Court Opinion

ID: 9772351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:08.617318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:10.723937
License: Public Domain

J-S11032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 IMTIAZ CHAUDHRY                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
              v.                         :
                                         :
 JOHN J. HUNT, III, JOHN DOE,            :
 UNKNOWN OCCUPANT                        :
                                         :
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: JOHN J. HUNT, III            :        No. 2612 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 30, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
                    Civil Division at No(s): 2021-03098

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

     Appellant, John J. Hunt, III, appeals pro se from the judgment entered

in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which granted immediate

possession of property to Appellee, Imtiaz Chaudhry. We affirm.

     The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

appeal as follows:

        On April 26, 2021, Appellee filed an amended complaint
        against Appellant and unknown occupants at the property
        to obtain possession of the land following a foreclosure
        action in which the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale on
        June 26, 2019 to U.S. Bank, National Association, who gave
        title to Appellee on November 10, 2020. Appellant has
        continued to occupy the property since the sheriff’s sale
        without permission of the owner.       The counts in the
        amended complaint were for ejectment, trespass and rent
        and mesne profits. [On February 2, 2022, Appellee filed a
        motion for summary judgment.         Appellant responded,
        opposing the motion, on February 6, 2022.] On May 12,
        2022, [the] court granted Appellee’s motion for summary
        judgment as to count 1, ejectment, and count II, trespass,
J-S11032-23

        but denied it as to count III, rent and mesne profits. No
        appeal was taken from this order.

        On July 5, 2022, [the] court scheduled argument to address
        count III for August 3, 2022. Appellant failed to appear at
        the scheduled court date and [the] court relisted this matter
        for a hearing on September 13, 2022. Appellant failed to
        appear at the hearing despite being served with the order.
        Appellee orally motioned to dismiss count III[. The trial
        court granted the motion] and further ordered immediate
        possession of the property to [Appellee].

        On September 1[9], 2022, Appellant filed a motion to strike
        the judgment for possession of the premises. [The c]ourt
        treated the motion as a notice of appeal … and directed
        Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained
        of on appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within
        twenty-one (21) days. On September 30, 2022, Appellee
        filed [a] praecipe for judgment in ejectment and praecipe
        for writ of possession. On October 2, 2022, Appellant filed
        a notice of appeal and a motion to strike the writ of
        possession and impose supersedeas on appeal. On October
        4, 2022, Appellant filed a timely statement of matters
        complained of on appeal.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/17/22, at 1-2) (unnecessary capitalization

omitted).

     Appellant raises the following four issues on appeal:

        I. Does Pa.R.C.P. 227.4 allow the Prothonotary to enter
        “Summary Judgment as a matter of Legal Opinion” or
        “Summary Verdict” into Final Judgment under the rule of
        procedure, leading to the issuance of Writ to the Sheriff?

        II. Will “Summary Judgment as Matter of Law” determine
        the verdict or the jurisdiction? Is the Defendant required to
        rebut the Plaintiff, or is the Plaintiff required to prove their
        complaint to the fact finder under Art 1. Pa. Const.?

        III. Did jurisdiction fail under Pa.R.C.P. 1054(b) when the
        amended complaint failed to “abstract the title back to
        common source of possession” within 21 years, and

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         moreover failed to raise any claim in Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)?

         IV. Does the action of ejectment being in the nature of
         “equitable bill to redeem” by settled precedent run to our
         counterclaim under Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(4), where the trial
         court must impose a constructive trust or similar remedy?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6-7).

      Preliminarily, it is well settled that “Rule 1925 is a crucial component of

the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on

those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v. Epstein, 866

A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S.Ct. 1048,

163 L.Ed.2d 858 (2006). “The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling

or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify

all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii).

         This Court has considered the question of what constitutes
         a sufficient [concise] statement on many occasions, and it
         is well-established that [an a]ppellant’s concise statement
         must properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal.
         The [concise] statement must be specific enough for the
         trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant
         wishes to raise on appeal. Further, this Court may find
         waiver where a concise statement is too vague. When a
         court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing,
         that is not enough for meaningful review. A [c]oncise
         [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to identify
         the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no
         [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court decided that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement

was “incoherent and vague as to legal error.” (Trial Court Opinion at 7). The

court explained:

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          Appellant fails to specifically identify how [the court]
          committed an error of law, erred in interpreting the law,
          and/or failed to apply the appropriate standard of review.
          Therefore the issues must be deemed waived because they
          are too vague to enable this Court to satisfy its obligation
          under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) to prepare an opinion addressing
          them.

(Id. at 8).1    We agree with the trial court’s analysis that Appellant’s Rule

1925(b) statement was insufficient to permit the trial court to identify the

issues Appellant sought to raise on appeal. Appellant’s appellate issues are

waived on this basis. See In re A.B., supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Judgment affirmed.

       Judge McLaughlin joins this memorandum.

       Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

____________________________________________

1 Notwithstanding its waiver analysis, the court provided reasons for its ruling,

explaining that it granted Appellee’s request to dismiss count III after
Appellant twice failed to appear at court proceedings to address that count
and Appellee orally motioned to dismiss it. The court further opined that there
was no error of law in granting Appellee’s request to dismiss count III, and
because there were no matters pending before the court it was appropriate to
grant Appellee immediate possession of the property. (Id.)

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