Court Opinion

ID: 9896095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 16:03:51.863919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:58.998642
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                              In re the Matter of:

                NICOLE IVY DEVLIN, Petitioner/Appellant,

                                        v.

         ANTHONY MATHEW KINGERY, Respondent/Appellee.

                           No. 1 CA-CV 23-0185 FC
                              FILED 11-09-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. FC2017-090943
               The Honorable Charlene D. Jackson, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Signature Law Group PLLC, Gilbert
By Bryan C. Shaw
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.
                       DEVLIN v. STATE/KINGERY
                          Decision of the Court

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1             Nicole Devlin (“Mother”) appeals the family court’s ruling
regarding legal decision-making and parenting time involving their minor
child. She argues that the family court lost jurisdiction over the case after
she filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights in the juvenile court.
We disagree, and for the following reasons, affirm.

                              BACKGROUND

¶2            In early 2018, Anthony Kingery (“Father”) filed a petition to
establish legal decision-making and parenting time. A year later, the parties
agreed on a parenting plan, which the family court entered as a final order.
Under the parenting plan, Mother had sole legal decision-making authority
and the parties shared equal parenting time.

¶3           In 2021, Mother learned Father was arrested for driving under
the influence with their child in the car. She filed a petition to modify
parenting time and requested emergency temporary orders. The family
court issued an ex parte order suspending Father’s parenting time on a
temporary basis, which it later affirmed at a temporary orders hearing.

¶4           The following year, Father filed a motion to set a trial on
Mother’s modification petition. During a hearing on his motion, Father
advised the family court that there was also a “matter in dependency
court.” Based on this information, the family court declined to set a trial
date.

¶5           In July 2022, Father filed an amended motion to set clarifying
that the juvenile court proceeding was not a dependency action. He also
affirmed that the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) was not
involved. He explained that Mother filed a “private” (i.e., not initiated by
DCS) petition to terminate his parental rights. The family court granted
Father’s amended motion and set the matter for trial.

¶6            Mother filed a motion to stay the family court matter until the
juvenile court ruled on her petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.
Father objected to the stay. In January 2023, the family court denied
Mother’s motion stating: “The Court has reviewed the Motion and finds
that [Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure] 5.1 applies to dependency and
family law matters. The juvenile matter at issue is a private severance and
is not a dependency.”

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                        DEVLIN v. STATE/KINGERY
                           Decision of the Court

¶7             A month after the January 2023 evidentiary hearing, the
family court issued a ruling awarding the parties joint legal decision-
making, with Mother having “presumptive decision-making authority” in
the event of a disagreement. The court ordered shared parenting time, with
Mother as the primary residential parent. Finally, the court advised Mother
that she could file a petition to vacate the family court orders if the juvenile
court terminated Father’s parental rights.1

¶8             Mother timely appeals the family court’s denial of her motion
to stay and its under advisement ruling.

                                 DISCUSSION

¶9             Mother argues that the family court lost jurisdiction to enter
legal decision-making and parenting-time orders as soon as it learned that
she filed a petition in the juvenile court to terminate Father’s parental rights
based on grounds of abandonment and neglect. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) &
(2). She also contends that because the family court lacked jurisdiction, it
erred by denying her motion to stay the family court proceedings pending
the juvenile court’s ruling.

¶10           We review the family court’s denial of a motion to stay for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Ott, 167 Ariz. 420, 428 (App. 1990). An abuse
of discretion occurs when the record is devoid of competent evidence to
support the decision, or when the court commits an error of law in the
process of reaching a discretionary conclusion. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48,
52, ¶ 19 (App. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

¶11           We review de novo subject matter jurisdiction as a question of
law. Beatie v. Beatie, 235 Ariz. 427, 430, ¶ 14 (App. 2014). Subject matter
jurisdiction is a “court’s statutory or constitutional power to hear or
determine a particular type of case.” State v. Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, 311,
¶ 14 (2010).

¶12           On appeal, Mother concedes that, although the juvenile court
has exclusive jurisdiction over concurrent family law and dependency
proceedings, there is no Constitutional or statutory provision providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court over concurrent family law and
private termination of parental rights proceedings. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 15;
A.R.S. § 8-202(B); Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 5.1; Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 323(a); see e.g.,

1    The Honorable Commissioner Keelan Bodow, Maricopa County
Superior Court, Juvenile Division, Case Number JS520316, denied Mother’s
termination petition on April 25, 2023.

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                       DEVLIN v. STATE/KINGERY
                          Decision of the Court

Rizik v. Jackson, 1 CA-SA 23-0132, 2023 WL 4948670, at *2, ¶ 10 (App. Aug.
3, 2023) (mem. decision) (affirming family court’s denial of a stay in the
family law proceedings when the mother filed a concurrent petition to
terminate the father’s parental rights in the juvenile court because neither
A.R.S. § 8-202(B) nor Rule 5.1 require such a stay).

¶13            Mother relies instead on McClendon v. Pima Cnty., 6 Ariz. App.
497 (1967), which involved inconsistent family court (child custody) and
juvenile court (delinquency adjudication) rulings. In that case, the family
court awarded the mother custody of the parties’ child, subject to the
father’s visitation rights. Id. at 497. Several years later, the juvenile court
adjudicated the child delinquent and placed her in the custody of her
mother and stepfather. Id. at 498. After learning of the child’s delinquency
adjudication, the father petitioned the family court for custody or, in the
alternative, for his sister to have custody. Id. The family court entered an ex
parte order granting immediate custody of the child to the paternal aunt. Id.
Two days later, the juvenile court affirmed the mother’s custody of the
child, ignoring the ex parte order from the family court because “the Juvenile
Court is exercising its exclusive jurisdiction” over the child who was
previously adjudicated as a delinquent child. Id.

¶14            On appeal, the McClendon court observed that under A.R.S.
§ 8-202(A), as it existed in 1967, the juvenile court had “[e]xclusive original
jurisdiction in all proceedings and matters affecting neglected, dependent,
incorrigible or delinquent children[.]” Id. at 499. Based on this statutory
authority, the court held that “when the juvenile court rightfully assumes
jurisdiction over a child, such jurisdiction is sufficiently ‘exclusive’ so that
hearings and orders as to the custody of that child in other judicial
proceedings are unauthorized.” Id. at 500.

¶15             Mother’s reliance on McClendon is misplaced. This case does
not involve a delinquency proceeding, and even under the 1967 version of
the statute, it is not clear that the term “neglected” children included a child
being properly cared for by one of his or her parents. Regardless, the current
version of A.R.S. § 8-202 no longer grants the juvenile court exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over “all proceedings and matters affecting
neglected” children. Compare A.R.S. § 8-202(A) (Laws 1941, Ch. 80, § 3) with
A.R.S. § 8-202(B) (Laws 2022, Ch. 112, § 2, formerly subsection (A)). The
statute now reads, “[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over all proceedings brought under the authority of this title except for
delinquency proceedings.” A.R.S. § 8-202(B) (emphasis added). Here, the
proceedings in family court involving legal decision-making and parenting
time were brought under Title 25. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A) (“The court shall

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                      DEVLIN v. STATE/KINGERY
                         Decision of the Court

determine legal decision-making and parenting time, either originally or on
petition for modification, in accordance with the best interests of the
child.”). The juvenile court’s exclusive original authority over proceedings
brought under the authority of Title 8—specifically, dependency
proceedings—is not implicated.

¶16            Further, the term “Juvenile court” as defined in A.R.S.
§ 8-201(21) only includes proceedings involving “delinquency, dependency
or incorrigibility.” The term “neglect” as defined in the same statute is tied
to the definition of “dependent child” and refers to neglect as a reason for
a child’s home being “unfit.” See A.R.S. § 8-201(15). Here there is no
allegation that the child is dependent and in need of intervention by the
State.

¶17            Mother argues that unless the juvenile court is given exclusive
jurisdiction in all concurrent family court and juvenile court proceedings,
neglected children will not be protected “through the primacy of the
Juvenile Court.” Her argument presumes that a “neglected” child is not
limited to a child neglected by both parents, and incorrectly assumes that
the family court is unable to address allegations of parental abuse and
neglect. See e.g., A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A)(11), -403.03(H), -410, & -411(A).

¶18            Mother argues that the juvenile court must have exclusive
jurisdiction in cases involving non-dependent children because otherwise
the family court could issue conflicting rulings. Because the family court
expressly directed Mother to file a petition to vacate the family court orders
if the juvenile court were to terminate Father’s parental rights, her
argument fails. And in any event, the juvenile court denied Mother’s
termination petition in April 2023.

¶19            Mother also asserts that two pending proceedings could
result in parenting time orders that would be confusing to the child. She
argues there is a possibility that the family court could order the child to
participate in visitation or reunification counseling with the non-custodial
parent, only to have the juvenile court terminate that parent’s parental
rights months later. But absent a termination order, a parent retains his or
her parental rights. A.R.S. § 1-602(D); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982). These rights include the right to petition the family court for legal
decision-making or parenting time orders. A.R.S. § 25-402(B). We will not
restrict these rights, or the family court’s authority to enter orders in the
child’s best interests, solely because one parent has filed a private
termination petition in the juvenile court.

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                     DEVLIN v. STATE/KINGERY
                        Decision of the Court

                             CONCLUSION

¶20           For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the family court
had jurisdiction to enter parenting time and legal decision-making orders,
and we affirm the court’s rulings.

                         AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                         FILED: TM

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