Court Opinion

ID: 9744863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:20:14.604814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.657284
License: Public Domain

BAKER, J.,
concurring with separate opinion.
I concur fully with the majority's opinion but write separately to emphasize that Roberts raised the issue of Open Door violations at the closed meetings on September 9 and 28 and again before the trial court. Had Roberts failed to object to obvious violations of the Open Door law at the meeting in question, then he would not be heard to later complain that such procedures were neglected to the detriment of the public This standard advances the stated purpose of the Open Door law: "It is the intent of [the Open Door law] that the official action of public agencies be conducted and taken openly, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, in order that the people may be fully informed." Ind.Code § 5-14-1.5-1. On the whole, such a standard encourages compliance with Open Door procedures by insuring that parties raise objections in order to correct potential violations.
It is also a tenet of sound adjudication that a party may not take advantage of an error he has waived. See, eg., Jolly v. Modisett, 257 Ind. 426, 429, 275 N.E.2d *198780, 782 (1971) ("[Tlo permit a party to submit his cause and await the decision of the trial judge beyond the ninety day period, without taking the steps available to him to effect a withdrawal of the submission and then to deny the jurisdiction, if and when the decision goes against him, would be to permit him to take advantage of error that he had waived."); Ind. Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Tucker, 676 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (applying rule in Administrative Procedures and Orders Act that "[a] party may only obtain judicial review of an issue that was raised before the administrative agency and preserved for review"). The public's interest in transparent public agency decisionmak-ing is disserved when a party knowingly acquiesces to a violation of the Open Door law-and then litigates when a result unfavorable to the party is reached. I note, however, this principle in no way impairs the nonparty public citizen who vindicates his right to access, because, in such cases, there is no waiver in the hope of future advantage.
Turning to the facts of the instant case, the record shows that a reporter for the Tribune Star was not permitted to attend the September 9 meeting. Tr. p. 13, 52. According to Roberts's affidavit, he objected to the meeting being closed to the public. Appellees' App. p. 24. Likewise, Roberts complained at the September 28 meeting that Frye was not allowed to attend. Tr. p. 31. Roberts raised these Open Door violations to the trial court. Specifically, he raised the September 9 violation in his amended complaint, and the September 28 violation in an oral motion that the pleadings conform to the evidence. Appellees' App. p. 21 (September 9 violation); Tr. p. 7 (September 28 violation). Because Roberts objected to the obvious violations at both meetings and raised the issues before the trial court, I fully concur in the majority's analysis and disposition.