Court Opinion

ID: 9517040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:01:57.257976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:09.515512
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THEIS, specially concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write separately because I do not join in that portion of the majority opinion which addresses the proportionality of the 20-year mandatory sentencing enhancement provision for first-degree murder. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8— 1 (a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2000). Defendant has no standing to raise this issue. Courts will not consider the validity of a statutory provision unless the person challenging the provision is directly affected by it or the unconstitutional feature is so pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid. People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 482, 786 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (2003). In either case, a party has standing to bring a constitutional challenge only if the party is able to show himself to be within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d at 482, 786 N.E.2d at 1002. A defendant does not ordinarily have standing to challenge a statute as it might be applied to others in different circumstances. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 644, 727 N.E.2d 200 (2000); In re M.T., 352 Ill. App. 3d 131, 139, 816 N.E.2d 354, 362 (2004). Essentially, defendant contends that the enhancement for personally discharging a firearm during the commission of a murder is penalized more severely than aggravated discharge of a firearm, which he maintains is “substantially less culpable activity.” Specifically, he argues, citing Moss, that under the 20-year enhancement, no actual harm or injury need result from the discharge. Therefore, the enhancement is less serious than the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm, which requires that the firearm be discharged in the direction of another person, an action that poses a greater risk. Defendant is correct that, hypothetically, there may be cases in which a defendant commits murder by the use of a weapon other than a firearm or by accountability but is eligible for the 15- or 20-year enhancement because he carried or discharged a firearm and no person was injured by the firearm. Thus, in certain circumstances, the enhancement may apply without establishing that the discharge caused serious harm to the victim where the victim was murdered by other means. The problem with this logic is that defendant cannot show himself to be within the class aggrieved by this hypothetical. In the present case, actual harm did indeed result from the discharge of his firearm. The facts established by defendant’s own confession and testimony reveal that he pulled out a gun and shot the victim in the chest, resulting in the victim’s death. Where the discharge of the firearm resulted in death, defendant has no basis to argue that the enhancement, as applied to him, was less serious than the aggravated discharge of a firearm in which there is merely a risk of harm or injury. Rather, as the majority points out, defendant was actually eligible for the 25-to-life mandatory enhancement pursuant to section 5 — 8—l(a)(l)(d)(iii) because he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death to another person. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1 (a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2000). Had the jury been provided with the appropriate jury instruction, the 25-to-life enhancement would have been mandatory. 730 ILCS 5/5— 8 — l(a)(l)(d)(iii) (West 2000). Furthermore, defendant has not argued, nor can he argue, that the 20-year enhancement is facially invalid. The fact that a statute may be invalid under some circumstances is insufficient to establish facial invalidity; a statute is facially unconstitutional only if “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 211, 641 N.E.2d 345 (1994), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). Therefore, as long as there exists a situation in which a statute could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail. Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 781 N.E.2d 1065, 1069 (2002). We have already held in Arnold, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 673-76, 812 N.E.2d at 701-04, that there does exist at least one situation in which the statute could be validly applied. Thus, where defendant lacks standing to raise the issue on appeal, I would not address the merits of his argument. Accordingly, I concur in the result of the majority in affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence.