Court Opinion

ID: 9716745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:50:02.760275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.652282
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I have no quarrel with the attempt by the majority to achieve a fair result by application of the doctrine of equitable assignment in the case before us. rectly stated by the majority, Indiana has long recognized the doctrine even with respect to an expectant interest. I further As cor-see no reason why the doctrine may not be applied to transfers of mortgage interests in real estate.
The problem with the case before us, however, is that, according to the majority, the transfer of Carr's interest in the fourth mortgage occurred by virtue of the quitclaim deed executed to Wernecke on March 27, 1985. At that point in time, Carr had only an expectation of one of two alternatives flowing from Pioneer. He had no interest, contractual or otherwise, in the fourth mortgage unless Pioneer chose not to pay Carr the $383,777.89. His arrangement with Pioneer was that Pioneer could either pay the amount or assign the fourth mortgage to Carr. Only after resolution of the Wisconsin litigation in 1986 could Carr assert even an expectant present interest in the fourth mortgage. The mortgage assignment was not in fact made until May, 1988. The decision of the majority would seem to require a determination that had Pioneer exercised its option to utilize the cash payment alternative, the quitclaim deed would be just as effective in assigning the right to the $383,777.39 amount as it was in conveying the contingent, expectant interest in the fourth mortgage. I do not believe the law of conveyances with respect to interests in real estate permits the analysis used by the majority even though the result achieved is seemingly fair.
As stated in Kuhn v. Kuhn (1979) 179 Ind.App. 441, 885 N.E.2d 1196, an equitable assignment of an expectant interest by virtue of a conveyance is a form of estoppel by deed. It serves to preclude the grantor from denying the validity of the transfer. However, estoppel by deed with regard to an after acquired interest has no application where the grantor conveys by quitclaim deed. 6A Powell on Real Property § 901[2] (1990).
A quitclaim deed conveys only such right, title and interest as the grantor may have, if any, at the time of the conveyance. Bryan v. Uland (1885) 101 Ind. 477, 1 N.E. 52; Emderle v. Shorman (1981) Ist Dist. Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 686. See Haskett v. Maxey (18983) 134 Ind. 182, 88 N.E. 858, *1338modifying Bryan v. Uland, supra, but upon other grounds.
Under the law of most states, a warranty deed which purports to convey a mere expectancy is void and transfers nothing. Therefore it is also incapable of transferring any interest by estoppel. 6A Powell on Real Property, supra. Even in jurisdictions which hold that a quitclaim deed is evidence of an intent to convey some interest and that a grantor may be estopped, such principle has no application to an expectancy not the subject of conveyance. Thompson on Real Property § 2522, p. 518 (1979 Repl.).
In Formers' Loan and Trust Company v. Wood (1922) 78 Ind.App. 147, 134 N.E. 899, the trustee held a sum of money which resulted from the sale of real and personal property in an estate. Prior to the death of the decedent, Wood, an heir to the estate, had "convey[ed] and quitelaim{ed]" certain real estate and personal property. The instrument further provided that the trustee was "to take any and all property that may hereafter come to [grantor] by descent or devise...." 78 Ind.App. at 149, 184 N.E. 899. The court held:
"'that in so far as the deed in question relates to the money involved in this action, [Wood] was attempting to assign or convey a mere expectancy. It is settled law in this state, and so recognized by text writers, that such a contract is against public policy, and hence inoperative, unless the ancestor through whom such expectancy may be derived, assents to the same." 78 Ind.App. at 150, 134 N.E. 899.
It is clear, therefore, that the instrument here involved could not serve as an equitable assignment of the contingent expectancy of the $388,777.89 to be received if and only if Pioneer chose that alternative instead of the mortgage assignment. For the same reason, I would hold that the alternative contingent expectancy of the mortgage assignment was not transferred or transferable in the 1985 deed.
In McAdams v. Bailey (1907) 169 Ind. 518, 82 N.E. 1057, the court found an estop-pel to exist but did so based upon a covenant of warranty in the instrument. The court however acknowledged the basic rule that a "mere quitclaim deed ... not purporting to convey any particular interest, would have been ineffectual to convey [the grantor's]l possible future interest...." 169 Ind. at 521, 82 N.E. 1057. To the same effect is Buckel v. Auer (1918) 68 Ind.App. 320, 120 N.E. 487, which recited the general rule but acknowledged an exception if the quitclaim deed contains a clearly expressed intent to convey a specifically described and identified interest.
The quitclaim deed here involved does not contain such specificity or expressed intent. It purports only to "Release and Quit-Claim ... a part of" the real estate legally described. Record at 528. For this reason, I am of the considered opinion that Wernecke did not acquire any interest in the fourth mortgage by virtue of Carr's quitclaim deed.
Because it would serve no useful purpose with regard to the result obtained in this appeal for me to discuss the other assertions of error advanced by Carr, I choose not to do so. My dissent is premised solely upon the single issue addressed by the majority. I do not opine whether there may be some other basis upon which to sustain the decision of the trial court.