Court Opinion

ID: 9766944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:03:59.456301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:27.383890
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Justice
(dissenting).
I would hold the Highway Commission had the power and authority to pass Minute Order 48644, and that this is a suit against the state. I would, therefore, dismiss this cause.
The Legislature, in creating the Highway Commission, provided as follows:
Article 6663 : “The administrative control of the State Highway Department * ' * * shall be vested in the State Highway Commission * * *.” All references to statutes in this opinion are to Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes, unless otherwise indicated.
Article 6665: “ * * * They [the Commission] shall formulate plans and policies for the location, construction and maintenance of a comprehensive system of State highways and public roads. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
Article 6666: “The Commission shall establish and make public proclamation of all rules and regulations for the conduct of the work of the [State Highway] Department as may be deemed necessary, not inconsistent with the provisions of law. * * ”
Article 6667; “ * * * It [the Department] shall investigate and determine the methods of road construction best adapted to the different sections of the State, and shall establish standards for the construction and maintenance of highways, bridges and ferries, giving due regard to all natural conditions and to the character and adaptability of road building material in the different counties.”
Article 6674k: “The State Highway Commission shall prescribe the form of such contracts [for work on state highways and public roads] and may include therein such matters as they may deem advantageous to the State. * * *" (Emphasis added).
In the case of Robbins v. Limestone County (1925), 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, this court said:
“The establishment of public highways being primarily a function of government belonging to the state, the right to establish them resides primarily in the Legislature, and, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, the Legislature may exercise that right direct or delegate it to a political subdivision of the state, or to such other agency or instrumentality, general or local in its scope, as it may determine. * * * The Legislature may exercise possession of public roads and control over them, by and through such agencies as it may designate.” 268 S.W. 918(5) (Citing authorities.)
Also, this court said:
“We do not deem it necessary to state the provisions of the highway statutes. They do, of course, create an agency in which are vested powers to formulate and execute plans and policies for the location, construction and maintenance of a comprehensive system of state highways and public roads.” 268 S.W.2d col. p. 920. (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Nairn et al. v. Bean et al. (1932), 121 Tex. 355, 48 S.W.2d 584, wherein Nairn and others brought suit against the Highway Commission, its individual members, the County Judge and County *532Commissioners to enjoin the relocation of a state highway, this court said:
“The effect of the present statute (6663 et seq.) on the subject is to vest administrative control of all public roads which might be a part of the state highway system in the state highway department, with respect to the * * * relocation, improvement, construction * * * thereof. Whatever said department may do in the premises, in the exercise of an honest, discretion, must be respected when untainted by fraud and unassailed on account of accident or mistake occurring in their performance, or such abuse of discretion as under the authorities would avoid the same.” (Citing authorities).
See also Texas Highway Commission et al. v. El Paso Building and Construction Trades Council (1950), 149 Tex. 457, 234 S.W.2d 857(1).
In Johnson v. Ferguson (1932), Tex.Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 153, writ dismissed (18-22), the court said:
“The highway department is one of the most important departments in the state' government. * * * -It would probably be difficult to find a citizen of the state who has not a direct concern in the affairs it administers, and this is certainly true as regards taxpaying citizens. To the members of the commission and in large measure to its chief engineer are intrusted responsibilities of outstanding importance. To meet these responsibilities they are invested with a wide discretion. This is of necessity so from the very nature of their duties. To properly discharge such duties they would perforce be required to make careful investigation from all competent and reasonably available sources in determining the bases for their action and for estimates from which to ascertain the bounds .of their authority. As public officials they are presumed to exercise their authority and perform their duties honestly, conscientiously, and efficiently.”
The above cases show that the Legislature has established the 'Highway Commission and given it full authority to carry out the duties imposed by the Constitution to establish a system of public roads.
Paraphrasing what we said in Haden Co. v. Dodgen (1958), 158 Tex. 74) 308 S.W.2d 838 at p. 842, 2nd col.: Power to construct public highways is conferred by'Arts. 6663, et seq., Revised Civil Statutes, upon the State Highway Commission. There is no statutory provision governing or limiting the manner in which this power may be exercised, save as to competitive bidding. So far as the statutes are concerned, so long as contracts are let by competitive bidding, the Commission may prescribe the kind and character of materials to be used in constructing and maintaining the public highways. The Commission’s action in prescribing materials to be used in the construction of our public roads is the selection and decision of the state.
I will now discuss whether or not the Commission’s order violates Art. 6674h requiring that road' contracts be let under competitive bidding procedure.
Respondents contend that it is not within the power of the State Highway Commission to pass Minute Order No. 48644, because it violates the provisions of Article 6674h requiring competitive bidding in the letting of highway construction contracts.
' In discussing what constitutes competitive bidding under the charter provisions of the City of Dallas,'this court said:
“Two forms of competition may exist. One is secured by calling for bids on only one kind of material for the work, which is a competition among bidders on the same thing. The other is secured by calling for bids on several kinds of material, any one of which is suitable for the work; this form brings bidders on different things in competition with each other. The *533latter kind of competition includes, it seems plain, the former.” (Citing authorities). Vilbig Bros. v. City of Dallas (1936), 127 Tex. 563; 91 S.W.2d 336(5), rehearing overruled 127 Tex. 563, 96 S.W.2d 229.
The court then concludes that the specifications in question which include materials patented, materials which can be furnished by only one bidder, and materials which can be furnished by many bidders are valid and provide for competition, unless ipso facto calling for bids on a patented article voids the bidding. The court quotes from 3 McQuillin: Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) § 1299 to the effect that even though a patented article or process is the only one on which bids are asked, the letting is not void so long as there is competition among those furnishing such patented article or process. (Emphasis added.)
The case of Sterrett v. Bell (1951, Tex.Civ.App.), 240 S.W.2d 516 (5, 6), no writ history, defines competitive bidding as follows :
“ ‘Competitive bidding’ requires due advertisement, giving opportunity to bid, and contemplates a bidding on the same undertaking upon each of the same . material items covered by the contract; upon the same thing. It requires that all bidders be placed upon the same plane of equality and that they each bid upon the same terms and conditions involved in all the items and parts of the contract, and that the proposal specify as to all bids the same, or substantially similar specifications.”
The Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Incorporated Town of Grand Junction et al. (1933), 216 Iowa 1301, 250 N.W. 136(3), has defined the term “competitive bidding” as used in the Iowa Statutes regulating public improvements as, “Competitive bidding means that all contractors make bids based upon the same or at least substantially similar specifications.”
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in the case of Flynn Construction Co. v. Leininger (1927), 125 Okl. 197, 257 P. 374, 377, has said:
"* * * [Y]et they [the court decisions] are all in substantial harmony on the abstract proposition that in order that bids may come clearly within the meaning of the term ‘competitive,’ they must be upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject-matter, the same undertaking.”
To the same effect is the case of Leininger v. Ward (Okla.Sup.1927), 126 Okl. 114, 258 P. 863.
In defining the term “competitive bidding,” in the case of State Highway Commission of Kentucky v. King et al. (1935), 259 Ky. 414, 82 S.W.2d 443, 450, the court quotes from the case of State Highway Commission v. Veiling, 230 Ky. 381, 19 S.W.2d 967, as follows:
“ ‘Competitive bidding requires that all bidders be placed on a plane of equality, and that they bid upon the same terms and conditions.’ ”
The Supreme Court of Delaware in. the case of Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken (1954), 34 Del.Ch. 439, 105 A.2d 614, 631 (20-22), has stated that the term “competitive bidding” as used in the law applicable to the letting of public contracts requires due advertisement and the giving of an opportunity to bid, and contemplates a bidding on the same undertaking upon each of the same material items covered by the contract, and it requires that all bidders be placed upon the same plane of equality and that they, each bid upon the same terms and conditions involved in all the items and parts of the contract, and that the proposals specify as to all bids, the same or substantially similar specifications.
The record in this case shows that there are many suppliers of domestic steel and that there is great competition among the *534domestic steel dealers; that since the adoption of Minute Order 48644 the price of steel furnished for highway construction work is lower than prior to the adoption of this order and when imported steel was being used. The record also shows that the Highway Commission keeps a check on the cost of steel, and that, if Minute Order 48644 results in higher steel prices, the Commission will review the matter and change Order 48644.
The case of McChesney v. People, ex rel. Raymond, 1902, 200 Ill. 146, 65 N.E. 626, quoted by the majority as authority for the fact that this Minute Order under consideration ipso facto violates Art. 6674h, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes, begins, “ * * any provision tending to increase the cost, and make the bids less favorable to the public and the property owners, is against public policy, illegal, and void. * * * ” It is this reasoning upon which the majority opinion rests its conclusion that Minute Order 48644 is invalid. This view is the minority view held by only the Courts of Pennsylvania, Illinois, Utah and New York.
The rule adopted by a majority of the states passing upon this is stated in Ebbeson v. Board of Education, etc., 18 Del.Ch. 37, 156 A. 286 (1931), as follows:
“But even under that view, the courts adopting it say that whether the conditions imposed do violate the statute is to be determined, not by a mere inspection of the condition, but by whether or not its actual operation in practice does in fact increase the costs. In other words, whether the condition stands or falls is a question of fact; it does not carry its own prima facie condemnation. For instance in St. Louis Quarry & Construction Co. v. Von Versen, 81 Mo.App. 519, and in Taylor v. Philadelphia, 261 Pa. 458, 104 A. 766, the condition was found as a matter of fact to cause an increase in cost and therefore was held invalid under a statute requiring the work to be let to the lowest responsible bidder; whereas in Allen v. Labsap, 188 Mo. 692, 87 S.W. 926, 3 Ann.Cas. 306, the condition was found not to effect an increase in cost and therefore was not invalid.” 156 A. 288.
On the question of whether or not the adoption of Minute Order 48644 increased costs, there is no dispute about the fact that since the adoption of this order in I960 the cost to the state, as reflected by the contractors’ bids, has decreased, and that the highway contracting business has continued most competitive.
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Petry, Chairman of the Highway Commission, was that from 1958 to 1960 (date of entry of order) there was no difference in cost of steel on purely state-financed projects when foreign materials were excluded, and federally-aided projects, where foreign materials were not excluded.
In answer to one of the issues submitted to the jury trying this case, the jury found: That the evidence did not show the order (No. 48644) resulted in increased cost of such materials (steel) to the State of Texas.
Thus the great bogey-man of the majority that increased costs will result is shown by the testimony given and the jury finding to be just a figment of the imagination and not a fact.
The view of the majority of the states which have passed on the point is: Ex parte Gemmill (1911) 20 Idaho 732, 119 P. 298, 41 L.R.A.,N.S., 711—county printing must be done within the State of Idaho; Hersey v. Nelson (1913) 47 Mont. 132, 131 P. 30—printing must be done within the state; Pasche v. South St. Joseph Town-Site Co. (1916, Mo.Ct. of Appeals), 190 S.W. 30—bricks used in paving must be manufactured in the state; St. John v. King (1933—hearing denied by Sup.Ct.) 130 Cal. App. 356, 20 P.2d 123—California product required in paving; State, ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co. (1917) 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258—non-residents or those not having a printing plant *535within the state prohibited from bidding on county printing contracts; Knight v. Barnes (1898), 7 N.D. 591, 75 N.W. 904—all county printing shall be done in the state, and if practicable in the county ordering the same. (The question of competitive bidding was also raised in this case, hut summarily dismissed). City and County of Denver v. Bossie (1928) 83 Colo. 329, 266 P. 214—Colorado materials to be used in all public works; Wilson v. Board of Commissioners of Warrick County (1923) 79 Ind.App. 250, 137 N.E. 783—provision for clean Ohio River gravel; Rote v. Bexar Co. Water Control & Imp. Dist. (1936, Tex.Civ.App.), 91 S.W.2d 1095, writ dismissed—holding district directors in their discretion could limit their call for bids to clay pipe without violating competitive bidding statute.
The record shows that Mr. Herbert Pe-try, Chairman of the Highway Commission, testified that in adopting this policy, the Commission gave consideration to matters of quality, uniformity, price, testing, and maintaining reliable sources of supply, particularly in times of war. He stated that the Commission had received numerous complaints concerning foreign products, not only from the contractors, but from fabricators as well; that in some cases, sizes of foreign steel would be different from those shown by the markings thereon; that they would be rusty, and the threads would not work right; and if not rusty, they would come in covered with some sort of solution that would have to be removed. He testified that it was difficult for the Department to test foreign materials at the source of •manufacture. He testified that testing at the source of manufacture was important; that the Department employs two private companies to do such testing at the source; •that where material was not so tested at the source of manufacture, and testing on the job site resulted in a rejection of materials, this produced delays and inefficiency in highway construction projects. He pointed out that altered mill reports received by the Department on foreign steel created problems as to testing, as to quality, and as to uniformity and reliability of the products. He testified that staff reports to the Commission reflected a lack of uniformity in the quality of foreign steel — even in a given batch or bundle of it — which adversely affected the reliability of the sample-testing methods used by the Department. Mr. Pe-try summarized the Commission’s position in adopting the Minute Order in these words:
“From the experience we have had, from the reports of staff, and for other reasons that I have enumerated here, and feeling that we were charged bylaw with the construction efficiently of the highway system, we determined that the passage of this minute order was to the best interest of the Texas Highway Department in its responsibility to wisely expend the tax dollar.”
Having held that the Commission had the power and authority to pass Minute Order No. 48644, and that such action was not arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion, it must follow that this is a suit against the State of Texas, and should be dismissed. Griffin v. Hawn (1960), 161 Tex. 422, 341 S.W.2d 151(1); W. D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen (1958), 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. (1948), 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628.
I would dismiss this cause.
STEAKLEY, J., joins in this dissent.