Court Opinion

ID: 9945288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:01:45.541194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.853591
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                      FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      FEB 27 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AURA MARINA VELASQUEZ REYES,                     No.   21-70287

                  Petitioner,                    Agency No. A209-875-492

    v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                  Respondent.

                       On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                           Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted February 14, 2024**
                             University of Hawaii, Manoa

Before: PAEZ, M. SMITH, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

         Aura Marina Velasquez Reyes (“Velasquez Reyes”), a native and citizen of

Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

         *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
         **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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(“BIA”) denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal.1 We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and review for substantial evidence the

agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,

1039 (9th Cir. 2010). Under this “highly deferential standard,” “administrative

findings [are] conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692,

(2020); then quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We deny the petition for review.

      The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s (IJ) determination that Velasquez

Reyes failed to timely file her asylum application and failed to establish eligibility

for withholding of removal because she was not credible. Because the adverse

credibility finding is dispositive of Velasquez Reyes’s asylum and withholding of

removal claims, we need not address Velasquez Reyes’s challenges regarding the

timeliness of her asylum claim.2

      Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding. The

record supports the agency’s conclusion that (1) Velasquez Reyes testified

1
  The BIA concluded that Velasquez Reyes waived her claim for relief under the
Convention Against Torture. Velasquez Reyes does not challenge this conclusion
in her opening brief. Thus, Velasquez Reyes has waived any challenge to this
claim. See Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2019).
2
  Because we do not reach Velasquez Reyes’s asylum arguments, we deny her
motion to supplement the record (Dkt. 34) as moot.

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inconsistently and made material omissions and (2) failed to corroborate her

claims.

      1.     The agency based its adverse credibility determination on

inconsistencies between Velasquez Reyes’s statements during her border

interview, credible fear interview, and hearing testimony. Most notably, Velasquez

Reyes initially identified one basis for her asylum claim at her border and credible

fear interview, but later presented a second basis for her claim in her asylum

application and testimony. The agency found that these inconsistencies and

omissions undermined Velazquez Reyes’s credibility. The agency did not accept

Velasquez Reyes’s explanations for the inconsistencies and omissions. None of

Velasquez Reyes’s challenges to the adverse credibility finding compel a decision

contrary to that of the agency. See Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 369.

      2.     Although Velasquez Reyes provided evidence to corroborate her

claim, the agency permissibly concluded that the totality of the circumstances

indicated that she was not credible. In sum, the agency’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence.3

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3
  We do not reach Velasquez’s arguments with regard to the IJ’s application of
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), vacated by Matter of A-B-, 28 I.
& N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021), because the adverse credibility determination is
dispositive.

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