Court Opinion

ID: 9442726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:57:12.654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:12.428214
License: Public Domain

HOLMES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion puts up a straw man and knocks him down, but it does not touch the novel question mentioned in the able opinion of the learned trial judge, which says that appellants’ contention outruns any present decision in Texas; that imputed negligence, after all, is only constructive negligence, and the fact that the three brothers were on a joint trip does not import any wrong whatever. Yet, he says it is for that reason alone that the driver’s negligence must be imputed to the husband in this case, since the husband was free of any personal wrongdoing under the verdict of the jury.
I might well close this dissent with the above indirect quotations from the excellent opinion of the trial court, but the ap-pellee’s brief is said to be dedicated to the proposition that the novel question was correctly decided below and is in accord with the “forward thinking of jurists throughout the country.” Therefore, for the benefit of the Texas jurisprudence, I will use some of the material of counsel, who contends that the trend of American decisions is the repudiation of the doctrine of imputed negligence, and that no authority in the country has" ever imputed negligence twice, that is, from one negligent party to one not negligent, and then again from the one not negligent to a third innocent party, which is what the appellants seek to have done and what the trial court re-fuséd to do. In Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W.2d 105, 109, 163 A.L.R. 697, the Supreme Court of Michigan quoted with approval the following: “In the typical case, there is presented, on the one hand, the plaintiff-passenger, wholly free of any negligence or wrongdoing. On the other *1005hand, there is the tort-feasor whose negligence has brought harm to such passenger or contributed to such harm. The injured party brings suit. The .court must choose between them, the one innocent, the other guilty! Which is to be preferred ? Must we continue for all time to drag in this exploded and obsolete legal monstrosity with the sole result of throwing the loss on the innocent party? The 'imputed negligence’ doctrine prefers the wrong-doer. He is the favored one and he is allowed to go free of responsibility for his wrongdoing. The loss is thrown upon the innocent passenger. As has been pointed out, abolition of the pernicious doctrine would affect only the wrong-doer and that only to the extent of preventing his escape from liability for his own negligence to one free from fault. At rock-bottom, the imputed negligence doctrine is a denial of justice as between parties litigant.”
In order to bar recovery by the wife in this case, the negligence of the driver of the car must be imputed twice, which is analogous to basing one inference upon another. The fact relied on to support an inference must be proven or admitted. Community Natural Gas Company v. Henley, Tex.Com.App., 24 S.W.2d 10; International Travelers’ Association v. Bettis, 120 Tex. 67, 35 S.W.2d 1040; Green v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 125 Tex. 168, 81 S.W.2d 669; Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company v. Wells, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W.2d 927; Same case affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas, 140 Tex. 2, 164 S.W.2d 660; Latimer v. Walgreen Drug Company of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W.2d 209, 213.
In the instant case, the wife was not a joint adventurer, since she had no control over the operation of the automobile. Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Kutac, 72 Tex. 643, 11 S.W. 127, and Id., 76 Tex. 473, 13 S.W. 327; Herrell v. St. Louis, etc., R.R. Co. 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102, 69 A.L.R. 470; 45 C.J. 1123, Sec. 705; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 198; Applebee v. Ross, Mo. Sup., 48 S.W.2d 900, 82 A.L.R. 288; Collier v. Rives, Tex.Civ.App., 103 S.W.2d 830.
See résumé of an excellent article by Leon Green, of Austin, Professor of Law, University of Texas, in the October, 1950, number of the Texas Bar Journal, from which I quote, as food for thought, the following: “The right of security of his person which a spouse brings to the marriage is his own. It is his from birth given him by a higher law than either the Constitution or court decision. It is personal to him and so is the claim for the vindication of its injury.” The article is in 26 Texas Law Review, p. 461.
In applying the Texas law, I think the federal court should not extend the doctrine of imputable negligence further than the courts of that state have ever done; and, therefore, I dissent.