Court Opinion

ID: 9896017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:07.232113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:20.623051
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-1521-MR

JESSICA J. CARR                                                     APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM TRIGG CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE C.A. WOODALL III, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 17-CI-00097

MARK W. CARR                                                          APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: In a prior appeal of this child custody dispute, we affirmed the

circuit court’s decision in favor of joint custody. We remanded this case solely for

a determination of whether the statutory presumption for equally shared parenting

time had been overcome. Now we have this second appeal.

            Appellant (“Jessica”) seeks reversal of the circuit court’s Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order on Parenting Time. In this order, the
circuit court concluded that Jessica had not rebutted the statutory presumption of

equal parenting time in KRS1 403.270(2). The circuit court ordered equal

parenting time between the parties, with a week-to-week schedule. Jessica alleges

the circuit court abused its discretion in this ruling.

                Jessica believes the circuit court disregarded its previous factual

findings, specifically the acceptance of certain opinions of court-appointed experts.

Jessica also asserts the circuit court improperly considered some evidence of

events that had occurred since its prior decision while disregarding other such

evidence. Jessica believes the circuit court should have held a new hearing to

revisit all the issues and determine the best interest of the child because so much

time had passed since the original hearing.

                For the reasons which follow, we conclude the circuit court was not

required to conduct a new, full-blown evidentiary hearing after the previous

remand by this Court. The circuit court was not strictly held to its prior

conclusions. Indeed, we directed a process to evaluate only the shared parenting

time issue under the affirmed joint custody decision. There was no abuse of

discretion by the circuit court in its decision on remand. Thus, we affirm the ruling

of the Trigg Circuit Court.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
                                            -2-
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             We need not repeat all the details from our prior lengthy appeal

decision, but some background is necessary. Jessica and Appellee (“Mark”) were

married in 2010. Jessica filed her dissolution of marriage petition in 2017. The

parties have one child, J.C., who was four when this case began. The parties have

been contentiously litigating custody of this child to his probable detriment for

most of his life.

             The parties had a final custody hearing on two days in November of

2018. A third day was required to conclude the hearing in February of 2019.

Jessica sought sole custody of J.C., with Mark receiving supervised visitation.

Mark wanted joint custody with him designated the primary residential parent.

The circuit court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final

Custody Order in August of 2019. In this order, the circuit court made 125

findings of fact.

             The circuit court heard testimony from the parties, as well as multiple

expert witnesses, including a court-appointed custody evaluator, and therapists.

The circuit court’s ultimate order was for joint custody, which is subject to a

presumption. But the circuit court separately concluded that Jessica would have

more than equally shared parenting time. The circuit court designated Jessica the

                                         -3-
primary residential parent, with Mark to have visitation in accordance with the

usual guidelines applied in that circuit.

                Both Mark and Jessica filed motions to alter, amend, or vacate the

final custody order. The circuit court heard these motions in September of 2019

and denied the primary relief sought by both sides in October of 2019. Mark filed

his timely Notice of Appeal. Jessica filed her timely Notice of Cross-Appeal two

days later.

                In the initial appeal,2 Mark questioned the circuit court’s timesharing

order, alleging the court erred when it did not consider the statutory presumption of

equal timesharing prior to making the best interest of the child analysis. Mark

further argued the circuit court did not make sufficient findings for its conclusion

that Jessica had rebutted the presumption. In her cross-appeal,3 Jessica argued the

circuit court abused its discretion by not granting her sole custody. She

additionally alleged the circuit court made several evidentiary errors.

                This Court rendered an opinion4 encompassing both appeals in March

of 2022. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review and ordered

the opinion to not be published. Because the prior opinion lays out much of the

2
    No. 2019-CA-1780-MR.
3
    No. 2019-CA-1781-MR.
4
    Carr v. Carr, 659 S.W.3d 872 (Ky. App. 2022) (depublished).
                                               -4-
testimony involved in the current appeal, we again choose not to rehash the entire

history of this heavily litigated custody dispute here.

             On Jessica’s prior appeal, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s

rulings, determining the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary

rulings and made no clearly erroneous findings. This Court further upheld the

circuit court’s award of joint custody. On Mark’s prior appeal, this Court agreed

with Mark that the circuit court did not apply the statutory presumption of equal

parenting time. This Court determined the circuit court’s order contained no

findings to explain why it chose to deviate from the presumption. The portion of

the final custody order pertaining to parenting time was vacated. This court

directed:

                    Accordingly, we must hold that the circuit court
             erred as a matter of law related to the issue of parenting
             time and vacate the order awarding Mark visitation
             pursuant to the Guidelines for visitation/time-sharing of
             the 56th Judicial Circuit. On remand, the court:

                    must begin its analysis with the rebuttable
                    presumption that equal parenting time is in
                    Child’s best interest. Should the family
                    court determine either party has presented
                    sufficient evidence to overcome the
                    presumption, it must expressly so state and
                    provide supportive factual findings. It must
                    craft a parenting time schedule designed to
                    maximize Child’s time with each parent
                    consistent with ensuring Child’s welfare.

             Pittman, 2020 WL 2095903, at *6
                                          -5-
                    For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the final
             custody order of the Trigg Circuit Court as to parenting
             time is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the circuit
             court for further proceedings in accordance with this
             Opinion. The portion of the final custody order awarding
             joint custody is affirmed.

Carr, supra, at 894.

             On remand, Mark filed a Motion to Enter Amended Parenting Time

Schedule in Light of Directives on Remand. In this motion, he asked the circuit

court to grant him equal parenting time with J.C. Jessica and J.C.’s Guardian ad

Litem (“GAL”) filed responses to Mark’s motion. Jessica objected to any change

of the parenting schedule without a new hearing. She recognized that this Court

did not compel a change in the circuit court’s conclusion, just that it required more

explanation of its reasoning. Jessica felt the circuit court should consider the

events of the three to four years after the last hearing before possibly modifying the

timesharing schedule.

             The GAL generally agreed with Jessica. He recommended that no

change should be granted until the circuit court could consider updated evidence

and until the GAL was able to interview J.C. The GAL stated alternatively, that if

the circuit court’s decision on remand must be based on the record at the time of

the appeal, he recommended the schedule should not be changed from the initial

custody order.

                                         -6-
              Mark filed a reply to Jessica and the GAL. He stated his motion was

not a new motion to modify custody. Because this Court vacated the prior custody

order with specific directions, there is nothing to modify as that term would usually

be applied to a custody case. Mark believed this Court did not re-open the case for

additional evidence.

              The circuit court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Final Order on Parenting Time without hearing additional evidence. In this order,

the circuit court stated it believed it was bound on remand to consider the case

based on the record at the close of the bench trial and prior final submission of the

case. The circuit court, in its order, stated:

                     Petitioner has the burden of proof to overcome the
              statutory presumption by a preponderance of the
              evidence. In retrospect, in considering all relevant
              factors, including those set out in KRS 403.270(2), the
              Court does not find that Petitioner has rebutted the
              presumption for equal time sharing.

                    This Court realizes that the Court of Appeals did
              not mandate a different decision from this Court’s
              original one. However, all relevant factors being
              considered, this is obviously a different outcome and the
              Court finds and concludes that equal parenting time is in
              the best interest of J.W.C.[5]

5
 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order on Parenting Time, entered 10/27/2022,
page 3.
                                             -7-
             The circuit court then established a week-to-week schedule, with the

parties exchanging J.C. on Sundays at 7:00 p.m. each week. Further details

involving school breaks and holidays were also included in the order.

             Jessica filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, and Motion for

Additional Findings. She argued the Court of Appeals’ opinion did not prohibit

the circuit court from considering new evidence. The GAL filed a response,

generally agreeing with Jessica. The circuit court entered an order confirming

Jessica had not rebutted the statutory presumption of equal timesharing and denied

Jessica’s motion. Jessica timely filed her Notice of Appeal for this second appeal.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Appellate review of custody decisions is for abuse of discretion.

Gertler v. Gertler, 303 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Ky. App. 2010). Abuse of discretion

occurs when a ruling is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

             We are allowed to set aside the trial court’s factual findings only if

they are clearly erroneous. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when they are not supported by substantial

evidence. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would

accept as adequate to support a conclusion and evidence that, when taken alone or

in the light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction

                                          -8-
in the minds of reasonable men.” Id. (internal quotation marks, footnotes,

brackets, and ellipses omitted). Due regard must be given when the trial court

assesses witness credibility. CR6 52.01.

                “If, after review, this Court determines the factual findings do not

present clear error, the analysis shifts to an examination of the trial court’s legal

conclusions, looking for abuse of discretion using a de novo standard.” Jones v.

Jones, 510 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Ky. App. 2017). “If, on a retrial after remand, there

was no change in the issues or evidence, on a new appeal the questions are limited

to whether the trial court properly construed and applied the mandate.” Kincaid v.

Johnson, True & Guarnieri, LLP, 538 S.W.3d 901, 917 (Ky. App. 2017) (brackets

omitted). A retrial is not always directed on a remand. An appellate court’s

review of whether a trial court properly followed an appellate court’s mandate is de

novo. See Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Beglin, 432 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Ky. App. 2014).

                                         ANALYSIS

                Jessica makes several allegations of error on the part of the circuit

court after the remand. First, she argues its conclusion that she failed to rebut the

presumption of equal parenting time was an abuse of discretion. Relatedly, she

argues the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to adhere to the parenting

schedule originally set out in its initial custody order. She alleges the circuit

6
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
                                            -9-
court’s conclusions of law generally are abuses of discretion and its findings of

facts are clearly erroneous. Finally, she argues the circuit court erred as a matter of

law in its consideration of evidence on remand.

             Initial custody determinations are controlled by KRS 403.270.

             KRS 403.270(2) states as follows:

             The court shall determine custody in accordance with the
             best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be
             given to each parent . . . there shall be a presumption,
             rebuttable by a preponderance of evidence, that joint
             custody and equally shared parenting time is in the best
             interest of the child. If a deviation from equal parenting
             time is warranted, the court shall construct a parenting
             time schedule which maximizes the time each parent or de
             facto custodian has with the child and is consistent with
             ensuring the child’s welfare. The court shall consider all
             relevant factors including:

                    (a) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents . . .
                    as to his or her custody;

                    (b) The wishes of the child as to his or her
                    custodian, with due consideration given to the
                    influence a parent . . . may have over the child’s
                    wishes;

                    (c) The interaction and interrelationship of the
                    child with his or her parent or parents, his or her
                    siblings, and any other person who may
                    significantly affect the child’s best interests;

                    (d) The motivation of the adults participating in
                    the custody proceeding;

                                         -10-
                   (e) The child’s adjustment and continuing
                   proximity to his or her home, school, and
                   community;

                   (f) The mental and physical health of all
                   individuals involved;

                   (g) A finding by the court that domestic violence
                   and abuse . . . has been committed by one (1) of
                   the parties against a child of the parties or against
                   another party. The court shall determine the extent
                   to which the domestic violence and abuse has
                   affected the child and the child’s relationship to
                   each party, with due consideration given to efforts
                   made by a party toward the completion of any
                   domestic violence treatment, counseling, or
                   program;

                   ...

                   (k) The likelihood a party will allow the child
                   frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with
                   the other parent . . . except that the court shall not
                   consider this likelihood if there is a finding that the
                   other parent . . . engaged in domestic violence and
                   abuse . . . against the party or a child and that a
                   continuing relationship with the other parent will
                   endanger the health or safety of either that party or
                   the child.

             The circuit court made detailed findings of fact in its initial custody

order in 2019. In its subsequent order after remand, the circuit court generally did

not abandon those findings. Jessica argues there are three additional findings in

the 2022 custody order which are clearly erroneous. She claims the finding of fact

that she had not rebutted the statutory presumption of equal parenting time

                                         -11-
(although this may be best characterized as a conclusion rather than a finding), and

relatedly, the finding that equal parenting time is in the child’s best interest, are

both clearly erroneous. She also argues the finding that Dr. Feinberg7 did not

recommend equal time sharing due to the distance between the parties to be clearly

erroneous.

                 A review of the findings of fact of the circuit court do not illustrate the

clear picture that Jessica sees. Jessica believes that the circuit court’s findings

overall show overwhelmingly that she has overcome the statutory presumption of

equal timesharing. We do not agree. As previously stated, the circuit court

incorporated most of its previous findings into the later custody order. Those

findings were reviewed by this Court previously, and they were not found to be

clearly erroneous. Taken as a whole, the findings do not dictate a conclusion that

Jessica has overcome the statutory presumption of equal timesharing.

                 Jessica contends the circuit court’s reversal of its prior holding is an

abuse of discretion, and she points specifically to the recommendations of the

testifying experts. Jessica is correct in that the GAL, the child’s therapist, and the

court appointed expert, Dr. Feinberg, recommended that she be the primary

residential parent. But a court is not required to adhere to an expert’s

recommendations.

7
    The court-appointed custodial evaluator.
                                               -12-
             “KRS 403.270 provides that the court must consider numerous factors,

not just psychological evaluations.” Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Ky.

1986). An expert’s opinion is merely a piece of the evidence for the circuit court

to consider in its “best interests” determination. An unpublished case Jessica relies

upon in her brief states “As set forth above, KRS 403.290 allows a court to seek

the assistance of experts in making custody evaluations; however, it is not bound to

follow their recommendations.” Gautney v. Brasher, No. 2012-CA-002197-ME,

2013 WL 5676860, at *3 (Ky. App. Oct. 18, 2013).

             We also note the irony in Jessica arguing so strenuously that the

circuit court on remand improperly rejected the recommendations of Dr. Feinberg

considering Jessica vehemently opposed the circuit court even hearing his

testimony originally. The circuit court correctly determined that Dr. Feinberg was

qualified to offer his opinions, and Jessica’s prior concerns went to the weight of

his testimony, not its admissibility. Now, when Jessica is relying on Dr.

Feinberg’s recommendations, she claims his opinion should be given more weight

than the circuit court gave it.

             The weight to be given such testimony is for the circuit court to

determine. CR 52.01. “As the factfinder, it is the trial court’s prerogative to make

findings of fact according to its own weighing of the evidence.” Cabinet for

Health & Fam. Servs. v. L.G., 653 S.W.3d 93, 101 (Ky. 2022). It is the

                                        -13-
factfinder’s “prerogative to weigh the credibility of the various experts and decide

whose opinions to accept and whose to reject.” Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking

Co. v. Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Ky. 2004).

              Jessica further argues the circuit court abused its discretion when it

changed its conclusion in the final custody order regarding the presumption of

equal parenting time. This argument has no merit. The circuit court did what it

was instructed to do by this Court. It started with the presumption that equal

parenting time was in the child’s best interests, then reviewed its findings to

determine if Jessica had overcome that presumption. The fact that the circuit court

changed its mind when it looked at the facts from a different starting point does not

make the decision an abuse of discretion.

             Jessica further argues that the circuit court should have outlined the

findings it relied upon when determining she had not overcome the statutory

presumption. However, it is not a requirement of a court to detail the findings it

made when finding a presumption had not been rebutted. Workman v. Wesley

Manor Methodist Home, 462 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Ky. 1971). A presumption must be

overcome. To conclude that a presumption has been overcome, as opposed to

when it has not “the trial court must provide written findings of fact with reference

to the specific evidence supporting its determinations.” Goodlett v. Brittain, 544

S.W.3d 656, 664 (Ky. App. 2018).

                                         -14-
             Jessica’s final argument is that the circuit court erred in its

consideration of some evidence upon remand. She insists that this Court’s remand

to the circuit court required the circuit court to hold a new evidentiary hearing

before changing the parenting time decision. We do not agree.

             This Court’s directive to the circuit court was: “the portion of the

final custody order of the Trigg Circuit Court as to parenting time is vacated, and

this matter is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings in accordance

with this Opinion.” Carr, 659 S.W.3d at 894.

             “The trial court must strictly follow the mandate set out in the prior

appellate decision. In a subsequent appeal following remand, this Court’s role is

limited to whether the trial court properly construed and applied the mandate.”

James v. James, 636 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Ky. App. 2021) (citations omitted). Both

Mark and Jessica are correct in stating that this Court did not expressly require or

prohibit the circuit court from hearing new evidence prior to issuing the custody

order. The circuit court then did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an

additional hearing.

             The circuit court properly informed the parties of how a new hearing

could have been sought. As pointed out by the circuit court in its Order on

Petitioner’s Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate and Motion for Additional

Findings, while the circuit court declined to hear additional evidence on the

                                         -15-
remand, it would have been permissible for Jessica to file a motion8 to modify

parenting time once the remand decision had been made. A hearing on this new

motion could include consideration of the amount of time that has elapsed since the

final hearing, but this does not change the limited purpose of the remand.

                Jessica further argues the circuit court erred in regarding some facts

about events which occurred since the hearing while declining to hold a full

evidentiary hearing. This is a meritless argument. Jessica alleges the circuit court

took two facts into consideration in making its new final custody order. The first is

the child’s age. It is beyond even the strictures of judicial notice9 that parties

involved in litigation all age during the pendency of a case. To recognize the

current age of J.C. was not an erroneous new finding of fact nor an abuse of

discretion in the consideration of evidence.

                The second fact Jessica alleges the circuit court considered was the

suggestion that Mark had moved closer to Jessica. It is unclear from the record if

this fact was established, and there is no indication that the circuit court relied on

this information in rendering its custody decision. Jessica makes the argument that

the circuit court’s statement: “[t]he primary fact that the Court relied on for its

8
 KRS 403.320(3) permits a motion to change parenting time at any time after the original
decision has been made pursuant to KRS 403.270. Layman v. Bohanon, 599 S.W.3d 423 (Ky.
2020).
9
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 201.
                                              -16-
initial ruling was the opinion of Dr. Feinberg expressed in finding of Fact 69 that

he did not recommend equal time sharing because of the distance between the

parties” shows that the circuit court relied on the proposition that Mark had since

moved. At the time of the initial hearing, the parties lived in neighboring counties.

The record does not show if they have moved. Again, there was no clear error in

any factual finding, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in the decision

for equally shared parenting time, which is presumed by law to be in the best

interests of J.C.

                                      CONCLUSION

              The Trigg Circuit Court properly acted within its discretion and

followed this Court’s direction upon remand. Its findings of fact are not clearly

erroneous. Its conclusions of law are correct, and its decision to order equally

shared parenting time was not an abuse of discretion. The Trigg Circuit Court is

AFFIRMED.

              ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 William F. McGee, Jr.                      James G. Adams III
 Smithland, Kentucky                        Hopkinsville, Kentucky

 Thomas E. Banks III                        Julia T. Crenshaw
 Louisville, Kentucky                       Hopkinsville, Kentucky

                                         -17-