Court Opinion

ID: 9790865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:00:35.876604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.278894
License: Public Domain

Young, C. J.,
with whom Springer, J., agrees,
dissenting:
We conclude that Mazzan’s claims have merit because his *752attorney, Laurence McNabney, failed to present highly favorable witnesses to testify as to his good character prior to the crime, and because McNabney had no reasonable explanation for this omission. Consequently, counsel’s deficiencies raise serious doubt as to the reliability of the penalty hearing results. Therefore, we would vacate Mazzan’s death sentence and remand his case to the district court for another penalty hearing.
Preliminarily, we acknowledge that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special need for reliability when the jury determines that death is the appropriate punishment in a capital case. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1986 (1988). Moreover, “the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985) (citation omitted). Thus, the fact that we once before reversed Mazzan’s death penalty because his counsel was ineffective should have no bearing on our review of this appeal.
We evaluate Mazzan’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and recognized by this court in Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 683 P.2d 504 (1984). The test provides that in order to set aside his death sentence, Mazzan must show: (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; and (2) that but for counsel’s mistakes, a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.
The prosecution spent more than three days presenting its evidence of aggravating circumstances, that Mazzan committed the murder in the course of a burglary and robbery.1 However, McNabney called only three witnesses. One witness, the victim’s father, testified that he had no overriding desire to have Mazzan executed. The two character witnesses, a prison chaplain and a prison counselor, testified to Mazzan’s good character during his time in prison. Although McNabney knew of other significant mitigating evidence available to him, he declined to present this testimony. Specifically, McNabney decided not to have Jean Mazzan, Mazzan’s mother, testify on her son’s behalf.
McNabney determined that Mrs. Mazzan did not know very much about her son because he left home at the age of seventeen to join the Navy. McNabney reached this conclusion despite the *753fact that Mazzan lived with his mother at different times during his adult life and that, even when Mazzan lived elsewhere, they remained in constant contact, either by letters or by telephone or by visits.
McNabney thereby undermined the importance of a mother testifying before a sentencing jury, burdened with determining the value of her son’s life.2 A defendant is entitled to present a plea for mercy. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-331 (1985). If McNabney had called Mrs. Mazzan, she could have presented an effective plea for mercy.
At a hearing on Mazzan’s petition for post-conviction relief, McNabney minimized the impact of Mrs. Mazzan’s testimony when he stated that “if you remove all the sympathy or moving nature of it or whatever, . . . there was little substance to it.” Thus, McNabney committed an error analogous to that discussed by Justice O’Connor in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987). In Brown, the Supreme Court upheld an instruction that the jury not be swayed by “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor observed that a danger inherent in attempts to remove emotion from capital sentencing procedures is that such attempts may mislead jurors into believing that mitigating evidence about a defendant’s background or character also must be ignored. Id. at 545-546.
Furthermore, McNabney had no reasonable basis for excluding Mrs. Mazzan’s testimony. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114 (1987) (holding that counsel’s concern that a mother’s testimony might reveal a criminal offense not in the record provided a reasonable basis for counsel’s decision not to present mitigating evidence); Wilson v. State, 105 Nev. 110, 771 P.2d 583 (1989) (concluding that counsel’s failure to call the family to testify did not vitiate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the family might deliver damaging testimony).
Finally, McNabney refused to present the other witnesses who *754testified at the post-conviction hearing, his former wife, a business associate and several friends and acquaintances. All of them said that they had come voluntarily and would have testified at Mazzan’s penalty hearing, had they been asked. They stated that they felt Mazzan should not receive the death penalty because he is basically a warm and caring individual and would not be a threat to society. Several of them remained in contact with Mazzan after his incarceration. Those individuals shared confidences with Mazzan and depended upon him for advice.
The defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action of counsel constituted a sound trial strategy. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186-187 (1986). The majority opinion holds that McNabney’s failure to call Mazzan’s mother and the other character witnesses represented a tactical decision. However, McNabney’s reasons for these decisions demonstrate a lack of understanding of the capital sentencing phase and further support Mazzan’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
At the post-conviction hearing, McNabney testified that he knew of witnesses who would describe Mazzan as a kind and helpful person and that he agreed with that characterization. However, McNabney incorrectly concluded that the evidence of Mazzan’s peaceful and compassionate nature was important only at the guilt phase. Incredibly, McNabney believed such evidence might be more damaging than helpful at the penalty phase because such testimony would make the murder appear more heinous, more gruesome. Under this analysis, any mitigating evidence would highlight the brutality of a homicide and would thus be counterproductive. Therefore, McNabney chose to rely on character evidence as mitigation, but his “logic” prevented the sentencing jury from hearing all available testimony of Mazzan’s good character prior to committing the crime.
The consideration of a defendant’s character is a “constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death,” to be considered together with the circumstances of the crime. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). “Just as the state may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-114 (1982) (emphasis in original). In the instant case, McNabney precluded the sentencing jury from considering favorable testimony of Mazzan’s character before he went to prison.
As well, McNabney’s decision to focus on evidence that Mazzan was a model prisoner resulted in testimony highly prejudicial to Mazzan. Before introducing the prison chaplain and prison *755counselor, McNabney attempted to exclude evidence that Mazzan was housed on death row. The prosecution argued that Mazzan’s position as a death row prisoner affected his conduct while in prison. Although the district court recognized the prejudicial nature of such evidence, the court allowed the prosecution to present this information as a motive for Mazzan’s good behavior in prison. Despite this advance knowledge, McNabney presented these character witnesses rather than Mrs. Mazzan and the others who testified at the post-conviction hearing. Subsequently, the prosecution revealed through cross-examination that Mazzan was a death row inmate.
McNabney’s misunderstanding of the concept and importance of mitigation resulted in the exclusion of highly favorable character evidence. Additionally, his introduction of character evidence from Mazzan’s time in prison prejudiced the sentencing jury by informing them that Mazzan had been previously sentenced to death. Therefore, Mazzan demonstrated that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, satisfying the first prong of Strickland.
Likewise, but for McNabney’s omission of this character evidence, the second jury could very well have decided against the death penalty.3 In his closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that the two aggravating circumstances, robbery and burglary, may not be sufficient cause to impose the death penalty. However, in the prosecutor’s opinion, the fact that Mazzan killed a friend in the victim’s home made this a “death case.”4 Conse*756quently, even the prosecutor admitted that the two aggravating circumstances in Mazzan’s case may not warrant the death penalty.
A jury in a capital sentencing proceeding makes a “highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.” Dawson v. State, 103 Nev. 76, 80, 734 P.2d 221, 223 (1987) (citations omitted). Under Nevada law, the jury weighs the mitigating factors against the aggravating circumstances which it finds to determine whether the defendant shall live or die.
In the instant case, the omitted testimony would have placed the murder in its proper perspective — a tragic but isolated event in a productive life that continues to impact positively on many people. Thus, a reasonable probability exists that, had it heard the additional mitigating evidence, the jury would not have imposed the death sentence. Therefore, we conclude that McNabney’s failure to present more mitigating evidence on Mazzan’s behalf was error serious enough to abrogate Mazzan’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Accordingly, we would vacate Mazzan’s death sentence and remand to the district court for a new penalty hearing.

 At Mazzan’s first penalty hearing, the prosecution never even attempted to prove burglary as an aggravating circumstance.

 The majority opinion states that “the hope of swaying the jury with an expression of the mother’s feelings for her convicted son is sufficiently speculative that counsel’s failure to use her was not ineffective assistance.” To support this position, it cites People v. Wright, 768 P.2d 72 (Cal. 1989). However, Wright did not involve counsel’s failure to present testimony of the defendant’s mother. Rather, counsel failed to object to the trial court’s exclusion of all potential witnesses from the proceeding, including defendant’s mother. Id. at 97. The court held that the benefits of the mother’s presence throughout the proceedings were too speculátive to conclude that counsel’s inaction prejudiced defendant. Id.

 The majority notes that at the guilt phase of appellant’s trial, appellant’s counsel had presented testimony of the mother and other witnesses whose absence from the second penalty trial constitute the basis for appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance. However, the fact that the first jury heard this character evidence at the guilt phase and still found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death does not mean the evidence had no effect. That the first jury imposed a death sentence is more likely explained by counsel’s ineffective assistance at the first penalty phase. See Mazzan v. State, 100 Nev. 74, 675 P.2d 409 (1984). The purpose of character evidence at the guilt phase in a capital case is entirely different from its purpose at the penalty phase. Moreover, because the second penalty jury never heard the character evidence, even at a guilt phase, it had no opportunity to consider this mitigating evidence. Had the jury heard the character evidence, it may well have decided against death.

 The majority opinion justifies the prosecution’s remarks as character evidence properly presented to the sentencing jury pursuant to NRS 175.552. However, we have never allowed the prosecution to characterize evidence as aggravating which conflicts with one of those circumstances listed as aggravating under NRS 200.033. The legislature determined that killing a person at random and without apparent motive is an aggravating circumstance. NRS 200.033(9). Because the prosecution’s argument that Mazzan’s killing a friend aggravated the seriousness of the murder controverts this statutory aggravating circumstance, we conclude that such an argument was impermissible.