Court Opinion

ID: 9761610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:47:30.437885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:25.079474
License: Public Domain

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that “it was not the accumulated snow in the parking lot or the parked truck that caused Claimant’s injury; rather, it was her own act of climbing over her console that injured her.”
As the majority correctly noted, our inquiry is whether Claimant’s injury was caused by a condition of Bucknell’s premises. Dana Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Gearhart), 120 Pa. Cmwlth.277, 548 A.2d 669 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 606, 562 A.2d 828 (1989).
Section 301(c)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. § 411(1) provides that “ ‘[t]he term injury arising in the course of his employment,’ .... shall include all injuries caused by the condition of the premises ....’” “Section 301(c)(1) of the Act does not say that the cause of the injuries must be the faulty condition of or negligent operations on the employer’s premises, it refers only to condition and operations.” Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Slaugenhaupt) v. United States Steel Corp., 31 Pa.Cmwlth.329, 376 A.2d 271, 275 (1977). (emphasis added).
In Motion Control Industries v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Buck), 145 Pa.Cmwlth.399, 603 A.2d 675, petition for allowance of appeal denied, 531 Pa. 658, 613 A.2d 562 (1992), this Court stated:
This holding [Newhouse v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Harris Cleaning Service), 109 Pa.Cmwlth.96, 530 A.2d 545 (1987), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 517 Pa. 627, 538 A.2d 879 (1988) ] inherently implies that once an employee is on the Employer’s premises, actually getting to or leaving the employee’s work station is a necessary part of that employee’s employment, and thus, definitively furthering the employer’s interests. There is no question that an Employer’s ‘premises’ includes a reasonable means of access to the situs of the Employer’s business, including employee parking lots, (emphasis added).
Id. at 678, citing Schofield v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Ohio Rubber Company), 39 Pa.Cmwlth.282, 395 A.2d 328 (1978).
*157Here, the WCJ found Claimant’s testimony credible that Employer’s premises was snowy and that the pickup truck was parked so close to Claimant’s vehicle that entry from the driver’s side was impossible. See WCJ’s Decision, August 12, 1998, Finding of Fact No. 3 at 3-4.
Alternatively, regardless whether the snow caused the pickup truck to be parked too closely, Claimant’s testimony is clear that she was unable to access her vehicle to drive home because of the location of the pickup truck. In my view, the closely parked pickup truck was a condition of the premises which necessitated Claimant’s actions.
It is this Court’s “obligation to interpret the Act liberally to effectuate its humanitarian purpose ... and to resolve borderline interpretations in favor of the injured employee ....” Hoffman v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Westmoreland Hospital), 559 Pa. 655, 660, 741 A.2d 1286, 1288 (1999).
I believe the controversy should be remanded for the WCJ to formulate more specific findings with regard to the medical and other testimony and to determine whether Claimant shouldered her burden to secure benefits.
Judge COLINS joins in this dissent.