Court Opinion

ID: 9763536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:48:41.038722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:45.690190
License: Public Domain

Henderson, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
The reversal in this case is based upon a finding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in commenting upon the case made out by the State, at the close of the State’s testimony. In the context, I think the comment imported only that the State had made out a prima facie case, and the opinion recognizes that, so construed, the comment would not be prejudicial error, if error at all. Even if the comment can fairly be said to go to the weight of the evidence, I think the present rules would not forbid such comment, provided the final determination is left to the jury. Compare Rule 739 e, and Rule 554 (formerly Rule 6 b. G.R.P.P., Pt. Three, III). The purpose of the rules was to restore to a trial judge much of the common law power which had been whittled away under the State practice. See Explanatory Notes, Code (1947 supp.) pp. 2077-2082, and 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 2551, 2551a. Even before the adoption of these rules, it was held that, ordinarily, a caution to the jury that they should disregard any expression of opinion by the court, and that they are the final judges, would cure the error. Cf. Western Maryland Dairy Corporation v. Brown, 169 Md. 257, 268, and Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 288, certiorari denied 316 U. S. 680.
*457I am also disturbed by the holding that the error was so plain that it should be noticed by this court, even though no objection was made. Our prior decisions have consistently taken the view that failure to object is a waiver, and that any other rule would prevent the trial court from correcting what may have been a mere inadvertence. See Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643; Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488; Asner v. State, 193 Md. 68; and cases cited. The fact that the accused was not represented by counsel would not seem to call for the application of a different rule. Cf. Jackson v. State, 214 Md. 454, 460. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter admonished, in his concurring opinion in Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 202, we should not “turn a criminal appeal into a quest for error.”
In any event, I cannot find that the accused was prejudiced by the comment. The accused had indicated in his opening statement to the jury, at the outset of the trial, that his defense was based solely on his contention that he had not signed the name of the unknown or fictitious payee. He never denied that he had uttered the check, in an attempt to obtain money by falsely representing himself as the payee. When he took the stand, he admitted that he impersonated the payee, and merely denied that he had admitted to the police that he had made and signed the check, and swore that he had found it on the street, fully executed. Even if the trial court had directed a verdict in his favor on the forgery charge (and there was evidence to go to the jury as to that), the conviction on the false pretense charge would still be valid. Indeed, his sworn admission in open court and on the stand was virtually a plea of guilty. Beard v. State, 216 Md. 302; McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 341. The sentence of two years was supportable on the charge of attempted false pretense alone.
I find no merit in the contention that the accused was compelled to take the stand in violation of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Compare Barber v. State, 191 Md. 555, 556, and Davis v. State, 168 Md. 10, 12. I also find no violation of his constitutional right to counsel, *458under the circumstances of this case. Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455. See also Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U. S. 504. I think the judgment should be affirmed.