Court Opinion

ID: 9680548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:33:31.711511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.206807
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
SHARPE, Justice.
In the original opinion herein we held that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and here rendered in favor of appellant (Mathis) for recovery of the price of the cotton picking machine purchased by appellee (Rosson) from appellant. We pointed out that appellant’s right of recovery under the written contract of sale could not be defeated by appellee herein because he did not establish a defense which authorized rescission; neither did he establish a defense based upon partial failure of consideration which would authorize an award of damages giving rise to a reduction of the amount owing to appellant. In addition to the authorities cited in the original opinion, we find that there are others1a which support our conclusions and we adhere to our original disposition of the case.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is based upon his original contentions as well as some of the matters contained in the dissenting opinion which are presented herein for the first time. Two of such new matters are: (1) the contention that there was no written acceptance of the contract by Mathis, and (2) the contention that the language of the contract prevented title from passing to the seller in the absence of the cash payment being made. Neither of these matters were relied upon by appellee in the brief or on oral argument of this case.
As to the first of such matters, the evidence established as a matter of law that there was a written acceptance of the contract by Mathis. Two instruments (each consisting of one printed page) were involved, to-wit, an order for the machine and a delivery report. Rosson signed both instruments and Mathis signed the delivery report (which fully described the equipment covered by the order) after the machine had been delivered to Rosson. There was obviously only one transaction, and Mathis, by signing the delivery report, evidenced its written acceptance of the contract resulting from such single transaction.2 Furthermore, the evidence otherwise conclusively shows acceptance of the contract by Mathis, evidenced by delivering the machine to Rosson, relinquishing control over it, receiving the written order *869signed by Rosson as well as the delivery report signed by him and Mathis, demanding payment, and granting indulgence as to time of payment. Mathis consistently took the position that it was entitled to payment, in accordance with Rosson’s admitted promise to pay, culminating in this suit. Aside from the signing of the delivery report, the conduct of Mathis was tantamount to signing of the said order.3 The reliance of appellee on the contention that there was no proper acceptance of the contract by Mathis, made for the first time in connection with his motion for rehearing, is not well taken.
As to the second new matter, hereinabove mentioned (alleged failure of title to pass to the buyer until the cash payment was made), it is apparent that, in law, the contract was a chattel mortgage. Under Art. 5489, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St., and the Supreme Court cases construing it, a reservation of title as security for the purchase price of a chattel does not keep the title from passing to' the buyer but instead results in the creation of a chattel mortgage.4
There is no basis for departing from our original disposition of this case on account of appellee’s contentions hereinbefore mentioned. There was a proper acceptance of Rosson’s order by Mathis and the written contract was completed. The instrument sued on by Mathis created an indebtedness and a chattel mortgage. The title of the machine was in Rosson, and a chattel mortgage lien as security for payment of the purchase price was held by Mathis.
The remainder of this opinion will assume that there was a completed written contract between the parties. Until his motion for rehearing, Rosson did not question the existence or completion of the written contract; he wanted to undo it on the basis of failure of consideration. However, he failed to secure a jury finding which would have authorized recission upon the basis of total failure of consideration, and he neither plead nor proved a cause of action or secured jury findings which would authorize a recovery for partial failure of consideration.
The original opinion did not discuss the nature and elements of recission. It appears now that further discussion in such connection is indicated.
Before a buyer can avail himself of the right of recission, (assuming that he has proper grounds for the same), he must proceed to give timely notice to the seller that the contract is being rescinded and either return, or, at least offer to return, the property he has received and the value of any benefit he may have derived from its possession.5 The rule requiring the buyer desiring to rescind to take such action is based on the view that before a recission can be granted, the parties must be placed in status quo,6 and on the maxim “He who seeks equity must do equity.” The burden of proof is on the *870party seeking recission to establish that he is entitled equitably to such relief.'7
In this case Rosson wholly failed to sustain the burden imposed on him by law to entitle him to the remedy of recission. He undisputedly received a substantial benefit from the use of the cotton machine in question.8 However, he never, at any time, offered to do equity or to place Mathis in status quo. His failure to comply with this essential element of recission, particularly coupled with the jury finding in answer to special issue no. 2, that the machine in question was not wholly worthless for the purpose of picking cotton, is fatal to the granting of equitable relief, and recission should not have been granted to him.9
The original opinion and decision were firmly based upon the expressed premise that the answer to special issue no. 1 was immaterial to rendition of judgment even if supported by evidence; and that Mathis was entitled to recover because of facts conclusively established and the answer of the jury to special issue no. 2.
Further discussion in the original opinion of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the answer to special issue no. 2, could have been omitted; but some consideration of it seemed to be indicated in the light of the whole record in this case. If insufficiency of the evidence to support said issue no. 1 had been the only ground for reversal, we would have been required to remand the case for trial rather than render judgment. However, because of its immateriality, special issue no. 1 could be disregarded and judgment then could and should be properly rendered for Mathis on the basis of the remaining finding of the jury on special issue no. 2, and facts conclusively established.
In connection with the insufficiency of the evidence to support the finding on special issue no. 1, the following appears; six witnesses testified in person (Rosson, Jouffray, Sutterfield, Murff, Card and West); one witness (Richie) testified by deposition; and there was a stipulation as to the matter which would be testified to by the witness Pullin. The testimony of*871fered by Rosson was that of himself and West, and the stipulation as to Pullin. The remaining witnesses and Rosson were called to testify by Mathis.
Neither Rosson, West nor Pullin had ever seen the machine in question prior to August 11, 1962, the date of its delivery to Rosson. The stipulation as to Pullin was that he would testify he was the supervisor of the operation of the said cotton picking machine in August of 1962, and that he saw to it that the machine was greased according to the instructions given him by Mr. Murff (of Mathis). Said stipulation did not refer to the question of newness of the machine. The testimony of the witnesses for Mathis traced the machine in question from the factory to the moment it was delivered to Rosson, and was to the effect that the machine was new, and that it had not been theretofore sold or used. A critical examination of the testimony by Rosson’s witnesses in the light of well-settled rules reflects that the same involves only bare conclusions not rising to the dignity of evidence sufficient to support a finding of non-newness.10 This is particularly true when the “use” test, discussed in our original opinion, is applied.
The theories of recovery and defense relied on by the parties herein are clearly shown. Mathis relied upon the ground that the contract was executed and that title to the machine passed to Rosson, making him liable for the agreed price. Rosson relied upon the defense of failure of consideration because; (1) he received something different from what he ordered in that the machine was not “new”, and (2) the machine was wholly worthless for the purpose of picking cotton. The evidence failed to establish the first said ground in favor of Rosson, since it shows that he received a specific machine which was delivered to him and demonstrated and examined by him prior to his written acceptance of it. Under such conditions, its non-newness (assuming such finding to be supported by evidence) would give rise in this case only to a cause of action for damages for breach of warranty (not urged herein), and recission would not be authorized under such ground of defense. The second ground urged by Rosson (that the machine was wholly worthless for the purpose of picking cotton) was found against him by the jury, thus eliminating any possible basis for recission of the contract. The judgment of the trial court granting a recission in favor of Rosson is, therefore, unsupported by any jury finding or facts conclusively established. There is no place here for evidence-supported findings to be supplied by presumption in favor of the recission accomplished by the judgment. The jury finding on special issue no. 2, that the machine was not wholly worthless for the purpose of picking cotton, aborted Rosson’s ground of defense based upon total failure of consideration. This issue was complete in itself and nothing remained to be supplied or implied. This is not a case where one or more elements of a ground of defense have been submitted to the jury and other elements have been omitted. There was nothing left to find in connection with special issue no. 2, which could have been found by the trial court or by this court. Neither is there any implied finding that can be supplied by presumption which would support the judgment of the trial court in connection with the answer to special issue no. 1.
We find no merit in the contentions made by appellee in his motion for rehearing and the same is overruled.

. Minneapolis-Moline Oo. v. Purser, 361 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.Civ.App., 1962, wr. ref. n. r. e.); Hendricks v. Moore, 156 Tex. 570, 297 S.W.2d 811 (1957); Billington v. Vest, 268 S.W.2d 705, (Tex.Civ.App., 1954, n. w. h.).

. Guadalupe-Bianco River Authority v. City of San Antonio, 145 Tex. 611, 200 S.W.2d 989 (1947) — “It is true the conveyance to the City and the lease to GBRA -were evidenced by separate instruments, but these instruments were all executed at the same time as the result of a common understanding to consummate one overall transaction, and are therefore to be construed together as one contract.” Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472, 475 (1942) — “It is the settled rule in this State, * * * that written contracts executed in different instruments whereby a single transaction or purpose is consummated are to be taken and construed together as one contract.”

. Grossmann v. Barney, 359 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.Civ.App.1962, ref. n.r.e.); Martin v. Roberts, 57 Tex. 564, 567-568 (1882).

. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Musick, (Tex.), 379 S.W.2d 297 (1964); Crews v. Harlan, 99 Tex. 93, 87 S.W. 656, 658 (1905); Harling v. Creech, 88 Tex. 300, 31 S.W. 357 (1895) ; Milburns Manuf’g Co. v. Peak, 89 Tex. 209, 34 S.W. 102, 103 (1896). As stated in the ease last cited: “In case of sale, the property in the goods passes to the ven-dee, and, though the contract expressly provide for the reservation or retention of the title by the vendor until the purchase money be paid, the statute fixes its status as a mortgage; and the relationship between the parties is that of mortgagor and mortgagee.”

. Ford v. Oliphant, 32 S.W. 437 (Tex. Civ.App., 1895, n.w.h.); Hubbs v. Marshall, 175 S.W. 716 (Tex.Civ.App., 1915, n.w.h.); 51 Tex.Jur.2d, Sales, Sec. 333, p. 54.

. Bowden v. Waggoner, 210 S.W. 605 (Tex.Civ.App., 1919, wr. ref.); 51 Tex. Jur.2d, Sales, Sec. 333, p. 53.

. Powell v. Rockow, 127 Tex. 209, 92 S.W. 2d 437 (1936), in which the court, speaking through Judge Hickman, said, “The burden is upon one seeking to have a contract canceled to establish that he is equitably entitled to that relief. Adams v. Hill (Tex.Civ.App.) 149 S.W. 349 (writ refused). The Roekows came into a court asking it to undo their contract. In order to be entitled to that relief, it was not enough that they merely establish fraud, but the burden was upon them to disclose a situation that made it not inequitable to grant it. This principle is well established.”

. Rosson’s own testimony established that the machine had picked fifty bales of cotton during the time he used it. Even at thirty cents a pound for an average bale of five hundred pounds, the value of the cotton picked by said machine would be $7,500.00; and at a cost of Thirty Dollars a bale, the picking cost to Rosson would be $1,500.00.

. Appellee herein has relied upon the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in the case of Moore v. Hendricks, 290 S.W. 2d 758. That decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Texas in Hendricks v. Moore, 156 Tex. 570, 297 S.W. 2d 811 (1957), and the judgment of the trial court (modified to the extent of a credit of $179.50 in favor of the buyer) was affirmed, as so modified. The Supreme Court held that the buyer there was not entitled to a recission but was relegated to an action for damages for partial failure of consideration, citing among other eases, Wright v. Davenport, 44 Tex. 164 (1875), and Allison Ranch Co. v. Angelo Auto Electric, Inc., 145 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Civ.App., 1940, wr. dism. w.o.j.), which last two cases we relied upon in the original opinion herein. Another recent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas which supports our original disposition of this case is General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Musick, 379 S.W.2d 297 (decided May 13, 1964). That case cites with approval J. B. Colt Co. v. Reeves, 266 S.W. 564 (Tex.Civ.App., 1924, n.w.h.), which decision we also relied on in our original opinion herein.

. Dallas Railway and Terminal Company v. Gossett, 156 Tex. 252, 294 S.W.20 377, 380 (1956); Casualty Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1939)..