Court Opinion

ID: 9926292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 16:01:08.134151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:21.447243
License: Public Domain

22-3012-cv
Dwyer v. United Kingdom Gen. Commc’ns Headquarters

                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                          FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                 SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 24th day of January, two thousand twenty-four.

       PRESENT:        Steven J. Menashi,
                       Eunice C. Lee,
                      Sarah A. L. Merriam,
                               Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________

THOMAS F. DWYER,

               Plaintiff-Appellant,

         v.                                                    No. 22-3012-cv

UNITED              KINGDOM                 GENERAL
COMMUNICATIONS                     HEADQUARTERS
(UKGCHQ), MALCOLM JOHN TOMBS,

               Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant:                 Thomas F. Dwyer, pro se, Walden, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees:                No appearance.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Swain, J.).

      Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      Plaintiff-Appellant Thomas Dwyer, proceeding pro se, sued Defendants-
Appellees Malcolm Tombs and the “United Kingdom General Communications
Headquarters,” alleging illegal warrantless surveillance, fraud, and other
misconduct. Observing Dwyer’s “history of filing frivolous lawsuits”—some
raising similar claims against Tombs—the district court sua sponte dismissed the
complaint as factually and legally frivolous. See Dwyer v. U.K. Gen. Commc’ns
Headquarters, No. 22-CV-07171, 2022 WL 15523479, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022)
(“The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has
paid the fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous.”).

      Dwyer timely appealed. However, Dwyer’s brief fails to address the
grounds for dismissal. Instead, Dwyer advances arguments and allegations
similar to those he raised in the district court. Dwyer has therefore abandoned any
challenge to the determination that his complaint was frivolous. See Moates v.
Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that “pro se litigants are afforded
some latitude in meeting the rules governing litigation [but that] we need not, and
normally will not, decide issues that a party fails to raise” on appeal); LoSacco v.
City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e need not manufacture claims
of error for an appellant proceeding pro se.”).

      Moreover, the allegations of international surveillance, mind-reading, and
assault in Dwyer’s complaint appear “fanciful” and “fantastic”; the district court

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did not err in categorizing those allegations as “factually frivolous.” Gallop v.
Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
32-33 (1992)). 1 Dwyer’s claims consisted largely of “legal conclusion[s] couched as
... factual allegation[s],” which we need not credit. Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd.,
36 F.4th 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Dwyer did not explain how the defendants’ alleged misconduct was directed at or
affected him, nor did he articulate any distinct injury in the recent past.

       While pro se litigants should generally receive at least one opportunity to
amend, see Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991), Dwyer has shown no
ability, either here or in prior lawsuits, to state a valid claim for relief that would
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See In
re Trib. Co. Fraudulent Conv. Litig., 10 F.4th 147, 175 (2d Cir. 2021).

                                       *      *      *

       We have considered Dwyer’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are
without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                            FOR THE COURT:
                                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

1 While our cases generally discourage the “bad practice” of dismissing an action sua
sponte without notice and opportunity to respond, Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp.,
899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018), we have recognized exceptions for “unmistakably”
defective pleadings, id., and serial litigation that “reassert[s]” claims previously
dismissed, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000).
Based on Dwyer’s litigation history (against Tombs in particular) and the district court’s
finding of factual frivolousness, no-notice sua sponte dismissal was appropriate here
because Dwyer was on constructive notice that his claims were vulnerable to dismissal.

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