Court Opinion

ID: 9723248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:08:37.591751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:11.495083
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAUGHLIN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which holds that the plaintiff is not bound by the stipulation entered into at trial which established the maximum recoverable amount of $2 million. I further dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which holds that proof of the "solvency” of Dr. Finch was established by evidence that (1) Dr. Finch was a licensed physician on the staff of one hospital, and (2) he charged for his services. A review of the record reveals the following statement: "MR. McMULLIN [defendants’ counsel]: That it had been stipulated by the parties that Dr. Finch has 2 million dollars in malpractice coverage. This is no longer an issue in the case that needs to be proved and therefore there should be no mention to the jury as to the amount of malpractice insurance available to pay any verdict against Dr. Finch, but instead any verdict for the plaintiff — the plaintiff obtains should be reduced so as not to exceed the amount of Dr. Finch’s medical malpractice insurance coverage.” Later in trial, the following colloquy occurred: "MR. CHAPMAN [plaintiffs counsel]: Well, Judge, I think what the question was is whether to read it to the jury, and I don’t care whether it’s read or not. I think we’ve already agreed to stipulate that it was two million dollars involved. The question was whether we wanted to put it before the jury. And I don’t care whether it goes or not. I think this just off the record shows that is the solvency of this defendant. MR. BRONSKY [defendants’ counsel]: We agree that it doesn’t have to go to the jury as long as the Court is going to reduce the verdict— THE COURT: To the extent that it might exceed that two million, that two million represents the limit of what— MR. BRONSKY: Liability. THE COURT: But for purposes of any judgment that’s entered, it will be taken into consideration and it will constitute the limit that can be recovered. MR. CHAPMAN: That’s correct.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court refused to enforce the stipulation. There are two distinct and separate reasons for my dissent. A In the particular setting of this case, the stipulation rose to the level of a judicial admission. When plaintiffs counsel agreed with the statement by the trial judge that $2 million would constitute the "limit that can be recovered,” the issue of maximum recovery was removed from consideration. "A stipulation, or a judicial admission, is an agreement between the parties or their attorneys with respect to business before the court.” Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 462, 605 N.E.2d 493, 505-06 (1992); American Pharmaseal v. TEC Systems, 162 Ill. App. 3d 351, 355, 515 N.E.2d 432, 434 (1987). The agreement that $2 million was the "limit that can be recovered” had the effect of withdrawing that issue from further consideration. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 462, 605 N.E.2d at 506; 34 Ill. L. & Prac. Stipulations § 8 (1958); 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 254, at 142 (4th ed. 1992). A judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it. It may not be controverted at trial, or on appeal, and has the effect of withdrawing that issue or fact from contention. Brummet v. Farel, 217 Ill. App. 3d 264, 267, 576 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (1991). Inasmuch as the stipulation/judicial admission of the plaintiff that $2 million would "constitute the limit that can be recovered” in this action, I believe that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to give that stipulation effect. If stipulations are not enforced by the courts, it is my opinion that the litigation process will suffer. In short, if counsel cannot rely on the sanctity of a stipulation given in open court, there will be no stipulations. The stipulation here was clear. It was straightforward. Had the verdict not exceeded the stipulated cap, there would have been no question about its good faith or its efficacy. It is not for this court to question the advisability of stipulations. It is clear it was made for the express purposes of establishing solvency (which was clearly in counsel’s minds as being required at trial) and limiting recoverable damages. This court should give it that construction; especially where it was never alleged or proven that the stipulation was unreasonable, fraudulent, obtained under duress, or in violation of public policy. Dawdy v. Sample, 178 Ill. App. 3d 118, 127, 532 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 (1989). B I agree with the majority that "collectability” is not synonymous with "solvency.” And, I agree that "solvency” is the better standard to apply to legal malpractice cases. The law in Illinois is, at best, unclear as to the precise pleading and proof requirements necessary to meet the plaintiff’s burden to establish "solvency” of the defendant in the underlying case.2 Yet, it is clear that there must be some evidence that the plaintiff could have recovered on the original case in order for the plaintiff to prove the pecuniary loss necessary to recover. The damages resulting from legal malpractice are pecuniary injuries to intangible property interests; they are not personal injuries. Yates v. Muir, 130 Ill. App. 3d 604, 609, 474 N.E.2d 934, 937 (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 112 Ill. 2d 205, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (1986). Damages flowing from legal malpractice are never presumed, but the plaintiff must prove that he suffered the injury for which recovery is sought, e.g., the plaintiff must prove that he suffered a "pecuniary” injury to his property interest, as opposed to a personal one, resulting from the negligence of an attorney. Gruse v. Belline, 138 Ill. App. 3d 689, 697, 486 N.E.2d 398, 404 (1985). The majority cites to Goldzier v. Poole, 82 Ill. App. 469 (1898), to support their conclusion that in order to recover, the plaintiff need only show solvency "in part or in whole.” Goldzier clearly holds that solvency cannot be presumed, and proof of same is the plaintiff’s burden. The phase "in part or in whole” must necessarily refer to the fact that even where there is proof of a "part” one may only recover for that part. To hold otherwise ignores the balance of the language in Goldzier and equates the damages sought herein to personal injuries, when, in fact, they are property damages. In the instant case, the majority holds that the fact that Dr. Finch was a physician who billed for his services was sufficient evidence of the solvency of Dr. Finch to allow for plaintiff to recover the entire judgment. I do not agree. The parties stipulated to the solvency of Dr. Finch at trial. That stipulation should be given effect. Merely because a physician is working and billing for his services is insufficient evidence of solvency to meet plaintiff’s burden. There was no evidence of Dr. Finch’s salary, his expenses, his other obligations, the title of any of his property, whether any of his property is nonattachable (pension plans), his debts, his likelihood of continued employment, his health, his age, or the type of Dr. Finch’s practice — all of which are relevant in order to determine his ability to pay the portion of the judgment which remains uninsured. I would reverse that portion of the judgment which exceeds $2 million and would affirm a judgment for the plaintiff for $2 million. I agree with the majority that the healing-art-malpractice provisions do not apply.  Cf. Donahue v. Weitzman, No. 5 — 93—0285, order at 11-12 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (134 Ill. 2d R. 23)), appeal denied, 164 Ill. 2d 561, 660 N.E.2d 1267 (1995).