Court Opinion

ID: 9658182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:50:12.563177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:52.550247
License: Public Domain

*651PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 188. (dissenting). The lead opinion prevents the public from viewing the workplace activities of Wisconsin Rapids School District (School District) employees (here, teachers) by creating an exception to the definition of "record" in the Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). This exception, when combined with the concurring opinions, grants government employees (here, teachers) a broad, blanket exception for e-mails that the teachers create in School District e-mail accounts, on School District computers, maintained by School District servers, when the teachers characterize their e-mails as "personal."1 This broad exception prevents the public from discovering what public empioy*652ees are doing during the workday, in the workplace, using equipment purchased with public funds. In so doing, the court contravenes Wisconsin's long history of transparency in and public access to actions of government employees. It is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Public Records Law and is a disservice to the public's interest in government oversight. Because I conclude that these e-mails are records2 and that the teachers have not met their burden to show that the public's interest in nondisclosure outweighs the public's interest in disclosure of these e-mails, I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 189. Don Bubolz (Bubolz), a citizen of the state of Wisconsin, sent the School District a public records request3 for the e-mails of five named teachers in the School District. Bubolz requested the "e-mails from March 1, 2007 through April 13, 2007 in their entirety .. . from the computers [the teachers used] during their school work day."4
¶ 190. The School District notified the teachers that it intended to comply with Bubolz's request. The *653teachers then commenced this action in circuit court, seeking to enjoin the release of e-mails within government e-mail accounts that they characterized as "personal."5
¶ 191. The circuit court ordered the release of all of the requested e-mails, including those e-mails that the teachers characterized as "personal." The circuit court concluded that all of the e-mails were "records" within the definition of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) of the Public Records Law. The circuit court also applied the requisite Public Records Law balancing test6 and concluded that the public interest in preventing the disclosure of the teachers' e-mails from government e-mail accounts did not outweigh the strong public interest favoring disclosure. The circuit court ordered the School District, prior to release, to redact from the e-mails any home addresses, telephone numbers, home e-mail addresses, social security numbers, medical information, bank account numbers and pupil record information.
¶ 192. The teachers appealed.
¶ 193. In his appellate brief, Bubolz, appearing pro se as the Intervenor-Respondent, explained that he requested the records because he wished to determine the extent and the quality of use of government computers and government e-mail services by the teachers *654during the workday.7 He explained that the School District has a "number of policies" with which he wanted to assess the teachers' compliance.8 As an example, Bubolz pointed to "the policy regarding teacher involvement in political campaigns."9 He explained that he "believes if the teachers' emails, sent or received, discussed school board members, school board proceedings, school hoard candidates or organizations supporting or opposing school board members or candidates," such e-mails would bear on that policy.10 He asserts that without the ability to view the content of the teachers' e-mails, "the public [could not] bring [concerns] to the attention of an administration."11
¶ 194. The School District has a written policy, "365.1 Network and Internet Acceptable Use Policy," for use of its e-mail accounts. That policy states in relevant part:
Users of the WRDN[, Wisconsin Rapids District Network,] should not assume that information stored and/or transmitted is confidential or secure.
All district assigned e-mail accounts are owned by the district and, therefore, are not private. Messages received by the e-mail system are retained on the system until deleted by the recipient....
Occasional personal use of e-mail is permitted, but limited to times which do not interfere with the user's responsibilities.12
*655To use the School District's internet system, School District employees must sign a form "acknowledg[ing] that e-mail messages and Internet usage are not private and recognizing] that all employee's activities on the WRDN may be monitored."13 Part of that acknowledgement provides:
[A]ecess to the WRDN and the Internet has been developed to support the district's educational responsibilities and mission....
By signing below I acknowledge that e-mail messages and Internet usage are not private and recognize that all employee's activities on the WRDN may be monitored.14
¶ 195. The lead opinion asserts that "[n]o allegation of improper use is at issue here."15 The lead opinion further asserts: "The School District and the Teachers agree that the Teachers did not violate the School District's written Internet Use Policy or Guidelines and that the content of the e-mails at issue is of a purely personal nature, with no connection to a government function."16 Similarly, Justice Bradley's concurring opinion asserts that the parties concede that the e-mails at issue in this case are purely "personal and evinces no violation of law or policy."17 However, neither Bubolz, the Intervenor-Respondent who requested these records, nor the School District agrees with the lead *656opinion's and Justice Bradley's concurring opinion's characterization.18
¶ 196. First, Bubolz asserts that "this entire case is an attempt by the [Wisconsin Education] Association [Council and counsel for the teachers,] to narrowly define Wisconsin's [Public] Records Law to allow public employees on their taxpayer paid work time to conduct personal business without any monitoring or accountability to the public or taxpayers."19 Bubolz also states: "To try to distinguish some duties as personal and not official would relegate [teachers] to a 'punch clock' status and make accountability in schools impossible because anytime they would do something inappropriate, they would simply state they were acting on personal time and outside the realm of their official duties."20 Finally, Bubolz contends that "whenever the teacher is on taxpayer paid time during their paid workday, they are performing official duties."21
¶ 197. Turning to the School District's position, in its answer to the teachers' amended complaint, the *657School District denied that it notified the teachers that it would release "personal emails," and instead asserted that it notified the teachers that it "would release records responsive to the request." Moreover, in its brief to this court, the School District asserted: "The materials at issue pertain to the business of the public entity."22 It explained: "It is [] not apparent from current Wisconsin law that emails sent by public employees on public resources during public time are not of public interest."23 These statements contradict the lead opinion's repeated assertion that "[i]t is [] uncontested that the contents of the e-mails at issue do not relate to the school district or government affairs or any official actions of the Teachers or other public officers or employees or the conduct of governmental business."24
¶ 198. We may accept parties' stipulated facts. See Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 4, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581. However, as we just explained, the parties in this case have not stipulated, nor do they agree, to the fact that the e-mails do not relate to governmental affairs.
¶ 199. As stated, the lead opinion and Justice Bradley's concurring opinion repeatedly assert that there is nothing in these e-mails that relates in any way to the teachers' employment.25 This assertion is made in the absence of an agreement by all the parties and *658based on a record that does not contain the e-mails at issue. Accordingly, there is nothing in the record that would allow any member of this court to base a decision on the content, number or length of the e-mails, or the time of day when the e-mails were created, all of which are necessary to determine whether the e-mails relate to the teachers' employment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 200. This case presents questions of statutory interpretation and application. We interpret and apply statutes independently of the previous court decision, but benefiting by its analysis. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶ 14, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (citing Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 2009 WI 16, ¶ 13, 315 Wis. 2d 612, 760 N.W.2d 396). Applying the balancing test prior to the disclosure of public records is also a question of law for our independent review; however, we benefit from the circuit court's discussion of the balance it conducted. Id. (citing Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis. 2d 768, 784, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996)).
B. General Principles of Statutory Interpretation
¶ 201. This case requires us to interpret and apply Wisconsin's Public Records Law statutes. "Statutory interpretation begins 'with the language of the statute.'" Cnty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶ 21, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110). Statutory language "is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning." *659Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 45. If a statute's meaning is plain, "then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according" to its terms. Id., ¶ 46 (internal quotations and citation omitted). However, if a statute "is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses," the statute is ambiguous, and we may consult extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to discern the meaning of the statute. Id., ¶¶ 47-48.
¶ 202. Statutes are not interpreted in a vacuum. Rather, we interpret them in the context in which the legislature placed them. Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶ 17, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641. Furthermore, when the legislature has set out the purpose of a statute, we interpret the statute so as to fulfill its stated purpose. Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶ 34 (citing Johnson v. Wis. Lumber & Supply Co., 203 Wis. 304, 310, 234 N.W. 506 (1931)).
C. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(2)
¶ 203. The lead opinion turns on its creation of an exception to the Public Records Law's definition of "record." "Record" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). Section 19.32(2) provides:
"Record" means any material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an authority. "Record" includes, but is not limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, charts, photographs, films, recordings, tapes (including computer tapes), computer printouts and optical disks. "Record" does not include drafts, notes, preliminary computations and like materials prepared for the *660originator's personal use or prepared by the originator in the name of a person for whom the originator is working; materials which are purely the personal property of the custodian and have no relation to his or her office; materials to which access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and published materials in the possession of an authority other than a public library which are available for sale, or which are available for inspection at a public library.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 204. The lead opinion seems to agree that e-mails are "records" within the definition of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2)26 However, it then narrowly construes "record" to create an exception for e-mails that it characterizes as "personal."27 That construction is incorrect as a matter of law for at least three reasons: (1) it contravenes the plain meaning of the statute; (2) it impairs Wisconsin's long history of open and accountable government; and (3) it creates a content-based exception from the Public Records Law for e-mails that are not in the record and, therefore, no member of this court has seen their content. Neither Bubolz, the public records requester, nor the School District agrees the e-mails have no connection to the teachers' employment.
1. Plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2)
¶ 205. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.32(2) defines "record" in broadly stated terms. It unambiguously defines *661"record" as "any material. . . regardless of physical form or characteristics." The statute also explains that the types of records that are listed are merely examples, not limitations on the broad definition the legislature chose. The statute does so by stating that "[r]ecord includes, but is not limited to" the list of examples that follows the introductory phrase.
¶ 206. Subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. § 19.32 also contains a discrete list of exceptions to the preceding statutory definition of "record." I agree with the lead opinion's discussion of why e-mails are not included within any of the exceptions listed in § 19.32(2).28 However, subsec. (2)'s discrete list of exceptions from the definition of "record" strengthens the unambiguous breadth of the legislative definition of record. Stated otherwise, if the legislature had intended to exclude "personal" e-mails, it would have included that exception in suhsec. (2)'s discrete list of exceptions. It did not do so.
¶ 207. Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context in which the legislature has placed them. Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, ¶ 20. Placed in context, the definition of "record" set out in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) must be compared with subsec. (2)'s discrete list of exceptions from the term "record." Subsection (2) establishes a broad reach in defining "record" under the Public Records Law by explicitly providing that the list in subsec. (2) of what constitutes a record is "not limited to" the examples listed. Accordingly, the list in subsec. (2) is by way of example only and not by way of limitation. However, the exceptions to that broad definition, also contained in subsec. (2), have no introductory phrase that suggests that the exceptions include, *662but are not limited to, those exceptions enumerated. The absence of such an introductory phrase suggests that the exceptions chosen by the legislature are a discrete list not to be expanded.
¶ 208. In addition, when the legislature states the purpose that it expects legislation to accomplish, we interpret the affected statutes to "best promote [that] statutory purpose[]." Cnty. of Dane, 315 Wis. 2d 293, ¶ 34. In establishing Wisconsin's Public Records Law, the legislature unambiguously stated its purpose. See Wis. Stat. § 19.31. It did so by establishing that construction of the Public Records Law must be undertaken "in every instance with a presumption of complete public access" § 19.31 (emphasis added).
¶ 209. As we have explained, the "statement of public policy in § 19.31 is one of the strongest declarations of policy to be found in the Wisconsin statutes." Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, ¶ 49, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240. Given the significant role that teachers play in our society, the public has a very strong interest in all of their activities in the workplace. See id., ¶ 53 ("Public school teachers... are in a significant position of responsibility and visibility. . . . They are entrusted with the responsibility of teaching children, and the public has an interest in knowing about such allegations of teacher misconduct and how they are handled."); Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶ 28, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811.
¶ 210. In Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403, 438 N.W.2d 589 (1989), we examined a claimed exception from record disclosure. We addressed a claim that a report of a study prepared by a third party was not a "record" within the meaning of the Public Records Law. Id. at 405. In concluding that the report was a record, we reasoned that the "term 'record' is broadly defined in *663sec. 19.32(2)." Id. at 410. We also explained that "[a]ny exceptions to the general rule of disclosure must be narrowly construed." Id. at 411 (citing Hathaway v. Green Bay Sch. Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984)).
¶ 211. I conclude that the lead opinion's creation of a broad exception to the Public Records Law — the exclusion of e-mails that government employees characterize as "personal"29 — contravenes the plain meaning of "record" as defined by the legislature. Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). The lead opinion changes the word "personal" into the word "private" in contravention of Wisconsin's long history of open and accessible oversight of government employees' actions.
2. Open and accountable government
¶ 212. Wisconsin has a long history of holding public employees accountable through providing complete public access to records that will assist in the public's review. Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶ 49. As stated, the legislative purpose of the Public Records Law is set out in Wis. Stat. § 19.31. Because of the strong legislative commitment to open and transparent government embodied in Wisconsin's Public Records Law, it is appropriate to fully set out and discuss the legislature's policy objective. Section 19.31 provides:
In recognition of the fact that a representative government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it is declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employees who represent *664them. Further, providing persons with such information is declared to be an essential function of a representative government and an integral part of the routine duties of officers and employees whose responsibility it is to provide such information. To that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied.
¶ 213. The legislature's statement that Wis. Stat. "ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access," was not followed in the lead opinion. See Wis. Stat. § 19.31. The lead opinion accords no presumption of access to the requested emails.
¶ 214. There is nothing ambiguous in the legislative directive of "complete public access." All e-mails in the School District's e-mail account should be released, unless there is an exception in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). § 19.31; Fox, 149 Wis. 2d at 410-11.
¶ 215. Any exception to the general presumption of complete disclosure must be narrowly construed. Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶ 31 ("[Statutory exceptions 'should be recognized for what they are, instances in derogation of the general legislative intent, and should, therefore, be narrowly construed.'" (quoting Fox, 149 Wis. 2d at 411)); Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397. It is "contrary to general well established principles of freedom-of-information statutes to hold that, by implication only, any type of record can be held from public inspection." Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397 (emphasis added).
*665¶ 216. Here, there is no statutory language excepting any type of e-mail from disclosure. Despite this, the lead opinion creates a broad, blanket exception for all emails in the School District's e-mail account, based solely on the teachers' allegation that the e-mails are "personal." The lead opinion has crafted its exception "by implication only," id., when it concludes that for an e-mail to be a "record" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), it must involve the carrying on of governmental business.30 There is nothing in Wis. Stat. ch. 19 that supports this interpretation. Indeed, claims have been filed against government employees based on the allegation that government computers were being used for purposes other than government business.31
¶ 217. And finally, why does the Public Records Law state that there is a presumption of complete public access? It does so to enable the public to see for itself what is going on in government work places. The lead opinion shuts down this public access whenever public employees characterize their emails as "personal." It is not possible to accord public oversight of government employees' activities when those same government employees decide what the public is permitted to see.
3. Content-based exception
¶ 218. Throughout the lead opinion, it repeats that whether an e-mail is a record within the meaning of the Public Records Law depends on the content of the *666email.32 This is a curious position for justices that have never read any of the e-mails. As stated, the e-mails are not in the record, so there is no means by which any justice could know the content of the e-mails.
¶ 219. Some courts in other jurisdictions have applied a content-based analysis to freedom-of-information types of requests, but they have made a decision about whether the material should be released only after an in camera review of the emails under consideration. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Canterbury, 688 S.E.2d 317, 322-23 (W. Va. 2009) (concluding that the trial court properly ordered the e-mails at issue produced for an in camera review of their content).
¶ 220. The lead opinion also supports its content-based exception by stating that those "personal e-mails include such messages as an e-mail from a teacher to her spouse about child care responsibilities and an e-mail from a friend to a teacher regarding social plans."33 The lead opinion errs. No justice has seen any of the e-mails at issue; they are not in the record. Therefore, there is no way any member of this court can provide examples of what the emails say. Notwithstanding this lack of knowledge, a majority of this court relates what the emails say.
¶ 221. Here, Bubolz, the records requester and a party to this action,34 alleges that the teachers are attempting to preclude him from reviewing the extent and quality of use of School District computers and *667e-mail services during the workday.35 He explains that he "believes if the teachers' e-mails, sent or received, discussed school board members, school board proceedings, school board candidates or organizations supporting or opposing school board members or candidates," he should be able to learn of it.36 The School District agrees that if the e-mails demonstrate "excessive personal usage" of District e-mail accounts during the workday "the public's interest may then be implicated."37 I, too, agree with Bubholz.
¶ 222. While .one could assert that those types of e-mails are personal in nature38 because the teachers are doing things outside of their jobs duties, one could also assert that it is not proper for teachers to be campaigning for school board candidates or members using School District e-mail accounts and computers during the workday.39 However, there is no way of knowing what is going on here because the lead opinion *668prevents the public from learning the content of the teachers' e-mails and how often they are using School District e-mail accounts and computers for non-job related tasks.
D. Balance
¶ 223. Since I have concluded that e-mails created in School District e-mail accounts on School District computers during the workday do not fall within an exception to the statutory definition of "record" contained in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), but rather that they are records covered by the Public Records Law, I must determine whether the circuit court properly applied the balancing of interests test. See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 319 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶ 54-55.
¶ 224. This balancing involves weighing "the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-disclosure." Id., ¶ 55. In balancing these interests, there generally are no " 'blanket exceptions from release.' " Id., ¶ 56 (quoting Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 10). Furthermore, there is a strong legislatively established presumption in favor of disclosure. Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶ 63, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551. Only in an "exceptional case" will nondisclosure be appropriate. Id. This presumption of disclosure is one of the strongest in the Wisconsin statutes. Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶ 49. To overcome this presumption, the person opposing disclosure has the burden to show a compelling public interest in nondisclosure. Local 2489, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Rock Cnty., 2004 WI App 210, ¶ 27, 277 Wis. 2d 208, 689 N.W.2d 644.
*669¶ 225. Here, the teachers assert they have a personal privacy interest in preventing disclosure that rises to the level of a public interest. The teachers cite two cases protecting the privacy of phone conversations and personal letters delivered to the school as supportive of their interests here. Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983). They assert that "[i]f a teacher makes a personal phone call at lunch time on the school phone, she does not waive all expectation of privacy in her phone conversation[,] ... [and] [i]f a teacher receives a personal letter in his school mailbox, he does not waive all expectation of privacy in his [] mail."40
¶ 226. I am not persuaded. First, the teachers have been informed by the School District's policy 365.1 on network and internet usage that they "should not assume that information stored and/or transmitted is confidential or secure."41 Second, each teacher was required to sign the following acknowledgement: "By signing below I acknowledge that e-mail messages and Internet usage are not private and recognize that all employee's activities on the WRDN may be monitored." Therefore, there can be no expectation of privacy in these emails. Neither of the cases cited by the teachers involved a similar policy and acknowledgement.
¶ 227. Furthermore, even though individual privacy concerns may rise to the level of a public interest, the teachers have made no such showing here. As the court of appeals has explained, "[w]hen individuals become public employees, they necessarily give up *670certain privacy rights and are subject to a degree of public scrutiny." Local 2489, 277 Wis. 2d 208, ¶ 26 (citing Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 786-87).
¶ 228. Accordingly, I conclude that the teachers have identified no public interest that will be served by the blanket exception from the Public Records Law they assert herein, given that the circuit court ordered the School District, prior to release, to redact from the e-mails any home addresses, telephone numbers, home e-mail addresses, social security numbers, medical information, bank account numbers and pupil record information.
¶ 229. Furthermore, the teachers' privacy concern, if it were to rise to the level of a public interest, is balanced against the strong public interest in disclosure of the activities of public employees in the workplace. See Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶ 49. It is also considered with regard to our recent affirmation that the Public Records Law is generally not amenable to blanket exceptions, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 319 Wis. 2d 439, ¶ 56, 768 N.W.2d 700, such as the lead opinion has attempted to create here for all e-mails it labels "personal." Therefore, even if I were to presume that the content of the e-mails do not involve work-related matters, I agree with the circuit court that the teachers have not overcome the statutory presumption of full disclosure and complete public access and, therefore, the e-mails should be provided pursuant to Bubolz's request.42 Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court order releasing the e-mails.
*671III. CONCLUSION
¶ 230. The lead opinion prevents the public from viewing the workplace activities of School District teachers by creating an exception to the definition of "record" in the Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). This exception, when combined with the concurring opinions, grants government employees, here, teachers, a broad, blanket exception for e-mails that the teachers create in School District email accounts, on School District computers, maintained by School District servers, when the teachers characterize their e-mails as "personal." This broad exception prevents the public from discovering what public employees are doing during the workday, in the workplace, using equipment purchased with public funds. In so doing, the court contravenes Wisconsin's long history of transparency in and public access to actions of government employees. The lead opinion is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Public Records Law and is a disservice to the public's interest in government oversight. Because I conclude that these e-mails are records and that the teachers have not met their burden to show that the public's interest in nondisclosure outweighs the public's interest in disclosure of these e-mails, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 231. I am authorized to state that Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins in this dissent.

 This appeal does not involve personal e-mail accounts that may have been accessed from government computers, but which accounts are not maintained on government servers. No one has raised this issue, so I do not address it.

 Both Justice Bradley's concurrence and Justice Gableman's concurrence conclude, as I do, that these e-mails fall within the Public Records Law's definition of "record." See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). Accordingly, a majority of the court holds that e-mails created in government e-mail accounts, on government computers, maintained by government servers are "records" subject to the Public Records Law.

 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 19.31 through 19.37 contain provisions of the Public Records Law. A request under the Public Records Law is often termed an "open records request."

 Amended Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief, Exhibit A.

 The Teachers' Amended Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief requested the circuit court enter "[a]n order enjoining the [School District] and their agents and employees from releasing the personal emails." (Emphasis added.)

 See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶¶ 54-55, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (explaining that, in the absence of a statutory or common law exception, the presumption favoring release may be overcome only when, in performing the balancing test, the public interest in non-disclosure outweighs the public interest in disclosure).

 Intervenor-Respondent's Brief, 2.

 Id.

 Id.

 Id. at 3.

 Id. at 2.

 365.1 Network and Internet Acceptable Use Policy, 300-104, 300-111.

 WRDN Employee Acknowledgement and Waiver, 300-114.

 Id.

 Lead op., ¶ 13.

 Id.

 Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶ 148.

 The assertion made by the lead opinion and Justice Bradley's concurring opinion that it is undisputed that the e-mails at issue are purely personal impacts their opinions in different ways. The lead opinion creates an exception to Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2)'s definition of "record" for purely personal e-mails. Lead op., ¶ 23. Conversely, Justice Bradley concludes, as I do, that the e-mails fall within the statutory definition of records. Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶ 151. However, in conducting the balancing test, Justice Bradley asserts that the public interest in nondisclosure will always outweigh the public interest in disclosure of purely personal e-mails that evince no violation of law or policy. Id., ¶ 167. I disagree.

 Intervenor-Respondent's Brief, 3.

 Id. at 4.

 Id.

 Defendant-Respondent's Brief, 8.

 Id. at 10.

 Lead op., ¶ 30 (emphasis added); see also Id., ¶ 23 ("In the instant case, the contents of the Teachers' personal e-mails have no connection to a government function ....").

 Id., ¶ 30, passim; Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶ 148, passim.

 Lead op., ¶ 56, passim ("The Teachers and the School District agree, as do we, that e-mails can fall within the first part of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2)'s description of materials that may be 'records.'").

 Id., ¶ 136, passim ("If the content of the e-mail is solely personal, it is not a record under the Public Records Law and the e-mail cannot be released.").

 E.g., id., ¶¶ 62-68.

 Lead op., ¶ 141.

 Lead op., ¶ 22, passim.

 See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, ¶ 93, 272 Wis. 2d 707, 681 N.W.2d 230, subsequent appeal at State v. Jensen, 2009 WI App 26, 316 Wis. 2d 377, 762 N.W.2d 833, rev'd State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, 324 Wis. 2d 586, 782 N.W.2d 415.

 Lead op., passim.

 Lead op., ¶ 29.

 The three justices who participate in the lead opinion and Justice Bradley in her concurring opinion rely on an asserted knowledge of the emails' content.

 Intervenor-Respondent's Brief, 2.

 Id. at 3. The lead opinion misstates its knowledge of the content of the emails when it says, "None of the e-mails at issue here relate to school board candidates." Lead op., ¶ 26 n.10. Neither Chief Justice Abrahamson, who authored the lead opinion, nor any other justice has seen the teachers' emails. Therefore, there is no basis on which to make such a statement. It is unfair to the public to make statements of material fact about which the court has no knowledge.

 Defendant-Respondent's Brief, 12.

 As I have already noted, a "personal" e-mail is not necessarily a "private" e-mail. The School District's policy on e-mail usage gives notice that the e-mail accounts are not private and may be monitored.

 As I related above, Bubolz's appellate brief, raises this concern. Query, what is to prevent a government employee who is campaigning through the use of governmental e-mails from *668characterizing those e-mails as "personal," thereby excluding them from disclosure when a public records request is made for e-mails.

 Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, 18.

 365.1 Network and Internet Acceptable Use Policy, 300-104.

 I, like every other justice, have not seen the e-mails. However, the presumption in favor of complete public access must be overcome by a compelling public interest in nondisclosure. Local 2489, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Rock Cnty., 2004 WI App 210, ¶ 26, 277 Wis. 2d 208, 689 N.W.2d 644 (citing Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 Wis. 2d *671768, 786-87, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996)). The teachers have identified no compelling public interest.