Court Opinion

ID: 9384021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 16:08:40.488288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.815413
License: Public Domain

J-S43019-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                v.                             :
                                               :
    DAVID SINGLETARY                           :
                                               :
    Appellant                                  :   No. 589 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 10, 2020,
             in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007831-2018.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                           FILED MARCH 31, 2023

        Following his non-jury conviction of possessing a firearm by a prohibited

person,1 David Singletary appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the judgment of

sentence imposing three to six years of incarceration. For the reasons below,

we affirm.

        Singletary and his uncle, Demetrius Singletary (“Uncle”), shared a

townhouse in Philadelphia. In mid-September 2018, the trial court issued a

protection-from-abuse order (“PFA”) against Singletary in favor of Uncle. A

week later, on September 20, Uncle called 911 to report that Singletary had

a gun in the home and was violating the PFA.

        When officers arrived, two of them positioned themselves behind the

townhouse.      Two other officers knocked on the front door, where Uncle

greeted them. He informed the police that Singletary had just fled through a

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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backdoor in the basement. Uncle invited the two officers to accompany him

through the house and into the basement. The officers who remained outside

detained Singletary.

      “The basement was a common area that contained a shelf at the bottom

of the steps, a mantlepiece for an old fireplace, a washer, dryer, couches, a

bed sectioned off with some sheets, and some storage.” Trial Court Opinion,

4/22/22, at 2. The “officers saw a loaded Glock with an additional magazine

partially stuffed into [the] couch cushion, as well as scales and hundreds of

empty and unused containers. Officers held the scene until they obtained a

search warrant to seize the items.” Id.

      Police charged Singletary with unlawful possession of the gun and other

offenses, irrelevant to this appeal.

      Singletary moved to suppress the evidence, because police “entered his

private space without permission and/or a warrant.”      Motion to Suppress

Physical Evidence at 2. They “entered his private area without knocking or

announcing their entry and, due to said unlawful entry, are alleged to have

observed a firearm and illegal narcotics.” Id. Thus, Singletary claimed the

police performed a warrantless search of the basement and in violation of the

knock-and-announce rule.

      After the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth argued the police did

not need a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement to enter the

basement with Uncle, because they were not there to conduct an evidentiary

search. See N.T., 1/24/23, at 45.

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      The suppression court denied Singletary’s motion from the bench. See

id. at 50.    In compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I), the suppression court

placed its factual findings and conclusions of law on the record.          Included

therein, the court said:

               The [officers’] entry into the basement was not for
         purposes of securing any drug-related evidence, but it was
         to locate the alleged violator of the [PFA], as well as the
         person who allegedly, at that point, the officers had
         reasonable suspicion to believe had a gun.

              The officers were operating within their authority
         under the law.

Id. at 49.

      In other words, the suppression court rejected Singletary’s theory that

the officers conducted a warrantless search. The court ruled the police were

simply there in response to Uncle’s report of a PFA violation. Thus, the court

never reached the issue of whether Uncle had actual or apparent authority to

consent to a search of the basement.

      The matter immediately proceeded to a bench trial. The court convicted

and sentenced Singletary as described above. This appeal followed.

      Singletary raises two appellate issues:

         1.     Whether the court was in error in denying the motion
                to suppress.

         2.     Whether the verdict was contrary to law and
                insufficient to find [Singletary] guilty of VUFA § 6105,
                possession of a firearm prohibited.

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Singletary’s Brief at 8. We address Singletary’s second issue first, because a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, if successful, results in discharge.

        Singletary argues that the Commonwealth offered insufficient evidence

to convict him of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited from doing

so. In his view, the evidence did not “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

[he] resided in the basement where the firearm was found and that he had

intent to exercise dominion and control over the firearm.” Id. at 18.

        When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we face “a question of

law.”    Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 409 (Pa. 2018).

Accordingly, our standard of review is “de novo.” Id. We view the “evidence

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and

we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth’s favor.”

Id. “Through this lens, we must ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved

all of the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

        Critically, “the Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of

wholly circumstantial evidence.”    Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 956 A.3d

386, 392 (Pa. 2013). When sitting as the fact finder, the trial court is free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence. See id.

        Explaining Singletary’s conviction on the possession-by-a-prohibited-

person charge, the learned Judge Barbara A. McDermott, writing for the Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, opined as follows:

                To sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm [by
          a] prohibited [person], the Commonwealth must prove that
          a defendant possessed a firearm and was previously

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       convicted of an offense enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
       6105(b). Commonwealth v. Williams, 911 A.2d 548,
       550-551 (Pa. Super. 2006). Possession may be proved
       entirely through circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth
       v. Buford, 101 A.3d 1182, 1189-1190 (Pa. Super. 2014).
       “Physical possession or control means the knowing exercise
       of power over a weapon . . . which may be proven through
       evidence of a direct, physical association between the
       defendant and the weapon . . . or evidence of constructive
       control.” Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 100
       (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson,
       83 A.3d 1023, 1036-37 (Pa. 2013)). Constructive control
       entails the ability to exercise a conscious dominion over the
       firearm or controlled substance and the intent to do so.
       Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 553 (Pa. Super.
       2021), appeal denied, (internal citations omitted).
       Constructive possession may be established by the totality
       of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67
       A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth
       v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2012)).

             The evidence established that [Singletary] was in
       constructive possession of the firearm, because the firearm
       was found near his ID in the basement, where he was
       staying, and he was apprehended close to the firearm.
       Police found [Singletary’s] firearm sticking out of a couch
       cushion near his ID on the mantlepiece. [Singletary’s] ID
       and the bed curtained-off from the rest of the basement
       showed that he stayed in the basement. The basement has
       a door allowing access to the back of the house where
       [Singletary] was apprehended. In Commonwealth v.
       Davis, 743 A.2d 946, 953-954 (Pa. Super. 1999), the
       defendant was in constructive possession of contraband,
       because his prescription bottle was nearby, even though the
       contraband was in a common area. Similar to Davis,
       [Singletary] was in constructive possession of the firearm,
       [because it] was found near his ID in the basement where
       he stayed. See Davis, 743 A.2d at 953-954 . . . Therefore,
       [Singletary’s] conviction for VUFA § 6105 was sufficiently
       supported by the evidence presented at trial.

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Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/22, at 5-6. We agree with the above, well-reasoned

opinion and adopt it as our own. Singletary’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue

is meritless.

      Turning to his other claim of error, Singletary contends the suppression

court incorrectly refused to suppress the gun. He claims Uncle “did not have

authority to allow the police to search . . . the basement, and there were no

exigent circumstances to have prevented the officers from getting a search

warrant.” Singletary’s Brief at 13.

      Our scope and standard of review for orders denying suppression are

well-settled. “Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression

court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much

of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the

context of the record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649,

654 (Pa. 2010). We review legal conclusions de novo. See id.

      The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides

that, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated

. . . .” Pursuant to that Amendment, warrantless searches “are presumptively

unreasonable,    subject   only   to   specifically   established   exceptions.”

Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 567-568 (Pa. 2018) (quotations

and citations omitted).

      “One exception to the warrant requirement is a consent search.”

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 257 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2020), reargument

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denied (Feb. 11, 2021), appeal denied, 259 A.3d 883 (Pa. 2021).          A third

party may consent to a warrantless search, even when the defendant is not

present, if the third party has actual and apparent authority to consent. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Basking, 970 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).

      Because a consent search is an exception to the warrant requirement,

Uncle’s authority to consent would be an issue, if the police had conducted a

warrantless search of the basement. The suppression court ruled they had

not. See N.T., 4/22/22, at 45-50. Instead, the suppression court concluded

the police were in the basement to apprehend Singletary for violated the PFA.

      Singletary did not challenge that ruling on appeal. He therefore waived

the issue of whether the suppression court erred in concluding there was no

search prior to the officers getting a warrant.      See Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (“No

question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions

involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The

argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be

argued; and shall have at the head of each part — in distinctive type or in

type distinctively displayed — the particular point treated therein, followed by

such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”).

      Accordingly, we need not decide whether Uncle had actual or apparent

authority to consent to a warrantless search. Even if he lacked that authority,

the suppression court’s decision (i.e., that police did not perform a warrantless

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search) would remain undisturbed. Hence, the same is true for its ultimate

conclusion that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

        Singletary’s failure to appeal the suppression court’s basis for denying

his motion renders the question of consent moot.         Therefore, we do not

consider it further in this direct appeal.

        Judgment of sentence affirmed.

        Judge Nichols joins the memorandum.

        Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2023

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