Court Opinion

ID: 9792084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:22:51.394012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:06.024673
License: Public Domain

WHITE, J.—I dissent.
Article XX, section 3 of the Constitution of this state requires that before entering upon their duties all public officers and employees shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation which, in essence, binds them to support and defend the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; to bear true faith *534and allegiance to these Constitutions; that such person does not himself advocate nor is he a member of any political party or other organization that advocates the overthrow of the national or state government by force or violence or by other unlawful means; that for five years immediately preceding the taking of such oath or affirmation, he has not been a member of any such subversive organization; and that during the time he holds such office or employment he will not himself advocate or become a member of any party, political or otherwise, that advocates the destruction of the federal or state governments by force or violence or any other unlawful means.
As the majority opinion correctly states, this appeal presents but a single issue which, as I view the record, involves an answer to the question whether plaintiff’s aversion and refusal to subscribe the foregoing California loyalty oath constitutes “good cause” for refusing to apply for “suitable employment” offered to him by the Department of Employment with the Alameda County Civil Service Commission, as the phrase “good cause” is used in the unemployment insurance law.
Section 1257 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, insofar as here pertinent, disqualifies a person otherwise entitled to unemployment benefits when without “good cause” such person refuses to apply for “suitable employment” when notified thereof by a public employment office.
The term, “suitable employment,” insofar as here relevant is defined by section 1258 of the Unemployment Insurance Code as “work in the individual’s usual occupation or for which he is reasonably fitted. ...” It is conceded that the work to which plaintiff was referred by the Department of Employment met the aforesaid code definition of “suitable employment.” Such being the case, plaintiff relies primarily on the contention that since he has a “conscientious objection” to swearing allegiance to the federal and state governments, their protection against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and that he will not himself advocate or associate himself with parties or organizations advocating the overthrow of such governments by force and violence or other unlawful means, he is immune from the denial of unemployment benefits to him because his conscientious objection to subscribe the loyalty oath furnishes “good cause,” as that term is used in the code, for his refusal to apply for a position wherein he would be required to take the oath here in question.
The reasons assigned by plaintiff for refusing to subscribe *535the oath are rather fully set forth in the majority opinion and need not here be repeated. Suffice it to say that they may be thus epitomized: Plaintiff reserves unto himself the right to determine when certain circumstances have arisen which in his opinion warrant the overthrow of the existing federal or state governments; at such time he will advocate by speech and will join in a concerted action to overthrow said governments by force and violence; the foregoing without regard to and in violation of the provisions of our constitutions which declare that all political power is inherently in the people and that they may peacefully change our form of government by ballots rather than by bullets. If plaintiff’s philosophy furnishes " good cause ’ ’ for excusing a profession of loyalty under the protective provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of California, then well may it be said that these constitutions contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction.
In explanation of his attitude toward taking a loyalty oath, plaintiff testified that the then established government of the United States was overthrown by force and violence through the Revolutionary War of 1776 and the majority opinion notes that our Declaration of Independence recognizes the existence of “basic human rights,” and that to secure those rights is the purpose of government as evidenced by the language of the Declaration of Independence “. . . that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government. . . To me a comparison between the tyrannical bondage imposed upon the colonists by the King of Great Britain and the inherent right of the people of the United States to control hy constitutional changes the form of their government seems unreasonable indeed. After setting forth a long list of outrages perpetrated against them by Great Britain’s King, including “He has abdicated government here by declaring us out of his protection and waging war against us ” by “. . . taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering, fundamentally, the forms of our governments. ...” He has also “Forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. . . . He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people *536would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature —a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only. . . . For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. . . . He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burned our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. . . . He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny, already begun, with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation.” And finally, “In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. ’ ’
I am at a complete loss to find any reasonable comparison between the tyrannical form of a really foreign government sought to be abolished by the immortal Declaration of Independence and a government established and functioning pursuant to the Constitution of the United States which, as heretofore pointed out, reposes all legislative and political powers in a Congress elected by the people as prescribed by the electors in each state, and which provides a method by which the people may change or alter their form of government, together with the Constitution of the State of California which provides that “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit of the people, and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it” (art. I, § 2), and which Constitution affords the right of initiative and referendum with regard to legislation as well as the recall of all elective public officials.
Plaintiff does not attack the constitutionality of the applicable statute but asserts that the application thereof to him as an applicant for unemployment insurance benefits requiring him to accept a referral to employment that demands of him a loyalty oath to which he has conscientious objections does violence to several of his constitutional rights. His first claim in that regard is that the procedure denies him freedom of speech and of assembly. The loyalty oath here in question is designed to protect the people not against what communists or other kindred subversive organizations or individuals advocate *537or believe, but against what the people in adopting the constitutional amendment and the Legislature have considered they have done and are likely to do again. Conceding that restriction on speech and assembly cannot be sustained unless the evil itself is “substantial” and “relatively serious,” or sometimes “extremely serious” thus creating what is commonly called “clear and present danger” nevertheless, as was said in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 [71 S.Ct. 857, 867, 95 L.Ed. 1137], “Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the ultimate value of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate value can be protected. If, then, this interest may be protected, the literal problem which is presented is what has been meant by the use of the phrase ‘clear and present danger’ of the utterances bringing about the evil within the power of Congress to punish.
“Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required. The argument that there is no need for Government to concern itself, for Government is strong, it possesses ample powers to put down a rebellion, it may defeat the revolution with ease needs no answer. For that is not the question. Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion places its imprimatur upon a decision that holds that the State of California must give unemployment benefits to an individual when a position consistent with said individual’s capabilities, earnings and work pattern is available to him and he refuses the same on the sole ground of objection to a loyalty oath which would circumscribe only unlawful acts (see Smith Act, U. S. Code, tit. 18, § 2385). The *538majority of this court grounds such holding upon the premise that “No statute couples unemployment insurance benefits with loyalty oaths,” and that plaintiff “. . . had good cause for his refusal, from the standpoint of public interest and from that of his individual rights. ’ ’ With this I cannot agree. As to the public interest, it may well be said that unemployment insurance is not a matter of right. It could be abolished or changed. Neither plaintiff nor the majority opinion herein challenges the constitutionality of the statute were it to require a loyalty oath as a condition precedent to the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. Wherein therefore, is there a denial of due process in the procedure adopted herein by the Department of Employment ? The public policy of the state is contained in section 100 of the Unemployment Insurance Code. In that declaration of policy the state has said, and the Legislature declares, that for the public good and general welfare of the citizens of this state the enactment of a measure for the compulsory setting aside of funds to be used for a system of unemployment insurance providing benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering occasioned thereby to a minimum, is required. As correctly pointed out in the majority opinion, once the unemployment insurance tax has been collected, although it may be earmarked for a special purpose, it is the property of the State of California. However, in administering this fund, the state has a definite interest in and obligation to administer the same with fairness to those from whom the funds are obtained, and in conformity with the aforesaid declared public policy of the state.
Viewed in this light can it be said that under section 1257 of the Unemployment Insurance Code the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board was unreasonable in its decision to disqualify for the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits one who refuses to apply for admittedly “suitable employment” solely on the ground that to accept such employment he would be required to subscribe an oath to defend the federal and state Constitutions and would not advocate himself or join any party or organization advocating the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means ? I think not.
Much of what has just been said is applicable to the holding in the majority opinion “that at least in the absence of any statute to the contrary, an applicant for unemployment insur*539anee benefits has good cause for declining public employment because of stated conscientious objections to taking a loyalty oath, looking at the situation from the standpoint of the individual’s rights.” (Emphasis added.)
The unemployment insurance program operates under the auspices of and is supervised and administered by the State of California. To me it appears implicit that under the public policy of this state as to loyalty oaths and the administration of the act here in question, the subversive philosophy of plaintiff in his assertion of the right to overthrow the federal and state governments by force and violence or other unlawful means forecloses him from the rights and privileges of participating in that program. History even in our own times warns us that the saddest epitaph ever carved to the memory of a vanished free state is that its people failed to raise their hands to keep their freedoms and liberties while yet they had that power.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Schauer, J., concurred.