Court Opinion

ID: 9964373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 20:00:49.99204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:21.451255
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 23-1312
QUINTIN SCOTT,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS,
                                      Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 1:17-cv-07135 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED DECEMBER 7, 2023 — DECIDED APRIL 29, 2024
                ____________________

   Before WOOD, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
    WOOD, Circuit Judge. Quintin Scott, a former pretrial de-
tainee at the Cook County Jail, ﬁled this class action more than
six years ago. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Scott asserts that
Cook County and its sheriﬀ (collectively, the “County”) pro-
vided him and other pretrial detainees inadequate dental care
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
2                                                             No. 23-1312

refused to certify the class, and soon after, Scott voluntarily
settled his individual claim. But the settlement reserved his
right to appeal the adverse class ruling and to seek an incen-
tive award for his role as named plaintiﬀ. 1 Scott followed
through with this timely appeal.
    The County contends that Scott lacks Article III standing
to pursue the class aspects of this case. It asserts that Scott no
longer has a live interest in the litigation, and that even if he
did, we could not redress his injury because nineteenth-cen-
tury Supreme Court precedent forbids courts from granting
“incentive awards.” We ﬁnd these arguments unpersuasive,
largely because we do not agree with the County’s reading of
the Supreme Court’s decisions. We see no reason to stray from
nearly half a century of case law in which courts across the
country have granted incentive awards to named plaintiﬀs in
class actions.
    We also conclude that the district court abused its discre-
tion in denying class certiﬁcation, as it misapplied our deci-
sion in McFields v. Dart, 982 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2020), and based
its decision on too strict a standard. If the district court’s ap-
proach were correct, it would never be possible to certify a
class of detainees alleging that they were denied adequate
medical care because medical care, by its nature, is individu-
alized. We therefore vacate the district court’s order and re-
mand for further proceedings.

    1 The original named plaintiff in this case was Montrell Carr. Scott

joined the case in an amended complaint filed on July 13, 2018. After the
district court denied class certification, Carr settled his claim and accepted
an unconditional offer of judgment. Carr’s settlement did not reserve his
right to appeal; this leaves Scott as the sole named plaintiff.
No. 23-1312                                                                3

                                     I
    Cook County Jail (the “Jail”) is one of the nation’s largest
single-site jails, housing approximately 9,500 detainees at any
given time. As custodian of the Jail, the County has a consti-
tutional obligation to provide its detainees with adequate
medical care. See Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 733 (7th
Cir. 2016). But unfortunately, it has not always met that obli-
gation. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) con-
cluded after an investigation that the Jail maintained grossly
deﬁcient policies and practices that denied constitutionally
adequate medical care to detainees. 2 The DOJ’s extensive
ﬁndings have since served as the basis for an onslaught of lit-
igation brought by detainees challenging various aspects of
the Jail’s policies and practices. See, e.g., United States v. Cook
County, 761 F.Supp.2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In 2010 the County
and the DOJ entered into a consent order, in which the
County agreed to allow regular monitoring by the federal
government and to ensure adequate medical staﬀ at the Jail.
   That brings us to this lawsuit, which takes aim at the
County’s refusal for more than a decade to keep an oral sur-
geon on staﬀ at the Jail. Back in 2006, the County employed
four dentists and one oral surgeon to serve the Jail’s detainees.
The oral surgeon performed a variety of procedures that gen-
eral dentists do not perform, including diﬃcult extractions
and diagnoses of other complex dental cases. In 2007, how-
ever, the County reduced the dental staﬀ to just one dentist,

    2 See Letter from Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen.,

Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Thomas Dart, Cook County Sheriff,
and to Todd H. Stroger, Cook County Board President (Jul. 11, 2008)
(available      at       https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/leg-
acy/2011/04/13/CookCountyJail_findingsletter_7-11-08.pdf).
4                                                   No. 23-1312

whose services were limited to extractions. Although the
County eventually hired more dentists, as part of its eﬀort to
comply with the DOJ’s consent order, it did not ﬁll the oral
surgeon position at the Jail. By March 12, 2020—the end date
of the proposed class—the County still had not hired an oral
surgeon for the Jail. (The record does not indicate whether
this remains the case today.) With no on-site oral surgeon, the
County adopted a new practice: if an on-site dentist examined
a detainee and determined that the detainee required treat-
ment from an oral surgeon, the dentist would then refer the
detainee to the oral surgery clinic at John H. Stroger, Jr., Hos-
pital of Cook County (“Stroger Hospital”).
    Scott alleges that the lack of an on-site oral surgeon has
caused him and other detainees to experience unnecessary
pain and signiﬁcant delays in receiving treatment. He has pre-
sented evidence to show that County oﬃcials were aware of
the need for an on-site oral surgeon but turned a blind eye to
the suﬀering of detainees, many of whom waited months be-
fore being transported to Stroger Hospital for treatment. For
example, the Jail’s Chief of Dental Services submitted a
budget request in June 2011, urging that the County hire an
oral surgeon to address the “constant[] suﬀer[ing]” of detain-
ees who waited “anywhere from 2 to 3[] months to be treated”
at Stroger Hospital. The Jail’s Director of Oral Health echoed
these concerns in an email in April 2016, stating that the Jail
was “in DESPERATE need for a part-time oral surgeon” (em-
phasis in original).
   Scott was housed at the Jail from June 23, 2013, to May 22,
2014. He began to experience severe tooth pain during that
period. On August 6, 2013, Scott submitted a Health Service
Request Form explaining that he had diﬃculty eating, that his
No. 23-1312                                                    5

tooth “throbbed all night long,” and that it “hurts like hell.”
An on-site dentist examined Scott two days later, determined
that he needed surgery to have his wisdom teeth removed,
and referred him to Stroger Hospital. Three months later,
Scott still had not received treatment. He submitted a griev-
ance on November 18, 2013, complaining: “I am suﬀering!!! I
am in pain, can’t lie down and eat properly, and have frequent
headaches.” On December 8, 2013, Scott submitted a second
grievance stating: “I have yet to see the oral surg[eon] and the
pain is getting to be unbearable. I am suﬀering!!!” Scott ﬁnally
received the treatment he needed from an oral surgeon on
March 28, 2014, seven months after the dentist had referred
him for treatment.
    As further support for his allegations, Scott has submitted
the written grievances of 11 detainees who also endured sig-
niﬁcant delays in receiving oral surgery. Each of these detain-
ees was examined by an on-site dentist, was referred to
Stroger Hospital for treatment by an oral surgeon, and expe-
rienced delays ranging from four to 19 weeks in receiving that
treatment. Because these detainees’ experiences are relevant
to the issues on appeal, we recount a few of them. (We refer
to each grievant by the initials of their ﬁrst and last names be-
cause the County produced the underlying documents sub-
ject to a conﬁdentiality order.)
   J.C. submitted the following grievance on April 29, 2014:
   I have wires on my mouth that I have been asking the
   Doctor and nurses if I can go to Stroger Hospital to
   have them remove because they are cutting my gums
   and make them bleed, and they causing me pain every
   time I eat. … On April 17, 2014, Dr. Martinez told me
6                                                    No. 23-1312

    that he was going to send me to the specialist in Stroger
    but I still haven’t gone.
J.C. was not taken to Stroger Hospital until August 15, 2014,
more than 17 weeks after his referral was entered.
   T.P. submitted a grievance on March 17, 2015, complain-
ing:
    Today I went and seen Dental, Dr. Montgomery, be-
    cause I have a rotten tooth that needs to be pulled. She
    agreed it needs to be pulled. Yet she did not do it. She
    said I was being referred to a oral surgeon which
    would 4-6 months, which is unethical as well as delib-
    erate medical neglect. I do not have enough pain med-
    icine for pain. As well as I can’t drink anything cold. To
    drink water it has to be hot. I’m having problems sleep-
    ing due to pain … .
T.P. was not taken to the oral surgeon until May 19, 2015, nine
weeks after he was referred to Stroger Hospital.
    Similarly, C.O. submitted a grievance on January 2, 2018,
complaining that he was “still in tremendous pain” as he had
been waiting weeks to have his wisdom tooth removed. An
oﬃcial at the Jail responded to C.O.’s grievance a few weeks
later, telling C.O that he should continue to take the aceta-
minophen that he had been prescribed for his pain. C.O. ap-
pealed, reiterating that he was “still in terrible pain.” On Feb-
ruary 15, 2018, a grievance oﬃcer at the Jail issued a response
stating that the “Decision stands. Appts for oral surgery can
take 90 days or more.”
   After discovery, Scott sought to certify the following class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3):
No. 23-1312                                                                 7

    All persons who were detained at the Cook County Jail
    at any time between November 1, 2013 and March 12,
    2020 and, after having been referred to an oral surgeon
    by a dentist at the Jail, awaited treatment at the Stroger
    Hospital Oral Surgery Clinic, excluding those persons
    who are members of the subclass certiﬁed in Whitney
    v. Khan, 18-cv-4475, N.D. Ill., Mem. Op. March 25, 2020,
    ECF No. 175. 3
    Although Scott has not pinpointed a deﬁnite number of
plaintiﬀs in the proposed class, he asserts that we can estimate
its size based on two spreadsheets the County provided dur-
ing discovery. The ﬁrst indicates that dentists at the Jail made
2,080 referrals to Stroger Hospital between February 20, 2014,
and July 7, 2017; the second identiﬁes 2,186 detainees who
were scheduled to be transported from the Jail to the oral sur-
gery clinic at Stroger Hospital between January 3, 2013, and
October 9, 2019. Adding these ﬁgures together, the district
court assumed for purposes of assessing class certiﬁcation
that the class contains anywhere from 2,080 to 4,266 members.
    Despite those numbers, the district court refused to certify
the class. Relying heavily on our decision in McFields, it found

    3 Whitney v. Khan was a similar classwide challenge in which detainees

at the Jail’s Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”) alleged that they had re-
ceived inadequate dental care. The district court certified a class of detain-
ees who “submitted a written ‘Health Service Request Form’ processed as
‘urgent’ by the RTU dental assistant and who did not receive an evalua-
tion by a dentist for at least 14 days after submitting the request.” Relevant
here, the district court later certified a subclass of detainees “who were
subsequently referred by the RTU dentist to the Stroger Hospital Oral Sur-
gery Clinic.” The district court approved a class settlement in Whitney on
August 5, 2021. See Whitney, 18-cv-4475, ECF No. 318.
8                                                     No. 23-1312

that the proposed class failed to meet the commonality, typi-
cality, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule
23. It ﬁrst observed that given the nature of the plaintiﬀs’
claims, they could not prevail unless they established that the
County’s policy decision not to keep an oral surgeon on staﬀ
at the Jail was objectively unreasonable. It then jumped to the
question whether each class member received objectively un-
reasonable care. The second point, it thought, turns on indi-
vidualized factors such as the type of dental problem, the se-
riousness of the condition, and the urgency of the need for
treatment. The necessity of moving to the person-by-person
level defeated the eﬀort to show a common question capable
of classwide resolution, in the court’s view. The same problem
aﬄicted the plaintiﬀs’ eﬀorts to establish the elements of typ-
icality, predominance, and superiority.
    Scott accepted a conditional oﬀer of judgment following
the district court’s ruling. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68. In that agree-
ment, Scott agreed to settle his individual claim for $7,500 but,
as we noted earlier, he expressly reserved his right to appeal
the denial of class certiﬁcation and to seek an incentive award
for his role as a named plaintiﬀ.
                                II
    Before turning to the principal issue on appeal, we must
ensure that we have Article III jurisdiction over this matter.
Article III conﬁnes the federal courts to resolving “the legal
rights of litigants in actual controversies.” Genesis Healthcare
Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013). Standing doctrine
gives eﬀect to this limitation. To establish standing, the plain-
tiﬀ must “have (1) suﬀered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
No. 23-1312                                                      9

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). These elements
must be present at all stages of the litigation, not just at its
inception. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 569 U.S. at 71.
    The County urges that Scott lacks standing for two rea-
sons. First, it asserts that Scott no longer has a live interest in
the case because he settled his individual claim and can obtain
only an incentive award if the class ultimately prevails. Sec-
ond, the County contends that to the extent Scott has an in-
jury, it is an incentive award banned by two Supreme Court
cases (decided well before the advent of Rule 23): Internal Im-
provement Fund Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), and
Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885). We
ﬁnd neither point persuasive.
                        A. Injury in fact
    As the County concedes, we already have concluded that
the prospect of an incentive award is enough to support the
named plaintiﬀ’s concrete interest in the litigation. See Espen-
scheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 876–77 (7th Cir.
2012). In Espenscheid, the named plaintiﬀs voluntarily settled
their claims with the defendants after the district court denied
class certiﬁcation. When the named plaintiﬀs later appealed
that ruling, the defendants argued that they no longer had a
cognizable interest in the continuation of the suit. We rejected
that argument because a provision of the settlement agree-
ment permitted the named plaintiﬀs to seek an incentive
award for their services as class representatives. Id. at 874.
“The prospect of [an incentive] award,” we concluded, “is
akin to a damages payment agreed in a settlement to be con-
tingent upon the outcome of the appeal; and the prospect of
such a payment, though probabilistic rather than certain, suf-
ﬁces to confer standing.” Id. at 875.
10                                                   No. 23-1312

    In reaching that conclusion, we explained that incentive
awards are designed to compensate named plaintiﬀs for the
costs incurred in performing their role as class representa-
tives—costs above and beyond what they would bear as ordi-
nary class members. Id. at 876–77. These costs include the time
and eﬀort that named plaintiﬀs must spend learning about
the case (class members must have enough familiarity with
the case to satisfy the “adequacy” requirement of Rule
23(a)(4)); sitting for depositions; complying with discovery re-
quests; monitoring class counsel; and reviewing and approv-
ing any proposed settlement agreements. 5 WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG AND RUBENSTEIN ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 17:3 (6th ed., Nov. 2023 update); Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoﬀrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiﬀs:
An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1305–06 (2006).
    Incentive awards compensate the named plaintiﬀ for bear-
ing certain risks inherent in stepping forward to represent the
class: “should the suit fail, [the named plaintiﬀ] may ﬁnd him-
self liable for the defendant’s costs or even, if the suit is held
to have been frivolous, for the defendant’s attorneys’ fees.”
Espenscheid, 688 F.3d at 876 (ﬁrst citing Katz v. Household Int’l,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1996); and then citing Blue v.
United States Dep’t of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 534 (4th Cir.
1990)). And in certain contexts, such as employment discrim-
ination actions, incentive awards may also recognize the
added risks of retaliation or stigmatization that named plain-
tiﬀs assume in participating in a lawsuit against their current
or former employers. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra, at 1305;
see also RUBENSTEIN § 17:3 n.17 (collecting district court cases
awarding incentive fees on this basis).
No. 23-1312                                                    11

    We further emphasized in Espenscheid that preventing the
settling plaintiﬀ from appealing would undermine judicial
economy, “since if the named plaintiﬀs settle after denial of
class certiﬁcation and then exit the scene another member of
the class can step forward and take the quitters’ place.” 688
F.3d at 877–78. Along the same lines, the Supreme Court has
held that defendants cannot moot an appeal from a denial of
class certiﬁcation by simply buying oﬀ the individual claims
of the named plaintiﬀs. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326, 339 (1980). “Requiring multiple plaintiﬀs to bring
separate actions,” the Court reasoned, “obviously would frus-
trate the objectives of class actions; moreover it would invite
waste of judicial resources by stimulating successive suits
brought by others claiming aggrievement.” Id.
    Since Espenscheid, we have reaﬃrmed that the “the possi-
bility of an incentive award … is enough of an interest to keep
the claim justiciable.” Weil v. Metal Technologies, Inc., 925 F.3d
352, 357 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Wright v. Calumet City, 848
F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir. 2017). To be sure, we clariﬁed in Wright
that the settlement agreement must expressly reserve the
rights of the named plaintiﬀs to pursue an incentive award on
appeal in order to secure standing. See 848 F.3d at 819–20. But
that is not a problem here, as the settlement agreement did
just that.
    The County nonetheless argues that Scott has not suﬀered
an injury in fact because he has not provided “any services to
the class” that would entitle him to an incentive award. The
record dispels that assertion. Scott joined the case as a named
plaintiﬀ nearly six years ago. Since then, Scott has prepared
for and sat for a deposition, monitored and conferred with
class counsel, and assisted with discovery. Though these
12                                                   No. 23-1312

services may “not [be] onerous,” and though “the risk of in-
curring liability [should the suit fail] is small,” we have held
that even modest services justify an incentive award. See Es-
penscheid, 688 F.3d at 877; see also Phillips v. Asset Acceptance,
LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that incentive
awards compensate class representatives “for what usually
are minimal services”). This is enough to show that Scott has
an ongoing stake in the litigation.
                       B. Redressability
    We also are unpersuaded by the County’s view of redress-
ability. The County argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Greenough and Pettus forbid federal courts from granting
incentive awards to named plaintiﬀs in class actions. It ﬁnds
support for this argument in a recent decision from the Elev-
enth Circuit, which extended those late-nineteenth-century
cases to reach the surprising conclusion that incentive awards
are per se unlawful. See Johnson v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, 975
F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020).
    To make sense of Johnson, we must ﬁrst look carefully at
Greenough and Pettus. These two cases recognized the “com-
mon-fund doctrine.” Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,
478 (1980). Under this doctrine, which is rooted in restitution
principles, “a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common
fund for the beneﬁt of persons other than himself or his client
is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a
whole.” Id.
   In Greenough, the Supreme Court identiﬁed limits on the
type of fee that a litigant may recover from a common fund.
The case involved a creditor, Francis Vose, who ﬁled a suit on
behalf of himself and other bondholders for alleged
No. 23-1312                                                   13

mismanagement of a common fund on the part of the trustees.
105 U.S. at 528. Vose, the Court said, carried on the litigation
“with great vigor and at much expense” and ultimately “se-
cured and saved” much of the trust fund, to the beneﬁt of the
other bondholders. Id. at 529. He then asked the district court
for an “allowance out of the fund for his expenses and ser-
vices.” Id. The district court awarded Vose attorneys’ fees, lit-
igation expenses, an allowance of $2,500 a year for ten years
for “personal services,” and “personal expenditures” of
$15,003.35 for his travel expenses incurred while litigating the
case. Id. at 530.
    On appeal, the Supreme Court aﬃrmed the district court’s
award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses, explaining
that forcing Vose to bear those costs “would not only be un-
just to him,” but would confer “an unfair advantage” on all
the bondholders who had reaped the beneﬁts of his eﬀorts. Id.
at 532. The Court further reasoned that these expenses were
recoverable because common-law trust cases had established
“a general principle that a trust estate must bear the expenses
of its administration.” Id. at 532–33. But the Court reversed the
award of “personal services and private expenses,” which it
saw as akin to a “salary.” Id. at 537–38. The Court explained
that, unlike the attorneys’ and litigation fees, “no authority
whatever” permitted the award of a salary to a named plain-
tiﬀ, and such awards would “present too great a temptation
to parties to intermeddle in the management of valuable
property or funds in which they have only the interest of cred-
itors[.]” Id. at 537–38.
   The Court decided Pettus a few years later. There, it con-
ﬁrmed that attorneys could recover expenses for their eﬀorts
on behalf of clients from the common fund. 113 U.S. at 127–
14                                                    No. 23-1312

28. Pettus said nothing about what private plaintiﬀs could re-
cover, and so its relevance to this case is minimal.
    Fast forward about 140 years to 2020. That was the year in
which the Eleventh Circuit’s Johnson decision muddied the
waters by unexpectedly declaring that the modern-day incen-
tive award is “roughly analogous” to the “salary” (or “per-
sonal services and private expenses”) that were prohibited in
Greenough. 975 F.3d at 1244. “If anything,” it said, “modern-
day incentive awards present even more pronounced risks
than the salary and expense reimbursements disapproved in
Greenough” because “[i]ncentive awards are intended not only
to compensate class representatives for their time (i.e., as a sal-
ary), but also to promote litigation by providing a prize to be
won (i.e., as a bounty).” Id. at 1258. Although the court
acknowledged that incentive awards are virtually ubiquitous
in class-action cases today, it found that this “state of aﬀairs
is a product of inertia and inattention, not adherence to law.”
Id. at 1259. The County now urges us to adopt this application
of Greenough and Pettus.
    We decline that invitation. As the court in Johnson admit-
ted, there is a long-standing practice of awarding incentive
fees to named plaintiﬀs in class actions. Indeed, up until John-
son, we and the rest of our sister circuits accepted the fact that
district courts have the authority to grant incentive awards to
named plaintiﬀs. See, e.g., Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016
(7th Cir. 1998) (aﬃrming a class representative’s $25,000 in-
centive award); Bezdek v. Vibram USA, Inc., 809 F.3d 78, 82 (1st
Cir. 2015); Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 96
(2d Cir. 2019); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 333 n.65
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 613–
14 (4th Cir. 2015); Jones v. Singing River Health Servs. Found.,
No. 23-1312                                                     15

865 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2017) (vacating a class-action settlement
with an incentive award on other grounds and aﬃrming the
same settlement after the district court provided further ex-
planation in 742 F. App’x 846 (5th Cir. 2018)); Pelzer v. Vassalle,
655 F. App’x 352, 361 (6th Cir. 2016) (unpublished); Caligiuri
v. Symantec Corp., 855 F.3d 860, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2017); Roes, 1–
2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1057 (9th Cir. 2019);
Tennille v. Western Union Co., 785 F.3d 422, 434–35 (10th Cir.
2015); Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
    The opinions in these cases demonstrate that this consen-
sus was not a “product of inertia and inattention.” Johnson, 975
F.3d at 1259. It instead reﬂects a signiﬁcant historical develop-
ment. As the Second Circuit recently explained, “Greenough
and Pettus have been superseded, not merely by practice and
usage, but by Rule 23, which creates a much broader and
more muscular class action device than the common law pre-
decessor that spawned nineteenth-century precedents.” Mo-
ses v. New York Times Company, 79 F.4th 235, 254–55 (2d Cir.
2023); see also Johnson v. NPAS Solutions, LLC, 43 F.4th 1138,
1144–50 (11th Cir. 2022) (mem.) (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining that the panel decision
in Johnson “fail[ed] to account for the historical development
of incentive awards”).
    Recall that the Greenough Court distinguished attorneys’
fees and litigation expenses from “personal services and pri-
vate expenses” in part by noting that there was “no authority
whatever” that allowed for litigants to be compensated in
common-fund cases. 105 U.S. at 537. At the time, “courts were
conﬁned to the application of federal general common law
and equitable principles.” Moses, 79 F.4th at 254. Today, there
is no general federal common law, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
16                                                     No. 23-1312

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), and Rule 23 creates the framework for
modern class actions. Moses, 79 F.4th at 254–55.
    Although Rule 23 does not use the phrase “incentive
award,” courts have long recognized that named plaintiﬀs
may receive compensation for shouldering the time-consum-
ing burdens of litigation and assuming risks of ﬁnancial, and
potentially reputational, harm. See RUBENSTEIN § 17:3. In
2018, Rule 23(e) was amended to ensure that a district court
may approve a settlement only if it “treats class members eq-
uitably relative to each other.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(D). In-
centive awards are consistent with this mandate because the
named plaintiﬀs invest in the case more heavily than their un-
named counterparts. Moses, 79 F.4th at 253.
    The County would have us overlook the changes that ac-
companied the historical shift from common-law to Rule 23
class actions. In its view, the common-fund cases look enough
like class actions that we should simply extend the common-
law doctrine to this wholly new context. But we are unwilling
to divorce those cases from the context in which they were
decided. As the Supreme Court has reminded us, courts must
“read general language in judicial opinions ... as referring in
context to circumstances similar to the circumstances then be-
fore the Court and not referring to quite diﬀerent circum-
stances that the Court was not then considering.” See Illinois
v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004).
    This is not the ﬁrst time we have rejected the argument
that the Supreme Court’s common-fund-doctrine cases pro-
hibit incentive awards. In In re Continental Illinois Securities Lit-
igation, 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992), the named plaintiﬀ
appealed the district court’s refusal to award him a $10,000
fee for “modest services” as class representative. We began
No. 23-1312                                                        17

our analysis of that issue by considering “whether a named
plaintiﬀ is ever entitled to [such] a fee” in light of the Supreme
Court’s common-fund cases:
   The usual formulations of the common-fund doctrine
   describe the plaintiﬀ rather than his lawyer as the per-
   son entitled to be compensated for the expenses he has
   incurred in conferring a beneﬁt on the (other) beneﬁ-
   ciaries of the common fund. See, e.g., Trustees of the In-
   ternal Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527
   (1882); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161
   (1939); Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478 (1980).
   The principal expense is the attorney’s fee, but there
   can be others, provided they are not personal. Green-
   ough, 105 U.S. at 537–38; Granada Investments, Inc. v.
   DWG Corp., No. 91–3297, slip op. at 9 (6th Cir. April 30,
   1992). Since without a named plaintiﬀ there can be no
   class action, such compensation as may be necessary to
   induce him to participate in the suit could be thought
   the equivalent of the lawyers’ nonlegal but essential
   case-speciﬁc expenses, such as long-distance phone
   calls, which are reimbursable.
In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d at 571 (ci-
tations cleaned up).
    In other words, we concluded that the modern-day incen-
tive award is akin to the kind of monetary award that the Su-
preme Court blessed in Greenough, not the “personal ex-
penses” it disapproved.
     The County dismisses our conclusion in In re Continental
Illinois Securities Litigation as dicta, but even if we take a fresh
look at the issue, we ﬁnd the proposed analogy between
18                                                   No. 23-1312

“personal services and private expenses” and incentive
awards to be faulty. The County argues that incentive awards
are problematic because the “personal interests [of named
plaintiﬀs] will make them willing to compromise the interests
of the class for their own personal gain.” But the Greenough
Court had in mind a much diﬀerent concern—that awarding
the creditor “personal services and private expenses” would
“present too great a temptation to parties to intermeddle in
the management of valuable property or funds in which they
have only the interest of creditors[.]” 105 U.S. at 538. Put an-
other way, “the [Greenough] Court was concerned that such
awards would induce creditors to interfere with the manage-
ment of funds that had already been entrusted to trustees
charged with ﬁduciary duties to act in the best interests of the
creditors.” Murray v. Grocery Delivery E-Servs. USA Inc., 55
F.4th 340, 352–53 (1st Cir. 2022). The problem was not that the
creditor would not adequately represent the interests of the
other creditors but rather that the creditor “was not a trustee.”
Greenough, 105 U.S. at 537.
    The drafters of Rule 23 were well aware that conﬂicts of
interest might arise between class representatives and class
members. The rule contains signiﬁcant safeguards against
those risks. It prohibits a court from approving a settlement
agreement unless it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” That
directive applies with full force to incentive awards. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(e)(2). In addition, courts have developed tests for
assessing the appropriateness of an incentive award on a case-
by-case basis. See RUBENSTEIN § 17:13 (collecting tests used by
diﬀerent circuits). In the Seventh Circuit, for example, “rele-
vant factors include the actions the plaintiﬀ has taken to pro-
tect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has
beneﬁtted from those actions, and the amount of time and
No. 23-1312                                                    19

eﬀort the plaintiﬀ expended in pursuing the litigation.” Cook,
142 F.3d at 1016. Rule 23(e) thus ensures that an incentive
award cannot be so large that it amounts to a “salary.” Green-
ough, 105 U.S. at 538.
    These safeguards are not just theoretical. The most recent
empirical study on incentive awards reviewed approximately
1,200 class actions from 2006 to 2011 and found that the me-
dian incentive award per named plaintiﬀ was $5,250 (or
$7,125 in 2023 dollars). See RUBENSTEIN § 17:8. In contrast, the
10-year allowance of $2,500 for “personal services” and award
of $15,003.35 for “personal expenditures” that the Supreme
Court disapproved of in Greenough in 1881, 105 U.S. at 530, are
equivalent to more than $1.4 million today.
   The Eleventh Circuit also expressed concern that incentive
awards may act as a “bounty” for bringing litigation. Johnson,
975 F.3d at 1258. But in so doing, it brushed aside the fact that
incentive awards are consistent with the core purpose of
Rule 23—“to encourage claimants with small claims to vindi-
cate their rights and to hold unlawful behavior to account.”
Murray, 55 F.4th at 353; see also Moses, 79 F.4th at 253 (explain-
ing that class-action lawsuits are “designed to provide a
mechanism by which persons, whose injuries are not large
enough to make pursuing their individual claims in the court
system cost eﬃcient, are able to bind together with persons
suﬀering the same harm and seek redress for their injuries.”
(ﬁrst quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 5; and then citing 1 JOSEPH
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (19th ed.
2022))). A categorical ban on incentive awards would under-
mine that purpose.
   We are not alone in rejecting eﬀorts to extend Greenough
and Pettus to the class-action context. In the wake of Johnson,
20                                                    No. 23-1312

three of our sister circuits have expressly rejected the Eleventh
Circuit’s interpretation of those cases. See Murray, 55 F.4th at
352–53; In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769,
785–87 (9th Cir. 2022); Moses, 79 F.4th at 253–55. Moreover, the
Supreme Court recently noted (albeit in a case that did not
squarely present the issue) that “[t]he class representative
might receive a share of class recovery above and beyond her
individual claim.” See China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 584 U.S. 732,
747 n.7 (2018) (citing Cook, 142 F.3d at 1016). Against all of this,
the Eleventh Circuit’s blanket approach to incentive awards is
anomalous.
    Consistent with historical practice, our precedent, and the
majority view on the issue, we conclude that incentive awards
to named plaintiﬀs are permitted so long as they comply with
the requirements of Rule 23. Such an award can redress the
injury asserted in this case, and so standing is secure.
                                III
    We now turn at last to the main event: the denial of class
certiﬁcation. We review such a decision only for abuse of dis-
cretion, “which can occur when a district court commits legal
error or makes clearly erroneous factual ﬁndings.” Bell v. PNC
Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 373 (7th Cir. 2015). Though our
review is deferential, it “must also be exacting” because “[a]
decision to deny or grant certiﬁcation can have a considerable
impact on the playing ﬁeld of litigation.” Red Barn Motors, Inc.
v. NextGear Capital, Inc., 915 F.3d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 2019).
    A plaintiﬀ seeking to certify a class must satisfy the four
requirements of Rule 23(a)—numerosity, typicality, common-
ality, and adequacy of representation—as well as one of the
categories in Rule 23(b). Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 497 (7th
No. 23-1312                                                    21

Cir. 2020). When certiﬁcation is sought under Rule 23(b)(3), as
it is here, the plaintiﬀ must show that “questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions
aﬀecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and eﬃciently
adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The
party seeking class treatment bears the burden of showing
that each requirement is met by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Bell, 800 F.3d at 373.
   The district court rested its denial on four grounds: com-
monality, typicality, predominance, and superiority. We ad-
dress each in turn.
                         A. Commonality
    Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of “questions of law or
fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). The Su-
preme Court has clariﬁed that “even a single common ques-
tion will do.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359
(2011) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). But merely
showing that the class members “have all suﬀered a violation
of the same provision of law” is not enough to satisfy com-
monality. Id. at 350. The claims must depend on a common
contention that is “capable of classwide resolution—which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke.” Id. The “critical point is the need for conduct com-
mon to members of the class.” Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc.,
764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted).
    In this case, the claims of the proposed class members all
arise from the same course of conduct by the same defendant:
22                                                   No. 23-1312

the County’s decade-long refusal to have an oral surgeon on
staﬀ at the Jail. With no oral surgeon readily available, the
class members all suﬀered the same alleged injury: unreason-
able delays in receiving treatment for their acknowledged se-
rious dental conditions.
    The same legal standards govern every class member’s
claim. To recover against the County under section 1983, the
class members must show that they “(1) suﬀered a depriva-
tion of a federal right; (2) as a result of either an express mu-
nicipal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act of a deci-
sion-maker with ﬁnal policy-making authority; which (3) was
the proximate cause of his injury.” See King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d
635, 649 (7th Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted) (quoting Ienco v.
City of Chicago, 286 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2002)). See generally
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Because the class members are pretrial detainees, their claims
of inadequate medical care arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which is governed by an
objective-reasonableness standard. See Miranda v. County of
Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 351–54 (7th Cir. 2018). “This standard re-
quires courts to focus on the totality of facts and circum-
stances faced by the individual alleged to have provided in-
adequate medical care and to gauge objectively—without re-
gard to any subjective belief held by the individual—whether
the response was reasonable.” McCann v. Ogle County, 909
F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018). A delay in medical treatment may
be objectively unreasonable “if the delay exacerbated the in-
jury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” See
McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010). With
these standards in mind, there is one common question of li-
ability that will yield a common answer: whether the
No. 23-1312                                                     23

County’s decision not to keep an oral surgeon on the Jail’s
medical staﬀ was objectively unreasonable.
    As we alluded to earlier, the district court was mistaken in
reading our decision in McFields to suggest that this question
could not be resolved for the class as a whole. McFields is sim-
ilar to this case, in that it too involved a proposed class of de-
tainees who alleged that Cook County Jail had provided in-
adequate dental care in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The plaintiﬀs in McFields, however, challenged the Jail’s
“paper triage policy,” whereby detainees who had dental
pain were required to submit a written complaint, staﬀ would
categorize that complaint as “routine,” “priority,” or “ur-
gent,” and the detainee would then be referred to a dentist in
anywhere from three to 30 days. 982 F.3d at 513. The plaintiﬀs
alleged that the standard of care required the Jail to provide
all detainees who submitted a complaint with a face-to-face
assessment by a nurse within 48 hours. The nurse could then
identify serious medical issues and dispense over-the-counter
pain medication. Id. at 513–14. In reality, not every detainee
received a face-to-face assessment within 48 hours of submit-
ting a complaint, and so the McFields plaintiﬀs alleged that the
paper triage policy was objectively unreasonable. Id.
     On those facts, we aﬃrmed the district court’s decision to
deny class certiﬁcation. As relevant here, we rejected the
plaintiﬀs’ proposed common question of “whether [the paper
triage policy] exposed detainees to a substantial risk of harm
in violation of the Constitution.” Id. at 515. “Answering this
question in the aﬃrmative,” we reasoned, “requires McFields
to prove that the policy was objectively unreasonable, but that
is, by its nature, an inquiry not suitable for resolution as to all
class members in one fell swoop. Rather, it is an
24                                                No. 23-1312

individualized inquiry that depends in large part on what is
disclosed on each detainee’s [written complaint]—when it
was submitted, what type of grievance and what level of pain
it reveals, and so forth.” Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
    In applying McFields to this case, the district court ob-
served that whether each detainee in the proposed class re-
ceived objectively unreasonable care requires us to look at in-
dividualized factors, such as the type of dental issue, degree
of pain, and how long each detainee waited before receiving
treatment. It then concluded that “the objective reasonable-
ness of [the challenged] policy will depend upon circum-
stances unique to each individual class member.”
    But the district court did not grapple with (or even recog-
nize) the salient diﬀerences between the paper triage policy
challenged in McFields and the policy challenged here. In
McFields, there was no uniform policy being challenged (de-
spite the plaintiﬀs’ contention otherwise). The plaintiﬀs ar-
gued that “most” detainees did not receive a timely face-to-
face assessment, yet some detainees did receive such an as-
sessment. Id. at 513. Their claims thus could not be construed
as a systemic challenge to the County’s provision of dental
care. Rather, they were individualized claims of inadequate
medical care that could be answered only by examining facts
unique to each plaintiﬀ.
   In contrast, the Jail’s decision not to put an oral surgeon
on staﬀ is a uniform policy that applies to every detainee at
the Jail. And the record contains evidence showing that this
policy causes systemic treatment delays for detainees who
have been referred by a dentist to receive treatment from an
oral surgeon. These delays were far longer than the 48-hour
period at issue in McFields; several detainees in the proposed
No. 23-1312                                                    25

class submitted grievances while awaiting treatment and re-
ceived responses from Jail oﬃcials stating that appointments
for oral surgery “can take 90 days or more.” Scott has also pre-
sented evidence showing that high-up oﬃcials in the Jail’s
dental staﬀ knew that the lack of an on-site oral surgeon
caused detainees to suﬀer signiﬁcant delays, worsening med-
ical conditions, and gratuitous pain. In 2011, the Jail’s Chief of
Dental Services submitted a budget request practically beg-
ging the County to hire an oral surgeon to address the “con-
stant[] suﬀer[ing]” of detainees who waited “anywhere from
2 to 3[] months to be treated” at Stroger Hospital. And in 2016,
the Jail’s Director of Oral Health stated in an email that the
Jail was “in DESPERATE need for a part-time oral surgeon”
(emphasis in original). Thus, the central question in this liti-
gation is whether, based on this evidence, the County’s deci-
sion not to hire an oral surgeon is objectively unreasonable for
any detainee who has a professionally identiﬁed need for oral
surgery.
    We have distinguished between challenges to conﬁnement
conditions that allege gross and systemic deﬁciencies (which
may proceed on a classwide basis) and those that allege indi-
vidual claims of inadequate medical care (which may not).
For example, in Phillips v. Sheriﬀ of Cook County, we aﬃrmed
the district court’s denial of class certiﬁcation where “proof of
a systemic practice” that “would lead to a ﬁnding that all de-
tainees are eﬀectively denied treatment” was absent, yet we
noted that “Cook County’s decision to staﬀ the Jail with only
one dentist might reﬂect a common policy of systemic delib-
erate indiﬀerence.” 828 F.3d 541, 557–58 (7th Cir. 2016)
(cleaned up) (distinguishing Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 676
(9th Cir. 2014)). And in Orr, we found commonality among a
class of inmates who alleged that they received inadequate
26                                                 No. 23-1312

medical care where “the speciﬁed policies and practices to
which all … inmates are subjected … are the ‘glue’ that holds
together the putative class; either each of the policies and
practices is unlawful as to every inmate or it is not.” 953 F.3d
at 499–500 (quotation and alterations omitted).
    Moreover, the district court overlooked the fact that, un-
like in McFields, the proposed class in this case is narrowly
deﬁned to limit the eﬀect of any variation between its mem-
bers. In McFields, we explained why the variation among the
proposed class members’ experiences “matter[ed] im-
mensely” for purposes of commonality:
     Suppose a detainee submits [a written complaint] of a
     toothache in the morning and is treated by a world-
     class dentist that afternoon. Or imagine that, for some
     reason, a perfectly healthy detainee falsely indicates
     extreme pain on his [complaint]. Both would fall com-
     fortably into McFields’s proposed class so long as nei-
     ther was given a face-to-face assessment before receiv-
     ing dental treatment, but obviously, these would-be
     plaintiﬀs have suﬀered no injury and have no colorable
     constitutional claim.
982 F.3d at 517.
    These concerns are not implicated here. Like Scott, every
member of the proposed class of detainees was examined by
an on-site dentist who observed a serious medical issue and
determined that each detainee required treatment from an
oral surgeon. And all the class members experienced delays
in receiving that treatment. Thus, “[t]he narrow way in which
the district court deﬁned the class[] here eliminates concern
that the deﬁnitions are overbroad or include a great many
No. 23-1312                                                     27

people who have suﬀered no injury.” Pella Corp. v. Saltzman,
606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
    To be sure, each class member eventually will have to pre-
sent individualized evidence to show that the harm she suf-
fered was causally related to the inadequate care she received.
Individualized evidence may also be used to determine the
amount of damages to which each class member is entitled.
But we repeatedly have stressed that the common question
presented need not resolve every issue in the case. “It is rou-
tine in class actions to have a ﬁnal phase in which individual-
ized proof [is] submitted.” Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756. In Bell v.
PNC Bank, for example, employees brought a classwide chal-
lenge alleging that their former employer had an unlawful,
unoﬃcial policy of failing to pay overtime wages. 800 F.3d at
374–79. We found that whether the employer had such an un-
oﬃcial policy was a common question, even though a later
portion of the suit would require assessing damages for each
class member on an individualized basis, as damages de-
pended on “how many hours of oﬀ-the-clock work each em-
ployee worked or the intent of [each employee’s] manager.”
Id. at 379. Similarly, in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., employees brought a classwide challenge to
two employment policies that allegedly had a discriminatory
impact. 672 F.3d 482, 488–89 (7th Cir. 2012). We observed that
“should the claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-
wide proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be neces-
sary to determine which class members were actually ad-
versely aﬀected.” Id. at 491. Yet we found commonality be-
cause “at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of those trials
to determine whether the challenged practices were unlaw-
ful.” Id.
28                                                    No. 23-1312

    The district court’s analysis boils down to the fact that
medical care is inherently individualized. But that alone is not
enough to preclude class certiﬁcation. The plaintiﬀs have
taken aim at a speciﬁc policy (i.e., the County’s decision not to
keep an oral surgeon at the Jail) that applies equally to all class
members, and the plaintiﬀs have oﬀered evidence to show
that the challenged policy causes systemic delays across the
entire class. That suﬃces to show commonality. See Suchanek,
764 F.3d at 756 (“Where the same conduct or practice by the
same defendant gives rise to the same kind of claims from all
class members, there is a common question.”). The district
court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise.
                           B. Typicality
    For similar reasons, the district court erred in concluding
that individual variations among the proposed class members
destroyed typicality. “[C]ommonality and typicality tend to
merge.” Priddy v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 870 F.3d 657, 660 (7th
Cir. 2017). Typicality requires that “the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). That requirement may be
satisﬁed “even if there are factual distinctions between the
claims of the named plaintiﬀs and those of other class mem-
bers[;]” it “primarily directs the district court to focus on
whether the named representatives’ claims have the same es-
sential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Muro
v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting De La
Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir.
1983)).
    There is some variation among the claims of the proposed
class members in this case. We can see this in the sample of
detainee grievances that Scott has presented: the class
No. 23-1312                                                     29

members experienced a range of dental issues (e.g., Scott
needed his wisdom tooth removed, whereas J.C. needed
wires removed from his mouth and T.P. needed a rotten tooth
extracted); the class members experienced diﬀerent periods of
delay before receiving treatment (e.g., Scott waited nearly 33
weeks, while others waited anywhere between four and 19
weeks); and the class members experienced diﬀerent degrees
of pain.
    But unlike McFields—where the proposed class members
included detainees who had submitted complaints of dental
pain that had never been vetted by a professional, 982 F.3d at
517—every proposed class member here was evaluated by an
on-site dentist who observed a serious medical condition and
concluded that treatment from an oral surgeon was necessary.
Every proposed class member then experienced a treatment
delay that is allegedly attributable to the lack of an on-site oral
surgeon. These are the “essential characteristics” that knit the
proposed class members together. De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at
232.
                C. Predominance and Superiority
    Finally, we address Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements that com-
mon questions of law or fact “predominate” over individual
ones and that a class action be “superior to other available
methods for fairly and eﬃciently adjudicating the contro-
versy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). “The guiding principle behind
predominance is whether the proposed class’s claims arise
from a common nucleus of operative facts and issues.” Beaton
v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). “This
requires more than a tally of common questions; the district
court must consider their relative importance.” Id.
30                                                  No. 23-1312

     The district court’s misstep with respect to predominance
and superiority ﬂows from the same error we noted earlier:
its conclusion that the question whether the County’s decision
with respect to an on-site oral surgeon is objectively reasona-
ble could not be answered without individualized assess-
ments. But, as we have explained, that question can be re-
solved on a classwide basis. And where a common issue exists
such that its resolution “‘is unlikely to be enhanced by re-
peated proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially
when the class is so large, to resolve th[at] issue[] in one fell
swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-speciﬁc issues
to individual follow-on proceedings.’” Pella Corp., 606 F.3d at
394 (quoting Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911
(7th Cir. 2003)).
    The County reminds us that if the class prevails on that
common issue, the class members would need to proceed in
individualized trials to prove causation and to seek damages.
Probably so. But that fact does not necessarily preclude class
certiﬁcation. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491; Bell, 800 F.3d at 377–
79. If the district court were to determine on the merits that
the County’s refusal to staﬀ an oral surgeon at the Jail passes
muster, then all the class members’ claims would fail to-
gether. If the plaintiﬀs prevail on the common issue, it will not
need to be revisited in each individual proceeding. That is
enough to show predominance and superiority.
                               IV
    We recognize that Scott’s estimate of the size of the pro-
posed class is quite large—possibly more than 2,000 mem-
bers. It may be that not every member of the proposed class
experienced a delay in treatment that was signiﬁcant enough
to amount to the denial of care; it may also be that not every
No. 23-1312                                                    31

member of the proposed class submitted a grievance report-
ing the pain and suﬀering experienced while awaiting treat-
ment. We have cautioned, however, that “[i]n circumstances
such as these, involving minor overbreadth problems that do
not call into question the validity of the class as a whole, the
better course is not to deny class certiﬁcation entirely but to
amend the class deﬁnition as needed to correct for the over-
breadth.” Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSys., 669 F.3d 802,
826 n.15 (7th Cir. 2012). The district court is free to revise the
class deﬁnition as it sees ﬁt upon remand to address this issue.
    We note, too, that the district court did not address
whether the proposed class meets Rule 23(a)’s requirements
of numerosity and adequacy of representation, which must be
satisﬁed before the class may be certiﬁed. The parties have not
briefed these issues, and so we express no view on them.
    We therefore VACATE the district court’s order denying
class certiﬁcation and REMAND for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.