Court Opinion

ID: 9514543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:21.663735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.752375
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶50.] Under settled South Dakota law, the trial court should have amended the verdict and entered a judgment for Defendant Risdall. Moreover, Berry waived the opportunity to challenge the verdict by not doing so while the jury was still impaneled and her remedy does not lie in a motion for new trial. Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion’s contrary conclusions and would not reach Issues 2-4.
[¶ 51.] 1. VERDICT FOR DEFENDAlNT
[¶ 52.] The majority opinion states, “There exists a split of authority among jurisdictions as to the consequences of a verdict for plaintiff but setting no monetary amount.”9 In fact, this court already decided in Lewis v. Storms, 290 N.W.2d 494, 498 (S.D.1980):
Although this court has never addressed the issue presented here, other jurisdictions have held that a verdict expressing a finding for plaintiff but awarding no damages is in fact and law a verdict for the defendant. The court is empowered to amend the verdict, correcting manifest errors of form, to make it conform to the intention of the jury. Therefore, it should have amended the verdict and entered judgment for defendant.
(Citations omitted). The majority opinion claims that the trial court had no indication of the jury’s intentions when it returned a verdict for no amount in favor of Berry. This ignores Lewis, which instructs the court to find “in fact and law a verdict for the defendant.” Id. (“It cannot be said that the jury found for plaintiff; otherwise, damages would have been awarded.”); accord K & E Land & Cattle, Inc. v. Mayer, 330 N.W.2d 529, 533 (S.D.1983) (reversing and remanding for correction of verdict to reflect that verdict for plaintiff which awarded zero damages was actually verdict for defendant); see also Kusser v. Feller, 453 N.W.2d 619 (S.D.1990) (refusing to reverse denial of plaintiffs motion for new trial when jury’s verdict for plaintiff awarded no damages).10
[¶53.] Additionally, the court could have easily caused the verdict to be clarified, if necessary, upon Berry’s request. See SDCL 15-14-30:
When the verdict is announced, if it be informal or insufficient in not covering the issue submitted, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be again sent out.
See also 75B AmJur2d Trial § 1789, at 551 (1992):
Where the form of the verdict is imprecise or contains superfluous language the verdict will not be invalidated if the jury’s *13intention is nonetheless clear or subject to clarification.
(Emphasis added); cf. Riggs v. Szymanski, 62 Mich.App. 610, 233 N.W.2d 670, 673 (1975) (“There can be no doubt that ... the court may amend the verdict, correcting manifest errors of form, and sometimes matters of substance, to make it conform to the intention of the jury.”); Trial supra § 1761, at 528 (“The verdict is not final until the deliberations are over, the result is announced in open court, it is assented to by the jury, and it is recorded by the court.”).
[¶ 54.] 2. WAIVER
[¶ 55.] Even if Berry could challenge this verdict in light of Lems and Mayer, by failing to act while the jury was still impaneled, she waived that opportunity.11 See Trial, supra § 1789, at 551:
When a deficiency or irregularity in a verdict is at once discernible upon the return of the verdict, any party adversely affected and desiring to invoke judicial relief must call the matter to the court’s attention then and there and afford the trial judge the opportunity to have the jury reconsider its verdict and correct its findings. The failure to take such action at a time when the trial judge yet has the jury available is a waiver of the claimed error.
(Emphasis added); see also Miller v. Hernandez, 520 N.W.2d 266, 271-72 (S.D.1994) (“We find Plaintiff has waived the issue of prejudgment interest ... by her failure to timely point out this problem to the circuit court while the jury was still impaneled[.]”); State v. O’Connor, 378 N.W.2d 248, 256 (S.D. 1985) (“Here, no reversible error exists because O’Connor failed to poll the jury, make .motions, or challenge any legal matters at the time the verdict was received.”); accord State v. Hoover, 89 S.D. 608, 619, 236 N.W.2d 635, 641 (S.D.1975).12
[¶ 56.] The jury clearly intended a defendant’s verdict and the trial court should have so amended the verdict and entered judgment for Risdall and we should reverse on that basis alone. Lewis, 290 N.W.2d at 498; Mayer, 330 N.W.2d at 533. Even if a motion for new trial were the proper remedy, the majority opinion errs in affirming the trial court under SDCL 15-6-59(a)(6), which allows for grant of a new trial only when the evidence is- insufficient to justify the verdict. As the author of the majority opinion noted in Tunender v. Minnaert, 1997 SD 62, ¶ 22, 563 N.W.2d 849, 853:
If the jury’s verdict can be explained with reference to the evidence, rather than by juror passion, prejudice or mistake of law, the verdict should be affirmed.
[¶57.] Risdall conceded Berry’s damages but repeatedly and vehemently disputed proximate cause. ‘When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict is challenged the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the successful party and he should have the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn therefrom.” Klug v. Keller Indus., Inc., 328 N.W.2d. 847, 849 (S.D.1982) (citation omitted). The jury heard testimony that the limousine driver failed to yield the right-of-way, failed to keep a proper lookout, and drove directly into Risdall’s path. It also heard the investigating officer testify that “this accident would have happened if, the driver was sober.” The jury must have concluded that *14Risdall’s negligence was not the proximate cause of Berry’s injuries. Therefore, the zero damage award can be explained and a new trial is not warranted:13
While we recognized that the trial court must exercise its discretion when presented with a motion for a new trial, we did not mean to imply that a court has carte blanche discretion to differ with the actions of a jury. Rather, neither the trial court nor this court may set aside a verdict unless it is clearly “unreasonable, arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence.”
Bakker v. Irvine, 519 N.W.2d 41, 49 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord Tunender, 1997 SD 62 at ¶22, 563 N.W.2d at 853 (“Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot say that the jury’s award was a result of passion or prejudice or that the jury has palpably mistaken the rules of law by which damages in this case are to be measured.”).
[¶ 58.] Even the majority opinion relies on authority that sustains this verdict. In Fjerstad v. Sioux Valley Hospital, 291 N.W.2d 786, 788 (S.D.1980), this court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs motion for new trial even though the jury’s verdict for the defendant was accompanied by this written statement:
We, the jury would like to submit to the Court that although we decided in favor of the defendant, we strongly feel that the defendant, Sioux Valley Hospital, was negligent in failing to properly supervise the emergency room.
The court ruled, “[W]e accept defendant’s construction of the verdict, i.e., that the jury determined that the hospital was negligent in not providing proper supervision, but that this negligence was not the proximate cause of Dezso Csoka’s death.” Id. Likewise, we should accept Risdall’s construction of the verdict, i.e., that the jury determined (as instructed) that Risdall was negligent for driving while under the influence, but that his negligence was not the proximate cause of Berry’s injuries. Cf. Riggs, 233 N.W.2d at 673:
Jury verdicts which find negligence on the part of a defendant but award no damages are not new to our jurisprudence.... In its simplest terms it merely means that there has been the invasion of another’s rights, but that no damage, or minuscule damage, flowed from the wrongful act.
[[Image here]]
Expressed another way the jury’s verdict may be properly interpreted to mean that the jury found no proximate causation and hence no recovery[.]
[¶ 59.] The majority opinion ignores well-settled precedent in affirming the trial court. The trial court should have amended the verdict and entered judgment for Risdall.
[¶ 60.] If we were to reach the motion for new trial here, the only permissible question would be: “Is there any legal evidence or testimony which fairly warrants the verdict of the jury?” That question can only be answered in the affirmative. Therefore, the verdict for the defendant should not be disturbed and we should reverse.

. The federal rule is that a verdict for no damages is not invalid or ambiguous and does not necessitate a new trial, and the court may enter a judgment in the amount of "0” dollars. 75B AmJur2d Trial § 1823, at 576-77 (1992).

. Kusser offers a slightly different twist to this issue. There, I wrote for the majority that it was unnecessaiy to amend the verdict and enter judgment in defendant's favor because, the court concluded, "the jury may have concluded that [defendant] was negligent, but that damages were not established with reasonable certainly.” 453 N.W.2d at 622. Under such a scenario, the juiy’s verdict would conform to its intention, and amendment of the verdict would be inappropriate and unnecessary.

. The majority opinion defends Berty’s failure to challenge the verdict, stating that she is not arguing that the verdict was inconsistent or irregular on its face, but is only appealing on the basis that the damages were inadequate. I might agree if Berry were not basing almost her entire argument on the verdict form. Waiting to challenge the form of the verdict on appeal amounts to "inviting error." See Taylor Realty Co. v. Haberling, 365 N.W.2d 870, 873 (S.D.1985):
The doctrine of "invited error” embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. It has been held that for the doctrine of invited error to apply it is sufficient that the party who on appeal complains of the error has contributed to it.
(Citation omitted). Acquiescence is enough to preclude the party from alleging the error later. State v. Buller, 484 N.W.2d 883, 888 (S.D.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 887, 113 S.Ct. 248, 121 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992).

. There are references in the briefs to Berry’s poll of the jury; however, a transcript of the poll does not appear in the record. Presumably, the jury agreed it was the correct verdict, or the court would have sent the jury out again under SDCL 15-14-25 &-26.

. Nor is relief warranted under SDCL 15 — 6— 59(a)(5), which provides that a new trial may be granted when excessive or inadequate damages appear to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. As oted in Bakker v. Irvine, 519 N.W.2d 41, 47 (S.D.1994), analyses under subdivisions (5) and (6), although not mutually exclusive, may be combined. To overturn a juty's damage award,
the damages ... must be so excessive or inadequate as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being, beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption.
Id. at 48 (citations & alteration omitted). As noted, an award of zero damages is not "beyond all measure” or "unreasonable and outrageous” — it is the only possible award if the jury concluded Risdall’s negligence was not the proximate cause of Berry’s injuries.