Court Opinion

ID: 9677476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:53:12.923235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:56.224767
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
{dissenting). The City of Madison is the only approving authority, sec. 236.10(l)(b), Stats., which has rejected the River Ridge Run revised preliminary plat. TTie Town of Westport Town Board and the Dane County Agriculture, Environment and Land Division Committee have each conditionally approved the plat. Many of their concerns — provision of public sewer and water services, erosion control and stormwater detention, and preservation of Cherokee Marsh — are reasons given by the City of Madison Common Council for rejecting the River Ridge Run plat. I conclude that these concerns may be satisfied by the subdivider; therefore, the common council may not reject the River Ridge Run preliminary plat. Its appropriate action is to approve the plat, subject to conditions. I therefore dissent.
An approving authority may reject a preliminary plat, sec. 236.11(l)(a), Stats., only if the authority cannot obtain compliance with the requirements set forth in sec. 236.13, Stats., by imposing conditions for obtaining its approval. A preliminary plat is an offer submitted to the approving authority "for purposes of preliminary consideration." Section 236.02(9), Stats.
The idea behind the preliminary plat procedure is to allow the subdivider to submit a tentative plat to the approving authority to learn what objections the authority may have. The subdivider is then entitled to *820an opportunity to correct, if possible, any objections an approving authority or objecting agency may have. This scheme was enacted by the legislature to meet concerns expressed to the Advisory Committee on Subdivision and Platting and the Judiciary Committee of the Wisconsin Legislative Council when ch. 236, Stats., was studied and revised in 1955. See Report of the Wisconsin Legislative Council, Volume IV, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Judiciary Committee on the Subdivision and Platting of Land (Jan. 1955). The judiciary committee and its advisory committee devoted most of their time to evaluating the burdens placed upon the subdivider with particular regard to the individual's right to the use of his or her land. Id. at 18 (Objective V). The judiciary committee noted that: "It is the practice of subdividers to submit preliminary plats to approving bodies prior to the preparation of a final plat to determine if the subdivider's proposed plan meets with the approval of the approving body before the expensive final plat is prepared." Id. at 19. The judiciary committee further stated that: "The purpose of a preliminary plat is to assure the subdivider that he is proceeding in an acceptable manner before he spends the money to have a final plat made. Present statutes require that the preliminary plat... comply with the same requirements as a final plat. This defeats the purpose of having a preliminary plat." Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
I conclude, therefore, that the trial court's order should be reversed and this matter remanded to the common council with directions that it fashion appropriate conditions upon which final approval will be conditioned. Of course, if the council determines that its concerns cannot be met by the subdivider because the land is unsuitable for development, the council may *821reject a preliminary or final plat for that reason. I do not believe the council had as yet made that determination. If the common council prohibits the division of River Ridge Run under sec. 236.45(2), Stats, (subdivision ordinance "may prohibit the division of land in areas where such prohibition will carry out the purposes of this section [236.45]"), River Ridge Joint Venture could maintain an action for inverse condemnation under sec. 32.10, Stats., if it believed it had been deprived of all, or practically all, economic use of its land. See Reel Enters. v. City of La Crosse, 146 Wis. 2d 662, 671, 431 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972)); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. —, —, 120 L.Ed.2d 798, 813 (1992) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
For the reasons I have expressed, I dissent.