Court Opinion

ID: 9729793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:49:03.985594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.664442
License: Public Domain

*41HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
I would reverse appellant’s conviction of receiving stolen property because the district attorney elicited testimony at trial that appellant had been in possession of marijuana at the time of the search.1
In September, 1968, Seward’s Incorporated, a sporting goods store in Exeter Township, Berks County, was burglarized. At least thirty-four guns were taken, including a West Point Carbine 30-30, serial number Ad 14686. On September 30, 1972, a private residence in Greensburg, Westmoreland County, was burglarized and five pistols were reported missing.
On December 19, 1973, Trooper Pease of the Pennsylvania State Police submitted an affidavit for a search warrant to a district justice. The affidavit recites the following: “. . . [the affiant] has just and reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that the (3A) entirety of the premises and the curtilage, consisting of a spring house and grounds of the premises known as (3B) Residence of Joseph . Biancone being a (3C) 2V2 story stone and aluminum siding building located at (3D) Antietam Road in the (4) Township of Lower . . Alsace is being used for the purpose of concealing” the proceeds of a recent burglary. Trooper Pease gave the warrant to Corporal McCreary to be executed. McCreary testified at trial that “[Pursuant to that warrant] I went to a residence along Angora Road in Alsace Township, Berks County.”
The search conducted on December 19, uncovered between forty and fifty guns. The serial numbers of some of the weapons, including a West Point 30-30 caliber rifle, had been ground off. The rifle was forwarded to the State Police laboratory in Harrisburg, where the police chemist was able to restore the serial number. The police thereby discovered that the weapon was one taken in the 1968 burglary of Seward’s sporting goods store.
*42McCreary also found a 410 shotgun pistol, recorded its serial number, but did not seize the weapon. He subsequently performed a computer check of the serial number and learned that the pistol was stolen. On December 20, he swore out a second search warrant for appellant’s home. The warrant now recited the address as Angora Road. The 410 shotgun pistol was not found during the December 20 search.
On August 7, 1974, appellant was indicted on charges of Receiving Stolen Property and Aiding Consummation of a Crime. Appellant filed a motion to suppress on October 8, 1974, denied on the same day. Appellant was found guilty by a jury of both charges on October 22, 1974. Post-trial motions were denied and this appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the assistant district attorney elicited testimony that the police search uncovered marijuana as well as weapons. During direct examination of Corporal McCreary, the following exchange took place:
“Q. Did you make a search of the entire premises of Mr. Biancone’s house?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Will you tell us what else you saw and did in the course of that search?
“A. During the course of the search, I had occasion to search a suspended ceiling, the new grid type of suspended ceiling, where there are metal grids suspended from the ceiling, and there are panels placed on top of those grids. I lifted up one of the panels and looked inside. In there, I found a 410 gauge shotgun pistol. .
“Q. Was anything else up there?
“A. Yes, sir, there was.
“Q. What?
“A. There was a bag of what appeared to be marijuana.” It is apparent that the district attorney was soliciting the officer’s testimony that appellant possessed contraband.
*43Appellant’s objection was sustained; but his motion for a mistrial was denied. Once the answer was offered, however, sustaining counsel’s objection was of limited utility. No attempt was made by the court to give a curative instruction. Cf. Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 318 A.2d 680 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 230 Pa.Super. 72, 327 A.2d 367 (1974).
In Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, the following dialogue took place: “ ‘Q. Were you able to identify the defendant at the preliminary hearing without anybody pointing to him or pointing him out? A. I was able to identify him, although he did look different. Q. In what way? A. His hair was different and his face had begun to fill. Q. What do you mean by that? A. The first time I saw him he had a gloss on his hair and when I saw him in the courtroom, preliminary hearing, he didn’t have a gloss. Q. What do you mean by his face had begun to fill? A. Shall I really tell you what I meant? Q. Yes. A. Well, if a man is without drugs for nine days he may gain a little weight. [Defense counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: Objection sustained. . . ’ After denying the appellant’s mistrial, the court instructed the jury as follows: ‘THE COURT: Members of the jury, this lady has been talking to you about something she thinks happened, that he used narcotics. There is nothing in this case about that. That is something in her mind and we try cases on facts and the fact she had a theory as to why, to her, this man’s face changed has nothing whatsoever to do with this case. Therefore, members of the jury, if as and when you are sent to the jury room you are to totally disregard that answer and not use it in any way to determining the final conclusion in this case. . . . ” 230 Pa.Super. at 74-75, 327 A.2d at 368. We held in Williams that such a vigorous admonishment to the jury was sufficient to cure any possible error that resulted from the witness’s statement.
In general, however, “[i]t is a fundamental precept of the common law that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal conduct as substan*44tive evidence of his guilt of the present charge.” Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 181, 292 A.2d 373, 375 (1972). Our system of justice recognizes several exceptions to the above-stated rule: evidence of other criminal activity may be introduced “for the purpose of showing intent, guilty knowledge, motive, identity, plan, the accused to be one of an organization banded together to commit crimes of the nature charged, part of a chain of circumstances or one of a sequence of acts, or part of the natural developments of the facts, or mental condition, when insanity is a defense or, within limitations, for the purpose of fixing the penalty in murder cases.” Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa.Super. 328, 336, 116 A.2d 867, 871 (1955). See also, Commonwealth v. Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 87 A.2d 287 (1952); Commonwealth v. Williams, supra. If a reference to prior criminal activity is indirect, a court must decide “whether or not a juror could reasonably infer from the facts presented that the accused had engaged in prior criminal activity. . . . Once it is determined that the jury could reasonably conclude from the . reference prior criminal activity on the part of the defendant prejudicial error has been committed.” Commonwealth v. Allen, supra 448 Pa. at 181-82, 292 A.2d at 375.
In the instant case, the testimony referred to appellant’s possession of marijuana.2 There is no question that possession of marijuana is criminal conduct. See Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 13; as amended; 35 P.S. § 780-113. Nor can it be argued that appellant’s possession of marijuana comes within any of the relevant exceptions to the general rule that evidence of criminal activity is inadmissible. Therefore, it was error for the lower court to fail to *45admonish the jury or to grant appellant’s motion for a mistrial.
Appellant also contends that the December 19 search warrant was defective so that evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should have been suppressed.
Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “. . .no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing [any place or person to be seized] as nearly as may be . .” In my view, the issue under § 8 is whether a warrant permits the search of only one clearly specified location. Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 242 Pa.Super. 631, 360 A.2d 658 (1975), (HOFFMAN, J. concurring opinion); see also, Commonwealth v. Muscheck, 460 Pa. 590, 834 A.2d 248 (1975); Commonwealth v. Smyser, 205 Pa.Super. 599, 211 A.2d 59 (1965).
From testimony at the suppression hearing, it is clear that appellant’s residence was located on a country road, that there were no signs in the area to demark the various intersecting roads, and that the residence was near Antietam Road: “From Mount Penn you go down Carsonia Avenue and you would come to the intersection that about five roads come together, one is Friedensburg Road, one is Antietam Road, there is a side street that goes into Pennside, I don’t know the name and another road that is blocked off, and you would have to take a left-hand turn and go onto Antietam Road. Then what you come onto first is a new section just built, it goes up the hill beside the dam, Antietam Lake. Up there it turns into a two-lane sort of bumpy road and winds around through the woods. There is another road up there, I don’t know what the name of it is, that goes down through the woods, back down the hill—
“THE COURT: Wait a minute, to get to Biancone’s you are going off this new section onto a two-lane bumpy road—
“THE WITNESS: Also Antietam Road—
“THE COURT: Now from there—
*46“THE WITNESS: From there I think you only stay on the bumpy section about a quarter-mile or so and you have to make a left.
“[BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: When you make a left, is there a name to that road?
“A. I don’t know what the name is. I don’t recall ever seeing a road sign.
“Q. How far along on that left-hand-turn road does one proceed?
“A. I would say maybe a half or three-quarters of a mile, and that brings you out onto the road that goes by in front of Mr. Biancone’s house. ... I don’t recall ever seeing a road sign there. I know if it would not be blocked off, you would come out at an intersection of Antietam Road and Carsonia Avenue, but that road is blocked off. It used to run in front of Antietam Dam.
“Q. Are you indicating if you passed Mr. Biancone’s home on the road you were at that time, you would come to the intersection of Antietam Road and—
“A. The new section of Antietam Road. I was under the impression that the new section of Antietam Road passed by Mr. Biancone’s house — ”
The description of the house was sufficiently detailed so that, in addition to the proximity to Antietam Road and to the fact that this was Mr. Biancone’s residence in Lower Alsace Township, the house searched was the only place that could have been legally searched. Cf. Commonwealth v. Kaplan, supra.
Therefore, I would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial. I would not, however, suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the December 19 search warrant.
CERCONE and SPAETH, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Appellant also contends that his sentence was excessive because compared to individuals who pled guilty, his was considerably longer. Because I would reverse for a new trial, I do not discuss this argument.

. The lower court stated in its opinion that “reference to drug addiction of the accused does not necessarily carry with it the inference that the accused has engaged in prior criminal conduct.” While it violates due process to punish an accused for a “status” rather than an action, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), there is no question that our system of justice permits the punishment of one in possession of contraband. The testimony in the instant case does not imply that appellant was an addict, but that he possessed marijuana.