Court Opinion

ID: 9637865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:24:19.984729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:01.358773
License: Public Domain

Justice WALLACE
dissenting.
For the first time our Court condones a warrantless search of a home under the emergency aid doctrine based on an open line 9-1-1 call. I cannot agree, and therefore I respectfully dissent.
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring warrants to be issued on probable cause. Any warrantless search is considered invalid until the State shows that the warrantless search “falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 455, 795 A.2d 250 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“An individual’s privacy interests are nowhere more clearly defined or rigorously protected by the courts than in the home[,] the core of [Fjourth [Ajmendment rights.” State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 625, 775 A.2d 1273 (2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Therefore, “[a] warrantless *613search of a person’s home ‘must be subjected to particularly careful scrutiny.’ ” State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 160, 843 A.2d 1132 (2004) (quoting State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 583, 560 A.2d 644, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 936, 110 S.Ct. 330, 107 L.Ed.2d 320 (1989)). This Court set out the heavy burden that the State bears when justifying a warrantless entry and search of a home by stating:
[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. Accordingly, it is well established that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, and hence prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
[State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 467, 463, 561 A.2d 1142 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted).]
Recently, the United States Supreme Court also emphasized that principle. “At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion. With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2041-42, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he ‘emergency aid’ doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274, 555 A.2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J.A.D., concurring and dissenting), rev’d on dissent, 118 N.J. 406, 571 A.2d 1304 (1990). To satisfy that exception, the State must show three elements: “ ‘(1) the existence of an emergency as viewed objectively[;] (2) a search not motivated by a desire to find evidence[;] and (3) a nexus between the search and the emergency.’ ” Cassidy, supra, 179 N.J. at 161, 843 A.2d 1132 (quoting Scott, supra, 231 N.J.Super. at 275, 555 A.2d 667). In determining whether the first prong of that three-part test is met, we have explained that an emergency situation exists only when police officers, firefighters or other public officials “are confronted with evidence which would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act on that information, even if ultimately found erroneous.” Id. at 161, 843 A.2d 1132. Stated another way, “the question is would the officers ‘have been *614derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise.’ ” Id. at 163, 843 A.2d 1132 (citation omitted).
In Cassidy, we recently addressed application of the emergency aid exception when the State seized weapons following a domestic violence dispute under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21d. Id. at 162-63, 843 A.2d 1132. There, we explained that although N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21d allowed for the removal of weapons from the premises of a domestic violence situation if an officer believes the victim is in danger, there was no emergency that justified the invasion of the defendant’s home because: (1) his home was not the scene of domestic violence that night; (2) there was no active altercation underway when police arrived; (3) the domestic violence incident complained of had occurred a month prior to the search; and (4) the parties had not been in contact for several days prior to the search. Id. at 163-64, 843 A.2d 1132. Thus, we refused to expand the emergency aid exception and adhered to this State’s tradition of applying that exception only when there is a reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed. Id. at 163, 843 A.2d 1132; see also State v. Garbin, 325 N.J.Super. 521, 526-27, 739 A.2d 1016 (App. Div.1999) (holding warrantless entry into garage permissible because of smoke emanating from structure), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 560, 753 A.2d 1153 (2000); State v. Garland, 270 N.J.Super. 31, 45-46, 636 A.2d 541 (App.Div.) (allowing search of hotel room when police were told that children were left alone and search was focused on ascertaining their whereabouts and welfare), certif. denied, 136 N.J. 296, 642 A.2d 1005 (1994).
After analyzing the totality of circumstances here, I find insufficient evidence to demonstrate that there were reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed in defendant’s home. The police did act reasonably when they responded to the open line 9-1-1 call that originated from defendant’s home because they did not know whether the call was an emergency or not. However, once defendant denied making the 9-1-1 call and offered a reasonable explanation for the call, the police no longer had a reasonable basis to believe someone was in need of assistance. Although
*615Gelber claimed that his suspicion was heightened by defendant’s nervousness and his refusal to consent to a home search, neither of these grounds has ever been considered sufficient to overcome the heavy burden of justifying a warrantless search of a person’s home in this State. See State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47-48, 573 A.2d 1376 (1990) (holding nervousness alone was insufficient to create probable cause to search without warrant); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 7, 70 S.Ct. 468, 471, 94 L.Ed. 599 (1950) (holding refusal to consent can never be used as evidence of a crime).
Further, the second test telephone call to the open line that resulted in a busy signal provided no additional justification under the totality of the circumstances analysis. First and most significant, defendant cooperated, quickly retrieved two portable phones, and demonstrated that the line rang. Second, there are countless reasons a telephone line might ring busy, including that it was a dedicated computer line. Third, there had been no prior distress calls from defendant’s address. Fourth, as noted in footnote three of the majority opinion, the dispatcher had received three other open line 9-1-1 calls of unknown origin in that shift alone. Like Cassidy, there was no contemporaneous request for assistance or any other reasonable indication that someone inside the home was in need of assistance once defendant cooperated. Under those circumstances, Gelber would not have been “derelict in his duty” if he did not search defendant’s home at that point, because his investigation produced no corroborating evidence to support a reasonable belief that someone inside was in need of assistance. Thus, any belief in a potential emergency was reduced to a mere hunch and any further search required a warrant.
Although I agree with the majority opinion that this is a close case, I disagree that the State met its heavy burden to justify the warrantless search of defendant’s home. Because I conclude the evidence here was insufficient to justify such a search, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the *616judgment of the Law Division granting defendant’s motion to suppress.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and ALBIN — 5.
For reversal — Justice WALLACE — 1.