Court Opinion

ID: 9705380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:04:48.62951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.647746
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD and STEIN, JJ.,
dissenting in part.
Only from so much of the Court’s perspicuous opinion as addresses the merger issue do we part company with our colleagues. We agree with Judge Brochin, dissenting below, who recognized that the State had produced evidence to support the possession charge that was independent of the evidence that supported the murder charge — that is, the State’s evidence showed that defendant had used the gun to threaten someone other than the murder victim. Judge Brochin also was persuaded that that evidence was sufficient to prevent merger if the trial court had instructed the jury differently. The narrow *247issue that divided the Appellate Division was whether the jury instructions in this case require that defendant’s convictions merge.
The dissenter below argued that in light of the jury instructions, the jury had no opportunity to reveal by its verdict whether the jury had based both convictions on the same act, namely, shooting the victim. Accordingly, “the defendant is entitled to have us treat the verdict as a finding that his unlawful purpose for possessing the firearm was to kill Meredith. Consequently, his conviction[s] * * * must merge * * Quoting State v. Williams, 213 N.J.Super. 30, 36-37, 516 A.2d 265 (App.Div.1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 104, 526 A.2d 177 (1987), Judge Brochin further stated that “ ‘in order to prevent merger, a judge should ask the jury to determine by separate verdicts whether the possession was solely with the specific unlawful purpose to use the weapon against the victim of the greater offense or with a broader unlawful purpose.’ ”
The majority below concluded that the convictions do not merge because the jury might have based each conviction on a different transaction or on different evidence. In effect, the majority endorsed a presumption in favor of the State: that the jury had based both convictions on separate wrongdoings.
The reported decisions that have considered whether to merge two convictions in the face of an ambiguous jury verdict are in tension. For example, in State v. Johnson, 203 N.J.Super. 127, 495 A.2d 1367 (App.Div.1985), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 312, 508 A.2d 195 (1986), the court considered whether to merge the defendant’s convictions for aggravated manslaughter and possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose. The defendant in that case — as here — claimed that because both offenses had arisen out of the same transaction, the convictions should merge. The Appellate Division disagreed, noting that “there was evidence that defendant had the gun before he encountered the victim, not for the purpose of shooting the victim but for the purpose of threatening another individual * * Id. at *248136, 495 A 2d 1367. Because the evidence would support the conclusion that the two crimes were distinct, the convictions did not merge.
The opinion in Johnson does not recite the jury instructions. Thus, whether the jury verdict in that case would also have permitted the conclusion that the jury had based both convictions on the same act is unclear. But because the trial court stated that “there was evidence” to show that the defendant had the gun to shoot someone other than the victim, rather than “the jury found,” we assume that both conclusions were plausible.
The approach taken in Johnson finds support in cases decided by this Court. For example, in State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 120, 527 A.2d 1362 (1987), we stated, “The record does not disclose what specific conduct formed the basis of the jury verdicts, but there was ample evidence to support both convictions based on different proofs.” See also State v. Buonandonna, 122 N.J. 22, 50, 583 A.2d 747 (1991) (“[W]e find that the State proffered sufficient evidence for each offense and that the convictions address separate injuries. * * * [Tjherefore * * * non-merger was proper.”); State v. Cole, 120 N.J. 321, 334, 576 A.2d 864 (1990) (“Here there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated sexual assault, on proofs separate and distinct from the proofs necessary for the [other convictions].”).
On the other hand, in Williams, supra, 213 N.J.Super. 30, 516 A2d 265, the case relied on by Judge Brochin, the court considered whether the defendant’s convictions for aggravated manslaughter and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose should merge. As here, the State’s evidence would have supported the conclusion that the defendant had possessed the weapon for a purpose unrelated to that of killing the victim. Nevertheless, the court held that the convictions merged.
When instructing the jury, the trial court in Williams had defined the possession crime as “possession of a firearm * * * *249to use it unlawfully against the person of [the victim].” Id. at 36, 516 A.2d 265. The jury thus had “no opportunity to find” that the defendant had possessed the firearm “with an unlawful purpose broader than that of using it against [the victim].” Id. at 36-37, 516 A. 2d 265. Accordingly, the court merged the convictions. The Williams court then concluded that to prevent merger, courts should ask juries to determine by separate verdicts whether the possession was solely with the specific unlawful purpose to use the weapon against the victim. Id. at 37, 516 A. 2d 265. Without such a verdict, the Williams court implied, a court must merge a defendant’s convictions when the jury might have relied on the same transaction for each conviction.
In State v. Land, 73 N.J. 24, 372 A.2d 297 (1977), this Court endorsed an approach much like that in Williams. We indicated that convictions should merge when the jury verdict does not reveal whether the jury relied on the same evidence or conduct as the basis for both convictions. In Land, one of the defendants was convicted of possession of marijuana and cocaine, and of possession of those substances with intent to distribute. Because that defendant’s attorney had a conflict of interest, we reversed the convictions. Nevertheless, because the issue was likely to arise on remand, we considered whether that defendant’s convictions for possession and possession with intent to distribute should merge.
In the defendant’s home the police had found cocaine in two places. We stated: “[I]n addition to the cocaine found in the metal box, foil packets of small quantities were also located in the dresser drawer so that an inference could be drawn that these were possessed for personal use as distinguished from the bulk cocaine which the jury apparently concluded was to be distributed.” Id. at 36, 372 A.2d 297. Based on that evidence the jury might have found facts sufficient to prevent merger, but that “was not clear from the jury’s verdict of guilt.” Ibid. We concluded that on remand, “the State should specify, with particularity, the substances upon which it seeks a conviction *250for possession and for possession with intent to distribute. * * * The trial judge should charge the jury on what specific substances [its] findings of possession and possession with intent to distribute may be predicated.” Ibid. Thus, we recognized the unfairness of presuming that the jury relied on different facts as the basis for each conviction.
To presume that the jury found that this defendant had engaged in two wrongdoings rather than one is unfair, tantamount to presuming defendant guilty of a second crime. In the absence of a jury verdict indicating whether the same act formed the basis for each conviction, we would indulge the presumption that defendant is guilty of one wrongdoing. See Williams, supra, 213 NJ.Super. 30, 516 A. 2d 265. Thus, if defendant is again convicted for the homicide, his possession conviction should merge.
For affirmance in part; reversal in part; and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
CLIFFORD and STEIN, JJ., dissenting in part.