Court Opinion

ID: 9948658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 17:14:06.186532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.818701
License: Public Domain

J-S03035-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SANTOS VELEZ-PACHECO                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 866 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 25, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-22-CR-0005911-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 07, 2024

       Santos Velez-Pacheco (“Velez-Pacheco”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas (“trial

court”) after a jury convicted him of attempted rape of child, aggravated

indecent assault of a child, indecent assault – complainant less than thirteen

years of age, unlawful contact with a minor, incest of a minor, and corruption

of minors.1      On appeal, Velez-Pacheco challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support each of his convictions (with the exception of incest of a

minor); the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and his designation as a

sexually violent predator (“SVP”). Because we find no merit to any of Velez-

Pacheco’s claims, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1  18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 3125(b), 3126(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 4302(b)(1),
6301(a)(1)(ii).
J-S03035-24

      The trial court detailed the factual and procedural histories of this case

as follows:

            At the trial in this matter, the testimony of [K.V.] ([]
      “Victim”), who is [Velez-Pacheco]’s daughter, described a
      progressively lewd course of conduct by [Velez-Pacheco], which
      continued for several years until Victim was 13 years old.

      Incidents at King’s Manor Apartment.

             The incidents between [Velez-Pacheco] and Victim began at
      the King’s Manor Apartment Complex in Susquehanna Township,
      where Victim lived in an apartment with her mother ([] “Mother”);
      her younger brother []; and [Velez-Pacheco], who was then
      married to Mother. [N.T., 11/29-12/1/2022, at 91-92]. During
      the time the family lived at King’s Manor, Victim was
      approximately between the ages of 7 and 10. Mother worked at
      Walmart overnight, so Victim would often be at home at night with
      just [her brother] and [Velez-Pacheco]. [Id.] at 66, 71-72. When
      asked at trial to recount the earliest incidents involving [Velez-
      Pacheco] at King’s Manor, Victim recounted that sometimes
      [Velez-Pacheco] would kiss her on the lips as the two were lying
      fully clothed in bed watching Friends, and while [her brother] was
      in a different room watching television. [Id.] at 92-94. Victim
      recalled another kissing incident where she came into the dining
      room to ask her father a question, and [Velez-Pacheco] kissed her
      on the lips while the two were in the dining room. [Id.] at 99.
      On other occasions while the two were lying in bed watching
      television, [Velez-Pacheco] would get on top of her while both
      were fully clothed. [Id.] at 95-96. Victim recalled one specific
      incident in which [Velez-Pacheco], who was fully clothed, got on
      top of Victim, such that they were face-to-face and began pressing
      his clothes-covered penis between Victim’s clothed legs. [Id.] at
      96-97. Victim testified that these types of incidents occurred
      “many times” at King’s Manor, but she did not recall exactly how
      many times per week. [Id.] at. 100.

             Although most of [Velez-Pacheco]’s contact with Victim at
      King’s Manor occurred while the two were fully clothed, Victim
      recalled one encounter in which she was clothed but [Velez-
      Pacheco] was naked. [Id.] at 97. During that encounter[, i]n
      which the two were sitting in bed, [Velez-Pacheco] had Victim
      place her mouth on his penis and perform oral sex. [Id.] at 97-

                                     -2-
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     99. Because Victim was young and unfamiliar with sex at the
     time, she did not understand what she was observing when
     [Velez-Pacheco] ejaculated, and she asked [Velez-Pacheco] if he
     was peeing. [Id.] at 98. [Velez-Pacheco] responded by pushing
     her, getting off the bed, and telling Victim not to say anything
     about what they had done because they could get in trouble. [Id.]

           Victim stated that during the time she lived at King’s Manor,
     she did not tell anyone about the encounters with [Velez-Pacheco]
     because she felt scared and guilty, and felt as if she might get in
     trouble. [Id.] at 102. In fact, Victim recalled one specific time
     when [her brother] asked her if [Velez-Pacheco] kissed her, but
     she denied it because she was scared. [Id.] at 101.

     Incidents at Locust Lane

           In 2016, Victim and her family, including [Velez-Pacheco],
     moved from King’s Manor to a house on Locust Lane in Lower
     Paxton Township. [Id.] at 67, 71-72. About a year after the
     family moved to Locust Lane, [Velez-Pacheco] and Mother
     separated, and [Velez-Pacheco] moved out of the house. [Id.] at
     73-74. However, even after he moved out, [Velez-Pacheco] still
     came to the house in the evenings and stayed overnight in the
     house to babysit Victim […] because Mother still worked at night.
     [Id.] at 74. Victim’s testimony established that [Velez-Pacheco]’s
     lewd behavior towards her continued when they moved to Locust
     Lane, and as she had done for King’s Manor, she also recounted
     various specific incidents that she remembered from Locust Lane.

            First, Victim recalled that one night when she was either in
     fifth or sixth grade; she woke up in her bed to find that [Velez-
     Pacheco] had entered her bedroom while she was sleeping. [Id.]
     at 105-13. [Velez-Pacheco] who was not wearing any pants, was
     on top of Victim, and he was removing her pants. [Id.] at 107-
     08. After Victim’s pants had been removed[,] [Velez-Pacheco]
     repeatedly pushed her legs apart and tried multiple times to put
     his penis into her vagina but was unable to do so. [Id.] at 109-
     10. [Velez-Pacheco] then left the room and Victim tried to go back
     to sleep. [Id.] at 110-11. However, shortly thereafter, [Velez-
     Pacheco] returned to Victim’s bedroom again, this time bearing a
     gun. [Id.] at 111-12. While holding the gun, [Velez-Pacheco]
     repeatedly asked whether he was a bad father and whether he
     should kill himself. [Id.] at 112.

                                    -3-
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           Second, Victim recalled a night when [Velez-Pacheco] came
     into her bedroom drunk and tried to get onto her bed. [Id.] at
     114. Victim repeatedly pushed [Velez-Pacheco] away, and he
     eventually ended up leaving the room. [Id.] at 114-15. Victim
     had a conversation with Mother the next morning and learned that
     Mother had kicked [Velez-Pacheco] out of their (Mother’s and
     [Velez-Pacheco]’s) bedroom because Mother did not want [Velez-
     Pacheco] coming to bed drunk. [Id.]

            Next, Victim recalled a morning when [Velez-Pacheco] came
     into the bathroom and started looking at her when she was in the
     shower getting ready for school. [Id.] at 117-118. Victim told
     [Velez-Pacheco] to stop looking at her, but she did not remember
     what [Velez-Pacheco] said in response. [Id.] at 117-18. After
     she finished her shower, Victim walked out into her bedroom,
     where her paternal grandmother was sleeping in her bed. [Id.]
     At some point, Victim’s grandmother asked her whether [Velez-
     Pacheco] ever looks at her, but Victim denied it because she was
     scared of what could happen to her dad or herself. [Id.] at 117.

            Third, Victim recalled that on multiple occasions, … she woke
     up to [Velez-Pacheco] rubbing her back or placing parts of himself
     inside her pants. Victim recalled one specific evening when she
     woke up to [Velez-Pacheco] trying to insert his fingers into her
     vagina, which caused her pain. [Id.] at 119. Another time, Victim
     recalled, she woke up after feeling [Velez-Pacheco]’s face between
     her legs. [Id.] at 121-22. After she awoke, she felt [Velez-
     Pacheco]’s tongue touching her vagina. [Id.] at 122. At the time,
     Victim felt “disgusted” and “scared,” and she wasn’t sure what she
     could do. [Id.]

            Victim testified that at around age 12 or 13[], she started
     to “fight against” [Velez-Pacheco] more and push him away more
     as he attempted his lewd conduct. [Id.] at 118. However,
     according to victim[,] whenever she resisted [Velez-Pacheco], he
     would call her names and threaten disciplinary action such as
     grounding her and taking her phone away. [Id.] Victim recounted
     one specific evening when [Velez-Pacheco] came to her room and
     started kicking him repeatedly. [Id.] at [118-19]. [Velez-
     Pacheco] became angry and started pushing Victim and asking,
     “what’s wrong with [her].” [Id.]

           At some point around September 2019, when Victim was 13
     years old, a friend of hers, Jovanna, told her that she herself had
     experienced some sort of sexual abuse. [Id.] at 123-25. Victim

                                    -4-
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     testified that this made her feel less ashamed and more
     comfortable sharing stories of her own experiences. [Id.] at 125.
     Therefore, Victim told Jovanna and another friend, Jocelyn, about
     what she had experienced with [Velez-Pacheco]. [Id.] at 125-26.
     Jovanna and Jocelyn then advised Victim to tell her [m]other
     about what [Velez-Pacheco] was doing.          [Id.] at 126-28.
     However, Victim did not tell Mother right away because she never
     felt close to her mother and “never knew how to talk to her.” [Id.]
     at 128. Instead, upon Jovanna’s urging, Victim spoke with a
     guidance counselor at her school on or about October 21, 2019.
     [Id.] at 128-129, 200.

            When speaking with the guidance counselor, Victim did not
     share every detail of the incidents, nor did she share the identity
     of the perpetrator, but she did tell the counselor that she was
     being assaulted at home. [Id.] at 129. The counselor then called
     Mother, who came to the school. [Id.] While the counselor was
     in another room, Victim spoke with Mother and shared who the
     perpetrator was. [Id.] However, at that time, she still did not tell
     Mother every detail about what happened. [Id.] at 130. A patrol
     officer from the Lower Paxton Township Police Department was
     then sent to the school. [Id.] As she had done with the counselor
     and her mother, Victim told the patrol officer that something was
     happening to her at home, but she did not feel comfortable
     divulging much detail. [Id.] Victim and Mother then went home,
     and the patrol officer contacted Detective Jeffrey Corcoran about
     the situation. [Id.] at 198. Detective Corcoran then apprised
     Detective Gregory Langley, who went to Victim’s house later that
     day. [Id.] at 198-99. Detective Langley arranged for Victim to
     be interviewed by the Children’s Resource Center (“CRC”) two
     days later. [Id.] at 200-01. It was not until Victim was
     interviewed at the CRC, on October 23, 2019, that she began
     sharing some more detail about what happened to her, although
     she still [did not] share every detail because it made her feel
     “disgusting” and “ashamed.” [Id.] at 131, 200-01.

            [The police arrested Velez-Pacheco and the Commonwealth
     charged him for his conduct.] Following a jury trial held from
     November 29 to December 1, 2022, a jury found [Velez-Pacheco]
     guilty [of attempted rape of child, aggravated indecent assault of
     a child, indecent assault – complainant less than thirteen years of
     age, unlawful contact with a minor, incest of a minor, and
     corruption of minors]. On January 25, 2023, [the trial court] held
     a hearing to determine whether [Velez-Pacheco] should be

                                    -5-
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     classified as a[n SVP] and to impose sentence. During the
     hearing, [the trial court] heard testimony from Robert Stein MD
     [(“Dr. Stein”)][,] a licensed psychologist who is a member of the
     Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders Assessment Board [(SOAB)].

           Based upon the testimony of Dr. Stein, [the trial court]
     found [Velez-Pacheco] to be a[n SVP].            Thereafter, the
     Commonwealth presented victim-impact statement[s] from
     Victim and Mother, and [Velez-Pacheco] made a statement on his
     own behalf. [The trial court] then sentenced [Velez-Pacheco] to
     an aggregate [term] of 11 to 22 years[ of] incarceration[.]

                                *     *     *

           On February 6, 2023, [Velez-Pacheco] filed a post-sentence
     [m]otion, which [the trial court] denied [] on May 17, 2023. On
     June 15, 2023, [Velez-Pacheco] filed a [n]otice of [a]ppeal to the
     Superior Court, and on June 23, 2023, [Velez-Pacheco] was
     directed to file a [c]oncise [s]tatement of [e]rrors [c]omplained of
     on [a]ppeal. [Velez-Pacheco] filed his [c]oncise [s]tatement on
     August 7, 2023.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/2023, at 1-7 (formatting modified).

     On appeal, Velez-Pacheco presents the following issues for review:

     1.    Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
           viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
           was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
           [Velez-Pacheco] was guilty of all counts (where the evidence
           offered to support the verdict of guilt is so unreliable and/or
           contradictory as to make the verdict based upon
           conjecture[)]?

     2.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
           [Velez-Pacheco] to consecutive sentences[?]

     3.    Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth,
           viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
           was clear and convincing to establish that [Velez-Pacheco]
           was a[n SVP]?

Velez-Pacheco’s Brief at 12.

                                    -6-
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       For his first issue, Velez-Pacheco challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence presented at trial to support his convictions of aggravated indecent

assault of a child, indecent assault – complainant less than thirteen years of

age, unlawful contact with a minor, and corruption of minors. See id. at 46-

49, 56-63. Beginning with his convictions of aggravated indecent assault of a

child and indecent assault – complainant less than thirteen years of age,

Velez-Pacheco argues that the evidence was insufficient because the

Commonwealth failed to present evidence that Victim was less than thirteen

years old when he assaulted her.               Id. at 46-49, 56-63.   Velez-Pacheco

maintains that at trial, Victim could not recall whether the crimes occurred

before or after her thirteenth birthday. Id. at 60. On this same basis, Velez-

Pacheco contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his unlawful

contact with a minor and corruption of minors convictions, because his

aggravated indecent assault of a child and indecent assault – complainant less

than thirteen years of age convictions were necessary components for

sustaining the convictions of those two crimes. Id. at 47-49.2

____________________________________________

2  We note that the trial court determined that Velez-Pacheco’s sufficiency of
the evidence claim should be waived because he failed to identify the specific
elements of the charged offenses the Commonwealth failed to prove at trial
in his 1925(b) statement. Trial Court Opinion, 9/26/2023, at 8-9; see also
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa.
Super. 2006)(“If a Rule 1925(b) statement is too vague, the trial judge may
find waiver and disregard any argument.”). While Velez-Pacheco’s 1925(b)
statement is not the model of clarity, given the relatively straightforward
nature of Velez-Pacheco’s sufficiency argument on appeal, we decline to find
waiver in this instance.

                                           -7-
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      Our Court’s standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence is well settled:

      In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
      elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
      finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
      links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

      The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines aggravated indecent assault of a

child as follows:

      (a) Offenses defined.--Except as provided in sections 3121
      (relating to rape), 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual assault),
      3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) and
      3124.1 (relating to sexual assault), a person who engages in
      penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a
      complainant with a part of the person’s body for any purpose other
      than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures
      commits aggravated indecent assault if:

            (1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent;

            (2) the person does so by forcible compulsion;

            (3) the person does so by threat of forcible compulsion that
            would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable
            resolution;

            (4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that
            the complainant is unaware that the penetration is
            occurring;

            (5) the person has substantially impaired the complainant’s
            power to appraise or control his or her conduct by
            administering or employing, without the knowledge of the

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            complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the
            purpose of preventing resistance;

            (6) the complainant suffers from a mental disability which
            renders him or her incapable of consent;

                                    *    *     *

      (b) Aggravated indecent assault of a child.--A person commits
      aggravated indecent assault of a child when the person violates
      subsection (a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) and the complainant is less
      than 13 years of age.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(1)-(6), (b).

      “By definition, the statutory provisions that define the offense of

aggravated indecent assault exclude the activities” that fit within the definition

“sexual   intercourse,”    (i.e.,   vaginal,   oral,   and   anal   intercourse).

Commonwealth v. Dove, 301 A.3d 427, 434 (Pa. Super. 2023). Through

the crime of aggravated indecent assault, the General Assembly has

prohibited the act of “nonconsensual digital penetration.”. Commonwealth

v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 557 (Pa. 2002).

      Section 3126(a)(7) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines indecent

assault – complainant less than thirteen years of age as follows:

      (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of indecent assault if
      the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the
      complainant to have indecent contact with the person or
      intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
      seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
      desire in the person or the complainant and:

                                    *    *     *

            (7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age[.]

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18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7). Indecent contact is “[a]ny touching of the sexual or

other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying

sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

      The record reflects that Victim was unable to recall during her testimony

whether she was less than thirteen years of age when Velez-Pacheco digitally

penetrated    her.    N.T.,    11/29/2023–12/1/2023,     at   120-23.      The

Commonwealth, however, also introduced as evidence Victim’s interview with

the CRC. Id. at 191, Exhibit 1. During her interview with the CRC, Victim

repeatedly indicated that she was eleven years old when Velez-Pacheco

digitally penetrated her. Id. at 191, Exhibit 1 (CRC Interview, 10/23/2019,

at 28-29, 44).

      Although Victim’s testimony at trial was not entirely consistent with her

CRC interview, this Court has made clear that the existence of inconsistencies

in a witness’ testimony does not alone render the evidence insufficient to

support a verdict. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super.

2003). The jury, as factfinder, “is free to believe all, part, or none of the

evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 302 A.3d 117, 120 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (quotations and citation omitted). Here, there was evidence of

record that Victim was less than thirteen years of age when Velez-Pacheco

digitally penetrated her.     See N.T., 11/29/2023–12/1/2023, at 191.      We

therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Velez-Pacheco’s

aggravated indecent assault of a child conviction. See Commonwealth v.

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Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2022) (concluding that the evidence

that appellant digitally penetrated the victim when she was less than thirteen

years of age was sufficient to establish the aggravated indecent assault of a

child conviction).

      For Velez-Pacheco’s indecent assault – complainant less than thirteen

years of age conviction, the record reflects that Victim testified that Velez-

Pacheco forced her to perform oral intercourse on him until he ejaculated.

N.T., 11/29/2023–12/1/2023, at 98-99.        Victim stated that this incident

occurred while she lived at King’s Manor Apartments. Id. at 99. The record

further reflects that Victim lived at King’s Manor Apartments until 2016, when

she was ten years old. Id. at 71.

      Thus, the record plainly reveals evidence indicating that Velez-Pacheco

committed acts constituting indecent assault while Victim was less than

thirteen years of age. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d 424, 434-

35 (Pa. Super. 2023) (holding that oral intercourse constitutes indecent

contact sufficient to sustain an indecent assault conviction). Accordingly, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Velez-Pacheco’s indecent

assault – complainant less than thirteen years of age conviction. See id.

      In light of the foregoing, we must also reject Velez-Pacheco’s challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his unlawful contact with a

minor and corruption of minors convictions, which he based solely on his

assertion that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his aggravated

                                    - 11 -
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indecent assault of a child and indecent assault – complainant less than

thirteen years of age convictions. Therefore, Velez-Pacheco’s first issue does

not entitle him to relief.

      For his second issue, Velez-Pacheco argues that his sentence was

excessive because the trial court imposed his one-to-two-year sentence for

his conviction of criminal attempt – rape of child consecutive to his ten-to-

twenty-year sentence for his aggravated indecent assault of a child conviction.

Velez-Pacheco’s Brief at 49-50, 53-54. This issue challenges the discretionary

aspects of Velez-Pacheco’s sentence. See Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107

A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that a claim arguing that a sentence

is excessive because the trial court imposed consecutive sentences challenges

the discretionary aspects of the sentence).

      “The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence

is not absolute and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014). To

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of

a sentence, an appellant must satisfy a four-part test:

      (1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
      time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the
      appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth
      a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
      his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant
      raises a substantial question for our review.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013).                     “A

defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a plausible

                                     - 12 -
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argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is

contrary     to   the   fundamental   norms    of    the   sentencing   process.”

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(quotations and citations omitted).

      Velez-Pacheco satisfied the first three requirements of the four-part test

by filing a timely notice of appeal, raising the issue in his post-sentence

motion, and including a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief.

See Notice of Appeal, 6/15/2023; Post-Sentence Motion, 2/6/2023; Velez-

Pacheco’s Brief at 49-52. We must therefore determine if Velez-Pacheco has

raised a substantial question for review.

      We evaluate what constitutes a substantial question on a case-by-case

basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). We

have found that a substantial question exists “when the appellant advances a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

to   the    fundamental   norms   which   underlie   the   sentencing   process.”

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).

      Here, Velez-Pacheco argues that the trial court should have imposed

concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences for his aggravated indecent

assault of a child and criminal attempt – rape of a child convictions. This Court

has consistently recognized that excessiveness claims premised on the

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imposition of consecutive sentences do not raise a substantial question for our

review. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa. Super.

2015) (en banc) (“A court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence

concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a substantial

question[.]”); Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super.

2013) (“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to

the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial

question.”).

      We have, however, recognized that consecutive sentences can be so

manifestly excessive that, in extreme circumstances, such a claim may give

rise to a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162,

171–72 (Pa. Super. 2010).       To make this determination, our focus is on

“whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence

to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal

conduct in this case.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 588

(Pa. Super .2010).

      Conducting this evaluation, we conclude that Velez-Pacheco has failed

to raise a substantial question for our review. Velez-Pacheco’s argument is

that his sentence was excessive because, had the trial court ordered his

sentences to run concurrently, he would have had an aggregate sentence of

                                     - 14 -
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ten to twenty years as opposed to the eleven to twenty-two years that he

received – a difference of one year on his minimum sentence and two years

on his maximum sentence. In light of the circumstances of this case and the

heinous criminal acts committed by Velez-Pacheco, we decline to find the trial

court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences manifestly excessive such

that it raises a substantial question. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction

to review Velez-Pacheco’s second issue.

      For his final issue, Velez-Pacheco challenges his designation as an SVP.

Velez-Pacheco’s Brief at 54-55, 64-66.        Specifically, Velez-Pacheco argues

that the evidence presented at his SVP hearing failed to show that he suffers

from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him likely to

engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. Id. at 55, 64-66.

      “A challenge to a trial court’s SVP designation presents a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence for which our standard of review is de novo and

our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Aumick, 297 A.3d 770,

776 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc).

      A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP
      designation requires the reviewing court to accept the
      undiminished record of the case in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth. The reviewing court must examine all of the
      Commonwealth’s evidence without consideration of its
      admissibility. … We will reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP
      status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and
      convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been
      satisfied.

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Id. at 776–77 (quotation marks and citations omitted).           “The clear and

convincing standard requires evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts [at] issue.” Commonwealth v.

Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (Pa. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

      The procedure for SVP determinations is statutorily mandated. Aumick,

297 A.3d at 777. Under Subchapter H of SORNA, the Commonwealth must

first demonstrate that an individual has been convicted of a “sexually violent

offense.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(a). SORNA defines a sexually violent offense

as “[a]n offense specified in section 9799.14 (relating to sexual offenses and

tier system) as a Tier I, Tier II[,] or Tier III sexual offense committed on or

after December 20, 2012, for which the individual was convicted.”         Id. §

9799.12.   Here, there is no dispute that Velez-Pacheco was convicted of

multiple sexually violent offenses enumerated in section 9799.12.

      Following conviction, but before sentencing, the trial court must order

an assessment by the SOAB of an individual who has committed a sexually

violent offense to determine whether that individual should be classified as an

SVP. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(a)-(b). The assessment must include, but is not

limited to, an examination of the following fifteen factors:

      (1) Facts of the current offense, including:

            (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

            (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary
            to achieve the offense.

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            (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

            (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

            (v) Age of the victim.

            (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual
            cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.

            (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

      (2) Prior offense history, including:

            (i) The individual’s prior criminal record.

            (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.

            (iii) Whether the individual       participated      in    available
            programs for sexual offenders.

      (3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

            (i) Age of the individual.

            (ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual.

            (iii) A mental      illness,   mental   disability    or    mental
            abnormality.

            (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to              the
            individual’s conduct.

      (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment
      field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.

Id. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). Upon completing its assessment, the SOAB must

submit a written report to the district attorney, who may file a praecipe for a

hearing on the matter. Id. § 9799.24(d), (e)(1); see also Aumick, 297 A.3d

at 777.

      At an SVP hearing, the trial court’s inquiry differs from the SOAB’s

assessment. Aumick, 297 A.3d at 777. While the SOAB must evaluate the

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fifteen factors listed in section 9799.24(b), “the trial court must determine

whether the Commonwealth has proven by clear and convincing evidence that

the defendant is an individual who has a mental abnormality or personality

disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually

violent offenses.” Id. at 777-79 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see

also Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972, 992 (Pa. 2020) (explaining

that an SVP is an individual that has committed a sexually violent offense “who

[has] been individually determined to suffer from a mental abnormality or

personality disorder such that they are highly likely to continue to commit

sexually violent offenses”).

      At Velez-Pacheco’s SVP hearing, the Commonwealth presented the

testimony of Dr. Stein, a licensed psychologist and the member of the SOAB

who conducted Velez-Pacheco’s court-ordered assessment.             See N.T.,

1/25/2023, at 5-17. Dr. Stein testified that he reviewed the fifteen factors

set forth in section 9799.24(b) in his assessment of Velez-Pacheco. Id. at 8.

When the Commonwealth asked Dr. Stein whether Velez-Pacheco had a

mental abnormality that made him likely to reoffend and whether he had

engaged in predatory behavior, Dr. Stein explained:

      A.     … He suffers from other specified paraphilic disorder with
      the specification being non-consent, meaning they sustained non-
      consenting … sexual conduct that victimizes another person. In
      this case, it was over an approximate two-year period.

      Q.    Can you explain of the 15 different points that you accessed
      and the information you had in this case, what information leads

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      you to believe that he does suffer from that other specified
      paraphilic disorder of non-consent?

      A.    The main issues were the acts themselves. These were
      hands-on acts. These were acts of sexual touching that included
      penetration. The relationship of the individual to the victim. The
      victim was a biological daughter. This is consistent with sexual
      deviance and paraphilic, which is another way of saying sexually
      deviant behavior.

      In terms of the mental capacity of the victim, while the victim is
      of normal capacity, she was asleep during the initiation of some
      of the assaults, unable to defend herself, and this is consistent
      with predatory behavior.

      The victim’s age. She was 10 when acts first started by her report.
      They had stopped for a while and started up again at age 11 and
      continued through age 13.

      The diagnosis of a paraphilic disorder is typically made if there’s
      sexually deviant and victimizing behaviors over at least six
      months or more. In this case, it was two years.

      So those were the primary issues, the young age of the victim,
      the acts themselves, and the duration of which they occurred.

      Q.   This mental abnormality, the paraphilic disorder that he
      meets the criteria of, is it a curable condition?

      A.     No. It is manageable with successful treatment but not
      curable. One of the purposes of the SVP classification is to
      hopefully ensure that the individual does not have access to
      unsupervised situations with children and to maintain long-term
      treatment to make sure that they don’t put themselves in risky
      situations with children.

Id. at 8-10. Dr. Stein concluded that “[g]iven his lengthy course of offending

over a two-year period, possibly more, there is sufficient evidence for a

condition of paraphilic disorder that makes sexual reoffending likely if given

unsupervised access to young girls.” Id. at 10.

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      Based upon our review of the record, in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Velez-

Pacheco SVP designation.      The record reflects that Velez-Pacheco was

convicted of multiple sexually violent offenses and that he underwent an

assessment by the SOAB. At the SVP hearing, Dr. Stein clearly and thoroughly

explained that Velez-Pacheco suffered from a mental abnormality (specified

paraphilic disorder with the specification being non-consent), that he engaged

in predatory behavior, and that his condition made him likely to reoffend. Id.

at 8-10.   Accordingly, because the Commonwealth presented clear and

convincing evidence that Velez-Pacheco met the statutory criteria to be

classified as an SVP, his third issue entitles him to no relief. See Aumick,

297 A.3d at 777-79.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/07/2024

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