Court Opinion

ID: 9380148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 14:05:38.494954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.872272
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Dunbar v. Beacom, 2023-Ohio-857.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      MIAMI COUNTY

 ERICA DUNBAR                                      :
                                                   :
       Appellant                                   :   C.A. No. 2022-CA-19
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 22 CV 90
                                                   :
 JOE BEACOM, ET AL.                                :   (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellees                                   :
                                                   :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                    Rendered on March 17, 2023

                                              ...........

JANE M. LYNCH & JARED A. WAGNER, Attorneys for Appellees

MICHAEL L. WRIGHT & ROBERT L. GRESHAM, Attorneys for Appellant

                                             .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant Erica Dunbar appeals from the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Joe Beacom. For the following reasons, we

reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.
                                                                                          -2-

   I.      Facts and Course of Proceedings

        {¶ 2} At around 7:00 a.m. on the morning of November 1, 2018, Beacom was

driving north on Nashville Road on his way home from working the third shift at a

distribution warehouse in Tipp City. At that same time, Dunbar was attempting to place

her two trash bins just off Nashville Road in front of the house in which she lived at 1865

Nashville Road.     The weather conditions were rainy, and it was dark outside.

Ultimately, Beacom hit Dunbar with his vehicle, resulting in Dunbar’s being thrown and

left unconscious in her driveway. Beacom waited by Dunbar until Dunbar’s mother called

for emergency assistance.      Beacom suffered numerous injuries from the collision,

including two broken hips, a shattered pelvis, injuries to the right side of her butt, and a

gash on her head.

        {¶ 3} On February 20, 2020, Dunbar commenced an action against Beacom in the

Common Pleas Court of Miami County, alleging that Beacom had negligently failed to

maintain an assured clear distance ahead and had engaged in distracted driving by using

a handheld cellphone while driving.      Dunbar was deposed on December 4, 2020.

Dunbar testified that, on the morning of the accident, she and her son were living with her

mother and stepfather at 1865 Nashville Road. Dunbar Depo., p. 7-9. Dunbar was

getting her son ready for school at approximately 7:00 a.m.; it was raining and she was

fully dressed. She had on a blue jean jacket. Id. at 31-33. Dunbar began taking the

first of two trash bins out to Nashville Road. Id. at 31-32. She explained that she had

finished placing one trash bin just outside the white line of the road and noticed the

headlights of a vehicle coming North on Nashville Road in her direction. She decided
                                                                                            -3-

she had enough time to go back and get the second trash bin. She did not remember

what happened after she began heading back to get the second trash bin. Id. at 32.

Specifically, she testified: “All I remember is I was taking that first trash can out. I set it

out. I looked down the street, and I seen a car coming. He was before Swailes Road.

I went back to go get the second trash can. I don’t know what happened after that, I

don’t know.” Id. at 33-34.

       {¶ 4} Dunbar testified that she did not walk onto the road when she placed the first

trash bin just outside the white line of the road. Id. at 39-45. When asked again whether

she was on the road at any point, Dunbar testified:

              I have to be -- I was behind the white line. I was -- I wasn’t in the

       street, but I do have to turn [the trash bin] around. And I made sure it was

       very clear there was no cars. I turned it around and went back to my

       driveway, but I am not in the street. I have to be in the street because it’s

       on the curb, but I am behind the white line. It’s a country road.

Id. at 45. Dunbar agreed that in order to have put the trash bin in the position it was

found on the morning of the accident, she had to have stood at or near the outer white

line of the road. Id. at 46-47.

       {¶ 5} Dunbar explained that the last thing she remembered happening was that

she walked into her driveway to get the second trash bin, and she saw her mom and son

walking out of the house. Id. at 49-50. She explained:

              No, mind you – no, mind you, I was facing my mother. So my – my

       front body was headed facing my house. I seen my mom and my son, so
                                                                                          -4-

       – and, mind you, I have the impression of his truck in my right side of my

       butt, so I was facing the house. My body was in the driveway facing my

       house.

Id. at 51.

       {¶ 6} After being hit by Beacom’s vehicle, Dunbar was found on the ground in her

driveway between some rocks. Id. at 56. Dunbar conceded that she had no idea how

far into the driveway she had been when she was hit by Beacom’s vehicle. Id. at 55.

As a result of the accident, Dunbar had two broken hips, a shattered pelvis, injuries to the

right side of her butt, and a gash on her head. Id. at 61-62.

       {¶ 7} Beacom was deposed on February 12, 2021.             He testified that, on the

morning of the accident, he had been driving home from his job as a warehouse clerk at

the Meijer Distribution facility in Tipp City. His shift went from 10:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m.

Beacom Depo., p. 17-18, 25. After stopping at a gas station to fill up his truck with gas,

he eventually turned right onto Nashville Road. Id. at 27, 31. It was raining and dark

on Nashville Road, and he had his windshield wipers turned on high. Id. at 32-33, 73-

74. Beacom agreed with counsel’s recitation of Beacom’s discovery responses that he

“saw a handle of a trash can out of the right side of [his] windshield” and then “turn[ed] a

hard left while pressing brakes to avoid not hitting the trash can.” Id. Beacom thought

he had hit the trash can, so he stopped his truck and walked back toward where the trash

can was. He then saw Dunbar lying on the ground in the driveway. Beacom saw a boy

come out of the house, and then a woman came out.               The woman called 911 for

assistance. Id. at 35-47.
                                                                                        -5-

      {¶ 8} Beacom testified that he had at no point crossed the white line on the right

side of the road. Id. at 35. Rather, he stated that he at some point visualized the handle

of the trash can, which caused him to turn a hard left to avoid the trash can. Id. at 36.

Beacom believed the trash can was in the road across the white line. Id. at 38. Another

vehicle was heading in the opposite direction on Nashville Road and passed Beacom just

before he reached Dunbar’s residence. He saw the trash can two or three seconds after

the car had passed him. Id. at 72-73. Beacom stated he never saw Dunbar but “I had

hit – I had seen something go by the window when I went by the trash can. I’m not being

– not sure what it was.” Id. at 60.

      {¶ 9} Beacom estimated that he was going 35 miles per hour when his vehicle hit

Dunbar. But the police report stated that Beacom had stated that he was going between

the speed of 45 and 50 miles per hour. Beacom disagreed with the police report. He

stated that the police officer decided to make it 45-50 even though Beacom told him he

was going between 35 and 40 miles per hour. Id. at 57-71.

      {¶ 10} Exhibit A to Beacom’s deposition was a traffic crash report completed by an

officer with the Troy Police Department. At the end of that exhibit was a “Traffic Crash

Witness Statement” that had been completed and signed by Beacom. The statement

explained that Beacom was “going north on Nashville, raining and dark, and out of

nowhere I saw trash can then something in front of it. Saw the object, hit the brakes and

the object. [T]urned around to see what I hit and it was a girl. The trash can was on the

fog line and she was on the road.”

      {¶ 11} In the traffic crash report, Police Officer Steffano stated, in whole:
                                                                                      -6-

             Unit 1 was traveling NB on Nashville Rd. a two lane country road with

      a posted speed limit of 55 mph. Unit 1 stated he was traveling between

      the speed of 45 to 50 mph. Unit 2, a pedestrian, was taking out the trash

      on the side of a dark/non-lighted road in front of address number 1865.

      The weather conditions at the time of call was heaving rain/wet roads. Unit

      1 stated he did not see Unit 2 and struck Unit 2 with the right side of his

      vehicle causing functional damage to the headlight. Unit 2 is believed to

      have gone up onto the hood of Unit 1 due to damage to the antenna and

      top portion of the hood. Unit 1 stated he did not brake until he hit Unit 2.

      Unit 1 turned around and came back to the location after realizing he hit

      something.    There was no evidence that indicated Unit 1 had left the

      roadway or was not in his lane of travel at anytime.

Officer Steffano also noted in a supplement to a Troy Police Department case report that

the “[e]xact location of [Dunbar] in the roadway is unknown.”

      {¶ 12} Following the depositions, Beacom filed a motion for summary judgment.

Dunbar then filed a voluntary dismissal of the action. On March 11, 2022, Dunbar refiled

her complaint, alleging that Beacom had failed to maintain an assured clear distance and

had been distracted by sending or receiving a text message while driving, which resulted

in injuries to Dunbar. Beacom then refiled his summary judgment motion. Along with

the depositions of Beacom and Dunbar and the police report, Beacom relied on the expert

report of Charles R. Scales, which was attached as Exhibit 2 to his motion for summary

judgment.
                                                                                       -7-

       {¶ 13} Scales authored a “Crash Reconstruction Report.” According to the report,

Dunbar was found lying in the middle of her driveway approximately 30 feet from the

handle side of the trash can that she had placed off Nashville Road. Expert Report, p.

1. Scales explained that “[t]he trash cart and a mailbox on the opposite side of the

driveway had no sign of impact and would have limited the opportunity for Beacom to

drive out of his lane.” Id. The Report noted that “Dunbar’s clothing was described as a

pink robe by the officer, but she testified that it was a jean jacket. He did not observe

any bright clothing that was white or reflective.” Id. at p. 3.

       {¶ 14} Scales stated that “[t]here was no physical evidence of braking until

[Beacom] stopped to turn around after impact.” Id. at 8. Further, Scales conducted

what he termed a “Speed Analysis,” trying to reconstruct where Dunbar likely had been

and how fast Beacom had likely been going when Beacom struck Dunbar with his truck.

According to Scales: “The pedestrian would have been struck then thrown approximately

30 feet if she were standing at the trash cart and landed in the middle of the driveway.

The range could include any distance up to 36 feet if the entire width of the driveway is

considered and Erica Dunbar’s deposition testimony that she was found between the

rocks, is accurate.” Id. at 8. However, Scales noted that “[t]he actual impact area,

landing area, throw distance and vehicle speed are unknown.” Id. Scales opined that

“[t]he analysis of the pedestrian impact with the available evidence, indicates the throw

distance is expected to be far enough to place the area of impact on the roadway, near

the trash cart while the truck was approaching at a speed that was described as 45-50

MPH.” Id. at 11.
                                                                                             -8-

       {¶ 15} Scales also conducted what he titled a “Pre-Crash Analysis.”               In this

section of his report, Scales attempted to analyze the ability to detect and avoid Dunbar

based on the conditions that were likely present on the morning of the accident. Scales

used an “Interactive Driver Response Research” software to determine that the average

recognition distance for a pedestrian observed on the road in front of the passenger side

headlight on a vehicle with similar headlight bulbs that Beacom had on his truck would be

140 feet if the pedestrian was dressed in gray clothing. Id. at 14. But that this number

would increase to 176.4 feet according to studies involving unlit roadways, independent

of headlight condition.   However, Scales stated that rain falling would reduce those

distances by 12.6% and the glare of oncoming headlights would reduce the detection

distances by approximately 31%. Scales then took into account that it takes a half

second to move the foot over to the brake. Finally, Scales made what he described as

a “reasonable estimate of the best braking effort possible for [Beacom’s] truck on the wet

asphalt.” Id. Scales opined: “The available room to brake would potentially allow time

to slow down, but not stop. A combination of adjustments for glare and rainfall would

further reduce the distances and chance for braking. Braking was possible and may

have occurred, but crash avoidance was not a reasonable expectation.” Id.

       {¶ 16} Scales also made the following conclusions in the “Summary” section at the

end of his report:

              Dunbar was found approximately 30 feet from the trash cart and she

       had been thrown less than 38 feet.

              The throw distance limits the speed of the truck to less than his stated
                                                                                   -9-

speed of 45-50 MPH. The sustained injuries would ordinarily be expected

at speeds over 25 MPH. Pre-impact braking would allow for Beacom’s

stated speed to be accurate, before slowing to cause the throw distance

that is evident here.

       Dunbar asserted that she was struck outside of the roadway. The

undamaged trash cart and undamaged mailbox mark the boundary of the

truck’s potential path. 25 MPH was not slow enough to make the two

successive steering movements that are needed to clear the obstacles,

move far enough out of the lane, and still leave a reasonable throw distance.

       The rainfall, potential headlight glare and poor reflectivity of Dunbar’s

clothing created a condition that made it unreasonable to expect that

Beacom would detect her early enough to avoid the collision.

       Concluding, the evidence does not support the possibility that

Dunbar was outside of the lane of travel when she was struck, and the

evidence is not consistent with illegal or unsafe speed.

       The most likely circumstance was that Dunbar was in the lane and

near the trash cart when she was struck at a speed that was between 25 –

45 MPH.

       The analysis of the factors that related to when Dunbar could be

detected by the average driver, allows for the possibility that Beacom may

have had time to brake and reduce his speed, but there is no expectation

that Beacom could have avoided the collision at his stated speed of 45-50
                                                                                           -10-

         MPH.

Id. at 15.

         {¶ 17} On June 23, 2022, the trial court granted summary judgment to Beacom on

all the pending claims. According to the trial court, Dunbar had not identified a triable

issue that she was struck in her driveway. Decision, p. 12. Further, the trial court found

that Dunbar had failed to take a counter position against Beacom’s expert, who opined

that it was “unreasonable to expect that Beacom would detect [Dunbar] early enough to

avoid the collision.” Id. at 13. Dunbar filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s

judgment.

   II.       The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Beacom Where There

             Were Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Where Dunbar Was When

             Beacom’s Truck Struck Her and Whether Beacom Should Have Seen Dunbar

             Early Enough to Avoid the Collision

         {¶ 18} Dunbar’s sole assignment of error states:

                THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT

         SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM.

         {¶ 19} Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is

de novo. Schroeder v. Henness, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2012-CA-18, 2013-Ohio-2767, ¶ 42,

citing Helton v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162, 703 N.E.2d 841

(4th Dist.1997). De novo review “ ‘means that this court uses the same standard that the

trial court should have used, and we examine the evidence to determine whether as a
                                                                                        -11-

matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial.’ ” Riverside v. State, 2016-Ohio-2881, 64

N.E.3d 504, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting Brewer v. Cleveland City Schools Bd. of Edn., 122

Ohio App.3d 378, 383, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997), citing Dupler v. Mansfield

Journal Co., Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980). On such review, we do

not grant deference to the trial court's determinations. Powell v. Rion, 2012-Ohio-2665,

972 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d

704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993).

       {¶ 20} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when (1) there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds, after construing the evidence most strongly in

favor of the nonmoving party, can only conclude adversely to that party. Zivich v. Mentor

Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998), citing Horton v.

Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196 (1995), paragraph three of

the syllabus. The moving party carries the initial burden of affirmatively demonstrating

that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio

St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). To this end, the movant must be able to point

to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to consider in

rendering summary judgment. Id. at 292-293.

       {¶ 21} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Id. at 293. Rather, the burden

then shifts to the nonmoving party to respond, with affidavits or as otherwise permitted by

Civ.R. 56, setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material
                                                                                      -12-

fact for trial. Id. Throughout, the evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmoving

party. Id.

      {¶ 22} “Summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation and to

avoid a formal trial where there is nothing to try. It must be awarded with caution,

resolving doubts and construing evidence against the moving party, and granted only

when it appears from the evidentiary material that reasonable minds can reach only an

adverse conclusion as to the party opposing the motion.” (Citations omitted.) Norris v.

Ohio Std. Oil Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 433 N.E.2d 615 (1982).

      {¶ 23} In his motion for summary judgment, Beacom contended that he did not

owe a duty to Dunbar unless he saw or had notice that she was in his lane of travel.

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10.             According to Beacom, Dunbar

“suddenly entered Beacom’s lane of travel in dark clothing on a dark and raining morning,

giving Beacom no opportunity to see her.” Id. Further, Beacom contended that “it is not

possible that [Dunbar] was in the driveway at the time of the accident.”       Id. at 11.

Rather, “[b]ased on how far [Dunbar] traveled after impact, she would have had to have

been on the roadway, near the trash can.” Id. at 12, citing Expert Report, p. 11.

      {¶ 24} In response to Beacom’s motion for summary judgment, Dunbar contended

that genuine issues of material fact remained as to where Dunbar was standing when

Beacom struck her with his truck, what Dunbar was wearing at the time of the collision,

whether Beacom failed to maintain an assured clear distance ahead, and whether

Beacom’s attention was diverted from the task of driving, creating an unsafe danger to

others.   According to Dunbar, “[e]xactly what Plaintiff was wearing would drastically
                                                                                            -13-

change whether she was reasonably discernible and should therefore be left to the trier

of fact.” Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9. Further, if

Dunbar was not in her driveway but also not standing in the road at the time of the

collision, there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Beacom was in

violation of the R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). Id. at 5. Dunbar did not present any evidence in

her opposition to Beacom’s motion for summary judgment in support of her distracted

driving claim.

       {¶ 25} The trial court found that Dunbar’s belief that she had been struck in her

driveway was not reasonable given the expert’s reconstruction of the accident. Further,

the trial court did its own calculations to determine that “Plaintiff’s version of events would

not leave Defendant enough reaction time (.75 seconds) to react and avoid the mailbox;

moreover, if [Beacom] had hit Plaintiff while she was standing at her trash bin, he would

have had only .06 seconds (.81 distance - .75 reaction time) to steer clear of the mailbox.”

June 23, 2022 Decision, p. 11. This calculation was based on Beacom’s stated speed

of 35 miles per hour and the assumption “that the reaction time of the average man is

about three quarters of a second.” Id., quoting State v. Bush, 88 Ohio Law Abs. 161,

182 N.E.2d 43, 47 (C.P.1962). The trial court concluded that Dunbar did not “identify

any admissible evidence to counter the expert’s findings,” but rather offered “only

speculation and conclusion.” Id. Therefore, the trial court found that Dunbar had not

identified a triable issue that she was struck in her driveway. Id. at 12.

       {¶ 26} The trial court also found that Dunbar had not identified a triable issue that

Beacom filed to maintain an assured clear distance ahead, as required by R.C.
                                                                                           -14-

4511.21(A). According to the trial court, assuming Dunbar was hit on the road, “[t]he

questions remain whether a jury must determine whether Plaintiff suddenly appeared

and/or was reasonably discernable.” June 23, 2022 Decision, p. 12. The trial court

noted that Beacom’s expert opined that “[t]he rainfall, potential headlight glare and poor

reflectivity of Dunbar’s clothing created a condition that made it unreasonable to expect

that Beacom would detect her early enough to avoid the collision.” Id. at 13, quoting

Expert Report, p.15. Based on this opinion, along “[w]ith no counter position taken by

Plaintiff, except for the conjecture above,” the trial court concluded that Beacom was

entitled to summary judgment. Id.

       {¶ 27} Before addressing the trial court’s finding that there were no genuine issues

of material fact, we will first address Beacom’s contention in his appellate brief and at oral

argument that we should affirm the trial court’s judgment based on Dunbar’s failure to

present evidence in opposition to Beacom’s motion for summary judgment. In particular,

Beacom contends that we must affirm the trial court’s judgment, because Dunbar failed

to present any evidence to the trial court that supported her contention that she was struck

by Beacom’s truck while she was standing in her driveway. Moreover, Dunbar did not

submit any evidence in response to the report of Beacom’s expert.

       {¶ 28} In Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 517 N.E.2d 904

(1988), the Ohio Supreme Court stated:

              “[I]t might appear that the nonmoving party must respond to an

       adverse motion for summary judgment or face the entry of judgment against

       him. However, this court has stated that even where the nonmoving party
                                                                                        -15-

       fails completely to respond to the motion, summary judgment is improper

       unless reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion and that

       conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Toledo's Great E. Shoppers

       City, Inc. [v. Abde's Black Angus Steak House No. III, Inc., 24 Ohio St.3d

       198, 201-202, 494 N.E.2d 1101 (1986)]. Accordingly, as the burden is

       upon the moving party to establish the non-existence of any material factual

       issues, the lack of a response by the opposing party cannot, of itself,

       mandate the granting of summary judgment.

(Emphasis sic.)

       {¶ 29} Although a party opposing summary judgment should always do its best to

present evidence in response to the motion, that is not absolutely required by Civ.R. 56 if

the party who brought the motion did not carry its initial burden of proving the absence of

any genuine issue of material fact. In other words, if genuine issues of material fact

remain after the movant’s evidence is considered, then summary judgment is not

appropriate, regardless of how effective the party opposing summary judgment is in

responding to the motion.

       {¶ 30} We also note that the trial court focused on the fact that Dunbar’s version

of being struck while standing in her driveway was so unsupported by the record that it

could not create a genuine issue of material fact. We agree that there is no genuine

issue of material fact that, when struck, Dunbar was not in her driveway. The trial court

then cited to a United States Supreme Court case that held: “When opposing parties tell

two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
                                                                                        -16-

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” June 23, 2022 Decision, p. 13,

quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

       {¶ 31} We do not believe the case before us is like the situation the court faced in

Harris. There, the Court reviewed a denial of a motion for summary judgment filed by a

police officer based on sovereign immunity. The underlying facts involved a high speed

chase that was caught on camera. The videotape clearly contradicted the version of the

story told by the plaintiff.   Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s

“version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could

have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction;

it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Harris at 380-381.

In Harris, the Court had to choose between only two versions of events, one of which was

clearly proven incorrect, especially considering the existence of video evidence. But

here, the trial court did not have to choose solely between Dunbar’s speculation that she

was in her driveway when she was struck or Beacom’s contention that Dunbar must have

been on the road near the trash bin when he struck her. If there was a genuine issue of

material fact whether other scenarios were possible which did not perfectly align with the

parties’ contentions, the trial court had to consider them before granting summary

judgment. For example, if Dunbar was struck when she was a few feet off the road on

her way back to her driveway, then summary judgment would not be appropriate. Or if

Dunbar was struck while on the road, but Beacom should have seen her sufficiently in

advance to avoid her, then summary judgment would not be appropriate.
                                                                                        -17-

       {¶ 32} As we noted, the overwhelming evidence established that Dunbar was not

standing in her driveway when she was struck by Beacom’s truck. But the inquiry did

not end there. The next question was whether a reasonable juror, after construing the

evidence most strongly in Dunbar’s favor, could have concluded that Dunbar was struck

while she was either standing or walking beside the road on the way back to her driveway.

Beacom’s expert and the trial court answered this question in the negative. And both

made several assumptions and calculations to arrive at their answer.

       {¶ 33} The evidence on which the trial court relied in making its determination that

no genuine issues of material fact remained included the deposition testimony of Beacom

and Dunbar, the police report, Beacom’s statement to police, and the expert report.

Based on our review of that evidence, we believe genuine issues of material fact remained

relating to whether Dunbar was on the road when she was struck by Beacom’s vehicle

and at what point Beacom should have seen Dunbar sufficiently to avoid hitting her with

his truck.

       {¶ 34} There was limited evidence of record regarding where exactly Dunbar was

standing when she was struck by Beacom’s truck. Dunbar’s testimony was that she did

not step into the road and that she began to walk back to get the other trash bin after she

noticed a car coming north on Nashville Road. Although her recollection that she made

it to her driveway was contradicted by substantial evidence, we are not convinced this

meant a reasonable juror could not have found that she was off the road walking back

toward her driveway when she was struck. It could just be that she could not recall

exactly what had happened after she placed the first trash can by the road, because she
                                                                                          -18-

suffered a traumatic injury when she was struck by Beacom’s truck. Beacom’s expert,

Charles Scales, made it clear in his report that “[t]he actual impact area, landing area,

throw distance and vehicle speed are unknown.” Although Scales attempted to recreate

what he considered to be the most likely scenario based on the information he had

reviewed, his recreation was an educated guess, not evidence of what happened. One

of the pieces of information on which Scales heavily relied was the police officer’s

statement that “[t]here was no evidence that indicated [Beacom] had left the roadway or

was not in his lane of travel at anytime.” But it is unclear what type of investigation went

into forming this conclusion. At the time the police officer made this statement, he had

only interviewed Beacom and presumably looked around for tire tracks or skid marks.

The police officer had not interviewed Dunbar, because she had been taken to a hospital.

The police officer also stated that the “[e]xact location of [Dunbar] in the roadway is

unknown.”

       {¶ 35} Beacom’s testimony also did not nail down where Dunbar was located when

he hit her with his truck. Indeed, Beacom’s testimony contained some inconsistencies.

First, Beacom testified that he was going approximately 35 miles per hour when he hit

Dunbar. But the police report stated that Beacom told the officer that he had been going

45 to 50 miles per hour. Beacom testified that the police officer’s report was incorrect

and that the police officer just chose to assign that arbitrary speed despite what Beacom

had told him. Beacom also testified that he had never crossed the white line on the right

side of his lane of travel, but he also testified that at some point he visualized the handle

of the trash bin, which caused him to turn a hard left to avoid the trash bin. But it was
                                                                                          -19-

undisputed that the trash bin was outside the white line of the road, so avoiding it would

not have required a hard left if Beacom’s truck was not outside the white line of the road.

While Beacom also testified that he thought the trash bin had been across the white line

and in the road, even Beacom’s expert stated that the trash bin had been outside the

white line, and there was no evidence that it had been moved from where Dunbar had

placed it a short time earlier.

       {¶ 36} In his witness statement that was completed the morning of the accident,

Beacom stated that, “out of nowhere I saw trash can and then something in front of it.

Saw the object, hit the brakes, and the object. [T]urned around to see what I hit and it

was a girl.” This statement differed from his deposition testimony where he stated that

he had seen “a handle of a trash can out of the right side of [his] windshield” and then

“turn[ed] a hard left while pressing brakes to avoid not hitting the trash can.” He testified

that he did not see Dunbar before hitting her.

       {¶ 37} The trial court decided to conduct its own analysis of what was the most

likely position of Dunbar by using Beacom’s stated speed of 35 miles per hour to

determine whether it was possible for Beacom to have hit Dunbar with his truck while

Dunbar was standing off the road. The trial court, like Beacom’s expert, noted that

neither the trash bin nor the mailbox was hit by Beacom’s truck.            Therefore, both

assumed that in order for Beacom to have hit Dunbar while she was standing off the road,

Beacom would have had to have hit her while he was traveling the distance between the

trash bin and the mailbox, and Beacom would have had to have reentered the road before

he reached the mailbox, because the mailbox was not damaged. Both the trial court and
                                                                                         -20-

the expert said this scenario was very unlikely. In order to reach its conclusion, the trial

court took judicial notice that a vehicle travels approximately 14.67 feet per second for

every ten miles per hour of velocity. Then the court took into account that there were

41.6 feet between the trash can and the mailbox. Further, the trial court took judicial

notice that the reaction time of the average man is about three quarters of a second. The

court concluded that “Plaintiff’s version of events would not leave Defendant enough

reaction time (.75 seconds) to react and avoid the mailbox; moreover, if Plaintiff had hit

Plaintiff while she was standing at her trash bin, he would have had only .06 seconds (.81

distance - .75 reaction time) to steer clear of the mailbox.” June 23, 2022 Decision, p.

11.

       {¶ 38} Beacom’s expert also made calculations based on several assumptions.

Importantly, Scales conceded that “[t]he actual impact area, landing area, throw distance

and vehicle speed are unknown.” Expert Report, p. 8. But Scales then cited to two

“technical papers” listing the projection efficiency (pedestrian throw speed divided by

vehicle speed) and “the results from numerous pedestrian throws that had similarities to

this crash.” According to Scales, one of the technical papers demonstrated “[d]istances

up to 47 feet (14.3 meters), were ordinarily associated with speeds under 38 MPH (60

kmh). Speeds at 55 MPH or above resulted in throws closer to 170 feet.” Id. Scales

then set out to determine whether it was likely that Beacom could have gone off the road

after the trash bin, hit Beacom with his truck, and then re-entered the road without hitting

the mailbox. Scales stated that “[t]here would also be a period to move the arms and

steer back toward the left. 0.5 second is a known time for limb movements to occur.”
                                                                                         -21-

Id. at 10. Further, Scales opined that “[i]f centered within the lane, the driver would have

to use an emergency steering effort to get far enough right, early enough to line up with

the proper throw distance range but miss the trash cart.”           Id.   Based on these

assumptions, Scales concluded that “Dunbar’s version of events could not be confirmed

even when using an unexpectedly high level of driver performance and vehicle dynamics.”

Id. at 11. Ultimately, Scales opined that the “analysis of the pedestrian impact with the

available evidence, indicates the throw distance is expected to be far enough to place the

area of impact on the roadway, near the trash cart while the truck was approaching at a

speed that was described as 45-50 MPH.” Id.

       {¶ 39} Scales also addressed whether the extent of Dunbar’s injuries could help

determine how far she was thrown by Beacom’s truck. Scales explained that “[t]he

extent of her injuries was compared to case files and available pedestrian crash studies.

Although similar examples were not located, many studies exist.” Id. at 12. Scales

noted one author “reported that impact speeds below 15 MPH caused severe injury for

9% of pedestrians while 30 MPH increased the risk to 45%.” Id. at 13. He noted that

another study reviewed 293 crashes “and reported severe injuries to the pelvis occurred

at speeds above 20 kmh (12 MPH), but with only a few occurring below 41 kmh (25

MPH).” Id. But Scales could not determine the distance thrown based solely on her

injuries. He conceded that he was unable to locate any similar examples in the crash

studies he reviewed.

       {¶ 40} We believe that both the trial court and Beacom’s expert made several

assumptions that conflicted with the summary judgment requirement that the evidence be
                                                                                         -22-

construed most strongly in favor of Dunbar. For example, both the trial court and the

expert concluded that Dunbar could not have been hit off the road because an average

person would not have had the necessary time in which to react when one factors in either

a .50 second or .75 second reaction time. The trial court borrowed its reaction time

component (.75 seconds) from a 1962 common pleas court case. Scales borrowed his

reaction time component (.50 seconds) from an unknown source. But Beacom did not

testify to his actual reaction time. Rather, he testified that he braked and made a hard

left turn after noticing the trash bin outside the right part of his windshield.       The

deceleration and hard left turn, if made quickly enough after passing the trash bin and

exiting the roadway, could have resulted in Beacom’s hitting Dunbar as she stood off the

road facing her house and then re-entering the roadway before the truck reached the

mailbox. While Scales opined that this was very unlikely, his opinion was based on a

reaction time component that was not based on any evidence in the record.

       {¶ 41} In short, Scales made several assumptions about the speed Beacom’s truck

was traveling, the distance Dunbar was thrown, and Beacom’s reaction time.              He

conceded that the actual impact area, landing area, throw distance, and vehicle speed

were unknown. He used his experience and the available evidence to reconstruct what

he believed to be the most likely scenario that resulted in Dunbar’s injuries. But the trial

court has a different duty when faced with a motion for summary judgment. The trial

court must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist after construing

the evidence most strongly in Dunbar’s favor. Scales did not construe the evidence most

strongly in Dunbar’s favor. Therefore, we believe there remained a genuine issue of
                                                                                          -23-

material fact regarding whether Dunbar was standing off the road when she was struck

by Beacom’s truck.

       {¶ 42} Further, we believe there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Beacom should have seen Dunbar sufficiently in advance to have had enough time to

avoid hitting her. Beacom’s expert concluded that Beacom may have had time to brake

and reduce his speed but “there is no expectation that Beacom could have avoided the

collision at his stated speed of 45-50 MPH.” Expert Report, p. 15. But Beacom testified

that his speed was actually 35 mph, which would presumably have given him more time

to react than the time his expert used in the calculation. Moreover, Beacom testified that

he applied the brakes immediately before hitting Dunbar, which would have further

lowered his speed.      Also, Beacom’s testimony regarding what he saw conflicted

somewhat with other evidence in the record. In his written statement completed after the

accident, he said that he saw the trash bin and something in front of it. At this deposition,

he stated that he saw something go by his window when he went by the trash can. His

expert noted that there had been damage to the front driver’s side portion of Beacom’s

vehicle and to the antenna on the hood of his car. Apparently, the expert believed the

upper part of Dunbar’s body bent toward the vehicle, causing damage to the antenna,

while the lower portion of her body received the full impact from Beacom’s vehicle. But

Beacom testified that he had no idea that he had hit a person until he stopped and went

back to check on the trash bin.

       {¶ 43} Once again, Beacom’s expert made several assumptions. First, the expert

assumed that Dunbar had been wearing a blue jacket rather than the pink robe that the
                                                                                        -24-

police officer noted. The expert based this assumption on Dunbar’s deposition testimony

regarding her recollection of what she had been wearing. This was not construing the

evidence most strongly in favor of Dunbar. Further, the expert considered the fact that

a vehicle was traveling in the other direction than Beacom, which may have decreased

Beacom’s detection distances by as much as 31%. But Beacom testified this occurred

two or three seconds before he hit Dunbar, and Beacom did not testify that the lights of

the vehicle traveling in the opposite direction affected his ability to see. Moreover, the

expert did not take into account the possibility that the headlights of the other vehicle

could have actually illuminated Dunbar’s actual position for Beacom if Dunbar had in fact

been on the road when the vehicle passed her heading south toward Beacom. These

assumptions made by Beacom’s expert were not the result of construing evidence most

strongly in favor of Dunbar.

       {¶ 44} It is understandable why Beacom’s expert did not construe the evidence

most strongly in favor of Dunbar. Beacom’s expert was hired to reconstruct the accident

in the most likely way it happened, based on his experience and his review of the available

evidence. Part of making such a reconstruction, however, requires the expert to make

decisions regarding what variables to include and what assumptions to make when critical

pieces of evidence are lacking.     It is undisputed that the following critical pieces of

evidence were lacking: the actual impact area, landing area, throw distance, and vehicle

speed. While Scales’s report may be helpful for a juror to consider when the juror is

faced with the task of deciding whether Dunbar has established her case by a

preponderance of the evidence, we do not believe Scales’s report proved the absence of
                                                                                         -25-

a genuine issue of material fact, especially in light of his assumptions that ran counter to

the summary judgment requirement that the evidence be construed most strongly in

Dunbar’s favor.

          {¶ 45} The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Beacom. There

remain genuine issues of material fact regarding where Dunbar was standing when she

was struck by Beacom’s truck and when Beacom should have seen Dunbar.                  The

assignment of error is sustained.

   III.      Conclusion

          {¶ 46} Having sustained the sole assignment of error, the judgment of the trial

court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                                      .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.