Court Opinion

ID: 9965043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 16:00:54.5806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.875814
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 1 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENISE LEONA PALMER,                            No.    22-16448

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00190-DLR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Arizona
                    Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted March 25, 2024
                           San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Denise Palmer appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of her

application for Social Security benefits.

      We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo an order

affirming a denial of Social Security benefits and may reverse when the decision is

not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error. Woods v.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022). Where the evidence is susceptible to

more than one rational interpretation, we must affirm. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th

489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022). We affirm.

       1. Palmer argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) improperly

discounted her symptom testimony. The ALJ discounted Palmer’s pain testimony

both because it was “not entirely consistent” with medical record evidence and

because her testimony about the severity of her pain and pain-related limitations

was not corroborated by objective medical evidence. “When objective medical

evidence is inconsistent with a claimant’s subjective testimony, an ALJ can ‘reject

the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering

specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 494

(quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ’s

opinion demonstrates specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Palmer’s

testimony about the degree of her impairments, including Palmer’s inconsistent use

of an ambulatory aid. And, although lack of objective corroboration cannot be the

only basis for discounting pain testimony, it is an additional factor that the ALJ

may consider in the credibility analysis. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th

Cir. 2005).

      2. Palmer argues the ALJ improperly discounted the medical opinions of Dr.

Young and Dr. Koss-Leland. Under the governing regulations, the ALJ “must

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‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ [she] finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each

doctor or other source [] and ‘explain how [she] considered the supportability and

consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (quoting

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) & (b)(2)). Although the ALJ did not specifically

articulate her analysis of the supportability and consistency factors, the ALJ’s

conclusion that Dr. Young and Dr. Koss-Leland’s opinions are inconsistent with

the normal findings present in Palmer’s treatment records and progress notes is

supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, to the extent the ALJ erred by

failing to clearly articulate how she considered the supportability factor, any such

error was harmless.

      AFFIRMED.

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