Court Opinion

ID: 9407624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 18:00:53.89029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.299494
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30483        Document: 00516812864             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                     July 7, 2023
                                      No. 22-30483                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                     Clerk

   Tellin Fontenot,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:20-CV-8
                     ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Plaintiff Fontenot worked in admissions for a satellite branch of
   Louisiana State University. After being passed over for several promotions
   and being transferred to another department, Fontenot filed a discrimination
   charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She then sued
   the University under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
   29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34, and a state-law analogue, the Louisiana Age

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30483      Document: 00516812864          Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/07/2023

                                    No. 22-30483

   Discrimination in Employment Act, La. Stat. Ann. § 23:311 (1999). Because
   all of Fontenot’s claims are either abandoned or prematurely brought, we
   AFFIRM the district court’s granting of summary judgment for LSU.
                                          I
          Fontenot began working in the Division of Admissions and Recruiting
   at LSU when she was 49 years old. She applied for several promotions but
   did not receive them. About a year into her employment, Fontenot’s
   recruiting role was converted to half-time. This caused her to spend the
   other half of her time at the University Registrar’s Office. One year later, her
   admissions position was eliminated entirely, due to changing University
   recruitment strategies. Fontenot was transferred to a position with identical
   title, pay, and benefits in the Division of Student Engagement.
          Dissatisfied with this, Fontenot filed a charge of discrimination with
   the EEOC and resigned several months later. In her EEOC charge,
   Fontenot checked the boxes for age and race discrimination. She did not
   check the boxes for retaliation or any other kind of unlawful treatment. The
   EEOC did not make a determination as to whether any statutes were
   violated, but it issued Fontenot a right-to-sue letter. Fontenot then filed a
   petition for damages in Louisiana state court, alleging discrimination based
   on age (but not race).
          LSU removed the case to federal court and requested summary
   judgment on all claims. The district court granted that motion, dismissing
   Fontenot’s federal ADEA claims with prejudice and dismissing Fontenot’s
   state-law LADEA claims without prejudice. Fontenot timely appealed.
                                          II
          This court reviews “grants of summary judgment de novo, applying
   the same standard as the district court.” In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852

                                          2
Case: 22-30483     Document: 00516812864           Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/07/2023

                                    No. 22-30483

   F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2022). “The court shall grant summary judgment if
   the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
   the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
   “When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we are required to review
   all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Exelon
   Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 394 (5th Cir. 2014).
          There are no genuine factual disputes because under the Middle
   District of Louisiana’s local rules, Fontenot admitted to LSU’s statement of
   undisputed facts. See M.D. La. LR 56(f).
                                        III
                                         A
          “A plaintiff abandons claims when it fails to address the claims or
   oppose a motion challenging those claims.” Terry Black’s Barbeque, L.L.C.
   v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F.4th 450, 459 (5th Cir. 2022). In opposing
   summary judgment, Fontenot did not respond to LSU’s defenses against her
   federal ADEA claims or state LADEA failure-to-promote claim, so the
   district court held that those were abandoned. On appeal, Fontenot does not
   challenge the district court’s dismissal of those abandoned claims.
   Therefore, Fontenot’s only remaining claims are for retaliation and
   constructive discharge, both brought under the LADEA.
                                         B
          Before suing for retaliation and constructive discharge under the
   LADEA, Fontenot was required to provide LSU with 30 days’ written
   notice. La. Stat. Ann. § 23:303(C) (2008). She did not do this.
          “Louisiana state and federal courts applying Louisiana law have held
   the filing of an EEOC charge of discrimination satisfies” Louisiana’s notice
   requirement. Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 767 F. Supp. 2d 678, 700 (W.D.

                                         3
Case: 22-30483      Document: 00516812864          Page: 4    Date Filed: 07/07/2023

                                    No. 22-30483

   La. 2011) (collecting cases). But they have held that such notice is limited
   “to the alleged discrimination detailed in the EEOC charge.” Id. To
   determine whether an EEOC charge provides sufficient notice under section
   23:303, Louisiana courts analogize to the exhaustion of administrative
   remedies in federal employment-discrimination cases. King v. Phelps Dunbar,
   L.L.P., 743 So. 2d 181, 187 (La. 1999). And in that context, we have held that
   discrimination claims are distinct from retaliation or constructive discharge
   claims, so the allegation of one in an EEOC charge does not exhaust a
   plaintiff’s remedies as to the other. See Randel v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 157 F.3d
   392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998).
          The question before us, then, is whether Fontenot’s EEOC charge
   put LSU on notice of Fontenot’s intention to sue for retaliation and
   constructive discharge. The first hurdle is that Fontenot did not check either
   the “retaliation” or “other” boxes on the EEOC charging form. This
   procedural formality is not fatal, however, so long as the written portion of
   the charge could have put LSU on notice. See Clark v. Auger Servs., Inc., 443
   F. Supp. 3d 685, 708 (M.D. La. 2020). The entirety of the written portion of
   Fontenot’s EEOC charge is as follows:
          I began my employment with Louisiana State University of
          Alexandria on March 21, 2016, most recently as an Enrollment
          Specialist, earning $32,000 per year. On July 21, 2017 I applied
          for a promotion as Senior Associate Director of Admissions
          and Recruiting. On July 25, 2017, I was called for a phone
          interview. I was not selected for promotion and I feel the
          questions asked of me were geared to me not getting the job.
          Ms. Kateline Nichols, WF, was hired. She has less
          qualifications tha[n] I do. Previously I had applied for several
          promotions and I had not been selected either. The person
          hired are younger, white employees who have less
          qualifications than I do.

                                          4
Case: 22-30483     Document: 00516812864          Page: 5   Date Filed: 07/07/2023

                                   No. 22-30483

         On March 12, 2018, I was told that my job would be eliminated
         and that I would need to move into another Department. I was
         told this by my Supervisor, Shelley Gill, WF, and Amond
         Hammond, Interim Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs. If I
         did not accept the transfer I would not have a job. I was to be
         the Student Engagement Retention Specialist. On March 13,
         2018, I met with Mr. Moore, BM, who was the Vice Chancellor
         of Student Engagement. Mr. Moore told me if he had to
         advertise the job, he would not select me. Ms. Abbey Baine,
         WF, 30’s, and Mr. Moore would write out my new job
         description. Ms. Baine, was on my initial hiring committee.
         They scheduled me to meet with them again on March 28,
         2018. On March 27, 2018, Ms. Gill informed me that they
         would be taking my computer and I was to report to my new job
         on April 2, 2018. On April 5, 2018, Mr. Moore informed me
         that my start date would reflect March 28, 2018.
         According to the company, I did not get my promotions
         because the committee said they had initially hired someone in
         my similarly protected as me. I believe that I have been
         discriminated against because of my race (B) in violation of
         Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; and
         because of my age (50) in violation of The Age Discrimination
         in Employment Act of 19676, as amended.
         No part of these facts suggests that Fontenot ever lodged a formal or
   informal complaint that she could have been retaliated against for making.
   Nor do the facts suggest that LSU created such a hostile environment that
   Fontenot was forced to resign, as would be required to support a constructive
   discharge claim. Fontenot did not introduce any other EEOC documents,
   such as an intake questionnaire or investigation notes.      And Fontenot
   presented no evidence that the EEOC took her charge and investigated for
   retaliation. Fontenot also never amended her EEOC charge, nor did she
   seek leave to amend her complaint.

                                         5
Case: 22-30483      Document: 00516812864            Page: 6   Date Filed: 07/07/2023

                                      No. 22-30483

          Instead of arguing that her EEOC charge itself provided LSU with
   notice, Fontenot’s sole argument is that LSU should be charged with
   constructive notice of anything that could be included in “the scope of the
   EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
   charge of discrimination.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455,
   466 (5th Cir. 1970). Fontenot’s reliance on that standard is mistaken.
          In Sanchez, we allowed an amended complaint to relate back to an
   original complaint, even though the amended complaint included new
   allegations of national-origin discrimination. But this was only because “the
   facts alleged in the complaint, and upon which both charges of sex and
   national origin discrimination were based, were identical.” Hornsby v.
   Conoco, Inc., 777 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1985). Sanchez does not allow a
   plaintiff to avoid exhausting administrative remedies when his or her EEOC
   charge “raise[s] different theories of recovery” and relies on different facts.
   Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 879 (5th Cir. 2003).
          The same conclusion follows for providing notice under section
   23:303 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. An EEOC charge cannot provide
   an employer with proper notice when the later-filed complaint adds “a new
   and independent charge . . . and new and independent facts to support this
   claim.” Hornsby, 777 F.2d at 247. “The consistent holdings in the case law
   indicate that the statute is to be imposed literally and any deficiency to the
   notice requirement is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim.” Miguel v. GEICO Gen.
   Ins. Co., 207 So. 3d 507, 511 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
                                  *        *         *
          The district court properly granted summary judgment for LSU.
   Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

                                           6