Court Opinion

ID: 9948966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:16:55.039024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.303660
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0061-22

T.K.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

R.K.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted February 13, 2024 – Decided March 8, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
                   No. FM-15-0950-09.

                   August J. Landi, Jr., attorney for appellant.

                   Law Offices of Steven P. Monaghan, LLC, attorneys
                   for respondent (Kristin Stoop Pallonetti, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1
   We use initials to refer to the parties and the minor child to protect their
privacy and preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
      Defendant R.K. appeals from the July 29, 2022 Family Part order, which

denied a plenary hearing regarding custody and parenting time because the judge

found no change in circumstances. Following our review of the record and

applicable legal standards, we affirm.

                                         I.

      Defendant and plaintiff T.K. were married in June 2006. They share a

minor child, C.K., born in June 2008. C.K. was diagnosed with autism spectrum

disorder, pervasive developmental disorder, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity

disorder. In August 2009, the parties divorced and incorporated into their final

judgment of divorce their marital settlement agreement (MSA). The parties

agreed to joint legal and shared residential custody of C.K.      Plaintiff was

designated as the parent of primary residence and defendant as the parent of

alternate residence. The MSA provided they would jointly make all major

decisions concerning C.K.'s health, safety, education, welfare, and religious

upbringing.

      Shortly after the parties divorced, disagreements arose regarding C.K.'s

education and medical decisions. In 2011, defendant moved for custody, to

become the parent of primary residence, and to remove C.K. from a "special

needs preschool program," which was denied. The motion judge ordered "an

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independent evaluation of [C.K.] regarding his [Individualized Education Plan]

and enrollment in the special needs program." Thereafter, a plenary hearing was

ordered regarding "educational-decision-making authority" and other ancillary

relief. After a parenting coordinator was appointed in 2013 to assist the parties

with education and medical disputes, the coordinator recommended "a change

from joint legal custody to sole legal custody . . . in favor of [plaintiff ]" or

alternatively, that plaintiff "make all medical and academic decisions for [C.K.]"

In 2014, the parties settled, agreeing to "resume joint legal custody" of C.K. and

that "custody decisions shall be discussed . . . via email only."

      In 2019, plaintiff moved for: a modification of parenting time; a custody

neutral assessment (CNA); defendant's attendance in a therapeutic program; a

review of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency's (DCPP) file; C.K.

to be interviewed; and other related relief. The DCPP had become involved

regarding C.K.'s welfare. Plaintiff maintained defendant was "regularly leaving

[their] son in his car for several hours at a time while he worked," and was

"repeatedly taking [C.K.] out of [s]tate" without informing her. Defendant filed

a cross-motion to: deny plaintiff's requested relief; receive a right of first

refusal; restrain and sanction plaintiff for not abiding by their parenting time

agreement; receive legal fees; and for other related relief.

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      In September, a new motion judge heard the motions and found the parties

had demonstrated "a sufficient showing of changed circumstances and that the

current arrangement may no longer [be] in the best interest[s] of the child." The

judge ordered "the parties' issues of custody and parenting time [be] referred to

mediation" and a CNA be completed. Based on plaintiff's allegation, the judge

further ordered the DCPP to provide its report and summary to the court. The

parties were to comply with the MSA and attend co-parenting therapy because

of the "high level of hostility between the parties" and lack of improvement with

the parenting time coordinator.

      In December, the CNA report was submitted. The judge permitted the

parties and counsel to review the CNA but barred its release. Plaintiff and her

counsel reviewed the CNA before the hearing, while defendant and his counsel

reviewed it the day of the hearing. At the hearing, the judge confirmed the

parties reviewed the CNA, that she had reviewed the "in-depth and

comprehensive report," and advised it "raise[d] a lot of concerns for the child

and [defendant]'s behavior toward[] the child."        The judge advised the

recommendations would be ordered and if the parties had "any questions," they

could "raise them." When asked if he had any questions, defendant responded

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"I am not agreeing to this." After further inquiry, his attorney responded there

were no questions.

      The judge awarded temporary sole custody to plaintiff pending further

order and directed the DCPP to become "re-involved" with the family.

Defendant was ordered to: "complete a [therapeutic program]"; cooperate with

the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) appointed; "undergo a comprehensive

psychological evaluation"; and then have "[t]herapeutic [s]upervised" visitation

with C.K. Defendant's completion of the ordered services was a "threshold"

requirement, and the judge stated that from "the court's perspective, the

paramount issue [wa]s safety of the child, best interests of the child," and there

was "a lot that [defendant] ha[d] to do before . . . hav[ing] unfettered, open

parenting time with that child." The judge ordered a "status update" in seventy-

five days to provide time for: the GAL to get involved, defendant "to do what

he need[ed] to do" and the submission of a GAL report. The judge ordered the

GAL "to more closely examine the concerns, interview the parties who provided

letters during the assessment process, perform an in-depth review [of C.K.'s]

treatment and school records, and communicate with any involved mental health

professionals for" C.K. The GAL was to "provide recommendations regarding

issues of legal custody and time sharing" and the cost of the GAL was allocated

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between the parties. As defendant failed to pay the GAL's retainer for several

months and complete the threshold programs, the matter was not heard.

      On November 17, 2020, defendant moved for: modification of the January

2020 order barring the release of the CNA; a due process violation finding; a

meeting with the GAL; and a case management conference (CMC). Plaintiff

cross-moved for:    a denial of defendant's requested relief; defendant to be

ordered to complete the psychological evaluation; and counsel fees. The judge

denied defendant's motion, finding his prior and current counsel were "aff orded

the opportunity to review the CNA." Further, the judge noted reconsideration

of the order was out of time and that the ordered reunification requirements had

not occurred because defendant failed to pay the GAL's retainer for

approximately eight months.      The judge partially granted plaintiff's relief,

ordering defendant to submit his psychological evaluation in camera and

awarding counsel fees.

      In a letter dated May 13, 2021, the GAL advised the court that, with the

assistance of a reunification therapist, a full weekend visit with defendant had

been arranged at the end of April. During that weekend, defendant called the

police about "his rights" to remove a "tracker" plaintiff had installed in C.K.'s

phone. The GAL reported defendant took C.K.'s phone several times, including

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                                       6
"at one point . . . pinn[ing C.K.] down and forcibly remov[ing] the phone from

his pocket." The GAL explained that although prior efforts to reunite C.K. and

defendant had restored their relationship and alternate weekend parenting time

was initiated, the GAL felt the process was "almost back to square one" after the

incident. Based on C.K.'s "justified fear of spending extended periods of time"

with defendant, the GAL was "forced to revert back to the old schedule" and

suggested two daytime visits with C.K. at defendant's home. The GAL conveyed

that after the daytime visits, the reunification therapist and the GAL would

reevaluate the possibility of "resuming a single overnight" visit. The GAL

represented that defendant failed to avail himself of the visitation opportunities

and had voluntarily chosen not to exercise his parenting time with C.K.

      In July, defendant filed a motion seeking: reinstatement of the MSA

parenting schedule; a plenary hearing; a due process violation finding; sealing

of the CNA from further consideration; a GAL meeting with the parties; a CMC;

and counsel fees. Plaintiff cross-moved for: a denial of defendant's motion;

review of the CNA; enforcement of prior orders; counsel fees; and other

equitable relief.

      On December 9, a different motion judge denied defendant's motion,

finding it was "essentially a motion for reconsideration packaged as an initial

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motion" and defendant "failed to prove a change [in] circumstances" on the

merits. The judge required "gradual[] reinstate[ment]" of defendant's parenting

time based on the child's best interests. Specifically, the judge found defendant

chose not to exercise further parenting time offered to him, refused to engage in

the reinstatement plan, and continued to rehash arguments previously presented.

The GAL was directed to work with the parties to "gradually resume

unsupervised overnight visitation," and a CMC was scheduled in three months.

Defendant appealed, which we dismissed on March 8, 2022 as interlocutory.

      On March 9, at a CMC, the judge ordered the matter "closed" with an

accompanying oral statement of reasons.           The judge determined that

"[defendant] ha[d] [not] followed any of the recommendations," there "were [no]

material facts in dispute . . . justifying a plenary hearing," and a motion to

address future changes could be filed in the ordinary course. Defendant moved

for leave to appeal, which we denied as the appeal was from a final order.

      On May 17, defendant again moved to: schedule a plenary hearing;

enforce daily communication with C.K.; vacate prior court orders; vacate the

GAL's and attorney's fees awarded; release the CNA; and deny plaintiff's fee

request. On July 14, plaintiff cross-moved, requesting: denial of defendant's

motion; the continued denial of a plenary hearing; the continued denial of a

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CMC; the judge review the CNA; the GAL to continue providing

recommendations; the parties continue to follow the CNA and the GAL's

recommendations; enforcement of prior orders awarding fees; award of fees; and

any equitable and just relief.

       On July 29, after argument, the judge issued a twenty-page order and a

statement of reasons. The judge denied without prejudice defendant's request

for a plenary hearing, finding no genuine issue of material fact existed. The

judge reasoned defendant had "voluntarily chose[n] to make himself unavailable

for the unsupervised, overnight weekend parenting that he s[ought] to re -

establish" and "gave up participating" in reunification.     Further, the ju dge

ordered defendant to "continue with the process" of reunification. The judge

denied defendant's other ancillary requested relief. Plaintiff's requested relief

was granted except for the demand that the CNA report to be reviewed.

       On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in: not ordering a

plenary hearing; denying a plenary hearing on procedural grounds; failing to

establish present circumstances; and off-loading judicial responsibility to the

GAL.

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                                         II.

       "We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their 'special

jurisdiction and expertise in family [law] matters.'" Gormley v. Gormley, 462

N.J. Super. 433, 442 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare v.

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Our scope of review of Family Part orders

is limited. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411. A judge's findings "are binding on appeal

so long as their determinations are 'supported by adequate, substantial, credible

evidence.'" Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. at 442 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-

12).

       A decision concerning custody and parenting time rests in "the sound

discretion of the trial courts." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995); see

Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 157 (App. Div. 2003)

("Judges of the Family Part are regularly called upon to make exceedingly

difficult and delicate decisions as to the best interest[s] of the children, and we

are obliged to give deference to both their findings and the exercise of their

sound discretion."). We review a judge's decision on a motion to modify custody

without conducting a plenary hearing for abuse of discretion. Costa v. Costa,

440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015).

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      In custody cases, "it is well settled that the court's primary consideration

is the best interests of the children." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105

(App. Div. 2007).     "A party seeking to modify custody must demonstrate

changed circumstances that affect the welfare of the children." Ibid. "Where

there is already a judgment or an agreement affecting custody in place, it is

presumed it 'embodies a best interests determination' and should be modified

only where there is a 'showing [of] changed circumstances which would affect

the welfare of the child[].'" A.J. v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173, 182 (App. Div.

2019) (quoting Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993));

see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). To determine whether the

requisite changed circumstances exist, the court must consider the circumstances

that existed at the time the current order was entered. See Beck v. Beck, 239

N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App. Div. 1990); see also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J.

Super. 117, 127-29 (App. Div. 2009). Then, the court can "ascertain what

motivated the original judgment and determine whether there has been any

change in circumstances." Id. at 288. The party seeking to change a judgment

or agreement involving a custodial arrangement bears the burden of

demonstrating the status quo is no longer in a child's best interests. See Bisbing

v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 322 (2017).

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                                        11
      Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing of changed

circumstances, only then is the moving party entitled to "a plenary hearing as to

disputed material facts regarding the child's best interests, and whether those

best interests are served by modification of the existing . . . order." Faucett v.

Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 111 (App. Div. 2009). Stated differently, a

plenary hearing is not required unless the parties' submissions demonstrate

"there is a genuine and substantial factual dispute regarding the welfare of the

children." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105; see also Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159; R. 5:8-

6 (requiring the court to "set a hearing date" if it "finds that the custody of

children is a genuine and substantial issue").

      "[A] judgment involving the custody of minor children is subject to

modification at any time upon the ground of changed circumstances." Innes v.

Carrascosa, 391 N.J. Super. 453, 500 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Sheehan, 51

N.J. Super. at 287). However, "not every factual dispute that arises in the

context of matrimonial proceedings triggers the need for a plenary hearing."

Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 1995). "[A] plenary

hearing is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate factual

dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012). "Without such a

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standard, courts would be obligated to hold hearings on every modification

application." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159.

      We also review orders denying reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016). A court

abuses its discretion "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissi ble

basis.'"   Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012)

(quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

                                       III.

      Based on the record, we are unpersuaded the judge abused her discretion

in denying a plenary hearing on custody and parenting time issues as no material

issues of fact existed.   Defendant presented no competent evidence of his

reunification efforts demonstrating a prima facie showing of changed

circumstances to alter the existing custody and parenting time plan in C.K.'s best

interests, much less a return to the status quo that existed before the MSA was

modified in January 2020. Because defendant failed to demonstrate a change in

circumstances occurred from the March 9, 2022 order to the order under appeal,

he was not entitled to a plenary hearing.

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      Given defendant's candid admission that he did not comply with the court-

ordered reunification process, because he felt "brief visits . . . [we]re more

hurtful for the child" and the scheduled visits were "insufficient," we are

satisfied the judge properly denied the plenary hearing and ordered that

defendant and C.K. "undergo[] a reunification process." The necessity for

defendant to engage in reunification therapy for C.K.'s best interests is well -

supported by the record.

      We reject defendant's contention that a plenary hearing is necessary to

establish the "present circumstances" and based on the passage of time. In

denying the plenary hearing, the judge accurately reasoned that the "court ha[d]

been continually involved with the same issues since 2019," defendant "chose

to make himself unavailable" for the reunification process, and his actions

required the order remain in the child's best interests. She concluded that

although defendant "gave up participating," the "GAL and the reunification

therapist remain[ed] ready, willing, and able to continue the developed plan."

The judge directed the "parties . . . to continue to cooperate with the reunification

protocol." We discern no reason to disturb the judge's well-reasoned decision.

      We are further unpersuaded by defendant's argument that the "trial judges

. . . consistently off-load[ed] judicial responsibility and decision-making to the

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                                        14
GAL." As an initial matter, defendant's argument is procedurally defective

because he failed to raise the argument before the court in his motion, and it is

therefore not properly before us. We generally decline to consider questions or

issues not presented below when an opportunity for such a presentation is

available unless the questions raised on appeal concern jurisdiction or matters

of great public interest. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234

(1973); see also Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014).

      Nevertheless, we briefly address his contention. "In all cases in which

custody or parenting time/visitation is an issue, a [GAL] may be appointed by

court order to represent the best interests of the child or children if the

circumstances warrant such an appointment." Milne, 428 N.J. Super. at 199

(quoting R. 5:8B(a)). "Once appointed, the GAL provides 'services . . . to the

court on behalf of the child . . . [and] acts as an independent fact finder,

investigator and evaluator as to what furthers the best interests of the child.'" Id.

at 200 (alterations in original) (quoting In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 173 (1994)).

      Defendant's contention that the GAL has served as a substitute for the

"court's exercise of its parens patriae obligation" is unsupported by the record.

After the CNA was completed in December 2019, a hearing was held on January

16, 2020. The judge advised the CNA's recommendations would be accepted

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                                        15
and provided the parties an opportunity to object and ask questions. Defendant

accepted the custody and parenting time plan established in the January order

which provided for:      therapeutic supervised parenting time, the DCPP's

reinvolvement, therapeutic program attendance, temporary sole custody to

plaintiff, a psychological evaluation of defendant, therapy for C.K. and plaintiff,

and the appointment of a GAL.          The GAL was appointed for C.K. to:

"communicate with . . . mental health professionals for [C.K.]"; communicate

with "the therapeutic supervisor" and defendant; "provide recommendations";

and report to the court the progress in C.K.'s best interests.         Relevantly,

defendant consented to the selected GAL, did not seek reconsideration, and did

not appeal. The record demonstrates, as the judge found, the GAL sought

defendant's reunification plan compliance in C.K.'s best interests, but he

voluntarily chose not to participate. Defendant's failure to comply with the

ordered reunification process is established by the record. Further, the unrefuted

history demonstrates the substantial need for a GAL for C.K.'s best interests.

Defendant's argument that judges offloaded judicial responsibility is meritless.

      To the extent that we have not addressed any of the parties' arguments, it

is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

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Affirmed.

                 A-0061-22
            17