Court Opinion

ID: 9754553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:03:45.630299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.563251
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in the majority’s conclusion that an enforceable contract existed. However, as to the rejection of the Chancellor’s damage calculations, I dissent, since the majority has made a serious error in ignoring the equity status of the instant controversy and treating it as an action at law.
The Chancellor in equity has long been recognized as possessing the power to enter money judgments against parties if the circumstances of the specific case require it. Meth v. Meth, 360 Pa. 623, 626, 62 A.2d 848, 849 (1949). Furthermore, it is not the duty of a court in equity to apply strict legal principles in resolving disputes, but rather to use its sound discretion to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the particular case. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 55 S.Ct. 380, 79 L.Ed. 841 (1935). See also, Overfield v. Pennroad Corporation, 42 F.Supp. 586, (E.D.Pa.1941); Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia, Equity § 31.
*397In granting equitable relief this Court has held that “the appropriateness of a particular form of relief is to be tested by balancing the seriousness of the injury against the cost of avoiding it and the importance of the conduct causing it.” (Citations omitted.) Dexter v. Bebenek, 458 Pa. 1, 3, 327 A.2d 38, 39 (1974).
The majority has eschewed these equitable principles and decided this matter as if it were an action at law, choosing for support prior assumpsit actions 1 rather than equity actions, and applying legal restrictions on damages such as foreseeability and certainty of loss. This type of legal analysis ignores the traditional distinction established by this Court in addressing the problems unique to equity and law.
Additionally, I note that a method of calculation identical to the one used by the Chancellor in the case at bar has been approved by other jurisdictions. See Reis v. Sparks, 547 F.2d 236 (4th Cir.1976) (applying Maryland law); Walker v. Benton, 407 So.2d 305 (Fla.App.1981); Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 453 A.2d 160 (1982).
In conclusion, I believe that the majority’s reliance on the foreseeability and certainty of damages is misplaced. It should be this Court’s responsibility to analyze whether the Chancellor has abused his discretion in assessing consequential damages. Given the fact that appellants were aware of the appellees’ plans to finance the purchase at a specific mortgage percentage rate, and that the appellants unreasonably refused to make the conveyance, I do not believe the Chancellor stepped outside his equitable powers by devising the contested formula in an effort to cure this conflict.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. See Keystone Diesel Engine Company v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, 224, 191 A.2d 376, 378 (1963), and cases cited therein.