Court Opinion

ID: 9530627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:01:43.502085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:11.854793
License: Public Domain

PÁGE, Justice
(concurring specially).
While I concur in the result reached by the court, I write separately about the court’s use of accomplice testimony to support Johnson’s conviction when that testimony is corroborated by nothing more *731than general facts showing the commission and circumstances of the crime. I believe that the court’s use of the accomplice’s general fact testimony for corroborative purposes is improper and unnecessary. “Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it ‘restores confidence in the accomplice’s testimony, confirming its truth and pointing to the defendant’s guilt in some substantial degree.’ ” State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 225 (Minn.1995) (quoting State v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 713 (Minn.1988)). Johnson argues that it is improper to use these general facts to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony because these facts do not tend to convict him of first-degree premeditated murder.1 Johnson is correct.
Here, for purposes of corroboration of the accomplice testimony, the court relies on evidence that confirms the truth of the accomplice’s testimony but which does not point to Johnson being guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. The accomplice’s testimony that three men approached Mr. Fernland, with one asking for the time, that Mr. Fernland was shot in the back, that Mr. Fernland was trying to run when shot, that the gun jammed, that there was laughter after Mr. Fernland was shot, that the perpetrators fled down an alley in a white Mercury Mountaineer, that a tire track in the alley matched a tire on Howard’s Mountaineer, and that the accomplice and Johnson stole cars to get to and from St. Cloud after the shooting, is corroborated by evidence confirming the truth of those facts. The corroboration of this testimony is not sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony that Johnson was the shooter.
The underlying rationale for requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony is that such testimony exposes the accused “to the danger of imprisonment based on the testimony of a witness naturally inclined to shift or diffuse criminal responsibility.” State v. Mathiasen, 267 Minn. 393, 399, 127 N.W.2d 534, 539 (1964). Given the potential for blame shifting, the accomplice’s testimony regarding general facts showing the commission and circumstances of Mr. Fernland’s murder that are not corroborated by evidence pointing to Johnson as the shooter cannot be used to support Johnson’s first-degree premeditated murder conviction.
Although the accomplice testimony discussed above should not be used to support Johnson’s first-degree premeditated murder conviction, his conviction must nonetheless be affirmed because there was sufficient evidence pointing to his guilt. Part of the accomplice’s testimony includes corroborative evidence: that Johnson hid the gun in Pritchard’s garage, which was corroborated by Pritchard’s testimony that Johnson told him that he hid a gun in Pritchard’s garage; that Johnson laughed after the shooting and appeared happy, which was corroborated by Pritchard’s testimony that Johnson appeared happy when he arrived at Pritchard’s house on the night of the shooting; and that Johnson was the shooter, which was sufficiently corroborated by Pritchard’s testimony that Johnson told him “we” shot someone, to convict Johnson of first-degree felony murder. In addition, the evidence regarding Johnson’s gunshot wound from a gun and bullet similar to that used to shoot Mr. Fernland points to Johnson’s guilt. This evidence, coupled with the other evidence admitted at trial, when viewed in the light *732most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to support the conviction.
PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the special concurrence of Justice PAGE.

. I question whether we should even reach this issue. Under Minn.Stat. § 609.04 (1998), only one of Johnson's two convictions may be upheld — the other must be vacated. The penalty for each is the same and there appears to be no required reason to vacate the first-degree felony murder conviction instead of the first-degree premeditated murder conviction. Because there is sufficient evidence to sustain Johnson’s first-degree felony murder conviction, if we were to vacate the first-degree premeditated murder conviction, there would be no need to rule on the corroboration issue.