Court Opinion

ID: 9552902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:19:05.114929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:19.393312
License: Public Domain

IBÁÑEZ, J.*
In all other respects I concur with the majority but respectfully disagree with its resolution of the issue of the timeliness of the motion for pretrial lineup. In this regard I concur with the dissent.
The robbery occurred on December 30, 1978. The stated motion was made on the date of appellant’s arraignment, namely, February 13, and was calendared for March 14, 1979, the date set for pretrial.
When the issue of timeliness, vel non, is viewed in time increments between significant procedural steps and circumstances it is apparent, at least to me, that the motion was timely. For example, between January 4, and January 18, 1979, the public defender, representing the appellant, could not have made the motion. Ethical constraints prevented him from doing so because of a conflict of interest. On the latter date, and for that reason, the public defender was relieved and private counsel appointed.
*154The next procedural step was the preliminary hearing, in which appellant was held to answer, and determined on January 30, 1979. It is not inconsistent with sound, ethical and responsible criminal defense practice to wait until after the preliminary hearing before taking certain affirmative steps in the preparation of the defense; I will add, steps which could assist the adversary. To wait until the arraignment to make the stated motion, in my opinion, would fall within the same category. Some leeway with respect to when such a motion ought properly to be made should be given to defense counsel to permit him to exercise his sound judgment as an advocate, consistent, of course, with the rules which apply.
The arraignment, a sigificant procedural step, was done on February 13, 1979. Of no less significance is the circumstance that on this date new counsel was appointed for appellant, who, as authorized by a local court rule, made the stated motion setting it for the pretrial date fixed by the court.
Based upon the foregoing facts and circumstances and for the reasons stated in the dissent, to which I join, I would reverse the order finding that the motion for pretrial lineup was untimely.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 16, 1981. Kaus, J., did not participate therein. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.