Court Opinion

ID: 9790876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:00:43.958378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.332784
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, P. J.,
dissenting.
Assuming that the officer reasonably suspected that defendant was “armed and presently dangerous to the officer,” ORS 131.625(1), he had the right to conduct an “external pat-down” of defendant’s “outer clothing.” See ORS 131.605(2). Assuming further that the officer was *598authorized to raise defendant’s shirt in order to facilitate a pat-down of defendant’s waist, he was authorized to remove the opaque plastic sandwich box to determine whether it contained a weapon. That is what the trial court properly concluded; the court then observed, accurately, that “when you heft it and feel” it, there “probably would be some question as to whether a weapon would be in that.”
Examination of the opaque plastic sandwich box should have ended there. Obviously, it did not contain a weapon. This case is indistinguishable from State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 554 P2d 1014 (1976). There, the defendant was validly stopped on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a burglary. The officer patted him down for weapons and, although he found none, during the course of the frisk he felt soft bulges in two of the defendant’s pockets. The officer suspected that the bulges were rolls of currency that might have been taken in the burglary. When the defendant refused to consent to a search, the officer reached into one of the defendant’s pockets and pulled out a bag of marijuana, which formed the basis of the charge on which the defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
“It is our opinion that after Grimes stopped defendant, questioned him and fruitlessly searched him for weapons, the officer did not have probable cause to search further in order to ascertain the contents of defendant’s pockets.”
Here, as in Gressel, the officer searched without probable cause after determining that defendant was not armed. See State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 729 P2d 524 (1986).
Apparently, although it is not clear, the trial court found that the officer was authorized to seize the box, even after it was obvious that it did not contain a weapon, and to search it. It did not find or conclude that the officer had probable cause to do so until after the search;1 until then, the officer testified that he only suspected that the box contained a controlled substance. The court, however, concluded:
“That the * * * container discovered in defendant’s pants *599was within the scope of permissible frisk, either in the interests of officer safety or as a pat-down incident to arrest.”
The conclusion that the search of the opaque plastic box was permissible “as a pat-down incident to arrest” is inconsistent with the trial court’s finding that, until the search, the officer had only a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime. That finding is supported by the officer’s testimony that he only suspected that the box contained drugs and that it was not until after he had shone a “SL20,20,000 candle power flashlight” and his car’s headlight on or through it that he “felt certain” of its contents. Defendant was then arrested — after the search had taken place.
The officer’s use of high powered lights to attempt to ascertain the contents of the box exceeded the scope of a permissible frisk for weapons. It constituted a search, as did the opening of the box at the police station. One needs only to look at the box (which is exhibit 3) to know that it is totally opaque and that it did not “announce its contents.” Its contents were not in plain view and it was not a unique container, such as a “paperfold,” ordinarily used to carry controlled substances. That the police conduct at the scene and at the police station constituted a search within the meaning of Article I, section 9, is made clear by State v. Owens, supra, in which the court said:
“Article I, section 9, protects privacy and possessory interests. A ‘search’ occurs when a person’s privacy interests are invaded. When the police lawfully seize a container, they can thoroughly examine the container’s exterior without violating any privacy interest in the owner or the person from whom the container was seized. For example, the police can observe, feel, smell, shake and weigh it. Furthermore, not all containers found by the police during a search merit the same protection under Article I, section 9. Some containers, those that by their very nature announce their contents (such as by touch or smell) do not support a cognizable privacy interest under Article I, section 9. Transparent containers (such as clear plastic baggies or pill bottles) announce their contents. The contents of transparent containers are visible virtually to the same extent as if the contents had been discovered in the ‘plain view,’ outside the confines of any container. Applying the doctrine of ‘plain view’ to transparent containers, we hold that no cognizable privacy interest inheres in their contents, and thus that transparent containers can be opened and their *600contents seized. No warrant is required for the opening and seizure of the contents of transparent containers or containers that otherwise announce their contents. Under the Oregon Constitution, a lawful seizure of a transparent container is a lawful seizure of its contents.” 302 Or at 206.
Because the searches and the seizure were without a warrant and there is no applicable exception to the warrant requirement, they were invalid. Accordingly, I dissent.

 If the majority’s statement, 99 Or App at 597 n 2, that the trial court found that the officers could see the contents (even though it concedes that we cannot), is intended to say that they did so before conducting a search of it with high-powered lights, it is wrong. Even if the court had made such a finding, there is no evidence that would support it.