Court Opinion

ID: 9897269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:29.149688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:59.535046
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Oct 03 2023, 8:34 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael A. Sarafin                                         David S. Gladish
Adam J. Sedia                                              Mark J. Schocke
Susan K. Swing                                             Gladish Law Group
Johnson & Bell, P.C.                                       Highland, Indiana
Crown Point, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Munster Medical Research                                   October 3, 2023
Foundation, Inc.,                                          Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant,                                       23A-CT-485
                                                           Appeal from the Lake Superior
        v.                                                 Court
                                                           The Honorable Calvin D.
Patricia Hintz,                                            Hawkins, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           45D02-2002-CT-152

                                  Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023                          Page 1 of 23
[1]   Munster Medical Research Foundation, Inc. (“MMRF”) appeals the Lake

      Superior Court’s judgment in favor of Patricia Hintz on her complaint alleging

      MMRF’s negligence following a jury trial. MMRF presents several issues for

      our review:

              1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied MMRF’s
              summary judgment motion.

              2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted a
              motion in limine regarding MMRF’s proffered nonparty defense.

              3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
              MMRF’s motion for judgment on the evidence.

              4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed
              the jury.

[2]   We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   MMRF owns and operates Community Hospital in Munster. On August 9,

      2022, Hintz’s mother, Betty, was a patient there. On that date, Alfred Peacock

      was an ultrasound technologist working at the hospital. In the course of Betty’s

      medical treatment, Peacock was instructed to perform an ultrasound on Betty,

      who was in one of two beds in a shared hospital room. Peacock plugged in a

      portable ultrasound machine into an outlet “[a]t the head of the bed.” Tr. Vol.

      1, p. 216. The machine was located at the foot of Betty’s bed. The lights in the

      room had been “turned down” to avoid reflections on the ultrasound machine’s

      screen. Id. at 217.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023        Page 2 of 23
[4]   Peacock was approximately half-way through the thirty-minute procedure when

      Hintz arrived to visit Betty. Hintz’s sister was there and had asked Hintz to

      bring some things for Betty from her home. Hintz’s “arms were full” as she was

      carrying two bags when she entered the room and approached Betty’s bedside.

      Tr. Vol. 2, p. 49. Suddenly and without warning, Hintz “fell onto [her] knees.”

      Id. at 36. Only after her fall did Hintz see that the cord to the ultrasound

      machine was “out in the walkway” and that her foot had gotten stuck in a

      “loop” of the cord. Id. at 37, 51. Hintz sustained injuries as a result of the fall.

[5]   On February 7, 2020, Hintz filed a complaint alleging that MMRF was

      negligent and caused her injuries. On September 30, 2022, MMRF filed a

      motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum in support of summary

      judgment, MMRF argued that Peacock was an independent contractor and,

      thus, MMRF could not be liable for his negligence. MMRF also argued that the

      power cord on the floor was not an unreasonably dangerous condition as a

      matter of law.

[6]   Hintz did not file anything in opposition to summary judgment. Instead, at the

      hearing on MMRF’s motion, Hintz argued that MMRF had a duty to make the

      hospital reasonably safe for Hintz, who was an invitee, and that whether

      MMRF breached that duty was a question of fact precluding summary

      judgment. In support, Hintz cited portions of her deposition testimony, which

      had been designated as evidence in support of summary judgment by MMRF.

      MMRF objected to Hintz’s reliance on that testimony, arguing that it had only

      designated portions of the deposition. But Hintz pointed out that, in MMRF’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023           Page 3 of 23
      “Designation of Evidence in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment,”

      MMRF had listed the entire deposition transcript of Hintz with no specific

      citations to page numbers. In addition, Hintz argued that Peacock was a dual

      employee of both MMRF and Anders Group LLC (“Anders”) and that MMRF

      was vicariously liable for Peacock’s negligence. The trial court denied MMRF’s

      summary judgment motion.

[7]   Prior to the ensuing jury trial, Hintz filed a motion in limine to bar evidence

      that Peacock’s employer, Anders, was a nonparty liable to Hintz. MMRF had

      not timely asserted a nonparty defense. MMRF objected to the motion in

      limine and argued that, while “the verdict form in this case would not include a

      non-party for apportionment of fault by the jury, it remains [Hintz]’s burden to

      prove MMRF is vicariously liable for the negligent conduct that [Hintz] alleges

      caused her fall, which remains a contested issue in this case.” Appellant’s App.

      Vol. 2, p. 240. The trial court granted the motion in limine over MMRF’s

      objection and precluded evidence that Peacock was an independent contractor

      employed by Anders.

[8]   During trial, Hintz argued that Peacock was an agent of MMRF and that

      MMRF was, therefore, liable for his negligent conduct. Hintz also argued in the

      alternative that MMRF was liable to Hintz, its invitee, because it breached its

      duty to take reasonable care to make its premises safe for her as its invitee.

      MMRF objected to final instructions regarding a principal’s liability for the acts

      of its agent, but the trial court gave those instructions. The jury found that

      Hintz had incurred $50,000 in damages, but it found that she was 35% at fault

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023         Page 4 of 23
       and MMRF was 65% at fault in causing her injuries. Accordingly, the verdict

       was $32,500 in favor of Hintz. This appeal ensued.

       Discussion and Decision
       Issue One: Summary Judgment

[9]    MMRF first contends that the trial court erred when it denied its motion for

       summary judgment. Our standard of review is well settled:

               When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for
               summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.”
               Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (quoting
               Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind.
               2019)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated
               evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
               material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
               a matter of law.” Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 109
               N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).
               We will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
               moving party. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors. Inc.,
               72 N.E.3d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 2017). We review summary
               judgment de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind.
               2014).

       Arrendale v. Am. Imaging & MRI, LLC, 183 N.E.3d 1064, 1067-68 (Ind. 2022).

[10]   As our Court has explained,

               [n]egligence is a tort that requires proof of “(1) a duty owed by
               the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3)
               injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s breach.”
               Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). “Negligence
               will not be inferred; rather, all of the elements of a negligence

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023           Page 5 of 23
               action must be supported by specific facts designated to the trial
               court or reasonable inferences that might be drawn from those
               facts.” Kincade v. MAC Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App.
               2002). “An inference is not reasonable when it rests on no more
               than speculation or conjecture.” Id. “A negligence action is
               generally not appropriate for disposal by summary judgment.” Id.
               “However, a defendant may obtain summary judgment in a
               negligence action when the undisputed facts negate at least one
               element of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id.

       Evansville Auto., LLC v. Labno-Fritchley, 207 N.E.3d 447, 454 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023), trans. denied. Simply put,

               “[g]enerally, it is the jury’s function to determine whether a
               defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about
               injury; when there might be a reasonable difference of opinion as
               to the foreseeability of a particular risk or the reasonableness with
               regard to it, the question is also one for the jury.” Harper v.
               Guarantee Auto Stores, 533 N.E.2d 1258, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App.
               1989), trans. denied. “Only in plain and indisputable cases, where
               only a single inference or conclusion can be drawn, are the
               questions of proximate cause and intervening cause matters of
               law to be determined by the court.” Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d
               736, 743 (Ind. 2004).

       Force v. New China Hy Buffet, LLC, ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 22A-CT-2759, 2023 WL

       6074318, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2023).

[11]   MMRF argues that the trial court erred when it denied its summary judgment

       motion “because (1) it permitted Hintz’s untimely responsive designation of

       evidence and (2) the properly designated evidence established as a matter of law

       that MMRF did not owe and did not breach any duty to Hintz thereby

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023          Page 6 of 23
       affirmatively negating essential elements.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. We address

       each contention in turn.

       Hintz’s Designation of Evidence

[12]   Hintz did not file any response to MMRF’s summary judgment motion.

       Instead, during the hearing on the motion, Hintz made argument based on

       MMRF’s designated pages of her deposition, which MMRF had designated as

       evidence in support of summary judgment. MMRF maintains that it did not

       designate the entire deposition, but only certain pages cited in its memorandum

       in support of summary judgment. But MMRF ignores its filing entitled

       “Designation of Evidence in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment,”

       which designated the entire deposition without any specific citations.

       Accordingly, Hintz was entitled to rely on that designated evidence in support

       of her argument in opposition to summary judgment.1 See, e.g., Countrymark

       Coop. Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 690 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding

       that party opposing summary judgment could rely on entire deposition where

       movant “designated the entire deposition and later in a different filing identified

       specific pages”), trans. denied.

       1
         In any event, as we address below, MMRF did not satisfy its burden on summary judgment to negate an
       element of Hintz’s negligence claim, and, while it was a risk for Hintz to assume as much, the burden never
       shifted to her to designate evidence in opposition to summary judgment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023                              Page 7 of 23
       Duty and Breach

[13]   MMRF also argues that it owed no duty of care to Hintz because Peacock was

       an independent contractor. In support, MMRF cites Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.

       Lohman, 661 N.E.2d 554, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), where we held in relevant

       part that,

               where the instrumentality causing the injury is in the control of
               the independent contractor, the complainant must show either
               that the landowner assumed control of the instrumentality or had
               superior knowledge of the potential dangers involved in its
               operation; otherwise, the landowner owes no duty to the contractor’s
               employee.

       (Emphasis added.) Further, “where an instrumentality causing injury was in the

       control of an independent contractor, a duty will not be found where there is no

       evidence that the landowner maintained any control over the ‘manner or

       means’ by which the contractor engaged in its work.” Id. at 557. MMRF

       contends that, because Peacock was an independent contractor and because

       MMRF had no control over the placement of the ultrasound machine or the

       cord, MMRF owed no duty to Hintz.

[14]   But Hintz asserts, and we must agree, that Bethlehem Steel is inapposite here.

       The question in Bethlehem Steel was whether a property owner had a duty to

       provide an independent contractor with a safe place to work, which is not at

       issue here. Id. at 556. As Hintz points out, she was an invitee of MMRF.

       “Under Indiana premises liability law, a landowner owes the highest duty to an

       invitee: the duty to exercise reasonable care for his protection while he is on the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023         Page 8 of 23
       landowner’s premises.” Converse v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., Inc., 120 N.E.3d 621, 625

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ind.

       1991)).

[15]   Further, our courts have adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343,

       which provides:

               A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
               to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

               (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover
               the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable
               risk of harm to such invitees, and

               (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
               or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

               (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
               danger.

[16]   MMRF additionally argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because

       the technician’s power cord was not an “unreasonably dangerous condition” as

       a matter of law. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 152. And it argued that, even if it

       were, MMRF “had no knowledge” of the cord and cannot be held liable. Id.

       We cannot agree.

[17]   In Roumbos v. Samuel G. Vazanellis & Thiros and Stracci, PC, a woman tripped

       over “at least three different wires or cords running along the floor” in a

       hospital room while visiting her husband, who was a patient there. 95 N.E.3d

       63, 68 (Ind. 2018). The plaintiff hired a lawyer, who did not timely file her

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023          Page 9 of 23
       complaint. She then sued her lawyer for legal malpractice. The trial court

       granted the lawyer’s summary judgment motion. On appeal, our Supreme

       Court reversed the trial court and held that the lawyer had “failed to establish,

       as a matter of law, that Plaintiff would not have succeeded in her premises-

       liability claim against the hospital.” Id. at 64. In particular, the Court concluded

       that, “[c]onstruing the designated facts most favorably to [the plaintiff] and

       drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, . . . a jury could reasonably find

       the wires were not obvious to the ordinary reasonable person in [plaintiff’s]

       position.” Id. at 68.

[18]   Likewise, here, the designated facts construed in favor of Hintz would support a

       jury’s determination that the power cord was not an obvious danger to a

       reasonable person in Hintz’s position. And whether MMRF knew or should

       have known that the mobile ultrasound machine’s power cord posed an

       unreasonable danger to invitees is a question of fact precluding summary

       judgment. MMRF’s assertion that it had “no knowledge” that the machine had

       to be plugged in is insufficient to negate the issue of whether it should have

       known about the danger posed by the power cord, and a reasonable fact-finder

       could readily conclude that MMRF should have known about the technician’s

       use of equipment. Indeed, MMRF was in charge of Betty’s care, and the

       ultrasound was ordered in the course of her care.

[19]   In sum, MMRF did not negate any of the elements of Hintz’s premises liability

       claim in its summary judgment motion. Accordingly, MMRF did not meet its

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023        Page 10 of 23
       burden under Trial Rule 56(C), and the trial court did not err when it denied its

       summary judgment motion.

       Issue Two: Motion in Limine

[20]   MMRF next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted

       Hintz’s motion in limine to preclude a nonparty defense, which morphed into

       an order precluding evidence that Peacock was an independent contractor. The

       grant or denial of a motion in limine is within the sound discretion of the trial

       court and is an adjunct of the power of trial courts to admit and exclude

       evidence. Terex-Telelect, Inc. v. Wade, 59 N.E.3d 298, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),

       trans. denied. Therefore, when reviewing a grant or denial of a motion in limine,

       we apply the standard of review for the admission of evidence, which is

       whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 302-03. We will find that a

       trial court has abused its discretion only when its decision is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 303.

[21]   Hintz’s motion in limine No. 18 sought to

               [b]ar[] any evidence that some unnamed, non-party is a
               proximate cause of [Hintz’s] injuries. [MMRF] has never named
               any non-party under Indiana Code [section] 34-51-2-15. A non-
               party defense is one that must be affirmatively pled and the
               burden is on [MMRF] to prove such a defense. Additionally,
               such a non-party defense must be made within 180 days prior
               to the expiration of the statute of limitations, which [MMRF]
               failed to do. Moreover, [MMRF has] not named a non-party in
               their pretrial contentions and therefore should not be allowed to
               make such arguments before a jury. I.C. § 34-51-2-15; See also

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023        Page 11 of 23
               Owens Corning v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 2001); and Cornell
               Harbison v. May, 546 N.E.2d 1186 (Ind. 1989).

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 204.

[22]   Initially, the parties agree that MMRF may not assert a nonparty defense. Thus,

       the trial court’s order with respect to that specific argument is affirmed.

[23]   However, the parties disagree as to whether MMRF should have been

       permitted to introduce evidence at trial that Peacock was an independent

       contractor. On that issue, Hintz argued to the trial court that Peacock’s status as

       an independent contractor was irrelevant to the issues at trial because he was an

       agent of MMRF, and the trial court agreed.

[24]   In support of that argument, Hintz relied on our Supreme Court’s opinion in

       Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999). Our Supreme Court

       has recently examined its holding in Sword and explained that:

               “[Vicarious liability] is a legal fiction by which a court can hold a
               party legally responsible for the negligence of another, not
               because the party did anything wrong but rather because of the
               party’s relationship with the wrongdoer.” Sword, 714 N.E.2d at
               147. Respondeat superior is the doctrine most often associated
               with vicarious liability in the tort context. It relies on an
               employer-employee or principal-agent relationship and generally
               does not apply to independent contractors. However, even absent
               an actual agency relationship, a principal may sometimes be
               vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of another under the
               doctrine of apparent agency. Id. Apparent agency may be
               established when a third party reasonably believes there is a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023         Page 12 of 23
        principal-agent relationship based on the principal’s
        manifestations to the third party. Id.

                                                  ***

        In Sword, a patient seeking medical attention for the birth of a
        child alleged that an independent contractor anesthesiologist
        working at a hospital committed malpractice while giving the
        patient an epidural. Id. at 145-46. Prior to Sword, Indiana courts
        followed the general rule that hospitals could not be held liable
        for the negligent actions of independent contractor physicians. Id.
        at 149. Courts also viewed respondeat superior as inapplicable to
        hospitals “because the hospitals could not legally assert any
        control over the physicians.” Id.; see also Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind.
        308, 316-18, 15 N.E.2d 365, 369-70 (1938). However, we
        acknowledged the “ongoing movement by courts to use apparent
        or ostensible agency as a means to hold hospitals vicariously
        liable for the negligence of some independent contractor
        physicians.” Sword, 714 N.E.2d at 150.

        Following this trend, Sword changed Indiana’s rule regarding a
        hospital’s prospective vicarious liability. Id. We expressly
        adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429 (1965),
        holding that a hospital may be found vicariously liable for the
        negligence of an independent contractor physician under the
        doctrine of apparent agency.[] Id. at 149. Section 429 provides:

                 One who employs an independent contractor to
                 perform services for another which are accepted in
                 the reasonable belief that the services are being
                 rendered by the employer or by his servants, is
                 subject to liability for physical harm caused by the
                 negligence of the contractor in supplying such
                 services, to the same extent as though the employer
                 were supplying them himself or by his servants.

        Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023          Page 13 of 23
               Under Sword’s Section 429 apparent agency analysis, courts look
               at two main factors: (1) the principal’s manifestations that an
               agency relationship exists and (2) the patient’s resulting reliance. Id.
               at 151. For the manifestations prong, courts see whether the
               hospital “acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable
               person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be
               negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital.” Id. (citing
               Kashishian v. Port, 167 Wis.2d 24, 481 N.W.2d 277, 284-85
               (1992)). For the reliance prong, courts see whether “the plaintiff
               acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
               consistent with ordinary care and prudence.” Id. (citing
               Kashishian, 481 N.W.2d at 285). . . .

       Arrendale v. Am. Imaging and MRI, LLC, 183 N.E.3d 1064, 1068-69 (Ind. 2022).

[25]   As MMRF argues, our courts have not applied the Sword apparent agency rule

       to a negligence claim brought by a plaintiff who was not a patient in a health

       care setting. Hintz provides no counterargument, but merely states, in a

       parenthetical and without citation to authority, that Sword “does not only apply

       to medical malpractice cases[.]” Appellee’s Br. at 39.

[26]   We are not persuaded by Hintz’s cursory position. As our Supreme Court has

       made clear, a plaintiff’s reliance on a hospital’s manifestations that an agency

       relationship exists between it and an independent contractor is an essential

       element of apparent agency. Arrendale, 183 N.E.3d at 1069. Here, Hintz did not

       argue to the trial court, and she does not argue on appeal, that she relied in any

       way on MMRF’s holding out Peacock as its agent. Indeed, whereas a patient

       relies on the expertise of a chosen hospital for her care, here, Hintz was a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023            Page 14 of 23
       visitor, and she has not asserted that she had any expectation that MMRF

       would do anything other than provide her with reasonably safe premises. In

       other words, whether Peacock was an MMRF employee or independent

       contractor is of no moment with respect to Hintz’s reliance on any

       representations MMRF may have made regarding Peacock’s employment

       status under the circumstances present here.

[27]   Accordingly, on this limited briefing, we are unable to say that Sword is

       applicable here. Thus, the trial court erred when it found that apparent agency

       principles applied. Because MMRF did not timely name a nonparty, it was

       appropriate to bar MMRF from naming Peacock’s employer. But, as MMRF

       demonstrates, the evidence that Peacock was an independent contractor should

       have been admissible at trial because it “was relevant to the elements of Hintz’s

       claim and whether she met her burden” to prove MMRF’s negligence.

       Appellant’s Br. at 41. In other words, Peacock’s status as an independent

       contractor was relevant because it went to the issue of vicarious liability. Of

       course, the issue remains whether MMRF was negligent in not taking

       precautions to make the premises safe for invitees, i.e., whether it knew or

       should have known that Peacock would leave a power cord in a walkway in a

       dimly-lit room and whether that posed a foreseeable danger to Hintz. See, e.g.,

       Roumbos, 95 N.E.3d at 68.

[28]   The trial court abused its discretion when it barred MMRF from introducing

       evidence that Peacock was an independent contractor. As we explain below,

       because the issue of apparent agency was central to Hintz’s argument at trial,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023       Page 15 of 23
       we reverse and remand for a new trial. If a new trial occurs, MMRF shall be

       permitted to introduce evidence that Peacock was an independent contractor,

       without naming his employer.

       Issue Three: Judgment on the Evidence

[29]   MMRF next contends that the trial court erred when it denied its motion for

       judgment on the evidence. As our Supreme Court has explained,

               [we review] a trial court’s [ruling on a motion for] judgment on
               the evidence by applying the same standard that the trial court
               uses, looking only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most
               favorable to the non-moving party. See Smith v. Baxter, 796
               N.E.2d 242, 243 (Ind. 2003); American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer,
               457 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ind. 1983). Thus, the Court turns to the
               text of Trial Rule 50, which provides the standard for judgment
               on the evidence.

               Trial Rule 50(A) states in relevant part: “Where all or some of
               the issues in a case tried before a jury . . . are not supported by
               sufficient evidence . . . the court shall withdraw such issues from the
               jury and enter judgment thereon . . . A party may move for such
               judgment on the evidence.” Ind. Trial Rule 50(A) (emphasis
               added). The purpose of a party’s motion for judgment on the
               evidence under Rule 50(A) is to test the sufficiency of the
               evidence presented by the non-movant. Nesvig v. Town of Porter,
               668 N.E.2d 1276, 1282-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

       Purcell v. Old Nat. Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. 2012).

[30]   Again, at trial, Hintz’s principal argument was that MMRF was liable for her

       injuries because Peacock was its apparent agent. MMRF argues that, because

       that theory does not apply here, the trial court abused its discretion when it

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023           Page 16 of 23
       denied its motion for judgment on the evidence. But Hintz also argued that

       MMRF was liable under a general premises liability theory as set out in Burrell

       v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991). In Burrell, our Supreme Court held that

       invitees “are entitled to a duty of reasonable care from landowners as that duty

       is defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343,” which, again, provides:

               A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
               to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

               (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover
               the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable
               risk of harm to such invitees, and

               (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
               or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

               (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
               danger.

       Id. at 640, 643.

[31]   On appeal, MMRF asserts in relevant part that it was entitled to judgment on

       the evidence because “Hintz failed to present evidence showing that MMRF

       had any actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition on its

       premises before she fell.” Appellant’s Br. at 51. In support, MMRF states that

       the

               only evidence Hintz presented during her case-in-chief was that
               nobody who was in the Room (Peacock, Betty, [her sister], the
               other patient, and the other visitor) between the time that
               Peacock entered the Room with the Machine until the time Hintz

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023          Page 17 of 23
                  fell, saw the power cord or had any reason to believe it was or
                  could have been a “dangerous condition” before the fall. All of
                  those people, in fact, did not see the cord on the floor before the
                  fall or did not know what caused the fall.

       Id. at 50.

[32]   However, “looking only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most

       favorable to [Hintz,]” as we are required to do, the evidence presented at trial

       supports reasonable inferences that MMRF knew or should have known that

       mobile ultrasound machines were used in hospital rooms (MMRF owned the

       machine Peacock used); that those machines have power cords that have to be

       plugged in; and that the lights in the room had to be dimmed in order for

       Peacock to see the screen. See Purcell, 972 N.E.2d at 839. That evidence is

       sufficient to support Hintz’s theory of liability under Burrell,2 and the trial court

       did not abuse its discretion when it denied MMRF’s motion for judgment on

       the evidence.

       Issue Four: Jury Instructions

[33]   Finally, MMRF contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it

       instructed the jury. When we review a trial court’s decision to give or refuse a

       tendered instruction, we consider whether: “1) the instruction correctly states

       the law; 2) the evidence in the record supports giving the instruction, and 3) the

       2
           Whether, on retrial, that theory would result in a verdict favorable to Hintz is, of course, an open question.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023                                   Page 18 of 23
       substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions.” Simmons v. Erie

       Ins. Exchange, 891 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Hoosier Ins.

       Co. v. N.S. Trucking Supplies, Inc., 684 N.E.2d 1164, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

       In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support an instruction, we

       will look only to that evidence most favorable to the appellee and any

       reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We review a trial court’s

       decision to give or refuse to give an instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id.

[34]   MMRF asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it gave final

       instructions 17 through 22, which were relevant to Hintz’s apparent agency

       theory of liability, and when it declined to give MMRF’s proffered final

       instructions 7 through 9 regarding the limitations on a landowner’s liability for

       an independent contractor’s negligence. We address each contention in turn.

       Instructions 17 through 22

[35]   The trial court gave the following final jury instructions:

               [No. 17:] A corporation acts through its agents. If, within the
               scope of its authority, a corporation’s agent wrongfully acts or
               fails to act, the corporation is liable for that action or inaction.

               [No. 18:] A principal is one who authorizes another to act on its
               behalf, subject to the principal’s control. The authorized person is
               called an agent.

               [No. 19:] A special agent is one authorized by a principal to
               perform one or more specific acts, either: (1) according to the
               principal’s specific instructions; or (2) within the limits implied
               by the authorized acts.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023             Page 19 of 23
               [No. 20:] An agent acts within the scope of its express authority
               when the agent handles business the principal has specifically
               authorized.

               [No. 21:] By giving the agent express authority, the principal also
               gives the agent implied authority to use the usual and reasonably
               necessary methods required to handle the principal’s business.

               [No. 22:] In addition to express and implied authority, an agent
               may also have apparent authority. “Apparent” means apparent
               to a third person, that is, someone other than the principal or the
               agent.

               An agent has apparent authority when the principal places the
               agent in a position to act on behalf of the principal, and a third
               person reasonably believes that the principal authorized the agent
               to act.

               If the third person reasonably relies on the agent’s apparent
               authority, the principal is liable to the third person, even if the
               agent exceeded the authority given to it by the principal.

               If however, the third person knows, or by using reasonable care
               should have known, that the exceeded its authority, the principal
               is not liable for the agent’s actions.

               Reasonable care means being careful and using good judgement
               and common sense.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, pp. 136-41.

[36]   Again, Hintz’s primary argument at trial was that MMRF was liable for her

       injuries because Peacock was its agent. As we explained above, Hintz’s reliance

       on that argument was misplaced. Further, as MMRF points out, the trial court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023            Page 20 of 23
       expressly found that, other than Peacock’s testimony during an offer of proof,

       there was “no evidence of agency” to support final instructions Nos. 17 through

       22. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 182. And the trial court found that the offer of proof was

       sufficient to support the instructions. But testimony in an offer of proof is not

       evidence. See Bradford v. State, 675 N.E.2d 296, 302 (Ind. 1996) (stating that an

       “offer of proof is part of the record only insofar as the defendant chooses to

       challenge the trial court’s exclusion” and will not be considered “for any other

       purpose”). Thus, these instructions were not supported by the evidence, and the

       trial court abused its discretion when it gave these instructions.

[37]   Apparent agency was Hintz’s primary, but not sole, argument at trial. Because

       these instructions were erroneous, it is probable that the jury based its verdict

       on apparent agency. Under these circumstances, we reverse the trial court’s

       judgment for Hintz and remand for a new trial.

       Proffered Final Instructions 6 through 8

[38]   MMRF proffered three instructions regarding a landowner’s liability for an

       independent contractor’s negligence, which the trial court declined to give. But

       MMRF’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court “abused its discretion

       when it did not provide MMRF’s proposed independent contractor instructions

       based on the same offer of proof testimony on which Final Instructions 17 to 22

       were based. The provision of such instructions would have fully instructed the

       jury on the parties’ respective theories.” Appellant’s Br. at 53. Because we hold

       that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on the offer of proof to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023         Page 21 of 23
       support Instructions 17 through 22, MMRF’s argument in support of its

       proffered instructions must fail.

       Conclusion

[39]   The trial court did not err when it denied MMRF’s motion for summary

       judgment. However, the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded

       MMRF from presenting evidence that Peacock was an independent contractor

       and when it instructed the jury on agency. Because Hintz’s primary argument at

       trial was based on the apparent agency doctrine, there is a reasonable

       probability that the jury relied on that theory when it entered its verdict for

       Hintz, and reversal of the judgment for Hintz is warranted. However, Hintz

       also argued that MMRF was liable under a premises liability theory, and the

       jury was instructed to consider the Burrell elements.3 Accordingly, on remand,

       the trial court shall conduct a new trial consistent with this opinion.

       3
           In her closing argument, Hintz argued in relevant part as follows:

                  So the issue really comes down to what's the liability here? Well, you're going to get jury
                  instructions. And the first jury instruction, this is going to be jury instruction number 13,
                  and it talks about the obligations of a property owner to an invitee. And there’s no
                  dispute here that Patricia was an invitee invited onto the property to remain to visit her
                  mother. So, here, we have that they knew that the condition existed or realized it created
                  an unreasonable danger to an invitee, or should have discovered the condition as a
                  danger. Number two, should have expected the invitee would not discover and realize the
                  danger of the condition, that's where we got the room, dim lit lights, the curtains pulled;
                  or would fail to protect herself against it. That’s what we have in this instance. They
                  failed to use reasonable care to protect someone like Patricia, which is simply making
                  sure that the plug is not in a tight room in an area where someone is going to trip over
                  that.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-485 | October 3, 2023                                   Page 22 of 23
[40]   Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

       Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       Tr. Vol. 2, p. 196.

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