Court Opinion

ID: 9431367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:08.715389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:28.188732
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting.
This case arises because of two peculiar, if not unique, rules of Ohio law. The first is that even though a foreign corporation may be subject to process under the state “long-*899arm” statute, it is nonetheless not “present” in the State for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. The second is that a foreign corporation installing machinery or equipment sold by it in interstate commerce is not required to appoint a statutory agent in order to transact business in Ohio. Ohio Rev. Code § 1703.02 (Supp. 1987). The Court dwells heavily upon the first peculiarity of Ohio law, but makes no mention of the second.
Midwesco agreed to deliver and install a boiler system at a Bendix plant in Fostoria, Ohio. On the basis of the sparse record before us, it is fair to say that while the sale may have been a transaction in interstate commerce, there is no reason at all to think that the installation was such. Cases such as Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U. S. 20 (1974), and Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921), on which the Court relies, deal with transactions respecting goods which are “in the stream of interstate commerce.” 419 U. S., at 30. A State may not require licen-sure of a foreign corporation which seeks only to engage in this sort of transaction. But a State may require licensure when a foreign corporation engages in intrastate commerce. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U. S. 276 (1961). And where a foreign corporation is engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce in a particular commodity, a State may require licensure in order to sue in connection with an intrastate aspect of the business. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202 (1944).
Thus, Midwesco’s immunity from Ohio’s requirement that foreign corporations appoint a statutory agent before doing business in the State is not by reason of any federal constitutional right, but by reason of a provision of the Ohio statutes. And if Ohio could have insisted that Midwesco appoint a statutory agent before it engaged in that portion of its transaction with Bendix which was intrastate commerce, I see no reason why it may not also treat Midwesco as it would treat any other entity which has done intrastate business in Ohio, *900incurred liability, and thereafter withdrawn from the State. Ohio seeks to do no more, I think, when it applies its tolling statute to Bendix’s action against Midwesco under these circumstances. I see no discrimination against interstate commerce here, and I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.