Court Opinion

ID: 9677826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:01:19.59633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:58.793608
License: Public Domain

REEVES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion bases its reason for reversal solely on the grounds that written notice to the City was not required because the erection of a barricade is a governmental function rather than a proprietary function. Consequently, the provisions of the Texas Tort Claim Act apply. The issue as to whether the erection of a barricade was a governmental rather than a proprietary responsibility of the City was not raised in either appellant’s or appellee’s brief. In*178deed, the thrust of Appellant’s brief is that the requirement of written notice, in the instance of a proprietary function, should be done away with due to its harshness and unreasonableness. This, to me, is a tacit acknowledgment on the part of the Appellant that the failure of the City to erect a barricade was a proprietary function.
The Appellant asks that we be trail blazers and strike down the written notice which is now required by most city charters in the State of Texas. ■ In my view, due to the relatively current vintage of the ease law upholding this type of notice, our responsibility as an intermediate appellate court is to leave that decision to our Supreme Court.