Court Opinion

ID: 9650976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:59:13.364226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:19.327689
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by MURPHY, Judge which ADKINS, J., joins.
I agree with the majority’s holding “that JSG was a bona fide purchaser, as of the date of its successful bid at the foreclosure sale, and, thus, the Mirjafaris’ failure to file a supersedeas bond rendered moot their subsequent appeal of the overruling of their exceptions and ratification of the report of sale.” I write separately, however, to emphasize that in the case at bar, at no point in time prior to dismissal of their appeal did Petitioners ever request that the Circuit Court exercise its discretion to (1) enjoin the foreclosure,1 (2) establish the amount of a supersedeas bond, (3) order other reasonable alternative security, or (4) stay enforcement of the judgment pending appeal.2 Nor did Petitioners request that the Court of Special Appeals enter an order staying the judgment of the Circuit Court.3 Moreover, on the record before us the Circuit Court would have been clearly erroneous in finding that JSG was not a bona fide purchaser. Under these circumstances, Petitioners’ appeal was properly dismissed.
I am concerned that the majority opinion will be misinterpreted as imposing an absolute requirement that a timely appeal noted by the victim of an equity stripping scheme must *491be dismissed whenever he or she is unable to comply with the security provisions established by the Circuit Court—regardless of how strongly the evidence indicated that the foreclosure sale purchaser was not entitled to bona fide purchaser status.4
In 2005 and in 2008, the General Assembly enacted legislation to protect mortgagors from falling victim to the deceitful practices of certain “foreclosure consultants.” Effective May 26, 2005, § T—311(e) of the Real Property Article (RP) provided:
A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE OR BONA FIDE LENDER FOR VALUE WHO ENTERS INTO A TRANSACTION WITH A HOMEOWNER OR A FORECLOSURE PURCHASER WHEN A FORECLOSURE CONSULTING CONTRACT IS IN EFFECT OR DURING THE PERIOD WHEN A FORECLOSURE RECONVEYANCE MAY BE RESCINDED, WITHOUT NOTICE OF THOSE FACTS, RECEIVES GOOD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY, FREE AND CLEAR OF THE RIGHT OF THE PARTIES TO THE FORECLOSURE CONSULTING CONTRACT OR THE RIGHT OF THE HOMEOWNER TO RESCIND THE FORECLOSURE RECONVEYANCE.
In 2008, that provision was eliminated when the General Assembly enacted the Protection of Homeowners in Foreclo*492sure Act (PHIFA).5 The case at bar does not require that we determine why the General Assembly repealed RP § 7-311(e), but I am persuaded that the Court of Special Appeals or this Court will soon be requested to make that determination. I would not dismiss the appeal of a party making that request, provided that the party has also requested the various forms of post-judgment relief that were never requested in the case at bar.
Judge ADKINS has authorized me to state that she joins in this concurring opinion.

. See Md. Rule 14-209(b), and Wells Fargo v. Neal, 398 Md. 705, 922 A.2d 538 (2007).

. See Md. Rule 2-632.

. See Md. Rule 8-425.

. In 2008, the provisions of RP § 7-311 were transferred to RP § 7-312.

. In Blondell, et al. v. Turover, 195 Md. 251, 72 A.2d 697 (1950), this Court stated:
The law requires reasonable diligence in a purchaser of real property to ascertain any defect of title.... When a purchaser has notice of a fact which casts doubt upon the validity of his title, the rights of innocent persons must not be prejudiced as a result of his negligence .... In determining whether a purchaser had notice of any prior equities or unrecorded interests, so as to preclude him from being entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser, the rule is that if he had knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, he will be presumed to have made such inquiry and will be charged with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability have disclosed if it had been properly pursued.
Id. at 257, 72 A.2d at 699.