Court Opinion

ID: 9919389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 14:05:24.657749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:52.481518
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-135.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                           SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-135
   THE STATE EX REL. JONES, APPELLANT, v. PASCHKE, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
         may be cited as State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, Slip Opinion No.
                                      2024-Ohio-135.]
Prohibition—General division of common pleas court has jurisdiction over
        appellant’s former mother-in-law’s complaint seeking companionship and
        visitation with appellant’s child under R.C. 3109.11—Appellant has
        adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by appeal to challenge
        appointment of guardian ad litem in former mother-in-law’s case—Court
        of appeals’ judgment denying petition affirmed.
 (No. 2023-0611—Submitted December 12, 2023—Decided January 18, 2024.)
                APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County,
                            No. 22-G-0037, 2023-Ohio-1536.
                                   __________________
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Appellant, Jeremy J. Jones, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in
the Eleventh District Court of Appeals against appellee, Judge Carolyn J. Paschke
of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. Jones argues
that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction over a case filed by Jones’s former mother-
in-law for grandparent companionship and visitation rights with Jones’s child. He
also argues that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem in
the case. The Eleventh District granted Judge Paschke’s motion for summary
judgment and denied Jones’s petition, and Jones has appealed. We affirm the
Eleventh District’s judgment denying the petition.
              I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} The Geauga County Court of Common Pleas consists of two
divisions: (1) the General Division, which hears domestic-relations cases (“the
general division”), and (2) a combined Probate and Juvenile Division (“the juvenile
division”).   See R.C. 2151.011(A)(1)(c) (“juvenile court” means the probate
division of the court of common pleas unless another statutory provision applies);
R.C. 2301.03 (no separate domestic-relations judge for Geauga County); Ohio
Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(C) (“Unless otherwise provided by law, there
shall be a probate division and such other divisions of the courts of common pleas
as may be provided by law”).
       {¶ 3} Jeremy Jones married Molly Jones in April 2015, and in December
2015, Molly gave birth to their son, B.J. In 2019, Molly filed for divorce in the
general division. On July 2, 2022, while the divorce proceedings were pending,
Molly passed away. The divorce case was dismissed on July 6.
       {¶ 4} On July 12, 2022, B.J.’s maternal grandmother, Heidi O’Neill, filed a
complaint     against   Jones   in   the       general   division   for   “grandparent
companionship/visitation time” with B.J. Jones filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the general division lacks jurisdiction over the complaint; Judge Paschke

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denied the motion. O’Neill filed a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem,
which Judge Paschke granted.
        {¶ 5} In September 2022, Jones filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in
the Eleventh District. Jones argued that the general division lacks jurisdiction over
complaints for grandparent companionship and visitation rights and that O’Neill’s
complaint should have been filed in the juvenile division. He also argued that Judge
Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem. Judge Paschke filed a
motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh District granted the motion and
denied Jones’s petition. Jones appeals as of right.
                             II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
                                A. Legal standards
        {¶ 6} We review de novo a court of appeals’ order granting summary
judgment in a prohibition action. State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio
St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 8.            “Summary judgment is
appropriate when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and * * * the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Ellipsis sic.) Id.,
quoting Civ.R. 56(C).
        {¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Jones must show that (1) Judge
Paschke exercised or is going to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for
which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. Id. at ¶ 9.
If Judge Paschke patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
Jones need not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Schlegel v. Sweeney,
171 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, 215 N.E.3d 451, ¶ 6. Here, the parties do not
dispute that Judge Paschke is exercising judicial power in the companionship-and-
visitation case.

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            B. The general division has jurisdiction over O’Neill’s case
       {¶ 8} Jones argues that Judge Paschke—a judge of the general division—
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over O’Neill’s companionship-and-visitation case
and that only the juvenile division has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. We
disagree.
       {¶ 9} R.C. 3105.011(A) provides that the “court of common pleas[,]
including divisions of courts of domestic relations, has full equitable powers and
jurisdiction appropriate to the determination of all domestic relations matters,” and
R.C. 3105.11(B)(2) defines “domestic relations matters” as including actions and
proceedings under R.C. Chapter 3109. R.C. Chapter 3109—specifically, R.C.
3109.11—authorizes the filing of complaints for grandparent companionship and
visitation if a parent of the child is deceased. The procedures authorized by R.C.
3109.11 therefore fall within the terms of R.C. 3105.011. The Geauga County
Court of Common Pleas does not have a separate domestic-relations division, but
R.C. 3105.011 grants jurisdiction to general divisions of courts of common pleas
as well. See also State ex rel. Gray v. Kimbler, 169 Ohio St.3d 424, 2022-Ohio-
3937, 205 N.E.3d 494, ¶ 14-15. Therefore, the general division has jurisdiction
over O’Neill’s complaint pursuant to R.C. 3105.011.
       {¶ 10} In addition, R.C. 3109.11 gives general divisions of courts of
common      pleas   jurisdiction   over     grandparents’   complaints     requesting
companionship or visitation. It provides:

               If either the father or mother of an unmarried minor child is
       deceased, the court of common pleas of the county in which the
       minor child resides may grant the parents and other relatives of the
       deceased father or mother reasonable companionship or visitation
       rights with respect to the minor child during the child’s minority if
       the parent or other relative files a complaint requesting reasonable

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                                 January Term, 2024

       companionship or visitation rights and if the court determines that the
       granting of the companionship or visitation rights is in the best
       interest of the minor child.

       {¶ 11} The statute requires that the complaint be brought in “the court of
common pleas of the county in which the minor child resides.” Id. It does not
specify that the complaint must be brought in a juvenile court or any other particular
division of the court of common pleas. The legislature knows how to specify that
a complaint must be brought in juvenile court, and many other statutes so require.
See, e.g., R.C. 2151.85 (complaint of minor seeking to have abortion without
parental notification); R.C. 2152.021 (complaint alleging that child is delinquent);
R.C. 3109.76 (complaint of grandparent seeking custody); R.C. 3321.19(D)(2)
(school-attendance officer’s complaint alleging that minor is a habitual truant). It
did not do so in R.C. 3109.11.
       {¶ 12} The general division has jurisdiction over O’Neill’s complaint
pursuant to R.C. 3105.011 and 3109.11.
       {¶ 13} Jones argues that R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) divests the general division of
jurisdiction over O’Neill’s complaint and gives the juvenile division exclusive
jurisdiction. R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) provides that with certain exceptions not relevant
here, juvenile courts shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction “to determine the
custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state.”
       {¶ 14} O’Neill’s complaint, however, seeks companionship and visitation
with B.J.—not custody. Visitation and custody are distinct legal concepts. In re
Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 573 N.E.2d 1074 (1991). “ ‘Custody’ resides in
the party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal and physical control of a
child. ‘Visitation’ resides in a noncustodial party and encompasses that party’s
right to visit the child.” Id.; see also R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) (defining “legal
custody”). A grandparent’s complaint for visitation with a grandchild is therefore

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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

not a matter involving the determination of custody. See Gibson at 171. Although
Gibson does not explicitly discuss complaints seeking companionship,
companionship is also distinct from custody and is generally treated similarly to
visitation. See, e.g., In re A.G., 2020-Ohio-2762, 154 N.E.3d 439, ¶ 44 (6th Dist.);
Murray v. Welch, 11th Dist. Portage No. 98-P-0030, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4657,
*11 (Sept. 30, 1999) (“companionship and visitation rights * * * are not issues of
custody”); see also Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 41-42, 706 N.E.2d 1218
(1999) (referring to a trial-court order that granted “companionship” as granting
“visitation”). R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) is not applicable to O’Neill’s complaint.
       {¶ 15} Because the general division has jurisdiction to decide complaints
seeking grandparent companionship and visitation filed under R.C. 3109.11, Jones
is not entitled to a writ of prohibition precluding Judge Paschke from exercising
jurisdiction over the case.
  C. Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to contest
               Judge Paschke’s appointment of a guardian ad litem
       {¶ 16} Jones also argues that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian ad litem, and he seeks a writ of prohibition precluding the appointment in
O’Neill’s case. Jones is correct that R.C. 3109.11 does not explicitly authorize a
court to appoint a guardian ad litem in grandparent companionship and visitation
cases. Nor do divisions (C), (D), (K), or (L) of R.C. 3109.051, which apply to such
cases. See R.C. 3109.11. Judge Paschke’s order appointing the guardian ad litem
in O’Neill’s case does not cite a particular statute as authorizing the appointment,
and neither do the Eleventh District’s opinion nor Judge Paschke’s merit brief filed
here. Rather, Judge Paschke argues—and the Eleventh District held—that Jones
has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to challenge the
appointment through appeal. We agree.
       {¶ 17} Because Judge Paschke does not patently and unambiguously lack
subject-matter jurisdiction over O’Neill’s case, Jones is entitled to a writ of

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                                January Term, 2024

prohibition only if the appointment of the guardian ad litem was not authorized by
law and Jones lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See
Gray, 169 Ohio St.3d 424, 2022-Ohio-3937, 205 N.E.3d 494, at ¶ 9. For an
alternate remedy to constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law,
it must be “complete, beneficial, and speedy.” State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v.
Mayfield Hts., 119 Ohio St.3d 11, 2008-Ohio-3181, 891 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14. Jones
cites cases for the proposition that an appeal is not an adequate remedy in cases
involving parenting time. See State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 138 Ohio St.3d 84,
2013-Ohio-5477, 3 N.E.3d 1184; Kallet v. Wilgus, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2021
AP 01 0004, 2021-Ohio-1637. These cases, however, involved determinations of
custody, not companionship and visitation. The danger we identified in V.K.B.—
that a child could be removed from his or her parent for several years pending an
appellate decision, see V.K.B. at ¶ 23—is not present here.
       {¶ 18} And even if the logic of these cases applied to companionship and
visitation cases, Jones is challenging only Judge Paschke’s appointment of a
guardian ad litem. A guardian ad litem makes recommendations to the court, see
Sup.R. 48.03(A)(1), and the guardian’s report “shall not be considered
determinative,” Sup.R. 48.06(A)(3). Judge Paschke, when determining whether to
grant companionship and/or visitation to O’Neill, must consider numerous factors,
see R.C. 3109.051(D)(1) through (16), and Jones will have the opportunity to file
his own evidence and briefs regarding these factors.          Jones can appeal the
appointment of the guardian ad litem as part of any appeal he brings from Judge
Paschke’s final judgment granting or denying grandparent companionship and/or
visitation, and this constitutes an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
       {¶ 19} Because Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law to challenge Judge Paschke’s appointment of the guardian ad litem in O’Neill’s
case, he is not entitled to a writ of prohibition precluding the appointment.

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

                              III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 20} Judge Paschke does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction over
O’Neill’s complaint for grandparent companionship and visitation. In addition,
Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to challenge Judge
Paschke’s appointment of a guardian ad litem. We therefore affirm the Eleventh
District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting Judge Paschke’s motion for summary
judgment and denying Jones’s petition for a writ of prohibition.
                                                               Judgment affirmed.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                              _________________
       Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A. Cruz, and Kelley
R. Tauring, for appellant.
       James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Linda M.
Applebaum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
                              _________________

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