Court Opinion

ID: 9676617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:28:40.22651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:41.418310
License: Public Domain

WHITHAM, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I refer to the appellants as “West End” and the appel-lees as “Rothpletz.” Before expressing my views on adverse-possession issues addressed by the majority, I must recognize an issue not acknowledged in the majority’s opinion. That issue is West End’s record ownership of the strip. West End’s record ownership of the strip is based on application of the “strip and gore doctrine.” The strip and gore doctrine provides that:
Where it appears that a grantor has conveyed all land owned by him adjoining a narrow strip of land that has ceased to be of any benefit or importance to him, the presumption is that the grantor intended to include such strip in such conveyance; unless it clearly appears in the deed, by plain and specific language, that the grantor intended to reserve the strip.
Cantley v. Gulf Production Co., 135 Tex. 339, 344, 143 S.W.2d 912, 915 (1940). By partial summary judgment, the trial court determined that West End had record title to the strip under the strip and gore doctrine. By cross-point, Rothpletz has preserved and assigned trial court error in granting this partial summary judgment in favor of West End. Since the majority’s opinion stands silent on matters raised by Rothpletz’s cross-point except in its footnote three, I state my view that the issues raised in Rothpletz’s cross-point have not been addressed by this court and that those issues must be addressed by this court or the Supreme Court before a take-nothing judgment could be rendered against Roth-pletz. I go to these lengths to point out Rothpletz’s cross-point because I do not want my concurrence to be read as agreeing that this court has considered and overruled Rothpletz’s cross-point. Thus, in my view, Rothpletz’s cross-point remains to be disposed of in the event this court or the Supreme Court should hereafter decide to reverse the trial court’s judgment. Consequently, for the purposes of this opinion, I assume, but do not decide, that West End was the record owner of the strip. Thus, I reach the question of whether Rothpletz acquired title to the strip by adverse possession.
In its prayer in its original brief in this court, West End asks that we reverse and render judgment declaring that full legal and equitable title to the strip is vested in West End. In its prayer in its brief for appellant and cross-appellees, West End asks that we reverse the trial court’s judgment and stops at that point. Nowhere does West End in that brief pray that we render. Nowhere in that brief does West End pray that we remand. When an appellate court reverses and the appellant’s brief contains no request for a remand, the appellate court assumes that the appellant considers the case fully developed and renders judgment. See Texas Prudential Insurance Co. v. Dillard, 158 Tex. 15, 32, 307 S.W.2d 242, 252 (1957). Therefore, I agree with the majority that, given West End’s prayers in its briefs in this court, we must treat West End’s three points of error as challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence (1) establishing Rothpletz’s exclusive possession of the strip, (2) negating Rothpletz’s ouster by West End from the *379strip and (B) establishing Rothpletz’s hostile possession of the strip. To my mind, the following exchange of letters between West End and Rothpletz constitutes the requisite evidence of probative value establishing Rothpletz’s exclusive possession, negating ouster by West End and establishing Rothpletz’s hostile possession. The parties exchanged these letters more than five years after Rothpletz asserted title to the strip. While the majority refers to these letters as a “letter agreement” in disposing of West End’s third point of error concerning hostile possession, I am of the opinion that the letters on their face pertain to each of West End’s three points and constitute more than a scintilla of evidence in support of all of the trial court’s findings on adverse possession. As used in the letters, know that the adjoining parking lot to 1800 N. Market Street consists of land owned of record by Rothpletz and the disputed strip. Thus, reference in the letters to a parking lot adjoining 1800 N. Market Street includes the disputed strip. Know also that the 1911 N. Market Street parking lot is West End’s property.
The first letter, dated June 13, 1984, from Rothpletz to West End reads as follows:
Re: Temporary use of parking lot at 1800 N. Market Street
Dear Mr. Lavie:
The owners of the property at 1800 N. Market Street and the adjoining parking lot have authorized me to agree to your temporary use of all or a portion of the parking lot which adjoins 1800 N. Market Street beginning June 20th and continuing thru the months of July and August.
In consideration for using our parking lot during the above mentioned period, it is my understanding that the tenants, clients and guests of the occupants of 1800 N. Market Street may use your lot at 1911 N. Market Street (which is directly behind 1800 N. Market).
It is my further understanding that a large trash collector and other construction materials will be placed on our lot and if any damage occurs to our lot, your company will repair same to its condition prior to your use of the property. You have also agreed to keep trash and debris cleaned up and policed.
Our understandings as set forth in this letter are terminable by either party upon one week’s notice. Other than the mutual consideration above extended, no additional consideration is expected by either of us as the result of these matters.
You may indicate your agreement by executing and returning to me a copy of this letter.
Best wishes for a successful project.
1800 N. Market Street
Owners
/s/ John K. Rothpletz
By: John K. Rothpletz,
Trustee
Agreed: West End API, Ltd.
/s/ Lavie
By: Robert Lavie,
Managing Partner
The second letter, dated June 14, 1984, from West End to Rothpletz reads:
Dear Mr. Rothpletz:
Please find enclosed a duly executed copy of your letter dated June 13, 1984.
It was a pleasure meeting with you yesterday and, I look forward to discussing further with you the future use of both our parking lots.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Lavie
Robert Lavie
Managing Partner
for West End API, Ltd.
West End filed this action on November 21, 1984. Thus, in these letters dated approximately five months before filing this action, West End admitted that Rothpletz owned the strip: (1) by trading Rothpletz the use of West End’s parking lot for the use of Rothpletz’s parking lot (which includes the strip) while construction work was performed on West End’s building; (2) by agreeing to repair any damage to Roth-pletz’s parking lot; and, (3) by agreeing to keep Rothpletz’s parking lot cleaned and policed. Indeed, West End’s letter concludes with a reference to “both our park*380ing lots.” The trial court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law. In findings of fact numbers thirteen and fifteen, the trial court found that:
13. For more than ten years prior to November 21, 1984, Rothpletz and his predecessors in interest, among whom there was privity of estate, under claim of right, used the strip and held possession if [sic] it that was peaceable, continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive, adverse, open, actual, visible and notorious, inconsistent with and hostile to any claim by any other person.
% * * * * *
15. Rothpletz and his predecessors in interest established possession of the strip as found above, and thereafter neither West End nor its predecessors in interest ever ousted Rothpletz or his predecessors in interest from their exclusive, adverse possion [sic] of the strip.
The trial court went on to conclude that “Rothpletz has full title to the strip, precluding all claims.”
Since the present case was tried before the court without a jury, the court sits as a trier of the facts as well as the law. He is the judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and his findings are entitled to the same weight and conclusiveness on appeal as a jury verdict. Where there is some evidence of a substantial and probative character to support the trial court’s findings and judgment, they are controlling upon a reviewing court and will not be disturbed. Hood v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co., 146 Tex. 522, 523-26, 209 S.W.2d 345, 346-47 (1948); Richardson v. Raby, 376 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1964, no writ). As explained, because of West End’s prayer for relief in this court, we must treat each of West End’s points of error as an attack on the legal sufficiency of the evidence. A “legally insufficient” point is a “no evidence” point presenting a question of law. In deciding that question, the appellate court must consider only the evidence and the inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).
Applying these principles to the present case, and considering only the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court's findings of fact in support of its judgment and disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary, I conclude that the statements and admissions contained in the two letters are some evidence of probative value that Rothpletz had exclusive possession of the strip, that West End did not oust Rothpletz from the strip and that Rothpletz had hostile possession of the strip. In short, it was within the trial court’s prerogatives to treat West End’s actions in signing the two letters as West End’s admission that Rothpletz had acquired title to the strip by adverse possession. Consequently, I agree that we must affirm the trial court’s judgment.