Court Opinion

ID: 9538698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:40:15.125231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:05.902069
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
The majority emphasize that sections 1539 and 1540 were enacted in 1872, 83 years before the exclusionary rule was adopted in People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513]. I fail to find that chronology particularly significant.
*847Arata v. Superior Court (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 767 [315 P.2d 473], was decided two years after the Calían decision, and this court denied a hearing. In Arata it was pointed out (at p. 770) that issuance of a search warrant is a judicial act and that “ [t]he only review of such a judicial act that is specifically provided by law, is the review sanctioned by sections 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code.” (Italics added.) Section 1539 provides: ‘‘If the grounds on which the warrant was issued be controverted, [the magistrate who issued the search warrant] must proceed to take testimony. ...”
Arata has been followed by an unbroken line of cases. (People v. Thornton (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 718, 721 [327 P.2d 161]; People v. Phillips (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 541, 545 [329 P.2d 621]; People v. Nelson (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 356, 360 [340 P.2d 718]; People v. Lepur (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 798, 802 [346 P.2d 914]; People v. Dosier (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 436, 439 [4 Cal.Rptr. 309]; People v. Prieto (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 62, 66 [12 Cal.Rptr. 577]; People v. Marion (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 835, 838 [18 Cal.Rptr. 219].)
I find no authority to justify overruling the foregoing post-Cahan decisions, and I am persuaded it is inadvisable to adopt a new rule. Under the majority view, a defendant who now has five methods of achieving the exclusion of evidence, is gratuitously awarded a sixth and additional procedure whenever he chooses to ignore or fails to first employ any of the other available means. As pointed out in People v. Phillips, supra, at page 545: ‘ ‘ California cases indicate that, if prior to trial, defendant had desired to challenge the validity of the search warrant and the resulting effect of it she could have (a) made a motion to quash it (People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459, 461 [282 P.2d 509]); (b) petition for a writ of mandamus for the return of the property (People v. Berger, supra); (c) made a motion to suppress or exclude the evidence (People v. Alaniz, [dissenting opinion] 149 Cal.App.2d 560, 571 [309 P.2d 71], citing United States v. Kind, 87 F.2d 315, 316); (d) sought a writ of prohibition (Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 291 [294 P.2d 36]). Also, defendant had certain rights under sections 1539 and 1540, Penal Code,...”
Arata and its progeny hold unequivocally that failure to pursue statutory remedies under sections 1539 and 1540 precludes a defendant from controverting the facts slated in the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based. This rule is generally followed in other jurisdictions, with or without comparable statutes. (E.g., see Tischler v. State (1955) 206 *848Md. 386 [111 A.2d 655, 657]; One 1949 Model Oldsmobile v. State (Okla. 1954) 276 P.2d 245, 247; O’Brien v. State (1959) 205 Tenn. 405 [326 S.W.2d 759, 764]; Hernandez v. State (1952) 158 Tex. Crim. Rep. 296 [255 S.W.2d 219, 221]; Goss v. Maryland (1951) 198 Md. 350 [84 A.2d 57, 58]; Mattingly v. Commonwealth (1949) 310 Ky. 561 [221 S.W.2d 82, 84]; People v. Alvis (1930) 342 Ill. 460 [174 N.E. 527]; Seager v. State (1928) 200 Ind. 579 [164 N.E. 274]; State v. Halbrook (1925) 311 Mo. 664 [279 S.W. 395]; State v. Seymour (1924) 46 R.I. 257 [126 A. 755, 756]; State v. English (1924) 71 Mont. 343 [229 P. 727].)
The majority suggest that sections 1539 and 1540 were designed “not to regulate the procedure for objecting to the introduction of evidence in criminal trials but to afford the person from whom property was wrongfully seized an expeditious remedy for its recovery.” As recently as 1961 this contention was rejected in People v Prieto, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d 62, at page 67, in which Mr. Justice Tobriner noted that although “as an original proposition, we might have doubted whether the language of the sections literally applied to an attempt of a defendant to suppress the evidence, rather than to regain it, we think the cases have clearly disposed of the issue. ... A belated change in the interpretation might well produce more confusion than clarification.” On May 31, 1961, this court denied a hearing in Prieto.
Again in People v. Marion (1961) supra, 197 Cal.App.2d 835, 838, it was categorically asserted that the “rule is well established that the issuance of a search warrant is a judicial act and that the only review of such an act is that sanctioned by sections 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code.” Not only did this court deny a hearing in Marion on February 7, 1962, but the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (370 U.S. 961).
People v. Keener (1961) 55 Cal.2d 714 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587], holds that a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the warrant at trial if he takes the required protective steps before trial, the asserted reason being that an appeal will not lie from denial of a motion to quash a warrant. While one might quarrel with that rationale, since prohibition could be sought in appellate courts in lieu of an appeal, stare decisis compels adherence to Keener. The rule should be limited, however, to the conclusion announced (at p. 720) : “Defendants, prior to the preliminary hearing, did all that could reasonably be expected of them to preserve their rights, and, under these circumstances, the adverse ruling upon the motion to quash *849the warrant did not preclude them from subsequently raising at the preliminary hearing their claim that the warrant was defective. ’ ’
In the instant case the defendant took no steps to preserve his rights. He made no motion to quash the warrant. He sought no writ of mandate for return or destruction of the property. He sought no writ of prohibition against use of the property at the trial. He made no motion to suppress or exclude the evidence. In short, he ignored all of the possible alternatives suggested in People v. Phillips, supra. Not until the trial did he seek to determine the facts underlying the issuance of the warrant.
The majority rely heavily, almost exclusively, on People v. Berger (1955) 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d 509], Factually, however, Berger is inapposite, for there the defendant prior to trial moved before the municipal court judge who issued the warrant, to quash the warrant. His motion was denied, so, still before trial, he sought a writ of mandate in the superior court, directing the municipal court to return the seized property. This was granted, the original warrant was quashed, and the records were returned. The problem discussed in the Berger opinion arose when the prosecutor attempted to introduce into evidence at the trial photostats of the records that had been returned pursuant to the court order. Obviously that issue could not have been reached prior to trial.
The majority see “no reason to adopt a different rule merely because evidence was obtained under a warrant.” But the point is, as I see it, that there is and should be a marked difference between evidence seized with and that taken without a warrant. As Chief Justice Gibson wrote in Keener (1961) supra, 55 Cal.2d 714, 723: “There is, of course, nothing novel in the view that law enforcement officials may be in a more favorable position where a warrant is obtained than where action is taken without a warrant. ’ ’
If a defendant may attack the sufficiency of the warrant at trial, without first following the procedures outlined in sections 1539 and 1540 and in the cases interpreting the sections, much of the ‘ ‘ favorable position where a warrant is obtained ’ ’ vanishes. My premonition is that hereafter there may he less frequent use of warrants by law enforcement officers, an unwholesome result for the administration of criminal justice.
I would affirm the orders.
McComb, J., concurred.