Court Opinion

ID: 9491815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:24:31.103346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:57.441820
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I am in complete accord with the discerning opinion on standard of review set out in part II.Á.1. and with the discussion in part II.A.2. on obstruction of justice.
I write separately with regard to part II.B. and the discussion of the sentence enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 is the guidelines section under consideration. It deals with “unlawful receipt, possession or transportation of firearms.” The particular subsection 2K2.1(b)(5) covers the situation “if the defendant used or possessed any firearm ... in connection with another felony offense.”
One would think the language used in the guidelines to enhance a sentence would apply to the circumstances involved in this case. McDonald was engaged in a felony, theft from a federally licensed firearms dealer; he burglarized the dealer and obtained, “received” without permission, a stash of firearms he intended to steal. He was in “possession” of the stolen firearms, and he was in the process of “transporting” them away when captured in the very act.
*1038A common sense reading of the guideline involved would seem to indicate that McDonald possessed these firearms “in connection with another felony offense” to which he pleaded guilty: burglary and theft of firearms (and other valuables) from a licensed weapons dealer.
Unfortunately, from my perspective, another panel of this court, in a similar recent case, somehow reached the opposite conclusion. United States v. Keidronn Sanders, 162 F.3d 396 (6th Cir.1998). I believe the decision to be mistaken, and I would have joined dissenting Judge Kennedy in her separate opinion had I been on that panel instead of this one. I do not believe that Note 18, properly construed, should lead to a different result. The “other felony offense” in our case was theft/burglary, not “firearm possession.”
I take some comfort that not only Judge Kennedy in Sanders, but the district judge who heard both Sanders and the instant ease, agree with my preferred interpretation.1 Alas, three of my colleagues now see it the way District Judge Borman saw it in Sanders. I see no logic in requiring as a condition precedent to the § 2K2.1 (b)(5) enhancement “a separation of time between the offense of conviction and the other felony offense.” Sanders, 162 F.3d at 400.
Despite my misgivings, I will concur in the result reached on the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) issue. We are bound by Sanders, but I would hope the entire court might take a look at this issue.

. We are also joined in this conclusion by the unanimous panel in a recent similar case, United States v. Armstead, 114 F.3d 504, 510-513 (5th Cir.1997).