Court Opinion

ID: 2964524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:57.947988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.376391
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1625

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  LAWRENCE ESTRELLA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The opinion of this Court, issued on January 9, 1997, should be
        amended as follows:

            On cover sheet page, replace issue date of "January 9, 1996" with
        "January 9, 1997".

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1625

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  LAWRENCE ESTRELLA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                 [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                 ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Paul J. Haley, by Appointment of the Court, with whom Law Office
            _____________                                         __________
        of Paul J. Haley was on brief for appellant.
        ________________
            Peter E. Papps, First Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
            ______________
        Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief for the United
        ______________
        States.

                                 ____________________

                                   January 9, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.  Lawrence  Estrella was convicted
                         _____________

            of being a "felon in possession" of a firearm in violation of

            18  U.S.C.    922(g)(1)  and  sentenced as  an  armed  career

            criminal.    Id.    924(e)(1).   His  appeal  raises  various
                         ___

            issues, the most difficult being  whether he is excepted from

            the  felon-in-possession statute  as one  whose civil  rights

            have been restored and  whose right to firearms has  not been

            significantly restricted under state law.  Id.   921(a)(20).
                                                       ___

                 Estrella's long  criminal record  began in 1967  when he

            was  17 years  old.   Pertinently, in  January 1977,  he pled

            guilty in  Massachusetts state  court to assault  and battery

            with  a dangerous  weapon (a  motor vehicle)  and received  a

            prison sentence of 3 to 10 years.  He escaped from custody on

            July 2, 1978, and proceeded to commit crimes in two different

            states for which he was convicted in 1980:  armed robbery and

            armed assault in Massachusetts,  and breaking and entering an

            occupied dwelling in Michigan.

                 Estrella  received a  10-to-15 year prison  sentence for

            the Massachusetts armed robbery and assault, and a concurrent

            7-to-15  year  prison  term  for  the  Michigan  crime.    On

            September 28, 1987, Estrella  was released from Massachusetts

            state  prison and placed on parole until the year 2003, later

            reduced to June 1, 1999.   He moved to New Hampshire  in 1990

            and his parole supervision  was transferred to New Hampshire.

                                         -2-
                                         -2-

            He now had three "violent felony"  convictions on his record.

            18 U.S.C.   924(e)(1).

                 On  February  16, 1994,  Estrella  went  to a  federally

            licensed firearms dealership in Goffstown, New Hampshire, and

            purchased a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol, allegedly as a

            gift for his wife.  The owner  of the dealership had received

            the gun from a  distributor in Massachusetts.  In  the course

            of  the  purchase,   Estrella  completed   an  ATF   Firearms

            Transaction Record,  see 27  C.F.R.    178.124(c);  on it  he
                                 ___

            answered, inaccurately, that he  had not been convicted  of a

            crime punishable by a term exceeding one year.

                 Having  learned of  the purchase  from the  local police

            chief in Estrella's  town, agents of  the Bureau of  Alcohol,

            Tobacco and Firearms obtained  a warrant to search Estrella's

            residence for  firearms and related  documents.  A  search of

            Estrella's home occurred  on March 8, 1994.  Estrella arrived

            during the  search,  and on  being  advised of  the  warrant,

            Estrella said he wanted  to cooperate and signed a  waiver of

            his  Miranda  rights.   He then  escorted  the agents  to his
                 _______

            garage and showed them where the pistol was located.

                 A federal  grand jury  indicted Estrella  as a  felon in

            possession,  18 U.S.C.    922(g)(1), and  for making  a false

            statement  in the  purchase  of a  firearm, id.    922(a)(6).
                                                        ___

            Related  New  Hampshire  state  charges  were  dismissed  and

            Estrella was tried in  federal court in September 1995.   The

                                         -3-
                                         -3-

            jury convicted Estrella  of violating section 922(g)(1),  but

            deadlocked   on  the  section   922(a)(6)  count,  which  the

            government later  abandoned.   Because of his  three violent-

            felony  convictions,  Estrella was  sentenced  to 216  months

            imprisonment.  He now appeals.

                 At the outset  we reject,  as an issue  settled in  this

            circuit,  Estrella's  argument  that section 922(g)  facially

            exceeds Congress'  power under  the Commerce Clause.   United
                                                                   ______

            States  v.  Blais,  98   F.3d  647,  649  (1st  Cir.   1996).
            ______      _____

            Estrella's  "as-applied"  challenge also  fails,  because the

            government offered evidence that  the pistol he purchased had

            moved in interstate commerce.   Our precedent also forecloses

            Estrella's cursory  Tenth Amendment challenge to  the federal

            firearm regulations.   United States v. Minnick,  949 F.2d 8,
                                   _____________    _______

            10-11 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 995 (1992).
                                   ____________

                 The main question, which we consider de novo, is whether
                                                      _______

            federal law  prohibited Estrella from  obtaining the  pistol.

            18 U.S.C.   922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for 

                 any  person .  . .  who has  been convicted  in any
                 court of, a crime  punishable by imprisonment for a
                 term  exceeding one year .  . . [to]  possess in or
                 affecting commerce, any  firearm or ammunition;  or
                 to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
                 shipped or  transported  in interstate  or  foreign
                 commerce.

            But  18 U.S.C.    921(a)(20) excepts  from the  definition of
            conviction

                 [a]ny conviction  which has  been expunged,  or set
                 aside or for  which a person  has been pardoned  or
                 has had  civil rights  restored .  . .  unless such

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

                 pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights
                 expressly provides  that the  person may not  ship,
                 transport, possess, or receive firearms.

            But  for this exception, Estrella fell within the main ban of

            section 922(g)(1); the troublesome  issues are whether he had

            his civil  rights restored and,  if so, whether  the "unless"

            clause applies in his case.

                 We   consider   first    whether   Massachusetts,    the

            jurisdiction   of  the  "predicate   offense,"  had  restored

            Estrella's   civil  rights.     (The  government   relied  on

            Estrella's Michigan  conviction only as  a predicate  offense

            for  sentencing  under  section  924(e)(1), and  not  in  his

            indictment  for   violating  section  922(g)(1).)    In  this

            circuit, the civil  rights that must  be restored to  trigger

            the  exception are the rights to vote, to hold public office,

            and to serve on a jury.  United States v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1, 2
                                     _____________    _____

            (1st Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2569 (1996).
                        _______   ____________

                 This  court has held  that all  three core  civil rights

            must be restored  for a  person to avoid  the prohibition  of

            section 922(g).   United States v.  Indelicato, 97 F.3d  627,
                              _____________     __________

            631 & n.3  (1st Cir.  1996).  In  Massachusetts, a  convicted

            felon does not lose the right to vote.  Mass. Gen. L. ch. 54,

               86, 103B.   And  Estrella  was no  longer incarcerated  in

            February 1994, so  he could  now hold public  office.   Mass.

            Gen.  L. ch. 279,   30.   Nevertheless, the government argues

                                         -5-
                                         -5-

            that  Estrella's  right  to serve  on  a  jury  had not  been

            sufficiently restored when he purchased the pistol.

                 Massachusetts disqualifies from  jury service any person

            who "has been  convicted of  a felony within  the past  seven

            years or is a defendant  in pending felony case or is  in the

            custody of  a correctional institution."   Mass. Gen.  L. ch.

            234A,    4(7).    Estrella's   conviction  in  1980  for  the

            predicate offense, the  armed assault  and robbery,  occurred

            more  than seven years  prior to his  purchase of  the gun in

            1994.  The government claims, however,  that in 1994 Estrella

            was still "in  the custody of a correctional  institution" by

            dint of his continuing parole status.

                 The  government cites  federal  decisions  holding  that

            parole  constitutes "custody"  for purposes  such as  federal

            habeas  jurisdiction.  E.g., United States  v. Flynn, 49 F.3d
                                   ____  _____________     _____

            11, 14 (1st  Cir. 1995)  (citing cases).   But "custody"  has

            been defined broadly in this context for  reasons peculiar to

            habeas corpus, Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984);
                           _________    ______

            and  under section  921(a)(20),  state  law  governs  whether

            Estrella is barred from serving on juries.  Beecham v. United
                                                        _______    ______

            States,  511  U.S.  368  (1994).    We  have  not  found  any
            ______

            Massachusetts  decisions  that decide  whether  a  parolee is

            barred from service.

                 While the term "custody" is elastic, it is doubtful that

            a paroled prisoner  would normally be  described as being  in

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            the custody  "of a  correctional institution."   Further, the

            Supreme  Judicial Court  has referred  in passing  to section

            4(7) as  disqualifying prospective  jurors on the  grounds of

            "incarceration  or conviction  of  a felony  within the  past
             _____________

            seven years."  Commonwealth v. Tolentino, 663 N.E.2d 846, 849
                           ____________    _________

            n.3 (Mass. 1996) (emphasis added).  Massachusetts also  has a

            statutory definition of "correctional  institution," defining

            it  in physical  terms  and referring  to  its use  "for  the

            custody  . .  .  of committed  offenders  and of  such  other

            persons as may be placed in  custody therein . . . ."   Mass.

            Gen. L. ch. 125,    1(d), (e).

                 Despite  these  scraps  of statute  and  precedent, some

            might  think it  odd that a  felon still on  parole should be

            seated  on  a  jury.   Still,  circumstances  vary,  and  the

            immediate issue is  simply whether  Massachusetts imposes  an

            automatic  ban.   We think  this is  a matter that  the state

            supreme court could probably decide either way,  but--pending

            such clarification--our best assessment is that Massachusetts

            law does  not automatically disqualify a  parolee seven years

            after conviction.

                 As a  fall-back argument, the government  says that even

            if Estrella could  in theory serve  on a jury,  Massachusetts

            law  so curtails the opportunity for any ex-felon to serve as

            a  juror that  this  civil right  has  not been  sufficiently

            restored  to  satisfy section  921(a)(20).     By  statute, a

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            Massachusetts trial judge  can choose to  remove from a  jury

            panel a  person  convicted  of  any  felony  or  other  crime

            punishable by imprisonment of more than one year.  Mass. Gen.

            L. ch.  234,    8.   In Caron we  left open  the problem  now
                                    _____

            posed.  77 F.3d at 6. 

                 We join  other circuits in  concluding that to  meet the

            test of  section 921(a)(20),  each of  the three core  "civil

            rights" must be substantially, but  not perfectly, restored.1

            In  applying this test, we are guided by the rationale behind

            Congress'  use of  "civil rights  restored" as  a touchstone:

            the notion  that  by reinvesting  a  person with  core  civic

            responsibilities, the  state vouches for  the trustworthiness

            of that  person to  possess  firearms (unless  that right  is

            withheld).  Indelicato, 97 F.3d at 630.
                        __________

                 While  regarding the matter as close,  we think that the

            Massachusetts legislature has expressed the requisite, albeit

            unquantifiable, measure  of confidence in  ex-felons such  as

            Estrella so far as concerns jury service.  Our view rests not

            only on the language of  section 8 but on what we  take to be

            its philosophy.   Almost a century ago, the  Supreme Judicial

            Court said that:

                                
            ____________________

                 1E.g., United States  v. Morrell, 61 F.3d  279, 280 (4th
                  ____  _____________     _______
            Cir.  1995); United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 549 (6th
                         _____________    _______
            Cir.  1990); United States v. McKinley, 23 F.3d 181, 183 (7th
                         _____________    ________
            Cir. 1994);  Presley v.  United States, 851  F.2d 1052,  1053
                         _______     _____________
            (8th Cir. 1988).

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

                 in this commonwealth it is not the law that persons
                 convicted of crime shall be permanently deprived of
                 their  civil rights.   Our legislation, more humane
                 and  charitable  than  the   law  of  early  times,
                 recognizes  the  possibility   of  repentance   and
                 reformation.   . . .  [T]here is nothing to prevent
                 the board from putting upon the jury list the  name
                 of a former  criminal, if  they find him  to be  of
                 good moral character and otherwise suitable.

          Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 71 N.E. 292, 293 (Mass. 1904).
          ____________    __________

                 The  right of the trial judge to dismiss an ex-felon under

          section 8 appears to  be a safeguard, allowing the trial judge to

          dismiss  the ex-felon  out of  hand wherever  his record,  or the

          nature of the case, warrants that course; without this provision,

          a judge might have to give a particularized reason.  Thus viewed,

          this qualification does not appear to detract from the Wong Chung
                                                                 __________

          view that  in Massachusetts  an  ex-felon after  seven years  and

          release  from jail is presumptively  trusted to serve  on a jury.

          Accord United States  v. Caron, 941  F. Supp. 238, 246  (D. Mass.
          ______ _____________     _____

          1996).

                 Construing  a  somewhat  similar  state  restriction,  two

          circuits  have held  that  Michigan does  not  restore the  civil

          rights of felons.  United States v. Metzger, 3 F.3d 756, 759 (4th
                             _____________    _______

          Cir. 1993), cert. denied,  114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994);  United States
                      ____________                            _____________

          v.  Driscoll,  970 F.2d  1472,  1478-79  (6th Cir.  1992),  cert.
              ________                                                _____

          denied, 506 U.S. 1083  (1993).  But Michigan court  rules require
          ______

          automatic  exclusion of  felons  as jurors  whenever  a party  so

          moves,  and also  direct  courts to  excuse convicted  felons sua
                                                                        ___

          sponte from jury panels  in criminal cases, once that  ground for
          ______

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

          exclusion is established.  Metzger, 3 F.3d at 759.   Michigan law
                                     _______

          is thus more hostile to  service by ex-felons than is the  law of

          Massachusetts.

                 Although all  three of  Estrella's core civil  rights were

          restored  by  Massachusetts,  his prior  felony  conviction still

          counts  as  a  predicate   offense  if  Massachusetts  "expressly

          provide[d]" that he "may not ship, transport, possess, or receive

          firearms,"  18  U.S.C.    921(a)(20),  "firearm"   being  broadly

          defined to include inter alia handguns, shotguns and rifles.  Id.
                             __________                                 ___

            921(a)(3).   Estrella objects  that his  parole papers  nowhere

          expressly provide that he  could not own firearms; but  his civil

          rights were not restored by pardon, or by his  parole papers, but

          by  state statutes.    And  in  such  a  situation,  we  look  to

          Massachusetts  law as  a  whole for  the "express"  restrictions.

          United States v. Sullivan, 98 F.3d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 1996).
          _____________    ________

                 Some  might think  it  perverse to  look to  Massachusetts

          firearms law when  the purchase was made  in New Hampshire.   But

          the trigger  for the federal ban is the Massachusetts conviction;
                               _______

          and  the ban  is  removed only  if  Massachusetts has  shown  the

          requisite confidence  in the  ex-felon by restoring  civil rights

          without limiting firearms ownership.   (New Hampshire, of course,

          is free to impose its own limitations on gun ownership within the

          state,  but they do  not control the  federal ban one  way or the

          other here.)   

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

                 In Massachusetts, an  ex-felon released  from custody  for

          more  than five years  can obtain a  firearm identification card,

          Mass. Gen.  L. ch. 140,    129B, which  permits one to  possess a

          handgun  (any firearm with a barrel of  less than 16 inches, or a

          short-barrel shotgun) in  his residence or place  of business and

          to possess a rifle or long-barrel shotgun anywhere.  Id. ch. 269,
                                                               ___

            10(a).  But in  Massachusetts a convicted felon cannot  carry a

          handgun anywhere else, id.  ch. 140,    125, 131, 131F;  ch. 269,
                                 ___

            10(a); never can  purchase, rent  or lease a  handgun, id.  ch.
                                                                   ___

          140,    131A; and never can sell, rent or lease to another person

          any firearms, ch. 140,   122.

                 In assessing this patchwork  of restrictions, little  help

          is  provided by  the federal  statute's language--"may  not ship,

          transport, possess,  or  receive firearms"--since  this  language

          does not tell us how much restriction is needed where some rights

          are  permitted and  others  forbidden.   The legislative  history

          refers only to  the "right to  firearm ownership"  as if it  were

          indivisible.   S. Rep.  No. 583, 98th  Cong., 2d Sess.  7 (1984).

          Possibly  Congress  never considered  the case  in which  the ex-

          felon's right to own firearms was restricted in some ways but not

          others.

                 Four  of  the   circuits  that   have  construed   section

          921(a)(20)  conclude that it does not protect the ex-felon if the

          state  continues in  any  way to  restrict significantly  the ex-

          felon's right to "ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms."

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

          Under  this "all or nothing" approach, it does not matter whether

          the particular weapon possessed by the defendant was permitted or

          forbidden by state law.  The Sixth and Tenth Circuits so construe

          the "exception to the exception," and the Seventh and Eighth come

          to about the same  result by treating firearms privileges  as one

          ofthecivil rightsthatmustbe restoredtotriggersection 921(a)(20).2

                 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit makes the federal ban apply

          only if  the ex-felon is found to possess a weapon that state law

          forbids  to him.   United States v.  Dahms, 938  F.2d 131, 134-35
                             _____________     _____

          (9th Cir. 1991);  see also  United States v.  Tomlinson, 67  F.3d
                            ________  _____________     _________

          508, 513  (4th Cir. 1995);  but see  United States v.  Clark, 993
                                      _______  _____________     _____

          F.2d 402, 404-05 (4th Cir. 1993).  Thus, if Estrella had bought a

          long-barreled  shotgun, the  federal  ban would  not here  apply.

          This  approach has patent virtues:   it respects  the state's own

          choice;  it  may provide  better warning  to  the ex-felon  if he
                                                                      __

          remains in his state of conviction; and it is probably easier for

          courts  to administer in the first instance (by asking what state

          law permits as to this weapon).
                            ____

                 But the Ninth Circuit's  approach is less persuasive  as a

          reading of the statute.   It strains the literal language of  the

          "unless" proviso,  see Driscoll, 970  F.2d at 1480-81;  and while
                             ___ ________

          the federal statute  does in some measure defer to  state law, it

                                
            ____________________

                 2Compare Driscoll,  970 F.2d at 1480,  and United States
                  _______ ________                          _____________
            v. Burns, 934 F.2d 1157, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
               _____                                        ____________
            502 U.S. 1124 (1992), with United States v. Lee, 72  F.3d 55,
                                  ____ _____________    ___
            57-58 (7th Cir. 1995),  and United States v. Ellis,  949 F.2d
                                        _____________    _____
            952, 955 (8th Cir. 1991).

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

          does  not give carte blanche to  the states.  Indelicato, 97 F.3d
                         _____________                  __________

          at 629-30.  We have overridden literal language where it appeared

          inadvertent and  undermined Congress'  aim.   Id.   But requiring
                                                        ___

          that the  state permit the untrammeled possession  of firearms is

          fully   consistent  with   the  trustworthiness   rationale  that

          underpins the "civil rights restored" provision itself.

                 The  Ninth  Circuit  approach   might  give  some  limited

          protection  to a defendant who  remains in the  state of original

          conviction  and who honestly  relies on state law;  but it is not

          clear  that this is a common case,  and (as we explain below) the

          statute does  not require  willfulness at  all.   As for  ease of

          administration, Congress  in drafting  the statute certainly  did

          not have  this value high on its list, and the plurality approach

          of cases  like Driscoll requires more  work in the first  case to
                         ________

          assess the law  of the state  but less work  in subsequent  cases

          involving the same state.

                 Under the  plurality approach, which we  choose to follow,

          we  think that  Massachusetts' ban  on handgun possession  by ex-

          felons outside the home or business is a substantial enough limit

          on firearms rights  to preserve  the federal ban.   Other  courts

          have  taken the  same  view in  assessing  other state  statutes.

          United  States  v. Wagner,  976 F.2d  354,  356 (7th  Cir. 1992);
          ______________     ______

          Driscoll, 970 F.2d at 1481;  Burns, 934 F.2d at 1160-61.   In the
          ________                     _____

          future, there might be close cases where, for example, some other

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

          state's  restriction  is arguably  de  minimis;  but an  ordinary
                                             ___________

          Massachusetts felon will not be exempted from the federal ban.3

                 Estrella raises  several other claims  of error concerning

          his conviction and sentence.  He argues first that he  lacked the

          requisite scienter because he believed  that his civil rights had

          been restored.  But this panel  is bound by the earlier ruling in

          this circuit that  under section 922(g), "the government need not

          prove that the defendant knowingly  violated the law; rather,  it

          only  need prove  . .  . that  the defendant  knowingly possessed

          firearms."  United States  v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710,  713 (1st Cir.
                      _____________     _____

          1991).  Accord United States v.  Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 352-53 (10th
                  ______ _____________     _____

          Cir.), cert. denied, 116  S. Ct. 2568 (1996); Tomlinson,  67 F.3d
                 ____________                           _________

          at 513-14 n.9 (distinguishing Staples v. United States, 511  U.S.
                                        _______    _____________

          600 (1994)).

                 A risk  of injustice  exists wherever a  legislature makes

          criminal conduct  that some  may believe to  be lawful.   But the

          federal felon-in-possession  statute does not  impose a statutory

          minimum term, 18 U.S.C.   924(b), so long as the defendant is not

          a three-time violent felon, id.   924(e)(1).  Even if  a jury can
                                      ___

          be found to  convict, sentencing  judges are not  likely to  deal

                                
            ____________________

                 3Recently, the Ninth Circuit held that Massachusetts law
            does not restore the civil rights of ex-felons at all. 
            United States v. Oman, 91 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996).  The
            _____________    ____
            court's reasoning is different than ours, consistent in some
            respects and not in others, but its result for Massachusetts
            ex-felons is the same.

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

          harshly with the defendant in the rare case of  a truly innocent-

          minded violation.

                 Estrella is  not in this category.   He was told  when his

          parole supervision was transferred to New Hampshire that he could

          not possess firearms.   Although his brief says that  by February

          1994 the New Hampshire  parole rules had lapsed, it  appears that

          New Hampshire  state law  independently prohibited  Estrella from

          possessing the pistol and there is some  indication that Estrella

          was so warned.  Further, Estrella's outright lie on the ATF form,

          denying that he had ever been convicted for a crime punishable by

          at least one year in prison, is not the act of an innocent man.

                 Because  a  mistake of  law was  no  defense, we  need not

          discuss  at  length  two  other  claims  by  Estrella:  that  the

          government should not have been  allowed to introduce evidence of

          the New  Hampshire parole rules  and that defense  counsel should

          have offered evidence that the rules had lapsed.  Apparently, the

          government's  evidence  was offered  without  objection.   It  is

          enough that neither piece  of evidence had much bearing  upon the

          issues  properly before  the  jury or  was  likely to  alter  the

          result.

                 Next,  Estrella  says  that  the search  warrant  did  not

          authorize entry into  his garage.   The warrant  approved by  the

          district court permitted the search of the "residence of Lawrence

          R. Estrella,  . . . more  particularly described as  a blue cape-

          style  house with  a breezeway  connecting a  two-car  garage and

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          located 450 feet uphill on  Tiffany Hill Road . . . ."   We agree

          with  the district  court that  the  common-sense meaning  of the

          warrant was that  the area  to be searched  included the  garage.

          Accord  United  States v.  Bonner, 808  F.2d  864, 868  (1st Cir.
          ______  ______________     ______

          1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006 (1987).
                 ____________

                 Finally, Estrella provides an outline, but little more, of

          several  objections to  his sentence.   Although  we  could treat

          those arguments as abandoned,  see United States v. St.  Cyr, 977
                                         ___ _____________    ________

          F.2d  698, 701  (1st  Cir. 1992),  the  length of  the  mandatory

          sentence has led us  to examine each argument on  the merits, but

          none appears to have force.   We see no reason to  describe those

          outlined arguments, nor to advert further to several other claims

          of  trial error that were amply developed in Estrella's brief but

          seem to us plainly hopeless.

                 Affirmed.
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