Court Opinion

ID: 9741850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:03:04.754251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:26.803598
License: Public Domain

*429DYKMAN, J.
{concurring). The majority concludes that because the informer’s privilege contained in sec. 905.10(1), Stats., is a common law doctrine, Larsen has no constitutional right to the identity of the informers. I do not join in this conclusion. The majority either implies that sec. 905.10(1) takes precedence over the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution or it ignores Larsen’s argument that notwithstanding sec. 905.10(1), he has a fourteenth amendment right to a new trial if the state fails to provide him with material exculpatory evidence in its possession.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), held that as a matter of federal due process, the state may not suppress material evidence favorable to the accused upon his request for that evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), re-affirmed the Brady rule, but emphasized the Brady requirement that the evidence be material.
The Brady holding has been applied to a broad list of exculpatory material, such as FBI interviews with potential witnesses, United States v. Brimberry, 803 F.2d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1977 (1987); statements of a co-conspirator, United States v. Driver, 798 F.2d 248, 250 (7th Cir. 1986); statements of an FBI informant, United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1986); ballistic tests, United States v. Peltier, 800 F.2d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 1986); payments to informants, Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1986) (decision on remand from United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)); letters from a U.S. embassy, United States v. Kluger, 794 F.2d 1579, 1580 (10th Cir. 1986); knowledge that a person other than defendant was considered a primary suspect, Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d *430593, 596 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 458-59 (1986); a report of a coast guard officer, United States v. Severdija, 790 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir. 1986); and information that the state’s chief witness had been given immunity or thought he had been given immunity, Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 719 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2192 (1987).
There is no exception to the Brady rule to the effect that a state statute such as sec. 905.10(1), Stats., permits the state to suppress evidence obtained from an informant. I would direct the trial court to consider Larsen’s fourteenth amendment due process claim as well as his sec. 905.10(3)(b) claim.