Court Opinion

ID: 9964788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 20:00:56.147132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:42.216611
License: Public Domain

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                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12988
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DERRICK ALFONDSO MORLEY,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20519-DPG-2
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                22-12988

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
                A jury convicted Derrick Morley of conspiracy to possess
        with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of cocaine, in
        violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute
        five hundred grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
        § 841(a)(1). For each count, Morley was sentenced to a term of 60
        months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Morley now
        appeals his convictions and sentence, arguing that: (1) the district
        court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was
        the fruit of an unlawful search; (2) the trial evidence was insuffi-
        cient to support his convictions; (3) the district court erred in
        providing a deliberate ignorance jury instruction; and (4) the dis-
        trict court erred in denying him a safety valve sentence reduction
        under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). After carefully considering the parties’
        arguments and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm Mor-
        ley’s convictions and sentence.
             I.     FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
               We begin with the government’s trial evidence as to two
        separate cocaine deals that led to Morley’s arrest. The first deal
        took place on August 6, 2021, when Morley’s associate and code-
        fendant, Valentino Edgecombe, sold half a kilogram of cocaine to
        a paid FBI confidential informant (“Fred”). The FBI learned, in
        early August 2021, that Edgecombe, a Bahamian national, had been
        in South Florida “looking to try to get off some dope.” Based on
        this information, Fred, at the FBI’s direction, arranged to meet
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        22-12988                Opinion of the Court                          3

        Edgecombe in the parking lot of a Miami shopping mall, outside of
        a Bass Pro Shops. With law enforcement officers surveilling, Fred
        bought half a kilogram of cocaine from Edgecombe for $14,000.
                Following the first cocaine deal, Fred tried to negotiate a big-
        ger deal for six kilograms of cocaine. On September 22, 2021, on a
        recorded phone call, Fred told Edgecombe that he had the money
        ready to buy more cocaine. About ten minutes later, on a second
        recorded phone call, Edgecombe offered to send Fred “straight to
        the person” with the cocaine. Edgecombe explained, however,
        that the person would only relinquish the cocaine if Edgecombe
        first cleared his debt, which he’d previously said he owed to “the
        guy who was holding the dope.”
               About an hour after the second recorded phone call, law en-
        forcement observed Edgecombe meet up with Morley in the park-
        ing lot of a Fort Lauderdale hotel where Edgecombe was staying.
        Morley arrived in a maroon BMW, which law enforcement later
        confirmed that he owned. Morley parked near Edgecombe, en-
        tered Edgecombe’s car, and they drove off together. Expecting a
        deal to occur, law enforcement tracked Edgecombe and Morley
        from the hotel, first to a car parts store and then to a Sam’s Club.
        However, no deal took place that day.
               Instead, the second deal happened six days later on Septem-
        ber 28, 2021. The day prior, in a recorded phone call, Edgecombe
        again told Fred that he had to take him straight to his cocaine
        source to clear his debt and make the deal. Fred agreed to pay
        $28,000 per kilogram of cocaine, and the two decided they would
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-12988

        meet up the next day and go together to the cocaine source. On
        the morning of the deal, Edgecombe sent a WhatsApp message to
        Fred indicating that he could sell him three kilograms of cocaine.
               Later that evening, before meeting Edgecombe, Fred met
        with law enforcement to prepare for a “controlled evidence pur-
        chase arrest operation.” Law enforcement gave Fred a hat
        equipped with a covert videorecording device and a backpack con-
        taining money for the deal. Law enforcement also told Fred to per-
        suade Edgecombe to meet him in “a specific part” of a parking lot
        of a Home Depot rather than going with Edgecombe to his source.
               Fred arrived at the Home Depot and, to coax Edgecombe
        into meeting him there, told Edgecombe that his car battery “was
        dead” and that his key “won’t crank.” Edgecombe ultimately
        agreed over the phone to meet Fred at the Home Depot to com-
        plete the deal. So, Fred sent a text message to Edgecombe with the
        address of the Home Depot.
               Edgecombe arrived at the Home Depot at around 8:30 p.m.
        and parked his car next to Fred’s car. Fred asked whether
        Edgecombe had the cocaine with him, and Edgecombe responded,
        “Yeah someone is right there” and promised “[i]t’s coming.”
        Edgecombe then tried to persuade Fred to get in the car with him,
        but Fred refused, stating “I can’t get in the car with you. I got too
        much money. I don’t got no gun.” Fred told Edgecombe to “tell
        [his] peoples” he can only get in Edgecombe’s car if he sees the co-
        caine first.
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                        5

               Minutes later, Morley arrived in his maroon BMW and
        “trolled through the parking lot.” He parked his car, got out, and
        quickly walked toward a nearby Wendy’s restaurant. Edgecombe
        instructed Fred to “[g]o get it” from Morley’s passenger seat. Fred
        retrieved a “small briefcase” from Morley’s car and brought it to
        his car, confirming that it contained three kilograms of cocaine.
                  In the meantime, Morley tried to enter the Wendy’s, but the
        door was locked, so he paced back and forth outside. All the while,
        Morley kept looking back toward the Home Depot parking lot:
        “[H]e just kept looking over his shoulder and then he walked into
        . . . [t]he driveway area of Wendy’s, and he just kind of lingered in
        the area kind of like looking at the BMW, just watching it.” After
        several minutes, Morley walked across the street to help a family
        with a broken-down car.
              After Fred gave Edgecombe $84,000 for the cocaine, law en-
        forcement arrested Edgecombe. Law enforcement then arrested
        Morley across the street.
               Incident to his arrest, agents seized Morley’s cellphone, got
        a search warrant, and accessed his phone. The search revealed ex-
        tensive communications between Morley and Edgecombe leading
        up to the second cocaine deal, as well as evidence that Morley had
        acted on that communication. For instance, Morley and
        Edgecombe called each other fifteen times on the night of Septem-
        ber 28. Edgecombe also sent the address of the Home Depot to
        Morley in a text message, which came two minutes after Fred had
        sent the same address to Edgecombe. Data from Morley’s phone
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        6                     Opinion of the Court               22-12988

        showed that he looked up directions from his home in Fort Lauder-
        dale to the Home Depot two minutes after Edgecombe had sent
        him the address.
               Edgecombe and Morley had also communicated in the lead-
        up to the first cocaine deal. On August 3, 2021, Edgecombe texted
        Morley, “i want you ride with me to deal with something also make
        yourself available” and “whenever i call you i want ride with me.”
        Then, on the day of the first deal, Edgecombe sent Morley a mes-
        sage with the address of the same Bass Pro Shops where Fred met
        Edgecombe.
             A grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging
        Morley with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five
        hundred grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
        (Count 1) and possessing with intent to distribute five hundred
        grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
        (Count 3).
               Morley moved to suppress the cocaine that Fred, at
        Edgecombe’s direction, took from Morley’s vehicle without a war-
        rant. The government opposed Morley’s suppression motion. The
        government argued that the automobile exception to the Fourth
        Amendment’s warrant requirement applied because there was a
        fair probability that Fred would find contraband in Morley’s car.
        The government noted that Fred and Edgecombe “had negotiated
        an $84,000 drug deal, and Edgecombe—who had previously sold
        [Fred] half a kilogram of cocaine—told [Fred] where to find the
        drugs.” Thus, the government concluded, Fred reasonably
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        22-12988                Opinion of the Court                           7

        believed he would find drugs in Morley’s car. In any event, the
        government added, the consent exception applied because Fred
        reasonably believed Edgecombe had the authority to direct him to
        search Morley’s car. Morley argued that neither of the two rele-
        vant exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
        applied to Fred’s search of his car.
                The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Mi-
        ami-Dade Detective and FBI Organized Crime Task Force Officer
        Wendell Johnson testified. After hearing the officer’s testimony,
        the district court denied Morley’s motion. First, the district court
        found that there was probable cause to believe Morley’s car con-
        tained contraband or evidence of a crime because Edgecombe and
        Fred “picked specific remote locations” for their drug deals, and
        “it’s really hard to believe that . . . [Morley] pulled up in close prox-
        imity” by happenstance. And second, the district court found that
        apparent authority existed under the circumstances because “the
        drugs were retrieved exactly where Mr. Edgecombe said that they
        would be.”
               Morley proceeded to a four-day jury trial. The govern-
        ment’s proposed jury instructions included the pattern instruction
        on deliberate ignorance. At the charge conference, Morley ob-
        jected to the government’s proposed deliberate ignorance instruc-
        tion. He contended that the record did not support the instruction
        because “[t]here ha[d] been no proof of any evidence in reference
        to fingerprints or . . . DNA” and “the testimony on exactly where
        the bag was located and how it was taken out of the car is extremely
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12988

        wishy-washy.” In response, the government argued that deliberate
        ignorance was “an alternative proof,” which was “consistent with
        the evidence that Edgecombe had him drive a bag to the Home
        Depot, and he never made any attempt to ask Edgecombe what
        was in that bag, despite the multiple calls they had.” The district
        court deferred ruling on Morley’s objection.
                After the close of the evidence, the district court decided to
        give the jury instruction because the evidence “equally could be
        consistent with actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.” The
        district court pointed to Morley’s actions, like walking away from
        the car, and the way the drugs were packaged. The instruction
        mirrored the government’s proposed instruction.
               During trial, Morley twice moved for a judgment of acquit-
        tal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). The district
        court denied both of his motions. The jury ultimately found him
        guilty as charged in the indictment. Afterward, Morley moved for
        a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict under Rule
        29(c). The district court denied his motion in a paperless order.
               Before sentencing, the United States Probation Office pre-
        pared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) using the 2021
        Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The PSI held Morley accountable
        for 3.518 kilograms of cocaine (about half a kilogram for the August
        6 deal and three kilograms for the September 28 deal), resulting in
        a total offense level of 28. It also assessed three criminal history
        points based on Morley’s prior 37-month sentence for conspiracy
        to import 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. With three criminal
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                          9

        history points, Morley fell into criminal history category II. To-
        gether, Morley’s total offense level and criminal history category
        produced a guideline range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment.
               Through his trial attorney, Morley filed several objections to
        the PSI’s description of his offense conduct. Despite the jury’s ver-
        dict, Morley maintained his innocence and “denied all knowledge”
        of Edgecombe’s sale of cocaine to Fred. In support, Morley at-
        tached a post-trial polygraph examination report, which claimed
        Morley “was truthful” in denying his knowledge of the conspiracy
        and the cocaine. Morley attached the full version of the polygraph
        examiner’s report to a motion for a downward variance filed a cou-
        ple of weeks later.
                A new attorney later entered his appearance to represent
        Morley for sentencing. Through his sentencing attorney, Morley
        filed additional objections to the PSI in which, among other things,
        he argued for a base offense level of 26, because the evidence only
        supported his responsibility for the September 28 deal, and a role
        reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Morley also moved to continue
        his sentencing hearing because his sentencing attorney, unlike his
        trial attorney, believed that he might qualify for relief from the
        mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Known
        as the safety valve, that statute allows the district court to impose
        a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence for drug
        crimes if the defendant meets five criteria. § 3553(f)(1)–(5). Two
        of the statutory criteria are relevant here. First, under § 3553(f)(1),
        the district court must find that:
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12988

               (1) the defendant does not have—
                  (A) more than 4 criminal history points, ex-
                  cluding any criminal history points resulting
                  from a 1-point offense, as determined under
                  the sentencing guidelines;
                  (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined un-
                  der the sentencing guidelines; and
                  (C) a prior 2-point offense, as determined un-
                  der the sentencing guidelines[.]
               Second, under § 3553(f)(5), the district court must find that
        the defendant truthfully provided to the government “all infor-
        mation and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or
        offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a com-
        mon scheme or plan.”
               As for § 3553(f)(1), Morley argued that his prior three-point
        offense for conspiracy to import marijuana did not preclude him
        from relief because the safety valve’s criminal- history-point provi-
        sion is “conjunctive.” The safety valve, he argued, only excludes
        defendants who have all three things: (A) more than four criminal
        history points, excluding any points from one-point offenses, (B) a
        prior three-point offense, and (C) a prior two-point violent offense.
        And because he did not have more than four criminal history points
        or a prior two-point violent offense, he could qualify for relief if the
        court gave him time to submit a truthful statement to the govern-
        ment.
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                         11

                After the district court continued Morley’s sentencing hear-
        ing, he submitted a written safety valve statement in an attempt to
        comply with § 3553(f)(5). In his statement, Morley again claimed
        he did not know he had delivered cocaine to a drug deal. He ex-
        plained that, when he arrived at the Home Depot, he “walked to a
        nearby Wendy’s for something to eat” and left his car unlocked
        “because the locks did not work (as shown in the trial) in an at-
        tempt to buy some food.” He pointed to his post-arrest statements
        and the polygraph test for corroboration of his lack of knowledge.
        But in the end, he admitted, whether it “was naïve, stupid or com-
        pletely negligent,” he “did bring the bag which contained cocaine
        in this case to the parking lot of the Home Depot,” and he accepted
        full responsibility for it.
               At sentencing, the district court granted two of Morley’s ob-
        jections to the PSI’s offense-level calculation. First, it found Morley
        responsible for 3, rather than 3.518, kilograms of cocaine, which
        reduced his base offense level to 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7).
        Second, it awarded Morley a two-level minor role reduction under
        U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, producing a new total offense level of 24.
                The district court then found Morley did not qualify for
        safety-valve relief both because of his criminal history and his fail-
        ure to truthfully provide the government with all the information
        he had concerning his offenses. As to his criminal history, the dis-
        trict court interpreted § 3553(f)(1) as “disjunctive,” meaning a de-
        fendant must not have any of (1) more than four criminal history
        points, (2) a prior three-point offense, or (3) a prior two-point
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                22-12988

        violent offense to qualify for relief. And because Morley had a prior
        three-point offense, the court found that he was not safety-valve
        eligible. As to his statement, the district court agreed with Morley’s
        contention that the government’s “belief regarding truthfulness”
        and noted that “perhaps” even “the jury’s findings” did not prevent
        it from finding his statement truthful. Still, the district court disa-
        greed that Morley provided a truthful and complete statement un-
        der § 3553(f)(5), particularly considering the government’s “strong
        circumstantial case.”
               The district court found that Morley’s total offense level of
        24 and his criminal history category of II produced a guideline
        range of 57 to 71 months. Because the mandatory minimum sen-
        tence for his offenses was 60 months, however, the district court
        calculated the guideline range as 60 to 71 months. The govern-
        ment advocated for a 65-month term of imprisonment, citing Mor-
        ley’s prior 37-month sentence for his federal drug conviction and
        the need to promote deterrence, respect for the law, “and send a
        message that the defendant should not be dealing with drugs.”
        Morley asked for the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months.
        Before the district court imposed its sentence, it allowed Morley to
        provide a statement.
              The district court sentenced Morley to two concurrent
        terms of 60 months’ imprisonment on both counts, the mandatory
        minimum sentence for each count under § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). This
        timely appeal followed.
                        II.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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        22-12988                Opinion of the Court                         13

               A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence is
        reviewed under a mixed standard. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d
        1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000). We review the district court’s findings
        of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and its application of
        law to those facts de novo. Id. We also give “due weight” to the
        inferences that the district court and law enforcement officers draw
        from the facts. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
        When considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, we must con-
        strue all facts in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in
        the district court. United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 510 (11th Cir.
        1994).
                “We review de novo a [d]istrict [c]ourt’s denial of judgment
        of acquittal on sufficiency of evidence grounds, considering the ev-
        idence in the light most favorable to the [g]overnment, and draw-
        ing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the [g]overn-
        ment’s favor.” United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir.
        2013) (emphasis omitted). We must affirm if “after viewing the ev-
        idence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
        trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[s]
        beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d
        1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v.
        Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
               We also review de novo whether the circumstances of a par-
        ticular case rendered it appropriate to instruct the jury on deliber-
        ate ignorance. United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993).
        But our review of jury instructions is deferential, and we will
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12988

        reverse only “if we are left with a substantial and eradicable doubt
        as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.”
        United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (quot-
        ing United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008)).
                                 III.   ANALYSIS
                On appeal, Morley argues that: (1) the district court erred in
        denying his motion to suppress the evidence of the briefcase as the
        fruit of an unlawful search; (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient
        to support his convictions; (3) the district court erred in providing
        a deliberate ignorance jury instruction; and (4) the district court
        erred in denying him a safety valve sentence reduction. We ad-
        dress each of his challenges in turn.
                             A. The Motion to Suppress
                Morley argues that Fred’s retrieval of the briefcase from the
        passenger seat of Morley’s car was an unconstitutional search in
        violation of the Fourth Amendment. It is undisputed that Fred’s
        actions amounted to a warrantless search that implicated the
        Fourth Amendment’s protections. We must determine, however,
        whether any exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
        quirement rendered the search constitutionally permissible. The
        district court specifically found that two exceptions applied: the au-
        tomobile exception and the consent exception by way of apparent
        authority.
              As an initial matter, Morley mischaracterizes the automobile
        and apparent authority doctrines as requirements that must be met
        for a valid search. Those doctrines, however, are separate
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                         15

        exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and
        either of which may provide an independent basis for us to affirm
        the denial of Morley’s suppression motion. Here, we conclude that
        the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the au-
        tomobile exception applied.
                The automobile exception allows law enforcement to con-
        duct a warrantless search of a vehicle if (1) the vehicle is readily
        mobile and (2) law enforcement has probable cause to search it.
        United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). All
        that is necessary to satisfy the first element is that the automobile
        is operational. United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.
        2003). In United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1990), this
        Court explained that “ready mobility” is “inherent in all automo-
        biles that reasonably appear to be capable of functioning.” Id. at
        903 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Alexander, 835
        F.2d 1406, 1409 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that the vehicle need not
        be moving at the moment when police obtain probable cause to
        search and that the ability of a vehicle to become mobile is suffi-
        cient). That requirement is met here because Morley drove the car
        to the scene, nor does Morley challenge that his vehicle was readily
        mobile. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680
        (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that a party abandons an issue by not rais-
        ing it on appeal).
              Turning to the second element, probable cause exists when,
        “under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability
        that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                22-12988

        vehicle.” Lindsey, 482 F.3d at 1293 (citation omitted). For example,
        in United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011), we held
        that the district court did not err in denying Lanzon’s motion to
        suppress because officers had probable cause to search Lanzon’s
        truck pursuant to the automobile exception. Id. at 1300. In that
        case, Lanzon participated in instant message conversations with an
        undercover agent posing as “Tom.” Id. Lanzon described to
        “Tom” his intent to have sex with a minor, and he agreed to meet
        “Tom” and the minor at a specific time and place and to bring col-
        ored condoms with him. Id. After driving his truck to the desig-
        nated meeting place at the agreed-upon time, Lanzon approached
        the officers who were posing as “Tom” and the minor and said,
        “Tom, Tom.” Id. Lanzon was then arrested, and a search of his
        person yielded no condoms. Id. The officers sought Lanzon’s con-
        sent to search his truck, but he refused. Id. at 1297. The officers
        then searched the truck anyway—using Lanzon’s keys to open it—
        and found the colored condoms, along with flavored lubricant and
        a receipt for the purchase of those items. Id. During his criminal
        proceedings, Lanzon filed to suppress the evidence seized from his
        truck, which the district court denied. Id. at 1299. On appeal, we
        held that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a fair
        probability that evidence of a crime would be found in Lanzon’s
        vehicle. Id. at 1300.
               The facts and circumstances known to law enforcement
        here are similar to those in Lanzon. As in Lanzon, law enforcement
        here, via a confidential informant, engaged in conversations with
        Edgecombe that led to an agreement to meet at a specific time and
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                        17

        place for an illicit act. The only significant difference here is the
        involvement of a third party, Morley. But Morley arrived at the
        designated meeting place at the agreed upon time, minutes after
        Edgecombe had texted him to come, and after Edgecombe told
        Fred that the cocaine was on its way. When Morley arrived, it was
        clear that Edgecombe recognized him. Indeed, Edgecombe explic-
        itly directed Fred to retrieve the cocaine from Morley’s car. There
        was more than a reasonable probability that Fred would find con-
        traband in the exact place that Edgecombe told him to look.
               Morley’s argument against probable cause relies heavily on
        one unpublished case, United States v. Smith, 596 F. App’x 804 (11th
        Cir. 2015), in which this Court affirmed a district court’s finding
        that probable cause existed. Id. at 807. In Smith, this Court held
        that a police officer’s credible belief that “he smelled marijuana
        coming from the car” of the defendant, whom he had just arrested
        for marijuana possession, sufficed to show probable cause to con-
        duct a warrantless search of the vehicle. Id. Morley’s argument
        largely consists of a recitation of the facts in Smith in an effort to
        distinguish it from the facts here. But there are multiple problems
        with Morley’s approach. For starters, Morley fails to explain how
        an unpublished case in which this Court found that law enforce-
        ment acted reasonably establishes that law enforcement acted un-
        reasonably here. Additionally, unlike the officer in Smith, Fred did
        not have to logically deduce that there might be contraband in the
        car based on smell or any other subjective factor. Fred searched
        Morley’s car after Edgecombe first told Fred that the cocaine was
        on its way and then specifically directed him to “[g]o get” the
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12988

        cocaine from Morley’s passenger seat. Thus, the probability that
        Fred would find contraband in Morley’s car was no less than it was
        in Smith.
               Morley also misconstrues both the standard of review and
        the legal test for probable cause. Regarding the standard of review,
        he argues that it “is not improbable that no reasonable fact finder
        could accept” an alternative explanation. Our review, however,
        does not ask whether there is some possible alternative explanation
        that a reasonable factfinder could have accepted. Rather, we re-
        view the district court’s findings of fact only for clear error, and we
        must give due weight to the inferences that the district court and
        law enforcement officers draw from those facts. Ornelas, 517 U.S.
        at 699. And when considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, we
        must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the party pre-
        vailing in the district court—here, the government. See Behety, 32
        F.3d at 510.
                As to the proper legal test, Morley argues that he was merely
        used by Edgecombe as a pawn to unwittingly facilitate the Septem-
        ber 28 deal. This conclusion, he contends, is supported by the fact
        that Edgecombe unilaterally involved an innocent decoy for the
        prior August 6 drug deal. But Morley’s knowledge, or lack thereof,
        is irrelevant to the probable cause inquiry. Instead, it is “the facts
        and circumstances within [law enforcement’s] knowledge” that
        matter. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (quot-
        ing Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir. 1995)). Even if
        Morley were “unwittingly duped” into bringing the cocaine to the
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        22-12988              Opinion of the Court                      19

        deal, his supposed lack of knowledge has no bearing on law en-
        forcement’s knowledge as to the probability that Morley’s car con-
        tained cocaine.
               Under the totality of the circumstances, the facts and cir-
        cumstances that were known to law enforcement at the relevant
        time supported a fair probability that cocaine would be found in
        Morley’s vehicle. Edgecombe had previously sold Fred half a kilo-
        gram of cocaine, and Fred and Edgecombe had no other relation-
        ship besides that of customer and drug dealer. Turning to the night
        of September 28, Fred and Edgecombe had negotiated an $84,000
        drug deal, and Edgecombe made it clear to Fred that he was not
        working alone. Edgecombe consistently asked Fred to go straight
        to “the guy who was holding the dope.” And on the night of the
        deal, Edgecombe asked Fred to drive with him to a different loca-
        tion to get the cocaine from another person. After Fred refused,
        Edgecombe told Fred that his associate was bringing it to them at
        the Home Depot. Shortly afterward, Morley arrived, and parked
        his vehicle close to Edgecombe and Fred’s cars. Edgecombe then
        directed Fred to retrieve the drugs from the passenger seat of Mor-
        ley’s car. This was more than enough to establish probable cause
        under the automobile exception.
                Because both elements of the automobile exception were
        satisfied, law enforcement was authorized to conduct a warrantless
        search of Morley’s car. Watts, 329 F.3d at 1286. We therefore af-
        firm the district court’s denial of Morley’s motion to suppress.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                22-12988

                        B.      Sufficiency of the Evidence
                Morley next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
        porting his convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to dis-
        tribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession of co-
        caine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
        Morley argues that the evidence here was solely circumstantial and
        that it was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find him guilty be-
        yond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Morley argues that the pros-
        ecution failed to prove that he was a willing participant in the con-
        spiracy and that he knew that the briefcase contained cocaine.
                Both of the offenses for which Morley was convicted have a
        guilty knowledge element. The conspiracy charge under § 846 re-
        quired the government to prove: (1) the existence of an illegal
        agreement between two or more people to distribute cocaine; (2)
        that Morley knew of the agreement and its goal; and (3) that Mor-
        ley knowingly joined or participated in the agreement. See United
        States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 2009). And the sub-
        stantive possession charge under § 841(a)(1) required the govern-
        ment to prove that Morley knowingly possessed cocaine and in-
        tended to distribute it. United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1076
        (11th Cir. 2008). Because guilty knowledge can rarely be estab-
        lished directly, however, “a jury may infer knowledge and criminal
        intent from circumstantial evidence alone.” United States v. Duenas,
        891 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2018).
             Morley argues that the circumstantial evidence here is not
        enough to support an inference of knowledge. He contends that
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                        21

        this is a case of “guilt by association,” and that close association
        with a co-conspirator or mere presence at the scene of the crime is
        insufficient evidence to prove knowing participation in a conspir-
        acy. Morley is correct that “[n]either association with a co-con-
        spirator nor presence at the scene of a crime, standing alone, will
        support a finding of specific knowledge.” Id. (citing United States v.
        Louis, 861 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2017)). But “presence none-
        theless is a probative factor which the jury may consider in deter-
        mining whether a defendant was a knowing and intentional partic-
        ipant in a criminal scheme.” United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953,
        959 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d
        1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001)).
                Relying mainly on our decision in United States v. Sullivan,
        763 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985), Morley argues that his association
        with Edgecombe along with his presence at the scene is insufficient
        to support his convictions. In Sullivan, six codefendants were con-
        victed of conspiring to import marijuana from Columbia and dis-
        tribute it in the United States. Id. at 1216. The plan was to fly the
        marijuana to Florida, and then at the airport landing strip, to of-
        fload that marijuana into vans. Id. at 1216–17. Those vans would
        then deliver the marijuana to other drivers who would be waiting
        at a nearby hotel and would keep distributing the marijuana. Id.
        All six codefendants appealed the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
        porting their conspiracy convictions, but this Court found that only
        one codefendant, Martos, raised a legitimate challenge. Id. at 1218.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                22-12988

               This Court summarized the evidence related to Martos as
        follows. Drug Enforcement Administration agents saw Martos in
        a hotel parking lot near a red van. Id. at 1219. A codefendant, Mar-
        tinez, arrived in a blue van and walked over to Martos. Id. Martos
        and Martinez then walked over to two other codefendants, and all
        four walked around the parking lot for about five minutes. Id.
        Martos and Martinez went to the blue van and one of them, though
        it was never established who, removed a small bag from the van.
        Id. The two then went into the hotel lounge. Id. All four of them
        were later arrested, including Martos. Id. When Martos was ar-
        rested, he was with Martinez who was carrying the small handbag,
        which was found to contain a pistol. Id. There was no marijuana
        found at the scene of arrest because the plan was for other conspira-
        tors to offload the marijuana from the planes and transport it to the
        hotel to meet separate drivers who would distribute it to various
        other points. Id. at 1217. Therefore, though the police knew that
        some alleged conspirators would be drivers in the hotel parking lot
        awaiting other conspirators delivering marijuana from the airport,
        there was no evidence as to who the drivers at the hotel would be.
        Id.
               We reversed Martos’s conviction because there was no evi-
        dence that Martos knew of the existence of the conspiracy or that
        he knew that the van was intended to transport marijuana. Id. His
        conviction, rather, was seemingly based only “on his presence at
        the scene in the [hotel] parking lot.” Id. He was never “observed
        doing anything from which the jury could draw an inference that
        he was a member of the conspiracy.” Id.
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                        23

               Morley contends that this case is similar to Martos’s in Sulli-
        van because there was no evidence that Morley knew Edgecombe
        was planning to sell cocaine on August 6 or September 22 or that
        Morley knew Edgecombe’s briefcase contained cocaine that
        Edgecombe would instruct Fred to retrieve from Morley’s car. In-
        stead, Morley argues, he merely believed that he was meeting his
        friend, Edgecombe, after they scheduled a meeting at Home Depot
        for Morley to return the case left in his car. Morley points out that
        neither his DNA nor latent fingerprints were found on the cocaine
        or briefcase, so there was insufficient proof that he knew that he
        was transporting cocaine.
                The circumstantial evidence here, however, is far greater
        than it was in Sullivan and was more than sufficient for the jury to
        infer Morley’s knowledge. For starters, no marijuana was recov-
        ered at the scene of arrest in Sullivan, so it was much more attenu-
        ated to impute, to Martos, knowledge of a conspiracy to distribute
        drugs that Martos never physically possessed. In this case, it is un-
        disputed that Morley was in physical possession of the three kilo-
        grams of cocaine and that he transported the cocaine to the scene
        of the drug deal at the time it was supposed to occur. The only
        issue is whether a reasonable jury could have inferred that Morley
        knowingly agreed to do so despite his contention that he was an
        unsuspecting pawn. While knowledge requirements may vary
        widely based on the individual facts of each case, a jury can infer
        knowledge using certain guideposts, such as whether “a defendant
        was instrumental to a plan’s success, had ample opportunities to
        discover the critical fact, and was in frequent contact with someone
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12988

        who knew that fact.” United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1190
        (11th Cir. 2021). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
        a reasonable jury could have found that Morley knew of the plan
        to deliver cocaine to a drug deal.
                Morley played an instrumental role in the plan’s success.
        Edgecombe relied on Morley to deliver $84,000 worth of cocaine
        to a drug deal that Edgecombe had been discussing with Fred for
        over a month. And a prudent drug dealer is not likely to entrust
        the delivery of costly amounts of drugs to unwitting participants.
        In fact, we have repeatedly held that because “‘a prudent smuggler
        is not likely to suffer the presence of unaffiliated bystanders,’ when
        the orchestrator of a conspiracy vests substantial trust in an associ-
        ate to contribute to the scheme, a jury may infer the associate’s
        knowing participation.” Duenas, 891 F.3d at 1334 (quoting United
        States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
        The deal’s success depended on Morley delivering the cocaine. He
        did so, arriving at the designated meeting site, at the designated
        meeting time, minutes after Edgecombe directed him to show up.
               Morley’s communications with Edgecombe further support
        the inference of knowledge. On the day of the drug deal, Morley
        was in consistent contact with Edgecombe, who had brokered the
        cocaine deal with Fred. Morley’s phone records showed that he
        and Edgecombe called each other fifteen times, including multiple
        phone calls after Edgecombe had sent Morley the Home Depot ad-
        dress. The communications leading up to the September 28 deal
        suggested Morley’s knowledge, too. On September 22, Fred and
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        22-12988               Opinion of the Court                        25

        Edgecombe had a conversation at 10:01 a.m. about a deal for six
        kilograms of cocaine. During that call, Edgecombe told Fred that
        “it still isn’t really in place yet.” Fred explained that he wanted to
        know when it would be ready because he had “business” in Or-
        lando. After that call, Edgecombe and Morley spoke twice on the
        phone, once at 10:06 a.m. and again at 10:13 a.m. A minute after
        Edgecombe’s second call with Morley, Edgecombe called Fred
        again and told him he would send him “straight” and “directly” to
        the person with the cocaine.
                On the day of the August 6 deal, Edgecombe shared with
        Morley the address of the Bass Pro Shops. In addition, a few days
        before the August 6 drug deal, Edgecombe sent Morley two cryptic
        text messages: “I want you ride with me to deal with something
        also make yourself available,” and “whenever i call you i want ride
        with me.” In Duenas, we found similar messages to be a relevant
        indicator of the defendant’s knowledge. 891 F.3d at 1335. Specifi-
        cally, the defendant in Duenas texted his girlfriend two days before
        the transaction “that he was ‘going to do a special work,’ which he
        suggested would be lucrative for him.” Id. His girlfriend “re-
        sponded, ‘Good luck. God protect you and guide you,’” which this
        Court found to be an indicator of the defendant’s “knowing as-
        sumption of a palpable risk.” Id. The August 6 messages here are
        similar to those in Duenas. Edgecombe urging Morley to make
        himself available to ride with Edgecombe to deal with something
        whenever Edgecombe called, a few days before the first drug deal,
        could support an inference of Morley’s knowledge of the circum-
        stances. When paired with the communications leading up to, and
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12988

        on the date of, the September 28 drug deal, the frequency and the
        timing of the calls suggested Morley was a knowing participant.
               Despite Morley’s arguments to the contrary, the circum-
        stantial evidence here went far beyond Morley’s mere presence at
        the scene or his close association with Edgecombe. Morley showed
        up at the designated meeting site, at the designated meeting time,
        minutes after Edgecombe directed him to come. He was entrusted
        with delivering the cocaine, so he was instrumental to the deal. His
        communications with Edgecombe, a knowing participant, were
        frequent and suspiciously timed. In totality, a jury could reasona-
        bly infer Morley’s knowing involvement in the cocaine conspiracy
        on these facts. The trial evidence was thus sufficient to support his
        convictions, and we affirm as to this issue.
                     C.     Deliberate Ignorance Instruction
               Morley also challenges the district court’s decision to pro-
        vide a jury instruction on deliberate ignorance. The district court
        instructed the jury on both actual knowledge and deliberate igno-
        rance because the evidence “equally could be consistent with ac-
        tual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.” The district court
        pointed to Morley’s actions, such as his walking away from the car,
        and the way the drugs were packaged.
                A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the
        facts “support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high
        probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely
        contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense
        in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Rivera,
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        22-12988              Opinion of the Court                       27

        944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Al-
        varado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1987)). We have cautioned the
        district courts against instructing juries on deliberate ignorance
        when the evidence only points to either actual knowledge or no
        knowledge on the part of the defendant. Stone, 9 F.3d at 937 (citing
        Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1570–71). But it is not error “when the evidence
        could support both actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance and
        the jury was instructed on both.” United States v. Maitre, 898 F.3d
        1151, 1157 (11th Cir. 2018).
                Morley argues that the evidence only supported an actual-
        knowledge theory and points to our decision in United States v. Pe-
        rez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1994) for support. There, the de-
        fendant had driven a “cocaine-laden” truck to a house and “was
        present while seventy kilograms of cocaine were taken off the truck
        and placed in the bedroom of the house.” Id. at 1565. Because the
        only inference a jury could draw from this evidence was that the
        defendant’s presence during such a large movement of cocaine
        meant that he “had to have been aware of it,” we held that the dis-
        trict court erroneously gave a deliberate ignorance instruction. Id.
               But the facts here are different from Perez-Tosta. Unlike the
        defendant in Perez-Tosta, Morley attempted to distance himself
        from the deal as it took place. Morley received a text message from
        Edgecombe with the address of the Home Depot and, within
        minutes, left his house and drove there with a briefcase containing
        three kilograms of cocaine on his passenger seat. When Morley
        arrived, however, he did not attempt to find Edgecombe. Instead,
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        28                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12988

        he quickly exited his vehicle and walked across the street to a
        Wendy’s restaurant. After realizing that the Wendy’s was closed,
        Morley paced around outside and eventually made his way across
        the street to help a family with car troubles. Consequently, Morley
        was not present when Fred retrieved the three kilograms of cocaine
        from Morley’s car, or when Fred gave Edgecombe the $84,000 for
        that cocaine. These facts supported the alternative inference that
        Morley was aware of a high probability that he had delivered co-
        caine to a drug deal and had been trying to avoid learning all the
        facts in order to have a defense in a subsequent prosecution. Mor-
        ley’s actions therefore warranted the deliberate ignorance instruc-
        tion.
                In any event, the district court instructed the jury that it
        could convict if Morley had actual knowledge or deliberate igno-
        rance. If, as Morley contends, there was insufficient evidence that
        he was deliberately ignorant of the contents of the briefcase, then
        our precedent is clear that the jury must have convicted on the al-
        ternative theory—actual knowledge. See Colston, 4 F.4th at 1192
        (citing Stone, 9 F.3d at 938). Thus, even if the district court erred in
        giving the deliberate ignorance instruction, it was harmless. See id.
        In any event, Morley’s challenge to the jury instruction fails.
                          D.      Safety Valve Reduction
              Finally, Morley argues that the district court erred in its de-
        termination that he was ineligible for a safety valve sentence reduc-
        tion under the First Step Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The district
        court denied Morley a safety valve reduction on two grounds: (1)
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        22-12988                  Opinion of the Court                              29

        Morley did not satisfy § 3553(f)(1) because he had a prior 3-point
        offense and (2) Morley did not satisfy § 3553(f)(5) because his safety
        valve statement was insufficiently truthful and complete. 1 In light
        of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pulsifer v. United States,
        144 S. Ct. 718 (2024), the district court’s first basis for denying safety
        valve relief was correct.
                At the time of sentencing, there were competing interpreta-
        tions as to whether § 3553(f)(1) was conjunctive or disjunctive. Af-
        ter noting that the issue was “still not settled by the Eleventh Cir-
        cuit,” the district court landed on the disjunctive side of the debate
        and based its first ground for denying safety valve relief on that
        finding. Shortly after Morley was sentenced, this Court released its
        en banc decision in United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir.
        2022) (en banc), abrogated by Pulsifer, 144 S. Ct. 718. Vacating a prior
        panel decision that reached the opposite conclusion, our en banc
        Court determined that § 3553(f)(1) was “conjunctive” such that de-
        fendants were only disqualified from safety valve relief due to prior
        convictions if they had all of the criminal history features under
        subsection (f)(1). Id. at 1276.
                On appeal, Morley argued that Garcon invalidated the dis-
        trict court’s first basis for denying safety valve relief and, as to the
        second basis, that the district court clearly erred in finding that he
        failed to satisfy § 3553(f)(5). The government conceded that, after

        1 The relevant statutory provisions, along with the conjunctive versus disjunc-

        tive interpretative divide, are detailed in the Factual & Procedural Back-
        ground.
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                   22-12988

        Garcon, the district court’s first basis for denying safety valve relief
        would have been incorrect. However, the government argued that
        we should affirm on the district court’s alternative rationale that
        Morley’s safety-valve statement was insufficient under § 3553(f)(5).
        Therefore, the only issue that we would have needed to consider
        is whether the district court erred in its § 3553(f)(5) determination.
        We only needed to reach that argument, however, if Morley was
        otherwise eligible for the safety valve reduction. But the Supreme
        Court’s recent decision in Pulsifer expressly abrogated our decision
        in Garcon and held that a defendant who has any of the three crim-
        inal-history components under § 3553(f)(1) is disqualified from
        safety valve sentencing relief. 144 S. Ct. at 737.
               It is undisputed in this appeal that Morley fails to satisfy §
        3553(f)(1)(B) because he has a prior three-point offense—conspir-
        acy to import 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. Therefore,
        Morley is ineligible for the safety valve reduction in light of Pulsifer.
        We thus affirm the district court’s denial of Morley’s request for a
        reduced sentence.
                                 IV.     CONCLUSION
                 For these reasons, we affirm Morley’s convictions and sen-
        tence.
                 AFFIRMED.