Court Opinion

ID: 9385562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 14:04:45.336333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.816013
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 31, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0765-MR

SHERI FLOYD                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-000233

THE PARKVIEW COUNCIL OF CO-
OWNERS, INC.; ALEX G. HEDGES;
AND HEDGES LANDSCAPING, LLC                                          APPELLEES

                               OPINION
                       REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Sheri Floyd (“Appellant”) appeals from an

opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in

favor of The Parkview Council of Co-Owners, Inc. (hereinafter “Parkview”), Alex

G. Hedges, and Hedges Landscaping, LLC (“Appellees”). Appellant argues that

she never assented to Parkview’s rules and regulations characterizing her as an
owner of a condominium. She also contends that Parkview’s governing documents

are open to multiple interpretations, and that Parkview’s definition of an “owner”

in its rules and regulations is overly broad and unclear. She seeks an opinion

reversing the order on appeal and remanding the matter for a jury trial. After

careful review, we reverse the order granting summary judgment, and remand the

matter for further proceedings.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES

             On January 20, 2019, Appellant slipped and fell on snow and ice in

the parking lot of Parkview Condominiums located in Louisville, Kentucky.

Appellant was on the premises to visit her boyfriend, Mike McGlynn, who owned

a condominium unit. On January 10, 2020, Appellant filed the instant action

against Parkview, as owner of the condominiums’ common areas, alleging

negligence or gross negligence in failing to maintain a reasonably safe condition in

the common areas. She also alleged that Alex G. Hedges and Hedges

Landscaping, LLC were negligent in their removal of snow and ice in the parking

lot.

             The matter proceeded in Jefferson Circuit Court, and the following

year Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion,

Appellees relied on “The Parkview Condominiums Rules and Regulations” Section

(A)(7). It provides that, “[o]wners travel at their own risk on driving areas, walks,

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and common areas in inclement weather and the association assumes no liability

for accidents or injuries.” Appellees noted that the definition of condominium

“owner” set out in Section (A)(2) includes not only the unit’s legal owner but also

the unit owner’s family, servants, employees, agents, visitors, and any guests,

invitees, or licensees of such unit owner, family, or the tenant. Appellees argued

that Appellant, as visitor or guest of unit owner Mike McGlynn, was an “owner” as

defined by Section (A)(2) and therefore traveled at her own risk in the parking lot.

Accordingly, Parkview argued that it owed no duty to Appellant.

             The Jefferson Circuit Court was persuaded that per The Parkview

Condominiums Rules and Regulations Sections (A)(2) and (A)(7), Appellant was a

condominium “owner” to whom Parkview owed no duty to maintain a reasonably

safe condition in the common areas. On June 1, 2022, the circuit court entered an

opinion and order sustaining Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and this

appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. “The record must be

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viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary

judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party

will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. Id.

“Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not

succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of

material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a summary

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).

                         ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in sustaining

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. She maintains that she never assented

to the terms of Parkview’s Rules and Regulations, either expressly or impliedly.

Appellant argues that a condominium association does not have the authority to

establish the scope of its duties of care to guests and visitors. The focus of her

argument is that she did not agree to be bound by rules and regulations which were

never given to her, which she never read, and to which she never assented.

Appellant also contends that the term “owner” has a different definition in

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Parkview’s Master Deed; that she cannot be a condominium “owner” without an

ownership interest; and, because it applies to various people – known and unknown

– Parkview’s definition of owner is overly broad and unclear. She seeks an

opinion and order reversing the order of summary judgment and remanding the

matter to the Jefferson Circuit Court.

                    The determination of the existence of a duty is still
             a legal question for the court to determine. But the court
             need only consider 1) if the property owner invited or
             ratified the presence of the guest on the premises, and 2)
             if the guest was injured or harmed in the course of or as a
             result of an activity taking place on the premises. If both
             requirements are met, the property owner owes a duty of
             reasonable care to the guest as a matter of law.

Bramlett v. Ryan, 635 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Ky. 2021), reh’g denied (Dec. 16, 2021).

                    We have recognized, of course, that the universal
             duty of care is not boundless. The examination must be
             focused so as to determine whether a duty is owed, and
             consideration must be given to public policy, statutory
             and common law theories in order to determine whether a
             duty existed in a particular situation. Consideration must
             also be given to whether the harm to the plaintiff
             resulting f[ro]m the defendant’s negligence was
             foreseeable. In deciding whether harm was foreseeable,
             Kentucky courts look to the general foreseeability of
             harm, not to whether the particular, precise form of injury
             could be foreseen. It is enough that injury of some kind
             to some person within the natural range of effect of the
             alleged negligent act could have been foreseen.

T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks ex rel. Hicks, 189 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Ky. 2006)

(internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). And finally,

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              an open-and-obvious condition does not eliminate a
              landowner’s duty. Rather, in the event that the defendant
              is shielded from liability, it is because the defendant
              fulfilled its duty of care and nothing further is required.
              The obviousness of the condition is a circumstance to be
              factored under the standard of care. No liability is
              imposed when the defendant is deemed to have acted
              reasonably under the given circumstances. So a more
              precise statement of the law would be that a landowner’s
              duty to exercise reasonable care or warn of or eliminate
              unreasonable dangers is not breached. When courts say
              the defendant owed no duty, they usually mean only that
              the defendant owed no duty that was breached or that he
              owed no duty that was relevant on the facts. And
              without breach, there can be no negligence as a matter of
              law.

Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 911-12 (Ky. 2013),

as corrected (Nov. 25, 2013) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations

omitted) (emphasis in original).

              “The rules of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of a

condominium declaration.” Cusimano v. Port Esplanade Condominium Ass’n,

Inc., 55 So. 3d 931, 936 (La. App. 2011) (citation omitted).1 “To create a valid,

enforceable contract, there must be a voluntary, complete assent by the parties

having capacity to contract.” Conners v. Eble, 269 S.W.2d 716, 717-18 (Ky. 1954)

(citation omitted). “To constitute such a contract there must, of course, be a

mutual assent by the parties – a meeting of minds – and also an intentional

1
 Where no controlling Kentucky case law is found, we may cite foreign case law as persuasive.
See Pretot v. Pretot, 905 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Ky. App. 1995).

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manifestation of such assent. Such manifestation may consist wholly or partly of

acts, other than written or spoken words.” Kincaid v. Johnson, True & Guarnieri,

LLP, 538 S.W.3d 901, 911 (Ky. App. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

               There is no evidence in the record that Appellant expressly manifested

“voluntary, complete assent” to Parkview’s Rules and Regulations per Conners,

nor that any assent was manifested indirectly through her actions as addressed in

Kincaid. No evidence was adduced that Parkview published its Rules and

Regulations via signage or by other methods reasonably likely to place guests and

visitors on notice that their presence on the property constituted a waiver of rights;

that Appellant read the Rules and Regulations or had any knowledge that they

existed; that Appellant’s ongoing visits to Mr. McGlynn’s condominium

constituted assent to the Rules and Regulations; nor, that Appellant otherwise

entered into a valid, enforceable contract with Parkview relating to the Rules and

Regulations.

               Parkview’s Rules and Regulations purport to characterize guests and

visitors as “owners” for the purpose of waiving duties of care otherwise owed to

such persons. Irrespective of Parkview’s characterization of guests and visitors,

we find no basis in the case law or statutory law for the proposition that a

landowner may unilaterally and without notice avoid its duties of care to the

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general public. While condominium unit owners may assent to Parkview’s Rules

and Regulations when purchasing a condominium unit, such assent cannot be

imposed upon guests and visitors by characterizing them as owners. An exception

may be found if the visitor or guest is placed on notice that his or her presence on

the property constitutes a waiver of rights. In the matter sub judice, however,

nothing in the record indicates that Appellant was informed of the Rules and

Regulations, nor that she assented to them.

                                     CONCLUSION

              Based on the persuasive authority of Cusimano, supra, we conclude

that a condominium association’s declarations, including its rules and regulations,

are subject to the rules of contract interpretation. Per Conners and Kincaid, the

terms of a contract are effective only as to persons who assent to them. No

evidence was adduced that Appellant assented to Parkview’s Rules and

Regulations, nor that she was even aware of them. As a landowner may not

unilaterally establish its duties to the general public, we conclude that Parkview’s

Rules and Regulations do not entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, we reverse the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order of summary judgment,

and remand the matter for further proceedings.2

2
 Nothing in this Opinion should be interpreted as holding that Appellees owed or breached a
duty to Appellant.

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           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE THE
                          PARKVIEW COUNCIL OF CO-
Kyle D. Kaiman            OWNERS, INC.:
Louisville, Kentucky
                          Jennifer A. Peterson
                          Connie L. Eyle
                          Louisville, Kentucky

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