Court Opinion

ID: 9899870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:01:41.860793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.565309
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0478n.06

                                       Case No. 23-1005

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                    Nov 17, 2023
                                                   )
 MALORY ZAJDEL; ADAM ZAJDEL,
                                                   )                        KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
        Plaintiffs-Appellants,                     )
                                                   )      ON APPEAL FROM THE
                v.                                 )      UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                   )      COURT FOR THE EASTERN
 EXEL, INC., a Foreign Corporation, dba DHL        )      DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
 Supply Chain (USA); MATTHEW PAUL                  )
 BOHLAND,                                          )                               OPINION
        Defendants-Appellees.                      )
                                                   )

Before: WHITE, NALBANDIAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

       WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Malory and Adam Zajdel appeal the grant of

summary judgment in favor of Defendants DHL and Matthew Bohland in this action arising from

a car accident. Because we agree with Plaintiffs that the district court improperly decided a key

issue of material fact that should have been left to a jury, we REVERSE and REMAND for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                            I. Facts

       On a clear July morning, Malory Zajdel drove her car northbound on Van Dyke Avenue in

Warren, Michigan. Bohland, a DHL freight-truck driver, was in his truck at a nearby car dealership

where he made deliveries five times per week. Intending to make a left turn onto southbound Van

Dyke, he pulled out onto the road in front of Zajdel, blocking three lanes of northbound traffic.

Bohland had previously made the same left turn many times without incident. However, Zajdel

did not slow her car, and she hit the rear axle of Bohland’s trailer. The crash seriously damaged
Case No. 23-1005, Zajdel v. Exel

Zajdel’s vehicle, and first responders had to rescue her with the Jaws of Life. Zajdel sustained

numerous fractures, and an ambulance transported her to a local hospital for treatment.

       Zajdel and her husband, Adam Zajdel, filed suit against Bohland and DHL. The complaint

included one count alleging negligent operation of the truck and one count of loss of consortium.

Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that no reasonable juror

could find Bohland more at fault for the crash than Zajdel.1 The district court granted defendants’

motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no issue of material fact about whether

Zajdel was more than 50% at fault for the accident.2 Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that Zajdel’s

percentage of fault is for a jury to determine. We begin by reviewing the relevant evidence.

                                          A. The Collision

       Bohland had to cross three lanes of traffic to make the left-hand turn. His trailer was 48-

feet long—long enough to simultaneously block all three lanes of northbound traffic. In a

deposition, Bohland estimated that it took twenty to twenty-five seconds to cross the northbound

lanes from a complete stop, and he believed there was enough time to complete the turn before

Zajdel’s vehicle would reach his truck.

       According to a collision report, Zajdel was traveling at 43 miles per hour, in a 35-mile-per-

hour zone, and never braked, even seconds before the crash. The report concluded that the crash

would not have occurred if Zajdel had driven the speed limit or applied her brakes at any point.

1
  As we discuss in Section II.B., Michigan bars recovery for noneconomic damages when the
plaintiff is more than 50% at fault. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(2)(b) (2022).
2
 The parties do not significantly dispute the circumstances surrounding the accident. Instead, the
parties dispute Zajdel’s level of fault, which is usually a jury question. See Alfieri v. Bertorelli,
813 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Poch v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 456, 461 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1998).
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Case No. 23-1005, Zajdel v. Exel

       Zajdel did not see a speed-limit sign and had reason to think she was driving properly.

Most vehicles on the road traveled between 40 and 45 miles per hour, and a speed study found that

the 85th percentile speed—the benchmark for a speed limit in Michigan—was 46 miles per hour.

Zajdel was thus driving in line with most drivers. Because the speed limit just north of the crash

site was 45 miles per hour, it is possible that drivers believed the same speed applied to the entire

stretch of road. The two responding officers testified that Zajdel probably would not have received

a ticket because her speed was reasonable.

       The accident reconstruction report found that Bohland blocked Zajdel’s path for six

seconds, enough time for her to slow down. A truck traveled alongside Zajdel and braked in time

to avoid a collision. Robert Tharpe, the driver of the truck, testified that there was “plenty of time

to stop” and that he “couldn’t believe” Zajdel “did not even hit the brakes.” R. 15-3, PID 180.

Zajdel explained in a deposition that she did not see the trailer in time because she glanced down

for a few moments to check the time on her car’s dashboard, and when she looked up, she saw the

truck and “froze up.” R. 15-2, PID 172, 175–56. There is no evidence that Zajdel was using her

phone when the accident occurred.

       The responding officers did not ascribe fault for the accident. In a report Bohland filled

out for his employer, he responded to the question, “[h]ow can you avoid this type of accident in

the future,” by stating that he could “[g]ive more time when entering a 7 lane busy state highway.”

R. 15-6, PID 204. DHL concluded that Bohland had failed to follow proper procedures because

“there was not . . . enough distance between him and the incoming traffic” and gave him a written

warning. R. 15-8, PID 216. The report also indicated that Bohland had been disciplined for a

similar safety issue in 2017. In a deposition, Bohland’s supervisor agreed that Bohland had not

“allow[ed] sufficient spacial management for clearance of his turn.” Id.

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Case No. 23-1005, Zajdel v. Exel

                                     B. District Court Order

       In its order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court

concluded that “reasonable minds could not differ” on whether Zajdel was more than 50% at fault

for the accident. R. 18, PID 305. The court faulted Zajdel for speeding, then concluded that her

failure to take any evasive action “suggests she was driving while distracted.” Id. at 303. The

court found it particularly convincing that the accident occurred on a clear, bright day and that

Tharpe, the other truck driver, was able to stop his vehicle in time to avoid a collision. Finally,

because Bohland had made the same turn well over a thousand times, the district court reasoned

that he had enough experience to know when the turn was safe. On these facts, the court concluded

that there was no material issue of fact regarding whether Zajdel was more than 50% at fault for

the accident.

                                            II. Analysis

                                     A. Standard of Review

       We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Profit Pet v. Arthur

Dogswell, LLC, 603 F.3d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is proper if “the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A movant makes this showing by “citing to particular

parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Id. at 56(c)(1)(A). A

defendant moving for summary judgment bears “the burden of showing the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact as to at least one essential element of Plaintiff’s claim.” Logan v. Denny’s,

Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001).

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Case No. 23-1005, Zajdel v. Exel

       Once a defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, must identify

specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. Courts must accept the plaintiff’s

evidence as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and view “all facts and

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Id.

       On appeal, we will reverse a grant of summary judgment “if the nonmoving party has

presented evidence of specific facts, which, viewed in the most favorable light, indicates that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400, 410 (6th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). Here, reversal is

appropriate if a reasonable juror could apportion 50% or more of the fault to Bohland.

                             B. Negligence and Apportioning Fault

       Negligence is “conduct involving an unreasonable risk of harm.” Schultz v. Consumers

Power Co., 506 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Mich. 1993). It occurs when an individual breaches a legal

duty owed to another person. Id. To succeed in a negligence claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate

both cause in fact and proximate cause. See Ray v. Swager, 903 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Mich. 2017).

Cause in fact, also known as factual causation, requires a showing that the injury would not have

occurred “but for” the party’s actions. See id. Proximate cause, known as legal causation,

“involves examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a defendant should be held

legally responsible for such consequences.” Id. (quoting Skinner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d

475, 479 (Mich. 1994)). When an individual violates a state statute, there is a rebuttable

presumption of negligence. Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976). A party can

rebut the presumption if the surrounding circumstances provide a valid excuse or if the negligence

did not contribute to the injury. Id. at 276–77.

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        Generally, a determination of negligence is made by the finder of fact. See Davis v.

Thornton, 180 N.W.2d 11, 13–14 (Mich. 1970). The determination of negligence “may not be

prescinded from the fact finder except on a determination that all reasonable men would agree.”

Id. at 14.

        Michigan uses a comparative-negligence system, in which a plaintiff’s recovery at trial is

reduced by the proportion of the injury caused by the plaintiff’s own negligence. See Placek v.

City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 519–20 (Mich. 1979). A plaintiff may not recover

noneconomic damages if the plaintiff is more than 50% at fault.                Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 500.3135(2)(b) (2022). The relative fault of the parties is ordinarily a question for the jury. Poch

v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 456, 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). However, summary judgment is

appropriate if no reasonable juror could find that the defendant was at greater fault than the

plaintiff. Huggins v. Scripter, 669 N.W.2d 813, 813 (Mich. 2003). When parties present

conflicting accounts, the jury is responsible for “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts.” Wyatt, 999 F.3d at 410 (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)); accord People v. Mardlin, 790

N.W.2d 607, 618 (Mich. 2010).

                                    C. Disputed Issues of Fact

        Neither party denies partial fault for the accident. Instead, they dispute whether Zajdel was

more than 50% at fault. In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that no

reasonable juror could find Zajdel equally or less to blame than Bohland. However, the district

court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Zajdel and made key factual

determinations that should have been left to a jury.

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Case No. 23-1005, Zajdel v. Exel

       A key fact in dispute is the extent to which Zajdel’s speed contributed to the accident. The

speed limit was 35 miles per hour, but Zajdel did not remember seeing a speed-limit sign, and local

police could not confirm that there was one on her route. A speed study confirmed that most

drivers on the road traveled at speeds consistent with a higher speed limit. The district court did

not give Zajdel the benefit of reasonable inferences in her favor. Although the district court is

correct that a speed study alone is insufficient to establish a new speed limit, the study does provide

evidence that Zajdel’s speed was not unreasonable and Bohland should have been aware of the

speed of traffic.3 Taken in the light most favorable to Zajdel, a reasonable jury could conclude

that her driving above the speed limit was only marginally negligent.

       Another key fact in dispute is the extent to which Zajdel’s alleged distraction contributed

to the collision. A responding officer testified that he did not believe that a “momentary glance at

the clock” constituted distracted driving, but he also did not “think a momentary glance would

cause you to not see something that large in front of you.” R. 15-10, PID 231. Zajdel claimed that

she looked down at her dashboard clock for just “2 to 3 seconds” before the crash, R. 15-12, PID

248, and that after looking up, she was so shocked by the trailer that she “froze up” and could not

brake in time, R. 15-2, PID 176. When construing these facts in the light most favorable to Zajdel,

a reasonable juror could determine that she was not excessively distracted or that her distraction

was insufficient to allocate her more than 50% of the fault.

3
  Defendants argued in their motion to dismiss that Zajdel lost her right of way because she was
speeding, citing to a Michigan statute. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.649(7) (2022) (“The driver
of a vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed forfeits a right of way that the driver might otherwise
have under this section.”). However, Section 649 only regulates highway intersections. Id.
§ 257.649(1) (“The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to
a vehicle that has entered the intersection from a different highway.”). Defendants do not claim
that the accident occurred at a highway intersection, as defined by Michigan statute. See id.
§ 257.22.

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       Finally, the district court improperly deferred to Bohland’s version of events. Zajdel

argued below, with support from an expert witness, that Bohland violated state law when he made

his turn, thus supporting a presumption of negligence. Michigan law requires drivers to “yield the

right of way to vehicles approaching on the highway” before making a turn. Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 257.652(1) (2022). Zajdel argued that Bohland breached that duty because he did not give

himself enough time to complete the turn, citing the fact he was disciplined for that reason after

the crash. The district court rejected the argument, crediting Bohland’s experience instead.

Because Bohland had completed the same turn many times, the court concluded that he “would

have been well aware of how his tractor-trailer accelerated and the time it would have taken to

complete the turn.” R. 18, PID 305. The district court thus determined that Bohland was

“substantially less at fault than Zajdel.” Id. However, viewing the evidence in Zajdel’s favor, a

reasonable juror could conclude that Bohland violated section 257.652(1) by making a turn with

insufficient space and time, which would make him presumptively negligent.

       On this record, a reasonable jury could conclude that both Zajdel and Bohland were

negligent and that Bohland was at least 50% at fault. Defendants resist this conclusion, pointing

to nearly a dozen purportedly similar cases where summary judgment was granted. The cases,

mostly unpublished decisions from the Michigan Court of Appeals, do not help Defendants.

       The first group of cases were not resolved on grounds of comparative negligence. Rather,

summary judgment was granted in those cases because there was no evidence of negligence in the

first place, or any such evidence was minimal. Cecile v. Wang, No. 336881, 2018 WL 2990185,

at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 14, 2018) (holding that there was no evidence of negligence when a

driver hit a pedestrian who jaywalked across a busy five-lane road during rush hour on a rainy and

sleety evening, and any negligence would be “unquestionably” less than the plaintiff’s); see also

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Est. of Homrich by Homrich v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. 346583, 2020 WL 5739651, at *2

(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2020) (no evidence of negligence when one driver hit a small child who

emerged suddenly from behind a recycling bin while it was dark, and another hit the child while

the child was being attended to); Ascencio v. Snider, No. 316643, 2014 WL 4723830, at *2 (Mich.

Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2014) (driver was not negligent when he hit a bicyclist who cut across his line

of travel as he was exiting a lot after traffic had cleared); Davis v. Williams, No. 278713, 2008 WL

5101634, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2008) (driver did not act negligently when he hit a vehicle

that suddenly swerved into his lane); Almaswari v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 360612, 2023 WL

3140188, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2023) (the plaintiff could not rebut the presumption of

negligence when he rear-ended the defendant’s vehicle after she stopped to avoid a truck that

swerved into plaintiff and defendant’s lane).

        Defendants’ other cases undermine their argument and, if anything, support Plaintiffs’

position. For example, Defendants cite the Michigan Supreme Court case establishing that a

defendant may be entitled to summary disposition on the issue of comparative negligence.

Huggins, 669 N.W.2d at 813 (holding that recovery was precluded because the defendant driver

was less than 50% responsible when he hit a plaintiff who “was crouching or kneeling in the middle

of an unlit rural road in the middle of the night, just beyond the crest of a hill, wearing dark colored

clothing”). In Huggins, the court held that the defendant was less than 50% responsible even if he

looked away from the road for a few moments to check the time, like Zajdel did here. Id.

Defendants also cite Michigan Court of Appeals cases supporting summary judgment, but the court

held in those cases that drivers with the right of way were not more than 50% responsible, even if

they were speeding or could have slowed down to prevent a collision. See, e.g., O’Keefe v.

Landgraff, No. 327455, 2016 WL 4467486, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016) (holding that,

                                                   9
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even if speeding, a driver who struck a motorcyclist who entered her right of way without time for

her to stop could not be held more than 50% responsible); Duquette v. Reister, No. 316026, 2014

WL 2795878, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. June 19, 2014) (holding that the defendant was less than 50%

responsible for an accident—even if he could have slowed down in time to stop the collision—

because he had the right of way, drove with “reasonable caution,” and the plaintiff “darted” in

front of his vehicle); Harris v. Weaver, No. 265617, 2006 WL 2381435, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.

Aug. 17, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff was more than 50% responsible for the collision when

she crossed five lanes of traffic and drifted into the defendant’s lane, although the defendant bus

driver might have anticipated that the plaintiff would cross into her lane).

       In sum, Defendants’ cases support the contention that summary judgment is appropriate in

certain comparative-negligence cases but not in this one. There is no dispute that both drivers bear

significant responsibility—Bohland by turning into Zajdel’s right of way, and Zajdel by failing to

slow or stop. Under these circumstances, apportioning fault is not a determination for the district

court. Instead, the jury is responsible for making such determinations. Viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to Zajdel and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, a reasonable jury

could find that she was 50% or less at fault. Accordingly, the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment was improper.

                                         III. Conclusion

       For the reasons stated, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary judgment

for Defendants and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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