Court Opinion

ID: 9834036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:15:08.327332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.137907
License: Public Domain

*760On Rehearing.
[10-13] The deed of trust contained the following stipulation as to posting the no- • tices of sale:
“It shall then be the duty of the ■ said then * * * substitute trustee, * * * after having first given notice of the time, place, and terms of said sale by posting written or printed notices thereof. * * * ”
(We refer to the quotation made from the deed of trust in our original opinion.) Under this clause of the deed of trust the actual time of signing of the notice of sale by the substitute trustee was an immaterial issue. He was only required to post the notices of sale. Of course, this duty also involved the additional ’ duty of preparing the notices and signing them. But, as to this, it has been held that the notices of sale need not be signed by the trustee in person, but can be signed for him by his attorney (Munson v. Ensor, 94 Mo. 504, 7 S. W. 108); that the trustee does not have to post the notices himself, but may delegate this duty to another (Roe v. Davis, 142 S. W. 950; Walter v. Taylor, 142 S. W. 31);' and that an error in the date of the notice of sale is immaterial (Weyburn v. Watkins, 90 Miss. 728, 44 South. 145). The signing and posting of notices of sale are ministerial acts, and do not involve the exercise. of discretion. Whether Davenport signed the notices of sale before he was formally designated as substitute trustee or after his designation, at the time when he posted them, as required by the deed of trust, and by his act in posting them, he ratified and affirmed his prior act of signing the notices, and recognized it as his present act, as of date of posting, as fully as if he had erased his signature from the notices and re-signed them. To hold otherwise would require a substitute trustee, who had signed notices of sale prior to his formal designation as such substitute trustee, to do the foolish thing of erasing his name from the notices of sale and re-signing them. We withdraw what we said in discussing this issue in our original opinion, though no exception has been taken thereto. What we there said is subject to the construction of holding void a substitute trustee’s sale on the ground that he had signed the notices of sale before he had been designated substitute trustee. Such a holding, in our judgment, would not be the law.
We also withdraw out statement that four witnesses testified that the notices of' sale were executed after the execution of the written designation of Davenport as substitute trustee. No witness testified to this fact directly, but. such issue was raised by the testimony. Judge G. W. Nugent testified:
“In my presence, and in the presence of Mr. Carpenter and justice of the peace, he signed that paper [referring to the written designation of Davenport as substitute trustee], and acknowledged it in his individual capacity— signed it in his individual capacity. A few (Jays after that, or about right close to that time, I met Mr. J. R. Davenport and E. H. Carpenter in Sour Dake. I don’t recall now that Mr. Wilson was present on that occasion, perhaps he was not — I directed Mr. Davenport that he should post three notices of this proposed sale —drafts of which I had already made — a number of them — and he should have the notice published in a newspaper then published in Hardin county.”
Mr. E. H. Carpenter testified:
“After the appointment of J. R. Davenport as substitute trustee, I had knowledge of the notices that were gotten out by you giving notice of the sale of these lands in controversy here by Mr. Davenport as substitute trustee. The notices were posted. I received a letter from you [C. W. Nugent] some time before, saying that three notices must be posted in three different parts of the county, one of which must be at the county site and two at other places. I saw you [C. W. Nugent] in Sour Lake in person and talked these matters over with you and Mr. Davenport before these notices were posted up. I know of my own personal knowledge that Mr. Davenport in person posted notice of this said that was had in February, 1907. Now as to what request or instructions, if any, you gave me at Sour Lake at that time with reference to the posting of these notices, and as to who should post them, well, you asked me to go with Mr. Davenport and see that they were posted in accordance with your former instructions. I did go with him. I will not tell this jury where these notices were posted. I don’t remember just exactly where they were all posted, but one of them was posted at Sour Lake, and the other I think' we posted close to the road in the town of Saratoga, but I will not be just positive. It was either right in the town or right in the edge of town, as I remember it now. That was an oil town at the time and a public place. One of the notices was posted at the courthouse door at Kountze, the county site of this county. * * * I am familiar- with the handwriting of J. R. Davenport, and this signature here to this notice of sale which you have banded me is the signature of J. R. Davenport. This notice of sale is in substance a copy of that notice, as I remember the character of the notice. * * *
“Q. You remember where these notices of sale were signed, Mr. Carpenter, what part of' Sour Lake, and where? At any rate, did you see them signed, did you see Mr. Davenport sign these notices? A. I don’t know whether I did or not; but I know this is his- signature that he signed, and I saw him post them.”
Appellee also assigns error against certain findings in the original opinion on the ground that we found such issues as facts when we-should have said that the testimony was-sufficient to raise such issues of fact for the jury. All we intended to say was that, such issues were raised as issues of fact for the jury.
The motion for rehearing, after being fully-considered, is in all things overruled.