Court Opinion

ID: 9665360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:45:54.246425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:15.041425
License: Public Domain

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with some of the holdings of the court, I would like to record my respectful dissent. The parties have favored the court with citation of many authorities, but in most respects, save one, the case reduces itself to a consideration of the impact of Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983). We appear to be among the first of many courts that will be called upon to deal with questions raised by this decision.
The precise holding of Sanchez is that damages for mental anguish are recoverable under the Texas Wrongful Death Act for the death of a child. TEX.REV.CIV. STAT.ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
In the cause under consideration the trial court submitted Special Issue No. 1(c) inquiring as to damages for the reasonable cash value of the loss of “society” of the deceased child. “Society” was defined as a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the continued existence of the other family members, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. A verdict and judgment against appellants for $500,-000.00 was rendered on the basis of this issue. In Special Issue No. 1(d) the court submitted the reasonable cash value of the past and future mental anguish suffered by Mrs. Reed as a result of the death of her son. An additional $500,000.00 was found by verdict and rendered by judgment against appellants on this issue. “Mental anguish” was not defined.
Loss of society, as defined, is included in the term “mental anguish” and the elements of damage thereof should not be separately submitted so as to invite, if not compel, a double recovery. “Mental anguish” and “loss of society” constitute emotional distress which should constitute one element of damages in a wrongful death case. I would, therefore, reverse and render the separate finding of damages for loss of “society” and consider, under the appropriate standards, the question of excessiveness with respect to the finding on mental anguish.
There is language in Sanchez both supportive of and contrary to my view. The supreme court noted that the Arizona Wrongful Death Statute had been interpreted to “allow recovery for loss of companionship and comfort and ... that these losses result in mental anguish”. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 254. The court further stated: “Therefore, our holding that a plaintiff *857may recover under the Wrongful Death Statute for loss of society and companionship and damages for mental anguish for the death of his or her minor child applies to all future causes as well as those still in the judicial process.” Id. This latter ruling would seem to indicate that all of these elements, save love and affection, may be considered; it fails, however, to decide the question whether the submission should be joint or separate.
In any event, the court in Sanchez states: “The judicial system has adequate safeguards to prevent recovery of damages based on sympathy or prejudice rather than fair and just compensation for the plaintiff’s injuries.” Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253. Among these safeguards is our duty to review the record as a whole so that we may exercise our sound judicial judgment and discretion in ascertaining the amount which would be reasonable compensation for the injuries sustained and treating the balance as excess. Having decided upon an amount that would be reasonable compensation, the court should authorize a remittitur of the excess in accordance with its sound judgment. Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835 (1959). The court has failed to make this assessment according to correct standards.
I agree with my brethren that the points challenging the conduct of counsel for ap-pellee do not reflect error. While vigorous and effective, most of the arguments were proper. Those arguments approaching impropriety certainly reflect no harmful error under Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.1979).
I am unable to agree with the holding of the court that the refusal of the trial court to allow evidence that Mrs. Reed shot and killed a man six or seven months after her son’s death did not constitute reversible error. Ordinarily, in an action for wrongful death the damages are fixed as of the time of the occurrence made the basis of suit and evidence of such a shooting would be entirely irrelevant unless an independent basis for admission is shown. Here, Mrs. Reed sought and obtained substantial damages for mental anguish for a period of time covering the shooting incident. It may be true, as the appellees’ psychiatrist indicated, that Mrs. Reed suffered no significant long term problems as a result of her killing another human being. The jury, however, could conclude otherwise. The jury is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The fact is the jury may not have believed this expert, and with good reason. In light of the claims being asserted and allowed, I cannot in good conscience apply the rule that the evidence, though probative, should be excluded because of prejudicial effect.
I would sustain appellants’ last point.