Court Opinion

ID: 9375615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 15:05:39.726513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:00.455252
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13253

             COMMONWEALTH   vs.   FRANK DiBENEDETTO.

      Suffolk.      November 4, 2022. – February 28, 2023.

      Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker,
                         & Wendlandt, JJ.

Due Process of Law, Plea. Constitutional Law, Plea. Practice,
     Criminal, Capital case, Plea, Trial of defendants together,
     Postconviction relief, District attorney. District
     Attorney. Words, "New and substantial question."

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on May 21, 1986.

     Following review by this court, 414 Mass. 37 (1992), 427
Mass. 414 (1998), 458 Mass. 657 (2011), and 475 Mass. 429
(2016), a motion for postconviction relief, filed on May 7,
2021, was heard by James F. Lang, J.

     A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gaziano, J.,
in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.

     Ruth Greenberg for the defendant.
     Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     Travis H. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for District
Attorney for the Hampden District.
     Robert F. Hennessy for Committee for Public Counsel
Services.
                                                                    2

    GAZIANO, J.   In 1994, the defendant, who had been indicted,

along with two codefendants, on two counts of murder in the

first degree, and was to be tried jointly with one of his

codefendants, was offered a "package deal" plea bargain.    Under

the terms of this offer, the defendant would have been able to

plead guilty to manslaughter, but only if his codefendant also

agreed to the same plea.   The defendant agreed to the terms of

the agreement, but his codefendant, a juvenile, refused.    Both

the defendant and his codefendant subsequently were tried and

convicted of all charges, and sentenced to consecutive terms of

life in prison without the possibility of parole.   In May 2021,

the defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court, pursuant to

Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), to

vacate his convictions of murder in the first degree and to

accept his pleas to manslaughter, as the Commonwealth originally

had offered.   The defendant's motion to enforce the terms of the

proffered agreement was based on the argument that the condition

attached to the offer -- that both he and his codefendant plead

guilty -- violated his due process right to decide whether to

accept the plea or to go to trial.   A Superior Court judge, who

was not the trial judge, denied the motion.   The defendant filed

a gatekeeper petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L.

c. 278, § 33E, seeking leave to appeal from the denial of the
                                                                     3

motion, and a single justice allowed the appeal to proceed in

this court.

     We conclude that the plea offer did not violate the

defendant's rights to due process.    A package deal plea is

consonant with the prosecutor's broad discretion to decide

whether, and under what terms, to enter into a plea agreement.

A prosecutor may insist that, in order for a defendant to

receive a more lenient sentence than what might be received at

trial, all codefendants must agree to waive their rights to

trial.1

     1.   Background.   a.   Prior proceedings.   This case has a

lengthy history in this court.    In April 1988, the defendant and

one of his codefendants, Louis R. Costa, were found guilty of

two counts of murder in the first degree after a joint trial.

Another codefendant, Paul Tanso, also was convicted of two

counts of murder in the first degree at a separate trial.      In

1992, this court reversed the convictions of all three

defendants because recorded testimony of a witness who was

unavailable at the trials had been admitted improperly.      See

Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 50 (1992);

     1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district
attorney for the Hampden district and the Committee for Public
Counsel Services.
                                                                    4

Commonwealth v. Tanso, 411 Mass. 640, 656, cert. denied, 505

U.S. 1221 (1992).

    The defendant and Costa were retried jointly, and on

February 3, 1994, they each were convicted of two counts of

murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate

premeditation.    The defendant also was found guilty on a theory

of extreme atrocity or cruelty.    The defendant and Costa each

were sentenced to consecutive sentences of life without the

possibility of parole.    This court affirmed the convictions and

denied the defendants' requests for relief under G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E.    See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 416

(1998).     In March 1994, Tanso was retried separately and was

acquitted.

    In 2005, the defendant and Costa each filed a motion for a

new trial based on newly discovered evidence concerning

deoxyribonucleic acid testing of bloodstains on the defendant's

sneakers.    In 2009, the Superior Court judge who had presided

over the defendant's second trial denied these motions.    The

defendant and Costa each filed gatekeeper petitions in the

county court pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, seeking leave to

appeal from the denial of their motions for a new trial; two

different single justices allowed these gatekeeper petitions to

proceed.    On a consolidated appeal from the denials, this court

remanded the matter to the Superior Court for further findings
                                                                          5

concerning the newly uncovered evidence and its exculpatory

value.    See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657, 670-673

(2011).   After a nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge

again denied the motions.   The defendant then filed a petition

in the county court to reinstate his appeal in the full court.

A single justice held that the defendant was "required to seek

leave to appeal from the renewed denial of his new trial motion

through a second gatekeeper petition under [G. L. c. 278,]

§ 33E."   Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 475 Mass. 429, 431 (2016).

The single justice "treated the defendant's petition to

reinstate his appeal as a second gatekeeper petition" and

"denied the petition."    Id.   In September 2015, "the defendant

filed a motion in the full court to reinstate his appeal."          Id.

at 431-432.   We held that "reinstatement of the appeal [was]

appropriate, even though the court did not expressly retain

jurisdiction."   Id. at 432.    We further concluded that the

"motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the

defendant's motion [for a new trial]."     Id.

    On October 9, 2015, Costa, who was sixteen at the time of

the shooting, was resentenced to serve two concurrent life

sentences with the possibility of parole.        The resentencing

followed this court's decision in Diatchenko v. District

Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013), S.C.,

471 Mass. 12 (2015), in which we concluded that the
                                                                     6

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not permit a sentence

of life in prison without the possibility of parole for

individuals who commit murder in the first degree while under

the age of eighteen.    On July 26, 2018, Costa was released on

parole.

    In May 2021, the defendant, who was nineteen years old at

the time of the shooting, filed a motion in the Superior Court,

pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, to vacate his convictions of

murder in the first degree and to enforce a plea arrangement

under which he would plead guilty to two counts of manslaughter.

In his motion, the defendant asserted that, during his retrial

in 1994, the prosecutor offered him and Costa a plea agreement

in which they each would plead guilty to manslaughter, but only

on the condition that both of them accepted the arrangement.

The defendant agreed to accept the proffered agreement, but

Costa rejected it.   As grounds for his motion, the defendant

argued that "making [his] plea offer contingent on the

willingness of his codefendant to accept it . . . violated his

due process right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and

art. 12, to make his own decision whether to accept the plea or

go to trial."   The defendant's motion was denied.   The defendant

filed another gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E, in the county court, seeking leave to appeal from the

denial of the motion.   The single justice allowed the appeal to
                                                                     7

proceed "on the ground that it presents a new and substantial

question which ought to be determined by the full court."

      b.   Plea offer.   The defendant submitted six affidavits to

support his contention that the Commonwealth offered him and

Costa a plea arrangement during the course of the 1994 retrial.

One affidavit was by the defendant himself; two were from the

attorney who represented him on retrial; one was by the

attorney's then associate, who assisted him on the case; one was

from the defendant's sister, who was in the court room during

the retrial; and one was by Costa.

      The defendant avers that the prosecutor offered him and

Costa the opportunity to plead guilty to two counts of

manslaughter, with the imposition of consecutive sentences,

provided that both accepted the offer.    The defendant recollects

that the plea arrangement would have included a combined

sentence of from twenty-four to twenty-six years; the defendant

asserts that, given then-available statutory good time and

reductions for time served, had he been able to accept the plea,

he would have been released in 2004.     The defendant maintains

that he wanted to accept the offer, but that Costa refused to do

so.   According to the defendant, if he were released from

custody, he would live with his sister and would work at a

restaurant that she and her husband own.
                                                                  8

     The other affidavits accord with the defendant's

recollection.   Costa recalled that the plea arrangement would

have required that the defendants "agree to a sentence that

would have each of [them] serve another eight or so years in

prison"2 and that "[t]he offer was a take it or leave it for both

of [them] together."   The other affiants did not recall the

length of the proposed sentence.

     According to the affidavit by the defendant's sister,

during the 1994 retrial, she "learned that the Commonwealth had

offered [the defendant] and his codefendant . . . a plea to

manslaughter provided that both of them accepted it.    [The

defendant] said he wanted to accept the plea.   In a hallway

outside the courtroom, [she] saw [Costa's] lawyer . . . get on

his knees and beg [Costa] to take the plea, but he refused."

The defendant's attorney and his associate each recalled that

Costa's attorney told them that he had "gotten on his knees and

begged Costa to accept the plea, but he still refused."

     2 The shooting took place on February 19, 1986. The
defendant and his codefendants were arrested on February 23,
1986. The defendant and Costa originally were sentenced on
April 11, 1988. On December 28, 1992, this court reversed the
judgments, set aside the verdicts, and remanded the cases for a
new trial, and the defendant was released on bail. On February
3, 1994, the defendant and Costa were convicted after retrial.
The defendant asserts that, at the time the plea agreement was
proffered, he had been incarcerated for four years and four
months.
                                                                     9

    The defendant's attorney averred that, in November 2020, he

spoke with the assistant district attorney who prosecuted the

case.    That assistant district attorney, who is now a Superior

Court judge, recalled that there had been a plea offer that had

been approved by the district attorney.     She further recalled

that it was her practice at the time to "require package pleas

in cases involving codefendants."     She did not remember the

specific terms of the offer.     The defendant's attorney also

explained in his affidavit that he had informed the

Commonwealth, either through the assistant district attorney who

prosecuted the case or through a first assistant district

attorney, that the defendant wished to accept the offer and

"urged that it be accepted despite Costa's refusal."

    The Commonwealth agrees that the defendant and Costa

received a plea offer that was contingent on acceptance by both

of them.   The Commonwealth takes no stance on the specific terms

of the arrangement.

    2.     Discussion.   A "package deal" plea agreement is a plea

arrangement under which "the government accepts a defendant's

guilty plea on the condition that his [or her] co-defendant(s)

also plead guilty."      United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 489
                                                                  10

(3d Cir. 2005).3   The defendant argues that a prosecutor's offer

to participate in a package agreement violates his rights to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights; the defendant maintains that such an offer violates the

due process rights of the defendant who receives the offer,

because the defendant's ability to plead is arbitrarily and

unfairly made contingent upon the willingness of a codefendant

to do so.   The defendant contends, therefore, that the plea

offer he received in 1994 was a violation of his due process

rights and that the appropriate remedy is to enforce the 1994

plea offer, even though Costa refused to accept it at the time.

     The Commonwealth argues that the defendant has waived any

claims he might have concerning the 1994 plea offer, because he

failed to raise them when he moved for a new trial in 2005.     The

Commonwealth also argues that the package plea offer did not

infringe upon the defendant's due process rights.

     Ordinarily, "[w]e review the denial of a motion brought

under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) . . . for abuse of discretion or

     3 Package plea deals also have been described as "wired"
pleas, United States v. Knight, 981 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir.
2020); "locked" pleas, United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 482
(3d Cir. 2005); "contingent" pleas, State v. Solano, 150 Ariz.
398, 401 (1986); "tied" pleas, State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho
530, 534 (2008); and "linked" pleas, People v. Wyatt, 2 A.D.3d
218, 219 (N.Y. 2003).
                                                                    11

error of law."   Commonwealth v. Perez, 480 Mass. 562, 567

(2018).   Where, however, "a defendant claims that a judge has

made an error of constitutional dimension, we accept the judge's

subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error . . . but review

independently the application of constitutional principles to

the facts found" (quotations and citation).    Id. at 567-568.

The defendant's argument here is constitutionally based, and

thus we review the denial of his motion de novo.

    a.    New and substantial question.   As an initial matter, we

consider whether the defendant's claim presents a new and

substantial question.    Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, a defendant

"is entitled to review of the denial of his [or her]

motion . . . if and only if [the defendant] can show that he [or

she] is raising an issue that is 'new and substantial.'"

Commonwealth v. Gunter, 459 Mass. 480, 488, cert. denied, 565

U.S. 868 (2011).    "An issue is not 'new' within the meaning of

G. L. c. 278, § 33E, where either it has already been addressed,

or . . . it could have been addressed had the defendant properly

raised it . . . ."    Commonwealth v. Ambers, 397 Mass. 705, 707

(1986).   Accordingly, "[i]f a defendant fails to raise a claim

that is generally known and available at the time of trial or

direct appeal or in the first motion for postconviction relief,

the claim is waived."    Rodwell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1016,

1017-1018 (2000).    A claim is deemed waived under G. L. c. 278,
                                                                  12

§ 33E, however, only if the defendant previously had a "genuine

opportunity" to raise it (citation omitted).     See Mains v.

Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 33 (2000).     See also Rodwell, supra

("the waiver principles that we apply pursuant to [G. L.

c. 278,] § 33E," are similar to "the waiver rules expressed in"

Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (2), which provides that claim is not

waived if it "could not reasonably have been raised in the

original or amended motion").     A genuine opportunity did not

exist if the "theory on which the [defendant's argument relies]

was not sufficiently developed at the time of [trial, in a

direct appeal, or in a prior motion for postconviction relief]"

(citation omitted).     Mains, supra at 34.

    Here, the single justice determined that the defendant's

motion to enforce the 1994 plea offer "raises a new and

substantial question regarding the scope of constitutional

protections afforded a defendant during the plea-bargaining

process."    The Commonwealth, however, argues that the

defendant's claim is not new, because he had had prior

opportunities to raise the issue, and thus the claim has been

waived.     The defendant maintains that he has not waived the

claim, because the theory on which it relies was not available

prior to 2012, when the United States Supreme Court issued its

decisions in two companion cases, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156

(2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
                                                                      13

     In both Frye, 566 U.S. at 143, and Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174,

the Court held that, at least in certain instances, a fair trial

may not suffice to cure a violation of a defendant's

constitutional rights during pretrial plea bargaining.    In Frye,

supra at 138-139, defense counsel failed to advise his client of

a prosecutor's plea offers, and the offers expired; the

defendant eventually pleaded guilty on more severe terms than he

would have had if he had accepted the original offers.    The

Court held that the defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution to the effective assistance of

counsel applies to plea bargaining, and remanded the matter to

the trial court to determine whether defense counsel's failure

to inform the defendant resulted in Strickland prejudice.4      Id.

at 147, 151.   The Court reasoned that "it is insufficient simply

to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that

inoculates any errors in the pretrial process."   Id. at 143-144.

     4 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court held that, to establish that
"counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of
a conviction," a defendant must show, first, "that counsel's
performance was deficient," and second, that "the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." The Court in Missouri v.
Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012), held that there is Strickland
prejudice in the plea bargaining context if a defendant can show
there is a "reasonable probability [the defendant] would have
accepted the earlier plea offer" absent deficient performance by
counsel and "there is a reasonable probability neither the
prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer
from being accepted or implemented."
                                                                     14

In Lafler, supra at 160-161, the defendant rejected the

prosecutor's plea offers due to erroneous advice by his

attorney, and was convicted at trial.     The Court held that

defense counsel's faulty advice violated the defendant's Sixth

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.      Id.

at 174.   Furthermore, the Court held, the fact that the

defendant had had a fair trial did not "wipe[] clean any

deficient performance by defense counsel during plea

bargaining."   Id. at 169.    As a remedy, the Court ordered the

State to reoffer the defendant the original plea agreement.         Id.

at 174.

    The defendant relies upon Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174, and

Frye, 566 U.S. at 143-144, to argue that the 1994 plea offer

should be enforced, regardless of whether he subsequently

received a fair trial.    At the time of Lafler, supra, and Frye,

supra, this court had not endorsed the enforcement of an expired

plea offer as a remedy.      See Commonwealth v. Mahar, 442 Mass.

11, 27 (2004) (Sosman, J., concurring) ("There is no basis for

ordering the prosecutor to revive the withdrawn offer as a

remedy for defense counsel's deficient advice concerning the

original plea offer").    See also Lafler, supra at 183 (Scalia,

J., dissenting) ("It is a remedy unheard of in American

jurisprudence -- and, I would be willing to bet, in the

jurisprudence of any other country").      The Court's holdings in
                                                                     15

Lafler, supra, and Frye, supra, obviously were not available to

the defendant in 2005, when he moved for a new trial, nor in

2009, when he filed a gatekeeper petition seeking leave to

appeal from the denial of that motion.     The defendant therefore

lacked a genuine opportunity to raise this claim prior to the

present motion.     See Mains, 433 Mass. at 33 (no genuine

opportunity to raise claim until after issuance of United States

Supreme Court decisions on which claim was based).

       The Commonwealth argues that the defendant had a previous

opportunity to raise a claim that relied upon Lafler, 566 U.S.

at 174, and Frye, 566 U.S. at 143-144, because he actively was

pursuing litigation in this case in 2012.     In that year,

however, the defendant was litigating the motion for a new trial

that he had filed in 2005, following this court's remand for

further findings in 2009.     See DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. at 672-

673.   This court retained jurisdiction over the case while it

was remanded to the Superior Court, and then, in 2016,

reinstated the defendant's 2009 appeal once the Superior Court

judge's "further hearing and findings" enabled us to decide the

issue the defendant had raised in 2005.     See DiBenedetto, 475

Mass. at 437-438.     We concluded that the defendant was not

required to file a new gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L.

c. 278, § 33E, in order to have his appeal reinstated, because

"a single justice already determined in 2009 that the
                                                                      16

defendant's motion for a new trial raised a new and substantial

issue worthy of consideration by the full court."      Id. at 437.

The defendant was not able to raise a new issue in his petition

to reinstate his appeal, because, had he done so, he would have

had to submit a new gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L.

c. 278, § 33E.     See id. at 438 n.12.   The defendant therefore

did not have an opportunity to raise a new claim during the

period of litigation between 2012 and 2016.       Accordingly, he has

not waived his claim challenging the constitutionality of the

plea offer that he was presented in 1994.

    We also agree with the single justice that the defendant's

claim is "substantial."     To be "substantial," a claim must

present a "meritorious issue . . . worthy of consideration by an

appellate court."     Gunter, 459 Mass. at 487.   As the single

justice explained, the issue presented here -- whether package

agreements are consistent with a defendant's rights to due

process -- has been a subject of disagreement among judges in

the Superior Court, and has not been addressed by this court

since the United States Supreme Court issued its decisions in

Lafler and Frye.    Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant

has presented a "new and substantial question."

    b.   Plea bargaining.     Prosecutors have "substantial freedom

to exercise their discretion in plea bargaining."      Commonwealth

v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 522 (1981).      It is the prosecutor's
                                                                    17

role to determine, on behalf of the Commonwealth, whether the

public interest would benefit from a plea agreement.     See

Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 500 (1991), S.C., 422

Mass. 816 (1996).    A defendant therefore has "no right to insist

that the prosecutor participate in plea bargaining."     Smith,

supra.    The discretion granted to the prosecutor in plea

bargaining "rests largely on the recognition that the decision

to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review"

(citation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Latimore, 423 Mass. 129,

136 (1996).   Judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretion

over plea bargaining could "threaten[] to chill law enforcement

by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and [decision-making] to

outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness

by revealing the Government's enforcement policy" (citation

omitted).   United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).

    That is not to say that there are no constraints on the

prosecutor's actions in plea bargaining.     See Lafler, 566 U.S.

at 168.   To the contrary, "[t]his phase of the process of

criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in

accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to

insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the

circumstances."     Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262

(1971).   Hence, "[d]ue process requires that '[a] "plea is valid

only when the defendant offers it voluntarily, with sufficient
                                                                  18

awareness of the relevant circumstances . . . and with the

advice of competent counsel"'" (citation omitted).   Commonwealth

v. Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 362 (2015).    Moreover, a judge may

"enforce a plea agreement over the Commonwealth's objection if

[the judge] finds that the defendant has reasonably relied on a

prosecutor's promise to his or her detriment."    Commonwealth v.

Francis, 477 Mass. 582, 585 (2017).

      This court previously has suggested that package plea

offers do not violate a defendant's due process rights.    In

Smith, 384 Mass. at 520, the defendant was tried with a

codefendant on charges of murder in the first degree.     The

prosecutor indicated that he would accept a guilty plea to

murder in the second degree from the defendant "only if [his

codefendant] also pleaded guilty to murder in the second

degree."   Id.   At first, the codefendant rejected the offer, and

thus prevented the defendant from accepting it.   Id.   After jury

deliberations began, however, the codefendant pleaded guilty to

murder in the second degree with the approval of the prosecutor.

Id. at 521.   Thereafter, the defendant attempted to plead to

murder in the second degree, but "the prosecutor opposed it,"

and the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree.

Id.   The judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial

because he concluded that the plea offer had expired once the

jury began deliberations and therefore was no longer enforceable
                                                                   19

over the Commonwealth's objection.   Id.    We affirmed.   Id.

at 520.   While the defendant did not challenge the

constitutionality of the package arrangement that he was

offered, we observed in passing that "[s]uch an arrangement has

survived challenge."   Id. at 520 n.2.    In affirming the trial

judge's ruling, we reasoned that "[t]he defendant is in no worse

position than he would have been if the prosecutor had made no

plea bargain offer at all," because "the defendant is left with

the adequate remedy of having a trial."    Id. at 522.

    The defendant maintains that the United States Supreme

Court's reasoning in Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169-170, and Frye, 566

U.S. at 143-144, calls into question this court's reasoning in

Smith, 384 Mass. at 522.   In contrast to this court's holding in

that case, the United States Supreme Court in Lafler, supra

at 166, observed that "[e]ven if the trial itself is free from

constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead of

taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a

conviction on more serious counts or the imposition of a more

severe sentence."   While defendants have "no right to be offered

a plea," the State "nonetheless [must] act in accord with the

dictates of the Constitution" once it decides to engage in plea

bargaining (citations omitted).   Id. at 168.   The defendant

contends that the offer of the package agreement violated his

rights to due process and, therefore, in order to cure the
                                                                 20

injury, the terms of the offer should be enforced.5   See Lafler,

supra at 166.

     c.   Fundamental right.   The defendant argues that the

condition attached to the plea offer -- that Costa also had to

plead guilty in order for the defendant to plead to a lesser

charge -- violated the defendant's fundamental right to choose

whether to accept or reject the offer.   According to the

defendant, the package deal unfairly impeded his ability to

enter into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, because the

success of the plea arrangement turned on Costa's willingness to

plead, a factor over which the defendant had no control.

     5 Prior to 2012, at least four United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals, and three State appellate courts, had rejected
challenges to package plea deals where a defendant could not
plead guilty because a codefendant had rejected the terms of the
offer. See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43
(1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814, 823
(10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1 (1997);
United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1134 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1107, 499 U.S. 968, and 499 U.S. 982
(1991); United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir.
1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); State v. McInelly, 146 Ariz.
161, 165 (1985); People v. Barnett, 113 Cal. App. 3d 563, 574
(1980); Bostic v. State, 184 Ga. App. 509, 511 (1987). Since
the United States Supreme Court decided Frye and Lafler in 2012,
all appellate decisions of which we are aware have rejected
constitutional challenges to package plea deals. See United
States v. Knight, 981 F.3d 1095, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2020); United
States v. Martin, 516 Fed. Appx. 433, 442-443 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 571 U.S. 919 and 571 U.S. 936 (2013); Lampkin v. State,
495 P.3d 529 (Nev. Ct. App. 2021); State v. Drain, 2020-Ohio-
701, at ¶¶ 12-15.
                                                                      21

    We evaluate a claim that the Commonwealth has impaired a

fundamental right under the framework of substantive due

process.   See Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 13 (2002).

Substantive due process is guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as by arts.

1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.      See

Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 55 (2022).     "Substantive

due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct

that shocks the conscience . . ." (quotations and citation

omitted), Vega v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 226, 231 (2022), or

that "unduly interfere[s] with rights that are deemed

fundamental," Kligler, supra.   Where fundamental rights are

involved, governmental conduct is "subject to strict scrutiny,

an exacting form of judicial review requiring that the statute

be narrowly tailored to further a compelling and legitimate

government interest" (quotation and citation omitted).      Id.

    "Fundamental rights are those rights that are explicitly or

implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" (quotation and

citation omitted).   Kligler, 491 Mass. at 55.   We have

recognized that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights "may

demand broader protection for fundamental rights than the

Federal Constitution" (citation omitted).   Id. at 60.     We adopt

a "comprehensive approach" to identifying fundamental rights

under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.   Id.     Under this
                                                                  22

approach, the court must use "reasoned judgment" to identify

"interests of the person so fundamental that the State must

accord them its respect."    Id. at 58, quoting Obergefell v.

Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).

    We conclude that the package plea offer did not violate the

defendant's fundamental due process rights under either the

United States Constitution or the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights.   "It is undisputed that a criminal defendant has no

constitutional right to a plea bargain."    Commonwealth v.

Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 127 (2013).    See Lafler, 566 U.S.

at 168.   Rather, "[t]he decision whether the Commonwealth enters

into a plea agreement with the defendant is the prosecutor's

alone."   Francis, 477 Mass. at 585.   In deciding whether to

enter into a plea agreement, the prosecutor may consider, among

other factors, "the strength of the case, the prosecution's

general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement

priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's

overall enforcement plan."   Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.

598, 607 (1985).   The prosecutor therefore may choose whether to

extend a plea offer to a defendant due to factors that are

outside the defendant's control, so long as those factors are

not "based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,

religion, or other arbitrary classification" (citation omitted).

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).    See
                                                                     23

Commonwealth v. Wilbur W., 479 Mass. 397, 409 (2018).     Contrast

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-250 (1980) ("A

scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise,

into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or

impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in

some contexts raise serious constitutional questions"); United

States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1297-1298, 1301-1302

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding to District

Court to determine whether government purposely gave more

favorable plea bargains to women as compared to men).     For

example, a prosecutor may prioritize the wishes of a victim, and

may choose to enter into a plea agreement with a defendant only

if a victim or a victim's family first approves the agreement.

See Latimore, 423 Mass. at 137.   There is no apparent reason,

then, why a prosecutor may not communicate to a defendant that

the prosecutor will agree to a plea only if a codefendant also

agrees to plead guilty.

    In support of his argument that a package deal plea offer

violates a fundamental right, the defendant points to two United

States Supreme Court decisions.   He first relies on language in

Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363, wherein the Court stated that a

defendant's due process rights are violated if the defendant is

not "free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."     That
                                                                    24

case, however, was about the defendant's right freely to reject

a plea offer without facing retaliation for doing "what the law

plainly allows him [or her] to do."    Id.    There is nothing in

the Court's holding to suggest that a defendant has a right to

accept a plea offer under terms to which the prosecutor has not

agreed.   See id. at 365.   The defendant also cites Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), in which the Court stated that

a defendant "has the ultimate authority to make certain

fundamental decisions regarding the case," including "whether to

plead guilty."   Jones, supra, however, concerned the authority

that a defendant has vis-à-vis the defendant's attorney to

control certain pretrial decisions and decisions at trial.      See

id. at 746.   The cited language simply explained that the

defendant's attorney may not override the defendant's decision

whether to plead guilty.    See id. at 751.

    d.    Rational basis review and procedural due process.

Governmental conduct that does "not have an impact on

fundamental rights . . . [is] subject to rational basis review,

a less exacting standard of review whereby a challenged [action]

will pass constitutional muster . . . if it bears a reasonable

relation to a permissible legislative objective" (quotations and

citation omitted).   Kligler, 491 Mass. at 55.    Moreover, if a

statute or governmental action has survived substantive due

process scrutiny, "[p]rocedural due process requires that [it]
                                                                    25

be implemented in a fair manner" (quotation and citation

omitted).    See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 674 (1993).

    The defendant contends that the package plea offer did not

serve a legitimate public purpose, and was arbitrary and unfair.

We conclude that package plea offers serve a legitimate public

purpose and that such offers are not inherently unfair to a

defendant.    Accordingly, they pass constitutional muster.   See

Kligler, 491 Mass. at 73.

    When a prosecutor enters into a plea agreement with a

defendant, the prosecutor agrees to "limit[] the defendant's

criminal liability."    Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 410 (1987)

(Stevens, J., dissenting).    In return, the Commonwealth avoids

trial, and thereby conserves "scarce judicial and prosecutorial

resources."   Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).

Where a prosecutor jointly tries two or more defendants, the

only way for the Commonwealth to avoid the effort and expense of

a trial is for each defendant to plead guilty; if only one

defendant pleads guilty, the Commonwealth still must try those

defendants who did not waive the right to trial.    See

Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 457 Mass. 24, 25 (2010) (by pleading

guilty defendant waives right to trial by jury).    In proffering

a package plea arrangement, a prosecutor can be assured that

each defendant will receive lenient treatment only if, in

return, the Commonwealth obtains the complete avoidance of
                                                                  26

trial.   See In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d 277, 289 n.5 (1983)

(package plea deal "may be a valuable tool to the

prosecutor" because "prosecutor may be properly interested in

avoiding the time, delay and expense of trial of all the

defendants").

    In the defendant's view, package plea offers are

unnecessary, and therefore reliance upon them is arbitrary and

unfair, because individual plea offers are a more effective

means of conserving the Commonwealth's resources.   The defendant

maintains that a package deal is effective only if all

defendants choose to plead, because otherwise all defendants

must be tried.   Individual plea offers, by contrast, allow the

Commonwealth to save on costs by trying fewer defendants, even

if not all defendants agree to plead.

    Here, the defendant contends, an individual trial of Costa

would have been less costly than the joint trial that did take

place, because the former option would have saved the

Commonwealth from having to present evidence that pertained to

the defendant's, and not Costa's, guilt.   Furthermore, had the

prosecutor allowed the defendant to plead, and solely tried

Costa, the Commonwealth would have had to respond to the

objections and arguments of only one defense attorney, rather

than two.   The defendant notes that, while the joint trial with

Costa lasted fifteen days, Tanso's trial took place over only
                                                                     27

eight days.   The defendant asserts that, if the prosecutor's

goal was to conserve resources, that goal would have been better

served had she allowed the defendant to plead to manslaughter.

    We disagree with the defendant's reasoning.      In plea

bargaining, a prosecutor must make difficult calculations about

the trade-offs between seeking a harsher sentence for a

defendant and sparing the Commonwealth the burden of a trial.

See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.    It is for the prosecutor, and the

prosecutor alone, to decide in any given instance whether these

trade-offs are in the public interest.     See Francis, 477 Mass.

at 585.

    Here, the prosecutor reasonably could have decided that it

would be worthwhile to allow the defendant to plead guilty to

manslaughter only if, thereby, trial were altogether avoided.

Consider, for example, that the prosecutor's focus could have

been on saving the victims' families from the ordeal of sitting

through a retrial.     See Commonwealth v. Smith, 387 Mass. 900,

913 (1983) (Abrams, J., concurring) (retrial "forces the friends

and family of the victim to relive the trauma of the crime and

again suffer the ordeal of a trial").     An individual plea offer

would have permitted the defendant a more lenient sentence

without serving this legitimate interest.     Accordingly, we

discern no reason to conclude that the package plea offer was

arbitrary or unfair.    See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
                                                                 28

U.S. 833, 845 (1998) ("[t]he touchstone of due process is

protection of the individual against arbitrary action of

government" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Blake, 454

Mass. 267, 283 (2009) ("Procedural due process, at a bare

minimum, requires that the proceedings against a defendant not

be fundamentally unfair").

    e.   Coercion.   Finally, the defendant contends that the

offer of a package arrangement was designed to pressure him into

coercing Costa into pleading guilty.   Nothing in the record,

however, suggests that this was the prosecutor's motive.

Moreover, neither the defendant nor Costa pleaded guilty, and

thus there is no risk that the plea offer had a coercive effect.

See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir.

2000) (concern "that the defendant may have been coerced into

giving up his right to go to trial obviously does not apply when

the defendant does go to trial"); United States v. Wheat, 813

F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153 (1988)

("defendant cannot complain that there was any coercion or

element of involuntariness here, because neither he nor his

codefendant accepted the [package deal plea offer]").

    We agree, however, that there are legitimate concerns about

the potential for package plea agreements to be coercive.     While

package plea agreements "are not per se involuntary," they

present a risk that "[o]ne defendant may be coerced into
                                                                    29

pleading guilty by a co-defendant who believes he is getting a

good deal under the package deal."    United States v. Mescual-

Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1175

and 543 U.S. 1176 (2005).   Furthermore, when there is a family

relationship between two defendants, "one defendant . . .

[might] involuntarily sacrifice his [or her] own best interests

for those of a family member . . . in a belief that the package

deal will benefit the other."   Id.   See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S.

at 364 n.8; Hodge, 412 F.3d at 489; State v. Bey, 270 Kan. 544,

554-555 (2001); State v. Hoang Muc Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 542

(Minn. 1994).   To mitigate these concerns, courts in other

jurisdictions have required that, for a package deal to be

enforced, the parties "must notify the . . . court that a

package deal exists," and the court must inquire into the

voluntariness of the package agreement "with special care."

Hodge, supra at 489-491.    See Mescual-Cruz, supra at 8; United

States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 659-660 (9th Cir. 1993); State v.

Solano, 150 Ariz. 398, 402 (1986); In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d

at 288-290; Bey, supra at 555; Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319,

335-336 (Tenn. 2006).

    We conclude that courts in Massachusetts should adopt a

similar approach.   Rule 12 (a) (3) of the Massachusetts Rules of

Criminal Procedure, as amended, 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), states

that a judge "may accept a plea of guilty . . . only after first
                                                                   30

determining that it is made voluntarily with an understanding of

the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."       "A

plea is voluntary if entered without coercion, duress, or

improper inducements" (citation omitted).    Commonwealth v.

Sherman, 451 Mass. 332, 338 (2008).   Accordingly, during the

plea colloquy, "a judge must conduct a real probe of the

defendant's mind to determine that the plea is not being

extracted from the defendant under undue pressure" (quotations

and citation omitted).   Id.   This inquiry is rendered incomplete

if the judge is not made aware that the defendant's codefendants

had reason to pressure the defendant to plead guilty.

     Accordingly, from the date of the issuance of the rescript

in this case, if a plea agreement "is conditioned on the

cooperation of more than one defendant," the plea judge must be

informed of the "package nature of the deal."6   Caro, 997 F.2d

at 660.   In the absence of such information, the judge's probe

into the voluntariness of the defendant's plea cannot account

for the "risks inherent in package deals."    Mescual-Cruz, 387

F.3d at 9.   Further, in determining whether a defendant whose

plea was pursuant to a package agreement "was subject to undue

pressure to plead guilty" (citation omitted), Sherman, 451 Mass.

     6 We ask this court's standing advisory committee on the
rules of criminal procedure to propose a suitable amendment to
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 to delineate these requirements.
                                                                   31

at 338, the judge must consider "the traditional types of

coercion and the unique pressure from a co-defendant or family

member that might be present in a package deal," Mescual-Cruz,

supra.   Consequently, a defendant must "be allowed to withdraw

his or her guilty plea if the [Commonwealth] fails to fully

inform the trial court of the nature of the [package] plea."

Bey, 270 Kan. at 555.

    3.   Conclusion.    The Superior Court judge's order denying

the defendant's motion to enforce the plea bargain is affirmed.

                                    So ordered.