Court Opinion

ID: 9582002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:21:15.927512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:22.915455
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, J.,
dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s decision on the first issue. But I disagree with their second conclusion because, in my opinion, the evidence amply supports the Commission’s finding, and the trial judge’s determination, that the claimant had violated the employer’s company-wide rule. The flaw in this decision, in my opinion, is *614that my brethren have made a finding of fact during the course of appellate review and have disregarded a contrary and binding factual determination already made below.
As a part of its investigation of the facts, the Commission first had to determine what language was contained in the company rule. No copy of a written statement of the rule was offered in evidence at the hearing. Instead, the Commission had to rely on the oral testimony of the employer’s Manager of Employee Relations to determine just what the rule provided. The witness testified on the subject as follows:
Virginia Chemicals has had since March of 1969, a policy for handling excess garnishees. In essence the policy is that if an employee receives three garnishees within twelve months of each other he is automatically terminated. Each new employee is given a copy of this policy and he is given a written warning each step of the way. [The claimant] was garnisheed first on August 27,1974. Eleven months later he was garnisheed July 24, 1975. He was garnisheed August 7, 1975 and this one was released by the store, but was not counted against him. He was garnisheed on September 24, 1975 and this was the same indebtedness as the one on July 24, 1975. As you are aware the law says you cannot discipline an employee for garnishees for the same indebtedness. And then on January 6, 1976 he was garnisheed again. So he was garnisheed one time, eleven months he was garnisheed again, and we disregarded the next two, six months after the second he was garnisheed the third. And on that basis in keeping with the policy he was terminated.
As a result of this testimony, the Commission found that the policy meant that a violation occurred if, as here, the employee suffers three valid garnishments, each not separated by more than twelve months. Such a conclusion is contrary to the majority’s appellate finding that the three garnishments must all be within a twelvemonth period.
After stating the “essence" of the policy, the witness demonstrated its meaning when he pointed out that the claimant “was garnisheed one time [August 27, 1974], eleven months he was garnisheed again [July 23, 1975], ... six months after the second he was garnisheed the third [January 6, 1976].” These are the *615precise three garnishments which the Commission and the trial court determined had constituted a violation of the company policy as it had determined the policy to be.
Thus it is obvious to me that the factual finding as to the provisions of the rule cannot be separated from the testimony relating to the operation of the rule. Plainly, the company witness meant when he said “three garnishees [sic] within twelve months of each other”, that the rule was violated, not only when the three were within a twelve-month period, but also when the three were each not separated by more than twelve months. In sum, I think we are as bound by the finding below dealing with how the company rule operates in practice as we are by the finding of what the rule actually provided. The testimony relating to the employer’s application of the rule was an integral part of the evidence which stated the language of the rule and should not have been disregarded on appeal.
But even when the finding below dealing with the employer’s application of the rule is ignored, I still disagree with the conclusion reached by the court. The majority's decision is premised upon the presumption that an ambiguity exists in the clause “within twelve months of each other.” I perceive no ambiguity.
The interpretation by my brethren renders the words “of each other” meaningless. To achieve the majority’s result, it would have only been necessary for the company to provide for a violation if the employee received three garnishments “within twelve months.” But it cannot be presumed that the scrivener of this employment policy used words aimlessly; no provision of the rule should be deemed superfluous unless it is plainly repetitious. See Ames v. American National Bank of Portsmouth, 163 Va. 1, 39, 176 S.E. 204, 214 (1934). When the clause is considered in its entirety, there is but one interpretation which gives meaning to all of the words and that interpretation was adopted by the Commission and the trial court. Since there is no ambiguity, the rule of construing a writing most strictly against its author has no application here.
Consequently, I believe the court below correctly decided all issues in the case and I would affirm.