Court Opinion

ID: 9375488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 22:02:26.853546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.295713
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 P. v. Washington CA1/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,                             A158017
 v.
 ISAIAH NOLAN WASHINGTON,                                         (Alameda County
            Defendant and Appellant.                              Super. Ct. No. H53084A)

       Isaiah Nolan Washington appeals from the denial of his
petitions for resentencing (Pen. Code, former § 1170.95),1 which
he filed in propria persona. Section 1172.6 provides for
resentencing of individuals convicted of murder under a felony
murder or natural and probable consequences theory if they could
no longer be convicted of murder under January 1, 2019
amendments to the Penal Code. The case returns to this court
following the California Supreme Court’s grant of review and
subsequent transfer order. Having complied with our high
court’s order directing us to vacate the previously issued opinion
and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) and People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698

       All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
        1

Code. As of June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We
hereafter refer to current code section 1172.6.
                                                1
(Strong), we agree with Washington that the trial court erred by
summarily denying his petitions without appointing counsel.
Nonetheless, we affirm because Washington suffered no
prejudice. Even after Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, Washington
remains ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

                          BACKGROUND
                                A.
      To be convicted of murder, a jury must ordinarily find that
the defendant acted with the requisite mental state, known as
malice aforethought. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172,
1181, quoting § 187, subd. (a).) Until 2019, the felony murder
rule provided an exception that made “a killing while committing
certain felonies murder without the necessity of further
examining the defendant’s mental state.” (Chun, supra, at p.
1182.) Under a separate rule known as the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, a person who knowingly aids and abets
criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime but also
of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits that is a
natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. (People
v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161, superseded by statute as
stated in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 958-959 & fn. 3.)

       Senate Bill No. 1437 ((2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437), which became effective January 1,
2019, raised the level of culpability required for murder liability
to be imposed under these theories. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §
1.) Senate Bill 1437 amended the definition of malice in section
188 to provide that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) The bill also amended section
189, which defines the degrees of murder, to limit murder
liability based on felony murder or a natural and probable
consequences theory to a person who: (1) was the actual killer; (2)
though not the actual killer, acted “with the intent to kill” and

                                 2
“aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer” in the commission of first
degree murder; or (3) was “a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e);
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; accord, Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp.
707-708.)

       Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95 (now section
1172.6), which provides a procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief.
(§ 1172.6, added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4 and renumbered
from section 1170.95 by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Such an individual may file a resentencing
petition if three conditions are met: “(1) A complaint, information,
or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner
was convicted of murder . . . following a trial or accepted a plea
offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been
convicted of murder . . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently
be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a);
accord, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960.) The petition
must include a declaration stating the petitioner is eligible for
relief based on the above requirements; the case number and year
of conviction; and whether the petitioner requests the
appointment of counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b).)

       If the petitioner has complied with these requirements, the
trial court must appoint counsel (if requested), receive briefing
from the parties, and then determine whether the petitioner has
made a “prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c);

                                  3
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 960, 966.) If so, then the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing—where the burden is on the prosecution to prove
(beyond a reasonable doubt) that the petitioner is ineligible for
relief because they are guilty of murder under the law as
amended by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c)-(d); Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 709; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.)
On the other hand, if the petition and record of conviction
establish conclusively that the petitioner is ineligible for relief,
the trial court may dismiss the petition. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c);
Lewis, at pp. 970–972.)

                                 B.
      Washington’s criminal case arose from a May 2010 incident
in Hayward, California, that left two victims dead from multiple
gunshot wounds. One of the murder victims, who died shortly
after police arrived at the scene, told the police, “ ‘They shot me
and took my money.’ ” A third (attempted murder) victim
managed to escape and was the primary witness at trial.

       The attempted murder victim testified that both
Washington and his co-defendant held the murder weapon at
different points of the robbery. When the co-defendant “ ‘end[ed]
up’ ” with the gun, the attempted murder victim heard gunshots
a “ ‘few seconds’ ” later but was looking at the murder victims
when they were shot. At trial, the attempted murder victim
testified on direct and on Washington’s cross-examination that
Washington’s co-defendant was the last person holding the gun
before the gunshots. But on the co-defendant’s cross-examination
she said she did not know who had the gun and admitted
testifying at the preliminary hearing that Washington had the
gun before she heard the gunshots.

     In December 2012, the District Attorney of Alameda
County filed an information charging Washington and his co-
defendant with two counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and one
                                  4
count of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)).
Washington was also charged with possession of a firearm by a
felon (former § 12021.1).

      The information alleged as special circumstances that
Washington and his co-defendant committed more than one
murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that they committed the
murders while committing a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)).
Regarding the murder and attempted murder counts, the
information alleged Washington and his co-defendant personally
used firearms (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (g)).

      In March 2015, a jury convicted Washington and his co-
defendant on all counts. The jury found the two murder counts
were of the first degree. For each count of murder, the jury found
true the special circumstance that Washington and his co-
defendant committed the murder while they were engaged in the
commission of robbery within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17)(A). The jury also found true the firearm use
allegations and that Washington and his co-defendant committed
multiple murders within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(3).

       In September 2015, the trial court sentenced Washington to
prison for two terms of life without the possibility of parole. The
court imposed concurrent sentences for attempted murder and
illegal firearm possession. On appeal, a different panel of this
court affirmed the judgment as to Washington. (People v.
Washington (Nov. 9, 2018, A146433) [nonpub. opn.].)

                                C.
       After the enactment of former section 1170.95, Washington
filed two identical petitions for resentencing. Each of his
petitions included a declaration stating that Washington was
convicted of first or second degree murder pursuant to the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine,

                                5
and he could not now be convicted of first or second degree
murder because of the recent amendments to sections 188 and
189. In addition, his declaration stated: “I was not the actual
killer”; “I did not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet, counsel,
command, induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual killer in
the commission of murder in the first degree”; and “I was not a
major participant in the felony or I did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the crime or
felony.” Washington also requested the appointment of counsel.

       Without appointing counsel to represent Washington or
receiving briefs from the parties, the trial court took judicial
notice of its own records (as well as this division’s November 9,
2018 opinion in Washington’s direct appeal) and denied the
petitions.2 The court concluded that Washington is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law because, at a minimum, in
finding the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation true,
the jury found that “petitioner acted with reckless indifference to
human life and was a major participant in the robberies which
resulted in the death of two people.”

                                D.
      Washington appealed from the trial court’s summary
denial. Agreeing with the trial court that the jury’s robbery-
murder special circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A))
established Washington’s ineligibility for resentencing as a
matter of law, this court affirmed the order in an unpublished
opinion, People v. Washington (March 23, 2020, A158017), review
granted June 17, 2020, S261782, judg. vacated and cause
remanded Nov. 16, 2022.

      2
       At the People’s request, we take judicial notice of the
record filed in Washington’s direct appeal (A146433). (See Evid.
Code §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970-972.)
                                 6
      The California Supreme Court granted review (June 17,
2020, S261782) and deferred further action pending consideration
and disposition of related issues in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952
and Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698. After the Court decided Lewis
and Strong, it transferred this case back to this division,
directing us to vacate the prior decision and to reconsider the
cause considering Lewis and Strong. Washington and the
Attorney General filed supplemental briefing.

                           DISCUSSION
                                A.
       Our Supreme Court’s decisions in Strong and Lewis contain
four key holdings relevant to this appeal. First, Lewis holds that
a petitioner who has filed a facially sufficient petition under
section 1172.6 is entitled to appointment of counsel before the
issue is briefed and the trial court determines whether the
petitioner has established a prima facie case of eligibility for
resentencing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 966, 970.) Second,
Lewis holds that in assessing whether the petitioner has made
out a prima facie case, the court may consider the record of
conviction (after the appointment of counsel) and may deny an
evidentiary hearing if the record contains facts refuting the
petitioner’s allegations. (Id. at pp. 970-972.) Third, Lewis
concludes that where a petitioner is denied the assistance of
counsel for a section 1172.6 petition, that deprivation is a state
law violation that is reviewed for harmless error under the test in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, supra, at pp.
972-974.) Under that test, the petitioner bears the burden to
show that it is reasonably probable that, had counsel been
appointed, their petition would not have been summarily denied
without an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 974.)

      Finally, Strong holds that prior felony-murder special
circumstance findings–that a defendant was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life–precludes that

                                 7
same defendant from establishing eligibility for resentencing
under section 1172.6 only if the prior jury finding was made after
our Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark). (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 710, 714-721.) Because
Banks and Clark significantly clarified what it means to be a
“major participant” and to “act with reckless indifference to
human life” during the commission of a felony (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at pp. 794, 800, 802-803; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp.
614, 618-622), jury findings made before those decisions warrant
reexamination because they are not conclusive on the question of
whether the petitioner could be convicted of murder after Senate
Bill 1437. (Strong, supra, at pp. 710-712, 716-718.)

                                B.
       Washington contends that the trial court erred in denying
his petitions without first appointing counsel. We agree that this
was error. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 966, 970.) However,
we conclude that the error is harmless because, as we explain
below, Washington cannot meet his burden to show that it is
reasonably probable that, had he been afforded counsel, his
petitions would not have been summarily denied without an
evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 974.)

       Washington was prosecuted for first-degree murder under
an alternative felony murder theory. The jury was instructed on
both premeditated first degree murder and felony murder, the
prosecution relied on the latter theory in its closing argument,
and the verdict forms finding Washington guilty of two counts of
first degree murder do not rule out a felony murder theory.

      We agree with the parties that Strong makes clear that
implicit “major participant” and “reckless indifference” findings
made before Banks and Clark were decided—like those in this
case—do not bar resentencing as a matter of law. (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 703, 714-720.) However, the People argue that
                                 8
any error was harmless because the jury also made special
circumstances findings that Washington was either the actual
killer or an aider or abettor who acted with intent to kill. The
Strong court stated that similar findings will ordinarily be
dispositive in the section 1172.6 context. (Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at pp. 714-715.)

       Here, the jury found true a multiple-murder special
circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). Furthermore, the
jury was correctly instructed that, to find the multiple-murder
special circumstance true, the People were required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Washington either (1) was the
actual killer or (2) aided and abetted the commission of first-
degree murder with the intent to kill. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (b),
(c); People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 45.)

       We agree with the People that the jury’s true finding on the
multiple-murder special circumstance, under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(3), necessarily amounted to a finding that
Washington was either the actual killer or acted with intent to
kill in aiding and abetting first degree murder. This makes
Washington ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because
he could still be convicted of murder despite the 2019 changes to
sections 188 and 189. (See §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e),
1172.6, subd. (a)(3); cf. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 703, 707-
708, 710; id. at p. 715 [special circumstance findings that require
proof of intent to kill conclusively establish resentencing
ineligibility].)

      Washington only argues that the multiple-murder special
circumstance finding is not determinative because “[t]he
defendant in [Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 704] was also
convicted of a multiple murder special circumstance.” However,
Strong does not assist Washington because the significance of the
multiple-murder special circumstance finding was not addressed
in that case. (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1071 [“a

                                  9
decision does not stand for a proposition not considered by the
court”].)

       Section 1172.6 was not intended to allow wholesale
relitigation of factual questions already settled by a previous
jury. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715.) Thus, the trial court’s
error in denying Washington’s petitions without appointing
counsel was harmless. We need not reach any additional
arguments.

                           DISPOSITION
     The previously filed unpublished opinion, People v.
Washington (March 23, 2020, A158017), is vacated. The order
denying Washington’s petitions for resentencing is affirmed.

                                10
                                    ______________________
                                    BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________
SIMONS, J.

A158017

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