Court Opinion

ID: 9833776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:00:58.146534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.603116
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The motion challenges the statement made that the facts warranted the conclusion of the trial court, as involved in his judgment, that the “entire debt” of appellant was contracted after the death of the testator. It is doubtful that we are warranted in saying that the “entire debt” was contracted after the death of the testator. The testimony of a member of the appellant company was that “at the time of the elder Copeland’s death he was indebted to Eisenstadt in the sum of about $2,300.” It is not clear that the other evidence contradicted this statement of the witness. So this left the evidence as showing that of the $9,000 sued for $2,300 of the amount was a debt owing by the testator. Being a creditor of the testator to that amount, and assuming that John Copeland had the power under the will, without being joined by the other executors, to undertake to run the jewelry business to produce funds to pay off creditors, and as an incident of such power incurred the further debt of appellant as a debt against the estate, the appellant conld perhaps predicate a right to recover of the executors individually for a misappropriation or devastavit, if any, of the estate. Therefore the ruling of the court complained of should be considered from the further ground of whether the appellant was entitled on the verdict of the jury to a judgment against the executors individually for misappropriation or devastavit of the estate.
The one question presented on the appeal, as stated before, is as to whether the verdict of the jury on special issues required the court, on the motion of appellant, to enter judgment for appellant against the executors individually.
[4] This assignment does not call into question the evidence nor sufficiency of the same to support the verdict, nor sufficiency of the evidence to support the conclusions of the court as involved in his judgment; and, consequently this court is not empowered to pass upon such questions. We can only pass upon the ruling complained of from the findings of the jury as recorded in their verdict. In order to hold the executors individually liable for misappropriation or devastavit, it devolved upon appellant, assuming it to be *716a creditor of the estate, to show a misappropriation or devastavit. The verdict shows material issues submitted to the jury. The question was ashed the jury how much did the estate of D. Copeland owe at the time of his death in 1903; and the jury failed to answer, stating that “4” stood for $10,000, and “8” stood for $14,000. The amount owing was a material question in determining whether there had been a misapplication, and was an issue. The evidence must have been conflicting or the jury would not reasonably have differed. The next question asked the jury was how much was realized from the sale of real estate; and the jury made answer, “Wte cannot agree.” This was a material issue in determining misappropriation or devastavit against the executors; and we must assume, as it was, that the evidence in this respect was in conflict. The jury was asked the further question of how much indebtedness of the Copeland estate has been paid by the executors; and the jury made the answer thereto, “Unable to assess the amount paid to creditors.” The answer indicates either an uncertainty of evidence to decide the question, or such conflict as to make disagreement of decision by them. The jury was further asked to state the total indebtedness paid by the executors and to whom paid, and they answered, “Unable to answer.” The jury was asked to state whether the estate became insolvent after the death of the testator; and they disagreed on answer, stating they stood evenly divided for and against.
[5] As the verdict was received in the above replies, and as the issues unanswered were material and the evidence conflicting, it must be assumed, in view of the motion, that the parties consented that, instead of the jury, the court make decision of fact on such issues. It therefore devolved upon the court to further make decision of fact on issues made by the pleadings and the evidence. So, assuming that appellant was a creditor of the estate, and as such could predicate the right to recover of the executors individually for devastavit, if any were shown, it could not be said that the appellant has shown that the verdict of the jury as recorded in their findings required the court to enter a judgment thereon against the executors individually.
[6] Before it would be error for the court to refuse to render a judgment for a particular party exclusively on the verdict of the jury on special issues, it must appear from the verdict itself that all issues of fact made by the pleadings and the evidence were determined, and that such party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law solely on such findings. As the unanswered issues submitted to the jury remained for decision by the court, the court, as within his power, was warranted in refusing judgment against the executors individually on the special verdict as returned and received. This answer disposes of the assignment, and consequently under the statute ends the further power of this court.
The statement appears in the original opinion that the jury made the finding that the two executors did not deem it best to continue the jewelry business. This is inaccurate, and is here corrected.
Appellant in its motion asks that the facts in support of the several contentions be given. It was not deemed material, in view of the assignment requiring us to assume all findings by the jury and court proven, to completely set out the facts nor to make statement covering all the contentions. In deference to the motion, however, we adopt and add, if necessary, the findings of the jury and the findings involved in the judgment of the court, to make the statement of the case complete.
The motion for rehearing is denied.