Court Opinion

ID: 9523391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:41:28.698715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:13.680394
License: Public Domain

Opinion Concurring in Result
Arterburn, C.J.
I do' not agree with the reasoning presented'in the'majority opinion. I feel the statute of 1941 *705having a two-year statute of limitation against actions for medical malpractice is unconstitutional on its face since it grants special privileges and immunities to the medical profession, were it to stand by itself. However, I find that in its application in relation to the other statutes in Indiana, it is not special legislation. The 1941 Act was passed to clarify the previous legislation on statutory limitations for personal injuries which was for two years. There was considerable confusion at the time as to whether or not the action of malpractice was brought in tort (with a two-year limitation) or in contract (with a six-year limitation). The 1941 Act which we are considering here merely clarified the existing confusion by providing for the two-year statute of limitation “whether brought in contract or in tort.” In view of this historical background, I would hold that although the Act of 1941 appears on its face to be in violation of the Indiana Constitutional provisions against special legislation, when viewed in its background and its purpose it merely placed malpractice acts within a statutory limitation of two years as in all cases in all actions “for injuries to person. ...” It thus gave medical malpractice acts no special consideration as to the statute of limitations over those of other personal injuries by other individuals. For that reason I found the Act not unconstitutional when viewed with existing statutes. It gives the medical profession no special privileges over those of other persons.
Considering the 1941 Act as merely amendatory, or clarifying the general statute of limitations on personal injuries, it, therefore, follows that the statute giving minors an extended time within which to file a cause of action for personal injuries is applicable to all the statutes alike including the 1941 Act. I would therefore reverse and remand as the majority opinion, but for different reasons.
Note. — Reported in 310 N. E. 2d 867.