Court Opinion

ID: 9898723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 00:03:31.587103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:05.162195
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/25/23; modified and certified for publication 11/14/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION THREE

 In re KAYLA W., a Person Coming                            B326119
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 _____________________________________
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                         (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND                                 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP03176A)
 FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

 LEYLA W.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
      Serobian Law and Liana Serobian, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

      Leyla W. (mother) appeals from an order terminating
parental rights to her child, Kayla W. Mother contends that the
court failed to comply with the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA, Fam. Code, § 3400,
et seq.).1 We reject her contention and affirm the order.
                       BACKGROUND
I.   Detention and UCCJEA proceedings
       Kayla (born in September 2017) came to the attention of
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) after mother was arrested in May 2019. After
mother’s arrest, officers found one-year-old Kayla in a motel
room, alone.
       Mother, who was born in California, told an officer and a
social worker that she had been living in Nevada since 2017 but
had just moved back to California in May 2019 to find work and a
place to live. Mother also said she was on probation in Nevada.
According to mother, Ricky B., who was living in Nevada, was not
Kayla’s biological father but was raising her as his own child.
Also, mother was pregnant with Ricky B.’s child, and after having
that child, she had another child with him, but neither are

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Family Code.

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parties to this proceeding. Mother has two older children who
live with their father in Lancaster, California.
      Based on mother having left Kayla alone at the motel,
DCFS filed a petition alleging that mother failed to protect Kayla
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b), count b-1).
      At the May 2019 detention hearing, the court noted that
there might be a UCCJEA issue and would discuss it with
Nevada authorities. After doing so, the court informed counsel
that Nevada would not assert jurisdiction if the prerelease
investigation report on maternal grandfather, who lived in
California and with whom mother wanted Kayla placed, was
negative (meaning he was a proper placement) but would assert
jurisdiction if the report was positive. It was thereafter
discovered that maternal grandfather had a criminal record, but
DCFS obtained a criminal exemption so that Kayla could be
placed with him.
      Accordingly, at the July 2019 adjudication hearing, the
court informed the Nevada court, which was at the hearing
telephonically, that Kayla would be placed with maternal
grandfather. The Nevada court said it would relinquish
jurisdiction “to allow counsel to proceed today with a permanent
placement as the goal for this child.” The juvenile court
proceeded with adjudication, sustaining the petition but
continuing disposition.
      At the continued disposition hearing in October 2019, the
court declared Kayla a dependent of the court and ordered her
released to mother and Ricky B. (father), although the order was
stayed and Kayla remained with maternal grandfather. Mother
was also ordered to participate in random on-demand drug tests,
parenting classes, and individual counseling.

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II.   Further proceedings
       In November 2019, the court vacated the home of parents
order after discovering father had a warrant for his arrest and
that parents were on parole in Nevada. DCFS filed a subsequent
section 342 petition, and the court sustained an allegation in the
petition that father had a history of domestic violence (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b); count b-2). Although no allegations
were sustained against mother, the court ordered her to provide
five random or on-demand drug tests (to be increased to a full
drug program if she missed tests or had a dirty test), individual
counseling, and to follow through with criminal court orders in
Nevada and California. The court also ordered monitored visits
with mother.
       As of November 2019, mother and father were living in
Nevada with their younger children.2
       Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the six-month review
hearing was continued and held in February 2021. The court
found parents in partial compliance with their case plans and
ordered continued reunification services.
       According to the report prepared for the 12-month review
hearing, Kayla remained placed with maternal grandfather.
Mother still had not resolved an outstanding California warrant,
had not shown up for drug tests, and had not completed
individual counseling, although she had completed a parenting
education program. Mother had in-person visits with Kayla in
August 2021; otherwise, mother had regular Facetime visits with

2      DCFS points out that during some of the proceedings, it
was unclear where father and mother were living. Even so, there
is no evidence that they returned to California to live.

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Kayla. At the 12-month review hearing in September 2021, the
court again found parents in partial compliance with their case
plans and ordered continued family reunification services.
       Because parents continued to receive reunification services,
maternal grandfather no longer wanted to adopt Kayla. In
December 2021, Kayla was therefore placed with another
caregiver, who wanted to adopt her.
       At the contested 18-month review hearing in January 2022,
the court terminated reunification services, observing that
mother lacked insight into what she had done and what she
would do differently. The court said “that much of the case has
been punctuated with blame shifting, often misrepresentation of
facts, and a lack of candor.” Mother filed a notice of intent to file
a writ petition; however, her attorney filed a letter under Glen C.
v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, stating that after
reviewing the record and researching potential issues, he could
not file a writ petition.
       Finally, in its report for the permanency planning hearing,
DCFS noted that Kayla continued to do well in the home of her
prospective adoptive parent, and she visited maternal
grandfather once a month. On November 18, 2022, the court
terminated parental rights.
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Overview of the UCCJEA
      California and Nevada have adopted the UCCJEA, an act
governing dependency proceedings that is the exclusive method
to decide the proper forum to adjudicate issues involving a child
subject to a sister-state custody order. (§ 3421, subd. (b); In re
Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096; In re J.W. (2020)

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53 Cal.App.5th 347, 355 [every state except Mass. has enacted
UCCJEA].) The UCCJEA “is designed to avoid jurisdictional
conflicts between states and relitigation of custody decisions,
promote cooperation between states, and facilitate enforcement of
another state’s custody decrees.” (In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
125, 136.)
       There are four ways in which a California court may assert
jurisdiction over a child.
       First, California was the child’s home state when the
proceeding was commenced, or was the child’s home state within
six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child
is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).) “Home
state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent for at
least six consecutive months immediately before the beginning of
the child custody proceeding. (§ 3402, subd. (g).)
       Second, another state’s court does not have jurisdiction
under the first ground, or declines to exercise jurisdiction, and
the child or at least one parent or person acting as a parent has a
significant connection to California other than mere physical
presence and substantial evidence is available in California
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationships. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).)
       Third, all courts having jurisdiction under the first two
grounds have declined to exercise jurisdiction because California
is the more appropriate forum. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3).)
       Fourth, no other state would have jurisdiction under the
first three grounds. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(4).)
       Interpretation of the UCCJEA is a question of law we
review de novo. (Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th

                                6
1276, 1287.) Otherwise, a court’s jurisdictional finding under the
UCCJEA is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 1286.)
Under that standard of review, we resolve all conflicts in favor of
the court’s order and indulge reasonable inferences to uphold it.
(Ibid.) Also, a failure to comply with the UCCJEA’s procedural
requirements is subject to harmless error analysis. (In re R.L.,
supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.) The party challenging a lower
court’s ruling must therefore show it is reasonably probable a
result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached
in the absence of any error. (Ibid.)
II.   The court did not violate the UCCJEA
      Mother does not contend California lacked jurisdiction over
the dependency proceeding when it was commenced, as Kayla’s
home state Nevada declined to exercise jurisdiction (§ 3421,
subd. (a)(2) & (3)). She instead contends that Nevada’s
relinquishment of jurisdiction was conditioned on Kayla being
placed with maternal grandfather, so once Kayla was removed
from maternal grandfather in December 2021 and placed with
another caregiver, the court had to contact Nevada so that it
could reassert jurisdiction. We reject this contention for several
reasons.
      A.    Mother forfeited the UCCJEA issue
      Mother never objected to Nevada’s declination of
jurisdiction, California’s acceptance of jurisdiction, or raised any
jurisdictional issue when Kayla was removed from maternal
grandfather’s care. Indeed, mother does not dispute that
California had jurisdiction when dependency proceedings were
commenced because Kayla’s home state declined jurisdiction
under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2) and (3).

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        Mother instead argues that Nevada had “continuing”
jurisdiction or that California lost jurisdiction and that her
failure to raise that issue below did not forfeit it on appeal. She
cites In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728. In that case, neither
DCFS nor the juvenile court, despite knowing of the mother’s
recent out-of-state residence and prior Texas child welfare case,
investigated whether Texas might have jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA. (Id. at p. 734.) Without deciding whether the
UCCJEA concerns fundamental jurisdiction, which is an
unsettled issue, the court found that the mother had not forfeited
any issue under that statutory scheme and could raise it for the
first time on appeal. (Id. at pp. 737–738; see generally In re J.W.,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 356 [fundamental jurisdiction is an
absence of power to hear a case and can be raised for first time on
appeal].)
        In re L.C. is distinguishable. The objection mother now
asserts to jurisdiction is not based on an argument that the
California court lacked fundamental jurisdiction, which cannot be
forfeited. Whereas the lower court in In re L.C. never addressed
the UCCJEA, the California court here consulted Nevada, and
the Nevada court declined to exercise home state jurisdiction,
thereby ceding subject matter jurisdiction to California—all
without objection from mother. Mother therefore acceded to
jurisdiction and did not raise any jurisdictional issue for years
while parental fitness was being adjudicated, only to assert a lack
of “continuing” jurisdiction for the first time after a termination
order. (See J.W., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 367 [UCCJEA does
not implicate fundamental jurisdiction and can be forfeited].)
Under such circumstances, forfeiture applies. (See generally In

                                 8
re L.C., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 738–739 [detailing forfeiture
principles].)
      B.    Nevada did not and could not impose a jurisdictional
            condition precedent
       Turning to the merits, we reject the premise on which
mother’s contention rests, that Nevada imposed a jurisdictional
“condition precedent” that Kayla be placed with maternal
grandfather, impliedly permanently. All the Nevada court said
was that it would exercise jurisdiction if maternal grandfather’s
prerelease investigation report was positive but would not
exercise jurisdiction if it was negative. The Nevada court did not
say the placement with maternal grandfather had to be
permanent or that its ceding of jurisdiction was conditioned on
Kayla remaining placed with maternal grandfather. Nor can we
see why the Nevada court would have made such an odd
pronouncement, given that maternal grandfather’s long-term
intentions at that time were unclear and that the stability of
Kayla’s placement with him—like any placement in a dependency
matter—was not a sure thing.
       Nevada also could not have imposed such a condition
precedent. Instead, subject matter jurisdiction is established
when the action is commenced, i.e., when the first pleading is
filed. (Ocegueda v. Perreira (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084.)
Once jurisdiction is established, the UCCJEA ensures that only
one state has jurisdiction to make child custody decisions at any
time. (A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 521; In
re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1015, 1037; In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478,
497–498 [UCCJEA’s major aim is to avoid concurrent
jurisdiction].) In A.H., at page 521, for example, a Texas court

                                 9
purported to cede jurisdiction to California only so long as the
parents remained in California. The appellate court found such
equivocation legally untenable. (Ibid.) Instead, once a court
having jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a), makes a
child custody determination, that court obtains exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction. (In re E.W. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1167,
1171.)
      C.    Sections 3429 and 3422 did not require the court to
            consult Nevada
       Mother cites sections 3429 and 3422 to support the notion
that California had to consult Nevada when it removed Kayla
from maternal grandfather. Neither section helps her.
       Section 3429 concerns what information each party must
give in the first pleading. Subdivision (d) of that section imposes
on each party a “continuing duty to inform the court of any
proceeding in this or any other state that could affect the current
proceeding.” Mother’s argument appears to be that because
Nevada was Kayla’s home state when the dependency proceeding
was commenced, section 3429 required the court to inform
Nevada that Kayla had been removed from maternal
grandfather. Section 3429, however, imposes a duty on the
parties, not the court. Further, it imposes a duty on the parties
to inform the court of a proceeding that could affect the current
proceeding. Kayla’s removal from maternal grandfather was not
a “proceeding” as contemplated in that subdivision. (See, e.g., In
re Marriage of Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 495 [mother’s
custody action in Pakistan was a proceeding father should have
provided timely notice of to California court].)
       Next, mother cites section 3422, subdivision (a). That
section provides that when a California court makes a child

                                10
custody determination under section 3421, the court has
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction until either of the following
occurs: “(1) A court of this state determines that neither the
child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person
acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state
and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationships. (2) A court of this state or a court of another state
determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person
acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.” (See
generally In re Marriage of Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at
p. 491.)
       To the extent mother’s argument is that Kayla’s removal
from maternal grandfather triggered some kind of action or duty
under section 3422, it is wholly unclear how that removal is
related to section 3422 or triggered any action under it.
       In any event, the conditions described in section 3422 do
not exist here. As we have said, mother never asked the court to
cede jurisdiction back to Nevada under section 3422, and Kayla
has resided in California since at least 2019, first with maternal
grandfather and then with another caregiver. Kayla therefore
presently resides in California.
       Moreover, there is substantial evidence that Kayla and
mother have significant connections to California. Mother was
born in California, mother appears to have lived in California
until 2017, mother had outstanding warrants in California, she
returned to California in 2019 with the intention of working and
finding a place to live, mother has two older children who live
with their father in Lancaster, maternal grandfather lives in
California, and extended relatives (a maternal uncle and young

                                 11
cousin) also reside in California. (See § 3421, subd. (a)(2).) While
living with maternal grandfather, Kayla became attached to her
maternal relatives, and the record suggests that Kayla’s current
caregiver continues to support those relationships by allowing
Kayla to visit maternal grandfather monthly and to attend family
parties. Thus, substantial evidence exists in California about
Kayla’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
(See § 3422, subd. (a).)
       Mother also relies on section 3422 to support her argument
that California became an inconvenient forum. However, the
convenience of the forum under the UCCJEA was determined
when Nevada declined to exercise jurisdiction. Generally, “when
a home state declines jurisdiction in any manner that conveys its
intent not to exercise jurisdiction over a child in connection with
a child custody proceeding, including inaction . . . such inaction or
refusal is tantamount to a declination of jurisdiction by the home
state on the grounds California is the more appropriate forum
under subdivision (a)(2) of section 3421.” (In re M.M. (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 703, 717.) When the proceeding was commenced,
mother and Kayla were in California, and mother said she was in
California to look for a job and a place to live. Moreover, mother
asked that Kayla be placed with maternal grandfather. On these
facts, California was a proper forum, and mother does not argue
otherwise.
       Nor did mother’s decision to return to Nevada after these
dependency proceedings had begun render California an
inconvenient forum. Mother cites no authority that the
convenience of the forum can be revisited, especially in the
absence of a request that the court consider it, after a home state
has declined jurisdiction and a parent has acceded to California’s

                                 12
jurisdiction. (See §§ 3421, subd. (a)(3); 3427 [stating factors
relevant to determining inconvenient forum].)
      And while mother’s decision to go to Nevada—which we in
no way criticize—made in-person visits more difficult, part of the
reason for that was mother’s decision not to return to California
while she had an outstanding warrant. Mother also had the
opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of DCFS’s
reunification services, and specifically its support of her visitation
rights, when she filed a notice of intention to file a writ from the
January 2022 order terminating reunification services. Instead,
her attorney filed a letter under Glen C. v. Superior Court, supra,
78 Cal.App.4th 570, stating that after reviewing the record and
researching potential issues, he could not file a writ petition.
(L.W. v. Superior Court, B318153.)
      Finally, mother points to the positive efforts she made
towards reunifying with Kayla—for example, that her home in
Nevada was appropriate and she complied with aspects of her
case plan—to show it was prejudicial error to keep Kayla in
California instead of placing her in Nevada so that mother could
more easily visit her. Because we have found no error regarding
jurisdiction, we need not address prejudice.
      D.    Mother’s constitutional rights were not violated
       For the same reasons, we reject mother’s contention that
“[h]olding Kayla in California, when mother had no financial
means for travel and lodging nor caretaker for her two minor
children in her custody” violated the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (See
generally In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 572 [parents have
fundamental liberty interest in companionship, care, custody,
and management of their children].) As we have said, mother

                                 13
asked that Kayla be placed with maternal grandfather in
California. While we appreciate the obstacles mother
encountered in trying thereafter to have in-person visits with
Kayla, mother cites nothing in the record showing that she raised
these issues below or otherwise challenged the reasonableness of
DCFS’s reunification efforts on this ground, despite having the
opportunity to do so. We therefore do not agree that mother’s
constitutional rights were violated.
                        DISPOSITION
      The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

                                    EDMON, P. J.

I concur:

                       LAVIN, J.

                       EGERTON, J.

                               14
Filed 11/14/23

                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION THREE

 In re KAYLA W., a Person Coming              B326119
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 _____________________________________
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                           (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND                   Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP03176A)
 FAMILY SERVICES,
                                              ORDER MODIFYING AND
        Plaintiff and Respondent,             CERTIFYING OPINION
                                              FOR PUBLICATION [NO
        v.                                    CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

 LEYLA W.,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed October 25,
2023, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published
in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
      It is ordered that the opinion be modified as follows:
      On page 8, in the second paragraph, the citation “J.W.,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 367” should be changed to “In re J.W.,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 367.”
       On page 9, the citation to “A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 504, 521” should be changed to “A.H. v. Superior
Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 520–521.”
       On page 12, in the first partial paragraph, following the
last sentence, the citation to “§ 3422, subd. (a)” should be changed
to “§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).”

      [There is no change in judgment.]

____________________________________________________________
EDMON, P. J.          LAVIN, J.        EGERTON, J.

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