Court Opinion

ID: 9745776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:31:21.754994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.526388
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure of the defendant’s trial attorney to request a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (725 ILCS 5/104 — 21(a) (West 1992).) Although it is true that the defendant was entitled to a fitness hearing under that provision, the appropriate question here is not whether a hearing would have been held if a proper request had been made, but whether the hearing would have resulted in a disposition favorable to the defendant. To hold otherwise, as the majority does, misconceives the nature of the relevant inquiry in resolving ineffective-assistance claims. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, prescribes a two-part test for evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must show that counsel was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) To be sure, there are exceptional cases in which prejudice will be presumed. "Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance. [Citation.] Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case by case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. [Citation.]” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.) In most cases, however, a defendant raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must establish prejudice. "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Thus, the relevant inquiry in this case is not whether a fitness hearing would have been conducted if defense counsel had requested one under section 104— 21(a), but whether the outcome of the hearing would have been favorable to the defendant, that is, whether the defendant would have been found unfit to stand trial. The majority, by considering only whether a fitness hearing would have been held (162 Ill. 2d at 457-59), simply presumes the existence of prejudice in circumstances in which such a presumption is not warranted. For these reasons, I do not believe that this court’s opinion in People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 501, cited by the majority, should control our decision here. In Eddmonds, a post-conviction proceeding, the defendant argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his trial attorney’s failure to investigate his fitness and to request a fitness hearing under the statutory predecessor to section 104 — 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/104 — 11 (West 1992) (defendant entitled to hearing when bona fide doubt of fitness raised)). In that case, the court simply adopted the defendant’s premise that, under Strickland, "he suffered prejudice because the trial court would have ordered a hearing to determine whether he was fit to stand trial, had it been appraised of the additional evidence raised in the post-conviction petition.” (Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d at 512.) In that case the State, too, apparently accepted the defendant’s phrasing of the prejudice inquiry. (Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d at 513 ("We agree with the State that the defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief on his ineffective-assistance claim only if the evidence introduced at the post-conviction proceeding raised a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial”).) Without examining whether that formulation was correct or not, the Eddmonds court determined that the evidence did not raise a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness and that the defendant thus was not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I do not believe that the present defendant can establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request a fitness hearing under section 104 — 21(a). A defendant is unfit to stand trial or to be sentenced if, "because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.” (725 ILCS 5/104 — 10 (West 1992).) The evidence presented by the defendant in support of his request for a hearing under section 104 — 11 showed that he had low intelligence and a learning disability. Yet the defendant was also a high school graduate and was employed. Moreover, the defense psychologist and the prosecution psychiatrist who examined the defendant in connection with his insanity defense agreed that the defendant could describe the functions of a court and jury. Limited intellectual ability does not by itself render a defendant unfit (People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 432-33; People v. Lucas (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7), and I do not believe that the present defendant would have been found unfit. For the reasons stated, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant has established ineffective assistance of counsel, and I would consider the remaining issues raised by the defendant in the case at bar. CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC and JUSTICE HEIPLE join in this dissent.