Court Opinion

ID: 9537857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:25:52.748227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:06.076849
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McEWAN,
dissenting.
The aircraft was manufactured on May 17, 1962, and purchased by appellee, Darr Services, Inc., shortly thereafter. There is no question that the engine in question left the factory of Continental with a magneto setting of 24° B.T.C., and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that the magneto setting had not been changed from 24°. There was a service bulletin from Continental dated February 7, 1962, (at least 13 days before the engine in question left Continental’s factory). This bulletin is referred to in the majority opinion under the heading of “Magneto Settings,” and shows that the magneto setting for the engine in question should be 20°. In addition to the portion quoted *254in the majority opinion, the bulletin also says:
“Magneto timing advanced beyond the setting that the engine was designed for and qualified with can cause detonation and/or pre-ignition resulting in broken rings, cracked and burned pistons and abnormal and excessive stresses induced into cylinder heads, cylinder barrels, crankcase, crankshaft and connecting rods. In a detonating cylinder, the temperatures and pressures rise to abnormal heights. The alloys from which the pistons are made were not intended to withstand this amoünt of heat. As a result, piston rings warp and lands under the top ring may wear excessively. This permits increased fluttering and hammering of the top ring which can break the ring and even the piston lands. * * * ”
This is apparently what happened to this engine. There was testimony that the magneto setting could advance as much as 3° between 100-hour inspections, and also that it was dangerous to permit an aircraft engine to have a magneto setting as much as' 4° above the specified setting, and, if it continued for 200 to 300 hours, there was a probability of engine failure. The engine in question had 390 hours on the date of the failure and crash.
Witnesses for Continental testified that the bulletin dated February 7, 1962, specifying that the magneto setting should be 20° was really not sent from the factory until June of 1962. I think it was a jury question as to when the bulletin was sent. In any event, on June 16, 1962, Continental sent another bulletin which said to change the magneto setting to 20°, and “ * * * After the timing has been reset, scrape off the present painted timing setting on the nameplate and steel stamp or etch in the revised setting of 20°. This also requires a log book entry.”
The magneto setting of 24°, together with the normal advance of the magneto setting between 100-hour inspections, created a dangerous condition of which the defendant-Continental was — or should have been — aware.
That it takes a rather high degree of skill, training and experience to service airplanes, and that owners and pilots must necessarily look to such skilled people, is widely known and was surely known by Continental. Mr. Floyd M. Johnson, who is president of Wyoming Air Services, is a licensed mechanic holding ratings of A. & P. (airframe and power plant), and A. I. (air inspector). He testified that pilots and owners of aircraft rely on the mechanics’ skill and judgment in determining the airworthiness of an airplane. Continental was aware that many repair and overhaul agencies were not properly setting the magnetos. Its bulletin of December 10, 1959, said:
“A recent survey of magneto timing checks conducted on engines flown in to our service hangar as well as engines returned from the field to our Service Department revealed an alarmingly high percentage of cases where timing was advanced far beyond specified settings. * # ⅜ ”
Continental’s bulletin of February 7, 1962, contained the following language:
“ * * * A continuing survey of magneto timing reflects a finding of 50 percent of the engines checked having magneto timing set in advance (some as much as 20°) of the setting specified for the engine.”
Thus, Continental, by its own admission, was aware that some service agencies were not complying with its bulletins regarding magneto settings.
The defendant-Continental had a responsibility to this plaintiff and cross-complainant to reasonably see that the change in the magneto settings was made. I think that under these circumstances something more was required of the defendant-Continental than the mere sending out of a warning bulletin, and a bulletin advising that the magneto setting change should be made and the nameplate changed.