Court Opinion

ID: 9462339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:39:03.048691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:33.290943
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In my opinion the reversal in this case results primarily from our court engaging in hindsight concerning the trial tactics of the defense attorney. I agree with the views of Judge Schatz stated in his unpublished opinion as follows:
A review of the entire record and proceedings clearly indicates that Mr. Cullan conducted a vigorous and knowledgeable defense, not impeded by lack of necessary investigation or preparation, and that he exercised, rather than abdicated, his professional judgment. There is no question but what this was a close case wherein the jury had difficult evidentiary discrepancies to resolve, and resolved them against petitioner. But the measure of defense counsel is not whether he ultimately prevails in a close case or is completely errorless or is judged ineffective or questionable by hindsight. Rather, the test is whether his representation renders the trial a farce, or a mockery of justice, or is shocking to the conscience of the Court, or was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, or pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation. See, e. g., Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1975); Scalf v. Bennett, 408 F.2d 325, 327-28 (8th Cir. 1969). Judged by these standards, and in view of the fact that the witnesses’ potential testimony, supra, would have been materially inconsistent with petitioner’s testimony, the Court cannot say that Mr. Cullan’s decision not to call these witnesses to testify amounted to a “mockery of justice” within the meaning of McQueen [McQueen v. Swenson, 8 Cir., 498 F.2d 207] and Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1974). See DeBerry v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1336 at 1340 (8th Cir. 1975).
This court has recently engrafted a caveat upon the mockery of justice standard to the effect that
* * * we have never intended it to be used as a shibboleth to avoid a searching evaluation of possible constitutional violations; nor has it been so used in this circuit. It was not intended that the “mockery of justice” standard be taken literally, but rather that it be employed as an embodiment of the principle that a petitioner must shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfairness.
*214McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974). However, in my opinion the petitioner in this case has not shouldered that heavy burden in proving unfairness.