Court Opinion

ID: 9774221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:11:46.337953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.591668
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, concurring. The trial court, as the majority opinion notes, ordered the return of the property to the appellee and then awarded incidental damages based on the loss of use of the items replevied. However, the court stated in its order that it was awarding damages for “conversion.” The majority opinion has seized on that mistaken terminology to duck the issue of whether the damages were correctly calculated. I see nothing wrong with the trial court’s calculation of damages. The appellant’s argument is that no evidence of the value of the replevied items was presented. Therefore, he says, the court had no basis for determining whether the compensatory damages awarded for loss of use were disproportionate to the market value of the items. In my opinion, if the appellant had wished to challenge the appellee’s evidence of rental rates under the Adams contract as a basis for damages, he could have done so by presentation of evidence of the value of the items. However, he did not. My primary objection to the majority opinion is that it leaves the impression that this court fails to understand that conversion damages and incidental damages accompanying replevin are wholly inconsistent remedies. The distinguishing feature of an action for conversion is an interference with property so serious as to justify a forced judicial sale to the wrongdoer. See W. Prosser and W. Keeton, Law of Torts, § 15 (5th Ed. 1984). The property owner is compensated by an award for value of the property at the time and place of the conversion. On the other hand, the primary object of a replevin action is the actual recovery of possession of the property. The owner cannot be required to accept the value of the item in lieu of return of possession. Pettit v. Kilby, 232 Ark. 993, 342 S.W.2d 93 (1961). By statute, the property owner may, in addition to return of the item, recover damages for loss of use while it was out of his possession. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-2116 (Repl. 1962). It is generally recognized that the value of the use of the property converted is not recoverable in a conversion action. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Henry, 267 Ark. 201, 584 S.W.2d 584 (1979) (measure of damages for conversion is the market value at the time and place of conversion, not the purchase, rental, or replacement cost); Hardin v. Marshall, 176 Ark. 977, 5 S.W.2d 325 (1928) (instruction allowing jury to assess as damages rental value of property converted in addition to value of property was error in a conversion cause of action). Rather than emphasize the trial court’s mistaken reference to conversion, I believe we can and should ignore the form of his order and look to its substance. The compensatory damage awards were so clearly the ones contemplated by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-2116 (Repl. 1962) that the court’s ruling should be treated as such. My second objection is that the majority opinion suggests we are somehow bound by the United States Supreme Court’s estimate of the precedential value of appellate decisions which result from a tie vote. This court is not bound by the way the federal courts choose to handle this situation. The question of what weight to accord decisions from an equally divided court has not been directly addressed in Arkansas, and the issue is far from settled. See R. Laurence, A Very Short Article on the Precedential Value of the Opinions from an Equally Divided Court, 37 Ark. L. Rev. 418 (1983). While White v. Gladden, 6 Ark. App. 299, 641 S.W.2d 738 (1982), is in my view, no more than a tempest in a teapot in the context of this case, I do not believe we should imply that it lacks precedential value in our court of appeals. While there is a temptation to remand this case to the trial court because of the mistaken terminology used in the judgment, I believe the judgment is clear enough in stating the damages and the means used to calculate them as incidental replevin damages that the judgment should be affirmed. Purtle, J., joins in this concurrence.