Court Opinion

ID: 9889553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 17:10:16.245233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:17.381613
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/10/23 P. v. Eidem CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096458

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 20CF02327)

           v.

 ANTHONY JOSEPH EIDEM,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Anthony Joseph Eidem guilty of forcible rape and
disrupting computer services without permission. The trial court sentenced defendant to
eight years eight months in prison. On appeal, defendant raises several claims of
prosecutorial error, several claims of evidentiary error pertaining to the testimony of the
prosecution’s experts, and one claim of instructional error. We affirm.
                         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         Defendant owned a barbershop where the victim worked. The victim thought
defendant was a “horrible boss,” as shown by his failure at times to provide air

                                                             1
conditioning to his employees. Given this treatment, when defendant’s barbershop
moved locations, a faction of the employees stayed behind and opened their own
barbershop in the location defendant’s shop had vacated. The victim was one of the
employees to stay behind and work in the new shop. After defendant moved his
business, employees at the new shop, including the victim, would talk poorly about
defendant. The victim maintained friendships with her former colleagues and with the
employees at the newly-created barbershop; however, there was animosity between the
employees of the two barbershops.
       In October 2019, the victim texted defendant “ ‘What time are you off, Ugly?’ ”
Her intent was to be rude to defendant because she did not like him and thought he was a
“horrible boss.” Still, the victim wanted the two barbershops to mend fences and wanted
to inquire from defendant about a job at his barbershop. To accomplish these goals, the
victim invited defendant out for drinks. She met defendant at his barbershop and talked
to her former colleagues who still worked for him. When she told them she was getting
drinks with defendant, they responded, “ ‘Why would you do that?’ ”
       During testimony, the victim could not recall much of the events of the evening
with defendant. She recalled going to several bars and drinking beer and consuming at
least one shot of alcohol. She did not recall defendant pressuring her to drink. She
recalled being in defendant’s car and then in his home. She did not recall telling
defendant that she did not want to go to his house. The victim recalled that while in
defendant’s house, she crawled on the carpet yelling for his girlfriend, whom she
believed lived with defendant. The victim yelled for defendant’s girlfriend because she
knew that if defendant’s girlfriend was there, “[the assault] wouldn’t have happened.”
       The victim also testified that she recalled defendant at some point getting on top of
her and pulling up her shirt. She recalled defendant fondling and biting her breasts and
strangling her with both of his hands. The victim told defendant, “ ‘Stop, that hurts,’ ”
before losing consciousness. The next thing the victim recalled was locking herself in

                                             2
defendant’s roommate’s room with defendant’s roommate and then being in defendant’s
roommate’s car. After stopping at a gas station, defendant’s roommate took the victim to
the police station,1 after which she took part in a sexual assault exam. When preparing
for the exam, the victim noticed her boot was unlaced, which she never did when taking
off her boots, her underwear was only on one leg, and her bra was unclasped. The victim
did not recall defendant penetrating her vagina with his fingers or his penis; however,
there was “strong support” that defendant’s DNA matched seminal fluid taken from the
victim’s vagina during the sexual assault exam. There was also “very strong support”
that defendant’s DNA matched DNA samples taken from the victim’s neck.
       Defendant’s roommate testified that he first met the victim when she came home
with defendant after the two went out drinking. The victim was obviously intoxicated
and much more intoxicated than defendant. Later in the night, the victim walked into
defendant’s roommate’s bedroom in pants soiled with urine and fell. Defendant came
into the bedroom behind the victim and yelled at her for ruining his roommate’s night and
causing problems. Defendant’s roommate told defendant to leave his room and that he
would take care of the victim. Defendant complied. The victim “came to” and appeared
“frantic.” Defendant’s roommate tried to calm her, but the victim kept saying, “ ‘You
need to leave. Please leave. He’s a bad man.’ ” The victim also told defendant’s
roommate that defendant raped her. Defendant’s roommate drove the victim away from
defendant’s house and eventually drove her to the police station. While in the car with
the victim, defendant’s roommate noticed red marks on both sides of her neck. Pictures
of the marks were shown to the jury.
       During the sexual assault exam, the victim also had very little memory of the
assault. Halfway through the exam, the victim indicated she remembered “ ‘struggling

1      The victim was interviewed at the police station and the interview was played for
the jury. During the interview, she appeared intoxicated and had large gaps in recall.

                                             3
and not being able to breathe because [defendant] was putting pressure on [her] neck and
chest with his hands and arms. [She] remember[ed] pressure. [She] was distressed and
needed to breathe, but could not.’ ” The victim’s injuries included a swollen lip, bruises
on the back of her arms consistent with fingerprints, bruises and scratches on her
buttocks, and bruises on her neck. The bruises on her neck appeared bright red and
tender and were located over the location of her carotid artery.
       Chico Police Detective Cale Smith investigated the victim’s allegation of rape.
During a search of defendant’s Facebook messages, Detective Smith saw that defendant
had communicated with his girlfriend the night of the offense. Defendant’s girlfriend
messaged him after 10:00 p.m. to tell him that he was supposed to have met with his
daughter that day. Defendant responded, “Ugh,” and told his girlfriend to tell his
daughter he could not call her because he was in a business meeting. Defendant’s
girlfriend knew he was out with the victim and told him to go home. At 11:25 p.m.,
defendant messaged his girlfriend that he was home. One minute later, defendant sent a
video to his girlfriend of the victim crawling on her hands and knees on the floor of his
home with his roommate in the background asking the victim if she wanted water. The
video was played for the jury.
       The victim left her phone at defendant’s house. Defendant’s girlfriend testified
that she and defendant searched the contents of the victim’s phone. Defendant’s
girlfriend also testified that she knew the victim to be flirtatious, especially with
defendant. The night defendant was out with the victim, his girlfriend sent him a text
message stating, “ ‘Don’t make out or fuck [the victim]. You know she likes you.’ ”
Defendant’s girlfriend communicated with defendant throughout the night, through
text/social media messages and phone calls. She told defendant to go home because she
was uneasy with defendant and the victim being together given her belief that the victim
was attracted to him. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant’s girlfriend
whether her actual concern was that defendant was a “cheater” and not that the victim

                                               4
was attracted to him. Defendant’s girlfriend testified that she was not worried about
defendant being a “cheater.” The prosecution then impeached defendant’s girlfriend over
defendant’s objection with text messages between herself and defendant demonstrating
her reaction to defendant having slept with other women. On redirect examination,
defendant’s girlfriend clarified that she and defendant were in an open relationship such
that they could date and have sexual intercourse with other people. Also on cross-
examination, the prosecutor confronted defendant’s girlfriend with text messages in
which defendant belittled her and called her a failure. In response, defendant’s girlfriend
messaged him that she does everything he asks of her. Defendant’s girlfriend clarified
that her statement was made in the context of their professional life and not her personal
life.
        Defendant testified that his night with the victim progressed into a date and the
two started kissing. He was drunk but drove the victim to his house. During the drive, he
touched her leg and she touched his hand. Defendant testified that he and the victim had
consensual sex shortly after arriving at his house. He then introduced the victim to his
roommate and took the video of the victim crawling on the floor. Defendant denied
strangling the victim.
        When asked by his counsel what happened when the two arrived home, defendant
answered, “When I got back to the house, we went in, I told—I remember, I do remember
her yelling for [my girlfriend], but I presumed to make sure that [she] wasn’t there, not
that she was there.” The prosecution objected to defendant’s answer because it was not
in response to the question. The trial court sustained the objection and defense counsel
did not follow up with further questions pertaining to defendant’s state of mind when
arriving home. When asked by the prosecution whether he had seen any positive
messages on the victim’s phone when he looked through it, defendant answered that he
had seen a lot of positive things and that the messages between them personally were
always positive.

                                              5
       Detective Smith spoke to defendant three months after the incident. During the
conversation, defendant did not say he and the victim had sex on the night in question.
When asked whether he had seen anything flirtatious between defendant and the victim
when searching the victim’s phone records, Detective Smith said the communications
were all about work.
       The jury found defendant guilty of forceable rape and disrupting computer
services without permission. The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years eight
months in prison.
       Defendant appeals.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                    Prosecutorial Error
       Defendant raises several contentions of prosecutorial error, including that the
prosecutor misstated the law in closing argument, alluded to evidence not admitted at
trial, and impermissibly relied on character evidence.
       “ ‘ “ ‘ “A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution
when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ ” ’ [Citations.] Conduct
by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial
misconduct under state law only if it involves ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Zambrano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228, 241.)
       We review de novo a defendant’s claim of prosecutorial error. (People v. Uribe
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 860.) When determining whether a prosecutor acted
egregiously or deceptively, we “ ‘ “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most
damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ”
(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553-554.) We presume, in the absence of

                                              6
evidence to the contrary, that the jury understands and follows instructions from the trial
court (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 823); and that the jurors treat the court’s
instructions as statements of law, and the arguments of the counsel as words spoken by an
advocate in an attempt to persuade (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 441; see
CALCRIM No. 222 [statements of counsel are not evidence]). We consider the
prosecutor’s remarks in context of the entire record. (People v. San Nicolas (2004)
34 Cal.4th 614, 665-666.)
                                             A
          The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Law During Closing Argument
       Defendant contends the prosecutor erred during closing argument by misstating
the law twice. First, he argues the prosecutor misstated the reasonable doubt standard
when arguing that she did not have to prove defendant’s guilt to a “ ‘near certainty.’ ”
Second, he argues the prosecutor misstated the law when telling the jury it was required
to reject inferences that were not based on the evidence. We disagree with both
contentions.
       Pertaining to the burden of proof, the prosecutor argued in rebuttal argument that
defense counsel “misstated a lot. And I want to address some of those misstatements. [¶]
For one, he kept saying ‘near certainty.’ ‘Must be near certainty.’ ‘The prosecution’s
case must be near perfect.’ You will find that absolutely nowhere in the law that the
judge gives you. Nowhere. That’s not what the law says. Why? Because, as I showed
you, everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. Near certainty is not
the standard. The standard is reasonable doubt. That was a misstatement.”
       Defendant argues a “near certainty” is often used in case law to define the
reasonable doubt standard, and thus the prosecutor’s statement that defense counsel
misstated the law was wrong. We take the prosecutor’s argument to mean that the term
“near certainty” was not included in the jury instructions given by the court, which it was
not. The instructions inform the jury that reasonable doubt meant it must hold “an

                                             7
abiding conviction that the charge is true” and that “[t]he evidence need not eliminate all
possible doubt.” (CALCRIM No. 220.) While case law may describe this standard as a
near certainty (see People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 324; People v. Reyes
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 500), the prosecutor referred the jury to the jury instruction as its
guiding post for the standard it was to apply and the instructions did not include the
phrase “near certainty.” As the trial court said when defendant objected to the
prosecutor’s reasonable doubt rebuttal argument, the jury was instructed to follow the
jury instructions and ignore the lawyers’ arguments if those arguments conflicted with the
law contained in the jury instructions. (CALCRIM No. 200.) Accordingly, the
prosecutor did not commit error when describing the reasonable doubt standard to the
jury.
        Pertaining to circumstantial evidence, the prosecutor told the jury that direct and
circumstantial evidence can equally be used to prove guilt. The prosecutor continued,
“Now, [defense counsel] made a huge to-do about this instruction that says if you can
draw two or more . . . reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one
of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept
the one that points to innocence. [¶] That’s correct. That’s the law. You know what he
left out? Conclusions from the circumstantial evidence. It has to be in evidence. It has
to be the testimony, the exhibits in the case, not [defense counsel]’s imaginary scenarios
that he’s asking you to consider. He doesn’t want you considering the evidence. He
wants you considering imaginary scenarios. That’s against the law. The law says you
must draw—if there are two or more reasonable conclusions from the evidence. Not
from [defense counsel]’s made-up, imaginary scenarios. Cannot, cannot consider his
explanations or his made-up scenarios. You cannot consider that. You can only consider
what was in evidence; okay?”
        As an example of what the jury was precluded from doing, the prosecutor said
“[d]efense [c]ounsel . . . picks apart little things that are in evidence, and he asks you to

                                               8
compare them to things that are imagined. ‘Imagine this scenario. Well, I would submit
to you that the mark on her neck could be caused by her shirt coming up.’ That’s not in
evidence. You can’t consider that. That’s [defense counsel] making something up. No
one testified, ‘Oh, yeah, I remember when I took her shirt off, I scratched her.’ Nobody
testified to that. It’s not in evidence. You can’t think of it.”
       We do not interpret the prosecutor’s argument regarding circumstantial evidence
as a misstatement of law. The jury was instructed on circumstantial evidence as follows:
“If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence
and one of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you
must accept the one that points to innocence. However, when considering circumstantial
evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are
unreasonable.” (CALCRIM No. 224.) While the prosecutor’s argument was one of
absolutes regarding what the jury could or could not consider, in context of the
prosecutor’s argument and the circumstantial evidence instruction (CALCRIM No. 224),
the prosecutor’s argument was akin to arguing that it was unreasonable to infer the shirt’s
removal caused the bruising because nobody ever testified that the victim’s shirt was
removed.
       Again, the jury was instructed to follow the law as it was provided by the trial
court and to disregard the lawyers’ arguments if they conflicted with the law.
(CALCRIM No. 200.) Importantly, the jury was also instructed that it was the sole
decider of fact. (CALCRIM Nos. 104, 200.) “[A] prosecutor is allowed to vigorously
argue the case and is afforded ‘significant leeway’ in discussing the facts and the law in
closing argument.” (People v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504, 516.) Even if the
prosecutor makes one statement that “when viewed in isolation, [does] misstate the law,”
there is no error if, “in the context of the entire argument and jury instructions, it was not
reasonably likely the jury understood or applied the statement in an improper or

                                               9
erroneous manner.” (People v. Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 66.) We conclude
that is the case here.
                                             B
             The Prosecutor Did Not Allude To Evidence Outside The Record
       Defendant contends the prosecutor erred by referring to evidence outside the
record when she told the jury during rebuttal argument that evidence of defendant’s
violent character was not admitted at trial. Defendant also argues this evidence served to
shift the burden of proof to defendant to prove he was a peaceful man, and thus innocent
of the crimes charged. We disagree.
       A prosecutor may not “refer[] in argument to matter outside the record.”
(People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 948, disapproved on another ground in
People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.)
       In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor responded to many of the assertions defense
counsel made during his own closing argument. In part, the prosecutor said, “[Defense
counsel] also made some big deal, he made a statement, ‘Where is the evidence of my
client being violent in the past? This man, who has never been accused of these things
before, where is the evidence of it?’ I’d submit two things to you about that. One, when
I asked him, ‘Are you violent?’ there was an objection, and he was not allowed to
answer. There is no evidence in this case that he was a peaceful man. There’s no
evidence of that. There’s no evidence that he was a previously violent man because that
wasn’t allowed to come in, nor was his peacefulness or lack of peacefulness allowed to
come in. That’s not in evidence. [¶] [Defense counsel] is saying, ‘Where, where is the
evidence of it?’ Well, it’s not in evidence. You’re right. We can’t consider that. But
you also can’t assume that he was peaceful, because there’s zero evidence that he’s lived
this law-abiding, peaceful life. That’s not in evidence. Not at all.”
       Given the context of the prosecutor’s argument, a jury would not reasonably
interpret her argument as referencing evidence outside of the record. Instead, the

                                             10
prosecutor assured the jury, consistent with the evidence admitted at trial, that there was
no evidence of defendant’s character for peacefulness or for violence, and thus the jury
could not consider it. This was a fair comment on the evidence and did not place the
burden on defendant to prove his innocence by demonstrating a character for
peacefulness.
                                               C
             The Prosecutor’s Conduct Did Not Constitute Prejudicial Error
       Defendant argues the prosecutor generally used reprehensible and deceptive trial
tactics to place defendant’s character at issue with the jury and to keep from the jury key
items of evidence in defendant’s favor. We disagree.
       Defendant first points to the prosecutor’s argument that Evidence Code2 section
1103 precluded the admission of defendant’s text message to the victim in which he said,
“[T]hat’s the best booty call I’ve ever had.” Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s
argument against admission was patently wrong and that she induced evidentiary error.
The People concede the evidence should have been admitted under section 1103. We do
not decide whether the text message was admissible under section 1103 as evidence of
the victim’s prior sexual conduct with defendant or whether the prosecutor acted
egregiously when arguing for its exclusion. In the end, any error in excluding the text
message, or in the prosecutor’s argument, was not prejudicial to defendant’s case because
the text message should have been excluded on other grounds—hearsay.
       With the introduction of the text message, defendant did not seek to introduce
reputation evidence tending to demonstrate he and the victim had previously engaged in
sexual intercourse. (§ 1324 [“Evidence of a person’s general reputation with reference to
his character or a trait of his character at a relevant time . . . is not made inadmissible by

2      Further section references are to the Evidence Code.

                                              11
the hearsay rule”].) He also did not seek to introduce evidence from his or the victim’s
personal knowledge demonstrating they had previously had sexual intercourse. Instead,
defendant moved to admit his self-serving statement, in the form of a text message, which
implied he previously had sex with the victim. The text message is a statement offered
for its truth, i.e., that defendant had a “booty call” with the victim, and it was offered by
the party who made the statement—the text message is hearsay. (See § 1200, subd. (a)
[“ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated”].)
While section 1103 is an exception to the exclusion of character evidence under section
1101 (§ 1103, subd. (a)(1)), section 1103 is not an exception to the exclusion of hearsay
and defendant has not pointed us to any hearsay evidence exception that applies in this
case. The evidence thus should have been excluded regardless of the prosecutor’s
argument pertaining to section 1103.
       The same is true concerning defendant’s proffer that his girlfriend would testify
that she told defendant the night he went out with the victim that the victim would crawl
into bed with him. This out-of-court statement is hearsay if offered for the truth, i.e., to
show the victim was likely to crawl into bed with defendant the night of the offense.
Defendant’s girlfriend lacked personal knowledge and foundation for her belief.
Defendant’s girlfriend was permitted to testify to her personal observations that the
victim was flirtatious, especially with defendant. But the fact that defendant’s girlfriend
believed and communicated to defendant that the victim would crawl into bed with him
that night was not based on the victim’s statements regarding her intent, nor was it based
on defendant’s girlfriend’s perceptions of the victim while she was out with defendant
that evening. Thus, defendant’s girlfriend’s opinion was inadmissible, regardless of the
application of section 1103. (See People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 130 [“ ‘A
witness who is not testifying as an expert may testify in the form of an opinion only if the
opinion is based on [her] own perception’ ”].)

                                              12
       Defendant next contends the prosecutor induced evidentiary error by making an
improper objection to defendant’s explanation of his state of mind. Specifically,
defendant points to his counsel’s question regarding what happened upon his arrival at
home with the victim. Defendant testified the victim yelled out for his girlfriend and he
presumed it was because she wanted to make sure his girlfriend was not home. The
prosecutor objected to defendant’s testimony regarding his state of mind as being
unresponsive to the question. The trial court sustained the objection and struck
defendant’s answer. Defendant argues his answer was a response to the question and,
because of the prosecutor’s improper objection, the jury was left with only the victim’s
testimony that she called out for defendant’s girlfriend because she knew the assault
would not happen if defendant’s girlfriend was at defendant’s house.
       The premise of defendant’s argument is faulty—the prosecutor did not induce
evidentiary error. Testimony regarding defendant’s state of mind when the victim called
for his girlfriend was unresponsive to the question asked by his counsel regarding the
circumstances of his arrival at home with the victim. The question called for the events
pertaining to arrival and not defendant’s state of mind related thereto. To be sure,
defendant’s state of mind was admissible, but his counsel did not ask any follow-up
questions in this regard. It was incumbent on defendant and his counsel to introduce
evidence favorable to his position. The fact the evidence revealed at trial tended to
support the prosecution’s case cannot be construed as error under these facts, and fault
for any alleged error cannot be laid at the prosecutor’s feet.
       Defendant next points to the prosecutor’s introduction, and the trial court’s
admission, of text messages between defendant and his girlfriend tending to show
defendant cheated on his girlfriend. To defendant, this testimony was irrelevant because
defendant’s girlfriend clarified that she and defendant were in an open relationship and he
was permitted to have sexual intercourse with other women. Thus, defendant’s reasoning

                                             13
follows, questions pertaining to whether he cheated on his girlfriend were asked by the
prosecutor for the sole purpose of showing he was a bad person. Not so.
       Defendant’s girlfriend testified that she was worried about the victim going out
with defendant because she knew the victim was flirtatious with defendant and found him
attractive. This testimony supported defendant’s defense by tending to show defendant
reasonably believed, like his girlfriend, that the victim wanted to engage in consensual
sex with him. To the contrary, however, defendant’s girlfriend’s text messages
pertaining to another woman with which she believed defendant had sexual intercourse
tended to show her worries were not about the victim’s behavior but about defendant’s
behavior. In other words, the prosecutor impeached defendant’s girlfriend’s testimony
that she believed the victim wanted to sleep with defendant. This was the reason the
prosecutor stated the text messages were relevant and the reason for which the trial court
admitted the evidence. The prosecutor did not argue that because defendant had the
character of a cheater, he was also rapist. Indeed, the evidence was limited to the purpose
of impeaching defendant’s girlfriend’s testimony and that was the purpose for which it
was used.
       The same is true for the text messages between defendant and his girlfriend
providing that she would do whatever he asked of her despite him treating her poorly.
While defendant argues the text messages were irrelevant because all they tended to show
was defendant’s disposition, the text messages were also relevant to show defendant’s
girlfriend’s credibility and her willingness to do whatever defendant wanted her to do
despite reasons to the contrary. Still, we agree with defendant that, in addition to using
the text messages to demonstrate defendant’s girlfriend lacked credibility, the prosecutor
argued in closing argument that the text messages also demonstrated that defendant was
delusional, had a superiority complex, and expected everyone to do as he asked. The
prosecutor’s argument in this regard was improper because it went beyond the scope of
the reason the underlying evidence was admitted and pertained directly to defendant’s

                                             14
character. We discern no prejudice, however, because the argument was fleeting and did
not constitute a pattern of conduct that denied defendant a fair trial or deceived the jury
into relying on an impermissible theory of guilt.
         Defendant further points to testimony concerning his treatment of his employees
and the victim’s categorization of him as a terrible boss. The problem with defendant’s
contention is that he did not object to this testimony at trial and instead even questioned
the victim about her feelings toward defendant. Indeed, defendant relied on the victim’s
ill feelings toward him during closing argument to attack the victim’s credibility. His
failure to object and request a timely admonition precludes defendant from relying on
that evidence now to demonstrate error. (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839,
863 [to preserve a claim of prosecutorial error for appeal, a defendant must object in a
timely fashion on that ground and request a curative jury admonition unless an
admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct].)
         Finally, defendant points to the prosecutor’s introduction of the contents of the
first text messages sent between himself and his girlfriend the night he was out with the
victim. The messages were admitted to show the timeline of the evening, which
defendant appears to concede was proper. Defendant, however, takes issue with the
contents of the messages being admitted because the contents merely show defendant
forgot to spend time with his daughter and lied to her about his whereabouts. To
defendant, the contents of the messages were irrelevant and improper character evidence.
Again, defendant did not object to the admission of these text messages. And, as
defendant appears to concede, the messages were relevant to show the timeline of the
evening and were not offered for their truth, and thus were not hearsay. Accordingly,
defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial or used
deceptive or reprehensible methods when introducing the substance of defendant’s text
messages with his girlfriend. In sum, defendant’s arguments of prosecutorial error lack
merit.

                                              15
                                               II
                               Opinion Testimony Contentions
       Defendant contends that two of the prosecution’s witnesses were not qualified to
testify as experts. Specifically, he points to the nurse who examined and the officer who
interviewed the victim. Both witnesses testified to their knowledge regarding the carotid
artery, and the nurse additionally testified to her expertise as it relates to strangulation
and rape trauma syndrome.
                                               A
                                         Background
       Jacqueline Winters-Hall testified on behalf of the prosecution as a supervising
nurse specializing in sexual assault forensic exams and as the nurse who examined the
victim. Her duties included training nurses at her hospital in conducting forensic exams,
as well as nurses attending training centers. Winters-Hall testified she had attended
several trainings through the Strangulation Training Institute and taken several webinars,
as well as attended strangulation breakout sessions at conferences. She developed the
clinical guidelines for strangulation at the hospital where she worked, which guides all
the doctors and nurses in the hospital. She has also treated patients who have presented
with signs of strangulation.
       Winters-Hall based her knowledge regarding strangulation in part on a publication
describing “what happens from the moment a person is strangled from the time the
pressure is applied to when death happens or respiration ceases.” The publication was
based on two studies in which researchers observed an adult male’s reaction to
strangulation. Because the studies pertained to adult males, Winters-Hall believed the
timing of certain reactions would be shorter if the person being strangled were a child or
female. The reaction time would also be shorter if the person being strangled had
consumed alcohol.

                                              16
       Winters-Hall testified that the studies demonstrated that at zero seconds into the
act of strangulation, the carotid artery becomes blocked and blood stops flowing to the
brain. Five to ten seconds into strangulation, a person will become unconscious. At 14
seconds, the person being strangled will have an anoxic seizure due to lack of oxygen.
After 15 seconds, a victim of strangulation experiences a loss of bladder control, then
after 30 seconds a loss of bowel control. At 62 seconds, the studies demonstrate that a
person will stop breathing and die.
       Winters-Hall testified that strangulation adversely affects both short-term and
long-term memory. Indications of strangulation are loss of memory and external injuries
such as, marks, bruises, or scrapes on the neck. It is also common to see petechiae, which
are broken blood vessels under the skin. According to Winters-Hall’s training, about 50
percent of deceased victims of strangulations have external injuries. In Winters-Hall’s
opinion, the markings on the victim’s neck, the loss of bladder control, memory loss, and
vomiting were all consistent with having been strangled. Specifically, the victim had
redness on her neck in the location of the carotid artery.
       Winters-Hall also received training related to rape trauma syndrome, which
describes the brain’s response to trauma and helps medical practitioners understand why
patients behave the way they do. Importantly, according to Winters-Hall, the ability to
maintain memory is changed by the body’s physiological response to trauma. Defendant
objected to this testimony asserting it lacked foundation. The trial court overruled the
objection.
       The prosecution also called Detective Smith to testify on the topic of the carotid
artery. Detective Smith testified that he had been a police officer for 15 years. In
addition to his duties as a detective, he was also a use-of-force trainer at his previous
police department and at the Chico Police Department where he now worked. In that
role, he trained people on carotid restraints, which are commonly referred to as choke
holds. According to Detective Smith, the carotid restraint is a technique formerly used by

                                             17
police officers to restrict oxygenated blood flow to someone’s brain by compressing or
putting pressure on the carotid arteries in the neck. When asked about the significance of
the red marks on the victim’s neck, Detective Smith responded that it appeared the red
marks were “right over the area of her carotid artery that runs—as you look, as you look
in the picture, it would be running along her neck at a diagonal direction, from the bottom
right to the top left portion of her jawline.” In Detective Smith’s opinion, putting
pressure on that spot of a person’s neck would cut off blood circulation and cause the
person to become unconscious. Bruising on the other side of the victim’s neck indicated
to Detective Smith, and other officers he consulted, that someone used their hand to apply
pressure with the thumb on one side of the neck and with the other fingers on the other
side. Defendant’s objection to the last portion of Detective Smith’s testimony was
overruled.
                                              B
                        Winters-Hall’s Testimony Was Admissible
       Defendant contends Winters-Hall was not qualified as an expert to testify
regarding strangulation, the location of the carotid artery, or rape trauma syndrome, and
thus her testimony on those topics was improper. Defendant also argues that the rape
trauma syndrome evidence should have been excluded because it was irrelevant to the
particular facts of the case. We disagree.
       “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he [or she] has special knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him [or her] as an expert on
the subject to which his [or her] testimony relates. Against the objection of a party, such
special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education must be shown before the
witness may testify as an expert.” (§ 720, subd. (a).) A defendant who fails to object to
an expert’s qualifications at trial forfeits the argument that the expert’s testimony was
inadmissible because the expert was not qualified to testify about the particular topics at
issue. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 321; In re Estate of Odian (2006)

                                             18
145 Cal.App.4th 152, 168 [any objection to the admissibility of expert opinion on appeal
was forfeited by failure to object at trial]; People v. Rodriquez (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d
770, 775, [an appellant cannot challenge an expert’s qualifications for the first time on
appeal].)
       Here, defendant did not object to Winters-Hall’s testimony on the basis that she
was unqualified as an expert regarding strangulation and the location of the carotid artery.
The only objections lodged during Winters-Hall’s testimony related to these topics was to
her testimony that the time frame within which a person experiences the effects of
strangulation is shortened when that person consumes alcohol. Defendant’s objections
were specific to Winters-Hall’s testimony regarding alcohol consumption because the
studies upon which Winters-Hall based her opinions did not include subjects who had
consumed alcohol. This was not a challenge to Winters-Hall’s qualification regarding the
topics of strangulation and the location of the carotid artery.
       Defendant also objected before trial to Winters-Hall’s testimony related to
strangulation because the prosecution did not properly notify him that Winters-Hall
would testify on that subject. This was not an objection to Winters-Hall’s qualifications
but was instead an argument that the prosecution committed a discovery violation. The
trial court found the argument unavailing, and defendant does not challenge that ruling on
appeal. Taken together, defendant never objected to Winters-Hall’s qualifications as an
expert on strangulation or the location of the carotid artery, and thus he has forfeited
those contentions on appeal. As a result of this conclusion, we similarly reject
defendant’s argument that Winters-Hall was precluded from relying on a photograph
taken by defendant’s roommate when forming her opinion that red marks on the victim’s
neck were located near the carotid artery. (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665,
686 [experts may rely on case-specific facts outside their personal knowledge when the
facts have been properly admitted under the rules of evidence].) In any event, Winters-
Hall testified to numerous photographs she took of the victim and her own perceptions of

                                             19
the victim’s injuries when testifying to her opinion that red marks on the victim’s neck
were in the location of the victim’s carotid artery, and thus she supplied adequate
foundation for her testimony.
        As it pertains to rape trauma syndrome, defendant objected to Winters-Hall’s
testimony on foundation grounds, which the trial court overruled. This was sufficient to
preserve his claim that Winters-Hall was not qualified to testify on the subject. Expertise
may be established by a showing that the witness “ ‘has the requisite knowledge of, or
was familiar with, or was involved in, a sufficient number of transactions involving the
subject matter of the opinion.’ ” (ABM Industries Overtime Cases (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th
277, 294.) We review the trial court’s ruling that an expert is qualified to testify on a
particular subject for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86,
100.)
        Here, Winters-Hall testified that she was a supervising nurse who specialized in
sexual assault forensic exams and her duties included training nurses at her hospital in
conducting forensic exams, as well as nurses attending training centers. When describing
rape trauma syndrome, Winters-Hall specified that practitioners such as herself utilize the
syndrome to help explain why patients who have experienced sexual assaults act the way
they do. This testimony provided sufficient foundation that Winters-Hall has utilized
rape trauma syndrome in her practice of treating patients and training nurses to conduct
forensic exams. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when finding Winters-Hall
qualified to testify on the subject of rape trauma syndrome.
        Additionally, testimony pertaining to rape trauma syndrome was relevant in this
case. At the outset, we reject defendant’s argument that the rape trauma syndrome
evidence here “was offered improperly to prove that in fact, [the victim] had been raped.”
As Winters-Hall testified, rape trauma syndrome describes the brain’s response to trauma
and helps medical practitioners understand why patients behave the way they do.
Specifically, the syndrome explains why patients have gaps in memory or are unable to

                                             20
maintain clear memories of the trauma. In this vein, rape trauma syndrome is admissible
to rebut the inference that a rape did not take place due to the victim’s conduct that may
appear inconsistent with the victim having been raped. Evidence of the syndrome may be
offered to disabuse the fact finder “of some widely held misconceptions about rape and
rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular
myths.” (People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247-248.)
       Here, defendant cross-examined the victim extensively about the circumstances of
her assault and pointed out various gaps in her memory and inconsistent statements she
made to police officers and Winters-Hall. Given defendant’s cross-examination of the
victim, the prosecution was permitted to elicit evidence regarding rape trauma syndrome
to disabuse the jury of the commonly held misconception (and inference the defendant
urged through his questioning) that, because the victim could not recall details of the
rape, she was not a victim of rape. In line with the permissible use of rape trauma
syndrome, the prosecutor argued during closing argument that the victim’s lapse in
memory and recall was not probative of her credibility given Winters-Hall’s testimony
regarding rape trauma syndrome. Accordingly, evidence pertaining to rape trauma
syndrome was not admitted or used for an improper purpose, and defendant’s claim to the
contrary lacks merit.
                                             C
                        Detective Smith’s Testimony Was Admissible
       Defendant contends that Detective Smith was not qualified to give an opinion
about the location of the carotid artery, and further could not have done so by looking at a
photograph of the victim’s neck. We disagree.
       Like Winters-Hall’s testimony related to the location of the carotid artery,
defendant did not object to Detective Smith’s testimony related to the location of the
carotid artery. On appeal, defendant cites to one of his counsel’s objections to Detective
Smith’s testimony, seemingly arguing that the court should have excluded Detective

                                             21
Smith’s testimony related to the carotid artery in general. Not so. Defense counsel’s
objection took issue only with Detective Smith’s testimony about the effects on the body
resulting from a carotid restraint. The objection was sustained, and the prosecutor agreed
that Detective Smith did not have the expertise to testify to such evidence and limited the
question to the location of the carotid artery. Defendant did not object to this question or
Detective Smith’s qualifications to answer it. Indeed, defendant affirmatively agreed
Detective Smith held the requisite qualifications through his training and experience to
testify about the carotid restraint and the process of performing the restraint successfully.
Thus, defendant has forfeited his appellate challenge to Detective Smith’s qualifications
regarding the location of the carotid artery.
       Still, however, defendant argues that Detective Smith should have been precluded
from relying on a photograph taken by defendant’s roommate when forming his opinion
that the markings on the victim’s neck were over her carotid artery and appeared to be the
product of a hand squeezing her neck. But, as explained, experts are permitted to rely on
and testify about case-specific facts when those facts have been properly admitted into
evidence. (People v. Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.) Defendant’s roommate
authenticated the photograph of the red marks on the victim’s neck and the photograph
was admitted into evidence. Thus, Detective Smith was permitted to testify to an opinion
based on that photograph.
       Defendant objected to Detective Smith’s testimony regarding the cause of the
bruising around the victim’s neck arguing the testimony lacked foundation, and thus that
contention has been preserved for appeal. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to overrule defendant’s objection. Detective Smith testified that he was trained, and
had trained others, to perform the carotid restraint in ways that would inflict the least
damage to the person being restrained. He then described the damage he saw on the
victim’s neck and testified to the technique he believed was used to inflict that damage.
Given Detective Smith’s position as a use-of-force trainer, it was not an abuse of

                                                22
discretion for the trial court to permit him to testify regarding the technique used to
strangle the victim and how it differed from the technique taught in the use-of-force
context. To the extent, however, that Detective Smith testified he spoke to other
investigators who shared his opinion regarding the cause of the victim’s bruises, that
testimony was improper hearsay. While defendant did not object to Detective Smith’s
testimony on that ground, any error was harmless given the brief nature of the testimony
and the fact that Detective Smith was permitted to testify to the substance of his opinion.
       Accordingly, defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly admitted expert
opinion testimony lacks merit.
                                             III
          The Trial Court Was Not Required To Instruct On Battery Or Assault
       Defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offenses of assault and battery. The trial court denied the request because there was no
evidence defendant committed only assault or battery and the only issue before the jury
was whether the victim consented to intercourse. Defendant contends this was error;
however, he limits his appellate argument to the lesser included offense instruction for
battery by failing to analyze whether the evidence demonstrated an assault. (See
In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [conclusory statements without argument and
authority are deemed forfeited].)
       We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Fiore (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378.) “ ‘ “The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the
elements of the charged offense were present and there is evidence that would justify a
conviction of such a lesser offense.” ’ [Citation.] As [has been] explained, instructing on
lesser included offenses shown by the evidence avoids forcing the jury into an
‘unwarranted all-or-nothing choice’ [citation] that could lead to an unwarranted
conviction.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 365.) “ ‘ “[T]he existence of ‘any

                                             23
evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense,
but such instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of
the lesser offense is ‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury.” ’ ”
(People v. Woods (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 461, 474.)
       Battery is a lesser included offense of rape. (People v. Miranda (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 162, 174, review granted June 16, 2021, S268384 [review granted on
issue of whether it is an equal protection violation to exclude young adults convicted
under the one strike law from early parole consideration].) “A battery is any willful and
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” (Pen. Code, § 242.)
       Defendant argues that substantial evidence supports a theory that he committed
only battery. Specifically, he argues that, if the jury found he actually and reasonably
believed the victim had consented but also that the victim did not in fact consent, it would
have found him guilty of battery. To defendant, the only reason the jury selected rape
was because its other option was to select acquittal. If the jury had the option of selecting
battery, the argument continues, it would have. Not so.
       It is unclear as to which offensive touching defendant refers when making his
argument the jury could have found him guilty of battery. If the offensive touching is the
intercourse itself, then defendant’s reasonable belief the victim consented is a defense to
battery based on that touching. (See People v. Samuels (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 501, 513
[consent is a defense to battery when the alleged offensive touching does not threaten
bodily harm]; see also People v. Rivera (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 736, 742 [where a
defendant reasonably believes the touching constituting the offense was consensual he
cannot be guilty if there is nothing unlawful about the physical contact].) Thus, if the
jury believed defendant’s version of events—that he did not strangle the victim and that
he actually and reasonably believed she had consented to intercourse—then defendant did
not commit a battery and the jury would have been compelled to find him not guilty
regardless of its belief that the victim subjectively withheld consent.

                                             24
       On the other hand, defendant appears to argue the jury could have found him
guilty of battery based on findings he actually and reasonably believed the victim
consented to intercourse but not to the strangulation. The problem with defendant’s
argument is that the strangulation was not alleged to be collateral to the sexual
intercourse. The victim testified that the strangulation occurred during the rape.
Defendant did not controvert that testimony and instead testified the victim consented to
intercourse and the strangulation did not occur at all. Thus, under the facts of this case, if
the jury believed the strangulation occurred, it believed it occurred during the intercourse.
A finding that the victim did not consent to being strangled during intercourse was the
equivalent of finding the victim withdrew consent to intercourse. (See CALCRIM
No. 1000 [“The defendant is not guilty of rape if he actually and reasonably believed that
the woman consented to the intercourse and actually and reasonably believed that she
consented throughout the act of intercourse”].)
       Indeed, “[t]he essence of consent is that it is given out of free will. That is why it
can be withdrawn. While there exists a defense to rape based on the defendant’s actual
and reasonable belief that the victim does consent [citations], we do not require that
victims communicate their lack of consent. [Citation.] We certainly do not require that
victims resist.” (People v. Ireland (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.) When defendant
strangled the victim during intercourse, and in the absence of any conduct by the victim
indicating her continued consent, the previously given consent no longer existed, either in
fact or in law. (Ibid.; see People v. Washington (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 609, 610
[“Consent induced by fear is no consent at all”].) Thus, defendant could not have been
found guilty of battery based on findings he reasonable believed the victim consented to
intercourse but not to being strangled. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying
defendant’s request the jury be instructed on the lesser included offense of battery.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                             25
                          /s/
                          ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

                     26