Court Opinion

ID: 9641314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:28:23.08984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:36.531564
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the Court’s conclusion that Patricia Wilz met her burden of proof to establish a constructive trust on behalf of her disabled son against his father and stepmother. I dissent from that portion of the opinion wherein the majority re-determines the extent of the constructive trust imposed upon real property purchased with the proceeds from the ward’s estate.
The problem in this appeal is that the majority is rendering its own judgment *840rather than reviewing the trial court’s. They have properly determined that Wilz, as successor guardian, proved the facts necessary for the imposition of a constructive trust on real property. In this regard, the jury determined that Wilz had proven the ward’s funds had been used to purchase certain real property. The majority properly notes that, because Wilz met her burden for the imposition of the constructive trust, the burden shifted to Flournoy to show the maximum extent to which the constructive trust could be imposed on the real property. Because Flournoy failed to obtain a jury finding on this issue, to prevail on appeal, he must conclusively establish its limitation.
To calculate the extent of the constructive trust, the majority focuses on the purchase price of the property and the principal balance of the mortgage. Under the facts presented, I believe this is improper. Flournoy had the burden to show what portion of the property should not be burdened with the constructive trust. All the majority is able to do from this record is guesstimate the approximate amount of the reduction in the loan balance over the years after the purchase. This is not adequate to meet Flournoy’s burden of proof.
Wilz proved that the ward’s assets were used to make mortgage payments. The mortgage payments were for more than principal reduction and Flournoy made no effort to apportion the value of the property based upon the source of funds used to purchase the property. Merely looking to the reduction in the loan balance does not take into consideration that the loan payments also involved taking money from the ward’s estate to pay interest and taxes related to the property.
Without some proof to support an apportionment of the benefits created by the payments made by Flournoy versus those made by the ward’s estate, there is no basis upon which we can properly disturb the trial court’s judgment. The ward is being deprived of the protection of a constructive trust on property upon which the ward’s money was used to pay interest and taxes. Under this approach, if Flournoy had used the ward’s money to pay only interest and taxes, the ward’s estate would not be entitled to the equitable remedy of a constructive trust.
Further, I note that the only source of any evidence that any part of the purchase price was paid by Flournoy came from his deposition testimony. On this record, it is not hard to conclude that the jury could have chosen to disbelieve this testimony. Because the jury could have easily disregarded this testimony, there is no basis upon which to limit the extent of the property upon which the constructive trust was imposed. The only jury finding on this claim was that funds belonging to the ward had been used for acquisition of the farm. Flournoy failed to secure a jury finding to establish what part, if any, of his funds could be traced to the purchase of the farm. It is improper for the majority to make that factual determination on appeal based on evidence the jury could have disbelieved. I would hold that the trial court properly imposed a constructive trust on the entire farm.
Thus, I concur in the judgment that a constructive trust is properly imposed on the farm, but dissent to the judgment to the extent it limits that constructive trust to a 35% undivided interest.