Court Opinion

ID: 9919451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:03:32.42181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:44.357001
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                           ____________

                        No. SC2019-0983
                          ____________

                       THE FLORIDA BAR,
                         Complainant,

                                vs.

               JONATHAN STEPHEN SCHWARTZ,
                       Respondent.

                           ____________

                        No. SC2021-0484
                          ____________

                       THE FLORIDA BAR,
                         Complainant,

                                vs.

               JONATHAN STEPHEN SCHWARTZ,
                       Respondent.

                        January 18, 2024

PER CURIAM.

    We have for review two referee’s reports, by different referees,

recommending that Respondent, Jonathan Stephen Schwartz, be
found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from the

practice of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

     As discussed below, we approve the referees’ findings of fact

and recommendations as to guilt. But we disapprove in part the

findings in aggravation and mitigation, and we disapprove each

referee’s suspension recommendation. Over time, Schwartz has

engaged in increasingly inappropriate conduct under the guise of

zealous representation. Most notably, a three-year suspension was

recently imposed on Schwartz for deceptive conduct in connection

with a judicial proceeding. See Fla. Bar v. Schwartz (Schwartz I),

284 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2019); Fla. Bar v. Schwartz (Schwartz II), 334

So. 3d 298, 299 (Fla. 2022). Schwartz’s cumulative transgressions

are egregious and will not be tolerated. Based on Schwartz’s

extensive disciplinary history and escalating pattern of misconduct,

we disbar him for his misconduct in these two cases.

                         I. BACKGROUND

                       Case No. SC2019-0983

     On October 16, 2017, Schwartz sent an unsolicited text

message to the Bar complainant’s cell phone. The message

included a photo of the complainant’s police report and the text “It’s

                                 -2-
Jonathan Schwartz. I am a lawyer for battery cases. If you would

like to consult regarding the case . . . please call or text.” The

referee found that the text message violated the advertising rules as

follows: (1) it did not include “Advertisement” as the first word in

the text, as required by Rule Regulating The Florida Bar (Bar Rule)

4-7.18(b)(2)(B); (2) it did not include any of the required information

regarding Schwartz’s experience and qualifications, in violation of

Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(C); (3) it did not include the sentence “If you

have already obtained a lawyer, please disregard this text,” as

required at the time by Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(E)1; (4) it did not state

how Schwartz obtained the complainant’s information, in violation

of now designated Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(G)2; and (5) it had not been

      1. Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(E), as relevant to this proceeding,
previously provided as follows: “The first sentence of any written
communication prompted by a specific occurrence involving or
affecting the intended recipient of the communication or a family
member must be: ‘If you have already retained a lawyer for this
matter, please disregard this letter.’ ” Effective August 21, 2023,
that requirement is no longer in place. See In re Amends. to Rules
Regul. Fla. Bar – Subchapter 4-7 Information About Legal Servs., 366
So. 3d 997, 998 (Fla. 2023).

     2. At the time of the text advertisement, the rule was
designated Bar Rule 4-7.18(b)(2)(H).

                                  -3-
filed for review by the Bar as required by Bar Rule 4-7.19(a). The

referee rejected Schwartz’s argument that the advertising rules,

specifically citing Bar Rule 4-7.11 (Application of Rules), do not

apply to text messages because the rules do not expressly identify

them, and that he was entitled to protection under the “Safe

Harbor” provisions of Bar Rule 4-7.16 (Presumptively Valid

Content). 3

     Turning to the issue of sanctions, the referee considered

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards) 8.1(c)(2)

(Violation of Court Order or Engaging in Subsequent Same or

Similar Misconduct; Public Reprimand) and 9.2(c)(2)

(Communications about a Lawyer’s Services; Public Reprimand). In

addition, the referee found three aggravating factors: (1) prior

disciplinary offenses, (2) pattern of misconduct, and (3) substantial

experience in the practice of law; and one mitigating factor,

     3. Bar Rule 4-7.16(a) creates a “safe harbor” for lawyers.
According to the Comment under the rule’s Editors’ Notes, “[a]
lawyer desiring a safe harbor from discipline may choose to limit
the content of an advertisement to the information listed in this rule
and, if the information is true, the advertisement complies with
these rules.”

                                 -4-
character or reputation. The referee also considered as mitigating

the following factors, some of which are specific to advertising cases

under Standard 9.6 (Mitigation and Aggravation): (1) Schwartz

believed that text messages were not subject to the advertising rules

and that the text message at issue fell under the Safe Harbor

provisions of Bar Rule 4-7.16; (2) Schwartz ceased sending any

other text messages seeking employment; (3) Schwartz did not send

any other messages to the complainant; (4) Schwartz explained his

position with respect to text messages to the complainant’s lawyer

upon receipt of his email; and (5) Schwartz “is a hard-working

attorney, works long hours, and is dedicated in representing his

clients.” The referee recommended that Schwartz receive a ten-day

suspension to run concurrently with the suspension anticipated to

be entered in case number SC2017-1391, where the same referee

had recommended finding Schwartz guilty of violating Bar Rules in

relation to his alterations to photocopies of a police lineup. 4 Neither

       4. A different referee presided over case number SC2021-
0484. The Court had not, however, imposed the three-year
suspension in case number SC2017-1391 at the time either referee
filed their respective reports. See Schwartz II, 334 So. 3d 298.

                                 -5-
party sought review of the referee’s report in case number SC2019-

0983.

                       Case No. SC2021-0484

     Schwartz, who had filed a notice of appearance on behalf of

the defendant in State v. Demarris Maloy, Case No.

132016CF021853A000XX, in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court,

met with both client Maloy and Maloy’s co-defendant, Gabriel

Antwan Johnson, on or about June 12, 2018. Johnson was

charged in Case No. 132016CF021853B000XX and was represented

by the Miami-Dade County Public Defender’s Office at the time.

While Johnson appeared at Schwartz’s office with Maloy, neither

Johnson’s lawyer, Assistant Public Defender Kristine Del Sol, nor

any other lawyer from the Public Defender’s Office, was present.

Schwartz did not call Del Sol or make any effort to contact her or

her office with respect to Johnson’s appearance at his office despite

knowing that he was represented.

     At that time, Johnson told Schwartz that he wanted to testify

on behalf of Schwartz’s client. Schwartz prepared a Byrd 5 Affidavit,

     5. See Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970). A
Byrd Affidavit is used to obtain a severed trial, based on a

                                -6-
executed by Johnson and notarized by Schwartz’s associate, which

averred that Johnson wanted to testify on behalf of Maloy,

acknowledged his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,

and sought to have his case adjudicated before that of his co-

defendant to extinguish his right to remain silent.

     Schwartz filed the Byrd Affidavit with the trial court in his

client’s case on the same day Johnson came to Schwartz’s office. It

was never filed in Johnson’s case. Schwartz also filed a motion to

sever in Maloy’s case on or about July 9, 2018, attaching the Byrd

Affidavit as an exhibit. A hearing was held on Schwartz’s motion, in

which Johnson’s public defender advised the trial court that the

affidavit was obtained without her knowledge, that she was

unaware that her client had visited Schwartz’s office, and that she

was only aware of the affidavit due to notification by the assistant

state attorney. Under oath, Johnson acknowledged that he was

defendant’s desire to use his co-defendant’s potentially exculpatory
testimony, and it must show the following: “(1) a bona fide need for
the testimony, (2) the substance of the testimony, (3) its exculpatory
nature and effect, and (4) that the co-defendant will in fact testify if
the cases are severed.” Taylor v. State, 472 So. 2d 814, 815 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1985) (citing Byrd).

                                 -7-
represented by counsel at the time the affidavit was executed and

that his lawyer was not present. Schwartz, who proffered that

Johnson would testify that the drugs at issue in the criminal case

belonged to him and not to Maloy, argued that it was irrelevant for

purposes of his motion to sever whether he acquired that

information from Johnson. Schwartz further proffered that he had

recommended that Johnson call his attorney, though no such call

was made.

      Following referral to a referee and the portion of the final

hearing held on the issue of guilt, the referee recommended that

Schwartz be found guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-4.2(a)

(Communication with Person Represented by Counsel) and 4-8.4(d)

(providing that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct in connection

with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of

justice”).

      Specifically, the referee recommended finding that Schwartz

violated Bar Rule 4-4.2(a) because he was aware that Johnson was

represented by the Public Defender’s Office when he and Maloy met

at Schwartz’s office, and while Johnson intended on firing his

lawyer, Johnson had not done so yet. Schwartz knew this based on

                                  -8-
Johnson’s statement about being unhappy with the Public

Defender’s Office, and it was evidenced by the fact that Schwartz

recommended that Johnson call his lawyer. The referee further

found that the preparation of the Byrd Affidavit “in and of itself is

the subject of the representation.”

     The referee also recommended finding that Schwartz violated

Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) when he engaged in the impermissible

communication with Johnson and had him swear out an affidavit

without the benefit of his own lawyer’s advice. Schwartz also

violated the rule when he immediately filed the affidavit and sought

to use it in court proceedings to sever his client’s case from his co-

defendant’s, also without communicating with Johnson’s lawyer.

     After a separate hearing on the matter of sanctions and

without the benefit of this Court’s decision on discipline in case

number SC2017-1391, the referee recommended a ninety-day

suspension. The referee considered the following Standards, all

limited to imposition of a suspension, prior to recommending

discipline: Standards 4.3(b) (Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest),

6.1(b) (False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation), 6.2(b)

(Abuse of the Legal Process), 7.1(b) (Deceptive Conduct or

                                 -9-
Statements and Unreasonable or Improper Fees), and 8.1(b)

(Violation of Court Order or Engaging in Subsequent Same or

Similar Misconduct). The referee did not discuss the Standards

cited or otherwise explain how a suspension was the presumptive

sanction under the Standards.

     In addition, the referee found three aggravating factors: (1)

prior disciplinary offenses, (2) a pattern of misconduct, and (3)

substantial experience in the practice of law. Regarding mitigating

factors, the referee found: (1) absence of dishonest or selfish motive,

(2) personal or emotional problems, (3) timely good faith effort to

make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct,

(4) full and free disclosure to the Bar or cooperative attitude toward

the proceedings, (5) character or reputation, (6) interim

rehabilitation, (7) imposition of other penalties or sanctions, and (8)

remorse.

     The Bar seeks review of the recommended discipline, while

Schwartz seeks cross-review of the findings of fact and the guilt

recommendations.

                                 - 10 -
                             II. ANALYSIS

A. Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt

     The Court’s review of the referee’s findings of fact as to each

rule violation is limited, and if the referee’s findings of fact are

supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, this

Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for

that of the referee. Fla. Bar v. Rush, 361 So. 3d 796, 801 (Fla.

2023) (citing Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 79 (Fla. 2018)).

“When reviewing a referee’s recommendations as to guilt, the

referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable

rules to support the recommendations.” Fla. Bar v. Jacobs, 370 So.

3d 876, 883 (Fla. 2023) (citing Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56,

61 (Fla. 2018)). Ultimately, the party challenging the referee’s

findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt has the burden to

demonstrate “that there is no evidence in the record to support

those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the

conclusions.” Fla. Bar v. Arugu, 350 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2022)

(quoting Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 620 (Fla. 2007)).

                                  - 11 -
                        Case No. SC2019-0983

     Neither party sought review of the referee’s report in this case.

Therefore, the referee’s findings of fact are approved along with the

referee’s recommendation that Schwartz be found guilty of the

advertising rule violations. Cf. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.7(c)(1)

(providing in pertinent part that “[t]he filing of the notice or cross-

notice to seek review is jurisdictional, and the party who fails to

timely file notice loses supreme court review as a right”).

                        Case No. SC2021-0484

     In seeking cross-review in this case, Schwartz argues that the

evidence does not support the findings of fact and that the Bar

failed to prove a violation of Bar Rules 4-4.2(a) and 4-8.4(d).

     Bar Rule 4-4.2(a) prohibits a lawyer in representing his or her

client from communicating about the subject of the representation

with a person known to be represented by other counsel without

consent of that counsel. The Comment to the rule recognizes that

“[t]he rule applies even though the represented person initiates or

consents to the communication.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-4.2,

Editors’ Notes, Comment.

                                 - 12 -
     Here, the record evidence—including Johnson’s testimony

before the trial court, Schwartz’s testimony before the referee, and

the testimony of assistant state attorney Daniel Walsh about an

email sent to him, assistant public defender Del Sol, and Schwartz

a month earlier pertaining to a different motion in the cases—

established that Schwartz knew that Johnson was represented by

the Public Defender’s Office, that Johnson did not know the name

of his attorney and was unhappy with his representation, and that

Johnson intended to hire, but had not yet hired, private counsel.

Despite having initially advised Johnson to contact his lawyer and

having told Johnson he could not speak with him about the case

since he was represented by counsel, Schwartz met with Johnson

regarding the criminal case and had him execute an affidavit that

would directly impact the two co-defendants’ cases.

     Regarding Schwartz’s argument that the affidavit was

necessary under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b)

(Severance of Defendants) to obtain a severance in his client’s case,

it should go without saying that that provision does not negate the

requirement that it be accomplished in accord with the ethics rules.

                                - 13 -
     Further, Schwartz’s reliance upon In re Decker, 212 So. 3d 291

(Fla. 2017), is misplaced. In Decker, we found that “the evidence is

uncontroverted that then-attorney Decker was directly and

unequivocally informed by [an individual who was represented by

counsel at the time] that he was no longer represented by counsel of

record.” Id. at 306. Here, Schwartz received no such direct and

unequivocal notification that Johnson was no longer represented by

counsel. In fact, Schwartz knew the opposite—that Johnson was

represented by the Public Defender’s Office.

     Therefore, the referee’s findings of fact are supported by

competent, substantial evidence and are sufficient to support the

recommendation of guilt. We approve the referee’s factual findings

and we find Schwartz guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-4.2(a).

     Next, Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) states that a lawyer shall not “engage

in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice.” Here, the evidence unequivocally

demonstrates that Schwartz improperly communicated with a

person he knew to be represented by another lawyer, without that

lawyer’s consent, and pertaining to the subject of the

representation. That improper conduct pertained to a criminal

                                - 14 -
prosecution, and in the course thereof Schwartz was not forthright

with the trial court as to the facts underlying his attempt to have

his client’s case severed from that of his co-defendant.

     Therefore, the referee’s findings of fact are supported by

competent, substantial evidence and are sufficient to support the

recommendation of guilt. We approve the referee’s findings of fact

and conclude that Schwartz violated Bar Rule 4-8.4(d). See Fla. Bar

v. Feinberg, 760 So. 2d 933, 938 (Fla. 2000) (holding that it was

prejudicial to the administration of justice for a state prosecutor to

meet with defendant who he knew was represented, even if the

defendant encouraged it and the prosecutor believed he had a good

motive); Fla. Bar v. Nunes, 661 So. 2d 1202, 1203-04 (Fla. 1995)

(upholding violations of Bar Rules 4-4.2(a) and 4-8.4(d)).

B. Discipline

     We now consider whether we should approve the referees’

recommended discipline of a ten-day suspension and a ninety-day

suspension in these cases. Prior to making a recommendation as to

discipline, referees must consider the Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions, which discuss the presumptive sanctions in

relation to the misconduct established and are subject to

                                - 15 -
aggravating and mitigating factors, and this Court’s existing case

law. See Fla. Bar v. Strems, 357 So. 3d 77, 90 (Fla. 2022). The

reason for the Court’s inquiry, even in an uncontested case, is

because the Court’s review of a referee’s recommended discipline is

broader than review of the referee’s findings of fact, as it is

ultimately this Court’s responsibility to determine the appropriate

discipline. See Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 83 (citing Fla. Bar v.

Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989)); see also art. V, § 15,

Fla. Const.

     In addition, the Court “also considers prior misconduct and

cumulative misconduct as relevant factors, and deals more severely

with cumulative misconduct than with isolated misconduct.” Fla.

Bar v. Wolfe, 759 So. 2d 639, 645 (Fla. 2000) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). As a matter of our discretion, we can

impose a combined sanction for all cases and determine “the

appropriate discipline from the totality of the conduct as though all

of the charges had been presented to the Court in one proceeding.” 6

     6. Currently pending before the referee who presided over
case number SC2021-0484 is the complaint filed by the Bar against
Schwartz in case number SC2022-1488. At oral argument
Schwartz requested that the instant case(s) not be held for

                                 - 16 -
Strems, 357 So. 3d at 90 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Greenspahn, 396 So.

2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1981)).

     Before addressing the recommended discipline in the two

instant cases, we must note Schwartz’s history of prior misconduct

and that he is currently under a three-year suspension. See

Schwartz II, 334 So. 3d at 299. Most recently, on February 17,

2022, the Court disapproved a recommended ninety-day

suspension and instead suspended Schwartz for three years based

upon his use of two defense exhibits during a pretrial deposition

held in February 2015:

     Schwartz created the exhibits, two black and white
     photocopies of a police lineup. In each, Schwartz altered
     the defendant’s [his client’s] picture. In one exhibit, he
     replaced the defendant’s face with that of an individual
     whom witnesses other than the robbery victim had
     identified as the perpetrator. In the other exhibit,
     Schwartz changed the defendant’s hairstyle. However,
     the altered photocopies used at the deposition retained
     the victim’s identification of the defendant, including
     both her circle around what had been the defendant’s
     picture and her signature at the bottom of the lineup, as
     well as a police officer’s signature.

resolution of the case before the referee, and the referee in that
unperfected case, with the agreement of both parties, sought and
obtained extensions to file her report.

                               - 17 -
Id. at 300. In disapproving a prior referee’s report, we explained

that the exhibits were “deceptive on their face” and “[b]y their very

nature, they conveyed the false message that the substituted

photograph was the photograph that had been previously identified

by the victim.” Schwartz I, 284 So. 3d at 396-97. Because

Schwartz had previously received the longest nonrehabilitative

suspension possible, we ultimately determined that Schwartz’s

misconduct related to the altered exhibits warranted a rehabilitative

suspension of three years. Schwartz II, 334 So. 3d at 303.

     Prior to the three-year suspension, Schwartz’s disciplinary

record resulted from consent judgments or otherwise uncontested

reports. In case number SC2011-2143, on May 29, 2012, the Court

suspended Schwartz for ninety days for having filed affidavits that

included deficient and misrepresented notarizations for a client in a

paternity action, as well as having loaned money to his client. On

May 23, 2007, Schwartz received an admonishment for minor

misconduct for the dissemination of a direct mail advertisement

with numerous violations, including misleading statements. In case

number SC2002-0787, Schwartz received a public reprimand on

June 20, 2002, for certain behavior arising from a business dispute.

                                - 18 -
There, Schwartz made numerous unsubstantiated complaints

against his former law partners and made an additional

misrepresentation before a judge stating that the former partners

were under criminal investigation despite being informed by police

that there was no such investigation. And in case number SC1960-

90204, Schwartz received a public reprimand on April 10, 1997, for

failure to comply with numerous court orders. Lastly, Schwartz

received two admonishments for minor misconduct: one, by service

of a Grievance Committee Report of Minor Misconduct dated March

29, 1995, in The Florida Bar File No. 1994-71,026(11B), as well as

one in 1996 for an advertisement that had not been filed with the

advertising section of the Bar and did not contain the word

“advertisement” in red ink.

     As has become all too clear to this Court, Schwartz’s

misconduct persistently involves varying degrees of dishonesty and

deceit.

     Turning to case number SC2019-0983 at issue here, we

disagree with the referee’s recommended discipline of a ten-day

suspension. We note that while the referee cited Schwartz’s prior

ninety-day suspension imposed in 2012 involving dishonest

                               - 19 -
conduct and reviewed cases reflecting that the Court views

cumulative misconduct more seriously than an isolated instance of

misconduct, the recommended ten-day suspension does not apply

that proposition or escalate the sanction to be imposed. Further,

prior case law would have supported a rehabilitative suspension

had we reviewed this case in isolation. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Dopazo,

232 So. 3d 258, 263 (Fla. 2017) (imposing a one-year suspension

for unethical violations of the solicitation rule); Fla. Bar v. Letwin,

70 So. 3d 578, 584-85 (Fla. 2011) (holding that sending letters

containing misleading statements and soliciting employment to over

900 prospective clients violated the rule pertaining to written

communications and warranted a one-year suspension); Wolfe, 759

So. 2d at 640, 646 (suspending attorney for one year for in-person

solicitation of clients in areas affected by tornadoes in violation of

advertising rules).

     In addition to not assigning appropriate weight to the

aggravating factors of prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of

misconduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law, the

referee gave undue consideration as mitigating factors to Schwartz’s

subjective, uninformed belief that the advertising rules did not

                                  - 20 -
apply to text messages, and that he has a “public defender type of

practice” and is “dedicated in representing his clients.” We find

unreasonable the notion that “written communications” under the

rules only applies to emails since it is specifically referenced.

Rather, Standard 9.1(c) defines “direct mail communication” to

include written or electronic communications as described in the

Bar Rules, and Bar Rule 4-7.11(a) expressly provides that

subchapter 4-7 (Information About Legal Services), which governs

direct contact with prospective clients (Bar Rule 4-7.18), “applies to

all forms of communication in any print or electronic forum” and is

not limited to the examples listed. And as we intimated in

Schwartz’s defense exhibits’ disciplinary case, the requirement of

providing zealous representation is not a sword to wield as an

excuse to otherwise engage in misconduct. See Schwartz II, 334 So.

3d at 304.

     Turning now to case number SC2021-0484, we first

disapprove of the portion of the referee’s report finding that the

Standards presumptively calling for suspension apply. Instead, we

find that disbarment is the presumptive sanction under the

following Standards.

                                 - 21 -
        Standard 5.1(a) provides that “[d]isbarment is appropriate

when a lawyer . . . engages in any other intentional conduct

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that

seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”

Here, while Schwartz knew that Johnson was represented by the

Public Defender’s Office, he filed the Byrd Affidavit in his client’s

case only and did not serve that office or file a copy in Johnson’s

case.

        Standard 6.1(a) provides that “[d]isbarment is appropriate

when a lawyer . . . improperly withholds material information and

causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a

significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal

proceeding.” Here, Schwartz withheld from the Public Defender’s

Office material information that could have exposed Johnson to

additional criminal charges, and, having proffered that Johnson

would testify that the drugs at issue in Maloy’s criminal case

belonged to Johnson and not Maloy, argued that it was irrelevant

for purposes of his motion to sever whether he acquired that

information from Johnson.

                                  - 22 -
     Standard 7.1(a) provides that “[d]isbarment is appropriate

when a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of

a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for

the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious

injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.” Here, Schwartz

owed a duty to Johnson and his lawyer to not communicate with

Johnson because Schwartz knew Johnson was represented by

counsel, irrespective of Johnson’s dissatisfaction with that

representation. Such conduct not only could have benefitted Maloy

to the detriment of Johnson, but also could have benefitted

Schwartz himself, who has sought to build a reputation as a so-

called private public defender upon his own misguided

interpretation of the ethics rules.

     We also disapprove of the portion of the referee’s report

regarding mitigating factors. “Like other factual findings, a referee’s

findings in mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of

correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without

support in the record.” Strems, 357 So. 3d at 91 (quoting Germain,

957 So. 2d at 621).

                                 - 23 -
     Here, the evidence only supports finding Standards 3.3(b)(7)

(character or reputation) and 3.3(b)(10) (interim rehabilitation).

Many friends, relatives of clients, and other professionals testified in

support of Schwartz about his character, while Schwartz testified

concerning his therapy with Florida Lawyer’s Assistance, Inc., and

his efforts to change the way he practices law.

     But the record evidence contradicts the referee’s findings as to

the other mitigating factors.

     Standard 3.3(b)(2) (absence of a dishonest or selfish motive) is

not applicable here because, while Schwartz’s motive was not

financial, the type of motive usually contemplated under this factor,

his overzealous representation was intended to benefit his

professional reputation of a “private public defender office.”

Standard 3.3(b)(3) (personal or emotional problems) does not apply

because at issue is a life-long personality characteristic as opposed

to an acute emotional impairment. With respect to Standards

3.3(b)(4) (timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the

consequences of the misconduct) and 3.3(b)(5) (full and free

disclosure to the bar or cooperative attitude toward the

proceedings), no evidence is cited in support of those mitigating

                                 - 24 -
factors. Regarding Standard 3.3(b)(11) (imposition of other

penalties or sanctions), Schwartz was not otherwise disciplined and

the delay in adjudicating this case is due to other pending Bar

disciplinary cases brought against Schwartz. Finally, Schwartz’s

expression of acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct is not

the same as being remorseful under Standard 3.3(b)(12). To the

contrary, the record reflects that Schwartz blamed the Bar for his

troubles, testifying at the sanction hearing that, in the context of

seeking help from other lawyers, he had stated that “[t]he Bar’s

doing everything they can to take away my license.” See Fla. Bar v.

Horton, 332 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla. 2019) (finding of remorse was

clearly erroneous and evidence was insufficient, where lawyer

accused the Bar of prosecuting him like a “trophy being hunted”

and that the proceedings were like “facing a firing squad for a traffic

violation”).

     The Court also considers existing case law in determining the

appropriate sanction to impose. Here, the referee distinguished as

factually dissimilar cases cited by the Bar in support of imposing

disbarment, while citing a ninety-day suspension case, Florida Bar

v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005), without explanation. The

                                - 25 -
referee appears to have rested her recommended sanction upon

Schwartz’s professed intent “to provide full and effective assistance

of counsel in a criminal case” and erroneously concluded that his

misconduct “did not do any harm to any other person or the system

of justice.” As we have previously stated, a lawyer’s asserted motive

or the purpose in acting is not determinative of whether a rule was

violated and is not a factor in determining the appropriate sanction

to impose. See Schwartz I, 284 So. 3d at 396. In addition, the

referee here neither cited nor applied our recent case law imposing

more severe sanctions for lawyer misconduct, see, e.g., Fla. Bar v.

Altman, 294 So. 3d 844, 847 (Fla. 2020) (citing Fla. Bar v. Parrish,

241 So. 3d 66, 80 (Fla. 2018), or that cumulative misconduct

warrants more severe discipline, Fla. Bar v. Bosecker, 259 So. 3d

689, 699 (Fla. 2018).

     Therefore, we disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline

in both cases. Instead, we conclude that the totality of Schwartz’s

conduct in the two cases taken together, and when considering

Schwartz’s disciplinary history, warrants disbarment. See Fla. Bar

v. Dupee, 160 So. 3d 838, 853 (Fla. 2015) (“The purposes of

attorney discipline are: (1) to protect the public from unethical

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conduct without undue harshness towards the attorney; (2) to

punish misconduct while encouraging reformation and

rehabilitation; and (3) to deter other lawyers from engaging in

similar misconduct.”).

                           III. CONCLUSION

     Accordingly, Schwartz is hereby disbarred from the practice of

law in the State of Florida, effective immediately because he is

currently under suspension. Schwartz shall fully comply with Rule

Regulating The Florida Bar 3-5.1(h) and Rule Regulating The

Florida Bar 3-6.1, if applicable. Prior to seeking readmission,

Schwartz is further directed to comply with all other terms and

conditions of the report in case number SC2021-0484.

     Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

Jonathan Stephen Schwartz in the amount of $9,795.75, 7 for which

sum let execution issue.

     It is so ordered.

    7. The Bar’s costs include $7,507.50 in case number SC2021-
0484 and $2,288.25 in case number SC2019-0983.

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MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee,
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida, Jennifer R. Falcone, Bar Counsel, The Florida
Bar, Miami, Florida, and Rita Florez, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Miami, Florida; and Chris Altenbernd of Banker, Lopez Gassler
P.A., Tampa, Florida,

     for Complainant

Barry M. Wax of Law Offices of Barry M. Wax, Miami, Florida;
Benedict P. Kuehne of Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., Miami, Florida;
and Richard Baron of Baron, Breslin & Sarmiento, Miami, Florida,
     for Respondent

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