Court Opinion

ID: 9450778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:57:31.950782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:26.850227
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result):
I also vote to sustain the determination of the trial judge, sitting without a jury, that the defendant crane company was not negligent and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.
I do not believe, however, that these determinations are findings of fact, to be disturbed only if “clearly erroneous,” Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. Several .other circuits have read the Supreme Court’s opinion in McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 75 S.Ct. 6, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954), to indicate that such determinations are findings of fact.1 But I follow the view of the Supreme Court’s action adopted by the Second Circuit, where Mc-Allister originated. This view is that ultimate determinations, such as negligence vel non, are “mixed questions of law and fact freely reviewable on appeal and not subject in the normal sense to the clearly erroneous limitation.”2 Under this standard, the court separates the legal and factual elements involved in the determination to the extent possible, and applies the standard of review ordinarily applicable to each. “ [I] f the trial judge, in assaying the proofs, including questions of credibility and the drawing of inferences of fact, can be shown to have arrived at his conclusory findings by a misapplication of the law, we must set aside the findings thus made.” 3
Here the trial court’s law and fact determinations are not sharply delineated. It is sufficiently clear, however, that correct legal principles were applied4 and that the findings of fact made are not “clearly erroneous.”

. E.g., Travis v. Motor Vessel Rapid Cities, 315 F.2d 805, 809-810 (8th Cir. 1963); Pacific Tow Boat Co. v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 276 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir. 1960).

. Castro v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 325 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1963) (citing cases).

. Id. at 75-76.

. For example, I read his determination of “no negligence” to rest on a balancing of testimony that the method of handling the crane jib was unsafe against testimony of industry practice, and not on an improper assessment of conclusive weight to the practice. See Harper & James, The Law of Torts § 17.3 (1956).