Court Opinion

ID: 9430185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:08.95251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:23.537065
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, concurring in the judgment.
Our cases of both recent and ancient vintage have struggled to pierce through the language of Art. Ill of the Constitution to the full meaning of the deceptively simple requirement that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Art. Ill, § 1. We know that those who framed our Constitution feared the tyranny of “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,” The Federalist No. 47, p. 300 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison), and sought to guard against it by dispersing federal power to three interdependent branches of Govérnment. Each branch of Government was intended to exercise a distinct but limited power and function as a check on any aggrandizing tendencies in the other branches. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam). The salary and tenure guarantees of Art. Ill — reflecting Hamilton’s observation that “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts *595to a power over his will,” The Federalist No. 79, p. 491 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) — were thought essential to the Judiciary’s ability to function effectively as a check on Congress and the Executive. It is thus clear that when Congress establishes courts pursuant to Art. Ill the judges presiding in those courts must receive salary and tenure guarantees. The difficult question is to what extent the need to preserve the Judiciary’s checking function requires Congress to assign the Federal Government’s decisionmaking authority to independent tribunals so constituted.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982), is the Court’s most recent attempt at defining the limits Art. Ill places on the power of Congress to assign adjudicative authority to decisionmakers not protected by tenure and salary guarantees. We faced the question whether, under the federal Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549, a federal bankruptcy court whose decisionmaker did not benefit from those guarantees could be empowered to render the entire initial adjudication of a state common-law cause of action. The issue was, in other words, whether Art. Ill permitted assignment of any essential attributes of the “judicial Power” to a non-Art. Ill federal decisionmaker when state law prescribed the rule of decision in a dispute between private parties. The Court invalidated the congressional action but a majority did not agree upon a common rationale. The plurality would have held that this allocation of decisional authority could not be justified as a proper exercise of either the congressional power to create Art. I legislative courts or the congressional power to create adjuncts to Art. Ill courts. 458 U. S., at 63-87. Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice O’Connor, would simply have held that Congress may not assign the power to adjudicate a traditional state common-law action to a non-Art. Ill tribunal even given the “traditional appellate review” by an Art. Ill court afforded under the challenged bankruptcy statute. Id., at 90-91.
*596Because the appellees in Northern Pipeline had argued that bankruptcy court jurisdiction over state-law contract claims could be justified as an exercise of Congress’ Art. I power to create legislative courts, the plurality examined the basis and scope of that congressional power as it has been explicated in our precedents. The plurality concluded that notwithstanding the commands of Art. Ill Congress could create such legislative courts for three categories of cases: territorial courts, courts-martial, and courts that adjudicate public rights disputes. The only serious question in Northern Pipeline was whether the disputed bankruptcy court jurisdiction fell into the third category.
The plurality opinion concluded that public rights cases, as that concept had come to be understood, involved disputes arising from the Federal Government’s administration of its laws or programs.1 458 U. S., at 68-69. The plurality *597expressly disclaimed any intention to provide a generally applicable definition of “public rights” but Concluded that at a minimum public rights disputes must arise “‘between the Government and others.’” Id., at 69, quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 458 (1929). The dispute at issue in Northern Pipeline was found by the plurality not to fall into the public rights category because state law created the right and provided the rule of decision as between the private parties litigating the dispute, irrespective of the existence of the federal bankruptcy scheme. 458 U. S., at 72, n. 26 (“Even in the absence of the federal scheme, the plaintiff would be able to proceed against the defendant on the state-law contractual claims”). In no sense could the dispute be said to be about the propriety or accuracy of a determination made by an organ of the Federal Government in administration or execution of a federal regulatory scheme. Whatever the precise scope of the public rights doctrine, that case was clearly outside it and therefore adjudication before an Art. Ill decisionmaker or properly constituted adjunct was required.2 Because the challenged bankruptcy jurisdiction could not be sustained on the alternative rationale that it was a proper adjunct to an Art. Ill court, id., at 77-86 (plurality opinion); id., at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment), the statute embodying the jurisdictional grant was declared unconstitutional.
*598Analysis of the present case properly begins with the recognition that it differs substantially from the issue in Northern Pipeline. The present case arises entirely within the regulatory confines of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U. S. C. § 136 et seq. This federal statute prescribes both the terms of compensation and the procedures for arriving at the proper amount of compensation in any given case. See 7 U. S. C. § 136a(c) (l)(D)(ii) (providing for negotiation followed by binding arbitration to set amounts “follow-on” registrants must pay in compensation for use of test data). Thus the question for decision here is whether fixing the amount of compensation for test data under FIFRA can be characterized as a public rights dispute that need not be adjudicated from the outset in an Art. Ill court or a properly constituted adjunct to such a court.3 Should it be concluded that this is such a dispute, the further issue must be confronted of whether some form of appellate oversight by an Art. Ill court is nonetheless required, see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442, 455, n. 13 (1977), and, if so, whether this statute’s provision of review only for “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct” suffices. 7 U. S. C. § 136a(c)(l)(D)(ii).
I agree with the Court that the determinative factor with respect to the proper characterization of the nature of the dispute in this case should not be the presence or absence of the Government as a party. See ante, at 586. Despite the Court’s contrary suggestions, the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline suggests neither that “the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of record” nor that “Article III has no force simply because a dispute is between the Government and an individual.” *599Ante, at 586. Properly understood, the analysis elaborated by the plurality in Northern Pipeline does not place the Federal Government in an Art. Ill straitjacket whenever a dispute technically is one between private parties. We recognized that a bankruptcy adjudication, though technically a dispute among private parties, may well be properly characterized as a matter of public rights. 458 U. S., at 50. The plurality opinion’s reaffirmation of the constitutionality of the administrative scheme at issue in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932), similarly suggests that a proper interpretation of Art. Ill affords the Federal Government substantial flexibility to rely on administrative tribunals. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 69, n. 22, 78-80. The plurality opinion should not be read to imply that reliance on administrative agencies for ratemaking or other forms of regulatory adjustments of private interests is necessarily suspect. Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 191 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Nor does the approach of the Northern Pipeline plurality opinion permit Congress to sap the Judiciary of all its checking power whenever the Government is a party. The opinion made clear that “the presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is . . . not [a] sufficient means of distinguishing ‘private rights’ from ‘public rights.’” 458 U. S., at 69, n. 23. At a minimum, Art. Ill must bar Congress from assigning to an Art. I decisionmaker the ultimate disposition of challenges to the constitutionality of Government action, either legislative or executive. Cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U. S. 667, 708-712 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Also, the plurality opinion was careful to leave open the question whether and to what extent even the resolution of public rights disputes might require some eventual review in an Art. Ill court in the exercise of its responsibility to check an impermissible accumulation of power in the other branches of Government. 458 U. S., at 70, n. 23; see also id., at 115 (White, J., dissenting) (“[A] scheme of *600Art. I courts that provides for appellate review by Art. Ill courts should be substantially less controversial than a legislative attempt entirely to avoid judicial review in a constitutional court”); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, supra, at 455, n. 13. Because the approach of the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the demands of contemporary Government while preserving the constitutional system of checks and balances, I adhere to it as the proper analysis for resolving the present case.
Though the issue before us in this, case is not free of doubt, in my judgment the FIFRA compensation scheme challenged in this case should be viewed as involving a matter of public rights as that term is understood in the line of cases culminating in Northern Pipeline. In one sense the question of proper compensation for a follow-on registrant’s use of test data is, under the FIFRA scheme, a dispute about “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,” Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 51 (defining matters of private right). But the dispute arises in the context of a federal regulatory scheme that virtually occupies the field. Congress has decided that effectuation of the public policies of FIFRA demands not only a requirement of compensation from “follow-on” registrants in return for mandatory access to data but also an administrative process — mandatory negotiation followed by binding arbitration — to ensure that unresolved compensation disputes do not delay public distribution of needed products. This case, in other words, involves not only the congressional prescription of a federal rule of decision to govern a private dispute but also the active participation of a federal regulatory agency in resolving the dispute. Although a compensation dispute under FIFRA ultimately involves a determination of the duty owed one private party by another, at its heart the dispute involves the exercise of authority by a Federal Government arbitrator in the course of administration of FIFRA’s comprehensive regulatory *601scheme. As such it partakes of the characteristics of a standard agency adjudication. Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, supra, at 191 (Brennan, J., dissenting).4
Given that this dispute is properly understood as one involving a matter in which Congress has substantial latitude to make use of Art. I decisionmakers, the question remains whether the Constitution nevertheless imposes some requirement of Art. Ill supervision of the arbitrator’s decisions under this scheme. In this case Congress has provided for review of arbitrators’ decisions to ensure against “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” The Court therefore need not reach the difficult question whether Congress is always free to cut off all judicial review of decisions respecting such exercises of Art. I authority.
The review prescribed under FIFRA encompasses the authority to invalidate an arbitrator’s decision when that decision exceeds the arbitrator’s authority or exhibits a manifest disregard for the governing law. See Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 597 (1960); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 436-437 (1953). Such review preserves the judicial authority over questions of law in the present context. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 54. In essence, the FIFRA scheme delegates a significant case-*602by-case lawmaking function to the arbitrator in compensation disputes. So long as this delegation is constitutionally permissible — an issue left open on remand — and judicial review to ensure that the arbitrator’s exercise of authority in any given case does not depart from the mandate of the delegation, the Judiciary will exercise a restraining authority sufficient to meet whatever requirements Art. Ill might impose in the present context.5
For these reasons, I agree with the Court that the FIFRA arbitration scheme does not violate the mandates of Art. Ill, and I would therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.

 In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438 (1929), public rights disputes were described as those “which may be . . . committed exclusively to executive officers.” Id., at 458. In this regard it is worth noting that early eases recognizing a public rights doctrine typically involved either challenges to Government action affecting private interests in which at the time no constitutional claim of entitlement was recognized, e. g., United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328, 331 (1919); Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (1840), or challenges by one private party seeking exercise of the Federal Government’s enforcement authority against another private party not before the court, e. g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra. The original theory would seem to have been that because Congress had absolute power to dispose of such issues as it saw fit without resort to the Judiciary, it could assign decisionmaking authority to Art. I courts.
The underpinnings of the original theory, of course, have not survived intact. We now recognize an entitlement in certain forms of government assistance. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). And we have recently made clear that government is not free to dispose of individual claims of entitlement in any manner it deems fit. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532 (1985). Also, such reasoning is not consistent with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). The erosion of these underpinnings does not, however, mandate the conclusion that disputes arising in the administration of federal regulatory programs may not be resolved *597through Art. I adjudication. The term “public rights” as now understood encompasses those “matters arising between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,” Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 67-68, that need not be fully adjudicated in an Art. Ill forum or a properly constituted adjunct to such a forum.

 “What clearly remains subject to Art. Ill are all private adjudications in federal courts within the States — matters from their nature subject to a ‘suit at common law or in equity or admiralty.’. . . There is no doubt that when the Framers assigned the ‘judicial Power’ to an independent Art. Ill Branch, these matters lay at what they perceived to be the protected core of that power.” Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., supra, at 70-71, n. 25.

 As the Court correctly concludes, there is no tenable argument that ap-pellees in this case will be forced to undergo an Art. I adjudication of a state-law claim that arises between private parties, as was the case in Northern Pipeline. See ante, at 584-585.

 Although the essential function of the Judiciary is to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), the exercise of this power with respect to the interpretation of federal statutory law may not be the power that constrains the actions of the Legislative Branch. Congress is always free to reject this Court’s interpretation of a federal statute by passing a new law. It may rather be that the exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review to ensure constitutionality is what restrains the exercise of legislative power. The power to interpret federal statutory law could be seen as acting as a check on the exercise of the executive power — or the power of administrative agencies whether or not they are considered as under the head of executive authority — given that what courts do when they review agency action, both rulemaking and adjudication, is ensure that the reviewed action has not departed from congressional intent.

 It is also important to note that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes, as the Court correctly notes, independent constraints on the ability of Congress to establish particular forums for dispute resolution under Art. I. See ante, at 592. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S., at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).