Court Opinion

ID: 9626505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:14:49.467205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:28.582584
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the evidence unequivocally discloses that assistant district attorney Green had direct knowledge prior to trial that the SKS rifle could not be produced, and he intentionally concealed that information from the court and the defense and offered contrary evidence to the jury, I must conclude that such misconduct was intended to goad defendants into moving for a mistrial. I therefore respectfully dissent.
*735Green testified at the hearing on the plea in bar that on Thursday, March 30, 2006, five days prior to the start of trial on Monday, April 3,2006, he requested that his investigator retrieve the evidence for trial from the evidence room. At some point between Thursday and Monday, Green became “aware that the weapon had either been lost or misplaced,” and he acknowledged he “got just about everything except the SKS [rifle] that’s the subject of this.” He did not, however, notify the court or the defense that the evidence was missing for two stated reasons: first, he was confident that the weapon ultimately would be located; and second, he did not think that the weapon “was important,” but was merely “gravy for [his] case.”
Because of the absence of the evidence, Green instructed his investigator to come up with an alternative weapon to use as a demonstrative device at trial. Green testified that when the case was called for trial, he had not spoken with his investigator to determine whether she had been able to find a replacement, and he did not know whether the actual rifle had been located.1 Nonetheless, Green urged the defense to enter into a written stipulation falsely setting forth the chain of custody, as follows: “all firearms and their parts that were located in this case have been properly collected, preserved and transported to preserve their integrity.” In his opening statement, Green referenced the stipulation concerning the ballistics materials, noting that the SKS rifle was “part of the stipulation between the parties and there is no question about that.” The full stipulation was published to the jury on the fourth day of trial.
Thus, unlike the position of the majority and the finding of the trial court,2 this is not a case of constructive or imputed knowledge. Admittedly, Green knew that the evidence was missing — his stated belief that it would be found is, at best, a mere assumption, and his explanation that it was inconsequential to the case is spurious.3
The appellate standard of review of a grant of a double jeopardy plea in bar is whether, after reviewing the trial court’s oral and written rulings as a whole, the trial court’s findings support its *736conclusion that the double jeopardy bar applied. Beck v. State, 261 Ga. 826, 827 (412 SE2d 530) (1992). While the trial court refused to find actual knowledge of the missing evidence, the undisputed evidence of record demands that conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court’s “resolution of the factual issues... is clearly erroneous.” Davis v. State, 278 Ga. 305, 306 (1) (602 SE2d 563) (2004). Thus, I must conclude that the objective facts support a finding that the prosecutor intentionally goaded the defendants into moving for a mistrial, and “purposefully attempt [ed] through its prosecutorial misconduct to secure an opportunity to retry the case, to avoid reversal of the conviction because of prosecutorial or judicial error, or to otherwise obtain a more favorable chance for a guilty verdict on retrial,” Davis, supra at 306, and a retrial is precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Decided March 19, 2007.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellant.
Conner & Conner, Stacie A. Conner, Drew Findling, for appellees.

 Green’s investigator testified that she informed Green prior to trial that she had located another rifle in the evidence room which was “similar hut not the one that was allegedly used in a crime scene,” and just as Green stood up to begin his direct examination of the State’s firearms expert, he turned to the investigator and asked, “Look, is this the real weapon,” to which she replied, “no.”

 In this regard, the trial court found: “Mr. Green first discovered the State did not have possession of the rifle at issue . . . until the fourth day of the jury trial, while Mr. Green was opening the box to present the rifle to the GBI firearms examiner.”

 In addition to charges of murder and aggravated assault, Traylor was indicted and tried for possession of a rifle by a convicted felon. Although in pretrial proceedings, Traylor sought more particulars about the rifle referred to in the indictment, none were forthcoming. Presumably, that was the rifle which the State could not produce at trial.