Court Opinion

ID: 9568149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:00:59.346082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:24.263868
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL
concurring in the result:
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I respectfully disagree with the analysis and conclusion regarding personal jurisdiction.
The determination of whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant involves a two-step analysis. White v. Stephens, 300 S.C. 241, 245, 387 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1990). First, in order for the courts to have statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction, the nonresident defendants conduct must meet the requirements of South Carolinas long-arm statute.2 Id. In relevant part, South Carolina courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who transacts business in this State or who enters into a contract to be performed in whole or in part in this State. S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803(1) and (7) (2003). In my view, REACH transacted business in the State by contacting Dr. Moore and arranging for part of the IYF procedure to be performed in Columbia. *22Likewise, since Dr. Moore’s services were a necessary part of the IVF procedure, I believe REACH consequently entered into a contract with the Coggeshalls which was performed in part in this State. For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s jurisdictional analysis, and I would hold that South Carolina may exercise personal jurisdiction over REACH pursuant to our long-arm statute.
The second step in the analysis is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process. Cockrell v. Hillerich Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 491-92, 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2005). In my opinion, exercising personal jurisdiction over REACH in this case would not violate due process. REACH purposefully sought out Dr. Moore in Columbia to perform services that were integral to the IVF procedure. Additionally, REACH admits it has treated thousands of South Carolinians over the past eight years, which is mostly likely a result of its office location in Charlotte, adjacent to the South Carolina/North Carolina border. See Cockrell, 363 S.C. at 485, 491-92, 611 S.E.2d at 508 (2005) (noting that due process requires minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there). I disagree with the majority’s analysis in distinguishing between defendants that render medical services and all other defendants. By asserting this distinction, the majority suggests that courts should apply profession-specific standards under which to measure due process requirements, thereby effectively making a policy decision. In my view, such policy decisions are better left to the legislature.
Despite finding personal jurisdiction, however, I would affirm the trial courts dismissal. In my opinion, the Coggeshalls do not allege an injury entitling them to relief. Specifically, the Coggeshalls contend they will suffer substantial financial expenses in caring for their child; however, the Coggeshalls do not allege that the failure to administer the pre-implantation testing caused their child’s condition. David v. McLeod Regional Medical Center, 367 S.C. 242, 248, 626 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must show that the defendants negligence *23was the proximate cause of the alleged injuries and damages). Therefore, despite their argument to the contrary, the Coggeshalls are essentially seeking damages directly resulting from their child being born. I see no actual difference between this claim and a claim for wrongful life, a claim which we have explicitly rejected. See Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 161, 607 S.E.2d 63, 71 (2004).
For these reasons, I would hold that although a South Carolina court may exercise personal jurisdiction over REACH, the Coggeshalls failed to present an injury to which they are entitled to relief.
BEATTY, J., concurs.

. Additionally, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction as to any cause of action over a person based upon an "enduring relationship” with the Stale pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-802 (2003). Although, in my view, South Carolina may arguably exercise personal jurisdiction under this statute as well, any analysis ol this issue is unnecessary given that the long-arm statute is applicable.