Court Opinion

ID: 9948368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 21:03:44.640925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:29.423705
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/6/24 P. v. Zavala CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085859
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. CR-18-009772)
                    v.

    RAYMOND LUIS ZAVALA,                                                                  OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Shawn D.
Bessey, Judge.
         Candace Hale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
       Appellant Raymond Luis Zavala appeals following the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code1 former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).2 The parties
agree that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s petition at the prima facie stage of
the statutory proceedings. Upon review of the record and arguments, we agree and
therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In December 2018, appellant and four codefendants (Stephen Tisdale, Mariah
Silva, Pedro Araiza, & Rodrigo Gomez) were charged in a criminal complaint with
multiple counts of murder and attempted murder. Appellant himself was charged in
several of the included counts.
       Count I charged appellant, Tisdale, and Silva with the murder of James Chisum.
An included enhancement and special circumstance alleged that all three acted
intentionally, deliberately, and with premeditation and were active participants in a
criminal street gang. Two other enhancements alleged that Tisdale “personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury or death to
another person,” while appellant and Silva “were principals in the foregoing offence.”
       Count IV charged appellant, Tisdale, and Silva with the attempted murder of
Debra Petrina. Included enhancements alleged that all three acted intentionally,
deliberately, with premeditation, and for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Two other
enhancements alleged that Tisdale “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
proximately caused great bodily injury or death to another person,” while appellant and
Silva “were principals in the foregoing offence.”

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2        Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change
in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

                                              2.
       Count V charged appellant, Tisdale, and Silva of another attempted murder, this
time of Randell Keene. Included enhancements alleged that all three acted intentionally,
deliberately, with premeditation, and for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Two other
enhancements alleged that Tisdale “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and
proximately caused great bodily injury or death to another person,” while appellant and
Silva “were principals in the foregoing offence.”
       Count VII charged appellant, Tisdale, and Silva with participating in a street gang.
       Count IX charged appellant and Tisdale with permitting a child to suffer under
circumstances likely to cause great bodily injury or death, related to conduct against an
18-month-old child. An enhancement alleged that both personally used firearms in the
offense.
       Finally, appellant was alleged to have suffered a prior serious felony conviction
for robbery.
       Appellant entered into a plea agreement prior to his preliminary hearing. He
agreed to plead no contest to “an attempted [section ]187, attempted murder charge,
nonpremeditated” and “also admit an enhancement pursuant to [section] 12022.5[,
subdivision ](a), personal use of a firearm.” For the factual basis, the prosecutor stated
that appellant “attempted to kill Debra Perina … when the defendant personally used a
.22-caliber rifle during the commission of this attempted murder.” The prosecutor noted
that those facts “and any other facts that might be contained in the affidavit in support of
the search warrant as well as the arrest warrant” supported the charge. Appellant
stipulated to those facts.
       When it came time to enter the no contest plea, the court asked appellant how he
would plead to the allegation he committed felony murder “in that you willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously and with malice aforethought attempted to murder Debra
Perina.” After appellant stated, “No contest,” the court began to ask, “Do you want the
premeditation—,” before the prosecutor explained, “[T]his is going to be a[n] attempted

                                             3.
murder in the second degree and not first degree. It would have been seven to life if it
was with the premeditation.” The court then asked if appellant admitted to the personal
use of a firearm “as a violation of section 12022.5[, subdivision ](a). That’s actually a
lesser of the enhancement alleged in Count IV.” Appellant admitted the allegation.
       Based on this plea, the remaining charges were dismissed, and appellant was
sentenced to a total term of 10 years in prison.
       In May 2022, appellant petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6. The
People opposed, arguing appellant was the shooter in the attempted murder and that he
was generally convicted for his own conduct, not under a natural and probable
consequences theory. In support of this claim, the People submitted the search warrant
affidavit noted in the plea agreement.
       The affidavit described Perina’s shooting. According to Perina, she was standing
on her front porch when a silver car approached. A Hispanic man exited the car and
began yelling at her in Spanish. Perina did not recognize or know the man and did not
understand what he was yelling. The man got back into the car, and Perina turned around
to go back into her house. After she turned around, she heard several gunshots and
believed she was struck by two. Police found a “Winchester #8 shot 20-gauge spent
shotgun shell,” two “.380 spent casings,” and one “live .380 casing” at the scene of the
shooting. Notably, although not related to Perina’s shooting, four “live .22 caliber long
cartridges” were found at the scene of Chisum’s murder that related to count I, which was
dismissed.
       On February 17, 2023, the trial court held a hearing and denied appellant’s
petition. Looking at the plea agreement, the court concluded appellant’s plea to
attempted murder and admission to personally using a firearm meant he had failed to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility.
       This appeal timely followed.

                                             4.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides that one convicted of attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine may file a petition to have the
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when (1) an
information was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under
a theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder after either a trial or
accepting a plea in lieu of a trial, and (3) the petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective
January 19, 2019.
       Prior to the statutory changes relevant here, an accomplice could be found guilty
of attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences theory of liability. The
intent to kill could be imputed to the accomplice from the actual killer or perpetrator.
(People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1007.) Following the changes, however,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine has been eliminated.
       To be liable for attempted murder, the prosecution must establish that appellant
held a specific intent to kill, and he committed a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing. (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) As
an aider and abettor, appellant may be guilty of attempted murder if he aided and
encouraged an attempted murder knowing of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and
intending to facilitate the killing. (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623–624.) In
other words, “the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend
to kill.” (Id. at p. 624.)
       Returning to the resentencing statute, section 1172.6, subdivision (c) explains:
“After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court

                                              5.
shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show cause,
it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”
       “[W]hen assessing the prima facie showing, the trial court should assume all facts
stated in the section [1172.6] petition are true. [Citation.] The trial court should not
evaluate the credibility of the petition’s assertions, but it need not credit factual assertions
that are untrue as a matter of law—for example, a petitioner’s assertion that a particular
conviction is eligible for relief where the crime is not listed … as eligible for
resentencing. Just as in habeas corpus, if the record ‘contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition … the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.’ [Citation.] However, this authority to make
determinations without conducting an evidentiary hearing … is limited to readily
ascertainable facts from the record (such as the crime of conviction), rather than
factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion (such as
determining whether the petitioner showed reckless indifference to human life in the
commission of the crime).” (People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 980, fourth
bracketed insertion in original, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961–963.)
       In this case, the parties agree the trial court erred in determining appellant had not
made a prima facie showing of eligibility. Upon review, this court accepts the parties’
position. Appellant pleaded no contest to a charge alleging appellant was a participant in
a multi-party attempted murder. While the charge alleged appellant acted intentionally,
deliberately, with premeditation, and with malice aforethought, the only enhancements
identifying a shooter charged Tisdale with shooting the victims. Appellant and Silva
were charged with enhancements alleging they were principals in the offenses under
street gang provisions.
       When appellant pleaded no contest, it was to an attempted murder charge that did
not include premeditation—thus justifying the seven-year sentence as to that charge.

                                               6.
(See § 664, subd. (a) [“However, if the crime attempted is willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, as defined in Section 189, the person guilty of that attempt shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole. If the
crime attempted is any other one in which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or
death, the person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for five, seven, or nine years.”].) And although appellant admitted using a firearm
in the offense, he was not charged with nor admitted firing that weapon. Further inquiry
shows that the firearm appellant stated he possessed was not one associated with
ammunition found at the scene of the attempted murder.
       Accordingly, the record contains several conflicts in the evidence that prevent a
determination at the prima facie stage that appellant’s resentencing eligibility claims were
false. Although the record implies appellant was acting with intent to kill as part of a
gang-based attempt to commit murder, it does not preclude a finding that appellant was
merely present and armed when a codefendant independently committed the attempted
murder. Under this later theory, appellant’s conviction could potentially rest on a now
eliminated natural and probable consequences theory. As the People suggest, an
evidentiary hearing is required to resolve these conflicts.
       At the prima facie stage, the trial court could not have resolved these factual
disputes and thus could not have concluded appellant was, in fact, ineligible for
resentencing. Appellant was therefore entitled to a show cause hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c).3

3      As we vacate the order on statutory grounds, we need not reach appellant’s due process
claims regarding factfinding at the prima facie stage.

                                              7.
                                     DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct a
hearing to determine whether to vacate appellant’s conviction, recall his sentence, and
resentence him.

                                            8.