Court Opinion

ID: 9494968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:51:25.877568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:44.358152
License: Public Domain

NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority correctly states that the question in this case is whether the unconstitutional presumption contained in the second-degree murder instruction “considered in light of the other instructions and the trial record as a whole had a ‘substantial and injurious’ effect on the verdict.” The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]his standard reflects the presumption of finality and legality that attaches to a conviction at the conclusion of direct review. It protects the State’s sovereign interest in punishing offenders and its good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights, while ensuring that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus is available to those whom society has grievously wronged.” Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-46, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In my view, it does not appear that the error in this case had any effect on the verdict and certainly not a substantial and injurious one.
The majority primarily relies on our decision in Houston v. Dutton. The instruction that we addressed in Houston is clearly distinguishable from the one here for two reasons. First, the instruction in this case was specifically confined to second-degree murder. In Houston, “the same [unconstitutional] definition of malice was used in the charge to cover first and second degree murder.” 50 F.3d at 385. Second, in Houston we found that the instruction “probably led the jury to accept the prosecutor’s theory” which we described as “doubtful” in light of the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 387. By contrast, the evidence in this case supports the prosecution’s theory that the murder was deliberate, and it is defendant’s provocation theory that is “doubtful.”
Implicitly recognizing this first difficulty, the majority reasons that the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that malice can come from the use of a deadly weapon created “a reasonable likelihood that jurors concluded that use of a deadly weapon raised the presumption of malice for first-degree murder as well as second-degree murder.” This conclusion is problematic for two reasons. First, it is contrary to the presumption that jurors follow instructions. See Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 706 (6th Cir.2000). Second, it ignores the language of the instruction itself.
In determining the effect that an unconstitutional instruction has had on a verdict we are bound by the presumption that “juries follow their instructions.” Id. This presumption can be overcome only where “there is an ‘overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1239 (6th Cir.1989)). The instructions in this case specifically distinguished the standard for the malice required for second-degree murder from the more stringent standard for the malice required for first-degree murder:
Malice is an essential ingredient of murder in the second degree and may be either express or implied.
Therefore, the malice necessary to constitute murder in the second degree is not confined to an intention to kill the person actually slain, as is ordinarily true in the ease of murder in the first degree, but includes an intention to do *846any unlawful act which may probably result in depriving a person of life. It is not so strictly a spirit of spite or malevolence toward a particular individual, as is generally required in murder in the first degree, but is an evil design in general....
(J.A. 278) (emphasis added). This distinction logically limits the unconstitutional presumption to the more generalized malice necessary for second-degree murder and excludes it from supporting the malice necessary for first-degree murder. While use of a gun by itself manifests “an intention to do any unlawful act which may probably result in depriving a person of life,” it does not necessarily indicate “an intention to kill the person actually slain.”
It is unnecessary to rely on the clear logic of this language, however, because the unconstitutional presumption itself explicitly applies only to the malice necessary for second-degree murder:
When the defendant is shown to have used a deadly weapon, and death is clearly shown to have resulted from its use, it is a presumption of law that the killing was done maliciously, that is, with malice necessary to support a conviction of murder in the second degree.
(J.A. 279) (emphasis added). I see no reason why the jury would have had any difficulty following these instructions and understanding that the presumption applies only to second-degree murder.1
Given that we must presume that jurors follow instructions and the very clear language restricting the presumption to second-degree murder in these instructions, I do not think that the majority is justified in concluding that the jury applied this presumption to the elements of first-degree murder. In my view, these instructions indicate that the jury did not consider the presumption at all in reaching its verdict. Therefore, the error did not have any effect on the verdict.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority itself acknowledges that there is only a "reasonable probability” that the jury ignored this limitation and applied the presumption to first-degree murder. However, as pointed out above, the presumption that a jury followed instructions can only be overcome where there is an "overwhelming probability” that it was unable to do so. See Hofbauer, 228 F.3d at 706.