Court Opinion

ID: 9645515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:27:33.478734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:29.041404
License: Public Domain

POLLOCK, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree substantially with the majority opinion, except for the result. Like the majority, ante at 223, and the Appellate Division, 204 N.J.Super. 288, 292-94 (1985), I believe that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge the jury that personal injury awards are not subject to federal or state income tax. Unlike the majority, ante at 229, but still like the Appellate Division, I conclude that the failure to so instruct the jury was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” Id. at 294; see R. 2:10-2.
My difference with the majority arises from our varying perceptions of the importance of jury instructions, a difference that has significant practical implications in this case. The *232verdict was $600,000, which together with prejudgment interest of $192,000 led to the entry on March 21, 1984, of a $792,000 judgment. Interest continues to accrue at 1%, or $6,000 per month, a total of $198,000 to date, which when added to the judgment produces a grand total to date of $998,000, nearly $1,000,000. While remaining sensitive to the value to the plaintiff of preserving the award, I cannot ignore the impact on the defendant of so substantial a judgment. The erroneous charge bears a direct relationship to the size of the verdict and is too important to disregard.
Because it was not instructed that the award was tax free, “[t]he jury may, for example, have increased a planned $480,000 verdict by $120,000 in the mistaken belief that 20% of the total of $600,000 would be withheld for federal income taxes.” Id. at 294; see also Tenore v. NuCar Carriers, 67 N.J. 466, 495 (1975) (instruction on taxation should have been given “to prevent a jury which might think otherwise from improperly increasing the verdict to protect plaintiff from the impact of such taxes”). Although the correct charge was twice requested by defense counsel and agreed to by plaintiffs counsel, it was not given to the jury. Insofar as plaintiffs damages are concerned, the failure to give that charge cannot, in my opinion, be considered harmless error. The error, however, should not affect the determination of liability in plaintiffs favor. Like the Appellate Division, I would remand for a new trial on damages only.
For reversal — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN— 6.
POLLOCK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.