Court Opinion

ID: 9548538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:05:06.681425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:06.074201
License: Public Domain

*634Fontron, J.,
dissenting: I find myself unable to agree with the majority, for in my judgment the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s requested instruction on sudden emergency.
For many years Kansas has followed the rule that one who acts according to his own best judgment in a sudden emergency not brought on by his own negligence, or one who because of want of time in which to form a judgment omits to act in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with negligence even though his judgment was wrongly exercised, provided he acts with the same degree of care and circumspection that others would exercise in like or similar circumstances. (Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136, 213 Pac. 663; Hill v. Southern Kansas Stage Lines Co., 143 Kan. 44, 53 P. 2d 923; Metzinger v. Subera, 175 Kan. 542, 266 P. 2d 287.)
This rule of conduct has for many years been expressed in civil trials throughout this state by means of jury instructions containing substantially the same language as that in requested instruction No. 6, which reads as follows:
“When one is suddenly confronted by an emergency not of his own making, consisting of circumstances that call for immediate, instinctive action, he is not required to exercise the same degree of care that he would be required to exercise had he time for reflection. Under such circumstances he is required to exercise such care as an ordinary person would exercise when confronted by a like emergency under circumstances then existing. The rule of sudden emergency cannot be invoked by a person who brought the emergency upon himself by his fault or did not use ordinary care to avoid it”
In my judgment, this is a fair statement of what has always been the law in Kansas. So impeccable is the lineage of the requested instruction that it can be found verbatim in Pattern Instructions for Kansas. (See PIK 8.81.) This work, which is promulgated by the Kansas District Judges Association, was compiled by judges of no mean ability and acumen, and has found wide acceptance throughout the courts of this jurisdiction.
A rear-end collision is involved in this case. The defendant’s sole explanation of the impact was that his brakes suddenly failed from loss of fluid, thus confronting him with an emergency not of his own making. There was substantial evidence supporting this contention. A litigant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case where there is evidence to support it. (Avey v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, 201 Kan. 687, 442 P. 2d 1013; Kreh v. Trinkle, 185 Kan. 329, 343 P. 2d 213.)
As I view the maligned instruction it would have served to assist *635members of the jury in understanding the issues, rather than causing them confusion and leading them into error. I fear the court takes too limited a view of the understanding and perspicacity of the Kansas juror.
Was the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instruction not only error, but prejudicial as well? From my point of view this question requires an affirmative answer. While it is true the jury found in response to Question 2 that the defendant was following too closely and did not have his car under proper control, it found also that the defendant failed to avoid the collision by using emergency procedure.
The answer to Question 2 must be construed as an entirety. Thus construed it is enigmatic, to say the least. At the very minimum it is subject to the interpretation that despite the fact defendant was following plaintiffs too closely, the collision could have been avoided, had defendant used available emergency measures.
The requested instruction would have had a direct bearing on the emergency procedures open to the defendant in avoiding the collision, and the jury should have been instructed as to the degree of care which the law requires a driver to exercise when confronted with a sudden emergency. From an impartial appraisal of the jury’s answers I think it cannot fairly be said that failure to give the instruction was non-prejudicial.
Accordingly, and with due respect, I am obliged to' dissent. I would return the case for a new trial.
Price, C. J. and Kaul, J., join in the foregoing dissent.