Court Opinion

ID: 7809975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:11:43.654395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:26.612369
License: Public Domain

HUMPHREYS, J. Appellants instituted suit against appellees in the Pulaski Chancery Court to prevent them from interfering with their membership in the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and their property rights, consisting of insurance, traveling cards, etc., incident to their membership. In substance, they alleged that the Grand International Division of said Brotherhood, commonly known as the “G. I. D,,” was a duly organized Ohio corporation, located at Cleveland, Ohio, with power to do business in Arkansas, and possessing supreme authority in matters of said brotherhood; that, without authority, and contrary to the laws of the Brotherhood and the land, said G. I. D., while sitting in triennial session in Cleveland, on May 18, 1918, expelled appellants from the Brotherhood, thereby injuring them in their property rights; that said G. I. D. ordered local division No. 554, in which they held their membership, to put the order of expulsion into effect. Based upon these allegations, appellants prayed for cancellation of the order of expulsion, the non-enforcement thereof, and reinstatement as members. Appellees admitted the expulsion and order for the enforcement of same but denied that it was without authority under the constitution and by-laws of the Brotherhood to expel them and direct the enforcement of the order.  (1) The cause was heard upon the pleadings, depositions and exhibits thereto, from which the chancellor found that the Grand International Division of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers possessed constitutional .authority to expel members of subordinate divisions of the Brotherhood and to order the division of which the expelled brother was a member, to enforce the order of expulsion; that appellants were charged, fairly tried and expelled for violating a by-law of the order. In keeping with the findings, the court dismissed the petition of appellants for want of equity. From the findings and decree of the chancellor, an appeal has been prosecuted to this court, and it is before us for trial de novo. Several years before the institution of this suit, F. C. Stelter sued the Rock Island Railroad on account of injuries received while operating one of its envines. The railroad company compromised the suit with Stelter, but refused to re-employ him, contrary, Stelter claimed, to its contract with the order. He attempted to present these claims, first, to his local division, next to the Grand Chief Engineer, and then to the Grand International Division, bnt failed to get relief. In preparing and presenting the claims, he was assisted by J. C. Love, one of the appellants in this cause. In .an attempt to get the claims of appellant Stelter considered, appellants attended the convention of the G. I. D. in 1918. "While there, the following written charges were preferred against them by E. S. Pritchard, a delegate to the G. I. D.: “To Officers and Members of the Grand International Division: “Sirs: I herewith prefer charges against member J. C. Love and member F. C. Stelter of Division No. 554, for violation of obligation, and submit the attacking pamphlet hereto as evidence.” The attacking pamphlet attached as evidence consisted in a bill of particulars and a complete statement of Stelter’s case and his fruitless attempts to obtain redress from the local division, the officials and the G. I. D. at its first convention. In substance, it charged that certain officers of the G. I. D., including the Chief Executive of the Order, prevented him from obtaining redress through deceit, falsehood, tyrannical influences, etc. The charges were referred to a committee of five for trial and report. Appellants appeared before the committee and admitted that the attacking pamphlet was signed by J. C. Love of Division No. 554, and prepared and circulated by him with the consent .and approval of appellant F. C. Stelter. The following report was filed by the committee: “Sirs and Brothers: "We, your committee appointed in the case of J. C. Love and F. C. Stelter of Division No. 554, for violation of obligation, beg to report that after due consideration of all the evidence and examination of all the witnesses, we find that they .are guilty as charged, and recommend their expulsion.” After refusing to allow appellants to appear before the body, the G. I. D. voted to expel them. The motion was then adopted conferring power on the Grand Chief Engineer and the Advisory Board to hear and reinstate parties who had been suspended. The evidence on the. part of appellants tended to show that the sitting of the committee was an informal affair; that when they appeared before such of them as were present, they did not intend to appear for trial, but thought they were appearing for the purpose of presenting Stelter’s claims set forth in the attacking pamphlet, and had no idea that they were being tried on the charges preferred against them; that they did not undérstand that the questions propounded to them as to authorship and circulation of the pamphlet were propounded in the course of a trial; that they left the committee, or such members ,as were present, believing that, in case they were to be tried, they would receive a copy of the written charges and notice of the time and place of trial. The evidence on the part of the committee tended to show that appellants were present and understood the nature of the charge against them; that they were being tried on it; and that on the trial they admitted authorship and responsibility for the circulation of the pamphlet. Appellants first insist that the constitution of the Grand International Brotherhood of Engineers did not invest the G. I. D. with original jurisdiction to expel the members of the subordinate divisions thereof, but in that respect, with appellate jurisdiction only. It is provided in the third section of the constitution of the Order that: “The G. I. D. shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all subjects pertaining to the Brotherhood, and its enactments and decisions upon all questions are the supreme law of the Brotherhood, and all divisions and members of the Order shall render true obedience thereto. “It shall also have full power to order the expulsion of a member of any division, and in the event of such division failing to comply with such order, the Grand Chief shall recall their charter and shall hold' the same until the order is complied with or decision is reversed by the Gr. I. D.; and such expelled member shall not be reinstated except by action of the G. I. D.” It would indeed be a restricted construction to hold that only appellate jurisdiction was conferred upon the G. I. D. by this section of the constitution. It is hard to conceive what broader or more specific language could be invoked in an attempt to confer all power upon a body, than was utilized in this section. The first clause confers jurisdiction on the G. I. D. over all subjects pertaining to the Brotherhood; the next makes the enactments and decisions the supreme law of the Brotherhood, and the next exacts complete obedience of every member of the Order to the laws enacted, or decisions made by the G. I. D., touching any subject concerning the Brotherhood. If this is not an investment of all power in a body by plain, unambiguous language, we are unable to detect the restriction or limitation. Touching upon the unlimited power vested in the G. I. D. by the first paragraph of this section of the constitution of the Order, it-was said by the court in the case of Simpson and Smith v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 98 S. E. 580, that: “The powers thus vested in it expressly exclude any presumption of intent to adopt the limitations and rules of the civil laws, respecting either procedure or substantive rights in the Order.” Again, in the latter clause of the same section, full power is vested in the G. I. D. to order the expulsion of a member of any division. Ample authority is granted the subordinate divisions of the order by other sections of the constitution to expel their members without an order from the G. I. D. In case of an affirmance of an expulsion on appeal to the G. I. D., an order to the division to expel the member would therefore be an unnecessary or superfluous order. In case of reversal of an expulsion on appeal to the G. I. D., certainly no such order would, or could, be issued. Consequently, it is plain that the authority conferred on the G. I. D. to order a division to expel a member grows out of an exercise of its original jurisdiction. Had the power thus conferred related to other than an exercise of original jurisdiction, the authority would not have been to order expulsion but to order the trial .and expulsion of a member, if found guilty. The order for the imposition of the penalty presupposes a trial and conviction.  (2) Again, it is insisted by appellants that there was no by-law establishing the offense charged and fixing expulsion as the penalty. Section 92 of the constitution of the Order provides that: “All divisions, or members of divisions, are prohibited from issuing circulars or signing any form of petition relative to Brotherhood business among members of the Brotherhood or others. If issued by a division its charter shall be suspended, and the length of such suspension shall be at the discretion of the Grand Chief Engineer. If issued or signed by a member, he shall be suspended or expelled; provided that the foregoing shall not prevent or hinder in any manner any official or division of the Brotherhood in properly conducting the business of the organization as to sending out notices, reports, etc., for the purpose of securing or giving information.” This by-law prevents lay members of the Order from issuing or signing circulars, or any form of petition in relation to the business of the Brotherhood among the members or others. The attacking pamphlet was a circular or petition relating to Brotherhood business, and, therefore, clearly inhibited by the law of the Order.  (3) Appellants also insist that the charge was not sufficiently definite to bring it under section 92 of statutes, or any other by-law of the Order. The charge, in substance, is the violation of obligation, evidenced by the attached attacking pamphlet. Owing to the length of the pamphlet, it is impracticable to incorporate it in this opinion. Suffice it to say that it is a circular or petition relative to the conduct of Division No. 554, the Grand Chief Engineer and the first triennial convention of the G. I. D. in relation to the claim of appellant F. C. Stelter, concerning an alleged violation of a contract between the Rook Island Railroad and the Order, in reference to the railroad’s refusal to re-employ him, after his suit against it was compromised. The subject matter contained in the pamphlet related to the business of the Brotherhood among the members as well as others. The charge was sufficiently definite and specific. It is also insisted by appellants that the mode of procedure adopted by the Gr. I. D. in the trial was contrary to the by-laws of the Order. We have examined the statutes of the Order and find that the mode of procedure provided in them for trial of members relates to trial by subordinate divisions. No method of procedure is specified in the laws of the Order for trials of members by the Gr. I. D. Under these circumstances, it was within the power of the Gr. I. D. to adopt a fair method of procedure, even though it did not conform to the method governing trials of the members before subordinate divisions. Gray v. Christian Society, 137 Mass. 329; Spillman v. Supreme Council of Home Circle, 157 Mass. 128, 31 N. E. 776.  (4) It is also contended by appellants that the Gr. I. D. had no right to delegate the investigation of the charges to a committee. It is asserted that the Gr. I. D. itself should have investigated the charges. In conventions of this character, composed of delegates from subordinate divisions, sitting triennially, it is hardly practicable to conduct investigations otherwise than through committees. This method was approved in the case of Spillman v. Supreme Council of Home Circle, supra, which was an organization quite like the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. In commenting on this method of procedure in that case, Justice Allen took occasion to say: “It (referring to the Supreme Council) was, in short, a body of the highest, and apparently unrestricted, authority. The trial of members or officers of grand or subordinate councils might be had before a special committee of one or more members of the Order named by the supreme leader. This committee need not consist of members of the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council is a body whose will is a law unto itself. It was to have original jurisdiction in all cases of its own officers and members, but no mode of procedure was provided for their trial. It would seem, therefore, that it might adopt such mode of trial as it pleased, subject only to the implied limitation that it must be fair.” Lastly, appellants insist that they did not obtain a fair and impartial trial. On sharply conflicting evidence, the chancellor made a special finding to the contrary, which finding seems to be supported by the evidence. No error appearing, the decree is affirmed.