Court Opinion

ID: 9556047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 22:04:01.369082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:41.556268
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/15/23 P. v. Griffin CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                        CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                                B322522

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Los Angeles County
                                                                           Super. Ct. No. VA003749)
           v.

FREDERICK GRIFFIN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Raul A. Sahagun, Judge. Affirmed.
     Jennifer Peabody and Sydney Banach, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
     Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
        _________________________________________

      Frederick Griffin was convicted of 13 counts of
residential robbery and one count of first degree felony
murder. He appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1
He argues the trial court erred when it determined he acted
with reckless indifference to human life without considering
he was 19 years old at the time of the murder. We affirm.

     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      From October 1989 to May 1990, appellant Frederick
Griffin and several companions committed a series of armed
residential robberies, resulting in the murder of Jay Tryon.
During the robberies preceding Tryon’s murder, the
appellant was identified as a perpetrator who: (1) held a gun
to the head of victims; (2) threatened to kill victims; and (3)
physically assaulted victims, including stepping on the back
of a victim who was nine months pregnant. During the final
robbery, involving victim Tryon, a neighbor witnessed Tryon
wrestling with one of the robbers on his porch and the robber

1      Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch.
58, § 10.) We hereafter cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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calling out to his companions who all joined in the struggle,
hitting Tryon. After one of the men yelled “‘blast him,’” a
shot rang out, and the men fled the scene. Tryon died from a
single gunshot wound to the head.
       In 1991, a jury convicted appellant of 13 counts of
residential robbery and one count of first degree felony
murder. The jury further found appellant personally used a
firearm in the commission of each offense. Appellant was
sentenced to state prison for 62 years and four months to
life. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v.
Griffin (Jan 14, 1993, B062398 [nonpub. opn.].)
       In February 2021, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)
based on various changes in the law regarding felony murder
liability. On June 14, 2022, after an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court concluded appellant was not entitled to
resentencing, finding the prosecutor had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to life.2

                       DISCUSSION
     A.    Section 1172.6
     The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule

2     The parties stipulated the superior court could rely on the trial
transcripts in deciding the matter and neither party submitted any
new evidence.

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and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); accord, §
189, subd. (e).) SB 1437 also added now section 1172.6,
providing a procedure for defendants whose cases are final to
seek retroactive relief by petitioning the sentencing court to
vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining
counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

      B.     People v. Jones Does Not Require Remand
      In this appeal, appellant does not argue the trial
court’s findings – that appellant was a major participant in
the underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference
to human life – are unsupported by substantial evidence.
Instead, citing People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076
(Jones) and the de novo standard of review, appellant argues
the matter must be remanded to the trial court because it
“failed to consider appellant’s youth at the time of the
crimes.” However, a review of People v. Jones shows why
remand is not warranted in this case.
      In Jones, defense counsel argued the defendant “‘was
barely 20 years old at the time of [the] crime,’” “‘immature’”
and “‘still developing.’” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p.
1091.) The trial court issued a detailed explanation of its

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denial of the resentencing motion, but “did not mention [the
defendant’s] age or maturity level.” (Ibid.)
      On appeal, the court observed that “[i]n the usual case,
the fact that a court did not specifically mention certain
evidence does not mean that the court ‘ignored’ that
evidence.” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
Rather, the court will “presume the trial court followed the
law in exercising its duties and duly considered the evidence
presented to it.” (Ibid.) The court determined, however, the
“unusual circumstances” of the case before it required
remand “for the court’s consideration of all relevant factors
consistent with prevailing law.” (Id. at pp. 1079, 1093.)
      In so concluding, the court pointed out that In re Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, which “squarely” held a
defendant’s youth is one relevant factor in the major
participant/reckless indifference analysis, was not issued
until months after the trial court’s decision denying Jones’
resentencing motion. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p.
1092.) To the extent another case, People v. Harris (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 939 (Harris), had previously indicated youth
was a relevant factor, that opinion was issued “just a few
weeks” before the trial court’s rejection of Jones’
resentencing petition and without any “remonstrance by
defense counsel.” (Jones, supra, at pp. 1091-1092.) 3

3     In Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 939, abrogated on other
grounds in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, the court remanded
the matter for a resentencing hearing under (former) section 1170.95
because the record of conviction did not establish as a matter of law
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

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Accordingly, and “in the interest of justice,” the court
remanded the matter for “the trial court to have a
meaningful opportunity to consider [Jones’] youth . . .
consistent with prevailing law.” (Id. at p. 1093.)
      Here, the “unusual circumstances” identified in Jones,
are not present. That is, appellant’s evidentiary hearing
took place on June 14, 2022, more than ten months after the
Moore decision, sixteen months after the Harris decision,
and after additional opinions, referenced in Jones, had been
issued on the youth factor. (See Jones, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1091-1092; citing People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990-991 [no substantial evidence
defendant acted with reckless indifference in light of his
youth] and In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 467-472
(Harper) [habeas corpus petition denied where defendant’s
youth, even if a factor, did not change his culpability].)
      In the trial court, defense counsel argued that
appellant and his cohorts were “kids” and “young men” when
they committed the robbery that led to Tryon’s death.
Appellant concedes that information regarding his age was
included in the underlying criminal record admitted at the

the defendant was ineligible for resentencing relief. (Harris, supra, at
pp. 944, 959-961.) In remanding the matter, the court observed in
dictum that given Harris’s youth at the time of the crime (he was 17
years old) it was “far from clear” he was aware of the dangers posed by
the nature of the crime. (Id. at p. 960.)

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evidentiary hearing.4 And the court remarked that in
preparation for the evidentiary hearing, it had “read all of
the papers” and had “reviewed the trial transcript.”
Although the court did not expressly discuss appellant’s age
in issuing its final ruling on appellant’s petition, it was not
required to do so and there is no affirmative indication it
refused to consider the point.5 (People v. Stowell (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [“[W]here a statement of reasons is not
required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will
presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular
finding or order”];6 contrast People v. Chambers (1982) 136
Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption the court follows the law
does not apply where the sentencing law is not yet
established].) Accordingly, appellant has failed to identify

4     Appellant points out the underlying record demonstrates he was
19 years old at the time of the offense. Respondent adds that the
probation report, also admitted as part of the underlying criminal
record, reflects the murder of Tryon occurred only “12 days prior to
appellant’s twentieth birthday.”
5      In denying relief, the trial court stated appellant not only
“created a lot of [the] danger” in the earlier robberies in which he
participated but that he “assisted in creating [] additional danger”
during the murder of Tryon, by either calling to his confederates for
help to subdue Tryon or joining in the melee. (Cf. Harper, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 472 [stating defendant’s youth “in no way
undermine[d]” reckless indifference/major participant finding given
defendant’s willing participation in a robbery that carried a high risk
the victim would die and his conduct before and after the crime].)
6     Section 1172.6 does not require a statement of reasons following
an evidentiary hearing.

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any circumstances that would warrant a remand in this
case. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091.)

                      DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                  MORI, J.

We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

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