Court Opinion

ID: 9606440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:42.832531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.446187
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, C. J.,
dissenting.
In the interest of preserving the consistency and stability of the law, courts must sometimes reach a result which in a particular case seems manifestly unfair. The facts of this case indicate that counsel for the defendants took every reasonable precaution to insure that her clients’ statutory right to appeal would not be surrendered by default. She telephoned the trial judge to inquire if he had signed the judgment order and was told, incorrectly, that he had not done so. She asked the judge to refrain from signing the order until she returned from a trial in Wallowa County, and he agreed to wait. She never received the notice of entry of judgment that ORS 18.030 requires to be mailed to the parties, because the clerk never sent it. As the trial judge stated in his letter opinion setting aside the first judgment, "I don’t know what else she could do.” The errors that resulted in the failure to file a timely *661notice of appeal were those of the trial court and of the clerk.
The majority recognizes what happened and why, yet it feels compelled to hold that the defendants must suffer for the mistakes of the court and of the clerk. Were this outcome a necessary concession to the greater values noted above I would, however uncomfortably, join in the opinion of the court. In this case, however, neither precedent nor policy compel such an inequitable result. In my opinion the trial judge had ample authority to temporarily suspend a judgment, in order to obviate the damage caused by his own oversight.
The majority opinion considers two possible sources of authority for the action taken by Judge Jacobs: ORS 18.1601 and the inherent power of the court to rectify a mistake in a judgment. I agree that ORS 18.160 does not afford relief in the particular circumstances of this case, for the second reason stated by the majority. The defendant does not seek relief from a judgment "taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” The misleading statement by the trial judge occurred after the judgment had been taken. Thus the statute, read literally, does not apply to the facts of this case.
The inapplicability of ORS 18.160 does not detract from the inherent power of the court to rectify its own mistakes.2 As this court stated in Hein v. Theil, 274 Or *662715, 724, 549 P2d 514, 518-19 (1976), "Even aside from the provisions of ORS 18.160 * * * it has been recognized that the courts of Oregon have inherent power to correct a mistake in a judgment within a reasonable time after its entry.” We have upheld circuit courts in the exercise of their inherent power in a broad range of circumstances,3 but the majority holds that its application in this instance would circumvent the requirements of ORS 19.033(2).4 That statute imposes a prerequisite to the assumption of jurisdiction by an appellate court: the notice of appeal must be served and filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. It does not follow, however, that the trial court’s authority to determine when the clock starts to run is thereby limited. The language chosen by the legislature, "The serving and filing of the notice of appeal * * * is jurisdictional,” suggests that the prohibition against waiver or extension of the filing deadline is addressed to the appellate court, not the trial judge.
Of course the trial court must have good cause to set aside a judgment for any reason. The inherent power
*663to correct or set aside a judgment is subject to the sound discretion of the court. Wells v. Wells, 262 Or 44, 496 P2d 718, 721 (1972). Our decisions reviewing the exercise of the inherent power turn on the presence or absence of the same equitable considerations which the legislature incorporated into ORS 18.160. A trial court that set aside a judgment without good cause could be reversed for abuse of discretion. Sackett v. Mitchell, 264 Or 396, 398, 505 P2d 1136, 1137 (1973).
Other courts have upheld the use of the inherent power to rectify the type of mistake which the court committed here. In Hill v. Hawes, 320 US 520, 64 S Ct 334, 88 L Ed 283 (1944), rehr den, 321 US 801, 64 S Ct 515, 88 L Ed 1088 (1944), a district court judge dismissed a complaint, but the clerk failed to notify the parties of the entry of judgment, as required by Fed R Civ P 77(d). Because of this breach the plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The case for relief was less compelling than in this case, because the appellant in Hill v. Hawes received no assurances from the judge. Nevertheless the trial judge vacated the judgment and filed a new one, of identical content. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the action of the trial judge would "make a dead letter of our rule fixing a definite time for appeal.” Hill v. Hawes, 76 US AppDC 168, 132 F2d 569, 572 (DC Cir 1942). But the Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the trial court had the inherent power,5 "in the exercise of a sound discretion,” to vacate and re-enter the judgment. 320 US at 524. The reason given by the Supreme Court for its holding applies directly to the facts of this case:
"It is true that Rule 77(d) does not purport to attach any consequence to the failure of the clerk to give the prescribed notice; but we can think of no *664reason for requiring the notice if counsel in the cause are not entitled to rely upon the requirement that it be given.” 320 US at 523.
In reviewing the exercise of the inherent power by a trial court judge, we should confine our inquiry to the narrow question of whether the court abused its discretion in setting aside the judgment. Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 279 Or 13, 16, 566 P2d 489, 491 (1977); Sackett v. Mitchell, 264 Or 396, 398, 505 P2d 1136, 1137 (1973); In re Marks Estate, 81 Or 632, 636, 160 P 540, 541 (1916). While the term "abuse of discretion” has no hard and fast meaning, this court has defined it as action which "exceeds the bounds of reason,” or which is "clearly against reason and evidence.” Cas-ciato v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 181 Or 707, 185 P2d 246, 249 (1947).
The mistakes of the trial court and of the clerk constitute grounds enough to sustain the contested order, under the narrow standard to which we should properly confine our review. For this reason, and for those outlined above, I dissent.
Peterson, J., joins in this dissent.

 ORS 18.160 states as follows:
"The court may, in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.”

 The majority cites two cases in which this court upheld trial judges who refused to set aside judgments against litigants who had been misled by the clerk or by the court, and one case in which this court refused to hear an appeal from a decree which had been vacated and re-entered to meet the filing deadline. See Tongue v. Brewster, 35 Or 228, 58 P 38 (1899); Haas v. Scott, 115 Or 580, 239 P 202 (1925); Western Land, etc. Co. v. Humfeld, 118 Or 416, 247 P 143 (1926). However, as the majority concedes, those cases *662were decided at a time when a common-law rule required the court to exercise its inherent power to correct a mistake in a judgment within the term during which the judgment was entered. In the latter two cases the Supreme Court said plainly that the term during which the decree was entered had expired by the time the losing party moved to set aside the judgment. 115 Or at 587; 118 Or at 420. The court in Tongue v. Brewster did not even consider the inherent power of the trial court to correct its own mistakes. Perhaps a new term had commenced by the time defendant moved to set aside the judgment, or perhaps defendant neglected to plead that ground for relief. Whatever the reason, the legislature in 1959 enacted ORS 1.055, quoted by the majority, which removed the stricture of the common-law rule. Unlike the court in Tongue, we must consider the inherent power of a circuit court judge to (temporarily) set aside a judgment in the circumstances of this case.

 See, e.g., Braat v. Andrews, 266 Or 537, 514 P2d 540 (1973) (upholding the modification of a judgment to include an award for attorney fees); Morphet v. Morphet, 263 Or 311, 502 P2d 255 (1972) (affirming order setting aside previous dismissal of case for want of prosecution); Finch v. Pacific Reduction Etc. Co., 113 Or 670, 234 P 296 (1925) (affirming order vacating default judgment against defendant who had not received service of process).

 The text of ORS 19.033(2) appears in the majority opinion, 287 Or at 659, 601 P2d at 1240.

 The Supreme Court rested its holding on the inherent power of the court, rather than on the federal rule which closely resembles ORS 18.160, because the mistake involved in the omission to mail notice of the judgment was that of the clerk, not the appellant. Fed R Civ P 60(b), like ORS 18.160, authorized the court to relieve a party only from his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. 320 US at 524 (incorporating a conclusion of the Court of Appeals, 132 F2d at 571).