Court Opinion

ID: 998900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:17:47.286429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:21.274480
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                       No. 98-4761

HERBERT SAMUEL CHRISTENSEN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
C. Weston Houck, Chief District Judge.
(CR-98-238)

Submitted: May 28, 1999

Decided: June 11, 1999

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

John D. Elliott, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene
Josey, United States Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Herbert Samuel Christensen, Jr., of being a felon
in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1)
(1994). On appeal, Christensen challenges the district court's decision
to sentence him as an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (1994) and USSG § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B).1 Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.

The basic facts of this case are undisputed. Christensen, who
admits to being a convicted felon, was arrested after he discharged a
firearm at a motel while intoxicated. Under the statute, a person is
considered an armed career criminal if the present conviction is for
a violation of § 922(g) and he has at least three prior convictions for
a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, which were com-
mitted on different occasions. See 18 U.S.C.§ 924(e).

In the present case, the district court found that Christensen had
seven qualifying convictions, which consisted of four convictions by
South Carolina state courts for burglary, housebreaking, grand lar-
ceny, and escape and three convictions by Nebraska state courts for
escape. Christensen challenges the inclusion of three of the South
Carolina convictions and the Nebraska convictions in determining his
status as an armed career criminal. Specifically, Christensen alleges
that his South Carolina convictions should not be considered because
they were found to be constitutionally defective on habeas review by
a federal district court in Nebraska. He further alleges that his escape
convictions should not be considered because under Nebraska law
they were not violent offenses.

Because the underlying facts are undisputed, we review the district
court's decision to sentence Christensen as an armed career criminal
de novo. See United States v. Daughtrey , 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir.
1989). Christensen's claim concerning the inclusion of his Nebraska
escape convictions were resolved against him in United States v.
_________________________________________________________________

1 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1997).

                     2
Hairston, 71 F.3d 115, 117-18 (4th Cir. 1995), in which we applied
the statutory definition of "violent felony" and found that the offense
of escape, by its very nature, "involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another." 2 Because we find that the
district court properly considered the Nebraska convictions and
because these convictions were sufficient to support the court's deci-
sion to sentence Christensen as an armed career criminal, we decline
to address Christensen's claim concerning the inclusion of his prior
South Carolina convictions.

Accordingly, we affirm Christensen's conviction and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).

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