Court Opinion

ID: 9834529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:39:56.880612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:32.237339
License: Public Domain

■ On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee seems to have misunderstood our opinion herein. In its motion for rehearing, it says that our opinion that it did not plead waiver is based on the fact that the technical expression “waiver” was not used in its *760answer. Such is not tlie case. Even had this term been used, it would not have been applicable to appellant’s plea for rescission on the ground of fraud, for the reason that appellee’s ¿nswer as to the waiver of the right of appellant to refuse to pay,for the automobile referred only to the failure of warranty on the part of appellee. All that we meant to say in connection with the failure of appellee to use the word waiver in its answer was that this was some indication that it did not intend to plead waiver. This is confirmed by appellee’s motion herein, in which it says that it did not plead waiver as to fraud, because it denied that it had committed a fraud, and says that our opinion would require it to admit such fraud.
[7] Learned .counsel for appellee are doubtless aware of the fact that under our statute inconsistent pleas may be filed, and that a plea of waiver as to .alleged fraud admits such fraud only for the purpose of such plea, and not as a fact upon the merits of the case. A plea of waiver as to fraud is in the nature of confession and avoidance, but applies no further than is applicable to that phase of the case. Independent of .any issue of fraud, it might well be that appellant- had lost his right to refuse to pay for the automobile and to rescind his contract for the purchase of the same, by reason of his long delay in making such claim; but this would involve only the issue of warranty as contained in the written contract, and not in any wise the issue of fraud by which he alleges he was induced to purchase the automobile.
[8] In support of its contention that appellant had lost his right to rescind the contract of purchase by reason of his long delay, appellee cites Bancroft v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 194 S. W. 991. In that case the implement company had made a contract with Bancroft for the sale of a tractor. The conditions of the sale were that the purchaser was to test the tractor, and that if it would not, after six days of fair weather for testing the same, pull a certain number of plows to a certain depth, to the satisfaction of the purchaser, he was under no obligation to take the tractor. The purchaser made a test, and notified the seller that he was not satisfied that the tractor would do the work as represented. Some repairs were made on the same by the seller. It was alleged that the defendant had “retained and used said ma--chinery for a period of two years and seven months, and that said time was an unreasonable time to retain, operate, and use said machinery without paying therefor, 'and that defendant having had a reasonable time in which to test said machinery, and having retained said machinery and having used said machinery as his own and having exercised the right of ownership over the same, he thereby became liable to plaintiff for the purchase price thereof.” The evidence sustained these allegations of fact.
The defense in that case was, not that the purchaser had been induced to purchase the tractor by reason of any false or fraudulent representations, but that, as the tractor had not proven satisfactory, he had the right under the contract to refuse to receive and pay for the same. This right he undoubtedly had, if he had exercised it seasonably; but the effect of the holding in that case is that the purchaser would not be heard to say that the machine did not perform satisfactorily to him, after having kept and used the same for a period of two years and seven months. Having lost his right to say that he would not receive the tractor, by retaining and using it for such a long period of time, it was held that he was liable for the purchase money.
The difference between that ease and the instant case is that while the appellant alleged that the automobile was not as warranted, and the defendant alleged that appelr lant had lost the right to such defense, by long delay in making complaint and in offering to return the automobile, the appellant also, in a separate paragraph of his petition, alleged that he was induced to purchase the automobile by reason of fraudulent representations, and on this ground he asked for a rescission of the contract. His plea for rescission as to the failure of *the automobile to comply with the warranties was distinctly stated to be an alternative cause of action. On the warranty feature of appellant’s case, the jury found against him; but on his plea for rescission, on the ground of fraud, the jury found in his favor. Such being'the case, appellant was entitled to a rescission of the contract, on the ground that it had been induced by fraudulent representation, unless he had waived the right to such rescission.
[9] Waiver must be both alleged and proven. There was not only no allegation as to waiver by use of that specific term, but ap-pellee did not allege the facts which constituted waiver. Had it done so, it would have been immaterial that it failed to use the technical term “waiver.’.’
[10] As a defense against fraud, it was necessary that appellee should have alleged that appellant discovered such fraud, and that thereafter he kept and used the automobile for a length of time, which was alleged to be unreasonable, or which was for such length of time as within itself would indicate that it was unreasonáble. Appel-lee not only failed to allege that appellant kept the automobile for an unreasonable length of time after discovering the fraud, but it did not allege that appellant had ever discovered the fraud, and consequently its pleading, as to the length of time which ap*761pellant had kept the automobile has no application to appellant’s plea for rescission, on the ground of fraud.
[11,12] Appellee, in its motion for rehearing, contends that judgment of the trial court should be affirmed for the reason that it denied the agency of Evans, in so far as any fraudulent representation might have been made by him, and that there was no specific finding that Evans was appellee’s agent, with authority to make such representations. The undisputed fact with reference to this matter is that Evans was the agent of appel-lee to solicit orders from purchasers for automobiles. He had no authority as such agent to make any warranties beyond those contained in the contract, for the reason that the contract so specified; but, as appellee’s agent to solicit contracts from purchasers, he had the apparent authority to make the representations which are alleged that he did make with reference to the automobile, and which did not relate to the workmanship and material — these being the things that were covered by the written warranty. Appellee did not request a special finding as to the authority of Evans to make the alleged fraudulent representations. The court must necessarily have assumed that Evans was the agent of appellee in this regard, for the reason that the special issues submitted as to fraud asked if Evans made the representations referred to in such issues. Ap-pellee did not object to the submission of these issues, as it might have done if the evidence was not sufficient to warrant a finding that Evans was the agent of appellee. From the fact that the court submitted the issues of fraud as to representations made by Evans, we must assume, in the absence of a special finding on that issue, that the court found that Evans was such agent; and the evidence is sufficient to support that finding.
Believing that no error was committed by our judgment herein, appellee’s motion for a rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.