Court Opinion

ID: 9531343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:10:01.006464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:25.202114
License: Public Domain

JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 44. {dissenting). I dissent. While I certainly do not believe that all exculpatory agreements should be upheld, the majority opinion will render it virtually impossible to enforce any exculpatory agreement in Wisconsin. The majority concludes that the agreement in this case is unenforceable as against public policy for three reasons: 1) the agreement is overly broad; 2) the agreement serves two purposes; and 3) there was no opportunity for the signer to bargain or negotiate over the exculpatory language. Majority op., ¶ 18. These factors originate from this court's decision in Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017-19, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994). I disagree with the majority's application of factors one and two and while I am bound to accept the legitimacy of *329the third factor, I question the manner in which the third factor is applied in this case. Further, the majority fails to articulate a clear test as to what types of exculpatory agreements are enforceable in this state. The majority applies the above three factors in such a fashion so as to leave little possibility that any exculpatory agreement could be enforceable in this state.
¶ 45. The law governing the enforceability of exculpatory agreements in Wisconsin has been anything but consistent and this court has, through its various articulations of standards applicable to such agreements, failed to ever adhere to a consistent test for determining their validity. While parties wishing to execute such agreements certainly have a plethora of cases explaining when such agreements are not enforceable, our jurisprudence has not provided a beacon for litigants to successfully navigate the rocky waters of this area of the law.
¶ 46. The last time this court had the opportunity to examine the validity of exculpatory agreements in Wisconsin, we noted that our previous cases had used a variety of tests to evaluate the legitimacy of such agreements. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 81-83, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996). We explained that although our past cases had not adhered to a single test, they all had a single common thread tying them together: "[t]hese cases, in different ways, involved an exculpatory clause that failed to disclose to the signers exactly what rights they were waiving." Id. at 81. After analyzing our prior jurisprudence, including Richards, this court distilled a two-part test governing the legitimacy of exculpatory agreements:
While the law grudgingly accepts the proposition that people may contract away their liability right to recovery for negligently caused injuries, the document *330must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably express this intention. Furthermore, the document when looked at in its entirety must clearly and unequivocally communicate the nature and significance of the waiver.
Id. at 88-89. The majority in this case reverts back to the test used in Richards while ignoring the lessons of Yauger.
¶ 47. Before analyzing the exculpatory agreement, it is important to set forth precisely the nature and contents of the agreement and consider the form on which it appears as a whole.1 The agreement in question is contained on an index card that is five and one-half inches by five and one-half inches. The card reads:
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That is the entirety of the agreement at question in this case.
¶ 48. The first reason the majority provides for striking down the exculpatory agreement contained on this card is: "this exculpatory waiver, which uses the word 'fault,' is overly broad and all-inclusive." Majority op., ¶ 18. The majority reasons that the language is ambiguous, could potentially cover a variety of claims, does not include the word "negligence," and states that it is unclear whether the risk of drowning was within the signer's contemplation. Majority op., ¶¶ 19-22.
¶ 49. "Fault," as understood by a layperson, is defined as "[a] mistake; an error" or"[responsibility for a mistake or an offense; culpability." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 665 (3d ed. 1992). Thus, the clear meaning of the first clause in the waiver is that the signer agrees to assume all liability for herself, without regard to who is responsible for any mistake leading to an injury. This language plainly covers negligent conduct. The fact that the legal definition of "fault" covers reckless and intentional acts, majority op., ¶ 19, is not dispositive. As the majority *332correctly indicates, waivers may not be enforced to prevent liability for reckless or intentional conduct. Id. However, neither reckless nor intentional conduct is at issue in this case. The fact that the waiver may be unenforceable as to other tortious acts is not germane; the relevant inquiry is whether "the exculpatory clause . .. fail[s] to disclose to the signers exactly what rights they were waiving[,]" and whether the agreement unambiguously and unmistakably covers the tortious act at issue. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 81, 86.
¶ 50. When read in context of the remaining language of the waiver release statement, the meaning of the first sentence, containing the word "fault," becomes even clearer. See Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶ 28 n.11, ¶ 29, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857 (words and phrases of a contract are to be read in context of the contract's other language in determining ambiguity). The second sentence of the waiver provides: "I FURTHER AGREE TO HOLD HARMLESS SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER, OR ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES FOR ANY CONDITIONS OR INJURY THAT MAY RESULT TO MYSELF WHILE AT THE SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER." Thus, when the first two sentences of the waiver are read together in context, an ordinary reader would understand that she is agreeing to hold Swimwest harmless for any injuries she suffers while at Swimwest that are due to mistakes or errors for which Swimwest is responsible. In other words, a layperson would understand that the waiver applies to any negligent acts of Swimwest or its employees.
¶ 51. However, the majority argues that the decedent would not have contemplated the injury that occurred, majority op., ¶ 22, and focuses on the fact that the agreement does not contain the word "negli*333gence." Majority op., ¶ 20. The decedent in this case went to a facility called "Swimwest" in order to swim laps as part of her physical therapy. Majority op., ¶ 3. She took her time to read the waiver and then signed it. Id., ¶¶ 5, 25. Yet, the majority somehow concludes that the decedent did not contemplate the risk of drowning. Regardless of whatever other activities the waiver may or may not cover, it is almost inconceivable that a reasonable person would not understand that, at a minimum, a waiver at an aquatic facility would cover the risk of drowning. What else would such a waiver cover if not the risk of drowning?
¶ 52. Must a business list in the waiver each and every conceivable form of negligence that may result in injury to a patron? The majority opinion would seem to so indicate. Majority op., ¶ 22 ("Wilson likely would not have contemplated drowning in a four-foot deep pool with a lifeguard on duty."). Listing the myriad of ways in which the proprietor or its agents could he negligent would be unduly burdensome to a business and would necessitate a waiver that is much more than one page in length. Such a waiver, in addition to being quite lengthy, would certainly not be easy to read or understand.
¶ 53. In Yauger, this court cited with approval guidelines originally developed for the Uniform Commercial Code that govern warranty disclaimers. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.2. One of the guidelines is that "the language of the negligence waiver should be readable. . . . and should not be written in legal jargon." Id. (quoting Stephanie J. Greer & Hurlie H. Collier, The Conspicuousness Requirement: Litigating and Drafting Contractual Indemnity Provisions in Texas After Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 243, 265-70, Apr. 1994). By focusing on the *334absence of a legal term of art in the waiver— "negligence" — and the fact that the waiver did not precisely mention the exact negligent act leading to injury in this case, the majority's rationale runs afoul of the principle that waivers should be easy to read and should not contain legal jargon.
¶ 54. Next, the majority concludes that the waiver does not provide "adequate notice of the waiver's nature and significance" because it serves two purposes. Majority op., ¶ 23. The majority states that as in Richards and Yauger, the exculpatory language here is part of a larger registration form. Majority op., ¶ 23. However, the waiver in this case is part of a simple five and one-half inch by five and one-half inch index card. The only part of the card containing contiguous complete sentences is the waiver. The remainder of the form is comprised of mere blank lines for the reader to fill in his or her contact information.
¶ 55. Thus, the waiver is the only part of the form for a patron to read. The form of the waiver in this case stands in stark contrast to the waiver in Yauger, which was "one paragraph in a form containing five separate paragraphs" that did not stand out from the other language. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87. Here, the exculpatory language is the only language on the form to be read. This is not a case where the exculpatory language is located in fine print at the end of a multi-page document or even a case where the waiver is located in the midst of several paragraphs on a single page form. Aside from the blanks for contact information, the waiver is the form.
¶ 56. While the top portion of the card does contain blanks for the signer to supply his or her contact information, such information would seem to be a necessary part of the waiver itself, as if injury did occur, *335it seems logical that the facility would he in need of the injured patron's contact information. The fact that the top portion of the card is entitled "GUEST REGISTRATION" does not somehow alter the inherent nature of the form. Indeed, one of the guidelines cited in Yauger is that the waiver should be separately labeled to distinguish it from other parts of the agreement. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.2.
¶ 57. The majority also stresses that there is not a separate signature line for the waiver. Majority op., ¶ 23. However, the signature line on the form is located directly under the exculpatory language, unlike the waiver in Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1013. One has to wonder why there would need to be a separate signature line under the blank lines in the top portion of the form.
¶ 58. The exculpatory language in this case satisfies the guidelines cited in Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.2. The waiver is conspicuous, as it is the only "paragraph" on the form. The waiver is set off from the remainder of the form in a separately titled section. The waiver is easy to locate. The waiver appears directly above a signature line and the waiver is the only portion of the document requiring a signature. The heading before the waiver is not misleading. The waiver itself is written in plain, easy to read language and does not contain an abundance of legal jargon. The waiver is written in large print. In other words, there is no doubt that the waiver is conspicuous and informs the signer of its nature and significance.
¶ 59. Yet, the majority concludes that the waiver "was not distinguishable enough." Majority op., ¶ 24. Apparently, the waiver would have been distinguishable if it appeared on a separate card, or if the form was multicolored and had but one more signature line, or if *336Swimwest had not utilized capital letters when asking for contact information. Id., ¶¶ 23-24. This type of analysis elevates form over substance and fails to consider the form on which the exculpatory clause appears as whole.
¶ 60. The majority states that it is clarifying the law in Wisconsin concerning exculpatory clauses. Majority op., ¶ 10. However, its application of these first two factors has done just the opposite. In Yauger we stated that a waiver appearing on a form with other language should be conspicuously labeled, set apart, and should stand out from the rest of the form. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 & n.2. Here, this was done. Yet, the majority uses the very fact that the "Waiver Release Statement" is labeled separately from the "Guest Registration" portion to conclude that the form serves two purposes and thus does not provide adequate notice of the significance and nature of the waiver. Majority op., ¶ 23. In Yauger, we suggested that a waiver should be easy to read and should not be written in legalese. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 & n.2. Yet, the majority faults Swimwest for not utilizing a legal term of art— "negligence" — in its waiver, and for not listing the precise act of negligence that allegedly occurred in this case. Majority op., ¶¶ 20, 22.
¶ 61. Further, as close reading of Yauger indicates, a document "serving two purposes" is not in and of itself questionable. Rather, the concern arises that the signer may not be aware of the nature and significance of the waiver when a document serves two purposes and the waiver is not conspicuous. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86-88. This concern is not present here because the waiver is conspicuous and, read in context, clearly indicates what is being waived. Thus, the fact *337that the form on which it appears arguably serves two purposes should not be dispositive.
¶ 62. Finally, the majority concludes that the waiver is not valid because "there was no opportunity for Wilson to bargain over the exculpatory language[.]" Majority op., ¶ 25. This "bargaining" requirement originated in Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1019-20, and was not based on any existing case law. The "bargaining" requirement was not utilized in Yauger. The dissent in Richards, which I joined, indicated that this requirement was hot based on existing law and discussed the inherent problems with such a requirement. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1035-43 (Day, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent in Richards queried:
[W]hat does it mean to "negotiate" in this context, and how would [a] company ensure that the negotiations were "equal"? Are we to assess the competency of [the plaintiff] to negotiate and assume that any deficiencies must somehow be compensated for in substance by the company? ... Or is it suggested that the company must appoint someone to help [the plaintiff] draft a counter-proposal? Must the company then negotiate — in good faith, of course — about which terms of its own release it might be willing to drop in "negotiations"? And what if, despite very skilled and fair negotiations on both sides, [the plaintiff] nevertheless agrees to accept the full release.
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1041 (Day, J., dissenting).
¶ 63. It is entirely impractical to require "bargaining" in this context. Almost all releases are printed on standardized forms and are a condition precedent to the use of recreational facilities. Such releases are utilized by aquatic facilities, athletic clubs, ski resorts, canoeing and rafting outfits, and other high-risk ventures such as skydiving and bungee jumping. Many of these busi*338nesses are small firms whose continued existence is based on high customer volume. Must the owner of such business, or other person with the authority to negotiate, be present at the desk of such facility during all hours of operation? Must the proprietor employ a full-time attorney whose duties include negotiating with every person in the long line of skiers waiting to brave the slopes? These businesses would grind to a halt under such practices or, at the very least, face long lines of angry customers.
¶ 64. The reality is that there is almost never an opportunity to "bargain" over exculpatory clauses, as the majority describes it. Rarely do ordinary consumers in today's fast-paced global economy have an "opportunity" to bargain over any of the terms of a contract (other than perhaps the price), as the majority describes "bargaining." The only meaningful "bargaining" tool that an ordinary consumer possesses is his or her choice to frequent another business.
¶ 65. While Richards has not been overruled and I am bound to accept the lack of the "opportunity to bargain" as a legitimate factor in the analysis of exculpatory agreements, the use of the "bargaining" factor in this case is particularly troublesome in light of the majority's refusal to set forth a workable standard describing what would satisfy the "opportunity to bargain" requirement and its failure to decide whether a single objectionable factor is sufficient to render an exculpatory clause invalid. Majority op., ¶ 18 n. 7. Richards, which utilized the "bargaining" test, noted that no one factor alone was sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory agreement. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1011. Yauger, which did not discuss the bargaining factor, came to the opposite conclusion and held the presence *339of one factor was sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory clause. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.1.
¶ 66. The majority fails to resolve this dispute and leaves open the possibility that even an exculpatory clause that is expertly drafted, conspicuous, and appears on a separate document may be invalidated merely because the signer had no "opportunity to bargain." As such, the majority places the legitimacy of all exculpatory agreements in doubt. If this court wishes to invalidate all exculpatory clauses, then it should so hold, rather than burdening businesses with confusing requirements that are impossible or unlikely to be met in any case.
¶ 67. Individuals have a right to know what the law is so that they may conduct their affairs in an orderly fashion. The majority has failed to articulate a clear, useable test that will provide meaningful guidance to those wishing to execute exculpatory agreements. Because the majority fails to articulate such a test, fails to apply the first two factors in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Yauger, and leaves open the possibility that the lack of an "opportunity to bargain" alone is sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory agreement, I respectfully dissent.
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 A copy of the agreement is attached as an exhibit at the end of this dissent.