Court Opinion

ID: 9723254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:08:51.714992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:46.086393
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Crumpacker, J.
In his petition for a rehearing the appellee asserts that we are in error in holding that the extension of the increased benefits, provided by the 1947 amendment, to him and all other similarly situated would result in the retrospective application of said amendment to past transactions and create new obligations in reference thereto. He assigns several reasons for this position all of which are predicated upon the proposition that, by the 1947 amendment, the state offered him a new contract which he accepted by discharging the obligations entailed by the offer and therefore is entitled to its benefits. That the state was free to offer him increased benefits upon his assumption of additional obligations and he was free to accept *450or refuse such offer. That he voluntarily accepted it and his contract, negotiated under the Act of 1941, before its amendment, was modified by mutual consent of the parties and no question of impairment is involved. We concede the soundness of this argument if the 1947 amendment constitutes an offer of a new or modified contract to him and others similarly situated.
So far as is pertinent to a decision of this controversy the act of 1941 concerns itself entirely with active field examiners. It makes no pretense of providing for those who were formerly in the employ of the department. The legislature recognized this by passing a supplemental act in 1945 whereby ex-field examiners could be reinstated and become members of the retirement plan. Acts 1945, ch. 118, p. 248; Burns’ 1943 Replacement (1949 Supp.), § 60-246a. The 1947 amendment left this supplemental act undisturbed and did nothing more than increase the benefits provided by the original act for active field examiners upon their retirement, provided they made specified additional contributions to the retirement fund. The amendment in no way changed the nature of the original act and it is still an act pertaining to active field examiners and providing for certain benefits upon their retirement. Thus it is apparent that, unless it be through some theory of statutory construction, the offer of a new contract, which the appellee says the amendment constitutes, was not made to him as admittedly he was not a field examiner when the offer was made. Obviously if the appellee is to be brought within the purview of the amendment it must be on this theory: The 1941 act as amended in 1947 offers new or modified contracts to field examiners. Although he is not a field examiner now he was such in 1941. As the amended act speaks as though it were originally written as amended, the new offer contained *451in the amendment includes him because he was a field examiner when the original act was passed.
We adhere to our original pronouncement that such a construction of the statute involves the retrospective application of the amendment with the result that intervening transactions and their obligations are disturbed. We do not say that the state, through the legislature, could not offer to change its contract with the appellee even though, in so doing, it assumed additional obligations. We do say, however, that it must do so through legislation that indicates such purpose and if the same is doubtful the question must be resolved through principles of statutory construction. In our opinion the 1947 amendment makes no such offer except through retrospective application to a situation which the legislature has indicated no intention to disturb.
The appellee has fortified us somewhat in this position by his own appraisal of the purpose of legislation of this character as expressed by the following language taken from his brief and with which we are in accord: “In the case of the statute here involved, the obvious purpose was to induce longevity of service, better employee morale and procurement of able and efficient field examiners by means of making available to them security in their old age ... It can be seen that the above purpose of the legislature in enacting this statute was a public purpose rather than a private one. At the same time in enacting this statute the legislature was attempting to remedy certain difficulties. The job of field examiner is one calling for special skills and abilities and also a certain amount of apprenticeship must be served before a new field examiner can serve in that capacity efficiently. The legislature by advancing the aforementioned inducement was trying to remedy the evils of public service — frequent turnover *452of employment of field examiners. It is the province of the court in these circumstances to contemplate these evils and construe the statute in such manner as to most efficiently suppress them.” It is obvious that the inclusion of retired field examiners within the purview in the amendment could in no manner serve these purposes. After many years of faithful service to the public, the appellee and those he represents have retired to private life and an increase in their benefits would savor of a gratuity extended by an appreciative sovereign under the guise of an annuity contract. It would serve purely a private and not a public purpose. On the other hand the restriction of the amendment to those who are now in the service and to those who may be attracted to it in the future, seems to us to be in full accord with the fundamental theory and purpose of the legislation.
Appellee’s petition for rehearing denied.
Royse, J., dissenting.