Court Opinion

ID: 9397012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 14:01:01.30984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:20.812241
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1187    Document: 99     Page: 1   Filed: 05/24/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

            JUAN M. GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
                     Petitioner

                             v.

            DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                        2022-1187
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. AT-0752-21-0264-I-1.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: May 24, 2023
                  ______________________

    STEPHAN B. CALDWELL, Stephen B. Caldwell, LLC, Su-
 wanee, GA, argued for petitioner.

     SEAN KELLY GRIFFIN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________
Case: 22-1187     Document: 99    Page: 2    Filed: 05/24/2023

 2                                 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, PROST and STARK, Circuit
                          Judges.
 STARK, Circuit Judge.
     Juan M. Gomez-Rodriguez petitions for review of the
 Merit Systems Protection Board’s (“Board”) decision af-
 firming his removal as a Department of the Army Civilian
 Police (“DACP”) officer in the Army’s Installation Com-
 mand, Directorate of Emergency Services (“DES”) at Fort
 Gordon, Georgia. We affirm.
                              I
     As a DACP officer, Gomez-Rodriguez had access to
 ALERTS, the Army Law Enforcement and Reporting
 Tracking System. ALERTS is a database of police investi-
 gations and incidents designed for official use only.
      As a condition of employment, Gomez-Rodriguez was
 required to maintain certification in the Individual Relia-
 bility Program (“IRP”). The IRP obligates police officers to
 “maintain a high standard of conduct at all times” and be
 continuously evaluated in terms of their “character, trust-
 worthiness, and fitness” to ensure they meet “the high
 standards expected of law enforcement.” J.A. 348 (Army
 Regulation (“AR”) 190-56 ¶¶ 3-3.a. and b).
    As we will explain, the Army removed Gomez-Rodri-
 guez based on his misuse of ALERTS and his failure to
 maintain his IRP certification.
     Several investigations preceded Gomez-Rodriguez’s re-
 moval. First, pursuant to AR 15-6, the Army investigated
 an allegation that Gomez-Rodriguez had improperly used
 ALERTS to obtain information about an alleged crime com-
 mitted by another officer, Michael Porreca (“AR 15-6 Inves-
 tigation”). The AR 15-6 Investigation revealed that Gomez-
 Rodriguez had searched for “Porreca” in ALERTS and ac-
 cessed a file naming Porreca as a suspect in a larceny
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 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY                                 3

 investigation. The Army also discovered that Gomez-Ro-
 driguez had searched in ALERTS for information on an-
 other police officer, Cory Burgess.
     Second, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service
 (“DCIS”) investigated the time and attendance practices of
 multiple Fort Gordon DES police officers, including Gomez-
 Rodriguez (“DCIS Investigation”). The DCIS Investigation
 revealed discrepancies in the time and attendance records
 of Gomez-Rodriguez and other officers.
      Consequently, on August 19, 2020, the DES Deputy Di-
 rector sent a memorandum to Gomez-Rodriguez concern-
 ing his IRP certification. The Deputy Director stated that,
 in light of the AR 15-6 and DCIS Investigations, he was
 offering Gomez-Rodriguez an opportunity to provide input
 regarding whether he could continue to retain his IRP cer-
 tification. On August 28, 2020, Gomez-Rodriguez’s union,
 the American Federation of Government Employees, re-
 sponded with additional information supporting his IRP
 certification.
     On October 19, 2020, the Military Police Director and
 Provost Marshal notified Gomez-Rodriguez via memoran-
 dum that he was being permanently decertified from the
 IRP because he lacked the “character, trustworthiness, and
 fitness . . . consistent with the high standards expected of
 law enforcement and security professionals.” J.A. 60 (cit-
 ing AR 190-56 ¶ 3-3.b). The memorandum referenced the
 AR 15-6 and DCIS Investigations, as well as an incident
 that had occurred at Pointes West Army Resort, where
 Gomez-Rodriguez had been found in possession of a person-
 ally owned firearm without the required written permis-
 sion. Gomez-Rodriguez had not been disciplined for the
 Pointes West incident.
     Also on October 19, 2020, the Deputy Director issued a
 notice of proposed removal based on two charges: (1) con-
 duct unbecoming a law enforcement officer and (2) failure
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 4                                 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ    v. ARMY

 to maintain a condition of employment. The specification
 supporting the first charge stated that Gomez-Rodriguez
 had improperly searched for Porreca and Burgess in
 ALERTS without an official purpose or authorization. The
 specification supporting the second charge alleged that
 Gomez-Rodriguez had failed to maintain his IRP certifica-
 tion, yet maintenance of such certification was a condition
 of his employment. In the proposed removal, the Deputy
 Director explained that he had considered the AR 15-6 and
 DCIS Investigations, the permanent IRP decertification,
 and the firearm incident at Pointes West Army Resort. On
 October 29, 2020, Gomez-Rodriguez submitted a written
 response and, through his union representative, an oral re-
 sponse to the notice of proposed removal.
      On February 4, 2021, the deciding official issued a de-
 cision sustaining the two charges and finding the penalty
 of removal to be adequate and appropriate. On February
 10, 2021, Gomez-Rodriguez was removed from his position.
 On March 3, 2021, he appealed to the Board.
     At the Board, an administrative judge (“AJ”) held a
 hearing. Gomez-Rodriguez was among the witnesses who
 appeared at the hearing. He testified that his ALERTS
 searches were authorized because they occurred in connec-
 tion with DUI training he was receiving from Porreca, in
 the course of which Porreca told the class to search for sam-
 ple DUI reports Porreca had written. According to Gomez-
 Rodriguez, his ALERTS search for Burgess was motivated
 by his desire to understand “his style of writing,” as Bur-
 gess was his supervisor and would be “reviewing my cases.”
 J.A. 486.
     Another witness, Deputy Chief William Russ, testified,
 however, that the manner in which Gomez-Rodriguez un-
 dertook the searches would produce reports related to the
 criminal investigations of his fellow officers, Porreca and
 Burgess, rather than to yield reports written by them. The
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 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY                                  5

 Board credited Russ’ testimony over that of Gomez-Rodri-
 guez and, thus, found that Gomez-Rodriguez had improp-
 erly used ALERTS.
      The Board also concluded that maintenance of IRP cer-
 tification was a condition of Gomez-Rodriguez’s employ-
 ment and that his decertification was justified based on
 information from the AR 15-6 and DCIS Investigations as
 well as the Pointes West Army Resort firearm incident.
 The Board rejected Gomez-Rodriguez’s contention that the
 Army had deprived him of due process by considering the
 DCIS Investigation, finding that the notice of proposed re-
 moval had adequately informed him that this investigation
 had identified significant negligence in his time and at-
 tendance records.
      Ultimately, the Board found a nexus between the
 grounds for removal and a legitimate governmental inter-
 est in efficiency of the service, and further found that re-
 moval was reasonable based on the evidence, despite
 Gomez-Rodriguez’s work record, length of service, previous
 performance, and lack of disciplinary history. The Board’s
 initial decision, issued by the AJ on September 24, 2021,
 became final on October 29, 2021. On November 22, 2021,
 Gomez-Rodriguez timely appealed to this Court. We have
 jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
                              II
     In reviewing the record and the Board’s decision, we
 must “hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, find-
 ings, or conclusions found to be – (1) arbitrary, capricious,
 an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
 law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule,
 or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
 substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
     On appeal, Gomez-Rodriguez argues (1) substantial ev-
 idence does not support either charge against him; (2) the
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 6                                 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY

 Board did not apply the law for disparate penalties; and (3)
 he was denied due process. 1 We address each contention
 in turn.
                              A
      Gomez-Rodriguez was charged with conduct unbecom-
 ing a law enforcement officer and failure to maintain a con-
 dition of employment. “[W]hen an agency uses such
 general charging language, the Board must look to the
 specification to determine what conduct the agency is rely-
 ing on as the basis for its proposed disciplinary action.”
 Russo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 284 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
 2002). Here, the specifications supporting the charges ex-
 plained in detail that (1) Gomez-Rodriguez improperly
 searched for Porreca and Burgess in ALERTS without an
 official purpose or authorization, and (2) Gomez-Rodriguez
 was permanently decertified from the IRP, yet mainte-
 nance of such certification was a condition of his employ-
 ment. Based on the evidence presented, which largely
 consisted of the testimony of Deputy Chief Russ and
 Gomez-Rodriguez, the Board determined that Gomez-Ro-
 driguez’s ALERTS searches for Porreca and Burgess were
 improper because they were unauthorized and not for an
 official purpose. The Board further found that IRP certifi-
 cation was a condition of Gomez-Rodriguez’s employment,
 so his permanent IRP decertification barred his continued
 employment.

     1    Gomez-Rodriguez had also argued to the Board
 that the Army discriminated against him based on race and
 nationality, but these issues are not before us because he
 did not raise them on appeal. See generally Toyama v.
 Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 481 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
 (noting that appeals from Board to this court are available
 where appellant is “willing to waive discrimination is-
 sues”); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2).
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 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY                                 7

     Substantial evidence, which is “such relevant evidence
 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
 a conclusion,” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154
 (2019), supports the Board’s determinations that both
 charges against Gomez-Rodriguez were proven by the req-
 uisite preponderance of the evidence. “[T]he possibility of
 drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
 does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from
 being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed.
 Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
     Both Deputy Chief Russ and Gomez-Rodriguez testi-
 fied before the AJ about the ALERTS searches Gomez-Ro-
 driguez performed. According to Russ, the way in which
 Gomez-Rodriguez conducted the searches would not have
 resulted in reports authored by other officers, for example
 Porreca, but instead “would only bring up their criminal
 history.” J.A. 444. Gomez-Rodriguez gave the AJ a differ-
 ent account, insisting he was only looking for reports writ-
 ten by, and not about, Porreca and Burgess. J.A. 476. The
 state of the record called upon the AJ to make a credibility
 finding, and she did so, explaining that Russ – who “helped
 develop the [ALERTS] program” and was “knowledgeable
 of the database” – was “straightforward and direct in his
 testimony” and exhibited a “demeanor throughout [that]
 was confident and assured,” while, “[i]n contrast,” Gomez-
 Rodriguez’s testimony was “less than forthright” and left
 “the impression that he would say whatever is necessary to
 save his position.” J.A. 15.
     While the AJ could have credited Gomez-Rodriguez’s
 testimony and found for him, she was likewise free to credit
 the contrary evidence and find against him. See King v.
 Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 133 F.3d 1450, 1453 (Fed.
 Cir. 1998). We will not disturb such credibility determina-
 tions where, as here, they are not “inherently improbable
 or discredited by undisputed evidence or physical fact.”
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 8                                    GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ    v. ARMY

 Hanratty v. Dep’t of Transp., 819 F.2d 286, 288 (Fed. Cir.
 1987).
     It is true, as Gomez-Rodriguez emphasizes, that Por-
 reca acknowledged he had told Gomez-Rodriguez (and
 other members of his DUI class) to use Porreca’s name to
 search ALERTS. This does not, however, undermine the
 AJ’s finding that the details of Gomez-Rodriguez’s particu-
 lar searches show he was searching in a manner distinct
 from what Porreca had directed. The AJ credited Deputy
 Chief Russ’ testimony about the specifics of Gomez-Rodri-
 guez’s searches, including that he had searched “Porreca”
 three times, and rejected Gomez-Rodriguez’s competing ac-
 count. The AJ’s credibility determination and Russ’ testi-
 mony constitute substantial evidence for the finding that
 Gomez-Rodriguez’s searches were improper and unauthor-
 ized.
     Gomez-Rodriguez also argues there were no standard
 procedures concerning authorized or unauthorized
 ALERTS usage at Fort Gordon. While the record shows
 that the standards were clarified in the course of the inves-
 tigations and audits relating to this case, see, e.g., J.A. 83
 (June 2021 Memo stating: “Unauthorized usage of
 ALERTS is exceeding access by reviewing information that
 you do not have a need to know about and providing infor-
 mation to others without a need to know, or an official pur-
 pose.”), the impropriety of Gomez-Rodriguez’s conduct was
 already sufficiently clear at the time he undertook his
 searches. For example, at that time, Gomez-Rodriguez was
 subject to limitations described in the Guidelines from the
 Office of the Provost Marshal General relating to AR 190-
 45, which provided (among other things): “Unauthorized
 use, which includes requests, dissemination, sharing, cop-
 ying or receipt of information within . . . ALERTS, could
 result in civil proceedings against . . . any user . . . . Viola-
 tions or misuse may also subject the user . . . to adminis-
 trative sanctions and possible disciplinary action by their
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 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ     v. ARMY                                      9

 command . . . .” Suppl. App. 1. Additionally, each ALERTS
 user saw one or more screens notifying the user that
 ALERTS is to be used only for official use on a need-to-
 know basis, with due consideration for sensitive and per-
 sonal information. J.A. 111, 113, 630-31; see also J.A. 442-
 43 (Deputy Chief Russ testifying that “[o]n the original
 screen, before you log into Alerts it lists that this is for of-
 ficial use only, law enforcement”). Investigator Jack Frost
 and Deputy Chief Russ also testified that official use of
 ALERTS meant “for law enforcement purposes.” J.A. 436;
 see J.A. 432 (“[I]t was . . . unofficial, which means it was
 unauthorized.”) (ellipses in original), 434 (“The authorized
 use comes from a need to know, and you know, not using it
 for personal . . . use.”) (ellipses in original); see also J.A. 466
 (Hugh Hardin, deciding official, testifying that “accessing
 of the ALERTS database without an official law enforce-
 ment purpose did constitute an unauthorized, inappropri-
 ate use of the system”).
     With respect to the IRP certification charge, it is undis-
 puted that maintaining IRP certification was a condition of
 Gomez-Rodriguez’s employment. Gomez-Rodriguez also
 does not dispute that he was decertified. Plainly, then,
 substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision to sus-
 tain the Army’s finding on the second charge.
     Therefore, we conclude that substantial evidence sup-
 ports the Board’s findings sustaining both charges brought
 against Gomez-Rodriguez.
                                 B
      Gomez-Rodriguez has not shown that the Board erred
 in its application, or non-application, of the law concerning
 disparate penalties and comparators.
    The relevant Douglas factor is the “consistency of the
 penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the
 same or similar offences.” Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5
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 10                                  GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ    v. ARMY

 M.S.P.B. 313, 332 (1981). As part of a challenge to the rea-
 sonableness of a penalty, an employee looking “[t]o estab-
 lish disparate penalties” “must show that the charges and
 circumstances surrounding the charged behavior [of him-
 self] are substantially similar [to those of others], which in-
 cludes proof that the proffered comparator . . . was
 subjected to the same standards governing discipline.”
 Miskill v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 863 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evaluation of a
 disparate penalties contention entails, “by [its] nature, a
 case-dependent, highly factual inquiry . . . not amenable to
 bright-line rules.” Id.
      Gomez-Rodriguez’s disparate penalties argument fails,
 first, because it is forfeited. At no point before the Board
 did Gomez-Rodriguez contend that specific Army employ-
 ees conducted unauthorized ALERTS searches and the
 Army then treated these similarly situated employees
 more leniently, thereby rendering the removal of Gomez-
 Rodriguez unreasonable in light of the Douglas factors.
     To avoid forfeiture and be available for appellate re-
 view, an issue first “must be raised with sufficient specific-
 ity and clarity that the tribunal [being reviewed] [wa]s
 aware that it must decide the issue.” Wallace v. Dep’t of
 the Air Force, 879 F.2d 829, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Having
 reviewed the record citations to which Gomez-Rodriguez
 directs us, see Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 2, we find no in-
 stance in which he put the Board on notice that he was
 challenging the reasonableness of the penalty of removal
 on the basis that it was inconsistent with discipline im-
 posed on others for similar misconduct.
     Shortly before the hearing, Gomez-Rodriguez filed a
 motion to put before the Board the Army’s June 9, 2021
 Memorandum (“June 2021 Memo”) entitled, “Findings and
 Recommendations for Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investi-
 gation – Alleged Improper Usage of Army Law
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 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY                                  11

 Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System,” which was
 based on audits undertaken in November 2020 and May
 2021. J.A. 66, 80-85. So the Board had in its record the
 June 2021 Memo, which reports that the audit found (in
 addition to Gomez-Rodriguez’s searches) 11 instances over
 a three-year period in which a total of five DES officers
 searched ALERTS for data on other DES employees. J.A.
 80-85. The June 2021 Memo does not show what discipline,
 if any, these other officers received, but it does recommend
 one of them for “administrative action.” J.A. 85. 2
     Even assuming that Gomez-Rodriguez’s motion was in-
 tended to put the Board on notice that he was making a
 disparate penalties argument, 3 it is easy to understand

     2    While the June 2021 Memo was prepared too late
 to be considered by the deciding official, Hardin, at the time
 he ordered the removal of Gomez-Rodriguez in February
 2021, Gomez-Rodriguez was free to ask the Board to con-
 sider it in weighing the Douglas factors. See Norris v. Sec.
 & Exch. Comm’n, 675 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As
 we explain, however, he failed to raise the issue with suffi-
 cient specificity and clarity to make the Board aware it was
 an issue it needed to decide. See Wallace, 879 F.2d at 832.
     3    Gomez-Rodriguez’s motion to add the June 2021
 Memo to the AJ hearing record refers to a “Union Exhibit
 C” – which the parties do not appear to have included in
 their joint appendix – which he describes as “the Audit re-
 port of all users that accessed Officer Porreca’s name and
 other names.” J.A. 67. This is likely a November 2020 list
 prepared by Deputy Chief Russ identifying all the officers
 who searched ALERTS for the names of DES employees,
 which served as the starting point for the further investi-
 gation that resulted in the June 2021 Memo. See Appel-
 lant’s Br. at 10 (“The May 12, 2021 Audit served to clarify
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 12                               GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ    v. ARMY

 the November 16, 2020 Audit.”). Gomez-Rodriguez’s mo-
 tion then suggests that the June 2021 Memo “contains rel-
 evant information and gives context to Union Exhibit C,”
 adding:

       Under the Douglas[] factors that the Agency
       did not consider, it goes to the Clarity of No-
       tice that the Appellant was on as to what de-
       fines Routine use.      Further, it explains
       penalties to those interviewed for a proper
       comparator analysis. This new Report [i.e.,
       the June 2021 Memo] gives context to those
       names to properly make a comparator analy-
       sis like New AR-15 Findings.

 J.A. 67 (internal emphasis omitted).     Later the motion
 states:

       Here, the Union has introduced Exhibit C, an
       Audit of all those police officers in DES at
       For[t] Gordon that accessed Officer Porreca’s
       name. The Audit by itself does not allow this
       Court to make proper comparisons for
       d[i]sp[a]rate discipline as the Appellant has
       raised as a defense. This new AR-15 Report
       presents findings and interviews of those that
       accessed Officer Porreca’s name, their rea-
       sons, and if they have been disciplined for
       that action. Without this Report, this Court
       cannot properly give context around to the
       names listed in Union Exhibit C to make the
       proper comparator analysis for a decision.

 J.A. 69. Despite the motion’s references to a “proper com-
 parator analysis,” neither in the motion nor anywhere else
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 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY                                  13

 how the Board could have missed it. The motion identifies
 by name only one other officer, Elvis Rondon, J.A. 67-68,
 who the June 2021 Memo reports “searched his supervi-
 sor’s name in ALERTS to find narrative statements as part
 of his official duties.” J.A. 83. The report does not state or
 even suggest that Rondon’s search was inconsistent with
 his supervisor’s instructions, making it difficult (if even
 possible) to discern that Gomez-Rodriguez believed Rondon
 was a proper comparator.
     During the Board hearing before the AJ, counsel for
 Gomez-Rodriguez examined the deciding official, Hugh
 Hardin, on the issue of comparators. Hardin was asked
 whether, assuming hypothetically he had been presented
 comparators, he would have considered them in deciding
 how to discipline Gomez-Rodriguez, to which Hardin said
 he would. J.A. 469. Hardin further explained the reality
 that Gomez-Rodriguez “was the only one that was pre-
 sented to me for conduct unbecoming with the underlying
 action of searching ALERTS inappropriately in an unau-
 thorized manner.” Id. Counsel for Gomez-Rodriguez also
 questioned his own client about comparators. J.A. 483.
 Gomez-Rodriguez interpreted the November 2020 audit as
 identifying 14 officers who had conducted ALERTS
 searches just as he had, and yet, to his knowledge, none of
 them “faced discipline or removal.” Id. There is, however,
 no documentary support in the record for these contentions
 and Gomez-Rodriguez never used his (or any other) testi-
 mony to develop an argument.
    Given Gomez-Rodriguez’s failure to articulate his
 Douglas comparator argument with any clarity, the Army

 did Gomez-Rodriguez clearly identify the purportedly
 proper comparators, state that they were treated differ-
 ently from himself, or ask the Board to determine he was
 subjected to a disparate penalty.
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 14                                GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY

 was never alerted to the prospect that it needed to develop
 a record with respect to the purported comparators. As a
 result, the Board was not provided by either party with the
 evidence on which such a highly fact-specific issue needs to
 be decided. And, again, the Board was not made aware by
 Gomez-Rodriguez that it had to decide the Douglas com-
 parator issue to resolve this case. Accordingly, Gomez-Ro-
 driguez forfeited the comparator contention he seeks to
 press on appeal.
     In any event, even if Gomez-Rodriguez had adequately
 presented the Douglas comparator issue to the Board, we
 would still affirm. As an initial matter, the Board did not
 completely overlook the evidence of the other 11 searches
 of DES employee names in ALERTS. Instead, the Board
 expressly referenced Deputy Chief Russ’ testimony that
 “he was asked to audit ALERTS for searches by officers,
 that the audit covered three years’ worth of searches, and
 that the audit revealed additional officers had conducted
 name searches of individuals [working] in DES.” J.A. 23.
 While the Board did not go on to address this evidence in
 connection with its Douglas analysis, 4 we will not presume
 that the Board entirely failed to consider the comparator
 evidence. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903,
 906 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“We presume that a fact finder re-
 views all the evidence presented unless [it] explicitly ex-
 presses otherwise.”).
    More importantly, Gomez-Rodriguez has failed to per-
 suade us that his comparator evidence supports a

      4  Gomez-Rodriguez’s contentions regarding unequal
 treatment largely went to his race and nationality discrim-
 ination claims, which the Board did explicitly address, and
 the rejection of which is not before us on appeal. J.A. 23-
 24.
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 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY                                 15

 conclusion that his removal was unreasonable. As already
 noted, Gomez-Rodriguez did not present sufficient evi-
 dence of what (if any) discipline was imposed on other em-
 ployees for the same or similar offenses he committed.
 There was no evidence before the Board that others who
 conducted unauthorized ALERTS searches received less
 harsh penalties.
      Moreover, the only evidence Gomez-Rodriguez points
 to, the June 2021 Memo, explains that five other officers
 conducted ALERTS searches on DES employees, and of
 them only one – Officer Hockenbery – was even arguably
 similarly situated, and that officer was recommended for
 administrative action. J.A. 82-85. The other four officers
 were either instructed by a superior to conduct the search
 in question (Keim) or did the searches as part of their offi-
 cial duties (Darby, Peloquin, Rondon). Id.; see also J.A. 74
 (Army approving investigating officer’s findings and refer-
 ring for further consideration the question of “what, if any,
 disciplinary action is appropriate for Sergeant Rory Keim
 and Sergeant Scott Hockenberry”). In short, Gomez-Rodri-
 guez has not shown that any similarly-situated officer (i.e.,
 one who conducted an unauthorized ALERTS search) was
 treated differently (i.e., less harshly) than him. See
 Miskill, 863 F.3d at 1384 (“To establish disparate penal-
 ties, the employee must show that the charges and circum-
 stances surrounding the charged behavior are
 substantially similar.”). 5

     5   We note that if Gomez-Rodriguez had presented
 the issue with sufficient specificity, and if the record had
 shown similarly situated employees who were potentially
 treated less harshly, the burden would then have shifted to
 the agency to “prove a legitimate reason for the difference
 in treatment by a preponderance of the evidence.” Miskill,
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 16                                   GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY

    Thus, again, we affirm the Board’s finding that the
 penalty of removal was reasonable.
                                 C
     Gomez-Rodriguez has also failed to show that he was
 denied due process. He argues that the Army’s notice of
 proposed removal and its decision to remove him did not
 inform him that the IRP memorandum was the basis of the
 charge. He further contends that the Board improperly re-
 lied on the specification in the first charge (improper
 ALERTS usage) to sustain the second charge (IRP decerti-
 fication).
     To meet the requirements of due process, Gomez-Ro-
 driguez had to be provided notice and an opportunity to be
 heard. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
 532, 546 (1985); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (setting out stat-
 utory requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard).
 Notice requires provision of sufficient detail so an employee
 may provide an informed response. See, e.g., LaChance v.
 Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 147 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
      Due process was satisfied here. The notice of proposed
 removal outlined the two charges, along with their respec-
 tive specifications (improper ALERTS usage and IRP de-
 certification).      The notice referenced the DCIS
 Investigation and the Pointes West Army Resort incident,
 although it did not identify them as bases for removal. The
 notice identified the IRP certification requirement and that
 Gomez-Rodriguez was decertified. Gomez-Rodriguez was
 given the opportunity to respond to the charges in the no-
 tice, and he did so.

 863 F.3d at 1384. Here, because of Gomez-Rodriguez’s fail-
 ings the burden did not shift to the Army.
Case: 22-1187   Document: 99        Page: 17   Filed: 05/24/2023

 GOMEZ-RODRIGUEZ   v. ARMY                                 17

      Nor was there any improper reliance by the Board on
 the first charge in deciding to sustain the second charge.
 The substance of the Board’s findings on both charges
 tracked how the charges were made in the notice of pro-
 posed removal. The two charges were related – that is, at
 least part of the reason Gomez-Rodriguez lost his IRP cer-
 tification was due to his ALERTS searches – and the decid-
 ing officer candidly acknowledged that had Gomez-
 Rodriguez not improperly accessed ALERTS, the second
 charge would likely not have been applicable. J.A. 472.
 But none of this provides the basis for a meritorious due
 process claim.
     In sum, Gomez-Rodriguez was notified of the Army’s
 reasons for its proposed actions and had an opportunity to
 respond. “Those are the limits of our review.” Adams v.
 Dep’t of Def., 688 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
                              III
     We have considered Gomez-Rodriguez’s additional ar-
 guments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
 reasons, we affirm.
                       AFFIRMED
                             COSTS
 No costs.