Court Opinion

ID: 9839112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 18:04:32.115664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:57.765705
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23 Escalante v. Maximum Management Corp. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

SILVIA ESCALANTE,                                               B317792

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 20STCV03859
         v.

MAXIMUM MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Reversed.

     Akhidenor Law and Michael O. Akhidenor for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

     Turner Henningsen Wolf & Vandenburg, Matthew C. Wolf,
Lauren VanDenburg and Robert Cho for Defendant and
Respondent.

                                    _________________________
       Plaintiff Silvia Escalante appeals the judgment entered
after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of her
landlord Maximum Management Corporation. She contends the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there
are triable issues of fact on her causes of action for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability and negligent maintenance of
premises. We agree the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment, reverse the judgment, and remand for further
proceedings.
                         BACKGROUND
      Beginning in March 1998, Escalante was a tenant in Unit
207 of an apartment building located on South Normandie
Avenue in Los Angeles, pursuant to a written agreement between
Escalante and respondent, the building’s landlord. When
Escalante moved into the building, respondent informed her that
complaints by tenants were to be made in writing to the resident
manager of the building. Escalante acknowledged she was
informed of this process, but stated: “However, most times you go
to the office to make complaints, the managers do not give you
the complaint for [sic] to fill out but simply acknowledge your
request and send you in [sic] your way with a promise that
repairs will be carried out.”
      Escalante alleged in her complaint that the building was
infested with cockroaches and had defective plumbing when she
moved in, but she was unaware of those conditions at the time.
Beginning in or about January 2014, she became increasingly
aware of dangerous and defective conditions in her apartment,
including “infested kitchen cabinets, roaches, mold, infestation of
bed bugs, leaks from bathroom ceiling, toilet [overflows] due to
plumbing issue, no functioning heater, water bubbles on

                                  2
bathroom ceiling, [and] dirty smelly water running from all
faucets in the home.” She began notifying respondent of the
conditions, but respondent failed and refused to repair the
conditions.
      In January 2020, Escalante brought this action against
respondent, alleging two causes of action against respondent, for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability and negligent
maintenance of premises. She alleged that she paid rent in the
amount of $1,003 per month, but her use of her apartment was
reduced by 75 percent as a result of the dangerous and defective
conditions. She also alleged she suffered property damage and
economic loss from the dangerous and defective conditions.
      Respondent demurred to the complaint on the ground that
each cause of action failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action and was uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible.
Respondent filed a motion to strike certain damages allegations.
Respondent also contended Escalante’s claims were barred by the
statute of limitations. The clerk’s transcript does not include the
ruling on the demurrer or motion to strike, and respondent has
not moved to augment the record on appeal with this ruling. The
case progressed to summary judgment on the original complaint,
so we presume the demurrer and motion to strike were
unsuccessful.
      Respondent was successful on summary judgment and this
appeal followed.
                          DISCUSSION
       When a plaintiff appeals from an order granting a
defendant summary judgment, we must independently examine
the record to determine whether triable issues of material fact
exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763,

                                  3
767; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “ ’Since defendants
obtained summary judgment in their favor, “we review the record
de novo to determine whether [they have] conclusively negated a
necessary element of the plaintiff’s case or demonstrated that
under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires
the process of trial.” ’ ” (Saelzler, at p. 767.) “In performing our
de novo review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to
plaintiff as the losing party [citation], liberally construing her
evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants’
own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or
ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.” (Id. at pp. 768–769.)
       Appellant’s brief is woefully deficient not only in identifying
evidence in the record which would show she offered evidence
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact, but in other ways as
well.1 Generally, “ ‘de novo review does not obligate us to cull the
record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to
uncover the requisite triable issues.’ ” (Gunn v. Mariners
Church, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.) At the same time,
“[a] party is entitled to summary judgment only if it meets its
initial burden of showing there are no triable issues of fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) This is true even if the

1     Appellant failed to provide an adequate record in this case.
She did not designate respondent’s memorandum of points and
authorities in support of its summary judgment motion,
respondent’s separate statement of facts, the declarations
supporting respondent’s separate statement of facts, or her own
separate statement of facts and supporting declaration.
Respondent, however, moved to augment the record with these
pleadings and we have granted that motion.

                                  4
opposing party fails to file any opposition. (Thatcher v. Lucky
Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1086–1087
[94 Cal.Rptr.2d 575].) ‘The court’s assessment of whether the
moving party has carried its burden—and therefore caused a
shift—occurs before the court’s evaluation of the opposing party’s
papers. [Citations.] Therefore, the burden on the motion does
not initially shift as a result of what is, or is not, contained in the
opposing papers. And because a reviewing court employs the
same three-step process in the course of its de novo review of a
summary judgment [citation], this conclusion applies with equal
force on appeal.’ (Y.K.A. Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency
of City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 367
[94 Cal.Rptr.3d 424], fn. omitted.)” (Mosley v. Pacific Specialty
Ins. Co. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 417, 434; see Denton v. City and
County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 779, 794 [“[E]ven
without opposition, a court may not grant a motion for summary
judgment unless it first determines that defendants have met
their initial burden of proof.”]; accord, Reilly v. Inquest
Technology, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 536, 551, fn. 3 [“Reilly
suggests the issue of whether the [relevant] Act applied was
waived due to Inquest’s failure to oppose the summary
adjudication motion. Not so. To prevail on the motion, the
burden fell on Reilly to submit evidence sufficient to establish
each element necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.”].)
       In its ruling, the trial court concluded that “[t]he moving
party met its burden to make a prima facie showing that no
triable issue of material fact exist[ed],” but the trial court’s
analysis preceding that conclusion fails to offer any explanation
of how respondent did so.

                                   5
       Accordingly, we consider de novo whether respondent met
its initial burden of showing no triable issue of material fact in
order to determine whether summary judgment was properly
granted. We note that “a moving defendant who claims that the
plaintiff cannot prove all the elements of his case must present
evidence in support of this claim. The defendant cannot simply
challenge the plaintiff to prove his case by opposition. [Citation.]
In other words, ‘a plaintiff resisting a motion for summary
judgment bears no burden to establish any element of his or her
case unless and until the defendant presents evidence either
affirmatively negating that element (proving its absence in fact),
or affirmatively showing that the plaintiff does not possess and
cannot acquire evidence to prove its existence.’ ” (Y.K.A.
Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 353–354 (Y.K.A. Industries).)
Typically, a defendant negates an element by offering evidence of
factually devoid discovery responses.
I.    Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
      The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability are the existence of a materially
defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability; notice to
the landlord; the landlord’s failure to correct the condition within
a reasonable time; and damages. (See Erlach v. Sierra Asset
Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296–1297
(Erlach).)
      In its memorandum of points and authorities in support of
summary judgment, respondent argued that summary judgment
was warranted because appellant had no evidence of 1) the
existence of a material condition affecting the premises’
habitability; 2) notice given to the landlord of any material

                                 6
defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability;
3) defendant’s failure to correct the defect within a reasonable
time; and 4) resulting damages. However, respondent set forth
only two issues for summary judgment in its separate statement:
it did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged
conditions in appellant’s complaint and it did promptly address
and repair issues of which it did have actual or constructive
notice.2 The result of this incongruity was that respondent made
statements in its memorandum of points and authorities which
were not found in its separate statement, particularly with
respect to the existence of the defective conditions and resulting
damages. Nevertheless, we will discuss each element in turn.
      A.    Materially defective conditions
      The first element of a cause of action for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability is the existence of a materially
defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability.
      Appellant alleged in her complaint that beginning in or
about 2014, there were numerous dangerous and defective
conditions in her apartment, including but not limited to

2      Respondent has forfeited its claim, briefly mentioned at
oral argument, that the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed on
the alternative ground of the statute of limitations, an issue
which respondent raised but the trial court did not address.
Respondent mentions this issue only once in its appellate brief, in
the standard of review section, and does not make any
substantive factual or legal argument in support of the issue.
Simply mentioning that the issue was raised in the trial court is
not sufficient, particularly when done in an inappropriate section
of the brief. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)

                                 7
“infested kitchen cabinets, roaches, mold, infestation of bed bugs,
leaks from bathroom ceiling, toilet [overflows] due to plumbing
issue, no functioning heater, water bubbles on bathroom ceiling,
[and] dirty smelly water running from all faucets in the home.”
All of these conditions as described would affect the habitability
of the apartment.3
       In its memorandum of points and authorities, respondent
claimed that “While Plaintiff provides a laundry list of alleged
dangerous conditions, Plaintiff provides no actual evidence of the
existence of these alleged dangerous conditions. The only shred
of evidence Plaintiff provides is a picture of bugs in a Ziploc bag
and documents related to bed bug treatment by Amen Pest
Control, which Defendant ordered to treat [the] bed bug
complaint.” Respondent does not support this contention with a
citation to its separate statement and there is no comparable
statement in that document. As respondent itself points out, the
separate statement is not merely a technical requirement: “it is
an indispensable part of the summary judgment or adjudication
process.”
       Even setting aside the deficiency in the separate statement,
respondent’s vague and general contention is difficult to analyze.
Respondent seems to be relying on appellant’s responses to
requests for document production and further seems to suggest
that the responses are factually devoid. This approach might
have some merit if appellant was required to produce

3      They would generally violate Civil Code section 1941.1, and
a violation of that section or another “statutory housing standard
that affects health and safety is a strong indication of a
materially defective condition.” (Peviani v. Arbors at California
Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891.)

                                8
photographic or documentary evidence of the defective conditions
in her apartment. Respondent has not cited, and we are not
aware of, any such requirement. Indeed, appellant’s testimony
alone is sufficient evidence of the conditions. There is nothing in
the record to suggest that appellant would be unable to testify at
trial concerning her observation of defective conditions in her
apartment.4

4      Although not determinative of our analysis on this appeal,
we note that appellant’s declaration in support of her opposition
is in fact evidence that the defective conditions existed. She is
clearly competent to testify that her heater did not work, her
toilet overflowed, dirty and smelly water came from all her taps,
there was a leak from her bathroom ceiling and water bubbles on
that ceiling and there were insect infestations of her house.
There is no requirement that she corroborate this testimony with
photographs or otherwise. Moreover, these descriptions of the
non-insect conditions are sufficiently detailed that a
representative could easily locate them within appellant’s
apartment. Locations of insects are more difficult to specify, as
insects are mobile. Appellant’s declaration indicates her kitchen
was the locus of the infestation. Appellant also narrowed down
the time frame in which she became aware of those conditions to
August 2015, and stated that she complained about the defective
conditions that same month. Similarly, her declaration is
evidence that there were bedbugs in her apartment in 2017.

       We also note the trial court declined to rule on respondent’s
evidentiary objections to appellant’s declaration and cited the
declaration in other parts of its ruling. Given this reliance on the
declaration for some issues, it is not clear to us why the court
ignored the declaration when it found appellant had not produced
sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact as to
the defective conditions.

                                 9
       Respondent also contends there is evidence in the form of
city inspection reports which affirmatively shows there were no
defective conditions in appellant’s apartment. Although
respondent does not support this contention with a citation to its
separate statement, we are readily able to locate the relevant
statements.
       Undisputed Material Fact (UMF) 9 states: “The City of Los
Angeles Housing Department (‘HCIDLA’) conducted a regular
inspection of part of the Systemic Code Enforcement Program
(SCEP) on August 17, 2016. The only deficiency found in Unit
#207 was for a smoke detector that was too close to a ceiling fan.
The ceiling fan had been installed by the tenant. Defendant
moved the smoke detector and installed another smoke detector
in the hallway. [¶] See Mills Decl., ¶ 10, Exhibit A.”
       The cited evidence lacks foundation and is hearsay. The
referenced Exhibit A to the Mills declaration includes a one-page
summary of the 2016 inspection report which does not list
specific violations, and does not identify which units had
violations; the report is not authenticated, and Mills does not
even state that he has attached it to his declaration.5 Mills does
not explain how he acquired personal knowledge of the specific
finding for appellant’s unit.6 But even if we accepted Mills’s

5      To be precise, although Mills states that he has attached a
true and correct copy of a 2021 inspection report, he does not
make the same statement with respect to the 2016 (or 2017)
reports attached to his declaration. In fact, he does not state that
he is attaching those reports as an exhibit.
6     Mills did not state he worked for respondent in 2016 or
explain what his job duties. We cannot simply speculate that he

                                10
statement about the 2016 report, that report would at most show
that the defective conditions were not present in August 2016. It
would not negate the earlier or later existence of those conditions.
       If we were to consider the 2016 report, we would also have
to consider the 2021 report, also offered by appellant, although it
suffers from similar evidentiary problems. The 2021 report is
much more detailed and shows several violations for appellant’s
unit; respondent apparently believes those violations are minor
and not material, but the report itself states the condition affects
habitability.7
       Thus, respondent has not offered evidence “ ’either
affirmatively negating [the materially defective condition]
element (proving its absence in fact), or affirmatively showing
that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot acquire evidence to

accompanied the city inspector during his inspection of
appellant’s apartment in 2016.

        If Mills read a copy of the full report, the report itself would
be hearsay and his statements would be double hearsay.
Statements by other employees describing the contents of the
(full) report to Mills would be hearsay, or possibly double hearsay
and Mills’s statement would be double or triple hearsay.
7      The report finds an “inter-wall/ceiling” violation consisting
of “1. Peeling paint at ceiling corner above tub[,] 2. Water
damaged wall between tub and toilet [and] 3. Bubble at wall
above window.” The report notes that inter-wall/ceiling
violations are rated as low severity because “Defective
wall/ceiling covering creates a minimally untenantable situation
and could diminish weather protection. Although this type of
violation reduces habitability and may cause injury, it is unlikely
to be life threatening.”

                                  11
prove its existence.’ ” (Y.K.A. Industries, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 353–354.)
      B.    Notice
       The complaint alleges appellant “repeatedly notified
management, of the defects and dangerous conditions described
in this complaint and requested that Defendant have them
repaired.”
       Respondent acknowledged receiving three written
complaints in 2015, and two complaints in 2017 about a bedbug
infestation. Respondent contended appellant could not show it
received other notice. By this, respondent appears to have meant
that appellant’s discovery responses were factually devoid.
Respondent argued that “Plaintiff cannot recall to whom nor
when Plaintiff gave notice of the alleged conditions. Plaintiff
recalls that she has given notice of the conditions in August 2015
and that she notified a manager of the property of the
conditions.” Although respondent did not support this contention
with a citation to its separate statement, the corresponding UMF
is readily ascertainable. UMF 17 states: “Plaintiff cannot
remember the details of who or when she made any complaints
regarding her unit. Plaintiff believes that she made complaints
to a property manager sometime in August 2015. [¶] See Wolf
Decl., ¶ 2, 4-6, Exhibits 1-3.” Although lacking in detail, this does
not rise to the level of a factually devoid discovery response. It
shows a reasonable narrow date range for appellant’s complaint
and identifies the person to whom she complained by title.
Respondent certainly knows this person’s identity. In addition,
respondent does not appear to dispute that it received notice of
the bedbug complaints in April and November 2017.

                                 12
      We recognize that respondent also stated appellant was
required to make all complaints in writing, and that any oral
complaints should, in effect, not impose a duty to repair on
respondent. Respondent has not cited any legal authority for the
proposition that written notice is an element of a cause of action
for the breach of the implied warranty of habitability, or for a
cause of action for negligence. The warranty of habitability is
implied in every lease in California, and conditions on that
warranty, assuming such conditions were permissible, would
have to be included in the lease. Respondent has offered no
evidence that written notice to the building manager was a part
of appellant’s lease. Respondent’s representative stated only that
appellant “was advised of the [process] when she moved in.”8

8     Although not determinative of our analysis on this appeal,
we note appellant acknowledged that she was informed of the
written notice requirement, but stated in her declaration that
“However, most times you go to the office to make complaints, the
managers do not give you the complaint for [sic] to fill out but
simply acknowledge your request and send you in [sic] your way
with a promise that repairs will be carried out.” This would
certainly raise a triable issue of material fact concerning whether
respondent actually required written notice.

       We question the trial court’s reading of appellant’s
declaration on this matter. The trial court stated: “Plaintiff
states that she did not receive written receipts of her complaints;
rather, managers would often ‘simply acknowledge your request
and send you in [sic] your way with a promise that repairs would
be carried out.’ ” We understand this statement to mean that the
managers would not give appellant a complaint form to fill out,
that is, the managers told appellant she did not need to make a
written complaint. We note, again, that appellant’s testimony is
evidence of the fact to which she testified, and there is no

                                13
Respondent does not provide evidence expressly denying it
received oral complaints from appellant.
       Thus, respondent has not offered evidence “ ’either
affirmatively negating [the notice] element (proving its absence in
fact), or affirmatively showing that the plaintiff does not possess
and cannot acquire evidence to prove its existence.’ ” (Y.K.A.
Industries, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 353–354.)
      C.    Repair within a reasonable time
       The complaint alleged that respondent did not repair the
defective conditions or did not repair them in a reasonable time.
       Respondent offered evidence that it remedied the three pre-
August 2015 complaints by appellant. Appellant did not, in fact,
dispute the pre-August 2015 toilet and wall repairs.
Respondent’s response to the April 15, 2015, roach complaint
appears to have been a roach treatment. If the treatment was
effective, a matter not shown by any evidence, it was not long-
lasting. Both appellant’s declaration and her interrogatory
responses show a roach infestation in August 2015. Respondent
does not contend it provided a roach treatment in or after August
2015.
       Respondent also did not offer evidence that it repaired the
other defects identified in the complaint in a timely manner.
Rather, respondent relied on its own summary of a 2016 city
inspection to show the defective conditions did not exist at that
time. Leaving aside the evidentiary issues with the inspection
report, the inspection took place on August 17, 2016, a year after
appellant’s August 2015 complaints. Even if we considered that

requirement that she provide corroboration such as receipts for
her complaints.

                                14
report, and treated it as conclusive, a year to make repair would
not be a reasonable period as a matter of law for ordinary repairs.
      Respondent’s own evidence also does not show that it fixed
the underlying problem of defective plumbing which appellant
alleged had existed in the building. The August 2016 inspection
report may be evidence that respondent repaired the bathroom
leak damage identified by appellant, but the same or similar wall
and ceiling damage showed up in the 2021 inspection report.
Five years would not be a reasonable time to repair defective
plumbing.
      We also find that respondent did not show that it remedied
appellant’s bedbug infestation in a reasonable time, or at all. It
is undisputed that respondent ordered a one-time heat treatment
in April 2017 in response to the bedbug complaint. There is,
however, no evidence that this treatment actually eliminated the
bedbugs. Respondent did not, for example, offer evidence that it
inspected the apartment and found no bedbugs.9 Nor did it

9     Respondent stated that as part of its process for handling
tenant complaints, “After the work is completed, the Resident
Manager confers with the tenant, inspects the finished work, and
then notifies the office of the completion of the work.” There is no
evidence that this actually occurred with the bedbug treatments.

       Although the burden did not shift to appellant to show the
ineffectiveness of the remedy, appellant did state in her
declaration that she continued to get bedbug bites during the
summer of 2017. To the extent that respondent relied on the
2017 city inspection report to show that the bedbugs were
eliminated before summer, that reliance was misplaced. As
described by respondent, the inspection occurred because
appellant “called the city for a complaint on May 3, 2017. The
city inspected and issued work orders . . . . All repairs were

                                15
provide expert testimony that a single heat treatment is normally
sufficient to eliminate bedbugs.
       As respondent acknowledged, appellant complained of
bedbugs again in November 2017. Viewed in the light most
favorable to appellant, this evidence should have put respondent
on constructive notice that bedbugs were a persistent problem
and that one treatment might not eliminate them. Respondent
did order a new and different treatment, involving chemicals.
Respondent has not offered any evidence that this treatment was
effective either.
       Thus, respondent has not offered evidence “ ‘either
affirmatively negating [the repair] element (proving its absence
in fact), or affirmatively showing that the plaintiff does not
possess and cannot acquire evidence to prove its existence.’ ”
(Y.K.A. Industries, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 353–354.)
      D.    Damages
      Appellant alleged in her complaint that she suffered two
forms of damage: a reduction in the use of her apartment by
75 percent as the result of the dangerous conditions and
“property damage . . . including . . . mattresses, bedding, linens
[and] pillows . . . due to contamination” by insects and mold.
      Respondent contended in its memorandum of points and
authorities that appellant had no evidence of damages, but at the
same time noted that appellant “present[ed] a receipt for new
bedding materials.” We understand this to be a reference to
appellant’s discovery responses, although respondent did not

completed and the complaint was satisfactorily closed on July 6,
2017.” There is no indication that the complaint involved
bedbugs or that the inspector looked for them.

                                16
provide a citation to the separate statement and did not list this
as an issue to be decided. Viewed in the light most favorable to
appellant, this is a receipt for bedding damaged by respondent’s
failure to remedy the defective conditions in appellant’s
apartment, particularly in light of the allegations of appellant’s
complaint. Respondent has not explained why this should not be
treated as evidence of damages, and there is similarly no
discussion by the trial court of why property damage would not
be recoverable.
       More importantly, a tenant may recover damages in the
amount of “the difference between the fair rental value of the
premises had they been in the condition warranted and their fair
rental value with the uninhabitable condition [(Green v. Superior
Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 638)], [or] the rent paid by the tenant
multiplied by the percentage of the premises rendered unusable
due to the uninhabitable condition (id. at p. 639, fn. 24; Cazares
v. Ortiz (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d Supp. 23, 33 [168 Cal.Rptr. 108]).”
(Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1298.) Under this second
method, the trial court determines the percentage of unusable
premises after hearing evidence of the defects. (Cazares, at
p. 29.) Appellant’s rental payments were not disputed, and
appellant would not need to produce any additional evidence to
recover under this theory. Put differently, because respondent
has not negated the elements of defect, notice and repair, he has
not negated this element either.
II.   Negligence Cause of Action
       In its pleadings and separate statement, respondent did not
treat the negligence cause of action any differently than the
implied warranty of habitability cause of action. Thus, based on
respondent’s showing in the trial court, we would reach the same

                                17
conclusion for the negligence cause of action as we did for the
breach of the implied warranty of habitability cause of action.
Summary adjudication of the cause of action is not warranted.
       However, the trial court did treat the two causes of action
differently in its ruling. The trial court explained that the
elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are
the same: a legal duty, breach of that duty, and proximate cause
resulting in injury. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1132, 1158.)
       The court then found that respondent “had a duty as the
manager of [appellant’s] residence to identify and counteract any
materially defective conditions there. As seen above,
[respondent] operated a protocol to allow residents in its property
opportunity to raise maintenance concerns with management.
[Citation.] Further, [appellant’s] use of this procedure prompted
[respondent] to address insect infestations on three separate
occasions and a plumbing malfunction. [Citation.] Given the
relatively short time within which [respondent] addressed
[appellant’s] documented complaints, the court finds that
[respondent] did not breach their duty to [appellant] to behave as
a reasonable manager of [the] residential property.”
       The mere existence of an unobserved protocol cannot
satisfy a landlord’s duty. As we mention above in the background
section and in footnote 8, appellant states in her declaration that
respondent did not follow its own protocol: it sometimes refused
to provide the requisite forms to make a written complaint.
Thus, even if the burden had shifted to appellant to show a
triable issue of material fact concerning notice on the negligence
cause of action, she has made that showing.

                                18
        It is not entirely clear what the court means by “address,”
but as we have discussed above, respondent did not provide any
evidence that its insect treatments worked. Specifically,
respondent did not provide any evidence that it followed its
protocol for making repairs, which called for it to inspect the
finished work and consult with the tenant.
        The trial court also found that appellant did not present
evidence that respondent’s “alleged negligence proximately
caused [her] injuries; as stated above, [appellant] does not offer
an itemized, specific list of her maintenance requests that went
unheeded by [respondent].” As we mention in footnote 4 above,
in her declaration, appellant does provide an adequately specific
list of the defective conditions in her apartment and does state
that she notified respondent of them. While it is not entirely
clear what the court means by “unheeded,” respondent does not
claim to have addressed those defective conditions in a timely
manner, or at all. The most that can be said is that respondent
offered inadmissible hearsay evidence that the conditions were
not present a year later. Similarly, while respondent did offer
evidence that it provided a single treatment for each insect
complaint, there is at least a question of fact as to whether it
would be “heeding” appellant’s complaints if the treatments
provided were not effective remedies of the defective conditions.
        Accordingly, summary adjudication was not proper on this
cause of action for negligence.

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                         DISPOSITION

     We reverse the judgment and remand for further
proceedings. Appellant is awarded costs on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             WILEY, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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