Court Opinion

ID: 9645666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:32:11.678872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:42.003453
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion because the defendant received a fundamentally fair trial. This Court should not substitute its view of the procedures for that of the trial court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. There was no abuse of discretion.
Daniel was charged with two counts of rape of his daughter from approximately February 21, Í993 to\March 15, 1993. The victim testified that she had been raped by her father and her uncle. Her father denied ever raping or molesting the victim. The victim’s cousin testified that she saw the father and daughter having sexual intercourse. This appeal followed the conviction of the father.
The trial judge did not commit reversible error or abuse his discretion in permitting the testimony of the victim’s sister and the victim’s cousin. Daniel was not denied due process of law as a result of the testimony. Daniel argues that he was not given reasonable notice prior to trial.
The record shows that at a pretrial conference on December 7, 1993, the prosecution gave notice pursuant to KRE 404(b) that it intended to use the testimony of other bad acts that had been committed with the victim and her sister. The prosecution indicated that the victim’s sister had been in foster care and had only recently come forward to her foster mother about her rape. The defense counsel said that an additional day would help him prepare by interviewing the witness. On the following day, defense counsel stated that he had interviewed the victim’s sister, but that he objected to her testimony because she was not specific, and he claimed she was not qualified to testify. The trial court overruled defense counsel’s motion.
The notice given to the defendant in this case is far more specific than that denounced by the majority in Gray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 895 (1992). There is no showing that fundamental fairness was abused. The majority opinion simply disagrees with the ruling by the trial judge and therefore summarily overrules the trial judge without an adequate legal basis. The majority substitutes its view of the situation for that of the trial judge. I believe the trial court ruled properly. The admission of evidence should remain in the sound discretion of the trial judge and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. There was no abuse of discretion in this case, because the defendant had sufficient notice.
Phillips v. Commonwealth, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 235 (1984), held that where evidence of other crimes is admitted into evidence, a reviewing court must consider all the evidence to determine if the accused has been unduly prejudiced. The victim’s cousin, who was 14 years-of-age at the time of trial, testified that she had observed the father engage in sexual intercourse with the victim. She also stated that she had sexual intercourse with both the defendant and her own father.
Lear v. Commonwealth, Ky., 884 S.W.2d 657 (1994), held that when the acts in question show such a well-defined, continuous pattern of conduct, they are admissible. In this case, the evidence indicates a well-defined, continuous pattern of conduct. Here all the victims were young females, daughters or nieces of the accused, who were living in or visiting his home and under his control. There is no issue of remoteness because the rapes occurred within a 30-day period. The requirements of Lear, supra, were satisfied and the evidence was properly admitted.
The trial judge properly admitted into evidence the testimony of the detective because it was offered to show that he took the statement, placed the victim in protective custody and ordered a physical examination, not for the proof of the matter asserted. The officer is permitted to testify as to what *81the victim said to him and what actions he took as a result thereof under the verbal acts doctrine. Cf. Releford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 770 (1993).
Reliance on Bussey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 797 S.W.2d 488 (1990), is misplaced. Here only one detective testified as to what he was told and the action he took. The victim said she was raped by both Daniel and her uncle. I do not believe the testimony unduly bolstered her statements and does not amount to a Bussey, supra, error where four officers testified. The alleged error was not prejudicial to Daniel.
The victim testified as to the rapes and that is sufficient. The uncorroborated testimony of the victim is enough to sustain a conviction for rape, sodomy or sexual abuse. Dyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 647 (1991). The error, if any, in the admission of the detective’s testimony would be nonprejudicial. Abernathy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 949 (1969).
I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
REYNOLDS, J., joins in this dissent.