Court Opinion

ID: 9840564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 14:01:02.723649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:35:44.584131
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14145    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 09/19/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14145
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       LEWGENE MEEKS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cr-00030-RH-MAF-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14145

       Before GRANT, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              While a police officer’s reasonable mistake of fact can
       provide the basis for a valid traffic stop, the mistake must be just
       that—reasonable. Members of the Tallahassee Police Department
       stopped Lewgene Meeks because an officer thought that he saw
       Meeks driving without a seatbelt. But the district court weighed
       the evidence and found that Meeks had been properly wearing his
       seatbelt before being stopped. Because the government offered no
       evidence that the officer’s mistaken conclusion was objectively
       reasonable, the district court’s denial of Meeks’s motion to
       suppress evidence of his drug crimes arising from the stop was
       erroneous. We therefore reverse, vacate the conviction, and
       remand for further proceedings.
                                         I.
              A member of the Tallahassee Police Department received a
       tip that Lewgene Meeks, recently released from prison, was dealing
       drugs. On February 22, 2022, Tallahassee police conducting
       surveillance on Meeks suspected that he was carrying drugs in his
       car. Officers—both plainclothes and uniformed—began tailing
       Meeks’s car, intending to perform a traffic stop so that they could
       search the vehicle.
              The lead investigator asked Officer Glenn Farmer to
       intercept Meeks and confirm whether he was driving with his
       seatbelt fastened. Farmer testified that he pulled up next to the left
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       22-14145                 Opinion of the Court                             3

       side of Meeks’s car. Looking through Meeks’s driver-side window,
       Farmer says that he observed Meeks driving without a seatbelt.
       Police then pulled Meeks over and discovered that he was carrying
       a large amount of drugs, including powder cocaine, crack cocaine,
       and alpha-PVP (Molly).
               Following his arrest and indictment, Meeks moved to
       suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop on the ground
       that the police initiated the stop without reasonable suspicion of a
       traffic violation, rendering all subsequently obtained evidence
       inadmissible. 1 Meeks argued that he did not commit the traffic
       infraction for which he was stopped and that Farmer’s contrary
       claim was an unreasonable mistake. Following a hearing, the
       district court denied the motion to suppress. Meeks then pleaded
       guilty to the charge of possession with intent to distribute,
       reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion
       to suppress. This appeal follows.
                                           II.
              “A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a
       mixed question of law and fact.” United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342
       F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). We review
       the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application
       of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d
       1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999). We must construe all facts in the light

       1 Meeks also moved to suppress on the ground that the officers’ order to him

       to exit the car during the stop was unconstitutional. He does not appeal the
       district court’s denial on this ground.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14145

       most favorable to the party that prevailed below. United States v.
       Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). The “ultimate
       determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause” are
       reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
                                        III.
               Before we can review the merits of the district court’s ruling,
       we need to decide what the district court actually ruled. This much
       is certain: the district court denied Meeks’s motion to suppress. But
       the parties disagree on the district court’s grounds for that decision,
       which were given orally. Meeks says that the district court made
       two findings: (1) that Meeks was wearing his seatbelt and (2) that
       Farmer’s belief at the time that Meeks was not wearing his seatbelt
       was a reasonable mistake. The government disagrees. It says that
       the district court had only mused, without deciding, that Meeks
       may have been wearing his seatbelt. Instead, the government
       argues, “what the district court did find was that Farmer credibly
       testified that he was certain he observed the defendant driving
       without a seat belt, and thus it was reasonable for him to believe a
       traffic violation had occurred.”
              We side with Meeks’s interpretation. The district court
       stated three times during its oral ruling that Meeks was wearing his
       seatbelt. Suppression Hr’g Tr. 111:25–112:1 (“It does appear to me
       in the video that Mr. Meeks had his seatbelt on.”); 112:24–25 (“And
       while [the video] wasn’t definitive, it did seem pretty clear to me
       that Mr. Meeks had his seatbelt on.”); 113:2–3 (“But the better view
       is probably that he had his seatbelt on.”); see also Fed. R. Crim. P.
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       22-14145                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

       12(d) (“When factual issues are involved in deciding a motion, the
       court must state its essential findings on the record.”). The district
       court’s subsequent statement that “my finding is that . . . Mr.
       Farmer reasonably believed that he had observed a traffic
       violation” is thus properly understood as a finding of a reasonable
       mistake of fact, which provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. 2
               The United States’s contrary interpretation is belied by the
       transcript of the suppression hearing, which demonstrates that the
       district court did rule that Farmer had made a mistake of fact. But
       even if the United States were correct that the district court only
       decided that Farmer was credible when he testified that he was
       “certain” he saw Meeks not wearing his seatbelt, we would not
       then be required to defer to the district court’s finding that this
       belief was objectively reasonable, as the United States argues. The
       strength of Farmer’s subjective belief—or indeed, whether or not
       he actually subjectively believed—that he had reasonable suspicion
       for the stop is irrelevant to our inquiry. The “question we are faced

       2 We characterize Farmer as having made a mistake about what he saw, rather

       than as lying, because the district court credited Farmer as telling the truth
       when he testified about his own beliefs. Ultimately, though, it does not matter
       either way. Whether or not Farmer actually believed that he saw Meeks
       wearing his seatbelt, if an officer in his position could have made an objectively
       reasonable mistake to that end, then there was reasonable suspicion for the
       stop. The “fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is
       hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the
       officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
       circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” Scott v. United States,
       436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 22-14145

       with here is not whether [Farmer] actually and subjectively had the
       pertinent reasonable suspicion, but whether, given the
       circumstances, reasonable suspicion objectively existed to justify”
       the stop. Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005). “We
       do not examine the subjective understanding of the particular
       officer involved.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014).
       Rather, the “Fourth Amendment tolerates only . . . objectively
       reasonable” mistakes. Id. We review that ultimate determination
       de novo.
                                       IV.
              Because the district court’s determination that Farmer had
       reasonable suspicion to stop Meeks for driving without a seatbelt
       presents a mixed question of law and fact, we first review for clear
       error the district court’s factual finding that Farmer was in a
       position to observe Meeks driving without a seatbelt. Zapata, 180
       F.3d at 1240. We then review de novo whether Farmer’s mistaken
       observation was objectively reasonable. See Chanthasouxat, 342
       F.3d at 1275–76.
                                       A.
              Farmer testified that he pulled up to look for Meeks’s
       seatbelt while they were traveling on a three-lane road. He
       observed Meeks from the left side of Meeks’s car through the
       driver’s side window. Body camera footage from another officer
       confirms that, fifteen seconds after Farmer claims to have observed
       Meeks from the left, his vehicle was seen on the other side of
       Meeks’s car, to the right. Farmer explained that, following his
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       22-14145               Opinion of the Court                         7

       observation from the left, he pulled back to give room to another
       officer, then pulled up again on the right.
               “Credibility determinations are typically the province of the
       fact finder because” the fact finder is “in a better position than a
       reviewing court to assess the credibility of witnesses.” United States
       v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). When
       reviewing for clear error, we will defer to the district court’s
       credibility determination unless its “understanding of the facts
       appears to be unbelievable.” Id. (quotation omitted). Meeks
       argues that Farmer’s version of events is factually impossible and
       that the district court clearly erred by crediting it. We disagree.
       Ordinary experience suggests that, in flowing traffic, two lane
       changes in fifteen seconds is perfectly within the capabilities of an
       ordinary driver, let alone an experienced police officer. The district
       court did not clearly err by crediting Farmer’s testimony on this
       point.
                                        B.
              Given the district court’s finding that Meeks was wearing his
       seatbelt, however, we must next ask whether Farmer’s mistaken
       assertion to the contrary was objectively reasonable. See
       Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1275–76. Our inquiry begins (and here,
       ends) with the burden of proof. While the ultimate burden of
       persuasion ordinarily rests with the movant in a suppression
       hearing, “if a defendant produces evidence that he was arrested or
       subjected to a search without a warrant, the burden shifts to the
       government to justify the warrantless arrest or search.” United
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       8                         Opinion of the Court                       22-14145

       States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977). 3 The
       government thus bears the burden of showing that Farmer’s
       mistake was objectively reasonable.
               The United States presented no evidence explaining how
       Farmer could have made an erroneous judgment with respect to
       Meeks’s seatbelt. Just the opposite—in testimony credited by the
       district court as credible, Farmer stated that he could “clearly see”
       through both his passenger and Meeks’s driver-side windows, that
       he had no trouble “getting up next to the car,” and that he was “100
       percent” sure Meeks was not wearing his seatbelt. Body camera
       video submitted into evidence confirms that the stop occurred on
       a clear, sunny day and that Meeks’s car windows were not tinted.
       Because there was no discussion at the suppression hearing about
       how Farmer’s misidentification could have constituted an
       objectively reasonable mistake under these circumstances, the
       district court erred by denying the motion to suppress.
              On appeal, the government argues that we should defer to
       the district court’s finding of reasonableness because the evidence
       shows that Farmer honestly believed that he had observed Meeks
       not wearing a seatbelt. The government commits a double fault.
       As already explained, this Court’s review of the ultimate
       reasonability of the stop is de novo; while we defer to the district
       court’s factual findings, we do not defer to its determination of

       3 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981

       are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th
       Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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       22-14145               Opinion of the Court                        9

       whether reasonable suspicion existed based on those facts. Zapata,
       180 F.3d at 1240; Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697. And Farmer’s subjective
       beliefs, no matter how genuinely held, are simply not relevant to
       the question of whether the stop was objectively reasonable. Hicks,
       422 F.3d at 1252.
                                  *     *      *
              The government bore the burden to show that its stop of
       Meeks was objectively reasonable and predicated on reasonable
       suspicion of a traffic violation. On the record provided, it did not.
       We therefore REVERSE the district court’s denial of Meeks’s
       motion to suppress, VACATE the conviction, and REMAND for
       further proceedings.