Court Opinion

ID: 9443612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:25:56.974719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:33.142492
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in No. 11435 only.
I would reverse as to appellant Bayne. In my view the circumstances underlying his plea of former jeopardy are entirely different from those of the other three appellants and constitute a bar to his retrial. I state my reasons briefly.
The associate of counsel for the three appellants who withdrew from the case was in nowise connected with Bayne’s defense. Thus it can hardly be assumed that his withdrawal was prejudicial to Bayne. And Bayne’s attorney never suggested that it would be. In fact, he did not even participate in the colloquy which led to the declaration of a mistrial. Moreover, no reason was expressed by the trial court and none clearly appears from the record for the action taken with respect to appellant Bayne. I do not think such reasons can be supplied on appeal by resort to conjecture and surmise, especially to support action touching upon the denial of fundamental constitutional rights.
Nor could a valid reason to support mistrial as to Bayne be inferred from the fact that the trial, judge had previously refused his request for a severence. Rulings on motions for severance are governed by a wide discretion and have a strong basis in considerations of trial efficiency and convenience. But a much more restricted discretion controls where double jeopardy is concerned, since this is a fundamental constitutional right. The power to compel a second trial must be exercised “with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes * * Here the record fails to disclose that “there [was] a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise [have been] defeated.”6

. United States v. Perez, 1824, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165, approved in Wade v. Hunter, 1949, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974.