Court Opinion

ID: 9425412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:14:37.352048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:55.378543
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
In upholding the warrantless search of respondent's rented Thunderbird, the Court purports merely to rely on our prior decisions dealing with automobile searches. It is clear to me, however, that nothing in our prior decisions supports either the reasoning or the result of the Court’s decision today. I therefore dissent and would hold the search of the Thunderbird unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The relevant facts are these. Respondent, an off-duty Chicago policeman, was arrested by police on a charge of drunken driving following a one-car automobile accident in which respondent severely damaged his rented 1967 Thunderbird. The car was towed from the scene of the accident to a private garage and, some two and one-half hours later, one of the arresting officers drove to the garage and, without a search warrant or respondent’s consent, conducted a thorough search of the car for the alleged purpose of finding respondent’s service revolver which was not on respondent’s person and had not been found during an initial search of the car at the scene of the accident. In the trunk of the car, the officer found and seized numerous items that eventually linked respondent to the death of one Herbert McKinney and *451ultimately contributed to respondent’s conviction for murder.
The Court begins its analysis by recognizing, as clearly it must, that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” is shaped by the warrant clause, and thus that a warrantless search of private property is per se “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment unless within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, ante, p. 266; Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967). At the same time, the Court also recognizes that one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement is the search of an automobile on the highway where there is probable cause to support the search and “where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U. S. 216 (1968). But the search of the Thunderbird plainly cannot be sustained under the “automobile exception,” for our prior decisions make it clear that where, as in this case, there is no reasonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be moved, the “automobile exception” is simply irrelevant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 461; Carroll v. United States, supra, at 156.
Another established exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a valid arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). But the search of the Thunderbird cannot be sustained under this exception, because even assuming that such a search would have been within the permissible scope of a search incident to *452an arrest for drunken driving, it is clear that under Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 368 (1964), “the search was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest.”
A third exception to the warrant requirement is the seizure of evidence in “plain view.” Thus, in Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968), we upheld the seizure of an automobile registration card that fell within plain view of a police officer as he opened the door of an impounded automobile to roll up the windows. But, as we cautioned in Coolidge, supra, at 466, “[w]hat the 'plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.” In Harris, the prior justification for the intrusion by the police was to roll, up the windows and lock the doors “to protect the car while it was in police custody.” 390 U. S., at 236. “[T]he discovery of the card was not the result of a search,” we said, and “in these narrow circumstances” the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement was fully applicable. In the present case, however, the sole purpose for the initial intrusion into the vehicle was to search for the gun. Thus, the seizure of the evidence from the trunk of the car can be sustained under the “plain view” doctrine only if the search for the gun was itself constitutional. Reliance on the “plain view” doctrine in this case is therefore misplaced since the antecedent search cannot be sustained.
Another exception to the warrant requirement is that which sustains a search in connection with the seizure of an automobile for purposes of forfeiture proceedings. In Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 (1967), the Court upheld the warrantless search of an automobile after it had been lawfully impounded pursuant to a California statute mandating the seizure and forfeiture of any *453vehicle used to facilitate the possession or transportation of narcotics. There, however, the police were authorized to treat the car in their custody as if it were their own, and the search was sustainable as an integral part of their right of retention. This case, of course, is poles away from Cooper. The Thunderbird was not subject to forfeiture proceedings. On the contrary, ownership of the car remained exclusively in respondent’s lessor and the sole reason that the police took even temporary possession of the car was to remove it from the highway until respondent could claim it.
Clearly, therefore, the Court’s decision today finds no support in any of the established exceptions. The police knew what they were looking for and had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant. Under those circumstances, our prior decisions make it clear that the Fourth Amendment required the police to obtain a warrant prior to the search. Carroll v. United States, supra, at 156. Thus, despite the Court’s asserted adherence to the principles of our prior decisions, in fact the decision rests on a subjective view of what is deemed acceptable in the way of investigative functions performed by rural police officers. But the applicability of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn on fine-line distinctions between criminal and investigative functions. On the contrary, “[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior,” Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 530, for “[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Id., at 528. Thus, the fact that the professed purpose of the contested search was to protect the public safety rather than to gain incriminating evi*454dence does not of itself eliminate the necessity for compliance with the warrant requirement. Although a valid public interest may establish probable cause to search, Camara, supra, and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), make clear that, absent exigent circumstances, the search must be conducted pursuant to a “suitably restricted search warrant.” Camara, supra, at 539. See also Almeida-Sanches v. United States, supra. And certainly there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search made of the Thunderbird. For even assuming that the officer had reason to believe that respondent’s service revolver was in the Thunderbird, the police had left the car in the custody of a private garage and did not return to look for the gun until two and one-half hours later. Moreover, although the arresting officers were at all times aware that respondent was an off-duty Chicago policeman, the officers never once inquired of respondent as to whether he was carrying a gun and, if so, where it was located. I can only conclude, therefore, that what the Court does today in the name of an investigative automobile search is in fact a serious departure from established Fourth Amendment principles. And since in my view that departure is totally unjustified, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals invalidating the search of the Thunderbird and remand the case to the District Court for determination whether the evidence seized during the search of the Dodge and the farm was the fruit of the unlawful search of the Thunderbird. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).