Court Opinion

ID: 9737406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:24:16.985342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:58.683451
License: Public Domain

Marilyn Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. A review of the chronology of events is helpful here.
The parties entered into a stipulation for obtaining findings from a handwriting expert on May 27, 1988. The expert, in examining the hate letter, found fingerprints on it and suggested to plaintiffs counsel that the prints might help in disclosing the author of the letter. By then the trial court *149had memorialized the stipulation in its June 13, 1988, protective order.
Plaintiffs counsel took immediate action on the handwriting expert’s idea and, presumably, sought concurrence from defense counsel, who refused. Plaintiffs counsel next filed a motion to compel the fingerprinting suggested by the handwriting expert. It was then one week after entry of the protective order. No results had been obtained pursuant to the stipulation with respect to analysis of the handwriting. It was not until July 20 that the handwriting report was submitted to the parties.
The trial court denied the June 24 motion in the belief that it lacked the discretion to compel non-parties to be fingerprinted for discovery purposes. At this point, I believe, the judge abused his discretion. First, as pointed out by the majority, the court was mistaken in concluding that the taking and furnishing of fingerprints by a non-party is unconstitutional. Secondly, the court did have the discretion to modify its June 13 protective order to permit discovery if it would further the ends of justice.
The fact that the protective order was based on a stipulation of counsel was not an insuperable bar to amendment. Our Court recognized that principle in People v Patricia Williams, 153 Mich App 582, 588-589; 396 NW2d 805 (1986), when it quoted 73 Am Jur 2d, Stipulations, § 14, pp 550-551:
It is generally held that relief may be afforded from a stipulation which has been entered into as the result of inadvertence, improvidence, or excusable neglect, provided that the situation has not materially changed to the prejudice of the antagonist and that the one seeking relief has been reasonably diligent in doing so. It is also generally recognized that relief may be had from a stipula*150tion where there has been a change in conditions or unforeseen developments which would render its enforcement inequitable, provided there has been diligence in discovering the facts relative to the disputed matter, the application is timely, and the opposing party has not so changed his position as to be prejudiced to a greater extent than the applicant.
Some cases have expressed the view that relief from a stipulation may properly be granted whenever it appears that some inequity or disadvantage may result to one of the parties, provided the other will not be prejudiced thereby. And there is some authority suggesting that relief from stipulations executed as a result of a mistake of law should be granted as a matter of course, at least where such relief would not constitute an injustice to the opposing party. A stipulation entered into under a mistake as to a material fact concerning the ascertainment of which there has been reasonable diligence exercised is the proper subject for relief.
It appears to me that the discovery of fingerprints on the hate note after counsel stipulated to the handwriting analysis constituted an unforeseen development. That development rendered inequitable the enforcement of the stipulation allowing dismissal of any suspect who was not unquestionably found by the handwriting expert to have written the note. I believe plaintiffs counsel acted diligently after learning that fingerprints existed on the note. The defense would not have been prejudiced by a granting of the motion, since it had not changed its position nor relied on the stipulation to its detriment.
I would remand for a hearing before the trial eourt to determine whether there was cause to amend the order and permit the discovery by fingerprinting sought by plaintiff.