Court Opinion

ID: 9716443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:39:46.593587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:45.641408
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 16. (dissenting). The Majority decides that between a wholly innocent landlord and a tenant whose use of her hair drier caused a several-thousand-dollar fire, the landlord is stuck with the fire-damage bill, even though it and the tenant had a contract to the contrary. Neither the law nor reason permits this bizarre result. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*159I.
¶ 17. As the Majority recognizes, there are no disputed facts in this case. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on stipulated facts. As material to this appeal, the parties agreed:
• The apartment rented to Cari M. Connell suffered some eight-thousand dollars of damage as the result of a fire that started in the apartment.
• "Said damages were caused by a fire, the origin of which came from a hair dryer owned by Cari Connell."
• "Although said hair dryer was the cause of the fire, it is agreed that Cari Connell did not previously know of any defect in said hair dryer."
The pertinent part of the lease provides:
Lessee responsible for acts and breaches of Lease by Lessee and Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees. Lessee shall be responsible for all intentional and negligent acts or breaches of this Lease by Lessee, Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees. Lessee shall be liable for all damage to the premises and appliances and equipment belonging thereto, in any way caused by the acts of Lessee, Lessee's occupants, guests and invitees.
(Underlining in original.) On its face, the lease thus makes Cari M. Connell liable to Maryland Arms "for all damage" to the apartment "in any way caused by the acts of' Ms. Connell. The circuit court thus ruled that the Connells were liable to Maryland Arms because Ms. Connell's hair dryer caused the fire. The Connells contend, and the Majority agrees, that both the lease and the material provisions of the Wisconsin statutes require that Cari M. Connell be negligent in connection *160with the fire as a precondition to imposition of liability. I disagree.
II.
¶ 18. The language of the lease the Connells signed is clear: as the circuit court observed, it makes them liable "for sill damage ... in any way caused by the acts of' Cari M. Connell. (Emphasis added.) Here, the parties agreed that Ms. Connell's "hair dryer was the cause of the fire." According to the undisputed summary judgment Record, it was plugged in at the time and the fire erupted when Ms. Connell was alone in her apartment, asleep; no one disputes that Ms. Connell plugged in the hair dryer, and left it plugged in while she slept. This might or might not rise to the level of negligence, but those two events (plugging it in and leaving it plugged in while she slept) were certainly acts that led directly to the fire, and were not mere causes in some obscure metaphysical sense, as the Connells contend.
¶ 19. The Connells argue, and the Majority agrees, that the second sentence of the lease provision we quoted must be read in the context of the first sentence, which makes the tenant "responsible for all intentional and negligent acts" and thus, they argue, negligence is also a prerequisite under the second sentence. If this were true, however, one of the sentences would be mere surplusage. We are constrained to apply contract language so that every element has meaning and nothing is surplusage. Kasten v. Doral Dental USA, LLC, 2007 WI 76, ¶ 48, 301 Wis. 2d 598, 628, 733 N.W.2d 300, 315. I agree with the circuit court that "any act" means "any act" and that, accordingly, the lease makes the Connells liable for the damages resulting from the fire that would not have started unless Cari M. Connell plugged in her hair dryer and left it plugged in, irrespective of whether this was "negligence."
*161¶ 20. The Connells also contend, and the Majority agrees, that the lease clause conflicts with Wis. Stat. § 704.07.1 Like the circuit court, I do not agree.
*162¶ 21. The Connells argue that Wis. Stat. § 704.07(3)(a)'s requirement that tenants repair "premises [that] are damaged by the negligence or improper use of the premises by the tenant," and § 704.07(4)'s requirement that the landlord must repair premises rendered "untenantable because of damage by fire" unless "the damage or condition is caused by negligence or improper use by the tenant" conflicts with the lease *163clause making the tenant responsible for non-negligent acts, and that this conflict is prohibited by § 704.07(1), which, as we see in the footnote, provides that "[a]n agreement to waive the requirements of this section in a residential tenancy is void." In my view, the lease provision did not purport to "waive" any of the provisions of § 704.07.
¶ 22. First, the lease provision did not waive or relinquish the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 704.07(3)(a) that the tenant is responsible for damages caused by his or her negligence. Further, § 704.07(3)(a) does not say that "the tenant must repair the damage and restore the appearance of the premises" only if he or she is negligent. There is nothing in that clause that prevents the parties from agreeing, as the parties did here, to affix liability on a tenant who causes damage even though he or she is not negligent. Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 704.03(1) specifically provides that "[sjections 704.05 and 704.07 govern as to matters within the scope of such sections and not provided for in such written lease or contract." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, making the tenant liable for damages the tenant causes even if the tenant is not negligent makes sense because as between the parties, the landlord and the tenant, the tenant is best able to monitor what goes on in his or her apartment and prevent damage. Certainly in this case, although Ms. Connell might not have been negligent, her acts and not that of the landlord caused the fire. The responsibility is properly hers and not the landlord's and, as the legislature recognized, the parties were free to apportion that reality in their agreement.
¶ 23. Second, and similarly, the lease provision also did not waive or relinquish the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 704.07(4) that the landlord keep the premises tenantable unless "damage or condition is caused by *164negligence or improper use by the tenant." Again, there is nothing in § 704.07(4) that prevents the parties from agreeing that where the damage is the result of the tenant's non-negligent acts, the landlord as the wholly innocent party should have recourse from the tenant for the cost of needed repairs. See Wis. Stat. § 704.03. Stated another way, although the landlord may have the duty to repair under § 704.07(4) (unless that duty is voided by the tenant's negligence), there is nothing in § 704.07(4) that requires the landlord to be ultimately responsible for the repair costs caused by the tenant if the parties otherwise agree, which is what they did here.2
¶ 24. The Wisconsin Constitution enjoins the lawmaking, law-interpreting, and law-enforcing branches of government from interfering with the right of persons to fashion contracts to govern their relationships and respective liabilities in connection with those relationships. Thus, article I, section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[n]o . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts[] shall ever be passed." It is true, of course, that this provision must be read consistent with the rules of reason and the state's police power. See *165State ex rel. Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass'n of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Adamany, 64 Wis. 2d 280, 292, 219 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1974) ("We have thus accepted the proposition that the obligation of contract is not an absolute right, but is one that may be obliged to yield to the compelling interest of the public — the exercise of the police power."). But we have no license to engraft on a statute inferences not clearly stated when to do so, as it does here, nullifies a contract entered freely and without duress.
¶ 25. The landlord here was entitled to try to protect itself from damages caused by a tenant. No doubt, it believed that it had done so. Both the circuit court and I also believe that it had done so. The Majority does not. Indeed, under the Majority's rationale, no landlord and tenant can ever agree that the tenant will be responsible for damages caused by the tenant, unless the landlord is able to prove that the tenant was negligent. This is not only bad law, it is contrary to the statutes. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 704.07 reads in full:
Repairs; untenantability. (1) Application of section. This section applies to any nonresidential tenancy if there is no contrary provision in writing signed by both parties and to all residential tenancies. An agreement to waive the requirements of this section in a residential tenancy is void. Nothing in this section is intended to affect rights and duties arising under other provisions of the statutes.
(2) Duty of landlord, (a) Except for repairs made necessary by the negligence of, or improper use of the premises by, the tenant, the landlord has a duty to do all of the following:
1. Keep in a reasonable state of repair portions of the premises over which the landlord maintains control.
2. Keep in a reasonable state of repair all equipment under the landlord's control necessary to supply services that the landlord has expressly or impliedly agreed to furnish to the tenant, such as heat, water, elevator, or air conditioning.
3. Make all necessary structural repairs.
4. Except for residential premises subject to a local housing code, and except as provided in sub. (3) (b), repair or replace any plumbing, electrical wiring, machinery, or equipment furnished with the premises and no longer in reasonable working condition.
5. For a residential tenancy, comply with any local housing code applicable to the premises.
(b) If the premises are part of a building, other parts of which are occupied by one or more other tenants, negligence or improper use by one tenant does not relieve the landlord from the landlord's duty as to the other tenants to make repairs as provided in par. (a).
(c) If the premises are damaged by fire, water or other casualty, not the result of the negligence or intentional act of the landlord, this subsection is inapplicable and either sub. (3) or (4) governs.
(3) Duty of tenant, (a) If the premises are damaged by the negligence or improper use of the premises by the tenant, the tenant must repair the damage and restore the appearance of the *162premises by redecorating. However, the landlord may elect to undertake the repair or redecoration, and in such case the tenant must reimburse the landlord for the reasonable cost thereof; the cost to the landlord is presumed reasonable unless proved otherwise by the tenant.
(b) Except for residential premises subject to a local housing code, the tenant is also under a duty to keep plumbing, electrical wiring, machinery and equipment furnished with the premises in reasonable working order if repair can be made at cost which is minor in relation to the rent.
(c) A tenant in a residential tenancy shall comply with a local housing code applicable to the premises.
(4) Untenantability If the premises become untenantable because of damage by fire, water or other casualty or because of any condition hazardous to health, or if there is a substantial violation of sub. (2) materially affecting the health or safety of the tenant, the tenant may remove from the premises unless the landlord proceeds promptly to repair or rebuild or eliminate the health hazard or the substantial violation of sub. (2) materially affecting the health or safety of the tenant; or the tenant may remove if the inconvenience to the tenant by reason of the nature and period of repair, rebuilding or elimination would impose undue hardship on the tenant. If the tenant remains in possession, rent abates to the extent the tenant is deprived of the full normal use of the premises. This section does not authorize rent to be withheld in full, if the tenant remains in possession. If the tenant justifiably moves out under this subsection, the tenant is not liable for rent after the premises become untenantable and the landlord must repay any rent paid in advance apportioned to the period after the premises become untenantable. This subsection is inapplicable if the damage or condition is caused by negligence or improper use by the tenant.

 We are not dealing with a situation where a lease agreement attempts to exculpate a landlord for his or her own negligence. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 88 Wis. 2d 124, 130, 276 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Ct. App. 1979) ("The general rule is that an exculpatory clause exempting a landlord from liability resulting from a condition of the premises does not apply where the damage sustained is caused by the active or affirmative negligence of the landlord."); Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08 ("No rental agreement may:... (5) Relieve, or purport to relieve the landlord from liability for property damage or personal injury caused by negligent acts or omissions of the landlord.").