Court Opinion

ID: 9686773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:05:57.341567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:11.918982
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The remedy crafted by the majority was not sought by Marilyn Buzick. Rather, her attorney requested a transcript to be paid for by Duane Buzick. That request was denied. I have a further concern however. We are not to retry the facts on appeal. See Rule 52(a), NDRCivP. I do not view the majority’s remedy as a statement on the merits of Marilyn Buzick’s appeal. But that remedy will only serve to reduce the amount available to Marilyn Buzick under the judgment should she avail herself of the option to secure the transcript and should we affirm on the merits after receipt of the transcript. I am unwilling to encourage such a result.
I respectfully dissent.
LEE A. CHRISTOFFERSON, District Judge.
I would affirm the trial court so must dissent.
First, the defendant never asked the trial court for an advance which is now granted by this court. How can a trial court judge be expected to order such an intrusive measure as an advance on a money judgment to pay for a transcript when it was never suggested by a party. Appellant’s counsel conceded he never asked for it and still wasn’t sure during oral argument if he wanted this relief. Counsel maintained that the plaintiff should pay for the transcript on appeal. The majority decision supplants lawyering tactics with what is deemed “the right thing to do.”
Second, it isn’t just a coincidence that there is a complete absence of authority on this subject from other jurisdictions. The uncharted course this court heads toward may have been foreseen by other courts as both suspect and inequitable in cases without funds to award a money judgment.
Finally, the majority decision suggests that a trial court can effectively prevent meaningful appellate review by preventing purchase of the transcript. I take issue with this unjustifiable suggestion since the trial court never prevented the purchase of a transcript. I fail to see any difference in this situation from cases such as Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 470 N.W.2d 230 (N.D.1991), where this court declined to review factual issues without a transcript. Who prevented meaningful appellate review in those eases where no transcript was provided? Surely not the trial court!