Court Opinion

ID: 9831948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:29:54.403356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:39.790418
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[5, 6] Appellees Dickinson, Gibson, and Quinn insist that we were in error in vacating the receivership as to the real property involved in controversy, as to which *223alone they asserted a lien, for the reason that appellant, who only claims right in the personal property, alone appealed from the order appointing the receiver. But in this view we cannot concur. It is manifest from the record that the parties to the controversy are numerous; that the rights are conflicting and necessarily interdependent. In such cases the court of necessity must have all of the parties interested in the subject-matter before it and be able to adjust and dispose of the several antagonistic priorities in a single final judgment. The reversal of the order appointing the receiver, therefore, should stand as against all parties to the original action whether parties to the present appeal or not, the practice on appeal being that where the rights of one party are dependent in any manner upon those of another, the appellate court will treat the judgment as an entirety, and where a reversal is required as to one it will reverse the judgment as a whole. See Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 S. W. 548; Belcher v. Wilson, 31 Tex. 140; Thompson v. Kelley, 100 Tex. 536, 101 S. W. 1074; Reeves v. McCracken (Sup.) 128 S. W. 895.