Court Opinion

ID: 9882105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 07:29:04.659618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:50:23.131419
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                     EL PASO, TEXAS

 CALEB HERRERA MUNOZ,                                §           No. 08-23-00084-CR

                               Appellant,            §              Appeal from the

 v.                                                  §        39th Judicial District Court

 THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                 §      of Throckmorton County, Texas

                               Appellee.             §                (TC# 1302)

                                                     §

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Caleb Herrera Munoz was convicted by a jury of possession with the intent to

deliver a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an aggregate weight of 4 grams or

more but less than 200 grams. He was sentenced to confinement in the Institutional Division of

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 87½ years and was fined $10,000. In his sole issue

on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the element of “intent

to deliver.” For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                   STATEMENT OF FACTS

       Throckmorton County Sheriff Doc Wigington (the Sheriff), responded to a reckless driving

call and identified Appellant, who was stopped on a roadway facing a private driveway. The
Sheriff approached Appellant while Appellant “was messing with his tire” and asked him for his

driver’s license. Appellant stated he did not have a license. The Sheriff then asked Appellant for

his name and date of birth. As the Sheriff searched the state database using the name and birthdate

Appellant provided, Appellant re-entered his vehicle. The database yielded no results for the name

and birthdate Appellant provided, so the Sheriff asked Appellant for another form of identification,

whereupon Appellant “put the car in drive” and drove up the private driveway through a barbwire

fence on the west side of the property. The Sheriff chased Appellant in his patrol vehicle until

Appellant drove the car into a water gully, exited the vehicle, and proceeded on foot. Eventually,

Appellant stopped behind a tank dam and was instructed not to move. Ignoring the instructions,

Appellant fled on foot once more until he became stuck in thick mud, allowing the Sheriff to take

him into custody. The vehicle Appellant had been driving was towed to the Sheriff’s office and

inventoried.

        At trial, the Sheriff testified that the location where Appellant was arrested was private

property, characterized as pastureland and surrounded by barbwire. He testified that he learned

from another deputy’s inventory report that the vehicle Appellant had been driving contained

ammunition. Based on this information, the Sheriff called for a Texas Parks and Wildlife

Department K-9 in hopes of having the K-9 detect evidence at the scene where Appellant was

arrested. 1 Derek Nalls, the K-9 handler, testified about the training and procedures he and the K-

9 follow to prepare for and conduct a search. He detailed the search they conducted in this case,

1
  The court sustained a motion in limine as to testimony from the Sheriff that any evidence found by the K-9
conclusively came from Appellant. The State’s theory is based on circumstantial evidence that links Appellant to the
dropped items found in the area where the chase occurred and where Appellant was arrested. The fact that the area
was vacant pastureland further linked Appellant to the dropped items. On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the
jury’s finding that he possessed the methamphetamine.

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which took place the day after Appellant’s apprehension at the location where Appellant led the

Sheriff on the chase. During the search, the K-9 discovered a black baseball cap that resembled

the cap Appellant was wearing during the chase and a pack containing a clear plastic bag. Inside

the clear bag was what was later determined to be methamphetamine. Christina Coucke-Garza, the

forensic chemist who conducted the analysis of the substance inside the clear bag, confirmed that

the substance amounted to 52.369 grams of methamphetamine.

         The Sheriff searched the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant, which he obtained a few

days after apprehending Appellant. He testified that the search revealed a small amount, less than

a gram, of methamphetamine in a cellophane package. The Sheriff further testified that in the

vehicle, he also found a vape, a marijuana grinder, a torch lighter, small rolling papers, and a small

bag of “what . . . appeared to be . . . cocaine,” although it was not tested for verification.

         Over Appellant’s objection, the Sheriff was designated as an expert witness, and he

testified that throughout his career, he had handled over 500 narcotics investigations. 2 He testified

that in his experience, he has seen cases involving possession of methamphetamine for personal

use in amounts ranging anywhere from less than a gram to less than 200 grams. Of those cases in

Throckmorton County, he testified that a “large percentage” involve just under a gram of

methamphetamine. The State argued in closing that based on this evidence, the quantity of

methamphetamine Appellant possessed was inconsistent with personal use, as it was over 52 times

the amount normally found in personal-use cases in Throckmorton County. Further, the State cited

Appellant’s possession of drug paraphernalia in the vehicle and his consciousness of guilt—

2
  While Appellant objected to the Sheriff’s designation as an expert witness in so far as he might be considered a
personal-drug-use expert, he did not take issue with the Sheriff’s ability to testify to his experience in narcotics
investigations and arrests in terms of general drug quantities, e.g., “When I’m dealing with someone that has, you
know, a hit of methamphetamine, it’s generally in this weight range.” In other words, Appellant’s (running) objection
was to the Sheriff extrapolating about personal use from the information about which he was competent to testify.

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evinced by the false identification he provided the Sheriff and his decision to flee from the Sheriff

to dispose of the methamphetamine in vacant pastureland—to support a finding that Appellant

possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver.

       The jury returned a verdict against Appellant and assessed punishment of confinement in

the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for 87½ years and a fine of

$10,000. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence from which a

rational jury could have inferred Appellant’s intent to deliver methamphetamine. He argues the

jury’s verdict is unfounded, as there is no evidence that Appellant is a known drug dealer or that

he was arrested in an area known for its drug activity. Additionally, Appellant argues that the

methamphetamine recovered from the scene of the chase was not packaged in a manner consistent

with resale, as it was all in a single bag as opposed to several bags, and the State’s expert’s

testimony is inadequate to support the inference that the methamphetamine was intended for

delivery. Finally, there were no devices recovered from the vehicle that are commonly associated

with a drug dealer’s trade—such as scales, ledgers, wads of cash, etc.—and the drug paraphernalia

that was recovered indicated only that Appellant was a user and not a distributor of drugs.

                     STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

       The Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process guarantee requires that legally sufficient

evidence support every conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979); Brooks

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In a legal-sufficiency challenge, we focus

solely on whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, would

permit any rational fact-finder to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912 (establishing legal sufficiency

under Jackson v. Virginia as the only standard for review of the evidence).

                                                 4
       Applying that standard, we recognize the fact-finder as the sole arbiter of witness

credibility and the weight attached to witness testimony. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Only the

fact-finder acts “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In doing so, the fact-finder may choose

to believe or disbelieve any testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the fact-finder resolved

the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In conducting a legal-sufficiency review, “[w]e are not to sit as

a thirteenth juror reweighing the evidence or deciding whether we believe the evidence established

the element in contention beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” Blankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198,

207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc). Instead, “we test the evidence to see if it is at least

conclusive enough for a reasonable fact-finder to believe based on the evidence that the element

is established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318).

       In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and direct

evidence are equally probative, and either one alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Ratliff v.

State, 663 S.W.3d 106, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “In circumstantial evidence cases, it is not

necessary that every fact and circumstance point directly and independently to the defendant’s

guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the

incriminating circumstances.” Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

                                                   5
        Appellant challenges his conviction of possession with the intent deliver methamphetamine

in an amount of 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams, arguing the evidence is insufficient to

establish his intent to deliver. In Texas, a person commits the crime of possession with the intent

to deliver a controlled substance when he or she knowingly or intentionally possesses the

controlled substance with the intent to “deliver” it, i.e., to transfer the controlled substance, actually

or constructively, to another. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.002, 481.112(a). “[I]ntent

to deliver” is a question of fact for the jury, and it may be inferred by the acts, words, or conduct

of the accused. Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Patrick

v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc). The intent requirement can be

proved by circumstantial evidence, such as “the nature of the location where the defendant was

arrested, the quantity of drugs the defendant possessed, the manner of packaging the drugs, the

presence or absence of drug paraphernalia, whether the defendant possessed a large amount of

cash, and the defendant’s status as a drug user.” Hughitt v. State, 539 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Moreover, intent to deliver

can be established by the expert testimony of experienced law enforcement officers. Id. “The

number of factors present is not as important as the logical force the factors have in establishing

the elements of the offense.” Moreno v. State, 195 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Thus, in some cases, possession of a large quantity of drugs alone can be

sufficient to prove intent to deliver if that evidence is accompanied by expert testimony that the

amount at issue is indicative of the intent to deliver. Simmons v. State, 100 S.W.3d 484, 491 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d).

                                                    6
                                             ANALYSIS

        In response to Appellant’s brief, the State argues the evidence is sufficient to support the

jury’s verdict because (1) Appellant possessed a larger and smaller bag of methamphetamine,

indicating an intent to divide the larger amount into smaller amounts for resale; (2) Appellant

possessed more methamphetamine than is customary for a mere user; (3) expert testimony from

the Sheriff revealed that a “large percentage” of possession of methamphetamine cases in

Throckmorton County involve less than a gram; and (4) Appellant possessed drug paraphernalia—

namely, a marijuana grinder, a torch lighter, a vape, and rolling papers—that indicate Appellant is

a marijuana user, allowing the jury to infer that the methamphetamine was for sale and not for

personal use. We address each point in turn, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict, as we are required to do.

        First, the State argues that evidence Appellant possessed 52.369 grams of

methamphetamine along with a smaller, separately packaged quantity is indicative of Appellant’s

intent to deliver. Courts have found that the manner of packaging is a relevant factor in determining

whether drugs were intended for delivery as opposed to mere personal consumption. E.g., Kibble

v. State, 340 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). A larger quantity of

drugs packaged into smaller quantities for resale has been found to be evidence of the practice of

dealing. Hughitt, 539 S.W.3d at 542 (finding that evidence of a gallon ziplock bag with

methamphetamine residue indicated that at one time, the defendant possessed a larger amount and

was distributing it); Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,

pet. ref’d) (finding that evidence of small plastic bags used for drug packaging was indicative of

defendant’s intent to deliver). At one point in trial, the Sheriff testified without objection that when

he searched Appellant’s vehicle, he found a small amount of methamphetamine, estimated to

                                                   7
weigh about less than a gram, in a cellophane package located in the “doorjamb” area of the

vehicle. From that testimony, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Appellant’s larger and

smaller quantities of methamphetamine are indicative of Appellant’s intent to deliver rather than

personally use the 52.369 grams of the drug, as he could have intended on dividing up the larger

amount into additional smaller amounts for resale.

       Moreover, courts have found that the quantity of drugs alone, when coupled with expert

testimony on the subject, can support a finding of intent to deliver. Simmons v. State, 100 S.W.3d

484, 491 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d). In the State’s view, Appellant possessed an

amount methamphetamine atypical for a mere user. At trial, the Sheriff testified of his over 500

narcotics investigation cases, a large percentage of the personal-use cases involve less than one

gram, which the State contrasted with the over 52 grams of the drug in Appellant’s case. The

relevant portion of the State’s direct examination of the Sheriff is as follows:

       [THE STATE]: Okay. What—typically, what do you see in your training and
                    experience when you run across methamphetamine in personal use
                    amounts?

       A.                In my experience, I’ve investigated cases from less than one gram
                         all the way up to—the typical amount is anywhere from less than
                         one gram up to about, you know, less than 200 grams.

       Q.                Okay. That’s your experience of the investigations you’ve done?

       A.                In Throckmorton County. I have investigated cases from less than
                         one gram all the way up to kilos.

       Q.                Okay. So regarding—would you have any idea how many cases
                         you’ve dealt with that are less than a gram? What percentage of
                         possession of methamphetamine cases you've had that are less
                         than a gram?

       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Relevance, Judge.

       THE COURT: Mr. Fouts?

                                                  8
         [THE STATE]: Judge, it’s relevant. It’s a drug case we are talking about.

         THE COURT: The Court’s going to overrule the objection. You can answer the
                    question.

         A.                  I would say a large percentage of the cases in Throckmorton
                             County are less than one gram.

Appellant argues this testimony was “inadequate, if even relevant” on the issue of Appellant’s

intent to deliver. According to Appellant, the Sheriff’s testimony establishes only that in his

experience, he has seen “a number of different weights that had proven to be for personal use.”

Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the jury could have

reasonably inferred from the Sheriff’s testimony that because 52.369 grams of methamphetamine

is well over a typical case of personal-use possession in Throckmorton County, where a “large

percentage” of cases involve less than one gram, Appellant intended to deliver the drugs. 3

         Additionally, a finding of defendant’s intent to deliver can be supported by the absence of

personal-use drug paraphernalia. See Sneed v. State, 406 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex. App.—Eastland

2013, no pet.) (finding that appellant’s conviction of possession with the intent to deliver cocaine

was supported by the expert testimony of a narcotics agent who searched the appellant and did not

find a crack pipe in his possession, which would have indicated that the appellant was a user). In

3
  We further note that the State’s argument that 52.369 grams of methamphetamine exceeds the amount a mere user
would possess is consistent with other cases in Texas where a lesser amount of methamphetamine was found to be to
indicative of an intent to deliver. See Biggers v. State, 634 S.W.3d 244, 254 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. ref’d)
(holding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver where experts testified that 11.68 grams of methamphetamine is not a user amount but a dealer
amount); Perez v. State, No. 11-02-00120-CR, 2002 WL 32344582, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 21, 2002, no
pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of intent
to deliver methamphetamine in the amount of 11.51 grams where an expert testified that the average user only
purchases half a gram or less and uses only a quarter of a gram of methamphetamine per day); Fletcher v. State, No.
11-04-00305-CR, 2006 WL 950093, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 13, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) (finding the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for possession of methamphetamine with
the intent to deliver where the officer testified that the 4.57 grams of methamphetamine linked to defendant was too
much for personal use).

                                                           9
this case, a search of the vehicle in which Appellant drove revealed that Appellant possessed a

marijuana grinder, a torch lighter, rolling papers, and a vape. On the one hand, the State argues

that the paraphernalia found in the vehicle is consistent with marijuana use, not methamphetamine

use. As such, the jury could have inferred that Appellant intended the methamphetamine for

delivery. On the other hand, Appellant avers that the torch lighter in particular is a tool used for

smoking methamphetamine, and thus suggests Appellant possessed the drug for his personal

consumption. Considering the circumstantial evidence suggesting Appellant was a drug user of

some kind, Appellant’s argument that the paraphernalia supports an inference that Appellant

personally consumed methamphetamine is a possibility—but the State was not required to

disprove every reasonable alternative hypothesis to the exclusion of Appellant’s guilt. Tate v.

State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In light of the standard, which requires that

we defer to the jury’s judgment with respect to conflicting inferences, we can presume that the

jury considered both possibilities—that Appellant was a marijuana user and that Appellant was a

methamphetamine user—and resolved that conflict against Appellant or even discounted this point

altogether and decided the case on the other circumstantial evidence from which it could have

rationally inferred Appellant had the intent to deliver.

       Lastly, Appellant cites to Justice Dauphinot’s dissent in Jordan v. State, 139 S.W.3d 723

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) for the proposition that the ability to deliver is not the same

as the intent to deliver. According to Appellant, from the amount of methamphetamine recovered,

jurors could question Appellant’s decision to buy his supply in bulk, but “that’s a question that

could be leveled at nearly every Costco shopper.” To the extent Appellant’s argument can be

construed as saying that the evidence here is just as consistent with the intent to possess as the

intent to deliver, we reiterate that it was the responsibility of the jury to resolve conflicting

                                                 10
inferences, and here, it did so against Appellant. See Johnson v. State, 829 S.W.2d 836, 837

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.) (citing Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 845 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991)) (“If conflicting inferences concerning Johnson's intent exist, this Court must presume—

even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such

conflict in favor of the prosecution, and we must defer to that resolution.”). Appellant also avers

that the record reveals no evidence of intent to deliver because there was no evidence of drug

paraphernalia commonly associated with a drug dealer’s trade or that Appellant was a known drug

dealer. And the area where he was arrested was not known for drug activity, plus the

methamphetamine actually admitted at trial was all in one bag as opposed to being packaged in a

manner consistent with resale. 4 But in conducting a sufficiency analysis, we look not to the

number of relevant factors supporting the conviction, but to the logical force behind those factors

that are present in the case.

         Because the cumulative force of the State’s evidence supports Appellant’s conviction, we

will not overturn the jury’s verdict solely because evidence of the specific factors to which

Appellant points was absent in this case. Taken together—i.e., the 52.369 grams of

methamphetamine; the Sheriff’s testimony concerning the quantity of methamphetamine that

typifies a “large percentage” of personal-use possession cases in Throckmorton County, coupled

with the fact that Appellant possessed far more than 52 times that amount; the Sheriff’s testimony

that he found a smaller cellophane package of methamphetamine in the vehicle; and the fact that

one piece of the drug paraphernalia found in Appellant’s car was just as consistent with marijuana

4
  While at one point, Appellant did not object when the Sheriff testified as to the smaller cellophane packaging of
methamphetamine he found in the vehicle, Appellant did object when the State attempted to admit the smaller bag
into evidence. At that juncture, Appellant argued his objection that the Sheriff lacked the qualifications to say with
any certainty that the substance found in the vehicle was methamphetamine. The State moved on without admitting
the evidence.

                                                         11
use as it was with methamphetamine use—the record contains sufficient evidence to support the

jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intended to deliver, rather than merely

possess, methamphetamine in the amount of 52.369 grams. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s

sole issue.

                                         CONCLUSION
        Because we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm.

                                              LISA J. SOTO, Justice

September 28, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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