Court Opinion

ID: 9891913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 19:04:10.147473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:01:13.732777
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/19/23
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

             COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                   DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 BREANNE MARTIN,                            D080534

        Plaintiff and Appellant,

        v.                                  (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-00008341-
                                            CU-PO-CTL)
 LESLIE T. GLADSTONE, as Trustee
 in Bankruptcy, etc.,

        Defendant and Respondent.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Gregory W. Pollack, Judge. Reversed.
       William Iagmin, Jon R. Williams, James S. Iagmin, Carlie M.
Bouslaugh and Jennifer French, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
       Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Peter L. Garchie, Lann G. McIntyre
and James P. McDonald for Defendant and Respondent.
      Plaintiff Breanne Martin alleges that she was injured when a large
metal gate fell on her while she was on a residential rental property located
in Alpine, California. Martin initially filed claims for negligence and
premises liability against the owners of the property. But upon learning that
the owners had previously filed a bankruptcy petition, Martin amended her
complaint to add the court-appointed bankruptcy trustee, Leslie T.
Gladstone, as a defendant.
      Gladstone demurred to Martin’s complaint, asserting that application
of federal statutory and common law demonstrated that Martin could not
state a cause of action against her. First, Gladstone argued that a roughly

140-year-old common law rule referred to as the “Barton doctrine”1 required
Martin to seek leave of the court that appointed Gladstone before filing an
action against her in a different forum. Second, Gladstone maintained that
she could not be held liable for Martin’s injuries because two days prior to the
accident, she filed a notice of intent to “abandon” the property where the
injury is alleged to have occurred and this abandonment was effectuated a
few weeks later. According to Gladstone, a trustee’s abandonment of
property in a bankruptcy estate is effective nunc pro tunc to the date the
bankruptcy petition was filed, and reverts all interest in the property to the
debtor as if no bankruptcy petition was ever filed. The trial court rejected
Gladstone’s argument regarding application of the Barton doctrine, but
accepted her argument regarding the abandonment of the property at issue;

1      Originating from United States Supreme Court precedent in Barton v.
Barbour (1881) 104 U.S. 126 (Barton) and its progeny, the Barton doctrine
“requires, before filing a lawsuit against officers appointed or approved by the
court, obtaining leave from the bankruptcy court that appointed or approved
them.” (Akhlaghpour v. Orantes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 232, 238–239
(Akhlaghpour).) We discuss the contours of the Barton doctrine, and its
significant statutory exception, later in this opinion.
                                       2
the court sustained Gladstone’s demurrer on this ground and entered
judgment in favor of Gladstone.
      On appeal, Martin contends the trial court erred in concluding that
Gladstone’s abandonment of the relevant property after the accident prevents
Gladstone from being held liable for Martin’s injuries. Martin further argues
that the trial court correctly determined it could not conclude as a matter of
law that the Barton doctrine applies to divest the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction over Martin’s claims. According to Martin, the trial court
therefore erred in sustaining Gladstone’s demurrer and entering judgment in
her favor. We agree with Martin’s appellate contentions and reverse the trial
court’s judgment.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2

A.    Factual Allegations

      On October 9, 2018, defendants Christopher Dougherty and Nereida
Dougherty filed a voluntary petition with the bankruptcy court under title 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. In that filing, the Doughertys listed JTA Real
Estate Holdings, LLC (JTA) as one of their assets. They indicated that JTA
owned three real properties, including a residential rental property located
on Japatul Spur in Alpine (the Alpine Property).
      On April 4, 2019, the bankruptcy court converted the Dougherty
defendants’ bankruptcy case from a chapter 11 proceeding to a chapter 7
proceeding and appointed Leslie T. Gladstone as the bankruptcy trustee.
Roughly six weeks later, the same court granted Gladstone’s ex parte
application seeking permission to “Operate Business During Chapter 7 Case

2      The facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint and matters
subject to judicial notice. (See 3250 Wilshire Boulevard Bldg. v. Employers
Ins. of Wausau (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1279.)
                                       3
Pending Sale of Debtors’ Assets.” The court “authorized” Gladstone to
“operate the businesses of the Debtors, accept lease payments, and pay
expenses that arise in the ordinary course of the business, until such time as
the Estate Properties and the JTA Real Estate Properties can be sold.”
Gladstone submitted monthly operating reports to the bankruptcy court,
which included financial documents related to the operation of the Alpine

Property as a residential rental.3
      On July 19, 2019, Gladstone filed in the bankruptcy court a document
titled “Trustee’s Notice of Proposed Abandonment of Property” with respect

to the Alpine Property. (Some capitalization omitted.)4 Gladstone indicated
that the Alpine Property had a value that was less than the value of the liens
against the property, and she specified that after she began marketing the
Alpine Property for sale, she became aware of “numerous code violations
against the property,” including the “failure to obtain building permits,
violations of County Building Codes, and grading permit violations,” which
had caused at least two potential purchasers to withdraw offers they had

made.5

3     For example, a profit and loss statement included in the filings
demonstrated that Gladstone had collected rents and paid out expenses for
the operation of the three real properties held by JTA Real Estate Properties,
such as insurance premiums and utility costs.
4       The notice provided information to individuals who had objections to
Gladstone’s proposed abandonment of the Alpine Property as to the process
for filing an objection in the bankruptcy court, which the notice indicated was
required to be done within 21 days of the filing of the notice of proposed
abandonment.
5     Gladstone clarified that the “abandonment does not include the
transaction for grant of an easement on this property to SDG&E, which is
                                       4
      Two days later, on July 21, Martin was at the Alpine Property when
she suffered “serious injuries” as a result of an iron gate “[falling] on her.”
According to Martin, at the time she sustained her injuries, the defendants
knew or should have known that the gate created an unreasonably dangerous
condition on their property.
      Less than a month later, Gladstone filed a “Report of Abandonment of
Property.” Gladstone indicated that the time for filing a request for hearing
on an objection to her notice of intent to abandon the Alpine Property had
expired without an objection. In the document Gladstone states, “The
Trustee hereby abandons and forever disclaims any further interest in and to
the following described real property of the debtor, namely: . . . . [¶] [The
remaining] interest after transfer of easement to SDG&E for [the Alpine
Property],” and later continues, “[t]he right of possession of the abandoned
property is hereby relinquished to the debtor, to be assumed at no cost to the
undersigned.”

B.    The Demurrer

      Martin filed a form complaint asserting causes of action for general
negligence and premises liability (the Complaint). It included an allegation
that each of the defendants “owned, leased, occupied, maintained, or
controlled” the Property. At the time of the initial filing, Martin identified
Christopher D. Dougherty, Nereida I. Dougherty, and JTA Real Estate
Holdings, LLC as named defendants. She later filed a form amendment to
the Complaint, replacing a Doe defendant with “Leslie T. Gladstone, Chapter
7 Trustee for Christopher & Nereida Dougherty Bankruptcy.”

pending between the estate and SDG&E,” and elsewhere indicated that the
“Trustee is abandoning the property subject to the easement.”
                                         5
      Gladstone demurred to the Complaint, raising two arguments as to
why Martin was unable to state a cause of action against her. Gladstone’s
main argument was that a common law rule referred to as the “Barton
doctrine” deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
Martin’s claims against Gladstone if Martin failed to show she obtained
permission from the bankruptcy court to file the claims. She set out as an
alternative basis for her demurrer the argument that her abandonment of the
Property operated to divest her of title to the Alpine Property—and
Gladstone argued, of “all possession, ownership, and control” over the
property—nunc pro tunc to the date the Doughertys’ bankruptcy petition was
filed. According to Gladstone, she therefore “lacked any ownership,
possession, or control over the subject property at the time of [the injury-

causing] incident.”6
      Martin opposed the demurrer, contending that a statutory exception to
the Barton doctrine applies in this case because Gladstone had sought and
obtained from the bankruptcy court the authority to carry on the business of
the Doughertys during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, including
continuing to operate the Alpine Property as a residential rental by accepting
lease payments and paying expenses. Martin also opposed the demurrer with
respect to the alternative ground asserted, contending that the nunc pro tunc
reversion of title to and a possessory interest in the Alpine Property did not

6     Gladstone filed a request for judicial notice in support of her demurrer
regarding multiple documents that had been filed in the bankruptcy action,
including, among other things, the Doughertys’ original bankruptcy petition,
the order converting the bankruptcy matter from a chapter 11 case to a
chapter 7 case, the order appointing Gladstone as trustee of the bankruptcy
estate, Gladstone’s proposed abandonment filing, and Gladstone’s August 16,
2019 “Report on Abandonment of Property.”
                                        6
overcome judicially noticeable facts the demonstrated Gladstone’s actual
possession and control over the property during the relevant time period.
      After a hearing on Gladstone’s demurrer and granting Gladstone’s
request for judicial notice in full, the trial court rejected Gladstone’s
argument that Martin failed to sufficiently allege subject matter jurisdiction
under the Barton doctrine theory. At the same time, the court agreed with
Gladstone’s contention that Martin could not state claims for negligence or
premises liability against her as a result of the legal effect of Gladstone’s
abandonment of the Alpine Property under bankruptcy law. As a result, the
court sustained Gladstone’s demurrer without leave to amend, entering
judgment in her favor.

                                  DISCUSSION

      We review an order sustaining a demurrer by applying well-established
principles. “[W]e examine the operative complaint de novo to determine
whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal
theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
“For purposes of reviewing a demurrer, we accept the truth of material facts
properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions,
or conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject to judicial
notice.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924

(Yvanova).)7

7      The trial court took judicial notice of the bankruptcy court orders and
filings Gladstone submitted. The existence and facial contents of these
documents were properly noticed in the trial court under Evidence Code
sections 452, subdivision (d), and 453. Therefore, under Evidence Code
section 459, subdivision (a), notice by this court is mandatory, and we take
notice of the existence and contents of these records, though not of disputed
                                         7
      Martin asserts causes of action for negligence and premises liability
against Gladstone and the other defendants. “The elements of a negligence
claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care,
breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v.
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) Section 1714 of the Civil Code
sets forth “the basic policy of this state” with respect to injuries caused by a
dangerous condition on land, which “is that everyone is responsible for an
injury caused to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property.” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th
659, 672; Hassaine v. Club Demonstration Services, Inc. (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 843, 851.) “ ‘The proper test to be applied to the liability of the
possessor of land in accordance with [this policy] is whether in the
management of [one’s] property [one] has acted as a reasonable [person] in
view of the probability of injury to others.’ ” (Kinsman, at p. 672.) This
requires persons “to maintain land in their possession and control in a
reasonably safe condition.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993)
6 Cal.4th 666, 674.) To comply with the duty, therefore, a possessor of land
must “ ‘ “ ‘ “inspect [the premises] or take other proper means to ascertain
their condition” ’ ” ’ and, if a dangerous condition exists that would have been
discovered by the exercise of reasonable care, [the possessor must] give
adequate warning of or remedy it.” (Staats v. Vintner’s Golf Club, LLC (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 826, 833.)
      Here, Martin has alleged that she suffered “serious injuries” when an
iron gate on the Alpine Property fell on her. She further alleged that the
named defendants, including Gladstone, “owned, leased, occupied,

or disputable facts stated in them. (See Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 924,
fn. 1.)
                                        8
maintained, or controlled” the property. According to Martin, at the time she
sustained her injuries, the defendants knew or should have known that an
unreasonably dangerous condition existed on their property. These
allegations sufficiently state a cause of action for negligence and/or premises
liability.
       Gladstone does not dispute that these allegations would be sufficient
under normal circumstances. She contends, however, that Martin cannot
state a cause of action against her for negligence and premises liability based
on her role as trustee of the Doughertys’ bankruptcy estate. Specifically,
Gladstone relies on judicially noticed documents from the bankruptcy court
proceeding, which she contends establish as matter of law that she
abandoned the Alpine Property and thereby relinquished any possession or
control over the property to the Doughertys nunc pro tunc to the date of the
filing of their bankruptcy petition in October 2018, roughly nine months
before the accident. Gladstone alternatively contends that the trial court’s
demurrer ruling should be affirmed because Martin is unable to bring any
claim or claims against her in connection with her role as trustee of the
Doughertys’ bankruptcy estate because Martin failed to seek leave of the
bankruptcy court to file the action, as required by the Barton doctrine.

A.    Gladstone’s abandonment of the Alpine Property did not operate
      retroactively as a matter of law.

       In considering the effect of Gladstone’s abandonment of the Alpine
Property on Martin’s alleged claims for negligence and premises liability,
we examine the law related to the creation of a bankruptcy estate, as well as
that related to a trustee’s abandonment of an asset that was originally
deemed to be a part of a bankruptcy estate.

                                       9
      Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a debtor’s legal or equitable
interests in property at the time of the commencement of the case become
property of the bankruptcy estate. (See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); see also Schwab
v. Reilly (2010) 560 U.S. 770, 774.) Property continues to remain part of the
bankruptcy estate unless it is administered, abandoned, or the bankruptcy
court orders otherwise. (11 U.S.C. § 554(d).) Bankruptcy estate property
may be abandoned in one of three ways: (1) a trustee may proactively
abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential value after notice
and a hearing; (2) the court may order the trustee to abandon property that is
burdensome or of inconsequential value upon the request of a party in
interest and notice and a hearing; or (3) property that was scheduled under
title 11 of the United States Code section 521(a)(1) and not otherwise
administered at the time of the closing of the bankruptcy case is abandoned
to the debtor by operation of law. (11 U.S.C. § 554(a), (b), (c).)
      The general rule is that “once a trustee abandons estate property it is
no longer part of the estate and is effectively beyond the reach and control of
the trustee.” (Huennekens v. Walker (In re Southern Int’l Co., L.P.) (Bankr.
E.D.Va. 1994) 165 B.R. 815, 819 (Southern International), citing In re Sutton

(Bankr. E.D.Va. 1981) 10 B.R. 737, 739.)8 “Under [title 11 of the United
States Code, section] 554, abandonment divests the property from the estate.
Ownership and control of the asset is reinstated in the debtor with all rights

8      “While we are not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts, even
on federal questions, they are persuasive and entitled to great weight.
[Citation.] Where lower federal precedents are divided or lacking, state
courts must necessarily make an independent determination of federal law
[citation], but where the decisions of the lower federal courts on a federal
question are ‘both numerous and consistent,’ we should hesitate to reject
their authority.” (Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 316,
320–321.)
                                        10
and obligations as before filing a petition in bankruptcy.” (In re Franklin
Signal Corp. (Bankr. D.Minn. 1986) 65 B.R. 268, 274, italics added; see In re
Wilson (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1989) 94 B.R. 886, 888 (Wilson) [“Upon
abandonment, the property reverts to the party with the possessory
interest.”]; see also Artesanias Hacienda Real S.A. de C.V. v. North Mill
Capital, LLC (In re Wilton Armetale, Inc.) (3d Cir. 2020) 968 F.3d 273, 284
[when the evidence of abandonment is clear and overt, “any abandoned
causes of action revert to their prior owner”].) Thus, for example, in In re
Argiannis (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1993) 156 B.R. 683, the court relied on the date
the property at issue was “deemed abandoned” as the date when “the
[bankruptcy] estate no longer had an interest in the property” for purposes of
determining when postpetition interest accrued on a creditor’s interest in the
bankruptcy estate’s interest in the property. (Id. at p. 688.) It concluded that
“[a]fter abandonment on July 24, 1991, [which occurred after notice of the
proposed abandonment had expired without objection] the estate no longer
had an interest in [the property] on which [the creditor’s] interest could
accrue.” (Ibid.) Consistent with these authorities, Gladstone’s “Report of
Abandonment” dated August 16, 2019 is phrased in the present tense,
representing that Gladstone “hereby abandons and forever disclaims” any
interest in the property. It further notes that the “right of possession of the
abandoned property is hereby relinquished to the debtor.” (Italics added.)
      Gladstone contends, however, that her abandonment of the Alpine
Property did not merely revert title and possession from Gladstone back to
the Doughertys as of the date of abandonment, but instead operated as if the
Doughertys retained title, possession, and control of the Alpine Property,
without interruption, throughout the pendency of the bankruptcy

                                       11
proceeding.9 It is true that some authorities have expressed the rule in such
a way that retroactivity of the abandonment is implied, at least for some
purposes. For example, it has been stated that “[abandoned property] reverts
to the debtor and stands as if no bankruptcy petition was filed” (In re
Dewsnup (10th Cir. 1990) 908 F.2d 588, 590), or that “ ‘[w]hen property of the
bankrupt is abandoned, the title reverts to the bankrupt, nunc pro tunc, so
that he is treated as having owned it continuously’ ” (Moses v. Howard Univ.
Hosp. (D.C.Cir. 2010) 606 F.3d 789, 795). But a close examination of the
cited cases demonstrates that these statements do not represent an absolute
rule to be applied without consideration of the factual circumstances of a
case. In other words, courts do not blindly give retroactive effect to a
trustee’s abandonment of bankruptcy estate property in every situation.
Rather, application of a rule treating the debtor as having owned the
abandoned property continuously despite the filing of a bankruptcy petition
“is a fiction, and a fiction is but a convenient device, invented by courts to aid
them in achieving a just result. It is not a categorical imperative, to be
blindly followed to a result that is unjust.” (Wallace v. Lawrence Warehouse
Co. (9th Cir. 1964) 338 F.2d 392, 394, fn. 1.)
      Although Wallace was one of the earliest courts to acknowledge the
legal “fiction” of retroactive application of abandonment and to reject its
wholesale application without consideration of the equities, other case
authority compellingly demonstrates that the rule of retroactivity is to be
invoked only where justice requires its application. (See, e.g., Van Curen v.
Great Am. Ins. Co. (In re Hat) (Bankr. E.D.Cal. 2007) 363 B.R. 123, 141 [“the

9     Gladstone contends that “[t]he legal effect of the abandonment is that
the property reverts to the debtors nunc pro tunc to the date the debtors filed
their bankruptcy petition as though the debtors held title to the property
continuously and as if no bankruptcy had been filed.”
                                        12
nunc pro tunc effect of abandonment is subject to a balancing of the
equities”]; In re Pena (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019) 600 B.R. 415, 422–423, fn. 11
[declining to apply general rule of “retroactive application of abandonment”

where “equities” did not support its application].)10 We take from our review
of these various authorities three general principles regarding the effect of
abandonment of bankruptcy estate property. First, a trustee’s abandonment
of estate property under the Bankruptcy Code generally returns title to, and
possession and control of, the abandoned property back to the debtor to the
same extent that the property had been held by the debtor prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy as of the date the abandonment is effectuated. Second, it
follows from the first that a trustee’s abandonment of bankruptcy estate

10     See also Failla v. CitiBank, N.A. (S.D.Fla. 2015) 542 B.R. 606, 612
[declining to “take[ ] literally” the “statements from the courts” to the effect
that after an abandonment by the trustee, property “ ‘reverts to the debtor
and stands as if no bankruptcy petition was filed’ ” where “[t]o hold otherwise
would permit the debtor to use the ‘fiction . . . invented by courts to . . . be
blindly followed to a result that is unjust’ ”]; Kunkel v. Jasin (3d Cir. 2011)
420 Fed.Appx. 198, 200 [affirming district court’s decision not to apply “the
doctrine of ‘relation back’ ” of abandonment where doing so would permit
debtor to benefit from his filing of invalid copyright registrations]; U.S. v.
Grant (1st Cir. 1992) 971 F.2d 799, 804 [“[T]he [‘relation back’] doctrine
originated within the very dissimilar framework of the Bankruptcy Act, and
its application . . . to these chapter 7 proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code
would serve none of the benign purposes for which it was fashioned. Rather,
its extension [in this case] would disserve the interests of justice which the
‘relation back’ doctrine was designed to serve.”]; Barletta v. Tedeschi (N.D.
N.Y. 1990) 121 B.R. 669, 674 [The “rule of [retroactive] reversion is a legal
fiction invented by the courts to aid them in achieving a just result”]; In re Ira
Haupt & Co. (2d Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 607, 613 [“fiction” that abandonment of
property renders it “ ‘as though the trustee had never owned or claimed it’ ”
should not prevent a court “from reaching the fairest solution”]; Rosenblum v.
Dingfelder (2d Cir. 1940) 111 F.2d 406, 409 [“Relation back may be
considered in the nature of a fiction” to be applied where it “fits” a case
“appropriately.”].
                                       13
property operates to relieve the trustee of further responsibility for and
interest in the property as of the date the abandonment is effectuated.
Third, however, a court may rely on the “fiction” that title to property
abandoned by a trustee remained with the debtor as if the bankruptcy
petition had never been filed in situations in which equity requires the
application of the nunc pro tunc fiction.
      Further, Gladstone has not cited, nor have we independently identified,
any authority in which a court at the pleading stage has applied the
equitable principal of retroactive application of a trustee’s abandonment to
relieve a trustee of liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of
estate property that occurred prior to the effectuation of an abandonment.
In fact, there is only one case on which Gladstone relies that specifically
involves the interplay between a trustee’s potential liability for an accident
that occurred on bankruptcy estate property and the trustee’s abandonment
of that property. And that decision demonstrates, contrary to Gladstone’s
argument and the trial court’s ruling, that under the facts as alleged here
and those determinable from judicially noticeable documents, Gladstone
cannot be deemed free from liability as a matter of law as a result of her post-
accident abandonment of the property.
      In Southern International, supra, 165 B.R. 815 at page 819, the court
determined that the date of abandonment is the point at which a trustee’s
responsibility for accidents that occur on bankruptcy estate property
terminates. In that case, the court considered a bankruptcy trustee’s motion
for summary judgment in connection with counterclaims asserted against the
trustee regarding the July 1991 contamination of the debtor company’s land,
as well as surrounding properties, caused by the overflow of tanks that
contained a toxic solution. (Id. at pp. 817–818.) Walker, an adjacent

                                       14
landowner asserting the counterclaims, accused the trustee “of negligence in
allowing the spills to occur and also ask[ed] that [the trustee] be held strictly
liable for the contamination.” (Id. at p. 818.)
      The trustee maintained that he had abandoned the property on which
the tanks were housed and further argued that his abandonment of the
property relieved him of liability in connection with the counterclaims,
thereby entitling him to summary judgment. (Southern International, supra,
165 B.R. at pp. 817–818.) The Southern International court discussed the
general rule as to how bankruptcy estate property is treated after it is
abandoned by a bankruptcy trustee, and related the effect of abandonment to
claims against a trustee for damage-producing incidents that occur on the
property:
         “It is a well established rule that once a trustee abandons
         estate property it is no longer part of the estate and is
         effectively beyond the reach and control of the trustee.
         See In re Sutton, 10 B.R. 737, 739 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1981).
         Consequently, in most instances the trustee may not be
         held responsible for any post-abandonment accidents
         involving the property. Upon abandonment, the property
         reverts back to the party with the possessory interest and
         also divests this Court of jurisdiction over the property.
         See [Wilson, supra, 94 B.R. at p. 888] and In re Reed, 94
         B.R. 48, 52 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1988). Thus, any claim for
         damage done to the property subsequent to the
         abandonment has no bearing on the administration of the
         debtor’s Chapter 7 case and must be dismissed. See Id.”
         (Southern International, at p. 819, italics added.)

      The court then examined three issues related to the trustee’s asserted
abandonment: (1) whether the trustee’s notice of possible abandonment
through a notice of the meeting of creditors under title 11 of the United
States Code, section 341 (the section 341 meeting) was sufficient notice of the
proposed abandonment of estate property to permit the trustee to effectuate

                                       15
an actual abandonment at that meeting; (2) whether the trustee’s
postabandonment conduct operated to “revoke a previously valid
abandonment”; and (3) whether the trustee even “had a right to abandon the
facility while its machinery still contained the [toxic] solution.” (Southern
International, supra, 165 B.R. at pp. 820–823.)
      The main dispute regarding the validity of the trustee’s notice of the

proposed abandonment was whether an April 30, 199111 notice provided by
the trustee regarding the section 341 meeting—a notice that included the
trustee’s indication that he might abandon certain property at the meeting
and a statement indicating that objections to such abandonment would have
to be filed pursuant to local rules—was sufficient to permit the trustee to
effectuate the abandonment of the property at the section 341 meeting.
(Southern International, supra, 165 B.R. at pp. 820–821.) The court
determined that it was, rendering effective the trustee’s abandonment of the

property at the May 30, 1991 creditors meeting. (Id. at p. 821.)12 Because
the Southern International court determined that Walker had admitted the
trustee “did actually abandon the property” at the creditors meeting
(Southern International, at p. 820, fn. 1), and because the notice about that

11    The Southern International opinion cites the date of the notice of the
meeting as “April 30, 1993,” but “1993” appears to be an editorial mistake, as
the meeting for which the notice was given took place in 1991. (165 B.R. at
p. 818.)
12    The Southern International court stated, “Because all proper parties
were effectively noticed of the proposed abandonment of estate property
through the notice of the meeting of creditors, the trustee did properly notice
his intent to abandon the facility at that creditor’s meeting. Because no party
objected to the proposed abandonment, the trustee is treated as effectively
abandoning the facility on May 30, 1991, some forty-nine days before the July
19, 1991 spill.” (165 B.R. at p. 821.)
                                       16
meeting had also informed interested parties that the property might be
abandoned at the meeting, the abandonment of the property by the trustee at
the section 341 meeting was effective as of the date of the meeting—i.e., May
30, 1991. (Southern International, at p. 821.) The contamination spill
occurred 49 days later on July 19, 1991. (Ibid.) After also rejecting the
alternative contentions that the trustee had revoked any abandonment
through subsequent conduct and that the trustee had no power to abandon
the property in the first place, the Southern International court concluded:

         “Because the trustee is held to have abandoned the facility
         before the spill, the trustee may not be held responsible for
         any damages flowing from that or any other accidents at
         the facility after the May 30, 1991 creditors’ meeting. Also,
         because abandonment of the facility divests this Court of
         any jurisdiction over the facility, any action involving the
         facility’s operations after the abandonment are not properly
         before this Court. In sum, because the trustee abandoned
         the facility before the spill, summary judgment should be
         granted in favor of the trustee on all three of Walker’s
         counts contained in his counterclaim.” (Southern
         International, at p. 823.)

      Applying these principles, we conclude that at the demurrer stage,
judicially noticeable documents demonstrate that the Doughertys’
bankruptcy proceeding was converted to a chapter 7 bankruptcy on April 4,
2019, and Gladstone was appointed trustee of the bankruptcy estate at that
time in connection with the conversion. Therefore, as of April 4, 2019, title to
and possession and control of the Alpine Property was held in trust by
Gladstone. On May 21, 2019, the bankruptcy court authorized Gladstone to
operate the bankruptcy estate’s businesses, which included operating the
Alpine Property as a rental business. Gladstone filed a notice of her intent to
abandon the Alpine Property on July 19, 2019. The alleged injury occurred
on the Alpine Property on July 21, 2019. It was only weeks later, on August
                                       17
16, 2019, that Gladstone effectuated the abandonment of the property, which
was after the time for objections had elapsed and was the date that Gladstone
filed with the bankruptcy court her “Report of Abandonment of Property.”
These facts demonstrate that title to and possession and control over the
Alpine Property did not terminate as to Gladstone and revert to the
Doughertys until August 16, 2019.
      Gladstone suggests that in Southern International “the court concluded
the notice of intent to abandon the property was the effective date for
determining whether the property was under the trustee’s control at the time
of the incident.” We believe this is a misreading of Southern International.
Rather, as we have previously explained, the date of the notice of the
trustee’s intent to abandon the property in Southern International was the
date that the trustee issued its notice of the section 341 meeting of the
creditors—i.e., April 30, 1991. (Southern International, supra, 165 B.R. at
p. 818.) But the actual abandonment of the property occurred “[d]uring the
duly scheduled [section] 341(a) meeting,” after the trustee verified that there
had been no timely-filed objections to the proposed abandonment. (Southern
International, at p. 818.) Thus, Southern International does not support
Gladstone’s contention that she is relieved of any responsibility for the Alpine
Property as of the date she filed a notice of her intention to abandon the
property, and certainly not as of the even earlier date when the bankruptcy
petition was filed. Southern International instead indicates that a trustee’s
responsibility for accidents that occur on estate property terminates only
when the abandonment is effectuated.
      Our application of the principles related to abandonment of bankruptcy
estate property, which is consistent with Southern International, serves to
promote California policy of requiring those who exercise control over

                                       18
property to remain diligent in ensuring that such property remains
reasonably safe. In California, “[t]he ‘ “crucial element” ’ for imposing a
duty . . . [to act reasonably to protect others from a dangerous condition on
the property] is control . . . .” (Soto v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 168, 177.) The rationale for this rule is that whoever has the
means to control the property also has the ability to take reasonable steps to
prevent harm. (Ibid.) It follows that a trustee who has actual possession and
control of estate property during a certain time period is the party who can
take steps to prevent harm from occurring on that property.
      In a case where a party is injured on the property during that time
period, applying the equitable nunc pro tunc rule to create a legal fiction that
the debtor exercised possession and control would undermine the rationale
for imposing a duty on the party who had actual control over property and
the concomitant ability to maintain it in a safe condition. And in the absence
of a compelling reason to depart from the reasoning in Southern
International, we conclude that it is only upon the trustee’s complete
relinquishment of control over the property back to the debtor—through the
effectuation of an abandonment—that a trustee may no longer be held liable
for accidents that occur on that property. As a result, Gladstone’s
abandonment of the Alpine Property on August 16, 2019, weeks after the
accident, does not provide a basis for the sustaining of Gladstone’s demurrer
as to Martin’s claims for injuries she sustained on July 21, 2019.

B.    The Barton rule does not provide an alternative ground for affirming
      the trial court’s sustaining of the demurrer.

      As an alternative ground for affirming the judgment, Gladstone argues
that the demurrer was properly sustained because Martin failed to obtain
bankruptcy court approval before filing her claims, as required by the Barton

                                       19
doctrine.13 In Barton, supra, 104 U.S. 126, a train passenger asserted
personal injury claims against a court-appointed receiver of the railroad
company that operated her train. (Id. at p. 127.) The receiver filed a plea to
the jurisdiction, arguing among other things that the plaintiff had not
obtained leave of the court that appointed the receiver. (Ibid.) The plaintiff
demurred to the plea, and the trial court overruled the demurrer and entered
judgment for the receiver. (Ibid.) On consideration of the plaintiff’s writ of
error, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against the
plaintiff, explaining that “a court of another State has not jurisdiction,
without leave of the court by which the receiver was appointed, to entertain a
suit against him for a cause of action arising in the State in which he was
appointed and in which the property in his possession is situated, based on
his negligence or that of his servants in the performance of their duty in
respect of such property.” (Id. at p. 137.)
      The Barton doctrine has more recently been summarized as requiring
“ ‘that a party must first obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before it
initiates an action in another forum against a bankruptcy trustee or other
officer appointed by the bankruptcy court for acts done in the officer’s official
capacity.’ ” (Harris v. Wittman (In re Harris) (9th Cir. 2009) 590 F.3d 730,

13    Martin suggests that Gladstone’s failure to file a “protective cross-
appeal from that aspect of the trial court’s Order denying her [Barton]
Doctrine argument” has rendered this issue forfeited. We disagree. It is well
settled that a defendant may argue, as an alternative basis for affirming the
judgment, separate grounds raised on demurrer even if they were not relied
on by the trial court. (See, e.g., Bichai v. Dignity Health (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 869, 877 [“Appellate courts affirm a judgment of dismissal if it is
correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, independent of the trial court’s
stated reasons]; Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967
[“The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of
demurrer is well taken.’ ”].)
                                       20
741.) In the absence of leave from the court that appointed the trustee,
“ ‘the other forum lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.’ ” (Harris,
at pp. 741–742.)
      “Cases since Barton . . . have explained that the doctrine exists to
ensure the ‘uniform application of bankruptcy law’ by requiring ‘all legal
proceedings that affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate be
brought either in bankruptcy court or with leave of the bankruptcy court.’[ ]
[Citation.] The doctrine also serves to protect receivers and trustees from the
burden of ‘having to defend against suits by litigants disappointed by his
actions on the court’s behalf, which would impede their work for the court.”
(Akhlaghpour, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 243, fn. omitted.) The Barton
doctrine generally “applies when three conditions are met: (1) the plaintiff
is attempting to ‘initiate[ ] an action in another forum’; (2) the action is
‘against a bankruptcy trustee or other officer appointed by the bankruptcy
court’; and (3) the action is ‘for acts done in the officer's official capacity.’ ”
(Akhlaghpour, at p. 244.)
      Although the Barton doctrine is of common law origin, it has been
legislatively narrowed by statute, the current version of which is found in the
Judicial Code at title 28 United States Code section 959(a). That provision
states:

          “Trustees, receivers or managers of any property, including
          debtors in possession, may be sued, without leave of the
          court appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or
          transactions in carrying on business connected with such
          property. Such actions shall be subject to the general
          equity power of such court so far as the same may be
          necessary to the ends of justice, but this shall not deprive a
          litigant of his right to trial by jury.” (28 U.S.C. § 959(a),
          italics added.)

                                          21
      The court in In re VistaCare Group, LLC (3d Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 218,
225–226 (VistaCare) noted that this statutory exception to the Barton
doctrine appears to have originated out of certain concerns that were raised
in the dissent in Barton:

         “[Title 28 United States Code section 959(a)], originally
         enacted in 1887, just six years after Barton, seems to have
         been in direct response to the concerns raised in Justice
         Miller’s dissent in Barton. Criticizing the scope of the
         Court's holding, Justice Miller noted that the role of a
         receiver had expanded well beyond winding up the affairs
         of a defunct corporation and liquidating its assets, to in
         some situations, essentially running the company.[ ]
         Barton, 104 U.S. at 137–[138] (Miller, J., dissenting).
         Justice Miller opined that it would be fundamentally unfair
         to require a party to obtain court permission to pursue
         claims against the receiver arising out of the receiver’s
         operation of the business. Id. at 138. Such a system
         would render the everyday operations of the corporation
         “exempt[ ] from the operation of common law” and deprive
         potential litigants of the right “to have their complaints
         tried by [a] jury or by the ordinary courts of justice.” Id.
         Rather, a party’s only remedy against the corporation
         would be in ‘the hands of . . . the court which appointed [the
         receiver].’ Id. In contrast, Justice Miller agreed with the
         majority that ‘[w]hen a receiver [was] appointed to wind up
         a defunct corporation . . . [and] his sole duty [was] to
         convert the property into a fund for the payment of
         debts, . . . a very strong reason exist[ed] why the court
         which appointed him should alone control him in the
         performance of his duty.’ Id.” (VistaCare, supra, 678 F.3d
         at p. 226, fn. omitted.)

      The VistaCare court found it “abundantly clear that Congress intended
to narrow the scope of the Barton doctrine by creating an exception for
situations in which the policy rationales underlying the Court’s creation of
the doctrine were not applicable.” (VistaCare, supra, 678 F.3d at p. 227.)
So “where a trustee or receiver is actually operating the business, and the acts
                                      22
complained of involved the trustee’s ‘conducting the debtor’s business in the
ordinary sense of the words or [his] pursuing that business as an operating
enterprise,’ an aggrieved party need not seek permission from the appointing
court before filing suit in another forum.” (Ibid., italics added, quoting Beck
v. Fort James Corp. (In re Crown Vantage, Inc.) (9th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 963,
971–972 (Crown Vantage).) On the other hand, in a situation in which a
trustee “ ‘acting in his official capacity conducts no business connected with
the property other than to perform administrative tasks necessarily incident
to the consolidation, preservation, and liquidation of assets in the debtor’s
estate,’ [title 28 United States Code section] 959(a) does not apply, and leave
of court is still required before filing suit against the trustee.” (VistaCare, at
p. 227, quoting Lebovits v. Scheffel (In re Lehal Realty Assocs.) (2d Cir. 1996)
101 F.3d 272, 276 (Lehal).)
      Courts have determined that the exception to the Barton rule in title 28
United States Code section 959(a) did not apply in various situations in
which the trustee was being sued in connection with activities related to the
winding up of a bankruptcy estate, because “ ‘[m]erely collecting, taking steps
to preserve, and/or holding assets, as well as other aspects of administering
and liquidating the estate, do not constitute ‘carrying on business’ as that
term has been judicially interpreted.’ ” (Carter v. Rodgers (11th Cir. 2000)
220 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Carter).) For example, where the trustee was sued in
connection with the selling of lots on a particular estate property, but the
debtor was “not in the business of buying and selling real estate,” the selling
of the lots was a matter of “performing [the] duty as trustee to liquidate the
assets of the estate.” (VistaCare, supra, 678 F.3d at p. 227, fn. 5.) Similarly
in Carter, a plaintiff-debtor’s action against a former bankruptcy trustee for
breach of fiduciary duty was “not premised on an act or transaction of a

                                        23
fiduciary in carrying out [the plaintiff-debtor’s] business operations,” but was
instead related to “the administration and liquidation of [the debtor’s]
estate,” rendering title 28 United States Code section 959(a)’s exception
inapplicable. (Carter, at p. 1254.) Or, where a trustee was being sued for his
conduct related to “liquidating the assets of the estate” in connection with his
handling of legal claims, the Barton doctrine applied and its statutory
exception did not. (Crown Vantage, supra, 421 F.3d at pp. 971–972; see also
Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.) (6th Cir. 1993) 991 F.2d 1236,
1241 [“Trustee’s fraudulent conveyance suit against DeLorean and Weitzman
was in no way related to carrying on [the debtor’s] business.” (Italics added.)];
Lehal, supra, 101 F.3d at p. 276 [“[Section] 959 does not apply where, as here,
a trustee acting in his official capacity conducts no business connected with
the property other than to perform administrative tasks necessarily incident
to the consolidation, preservation, and liquidation of assets in the debtor’s
estate.”].)
      Thus, where the conduct being challenged in a lawsuit involves a
trustee acting in a manner consistent with liquidating the assets of the
bankruptcy estate and doing nothing more, the Barton doctrine applies to
require leave of the bankruptcy court before filing suit. (Crown Vantage,
supra, 421 F.3d at p. 972.) In contrast, however, the exception to the Barton
doctrine provided for in title 28 United States Code section 959(a) applies to
situations in which a plaintiff is suing the trustee for conduct in “operating
the business previously conducted by the debtor.” (Crown Vantage, at
p. 972.) This “carrying on business” exception is intended to “permit actions
redressing torts committed in furtherance of the debtor’s business, such as
the common situation of a negligence claim in a slip and fall case where a
bankruptcy trustee, for example, conducted a retail store.” (Lehal, supra,

                                       24
101 F.3d at p. 276.) Carrying on business “only cover[s] ‘acts or transactions
in conducting the debtor’s business in the ordinary sense of the words or in
pursuing that business as an operating enterprise.’ ” (Seaman Paper Co. of
Mass., Inc. v. Polsky (D. Mass. 2007) 537 F.Supp.2d. 233, 238.)
      For example, the United States Supreme Court approved the bringing
of a state lawsuit against a bankruptcy trustee for “a money claim against
the estate for acts of the trustee in operating trains over respondent’s tracks,”
despite the failure to seek leave of the bankruptcy court. (Thompson v. Texas
M. R. Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 134, 138 (Thompson).) The Thompson court
explained that “[o]peration of the trains is plainly a part of the trustee’s
functions. Claims which arise from their operation—whether grade-crossing
claims as in [McNulta v. Lochridge (1891) 141 U.S. 327, 332], or claims for
the use of the tracks of another as in the present case—are claims based on
acts of the trustee in conducting the business [of the debtor].” (Thompson, at
p. 138, italics added.) And in McNulta, the case relied on by the Thompson
court, the United States Supreme Court similarly permitted a plaintiff to
maintain a state lawsuit for wrongful death alleged in connection with the
“negligent management of an engine at a public crossing” against a receiver
without the plaintiff having first sought leave of the court that had appointed
the receiver. (McNulta, at pp. 327, 331.)
      Similarly, in Valdes v. Feliciano (1st Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 91, the court
relied on the statutory exception to the Barton rule to conclude that the
plaintiffs could pursue state law claims arising out of “a grade-crossing
accident” that was alleged to have been “caused by negligence of the debtor
railroad in the operation of a locomotive” after the bankruptcy petition had
been filed. (Valdes, at pp. 93, 94–95.) The Valdes court relied on Thompson
to acknowledge that the “ ‘operation of the trains is plainly a part of the

                                        25
trustee’s functions’ ” and therefore concluded that the plaintiffs “were entitled
to proceed with their tort actions.” (Valdes, at pp. 94–95.)
      More recently, in a case quite similar to the one before us, the statutory
exception set out in title 28 United States Code section 959(a) was applied to
permit a tort action to proceed in the face of a motion to dismiss filed by a
trustee who had been maintaining a residential apartment as part of the
estate’s property at the time a tenant was injured at the apartment. (Dell v.
Chain (In re Chain) (W.D.Pa. 2020) 614 B.R. 512, 517 (Chain).) In Chain, a
trustee was appointed to administer the bankruptcy estate on September 15,
2015. At a meeting of the creditors that took place approximately a month
later, the secured creditor of the building in which the apartment was located
and the trustee “agreed that [the trustee] would manage the ongoing
operations of the building until it and other property could be sold and
distributed.” (Ibid.) The trustee “continued to manage the property in an
effort to liquidate it for the benefit of the creditors,” and the property was
eventually sold on November 10, 2016. (Ibid.) According to the complaint, in
late March 2016 (i.e., at a time during which the trustee was managing the
property while preparing to sell it), a walking cane belonging to one of the
tenants “broke through a wooden step that had been decaying for some time,”
causing the man to lose his balance, fall down the stairs, and sustain serious
injuries. (Ibid.)
      The trustee moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction “because the [Barton] doctrine
prohibits a trustee from being sued for administrative acts without leave
from the bankruptcy court, which plaintiffs did not obtain.” (Chain, supra,
614 B.R. at p. 518.) The Chain court rejected this argument, stating that
“it has become clear that the exception to the [Barton] doctrine is meant to

                                        26
apply in precisely the type of case alleged here.” (Chain, at p. 519.) The
court explained, “Here, plaintiffs assert that defendant [trustee] was
negligent in maintaining the premises for the operation of the rental
business” and “specifically aver that while [the defendant] was acting as the
trustee, he leased, operated, owned, possessed, controlled, managed and
maintained the premises where the accident occurred.” (Ibid.) According to
the Chain court, the “alleged activities extend beyond the mere
administration of property, or tasks incident to consolidating, preserving or
liquidating the assets,” in that “[t]hey raise a sufficient inference that [the
defendant] carried on an ongoing rental business connected with the
premises . . . .” (Ibid.)
      A review of the above-referenced authorities makes clear that we must
determine whether the allegations of the Complaint and the facts that may
be ascertained from the judicially noticed documents filed in the bankruptcy
court demonstrate, as a matter of law, that Gladstone was “ ‘[m]erely
collecting, taking steps to preserve, and/or holding assets, as well as other
aspects of administering and liquidating the estate,’ ” which would require
application of the Barton doctrine. (Carter, supra, 220 F.3d at p. 1254.)
We cannot so conclude at this stage of the proceedings. Similar to the
allegations at issue in Chain, supra, 614 B.R. at page 519, the Complaint
here includes allegations that Gladstone, “owned, leased, occupied,

maintained, or controlled” the Property during the relevant time period.14
In addition, the documents filed in the bankruptcy court demonstrate that
Gladstone specifically sought and obtained from that court the “authority to

14    In Chain, the complaint alleged that the trustee “leased, operated,
owned, possessed, controlled, managed and maintained the premises where
the accident occurred.” (Chain, supra, 614 B.R. at p. 519.)
                                        27
operate to maintain the Properties pending sale,” including the Alpine
Property, which Gladstone identified as being “leased to tenants.” She
framed her request as seeking authorization “to operate the businesses of
Debtors, accept lease payments, and pay expenses that arise in the ordinary
course of the business,” and the court granted her request without limitation.
(Italics added.) Further, Gladstone submitted financial reports that
indicated she was operating the Alpine Property as a rental.
      As a result, the allegations of the Complaint and the judicially noticed
bankruptcy court documents are sufficient to support an inference that
Gladstone’s alleged activities in connection with the Alpine Property, like the
activities of the trustee in Chain, supra, 614 B.R. at page 519, “extend[ed]
beyond the mere administration of property, or tasks incident to
consolidating, preserving or liquidating the assets.” These allegations and
judicially noticed facts appear to support a conclusion that Gladstone was
maintaining, controlling, and, most importantly, acting as a landlord in
continuing to lease the Alpine Property as a rental unit, and that in doing so
she was “carr[ying] on an ongoing rental business connected with the
premises” (Chain, supra, 614 B.R. at p. 519) at the time Martin is alleged to
have suffered an injury. Such a conclusion would render the title 28 United
States Code section 959(a) exception to the Barton doctrine applicable here.
      Accordingly, we conclude that the Barton doctrine does not provide an
alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s sustaining of Gladstone’s
demurrer to the Complaint.

                                       28
                              DISPOSITION

     The judgment is reversed. Martin is entitled to costs on appeal.

                                                                   DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

                                    29