Court Opinion

ID: 9952939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 23:01:50.814788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:33.977659
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Stewart CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H051171
                                                                    (Santa Cruz County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Super. Ct. No. 23CR01912)

           v.

 STEPHEN STEWART,

           Defendant and Appellant.

                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
         We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of
Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.)
         After defendant Stephen Stewart admitted a probation violation, the trial court
added a new condition: “Don’t bother anybody.” Stewart argues that this condition is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and the Attorney General concedes that the
condition is unconstitutionally vague. We accept the concession.
         On May 4, 2023, Stewart was charged with vandalizing a window in the house of
his mother and stepfather. The complaint also alleged that Stewart was released on bail
at the time of the incident. On May 12, 2023, pursuant to a plea agreement, Stewart
pleaded no contest to the vandalism charge as well as to violating a protective order in a

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misdemeanor case, and the allegation that he was on bail at the time was dismissed. The
trial court then suspended imposition of the sentence for vandalism and placed Stewart on
formal probation for two years.
       Less than two weeks later, Stewart was back in court for disturbing the peace near
a middle school. Stewart admitted that he had violated the conditions initially placed on
his probation, and after a discussion of his mental health issues, the trial court reinstated
probation, adding the conditions that Stewart take all medication prescribed for him and
that he stay away from the middle school. The prosecutor then requested that Stewart
“not yell and scream and/or disturb the peace of any workers” at the school. Stewart’s
counsel objected that this condition was overly broad because Stewart would not know
who worked at the school. The trial court responded that “[h]e’s not to bother anybody.
Don’t bother anybody. That’s my order.” Stewart objected that this requirement was
overbroad, but the condition “[d]on’t bother anybody” was included in the probation
order. Stewart filed a timely noticed of appeal.
       In this court, Stewart argues that the condition “[d]on’t bother anybody” is
unconstitutionally vague as well as overbroad. The Attorney General concedes that the
condition is unconstitutionally vague because it neither explains what constitutes
“bothering” others nor defines a particular group of persons that Stewart may not bother.
We agree and therefore accept the Attorney General’s concession.
       As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]o withstand a constitutional challenge
on grounds of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the
probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine
whether the probationer has violated the condition.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th
494, 500; see also In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).) The purpose
of the vagueness requirement is to ensure “fair warning,” which “ ‘prevent[s] arbitrary
law enforcement’ ” as well as “ ‘providing adequate notice to potential offenders.’ ”
(Sheena K., at p. 890.)
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       The condition “[d]on’t bother anybody” is not sufficiently definite to inform
Stewart what conduct the condition on his probation prohibits. In Coates v. City of
Cincinnati (1971) 402 U.S. 611 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutionally
vague an ordinance that prohibited three or more individuals from conducting themselves
in a manner “annoying to persons passing by.” “Conduct that annoys some people,” the
Supreme Court reasoned, “does not annoy others,” and therefore “ ‘men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at [the ordinance’s] meaning.’ ” (Id. at p. 614.) The
same is true of the probation condition here. The word “bother” is even broader than
“annoy.” (Compare Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 87, col. 3 [defining
“annoy” to mean “to irritate with a nettling or exasperating effect” or “to harass”] with
id., p. 258, col. 2 [defining “bother” to mean “to put into a state of agitation” or “a
flutter” or “to annoy, anger, or upset”].) Consequently, just as conduct that annoys some
people may not annoy others, conduct that bothers some people may not bother others.
In addition, because Stewart’s probation condition prohibits him from bothering
“anybody,” the condition cannot be saved by implying into it a requirement that a
reasonable person would be bothered. (Compare People v. Ewing (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
199, 208.) As a consequence, the “[d]on’t bother anybody” condition leaves Stewart no
way of knowing when his conduct may violate the condition by bothering a particularly
sensitive individual, and nothing prevents a law enforcement officer or judge from
deciding in an unpredictable and arbitrary fashion that some relatively ordinary and
innocuous conduct violates the condition. We therefore conclude that the condition is
unconstitutionally vague.
                                        DISPOSITION
       The May 25, 2023 probation order is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the
trial court to strike or modify the probation conditions consistent with this opinion.

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                                       ____________________________
                                       BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.

____________________________________
DANNER, J.

People v. Stewart
H051171

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