Court Opinion

ID: 9728635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:53.073498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:50.510793
License: Public Domain

*617EVANS, J.
I concur in the result which orders a peremptory writ issue directing the trial court to vacate its order granting petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment.
I view parts I and V of the opinion as totally dispositive of the writ petition. I perceive parts II, III, and IV as extraneous, interesting dissertations on a fascinating topic; however, they are totally lacking in necessity in this proceeding and would be better suited for exposition in a law review as an expression of the writer’s opinion.
I conform my concurrence to the reasoning and conclusion reached in Turpin v. Sortini (1982) 31 Cal.3d 220 [182 Cal.Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d 954]. That court succinctly summarized the extent to which such an action may be pursued and ultimately compensated in damages. “In sum, we conclude that while a plaintiff-child in a wrongful life action may not recover general damages for being born impaired as opposed to not being born at all, the child—like his or her parents—may recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment.” (Id., at p. 239.)
Any expansion of the right to recover damages in a wrongful life cause of action by either the parent or the child should be left to the legislative process and not suggested by judicial dicta.