Court Opinion

ID: 9950746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 18:03:20.426247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:37.364693
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 Marriage of Wolf and Stillwell CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of DEVINN
WOLF and DESTINY STILLWELL.
                                                                D083311
DEVINN WOLF,

         Appellant,                                             (Super. Ct. No. FAMSS2000607)

         v.

DESTINY STILLWELL,

         Respondent.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Dina Issam Amana, Commissioner, and Michelle H. Gilleece, Judge.
Dismissed.
         Southern California Lawyers Group and Eric Morris for Appellant.
         Law Offices of Dilip Vithlani and Dilip Vithlani for Respondent.
         Devinn Wolf and Destiny Stillwell had three minor children together
when they filed for dissolution of their marriage. In December 2020, the
superior court entered an order granting them joint legal and physical
custody. The court subsequently issued a written order on October 4, 2022,
in which it explained it misstated the law regarding the appealability of the
December 2020 custody orders. On its own motion, the court clarified that
the December orders were interim orders. It then ordered that at trial, “the
court [would] consider all facts and circumstances, whether previously argued
or not by either party, in order to determine what custody and visitation
orders are in the best interest of the children.” (Emphasis in original).
      Wolf appeals the court’s October 2022 order. Wolf argues that the
ruling is appealable as either a discretionary appeal, a collateral appeal, a

ruling on a motion in limine,1 or, alternatively, as an extraordinary writ. As
we explain below, we conclude that the December 2020 custody orders were
interim orders. The subsequent orders addressing those orders are, likewise,
interim orders. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Because we decline to exercise our discretion to treat this appeal as a petition
for writ relief, we dismiss the appeal in its entirety.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Wolf filed a petition for dissolution and a request for order (RFO)
regarding custody and support in January 2020. The court held a two-day
evidentiary hearing on Wolf’s RFO in September 2020, addressing the issues
of child custody, visitation, and child support. At that hearing, Wolf had
counsel and Stillwell proceeded in propria persona. In December 2020, the
court adopted Wolf’s proposed statement of decision without modification
(December SOD). The December SOD ordered joint legal and physical
custody of the minor children and ordered Stillwell to pay Wolf “guideline
child support and guideline spousal support” retroactive to February 2020.
The December SOD did not address any of the marital property or debts.

1     The court described the December order as similar to an order on a
motion in limine, but it is clear that it is not itself a ruling on a motion in
limine.
                                         2
Following the December SOD, Stillwell retained counsel, and, in May 2021,
she filed an RFO to vacate the “interim orders” made in December 2020

under Code of Civil Procedure2 section 473 for mistake or excusable neglect.
In November 2021, while the request to vacate was pending, Stillwell filed an
additional RFO to modify the custody and visitation orders, relying on
evidence the court heard prior to issuing the December SOD. The court
denied her RFO to vacate the December SOD on February 9, 2022.
      In response to Stillwell’s request to modify the interim orders, Wolf
argued that the superior court was estopped from relying on evidence
previously considered when the court entered orders in the December SOD.
The court heard argument on the issue of collateral estoppel on
March 15, 2022. At the hearing, the court told the parties that on the issue of
custody, it would only consider new evidence, i.e., evidence of events
occurring after the December SOD. Stillwell’s attorney noted that there was
no request to bifurcate custody from the other issues for final judgment and
argued the December SOD was not a final order. Wolf confirmed that neither
side “requested a formal trial to finalize all issues and have a judgment
entered.” The court allowed supplemental briefing on the issue, which the
parties submitted in September 2022.
      On October 4, 2022, the court issued its written order. The order
explained that the court previously misstated the law “regarding the
appealability of the orders made on December 15, 2020,” and corrected that
statement on its own motion, pursuant to section 1008. The court explained
that the December SOD orders were “temporary orders and not subject to
appeal.” The court has not entered final judgment.

2    Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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                                 DISCUSSION
      On appeal, Wolf contends the court erred by considering any
modification to the December SOD. He maintains that the December SOD
was a final custody order that Stillwell failed to appeal. Thus, he contends,
collateral estoppel prevents Stillwell from making subsequent RFOs to
modify custody that raise some of the same factual issues contained in the
December SOD. He further contends the court erred in considering any
modification to the December SOD. Wolf argues that the October 4, 2022
order is appealable, either on its own or as a function of the order it corrected.
We conclude that it is not.
      We note, first, that the court has the inherent authority to correct
judicial error in its interim orders at any time prior to final judgment. (Le
Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1096–1097, 1105 & fn. 4,
1107–1108.) When the court corrects error pursuant to section 1008, the
ruling is appealable only when the subject order is a final order. (Robbins v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317, Austin v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 927–928, fn. 6.) The
December SOD is not a final order and cannot reasonably be considered final
judgment on any of the issues of the dissolution because it did not resolve all
the issues of the dissolution.
      First, we observe that the December SOD established interim orders
and that interim orders are not appealable. “Generally, a reviewing court
acts in the procedural context of either a direct appeal or a writ proceeding.”
(Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) “A
reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an
appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Ibid.) A trial court order is
not appealable unless “made so by statute.” (Ibid.; see also Smith v. Smith

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(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1083 [“In the absence of a statute authorizing
an appeal, we lack jurisdiction to review a case even by consent, waiver, or
estoppel.”].) Because the Family Code contains no statutory provisions
governing appeals from child custody orders, “the right to appeal a child
custody determination is generally limited to final judgments and orders
made after final judgments” under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(1) and (2). (Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th
1371, 1377.) Consequently, prejudgment rulings that merely decide custody
or visitation issues on an interim or temporary basis are not subject to
appeal. (See Banning v. Newdow (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 438, 456 [“interim
custody orders are nonappealable”].) “A temporary custody order is
interlocutory by definition, since it is made pendente lite with the intent that
it will be superseded by an award of custody after trial.” (Lester v. Lennane
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 559.) Nothing in the December SOD indicated the
court intended to terminate the litigation as to dissolution. Further, the
court itself described the December SOD as “the initial decision.” It stated
the matter was “still prejudgment.” Wolf confirmed his understanding of the
nature of the orders when he confirmed that neither party “requested a
formal trial to finalize all issues and have a judgment entered.”
Consequently, the December SOD is not appealable because it was
“preliminary to future proceedings.” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 654.)
      Interim orders in a family law proceeding are not ordinarily appealable
where other issues remain to be tried or resolved. (In re Marriage of Griffin
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 685, 689.) When the court issued the December SOD,
Wolf did not even have full financial disclosures and could not calculate final
child or spousal support. Further, the December SOD ordered “guideline

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support” but did not include any numbers or calculations. At a combined
trial readiness conference and status conference held in July 2022, Wolf
represented to the court that “[t]here are multiple new issues” to be resolved.
The parties had not endured a full trial and had not reached judgment in the
matter. The record before us is clear that the orders contained within the
December SOD were interim orders and did not constitute judgment.
Notably, none of the parties proceeded as if it was final and continued to file
requests for orders, set evidentiary hearings, and prepare for trial.
      The only permissible way to appeal from an order where issues remain
to be tried or resolved is when the issues are bifurcated. (§ 904.1,

subd. (a)(14).)3 The court discussed the issue of bifurcation in March 2022,
though it appears neither party pursued it. As the court noted, “neither
party requested the[ ] issues be bifurcated” and “[t]he court itself did not
bifurcate the[ ] issues.” Stillwell similarly observed, “[t]he issue was never
bifurcated.”
      Wolf asks alternatively that we construe his appeal as a petition for
extraordinary writ relief. When an appellant does not seek writ relief in the
first instance, the question is not whether we may, but whether we should
treat the appeal as a writ petition. As our Supreme Court has explained,
although we do have the power to treat an appeal as a petition for writ of
mandate, “we should not exercise that power except under unusual
circumstances.” (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401; accord San
Joaquin County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Winn (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 296, 300.) A case may present sufficiently unusual

3     Wolf argues his appeal should be considered a collateral appeal, as
resolving an issue collateral to the main issue. Without bifurcation, however,
we cannot reasonably consider the issue of custody to be collateral in a
dissolution matter.
                                        6
circumstances where the trial court made a substantive error and judicial
economy would not be served by deferring resolution until final judgment.
(See Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 746.)
      Here, we discern no unusual or extraordinary circumstances associated
with Wolf’s appeal, and we decline to treat his appeal as a petition for writ of
mandate.
                                DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed. Appellant to bear the costs of appeal.

                                                                    KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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