Court Opinion

ID: 9756828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:02:41.195802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:31.830727
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SAYLOR
CONCURRING.
I concur in the result, as I did in Morris I. My most substantial point of difference with these decisions is with the *187majority’s conclusion that a stay of execution is substantive in character, as opposed to procedural, for purposes of assessing the scope of the Court’s exclusive rulemaking province under Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This determination stands in sharp contrast with Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981), in which the Court treated a component of a civil damages award as procedural, rather than substantive. See id. at 66-67, 436 A.2d at 155. It would seem, at least to me, to be more rational to deem the maintenance of the status quo to be procedural and an affirmative award of relief substantive, accord Allen v. Mellinger, 567 Pa. 1, 13-14, 784 A.2d 762, 769 (2001) (Saylor, J., concurring); indeed, given the Morris and Laudenberger holdings in these regards, it is quite difficult for me to predict how the substantive/procedural dichotomy will be applied to various decisions made by the legislative and judicial branches in future contexts as they may arise.
Nevertheless, I am able to join the majority in approving Section 9545(c) of the PCRA, for reasons along the lines expressed in the opinion in support of reversal in Gmerek v. State Ethics Comm’n, 569 Pa. 579, 807 A.2d 812 (2002) (Saylor, J.). In short, and in my judgment, implementation of the General Assembly’s present design for post-conviction review resides at the boundary between legislative and judicial power. Where the Legislature has proceeded in such circumstances, I have taken the position that a degree of comity is appropriate and deference due to such aspects of its design as may be deemed reasonable, although these may nonetheless have a procedural dynamic. See id. at 601, 807 A.2d at 826. I believe that the legislative prescription requiring a strong showing of a likelihood of success on the merits as a prerequisite to a stay of execution predicated on a second or subsequent post-conviction petition is a reasonable one. The Court must, of course, be diligent in ensuring the necessary review concerning whether such likelihood is present, in the face of an impending execution.