Court Opinion

ID: 9648134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:04:13.65748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:56.657054
License: Public Domain

Alcorn, J.,
with whom House, J., concurs (dissenting). The majority correctly holds that “the possession of property recently stolen, if unexplained and standing alone or without other facts pointing to a contrary conclusion, will justify the *564trier in drawing the inference that the possessor stole the property”; that “the inference is one of fact”; that “[t]he soundness of the inference to be drawn involves the probative value of circumstantial evidence”; and that “the probative tendency and force” of such evidence “may justify an inference of theft, or of receipt of stolen goods, largely depending on the other facts and circumstances.” Without indulging in a complete recital of the evidence here, I am satisfied that, in each of these cases, the trial court, applying those principles, could, as it did, properly conclude that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime of receiving stolen goods as those elements are summarized and explained in State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543, 546, 95 A.2d 695. The conclusion of the trial court is not unreasonable or illogical or contrary to or inconsistent with the relevant facts, and consequently this court should not intervene to substitute its judgment on the evidence for the conclusion reached by the trier. Arvee Construction Co. v. Ardolino, 144 Conn. 7, 12, 127 A.2d 39; State v. Malm, 142 Conn. 113, 115, 111 A.2d 685; State v. Simborshi, 120 Conn. 624, 626, 182 A. 221.
I find no error in either case.