Court Opinion

ID: 9891025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 14:00:44.077949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:41.018882
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1567    Document: 43     Page: 1   Filed: 10/17/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                  WILSON E. TUCKER,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                             v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                        2022-1567
                  ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 20-2924, Judge Grant Jaquith.
                 ______________________

                Decided: October 17, 2023
                 ______________________

      WILLIAM C. HERREN, Herren Law Office, Houston, TX,
 for claimant-appellant.

     BRENDAN DAVID JORDAN, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,
 LOREN MISHA PREHEIM; AMANDA BLACKMON, BRIAN D.
 GRIFFIN, Office of General Counsel, United States Depart-
 ment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
Case: 22-1567     Document: 43    Page: 2   Filed: 10/17/2023

 2                                    TUCKER v. MCDONOUGH

                   ______________________

     Before STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     Wilson E. Tucker appeals from the decision of the
 United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Vet-
 erans Court”) affirming the decision of the Board of Veter-
 ans’ Appeals (“Board”) denying Mr. Tucker’s claim for
 Clear and Unmistakable Error (“CUE”) relating to a Feb-
 ruary 1979 regional office (“RO”) decision denying service
 connection for schizophrenia. Tucker v. McDonough, No.
 20-2924, 2021 WL 6143675 (Vet. App. Dec. 30, 2021). For
 the reasons provided below, we affirm in part and dismiss
 in part.
                              I
     Mr. Tucker served on active duty in the U.S. Marine
 Corps from September 1974 to September 1977. On Octo-
 ber 23, 1978, he was admitted to the Jackson VA Hospital
 in Mississippi. Over the preceding nine days, he had been
 arrested for possession of marijuana, then hospitalized in
 Meridian, Mississippi, and discharged from that hospital
 with guidance that he obtain a psychiatric evaluation. Mr.
 Tucker’s chief complaints on admission to the Jackson VA
 Hospital were “withdrawn behavior, [acting] short tem-
 pered, hearing things for the past one to two months, and
 agitation.” App’x 12. He was diagnosed with schizophre-
 nia, paranoid type.
     On October 27, 1978, Mr. Tucker left the Jackson VA
 Hospital without approval. Then, on November 2, 1978, he
 was admitted to East Mississippi State Hospital pursuant
 to a court order. The admission notes from East Missis-
 sippi State Hospital stated that Mr. Tucker had been
 “drinking, smoking marijuana and taking ‘angel dust.’”
 App’x 14. He was again diagnosed with schizophrenia, par-
 anoid type. On November 7, 1978, Mr. Tucker underwent
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 TUCKER v. MCDONOUGH                                        3

 a psychological evaluation at East Mississippi State Hospi-
 tal.   The examination notes show that Mr. Tucker
 “acknowledged the intake of marijuana and alcohol, appar-
 ently on a regular basis, but denied the use of other drugs
 for the previous four years.” App’x 17. A social work report
 dated November 11, 1978 from East Mississippi State Hos-
 pital indicates that Mr. Tucker’s mother said that “when
 smoking marijuana in conjunction with alcohol [Mr.
 Tucker] seemed to have become more belligerent toward
 those around him” and “would also go and talk to himself.”
 App’x 20. The social work report’s assessment was that Mr.
 Tucker needed to “change [his] socially unacceptable be-
 haviors and learn to control his abuse of alcohol and drugs.”
 App’x 21.
     On November 9, 1978, Mr. Tucker filed a claim for ser-
 vice connection for schizophrenia. On February 5, 1979,
 the RO issued a rating decision denying his claim. The rat-
 ing decision, in relevant part, stated:
       As to schizophrenia, there is no evidence of
       complaint, treatment or diagnosis in service
       or within one year after discharge. The pre-
       ponderance of evidence indicates that [Mr.
       Tucker] was hospitalized for the first time on
       10-23-78 with history of involvement in drugs
       and marijuana. Since there is no evidence to
       show that [Mr. Tucker’s] psychiatric problems
       go back to an earlier date than that which is
       identified with drug abuse, it cannot be shown
       that the etiology is related to service or comes
       within the presumptive period after service
       for compensation purposes.
 App’x 22. Mr. Tucker did not appeal the RO’s decision,
 which became final.
     On September 22, 2014, Mr. Tucker filed a CUE claim
 to reverse or revise the RO’s 1979 rating decision. He ar-
 gued that his October 1978 schizophrenia diagnosis
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 4                                      TUCKER v. MCDONOUGH

 established that he did, in fact, exhibit schizophrenia
 symptoms during the one-year presumptive period, which
 ended in September 1978, because a schizophrenia diagno-
 sis requires “a finding of duration of symptoms of six
 months or more.” App’x 27. Mr. Tucker also argued that
 the RO erred by focusing on the first dated medical diagno-
 sis and failing to consider the “entire suite of evidence,” in-
 cluding lay evidence in the record. In a decision issued on
 April 19, 2017, the RO found no CUE in the 1979 rating
 decision, explaining that since there was “no evidence to
 show that [Mr. Tucker’s] psychiatric problems go back to
 an earlier effective date [than] that which is identified with
 drug abuse it cannot be shown that the etiology is related
 to service or comes within the presumptive period after ser-
 vice for compensation purposes.” App’x 33. Mr. Tucker ap-
 pealed that decision to the Board.
     On December 31, 2019, the Board issued a decision
 finding that the RO’s 1979 rating decision did not contain
 CUE. The Board explained:
       There is no indication that the regional office
       erred in the application of the law or the facts
       in rendering the February 1979 rating deci-
       sion. The applicable law . . . clearly indicates
       that service connection based on the one-year
       presumptive period cannot be established for
       a chronic disease where the disease is a result
       of drug ingestion. In this case, the regional
       office found that [Mr. Tucker’s] schizophrenia
       was precipitated by drug use and that there
       was no indication that the symptoms existed
       prior to the drug use, concluding that [Mr.
       Tucker] did not experience a chronic disease
       within one year of separation [from] service
       and foreclosing service connection on a pre-
       sumptive basis.
Case: 22-1567     Document: 43       Page: 5   Filed: 10/17/2023

 TUCKER v. MCDONOUGH                                          5

 App’x 48. Mr. Tucker then appealed the Board’s decision
 to the Veterans Court.
      The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision, find-
 ing that Mr. Tucker’s reliance on medical treatises to es-
 tablish the six-month incubation period for schizophrenia
 was misplaced because the editions of the treatises he cited
 to did not exist at the time of the RO’s 1979 rating decision.
 The Veterans Court also found that the RO’s consideration
 of the evidence was consistent with the regulations then in
 effect and that Mr. Tucker failed to show that the RO’s rat-
 ing decision would have been manifestly different had the
 RO explicitly addressed his drug use in relation to the re-
 buttal standard under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307. Mr. Tucker
 timely appealed to us.
                               II
     We have limited jurisdiction to review judgments of the
 Veterans Court. We may review the validity of a decision
 “on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any
 interpretation thereof . . . that was relied upon by” the Vet-
 erans Court. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). However, “[e]xcept to
 the extent that an appeal . . . presents a constitutional is-
 sue,” we may not review “a challenge to a factual determi-
 nation” or “to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of
 a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2). We review statutory
 and regulatory interpretations relied upon by the Veterans
 Court de novo. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317,
 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007). And we will “hold unlawful and set
 aside any regulation or any interpretation thereof” that we
 find to be: “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
 or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to
 constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in
 excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, limitations, or in
 violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of
 procedure required by law.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1).
                               III
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 6                                     TUCKER v. MCDONOUGH

      Mr. Tucker first contends that the Veterans Court and
 the Board incorrectly applied 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(b) by not
 requiring a determination of whether he had been diag-
 nosed with an acute condition in 1978. The government
 responds that we lack jurisdiction because the Veterans
 Court did not interpret the regulation. Alternatively, even
 if we find jurisdiction, the government argues we should
 affirm because no finding of whether Mr. Tucker had an
 acute diagnosis was necessary.
     We may “determine whether the legal requirement of
 the statute or regulation has been correctly interpreted in
 a particular context where the relevant facts are not in dis-
 pute.” Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
 2004); see also Bailey v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.
 Cir. 2003) (exercising jurisdiction “when the material facts
 are not in dispute and the adoption of a particular legal
 standard would dictate the outcome” of issue). Here, there
 is no dispute over the relevant facts: the RO did not make
 a finding of acute diagnosis in its rating decision, and no
 one contends that it did. Mr. Tucker’s appeal on this issue,
 then, turns entirely on whether Section 3.307(b) should be
 interpreted as requiring such a finding. Thus, we have ju-
 risdiction to address the interpretation of Section 3.307(b).
    At the pertinent time, Section 3.307(b) stated, in rele-
 vant part:
       The diseases listed in § 3.309(a) will be ac-
       cepted as chronic, even though diagnosed as
       acute because of insidious inception and
       chronic development, except: (1) where they
       result from intercurrent causes . . . ; or (2)
       where a disease is the result of drug ingestion
       or a complication of some other condition not
       related to service.
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 TUCKER v. MCDONOUGH                                         7

 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(b) (1970). The plain meaning of the reg-
 ulation is clear and permissive: diseases listed 1 in Section
 3.309(a), “even though diagnosed as acute,” may still be ac-
 cepted as chronic, under the conditions set out in Section
 3.307(b). Section 3.307(b) contains two exceptions, i.e., sit-
 uations in which diseases listed in Section 3.309(a) may not
 be accepted as chronic: (1) where the disease results from
 intercurrent causes; and (2) where the disease “is the result
 of drug ingestion or a complication of some other condition
 not related to service.” Thus, the RO did not require an
 acute diagnosis in order to deny Mr. Tucker’s claim; it was
 permitted to deny that claim based on his disease, schizo-
 phrenia, being “the result of drug ingestion,” regardless of
 whether his schizophrenia was acute or chronic.
     Mr. Tucker next argues that the Veterans Court and
 the Board erred by failing to decide whether the RO exer-
 cised “medical judgment” in reaching the conclusion that
 his schizophrenia was connected to his drug use. Mr.
 Tucker’s contention hinges on whether the evidence the RO
 relied on in making its rating decision was sufficiently
 medically independent to rebut the presumption that Mr.
 Tucker’s schizophrenia was service connected. Addressing
 this issue would require us to weigh the evidence, a task
 outside of our jurisdiction. See Andino v. Nicholson, 498
 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that “making
 credibility determinations or weighing evidence . . . is be-
 yond our jurisdiction”). Thus, we dismiss this part of ap-
 peal for lack of jurisdiction.
                              IV
    We have considered Mr. Tucker’s remaining argu-
 ments and find that they lack merit. Accordingly, for the

     1   Psychosis was listed among the chronic diseases
 subject to presumptive entitlement in the operative version
 of Section 3.309(a). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (1976).
Case: 22-1567    Document: 43      Page: 8   Filed: 10/17/2023

 8                                    TUCKER v. MCDONOUGH

 reasons given above, we affirm the Veterans Court’s inter-
 pretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(b) and dismiss the challenge
 to the fact-based determination that Mr. Tucker’s schizo-
 phrenia was connected to his drug use.
     AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND DISMISSED-IN-PART
                           COSTS
 No costs.