Court Opinion

ID: 9768275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:53:56.727557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:39.030930
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The testimony given by the child’s grandmother regarding statements made by the child incriminating the appellant as the person causing her injuries, are arguably admissible. Therefore, the decision of the trial court to admit them should be sustained.
These statements were made a number of hours following the occurrence, and in response to inquiry, both circumstances mitigating against admissibility. However, there is evidence of record from which it can be inferred that the child was still suffering from her injuries and in a state of emotional upset at the time that her *736grandmother talked to her. This, coupled with the child’s youth and the relationship of trust that existed between the child and her grandmother, and the fact that the manner of inquiry was to press for the truth rather than to push the child to incriminate the appellant, are all circumstances bearing on whether this evidence was admissible under the spontaneous statements exception to the hearsay rule. The circumstances of the grandmother’s inquiry is in sharp contrast with those involved in the subsequent investigation by the social worker.
Had the trial court ruled inadmissible the grandmother’s testimony about the statements the child made incriminating the appellant, I would affirm. However, this testimony falls close enough to the relevant factors permitting a hearsay exception in these circumstances so that I would defer to the trial court’s judgment that the statements were admissible.
GANT, J., joins in this dissent.