Court Opinion

ID: 9689135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:21:13.693105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:45.282173
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Justice
(dissenting).
, I respectfully dissent.
While I agree with the majority that an ordinary definition of disability should be applied, I do not think the one selected by the arbitrator is “ordinary.” When the issue is disability, the question must be asked— disabled from doing what? What can the individual not do that he or she could do before? See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 642 (1961) (defining disability as an “inability to do something.”); Oxford American Dictionary 181 (1980) (defining disability as “something that disables or disqualifies a person, a physical incapacity caused by injury or disease etc.”) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1996) (defining disability under the federal Social Security Act as an inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment * * *.”) (emphasis added). Here all we know is that the plaintiff had trouble lifting trays when she was waitressing, was uncomfortable sitting for long periods of time while studying and had back pains — but where is the disability? It seems to me that when the legislature left to the courts the determination of “disability” in the context of the lapse provision, it must have meant something more than having discomfort while engaging in some activity. I would reverse the court of appeals, applying a definition of disability that requires proof of some form of physical or mental incapacity, notably absent here.
ANDERSON, J., joins in the dissent of Justice STRINGER.