Court Opinion

ID: 9960936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:08:41.277808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:03.307430
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41032

VALENTINA E. WALKER n/k/a
VALENTINA E. BASILE,

      Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH C. WALKER,

      Respondent-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Debra Ramirez, District Court Judge

Law Office of Augustine M. Rodriguez, LLC
Augustine M. Rodriguez
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Durham, Pittard & Spalding, LLP
Caren I. Friedman
Philip M. Kovnat
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1}    Petitioner Valentina E. Walker n/k/a Valentina E. Basile, appeals the district
court’s final order on Respondent Joseph C. Walker’s objections to the hearing officer’s
child support modification award. The hearing officer reached its modified child support
award based in part on a calculation that included the cost of sending the parties two
minor children to private school. Sending children to private school was not the status
quo and was Petitioner’s unilateral decision. In its order, the district court held that any
cost or expense for sending children to private school is Petitioner’s responsibility and
that those costs and fees would “not be considered on any child support worksheet.”
The district court’s order also held that Petitioner would have to reimburse Respondent
for a series of child support overpayments. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

{2}    Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the
lengthy procedural history and facts on appeal, we discuss the facts only as they
become necessary to our analysis.

{3}     On appeal, Petitioner argues the district court (1) erred because it had previously
ruled that Respondent would not be reimbursed for overpayments; (2) misstated the law
of apportionment regarding private school costs by failing to consider “substantial
hardship” to Respondent, as well as “any extraordinary educational expenses for
children of parties,” see NMSA 1978, §§ 40-4-11.2 (2021, amended 2023); 11.1(K)(2)
(2021, amended 2023);1 (3) erred by failing to rule on the issue of whether Petitioner
would be reimbursed for the credit Respondent received by failing to provide medical
insurance to the children; and (4) deprived Petitioner of due process by holding a
hearing when she was on active duty with the U.S. Air Force. Respondent declined to
file an answer brief. See Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005-NMCA-098, ¶ 39, 138 N.M. 113,
117 P.3d 919 (“[A]n appellee does not . . . have to file a brief, and the appellate court
will review the case in accordance with the same favorable view of the proceedings
below.”).

{4}     Child support determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jury v. Jury,
2017-NMCA-036, ¶ 26, 392 P.3d 242. “The [district] court’s discretion, however, must
be exercised in accordance with the child support guidelines.” Styka v. Styka, 1999-
NMCA-002, ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 515, 972 P.2d 16. “The [district] court abuses discretion when
it applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is
premised on a misapprehension of the law.” Klinksiek v. Klinkseik, 2005-NMCA-008,
¶ 4, 136 N.M. 693, 104 P.3d 559 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted). “In determining whether a deviation from the child support guidelines resulted
from a misapprehension of law, we apply de novo review.” Jury, 2017-NMCA-036, ¶ 26.

{5}    We begin with Petitioner’s argument that the district court erred by holding that
Respondent was entitled to reimbursement for past child support overpayments
because it had previously orally ruled that Respondent would not be reimbursed.
Petitioner claims that the district court held that Respondent would not receive
reimbursement during a presentment hearing when it stated, “I understand why
[Respondent] would want consideration for an overpayment. I would suggest that that’s
not a good . . . I would suggest that is absolutely unnecessary.” However, following a
subsequent presentment hearing, the district court held that Respondent would receive

1All references to Sections 40-4-11.2 and 40-4-11.1(K)(2) noted in this opinion are to the 2021 versions
of the statutes, which were in effect when this case was decided.
reimbursement for his overpayments, which totaled $7,864.54. Petitioner states that the
entire final order should be set aside based on the district courts oral statement
suggesting that reimbursement was unnecessary. We disagree and explain.

{6}      “Formal written orders filed of record normally supersede oral rulings, and oral
rulings cannot normally be used to contradict written orders.” Enriquez v. Cochran,
1998-NMCA-157, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 196, 967 P.2d 1136; see also Smith v. Love, 1984-
NMSC-061, ¶ 4, 101 N.M. 355, 683 P.2d 37 (noting that the district court may change
its ruling “anytime before the entry of the final judgment”). Here, prior to issuing the final
order, the district court heard additional evidence at a subsequent presentment hearing
during which Respondent showed that he had been paying $462.62 monthly for health
insurance, which had not been deducted from his child support payments for seventeen
months. Given this evidence, the district court clarified that Respondent should, in fact,
receive reimbursement for his overpayments. See Boutz v. Donaldson, 1999-NMCA-
131, ¶ 8, 128 N.M. 232, 991 P.2d 517 (“[A] reviewing court will make all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the judgment below.”). Based on the forgoing,
we affirm the district court because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate error in the face
of our clear case law regarding the district court’s discretion to issue a written order that
differs from an oral ruling.

{7}     Petitioner’s second argument concerns the district court’s determination that
“sole legal custody does not provide [Petitioner] the ability to hold [Respondent]
financially responsible” for sending the children to private school. Petitioner claims that
Respondent bore the burden of proving that “contributing to the costs of the private
school would be a substantial hardship to him” before the district court could reach this
conclusion. We disagree—Petitioner misconstrues the burdens of the parties. Here,
Petitioner requested the deviation from the child support guidelines to include the costs
of private school tuition. As such, she carried the burden to justify the requested
change. See Jury, 2017-NMCA-036, ¶ 37 (“[A] petitioner must demonstrate a
substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the children to justify a
modification.”); see also NMSA 1978, § 40-4-11.4(A) (2021) (providing that “[a] court
may modify a child support obligation upon a showing of material and substantial
changes in circumstances subsequent to the adjudication of the pre-existing order”).

{8}    In addition, we do not read the permissive language of Section 40-4-11.2 to
require a party to demonstrate substantial hardship to justify deviating from the child
support guidelines. See id. (“Circumstances creating a substantial hardship in the
obligor, obligee or subject children may justify a deviation upward or downward from the
amount that would otherwise be payable under the guidelines and basic child support
schedule.” (emphasis added)). “The word ‘may’ is permissive, and is not the equivalent
of ‘shall,’ which is mandatory.” Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
2004-NMCA-096, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167; cf. Pederson v. Pederson, 2000-
NMCA-042, ¶ 4, 129 N.M. 56, 1 P.3d 974 (noting that “the Supreme Court’s use
of may, rather than shall, was intended to underscore the [district] court’s discretion in
allocating social security benefits payable directly to the child”). We therefore decline to
hold that Respondent had to prove substantial hardship to refute a potential change in
child support.

{9}      Petitioner additionally argues that the district court misconstrued the law upon
concluding that Respondent did not have to pay for the children’s private school tuition
because child support guidelines mandate consideration of “extraordinary educational
expenses” under Section 40-4-11.1(K)(2). Neither the statute nor our case law support
Petitioner’s claim. See Styka, 1999-NMCA-002, ¶ 42 (noting that the use of the word
“may” in Section 40-4-11.1(K) indicates that the district court has discretion to decide
whether to include the costs of private school as “extraordinary educational expenses”
in the child support worksheet). Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not
err in its application of Sections 40-4-11.1(K)(2) or -11.2.

{10} We next consider Petitioner’s third argument—that the district court failed to rule
on the issue of whether she would be reimbursed for medical insurance expenses.
Petitioner filed a motion for summary and declaratory judgment that included a request
for reimbursement for medical insurance expenses. Several months later, the parties
entered a stipulated order in which Petitioner withdrew her motion for summary and
declaratory judgment. Having withdrawn her claim, we hold that Petitioner cannot now
complain that the district court did not rule on this issue. See Chris L. v. Vanessa O.,
2013-NMCA-107, ¶ 27, 320 P.3d 16 (“Invited error occurs where a party has
contributed, at least in part, to perceived shortcomings in a [district] court’s ruling, and,
as a result, the party should hardly be heard to complain about these shortcomings on
appeal.” (alteration, omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

{11} We thus turn to Petitioner’s fourth and final argument. Petitioner claims that the
district court deprived her of due process by conducting a hearing while she was on
active duty with the U.S. Air Force and delaying in issuing a final order. Petitioner claims
that the U.S. Code, specifically 50 U.S.C. § 3938 (Child custody protection), “requires
that legal proceedings be stayed pending return from military deployment.” Section
3938 states,

       (a)    Duration of temporary custody order based on certain deployments

              If a court renders a temporary order for custodial responsibility for a
       child based solely on a deployment or anticipated deployment of a parent
       who is a servicemember, the court shall require that the temporary order
       shall expire not later than the period justified by the deployment of the
       servicemember.

       (b)   Limitation on consideration of member’s deployment in
       determination of child’s best interest

              If a motion or a petition is filed seeking a permanent order to modify
       the custody of the child of a servicemember, no court may consider the
       absence of the servicemember by reason of deployment, or the possibility
      of deployment, as the sole factor in determining the best interest of the
      child.

      (c)    No Federal jurisdiction or right of action or removal

            Nothing in this section shall create a Federal right of action or
      otherwise give rise to Federal jurisdiction or create a right of removal.

      (d)    Preemption

             In any case where State law applicable to a child custody
      proceeding involving a temporary order as contemplated in this section
      provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent who is a
      deploying servicemember than the rights provided under this section with
      respect to such temporary order, the appropriate court shall apply the
      higher State standard.

      (e)    Deployment defined

             In this section, the term “deployment” means the movement or
      mobilization of a servicemember to a location for a period of longer than
      60 days and not longer than 540 days pursuant to temporary or
      permanent official orders

             (1)    that are designated as unaccompanied;

             (2)    for which dependent travel is not authorized; or

             (3) that otherwise do not permit the movement of family
             members to that location.

{12} No portion of this statute supports Petitioner’s claim that it requires proceedings
be stayed during military deployment. See State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t v.
Douglas B., 2023-NMSC-028, ¶ 13, 539 P.3d 294 (noting that when interpreting the
U.S. Code, “we look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their
ordinary meaning” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We further note that
§ 3938 only pertains to child custody disputes—not child support, which was at issue at
the emergency hearing that occurred when Petitioner was deployed.

{13} Additionally, we note that at the emergency hearing, which Respondent had
requested to prevent the children from attending private school, Petitioner’s counsel
motioned for a continuance until she returned. The district court denied the motion
because Petitioner was able to attend the hearing telephonically. As such, Petitioner
has failed to demonstrate prejudice arising from her physical absence at the emergency
hearing—she attended telephonically and had an opportunity to respond to
Respondent’s request to prevent the children from attending private school.
{14} Finally, Petitioner argues that the district court denied her due process by failing
to issue a final order until a year-and-a-half after the evidentiary hearing. However,
Petitioner has not offered any authority to support her argument, and the argument is
undeveloped—Petitioner fails to explain how she was prejudiced beyond her general
claim. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329
(“We assume where arguments in briefs are unsupported by cited authority, counsel
after diligent search, was unable to find any supporting authority.”); Headley v. Morgan
Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review
unclear arguments.”). We therefore conclude that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate
reversible error.

CONCLUSION

{15}   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{16}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, Sitting by designation