Court Opinion

ID: 9580380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:30.987848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:14.856566
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree with the majority that the trial court was authorized to impose sanctions upon Tandy Corporation pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) for failure to comply with its discovery obligations. Indeed, so reprehensible do I find Tandy’s conduct in the matter that I believe the trial court would have been justified in striking its answer and entering default judgment against it pursuant to § 9-11-37 (b) (2) (C). However, contrary to the majority’s view in Division 3, I do not believe the courts of this state are authorized under current law to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a discovery dispute, even to one who is a licensed attorney, where that party is not represented by an attorney but is proceeding pro se.
The portion of the statute authorizing an award of attorney fees against a party for failing to comply with a discovery order reads as follows: “In lieu of any of the foregoing orders, or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” (Emphasis supplied.) The word “expenses,” as used in this statute, quite clearly denotes monetary expenses; and a pro se litigant, even one who is a licensed attorney, ob*748viously incurs no monetary expense for attorney fees. While it may be argued that a licensed attorney-litigant should be entitled to some remuneration for his own services in securing an opposing party’s compliance with a discovery order, only by the most tortured of constructions can that result be reached under the present statute.
Additionally, it strikes me that attorneys already enjoy a considerable advantage over non-lawyers in prosecuting claims such as the one at issue in the present case, wherein the relatively small amount of actual damages involved and the considerable financial ability of the defendant to resist the claim may make the employment of independent counsel by the plaintifF an unrealistic option. To extend a further advantage to attorney-litigants by allowing them and them alone to recover compensation for their time spent in prosecuting such claims compounds that advantage and runs the risk of contributing to the unfortunately widespread public perception that the courts exist firstly and foremostly for the benefit of the legal profession. Non-lawyers are, after all, as fully entitled to represent themselves in lawsuits in the courts of this state as are licensed attorneys, Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII; and they, too, may experience lost income or lost business opportunities as the result of their time spent in doing so.
Although the issue of whether a pro se litigant may recover attorney fees as expenses of litigation in a discovery dispute appears as one of first impression in this state, the federal courts have almost universally disallowed such recoveries construing analogous statutory provisions. For example, every federal circuit court of appeals which has addressed the issue appears to have held that a pro se litigant may not recover attorney fees under 42 USC § 1988 for representing himself in a civil rights action. See Lovell v. Snow, 637 F2d 170 (1st Cir. 1981); Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1982); Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979); Turman v. Tuttle, 711 F2d 148 (10th Cir. 1983). In litigation involving the Freedom of Information Act, the federal circuits are split on the issue of whether a pro se plaintiff who is also an attorney may recover attorney fees, with the Sixth Circuit holding that he cannot, Falcone v. I.R.S., 714 F2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. den. 466 U. S. 908 (104 SC 1689, 80 LE2d 162) (1984), and the Fifth Circuit holding that he can. Cazalas v. U. S. Dept. of Justice, 709 F2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983). On the issue of whether non-attorney plaintiffs may recover attorney fees for representing themselves in FOIA actions, the federal courts are virtually united in concluding that they cannot, with only the District of Columbia Circuit holding unconditionally that they can. See Wolfel v. United States, 711 F2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983), and cases cited therein.
Therefore, I would vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees *749to McCrimmon, for I do not read OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) as authorizing payment of attorney fees to a pro se litigant, even one who is a licensed attorney; and I would remand the case for a new assessment of sanctions, which does not include such compensation.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this opinion.