Court Opinion

ID: 9852401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:55.500989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.520491
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the habeas court’s judgment was erroneous because the pro se appellee did not raise in his habeas petition that he was denied effective assistance of counsel specifically because of counsel’s lack of pre-trial investigation.
Appellee filed his habeas petition pro se on a form provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts. In his second enumerated error, appellee alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and stated as follows:
Counsel never suppressed evidence on my behalf. Also, he made me think if I pleaded guilty I would receive probation [.] Bar was contacted about said matter. Not long after sentencing date, he was disbarred from the public defenders[’] office due to his insufficience [sic].
In his brief in support of his petition for habeas relief, appellee also complained that trial counsel did not investigate the role of an alleged accomplice to the crime. At the beginning of the habeas hearing, appellee asserted another allegation in support of his ineffective assistance claim, opining that “the lawyer withheld evidence that [appellee] gave testimony to [a] psychiatrist. ...”
Trial counsel testified at the habeas hearing. In regard to the work trial counsel performed on appellee’s case, the State elicited the following testimony: that trial counsel did not interview the victim; that he looked at a copy of the State’s file and spoke to the district attorney; that he spoke a few times to appellee at the jail; that trial counsel could not think of “any real good defense” for appellee; that he advised appellee that his only available options, other than a negotiated plea, were to go to trial on the chance the State would make a technical mistake that could be appealed, or enter a blind plea to the judge; and that trial counsel “went back and forth several times” asking the district attorney to grant appellee probation. On cross-examination, appellee specifically asked trial counsel whether he gathered certain information independently of what he was told by or obtained from the district attorney and trial counsel responded in the negative. The State did not present any argument and did not *283provide the plea hearing transcript to the habeas court. On this record, the habeas court determined appellee had constructively been denied counsel.
Decided November 2, 2009
Reconsideration denied December 15, 2009.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Amy E. Hawkins Morelli, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Sarah L. Gerwig-Moore, Sell & Melton, Brian P. Adams, William A. Bonner III, for appellee.
“A habeas court’s determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is to be affirmed unless the reviewing court concludes the habeas court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous or are legally insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel.” Head v. Thomason, 276 Ga. 434 (1) (578 SE2d 426) (2003). A habeas court may also make rulings sua sponte if the parties are allowed to address the issue at hand in a “meaningful way.” King v. Hawkins, 265 Ga. 93 (454 SE2d 135) (1995). The record reveals appellee raised a concern about trial counsel’s investigation of his case. During the habeas hearing, a thorough record was made as to what trial counsel did and did not do in regard to preparing for appellee’s case. Many of the relevant facts were elicited on direct examination by the State. Trial counsel admitted he did not talk to the victim, conducted no independent investigation of the information provided by the district attorney, and made no effort to theorize a defense for appellee, but acted simply as a conduit for a negotiated plea. “A habeas court’s factual findings cannot be found to be clearly erroneous, if there is evidence in the record to support such findings.” Tillman v. Gee, 284 Ga. 416, 419 (667 SE2d 600) (2008). See also Upton v. Johnson, 282 Ga. 600, 602 (652 SE2d 516) (2007). Here, the undisputed facts support the legal conclusion that counsel was ineffective and appel-lee prejudiced thereby, pretermitting whether there was a constructive denial of counsel. See Heyward v. Humphrey, 277 Ga. 565 (592 SE2d 660) (2004). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the habeas court. Head v. Thomason, 276 Ga. 434, supra.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.