Court Opinion

ID: 8896377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 00:05:49.472226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:30.807328
License: Public Domain

McCULLOUGH, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority affirms a ruling of the superior court reversing an order of the State Personnel Commission (SPC) which demoted, transferred and decreased the respondent’s salary due to comments of a crude sexual nature made by respondent to female correctional officers with whom he worked. From this ruling, I respectfully dissent.
The record shows that respondent offered a female correctional officer money to go to the beach with him, stated that she was being stingy with her “coochie,” that she would have to sell a lot of “coochie” to make her car payment, and asked this officer and another officer what color underpants they were wearing.
*454Both the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who originally heard this matter, and the superior court judge who heard the Petition For Judicial Review, concluded that, to be actionable, (1) sexual comments had to rise to the level of sexual harassment as defined by the Department of Correction (DOC); and (2) such comments that do not rise to that level cannot qualify as “unacceptable personal behavior,” as that term is defined in the Office of State Personnel Policy Manual, codified at N.C. Admin. Code tit. 25, r.1J.0614(i)(1) (June 2002). In affirming, the majority concurs with the shared viewpoint expressed by the ALJ and the superior court. The majority opinion sets forth the DOC sexual harassment policy in detail. Upon reading the DOC policy statement, it is apparent that not all crude sexual remarks meet the test set forth therein.
I would reverse the order of the superior court which reversed respondent’s discipline, as I believe that the SPC gave an adequate explanation of why it did not adopt the reasoning and conclusions of the ALJ. A point-by-point refutation of the ALJ’s findings and conclusions is not required. Webb v. N.C. Dept. of Envir., Health and Nat. Resources, 102 N.C. App. 767, 404 S.E.2d 29 (1991). I believe the SPC addressed the case adequately and complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51 (2001) when it included Conclusion of Law No. 8 in its order. That conclusion stated:
8. Regardless of whether Petitioner’s conduct rose to the level of sexual harassment as defined above, Petitioner’s conduct did constitute personal misconduct, “for which no reasonable person should expect to receive a prior warning,” thereby subjecting Petitioner to disciplinary action as provided for in 25 NCAC 1J.0612 and .0613 and in DOC’s Disciplinary Policy and Procedures, Section 6, p. 38, resulting in his demotion and transfer.
Respondent was well aware that comments of a sexual nature could lead to some form of discipline, whether or not they rose to the level of sexual harassment. The record indicates that, on 19 November 1996, respondent signed a Human Relations in the Workplace memorandum to that effect. His conduct was therefore a willful violation of a work rule, which is also unacceptable personal conduct for which he could be disciplined. See N.C. Admin. Code tit. 25, r.1J.0614(i)(4); and North Carolina Department of Correction v. McNeely, 135 N.C. App. 587, 521 S.E.2d 730 (1999).
*455The majority seems to hold that, although the SPC inserted Conclusion of Law No. 8 into its Order as an alternative basis for discipline, such was of no import. The majority then accepts the superior court’s determination that the sole issue before that court (and, by implication, this Court as well) was whether the complained-of comments constituted sexual harassment as defined by the DOC policy statement. With this assessment, I disagree. In so doing, I believe the superior court made an error of law, which we review de novo. Walker v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 498, 397 S.E.2d 350 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 98, 402 S.E.2d 430 (1991).
While crude sexual comments may not always rise to the level of sexual harassment as defined in the DOC policy statement, they are nevertheless capable of subjecting an employee to discipline. The SPC never attempted to rely solely on sexual harassment as the only ground for discipline, and this Court should not overlook the SPC’s attempt to base the discipline imposed on its Conclusion of Law No. 8 set forth above. In summary, I would reverse the order of the superior court and uphold the SPC and the discipline it imposed.