Court Opinion

ID: 9775286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:53:07.257612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:24.612749
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe that the tactics employed by the Assistant Circuit Attorney throughout the trial of this criminal proceeding was the product of an intention to procure a conviction at any costs and deprived the appellant of a fair and impartial trial.
I agree with my esteemed colleagues that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of the jury; that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the color photographs, and that the sentence imposed was not in excess of that allowed by statute. I cannot agree, however, with the affirmation of the conviction for reasons stated hereinabove.
The majority admits that the Assistant Circuit Attorney, in a number of these instances acted improperly but holds that the trial court’s rulings and instructions to the jury cured them. Because of the number of prosecutorial improprieties involved, I cannot accept this conclusion.
The Assistant Circuit Attorney initiated a course of misconduct in voir dire, continued said course in cross-examination of the appellant and reached a nadir in her summation.
The majority opinion has set out that portion of the voir dire wherein the Assistant Circuit Attorney attempted to advise the jury why she had plea-bargained with Mrs. Bruegge and agreed to a plea to a *551reduced charge, i. e. to obtain her truthful testimony. One need cite no authority why this is improper; the trial judge recognized that it was and admonished the Assistant Circuit Attorney that she should not make that statement again. Undaunted by this admonition, she proceeded along the same course, advising the prospective jurors that despite the fact she didn’t want to do it, she made a recommendation for a sentence so Mrs. Bruegge would testify. Appellant’s objection was again sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard those statements. The majority disposes of appellant’s claim of error by analyzing the nature of his objection and by apparently concluding that he waived any error when he failed to object when Mrs. Bruegge testified that she had pled guilty to mistreatment of the child and cross-examined her about these matters to attack her credibility.
The majority does, however, admit that this portion of the state’s voir dire “was not well thought out nor artfully prepared and was improper.” I recognize that not every improper question asked by a prosecutor calls for a mistrial, and if this was the only instance of impropriety I might agree with the majority. However, viewed in light of the remaining incidents of prosecutorial misconduct by this Assistant Circuit Attorney, I believe it must be examined in the light of the effect that each instance of misconduct, although • miniscule in itself, like the continuing dripping of droplets of water erodes the stone upon which it drops, eroded the defendant’s constitutional guarantee of a fair and impartial trial.
The next instance I perceive to be prose-cutorial misconduct occurred during cross-examination of the appellant when he was asked when he had last seen his children. Although no objection was made on those grounds, the question went beyond the scope of appellant’s direct examination and was in direct violation of § 546.260 V.A.M.S., State v. Harris, 564 S.W.2d 561, 574[18] (Mo.App.1978). Every prosecutor is presumed to know this statutory restriction on cross-examination of a defendant. The Assistant Circuit Attorney admitted that the question was a fishing expedition, — “I can’t honestly state to the Court what I would find” — and although she didn’t have proof of it, she believed he was ordered by a court in Illinois not to go near his wife or children and she wouldn’t be able to prove it until the next day. So far as the record shows no such proof was forthcoming.
As the majority points out, the appellant’s reply that he had not seen his children because their custody was awarded to his former wife — their mother — did not adduce any evidence that he was barred from seeing them because he had abused them. However, this question is indicative of the reckless disregard of the statutory rules of evidence she would have employed unless stopped by opposing counsel and supports a finding that the improprieties engaged in were calculated and in derogation of appellant’s right to a fair trial. The fact that she dropped the line of inquiry with appellant’s answer merely supports a conclusion that she got across to the jury the point she wanted — appellant was unfit to have custody of his children. There had been no evidence as to appellant’s married state nor whether he had any children until it was brought out on cross-examination.
The majority concludes that no demonstrable prejudice resulted from the admission of this testimony. If this were the only improper question, I would agree; however, when viewed in light of the others, I cannot adopt that conclusion.
The next three alleged errors occurred during summation — or as more often identified — “argument.” The first claim of prejudicial argument is that the Assistant Circuit Attorney engaged in misconduct in arguing appellant’s prior convictions and the fact that he had served time in the penitentiary as evidence of his guilt of this crime.
It has been the law in this state, at least since 1963, that when an accused has taken the witness stand to testify in his own behalf and has admitted the nature and the number of his prior convictions, it is reversible error for a prosecutor to refer to those prior convictions in summation to establish a propensity for criminal conduct. The only *552legitimate purpose of a prosecutor’s argument relative to an accused’s prior convictions is on the issue of the accused’s credibility, and any argument concerning prior unconnected crimes as reflecting upon the accused’s character or as a basis for conviction in the case on trial is improper. State v. Mobley, 369 S.W.2d 576, 579-580[1, 2, 3] (Mo.1963). See State v. Guernsey, 577 S.W.2d 432, 435[2] (Mo.App.1979) and cases cited therein on this issue.
I need not set out in haec verbae the argument of the Assistant Circuit Attorney; the majority opinion has done that. The majority does not hold that this argument is not error; it holds that the error was cured by the court’s instruction to disregard the word “penitentiary,” and therefore the appellant obtained all the relief he asked for.
Nevertheless, the Assistant Circuit Attorney merely shifted gears, and used appellant’s “six different felonies,” admitted to by appellant when he testified, as proof that he committed the crime for which he was on trial. While I must admit appellant’s counsel’s objection was not the most artful and is correctly categorized by the majority as a “general objection,” I believe that in the context it sufficiently advised the trial court that it was on the same grounds as the one the trial court had just sustained. It was: “I’ll object. She’s doing the same thing ...” In fact, she was.
Unlike the majority, I view the second part of this objection as a request for a contempt citation if, after a second favorable ruling, the Assistant Circuit Attorney continued this line of argument, not as a request for a contempt citation at that point. I believe appellant’s counsel had every reason to expect his objection would be sustained in view of the prior ruling of the trial court on the preceding question. Both questions were in violation of the Rule in State v. Mobley, supra, and, in my humble opinion, the trial court erred in the latter ruling.
If the majority is correct in construing this objection as a request for a contempt citation alone, then I would say that the Assistant Circuit Attorney should have been cautioned that if she persisted in this line of inquiry she would be cited for contempt because, as Judge Eager recognized in State v. Mobley, supra, l.c. 581: “All lawyers and judges know that a jury’s knowledge of prior convictions is, in itself, a most damning thing in the trial of a criminal case. When used for legitimate purposes, the defendant must take his chances on this. But prosecutors should not seize upon such an opportunity to further prejudice the defendant by undue repetition and insinuation, or to convey the idea of guilt by reason of the prior offenses.” State v. Scott, 459 S.W.2d 321, 324[2] (Mo.1970); State v. Newman, 568 S.W.2d 276, 281, 282 (Mo.App.1978).
Furthermore, the Attorney General’s office has not urged upon us that this point was not preserved for review because the objection was not sufficiently specific to call attention of the trial court to the grounds or reason for the objection, nor that an objection such as “I object” preserves nothing for review. State v. Lang, 515 S.W.2d 507, 511 [6, 7] (Mo.1974). While I concede that an objection must generally be specific, I believe there are circumstances where the argument of counsel is so improper and prejudicial that any experienced trial judge should, and as here did with respect to the immediate prior argument in the same vein, recognize the reversible error and, consistent with his prior ruling, sustain it.
I have no difficulty finding the Assistant Circuit Attorney’s argument concerning the absence of “the other girl friends and children to tell you what Searl Dunn is really like” was a direct attack upon appellant’s failure to call character witnesses and therefore error when he did not put his “general character” in evidence. However, here, for the fourth time, improper conduct by the Assistant Circuit Attorney is excused by the majority because the trial court sustained his objection and instructed the jury to disregard the argument.
Finally we reach the “name-calling” state of the argument, which appellant claims *553was prosecutorial misconduct. He complains because the Assistant Circuit Attorney repeatedly referred to him as a “demon.” 1 The majority aptly condemned the use of unbecoming names and epithets to characterize the defendant and pointed out that very few cases have been reversed on these grounds alone. This latter admission, in my humble opinion, is a sad reflection on the state of our criminal justice system and an invitation to prosecutors to engage in a practice we condemn. Why counsel would sit by and permit this to occur, I do not know; but, it may have been a tactical decision; or, having been rebuffed so often, he may have finally thrown in the towel. Appellant’s only chance for review was by way of Rule 27.20(c) (now Rule 29.12(b)) and my brethren have concluded this argument did not constitute “plain error” as that term is employed in the Rule. I cannot quarrel with them on this point, although I think the time must come when we inform counsel for either the state or the defense that we will no longer tolerate argument of this kind.
I do believe, however, that where, as I opine was done here, a prosecutor, to obtain a conviction, pulls all stops, and engages in one impropriety after another, whereby, in the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial was compromised, I cannot let the conviction stand and must vote to reverse and remand for a new trial.2

. The record reveals that the Assistant Circuit Attorney referred to appellant as a “demon” three times; a “devil,” five times, and “a monstrous force,” once. She argued, “This devil is the killer of this little baby.” However, the Assistant Circuit Attorney also referred to her star witness, Mrs. Bruegge, as a “slut” and a “tramp.” She spared only the judge, her opponent, and the jury.

. See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 Tex.L.R. 629 (1972).