Court Opinion

ID: 9712298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:51:04.425435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.372819
License: Public Domain

CONOVER, Judge,
concurring.
The majority affirms the trial court in each of these cases because both appellants failed to provide us with any record, reconstructed*1021 or otherwise. I concur in that result, but feel compelled to state my views as to the majority's holding a misdemean-ant's presence in court when he is arraigned, pleads and is found guilty thereof but only a fine rather than imprisonment is imposed by the trial court as a penalty are facts insufficient, standing alone, to start the laches clock ticking. I do not agree with that proposition.
The majority correctly notes when the State files an affirmative defense of laches in a P.C.R. 1 proceeding, it bears the burden of proving that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Twyman v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 705, 712. It must prove
(1) the petitioner had knowledge of existing conditions,
(2) he acquiesced in those conditions, and
(8) the State was prejudiced thereby.
Gipson v. State (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 992, 998; Frazier v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 614, 335 N.E.2d 623, 624.2
In both cases here, the State established all three elements of the laches defense by a preponderance of the evidence to the court's satisfaction, and substantial evidence of probative value supports the trial courts' findings in each case, in my opinion.
As to the last element, prejudice to the State, in each case the evidence is undisputed the arresting officers have no present memory of the incidents involved, or the evidence needed to convict was not preserved and is no longer available. Thus, the State would have been denied the opportunity to re-prosecute these petitioners had the trial courts been reversed. Because it is the State's right and duty to prosecute legitimate drunken driving cases, the State was prejudiced in each case by the petitioners' unreasonable delay in filing their post-conviction proceedings.
Further, the petitioners were put upon inquiry under the facts proven. Each was personally present in court at all stages of the proceedings, arraignment, plea, sentencing, fine and revocation of their drivers' licenses. From these facts, the post-conviction courts could and did reasonably infer these defendants knew or should have known of their post-conviction rights and remedies, or at least the facts were sufficient to put them upon inquiry to determine their rights and remedies. Perry v. State (1986), Ind.App., 492 N.E.2d 57, 60. In Perry, our Second District found a conviction for reckless driving, driving under the influence, and driving with suspended license which resulted in loss of the defendant's driver's license was a sufficient change in the circumstances from which to infer both knowledge a reasonable inquiry would reveal defendant's post-conviction rights and remedies, and a person so positioned would make such inquiry, albeit there was some evidence of defendant's impaired mental capacity. The court there held, per Shields, J., failure to make such inquiry under those circumstances constituted knowing acquiescence in the circumstances of conviction and punishment. No prison sentence was imposed. Accord: Badelle v. State (1986), Ind.App., 487 N.E.2d 844, 845, (eleven year delay in bringing post-conviction relief proceeding warrants inference defendant was put on inquiry, facts included 360 day prison sentence); Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783 (burglary conviction and incarceration put defendant on inquiry as to means of relief or appeal, thus inference of unreasonable delay proper); Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379 {conviction for exerting unauthorized control over vehicle and one year sentence with other circumstances sufficient to imply unreasonable delay), Thus, all three elements of the laches defense were established by substantial evidence at the hearings below in each case. The majority's holding the facts do not support that conclusion as to the first and second elements of the laches defense is clear error, in my *103opinion, and creates a conflict on that subject with our Second District.
I would affirm each trial court in all things.

. Per Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 7.2(A)(3)(c)

. Gipson, Twyman, and Frazier are all cases where lapse of time was shown by the State but nothing more.