Court Opinion

ID: 9632867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:26:27.583325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:29.497081
License: Public Domain

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge, dissenting. It is black-letter law that “a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, we are left on the entire evidence with a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” E.g., Fischer v. Kinzalow, 88 Ark. App. 307, 198 S.W.3d 555 (2004). I do not recall a case in which I have ever had a firmer conviction that a mistake has been committed. First, I agree with Laurie Martin’s argument that the trial judge erred by failing to consider Mary Ann’s preference, as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-204(c) (Repl. 2004). While it is true that Ms. Daley exhibited some confusion in court, which was likely due in no small part because she was nervous about testifying, as she herself noted, the trial court’s finding that she was “incapacitated mentally to such an extent that she is incapable of handling her personal and business affairs” simply does not address her stated preference for her guardian. This finding, while certainly sufficient to justify the appointment of a guardian •— which is not contested — is not, as the majority apparently believes, tantamount to saying that she was incapable of stating a preference for her guardian, which she unequivocally did in open court. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, Ms. Daley was not found to be “incompetent.” It is obvious from the record that Ms. Daley’s mental capacity was demonstrated to be far greater than the ward in McCartney v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 227 Ark. 80, 296 S.W.2d 497 (1956), the precedent the majority so heavily relies on, where the ward was described simply as a “hopeless mental case.” Finally, while Ms. Daley did express some confusion about Martin’s title, she nonetheless consistently maintained her preference for the person who was present in court — Laurie Martin — to serve as her guardian. Significantly, she never indicated in any way that she wanted Decker to be her guardian even though he too was in court. It is remarkable that the majority can denigrate Ms. Daley’s mental functioning on the one hand, and not have the ability to see what was obvious to Ms. Daley despite her supposed diminished capacity. Moreover, I cannot ignore the fact that on June 6, 2003, with the assistance of counsel, Ms. Daley granted Laurie Martin durable powers of attorney to make health care and financial decisions for her. There is no evidence in this record that Ms. Daley was incapable of stating her preference for Martin at that time, and it strongly corroborates the validity of her in-court declaration of preference. It is axiomatic that such an erroneous application of law constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Seeco, Inc. v. Hales, 334 Ark. 134, 969 S.W.2d 193 (1998). Ignoring the statutory requirement that Ms. Daley’s preference for Martin be considered is therefore a manifest abuse of discretion. Even if I could accept the propriety of the majority undertaking its own fact finding, and I assume for the purposes of this discussion that they are correct in finding that Ms. Daley’s preference was irrelevant, I certainly cannot accept the findings that the trial judge made to justify his decision. The trial judge found Decker “more suitable” because Decker had been in business with her “for a number of years” and had a consistent interest in her well-being, stayed in touch with her and with Weth, and traveled with her “when she was healthy.” The trial judge also found that Decker put Mary Ann in a nursing home after her stroke. Finding Decker’s business relationship with Ms. Daley weighed in favor of appointing him as her guardian is at best fanciful, if not down right absurd. By Decker’s own testimony, he and his former girlfriend manipulated their majority ownership of the business venture that Ms. Daley had a one-third interest in to remove her from the board of directors and to cut off the income stream that she had previously enjoyed while simultaneously increasing their own salaries as board members by approximately $3,000 each per month, despite Decker’s own candid admission that he did not actually work in the business.1  Regarding Decker’s supposed “staying in touch,” by his own admission, Decker’s contact with Ms. Daley was episodic at best for most of his adult life. The trips that he took with Ms. Daley, three total, occurred nearly a decade before the guardianship proceeding, and lasted for a mere matter of days. Finally, there is no basis for the trial court to conclude that Decker put Ms. Daley in the nursing home because Decker himself, as well as Susan Stogsdill, the business-office manager for the nursing home where Ms. Daley resided, testified that Weth, not Decker, checked Ms. Daley into the facility on November 12, 2001. No more convincing are the trial judge’s findings that attempt to justify his conclusion that Martin is a less suitable candidate for guardian than Decker. Specifically, the trial judge found that Martin “was estranged from her mother for a period of time,” and Martin did not invite her mother to her second wedding. He also found that when Martin re-entered her mother’s life, she “cut off Robert Decker from visiting Mary Ann Daley in the nursing home and from talking to her doctors.” The trial court also noted that Martin accused Decker of “stealing from her mother in their business affairs.” The court also found that while Mary Ann has never lived in California, she “lived in Omaha many years ago and has friends there together with two of Robert Decker’s children and his ex-wife who is a friend of Mary Ann Daley” and unlike Martin, Decker would impose no restrictions on Mary Ann’s visitation. I have no doubt that these findings are clearly erroneous. The findings that justify the trial judge’s decision that Martin would be less suitable are no more justifiable. Regarding Martin’s estrangement from her mother, it had ended long before Decker instituted the guardianship proceeding, and their reconciliation is proven by Ms. Daley giving Martin the powers of attorney. As far as Martin restricting visitation, evidence was conflicting on this issue, and the only person that Martin clearly tried to exclude from the nursing home was a lawyer hired by Weth’s ex-husband who was trying to get Ms. Daley to execute a new will that would more strongly favor Weth’s children. As far as Martin accusing Decker of stealing from Ms. Daley in their business affairs, it is well documented in the evidence, and admitted by Decker, that he took her off the board and redistributed the money that Ms. Daley had previously received to himself and his former girlfriend in the form of salaries, even though neither of them actually work in the business. Given these undisputed facts, the trial judge should not have faulted a lay person like Martin for interpreting Decker’s actions as “stealing.” The majority’s crediting of testimony by Decker that he “had taken proper measures to insure that Daley’s money from the business was accounted for” is laughable, but I submit, probably accurate; Decker will have to pay income tax on that money because he took it as a salary. I cannot understand why the majority feels that Ms. Daley has gotten more than her fair share from her investment. In the first place, from Decker’s own testimony we know that Decker only offered her the opportunity to invest in his company because he could not obtain a bank loan. Secondly, Decker and the other shareholder, Decker’s former girlfriend, who each contributed an amount of capital equal to Ms. Daley’s contribution for the formation of the business, realized even more from their investment. Does the majority suggest that the Walton family would be justified in asking those fortunate souls who invested in Wal-Mart stock forty years ago to turn in their stock because they have made enough money already? Finally, the trial judge’s finding that Omaha would be a superior place for Ms. Daley to serve out the remaining years of her life because she had lived there forty years ago and would be visited by Decker, Decker’s ex-wife, and friends that she had not seen since the mid-1960s, rather than near her daughter and grandchildren in California, is simply incredible. Taken together, after wading through this lengthy record, I am left with a firm conviction that a mistake had been made. I think it bears noting that while the majority cites Decker’s testimony that Martin had taken $46,000 from Ms. Daley’s lock box, it should be given no weight. This bald accusation was belied by the fact that the signature cards from Ms. Daley’s safety-deposit boxes, which were admitted into evidence over Decker’s strenuous objections, showed that Martin did not have access to the boxes and could not have taken anything from the boxes. Not surprisingly, the trial judge made no mention of this obviously spurious allegation, and the majority should avoid finding it credible where the trial judge obviously did not. This is but another example of the majority’s invasion of the province of the trial court, making not only findings, but findings based on credibility determinations that the trial court obviously did not subscribe to because it was clearly refuted by documentary evidence. Finally, it is worth noting that Decker’s last-second motion to amend his guardianship petition to have a bank appointed guardian of the estate is nothing more than clever lawyering. By statute, the “reputable financial institution” that the trial judge ordered to be appointed guardian of Ms. Daley’s estate is charged only with protecting the existing assets, not attempting to draw more assets into the estate by mounting a shareholders’ suit against Decker for keeping Ms. Daley from realizing any more income from her investment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1) (Repl. 2004).2 This tactic does not show personal concern for Ms. Daley or effectively insulate her from Daley’s obvious conflict of interest, but rather insures that no one looks at the financial aspect of the Decker’s business practices prior to the appointment of the guardian of the estate. I cannot agree with the majority that Decker’s appointment as guardian was in Ms. Daley’s best interest. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.   Although we cannot weigh evidence on review, I believe it is worth noting that in contrast to what was proved by Decker’s own admission that he had manipulated the distribution of profits to deny Mary Ann any further return on her investment, there was uncontroverted evidence that Martin faithfully and scrupulously took care of Ms. Daley’s financial affairs.    Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-301 (b)(1) lists the duties of the guardian of the estate and are stated as follows: It shall be the duty of the guardian of the estate: (A) To exercise due care to protect and preserve it; (B) To invest it and apply it as provided in this chapter; (C) To account for it faithfully; (D) To perform all other duties required of him or her by law; and (E) At the termination of the guardianship, to deliver the assets of the ward to the persons entitled to them.