Court Opinion

ID: 9694052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:19:36.726228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:34.949820
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge COHN JUBELIRER.
I must respectfully dissent. The Delaware County Tax Claim Bureau (Bureau) was required to abide by the requirements of Section 607.1 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (RETSL),1 the statutory section that deals with additional notification efforts. It did not do so. Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court).
The property at issue was occupied by its owner, Gloria Pitts (Owner). The Bureau sent notice of the sale via certified mail to Owner in July 2006. This notice was returned to the Bureau as unclaimed. In August 2006, the Bureau sought waiver of personal service upon Owner, which the trial court granted. The Bureau did not make any further efforts to personally serve Owner prior to or subsequent to the sale of the property. Accordingly, Owner was not personally served notice of the tax sale. Owner only learned of the sale after finding a post-it note on her door that had been left by the purchaser of the property. Owner challenged the sale before the trial court. The trial court reviewed the record, made necessary findings, and determined that no reasonable efforts were made to notify Owner of the tax sale. I agree with the trial court’s findings and conclusion.
At issue here is Section 607.1(a) of the RETSL. There are two parts to this Section. The first part identifies when the section applies:
[w]hen any notification of a pending tax sale or a tax sale subject to court confirmation is required to be mailed to any owner ... and such mailed notification is ... returned without the required receipted personal signature of the addressee ... the bureau must exercise reasonable efforts to discover the whereabouts of such person or entity and notify him.
72 P.S. § 5860.607a(a) (emphasis added). The present case falls within this language because, as noted, the notice was returned without the required signature of the addressee. The effect of this first portion of the statutory section is to require “reasonable efforts” by the Bureau to discover the location of a property owner when the Bureau has not received a signed acknowl-edgement of the receipt of notice.
The term “reasonable efforts,” as used in the first part of Section 607.1, is defined in the second part of that statutory section. The definition of “reasonable efforts” has two components: (1) mandatory search requirements; and (2) discretionary search requirements.
As suggested by the name, the mandatory nature of these requirements is identified by the word “shall”, clearly indicating that these searches are to be performed in *1057all cases. 72 P.S. § 5860.607a(a). The mandatory requirements are as follows:
[T]he bureau must exercise reasonable efforts to discover the whereabouts of such person or entity and notify him. The bureau’s efforts shall include, but not necessarily be restricted to a search of[: (1)] current telephone directories for the county[; (2)] the dockets and indices of the county tax assessment offices, recorder of deeds office and pro-thonotary’s office[; and (3) ] contacts made to any apparent alternate address or telephone number which may have been written on or in the file pertinent to such property.
72 P.S. § 5860.607a(a) (emphasis added). Completion of one of these requirements does not eliminate the necessity to satisfy the remaining two requirements. Failure by the Bureau to conduct all three searches, at a minimum, is a fatal defect. Fernandez v. Tax Claim Bureau of Northampton County, 925 A.2d 207, 214 (Pa. Cmwlth.2007) (setting aside a judicial sale, noting that the tax claim bureau’s “failure to consult with these tax assessment offices provides sufficient basis on its own to require the judicial sale to be set aside.”).
The second component, the discretionary search requirements, are more broadly defined and what constitutes an appropriate discretionary search is determined on a case by case basis: “[T]he bureau’s efforts shall include, but not necessarily be restricted to [the mandatory searches].” 72 P.S. § 5860.607a(a) (emphasis added). In determining what are appropriate additional discretionary efforts, the Bureau is required to “use ordinary common sense business practices to ascertain proper addresses where notice of the tax sale may be given.” Farro v. Tax Claim Bureau of Monroe County, 704 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Pa. Cmwlth.1997).
In this case, the Bureau focused on the fact that the telephone directory requirement had been satisfied, but there is no indication in the original record or briefs that the second requirement, the “search ... of the dockets and indices of the county tax assessment offices, recorder of deeds office and prothonotary’s office” was completed. 72 P.S. § 5860.607a(a). The majority treats the mandatory searches as being merely discretionary. The statutory language and this Court’s precedent establish that “reasonable efforts” consist of the three mandatory searches and, given the facts, whatever additional searches are appropriate. Before we get to a discussion of what discretionary efforts, if any, are required, the mandatory search requirements must clearly have been met. Our precedent is clear that the mandatory search requirements will be strictly enforced, see, e.g., Fernandez, even if following the steps might not have led to a different result.2 I believe the majority errs by focusing on the discretionary efforts that the Bureau made, without first addressing the separate issue of whether *1058the Bureau complied with mandatory search requirements.
The majority’s opinion effectively puts the cart before the horse, absolving the Bureau of the mandatory “additional notification efforts” of Section 607.1 it must conduct, prior to the sale, because evidence produced after the sale indicated that the address the notice was sent to was indeed where Owner resided. The majority references Section 602(h) of the RETSL and its language that “[n]o sale shall be defeated ... because of proof that mail notice as herein required was not received by the owner, provided such notice was given as prescribed by this section.” Section 602(h) of the RETSL, 72 P.S. § 5860.602(h). The majority reads this language as precluding any subsequent review of the notification efforts because the Bureau complied with the requirements of Section 602 of the RETSL. The majority’s interpretation reads out of RETSL the additional, prescribed notification efforts of Section 607.1. I respectfully disagree, and note that Section 602(h) is premised on the assumption that “notice was given as prescribed.” I would read Section 602 in pari materia with Section 607.1. The protection of Section 602(h) only applies if the Bureau has fully complied with the notice requirements of the RETSL, which include the mandatory efforts of Section 607.1. Admittedly, “[ojnce the court confirms [a] sale absolutely, there can be no judicial inquiry in equity or in civil proceedings except with respect to the giving of notice under [the RETSL] and certain other matters.” Piper v. Tax Claim Bureau of Westmoreland County, 910 A.2d 162, 164 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (emphasis added). The mandatory search provisions of Section 607.1 fall within this exception.
Additionally, there is an undercurrent in the majority’s arguments that intimates that the Owner did not receive notice due to some fault of her own. In particular, the majority lists seven points that it finds to be important in concluding that sufficient notice was provided. The majority notes that Owner acknowledged receiving the tax delinquency notice. Additionally the majority notes that the judicial sale notices were returned as “unclaimed,” implying that Owner purposefully avoided receiving these documents. The majority also notes that there were efforts at personal service, and that the sale was advertised in local newspapers.
To the extent the majority suggests that Owner was at fault in not claiming the notice sent to her by the Bureau, our case law is clear that “[T]he focus is not on the alleged neglect of the owner, which is often present in some degree, but on whether the activities of the Bureau comply with the requirements of the statute.” Smith v. Tax Claim Bureau of Pike County, 834 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).3 The *1059statutory requirements are imposed “upon the agencies responsible for real estate tax sales” and require those agencies to strictly comply with the notice requirements “in order to guard against the deprivation of property without due process.” Smith, 834 A.2d at 1251 (citing McElvenny v. Bucks County Tax Claim Bureau, 804 A.2d 719 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002)).
I disagree with the majority’s finding that the notice requirements were met as to the tax sale because Owner acknowledges having received notice of tax delinquency. The law is clear that receipt of notice of tax delinquency is not relevant for purposes of the tax sale. Our United States Supreme Court, in addressing the Constitutional dimension of due process and notice, has recently and clearly held that “[a]n interested party’s ‘knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending.’ ” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006) (quoting Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2712, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983)). I respectfully suggest that, per Jones, we cannot equate knowledge of a tax delinquency with knowledge of a tax sale. In this case, regardless of what notice Owner received as to the delinquency, the Bureau was required to ensure that all statutorily prescribed procedures were met.
Additionally, in considering these seven points relied upon by the majority, it must first be mentioned that none of these seven points, either individually or collectively, made it unnecessary for the Bureau to comply with the requirements of Section 607.1. The language in Section 607.1 makes clear that its provisions apply whenever a notice is returned to the Bureau, regardless of the reasons why the notice was not received:
When any notification of a pending tax sale ... is required to be mailed to any owner ... and such mailed notification is either returned without the required receipted personal signature of the addressee or under other circumstances raising a significant doubt as to the actual receipt of such notification by the named addressee or is not returned or acknowledged at all, then, before the tax sale can be conducted or confirmed, the bureau must [utilize the notification efforts of Section 607.1].
72 P.S. § 5860.607a(a) (emphasis added).
I agree with the Owner that the record itself lacks documentary evidence that substantiates that all of the various means of notice referenced in these seven points were, in fact, used. At best, factual issues exist as to whether these various efforts were conducted. Notably, Owner’s testimony indicates that she did not receive any documentation indicating that there was certified mail waiting for her at the post office. (Trial Ct. Hr’g Tr. at 58.4)
*1060At argument before the En Banc Court, counsel for the purchasers summed up his client’s position and, as it is, the majority’s analysis, by stating the legal maxim that equity does not require an act that is fruitless. With this maxim, counsel and the majority nullify the mandatory statutory language based on the ex post facto conclusion that these mandatory searches would have been pointless. I note that these notice requirements are not creatures of precedent, arising in equity, but are legislatively prescribed in statute. In strictly interpreting these provisions, I do not see this Court as requiring “fruitless” endeavors but, rather, I see this Court fulfilling its function of upholding and applying the due process concerns founded in the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, which informed the General Assembly in its enactment of the RETSL. As discussed earlier, we are required to strictly construe and apply these notice requirements. In this case, the trial court, in response to Owner’s petition, did just that.
As I would affirm the trial court’s order, I must respectfully dissent from the majority.

. Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, added by the Act of July 3, 1986, P.L. 351, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5860.607a.

. The majority relies on In re Tax Sale of Real Property Situated in Jefferson Township, 828 A.2d 475, 480 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), to support the conclusion that a review of county records, such as the recorder of deeds, was not necessary because "nothing in the record suggests that such a search would have revealed anything other than the address to which the notices were mailed.” However, that case did not involve owner-occupied property. In that case, the owner was arguing that the Bureau needed to search the recorder of deeds records of a county outside of the county where the property was located. In contrast, the statute only requires a search of the recorder of deeds for the county where the property is located. Nothing in that case can be read to allow a tax claim bureau to forgo conducting the statutorily mandated search of the office of the recorder of deeds for the county where the properly is located.

. Whether the statutory task is pointless, or whether the property owner is herself negligent, does not excuse the Bureau from conducting these statutorily required searches:
The [RETSL], however, imposes duties not upon owners but upon the agencies responsible for real estate tax sales. Notice to owners of an impending sale of their properties is a duty requiring strict compliance in order to guard against the deprivation of property without due process. Thus, the focus is not on the alleged neglect of the owner, which is often present in some degree, but on whether the activities of the Bureau comply with the requirements of the statute. [The property owner] did not have a duty to give the Bureau notice of her address change.
Finally, the Bureau argues that because Mrs. Smith never lived in Pike County, the "Trial Court’s insistence on strict construction of Section [607.1] is abuse of discretion.” The mandate to "search phone directories, records and indices, would be a futile act which would accomplish no further protection for the property owner and *1059could at the same time require a pointless task.”
Whether the statutory task is pointless does not excuse its attempted performance. The Bureau[']s argument that pursuing the statutory requirements for additional notice of a tax sale would not have made a difference is mere speculation.
Smith v. Tax Claim Bureau of Pike County, 834 A.2d 1247, 1251-52 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (citations omitted). I would also note that there was testimony that Owner’s estranged husband had access to her mail and occasionally took her mail during July and August of 2006. (Trial Ct. Hr’g Tr. at 69-70.) Owner also testified that her estranged husband had previously been responsible for the payment of the taxes. (Trial Ct. Hr’g Tr. at 57.)

. I note that the record contains two distinct transcriptions of the April 30, 2007 hearing that took place before the trial court. There are some scrivener's differences between the two transcriptions, resulting in differences in the pagination between the two transcrip*1060tions. However, for purposes of the issues before this Court in this appeal, the transcriptions are substantively the same. For clarity's sake, I note that both the majority opinion and my dissent cite to the transcription in the record that was also included in the reproduced record before this Court, and that had been attached as Exhibit A to the memorandum of Owner in support of her petition to set aside the sale that she had filed in the trial court.