Court Opinion

ID: 9794503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:07:07.828455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:56.111916
License: Public Domain

NESBETT, Chief Justice.
The complaint requesting injunctive relief in this case was not signed by appellee’s attorney, contrary to the requirements of Civil Rule II-.1
Appellants’ first point on appeal is that failure to sign the complaint deprived the court of jurisdiction.
The record discloses that a complaint, praying for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief against the appellants for creating disturbances in the union hall maintained by appellee, was filed on July 18, 1962. The complaint was signed immediately after the prayer for relief by R. E. McFarland as secretary-treasurer of appel-lee union. Following McFarland’s signature was a typewritten verification prepared for his signature. This verification was signed as required and was followed by a notarization duly executed.
Below and to the left of the notarization there was typed:
“HARTLIEB and RADER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY:-
Gordon W. Hartlieb”
No signature had been affixed on the line provided.
Likewise filed on July 18, 1962, and apparently concurrently with the filing of the’ complaint, was a Notice and a Motion For Preliminary Injunction, both of which were signed by Gordon W. Hartlieb of Hartlieb and Rader, Attorneys for Plaintiff. Also filed on the same date were a number of affidavits in support of the motion, including one by R. E. McFarland.
The requirements of Alaska’s Civil Rule 11 have been embodied in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since 'adoption of those rules and prior to that in Federal Equity Rules 21 and 24,2
In requiring the signature of counsel, the overlying purpose of the rule has been to insure the good faith of counsel by holding them strictly accountable for all allegations contained in the complaint.3 This purpose seems to be fully and plainly set out in the present wording of the rule.
For the failure of counsel to sign a pleading, the rule provides that, “it may be stricken as sham and false and the action *201may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.” [Emphasis ours.] It will be noted that the above wording leaves the application of any sanction for failure to sign a pleading to the discretion of the judge.
In Holley Coal Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co.4 the court held that striking the pleading was within the sound discretion of the court, but since no reason other than oversight appeared for the failure of the defendant to sign its original answer, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the first amended answer.
In the case before us the complaint recounted in some detail a series of incidents in which appellants purportedly acted to disrupt union meetings, destroy union property, destroy the effectiveness of appellee local union and commit libel and slander against officials of appellee local. Although the complaint was not signed by counsel, a Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed on the same date as the complaint, recounting the incidents mentioned in the complaint in abstract form, was signed by counsel.
It is not contended that counsel’s failure to sign the complaint was willful or 'anything other than an oversight. A place was prepared for such signature. Appellants did not draw the trial court’s attention to the failure of counsel to sign the complaint nor did they move that the complaint be stricken for failure to comply with the rule. Since the trial court had no oppor-timity to pass on the matter, we shall not consider it for the first time on appeal.5
Appellants’ next point is that, although the complaint was signed by R. E. McFarland as secretary-treasurer of Ap-pellee Common Laborer’s and Hod Carriers Union of America, Local 341, there was no allegation that McFarland had authority to so act for that appellee.
The answer is that in the absence of a contradiction by appellants of McFarland’s authority to sign the complaint, his signature in his capacity as an officer of the union was a sufficient allegation of authority under the circumstances.6 Our attention has not been invited to any evidence produced at the trial which would show that McFarland did not have authority to sign the complaint.
Appellants cite Kassly Undertaking Co. v. Flexible Co.7 for the proposition that the suit would be dismissed for failure of a plaintiff affiant to set out the facts of his authority as an agent. The fact is that this case held the opposite of appellants’ representation — that the suit would “nof’ be dismissed on the ground advanced.
Appellants next argue that the court erred in granting injunctive relief.
As has been stated the complaint alleged numerous acts of appellants, which it was claimed caused harm to appellee union, such as: committing acts of violence within the union hall, disrupting union meetings, creating trouble and confusion during work *202calls, filing numerous lawsuits against the local union, and attempting to physically harm an officer of the union, in addition to those acts mentioned earlier in this opinion. In addition to the verified complaint these allegations were supported by six affidavits.
Under this heading appellants argue first that since the complaint did not allege that the acts asserted were causing irreparable injury, it was error to grant injunctive relief.
In paragraph XXIV the complaint alleged : “That irreputable harm, damage and injury will follow and be done to plaintiff unless the acts and conduct of the defendants above complained of are enjoined.” r.. .
Appellants argue that there is no such word as “irreputable” and that the court is not at liberty to place upon it an interpretation not known to the law. We believe that the wording of this paragraph makes it plain enough that the pleader intended to allege and would be understood by the average reader to be alleging “irreparable harm, damage and injury”, and that the error in transcribing “irreparable” as “irreputable” was not sufficient to obscure the pleader’s true meaning.
It is next argued that injunctive relief was improper because there was an adequate remedy at law. Argument in support of this claim is that on two prior occasions appellee had availed itself of an existing adequate remedy at law and had caused appellants to be punished for similar acts.
Appellants’ argument falls of its own weight. The allegations contained in the verified complaint and affidavits were sufficient to support injunctive relief if established to the satisfaction of the court and belied the effectiveness of any previous attempts to obtain adequate relief from appellants’ acts.
Appellants next contend that the judgment herein is void because service of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was not made on appellants. As a result they claim to have been illegally deprived of their right under Civil Rule 78(b) to a five day period within which to “serve a written detailed statement of objections.” 8
The fact is that appellants were not served with copies of the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Judgment and apparently did not learn of the judgment until after it had been signed.
On the other hand, appellants have not made a showing of how they have been prejudiced by the terms of the judgment as it read and how they would have moved to modify it if they had been served according to the rule.
In its main provisions the judgment enjoins appellants from being on the local union premises except during work calls; requires that while on the premises they not create any disturbance; that they be enjoined from using obscene and other offensive language on the premises and that they conduct themselves in an orderly manner and refrain from acts of physical violence toward any person on the premises.
There appears to be nothing unreasonable about the judgment on its face and appellants have not shown prejudice resulting from failure of appellee to comply with Civil Rule 78(a). In a similar fact situation in Briggs v. Kelly 9 we said:
“Non-compliance with subdivisions (a) and (b) of Rule 78 does not in itself require us to reverse the judgment below and order it to be set aside. The *203appellant must first show that she has been prejudiced in some substantial way. * * * ”10 [Footnote omitted.]
We have declined to attempt to consider and decide the matters concerning free speech mentioned by our colleague in a dissenting opinion for the reason that.those matters were not made issues on appeal by appellants’ Statement of Points on Appeal as required by Supreme Court Rule 9(e),11 nor were they set out in the Specifications of Error or covered by the Questions Presented for Review and Summary of Argument as required by Supreme Court Rule 11 (a) (S), (6) and (7). They were mentioned only casually or not at all in appellants’ main argument and were not briefed by ap-pellee.
The judgment below is affirmed.

. Civ.R. 11 states in pertinent part:
“Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. * * * The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. Eor a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.”

. 2 Moore, Federal Practice para. 11.01 [2] (2d ed. 1964).

. Goodwin Film & Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 222 F. 249, 260-61 (2d Cir.1915); United States ex rel. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. American Sur. Co., 25 F.Supp. 225, 226 (E.D.N.Y.1938).

. 186 F.2d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 1950). See also In re Legon, 85 F.Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y.1949).

. Merl F. Thomas Sons, Inc. v. State, 396 P.2d 76, 79-80 (Alaska 1964); Schenderline v. Robertson, 394 P.2d 395, 397 (Alaska 1964); Lumbermens Mut. Gas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 387 P.2d 104, 109 (Alaska 1963); Pollastrine v. Severance, 375 P.2d 528, 531 (Alaska 1962).

. Civil. 9(a) states:
“(a) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons tbat is made a party, except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the court. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader’s knowledge.”
See Brown v. Music Inc., 359 P.2d 295, 301 (Alaska 1961).

.313 Ill.App. 653, 40 N.E.2d 621 (1942).

. Civ.R. 78(b) states:
“(b) Objections. Within 5 days after service of any of the documents mentioned in subdivision (a), a party may serve a written detailed statement of objections to any such document and the reasons therefor. If objections are served within the time specified herein, the court may thereafter require the attorneys interested to appear before it, or it may sign the document as prepared by counsel for the successful party or as modified by the court.”

. 376 P.2d 715 (Alaska 1962).

. Id. at 717.

. Supreme Ct.R. 9(e) states:
“Statement of Points. If the appellant does not designate for inclusion the complete record and all the proceedings and evidence in the action, he shall serve and file with his designation a concise statement of the points on which he intends to rely on the appeal. Otherwise such statement of points shall he served and filed prior to the time that the preparation of the record on appeal is to be completed. The court will consider nothing but the points so stated.”