Court Opinion

ID: 9963597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 20:08:57.49257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:53.370069
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                     Case No. 5D2022-2823
                  LT Case No. 2018-31181-CICI
                 _____________________________

JOSE DURAN,

    Appellant,

    v.

CRAB SHACK ACQUISITION, FL,
LLC, d/b/a JOE’S CRAB SHACK,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Mary G. Jolley, Judge.

Chad A. Barr, of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte Springs, for
Appellant.

Robert A. Ader and Elizabeth B. Hitt, of Ader & Hitt, P.A.,
Miami, for Appellee.

                          April 25, 2024

SOUD, J.

     Jose Duran appeals the trial court’s entry of final summary
judgment against him and in favor of Crab Shack Acquisition, FL,
LLC d/b/a Joe’s Crab Shack in this slip-and-fall case. We have
jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P.
9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm.
                                I.

     Duran and two out-of-town friends went to lunch at Joe’s Crab
Shack in Daytona Beach, Florida on March 11, 2018, a busy
Sunday afternoon at the restaurant. As Duran was leaving, he
slipped and fell in something wet, which he believed to be a
“brownish” liquid. Duran fell several feet away from the kitchen
door where servers bring drinks on a tray to be served to patrons.
John Calo, a regional director for Joe’s Crab Shack who noticed
Duran as he entered the restaurant because Duran had a “labored”
and “extreme” gait, estimated Duran fell approximately twelve
feet from the kitchen door, in the general walkway “in the dining
room” area. The record makes clear this location is a high traffic
area heavily traversed by both customers and employees alike
because it is a main pathway for customers entering and exiting
the dining area of the restaurant.

     Duran’s friends were behind him as the three were exiting the
restaurant and did not see Duran fall. Jessy Ortiz had stopped to
take a picture and lost sight of Duran until Nikauris Tavares
indicated Duran had fallen. When the two came to Duran, Ortiz
noticed “drops of water” on the floor. Ortiz opined that the water
came from drinks on servers’ trays that would drip because “the
drinks were too full.” Tavares said the floor where Duran fell was
wet, greasy, and dirty. There is no evidence presented by Duran
that the liquid on the floor was scuffed or dirty or had footprints
through it. Neither Duran nor his friends were able to testify how
the substance on which he slipped got onto the floor or how long it
was present there.

     Duran filed suit seeking damages for the injuries sustained
from the fall that he claimed resulted from Joe’s Crab Shack’s
negligence. Ultimately, the restaurant moved for summary
judgment, arguing Duran was unable to meet his burden of
establishing that the restaurant had actual or constructive
knowledge of the presence of the substance that caused his fall.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and
entered final summary judgment in favor of Joe’s Crab Shack. This
appeal followed.

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                                 II.

     We review de novo the trial court’s order granting final
summary judgment in favor of Joe’s Crab Shack. See Leftwich v.
Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D436b (Fla. 5th DCA
Feb. 22, 2024); see also Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277, 1278
(Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (citing Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond
Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)).

                                 A.

     To be entitled to summary judgment, a movant must show
“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a). “[A] genuine dispute occurs when the evidence would
allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for [the non-moving]
party.” Welch, 357 So. 3d at 1278. This standard “closely mirrors
the standard for directed verdict, in which the focus of the analysis
is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury.” Carpio v. W. Beef of Fla., LLC, 49
Fla. L. Weekly D86a (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 3, 2024) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). When considering a motion for
summary judgment, a trial court—and this Court—must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Welch, 357 So. 3d at 1278.

                                 B.

     Duran claims that Joe’s Crab Shack negligently maintained
its premises by allowing a dangerous condition, drops of water, to
exist in its restaurant without warning him or taking action to
correct the condition. Of course, at an elementary level, to sustain
his negligence claim, Duran must prove four elements: duty,
breach, causation, and damages. See id. (citing Peoples Gas Sys. v.
Posen Constr., Inc., 322 So. 3d 604, 612 n.8 (Fla. 2021)).

    When a business invites another onto its premises, the owner
has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the business “in a
reasonably safe condition.” See Whitlow v. Tallahassee Mem’l
Healthcare, Inc., 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1647 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 16,
2023) (quoting S. Express Co. v. Williamson, 63 So. 433, 437 (Fla.
1913)). That duty “may vary with the circumstances of each case.”

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Id. More specifically stated, the business owner is charged with the
duty to

       maintain[ ] the property in a reasonably safe
       condition and to [give] [the invitee] timely notice
       and warning of latent and concealed perils, known
       to the owners and their rental agent, or by the
       exercise of due care, should have been known, and
       which were to the appellant unknown or that by the
       exercise of due care she could not have known of the
       latent and concealed dangers.

Tutwiler v. I. Beverally Nalle, Inc., 12 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 1943)
(quoted in Whitlow, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1647).

     Importantly, under longstanding Florida law, a business is
not an insurer of the safety of those who come onto its property;
rather, the business is legally bound to exercise reasonable care to
protect against hazards of which it has actual or constructive
notice. See Whitlow, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1647 (citing Winn-Dixie
Montgomery, Inc. v. Petterson, 291 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA
1974)). “Negligence will not be presumed merely because of the
happening of an accident.” Id. (quoting Clyde Bar, Inc. v.
McClamma, 10 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. 1942)); see also Emmons v.
Baptist Hosp., 478 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“[I]t is
fundamental that the mere occurrence of an accident does not give
rise to an inference of negligence and that the plaintiff must show
that the condition complained of was an unreasonable hazard.”).

      Section 768.0755(1), Florida Statutes (2017)—consistent with
the duty of care owed at Florida common law 1—“statutorily
constrain[s]” what a plaintiff must prove to establish a business’s
breach of that duty in a negligence action arising from a slip and
fall on a transitory foreign substance. See Welch, 357 So. 3d at 1278
(quoting Encarnacion v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 211 So. 3d 275,
278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)). Section 768.0755 states:

    1 Section 768.0755(2) provides, “This section does not affect

any common-law duty of care owed by a person or entity in
possession or control of a business premises.”

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       (1) If a person slips and falls on a transitory
       foreign substance in a business establishment, the
       injured person must prove that the business
       establishment had actual or constructive
       knowledge of the dangerous condition and should
       have taken action to remedy it. Constructive
       knowledge may be proven by circumstantial
       evidence showing that:

       (a) The dangerous condition existed for such a
       length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary care,
       the business establishment should have known of
       the condition; or

       (b) The condition occurred with regularity and
       was therefore foreseeable.

§ 768.0755(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

     As the plain language of this statute makes clear, Duran must
establish that Joe’s Crab Shack either had (i) actual knowledge of
the “drops of water” on the floor or (ii) constructive knowledge of
that liquid’s presence. He can prove neither in this case. 2

     As to Duran’s claim that Joe’s Crab Shack had constructive
knowledge of the presence of the substance, constructive
knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence that:
“(a) [t]he dangerous condition existed for such a length of time
that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the [restaurant] should have
known of the condition; or (b) [t]he condition occurred with
regularity and was therefore foreseeable.” § 768.0755(1), Fla. Stat.
Contrary to Joe’s Crab Shack’s argument, to establish constructive
knowledge, Florida law does not require Duran to provide “direct
evidence about who or what caused the dangerous substance and
when exactly it happened. Instead, circumstantial evidence that
sufficiently establishes the dangerous condition was present for a
long enough period of time is enough” to prove constructive

    2 We conclude without further comment that Duran is unable

to establish Joe’s Crab Shack’s actual knowledge of the substance
on the floor that he contends caused his fall.

                                 5
knowledge of the existence of the dangerous condition. Sutton v.
Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 64 F.4th 1166, 1172 (11th Cir. 2023)
(citing section 768.0755(1)(a) in rejecting Wal-Mart’s claim that
the plaintiff there failed to present evidence as to where the
substance came from and how and when it got on the floor); see
also Welch, 357 So. 3d at 1278–79.

     While Duran testified he fell in something wet—a “brownish”
liquid—the presence of the substance on the floor alone cannot
itself establish constructive knowledge. Rather, because some
substances may be colored or have other characteristics such as
sliminess, see Welch, 357 So. 3d at 1279, there must be evidence in
addition to the foreign substance—a “plus”—from which the jury
may reasonably conclude the substance was present for a sufficient
length of time that Joe’s Crab Shack, in the exercise of ordinary
care, should have known of its existence. See id. (citing
Encarnacion, 211 So. 3d at 278); see also Delgado v. Laundromax,
Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). “In trying to assess
how long a substance has been sitting on a floor, courts look to
several factors, including ‘evidence of footprints, prior track marks,
changes in consistency, [or] drying of the liquid.’” Welch, 357 So.
3d at 1278–79 (quoting Torres v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 555 F.
Supp. 3d 1276, 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2021)). “They also consider if the
‘offending liquid’ was ‘dirty’ or ‘scuffed.’” Id. at 1279 (quoting
Torres).

     This is precisely where Duran’s claim of the restaurant’s
constructive knowledge fails. There is no “plus” evidence in the
record before us—a requirement for Duran to prove constructive
knowledge of Joe’s Crab Shack. There is no testimony of footprints,
changes in consistency, or drying of any liquid. Similarly, there is
no evidence sufficiently presented below that the liquid was
scuffed or polluted by other substances, such as dirt or food. As a
result, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Duran,
there is insufficient evidence that would allow a jury to find Joe’s
Crab Shack had constructive knowledge of the liquid.

                                 III.

    As there remains no genuine dispute of any material fact—
and Duran is unable to establish that Joe’s Crab Shack had either
actual or constructive notice of any substance purportedly causing

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his fall, as required by Florida law—the trial court’s final summary
judgment in favor of Joe’s Crab Shack is AFFIRMED.

    It is so ordered.

EISNAUGLE and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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