Court Opinion

ID: 9521656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:09:26.213254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:04.075376
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: On December 23, 1978, Officer Dwyer, at the home of the defendant’s mother and with her permission, monitored the phone conversation between the defendant and his mother. He did this by picking up the extension telephone located in the next room. Under section 14—2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 14—2), a person does not commit eavesdropping if all of the parties to the conversation have consented or any party gives permission and the use of an eavesdropping device has been judicially authorized (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 14—2; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 108A et seq.). Section 108A—6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides for an emergency exception to normal procedures. If a reasonable effort has been made to contact the appropriate State’s Attorney, a law-enforcement officer may use an eavesdropping device in an “emergency situation.” An emergency situation exists when the conversation to be “overheard” will occur shortly and the officer had not been aware for a sufficiently long enough time to obtain prior judicial approval (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 108A—6). Officer Dwyer did not have the consent of both parties to the conversation. He did not obtain prior judicial approval, and he made no effort to contact the appropriate State’s Attorney. A persuasive argument could have been proffered that in this case it would have been physically impossible for Officer Dwyer to obtain prior approval or even attempt to contact a State’s Attorney. However, in all “emergency” situations an application for approval of the use of an eavesdropping device “*** must be made within 48 hours of the commencement of such use. ### In order to approve such emergency use, the judge must make a determination (1) that he would have granted an order had the information been before the court prior to the use of the device and (2) that there was an emergency situation as defined in this Section.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 108A—6(b).) No application was ever made. It is axiomatic that without such an application no authorization could have been given. Without subsequent approval the contents of the conversation overheard are treated as having been obtained in violation of the article 108A requirements mandating judicial supervision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 108A—6(c)). And without such authorization, section 14—5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 14—5) provides that any evidence obtained as a result of the eavesdropping (as defined in section 14—2) is inadmissible (People v. Kurth (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 387). The majority holds that since an extension telephone did not constitute an eavesdropping device, as defined by section 14—1(a), then the monitoring of the conversation was not proscribed by section 14—2(a). The majority contends that People v. Dixon (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 513, was not overruled by People v. Kurth (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 387. The court goes on to say that the decision in Kurth “turned on the holding that even though the device had been installed by one of the parties to the conversation, another party was not precluded from having the conversation excluded from evidence.” (88 Ill. 2d at 363.) The majority concluded that “[t]he court overruled Dixon only with respect to that issue.” (88 Ill. 2d at 363. See 34 Ill. 2d 387, 395.) But to that extent Dixon was overruled, and that is precisely what is at issue here. The defendant did not have knowledge and did not consent. Recordings of this conversation would clearly be inadmissible against the defendant. So too should the conversations as repeated by the police officer. A person commits eavesdropping when he uses an eavesdropping device to hear or record any part of a conversation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 14—2). The term “eavesdropping device” is defined by section 14—1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 as any device capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation whether such conversation is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other means (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 14—1(a).) This does not include hearing-aid devices used to help the hard-of-hearing (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 14—1(a)). When an extension telephone is used for the sole purpose of surreptitiously overhearing the conversation of two parties, then it becomes an eavesdropping device even though one party may have consented. In People v. Perez (1968), 92 Ill. App. 2d 366, the police attached an aparatus to the earphone of a telephone to secretly overhear and record the conversation. This apparatus enabled others in the room to listen undetected to both sides of the conversation. The court considered this an eavesdropping device. There is no logical distinction between the apparatus in Perez and the extension telephone here, when one considers the manner in which the phone is being used. The application of this statute should not turn on the type of equipment utilized. The privacy of a telephone conversation was invaded without proper authority in a manner offensive to the language of section 14—2. Officer Dwyer used the extension telephone for only one purpose; to overhear the telephone conversation of the defendant without detection. In United States v. Harpel (10th Cir. 1974), 493 F.2d 346, 350, the court noted that “[i]t is the means whereby the contents of the conversation are acquired that is crucial.” The majority is correct in pointing out the differences between the Federal statute as construed in Harpel (18 U.S.C. §§2510 to 2520 (1970)) and the Illinois statute. However, the Harpel court’s rationale is sound. The court in Harpel refuted the contention that the use of an extension telephone does not violate the Federal eavesdropping statute. (493 F.2d 346, 351.) The court said that the use of an extension telephone, with the consent of one party, to overhear a conversation does not violate Federal law. However, when the extension telephone is being used to overhear a conversation without any consent, then a violation does occur. It becomes apparent, then, that an extension telephone, when used to surreptitiously overhear a conversation, is an eavesdropping device, and statutory requirements regulating the use of such devices must be complied with. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Murray (1966), 423 Penn. 37, 223 A.2d 102, indicated that, while in a majority of instances an extension telephone is not an eavesdropping device, “ [i]t is not what the telephone extension is that may make it illegal in certain circumstances, but the use to which it is put.” (423 Penn. 37, 50, 223 A.2d 102, 109.) The commonplaceness of the device is not the criterion for determining the criminality of its employment. (423 Penn. 37, 50, 223 A.2d 102, 109.) See Campiti v. Walonis (1st Cir. 1979), 611 F.2d 387 (an extension telephone used to monitor conversations of prison inmates is an intercepting device). The officer’s testimony concerning the defendant’s conversation was tainted, since it was the product of unlawful eavesdropping. The contents of that conversation should have been suppressed. If the conversation resulted in the discovery of the gun, it too should have been suppressed. Any product of such eavesdropping is excludable as a “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407; Costello v. United States (1961), 365 U.S. 265, 5 L. Ed. 2d 551, 81 S. Ct. 534.) Any information obtained in violation of the eavesdropping statute is not admissible. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 14—5.) This applies both to primary evidence (the conversation) and any derivative evidence acquired as a logical consequence of the officer’s unlawful eavesdropping.