Court Opinion

ID: 9794803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:11:55.965172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:39.607757
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
The principal question to be determined here is the effect that must be given by the Industrial Commission to the decree of the Superior Court of Maricopa County. Before entering into an examination of the law directly determinative of this, question, some significant distinctions should be observed. Ultimately, in the course of any litigation, there arrives a time when the court hearing the cause decides wherein the respective rights of the parties lie. At this point the court makes known the results of its conclusions as to the law on the facts. This may be done in a number of different ways. Customarily, it is by pronouncement in open court in the presence of the litigants or their attorneys. This pronouncement is, I believe, universally accepted as the rendition of judgment.
“ * * * It is well established that the rendition of a judgment is the judicial act performed by the court at the time it makes its pronouncement and that the entry of a judgment on the record is simply a ministerial act performed by the clerk.” In re Young’s Estate, 414 Ill. 525, 112 N.E.2d 113, 117.
The same distinction has been repeatedly observed in this state.
“The rendition of a judgment is the act of the court in pronouncing its judgment, and differs from the entry or filing of the judgment in that the former act is the declaration of the court from the bench announcing its decision, while the entry is the act of the clerk in writing it upon the' records of the court.” American Surety Co. of New York v. Mosher, 48 Ariz. 552, 561, 64 P.2d 1025, 1029.
In Moulton v. Smith, 23 Ariz. 319, 203 P. 562, 563 we said:
*129“ * * * By the term ‘rendering judgment’ is meant the act of the court in announcing its final determination of the rights of the parties to the action.” (Citing cases.)
and
“ * * * the practice of filing written judgments, signed by the judge, is commendable, as remarked by the court in Kinsley v. New Vulture Mining Co., 11 Ariz, 66, 90 Pac. 438, 110 Pac. 1135, but it can properly go no further than to give perhaps in a more detailed way what the judgment already contains.”
We also said, quoting from In re Cook’s .Estate, 77 Cal. 220, 17 P. 923, 19 P. 431, 1 L.R.A. 567, 11 Am.St.Rep. 267:
“ ‘ * * * when, after the trial and final submission of the case, the court pronounces a judgment in apt language, which finally determines the rights of the parties to the action, and leaves nothing more to be done except the ministerial act of the clerk in entering it, and especially when what the court has pronounced has been entered in the minutes, then the judgment has been rendered, and the * * * ” (Italics mine.)
The court then, in suggesting the proper form of an order, observed:
“This * * * avoids the serious consequences of proceeding upon the erroneous theory that the judgment is not rendered until it is signed and ■ filed.”
The foregoing statements of the court in the Moulton case, supra, were made under the circumstance that a money judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. They are, of course, equally applicable to other types of judgments, the dominant question being whether the court has actually pronounced the sentence of the law upon the facts. Of course, in those instances where the court merely announces which party is to prevail in the action with the details to be worked out at a later time, there may be no actual pronouncement of the sentence of the law upon the facts. It is, therefore, possible for the rendition of judgment to be postponed to the moment of the signing of the written judgment, and in that event the signing is a substitute for the oral pronouncement.
Generally, in the United States, the time of rendition of judgment is the time at which appeal starts and is the time which entitles the prevailing party to execution. Cf. Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 83 Ariz. 20, 315 P.2d 871. Consequently and because of the importance of the date of the rendition of judgment, statutes or rules of court commonly exist which purport to either (1) provide for certain formalities which must accompany the rendition of judgment in order that the time thereof be fixed with certainty, or (2) postpone the *130effective date of the judgment until some formality has been completed, such as its entry into the proper record. In this jurisdiction we have illustrations of both. Formerly, under what was known as Rule VII, Uniform Rules of the Superior Courts, effective May 15, 1932, no judgment was rendered until a formal written judgment, signed by the trial judge, was filed with the clerk. Paul v. Paul, 28 Ariz. 598, 238 P. 399; American Surety Co. of New York v. Mosher, supra. Thus, by court rule, a judgment was not pronounced, rendered, until the concurrence of these acts.
This practice was abandoned on the adoption of Rule 58(a), adapted from Federal Rule 58, Rules of Federal Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. By Rule 58(a) the effective date of the judgment is postponed until the formalities specified therein have been completed. In the case of a judgment for money or costs only, or that all relief be denied, it is the time when the clerk enters the judgment, previously rendered, in the civil docket. In cases granting any other relief, it is the filing with the clerk of a judgment approved and signed by the judge. Professor Moore, in his discussion of the Federal practice, makes the following observation:
“In order to achieve clarity, certain other related terms that are commonly used in this area should be defined and distinguished. Rendition of judgment signifies the pronouncement or annunciation of the adjudication or judgment of the court, not the entry nor the recordation of the judgment. This pronouncement may be written or oral, but must demonstrate a present intention to adjudge and constitute an adjudication of the matter. Entry of judgment is the notation of the judgment in the civil docket by the clerk, as provided by Rule 79(a); * * * ” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, Section 54.02, p. 16, (2d Ed. 1953).
The important point to be observed is that the effective date of the judgment has no bearing on the question of whether there has been in fact an adjudication of the controversy, a judgment pronounced.
This leads me to the following conclusions: The order for decree of divorce of July 12, 1943, being predicated as it was on evidence introduced at a hearing, is an adjudication of the controversy and in the strictest sense of the language used is a rendition of judgment. There is before this court, as there was before the Commission, unimpeached evidence of the fact that a judgment was rendered. In accordance with Rule 58(a) nothing more remained to be done in order to have an effective judgment except that a form of judgment be settled, signed, and filed with the clerk. As pointed out, this was done on the 9th day of November, 1955 when Judge Stevens adjudged and.decreed:
*131fC * * * the bonds of matrimony existing between the parties be and the same are hereby dissolved * *
Because the Superior Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and person, and the power to approve and sign a decree of divorce, it must be held that there then came into existence a binding judgment conclusive against collateral attack by any of the parties or their privies. Schuster v. Schuster, 51 Ariz. 1, 73 P.2d 1345; Collins v. Superior Court, 48 Ariz. 381, 62 P.2d 131.
The majority of this court in their decision seem to hold that the order of November 9, 1955 directing the Clerk of Court to file this decree nunc pro tunc as of July 12, 1943, is absolutely void for want of jurisdiction. With this I am in complete disagreement. The power of the Superior Court as a court of general jurisdiction ought not to be so circumscribed. The Supreme Court of the United States recognizes the power to enter a judgment retrospectively, even where there is a delay in the rendition.
“ * * * We deem it unnecessary to present an analysis of the authorities, some of which are cited in a note to this opinion, but content ourselves with saying that the rule established by the general concurrence of the American and English courts, is, that where the delay in rendering judgment or decree arises from the act of the court, that is, where the delay has been for its convenience, or has been caused by the multiplicity or press of business or the intricacy of the questions involved, or for any other cause not attributable to the laches of the parties, but within the control of the court, the judgment or decree may be entered retrospectively, as of a time when it should or might have been entered up. * * * ” Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 26 L.Ed. 369.
I can find no dissent to the proposition that where a judgment has actually been rendered and that rendition is reflected in the record of the court, the judgment may be entered nunc pro tunc if the delay is not occasioned by the party applying. Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54, 53 P.2d 952; Freshour v. Freshour, 233 Iowa 1144, 11 N.W.2d 375; Arnd v. Poston, 199 Iowa 931, 203 N.W. 260; Wallace Grain & Supply Co. v. Cary, 303 Ill.App. 221, 24 N.E.2d 907, reversed on other grounds 374 Ill. 57, 28 N.E.2d 107; In re Saric, 197 Ind. 1, 149 N.E. 434; Gorman v. Lusk, 280 Ky. 692, 134 S.W.2d 598; Pepple v. Stacy, Mo.App., 282 S.W. 451, 454; Watson Bros. Transportation Co. v. Red Ball Transfer Co., 159 Neb. 448, 67 N.W.2d 475; Bowie Sewerage Co. v. Watson, Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W. 179; Chavarria v. Macias, Tex. Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 262. For example, in Norton v. City of Pomona, supra, the *132Supreme Court of California said [5 Cal. 2d 54, 53 P.2d 956]:
“ * * * When the state of the record or the minutes kept by the court or clerk show that a suitor was entitled to a particular judgment but that the judgment was not entered when it might have been, such judgment may subsequently be entered so as to relate back to the time when it should have been entered, providing the delay was not occasioned by the party applying. Such an order should be granted or refused as justice may require in view of the circumstances of a particular case. * * * ” (Italics mine.)
In the instant case, the basis of the order directing the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc is the minute entry of the Clerk of Court dated July 12, 1943. This minute entry was recited in the judgment. No more competent evidence of rendition of judgment can be required.
The order of Judge Stevens directing entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc gives the judgment retrospective operation so as to take effect at the time of rendition.
“The rule that there can be no judgment until it is entered in the proper record of the court has no reference to the effect to be given a nunc pro tunc entry.” (Citing authority) State v. Harbour, 240 Iowa 705, 37 N.W.2d 290, 293.
“ * * * Generally, however, a nunc pro tunc entry of judgment, or a nunc pro tunc correction of the records of a judgment, is given a retrospective operation as between the parties thereto, so as to take effect from the time of the rendition, or of the original entry, of the judgment. Under this rule, a judgment entered nunc pro tunc is respected and enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as if entered at the proper time, and a record properly amended nunc pro tunc so as to make it speak the truth respecting the actual doings of the court stands afterwards as if it had never been defective, or had been corrected at once at the proper time. * * * ” 30 Am.Jur. 886, Judgments, Section 123.
Since I am of the opinion that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to enter the decree of divorce and had jurisdiction to direct its entry nunc pro tunc effective as of July 12, 1943, the sole remaining question is the effect which must be given to it by the Industrial Commission.
It is well settled that, at least ordinarily, a judgment is conclusive only between the parties and their privies. National Public Service Insurance Company v. Welch, 81 Ariz. 156, 302 P.2d 926. There are, however, certain well recognized exceptions. Clearly, it is evidence of the fact of its own rendition, Mutual Benefit Health and *133Accident Association v. Neale, 43 Ariz. 532, 33 P.2d 604, and it is universally held that an action for divorce, being in rem, and the question of divorce being one affected with public policy, a decree of divorce is binding u-pon all persons in the world.
“The doctrine of res judicata as a bar or as an estoppel applies between the parties and their privies; but it does not ordinarily operate so as to affect strangers who are not in privity with a party. This principle applies in divorce actions, but there is one exception : a proceeding in rem with respect to a status is conclusive upon all the world; and so a judicial dissolution of marriage in a proceeding for an absolute divorce binds strangers in so far as it determines that from the entry of the decree whatever marriage there may have been between the parties is dissolved and that the parties are single persons as to each other.” 17 Am.Jur. 645, Divorce and Separation, Section 550.
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“In a proceeding in rem with respect to a status the judgment is conclusive upon all persons as to the existence of the status.” Restatement of the Law —Judgments, Section 74.
In the present case, the Industrial Commission in its decision upon rehearing made this finding of fact:
“That the said Edna Black was not, in fact, the lawful wife of the said Roy Lee Black * * * on October 8, 1955, the date of his death, and that the said Edna Black is not, in fact, the lawful widow of said deceased * ‡
This finding has no support in the evidence because it is contrary to the status of Roy Lee Black as a divorced man established by the binding judgment of the Superior Court. :•
The majority of this court rely and quote extensively from two decisions from the State of Ohio: Herman v. Ohio Finance Company and Ruby v. Wolf, supra. I do not consider those cases as being contrary to petitioner’s position here. In the later case, Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 85 Ohio App. 285, 88 N.E.2d 616, where the decedent was a soldier and the action was for a declaratory judgment by the mother as to the marital status of the decedent’s purported wife, the wife being the principal beneficiary under the National Service Life Insurance and the mother the contingent beneficiary, it was held that the mother did not have such interest as to attack collaterally the nunc pro tunc divorce decree granting the wife a divorce from a prior husband after decedent’s death. This case is squarely on point in that it answers many of the questions at issue here-. The Ohio court quoted with approval from 1 *134Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., Section 138:
“The expression so frequently made that a nunc pro tunc entry is not to affect the rights of third persons must not be understood as signifying that effect must be denied to such an entry in all cases where third persons have acquired interests. Courts in determining whether or not to amend or perfect their records are controlled by considerations of equity. If one not a party to the action has, when without notice of the rendition of the judgment or of facts from which such notice must be imputed to him, advanced or paid money or property, or in other words, has become a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and upon a valuable consideration, then the subsequent entry of such judgment nunc pro tunc will not be allowed to prejudice him. Otherwise its effect against him is the same as if it had been entered at the proper time.”
And concluded with this statement:
“It is the conclusion of a majority of this court that the petitioner’s interest does not come within the class of interests which may be asserted despite the retroactive order of the court, and that the trial court correctly held that the decree nunc pro.tunc could not be collaterally attacked in this proceeding.”
The case of Hobson v. Dempsey Construction Company, 232 Iowa 1226, 7 N.W. 2d 896, 899, is another example of where the facts are so squarely on the point that it should not be passed without some comment. There the husband was killed in an accident arising out of the course of his employment and the wife filed with the Iowa Industrial Commission an application for arbitration against his employer. The mother of the decedent intervened, praying that the compensation be awarded to her, alleging that the applicant was not the decedent’s surviving spouse. In passing upon the issues, the Iowa court stated:
“ * * * Most authorities hold that, in such cases, a nunc pro tunc entry as of the date of the former judgment is sufficient to dissolve the marriage relation as of said former date. (Citing authorities.)
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“Appellant (mother) contends she is an innocent third person who acquired vested interests before said nunc pro tunc entry was made, and, therefore, that said entry could not affect her said property rights.”
After discussing this contention, the court concluded:
“ * * * Appellant was not an innocent third person without notice within the meaning of the foregoing doctrine, and her claim to the workmen’s compensation is not entitled to *135preference over appellee’s rights as evidenced in part by the nunc pro tunc entry.”
Since I am of the opinion that the decree of divorce was conclusive as to the marital status of Roy Lee Black at the time of his marriage to Edna Black, petitioner herein, and of the further opinion that the Commission does not have sufficient interest to question the nunc pro tunc entry, I believe that the award of the Commission denying benefits to Edna Black should be set aside and vacated.
JOHNSON, Justice.
I concur in this dissent.