Court Opinion

ID: 9373344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:19.857048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.996221
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KATHLEEN MARY KAPLAN,                           DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-0432-17-0195-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: October 6, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Kathleen Mary Kaplan, Arlington, Virginia, pro se.

           Caroline Raines Greenfield and Jeremiah Crowley, Joint Base Andrews,
             Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed her removal for inadequate contribution .        For the reasons set forth
     below, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
     REMAND the appeal to the Washington Regional Office for further adjudication

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     consistent with Santos v. National Aeronautics & Space Administration, 990 F.3d
     1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was a DR-IV Principal Computer Scientist for the Air Force
     Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 52.
     Her principal duties involved managing the agency’s basic research program in
     software and systems, evaluating scientific opportunities, evaluating and selecting
     research   proposals,    and   advocating    research    programs      to   management,
     stakeholders, and agency review panels. IAF, Tab 17 at 29. This was a pay band
     position under an Office of Personnel Management demonstration project,
     utilizing a contribution-based compensation system.           IAF, Tab 18 at 5-16,
     Tabs 19-22, Tab 23 at 8; see generally National Defense Authorization Act for
     Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 342(b), 108 Stat. 2663 (1994); 5 U.S.C.
     § 4703; 5 C.F.R. part 470.
¶3        The contribution-based compensation system works by linking employees’
     salaries to their actual contributions to the agency’s mission. IAF, Tab 19 at 16. 2
     The system has five “broadbands,” each encompassing a salary range and a
     corresponding contribution range—the higher the salary, the greater the
     contribution expected and vice versa. Id. at 14, 16-18. As a DR-IV employee
     with an annual salary of $120,290 (not including a $29,907 locality adjustment),
     the appellant was expected to have an overall contribution score of 4.3. IAF,
     Tab 23 at 8. Science and engineering employees, like the appellant, are rated on
     four areas of     contribution:     (1)     Problem     solving; (2)    communication;
     (3) technology management; and (4) teamwork and leadership.                 IAF, Tab 21
     at 9-12, Tab 23 at 9-10. An employee earns a score for each of these areas, and

     2
       Tabs 19 through 22 of the Initial Appeal File contain the text of the regulation
     governing the contribution-based compensation system at issue, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,076
     (Aug. 30, 2010).
                                                                                       3

     the four scores are averaged to arrive at an overall contribution score.       IAF,
     Tab 20 at 4, Tab 23 at 8-10.       Initial contribution ratings are assessed by an
     employee’s immediate supervisor and then presented to a “meeting of managers,”
     who are responsible for refining the initial ratings as appropriate to arrive at a
     final rating that is equitable in comparison to all employees under their purview.
     IAF, Tab 20 at 4.      A deviation of 3/10 of a point or less between expected
     contribution and actual contribution is deemed acceptable. IAF, Tab 19 at 19.
¶4           If an employee earns an overall contribution score more than 3/10 of a point
     lower than her expected score, her contribution is deemed to be inadequate and
     management is required to take remedial action, which may include a contribution
     improvement plan (CIP). 3       Id. at 7.   A CIP is analogous to a performance
     improvement plan under 5 C.F.R. part 432 and replaces those procedures for
     covered employees.      Id.   Under CIP procedures, an employee is entitled to a
     reasonable amount of time (a minimum of 60 days under the demonstration
     project) to demonstrate adequate contribution.      Id.   Management is obliged to
     offer the employee appropriate assistance in meeting her goals. Id. At the end of
     the CIP, a meeting of managers will convene to determine whether the employee
     has brought her contribution up to expectations. IAF, Tab 18 at 12. If she has
     not, management has the sole discretion to initiate a reduction in pay or a
     removal. IAF, Tab 20 at 7. An employee subjected to such an action has the
     right to appeal to the Board under the procedures of 5 C.F.R. § 432.106(a). Id.
     at 8.
¶5           Turning to the facts of this case, the appellant was a Program Officer in
     charge of a portfolio of research projects related to systems and soft ware
     development, whereby money would be allocated to promote the various fields of
     research therein. Hearing Recording, May 22, 2017 (HR 1) at 18:00 (testimony
     of the Chief Scientist).       Like other Program Officers, the appellant was
     3
      These procedures may be invoked at any point during the contribution year during
     which an employee’s contribution falls below the acceptable level. IAF, Tab 20 at 8.
                                                                                       4

     responsible for presenting her portfolio biennially to the Air Force Scientific
     Advisory Board (SAB), an advisory committee of civilian experts appointed by
     the Secretary of Defense to make recommendations on scientific and technical
     matters. IAF, Tab 23 at 12; HR 1 at 25:25 (testimony of the Chief Scientist).
     The appellant presented her portfolio to the SAB in March 2016, and the SAB
     was highly critical of it.    Specifically, the SAB found that the appellant’s
     portfolio lacked “technical direction and rigor,” was “behind the state of the art,”
     and concerned projects that had limited application to agency needs. IAF, Tab 23
     at 19-20. The SAB recommended that the agency “[m]ake no further investments
     in the Systems and Software portfolio until proper focus on key systems and
     software research is achieved.”     Id. at 20.     Following this SAB feedback, on
     March 11, 2016, the Director of AFOSR recommended that the appellant be
     placed on a CIP. IAF, Tab 39 at 74.
¶6        On May 25, 2016, the Chief of the Engineering and Information Science
     Branch issued the appellant a notice placing her on a 90-day CIP effective
     immediately. IAF, Tab 17 at 16-24. The CIP notice identified deficiencies in
     each of the appellant’s four contribution areas and explained what her expected
     contribution during the CIP would be. Id. at 19-22. The appellant was expected
     to demonstrate adequate contribution by following a prescribed process to set a
     new focus for the Systems and Software portfolio, as well as prepare and
     articulate the portfolio’s basic research areas, strategic vision, and researcher
     state-of-the-art accomplishments.     Id. at 22.    Her work was to culminate in a
     written proposal and a presentation to agency management. Id. The final written
     proposal was due on August 10, 2016, and the presentation was scheduled for
     August 23, 2016. Id. at 23. The CIP also scheduled several interim milestones
     for the appellant to meet on her way to the finished product. Id.
¶7        At the close of the CIP period, on August 29, 2016, a meeting of managers
     consisting of the Division Chief and the Chiefs of the Engineering and
     Information Science and Physical and Biological Sciences Branches convened to
                                                                                           5

     discuss the appellant’s contribution during the CIP. 4 IAF, Tab 39 at 54. These
     officials concluded that the appellant’s work during the CIP earned her only a
     1.78 contribution score overall, and that she had therefore failed to demonstrate
     satisfactory contribution. IAF, Tab 7 at 83-86. They recommended her removal.
     IAF, Tab 39 at 69. On August 30, 2016, the Branch Chief 5 issued the appellant a
     notice of proposed removal. IAF, Tab 7 at 91-97. After the appellant responded,
     id. at 57-79, the AFSOR Director issued a decision removing the appellant
     effective November 30, 2016, id. at 52, 54-55.
¶8         The appellant filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1.
     Prior to the hearing, the administrative judge issued an order identifying
     affirmative defenses of due process and “reprisal for protected [equal employment
     opportunity (EEO)] activity or for activity.” IAF, Tab 42 at 2. After the hearing,
     the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the agency proved
     its case and that the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses.         IAF,
     Tab 49, Initial Decision (ID). Accordingly, the administrat ive judge affirmed the
     appellant’s removal. ID at 39.
¶9         The appellant has filed a petition for review disputing numerous aspects of
     the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed
     a response, PFR File, Tab 4, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s
     response, PFR File, Tab 5. 6

     4
       Two other officials were present at the meeting, the AFOSR Chief of Operations
     Management and a Management Analyst—the former to act as a technical advisor and
     the latter to take notes. They had no input into the Division’s and Branch Chiefs’
     assessing the appellant’s contribution. HR 1 at 3:59:55 (testimony of the Management
     Analyst).
     5
       Unless otherwise indicated, “Branch Chief” refers to the appellant’s immediate
     supervisor, who was the Chief of the Engineering and Information Science Branch
     during the relevant period.
     6
      After the close of the record on review, the appellant filed a motion to disqualify the
     administrative judge, supported by her correspondence with the Utah State Bar
     Association Office of Professional Conduct, Utah being the jurisdiction in which the
     administrative judge is licensed to practice law. PFR File, Tab 7. The appellant filed a
                                                                                              6

                                            ANALYSIS
¶10         The administrative judge found that the agency had the burden to prove, by
      substantial evidence, that: (1) it notified the appellant that she would be placed
      on a CIP; (2) it informed her of what she must do during the CIP to demonstrate
      acceptable contribution and warned her that failure to do so could result in an
      adverse action; (3) it gave her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable
      contribution during the CIP; and (4) her contribution during the CIP was
      unacceptable. ID at 2-3. These are the same elements and burden of proof that
      the Board applied in Thompson v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 7
      (2015), another appeal involving a removal for inadequate contribution under a
      similar     contribution-based    compensation      system     demonstration     project.
      Nevertheless, the Board in Thompson made no finding on the correctness of this
      analytical framework, noting only that neither party disputed it.          122 M.S.P.R.
      372, ¶ 7.
¶11         In this case, the appellant argues that the administrative judge should have
      required the agency to prove its case by preponderant evidence. IAF, Tab 44;
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 31.        Specifically, she argues that the agency explicitly
      removed her to promote the “efficiency of the service,” a term found in 5 U.S.C.
      chapter 75, in which the preponderant evidence standard of proof applies. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 31; IAF, Tab 7 at 91. She also notes that the governing agency
      manual states that chapter 75 due process rights apply in contribution-based
      actions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 31; IAF, Tab 18 at 13. We find, however, that neither

      complaint with the Office of Professional Conduct concerning the administrative
      judge’s conduct during the course of the Board proceedings, but the Office determined
      that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the administrative judge engaged in
      misconduct or that he should otherwise have recused himself from the appellant’s case.
      Id. at 12-13. We find that this evidence is immaterial to the outcome of the appeal and
      that there is no basis under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k) for the Board to consider this
      untimely filing. Therefore, we deny the appellant’s motion.
                                                                                            7

      the applicability of due process nor the concept of the “efficiency of the service”
      have anything to do with the quantum of proof that is required in this appeal. 7
¶12         We have reviewed the regulation establishing the contribution -based
      compensation system, as well as the agency’s implementing manual, and we agree
      with the administrative judge that substantial evidence is the approp riate standard
      of proof. IAF, Tab 18 at 11-16, Tab 20 at 7-8, Tab 45. Most convincing is the
      regulatory language that states in relevant part, “The following procedures are
      similar to and replace those established in 5 CFR part 432 pertaining to
      performance-based reduction in grade and removal actions.” IAF, Tab 20 at 7.
      We find no reason to interpret these procedures as tacitly abandoning the lowered
      burden of proof applicable to traditional chapter 43 appeals, particularly because
      the lowered burden of proof is such a major feature of chapter 43 and the
      procedures are supposed to be “similar.”

      The validity of the appellant’s contribution standards are not at issue.
¶13         The appellant appears to argue that her contribution standards were invalid
      because they were not sufficiently specific. PFR File, Tab 1 at 32. However, in
      his prehearing conference summary, the administrative judge did not identify the
      validity of the contribution standards as an issue to be decided in this appeal, and
      the appellant did not object to its omission. IAF, Tab 42 at 1 -2. She is therefore
      precluded from raising this issue for the first time on review.          See Banks v.
      Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980); cf. White v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5 (2013) (finding in a
      traditional chapter 43 performance-based action, that the agency is required to

      7
        To the extent that the appellant is arguing that the administrative judge should have
      adjudicated this appeal under the standards of 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, we disagree.
      Notwithstanding the agency’s reference to the “efficiency of the service,” we find that
      both the notice of proposed removal and the decision letter provided the appellant clear
      and explicit notice that this was a contribution-based action taken under the procedures
      of the contribution-based compensation system demonstration project. IAF, Tab 7
      at 54, 91; see Penaloza v. Department of Health & Human Services, 4 M.S.P.R. 322,
      326-27 (1980).
                                                                                           8

      prove that the performance standards were valid).         In any event, even if the
      validity of the appellant’s contribution standards were at issue, we would find
      that they are sufficiently specific to provide a firm benchmark for contribution.
      IAF, Tab 17 at 19-22; see Henderson v. National Aeronautics & Space
      Administration, 116 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶ 20 (2011).

      The agency proved by substantial evidence that it informed the appellant of what
      she must do to demonstrate acceptable contribution during the CIP.
¶14         The administrative judge found that the agency notified the appellant that
      she would be placed on a CIP, ID at 4-18, and that it informed her of what she
      must do during the CIP to demonstrate acceptable contribution an d warned her
      that failure to do so could result in an adverse action, ID at 18 -21. That the
      agency notified the appellant that she would be placed on a CIP appears to be
      undisputed.    However, the appellant disagrees that the agency adequately
      informed her of what she needed to do to succeed. Specifically, she argues that
      the CIP contained no scores to reach and no measure of how those scores would
      be calculated. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. She also argues that the administrative
      judge discussed her expected contribution using several words that did not appear
      anywhere in the CIP, including “quality,” “central task,” and “narrowed focus.”
      Id. at 6-8.
¶15         We find these arguments unconvincing. First, although the CIP notice itself
      did not contain the numerical score that the appellant needed to achieve to
      succeed, we find that she was otherwise well aware, based on her receiving prior
      annual contribution evaluations, that she was expected to achieve an overall
      rating of 4.3. 8 IAF, Tab 23 at 8. In any event, this rating was merely a numerical
      expression of the appellant’s expected contribution, which was set forth

      8
       The appellant repeatedly faults the administrative judge for looking “beyond the four
      corners of the CIP.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 30, 32. However, it is well-established that
      an agency may inform an employee of the standards that she must meet outside the
      performance improvement (or in this case contribution improvement) document itself.
      Donaldson v. Department of Labor, 27 M.S.P.R. 293, 298 (1985).
                                                                                       9

      adequately in the CIP document in narrative form. IAF, Tab 17 at 19-22. We do
      not see how appending a numerical goal to the CIP notice could have made the
      agency’s expectations any clearer.      Regarding the particular words that the
      administrative judge used to describe or paraphrase the requirements of the CIP,
      we agree with the agency that this amounts to a debate over semantics and
      provides no basis to disturb the initial decision.   PFR File, Tab 4 at 12-13.
      We have reviewed the CIP notice and we find that the administrative judge
      correctly understood the document and accurately described it in his initial
      decision. ID at 19-21. For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree
      with the administrative judge that the appellant was adequately informed of what
      she needed to do during the CIP to demonstrate acceptable contribution.        ID
      at 18-21.

      The agency proved by substantial evidence that the appellant was provided a
      reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable contribution.
¶16        The appellant disputes the administrative judge’s finding that the CIP
      provided her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable contribution.
      She argues that the CIP comprised tasks that were not part of her normal duties,
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 8 n.11, that she was not afforded the full 90 days that she was
      supposed to have under the CIP, id. at 11, 17-18, 31-32, and that she was
      constrained by the directions of the Branch Chief, who was not an expert in
      computer science, id. at 7-8, 24-25.
¶17        We have considered the appellant’s arguments, but we find them
      unpersuasive.   First, we disagree that the CIP tasks were outside her normal
      duties. The appellant had been maintaining the Systems and Software portfolio as
      part of her regular duties since 2013. Hearing Recording, May 23, 2017, Track 2
      at 8:45 (testimony of the appellant).    Although the appellant may have been
      required to additionally document her work on the portfolio during the CIP, we
      find the CIP tasks were all directed toward improving and managing that
      portfolio, and that her duties during this time were, therefore, essentially
                                                                                       10

      unchanged.    IAF, Tab 17 at 19-23.      As for the CIP’s duration, even if the
      appellant was effectively allowed only 76 days to demonstrate acceptable
      contribution, as she asserts, we find that this was nevertheless a sufficient amount
      of time for her to do so. The Board has found that 60 or even 30 days is a
      sufficient time for an employee to demonstrate acceptable performance. Lee v.
      Environmental Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 33 (2010).           Also, the
      governing regulation explicitly states that 60 days is a sufficient amount of time
      for a CIP. IAF, Tab 20 at 7. Furthermore, because the deadlines for the appellant
      to complete and present her proposal were provided to her at the beginning of the
      CIP period, she could not have relied to her detriment on agency misinformation
      about what the actual length of the CIP would be. Id. at 23. Finally, although the
      appellant might have disagreed with the Branch Chief’s guidance, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant’s inadequate contribution during the
      CIP was attributable not to the guidance, but to her failure to follow it.       ID
      at 24-25.    The appellant has not given us a sufficient basis to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings in this regard.     See Haebe v. Department of
      Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Weaver v. Department of the Navy,
      2 M.S.P.R. 129, 133-34 (1980). For the reasons explained in the initial decision,
      we agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved by substantial
      evidence that it provided the appellant an adequate opportunity to demonstrate
      acceptable contribution. ID at 21-25.

      The agency proved by substantial evidence that the appellant’s contribution
      during the CIP was unacceptable.
¶18        On review, the appellant        makes    several   arguments   regarding   her
      contribution during the CIP. First, she argues that she timely completed all of the
      CIP tasks and met all of the milestones. PFR File, Tab 1 at 26, 33; IAF, Tab 17
      at 23. However, the administrative judge addressed this argument in his initial
      decision and found that the appellant’s lack of contribution was not due to her
                                                                                            11

      failure to meet any deadlines, but rather to the quality of the work that she
      produced. 9 ID at 26.
¶19         The appellant also disputes the administrative judge’s finding that she failed
      to narrow the focus of her portfolio as required under the CIP. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 8-9; ID at 29. We agree with the appellant that her final portfolio proposal had
      nominally a single focus area, IAF, Tab 7 at 99, but it also covered four
      “additional” proposed focus areas, id. at 216-64.          Her proposal approvingly
      discussed the “extreme” breadth of the current Systems and Software portfolio
      and recommended that all of the current research areas remain in addition to the
      new ones that she was proposing.           Id. at 130, 139-40.        Furthermore, the
      administrative judge credited the testimony of several agency witnesses who
      stated that the appellant’s final proposed portfolio was actually broader than the
      one she had prior to the CIP. 10 ID at 26-28. We therefore find that the agency
      presented substantial evidence that the appellant did not focus her portfolio
      during the CIP as directed.
¶20         The appellant disputes the administrative judge’s findings that her portfolio
      proposal was long and rambling and that her presentation of the proposal was
      deficient. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-11, ID at 27-29. However, even if, on review, we
      were to accept the appellant’s characterization of her work product and credit the
      evidence that she cites in support, we find substantial evidence to support the
      agency’s contention that the appellant’s work product demonstrated inadequate
      contribution.   See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p) (defining “substantial evidence”).          We

      9
        To the extent that the appellant is arguing that there was no quality expectation under
      the CIP, we disagree. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7; IAF, Tab 7 at 19-23.
      10
         The appellant argues that the Branch Chief’s hearing testimony was contradicted by
      the record of his comments at the August 29, 2016 meeting of managers, in which he
      stated, “She had her area so wide, and did that narrow down portfolio.” PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 23. There are some legibility problems with the handwritten notes of this
      meeting, but we read them as saying “did not narrow down portfolio.” IAF, Tab 39
      at 56. The appellant’s proffered interpretation does not make any grammatical or
      contextual sense.
                                                                                        12

      therefore find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s findings on this issue.
      ID at 27-29.
¶21         The appellant specifically disputes that administrative judge’s finding that
      she could determine and pursue whatever field of inquiry she believed would be
      of most value to the agency because she had to wait until AFOSR approved her
      proposed portfolio to pursue anything. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9; ID at 24. We find
      that this argument is merely a matter of semantics.         The appellant does not
      dispute that she had the freedom to shape the proposed portfolio according to her
      judgment, which was the central task of the CIP and was clearly what the
      administrative judge was referring to. IAF, Tab 17 at 22.
¶22         The appellant also argues that because she received the results of her
      successful midyear contribution review the day after the CIP began, this
      constituted feedback during the CIP period and she therefore passed the CIP.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 14, 33; IAF, Tab 24 at 75-77. We disagree. Although the
      appellant happened to receive her midyear review during the CIP period, this
      review pertained to her contribution prior to the CIP and has no bearing on
      whether she demonstrated an acceptable level of contribution during the CIP.
      IAF, Tab 24 at 75-77. She further argues that the August 29, 2016 meeting of
      managers considered performance issues pre-dating the CIP but did not consider
      her successful midyear review in arriving at its decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15,
      33.   However, as long as the appellant failed to demonstrate acceptable
      contribution during the CIP period, there is nothing to prevent the agency from
      relying on contribution deficiencies that occurred at any time during the year
      preceding the notice of proposed removal. See Brown v. Veterans Administration,
      44 M.S.P.R. 635, 640 (1990).       Furthermore, although the successful midyear
      contribution review seems inconsistent with other evidence about the appellant’s
      contribution leading up to the CIP, we find that there remains substantial
      evidence that the appellant’s contribution as a whole was inadequate during the
      time period at issue.
                                                                                       13

¶23        Finally, the appellant argues that the agency assessed her contribution
      during the CIP period based on the “rubric” for assessing contribution rather than
      on the “expected contributions” set forth in the CIP notice. IAF, Tab 17 at 19-22,
      Tab 21 at 9-12; PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-20. However, we find that the CIP notice
      set forth both the rubric and the expected contribution in each area. IAF, Tab 17
      at 19-21. We therefore find nothing improper about the agency considering the
      rubric to determine whether the appellant made the contributions expected of her.
¶24        For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the agency proved by substantial evidence that the
      appellant’s contribution during the CIP period was unacceptable. ID at 25 -29.

      The appellant has not shown that the agency committed harmful procedural error.
¶25        The appellant argued below that the agency failed, in several respects, to
      follow the pertinent manual in administering her CIP. IAF, Tab 39 at 6 -8. The
      administrative judge considered these arguments as both due process and harmful
      error claims, but he found that the appellant failed to prove them. ID at 36-38
      & n.6.   On review, the appellant disputes some of the administrative judge’s
      findings.
¶26        The appellant argues that the decision to place her on a CIP was not made
      by a meeting of managers, as required by the manual. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-21;
      IAF, Tab 18 at 11. She argues that evidence of this meeting was not presented to
      her until at the Board hearing and that the managers supposedly in attendance
      disagreed about the details of the meeting. Thus, she argues , the most logical
      conclusion is that the meeting never actually occurred. PFR File, Tabs 20 -21.
      However, the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.
      Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. We find that the appellant’s arguments are insufficient
      to overcome the administrative judge’s findings, based on in-person hearing
                                                                                    14

      testimony that the pre-CIP meeting of managers was convened on March 29,
      2016, as required. ID at 37. This is especially so in light of the appellant’s
      May 25, 2016 email in which she acknowledges that this meeting did in fact
      occur. IAF, Tab 24 at 79. We therefore agree with the administrative judge that
      the appellant has not established that the agency committed any error concerning
      the managers’ pre-CIP meeting.        See Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency,
      1 M.S.P.R. 505, 513 (1980) (finding that, to prove that the agency committed
      harmful procedural error, the appellant must show both that the age ncy committed
      procedural error and that the error was harmful).
¶27        The appellant also appears to allege that the agency committed harmful
      procedural error by not allowing her the full 90 days promised in the CIP notice
      to demonstrate acceptable contribution. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17. However, even
      assuming that the agency committed error by effectively shortening the CIP
      period, we find that the appellant has not shown it likely that she would have
      demonstrated acceptable contribution even with more time allott ed. Stephen v.
      Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 (1991) (finding that, to show
      harmful error, an appellant must prove that any procedural errors by the agency
      prejudiced her substantive rights by possibly affecting the agency’s decision;
      harmful error cannot be presumed).
¶28        The appellant further alleges that the agency committed numerous
      procedural errors leading up to the March 29, 2016 meeting of managers,
      including its failure to discuss expectations with her at the beginning of the
      appraisal cycle, failure to provide her an updated statement of duties and
      experience, and providing her feedback after the March 29 meeting t hat was
      inconsistent with her routine performance appraisals. PFR File, Tab 1 at 21 -23.
      However, under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A), an appellant must show “harmful error
      in the application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at its decision.” Thus,
      procedures unrelated to the processing of an appellant’s removal cannot be
      challenged under the harmful error analysis. Livingston v. Department of the Air
                                                                                          15

      Force, 26 M.S.P.R. 273, 275 (1985). The record of evidence does not support the
      appellant’s claims that these errors occurred, and in any event, even if the agency
      did commit these procedural errors, as alleged, they cannot serve as a basis for an
      affirmative defense of harmful procedural error.

      The appellant has not shown that she was removed in retaliation for protected
      activity.
¶29         The appellant alleged that her removal was in retaliation for four protected
      activities: (1) an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint that went to
      hearing in January 2016; (2) a May 26, 2016 complaint to the Office of Special
      Counsel (OSC); (3) a 2014 Equal Pay Act claim that was still ongoing during the
      relevant time period; and (4) a 2014 disclosure of physical intimidation by the
      Division Chief. IAF, Tab 39 at 17-18. The administrative judge found that some
      of the officials involved in the removal process were aware of at least some of
      this activity, but that none of it actually influenced the removal. ID at 30 -36.
¶30         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge considered
      only her EEO complaint and did not address all her claims of retaliation for
      protected activity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-28. We disagree. Notwithstanding the
      heading in the initial decision under which he analyzed them, the administrative
      judge addressed all four of the appellant’s alleged protected activities.           ID
      at 29-36. The appellant also cites several facts in support of her contention that
      her removal was retaliatory, including that her OSC complaint was mentioned at
      the August 29, 2016 meeting of managers, all three officials at the meeting knew
      about her claim of physical intimidation, and these three officials plus the
      deciding official were all aware of her Equal Pay Act claim. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 26-28. However, we find that these facts are not material to the outcome of
      this appeal because they go chiefly to whether the relevant officials knew o f the
      appellant’s protected activities, which as explained above, the administrative
      judge found they did.     The administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s
      removal was not an act of retaliation was based on explicit demeanor -based
                                                                                          16

      credibility determinations and credible testimony by the officials involved that
      they did not consider the appellant’s protected activities in deciding to remove
      her. ID at 33-36. Again, the appellant has not provided the Board a sufficiently
      sound reason to overturn these determinations. See Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.
¶31          In further support for her claims of retaliation, the appellant alleges that she
      was the only Program Officer who was not permitted to submit clarifications to
      the SAB. PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-26. However, as the administrative judge found,
      no other Program Officer’s portfolio received such a negative review from the
      SAB.     ID at 35.   Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency had a legitimate basis to treat these other Program Officers differently.
      Id.
¶32          Finally, regarding the August 29, 2016 meeting of managers, the appellant
      asserts that the Division Chief and the Chief of the Physical and Biological
      Sciences Branch had the greatest motive to retaliate against her. She argues that
      these two officials strong-armed the Chief of the Engineering and Information
      Science Branch to go along with them in finding that she failed the CIP, and that
      it was the Division Chief’s decision to recommend her removal. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 28-30. We find that the appellant is misconstruing the evidence. First, as
      noted above, the Branch Chief did not state during the meeting that the appellant
      narrowed down her portfolio.       Supra ¶ 19 n.10. Second, although the Branch
      Chief initially recommended a higher contribution score (3.5) for the
      problem-solving factor than was ultimately awarded (2.5), he also indicated at the
      outset of the meeting that the appellant’s contribution in the other areas was not
      as strong. 11 IAF, Tab 7 at 83, Tab 39 at 55. This generally is reflected in the
      managers’ final analysis of the appellant’s CIP contribution. IAF, Tab 7 at 83-86.
      Furthermore, the very purpose of the meeting of managers is to ensure an

      11
        We note that even a contribution score of 3.5 is well below what the appellant would
      have needed to achieve as a composite score in order to meet the expected contribution
      level of 4.3.
                                                                                       17

      equitable rating process by broadening the input beyond that of the employe es’
      individual supervisors. IAF, Tab 20 at 4. That the discussion this engendered
      resulted an agreement to rate the appellant lower on problem solving than the
      Branch Chief initially proposed is, at best, weak circumstantial evidence of
      retaliation. As for the decision to recommend removal, someone at the meeting
      had to be the first to raise the issue, and we do not find it surprising that it was
      the senior official present. IAF, Tab 39 at 69; HR 1 at 4:06:50 (testimony of the
      Management Analyst).      We find no indication that the Branch Chiefs were
      reluctant to agree.

      The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge was biased.
¶33         The appellant argues that the administrative judge, a former Air Force
      member, was biased based on his friendly banter with agency counsel, his
      allegedly self-deprecating comments about his role as an administrative judge,
      and his adjudication of two of the appellant’s prior appeals. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 30-32.
¶34         As an initial matter, a party should not wait until after adju dication is
      complete to attempt to disqualify an administrative judge.       E.g., Gensburg v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 85 M.S.P.R. 198, ¶ 7 (2000); 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.42(b). The appellant was aware of all these alleged indicia of bias before
      the hearing’s conclusion, yet she did not follow the Board’s regulatory p rocedures
      for seeking the administrative judge’s disqualification.            See   5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.42(b)-(c).
¶35         Furthermore, we find that the appellant’s allegations, even if true, are not
      sufficient to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies
      administrative adjudicators.     See Oliver v. Department of Transportation,
      1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course
      of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if his comments or
      actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
      judgment impossible.”     Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d. 1358,
                                                                                        18

      1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
      (1994)). Neither the administrative judge’s former association with the agency,
      his friendly demeanor toward agency counsel, nor his alleged self -deprecating
      humor rise to that level.       See Madison v. Department of the Air Force,
      32 M.S.P.R. 465, 469 (1987); Morris v. Department of the Air Force, 24 M.S.P.R.
      41, 43 (1984). Nor are the administrative judge’s rulings against the appellant in
      other appeals sufficient to demonstrate bias. See Caracciolo v. Department of the
      Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 663, ¶ 14 (2007).

      The appeal must be remanded for further adjudication regarding the appellant’s
      contribution during the period leading up to the CIP.
¶36            On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency was not
      justified in placing her on a CIP in the first place because her contribution leading
      up to the May 25, 2016 CIP was sufficient. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-16, 22-25, 28.
      At the time the initial decision was issued, a longstanding line of Board case s
      held that an agency is not required in a chapter 43 appeal to prove that an
      appellant was performing unacceptably prior to a performance improvement plan
      (PIP).     E.g., Wright v. Department of Labor, 82 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 12 (1999).
      Consistent with that precedent, the administrative judge did not address the issue
      of whether the appellant was contributing inadequately prior to her CIP.
      However, during the pendency of the petition for review in this case, the United
      States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in Santos, 990 F.3d
      at 1360-61, that part of the agency’s burden under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43 is to
      justify the institution of a PIP by proving by substantial evidence that the
      employee’s performance was unacceptable prior to that time.
¶37            Although the appeal in Santos involved a performance-based adverse action
      under a more traditional performance-based appraisal system, we find that the
      court’s reasoning applies equally to the contribution-based adverse action at issue
      here. According to the documents implementing this demonstration project, when
      placing an employee on a CIP, the agency is required to inform her specifically of
                                                                                       19

      how she is failing to make expected contributions, and afford her an opportunity
      to demonstrate a level of increased contribution. IAF, Tab 18 at 11-12, Tab 20
      at 7.   Furthermore, the agency’s authority to place an employee on a CIP is
      explicitly predicated on the employee’s contribution score falling below the
      expected range. IAF, Tab 20 at 7; cf. Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61 (examining
      similar statutory language to conclude that that an agency must justify institution
      of a PIP when an employee challenges a performance-based adverse action under
      chapter 43). The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to all pending cases,
      including this one, regardless of when the events took place. Lee v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16. Although the record in this appeal
      already contains some evidence suggesting that the appellant’s contribution
      leading up to the CIP was unacceptable, IAF, Tab 17 at 18-19, Tab 23 at 19-20,
      Tab 24 at 26-67, we remand the appeal to give the parties the opportunity to
      present argument and additional evidence on the issue, see Lee, 2022 MSPB 11,
      ¶¶ 15-17.     On remand, the administrative judge shall accept argument and
      evidence on this issue, and shall hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate. Id.,
      ¶ 17.
¶38           The administrative judge shall then issue a new initial decision consistent
      with Santos. See id. If the agency makes the additional showing required under
      Santos on remand, the administrative judge may incorporate his prior findings on
      the other elements of the agency’s case and the appellant’s affirmative defenses
      in the remand initial decision.     See id.   However, regardless of whether the
      agency meets its burden, if the argument or evidence on remand regarding the
      appellant’s pre-CIP performance affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the
      other elements of the charge or the appellant’s affirmative defenses, he should
      address such argument or evidence in the remand initial decision. See Spithaler
      v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that
      an initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the
      evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s
                                                                                  20

      conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which
      that reasoning rests).

                                          ORDER
¶39         For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the regional
      office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                               Jennifer Everling
                                               Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.