Court Opinion

ID: 9896607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 20:04:29.204853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.635152
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23 Barkett v. Malcoun CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

LISA ANN BARKETT,                                               B318270

    Cross-complainant and                                       Los Angeles County
    Appellant,                                                  Super. Ct. No. 18STCV08722

         v.

DIANE MALCOUN et al.,

    Cross-defendants and
    Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Elaine Lu, Judge. Affirmed.
     Gilmore Magness Janisse and David M. Gilmore for Cross-
complainant and Appellant.
     Mayall Hurley and Steven A. Malcoun for Cross-defendant
and Respondent Diane Malcoun.
     Klinedinst, Earll M. Pott, Robert M. Shaughnessy and
Amara S. Barbara for Cross-defendant and Respondent Steven
Malcoun.
               ______________________________
                            SUMMARY
       This case involves three sisters who are beneficiaries of a
trust created by their parents. One sister (plaintiff) complains
that another sister, as successor trustee of the trust and in other
capacities, breached her fiduciary duties and breached a contract
among their mother and the three sisters. Plaintiff alleges her
brother-in-law aided and abetted her sister’s breaches of
fiduciary duty, and alleges she is entitled to an accounting.
       The trial court sustained demurrers without leave to
amend. The court concluded the breach of contract allegations
were contradicted by the contract attached to the operative
pleading; court records of which the court took judicial notice
showed plaintiff could not state a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, and in addition, the statute of limitations barred that claim;
the aiding and abetting claim necessarily failed as well; and no
relationship existed requiring an accounting.
       We affirm the judgment of dismissal.
                               FACTS
1.     The Operative Pleading and Related Documents
       This case involves only the allegations in a cross-complaint
filed by Lisa Barkett against her sister and brother-in-law, Diane
and Steven Malcoun. The third sister, Debra Stephan, and her
husband George started this litigation by suing Ms. Barkett. The
Stephans are cross-defendants but are not parties in this appeal.
For simplicity’s sake, we refer to Ms. Barkett as plaintiff, and to
Diane and Steven Malcoun as defendants or the Malcouns (or by
their first names for sake of readability). Plaintiff’s operative
second amended cross-complaint (the complaint) is 47 pages long
and attaches 15 exhibits.
       Sylvester and Margaret Denton were parents of the
three sisters, who are the beneficiaries of a trust created by their
parents (the Denton trust). The parents were the original

                                 2
trustees, and Diane was named as a successor trustee.
Defendant Steven, Diane’s husband, is a licensed attorney, and
he prepared the trust documents and the parents’ wills.
       Sylvester Denton died on April 1, 2013. Upon Sylvester’s
death, the Denton trust was to be divided into three separate
trusts: a survivor’s trust for Margaret, a residual trust, and an
election trust. The trusts involved in this case are the survivor’s
trust and the residual trust. Sylvester’s community and separate
property was to be placed in the residual trust which then
became irrevocable. “The other half of the community and
separate property assets were to go into the Survivor’s Trust for
Margaret Denton.” She retained the power to make changes to
the survivor’s trust and was entitled to the income from both
trusts. Under Margaret’s will, most of her assets were to “pour
over” into the Denton trust. The beneficiaries of Margaret’s will
included the Denton trust and the three sisters. Diane was
designated as executrix.
       Following is a chronology of events after Sylvester’s death
in 2013, events before Margaret’s death in 2019, and events after
Margaret’s death, as alleged in the complaint or demonstrated by
the judicially noticed documents.
       On May 27, 2014, Diane filed a petition seeking approval of
a first accounting and report of administration of the Denton
trust (including a request for appointment of Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. or an alternate bank as successor trustee). According to the
complaint, the petition failed to disclose several assets that
should have passed into the Denton trust on Sylvester’s death via
his will. Shortly before Sylvester died, defendants “got Margaret
Denton to sign a power of attorney granting [Diane] a general
power of attorney over Margaret Denton’s affairs.” “Once [Diane]
had the power of attorney she proceeded to use that power of
attorney to take over all of the non-Trust accounts and to begin to

                                 3
drain those accounts and move money around to various
accounts.”
       On July 31, 2014, plaintiff filed objections to Diane’s
accounting, asserting the same claims she repeated and
expanded in the complaint she filed six years later. Her
objections included allegations that the accounting did not
identify assets and accounts that should be in the Denton trust,
and that defendants were using income from the trust for their
personal expenses.
       Margaret Denton did not agree with her daughter Lisa’s
allegations against her daughter Diane and son-in-law Steven.
On August 21, 2014, Margaret consented in writing to Diane’s
first accounting and joined in the request that all acts and
transactions of Diane be ratified and approved. Margaret’s
written and verified approval of Diane’s first accounting
specifically responded to and rejected plaintiff’s objections
concerning allegedly missing bank accounts and improper use of
trust assets.
       On May 12, 2015, the probate court held that, under the
terms of the trust and applicable law, plaintiff had no standing to
object to the accounting. Paragraph 16 of the Denton trust
provided: “During the lifetime of either Settlor and while both
Settlors are acting as Trustees, the Trustees shall account only to
the Settlors and their written approval shall be final and
conclusive in respect to the transactions disclosed in the account
as to all beneficiaries of the Trust, including unborn and
contingent beneficiaries.”
       The probate court’s order was served on plaintiff and was
not appealed.
       On July 3, 2015, Margaret executed a declaration, attached
as an exhibit to the complaint. The complaint characterized
Margaret’s declaration as making clear that her intent was to

                                 4
keep her three daughters informed about the status of the trust
and her accounts, “to make sure that the division was equal on
her passing,” and not to allow any of them to use her money or
her property. (Margaret also expressed her expectation that
Wells Fargo Bank would become the trustee of all her accounts,
whether in the trust or not.)
      The complaint alleged that on August 26, 2015, Margaret
and the three sisters met with a mediator and negotiated a
resolution of some of the issues in Diane’s May 2014 accounting
to which Lisa objected and Margaret had consented. The
complaint alleged Margaret and her daughters “reduced some of
that to a written agreement.” Plaintiff attached the mediation
agreement as an exhibit to the complaint, and alleged it “does not
include all of the provisions agreed to and it was agreed that
there would be further discussions although those never took
place.” The complaint characterized the mediation agreement as
“[making] clear that there were further issues to discuss and
agree on at a future date.”
      The August 27, 2015 mediation agreement contradicts the
allegation that the parties agreed there were further issues to be
decided: “[A]ll of the material terms of the settlement are set
forth herein.”
      The remaining provisions of the mediation agreement
(other than provisions on its admissibility and enforceability)
concern matters relating to Margaret’s stays with the daughters
on a rotating basis and their related communications with each
other, their telephone access to Margaret, her medical records,
and that if Margaret “is taken for medical care, the other
daughters will be notified immediately.” The only mention of the
Denton trust is a provision that in the event Margaret needs a
caregiver while in a daughter’s care, “the daughter shall be
reimbursed by the trust.”

                                5
       On August 31, 2015, the probate court issued an order
approving Diane’s first account and report. Also on August 31,
2015, the probate court entered an order accepting Diane’s tender
of resignation and appointing Wells Fargo Bank as successor
trustee upon the satisfaction of several conditions. These
included transfer of the remaining assets of the survivor’s trust
and residual trust to Wells Fargo Bank and filing of proper
receipts with the court, and the court’s entry of an order
regarding a second and final account and report for the survivor’s
trust and the residual trust.
       Within a month of these orders, Diane petitioned for
approval of a second and final accounting. On November 25,
2015, the probate court approved the final accounting and
discharged Diane as a trustee. The court’s order states that
counsel for Margaret approved of the petition and accounting,
and all amendments and supplemental reports and accounts.
       Four years later, on November 20, 2019, Margaret died.
Plaintiff filed her complaint on June 9, 2020. The complaint
alleged causes of action against Diane for breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, and an accounting; and causes of action
against both the Malcouns for elder abuse and aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty. (Plaintiff has abandoned the
elder abuse claim.)
       The complaint alleged Diane was “in breach of the
agreement” among Margaret and the three sisters in that she
used Margaret’s assets for her and her family’s personal benefit,
failed to turn over the assets to Wells Fargo Bank, refused to
account for the nontrust assets, concealed information about
assets, failed to provide information about Margaret’s health and
physical condition, and manipulated accounts to the exclusion of
plaintiff.

                                6
      The complaint alleged that “[t]o date [May 3, 2021] Wells
Fargo Bank has not provided an accounting or closed the Trust
although it is anticipated such an accounting will be provided
when it is time to close the Trust.” The complaint continued,
alleging “that when the accounting is provided it will confirm
that money was taken by [defendants] for their own personal
benefit or the benefit of their families.” “Despite being the
Executrix of the Last Will, Diane Malcoun has not accounted for
the assets to be disposed of via that Last Will whether as to
Sylvester or Margaret. She has sent no notices relating thereto
and has not opened or completed a probate. She has not
accounted to Wells Fargo Bank or the beneficiaries for the items
that were to be divided among the children or those items that
should have poured over into the Trust.”
2.    The Demurrers
       The Malcouns each filed demurrers to the operative
complaint. They also filed requests for judicial notice of
numerous court records, some of which we have just described.
The court granted these unopposed requests, while observing the
court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of matters asserted
in the documents.
      Diane demurred on several grounds. She contended the
breach of contract claim failed because the allegations of an oral
agreement were time-barred, the operative complaint was a sham
pleading, and there was no alleged breach of the mediation
agreement. The breach of fiduciary duty claim failed to state a
fiduciary duty as to one trust and was barred by res judicata as to
the other trust, and the claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. The cause of action for an accounting failed because
Diane was no longer trustee of the trust.
      Steven demurred to the aiding and abetting claim on the
ground, among others, that it was time-barred.

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3.     The Trial Court’s Rulings
       In a detailed 44-page opinion, the trial court sustained both
demurrers without leave to amend.
       The breach of contract claim failed because the allegations
were contrary to the mediation agreement attached to the
complaint and executed by the three sisters and Margaret on
August 27, 2015. The court concluded: “to the extent that
[plaintiff] contends that there were additional terms to the
Mediation Agreement not memorialized in writing, these
allegations are directly contrary to the exhibit, and thus, the
allegations in the exhibit take precedence.” It was thus
irrelevant whether the alleged oral agreement was time-barred or
a sham pleading.
       The breach of fiduciary duty claim failed on two grounds.
First, Margaret’s ratification of Diane’s actions and accounting in
judicially noticed probate court records was conclusive and
binding on plaintiff under the express terms of the trust
instrument. Second, the claim was barred by the three-year
statute of limitations under Probate Code section 16460. The
trial court stated plaintiff was “plainly on notice of the alleged
improprieties and defects that form the basis of her breach of
fiduciary duty claim as she filed objections on July 31, 2014 to
[Diane’s] first accounting.” “Three years from the final
accounting by [Diane] being mailed to [plaintiff] would be
November 18, 2018.” Plaintiff’s cross-complaint was filed June 9,
2020, well after the three-year deadline.
       The court sustained the demurrer to the claim for an
accounting on the ground the complaint did not allege a
relationship between plaintiff and defendant that requires an
accounting.
       The court sustained Steven’s demurrer to plaintiff’s cause
of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, holding

                                 8
that because the complaint failed to allege a breach of fiduciary
duty by Diane, there was “no primary violation for [Steven] to
have knowingly aided and abetted.” The trial court also
sustained Steven’s demurrer on statute of limitation grounds,
relying on the one-year statute of limitations for wrongful acts in
performance of legal services.
       The court entered a judgment of dismissal and plaintiff
filed a timely appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
       A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. We
review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action. For purposes of review,
we accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also
consider matters that may be judicially noticed. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
       When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Plaintiff has the burden to show a
reasonable possibility the complaint can be amended to state a
cause of action. (Ibid.)
       We preface our discussion with the observation that
plaintiff’s briefing repeatedly refers to matters not alleged in her
complaint, some of which are belied by facts that are alleged in
the complaint. For example, plaintiff’s brief contends Margaret
was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and was prescribed an
Alzheimer’s medication in March 2013, a few days before she
gave Diane her power of attorney, and that the Malcouns “took
steps to gain and exercise control over Margaret Denton’s affairs

                                 9
even in light of her Alzheimer’s diagnosis and knowledge that she
was taking medication for treatment of Alzheimer’s.” However,
the August 27, 2015 mediation agreement provides: “All three
daughters agree Margaret presently has capacity and is not in
need of a Guardian ad Litem.” Plaintiff’s unfounded assertions,
and others without basis in or citation to the record, have no
place in appellate briefing.
1.    The Breach of Contract Claim
      Plaintiff contends she properly alleged, in addition to the
written mediation agreement, oral agreements among Margaret
and her daughters. The allegations of oral agreements are
directly contrary to the terms of the mediation agreement.
      We have described the provisions of the mediation
agreement (ante, at pp. 5–6). Those provisions directly conflict
with the complaint’s allegations that on August 26, 2015, the
parties “reached an agreement that was partly written and partly
oral,” and that the written agreement “made clear that there
were further issues to discuss and agree on at a future date.” The
agreement expressly states that “all of the material terms of the
settlement are set forth herein.” This is directly contrary to the
complaint’s allegation that the mediation agreement “does not
include all of the provisions agreed to.” Moreover, the complaint
itself alleged that further discussions “never took place.”
       Plaintiff contends and the complaint alleged that Diane
“breached the agreement by not turning over all of the assets of
Marg[a]ret to the Trust and failing to provide full disclosure and
by using Margaret’s funds for their own benefit.” But the
mediation agreement contains no terms relating to the trust or
other assets (except that the trust would reimburse costs for a
caregiver if needed).

                               10
       Plaintiff tries to fill this void by relying on Margaret’s
July 3, 2015 declaration. The complaint alleged that a “key
component[] to the agreement” was Diane’s resignation and
replacement as trustee, including that she would turn over all
Margaret’s assets to Wells Fargo Bank. The complaint alleged
“[t]his was later made clear in Margaret’s Declaration as to her
understanding of what the agreement was.” Similarly, the
complaint alleged that “[t]he oral parts of the subsequent oral
agreement were in effect memorialized by Margaret Denton in
her Declaration” attached to the complaint.
       However, Margaret’s July 3, 2015 declaration predates the
August 27, 2015 mediation agreement, and does not state or
imply any agreement among the sisters, but rather merely
expresses Margaret’s intentions. (These include her desire for
her daughters to have “equal and free access to the accountings
and other records relating to the Trusts,” and “to be as
transparent as possible with each of them,” and her expectation
that Wells Fargo Bank would replace Diane as trustee and be the
trustee for all her accounts, whether in the trust or not.)
       In short, plaintiff’s allegations of an oral agreement to
additional terms are directly contradicted by the terms of the
written agreement. And, as the trial court concluded, the written
agreement takes precedence. “ ‘While the “allegations [of a
complaint] must be accepted as true for purposes of demurrer,”
the “facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint will
also be accepted as true and, if contrary to the allegations in the
pleading, will be given precedence.” ’ ” (Moran v. Prime
Healthcare Management, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1145–
1146; see Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate (1941)
46 Cal.App.2d 684, 691 [treating “conclusions of the pleader . . .

                                11
contrary to the express terms of the instrument creating the trust
which is . . . made a part of the complaint” as “surplusage”].)
2.     The Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
       To plead a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
plaintiff must allege facts showing the existence of a fiduciary
duty, breach of that duty, and resulting damage. (Pellegrini v.
Weiss (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 515, 524.) Plaintiff has not done so.
       “ ‘[B]efore a person can be charged with a fiduciary
obligation, he must either knowingly undertake to act on behalf
and for the benefit of another, or must enter into a relationship
which imposes that undertaking as a matter of law.’ ” (City of
Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008)
43 Cal.4th 375, 386.) Plaintiff must plead facts giving rise to a
confidential relationship; “[a] bare allegation that defendants
assumed a fiduciary relationship” is a conclusion of law and there
“ ‘is not a fiduciary relation between the promisor or promisee
and the beneficiary of a contract.’ ” (Zumbrun v. University of
Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 13.)
       Here, the complaint alleged Diane undertook fiduciary
duties as successor trustee; as executrix of Margaret’s will; as
holder of Margaret’s power of attorney; as cosigner on Margaret’s
accounts; and under the mediation agreement and “an agreement
with Margaret Denton regarding her care and living
arrangements, health care and financial well being.” However,
except for her fiduciary duties as successor trustee, the
documents and relationships cited do not give rise to a fiduciary
duty that Diane owed to plaintiff.
       The complaint alleged that Margaret’s will designated
Diane as executrix, and that Diane’s “position as the Executrix”
imposed fiduciary duties on Diane to the estate and its
beneficiaries. Of course, an executor of an estate, acting as

                               12
executor, does have such fiduciary duties. However, a
designation in a will, standing alone, does not give the person
designated as the executor the authority to administer the
estate. That requires appointment by the probate court. The
complaint did not allege that the probate court ever appointed
Diane to act as executrix of Margaret’s will. In fact, the
complaint alleged Diane “has not opened or completed a probate.”
       “A person has no power to administer the estate until the
person is appointed personal representative and the appointment
becomes effective.” (Prob. Code, § 8400, subd. (a).) That
provision applies “whether or not the person is named executor in
the decedent’s will . . . .” (Id., subd. (b).) Consequently, Diane
had no fiduciary duty based solely on her designation as executor
in Margaret’s will, as she has not been appointed by the court to
act as the decedent’s personal representative (i.e., as the executor
or administrator of her estate).
       Any duty under the mediation agreement or other
agreement with Margaret concerning her care and financial well-
being was owed to Margaret, not plaintiff. Plaintiff contends the
complaint alleges that “the relationship among the parties” to
those agreements “creates additional duties on Diane Malcoun,”
and “specifically alleges that it [the agreement] created a
fiduciary relationship.” She cites inapt cases that involve
principal-agent and partnership relationships. Plaintiff asserts
we must accept her “relationship” allegations as true, but that is
not the case. We accept as true only the material facts alleged,
not conclusions of fact or law. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d
at p. 318.) Plaintiff has not alleged facts giving rise to a fiduciary
relationship between Diane and plaintiff. Similarly, the power of
attorney over Margaret’s affairs gives rise to a fiduciary duty to
Margaret, not to plaintiff.

                                 13
       That leaves the trusts of which Diane was successor trustee
until her discharge upon approval of her accounting (on
November 25, 2015) and filing of receipts for delivery of the trust
assets to Wells Fargo Bank (dated September 1, 2016, and
October 3, 2016), as reflected in court records judicially noticed.
As trustee, Diane owed fiduciary duties to beneficiaries of the
trust. (Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340.)
These duties existed as to the trust assets, and until Diane was
discharged as trustee.
       The court records that were either attached to the
complaint or judicially noticed include Diane’s first and later-filed
final accountings; plaintiff’s objections to Diane’s first accounting;
Margaret’s written consent to Diane’s accountings, including her
rejection of plaintiff’s objections; trust provisions requiring the
trustee to account only to the settlors while they were alive and
making a settlor’s written approval final and conclusive; and a
court order approving Diane’s final accounting, including the
court’s statement that counsel for Margaret approved of the
petition and accounting.
       These court records permit only one legal conclusion:
Margaret’s approval of Diane’s accounting was final and
conclusive under the terms of the Denton trust, and plaintiff
cannot now relitigate her claims of missing assets and assets
used for the trustee’s benefit.
       Plaintiff cites Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058,
1076 (Giraldin) as support for her contention that she may
pursue her breach of fiduciary duty claims against Diane.
Giraldin is starkly distinguishable and does not apply to the
entirely different facts in this case.
       Giraldin held that “after the settlor’s death, the
beneficiaries have standing to assert a breach of the fiduciary

                                 14
duty the trustee owed to the settlor to the extent that breach
harmed the beneficiaries.” (Giraldin, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 1076.) In Giraldin, the beneficiaries alleged the trustee
squandered the settlor’s life savings for the trustee’s own benefit
and that of his brother, making a series of bad investments in a
company his brother started and the trustee partially owned. (Id.
at p. 1064.) There were trial court findings that the settlor did
not authorize any of the trustee’s actions in writing as the trust
required, and that the settlor “ ‘was not sufficiently mentally
competent’ ” to analyze or authorize the trustee to make the
investments at issue. (Ibid.)
       In Giraldin, there was no accounting by the trustee and
therefore no express approval of any accounting by the settlor.
Here there was: Margaret expressly ratified Diane’s actions by
approving her accountings and rejecting objections plaintiff
raised, including plaintiff’s claim of improper use of Margaret’s
credit cards and her claim of bank accounts not included in the
accounting. Margaret confirmed the bank accounts were her
separate property and not property of the trust, and expressed
her belief there was no factual basis for plaintiff’s criticism of
Diane’s actions as successor trustee.
       In short, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that
the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is barred by
Margaret’s ratification of Diane’s actions in judicially noticed
court records, “made conclusive and binding” on plaintiff by the
express terms of the trust instrument. Nothing in Giraldin
changes this analysis.
       The trial court also found plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary
duty claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations
under Probate Code section 16460. Section 16460 includes this
provision: “If a beneficiary has received an interim or final

                                 15
account in writing, or other written report, that adequately
discloses the existence of a claim against the trustee for breach of
trust, the claim is barred as to that beneficiary unless a
proceeding to assert the claim is commenced within three years
after receipt of the account or report. An account or report
adequately discloses existence of a claim if it provides sufficient
information so that the beneficiary knows of the claim or
reasonably should have inquired into the existence of the claim.”
(Id., subd. (a)(1).)
       We also find plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. The objections
plaintiff filed on July 31, 2014, to Diane’s first accounting show
that plaintiff was then on notice of allegedly missing assets and
alleged misuse of trust assets for personal benefit. Plaintiff was
served with Diane’s final accounting in November 2015, so the
three-year statute expired not later than November 2018.
Plaintiff did not file her cross-complaint for breach of fiduciary
duty until June 9, 2020, well beyond the three-year limit
specified in Probate Code section 16460.
       Plaintiff contends her claims are not time-barred, but her
arguments are either not developed, not comprehensible, or
simply mistaken. For example, she states the pertinent date is
the date of the complaint that George and Debra Stephan filed
against her on December 14, 2018, not the date of her June 2020
cross-complaint against the Malcouns. She cites ZF Micro
Devices, Inc. v. TAT Capital Partners, Ltd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
69, 84–85, 92–93, but does not describe the case or explain why
or how it applies to this case. On that basis alone, she has
forfeited the argument. In any event, ZF held that the filing of a
complaint tolled the statute of limitations for a defendant’s
permissive cross-complaint against the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 92; id.
at p. 73.) The ZF holding does not apply here because the

                                 16
Malcouns were not plaintiffs in the Stephans’ lawsuit against
plaintiff. Plaintiff makes no argument for applying ZF’s holding
to a cross-complaint against a third party, and we find it does not
apply here.
3.     The Claim for an Accounting
       “[A] fiduciary relationship between the parties is not
required to state a cause of action for accounting. All that is
required is that some relationship exists that requires an
accounting. [Citation.] The right to an accounting can arise from
the possession by the defendant of money or property which,
because of the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff, the
defendant is obliged to surrender.” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179–180.)
       Here, plaintiff maintains Diane must account to her for
assets of Margaret and Sylvester Denton that were never in the
trust and/or were taken by the Malcouns. She repeatedly refers
to Diane as a fiduciary, and she claims it “does not appear that
Diane Malcoun ever prepared a full or complete accounting.”
This argument is belied by the accountings prepared and filed by
Diane while she was successor trustee and consented to by
Margaret. Diane is no longer the trustee, and she has not been
the trustee since October 2016; she has no relationship with the
trust to account for. And, so far as nontrust assets are concerned
(and as previously mentioned), Diane is not the personal
representative of the estates of Sylvester or Margaret, and so has
no duty to account or power to act on behalf of the estates.
Plaintiff has not and cannot allege a relationship that requires an
accounting.
4.     The Aiding and Abetting Claim
       “A defendant is liable for aiding and abetting another in the
commission of an intentional tort, including a breach of fiduciary

                                17
duty, if the defendant ‘ “ ‘knows the other’s conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement
to the other to so act.’ ” ’ ” (Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 343.) Because plaintiff has not
stated a claim against Diane for breach of fiduciary duty, her
claim against Steven for aiding abetting the alleged breach of
fiduciary duty necessarily fails as well.
5.     Leave to Amend
       Plaintiff contends that if the trial court believed the
allegations of the complaint lacked clarity, leave to amend should
have been granted. She says she can “allege evidentiary facts
that support the allegations with even more detail,” but does not
tell us what those facts are. Consequently, she has not met her
burden to show a reasonable possibility the complaint can be
amended to state a cause of action. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra,
39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
                             DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Diane and Steven Malcoun shall
recover their costs on appeal.

                              GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        WILEY, J.

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