Court Opinion

ID: 9560844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:57:31.041906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:15.042371
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority reaches the strained conclusion that the form signed by plaintiff is capable of more than one sensible and reasonable interpretation and is therefore ambiguous. That conclusion is wrong. The form is not ambiguous.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority ignores fundamental rules of interpretation. In interpreting an agreement, and thus in determining if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, we are guided by these maxims: “If it can be done, the agreement should be interpreted to avoid inconsistencies and to give meaning to all of its terms,” and “The specific governs the general.” Standley v. Standley, 90 Or App 552, 556, 752 P2d 1284, rev den 306 Or 413 (1988); see ORS 42.230 and ORS 42.240. The majority violates these *598maxims. It interprets the form to create.inconsistency, it fails to give meaning to the term ‘ ‘ emergency transportation, ” and it allows the general term “anyone who is a passenger” to control the meaning of the specific term “a passenger [riding] to obtain emergency transportation.” Its interpretation is, therefore, unreasonable and does not support a finding of ambiguity.
The majority creates ambiguity by finding an inconsistency between a statement at the top of the form and the release language at the bottom of the form. The majority supposes that there is no apparent reason to require all passengers to sign the form and, therefore, that its only purpose can be to provide a release from liability, regardless of the circumstances. There is no reason why the form cannot, for example, be assumed to serve the dual purpose of providing a record of passengers and releasing United Grocers from liability under the circumstances expressed in the release portion of the form.
Because the form is not ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent is inadmissible. ORS 41.740; Jarrett v. U.S. National Bank, 81 Or App 242, 246, 725 P2d 384 (1986), rev den 302 Or 476 (1987); see also CH2M Hill Northwest, Inc. v. Parktel I, Inc., 107 Or App 461, 812 P2d 840 (1991). Iwould hold that defendants have not shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and would reverse and remand for trial.
I dissent.