Court Opinion

ID: 9521271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:01:49.101741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:11.316642
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NICKELS, dissenting: This appeal raises the question of whether the circuit court may impose consecutive sentences on remand where the circuit court initially imposed concurrent sentences on certain offenses. The majority holds that the initial sentences were "void” and therefore the circuit court may impose consecutive sentences. This holding allows the circuit court to lengthen the aggregate sentence for each defendant. Because this holding, in effect, penalizes defendants for appealing their sentences, I dissent. In reaching its conclusion, the majority relies heavily on People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995). In Amo, the defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 and 45 years in prison, as opposed to consecutive terms. This court held that the circuit court erred in sentencing and that consecutive sentences were required. Although the State was not entitled to appeal the sentencing issue, this court found that the issue was reviewable. In justifying this action, the Arna majority reasoned that "[a] sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void” and is therefore reviewable at any time. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113. I dissented in Arna and I still believe Arna was wrongly decided. See Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 115-17 (Nickels, J., dissenting). Supreme Court Rule 604(a) is specific in providing when the State may appeal in criminal cases. It does not allow the State to appeal sentencing issues. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a). In the majority’s discussion, the majority notes that "the State and reviewing courts will be the parties pointing to a trial judge’s error.” 179 Ill. 2d at 75. Because the State may not appeal sentencing issues, it is also prohibited on a defendant’s appeal from "pointing to” sentencing errors made in the circuit court. In addition, Rule 615(b) sets forth the powers of a reviewing court. It does not give a reviewing court the power to increase a sentence on appeal. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b). In the instant case, the majority essentially authorizes an increase in defendants’ aggregate sentences. In addition to requiring consecutive sentences on remand, the majority finds that, because the original sentences imposed on the various counts were void, the sentences imposed on remand "will not be greater than, less, or equal to defendants’ original sentences.” 179 Ill. 2d at 73. The majority apparently holds that the circuit court may impose a longer sentence for each individual offense. This is simply incorrect. Section 5 — 5—4 of the Unified Code of Corrections provides: "Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied unless the more severe sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—4 (West 1992). This statute places a limitation on resentencing. The statute applies to the instant case because defendants’ sentences have been "set aside” on appeal. Pursuant to the statute, a more severe sentence can be imposed for each individual offense only if it is based on conduct that occurs after sentencing. In their briefs, defendants argue against the imposition of more severe sentences on remand. They rely extensively on People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (1995), and People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367 (1995), two recent cases from this court. Although these cases were discussed in the appellate court and raised in the briefs to this court, the majority ignores them. In Kilpatrick, the circuit court imposed consecutive sentences of six and nine years for two offenses. On reconsideration, the circuit court determined that consecutive sentences were not appropriate under the sentencing statute and vacated the consecutive sentences. It then imposed longer terms of 15 years for each offense, to be served concurrently. In Kilpatrick, this court held that this action resulted in an impermissible increase in sentencing because section 5 — 8—1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(c) (West 1992)) prohibited the circuit court from increasing a sentence after it was imposed. Thus, on reconsideration, the circuit court could not impose a more severe sentence for each individual offense. This court employed the same reasoning in Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367. In Kilpatrick and Jones, this court found that section 5 — 8—1(c) limited the circuit court’s discretion in resentencing after the defendants filed motions to reconsider in the circuit court. Similarly, in the instant case, section 5 — 5—4 limits the circuit court’s discretion in resentencing where a reviewing court has set aside the original sentences on appeal. It is inconsistent to hold that a sentence cannot be increased after a motion to reconsider the sentence but may be increased on resentencing following an appeal. Given these similar statutory prohibitions and given the reasoning of Kilpatrick and Jones, the circuit court cannot impose a more severe sentence on each individual offense. The majority fails to address the foregoing statutes and case law. According to the majority, because the original sentences were "void,” there are no limitations on the circuit court on remand. The majority holds that the circuit court is free to impose any sentence for each individual offense, even if it is greater than the original sentence. I believe that there is a fundamental inconsistency between Arna, which the majority relies on in the instant case, and Kilpatrick and Jones. Under the majority’s reasoning, the defendants’ original sentences in Kilpatrick and Jones would have been just as void as those involved here because there was no statutory authorization for the original sentences. Under this reasoning, any time a trial judge does not correctly follow a sentencing statute and makes an erroneous decision, the sentence is void. In effect, this reasoning eliminates many of the statutory protections and rules that safeguard defendants on resentencing. Such a result raises grave due process concerns. In my view, the best solution is to recognize that Arna was wrongly decided and to overrule it. In the instant case, the circuit court may have applied the sentencing statute incorrectly, but this error does not make its determination "void.” Sentences were imposed for each defendant. They appealed their convictions and sentences and were partially successful in their appeals. On remand, however, they may suffer the consequences of longer sentences as a result of pursuing their right to appeal. Given such consequences, defendants in future cases will face a difficult choice. They may choose to appeal in the belief that they have meritorious legal arguments requiring reversal. It may be wiser, however, to forgo an appeal because defendants will subject themselves to the risk of increased punishment by appealing. Certainly, such a scenario will have a chilling effect on every defendant’s right to appeal and clearly flies in the face of Rule 615(b) and section 5 — 5—4 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Defendants should not be required to make such a choice. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. JUSTICES HARRISON and McMORROW join in this dissent.