Court Opinion

ID: 9778009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:30:04.334912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.765823
License: Public Domain

FRANKS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion correctly states “the complaint is directed at negligent acts or omissions of employees of either the City of Cleveland or Bradley County, acting in the course and scope of their employment”, and the negligence alleged is the failure of the governmental employees to set the traffic light so as to give adequate warning to approaching drivers.
Further, the majority is correct in its assertion that disposition of the dispute is governed by the immunity provisions of T.C.A., § 29-20-205, but not correct in concluding the governmental entities retained immunity under the code section because the setting of the time interval and the alleged failure to reset the timing sequence “represented a judgment call by the person responsible for such setting in the exercise of his professional judgment, and is thus a discretionary act....”
Apparently, no reported decisions in this jurisdiction have construed the “discretionary function” language of the statute. Numerous other jurisdictions, however, have interpreted the phrase in the context of federal and state tort claims statutes. Several courts have adopted a “planning-operational” test as the standard for applying the discretionary act exception under state tort claims statutes. This test was succinctly articulated by the Alaska Supreme Court in Carlson v. State, 598 P.2d 969 (Alas.1979): “[Djecisions that rise to the level of planning or policy-making are considered discretionary acts which do not give rise to tort liability, while decisions that are merely operational in nature are not considered to be discretionary acts and therefore are not immune from liability.” Id., at 972. The rationale for this distinction rests upon the fact that certain acts or decisions of a “planning” nature are committed to a coordinate branch of government and should not be subject to judicial interference. Id.; State v. I’Anson, 529 P.2d 188 (Alas.1974).
The federal courts have adopted essentially the same approach in delineating the contours of “discretionary function”. As one federal court observed, “a duty ... is not discretionary if it involves enforcement or administration of a mandatory duty at the operational level, even if some degree of professional expert evaluation is required.” Estrada v. Hills, 401 F.Supp. 429 (N.D.Ill.1975). The Third Circuit echoed this analysis in Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir.1974):
Liability, in such cases, is predicated not on a negligent or unwise policy determination, but on the failure of Government employees to conform to and act consistently with the authority delegated. We do not hold that the Government may be liable for policy determinations made by its officials. Rather, we hold only that the Government may be liable where its employees, in carrying out their duties, fail to conform to pre-existing statutory and regulatory requirements. Id., at 1069.
A wide array of “operational” acts or decisions of public employees have been held “non-discretionary” and therefore not exempt from tort liability. See e.g., Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); *617Carlson, supra, at 973; Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); I’Anson, supra; State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712 (Alas.1972); Mills v. American Playground Device Co., 405 N.E.2d 621 (Ind.App.1980).
In the instant case, the government employee’s setting of the traffic light interval was not a “basic policy decision” but an “operational” act, and any failure on the part of the employee to comply with regulations governing the setting of the traffic light intervals could constitute operational negligence. The mere fact that the employee might, in setting the device, make “a judgment call” is insufficient to warrant the majority’s characterization of the employee’s act as discretionary within the meaning of the statute.
The record reveals the caution light was set at an interval of 3.6 seconds, which was within the time frame set by the state’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices; however, the manual states “[generally the longer intervals are appropriate to higher approach speeds.” The manual established the regulatory requirements and the factual issue is whether the employee failed to conform to these requirements in carrying out his duties. See Gorman v. Adams, 259 Iowa 75, 143 N.W.2d 648 (1966); Pritchard v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co., 178 Cal.App.2d 246, 2 Cal.Rptr. 830 (1960).
The affidavit of appellant’s expert witness advances the opinion that the 3.6 second interval was deficient under current standards, particularly in light of the traffic volume and approach speed at the intersection. The witness concluded “[t]he proper yellow time ... would have allowed the Jackson truck to clear the intersection before Mr. Davis was shown a green signal.” Thus, a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the city or county, through its employees, acted negligently in setting the caution light interval under these conditions was established.
I would vacate the summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings, not inconsistent with the foregoing.