Court Opinion

ID: 9912465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:08:48.753187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:27.944357
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Verna Shedrick,                        :
                             Appellant :
                                       :
          v.                           : No. 1041 C.D. 2022
                                       : Submitted: November 6, 2023
Duane A. Watson                        :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                     FILED: December 22, 2023

      Verna Shedrick (Shedrick) appeals from the October 26, 2021 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia (trial court) sustaining the preliminary
objections of City of Philadelphia Police Officer Duane A. Watson (Officer Watson)
and dismissing Shedrick’s claims against Officer Watson for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, following her arrest for controlled
substance violations and the subsequent dismissal of the charges. Upon review, we
affirm.
                                BACKGROUND
      On April 3, 2019, Shedrick’s brother picked her up from her cousin’s house
to give her a ride home. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 40a. Shedrick rode in the
front passenger seat while her brother drove. Id. Police officers, including Officer
Watson, initiated a traffic stop and, during the encounter, ordered both parties to exit
the vehicle. Id. The police found illegal drugs in the pocket of the front passenger
side door where Shedrick had been sitting. Id. Shedrick told the police the drugs
did not belong to her. Id. Shedrick’s brother also claimed the drugs were not
Shedrick’s, they were his, and Shedrick did not know the drugs were in the vehicle.
Id. at 41a. Officer Watson arrested Shedrick and charged her with purchase or
receipt of an unauthorized controlled substance and possession of a controlled
substance (drug charges). Id. Ultimately, the Philadelphia Office of the District
Attorney withdrew the drug charges on July 31, 2019. Id.
      On March 31, 2021, Shedrick filed her Complaint against Officer Watson
asserting claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Id.
at 9a-16a. In response, Officer Watson filed preliminary objections in the nature of
a demurrer asserting Shedrick’s claims require a lack of probable cause at the time
of arrest and, based on the facts Shedrick pled in her Complaint, probable cause
existed when Officer Watson arrested Shedrick thereby defeating her claims. Id. at
17a-20a. Subsequently, Shedrick filed an amended Complaint asserting the same
claims, but amending her factual averments. Id. at 39a-46a. By order filed October
26, 2021, the trial court sustained Officer Watson’s preliminary objections and
dismissed Shedrick’s Complaint with prejudice. Id. at 110a. In its Pa. R.A.P.
1925(a) Opinion, the trial court explained:

      [Shedrick] pleaded that “police officers found [the drugs] in the pocket
      of the front passenger side door near where [Shedrick] had been
      sitting.” Equal access to the [the drugs] provided police officers with
      the requisite facts to recognize that [Shedrick] had constructive
      possession of [the drugs], warranting probable cause for her arrest. This
      alone is enough to support [the trial court’s finding that its] dismissal
      of [Officer Watson] from this case was clearly warranted and further,

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      that [Shedrick] would be unable to prove facts that were legally
      sufficient to establish the right to relief.

Id. at 121a (internal citation omitted).
      Shedrick appeals to this Court.      On appeal, Shedrick asserts the trial court
erred in sustaining Officer Watson’s preliminary objections and dismissing her
Complaint because her Complaint properly alleged Officer Watson lacked probable
cause to arrest and prosecute her for the drug charges. Shedrick’s Br. at 4, 14.
Additionally, Shedrick contends the legal requirement of probable cause should have
been decided by the jury and the trial court misapplied the law and erred when it
determined it was reasonable for Officer Watson to believe Shedrick had
constructive possession of the illegal drugs found in an area of the car hidden from
view. Id. at 19-20. In response, Officer Watson argues the trial court properly found
he had probable cause to arrest Shedrick based on his belief that she constructively
possessed the illegal drugs. Officer Watson’s Br. at 9. Additionally, Officer Watson
maintains Shedrick’s arguments do not abrogate probable cause for her arrest. Id. at
13. Finally, Officer Watson asserts even if this Court was to conclude he lacked
probable cause to arrest Shedrick, Shedrick’s claims are barred by what is known as
the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8501-8564, because she
failed to allege sufficient facts to establish Officer Watson’s actions constituted
willful misconduct or actual malice. Id. at 16.
                                    DISCUSSION
      In an appeal from a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections and
dismissing a complaint, we review the trial court’s decision for an error of law or an
abuse of discretion. Rok v. Flaherty, 527 A.2d 211, 212 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). When
reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Reed
v. Brown, 166 A.3d 570, 572 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Schuylkill Navy v.

                                           3
Langbord, 728 A.2d 964, 968 (Pa. Super. 1999)). Under this standard, to sustain a
preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, it must appear with certainty,
based on the facts averred, the law will not permit recovery. Pa. State Troopers
Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 606 A.2d 586, 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). If any doubt exists,
we must overrule the preliminary objections. Id. While we accept as true all well-
pled facts and all reasonable inferences deduced from those facts, J.B. Steven, Inc.
v. Board of Commissioners of Wilkens Township, 643 A.2d 142, 144-45 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1994), we do not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences
from those facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. Pa. Builders
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 4 A.3d 215, 225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
      Shedrick’s Complaint alleged claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution against Officer Watson. As Officer Watson correctly points
out in his brief, see Officer Watson’s Br. at 9 n.1, under Pennsylvania law, false
arrest is synonymous with false imprisonment. Gagliardi v. Lynn, 285 A.2d 109,
111 (Pa. 1971). To sustain a cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment,
a plaintiff must show the defendant detained the plaintiff and the detention was
unlawful. Alleyne v. Pirrone, 180 A.3d 524, 543 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Where a
police officer’s detention, or arrest, of an individual is based upon probable cause, it
is justified and lawful, regardless of whether the individual arrested was guilty. Renk
v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). To sustain a cause of action for
malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show the defendant instituted proceedings
against the plaintiff without probable cause and with malice, and that the
proceedings terminated in favor of the plaintiff.         Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, and Helpers, Loc. Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988). The
absence of probable cause is a necessary element of malicious prosecution and if

                                           4
probable cause is shown to exist, it establishes an absolute defense to the action.
Turano v. Hunt, 631 A.2d 822, 824-25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Because Shedrick’s
claims require that Officer Watson lacked probable cause when he arrested Shedrick,
her claims necessarily fail if probable cause existed. Thus, we must consider
whether the facts averred by Shedrick support the trial court’s conclusion that
Officer Watson had probable cause to arrest Shedrick for the drug charges.
      “[P]robable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficient to warrant that an ordinary person in the same situation
could believe a party is guilty of the offense charged.” Id. at 825. Probable cause
“is not a high bar[,]” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014), and it “does
not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as
would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149
(1972). Notably, there is a clear distinction between what is required to establish
probable cause and what is required to sustain a conviction. An arresting officer is
not required to have evidence sufficient to convict in order to have probable cause
to make an arrest. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Probable cause
“requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). The
evidentiary standard for probable cause is significantly lower than the standard
required for conviction. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979).
      Moreover, when addressing whether an officer has probable cause, we do not
question whether the officer’s belief was “correct or more likely true than false.”
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Rather, we take a “common sense”
approach and determine its existence based upon the totality of the circumstances.
Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2016). Officers are permitted to

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come to their own “common-sense conclusions about human behavior” during their
investigations. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citation omitted). Additionally, an acquittal
or withdrawal of charges at a subsequent proceeding does not establish a lack of
probable cause at the time of the arrest. Turano, 631 A.2d at 824. The relevant
inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could conclude, considering the totality of
the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of any proffered
explanations, that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018). Whether a particular set of facts suggest
that an arrest is justified by probable cause requires an examination of the elements
of the crime at issue.
      Here, Officer Watson arrested Shedrick for drug possession.            In drug
possession cases, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant had knowing or
intentional possession of a controlled substance, and if the substance is not found on
the defendant’s person, then the Commonwealth must satisfy that burden by proof
of “constructive possession.” Commonwealth v. Macolino, 469 A.2d 132, 134 (Pa.
1983). Constructive possession is a “legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to deal with
the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference
arising from a set of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than
not.” Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986). Constructive
possession requires the defendant had both the power to control the contraband and
the intent to exercise that control. Macolino, 469 A.2d at 134. An officer may infer
constructive possession from the totality of the circumstances using circumstantial
evidence. Id. Further, more than one individual may be deemed to constructively
possess an item when it is found in an area of joint control or equal access.
Commonwealth v. Valette, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. 1992).

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      Applied to the current case, to have probable cause to arrest Shedrick for the
drug charges, Officer Watson needed only to reasonably suspect Shedrick
constructively possessed the illegal drugs. Here, Shedrick pled facts that supported
the conclusion Officer Watson had a reasonable belief she constructively possessed
the illegal drugs. Readily apparent to Officer Watson were the following facts: (1)
Shedrick was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle when the traffic stop
was initiated; and (2) upon a search of the vehicle, the illegal drugs were found in
the front passenger door of the vehicle. Obviously, the illegal drugs would have
been within her reach and, in fact, more accessible to her than the driver of the
vehicle. Upon these facts, we cannot say Officer Watson was unreasonable to
believe Shedrick committed the crime of, at least, constructive possession of the
illegal drugs.
      Shedrick argues her Complaint sufficiently pled Officer Watson knew he
lacked probable cause because of “observations the officers made prior to stopping
the vehicle” and Shedrick’s statements to Officer Watson claiming the illegal drugs
did not belong to her. Shedrick’s Br. at 17-18. We disagree. The trial court accepted
Shedrick’s factual averment that she and her brother told Officer Watson the illegal
drugs did not belong to Shedrick. R.R. at 122a-23a. However, the probable cause
standard does not require Officer Watson to resolve all potential issues nor to accept
as true Shedrick’s claims of innocence or her brother’s claims she was innocent.
Officer Watson could have reasonably inferred Shedrick was lying to avoid being
charged with a crime and Shedrick’s brother was lying to protect his sister. A
probable cause inquiry considers the totality of the circumstances and does not
require the police to correctly resolve conflicting evidence or to make accurate
credibility determinations. See Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005).

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Consequently, Shedrick’s claim that Officer Watson “knew” he lacked probable
cause or “knew” Shedrick did not commit the crime is nothing more than an
inference unwarranted by the facts, an argumentative allegation, or simply an
expression of Shedrick’s opinion. As a result, we need not accept the claim as true
and it was properly rejected by the trial court.
                                   CONCLUSION
      The facts averred by Shedrick in her Complaint demonstrate that Officer
Watson had a reasonable basis to suspect Shedrick constructively possessed the
illegal drugs the police found in the pocket of the passenger side door where
Shedrick sat at the time of the traffic stop. Even if Officer Watson made a mistake,
we cannot say Officer Watson acted unreasonably considering the information
available to him at the time. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion
Officer Watson had probable cause to arrest Shedrick. Because we conclude Officer
Watson had probable cause, Shedrick’s claims for false arrest or false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution necessarily fail. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion or err in sustaining Officer Watson’s preliminary objections and
dismissing Shedrick’s Complaint. We affirm the trial court’s order.

                                               ______________________________
                                               STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                           8
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Verna Shedrick,                     :
                          Appellant :
                                    :
         v.                         : No. 1041 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Duane A. Watson                     :

                                ORDER

     AND NOW, this 22nd day of December 2023, the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia’s October 26, 2021 order is AFFIRMED.

                                     ______________________________
                                     STACY WALLACE, Judge