Court Opinion

ID: 9363362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 23:01:22.285155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.532570
License: Public Domain

Rel: January 13, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0511
                                _________________________

                               Brighton Ventures 2 LLC

                                                  v.

                                     State of Alabama

                        Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                                  (CV-19-902016)
                             _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0512
                                _________________________
SC-2022-0511; SC-2022-0512; SC-2022-0514; SC-2022-0745; SC-2022-
0746; SC-2022-0747

                      St. John Life Center

                                v.

                        State of Alabama

              Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                        (CV-19-902017)
                   _________________________

                          SC-2022-0514
                    _________________________

                    Brighton Ventures 2 LLC

                                v.

                        State of Alabama

              Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                        (CV-19-902024)
                   _________________________

                          SC-2022-0745
                    _________________________

                    Brighton Ventures 2 LLC

                                v.

                        State of Alabama

                                2
SC-2022-0511; SC-2022-0512; SC-2022-0514; SC-2022-0745; SC-2022-
0746; SC-2022-0747

                 Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                           (CV-19-902016)
                      _________________________

                            SC-2022-0746
                      _________________________

                        St. John Life Center

                                 v.

                          State of Alabama

              Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                        (CV-19-902017)
                   _________________________

                            SC-2022-0747
                      _________________________

                      Brighton Ventures 2 LLC

                                 v.

                          State of Alabama

              Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                        (CV-19-902024)

SHAW, Justice.

     In these consolidated appeals, Brighton Ventures 2 LLC ("Brighton

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0746; SC-2022-0747

Ventures") and the St. John Life Center ("the Life Center") appeal from

a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court forfeiting $446,897.19 that was

found to have been used as bets or stakes as part of an illegal gambling

operation.1 We affirm.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     The City of Brighton ("the City") has an ordinance permitting the

establishment of charitable bingo operations within its city limits. Under

that ordinance, a business may apply for and obtain a license to offer

bingo games, provided that the games comply with the provisions of the

ordinance and that the business itself has a named charity through which

it operates.

     In early 2019, an application for a charity-bingo business license

was submitted to the City on behalf of Super Highway Bingo ("the

     1These    cases were brought as in rem actions in the circuit court.
Brighton Ventures intervened in case nos. CV-19-902016 and CV-19-
902024, claiming an interest in the $27,955 and the funds in a BB&T
Bank account that the State sought to condemn in those actions. The Life
Center intervened in case no. CV-19-902017, claiming an interest in the
funds in a Regions Bank account that the State also sought to condemn
in that action. We have restyled each of the appeals to list either Brighton
Ventures or the Life Center as the appellant challenging the circuit
court's forfeiture judgment.
                                    4
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0746; SC-2022-0747

casino"). On the application, the Life Center, a local charity, is listed as

the named charity. In February 2019, the City issued the requested

business license, and, in March 2019, the casino officially opened.

According to the record, Brighton Ventures was responsible for the day-

to-day operations of the casino and, in exchange for its management

services, received 85% of the casino's profits. The Life Center, in return,

received 15% of the casino's profits.

     Around the time the casino opened, the Alabama Attorney

General's Office began an investigation into "electronic bingo" activity

occurring there. "Electronic bingo is illegal in Alabama." State v. Epic

Tech, LLC, [Ms. 1200798, Sept. 30, 2022] ____ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala.

2022). As part of the investigation, Darryl Jackson went undercover into

the casino. Jackson later testified that the primary form of entertainment

offered to the casino's patrons was "electronic bingo" machines. According

to Jackson, to play the machines, a patron either inserted cash directly

into the machine or purchased a ticket from a cashier that could then be

used with the machine. The patron then pressed a button on the machine

to bet a certain number of credits on a particular game. Once the bet was

placed, the patron pressed a "play" button and the machine determined

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0746; SC-2022-0747

whether the player won or lost the game.

     If the patron won, his credits went up; if he lost, his credits went

down. The patron could either play again or "cash out," at which point

the remaining credits would be printed on a receipt. The patron could

then redeem the credits for cash by presenting the receipt to a cashier;

the cashier would enter the information into a computer and give the

patron the credit balance in cash. According to Jackson, no other form of

business was offered at the casino.

     The revenue generated from the machines each day was kept in the

casino's cashier area in locked boxes or in the casino's safe until it was

transported -- usually by an armed Brinks, Inc., courier truck -- to a bank

and then deposited into a specified account. According to the State,

typically, the revenue from the casino was deposited into an account at

BB&T Bank ("the main account") that was opened in the Life Center's

name. That account, the State said, was the "main account" out of which

all the money for the casino's expenses were transferred to other

accounts. Specifically, the money was then transferred into either the

Life Center's account at Regions Bank ("the Regions account") or into

Brighton Ventures' account with BB&T Bank ("the BB&T account"). The

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0746; SC-2022-0747

money deposited into the Regions account was used to pay the casino's

taxes and payroll. The money that was deposited into the BB&T account

was used primarily to pay the casino's expenses.

     Following a month-long investigation, the State executed multiple

search warrants at the casino during which it seized, among other things,

over 200 "electronic bingo" machines and large sums of cash. The State

also executed search warrants on the main account, the Regions account,

the BB&T account, and a local Brinks facility. In addition to seizing from

the main account an amount that is undisclosed in the record, the State

also seized $27,955 in cash that was being held at the Brinks facility,

$50,060.19 from the Regions account, and $368,882 from the BB&T

account. The amount of money seized from those three sources totaled

$446,897.19.

     Relevant to these appeals, the State then initiated separate actions,

petitioning the circuit court for an in rem civil forfeiture of the

$446,897.19 pursuant to § 13A-12-30(c), Ala. Code 1975, on the basis that

that money had been used as "bets" or "stakes" for illegal gambling at the

casino. Although Brighton Ventures and the Life Center were not

specifically named as defendants in the State's petitions, because they

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0746; SC-2022-0747

had ownership interests in the seized funds, they intervened in the

proceedings.

     In their initial responses to the State's petitions, Brighton Ventures

and the Life Center denied that the funds seized were "used as bets or

stakes in gambling activity" as described in § 13A-12-30(c) and argued

that the State had unlawfully seized the funds. They also asserted

counterclaims in which they alleged, among other things, that forfeiture

of the funds constitutes an "excessive fine" in violation of the Excessive

Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

     After the State filed replies to Brighton Ventures' and the Life

Center's counterclaims, in which it alleged various affirmative defenses,

it amended each of its petitions to clarify that it had obtained records

from the casino that indicated that the money it had seized was connected

to the casino's illegal gambling activities.

     The State then moved to consolidate the cases. That motion was

granted.

     The circuit court held a bench trial during which it heard testimony

from several witnesses, including Carl Johnson, the pastor of St. John

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0746; SC-2022-0747

Baptist Church in Dolomite and the executive director of the Life Center.

Johnson testified that he first considered partnering with the casino

when he heard that it "was a charity bingo [operation] that could help"

his nonprofit organization raise money. Johnson explained that Brighton

Ventures was the only entity responsible for running and managing the

casino and that the Life Center's only purpose was to serve as the named

charity for the casino's charity-bingo business license.

     When asked about the money that the Life Center received from

the casino, Johnson admitted that he had no control over what funds

were deposited into the Regions account and that he had trusted

Brighton Ventures to manage that account. He also confirmed that the

sole reason the Life Center established the Regions account was so that

money from the casino could be held and later used for the casino's taxes

and payroll. Additionally, Johnson explained that, typically, once money

was deposited into the Regions account, it was then transferred to the

BB&T account to help pay for the casino's expenses.

     The circuit court then heard testimony from the casino's

administrative assistant, Tearie Leslie, who testified that she was

responsible for handling all of the casino's expenses. According to Leslie,

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0746; SC-2022-0747

because the revenue generated by the casino each day was first deposited

into the main account before later being distributed to the BB&T account,

she often had to contact Johnson to get him to write checks out of the

Regions account. Although Leslie acknowledged that that system was

problematic, she said that they were working to improve the system

around the time the State executed its search warrants on the casino and

the subject bank accounts.

     Vicki Wilson, a special agent with the Alabama Attorney General's

Office, also testified during the trial. Agent Wilson indicated that she was

the leader of the law-enforcement team that had executed the search

warrant at the casino. According to Agent Wilson, as a result of the

execution of the search warrant, law-enforcement officials were able to

collect over 200 gambling machines and $89,000 in cash from the casino.

When asked if she had a chance to observe how the casino's machines

worked, Agent Wilson said that she had observed one of her partners

playing a game on a machine and had noted that, before he could play

the game, he first had to place a "bet." Once that bet was placed, Agent

Wilson said, the machine proceeded with determining whether her

partner was the winner or loser of the game. From there, Agent Wilson

                                    10
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0746; SC-2022-0747

said her partner had the option of placing another bet or "cashing out."

Agent Wilson stated that, based on all of those factors, she believed that

the casino's "electronic bingo" machines were, in fact, illegal gambling

machines that did not offer the legally permissible game of "bingo" as

defined by this Court in Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach,

Inc., 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala. 2009).

     Finally, Jackson testified that he had a great deal of experience

investigating gambling operations in Alabama and that, as part of his

investigation for the State in this case, he had gone to the casino at least

three or four times and had used the machines. Jackson described what

he observed each time he played the machines and that the machines

were the only forms of business offered at the casino.

     In addition to hearing the above testimony, the circuit court

reviewed a variety of exhibits, including Jackson's undercover video

footage of gameplay at the casino. The circuit court also examined

documents showing that money from the casino was transported and held

by Brinks and records showing numerous deposits of money from the

casino and transfers between the subject bank accounts. Following the

bench trial, the circuit court entered an order in favor of the State in

                                    11
SC-2022-0511; SC-2022-0512; SC-2022-0514; SC-2022-0745; SC-2022-
0746; SC-2022-0747

which it stated the following:

     "After consideration of all the evidence presented at the trial
     of these consolidated cases on November 8, 2021, and after
     consideration of all of the arguments and authorities cited by
     the parties, the Court hereby finds that the State has met its
     burden. This Court is reasonably satisfied that [the] seized
     accounts and funds are connected with illegal gambling
     activity, namely the bets and stakes wagered by patrons of the
     gambling establishments, [and] have been conclusively shown
     to exist in the seized accounts at issue in these consolidated
     matters. As such, this Court finds that they are illegal bets
     and stakes susceptible to forfeiture to the State pursuant to
     State law. See Ala. Code § 13A-1[2]-30(c) (1975)."

The circuit court then ordered the seized funds to be "transferred to the

General Fund in accordance with the provisions of" § 13A-12-30(c). It did

not, however, render a decision as to Brighton Ventures' and the Life

Center's counterclaims. Brighton Ventures and the Life Center each filed

posttrial motions that were denied.

     In appeal nos. SC-2022-0511 and SC-2022-0514, Brighton Ventures

appealed the circuit court's order insofar as it directed the forfeiture of

the money seized from the Brinks facility and the BB&T account; in

appeal SC-2022-0512, the Life Center appealed the circuit court's order

insofar as it directed the forfeiture of the money seized from the Regions

                                    12
SC-2022-0511; SC-2022-0512; SC-2022-0514; SC-2022-0745; SC-2022-
0746; SC-2022-0747

account.2 Because the counterclaims remained unresolved, this Court

remanded the cases in accordance with the policy stated in Foster v.

Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605 (Ala. 1984), overruled on other grounds

by Ex parte Andrews, 520 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1987).

     Following a hearing on July 14, 2022, the circuit court entered an

amended final judgment in which it denied the counterclaims. Brighton

Ventures and the Life Center filed new notices of appeal, appeal nos. SC-

2022-0745, SC-2022-0746, and SC-2022-0747. All six appeals were

consolidated by this Court.

                          Standard of Review

     The circuit court issued its judgment following a bench trial during

which evidence was presented ore tenus. We, therefore, apply the

following standard of review:

           " ' "[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, its
     findings on disputed facts are presumed correct and its
     judgment based on those findings will not be reversed unless
     the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly
     unjust." Philpot v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002).
     " 'The presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable and

     2The   Life Center also filed a separate appeal, appeal no. SC-2022-
0513, in which it challenged the seizure of the funds from the main
account pursuant to another forfeiture petition. However, the Life Center
later filed a motion to dismiss that appeal, which was granted.
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0746; SC-2022-0747

     may be overcome where there is insufficient evidence
     presented     to    the    trial   court     to    sustain   its
     judgment.' " Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Ala.
     2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985)).
     "Additionally, the ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak with
     a presumption of correctness a trial judge's conclusions of law
     or the incorrect application of law to the facts." Id.' "

State v. $223,405.86, 203 So. 3d 816, 822 (Ala. 2016) (quoting Fadalla v.

Fadalla, 929 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005)).

                               Discussion

                                    I.

     In their brief on appeal, Brighton Ventures and the Life Center

("the claimants") admit that the circuit court's conclusion that the seized

funds are connected with illegal gambling activity "is not palpably

wrong." Therefore, there is no dispute on appeal that the gambling

activity at the casino was illegal. However, the claimants contend that

the funds seized were a form of "gambling proceeds" that are not

specifically included in the categories of funds that may be forfeited

pursuant to § 13A-12-30(c) and, therefore, should not have been forfeited

to the State. The claimants further argue that, even if the seized funds

somehow constituted "bets" and "stakes" under § 13A-12-30(c), rather

than "gambling proceeds," the State failed to present any evidence in

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0746; SC-2022-0747

support of that finding during trial.

      The claimants did not assert in either their posttrial motions or

their joint posttrial brief that the funds seized were "gambling proceeds"

and not "bets" or "stakes" that are subject to forfeiture under § 13A-12-

30(c). We also do not see the issue raised elsewhere. " '[I]t is a well-settled

rule that an appellate court's review is limited to only those issues that

were raised before the trial court. Issues raised for the first time on

appeal cannot be considered.' " Neal v. Neal, 856 So. 2d 766, 778 (Ala.

2002) (quoting Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365, 1372 (Ala.

1994)). However, the claimants did argue below that the evidence was

insufficient.

      Section 13A-12-30 provides that the following are subject to

forfeiture:

            "(a) Any gambling device or gambling record possessed
      or used in violation of this article [Title 13A, Chapter 12,
      'Gambling Offenses'] is forfeited to the state, and shall by
      court order be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the court
      directs.

            "(b) Any vehicle possessed or used in violation of this
      article may be forfeited to the state and disposed of by court
      order as authorized by law.

              "(c) Money used as bets or stakes in gambling activity in

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0746; SC-2022-0747

     violation of this article is forfeited to the state and by court
     order shall be transmitted to the General Fund of the state."

(Emphasis added.)

     Caselaw holds that funds used in illegal gambling activity similar

to the "gambling" or "electronic bingo" activity involved in these cases

constitute "bets" or "stakes" under § 13A-12-30(c). In Wade v. State, 986

So. 2d 1212 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), law-enforcement officials executed a

search warrant at a gaming facility known as the "Joker's Wild Arcade"

and seized 74 video gaming machines, $18,362 in cash, and various $5

gift certificates. The State filed a petition, pursuant to § 13A-12-20 et

seq., Ala. Code 1975, seeking to condemn the seized gaming machines

and cash. During the proceedings, Jefferson County Sheriff's Deputy

Jack Self testified that, on three separate occasions, he had gone to the

facility and had observed that, after a patron inserted cash into one of

the gaming machines and played the game, the machine would then

increase or decrease the number of credits the patron had until either all

of the patron's credits were gone or the patron "cash[ed] out." 986 So. 2d

at 1216. If a patron chose to "cash out," the machine would print a ticket

showing the number of credits earned by the patron. Id. Upon

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presentment of the ticket, an attendant would then hand the patron cash

based on the number of credits that she had earned. Id. The defendants

did not offer any testimony or other evidence to refute the evidence that

had been presented by the State. The trial court entered an order finding

that the defendants' activities were part of an illegal gambling enterprise

and ordering, pursuant to § 13A-12-30, that the 74 gaming machines be

destroyed and that the cash seized be forfeited to the General Fund of the

State. Id. at 1216-17.

     On appeal, it was argued that the forfeiture of the gambling

machines and money was unreasonable and not proper under Alabama

law. Citing § 13A-12-30, the Court of Civil Appeals explained:

     "In this case, it is undisputed that an employee of the Joker's
     Wild Arcade paid [patrons] in cash as a result of their having
     earned credits on multiple gaming machines on multiple
     dates. The payment in cash as a reward for playing the
     gaming machines, in and of itself, violated the antigambling
     laws of this State.

           "Additionally, it was undisputed at the forfeiture
     hearing that operation of the gaming machines was the only
     business being conducted on the premises of the Joker's Wild
     Arcade. Therefore, any money found on the premises of the
     Joker's Wild Arcade must have been received as 'bets' from
     the players or used as 'stakes' in furtherance of the business
     of the Joker's Wild Arcade."

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986 So. 2d at 1220. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court

of Civil Appeals concluded, the "only reasonable inference to be drawn

from the evidence in the case was that all the gaming machines and all

the cash seized from the Joker's Wild Arcade were part and parcel of the

same illegal-gambling enterprise." Id. at 1221. The Court of Civil Appeals

held that, because "the seized gaming machines and seized cash had been

used in violating the antigambling laws," they were properly forfeited to

the State under § 13A-12-30. Id.

      In these cases, the State presented a variety of evidence to show

that the funds seized were "[m]on[ey] used as bets or stakes in gambling

activity." § 13A-12-30(c). For example, Agent Wilson and Jackson both

clearly testified that the money generated by the casino was from "bets"

or "stakes" that were placed by patrons when they played the games on

the casino's machines and that this was the only form of business

conducted by the casino. Additionally, Johnson and Leslie testified that

the money earned by the casino each day was first deposited into the

main account before eventually being transferred into either the Regions

account or the BB&T account.

     The State supported the testimony with copies of documents from

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0746; SC-2022-0747

Brinks showing that it was responsible for collecting money from the

casino at the end of each day. The State also presented copies of bank

statements and deposit slips for each of the subject accounts showing

large sums of money either being deposited into those accounts or being

transferred among them. The claimants did not offer any testimony or

evidence to refute the evidence presented by the State.

     Based on the above evidence, like in Wade, any money seized from

the bank accounts at issue in these cases was first received as "bets" from

the players or used as "stakes" in furtherance of the casino's illegal

gambling activities before later being deposited into the subject bank

accounts or taken by a Brinks truck. Thus, under these circumstances,

the circuit court's determination that the funds seized were part and

parcel of an illegal gambling enterprise was not erroneous. Therefore, the

circuit court correctly concluded that the money at issue was

undisputedly used as "bets" or "stakes" in violation of Alabama's

antigambling laws and was, therefore, subject to forfeiture to the State

under § 13A-12-30(c).

                                    II.

     Next, the claimants argue that the forfeiture of the seized funds

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0746; SC-2022-0747

from Brinks and their respective bank accounts constitutes an excessive

fine in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. According to the claimants, gambling

offenses are either Class A or Class C misdemeanors under Alabama law,

see §§ 13A-12-21 through 13A-12-25 and § 13A-12-27, Ala. Code 1975,

and thus carry a fine of no more than either $6,000 or $500, respectively,

see § 13A-5-12(a)(1) and (3). Relying on United States v. Bajakajian, 524

U.S. 321 (1998), in which the Supreme Court of the United States

explained that certain forms of civil forfeiture violate the Excessive Fines

Clause if they are " 'grossly disproportionate to the gravity of a

defendant's offense,' " id. at 326 (citation omitted), the claimants argue

that, because the maximum fine applicable in this case would be $6,000

and the amount seized by and forfeited to the State was $446,897.19, the

forfeitures ordered by the circuit court were "obviously a gross violation

of the Excessive Fines Clause." The State argues, however, that its

seizure of the money at issue was a "nonpunitive," "traditional civil in

rem forfeiture" that falls outside the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause

of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the State contends that the

proportionality standard announced in Bajakajian is inapplicable here

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and the forfeiture was appropriate in these cases.

     The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted" and is applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 586, ____, 139

S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019). At issue here is the clause "nor excessive fines

imposed," which, as the Supreme Court has explained, " 'limits the

government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, "as

punishment for some offense." ' " Timbs, 586 U.S. at ____, 139 S. Ct. at

687 (citations omitted).

     In the context of in rem civil forfeitures like the one at issue in these

cases, the relevant inquiry in determining the applicability of the

Excessive Fines Clause is whether the forfeiture is punitive. See

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n.6 ("Because some recent federal forfeiture

laws have blurred the traditional distinction between civil in rem and

criminal in personam forfeiture, we have held that a modern statutory

forfeiture is a 'fine' for Eighth Amendment purposes if it constitutes

punishment even in part, regardless of whether the proceeding is styled

[as being] in rem or in personam."). See also Timbs, 586 U.S. at ____, 139

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S. Ct. at 690 ("[C]ivil in rem forfeitures are fines for purposes of the

Eighth Amendment when they are at least partially punitive.").

"Forfeitures … are thus 'fines' [for purposes of the Excessive Fines

Clause] if they constitute punishment for an offense." Bajakajian, 524

U.S. at 328. If, however, a forfeiture is nonpunitive in nature, meaning

that it has the "hallmarks of traditional civil in rem forfeitures,"

including proceeding "against the currency itself" rather than

"obtain[ing] a criminal conviction of [the defendant] personally," it may

be deemed to "occupy a place outside the domain of the Excessive Fines

Clause" and, thus, not subject to the proportionality analysis in

Bajakajian. Id. at 331-32.

     Although the issue has not been addressed by the appellate courts

of this State, at least one federal court has discussed whether the

forfeiture of proceeds from illegal gambling activity under § 13A-12-30(c)

constitutes a "fine" for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause. In

Pettway v. Marshall, No. 5:19-CV-1073-KOB, July 16, 2020 (N.D. Ala.

2020) (not reported in Federal Supplement), the plaintiffs in a federal

suit contended that an in rem forfeiture action pending in state court

seeking to forfeit illegal gambling funds under § 13A-12-30(c) violated the

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0746; SC-2022-0747

Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The federal court

discussed the issue as follows:

            "Plaintiffs' Count I fails because Plaintiffs incorrectly
     assume that the freeze of the BBVA account constituted a
     'fine' under the Eighth Amendment. In the context of in rem
     civil forfeitures, the relevant inquiry in determining the
     applicability of the excessive fines clause is not the
     nomenclature of the mechanism by which a government
     seizes property -- e.g., civil, in rem forfeiture or criminal fine
     -- but whether the payment is punitive or remedial. See
     United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 n.6 (1998)
     ('Because some recent federal forfeiture laws have blurred the
     traditional distinction between civil in rem and criminal in
     personam forfeiture, we have held that a modern statutory
     forfeiture is a "fine" for Eighth Amendment purposes if it
     constitutes punishment even in part, regardless of whether
     the proceeding is styled in rem or in personam.') See also
     Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019) ('civil in rem
     forfeitures are fines for purposes of the Eighth Amendment
     when they are at least partially punitive').

          "… [N]on-punitive forfeitures fall outside the bounds of
     the Eighth Amendment. United States v. One Hundred Thirty
     Thousand Fifty-Two Dollars in United States Currency, 909
     F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Bajakajian, 524 [U.S.]
     at 328 (determining that forfeitures are fines only 'if they
     constitute punishment for an offense'); Browning-Ferris
     Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989) (explaining
     that a 'fine' is 'a payment to a sovereign as punishment for
     some offense').

          "The instant case features neither a payment nor a
     punishment. In the underlying civil in rem forfeiture action in
     State court, the State of Alabama seeks forfeiture of the
     $15,500 in Plaintiffs' account pursuant to Ala. Code § 13A-12-

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     30, which states that '[m]oney used as bets or stakes in
     gambling activity in violation of this article is forfeited to the
     state and by court order shall be transmitted to the general
     fund of the state.' In the [State's in rem action], the State of
     Alabama seeks recovery of the proceeds of allegedly illegal
     gambling activity. Unlike the forfeiture of property used in
     furtherance of illegal activity -- which, if punitive, requires an
     Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis to evaluate
     whether the forfeiture is excessive -- the '[f]orfeiture of
     proceeds cannot be considered punishment, and thus, subject
     to the excessive fines clause, as it simply parts the owner from
     the fruits of the criminal activity.' United States v. Nelson,
     No. 3:10-cr-23-J-32, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20982, at *4 (M.D.
     Fla. Feb. 21, 2012) (emphasis added) (citing to United States
     v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994)) and United States v.
     Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994)). See also
     Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 n.14 (1993) ('a fine
     that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be considered
     "excessive" in any event'); United States v. Masino, No.
     3:16cr17, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34862, at *34 n.18, 2019 WL
     1045179 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2019) (distinguishing, in the
     context of a governmental forfeiture action to recover profit
     gleaned from an illegal bingo operation, between the
     'forfeiture of only proceeds ... [of] criminally derived property'
     versus 'money legitimately obtained'); United States v.
     Levine, 905 F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that
     civil forfeiture of illegal proceeds is remedial rather than
     punitive)."

     Additionally, other courts have recognized that the forfeiture of

proceeds from illegal activity is remedial, not punitive, and is, therefore,

not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. United States v. Betancourt,

422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2005) (" '[T]he forfeiture of drug proceeds does

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not constitute punishment, and thus neither the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against excessive fines nor double jeopardy analysis is

applicable.' " (quoting United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 830 n.12

(5th Cir. 1995))); United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. Described as

Lot 41, Berryhill Farm Estates, 128 F.3d 1386, 1395 (10th Cir. 1997)

(holding "as a matter of law that forfeiture of drug proceeds … can never

be constitutionally excessive"); United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 554

(6th Cir. 1995) (holding that "forfeiture of drug proceeds is not

punishment, but is remedial in nature," because "one never acquires a

property right to proceeds"); and United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d

1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Forfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered

punishment, and thus, subject to the excessive fines clause, as it simply

parts the owner from the fruits of the criminal activity.").

      As in Pettway, these cases feature neither a payment nor a

punishment. As explained in Part I of the "Discussion" section of this

opinion, the seized funds in the underlying civil in rem forfeiture actions

in the circuit court constituted proceeds of illegal gambling activity -- i.e.,

"[m]oney used as bets or stakes in gambling activity" -- and, as in

Pettway, the forfeiture of those proceeds cannot be considered

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punishment because it "simply parts the owner from the fruits of the

criminal activity."

     The claimants cite no caselaw indicating that the deprivation of

proceeds from illegal gambling activity is punitive and can therefore

constitute a "fine" under the Eighth Amendment. See Rule 28(a), Ala. R.

App. P. Instead, they rely on cases, such as Harris v. State, 821 So. 2d

177 (Ala. 2001), in which our appellate courts have addressed the

excessiveness of the forfeiture of property that was used in furtherance

of criminal activity and, therefore, determined the forfeiture to be

punitive in nature. In none of those cases, including Harris, however, did

our courts reject the punitive-versus-remedial distinction that must be

resolved before a proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment

can even apply.3 Under these circumstances, the claimants have failed to

demonstrate that they are entitled to relief, and, thus, the judgment of

the circuit court is affirmed.

     3In  Harris, the Court addressed an argument as to whether the
seizure of proceeds from drug sales amounted to an excessive fine, but it
did not hold, contrary to the above-cited federal caselaw, that such an
analysis was required. Instead, the Court held that the forfeiture in that
case would clearly not be excessive.
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     SC-2022-0511 -- AFFIRMED.

     SC-2022-0512 -- AFFIRMED.

     SC-2022-0514 -- AFFIRMED.

     SC-2022-0745 -- AFFIRMED.

     SC-2022-0746 -- AFFIRMED.

     SC-2022-0747 -- AFFIRMED.

     Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.

     Mitchell, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion,

which Parker, C.J., joins.

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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

      I agree with Part I of the main opinion -- the money seized was

"used as bets or stakes" under § 13A-12-30(c), Ala. Code 1975. I also

agree with the conclusion reached in Part II that the forfeiture was not a

"fine" within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. But, because § 13A-12-

30(c) authorizes the forfeiture of money as an instrumentality -- not as

proceeds -- of illegal gambling activity, I concur with Part II only to the

extent that it reaches the correct result.

      A property forfeiture is a "fine" subject to the Excessive Fines

Clause when it is "at least partially punitive." Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S.

___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 682, 690 (2019) (citing Austin v. United States, 509

U.S. 602 (1993)). As the main opinion correctly notes, several federal

courts have held that any forfeiture -- even a criminal in personam

forfeiture -- of the proceeds (or fruits) of a crime is entirely nonpunitive. 4

      4Othercourts have repudiated this view. See, e.g., United States v.
Jalaram, Inc., 599 F.3d 347, 354 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting "the
Government's argument that forfeiture of … the proceeds of a criminal
conspiracy … is, by definition, nonpunitive"); United States v. Browne,
505 F.3d 1229, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2007) (subjecting the forfeiture of
proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) to the Excessive Fines Clause);
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See, e.g., United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2005);

United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. Described as Lot 41, Berryhill

Farm Estates, 128 F.3d 1386, 1395 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Alexander, 32

F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994).      By contrast, the forfeiture of the

instrumentality of a crime is entirely nonpunitive only if it is in the form

of a traditional civil in rem proceeding -- that is, a proceeding "against

the [property] itself" that serves a "remedial purpose," neither "designed

to punish the offender" nor able to be "imposed upon innocent owners."

United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1998).

     The money forfeited here under § 13A-12-30(c) was forfeited as an

instrumentality of illegal gambling activity. The statute authorizes a

proceeding against "[m]oney used as bets or stakes in gambling activity

in violation of this article." § 13A-12-30(c) (emphasis added). In stark

contrast to the proceeds-forfeiture cases cited by the main opinion, § 13A-

United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 552, 558 (6th Cir. 2000)
(explaining how "courts can reduce the forfeiture [of illegal proceeds
under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3)] … so as not to violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against … 'excessive fines' " and applying the
Excessive Fines Clause to the forfeiture of proceeds).

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12-30(c) makes no mention whatsoever of proceeds. 5               See, e.g.,

Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 250 (applying 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), which

prescribes the forfeiture of "any property constituting, or derived from,

any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly as the result of

such violation"); One Parcel, 128 F.3d at 1395 (applying 21 U.S.C. §

881(a)(6), which authorizes the forfeiture of "all proceeds traceable" to an

"exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical"); Salinas, 65 F.3d

at 552, 554 (same); Alexander, 32 F.3d at 1233 (applying 18 U.S.C. §

1963(a)(3), which provides for the forfeiture of "any property constituting,

or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or

indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection").

Rather, by limiting forfeiture to "[m]oney used … in violation of this

article," § 13A-12-30(c) prescribes the forfeiture of money only when it is

"the actual means by which an offense was committed" -- that is, an

     5The    Legislature has prohibited this Court from considering
§ 13A-12-30's title ("Forfeiture of gambling devices and gambling
proceeds") as a matter of statutory construction. § 1-1-14(a), Ala. Code
1975 ("The classification and organization of the titles, chapters, articles,
divisions, subdivisions and sections of this Code, and the headings
thereto, are made for the purpose of convenient reference and orderly
arrangement, and no implication, inference or presumption of a
legislative construction shall be drawn therefrom.").
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instrumentality. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333 n.8. And, because the

instrumentality forfeiture under § 13A-12-30(c) does not deviate from the

hallmarks of a traditional civil in rem forfeiture -- it is against the money

itself, based solely on its use in violation of the antigambling statutes,

and is effective regardless of the guilt of the money's owner -- the

forfeiture here was entirely nonpunitive and thus not subject to the

Excessive Fines Clause.

     Because the main opinion is correct that the forfeiture here was

covered by § 13A-12-30(c) and not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause,

I concur in part and concur in the result.

     Parker, C.J., concurs.

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