Court Opinion

ID: 9513886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:41:49.893773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:04.889451
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 21] I respectfully dissent.
[¶22] The district judge held on the issue of attorney fees:
The two statutes conflict in that one leaves the amount of attorney’s fees to the discretion of the Court and the other provides for the creation of a specific schedule of fees to be followed and a cap on the amount that may be awarded. The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that “when two statutes relating to the same subject matter appear to be in conflict, they should whenever possible be construed to give effect to both if such can be done without doing violence to either.” City of Bismarck v. Fettig, 1999 ND 193, ¶ 14, 601 N.W.2d 247. In addition, “[w]hen there is a conflict between statutes, we construe specific statutes to control general statutes.” Id. at ¶ 15 (citing Haff v. Hettich, 1999 ND 94, ¶34, 593 N.W.2d 383). This follows North Dakota law which states:
Whenever a general provision in a statute is in conflict with a special provision in the same or in another statute, the two must be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both provisions, but if the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable the special provision must prevail and must be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is enacted later and it is the manifest legislative intent that such general provision shall prevail.
N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07 (1987).
... Because Title 65 governs a more specific and narrowly defined area, it would follow that sections 65-02-08 and 65-10-03 would be considered more specific provisions that must control in cases involving the WSI over the more general provisions found under Chapter 28-32.
[¶ 23] I am persuaded that the district court was correct.
[¶ 24] Any possibility that the two statutes can be read harmoniously is removed *409by the explicit language of N.D.C.C. § 65-10-03:
The maximum fee may be exceeded upon application of the injured employee to the organization, upon a finding that the claim had clear and substantial merit, and that the legal or factual issues involved in the appeal were unusually complex, but a court may not order that the maximum fee be exceeded.
See also N.D.C.C. § 65-02-08 providing that “a hearing officer or arbitrator may not order that the maximum fees be exceeded.”
[IT 25] If the legislature had intended an exception for cases under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-50, it would not have stated “a court may not order that the maximum fee be exceeded.” Instead, the legislature provided that in cases of “clear and substantial merit,” a claimant can apply to WSI for a fee in excess of the maximum fees. This may be such a case. However, application to WSI is the correct manner for achieving such a result.
[¶ 26] I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
[¶ 27] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER