Court Opinion

ID: 9457036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:10:41.634549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:11.797183
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
With deference, I think this court, like the trial judge, has usurped the jury’s function in assessing the credibility of witnesses. The testimony in this case was in conflict concerning the critical questions of the speed of the bus and the speed of the pedestrian just prior to the collision. That conflict was both serious and substantial, and the jury’s resolution was crucial to the issue of liability. I agree with appellant that the evidence of the bus driver’s negligence was sufficient to raise a jury question, and that the trial judge erroneously refused to instruct the jury that contributory negligence is no bar to recovery if the driver has the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident.
For the purpose of reviewing this judgment, we must of course consider the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant. Shewmaker v. Capital Transit Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 143 F.2d 142 (1944). It is undisputed that Mr. Law had crossed more than twenty feet of Eye Street before he was seen by the bus driver. It is also undisputed that his entire path was visible to the driver from the time the driver turned into Eye Street.1 If, as Mr. Law testified, he was walking at about two miles an hour, then he was in the street, within the driver’s field of vision, for some seven seconds before he was seen. On that basis the jury could well find that the driver was negligent in failing to keep a lookout adequate to spot pedestrians in the street ahead of him.2
*996It was of course open to the jury to discredit Mr. Law, and to believe the driver’s testimony that Mr. Law ran into the street. If the pedestrian entered the driver’s field of vision suddenly, then there would be no basis for the conclusion that the driver failed to keep an adequate lookout.3 But the resolution of that conflict in the testimony is for the jury, and not for the trial judge or the appellate court. I do not find it “inherently incredible” that Mr. Law was walking slowly after a few drinks on a rainy night, and I see no basis for setting aside his testimony on that ground. I do not suggest that the evidence of the driver’s negligence was so strong that it compels a finding of liability. But in my view the evidence clearly permits such a finding, and our jurisprudence entrusts the decision on that matter to the jury. Mr. Law should not be barred from recovery by this court’s speculation that the jury may have based its verdict on a general attitude toward corporate bus companies, rather than on permissible inferences from the evidence.
If the jury found that Mr. Law’s own negligence contributed to the accident,4 they could have found further that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision, either by slowing down or by sounding his horn.5 Therefore, it was error for the trial judge to grant the motion for judgment n. o. v. on the ground that the evidence conclusively established the negligence of appellant.
Since the trial judge wisely submitted this case to the jury instead of directing a verdict at the close of the evidence, it would be possible simply to reinstate the verdict and thereby avoid a new trial.6 However the judge also granted appel-lee’s alternative motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. That motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which appellate courts are reluctant to disturb on appeal.7 Because that ruling may have *997been based in part on the erroneous view that the doctrine of last clear chance is inapplicable to the facts of this ease, I would remand the ease for reconsideration of the ruling on the motion for a new trial. And if a new trial were granted, then I would require the jury to be instructed that contributory negligence is no bar to recovery if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.

. The driver testified that despite the weather conditions, he could see for at least half a block ahead of him. Mr. Law’s path was at all points less than half a block from the corner at which the bus entered Eye Street.

. Kuzminsky v. Woodard, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 238, 307 F.2d 195 (1962); Tyler v. *996Starke, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 42, 128 F.2d 611 (1942); Heurich Brewing Co. v. McGavin, 56 App.D.C. 389, 16 F.2d 334 (1926); Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Blum, 54 App.D.C. 357, 298 F. 679 (1924).

. See Robinson v. City Express, Inc., 112 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 298 F.2d 677 (1962) (pedestrian emerged from behind oncoming traffic) ; Capital Transit Co. v. Gamble, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 160 F.2d 283 (1947) (child darted out from behind furniture on sidewalk) ; Mackall v. Washington Gas Light Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 147 F.2d 149, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 869, 65 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed. 1988 (1945) (pedestrian overtook truck from right rear, out of driver’s normal range of vision).

. As the majority points out, there is evidence tending to show that appellant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. In addition, it may be some evidence of negligence that appellant was crossing a street in the middle of the block. See D. C. Motor Vehicle Regs. § 53(a). Finally, the jury, like the majority of this court, may have discredited appellant’s statement that he looked both ways before crossing, and found that he failed to exercise reasonable care in that regard.

. See Capital Transit Co. v. Garcia, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 194 F.2d 162 (1952); Boaze v. Windridge & Handy, 70 App.D.C. 24, 102 F.2d 628 (1939); Reid v. Lyon, 278 F.Supp. 855 (D.D.C.1967); and cases cited note 2 supra. But see Faucett v. Bergmann, 57 App.D.C. 290, 22 F.2d 718 (1927). See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479-480 (1965). The traffic regulations of the District of Columbia provide:
[Ejvery driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.
D. C. Motor Vehicle Regs. § 54.

. Morse v. Moretti, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 403 F.2d 564 (1968); 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 50.03 (1969).

. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 254, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940); Binder v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass’n of America, 165 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1948).