Court Opinion

ID: 8980663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 11:19:27.423833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:10:39.369632
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Powell join, concurring in the judgment.
Since March 1, 1875, the criminal laws of the United States have contained a proscription to the following effect:
“No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude . . . .”
By this unambiguous provision, now contained in 18 U. S. C. § 243, Congress put cases involving exclusions *506from jury service on grounds of race in a class, by themselves. “For us the majestic generalities of thé Fourteenth Amendment are thus reduced to a concrete statutory command when cases involve race or color which is wanting in every other case of alleged discrimination.” Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 282-283 (1947).
The consequence is that where jury commissioners disqualify citizens on the grounds of racé, they fail “to perform their constitutional duty — recognized by § 4 of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875 . . . and fully established since the decision in 1881 of Neal v. Delaware . . . not to pursue a course of conduct in the administration of their office which would operate to discriminate in the selection of jurors on racial grounds.” Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 (1942). Thus, “no State is at liberty to impose upon one charged with crime a discrimination in its trial procedure which the Constitution, and an Act of Congress passed pursuant to the Constitution, alike forbid .... [I]t is our duty as well as the State’s to see to it that throughout the procedure for bringing him to justice he shall enjoy the protection which the Constitution guarantees. Where, as in this case, timely objection has laid bare' a discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, the conviction cannot stand, because the Constitution prohibits the procedure by which it was obtained.” Id., at 406.
It is true that the defendant in Hill was a Negro and petitioner here is a white man. It is also true that there is no case in this Court-setting aside a conviction for arbitrary exclusions of a class of citizens from jury service where the defendant was not a member of the excluded class. I also recognize that, as in this case, the courts of appeals reflecting the generally accepted constitutional view, have rejected claims such as petitioner presents here. For me, however, the rationale and operative language of Hill v. Texas suggest a broader *507sweep; and I would implement the strong statutory policy of § 243, which reflects the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment with racial discrimination, by permitting petitioner to challenge his conviction on the grounds that Negroes were arbitrarily excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. This is the better view, and it is time that we now recognized it in this case and as the standard governing criminal proceedings instituted hereafter. Hence, I join the judgment of the Court.