Court Opinion

ID: 9745065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:31:52.511425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:43.234027
License: Public Domain

*531MOSK, J.
I concur.
A contract claim is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim and should not be preempted unless the contract claim is based upon the enforcement or determination of federal copyright law. Thus, I do not agree with the majority’s “fact-specific analysis” to determine the existence of preemption.
I concur in the majority’s determination in this case as to the noncontractrelated claims. I also concur in the majority’s conclusion with respect to the contract and contract-related claims because the pleadings of those causes of action are deficient. The allegations in the complaint show that in some instances plaintiffs did not have a contractual relationship with defendants in connection with the musical properties. It appears that in some instances the transferors just transferred whatever rights they had; plaintiffs did not plead explicitly that they had all rights in the properties. Plaintiffs did not plead that there was any promise or agreement, express or implied, that defendants would not use the properties. It is unclear if the copyrights were transferred or whether plaintiffs owned them. It is also unclear if the alleged breaches of contracts are based on defendants’ violations of copyrights or of other contractual obligations.
Thus, based on these deficiencies, plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim. On this ground I agree with the affirmance of the judgment on the pleadings as to the purported contract and contract-related claims.
I do not believe that the “fact-specific analysis” applied by the majority should be employed to determine whether or not there is preemption. Many court decisions do not support the majority’s formulation. (See, e.g., Lipscher v. LRP Publications, Inc. (11th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1305, 1318-1319 (Lipscher); Expediters Intern, v. Direct Line Cargo Management (D.N.J. 1998) 995 F.Supp. 468, 483 (Expediters); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 935 F.Supp. 425, 438-441 (Architectronics); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (7th Cir. 1996) 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-1455 (ProCD); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber (5th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (Taquino); see also Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment (D.N.J. 2002) 210 F.Supp.2d 552, 565-566 (Video Pipeline) [citing with approval some of the above cases but finding an additional obligation as the “extra element”].)
Moreover, the legislative history of the federal copyright law, a history that is “puzzling and unreliable,” does not support the “fact-specific analysis.” (Architectronics, supra, 935 F.Supp. at p. 440; see also ibid., quoting *532Note, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association: The Right of Publicity in Game Performances and Federal Copyright Preemption (1989) 36 UCLA L.Rev. 861, 879 [“ ‘Section 301(b)’s legislative history is a source of controversy and ambiguity, rather than a helpful guide to determining which rights Congress intended as not equivalent’ ”]; National Car Rental v. Computer Associates (8th Cir. 1993) 991 F.2d 426, 433-434 (National Car Rental) [“we believe in this case the facts surrounding the deletion of § 301(b)(3) suggest Congress did not intend to reverse the presumption of non-preemption for the examples initially included in § 301(b)(3)”]; Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 601 F.Supp. 1523, 1533; Factors, etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 496 F.Supp. 1090, 1096-1097, revd. on other grounds (2d. Cir. 1981) 652 F.2d 278.) Additionally, the “fact-specific analysis” is not easily workable, for it entails an evaluation in each case of the nature of the claims. Also, the “fact-specific analysis” broadens the application of preemption, a doctrine that deprives a party of state contract remedies and infringes on state sovereignty without any discernible benefit.
A widely used authority, Nimmer on Copyright, states that “[A] breach of contract action (whether such contract involves a mere idea or a fully developed literary work) is not predicated upon a right that is ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. . .’ This for the reason that a contract right may not be claimed unless there exists an element in addition to the mere acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display. That additional element is a promise (express or implied) upon the part of the defendant.” (4 Nimmer on Copyright (2002) The Law of Ideas, § 16.04[C], p. 16-25, ins. omitted (Nimmer).)
Professor Paul Goldstein, in his highly regarded work on copyright, presents an even broader concept of the contract exemption from federal copyright preemption. He states, “Contract law is a good example of a state law that will be immune from preemption under the extra element test. Contract law may be employed to prohibit the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, performance or display of a work. But, in addition to these acts, contract law requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a bargained-for exchange—something it need not prove in a cause of action for copyright infringement.” (3 Goldstein, Copyright (2002 supp.) § 15.2.1, p. 15:12.)
A number of courts have stated that contract claims are qualitatively distinct from copyright infringement and therefore are not preempted. (See, e.g., Video Pipeline, supra, 210 F.Supp.2d at pp. 566-567; Lipscher, supra, 266 F.3d at pp. 1318-1319; Expediters, supra, 995 F.Supp. at p. 483; Architectronics, supra, 935 F.Supp. at pp. 438-441; ProCD, supra, 86 F.3d at *533pp. 1453-1455; Taquino, supra, 893 F.2d at p. 1501; cf. Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Exp. Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 621 F.Supp. 981, 985-986; Rokos v. Peck (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 604, 617-618 [227 Cal.Rptr. 480].)1 Admittedly, not all of these authorities are clear, and the theories differ. (Compare ProCD, 86 F.3d at p. 1454 [citing Taquino, National Car Rental and Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz (4th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 923, 926 for the proposition that rights created by contract are not equivalent to copyright protection], with 1 Nimmer, supra, § 1.01[B][l][a] at p. 1-20 [asserting that these cases are fact-specific].) Nimmer focuses on the promise in the contract not to use the rights transferred as the additional element necessary to distinguish the contract claim from a copyright claim, while Professor Goldstein points to the bargained-for exchange as that additional element. Judge Easterbrook in ProCD, supra, 86 F.3d at page 1454, bases his conclusion that rights created by contract are not equivalent to the rights covered by copyright and therefore are not preempted because copyright rights are created by law, while a contract is created by and between the parties. He states that a “copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’ ” (Ibid.)
Because of these variations, Nimmer has pointed out “that the rule safeguarding contract causes of action against copyright pre-emption is less than categorical.” He adds, however, that “the vast majority of contract claims will presumably survive scrutiny . . . ,”2 (1 Nimmer, supra, § 1.01 [B][l][a] at p. 1-22, in. omitted.)
In my view, a claim that the reproduction or use of expressive material breaches a contract should not be preempted on the ground that the breach also violates the copyright law unless resort to the substantive federal copyright law is required in order to ascertain the rights of the parties under the contract. This approach resolves the dilemma presented by the court in Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp. (C.D.Cal. 2000) 96 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1060, in which the court observed that sometimes a promise is not an additional element, but is inextricable from the copyright—for instance, if a *534defendant promised not to infringe a copyright. In that instance, because the determination of the parties’ rights would require deciding whether copyright infringement had occurred, the contract claim would be preempted.

In National Car Rental, supra, 991 F.2d at page 434, footnote 6, the court said, “Because we decide that the specific contract right CA seeks to enforce is not equivalent to any of the copyright rights, we do not need to decide whether a breach of contract claim based on a wrongful exercise of one of the exclusive copyright rights is preempted.”

Nimmer goes on to state that “. . . nonetheless pre-emption should continue to strike down claims that, though denominated ‘contract,’ nonetheless complain directly about the reproduction of expressive materials.” (1 Nimmer, supra, § 1.01 [B][l][a] at p. 1-22, fii. omitted.) This statement appears to be inconsistent with other pronouncements in the work. (See 4 Nimmer, supra, § 16.04[C], p. 16-25, fn. omitted.)