Court Opinion

ID: 9731488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:47:25.71356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.559678
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
The clear and unambiguous language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2353(b)(3) (Reissue 1979) provides that where there has been a valid court proceeding concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property rights, a party governed by such an order cannot be deemed a “surviving spouse.” A reading of this plain language leads to the inescapable conclusion that where, as in the present case, a husband has been a party to such an order, he cannot receive another share of his wife’s estate as a “surviving spouse.” The eighth circuit reached this conclusion in applying § 30-2353 in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Dulek, 665 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1981).
The majority relies heavily on the draftsman’s comments to § 30-2353 in reaching its decision. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, as it is in the statute involved herein, no resort may be had to legislative history to explain such terms. In O’Neill Production Credit Assn. v. Schnoor, 208 Neb. 105, 108, 302 N.W.2d 376, 378 (1981), we said: “ ‘[A] statute should be construed so that an ordinary person reading it would get from it the usual *314accepted meaning. Rules of interpretation are resorted to for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity, not of creating it.’ ”
In County of Douglas v. Board of Regents, 210 Neb. 573, 577-78, 316 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1982), we said:
“A statute is not to be read as if open to construction as a matter of course. Where the words of a statute are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is needed to ascertain the meaning. ... It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the legislative language. Neither is it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute.”
We noted in Norden Laboratories, Inc. v. County Board of Equalization, 189 Neb. 437, 440, 203 N.W.2d 152, 154 (1973), that legislative history cannot serve to “ ‘ “import an intent into legislation devoid of language fit to express it.” ’ ” In the present case there is no language in the unambiguous exception listed in § 30-2353(b)(3) which would lead one to the conclusion that its application is as limited as concluded by the majority.
It is apparent from the plain language of the statute that the exception embodied in § 30-2353 was designed to prevent a spouse who had received a share of the marital estate through a court order from receiving another share of that estate due to the untimely death of a “soon to be” former spouse. This was mischief the statute was clearly designed to prevent, and it should be applied as it was written.