Court Opinion

ID: 9919223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 18:14:44.081995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:27.594957
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                         Washington State
                                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Division Two

                                                                                          January 17, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 58050-1-II

                                Respondent,

        v.                                                      PUBLISHED OPINION

 MARCUS ADRIAN ELLER,

                                Appellant.

       MAXA, J. – Marcus Eller appeals his exceptional sentence imposed under RCW

9.94A.535(2)(d) following his felony conviction of driving under the influence (DUI). He also

appeals the inclusion of a forfeiture provision in his judgment and sentence and raises additional

claims in a statement of additional grounds (SAG).

       RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) permits the trial court to impose an exceptional sentence when

“[t]he failure to consider the defendant’s prior criminal history which was omitted from the

offender score calculation pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525 results in a presumptive sentence that is

clearly too lenient.” (Emphasis added). Eller argues that the trial court violated his right to a

jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by imposing the

exceptional sentence without a jury first finding that a standard range sentence would be clearly

too lenient in light of his 19 point offender score and numerous unscored misdemeanor offenses.
No. 58050-1-II

         We hold that (1) whether a standard range sentence would be clearly too lenient must be

determined by a jury rather than by the trial court, and the trial court’s imposition of the

exceptional sentence based on RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) without such a jury finding violated the

Sixth Amendment as applied to Eller; (2) as the State concedes, the forfeiture provision in the

judgment and sentence was a scrivener’s error and should be stricken; and (3) Eller’s SAG

claims either rely on evidence that is outside the appellate record, are too vague to address, or

have no merit.

         Accordingly, we vacate Eller’s exceptional sentence and remand to the trial court for

resentencing within the standard range without the forfeiture provision.

                                                  FACTS

Guilty Plea

         In February 2022, Eller pled guilty to one count of felony DUI. In his guilty plea

statement, Eller admitted to driving under the influence having previously been convicted of DUI

at least three times within the prior 10 years.

         The criminal history in the plea agreement listed 38 offenses, including 10 prior felony

offenses and nine prior DUI convictions. The plea agreement stated that Eller’s offender score

was 19 and that the standard sentencing range for the felony DUI conviction was 63 to 84

months. The plea agreement also stated that the statutory maximum for the offense was 10

years.

         In the plea agreement, the State agreed to request an 84 month term of confinement and

12 month term of community custody. Eller was permitted to argue for any standard range

sentence. Eller did not stipulate to an exceptional sentence, admit that a factual basis for an

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No. 58050-1-II

exceptional sentence existed, or waive his right to have any facts supporting an exceptional

sentence determined by a jury.

       The trial court accepted Eller’s guilty plea.

Sentencing

       At the sentencing hearing, the State requested an 84 month sentence. The State argued

that a sentence at the top of the standard range was appropriate in light of Eller’s high offender

score of 19 points and his numerous unscored misdemeanors. Eller requested a sentence at the

low end of the standard range.

       The trial court imposed an exceptional 120 month sentence, the statutory maximum for

the offense. The court stated, “I’m imposing an exceptional sentence upwards finding that the

defendant’s offender score essentially exceeds the standard calculation, and that for those

reasons, an exceptional sentence is warranted.” Rep. of Proc. at 171.

       After considering additional briefing and the parties’ arguments, the trial court entered

written findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the exceptional sentence. The court

found that Eller’s offender score exceeded the highest offender score considered in the

Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, by 10 points and that a standard

range sentence would ignore a significant portion of Eller’s criminal history.

       The trial court also entered the following finding of fact:

       This Court finds that the failure to consider the defendant’s prior criminal history
       which was omitted from the offender score calculation pursuant to RCW
       9.94A.525, results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of
       the purpose of the [SRA], as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 71.

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No. 58050-1-II

       The trial court entered a conclusion of law that there were “substantial and compelling

reasons to impose an exceptional sentence of 120 months.” CP at 71. The court concluded

“[t]hat the exceptional sentence is justified by the aggravating circumstances described in the

above Findings of Fact and RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d).” CP at 72. The court also entered the

following conclusion of law:

       That the failure to consider the defendant’s prior criminal history which was
       omitted from the offender score calculation pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525, results in
       a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of the
       [SRA], as expressed in RCW 9 .94A.010.

CP at 72. And the court concluded that it had authority to impose the exceptional sentence

without a jury finding.

       The judgment and sentence also required Eller to “[f]orfeit all seized property subject to

forfeiture under RCW 9.41.098 or RCW 69.50.505 to the originating law enforcement agency

unless otherwise noted.” CP at 51.

       Eller appeals his exceptional sentence and the imposition of the forfeiture provision.

                                            ANALYSIS

A.     EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE BASED ON RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d)

       RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) permits the sentencing court to impose an exceptional sentence

without a finding of fact by a jury based on an aggravating factor that “[t]he failure to consider

the defendant’s prior criminal history which was omitted from the offender score calculation

pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient.”

       Notwithstanding the statutory language permitting the sentencing court to impose an

exceptional sentence under these circumstances, Eller argues that the trial court’s application of

the RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) aggravating factor to impose an exceptional sentence must be based

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No. 58050-1-II

on a jury finding that the presumptive sentence is clearly too lenient. Therefore, he claims that

RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) is unconstitutional as applied to him. We agree.

       1.      Legal Principles

       Under RCW 9.94A.535, “The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence

range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial

and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” RCW 9.94A.535(2) lists

aggravating circumstances under which a court can impose an exceptional sentence without a

finding of fact by the jury.

       RCW 9.94A.535(2) provides in part,

       The trial court may impose an aggravated exceptional sentence without a finding of
       fact by a jury under the following circumstances:
       ....

       (b) The defendant’s prior unscored misdemeanor or prior unscored foreign criminal
       history results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the
       purpose of this chapter, as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010.
       ....

       (d) The failure to consider the defendant’s prior criminal history which was omitted
       from the offender score calculation pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525 results in a
       presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient.

(Emphasis added).

       However, the law is clear that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a

jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 563, 192 P.3d

345 (2008); see also Blakely v, Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d

403 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435

(2000). This rule is based on the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d

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No. 58050-1-II

at 563. Whether an exceptional sentence violates the Sixth Amendment is a question of law that

we review de novo. Id.

       2.      Requirement of Jury Finding

       Here, the trial court imposed the exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d)

without a jury finding that the presumptive sentence was clearly too lenient.1 Eller argues that

the court could not impose an exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) because

whether the presumptive sentence is clearly too lenient is a question for the jury. He recognizes

that RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) gives the court the authority to impose an exceptional sentence based

on an omitted criminal history, but he argues that this statute is unconstitutional as applied to

him.

       In State v. Hughes, the Supreme Court addressed a trial court’s imposition of an

exceptional sentence based in part on the court’s “clearly too lenient” finding under former RCW

9.94A.535(2)(i) (2003). 154 Wn.2d 118, 127-28, 137, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled in part on

other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466

(2006). That statute allowed the court to impose an exceptional sentence without a jury finding

if “[t]he operation of the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589 results in a presumptive

sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter, as expressed in RCW

9.94A.010.” Former RCW 9.94A.535(2)(i) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that a

clearly too lenient finding required to impose an exceptional sentence under former RCW

1
 We note that the trial court’s imposition of an exceptional sentence without a jury finding
complied with the statutory directive in RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) that the clearly too lenient
determination could be made by the court.

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No. 58050-1-II

9.94A.535(2)(i) was a factual issue that required a jury finding under Blakely. Hughes, 154

Wn.2d at 137, 140.

       In State v. Saltz, the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence based in part on a finding

that the defendant’s unscored misdemeanor offenses made the presumptive sentence clearly too

lenient finding under RCW 9.94A.535(2)(b). 137 Wn. App. 576, 579-80, 154 P.3d 282 (2007).

Relying on Hughes, Division Three of this court held that although the existence of Saltz’s

misdemeanor history was an objective determination that the court could make, the question of

whether a standard range sentence would be clearly too lenient under the circumstances was a

factual question that required a jury determination. Id. at 581-82. Therefore, the court held that

RCW 9.94A.535(2)(b) was unconstitutional as applied to Saltz. Id. at 584.

       In Alvarado, the Supreme Court addressed an exceptional sentence imposed under RCW

9.94A.535(2)(c). 164 Wn.2d at 559. In distinguishing that subsection from subsections referring

to “clearly too lenient,” the court discussed with approval the holdings in Hughes and Saltz that

the clearly too lenient finding be made by a jury. Id. at 565-68. The court stated, “ ‘The

conclusion that allowing a current offense to go unpunished is clearly too lenient is a factual

determination that cannot be made by the trial court following Blakely.’ ” Id. at 568 (quoting

Hughes, 154 Wn.2d at 140).

       Although a different subsection of RCW 9.94A.535(2) is at issue here, the analyses in

Hughes and Saltz apply equally to this case. RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) requires a clearly too lenient

finding, the same as former RCW 9.94A.535(2)(i) applied in Hughes and RCW 9.94A.535(2)(b)

applied in Saltz. Because a clearly too lenient finding was required to be made by a jury in

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No. 58050-1-II

Hughes and Saltz, we hold that the clearly too lenient finding is required to be made by a jury

under RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d).

       The State makes three arguments to the contrary, which we conclude are not persuasive.

First, the State contends that RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d)’s plain language permits the trial court to

impose an exceptional sentence if it finds that the presumptive sentence is clearly too lenient, and

the record supports the trial court’s reasons for imposing the exceptional sentence. But the issue

here is not what the statute provides, but whether RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d) violates the Sixth

Amendment by allowing the trial court to make the clearly too lenient finding.

       Second, the State relies on State v. Clarke, 156 Wn.2d 880, 134 P.3d 188 (2006). In

Clarke, the Supreme Court addressed the imposition of an exceptional minimum sentence under

former RCW 9.94A.712 (recodified as RCW 9.94A.507), which required trial courts to sentence

certain sex offenders to a minimum term and a maximum term equal to the statutory maximum

sentence. 156 Wn.2d at 884. The trial court imposed the exceptional minimum sentence under

two provisions of former RCW 9.94A.535(2) that contained the clearly too lenient requirements.

Id.

       The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had not engaged in impermissible fact

finding when imposing the exceptional minimum sentence because the relevant statutory

maximum that the court may impose without additional findings in this context was the

maximum sentence of life, not the standard sentencing range that applied to the minimum

sentence. Id. at 890-91.The court stated, “[W]e hold that in the context of indeterminate

sentencing under [former] RCW 9.94A.712, the Sixth Amendment does not bar judicial fact-

finding related to an exceptional minimum sentence when the exceptional sentence does not

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No. 58050-1-II

exceed the maximum sentence imposed.” Id. at 893. In other words, the court held that “Blakely

does not apply to exceptional minimum sentences imposed under RCW 9.94A.712 that do not

exceed the maximum sentence imposed.” Id. at 894.

        The court in Clarke expressly declined to consider “whether the specific fact-finding

performed by the sentencing court violated the Sixth Amendment.” Id. However, the court

noted that “the particular aggravating factors found here may violate the constitution in other

contexts.” Id.

        Because Blakely was inapplicable, the court’s review of the exceptional minimal sentence

involved only whether there were substantial and compelling reasons that justified the

exceptional minimum sentences. Id. at 894-95. The court held that the trial court had not erred

when it determined that a standard range minimum sentence would have been clearly too lenient.

Id. at 894-96.

        The State emphasizes that the court in Clarke did not find that the trial court erred when

the trial court, rather than a jury, made the clearly too lenient finding. The State claims that this

fact demonstrates that a clearly too lenient finding can be made by the trial court and that Saltz

was wrongly decided. But Clarke was decided based on the specific facts and legal framework

in that case – the imposition of an exceptional minimal sentence under the indeterminate

sentencing scheme of former RCW 9.94A.712. See 156 Wn.2d at 893. And significantly, the

court held that Blakely did not apply in this situation. Id. at 894. This case does not involve

similar facts.

        Third, the State relies on State v. Vance, 168 Wn.2d 754, 230 P.3d 1055 (2010). In

Vance, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an exceptional sentence in the form of

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No. 58050-1-II

consecutive standard range sentences. 168 Wn.2d at 757-58. The court based the exceptional

sentence on former RCW 9.94A.535(2)(d)(i), which allowed an exceptional sentence if operation

of the multiple offense policy resulted in a presumptive sentence that was clearly too lenient in

light of the purpose of the SRA. Id. The Supreme Court addressed the question whether the

Sixth Amendment “requires that a jury, not a trial judge, make findings of fact to support an

exceptional consecutive sentence.” Id. at 759.

       The Supreme Court held that under precedent announced in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160,

129 S. Ct. 711, 172 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2009), “a sentencing judge, not a jury, may find facts to

support consecutive sentences.” Vance, 168 Wn.2d at 762. The rationale supporting this holding

was that historically, “ ‘[t]he decision to impose sentences consecutively is not within the jury

function.’ ” Id. (quoting Ice, 530 U.S. at 168). Therefore, Apprendi and Blakely are inapplicable

to exceptional sentences in the form of consecutive sentences. Vance, 168 Wn.2d at 762.

       The State emphasizes that the court in Vance had no problem with allowing a trial court

to make a clearly too lenient finding. But as with Clarke, Vance was decided based on the

specific facts and legal framework in that case – the imposition of an exceptional sentence in the

form of consecutive sentences. See Vance, 168 Wn.2d at 762. And once again, the court held

that Blakely did not apply in this situation. Id. This case does not involve similar facts.

       We hold that the trial court’s imposition of an exceptional sentence under RCW

9.94A.535(2)(d) without a jury finding that the presumptive sentence was clearly too lenient

violated the Sixth Amendment as applied to Eller. Therefore, we vacate the exceptional sentence

and remand for resentencing within the standard range.

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No. 58050-1-II

B.     FORFEITURE PROVISION

       Eller argues, and the State concedes, that the forfeiture provision in his judgment and

sentence is a clerical error and is not supported by any statutory authority. We agree.

       The forfeiture provision in Eller’s judgment and sentence provides, “Forfeit all seized

property subject to forfeiture under RCW 9.41.098 or RCW 69.50.505 to the originating law

enforcement agency unless otherwise noted.” CP at 51. RCW 9.41.098 addresses the forfeiture

of firearms. And RCW 69.50.505 authorizes the seizure and forfeiture of controlled substances

and real and personal property related to the possession, manufacture, delivery, or distribution of

controlled substances. Because Eller’s offense does not involve firearms or drugs, the forfeiture

provision does not apply and should not have been included in the judgment and sentence. And

we note that the forfeiture provision should not be imposed on remand.

C.     SAG CLAIMS

       In his SAG, Eller asks this court to “investigate” an alleged improper reading of his

breath test results in light of information he has supplied. SAG at 1. Because this claim is based

on matters outside the record, we do not consider this claim. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d at 569.

       In what appears to be a separate claim, Eller also states “Dismiss felony DUI submit as

follows.” SAG at 1. This claim is too vague to address. RAP 10.10(c) (“[T]he appellate court

will not consider a defendant’s [SAG] for review if it does not inform the court of the nature and

occurrence of alleged errors.”).

       Finally, Eller attaches to his SAG a copy of the State’s response to his opening brief with

a notation in the margin on page 3 in which he seems to question how the trial court determined

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No. 58050-1-II

that his offender score was 19 when the State mentions only 10 prior offenses. Eller appears to

be raising an issue regarding his offender score calculation.

         The portion of the State’s response that Eller appears to be concerned about is where the

State is asserting that 10 of his prior offenses that contributed to his 19 point offender score were

not considered at sentencing because the sentencing grid tops out at 9 points. The State did not

assert that his offender score was based on these 10 offenses. Eller’s 19 point offender score

calculation is supported by the offenses emphasized in bold in his judgment and sentence.

Accordingly, to the extent Eller is raising this issue, it has no merit.

                                           CONCLUSION

         We vacate Eller’s exceptional sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing

within the standard range and without the forfeiture provision.

                                                       MAXA, J.

    We concur:

    CRUSER, A.C.J.

    LANESE, J.2

2
    Judge Lanese is serving as a judge pro tempore of the court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1).

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