Court Opinion

ID: 9896008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:00:49.104637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:19.971560
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1588    Document: 29     Page: 1   Filed: 11/09/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

           CHRISTOPHER R. CHIN-YOUNG,
                    Petitioner

                             v.

            DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                        2023-1588
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DC-0752-11-0394-I-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: November 9, 2023
                 ______________________

    CHRISTOPHER CHIN-YOUNG, Tallahassee, FL, pro se.

     YARIV S. PIERCE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; PATRICK L. GARY, Civilian Personnel Litiga-
 tion Branch, Litigation Division, United States Army Legal
 Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.
                   ______________________
Case: 23-1588      Document: 29    Page: 2   Filed: 11/09/2023

 2                                       CHIN-YOUNG v. ARMY

         Before DYK, SCHALL, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     Christopher Chin-Young (petitioner), appearing pro se,
 petitions for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board’s (MSPB or Board) final decision dismissing the case
 as settled. We affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
     On January 18, 2011, the Department of the Army re-
 moved petitioner from his position with the U.S. Army Con-
 tracting Command (ACC) as a Supervisory Program
 Analyst. Petitioner appealed through his then-counsel,
 Robert Waldeck, to the MSPB. 1 Shortly thereafter, Mr.
 Waldeck withdrew as petitioner’s counsel, and petitioner
 informed the counsel for the Army that he retained new
 counsel. The new counsel was identified to be James Shoe-
 maker. Mr. Shoemaker submitted a Designation of Repre-
 sentative form, which was not signed by petitioner,
 indicating that he was representing petitioner.
     Mr. Shoemaker appeared before the Board and ar-
 ranged a settlement agreement to resolve petitioner’s
 claims. The settlement agreement was signed by Mr. Shoe-
 maker and petitioner. A Board administrative judge ap-
 proved the settlement and dismissed the appeal on May 19,
 2011.
     On September 6, 2011, petitioner filed a petition to en-
 force the settlement agreement with the Board, asserting
 that the Army failed to comply with the terms of the settle-
 ment agreement by failing to rescind or expunge certain
 entries from petitioner’s record and providing improper

     1   Petitioner contends this is not correct and that Mr.
 Waldeck was retained only for a different case. Whether
 Robert Waldeck was retained or not makes no difference to
 the outcome of this case.
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 CHIN-YOUNG v. ARMY                                          3

 references to managers in other federal agencies, prevent-
 ing petitioner from being hired. On November 29, 2011,
 Mr. Shoemaker filed a modified settlement agreement,
 signed by petitioner, Mr. Shoemaker, and representatives
 for the Department of the Army, with the administrative
 judge. S.A. 127–129. On November 30, 2011, the adminis-
 trative judge dismissed the petition as settled. S.A. 130–
 34. On February 7, 2012, Mr. Shoemaker withdrew as pe-
 titioner’s counsel. S.A. 136–39.
      On August 31, 2017, petitioner, pro se, filed a petition
 for review of the administrative judge’s May 19, 2011, de-
 cision that dismissed the case as settled. Petitioner alleged
 newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from
 Mr. Shoemaker, which stated that Mr. Shoemaker was not
 designated as petitioner’s representative in the case. Peti-
 tioner referred to the designation of representative form
 submitted to the MSPB in March of 2011, which lacked pe-
 titioner’s signature. Because the designation of repre-
 sentative form was not signed by petitioner, petitioner
 contended that Mr. Shoemaker was not petitioner’s desig-
 nated representative and was not authorized to enter into
 the settlement agreement nor the modified settlement
 agreement. Petitioner argues that Mr. Shoemaker “was
 without any authority to access the record, submit various
 documents, and negotiate a settlement at [petitioner’s] ex-
 pense.” S.A. 252.
      The Board denied petitioner’s petition for review and
 affirmed the initial decision. S.A. 2. While the Board
 acknowledged that petitioner never signed the designation
 of representative form, the Board found Mr. Shoemaker’s
 actions “bore the indicia of authority” because petitioner
 failed to indicate otherwise and Mr. Shoemaker engaged in
 activities such as “discovery, fil[ing] prehearing submis-
 sions, participat[ing] in a prehearing conference, enter[ing]
 into stipulations, participat[ing] in settlement negotia-
 tions, and sign[ing] the settlement on [petitioner’s] behalf.”
 S.A. 2–3. The Board further determined that even if Mr.
Case: 23-1588    Document: 29     Page: 4   Filed: 11/09/2023

 4                                      CHIN-YOUNG v. ARMY

 Shoemaker lacked settlement authority, the settlement
 agreement was still valid because petitioner signed it him-
 self. S.A. 3.
    Petitioner petitions for review of the Board’s decision.
 We have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7703.
                        DISCUSSION
                              I
     Petitioner argues that Mr. Shoemaker did not have au-
 thority to enter into the settlement agreement under 5
 C.F.R. § 1201.31(a). We disagree.
     We do not find any procedural defect under section
 1201.31(a). That section provides “[a] party to an appeal
 may be represented in any matter related to the appeal.
 Parties may designate a representative, revoke such a des-
 ignation, and change such a designation in a signed sub-
 mission, submitted as a pleading.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.31(a).
 Petitioner contends that this regulation requires a signed
 submission in order for a designation to take effect. The
 Department of the Army contends that the regulation does
 not require a signed submission because it uses the word
 “may” instead of “shall.”
     We agree with the Board that petitioner’s failure to
 sign the designation of representative form does not inval-
 idate the settlement agreement or the modified settlement
 agreement. Mr. Shoemaker acted with apparent authority
 as petitioner’s representative, and petitioner previously
 admitted that he hired Mr. Shoemaker. S.A. 241 (noting
 he retained Mr. Shoemaker’s firm). Even if Mr. Shoemaker
 lacked the authority to execute the settlement agreement
 and the modified settlement agreement, the petitioner also
 signed those documents.
     The Board did not err in concluding that the settlement
 agreements were not rendered ineffective because peti-
 tioner did not sign the designation of representative form.
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 CHIN-YOUNG v. ARMY                                          5

                               II
     Petitioner also challenges the validity of the settlement
 agreements because the Board’s and Army’s actions “were
 not in good faith for settlement and not freely entered,” and
 the administrative judge allegedly pressured the petitioner
 and Mr. Shoemaker to sign the agreement. Petitioner’s Br.
 12.
      Petitioner has challenged the enforceability of the set-
 tlement agreement and modified settlement agreement on
 similar grounds in other proceedings before the Board and
 in federal district courts. See e.g., Chin-Young v. Dep’t of
 Army, No. DC-0752-11-0394-C-1, 2013 WL 9658987, at *3–
 5 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 14, 2013); Chin-Young v. McHugh, No.
 RWT 13-CV-3772, 2015 WL 1522880, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 2,
 2015), aff’d sub nom. Chin-Young v. Rowell, 623 F. App’x
 121 (4th Cir. 2015); Chin-Young v. United States, No. 1:16-
 CV-1454, 2017 WL 2960532, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 11, 2017),
 aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 774 F. App’x 106
 (4th Cir. 2019). However, there is no indication that peti-
 tioner has adequately raised these allegations of coercion,
 bad faith, and other procedural issues before the adminis-
 trative judge in the present case. These allegations are, at
 best, made in passing and in a conclusory manner in the
 petition to the Board.
     The Board did not address these allegations in its deci-
 sion, instead focusing solely on the issue of whether Mr.
 Shoemaker had the authority to enter into the settlement
 agreement. We understand the Board determined that
 those allegations were not properly raised in this case.
 “Our precedent clearly establishes the impropriety of seek-
 ing a reversal of the [B]oard’s decision [approving a settle-
 ment agreement] on the basis of assertions never presented
 to the presiding official or to the [B]oard.” Sargent v. Dep’t
 of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir.
 2000) (collecting cases). Because these issues were not
Case: 23-1588    Document: 29      Page: 6   Filed: 11/09/2023

 6                                       CHIN-YOUNG v. ARMY

 properly raised before the administrative judge or the
 Board, we cannot address them on review. See id.
     We affirm the Board’s decision.
                       AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
No costs.