Court Opinion

ID: 9772639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:24:31.215941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.429904
License: Public Domain

MALONEY, Judge,
concurring.
While I join the majority’s opinion, based upon a plain language reading of article 42.12 § 3g and the fully incorporated penal code definition of “deadly weapon,” I write separately to point out that perhaps it is time for the Legislature to re-examine its goals in the context of article 42.12 § 3g and consider whether those goals are being met under the current reading of that provision.
Article 42.12 § 3g(a)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon may be made “when it is shown that a deadly weapon as defined in Section 1.07, Penal Code, was used or exhibited during the commission of a felony offense....” If such a finding is made, the defendant is not eligible for court-ordered community supervision and is not eligible for parole until his actual calendar time served, without consideration of good conduct time, is the lesser of one half of his maximum sentence or thirty years. Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. arts. 42.12 § 3g; 42.18 § 8(b)(3).
Appellant argues in part that “an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon requires an element of intent or deliberateness on the part of the actor that the object be utilized as a deadly weapon.” In other words, the manner of use necessarily includes the notion that the actor intended the result — in this case, death. While I am compelled to agree with the majority that appellant’s argument is not consistent with a plain reading of the definition of “deadly weapon” under section 1.07, it is consistent with the Legislature’s original intent in enacting the deadly weapon finding under section 3g.
There is not a lot to be gleaned from the legislative history of section 3g as to the Legislature’s understanding of specific terms within the section. See Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (stating “[djirect reference to the evolution of Art. 42.12 § 3g, supra, through both houses of the Legislature and conference committee sheds no light on what the Legislature intended to be meant by ‘used or exhibited a deadly weapon’ and tapes of the legislative debates and committee hearings are equally as barren”); Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 393 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (noting that record of legislative history for SB 152, the bill that was to become section 3 of article 42.12, “is incomplete” and that intended meaning of specific term within that legislation “is difficult to educe”). However, what legislative history can be found at least illuminates the Legislature’s overall purpose in enacting the section.
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Affairs, Senator Bill Meier, the sponsor of Senate Bill 152 explained that the new provision would have the effect of enhancing the sentences of offenders of violent crimes1 and offenders who utilized a “deadly weapon” in the commission of their crime. Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Affairs, Transcript of Discussion on SB 152, Feb. 8, 1977, *803at p. 2-3. One individual who testified before the subcommittee stated that the enhancement nature of the bill was intended to send a message to criminals to leave their firearms2 at home:
... the point we are trying to get to when we use the language “used or exhibited” is simply to say that if a person is going to commit an offense, leave that firearm at home. Don’t take it with you. Don’t have the opportunity to use it; don’t exhibit it. Don’t be around a firearm if you are going to commit an offense because you know that if you do the offense or the penalty, or the combination of the two would perhaps be more onerous than if you commit the offense without the use of a firearm.
Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Affairs, Transcript of Discussion on SB 152, Feb. 15, 1977, at p. 15; see also id. at 17 (another witness testifying against the bill, stated “the intent is to stop people from using weapons in the commission of crime”). An advocate opposing portions of the bill argued against the inclusion of the “exhibited” language, urging that there needed to be “a causation between the weapon and the crime.” Id. at 18. Senator Meier responded that deletion of the “exhibited” language would render “any deterrent effect of the law totally useless” because “what we want to do is stop the guy from bringing it[, the firearm or deadly weapon,] in the first place.” Id. at 20. Another person argued against the bill on the ground that there were already substantial deterrents built into the Penal Code to “leave the gun at home or the deadly weapon at home.” Id. at 23. Responding to that testimony, Senator Meier stated in part:
... the purpose of the bill is to ... attempt to deter the commission of those crimes by insuring that other provisions of the criminal justice system, such as the calculation of good time credit, and such as the obtaining of probation, and such as the time a person is going to be eligible for parole, are denied the persons who commit those serious offenses in those limited circumstances. That is the purpose of the bill.
Id. at 24. From this testimony it is clear that one of the primary goals behind the enactment of section 3g was to deter offenders from using guns or other deadly weapons in the commission of crimes — to encourage them to leave their weapons at home. See also Narron, v. State, 835 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (Overstreet, J., concurring) (recognizing one reason for affirmative deadly weapon finding under article 42.12 is to act as a deterrent).
Yet, the original deterrent purpose of the legislation is at odds with the reality of the application of section 3g, due largely to what may have been legislative oversight in incorporating the whole of the Penal Code’s definition of deadly weapon. Section 1.07 of the Penal Code defines “deadly weapon” as:
(A) a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or
(B) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
Under subsection (B) virtually everything has been found to be a deadly weapon and therefore supportive of a deadly weapon finding for purposes of section 3g, including such things as hands, feet, fabric, a sock, the floor, and of course, an automobile.3 Given that *804the purpose of section 3g was to deter offenders from bringing weapons with them to use in the commission of crimes, it is difficult to imagine how this goal can be furthered if even the offender’s hands or the car he drives is a deadly weapon. This point is well-reasoned in the brief of the amicus curiae:
The logical rationale for increasing the amount of time required to be served before a prisoner is eligible for parole or early release where an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon has been made is twofold: (1) to act as a deterrent “in order to diminish the danger to human life that could be expected to arise in the circumstances that attend a felony offense when its commission is accompanied by a deadly weapon” [Narron v. State, 835 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (Overstreet, J., concurring) ]; and (2) imposing a less lenient range of punishment (by denying probation eligibility and delaying parole eligibility) on the grounds that someone who uses a deadly weapon has a higher degree of culpability than one who doesn’t, because of the attendant risk.
Both of these reasons are rational only if the issue of “use” of the object found to be a deadly weapon involves some element of choice or decision on the part of the actor. To “deter” is defined as “to turn aside, discourage, or prevent from acting by fear or consideration of dangerous, difficult, or unpleasant attendant circumstances or consequences.” [citing Websters Third New International Dictionary], The increased punishment provisions would have no “deterrent” effect unless the actor was provided the choice to use or not to use a deadly weapon. Likewise, the issue of increased culpability is dependent upon an actor’s conscious assumption of the real and potential risks to others inherent in the use of an object as a deadly weapon.
This problem is particularly acute when the scope of “deadly weapon” includes not only “objects” or “instruments”, but also hands and feet. If, literally, anything which could or is used to cause death or serious bodily injury is a deadly weapon, the issue of an affirmative finding becomes meaningless, as every case where a death or serious bodily injury occurred would result in an “automatic” deadly weapon finding.
(footnotes omitted).
The incorporation of only subsection (A) of the section 1.07 definition would have been in *805line with the Legislature’s stated goal in enacting section 3g by providing a deterrent for offenders who are making a choice as to whether or not to leave their deadly weapons at home. By also incorporating subsection (B) of the section 1.07 definition, under which virtually everything has been rendered a deadly weapon, the Legislature effectively thwarted the primary purpose it intended to serve by enacting section 3g. I would urge the Legislature to take a closer look at the intended function of section 3g as it is applied in light of section 1.07.
With these comments I join the opinion of the majority.

. The first subsection of the bill provided that a defendant found guilty of certain enumerated offenses would not be eligible for parole until a specified amount of calendar time had been served or for court-ordered community supervision, the same sanctions that applied to a defendant who used or exhibited a deadly weapon under the following subsection. When the bill was enacted the following crimes were enumerated: capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated sexual abuse, and aggravated robbery. This subsection was amended in 1993 to add murder and indecency with a child to the list. Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900 § 4.01, p. 3718.

. As enacted, another subsection of 3g provided that upon an affirmative finding that the defendant convicted of a second degree (or higher) felony used or exhibited a firearm and the defendant is granted probation, the court may nevertheless order the defendant confined in the Department of Corrections for not less than 60 days or more than 120 days.
Because both the deadly weapon subsection and the firearm subsection served similar goals, it appears that they were often referred to interchangeably throughout the subcommittee discussions.

. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 883 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.App. — Ft. Worth 1994, no pet. history)) (automobile was deadly weapon in involuntary manslaughter, driving while intoxicated case); Hill v. State, 881 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.App. — Ft. Worth 1994, pet. granted) (metal rods, belts, and locks *804used to restrain child from obtaining food were deadly weapons in injury to child by omission case); Stanul v. State, 870 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App. — Austin 1994, pet. granted) (floor against which defendant struck victim’s head was deadly weapon); Escobar v. State, 799 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd) (baseball bat was deadly weapon in murder case); Lozano v. State, 860 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.App. — Austin 1993, pet. ref’d) (lighter used to start fire that killed or badly binned five people was deadly weapon); Johnson v. State, 770 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1989) (hands and feet used to strike victim were deadly weapon in murder case), affd, 815 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Roberts v. State, 766 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.App. — Austin 1989, no pet.) (truck was deadly weapon in aggravated assault with deadly weapon case); Shockley v. State, 747 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (fabric or hands were deadly weapon in murder by strangulation case); Kirkpatrick v. State, 747 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.App. — Ft. Worth 1988, pet ref’d) (hands were deadly weapon in murder case); Fegurgur v. State, 734 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.App. — Austin 1987, no pet.) (knife or knuckles were deadly weapon in murder case); Cervantes v. State, 706 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.) (board was deadly weapon in aggravated assault case); see also State ex rel Esparza v. Paxson, 855 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1993, no pet.) (trial court did not have discretion to disregard affirmative finding that sock was deadly weapon in strangulation case).
The category of “deadly weapons” has likewise been broadly interpreted in deciding whether the indictment provided sufficient notice that the State would seek a deadly weapon finding. See, e.g., Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim.App.1992) (recognizing that motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon in involuntary manslaughter case for purposes of providing notice in indictment); Pena v. State, 864 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App. — Waco 1993, no pet.) (allegation that defendant caused death by cutting victim’s throat with "sharp object” was sufficient to give notice that State would seek deadly weapon finding); Mixon v. State, 781 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (indictment alleging unknown object used to strangle provided sufficient notice); Gilbert v. State, 769 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Crim.App.1989, no pet.) (allegation that defendant caused serious bodily injury to a child by placing him in hot liquid provided sufficient notice).