Court Opinion

ID: 9688961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:14:33.0238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:43.268243
License: Public Domain

*245M. G. Harrison, J.
(concurring). I concur that this matter should be remanded but for different reasons. The parties provided in their property settlement as follows:
It is understood, acknowledged and agreed that the foregoing provisions have been negotiated and bargained for, by and between the parties, taking into account all possible contingencies (foreseen and unforeseen) and that said provisions represent a final compromise and settlement of all such claims. Accordingly, the parties intend and agree that the foregoing provisions are not subject to modification by way of extension, enlargement, diminishment, or termination for any reason whatsoever, except as is expressly provided hereinbefore, and each agrees to take no action in the pending divorce action or in any post-judgment proceedings therein which is inconsistent herewith.
Additionally, they provided:
It is the intention and understanding of the parties .that all of the provisions of this agreement relating to division or distribution of property, alimony, attorney fees and life insurance . . . shall be contractually binding between these parties
The majority adopts a "bright line” test to distinguish periodic alimony from alimony in gross and focuses solely on whether any contingency, however remote, might affect the total sum paid.
Although I concur that the provisions do not lead to a conclusion that alimony in gross has been created in law, I am not persuaded that such was not intended by the parties. The alimony provision is alimony in gross in every respect except for termination in the event of plaintiff’s *246death, something which may have been conceded in the negotiations as having no significance to her.
In negotiating the terms of a divorce judgment, a party may well bargain for a smaller amount of property in exchange for the security of a substantial sum certain, payable in installments, but not subject to later modification. Under such circumstances, it would be inappropriate to deprive that party of the benefits of a bargain both intended merely because full payment is contingent on the payee’s survival for the payment period. I submit that, without looking to other factors involved, a survival contingency alone does not necessarily transform alimony in gross to periodic alimony.
Judicial construction of a settlement agreement provision is essentially an issue of contract interpretation, wherein the court must focus on ascertaining the intentions of the parties. In re Long Estate, 99 Mich App 240, 245; 298 NW2d 13 (1980). Including a number of contingencies in a provision for what otherwise would be alimony in gross evidences an intent to create periodic alimony. Firnschild v Firnschild, 67 Mich App 327; 240 NW2d 790 (1976). Nevertheless, such should not preclude using an approach designed to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties. See Tessmer v Tessmer, 261 Mich 681; 247 NW 93 (1933).
Although it appears to this writer that alimony in gross was intended by the parties, since there may be some question, I respectfully suggest that this matter should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the original intention of the parties as to the nature of the alimony in order to carry out that intention rather than to have it possibly thwarted by an improvident judicial interpretation.
*247A bright line test does have its merits. I would urge adoption of a clearly enunciated rule adopting the standards under § 71 of the Internal Revenue Code in distinguishing periodic alimony from alimony in gross. Michigan law, however, has not been clear in this area, which undoubtedly has left many lawyers at their peril. Under these circumstances, such a rule should be prospective in its application for settlements after its adoption.