Court Opinion

ID: 9716357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:35:20.540375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:44.271929
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Sullivan, P.J.
I concur in the dismissal of the purported appeal before us but for reasons substantially different than those stated by the majority.
There has been no judgment, final or otherwise, entered in the trial court. My colleagues prefer to not consider whether the July 5 entry is a final judgment. It is clear to me that such entry is not a judgment at all. It is very simply a ruling on a Motion to Dismiss. It cannot be construed otherwise. Hendrickson v. AFNB (1973), 158 Ind. App. 20, 301 N.E.2d 530 (impliedly overruled on other grounds by Soft Water Utilities v. LeFevre (1973), 261 Ind. 260, 301 N.E.2d 745 (opinion on transfer)).
In Cochran v. Sloan (1934), 99 Ind. App. 408, 410, 192 N.E. 772, as quoted with approval in Williams v. Williams (1939), 216 Ind. 110, 113, 23 N.E.2d 428 and as requoted in Fairwood Bluffs Conservancy District v. Imel (1970), 146 Ind. App. 352, 255 N.E.2d 674, 682-683, it was said most succinctly:
“It appears that no final disposition of the cause has been made in the court below. Although the record, as hereto*65fore stated, does show that the court sustained the defendants’ motion to dismiss the cause, it wholly fails to show that any order dismissing the cause was entered or that any judgment of dismissal was rendered. * * *
“It makes no difference how decisive may seem the ruling of a trial court as indicative of what the final judgment will be, for until there is such a final judgment no appeal can be properly taken, as appeals lie from final judgments only, except as otherwise provided by statute.”
Furthermore, the entry of July 5 could not be considered a final judgment even had it contained language of such import because Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 12(B) provides in part:
“When a motion to dismiss is sustained for failure to state a claim under subsection (B) (6) of this rule the pleading may be amended once as of right pursuant to Rule 15(A) within ten [10] days after service of notice of the court’s order sustaining the motion and thereafter with permission of the court pursuant to such rule.”
Thus, no judgment of dismissal, even if intended or contemplated by the trial court, could be appropriately entered until more than ten days following the ruling of July 5 which sustained the Motion to Dismiss.
The purported Motion to Correct Errors filed by Hansbrough was premature. A Motion to Correct Errors necessarily contemplates a previously entered judgment. The absence of such a judgment therefore renders any purported Motion to Correct Errors a nullity. Clanton v. State (1974), 159 Ind. App. 603, 308 N.E.2d 726.
Accordingly, the “ruling” on the “Motion to Correct Errors” cannot be deemed to be a final judgment pursuant to AP. 4(A) for purposes of an appeal.
We specifically held in Clanton v. State, supra:
“The question thus presented has previously been decided by this Court in the case of Spall v. State (1973), [156] Ind. App. [189], 295 N.E.2d 852. In the case presently before us, as well as in Spall, there was no motion to correct errors filed at any time subsequent to the court’s entry of judgment. The only motion to correct errors that was *66filed was filed after the verdict was returned but before judgment was entered thereon.
In Spall, we compared the language employed in the former statute and rule with the language employed in the present rules TR. 59 (C) and CR. 16, and concluded that the Supreme Court intended to change the former procedure so that now, under the present rules, the motion to correct errors should not be filed until after the entry of judgment, but should be filed within 60 days thereafter. We then stated as follows:
‘The effect of the appellant having prematurely filed his Motion to Correct Errors before sentencing, is that he has not filed any Motion to Correct Errors directed to the judgment or sentence, and therefore has not preserved any error on appeal. Without a Motion to Correct Errors having been filed, there is no complaint in the appellate tribunal, and nothing is pesented to this court for review.’
Since the question presented in this motion is the same as that presented in Spall, the same result must obtain.” 308 N.E.2d at 727.
The majority views the October 25 “ruling” or “entry” as a final judgment, notwithstanding that it purports to be nothing more than a ruling on a Motion to Correct Errors. It does not purport to be a judgment at all and it contains no words or phrases susceptible to such an inference. To the contrary, it is specifically directed to a “motion to correct errors sought to overturn the Court’s entry of July 6 (sic), 1973, sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss.” (Emphasis supplied). To be sure the ruling on the purported Motion to Correct Errors contains a statement of reasons, in the form of Findings and Conclusions, for rejecting the “Motion to Correct Errors” and it contains a rationale for the July 5 ruling. But findings, conclusions, reasons, opinions or rationales are not sufficient, for appellate purposes, to constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties. Farley v. Farley (1973), 157 Ind. App. 385, 300 N.E.2d 375; 3 Harvey, Indiana Practice § 54.1, p. 494. Therefore, even though the findings and conclusions here dealt in a seemingly determinative manner with certain issues within the framework of the case in litigation, such findings and conclusions did not constitute a final appealable judgment. Thus, even had Hans*67brough filed another purported Motion to Correct Errors directed to the October 25 entry, as the majority here would require, we would nevertheless be required to dismiss any subsequent attempted appeal for no reviewable question could be thereby presented. Clanton v. State, supra.
Note.—Reported at 326 N.E.2d 599.