Court Opinion

ID: 9658436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:59:55.861754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:55.245215
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
I agree that the documents are to be read as one, but I disagree on the result.
I am convinced that a fair reading of the easement, including the terms of the agreement, in the light of the circumstances under which they were drafted and executed, indicates an intent to limit the easement for the use of and access to the water.
In pertinent part, SDCL 43-13-5 provides, “The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant[.]” An easement like any other estate in land may be a base, qualified or determinable fee; i. e., an estate which may last forever, but which may end on a merely possible event. Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal.App. 554, 229 P. 1002, 1005 (1924).
Although the draftsmanship is not a model of clarity, by reading the documents together it is apparent to me that the last paragraph is a limitation on the use of the water. It provides,
It is further understood and agreed that during the period the well is used by all parties of this agreement they will equally share the repair, upkeep, maintenance, for the proper operation of said water system. (Emphasis added.)
“The rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply with full force and effect to instruments conveying easements or other similar rights and privileges.” Flynn v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Company, 161 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa 1968).
In construing this deed we must endeavor to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties. Under the rules of construction we must first try to arrive at this intention from a reading of the whole instrument, but if, in doing so, the language used leaves the intention of the parties in doubt then we must turn to and consider the situation and circumstances of the parties at the time of the execution of the deed in order to determine what was within their contemplation at that time.
Black Hills Power & Light Co. v. Schuft, 86 S.D. 194, 193 N.W.2d 429, 432 (1972).
To properly construe this agreement, I look to the history of the development and use of the well to determine the intent of the parties. At the time the agreement was entered into the well was the sole source of water readily available in the vicinity. As Carl Pfeifer, one of the signatories to the agreement, testified, the agreement was entered into to relieve the Pfeifer families of the necessity of drilling wells to secure water for the houses they were building in the immediate area. At that time, the area was outside the city limits of Sioux Falls and city water was not available. Subsequently, the city limits were extended. Consequently, all of the parties or their successors in interest, including Nelsons, acquired city water service several years ago. Because Nelsons alone *788desire to continue the use of the water solely for the purpose of watering their lawn and garden, apparently, the majority reads the last paragraph, quoted above, as “used by any party.” One party’s use does not mean “all parties.” (Emphasis added.)
Applying the majority’s interpretation, now Nelsons may be able to require the other parties to share in the expense of upkeep. As I construe the provision quoted above, it was the intent of the parties that the agreement would be binding until city water was available. The use of the well has changed from a matter of necessity to all the property owners to a matter of convenience for one of them. The fact that Steele gave notice of revocation is undisputed.
Reading and construing the documents together, as urged by the appellees, I would hold that the easement has expired, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of appellants as prayed for in their complaint.
I am authorized to state that Justice FOSHEIM joins in this dissent.