Court Opinion

ID: 9701828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:39:50.240215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.014899
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). On the facts of this case and the law applicable thereto, the trial court properly ordered the discharge of the plaintiff.
The sentence of a parolee continues to run until such time as a request for his return to custody is issued by an appropriate authority. Upon return to custody for a violation of parole, an inmate may be retained in custody for a period equal to the unexpired portion of the term of his sentence as measured from the date of the request for rearrest. *136General Statutes § 54-128. Thus, the ex parte issuance of a request for rearrest suspends the running of the parolee’s sentence until he is actually returned to custody. That period of time is commonly referred to as “dead time” since it deprives the parolee of his entitlement to any credit for that period of time against the running of his sentence.
In this case, the parole violation warrant was issued on December 21, 1971. It was not, however, until October 25, 1974, that the warrant was served upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that the failure of the state to execute the warrant within a reasonable time after its issuance violated his constitutional rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the liberty of a parolee “is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however informal.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484. The underlying rationale of that decision was that fundamental fairness is required before the liberty of a parolee may be taken away. Id., pp. 483-84. In Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86, 97 S. Ct. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Morrissey decision as holding “that the conditional freedom of a parolee generated by statute is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which may not be terminated absent appropriate due process safeguards.”
That fundamental fairness doctrine requires that the warrant for a parolee’s arrest be executed within a reasonable time after its issuance. Some *137courts have reached that conclusion on the theory that failure to do so was a violation of procedural due process. McCowan v. Nelson, 436 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.); Boswell v. United States Board of Parole, 388 F.2d 567, 571, 573-74 (D.C. Cir.); United States ex rel. Howard v. Ragen, 59 F. Sup. 374, 378 (N.D. Ill.); In re Colin, 337 Mich. 491, 494, 60 N.W.2d 431. Other courts have ruled that there was a waiver by the state. Greene v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 315 F.2d 546, 547-48 (6th Cir.); Ex parte Bice, 42 Ala. App. 547, 171 So. 2d 261; People v. Valle, 7 Misc. 2d 125, 164 N.Y.S.2d 67. And still other courts have reasoned that a warrant not executed within a reasonable time was stale and therefore ineffective. United States ex rel. Vance v. Kenton, 252 F. Sup. 344, 345 (D. Conn.); United States v. Gernie, 228 F, Sup. 329, 337-39 (S.D. N.Y.).
The warrant for the arrest must be executed within a reasonable time. “We think the issuance of a violator warrant triggers a process which, as a matter of fundamental fairness, must be pursued with reasonable diligence and with reasonable dispatch.” Boswell v. United States Board of Parole, supra, 574.
To determine whether execution of the warrant was accomplished within a reasonable time, each case must be decided on its own merits. The relevant considerations are: (1) the time lapse between the issuance of the warrant and its execution; (2) the efforts of the state to serve the warrant; and (3) the conduct of the plaintiff in frustrating service of the warrant. United States ex rel. Vance v. Kenton, supra; United States v. Gernie, supra, 338.
*138The trial court made the following findings of fact: Immediately after leaving Daytop the plaintiff called his parole officer to tell him that he had left Daytop, why he had left, and where he was then located in the city of Stamford. During the period from December, 1971, until October, 1974, the plaintiff lived and worked openly in Fairfield County. He signed documents, entered into contracts and was listed in the Norwalk telephone directory, all under the name of Isaac Parham. At no time did he hide or leave the state.
The relevant findings of fact concerning the state’s effort to execute the warrant are: A parole violation warrant was issued on December 21, 1971. Because the plaintiff indicated he was staying in the Stamford area, the parole officer mailed the warrant to the Bridgeport police with instructions to alert the Stamford police department. During the entire period from December, 1971, to October, 1974, the division of parole, in accordance with its well-established policy in such cases, made no attempt to notify the plaintiff that a parole violation warrant had been issued for his arrest.
From these and other facts found the trial court concluded (1) that the plaintiff did nothing to frustrate the service of the warrant on him or the giving to him of timely notice; (2) that the parole and law enforcement agencies failed to take reasonable steps to execute the warrant or give the plaintiff notice of it; and (3) that the plaintiff’s maximum sentence would have expired on May 1, 1974, if he had not been admitted to parole.
On those facts, the trial court concluded that the delay in the execution of the warrant was unreasonable. That delay, in light of the dead-time penalty, made the warrant stale and ineffective.
*139“If the law were otherwise the results would he offensive to every concept of justice and fair play. A warrant issued ex parte could be held . . . indefinitely and could be executed many years later at the whim ... of the probation authorities. This could occur even were the probationer’s address and whereabouts fully known ... or indeed a matter of record. . . . Upon his arrest after a lapse of many years proof of innocence of the charge of violation might well be unavailable to him.” United States v. Gernie, supra, 338. Administrative workloads and administrative efficiency cannot justify abridgement of basic constitutional rights. United States v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir.); and Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116,135, 365 A.2d 109 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting opinion).
As this case involves the intrusion into the constitutional rights of the accused, the plaintiff “is not required to show that the constitutional error was harmful; rather, the state must show that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705”; Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 548, 363 A.2d 49. There was no evidence presented by the state that the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights was harmless.
I would, therefore, find no error in the trial court’s rulings.