Court Opinion

ID: 9682596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:14:32.372637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:40.302510
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The testimony of the witness Dillard makes it clear that the *555only “practice of the industry” that “required” the fireman to give warning and the engineer to begin slowing the train in the situation outlined in the various hypothetical questions was the practice of exercising care to prevent accidents. It was quite natural then for the witness to answer questions concerning this “practice” by stating what he would have done. He did not at any time speak of a rule or custom or habit or practice or use any word of similar import. This is not surprising. He was not testifying about a rule or custom or habit or practice but was simply describing the precautions that he considered appropriate under the circumstances. The essential meaning of his testimony is not altered in any way by the conclusion of the trial court that the witness, in stating what he would have done, was not stating what he would have done. It is my opinion that Dillard’s testimony concerning the “practice of the industry” should have been excluded and that the Court improperly relies upon it to reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
Even if this evidence is considered, I would hold that it affords no support for the jury’s findings. The net effect of Dillard’s testimony is that a fireman, upon discovering an automobile traveling at a speed of 60 or 65 miles per hour at a distance of 2,000 or 2,500 feet from the crossing, should give some sort of warning that would cause the engineer to begin slowing the train. In other words, he would have the operatives of the train act on the assumption that the driver of an automobile moving at a speed of 60 or 65 miles an hour almost half a mile from the crossing might not stop before reaching the crossing. This is a heavier burden than that imposed by law upon the fireman and engineer.
We are dealing with a railroad crossing protected by signs on the highway jsome distance from the crossing and by flashing lights operating at the crossing. The highway is practically perpendicular to the railroad tracks, and there was no obstruction that might have prevented the driver of an approaching vehicle from seeing the signs and flashing lights. It further appears from the evidence that the driver of an automobile moving at a speed of 60 miles per hour can, upon becoming aware of a danger, stop the vehicle in a distance of approximately 200 feet. When the automobile in this case was 2,000 or 2,500 feet from the crossing, therefore, the operatives of the train “had a right to assume that the driver would stop it before reaching the crossing. Both ordinary care for his own safety and Article 6701d, Sec. 86(d), Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. required that he stop it.” Ford v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 151 Tex. 538, 252 S.W.2d 561. See also Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co. v. Hart, 163 Tex. 450, 356 S.W.2d 901. In this case, of course, it would be Section 86(a) of Article 6701d that required the driver to stop.
It is evident, moreover, that the firemen with whom Dillard had worked adhered to the “practice” of giving no warning of an approaching vehicle unless and until there was immediate danger of a collision. This is suggested by his testimony that he would begin to stop upon being warned that a car was coming up fast on the fireman’s side of the train. It is made clear by his answer, in response to other inquiries concerning the “practice in the industry,” that the fireman does not warn of every car he may see approaching the intersection but only “cars that he thinks are in danger of collision.” If that is 'the understanding between the fireman and engineer, the latter undoubtedly should begin slowing the train upon being warned by the fireman that an automobile was approaching. Indeed, the engineer would ordinarily be guilty of negligence if he failed to apply the emergency brakes.
The fireman on respondent’s train was somewhat more cautious than those whose practices Dillard had observed. He did *556not wait until the automobile “was in danger of collision” before warning the engineer. When he first saw the automobile, he warned the engineer that a car was “coming up on my side pretty fast” and to “blow your whistle for all it has got.” The engineer was already blowing the horn and continued to do so. This is all that either he or the fireman was required to do in the exercise of reasonable care at that time and thereafter until a person of ordinary prudence would have realized there was danger that the driver of the automobile would not stop it. Upon realizing that the driver probably would not stop his vehicle before it reached the crossing, the fireman gave further warning to the engineer and the latter applied the emergency brakes. It was then too late to avoid the collision.
In my opinion Dillard’s testimony concerning the “practice in the industry” constitutes at best a bare scintilla of evidence that the collision was proximately caused by any negligence on the part of either the fireman or engineer. It is not proper, of course, to find support for the negligence findings in the situation as it existed when the automobile was perhaps 300 or 400 feet from the crossing and then look to what the fireman and engineer might have done when the train was 1,000 feet from the crossing to support the proximate cause findings. There is no evidence of any fact or circumstance from which it can reasonably be concluded that a person of ordinary prudence in the position of the train operatives would have realized, at a time when the speed of the train could have been slowed sufficiently to avoid the collision, that there was danger that the driver of the automobile would not stop. It is my opinion that the record does not support the jury’s findings on which the liability of respondent must rest, and I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.