Court Opinion

ID: 9843784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:43:17.694572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:55.330264
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 20] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 21] The time limit for filing a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, and cannot be waived by the supreme court. See, e.g., State v. Guthmiller, 497 N.W.2d 407 (N.D.1993). The supreme court may not extend the time to file a notice of appeal in this case. N.D.R.App.P. 26(b); cf. N.D.C.C. § 27-20-05 (supreme court may extend time for appeal under Juvenile Court Act). Here, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction to act on all motions for extensions of time to file the notice of appeal. N.D.R.App.P. 26(b).
[¶ 22] “In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of district court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order being appealed.” N.D.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(A). The district court may extend the time to file the notice of appeal under these circumstances:
Upon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may — before or after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice — extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision.
N.D.R.App.P. 4(b)(4).
[¶ 23] Prior to this case, we have not addressed the “good cause” standard for granting an extension of time (adopted in the 2003 amendment to Rule 4). In this case of first impression, I expected the majority would require affidavits or other competent evidence to support Fischer’s request for an extension of time, just as such evidence is required to establish “excusable neglect.” See Redfield v. Bitterman, 2000 ND 217, ¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d 570. This Court has rejected claims of excusable neglect when the movant failed to offer affidavits or evidence in support of that claim. See State v. Jones, 2002 ND 163, ¶ 7, 652 N.W.2d 369 (holding that the district court’s denial of Jones’s motion for an extension of time was not an abuse of discretion because of his complete failure to make any showing of excusable neglect); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 1998 ND 75, ¶ 8, 576 N.W.2d 215 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the movant’s request for an extension because her claim of excusable neglect was not reasonably supported by the evidence).
[¶ 24] In any proceeding “we have consistently held that a person acting as his own attorney is equally bound by applicable rules of procedure, even if that person lacks understanding of those rules or the correct procedures.” State v. DuPaul, 527 N.W.2d 238, 243-44 (N.D.1995). “ ‘A defendant’s pro se status does not relieve him of the requirement of strict compliance with procedural rules.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Neigum, 369 N.W.2d 375, 377 (N.D.1985)).
[¶ 25] One rule applicable to Fischer and all others who attempt to appeal is N.D.R.App.P. 30(a)(1), which provides: “Only items in the record may be included in the appendix.” Items not in the district court’s record but placed in the appendix and brought before this Court are not considered. Oien v. Oien, 2005 ND 205, ¶ 11, 706 N.W.2d 81. Because an appeal is to be determined upon the district court’s record, we do not consider evidence or arguments presented for the first time on appeal. Id.
*757[¶ 26] Notwithstanding our unambiguous rule and clear case law, Fischer’s appendix contains important documents that were not part of the record below and, therefore, were not seen by the district court. The documents include:
1. June 30, 2006 letter from Attorney Thomas J. Glass to Fischer regarding untimely notice of appeal and services provided to Fischer
2. Notice of appeal dated March 28, 2006, and stamped “Received March 30, 2006” by the State’s Attorney’s office
3. Fischer’s order for transcripts dated March 28, 2006
4. Attorney’s Certificate of Service dated March 28, 2006 and signed by Fischer regarding service of Notice of Appeal and Order for Transcripts on State’s Attorney
[¶ 27] The record — or more accurately, the lack of record — is highly problematic for Fischer because it does not include a copy of the first notice of appeal which Fischer claims to have mailed to the clerk of court but was never received. The record does not contain any form of proof of service of the first notice of appeal on the clerk of court. Indeed, those documents are not even present in Fischer’s improperly augmented Appendix.
[¶ 28] The record does contain the State’s admission that it received a notice of appeal from Fischer dated March 28, 2006. However, the State’s copy of the notice of appeal was not part of the district court’s record. The result is that the district court had no evidence of the date on which the State’s Attorney received Fischer’s first notice of appeal or the order for transcript.
[¶ 29] I do not condone the district court’s failure to explain why it denied Fischer’s requested relief. Nevertheless, looking only at the documents available to the district court when it denied Fischer’s Motion for Extension of Time on May 9, 2006, we are left with Fischer’s April 19, 2006 Notice of [Motion for] Amended Order for Transcripts and the Stipulation to Amend Order for Transcripts and Certificate of Service; the State’s April 21 Motion to Quash Order for Transcripts; Fischer’s Motion and Brief for an Extension of Time and his [second] Notice of Appeal and Certificate of Service by Mail filed on May 2, 2006; and the State’s May 3, 2006 Brief resisting Fischer’s motion for extension of time. As indicated above, the State admits in its May 3 brief that it received Fischer’s first notice, but it did not say when the document was received. Those details were supplied in Fischer’s un-sworn filings.
[¶ 30] North Dakota law has long held that motions cannot be granted without the support of competent evidence and that statements in motions or briefs do not constitute evidence. Medd v. Fonder, 543 N.W.2d 483, 486-87 (N.D.1996). We are therefore required in this case to disregard Fischer’s arguments and use only proper evidence to measure whether the district court abused its discretion. Doing so, we are left with the bare fact that on an unknown date the State received a notice of appeal dated March 28, 2006, and that on April 19, 2006 Fischer filed a motion or purported “order” relating to transcripts.
[¶ 31] This record simply does not support a conclusion the district court abused its discretion. After stripping away the improper records in Fischer’s appellate appendix, and after disregarding the argument in Fischer’s brief, the scant remaining evidence provides no basis for finding Fischer’s failure to timely file his notice of appeal should be excused for good cause. Instead, we have the unexplained conclusion that a notice of appeal dated March 28 was sent to the State’s Attorney and that the Clerk of the District Court did not *758receive the same notice. Without more, I cannot agree the district court’s actions were arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable.
[¶ 32] Finally, the Majority makes much of Fischer’s status as an unrepresented prisoner and the resulting difficulties Fischer might have in complying with the requirements for perfecting an appeal. I am mindful of the constraints placed on a self-represented inmate, but do not agree that they can become a lawful justification which excuses compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and our case law. To the contrary, not only are pro se criminal defendants held to the same standard as practicing attorneys, but those defendants are required to have been warned of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. This Court has addressed the issue by stating:
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-21, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held criminal defendants have a corollary right under the Sixth Amendment to conduct their own defense. [City of Fargo v.] Rockwell, 1999 ND 125, ¶ 8, 597 N.W.2d 406; [State v.] Poitra, 1998 ND 88, ¶ 8, 578 N.W.2d 121; [State v.] Harmon, 1997 ND 233, ¶ 16, 575 N.W.2d 635; State v. Hart, 1997 ND 188, ¶ 6, 569 N.W.2d 451. Criminal defendants who proceed pro se necessarily relinquish many of the benefits associated with the right to counsel, and in order to proceed pro se, they must voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently relinquish the benefits of counsel. Rockwell, at ¶ 8, 597 N.W.2d 406. A defendant need not have the skill and experience of a lawyer to competently and intelligently choose self-representation, but the defendant should be aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so the record establishes the choice is made with eyes open. Faretta, at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.
An unavoidable tension exists between the right to counsel and the right to self-representation, because asserting one right necessitates a waiver of the other. In recent years, we have become increasingly involved with the tension between those mutually exclusive rights. In Harmon, 1997 ND 233, ¶ 23 n. 1, 575 N.W.2d 635, we acknowledged increasing problems with defendants who proceed pro se, and suggested “[tjrial courts should be careful to make specific on-the-record determinations about whether a defendant unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently waived either his right to counsel or self-representation. Such a determination should make clear the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.”
State v. Dvorak, 2000 ND 6, ¶¶ 10-11, 604 N.W.2d 445.
[¶ 33] In addition to the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” outside a penal institution, inmate litigants are subject to even greater constraints once inside prison. Of course, our starting point is that an inmate must be provided with “ ‘meaningful access’ to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Yet, a prison “may place reasonable restrictions on an inmate’s right to legal materials or legal assistance based on the institution’s legitimate interest in security.” Cooper v. Corderman, 809 S.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Mo.App.1991) (citing Williams v. Wyrick, 747 F.2d 1231, 1232 (8th Cir.1984)). And an inmate’s “right to present and prepare legal matters is one which he must exercise in a reasonable manner, and within the institution’s rules concerning inmates’ possessions.” Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F.Supp. 585, 599 (D.Mo.1968), aff'd 417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 996, 25 L.Ed.2d 255 (D.Mo.1970). The ability to prepare and present legal matters is also hindered by *759the very real limitation that an inmate does not have a free and unfettered ability to call the court, and does not have any ability to personally deliver papers to the court or to personally examine documents and records at the courthouse.
[¶ 34] These are all limitations Fischer knew about and accepted when he exercised his right to proceed pro se. Having made the decision to represent himself after conviction and after incarceration, Fischer cannot complain now he has been prejudiced by the limitations on his ability to conduct his legal affairs that exist exclusively due to his physical confinement in a penal institution. As a result, and based on the record in this case, I am compelled to conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fischer’s motion for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal. I would affirm the district court’s order.
[¶ 35] DALE V. SANDSTROM, J., concurs.