Court Opinion

ID: 9704321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:30:44.874826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:28.390362
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: In this case, I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand with directions for the trial court to determine if Robert owes an arrearage from the October 1987 order. In all other respects, I would affirm the court’s order and respectfully dissent. Candice argues the trial court’s order abating support was contrary to case law, specifically Coons. I disagree. As the majority notes, courts have long possessed the authority to abate support under certain circumstances, even prior to Rule 296(f) being adopted. Candice next argues Rule 296(f) makes it clear abatement is only temporary. While I agree with this proposition, Rule 296(f) was not in effect when the trial court entered its May 26, 1988, order, and Candice did not take any steps to bring the new rule to the court’s attention after it came into effect. This court discussed applying supreme court rules retroactively in People ex rel. Madigan v. Petco Petroleum Corp., 363 Ill. App. 3d 613, 620-21, 841 N.E.2d 1065, 1071 (2006): “In People v. Atkins, 217 Ill. 2d 66, 71-73[, 838 N.E.2d 943, 946-48] (2005), the supreme court addressed the retroactivity of legislative amendments. The court held that when the legislature has not indicated whether an amendment should be applied retroactively, in accordance with section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2004)), procedural changes to statutes may be applied retroactively, while substantive changes may not. Atkins, 217 Ill. 2d at 71[, 838 N.E.2d at 946-47]. Although Atkins addressed legislative amendments, its holding applies equally to supreme court rules. See generally People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116, 824 N.E.2d 250, 256 (2005) (‘The rules of statutory construction also apply to interpretation of *** supreme court rules’).” In adopting Rule 296(f), the supreme court did not indicate whether the rule should be applied retroactively. “Thus, in accordance with section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2004)), we must determine whether the changes are substantive or procedural. In Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 310-11, 522 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (1988), the supreme court explained the difference between a substantive amendment and a procedural one: ‘In general, procedural law is “ ‘[t]hat which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; machinery for carrying on a suit.’ ” [Citation.] Substantive law, in contrast, establishes the rights whose invasion may be redressed through a particular procedure. More specifically, procedure embraces “pleading, evidence^] and practice. Practice means those legal rules which direct the course of proceedings to bring parties into court and the course of the court after they are brought in.” [Citation.]’ ” Petco, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 621, 841 N.E.2d at 1071. Whether child-support payments continue to accrue under an abatement order is more than a matter of procedural law. Accordingly, Rule 296(f) should not be applied retroactively in this case. Even if it did apply retroactively, child support would have been abated without accrual until February 1, 1989, and then accrued at $10 per week. Candice’s amended complaint asked that child support be modified to reflect the amount Robert would have paid had he reported his employment to the IDPA as and when required. However, the essence of Candice’s action is to retroactively modify Robert’s support obligation after the child reached majority. “Support may be modified only as to installments accruing after the nonmoving party has been notified that a motion to modify has been filed and only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.” Zukausky, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 618, 613 N.E.2d at 398, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 510(a). Section 510(d) of the Dissolution Act provides in part “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child, except as otherwise provided herein.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 510(d). While the appellate court has stated that a “circuit court is not statutorily barred from imposing a retroactive child[-]support obligation upon a respondent in an ongoing child[-]support proceeding who, contrary to the court’s directive, has failed to inform the court of his having resumed employment” (Williams, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 317, 547 N.E.2d at 731), Candice has not cited any authority to file the petition seeking the retroactive modification of child support when more than three years have passed since the child reached majority. The only statutory authority that grants the authority to file for a modification of child support after majority is section 513 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/513(a)(l), (a)(2) (West 2000) (application for support or expenses may be made before or after child has reached majority)). Section 513 only provides for postmajority support or expenses in two circumstances: (1) when the child is physically or mentally disabled, and not otherwise emancipated; and (2) for postmajority educational expenses. 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(l), (a)(2) (West 2000). Candice has not alleged the parties’ child is physically or mentally disabled, nor has she asked for educational expenses. Thus, I find no authority for a post-majority retroactive modification of a child-support obligation allegedly owed during the child’s majority. Candice claims “[t]he long-term effect of allowing Robert to avoid the payment of support is to abrogate the plan established by the legislature and mandated by Congress to provide for child support.” While the abatement of Robert’s support was likely meant to be temporary, given the trial court’s later orders ordering Robert to appear and produce a log of potential employers, it became permanent because Candice took no action against Robert until three years after the child reached majority. In addition to not providing any support for her argument that a child-support obligation can be retroactively modified three years after the child reached majority, Candice failed to provide the court with any explanation for her inaction against Robert from July 6, 1989, when the court placed the cause on the inactive docket, until the child reached majority in January 2001. I fully understand and appreciate the majority’s desire to allow this action to proceed because the public policy of this state requires deadbeat parents to support their children. However, Candice’s inaction, along with the IDPA, the State’s Attorney, and/or the AG, dictates a result denying the requested relief. Moreover, the General Assembly, not the courts, provides the framework for the implementation, enforcement, and achievement of this state’s public policy. Here, the majority’s holding finds no support in the law, and in my view, citing public-policy considerations as a rationale for disregarding settled law does not justify the majority’s action to reach a preferred result, however desirable.