Court Opinion

ID: 9947797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 18:00:49.212602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:35.318631
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                      No. 23-2030
                                      ___________

                                 ANDREW FULLMAN,
                                            Appellant
                                       v.

              CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; BARBARA A. MCDERMOTT;
           RICHARD ROSS, JR., Police Commissioner; EILEEN A. BONNER;
               JOHNNIE MAE CARTER, #1305; WILLIAM DORNEY
                    ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                       (E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-02673)
                     District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
                      ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                  February 23, 2024

               Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges.

                              (Opinion filed: March 5, 2024)
                                      ___________

                                       OPINION*
                                      ___________

       *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

       Pro se appellant Andrew Fullman appeals the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of defendants in his civil rights case. For the reasons that follow, we

will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

                                              I.

       In 2017, Fullman filed a civil rights complaint in the District Court naming as

defendants the City of Philadelphia, former Philadelphia Police Commissioner Richard

Ross, Jr., and Eileen A. Bonner, an agent with the Gun Violence Task Force for the

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. He alleged violations of his due process and

equal protection rights, as well as retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

       Fullman testified to the following facts at a deposition. In 2014, Fullman witnessed

two shootings. In May 2014, he saw Hakeem Harmon shooting a firearm. Fullman gave

a statement about the shooting to Bonner. Fullman never signed a confidential informant

agreement with Bonner, but he claims that Bonner told him that she would not disclose his

statement. In August 2014, he observed a second shooting, where one of the shooters was

his nephew. No one was injured in either shooting.

       Fullman maintains that, two years later, Bonner revealed details about his statement

to police officers or a prosecutor, who in turn revealed those details to Harmon and his

nephew. Fullman’s nephew and Harmon threatened Fullman after they found out about

his statement.   Fullman then sent letters and complaints to the Philadelphia Police

Department and Commissioner Ross regarding this incident. He also claimed that there

                                              2
had been a coverup of the two shootings because the suspects he had identified were never

arrested or charged.

       In his civil rights action, Fullman alleged that Bonner and the Philadelphia Police

Department were negligent in disclosing his statement and that they did so in retaliation

for his complaints about how the police were investigating the shootings. He also alleged

that defendants ignored his letters and complaints. The District Court denied defendants’

early motions to dismiss, ordering defendants to depose Fullman and explaining that it

would hold a discovery conference after defendants filed motions for summary judgment.

       At the discovery conference, the District Court instructed Fullman to include

discovery requests in his summary judgment response, and to explain why his requests

were necessary for him to fully complete his response. Fullman then filed a motion seeking

to add new parties to the case; the District Court denied his motion without prejudice. At

Fullman’s request, the case was placed in suspense for several years; he was granted

numerous extensions of time to respond to the defendants’ summary judgment motions.

He ultimately filed summary judgment responses and separately filed a motion with

discovery requests. He also filed a new amended complaint and a separate motion to add

new parties to the case. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants,

denied Fullman’s motions, and struck his new complaint. Fullman timely appealed.1

       1
           Fullman sought reconsideration after summary judgment was granted for
defendants; his motion was denied. He did not appeal that decision and thus we do not
review it here.
                                            3
                                             II.

       We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise

plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants. See

Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment

is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

                                             III.

       We agree with the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

For Fullman’s § 1983 claim against the City of Philadelphia, he never identified a policy

or custom that resulted in his alleged constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978); see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971

(3d Cir. 1996). Rather, he claims that his witness statement was improperly released and

that police officers failed to investigate crimes he reported, but there is no record evidence

that either action stemmed from a City policy or custom. There is also no evidence of

Commissioner Ross’s personal involvement with either of these issues, which Fullman

must establish to support a § 1983 claim against him. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d

1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Fullman claims that Ross must have been aware of Bonner’s

disclosure and the alleged coverup because Fullman sent him letters by certified mail to

                                              4
notify him, but there is no evidence that Ross personally received or read the letters, let

alone that he had any involvement with either issue. See id. at 1208.

       Next, to the extent that Fullman sought to sue Bonner in her official capacity as an

employee of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, state employees in their official

capacities are not “persons” who can be sued for damages under § 1983. See Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Fullman appears to argue in his appellate

brief that he was seeking to sue Fullman in her individual capacity on his due process,

equal protection, and retaliation claims. However, Fullman did not have a constitutionally

protected privacy interest in the information he provided to Bonner as a witness. See

Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he information

contained in a police report is not protected by the confidentiality branch of the

constitutional right of privacy.”). He also did not have a constitutionally protected interest

in keeping his reputation intact such that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest.

See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Setting aside that there is no evidence in the

record that Bonner revealed Fullman’s witness statement to any third party, Fullman has

not explained how Bonner violated any protected constitutional interest beyond conclusory

insistence that she “caused a deprivation of . . . [his] federal rights.” See Appellant’s Br.

at 1. Further, because Fullman has never explained how he was treated differently than

any similarly situated individual, he cannot establish an equal protection claim. See

Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]o state a claim for

‘class of one’ equal protection, a plaintiff must at a minimum allege that he was

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated by the defendant[.]”).

                                              5
       Fullman also cannot establish a § 1983 retaliation claim against Bonner because

there is no record evidence of a causal link between his conduct and the retaliation he

claims occurred. See Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (requiring,

among other factors, “a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the

retaliatory action” to allege a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983). Fullman

argues that Bonner retaliated against him by releasing his witness statement because he

complained to the police about an alleged coverup of the crimes he witnessed. However,

according to the record evidence, Fullman began contacting the police about their

investigations only after he was threatened by Harmon and his nephew in 2016, which was

supposedly after his statement was released. This timeline cannot support a finding that

Fullman’s witness statement was released because he complained to police about their

handling of the investigations into the shootings. Fullman’s appellate brief does not clarify

this issue. To the extent that Fullman claims that the defendants retaliated against him for

making a report to Bonner, he has presented no evidence to support that theory.

       We see no error in the District Court’s discovery rulings that Fullman challenges on

appeal. See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010)

(reviewing a district court’s discovery orders for abuse of discretion, explaining that we

“will not disturb such an order absent a showing of actual and substantial prejudice”). The

District Court held a hearing where it discussed Fullman’s discovery needs and gave him

an opportunity to file discovery requests that were relevant to the claims he sought to bring.

However, Fullman did not explain how the interrogatory answers and documents he sought

would preclude a grant of summary judgment under these circumstances. Many of his

                                              6
requests were legal research questions rather than requests that addressed factual issues,

and he did not explain how his factual requests were relevant to his claims. Fullman argues

on appeal that further discovery would have revealed the names of officers who came to

the crime scenes to collect ballistics evidence and thus must have participated in a coverup

of the shooting investigations, but he has not clarified how this information would have

assisted him in proving his claims.

       Finally, the District Court did not err in denying Fullman’s requests to amend his

complaint. See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). One of

his proposed complaints involved wholly unrelated parties and claims. He also sought to

add an officer who responded at the scene of one of the shootings as a party, as well as

officers who responded to his police complaint letters. Although Fullman insists that he

has identified the individuals somehow responsible for the alleged coverup his claims are

based on, he does not dispute in his appellate brief that his proposed amendments were

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Nor does he meaningfully challenge the

District Court’s conclusion that his proposed amendments did not relate back to his

operative complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) because he could

not show that the proposed defendants had either actual or constructive notice of his

lawsuit.2 See id. at 196 (describing the shared attorney and identity of interest theories of

imputing notice).

       2
          Similarly, Fullman mentions the District Court’s denial of his request for
appointment of counsel but does not explain why he believes that decision was incorrect.
In any event, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s ruling under the
circumstances of this case. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).
                                             7
      Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Additionally, Fullman claims that the District Court was biased against him because it
called him “a notorious and prolific litigant.” See Appellant’s Br. at 3. We cannot locate
any such reference to Fullman by the District Court in this case; it appears that this
statement appeared in a different case brought by Fullman several years ago, where we
concluded that it did not support a finding of bias. See Fullman v. City of Phila., 722 F.
App’x 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
                                            8