Court Opinion

ID: 9579396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:41.286955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:29.072803
License: Public Domain

HEARN, C.J.:
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority that exclusion (l) does not bar coverage here, I would not reach that question because I believe there was no occurrence.
Under the policy, there must be an occurrence to trigger insurance coverage. The policy defines occurrence as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Here, faulty construction resulted in the collapse of the construction project itself. Under our case law, faulty workmanship alone is not an occurrence; there must also be an accident. Isle of Palms Pest Control Co. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 319 S.C. 12, 16, *561459 S.E.2d 318, 320 (Ct.App.1994), aff'd 321 S.C. 310, 468 S.E.2d 304 (1996).
With respect to whether ordinary negligence of the insured or his agent is an accident, there is a decided split of authority among the states. See generally J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Liability Insurance: “Accident” or “Accidental” as Including Loss Resulting from Ordinary Negligence of Insured or His Agent 7 A.L.R.3d 1262 (1966 & Supp.2000). Some jurisdictions have found that injury caused by the insured’s negligence is not an accident if the loss is a natural and probable consequence of the negligence. Id. at § 6. Other jurisdictions have found that the term accident is broad enough to cover negligence if the injury or damage was not intentional. Id. at § 5.1 would hold that South Carolina falls into the first group.
The Fourth Circuit, construing South Carolina law, has found:
In our case, neither the means nor the result was accidental, since the acts which caused the damage were persistently and continuously done and the results were the normal consequences of the acts. We do not mean to say that there may not be an accident as a result of negligence, but there was no such result in this case and it cannot be held that negligence is synonymous with accident.
C.Y. Thomason Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 F.2d 729, 732-33 (4th Cir.1950) (citations omitted) (finding no coverage for negligent excavation of a ditch resulting in flooding and debris build-up in garage or for creating bump which damaged cars entering garage). In another case applying our law, the Fourth Circuit found that there was no accident for purposes of coverage where negligence was followed by a foreseeable consequence “for then neither the cause nor the effect is unexpectable. [sic]” Baker v. Am. Ins. Co. of Newark, NJ, 324 F.2d 748, 750 (4th Cir.1963) (finding coverage in case of negligently built retaining wall because century high rainfall exacerbated damage). These interpretations are consistent with South Carolina case law’s definition of accident. See Ducker v. Cent. Sur. & Ins. Corp., 234 S.C. 228, 230-31, 107 S.E.2d 342, 343 (1959) (adopting the following definition: “An effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of those means, an effect which *562the actor did not intend to produce and cannot be charged with the design of producing, ... is produced by accidental means.”); Mfrs. & Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 330 S.C. 152, 159, 498 S.E.2d 222, 225 (Ct.App.1998).
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the damages here as remote and unexpected. The only damages in this case were the natural and proximate result of the faulty work. See Stroup Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 268 S.C. 203, 213, 232 S.E.2d 885, 888-89 (1977) (finding no coverage for faulty workmanship because the damage could not be considered “neither expected nor intended.... ”). The record contains no allegations of an intervening and superseding cause that might be classified as accidental.
The majority contends that under Isle of Palms the damage here was caused by an occurrence. However, the facts and the focus of the inquiry there differ markedly from the instant case. In Isle of Palms, a termite inspector negligently failed to discover existing termite damage. The analysis centered on how that failure resulted in property damage as opposed to purely economic loss. In this case, there is no question about whether there was property damage; we are instead called to determine whether there was an occurrence. Moreover, the consequences and expectations in a negligent inspection scenario are not the same as those in a negligent construction case. I find the case of Indiana Insurance Co. v. Hydra Corp., 245 Ill.App.3d 926, 185 Ill.Dec. 775, 615 N.E.2d 70 (1993) instructive because, unlike many of the other cases interpreting whether damage was caused by an accident, all of the damages were directly tied to the construction project. There, the court found no occurrence and thus no coverage because “the cracks in the floor and the loose paint on the exterior of the building are the natural and ordinary consequences of installing defective concrete flooring and applying the wrong type of paint.” Id. at 73. The same reasoning applies here because neither the cause of the problem nor the damage that followed was unforeseeable.19
Accordingly, I would reverse.

. For this reason, I believe Kalchthaler v. Keller Construction Co., 224 Wis.2d 387, 591 N.W.2d 169 (App.1999) is distinguishable. In that *563case, the court found coverage when leaky windows damaged the drapery and wallpaper of the completed building; thus, the damages extended beyond the scope of the contractor’s original work.