Court Opinion

ID: 9678576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:24:02.198426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:33.155242
License: Public Domain

*939Thompson, J.
(dissenting in part) — I dissent from Division IV of the majority opinion, and think we should hold the failure to serve a notice of appeal within thirty days from the date of the order appealed from requires a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. The reasons for this are set out in the dissenting opinion in In re Estate of Bobertson, 246 Iowa 685, 68 N.W.2d 909, and need not be repeated here.
However, it is appropriate to point out that the other two cases cited by the majority to uphold its position in the instant case do not aid it, but rather confirm the position taken in the dissent in the Bobertson case. Stolar v. Turner, 236 Iowa 628, 640, 19 N.W.2d 585, 590, was concerned only with Buies of Civil Procedure 340 to 353 inclusive and we were careful to point out rule 371, which reserved to this court the right to revoke, supplement or change any of the rules which provide the procedure on appeals, “ ‘except Buies 331-339 inclusive.’ ” We were concerned in the Stolar case particularly with rule 342, and we held we had power to waive its strict provisions. It prescribed the time for filing abstracts of the record.
But we also said, page 639 of 236 Iowa, page 590 of 19 N.W.2d: “Since these Buies of Civil Procedure have the effect of repealing statutory provisions and take the place of such statutory provisions, it might appear that they should be given the same application as statutes. There is force to such theory, with one exception.” The opinion then proceeds to set out rulé 371, supra, as a justification for refusal to strictly apply rule 342. There is no support for the majority’s statement that we “accepted various excuses and found waiver of strict compliance with rule 335” in the Stolar ease. Not only was rule 335 not involved in that case, but the inference from the language quoted above is that we do not have the right to waive compliance with it or any other of rules 331 to 339 inclusive.
Eggermont v. Service Life Insurance Co., 237 Iowa 301, 21 N.W.2d 761, likewise lends no aid to the majority’s position. Bather it seems directly in point that there is lack of jurisdiction. In that case the application for an interlocutory appeal was not filed until more than thirty days after the ruling from which appeal was sought. We held lack of jurisdiction and *940denied the application. It was pointed out.that Stolar v. Turner, supra, turned upon the provisions of rule 371, placing rules 340 to 353 inclusive in the same category as domestic rules of the court, and so under appropriate circumstances strict compliance might be waived. But we said, pages 303, 304 of 237 Iowa, page 762 of 21 N.W.2d: “However, rule 335, as amended, does not fall within that category. Under repeated pronouncements of this court, and under our interpretation thereof in Stolar v. Turner, supra, rule 335 is analogous to a statutory requirement and must be strictly complied with.”
The holding of both the Stolar and Eggermont cases is that we may excuse or waive compliance with rules 340 to 353 inclusive because they have the status of domestic rules of the court and such excuse, or waiver is expressly permitted by rule 371; but that rules 331 to 339 inclusive are analogous to statutory requirements, are expressly excepted from the terms of rule 371, and, must be strictly complied with.
The majority says when the court postponed the hearing it inferentially granted plaintiff additional time in which to file the required notice. The question naturally arises, how much time? The order granting the appeal was entered on September 9, 1959; the notice was filed on October 6 next. I cannot agree that if the time for hearing on an application for an appeal from an order before final judgment is not set until after thirty days from the date of the order, the applicant is thereby relieved from compliance with the plain provisions of the rule. It says the time for filing the notice may be extended “and the appeal, in such event, may be perfected within the time thus specified.” It is not difficult for counsel for an applicant to read this rule, or to comply with it. It is not obscure, nor ambiguous, nor difficult to find in the books. There is no reason apparent to me why this court should not follow the rule; why we should not hold, in the language of the Eggermont case, that it should be “strictly complied with.” Indeed, we have no right to do otherwise. There is no good reason for misunderstanding in regard to the rule, which is plainly written. While I have no great objection to “calling counsels’ attention *941to the requirements of the rule when the application is made”, I see no more reason for so emphasizing this rule than any other. All of them are printed in available Codes or compilations.
The majority says “this court would not participate in a manner which would likely result in a dismissal of applicants’ [plaintiffs’] appeal even before the application was heard.” I do not think it the responsibility of this court to see to the proper and timely service of notice of appeal, or to see that time is extended where it may be necessary, as rule 335 permits. It is a simple matter for the attorney seeking leave to appeal from an order before final judgment, at the time he presents his application to this court, to ask and secure an order extending the time for service of notice of appeal for five or ten or other reasonable number of days after the appeal is allowed. It should no more be the duty of the court to advise him to procure this order than it is of the trial court to advise that additional time in which to file a motion for new trial must be secured, or that only thirty days are allowed to appeal from a final judgment. Doing any of these things is in effect advising one party to the litigation how to try his case, to effect his appeal, and to that extent the court abandons its attitude of impartiality and becomes a partisan of the party receiving the advice. It should be the responsibility of the party seeking the appeal to see that his procedures are in accordance with the statutory rules.
I would hold lack of jurisdiction.
Garfield and Thornton, JJ., join in this dissent.