Court Opinion

ID: 9776279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:29:25.101471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:36.505169
License: Public Domain

FENDER, Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
On original submission the undersigned prepared and circulated an opinion affirming the instant cause in its entirety. This *788opinion is prepared and submitted only to dissent from that portion of the now majority opinion which reverses the trial court below on the disposition of the jurisdictional question.
I agree with the majority’s recitation of the chain of events that sets the stage for this decision and will not repeat same here. I also agree that the threshold question requires us to determine if the trial court erred in deeming Liberty’s conduct as a general appearance without an opportunity to have a hearing and to present its contest to the jurisdiction.
Basic authority permitting a party who claims not to be amenable to process issued by the courts of this state to enter a special appearance objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over its person or property is provided by TEX.R.CIV.P. 120a. The rule prescribes the requisites of such special appearance and contemplates that the matter be heard and determined before a motion to transfer venue or any other plea or pleading may be heard. If the objection to the jurisdiction is overruled, the objecting party may thereafter appear generally for any purpose without waiver of objection to the jurisdiction.
As noted in the factual summary, Liberty’s entrance in this cause came only after Moore had obtained a default judgment against it, thus necessitating the filing and disposition of its motion for new trial in order to preserve the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear its objection to the jurisdiction. After a new trial was granted to Liberty, it was the contention of Moore and the decision of the trial court that Liberty’s conduct to such point constituted a general appearance which served as a bar to its continued objection to the jurisdiction. Such conclusion evidently was reached in view of the limitation of section 1, Rule 120a, with the necessary implication that there can be no special appearance after judgment.
Liberty contends that a party does not enter a general appearance when it files a motion for new trial and has a hearing thereon, so long as such motion for new trial is filed subject to the special appearance, citing Stegall and Stegall v. Cohn, 592 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, no writ); Pardue v. Confederate Air Force, 615 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, writ dism’d); and Long v. Gonzales, 650 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ).
I view Stegall as holding, among other things not material to this inquiry, only that the filing of other pleadings along with the special appearance motion but subject to same, does not constitute entering a general appearance Stegall can be distinguished from this case by the fact that no judgment had been entered prior to the special appearance motion in that case.
In Pardue, supra, after an interlocutory default judgment against them, the defendants filed motions for new trial and pleas of privilege. After granting a new trial, the court sustained the pleas of privilege. On appeal, the sole claim was that the pleading and hearing on the motions for new trial constituted pleading and hearing on the merits of the case preceding the hearing on the pleas of privilege and thus the pleas of privilege were urged too late. The appellate court disagreed, saying that such a motion for new trial to set aside or vacate a default judgment does not have the effect of a general appearance so as to foreclose the subsequent consideration of a plea of privilege. Regarding the consequences of successful motions for new trial upon the question of jurisdiction, however, I am struck by the following expressions of the Pardue court which seem to be of little comfort to appellant Liberty in this case:
McDonald supports the proposition that a defendant may urge a motion to set aside a default judgment without waiving a subsequent hearing on a plea of privilege, reasoning that such motion does not invoke action by the trial court on the merits of the case. 1 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice sec. 4.40(111) (rev. 1965). Here, it was imperative that defendants set aside the interlocutory default judgment in order to present any defense to the suit. The posture of this case, at the *789moment the interlocutory default judgment was set aside, was that the defendants were before the court by reason of their appearance and the court had jurisdiction of both the persons and the subject matter. The only pleadings before the court then remaining were the pleas of privilege which were next heard and acted upon. (Emphasis added).
[[Image here]]
Appellants further argue that the jurisdiction of the court was invoked at the hearing resulting in the order granting a new trial. We agree. Jurisdiction must attach, by service or otherwise, before the court has power to act; however, after jurisdiction attaches, a defendant is granted time within which to assert his defenses, whatever they may be.
I take “defenses” in the last line above quoted to mean defenses to the merits, which includes the assertion of the right to be sued in the court in which venue properly lies, but does not include a challenge to the jurisdiction of the very court which granted the new trial.
Likewise, as I see Long v. Gonzales, it is authority only for the proposition that granting of a motion for new trial setting aside a default judgment does not waive or preclude subsequent filing of a plea of privilege. While there is language in the three cases cited by Moore stating that general jurisdiction is not invoked in such situations and that the only jurisdiction invoked is that required to set aside the judgment and afford an opportunity to present the plea of privilege, they do not hold that in such cases there is still afforded an opportunity to present a plea to the jurisdiction after having invoked the jurisdiction of the court to set aside the default judgment.
While not necessary to the disposition of this cause, I note that in Liberty’s motion for a new trial, it is asserted that Liberty had a meritorious defense to the claim of Moore and sets forth in affidavit form the details of such defense, and further that in such motion, Liberty states that it “is ready to try this case when it is promptly set for trial.” I am not directed to any ease, nor does independent research disclose any case, which has considered the precise question presented here, i.e., the effect of invoking jurisdiction to set aside a judgment upon a party’s plea to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction over the party. After careful review, I would hold that in this case the invoking of the jurisdiction of the trial court to set aside the default judgment was a general appearance and foreclosed a subsequent hearing on a plea to the jurisdiction, and would affirm the judgment below in its entirety.