Court Opinion

ID: 2964824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:41.758085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:34.556446
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1838

                                     GARY WHITE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               ROBERT GITTENS, ET AL.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Douglas W. Salvesen with whom Yurko & Perry, P.C. was on brief
            ___________________           ___________________
        for appellant.
            Gregory I. Massing, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Scott
            __________________                                        _____
        Harshbarger, Attorney General, was on brief for appellee.
        ___________

                                 ____________________

                                   August 21, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit  Judge.  The Massachusetts
                                _____________________

            Parole Board revoked Gary White's parole based on information

            from  state social service  authorities alleging that  he had

            molested  his  step-daughter.    White  was  not  offered  or

            furnished with counsel at his parole revocation hearing.   He

            brought this  action under  42 U.S.C.    1983 in  the federal

            district court against the former and current  members of the

            Massachusetts Parole Board, asserting  that they had deprived

            him of his  constitutional due process  rights by failing  to

            adopt regulations providing for the appointment of counsel at

            parole revocation hearings  and by not furnishing  counsel in

            his case.  The district court dismissed, holding that White's

              1983 action was  barred by res judicata and that the parole

            board  members were protected by qualified immunity.  Because

            of events which occurred after the district court's decision,

            we vacate the district court's order and remand with an order

            to dismiss the action without prejudice.

                                    I.  Background
                                    ______________

                      We describe the  facts in the light  most favorable

            to White.   See Watterson  v. Page, 987  F.2d 1, 3  (1st Cir.
                        ___ _________     ____

            1993)  (on motion  to dismiss, a  court takes  allegations in

            complaint  as true  and makes  all  reasonable inferences  in

            plaintiff's favor).

                      Gary White was  convicted of armed robbery  in 1987

            and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.   He was paroled

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            on  September 19,  1989.   While  paroled, White  married his

            current wife, Gina  White, and began living with  her and her

            three children, Melany (age 3), Matthew (age 4), and  Marlene

            (age 5).

                      In 1990,  Melany's behavior  changed,  and she  was

            evaluated  to  determine  if she  had  been  sexually abused.

            Melany met  with an evaluator once a week for six weeks, with

            Gina  White present  at  each meeting.    The evaluation  was

            inconclusive,  and  Melany's  physician  could not  find  any

            evidence of sexual contact.  Nevertheless,  the Massachusetts

            Department  of  Social  Services  ("DSS")  removed  the three

            children from the Whites' home  on April 25, 1990, and placed

            them in foster care.  

                      The  DSS filed  a report  alleging  that White  was

            sexually abusing his  step-children and sent  a copy of  this

            report  to  the Plymouth  County District  Attorney's office.

            The  district attorney's office did not bring charges against

            White.

                      When  in July  of 1992  DSS  offered to  permit the

            children to return to their mother if White moved out  of the

            house, White  informed his parole officer of  the DSS's abuse

            report and  of the  agency's request that  he move.   White's

            parole officer thereupon  notified White  that a  preliminary

            parole  revocation hearing  would be  held  on September  10,

            1992.          After the preliminary  hearing, a final parole

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                                          3

            revocation hearing was held on November 19, 1992.  Throughout

            the proceedings, White maintained he had not abused his step-

            children.  White was not represented by counsel, being unable

            to afford  a private attorney,  and the parole board  did not

            offer to  provide White with  appointed counsel.   The parole

            board  voted to  revoke White's  parole and  returned  him to

            prison.

                      On March 29, 1995,  White filed an action     which

            he  labeled  a   petition  for  habeas   corpus      in   the

            Massachusetts Superior  Court, challenging the  revocation of

            his  parole on  several  grounds.   On  April  21, 1995,  the

            Superior Court ruled that White  was entitled to a new parole

            revocation hearing within sixty days because the parole board

            had violated its own regulations by failing to  provide White

            with a copy of the DSS report.  White v. Bissonnette, No. 95-
                                            _____    ___________

            1729-C,  slip. op.  at 4  (Mass. Dist.  Ct. April  21, 1995),

            vacated as moot, 667 N.E.2d 920 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), review
            _______________                                        ______

            denied,  674  N.E.2d 1085  (Mass.  1996).   Citing  Gagnon v.
            ______                                              ______

            Scarpelli,  411 U.S.  778 (1973), the  Massachusetts Superior
            _________

            Court also held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

            Amendment  required the parole  board to appoint  counsel for

            White at the  new hearing if the board  determined that White

            was indigent.  Id. at 6. 
                           ___

                      Although White had styled his state court action as

            one  for habeas  corpus  relief, the  Massachusetts  Superior

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            Court,  citing Massachusetts  Parole  Bd.  v. Brusgulis,  532
                           __________________________     _________

            N.E.2d 45 (Mass.  1989), held that the suit  was actually for

            declaratory relief because, if his suit was successful, White

            would not  be freed  altogether but  would instead  return to

            parole.  Bissonnette, slip op. at 6.
                     ___________

                      The parole board appealed from the Superior Court's

            order that  the board provide  White with counsel at  the new

            hearing.   White appealed  from the Superior  Court's holding

            that his action  should be regarded  as one for  declaratory,

            not  habeas corpus, relief.  Before the parole board provided

            White with a new hearing, White's sentence expired and he was

            released  from prison.    The  parole  board then  moved  for

            voluntary dismissal of  its appeal.  This  motion was allowed

            on  July 27,  1995.    On July  22,  1996, the  Massachusetts

            Appeals Court  ordered the  Superior Court's  judgment to  be

            vacated  because the matter  had become  moot when  White was

            released from prison, and  remanded the case to the  Superior

            Court  with a  direction to  dismiss  the action.   White  v.
                                                                _____

            Massachusetts  Parole Bd.,  667 N.E.2d  920  (Mass. App.  Ct.
            _________________________

            1996),  review denied,  674 N.E.2d  1085 (Mass.  1996).1   On
                    _____________

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The appeals court's order stated, "The judgment is
            vacated, not on the merits but because the case has become
            moot, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court with
            directions to dismiss the action."  White, 667 N.E. 2d at
                                                _____
            920.  Although the appeals court issued its order after the
            district court had rendered the judgment in the case below,
            and there is therefore nothing in the record evidencing the
            state appeals court's actions, we may take judicial notice of
            published state court dispositions of cases.  See Lamar v.
                                                          ___ _____

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                                          5

            motion  for rehearing, the  state appeals court  affirmed its

            original order, and the Massachusetts  Supreme Judicial Court

            denied  White's  application  for  further  review, White  v.
                                                                _____

            Massachusetts Parole Bd., 674 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1996).
            ________________________

                      On  February 11, 1996, after the Superior Court had

            ordered  a new  parole  revocation  hearing  but  before  the

            Massachusetts Appeals Court had ruled that the proceeding was

            moot,  White filed  the present  complaint under 42  U.S.C.  

            1983 in the United States  District Court for the District of

            Massachusetts against the  current and former members  of the

            Massachusetts Parole  Board.  White's  complaint alleged that

            the  defendants had  violated his constitutional  due process

            rights by neglecting to establish procedures for when counsel

            should  be   appointed  for   persons  facing   final  parole

            revocation hearings.   He claimed that  the parole board  had

            also  violated  his  constitutional  due  process  rights  by

            failing to  provide him with  appointed counsel at  his final

            parole revocation hearing.    White     requested    monetary

            damages   from  the  former  parole  board  members  for  the

                                
            ____________________

            Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885) ("The law of any State of the
            _____
            Union, whether depending upon statutes or upon judicial
            opinions, is a matter of which the courts of the United
            States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or
            proof."); Retired Chicago Police Association v. City of
                      __________________________________    _______
            Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 609 n.30 (7th Cir. 1993) ("This court
            _______
            can take judicial notice of the decisions of federal and
            state courts."); Parente v. Town of West Warwick, 868 F.2d
                             _______    ____________________
            522, 523 (1st Cir. 1989) (taking judicial notice of a state
            court's opinion).  See generally Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 
                               _____________

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                                          6

            violation  of  his  rights.   He  also  requested declaratory

            relief against the parole board's current members, asking for

            a declaratory judgment stating that his parole revocation was

            unconstitutional and therefore void and stating that a person

            facing  a parole revocation "is entitled to appointed counsel

            on a  case-by-case basis  and that  appointed counsel  should

            presumptively be provided where the parolee claims he did not

            commit  the alleged violation."  White further requested that

            the parole revocation be expunged from his records.

                      On  June 11, 1996,  the district court  allowed the

            defendants' motion  to dismiss  both because  the action  was

            barred  by res  judicata  and  because  the  defendants  were

            protected  by  qualified  immunity.     The  district   court

            expressed doubt as  to whether the defendants  were sheltered

            by absolute immunity.  White then brought this appeal.

                       II.  Cognizability of the   1983 Action
                       _______________________________________

                      White's   1983 action is not cognizable.2  Although

            neither party addressed the issue, "[i]t is too elementary to

            warrant  citation of authority that a court has an obligation

            to inquire sua  sponte into its subject  matter jurisdiction,

            and to  proceed no  further if such jurisdiction is wanting."

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "cognizable" to
                ______________________
            mean, "Capable of being tried or examined before a designated
            tribunal; within jurisdiction of court or power given to
                      ____________________________
            court to adjudicate controversy."  Black's Law Dictionary 259
                                               ______________________
            (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).  See also F.D.I.C. v. Meyer,
                                              ________ ________    _____
            510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (stating that this is what
            "cognizable" ordinarily means).

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                                          7

            In  re Recticel  Foam Corp.,  859 F.2d  1000, 1002  (1st Cir.
            ___________________________

            1988).

                      In  Heck  v.  Humphrey, 512  U.S.  477  (1994), the
                          ____      ________

            Supreme Court held:

                      [I]n   order  to   recover  damages   for
                      allegedly unconstitutional  conviction or
                      imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
                      actions whose unlawfulness would render a
                      conviction or sentence  invalid, a   1983
                      plaintiff must prove  that the conviction
                      or sentence  has been reversed  on direct
                      appeal,  expunged  by   executive  order,
                      declared  invalid  by  a  state  tribunal
                      authorized to make such determination, or
                      called into question by a federal court's
                      issuance of  a writ of habeas  corpus, 28
                      U.S.C.   2254.

              Id. at 487 (footnote omitted).
              ___

                      The Court  ruled that  habeas corpus  was the  only

            permitted  mode of  federal  collateral  attack  on  a  state

            conviction.   Id.  at 481-82.   The  Court analogized    1983
                          ___

            actions seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations

            related   to  a  state  criminal  conviction  to  common  law

            malicious prosecution  claims, for which  termination of  the

            prior  criminal proceeding  in  the  accused's  favor  is  an

            essential element.   Id. at 484-86.   A   1983 suit  like the
                                 ___

            present,  contending  that  a  state  parole  revocation  was

            constitutionally invalid, challenges the "fact or duration of

            [the  plaintiff's] confinement." Id.  at  481; accord Crow v.
                                             ___           ______ ____

            Penry, 102 F.3d 1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996); Littles v. Board
            _____                                        _______    _____

            of Pardons & Paroles Div.,  68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir.  1995)
            _________________________

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                                          8

            (per curiam);  cf. Edwards v.  Balisok, ___ U.S. ___,  117 S.
                           ___ _______     _______

            Ct.  1584 (1997)  (applying  the Heck  rule  to a  prisoner's
                                             ____

            deprivation  of   good-time   credits  in   a  state   prison

            disciplinary  proceeding); Schafer v.  Moore, 46 F.3d  43, 45
                                       _______     _____

            (8th Cir.  1995) (per  curiam) (applying the  Heck rule  to a
                                                          ____

            state  decision  to  deny  parole);    see  also  Preiser  v.
                                                   _________  _______

            Rodriguez,  411 U.S.  475,  490-92  (1973)  (holding  that  a
            _________

            petition for  habeas corpus is the only federal procedure for

            attacking "the  validity of  the fact or  length" of  a state

            prisoner's confinement and applying this principle  to "areas

            of  particular  state  administrative  concern"  such  as the

            deprivation  of  a  prisoner's  good-conduct-time credits  in

            state prison disciplinary proceedings).

                      In a footnote, the Heck Court refused to  relax the
                                         ____

            rule requiring  termination of the prior  criminal proceeding

            in the  accused's favor in  cases in which the  plaintiff had

            served  his sentence  and so  no  longer had  post-conviction

            challenges  available.    The  Court  wrote,  "We  think  the

            principle  barring  collateral  attacks--a  longstanding  and

            deeply  rooted feature  of both  the common  law and  our own

            jurisprudence--is not rendered  inapplicable by the  fortuity

            that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated."  Id. at
                                                                   ___

            490 n.10.

                      Whit  now  contends  that   his  parole  revocation

            violated  the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

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                                          9

            giving  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  under     1983.   The

            contention  is  based  on his  allegation  that,  despite his

            denying that  he had  molested step-daughter,  White was  not

            offered  and  furnished  with  an  attorney  for  his  parole

            hearing.   Without  an  attorney,  White  maintains,  he  was

            deprived  of the  opportunity to  prove  his innocence,  and,

            therefore, of  due process.   A favorable  decision in  the  

            1983  proceeding would  necessarily  call  into question  the

            validity  of the  state's  decree  revoking  his  parole  and

            ordering  him back to  prison.  Heck  therefore applies,3 and
                                            ____

            the   1983 action  is not cognizable in a federal  court, see

            footnote 1,  supra, unless  the parole  revocation "has  been
                         _____

            reversed  on direct  appeal,  expunged  by  executive  order,

            declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to  make such

            determination, or called  into question by a  federal court's

            issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.   2254."   Id.
                                                                      ___

            at 487.

                      After  the  federal  district  court had  dismissed

            White's    1983 action  on other grounds,  White was  finally

            released from  confinement, his  sentence having  terminated,

            and the Massachusetts Appeals Court then vacated the Superior

            Court's judgment  as being  moot and  remanded White's  state

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The Heck rule applies to   1983 actions for declaratory
                    ____
            relief as well as to   1983 suits for damages.  See Edwards
                                                            ___ _______
            v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997) (applying the Heck rule to
               _______                                       ____
            a request for declaratory relief under   1983).

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                                          10

            case to  the Superior Court  with a direction to  dismiss it.

            Hence  there  is  in effect  no  state  judgment invalidating

            White's parole  revocation (nor,  of course,  was the  parole

            revocation  invalidated by a  federal habeas petition).   See
                                                                      ___

            United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950)
            _____________    _________________

            (holding that vacating  a judgment as  moot and remanding  it

            with a direction to dismiss "eliminates a judgment, review of

            which  was   prevented  through  happenstance");   49  C.J.S.

            Judgments   357  (1997) ("Where a judgment is  vacated or set
            _________

            aside by a valid order  or judgment, it is entirely destroyed

            and the rights  of the  parties are  left as  though no  such

            judgment had  ever been  entered.");   cf.  Reilly v.  School
                                                   ___  ______     ______

            Comm. of Boston, 290 N.E.2d  516 (Mass. 1972) (holding that a
            _______________

            case which  is vacated  as moot on  appeal has  no collateral

            estoppel consequences).

                      We have carefully  reviewed the  reasoning in  Heck
                                                                     ____

            and related cases and can find no basis for  holding that the

            vacated   state   decision  that   impugned   White's  parole

            revocation meets  Heck's  requirement  of  a  declaration  of
                              ____

            invalidity  "by  a  state tribunal  authorized  to  make such

            determination.  "512 U.S. at 487.  We are constrained to hold

            that White's Section 1983 action  is not cognizable since any

            award of damages  or declaratory relief would  seriously call

            into question the  as yet undisturbed  validity of the  state

            parole board's action.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
                                    ____

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                                          11

                      As  White's   suit  is  not  cognizable   and  must

            therefore be dismissed,  we do not address  White's claims of

            error  or the  parole board's arguments  that his  claims are

            barred by res  judicata and that his  request for declaratory

            relief  is moot.    Nor  do we  consider  the parole  board's

            contention that its  former members are not liable in damages

            for any errors made in  respect to the appointment of counsel

            because of their absolute immunity.

                                   III.  Conclusion
                                   ________________

                      We vacate the district court's dismissal of White's

            suit  on  the  merits  and remand  the  case,  directing  the

            district court to dismiss the action without prejudice.   See
                                                                      ___

            Heck, 512 U.S.  at 479, 490 (affirming  the dismissal without
            ____

            prejudice  of a     1983 action  which  was not  cognizable);

            Fottler v. United  States, 73 F.3d  1064, 1065-66 (10th  Cir.
            _______    ______________

            1996)  (holding that the  dismissal of a  Section 1983 action

            because  it  was  not yet  cognizable  under  Heck  should be
                                                          ____

            without prejudice); Perez  v. Sifel,  57 F.3d  503, 505  (7th
                                _____     _____

            Cir.  1995) (per  curiam) (same);  Trimble  v. City  of Santa
                                               _______     ______________

            Rosa, 49 F.3d  583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995)  (per curiam) (same);
            ____

            Schafer, 46 F.3d at 45 (same).
            _______

                      Vacated and remanded.
                      ____________________

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