Court Opinion

ID: 2964847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:05.437575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:00.127689
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
          No. 96-2149
                            EDNA RODRIGUEZ-SURIS, ET AL.,
                              Plaintiffs - Appellants,
                                         v.
                             BERTHA MONTESINOS, ET AL.,
                               Defendants - Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                   [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                             Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                            and Keeton,  District Judge.
                                _____________________
               Kevin G. Little for appellants.
               Joe 
                   W. 
                      Redden, 
                              Jr., with whom  Curt 
                                                   Webb, Linda 
                                                               K. 
                                                                   McCloud,
          Beck, Redden & Secrest
                               , 
                                 Edna Hernandez
                                                and 
                                                   Reichard & Escalera
                                                                       were
          on brief for appellees.
                                ____________________
                                   August 11, 1997
                                ____________________
                              
           Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    KEETON, District  
                                      Judge. In this diversity action,
          plaintiffs-appellants sued defendants-appellees for injuries
          sustained after receiving facial collagen injections from defendant
          Bertha Montesinos. Plaintiffs filed their complaint nearly four
          years after receiving the injurious injections. The district court
          granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants (Montesinos
          and Collagen Corporation), holding that all of plaintiffs' claims
          were barred by the one-year Puerto Rico statute of limitation
          applicable to tort actions. 935 F. Supp. 71 (D.P.R. 1996). We
          reverse and remand with directions, as explained.
                                 I. Issues Presented
                    The principal legal issues in dispute in this case
          concern limitation of tort actions under the law of Puerto Rico.
          More precisely, the dispute centers on the meaning of statutory
          provisions and opinions of courts of Puerto Rico interpreting them,
          particularly with respect to levels of awareness of injury, source
          of injury, causal connection, and legal responsibility.
                    To what extent is the running of the statutory time limit
          of one year for the filing of tort actions for damages affected by
          lack of awareness of injury, a connection between injury and the
          personal services or other conduct of a person, and legal
          responsibility for the injury?
                    To what extent is the running of the statutory time limit
          of one year affected by lack of awareness of a connection between
                                         -2-

          injury and a product of a manufacturer or other supplier of the
          product?
                    To what extent is the running of the limitation period
          affected by the representations of the person who caused the
          injury, or of third persons, regarding the nature and source of a
          plaintiff's injury?
                    Answers to these questions must be determined as matters
          of law. Accordingly, this court reviews the district court's
          rulings on these issues de novo.
                    The matters of law we are deciding, of course, are
          matters of the law of Puerto Rico. Both in the district court and
          in this court on appeal, the determination of these questions of
          law does not involve any discretion to fashion rules of law.
          Instead, our objective is solely to determine what is the law as
          indicated by authoritative sources. Primary among these
          "authoritative sources" are the plainly expressed holdings of the
          highest court of Puerto Rico.   See, e.g.,  Daigle v. Maine 
                                                                       Med.
          Ctr.,  
                Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that in
          applying state law, a federal court is "absolutely bound by a
          current interpretation of that law formulated by the state's
          highest tribunal"). Where a jurisdiction's highest court has not
          spoken on a precise issue of law, we look to "analogous state court
          decisions, persuasive adjudications by courts of sister states,
          learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in
          state decisional law" in order to make an "informed prophecy" of
                                         -3-

          how the state court would rule on the precise issue.  Blinzler v.
          Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996).
              II. Puerto Rico Law Regarding the Statute of Limitation
          A. An Overview
                    The Puerto Rico statute of limitation for tort actions
          provides for a one-year limitation period that begins to run from
          "the time the aggrieved person has knowledge of the injury." P.R.
          Laws Ann. tit. 31, S 5298 (1994). Plaintiff bears the burden of
          proving when the "damage" became known.    Rivera 
                                                            Encarnacion v.
          Comm. of Puerto Rico
                             , 113 P.R. Dec. 383, 385, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans.
          498, 501 (1982).
                    What is it that one must know in order to have "knowledge
          of the injury?" The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has stated that
          a plaintiff will be deemed to have "knowledge" of the injury, for
          purposes of the statute of limitation, when she has "notice of the
          injury, plus notice of the person who caused it." Colon Prieto
                                                                         v.
          Geigel, 115 P.R. Dec. 232, __ (1984), 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 313,
          330 [citations hereafter to P.R. Offic. Trans.]. See also
                                                                    
                                                                    Fragoso
          v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 886 (1st Cir. 1993);   Santiago 
                                                                  Hodge v.
          Parke Davis & Co.
                          , 909 F.2d 628, 632 (1st Cir. 1990); 
                                                              Barretto Peat
          v. Luis 
                  Ayala 
                        Colon 
                               Sucrs., 896 F.2d 656, 658 (1st Cir. 1990);
          Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 833 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1987).
                    "Notice of the injury," as explained in a later case, is
          established by proof of:
                      some outward or physical signs through
                      which the aggrieved party may become aware
                                         -4-

                      and realize that he [or she] has suffered
                      an injurious aftereffect, which when known
                      becomes a damage even if at the time its
                      full scope and extent cannot be weighed.
                      These circumstances need not be known in
                      order to argue that the damage has become
                      known, because its scope, extent and
                      weight may be established later on during
                      the prosecution of the remedial action.
          Delgado Rodriguez
                           v. 
                              Nazario de Ferrer
                                               , No. CE-86-417, slip op. at
          10 (Official English Translation) (P.R. May 16, 1988) (quoting H.
          Brau del Toro, 
                        Los Danos y Perjuicios Extracontractuales en Puerto
          Rico 639-40, Pub. J.T.S., Inc. (2d ed. 1986)) (internal quotation
          marks omitted). Once a plaintiff is on "notice of the injury," the
          plaintiff may "not wait for his [or her] injury to reach its final
          degree of development and postpone the running of the period of
          limitation according to his [or her] subjective appraisal and
          judgment."  Ortiz v. Municipality of Orocovis, 113 P.R. Dec. 484,
          487, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans. 619, 622 (1982).
                    In some circumstances, awareness of the existence of an
          injury, on its own, will not be enough to trigger the running of
          the limitation period. See, 
                                      e.g., 
                                            Galarza v. 
                                                       Zagury, 739 F.2d 20,
          24 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that "knowledge of the author of the
          harm means more than an awareness of some ill effects resulting
          from an operation by a particular doctor"). If a plaintiff is not
          aware of some level of reasonable likelihood of legal liability on
          the part of the person or entity that caused the injury, the
          statute of limitation will be tolled. In other words, a plaintiff
          must also have "knowledge of the author of the injury," a concept
                                         -5-

          articulated at length in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's
          decision in Colon Prieto. 
                    In Colon  
                              Prieto, the plaintiff experienced pain and
          insensitivity in his tongue following dental surgery in November
          1971. 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 317. Geigel, the dental surgeon,
          told plaintiff that he had bitten himself on the tongue and that
          the symptoms would subside in a short while. 
                                                      Id. For over a year,
          Colon Prieto continued to see Geigel, who told him that the pain
          would go away. Id. But the symptoms did not subside. In November
          1972, plaintiff consulted with another physician, and learned for
          the first time that the pain was the result of Geigel's having cut
          a nerve during the initial operation.
                    Colon Prieto brought suit against Geigel on September 10,
          1973, more than one year after the original operation. Geigel
          asserted the statute of limitation as a defense. The Supreme Court
          of Puerto Rico rejected Geigel's defense, holding that, because
          Colon Prieto did not acquire knowledge of the nature of his injury
          and Geigel's role in the injury until the November 1972
          consultation with the other doctor, plaintiff was not barred under
          the Puerto Rico statute of limitation.
                    Distinguishing Colon Prieto's case from the more
          traditional tort case in which a plaintiff is aware from the moment
          of the tortious act of the injury and its cause (for example, where
          a defendant's act causes something to fall on a plaintiff
          immediately), the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico observed that the
          statutory phrase "'
                            from the time the aggrieved person had knowledge
                                         -6-

          thereof' ... rejects a literal and narrow reading."  Id. at 327.
          The court noted that the legal reasoning behind a plaintiff's loss
          of rights under a statute of limitation is that the plaintiff is
          deemed to have abandoned those rights.   Id. (quoting A. Borrell
          Macia, 
                Responsabilidades Derivadas de Culpa Extracontractual Civil
                                                                          ,
          66, Barcelona, Ed. Bosch (2d ed. 1958)). In order for this legal
          reasoning to apply, therefore, "such abandonment [on the part of
          the plaintiff] should really exist."  Id.
          B. Three Analytically Separable Questions
                    We conclude that within the larger structure regarding
          the law of Puerto Rico on limitation of tort actions are three
          analytically separable subsidiary issues. These issues concern the
          circumstances in which a plaintiff can be said to have, or to lack,
          the requisite level of awareness for statute of limitation
          purposes.
                    First, the concept of "true knowledge" applies where a
          plaintiff is actually aware of all the necessary facts and the
          existence of a likelihood of a legal cause of action. Second,
          concepts of "notice" and "deemed knowledge" apply. Under these
          concepts a plaintiff's subjective awareness is measured against the
          level of awareness that the plaintiff, having been put on notice as
          to certain facts and having exercised reasonable care regarding a
          potential claim, should have acquired. Third, the law or Puerto
          Rico recognizes an exception to applicability of the concepts of
          notice and deemed knowledge for circumstances in which a
                                         -7-

          plaintiff's failure to make a timely filing of a claim is
          reasonably based upon the assurances of the person who caused the
          injury.
                    From a structural perspective, two of these questions
          (about true knowledge and deemed knowledge) concern alternative
          ways in which a defendant may establish that a claim is barred
          because it is filed too late. If the defendant succeeds in showing
          that plaintiff has not satisfied, or cannot satisfy, plaintiff's
          burden of proving lack of true knowledge (that is, lack of full
          awareness of all that need be known to preclude tolling), final
          judgment for the defendant on the ground of late filing is
          appropriate.
                    If, instead, the finder of fact finds (or the court, by
          determining that the evidence of record is so one-sided as to
          compel a finding) that the plaintiff was aware of enough facts to
          constitute notice and to satisfy the deemed knowledge rule of the
          Puerto Rico law of limitation of tort actions, final judgment for
          the defendant on the ground of late filing is appropriate  unless
          plaintiff has proffered evidence sufficient to support a finding
          that representations and assurances by the defendant persuaded
          plaintiff to rely reasonably and delay institution of a civil
          action.
                    The "unless" clause in the next preceding sentence may be
          treated either as a condition to be satisfied before the deemed
          knowledge rule applies, or as a negation of an otherwise adequate
          showing of applicability of the deemed knowledge rule. Under
                                         -8-

          either analytic treatment of the substantive requirement of the
          legal test for deemed knowledge, this substantive requirement is
          the third of the analytically separable issues to which we referred
          above. It creates another possibility of a plaintiff's showing
          that a genuine dispute of material fact precludes a judgment as a
          matter of law for the defendant on the limitation ground.
                    1. Full Awareness:
                                        
                                        A Subjective Component of the Legal
                    Test
                    In circumstances where a plaintiff has not abandoned a
          cause of action, but instead was never aware that such a cause of
          action existed, the statute of limitation would not operate as a
          bar to the exercise of the plaintiff's legal rights.   See  Colon
          Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 327-328. As the court noted in
          Colon 
                Prieto, a plaintiff who is not aware of the existence of a
          cause of action is essentially incapable of bringing suit within
          the limitation period.     Id. at 327. The emphasis on the
          plaintiff's "subjective" ability to bring suit is justified, at
          least in part, by the brevity of the limitation period.   Id. at
          328.
                    Reasoning from these premises, the Supreme Court of
          Puerto Rico held that, in order for the limitation period to start
          to run, a plaintiff must be able to institute suit, which requires
          knowledge of the existence of an injury and knowledge of the person
          who caused the injury. Knowledge of who caused the injury, the
          court held, was necessary so that the plaintiff would know whom to
          sue.  Id. at 330 (quoting I A. Barrell y Soler,    Derecho 
                                                                      Civil
          Espanol 500, Barcelona, Ed. Bosch (1955)). 
                                         -9-

                    In setting forth this standard, the court in 
                                                               Colon Prieto
          stated that it was adopting a "subjective" standard.  Id. at 328.
          In the law of Puerto Rico, a legal test of this kind is sometimes
          referred to as grounded in the "cognitive" theory of damages. 
                                                                       See,
          e.g., Barretto Peat, 896 F.2d at 657 (describing S 5298 of Puerto
          Rico's Civil Code as codifying the cognitive theory).
                    To understand this component of the applicable legal
          test, for the purpose of applying it to the case now before us, we
          must understand what level of awareness is required as to
          particulars of the injury and its source. Was the source in
          personal services, or in some other form of conduct of some
          identifiable person, or in a product used or supplied by some
          person and obtained through a chain of distribution involving one
          or more others, including a manufacturer?
                    Under the law of Puerto Rico, the plaintiff's level of
          awareness about these matters may be relevant in more than a single
          way, bearing upon more than a single sub-issue.
                      First. What effect is to be given to evidence, if
          creditworthy, of the effect that post-injury conduct of a person
          who was a cause of the injury, or post-injury conduct of other
          persons, had on plaintiff's refraining from or delaying instituting
          suit?
                    Second. What more would the plaintiff have learned about
          the injury and authorship of the injury if the plaintiff, having
          notice in the sense of awareness of some facts, had then made the
          inquiries that a careful person would have made?
                                        -10-

                    2. Notice and Deemed Knowledge:
                                                    
                                                    The Objective Component
                    We understand the court in  Colon 
                                                       Prieto to have been
          speaking quite explicitly to the second of these two questions
          (stated immediately above) in the passage of the opinion noting
          that, if a plaintiff's ignorance of an injury and its origin was
          due to the plaintiff's own negligence or lack of care, then the
          statute of limitation would not be tolled.  See Colon 
                                                                Prieto, 15
          P.R. Offic. Trans. at 327-29 (quoting A. Borrell Macia,
          Responsabilidades Derivadas de Culpa Extracontractual Civil
                                                                    344-345
          (Bosch ed. 2d ed. 1958)). This point is associated with the level
          of awareness implicit in the concept of notice. 
                    The law of Puerto Rico treats a person as being aware of
          all that, having awareness constituting notice, that person would
          have been likely to come to know through the exercise of care.
          Thus, we understand the holdings of Puerto Rico decisions to mean
          that "actual knowledge is not required where, by due diligence,
          such knowledge would likely have been acquired." Villarini-Garcia
          v. Hospital del Maestro, Inc., 8 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1993). It
          follows, then, that to determine the point at which a plaintiff
          should be held responsible for the required level of awareness of
          whether another particular person was an author of the injury, a
          court looks to "whether plaintiff knew or with the degree of
          diligence required by law would have known whom to sue." 
                                                                  Kaiser v.
          Armstrong  
                    World  
                           Indus., 872 F.2d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1989)
          (citations and internal quotation omitted). 
                                        -11-

                    Once a plaintiff is made aware of facts sufficient to put
          her on notice that she has a potential tort claim, she must pursue
          that claim with reasonable diligence, or risk being held to have
          relinquished her right to pursue it later, after the limitation
          period has run.  See, e.g., Villarini, 8 F.3d at 85.
                    In Villarini, a plaintiff was made aware of facts
          sufficient for her to be able to file suit (as to two of her
          claims) three weeks after her operation. We held that the
          plaintiff was time-barred from bringing those claims roughly two
          and a half years later.  Id. We recognized in  Villarini that the
          plaintiff may not have understood fully the legal significance of
          the facts known to her after her operation, but also recognized
          that the meaning of authoritative declarations of the law of Puerto
          Rico is that "there is nothing unfair in a policy that insists that
          the plaintiff promptly assert her rights." Id. Thus, plaintiff's
          failure to consult with a lawyer or otherwise investigate the claim
          to which she had been alerted by the factual circumstances
          associated with the operation barred her from commencing that claim
          in the courts over one year after being on notice.  Id.
                    Similarly, once a plaintiff is put on notice that someone
          or some entity is the cause of the injury, the plaintiff may not
          succeed in a late-filed claim by asserting ignorance about the
          precise identity of the tortfeasor. Also, because corporate
          identities and intracorporate relationships are a matter of public
          record, knowledge of the precise corporate identity of the entity
          responsible for a plaintiff's injury is not required before the
                                        -12-

          period prescribed by the statute of limitation begins to run. See
          Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 833 F.2d 6, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1987).
                    3.  An Exception to the Rule of Notice
                    An exception to the rule of notice (the objective
          component of the law of limitation of tort actions) is recognized.
          If a plaintiff's suspicions that she may have been the victim of a
          tort are assuaged by assurances made by the person who caused the
          injury, a plaintiff will not be held responsible for failing to
          pursue her claim more aggressively.  Colon Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic.
          Trans. at 329-330.
                    In addition to holdings discussed above (in explanation
          of both the subjective and the objective components of the law of
          Puerto Rico), the court in   Colon  
                                              Prieto held that, where the
          plaintiff's doctor (the person responsible for causing the injury)
          assured the plaintiff that the pain was normal and was due to
          plaintiff's biting his tongue during the operation, the plaintiff
          would not be held to have "known" of the injury and the cause until
          the later consultation. This ruling, the court observed, was
                      the fairest and most equitable. We
                      safeguard the aggrieved party's right to
                      seek redress, while we abstain from
                      rewarding the person who, having caused
                      the damage, took refuge in his patient's
                      trust and ignorance trying to avail
                      himself of the circumstances in order to
                      defeat the action.
          Id. at 330. 
                    In this context, where a diligent plaintiff reasonably
          relies upon representations made by a tortfeasor that her symptoms
          are not the result of a negligent or otherwise tortious act, that
                                        -13-

          plaintiff is not barred, because of her "own negligence or lack of
          care," from the benefit of tolling of the limitation period.  See
          Colon  
                Prieto, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 329-330.         See  
                                                                       also
          Villarini, 8 F.3d at 85-86. Stated another way, the condition
          attached to a plaintiff's right of tolling -- the condition that
          she act with care to make additional inquiries once she is on
          notice -- does not apply (or is excused, or negated) when the
          plaintiff reasonably relies on what others told her. The reliance,
          however, must be reasonable, and the determination of the
          reasonableness of a plaintiff's reliance on the assurances of
          others involves an evaluation that, depending upon the
          circumstances, may or may not be a question for the finder of fact,
          and thus may or may not preclude summary judgment. See 
                                                                 id. at 86-
          87.
                    Where facts sufficient to support every element of a
          claim relating to an injury are apparent to a plaintiff at an
          earlier time, it will not be reasonable for the plaintiff to rely
          on assurances of a tortfeasor and fail to pursue the claim.   See
          id. at 86 (where plaintiff had all the information necessary for
          a failure-to-warn claim, doctor's subsequent reassurances would not
          excuse plaintiff's lack of diligence in pursuing the claim). Our
          holdings, moreover, support the conclusion that a time will come at
          which, if the tortfeasor's initial predictions are not borne out,
          a plaintiff's reliance is no longer reasonable.    Id. Finally,
          representations made by third-party doctors constitute another
          factor to consider in determining whether a plaintiff's continued
                                        -14-

          reliance upon the reassurances of a tortfeasor is reasonable. See
          Villarini, 8 F.3d at 86 (holding that varying diagnoses of
          different doctors, along with the reassurances of the negligent
          physician, "could have lulled a reasonable person into believing
          for a year or more that the operation had not been botched"). 
          C. Summary
                    In sum, we conclude (1) that within the larger questions
          regarding the law of Puerto Rico on limitation of tort actions are
          three analytically separable subsidiary questions; (2) that from a
          structural perspective, two of these questions (about true
          knowledge and deemed knowledge) concern alternative ways a
          defendant may establish that a claim is barred because filed too
          late; (3) that, if on the evidence proffered in a case, a finder of
          fact might reasonably find that representations and assurances
          persuaded plaintiff to rely reasonably and delay institution of a
          civil action, summary judgment for defendants would be
          inappropriate; and (4) that this remains true even if the record
          would otherwise require judgment for defendant under the rule of
          notice and deemed knowledge.
                               III. Record for Review
          A. Factual Background
                    Collagen is a natural protein found throughout the body
          that provides support to other bodily tissues, including the skin.
          Since the 1970s, collagen obtained from animals has been used in a
                                        -15-

          variety of medical procedures, including procedures designed to
          improve the consistency and appearance of the skin. Defendant
          Collagen Corporation manufactures and distributes at least two
          types of bovine collagen (derived from cows), called Zyderm and
          Zyplast. Both can be injected under the skin to improve the
          appearance and structure of the skin. Collagen's products are
          distributed only to be sold to and administered by licensed
          physicians.
                    In 1989, each of the plaintiffs, Edna Rodriguez-Suris
          ("Rodriguez"), Maria Rosa Gonzalez San Juan de Cortes ("Gonzalez"),
          Annette Perez de Pedreira ("Pedreira"), and Vanessa Perez de
          Fernandez ("Fernandez"), received collagen injections from
          defendant Bertha Montesinos. Montesinos, who was not a licensed
          physician, obtained injectable collagen from a doctor in Miami,
          Florida, and administered the injections at her apartment in
          Santurce, Puerto Rico. In each instance, Montesinos injected
          collagen into the forehead (between the eyebrows) and along the
          "expression lines" surrounding the nose and lips of each of the
          plaintiffs. None of the plaintiffs saw the material that was
          injected. In some instances, Montesinos provided the plaintiff
          with a brochure describing cosmetic collagen treatments, but none
          of the plaintiffs saw Collagen Corporation product packaging or
          inserts. In the fall of 1989, Montesinos gave each of the
          plaintiffs a treatment involving injections. Shortly thereafter,
          each plaintiff developed hard red nodules or bumps at the sites of
          the injections.
                                        -16-

                    In the following summary of the evidence of record with
          respect to each plaintiff's history of treatment and consequences,
          we state the evidence as a finder of fact might find by a
          preponderance of the evidence, where any genuine dispute exists,
          since our purpose is to determine whether summary judgment for
          defendants is appropriate.
                    1.  Rodriguez
                    Plaintiff Rodriguez went to Montesinos for injections for
          the third time in November 1989. Immediately after the treatment,
          Rodriguez developed a redness, accompanied by a burning sensation,
          around the area of the injections. Although the burning sensation
          subsided within a week, Rodriguez was left with a "red, raised
          ridge" on both sides of her nose and mouth. Over the next two and
          a half years, Rodriguez received three to four more collagen
          injections from Montesinos, who assured her that the marks would
          gradually go away. The ridge, however, remained hard and did not
          diminish in size. Rodriguez last saw Montesinos in March 1992.
                    Rodriguez spoke informally with two doctors about her
          problem. In late November 1989, Rodriguez talked with Dr. Robert
          Nevarez, a plastic surgeon, during a party they were both
          attending. Rodriguez told Dr. Nevarez that she had received
          collagen injections and that the red marks were a reaction to the
          injections. Dr. Nevarez said that he thought that the marks were
          an adverse reaction to collagen, but that they would go away.
          Nevarez told Rodriguez to come to his office for a consultation,
          but the plaintiff never followed up. At another social event some
                                        -17-

          time between 1989 and 1992, but closer to 1989, Rodriguez talked
          with Dr. Pedro Borras, a neurosurgeon, who told her that if the
          marks were a reaction to collagen, then they would go away. 
                    In September 1992, Rodriguez went to see Dr. Tolbert
          Wilkinson in San Antonio, Texas, at which time, according to
          Rodriguez, she first learned that the marks had been caused by
          products of defendant Collagen Corporation and would be permanent.
                    2.  Fernandez
                    Plaintiff Fernandez, sister of plaintiff Pedreira,
          received her third collagen injection treatment from Montesinos in
          October 1989. Fernandez did not see what was injected into her
          face. The evening after her third treatment, Fernandez noticed
          "slightly raised and red" marks in the places where she had been
          injected. When the marks did not disappear as she expected,
          Fernandez went to see Dr. David Latoni-Cabanillas, a dermatologist,
          in early 1990. Fernandez told Dr. Latoni that she received
          collagen injections from Montesinos in the areas where she
          developed the marks. Dr. Latoni said that the marks looked
          "strange" to him, and that he did not know if they would go away.
                    Dr. Latoni attempted to treat Fernandez' symptoms with
          various techniques, including injections of other material and
          dermabrasion. His attempts to remedy her symptoms were
          unsuccessful. Fernandez also had a discussion with Montesinos, who
          told plaintiff that the marks would go away. 
                    In September 1992, Fernandez consulted with Dr. Wilkinson
          in San Antonio. Fernandez claims that she was not aware of the
                                        -18-

          source and extent of her injuries until the meeting with
          Dr. Wilkinson.
                    3.  Gonzalez
                    Plaintiff Gonzalez received two treatments from
          Montesinos in 1989 and two or three in 1990 or 1991. Gonzalez did
          not see the material injected into her face, or any packaging, but
          Montesinos told her that it was "animal collagen." Gonzalez
          received her second series of collagen injections on October 24,
          1989. The day after this second series, Gonzalez developed a rash-
          like reaction at the sites of the injections. 
                    A few months after the development of the rash, Gonzalez
          consulted Dr. Isabel Banuchi, a dermatologist who administered
          collagen injections as part of her practice. Dr. Banuchi expressed
          concern after hearing that Gonzalez had received injections from an
          unlicensed person. Dr. Banuchi told Gonzalez that she did not know
          whether the material that had been injected was in fact collagen,
          and that she had never seen the type of reaction to collagen that
          Gonzalez was experiencing.
                    Gonzalez also consulted with two other doctors between
          1990 and 1992: Dr. Carranza, who told her that she should wait and
          see what happened with the reaction, and Dr. Armando Silva, a
          dermatologist who said he did not know what had been injected into
          Gonzalez' face. According to Gonzalez, although she informed all
          of these doctors that she developed the symptoms immediately after
          being injected by what she was told was collagen, the physicians
          said that her reaction seemed "strange" to them, because reactions
                                        -19-

          to collagen injections normally disappear. Dr. Carranza, however,
          did tell Gonzalez that her rash was a result of whatever had been
          injected into her face.
                    Despite directions from the physicians with whom she
          consulted not to have any more injections, Gonzalez received more
          treatments from Montesinos two or three times after developing the
          rash, in 1990 or 1991. Montesinos administered injections at the
          site of the hard nodules because, she told Gonzalez, the reaction
          might have been the result of "dead" collagen, and further
          injections could help improve the condition of her facial skin.
                    Gonzalez also sought diagnosis and treatment from
          Dr. Walter Benavent. On December 26, 1990, Dr. Benavent wrote to
          a scientist at Collagen Corporation asking for assistance in
          diagnosing one of his patients (Gonzalez) who had developed
          "hardened nodules along both naso-labial folds, corner of the
          mouth, and chin following injections of Collagen" some time in
          September or October of 1989. According to Dr. Benavent, Gonzalez
          stated that the person who administered the injections told her it
          was collagen, but that Gonzalez suspected that the collagen might
          not have been properly refrigerated because of power outages in
          Puerto Rico following Hurricane Hugo. 
                    Over a year later, in January 1992, Dr. Benavent received
          a letter from Collagen Corporation stating that it was difficult to
          determine whether his patients (by this time, Gonzalez and
          Pedreira) had in fact been injected with collagen, because their
          described symptoms were not typical of a reaction to collagen, and
                                        -20-

          suggesting that Dr. Benavent send the patients' blood samples to
          Collagen Corporation to test for the presence of collagen. At the
          direction of Dr. Benavent, Gonzalez sent a sample of her blood to
          Collagen Corporation. On March 4, 1992, Collagen Corporation wrote
          to Dr. Benavent (who passed the letter on to Gonzalez) that
          Gonzalez' blood tested negative for the presence of bovine collagen
          antibodies. The letter stated that the results were a "research
          tool only and should not be considered diagnostic."
                    After receiving the results from Collagen Corporation,
          Dr. Benavent told Gonzalez that he did not think that the material
          injected into her face was collagen. He did, however, tell her
          that her symptoms might be permanent.
                    In September 1992, Gonzalez traveled to San Antonio to
          meet with Dr. Wilkinson, who told her that the marks on her face
          were a reaction to bovine collagen. According to Gonzalez, this
          was the first time that she became aware of the permanency and
          cause of her injury.
                    4.  Pedreira
                    The small bumps that appeared on plaintiff Pedreira's
          face after her third treatment with Montesinos in September 1989
          became "quite noticeable" four to six weeks later, and have
          persisted in that state ever since. Although Pedreira did not see
          the material being injected, Montesinos told Pedreira that she was
          using bovine collagen.
                    Starting in January or February of 1990, and continuing
          over the next two years, Pedreira consulted a number of physicians
                                        -21-

          for diagnosis and treatment. These physicians, whom Pedreira told
          that she had received injections of what she thought was collagen
          in the areas where the bumps appeared, tried various treatment
          techniques to no avail. A dermatologist told Pedreira that she
          should wait, because if it was collagen, the reaction would "wear
          away," and a plastic surgeon stated that there was nothing he could
          do to help her. After consulting some of the doctors, Pedreira
          went to Montesinos, who told her to massage the affected area, and
          to wait because the reaction would "wear away." Pedreira later
          testified that in 1990, when she consulted the plastic surgeon, she
          did suspect that collagen was the cause of her injury, but that,
          based on the physicians' and Montesinos' assurances, she assumed
          the marks would eventually go away.
                    In January 1992, after talking with her friend Gonzalez,
          Pedreira went to see Dr. Benavent. In his notes following
          consultation with Pedreira, Dr. Benavent stated that Pedreira had
          nodules around her nose and mouth that appeared after receiving
          injections of what was purportedly collagen from a "beautician."
          Like Gonzalez, Pedreira submitted a blood sample to Collagen
          Corporation for testing, the results of which were negative for the
          presence of collagen. Finally, Pedreira saw Dr. Wilkinson in
          September 1989, at which time she asserts she first became aware of
          the permanency and cause of her facial deformities.
          B. Procedural Background
                    Plaintiffs filed their separate complaints on August 31,
          1993. Their cases were subsequently consolidated. On August 20,
                                        -22-

          1996, the district court granted summary judgment for defendant
          Collagen Corporation, after concluding that plaintiffs' claims were
          barred by Puerto Rico's one-year statute of limitations for tort
          actions. Specifically, the district court concluded that, based on
          the plaintiffs' own testimony, each plaintiff had reasonable notice
          of her injury, "sufficient to file suit" well before they met with
          Dr. Wilkinson in September 1992. Based on the district court's
          determination that the record indisputably showed that plaintiffs
          had sufficient notice of their cause of action, the court held
          that:
                      the one-year statute of limitation for
                      plaintiffs' causes of action began to run,
                      at the very latest, in the beginning of
                      1992. At that time, plaintiffs had
                      knowledge of their injuries, and of the
                      entity ("collagen") that caused the tort.
                      With due diligence, the identity of the
                      manufacturer of the material injected
                      could have easily been ascertained by the
                      plaintiffs. Further, suit could have been
                      commenced in this court, or at state
                      court, against Montesinos and a fictitious
                      named company defendant, to describe the
                      collagen manufacturer, as allowed under
                      Puerto Rico law. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32,
                      App. III R15.4 (1983).
          935 F. Supp. at 82.
                    In an order dated December 31, 1996, the district court
          granted summary judgment, based on the same findings of fact and
          conclusions of law, for defendant Bertha Montesinos, and denied
          plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
                                        -23-

            IV. Application of Standards of Review to the Present Record
                    As an initial matter, both appellants and appellees argue
          that a decision in their favor is required because the other party
          is in some way bound to statements made in pleadings.
                    Appellants argue that appellee Collagen Corporation
          cannot succeed in contending that the plaintiffs knew, or at least
          had notice, for purposes of applying the law of limitation of tort
          actions in Puerto Rico, that the material injected during
          treatments by Montesinos was collagen, while at the same time
          denying, as a primary defense, that the material injected was
          indeed a collagen product of Collagen Corporation. This argument
          fails adequately to take into account a procedural provision, in
          Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(e)(2), that allows parties to
          take inconsistent positions in their pleadings. Especially at the
          early stages of litigation, a party's pleading will not be treated
          as an admission precluding another, inconsistent, pleading.   See
          Gens v. Resolution Trust Corp., 112 F.3d 569, 573 & n.4 (1st Cir.
          1997) (noting the relaxed standard of the Federal Rules that allows
          alternative pleadings); Aetna 
                                        Cas. 
                                             Sur. 
                                                   Co. v. P&B 
                                                              Autobody, 43
          F.3d 1546, 1555 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Because procedural law allows
          alternative contentions, parties to a civil action involving such
          an array of factual and legal theories as this case presents may be
          allowed to defer choice at least until late stages of proceedings
          in the trial court."); McCalden v. California 
                                                        Library 
                                                                Ass'n, 955
          F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that allegations should not be
          construed as an admission against inconsistent claims),     cert.
                                        -24-

          denied, 504 U.S. 957, 112 S. Ct. 2306 (1992); 
                                                       Molsbergen v. 
                                                                     United
          States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (9th Cir.) (same), 
                                                           cert. dismissed
                                                                          ,
          473 U.S. 934, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
                    Likewise, statements contained in plaintiffs' complaints
          will not be construed as admissions by plaintiffs that they knew,
          before Montesinos administered injections, that Montesinos was
          using one of Collagen's products. Collagen argues, unpersuasively,
          that statements contained in the plaintiffs' complaints that in
          1989 Montesinos injected plaintiffs with "Collagen, a product of
          Collagen Corporation," amount to judicial admissions that
          plaintiffs knew in 1989 what was being injected into their faces.
          The pleading was simply asserting the alleged fact as to what
          happened, not as to when plaintiffs learned about that fact.
                      Turning to the central issues in this appeal, we
          conclude that the factual record in this case is sufficiently
          developed for this court to determine that the trial court
          correctly concluded that the notice component (the objective
          component) was established in favor of all defendants against all
          plaintiffs as an initial or prima facie matter. We also conclude,
          however, that we must nevertheless vacate the judgment for
          defendants because a trialworthy dispute of fact exists, on this
          record, with respect to the applicability of the recognized
          exception to the notice rule as to each plaintiff's claim against
          each defendant in this case.
                    Defendants' argument that plaintiff Rodriguez had
          "notice" by early 1992, if not earlier, has support in the record.
                                        -25-

          Plaintiff Rodriguez developed hard, red, raised bumps around the
          area of injections shortly after Montesinos' treatment in the fall
          of 1989. Over the next three years, these bumps did not dissipate
          or change in any way. Rodriguez' discussions with Drs. Nevarez and
          Borras between 1989 and 1992 show that she was already aware that
          a raised ridge was a result of--or at least related to--the
          injections she received from Montesinos. By March 1992 (if not
          earlier), when Rodriguez discontinued injection treatments with
          Montesinos, the intractable nature of Rodriguez' symptoms put her
          on notice that she had been injured. By early 1992, enough facts
          were available to Rodriguez to enable her to consult a lawyer and,
          with the lawyer's help, investigate the manufacturing source of the
          material injected by Montesinos into her face. Had she not
          received the assurances of Montesinos and encountered the
          uncertainty of the doctors, her failure to pursue a claim after two
          years of unchanged symptoms would have barred her claim under the
          objective rule of notice.
                    Plaintiff Fernandez developed the reactive bumps, at the
          sites of the injections, the evening after receiving her third
          treatment from Montesinos. At some time in early 1990, she
          consulted with Dr. Latoni. Fernandez told Dr. Latoni at that time
          that she had received collagen injections from Montesinos at the
          site of the reaction. Dr. Latoni treated Fernandez "nine or ten
          times," using kenalog injections and dermabrasion techniques, but
          to no avail.
                                        -26-

                    Defendants contend, with support in the record, that by
          the time Fernandez finished treatment with Dr. Latoni (the date is
          not apparent from the record, but it was well before her visit to
          Dr. Wilkinson), sufficient facts were available to put her on
          notice that she had sustained an injury as a result of the
          injections administered by Montesinos. That Fernandez was aware of
          a possible link between the injections and her facial deformities
          is evidenced in her statements to Dr. Latoni, and her discussions
          with Montesinos, whom she told about the reaction. When the
          symptoms persisted unchanged, even after numerous treatments by
          Dr. Latoni, Fernandez was put on notice that the marks on her face
          were not a normal reaction to collagen injections that would "wear
          away."
                    Plaintiff Gonzalez had numerous indications, well before
          her September 1992 visit to Dr. Wilkinson, that her reaction was a
          result of the collagen injections that she received from Montesinos
          on October 24, 1989. Montesinos told Gonzalez that she was using
          collagen in the injections, and later told her that the reaction
          might have been caused by "dead" collagen. Although some of the
          doctors told Gonzalez that if it was collagen, the reaction would
          go away, the bumps did not disappear for over two years. And at
          least one of the doctors, Dr. Carranza, explicitly told Gonzalez
          that the reaction was related to her facial injections.
                    The reaction did not subside over time, despite further
          treatments from Montesinos. The fact that Gonzalez continued to
          see the unlicensed cosmetologist after being advised by her
                                        -27-

          physicians that she should not continue to have injections,
          moreover, tends to undermine any claim by Gonzalez that she was not
          on notice. Also, as she did with the other doctors that she saw,
          Gonzalez told Dr. Benavent in 1990 that she had received what she
          believed was collagen injected into her face, and that she had
          developed the rash at the same location as the injections. In his
          letter to the Collagen Corporation, Dr. Benavent related how
          Gonzalez told him that she believed that Montesinos might have
          injected collagen that was not properly refrigerated. Gonzalez was
          informed of the letter from Collagen stating that her blood tested
          negative for collagen antibodies. After receiving these results,
          Dr. Benavent told Gonzalez that he did not know what had been
          injected into her face. 
                    Defendants contend, with support in the record, that
          Gonzalez was aware, when she consulted with the various doctors
          between 1989 and 1991, that her facial deformities were related to
          the injection she received in the fall of 1989. She even told
          Dr. Benavent that she suspected that the injection that resulted in
          her deformities might have contained improperly stored collagen.
          The representations of Collagen and Benavent were not enough to
          undermine an impression, supported by facts known to Gonzalez at
          the time, that she had been injured as a result of the particular
          injection administered by Montesinos. We conclude that, as a
          matter of law, she was on notice.
                    Like plaintiff Gonzalez, plaintiff Pedreira consulted
          with Dr. Benavent; similarly, she received the results of the blood
                                        -28-

          tests and Dr. Benavent's opinion that the reaction was probably not
          caused by collagen. For the reasons just discussed, defendants
          contend, with support in the record, that Pedreira told the doctors
          with whom she consulted that the bumps on her face appeared after
          receiving collagen injections into her face, and that the bumps
          were located at the sites of the injections. Pedreira admitted
          that in late 1990 she suspected the collagen injection as the
          culprit in her injury, but that she believed that the symptoms
          would just go away. It is true that this belief was based in part
          on the representations of Montesinos, with whom she talked in the
          summer of 1990, and who told her to massage the bumps, which would
          eventually go away. We conclude, nevertheless, that as a matter of
          law Pedreira was on notice.
                    In the present case, each of the plaintiffs had notice
          well before September 1992 that her symptoms were related to the
          collagen injections administered by Montesinos. Each of the
          plaintiffs was told by Montesinos, either before the damaging
          injections, or after the plaintiff developed the marks on her face,
          that Montesinos had used injectable collagen. All of the
          plaintiffs told their doctors that the marks appeared after
          receiving the collagen injections, at the same sites as the
          injections. Many of the doctors confirmed plaintiffs' suspicions
          that the bumps or marks were a result of the collagen injections.
          All of plaintiffs received more than one collagen reaction; most
          received injections after the one that resulted in the rash. That
          the red raised bumps were not a normal, more mild, reaction to
                                        -29-

          collagen should have been apparent to plaintiffs, given that they
          did not experience a similar reaction to any of the other
          injections. 
                    Even if the plaintiffs were on notice as to the
          likelihood of a legal claim springing from their facial
          deformities, an arguable question of fact remains as to whether the
          representations of Montesinos and others contributed, in a material
          way, to plaintiffs' delay in bringing suit. In other words, a
          question of material fact remains as to whether the exception to
          the notice rule applies in this case. Plaintiffs received repeated
          reassurances from Montesinos that the reactions would go away. The
          doctors consulted by the plaintiffs gave a wide range of diagnoses
          and prognoses, including reassurances that the symptoms would
          subside, statements of uncertainty as to the composition of the
          injected material, and prescriptions for treatments that
          purportedly would remedy the facial marks. The effect of these
          representations, although not made by the alleged torfeasors, is a
          factor to consider in determining whether plaintiffs reasonably
          relied on Montesinos' assurances. 
                    After full consideration of the factual record before us
          in this appeal, we conclude that we cannot say that a finder of
          fact, reasoning on the basis of the evidence in the record before
          us, could come to only one finding, a finding for the defendants on
          the limitation issue on all claims against all defendants. The
          evidence in the record in this case is not so one-sided that we can
          say that defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
                                        -30-

          that the exception to the notice concept does not apply. It is a
          defendant's burden, in moving for summary judgment, to establish
          that all material facts are undisputed, and that no finder of fact
          could reasonably find a genuine dispute of material fact and
          resolve that dispute in the plaintiff's favor. In view of the
          relatively particularized nature of evidence favorable to each
          plaintiff in this case with respect to reassurances after
          suspicions were aroused, in relation to her claim against each
          defendant, we cannot say that a finder of fact must find this
          evidence not creditworthy.
                    First. The evidence does not compel a finding, as to any
          plaintiff, that she has failed to show by a preponderance of the
          evidence that she did not have true knowledge of injury, source of
          injury, and awareness of all facts constituting the factual grounds
          for legal responsibility of an identifiable actor or supplier of
          collagen.
                    Second. The evidence does not compel a finding, as to
          any plaintiff, that she has failed to show by a preponderance of
          the evidence that she reasonably relied upon repeated assurances by
          Montesinos and others.
                    For these reasons, even though we have ruled that but for
          the second of the foregoing genuine disputes of fact defendants
          would have been entitled to summary judgment under the notice rule
          (the objective component of the legal test), the judgment for
          defendants entered in the trial court must be vacated and the case
          must be remanded. We direct, explicitly, that the only limitation-
                                        -31-

          of-actions issue remaining for proceedings on remand is the issue
          regarding reasonableness of reliance on assurances of the
          defendants, evaluated in the context of evidence of assurances by
          unaffiliated third parties.
                    It is so ordered. Costs are awarded to plaintiffs.
                                        -32-