Court Opinion

ID: 9366023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 18:01:00.032465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:48.822783
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-5075     Document: 010110803223        Date Filed: 01/25/2023     Page: 1
                                                                  FILED
                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        January 25, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                   Clerk of Court

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 21-5075
                                                     (D.C. No. 4:20-CR-00237-JFH-1)
  CARL GENE ORTNER, JR.,                                       (N.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Defendant Carl Gene Ortner, Jr. was convicted after a jury trial of transportation

 of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (Count

 1); sexual abuse of a child in Indian country, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152 & 2243(a) (Count

 2); abusive sexual contact in Indian country, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152 & 2244(b)(3)

 (Count 3); possession of parts of a bald eagle 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (Count 4); and

 possession of parts of a golden eagle, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (Count 5). He was sentenced to

 concurrent terms of life as to Count 1; 180 months as to Count 2; 24 months as to Count

 3; 12 months as to Counts 4 and 5; and supervised release of varying terms in the event

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 21-5075     Document: 010110803223          Date Filed: 01/25/2023      Page: 2

 he was ever released from imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the jury instructions

 for Count 1–3 constituted plain error due to a lack of an accurate explanation of criminal

 intent and specification of an underlying state offense (Count 1) and failing to require a

 finding that Mr. Ortner was a non-Indian (Counts 2 and 3). He also argues that the

 district court erred by (1) failing to sever the sex offense counts (1–3) from the eagle

 parts counts (4–5), and (2) imposing a $100,000 fine. Exercising jurisdiction under 28

 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.

                                        Background
        In 2016, Mr. Ortner, then 53-years-old, met S.W., then 14-years-old and a member

 of the Wyandotte Nation tribe. At the time of their introduction, S.W. and her parents,

 Mr. and Mrs. Wright, were grieving the death of S.W.’s sister, who had been involved in

 a fatal car accident one year earlier. S.W. became acquainted with Mr. Ortner by virtue

 of her participation in tribal powwows, where she and Mr. Ortner would perform

 traditional dances. Mr. Ortner began to spend time with S.W.’s family, offering to help

 S.W. recover from the loss of her sister. To affiliate with her family and to get close to

 S.W., Mr. Ortner portrayed himself as a member of the Native American community.

 Mr. Ortner gave S.W. regalia he constructed from eagle feathers for her to wear in tribal

 dances. Such items are considered sacred and a great honor to receive from an elder in

 the tribal community.

        Mr. Ortner was not registered as a member of any tribe, and during an

 investigation, Mr. Ortner “advised that he was not Native American.” 3 R. 194.

 However, the record suggests that Mr. Ortner was informally accepted as an elder in the
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 Indian community. 3 R. 107, 179–80. Mr. Ortner gave S.W. eagle feathers and bought

 S.W. other gifts, including jewelry and underwear Mr. Ortner termed “big girl panties.”

 3 R. 64. At a certain point in their relationship, Mr. Ortner began to engage in a pattern

 of abuse. At first, S.W. described “sensual touching,” groping, and kissing, while the

 pair played basketball at a gym on Wyandotte land. 3 R. 59–61, 68–69. Around

 November 2017, S.W. testified that outside a convenience store on Wyandotte, Mr.

 Ortner touched her under her clothes and put his hand in her vagina. 3 R. 67.

        In January 2018, Mr. Ortner traveled to Joplin, Missouri from Wyandotte,

 Oklahoma, with S.W, who was 15. See 3 R. 70–71. At trial, S.W. stated that leading up

 to this trip, Mr. Ortner asked her various questions related to sex. Mr. Ortner described

 the trip as an errand relating to his work for an advertising agency and testified that S.W.

 “ran with [him].” 3 R. 70, 250. The government theorized that Mr. Ortner had planned

 to have sex with S.W. in Joplin, where that plan was realized. Aplee. Br. at 8. S.W.

 testified that on this trip they had sex for the first time, in a conference room at Mr.

 Ortner’s office at night. 3 R. 72–73. Mr. Ortner recalled that the trip occurred in

 daylight and that he waited until after the trip to have sex with S.W., when she would turn

 16. 3 R. 250–51, 275, 310–11. S.W. recounted multiple sexual encounters following the

 Joplin trip, in various locations including Mr. Ortner’s home and car.

        In April 2018, the abuse was reported by S.W.’s high school after S.W. sent a

 Snapchat message to high school friends, prompting a law enforcement investigation. In

 August 2018, officers searched Mr. Ortner’s home, through which officers discovered

 bald eagle and golden eagle parts. The parties agree that these parts/feathers were not the

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 same as those used to lure S.W., as the latter were ceremonially burned and buried before

 execution of the search warrant.

         The district court denied a pretrial motion to sever the sex counts from those

 involving eagle parts, finding evidentiary overlap and de minimis potential prejudice. At

 trial, the jury learned that in 2019, Mr. Ortner pled guilty to a state charge of second-

 degree rape of a minor. 3 R. 297, 304. Also admitted: Mr. Ortner’s prior sworn

 statement that between November 17, [2017] and April 18, [2018], he had sexual

 intercourse with S.W. who was under the age of 16 at that time. See 3 R. 304–05. The

 jury was instructed that it could consider the state conviction for the purpose of

 impeachment only. 3 R. 346. At the close of evidence, as to Counts 2 and 3, the

 government dismissed the § 1153 charges and proceeded only under § 1152, given the

 lack of evidence that Mr. Ortner was an Indian. Mr. Ortner did not object. 3 R. 335.

                                          Discussion
    I.      Jury instructions as to Count 1

         A. Purpose
         Mr. Ortner challenges the district court’s instructions to the jury as to Count 1.

 Having raised no objection at trial, our review is for plain error. United States v. Smalls,

 752 F.3d 1227, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014). To that end, the court “examine[s] the[ ]

 [instructions] as a whole to determine whether the instructions provided the jury with an

 accurate statement of the applicable law.” United States v. Harmon, 996 F.2d 256, 258

 (10th Cir. 1993). To warrant reversal under this standard, the district court must have

 committed (1) legal error, (2) that was clear and not reasonably debatable, (3) which

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 violated the Defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) was so grave as to “seriously affect

 the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett v. United

 States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).

        The court instructed the jury as follows:

        The Defendant can be found guilty of [18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)] only if all of the
        following are proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
                     First:          The Defendant knowingly transported a
               person in interstate commerce;
                     Second:       At the time of the transportation, that
               person was less than 18 years of age; and
                      Third:       At the time of the transportation, the
               Defendant intended that person would engage in unlawful
               sexual activity for which someone could be charged with a
               crime.
 1 R. 141.
        Mr. Ortner argues the instruction is faulty because it does not require the jury to

 find (i) defendant’s dominant purpose in taking S.W. to Missouri was for her to engage in

 illicit sexual activity and (ii) defendant violated a specific criminal statute. Mr. Ortner

 argues that the jury wasn’t told that illicit sexual activity needed to be a “motive—

 dominant or otherwise—for the interstate transport of the minor.” Aplt. Br. at 13

 (emphasis in original).

        We find no error, plain or otherwise. As a whole, the instructions “provided the

 jury with an accurate statement of the applicable law.” United States v. Scisum, 32 F.3d

 1479, 1484 (10th Cir. 1994). The instructions properly focused Mr. Ortner’s intent at the

 time of the interstate transportation and ensured the jury found an aim of the trip was to

 engage in unlawful sexual conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); United States v. Scott, 529

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 F.3d 1290, 1303 (10th Cir. 2008). As for the requisite motive, the “illicit sexual activity

 need not be the only purpose” for the trip but is enough if it was one of the defendant’s

 motivating purposes. United States v. Lacy, 904 F.3d 889, 901 (10th Cir. 2018)

 (emphasis added). The word “intent” is “of common enough usage to be clear to any

 reasonable lay juror.” Scisum, 32 F.3d at 1485. The instructions thus reflected our

 precedent and plain error only occurs when a claimed error violates “current well-settled

 law.” Lacy, 904 F.3d at 893. That additional explanation might have been given does

 not mean that the absence of such language constitutes plain error. Cf. United States v.

 Knight, 659 F.3d 1285, 1293 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding no plain error because although

 defendant “point[ed] to several cases in which courts distinguish[ed] between actual and

 constructive possession, he d[id] not identify any case—much less a Tenth Circuit or

 Supreme Court decision—holding that failure to provide a constructive possession

 instruction is erroneous”).

        B. Criminal sexual conduct

        Defendant’s next assertion—that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)’s third element requires the

 jury to find that the government proved violation of a specific criminal statute—is not

 something this court has ever held. The government notes that the court did not instruct

 on the specific state statute which would make the contemplated sex unlawful given the

 age difference between Mr. Ortner and S.W., but that the age difference would have

 rendered the sex unlawful in any jurisdiction. Aplee. Br. at 30 (citing Mo. Ann. Stat.

 § 566.034 for second-degree statutory rape); id. at 35. The issue of whether the violation

 of a specific state statute is an element of the offense or merely a means of proving the

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 third element is one on which courts may differ. Compare United States v. Doak, 47

 F.4th 1340, 1352 (11th Cir. 2022) (state offenses were means; § 2423(a) “turn[s] on

 whether [the defendant] intended the girls to commit some criminal sexual act—not

 whether he ultimately forced them to commit one specific criminal sex act or another”),

 with United States v. Ray, 831 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2016) (state offenses were

 elements; “Section 2423(a) creates a piggyback offense: The prosecution must show that

 the sexual activity after crossing the state line violated some other statute.”). But it is not

 one we must address given Mr. Ortner’s failure to raise it before the district court and our

 plain error review. Where there is such variation in approaches, it cannot be plain error.

    II.      Jury instructions as to Counts 2 and 3

          As noted, Counts 2 and 3 were submitted under the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.

 § 1152 only. See 3 R. 332–35. The court instructed the jury regarding the government’s

 statutory burden to prove S.W. was an Indian and that the crime was committed in Indian

 Country. 1 R. 142–45. The court also instructed the jury that a person is considered

 Indian if he has “some Indian blood” and “was, at the time of the offense, recognized as

 an Indian by a federally recognized tribe or by the federal government.” Id. 146. The

 jury was further provided a multi-factor test to determine whether Indian recognition

 exists. Id. 147. Defendant faults the district court for not requiring the government

 prove, for purposes of § 1152, that Mr. Ortner was non-Indian. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152

 (excluding offenses “committed by one Indian against . . . another Indian”).

          The government concedes error not to require proof of Mr. Ortner’s non-Indian

 status. Aplee. Br. at 37; United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 978 (10th Cir. 2001).

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 However, the failure to do so did not violate Mr. Ortner’s substantial rights, given an

 absence of evidence Mr. Ortner had any Indian blood, required under any conception of

 Indian (including Mr. Ortner’s) for purposes of § 1152.1

        While there is no specific percentage of Indian blood required to render a person

 Indian, 1 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 3.03[4] (LexisNexis 2019), some

 quantum is required. United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001).

 Leading legal authorities agree. Cohen § 3.03[4]; RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF AM.

 INDIANS § 69 (AM. L. INST. 2022). The record lacks evidence that Mr. Ortner possessed

 any Indian blood.

        In his opening brief, Mr. Ortner cites to evidence he believes supports his Indian

 status, including his participation in tribal powwows and the fact that tribal members

 asked him to prepare feathered regalia. Aplt. Br. at 28–30. At trial, Mr. Ortner’s

 childhood friend, Beverly Lawellin, testified that Mr. Ortner did have Indian blood

 “[a]ccording to records that were passed down.” 3 R. 240. And Mr. Ortner’s sister,

 Christine Thomas, testified she “believe[d]” their great-grandfather was deeded land from

 the Cherokee and both she and Mr. Ortner claimed they were raised to believe they were

 Indian. Id. 232–33, 300. However, at the same time, Ms. Thomas admitted that no

        1
         In reply, Mr. Ortner argues that the government does not challenge the
 element of Indian blood. Aplt. Reply Br. at 10 n.7. However, the government’s
 statement that “[t]he evidence supported no finding that [Mr.] Ortner is ‘an individual
 who has Indian blood’” sufficiently raises this argument and both sides briefed the
 issue. See Aplee. Br. at 37 (quoting Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 24
 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds. 1982)); Aplt. Br. 28–30. Therefore, our review is
 appropriate.
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 member of their family had procured enough records to get a tribal membership card

 recognizing their membership in any particular tribe. Id. 232. While lack of tribal

 membership does not foreclose a finding of Indian status, Prentiss, 273 F.3d at 1283, the

 absence of such evidence here suggests that Mr. Ortner did not have Native American

 ancestry of note. And Ms. Lawellin’s unsubstantiated opinion testimony is insufficient

 evidence to demonstrate Mr. Ortner possessed “some quantum” of Indian blood, as

 required under extant law. Cf. United States v. Reza-Ramos, 816 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th

 Cir. 2016) (“Reliable or undisputed documentation that a defendant has Indian blood . . .

 may meet [the blood-quantum] requirement.”); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215,

 1223 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[E]vidence of a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is

 clearly identified as an Indian is generally sufficient to satisfy [the blood-quantum

 element].”). Thus, under these circumstances, failing to require proof that Mr. Ortner

 was not Indian was not plain error.

    III.   Joinder of Sex and Feather counts

        Mr. Ortner contends the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to sever

 Counts 1–3, from Counts 4–5. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, counts may be

 joined in a single indictment if the offenses “[(i)] are of the same or similar character or

 [(ii)] are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions

 connected together or [(iii)] constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R.

 Crim. P. Rule 8(a). The third basis is relevant here. While we review alleged misjoinder

 de novo, we construe Rule 8 liberally to promote judicial economy, United States v.

 Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1427 (10th Cir. 1997), recognizing that the decision to grant

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  severance “lies ‘within the sound discretion of the trial court.’” United States v. Hill, 786

  F.3d 1254, 1272 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 289

  (10th Cir. 1983)).

         Joinder was proper under Rule 8 because the feathers were “arguably related to

  and part of” Mr. Ortner’s abusive tactics. Johnson, 130 F.3d at 1427. In the district

  court, Mr. Ortner argued that the joinder did not involve eagle feathers pertinent to the

  sex offenses and would create a “false impression among the jurors that Mr. Ortner is

  simply a bad man who engages in a wide variety of crime.” 1 R. 21. In his opening

  brief, Mr. Ortner argues that severance was warranted because the charged eagle feathers

  were not integral to the sex offense accounts. He makes much of the fact that the feathers

  used to lure S.W. were destroyed before the search leading to discovery of the feathers

  underlying the possession counts. We are not persuaded. The trial evidence reflects that

  Mr. Ortner used the eagle feathers as a mechanism to gain the trust of the community and

  his victims. Even if Mr. Ortner could demonstrate significant risk of prejudice (at the

  district court, he did not), the jury was instructed that it must consider each count

  separately, 3 R. 341–42, and we presume juries follow instructions. United States v.

  Herrera, 51 F.4th 1226, 1273 (10th Cir. 2022); see also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.

  534, 539 (1993) (advising limiting instructions will often suffice “to cure any risk of

  prejudice”).

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           In his reply brief, Mr. Ortner explains why the joinder cannot be harmless error

  under which the government would have the burden. We find no error (no abuse of

  discretion), so it is unnecessary to consider harmless error.

     IV.      The $100,000 fine

           Finally, Mr. Ortner argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing the

  $100,000 fine in connection with his sentence. According to Mr. Ortner, the imposition

  of the fine was procedurally unreasonable and clearly erroneous because the record is

  contradictory and does not support his ability to pay. Aplt. Br. at 40–41. He also objects

  to the extent that the fine is based upon the government’s untimely objection to the

  presentence report (PSR)’s finding that he was unable to pay. Id. at 39.

           We review a monetary sentence “for ‘reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-

  discretion standard.’” United States v. Sanchez-Urias, 887 F.3d 1069, 1070–71 (10th Cir.

  2018) (quoting United States v. Sharp, 749 F.3d 1267, 1291 (10th Cir. 2014)).

  Underlying factual determinations regarding a defendant’s financial situation are

  reviewed for clear error. United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1398 (10th Cir. 1998).

  To the extent a defendant fails to object, a sentence is subject to plain error review.

  United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003).

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         Mr. Ortner argues the sentencing hearing was procedurally unreasonable insofar as

  the district court made inconsistent factual findings regarding his ability to pay.2 Review

  of the record reveals three such findings.

      The PSR indicated Mr. Ortner lacked the ability to pay any monetary penalty or

         special assessment in relation to his sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the

         district court adopted the PSR’s findings in full, including as to Mr. Ortner’s

         inability to pay a fine. 1 R. 211–12.

      Soon thereafter, the government requested a fine for the first time because “Mr.

         Ortner had a job for 14 years that made somewhere around $100,000 and owns a

         home” and speculated that “I would think that there’s sufficient money to pay a

         fine, even if nominal.” Id. 218. Over Mr. Ortner’s reference to his $89,000 in

         consumer debt, the district court determined Mr. Ortner had the ability to pay a

         fine of $100,000 based on his financial profile.3 Id. 218, 221.

      Then, in an apparent change of course, the court declined to impose a special

         monetary assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(3), which states courts “shall”

         impose a $5,000 penalty “on any non-indigent person” in connection with certain

         offenses “relating to sexual . . . abuse of children.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(3)

         2
             Mr. Ortner also contends that there is no quantitative support for his ability to
  pay.
         3
           Relying upon Sanchez-Urias, 887 F.3d at 1071, the government argues that
  Mr. Ortner did not carry his burden of establishing his inability to pay because his
  PSR did not provide adequate financial information. Aplee. Br. at 42. But the PSR
  concluded that Mr. Ortner lacked the ability to pay the fine and in no way suggests
  that he refused to provide a financial profile. 2 R. 79.
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         (emphasis added); 1 R. 221–22 (ordering “a mandatory $100 special monetary

         assessment per count as to Counts 1 through 3, and a $25 special monetary

         assessment per count as to Counts 4 and 5” but seeing “no reason or basis to find a

         special monetary assessment pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 3014(a)(3)”).

     According to statute, the only exception to the mandatory additional special

  assessment is indigency, a conclusion other courts have reached. See 18 U.S.C.

  § 3014(a)(3); e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 922 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 2019)

  (explaining that § 3014 “uses mandatory language, leaving no room for discretion” and

  that “the district court has no choice but to impose the $ 5,000 assessment if it determines

  that the defendant is non-indigent”); see also United States v. Labat, 915 F.2d 603, 607

  (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining “shall” in an analogous provision of U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2

  implies obligation, except where the defendant establishes indigency).

     Thus, we have an implicit determination that Mr. Ortner was indigent, contrary to the

  court’s earlier determination he had the ability to pay $100,000. See 18 U.S.C.

  § 3572(a)(1) (directing courts to consider, among other factors, “the defendant’s income,

  earning capacity, and financial resources” in deciding whether and how to impose a fine).

         Although ordinarily “this court will not set aside findings of fact unless clearly

  erroneous,” John Allan Co. v. Craig Allen Co. L.L.C., 540 F.3d 1133, 1139 (10th Cir.

  2008), in light of these internal inconsistencies, we must remand for reconsideration of

  Mr. Ortner’s ability or inability to pay a fine, as well as any amount, and the additional

  special assessment under § 3014. See id. at 1139–40 (remanding in light of internally

  inconsistent findings); see also United States v. Vigil, 644 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir.

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  2011) (vacating and remanding where the district court did not provide reasoning for its

  “implicit determination” that the defendant had the ability to pay a $10,000 fine).

  Because the case must be remanded on this basis, it is unnecessary for us to consider Mr.

  Ortner’s unpreserved claim that the district court procedurally erred by addressing the

  government’s late request for a fine (and implicit objection to the PSR) absent a showing

  of good cause.

         Thus, the fine is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings

  consistent with this opinion, but in all other respects the judgment is AFFIRMED.

                                                   Entered for the Court

                                                   Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                                   Circuit Judge

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