Court Opinion

ID: 9779200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:39:57.104646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:23.286487
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority affirms the granting of the summary judgment by holding that the deposition of the plaintiff’s expert was not properly before the trial court nor properly before us. As to whether the deposition is properly before us, I leave that to another day. (Although if it is not before us, how can we determine if it was or was not on file at the time of the summary judgment hearing?) The real crux of the matter is whether the deposition could be considered by the trial court. I readily grant that rule 166a applies to the deposition on file at the time of the hearing. I further recognize there were numerous cases holding that depositions which are not on file at the time of the hearing are not competent summary judgment proof. I do not believe the language of rule 166a sets forth a concrete requirement for which there is no exception. A case relied upon by the majority, Barrow v. Jack’s Catfish Inn, 641 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ), couches the requirement in the following language: “As a general rule, a deposition which was not on file on the date the motion for summary judgment was granted cannot be considered as summary judgment evidence.” If the requirement is absolute, then why include the disclaimer “as a general rule”?
In Bryant v. INA of Texas, 673 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.App.—Waco 1984), aff'd, 686 S.W.2d 614 (Tex.1985), a late filed deposition was held to be properly a part of the summary judgment evidence because it was specifically referenced in the summary judgment order. It is apparent to this writer, in the instant case, that the deposition of Dr. Brink was before the trial court. In the first place, the movant stated in the motion for summary judgment that “[s]um-mary judgment evidence consists of the depositions of ... the Plaintiff’s expert, Robert R. Brink, M.D.” The movant even attached excerpts of Dr. Brink’s deposition to the motion. Thereafter, the non-movant filed a response relying upon Dr. Brink’s deposition, averring it was properly filed, and a report of Dr. Brink’s which was attached to the response. The movant filed objections to the use of the report, but never objected to the use of Dr. Brink’s deposition, nor called the trial court’s attention to the fact the deposition was not on file. In fact, the movant then filed a supplemental motion and again referenced Dr. Brink’s deposition in support of the motion. It was only after the non-movant supplemented the transcript with the depositions that the movant raised the issue that Dr. Brink’s deposition was not properly before the trial court. Rule 166a notwithstand*461ing, I believe this was too late. It would appear to me that all the participants below were under the impression that the deposition was filed and all the participants relied upon the deposition. It is this bilateral misconception and reliance that would make the deposition competent summary judgment evidence. Compare Nicholson v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 722 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the excerpts from a deposition were only in a summary judgment response. I would hold the instant situation to be one which does not fit the “general rule” of rule 166a. If TEX.R.CIV.P. 1 has any meaning when it states that the proper objective of the rules is to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants, then equity requires the movant to have “clean hands.” The movant’s repeated references to the deposition and failure to call to the trial court’s attention the status of the deposition have resulted in the movant’s waiver of the requirements of rule 166a. I therefore dissent to the majority’s manner of affirmance in that it does not reach the real question of whether the deposition testimony of Dr. Brink is competent expert testimony. See Milkie v. Metni, 658 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, no writ).