Court Opinion

ID: 9527242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:28:48.605243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:39.398658
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Appellants contend that Equity Rule 62 governs procedure on applications for rehearing in equity; that Rule 62 differs from and is in conflict with § 119, Title 13, with respect to the necessity for successive orders of continuance of an application for rehearing; that Rule 62 must prevail over § 119 under the reasoning in Faust v. Paramore, 272 Ala. 19, 127 So.2d 832; and, therefore, that we are in error in holding on original deliverance that the applications for rehearing had been discontinued and that the trial court erred in rendering the decree on rehearing which modified the original final decree.
Appellants appear to recognize that under § 119, in cases at law, motions to set aside the judgment or grant a new trial will become discontinued unless successive orders of continuance are regularly made. *486Appellants say this is not the correct interpretation of Equity Rule 62 in connection with Rule 65.
In § 119, it is required that the motion he filed, called to the attention of the court, and an order entered continuing the motion for hearing to a future day.
Rule 62 requires that a party desiring a rehearing must file application, present same to the judge, that the judge may grant or overrule the application, or modify the decree, or set the same down for hearing, and, “In any event, the judge must enter an order or decree setting forth his ruling.”
The trial judge in.the instant case made an order setting the applications down for hearing.
We can find no conflict between rule and statute with respect to successive orders of continuance of the application. If appellants be correct in saying that successive orders of continuance are not necessary, then, in equity, a judge could set down an application for rehearing for a specific day, or for no day at all, and, without more, at some unspecified future day, months or years later, render a decree on rehearing modifying the former final decree.
Equity Rule 62 modifies in some respects its predecessor, old Rule 81. The late Judge Creel, who is recognized as an able authority on equity procedure, wrote concerning Rule 62 as follows:
“ . . . . This rule changes and clarifies to a large degree the procedure on such application and is a decided improvement over our old uncertain practice.” (1 Alabama Lawyer at page 33)
To follow the construction contended for by appellants would restore uncertainty and indefiniteness to Rule 62 with respect to procedure on applications for rehearing. We have found no authority which controls the construction of Rule 62 on the point here under consideration. We are of opinion that the correct construction requires successive orders of continuance and that we should adhere to our original holding.
Opinion extended.
Application for rehearing overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.