Court Opinion

ID: 9547632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:49:54.594243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:54.807269
License: Public Domain

VAN CISE, Judge.
Defendants, Colorado State Personnel Board (Board) and the Division of Developmental Disabilities (Division) of the Department of Institutions (Department), appeal from a judgment of the district court setting aside an order of the Board and remanding the cause to it with directions to “reconstitute” the hearing procedures and reinstate the termination of employment appeal of plaintiff, John I. Royal. We reverse.
Royal, an accountant IV, step 7, for the Division, was terminated from his position on May 23, 1977. He appealed to the Board, and a hearing on the merits was conducted in May 1978 before a hearing officer. The parties reached a settlement during the hearing.
The settlement, dictated into the record by Royal’s counsel, provided that Royal was to be reinstated with back pay and benefits to his former position with the Division, effective as of the date of his original termination in 1977. His position was then to be abolished as of the settlement date, May 16, 1978, and he would be given 30 days of paid administrative leave to find new employment. If he could not find new employment, he was to be placed on the statewide general reemployment list. However, Royal, who had been embroiled in a bitter dispute with the Department, was not to take reemployment at any level with the Department. Royal’s personnel folder was to be expunged of all matters relating to his termination, including termination documents, unsatisfactory performance reports, etc.
Royal agreed to dismiss his civil rights claims filed with the state and federal governments and his pending civil action in the Denver district court against the Board and the Civil Rights Commission. He also agreed to waive, release, and relinquish all claims against anyone in the Department relating to the circumstances which had occurred to Royal in 1976, 1977, and 1978.
Royal’s counsel and the hearing officer both specifically questioned the parties regarding their understanding of the terms of the agreement and their assent thereto. Receiving answers in the affirmative, the hearing officer accepted the agreement and closed the hearing.
In the period following the settlement date, the Department attempted to comply with its obligations under the agreement. A state warrant for his monetary entitlements was executed and forwarded to Royal. The position was abolished by the Department, and Royal was afforded 30 days paid administrative leave to seek new employment. Upon Royal’s failure to obtain new employment within the 30 days following May 16, his name was entered on the reemployment lists for accountant IV. His personnel folder was expunged as agreed.
However, Royal did not dismiss his civil rights claims or his civil action, nor did he waive, release, or relinquish any claims against the Department or its personnel. Instead, he filed a motion with the hearing *255officer to set aside the agreement, alleging that the stipulation entered into the record was incomplete, that it contained mutual mistakes of law, and that it was not in compliance with certain rules and regulations of the Board pertaining to “bumping rights.” The motion was denied following argument, and a memorandum order was entered by the hearing officer declaring the stipulation to be valid and enforceable.
Royal appealed to the Board, alleging that the order was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The Board affirmed the order following a hearing. Royal then sought review in the district court pursuant to § 24-4-106, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Yol. 10).
In July 1981 the matter was presented based on the record and transcripts of the agency hearings and on the applicable rules and regulations of the Board. There was no oral testimony. After hearing oral arguments, the district court refused to enforce the stipulation, holding that there had not been a meeting of the minds sufficient to form a contract between the parties. It remanded the matter back to the Board with directions to “reconstitute” the hearing procedures. This appeal followed.
As determined by this court in a previous appeal in this case, Royal v. Colorado State Personnel Board (Colo.App. No. 80CA0446, October 2, 1980) (not selected for publication), the sole issue which could be brought before the district court was the enforceability of the stipulation. And, that is the only issue on this appeal.
In this case the district court’s determination was based on the agency record — documentary evidence only. Therefore, we are not bound by any of the district court’s findings, and can draw our own conclusions from the same record. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Municipal Subdistrict, 198 Colo. 352, 610 P.2d 81 (1979).
The terms of the stipulation as dictated into the record by Royal’s counsel are clear and unambiguous. Upon the abolition of his position, the layoff rules applied. See Colorado State Personnel System Rules & Regulations, (Rules) Article II, 9-3-1 (February 1, 1976). Royal had 30 days with pay within which to attempt to obtain employment anywhere except within his own principal department (the Department of Institutions). This by rule included bumping rights. See Rules 9-4-1, et seq., and 9-6-1, et seq. If he did not secure employment within that time, he would be placed on the general reemployment list. There is no provision in the Rules for paying persons on the reemployment list. See Rules 9-6-1, 4-5-1, 3-3-4, and l-l-l(z).
What Royal may have understood or contemplated is not relevant. A unilateral mistake or mistake of law, if any, is not a ground for setting aside an agreement. In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669 (Colo.1983); Kuper v. Scroggins, 127 Colo. 416, 257 P.2d 412 (1983). And, there is nothing to indicate that there was any mutual mistake here.
In view of the unequivocal affirmative answers he made to his counsel and to the hearing officer at the time the stipulation was being dictated into the record, it appears that what really happened was that Royal changed his mind after he initially agreed to the terms thereof. But, later dissatisfaction with the terms of a stipulated compromise agreement is not sufficient grounds to set it aside. Eisenson v. Eisenson, 158 Colo. 394, 407 P.2d 20 (1965); Rogers v. Funkhouser, 121 Colo. 13, 212 P.2d 497 (1949). The agreement is enforceable in accordance with the terms as dictated. See Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 P.2d 333 (1965).
The Board’s action was supported by competent evidence, and there was no abuse of discretion in its affirming the hearing officer’s order enforcing the stipulated agreement and compromise between the parties. See Board of County Commissioners v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972).
The district court’s judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss Royal’s appeal.
*256METZGER, J., concurs.
STERNBERG, J., dissents.