Court Opinion

ID: 9838621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 08:10:30.87448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:50.886135
License: Public Domain

In The
                                    Court of Appeals
                           Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                   No. 07-22-00321-CR

                       ARMOND JORDAN SMITH, APPELLANT

                                            V.

                                THE STATE OF TEXAS

                       On Appeal from the 46th Judicial District Court
                                 Hardeman County, Texas,
                 Trial Court No. 4506, Honorable Dan Mike Bird, Presiding

                                    August 31, 2023
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

      Appellant, Armond Jordan Smith, was charged by indictment with the murder of

Anaja Griffin-McNeal. After he was found competent to stand trial, a jury found him guilty

of the charged offense and assessed punishment at confinement in prison for 75 years.

Appellant challenges his conviction through six issues. We affirm.
                                              Background

The Death of Anaja Griffin-McNeal

        On January 14, 2021, Appellant and Anaja Griffin-McNeal were seen sitting in a

Dodge Charger at the gas pump of a Quanah, Texas, convenience store. After they

remained for more than 30 minutes, employees contacted law enforcement, who

instructed Appellant and Anaja1 to go to a nearby truck stop if they intended to sleep. An

officer observed the vehicle parked at the truck stop a few hours later.

        The next morning, Deputy Craig Hodgkins with the Hardeman County Sheriff’s

Department responded to a request for a welfare check on a Dodge Charger at the truck

stop. After he received no response to his knock on the car’s window, Hodgkins opened

the door and found Anaja’s body in the driver’s seat. Hodgkins testified he believed Anaja

had suffered a fatal gunshot to the head.

Appellant’s Inculpatory Statements

        Hodgkins found Appellant stirring in the passenger seat. Appellant appeared to

be suffering from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. EMS was called, and

Appellant was able to stand. He was handcuffed. Hodgkins found a handgun on the front

passenger side floorboard near where Appellant had been.

        Appellant was transported to the emergency department of Hardeman County

Hospital. As he was being moved from the ambulance’s stretcher to a bed, Appellant

        1 For clarity, we will refer to the decedent, Anaja Griffin-McNeal, and her cousin, Marquise Griffin,

by their first names.

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twice blurted out to the hospital’s staff, “I shot them, I did it.” Appellant also allegedly told

a treating nurse practitioner, “I shot her.”

       Appellant was transferred to University Medical Center in Lubbock. During a

psychiatric interview, Appellant told an evaluator that his gunshot wound was self-inflicted

and that “he wanted to end his life with a gunshot.”

The Forensic Investigation

       Two officers with the Texas Rangers conducted an investigation at the truck stop

about 90 minutes after Anaja’s body was discovered. The Rangers saw no evidence of

an attempted robbery or of a third party’s involvement. The two took photos and collected

DNA from blood stains on the exterior of the vehicle and from the parking lot.

       Inside the vehicle, the Rangers recovered the Glock handgun discovered by

Hodgkins, as well as three casings and two spent bullets. One bullet was recovered from

inside the vehicle’s console; the other was discovered beneath the driver’s seat. The

Rangers also found a “perforating defect” in the car’s roof where they believe a third bullet

passed. A forensic scientist with the DPS crime lab opined that the recovered projectiles

were fired from the gun found in the vehicle.

       Four DNA samples from the recovered handgun were all found to originate from a

single individual. The jury heard testimony that Anaja was not the contributor of the DNA,

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but that Smith was the likely contributor. Other samples taken at the crime scene similarly

suggested that Smith was the likely contributor of the DNA.

       Based on his investigation, Ranger Matt Kelly opined that Anaja was asleep,

leaning on her right hip with her head resting atop her arm on the vehicle’s center console,

when she was shot. A medical examiner with the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s

Office who performed Anaja’s autopsy opined that the bullet entered Anaja’s right

forehead, traveled through the corpus callosum connecting the two brain hemispheres,

and exited on the back left side of her head/neck. Soot and stippling observed near the

entrance wound suggested the shot was fired from a distance of one to two feet from

Anaja’s body.    The pathologist concluded that the manner of Anaja’s death was a

homicide caused by a gunshot wound to the head.

                                         Analysis

Sufficiency of the Competency Trial Evidence

       In his first issue, Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support a

jury’s finding that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Under Texas law, a defendant

is presumed competent to stand trial and bears the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that he is incompetent. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(b);

Freeman v. State, No. 07-10-00219-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7759, at *12 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Sept. 28, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have “sufficient present

ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or

possess “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the

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person.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a). Evidence relevant to competence

to stand trial probes whether the defendant is capable of: (1) understanding the charges

against him and the potential consequences of the pending criminal proceedings, (2)

disclosing to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind, (3) engaging in a

reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, (4) understanding the adversarial nature

of criminal proceedings, (5) exhibiting appropriate courtroom behavior, and (6) testifying.

Freeman, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7759, at *12–13 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

46B.024). We will reverse the jury’s competency determination only if the finding is so

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.

Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

       We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the jury’s competency finding was

against the great weight of the evidence or unjust. The evidence supporting Appellant’s

competence came, in part, from the testimony and expert report of Timothy Nyberg,

Ph.D., a psychologist. Consistent with each of the factors articulated in Freeman, Nyberg

opined that despite Appellant’s head injury from the gunshot, Appellant demonstrated

sufficient capacity to understand the proceedings and communicate with his attorney. We

overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Guilty Verdict

       By his second issue, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the

verdict finding him guilty of murder. The Texas Penal Code provides that a person

commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an

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individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1). At trial, the court charged the jury with

an instruction tracking the statute.

       Our sufficiency determination is directed by the familiar standard of Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).2 Reviewing the

evidence under the proper standard, we conclude the evidence shows that on January

14, 2021, Anaja was killed by a gunshot to the head fired at close range. Opinion

testimony told the jury about how the deadly bullet traveled through Anaja’s head.

Appellant and Anaja were the only occupants of the vehicle in which her body was found.

Spent bullets from the recovered gun were found in the vehicle; DNA on the gun was

linked to Appellant.

       In addition, the jury heard testimony that Appellant made multiple admissions of

being the shooter and that his own gunshot wound was self-inflicted. Based on this

evidence, we conclude a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt

that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Anaja. Appellant’s second

issue is overruled.

Evidence Regarding Appellant’s Confessions to Health Care Workers

       By his third and sixth issues, Appellant argues the statements he made at the

Hardeman County Hospital were the product of custodial interrogation conducted in

violation of the United States Constitution’s protections against self-incrimination3 and

        2 For a more in-depth discussion, see Teague v. State, 626 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2021, no pet.).
       3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

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Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.4 Appellant’s complaint pertains

to Appellant’s three statements that he “shot them” and/or “shot her.” Hodgkins testified

that at the crime scene, Appellant had been handcuffed and was “being detained” before

being transported to the hospital.

       In his third issue, Appellant reasons that because he was never warned of the right

to remain silent or the right to counsel after he was handcuffed, the trial court abused its

discretion5 in admitting the statements into evidence. We disagree. Our Court of Criminal

Appeals has held that being placed in custody does not trigger a defendant’s right to make

incriminating statements with impunity. See Elizondo v. State, 382 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012); Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Rather, the rights afforded defendants against self-incrimination only pertain to instances

in which the defendant is under custodial interrogation. In Miranda, the United States

Supreme Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody.” 384 U.S. at 444.

Similarly, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22 applies to statements made by

an accused as a result of custodial interrogation. In other words, these protections

generally apply “only to questioning by law enforcement officers or their agents.”

Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

       It is true that the health care workers who heard Smith’s outbursts about being the

shooter may have been government employees (i.e., employees of Hardeman County).

       4 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a).

       5 Again, the standard for assessing the trial court’s discretion in admitting such evidence is well-

established. See Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

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But that does not automatically make them agents of the state for purposes of our

analysis.       Wilkerson, 173 S.W.3d at 528.                When it held that employees with Child

Protective Services were not necessarily agents of the state for Miranda or Article 38.22

purposes, the Court of Criminal Appeals had this to say:

           Our law recognizes that different types of state employees serve different
           roles. It is law enforcement’s job to ferret out crime, investigate its
           commission, arrest the perpetrator, and gather evidence for a possible
           prosecution. In pursuing this legitimate goal, the police might be tempted
           to use physical coercion or other illegitimate methods to gather a
           confession. The Supreme Court was concerned with this particular power
           imbalance and the resulting inherently coercive interactions when it devised
           the Miranda warnings.

Id. at 528.

           In the present case, there is no evidence that the health care workers to whom

Appellant made his remarks were serving as law enforcement officers. There is likewise

no evidence they were acting in tandem or “in cahoots” with law enforcement. Elizondo,

382 S.W.3d at 394 (applying three-part test announced in Wilkerson to hold that loss

prevention officer was not cloaked with actual or apparent authority to investigate on

behalf of police).6 We therefore overrule Appellant’s third issue.

           In his sixth issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion7 when

refusing to include in the jury charge instructions pertaining to his hospital statements as

the person who “shot them” or “shot her.” The trial court refused each of Appellant’s

           6 The three factor test looks at (1) the relationship between the police and the potential police agent,
(2) the interviewer’s actions and perceptions, and (3) the defendant’s perceptions of the encounter. Id.
(citing Wilkerson, 173 S.W.3d at 530–31).
           7 See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (discussing standard of

review).

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requested instructions, explaining it previously found the statements “were noncustodial

statements, and that they were admissible.” For the reasons discussed above, we agree

with the trial court. We therefore conclude the trial court properly exercised discretion in

denying Appellant’s requested instructions. Appellant’s sixth issue is overruled.

Admission of Hearsay Statement as Excited Utterance

       In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing

Marquise, to testify of Anaja’s hearsay during a one-to-two-minute telephone call in

November 2020. Anaja and Appellant began dating in the late summer of 2020 when she

moved to Houston to attend college. During the November telephone call with Marquise,

Anaja appeared to be very upset:

       She was loud, she was yelling, her voice was trembling. She was -- I don't
       want to say hyperventilating, but she was -- she was breathing heavily like
       -- you know, she was very -- her voice was frantic. It was shaky. It was --
       it was -- she was crying. It was obvious.

Anaja told Marquise she was in fear of Appellant. Then, apparently because Appellant

returned to her presence, Anaja terminated the call. At a hearing outside the presence

of the jury, the trial court overruled Appellant’s hearsay objection, finding it met the

exception as an excited utterance under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2).

       We hold that the trial court did not reversibly err in permitting the jury to hear this

testimony. The excited utterance exception pertains to statements “relating to a startling

event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it

caused.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(2). The critical test here is whether Anaja was still dominated

by the emotion caused by the startling event when she spoke. See Coble v. State, 330

                                              9
S.W.3d 253, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The context of the call reasonably suggested

to the trial court, as it did to Marquis, that Anaja was communicating fears related to the

condition she was under at the time.        Marquis’ description of Anaja’s voice – loud,

trembling voice, frantic, crying, and shaking, all support a conclusion that Anaja was still

under the stress of excitement caused by her argument with Appellant. We believe this

evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement about whether the excited

utterance exception was appropriate. Appellant’s fourth issue is overruled.

Rule 403 Objection to Medical Examiner’s Opinions

       By his fifth issue, Appellant assert’s that the probative value of the medical

examiner’s testimony as to the manner and cause of Anaja’s death was substantially

outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

       Stacy Murthy, M.D., testified that the cause of Anaja’s death was a gunshot wound

to the head and the manner of death was a homicide. Appellant objected to these

opinions claiming they were more prejudicial than probative. The trial court overruled

Appellant’s Rule 403 objection finding the probative value of Dr. Murthy’s testimony

outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.

       Texas Rule of Evidence 403 provides in part that relevant evidence may be

excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair

prejudice . . . .” TEX. R. EVID. 403. “‘Probative value’ refers to the inherent probative force

of an item of evidence -- that is, how strongly it serves to make more or less probable the

existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation -- coupled with the proponent’s need

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for that item of evidence. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

         In this case, the medical examiner’s opinions were relevant to establishing the

State’s theory that Anaja died of a gunshot fired at close range from within the vehicle.

Appellant offers nothing to support his argument that “[t]he Court will see upon reviewing

the record that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the

prejudicial effect to Appellant.” Nor do we find any: Rule 403 specifically seeks to address

the danger of unfair prejudice. Otherwise, any evidence suggesting a defendant’s guilt

would be subject to the rule.

         The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Appellant’s

fifth issue is overruled.

                                        Conclusion

         Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

                                                         Lawrence M. Doss
                                                             Justice

Do not publish.

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