Court Opinion

ID: 9962564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:11:59.607072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:02.677633
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Preece, 2024-Ohio-1556.]

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                               :

              Plaintiff-Appellee,            :
                                                                      No. 22AP-252
v.                                           :                    (C.P.C. No. 19CR-4791)

William D. Preece,                           :                 (REGULAR CALENDAR)

              Defendant-Appellant.           :

                                     D E C I S I O N

                                Rendered on April 23, 2024

              On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
              Sheryl L. Prichard, for appellee.

              On brief: The Law Office of Thomas F. Hayes, and
              Thomas F. Hayes, for appellant.

                 APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

       {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, William D. Preece, appeals the judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas following a three-day jury trial and finding of guilt
as to the offense of first-degree felony assault with a law enforcement victim specification.
       {¶ 2} Preece was convicted of felonious assault for biting off the fingertip of
Franklin County Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Roger Howard while incarcerated at the
Franklin County Jail. Preece was also acquitted of assaulting Deputy Ryan Fultz during an
event that occurred a few minutes earlier. Preece contends that his assault on Howard
would not have occurred but for the fact that Fultz assaulted Preece first, and he bit
Howard’s finger amidst a dispute about whether or not he would be transported to a
hospital to receive medical attention for his altercation with Fultz.
No. 22AP-252                                                                                   2

       {¶ 3} Preece was incarcerated on the third floor of the Franklin County jail on
September 12, 2019, and at that time he was being supervised by Fultz. Inmates are
permitted to be out of their cells for one hour each day, for “recreation time,” and at the end
of Preece’s recreation time, he became upset that Fultz was forcing him to get off the
telephone and go back to his cell. Preece initially returned to his cell, but when Fultz came
to shut the cell door, Preece attempted to push his way out, ultimately leading to Fultz
striking Preece in the face at least twice. Subsequently, a team of deputies were called to
assist in subduing Preece, and he was handcuffed and escorted to the medical area to be
checked for injuries by that team of deputies, including Howard. This entire incident was
videotaped, and the video was played for the jury without objection. (See State’s Ex. B-1;
Feb. 23, 2022 Tr. Vol. 2 at 148.)
       {¶ 4} In the video, Preece appears to have many significant injuries on his forehead
and face, including bruises, swelling, and bleeding, and he repeatedly blamed all those
injuries on Fultz. Preece can be seen talking to Howard, insisting that Fultz had “beat [him]
up for no reason,” and had taken advantage of the fact that Preece had an injured foot and
was unable to walk normally. Several other deputies had to hold Preece back, while Howard
attempted to calm Preece down and ultimately had to pepper spray him. Preece remains
agitated. After he is initially examined, he is placed in a wheelchair to be transported to the
first floor of the jail. Preece insists that Fultz beat him, expresses anger with other deputies,
and acts combative, but repeatedly refuses any need to go the hospital. Id. He is
transported to the first floor and placed into a holding cell, where several deputies are
required to subdue him. He gets pepper-sprayed again but continues to insist that he was
beat up for no reason and refuses to cooperate with Fultz’s instructions.
       {¶ 5} Preece then agrees he will go to the hospital, and is placed in a “spit hood,” a
mesh drawstring fabric bag used to prevent supervising deputies from coming into contact
with a detainee’s bodily fluids. When the spit hood is placed on him, he is removed from
the holding cell and placed in a wheelchair. Preece continues to resist and repeatedly
complains he is too hot and cannot breathe and then begins to convulse. He is returned to
the holding cell and briefly reexamined by medical staff but begins screaming that weight
is being placed by deputies onto his broken foot. He is then placed back to the wheelchair,
and again readied to be transported to the hospital, but screams that he is being suffocated
No. 22AP-252                                                                                  3

by the spit hood and resists. In attempt to gain his compliance, several deputies reach near
him and try to get him to stand so he can be transported, and Howard again moves to
pepper spray Preece—it is during this affray that Preece bites Howard’s hand and severs his
right ring finger at the base of the nail. (See State’s Ex’s E1 through E12; Tr. at 264-75.)
Preece is finally placed in a restraint chair by several deputies and is ultimately escorted out
into an ambulance. (See State’s Ex’s B-1 and B-2; Tr. at 153-61.)
       {¶ 6} When he was returned to the jail after his visit to the hospital, Preece was
again housed on the third floor of the jail and was placed under the supervision of Fultz.
On September 21, 2019, Preece was escorted by several deputies, including Fultz, to receive
a visitor. That escort was video recorded, and during the walk to the visitation booth Preece
spontaneously states that he “did not mean” for that to happen to Howard, that he had
known Howard for many years and liked him, that he felt badly about Howard’s injury, that
he had been unable to see what was happening while inside the spit hood, and that he did
not intend to hurt Howard. The video of these statements was played for the jury without
objection. (See State’s Ex. B-3; Tr. at 98.)
       {¶ 7} After deliberation, the jury found Preece guilty of one count of the first-degree
felonious assault charge relating to Howard but acquitted him of the first-degree felonious
assault charge relating to Fultz. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to an indefinite
term of six to nine years incarceration with mandatory post-release control. Preece timely
appealed and asserts four assignments of error with the trial court’s judgment. Each
assigned error and its governing law are set forth below.
              1. There is insufficient evidence of the “knowingly” state of
              mind with respect to Count 1.

              2. The conviction of felonious assault (Count 1) is contrary to
              the manifest weight of the evidence.

              3. Defendant-Appellant was denied a fair trial due to the
              introduction of evidence in violation of Evid. R. 404(B).

              4. The trial court committed plain error in imposing an
              indefinite sentence under R.C. 2967.271, the Regan Tokes Law,
              because it violates the United States and Ohio Constitutions.

       {¶ 8} Preece first argues that the evidence at trial did not establish that he
knowingly assaulted Howard. To convict a defendant of felonious assault, the state must
No. 22AP-252                                                                                  4

demonstrate that the defendant knowingly caused serious physical harm to the victim. R.C.
2903.11(A)(1). Preece does not dispute that he bit Howard, or that he caused Howard
serious physical injury. The only question here is whether the evidence at trial was
sufficient to show that Preece was able to form the mental state of “knowingly” on these
facts. As this court has previously explained:
              “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the
              person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a
              certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C.
              2901.22(B). When determining whether a defendant acted
              knowingly, his state of mind must be determined from the
              totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime.
              Culpable mental states are frequently demonstrated through
              circumstantial evidence.

(Citations omitted.) State v. Hayward, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-390, 2018-Ohio-1070, ¶ 35.

       {¶ 9} Pursuant to State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), to determine whether a
conviction is supported by sufficient evidence of guilt, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979). Preece argues that he did not act knowingly, but merely recklessly, and that
therefore there is insufficient evidence of his guilt of felonious assault on a peace officer.
He points to the fact that he had already been beat up by Fultz—he describes his injuries as
“ ‘a busted lip,’ swelling on top of his forehead, [and] a swollen and bloody nose, all because
of being struck in the face several times by Deputy Fultz.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4; Tr. at 102-
03.) He contends that these injuries, taken together with his subsequent treatment negated
his ability to act knowingly. He observes that after he was injured by Fultz, he was pepper-
sprayed once before being transported to an observation cell, then sprayed again and began
spitting blood, saliva, and mucus, after which he was placed in the spit hood. Already
handcuffed, he was placed into a wheelchair, and began convulsing. After being evaluated
and assisted and then returned to the wheelchair, he began convulsing or writhing and
apparently tried to kick another deputy. It was apparent at that point Howard sprayed him
a third time, and it was during that melee Preece bit his finger.
No. 22AP-252                                                                                5

       {¶ 10} The videotaped evidence from September 21, 2019, construed most strongly
in favor of the state, merely indicates that Preece was unable to see what was happening
while inside the spit hood and that he did not “intend” to hurt Howard. (State’s Ex. B-3;
Tr. at 98.) That evidence tends to negate that Preece acted purposely, but it is entirely
consistent with the state’s theory that he acted knowingly. Compare R.C. 2901.22(A) (“A
person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result
* * *.”) (emphasis added), with R.C. 2901.22(B) (“A person acts knowingly, regardless of
purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain
result * * *.”) (emphasis added). The evidence presented does not suggest that a rational
juror could only conclude that Preece was unaware that biting someone’s finger could cause
serious physical injury, nor does it suggest that Preece was wholly unaware that he bit
someone. Accordingly, whether Preece acted knowingly is a question of weight for the jury,
not a question of sufficiency, and Preece’s first assignment of error lacks merit.
       {¶ 11} In his second assignment of error, Preece contends that his conviction is
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. An appellate court considering a manifest
weight challenge “may not merely substitute its view for that of the trier of fact, but must
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the
credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-
770, 2014-Ohio-2501, ¶ 22, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997),
(superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds). Appellate courts should
reverse a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the most
“ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ”
Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
Moreover, determinations of credibility and weight of the testimony are primarily for the
trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The
jury may take note of inconsistencies at trial and resolve them accordingly, “believ[ing] all,
part, or none of a witness’s testimony.” State v. Raver, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-604, 2003-
Ohio-958, ¶ 21, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). Therefore, “[w]hen a court
of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the
No. 22AP-252                                                                                 6

weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the
factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982).
       {¶ 12} Upon review of all the evidence presented below, we cannot conclude that
Preece was convicted against the manifest weight of the evidence. Preece’s belligerence and
lack of cooperation for over 20 minutes prior to biting Howard, documented on video, is
compelling evidence that fully supports the jury’s resolution of the charge against him. This
is not the exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against conviction, and
Preece’s contention to the contrary is unpersuasive. His second assignment of error lacks
merit and is overruled.
       {¶ 13} In his third assignment of error, Preece argues that he was denied a fair trial.
He specifically contends that he was unfairly prejudiced by Howard’s testimony that
Howard had encountered Preece “dozens” of times in the past, that Preece has “spit before,”
and that pepper spray “has worked in the past” on Preece. (See generally Appellant’s Brief
at 7; Tr. at 240, 254.) He also argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor’s
closing statement summarizing Howard’s testimony. (See Feb. 24, 2022 Tr. Vol. 3 at 423-
79.) Preece contends Howard’s statements and the state’s summary relying upon them
were improper propensity evidence and were therefore inadmissible under Evid.R.
404(B)(1) (“Evidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not admissible to prove the
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.”).
       {¶ 14} But because there were no objections to any of the testimony challenged on
appeal, Preece must establish that its admission created plain error, and that he cannot do.
“A party claiming plain error must show (1) that an error occurred, (2) that the error was
obvious, and (3) that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio
St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5488, ¶ 134, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002) and
Crim.R. 52(B). See also State v. Carter, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-136, 2024-Ohio-444, ¶ 19.
And “the burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.” Id., citing State
v. Jester, 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1987).
       {¶ 15} First, it is doubtful that Howard’s testimony is improper propensity evidence,
as each of his challenged statements seems to have been offered for the permissible purpose
No. 22AP-252                                                                                 7

of explaining Howard’s action in pepper spraying Preece multiple times. Compare with
Evid.R. 404(B)(2) (such “evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident.”). Several of the statements are merely repetitive of what Preece admitted
in the September 21, 2019 video—that Preece had known Howard for 15 years and liked
him, that Preece had never been a problem defendant in previous encounters with him, and
that Preece regretted biting Howard. (See State’s Ex. B3.) Moreover, the court gave a
proper limiting instruction regarding the challenged testimony, specifically informing the
jury:
              [E]vidence about defendant’s incarceration for an unrelated
              matter cannot be considered for any other purpose. It was not
              received, and you may not consider it, to prove the character of
              the defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity with
              that character * * * [and the state] cannot satisfy its burden
              merely by implying that the defendant committed these crimes
              because his other acts suggest a propensity to commit crimes.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 502.) For all these reasons, even if Preece had objected to Howard’s
statements below, it is more than likely that objection would have been overruled. But even
if we were to somehow conclude that the admission of this evidence was erroneous under
the first prong of the plain-error test, it was certainly not “obvious” error under the second
prong of that test. And given the other overwhelming evidence that was presented, Preece
cannot demonstrate that Howard’s statements or the state’s summary of them affected the
outcome of the trial as required by the last prong of the plain-error test. Accordingly,
Preece’s third assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
        {¶ 16} Finally, Preece argues that his indefinite sentence and the presumptive
release feature of R.C. 2967.271 enacted in the Reagan Tokes Law violates his rights to trial
by jury and due process of law under the Ohio and United States Constitutions and the
requirement of separation of powers under the Ohio Constitution. After briefing in this
case, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued a decision in State v. Hacker, __ Ohio St.3d. __,
2023-Ohio-2535, in which it rejected all three of these challenges to the law. See id. at ¶ 13-
25 (Reagan Tokes Law does not violate separation of powers provisions of Ohio
Constitution), ¶ 26-28 (Reagan Tokes Law does not violate right to jury trial), and ¶ 29-40
No. 22AP-252                                                                             8

(Reagan Tokes Law does not violate right to due process of law). This court is bound by the
decision in Hacker, and therefore must overrule Preece’s fourth assignment of error.
      {¶ 17} For all the foregoing reasons, Preece’s four assignments of error are
overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
                                                                      Judgment affirmed.
                        MENTEL, P.J., and JAMISON J., concur.