Court Opinion

ID: 9466219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:08:26.178784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:36.347967
License: Public Domain

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM.
The petition for rehearing raises a number of points, none of which have merit, but since the motion contains irresponsible statements and charges, we choose to comment on it.
The fundamental basis for the opinion is that Congress rather than the court has the power to regulate the value of money. This is a power guaranteed by the Constitution, and the conclusion that the courts do not have a role in this area cannot be questioned. The motion fails to ever come to grips with this basic issue.
It is to be noted at the outset that this court as well as the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have had occasion to review tax evasion cases in which the contention has been advanced that salaries paid in federal reserve notes were not taxable under the Internal Revenue Code. This apparently is based on a belief that inflation has affected the value of these notes. The following are the cases that have dealt with this: United States v. Johnson, No. 77-1366 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 1978); United States v. Wright, No. 77-1021 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 1978); United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1063, 94 S.Ct. 571, 38 L.Ed.2d 469 (1973); United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105, 97 S.Ct. 1134, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977); United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853, 97 S.Ct. 145, 50 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967, 97 S.Ct. 2924, 53 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1977). The above decisions have summarily rejected arguments such as are raised here, the essence of which is that whenever economic conditions are inflationary, adjustments must be made in the values to be attributed to income and that this affects the filing requirements of Internal Revenue Code § 6012.
One of the arguments made is that a certain statute was not mentioned in the brief or in oral argument, 31 U.S.C. § 463, and that we are precluded from considering it. This is specious on its face. No more needs to be said.
Counsel complains that § 463 is not applicable to federal reserve notes. This court did not make any such suggestion in its opinion that it had direct affect on such notes. This fact does not change the basic thrust of the court’s opinion, which is that Congress is exclusive authority in this field.
It is said that § 463 was repealed in October 1977. It was, however, in force in *4071973, 1974 and 1975, the years involved in this case. The fact that Congress took this action does not affect the issue whether Congress had the power to regulate the currency. This section was cited in the opinion in relation to a discussion of Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407, 79 L.Ed. 885 (1935), which upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the power of the Congress over the monetary system of the United States. The Norman case was used as an illustration of the constitutional principle that the authority of Congress over currency is plenary and that the Judiciary is not to tamper with it. It is wholly inaccurate to say, as counsel has said, that there was heavy reliance (in the opinion) on this statute. The attempt to distinguish the Norman case, when it is considered that it was cited only to show the extent of congressional power in the monetary area, becomes wholly off the mark.
A further argument is made that the federal reserve note does not have a value equivalent to other forms of United States currency. However, Congress has declared in 31 U.S.C. § 392 (1976) that “All coins and currencies of the United States (including Federal Reserve Notes * * *), regardless of when coined or issued, shall be legal tender for all debts, public and private, public charges, taxes, duties and' dues.” This statute places federal reserve notes on a par with all other forms of United States currency as a medium of exchange regardless of whatever formal differences exist among the various currency statutes. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 411 (1976), and 31 U.S.C. § 452 (1976). This is the law of the land and it must be upheld.
The next contention is that the trial court erred in refusing to-instruct the jury concerning whether the defendant understood that he was not required to file a return. This matter was fully considered, and the only purpose of the argument in the petition for rehearing is to express the disagreement of counsel with this court’s ruling. Good faith belief of the accused as to what the law should be is inconsequential in these circumstances. United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105, 97 S.Ct. 1134, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064, 94 S.Ct. 571, 38 L.Ed.2d 469 (1973).
Finally, it is contended that this ease should be heard en banc because it deals with the monetary system of the United States. This is patently insufficient and needs no further comment.
The motion together with the “brief” could be stricken due to its many inaccuracies and deficiencies. We decide, however, to allow it to remain. A cursory reading of it reveals its character.
Upon consideration by Circuit Judges Doyle, Breitenstein and Logan, to whom the case was argued and submitted, the petition for rehearing is denied.
The petition for rehearing having been denied by the panel to whom the case was argued and submitted, and no member of the panel nor judge in regular active service on the court having requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc, Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied.