Court Opinion

ID: 9898900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:05:25.248874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:52.764224
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                    SECOND DISTRICT

              DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

                                 Petitioner,

                                     v.

              MICHELET PIERRE and STATE OF FLORIDA,

                               Respondents.

                               No. 2D23-873

                            November 15, 2023

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Pat
Siracusa, Judge.

Alicia Victoria Gonzalez, Assistant General Counsel, Department of
Children and Families, Tampa, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford
Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent, State of
Florida.

No appearance for Respondent, Michelet Pierre.

SMITH, Judge.
     The Department of Children and Families petitions this court for a
writ of certiorari quashing an order committing Michelet Pierre to the
Department's care and custody after he was found incompetent to
proceed on criminal charges. Because the record is devoid of clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Pierre "will respond to treatment and . . .
will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future,"
Mr. Pierre does not meet the criteria required for involuntary
commitment under section 916.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2022).
Therefore, we grant the Department's petition and quash the order.
     Mr. Pierre was charged with aggravated battery of a law
enforcement officer, aggravated battery, resisting a law enforcement
officer with violence, battery on a law enforcement officer, obstructing or
resisting a law enforcement officer without violence, and battery after an
incident during which Mr. Pierre was running from law enforcement and,
after being struck with a taser, ran into oncoming traffic where he was
hit by a pickup truck. Despite being knocked to the ground, Mr. Pierre
stood back up and began running again from law enforcement.
Ultimately, law enforcement caught up with Mr. Pierre and tackled him.
He was then arrested and taken to the hospital where he continued to be
combative while being treated for head trauma.
     The issue of Mr. Pierre's competency was raised in the proceedings
below, and he was evaluated by two separate mental health experts.
Both experts opined that Mr. Pierre was incompetent to proceed with the
criminal charges. Dr. Ohiana Torrealday first evaluated Mr. Pierre and
opined that he was not competent to proceed or stand trial. While Dr.
Torrealday recommended treatment in a secure residential setting, her
report does not address whether Mr. Pierre can be restored to
competency.1 The second mental health expert who evaluated Mr. Pierre

     1 The Department also argues that the trial court erred in relying

on Dr. Torrealday's evaluation because it was more than six months old
and, therefore, cannot provide evidence to support the trial court's

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was Dr. Valerie McClain. She too opined that Mr. Pierre was not
competent to proceed to trial. Dr. McClain recommended competency
training in a structured, secured psychiatric setting but stated that "[Mr.
Pierre's] prognosis for achieving competency is guarded given his
apparent neurocognitive deficits." Dr. McClain "anticipated that it will be
apparent if he can achieve competency within three months given this
intervention" and recommended that further neurological evaluation was
needed to determine the extent of Mr. Pierre's deficits.
     The trial court relied on both experts' opinions and found that Mr.
Pierre was incompetent to proceed and issued an order of commitment,
placing Mr. Pierre in the custody of the Department. Relying on Dr.
McClain's report, the trial court's order noted that it would be apparent if
Mr. Pierre can achieve competency within three months of the
recommended intervention.
     In seeking certiorari relief, the Department argues that Mr. Pierre
does not meet the statutory requirements of commitment because there
was no evidence presented that Mr. Pierre's "incompetence will respond
to treatment and [he] will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably
foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c). We agree.
     "[T]o obtain a writ of certiorari, there must exist '(1) a departure
from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material
injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on
postjudgment appeal.' " In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So. 2d 453, 455

finding that Mr. Pierre was presently incompetent to proceed. See In re
Commitment of Reilly, 970 So. 2d 453, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Because
we grant the petition on the basis that Mr. Pierre does not meet the
criteria required for involuntary commitment under section 916.13, we
decline to comment on the issue of whether Dr. Torrealday's evaluation
of Mr. Pierre could support the trial court's finding of incompetence.

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(Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood
Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004)). "As a general rule,
certiorari is the proper vehicle for seeking this court's review of orders
committing an individual involuntarily." Id.; see also Dep't of Child. &
Fam. Servs. v. Amaya, 10 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
("Certiorari jurisdiction lies to review [the Department's] claim that the
trial court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction by ordering [the
Department] to undertake responsibilities beyond what is required by
statute.").
      For the trial court to involuntarily commit a defendant to the
Department's custody, the defendant must meet the statutory criteria for
involuntary commitment. § 916.13(2) ("A defendant who has been
charged with a felony and who has been adjudicated incompetent to
proceed due to mental illness, and who meets the criteria for involuntary
commitment under this chapter, may be committed to the department,
and the department shall retain and treat the defendant."); see also Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(3). Listed among the statutory criteria, and relevant
here, is the requirement that the trial court find by clear and convincing
evidence that "[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental illness
causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the
defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably
foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c) (emphasis added). "[A] finding that [a
defendant] 'might' be restored to competency . . . does [not] satisfy the
statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence that there be a
'substantial probability' that the [defendant] will regain competency in
the foreseeable future." Horton v. Judd, 80 So. 3d 439, 440 (Fla. 2d DCA
2012).

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     The record in this case is void of any evidence that Mr. Pierre's
"incompetence will respond to treatment" or that he "will regain
competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." See
§ 916.13(1)(c). Dr. Torrealday's evaluation does not address whether Mr.
Pierre can be restored to competency. And Dr. McClain's evaluation
gives only a qualified opinion stating that Mr. Pierre's "prognosis for
achieving competency is guarded" and that "[i]t is anticipated that it will
be apparent if he can achieve competency within three months given [the
recommended] intervention." Therefore, Mr. Pierre failed to meet the
statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, and the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of the law by ordering Mr.
Pierre's commitment to the Department. See Dep't of Child. & Fams. v.
Botes, 355 So. 3d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (holding the trial court
erred in ordering involuntary commitment where there was no evidence
that the defendant could be restored to competency); Dep't of Child. &
Fams. v. Musa, 321 So. 3d 908, 910-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (concluding
that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in
finding the defendant would regain competency to proceed in the
reasonably foreseeable future where there was no evidence presented to
support this finding, and, thus, the defendant did not meet the criteria
for commitment); Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. Barnett, 124 So. 3d 430,
433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that a defendant that is not restorable
to competency does not satisfy the requirements for involuntary
commitment under section 916.13(1)(c)); Oren v. Judd, 940 So. 2d 1271,
1273-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (same); Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. Garcia,
245 So. 3d 919, 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("[T]he trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ordered the department to involuntarily commit

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Garcia after he was found incompetent without evidence that he met the
criteria under section 916.13(1)(c).").
      In its response to the petition, the State asks this court to provide
additional guidance and "issue a ruling which would allow the State a
finite period of time to conclusively determine, in a secure setting, the
viability of restoring [Mr.] Pierre to competency." This request reaches
beyond the scope of this court's authority, and we decline to entertain
the request, although we recognize that the options left to the State are
less than ideal when a defendant is deemed incompetent but there is no
clear and convincing evidence as to when or if that defendant will regain
competency—especially in cases like this where the possibility that the
defendant may regain competency is not completely foreclosed.
      However, the law clearly dictates that in situations like the one
before us "the State must either institute civil commitment proceedings
or release that defendant." Schofield v. Judd, 268 So. 3d 890, 900 (Fla.
2d DCA 2019) (citing Oren, 940 So. 2d at 1273-74); see also Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (explaining that where a defendant is
incompetent and will not "attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future . . . the State must either institute the customary civil
commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely
any other citizen, or release the defendant"); Bronson v. State, 89 So. 3d
1089, 1090 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) ("According to the medical evidence,
there is little chance that [p]etitioner will be restored to competency due
to his cognitive deficits resulting from his stroke; therefore, he must be
civilly committed or released from custody." (first citing Roddenberry v.
State, 898 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); then citing Oren, 940
So. 2d 1271; and then citing Mosher v. State, 876 So. 2d 1230, 1230 (Fla.
5th DCA 2012))); Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. Gilliland, 947 So. 2d 1262,

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1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (granting certiorari relief where the defendant
suffered from dementia and the medical testimony revealed little to no
possibility that competency would be restored and explaining that the
State's options were to either institute a civil commitment proceeding or
release the defendant).
     We explained our judicial constraints in Barnett:
     While we certainly sympathize with the trial court's
     frustrations and unwillingness to contribute to potential
     chaos, we note that the rule of law simply does not permit a
     trial court to fashion its own remedy in derogation of
     statutory limitations, and good intentions cannot expand the
     trial court's power in this regard. It is up to the legislature—
     not the trial court or this court—to close any gaps that may
     exist in the statutory scheme and to address the inadequacies
     of the existing law when applied to facts such as these.
124 So. 3d at 433.
     Because there was no clear and convincing evidence that Mr.
Pierre's condition will respond to treatment or that he will regain
competency in the reasonably foreseeable future, Mr. Pierre failed to
meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. For this reason, his
commitment was not authorized by section 916.13, and the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of the law when it ordered that
Mr. Pierre be committed to the Department.
     Petition for writ of certiorari granted; order of commitment
quashed.

SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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