Court Opinion

ID: 9802392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 14:00:45.567137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:52.378298
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12180   Document: 34-1    Date Filed: 08/31/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12180
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        CANDICE HAGAN,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER,      GEORGIA DEPARTMENT                      OF
        CORRECTIONS,
        PULASKI SP WARDEN,
        GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023     Page: 2 of 18

        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12180

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00107-TES
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Plaintiff appeals the district court’s order dismissing her 42
        U.S.C. § 1983 and state negligence claims pursuant to Federal Rule
        12(c). Additionally, Plaintiff appeals the district court’s failure to
        sua sponte grant leave for her to amend the complaint before dis-
        missing her claims and entering judgment for Defendants. After a
        careful review of the record and the briefing submitted by the par-
        ties, we find that the district court did not err when it dismissed
        Plaintiff’s claims and did not abuse its discretion when it declined
        sua sponte to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Therefore,
        we affirm.
                                 BACKGROUND
               This case arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained while she
        was incarcerated in the Bleckley County Residential Substance
        Abuse Treatment (“RSAT”) Center. At the time of Plaintiff’s inju-
        ries, Defendant Mickens was the warden of Pulaski State Prison,
        the facility that operates the RSAT Center, and Defendant Ward
        was the Commissioner of Defendant Georgia Department of Cor-
        rections (“GDC”), the agency in charge of the prison and the RSAT.
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 3 of 18

        22-12180               Opinion of the Court                          3

               While incarcerated in February 2020, Plaintiff slipped on liq-
        uid left on the concrete floor of a common area in the RSAT Cen-
        ter. As a result of her fall, Plaintiff sustained injuries to her right
        shoulder, forearm, and wrist. A correctional officer arrived shortly
        after Plaintiff’s fall and questioned her about the fall and her inju-
        ries. After telling the officer she was experiencing pain in her right
        shoulder, forearm, and wrist, Plaintiff was placed in a wheelchair
        and taken to the RSAT Center’s nursing station. An initial exami-
        nation revealed pain in Plaintiff’s shoulder and visible swelling and
        injury to her forearm and wrist.
               Plaintiff subsequently was transported to a local emergency
        room (“ER”) and evaluated by an ER physician, who diagnosed
        Plaintiff with a severe fracture to her right forearm and wrist. The
        physician determined that Plaintiff’s injuries required immediate
        surgery, which was arranged to take place at Coliseum Medical
        Center (“Coliseum”) in Macon, Georgia. Plaintiff traveled to Coli-
        seum with a correctional officer that same day, and she was seen
        by an orthopedic surgeon there who concurred in her need for sur-
        gery. The surgery was scheduled for the following morning, but
        the correctional officer told Plaintiff she could not stay overnight
        at Coliseum and needed to return to the RSAT Center, which she
        did.
               The next morning, Plaintiff awoke with severe pain and
        swelling in her right forearm and wrist and asked the RSAT Center
        nurse for her prescribed medication. The nurse allegedly advised
        Plaintiff that she would not be given any medication and that she
USCA11 Case: 22-12180       Document: 34-1       Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 4 of 18

        4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12180

        was not being taken for her scheduled surgery at Coliseum. Over
        the following week, Plaintiff repeatedly asked for her prescribed
        medication and to be transported for her surgery. These requests
        were denied.
               A week after her initial injury, Plaintiff, still experiencing se-
        vere pain and swelling in her right forearm in wrist, was taken to a
        surgeon in Eastman, Georgia for additional treatment. The sur-
        geon examined Plaintiff, noted severe swelling and deformities in
        her right forearm and wrist, and immediately took her into sur-
        gery. Plaintiff claims she suffered permanent injury to her forearm
        and wrist—including paresthesia, numbness, and loss of feeling and
        dexterity in her right hand—that was caused by the delay in treat-
        ment and could have been avoided if Defendants had allowed her
        to receive the initially scheduled surgery.
               Represented by counsel, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Febru-
        ary 2022 against Defendant GDC, Defendant Mickens, and Defend-
        ant Ward in the Superior Court of Pulaski County, Georgia, assert-
        ing claims under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff broadly
        alleged in her complaint that Defendants violated state and federal
        law governing the medical treatment of an individual who is in-
        jured while in the GDC’s care, causing her to incur compensable
        damages and attorney’s fees. In support of her right to recover un-
        der state law, Plaintiff claimed Defendants were negligent in their
        execution of various duties they owed to her, and that they were
        liable under a respondeat superior theory for the actions of their
        employees who also were negligent. As to her § 1983 claims,
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023     Page: 5 of 18

        22-12180               Opinion of the Court                         5

        Plaintiff asserted that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
        her serious medical needs and that their actions were “cruel and
        unusual in violation of” her constitutional rights.
                 Defendants removed Plaintiff’s complaint to the United
        States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia and filed a
        motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule 12(c). In
        support of the motion, Defendants argued that sovereign immun-
        ity, the Eleventh Amendment, and the text of § 1983 barred Plain-
        tiff’s federal constitutional claim against Defendant GDC. As to
        Ward and Mickens, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to
        properly state a § 1983 claim against those Defendants individually
        because she did not allege (1) any facts suggesting that either Ward
        or Mickens was personally involved in the conduct underlying her
        claim or (2) a plausible basis for imposing supervisory liability. Fi-
        nally, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s state negligence claim was
        barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Georgia Tort
        Claims Act (“GTCA”).
               The district court granted the Rule 12(c) motion and dis-
        missed Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. Specifically, the court
        held that sovereign immunity and a plain reading of § 1983 barred
        Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant GDC. As to Defendants
        Ward and Mickens, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s § 1983
        claims against them failed because she did not plausibly allege that
        either of these Defendants was responsible for the misconduct al-
        leged in her complaint. Regarding Plaintiff’s state claims, the court
        held that Defendants Ward and Mickens were immune from
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 6 of 18

        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12180

        liability under the GTCA and that Defendant GDC was the proper
        defendant for Plaintiff’s state negligence claim pursuant to
        O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b). Nevertheless, the court held that a negli-
        gence claim asserted against GDC still failed because of the discre-
        tionary function exception to Georgia’s limited waiver of immun-
        ity in the GTCA.
                Plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) she was held to a higher
        pleading standard than required, (2) the district court erroneously
        failed to convert the motion for judgment on the pleadings to a
        motion for summary judgment because the court did not expressly
        exclude extrinsic documents, and (3) the court should have sua
        sponte offered her an opportunity to amend her complaint before
        dismissing it. Plaintiff does not address in her appellate briefing the
        district court’s rulings that (1) sovereign immunity and a plain read-
        ing of § 1983 barred her federal claim against Defendant GDC and
        (2) the GTCA barred her state negligence claims against all Defend-
        ants. Those claims are thus abandoned, and we do not consider
        them here. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
        680 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When an appellant fails to challenge properly
        on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its
        judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that
        ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”).
        As for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ward and Mickens individu-
        ally, we are unpersuaded by her arguments on appeal and thus af-
        firm the district court’s order dismissing those claims as well as its
        decision not to sua sponte offer an opportunity for Plaintiff to
        amend her complaint before dismissing it.
USCA11 Case: 22-12180       Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 7 of 18

        22-12180                Opinion of the Court                          7

                                    DISCUSSION
        I.     Standard of Review
                We review de novo the district court’s order granting judg-
        ment on the pleadings. See Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 57
        F.4th 916, 928 (11th Cir. 2023). “Judgment on the pleadings is ap-
        propriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the mov-
        ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cannon v. City
        of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “In deter-
        mining whether a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings,
        we accept as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving
        party’s pleading, and we view those facts in the light most favorable
        to the non-moving party.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329,
        1335 (11th Cir. 2014). We likewise review de novo whether a dis-
        trict court was required to convert a motion to dismiss into a mo-
        tion for summary judgment. See SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am.
        Secs., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2010). We review for
        abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s
        complaint without sua sponte offering her an opportunity to
        amend it. See Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291
        (11th Cir. 2018).
        II.    Dismissal of Claims as Insufficiently Pled
                Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court erred by
        holding her complaint to a higher pleading standard than required
        when it dismissed her § 1983 claims against Defendants Ward and
        Mickens. Plaintiff argues further that the district court improperly
        failed to consider Defendant GDC’s policies and procedures, which
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 8 of 18

        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12180

        she attached in opposition to the motion for judgment on the
        pleadings, under the incorporation by reference doctrine. We are
        unpersuaded by either argument.
                As to the applicable pleading standard, a plaintiff is required
        to provide in her complaint “a short and plain statement” of her
        claim showing she “is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
        This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allega-
        tions,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-un-
        lawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
        (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
        As such, a complaint that only provides “labels and conclusions or
        a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is not
        adequate to survive a motion to dismiss. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp.,
        693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation
        omitted). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual
        matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
        on its face.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is
        plausible on its face when it is supported by “factual content that
        allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defend-
        ant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
        “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action and con-
        clusory statements are insufficient” to meet this standard. New-
        bauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 931, 934 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation
        and quotation marks omitted)).
             We apply a two-step framework to determine whether a
        complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. At the first
USCA11 Case: 22-12180       Document: 34-1       Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 9 of 18

        22-12180                Opinion of the Court                           9

        step, we “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely
        legal conclusions.” Id. At the second step, we “assume the veracity
        of the well-pleaded factual allegations and then determine whether
        they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 934–35
        (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
                Applying the above analysis to Plaintiff’s complaint, most of
        the allegations underlying her § 1983 claim against Ward and Mick-
        ens fail at the first step because they are simply legal conclusions
        that track the elements of a deliberate indifference claim. How-
        ever, two of Plaintiff’s factual allegations do satisfy the framework’s
        first step. First, Plaintiff’s claims regarding the severity of her inju-
        ries are detailed and sufficiently pled. Second, the RSAT Center
        nurse’s alleged statement that Defendants would not give any med-
        ication to Plaintiff or transport her for surgery also provides some
        factual basis. Accordingly, we consider below whether these two
        allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” by Plain-
        tiff on her § 1983 claims asserted against Ward and Mickens indi-
        vidually.
                 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ward and Mickens are based
        on a deliberate indifference theory. To prevail on such a theory, “a
        plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.”
        Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.
        2020). The objective prong of the inquiry requires a plaintiff to
        demonstrate “an objectively serious medical need”—that is, a need
        “that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
        . . . that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
USCA11 Case: 22-12180     Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023    Page: 10 of 18

        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-12180

        the necessity for a doctor’s attention” and that “if left unattended,
        poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. As for the subjective
        prong, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “(1) had subjec-
        tive knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk;
        and (3) acted with more than gross negligence.” Harper v. Lawrence
        Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burnette v. Tay-
        lor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008)). Assuming both require-
        ments are met, the plaintiff must then establish a causal link “be-
        tween the defendant’s indifference and [her] injury.” Roy v. Ivy, 53
        F.4th 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2022).
               Plaintiff sufficiently pled an objectively serious medical
        need: a severe fracture following her fall. Further, citing the con-
        firmation by the Coliseum surgeon, Plaintiff adequately alleged her
        need to promptly receive surgery. Turning next to the subjective
        prong, Plaintiff’s only allegation relevant to that inquiry is the
        RSAT Center nurse’s statement that she would not be given any
        medication or transported for surgery. Even assuming the nurse’s
        statement is true and drawing all inferences from it in favor of
        Plaintiff, the statement does not provide a factual basis to suggest
        that either Ward or Mickens was subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s
        injuries, nor does Plaintiff allege such subjective awareness else-
        where in her complaint. In comparison, the correctional officer
        who transported Plaintiff to and from the emergency room and the
        RSAT Center nurse who responded to Plaintiff’s request for medi-
        cation were perhaps aware of Plaintiff’s objectively serious medical
        need. However, Plaintiff did not assert claims against either of
        those individuals or even name them in her complaint. Instead,
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1       Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 11 of 18

        22-12180                Opinion of the Court                          11

        she asserted claims only against Defendant Ward, the commis-
        sioner of the Georgia correctional system, and Defendant Mickens,
        the warden of a prison that operates the rehabilitation facility
        where Plaintiff was housed when she was injured.
                Presumably because of the lack of personal participation—
        or even alleged awareness—by Ward or Mickens of her injury,
        Plaintiff focuses in her complaint on a theory of supervisory liabil-
        ity. Supervisory liability under § 1983 “must be based on some-
        thing more than the theory of respondeat superior.” Myrick v. Ful-
        ton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023) (noting that “the
        standard by which a supervisor is held liable in his . . . individual
        capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous”
        (quotation marks omitted)). Instead, a plaintiff must allege either
        that “the supervisor personally participate[d] in the alleged uncon-
        stitutional conduct” or that “there is a causal connection between
        the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional
        deprivation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Relevant to our anal-
        ysis here, a causal connection can be established “when a supervi-
        sor’s custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to con-
        stitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the super-
        visor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the
        subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
        doing so.” Harper, 592 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326
        F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2003)).
              As discussed above, Plaintiff did not allege that either Ward
        or Mickens personally participated in or was even aware of the
USCA11 Case: 22-12180     Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023     Page: 12 of 18

        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12180

        conduct underlying her complaint. We therefore turn our focus to
        determine if Plaintiff otherwise alleged the necessary causal con-
        nection to establish supervisory liability. See Harper, 592 F.3d at
        1236 (“Here, because there are no allegations in the Complaint re-
        garding the supervisors’ personal participation in the denial of . . .
        rights, we look to whether Plaintiff has alleged a ‘causal connec-
        tion.’”). Again, such a connection can be asserted by alleging
        (1) that a supervisor’s custom or policy resulted in the deliberate
        indifference or (2) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor
        directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew subordinates
        would act unlawfully but failed to stop them. Id. Plaintiff has done
        neither.
                As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not allege that any custom
        or policy instituted by Ward or Mickens caused her harm. On the
        contrary, Plaintiff claimed the failure of prison officials to act in
        conformity with governing GDC policy caused her harm rather
        than any defective custom or policy. Likewise, Plaintiff did not al-
        lege that Ward or Mickens “directed . . . subordinates to act unlaw-
        fully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed
        to stop them from doing so.” 592 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Cottone,
        326 F.3d at 1360–61). The only potentially relevant allegation to
        this issue is the RSAT nurse’s statement suggesting Plaintiff was
        denied pain medication and immediate transport for surgery. As-
        suming the nurse’s statement is true and viewing it in the light
        most favorable to Plaintiff, the statement does not suggest—and is
        insufficient in and of itself to allow one to infer—that Ward or
        Mickens had ordered their subordinates to deny medication or
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 13 of 18

        22-12180                Opinion of the Court                         13

        treatment for Plaintiff’s injuries or that they knew their subordi-
        nates would deny such care and failed to stop them. Nor does
        Plaintiff allege any facts to suggest that Ward or Mickens had notice
        of a “persistent pattern” of similar violations that might have made
        them aware of a likelihood that their subordinates would be delib-
        erately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. See Goebert
        v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007).
                In short, Plaintiff did not allege in her complaint a viable ba-
        sis for holding either Ward or Mickens individually liable for her
        injuries under § 1983. Although Plaintiff argues the district court
        erred by “applying a higher pleading standard” to her complaint
        and “wrongly exclude[d] facts” for being conclusory, she does not
        point to—and we have not found in our independent review of the
        complaint—any specific factual allegations that were wrongly ex-
        cluded. As such, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s
        § 1983 claims asserted against Defendants Ward and Mickens in
        their individual capacity. See McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324,
        1334 (11th Cir. 2018) (dismissing as conclusory allegations that gov-
        ernment officials created and implemented unlawful policies in
        “[t]he absence of allegations about any individual acts of the [gov-
        ernment officials]”).
        III.   Consideration of Matters Outside the Pleadings
              Plaintiff argues in the alternative that the district court erred
        by not converting the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a
        motion for summary judgment because the court did not expressly
        exclude certain GDC policies that she attached to her response. As
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 14 of 18

        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12180

        discussed below, this argument is foreclosed by binding circuit
        precedent.
               On a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, if “matters outside the
        pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the mo-
        tion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56”
        and the parties must be given “a reasonable opportunity to present
        all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
        12(d). “[I]t is within the district court’s discretion whether to accept
        extra-pleading matter on a motion for judgment on the pleadings
        and treat it as one for summary judgment or to reject it and main-
        tain the character of the motion as one under Rule 12(c).” 5C Ar-
        thur R. Miller & A. Benjamin Spencer, Federal Practice and Procedure
        § 1371 (3d ed. & April 2023 update). “A statement in a pleading
        may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in
        any other pleading or motion. A copy of a written instrument that
        is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). “Because Rule 10(c) incorporates into the
        pleadings all exhibits attached thereto, the district court can con-
        sider those documents in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion without
        converting it into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion.” 5C Mil-
        ler & Spencer, supra, § 1371. “Furthermore, when the plaintiff fails
        to attach a pertinent document, it has been held that the defendant
        can attach that document to a motion for judgment on the plead-
        ings without converting the motion into one for summary judg-
        ment.” Id.
USCA11 Case: 22-12180        Document: 34-1         Date Filed: 08/31/2023         Page: 15 of 18

        22-12180                   Opinion of the Court                               15

                Applying the above rules in Harper, this Court held that “[a]
        judge need not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for sum-
        mary judgment as long as he or she does not consider matters out-
        side the pleadings” and “‘not considering’ such matters is the func-
        tional equivalent of ‘excluding’ them—there is no more formal step
        required.” 592 F.3d at 1232 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument “that
        it was not enough for the court to have declined to consider the
        outside documents in ruling on the motion to dismiss—rather, it
        should have excluded them pursuant to Rule 12(d)”). See also Ware
        v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d 413, 414 (5th Cir. 1980) (not-
        ing the “express wording” of the district court’s order indicating
        that materials outside the pleading were not considered). 1 In con-
        trast, this Court has held that a district court ordering discovery
        and relying on the documents produced in discovery to flesh out
        claims is an example of the record demonstrating outside materials
        were considered by the district court in deciding a motion. See
        Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.
        2019) (“Because the district court considered materials outside the
        pleadings in deciding the [motion to dismiss], though—and indeed,
        affirmatively directed discovery—that motion may properly be
        converted into a motion for summary judgment.”).
               Here, Plaintiff concedes the district court did not reference
        or rely on the GDC policies she attached to her response in ruling

        1 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981,
        constitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
        661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023      Page: 16 of 18

        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12180

        on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Indeed, Plaintiff ar-
        gues in her appellate brief that the district court erred by not con-
        sidering those policies. Because the district court was not obligated
        to consider an extrinsic document attached to Plaintiff’s response,
        nor was it required to expressly state that it did not consider the
        document, the court did not err by reviewing the motion for judg-
        ment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) instead of Rule 56.
        IV.    Amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint
               Finally, Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court erred
        by dismissing her complaint without sua sponte giving her an op-
        portunity to amend. “A district court’s discretion to deny leave
        to amend a complaint is severely restricted by [Federal Rule 15],
        which stresses that courts should freely give leave to amend when
        justice so requires.” Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291. Pursuant to Rule
        15, “[w]here a more carefully drafted complaint might state a
        claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
        complaint before the district court dismisses the action with preju-
        dice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, a district court
        need not allow an amendment that would be futile. See Garcia v.
        Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 48 F.4th 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2022). Fur-
        ther, “our precedent is clear that ‘[a] district court is not required
        to grant a plaintiff leave to amend [her] complaint sua sponte when
        the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to
        amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.’”
        Newbauer, 26 F.4th at 936 (alteration in original) (quoting Wagner v.
        Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002)
        (en banc)).
USCA11 Case: 22-12180      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023     Page: 17 of 18

        22-12180               Opinion of the Court                         17

                 Plaintiff was represented by counsel. Yet, before the district
        court, she never moved to amend her complaint—either during
        the pendency of Defendants’ motion to dismiss or after the district
        court had dismissed the complaint. Instead, Plaintiff raises the
        amendment issue for the first time on appeal. Thus, under our
        precedent, the district court was not required sua sponte to grant
        Plaintiff leave to amend in this situation unless it dismissed Plain-
        tiff’s complaint on shotgun pleading grounds. See Vibe Micro, Inc. v.
        Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (“When a litigant
        files a shotgun pleading, is represented by counsel, and fails to re-
        quest leave to amend, a district court must sua sponte give him one
        chance to replead before dismissing his case with prejudice on non-
        merits shotgun pleading grounds.”). Here, the district court ex-
        pressly chose not to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on shotgun plead-
        ing grounds, and instead ruled on the merits.
               We likewise decline to characterize Plaintiff’s complaint as a
        shotgun pleading. Shotgun pleadings come in four categories, one
        of which is “asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants
        without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
        which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is
        brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d
        1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). However, what unifies all categories
        of shotgun pleadings “is that they fail to one degree or another, and
        in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of
        the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
        rests.” Id. In choosing to rule on the merits, the district court found
        that despite Plaintiff’s complaint exhibiting some characteristics of
USCA11 Case: 22-12180     Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023     Page: 18 of 18

        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12180

        a shotgun pleading, the complaint provided sufficient notice to De-
        fendants of the claims asserted against them and the grounds upon
        which the claims rested.
               We agree with the district court’s assessment. Plaintiff’s
        complaint made clear that she was asserting § 1983 deliberate indif-
        ference claims against both Ward and Mickens in their individual
        capacities to recover for injuries she suffered as a result of her de-
        layed treatment following a fall at the RSAT facility where she was
        incarcerated at the time. The complaint failed to allege any viable
        basis for imposing individual liability on Ward or Mickens, but it
        did not fail to give either of those defendants “adequate notice of
        the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
        rests.” Id. As such, the complaint was not a shotgun pleading and,
        given that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney, the district
        court did not abuse its discretion by failing sua sponte to give her
        an opportunity to amend before dismissing her claims.
                                  CONCLUSION
               For the reasons stated above, we find no error in the district
        court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint and we likewise hold
        that the court did not abuse its discretion by failing sua sponte to
        give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Therefore, we affirm.
        AFFIRMED.