Court Opinion

ID: 9940740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 15:01:17.380137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:44.040313
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6078     Document: 010111000895         Date Filed: 02/15/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           February 15, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                            No. 23-6078
                                                      (D.C. Nos. 5:23-CV-00121-HE &
  GREG ALLEN HENKE,                                        5:21-CR-00137-HE-1)
                                                               (W.D. Okla.)
        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Greg Allen Henke, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of

 appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion

 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.1 We deny the application for a COA and

 dismiss this matter.2

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        1
          We liberally construe Mr. Henke’s pro se application for a COA. See Hall v.
 Scott, 292 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002).
        2
         Our references to the record correspond with the number on the upper right-hand
 corner of the page.
Appellate Case: 23-6078     Document: 010111000895         Date Filed: 02/15/2024     Page: 2

                                     BACKGROUND

        Mr. Henke was charged in a five-count indictment with: (1) attempted access

 with intent to view child pornography; (2) persuading or coercing a minor to engage in

 sexual activity; (3) knowingly possessing materials containing images of child

 pornography; (4) the use and attempted use of a minor, Jane Doe I, to engage in sexually

 explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of the sex act and then

 producing and transmitting the visual images; and (5) engaging in the same conduct

 charged in count four but with a different victim—Jane Doe 2.

        Federal public defender William P. Earley was appointed as counsel to represent

 Mr. Henke. He served in that role from May 14, 2021, until his retirement on July 31,

 2022, when he turned representation and the case file over to his fellow federal public

 defender J.P. Hill.

        In November 2021, with Mr. Earley as counsel, Mr. Henke pled guilty to Counts 3

 and 4 of the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement. But the Presentence Report (PSR)

 was not completed until after Mr. Earley retired, so it was Mr. Hill who filed objections

 and a sentencing memorandum. In December 2022, Mr. Henke was sentenced to

 540 months in prison.

        Mr. Henke timely filed his § 2255 motion in which he raised several claims of

 ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr. Earley. The district court examined and

 denied each claim on the merits and further determined that a hearing was unnecessary.

 In a subsequent order, the court denied a COA and Mr. Henke’s motion to proceed on

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Appellate Case: 23-6078       Document: 010111000895         Date Filed: 02/15/2024     Page: 3

 appeal without prepayment of fees on the grounds that the appeal was not taken in good

 faith.

                           CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

          To appeal the denial of relief under § 2255, a prisoner must obtain a COA. See

 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (“[U]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a [COA], an appeal

 may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a proceeding under

 section 2255.”). “We may grant a COA only if the petitioner makes a ‘substantial

 showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’” Milton v. Miller, 812 F.3d 1252, 1263

 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). “To obtain a COA after a district

 court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the ‘petitioner must

 demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the . . .

 constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Id. (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

 473, 484 (2000).

                       INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

          Federal law establishes the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland

 v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684, 686 (1984) (recognizing Sixth Amendment right to

 effective assistance of counsel). To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance,

 Mr. Henke must show both that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard

 of reasonableness” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id.

 at 687-88.

          Under the first prong, Mr. Henke must demonstrate that the errors were so serious

 that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth

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 Amendment.” Id. at 687. But “[c]ounsel’s performance must be completely

 unreasonable to be constitutionally ineffective, not merely wrong.” Wilson v. Sirmons,

 536 F.3d 1064, 1083, (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

 “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland,

 446 U.S. at 689. There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

 wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome

 the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

 sound trial strategy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Under the second prong, Mr. Henke must “affirmatively prove prejudice.” Id.

 at 693. “[M]ere speculation is not sufficient to satisfy [the petitioner’s] burden.” Byrd v.

 Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011).

        The prejudice standard differs depending on the nature of the claim. For

 Mr. Henke’s claims, which are based on deficient performance before the guilty plea, he

 “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

 errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability

 is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

 at 694. “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to

 approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry

 if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.

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                                         ANALYSIS

 Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Investigate Possible Defenses

        This claim of ineffective assistance is based on Mr. Henke’s contention that

 Mr. Earley failed to press an argument that he was uncomfortable with unwanted physical

 advances by the victims and that both the victims and their guardians sensationalized the

 abuse. The district court found no ineffective assistance because this evidence did not

 provide a defense.

        As to the first circumstance, the district court noted that the “intellectually

 disabled status [and youth] of the victims as undercutting [the] argument [that the victims

 initiated the physical contact] is, if not obviously correct, wholly within the range of

 reasonable professional judgment.” R., vol. I at 109. See United States v. Wells,

 843 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the victim’s actions and state of mind

 are irrelevant because “a minor cannot consent to production of child pornography”). On

 the second point, the court found there was no evidence of sensational statements by the

 victims because neither victim had the ability to communicate based on their severe

 disabilities and there was no evidence that the guardians made any sensational comments

 at all. We deny a COA because reasonable jurists would not debate the court’s resolution

 of this claim.

 Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Obtain a Psychological Evaluation

        This claim of ineffective assistance is based on Mr. Earley’s alleged failure to

 obtain a psychological evaluation focusing on Mr. Henke’s past childhood trauma. The

 district court determined that any past childhood abuse was not a defense to the charges.

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 More to the point, Mr. Henke fails to explain how such an evaluation would have led to a

 defense or changed his plea. Also, as the court noted, Mr. Earley obtained a report from

 forensic psychologist, which was considered as potential mitigation at sentencing.

 Because reasonable jurists would not debate the court’s resolution of this claim, we deny

 a COA.

 Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Provide the Case File to Successor Counsel

        According to Mr. Henke, Mr. Earley was ineffective because he failed to turn over

 the case file to successor counsel, Mr. Hill. But he never explains how this alleged

 failure would have led to a defense or affected his plea. Indeed, Mr. Henke cannot meet

 this burden given that he was represented by counsel who had the file when he pled

 guilty. Moreover, the district court determined any suggestion that Mr. Earley failed to

 turn over the case file to Mr. Hill was “frivolous” based on Mr. Earley’s sworn statement

 that he gave all the materials to Mr. Hill, and they were both “Assistant Public Defenders

 in the same office.” R., vol. I at 110.

        We also reject Mr. Henke’s argument that he was prejudiced at sentencing because

 Mr. Hill could not find every email that his wife sent to Mr. Earley. This does not mean

 that they were not included in the file; rather, it simply means Mr. Hill could not find

 them. More to the point, Mr. Henke admits in his application for a COA that his wife

 sent copies of the emails to Mr. Hill, who used at least one of them in his argument at the

 sentencing hearing. Reasonable jurists would not debate the court’s resolution of this

 claim, and we therefore deny a COA.

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 Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing

        The district court found that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because

 Mr. Henke failed to “present any plausible basis for vacating the sentence based on

 ineffective assistance of counsel.” R., vol. I at 111. To be sure, a prisoner is entitled to a

 hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that

 the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” § 2255(b). However, “an evidentiary hearing is

 [not] required where the district court finds the case record conclusively shows the

 prisoner is entitled to no relief.” United States v. Marr, 856 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir.

 1988). “We review the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse

 of discretion.” United States v. Moya, 676 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal

 quotation marks omitted). Because reasonable jurists would not dispute that the district

 court acted within its discretion in denying Mr. Henke a hearing, we deny a COA.

 Alleged District Court Bias

        According to Mr. Henke, the district court was biased against him. In particular,

 he says that the court typecast him as a monster, pervert, and pedophile. But because

 Mr. Henke did not raise this argument in his habeas petition, “it is waived on appeal.”

 Owens v. Trammell, 792 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th Cir. 2015); see Childers v. Crow, 1 F.4th

 792, 798 (10th Cir. 2021) (“Although [a] pro se petition before the district court is

 entitled to a liberal construction, we may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were

 never presented.”).

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                                      CONCLUSION

        We deny a COA and dismiss this matter. We deny Mr. Henke’s motion to

 proceed without prepayment of costs or fees because his request for a COA is legally and

 factually frivolous. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991)

 (requiring both an inability to pay and “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous

 argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.”).

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                              Circuit Judge

                                              8