Court Opinion

ID: 9571891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:36:06.429961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:09.079653
License: Public Domain

*717Justice MEYER
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority that the claimant’s failure to file his claim within the time prescribed by G.S. § 97-58(c) resulted in the Commission’s being without jurisdiction to hear the claim. I respectfully disagree that the record before this Court supports the conclusion that the claimant had an “occupational disease” in 1973. The majority concedes that the three factors identified in Taylor v. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E. 2d 144 (1980), “as triggering the onset of the two year period prescribed in G.S. § 97-58(c) for filing claims in the case of an occupational disease all came into being no later than 1974.” Completely insignificant to the proper result is, in what essentially amounts to dicta, that “plaintiff suffered injury from an occupational disease during 1973.” There is absolutely no reason to select the date of 1973 except to fortify the language in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E. 2d 359 (1983).
In 1974 Dr. Springer had made a finding of disablement by reason of the occupational disease, byssinosis, and advised claimant to apply for workers’ compensation for byssinosis in the State of Virginia. The majority concedes as much by its statement that:
This evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff was notified by Dr. Springer in 1974 that he had and was disabled by byssinosis and that disability due to byssinosis was of a sufficient nature and work related cause to entitle him to workers’ compensation disability benefits.
The majority further concedes that by Dr. Springer’s report “. . . the plaintiff was informed by competent medical authority of the nature and work related cause of his occupational disease no later than 1974.”
I also believe that on the record before us 1974 was the first year in which the claimant’s evidence of inability to work for extended periods of time demonstrates a total disability. The majority so concedes in stating that “the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that no later than 1974 the plaintiff was incapable of earning the same wages, either in the same or any other employment . . . .”
*718It is clear to me that the majority itself believes that all of the necessary factors came together in 1974 rather than in 1973. The majority says that:
We have found that the three factors identified in Taylor as triggering the onset of the two year period prescribed by G.S. 97-58(c) for filing claims in the case of an occupational disease all came into being no later than 1974. (Emphasis added.)
In order to find that claimant had an occupational disease (one of the Taylor factors) as early as 1973, the majority has found it necessary to rely heavily upon Rutledge. Not only is reliance on Rutledge ill advised, but in light of the majority’s conclusion that the critical date is 1974, it is completely unnecessary. Nevertheless, in view of the majority’s inexplicable reliance on the Rutledge rationale, I am further compelled to disagree with the majority’s reasoning in reaching its conclusion that claimant had an “occupational disease” in 1973.
The only medical evidence of claimant’s condition in 1973 was Dr. Battigelli’s report. It is clear that his report concludes that the claimant was severely and totally disabled and that he should not thereafter be exposed to “air borne irritants” such as “cigarette smoke and industrial dust.” It is likewise clear from that report that claimant’s respiratory impairment was probably due “in part” to cotton dust exposure. It is not clear (and the majority in my view is not justified in finding) that the impairment resulted from an “occupational disease.” Dr. Battigelli specifically reported in 1973 that “the diagnosis of byssinosis is not warranted” and that “[if] this subject has byssinosis this problem appears only an addition rather than the substance of his present impairment.” Dr. Battigelli’s diagnosis was “[ojbstructive disease in cigarette smoker with distinct aggravation on cotton dust exposure.” I do not find it significant that the claimant’s “obstructive disease” was aggravated by exposure to cotton dust. It was clearly also aggravated by cigarette smoke and presumably by other “airborne irritants.” Dr. Battigelli clearly “encouraged” the claimant to “discontinue smoking and dust exposure.” This limited medical evidence of the cause of claimant’s disablement does not justify a finding that the claimant had an “occupational disease” in 1973.
*719The majority contends that Dr. Battigelli’s report “[wjhen viewed in light of the testimony by the plaintiff and others” is sufficient to support a finding that “plaintiffs exposure to cotton dust in his employment significantly contributed to or was a significant causal factor in the disease.” The majority’s conclusion as to the “significance” and “substantiality” of the cotton dust exposure is exactly contrary to the clear words and meaning of Dr. Battigelli’s report. The pertinent part of Dr. Battigelli’s report concluded:
The etiology of . . . [claimant’s] impairment is probably due to in part to the cotton dust exposure in spite of the fact that the diagnosis of byssinosis is not warranted in view of the only occasional occurrence of complaints in relation to cotton dust exposure. If this subject has byssinosis this problem appears only an addition rather than the substance of his present impairment.
I continue to adhere to my position that there is no basis in law or in fact for the proposition that “for the purposes of awarding workers’ compensation benefits, there is no practical difference between chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis.” There is indeed a vast practical difference in “chronic obstructive lung disease” and “byssinosis.” Chronic obstructive lung disease can be due solely to any one or a combination of diseases such as asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, etc., which may be totally unrelated to an individual’s occupation. It is correct to say that whether chronic obstructive lung disease is compensable depends upon other factors. In my view those factors are aggravation or extenuation by conditions of the workplace and not, as the majority says, “factors set forth in Rutledge."
I find it totally unnecessary to rely on Rutledge to justify a finding of “occupational disease” in this case in 1973 when it was so clearly present, in connection with the other factors set forth in Taylor, in 1974.
Chief Justice BRANCH and Justice COPELAND join in this concurring opinion.