Court Opinion

ID: 9520872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:52:18.875319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:06.805047
License: Public Domain

G.B. Smith, J.
(dissenting). In this case where 2 out of 11 eyewitnesses identified defendant as the assailant and where three eyewitnesses unequivocally stated that defendant was not the attacker, the trial court’s charge that the jury could not use the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert to reach its verdict was both an error of law and prejudicial.
On November 16, 1999, Nicole Barrett was standing on the northeast corner of East 42nd Street and Madison Avenue in Manhattan when a man threw a brick, hitting her in the head, and then ran away. Several accounts of the attack aired on television news, and the program coordinator of a Brooklyn homeless shelter called the police and reported he had a delusional and paranoid resident who matched the aired description of Barrett’s attacker. The homeless man, Clement Tikiba, had a criminal record and resided at the shelter from August 20, 1999 until November 16, 1999, the day of the attack. On that day, he disappeared and has never been found. Tikiba’s picture was *35placed in a photo array and two witnesses, LW and RD, selected him as the assailant.*
Paris Drake was arrested two weeks following the attack based on an informant’s tip. He was placed in six lineups, where five people failed to identify him. LW however, who had previously selected Clement Tikiba in a photo array as the attacker, now identified defendant. AC, a maintenance worker, who did not see the crime but only the assailant running away, identified defendant in court as Barrett’s attacker. Although he initially refused to help police by looking at a photo array or a lineup, AC came forward after he saw defendant on television being escorted by the police.
Eleven eyewitnesses testified at trial: six for the prosecution and five for the defense. Nine of eleven did not identify defendant as the perpetrator. Only LW and AC identified defendant in court. Defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree assault and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
LW’s testimony was significant for the prosecution because she was the only identifying witness who saw the attack. During trial the defense learned that LW had been returning from a visit to a psychotherapist when she witnessed the attack. The defendant asked for an in camera examination of LW’s psychiatric records to determine whether they were relevant to her state of mind at the time of the crime and whether this could have altered her perception. The prosecution disclosed that she was on “mild” prescription medication for anxiety but the court refused the in camera inspection and ruled that the defense could not ask her any questions relating to her therapy.
The defense called Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, a professor of psychology at the University of Washington, who testified about the memory retention process. Dr. Loftus testified that the memory acquisition phase could be affected by the presence of a weapon and by cross-racial identification. She testified that memory fades over time and can become susceptible to post-event formation or distorted by new information from outside sources like news reports. She also addressed the memory retrieval stage and the weak correlation between the confidence of an eyewitness and accuracy.
At the jury charge conference, the judge informed the parties of her planned charge which included the statement:
“The testimony of Dr. Loftus was admitted for the *36purpose of providing the jury with various factors which scientific studies have shown are relevant to a person’s ability to perceive and remember. This testimony may not be used to discredit or [accredit] the reliability of eyewitness testimony in general or in this case.”
The defendant opposed the charging of the last sentence quoted and the majority concedes that the latter sentence was “improper,” “ill advised” and should not have been used but concludes that the error was not prejudicial (majority op at 32).
Other than the erroneous sentence, the court gave the standard charge on expert testimony. It charged:
“You will recall that Dr. Maximo Koslow testified concerning his qualifications in the field of neurosurgery and that Dr. Elizabeth Loftus testified concerning her qualifications in the field of eyewitness identification.
“Where scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist a jury in understanding evidence, our law permits a witness with special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to state his or her opinion.
“You may consider the opinion of each expert along with the reasons given for his or her opinion and you may also consider the expert’s qualifications and credibility.
“The opinion of each witness was based on particular facts or scientific studies. You may reject an expert’s opinion if you find the facts established at this trial are different from those which form the basis of the expert’s opinion.
“You may also reject the opinion if after careful consideration of all of the evidence in the case, expert and other, you disagree with that opinion.
“In other words, you’re not required to accept an expert’s opinion to the exclusion of the facts and circumstances disclosed in the other testimony.
“The opinion of an expert witness is subject to the same tests concerning reliability and credibility as the testimony of any other witness. It is up to you *37as the triers of fact to determine whether to accept or reject an expert’s opinion.
“Given to assist you in reaching a proper conclusion, expert testimony is entitled to such weight as you find the expert’s qualifications in his or her field warrant and it may be considered by you, but it’s not controlling on your judgement.
“The testimony of Dr. Koslow was admitted to assist the jury in determining the effect and the seriousness of the injuries sustained by the complainant and the manner in which they may have been caused.
“This testimony may not be used as actual evidence of how the injuries occurred or to supplant the testimony of any eyewitness.
“The testimony of Dr. Loftus was admitted for the purpose of providing the jury with various factors which scientific studies have shown are relevant to a person’s ability to perceive and remember.”
The court then gave the erroneous charge that Dr. Loftus’ testimony “may not be used to discredit or accredit the reliability of eyewitness testimony in general or in this case.” The effect of that portion of the charge was to negate all of the testimony of Dr. Loftus. The trial judge accurately explained that the testimony of the medical expert, Dr. Koslow, was admitted to help the jury understand the seriousness of Barrett’s injuries but that it could not supplant eyewitness testimony on how the injuries occurred. The instruction left room for a jury to understand that since Dr. Koslow was not present during the attack, the eyewitness accounts could not be replaced by his testimony. The instruction regarding Dr. Loftus, however, was incorrect because her testimony was offered to influence the jury’s consideration of the eyewitness accounts. Ordering jurors to discount and ignore (that is neither credit nor discredit) the testimony of Dr. Loftus was thus highly prejudicial.
In People v Ladd (89 NY2d 893 [1996]), this Court reiterated that a jury charge may be sufficient even if it contains erroneous phrases and “[t]he test is always whether the jury, hearing the whole charge, would gather from its language the correct rules which should be applied in arriving at decision” (id. at 895, quoting People v Russell, 266 NY 147, 153 [1934]). We are *38therefore concerned with whether the correct instructions predominated. In this matter, they did not. Although the trial judge stated, prior to the incorrect instruction, that an expert’s testimony can be weighed for credibility like any other witness, the incorrect statement regarding accrediting and discrediting other witnesses erased and outweighed everything that came before. The jury was led to the conclusion that it could find Dr. Loftus’ testimony valuable but could not apply her statements about the science of memory to the testimony of LW or AC. This charge effectively negated Dr. Loftus’ testimony and predominated over the correct portions of the instructions.
The two eyewitness identifications form the center of the People’s case against defendant and without LW and AC, there would have been no case. Defendant’s only option to counter such significant testimony was to rebut the memory of these witnesses. The majority concludes that “[n]o reasonable juror could have concluded from the court’s instructions that Dr. Loftus’s testimony had been effectively stricken from the case” (majority op at 34) because the judge originally read them the correct standard jury instructions regarding the role of experts in a trial. We do not know the effect that these instructions had on the verdict but the majority takes the risk that the jury saw past this error. There is nothing in the record on which to base such an assumption (see People v Williams, 5 NY3d 732 [2005] [affirming reversal where incorrect instructions may have misled jurors to believe that they could not draw inferences concerning an absent ghost officer]; People v Graves, 76 NY2d 16 [1990] [holding instruction erroneous where it merged two separate elements and finding jury would not gather correct rule from instruction]).
The trial court also erred in its refusal to allow an in camera review of LW’s psychotherapy records. Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant has the right to confront witnesses against him. The Supreme Court has construed this right by holding the “primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination” (Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415, 418 [1965]). The Supreme Court has also “recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination” (Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 316-317 [1974], citing Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474, 496 [1959]). In People v Gissendanner (48 NY2d 543, 548 [1979]), this Court reiterated that
*39“access must be afforded to otherwise confidential data relevant and material to the determination of guilt or innocence, as, for example, when a request for access is directed toward revealing specific ‘biases, prejudices or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand’ ” (quoting Davis v Alaska, supra at 316).
Given LW’s importance to the People’s case and the prosecution’s concession that she was on medication, the court should have allowed an in camera inspection to determine whether her perception could have been hindered in any way by any medication or mental problems. In Davis v Alaska, the Supreme Court explained, “Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to [the witness] by disclosure of [sealed records] — if the prosecution insisted on using him to make its case — is outweighed by petitioner’s right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness” (415 US at 319). The trial court should have reviewed the medical records. Its refusal was error as a matter of law.
Accordingly, I dissent.
Judges Ciparick, Rosenblatt, Graffeo, Read and R.S. Smith concur with Chief Judge Kaye; Judge G.B. Smith dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion.
Order affirmed.

 RD claims he had eye contact with the perpetrator following the attack.