Court Opinion

ID: 9859580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:03:40.517785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:53:38.976393
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: Although I agree that under Illinois law the statute of limitations in a latent disease case begins to run on the date the injury is discovered, I do not agree that it begins to run anew for each successive injury caused by the same wrongful act. For this reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Illinois law imposes a two-year limitations period on a cause of action for personal injury. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 — 202.) In the case of injuries that develop over a long period of time, such as asbestos-related diseases, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both of the injury and that it was wrongfully caused. (Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 161, 169, 421 N.E.2d 864.) However, once the existence of an injury and its wrongful cause are known, the fact that the full extent of the plaintiffs damages is not immediately ascertainable will not toll the limitations period. Reat v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1964), 47 Ill. App. 2d 267, 271-72, 197 N.E.2d 860; Deer v. New York Central R.R. Co. (7th Cir. 1953), 202 F.2d 625, 628; Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Lobianco & Son Co. (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 765, 768, 357 N.E.2d 621, affd (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 126; Del Bianco v. American Motorists Insurance Co. (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 743, 747, 392 N.E.2d 120; Austin v. House of Vision, Inc. (1968), 101 Ill. App. 2d 251, 256, 243 N.E.2d 297. In Reat v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1964), 47 Ill. App. 2d 267, 197 N.E.2d 860, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against his employer for damages resulting from a 1955 accident which caused an injury to his foot. A doctor took X rays and wrongfully advised the plaintiff that his foot was not damaged. In fact, the foot was fractured, causing the plaintiff to subsequently develop an infection which necessitated amputation of a' portion of the leg in 1958. The court held that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued for purposes of the statute of limitations in 1955 when the injury occurred and that no new cause of action arose as a result of the subsequent infection. In support of this conclusion, the Reat court cited the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Deer v. New York Central R.R. Co. (7th Cir. 1953), 202 F.2d 625. The plaintiff in Deer was injured in 1945 when he was struck on the head by a chain hoist. Two months after the accident, his hair began to fall out and he was told by his doctor that his hair nerves were paralyzed. In 1946, the plaintiff began to suffer headaches and seizures, and in 1950 he was advised that he had developed a brain tumor as a result of the accident. The court in Deer, interpreting Illinois law, held that the cause of action accrued at the time of the initial injury in 1945 and that no new cause of action arose when the plaintiff subsequently developed a brain tumor. In line with the reasoning of Reat and Deer, I believe that the instant cause of action accrued, for purposes of the statute of limitations, in 1972 when the plaintiff discovered that he had asbestosis resulting from the defendant’s wrongful conduct. At that time, he knew both that he was injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused. (See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 161, 169, 421 N.E.2d 864.) Given the above-cited case law, I do not believe that Hlinois law can be properly interpreted to allow a personal injury plaintiff in a latent disease case to state a separate cause of action with a separate two-year limitations period for each distinct injury resulting from the same wrongful conduct.