Court Opinion

ID: 9564708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:05:46.258552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:37.693962
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree that summary judgment was properly granted to all defendants except Deputy Rowe. However, I write separately to clarify the distinction between sovereign and official immunity.
It is true that, “[wjhile suits against public employees in their *894personal capacities involve official immunity, suits against public employees in their official capacities are in reality suits against the state and, therefore, involve sovereign immunity.” (Punctuation omitted.) Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 750 (4) (452 SE2d 476) (1994), quoting Donaldson v. Dept. of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 56 (414 SE2d 638) (1992). However, the mere fact that a public employee is being sued for actions performed within the scope of his employment does not mean that he is being sued in his official capacity, and is therefore entitled to sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court extensively addressed the nature of sovereign and official immunity in Gilbert. The court noted that the common-law doctrine of official immunity provided that “while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are willful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority.” Gilbert, supra at 752 (6).
The court then noted that the official immunity doctrine became part of the State constitution pursuant to a 1991 amendment, which provided as follows: “Except as specifically provided by the General Assembly in a State Tort Claims Act, all officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies may be subject to suit and may be liable for injuries and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent failure to perform, their ministerial functions and may be liable for injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions. Except as provided in this subparagraph, officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies shall not be subject to suit or liability, and no judgment shall be entered against them, for the performance or nonperformance of their official functions. The provisions of this subparagraph shall not be waived.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (d).
In interpreting this section, the Supreme Court stated as follows: “According to the plain language of [the amendment], state officers and employees and those of its departments and agencies are subject to suit only when they negligently perform or fail to perform their ‘ministerial functions’ or when they act with actual malice or intent to cause injury in the performance of their ‘official functions.’ This court has not previously considered the effect of the amendment’s reference to ‘ministerial’ or ‘official’ functions, in contrast to the previous ‘ministerial act’ versus ‘discretionary act’ dichotomy.
“We interpret the term ‘official functions’ to mean any act performed within the officer’s or employee’s scope of authority, including both ministerial and discretionary acts. Under this definition, the 1991 amendment provides no immunity for ministerial acts negligently performed or for ministerial or discretionary acts performed *895with malice or an intent to injure. It, however, does provide immunity for the negligent performance of discretionary acts, which is consistent with prior law.” (Emphasis supplied.) Gilbert, supra at 752-753.
Thus, Gilbert makes it clear that a public employee may be sued for negligent performance of his ministerial acts, despite the fact that such acts constitute “official functions.” Accordingly, the mere fact that an employee is sued for acts performed within the scope of his employment does not mean that he is sued in his official capacity.1 To hold otherwise would virtually obliterate the need for a distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts, because a defendant would be able to claim that he is entitled to sovereign immunity regardless of the nature of his actions.
The complaint against Rowe alleged that he negligently failed to perform his ministerial function of notifying the county of the dangerous condition. As such, the suit is one against Rowe in his individual capacity, and he is not entitled to sovereign immunity. For summary judgment purposes, we accept as fact that Rowe failed to notify the dispatcher of the road conditions. This constitutes a failure to perform a ministerial act, and therefore he is not entitled to official immunity.

 I note that the Georgia Tort Claims Act, enacted under the authority of the 1991 amendment, provides state employees with broad immunity for actions performed within the scope of their official duties, regardless of whether such actions are discretionary or ministerial. OCGA § 50-21-21 (a); see also Riddle v. Ashe, 269 Ga. 65 (495 SE2d 287) (1998). However, this statutory immunity is not applicable to county employees and has no application in this case. See OCGA § 50-21-22 (5).