Court Opinion

ID: 9910902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 20:00:43.537515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:12.225549
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 18 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEREMY VAUGHN PINSON,                           No. 23-15027

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No. 4:22-cv-00469-RM-JR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
M. GUTIERREZ,

                Respondent-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Rosemary Márquez, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted December 12, 2023**

Before:      WALLACE, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Federal prisoner Jeremy Pinson appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment summarily dismissing Pinson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      Pinson’s § 2241 petition asserted Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
against Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials premised on Pinson’s allegations that

Pinson is being subjected to harassment and violence and is being denied medical

care, including gender-affirming surgery, as a result of Pinson’s designation as a

maximum custody inmate and placement at a high-security men’s facility. The

district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition as duplicative

because it raises the same claims and is based on the same factual allegations as

those in Pinson v. Carvajal, et al., 4:22-cv-00298-RM.1 See Adams v. Cal. Dep’t

of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating standard of review

and test for determining whether an action is duplicative), abrogated in part on

other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).

         We reject Pinson’s allegation of judicial bias as unsupported by the record.

We also reject Pinson’s argument that the district court should have appointed

counsel sua sponte. See Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)

(stating criteria for appointment of counsel in a habeas proceeding).

         Because we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Pinson’s § 2241

petition was duplicative, we do not address Pinson’s challenges to the district

court’s alternative holding that Pinson’s claims were not cognizable.

         Pinson’s renewed “Motion to Consolidate/Appoint Counsel” is denied.

         AFFIRMED.

1
    Contrary to Pinson’s suggestion, this civil action has not been dismissed.

                                            2                                     23-15027