Court Opinion

ID: 9759932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:33:19.553929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:06.258445
License: Public Domain

GARIBALDI, J.,
dissenting.
The Court has done what the Legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware have not — amend the congressionally-approved Interstate Compact (the Compact) between Delaware and New Jersey to require the Delaware River and Bay Authority (the DRBA) to negotiate collectively with its employees. I believe that the Court does not have the power to amend the Compact unilaterally or to impose additional duties and obligations, arising under New Jersey law, on the DRBA without Delaware’s consent.
The majority finds that New Jersey has the power to amend Articles VII(e) and VIII of the Compact because the labor laws of *449New Jersey and Delaware, although not identical, are complementary or parallel with regard to collective negotiations for public employees. Although in some situations an agency may be subject to complementary or parallel legislation when the issue is limited to interpreting a state law or a state regulation, such legislation cannot and should not be used to repeal the Compact. Such a result comes from an unwarranted expansion of the dicta in Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, Inc. v. City of Camden, 111 N.J. 389, 545 A.2d 127 (1988), and will lead to confusion, uncertainty, and conflicts when the Superior Court, Chancery Division of New Jersey, attempts to decide how the differing labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware, as expressed in their parallel labor legislation, are to be effectuated.
I
The Court’s ruling directly contravenes Article VII(e) of the Compact, giving the DRBA the power to
[a]ppoint, or employ, such other officers, agents, attorneys, engineers and employees as it may require for the performance of its duties and to fix and determine their qualifications, duties, compensation, pensions, terms of office and all other conditions and terns of employment and retention.
[N.J.S.A. 32:11E-1, art. VII(e) (emphasis added).]
That provision is intended to keep matters concerning labor relations and collective negotiations in the hands of the DRBA.
The Court’s opinion also directly contravenes Article VIII of the Compact that establishes additional powers that may be granted to the DRBA but limits the duties that may be imposed on it. That Article provides:
For the purpose of effectuating the authorized purposes of the authority, additional powers may be granted to the authority by legislation of either State without concurrence of the other, and may be exercised within such State; or may be granted to the authority by Congress and exercised by it; but no additional duties or obligations shall be undertaken by the authority under the law of either State or of Congress zoithout authorization by the lazo of both States.
[.N.J.S.A. 32:11E-1, art VIII (emphasis added).]
Requiring the DRBA to negotiate collectively with its employees most certainly will impose “additional duties or obligations” on it.
*450II
Unless both states agree, it is well-established that a single-creator state may not unilaterally impose additional duties upon a bi-state agency when to do so would contravene the terms of the Compact. Eastern, supra, 111 N.J. at 398, 545 A.2d 127; Bell v. Bell, 83 N.J. 417, 424, 416 A.2d 829 (1980); Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. New Jersey PERC, 112 N.J.Super. 160, 165-66, 270 A.2d 704 (App.Div.1970) (PERC), aff'd o.b., 58 N.J. 388, 277 A.2d 880 (1971). That principle was addressed by the Appellate Division in PERC, supra, a case also concerning labor relations of the DRBA. 112 N.J.Super. at 165, 270 A.2d 704. There, the court was asked to determine whether New Jersey’s Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) had jurisdiction to certify a union as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain DRBA employees. Id. at 163, 270 A2d 704. Holding that PERC did not have jurisdiction, the panel stated that such jurisdiction “must be expressly given to [PERC] by the Legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware, and not inferred by the cowls.” Ibid, (emphasis added). To hold otherwise, the panel explained, would authorize one creator-state to impose its will and policies over the other state contrary to the terms of the Compact. Ibid. The court noted that under Article VIII of the Compact, the DRBA’s powers were to be jointly controlled by both creator-states. Id. at 164, 270 A.2d 704.
The court further explained that because a bi-state agency is a single agency of the governments of both creator-states, neither creator-state may enact laws involving and regulating the agency unless both states agree. Id. at 165-66, 270 A.2d 704; see also Bell, supra, 83 N.J. at 424, 416 A.2d 829 (“[T]he New Jersey Legislature does not have the power to modify by unilateral action the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the bi-state compact; yet that would be the result were the Tort Claims Act held to apply to the DRPA.”); Gauntt Constr. Co./Lott Electric Co. v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 241 N.J.Super. 310, 575 A.2d 13 (App.Div.1990) (rejecting contention that public policy of both compacting states imposed duties on bi-state agency).
*451A careful reading of Eastern, supra, 111 N.J. at 389, 545 A.2d 127, discloses that the majority has expanded the scope of that decision. In Eastern we only decided whether the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, the New Jersey Uniform Construction Code Act, N.J.S.A 52:27D-119 to - 141, and the New Jersey Handicapped Access Law, N.J.S.A. 52:32-42 to -16 applied to the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA). We concluded that New Jersey laws could not be applied because the DRPA was a public corporate-instrumentality of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Hence, “neither creator state [may] unilaterally impose additional duties, powers, or responsibilities upon the Authority.” Id. at 398, 545 A.2d 127. Additionally, the Court, citing Bell, concluded that New Jersey may not unilaterally exercise jurisdiction over the DRPA because to do so would violate the Compact, which made no provision for such jurisdiction. Ibid.
In Eastern, we also found that the DRPA’s Compact did “not contemplate single-state jurisdiction in general.” Id. at 400, 545 A.2d 127. The Court observed that “when Pennsylvania and New Jersey intended that local law would govern an area relevant to their compact, such as acquisition by eminent domain, N.J.S.A. 32:3-13.51, or consent for highway connection to the bi-state toll bridge, N.J.S.A. 32:3-13.55, they so specified.” Id. at 401-02, 545 A.2d 127.
In addressing the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association’s contention that the public policy of New Jersey mandated that the DRPA install elevators at its transit facility in Camden, the Court stated:
This State lacks the sovereign authority to direct the DRPA to cede jurisdiction to New Jersey____ [S]o too a single state cannot dictate the policy of a bi-state agency.
[Id at 407, 545 A.2d 127 (citations omitted).]
Accordingly, the Court held that the State of New Jersey could not exercise unilateral jurisdiction over the DRPA, stating that compacting states may only be subjected to single-state jurisdiction when the compact itself recognizes such jurisdiction. Id. at *452399, 545 A.2d 127. The DRPA’s Compact, the Court made clear, did not contemplate that form of unilateral state jurisdiction. Id. at 400, 545 A.2d 127.
Remanding the matter to the trial court, the Court, in dicta, suggested, however, that “the theories of complementary regulations and implied consent, given a fuller exposition, may yield a just resolution of the dispute.” Id. at 400-01, 545 A.2d 127. To succeed under that fact-sensitive,, complementary-legislative theory, the Court stated, there must be “some showing of agreement ” by the creator states to the enforcement of laws involving and regulating a bi-state agency. Id. at 402, 545 A.2d 127 (emphasis added). The best illustration of parallelism, the Court pointed out, is that DRPA employees are required to observe stop lights in New Jersey just as they are required to do so in Pennsylvania, even though neither state adopted such regulations within the framework of the compact creating the bi-state agency. Id. at 400, 545 A.2d 127 (citing Nardi v. Delaware River Port Auth., 88 Pa.Cmwlth. 558, 490 A.2d 949, 952 n. 10 (1985)). That example indicates the type of uncomplicated situation that complementary laws were capable of addressing.
In Ampro Fisheries, Inc. v. Yaskin, 127 N.J. 602, 606 A.2d 1099 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 409, 121 L. Ed.2d 333 (1992), and Bunk v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 144 N.J. 176, 676 A.2d 118 (1996), the facts were much different from those in this case. In those cases, the Court did not amend the language of the Compact. In this case, however, Article VTI(e), giving the Authority exclusive control over conditions and terms of employment, and Article VIII, providing that no state shall impose additional duties on another state without its consent, are, in effect, being directly overruled.
The Compact does not expressly give the compacting states the power to impose their labor laws on the DRBA, and the DRBA did not consent to the exercise of single-state jurisdiction in the area of collective negotiations with its employees. In fact, the evidence *453is to the contrary. That policy is confirmed by Article XIV of the DRBA’s Personnel Manual (the Manual), which provides:
Upon accepting a position ... with the Authority, an individual becomes a public or governmental employee---- In this connection, Authority employees have no right to incite, organize, conduct or participate in any strike, slowdown, or impediment to work against the Authority ... and neither does the Authoiity have the obligation to engage in collective bargaining with its employees or their chosen representative as may be unusual [sic] and legally done in private individual employment.
[Emphasis added.]
In view of the language of Article VII(e) and VIII of the Compact, something more than mere complementary or parallel statutes is needed to repeal specific language in the Compact, or stated differently, to act as an implied repeal of the Compact’s language. Similar public policy in two states is not sufficient to render one state’s legislation applicable to a bi-state agency’s employment practice. Malverty v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 71 N.Y.2d 977, 529 N.Y.S.2d 67, 524 N.E.2d 421 (1988).
Permitting similar legislative acts of compacting states to amend a compact completely disregards the long-standing precedents requiring legislatures to agree expressly before a state can impose duties and obligations on a bi-state agency. The majority’s reasoning ignores the fact that when the Legislatures of New Jersey and Delaware sought to impose unilaterally-enacted state legislation on their bi-state agency, they expressly provided for. it in the Compact. Eastern, supra, 111 N.J. at 401-02, 545 A.2d 127; see also N.J.S.A. 32:11E-1, Article XXII (imposing obligation on DRBA to comply with unilaterally-enacted environmental protection laws when planning, developing, constructing, or operating certain projects). The lack of a similar provision imposing unilaterally-enacted employment or labor laws on the DRBA must be viewed as an intent that such laws not apply.
Ill
Moreover, as explained in PERC, supra, 112 N.J.Super. at 166, 270 A.2d 704, “[t]o sanction such practice would lead- to discord *454and a destruction of the purposes for which such bi-state agencies are formed.” The panel made it clear that to impose New Jersey’s labor policies on Delaware and its citizens, who are employed by the DRBA, would require that
[t]he States of New Jersey and Delaware ... amend the compact and agree upon the issue of whether [the DRBA’s] employees may organize and engage in collective negotiations, what procedure should be utilized to implement this result, and where and how it should be accomplished. Unless, such is done, Delaware and New Jersey could each claim jurisdiction since both states have legislation permitting public employees to organize and negotiate. The confusion and conflicts which would follow if one state assumed jurisdiction, makes it clear that such was never intended by the compact.
[Id. at 166, 270 A.2d 704 (emphasis added).]
The same problem will result from the majority’s remand to the Chancery Division to effectuate the implementation of the two laws. Although the labor laws of New Jersey and Delaware are based on similar public policies, they differ in the following manner: (1) each States’ statute describes a different procedure for determining the employee-bargaining unit (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3; DeLCode Ann. tit. 19, § 1310); (2) the provisions for determining unfair labor practices and enforcing the statutes are different (N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4; Del.Code Ann. tit. 19, § 1308); (3) the New Jersey statute provides for arbitration of disputes whereas the Delaware statute does not (N.J.S.A 34:13A-7); and (4) neither statute indicates in its declaration or purpose that it intended for the statute to apply to the DRBA.
Inevitably, the Court’s decision will create uncertainty as to which state’s law and administrative procedures apply to a given situation. Rather than acting as a court, the Chancery Division will be acting as an administrative agency interpreting labor law; a role for which the Chancery Court was not intended and for which it is not well suited.
IV
In conclusion, I find that complementary or parallel state laws cannot repeal the language of the Compact. The Legislatures of both States could readily enact concurrent legislation requiring *455the DRBA to enter into collective negotiations with its employees thereby designating an entity more appropriate than the Chancery Division to decide the myriad of issues that will arise during the course of collective negotiations. They did not, however, choose to follow such a course. As such, the courts of New Jersey lack the authority to unilaterally grant such power.
I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
For affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, STEIN and COLEMAN — 6.
For reversal — -Justice GARIBALDI — 1.