Court Opinion

ID: 9644772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:04:39.6838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:18.157698
License: Public Domain

Weintraub, C. J.
(dissenting). The factual thesis against Waldor was that he, turning left into Elizabeth Avenue, crossed the path of Stanley’s car. In the parlance of the road, it was claimed that Waldor “cut off” Stanley. There was ample evidence to support that theme.
Waldor admitted a left turn and said the cars came within some two feet of each other. Paint found on the Waldor car was identified with the Stanley vehicle, thus indicating actual contact. Waldor said he stopped immediately, drove one block to a store to telephone the police, parking the car around the corner, and then returned to the scene on foot. He talked with policemen who had arrived by car. He then went to the Beth Israel Hospital, his intended destination. Some 15 or 20 minutes after the accident the police informed him at the hospital that a baby had been killed in the accident. According to Waldor, he insisted his car be inspected at once and it was.
*509Plaintiffs on their case called both defendants. Counsel for Stanley, cross-examining Waldor, sought to elicit the fact that upon returning to the scene after making the telephone call, Waldor heard some one say a green car (Waldor’s car was green) had cut off the Stanley car. On pretrial examination Waldor had volunteered that he heard the remark.
Waldor denied any involvement and yet admitted that on his own he spoke to the police and later asked them to inspect his ear. In these circumstances it was appropriate to explore his motivation. Indeed, one would expect Waldor himself to offer an explanation to avoid an inference that he was conscious of culpability. Later in the case, when called as a witness in his own behalf, Waldor did undertake to explain in terms of some statement he heard at the scene that suggested he might have been at fault. It may well be that the cross-examination in question was proper to explore a possible consciousness of responsibility. It, however, was not pressed on that basis, and for present purposes I will assume it could not have been.
The cross-examination was conducted on the thesis that Waldor failed to deny a statement importing that he had cut off Stanley and hence an admission to that effect should be inferred. I agree he was under no duty to speak in response to a statement made by some unknown person and not addressed accusingly at him. Moreover, Waldor did deny involvement to the police, a fact which adequately dispelled acquiescence by silence. Nonetheless, I find no basis for disturbing the judgments entered in the trial court.
The testimony sought to be elicited did not come in. Nor did the suggestion of a cut-off introduce something foreign to the case; it was already in the record through other witnesses. It seems most unlikely that the jury would have given additional weight to the rumor, even if it disregarded the trial court's ruling, since the rumor would readily be attributable to one of the witnesses who appeared at the trial. Moreover, Waldor later testified substantially *510to the same rumor. Immediately after the motion for mistrial was denied, Waldor testified without objection that he told the police that “I understand that somebody claims it is a hit and run driver, green car,” and that “I can’t understand that they referred to me or is it some other car, but I thought I would call it to your attention.” Later, testifying in his own behalf, he said on direct that “due to the fact that I heard different rumors at the scene of the accident I insisted of them to look at my car at that moment.” Asked on cross-examination to state the “rumors,” he answered, “I heard someone say hit and run driver.” The latter answer was received over objection, and I think permissibly so on the issue of credibility, even though Waldor might have been entitled to an instruction that the content of the rumor was not evidential against him. In any event, the answer merely repeated what Waldor had already said. Thus, the fact that some unidentified person at the scene inculpated another driver, who could only be Waldor, otherwise come into the case. The sole difference between the testimony admitted and the testimony excluded was the reference in the latter to the subject of a cut-off. The difference is not significant, because under the facts upon which both Waldor and Stanley agreed, Waldor’s involvement could only be in terms of impeding the movement of the Stanley car, and hence, whether it be called “hit and run” or “cut off,” the implication would be essentially the same. I cannot find any harm in the fruitless effort of counsel to elicit what later did come into the case.
It should be stressed that the issue is not whether improper testimony was admitted with prejudicial effect; the objection was sustained. Bather, the question is whether the trial court misused its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial based upon an effort to adduce testimony. The trial consumed some five or six days. The trial judge had the feel of the case. He was best situated to determine the impact of the incident. An appellate court should not lightly quarrel with an exercise of discretion in such circumstances.
*511The Appellate Division commented that there was “no justification for trial counsel deliberately blurting out the damaging question after the court had sustained objection to the line of examination five times and counsel had been heard in defense of the proposed interrogation and his contention overruled.” If counsel deliberately pursues an improper course, it may become difficult for him to deny he achieved the unfair advantage he sought. But the thought is here inappropriate.
The difficulty arose from a failure of communication. Counsel for Waldor objected without specifying his grounds. Counsel for Stanley said he thought “it is material,” to which the trial court replied, “I don’t think a foundation has been laid.” Later counsel for Stanley stated his thesis that a person “by his silence” may be deemed to subscribe to an unfavorable statement, to which the trial court again said, “You haven’t laid a foundation to support that at all.” Counsel thought the court meant he had not proved that Waldor heard the statement, although in fact Waldor had already testified that he had. Counsel was pressing to show that Waldor heard the remark when the motion for a mistrial was made. In the argument which followed, counsel for Stanley explained what he understood the court meant by lack of foundation. The record then reads:
“The Court: I am frank to say that I haven’t understood that this witness heard the statement.
Mr. Harkavy: It is in the record. I asked him if he was close enough to hear it. He said yes.
The Court: I said the foundation wasn’t laid. When I said the foundation wasn’t laid for competency, I have in mind my recollection of the testimony that somebody simply in the crowd made a statement.
Mr. Harkavy: One of the first questions I asked was whether he heard it said and he said yes. I think there is another time when he said he was close enough and he said one person said it.
The Court: My impression was that you were addressing a question to him which was founded on something that someone else said. * * *”
*512After a recess, the court denied the motion but reaffirmed its ruling:
“Mr. Harkavy: Before the jury comes in, sir, in only the utmost desire to facilitate the situation, may I ask your Honor’s reason?
The Court: It is not competent.
Mr. Harkavy: May I ask if your Honor feels that I haven’t
laid a foundation?
The Court: Xou haven’t laid a sufficient foundation to make it competent.
Mr. Harkavy: Is that in line with what you said earlier that you didn’t recall any evidence?
The Court: Xes, in addition I notice that the person who made the statement, the purported statement, has not been identified who would know the fact with the result that this defendant would be called upon to respond to the statement.”
I find no basis for suggesting that counsel acted other than in good faith, seeking to meet what he thought was the basis for the ruling.
I am convinced that this incident, of a minor, run-of-the-mill character, has been isolated and magnified by the special attention accorded it on appeal.
I would affirm the judgments as entered in the trial court. Hence I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division in the case of the Greenbergs against Waldor and would reverse it in the case of Stanley against Waldor.
Jacobs, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
For reversal in part and affirmance in part — Justices Buklihg, EeajStcis, Peoctoe and Hall — 4.
For affirmance in part and reversal in part — Chief Justice Weintraub and Justice Jacobs — 2.