Court Opinion

ID: 9396658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 15:06:01.641354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.623196
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13300

     SMILEY FIRST, LLC     vs.   DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

            Suffolk.    November 4, 2022. – May 23, 2023.

 Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                            & Georges, JJ.

Easement. Eminent Domain, Extent of taking.      Real Property,
     Easement. Railroad.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
January 24, 2020.

     The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on motions for
summary judgment.

     The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

     Paul L. Feldman (Shawn M. McCormack also present) for the
plaintiff.
     Kendra Kinscherf, Assistant Attorney General, for the
defendant.
     Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow, for New England Legal
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
     Deborah J. La Fetra, of California, Sam Spiegelman, of
Washington, & Jonathan M. Houghton, for Pacific Legal
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
                                                                     2

     GEORGES, J.     In this case, we consider whether an easement

taken by eminent domain in 2018 (2018 easement) by the

defendant, the Department of Transportation (MassDOT), exceeded

the scope of an easement taken in 1991 (1991 easement) by

MassDOT's predecessor in interest, the Department of Public

Works (DPW), with respect to certain land in the South Boston

section of Boston (burdened land) that presently is owned by the

plaintiff, Smiley First, LLC (Smiley).

     DPW's 1991 order of taking (1991 taking) created an

easement over the burdened land for purposes of "the relocation

of the facilities of the Consolidated Rail Corporation

[(Conrail)]," which were going to be displaced by construction

of a haul road for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, also known

as the "Big Dig."1    In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority (MBTA) announced plans to construct a test track and a

6,000 square foot building for newly purchased subway cars (Red

Line test track project) on the portion of Smiley's land

burdened by the 1991 easement.     MassDOT then recorded the 2018

confirmatory order of taking (2018 taking), which provides that

it is to confirm and, "to the extent necessary to establish such

     1 The Central Artery/Tunnel Project rerouted the Central
Artery, a portion of Interstate Route 93 that ran through the
city of Boston on an elevated highway, to an underground tunnel.
DPW and Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority operated
together on the Big Dig project. MassDOT is the lawful
successor to DPW in accordance with G. L. c. 6C.
                                                                    3

rights, acquire[]" an easement "for railroad purposes" that

include the Red Line test track project.

    Based on its contention that the 2018 taking merely

confirmed rights that it already held under the 1991 taking,

MassDOT refused to pay Smiley any compensation for the 2018

taking, and this litigation ensued.   On the parties' cross

motions for partial summary judgment, a Superior Court judge

determined, in reliance on his understanding that easements

taken by eminent domain are not subject to the ordinary rules of

interpretation of easements, that the 1991 easement was a grant

to use the entire area of the easement for "any 'railroad

purpose,'" including the Red Line test track project, and,

accordingly, that Smiley was due no compensation as a result of

the 2018 taking.

    We hold that, while the intent of the parties is not to be

considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the

ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply.

Thus, the "scope of the condemnor's use of the easement will be

limited to the extent reasonably necessary for the purpose

served by the taking, so that the landowner's right to use the

easement area is as great as possible while remaining reasonably

consistent with the purpose of the taking."   General Hosp. Corp.

v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 423 Mass. 759, 764 (1996).

Applying this principle here, we conclude that the 1991 easement
                                                                     4

was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement and, in

particular, did not encompass a use such as the Red Line test

track project.   Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of

MassDOT must be reversed, and the matter remanded to the

Superior Court for a determination of the appropriate

compensation due Smiley.2

     1.   Background.    We summarize the undisputed facts set

forth in the motion judge's decision on the parties' cross

motions for partial summary judgment, supplemented by other

uncontroverted facts in the summary judgment record.     See

Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 685

(2022).

     a.   Smiley's property.   In 2015, Smiley acquired an 18,088

square foot parcel of land at the intersection of B Street and

Cypher Street in South Boston.    Approximately 12,510 square feet

of that property comprise the burdened land at issue here, which

is contained within one of the parcels, parcel 60-E-RR-1,

subject to the 1991 taking.

     b.   1991 taking.   In 1991, DPW laid out a limited access

State highway, known as the South Boston Haul Road (haul road),

to support construction of the extension of Interstate Route 90

to the proposed third harbor tunnel, as part of the Central

     2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs by the New England Legal
Foundation and the Pacific Legal Foundation.
                                                                   5

Artery/Tunnel Project.   Construction of the haul road was a

massive enterprise that affected over 1 million square feet of

land spread across twenty-eight parcels owned by multiple

different owners.

    To acquire property for the haul road, the 1991 taking took

in fee simple approximately 400,000 square feet of land occupied

by Conrail, which is not at issue in this appeal.   Because this

action displaced Conrail's rail operations, the order also

established easements on several neighboring parcels, including

over 12,510 square feet of parcel 60-E-RR-1, so that Conrail

could relocate its railroad operations there.   Specifically, the

order provides:

    "In connection with the laying out of the State highway
    hereinbefore described, it is necessary to relocate
    portions of railroad rights of way and land is hereby
    acquired for said relocation as follows:

    "Easements are hereby taken in parcels 60-E-RR-1, 60-E-RR-
    5, and 60-E-RR-6, shown on the plan hereinafter referred
    to, for the relocation of facilities of the Consolidated
    Rail Corporation, including all trees and structures
    located thereon . . . .

    "Said easements (i) shall be used for railroad purposes
    only, (ii) shall not be used for the storage of any
    hazardous materials, hazardous wastes or hazardous
    substances other than in connection with the extension of
    Interstate Route 90 or the reconstruction of Interstate
    Route 93, and (iii) shall be subject to the rights of the
    owner of the underlying fee as hereinafter provided. . . .

    "Said railroad easements are acquired in limited vertical
    dimension only, said area being limited to a height of
    [twenty feet, six inches] above the top of the rails to be
    placed thereon. Included in the easements, however, is the
                                                                      6

     unlimited right to utilize the air rights above [twenty
     feet, six inches] for twelve (12) years following the date
     of recording of this taking. Thereafter, the use of said
     easements shall be subject to the rights of the owner of
     the air rights so reserved to use the area subject to the
     easements as reasonably may be required, subject to the
     approval of the party or parties having the benefit of the
     easements, for access to and to support the uses of the air
     rights."

This order by its terms defined the 1991 easement, and, pursuant

to it, Conrail subsequently relocated its main line to a single

track that crosses land, now part of Smiley's property, that is

burdened by the 1991 easement.

     c.    2018 taking.   Through a series of transactions, MassDOT

ultimately acquired the 1991 easement.3    MassDOT subsequently

sponsored the MBTA's Red Line test track project and authorized

the MBTA to use MassDOT's land and rights in land for the

project.   MassDOT and the MBTA also publicly declared that the

entirety of the burdened land on Smiley's property was subject

to the MBTA's exclusive use for any railroad purpose, including

the Red Line test track project.

     After Smiley filed a complaint in the Land Court

challenging MassDOT's authority to use the burdened land for the

     3 In 1997, the Commonwealth conveyed the 1991 easement to
Conrail. On June 1, 1999, Conrail sold its Boston rail assets
to New York Central Lines LLC, which subsequently merged into
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX). Through a release deed dated
June 11, 2010, CSX conveyed to MassDOT its right, title, and
interest in the 1991 easement, subject to a retained easement
for CSX's continued freight service.
                                                                    7

Red Line test track project, MassDOT recorded the 2018 taking.

That order purported to "confirm and, to the extent necessary to

establish such rights, acquire[] an easement for railroad

purposes as . . . set forth in the 1991 [t]aking and/or in this

instrument," including testing and storage of rapid transit rail

vehicles and reasonably related uses such as access, parking,

and utility needs.    "For the further avoidance of doubt," the

order explicitly declared that these uses included the Red Line

test track project.

     d.   Prior proceedings.   Following dismissal of its initial

suit without prejudice,4 in 2020, Smiley filed a new complaint

against MassDOT in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory and

equitable relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, with respect to

the parties' respective rights under the 1991 easement as of

January 11, 2018 (the day before the 2018 taking), and damages

pursuant to G. L. c. 79, for the taking by MassDOT on January

12, 2018.

     4 A Land Court judge dismissed Smiley's quiet title claims,
but not the declaratory judgment claims, which, by agreement of
the parties, were transferred to the Superior Court. A Superior
Court judge dismissed those claims without prejudice, ruling
that the remaining declaratory judgment claims had to be
combined in a single action with a claim for land damages.
Smiley then filed his current complaint in the Superior Court in
January 2020; the resulting judgment is what is now before us on
appeal.
                                                                       8

    Following a nonevidentiary hearing on the parties' cross

motions for partial summary judgment, a Superior Court judge

denied Smiley's motion, allowed MassDOT's cross motion, and

dismissed Smiley's claim for compensation under G. L. c. 79.

The judge agreed with MassDOT that the 1991 "easement, by its

terms, may be used for any 'railroad purposes,' which includes

the construction of a test track and building to test newly-

purchased subway cars."      Smiley filed an appeal with the Appeals

Court, and we transferred the case to this court on our own

motion.

    2.    Discussion.   a.    Standard of review.   "We review a

decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo and, thus,

accord no deference to the decision of the motion judge"

(quotation omitted).    Williams, 490 Mass. at 689-690, quoting

Tracer Lane II Realty, LLC v. Waltham, 489 Mass. 775, 778

(2022).   "The allowance of a motion for summary judgment 'is

appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact

in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.'"   Williams, supra at 689, quoting Barron

Chiropractic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group,

469 Mass. 800, 804 (2014).      Where both parties have moved for

summary judgment, "the evidence is viewed in the light most

favorable to the party against whom judgment" has been entered.
                                                                     9

Green Mountains Ins. Co. v. Wakelin, 484 Mass. 222, 226 (2020),

quoting Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012).

    b.    Principles governing easements taken by eminent domain.

"The meaning and scope of an instrument of taking, so far as it

affects private rights in property, is a question of law."

General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764, citing Flagg v. Concord,

222 Mass. 569, 572 (1916).

    We begin by reviewing the principles governing our general

construction of easements.    "An affirmative easement 'creates a

nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of

another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the

uses authorized by the easement.'"   Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass.

658, 663 (2007), quoting Restatement (Third) of Property:

Servitudes § 1.2(1) (2000).   "Restrictions on land 'are

disfavored,' . . . and doubts concerning the rights of use of an

easement 'are to be resolved in favor of freedom of land from

servitude'" (citation omitted).   Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC,

467 Mass. 1, 9 (2014).    "[T]he servient owner retains the use of

his [or her] land for all purposes except such as are

inconsistent with the right granted to the dominant owner" or

acquired by that owner.   Merry v. Priest, 276 Mass. 592, 600

(1931).

    The motion judge concluded that "[t]hese principles . . .

do not assist Smiley," and Smiley's reliance on them was
                                                                    10

misplaced, because they derive from cases that concern

"transfers or prescriptive rights involving private parties"

(emphasis added), Mugar v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 28

Mass. App. Ct. 443, 445 (1990).   The conclusion that easements

taken by eminent domain are not to be construed in favor of

freedom of the land from servitude was error.

    As MassDOT points out, an easement taken by eminent domain

must be construed in light of the language of the order of

taking and the "circumstances surrounding the taking."    General

Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764.    This approach differs in one

respect from negotiated easements, as the intents of the owner

and the government entity taking the easement are not relevant.

See Mugar, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 445 (intent of parties is

irrelevant in construing easement taken by eminent domain

because "[t]he taking of private property for a public purpose

may be accomplished without the consent of the owner," and "the

intent of the governmental body is largely beyond the scope of

judicial scrutiny").   Thus, "principles of interpretation

designed to give effect to the express or implied intent of

parties contracting for or acquiring an interest in land . . .

are, in general, inapplicable to eminent domain proceedings."

Taylor v. Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Comm'n, 475 Mass. 682, 690

n.17 (2016), quoting Bateman v. Board of Appeals of Georgetown,

56 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 239 (2002).
                                                                  11

    But that does not mean that an easement taken by eminent

domain is insulated from application of the ordinary rules of

construction otherwise applicable to the interpretation of

easements.   Apart from consideration of the parties' intent,

which is inapplicable to takings by eminent domain, we

consistently have applied the same rules of construction to

easements taken by eminent domain as are applicable to privately

granted easements.   Most significantly with respect to the

issues here, whether an easement has been established by eminent

domain or granted privately, "as a general rule, doubts as to

the extent of a restriction in an easement 'should be resolved

in favor of freedom of land from servitude.'"   General Hosp.

Corp., 423 Mass. at 765, quoting Hemenway v. Bartevian, 321

Mass. 226, 229 (1947).   As with an easement that was privately

granted,

    "[t]he scope of the condemnor's use of the easement will be
    limited to the extent reasonably necessary for the purpose
    served by the taking, so that the landowner's right to use
    the easement area is as great as possible while remaining
    reasonably consistent with the purpose of the taking. . . .
    If the condemnor takes an easement, the owner retains title
    to the land in fee and has the right to make any use of it
    that does not interfere with the public use."

General Hosp. Corp., supra at 764-765.   See Agostini v. North

Adams Gaslight Co., 265 Mass. 70, 73 (1928) ("In a taking by

eminent domain only such rights are acquired as are reasonably

necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the taking is
                                                                  12

made, unless the Legislature authorizes the acquiring of greater

rights").

    With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the

easements at issue in this case.

    c.   Scope of 1991 easement.   In determining the scope of

the 1991 easement, we begin with the language of the 1991

taking, which expresses the purpose for which the easement was

taken and the circumstances of the taking.   The 1991 order

clearly states that the purpose was to facilitate "the laying

out of the State highway" for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project

by "relocat[ing] portions of railroad rights of way," and, more

specifically, "relocat[ing] . . . the facilities of [Conrail]."

Accordingly, by its plain language, the scope of the easement is

limited to the extent reasonably necessary to relocate Conrail's

facilities.   See General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764

(questions about extent of eminent domain takings "should be

resolved in favor of freedom of the land from the servitude").

    MassDOT correctly points out that the 1991 license

agreement between the Commonwealth and Conrail permitted the

1991 easement to be used by Conrail for ancillary activities

that constituted "railroad purposes":

    "(i) for the construction and maintenance of the temporary
    rail yard; (ii) for materials handling and processing; and
    (iii) for use by Conrail, its authorized customers, agents
    and assigns for railroad purposes (freight or passenger),
    including the loading and unloading of rail cars or
                                                                    13

    containers, the classifying and assembling of trains, the
    temporary storage of operating rolling stock or for such
    other railroad purposes related to the transportation of
    freight and commodities by rail."

But this license could not unilaterally expand the scope of the

permissible use of the burdened land beyond what was stated in

the 1991 taking.    Moreover, consistent with the purpose stated

in the 1991 taking, the license agreement similarly recites that

the Commonwealth is entering into the license agreement "to

partially replace and restore the [c]urrent [Conrail] Rail

Facilities and Conrail Land affected or eliminated by the Haul

Road."   Thus, the Commonwealth's licensing of these activities

was still governed by the over-all purpose set out in the 1991

taking –- enabling Conrail to relocate the facilities being

displaced by the haul road.

    It is also important to recognize that the 1991 easement

for the relocation of Conrail's facilities was limited in space

and time by the air rights reserved to the fee holder.    As

defined in the 1991 taking, the easement included a vertical

dimension of twenty feet and six inches "above the top of the

rails to be placed" on the property, "subject to the rights of

the owner of the air rights" above that height after a certain

period of time.    For the first twelve years after the recording

of the taking, Conrail, as the beneficiary of the easement, also

enjoyed "the unlimited right to utilize the air rights above"
                                                                   14

twenty feet and six inches.   "Thereafter, the use of said

easements shall be subject to the rights of the owner of the air

rights so reserved . . . for access to and to support the uses

of the air rights."    Notably, the twelve-year period coincided

with the time frame in which Conrail was to complete the

relocation of its track and other facilities, and for the haul

road to be constructed.   Otherwise put, the fee holder had to

wait twelve years before developing its air rights, so as to

allow Conrail time to relocate its operations, in accordance

with the purpose of the taking.   Once Conrail accomplished that

purpose by relocating a single track to the property, the scope

of the easement established thereunder was fixed and limited to

the right of way occupied by Conrail's track and the vertical

dimension above it.5

     5 As we discuss further infra, the operation of the air
rights provision in the 1991 easement was analogous to the well-
established doctrine of practical location.

     "Where a right of way, or other easement, is granted by
     deed without fixed and defined limits, the practical
     location and use of such way or easement by the grantee
     under [the] deed, acquiesced in by the grantor at the time
     of the grant and for a long time subsequent thereto,
     operate as an assignment of the right, and are deemed to be
     that which was intended to be conveyed by the deed, and are
     the same, in legal effect, as if it had been fully
     described by the terms of the grant."

Bannon v. Angier, 2 Allen 128, 129 (1861). See Naumkeag Steam
Cotton Co. v. American Glue Co., 244 Mass. 506, 508 (1923)
("When the exact location of the easement is not precisely
defined but has been exercised in a certain place, the grantee
                                                                    15

    Our interpretation of the extent of the 1991 easement is

supported by one of our rulings in General Hosp. Corp.    In that

case, Massachusetts General Hospital had acquired property that

was subject to an easement taken by DPW for the purpose of

constructing an elevated highway ramp.    General Hosp. Corp., 423

Mass. at 759-760.    The hospital and the MBTA then disputed the

scope of this easement in the hospital's suit seeking damages

for the MBTA's subsequent eminent domain takings of hospital

property.   Id.   Specifically, the MBTA contended that the

hospital had no right to access its property across location

lines shown on the highway ramp layout.    Id. at 763-764.

    We concluded, however, that, as the fee owner, the hospital

had the right to access its property across these location

lines, given that DPW had only taken an easement on the

property, not a fee; the easement had been taken for "highway

purposes"; and "[t]he height of the ramp where it crosse[d] [the

has not the right afterwards to change the location to some
other part of the land"); Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct
Corp., 125 Mass. 544, 550 (1878) (easement to lay pipes and keep
and support them forever did not include right to change
location of pipes once they had been laid). See also
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.8 comment c
("When improvements are constructed or installed on the servient
estate for the enjoyment of a servitude without objection from
the servient owner, the parties have given a practical
construction to the instrument or agreement that created the
servitude. Even if the instrument specifies a different
location, the location is fixed by the placement of the
improvements unless the language or circumstances lead to the
conclusion that the initial location is temporary").
                                                                  16

property] was adequate to permit the owner of the underlying fee

to use the area under the ramp without interfering with the

limited access highway."   Id. at 764-765.   Once DPW had

constructed the highway ramp, the hospital was free to access

and use the remaining land for parking, as long as the parking

did not interfere with the highway.   See id. at 765-766.

Similarly, here, under the 1991 taking, the fee holder of what

is now Smiley's land was entitled to access to the burdened

land, so long as that access did not interfere with the

operations of the railroad track built by Conrail.

     d.   Scope of 2018 taking.   The 2018 taking provides that

the easement for "railroad purposes" "permits [MassDOT] and its

lawful successors and assigns to use the Remainder Railroad

Easement Area for all lawful railroad purposes within the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts."   The 2018 taking further

specifies that such uses shall include "(a) the use of the

Remainder Railroad Easement Area[6] by railroads powered by any

source, for purposes including, but not limited to, the

deployment, testing, calibration, and storage of rapid transit

rail vehicles; and (b) uses reasonably related to such railroad

     6 The 2018 taking defines the "Remainder Railroad Easement
Area" as "an easement for railroad purposes as described and
more particularly set forth in the 1991 [t]aking and/or in this
instrument over the parcel of land comprised of portions of the
Easement Parcel as more particularly shown on the plan of land
hereinafter described."
                                                                  17

purposes such as access, parking and utility needs in connection

therewith."

    We conclude that the scope of the 2018 easement exceeds the

scope of the 1991 taking and that the motion judge erred in

determining otherwise.   The judge misconstrued the extent of the

1991 easement in large part because, in his view, certain

ordinary rules of construction of easements were inapplicable to

an easement taken by eminent domain.   As stated, however, other

than the exclusion of any consideration of the parties' intent,

we consistently have applied the ordinary rules of

interpretation of easements to easements taken by eminent

domain, see General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764-765, and

MassDOT has not proffered any reason for us to revisit that

view.

    Here, whereas the purpose of the 1991 taking was to

relocate railroad rights of way and Conrail's facilities, the

2018 taking provides, "[f]or the avoidance of doubt," that it

encompasses the 1991 purpose, but that it also includes "all

lawful railroad purposes within the Commonwealth."

Specifically, the 2018 taking states that it encompasses,

"without limitation," testing, calibration, and storage of any

type of railroad vehicle, and the associated uses such as

parking that are necessary to those primary uses.
                                                                   18

    The Red Line test track project, which falls within this

language, is a new and different project from the original

relocation of Conrail's railroad track and facilities.   It

involves an additional 6,000 square foot building, a different

type of railroad car, and a considerably larger portion of the

burdened land than did the single track originally constructed

by Conrail pursuant to the 1991 easement.   Indeed, the 2018

taking permits the easement holder to use the "Remainder

Railroad Easement Area" -- i.e., the entirety of the burdened

land, not just the right of way taken up by the relocated

Conrail track -– for "all lawful railroad purposes within the

Commonwealth."   Thus, the easement holder now may engage in any

"railroad purposes," anytime and anywhere on the burdened land.

Consequently, the 2018 easement makes it virtually impossible

for the fee holder to build anywhere else on the burdened land,

because the owner of the fee can never know whether or when the

easement holder might seek to exercise its rights on that part

of the burdened land.

    MassDOT raises a number of arguments as to why the 1991

easement is just as sweeping in extent as the 2018 easement.

These arguments are unpersuasive.   If the purpose of the 1991

easement was to relocate Conrail's right of way and facilities

to support construction of the haul road, and if the location of

the easement became fixed once Conrail completed that process,
                                                                      19

then clearly the 1991 easement did not authorize the very

different and larger Red Line test track project nearly thirty

years later.     In particular, MassDOT contends that the provision

in the 1991 taking that the easement "shall be used for railroad

purposes only" broadly authorizes use of the 1991 easement for

any railroad purpose in the future, including the Red Line test

track project.     That provision, however, is plainly a

restriction on the use of the 1991 easement; it prohibits

Conrail or a successor from using the easement for something

other than railroad purposes.     As such, it remains subordinate

to the over-all governing purpose of the 1991 easement, namely,

the relocation of Conrail's right of way and facilities to

support construction of the haul road.      The provision does not

supersede that overarching governing purpose so as to expand the

scope of the easement to include any future railroad purpose.

    As discussed, an easement taken by eminent domain must be

construed in light of the "circumstances surrounding the

taking."   General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764.     In that case,

for example, DPW had granted the Massachusetts Transit Authority

(MTA) (the predecessor of the MBTA) the right to maintain its

existing transit lines running through a DPW highway layout.

Id. at 761.    The right to maintain included the right to

"construct, reconstruct, maintain, repair, and operate [the]

structures."     Id.   Because the MTA's only structures within the
                                                                     20

layout at that time were elevated tracks, no reasonable

interpretation of the language of the easement granted the MTA

the right to build an underground parking garage.      Similarly,

here, the phrase "for railroad purposes only" in the 1991 taking

should not be viewed out of context as authorizing the Red Line

test track project nearly thirty years later, when clearly the

purpose of the 1991 taking was to facilitate the relocation of

Conrail's facilities.

    e.   Use of like kind.     MassDOT further argues, relying on

Leroy v. Worcester St. Ry., 287 Mass. 1, 10-15 (1934), that the

use of the easement for a test track and a building to hold new

subway cars was permissible under the 1991 taking because the

new use did not differ in kind from the original railroad use

set forth in the 1991 taking.     In Leroy, the court held that an

easement that had been taken for operation of a steam railway

properly could be used for a motor bus, applying the principle

that an easement taken for one public purpose may be used for a

"public use of a like kind."     Leroy, supra at 13.   In either

event, the court reasoned, "the essential purpose was to . . .

transport members of the public."     Id. at 12.

    The Red Line test track project, however, is not a public

use of a like kind.     The 1991 easement provided Conrail the

right to relocate its operations, which proved to be a single

track.   In contrast, the Red Line test track project involves
                                                                    21

not only a test track, but also a large new building, parking,

and another track.

    f.   Doctrine of practical location.    MassDOT also contends

that because the 1991 easement covered the entirety of the

12,510 square foot area set forth in the 1991 taking, the use of

the entire burdened area for the Red Line test track was

permissible.     We disagree.

    The 1991 taking states at the outset of the relevant

passage that "[e]asements are hereby taken in [three] parcels[,

including] 60-E-RR-1, . . . for the relocation of the facilities

of [Conrail]."    Contrary to MassDOT's contention, this language

does not "clearly and unambiguously" establish that those

easements were intended to cover the entirety of each parcel.

Rather, the language merely refers to an easement in some

portion of each enumerated parcel.

    Under the 1991 easement, Conrail was free to relocate its

operations wherever it chose within the scope of the easement on

each parcel.    Once it did so, however, the location of the

easement became fixed, see Leroy, 287 Mass. at 14; Naumkeag

Steam Cotton Co. v. American Glue Co., 244 Mass. 506, 508

(1923), and the fee owner was free to develop the remainder of

the parcel and the air rights, see General Hosp. Corp., 423

Mass. at 764.    MassDOT's contention that possession of the

easement continued to give the easement holder complete control
                                                                  22

to construct additional facilities anywhere on the burdened land

is inconsistent with the fundamental principles limiting the

dominant estate to the extent reasonably necessary for the

purpose of the taking, and protecting the right of the fee

holder to use the easement area to as great an extent as

possible, see id., as well as with the doctrine of practical

location, see Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., supra; Bannon v.

Angier, 2 Allen 128, 129 (1861).

     For this reason, we reject, as inapplicable, MassDOT's

argument that it would have been illegal under Federal law for

Conrail to "abandon" its rights over the rest of the burdened

land.    Conrail never possessed a right to occupy the entire

parcel of burdened land in perpetuity.    Conrail only possessed a

right to place its tracks and facilities in the place of its

choosing on the burdened land.7

     We also conclude that the Appeals Court's decision in

Mugar, which MassDOT cites and upon which the motion judge

substantially relied, is distinguishable from the present case.

Mugar involved an action for compensation where the MBTA had

taken an easement for an "undefined right of access" from

     7 MassDOT also cites Mahan v. Rockport, 287 Mass. 34, 37
(1934), for the proposition that rights are not lost by using
less than the entire area taken, but that case involved a public
way, which "once duly laid out continues to be such until
legally discontinued," and "may be discontinued by vote of the
town and not otherwise."
                                                                       23

surrounding city streets to a parcel containing a subway vent

shaft near the center of the plaintiffs' parking lot.       Mugar, 28

Mass. App. Ct. at 443-444.       Because this access easement gave

the MBTA unlimited rights of passage from the city streets, it

necessarily prevented the plaintiffs from building anywhere in

the parking lot.    See id. at 444.    By contrast, here the 1991

taking included language that limited the scope of the easement

to the relocation of Conrail's facilities and explicitly allowed

the fee holder to develop the air rights on the burdened land

after a twelve-year period.

       We are mindful that, in exercising the power of eminent

domain in 1991, DPW had the power to choose how it wished to

articulate the scope of the easement.      If it had intended to

establish a perpetual right to occupy all of the burdened

property, then it could have done so unequivocally, but it did

not.    When the scope and extent of a taking is unclear, we must

adopt the narrower interpretation of its language, in favor of

freedom of the land from servitude, as long as it is otherwise

consistent with applicable legal principles.       See General Hosp.

Corp., 423 Mass. at 764.

       g.   Just compensation.   Because the scope of the 2018

easement exceeded the scope of the 1991 easement, it represented

an additional taking.     Accordingly, Smiley's claim for damages
                                                                  24

under G. L. c. 79 should not have been dismissed, and, on

remand, Smiley is entitled to pursue its claim for damages.

    3.   Conclusion.   The summary judgment is reversed.    The

matter is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a

declaratory judgment in favor of Smiley that the 2018 easement

exceeded the scope of the 1991 easement and, in particular, did

not encompass a use such as the Red Line test track project, and

for further proceedings on the compensation Smiley is due

pursuant to G. L. c. 79, § 14, as a result of the 2018 taking.

                                   So ordered.