Court Opinion

ID: 9408608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:02:10.255934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.592985
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1880    Document: 36     Page: 1   Filed: 07/13/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                CARISSIMA M. PETTUS,
                      Petitioner

                             v.

            DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                        2022-1880
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in Nos. DC-0353-13-0409-B-1, DC-0752-16-0763-I-1.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: July 13, 2023
                  ______________________

    CARISSIMA M. PETTUS, Williamsburg, VA, pro se.

     KRISTIN ELAINE OLSON, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR.
                   ______________________

      Before STOLL, LINN, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
Case: 22-1880     Document: 36     Page: 2    Filed: 07/13/2023

 2                                             PETTUS   v. NAVY

     Carissima M. Pettus appeals the final decision of the
 Merit Systems Protection Board that affirmed two initial
 decisions, one granting Ms. Pettus backpay in a restoration
 appeal and the other dismissing her constructive suspen-
 sion appeal. Pettus v. Dep’t of the Navy, Nos. DC-0353-13-
 0409-B-1, DC-0752-16-0763-I-1, 2022 WL 1046962, at *1
 (M.S.P.B. Apr. 4, 2022) (Board Decision). For the reasons
 below, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     On November 30, 2011, Ms. Pettus suffered an injury
 while working as a police officer at the Naval Weapons Sta-
 tion Yorktown. She underwent reconstructive shoulder
 surgery and returned to work in a limited duty position but
 then suffered a recurrence of her injury. On November 26,
 2012, Ms. Pettus’s surgeon informed her that she reached
 maximum medical improvement, i.e., that her shoulder in-
 jury would not improve further. Her now permanent re-
 strictions disqualified her from being a police officer.
     Shortly after, on November 29, 2012, Ms. Pettus asked
 the Department of the Navy (the agency) to restore her to
 duty, specifically requesting a Program Support Assistant
 position. The agency denied her request. Ms. Pettus ap-
 pealed, alleging that the agency (1) failed to restore her to
 duty in violation of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(c) and (2) discrimi-
 nated against her based on her disability. Under 5 C.F.R.
 § 353.301(c), “[a]n individual who is physically disqualified
 for the former position or equivalent because of a compen-
 sable injury, is entitled to be placed in another position for
 which qualified that will provide the employee with the
 same status, and pay, or the nearest approximation
 thereof, consistent with the circumstances in each case.”
    On December 23, 2013, with the restoration appeal on-
 going, the agency offered Ms. Pettus a Security Assistant
 position. Pettus v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 0353-13-0409-B-
 1, 2016 MSPB LEXIS 4436, at *9–10 (M.S.P.B. July 29,
Case: 22-1880       Document: 36   Page: 3    Filed: 07/13/2023

 PETTUS   v. NAVY                                           3

 2016) (Restoration Decision). She accepted on Decem-
 ber 24, 2013, and began working on January 13, 2014. Id.;
 Pet. Br. 5 1. The agency later removed Ms. Pettus from the
 Security Assistant position.        Restoration Decision,
 2016 MSPB LEXIS 4436, at *3 n.2.   2

     Relevant here, for her restoration appeal, the Adminis-
 trative Judge (AJ) set forth discovery deadlines and
 granted several agency requests, including a 30-day con-
 tinuance and a motion to compel discovery. Board Deci-
 sion, 2022 WL 1046962, at *4. Ms. Pettus failed to comply
 with the AJ’s order compelling discovery. Restoration De-
 cision, 2016 MSPB LEXIS 4436, at *6. Consequently, the
 AJ sanctioned Ms. Pettus by dismissing her disability dis-
 crimination claim. Id.
     Ultimately, the AJ found that the agency failed to re-
 store Ms. Pettus as required by 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(c). Id.
 at *10. The AJ ordered backpay from November 29, 2012
 (when Ms. Pettus requested restoration) to December 23,
 2013 (the day before Ms. Pettus accepted the Security As-
 sistant position). Id. at *10–11.
     Separately, Ms. Pettus filed a constructive suspension
 appeal pro se, alleging that the agency constructively sus-
 pended her for more than fourteen days. Appx. 78–81. 3
 The AJ dismissed her claim, explaining that Ms. Pettus’s
 “rights and remedies regarding the time period for which
 she claims [constructive suspension] . . . are subsumed in
 the restoration appeal process.” Pettus v. Dep’t of the Navy,

     1   “Pet. Br.” refers to pages in Ms. Pettus’s informal
 opening brief as numbered by operation of an electronic file
 viewing system.
     2   Ms. Pettus appealed this removal, but the admin-
 istrative judge dismissed it as untimely. Pet. Br. 9.
     3   “Appx.” refers to the appendix filed concurrently
 with Respondent’s brief.
Case: 22-1880    Document: 36     Page: 4    Filed: 07/13/2023

 4                                            PETTUS   v. NAVY

 No. DC-0752-16-0763-I-1, 2016 MSPB LEXIS               5088,
 at *12–16 (Constructive Suspension Decision).
     Ms. Pettus then appealed both her restoration and con-
 structive suspension appeals, again pro se. Board Decision,
 2022 WL 1046962, at *1. The Board combined the appeals,
 per 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b), and affirmed the AJ’s initial de-
 cisions. Id.
     First, the Board rejected Ms. Pettus’s argument that
 the AJ should have ordered the agency to retroactively
 place her in the Program Support Assistant position she
 previously requested. Id. at *3. The Board found that, be-
 cause the agency removed Ms. Pettus from the Security As-
 sistant position for cause unrelated to the matters on
 appeal, she was not entitled to retroactive restoration. Id.
     Second, the Board rejected Ms. Pettus’s argument that
 the AJ’s sanction in her restoration appeal––striking her
 disability discrimination claim––was untimely and preju-
 dicial. Id. The Board found that the AJ did not abuse her
 discretion in imposing a sanction after Ms. Pettus repeat-
 edly failed to comply with the AJ’s orders. Id. 4
    Third, the Board interpreted Ms. Pettus’s argument as
 implying that the AJ was biased in granting the agency a
 30-day continuance in the restoration appeal. Board Deci-
 sion, 2022 WL 1046962, at *4. The Board found that
 Ms. Pettus failed to show bias, noting that the AJ extended
 deadlines for both parties due to the agency’s scheduling
 conflict. Id.
    Lastly, the Board rejected Ms. Pettus’s challenges to the
 dismissal of her constructive suspension appeal. Id. The
 Board explained that a constructive suspension claim is

     4    Ms. Pettus has since chosen to abandon her disa-
 bility discrimination claim in order for this court to have
 jurisdiction. See ECF No. 18 at 3.
Case: 22-1880       Document: 36    Page: 5    Filed: 07/13/2023

 PETTUS   v. NAVY                                             5

 generally subsumed in a restoration claim when both are
 based on the same absence. Id. (citing Kinglee v. U.S.
 Postal Serv., 114 M.S.P.R. 473, ¶¶ 19–22 (2010)).
    Ms. Pettus appeals.      We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. § 7703.
                          DISCUSSION
      Our authority to review a final Board decision is statu-
 torily limited. We may only set aside a final Board decision
 if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
 otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
 procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
 followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence[.]”
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
 support a conclusion.”         Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.
 v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
     Ms. Pettus raises several issues on appeal. First, she
 contends that her entitlement to return to a “complete sta-
 tus quo” requires retroactive restoration to the Program
 Support Assistant position she requested on November 29,
 2012. Pet. Br. 5–6; see Resp. Br. 11. Second, she argues
 that the AJ abused her discretion in procedural matters.
 Pet. Br. 7–8. Third, she challenges the removal of her dis-
 ability discrimination claim as a discovery sanction. Pet.
 Br. 8–9. Lastly, she challenges the dismissal of her con-
 structive suspension appeal, contending that the Board
 erred in stating that the dates of her constructive discharge
 appeal and restoration appeal were the same. Pet. Br. 9.
 We address each issue in turn. 5

     5   Ms. Pettus also argues that the Board erroneously
 stated that her restoration appeal was under 5 C.F.R.
 § 353.304(c), instead of § 353.301(c). Pet. Br. 9. But the
 Board properly considered Ms. Pettus’s restoration under
Case: 22-1880     Document: 36     Page: 6    Filed: 07/13/2023

 6                                             PETTUS   v. NAVY

      First, we address Ms. Pettus’s retroactive restoration
 argument. Restoration requires placement to a position
 that is the “same . . . or the nearest approximation thereof,”
 in other words, the status quo. § 353.301(c). Ms. Pettus
 argues that returning her to the status quo requires retro-
 actively restoring her to the Program Support Assistant po-
 sition she initially requested, explaining that “but for[] the
 agency’s improper restoration . . . she would not have been
 removed” from the Security Assistant position. Pet Br. 9;
 see Pet. Br. 6. She also argues that the Board incorrectly
 stated that her removal was not substantially related to
 her compensable injury. Pet. Br. 6, 19.
     As the Board correctly explained, an employee removed
 for cause, rather than for reasons substantially related to
 their compensable injury, is not entitled to restoration.
 Board Decision, 2022 WL 1046962, at *3 (citing Manning
 v. U.S. Postal Serv., 118 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 8 (2012)). Here,
 the Board determined that “[t]he record reflects” that
 Ms. Pettus was removed “for misconduct unrelated to the
 matters on appeal,” and thus was not entitled to restora-
 tion. Board Decision, 2022 WL 1046962, at *3. But the

 § 353.301(c) and only referenced § 353.304 to clarify a bur-
 den of proof standard. Board Decision, 2022 WL 1046962,
 at *3 n.3. Thus, there is no error.
     Additionally, Ms. Pettus argues that the Board incor-
 rectly found that she never appealed her removal. Pet.
 Br. 9. As Ms. Pettus notes, she appealed her removal and
 it was dismissed as untimely. Pettus v. Dep’t of the Navy,
 DC-0752-17-0156-I-1, 2016 WL 7508803 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 29,
 2016). However, that removal, or any subsequent appeal
 for it, is not before us. See Board Decision, 2022 WL
 1046962, at *1 (listing only Restoration Decision and Con-
 structive Suspension Decision on appeal to the Board);
 Appx. 5 (listing only that Board’s decision on appeal to this
 court).
Case: 22-1880       Document: 36   Page: 7    Filed: 07/13/2023

 PETTUS   v. NAVY                                            7

 Board only cites to the AJ’s decision for support, which
 states that the “parties informed [the AJ] that [Ms. Pettus]
 was subsequently removed from the . . . Security Assistant
 position, effective May 27, 2015, and that she did not file
 an appeal with the Board from that action.” Restoration
 Decision, 2016 MSPB LEXIS 4436, at *3 n.2. That is not
 evidence supporting a finding that Ms. Pettus’s removal
 was substantially unrelated to her compensable injury,
 much less substantial evidence. However, the Board’s er-
 ror is harmless.
     The harmless error rule serves to “avoid wasteful pro-
 ceedings on remand where there is no reason to believe a
 different result would have been obtained had the error not
 occurred.” In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
 2004); see 28 U.S.C. § 2111. In Shinseki v. Sanders,
 556 U.S. 396, 411–12 (2009), the Supreme Court laid out
 several factors that may inform a reviewing court’s harm-
 less error analysis, including “the likelihood that the result
 would have been different.” Normally, the party attacking
 an agency’s determination bears the burden of showing
 that an error is harmful. Id. at 409. Thus, Ms. Pettus has
 the burden of showing that correcting the Board’s error
 would likely yield a different result.
     Ms. Pettus does not meet her burden to show that the
 Board’s error was harmful. She argues that her removal
 was related to her injury because, but for “improper resto-
 ration” to the Security Assistant position, “she would not
 have been removed.” Pet. Br. 9. This argument does not
 tie her compensable injury to the reason for her removal.
 In other words, Ms. Pettus presents no evidence that her
 removal from the Security Assistant position was related
 to her injury. We therefore find the Board’s error harmless
 and do not disturb this portion of its decision.
     We now turn to Ms. Pettus’s argument that the AJ
 abused her discretion when she granted the agency an ex-
 tension of time to respond to certain matters. Pet. Br. 7.
Case: 22-1880     Document: 36      Page: 8    Filed: 07/13/2023

 8                                              PETTUS   v. NAVY

 The Board explained that the AJ granted the agency (and
 Ms. Pettus) a 30-day extension based on a scheduling con-
 flict. Board Decision, 2022 WL 1046962, at *4. “Proce-
 dural matters relative to discovery . . . fall within the sound
 discretion of the [B]oard and its officials.” Curtin v. Off. of
 Pers. Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (cita-
 tions omitted). And these kinds of extensions are regularly
 granted. See Roberts v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 250 F. App’x
 346, 349 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential) (noting that it
 is not unusual for an extension of time to be granted). We
 see no abuse of discretion in this case, and thus affirm.
     Next, we turn to Ms. Pettus’s challenge to the AJ’s
 sanction dismissing her disability discrimination claim. As
 the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] federal employee
 who claims that an agency action appealable to the MSPB
 violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in [5 U.S.C.]
 § 7702(a)(1) 6 should seek judicial review in district court,
 not the Federal Circuit,” regardless of whether the MSPB
 decided her case on procedural grounds or on the merits.
 Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 56 (2012). By choosing to
 abandon her disability discrimination claim for this court
 to have jurisdiction, Ms. Pettus chose to abandon not only
 the merits of her disability discrimination claim but the re-
 lated procedural arguments as well. See ECF No. 18;
 Kloeckner, 568 U.S. at 56. Thus, we cannot consider this
 issue. 7
    Lastly, we address Ms. Pettus’s challenge to the
 Board’s dismissal of her constructive suspension appeal.

     6   Ms. Pettus alleged disability discrimination under
 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, one of the antidiscrimina-
 tion statutes listed in § 7702(a)(1). Appx. 28.
     7   As for Ms. Pettus’s argument that she is pro se and
 did not know the law, those arguments also relate to her
 discrimination claim and are thus not before us. See ECF
 No. 18; Kloeckner, 568 U.S. at 56.
Case: 22-1880       Document: 36   Page: 9    Filed: 07/13/2023

 PETTUS   v. NAVY                                           9

 Ms. Pettus seems to argue that her restoration and con-
 structive suspension appeals are for different dates, pre-
 sumably to prevent her constructive suspension appeal
 from being subsumed by her restoration appeal. See Pet.
 Br. 9. But Ms. Pettus does not identify what the alleged
 correct dates are or how the Board erred in making its de-
 termination. See Pet. Br. 9, 12. Said otherwise, she has
 failed to adequately develop her argument and has thus
 waived it. See Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 8 F.4th
 1290, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“An issue that is merely al-
 luded to and not developed as an argument in a party’s
 brief is deemed waived.”)
    We have considered Ms. Pettus’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. 8

     8    For example, Ms. Pettus raises several issues for
 the first time on appeal, including that she accepted the
 temporary Security Assistant position under duress, Pet.
 Br. 19; challenges to the agency’s backpay calculations,
 Pet. Br. 12; and arguments related to a separate EEOC
 partial recovery appeal, Pet. Br. 9, 12. See Pettus, MSPB
 Docket No. DC-0353013-0409-B-1, Pet. for Review (Sept. 2,
 2016) (raising no argument about these issues); Pettus,
 MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-16-0763-I-1, Pet. for Review
 (Oct. 4, 2016) (same). This court has “regularly stated . . .
 that a position not presented in the tribunal under review
 will not be considered on appeal in the absence of excep-
 tional circumstances.” Pavo Sols. LLC v. Kingston Tech.
 Co., 35 F.4th 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting In re
 Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
 2020)). Because Ms. Pettus did not raise these arguments
 before the Board and does not argue any exceptional cir-
 cumstances to warrant review, she has forfeited these ar-
 guments.
Case: 22-1880   Document: 36     Page: 10    Filed: 07/13/2023

 10                                          PETTUS   v. NAVY

                        CONCLUSION
      For the reasons above, we affirm the Board’s final de-
 cision granting Ms. Pettus’s restoration appeal and dis-
 missing her constructive suspension appeal.
                       AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.