Court Opinion

ID: 9706211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:34:35.984926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:20.197473
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE KUNCE, dissenting: A school board has no legal duty to supervise the type of activity as shown by the facts of the instant case. Although physical education and varsity athletics are integral parts of most all school programs, there is no evidence in this record that the powderpuff football game had any connection with such programs or with any other school program. The game did not take place at the halftime of a varsity football game. Neither the school board, the principal of the school nor anyone in authority authorized the game. Unpaid teachers were present at the game, but there is no record of anything that they did while there being authorized, directed or controlled by the school authorities so as to create an agency relationship. Failing to instruct a teacher not to participate in after-school or weekend activities of pupils by the principal or other school authorities does not in my opinion constitute consent to, approval of or result in responsibility for such activities. The plaintiffs totally failed to prove any conduct of the school board or its authorized agents that was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The majority opinion states that the jury weighed the conflicting evidence; however, there was, in fact, no conflict in evidence bearing on the question of this being an authorized school activity. The game being a school tradition at one time but since discontinued as such, being announced on the school’s public address system and bulletin boards without authority, being coached by teachers off duty and not being paid, being on unlocked school property, with knowledge of the principal and his assistant of the game and not admonishing the teachers to not participate in the same, do not in my opinion constitute any evidence that the activity was authorized by the defendant and are wholly insufficient to impose any duty on the district. This testimony did not conflict with the evidence presented by the district that the game was not an authorized school activity. The testimony of the principal that he ordered the games discontinued when he became principal, that the game was not sponsored by the school and the pupils’ request for sponsorship was denied, that the announcement of the game over the school’s public address system was unauthorized and countermanded on his order and that he did not authorize the teachers to supervise or coach the game was in no way disputed or contradicted by any evidence presented by the plaintiffs. The testimony of the teacher, Suarez, and the assistant principal was no evidence of board authorization for the conduct of the game, its supervision or equipment to be used. It was all negative testimony that failed to support plaintiffs’ burden of proving that the game was authorized. The testimony presented by the plaintiffs in an attempt to prove an authorized and supervised game is, at the most, pure speculation that was clearly controverted by the direct, unequivocal and positive evidence presented by the board. Even if we assumed, arguendo, that plaintiffs’ testimony presented some controverted facts, the jury’s verdict under all of this record is palpably erroneous, wholly unwarranted and clearly contrary to the manifest weight of all the evidence. The real question before this court is whether the facts are in dispute, and it is my opinion that they are not. The question on review, then, is whether the facts sustain the judgment of the trial court. The material facts submitted to the jury on the question of authority of alleged agents on which a finding of duty could be established were basically uncontroverted. We have before us essentially a question of law, and the rule of law on which the majority rely that a reviewing court may not set aside findings of the trier of fact unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence does not apply. Simon v. Horan (1944), 323 Ill. App. 527, 56 N.E.2d 147; Crum v. Gulf Oil Corp. (5th Dist. 1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 897, 388 N.E.2d 1008. The nature and extent of an agency are facts to be proved by the plaintiffs, but if they are not in dispute or in conflict, the question becomes one of law to be determined by the court. (Freet v. American Electrical Supply Co. (1913), 257 Ill. 248, 100 N.E. 933). An agent’s source of authority is the principal, and the power of the agent to bind can only be proved by tracing it to that source by some word or act of the principal. (Merchant’s National Bank v. Nichols & Shepard Co. (1906), 223 Ill. 41, 79 N.E. 28.) The fact of agency or authority, when disputed or denied, must ordinarily be established by evidence of the acts or conduct of the principal or by statements to the agent or third persons. (Kapelski v. Alton & Southern R.R. (5th Dist. 1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 37, 42, 343 N.E.2d 207, 210.) There are no acts, conduct or statements either expressed or implied of the defendant board giving their employees any authority to participate in, supervise or furnish equipment for this game. It is my opinion that the girls’ football game in the instant case was an unauthorized, noncurricular activity as a matter of law. The principle announced in Chimerofsky v. School District No. 63 (1st Dist. 1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 371, 257 N.E.2d 480, would therefore apply, and the board should not be held responsible for such injuries since it had no duty to provide equipment or to supervise this type of activity and should not be liable in damages to one voluntarily enjoying the unrestricted use of its premises to play games. Further, I believe the trial court erred in giving plaintiffs’ instruction No. 30 to the jury. Section 16 — 8 of the School Code merely states the purposes for which school districts may acquire and use real estate owned by them. This statute informs school districts that they “may” employ play leaders, playground directors, supervisors, etc., for their playgrounds, recreation grounds or athletic fields. By giving this instruction, the jury could very well have been led to believe that because a statute authorized the supervision of the field that such supervision was mandated by the statute and thus the district’s duty to do so requiring school personnel to be present to supervise the football field when any game or activity was in progress. This statute does not impose such a duty. Evidence tending to prove the violation of a statute or city ordinance, adapting the same to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 60.01 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter IPI) should not be given unless the statute is intended to protect against the injury in question. This statute is permissive — it cannot be violated. It provides that school districts are permitted to acquire and maintain property for the purposes set out and may employ play leaders, etc. It does not require the district to do so. It may if it wishes, but the statute sets no standards for maintenance, operation, equipping or supervision for the purposes provided. Our supreme court pointed out in Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 380, 390, 356 N.E.2d 93, 97, that “the violation of a statute or ordinance designed for the protection of human life or property is prima facie evidence of negligence.” By merely giving this instruction, the jury were told that this statute was in effect passed by the legislature for the purpose of protecting life or property and that if violated, it constituted evidence of negligence, whereas, this statute was not so designed. It has no application or relevance to the question of negligence or wilful conduct of the district. As the comments to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions point out: “If the statute or ordinance is not intended to protect against the type of injury in question, [citation], or if the injured party is not within the protected class, [citation], the statute or ordinance should not be called to the jury’s attention.” (Emphasis supplied.) IPI Civil No. 60.01, Comment, at 252 (2d ed. 1971). The instruction as given erroneously informed the jury that the defendant had a duty not imposed on it by statute or by judicial decision. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment of the trial court of Madison County.