Court Opinion

ID: 9783731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:05:04.037416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:34.264368
License: Public Domain

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice, concurring. I concur in the majority’s decision that this case should be affirmed. However, I write separately because I differ in my analysis on admission of the evidence under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b). At issue is evidence that Banks ordered the shooting of Antoine Jones’s home (that resulted in the death of Kamya Weathers-by and Banks being charged with her murder in separate proceedings), the intimidation and assault of witnesses such as Jones, and the murder of Thomas Okafor. The State argued that these acts were admissible as acts proving the charged murder of Brent Pettus because they revealed a guilty conscience. Banks argued that the evidence was inadmissible because it revealed other crimes, wrongs, or acts in violation of Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b). I note first that the majority holds that the evidence fits an exception to Rule 404(b). The word “exception” does not appear in Rule 404(b). There can be no exceptions to Rule 404(b) because Rule 404(b) is a rule of relevance. Evidence offered under Rule 404(b) “must be independently relevant.” Allen v. State, 374 Ark. 309, 316, 287 S.W.3d 579, 584 (2008). If an exception is granted, it is an exception to the requirement of relevance. To admit irrelevant evidence offends due process and means criminal convictions are based on proof less |inthan proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1  Rule 404(b) is a codification of the common law rule that existed in Arkansas at the time the Rule was adopted. Pnce v. State, 267 Ark. 1172, 1175, 599 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Ark.App.1980). The relevant common law rule was that evidence that reveals that the defendant is guilty of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not necessarily inadmissible when it, independent of revealing the other crimes, wrongs, or acts, constitutes competent evidence to prove the charged crime. See Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 334, 266 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1954); State v. Dulaney, 87 Ark. 17, 23, 112 S.W. 158, 160 (1908). This court in Dulaney stated that, while the principle is often spoken of as an exception, “it is not an exception,” because, as just noted, the evidence is not admitted to prove the charged crime based on the commission of another crime, but because the evidence is admissible to prove the charged crime despite revealing another crime. Dulaney, 87 Ark. at 22-23,112 S.W. at 160; See also Alford, 223 Ark. at 335, 266 S.W.2d at 806 (“Instances of admissibility are not really exceptions to the exclusionary principle.”). However, the idea of an exception has been reintroduced in Arkansas precedent from time to time. In Satterfield v. State, 245 Ark. 337, 341-42, 432 S.W.2d 472, 474 (1968), the court inadvertently reintroduced the term in quoting language from 22A Corpus Juris Secundum, Criminal Law § 682 (1961) rather than relying on existing precedent. The term reappears in our precedent sporadically but has been used more | n consistently since it was inadvertently reintroduced in a concurring opinion in Benedetti v. State, 268 Ark. 571, 575, 594 S.W.2d 61, 63 (1980) (Newbern, J., concurring). Referring to exceptions to Rule 404(b) is error and only confuses an already troublesome area of the law. I must next note that the majority errs in stating that “[ajnother crime is ‘independently relevant’ if it tends to prove a material point and is not introduced merely to demonstrate that the defendant is a criminal.”2 “Another crime,” as a crime, is not independently relevant to prove a charged crime. For many years this court has recognized that a fundamental rule of exclusion forbids the prosecution from proving the commission of one crime by proof of the commission of another crime. Hickey v. State, 263 Ark. 809, 810, 569 S.W.2d 64, 64 (1978) (quoting Alford, 223 Ark. at 833, 266 S.W.2d at 806).3 Rule 404(b) does not permit admission of other crimes to prove a charged crime. Rule 404(b) permits admission of evidence, where that evidence, entirely independent from revealing a separate crime, wrong, or act, constitutes evidence relevant to prove the charged crime. In other words, even if the conduct at issue did not reveal a separate crime, it would still constitute evidence relevant to prove the charged crime. The principle is simply that evidence relevant |12to prove the charged crime is not necessarily excluded because it also incidentally reveals the commission of another crime, wrong, or act. See Um-baugh v. State, 250 Ark. 50, 55, 463 S.W.2d 634, 636 (1971) (quoting Dulaney, 87 Ark. at 23, 112 S.W. at 160). Thus, stating that another “crime” is relevant misstates the law. Finally, I conclude that the evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b). The evidence that Banks ordered the shooting, the witness intimidation, and the murder of Okafor to silence witnesses to the charged murder of Pettus constitutes independently relevant evidence proving that Smith murdered Pettus. Tampering with witnesses to thwart prosecution for the charged crime reveals consciousness of guilt and constitutes evidence relevant to prove the charged crime. See Henderson v. State, 322 Ark. 402, 408, 910 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1995). Thus, while the evidence at issue may or may not reveal the commission of separate and distinct crimes from the charged murder, it constitutes proof of the charged murder.4 It is, therefore, independent of revealing other crimes, wrongs, or acts, relevant proof of the charged crime, the murder of Pettus. “[T]he fact that evidence shows that the defendant was guilty of another crime does not prevent it being admissible when otherwise it would be competent on the issue under trial.” Umbaugh v. State, 250 Ark. at 55, 463 S.W.2d at 636 (quoting Dulaney, 87 Ark. at 23,112 S.W. at 160). Thus, the evidence was independently relevant under Rule 404(b), and “[o]nce 1 ^independent relevancy is established, the trial court is then obliged to scrutinize the evidence under A.R.E. Rule 403.” Skiver v. State, 336 Ark. 86, 100, 983 S.W.2d 931, 938 (1999). Because the evidence at issue constitutes proof Banks committed the charged murder of Pettus, it is relevant and, because its probative value outweighs the prejudicial harm, it was properly admitted. DANIELSON, J„ joins.  . A finding of guilt must rest upon proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the exact offense for which he is being tried. Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 358, 5 S.W.3d 448, 454 (1999) (quoting Simmons v. State, 233 Ark. 616, 619, 346 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1961)) (quoting Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 334, 266 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1954)).   . The phrase "another crime is independently relevant” appears in two prior majority opinions of this court. Henderson v. State, 360 Ark. 356, 361, 201 S.W.3d 401, 405 (2005); Eliott v. State, 342 Ark. 237, 240, 27 S.W.3d 432, 435 (2000).   . Rule 404(b) was in force at the time that Hickey v. State, 263 Ark. 809, 569 S.W.2d 64 (1978), was decided. The uniform rules of evidence were adopted by the General Assembly in 1976, and the adoption was declared void by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986). In Ricarte, the court adopted the rules as court rules. Rule 404(b) has remained the same since it was adopted by the General Assembly in 1976.   . If the State introduced the evidence of other crimes to prove that Banks was a criminal, and that because he was a criminal, it was more rather than less likely that he murdered Pettus, it would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 494, 231 S.W.3d 638, 651 (2006) (stating that other unrelated crimes, wrongs, or acts are inadmissible to prove a defendant is a man of bad character and addicted to crime).