Court Opinion

ID: 9726187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:36:21.410792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.967463
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Acting P. J.
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction; however, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion requiring the trial court to resentence the defendant in accord with People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 [159 Cal.Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396].
In Harvey, the Supreme Court ruled that Penal Code section 1170.11 permits enhancement of consecutive sentences only for the specific offenses listed in section 667.5 and not for “any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm.” {Id., at p. 760.) The court evidently misconstrued the original underlying legislative intent, as the Legislature immediately reacted by enacting Assembly Bill No. 2123 (Stats. 1980, ch. 132). Section 1 of that act provides: “The Legislature hereby finds and declares as follows:
“(a) The commission of ‘violent felonies’ as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code represents a substantial threat to the welfare of the people of the State of California.
“(b) The legislative intent in enacting subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code was to identify these ‘violent felonies’ and to single them out for special consideration in several aspects of the sentencing process.
“(c) This act is intended to clarify and reemphasize what has been the legislative intent since July 1, 1977.” (Italics ours.)
Section 2 of the act amends Penal Code section 1170.1 to provide that when a defendant receives a consecutive sentence for a violent felony as defined in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c), . .including those offenses described in paragraph (8) of subdivision (c) of *63Section 667.5,” his consecutive sentence is one-third the middle term for the offense, plus one-third of any enhancements imposed pursuant to sections 12022, 12022.5, or 12022.7.
The amendment did not add new enhancement material to section 1170.1, but made clear the original and continuing intent of the Legislature. Harvey failed to find the original intent underlying the sections to be sufficiently clear.
The question arises whether this court may consider and give effect to the recent restatement of the original and present legislative intent underlying sections 1170.1 and 667.5, or whether as an intermediate Court of Appeal we are precluded from doing so under the doctrine of stare decisis. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) I conclude that we are not precluded by that doctrine from considering the clear intent of the Legislature as expressed in the original statutory enactment as reitcrated in Assembly Bill No. 2123.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis all courts exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction; it is not a lower court’s function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court. (57 Cal.2d at p. 455.) Although there are no true “exceptions” to the rule of stare decisis, there are, however, exceptional situations in which a lower court is not required to blindly follow precedent which has only facial applicability.
The right and power of the Legislature to adopt legislation clarifying its intent is well established. (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836 [157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836]; People v. Superior Court (Douglass) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 428 [155 Cal.Rptr. 704, 595 P.2d 139]; County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662, 675 [114 Cal.Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345]; State Bd. of Equalization v. Board of Supervisors (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 813 [164 Cal.Rptr. 739]; Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 335 [132 Cal.Rptr. 43]; Burgess v. Board of Education (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 571, 581 [116 Cal.Rptr. 183]; Friends of Lake Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 497 [113 Cal.Rptr. 539]; People v. Rozell (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 875 [28 Cal.Rptr. 478]; Flewelling v. Board of Trustees (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 168 [2 Cal.Rptr. 891].)
*64The question whether a later statement of legislative intent relating to previously enacted legislation, may supersede an erroneous intervening construction given that legislation by the Supreme Court, must be answered affirmatively. The rule of stare decisis is not so imperious or inflexible that it requires blind conformance in any case; rather its application must be determined by the circumstances in each case. Prior decisions should not be followed to the extent that obvious error may be perpetuated. (See Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 342; County of Los Angeles v. Faus (1957) 48 Cal.2d 672, 679 [312 P.2d 680].) The following from Flewelling v. Board of Trustees, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at page 172, citing Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 204 [114 P.2d 592], seems particularly apropos in this instance. “‘This expression by the legislature concerning the existence of an ambiguity and the declaration of the intent of the 1933 act, although not binding upon this court in its construction of the 1933 act, is a factor that may" properly be considered in correctly determining the meaning and effect of the sentence in question. [Citations.] That is not giving a retroactive effect to a statute, because the meaning of the statute to be interpreted has always been the same. The subsequent legislation interpreting the statute construed, does not change the meaning; it merely supplies an indication of the legislative intent which may be considered together with other factors in arriving at the true intent existing at the time the legislation was enacted.’”
As stated by the court in Bates v. McHenry (1932) 123 Cal.App. 81, at page 93 [10 P.2d 1038], “In view of the legislature’s own interpretation as thus clearly set forth by its amending section 52, supra, there remains only one duty to be performed by the court, and that is to accept the interpretation as not only equitable but final.”
In People v. Harvey, supra, the court did not find the statute ambiguous, but rather candidly observed that a literal reading of the statute would permit enhancement of consecutive sentences for the use of a firearm or infliction of great bodily injury in every case in which those factors were present. (25 Cal.3d at pp. 760-761.)2
*65It is axiomatic that in the guise of clarification of intent, the Legislature may not effect an amendment of a statute. Similarly, a “clarification” of an ambiguous statute cannot be given an absurd effect simply because the Legislature states that an unmistakable change is merely a clarification and a statement of original intent. (California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 213-214 [187 P.2d 702].) It is because of such possibilities that courts are careful in their consideration of subsequent expressions of legislative intent.
In Forde v. Cory (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 434 [135 Cal.Rptr. 903], this court considered the application of a provision of the Judges’ Retirement Law. Under that law a judge could provide for survivor benefits for his spouse in the event he should die before reaching retirement eligibility, but if he chose to do so, his estate was not entitled to the normal lump sum death benefit. A similar law was enacted with respect to surviving children of a judge which was parallel to the surviving spouse provisions except that it omitted the provision that election to provide survivor benefits for children would be in lieu of the lump sum death benefit. After electing to provide survivor benefits for his children, and before becoming eligible to retire, a superior court judge died and his executor applied for both survivor benefits and a lump sum death benefit. In construing the provision this court relied, in part, upon a legislative enactment passed more than two years after the judge’s death. We reasoned that the legislative expression of intent in the later statute was merely a clarification and not a change in the law. (66 Cal.App.3d at p. 438; see also People v. Poggi (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 581, 587-588 [165 Cal.Rptr. 758].)
The subsequent expression of legislative intent related, to the enactment of Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (a), and section 667.5 as articulated in Assembly Bill No. 2123 is not inconsistent with the *66prior enactments. I note, as did the majority opinion in Harvey, that a literal reading of the prior enactment would require the enhancement of consecutive sentences under the circumstances present here. Assembly Bill No. 2123 does not constitute a change in the statute; its terms compel the conclusion that it is merely a restatement of the original intent of the Legislature.
Under the circumstances I do not believe the clear legislative intent should be thwarted. Stare decisis should not be used as a means of avoiding distasteful legislative enactments. I would conclude that the defendant’s sentence was correctly determined by the trial court, and the intervening decision in Harvey has been rendered inapplicable.
My conclusion does not impose an ex post facto punishment upon the defendant. At the time defendant committed his crimes, section 1170.1, subdivision (a), provided for the enhanced consecutive sentences for the use of a firearm in the commission of the crimes for which consecutive sentences were imposed. The subsequent statement of original legislative intent did not retroactively amend the statute to provide for a greater sentence. It merely advised the Supreme Court that the provisions of the original enactment were intended. (See People v. Sobiek (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 458, 472-473 [106 Cal.Rptr. 519, 82 A.L.R.3d 804].) I believe that People v. Fulton (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 777 [167 Cal.Rptr. 436], and People v. Matthews (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 793 [167 Cal.Rptr. 8], were erroneously decided given the facts and circumstances underlying the decision in People v. Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d 754, and Assembly Bill No. 2123, and their results should not be followed.
In my view, the majority blindly follow Harvey and conclude the . Legislature did not intend “to impose an enhancement for firearm use or great bodily injury in every case involving such factors.”
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 16, 1981. Evans, Acting P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petitions of both parties for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied May 13 and May 15, 1981.

 All further code references will be to the Penal Code.

The 'majority, lemming-like, blindly adhere to the Harvey result and imply that only after the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 2123 was the legislative intent behind sections 1170.1 and 667.5 made known. A casual reading of Harvey discloses the majority of the Supreme Court acknowledged the contrary to be true. (See pp. 760-761.) “Although robbery with firearm use is not specifically mentioned by name in the list of ‘violent felonies’ under subdivision (c), this offense presumably *65would be included within that category by reason of the broad language of paragraph (8)." The court did not indicate any lack of legislative intent to include the specific crime in the broad language of paragraph (8). The result of Assembly Bill No. 2123 was simply a statement by the Legislature that we meant what we said.
Harvey is another clear example of the frequent and willing intrusion by the majority of the present California Supreme Court into the legislative arena, in this instance, because of a paternalistic concern for the rights of the criminal. Where there is no doubt of the legislative intent, or if there be any that question is “close and subtle,” an absence of judicial interference is in order. The majority opinion in this instance perpetuates the error.
As stated by Justice Clark in his dissent at page 762, “that the Legislature could have expressed itself with greater concision is no justification for refusing to give effect to what it did say."