Court Opinion

ID: 9700747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:47:49.490592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:14.298046
License: Public Domain

Mahady, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent. In this lengthy trial of an eighteen-year-old woman charged with manslaughter and child abuse in the death of her infant daughter, defendant’s only defense was insanity. The trial court, over objection, permitted an expert witness to testify that the incidence of insanity among child abusers is no higher than in the general population. The majority holds that this testimony was properly admitted. I disagree, and would hold the admission of such testimony to be reversible error.
Evidence is inadmissible if it is irrelevant, V.R.E. 402, or, even if relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, V.R.E. 403. “Relevant evidence” is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” V.R.E. 401.
In order to support its claim that Janet Valley was sane at the time of the alleged offenses, the State, over objection, introduced evidence by Conrad Grims, District Director of Social and Rehabilitation Services for the Newport area, that child abusers typically present certain characteristics; in particular, they are no more prone to mental illness than are members of the general population:
The findings are that the incidence of mental illness is no greater among child abusers than it is in the general popu*400lation. That means that if, for example, ten percent of the general population is found to be mentally ill, we would expect that ten percent of child abusers would also be found to be mentally ill.1
I believe this testimony to be irrelevant to the determination of Janet Valley’s sanity.
I am, first of all, deeply skeptical of the validity of the statistic. Mr. Grims refers to “findings,” but nowhere describes where they are documented, who made them, or of what the studies consisted. We have recently stated that “[i]n order for this testimony [profile evidence] to be admissible, the condition must be one that is generally recognized in the field.” State v. Percy, 146 Vt. 475, 483, 507 A.2d 955, 960 (1986). That the “condition” of being a child abuser is “generally recognized” has not been established to my satisfaction — by this record at least. Other courts have excluded evidence of a “battering parent” syndrome. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) (exclusion “required until further evidence of the scientific accuracy and reliability of syndrome or profile diagnoses can be established”). Cf. State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 369-70, 534 A.2d 184, 187 (1987) (profile evidence of sexually abused children admissible under V.R.E. 702 in appropriate circumstances).
Even if the generalization were accurate, however, it can have no bearing on whether Janet Valley is among the ten percent who are mentally ill or the ninety percent who are not. And that is the “fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” V.R.E. 401. In State v. Percy, a case similarly involving the State’s introduction of evidence — that rapists typically claim consent or amnesia — to rebut defendant’s insanity defense, we wrote: “We fail to see how explanations or excuses offered by other rapists are relevant to what this particular defendant said in response to the offense charged.” 146 Vt. at 484, 507 A.2d at 960. I similarly fail to see how a claim about the incidence of mental illness among child abusers is relevant to *401whether Janet Valley was mentally ill. In Percy, the State’s evidence “did not provide jurors with an explanation as to why most rapists made these claims. It simply casts doubt on the defendant’s credibility by suggesting to the jury that all persons charged with rape made these same assertions.” Id. at 483, 507 A.2d at 960. In the case at bar, the disputed evidence likewise simply casts doubt on Janet Valley’s insanity defense by suggesting that she is not likely to be insane because child abusers generally are not likely to be insane. See Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 281, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983) (admission of “child battering profile” was error; “evidence is totally irrelevant because it does not tend to prove that [defendant] committed the acts of abuse attributed to him”); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 576, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984) (improper to admit expert testimony that in “eighty-five to ninety percent of our cases, the child is molested by someone they already know”); State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983) (reversible error for trial court to admit evidence that accused was member of group which had higher incidence of committing sexual abuse of children than other groups).
The majority cites State v. Catsam as determinative on the question of the relevance of the disputed evidence. State v. Valley, 153 Vt. 380, 386, 571 A.2d 579, 582 (1989). I do not read Catsam so expansively. In Catsam, we stated in dicta that the trial court may in appropriate circumstances admit evidence on “the psychological and emotional profile” of child victims of sexual assault. 148 Vt. at 370, 534 A.2d at 187;2 see also State v. Hicks, 148 Vt. 459, 462, 535 A.2d 776, 777 (1987). This conclusion must, however, be read in context:
Given the demonstrated usefulness that such evidence can have in assisting the jury to assess the credibility of the complaining child witness, we join the majority of courts that have concluded that it is within the trial court’s discretion to admit such evidence in appropriate circumstances.
*402Catsam, 148 Vt. at 369-70, 534 A.2d at 187. Furthermore:
The unique psychological effects of sexual assault on children place the average juror at a disadvantage in understanding the behavior of the victim. The confusion, shame, guilt, and fear that often result from such abuse may cause a “victim to react and behave in a different manner from many other crime victims, especially when the sexual abuse victim is forced to testify to the acts in open court.”
Id. at 369, 534 A.2d at 187 (quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 377, 502 A.2d 253, 258 (1985)) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In Catsam, the evidence pertained to the victim, a child. Here, the evidence pertains to the defendant, an adult. These distinctions are critical. It was only because of the “unique psychological effects of sexual assault on children” and the “demonstrated usefulness” of evidence on their emotional symptoms that we reached the conclusion we did. Any support in Catsam for the majority’s holding today, therefore, is extremely tenuous.
Even if the disputed testimony were relevant — perhaps, as the State contends, to counter a “common misperception of the general public that any parent who would commit such abuse . . . must be mentally ill” — it should have been excluded under Rule 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
There is a distinct worry that the jury will improperly infer from the challenged testimony alone that Janet Valley is among the ninety percent alleged to be sane. This Court has previously expressed concern that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome “lent an improper ‘aura of special reliability and trustworthiness’ to the complainant’s testimony.” State v. Bubar, 146 Vt. 398, 401, 505 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1985) (quoting State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)). Here, the concern is the opposite: that the “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness” surrounding the expert will unfairly prejudice Ms. Valley’s ability to present her defense and will hinder rather than assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Again, our decision in State v. Percy is pertinent:
*403The testimony stereotyped the defendant as one whose explanations were not to be believed because they were explanations typically offered by psychiatric patients accused of rape. The resulting prejudice is obvious. The jury could well have concluded that this rapist was just like all the other rapists and rejected the defendant’s insanity defense not because of the evidence before it but because “he fit the mold.”
146 Vt. at 484, 507 A.2d at 961.
The majority states that “the evidence does not go directly to defendant’s guilt, the characteristic we found objectionable in Percy” Valley, 153 Vt. at 387, 571 A.2d at 583. The issue at trial was not whether defendant did or did not do any particular acts; the issue was whether she was sane at the time, that is, whether she had the requisite mental state to establish guilt. The disputed testimony did go directly and precisely to that issue: Janet Valley was a child abuser and child abusers are typically sane. In the context of the issues before the jury, this testimony was the equivalent of testimony that rapists typically claim consent or amnesia—the forbidden evidence in State v. Percy, 146 Vt. at 483, 507 A.2d at 960. The testimony was “inflammatory and prejudicial and went directly to the question of defendant’s guilt by association with other defendants.” State v. Hicks, 148 Vt. at 463, 535 A.2d at 778 (explaining the prejudicial effect of the testimony at issue in Percy).
The admission of the testimony by Mr. Grims on the incidence of mental illness among child abusers was therefore error. Since there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury’s verdict that Janet Valley was sane, it cannot be deemed harmless under V.R.Cr.P. 52(a).
Several psychiatrists testified on both sides on the issue of insanity. The closing arguments focused almost exclusively on this issue. The issue appears to be a close one. We cannot say, therefore, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the disputed evidence. “Harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court to inquire if, absent the alleged error, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict regardless of the error.” State v. *404Catsam, 148 Vt. at 371, 534 A.2d at 188 (quoting State v. Hamlin, 146 Vt. 97, 106, 499 A.2d 45, 52 (1985)). “Since the defendant holds a carefully guarded right to have his guilt adjudged by the jury, an appellate court should be slow to assume that an error in the trial was inconsequential.” De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 155 (5th Cir. 1962).
I would be “slow to assume” that any error here was inconsequential and would hold that the State has failed to establish that the trial court’s admission of the challenged testimony was harmless.3 The testimony went to the central issue of the trial: whether Ms. Valley was legally insane at the time of the alleged offenses. We do not know how the jury would have decided without the challenged testimony, and we should not take the issue out of its hands. “[I]t is not the appellate court function to determine guilt or innocence.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763 (1946).
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

 This testimony was emphasized by the State in its closing argument to the jury:
It may seem startling, but the evidence is that even in serious cases of child abuse serious mental illness is not any more present there than it is in the general population. Most child abusers are not legally insane, we submit.

 This portion of the opinion was dicta because the defendant had not challenged the “profile evidence,” id. at 368-69, 634 A.2d at 186; the issue was the admission of expert testimony on the credibility of the complaining witness, and it was on that issue that we reversed.

 The burden is on the party not prejudiced by the error to show that it was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. at 372, 534 A.2d at 188.