any person because such
            person (1) has taken an action to enforce a protection afforde d any
            person under this chapter, (2) has testified or otherwise made a
            statement in or in connection with any proceeding under this chapter,
            (3) has assisted or otherwise participated in an investigation under
            this chapter, or (4) has exercised a right provided for in this chapter.
      38 U.S.C. § 4311(b).     If an appellant engages in one or more forms of the
      protected activity described above, an agency violates section 4311(b) if the
      appellant’s protected activity “is a motivating factor in the employer’s action,
      unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the
      absence of such person’s [protected activity].” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(2). In other
      words, an agency violates section 4311(b) if it would not have taken the action
      but for the appellant’s protected activity. Burroughs v. Department of the Army,
      120 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶ 7 (2013). To establish jurisdiction under section 4311(b), as
      under section 4311(a), the appellant must raise nonfrivolous allegations in
      support of his claim.
¶14        The Board has held that an administrative judge must inform an appellant of
      the USERRA burdens and methods of proof in a USERRA appeal. Haynes v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 9, ¶ 7 (2001). Although the appellant raised this
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      argument below, IAF, Tab 1 at 5, the administrative judge failed to issue an order
      setting forth, first, the requirements for establishing jurisdiction, and, then, the
      requirements for establishing a claim, under section 4311(b) of USERRA. To the
      extent that the agency, in attempting to challenge the appellant’s claim, addressed
      the USERRA statute, its discussion was incomplete and did not serve to put the
      appellant on notice of the statutory requirements. IAF, Tab 6 at 8; cf. Nichols v.
      Department of the Interior, 69 M.S.P.R. 386, 388-89 (1996) (holding that an
      appeal need not be remanded to address a jurisdictional issue whe n an agency’s
      motion to dismiss provides the appellant with notice that was lacking in the
      acknowledgment order).     Because the appellant has not been afforded proper
      notice, a remand is required. Haynes, 89 M.S.P.R. 9, ¶¶ 7-8.

                                           ORDER
¶15        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. On remand, the
      administrative judge shall inform the appellant of the burdens and elements of
      proof in a USERRA retaliation claim brought under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b). After
      affording such notice, the administrative judge shall allow for further
      development of the record. If he determines that the appellant has established
      Board jurisdiction over this claim, the administrative judge shall convene a
      hearing.   Downs, 110 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 17.      In his remand initial decision, the
      administrative judge may adopt his prior findings concerning the ap pellant’s
      VEOA appeal, his claim under section 4311(a) of USERRA, his claim of race
      discrimination, and his whistleblower claim under the WPA.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.