Court Opinion

ID: 9408392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 17:05:43.44981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.698643
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/12/23 P. v. Napier CA1/5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A165405
 v.
 KEITH L. NAPIER,                                                       (Alameda County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. H54603)
             Defendant and Appellant.

         Appellant Keith Napier (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s order
denying recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1.1 Appellant
has not shown the court abused its discretion.
                                     PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In September 2013, the Alameda County District Attorney filed an
information charging appellant with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); count 1); aggravated mayhem (§ 205; count 2); and attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 3). The information included allegations
that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury (permanent paralysis)
(§ 12022.7, subd. (b)) and that appellant personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon (a knife) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information further

         1   All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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alleged that appellant committed the offenses while on parole (§ 1203.085,
subd. (b)), that he had served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and
that he had suffered two prior serious and violent felony convictions (§§ 667,
subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (a)).
      In October 2014, appellant pleaded no contest to the assault
charge and admitted the allegations that he had inflicted great bodily injury
and had suffered a prior serious felony conviction. The plea was in exchange
for a term of 14 years in prison and the dismissal of the remaining charges
and allegations. The trial court sentenced appellant to the agreed-upon term,
comprised of 4 years for the assault conviction, 5 years for the injury
enhancement, and 5 years for the prior serious felony conviction.
      In October 2019, the Secretary of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recall of appellant’s
sentence and resentencing under former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (now
section 1172.1). The letter referenced an amendment to section 1385 giving
the trial court discretion to dismiss an enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). In compliance with the procedures of section 1172.1, the
trial court appointed counsel and held a hearing. In April 2022, the court
denied recall and resentencing on the ground that appellant posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
      The present appeal followed.
                           FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      According to the probation officer’s report, on the evening of June 4,
2012, Hayward police officers responded to a report of “a man down on the
sidewalk.” The officers learned from witnesses that the victim, appellant,
and two others drove from Vallejo to a Motel 6 in Hayward, close to the
location where the officers responded. “The victim was attempting to meet

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up with his girlfriend who was staying at a Motel 6,” and he used appellant’s
cell phone to stay in contact with her. The victim realized they were at the
wrong Motel 6 location, and appellant “became enraged and began arguing
with the victim[,] stating he was returning to Vallejo.” The victim refused to
return appellant’s phone because he needed to communicate with his
girlfriend.
      Appellant “drove erratically out of the parking lot and stopped at” an
intersection, “yelling at the victim.” The victim and another person exited
the car and began to walk back towards the Motel 6. The victim still had
appellant’s cell phone; appellant followed and demanded return of his phone.
The victim refused. As the victim walked away, appellant “used a pointed
weapon and stabbed the victim one time [i]n the back of his neck. . . . The
victim fell to the ground.” Appellant fled.
      The stab “transected [the victim’s] spinal cord[,] causing permanent
paralysis.” The victim “require[d] a ventilator tube, feeding tube and
pacemaker to stay alive.” The parties agree the victim died from his injury
years later.
                                DISCUSSION
      Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a court to “recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant
in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced” on the
court’s own motion (within 120 days after sentencing) or at any time upon a
recommendation from the Secretary of the CDCR or other specified persons.
      The goal of such resentencing is to “eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) Section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(4) provides that, “In recalling and resentencing
pursuant to this provision, the court may consider postconviction factors,

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including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. The court shall
consider if the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence, . . . and whether those circumstances were a contributing
factor in the commission of the offense.”
      Because the Secretary of the CDCR recommended resentencing there is
a “presumption favoring recall and resentencing of [appellant], which may
only be overcome if a court finds [appellant] is an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (b)(2).) Section 1170.18, subdivision (c) states that “ ‘unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner
will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of
subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” As
relevant in the present case, that clause includes “Any homicide offense,
including any attempted homicide offense.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).)
We review the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. (People
v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863.)
      In denying recall and resentencing, the trial court stated, “I have very
carefully considered this matter over a period of time, and . . . I’ve reviewed
the material in this case thoroughly a couple of times. . . . [¶] I’m going to
deny recall and resentencing. . . . [¶] I’m mindful that in this event that
[appellant] and the victim . . . were acquaintances. They were socializing

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together. The victim had borrowed [appellant’s] cellphone to call his
girlfriend. [Appellant] wanted the cellphone back. The victim wasn’t quick
enough to return the cellphone. [Appellant] responded by stabbing the victim
in the back of the neck, which completely severed his spinal cord. He nearly
died from it, and over a period of seven or eight years, he was on a ventilator
and deteriorating health and ultimately succumbed to these injuries and died
as a result.”
      The court continued, “When I look at [the] kind[] [of] mitigating factors
that are described in 117[2.1](a)(4), among other things, I should consider
whether [appellant has] experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma. He indicated in the probation report he suffered none of that. He
indicated his mental health was good. His physical health was good . . . . [¶]
I’m just finding that the degree of violence here, he was on parole when this
occurred, and . . . it was parole for assault with personal infliction of great
bodily injury to somebody else. [¶] [Appellant] is just an extremely
dangerous individual who has anger management issues to the extreme, and
he’s not safe for the community, and . . . I find that there’s a real threat . . . of
him committing another homicide offense or attempted homicide offense.”
      Appellant argues resentencing was justified due to his age (about 60
years old) and his good record during confinement. He also argues the grant
of discretion to trial courts to strike the five-year prior conviction
enhancement is a change of circumstances supporting resentencing. He also
emphasizes the presumption in favor of resentencing.
      None of those considerations show the trial court abused its discretion.
As the trial court explained, the record lacked significant mitigating factors
such as those identified in section 1172.1. In particular, appellant told the
probation officer he had a stable upbringing and did not suggest he had

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suffered any trauma that contributed to commission of the offense. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(4).) There was no indication appellant’s age or physical health
significantly reduced the risk of future violence. (Ibid.) The trial court was
reasonably concerned about the extreme and disproportionate violence in the
underlying offense and the possibility of a recurrence of such violence in the
future, and the court appropriately pointed out that there were similar
explosions of violence in appellant’s criminal record. Although appellant’s
record during confinement was good, that did not negate the risk of future
violence.
      Appellant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in denying
recall and resentencing.
                                DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order is affirmed.

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                     SIMONS, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J.

(A165405)

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