Court Opinion

ID: 9713077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:07:03.272035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.416562
License: Public Domain

ENGLISH, J, dissenting: In recent years the trials of personal injury suits in Illinois wére frequently punctuated by strong and, often, heated objections to the use by plaintiffs’ attorneys of what came to be known as the “per diem formula” in argument to the jury on the question of damages for pain and suffering. The plaintiffs’ attorneys were equally intent on using the argument as it wás a polemic tool Of very considerable value, starting, as it would, with a rate of damages per hour or per day which would seem very small, and concluding with a large sum through multiplication by the number of time units elapsed from the injury to the date of trial, and further for the period of the plaintiff’s life expectancy. Among trial court judges there were marked differences of opinion as to the propriety and legality of sueh an argument, and there was no governing Illinois authority. Pennsylvania had long been alone in prohibiting use of the argument, but after the New Jersey Supreme Court took the same position in Botta v. Brunner, 26 NJ 82, 138 A2d 713 (1958), the reviewing courts of many states began in quick succession to line up on one side or the other. Appellate Courts in Illinois reached divergent conclusions, and the Appellate Court for the Second District itself divided on the subject in Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill App2d 323, 173 NE2d 209, the majority opinion permitting use of the argument. That court, however, determined that the question justified granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court with a certificate of importance. Upon further review, the Supreme Court also recognized the profound effect its decision would have in this area of trial practice, when it stated at the outset of its opinion: The important question presented for determination is whether the scope of proper jury argument permits the use of a mathematical formula from which counsel may argue that his client should he awarded a specific sum per day, or other fixed unit of time, for pain and suffering. (Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill2d 390, 391, 182 NE2d 206.) Finding no error in several other points presented, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the sole ground that the use of the per diem formula “transcends the bounds of proper argument.” This conclusion was fortified by the court at the same filing when, referring again to a per diem argument, it said in Jensen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 24 Ill2d 383, 387, 182 NE2d 211: This issue, together with the same arguments as are here advanced, were presented to us in Caley v. Manicke, post, p 390, where we hold that it was reversible error to permit counsel to use this sort of a mathematical formula in his argument to the jury. Our decision in that case is controlling here. (Emphasis supplied.) It is difficult for me to conceive of any stronger language than this to indicate an unequivocal adjudication that use of the per diem argument is not to be countenanced and failure to sustain objection to its use will constitute reversible error. Thus, I should have thought, the confusion in the trial courts on this subject was laid to rest once and for all. Now, however, with the filing of this opinion we restore the confusion. The Supreme Court said “it was reversible error.” The majority here say “we do not feel it to be reversible error.” Another division of this court (whose opinion had been reversed in the Jensen case) recently characterized the Supreme Court’s Caley decision by stating that “[i]n the Caley case the court squarely held that it was reversible error to permit plaintiff’s counsel to use this type of argument to the jury.” (Millsap v. Central Wisconsin Motor Transp. Co., 41 Ill App2d 1, 189 NE2d 793, 798.) The Supreme Court itself said that the Caley decision was controlling of its own determination of the Jensen case. I think we commit error in not reaching the same conclusion here. We attempt to exercise a discretion where none exists. As stated by the Supreme Court in Agriculture Transp. Ass’n v. Carpentier, 2 Ill2d 19, 27, 116 NE2d 863: Where the Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion, and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases. That the type of argument used in the ease at bar and in Caley and Jensen were similar there can be no doubt. In commenting on the per diem argument in this case, the majority say that it “was actually very limited, involving only a small portion of his entire argument on the question of damages,” and that it did “not remotely resemble the meticulous, comprehensive ‘per diem’ argument used in Caley.” I say that it was meticulous and comprehensive and that it was the very heart of plaintiff’s damages argument. It should be pointed out, however, that the opinions in Caley and Jensen make it clear that they rest not on what portion of the jury argument is devoted to the per diem formula, or on how metieulously it is presented, but only on the fact of its being argued at all. The Appellate Court opinion in Caley sets forth the chart made by plaintiff’s attorney in closing argument, in which seven items were listed with amounts after each, totalling $50,140.90. (29 Ill App2d 323, 333.) Three of the items were for pain and suffering and totalled $25,540, or approximately half of the total amount requested. These items were: 11,680 hours (for the first 2 years, 18 hours per day @ $1 per hour) $11,680.00 510 days (for the remaining time to date of trial @ $10 per day) 5,100.00 Future (for expectancy of 24.52 years @ $1 per day) 8,760.00 $25,540.00 In the case at bar a similar chart was made by counsel on a blackboard which was not preserved in the reeord, but the figures can be reconstructed from the argument. About the same number of items were used, including three for pain and suffering, on a per diem formula. These items were: 268 days (in the hospital @ $100 per day) $26,800.00 5 years (in and out of the hospital in the future @ $10 per day) 18,250.00 Future (for expectancy of 43.7 years @ $10 per day) 159,505.00 $204,555.00 *  Other items for the nature and extent of the injuries (totalling $65,000), hospital and medical bills ($13,257.95), and future hospital and medical bills (estimated by the doctor @ $18,800) came to $97,057.-95. Thus, the grand total requested of the jury was $301,612.95, of which the per diem formula items constituted more than two-thirds (as compared with one-half in Caley). 1 believe that the figures shown above indicate that the arguments used here and in Caley are of the same type. The manner of presentation to the jury in the instant case also is a classic example of the per diem formula argument. I quote only a portion to demonstrate: *  Now we know she has a life expectancy of 43.70 years. 43.70 years to look this way, going into the world and having people stare at her, to have people shy away from her, to neglect her. Walk down the street with her once and see what happens, and she may get worse according to the doctor. Would you say because of that injury, because of that injury and that humiliation and that pain and suffering for the rest of her life, would you say that $10 a day would compensate her, would begin to compensate her, just $10 a day for that,phase of her injury. His Honor will tell you you can take that into consideration. If you say $10 a day is fair, there’s 365 days a year and for one year of being looked at and shied away from and humiliated, that comes to $3,650, and for 43 years it is $159,505, and I figured out, and if my mathematics aren’t proper you correct me, but this starts to tell you, give you an idea of what the figure is, what the amount is, and that total is $301,612.95. One gets from the majority opinion five other reasons or inferences as to why the Caley rule should not be applied in this case: (1) the damages awarded were not excessive, (2) the jury appears not to have been prejudiced by the argument when the amount awarded is compared with the amount requested,* (3) the record justifies the verdict, (4) defendant’s counsel also made an improper argument as to damages, and (5) plaintiff’s attorney did, not throw down the gauntlet or challenge defense counsel as he did in Caley. I believe none of these is tenable. (1) In Caley the defendant made no claim that the verdict was excessive. (2) , (3) The dissenting justice in Caley set forth these positions very ably, but they were not persuasive to the other six members of the court. (4) The court in Caley anticipated the basic idea contained in this point when it said: “Nor would the fact that opposing counsel could use his own formula and figures remedy the situation because this would only emphasize the improper argument and would further mislead the jury into relying on the formulae and figures rather than the actual evidence of damages.” (Page 393.) (5) I consider the gauntlet point to be of no consequence. There are other matters in the majority opinion with which I am not in agreement, but I shall not enumerate them, as I believe the Caley decision, standing alone, controls this ease and requires the granting of a new trial.   This amount demonstrates what the Supreme Court was referring to when it said in Caley that such figures produce “an illusion of certainty.”    The entire per diem argument was made after timely objection thereto had been overruled.    The verdict in Caley was approximately 40% of the amount requested. In the case at bar it was approximately 50%.