Court Opinion

ID: 9378692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-12 22:09:27.371303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:38.841026
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                  OF TEXAS

                           NO. PD-0936-20

                  JEREL CHINEDU IGBOJI, Appellant

                                   v.

                         THE STATE OF TEXAS

        ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
            FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                      FORT BEND COUNTY

      NEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY,
RICHARDSON, WALKER, SLAUGHTER and MCCLURE, JJ., joined. YEARY, J., filed
a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and KEEL, J., joined.

                               OPINION

     For exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless seizure of

personal property, such as a cell phone, the record must show that law

enforcement officers reasonably believed that evidence would be
                                                            Igboji — 2

imminently destroyed if they waited to obtain a warrant to seize the

property. Affirmative conduct by the suspect is not required, but it is

one circumstance in the totality-of-the-circumstances test that may

show that the potential destruction of evidence was imminent.

However, the absence of such affirmative conduct does not foreclose an

exigent-circumstances determination. We agree with the State that the

court of appeals erred to hold that it did.    We reverse the court of

appeals and remand for a proper exigent-circumstances analysis.

                             Background

     Appellant worked at a Kentucky Fried Chicken in Stafford, Texas.

Shortly after the restaurant closed for the night on December 10, 2015,

two armed men entered the restaurant through an unsecured back door.

The men forced Appellant and his coworkers into the freezer while they

took the money from the cash registers. After taking the money, the

men fled, and the manager triggered the security alarm. Officers with

the Stafford Police Department responded to the restaurant and began

investigating the robbery that night.

                           The Investigation

     After responding to the restaurant, officers interviewed the

employees that were present during the robbery.         Through those

interviews, officers learned that the robbers had entered through the
                                                             Igboji — 3

back door, which Appellant had left unsecured when he took the trash

out that night.   Appellant cooperated with the investigation and told

officers that he was asked to take the trash out by the manager, Tammi

Ball. When officers spoke to Ball, however, she told them that Appellant

had offered to take the trash out, which she found to be suspicious

because, according to her, Appellant usually avoided work. Ball also

said that Appellant took the trash out through the restaurant’s back

door, which was against the restaurant’s policy.

     The next morning, the Stafford Police Department assigned

Detective Michael Ramirez to investigate the robbery.         Detective

Ramirez spoke with some of the restaurant employees.        One of the

employees told Detective Ramirez that Appellant had posted several

videos that captured the initial police response to the robbery on

Snapchat, a social media platform.    The employee showed Detective

Ramirez the videos on her phone, but Detective Ramirez did not obtain

a copy or recording of the videos from the employee. He did not contact

Appellant about the Snapchat video or otherwise attempt to secure the

video that day.

     Instead, Detective Ramirez called Appellant three days later and

asked him to provide a formal statement. Appellant agreed to meet

with Detective Ramirez, and Detective Ramirez drove Appellant to the
                                                            Igboji — 4

Stafford Police Department.    Once there, Detective Ramirez asked

Appellant to show him the videos from Snapchat. Appellant explained

that Snapchat automatically deleted the videos after 24 hours and told

Detective Ramirez that he did not have any other videos relevant to the

investigation.

     Detective Ramirez told Appellant that he only had two options:

either (1) give consent to search the phone, in which case Appellant

would have the phone back quickly, or (2) Detective Ramirez would have

to seize the phone and obtain a search warrant, which would take much

longer. Appellant responded that Detective Ramirez should get a search

warrant, at which point Detective Ramirez seized Appellant’s phone.

Detective Ramirez again asked Appellant for consent to search

Appellant’s phone and told him that he had never had a search warrant

denied in his decade of experience as a police officer. Appellant again

declined to give Detective Ramirez consent to search the phone.

Detective Ramirez then seized Appellant’s phone but did not search its

contents.

     Two days after the warrantless seizure of the phone, Detective

Ramirez applied for a search warrant.       The affidavit recited that

Appellant told Detective Ramirez that Snapchat deleted any videos after

24 hours and that he did not have any videos that could help the
                                                                Igboji — 5

investigation, which Detective Ramirez “refused to believe.”           The

affidavit also recited that Detective Ramirez, being a forensic cell phone

examiner himself, knew that content deleted from phones could

sometimes be recovered. Similarly, the affidavit also later stated that

cell phones save and delete information on both the internal memory

system and the SIM card, so even though an item may have been

deleted, it could still be possible to recover the deleted files. Detective

Ramirez recited in the affidavit that Appellant’s motives for recording

the initial investigation were unknown. Moreover, Detective Ramirez

sought to discover whether Appellant might have “recorded the actual

robbery as he has shown an inclination to record with his cell phone

despite the propriety of the activity.” Finally, Detective Ramirez also

relied in the affidavit upon Appellant’s refusal to consent to the search

of the phone as support for the search warrant.

     The warrant issued the same day as the application. The Warrant

Return and Inventory indicated that the warrant was not executed,

however, until two days later, which was four days after the phone had

been seized. The search of the phone pursuant to the search warrant

revealed text messages that incriminated Appellant.          It is unclear

whether the Snapchat video was obtained during the search.
                                                                 Igboji — 6

         Police arrested Appellant on January 10, 2016. The State indicted

Appellant for aggravated robbery. 1        Appellant pleaded not guilty and

elected to proceed with a jury trial.

                          The Trial & Suppression Hearing

         Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress.     In his motion,

Appellant argued that Detective Ramirez’s warrantless seizure of his cell

phone violated the Fourth Amendment and asked the trial court to

suppress all evidence obtained from the phone. The trial court held a

hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress after jury selection.

         Detective Ramirez testified at the suppression hearing. His

testimony largely echoed the information in his affidavit. When asked

how urgent he felt it was to obtain Appellant’s phone, Detective Ramirez

responded, “The device, not very urgent at all. I needed a copy of the

videos and any other evidence.” He conceded that he did not obtain a

copy of the video from the employee who showed it to him. When asked

why, Detective Ramirez explained that the employee did not want to

copy the video because she was concerned that doing so would notify

Appellant.        Detective Ramirez acknowledged that, although he felt

1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03.
                                                               Igboji — 7

obtaining a copy of the videos was “pretty urgent at that time,” he did

not seize the employee’s phone.

     On redirect, Appellant’s counsel asked what prevented Detective

Ramirez from obtaining a search warrant for Appellant’s phone earlier.

Detective Ramirez responded, “[h]onestly, I was hoping with him being

a witness, he would just consent and it wouldn't have been a big deal.”

He also acknowledged that, before seizing the phone, he did not view

Appellant as a suspect. When asked whether he expected the Snapchat

videos to be inculpatory or exculpatory, Detective Ramirez stated, “I

mean, I just believed that they were -- they were videos that could have

contained evidence to my investigation. I really didn't know what all was

on there. I saw one short clip. I didn't know what else was there. I mean,

I really -- I don't know how to answer that, to be honest with you.”

Detective Ramirez ultimately agreed that he could have obtained the

warrant “a lot sooner” than he did.

     The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The State

offered—and the trial court admitted into evidence during the

guilt/innocence phase of the trial—text messages obtained from the

search of Appellant’s phone. The State did not offer the Snapchat video

into evidence, however. The jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated

robbery and sentenced him to 17 years imprisonment.
                                                                                Igboji — 8

                                        The Appeal

          On appeal, Appellant’s sole argument was that the trial court erred

by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained following the

warrantless seizure of his cell phone. 2               The court of appeals agreed,

concluding that Detective Ramirez's warrantless seizure of Appellant's

phone did not fall within the exigent-circumstances exception. 3                          In

reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals cited our opinion in

Turrubiate v. State for the proposition that the exigent-circumstances

exception to the warrant requirement requires “proof of imminent

destruction based on affirmative conduct.” 4 Though some facts

suggested         that    potential      evidence      could     have     been      deleted

automatically by Snapchat, the court of appeals found that the record

lacked “any evidence showing or permitting an inference that Appellant

was taking affirmative steps to destroy evidence on his phone.” 5 Finding

that the erroneous admission of the evidence seized from Appellant’s

2
    Igboji v. State, 607 S.W.3d 157, 160–61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020).

3
    Id. at 170.

4
    Id. at 169 (citing Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 153–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).

5
    Id.
                                                              Igboji — 9

cell phone was not harmless, the court of appeals reversed and

remanded for a new trial. 6

          In a dissenting opinion, Justice Christopher opined that the

majority was wrong to apply the affirmative conduct requirement to a

case involving the seizure of personal property. 7      She noted that

Turrubiate dealt with the warrantless search of a house, which

implicated a protected privacy interest beyond the possessory interest

a person has in his or her personal property. 8         Instead, Justice

Christopher opined the warrantless seizure of the cellphone was justified

under the exigent-circumstances exception despite the lack of any

affirmative conduct on the part of Appellant suggesting the imminent

destruction of evidence. 9

          The State Prosecuting Attorney’s Office filed a petition for

discretionary review, asking this Court to review the court of appeals’

decision. Specifically, we granted review to consider the following

questions:

6
    Id. at 172.

7
    Id.

8
    Id. at 172–73.

9
    Id. at 174.
                                                             Igboji — 10

     (1)   Do exigent circumstances to seize a cellular phone for
           fear of unintentional loss of evidence require that law
           enforcement act at the earliest possible opportunity?

     (2)   Do exigent circumstances to seize a cellular phone for
           fear of intentional destruction of evidence require
           “affirmative conduct” by the suspect?

     (3)   Does the exigent circumstances exception require proof
           that the evidence was unavailable from other sources?

However, the court of appeals’ decision rests on the proposition that the

seizure at issue was unjustified because there was no evidence of

“affirmative conduct” on the part of Appellant. To the extent that the

court of appeals touched on the availability of the same information from

other sources and the lack of alacrity with which Detective Ramirez

sought the evidence, those were observations about the facts of the

case and not part of the legal decision. Consequently, we dismiss issues

one and three as improvidently granted and focus solely on the State’s

second issue. The question before us is whether the court of appeals

failed to apply the proper standard for determining whether exigent

circumstances existed by requiring a showing of affirmative conduct on

the part of a suspect suggesting the destruction of evidence is imminent.

                         Standard of Review
                                                                          Igboji — 11

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress under a

bifurcated standard of review. 10 We review a trial court's determination

of whether a specific search or seizure was reasonable under a de novo

standard, 11 but we give trial courts almost complete deference in

determining historical facts that depend on credibility and demeanor. 12

Because the trial court did not make explicit findings of fact in this case,

we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling

and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported

by the record. 13 Generally, our review is limited to the record at the

time of the suppression hearing. 14

                                  The Fourth Amendment

           The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable          searches     and    seizures[.]” 15    Generally,   the   Fourth

Amendment requires that searches and seizures be accomplished

10
     Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

11
     Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

12
     Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493.

13
     Id.

14
  Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 151–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing O’Hara v.
State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

15
     U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
                                                                                Igboji — 12

pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and

particularly describing the items to be searched or seized. 16 A

warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant

requirement. 17

         One such exception is based upon the existence of exigent

circumstances. The exigent-circumstances exception applies when “the

exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so

compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under

the Fourth Amendment.” 18 The exception enables law enforcement

officers to handle emergencies—situations presenting a “compelling

need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” 19 Under this

exception, law enforcement may be justified in conducting a warrantless

search “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” 20 Whether

law enforcement faced an emergency that justified acting without a

16
     United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).

17
  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013); Place, 462 U.S. at 701; Kothe, 152 S.W.3d
at 59 n.10 (“warrantless searches and seizures are presumed to be unreasonable”).

18
     Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).

19
     Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149.

20
     McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149.
                                                                             Igboji — 13

warrant calls for a case-by-case determination based on the totality of

circumstances existing at the time of the search or seizure. 21

           Because a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment, once a defendant has shown that a

warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the burden shifts to the

State to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. 22

To validate a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, the

State must satisfy a two-step process. 23               First, there must be probable

cause to enter or search a specific location. 24                     In the context of

warrantless        searches,      probable      cause    exists      “when   reasonably

trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer

on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that

the instrumentality . . . or evidence of a crime will be found.” 25

           Second, an exigency that requires an immediate action on the part

of law enforcement must exist. 26 We have identified three categories of

21
  Cole v. State, 490 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Lange v. California, 141
S.Ct. 2011, 2018 (2021).

22
  State v. Garcia, 569 S.W.3d 142, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also 43 George E. Dix &
John M. Schmolesky, Texas Practice—Criminal Practice and Procedure § 18:20 (3d ed. 2011).

23
     Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

24
     Id.

25
     Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

26
     Parker, 206 S.W.3d at 597.
                                                                           Igboji — 14

exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless intrusion by police

officers: (1) providing aid or assistance to persons whom law

enforcement reasonably believes are in need of assistance; (2)

protecting police officers from persons whom they reasonably believe to

be present, armed, and dangerous; and (3) preventing the destruction

of evidence or contraband. 27 In this case, we are only concerned with

the third circumstance.

                                       Analysis

         As discussed above, a warrantless seizure of personal property is

per se unreasonable. 28         This principle applies even though a Fourth

Amendment challenge may ultimately focus on the subsequent search

of a container rather than its initial seizure. 29 When law enforcement

has probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or

evidence of a crime, but has not secured a warrant, law enforcement

may seize the property, pending the issuance of the warrant to examine

the contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some

27
  McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 153.

28
     Place, 462 U.S. at 701.

29
     Id. at 700-01.
                                                                                Igboji — 15

other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present. 30

Relying in part upon our holding in Turrubiate v. State, the court of

appeals set out the legal standard, discussed above, for evaluating

whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless seizure

of Appellant’s phone to avoid the imminent destruction of evidence. 31

         However, the court read too much into our holding in Turrubiate

v. State. Relying on Turrubiate, the court of appeals required a showing

of some affirmative conduct by Appellant indicating a danger of

imminent destruction of the Snapchat videos. 32 Finding that the record

did not “contain any evidence showing that Appellant, by his affirmative

conduct, was actively deleting evidence on his phone[,]” the court of

appeals concluded that the warrantless seizure did not fall within the

exigent-circumstances exception. 33 However, we agree with the dissent

below that, in the context of a warrantless search or seizure pursuant

30
  Id. at 701; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 401-02 (2014) (noting that the exigent circumstances
exception may apply to cell phones and citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. at 469, which
involved a search of a residence, for the application of that exception to cell phone searches).

31
     Igboji, 607 S.W.3d at 167-68 (examining Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 151-52).

32
     Igboji, 607 S.W.3d at 169 (citing Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 153–55).

33
     Id. at 170.
                                                                               Igboji — 16

to exigent circumstances, there is no requirement that the record show

affirmative conduct on the part of the suspect. 34

         In this case, the court of appeals, perhaps understandably, placed

too much emphasis on our use of the phrase “affirmative conduct” in

Turrubiate. Our decision in Turrubiate relied upon the Supreme Court

holding in Kentucky v. King. 35 As we explained, the Supreme Court in

King rejected a presumption that those in possession of narcotics would

destroy evidence upon learning of a police presence. 36 In saying that

Kentucky v. King required “proof of imminent destruction based on

affirmative conduct”, our point in Turrubiate was that there was no

presumption that evidence would be imminently destroyed simply

because a suspect knew that law enforcement was nearby or had

contacted the suspect. 37 And based on King, we rejected the State’s

argument that law enforcement could infer that the destruction of

evidence was imminent simply because the suspect knew that police

34
     See id. at 172–73 (Christopher, J., dissenting).

35
     Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 152 (discussing the holding of King, 563 U.S. at 462-63).

36
     Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 152 (citing King, 563 U.S. at 469-70).

37
  See id. at 153; see also King, 563 U.S. at 469-70 (noting that a suspect may simply decline
to answer the door when police knock on it, but if a suspect attempts to destroy evidence
that may change the calculus).
                                                                            Igboji — 17

were present. 38 We explained that such an approach “would abandon

the requirement that the record affirmatively show facts that reasonably

indicate exigent circumstances that a defendant was attempting to, or

would attempt to, destroy evidence, a requirement vital to the Supreme

Court’s holding in King.” 39 And, as we reiterated later, “[w]e require

some evidence of exigency beyond mere knowledge of police presence

and an odor of illegal narcotics.” 40 But the critical thing the record must

show is facts suggesting an imminent destruction of evidence, 41 not

necessarily affirmative conduct on the part of the criminal suspect.

           Put another way, affirmative conduct by a suspect suggesting that

he or she will soon destroy evidence or is in the process of destroying

evidence—such as furtive movements—is one way of showing that an

exigency—the           imminent      destruction    of   evidence—exists. 42           But

affirmative conduct is not the only way that a record may affirmatively

38
     Id. at 152.

39
     Id.

40
     Id. at 154.

41
   Precedent consistently affirms that the potential destruction of evidence must be
“imminent.” See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Riley, 573
U.S. at 402; Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 455 (2016); Lange, 141 S.Ct. at 2018;
Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 923.

42
     See, e.g., Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 154.
                                                                            Igboji — 18

show that evidence was in danger of being imminently destroyed. 43

Given the fact-bound nature of the inquiry, 44 we decline to hold that

affirmative conduct by a suspect is always required to show that the

destruction of evidence was imminent. To the extent that our language

in our holding in Turrubiate requires otherwise, we explicitly disavow it

as an unwarranted extension of King.

           The court of appeals also appears to have announced a categorial

rule when it rejected the dissent’s argument that police may reasonably

seize personal property in order to secure a warrant when a criminal

suspect realizes that police are on his trail. 45 According to the court of

appeals, “Such a test would arm law enforcement with a weapon to

defeat the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law, thereby rendering it

effectively null with respect to protecting the People’s property from

unreasonable seizure.” 46 At first blush, relying upon the mere fact that

a suspect knows police are “on his trail” to establish exigency would

seem to authorize the type of impermissible presumption that a suspect

43
  See, e.g., McNeely, 569 U.S. at 153 (referring to “circumstances in which the suspect has
control over easily disposable evidence” as a “now or never” situation giving rise to an
exigency) (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116, n. 6 (2006)).

44
     See, e.g., Lange, 141 S.Ct. at 2018.

45
     Igboji, 607 S.W.3d at 170.

46
     Id.
                                                                             Igboji — 19

will attempt to destroy evidence merely because he possesses it and is

aware of police presence. 47                The Supreme Court appears to have

rejected this approach in King and noted that a suspect could choose to

stand on his constitutional rights rather than acquiesce to a request from

law enforcement. 48

         However, King and Turrubiate both dealt with situations involving

warrantless entry into a person’s home in order to conduct a warrantless

search rather than the warrantless seizure of personal property in order

to secure a search warrant. As noted in the dissent below, there are

differences between searches and seizures. 49                    In Segura v. United

States, the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless seizure

to maintain the status quo during the time necessary to secure a warrant

can be a reasonable warrantless seizure even if a warrantless search

47
     Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 152.

48
   King, 563 U.S. at 470 (“Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights
but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the
warrantless exigent circumstances search that may ensue.”). At least arguably, it also raises
the question of whether law enforcement created its own exigency through actual or
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. See King, 563 U.S. at 469 (“For these
reasons, we conclude that the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain
entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
However, it is an open question, left unconsidered by the court of appeals, whether this
limitation on the exigent-circumstances exception applies to seizures of personal property in
addition to searches of a premises.

49
     Igboji, 607 S.W.3d at 172 (Christopher, J. dissenting).
                                                                               Igboji — 20

would have been impermissible. 50 And in United States v. Place, the

Supreme Court recognized that law enforcement could essentially

“detain” personal property based upon less than probable cause so long

as the seizure was not unreasonably prolonged. 51                            Rather than

announcing a categorical rule that police may never seize personal

property simply because a criminal suspect knows he is a suspect, the

court of appeals should have analyzed under the totality of the

circumstances whether law enforcement’s seizure of Appellant’s phone

was the type of reasonable seizure necessary to maintain the status quo

to provide law enforcement with time to secure a search warrant. 52

                                       Conclusion

         For exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless seizure of

personal property, such as a cell phone, the record must show that law

enforcement officers reasonably believed that evidence would be

imminently destroyed if they waited to obtain a warrant to seize the

50
     Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984).

51
   Place, 462 U.S. at 708; but see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“We have
consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level
of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”); Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661,
668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“A person’s refusal to cooperate with police during a consensual
encounter cannot, by itself, provide the basis for a detention.”).

52
   See, e.g., Segura, 468 U.S. at 806; Place, 462 U.S. at 708 (recognizing that police may
seize personal property on reasonable suspicion in order to obtain a warrant, but they may
not unduly prolong the seizure).
                                                                                  Igboji — 21

property. Affirmative conduct by the suspect is not required, but it is

one way the record may show that the potential destruction was

imminent.        We remand for the court of appeals to reconsider the

arguments of the parties regarding whether exigent circumstances

existed to justify the warrantless seizure of Appellant’s cell phone in this

case and whether the officer’s conduct in seizing the property to obtain

a warrant was reasonable under those circumstances. 53

Delivered: March 8, 2023

Publish

53
   See, e.g., McClintock v. State, 444 S.W.3d 15, 20-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“But the
issue of the proper application of the exclusionary rule to the facts of this case is not remotely
clear cut, and we believe that the proper disposition here should be to remand for the court
of appeals to address it in the first instances. The parties make a number of substantial
arguments in support of their respective positions in this Court, and our resolution of this
issue (if any should even be necessary after a remand) would benefit from a carefully wrought
decision from the court of appeals.”).