Court Opinion

ID: 9854065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:00:15.013207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:53.922091
License: Public Domain

Judge Clark
dissenting:
In making the foreclosure sale under the power of sale in a deed of trust it is the duty of the trustee to exercise due diligence and to act in good faith for the best interests of the parties, both grantees and beneficiaries. But in this case we are concerned with the duty of the trustee in determining default, which is controlled by the terms of the deed of trust, a contract between the parties. Under these terms the trustee could act only when authorized by the creditors. The creditors had the option of declaring the entire indebtedness due and payable; they did so and directed the trustee to foreclose. The trustee then had the duty to foreclose.
The grantors attempted to enjoin the foreclosure, obtained a temporary restraining order, but in the hearing before Judge Brewer to continue the restraining order on 28 August 1974, the court found . . there is no competent evidence . . . which would support an order continuing the restraining order.” The trustee sold the property two days later on 30 August 1974. Two days before sale the grantors were unable to offer to the court competent evidence that there was no default. I find nothing in the record to indicate that any competent evidence was submitted to the creditors or the trustee at any time which would justify cancellation of the foreclosure sale.
*258In my opinion the plaintiffs were required (1) to provide insurance as required by the deed of trust, and (2) to submit satisfactory proof to the creditors that they had effected this insurance. All of the proof establishes that the insurance coverage was cancelled, and there was no competent evidence that prior to foreclosure sale on 30 August 1974 the plaintiffs had in effect the required insurance coverage and offered satisfactory proof of such to the creditors. I would grant all of defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E. 2d 392 (1976).