Court Opinion

ID: 9948421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 23:01:29.900932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:34.012830
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
FLEMING, HAYES, and POND
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Private EZ MATTHEW P. WHITE
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20210676

Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca
Michael E. Korte, Military Judge
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen E. Latino, Acting Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Mitchell D. Herniak, JA; Captain Tumentugs D. Armstrong,
JA (on brief); Colonel Philip M. Staten, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Autumn R. Porter,
JA; Major Mitchell D. Herniak, JA; Captain Tumentugs D. Armstrong, JA (on reply
brief).

For Appellee: Colonel Christopher B. Burgess, JA; Major Kalin P. Schlueter, JA;
Captain Dominique L. Dove, JA (on brief).

28 February 2024

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

HAYES, Judge:

Appellant asserts two errors before this court, neither of which merit
discussion nor relief.| We write to correct multiplicity in the offenses of which
appellant stands convicted. We dismiss one multiplicious specification and reassess
appellant’s sentence in the decretal paragraph below.

' We have given full and fair consideration to the matters personally raised by
appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and
find they merit neither discussion nor relief.
WHITE — ARMY 20210676
BACKGROUND

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of one specification of conspiracy to obstruct justice, one
specification each of wrongful introduction, wrongful possession, and wrongful
distribution of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and one specification of
obstruction of justice, in violation of Articles 81, 112a, and 131b, Uniform Code of
Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 912a, and 931b. The military judge also
found appellant guilty, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of conspiracy to
wrongfully purchase, use, distribute, and introduce onto a military installation LSD
and one specification each of wrongful use, distribution, possession, and
introduction onto a military installation of LSD, in violation of Articles 81 and 112a,
UCMSJ. The military judge, sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge and a
total of twenty-five months confinement.? The convening authority took no action
on the findings or sentence in appellant’s case.

Appellant’s convictions for Specifications 2 and 3 of Charge III address the
wrongful introduction onto Fort Huachuca and possession, respectively, of LSD on
or about 19 April 2021. Similarly, appellant’s convictions for Specifications 6, 7, 8,
and 9 of Charge III address the wrongful use, distribution, possession, and
introduction onto Fort Huachuca, respectively, of LSD between on or about 4 June
2021 and on or about 5 June 2021 [the June offenses]. At trial, appellant argued
Specifications 2 and 3 of Charge III, and Specifications 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Charge III
constituted an unreasonable multiplication of charges but did not allege multiplicity.
The military judge ultimately sentenced appellant concurrently for three different
“groups” of offenses. See supra note 2.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

“(T]he general principle of criminal law [is] that an unconditional plea of
guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects. ...” United States v. Hardy, 77 M.J. 438,
442 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citations omitted). “Absent a timely motion, an unconditional
guilty plea, such as [appellant’s], waives a multiplicity claim absent plain error.”
United States v. Hudson, 59 M.J. 357, 358-59 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (citing United States

* The military judge divided appellant’s sentence to confinement into three
concurrent “groups.” Concurrent Group 1: five months for The Specification of
Charge II and five months for The Specification of Charge IV; Concurrent Group 2:
three months for Specification 2 of Charge III, one month for Specification 3 of
Charge III, and six months for Specification 5 of Charge III; Concurrent Group 3:
three months for Specification 6 of Charge III, fourteen months for Specification 7
of Charge III, two months for Specification 8 of Charge III, ten months for
Specification 9 of Charge III, and five months for The Specification of The
Additional Charge.
WHITE — ARMY 20210676

v. Heryford, 52 M.J. 265, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2000)). Our superior court, however, “[t]o
be sure, .. . [has] recognized some exceptions to this general principle about the
effect of a guilty plea.” Hardy, 77 M.J. at 442 (citing United States v. Pauling, 60
M.J. 91, 94 (C.A.A.F 2004)) (holding a guilty plea does not waive a [constitutional]
multiplicity issue when the offenses are facially duplicative).

To determine whether multiple convictions are multiplicious, we apply the
“elements test”. See United States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370, 376 C.M.A. 1993).
“Under the elements test, one compares the elements of each offense. If all of the
elements of offense X are also elements of offense Y, then X is [a lesser included
offense] of Y.” United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 470 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

To determine whether multiple offenses are “facially duplicative” we assess
whether the offenses are factually the same, as “determined by reviewing the
language of the specifications and facts apparent on the face of the record.”
Heryford, 52 M.J. at 266 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (citations omitted).

The June offenses to which appellant pled guilty cover appellant’s
introduction of an amount of LSD onto Fort Huachuca, as well as his possession of
the same amount of LSD that he both personally used and distributed to other
Soldiers, all while on Fort Huachuca. Specifically, appellant was convicted of
possession, use, and distribution of the same LSD during the same time frame.
Possession is a presidentially prescribed lesser included offense of both use and
distribution. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) [MCM] App.
12A at A12A-5. Both use and distribution require appellant to actually or
constructively possess the substance used or distributed. Therefore, the possession
of LSD alleged in Specification 8 of Charge III, to which appellant pled and of
which he was found guilty, was multiplicious with the use and distribution of LSD
alleged in Specifications 6 and 7 of Charge III. Our plain error analysis requires us
to determine whether the specifications are also facially duplicative.

After a close review of the record, we find in this case that the June 2021
possession of LSD in Specification 8 of Charge III is not only predicated on the
same criminal conduct as the wrongful use and distribution of LSD in Specifications
6 and 7 of Charge III, but is also facially duplicative. There is nothing in the
language of the specifications or the facts apparent on the face of the record that
suggests any factual distinction between the LSD that was used and distributed from
the LSD that was possessed. To the contrary, the record is clear it was the same
LSD, and the possession was concurrent with the use and distribution. Having found
the possession specification “facially duplicative” of those June offenses, it would
be plain error not to dismiss them. Heryford, 52 M.J. at 266-67; United States v.
Lloyd, 46 M.J. 19 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (holding constitutionally multiplicious offenses
are reviewed under the doctrine of plain error.) This error prejudiced appellant’s
WHITE — ARMY 20210676

substantial right where appellant received multiple convictions for the same act or
course of conduct, which subjected him to additional punitive exposure.

CONCLUSION
On consideration of the entire record, the finding of guilty for Specification 8
of Charge III is SET ASIDE and DISMISSED with prejudice. The remaining
findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED.?

Senior Judge FLEMING and Judge POND concur.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.
Clerk of Court

3 We assess appellant’s sentence in accordance with the principles articulated by our
superior court in United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307-08 (C.M.A. 1986) and
United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013). Based on our
experience as judges on this court, and with the aid of a confinement sentence
segmented by the military judge for each specification as well as the concurrent
sentence appellant received for the remaining offenses in the concurrent group, we
are confident the dismissal of one specification would have no impact on appellant’s
sentence to 25 months of confinement as the dismissal does not change the overall
sentence for the concurrent group. Given the dismissed specification is a lesser
included offense of the offenses for which appellant remains convicted, we are
confident the military judge would have imposed a dishonorable discharge absent the
error.