Court Opinion

ID: 9701842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:40:15.102864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.083544
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge
(concurring):
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I cannot join, nor can I agree with the conclusion the majority reaches by the use of the tender years doctrine. . The majority concludes that the natural mother has a prima facie right to her child over any other person (majority opinion 244 Pa.Super. 9, 366 A.2d 290, and *14that it is her opponent’s burden to establish that she must forfeit this right. With that language I most strongly disagree and therefore find it necessary to write this opinion.
The majority’s reliance on Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa.Super. 210, 166 A.2d 60 (1960), and Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Fox, 216 Pa.Super. 11, 260 A.2d 470 (1969), to my view is misplaced. Since those cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held the tender years doctrine to be merely the vehicle through which decision “. . . may be reached where factual considerations do not otherwise dictate a different result.” Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 109, 296 A.2d 625, 627 (1972). And this Court has more recently reinforced this principle. In Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Williams, 229 Pa.Super. 327, 324 A.2d 540 (1974), we said:
“In- awarding custody, the primary consideration is always the best interest of the child. See, e. g., Commonwealth ex rel. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 186 Pa.Super. 347, 142 A.2d 304 (1958). In determining the best interest of the child, for many years the courts of this Commonwealth have applied the principle of law that has come to be known as the ‘tender years’ doctrine. See, e. g., Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa.Super. 403, 205 A.2d 49 (1964). However, always paramount are the child’s physical, intellectual, spiritual and emotional well-being and all conflicting considerations, including the ‘tender years’ doctrine, will be subordinated to these matters. Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa.Super. 95, 198 A.2d 377 (1964).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held the ‘tender years’ doctrine to be merely a vehicle through which a decision respecting an infant’s custodial well-being may be reached where factual considerations do *15not otherwise dictate a different result. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).”
See also Davidyan v. Davidyan, 230 Pa.Super. 599, 327 A.2d 145 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa.Super. 144, 331 A.2d 665 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Pruss v. Pruss, 236 Pa.Super. 247, 344 A.2d 509 (1975); Russo Appeal, 237 Pa.Super. 80, 347 A.2d 355 (1975).
There are many cases in which determination of the child’s best interests has led to an award of custody to someone other than a parent. See cases cited in Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa.Super. 371, 324 A.2d 562 at n. 7 (1974).
Although great consideration is due a natural parent’s interest in having her child, a presumption must never interfere with determining what is in fact in the child’s best interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa.Super. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973).
I believe the majority, therefore, places reliance upon a doctrine that does not create a prima facie right in a mother and does not shift any burden of proof.
I agree, however, under our duty to give broad review to custody cases that, in reliance upon the evidence, and the other principles of law cited and used by the majority, that the order of the lower court should be reversed with a procedendo.
HOFFMAN and SPAETH, JJ., join.