Court Opinion

ID: 9517401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:16:02.289071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:02.831536
License: Public Domain

White, C. J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully but strongly dissent. The majority opinion finds that the word “airport” in section 3-502, R. R. S. 1943, can mean only an airport authority licensed for public use. In so doing the majority opinion prohibits the lawful attempts of the City of Seward to operate under the Cities Airport Authorities Act, sections 3-501 to 3-514, R. R. S. 1943, to develop a safe and approved airport for the city.
The majority opinion thwarts the project of the City of Seward in the initial stages of its project for the singular reason that the airport being developed does not already meet the standards that the Cities Airport Authorities Act is designed to achieve. At best, this is an incongruous result. The lawfulness and appropriateness of the City of Seward’s action is best demonstrated by a brief survey of the Cities Airport Authorities Act.
Section 3-502, R. R. S. 1943, authorizes the creation of a city airport authority at the discretion of the mayor and city council of the city.
Section 3-504(4), R. R. S. 1943, specifically gives a city airport authority, the power: “To acquire, in the name *662of the city, by purchase or condemnation, real property or rights or easements, therein necessary or convenient for its corporate purposes, * *
The corporate purposes of the authorities are clearly defined in the same section at subsection (9): “To design, construct, maintain, operate, improve, and reconstruct so long as its corporate existence shall continue such projects as shall be necessary and convenient to the maintenance and development of aviation services, to and for the city in which such authority is established, including landing fields, * * * and all facilities necessary or convenient in connection with any such project * * (Emphasis supplied.)
The word “project” as used in the act includes, “any airport operated by the authority, including all real and personal property, * * § 3-501 (6), R. R. S. 1943.
The word “real property” is “any and all things and rights usually included within the term real property, including not only fee simple absolute but also any and all lesser interests, such as * * * leases.” § 3-501 (5), R. R. S. 1943.
Property acquired by the city may be conveyed or transferred to the city airport authority by resolution of the city council for use by the airport authority in connection with the project.
The city airport authority is given the power to tax the property of the city it services, to accept grants from the United States, the State of Nebraska, or any other agency, and incur debt and issue negotiable bonds. It may also expend all such funds for corporate purposes. § 3-504 (12), (14), (15), R. R. S. 1943.
The corporate purposes, as. have been cited above, are the design, construction, improvement, or maintenance of an airport project.
The Legislature has clearly and thoroughly provided authorization for a city to acquire land and funds to develop an airport' to service the city. The city airport authority is to have “full and exclusive jurisdiction and *663control over all facilities owned or thereafter acquired, by such city for the purpose of aviation operation, * * (Emphasis supplied.) § 3-502, R. R. S. 1943.
The language of the statute is explicit in referring to present and future land and facilities. The words “design” and “construct” do not envision existing entities but rather proposed facilities. As, if the language of the Cities Airport Authorities Act was not sufficiently clear, the Legislature included an even more definitive section. Furthermore, the section is relevant to the appellee’s attempt to put the question of the airport authority to a vote of the electors of the city.
“Sections 3-501 to 3-514 shall be full authority for the creation of airport authorities by cities, and for the exercise of the powers therein granted to cities and to.such authorities, and no action, proceeding or election shall be required prior to the creation of airport authorities hereunder or to authorize the exercise of any of the powers herein granted, any provision of law or of any city charter to the contrary notwithstanding, * * (Emphasis supplied.) § 3-504.01, R. R. S. 1943.
The conduct of the City of Seward through its city council during the period between acquisition of the lease from Charles Krutz and the application for a license to operate a public use and then a private use, personal landing area, is completely consistent with the spirit and letter of the Cities Airport Authorities Act. The council did not have to act in haste or deception in acquiring the lease of the Krutz’ land or creating the airport authority by resolution. The denial of a license to operate a public use airport in no way jeopardizes the powers or authority of a city airport authority to design and construct a project airport under the auspices of the Cities Airport Authorities, Act.
According to statute, council resolution is sufficient to create the airport authority; a lease interest in property is sufficient real property for the airport authority to manage; and, the corporate purposes of the air*664port authority thereby created include the design and construction of airport projects.
Furthermore, the federal definition of airport, on which the majority opinion relies, Title 49 U. S. C., § 1101(8), now § 1711(12), is part of an even more extensive program for the development of civil aviation in the United States. See, Title 49 U. S. CL, §§ 1713(a), 1714 (a), 1716 (a), and 1716(b).
It is clear that the statutory scheme and spirit of the Nebraska Cities Airport Authorities Act is in response to the natural priority evidenced by Title 49 U. S. C., § 1701: “That the nation’s airport and airway system is inadequate to meet current and projected growth in aviation.”
The City of Seward was attempting to work within the statutory framework provided by the Nebraska Legislature for the acquisition of land and development of municipal airports. The city should not be forbidden to comply with the laws of Nebraska in order to bring public aviation facilities to Seward.
I would reverse the judgment and dismiss the cause so that the city airport authority may continue its project under the authority of the Cities Airport Authorities Act.
Carter, J., joins in this dissent.