Court Opinion

ID: 9613244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:15:32.970281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:27.063382
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I agree with parts I, II, III and V of the majority opinion and disagree with parts IV and VI.
I
The key holding of part IV is that the taxpayers have made an insufficient showing that there is a real possibility, as opposed to a “trifling or imaginary” one, that they will be incriminated if they comply with the summons. I am at a loss to understand what this conclusion is based on.
AS 43.20.335(c) makes it a crime for any person required to file an income tax return to willfully fail to do so. For the years in question here, all persons making more than a rather low minimum amount of income were required to file such returns. The documents sought by the State will obviously reveal the taxpayers’ incomes. Since they have not filed income tax returns 1 for the years in question, there is a distinct possibility that the documents will serve to incriminate them. The burden imposed on one asserting the privilege against self-incrimination to show that there is a real possibility of prosecution as opposed to a trifling or imaginary one should not be heavy. One should not be made to confess to a crime in order to use the privilege. Only where it clearly appears that the person claiming the privilege is mistaken in his fears of prosecution should he be forced to answer. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 816, 95 L.Ed. *11691118, 1124 (1951). The facts in this ease fall far short of such a demonstration.
In Oliver, the trial court specifically found that there was a real chance of prosecution stating:
This court finds ... that the defendant had not in fact filed a meaningful return and could very well be subject to prosecution by both state and federal authorities for failure to file in which his records, particularly bank statements, could tend to incriminate him if in fact he had any substantial income at all.
It is doing no more than pointing out the obvious to state that there is a good possibility that Pickles and the Olivers are guilty of the crime of failing to file a required tax return; that the information sought by the state is likely to be incriminating; and that there is no assurance that the state would not use the information in a prosecution, or supply it to the federal government which could use it in prosecuting the cognate federal crime. I find it not a little disturbing that the court, in the face of these facts, has simply asserted that neither Pickles nor the Olivers face any real hazard of incrimination.
However, merely concluding that there is a real hazard of incrimination does not mean that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to all of the documents which the state has demanded. While the privilege does guard against the compulsory production of one’s private papers,2 it is only private papers that are protected. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1582, 48 L.Ed.2d 39, 58 (1976), reviewed the kinds of documents that are, and are not, protected by the privilege:
Production of documentary materials created or authenticated by a State or the Federal Government, such as automobile registrations or property deeds, would seem ordinarily to fall outside the protection of the privilege. They hardly reflect an extension of the person.
Economic and business records may present difficulty in particular cases. The records of business entities generally fall without the scope of the privilege. But, as noted, the Court has recognized that the privilege extends to the business records of the sole proprietor or practitioner. Such records are at least an extension of an aspect of a person’s activities, though concededly not the more intimate aspects of one’s life. Where the privilege would have protected one’s mental notes of his business affairs in a less complicated day and age, it would seem that that protection should not fall away because the complexities of another time compel one to keep business records. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474, 48 S.Ct. 564[, 571], 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nonbusiness economic records in the possession of an individual, such as canceled checks or tax records, would also seem to be protected. They may provide clear insights into a person’s total lifestyle. They are, however, like business records and the papers involved in these cases, frequently, though not always, disclosed to other parties; and disclosure, in proper cases, may foreclose reliance upon the privilege. Personal letters constitute an integral aspect of a person’s private enclave. And while letters, being necessarily interpersonal, are not wholly private, their peculiarly private nature and the generally narrow extent of their disclosure would seem to render them within the scope of the privilege. Papers in the nature of a personal diary are a fortiori protected under the privilege.
425 U.S. at 426-27, 96 S.Ct. at 1588-1589, 48 L.Ed.2d at 65-66.
The summons directed to the Olivers clearly did not include protected private papers. Therefore, I concur in the result reached by the majority with respect to Oliver. Regarding Pickles, the state’s summons is broad enough to include private papers and to that extent Pickles was privileged to decline to comply with the sum*1170mons. I would therefore reverse and remand Pickles with directions to the trial court to narrow the summons to seek only material which is not protected, and to enforce the summons as so narrowed.
II
Although the foregoing explains my position on how this case ought to be decided, I am constrained also to state my disagreement with part VI of the majority opinion concerning the privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution. The majority’s holding on this point is that the privacy clause protects the documents prepared personally by Pickles from disclosure to the state at least until the state shows that those documents are needed in order to determine Pickles’ tax liability. This holding, while innovative, is both too narrow and too broad.
It is too narrow because the protection afforded is ephemeral. One is assured that one’s private papers are protected only so long as they are not needed. In contrast, the privilege against self-incrimination provides unconditional protection so long as the possibility of prosecution remains.
The majority’s holding is also too broad because it applies regardless of the hazard of incrimination. If immunity from prosecution were granted Pickles, I would see no reason not to require the production of his personally prepared financial records based solely on a showing of relevance, rather than necessity. The Department of Revenue is under a statutory obligation not to disclose or publish such materials, AS 43.-05.230, and therefore there is no danger that one’s personal affairs will be made public. I fail to see how it is any greater invasion of privacy to be made to turn over one’s personally prepared financial records to the Department of Revenue, than it is to be required to file an income tax form calling for the details of one’s annual income and expenditures.
Moreover, if the privacy clause of our state constitution protects private papers from production to the Department of Revenue except on a showing of necessity, it should shield such documents from production in an ordinary civil case, except upon a similar showing. This is contrary to current law, which requires only a showing of relevance.3 The wisdom of this standard is supported by quite a lot of accumulated experience,4 and I would not favor changing it. On the other hand, if it is not to be changed, the court will need to hold that the privacy clause protects private papers from compulsory production under AS 43.-05.040, except upon a showing of necessity, but not under Civil Rules 26 and 34. I doubt that such a distinction can responsibly be made.

. Signing a blank return which does not disclose any financial information is the equivalent of filing no return. See United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 233, 62 L.Ed.2d 172 (1979); United States v. Dillon, 566 F.2d 702, 703 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1613, 56 L.Ed.2d 63 (1978); United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012, 98 S.Ct. 725, 54 L.Ed.2d 755 (1978); United States v. Hoopes, 545 F.2d 721, 722 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 2675, 53 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977); United States v. Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1219 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 2185, 53 L.Ed.2d 230 (1977); United States v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28, 29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064, 94 S.Ct. 571, 38 L.Ed.2d 469 (1973); United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824, 91 S.Ct. 47, 27 L.Ed.2d 53 (1970).

. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) has not been overruled on this point, and is therefore controlling authority.

. Alaska R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) provides:
(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

. See e.g., 4A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 34.08 pp. 34-59 to 34-86 (2d ed. 1981).