Court Opinion

ID: 9836736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:55.72929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.704986
License: Public Domain

*58Judge GIERKE
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of aggravated assault (2 specifications), assault consummated by a battery, and kidnapping, in violation of Articles 128 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 928 and 934, respectively. The military judge sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 7 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence but suspended all confinement in excess of 30 months for a period of 30 months in accordance with a pretrial agreement. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
Our Court granted review of the following issues:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS FAILED TO ANALYZE THE PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT UNDER UNITED STATES V. WHEE-LUS, “SOME COLORABLE SHOWING OF POSSIBLE PREJUDICE,” AND INSTEAD ERRONEOUSLY TESTED FOR PREJUDICE UNDER ARTICLE 59(a), UCMJ, “MATERIAL PREJUDICE TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.”
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW THAT THE FAILURE TO ABIDE BY ARTICLE 60, UCMJ, WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
For the reasons set out below, we affirm.

Factual Background

The facts underlying appellant’s guilty pleas were set out in a stipulation of fact. The stipulation recites that appellant grabbed Religious Programs Specialist Seaman (RPSN) B around the neck, brandished a 12-inch barbecue fork in her face, and threatened to stab her. He forced her into an unoccupied room in the barracks where he pushed her onto a bed, unbuckled and pulled down her pants, and placed his hand on her vaginal area. He held RPSN B in the room against her will for about an hour, during which she attempted to escape four times but was forced by appellant to remain in the room.
After the record was completed and authenticated, the staff judge advocate’s (SJA’s) recommendation was signed and submitted by Lieutenant (LT) Brendan C. Cur-ran, a commissioned officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, who identified himself as the “Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, Naval Training Center, Great Lakes.” The document does not reflect whether the SJA reviewed and approved it, nor does it reflect whether LT Curran was the acting SJA when he prepared and submitted his recommendation.
LT Curran neglected to mention appellant’s request for deferment of his reduction in grade and forfeitures and his request for clemency. The convening authority’s action, however, specifically recites that he considered “the record of trial, the results of trial, the request for deferment of reduction in rank and forfeitures from the defense counsel submitted 23 December 1997, the clemency request received on 3 February 1998 and the recommendation of the Staff Judge Advocate.”
The SJA’s recommendation was served on appellant and his defense counsel. Defense counsel responded that he had no comments concerning the recommendation. Appellant did not challenge LT Curran’s authority to prepare and submit the posttrial recommendation until his case was before the Court of Cidminal Appeals. That court held, 52 MJ 308, that it was error for LT Curran to submit the posttrial recommendation in his capacity as an assistant SJA, but it declined to grant relief, holding that any error was waived unless it rose to the level of plain error. The court did not attempt to determine if LT Curran was in fact the acting SJA. The court held that there was no plain error. Unpub. op. at 2.

*59
Discussion

Appellant now asserts that he was deprived of a posttrial recommendation prepared by “a senior officer with greater legal and life experience” than LT Curran. Final Brief at 5. He argues that a more experienced officer may have viewed his requests for clemency differently. The Government argues that any error was waived and does not rise to the level of plain error.
Article 60(d), UCMJ, 10 USC § 860(d), requires that the convening authority “obtain and consider the written recommendation of his staff judge advocate or legal officer.” Similarly, RCM 1107(b)(3)(A)(ii), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.),* requires that the convening authority consider “[t]he recommendation of the staff judge advocate or legal officer under RCM 1106, if applicable.” In United States v. Kema, 10 USCMA 272, 27 CMR 346 (1959), the three judges of this Court each took a somewhat different approach to a case where an assistant SJA prepared and signed the posttrial review, and the SJA added a statement, “I concur,” and signed it. The judges disagreed on the amount of personal involvement required of the SJA. All three judges were in agreement, however, that Congress contemplated that the convening authority receive the recommendation of the SJA, not an assistant SJA.
RCM 1106(f)(6) provides that defense counsel’s failure to comment on any matter in the posttrial recommendation in a timely manner waives any later claim of error, unless it rises to the level of plain error. An appellant has the burden of persuading this Court that there was plain error. He must show that (1) there was an error; (2) that it was plain or obvious; and (3) that the error materially prejudiced a substantial right. United States v. Finster, 51 MJ 185, 187 (1999), citing United States v. Powell, 49 MJ 460, 463, 465 (1998). Because of the highly discretionary nature of the convening authority’s action on the sentence, we will grant relief if an appellant presents “some colorable showing of possible prejudice.” United States v. Wheelus, 49 MJ 283, 289 (1998).
In this ease, LT Curran was statutorily qualified to submit the posttrial recommendation if the SJA reviewed and approved it or if LT Curran was the acting SJA because of the absence or disqualification of the SJA. Thus, this case is different from our recent decision in United States v. Finster, supra, where the recommendation was submitted by an enlisted person who was statutorily unqualified.
The court below did not determine the specific nature of the error. Instead it merely recited two possibilities: (1) an administrative error by failing to identify LT Curran as the acting SJA, or (2) a legal error, i.e., submission of the posttrial recommendation by an officer other than the senior judge advocate present for duty. The court below concluded that any error did not rise to the level of plain error.
We hold that appellant has failed to carry his burden of persuading us that there was plain error. There is nothing in the record before us showing that LT Curran was not the senior judge advocate present for duty. Appellant has shown only a minor clerical error in LT Curran’s signature block, which falls short of the substantive legal error required by Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a), and the third prong of Powell.
Furthermore, appellant has pointed to no errors in the posttrial recommendation and we have found none, except the failure to mention the clemency request and request for deferment. However, that failure was clearly harmless, because the convening authority specifically recited in his action that he considered them. While in another case there might have been a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable recommendation from a “senior officer with greater legal and life experience” than LT Curran, that likelihood is purely speculative in this case. Appellant went to trial facing serious charges *60and a possible sentence of life imprisonment. See para. 92e, Part IV, Manual, supra (maximum punishment for kidnapping). He had negotiated a pretrial agreement that had the practical effect of cutting the adjudged confinement from 7 years to 30 months. We recognize the highly discretionary nature of the convening authority’s clemency power. Nevertheless, we are convinced that there is no reasonable likelihood that the SJA would have recommended clemency in this case, or that the convening authority would have granted it.

Decision

The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

 All Manual provisions are cited to the version in effect at the time of trial. The 1998 Manual version is unchanged, unless otherwise indicated.