Court Opinion

ID: 9480653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:54:37.286586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:49.399132
License: Public Domain

concurring specially.
I agree with the result but concur specially. The opinion as written may be read by judges and lawyers to stand for the proposition that summary judgment for the defendant is inappropriate where the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case presents a prima facie case. I do not believe this is, or should be, the law. As the majority states, to establish a prima facie case, plaintiff need only show (1) she was in the protected age bracket; (2) her job performance was satisfactory; (3) she was discharged; and (4) she was replaced by a younger person of no better credentials. These elements can be satisfied without any evidence tending to rebut the defendant’s evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the employment dé-cision. I agree that the evidence introduced to establish a prima facie case — if it tends also to show that the employers proffered reasons are not credible — could be such that a summary judgment would be inappropriate and plaintiff would not be required to present additional evidence to raise a jury question. But, I do not believe that the fact that plaintiff has established a prima facie case in and of itself is sufficient to foreclose the granting of a motion for summary judgment. I believe this opinion should so state for the benefit of the trial bench and bar.
The First and Eleventh Circuits have held in ADEA cases that establishment of a prima facie case does not in itself entitle a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment. Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1111 (1st Cir.1989); Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828-29 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 782, 102 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989); Rollins v. Techsouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1987); Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir.1987); Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1987); Palmer v. District Bd. of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior College, 748 F.2d 595, 599 (11th Cir.1984); Pace v. Southern Ry. System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1391 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018, 104 S.Ct. 549, 78 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). The plaintiff also must present a genuine issue of materia] fact as to the pretextual nature of any reasons offered by the defendant as an explanation for its actions. See Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 707 (3rd Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. *496725, 107 L.Ed.2d 745 (1990) (Title VII); Hebert, 872 F.2d at 707; Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2nd Cir.1988) (ERISA); Young, 840 F.2d at 829; Box v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1378 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986) (Title VII); Parker v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 741 F.2d 975, 979-80 (7th Cir.1984); Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983); Pace, 701 F.2d at 1391.
The phrase “prima facie case” “not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 n. 7, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 216 n. 7 (1981). In the Title VII context, the phrase is used in the former sense. Id. It has the same meaning in the ADEA context. Thus, where the defendant rebuts the presumption created by the plaintiffs prima facie case with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reason given was not the true reason. Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d at 217. The evidence introduced as part of the prima facie case is to be considered. Id. at 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 n. 10, 67 L.Ed.2d at 216 n. 10.
The majority quotes a portion of footnote 10 which states: “there may be some cases where the plaintiffs initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant’s explanation.” This dictum could be interpreted to foreclose any summary judgments because there would be no opportunity for cross-examination if a summary judgment were granted. However, when the entire footnote 10 is read in relationship to the paragraph of the opinion containing footnote 10, it is clear that the ultimate burden of persuading the court that plaintiff has been the victim of intentional discrimination remains on her. If the evidence introduced as part of plaintiffs prima facie case does not tend to prove that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, defendant would be entitled to a summary judgment unless additional evidence is produced to rebut the proffered reasons.
Where the plaintiff presents genuine issues of material fact both as to the prima facie case elements and as to pretext, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Jalil, 873 F.2d at 707. See, e.g., Hebert, 872 F.2d at 1113-16 (summary judgment reversed); Montana v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100, 105 (2nd Cir.1989) (same); Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 466-67 (2nd Cir.1989) (same) (Title VII); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 61-62 (3rd Cir.1988) (same); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 456 (7th Cir.1988) (same); Perez v. Curcio, 841 F.2d 255, 257-58 (9th Cir.1988) (same); Rollins, 833 F.2d at 1529 (same); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898-900 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1052, 108 S.Ct. 26, 97 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987) (same). Conversely, where the plaintiff presents genuine issues of material fact only as to the prima facie case elements and not as to pretext, summary judgment is appropriate. See Jalil, 873 F.2d at 707. See, e.g., Fowle, 868 F.2d at 67; Dister, 859 F.2d at 1115-17; Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 109 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII); Young, 840 F.2d at 829-30; Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 803-04 (9th Cir.1987) (applying California law); Grigsby, 821 F.2d at 595-96; Dea, 810 F.2d at 15-16 (merely making out a prima facie case does not automatically save [plaintiff] from a summary, judgment motion); Box, 772 F.2d at 1378-80; Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 997-98 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985) (Title VII); Palmer, 748 F.2d at 599; Parker, 741 F.2d at 979; Steckl, 703 F.2d at 393; Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1980).
The Eighth Circuit has affirmed a summary judgment for a defendant where the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case established a prima facie case. See *497Pierce v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 601, 603-04 (8th Cir.1988) (Title VII). The defendant articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to promote the plaintiff. Id. at 603. The court agreed with the district court that the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer that the defendant’s articulated non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. Id. at 604. The court held that the plaintiff, having failed to raise any evidence of pretext, must, as a matter of law, fail in his claim of racial discrimination. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
The Eleventh Circuit directly addressed the issue in Grigsby v. Reynolds Metal Co., 821 F.2d at 595, holding that “the establishment of a prima facie case does not in itself entitle an employment discrimination plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment in all cases.” The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d at 393-94, stating:
Steckl also claims that summary judgment in an age discrimination case is precluded if a plaintiff has established a prima facie case and intends to prove pretext by challenging the credibility of the employer's witness on cross-examination. We disagree. Plaintiffs in ADEA cases must tender a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext in order to avoid summary judgment.
It should make no difference whether evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext comes in as part of the prima facie case or as additional evidence, after the employer has articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment action, but such evidence must be presented. Merely satisfying the elements required to establish a prima facie case is not enough to foreclose a summary judgment.
I therefore concur in the result, but believe it should be made clear that proof of a prima facie case by the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case does not in and of itself foreclose the granting of a motion for summary judgment when defendant has produced evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.