Court Opinion

ID: 9573899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:00:18.38576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:38.358617
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with that part of the majority opinion which concludes that defendant’s confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible.
Detective Keliher, one of the officers who was present when defendant was interrogated, testified at the Walker hearing, and the following colloquy took place between the detective and defense counsel:
"Mr. Kosick: All right. Did you tell Debra that if she wanted a court-appointed attorney it would be a few days before one could be appointed for her?
"Detective Keliher: I told her that we couldn’t get her one at that time. I am sure I said that to her because we can’t.
"Mr. Kosick: You couldn’t get one even appointed until the arraignment?
"Detective Keliher: The Court would appoint one. I would not, sir.” (Emphasis added.)
In People v Lewis, 47 Mich App 450; 209 NW2d 450 (1973), the defendant, a 17-year-old with a ninth-grade education, was arrested and transported to the police station for questioning. After *33being informed of his rights, he asked whether it was possible to obtain an attorney at that hour. When the police responded that it was not possible, he told them to "forget it” and subsequently confessed. The trial court held the confession admissible, but this Court, in an opinion which I authored, reversed stating at pp 452-453 209 NW2d 451:
"Applying the doctrine of Miranda to the case at hand, it is readily apparent that the defendant, by inquiring as to whether it was possible to obtain an attorney at that early hour, sufficiently indicated a desire to consult an attorney before speaking. We are not unmindful that the police may have acted innocently by stating that an attorney was not available at that time of the day. Nonetheless, the police were not free to ignore the letter and spirit of Miranda, and the questioning should have ceased until such time as counsel could have been secured on behalf of the defendant. It was only after the defendant was told counsel could not be obtained that he told the officers to 'forget it’ and began to answer the questions which led to his incriminating statement. It is our opinion that under these circumstances defendant’s statement to 'forget it’ did not constitute a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.”
Such is the case here. As in Lewis, the defendant here did not specifically request an attorney. However, it is my opinion that by inquiring whether an attorney could be appointed if she wanted one, the defendant "sufficiently indicated a desire to consult an attorney before speaking”. I am aware that the police may have acted innocently by telling defendant that she would receive an attorney when she went to court. However, I feel that due to her limited education, defendant might have understood the officers to mean that *34she was not entitled to an attorney until she went to court.
As in Lewis, I believe that the police, in questioning defendant before counsel was secured in her behalf, failed to observe the letter and spirit of Miranda. It was only after defendant was told that she could not obtain an attorney until after she went to court that she decided to answer the questions which led to the statements in question. It is, therefore, my opinion that under these circumstances defendant’s decision to answer questions and her subsequent signing of the waiver form did not constitute a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
The failure to secure counsel for the defendant after a sufficient request therefor constituted a denial of her right to counsel and thus rendered the statement in question involuntary. Therefore, it was reversible error to admit the statement into evidence at trial.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial with instructions that defendant’s confession be suppressed as evidence.