Court Opinion

ID: 9418618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:34:12.04396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:07.132044
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
The first count charges an unlawful purchase of 3.4 grains of morphine. The second charges unlawful sales. Defendant was convicted on both and sentenced to the penitentiary for fourteen months on each, the terms to run concurrently. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on both counts. Here the Government rightly says that the conviction on the second count should not be sustained. This Court accepts that view and, as to that count, petitioner is entitled to hake the judgment reversed.
The indictment is under § 1 of the Harrison Narcotic Act of December 7, 1914, c. 1, 38 Stat. 785, as amended *426February 24, 1919, e. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131. It was enacted under Art. 1, § 8 of the Constitution granting to Congress power to lay and collect taxes. The words of the section under which the first count was found are:
“ It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase . . . any of the aforesaid drugs except jin ... or from the original stamped package ....”'
The essential substance of the first count follows:
Thomas J. Casey on the 31st day of December, 1925, at Seattle, Washington, did unlawfully purchase from a person unknown, and not in or from the original stamped package 3.4 grains of morphine.
By far the larger part of the testimony heard related to the second count and was not admissible to prove the purchase alleged in the first. That evidence can not fairly be brought forward now to sustain conviction on the first count.
Mere purchase or possession of morphine is not crime. Congress has not attempted, and has no power, to make either an offense. The gist of accusation is purchase of 3.4 grains of morphine that was not in or taken from a stamped package when delivered to defendant. That is the corpus delicti.
There was testimony sufficient to sustain a finding that defendant at the time and place specified, had possession of 3.4 grains of morphine. But there was no evidence to show how, when or where or from whom he got it. There is much difference between such a possession and the crime charged. A statutory provision is invoked in lieu of evidence to bridge this gap. It is found in the twelfth paragraph of the section; and, in order to show the immediate environment of the words relied on, the first three clauses of the paragraph are.quoted.
“ It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute any of the aforesaid drugs except *427in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the person in whose possession same may be found; and the possession of any original stamped package containing any of the aforesaid drugs by any person who has riot registered and paid special taxes as required by this section shall be prima facie evidence of liability to such special tax: ”
- This section defines many offenses. They include purchasing, selling, dispensing, distributing, importing, manufacturing, producing, compounding, dealing in, administering and giving away of each of the numerous drugs mentioned in the section. The things forbidden are not alike. Some are essentially different from and inconsistent with the others. It can not reasonably be said that mere possession of 3.4 grains of morphine without a stamp thereon was sufficient to establish prima facie that defendant was guilty of all these crimes, or all that related to morphine or even to those respectively involving manufacture, sale and purchase of the 3.4 grains. There is no more reason to select one of these than there is to choose another for the application of the statutory rule of evidence.
The “ absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps cannot be said to make out dissimilar and inconsistent offenses. Tax-paid stamps are significant to show payment of taxes and their absence under some circumstances properly may be evidence of non-payment. According to its words, the clause in question merely makes such absence “prima facie evidence of a violation of this section,” the clause following malees possession of an original stamped package containing the drug by one not registered, evidence of liability for a tax. Fairly considered both clauses have to do with tax liability. The first to the tax on the drug, and the second to the tax imposed on importers, dealers, *428physicians, etc. That construction would be reasonable and would not stretch the law against those accused of the crimes created by the section.
And it is always to' be remembered that this Act is to be construed as a measure to “ lay and collect taxes.” It has no other legal existence. The tax is one cent on each ounce or fractional part thereof. Defendant had 3.4 grains without a stamp on it. He is not accused of failure to pay a tax. The unlawful purchase charged is punishable by a fine of not more than $2,000 or by imprisonment of not more than five years or by both. U. S. C., Tit. 26, § 705. The only legal justification for such penalties is that they are calculated to aid collection of taxes. It is hard to continue to say that this Act is a taxing measure in order to sustain it. Eagerness to use federal law as a police measure to combat the opium habit — a purpose for which Congress has no power to legislate — should not lead to the enactment or the construction of laws that shock common sense.
And above all, the statutory rule of evidence should be construed.having regard to the ancient and salutary doctrine known and rightly cherished as fair play by the people, the bar and the courts of this country, that every person on trial for crime is presumed to be innocent; and, that in order to convict him, the evidence must satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime charged. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 453. Cochrane and Sayre v. United States, 157 U. S. 286, 298. Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469. The connection, -if any, between the possession shown and the substance of the offense charged is too remote. Attention has not been called to any decision that goes so far. None can be found.
*429There is no evidence in the record that reasonably tends to show that defendant purchased the 3.4 grains of morphine or that, when purchased, it was not in or taken from the original stamped package.
I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed.