Court Opinion

ID: 9653989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:00:57.964834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:04.244656
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
On motion for rehearing respondents complain that plaintiff’s evidence has not been considered as a whole, but only part isolated from the rest; and that “matters appearing in plaintiff’s evidence which are fatal to her prevailing in this action” have been omitted from the statement of facts. We think that all admitted or conceded facts adverse to plaintiff’s position are sufficiently shown in the opinion. Of course many details affecting credibility, weight and value of her evidence and many facts not admitted or conceded and not binding on plaintiff were necessarily omitted. Some facts of which respondents complain, to wit, admissions by plaintiff as to the unfriendly relationship and lack of affection between herself and her mother and the admissions of plaintiff’s witness, Dr. Jones, sufficiently appear from the opinion.
Respondents continue to insist that plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1 submits the issue of insane hatred as an insane delusion, and separately from the submission of general testamentary incapacity; and that the issue of insane hatred is not sustained by the pleadings. While conceding that the instruction in question was taken from the case of Evans v. Partlow, 322 Mo. 11, 16 S.W.2d 212, 217, where no insane delusion was pleaded and where the instruction was approved, respondents say that that case may be distinguished because, there was no issue as to the pleadings and because “the defendants admitted that testator suffered from an insane delusion.” Plowever, the opinion in that case states: “Moreover, defendants’ instruction is a solemn admission that there was evidence tending to prove that at time the will was made, the testator was subject to a delusion as to his son’s legitimacy and that he was dominated by an unreasonable aversion to him.” (Italics ours.) Defendants did substantially the same in this case. If Instruction No. 1 submits insane hatred as an insane delusion, as respondents contend, their position is not improved. The opinion shows the allegations stricken from plaintiff’s petition, the opening statement of her counsel, the statements of the trial judge in the course of the trial, the evidence offered and certain instructions requested by defendants and given. Reference is made to Section 509.500 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., and it is shown that there was no request for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a submission of insane hatred as an insane delusion and no withdrawal instruction was requested on that issue and the sufficiency of the evidence on that issue was not otherwise tested, but instead defendants offered and the court gave the instructions set out in the opinion and defendants thereby joined in the submission of whatever issue was in fact submitted by plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1, whether testamentary incapacity, as stated, or insane hatred as an insane delusion, as respondents contend.
Respondents further say that the opinion overlooked or failed to state certain facts shown by plaintiff’s evidence which, “as a matter of law”, show that the “strong aversion, dislike, anger, ill will or hatred * * * was not without cause or reason.” Respondents’ theory is “that family bickering and quarrels will not justify or sustain the setting aside of a will” on the ground of an insane hatred or delusion. We think the facts are sufficient to sustain the submission of testamentary incapacity, as stated, but, if they are not, this argument does not necessarily aid respondents because, if plaintiff made a case for the jury on any theory properly submitted, the trial court erred in entering the judgment probating the will, notwithstanding the verdict against the will, and if Instruction No. I submitted insane hatred as an insane de*39lusion, the respondents by their instructions joined in that submission without ever having in any manner tested the sufficiency of the evidence on that issue.
Respondents further say that, if testatrix was a normal person “except for her relationship to her own family and particularly to her own daughter,” she was suffering from “a species of insanity or mental incapacity, to wit, an insane delusion,” which must be pleaded, proved and submitted as such. Respondents cite Zorn v. Zorn, Mo.Sup., 64 S.W.2d 626, 627. In the Zorn case, the plaintiff pleaded testamentary incapacity and undue influence. At the close of the evidence the court sustained a demurrer as to testamentary incapacity and submitted undue influence. However, plaintiff further instructed on “strong aversion, dislike, anger, ill will, or hatred toward” a son. The court said “such an instruction” had no place in the case, and further pointed out that the instruction did “not require a finding that the ill will, dislike, or hatred which testator had toward the plaintiff was without cause or reason or amounted to an insane delusion.” Here Instruction No. 1 required a finding that the hatred was “without cause or reason.” Further the instruction in the Zorn case was held erroneous on the theory that it was not supported by the pleadings or the evidence. In the Zorn case there was neither pleadings, nor evidence, nor trial theory to sustain the submission of insane hatred and there was no contention on appeal that a case was made for the jury on the basis of testamentary incapacity. The case is not controlling on the issues presented here.
Respondents say that the holding to the* effect the “parties tried the case on the theory the extensive correspondence between mother and daughter was admissible to show testamentary incapacity and to show ill will and dislike sufficient to invalidate the will” is contradicted by the record, and reference is made to specific pages of the record which show that exhibits 31 to 81, inclusive, were admitted without objection. Respondents’ counsel stated: “* * * we have no objection to the introduction of any of those items, and we do not require the identification of any of them; it’s agreed that the person who purports to write them did write them, and the person who purports to have received them did receive them.” Subsequent remarks of counsel that they were not conceding in any way that the letters established or tended to establish insanity on the part of the deceased; and that they did not think the letters, as a matter of law, were sufficient to sustain an inference of insanity on the part of the deceased, are immaterial.
Respondents say that in their brief on appeal they contended that Instruction No. 1 was erroneous in form because it “failed to require a finding * * * that such ill will or dislike amounted to an insane delusion”; and that the opinion holds the instruction correct without that requirement. No such issue was presented on appeal. The fourth point of respondents’ brief is: “The trial court correctly ruled that, in the event of his judgment for the will being reversed, a new trial should be awarded because of the giving of Instruction No. 1, which was neither supported by the pleadings nor the evidence.” This assignment does not seek to sustain the motion for new trial on the ground of alleged insufficiency in the form of Instruction No. 1, as a submission of ill will and hatred as an insane delusion. There is a recital subsequently under this heading of the brief that “it is held that the alleged hatred must amount to an insane delusion and an instruction which fails to require a finding on this point is erroneous.” This recital does not present an issue for determination different from the main heading under which it appears that Instruction No. 1 is not “supported by the pleading nor the evidence.”
Few issues were presented on this appeal. If plaintiff made a case for the jury on any issue that was properly submitted to the jury, the trial court erred in entering judg*40,'ment as a matter of law in favor of the .will, and if Instruction No. 1 is supported .'by the pleadings and the evidence, the trial court erred in ordering a new trial. We have so held. No other ground of error to support the order granting the new .trial was presented. In these circumstances the verdict should be re-instated and judgment entered thereon. The motion for rehearing or to transfer to the Court en Banc overruled.