Court Opinion

ID: 9712814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:00:33.290243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.547361
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Since plaintiff concedes that there appeared to be no proof available which would establish that defendant or anyone else actually used the mirror to view plaintiff and her daughter in the restroom, I fail to see how plaintiff and her daughter have been injured. Installation of the mirror, by itself, was insufficient to harm the plaintiff and her daughter. Any harm to plaintiff and her daughter would arise from use of the mirror to observe them in private acts.
The majority opinion’s reliance on De May v Roberts, 46 Mich 160; 9 NW 146 (1881), is misplaced. In that case, contrary to what occurred here, the young man actually observed plaintiff giving birth.
*184I also believe that Hamberger v Eastman, 106 NH 107; 206 A2d 239; 11 ALR3d 1288 (1964), relied on by the majority, rests on faulty premises. Although that opinion relies upon Restatement, Torts, § 867, my examination of that section reveals that, in all of the examples, the plaintiff was actually observed. The majority also relies upon 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 652A, p 376 and § 652B, p 378. Again, my review of the text and examples in those sections reveals that placement of an eavesdropping or peeping device alone does not constitute a cause of action; the device must actually be used in order for the cause of action to arise.
I would affirm the decision of the trial judge.