Court Opinion

ID: 9939887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 01:00:30.790248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:05.742789
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10690         Document: 00517062777             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/12/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                      February 12, 2024
                                        No. 23-10690
                                      ____________                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Shabbar Rafiq,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:16-CR-243-3
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Shabbar Rafiq appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion
   for a writ of audita querela. We AFFIRM.
                                                I.
         In 2016, Rafiq pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute synthetic
   cannabinoids. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). In a signed factual
   resume, Rafiq stipulated that certain assets (including bank deposits, a
         _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 23-10690

   significant amount of currency, a luxury sedan, and four gold bars) would be
   forfeited to the United States Government as proceeds of the offense. See 21
   U.S.C. § 853(a). But when the presentence report listed that property as
   subject to forfeiture, defense counsel objected, arguing that the forfeited
   assets did not belong to Rafiq. The probation officer clarified that, while Rafiq
   had placed the items in others’ names, he still had interests in and controlled
   the assets. Rafiq’s counsel then withdrew all of his forfeiture-related
   objections.
          Around the same time, the Government filed a motion for preliminary
   order of forfeiture. The Government sent the motion to Rafiq’s trial counsel
   and requested a conference; in response, counsel stated that he was not
   Rafiq’s “civil lawyer.” The district court granted the motion. At the
   subsequent sentencing hearing, Rafiq’s counsel appeared to argue an
   unrelated objection. The district court sentenced Rafiq to 144 months of
   imprisonment. The court also pronounced a judgment of forfeiture.
          Rafiq appealed. With the aid of new counsel, he argued that the
   forfeiture order should be vacated because he was constructively denied
   counsel during his criminal forfeiture proceedings. See United States v.
   Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). A panel of this court affirmed the district court’s
   judgment. See United States v. Rafiq, 745 F. App’x 241 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
   curiam).
          Rafiq then filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
   § 2255.. He argued, inter alia, that his judgment should be vacated because
   he was denied the right to counsel throughout his forfeiture proceedings. As
   a part of its response, the Government provided an affidavit from Rafiq’s trial
   counsel, who stated that he “very clearly indicated” that he did not handle
   the “forfeiture matters.” ROA.20-11168.145.

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          The district court denied Rafiq’s § 2255 motion, and this court later
   affirmed that denial. See United States v. Rafiq, 2022 WL 2387348 (5th Cir.
   July 1, 2022). Later, this court denied Rafiq’s application to file a second and
   successive § 2255 motion.
          Finally, Rafiq filed a motion for writ of audita querela under the All
   Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). He claimed that the affidavit of his trial
   counsel demonstrates a denial of counsel during his forfeiture proceedings.
   Since the affidavit was submitted after his direct appeal, Rafiq argued that the
   initial judgment, though correct when rendered, became infirm through the
   later discovery of a Sixth Amendment violation. Rafiq asked the district court
   to grant his motion for writ of audita querela and overturn his earlier forfeiture
   judgment.
          The district court denied Rafiq’s motion for writ of audita querela. It
   reasoned that Rafiq “failed to identify a gap in the post-conviction relief
   system” because he “challenged the forfeiture order based on denial of
   counsel on direct appeal,” noting that a forfeiture judgment “must be
   challenged on direct appeal or not at all.” ROA.689–90 (quoting Young v.
   United States, 489 F.3d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
   omitted)).
          Rafiq timely appealed. Our review is de novo. See United States v.
   Whitehead, 449 F. App’x 326, 326 (5th Cir. 2011).
                                          II.
          Audita querela is a common-law writ that dates back to the reign of
   Edward III. See United States v. Miller, 599 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2010).
   There is some debate over the exact content of the writ. Cf. Klapprott v.
   United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949) (op. of Black, J.) (“[F]ew courts ever
   have agreed as to what circumstances would justify relief under these old
   remedies.”). But it appears that the writ was used by judgment debtors to

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   escape the execution of a judgment on the grounds of post-judgment release
   or discharge. See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *404–05;
   see also Audita Querela, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). It is
   distinguished from coram nobis, in that “a writ of coram nobis attacks a
   judgment that was infirm at the time it was rendered for reasons that later
   came to light, while a writ of audita querela is used to challenge a judgment
   that was correct at the time it was rendered but which is made infirm by
   matters that arose after its rendition.” Miller, 599 F.3d at 487 (citation
   omitted); see also United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
   (observing that “the distinction between audita querela and other forms of
   postconviction relief lies not in the character of the grounds for voiding the
   judgment, but rather in the timing of the occurrence of these grounds.”
   (emphases in original and citations omitted)).
          In 1948, Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure formally
   abolished the writ of audita querela along with other common-law writs. See
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1948). But in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502
   (1954), the Supreme Court preserved the writ of coram nobis in the criminal
   setting by reference to the All Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Neither
   the Supreme Court nor our court has held that audita querela likewise
   survives in criminal cases. See Miller, 599 F.3d at 487–88 (“[W]e have, as
   have several other circuits, acknowledged, with some reservation, that the
   writ of audita querela might also survive in criminal adjudications, if there is a
   gap for it to fill.” (citations omitted)). But see id. at 488 (“We have yet to
   encounter a case that has required us to decide squarely whether or not the
   writ of audita querela survives in criminal cases.”).
          But even assuming audita querela is theoretically available in criminal
   cases, it provides a “slender reed upon which to lean.” United States v.
   Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993). It theoretically might help a prisoner
   who brings (1) a legal objection that (2) arose after a judgment that (3) was

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   initially correct, assuming the (4) legal objection could not be brought
   through another post-conviction remedy. See Miller, 599 F.3d at 488; United
   States v. Reyes, 945 F.2d 862, 865–66 (5th Cir. 1991).
          Plainly, Rafiq cannot meet that theoretical standard. Even if Rafiq was
   denied counsel during his forfeiture proceedings, no relevant “gap exists in
   the system of federal post-conviction remedies.” Miller, 599 F.3d at 488
   (citation omitted).
          AFFIRMED.

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