Court Opinion

ID: 9648866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:36:52.054191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.878380
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. It would appear that the majority is requiring counsel to raise the question of the accused’s competence to stand trial in every case, for fear that he will be otherwise found “ineffective,” even where there is no question that the accused is competent to stand trial.
The test of an accused’s competence to stand trial is: “his ability to comprehend his position of one accused of murder and to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense. [Sjtated another way, did he have sufficient ability at the pertinent time to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”
Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney, 424 Pa. 493, 495, 227 A.2d 159, 160 (1967).
*501A review of the record in this case reveals a wealth of psychiatric testimony which clearly establishes appellant’s competency to stand trial. Although, as the majority correctly indicates, “the two psychiatric evaluations which are of record are concerned with the question of insanity and legal culpability” (Majority Opinion, supra at 7-8), there is sufficient relevant uncontradicted evidence to show that appellant was indeed competent. Appellant clearly was in touch with reality, had an understanding of the proceedings against him and was perfectly capable of participating in his defense.*
*502Appellant’s competence to stand trial was apparently never in question. This being the case, there was absolutely no reason for trial counsel to have ever raised the issue. In fact, had he done so, he would have been asserting a frivolous claim — something we should be discouraging. The majority, in remanding to determine whether trial counsel had any “reasonable basis” for failing to raise the competency claim is imposing an unnecessary burden on the court’s already limited time and resources, for it is clear that there was never a question of appellant’s competence. Accordingly, I dissent.
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 The following excerpts from the record support a finding that appellant was competent to stand trial:
Testimony of Dr. Laucks (psychiatrist for the prosecution):
Q Would you tell the Court what you observed about the personality of Harold Nelson during the course of your examination?
A Harold was quite calm and cooperative throughout the examination. He didn’t seem particularly anxious either about the examination or the situation in which he was currently caught up. At no point throughout the examination did he or I have any difficulty communicating. He did not display any evidence of gross mental symptoms that could be construed as psychotic. He described in considerable detail his behavior both in the current situation and prior to this. (N.T. at 60).
Q During the conduct of your examination, how would you describe his ability to answer questions or respond to questions or his general verbal productivity?
A Normal.
Q Was he aware of the charge against him?
A He was.
Q Was he aware of the possible sentence he might receive?
A Yes.
Q Did the defendant during your interview express any delusions, any hallucinations, or express any grandiose trends?
A. No.
Q. What is his orientation for time and place and people?
A. Normal. (N.T. at 63).
Testimony of Dr. Pandelidis (defense psychiatrist):
Q. What conclusion did you arrive at with respect to defendant being oriented and so on?
A. He was oriented in all spheres.
Q. Was he able to cooperate with you in the conversation?
A. He was. (N.T. at 77-78).