Court Opinion

ID: 9667918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:57:41.481223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:41.553877
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent in what has been a very troublesome appeal.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, we have the case of a man and woman, each married to another, consensually engaging in an act of fellatio in a third person’s house. The majority finds this conduct protected by a “right of privacy” grounded on the due process clause of the United States Constitution, Amendment 14, which “provides substantive protection for fundamental human values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”
Holding the United States Constitution forbids state regulation of such consensual acts in absence of a compelling reason, the majority, displaying an understandable ambivalence by indicating it holds the statute unconstitutional only as applied, nonetheless clearly strikes down § 705.1, The Code (sodomy) in toto. In so doing, it ignores the action of the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the constitutionality of a similar Virginia sodomy statute (see Doe v. Commonwealth’s Atty. for City of Richmond, 403 F.Supp. 1199 [E.D.Va.1975], aff’d, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1489, 47 L.Ed.2d 751, 44 U.S.L.W. 3545 [1976]). It also ignores the latest decision from a state supreme court, State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), to pursue a rationale which no other court of last resort in any jurisdiction has adopted.
The majority employs a United States Supreme Court decision grounded on the sanctity of the marriage relationship (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 [1965]) and another grounded on the personal choice of procreation (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 [1972]) in pioneering an unqualified and absolute right of privacy which protects an act of fellatio between two persons, each married to another, to the extent of rendering a proscribing Iowa statute unconstitutional. Such a result should be reached only after the most careful analysis to determine whether it is mandated.
I. What is the effect of the majority holding?
The ambivalence of the majority opinion, above noted, is best demonstrated by comparing this sentence: “The statute cannot be construed to render it constitutionally valid when applied to the factual situation presented by this record,” with the language quoted below. Nothing can disguise the fact, however, § 705.1 has been declared unconstitutional on its face, nor will the bench and bar interpret this decision in any other way. Although superficially appearing to reserve all those other troublesome situations which now will soon clog our *361appeals pipeline (e. g., homosexual acts, so-domitical acts with minors, nonconsenting sodomitical acts) there is no mistaking the majority’s sweeping indictment of § 705.1:
“[I]t [§ 705.1] makes all sodomy illegal, whether between persons married or unmarried, between consenting or noncon-senting adults or between the same or opposite sexes. It draws no distinction between public and private acts. Likewise, the age of the parties is not relevant.

There is no word, clause or phrase which may be excised from this section which will render it constitutionally acceptable and still leave standing a statute capable of fulfilling the legislative intent in enacting the statute.”
Of course, under this restrictive rationale, there are also no words which may be excised to make it applicable to future cases involving persons of the same sex, or non-consenting persons or adult-minor or public sexual activities. The language of the majority above quoted and earlier portions of the opinion can only be interpreted to mean: (1) the statute as written is overly broad because it encompasses constitutionally protected activities; (2) this court is powerless to restrict the scope of the statute; (3) therefore § 705.1 is unconstitutional on its face. Given this hypothesis, well-established principles inexorably dictate the statute is void. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 308 U.S. 479, 497, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1126, 14 L.Ed.2d 22, 34 (1965); 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 2.06 at 22 (Sands 4th ed. 1972).
If, as the majority elsewhere in its opinion desultorily intimates, it intends to hold the statute unconstitutional only as to consenting adults of the opposite sex then it should: (1) say so, and (2) remand the case for retrial under appropriate instructions. This was the disposition made by the United States Supreme Court in each case cited by the majority where defendant’s conviction encompassed activities which, depending on a jury’s factual finding, may have fallen either in a constitutionally protected or a constitutionally unprotected area. See Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 90 S.Ct. 1312, 25 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931); United States v. Bowen, 414 F.2d 1268 (3 Cir. 1969).
That majority fails to remand is further proof it strikes down § 705.1 in toto. If the statute is unconstitutional only as to consenting adults of the opposite sex, then it should be a simple matter to allow the jury to find whether that is the fact situation presented in this case. On the other hand, under the majority’s rationale, if there are no words to strike which would permit the jury to distinguish between a consenting and nonconsenting situation, then there are none to strike which would permit a jury to distinguish between male and female or adult and minor. It is clear the majority’s approach drains all viability from § 705.1.
Another fall-out from today’s invalidation of § 705.1 will be a multitude of challenges' by those previously convicted of a § 705.1 crime, asserting this decision must be given retroactive application. At the minimum, the majority should limit the havoc its opinion will create by declaring it applies prospectively only.
We turn now to a discussion of the arguments raised here by the defendant, some of which the majority unfortunately adopts.
II. Is § 705.1, The Code, void for vagueness?
Defendant contends the language of the statute so vaguely defines sodomitical conduct it is constitutionally unenforceable. But our adjudicated cases have defined and brought within the statute’s scope the identical act defendant was accused of committing. State v. Simpson, 243 Iowa 65, 50 N.W.2d 601 (1951); State v. Farris, 189 Iowa 505, 178 N.W. 361 (1920).
The majority appropriately has cited to our rule that a statute is not so vague and *362uncertain as to be void where the meaning of the words can be ascertained by reference to other judicial determinations. State v. Williams, 238 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Iowa 1976). Fleshed out by our adjudicated cases, supra, § 705.1 is not unconstitutionally vague in any manner affecting the defendant in this appeal.
Nor are we concerned with the vagueness-overbreadth intertwining referred to by the majority, which may find applicability in cases involving the first amendment. The privacy right which defendant claims should insulate him from prosecution is rooted in the fourteenth amendment, as indicated by majority in division III of its opinion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 177 (1973); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Iowa 1976).
Almost-identical statutes have withstood void-for-vagueness constitutional attacks. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 179 (1973); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 232, 500 S.W.2d 368, 373 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905, 94 S.Ct. 1610, 40 L.Ed.2d 110 (1974); Dixon v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 271-272, 268 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (1971).
Defendant’s void-for-vagueness arguments are without merit.
III. Is § 705.1 unconstitutionally over-broad?
While there is considerable question whether defendant challenges § 705.1 for overbreadth, at one point in his brief he does assert, “[tjhere can be no justification for the overbreadth of this statute which attempts to regulate the sexual practices of husband and wife.”
A statute is overbroad if it attempts to achieve a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation by means which sweep unnecessarily into areas of protected freedoms. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 249-250, 88 S.Ct. 391, 396, 19 L.Ed.2d 444, 451 (1967); State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1974).
Of course defendant initially must show he has standing to question the statute’s constitutionality on this ground. Ordinarily a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-611, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 839 (1973); Carter v. State, supra, 255 Ark. at 233, 500 S.W.2d at 373; Hughes v. State, 14 Md.App. 497, 501, 287 A.2d 299, 303, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025, 93 S.Ct. 469, 34 L.Ed.2d 317 (1972). Nor does defendant appear to bring himself within any of those exceptions to the general rule collected in Broadrick.
Nonetheless, I would resolve the standing issue in defendant’s favor. At the same time, I believe the court should follow well-reasoned precedent and forthrightly say § 705.1 is constitutionally inapplicable to sexual conduct of spouses in their home, under the holding in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra. See State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 396, 301 A.2d 748, 753 (1973); cf. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass.1974).
This would first require an ancillary determination whether the sweep of § 705.1 may be so limited without voiding the statute.
The majority reasons because there are no specific words in § 705.1 which leave room for this or any other construction the statute cannot be salvaged. I do not agree. Whether this court will limit the thrust of a statute or add to it in order to remove constitutional infirmities frequently turns, not on the mechanical construction of the statute’s language, but on the exigencies and a pragmatic overview of all surrounding circumstances and policy considerations. See C. S. C. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2893, 37 L.Ed.2d 796, 812 (1973) (“ * * * our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations”).
The concept of a limiting application often has been recognized by the United *363States Supreme Court. Thus Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at 613, 616, 93 S.Ct. at 2916, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841, 842 relevantly states:
“Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.

[Wjhatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In State v. Rasmussen, 213 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Iowa 1973) we so limited the operative reach of a statute, saying, “[W]e must recognize the constitutional infirmities which would result from adopting plaintiff’s construction of the Iowa Act. In order to avoid such problems, we therefore limit the application of sections 204.308 and 204.-101(22), The Code, 1973, to practitioners registered in Iowa.” (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Price, supra, 237 N.W.2d at 818, we limited the reach of § 724.1 (prohibiting prostitution) to the “buyer and seller of sex in the traditional commercial setting” although the statute on its face is broad enough to proscribe non-commercial sexual activity. In State v. Farrell, 209 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 1973), vacated and remanded, Farrell v. Iowa, 418 U.S. 907, 94 S.Ct. 3198, 41 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1974), 223 N.W.2d 270 (Iowa 1974) we held § 32.1, The Code “no longer applicable to the utterance of pure speech.” See also In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972).
Nor, when the situation has demanded it, have we had any difficulty reading into a statute various safeguards in order to save it from constitutional infirmity. State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 37 (Iowa 1975) (“With the unconstitutional portion of the statute eliminated, the constitutionally mandated principle of Mullaney must be read into the remainder”); Catholic Char. of Arch. of Dubuque v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539, 546-549 (Iowa 1975) (“Interpreting” Iowa’s adoption statute to include constitutionally required notice and hearing); State v. Drummer, 254 Iowa 324, 117 N.W.2d 505 (1962) (reading the missing element of intent into § 321.76, The Code, 1954); State v. Schultz, 242 Iowa 1328, 50 N.W.2d 9 (1951) (reading the element of intent into § 124.20, The Code, 1950); see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 250, 96 L.Ed. 288, 300 (1952) (furnishing the element of intent in 18 U.S.C. § 641).
It is apparent there is no compelling reason to strike down § 705.1 (an action analogous to violating the ancient admonition not to throw the baby out with the bath) when its operation can be limited to those areas which the State may constitutionally regulate.
There are good reasons for salvaging § 705.1 apart from our ever-present motive to avoid a holding of unconstitutionality if reasonably possible. State v. Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Iowa 1975).
The sure knowledge abolition of § 705.1 would remove all meaningful penalty (until corrective legislative action at some future unknown date) for the most traumatic types of sexual assaults should cause us to weigh carefully any permissible alternative, despite the fact most members of this court may have a subjective reaction that legislative reconsideration and overhaul of the statute is long overdue.
Although there may be a body of opinion that as between willing adults sodomitical acts should be left to moral sanctions alone and eliminated from the criminal law, no decision from a court of last report in any jurisdiction has been found by the majority which holds such a statute unconstitutional on the ground relied on in the majority opinion.
For decades courts have upheld sodomy statutes against attacks on constitutional grounds. See the extensive collection of appellate court decisions, Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636, 640, 643-648; 70 Am.Jur.2d Sodomy § 2, pp. 805-806; 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § 1 (Supp.1975, n. 33.10). The matter ordinarily has been held to present a question for the legislature and not for the courts. See, e. g., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 110-111, 547 P.2d 6, 9-10 (1976); Carter v. State, *364supra, 255 Ark. at 229, 500 S.W.2d at 371; People v. Hurd, 5 Cal.App.3d 865, 877, 85 Cal.Rptr. 718, 726 (1970); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal.App.2d 488, 495, 64 Cal.Rptr. 70, 74 (1967); People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal.App.2d 676, 679, 2 Cal.Rptr. 640, 641-642 (1960).
The marriage relationship is not only a valid basis for classification, it is the only rational ground for any interpretive construction of § 705.1. The married family relationship is the fundamental building block in our society, a concept so judicially well recognized it has withstood constitutional attack based on religious freedom in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165, 25 L.Ed. 244, 250 (1879). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1018 (1967).
In short, we may and should concede § 705.1, The Code, sweeps with an unconstitutionally broad brush in absence of a limiting construction. That construction — holding it cannot reach sexual activity of spouses in their home— is a viable alternative the court should adopt. Limiting it in that factual situation pursuant to the plain authority of Broadrick, supra, Rasmussen, supra, and Price, supra, preserves the statute for all other intended sanctions.
IV. Does § 705.1, as so limited, violate the equal protection clause?
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not deny to states the power to treat different classes of people in different ways. But a classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253-254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229 (1971).
Defendant reasons that because the constitutional right of privacy in the marital relationship recognized in Griswold prevents Iowa’s sodomy act from reaching the sexual activity of consenting spouses in the “marital bedroom”, consenting non-spouses are entitled to the same protection under the holding in Eisenstadt, supra.
But a rational basis for different treatment of non-spouses with respect to sodomy is plain: the law has customarily treated spouses and non-spouses differently with respect to sexual familiarity and conduct. Consider the traditional sex crimes involving non-spouse participants: fornication, see 2 Am.Jur.2d Adultery & Fornication § 8 at p. 967; 37 C.J.S. Fornication § 2 at p. 119 (“A valid and subsisting marriage between the parties accused of fornication renders their sexual relationship legal and precludes a prosecution for fornication”), and lewdness, 53 C.J.S. Lewdness § 3 at p. 9 (“[M]ar-riage of the parties to each other at the time of the alleged offense is a defense”). If the law may place non-spouses in a class as to fornication and lewdness, certainly it may do so as to sodomy. See Moore v. State, 501 P.2d 529 (Okl.Cr.App.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987, 93 S.Ct. 1517, 36 L.Ed.2d 185 (1973).
On first impression, Eisenstadt, supra, appears to treat married and unmarried participants the same, at least with respect to non-sodomitical sex acts. A superficial analysis runs this way: the court held that since spouses may have contraceptives, non-spouses must be allowed to have them; if non-spouses have contraceptives, for what purpose would they have them except to engage in sexual intercourse; therefore a logical projection of Eisenstadt requires that spouses and non-spouses be classified the same respecting all sexual activity.
But that interpretation ignores the gist of the Eisenstadt opinion. Massachusetts urged its statute’s purpose was to deter premarital sexual intercourse. However, the court denied that “deterrence of premarital sex may reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law.” 405 U.S. at 448, 92 S.Ct. at 1035, 31 L.Ed.2d at 359. The court went to considerable length to demonstrate the objective of the Massachusetts anti-contraceptive statute was not to discourage sexual misconduct, stating the statute had “a dubious relation to the State’s criminal prohibition on fornication.” 405 U.S. at 449, 92 S.Ct. at 1036, 31 L.Ed.2d at 360. At no place did the opinion inti*365mate the fornication statute was unconstitutional as an invasion of privacy. The court concluded the objective of the Massachusetts anti-contraceptive statute was the same forbidden objective as that of the Connecticut statute in the Griswold case relating to married couples, that is, interference with “the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d at 362. The Eisenstadt court held unmarried persons could not be treated differently from married ones with respect to “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” (Emphasis supplied.) 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d at 362.
Why would the court be at such pains in Eisenstadt to distinguish statutory deterrence of fornication unless such statutes are in a different class and within the competency of the legislature to enact? The objective of our sodomy statute, even less than the objective of a fornication statute, it not to interfere with the right of individuals to decide whether to bear or beget children, but is rather to prohibit what the legislature has determined to be sexual misconduct. The Eisenstadt equal protection holding forbids different treatment of non-spouses with respect to limiting procreation, but not with respect to other state-prohibited sexual activities.
Nothing in Griswold or Eisenstadt requires striking down § 705.1 when it has been properly limited in its reach as suggested in division III, supra. The classification resulting from such limitation has a traditional and constitutional basis. There would be no violation of defendant’s equal protection constitutional rights.
V. Does defendant have a right of privacy which protects him from § 705.1 prosecution ?
Finally, we reach the issue whether non-spouses privately engaging in consensual sodomitical acts are protected by a constitutional right of privacy.
The majority opinion determines this right exists for such persons, based on its interpretation of Eisenstadt, supra.
The majority concludes on the basis of Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at. 497-498, 85 S.Ct. at 1688-1689, 14 L.Ed.2d at 523, that the State must here show a compelling State interest to justify its encroachment into “recognized areas of fundamental rights.” Of course, this ignores Justice Goldberg’s warning that the court’s holding in Griswold
“ * * * in no way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct. As my Brother Harlan so well stated in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, supra, 367 U.S. at 553 [81 S.Ct. at 1782] 6 L.Ed.2d at 1025].
‘Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and protected. * * * >
In sum, I believe that the right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic — a personal right ‘retained by the people’ within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
—381 U.S. at 498-499, 85 S.Ct. at 1689-1690, 14 L.Ed.2d at 523-524.
The United States Supreme Court further limited the scope of this privacy right when it said “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ * * * are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.” Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 152-153, 93 S.Ct. at 726, 35 L.Ed.2d at 176-177. As noted in Roe, “They [later decisions] also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage * * *; procreation * * *; contraception * * * ; family relation*366ships * * * ; and child rearing and education * * *.” (Citations omitted.) Id.
The court reiterated the dependent nature of the right of privacy in Paul v. Davis, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1166, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 420, 44 U.S.L.W. 4337, 4343 (1976) when it said: “While there is no ‘right of privacy’ found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, the Court has recognized that ‘zones of privacy’ may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power.” (Emphasis supplied.) Again the court emphasized the normal association of the right in previous decisions had been with matters of marriage and family. See State v. Price, supra, 237 N.W.2d at 818 (holding prostitution not entitled to right-of-privacy protection.)
Of course, majority’s holding that the right of privacy per se is a fundamental right creates potentially infinite implica-, tions. From now on, whenever a litigant challenges a statute on the basis of his right to privacy, the State will have the constitutional burden to prove it has a compelling interest in enforcement of the statute. The State would be hard pressed to show a. compelling State interest in making arrest records public (see chapter 68A, The Code); or prohibiting use of marijuana in the home (see chapter 204, The Code). The State could also be forced to come up with a compelling interest in prohibiting keeping a house of ill fame (§ 724.3, The Code), regulating massage parlors, prohibiting adultery (§ 702.1, The Code) and bigamy (§ 703.1, The Code), and statutory proscriptions in any number of other areas states have traditionally regulated. The possibilities are limited only by the fertile imagination of our practicing bar.
In contrast with the majority’s concept of a privacy right, the right of privacy identified by the United States Supreme Court has never existed in a vacuum. It is found, if at all, accompanying (in tandem fashion) a basic constitutional right so fundamental it merits careful nurture. A litigant’s mere invocation of the “right to privacy” will not in itself mandate application of the “compelling interest” test. Rather, according to the United States Supreme Court rationale, we must examine the* nature of the underlying right sought to be protected to determine whether it is “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” If it is, the compelling interest test must be met (see Roe v. Wade, supra); if it is not, the State need show only a rational basis for its regulation of the activity. Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.Supp. 105 (S.D.Iowa 1973), aff’d, 491 F.2d 705 (8 Cir. 1974).
Thus the question of the State’s burden here logically resolves itself, not into the question whether there is an abstract right of privacy present in this case, but instead whether the right of consenting non-spouses to engage in sodomitical activity is fundamental in a constitutional sense.
The United States Supreme Court, affirming Doe v. Commonwealth’s Atty. for City of Richmond, 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va.1975), aff’d, 44 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. March 29,1976), has answered that question in the negative. In Doe, the court held that since Virginia’s sodomy statute had a rational basis it was not constitutionally infirm. 403 F.Supp. at 1203. The same rational basis attaches to § 705.1, The Code, which, limited as above suggested, is a logical extension of the State’s police power. Carter v. State supra, 255 Ark. at 231-232, 500 S.W.2d at 372.
Nor would the mere fact these individuals were consenting adults (accepting ar-guendo defendant’s hypothesis) be enough in itself to shield their activity from state regulation. Such an argument was rejected in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68, 93. S.Ct. 2628, 2641, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, 463 (1973):
“Finally, petitioners argue that conduct which directly involves ‘consenting adults’ only has, for that sole reason, a special claim to constitutional protection. Our Constitution establishes a broad range of conditions on the exercise of power by the States, but for us to say that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond *367state regulation, is a step we are unable to take.”
See State v. Price, supra, 237 N.W.2d at 817-818.
In overview, it is clear the majority opinion pushes the protection of the United States Constitution far beyond any point suggested by United States Supreme Court decisions. It unnecessarily engineers in complex moral and social areas better left to the legislature. It effectively leaves citizens without deterrent protection from the most offensive of violent crimes. However much in good faith, it accomplishes these results by failing to utilize the legislation-salvaging devices we have readily applied in similar situations, and by failing to appreciate the careful limiting language in Gris-wold and Eisenstadt.
I would affirm the judgment below.
MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND and UH-LENHOPP, JJ., join in this dissent.