Court Opinion

ID: 9843035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:24:52.530342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:26.317033
License: Public Domain

SKELTON, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority has committed serious legal error in holding that since the petitioner failed properly to raise the issue before the board that the performance standards on which she was evaluated and removed are vague, subject tive, and nonspecific, and therefore her removal was invalid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302, it is not open to her on this appeal and “we do not consider it.” Contrary to this holding, the record .shows that petitioner raised *835this issue (the § 4302 issue) at every stage of the administrative proceedings, altogether at least five times, as shown below.
(Í) The petitioner raised this issue the first time early in the administrative proceedings when she filed with the deciding official a reply to the notice of proposal to remove her from her job, as follows:
I will now be specific about the elements of law and derivative regulations which I charge that the supervisor, Mr. Richard Ellis, has violated in this case:
Mr. Ellis, in his letter, Notice of Proposed Removal, 4 Feb 1983 (atch 2) charges in para 1 that Ms. Wallace failed to meet “the performance standards established for your position.” The period of alleged failure to meet the standards is from 19 Feb 1982 through 4 Feb 1983. I charge that the standards established by Mr. Ellis for this position, and his application of them, violated the Act. The CSRA, PL 95-454, Oct 13, 1978, 92 Stat 1132, as coded in 5 USC 4302(b)(1), call for job criteria to be “objective,” not punitive as Ms. Wallace’s are.
This statement squarely raises the issue in the administrative proceedings, and its filing with the deciding official was all that was necessary. That was the effect of the decision of the board in Callaway v. Department of the Army, 23 M.S.P.R. 592 (1984). There the facts were practically identical to those in the instant case with regard to raising a 5 U.S.C. § 4302 issue before the board. In that case the agency removed an employee from her position as a secretary for unacceptable performance claiming that she had failed to satisfactorily perform two critical elements of her position containing performance standards that required courtesy and proper file maintenance. The employee appealed to the board and its AJ reversed the removal action, and the agency appealed. On appeal the agency contended that thé AJ improperly expanded the issues and exceeded his authority by finding the performance standard requiring courtesy invalid because the employee had not contended that the performance standard was invalid. (Emphasis supplied) (That is the same position the majority takes in the case before us.) The board rejected this argument and held.
In her response to the agency’s notice of proposed removal, appellant contended that her performance standards did not conform to 5 U.S.C. Chapter 43 because they were not objective, fair, or reasonable. See Agency Exhibit 1, Tab 7. The presiding official, therefore, did not improperly expand the issues by considering whether appellant’s performance standard requiring courtesy was valid.
Callaway v. Department of the Army, 23 M.S.P.R. at 596.
As can be seen by the holding of the board in that case, the employee raised the issue of the lack of objectivity of the standards of performance under 5 U.S.C. § 4302 in her response to the agency’s notice of proposed removal (as was done in the case before us), and that was all that was necessary to raise the issue in the administrative proceedings. The majority erred by not making the same ruling in the instant case.
(2) The petitioner raised the Section 4302 issue again in response to an order of the board setting a prehearing conference and hearing in which petitioner was required to state the issues in the case. She described the issues as follows:
ISSUES
The issues in this case are:
Did the Agency comply with the requirements of law and regulations, specifically, 5 U.S.C. 4302, and AFR 40-452, and with case law and precedents, in their removal of Ms. Janet L. Wallace, from her position with the Air Force effective April 15,1983, or was it a personal action based on some motivation of her supervisor Mr. Richard Ellis?
The majority seems to view this paragraph as a question instead of a statement of the issues. In doing so the majority errs. It will be noted that the statement was intended to describe the issues and was filed for that purpose by order of the board. Furthermore, the heading on the statement refers to its contents twice as issues (plural) with one of such references being in *836capital letters. Actually, there are two issues contained in the statement, although they are contained in one sentence and in one paragraph. There is no doubt that the first issue referred “specifically” to 5 U.S. G. § 4302 and to APR 40-452 (Air Force Regulation 40-452, Performance Appraisal Program). The second issue related to the motivation of petitioner’s supervisor Richard Ellis. Even though petitioner’s statement about the issues may be inartfully drawn, if the majority has any doubt about the interpretation of petitioner’s issues, that doubt should be resolved in her favor since she did not have an attorney.
(3) The next time petitioner raised the Section 4302 issue was in a colloquy of petitioner’s Union representative Mr. Cook with AJ Manrose during the first trial. This colloquy was, in pertinent part, as follows:
JUDGE MANROSE: It would help me to decide the case. How do you address the testimony of [persons] like Mr. Ellis and the secretary who was here today and apparently some other people? ******
MR. COOK: Well, its the same now as it was all along.
******
We also had said at the time that her typing — that there is — there isn’t any— there isn’t any objective standard. The performance standard is not objective. Where is there a number that we can identify against? Typographical errors are frequent. You know, what’s frequent? It’s a judgment call. They say it was frequent, she says it wasn’t.
JUDGE MANROSE: Well what would . you propose in a standard? How could that be worded to—
MR. COOK: Well, I think that number of errors on a page and some standards for typists dó do this. But this one wasn’t. See that’s what our problem is. That the standard is so subjective that one person can say her errors were frequent and another person can say, well, they weren’t any more frequent than anybody else’s.
JUDGE MANROSE: All right.
(Emphasis supplied)
The § 4302 issue was clearly raised by petitioner’s representative before the AJ during the trial, as shown by the above conversation between them. This was the reason they were discussing the objectivity and the subjectivity of the performance standards. At the first trial petitioner’s removal from her job for poor typing was affirmed by the AJ, but this decision was reversed by the board. The decision at the second trial affirming her removal was for reasons other than typing. This does not detract from the importance of the above colloquy between the AJ and petitioner’s representative, because all charges were before the AJ at the first trial and so were petitioner’s § 4302 objections which applied to all charges. Furthermore, all proceedings of the first trial were introduced into the record at the second trial and became a part of that record. Accordingly, petitioner’s raising of the § 4302 issue of subjective performance standards was in the case from beginning to end. None of the charges were ever dismissed, and petitioner’s § 4302 objection to all of the charges was in the proceedings until the final decision of the board.
(4) Petitioner raised the Section 4302 issue again in her petition to the board to set aside the second decision of the AJ. In that petition she stated in pertinent part:
In addition to the above, the Agency has failed to meet the criteria required in 5 USC 4302 and 4303, specifically that:
a. Standards must, “to the maximum extent feasible, permit the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of objective criteria_” (underlines ours). [Ref: 5 USC 4302(b)(1).]
******
In the instant case, none of these criteria have been met,....
Regarding the “Backlog of unfiled material” charge, and the statement that “the condition of assigned files was not acceptable,” we challenge both compliance of the standard with applicable law, and the agency’s lack of viable evidence *837showing any violation of even this standard.
As Appellant pointed out, federal law at 5 USC 4302, Section (b)(1), requires “objective criteria” _ “to the maximum extent feasible” for performance standards. The standard requires “Backlog of unfiled material is minimal. Formal inspections reveal few minor and no major deficiencies.”
What’s “minimal” when filing is low priority on work assignments? Objective criteria could have been written for the filing element, but they were not.
* * * * * *
In fact, although he [Ellis] did disparage Appellant’s work on the filing element, he characterized it as a “personal judgment”.
* * * * * *
There is more, but let’s evaluate that statement: Mr. Ellis admitted that the evaluation of the element was a “judgment.” He insists that it was a multiple judgment. But no matter how many people made it, it was still subjective, and made on a subjective criterium.
The § 4302 issue was clearly raised at least four times in this petition for review filed with the board. This petition was filed with reference to a reversal of the second decision affirming petitioner’s removal for “backlog of unfiled material” on which her removal was affirmed in the second trial.
(5) During the E.E.O.C. hearing of petitioner’s old age discrimination charge, her representative raised the § 4302 issue before the examining attorney as follows:
It is also contained in Section 4302 of Title V, the fact that the employee has a right to an objective appraisal of his or her performance....
The record in the EEOC hearing was introduced into evidence in the trial of the instant case and it thereby became a part of its record. Actually, the AJ made reference to it.
In petitioner’s petition in this court to review the final order of the board, she raised the § 4302 issue in the following pleading:
Petitioner prays that the Court set aside the MSPB’s decision, as it is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law, including 5 USC 4302, and appropriate regulations and precedents; and that the MSPB’s findings are unsupported by substantial evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
The issue is squarely before us and we should decide it.
We held in Fucik v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 379, 655 F.2d 1089, 1095 Ct.Cl. (1981) that an administrative issue considered on appeal may be raised in a motion for reconsideration of the board’s final decision. Obviously, such a motion is made at the very end of an administrative proceeding. All that is required is that the issue be raised below at some point in the administrative proceeding. As shown above, the § 4302 issue was raised repeatedly by petitioner at every stage of the proceedings before authorized officials, including the deciding official, as in Callaway, supra, before the AJ, before the hearing examiner in the EEOC proceeding, and before the board itself.
The majority has committed additional errors. For instance, it holds that the issue was not “properly” raised by petitioner. There is no particular form that is required to be used to raise an issue. All that is necessary is for the employee to call the issue to the attention of a participating official in the administrative proceeding who has decision-making authority so that he will be aware of the existence of the issue. The petitioner has complied with this requirement many times in this case.
The majority also errs in holding that the AJ had no opportunity to receive evidence on the issue or to decide it. After two trials, this is contrary to reality. The issue was in the administrative proceedings from the very beginning to the end. The AJ was well aware of it, as shown by his conversation with petitioner’s representative in open court during the hearing. He had every opportunity to decide it and so did the full *838board. As to receiving evidence on the issue, all of the evidence needed to decide it was and is in the record. If the AJ wanted more evidence, he had every opportunity to get it during two trials. He simply did not consider the issue, and neither did the board. Now, the majority is following the same course, and petitioner is being denied her rightful day in court.
This is a very important case for employees who are charged, or who may be charged, with unacceptable performance in their jobs. If the majority opinion is allowed to stand, it will deprive them of many of their rights and will impose legal burdens and hardships on them in adverse proceedings never intended by Congress when it enacted 5 U.S.C. § 4302. It will also cause confusion as to what is an issue and how, when and where it must be raised for it to be considered on appeal.
In view of the overwhelming evidence that the § 4302 issue was raised in the administrative proceedings by petitioner, the issue is before us and we should consider it and dispose of it as we did in Wilson v. Department of Health and Human Servs, 770 F.2d 1048, (Fed.Cir.1985). In that consolidated case, the board had affirmed the demotion of two employees for unacceptable work performance. The employees contended, as petitioner does here, that their performance standards were based on subjective criteria contrary to the statute and were invalid and that their demotions were therefore invalid. We held that the performance standards of employee Wilson of the Social Security Administration were contrary to the statutory mandate and her demotion was invalid and the decision of the board was reversed. On the other hand, we held that the performance standards of employee Jackson of the Environmental Protection Agency were objective in character and complied with the statute, and his demotion was affirmed. We carefully analyzed and interpreted the performance standards of both employees along with the provisions of the statute. The petitioner asks that we do the same in the instant case. In my opinion, she is entitled to such a decision, whether she wins or loses.
If the majority feels that under the circumstances here the board should first consider the issue, the case could of course be remanded to it for a decision. That was the procedure followed by the Court of Claims in Gratehouse v. United States, 206 Ct.Cl. 288, 512 F.2d 1104 (1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 480, 54 L.Ed.2d 313 (1977); and also by our court in Fucik v. United States, supra, where the plaintiff attempted to raise an issue below, “although somewhat inartfully.”