Court Opinion

ID: 9474193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:50:22.747873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:57.106867
License: Public Domain

RICH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
I agree with the result reached on the patent issues but not with all that is said in doing so.
All I dissent from is the majority’s treatment of the § 43(a)1 aspect of this case, the “(f) Unfair Competition” section of its opinion.
The majority opinion, with an undue reliance on Rule 52(a) and failure to heed the evidence, creates a more persuasive case for plaintiff than even the plaintiff-drafted findings of fact by further highlighting selected highlights thereof. But those findings2 are fatally flawed as (1) in large part unsupported by, or even contrary to, the evidence in the case; (2) based on unsound legal principles; (3) contrary to the law of the Eleventh Circuit and the law of other circuits as adopted by the Eleventh Circuit and this circuit; (4) not a product of independent judicial thinking; and (5) to some extent self-contradictory.
I.
Three aspects of the law of this country are involved. The complaint contained two distinct and separate counts, one for patent infringement and one for “false designation of origin and false descriptions or representations arising under the Trademark Laws of the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),” which is § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (note 1, supra), the designation I shall use. Therefore, we are involved, firstly, with the patent laws which provide for time-limited rights to exclude others from making, using or selling inventions covered by patent claims. The patent here involved expires in less than 5 years. Secondly, we are involved with § 43(a) which deals basically with unfair competition, more particularly with competition which is unfair because it involves false designation of origin, false description, or false representation, terms which have been given broad interpretations where commercial unfairness is found. Protection against such unfair competition is not time-limited like patent rights. It is closely akin to the protection given trademarks and the courts apply the same principles. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 981, 219 USPQ 515, 528 (11th Cir.1983). Traders must not deceive or confuse purchasers about the origins of merchandise. The third aspect of the law, which is involved with and tempers both of the foregoing, is the underlying principle involved in antitrust law: competition in the marketplace is to be encouraged and to that end copying — even outright, deliberate copying — is permitted as beneficial to consumers except where it is forbidden by patent law or deemed “unfair” because it involves explicit or inherent falsification of some kind. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed.2d 661, 140 USPQ 524 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 84 S.Ct. 779, 11 L.Ed.2d 669, 140 USPQ 528 (1964).
It seems to me that the majority, like the district court, have completely forgotten or *1017overlooked the third aspect and have treated all copying done by defendant Pegasus — assuming there was copying — as though it were inherently wrong. They have also approved mixing up by the district court (though it is denied) of the distinct matters of legitimate patent right enforcement with unfair competition as though patent infringement by itself were a § 43(a) offense, which it is not, as the majority admit. Patent infringement is not false representation. The two counts of the complaint represented separate causes of action (over one of which we have exclusive appellate jurisdiction and over the other of which we do not). Each must be separately proved. In my opinion, after reading the entire trial transcript, appellee CPG did not prove its § 43(a) action, Count II, and it should have been dismissed.
II.
The applicable law on § 43(a) cases in the Eleventh Circuit is well, recently, and succinctly stated in John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., supra, 711 F.2d at 980, 219 USPQ at 528, as follows:
This court and the former Fifth Circuit have held that § 43(a) creates a federal cause of action for trade dress infringement. [Cases cited.]
“Trade dress” involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d at 831 (“adoption procedures used by [plaintiff] in the sale of its dolls qualify as protectable trade dress”); SK & F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 481 F.Supp. 1184, 1187 [D.C.N.J.] (stating that “[t]rade dress is a complex composite of features” including, inter alia, size, col- or, texture, and graphics, which must “be considered together, not separately”), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.1980); 1 J.T. McCarthy, supra, § 8.1, at 230-31.
Most trade dress infringement actions involve the packaging or labeling of goods. [Cases cited.] Recently, however, courts have recognized that the design of a product itself may constitute protectable trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.1981) (distinctive color and symbols on toy car protected under § 43(a)); Harlequin Enterprises Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.1981) (distinctive book covers protected against trade dress infringement); Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.) (unique exterior design of twin hopper bottomed grain semi-trailer protected under § 43(a)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, 97 S.Ct. 164, 50 L.Ed.2d 139 (1976).
In order to prevail on a claim for trade dress infringement under § 43(a), plaintiff must prove three basic things: “[T]hat the trade dress of the two products is confusingly similar, that the features of the trade dress are primarily non-functional, and that the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning.” Black & Decker Co. v. Everready Appliance Manufacturing Co., 518 F.Supp. 607, 616 (E.D.Mo.1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir.1982); accord, Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 772-73 (9th Cir.1981); SK & F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir.1980); Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d at 1217-21.
With respect to this statement of the law, I point out that it is not peculiar to the Eleventh Circuit, which, as is apparent, has gleaned its authorities from several other circuits and that the law in this circuit is no different. It is pretty much the same everywhere. Next, I would like to emphasize something that the trial court apparently failed to understand; similarities between two products with respect to such things as size, shape, color, texture, and sales techniques is not necessarily enough per se to make out a case of “trade dress” infringement under § 43(a). One or more of these things may be common to the trade. Under that statute there must be *1018something in the nature of unfairness or falsification, or evidence of an intent to mislead or cause confusion as to origin. I find no evidence of intent in this case and when challenged with its absence, appellee has had nothing to say. The trial court merely inferred intent. The finding of intent is clearly erroneous.
Finally, I return to and emphasize the last paragraph quoted above which states the three basic things a plaintiff such as CPG must establish to prove a claim under § 43(a): confusing similarity, non-functionality of the features in common relied on, and the existence of secondary meaning in the purloined features or combination of features relied on in the plaintiffs product, which means that those features by themselves have trademark (origin indicating) significance in the minds of the public. No evidence was produced by CPG to show either secondary meaning or likelihood of confusion, two necessary elements of its case.
CPG’s brief in this court on the § 43(a) issue consists of only 4 pages devoted solely to the single contention that it is not necessary to show secondary meaning, which clearly indicates CPG’s awareness of the absence of any evidence on that matter. Assuming, arguendo, that that contention is correct, there is still no evidence of likelihood of confusion. The evidence shows only certain common features, and that brings me to the question of the effect of those common features on the viewer and the equally important questions of Pegasus’ right to copy them, or use them regardless of copying, and whether it did in fact copy them.
III.
In order to comprehend a discussion of the copying question, one must have a visual impression of what the luggage in this case looks like, to which end I annex to this opinion copies of plaintiff's exhibits 16 and 31. Ex. 16 shows the LARK PERMAMATIC luggage made by the Lark Division of CPG (now owned by General Mills, Inc.). Ex. 31 shows the Pegasus case. Suitcases of this type are known in the trade as “packing cases.”
Pegasus is no fly-by-night “knock off” artist; it is as substantial as Lark and the two companies are apparently steady competitors. Pegasus is not interested in having purchasers think its luggage is Lark’s. Its annual gross approaches $8 million and Seymor Friedman, its president, was elected president of The Luggage and Leather Goods Manufacturers Association. Pegasus employs 250 people in its factory in Florida. It has advertised on prime time TV. Lark makes the more expensive line of cases. If it comes out with a successful line, there is no reason in the law of this country why Pegasus should not try for its share of the market, subject to the limitations I have mentioned above — so long as it avoids patent infringement (which it has not done here) and so long as it does not conduct its business so as to mislead the purchasing public by some falsification as to whose merchandise it is buying. These are two utterly different matters and my point is that, even though Pegasus may have done some copying, the evidence in this case does not show it has done more than it is entitled to do within the principles of § 43(a) and the case law developed thereunder. Granted that Pegasus is liable for patent infringement, all I am discussing is whether it is separately liable for unfair competition within the meaning of § 43(a). Patent infringement is not unfair competition in that sense. I will dispose of that point first.
The ordinary purchaser cannot tell by looking at either packing case whether or not it contains the Pelavin patented invention. The invention is invisibly contained in the structure of the case. It has no more effect on appearance than the rustproofing on the bottom of a new car has on the appearance of the car. Callman, the trademark authority, in his "Unfair Competition and Monopolies,” § 4.57, page 81, says:
Where a plaintiff-competitor pleads both patent infringement and unfair competition, the courts have properly held, when the acts are identical, that the *1019cause of action for unfair competition must be dismissed. [Citing 6 cases.]
In other words, patent infringement is not, in itself, also unfair competition. The trial court, now with majority approval, treated it as though it were. That is an undesirable innovation in the law.
Now I call attention to the illustrations in the annexed exhibits. Names are the most obvious indications of origin and Ex. 16 shows a hang-tag or key-chain tag bearing the name LARK hanging from the handle. The evidence is that Pegasus also used fabric hang-tags with its flying-horse logo and name on them, and stamps PEGASUS with a hot die on the front of the case. Its origin-indicators also appear inside the case, which a purchaser would surely examine before buying this expensive item. There is no false representation here.
The other possible distinguishing feature of LARK luggage is what the witnesses referred to as the “Gucci stripe” common to the Lark line — a wide band of material with three stripes having the colors of the Italian flag, disposed vertically on the top or front face of the case in line with the handle. Both parties and the trial court have treated the stripe as a trademark, which means that it indicates LARK as the origin. No such stripe or any similar feature is used on Pegasus’ cases, and the trial court so held (finding J-l).
Aside from the names, which differ, and the stripe, used by LARK but not by Pegasus, what else is there on which to base a claim of false indication or origin or unfair immitation. As Gertrude Stein would have said, “A suitcase is a suitcase is a suitcase.” What color would you have? Black nylon with tan leather or vinyl trim? Anyone in the luggage business is free to select and sell such a combination. Several do. Mr. Pelavin, inventor of the patent-in-suit, a former owner of LARK, instigator of the suit, and principal fact witness for CPG, conceded that many firms were losing the same colors, saying “you can’t obtain protection from using a color.” Indeed, it is foolish even to think of color as an indication of origin in this case, in combination with other features or by itself, when both parties offer their luggage in a variety of colors. But the trial court did. There is no justification for the reference in Finding of Fact J-4 to “LARK’s color.” Which color? Lark has no proprietary col- or, the evidence from Lark’s founder being that other manufacturers use the same various colors.
The trial judge, in finding J-l, refers to “trim and shape of trim.” The only trim I can see that has shape, other than straight lines applied around obvious margins where trim is normally used on luggage, are the four corner reinforcements, and the corner reinforcements are definitely of different shapes. The shape in Pegasus is clear from the picture. LARK’s, which is not so clear, differs in having a convex curve in the middle whereas Pegasus has a concave curve; just the opposite. How could this confuse purchasers as to origin?
All that is left is the handles. As may be seen, they differ markedly. LARK has rectangular lines, Pegasus curved. Luggage, specifically packing cases, like cars, has a way of looking very much alike regardless of who makes it. Each type is bound to have many features in common. But does anyone really have much trouble telling a Buick from a Cadillac? LARK fancies itself the Cadillac of the field here involved. Is Pegasus, as the Buick in the business, to be prevented from making a bag with many similar appearance features? If so, why? Isn’t that the way competitive merchandising is customarily done? Isn’t that what the public wants and has a right to?
In my judgment, the findings of fact, essentially written by Lark’s counsel for and adopted by the trial judge on the Count II § 43(a) Unfair Competition issue are totally unjustified by the record in this case and are clearly erroneous. So are the conclusions of law on that issue, also essentially drafted by Lark’s counsel, being based as they are on clearly erroneous fact findings and unsound legal principles.
*1020IV.
The aspect of this case that perhaps concerns roe most is that the trial judge used the patent infringement as a primary aspect of its § 43(a) unfair competition case, notwithstanding the majority’s effort at denying it. This is clear from the emphasized portions of Findings of Fact J-2 and J-4 (all emphasis mine):
2. By reason of LARK’s patent rights the utilitarian feature of crushable, deformable, light weight luggage is unique to the LARK PERMAMATIC construction. Thus, when coupled with the non-functional features of the PERMAMATIC construction, PEGASUS intended to and, in fact, is likely to confuse the public about the origin of PEGASUS' luggage construction by adopting all of the design embellishments of LARK’s PERMAMATIC luggage. (Pelavin Tr., 109).
4. PEGASUS[’] use of LARK’s color and trim in combination with its copying of LARK’s unique functional concept creates a medium for confusion and may cause a consumer to be subjected to others claiming that they can obtain the PERMAMATIC luggage by another name through other outlets at a cheaper price.
Finding 2 is a verbatim copy of LARK’s proposal omitting only three “R-in-a-circle” symbols appended to PERMAMATIC. Finding 4 was in substance proposed by LARK. The changes made were: (1) “col- or and trim” for “ornamental emblishment [sic]”; (2) “may cause a consumer” for “will cause the public”; and (3) omission of one symbol as in finding 2. The second half of finding 4, upon analysis, is truly gibberish. I know from the record and arguments therein that the “others claiming” refers to retail salesmen having no connection with Pegasus; but how they would persuade a customer that a packing case sold under the name PEGASUS is really a LARK PERMAMATIC case escapes me. So does the meaning of “other outlets.” That Pegasus cases sell for less than LARK cases is not in dispute and is a fact in which purchasers are much interested. Perhaps it is trying to say one can enjoy all the advantages of a LARK PERMAMATIC case for less money by buying a PEGASUS case, but I have never heard that this is either false or misleading as to the origin of the merchandise or within the purview of § 43(a).
Conclusion of Law “E. Unfair Competition,” paragraph 1, in pertinent part, reads:
1. The PEGASUS 1700 Series has copied not only the utilitarian features described and claimed in the suit patent, but also the non-functional features of the PERMAMATIC construction. Such copying is likely to confuse the public about the origin of the PEGASUS luggage construction by adopting all of the design embellishments of LARK’S PERMAMATIC luggage. The essential element of an action under § 43(a) is proof by the plaintiff that the alleged infringement [patent or trademark?] by the defendant creates a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers as to the source of the goods. [Emphasis and bracketed insertion mine.]
This conclusion is LARK’s proposal with only the following insubstantial changes: (1) a comma in line 1; (2) “is likely” for “was intended" in line 5; (3) omission of two “R-in-a-circle” symbols. I have omitted at the end a citation to the Original Appalachian Artworks case.
I am unwilling to lend my name to the approval of such a jumble of patent and unfair competition law, and I am surprised to find the majority doing so. That was, however, the theory on which the plaintiff, CPG, proceeded and argued to the trial judge. In response to Pegasus' motion for a “directed verdict” (this is not a jury case) on Count II, § 43(a) Unfair Competition, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the argument ran as follows:
[T]his piece of [Pegasus] luggage here is basically a copy of the heart and soul of the Pelavin invention____ So what we have is we have a copy of the utilitarian features that lead to the Count I of the complaint, namely, patent infringement.
*1021There’s been wholesale copying of every substantive feature in the Permamatic case in this case. But did Pegasus stop at that? Your Honor, what they have done in addition to that, and I believe that the factual witnesses pointed that out is the color. The color per se is not unique to Lark. The trim per se is not unique to Lark. The particular zipper valance perhaps is unique to Lark____ But the point is that they have started out with the utilitarian structure that is virtually the heart and soul copy of the Pelavin invention contribution. And then they have compounded that injury by creating a medium for confusion.
That seems to be the point in the case where the patent infringement got tied, in the court’s mind, to the unfair competition issue. The majority tacitly approves of this. I do not. Nor do I attribute this line of reasoning to the trial judge; he was merely persuaded to adopt it, ready made. The reasoning was and is CPG’s. The record provides strong evidence of this. Before the trial started, the judge had wanted to know what counsel were going to do about providing him with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, indicating he liked to have them before trial. Plaintiff’s counsel said he was accustomed in patent cases to providing them after the trial, rather than before. After hearing arguments at mid-trial from both sides on the defendant’s motion for a “directed verdict” on Count II, § 43(a), mentioned above, and receiving a short memo, the court reserved decision overnight “until such time as I have made myself familiar with the cases that were cited ... in light of the fact that I am not as fully familiar with the cases that were cited as I would like to be____” Next morning both parties presented further argument and the judge denied the motion. The case then proceeded to its termination with defendant’s evidence, concluded the same day.
During the closing argument by counsel for Pegasus on the Lanham Act § 43(a) issue, he was trying to make the point that there was no likelihood of confusion of purchasers as to origin by reason of the distinctly different identifications on the luggage of both parties, particularly the names and the LARK stripe, when the trial judge took him off on an entirely irrelevant detour:
THE COURT: —the fact that a customer might look at that luggage and not be confused as you suggest, does that stop one who is vending these items from bearing out some similarities and as a far example saying that this Lark Luggage costs a whole wheel of a lot more than this other luggage, let me show you this piece over here. What happens then? Is the likelihood of confusion there or can you distinguish this?
MR. FRIEDMAN [defense counsel]: You’re saying the individual salesman who then works in the department store?
THE COURT: Yes. I go to Sears to buy a $99 television that they advertised. I got there and the guy showed me the $285 television and why I should buy it. My understanding is if anybody ever bought the $99 one he would lose his job.
After this irrelevant example of typical “bait-and-switch” merchandising tactics, which have no bearing whatever on a § 43(a) issue or any other aspect of this case, counsel tried to explain to the judge that if such tactics were applied it would result in the customer buying LARK luggage because it is the more expensive make, not Pegasus. The court persisted:
THE COURT: I’ll let you paint with that brush. But I have seen it a lot of different ways. Let me show you this dress over here, it is not one of those designer dresses but, you know, I’m a regular customer, I’m your buddy. Well, it is probably not important.
MR. FRIEDMAN: ... I can only say when the consumer sees a piece of luggage and that has as many differences as Pegasus versus the Lark, particularly with the Gucci stripe and particularly with the direct identification, it is pretty hard to say that Pegasus is not Pegasus or Lark is not Lark____ That is the key, *1022Your Honor, I think. And not to say that, don’t buy Lark, buy Pegasus, or don’t buy Pegasus buy Lark—
THE COURT: That’s not my understanding of the law.
Counsel then concluded his argument with a statement that plaintiff had not sustained its burden of proving likelihood of confusion, pointing to the evidence of the many identifying differences between the packing cases, mentioning the extensive advertising of Pegasus luggage under its own name featuring its flying horse trademark, and concluded that there was little likelihood of confusion. The judge then concluded with these views which shed much light on his understanding of the issues (all emphasis mine):
THE COURT: If it was left to one thing, but it is not left to one thing, and I’m not being predisposed because I really do not know just yet until I hear from you all. You see it wouldn’t be just actual confusion by itself. It has to do with whatever that likelihood is. And that case I was telling you teaches that. [Original Appalachian Artworks case.] It’s the likelihood of confusion that is the touchstone of patent infringement. And it talks in terms of similarity of design, similarity of product, similarity of retail outlets, even when you talk in terms of them utilizing the same kind of thing. But that’s another day. I just am trying to learn, that’s all.
Plaintiff’s counsel then made his closing argument on the patent aspects of the case and co-counsel rose to state that he would say nothing on the unfair competition count.
In due course, counsel on each side submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and plaintiff’s submissions, as I discussed above, were essentially adopted by the court. The trial judge never wrote an opinion of any kind on any subject.
Under the circumstances of this all too prevalent practice (albeit forced on the courts by impossible workloads in many instances) of adopting highly partisan, counsel-drafted findings and conclusions, it behooves this court to at least consider them realistically for what they are and view them with a modicum of skepticism and caution.
V.
The majority opinion, as I read it, seems to sanction combining the utilitarian with the non-functional features such as color, trim, and shape of trim to make out a case of § 43(a) trade dress falsification which would mislead the public as to origin, and to find intent to do so as well.
Under the law as I know it, functional or utilitarian features of a structure are incapable of having trademark significance. In re Deister, 289 F.2d 496, 129 USPQ 314 (CCPA 1961), and cases following it, too numerous to mention. Trademark significance means, simply, indicating origin or sponsorship. The trial court’s findings rest primarily on the utilitarian features, contrary to that law.
I have carefully studied the Harland case, relied on by the majority, from which I have quoted earlier herein. There is nothing in that opinion to support what has been done here. In fact, the court in Harland made clear, as shown earlier herein, that “the second requirement for a trade dress infringement action” is “demonstrating that any features of the trade dress ... are ‘primarily non-functional’.” Harland was a jury case. The trade dress infringement issue went to the jury. The court said “functionality has been consistently treated as a question of fact.” Therefore, the court held that it had to affirm the jury’s verdict of trade-dress infringement if it was based on substantial evidence and the instructions were correct, as they were found to be. The trial judge had charged the jury that “the fact that the defendant utilizes functional features ... that are similar or even identical in some respects to functional features on plaintiff's ... product does not and cannot constitute unfair competition.” He next charged that to establish its claim for trade dress infringe*1023ment, “plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, (1), the design aspects or trade dress of Harland’s ... product are primarily nonfunctional.” (My emphasis.) He reiterated that statement no less than three times and then told the jury it had to determine whether the trade dress of Harland’s product had acquired a secondary meaning. Nowhere did the trial judge or the Eleventh Circuit intimate that the presence of functional features such as a patented invention (a patent on a feature proving that it is at least prima facie functional, Deister, supra) can be “coupled” with non-functional features to create an infringing “total image.” That unsound concept of law cannot be found in Harland.
The other Eleventh Circuit case cited by the majority is Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., supra, decided before and approved in Harland. Like Harland, it is no support for what was done here. Its trade dress aspects rest on the same basic legal principle that has not been complied with here, stated by the court as follows: “The essential element of an action under § 43(a) is proof by the plaintiff that the alleged infringement by the defendant creates a likelihood of confusion on the part of consumers as to the source of the goods.” The “trade dress” situation there was unique and consisted of a merchandising scheme or sales technique devised by the plaintiff in connection with the sale of “soft-sculpture” dolls. Each doll was sold with “adoption papers” and a birth certificate. On the anniversary of sale, a birthday card was sent to the doll’s purchaser. The buyer executed an “oath of adoption” and the doll received a personal name. Each doll’s buttock was signed with a source indicator. Defendant appropriated this whole scheme, making only enough minor changes to provide something to argue about. The court of appeals held that the trial court’s finding of infringement of “trade dress” which would create customer confusion, being a fact finding, was not clearly erroneous. There had, moreover, been evidence of actual confusion, as there had been in Harland, which the court said was the best evidence of likelihood of confusion. There is no such evidence in this case. Most significantly, nothing in the case justifies the “coupling” of patent infringement with respect to purely functional or “utilitarian” features with non-functional features to sustain a holding of unfair competition.
The majority seems not to appreciate that its handling of the foregoing points completely unravels the district court’s (i.e., LARK’s) rationale in support of its holding of § 43(a) unfair competition. The majority says, in agreement with me, that patent infringement is “not the unfair competition envisaged in § 43(a),” that Pegasus is “not precluded from using black as a color, or tan leather trim, or a wide variety of shapes of trim.” But the district court rested its decision of § 43(a) unfair competition on the combination of those very things: “LARK’s color and trim in combination with its copying of LARK’s unique functional concept” (finding J-4). The latter element it explained in finding J-2, first sentence, reading: “By reason of LARK’s patent rights the utilitarian feature of erushable, deformable, light weight luggage is unique to the LARK PERMAMATIC construction.” (My emphasis). It certainly treated the invention as an essential element of § 43(a) unfair competition whether or not the majority would do so. See conclusion E-l, supra.
VI.
I forego any extended discussion of the injunction, paragraph “9” of the court’s Dec. 14, 1983, Order, except to say there is nothing “carefully tailored” about it. I shall let the reader look at the injunction and at Plaintiff’s Exhibit 21 and draw his own conclusions. If there are any reasonable limitations, they are to be found only in the majority opinion, which I find inconsistent with the injunction as written.
One last point. The injunction is permanent. It is based in major part on the flaw inherent in the findings of fact, namely, utilizing the patent infringement as a ma*1024jor element of the § 43(a) decision. The patent will expire on May 1, 1990. Will the injunction based on unfair competition continue thereafter? Will Pegasus ever be able to make a packing case which “looks similar” to the 1700 Series?

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision on Count II, the alleged unfair competition or § 43(a) issue.
*1025APPENDIX

*1026LUGGAGE SERIES

[PEGASUS]
Packing Cases of industrial nylon, trimmed in leather. These cases are specially designed with reflex support material so they always resume their former shape. Steel core center handle, removable, plastic lined inside pocket and tie tapes.
Black or Bronze with Tan Leather Trim
1722 W-7”, H-13", L-22”
1724 W-7”, H-16", L-24”
172(6 W-7" H-16" 1.-26”

. The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 USC 1125(a), the relevant provision of which reads as follows:
Any person who shall ... use in connection with any goods ... a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending fabely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, ... shall be liable to a civil action by any person ... who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such fabe description or representation. [Emphasis mine.]

. On the § 43(a) issue there are only four fact findings, designated "J. 1-4” which are to be found in 221 USPQ at 776. The three corresponding conclusions of law are "E. 1-3,” 221 USPQ at 780-81.