Court Opinion

ID: 9649933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:14:41.088998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:16.122944
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would find that the evidence in this case clearly insufficient to come within the additional *304consideration exception to the presumption of at-will employment. Accordingly, I would reverse and enter judgment in favor of appellant.
In Pennsylvania, “all employment is considered to be at-will absent: (1) sufficient additional consideration; (2) an agreement for a definite duration; (3) an agreement specifying that the employee will be discharged only for just cause; or (4) an applicable recognized public policy exception.” Id. Instantly, the parties agree that (2), (3) and (4) are inapplicable to this case, and that the only argument centers around exception (1). I limit my review accordingly.
As was stated by the panel in Darlington v. General Electric, 350 Pa.Super. 183, 201, 504 A.2d 306, 315 (1986):
[A] court will find “additional consideration” when an employee affords his employer a substantial benefit other than the services which the employee is hired to perform, or when the employee undergoes a substantial hardship other than the services which he is hired to perform. “If the circumstances are such that a termination of the relation by one party will result in great hardship or loss to the other, as they must have known it would when they made the contract, this is a factor of great weight in inducing a holding that the parties agreed upon a specific period.” 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 684 (1960).
Moreover, “[w]hen sufficient additional consideration is present, an employee should not be subject to discharge without just cause for a reasonable time. The length of time during which it would be unreasonable to terminate, without just cause, an employee who has given additional consideration should be commensurate with the hardship the employee has endured or the benefit he has bestowed.” Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85, 97, 515 A.2d 571, 578 (1986) (citing Darlington).
The trial court relied on five factors in concluding that sufficient evidence of additional consideration was present to submit the question to the jury: (1) in order to accept the employment offer, appellee had to relocate his family from California to Pennsylvania; (2) appellee’s relocation necessi*305tated the sale of his California home and a subsequent purchase of real estate in Pennsylvania; (3) appellee rejected a higher offer from his current employer prior to accepting the position with appellant; (4) appellant indicated to appellee that “this would be the last job he would ever have”; and (5) the terms of employment included a country club membership for the following year. Appellant contends that at least two of these factors, (4) and (5), are not additional consideration for they do not afford a substantial benefit to the employer nor do they impose a substantial hardship on appellee. I would agree with appellant on this point, and with the remainder of its argument.
In Veno v. Meredith, supra, we were asked whether additional consideration was present where the employee left his former job with a newspaper, moved his family from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, and refused other employment opportunities for eight years before being fired by his current employer. In concluding this evidence insufficient to rebut the at-will presumption, we found no sufficiently detrimental hardship suffered by appellant which would relieve him of at-will status. Id., 357 Pa.Superior Ct. at 101, 515 A.2d at 580. We specifically noted that the detriments alleged by the employee, which are almost identical to those alleged herein, were “commensurate with those incurred by all manner of salaried professionals.” Id. As such, we concluded that no evidence was presented which would “suggest that appellant brought to the employment so substantial a benefit, or incurred so detrimental a hardship in taking the job, that he should be accorded treatment any different from the typical at-will employee.” Id.
Instantly, I find a situation on point with the facts of Veno. Here, though the evidence showed that appellee moved his family from California to Pennsylvania, necessitating a sale of his home and subsequent purchase of property, in addition to refusing a wage increase from his old employer, I would hold, as we did in Veno, that this evidence was insufficient to relieve appellee of at-will status. The type of detriment alleged is identical with that of *306the majority of today’s salaried professionals. Absent any indication by our Supreme Court or Legislature of a need for altering the existing at-will doctrine, I cannot come to a contrary conclusion.1 Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to decide the issues raised in this case, and in further concluding that judgment n.o.v. was unwarranted herein. I would, therefore, deem it appropriate to reverse and enter judgment in favor of appellant.

. The at-will doctrine was most recently reaffirmed by our Supreme Court in Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 524 Pa. 90, 569 A.2d 346 (1990), wherein the Court refused to create an equitable estoppel exception to at-will employment. Such a holding, I believe, is indicative of a decided preference to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature and not the courts.