Court Opinion

ID: 9960162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:11:23.511099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:14.849422
License: Public Domain

J-A07022-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOSH HUENTEQUEO PACHECO                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 816 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 3, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Juniata County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-34-CR-0000195-2021

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                              FILED APRIL 15, 2024

       Josh Huentequeo Pacheco (“Pacheco”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed following his convictions for driving under the influence

(“DUI”) – general impairment, DUI – high rate of alcohol, driving vehicle at a

safe speed, and driving on roadways laned for traffic – driving within single

lane.1 We affirm.

       The factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. In late May

2021, Tyler Rapp (“Rapp”) was in bed sleeping when he received a phone call

at 10:16 p.m. from Pacheco stating he had run “off the road and hit a truck”

in Rapp’s mechanic shop parking lot. See N.T., 9/23/22, at 7-8, 12. Rapp got

out of bed, informed his wife about the call, and while Rapp traveled the

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3802(b), 3361, and 3309(1), respectively.
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approximately five miles to the accident scene, his wife called the police. See

id. at 7-9. Upon arrival, Rapp saw that four vehicles, including Pacheco’s, had

been “smashed.” Id. Rapp told Pacheco the police were on their way and

asked Pacheco if he was hurt, to which Pacheco replied that he was not. See

id. at 9. Pacheco then said to Rapp that “he didn’t want to go to jail, and he

was sorry.”   Id. at 13.   Additionally, Rapp observed Pacheco slurring his

speech, repeating himself, and swaying back and forth. See id.

      Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Zebulan Evans (“Trooper

Evans”) arrived at 10:59 P.M. See id. at 16. While examining the scene and

talking to Pacheco, Trooper Evans detected alcohol on Pacheco’s breath. See

id. at 18. Trooper Evans also observed that Pacheco had “slow, slurred, raspy”

speech and disheveled clothing. See id. Trooper Evans noticed Pacheco also

had “glassy, bloodshot eyes, watery eyes.” Id. Pacheco admitted to Trooper

Evans that he was the driver of the vehicle.    See id. Trooper Evans then

administered field sobriety tests (“FSTs”) including, inter alia, the walk-and-

turn test and the one-leg stand test. Trooper Evans concluded, in light of his

eight years of PSP training and experience— including “numerous” DUI arrests

and FST training—and paired with the signs of impairment Pacheco exhibited,

along with Pacheco’s performance on the FSTs, that Pacheco was impaired and

incapable of operating a vehicle safely. See id. at 19-21.

      Trooper Evans transported Pacheco to Lewistown Hospital for a blood

draw, to which Pacheco consented. See id. at 27-29. Phlebotomist Linzee

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Renninger drew Pacheco’s blood for testing at 11:55 P.M. See id. at 30, 43,

70. The hospital sent Pacheco’s blood to a lab for testing. Forensic toxicologist

Kari Midthun, later qualified at trial as an expert in her field, subsequently

testified that the results showed Pacheco’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) to

be .153. See id. at 57.2 The Commonwealth charged Pacheco with the above

offenses.

       Following a non-jury trial, during which the trial court heard the

evidence as summarized supra, the court found Pacheco guilty on all counts.

See id. at 72. Pacheco received an aggregate sentence of, inter alia, forty-

eight hours to six months of incarceration, plus fines and costs. See Order,

1/3/23. Following several extensions and the subsequent denial of Pacheco’s

post-sentence motion, see Order 5/9/23, Pacheco timely appealed, and both

he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Pacheco raises the following issue for our review:

       Whether the . . . verdict as to count 1 through count 4 is against
       the sufficiency and weight of the evidence when the
       Commonwealth was unable to provide evidence that proved
       Pacheco was substantially impaired to the point he could not drive
       safely.

Pacheco’s Brief at 6.

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2 Accounting for the margin of error of .009, Pacheco’s blood showed a BAC

which “could have been anywhere from a .144 to a .162 . . ..” N.T., 9/23/22,
at 58.

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      In considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, our standard of

review is as follows:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict[-]winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not
      weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
      finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
      may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
      be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime[s]
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 109-10 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

      Before reaching the merits of Pacheco’s sufficiency issue, we must

determine whether he has preserved it.          An appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement must “concisely identify each error that the appellant intends to

assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.”

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii).     Rule 1925(b) requires an appellant, when

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, to specify for which elements of

which offenses the evidence was insufficient; as this Court has explained:

      If [an a]ppellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
      insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the

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      element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.
      This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal.
      [Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly
      unproven elements[,] . . . the sufficiency issue is waived.

Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284 A.3d 1262, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal

citation omitted; brackets in original). “Even if the trial court correctly guesses

the issues [an a]ppellant[ ] raise[s] on appeal and writes an opinion pursuant

to that supposition the issues are still waived.” Commonwealth v. Bonnett,

239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020) (some brackets in original).

      Following our review, we conclude Pacheco has waived his sufficiency

issue by failing to set forth in sufficient detail the elements of each offense for

which he asserts the evidence was insufficient. See Rule 1925(b) Statement,

7/26/23, at ¶ 6.1. Pacheco’s Rule 1925(b) statement reads, in relevant part,

as follows:

      The Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence as to Count 1
      — DUI: Controlled Substance — Impaired Ability; Count 2 — DUI
      High Rate; Count 3 — Driving at Safe Speed; and Count 4 —
      Disregard Traffic Lane. See generally Commonwealth v.
      Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003) (a claim challenging
      the sufficiency of the evidence asserts that there is insufficient
      evidence to support at least one material element of the crime);
      see also Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa.
      2000) (as this court well knows, the standard of review is to
      review the record “in the light most favorable to the verdict winner
      giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to
      be drawn from the evidence”).

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See id. Thus, as Pacheco did not specify the elements of each offense for

which the evidence was allegedly insufficient, he has waived his sufficiency

challenge. See Arnold, 284 A.3d at 1279; Bonnett, 239 A.3d. at 1106-07.3

       Pacheco secondarily argues that his convictions are against the weight

of the evidence.      Our standard of review for challenges to weight of the

evidence is as follows:

       A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to
       the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
       evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that
       the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The decision
       whether to grant a new trial on this basis rests within the
       discretion of the trial court. A trial court should award a new trial
       on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the
       evidence only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the
       evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and make the award
       of a new trial imperative so that right may be given another
       opportunity to prevail. The role of [this Court] in reviewing the
       weight of the evidence is very limited. The purpose of that review
       is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and
       not to substitute the reviewing Court’s judgment for that of the
       trial court. Accordingly, where the evidence is conflicting, the
       credibility of the witnesses is solely for the jury, and if its finding
____________________________________________

3 Pacheco’s argument—which is that there was no “proof” of his impairment

because the FSTs were not recorded, see Pacheco’s Brief at 15—is also
arguably waived because it is undeveloped. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b)
(requiring a properly developed argument for each question presented
including a discussion of and citation to authorities in appellate brief); see
also Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(en banc) (stating failure to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure
results in waiver of the underlying issue). In any event, even if preserved,
Pacheco’s issue is meritless. Pacheco has cited no authority for his assertion
that field sobriety tests must be recorded. Consequently, because the trial
court heard evidence of Pacheco’s impairment, his issue merits no relief. See
N.T., 9/23/22, at 22 (Trooper Evans concluding Pacheco was impaired based
on his training and experience, and the signs of impairment Pacheco
exhibited); contra Pacheco’s Brief at 15.

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      is supported by the record, the trial court’s denial of a motion for
      new trial will not be disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 663 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 1995) (internal

citations omitted).

      A weight claim is one of the least assailable reasons for ruling whether

there should be a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d 1014,

1022 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations, quotation marks, and quotations omitted).

Additionally, the factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence

presented. See Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super.

2011). This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder.

See id.    Any inconsistencies in a victim’s testimony are decided by the

factfinder’s credibility determination. See Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171

A.3d 803, 809 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      Before addressing the merits of Pacheco’s weight issue, we must

determine whether he has waived it. An undeveloped argument is one which

completely lacks any meaningful discussion and which does not apply the

appropriate governing standard for review of the issue. See Commonwealth

v. Bracey, 795 A.2d 935, 940 n.4 (Pa. 2001). An undeveloped argument

“does not satisfy [an a]ppellant’s burden of establishing that he is entitled to

any relief.” Id. As this Court has explained:

             When briefing the various issues that have been preserved,
      it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently
      developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with
      pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with
      citations to legal authorities. [See] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c).

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       Citations to authorities must articulate the principles for which
       they are cited. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b).

             This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop
       arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in
       a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review,
       we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be
       waived.

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some

citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 841

(Pa. 2014) (providing that, if an appellant’s argument has boilerplate language

and is undeveloped, it is considered waived).

       Our review discloses that Pacheco’s argument is undeveloped. In his

brief, Pacheco employs boilerplate statutory language. See Pacheco’s Brief at

14. His following argument consists simply of an assertion that the trial court

erred in denying his weight claim without citing factual or legal support. See

id. This deficiency impedes our review. Accordingly, Pacheco’s weight claim

is waived. See Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771; Perez, 93 A.3d at 841.4

       In conclusion, Pacheco has waived his sufficiency and weight claims,

but, even if preserved, neither of Pacheco’s arguments merit relief, and

therefore, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

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4 Regardless, Pacheco’s argument fails on the merits, as we have rejected his

argument that Trooper Evans’s testimony required supporting video
documentation, and because Pacheco did not identify any evidence to show
that the verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks the conscience
such that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the weight claim in
his post-sentence motion. See Holmes, 663 A.2d at 774.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/15/2024

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