Court Opinion

ID: 9582402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:26:18.620199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:45.545856
License: Public Domain

KONDUROS, J.
I respectfully dissent. The majority finds Smith actually litigated the issue of contract damages at the first trial. Because the trial court was considering this case at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, I disagree. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP. For summary judgment purposes, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001). Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, a court should cautiously invoke it so it will not improperly deprive a party of a trial of the disputed factual issues. *559Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 112, 410 S.E.2d 537, 543 (1991).
A party asserting the defense of collateral estoppel has the burden of proving all of the elements, including whether the issue was actually litigated. See Carrigg v. Cannon, 347 S.C. 75, 80, 552 S.E.2d 767, 770 (Ct.App.2001) (quoting Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363, 371, 315 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ct.App.1984)) (“The party asserting collateral estoppel ‘must show that the issue was actually litigated and directly determined in the prior action and that the matter or fact directly in issue was necessary to support the first judgment.’ ”). Here, SCDOT had the burden of showing the issue of contract damages was actually litigated. Because the case was at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the trial court was looking to see if SCDOT presented any evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the issue of contract damages was litigated. Carolina Renewal, the nonmoving party, only needed to submit a scintilla of evidence warranting determination by a jury for summary judgment to be denied. See Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009) (clarifying and reaffirming in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the nonmoving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment). Despite the fact Smith owned all of the shares of Carolina Renewal, he could not have brought the cause of action for breach of contract individually because he was not a party to the contract.5 While the first case included testimony regarding the contract,- the jury was not asked to examine the terms of the contract or whether SCDOT’s actions were a breach of the terms. In fact, Smith did not move to admit the contract into evidence; SCDOT did. SCDOT did not demonstrate the complaint in the first case was amended to include the breach of contract action, nor point to anywhere in the record from the first case that the parties agreed to try the *560breach of contract action. Additionally, the verdict in the first case was a general verdict, which made determining whether the jury decided the breach of contract issue impossible. I believe all of this amounted to at least a mere scintilla of evidence the contract damages were not litigated. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

. I do not disagree with the majority that mutuality of parties is no longer a requirement for collateral estoppel. However, I do believe the fact that Smith could not have individually brought the breach of contract action is one of several factors that raised a material question of fact as to whether breach of contract damages were actually litigated.