Court Opinion

ID: 9774032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:07:10.327887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:48.802133
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge.
On original submission appellant’s conviction for aggravated sexual abuse, V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 21.05, was reversed for the erroneous admission of evidence of an extraneous offense. We need not consider the correctness of that holding for reasons stated herein.
On rehearing we notice the jury charge is fundamentally defective and therefore requires reversal.
Section 21.05, supra, at the time of this offense provided:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he commits sexual abuse as defined in Section 21.04 of this code or sexual abuse of a child as defined in Section 21.10 of this code and he:
*888“(1) causes serious bodily injury or attempts to cause death to the victim or another in the course of the same criminal episode; or
“(2) compels submission to the sexual abuse by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on anyone.
“(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree.”
The felony information in this case alleged that appellant did:
“with intent to arouse the sexual desire of the Defendant and by force and by threatening the imminent infliction of serious bodily injury and death to and without the consent of [M_S_G-], a person not his spouse and hereafter styled the Complainant, have deviate sexual intercourse with the Complainant by placing his penis in the mouth of the Complainant.”
The aggravating factor alleged pursuant to Sec. 21.05(a)(2), supra, is the threat of “imminent infliction of serious bodily injury and death” to the complainant. The allegation of the use of force is not an allegation of an aggravating factor under Sec. 21.05. Yet when the jury was charged on the circumstances under which a guilty verdict would be authorized, the allegations of the use of force and of the threats alleged were submitted disjunctively:
“Now, therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in Harris County, Texas, on or about May 14, 1978, the defendant did then and there unlawfully with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of him, the defendant, and by force or by threatening the imminent infliction of serious bodily injury or death to and without the consent of [M_S-G_], a person not his spouse, have deviate sexual intercourse with [M-S_G_] by placing his, the defendant’s penis in the mouth of [M_S_G_], you will find the defendant guilty as charged.”
The charge, therefore, authorized the jury to convict appellant of aggravated sexual abuse without finding the alleged acts of aggravation. This had the same effect as an omission of that element from the charge, which constitutes fundamental error. Cumbie v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 578 S.W.2d 732; see Odom & Valdez, A Review of Fundamental Error in Jury Charges in Texas Criminal Cases, 33 Baylor L.R. 749.
The motion for rehearing is denied.
ROBERTS and TEAGUE, JJ., concur in the results.
McCORMICK, J., dissents.