Court Opinion

ID: 9713573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:18:01.282687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.365598
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: I believe the majority opinion conflicts with the decision of our supreme court in People v. Smith (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 13, 230 N.E.2d 188, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1602, and Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 85 S. Ct. 1065. In a case remarkably similar to the present one, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically held Bruton applicable in a conspiracy situation. In United States v. Sanchez (9th Cir. 1966), 532 F.2d 155, three persons were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute opium and heroin. One of the defendants pleaded guilty and the other two went on to trial. One co-defendant did not take the stand, but asserted a defense of entrapment. His attorney advised the jury that had he testified, he would have admitted the allegations in the indictment. The court stated that the incriminatory admissions of the one co-defendant were extremely damaging to the appealing defendant and impaired his right to a fair trial. The entrapment instruction contained no protective language restricting the admissions to the nontestifying defendant, nor was any objection or request made to include such by the appealing defendant. Nevertheless, relying on Bruton, the court implied that a limiting instruction under the circumstances would not have cured the constitutional defect. The major factor in the court’s decision was the fact that the case against the appealing defendant was extremely slender and therefore the use of the statements against him was manifest injustice resulting in plain error. In comparison to this case, it should be noted that the trial judge himself admitted on the record that the case against Goodman was very weak. However, assuming that the statement of a co-conspirator is an exception to the rule laid down in Bruton, I still disagree with the majority because no conspiracy was ever proved between defendant Goodman and defendant Bury, independent of Bury’s hearsay statements. Conspiracy is generally defined as an agreement, tacit or express, to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The essence of the offense is a concern of will and endeavor between two or more people. (People v. Bain (1934), 358 Ill. 177, 193 N.E. 137.) When this record is viewed without consideration of Bury’s statements, there is no evidence that any such agreement existed between the defendant and Bury. Agent Inlow met Bury in a public restaurant. Bury was accompanied by defendant and a second man, in whose presence he stated that he had cocaine. Defendant was not a party to any discussion between Inlow and Bury at this meeting or at any other time, and no evidence was presented showing that any conversation between defendant and Bury which specifically referred to the cocaine ever occurred. The actual exchange of drugs and money occurred out of defendant’s presence. Bury subsequently gave defendant a large sum of money in a public place. The most incriminating conclusion that can be drawn from this sequence of events is that defendant had knowledge of and acquiesced to the illegal transaction. This certainly does not constitute participation in a conspiracy. The only agreement shown in this case was the agreement between Inlow and Bury for the transfer of the cocaine, which agreement began when Inlow contacted Bury to attempt a purchase and Bury agreed to arrange a sale. The majority opinion rests its finding of a conspiracy between Goodman and Bury on two grounds. The first of these is circumstantial evidence which indicated that Goodman was the contact. This evidence consisted of the facts that Goodman lived near Okawville and once had his telephone disconnected. These facts standing alone are irrelevant— they have significance only when tied to the hearsay statements of Bury that his contact lived in Okawville and once had his telephone removed for fear of eavesdropping. How can it be said that these facts independently help to establish the existence of a conspiracy? Second, the majority relies on the money transaction and overheard conversation between Bury and Goodman in the restaurant to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy. As stated above, the most that can be said of this is that Goodman knew of and acquiesced to Bury’s illegal dealings. Where is the evidence of any agreement to further Bury’s criminal intent? The fact that a party commits illegal acts that further the object of a conspiracy does not make him a conspirator unless he had knowledge of the conspiracy. (16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy §10 (1964).) Taking the money, therefore, is not sufficient in itself. The circumstantial evidence used to establish a conspiracy must afford a reasonable inference as to the ultimate facts to be proved and must not be based on mere speculation or suspicion. (16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy §36 (1964).) A conspiracy cannot be established by evidence of a mere relationship or transaction between the parties. (People v. Persinger (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 116, 363 N.E.2d 897.) Demonstrating knowledge is not enough; it is the finding of intent and agreement that makes a conspiracy. (People v. Persinger.) In Persinger the circumstantial evidence used to inferentially establish an agreement to unlawfully deliver a controlled substance was much stronger than in this case. There was cumulative evidence as to the quantity, frequency and duration of sales to the State’s key witness over the period of a year and of the defendant’s presence at numerous drug sales, although he never made any of them directly. In addition, on one occasion he actively facilitated the transaction by lending his pocket knife to the seller to scrape off a prescription label. In comparison to this case, the State’s key witness had never seen Goodman before, Goodman was not present nor did he actively participate in the actual exchange, and there were no prior dealings between Bury and the agent which could have linked Goodman to them. The circumstantial evidence as a whole just does not reach the level it did in Persinger and really amounts to nothing more than suspicion. If it can be said that there was any conspiracy at all betwen Bury and Goodman, it must be viewed as commencing with the conversation between them in the restaurant whereby Bury told Goodman that he was going with the buyer to get more money. This could possibly be viewed as putting Goodman on notice of the pre-existing conspiracy between Inlow, Bury and conceivably Malee and constituting a tacit agreement to join. However, it is standard hornbook law that declarations or acts of one conspirator made prior to the beginning of the conspiracy are not admissible against other members of the conspiracy. (16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy §39 (1964).) In other words, subsequent membership in a conspiracy renders the new member criminally liable for the deeds of the conspiracy but does not relate back to impute co-conspirator statements to him on an agency theory. Therefore, Bury’s statements regarding the need to verify transactions with his “contact” and the whereabouts of his contact are inadmissible under the conspiracy exception because they were made prior to the formation of the conspiracy between Goodman and himself. The admission of the hearsay statements into evidence cannot be justified on the basis of the existence of a conspiracy, because the evidence failed to establish one, or if it did, the statements were made prior to its formation.