Court Opinion

ID: 9555344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 18:06:32.090552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:24.859191
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/11/23 P. v. Charles CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061784

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 94NF2611)

 EDWARD CHARLES III,                                                   OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              Defendant Edward Charles III filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
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former Penal Code section 1170.95. At the prima facie hearing on the petition, the trial
court found Charles ineligible for relief as a matter of law and denied the petition.
Appointed appellate counsel for Charles filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case. Appellate counsel also asked this court
to conduct an independent review of the record. Charles was provided an opportunity to
file a supplemental brief but did not do so.
              Exercising our discretion, we have examined the entire record and we find
no reasonably arguable issue. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 232.) We
therefore affirm.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
              In 1996, a jury found Charles guilty of one count of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 2) and two counts of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a);
counts 1 and 3). The jury also found true the multiple murder special circumstance (§
190.2, subd. (a)(3)). Charles was sentenced to death on January 15, 1999. On direct
appeal to the California Supreme Court, the judgment was affirmed. (People v. Charles
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 308.)
              In April 2022, Charles filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. Counsel was subsequently appointed at his request. The People filed a response
to the petition arguing it should be denied and counsel for Charles filed a brief in support
of the petition. At the prima facie hearing on the petition, both parties submitted on their
briefs. After a consideration of the briefs and the record of conviction, the trial court

1
  Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6,
with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the statute as section
1172.6. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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found Charles had failed to establish a prima facie showing for relief. A statement of
decision was later issued by the trial court. Charles appealed.

                                        DISCUSSION
              Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder ‘“to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate
Bill No. 1437 also created procedures “for convicted murderers who could not be
convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, at p. 957.)
              After receipt of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition, counsel shall be
appointed upon petitioner’s request; the prosecutor must then file a response to the
petition, and a reply may be filed by the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(1)-(3) & (c).)
The trial court shall then “hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief.” (Id., subd. (c).)
              At the prima facie hearing, the trial court may rely on the record of
conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–971.) “The record of conviction will
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under [former] section 1170.95,
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.) Instructions given to the jury at a petitioner’s trial may be
relied on by the trial court as part of the record of conviction at the prima facie hearing.
(People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055.) “It is only where the record of
conviction establishes the petition lacks merit as a matter of law that the court may deny
the petition without a hearing. [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566,
576.)

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              Here, the trial court considered the jury instructions and verdict forms,
specifically noting Charles “was charged and tried alone for three murders.” The jury
was instructed on “express malice, making it clear that the People proceeded solely on a
theory that [Charles] was the actual killer.” The jury was not instructed on “the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, nor is there any other reference to a theory in which
malice could have been imputed to [Charles] solely based on his participation in the
offense.” The trial court concluded: “As such, the jury instructions and the jury’s
corresponding findings necessarily mean that the jury found [Charles] was the actual
perpetrator who harbored specific intent to kill.” Since the record of conviction
established Charles was not convicted under a vicarious liability theory, relief was
properly denied by the trial court.

              After an independent review of the entire appellate record, we find no
arguable issues. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying Charles
postjudgment relief.

                                      DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order denying the resentencing petition is affirmed.

                                                 MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, P.J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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