Court Opinion

ID: 9882618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:17:31.976544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:35.781884
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Crisp, 2023-Ohio-3537.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     WILLIAMS COUNTY

State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals Nos. WM-22-005
                                                                        WM-22-006
       Appellee
                                                  Trial Court Nos. 21CR000244
                                                                   22CR000059

v.

Elmeco R. Crisp                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                 Decided: September 29, 2023

                                            *****

        Katherine J. Zartman, Williams County Prosecuting Attorney,
        for appellee.

        Karin L. Coble, for appellant.

                                            *****

        ZMUDA, J.

        {¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, following a bench trial, defendant-appellant,

Elmeco R. Crisp, appeals the November 9, 2022 judgments of the Williams County Court

of Common Pleas, convicting him of domestic violence and failure to appear, and

sentencing him to prison terms of 17 months and 12 months, to be served consecutively.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court judgments.
                                   I.      Background

       {¶ 2} Elmeco R. Crisp was indicted in Williams County case No. 21CR000244 on

one count of domestic violence, a violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) and (D)(3), a fourth-

degree felony. He was indicted in Williams County case No. 22CR000059 on one count

of failure to appear, a violation of R.C. 2937.99(A) and (B), also a fourth-degree felony.

The cases were consolidated for a bench trial, which took place on September 13, 2022.

The victim, K.B., testified for the state, as did Bryan Police Officers Justin Garza, Derek

Beardsley, and Ross Butler. Crisp testified in his own defense.

                              A. The State’s Case-In-Chief

       {¶ 3} According to the state’s evidence, 14-year-old, K.B., lived with her mother,

J.H., and her mother’s boyfriend, Crisp, in a one-room home in Bryan. On December 16,

2021, K.B., J.H., and Crisp got up early and went out to eat. They later walked around,

then went to a bar, where J.H. and Crisp had alcoholic drinks. J.H. and Crisp began

arguing, and they eventually went home.

       {¶ 4} At some point, when it was dark out, J.H. and Crisp got bottles of an

alcoholic beverage. Crisp was in the kitchen dancing, celebrating “because it was [the]

last day of child services.” Later, J.H. and Crisp did the dishes and were standing by the

sink whispering while K.B. lay down in J.H’s bed. J.H. “started freaking out and getting

mad” and Crisp went into the bathroom.

2.
       {¶ 5} K.B. and J.H. lay in bed together, and Crisp came in the room and pulled the

blanket off of J.H. J.H. pulled it back up. Crisp pulled it off again, hit J.H. in the face,

spit on her, and poured alcohol on her. K.B. was upset that Crisp did this to her mother

for no reason. Soon after, Crisp left. K.B. and J.H. also left and went to K.B.’s uncle’s

house, but he did not answer the door. They stayed in his backyard for a while, then

returned home. K.B. said she was going to “Anthony’s house.” Her mother told her to

be home by 9:00 p.m.

       {¶ 6} Anthony walked K.B. home around 9:12 p.m. The doors were locked. K.B.

knocked, and her mother answered the door. K.B. and J.H. again lay down in J.H.’s bed.

At around 2:00 a.m. they awoke to Crisp banging on the windows, asking to be let in.

K.B. told her mother not to let Crisp in, but she did anyway. He came in the house

“screaming and yelling.” He turned on all the lights and started making macaroni and

cheese. Afterwards, he told J.H. he wanted to lie down, so J.H. asked K.B. to leave her

bed.

       {¶ 7} J.H. and Crisp again began yelling at one another. J.H. stood up and pushed

down K.B.’s dresser, which separated the two beds in the home, and K.B.’s belongings

fell out of the dresser. K.B. yelled at her mom for this, but J.H. was not listening because

she was yelling at Crisp to leave. At first Crisp refused to leave, but then “he went into

the closet door” “to get all of his stuff,” which included “his clothes.” In the past when

he would leave, Crisp would put his clothes in bags.

3.
       {¶ 8} J.H. was crying and K.B. told Crisp he wasn’t going to leave “cause he

didn’t have anywhere to go.” Crisp told J.H. and K.B. that he was going to set the house

on fire. He took a rug and put it on the stove, and it started smoking. J.H. told K.B. that

they had to get out of the house, but Crisp took the rug off the stove.

       {¶ 9} K.B. yelled at Crisp and threw two candles, a container, and a book at him.

Crisp warned J.H. “if she throws something at me again…,” at which point K.B. threw a

bottle of hand sanitizer at him. Crisp “came at” K.B. and she fell down. He hit her in the

eye. K.B. recalled that it hurt—she saw “black and white,” was “sitting on the floor

crying,” and was “really upset.” J.H. yelled at Crisp and Crisp just walked around. K.B.

told her mother she was leaving and going to the police station. Crisp called his mother

and told her “if I go to jail * * * I’m going to make sure you’re taken care of right.”

       {¶ 10} K.B. walked to the police station, about four-and-a-half blocks away, and

asked to speak to someone. Officer Butler asked K.B. to write a statement and he took

photographs of her face. He described that K.B. appeared “kind of like scared, shy,

timid.” He observed redness in her eye and on her upper cheek, underneath her left eye.

After the photographs and statement were completed, he and a sergeant went to the

residence to try to make contact with anyone inside. They knocked and announced

themselves several times. The lights appeared to be off and the windows were covered; it

seemed there was nobody home.

4.
       {¶ 11} Officer Butler went back to the station and tried to contact J.H. at her place

of employment, but she had called off around 3:00 a.m. Her employer provided contact

information for J.H. and he tried to call her, but she did not answer. He left a voicemail,

but she did not return the call. Officer Butler then contacted Job and Family Services for

assistance. K.B.’s foster parents picked her up from the station.

       {¶ 12} Officer Butler ran a check of Crisp and J.H. in LEADS. The LEADS

search turned up a Lima address for Crisp, which is tied to his driver’s license, and a

Bryan address for J.H. Officer Butler discovered that Crisp had a prior domestic violence

conviction in Lima. Based on that information, he filed a warrant for felony domestic

violence.

       {¶ 13} Officers Justin Garza and Derek Beardsley went to the home to serve the

warrant on Crisp. J.H.’s father was on the scene, as was her sister. The officers knocked,

but no one answered. The officers had information that Crisp and J.H. were in the home

and that J.H. may be held captive or hurt. Because of the fear for J.H.’s safety, Officer

Garza contacted the police chief and made arrangements with the landlord to get a key.

The chief and Officer Beardsley knocked, then eventually entered the residence where

they made contact with Crisp. J.H. was also there. Crisp had been in the bathroom. He

came out and got his clothes. The officers arrested Crisp, and Garza took Crisp into

custody. Officer Beardsley stayed to take pictures. The stove showed evidence of the

rug having been burned; the burnt rug was retrieved from the trash can.

5.
          {¶ 14} At the station, after being advised of his Miranda rights, Crisp told Officer

Garza that the juvenile female had thrown objects at him, but he denied striking her. He

said the juvenile left the residence and J.H. went looking for her, but they did not call the

police.

                         B. Crisp’s Crim.R. 29 Motion for Acquittal

          {¶ 15} After presenting this evidence, the state rested. Crisp moved for acquittal

under Crim.R. 29 on the basis that the state failed to show that the incident involved a

“family or household member,” therefore, it failed to present sufficient evidence of

domestic violence. The state responded, and cited the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in

State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (1997), in support of its position

that the evidence was sufficient to establish that J.H. and Crisp were cohabitating,

therefore, K.B. was “a family member or household member” for purposes of the

domestic violence statute. It explained that Williams defines cohabitation to include the

sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and consortium.

          {¶ 16} The state emphasized that as to the sharing of familial or financial

responsibilities, it had presented evidence from K.B. that Crisp and her mother shared

shelter, food, and clothing. As to consortium, the state highlighted evidence

demonstrating that Crisp and J.H. were affectionate, they kissed, held hands, and Crisp

would comfort her when she had anxiety.

6.
         {¶ 17} Pertinent to the issue of cohabitation, K.B. testified that Crisp would stay

with her and J.H. “for a long time,” “he’d leave for like a week” to go to Lima if “he had

appointments and stuff,” then he would come back. She estimated that Crisp would stay

with her and J.H. for about “a month.” K.B. described that Crisp went for treatment in

Lima for a fractured foot he got from “running around” with K.B. and for injuries

sustained in a car accident. She recalled that once or twice, Crisp had received mail at

their house. She did not know if he was on the lease or whether he had a key to the

house; she thought he might have taken her mother’s key. K.B. did not believe that Crisp

paid any bills at the house. He did not have a job, so her mother would help him out.

Crisp often talked with his mother on the phone, but K.B. did not know where his mother

lives.

         {¶ 18} K.B. also testified that the three of them would go out to eat together or he

and J.H. would cook together. They would watch movies together. Crisp would sleep in

her mother’s bed. Crisp and J.H. were affectionate together—they would hold hands,

kiss, and cuddle. If her mom was sad, he would comfort her and rub her back.

Sometimes K.B. and Crisp would argue when she told him to get out of her room, or if

Crisp was arguing with K.B.’s mother, K.B. would jump in to defend her.

         {¶ 19} The officers also testified to facts pertinent to cohabitation. Officer

Beardsley said that Crisp’s clothes were in various areas throughout the residence.

Officer Garza couldn’t remember where Crisp’s clothes were located.

7.
       {¶ 20} The court denied Crisp’s motion.

                                 C. Crisp’s Case-In-Chief

       {¶ 21} Crisp testified in his own defense. On the issue of his residence, he said he

has lived with his mother on Calumet Avenue in Lima, Ohio, since 2001. He maintained

that he has a bedroom there, all his things are there, and his mail goes there. The Lima

address is on his driver’s license, he uses that address for social security and other

business purposes, and that is the address used for his probation in Lima. He

acknowledged that he spent time at J.H.’s residence, but he claimed only that he “would

go and visit her every now and then” and would stay one or two nights at the most. He

denied staying there months at a time and denied that he had furniture there. He said he

kept an outfit or two there. Crisp acknowledged that he was at the residence on

December 16, 2021, but claimed that he had only spent a day or two there. He was not

on the lease, had no key, and no utilities were in his name.

       {¶ 22} Crisp testified that there was a pending children’s services case involving

J.H. and K.B., but claimed that he was not an active participant. He said that Job and

Family Services closed a case against him because it concluded that he was not living in

the home.

       {¶ 23} As to the incident itself, Crisp said that he did not remember much about

the day because he had had hernia surgery in November and was still on medication. He

described that his relationship with K.B. was “alright,” but she was mouthy and always

8.
wanted to intervene between him and J.H. He agreed that they had gone out to eat that

day and that he and J.H. had arguments, but he denied that there was anything physical.

He recalled that he left J.H.’s home the night of the incident, then came back around 1:00

a.m. and had to knock on the window to ask to come back in. He claimed that he “put the

rug on the stove just to calm everybody down” because they were arguing.

       {¶ 24} When Crisp got back to the house around 1:00, he fixed himself something

to eat because J.H did not want to make food for him. He went to lie down with J.H., and

J.H. asked K.B. to get up and go to her own bed. This caused K.B. to “throw a little fit

cause she had to get up and get in her own bed so” Crisp could lie down. At that point,

“stuff started getting thrown.” Crisp told J.H. to tell K.B. to stop throwing things, but

K.B. hit him with a candle and a book. He told K.B. to chill out, then she came at him

swinging. He put his hand up trying to fend her off. She fell to the ground, but Crisp

denied striking her. He did not know why she fell to the ground. He did not see any red

mark. He claimed that he did not know that K.B. was going to the police station.

       {¶ 25} On the issue of his failure to appear in court, Crisp conceded that he missed

a court date, but claimed that he was sick and had tried to call his attorney’s office to get

his April 12, 2022 court date changed. He insisted that he was in Lima with a stomach

ache, throwing up. He has no documentation that he was sick that day and did not go to

the hospital or the doctor. He called the court, but was advised to talk to his attorney. He

has a physician in Lima, but does not have one in Williams County. The court took

9.
judicial notice that defense counsel was present in court on April 12, 2022, and counsel

made an oral representation that he had received a call that Crisp could not be there

because he was sick. Bond was revoked and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.

       {¶ 26} On cross-examination, Crisp acknowledged that he had a prior domestic

violence conviction out of Lima Municipal Court. He admitted that he has a sexual

relationship with J.H. and would occasionally stay at her residence. He claimed he would

bring only an outfit or two to her place. Crisp admitted that he was not supposed to be at

J.H.’s house, but insisted that J.H. asked him to come over. He acknowledged that he

drank alcohol on December 16, 2021—he claims he had “a drink.” He denied that he

drank to excess. He admitted that he had a beer after he left J.H.’s place in the early

morning hours of December 17, 2021.

                              D. The Trial Court’s Verdict

       {¶ 27} On September 29, 2022, the trial court orally announced its verdict in open

court. The court found Crisp guilty on both counts. It continued the matter for

sentencing. On October 27, 2022, the court imposed a prison term of 17 months on the

domestic violence conviction, 12 months in prison on the conviction for failure to appeal,

and up to two years’ discretionary postrelease control on both counts. The court ordered

that the prison sentences be served consecutively. The trial court’s sentencing entries

were filed on November 9, 2022.

10.
                            E. Crisp’s Assignments of Error

       {¶ 28} Crisp appealed. He assigns the following errors for our review:

              Assignment of Error One: Mr. Crisp’s conviction for domestic

       violence violates Due Process as it is based on insufficient evidence.

              Assignment of Error Two: The trial court’s findings were

       insufficient to warrant imposition of consecutive sentences.

                                II.    Law and Analysis

       {¶ 29} In his first assignment of error, Crisp argues that his domestic-violence

conviction lacked sufficient evidence that he was a “family or household member.” In

his second assignment of error, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive

sentences. We consider each of these assignments in turn.

                             A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       {¶ 30} Crisp was convicted of domestic violence, a violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).

R.C. 2919.25(A) prohibits a person from “knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause

physical harm to a family or household member.” In his first assignment of error, Crisp

argues that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence because the state failed

to show that he was a “family or household member” for purposes of R.C. 2919.25(A).

       {¶ 31} Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a question of

law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In reviewing a

challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing

11.
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 668

(1997). In making that determination, the appellate court will not weigh the evidence or

assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 212, 378

N.E.2d 1049 (1978). “Rather, we decide whether, if believed, the evidence can sustain

the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-

8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13. Naturally, this requires “a review of the elements of the

charged offense and a review of the state’s evidence.” Id.

       {¶ 32} R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(iii) defines “family or household member” to

include “a child of a * * * person living as a spouse * * * of the offender.” A “person

living as a spouse” means “a person who is living or has lived with the offender in a

common law marital relationship, who otherwise is cohabiting with the offender, or who

otherwise has cohabited with the offender within five years prior to the date of the

alleged commission of the act in question.” R.C. 2919.25(F)(2). Ohio courts recognize

that “[t]he burden of establishing cohabitation is not substantial.” State v. Woullard, 158

Ohio App.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-3395, 813 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). See also State v.

McManaway, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0046, 2022-Ohio-2086, ¶ 13.

       {¶ 33} There are two seminal Ohio Supreme Court cases explaining what it means

to “cohabitate” for purposes of the domestic violence statute: Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d

12.
459, 683 N.E.2d 1126, and State v. McGlothan, 138 Ohio St.3d 146, 2014-Ohio-85, 4

N.E.3d 1021. In Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court identified the essential elements of

“cohabitation” to include “(1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2)

consortium.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. The victim in Williams testified that

she did not live with the defendant, but they “were going together,” and for a few months,

she was staying more nights at his place than at hers. Id. at 460.

       {¶ 34} The court recognized that “[i]n contrast to ‘stranger’ violence, domestic

violence arises out of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.”

(Emphasis in original.) Id. at 462. It cited studies showing that “the rate of violence in

dating relationships is at least the same as, if not greater than, that of couples who

maintain one address.” Id., citing Klein & Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for

Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L.Rev. 801,

836-837 (1993). The court observed that the General Assembly recognized the special

nature of domestic violence when it drafted the domestic violence statutes, and

emphasized that “the offense of domestic violence arises out of the relationship itself, not

the fact that the parties happen to share one address.” Id. at 463.

       {¶ 35} To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court set out to define what it means to

“cohabitate.” It concluded that “the essential elements of ‘cohabitation’ are (1) sharing of

familial or financial responsibilities and (2) consortium.” Id. at paragraph two of the

syllabus. It provided examples of possible factors that may establish “shared familial or

13.
financial responsibilities,” including “provisions for shelter, food, clothing, utilities,

and/or commingled assets.” Id. at 465. It also provided examples of possible factors that

may establish “consortium,” including “mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society,

cooperation, solace, comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal relations.” Id.

The court explained that “[t]hese factors are unique to each case and how much weight, if

any, to give to each of these factors must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the trier

of fact.” Id.

       {¶ 36} Under the facts of the case in Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court observed

that the victim and the defendant had been fighting over money, suggesting that there was

a commingling of assets, and, therefore, a sharing of familial or financial responsibilities.

Moreover, the victim had testified that she and the defendant spent most of their nights

together at his residence and, at one time, she thought she might be pregnant with his

child, “demonstrating society and conjugal relations,” and by extension, consortium. Id.

On these facts, the court found that there was sufficient evidence upon which it could be

concluded that the victim and the defendant were “family or household members.”

       {¶ 37} In McGlothan, 138 Ohio St.3d 146, 2014-Ohio-85, 4 N.E.3d 1021, the

Ohio Supreme Court clarified Williams and expounded on what is necessary to establish

“cohabitation” for purposes of R.C. 2919.25(F)(2). Essentially, it determined that where

there is evidence that two people are living together, “the state ha[s] no obligation to

demonstrate the sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and consortium to prove

14.
cohabitation[.]” McGlothan at ¶ 15. It also emphasized that Williams set forth

nonexhaustive factors. It noted that shared living expenses “is merely one factor that a

court may consider in a cohabitation analysis.” Id. at ¶ 7.

       {¶ 38} Crisp maintains that the testimony did not show that he and J.H. lived

together. He claims, therefore, that the state was required to provide evidence of the

sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and consortium. While he concedes that

he and J.H. had a sexual relationship—the consortium element—he denies that they

shared familial or financial responsibilities. He emphasizes his own testimony indicating

that (1) he spent more nights at his own house in Lima rather than with J.H.; (2) he did

not contribute financially to the running of the household; (3) he was not on the lease and

did not have a key; (4) he had no job, paid no utilities, and did not contribute to groceries

for the household; (5) he had no responsibilities with respect to caring for K.B., such as

helping with homework or rides to activities; and (6) children’s services closed the case

against him because he was not a member of the household and a temporary order

forbade him from staying at the house in Bryan. Crisp also points to the absence of

testimony from K.B. indicating that he had moved in or was staying there permanently,

and emphasizes that even the LEADS search of his driver’s license showed that his

address was in Lima. As such, he argues, the state’s evidence is constitutionally deficient

to convict him of domestic violence.

15.
       {¶ 39} In State v. Tilman, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1238, 2022-Ohio-3928, ¶ 5,

we considered whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant as a

household member. There, the state presented evidence that the defendant received a

letter from Lucas County Children’s Services and credit card bills at the victim’s

apartment; the victim testified that she, the defendant, and her daughter regularly shared

meals and time together, spent time together with each other’s relatives, had an intimate

relationship, and shared a bed. She also testified that although his name was not on them,

the defendant sometimes helped with household bills, he kept a bag of toiletries at the

apartment, and he had garbage bags of clothes in her bedroom, but did not keep them in

her closet because it was too full for him to put them away. We found that while

conflicting evidence was presented as to whether appellant lived in the home, the

evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant as a household member.

       {¶ 40} Here, there was evidence presented that Crisp lived with J.H. and K.B. The

state presented testimony from K.B. that Crisp would stay with her and her mother “for a

long time,” would leave to go to appointments in Lima, but would come back. She said

that Crisp would stay at their home for about “a month” at a time and received mail at

their house a couple of times. K.B. testified that when J.H. told Crisp to leave, he “went

into the closet door” “to get all of his stuff,” which included “his clothes.” And K.B. told

Crisp that despite his threats, he wasn’t going to leave “cause he didn’t have anywhere to

go.” See State v. White, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25792, 2014-Ohio-1446, ¶ 14

16.
(concluding that a reasonable jury could find that victim and defendant were cohabitating

where, contrary to defendant’s testimony, victim testified that she had been living with

defendant in his room in a boarding house for about two months when incident occurred).

       {¶ 41} But even setting aside this testimony indicating that Crisp lived with J.H.

on the date of the offense—which would obviate the need for the state to prove

consortium and shared familial or financial responsibilities, see Tilman at ¶ 23 (“[T]he

element of cohabitation need not be proven where evidence is presented that the parties

lived together on the date of the offense.”)—there was evidence from which a rational

trier of fact could conclude that Crisp and J.H. “cohabitated” as that term has been

defined by the Ohio Supreme Court. Crisp conceded the “consortium” element of

cohabitation, thus the only issue was whether Crisp and J.H. shared familial or financial

responsibilities. Importantly, the state is not required to establish all the Williams factors

in order to demonstrate that the defendant shared familial or financial responsibilities.

State v. Young, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16985, 1998 WL 801498, *3 (Nov. 20, 1998).

And consistent with Williams, the focus must be on the relationship of the parties and not

the fact that they happen to share one address.

       {¶ 42} By Crisp’s admission, he and J.H. were involved in a romantic relationship.

Crisp regularly stayed at the home J.H. shared with her daughter. K.B. described that

Crisp would cook at the house, including on the night of the incident, and that earlier in

the night, Crisp and her mother did dishes together in the kitchen. She explained that

17.
they would cook together, go out to eat together, and watch movies together. If Crisp left

for appointments in Lima, he would come back. In fact, Crisp hurt his foot “running

around” with K.B. Finally, K.B. testified that Crisp did not pay bills because he did not

have a job; J.H. helped him out.

       {¶ 43} Focusing on the parties’ relationship rather than their exact living

circumstances, these facts, if believed, could lead a rational fact-finder to conclude that

Crisp and J.H. shared familial or financial responsibilities. This, plus Crisp’s concession

of the consortium element, leads us to conclude that the state presented sufficient

evidence to establish “cohabitation” for purposes of R.C. 2919.25(F)(2), and that Crisp

knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the child of a person with

whom he was cohabiting. Accordingly, we find Crisp’s first assignment of error not

well-taken.

                                 B. Consecutive Sentences

       {¶ 44} In his second assignment of error, Crisp argues that the trial court’s

imposition of consecutive sentences is not supported by the record. Although he

concedes that the trial court made the findings required to impose consecutive sentences,

he claims that the record does not support its findings.

       {¶ 45} We review a challenge to a felony sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise

18.
modify a sentence or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing

court for resentencing if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

              (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings

       under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of

       section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,

       whichever, if any, is relevant;

              (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

       {¶ 46} Crisp’s challenge falls under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) because he argues that

the trial court’s findings for imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

are not supported by the record. We review a trial court’s findings related to consecutive

sentences de novo. State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607, ¶ 27.1

       {¶ 47} Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), where a trial court imposes multiple prison

terms for convictions of multiple offenses, it may require the offender to serve the prison

terms consecutively if it finds that “consecutive service is necessary to protect the public

from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the

offender poses to the public,” and if it also finds any of the following:

1
 We note that a motion for reconsideration of this decision is pending before the Ohio
Supreme Court.

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              (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

       while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

       imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

       Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

              (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

       one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the

       multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

       of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

              (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

       consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

       by the offender.

       {¶ 48} This statute requires the trial court to make three statutory findings before

imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493,

108 N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 252; State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16

N.E.3d 659, ¶ 26. It must find that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the

public or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the

seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger that the offender poses to the

public; and (3) R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) is applicable. Beasley at ¶ 252. A

sentencing court must make its findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing

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hearing and incorporate them into the sentencing entry, but it need not state the reasons

behind its findings. Bonnell at syllabus.

       {¶ 49} The Ohio Supreme Court explained in Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-

Ohio-4607, the review an appellate court must undertake in considering the propriety of

the imposition of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). First, it must ensure

that the trial court made each of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Id. at ¶ 25.

Next, it must determine if the trial court’s findings are clearly and convincingly supported

by the record. Id. at ¶ 26. Reviewing the record for clear and convincing evidence

requires the appellate court to (1) determine if there is some evidentiary support in the

record for the trial court’s consecutive sentence findings, and (2) ensure that whatever

evidentiary basis exists is “adequate to fully support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence

findings.” Id. at ¶ 29. We may not vacate or modify an order imposing consecutive

sentences unless we have “a firm conviction or belief” that the evidence in the record

does not support the trial court’s findings. Id. at ¶ 26-27.

       {¶ 50} Here, Crisp concedes that the trial court made the required findings and

determined that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) applies. He contends, however, that the record

does not clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s findings. While he does not

dispute that he has a lengthy criminal history, he argues that he does not pose a danger

“to the larger public,” consecutive sentences are disproportionate to the seriousness of his

conduct and to the danger that he poses to the public, and the harm caused to K.B. was

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not so great or unusual that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness of

his conduct. As support, he maintains that K.B. testified that she was slapped with an

open hand, and the pictures demonstrate that there was no bruising—just a slight redness

underneath one eye on her cheekbone.

       {¶ 51} The state responds that Crisp showed no remorse and did not take

responsibility for the offenses; he has an extremely lengthy criminal history and has spent

at least 18 years of his life in prison; he violated bond conditions by failing to appear and

by violating a no-contact order; he was on community control when he committed the

offenses; and he has a history of assaultive behaviors for which he has never been

rehabilitated. The state urges that Crisp downplays the effects of his conduct. It

emphasizes that Crisp’s conduct prevented K.B. from feeling safe in her home, thus she

has suffered both physically and emotionally, and Crisp’s conduct and criminal history

demonstrate that he poses a danger to others with whom he may have relationships with

in the future.

       {¶ 52} Without question, Crisp has a long history of criminal conduct. The trial

court tallied the charges against Crisp at 90—these included probation violations,

misdemeanors, and felonies. It noted that Crisp, 46 years old, has spent 18 years of his

life in prison and additional time in jail. At sentencing, the trial court took particular

interest in Crisp’s history of assaultive behaviors. The PSI reveals that he has numerous

charges and convictions for assault and poses a particular risk to people with whom he is

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in relationships. While Crisp contends that he does not pose a danger “to the larger

public,” we decline to find that a person does not pose a danger to the public merely

because the most frequent victims of his assaultive behaviors are those with whom he

maintains relationships. See State v. Dixon, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-884, 2018-

Ohio-3759, ¶ 12 (imposing consecutive sentences, recognizing that defendant

“demonstrated a clear pattern of repeated behavior in that he has been assaultive to the

mothers of his children”). We also decline to find that Crisp’s failure to cause serious

bodily harm to K.B. requires a finding that consecutive sentences are disproportionate to

the seriousness of his conduct. As pointed out by the state, K.B. is a child who was made

to feel unsafe in her home, a place where she should feel most safe. The record reflects

that the night Crisp assaulted K.B. was a tumultuous night, during which Crisp also

threatened (and took steps) to burn down the house. This emotional harm to K.B., along

with the physical harm, contributed to the seriousness of Crisp’s conduct.

       {¶ 53} Accordingly, we conclude that the record clearly and convincingly supports

the trial court’s findings in support of consecutive sentences, including that (1)

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public or to punish Crisp; (2)

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Crisp’s conduct and

to the danger that he poses to the public; and (3) Crisp’s history of criminal conduct

demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future

crime. We find Crisp’s second assignment of error not well-taken.

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                                      III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 54} We conclude that after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that Crisp and J.H. cohabitated,

therefore, his conviction of domestic violence was supported by sufficient evidence. We

find Crisp’s first assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 55} We also conclude that the trial court’s findings in support of consecutive

sentences are clearly and convincingly supported by the record. We find Crisp’s second

assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 56} We affirm the November 9, 2022 judgments of the Williams County Court

of Common Pleas. Crisp is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.

                                                                       Judgments affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                          ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                    JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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