Court Opinion

ID: 9947377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 18:05:58.434255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:24.229659
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 231784

                                                                                FIFTH DIVISION
                                                                                    March 4, 2024

                                        IN THE
                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                    FIRST DISTRICT

No. 1-23-1784

 In re PARENTAGE OF D.F. and J.F., Minors,                      )      Appeal from the
                                                                )      Circuit Court of
 (Leslie Ward,                                                  )      Cook County.
                                                                )
        Petitioner-Appellant,                                   )
                                                                )      No. 22 D 079326
 v.                                                             )
                                                                )
 Jennifer Froelich,                                             )      Honorable
                                                                )      Patrick Powers,
        Respondent-Appellee).                                   )      Judge Presiding.

       JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Justices Lyle and Navarro concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1     Petitioner Leslie Ward and respondent Jennifer Froelich were in a long-term romantic

relationship during which Jennifer gave birth through artificial insemination to the minor children,

D.F. and J.F. After the relationship ended, Jennifer no longer permitted Leslie to see the children.

Leslie filed a petition, asking the court to enter an order finding she was a parent of D.F. and J.F.

and giving her reasonable parenting time. Jennifer filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section

2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022)), arguing

Leslie lacked standing to bring the petition. The circuit court agreed and dismissed Leslie’s
No. 1-23-1784

petition. Leslie has appealed and, for the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

¶2                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶3     On March 17, 2022, Leslie filed a “Petition to Adjudicate Parentage, For Entry of

Allocation of Parenting Time Order, Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, Related Matters, and

Other Relief.” According to Leslie, she and Jennifer were in a committed relationship during which

they had two children through artificial insemination. Although Jennifer gave birth to both

children, Leslie and Jennifer both “parented the children and had committed to and did share all

responsibilities of parenthood.” Shortly after their relationship ended in November 2021, Jennfier

changed the locks on the residence and has refused to allow Leslie access to their children.

¶4     Leslie asserted two claims: (1) a “petition to adjudicate parentage”; and (2) a “petition for

entry of an allocation of parenting time order, appointment of guardian ad litem, related matters

and other relief.” Under both counts, Leslie alleged she had standing pursuant to section 602 of

the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (Parentage Act or Act) (750 ILCS 46/101 et seq.) and under the

common law. Specifically, Leslie alleged that she had standing under the Act because she was a

woman “alleging herself to be the parent of the child” (id. § 602(e)), she had “provided financial

support to the child” (id. § 602(g)), and she was “an intended parent” (id. § 602(k)). In addition,

Leslie alleged that she had standing under the common law as a person with rights pursuant to the

common law causes of action of breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel.

¶5     Leslie further alleged that she and Jennifer had been in a “long-term romantic, intimate

relationship” starting in 2007. They moved in together in 2013, and Leslie “contributed to

mortgage payments, living and related expenses,” and she and Jennifer “discussed their desire and

plans to have children.” Each wanted to be a biological parent and they agreed “that they would

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No. 1-23-1784

each adopt the other’s biological child to assure there would be no issues with hospital/medical

access for the non-birth parent and that there would be no issues in the event something happened

to either one of them.” They agreed that Jennifer would try to conceive first because she was

approximately five years older than Leslie.

¶6     Their first child, D.F., was born in 2016. When Leslie suggested initiating adoption

proceedings, however, Jennifer said “she wanted to wait until [Leslie] delivered their second child

and then have adoptions for both children at the same time.” Adoption required the consent of both

parties, and Leslie said she “had no reason not to trust [Jennifer] and relied on her to make good

on her promise after their next child was to be born.”

¶7     When the two women decided that it was time to have their second child, Jennifer said she

again wanted to bear the child, citing her age, and Leslie “conceded, based on her trust in

[Jennifer],” believing “that she would have a vital, equal parenting role.” Jennifer thus also carried

their second child, J.F., who was born in 2018. Leslie alleged that Jennifer then “again reneged on

her promise to participate with [Leslie] in adoption proceedings for both children.”

¶8     Leslie alleged in detail her involvement in the entire process of having the children. Leslie

took on the primary role in selecting the donor and both she and Jennifer shared the cost of

“purchasing sufficient vials of donor gametes to have enough for future children.” Leslie attended

fertility appointments, OB/GYN appointments, and parenting classes, together with Jennifer. They

shopped for nursery furniture and baby clothes together. Leslie and Jennifer attended a baby

shower at Leslie’s parents’ home in Michigan, along with Jennifer’s mother and one of her sisters,

where they were “introduced as partners and parents” and opened gifts together. They sent out

thank you cards together.

¶9     Leslie alleged that she was in the room for the entire labor and delivery of both of their

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No. 1-23-1784

children. Leslie said she and Jennifer shared in the joys, responsibilities, and financial expenses of

parenting both D.F. and J.F. They both “bonded with their children through loving, hugging,

feeding, playing, dressing, reading, changing diapers, tending to minor illnesses, and engaging in

all the other activities that are part of being a parent.” Both D.F. and J.F. called Leslie “Mommy.”

¶ 10   Leslie split the cost of daycare for both children with Jennifer and participated as a full

parent with respect to both children’s daycare experiences. When Leslie and Jennifer moved with

their children to a new home in 2019, Leslie “continued to contribute to the mortgage payment and

other expenses of the family’s new residence.” Leslie also alleged that D.F. and J.F. knew her

parents as grandparents, and that her parents visited them in Northbrook to “enjoy the company of

their grandchildren.” Leslie and the children had also visited Leslie’s parents “several times at

their home in Michigan.”

¶ 11   As relief, Leslie requested an order finding that she was a parent of D.F. and J.F. and that

she was “entitled to all legal rights, benefits, and responsibilities of a parent.” Leslie asked the

court to give her reasonable parenting time with both D.F. and J.F., set a temporary parenting time

schedule, require the parties to attend mediation, appoint a guardian ad litem for the children, and

for an award of attorney fees and costs.

¶ 12   On May 2, 2022, Jennifer moved to dismiss Leslie’s petition pursuant to section 2-619 of

the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2022)), arguing that Leslie lacked standing to seek the

requested relief.

¶ 13   In her response to Jennifer’s motion, Leslie primarily argued that Jennifer failed to support

her motion with an affidavit, Jennifer’s motion “consist[ed] of conclusions and facts not

‘admissible in evidence,” and that it was Jennifer’s burden to prove Leslie lacked standing, not

Leslie’s burden to establish standing.

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No. 1-23-1784

¶ 14   Argument was held, after which the circuit court issued a written order on September 1,

2023, granting Jennifer’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that this was “a purely legal issue of

statutory construction regarding the threshold question of whether Leslie ha[d] standing to bring

her Petition.” The court found Leslie had failed to allege facts showing she had standing to bring

her petition under the Parentage Act or common law standing. The court acknowledged that “when

the General Assembly enacted the Parentage Act of 2015, it broadened the statutory avenues to

achieve standing to be a parent, and included situations that had previously been omitted.”

Ultimately, however, the court concluded that the situation Leslie found herself in—“an individual

in a dating relationship with someone who ha[d] children”—was not included in the relevant

sections of the Parentage Act. The court feared that to hold otherwise would “open the floodgates”

to claims by parties who were merely in dating relationships with individuals who were the parents

of children seeking court intervention to maintain relationships with those children “absent any

legal basis and against the wishes of the parent.”

¶ 15   This appeal followed.

¶ 16                                    II. JURISDICTION

¶ 17   The circuit court dismissed Leslie’s petition on September 1, 2023, and Leslie timely filed

her notice of appeal on September 29, 2023. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final

judgments entered by the circuit court in civil cases.

¶ 18                                      III. ANALYSIS

¶ 19   “The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and easily

proved issues of fact at the outset of litigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Strauss v. City

of Chicago, 2022 IL 127149, ¶ 54. Subsection (a)(9) specifically provides for involuntary

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No. 1-23-1784

dismissal where “the claim asserted against [the] defendant is barred by other affirmative matter

avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022). An

“affirmative matter” is “something in the nature of a defense which negates the cause of action

completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or

inferred from the complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Strauss, 2022 IL 127149, ¶ 54.

It must either “be apparent on the face of the complaint or otherwise be supported by affidavits or

other evidentiary material.” Id. In deciding a section 2-619 motion, the court “must interpret all

pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. “Thus, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn in [the] plaintiffs’ favor.” Valerio v.

Moore Landscapes, LLC, 2021 IL 126139, ¶ 20. We review a dismissal under section 2-619

de novo. Id.

¶ 20   The sole basis for Jennifer’s section 2-619 motion was that Leslie lacked standing to bring

her petition, under either the Parentage Act or the common law. The purpose of the standing

doctrine “is to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies and not abstract

questions or moot issues” (In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1996)) and “to preclude

persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit” (Glisson v. City of Marion, 188

Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)). “A standing challenge focuses on the party seeking relief—not on the

merits of the controversy—and asks whether that party is entitled to pursue the legal challenge,

either in their personal or representative capacity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mareskas-

Palcek v. Schwartz, Wolf & Bernstein, LLP, 2017 IL App (1st) 162746, ¶ 30.

¶ 21   Initially, we note that Jennifer spends a decent portion of her brief arguing that Leslie has

forfeited her arguments because her opening brief fails to comply with Illinois Supreme Court

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No. 1-23-1784

Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), and because she did not raise precisely the same arguments in

the circuit court. We disagree, however, that Leslie has forfeited anything on appeal.

¶ 22     Rule 341(h)(7) requires that the argument section of an appellate brief “contain the

contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages

of the record relied on.” Id. The argument section of Leslie’s brief complies with those

requirements—she claims that she has standing under the Parentage Act and common law, she

cites the sections of the Parentage Act under which she claims to have standing, she points out the

facts alleged in her petition that support her claim for standing, and she cites caselaw that she

argues supports her common law standing claim. Leslie’s brief complies with Rule 341(h)(7).

¶ 23     As to whether Leslie forfeited her arguments by failing to make them in the circuit court,

our supreme court has made clear that a party may forfeit a claim, but not arguments in support of

a claim. Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76. Here, Leslie raised her claim that she has

standing before the circuit court and maintains it now on appeal. In her petition, she specifically

alleged standing under subsections (e), (g), and (k) of section 602 the Parentage Act, as well as

common law standing. Any arguments she makes in support of that claim are not forfeited, even

if they were not made before the circuit court. Accordingly, Leslie has not forfeited her standing

claim.

¶ 24     The question of whether Leslie has standing pursuant to the Parentage Act is one of

statutory construction. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect

to the intent of the legislature.” Hart v. Illinois State Police, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 17. The best

indication of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute, which “should be given its plain

and ordinary meaning.” Id.

¶ 25     Article 6 of the Parentage Act is titled “Proceeding to Adjudicate Parentage” and

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No. 1-23-1784

specifically authorizes civil proceedings “to adjudicate the parentage of a child.” 750 ILCS 46/601

(West 2022). Section 602, titled “Standing,” first states that “[a] complaint to adjudicate parentage

shall be verified, shall be designated a petition, and shall name the person or persons alleged to be

the parent of the child.” Id. § 602. It then provides that “a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may

be maintained by,” in relevant part:

                “(e) a woman presumed or alleging herself to be the parent of the child;

                ***

                (g) any person or public agency that has physical possession of or has custody of

       or has been allocated parental responsibilities for, is providing financial support to, or has

       provided financial support to the child; [or]

                                                 ***

                (k) an intended parent.” Id. § 602(e), (g), (k).

¶ 26   It is clear to us, reading Leslie’s allegations in the light most favorable to her as the

non-moving party, that Leslie has standing under several subsections of section 602. Section 602

is broad, granting standing to numerous parties who might not otherwise have it, such as “the

support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency authorized by other law.” Id. § 602(f).

¶ 27   Specifically relevant to this case, the Parentage Act recognizes standing for “a woman who

is presumed to be or alleging herself to be the parent of the child.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 602(e).

Leslie, through filing a petition seeking an adjudication that she is the parent of D.F. and J.F., has

alleged herself to be the parent of D.F. and J.F. The language of the statute makes clear that this is

sufficient to give her standing.

¶ 28   The circuit court recognized that subsection (e) gives standing to a woman alleging herself

to be a parent but found, with no explanation or citation of authority, that this subsection must be

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No. 1-23-1784

read “in light of the provisions of Section 204” of the Act and that “nothing in Leslie’s Petition

[brought] her matter within the scope of [that] provision.” We disagree.

¶ 29    Section 204 of the Act lists the circumstances under which a person is presumed to be a

parent. Id. § 204. However, section 602(e) grants standing more broadly to “a woman presumed

or alleging herself to be the parent of the child.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 602(e). As our supreme

has observed, “[t]he word ‘or’ is disjunctive” and “[a]s used in its ordinary sense, *** marks an

alternative indicating the various parts of the sentence which it connects are to be taken separately.”

Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 145 (2006). Indeed, the Act itself

contemplates that a presumed parent may be a different person than an alleged parent. See 750

ILCS 46/605(a)(1) (West 2022) (“In any action brought under *** Article 6 of this Act where ***

the individual alleged to be the parent in a petition is different from an individual who is presumed

to be the parent of the child under Article 2 of this Act, a notice shall be served on the presumed

parent ***” (emphasis added)). Leslie asserts that she has standing as a person “alleging herself to

be the parent of the child” and the alternative provision of section 602(e) giving standing to a

“presumed” parent under section 204 is simply irrelevant.

¶ 30    Jennifer also argues that Leslie’s allegations that she is a parent should be disregarded as

conclusory. According to Jennifer, “Leslie declares that she is a ‘parent’ within the meaning of the

2015 Act without showing that she has a ‘parent-child’ relationship under § 201 as required by the

definition.” We are not sure that any more detail is required to give Leslie standing but, in any

event, Leslie did not simply state that she was a parent without any supporting allegations: All of

Leslie’s allegations in support of her petition—her involvement in selecting a donor, the artificial

insemination process, the pregnancy, and the raising of the children—support her allegation that

she is a parent.

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No. 1-23-1784

¶ 31   In short, Leslie has standing under subsection (e) as someone alleging herself to be the

parent of D.F. and J. F. This is a classic example of a party with “a real interest in the outcome of

the controversy” (Carr v. Koch, 2012 IL 113414, ¶ 28) who “is entitled to pursue the legal

challenge” (Mareskas-Palcek, 2017 IL App (1st) 162746, ¶ 30).

¶ 32   Leslie has also alleged sufficient facts to show that she fits under the narrower standing

provisions of sections 602(g) and 602(k).

¶ 33   Section 602(g) grants standing to a person who “has physical possession of or has custody

of or has been allocated parental responsibilities for, is providing financial support to, or has

provided financial support to the child.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 46/602(g) (West 2022).

Leslie has alleged throughout the petition numerous ways in which she provided financial support

to D.F. and J.F., including splitting the cost of daycare for both children with Jennifer.

¶ 34   This ground was found inapplicable by the circuit court because Leslie “fail[ed] to allege

any court order or other legal document that requires her to provide the children with financial

support.” But nothing in section 602(g) requires that the person who provided financial support

did so pursuant to a court order, and “[a] court may not read into a statute any limitations or

conditions which are not expressed in the plain language of the statute.” Evanston Insurance Co.

v. Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 23.

¶ 35   Jennifer argues that Leslie’s claim lacks merit because “financial ‘support’ is a duty that is

defined and ordered by a court *** and does not equate with the simple payment of certain

expenses.” Jennifer points to article 8 of the Act, section 801(a) of which references the Illinois

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2022)).

That section, titled “Child support orders,” provides that “[i]n determining the amount of [a] child

support award, the court shall use the guidelines and standards set forth in Sections 505 and 505.2

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No. 1-23-1784

of the [Marriage Act].” 750 ILCS 46/801(a) (West 2022). It appears that Jennifer is arguing that

“support” is a term of art that Leslie has misconstrued, but Jennifer ignores the fact that section

801 of the Parentage Act and sections 505 and 505.2 of the Marriage Act refer to “child support”—

not to “financial support.” Id.; 750 ILCS 5/505, 505.2 (West 2022). If the legislature had intended

to grant standing under section 602(g) of the Parentage Act only to a person who had paid court-

ordered child support, it certainly could have used that term. Instead, the legislature used the more

generic “financial support.” We are thus unpersuaded by Jennifer’s argument on this point. Leslie

also had standing based on section 602(g).

¶ 36   Finally, we find that Leslie has alleged sufficient facts to show she has standing under

section 602(k) as an “intended parent.” 750 ILCS 46/602(k) (West 2022). The Act defines an

“intended parent” as “a person who enters into an assisted reproductive technology arrangement

*** under which he or she will be the legal parent of the resulting child.” 750 ILCS 46/103(m-5).

The term “arrangement” means “[a] measure taken or plan made in advance of some occurrence,

sometimes for a legal purpose; an agreement or settlement of details made in anticipation.” Black’s

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

¶ 37   Leslie alleged in her petition that she and Jennifer discussed their plans to have children,

that each wanted to be a biological parent, that they jointly agreed that Jennifer would have their

first child while Leslie would have their second, and that “they would each adopt the other’s

biological child.” This certainly seems like a plan made in advance of some occurrence, and under

this plan—as modified when it was decided that Jennifer would also carry their second child—

Leslie was supposed to adopt her non-biological child, which would have made her the legal parent

of that child (see 750 ILCS 46/201(a)(3) (West 2022) (a parent-child relationship is established by

“adoption of the child by the woman”). That Jennifer then refused to allow Leslie to adopt either

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No. 1-23-1784

D.F. or J.F. does not change Leslie’s allegations that they had an arrangement under which she

would have become the legal parent of her non-biological children.

¶ 38   Because Leslie has alleged sufficient facts to show she has standing under the Parentage

Act, the circuit court’s grant of Jennifer’s motion to dismiss was in error. Accordingly, we reverse

the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 39   We note that this case addresses standing, not the merits of Leslie’s petition. Those remain

to be determined in the first instance by the circuit court. This case was considered and resolved

by this court on an expedited basis under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018),

because it involves allocation of parental responsibilities. Time is of the essence for these young

children who have already grown two years older since Leslie filed this petition. We urge the

circuit court and the parties to move expeditiously to resolve the merits of this case.

¶ 40   In order to expedite this resolution, this court has by separate order, on its own motion,

shortened the time to file any petition for rehearing to 10 days and has directed that the mandate

shall issue immediately thereafter if no petition is filed.

¶ 41                                    IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 42   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for

further proceedings.

¶ 43   Reversed and remanded.

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No. 1-23-1784

                         In re D.F., 2024 IL App (1st) 231784

Decision Under Review:      Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-D-
                            079326, the Hon. Patrick Powers, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                   Leslie Ward, of Northbrook, appellant pro se.
for
Appellant:

Attorneys                   Schiller Du Canto & Fleck LLP, of Chicago (Michele M.
for                         Jochner and Anita M. Ventrelli, of counsel).
Appellee:

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