Court Opinion

ID: 9677347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:49:45.858212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:56.309934
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
On September 28,1962, Clara Williams gave a warranty deed to Sun Oil Company by which she conveyed to that company two lots. Contained in her deed is the following agreement:
“Grantor agrees that property now owned-by grantor lying north of and adjacent to' the" within described premises shall not be used for or in connection with the operation of a gasoline service station or filling station for the sale of gasoline, motor fuel, petroleum products, automotive accessories or automotive services generally.” (Emphasis added.)
On February 1, 1964, Clara Williams executed a land contract to defendant, Trent Auto Wash, *186Inc. It is admitted that the land contract covered ‘‘that property now owned by grantor lying north of and adjacent to” the lots Clara Williams conveyed to Sun Oil Company. The defendant also “admits that it had knowledge of the alleged covenant; that plaintiff’s agents informed it that plaintiff would attempt to enforce said covenant, and that defendant intends to construct underground storage tanks and above ground pumps,” et cetera.
It is unnecessary to determine whether the above agreement is a covenant running with the land to afford plaintiff the relief it seeks. The agreement relates to the property purchased by Trent Auto Wash and it is equally clear that it was intended for the benefit of the adjacent property of Sun Oil Company. The agreement does not relate to any activities on the part of Clara Williams, but, rather, contemplates a restriction upon the use of property retained by her. Whatever she could not do, chancery may also enjoin those in privity with her and with notice of the restriction from doing.
The principle is stated by the Lord Chancellor in the case of Tulk v. Moxhay (1848), 2 Ph 774 (41 Eng Rep 1143), affirming 11 Beav 571 (50 Eng Rep 937):
“The question does not depend upon whether the covenant runs with the land * * * if there was a mere agreement and no covenant, this court would enforce it against the party purchasing with notice of it; for if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from whom he purchased.”
The principle of Tulk has been widely recognized and followed in numerous cases. In the case of Langenback v. Mays (1950), 207 Ga 156 (60 SE2d 240), the defendants sold to plaintiffs a small tract of land on which several tourist cabins were located, *187and orally agreed not to nse their remaining land for a tourist camp. The defendants constructed a tourist camp in violation of their contract and, when enjoined from operating it, executed an instrument purporting to he a lease to their daughter for the tourist camp. The daughter operated the business with actual knowledge of the injunction granted against her parents. The supreme court of Georgia’s opinion states:
“Equity will enforce a lawful restrictive agreement concerning land against a person who takes with notice of the contract. In such a case, the person violating the agreement, though not a party to it, is a privy in conscience with the maker. 31 Yale Law Jour 127, 131; Francisco v. Smith, 143 NY 488 (38 NE 980); Rosen v. Wolff, 152 Ga 578 (110 SE 877).”
In the case of Thodos v. Shirk (1956), 248 Iowa 172 (79 NW2d 733), plaintiff, owner of certain lots in a subdivision, brought an action in equity asking that defendants be enjoined from using their property as a trailer court in violation of the restrictive covenant in their deed which provided: “No building shall be placed or erected on said premises except for residence purposes.” The court in discussing the doctrine of equitable servitudes said (p 179):
“Since the doctrine of equitable servitudes rests upon the theory of a servitude imposed upon the land, enforceable against all subsequent purchasers of the land who are charged with notice actual or constructive, the requirement of the special words such as ‘and assigns’ is unnecessary in the deed. The sole test for the running of the burden in equity is the intention of the parties to impose a servitude upon the land as distinguished from a personal promise of the present owner.”
*188In Hodge v. Sloan (1887), 107 NY 244 (17 NE 335), a grantee bound bimself by a covenant in his deed to limit the use of land purchased so as not to interfere with the trade or business of the grantor and the property was subsequently sold to defendant without covenant on his part but with notice of the covenant in the deed to his grantor. The court said (p 250):
“There seems no reason why he and his grantee, taking title with notice of the restriction, should not be equally bound. The contract was good between the original parties, and it should in equity at least bind whoever takes title with notice of such covenant. By reason of it the vendor received less for his land, and the plain and expressed intention of the parties would be defeated if the covenant could not be enforced as well against a purchaser with notice, as against the original covenantor. In order to uphold the liability of the successor in title, it is not necessary that the covenant should be one technically attaching to and concerning the land and so running with the title. It is enough that a purchaser has notice of it.”
In the case of Coomes v. Aero Theatre and Shopping Center, Inc. (1955), 207 Md 432 (114 A2d 631), the complainant and his grantee intended that land should be restricted to uses not in conflict with the use of complainant’s remaining land. The restrictive covenant read:
“Subject also the further restriction that the grantees or their tenants therein will not engage "in any business which shall compete with or be of a similar nature of those businesses conducted and maintained on the property known as the Aero Theatre and Shopping Center, Inc.”
Defendants, who took from plaintiff’s grantee, had notice of the restriction at time of conveyance. The *189restriction was held binding on them. The court, said (p 437):
“We reaffirm the doctrine [the doctrine of Tulk] that if the owner of land enters into a covenant, concerning its use, subjecting it to an easement- or personal servitude, and the land is afterwards conveyed to one who has notice of the covenant, the grantee will take the land bound by the covenant and will be compelled in equity to specifically execute it or will be restrained from violating it; and it makes no difference, with respect to this liability in equity, whether or not the covenant is one which runs with the land. Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md 487, 494; Halle v. Newbold, 69 Md 265, 270 (14 A 662); Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., 70 Md 493 (17 A 372, 3 LRA 579); Peabody Heights Co. of Baltimore City v. Willson, 82 Md 186 (32 A 386, 1077, 36 LRA 393); Clem v. Valentine, 155 Md 19 (141 A 710); Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md 336 (111 A 2d 855); 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed), § 689. * * *
“'While most courts have accepted the theory that restrictive agreements should be enforced as an easement or servitude, Mr. Tiffany took the view that the more satisfactory theory is that equity regards such an agreement as vesting in the promisee a right to specific enforcement by means of an injunction or otherwise, not only as against the original promisor, but also as against a subsequent holder of the property, if not a purchaser for value without notice. He argued that if the right to equitable relief could not thus be asserted as against a subsequent holder of the property, the result would be that the promisee could be deprived of such right, in practically every case, by a collusive transfer on the part of the. promisor. 3 Tiffany,' Re.al Property (3d Ed), § 861. * * *
' “It is understood, however, that it is not necessary that the expression of intention shall take any particular form. Of course, if the promise purports to bind successors by the use of such words as ‘sue*190cessors’ or ‘assigns’, little question can arise as to the existence of the necessary intention. But as the language employed becomes less plain and precise, the conclusion that the successors were intended to be bound must rest in a correspondingly greater degree upon an inference drawn from the circumstances under which the promise was made. The circumstances of a particular transaction may yield such an inference without the aid of any specific language in the terms of the promise.”
For further annotated statements of the equitable doctrine, see Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed), §§ 689 and 1295; Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed), § 859; Thompson on Real Property (1962 Replacement), § 3170; 20 Am Jur 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, § 26; 23 ALR2d p 520 et seq.
The agreement between Clara Williams and Sun Oil Company is not so ambiguous as to be incapable of enforcement against those who have taken with notice of it. The commitment is that “that property * * * shall not be used for or in connection with the operation of a gasoline service station.” There is nothing personal as to Mrs. Williams in this language. It clearly refers to the land. While the time of the commitment is not expressed, this is no insuperable obstacle. Courts are quite accustomed to making determinations of what is a reasonable time in terms of the presumed intent of the parties. Finally, if the agreement is not enforced by equity, it becomes completely vitiated. Obviously, plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. If equity cannot grant relief, a covenantor need only convey the land to destroy today the covenant he made yesterday — or, as in Mrs. Williams’ case, the covenant made by her a short 16 months before her conveyance to defendant,
*191Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals-disposed of this matter by holding that the covenant or agreement of the parties ran with the land, a. determination I do not regard, as necessary for disposition of this case. The chancellor also recog-; nized the equitable doctrine as being applicable if the covenant did not run with the land. I would remand to him for such hearing as may be required to apply that doctrine. Determination of possible-.questions such as a change in circumstances relating to the lands in question may be necessary. Other aspects of the transaction not presently before may bear upon the equities of the parties. This is a traditional equity action which does not lend itself to summary disposition. Upon the conclusion of a full hearing, the chancellor will be in a position to shape a proper decree.
I agree that the covenant does not violate CL 1948, § 750.151 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.348).
I would remand, with costs to abide final result.
Kelly, Black, and T. M. Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.