Court Opinion

ID: 9590078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:51:21.114424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:44.233300
License: Public Domain

*38Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the evidence does not support the terms of the change of custody order, as held in Division 3. In fact, the terms will be detrimental to the best interests of the child, as the evidence clearly shows.
I cannot concur in the narrow interpretation of the mother’s first enumeration of error, filed pursuant to Rule 22, and the Court’s refusal to consider the sufficiency of the evidence to change custody of this troubled ten-year-old boy from his mother to a joint arrangement. She worded the first enumeration of error as being the order granting legal custody jointly “when” neither party requested such. She did not say “because”; if she had, it could have been construed technically to limit her challenge to the joint custody award to one ground for that enumerated error. But she did not do so. Instead, she challenges the joint custody award because neither parent requested joint custody as a solution and the evidence does not support it.
Even if her enumeration itself is unartfully worded, it does not require an enlargement of it so as to include issues not embraced therein. Instead, her two-pronged argument explains her position. A consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence does not violate the appellate procedural rule quoted in In the Interest of S. K. L., 199 Ga. App. 731, 734 (2) (a) (405 SE2d 903) (1991).
OCGA § 5-6-40 requires the appellant to file “an enumeration of the errors which shall set out separately each error relied upon. [It] shall be concise. . . .” OCGA § 5-6-48 (f) provides that “Where it is apparent from the notice of appeal, the record, the enumeration of errors, or any combination of the foregoing, . . . what errors are sought to be asserted upon appeal, the appeal shall be considered in accordance therewith notwithstanding . . . that the enumeration of errors fails to enumerate clearly the errors sought to be reviewed.”
Appellant’s first enumeration of error is not so deficient that we cannot consider her complaint. It is totally evident from the nature of the proceeding below and her argument in support of her first enumeration that part and parcel of her complaint on appeal is that a change from sole to joint custody is insupportable factually. In the third sentence of the very first paragraph of her argument she states her position that “[t]he facts of this case do not support the court’s joint custody award.” This is the whole focus of the remainder of her argument on the first enumeration. We are required to construe the Appellate Practice Act liberally “so as ... to avoid . . . refusal to consider any points raised therein, except as may be specifically referred to in [the Appellate Practice Act].” OCGA § 5-6-30.
This does not contradict the legal principles called to support by the dissent in Taylor v. State, 186 Ga. App. 113, 115-116 (366 SE2d 422) (1988). In that case the appellate court created an issue itself, *39the nature of which required express prior raising and ruling in the trial court. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, on the other hand, may be pursued in the appellate court because it is inherent in the trial of the case. It is the issue being tried. Moreover, the question decided by the appellate court in Taylor had not been enumerated as error or encompassed in any enumeration or briefed. According to the governance of Hess Oil &c. Corp. v. Nash, 226 Ga. 706, 709 (177 SE2d 70) (1970), the court in Taylor exceeded its authority. Here the question of evidence sufficiency was embraced in the enumeration and briefed at length.
Cases in which we have refused to expand explicit enumerations involved efforts of appellants to enumerate one error and complain of something else. So, for example, in Norman v. State, 212 Ga. App. 105, 109 (4) (441 SE2d 94) (1994), the error enumerated was the failure to give a certain instruction to the jury concerning the effect of violation of the rule of sequestration by a witness. The additional error briefed but not enumerated was that the court failed to make a further inquiry about possible violation of that rule. Those were two different matters entirely.
In Loyd v. State, 202 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1) (c) (413 SE2d 222) (1991), appellant stated in his enumeration one ground, a procedural one, for the asserted error of the admission of similar transactions, i.e., failure of proper prior notice. In his brief, he also attempted to raise a substantive challenge to the similarity of the prior transaction to the one on trial. We first ruled on the merits of this substantive challenge and then, as a second basis for declining to reverse the judgment on this enumeration, stated the rule precluding enlargement.
In Worley v. State, 201 Ga. App. 704 (2) (411 SE2d 760) (1991), we refused to consider the issue of similarity of other crimes when the enumeration complained only that defendant had not been identified as the perpetrator. Also in Giles v. State, 197 Ga. App. 895, 897 (1) (400 SE2d 368) (1990), the brief included an issue not made in the enumeration. The enumeration challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute, but the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. In the portion of the brief concerning that enumeration, appellant also challenged the validity of one of the affidavits used to support the trial court’s order. This was simply not included in the reach of the enumeration.
Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in Scott v. State, 193 Ga. App. 577, 579 (3) (388 SE2d 416) (1989), but in his brief he also questioned the voluntariness of his statements. We ruled that this was not included in the context of a challenge to evidence sufficiency.
In City of College Park v. Ga. Power Co., 188 Ga. App. 223 (372 SE2d 493) (1988), there were three procedural and one substantive *40contentions of error argued in a brief submitted to support one enumeration. The court limited its review to the one alleged error enumerated, i.e., whether the trial court had exercised its discretion with respect to the matter at issue.
None of these cases presents the situation here, where the enumeration “fairly encompass[es]” the argument made, which is “within” the enumerated error. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 156 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) (275 SE2d 142) (1980).
Most importantly, we should not lose sight of what we are dealing with here. If, as appellant mother argues, the fundamental custody change being effected by the court’s order in this at-risk boy’s life is error as a matter of law, we should not refuse to rectify it because of a rigid standard as to what is encompassed in the scope of an enumeration of error. That elevates form over substance even when the substance is provided at length in appellant’s address to the court explaining the rationale for her position and citing legal authority to justify it.
If we were to examine it, we would have to conclude that the test for change of custody has not been met by the father. The law is that the initial award of custody is conclusive “unless there have been subsequently to the decree new and material changes in the conditions and circumstances substantially affecting the interest and welfare of the child. Though the judge is given a discretion, he is restricted to the evidence and unauthorized to change the custody where there is no evidence to show new and material conditions that affect the welfare of the child.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Livesay v. Hilley, 190 Ga. App. 655, 656 (379 SE2d 557) (1989). Although Livesay involved a divorce decree and this case involves a consent legitimation order as the original source of custody determination, the standard is the same. See Nodvin v. Nodvin, 235 Ga. 708, 709 (221 SE2d 404) (1975); Templeman v. Earnest, 209 Ga. App. 557, 558 (434 SE2d 106) (1993).
If anything, the conditions strongly indicate that sole custody should remain in the mother. The evidence described in the majority opinion demonstrates this. In addition, not only was the child in serious developmental, emotional, and psychological trouble after somewhat over two of his formative years with the father, who had not taken appropriate or adequate steps to correct it, but the father had not provided the court-ordered support in the child’s early years. He was over $8,000 in arrears when the court ordered him to return the boy to his mother “instanter” in December 1993.
The only negative material change in circumstances found by the court affecting the mother’s legally-favored sole custody was her relationship with Earl Hardy, which resulted in contact with the child although they did not live together. Without describing how this *41harmed the child, the trial court found that this contact was detrimental to him.
Decided March 3, 1997.
Fitzpatrick & Camp, Barry L. Fitzpatrick, for appellant.
R. Dale Perry, John A. Kupris, for appellee.
One instance of them being together disturbed the court because it had occurred shortly after the court orally indicated at the close of the evidence that it would not prejudge the case before it received briefs but it wanted the mother not to permit contact with Hardy. The instance was the Labor Day trip to the Okefenokee Swamp and Florida, taken by the mother, the child, the child’s half-sister, and Hardy. The trip was taken because it had long been promised by Hardy to the child, who had learned about the swamp at school and wanted to see it. Although this does not excuse non-compliance if there was an order, it does not create a change in circumstances so as to warrant change from sole custody. Dr. Glazer, the professional who evaluated the parties pursuant to court order, testified that the child had made “substantial progress” after his return to his mother’s custody and that, with respect to Hardy, the child did not appear to be afraid or feel that he was a threat.
Considering the severe problems which the child developed when in the father’s custody, on the one hand, and the enormous strides to normalcy and even achievement made when in the mother’s custody, a change of custody is simply not indicated as a matter of law. There is no reasonable evidence to support the trial court’s findings that there has been (1) a change in condition or circumstances of parents or child, (2) which substantially affects the interest and welfare of the child, (3) which is material and (4) has occurred since the prior award. OCGA § 19-9-1 (b); Kennedy v. Adams, 218 Ga. App. 120, 121-122 (1) (460 SE2d 540) (1995); Lightfoot v. Lightfoot, 210 Ga. App. 400, 403 (3) (436 SE2d 700) (1993); Arp v. Hammonds, 200 Ga. App. 715, 716-717 (409 SE2d 275) (1991); Johnson v. Hubert, 175 Ga. App. 169, 170 (333 SE2d 21) (1985). Most importantly, there is no evidence to support the finding that the change from sole custody in the mother is in the best interest of the child.