Court Opinion

ID: 9386426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:05:11.820755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.342423
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1267
                              Filed April 12, 2023

JOHN JOSEPH BENGE,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

WAYNE MICHAEL LAUTENBACH,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wayne County, Elisabeth

Reynoldson, Judge.

      Wayne Michael Lautenbach appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. AFFIRMED.

      David Leitner, West Des Moines, for appellant.

      John J. Benge, Lineville, self-represented appellee.

      Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                             2

GREER, Judge.

         Wayne Lautenbach asks us to decide if the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment that he argues did not comply with Iowa

Code section 626A.2(1) (2021).1          His requested remedy is dismissal of the

collection action against him. He characterizes the question he presents as one

of first impression. We start with the procedural background that gets us to an

Iowa court.

         The Process.

         After John Benge, a Missouri lawyer, performed legal services for

Lautenbach, Benge obtained a March 2021 default judgment in the Missouri courts

against Lautenbach for unpaid legal fees. In April, Benge attempted to enforce the

Missouri judgment in Iowa by filing a certified, but not authenticated, copy of the

order with the Wayne County, Iowa clerk of court. In June, the clerk of court filed

and sent to Lautenbach a notice of filing of foreign judgment. Nineteen days later,

Benge acknowledged receipt in a letter directed to the clerk of court disputing the

filing as “highly irregular,” along with other general statements about constitutional

1   Section 626A.2(1) provides:
                 A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with
         an Act of Congress or the statutes of this state may be filed in the
         office of the clerk of the district court of a county of this state which
         would have venue if the original action was being commenced in this
         state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner
         as a judgment of the district court of this state. A judgment so filed
         has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses
         and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment
         of the district court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in
         like manner.
                                          3

rights.2 So, the next month, Benge took steps to levy against some Iowa real

estate purportedly owned by Lautenbach in Wayne County.                    In August,

Lautenbach filed another letter to the clerk of court along with a document entitled

“Wayne-Michael: Lautenbach, Formal Challenge to the Twelve Presumptions of

Law.” None of the documents addressed the venue of the case. Next, the district

court, recognizing Lautenbach’s filings as a challenge to the clerk of court’s

authority, issued an August 2021 ruling finding the challenges were without merit

and concluding “there was no timely challenge to the conclusiveness of the foreign

judgment.” See Iowa Code § 626A.2(3). Lautenbach did not appeal the ruling.

       Then, over three months later, Lautenbach moved to quash the writ of

execution and asked for a stay of “any further efforts to seize the real estate.”

Because of a dispute over who held title to the real estate being executed upon,3

Benge asked for time to address the motion to quash after discovery was

completed, and the district court granted that request. But by April 2022, while the

discovery was ongoing, Lautenbach moved to dismiss the case arguing that the

district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, noting he could raise that

issue at any time. The central theme of the motion was:

       [t]he court only has subject matter jurisdiction if venue in the original
       action would have lied in this court. Venue in this county would not
       exist if the original action was commenced in this state. The proper
       venue is required to grant this court subject matter jurisdiction over
       the foreign judgment.

2 Included with his letter were copies of some documents filed in the Missouri court
where judgment was obtained.
3 Benge attempted to collect the judgment by attaching real property that at the

time of collection was titled in the name “Heavens Door Trust,” but title was an
underlying issue in the case because Benge alleged Lautenbach filed documents
after the title transfer to the trust declaring his individual ownership in the real
estate and was the sole trustee and beneficiary of the trust.
                                          4

Lautenbach referenced Iowa Code section 616.17, relating to the proper venue for

personal actions not otherwise provided in chapter 616.           The district court

conducted a reported hearing on both Lautenbach’s motion to dismiss and an

application for discovery sanctions filed by Benge over discovery abuses. Denying

the motion to dismiss, the district court reasoned:

       [Lautenbach’s] Motion asserts the case must be dismissed as the
       Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. [Lautenbach] cites
       Iowa Code section 626A.2 in support of his Motion. As correctly
       stated by [Benge] in his Resistance, section 626A.2 refers to “venue,”
       not subject matter jurisdiction. For this and all the reasons set forth
       in [Benge’s] Resistance, [Lautenbach’s] Motion to Dismiss is denied.

The district court also issued severe discovery sanctions. Lautenbach asked the

district court to reconsider its ruling. After receiving the ruling denying his motion

to reconsider, Lautenbach appealed.

       Disposition.

       In his appellate brief, Lautenbach frames his appeal issue as “whether the

[Iowa] district court had subject matter jurisdiction to deal with the Missouri

judgment.” We review subject matter jurisdiction rulings for correction of errors at

law. See Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Iowa 2013); see also Iowa R.

App. P. 6.907. “A ‘court has inherent power to determine whether it has jurisdiction

over the subject matter of the proceedings before it.’” Klinge v. Bentien, 725

N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). Our review of a district court’s ruling

on a motion to dismiss is also for errors at law. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Kirk, 801

N.W.2d 856, 859 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). “Ultimately, ‘our decision to overrule or

sustain a motion to dismiss must rest on legal grounds.’” Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668
                                          5

N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa

1994)).

       We first address Lautenbach’s unpreserved argument that the Missouri

judgment was not authenticated under section 622.53, which provides,

“[Judgments] of another state may be proved by the attestation of the clerk and the

seal of the court annexed, if there is a seal, together with a certificate of a judge,

chief justice, or presiding magistrate that the attestation is in due form of law.”

       Benge concedes the judgment was certified but not authenticated, but he

correctly points out Lautenbach never mentioned this failing to the district court.

True, until this appeal, Lautenbach did not raise the question of whether the

Missouri judgment was authenticated as a defense. Hence, the district court did

not decide the issue as it never came up in the arguments or pleadings until now.

“Generally, we will only review an issue raised on appeal if it was first presented

to and ruled on by the district court.” Ronnfeldt v. Shelby Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue

Mem’l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Iowa 2023) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 757

N.W.2d 431, 435 (Iowa 2008)). We decline to take this up now as there is no

reference in Lautenbach’s appeal brief as to where the issue was preserved in the

underlying action. See id. (refusing to undertake a partisan role and undertake the

party’s research and advocacy).

       Returning to the heart of Lautenbach’s appeal—his claim the court lacked

subject matter—we find it “helpful at this juncture to point out the difference

between a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and its authority.” State v. Emery, 636

N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001).
                                         6

      Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court “to hear and
      determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
      question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the
      court’s attention.” Such jurisdiction flows from the constitution or
      from statutes and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or
      estoppel.
             . . . [S]ubject matter jurisdiction should not be confused with
      authority. “A court may have subject matter jurisdiction but for one
      reason or another may not be able to entertain a particular case. In
      such a situation we say the court lacks authority to hear that
      particular case.” A court may lack authority to hear a particular case
      “where a party fails to follow the statutory procedures for invoking the
      court's authority.”

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Here, under the authority of chapter

626A, the Iowa district court had the power to hear cases involving the

enforcement of foreign judgments. Subject matter jurisdiction can be conferred by

statute and is not waived or vested by consent of the parties. Cooper v. Kirkwood

Cmty. Coll., 782 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).

      A court may lack authority to hear a particular case if the statutory

procedures required to invoke the court’s authority are not followed, but that does

not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. See Alliant Energy-Interstate Power &

Light Co. v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 875 (Iowa 2007). Here Lautenbach argues

that the foreign judgment could only be transferred to, and thus recognized in, a

county “which would have had venue if the original action was being commenced

in this state.” See Iowa Code § 626A.2(1). Lautenbach asserts because he

resides in Door County, Wisconsin, did not personally own any property in Iowa,

and was not in Iowa for any purpose, he cannot be subject to its jurisdiction.

Drilling down, Lautenbach clarifies that his argument about venue is not made in

the typical mode since no venue in Iowa was appropriate, but the focus on venue

addresses a requirement that must be met to access subject matter jurisdiction of
                                           7

the Iowa district court. Still, this argument goes to personal jurisdiction, not subject

matter jurisdiction.4 And at the core, Lautenbach’s complaint is an improper venue

claim based on whether Lautenbach owned Iowa real estate in Wayne County.5

So, this case is more in line with Board of Directors of the Starmont Community

School District v. Banke, 474 N.W.2d 558, 561–62 (Iowa 1991) abrogated on other

grounds by Anderson v. W. Hodgeman & Sons, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 418, 421 n.3

(Iowa 1994) (addressing venue rules in administrative actions). In Banke, the

district court concluded:

       Of importance to the present case is the distinction we drew in
       [Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1989)] between
       jurisdiction (or authority to hear the case) and venue. As a general
       rule, venue designates “[t]he particular county . . . in which a court
       with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case.” Black’s Law
       Dictionary 1396 (5th ed. 1979). A statutory venue provision is
       subject to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure [1.808]. Christie, 448 N.W.2d
       at 451. The rule provides that any infirmity in venue is waived unless,
       prior to answer, the defendant moves to transfer the case to the
       proper county. Id.; see Iowa R. Civ. P. [1.808(1)].

474 N.W.2d at 561–62 (finding the failure to move to transfer venue within the time

allowed defeated defendant’s claim over jurisdiction (second alteration in original)).

And while Lautenbach initially raised general issues about the appropriateness of

filing the foreign judgment in Iowa, those allegations were ruled upon in early 2021

and Lautenbach did not appeal from that decision.

4 The Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution “limits a state’s power to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Shams v. Hassan,
829 N.W.2d 848, 854 (Iowa 2013). Personal jurisdiction can be exercised only if
minimum contacts exist between the state and the individuals so that the state may
reasonably exert jurisdiction over the person. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash.,
326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945).
5 Venue is proper in actions for recovery of real property in the county in which the

property is situated. See Iowa Code § 616.1. Lautenbach waited 359 days to
raise venue.
                                            8

          At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Benge offered a “that ship has

sailed” analogy and pointed out that Lautenbach waived his improper venue claim

by failing to timely challenge it under the rules. He emphasized, as developed

above, that Lautenbach missed the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction

and venue, by noting “there’s nothing in the Iowa case law or Iowa statutes that

provides the filing of an action in the proper county as a prerequisite to confer any

subject matter jurisdiction on this Court.” Because all of his eggs were in the

subject-matter-jurisdiction basket and that argument proved to be unsuccessful,

Lautenbach’s motion to dismiss was properly denied. We affirm the district court’s

ruling.

          Last, going to what Lautenbach calls “subsidiary issues” that are directed to

the merits of the collection case, Lautenbach maintains “the [Heavens Door] trust

is considered a disregarded entity for purposes of execution.” Under his theory in

his appellate brief, he asserts the trust was irrevocable and he was neither a settlor,

trustee, or beneficiary of that trust. Contending he transferred any interest he had

in 2016, Lautenbach maintains the trust assets were not available for collection.

Benge disputes these subsidiary issues are before our court. As a discovery

sanction, the district court ordered that Lautenbach’s pleadings were stricken and

these facts were established:

                a. The Trust was not properly established at the time of the
          execution of the Warranty Deeds of Defendant purportedly
          conveying the residence and lots located in Lineville to the Trust;
                b. The Trust is a revocable trust;
                c. Defendant is the sole grantor of the Trust;
                d. Defendant is the sole beneficiary of the Trust;
                e. The Trust is a “disregarded entity”;
                f. Defendant is the owner of the assets that he transferred or
          attempted to transfer into the Trust.
                                         9

While he continues to dispute the trust ownership issues in his appellate brief,

Lautenbach makes no argument about the merits of the sanctions imposed. We

agree that the issue of the sanctions is not before us, and we find that the district

court’s imposition of sanctions makes the ownership issue moot; so, we do not

address those claims. See Ronnfeldt, 984 N.W.2d at 421 (requiring the litigant to

brief and argue an issue raised).

       We affirm the denial of Lautenbach’s motion to dismiss.

       AFFIRMED.