Court Opinion

ID: 9760798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:16:56.416635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:16.826185
License: Public Domain

DOGGETT, Justice,
joined by GAMMAGE, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
My opinion of November 24, 1993 is withdrawn and the following is substituted. This new opinion is necessitated by the formal merger of the previous peculiar twin majority opinions of Chief Justice Phillips and Justice Hecht, compare Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 565 (Tex.1989) (Chief Justice Phillips dissenting to his own majority opinion), and by the majority’s abandonment of its previous rationale regarding the contribution due from Energy Coatings. Compare 37 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 162, 167 (Nov. 24, 1993) (Doggett, J., concurring & dissenting).
*332Today’s extended observations address significant, complex issues on which the litigants have not fully spoken. The parties limited their argument to the prejudgment interest issue on which writ was granted, and only the defendants even briefed the issue on comparative responsibility about which today’s majority now says so much. See generally Fikes v. Ports, 378 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“Our judicial system rests upon the foundation of an adversary presentation, which affords a theoretical guarantee that the diligent antagonists, by developing all aspects of the dispute, will prevent the court from being misled by inadequate understanding of the facts and law, into a position unjust to the parties before it and possibly damaging to the community”); compare Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 200, 201 (Tex.1992) (majority declines decision of issue on grounds that “it has not been adequately presented by the parties[ and i]t would ill-serve the State’s jurisprudence to decide [it] on such a sparse record.”).
I. Loss of Inheritance Damages
The majority today rewrites our state’s decisional law regarding loss of inheritance damages. After making a thorough review of decisions in other jurisdictions, leading commentators, and federal statutory provisions, this Court concluded in Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.1986), that allowing recovery for loss of inheritance was necessary to ensure justice for the family members of some victims of wrongful death.1 We defined loss of inheritance damages as
the present value that the deceased, in reasonable probability, would have added to the estate and left at natural death to the statutory wrongful death beneficiaries but for the wrongful act causing the premature death.
Id. at 633. The minority view that such damages are simply “too speculative” was expressly rejected:
Though probably nothing is more certain than the uncertainty of human life, presuming that thrifty persons will accumulate an estate and leave it to their heirs at death is no more speculative than finding any of the other recognized elements of pecuniary loss in a wrongful death action, such as lost support, guidance, and training. “Statutes giving damages for injuries resulting in death necessarily deal with probabilities,” and necessarily indeterminate damages are properly left to the sound determination of the jury. San Antoni[o] A.P. Ry. Co. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148, 27 S.W. 113, 117, 118 (1894).

Id.

Under the guise of “no evidence” review, the majority has today once again rejected that “sound determination of the jury.” Id. In determining a “no evidence” point, a reviewing court “must consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the jury’s finding, viewed most favorably in support of the finding, and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.” Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex.1992); see also State v. $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.1991) (per curiam); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). If more than a scintilla of such evidence exists, the claim is sufficient as a matter of law, and any challenges go merely to the weight to be accorded the evidence.
The court of appeals here had no difficulty applying that well established standard and concluding that there is obviously some evidence to support the jury finding that Linda Thompson, the widow, suffered $200,000 in damages for loss of inheritance. 810 S.W.2d 259, 270-71. This evidence established the current salary and reasonably expected increases for Jerry Thompson, a certified public accountant and vice president of Sunbelt Ironworks, Inc. Testimony further addressed his very conservative spending hab*333its, accumulation of savings, retirement plans, age, health, and relationship with the wrongful death beneficiaries, as well as the age and health of the latter.
In addition to lay witnesses on these subjects, Dr. John William Allen, a professor of economics at Texas A & M University,
testified as to the value of Jerry Thompson’s earning capacity, made a deduction for ... personal consumption, and valued the loss from Jerry Thompson’s death, discounted to present value.
810 S.W.2d at 271. This calculation of the decedent’s spending habits or consumption allowance is ignored. While not assigning a precise dollar value to the loss of inheritance component of damages, Dr. Allen did provide evidence from which the jury could properly make its own assessment. However, nothing in Yowell mandates or even implies that expert testimony is a prerequisite to establishing this category of damages. We said there that:
The plaintiffs introduced evidence as to each of the decedents’ salaries, expected raises, expected promotions and salary increases, earning capacities, enforced savings through pension plans, spending habits, age, health, and relationship with the wrongful death beneficiaries. The plaintiffs also produced evidence of the age and health of the wrongful death beneficiaries.
703 S.W.2d at 634.2 Although the evidence addressed here is quite similar to that upheld as legally sufficient in Yowell it will not suffice for this majority.3
Therefore, it is obviously not the amount of evidence offered by the Thompsons, which exceeded that presented in Yowell, but any recovery whatsoever for loss of inheritance damages to which the majority objects. Since “[t]he parties have not argued that we should revisit Yowell,” 903 S.W.2d at 324, he simply criticizes the Thompson family for some vague failing in offering the same type of evidence approved by Yowell. The essence of the majority’s thinking is captured by its conclusion that
[t]he argument that loss of inheritance damages are inherently too speculative and should never be awarded, although rejected in Yowell, has not been disproved.
903 S.W.2d at 323. Not “disproved,” indeed, this argument previously rejected by both this Court in Yowell and in the extensive authorities upon which we relied there, is today lovingly approved. The reasoning that we employed in 1986, the reasoning that others have embraced for decades, remains valid today: “ [preventing the heir’s recovery would protect the wrongdoer from the consequences of the wrong.” 703 S.W.2d at 633. Here, that wrong means the denial of $200,-000 in damages to Jerry Thompson’s widow as determined by the jury, adjudged by the trial court, and affirmed by the court of appeals. For our broader jurisprudence, it means that the majority continues a disturbing trend of reversing the prior rulings of *334this Court through mischaracterization4 and weakening the right to trial by jury.5
II. Prejudgment Interest
The proper answer concerning prejudgment interest, the only issue on which we requested oral argument, is indisputable. No ambiguity, no statutory conflict, nor confusing legislative history is involved here. The statutory language at issue is clear and terse: “prejudgment interest accrues on the amount of the judgment_” Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a). The phrase “amount of the judgment” means all, not pari; it encompasses both past and future damages.
No state court in any reported case has ever experienced the slightest difficulty understanding this legislative command, and every Texas appellate judge to have previously considered these nine words has reached the same obvious conclusion. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Berry, 833 S.W.2d 587, 596 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Hughes v. Thrash, 832 S.W.2d 779, 787 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word v. Dunsmoor, 832 S.W.2d 112, 115-16 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, writ denied); C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 810 S.W.2d 259, 276 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991); C.T.W. v. B.C.G., 809 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1991, no writ); Ellis County State Bank v. Keever, 870 S.W.2d 63, 71-72 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 888 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.1994). Indeed, as one of these decisions concluded, the legislature “could have hardly used language which more clearly expressed a desire to allow a party to recover pre-judgment interest on the entire amount of the damages.... ” C.T.W., 809 S.W.2d at 795. A diverse statewide committee that prepared recommendations to guide the bench and bar in the proper preparation of jury instructions has likewise advised that “it is no longer necessary to obtain separate answers for past and future damages to calculate prejudgment interest.” State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury Charges Comment to PJC 81.02 at 81-7.
There are several ways in which the legislature could have written its enactment to satisfy Justice Hecht. It could easily have defined “judgment” in such a way as to exclude future damages or said that prejudgment interest accrues only on past damages. Alternatively, it could simply have expanded its prohibition of prejudgment interest for certain types of damages6 to prejudgment interest for future damages. But instead the legislature chose to define as “interest” a remedy which does not measure the value of lost use of money. Justice Hecht professes much conceptual distress with this legislative decision, describing it rather vividly as a “crucifi[xion] [of] language”. 903 S.W.2d at 329 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting). But a body of lawmakers does not always deal in concepts and theories; it must resolve conflicts through give and take. Pragmatism — the art of compromise — predominates. The type of “linguistic purity” demanded by Justice Hecht, id., has seldom been a theme of effective lawmaking nor a regular requirement of our constitution. Perhaps such an approach is desirable in academia, but it is *335not appropriate for a court of law that is obligated to enforce what the legislature enacts.
The compromise struck here is documented by two of the principal proponents of “tort reform”, who agreed during legislative negotiations to yield a modest concession to their opponents by applying prejudgment interest to future damages. Senator John Montford has described his sponsorship of broad “tort reform” legislation advanced by the insurance industry and other lobby groups operating under the title “Texas Civil Justice League”. See John Montford and Will Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The Quest For a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous.L.Rev. 59, 80-88 (1988). This article devotes fifteen pages to describing the six separate changes that were involved in “strik[ing] a new balance” with regard to prejudgment interest. Id. at 102-16.
These two tort reform advocates are as unequivocal as every previous Texas judge that in “modifying Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.,” 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1985), the statute “expands prejudgment interest to future damages included in the judgment.” Id. at 102.7 In addition to noting, at least four times, this obvious effect of the statute, they provide an illustrative case example as a practice guide so that attorneys will not be confused by the legislative changes. Id. at 103-04. This particular section of their writing is not some after-the-fact, self-serving affidavit of a single legislator or an attempt to embellish and expand language that the legislature did not approve. Were that the purpose of theft writing, I would agree with Justice Hecht that it would “provide little guidance as to what the legislature collectively intended.” 903 S.W.2d at 328. But in what is really the legislative equivalent of an admission against interest, the sponsor is only outlining a concession made in order to achieve enactment of an entire legislative package. This product of legislative compromise is candidly described:
From a tort reform policy perspective section 6(a) [of the prejudgment interest statute] is a trade-off provision. Shortening of the accrual period promotes the policies of the tort reform laws, while applicability to future damages does not.
Id. at 104. See also id. at 105 (referencing theft legislation as “expanding Cavnar ⅛ scope to include future damages”). Quite clearly the legislature’s word choice was not casual. Hence, the trial court in awarding prejudgment interest on all damages and the court of appeals in affirming that judgment were simply enforcing what the legislature wrote.
III. Contribution and Set-off
The same legislative effort which affected prejudgment interest also yielded a complex revision of the law governing contribution rights among multiple defendants and defining the effect of any settlements. The statute clearly defines what is necessary to constitute a “settling person”8 and provides that the effect of a
claimant[’s] ... settle[ment] with one or more persons [is to] reduce the amount of damages to be recovered ... by ... the sum of the dollar amounts of all settlements.
TEX.Crv.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.012(b)(1) (1993). Before the jury deliberated, C & H entered into a partial settlement with the Thompsons. For purposes of deciding whether the amount of this settlement will reduce the Thompsons’ recovery against the other defendants pursuant to this provision, the majority correctly acknowledges that the language means what it says — the statutory
*336definition does not limit settling persons to those who have fully resolved all claims against them; rather it includes those who settle only part of their liability.
903 S.W.2d at 819. Although remaining a defendant subject to liability in this case, C & H has entered a partial settlement that is statutorily mandated to benefit all defendants, each of which enjoys a reduction in the amount due the plaintiffs equal to a proportionate share of the amount paid by C & H to resolve the claim against it.
But the term “settling person” is employed more than once; another section of the same statute tersely mandates that “[n]o defendant has a right of contribution against any settling person.” Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.015(d) (1993). Applying this clear command, the court of appeals properly concluded that C & H, as a “settling person”, should not be hable for claims of contribution brought by a co-defendant, such as E cotech. Displeased with this result, the majority refuses to enforce the statutory inclusion of partially settling persons. Preferring euphemistically its own “better reading” of this legislative enactment, the majority rewrites the direct and simple command of section 33.015(d) to provide that “a settling person is free from contribution only to the extent of the liability settled.” 903 S.W.2d at 319. One consequence is to remove by judicial fiat the statutory protection from contribution claims that a company like C & H had a right to expect when it made a settlement payment to the Thompsons.
The contribution section merited only a regular reading, but to avoid a perceived “anomaly” the recovery credit section gets this new, improved form of perusal. “Reviewing] the statute for fairness” is “beyond [the Court’s] power” as to the contribution action, 903 S.W.2d at 320, but represents the very course that the majority must pursue with reference to the recovery credit section.9 In reality, the statute’s meaning thus shifts from section to section in accord with the whims not of a judicial reader, but a judicial writer.
On rehearing, the majority no longer disputes that a severally liable defendant like Energy Coatings has potential contribution liability for its comparative percentage of the verdict, rather than the judgment. Compare 37 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. at 154 (Hecht, J., for the majority) (holding Energy Coatings is liable in contribution to the extent it has not paid its proportion of the judgment). Section 33.015(a) sets the maximum contribution obligations of those defendants who are not jointly and severally liable as their individual percentage of damages found by the trier of fact[.] Subsection (b), in contrast, provides that each jointly and severally liable defendant can be liable for contribution to each other for
the damages recoverable by the claimant under Section 33.012 in proportion to his respective percentage of responsibility.
The obvious difference in language in these parallel subsections has to do with whether *337the co-defendants’ maximum contribution liabilities are its percentage of damages found by the jury, or its percentage of the amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff, after the reductions required by section 33.012 have been made. In this case, as in many others, the difference is significant. The amount of damages found by the trier of fact is $8,205,720.35, while the net damages recoverable by the plaintiff is $2,205,720.35. Under the plain language of subsection (a), Energy Coatings’ contribution liability should be five percent of the greater amount; its maximum contribution liability to jointly and severally liable defendants is its “percentage of damages found by the trier of fact.”
By a strained interpretation of section 33.015(a), however, the majority holds that Energy Coatings can have no contribution liability to C & H or Ecotech. Under that section, contribution may be sought against a severally liable defendant by a jointly and severally liable defendant who
pays a percentage of the damages for which the defendant is jointly and severally liable greater than his percentage of responsibility....
§ 33.015(a). The phrase “damages for which defendant is jointly and severally liable” is an obvious and straightforward reference to
damages recoverable by the claimant under Section 33.012 [against] defendants who [are] jointly and severally liable....
§ 33.015(b). Section 33.012 damages are percentages of amounts recoverable under the judgment, rather than amounts awarded by the jury. §§ 33.012; 33.013(b). Thus, under section 33.015(a), a jointly and severally liable defendant is entitled to contribution from a severally liable defendant when it pays to the plaintiff more than its percentage of responsibility for the judgment. There is no threshold requirement that it pay more than its percentage of the jury verdict.
By obscure reasoning, the majority concludes the opposite — that a jointly and severally liable defendant has no contribution rights against a severally liable defendant unless it has paid more than its required percentage both of the judgment damages and the jury verdict damages. 903 S.W.2d at 318. In other words, the majority interprets the words “jointly and severally liable” in section 33.015(a) to refer both to the defendant’s joint and several liability under § 33.013(b) as well as that defendant’s several liability under § 33.013(a). Id. The only legitimate way for the statute to have this meaning would be by substituting the word “or” for the word “and” in the controlling phrase from section 33.015(a):
If a defendant who is jointly and severally liable under Section 33.013 pays a percentage of the damages for which the defendant is jointly and [or] severally liable greater than his percentage of responsibility, that defendant has a right of contribution. ...
Despite the majority’s ironic averment that it relies on a “literal reading” of section 33.015(a), its approach in fact requires that the language of that section be ignored.
Under the statute, C & H and Ecotech are jointly liable for the damages recoverable by Thompson. § 33.013(b). If, by virtue of their several liability for their respective percentages of the jury verdict, § 33.013(a), either one pays more than their percentage of comparative responsibility for the damages recoverable by Thompson, then they can seek contribution against Energy Coatings, to the extent the latter has not paid 5% of the damages recoverable under the jury verdict. I would so hold.
IV. Conclusion
Today’s opinion effectively rejects both our decisional law on loss of inheritance damages and a legislative command on handling multiple parties in complex litigation. With reference to Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the majority accomplishes a judicial rewrite that was only very narrowly avoided for the prejudgment interest statute.10 This is not statutory construe*338tion, it is statutory deconstruction.11 Preferring to respect both the precedent of this Court and the relevant legislative enactment, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court except with regard to the ultimate contribution obligation of Energy Coating.

. By the time of our decision in Yowell, "loss of inheritance damages ha[d] long been recognized as recoverable in death cases.” 1 Stuart M. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 3:39, at 278 (2d ed. 1975) (citing Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act 378 (2d ed. 1913) and McCormick, Damages 350 (1935)).

. See also Lopez v. City Towing Assoc., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 254, 265 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (detailing evidence sufficient to support award of loss of inheritance damages); Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 1336, 1340 (5th Cir.1990) (‘‘[Loss of inheritance] damages are recoverable [in Texas] ‘where the wrongful death plaintiff shows that the decedent (1) would have enhanced his estate by some amount by saving some of his earnings or by prosperous management of his investments, and (2) would, in all reasonable probability, have left that amount upon his natural death to the plaintiff.’ ”) (quoting Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 290 (5th Cir.1987)) (emphasis omitted).

. The majority’s contention that the evidence presented here also fails to meet the Lopez standard, 903 S.W.2d at 324, is contradicted by that decision:
Mrs. Lopez had worked ten years in a day care center prior to the accident and had only quit her job one month before the accident. [She] obtained her G.E.D. and was promoted to teacher’s aide and then to a teacher's position. Testimony indicated that Mrs. Lopez wanted to obtain a college degree so that she could return to work as an elementary school teacher or as a substitute teacher. There was testimony that Mrs. Lopez’ earnings were not used to support the family, but were used to provide extra things for the family, primarily for the children. Finally, there was extensive testimony of Mrs. Lopez’ close and loving relationship with the members of her family.
754 S.W.2d at 265. There is far more testimony in the record here as to the financial status and acumen of Jerry Thompson from which a jury could deduce the amount of the estate that would likely have been left by him than was held sufficient to support such an award in Lopez.

. See University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 180-81 (Tex.1994) (Gammage, J., dissenting) (effectively overruling longstanding precedent while purporting to distinguish it); Dresser v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 750, 757 (Doggett, J., dissenting) ("By what it euphemistically labels reading [a prior decision] in ‘context’, the majority essentially reads that ruling out of the lawbooks.”).

. See, e.g., Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 459-67 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 609-10, 616 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting); May v. United Services Ass’n of America, 844 S.W.2d 666, 675 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting); LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 55-56 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 599 (Tex.1992) (Mauzy, J., dissenting); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 491 (Tex.1991) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex.1990) (Doggett, J., dissenting).

. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 41.006 (Supp.1993), which excludes prejudgment interest for punitive damages on causes implicated under TexCiv.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.001 (Supp.1993).

. See also id. at 103: "Section 6(a) also expands the Cavnar reach of prejudgment interest, which included only past damages (damages that have accrued by the time of judgment) to apply also to future damages included in the judgment.”

. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.011(5) (1993) provides:
"Settling person” means a person who at the time of submission has paid or promised to pay money or anything of monetary value to a claimant at any time in consideration of potential liability pursuant to the provisions of Section 33.001 with respect to the personal injury, property damage, death, or other harm for which recovery of damages is sought.

. Consistent application of the statutory definition of "settling persons” would benefit claimants such as the Thompson family — a result this majority consistently disfavors. It is noteworthy that the majority does not give plaintiffs the same benefits of the type of "better reading” he accords when statutory language anomalously harms defendants. If a "better reading” of section 33.015(d) would interpret "any settling person” to mean “any settling person to the extent of the liability settled," surely it is also a better reading of section 33.012(b) to interpret the "dollar amounts of all settlements" to mean all settlements to the extent they settle the same type of liability found by the jury. Such a reading would prevent settlement funds from offsetting a plaintiff’s recovery against nonsettling defendants as long as the settlement did not bar contribution claims against the settling party.
It may well be anomalous, absurd and unfair for a partial settlement that does not limit non-settling defendants' contribution recovery against the settling defendant to nevertheless limit the plaintiff’s recovery against the nonsettling defendants. This result of the majority's inconsistent reading of Chapter 33 also runs contrary to our previous common law jurisprudence on contribution. See, e.g., Cypress Creek Utility Service Co. v. Muller, 640 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex.1982) (settlement credit given nonsettling defendants constitutes a substitute for the right of contribution the nonsettling defendant would have had against the settling defendant if that defendant had not settled).
I would construe all provisions of the statute consistently, as written, to bar all contribution claims against settling defendants as well as reduce the plaintiffs’ recovery by the amount received in consideration of the settlement.

. The majority also reaches out in an attempt to limit the right to trial by jury with unnecessary dicta addressing a subargument that an award of prejudgment interest on future damages violates Article I, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution. This contention was not the subject of any writing by the court of appeals or any oral argument or authority cited by the parties and merited all *338of one sentence in the brief of one Defendant and three sentences in that of the other. See 903 S.W.2d at 327.

. Only recently Justice Hecht attempted to apply this same approach to a civil service statute that met with his personal disapproval. See Tijerina v. City of Tyler, 846 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Tex.1992) (Hecht, J., dissenting). There this court resisted the temptation to meddle:
While we may permissibly consider public policy in construing the intent of the Legislature from an ambiguous provision, we cannot rewrite or ... deconstruct a plainly worded statute because we believe it does not effectuate sound policy.
846 S.W.2d at 828.