Court Opinion

ID: 9514293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:48:30.422707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:15.911427
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 25] The addition of the words “separate transactions” to the written judgment after defendant began serving his sentence constitutes an illegal enhancement of sentence.
[¶26] Circuit Court Judge Hurd could have given defendant life for kidnapping in this case, but he did not. He cannot reopen the sentence or make the same transaction into separate transactions merely by saying it or by adding it after the sentence is being served. He may have made a mistake, but that does not mean we should further the mistake by ignoring the law in an attempt to correct it.
[¶ 27] South Dakota case law is clear that a sentence cannot be enhanced once it has been imposed and once the defendant has begun serving it — even if the enhanced sentence would have been a legal sentence had the court imposed it in the first place. “[0]nee an offender is within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government, the judicial branch — the circuit court — loses jurisdiction and control.” State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125, 129 (S.D. 1985) (citation omitted). We have stated, on numerous occasions, that “as against an unwilling defendant, a valid sentence cannot be increased in severity after he has commenced the serving thereof[.]” State v. Ford, 328 N.W.2d 263, 267 (S.D. 1982) (citing State v. Hughes, 62 S.D. 579, 584, 255 N.W. 800, 802 (1934); State v. Jackson, 272 N.W.2d 102 (S.D. 1978); Ex parte Watt, 73 S.D. 436, 44 N.W.2d 119 (1950)). “[A] sentence commences as soon as the prisoner suffers some confinement in the custody of a sheriff.” Id.
[¶ 28] In State v. DeMarsche, 68 S.D. 250, 1 N.W.2d 67 (1941), a judge sentenced a defendant to ten years imprisonment on the *484principal felony and withheld action on a second “habitual offender” information. The State withdrew its second information and refiled a more detailed information two to three weeks later, at which time a second judge set aside the ten-year sentence the defendant had already begun to serve and gave him a life sentence as enhanced by the second information. This court reversed because “[tjhe sentence of the first trial judge is still in all respects valid and effective. The [second] sentence ... was without authority and void.” 68 S.D. at 255, 1 N.W.2d at 69.
[¶ 29] In Ford, the trial court gave a defendant a sentence of three years with credit for thirty-three days served. Just three days later, before the defendant was transported to the penitentiary, the trial court, on its own motion, increased the sentence to ten years. After examining federal courts’ disposition of the issue, this court held “that the oral sentence is the only sentence, and that the written judgment must conform to it.” 328 N.W.2d at 267 (relying upon United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1974); Chunn v. United States, 462 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1970); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433 (D.C.Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916, 89 S.Ct. 1765, 23 L.Ed.2d 230 (1969); Rakes v. United States, 309 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1962)); see also State v. Cady, 422 N.W.2d 828, 830 (S.D. 1988) (collecting additional federal eases to support the proposition that it is settled law “that the oral sentence is . the only sentence and the written sentence must conform to it”). On that basis, the court invalidated the second sentence and reinstated the first. We should do the same.
[¶30] The facts were even more extreme in State v. Bucholz, 403 N.W.2d 400 (S.D. 1987). In that case, the trial court pronounced oral sentence in reliance upon' the defendant’s self-reports about his reformed behavior since the offense date; almost immediately after sentencing, the court discovered that the defendant and a primary witness had lied about his conduct. The court had the defendant back before it within one hour and ordered a resentencing hearing. Approximately one week later, the court increased the sentence to more than four times the original sentence, which was still within permissible statutory limits. Despite the brief span of time and the defendant’s fraud on the court, this court overturned the second sentence in favor of the first, quoting State v. Tibbetts, 333 N.W.2d 440 (S.D. 1983) that “a trial court may not use SDCL 23A-31-1 to increase the length of the sentence.” Bucholz, 403 N.W.2d at 402. See also Application of Grosh, 415 N.W.2d 824 (S.D. 1987). In that case, the trial court’s modification of its initial oral sentence did not, on its face, increase the length of the sentence; however, this court held that the elimination of a work release provision over five months after sentencing was an “impermissible augmentation of sentence.” Id. at 828.
[¶ 31] Sieler was sentenced to a total of 105 years imprisonment. Even though he had five convictions, all five of the convictions arose from conduct that occurred within a period of approximately one and one-half hours in the early morning of June 24, 1994. He was the only defendant, there was only one victim, all five charges were handed down on the same day in one indictment, he was arraigned on the same day on all five charges, he was tried before the same jury on all five charges, and he was found guilty of all five charges on the same day. Absent the addition of the words “separate transactions,” which appeared in the written Judgments and Sentences but which appear nowhere in the transcript of the oral sentence, Sieler would have become eligible for parole in the year 2008. The addition of those critical two words after a valid oral sentence had been pronounced substantially and im-permissibly augmented his sentence by insuring that he would not become eligible for parole until the year 2022.
[¶ 32] The trial court candidly admitted that this term of art, “separate transactions” had not come up at the sentencing hearing: “I don’t know that I used the word transaction. I probably didn’t).]” The court further stated: “I do recall that I did instruct counsel for the State ... although I don’t think it was on the record ... I did instruct counsel for the State that I wanted these as separate transactions. But that was not at the sen-*485fencing hearing, that was subsequent to the sentencing hearing.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, the crucial modification was made after Sieler had already begun to serve his sentence and “was without authority and void.” DeMarsche, 68 S.D. at 255, 1 N.W.2d at 69.
[¶ 33] As indicated above, even though Judge Hurd made a mistake and improperly second-guessed his initial sentence, it does not justify the majority’s complete disregard of the settled law as set forth in this dissent. Accordingly, the words “separate transactions” should be stricken from the written Judgments and Sentences so that the original sentence may be reinstated “as it existed on [the date of original sentencing], in all respects.” Grosh, 415 N.W.2d at 828.*

 Defense counsel says it well:
Sieler began to serve [his] sentence. The court then enhanced the sentence by adding a critical phrase to four of the five Judgments and Sentences which at a stroke doubled the number of years Sieler would have to serve until becoming eligible for parole. Contrary to the spin the State wishes to put on this sequence of events, this was an illegal ex post facto enhancement of sentence which this court should rectify by striking the words "separate transactions” from the Judgments and Sentences where they appear.