Court Opinion

ID: 9849366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:39:01.428681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:19.599334
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the lower court.
Our guest statute was enacted by the legislature in 1930. It is an exact copy of one enacted by the legislature of Connecticut in 1927. See Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S. C. 286, 181 S. E. 30 (1935). In Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 50 S. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed. 221 (1929), the United States Supreme Court held the Connecticut statute constitutional. In Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U. S. 810, 95 S. Ct. 24, 42 L. Ed. (2d) 37 (1974), the same Court summarily affirmed the Utah Supreme Count’s decision upholding its guest statute. This court is bound, as to the federal Constitution, by the ruling implicit in the summary dismissal. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 2281, 45 L. Ed. (2d) 223 (1975). I would hold that the statute does not violate the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Article I, § 3 of the Constitution of South Carolina reads as follows:
“§ 3. Privileges and immunities; due process; equal protection of laws.
“The privileges and immunities of citizens of this State and of the United States under this Constitution shall not *687be abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
While the federal cases do not dispose of the equal protection claim under the South Carolina Constitution, they are entitled to much weight. See In Re Hearing Before Joint Legislative Committee, 187 S. C. 1, 196 S. E. 164, 118 A. L. R. 591 (1938).
The motion in this case, and the appeal before us, was apparently inspired by our recent holding in Marley.1 While this case is of interest and is of some persuasion, it is not controlling because of the factual differences.
The issue is basically one of classification. The fundamental tenets regarding equal protection are easily enunciated but, quite often, difficult to apply. Clearly, equal protection does not forbid discrimination with respect to groups that are situated differently. 16 Am. Jur. (2d) Constitutional Law § 488. A legislative classification should be (1) reasonable in light of the purpose of the legislation; (2) based on proper distinctions considering its purpose, and (3) not arbitrary or a subterfuge to unduly burden or oppress a particular group. 16 Am. Jur. (2d) Constitutional Law § 494. The legislature enjoys wide discretion in enacting laws which establish classifications. A classification in a statute should be upheld if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457, 77 S. Ct. 1344, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 1485 (1957). The burden of showing that a statute does not rest upon any reasonable basis is upon the one who attacks it, in this case the plaintiff.
In University of South Carolina v. Mehlman, 245 S. C. 180, 139 S. E. (2d) 771 (1964), this court reiterated a rule firmly established in this state:
“We are called upon to pass upon the constitutionality of an Act passed by the General Assembly. In determining this *688question, it is a well settled rule in this State that a statute will, if possible, be construed so as to render it valid; that a legislative Act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt; that every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; that it will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution; that all reasonable presumptions must be made in favor of the validity of the Act; and that the Constitution of South Carolina is a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, legislative powers. Clarke v. South Carolina Public, Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E. 481; Nolletti v. Nolletti, 243 S. C. 20, 132 S. E. (2d) 11.”
I would decline to hold that this statute, in existence for almost 50 years and heretofore uncontested, is repugnant to our constitution beyond a reasonable doubt. There is involved a policy consideration which the legislature had the right to determine.
Actions in tort basically involve a breach of duty. The duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff depends in large part upon the relationship existing between the two. The relationship between the driver of a motor vehicle and a pedestrian is different from the relationship between the driver of a motor vehicle and a nonpaying guest. The relationship between the driver of a motor vehicle and a paying guest is also different. The legislature was entitled to consider the relationship between a driver and a nonpaying passenger in enacting the legislation here involved. Classification is primarily for the legislature, and the courts should not interfere unless classification is clearly unreasonable.
I agree with the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Silver,2 wherein it said, *689“There is inherent justice in the requirement that one who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitously should not be under the same measure of obligation as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay, and the reason for a distinction between the measure of liability in the case of a gratuitous bailment and gratuitous transportation is not obvious. It seems to us that the Legislature was acting well within the limits of the police power in making a distinction between the degree of care to be exercised by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle toward a guest and that to be exercised toward one who pays for his transportation.”
The duty owed a guest in various situations has always been slightly different from the duty owed to others. A landowner owes one duty to an invitee, but another duty to a licensee. Guests in airplanes are held to the same burden of proof as guests in automobiles. Cole § 55-1-10.
The constitutional guarantee does not prevent classification, but requires that classification shall be reasonable, not arbitrary, and that it shall rest upon distinctions having a fair and substantial relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation.
This statute was enacted at a time when motor vehicles were coming into popular use by the great mass of people. Such use brought into existence a problem with which the legislature was entitled to deal. The statute, until this case, has remained constitutionally unchallenged before this court. The legislature has apparently been satisfied that the statute properly adjusts the rights of motor vehicle drivers and non-paying guests..
I would hold that the South Carolina Guest Statute does not violate the equal protection clause of either the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of South Carolina.
Rhodes, J., concurs.

 Cited in majority opinon.

Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240 (1928).