Court Opinion

ID: 9670920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:28:18.637174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.259771
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority for the reasons stated in the majority opinion in the Court of Appeals. 121 Mich App 466, 473; 328 NW2d 678 (1982). I agree with the analysis of the Court of Appeals majority of the law of substantial impairment and its application to the facts in this case. As succinctly summarized:
"A buyer may properly revoke acceptance of a commercial unit where the nonconformity substantially impairs its value. The existence of such nonconformity depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Jorgensen v Pressnall, 274 Or 285; 545 P2d 1382 (1976). The determination of substantial impairment is made from an objective view or from the buyer’s subjective view, considering the particular needs and circumstances. See White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (2d ed), § 8-3, p 308, and MCL 440.2608, comment 2; MSA 19.2608, comment 2. The objective approach was utilized in Fargo Machine & Tool Co [v Keaney & Trecker Corp, 428 F Supp 364 (ED Mich, 1977)]. In Jorgensen, both the objective and subjective tests were used in the determination.
"The purpose of the requirement of substantial impairment of value is to preclude revocation for trivial defects or defects which may be easily corrected. Roz*462mus v Thompson’s Lincoln-Mercury Co, 209 Pa Super 120; 224 A2d 782 (1966).
"The trial judge’s determination that the temporarily missing spare tire did not constitute a substantial impairment in value under either the subjective or objective test was not clearly erroneous.” Id., pp 473-474.
Therefore, I do not agree that defendant Miller properly revoked acceptance of the vehicle, and I would affirm the trial court’s finding on that issue.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Boyle, J.