Court Opinion

ID: 9480231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:41:40.163404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:33.268337
License: Public Domain

DUFF, District Judge,
concurring in the result.
I agree with the court that the Department of the Navy lawfully suspended Otto Engdahl under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501 et seq. (1988), and that the Navy did not violate Engdahl’s right to due process under the fifth amendment to the Constitution. I write separately only to express caution at one aspect of the court’s opinion, and to register a minor disagreement.
The central issue concerning the Navy’s power to suspend Engdahl under Chapter 75 is whether the Navy’s suspension was “disciplinary,” as that word appears in 5 U.S.C. § 7501(2). The court has discussed § 7501(2)’s use of “disciplinary” four times prior to this case, beginning with Thomas v. General Services Admin., 756 F.2d 86 (Fed.Cir.1985). In Thomas, the General Services Administration suspended an employee whom a psychiatrist had diagnosed as highly paranoid, pending action on the agency’s application to retire the employee on grounds of disability. The employee trained federal law enforcement officers, had disrupted agency operations on numerous occasions, and had threatened his coworkers. See id. at 87.
The agency claimed that it could suspend the employee under Chapter 75 as a disciplinary measure. This court agreed. While the court’s decision today quotes from the pertinent passage in Thomas which justified the agency’s action as being disciplinary, I believe that the context of those quotations is so critical to their meaning that I must quote a fuller version here:
We conclude that Congress did not intend, in the [Civil Service] Reform Act, to preclude appeals [to the Merit Systems Protection Board] of involuntary suspensions [in disability retirement cases]. Such suspensions — which are ordered because the agency believes that the employee’s retention on active duty could result in damage to federal property, or be detrimental to governmental interests, or be injurious to the employee, his fellow workers, or the public — are “disciplinary” in the broader sense of maintaining the orderly working of the Government against possible disruption by the suspended employee (pending the determination of that employee’s disability retirement).
Thomas, 756 F.2d at 89 (footnote omitted).
Thomas defined “discipline” for purposes of Chapter 75 as a means to achieve *1580specific ends — namely, protecting government property, preserving the orderly working of the government, and saving the employee, his co-workers, and the public from injury. Discipline is not an end in itself, nor is it a means by which the government may serve private interests. Every decision of this court which has invoked Thomas’s definition comports with this view. See Mercer v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 772 F.2d 856 (Fed.Cir.1985) (upholding suspension of employee who slept on job and threatened co-workers with injury); Wilson v. Turnage, 791 F.2d 151 (Fed.Cir.1986) (upholding suspension of Selective Service employee who took concerns about military preparedness outside of the chain of command); Pittman v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 832 F.2d 598 (Fed.Cir.1987) (upholding suspension of employee who was physically incapable of performing light work; suspension protected worker from injury and served government’s interest in seeing work performed properly).
Thomas’s definition of “disciplinary” allowed the Navy to suspend Engdahl without pay under Chapter 75 of the Act. As the court observes, Engdahl’s superiors lost confidence in Engdahl’s ability to perform his work safely, as his duties required him to enter private households on the naval base where Engdahl worked. One finds the evidence which indicates that Engdahl was a risk to base personnel in affidavits from Engdahl’s supervisors. From the record it appears that Engdahl never challenged the opinions reflected in these affidavits. Had Engdahl done so, this appeal could have turned out differently. See D.E. v. Department of the Navy, MSPB, 721 F.2d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir.1983) (Navy employee convicted of child molestation; Navy’s conclusory claims of distrust of employee insufficient to support subsequent discharge of employee). Nevertheless, the Navy had a legitimate disciplinary interest under Thomas in suspending Eng-dahl, rather than risking injury to persons living in base households or incurring costs to supervise Engdahl more closely.
The court also points out that the Navy had a second reason for disciplining Eng-dahl: improving the job performance of Engdahl’s female co-workers. The record again supports the Navy’s contention that Engdahl’s presence at the base prevented at least two of its employees from working well; again the Navy prevails perhaps on account of less than strenuous opposition from Engdahl* But here is where I feel caution is required. Although the presumption in our criminal laws is that a person is innocent until proven guilty, our emotional presumptions often run the opposite — and it is the rare person who does not bring his or her emotions to the workplace. One could read the court’s opinion as approving government efforts to cater to these emotions, under the guise of promoting workplace efficiency.
There are dangers in this. It is perhaps easy for one to approve of suspending a worker accused of the heinous crimes which Engdahl faced — notwithstanding what appears to be an unsullied work record, and no evidence of any sexual devi-*1581anee outside of the home. Nevertheless, I fear the cases which are further down the slope which the court may be on today. What of the employee who is arrested in an unpopular protest, one which makes the employee’s co-workers feel “uncomfortable,” “disgusted,” or “revulsed?” I would hope that this court would stop short of countenancing a disciplinary suspension in such a situation, but by enshrining workplace efficiency in the manner the court chooses today, the court might be ready to accept even that result.
I can briefly state my one disagreement with the court. The court states that the public had three interests which outweighed Engdahl’s significant stake in keeping his job: protecting base residents, assuring workplace efficiency, and avoiding adverse publicity to the Navy. Subject to the concerns which I have expressed already, I agree with the court that the public had an interest in protecting base residents and assuring workplace efficiency. I disagree that the government had an interest in avoiding notoriety in this case. While it is true that the press reported the initial charges against Engdahl, nothing in the record supports the conclusions that this press reflected badly on the Navy, and that the public had less confidence in naval operations as a result of Engdahl’s arrest.
But this is a minor point. The court reaches the correct conclusion that, in light of the interests at stake and the alternative procedures available to the Navy, Engdahl has not demonstrated that the Navy deprived him of due process. Engdahl had ample opportunities to persuade the Navy that its concerns were unfounded, and I cannot fault the Navy for Engdahl’s choice not to challenge the allegations of his fellow workers. It was thus lawful for the Navy to suspend Engdahl, even if the accusations of Engdahl’s co-workers were in large part what I suspect them to be: the products of visceral reactions to Engdahl’s arrest.

 The Administrative Judge presented the most complete description of these two affidavits in the record:
In her affidavit, Kathleen T. Quinn noted that she is a supply clerk ... [who] comes into contact with [Engdahl] probably a couple of times a week. Quinn first learned of [Eng-dahl’s] arrest when she was shown a newspaper article reporting the incident by a coworker. She is aware that some of the charges were dropped at [Engdahl’s preliminary] hearing, but would feel uncomfortable and extremely uneasy if she would come in contact with [Engdahl], She characterized her feelings as being disgust and revulsion, and would not want to work around him anymore.
In her affidavit, Carmen I. Castro stated that she is a clerk-typist ... and first became aware of [Engdahl’s] arrest when she was shown a newspaper article ... by Ms. Quinn. She works in the office with Quinn, and regularly sees [Engdahl] at least twice a week in the office, and almost every day on the agency premises outside of the office. She is aware that certain of the charges against [Engdahl] were dropped, but still feels strongly that she would be very uncomfortable if she ever came in contact with him again. Castro is fearful of her well being in that she might sometimes be alone in the office when [Engdahl] would be about the agency premises.
Petitioner’s Appendix 21-22.