Court Opinion

ID: 9900524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:02:27.866425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:07.160273
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                Before
                    HOLIFIELD, HACKEL, and KISOR
                       Appellate Military Judges

                         _________________________

                           UNITED STATES
                               Appellee

                                       v.

                       Justin T. ELLARD
               Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps
                             Appellant

                              No. 202200051

                         _________________________

                          Decided: 31 August 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                              Military Judges:
                      Nicholas S. Henry (arraignment)
                            Eric A. Catto (trial)

 Sentence adjudged 18 November 2021 by a general court-martial con-
 vened at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, consisting
 of officer and enlisted members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment:
 reduction to E-1, confinement for nine months, forfeiture of all pay and
 allowances, and a bad-conduct discharge. 1

 1 Appellant received credit for 216 days of pretrial confinement.
                 United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                              Opinion of the Court

                                 For Appellant:
                          Mr. William E. Cassara, Esq.
                 Lieutenant Christopher B. Dempsey, JAGC, USN

                                  For Appellee:
                    Lieutenant James P. Wu Zhu, JAGC, USN
                          Captain Tyler W. Blair, USMC

    Senior Judge HACKEL delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Chief Judge HOLIFIELD and Senior Judge KISOR joined.

                              _________________________

          This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
               may be cited as persuasive authority under
                NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                              _________________________

HACKEL, Senior Judge:
    A panel of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant, contrary to
his pleas, of three specifications of violating a lawful general order, one speci-
fication of aggravated assault by inflicting substantial bodily harm, and one
specification of negligently discharging a firearm, in violation of Articles 92,
128, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 2 Specifically, he neg-
ligently shot another Marine, Corporal [Cpl] Bravo. 3 Appellant also failed to
register his personal firearm as required, wrongfully stored ammunition with
his firearm while residing in the barracks, and wrongfully transported a loaded
firearm aboard the installation.
    Appellant asserts five assignments of error (AOEs), which we reorder as
follows: (1) his convictions for violating a lawful general order in violation of

    2 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 928, 934. Upon the motion of trial defense counsel, which was

unopposed by the Government, the military judge merged Charge IV (discharging of a
firearm through negligence) with Charge III (aggravated assault inflicting substantial
bodily harm) for the purposes of sentencing.
    3 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and appellate

counsel, are pseudonyms. We note that some of the witnesses in this case were active
duty Marines at the time of the incident but were no longer on active duty at the time
of trial. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to the witnesses by their ranks at the time
of the incident.

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                United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                             Opinion of the Court

Art. 92, UCMJ, are legally insufficient; (2) his conviction for aggravated as-
sault is legally and factually insufficient; (3) his convictions for Charge III (ag-
gravated assault), Charge IV (negligent discharge), and the three specifica-
tions of Charge II (violating a lawful general order) are an unreasonable mul-
tiplication of charges; (4) trial counsel committed plain error by misstating the
law and evidence in his opening statement, closing argument, and sentencing
argument; and (5) the commanding officer who issued the order at issue in
Charge I (willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer, in violation of
Art 90, UCMJ—of which Appellant was acquitted) was an accuser and his ac-
tions in ordering the preliminary hearing and recommending trial by general
court-martial created an improper referral process. 4 We find no prejudicial er-
ror and affirm.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

   “He was lucky. He was very lucky.” 5
    The basic facts are not in dispute. On 15 April 2021, while practicing draw-
ing his pistol from his new holster, Appellant accidentally shot Cpl Bravo in
the abdomen. Corporal Bravo survived the gunshot wound, which fortunately
did not pierce any internal organs. However, the injury did require Cpl Bravo
to receive emergency medical treatment and spend a few days in the hospital.
    On the evening in question, Appellant and his fellow Marines had just re-
turned from an exercise in Norway. Appellant, Cpl Bravo, Lance Corporal
[LCpl] Delta, and LCpl Alpha had picked up dinner and were eating in LCpl
Delta’s barracks room. While they were still eating and relaxing, Appellant
retrieved his new holster and practiced drawing his 9-millimeter pistol, pre-
senting it, and dry firing.
    After practicing with the weapon unloaded, Appellant loaded the weapon,
and chambered a round. He continued to practice removing the pistol from the
holster and putting it back. While doing this, Appellant pulled the trigger and
accidentally shot Cpl Bravo.

   4 We have reviewed Appellant’s fifth AOE and find it to be without merit. United

States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 363 (C.M.A. 1987); See United States v. Tittel, 53 M.J.
313 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (finding that a convening authority did not become an accuser de-
spite having given the order the accused was alleged to have disobeyed because there
was no evidence the convening authority became personally involved).
   5 Dr. Uniform—the trauma surgeon who treated the victim. R. at 251.

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                United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                             Opinion of the Court

    The Marines in LCpl Delta’s room immediately took action to help Cpl
Bravo, applying pressure to the wound and calling for emergency services. Cor-
poral Bravo was taken to the hospital where he received treatment. Corporal
Bravo’s trauma surgeon cauterized the wound and prescribed pain medication.
The bullet entered a few inches above his belly button and exited approxi-
mately seven inches across on his right side. The bullet did not pierce the per-
itoneal cavity, but passed through the skin, fat, and muscle layers of the ab-
dominal wall before exiting. Corporal Bravo remained in the hospital for sev-
eral days before being released. He suffered scarring from the bullet wound,
but no other long-term physical effects.
    The subsequent investigation revealed that Appellant possessed multiple
firearms, which he kept in his barracks room and personal vehicle, and also
kept hundreds of rounds of rifle and pistol ammunition in his barracks room.
He admitted to possessing the firearms and ammunition and to transporting a
loaded personal firearm aboard the installation.
    Additional facts will be set forth as necessary to address Appellant’s AOEs.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

A. Appellant’s Convictions are Legally and Factually Sufficient
    Appellant argues that his convictions for violations of a general order are
legally insufficient, and his conviction for aggravated assault is both legally
and factually insufficient. We review such questions de novo. 6
     To determine legal sufficiency, we ask whether, “considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable fact-finder could
have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” 7 In conduct-
ing this analysis, we must “draw every reasonable inference from the evidence
of record in favor of the prosecution.” 8 In doing so, we are mindful that
“[f]indings may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence.” 9

    6 Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ; United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F.

2002).
    7 United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (citing Jackson v. Vir-

ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
    8 United States v. Gutierrez, 74 M.J. 61, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
    9 United States v. Long, 81 M.J. 362, 368 (C.A.A.F. 2021).

                                          4
                 United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                              Opinion of the Court

    In evaluating factual sufficiency arguments raised by Appellant, we first
determine whether Appellant has made a specific showing of a deficiency of
proof. 10 To do so, Appellant “must identify a weakness in the evidence admitted
at trial to support an element (or more than one element) and explain why, on
balance, the evidence (or lack thereof) admitted at trial contradicts a guilty
finding.” 11 After Appellant has made a specific showing, “the Court may weigh
the evidence and determine controverted questions of fact.” 12 When evaluating
the evidence, we must give appropriate deference both “to the fact that the trial
court saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence,” and “to findings of fact
entered into the record by the military judge.” 13 We may only set aside (or mod-
ify) a guilty finding “[i]f, as a result of the review conducted [after the appellant
makes a specific showing of a deficiency of proof], [we are] clearly convinced
that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence.” 14

   1. Violation of a lawful general order
    Appellant was found guilty of three specifications of violating a lawful gen-
eral order for failing to register his personal firearms, wrongfully storing am-
munition with his firearm while residing in the barracks, and wrongfully
transporting a loaded firearm aboard the installation. He challenges the legal
sufficiency of these convictions.
    To convict Appellant of violating a lawful general order, the Government
was required to prove: (1) that there was in effect a certain lawful general order
or regulation; (2) that the accused had a duty to obey it; and (3) that the accused
violated or failed to obey the order or regulation. 15 “Knowledge of a general
order or regulation need not be alleged or proved as knowledge is not an ele-
ment of this offense and a lack of knowledge does not constitute a defense.” 16

   10 Art. 66(d)(1)(B).

   11 United States v. Harvey, 83 M.J. 685, 2023 CCA LEXIS 220, *11 (N-M Ct. Crim.

App. 2023).
   12 Art. 66(d)(1)(B)(ii).

   13 Art. 66(d)(1)(B)(ii).

   14 Art. 66(d)(1)(B)(iii).

   15 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) [MCM], pt. IV, para. 18.b.(1)

at IV-27.
   16 MCM, pt. IV, para. 18.c.(1)(d) at IV-27.

                                           5
                United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                             Opinion of the Court

    Appellant does not argue that the order in question—Marine Corps Instal-
lations East-Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune Order 5500.1 w/ Ch 1, Posses-
sion Registration, Use, and Sale of Privately Owned Firearms, Weapons, Am-
munition, Explosives, Fireworks, and Pyrotechnics, dated 8 May 2015
[MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJO 5500.1 w/ CH 1]—was not a lawful general order.
Rather, he argues that his convictions for the three specifications are legally
insufficient because, although knowledge is not generally an element of this
offense, this specific order requires knowledge in that it tasks commanding of-
ficers to ensure new personnel are informed of the provisions of the order. 17
Specifically, the order states that commanding officers shall “[e]nsure all newly
assigned personnel are informed of the provision of this Order, during initial
orientation, and as often thereafter as deemed necessary.” 18 Appellant relies
on United States v. Nardell, in which the Court of Military Appeals explained
that, “[i]f [an] order requires implementation by subordinate commanders to
give it effect as a code of conduct, it will not qualify as a general order for the
purpose of an Article 92 prosecution.” 19
    “No single characteristic of a general order determines whether it applies
punitively to members of a command.” 20 To be punitive, “[t]he order in its en-
tirety must demonstrate that rather than providing general guidelines for the
conduct of military functions it is basically intended to regulate conduct of in-
dividual members and that its direct application of sanctions for its violation
is self-evident.” 21
    We decline to adopt Appellant’s argument, which conflates the publication
of the order with its implementation and punitive nature. The Court in Nardell
reviewed the conviction of a Marine who had played slot machines while serv-
ing as the manager for the staff noncommissioned officer club in DaNang, Vi-
etnam, in violation of a general order. In its analysis, the Court found that the
order provided for the operation of messes, clubs, and miscellaneous nonappro-

   17 Appellant’s Brief, at 25.

   18 MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJO 5500.1 w/ CH 1, para. 15.

   19 United States v. Nardell, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 329, 45 C.M.R. 101, 103 (C.M.R.

1972).
   20 Id.

   21 Id.

                                        6
                    United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                 Opinion of the Court

priated fund activities within the command—none of which suggested a pur-
pose other than advisory or instructional. 22 The Court of Military Appeals con-
sidered the order to be predominantly instructional and directory rather than
a code of conduct, with a requirement for subordinate commanders to provide
specific notice of the prohibition leading to the charged misconduct. 23
    Here we have no concerns about the clarity or punitive nature of
MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJO 5500.1 w/ CH 1. The order regulates the behavior
of on-installation activities to “ensure the security and safety of our commu-
nity, which is essential to preserve the good order and discipline aboard
MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJ.” 24 Additionally, on its very first page, the order pro-
vides for a “punitive effect” in that [v]iolations of this Order by military per-
sonnel are punishable as violations of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice and can subject the violator to court-martial or other judicial or
administrative action.” 25 The order is clear on its face with regard to the pro-
scribed conduct and requires no implementation by subordinate commanders.
     With regard to the order’s publication, the military judge considered the
Government’s request to take judicial notice of the fact that the order was
properly published. After hearing evidence on the matter, the military judge
found that the legal requirements of publication had been met and took judicial
notice of the fact that the order was a lawful order, properly published and
promulgated, and in effect on 15 April 2021, the date Appellant shot Cpl
Bravo. 26 Notably, the military judge heard the testimony of the Marine Corps
Installations East deputy adjutant, who testified that once signed, orders are
posted on the unit website and accessible to everyone on the world wide web,
and that this process occurred for MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJO 5500.1 w/ CH
1. 27 We see nothing wrong with the military judge’s reasoning or decision to
take judicial notice, particularly after civilian defense counsel admitted having
no reason to doubt the testimony of the deputy adjutant. 28 We also note that
Appellant himself has not challenged this decision.

   22 Id. at 329-30.

   23 Id. at 330.

   24 MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJO 5500.1 w/ CH 1, para. 4.a(1).

   25 MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJO 5500.1 w/ CH 1, para. 3.a.

   26 R. at 133-46; App. Ex. XXIX; R. at 397.

   27 R. at 136-37.

   28 R. at 145.

                                          7
                United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                             Opinion of the Court

    Next, we find that the language directing commanding officers to ensure
their personnel are informed of the order does not impose an additional step in
the publication of MCIEAST-MCB CAMLEJO 5500.1 w/ CH 1. Rather, we con-
sider it as emphasis by the Commander to guarantee the safety of the instal-
lation, particularly given the potential for serious injury that can be caused by
the regulated items (firearms, ammunition, explosives, etc.). 29 As such, the re-
quirement that commanding officers ensure new personnel are aware of the
general order and its provisions does not constitute an additional implementa-
tion step necessary to give the order punitive effect.
    Moving to the substantive elements of Charge II, through Appellant’s ac-
tions and admissions to NCIS agents, we find ample evidence that Appellant
was a member of a unit located on board Camp Lejeune and therefore subject
to the order, and that he failed to register his personal firearms, wrongfully
stored ammunition with his firearm while residing in the barracks, and wrong-
fully transported a loaded firearm aboard the installation. Each of these dis-
crete actions violated the order.
    We are therefore convinced that a reasonable fact-finder could have found
all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that Appel-
lant violated a lawful general order for each of the three specifications. Accord-
ingly, Appellant’s convictions for violating a lawful general order are legally
sufficient.

    2. Aggravated Assault
   Appellant was acquitted of aggravated assault by grievous bodily harm, but
found guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault by inflicting
substantial bodily harm for shooting Cpl Bravo in the abdomen.
   For Appellant to be found guilty of aggravated assault causing substantial
bodily harm by a loaded firearm, the Government was required to prove: (1)
that the accused assaulted Cpl Bravo; (2) that substantial bodily harm was
thereby inflicted upon Cpl Bravo; and (3) that the injury was inflicted with a

    29 See United States v. Joseph, No. 201300460, 2015 CCA LEXIS 54, *10-11 (N-M.

Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2015) (finding that a general order requiring “that commanding
officers must ‘ensure that the provisions of this Order are widely publicized and that
newly joined personnel are fully briefed on the responsibilities, prohibitions and re-
strictions contained’ therein” was a punitive order because “it was intended to regulate
the conduct of service members living in barracks and was specifically implemented
for the purpose of discipline.”)

                                           8
                   United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                Opinion of the Court

loaded firearm. 30 “Substantial bodily harm” means “(i) a temporary but sub-
stantial disfigurement, or (ii) a temporary but substantial loss or impairment
of function of any bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” 31
    Appellant does not dispute that he shot Cpl Bravo. He acknowledges that
his actions were culpably negligent and Cpl Bravo was injured as a result. 32
Nonetheless, he argues that the injury Cpl Bravo sustained does not qualify as
substantial bodily harm. Specifically, Appellant argues that Cpl Bravo did not
suffer a temporary but substantial disfigurement.
    In United States v. Spearman, the Court of Military Appeals affirmed the
conviction of a Soldier found guilty of assault in which grievous bodily harm
was inflicted when he stabbed another Soldier four times with a steak knife,
leading the victim to require transportation to the hospital for his wounds and
to be stitched up after “not too much” blood loss. 33 The victim returned to duty
shortly thereafter. Like here, the appellant in Spearman argued that “grievous
bodily harm was not visited on the victim because he suffered only superficial
cuts, none of which were disfiguring or disabling.” 34 The Court disagreed with
this characterization of the victim’s injuries, finding that “the record reflects
that his wounds required hospital treatment, had to be stitched up, were ‘stab’
wounds, and that at least three of them were in an area of the body containing
the vital organs.” 35
     The losing argument put forth in Spearman carries even less weight here.
Appellant was found guilty of assault in which substantial bodily harm is in-
flicted, a lesser included offense of that charged in Spearman. Here the Gov-
ernment presented evidence that the bullet wound left a hole through Cpl
Bravo’s abdomen and left two scars on his torso. We find that the threshold for
“substantial bodily harm” is met here in Appellant’s act of shooting Cpl Bravo
in the torso, “five or six centimeters above his belly button,” with the bullet
penetrating skin, fat, and abdominal muscles, traveling through his body, and
leaving an exit wound on Cpl Bravo’s right side on the same plane as his belly

   30 MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.b.(4)(b) at IV-118.

   31 MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.c.(1)(b) at IV-118.

   32 Appellant’s Brief, at 15.

   33 United States v. Spearman, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 32, 48 C.M.R. 405, 406 (C.M.A.

1974).
   34 Id. at 33.

   35 Id.

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                United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                             Opinion of the Court

button. 36 The injury required expert medical intervention followed by several
days of recovery at the hospital for proper monitoring and wound care. Similar
to the Court in Spearman, we refuse to adopt Appellant’s contention that the
injury needed to be more severe—to have damaged internal organs or pene-
trated the peritoneal cavity, for example—to constitute substantial bodily
harm.
    We are convinced that a reasonable fact-finder could have found all the es-
sential elements beyond a reasonable doubt and conclude that Cpl Bravo’s in-
jury constitutes substantial bodily harm. Appellant’s conviction for aggravated
assault causing substantial bodily harm is therefore legally sufficient.
     Turning to factual sufficiency, we first look at whether Appellant has iden-
tified a specific deficiency in proof by identifying a weakness in the evidence
admitted at trial. 37 Appellant concedes that his actions were culpably negligent
and that Cpl Bravo suffered a gunshot wound as a result of his actions. 38 None-
theless, Appellant argues that as a matter of definition, the gunshot wound
suffered by Cpl Bravo does “not rise to the level of substantial bodily harm.” 39
We note that nothing in Appellant’s briefs specify any deficiencies in the evi-
dence; rather, Appellant reiterates his argument of legal insufficiency of the
evidence using the term, “factual sufficiency,” and attempts to import defini-
tions from Article 128a (maiming) into Article 128. 40 We disagree with Appel-
lant and see no meaningful argument that there was a specific deficiency of
proof in this case. Regardless, we are also not convinced that the finding of
guilty is against the weight of the evidence. Thus, Appellant’s conviction for
aggravated assault is factually sufficient.

   3. Negligent Discharge of a Firearm
    Appellant does not specifically challenge the legal sufficiency of his convic-
tion for negligent discharge of a firearm. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the
evidence in this case and are satisfied that Appellant’s conviction for that of-
fense is legally sufficient. As Appellant does not challenge the factual suffi-
ciency for the conviction for Charge IV, we will not address that. 41

   36 R. at 233-36.

   37 Harvey, 83 M.J. 685, 2023 CCA LEXIS 220, at *11.

   38 Appellant’s Brief at 15.

   39 Appellant’s Brief at 15.

   40 Appellant’s Brief at 12-17; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11-14.

   41 Art 66(d)(1)(B)(i).

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                United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                             Opinion of the Court

B. The Charges against Appellant were not Unreasonably Multiplied
    At trial, Appellant moved to have the three specifications of Charge II (vi-
olation of lawful general order) merged for sentencing. He also moved to have
the sole specification of Charge III (aggravated assault) and the sole specifica-
tion of Charge IV (negligent discharge of a firearm) merged for sentencing. He
did not seek to have the charges merged for findings. The military judge
merged Charges III and IV for sentencing, but denied Appellant’s request re-
garding the three specifications of Charge II. Appellant now asserts the mili-
tary judge erred in not merging Charges III and IV for findings (as opposed to
sentencing), and in not merging specifications 1 and 2 of Charge II for findings
and sentencing based on an unreasonable multiplication of charges.
    We review a military judge’s decision to deny relief for the unreasonable
multiplication of charges for an abuse of discretion. 42 “The abuse of discretion
standard is a strict one, calling for more than a mere difference of opinion. The
challenged action must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly
erroneous.” 43 When an appellant fails to raise a claim of unreasonable multi-
plication of charges at trial the issue is reviewed on appeal for plain error. 44
“For an appellant to prevail under plain error review, there must be an error,
that was clear or obvious, and which prejudiced a substantial right of the ac-
cused.” 45
    “What is substantially one transaction should not be made the basis for an
unreasonable multiplication of charges.” 46 Military courts review the non-ex-
clusive factors set forth in United States v. Quiroz to determine whether there
is an unreasonable multiplication of charges. 47 Those factors include: (1)
whether the appellant objected at trial; (2) whether each charge and specifica-
tion is aimed at distinctly separate criminal acts; (3) whether the number of
charges and specifications misrepresent or exaggerate the appellant’s crimi-

   42 United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19 (C.A.A.F. 2012).

   43 United States v. White, 69 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

   44 United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311, 313 (C.A.A.F. 20009).

   45 United States v. Coleman, 79 M.J. 100, 103 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (quoting United

States v. Tovarchavez, 78 M.J. 458, 462 (C.A.A.F. 2019)).
   46 R.C.M. 307(c)(4).

   47 United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

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                    United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                 Opinion of the Court

nality; (4) whether the number of charges and specifications unreasonably in-
crease the appellant’s punitive exposure; and (5) whether there is any evidence
of prosecutorial overreach or abuse in the drafting of the charges. 48
    First, we review Appellant’s assertion that the military judge should have
merged Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge II for findings for plain error. We look
to the Quiroz factors to determine if there was error. As explained above, Ap-
pellant did not move for merger of these specifications for findings at trial. We
find that the charges and specifications are aimed at distinctly separate crim-
inal acts—(1) failing to register his firearms as required by the instruction; and
(2) wrongfully storing ammunition with his firearm while residing in the bar-
racks—and do not misrepresent or exaggerate Appellant’s criminality. One
clearly could commit either offense while not committing the other. By facing
two specifications rather than one, Appellant’s punitive exposure increased by
two years. We do not find this increase to be unreasonable. Finally, we find no
evidence of prosecutorial overreach. Thus, we find Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that there was error, plain or otherwise.
    Second, we review the military judge’s denial of Appellant’s motion to
merge for sentencing the three specifications under Charge II for an abuse of
discretion. In denying Appellant’s motion for merger, the military judge re-
viewed the Quiroz factors and found “the violations in the specifications to be
aimed at distinctly separate acts. The number of the charges does not misrep-
resent or exaggerate the accused criminality, and the Court does not find pros-
ecutorial overreaching in the drafting and does not find that the number [of]
charges [and] specifications unreasonably increase[s] the punitive exposure to
the accused. So that portion of the defense UMC motion is denied.” 49
    While Appellant did object at trial, we agree with the military judge’s anal-
ysis regarding the other Quiroz factors. Thus, we find that the military judge
did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to merge the three
specifications under Charge II for sentencing.
    Finally, we review Appellant’s argument that the military judge should
have merged Charges III (aggravated assault) and IV (negligent discharge of
a firearm) for findings for plain error. We find that the charges and specifica-
tions are aimed at distinctly separate criminal acts: (1) assaulting Cpl Bravo
by shooting him; and (2) negligently discharging a firearm. These offenses re-
quire distinctly different elements of proof, and they do not misrepresent or

   48 Id. at 388.

   49 R. at 511.

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                   United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                Opinion of the Court

exaggerate Appellant’s criminality. By facing two charges rather than one, Ap-
pellant’s potential punitive exposure increased by three months. 50 We do not
find this increase to be unreasonable. Finally, we find no evidence of prosecu-
torial overreach. Thus, we find Appellant has failed to demonstrate that there
was error, plain or otherwise.

C. Trial Counsel did not Commit Plain Error
    Appellant argues that trial counsel committed plain error when he mis-
stated the law and evidence during his opening statement, closing argument,
and sentencing argument.
    Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor “oversteps the bounds
of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such
an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense.” 51 It is “defined as action or
inaction by a prosecutor in violation of some legal norm or standard, e.g., a
constitutional provision, a statute, a Manual rule, or an applicable professional
ethics canon.” 52 The conduct of the “trial counsel must be viewed within the
context of the entire court-martial . . . not [just] on words in isolation.” 53
   We review prosecutorial misconduct and improper argument de novo. 54
When properly objected to at trial, we review for prejudicial error to an appel-
lant’s substantial rights. 55 “Challenged argument is reviewed not based on
‘words in isolation, but on the argument viewed in context,’ and ‘within the
context of the entire court-martial.’” 56

    50 As previously noted, the military judge merged Charges III and IV for the pur-

poses of sentencing.
    51 United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 178 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (quoting Berger v.

United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935)).
    52 United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 5 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citing Berger, 295 U.S. at

88)).
    53 United States v. Baer, 53 M.J. 235, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting United States v.

Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985)).
    54 United States v. Andrews, 77 M.J. 393, 398 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citing United States

v. Sewell, 76 M.J. 14, 18 (C.A.A.F. 2017)).
    55 Id. (citing   Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179); United States v. Voorhees, 79 M.J. 5, 9
(C.A.A.F. 2019).
    56 United States v. Causey, 82 M.J. 574, 581 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Baer,

53 M.J. at 238 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                              13
                    United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                 Opinion of the Court

    If no objection for improper argument is made at trial, “we review for plain
error.” 57 “The plain error doctrine is invoked to rectify those errors that seri-
ously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
As a consequence, it is to be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in
which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” 58 “Under plain error
review, Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that: ‘(1) there was error,
(2) the error was clear and obvious, and (3) the error materially prejudiced a
substantial right of the accused.’” 59 “Thus, we must determine: (1) whether
trial counsel’s arguments amounted to clear, obvious error; and (2) if so,
whether there was a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different.” 60

    1. Opening Statement and Closing Argument
    During his opening statement trial counsel claimed that HM3 Mike “hap-
pened to be close by luckily. Luckily, all these Marines were trained in combat
lifesaving and were able to save Corporal [Bravo’s] life.” 61 He also claimed that
the actions of Cpl Delta and LCpl Alpha “helped save Corporal [Bravo].” 62 The
Defense did not object to trial counsel’s statements, but instead argued during
opening statement that Cpl Bravo was never in risk of losing his life.
    During trial, the trauma surgeon who treated Cpl Bravo testified that the
injury was not life-threatening and did not involve a substantial risk of death
because the bullet did not pierce the peritoneal cavity and instead was only a
soft tissue injury.
    During rebuttal closing argument, trial counsel attempted to quote the in-
struction on reasonable doubt:
            “I would remind you to look at the Military Judge’s instruc-
        tion. Beyond a reasonable doubt does not by any – or I’m sorry,
        all reasonable doubt. That’s not the standard. The government
        doesn’t have to rule out all reasonable doubt. The government –

    57 Id.

    58 United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327, 328-29 (C.M.A. 1986).

    59 United States v. Cueto, 82 M.J. 323, 334 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (quoting United States

v. Jones, 78 M.J. 37, 44 (C.A.A.F. 2018)).
    60 Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 9 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

    61 R. at 168-69.

    62 R. at 170.

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                   United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                Opinion of the Court

       the proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you
       firmly convinced of the accused’s guilt, that’s the standard of rea-
       sonable doubt, members.” 63
Immediately after the Government’s rebuttal—on the same page of the tran-
scribed record—the military judge instructed the members, “counsel have re-
ferred to the instructions that I gave you, if there is any inconsistency between
what counsel have said about the instructions and the instructions which I
gave you, you must accept my statement as being correct.” 64
    Because Appellant did not object at trial we review trial counsel’s argument
for plain error. The Government argues that trial counsel’s statements about
saving Appellant’s life were a reasonable characterization of the evidence. Re-
garding trial counsel’s misstatement of the burden of proof, the Government
concedes error, but argues that Appellant was not prejudiced by the error. 65
We agree with the Government that trial counsel’s misstatement of the burden
of proof was error.
    Appellant was charged with aggravated assault inflicting grievous bodily
harm. The Government attempted to prove that the injury suffered by Cpl
Bravo involved a substantial risk of death. Appellant’s entire defense at trial
focused on the argument that Cpl Bravo’s life was never in jeopardy. The mem-
bers apparently agreed with Appellant; rather than convict him of aggravated
assault by grievous bodily harm, they convicted Appellant of aggravated as-
sault by substantial bodily harm. As explained above, substantial bodily harm
required the Government to prove temporary but substantial disfigurement,
while grievous bodily harm would have required the government to prove a
substantial risk of death. 66
   We are confident that Appellant has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s
comments about the “life-saving" actions taken by Appellant and his fellow
Marines were not a fair argument based on the evidence. Even assuming plain
and obvious error, we do not find that Appellant has demonstrated that but for
counsel’s argument there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. 67

   63 R. at 437.

   64 R. at 437.

   65 Appellee’s Brief at 24.

   66 MCM, pt IV, para. 77.c.(1)(c) at IV-118.

   67 Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 9.

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                United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                             Opinion of the Court

    Similarly, we find that Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable prob-
ability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for
trial counsel’s misstatement of the burden of proof. We do not evaluate trial
counsel’s comments in a vacuum, but instead review them within the context
of the court-martial as a whole. The military judge properly instructed the
members on reasonable doubt before trial counsel’s argument:
           Lastly, the burden of proof to establish the guilty of the ac-
       cused beyond a reasonable doubt is on the government. The bur-
       den never shifts to the accused to establish innocence or to dis-
       prove the facts necessary to establish each element of each of-
       fense. By reasonable doubt is intended, not fanciful, speculative
       or ingenuous doubt or conjecture, but an honest and actual doubt
       suggested by the material evidence of lack of it in the case.
           It is a genuine misgiving caused by insufficiency of proof of
       guilt. Reasonable doubt is a fair and rational doubt based upon
       reason and common sense, and arising from the state of the evi-
       dence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt if proof that leaves you
       firmly convinced of the accused guilt. 68
After trial counsel’s misstatement, the military judge immediately instructed
the members that if anything counsel said differed from the instructions al-
ready provided the members must apply the law as instructed by the military
judge.
    “We presume, absent contrary indications, that the panel followed the mil-
itary judge’s instructions.” 69 Here, the military judge correctly instructed the
members regarding reasonable doubt. After trial counsel’s misstatement, the
military judge immediately instructed the members that they were to follow
the instructions as given by him. We are satisfied that the members applied
the law as instructed by the military judge. Indeed, as already explained, the
members found Appellant not guilty of inflicting grievous bodily harm and in-
stead convicted him of the lesser included offense of inflicting substantial bod-
ily harm.

   68 R. at 413-14.

   69 United States v. Norwood, 81 M.J. 12, 20 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting United States

v. Short, 77 M.J. 148, 151 (C.A.A.F. 2018)).

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                   United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                Opinion of the Court

   2. Sentencing Argument
    During sentencing argument trial counsel reiterated aspects of his earlier
argument on findings that Cpl Bravo “suffered a brush with death,” 70 that Ap-
pellant “almost killed one of his best friends,” 71 and that Cpl Bravo was in “un-
bearable pain” 72. Because Appellant did not object to these statements at trial
we review for plain error.
     Appellant’s argument is rooted in the fact that the evidence at trial re-
vealed the gunshot wound suffered by Cpl Bravo did not result in a life-threat-
ening injury. The members agreed with Appellant, finding him not guilty of
aggravated assault by grievous bodily harm. However, they did find that he
had committed an aggravated assault in which substantial bodily harm is in-
flicted, which requires a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or a tempo-
rary but substantial loss or impairment of function of any bodily member, or-
gan, or mental faculty. 73 In contrast, grievous bodily harm means a bodily in-
jury that involves a substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, protracted
or obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. 74
    We find that trial counsel’s argument was largely supported by the evi-
dence and did not rise to the level of plain error. Corporal Bravo suffered a
gunshot wound to the abdomen from very close range. Corporal Bravo’s trauma
surgeon testified that he was incredibly lucky that the bullet did not pierce any
of his internal organs. Additionally, trial counsel’s argument that Cpl Bravo
suffered unbearable pain was a reasonable characterization of the evidence.
Witnesses present shortly after Cpl Bravo was shot testified about his reac-
tions. One stated that “[h]e had a facial grimace, he was breathing in and out
very quickly, like labored breathing, wincing with pain, his eyes were closed,
and he was saying that it hurts.” 75 Another stated that “[Cpl Bravo] was just
screaming for help, screaming my name.” 76 That same witness stated that Cpl

   70 R. at 514.

   71 R. at 515.

   72 R. at 517.

   73 MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.c.(1)(b) at IV-118.

   74 MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.c.(1)(c) at IV-118.

   75 R. at 264.

   76 R. at 283.

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                   United States v. Ellard, NMCCA No. 202200051
                                Opinion of the Court

Bravo also said “don’t let [me] die.” 77 Additionally, Cpl Bravo’s trauma surgeon
testified that when he tried to stop the bleeding in the emergency room, Cpl
Bravo “wasn’t tolerating the pain well.” 78 Thus, Appellant has not demon-
strated the trial counsel’s argument amounted to clear or obvious error.
    Even had Appellant met the threshold for plain error, we do not find that
Appellant has demonstrated that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. As ex-
plained above, the members disagreed with trial counsel’s characterization of
the evidence, as shown through their finding Appellant guilty of the lesser in-
cluded offense. We are confident that the members were not influenced by trial
counsel’s restatement of his closing argument when they determined Appel-
lant’s sentence. In his sentencing argument, trial counsel asked the members
to award a 19-month sentence of confinement, while defense counsel argued
for a sentence of time served (seven months). The members sentenced Appel-
lant to nine months of confinement. Considering this in view of Appellant’s
convictions for negligently shooting another Marine and committing violations
of a general order, we do not find merit in Appellant’s argument that but for
trial counsel’s alleged error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 79
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                  FOR THE COURT:

                                  MARK K. JAMISON
                                  Clerk of Court

   77 R. at 283.

   78 R. at 240.

   79 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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