Court Opinion

ID: 9443678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:27:11.557151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:34.094884
License: Public Domain

HOLMES, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
The pertinent policy provisions are (1) that death must have “resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external violent and accidental means,” and (2) in the next paragraph, that death must not have resulted “directly or indirectly from illness or disease, or from any bacterial infection other than bacterial infection occurring in consequence of accidental and external bodily injury.” The first is broader than the second, and impliedly includes the second under the maxim that the greater includes the less. The first includes the second because it includes death that resulted directly from bodily injury and “independently of all other causes”; therefore independently of illness, disease, or any bacterial infection except such occurring in consequence of such bodily injury.
The first provision above quoted is in substance the same as in the policy before the-court in U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548, 87 So. 115, 15 A.L.R. 605, wherein the court said:
“Does the provision .of the policy - ‘the effects resulting directly and exclusively of all other causes from bodily injury sustained during the life of this policy solely through accidental means’ mean that there can be no recovery if there is a latent or dormant disease which becomes active through the agency of the accident, and co-operates with the other effects of the accident in bringing about death?
“We think that, if the accident is the proximate cause of the death and sets in motion or starts a latent or dormant disease, and such disease merely con-tributés to the death after being so precipitated by the accident, it is not a proximate cause of the death nor a contributing cause within the meaning of the terms of the policy.” 124 Miss, at page 572, 87 So. at page 119.
*189In case of doubt or ambiguity in the language of an insurance policy, that interpretation should be given which favors the insured rather than the insurer. An injury that might naturally produce death to a person of a certain age or state of health is the cause of his death, if he dies by reason of it, even if he would not have died if his age or previous health had been different. There are a number of cases which hold to the contrary, says the Mississippi Supreme Court, but it thinks the Hood case adopts the true rule. The opinion in that case shows that the Mississippi court aligned itself with those jurisdictions which apply the rule of proximate cause to insurance policies.
The Mississippi law, under the terms of the policy in the instant case, does not require the court or the jury to consider the cause of causes; it would be impracticable to do so. As Bacon says, it were infinite with the law to consider causes that would lead us back to the birth of a person, “for if he had never been born the accident would not have happened.” It is the cause causing the death, not the condition without which the death would not have occurred (the causa causan, not the causa sine qua non), that fixes liability under a policy for accident insurance or under a provision for double indemnity in case of death from bodily injury effected solely through violent and accidental means.
There is nothing in the policy before the court to indicate that remote causes of an accidental death were to be considered or that there should be any departure from the maxim: Causa próxima non remota spectatur. This maxim, although of general application, is usually cited with reference to marine insurance; it qualifies the policy provisions so as to read that death must have resulted directly and proximately, and independently of all other proximate causes, from bodily injuries. In the next paragraph, the negative clause should be interpreted to read that death must not proximately have resulted directly or indirectly from illness or disease. Whenever the words “contributing cause” are used in the policy, the qualifying word proximate is supplied by a fair interpretation. Otherwise the clause would be interpreted to read thus: “Death must not have resulted directly or indirectly, proximately or remotely, from illness or disease,” which would be absurd. Direct, remote, and proximate, are words familiar to lawyers, and they have a distinct legal signification when applied to causes.
The Hood case was decided in 1920', and has been steadfastly adhered to in Mississippi for over three decades. This is demonstrated in the able brief for the appellees, citing Mississippi decisions and calling this> court’s attention to the general rule that they are entitled to an affirmance of the judgment (which is based on a jury verdict) if the evidence was such that fair and reasonable men might reach different conclusions upon the point in issue.