Court Opinion

ID: 7807191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:07:58.773448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:21.607176
License: Public Domain

on rehearing. Hart, J. Counsel for appellant insists that he should have a rehearing on the authority of the case of Green v. Maddox, 97 Ark. 397. In that case Henry Maddox became the purchaser of the land at a commissioner’s sale, under a chancery decree, in November, 1888. He executed his notes for the purchase money and the sale was reported by the commissioner to the chancery court and was confirmed by the court at its March term, 1889. Henry Maddox went into possession of the land and commenced the erection of a house upon it. Prior to the maturity of the notes which he had executed to the commissioner for the purchase money of the land, Henry Maddox died, leaving surviving as his heirs at law the plaintiff, Hayden Maddox, and his elder brother, named Donald. At the February term, 1890, of the chancery court J. D. Maddox presented to the court a petition alleging that he was the uncle and guardian of the minor heirs of Henry Maddox, deceased, and that there were no funds of said decedent’s estate out of which to pay the purchase money of said land sold to Henry Maddox, and that he had paid the same out of his own funds. He asked an order of the court directing the commissioner, for that reason, to execute a deed to him for the land, which was accordingly done. Upon appeal to this court it was held that when J. D. Maddox paid the purchase money to the commissioner after the sale of the land was made by him to Henry Maddox, and the sale was eon-firmed, he became a constructive trustee for the heirs of Henry Maddox, to whom his rights descended. Here the facts are essentially different. It is true that James Purcell on March 27, 1897, was the accepted bidder at the commissioner’s sale and that the sale was confirmed on July 2, 1897. Section 6323, Kirby’s Digest, provides that a conveyance by a commissioner shall not pass any right until it has been examined and approved by the court, which approval shall be endorsed on the conveyance and recorded with it. Here, as in the case of Green v. Maddox, supra, the confirmation was made, in the first place, of the sale and afterward of the deed, but in the case of Green v. Maddox it will be- noted that the purchaser died before any one was substituted,™ his stead as purchaser. It is a recognized practice to allow another person to be substituted for the purchaser and to take the deed directly to himself. Jones on Mortgages (6 ed.), vol. 2, § 1652. In such cases the court is the seller and the whole, matter remains under its control until the sale is, completed and until the delivery of the deed and its approval by the court. When this is done it relates back to the time of the sale and carries the legal title from the delivery of the deed. In the present case Gann & Shoemaker were substituted as purchasers in the place of James Purcell by the latter’s consent and direction. In this respect the present case is essentially different from the case of Green v. Maddox, supra. James Purcell, by becoming the purchaser, and Shoemaker & Gann having agreed to be substituted as purchasers in his stead, by his consent and direction, all became parties to tbe foreclosure proceeding insofar as their rights were concerned. James Purcell having agreed that Shoemaker & Gann should be substituted as purchasers in his stead and that under said agreement, they having paid the purchase money and the deed having been executed to them and approved by the court, they became the purchasers of the land in the foreclosure sale and Purcell did not obtain any title, legal or equitable, within the meaning of section 734, Kirby’s Digest. Neither can it be said that James Purcell, being the mortgagor, and thus bound to pay the mortgage debt, that when he bid in the land at the foreclosure sale and the sale was confirmed, this amounted to a satisfaction and discharge of the mortgage. The reason for this is that he asked that Shoemaker & Gann be substituted in his stead as purchasers, and it was their money that bought the property and paid for it. They were properly substituted as purchasers in his stead and the result is precisely the same as if they had personally bid in the property at the commissioner’s sale. Bensieck v. Cook (Sup. Ct. of Mo.), 19 S. W. 642. Motion for rehearing will be denied.