Court Opinion

ID: 9889856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:10:49.10041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:07.283734
License: Public Domain

J-S32022-23

                                   2023 PA Super 198

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MERCHELEYN SHANAE FISHER                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 351 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 10, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-41-CR-0000977-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                              FILED OCTOBER 11, 2023

       Mercheleyn Fisher appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after

she was convicted of disorderly conduct and an equipment violation.1            We

affirm Fisher’s convictions but vacate her sentence and remand for

resentencing.

       The trial court recounted the evidence at trial:

              Officer Gareck Esposito testified that he was an officer of the
       South Williamsport Police Department on September 19, 2021. At
       approximately 9:00 p.m. . . . that day, he performed a traffic stop
       [of Fisher] for a window tint violation. After stopping [Fisher], he
       tested [Fisher’s] window with a window tint reader and found it to
       be in violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.

             Officer Esposito first observed the violation in the parking
       lot of a McDonald’s restaurant on U.S. Route 15, within the
       Borough of South Williamsport. Rather than performing the stop
       in the McDonald’s parking lot, Officer Esposito waited for [Fisher]
       to leave, whereupon he followed her for a short time and
       performed the stop on U.S. Route 15 South in Armstrong
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2).
J-S32022-23

     Township, just outside of the Borough. U.S. Route 15 is a busy,
     non-divided highway at the location of the traffic stop, and the
     South Williamsport Police Department has clocked motorists
     travelling through that area at speeds in excess of 70 miles per
     hour. Officer Esposito stopped [Fisher] there, however, because
     it was the safest portion of the road for a traffic stop in that area.

           Since the shoulder of the road is narrow there and is not
     even wide enough for one vehicle, he approached [Fisher’s]
     vehicle on the passenger side. Initially, he asked [Fisher] to roll
     down the back window so he could clear the back of the car, which
     he could not see otherwise due to the window tint. Once the
     window was down, he observed two of [Fisher’s] children
     improperly restrained in the back seat.

           Thereafter, having cleared the back of the car, he moved to
     the front window to speak with [Fisher], who was driving the
     vehicle.   He asked [Fisher] to provide her driver’s license,
     automobile registration and proof of insurance. She provided the
     requested documentation ultimately, but only after arguing with
     Officer Esposito about whether he had the right to stop her and
     about his utilization of a flashlight to look into the car which, he
     explained to her, was to clear the vehicle and assure safety, given
     the window tint and the darkness outside occasioned by the time
     of day.

           Corporal MacInnis, from the South Williamsport Police
     Department, soon arrived to provide back up, and he approached
     [Fisher’s] vehicle from the driver’s side. Officer Esposito directed
     [Fisher] to roll down her driver’s side window, which she refused
     to do. The officers observed something between [Fisher’s] legs
     which they feared might be a weapon or contraband. Officer
     Esposito could not see what it was due to his angle of view, and
     Corporal MacInnis could not see what it was because of the
     window tint. After arguing with [Fisher] further about that and
     other matters, Officer Esposito ordered [Fisher] out of the vehicle
     because of her noncompliance. [Fisher] refused to exit initially,
     but did exit on her own after Corporal MacInnis opened her car
     door.[TCO n.15]
        TCO n.15 He did this as an officer safety measure to observe

        what he could not see due to the window tint.
        Notwithstanding the officers’ safety concerns, the item
        between [Fisher’s] legs turned out to be papers.

                                     -2-
J-S32022-23

            From the beginning of the traffic stop, [Fisher] had been on
     her phone with another person or persons, whom she invited to
     the traffic stop. Another individual ultimately did arrive, which
     caused concern regarding the safety of having another vehicle
     stopped on a busy highway. After [Fisher] was out of her vehicle,
     Corporal MacInnis directed [Fisher] to surrender her phone, which
     was in her bra, so she would not invite even more people to the
     traffic stop. She initially refused despite Corporal MacInnis asking
     her multiple times. Officer Esposito thereafter detained [Fisher]
     for non-compliance so that he could proceed safely with the work
     incident to the traffic stop.

            The reason Officer Esposito detained [Fisher] was for her
     safety, the officers’ safety, and the general public’s safety. He
     attempted to put [Fisher] into the back of his vehicle for her
     safety. Again, she refused initially but complied ultimately. Her
     phone remained in her bra while she was in the back of the police
     vehicle until the phone was later removed. While in the back of
     the police vehicle, [Fisher] was speaking with two people—a male
     who was at the scene of the traffic stop, and a female who was
     offering legal advice about the traffic stop. Officer Esposito
     wanted to secure everyone’s safety before addressing [Fisher’s]
     concerns and completing the traffic stop. His safety concerns
     were exacerbated by the fact that it was dark outside at the time,
     the vehicle stop was conducted on a shallow shoulder of a busy
     highway, [Fisher] had invited others who had arrived at the scene,
     and there were two small children in [Fisher’s] vehicle.

           Officer Esposito primarily dealt with [Fisher] and tested
     [Fisher’s] window tint because it was his traffic stop. Upon testing
     her rear window with a device issued by his Department, Officer
     Esposito confirmed that the window tint only allowed four percent
     (4%) light to pass through, whereupon he issued [Fisher] citations
     for window tint violations. Corporal MacInnis was on scene as
     back up for Officer Esposito, for traffic control, and to tend to
     [Fisher’s] children who were still in the back seat of the vehicle.

            The traffic stop should have taken only a short time under
     normal circumstances, but it ended up taking more than one hour
     due to [Fisher’s] noncompliance and her insistence that a female
     officer be summoned to search her.[TCO n.16] A female officer was
     summoned from another Department, and Officer Neeper
     thereafter arrived on the scene.       Officer Neeper ultimately
     removed the phone from [Fisher’s] bra.[TCO n.17]

                                    -3-
J-S32022-23

        TCO n.16Officer Esposito patted [Fisher] down for weapons
        when he detained her, which he was permitted to do under
        the circumstances, despite being a male officer. [Fisher]
        contended she was being searched, however, and asked for
        a female officer. Her request was accommodated, even
        though she was not being searched.
        TCO n.17 The officers did not search [the contents of Fisher’s]

        phone; the reason they wanted it was to prevent [Fisher]
        from directly inviting other persons to the traffic stop, as a
        safety measure, and not to prevent the public at large from
        viewing what was happening.

            Officer Esposito’s safety concerns about the incident were
     worsened by the extended time the traffic stop took due to
     [Fisher’s] noncompliance; the three police officers from two
     different departments whose vehicles were parked along the side
     of the highway; the additional person(s) summoned to the scene
     by [Fisher]; [Fisher’s] children being in the back of her car for the
     duration to the traffic stop; and southbound traffic having to move
     toward the center of a non-divided roadway while northbound
     traffic was oncoming at high speed as a result of all of the vehicles
     stopped along the side of the highway. These circumstances were
     created by [Fisher], and they unnecessarily put [Fisher], her
     children, the police officers and the general public at risk of death
     or serious injury.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/23, at 5–8.

     Following trial, the trial court found Fisher guilty of disorderly conduct

and an equipment violation.    The court sentenced Fisher to undergo three

days of imprisonment, pay a fine, and “complete 24 hours of community

service washing police cars at the South Williamsport Police Department.”

Order, 2/13/23, at 1. It indicated that failure to complete community service

could expose Fisher to prosecution for criminal contempt. Id. at 1–2.

     Fisher timely appealed.      Fisher and the trial court complied with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

                                     -4-
J-S32022-23

      Fisher presents two questions for our review:

      I.     Was evidence sufficient to convict [Fisher of disorderly
             conduct]?

      II.    Did the Sentencing Court abuse its discretion in the
             sentencing condition that [Fisher] wash the police cars for
             the South Williamsport Police Department?

Fisher’s Brief at 7.

      Fisher’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict

her of disorderly conduct. This Court’s review follows a well-settled standard:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence produced, is
      free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 309 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540–41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc)).

      The elements of disorderly conduct are set forth by statute: “A person

is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience,

                                      -5-
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annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, [she] creates a

hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no

legitimate purpose of the actor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). The statute aims

to protect the public from public unruliness that leads to tumult or disorder,

rather than being a “catchall for every act which annoys or disturbs people.”

Commonwealth v. Coniker, 290 A.3d 725, 735 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Mauz, 122 A.3d 1039, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2015)).                  A

“hazardous” condition “‘involves danger or risk’ of ‘the possibility of injuries

resulting from public disorders.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Roth, 531

A.3d 1133, 1137 (Pa. Super. 1987)).

       Our research has revealed one disorderly conduct case involving a traffic

stop: Commonwealth v. Jones, No. 829 EDA 2021, 2022 WL 289261, at *2

(Pa. Super. Feb. 1, 2022) (non-precedential decision).2 Troopers pulled Jones

over on Interstate 80 and determined that his vehicle had to be towed. Id.

at *1. When Jones refused to exit his vehicle, the police closed off the right

lane of the busy highway to remove him and arrest him. Id.

       Jones argued on appeal that the police, not he, created the hazardous

condition of the lane closure. Id. at *2. This Court rejected that argument:

“Simply put, the towing of the vehicle did not cause the lane closure. Rather,

the sole cause of the lane closure was [Jones’] refusal to exit the vehicle.” Id.

____________________________________________

2 We cite a non-precedential decision filed after May 1, 2019 for its persuasive

value. See Superior Court O.P. 65.37(B).

                                           -6-
J-S32022-23

Because Jones’ non-compliance caused the hazardous condition, the evidence

was sufficient to convict him under Section 5503(a)(4). Id.

      Here, the trial court described the hazardous condition as “[h]aving

multiple vehicles with multiple persons in and around them parked alongside

a busy, non-divided highway when vehicles travel by at high speed in both

directions.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/23, at 11. Fisher does not dispute that

this condition was hazardous. Rather, she contends that the Commonwealth

did not prove that any act of hers caused this hazardous condition. Fisher’s

Brief at 13–17. She argues that it was Officer Esposito’s choice of where to

activate his lights that put the participants in the traffic stop at risk of being

struck by a fast-moving vehicle. Id.

      We find the evidence to be sufficient. While Officer Esposito made the

initial decision of where to activate his lights, it was Fisher’s persistent actions

that prolonged the traffic stop over an hour. Fisher refused to roll down her

window, open her door, or exit her car. Fisher argued with the officers about

the propriety of the stop. Fisher invited other people to the scene. As in

Jones, these non-compliant acts required the police to prolong the traffic stop

along a busy two-lane highway to respond to her and respond to the issues

that she created. “[Fisher] turned a routine traffic stop that should have taken

mere minutes into an hour-long confrontation with the police [while multiple

passing vehicles had to avoid the obstruction]. . . . [T]he escalation of the

situation was entirely [Fisher’s] fault.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/23, at 13.

Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict Fisher of disorderly conduct.

                                       -7-
J-S32022-23

      Fisher’s second issue is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of her

sentence, specifically the term of community service. She argues that the

trial court abused its discretion by requiring her to travel several hours away

from her home in Philadelphia to wash cars for the South Williamsport Police

Department. Fisher’s Brief at 17–20.

      Fisher has waived this issue.      “To preserve issues concerning the

discretionary aspects of sentencing, a defendant must raise them during

sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion.” Commonwealth v. Feucht,

955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Malovich,

903 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2006), and Pa.R.Crim.P. 720). Fisher did

not contest her term of community service either at sentencing or in a post-

sentence motion for reconsideration. Therefore, this issue is waived.

      However, we may evaluate the legality of Fisher’s sentence, including

the community service order, sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi,

Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 889 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v.

Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 903 (Pa. Super. 2010)). The legislative branch,

not the judicial branch, defines the sanctions that may be imposed on a

defendant who violates a criminal statute. “If no statutory authorization exists

for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction.”

Id. at 891 (quoting Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 850 A.2d 1268, 1271

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)).

      Here, the trial court explained that its order of community service is a

restorative sanction with the rehabilitative goal of impressing upon Fisher the

                                     -8-
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loss that she caused and her responsibility to repair the loss.     Trial Court

Opinion, 4/20/23, at 13–14. However, it appears that the trial court conflated

community service with restitution. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wood,

446 A.2d 948, 950 (Pa. Super. 1982) (describing the purpose of restitution)).

       The legislature has provided that a sentencing court may order

community service as a condition of probation. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(3);

see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibson, No. 1600 WDA 2019, 2020 WL

4371323, at *4 (Pa. Super. July 30, 2020) (non-precedential decision) (finding

community service to be legal as a condition of probation). The sentencing

regulations provide that community service is a restorative sanction, which

“when ordered, is imposed as a condition of probation.”           204 Pa.Code

§ 303.14(a)(4). Except for certain circumstances that do not apply here,3 a

sentencing court lacks authority to order community service as a standalone

term of a non-probation sentence.

       The sentencing court ordered Fisher to undergo a period of confinement,

pay a fine, and complete community service. Because this sentence did not

include a term of probation, the court lacked statutory authority to order

community service.        Therefore, Fisher’s sentence was illegal, and we will

vacate the term of community service. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d at 891.

Mindful that this may disturb the overall sentencing scheme, we vacate the

____________________________________________

3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9720 (providing for community service as a sentence

for criminal mischief) and 9759(c) (allowing an alternative sentence for
nonpayment of fines).

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entire sentence and remand for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Tanner,

61 A.3d 1043, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams,

997 A.2d 1205, 1210–11 (Pa. Super. 2010)). Because we vacate on legality

grounds and Fisher waived her discretionary-aspects-of-sentencing issue, we

do not comment on the trial court’s exercise of discretion.

      Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded

for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/11/2023

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