Court Opinion

ID: 9854491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:08:20.068371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:06.928133
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom JUSTICE STEPHENSON joins,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the following exclusionary language is clear and unambiguous: “We do not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of the past or present business pursuits of an insured person.” There is no dispute that the insured’s day-care activities were “business pursuits” within the meaning of the foregoing sentence. From this plain language, no coverage was afforded to this insured, who was caring for the child in the course of the insured’s business at the time of the injury.
When the following policy language is considered, the exclusion becomes even clearer. “We do cover . . . the incidental business activities of any insured person for babysitting, caddying, lawn care, newspaper delivery, and other similar activities.” Clearly, “incidental” babysitting activities are covered, not full-time childcare activities like those conducted by this insured. As we recently said in another insurance case, the term “incidental” means “subordinate” and “nonessential.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Glick, 240 Va. 283, 288, 397 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1990). There is nothing “subordinate” or “nonessential” about babysitting performed in the course of an established, child-care business.
Accordingly, because there is no ambiguity on the face of the provisions in issue, they should be interpreted in accordance with their plain language; the agreement should not be rewritten by this Court. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wenger, 222 Va. 263, 268, 278 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1981). Thus, I would affirm the judgment below.