Court Opinion

ID: 9581085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:35.862928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:41.684405
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice,
dissenting.
Billy Richard Glaze was tried in one prosecution for the murders of three women, murders committed at different times and different places in the City of Minneapolis. The state’s case rested on the theory that these were serial killings. Angela Green, the third of the murder victims, had not been strangled, as had the earlier two victims, but had died by having her skull crushed by a concrete block. There were other differences between the first two murders and the last. Glaze sought unsuccessfully to introduce evidence at trial that someone other than himself had killed Angela Green. As to whether the exclusion of that evidence was in error, the majority states that
[w]e tend to agree with the defense that the evidence was admissible on the issue of the identity of the person who murdered Green. [But] [g]iven the overwhelming evidence of Glaze’s guilt, it is extremely doubtful that admission of more detailed evidence concerning Cooper’s relationship with Green would have *663affected the verdict. Accordingly, any error by the trial court was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See p. 661. Because the denial of the right to introduce evidence that someone other than defendant committed the crime goes to the very heart of a defendant’s right to a fair trial — the right to present a defense to a charge by the state, I respectfully dissent.
The majority recognizes when a defendant seeks to introduce evidence that someone else had cause or opportunity to commit the crime with which the defendant is charged:
[EJvidence tending to prove that another person did the killing is admissible. The purpose of evidence to show that another committed the homicide is not to prove the guilt of the other person, but to generate a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. Proper foundation must be laid for the admission of such evidence, however, to avoid the consideration of matters collateral to the crime. ‘The rule is that [evidence of such acts] by a third person against the victim may not be shown unless coupled with other evidence having an inherent tendency to connect such other person with the actual commission of the crime.’
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Once the necessary foundation is proven, it is permissible to introduce evidence of a motive of the third person to commit the crime, threats by the third person, or other miscellaneous facts which would tend to prove the third person'committed the act.
State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158-59 (Minn.1977) (quoting Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969, 984 (Alaska 1961)) (other citations omitted). It is clear that in this case the defense had the requisite foundation for the introduction of evidence tending to show that someone other than Glaze was the killer of Green.
The defense had evidence that Michael Cooper, an Afro-American, was Angela Green’s pimp and that he wore a “Coors Light” hat. A Coors Light hat was found at the murder scene and forensics revealed that inside the hat were hairs of a negroid type. In addition to the hat, there was evidence that Angela Green had reported to the police that Cooper had raped her at knife point. A knife was found at the murder scene. Additionally, Green had given to her sister a list of people of whom she was afraid, Cooper was on that list. The day before she was killed, Green had told someone she was afraid that Cooper would kill her.
The trial court granted the state’s motion in limine seeking to exclude this evidence.1 Although it is true, as the majority notes, that the jury did get to hear bits and pieces of the evidence concerning Cooper and Green, the majority ignores the fact that the connection between Cooper and Green — the crucial reason for the introduction of the evidence — was excluded from consideration by the jury. The majority then concludes that because the evidence in this case was so overwhelming, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The harmless error standard of review applies to errors involving constitutional rights. State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Minn.1988). Appellant’s constitutional right in this case was the most fundamental of all rights of an accused facing murder charges — the right to present evidence of a defense. In order to conclude that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence did not impermissibly abrogate appellant’s constitutional right to present a defense, this court must
independently evaluate the evidence to determine whether or not an average *664jury would have changed its verdict had [the evidence]-been [introduced]. If the record contains overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the [evidence] was merely cumulative and could not have played a significant role in the jury’s conviction, it is harmless.
Robinson, 427 N.W.2d at 224.
This evidentiary error deprived defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense. Because I cannot say, as did the majority, that the evidence used to convict Glaze was overwhelming, I cannot conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant is entitled to a new trial.

. The trial court relied on cases supplied by the state to exclude the evidence of the connection between Cooper and Green. The cases relied on were State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 432 (Minn.1982) and State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425, 427-28 (Minn.1981). These cases stand for the proposition that hearsay statements concerning a homicide victim’s fear of a defendant are admissible if the victim’s state of mind is a relevant issue, the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect and a proper limiting instruction is given. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d at 432. In this case, however, the evidence was not being introduced to show Green’s fear of Glaze, but her fear of a third person.