Court Opinion

ID: 9911621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 16:03:40.845935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:40.770079
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

             SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA d/b/a
     SEMINOLE HARD ROCK HOTEL & CASINO – HOLLYWOOD,
                        Appellant,

                                     v.

                           JOSEPHINE PUPO,
                               Appellee.

                            No. 4D2023-0437

                           [December 20, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE22-
013372.

  Mark David Schellhase, Jordan S. Kosches, and Emily L. Pineless of
GrayRobinson, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellant.

    Douglas F. Eaton and Daniel R. Schwartz of Eaton & Wolk, PL, Miami,
for appellee.

GROSS, J.

  The Seminole Tribe of Florida (the “Tribe”) appeals an order denying its
motion to dismiss a casino patron’s tort action based on sovereign
immunity. We affirm.

    Appellee, a casino patron (the “patron”), sued the Tribe pursuant to the
2010 Gaming Compact (the “Compact”) between the Tribe and the State of
Florida, authorized by section 285.710, Florida Statutes (2023). Among
other terms, the Compact authorizes the Tribe to operate gambling on
tribal land, creates a limited waiver of tribal immunity, and defines the
procedure and notice requirements for bringing tort claims against the
Tribe.

   Relevant to this case is that the Compact provides generally for a patron
to wait one year to file a tort claim against the Tribe after the patron
provides the requisite written notice. This one-year period anticipates
good faith review and negotiation of the claim among the patron, the Tribe,
and the Tribe’s insurer. Also relevant here is that the patron filed multiple
complaints, the first of which was within the one-year period, giving rise
to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity-based motion to dismiss the action as
premature.

                             The Complaints

   On April 20, 2021, the patron provided the Tribe with a timely written
notice of a premises liability claim. On May 3, 2021, the Tribe responded
and formally acknowledged the claim, giving insurance information.

    In February 2022, the patron filed a complaint in circuit court, but the
following month voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice and without
comment.

   The patron refiled the complaint in September 2022. The Tribe moved
to dismiss the complaint based on sovereign immunity, arguing that the
new lawsuit was barred because the patron prematurely filed the initial
February 2022 suit, before the one-year mandatory wait period expired.
The circuit court denied the Tribe’s motion.

   On appeal, the Tribe contends that the patron’s early filing and
dismissal of the first lawsuit “forever barred” the claim against the Tribe
under the Compact.

                               The Compact

   The parties agree that this case is governed by Part VI, Section D of the
Compact, which creates a limited waiver for patron tort claims at tribal
facilities and defines the procedure for bringing such claims. In pertinent
part, the Compact reads:

      D. Tort remedies for Patrons.

      1. A Patron who claims to have been injured . . . is required to
      provide written notice to the Tribe’s Risk Management
      Department or the Facility, in a reasonable and timely
      manner, but in no event later than three (3) years after the
      date of the incident giving rise to the claimed injury occurs, or
      the claim shall be forever barred.

      2. The Tribe shall have thirty (30) days to respond to a claim
      made by a Patron. If the Tribe fails to respond within thirty
      (30) days, the Patron may file suit against the Tribe. When

                                      2
the Tribe responds to an incident alleged to have caused a
Patron’s injury or illness, the Tribe shall provide a claim form
to the Patron. The form must include the address for the
Tribe’s Risk Management and provide notice of the Tribe’s
administrative procedures for addressing Patron tort claims,
including notice of the relevant deadlines that may bar
such claims if the Tribe’s administrative procedures are
not followed. It is the Patron’s responsibility to complete the
form and forward the form to the Tribe’s Risk Management
Department within a reasonable period of time, and in a
reasonable and timely manner. Nothing herein shall interfere
with any claim a Patron might have arising under the Federal
Tort Claim Act.

3. Upon receiving written notification of the claim, the Tribe’s
Risk Management Department shall forward the notification
to the Tribe’s insurance carrier . . .

4. The insurance carrier will handle the claim to conclusion.
If the Patron and the Tribe and the insurance carrier are not
able to resolve the claim in good faith within one (1) year after
the Patron provided written notice to the Tribe’s Risk
Management Department or the Facility, the Patron may bring
a tort claim against the Tribe. . . . A Patron’s notice of injury
to the Tribe pursuant to Section D.1. of this Part and the
fulfillment of the good faith attempt at resolution
pursuant to Sections D.2. and 4. of this Part are
conditions precedent to filing suit.

5. For tort claims of Patrons made pursuant to Section D. of
this Part, the Tribe agrees to waive its tribal sovereign
immunity to the same extent as the State of Florida waives its
sovereign immunity, as specified in sections 768.28(1) and (5),
Florida Statutes . . .

6. Notices explaining the procedures and time limitations
with respect to making a tort claim shall be prominently
displayed in the Facilities, posted on the Tribe’s website, and
provided to any Patron for whom the Tribe has notice of the
injury or property damage giving rise to the tort claim. Such
notices shall explain the method and places for making a tort
claim, including where the Patron must submit the form, that
the process is the exclusive method for asserting a tort claim
arising under this section against the Tribe, that the Tribe and

                               3
       its insurance carrier have one (1) year from the date the Patron
       gives notice of the claim to resolve the matter and after that
       time the Patron may file suit in a court of competent
       jurisdiction, that the exhaustion of the process is a
       prerequisite to filing a claim in state court, and that claims
       that fail to follow this process shall be forever barred.

(Emphasis supplied).

    We recently issued two opinions outlining the Tribe’s history of
immunity and addressing this Compact, but we decide this case on a point
those decisions expressly declined to reach because of issues involving the
sufficiency of the patron’s notice to trigger the waiver. See Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Webster, 372 So. 3d 287, 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Manzini, 361 So. 3d 883, 887–88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

                                    Discussion

   Even though the patron’s second lawsuit was filed over a year after the
written notice of claim, the Tribe contends that suit was “forever barred”
because the initial February 2022 suit was filed before the mandatory one-
year waiting period had expired.

    The Compact does not provide for such a draconian procedural
mechanism. 1 Section VI.D.1 states that a claim shall be “forever barred”
if a claimant fails to provide a written notice “in a reasonable and timely
manner, but in no event later than three (3) years after the date of the
incident.” That provision does not apply here, because the patron’s written
notice to the Tribe was timely.

   Nor does subsection VI.D.6 come into play. That section merely
describes the required content of notices “explaining the procedures and
time limitations with respect to making a tort claim” which “shall be
prominently displayed in the Facilities, posted on the Tribe’s website, and
provided to any Patron for whom the Tribe has notice of the injury or
property damage giving rise to the tort claim.”

   Section VI.D.4., which creates the one-year waiting period, does not
state that a failure to meet that requirement “forever bars” a claim.

1 Because we decide that the premature filing of the first lawsuit does not bar the

second lawsuit under the terms of the Compact, we do not reach the issue of the
legal effect of the Tribe’s failure to file a proper response to the patron’s notice of
claim.

                                          4
Instead, Section VI.D.4. explains that the pre-suit claim resolution process
is a “condition precedent” to suit. A failure to comply with a condition
precedent to suit typically results in the dismissal of a prematurely-filed
suit, not a “forever” bar unless a statute of limitations or repose would
preclude a newly-filed lawsuit. Here, where the Compact governs, it would
have to clearly state that a premature filing does not invoke the Tribe’s
waiver of its tribal immunity and requires the action be dismissed and
forever barred.

    The Tribe cites several cases for the proposition that a claimant’s failure
to “strictly follow” the terms of an immunity waiver “results in sovereign
immunity not being waived and mandates dismissal.” However, those
cases are distinguishable because they involve procedural defects other
than a premature filing of a lawsuit, such as defective notice, failure to
serve process, or untimely filing. See, e.g., Sampson v. City of Miami
Gardens, No. 13-24312-CIV, 2015 WL 11202372, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 27,
2015) (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs on their state law
claims because they did not strictly adhere to “the notice requirements set
forth in Florida’s sovereign immunity waiver statute” and were “precluded
from correcting their oversight” because “discovery is now closed”)
(emphasis added); Williams v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 957 So. 2d 52, 52 (Fla.
3d DCA 2007) (affirming directed verdict in County’s favor and concluding
that plaintiff’s failure to “prove compliance with the process service
requirements of section 768.28(7)” was “fatal to his action”) (emphasis
added); Aristide v. Jackson Mem’l Hosp., 917 So. 2d 253, 255–56 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2005) (affirming dismissal of complaint and concluding that “the suit
is barred by sovereign immunity, because the suit was clearly filed outside
the statutorily prescribed time limits”).

   The one-year waiting period the Tribe enjoys under the Compact is
comparable to the six-month waiting period that applies under Florida’s
sovereign immunity statute. § 768.28(6)(a), (d), Fla. Stat. (2022) (requiring
that, before instituting an action, the claimant must submit the claim in
writing and receive a written denial, unless the agencies fail to act within
six months, which is deemed a denial). In those cases, prematurity alone
is not fatal to a claim. See Williams v. Henderson, 687 So. 2d 838, 839
(Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (explaining that “failure to wait six months to file suit
after giving notice does not mandate a dismissal”); see also City of Coconut
Creek v. City of Deerfield Beach, 840 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
(cataloging cases involving prematurity relevant to various statutes and
noting that “where a legal action is prematurely taken, though the

                                      5
condition precedent has been met, . . . if the mere passage of time will cure
a defect, the action should be abated, not dismissed”). 2

   Also, where, as here, the plaintiff prematurely files a complaint after
proper notice, but the sovereign immunity waiting period passes before the
court reaches a motion to dismiss on that basis, the defect is generally
considered cured. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. McDaniel, 833 F.2d 1516, 1519
(11th Cir. 1987) (“Although [plaintiff] failed to wait six months to file this
action, more than six months elapsed before the district court finally
disposed of the issue. Since [defendant] was duly notified of [plaintiff’s]
claims and had time to respond, the purpose underlying section 768.28(6)
was adequately served.”).

  Based on the above, the trial court properly concluded that the patron
met the conditions precedent to filing suit.

    Affirmed.

CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                              *         *          *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

2  In City of Coconut Creek, the plaintiff failed to comply with a land planning
statute that required, as a condition precedent to suit, the complaining party to
first file a verified complaint, within a specified time, with the local government
against which the complaint was made. Id. at 391.

                                        6