Court Opinion

ID: 9554624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 16:10:54.71163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:03.801310
License: Public Domain

J-S21001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: J.I.A, A                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
  MINOR                                        :
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: U.S.A., JR., FATHER               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 182 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans' Court at
                            No(s): 2022-01046

  IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  OF: U.T.A., A MINOR                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: U.S.A., JR., FATHER               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 183 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered January 9, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans' Court at
                            No(s): 2022-01047

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                               FILED: AUGUST 9, 2023

       U.S.A., Jr. (“Father”) appeals the January 9, 2023 decrees that

involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his biological sons, J.I.A., born

in June 2009, and U.T.A., born in March 2011. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S21001-23

       We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the

certified record, which the orphans’ court has aptly summarized, as follows:1

       C.LS. (“Mother”) is the natural mother of J.I.A., U.T.A., and
       D.M.M. Father is the biological father of U.T.A. and J.I.A., while
       [t]he father of D.M.M. is unknown . . . .

       [Lebanon County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the
       agency”)] first became involved with the family on August 16,
       2020, due to Mother’s substance use and mental health behavior
       issues. . . . [In connection with these allegations], Mother signed
       over guardianship of J.I.A. and U.T.A. to S.M., a family friend. The
       agency opened a case for all of the children in November 2020.
       At that time, Father was [living apart from the family in New York
       and] Mother’s whereabouts were unknown . . . .

       [In January 2021,] concerns arose about [S.M.’s] suspected drug
       use, home conditions, and that [she] refused to drug test when
       requested. The agency requested emergency custody of U.T.A.
       on January 26, 2021[, which was granted the same day.] U.T.A.
       was adjudicated dependent on February 8, 2021. [At this time,
       Father’s whereabouts were unknown to the agency, although he
       was suspected to be in New York with Mother.]

       Thereafter, during the summer of 2021, the agency received
       reports that J.I.A. was back in Pennsylvania at the maternal
       grandmother’s home; however, the agency could not confirm
       these reports. Father and Mother alleged that J.I.A. was in New
       York with a relative. The relative, however, denied having J.I.A[.]

       The agency located J.I.A. at his football game on September 17,
       2021. The same day, the agency was awarded emergency
       custody of J.I.A. He was placed into a kinship foster home with
       his football coaches[.]   On November 29, 2021, J.I.A. was
       adjudicated dependent[.]

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 4-5 (cleaned up).

____________________________________________

1  On January 9, 2023, the orphans’ court also terminated Mother’s parental
rights to, inter alia, J.I.A. and U.T.A. She has appealed those determinations
at 222 and 223 MDA 2023, which we have addressed in a separate writing.

                                           -2-
J-S21001-23

       The   orphans’     court   initially    established   a   permanency    goal   of

reunification with respect to U.T.A. and J.I.A. Father was assigned numerous

objectives including, inter alia, obtaining suitable housing, finding stable

employment, submitting to regular drug tests, obtaining a drug and alcohol

assessment, and participating in visits with U.T.A. and J.I.A.                See N.T.,

1/9/23, at 21-22; see also CYS Exhibit 3 (permanency plan for J.I.A.), CYS

Exhibit 4 (permanency plan for U.T.A.), CYS Exhibit 5 (permanency plan for

D.M.M.). Father was most recently incarcerated in approximately April 2022.

In August 2022, he received a sentence of eighteen months to seven years of

imprisonment. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 21, 24, 34, 63-65.

       On December 20, 2022, the agency filed petitions seeking to, inter alia,

involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights.2           On January 9, 2023, the

court held a termination hearing, at which point U.T.A. had been in placement

for approximately twenty-four months while J.I.A. had been in placement for

approximately sixteen months. At the hearing, the agency adduced testimony

from CYS foster care supervisor Angelica Farrisi. Father testified on his own

behalf.   The same day as the hearing, the orphans’ court entered decrees

____________________________________________

2  On December 20, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed a guardian ad litem
and separate legal counsel to represent, respectively, the best interests and
the legal interests of, inter alia, U.T.A. and J.I.A. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).
Legal counsel has filed a brief in this Court advocating that the orphans’ court’s
termination decrees be affirmed.

                                           -3-
J-S21001-23

involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

      On February 1, 2023, Father filed separate, timely notices of appeal

along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1)(i) and (b).         On appeal, this Court sua sponte

consolidated the above-captioned cases pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513.

      Father has raised two claims for our consideration:

      A.    Whether the [orphans’] court committed an error of law
      and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of
      [Father]?

      B.    Whether the [orphans’] court committed an error of law
      and/or abused its discretion in finding the termination of parental
      rights [was proper pursuant to] 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
      and (8) as to J.I.A. and U.T.A.?

Father’s brief at 4.

      Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
      an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
      unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial

                                        -4-
J-S21001-23

     courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
     hearings.

     In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
     court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
     decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
     child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
     protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
     significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
     child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
     party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
     evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
     convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
     without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

     The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which necessitates a bifurcated analysis

that first focuses upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct

that may warrant termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(1)-(11). Id. at 830. If

the orphans’ court determines that a petitioner has established grounds for

termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and convincing

evidence,” the court then assesses the petition under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b),

which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court “need

only agree with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in

order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” T.S.M., supra at 267.

     In the instant case, the orphans’ court found that termination was

appropriate pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). However, we need

only agree with one such subsection, in addition to § 2511(b), in order to

                                     -5-
J-S21001-23

affirm involuntary termination.      Thus, our analysis in this proceeding

implicates § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows:

      (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         ...

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

         ...

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      Pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the party petitioning for termination of

parental rights must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3)

that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not

be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa.Super.

                                     -6-
J-S21001-23

2021) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)). Grounds sufficient for termination

under section 2511(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative misconduct but may

also concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. Id.

     If a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination pursuant to

§ 2511(a), the court turns to § 2511(b), which requires that it “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “Notably, courts should consider the

matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their] developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.”       In the

Interest of K.T., ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 4092986 at *13 (Pa. June 21,

2023). This determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must

be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each

child’s specific needs.” Id. at *14. Accordingly, as our Supreme Court has

recently explained, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be

considered in this context. Id. at *18 n.28.

     Since its holding in In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), our Supreme

Court has mandated that a court’s § 2511(b) analysis must include

“consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.” T.S.M.,

supra at 267. Thus, the court must determine whether the “trauma” caused

by sundering the parent-child bond is “outweighed by the benefit of moving

the child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253 (cleaned up). Specifically,

the recognized threshold for this finding is that the court must determine

                                    -7-
J-S21001-23

whether termination will sever a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” such

that the child “could suffer extreme emotional consequences.” K.T., supra

at *16.     Our Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that such

consequences must constitute more than mere proof of “an adverse or

detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond” in order to preclude

termination.   Id. at *18.   Thus, “courts correctly refine their focus on the

child’s development and mental and emotional health rather than considering

only the child’s ‘feelings’ or ‘affection’ for the parent, which even badly abused

and neglected children will retain.” Id. at *16 (citing T.S.M., supra at 267).

      Our case law reflects that a court’s analysis pursuant to § 2511(b) is not

narrow but must include consideration of “intangibles such as love, comfort,

security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 267. Indeed, our Supreme Court

has affirmed that “the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection

(b) analysis.” K.T., supra at *18. Thus, “courts must not only consider the

child’s bond with the biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort,

security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T.,

supra at *17 (cleaned up; emphasis in original). Our Supreme Court has

noted that Pennsylvania courts should also consider, where appropriate due

to the particular facts of a case, related factors such as: (1) the child’s need

for permanency and length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is in

a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and (3) whether the

foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at *18.

                                      -8-
J-S21001-23

      With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Father’s

arguments. Although framed as separate issues, Father’s brief contains only

a unitary argument that collectively addresses the orphans’ court’s findings

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a),

2119(a).     We discern that Father is arguing that the orphans’ court

inappropriately relied solely upon the fact of his incarceration to terminate his

parental rights. See Father’s brief at 13-14.

      While Father argues that the orphans’ court inappropriately focused

upon his incarceration in rendering this decision, our Supreme Court’s

jurisprudence indicates otherwise:

      [I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be
      determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of
      providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
      length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly
      relevant to whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
      abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
      parent, sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to
      23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012). This Court has also

explained:

      Each case of an incarcerated parent facing termination must be
      analyzed on its own facts, keeping in mind . . . that the child's
      need for consistent parental care and stability cannot be put aside
      or put on hold[.] Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for
      a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental
      responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
      physical and emotional needs. Rather, a parent must utilize all
      available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
      must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
      the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.

                                      -9-
J-S21001-23

Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).

      We emphasize that Father has been an absent parent in the lives of

U.T.A. and J.I.A. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 61. Indeed, by his own admission,

Father lived completely apart from the family in New York from at least

September 2019 until February 2021.           Id.     In addition to this period of

voluntary absence, Father has been sporadically imprisoned during the

agency’s involvement with the family. Id. at 61-62, 67-68. The exact periods

of, and reasons for, Father’s various terms of confinement are not entirely

clear from the certified record. However, his most recent term of incarceration

began in April 2022 and, ultimately, he received a sentence of eighteen

months to seven years with no release date yet set. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 21,

24, 34, 63-65. Whether imprisoned or free, however, the orphans’ court found

that Father demonstrated a continued incapacity in that he has either refused,

or been unable, to maintain verifiable housing, obtain employment, undergo

mental health and drug and alcohol evaluations, or participate in visits with

his sons. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 22. The orphans’ court

concomitantly found that these incapacities had deprived U.T.A. and J.I.A. of

essential parental care and subsistence.        Id.     Finally, the orphans’ court

concluded that Father’s incapacities would not be remedied. Id.

      Our review of the record reveals full support for the court’s findings. Ms.

Farrisi testified that Father has never maintained appropriate housing or

employment during the course of the agency’s involvement with the family.

                                     - 10 -
J-S21001-23

See N.T., 1/9/23, at 37. She also testified that Father failed to obtain either

a mental health evaluation or a drug and alcohol evaluation. Id. at 25-26.

Ms. Farrisi’s testimony similarly reflected that Father was only able to

participate in one supervised visit with U.T.A. or J.I.A. during their placements,

i.e., for periods of twenty-four and sixteen months, respectively. Id. at 21,

24, 34.   Indeed, there is no indication in the record that Father has ever

provided any relevant parental care or subsistence to U.T.A. and J.I.A.

      Finally, competent evidence supports the orphans’ court’s determination

that Father would not, or could not, remedy his incapacities. Even prior to his

imprisonment, Ms. Farrisi reported that Father was evasive and non-

cooperative with the agency.     Id. at 21-26, 34-37.     Father has now been

incarcerated since April 2022 and is currently serving a sentence with a

maximum term of seven years. Id. at 63. Furthermore, as of the termination

hearing in January 2023, U.T.A. was approximately eleven years old and had

been in placement for two years, while J.I.A. was approximately thirteen years

old and had been in placement for sixteen months. Forcing U.T.A. and J.I.A.

to wait for Father’s release at some future, uncertain date would essentially

hold what little remains of their childhood ransom to an eventuality that may

never come to fruition. See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513

(Pa.Super. 2006) (“The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a

child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's . . . hope for the

future.”). Instantly, Father’s repeated and continued incapacity due to his

                                     - 11 -
J-S21001-23

incarceration has caused U.T.A. and J.I.A. to be without essential parental

care, control, and subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-

being. See S.P., supra at 830 (“A parent who is incapable of performing

parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the

duties.” (cleaned up)).

      Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in

the orphans’ court’s conclusion that involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights was appropriate pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

      Father has advanced no colorable argument concerning § 2511(b). The

statute is neither cited nor discussed with particularity in his brief to this Court.

See Father’s brief at 7-16. We note that “[i]t is well-settled that this Court

will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an

appellant's brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.”         In re

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa.Super. 2017). On this ground, alone, we

could find that Father has waived any claim regarding the orphans’ court’s

holding pursuant to § 2511(b). Id. at 466 n.3 (disapproving of a requirement

that this Court should address § 2511(b) “even where the appellant has made

no effort to present a challenge regarding that section”).

      Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we review the orphans’

court’s needs and welfare analysis. In terminating Father’s parental rights,

the orphans’ court found that: (1) no parental bond existed between Father

and either U.T.A. or J.I.A.; and (2) the involuntary termination of Father’s

                                       - 12 -
J-S21001-23

parental rights would serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of J.I.A. and U.T.A., particularly with respect to affording them

permanency and stability.     See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 27-28.

The evidence of record supports these conclusions.

      As detailed above, the record establishes that Father’s only contact with

U.T.A. and J.I.A. during this time period have been a single supervised

visitation and occasional letters, which were not well-received by U.T.A. or

J.I.A. Id. at 21, 24, 33-34. He has been largely absent from his sons’ lives

and U.T.A. and J.I.A. have not expressed a desire to have continued contact

with him. Id. at 72. Overall, we find ample support for the court’s conclusion

that no parental bond exists.      See Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 984

(Pa.Super. 2019) (“Where there is no evidence of a bond between the parent

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”).

      Furthermore, Ms. Farrisi reported that U.T.A. and J.I.A. are thriving in

their respective placements and are bonded with their pre-adoptive foster

families.   See N.T., 1/9/23, at 20-21.       She also averred that J.I.A.’s and

U.T.A.’s need for stability and permanency would be best served by

terminating Father’s parental rights. Id. at 40. Her conclusion on this point

is further buttressed by the long duration of the respective placements of each

child in this matter.    Id. at 21, 34.       Accordingly, the orphans’ court’s

conclusions with respect to § 2511(b) are supported by sufficient evidence.

                                     - 13 -
J-S21001-23

      Based upon the review conducted above, we discern no abuse of

discretion or error law in the orphans’ court’s holding.

      Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2023

                                     - 14 -