Court Opinion

ID: 8841733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 16:44:06.234058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:13.558714
License: Public Domain

Hallett, J.,
(dissenting.) My construction of this contract is widely different from that given by Justice Miller. I think that the judgment of the court should not be confined to section 1 of article 1 of the contract, but should cover the whole instrument; and, in order to bring out the true interpretation and meaning of the contract, it is proper to look at the situation of the parties. When this contract was made, the Chicago, Rock Island & Colorado Railway Company was engaged in building a road from the Kansas line through the state in this direction, with the intention to bring that road to this point, Colorado Springs, and also with the intention, under some circumstances, to carry the road to Denver direct. It was seen that if the road should be constructed to this point it would become necessary to connect with the two principal commercial cities in the state, — cities which, I believe, are regarded by railroad men as common points, to which freight rates are equal and also passenger rates; and, when they, should arrive at this place with the road, it would become a question whether that road should be built from Colorado Springs to Pueblo, and from Colorado Springs to Denver, or whether an arrangement should be made with the Rio Grande Company for the use of its road between Denver and Pueblo; and, of course, if satisfactory arrangements could be made with the Denver & Rio'Grande Company, it would be much cheaper for the new company, and would somewhat reduce the expenses of the old company, to make such an arrangement. Accordingly, this contract was made; and, as I understand *151it, the road, considered in its physical character, the Chicago, Rock Isl- and & Pacific Railway Company, acquired the use of the Denver & Rio Grande Railway between this point and Pueblo and Colorado Springs. More than in any other instance, I think, the railroad of a railroad company is the physical body of the corporation, in so far as any corporation may be said to have a physical existence, and a body which may be recognized. The body of the corporation is the railroad, and it represents the corporation, in that sense; and this was the contract of the road — the new railroad with the old railroad — for one connection at Colorado Springs, not a connection at Denver, Pueblo, or other point. If the contract which has since been made by the Rock Island Company with the Union Pacific Company, by which it has secured a line between Limón and Denver, had then been made, this contract would not have taken effect, because it is expressly provided in this instrument that, if the Chicago & Colorado Railway Company shall build a road to Denver, then the contract shall become void and ineffectual; and, of course, if the Chicago Company had acquired the right to use the Union Pacific road at that time, there would have been no occasion for the making of the contract. Moreover, if the complainant in this suit should now acquire a line going into Pueblo in the same manner that it has acquired the right to enter Denver by a distinct line, there would then be no use whatever for the Rio Grande road between Denver and Pueblo, and the use of it in the way in which it is mentioned in this contract, and all the provisions in this contract for estimating the cost of maintenance by wheelage, and all that, would become ineffectual. Now, as to this interpretation of this contract, I can find support in every clause of the agreement, but I do not care to refer to more than one of them. To go over the contract at length, and give consideration to each particular clause, would be a matter of great labor, and occupy a great deal of time, to no profit. The clause to which I refer is the third clause on page 18 of article 8 of the printed contract, which provides that “the Denver Company may admit any other company operating a connecting railway to the possession and use of said railway between Denver and South Pueblo, or any portion thereof, with itself and the Chicago Company, upon substantially the same terms as those set out in these articles.” Now the Union Pacific road, which has since been acquired proportionately from Limón to Denver by the Rock Island Company, was then in existence. It is one of the roads referred to in this clause of the agreement, and the right to admit that road to the use of this road was reserved in this agreement to the Rio Grande Company. There is not a doubt of that in my mind. Furthermore, on the next page of this contract, it is said here in section 11: “This contract is intended to permit either party hereto to exchange business with other companies in carload lots or otherwise, and in the ordinary exchange of business in the cars of such other companies.” The right here reserved to this exchange at the time of this contract was a right arising out of the use of the road from Limón to Denver, and it was provided for in this agreement. Now, if you look at this and other parts of this instrument, it seems to me *152perfectly clear that the right acquired by the new company — the “Chicago Company,” as it is called in the agreement — was the use of the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad between Denver and Pueblo, in connection with the line which they proposed to build. It was through a connection at Colorado Springs, and not elsewhere. It was by one connection, and no more. The Rock Island Company has since made another connection, and my Brother Miller announces here that the}7 may make any number of connections. If they acquire the control and use of all the lines that enter Denver, they may put the business of all those lines upon the yards and terminals of this company; they may put it anywhere upon the line of this road. I cannot agree in that construction of the agreement, but it is unnecessary for me to comment at length ■upon it. I must dissent from the opinion given by Justice Miller, and when this cause comes up for final decision, as Brother Miller will not be present, it will be for. the consideration of the circuit judge.