Court Opinion

ID: 9521623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:08:59.918126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:00.765591
License: Public Domain

ANDREASEN, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion.
Under Iowa Code section 85.26 (1993), a petition for workers’ compensation benefits must be filed within two years from the date of the occurrence of the injury for which benefits are claimed. In Orr v. Lewis Central School District, 298 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Iowa 1980), we held the discovery rule, first adopted by the court in Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967), applied to such workers’ compensation claims. In arriving at this decision we recognized that courts do not favor statutes of limitations and that we must apply the workers’ compensation statute broadly and liberally in furtherance of its humanitarian objective. Orr, 298 N.W.2d at 261. Under the discovery rule, the limitation period began to run “when the employee discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the nature; seriousness and probable compensable character” of the injury causing the disability for which benefits were claimed. Id. (emphasis added).
I agree with the majority statement that “[t]he controversy here is whether he [Ran-ney] had imputed knowledge of the probable compensable nature of his disease.” I also agree Ranney was on inquiry notice when he first became “aware of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its causes.” Estate of Montag v. T H Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa 1993).
It is clear from the record that, when diagnosed with Hodgkin’s disease in 1985, Ranney made inquiry as to whether the disease was caused by his work place exposure to toxic chemicals. He attempted to establish a causal link between his disease and the chemicals to which he was exposed. He was told by his physician that the medical establishment did not know what caused Hodgkin’s disease. He continued to investigate and inquire as to the cause of his disease. He made numerous inquiries as to the cause of the disease of different physicians who were examining and treating him between 1985 and 1992. It is undisputed that Ranney first became aware of the probable causal *158link between his disease and his employment in February 1992. He filed his petition'for workers’ compensation benefits four months later.
The majority opinion suggests that once Ranney knew of his disease and its possible connection with his employment, he had a duty to investigate and the two-year statute of limitation period began to run. Apparently, once Ranney was under a duty to investigate (inquiry notice), it made no difference if a reasonable investigation revealed the cause of his Hodgkin’s disease is unknown. This interpretation of the inquiry notice doctrine conflicts with the majority opinion statements that “[tjhe purpose of the investigation is to ascertain whether the known condition is probably, as opposed to merely possibly, compensable,” and that, when Ranney had enough information to trigger his duty to investigate, “[a]s of that date, Ranney was on notice of what a reasonably diligent investigation would have disclosed.”
Ranney is not asking that the statute be tolled until the successful completion of his investigation. Inquiry notice did impose a duty on him to investigate. The limitation period should run only if a reasonably diligent investigation would disclose the probable compensable character of his injury. In our previous application of the inquiry notice doctrine, we stated:
The information they possessed on the date of the accident was plainly sufficient to put them on inquiry notice concerning possible defects in the wagon. They did not investigate at that time. When they later investigated, they found the alleged defects they now rely on.
Franzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1985), quoted in Vachon v. State, 514 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Iowa 1994).
In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979), the Court in a medical malpractice suit filed in 1992 stated: “It is undisputed in this case that in January 1969 Kubrick was aware of his injury and its probable cause.” Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 118, 100 S.Ct. at 357, 62 L.Ed.2d at 267 (emphasis added). The Court was addressing the application of the discovery rule where the plaintiff was ignorant of his legal rights; rather than ignorant of the fact of his injury or its causes. Id. at 123, 100 S.Ct. at 359, 62 L.Ed.2d at 269. After recognizing reasonably competent doctors would have known the plaintiff should not have been treated with Neomycin, the Court stated:
Crediting this finding, as we must, Kubrick need only have made inquiry among doctors with average training aiid experience in such matters to have discovered that he probably had a good cause of action. The difficulty is that it does not appear that Kubrick ever made any inquiry, although meanwhile he had consulted several specialists about his loss of hearing and had been in possession of all the facts about the cause of his injury since January 1969. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that Dr. Soma, who in 1971 volunteered his ■ opinion that Kubrick’s treatment had been improper, would have had the same opinion had the plaintiff sought his judgment in 1969.
Id. at 122-23,100 S.Ct. at 360-61, 62 L.Ed.2d at 269-70.
I do not agree the undisputed record of Ranney’s repeated inquiry of many examining and treating physicians as to the cause of his Hodgkin’s disease is insufficient to create a factual issue on the application of the discovery rule.' The record establishes Ranney made reasonable inquiry, or at least the presence of a disputed factual issue on this question. There is no suggestion in the record that “in the exercise of reasonable diligence” or “in the exercise of a reasonably diligent investigation” Ranney, or a reasonable person, would have acquired actual or implied knowledge of the probable compensable nature of his claim before June 1990, two years prior to the filing of his claim.
Our court’s application of the inquiry notice doctrine when a reasonably diligent investigation would not disclose the probable compensable character of the employee’s injury, “guts” the basic requirement of the discovery rule that the limitation period begins when the employee discovered or should have discovered the probable compensable character of the injury. I would affirm the *159summary judgment ruling dismissing the chapter 85A claim and reverse the ruling dismissing the claim under chapter 85. I would then remand to the industrial commissioner for further proceedings under chapter 85.
LARSON, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ., join this dissent.