Court Opinion

ID: 9786009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:44:29.022646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:40.247570
License: Public Domain

Judge VOGT
dissents.
I respectfully dissent.
The Colorado Employment Security Act, § 8-70-101, et seq., C.R.S.2003, delegates to the hearing officer and the Panel the responsibility for applying the standards adopted by the General Assembly to determine whether, under all the circumstances of the case, a particular separation from employment should result in an award of benefits. Given the scope and purpose of the statutory scheme, our courts have refused to engraft civil wrongful discharge case law onto the Act. See Keil v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 847 P.2d 235 (Colo.App.1993)(holding that principles concerning wrongful discharge in civil case law are not determinative of entitlement and fault issues in an unemployment compensation benefits case).
Here, after a two-day evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer concluded that employer’s instruction regarding the performance agreement was reasonable in light of its “valid concerns about the claimant’s job performance.” In her appeal to the Panel, claimant focused primarily on disputing the asserted deficiencies in her job performance, but also argued that the performance agreement was unconscionable and coercive. The Panel disagreed, concluding, as did the hearing officer, that there was nothing objectively unreasonable in employer’s request.
In my view, the Panel correctly interpreted and applied the statutory standard it is responsible for applying to the circumstances *588of this case. For purposes of determining disqualification from unemployment benefits, “insubordination” is defined as including “[djeliberate disobedience of a reasonable instruction of an employer.” Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VT), C.R.S.2003. The Panel found the instruction reasonable under all the circumstances, and there was no dispute that claimant deliberately did not obey the instruction.
The majority does not disagree that employer “could reasonably request claimant to consider settling their differences.” However, it then concludes that her refusal to comply with employer’s request that she sign a settlement agreement did not constitute insubordination. I disagree with the latter conclusion for three reasons.
First, in support of its conclusion, the majority relies on three cases from other jurisdictions that involve civil claims for wrongful discharge or breach of an employment agreement. I view these decisions as having limited applicability to a determination whether a separation from employment should result in an award of unemployment benefits under Colorado’s statutory scheme. See Keil v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra.
Second, I interpret the performance agreement as a reasonable proposal to compromise a disputed issue, not as an improper attempt to require claimant to “waive significant legal protections and rights,” as the majority characterizes it.
As the majority recognizes, the hearing officer’s finding that employer had genuine and valid concerns about claimant’s job performance is supported by substantial evidence in the record. After acknowledging that claimant had the right to contest the discipline imposed for her substandard performance in accordance with employer’s handbook and that neither side could predict the outcome if she did so, the agreement provides that both employer and claimant will give up certain rights. Employer agrees not to impose any further disciplinary action beyond the five-day suspension for the performance issues, and claimant agrees that, if she does not comply with the job performance obligations in the agreement, she has given up her right to any internal administrative appeal she would otherwise have.
Notably, the agreement does not require that claimant forgo seeking workers’ compensation benefits or agree to some other condition that has been recognized as improper under Colorado law. See Vaske v. DuCharme, McMillen & Associates, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 1158 (D.Colo.1990). I do not view the agreement as either illegal or unconscionable, and am aware of no authority that would prevent an employer and an employee from entering into such agreement.
Third, and perhaps most important, upon review of the entire record, I am persuaded that neither employer’s termination of claimant nor the Panel’s subsequent determination that she was not entitled to unemployment benefits was unfair under all the circumstances.
The majority suggests that claimant should have had the option of not signing the agreement and taking her chance in then pending disciplinary proceedings. The record permits a reasonable inference that she in fact was given such an opportunity, but declined it.
Claimant’s supervisor testified that, when claimant was suspended in September 2002 based on job performance deficiencies that had previously been brought to her attention, she was asked to sign a performance contract. She disputed the terms and employer agreed to modify it. Thereafter, a second contract, with one “bullet item” removed, was presented to her. When she again refused to sign, she was not immediately fired. Rather, because she had already filed an administrative appeal, employer decided to go forward with the appeal hearing to give her a final opportunity to go through the appeal process. Claimant was told she should come back to work pending the outcome of the appeal. When claimant did not return to work, the appeal hearing was converted to a pretermination hearing.
A transcript of that internal administrative hearing is also included in the record. The transcript reflects that the employer’s hearing officer asked at the outset to hear “both sides of the issue.” After the supervisor stated employer’s position, claimant simply asked the hearing officer to confirm that she *589was being terminated for not signing a performance contract agreement and for missing two days of work. When the hearing officer did so, claimant responded: “That’s all I needed to know. We really don’t have anything else to talk about.” The hearing officer then explained that he had brought her in “to hear both sides to determine if the termination would stand” and “that is the reason for this hearing.” Claimant declined the offer, stating “I’ve had my questions answered. I’m done.” The hearing officer again clarified that claimant was “not terminated until the decision is final from this hearing.... This is a hearing to determine whether you are [going to] be terminated.”
At the subsequent unemployment compensation hearing, the employer’s hearing officer testified that his role at the administrative hearing was to make a determination of whether termination was appropriate or not; that he had the power to overturn whatever had previously been decided; and that he was “expecting to hear both sides of the issue so [he] could make a decision.”
This record was before the Panel when it made its determination. In my view, the Panel applied the correct legal standard and appropriately considered all the facts and circumstances of the case in determining that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. I would therefore affirm its order.