Court Opinion

ID: 9427945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:18.879213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.703891
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun-,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s judgment that §§17 (a) (2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77q (a)(2) and (3), do not require a showing of scienter for purposes of an action for injunctive relief brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I dissent from the remainder of the Court’s reasoning and judgment. I am of the view that neither § 17 (a)(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a)(1), nor § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), as elaborated by SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979), requires the Commission to prove scienter *704before it can obtain equitable protection against deceptive practices in securities trading. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.
The issues before the Court in this case are important and critical. Sections 17 (a) and 10 (b) are the primary anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. They are the chief means through which the Commission, by exercise of its authority to bring actions for injunctive relief, can seek protection against deception in the marketplace. See § 20 (b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77t (b); § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (d). As a result, they are key weapons in the statutory arsenal for securing market integrity and investor confidence. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L. J. 171, 182 (1933); Note, 57 Yale L. J. 1023 (1948). If the Commission is denied the ability effectively to nip in the bud the misrepresentations and deceptions that its investigations have revealed, honest investors will be the ones who suffer. Often they may find themselves stripped of their investments through reliance on information that the Commission knew was misleading but lacked the power to stop or contain.
Today’s decision requires the Commission to prove scienter in many, if not most, situations before it is able to obtain an injunction. This holding unnecessarily undercuts the Commission’s authority to police the marketplace. As I read the Court’s opinion, it is little more than an extrapolation of the reasoning that was employed in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976), in imposing a scienter requirement upon private actions for damages implied under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. Whatever the authority of Hochfelder may be in its own context, I perceive little reason to regard it as governing precedent here. I believe that there are sound reasons for distinguishing between private damages actions and public enforcement actions under these statutes, and for applying a scienter standard, if one must be applied anywhere, only in the former class of cases.
*705I
In keeping with the reasoning of Hochfelder, the Court places much emphasis upon statutory language and its as-sertedly plain meaning. The words “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” in § 17 (a)(1), and the words “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in § 10 (b), are said to connote “knowing or intentional misconduct.” Ante, at 690, 696. And this connotation, it is said, implicitly incorporates the requirement of scienter traditionally applicable in the common law of fraud. But there are at least two specific responses to this wooden analysis. First, it is quite unclear that the words themselves call for so restrictive a definition. Second, as the Court recognized in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 180 (1963), the common-law requirement of scienter generally observed in actions for fraud at law was often dispensed with in actions brought before chancery.
A
The words of a statute, particularly one with a remedial object, have a “ ‘meaning imparted to them by the mischief to be remedied.'” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U. S. 531, 545 (1978), quoting Duparquet Co. v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216, 221 (1936). Thus, antifraud provisions of securities legislation are to be construed “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S., at 195; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 12 (1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972). See also SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 350-351 (1943); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 849-851 (1975). I have no doubt that the “mischief” confronting Congress in 1933 and 1934 included a large measure of intentional deceit and misrepresentation. The concern, however, ran deeper still, and Congress sought to develop a regulatory *706framework that would ensure a free flow of honest, reliable information in the securities markets. This Court has recognized that it was Congress’ desire “to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat erupt or,” and to place upon those in control of information the responsibility for misrepresentation. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S., at 186; see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933); Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1933). This step was perceived as a fundamental prerequisite to restoration of investor confidence sorely needed after the market debacles that helped to plummet the Nation into a major economic depression. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 775 (1979).
Reading the language of § 17 (a) (1) and § 10 (b) with these purposes in mind, I am not at all certain — although the Court professes to be — that the language is incapable of being read to include misrepresentations that result from something less than willful behavior. The word “willfully,” that Congress employed elsewhere in the securities laws when it wanted to specify a prerequisite of knowledge or intent, is conspicuously missing.1 Instead, Congress employed a variety of *707terms to describe the conduct that it authorized the Commission to prohibit. These operative terms are expressed in the disjunctive, and each should be given its separate meaning. Contrary to the Court’s view, I would conclude that they identify a range of behavior, including but not limited to intentional misconduct, and that they admit an interpretation, in the context of Commission enforcement actions, that reaches deceptive practices whether the common-law condition of scienter is specifically present or not.
For example, the word “device” that is common to both statutes may have a far broader scope than the Court suggests. The legislative history of the 1934 Act used that term as a synonym for “practice,” a word without any strong connotation of scienter, and it expressed a desire to confer upon the Commission authority under § 10 (b) to prohibit “any ... manipulative or deceptive practices . . . detrimental to the interests of the investor.” S Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1934). The term “device” also was used in § 15 *708(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 IT. S. C. § 78o (c)(1), where it has been interpreted with congressional approval to apply to negligent acts and practices. See SEC Rule 150-1-2, 17 CPR § 240.15cl-2 (1979); H. R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 10 (1938). Moreover, “device” had been given broad definition in prior enactments. In Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 71 (1908), the Court rejected the contention that its meaning in the Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847, should be limited to conduct involving resort to underhanded, dishonest, or fraudulent means.
In my view, this evidence provides a stronger indication of congressional understanding of the term “device” than the dictionary definition on which the Court relies. Ante, at 696, n. 13; cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 199, n. 20.2 At the very least, it fully counters the Court’s bald assertion that the meaning of terms used in the antifraud provisions is sufficiently “plain” that statutory policy and administrative interpretation may be ignored in defining the scope of the legislation. See ante, at 695, 700, n. 19. Division in the lower courts over the issues before us is itself an indication that reasonable minds differ over the import of the terminology that Congress has used. I can agree with the Court that the language of the statutes is the starting point of analysis, but at least in present circumstances I strongly disagree with the conclusion that it is the ending point as well.
*709B
An additional and independent ground for disagreement with the Court’s analysis is its utter failure to harmonize statutory construction with prevailing equity practice at the time the securities laws were enacted. On prior occasions, the Court has emphasized the relevance of common-law principles in the interpretation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. See, e. g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 227-229 (1980). See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1289-1291 (CA2 1973) (en banc). Yet in this case, the Court oddly finds those principles inapplicable. It specifically casts aside the fact that proof of scienter was not required in actions seeking equitable relief against fraudulent practices. This position stands in stark contrast with the Court’s clear recognition of this separate equity tradition in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 180 (1963).
In Capital Gains, the Court was called upon to construe § 206 (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6 (2). The statute is a general antifraud provision framed in language similar to that of § 17 (a) (3) of the 1933 Act. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, had decided by a close vote that the Commission could not obtain an injunction for violation of the statute unless it proved scienter. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 306 F. 2d 606 (CA2 1962). This Court, rejecting the view of the lower court that scienter was required in all cases involving fraud, reversed. It said:
“The content of common-law fraud has not remained static as the courts below seem to have assumed. It has varied, for example, with the nature of the relief sought, the relationship between the parties, and the merchandise in issue. It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages.” 375 IT. S., at 193.
*710In particular, the Court observed that proof of scienter was one element of an action for damages that the equity courts omitted. Id., at 193-194. See also Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122, 128 (1889).
The Court does not now dispute the veracity of what it said in Capital Cains. Indeed, the different standards for fraud in law and at equity have been noted by commentators for more than a century. See, e. g., 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 186-187 (6th ed. 1853); G. Bower, The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation §250 (1911); 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 885 (4th ed. 1918); 3 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts § 1500 (1920); W. Walsh, Equity § 109, p. 509 (1930). See also Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L. J. 227, 231 (1933). The difference originally may have been attributable more to historical accident than to any conscious policy. See Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation: Legal Fault as a Requirement (Part I), 1 Okla. L. Rev. 21, 23 (1948). But as one commentator explained, it has survived because in equity “[i]t is not the cause but the fact, of injury, and the problem of its practical control through judicial action, which concern the court.” 1 F. Lawrence, Substantive Law of Equity Jurisprudence § 13 (1929) (emphasis in original); see also id., § 17. As a consequence of this different focus, common-law courts consistently have held that in an action for rescission or other equitable relief the fact of material misrepresentation is sufficient, and the knowledge or purpose of the wrongdoer need not be shown.
The Court purports to distinguish Capital Gains on the grounds that it involved a different statutory provision with somewhat different language, and that it stressed the confidential duties of investment advisers to their clients. Ante, at 693-695. These observations, in my view, do not weaken the relevance of the history on which the Court in Capital Gains relied. In fact, that history may be even more pertinent here. This ease involves actual dissemination of material *711false statements by a broker-dealer serving as market maker in the relevant security; Capital Gains involved an investment adviser’s omission to state material facts. Because there was no affirmative misrepresentation in Capital Gains, the existence of a confidential duty arguably was necessary before the broker’s silence could become the basis for a charge of fraud. Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S., at 228. Here, in contrast, the fraudulent nature of the underlying conduct is clear, and the only issue is whether the Commission may obtain the desired prophylactic relief.
The significance of this common-law tradition, moreover, is buttressed by reference to state precursors of the federal securities laws. The problem of securities fraud was by no means new in 1933, and many States had attempted to deal with it by enactment of their own “blue-sky” statutes. When Congress turned to the problem, it explicitly drew from their experience. One variety of state statute, the so-called “fraud” laws of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware, empowered the respective state attorneys general to bring actions for injunctive relief when fraudulent practices in the sale of securities were uncovered. See, e. g., Federal Securities Act, Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 95 (1933). Of these statutes, the most prominent was the Martin Act of New York, 1921 N. Y. Laws, ch. 649, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-353 (Consol. 1921), which had been fairly actively enforced. The drafters of the federal securities laws referred to these specific statutes as models for the power to seek injunctive relief that they requested for federal enforcement authorities. The experience of the State of New York, in particular, was repeatedly called to Congress’ attention as an example for federal legislation to follow.3
*712In light of this legislative history, I find it far more significant than does the Court that proof of scienter was not a prerequisite to relief under the Martin Act and other similar “blue-sky” laws. In People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655 (1926), the New York Court of Appeals held that lack of scienter was no defense to Martin Act liability. The court justified this decision by looking to the traditional equity practice to which I have referred. It held:
“[I]ntentional misstatements, as in an action at law to recover damages for fraud and deceit . . . need not be alleged. Material misrepresentations intended to influence the bargain, on which an action might be maintained in equity to rescind a consummated transaction, are enough.” Id., at 40-41, 154 N. E., at 658.
This decision was in keeping with the general tenor of state laws governing equitable relief in the context of securities transactions. See Note, 40 Yale L. J. 987, 988 (1931).
The Court dismisses all this evidence with the observation, ante, at 700, n. 18, that the specific holdings of cases like Federated Radio were not explicitly placed before Congress. Yet these were not isolated holdings or novel twists of law. They were part of an established, longstanding equity tradition the significance of which the Court has chosen simply to ignore. I am convinced that Congress was aware of this tradition, see n. 3, supra, and that if it had intended to depart from it, it would have left more traces of that intention than the Court has been able to find. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944) (“We are dealing here with the requirements of equity practice with a background of several hundred years of history”).
*713II
Although I disagree with the Court’s textual exegesis and its assessment of history, I believe its most serious error may be a failure to appreciate the structural interrelationship among equitable remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and to accord that interrelationship proper weight in determining the substantive reach of the Commission’s enforcement powers under § 17 (a) and § 10 (b).
The structural considerations that were advanced in support of the decision to require proof of scienter in a private action for damages, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 206-211, have no application in the present context. In Hochfelder, the Court noted that Congress had placed significant limitations on the private causes of action for negligence that were available under provisions of the 1934 Act other than § 10 (b). Ibid. It concluded that the effectiveness of these companion statutes might be undermined if private plaintiffs sustaining losses from negligent behavior also could sue for damages under § 10 (b). Id., at 210. Obviously, no such danger is created by Commission-initiated actions for injunctive relief, and the Court admits as much. Ante, at 691, n. 9.4
In fact, the consistent pattern in both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is to grant the Commission broad authority to seek enforcement without regard to scienter, unless criminal punishments are contemplated. In both Acts, state of mind is treated with some precision. Congress used terms such as *714“knowing,” “willful,” and “good faith,” when it wished to impose a state-of-mind requirement. The omission of such terms in statutory provisions authorizing the Commission to sue for injunctive relief contrasts sharply with their inclusion in provisions authorizing criminal prosecution. Compare § 20 (b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77t (b), and § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (d), with § 24 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77x, and § 32 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78ff (a). Moreover, the Acts create other civil remedies that may be pursued by the Commission that do not include state-of-mind prerequisites.5 This pattern comports with Congress’ expressed intent to give the Commission maximum flexibility to deal with new or unanticipated problems, rather than to confine its enforcement efforts within a rigid statutory framework. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1934); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 8113 (1934).
The Court’s decision deviates from this statutory scheme. That deviation, of course, is only partial. After today’s decision, it still will be possible for the Commission to obtain belief against some negligent misrepresentations under § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act. Yet this halfway-house approach itself highlights the error of the Court’s decision. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated to fill a gap in federal securities legislation, and *715to apply to both purchasers and sellers under § 10 (b) the legal duties that § 17 (a) had applied to sellers alone. See Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S. E. C. 373, 381, n. 8 (1943) ; SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). As the Commission thus recognized, the two statutes should operate in harmony. The Court now drives a wedge between them, and says that henceforth only the seller’s negligent misrepresentations may be enjoined. I have searched in vain for any reason in policy or logic to support this division. Its only support, so far as I can tell, is to be found in the Court’s technical linguistic analysis.
Many lower courts have refused to go so far. Both before and after Hochf elder, they have rejected the contention that the Commission must prove scienter under either § 17 (a) or § 10 (b) before it can obtain injunctive relief against deceptive practices.6 Even those judges who anticipated Hochf elder by advocating a scienter requirement in private actions for money damages found no reason' to place similar strictures on the Commission. See, e. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 866-868 (CA2 1968) (concurring opinion), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969), cited with approval in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 197, 211, 213, 214.
*716The reasons for this refusal to limit the Commission’s authority are not difficult to fathom. As one court observed in the context of § 17 (a), “[i]mpressive policies” support the need for Commission authority to seek prophylactic relief against misrepresentations that are caused by negligence, as well as those that are caused by deliberate swindling. SEC v. Coven, 581 F. 2d 1020, 1027 (CA2 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 950 (1979). False and misleading statements about securities “can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar.” United States v. Benjamin, 328 F. 2d 854, 863 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Howard v. United States, 377 U. S. 953 (1964). And when misinformation causes loss, it is small comfort to the investor to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by fraudulent design, particularly when recovery of his loss has been foreclosed by this Court’s decisions.7 As the reported cases illustrate, injunctions against negligent dissemination of misinformation play an essential role in preserving market integrity and preventing serious financial loss. *717See, e. g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F. 2d 535, 540-541 (CA1 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F. 2d 801, 809 (CA2 1975); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F. 2d 1082, 1095-1097 (CA2 1972).8
III
I thus arrive at the conclusion that statutory language does not compel the judgment reached by the Court, while considerations of history, statutory structure, legislative purpose, and policy all strongly favor an interpretation of § 17 (a) and § 10 (b) that permits the Commission to seek injunctive relief without first having to prove scienter. In my view, this conclusion is fortified by the fact that Congress has approved it in a related context.9 Because I find nothing *718whatever in either Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder or today’s decision that compels a different result, I dissent.

 The word “willfully” was originally included in the draft of what was to become § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, and both Houses of Congress considered the addition of the phrase “with intent to defraud” to the language of that provision. That phrase ultimately was inserted by the Senate, but the bill that emerged from conference lacked either of the references to a state-of-mind requirement. See H. R. 4314, § 13, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1933); S. 875, § 13, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 1933) ; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 26-27 (1933). The House bill, which as reported did not contain the words “willfully” and “intent to defraud,” see H. R. 5480, § 16 (a), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 4, 1933), was used by the conferees as their working draft. See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29, 45 (1959).
The Court suggests that no meaning should be attributed to these events, because Congress never explained its reasons for deleting this *707explicit state-of-mind language. Ante, at 699-700. But the Conference Report, which discussed differences between the House bill and the Conference substitute, noted that the conferees had adopted from the Senate bill several “minor and clarifying changes” that were intended “to make clear and effective the administrative procedure provided for and to remove uncertainties” concerning the powers of the Commission. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1933). If the Court were correct in its interpretation of § 17 (a) (1), retention of the Senate’s explicit state-of-mind language undoubtedly would have added clarity to congressional intent. In light of the other changes to which the House acceded, it is thus difficult, on the Court’s theory, to understand why this change would not have been adopted as well. Moreover, Congress was well aware of the significance that addition or deletion of these terms would have. See 77 Cong. Rec. 2994 (1933) (colloquy between Sens. Fess and Fletcher); id., at 2919 (remarks of Rep. Rayburn). It is also noteworthy that, when the 1934 Act was under consideration, a proposal was placed before Congress to amend § 17 (a) to limit it to conduct that was undertaken “willfully and with intent to deceive.” 78 Cong. Rec. 8703 (1934). The proposal was voted down. Id., at 8708.

 I perceive no reason why the misrepresentations concerning Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corp. spread by petitioner’s brokerage house would not qualify as a “device ... to defraud',” within the meaning of § 17 (a)(1), or as a “deceptive device” in contravention of Rule 10b~5, within the meaning of § 10 (b). I do not regard the word “deceptive,” which focuses more on effect than on purpose, as adding significant connotations of scienter to the word “device.” In light of the Court’s disposition of this case, I shall not consider whether the misrepresentations might be reached under § 17 (a) (2) or § 17 (a) (3) as well, or whether the facts of the case establish scienter, as the District Court found.

 See, e. g., Federal Securities Act, Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 95, 109, 112 (1933); Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 71, *712146-147, 156, 170, 245-246, 253 (1933); see also 78 Cong. Ree. 8096 (1934). For a general discussion of state precursors and their consideration by Congress, see 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 33-34, 35-43 (2d ed. 1961).

 Nor is there any' danger that actions for prophylactic relief brought by the Commission will result in the “ ‘broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of the law,’ ” that has been an animating concern of the Court’s decisions limiting the scope of private damages actions under § 10 (b). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 214, n. 33 (1976), quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 747-748 (1975). Compare Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 179-180, 174 N. E. 441, 444 (1931), with People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E 655 (1926).

 The prohibition in § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77e, against selling securities without an effective registration statement has been interpreted to require no showing of scienter. See, e. g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F. 2d 535, 541-542 (CA2 1973); SEC v. North American Research & Development Corp., 424 F. 2d 63, 73-74 (CA2 1970). See also §8 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 77h (b) (power to withhold registration effectiveness); § 8 (d), 15 U. S. C. § 77h (d) (power to issue “stop order” suspending registration effectiveness). The 1934 Act incorporated the culpability requirements for Commission remedies that the 1933 Act had established, although it did set a scienter standard for SEC remedies of criminal prosecution and administrative revocation of broker-dealer registrations. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Tit. II, §210, 48 Stat. 908-909.

 For cases involving § 10 (b) see, e. g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F. 2d 535, 541, n. 10 (CAI 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F. 2d 801, 809 (CA2 1975); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F. 2d 1082, 1096 (CA2 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 863 (CA2 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F. 2d 1279, 1284 (CA7 1974); SEC v. Geyser Minerals Corp., 452 F. 2d 876, 880-881 (CA10 1971). For cases involving § 17 (a) see, e. g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, supra; SEC v. Coven, 581 F. 2d 1020, 1026 (CA2 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 950 (1979); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F. 2d 1001, 1006-1007 (CA4 1978); SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F. 2d 181, 185-186 (CA7 1966); SEC v. Geyser Minerals Corp., supra. Because several of the latter cases turn on interpretations of §17 (a) (2) or §17 (a) (3), they do not necessarily conflict in result with today’s decision.

 When questioned about .civil liability, the drafters of the 1933 Act strongly defended the theory that it would be preferable to place liability for negligent misstatements on the shoulders of those responsible for their dissemination rather than to require innocent investors to suffer in silence. Judge Alexander Holtzoff, then Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, put it this way:
“Criminal liability is based only on knowingly making a false statement. But civil liability exists even in the ease of an innocent mistake. Let us assume that an innocent mistake is made and an investor loses money because of it. Now, who should suffer? The man who loses the money or the man who puts the mistake in circulation knowing that other people will rely upon that mistaken statement?” Securities Act, Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 207 (1933).
See also Federal Securities Act, Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 124r-125 (1933) (testimony of Ollie M. Butler, Foreign Service Division, Department of Commerce).

 In recognition of the importance to the investing public of the Commission’s authority to prevent negligent misstatements, the proposed Federal Securities Code drafted by the American Law Institute provides the Commission with power to obtain injunctions preventing deception and misrepresentation without proof of scienter. ALI, Federal Securities Code §§262 (d), 297 (a), 1602 (a), 1819 (a)(3), 1819 (a)(4) (Prop. Off. Draft 1978). The ALI Code has been approved by the American Bar Association, 65 A. B. A. J. 341 (1979).

 In 1975, Congress undertook relatively substantial revision of the securities laws. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97; see Securities Acts Amendments of 1975: Hearings on S. 249 before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1975). In the course of its deliberations, Congress had occasion to consider the scope of Commission injunctive remedies. In reliance on the different purposes of Commission enforcement proceedings and private actions, Congress enacted §21 (g) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (g), which provides that, absent consent from the Commission, private actions may not be consolidated with Commission proceedings. The Senate Committee in charge of the legislation observed that Commission enforcement actions and private suits for damages, though both civil in nature, “are very different,” and it explained that private suits involve complications that are not present when the Commission seeks injunctive relief:
“Private actions frequently will involve more parties and more issues than the Commission’s enforcement action, thus greatly increasing the *718need for extensive pretrial discovery. In particular, issues related to . . . scienter, causation, and the extent of damages, are elements not required to be demonstrated in a Commission injunctive action.” S. Rep. No. 94r-75, p. 76 (1975) (emphasis in original).
In 1977, following the decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, Congress re-examined the Commission’s enforcement authority, this time in connection with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494. Case law was discussed in some detail, and express approval was given to judicial decisions holding that scienter was not required when the SEC sought injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5. The responsible Committee in the House of Representatives declared:
“In the context of an SEC action to enjoin future violations of the securities laws, a defendant’s state, of mind should make no difference. The harm to the public is the same regardless of whether or not the violative conduct involved scienter. Because an SEC enforcement action is designed to protect the public against the recurrence of violative conduct, and not to punish a state of mind, this Committee intends that scienter is not an element of any Commission enforcement proceeding.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-640, p. 10 (1977).
As expressions of later Congresses, these statements, of course, do not control the meaning of provisions enacted in 1933 and 1934. Yet the views of a subsequent Congress are entitled to some weight, particularly when that Congress undertakes significant revision of the statute but leaves the disputed provision intact. Cf., e. g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 59, n. 10 (1979); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 553-554 (1979); Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U. S. 234, 248 (1978); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 274-275 (1974).