Court Opinion

ID: 9578285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:43:44.989812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:27.886304
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
In this case the Court rejects the employer-appellant’s argument that the Commission failed to consider the nonmedical factors referred to in I.C. § 72-425 and affirms the Commission’s decision awarding disability benefits based upon a permanent disability equal to 44% of the whole man, *463despite the fact that Mr. Baldner’s permanent partial impairment rating was 15% of the whole man. I concur in the result reached by the majority because I believe the income comparison procedure used by the Commission in reaching its decision in this case implicitly took into account the nonmedical factors to which I.C. § 72-425 refers. To my mind under the circumstances of this case, the fact that Baldner’s post-accident employment paid less than what his employment prior to the industrial accident paid (and to some extent the fact that he found employment at all), reflects to some degree the nonmedical factors to which I.C. § 72 — 425 refers. Thus, under the unique circumstances of this case,1 I believe the Commission acted properly in determining the percentage of permanent disability by comparing Baldner’s income before and after the industrial accident. Somewhat troubling, however, is the reasoning the Court employs in its decision in this case:
“There is no showing on the record that the decision was made without any consideration of factors other than the mathematical comparison of pre-injury and post-injury incomes. It only indicates that the income comparison result measures Baldner’s loss of ‘ability to engage in gainful activity’ accurately regardless or in spite of the other factors. We find no error of law, nor do we find the findings lack support in the evidence and hence the Commission’s order will not be set aside.”
The majority opinion might be read as adopting the rule that there is a presumption that such factors were considered. Such a presumption could be used to unduly burden an injured workman who appeals from a decision of the Commission, arguing that the Commission did not consider the appropriate nonmedical factors. Better, I think, that the Commission should establish in its record that there was indeed a consideration of the nonmedical factors. See Houser v. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441, 649 P.2d 1197, Supreme Court No. 13589 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
In Houser, the injured workman made the same argument that the employer in this case makes. The Court in Houser simply rejected the argument since it found that there was “no . .. evidence in the record bearing on any disability above and beyond the physical impairment rating.” I dissented in Houser because I could not agree that the record did not contain evidence sufficient to sustain a higher disability rating, and I went on to state:
“[I]t would be inappropriate to presume that the Commission considered the factors found in I.C. § 72-425 where no such consideration of the factors appears in the record. There is no way for a claimant who is denied compensation, or for this Court in reviewing on appeal such a denial, to on a bare record determine whether or not the Commission has complied with its statutory duty [to consider nonmedical factors in its determination of a claimant’s permanent disability].”
I continue to adhere to the views I expressed in Houser. I believe that the Court inappropriately presumes that the Commission complied with its statutory mandate, and the chief concern is that such a presumption may be used to unduly burden an injured worker. It is difficult, if not impossible, to visualize a scenario which adequately depicts that the Commission did not consider nonmedical factors in its determination, if the absence of such factors or considerations in the record is not sufficient.
It is true that the Commission in this case considered Baldner’s income before and af*464ter the industrial accident, and that such a consideration is certainly a “nonmedical” consideration. Implicit in the majority’s opinion, however, is, that the pre-injury /post-injury income comparison procedure used by the referee is a sufficient consideration of nonmedical factors under I.C. § 72 — 425. I do not believe in every case, and perhaps not even in the ordinary case, that a mathematical comparison by the Commission of pre-injury and post-injury incomes will be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that the Commission consider “nonmedical factors such as age, sex, education, economic and social environment” under I.C. § 72-425. While I do agree that such a comparison is some, and even strong, evidence of an injured worker’s “ability to engage in gainful activity,” I do not believe that in the ordinary case this is the only nonmedical evidence which should be considered by the Commission. I concur in the result in this case, only because under the specific circumstances of this case, I believe the procedure used by the Commission sufficiently took into account the nonmedical factors as well as comparable incomes.

. Both the referee, whose decision was adopted by the Commission, and the majority recognized that this is an unusual case. As the majority notes, “following his impairment and removal from the labor market as an ironwork-er, [the claimant] has educated and continues to educate, himself for the purpose of finding another line of gainful activity in the labor market.” Furthermore, based upon the facts in this case, the referee specifically found that “both [Baldner’s] pre-injury and post-injury wages accurately represent his ability to engage in gainful activity.”