Court Opinion

ID: 9788909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:21:58.636143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:17.428379
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring.
Justice Moreno in his concurring and dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority that substantial evidence supports the lying-in-wait special circumstance. Although the evidence is not strong, I agree with the majority that it is sufficient to support this special circumstance. I reiterate a concern, however, that I expressed nearly a decade ago in a concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1146 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55], where I said: “Recent decisions of this court have given expansive definitions to the term Tying in wait,’ while drawing little distinction between Tying in wait’ as a form of first degree murder and the lying-in-wait special circumstance, which subjects a defendant to the death penalty. [Citations.] Constrained by the principle of stare decisis, I concurred in the more recent of these decisions, which were reached after I joined this court. I have a growing concern, however, that these decisions may have undermined the critical narrowing function of the lying-in-wait special circumstance: to separate defendants whose acts warrant the death penalty from those defendants who are ‘merely’ guilty of first degree murder.” (People v. Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1147 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
*513Because I agree with the majority that substantial evidence supports the lying-in-wait special circumstance, I need not here explore the differences between the special circumstance and lying in wait as a form of first degree murder.