Court Opinion

ID: 9661302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:34:43.848552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:53:05.940194
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
In denying a woman’s attempt to enforce an unpaid $40,000 judgment from an Amended Decree of Dissolution, the majority confuses the distinction between an amended judgment pursuant to Rule 75.01, Mo. R. Civ. P., and a nunc pro tunc order, and ignores the clear precedent of Moyer v. Walker, 771 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.App.1989).
In this case, the trial court entered an Amended Decree of Dissolution. The trial court is allowed to do this because it is granted control of its judgments for thirty days pursuant to Rule 75.01. Within this time, a trial court is allowed to “vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment.” There is no restriction in Rule 75.01 that would prevent a trial court from entering an amended judgment to correct a typing error.
A nunc pro tune order is something quite different. It is an order that is generally entered after the tune within which a trial court is allowed control of its judgment has expired. Because of this, a nunc pro tunc order may only correct clerical-type mistakes. See, 2 Mo. Practice section 19.07 (1992) and 16 Mo. Practice section 75.01-7 (1976). The unique nature of a nunc pro tunc order is stated in Black’s Law Dictionary 1218 (Revised 4th Ed.1968), as:
A phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the same effect as if regularly done. (Emphasis supplied.)
While nunc pro tunc orders are within the inherent power of a court, in 1987 we provided specific and separate authority, apart from Rule 75.01, for nunc pro tunc orders in Rule 74.06, Mo. R. Civ. P., which states:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time ... (Emphasis supplied.)
*248As the majority points out, because nunc pro tunc orders are generally entered out of time, and may only correct clerical errors, they must relate back to the time they were originally ordered. Amendments made during the time period within which the trial court has control of its judgments, however, need not necessarily relate back. These amendments are valid in and of themselves when made because the court has power to do what it believes is necessary during this time.
The majority cites to no Missouri authority to support its proposition that an amended decree entered within the period of time that the trial court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 75.01, even if its effect is to correct typographical errors, must be treated as a nunc pro tunc order that relates back to the date of entry of the original decree. In fact, one Missouri decision is directly on point, Moyer v. Walker, 771 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.App.1989), and holds to the contrary. Writing for the Court of Appeals, Southern District, Judge Holstein stated:
The record shows that an original judgment was filed on April 1, 1988. Thereafter on April 15, 1988, a first amended judgment was filed. The amended judgment was essentially the same as the first judgment but substituted the word “plaintiff” for “defendant” in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the findings of fact. The notice of appeal was filed on May 13, 1988. A trial court may amend a judgment within thirty days after entry of judgment. Rule 75.01. While the trial court did not vacate the original judgment before filing the amended judgment, the effect of the amendment was entry of a new judgment. Daniels v. Daniels, 675 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Mo.App.1984). Consequently, the amended judgment was not final for purposes of appeal until May 15, 1988, and the notice of appeal was timely. Rule 84.05.
Of course, the majority is free to abandon previous Missouri law and to read in a new way our carefully crafted rules of civil procedure, if logic or good cause would require it to do so. The majority decision, however, can claim neither.
The majority’s argument is not supported by logic but instead violates classical rules of logic. The essence of the majority’s argument is that:
1. Nunc pro tunc orders only correct clerical errors;
2. This order corrects clerical errors; and, therefore,
3. This order is a nunc pro tunc order.
This form of argument is referred to in basic logic textbooks as the “Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent” and is universally condemned as invalid. Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, p. 292 (5th ed.); R. Angelí, Reasoning and Logic, p. 148 (1964). The mistake in this type of argument is simply stated by Angelí as follows:
This form is invalid since even if we accepted both premises as true, it would be possible to deny the conclusion consistently:
If it has been sub-zero weather for three days, then it If p then q. is safe to skate.
It is safe to skate. q
Hence, it has been sub-zero weather for three days. Hence, p.
It is easy to see that the conclusion does not follow necessarily. The reason why it is now safe to skate might be something other than three days of subzero weather; perhaps ten days of weather at twenty above zero. To say this would not be to deny that if there had been three days of sub-zero weather it would also have been safe to skate, or that it is safe to skate now. In other words the premises could both be true, though the conclusion was false; thus it is not valid.1
*249In our case, the majority’s argument simply cannot account for the possibility that the trial court’s order may be justified by Rule 75.012 and may constitute a new entry of judgment.3 The majority’s argument is legally invalid by textbook definition.
The majority opinion also fails to establish any good cause for abandoning the law stated in Moyer v. Walker. No mischief or injustice is cited resulting from that opinion. Sadly, however, this is not true for the majority decision. It creates an immediate injustice. It allows a husband judgment debtor to walk away from a $40,000 judgment, leaving his unpaid former wife without remedy.

. Or, in language more common to the legal profession, the majority's argument is akin to stating that;
1. All judges are lawyers;
2. “A" is a lawyer; therefore
3. "A” is a judge.

. The majority misfires, again, when it attempts to argue that the trial court did not comply with the notice and hearing requirement of Rule 75.01. The record entry indicated that the court was "advised” of the typing error and that "copies of amended decree forwarded to attys Elsey and Harpool.” The record indicates no objection by either attorney. There can be no valid issue made regarding this point. State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. banc 1997).

. The record indicates the trial court’s intention to enter a new judgment, not merely a nunc pro tunc correction. The trial court titled its judgment as an "Amended Decree of Dissolution of Marriage” not a "Nunc Pro Tunc Order.” The trial court's judgment was a two-page document, restated in its entirety, complete within its four comers. It was not merely an indication of correction of certain errors.