Court Opinion

ID: 9912208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 20:02:22.794609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:57.073455
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/21/23 P. v. Salazar CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B327454

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. GA092102)
           v.

 FRANCISCO SALAZAR et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Teri Schwartz, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Francisco Salazar.
      Lori A. Nakaoka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Fernando Pereida.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Francisco Salazar and Fernando Pereida appeal the denial
of their petitions for resentencing under Penal Code1 section
1172.6 (former § 1170.95)2 at the prima facie stage. Appellants
contend the superior court improperly weighed evidence and
made findings of fact based on erroneous conclusions about the
substance of appellants’ pleas and the preliminary hearing
transcript to deny their petitions. We agree. The orders denying
appellants’ petitions under section 1172.6 are therefore reversed,
and both matters are remanded to the superior court for issuance
of orders to show cause and further proceedings in accordance
with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
      FACTUAL3 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In the early morning hours of October 27, 2013, Raul
Garcia was at a house party, where someone pointed out
appellants Pereida and Salazar to him by name. Garcia left the
party and walked to his car parked down the street. It was very
dark. After Garcia had entered his car, two men approached and
stood at the driver’s side window. One or both of them asked
Garcia where he was from. Garcia responded, “Nowhere.”
Garcia was then struck by two bullets in the back of his ear and
his head, both of which lodged in his face. Garcia did not see a
gun and did not know who shot him, but he identified Pereida

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

      2 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
      3 The following factual summary is drawn from the
transcript of the preliminary hearing.

                                2
and Salazar as the two men who stood at his car window and
asked where he was from.
       On September 9, 2014, defendants Pereida and Salazar
were charged by information with one count of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a).) It
was further alleged that a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c), (d), & (e)), and that the offense was committed for
the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C) &
(b)(4)). Defendants pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.
       On February 11, 2016, both defendants withdrew their
pleas of not guilty and pleaded no contest to count 1. Each
admitted the allegation pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivisions (c) and (e)(1) that a principal personally discharged
a firearm, and also admitted the gang allegation. The trial court
granted the People’s motion to amend the information to strike
the allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated. Counsel for both defendants stipulated to a
factual basis for the plea based on the preliminary hearing
transcript and arrest reports. In accordance with the plea
agreement, the trial court sentenced each defendant to a term of
29 years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of nine
years for attempted murder plus 20 years for the principal-armed
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and
(e)(1). The gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1)(C) was imposed and stricken pursuant to the plea
agreement.
       On February 14, 2022, appellant Pereida filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. Appellant Salazar filed his
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing on March 23, 2022. Both

                                 3
petitions alleged that a complaint, information, or indictment
was filed which allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; appellants accepted plea offers in lieu of a
trial at which they could have been convicted of attempted
murder; and appellants could not presently be convicted of
attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and
189, effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       Following appointment of counsel for appellants and
briefing by the parties, the superior court conducted a prima facie
hearing on the petitions on December 14, 2022. The superior
court stated it had reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript
and determined that “[t]he information in this case did not allow
the prosecution to proceed under the felony murder or natural
and probable consequence doctrine. This was an express malice
attempted murder and both Mr. Salazar and Mr. Pereida were
principals in the offense. So there’s no imputation of express
malice.” The court further noted that appellants “pled no contest
to express malice attempted murder and admitted a personal use
of a firearm allegation.” It then denied the petitions on the
ground that appellants had failed to make the requisite prima
facie showing and were ineligible for relief under section 1172.6
as a matter of law.
                           DISCUSSION
       The Superior Court Erred in Denying
       Appellants’ Petitions for Resentencing Without
       Conducting an Evidentiary Hearing in
       Accordance with Section 1172.6, Subdivision (d)
       Appellants assert that their petitions adequately alleged
the conditions for relief under section 1172.6, thereby making a

                                4
prima facie showing of eligibility. Because there was nothing in
the record the superior court could properly rely on at this stage
to conclusively refute these allegations, appellants contend
reversal is required and the matter must be remanded for
issuance of orders to show cause and a hearing in accordance
with section 1172.6, subdivision (d). We agree.
    A. Applicable legal principles
       Attempted murder requires that the defendant harbor
express malice, that is, the specific intent to kill. (People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 457; People v. Stone (2009) 46
Cal.4th 131, 139; People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739
[“Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice are, in essence, ‘one
and the same’ ”].) When appellants entered their pleas, however,
an aider and abettor could be found guilty of attempted
murder⎯even absent the intent to kill⎯under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Under that doctrine, malice
could be imputed to an aider and abettor, making that person
“guilty not only of the intended, or target, crime but also of any
other crime a principal in the target crime actually commits (the
nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable consequence of
the target crime. [Citations.] ‘Thus, for example, if a person aids
and abets only an intended assault, but a murder results, that
person may be guilty of that murder, even if unintended, if it is a
natural and probable consequence of the intended assault.’ ”
(People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611; see People v. Medina
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919–928 [defendants who aided and
abetted simple assault were guilty of resulting murder and
attempted murder by accomplice].)
       Effective January 1, 2019, “Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 1437)

                                 5
eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Curiel (Nov. 27,
2023, S272238) __ Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal. Lexis 6622, p. *50]
(Curiel); § 188, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 2.) Specifically, the Legislature amended section 188 to require
that, when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in
the crime of murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and
“[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1172.6 (former
§ 1170.95) to the Penal Code, creating “a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.)
Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1, 2022, amended section
1172.6 to expand its coverage to individuals convicted of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Saibu (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)
       Upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing, the superior court must appoint counsel if
requested, and then conduct a prima facie analysis with briefing
to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 960;
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).) “[T]he
prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘ “[T]he court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court

                                  6
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Lewis, at p. 971; Curiel,
supra, __ Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal. Lexis, p. *52].) In making its
assessment, the superior court may consider the petitioner’s
record of conviction. (Lewis, at pp. 970–971.) And in cases where
the conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the
record of conviction may include the transcript of the petitioner’s
preliminary hearing. (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223.)
As Lewis explained, “The record of conviction will necessarily
inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . allowing the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971.) However, “the court should
not make credibility determinations or engage in ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Id. at p. 974; People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 991
(Flores) [at prima facie stage, superior court is prohibited from
engaging in factfinding].)
       We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
appellants’ section 1172.6 petitions without issuing orders to
show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545;
People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975 (Eynon).) A
denial at this stage is appropriate only if the record of conviction
demonstrates that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.)
   B. Neither the information nor appellants’ pleas to
attempted murder establish ineligibility for resentencing
as a matter of law
       The information charged appellants with one substantive
offense: “attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder.” Pursuant to the plea agreement, and at the People’s
request, the trial court amended the information “to strike the

                                  7
willful, deliberate, and premeditated” allegation, and both
defendants pleaded no contest to “straight attempt[ed] murder.”
Nothing in the information itself or the attempted murder charge
to which appellants pleaded no contest prevented the prosecution
from presenting any available theory of attempted murder
liability to convict appellants, and at the time of appellants’ no
contest pleas in February 2016, such theories included liability
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v.
Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879 [“it is only necessary that the
attempted murder ‘be committed by one of the perpetrators with
the requisite state of mind’ ”]; see also People v. Das (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 954, 959; People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217,
233 (Rivera) [“the allegation that a murder was committed
‘willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought’ is a generic
charge permitting the prosecution to proceed on any theory of
murder”]; accord, Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 987; Eynon,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 970–971.)
       The fact that attempted murder requires an intent to kill,
and that appellants pleaded to the offense, does not conclusively
establish that each defendant personally intended to kill the
victim, much less answer the question whether that intent could
have been imputed to him under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
1001, 1007–1008 [trial court erred in inferring from the jury’s
finding of guilt of attempted murder that the jury must have
found the defendant personally possessed the intent to kill where
the conviction under a natural and probable consequences theory
was possible].)
       Contrary to the superior court’s findings, the information in
this case did not specify or limit the prosecution to any particular

                                 8
theory of attempted murder. (Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 233.) Our Supreme Court has held that “only a single
statutory offense of murder exists.” (People v. Nakahara (2003)
30 Cal.4th 705, 712.) “Thus, ‘it has long been the law in this
state that an accusatory pleading charging murder need not
specify degree or the manner in which the murder was
committed’ (People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 829, fn. 5),
nor need it ‘specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution
relies at trial.’ (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 147.)
Specifically, neither felony murder nor murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine need be separately pleaded.”
(Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 233, citing Nakahara, at
p. 712 [felony murder]; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843
[aiding and abetting not a separate offense]; People v. Garrison
(1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 776, fn. 12 [accusatory pleading that
charges the defendant “as a principal is sufficient to support a
conviction as an aider or abettor”].)
       Appellants also did not plead “to express malice attempted
murder,” nor did they admit to or stipulate to any other theory of
attempted murder. Instead, the record definitively shows that
appellants pleaded “just to a straight attempt[ed] murder,”
without “the willful, deliberate, premeditated” allegation.
Neither one admitted harboring an intent to kill.
       The superior court also erred in finding that appellants
“admitted a personal use of a firearm allegation.” They did not.
Rather, the record of the plea colloquy is clear that each
defendant admitted that “a principal personally discharged a
firearm” in the commission of the offense pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1). (Italics added.) Neither
defendant admitted that he personally discharged a firearm.

                                 9
Instead, each stipulated he was subject to the firearm
enhancement as a non-shooter because he violated the gang
enhancement statute (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and another principal
in the offense personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1)).
       A defendant’s admission to a principal’s use of a firearm
does not constitute an admission to personal use of a firearm by
the defendant, or an admission of express malice. (See People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598.) In Offley the court held
that because “an enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) does not require that the defendant acted either
with the intent to kill or with conscious disregard to life, it does
not establish that the defendant acted with malice aforethought.”
(Ibid.) As it does now, section 12022.53, subdivision (d) provided
a sentence enhancement for persons who personally and
intentionally discharge a firearm and proximately cause great
bodily injury in the commission of attempted murder or other
specified felony. The Offley court found section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) “does not refer to an ‘intent to achieve any
additional consequence.’ [Citation.] It is thus a general intent
enhancement, and does not require the prosecution to prove that
the defendant harbored a particular mental state as to the
victim’s injury or death.” (Ibid.)
       Here, subdivision (c) of section 12022.53 is similar to
subdivision (d) but omits the requirement the shooting
proximately caused great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c) [prescribing an additional and consecutive 20-year term
of imprisonment for committing attempted murder by “personally
and intentionally discharg[ing] a firearm”].) It requires the
intentional discharge of a firearm but does not refer to an intent

                                10
to achieve any additional consequence. While an inference could
be made that either or both Pereida and Salazar were actual
shooters who acted with the intent to kill, as we have discussed,
neither defendant’s plea included an admission he was an actual
shooter or that he intended to shoot or kill Garcia. In order to
draw such an inference and deny appellants’ petitions at the
prima facie stage, the superior court must have engaged in
prohibited factfinding. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
       In sum, neither the information nor any aspect of
appellants’ plea to the charge conclusively establishes appellants
are ineligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 as a
matter of law.
   C. Appellants’ stipulation to the preliminary hearing
transcript as a factual basis for their pleas does not
establish ineligibility for relief
       Through counsel, both defendants stipulated to a factual
basis for their pleas based on the preliminary hearing transcript
and arrest reports. The superior court cited the preliminary
hearing transcript as a basis for denying the resentencing
petitions at the prima facie stage.4 However, neither appellants’

      4 Courts of Appeal are split on the significance of the
preliminary hearing transcript in determining whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie case for resentencing under
section 1172.6, and the issue is now before the Supreme Court.
(People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657, review granted
June 28, 2023, S279670 (Patton) [issue under review is whether
trial court engaged in impermissible judicial factfinding at the
prima facie stage by relying on preliminary hearing transcript to
deny defendant’s section 1172.6 petition]; People v. Nguyen (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1161 [court may consider information

                                11
stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual
basis for the plea, nor the preliminary hearing testimony itself
establishes appellants’ ineligibility for resentencing under section
1172.6.
      The finding of a factual basis for a guilty or no contest plea
means nothing more than that a prima facie factual basis for the
charges has been established. (People v. Holmes (2004) 32
Cal.4th 432, 441.) The trial court is not required to inquire about
possible defenses to the charged crime, nor must the court even
be convinced of the defendant’s guilt. (Ibid.; Rivera, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th at p. 235.) Moreover, “[a] defendant is not required
to personally admit the truth of the factual basis of the plea,
which may be established by defense counsel’s stipulation to a
particular document, such as a police report or a preliminary

contained in the preliminary hearing transcript when it is
stipulated as the factual basis for the plea]; People v. Davenport
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481 (Davenport) [court held
preliminary hearing transcript was part of the record of
conviction, but concluded the trial court erroneously relied on
that transcript to make the prima facie determination because
the defendant “did not stipulate to the transcript as a factual
basis for his plea”]; contrast, Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 991 [information in the preliminary hearing transcript may not
be used to find a petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law].)
        Because we conclude that the preliminary hearing
transcript in this case does not conclusively establish appellants’
ineligibility for resentencing under section 1172.6, we need not
and do not reach the question of whether and under what
circumstances the preliminary hearing transcript may be used to
determine if a resentencing petition states a prima facie claim for
relief.

                                12
hearing transcript.” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 50–
51.) Simply being held to answer on a charge or allegation does
not constitute a factual finding that the charge or allegation is
true, nor does it constitute a determination that the charge or
allegation is supported by substantial evidence. (Eynon, supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975–976.) “Thus, absent an indication that
a defendant admitted the truth of particular facts, the stipulation
to a factual basis for the plea does not ‘constitute[ ] a binding
admission for all purposes.’ ” (Rivera, at p. 235; French, at
pp. 51–52; see People v. Hiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 335, 349
[“Courts have consistently differentiated between an admission
that a document or recitation contains a factual basis for a plea
and an admission that statements in that document or recitation
are true”].) Here, defense counsel stipulated to the preliminary
hearing transcript without reference to any particular facts.
Thus, defendants did not admit the truth of any of the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing, and that evidence cannot
be used to demonstrate that either admitted to acting with actual
malice. (See Rivera, at pp. 234–235.)
       This is obviously not a case in which the only possible
scenario is that one defendant was the sole perpetrator.
(Cf. People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 [the
defendant was “not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6”
because he “was the actual killer and the only participant in the
killing”].) Clearly, both defendants had some involvement in the
shooting that led to the attempted murder charge. But while
Garcia identified both defendants as the men who demanded to
know “where [he was] from,” he did not know who shot him. And
although there was some preliminary hearing testimony that
Garcia recalled telling his girlfriend it was Pereida who shot him,

                                13
an affirmative finding that Pereida was the actual shooter based
on this evidence would require factfinding that is not permitted
at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971, 974; People v. Flores (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170 [“a court presented with a section 1172.6
petition may not engage in factfinding that requires weighing
evidence or exercising discretion” at the prima facie stage].)
   D. Appellants adequately alleged a prima facie case for
relief and are entitled to an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d)
       The People contend that uncontroverted evidence from the
preliminary hearing, the plea hearing, and the section 1172.6
proceedings established appellants’ ineligibility for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. They assert that appellants failed to
establish a “bonafide [sic] factual dispute” demonstrating prima
facie eligibility for relief, and claim “[t]he record shows, without
resort to improper factfinding, that [an] actual perpetrator/direct
aiding and abetting theory was the prosecution’s theory of the
case.” In support of their argument, the People cite Patton,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649 (rev.gr.) and People v. Pickett (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 982, review granted October 11, 2023, S281643
(Pickett) as “instructive.” However, these cases are
distinguishable, and respondent’s reliance on them misplaced.
       Both Patton and Pickett were single-perpetrator cases. In
Patton, the Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s denial of
Patton’s section 1172.6 petition on the ground that the
preliminary hearing transcript demonstrated that Patton was the
sole and actual perpetrator of the attempted murder, making him
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Patton, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at pp. 652, 657, rev.gr.) Patton also admitted the

                                14
allegation that he personally used and discharged a firearm. (Id.
at p. 653.)
       Similarly, in Pickett, the preliminary hearing transcript
contained no indication of an accomplice, and the appellate court
upheld the superior court’s denial of the section 1172.6 petition,
finding “[t]he inference that Pickett acted alone and was the
actual killer is uncontradicted and compelling.” (Pickett, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 990.) The Pickett court noted that in
response to the district attorney’s evidence in opposition to the
petition, Pickett had asserted no objection or offered any evidence
or argument that might have raised a factual issue as to his
involvement in the victim’s death. (Ibid.) The court declared,
“We can thus assess Pickett’s prima facie showing without
‘engag[ing] in “factfinding involving the weighing of evidence” ’ or
making any credibility determinations (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 972), because Pickett offered no evidence to weigh, and did
not dispute the evidence the district attorney submitted.” The
court went on to hold, “Under these circumstances, where the
defendant alleges no facts concerning the murder to which he
pleaded guilty, the People introduce without objection
uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript
showing that the defendant acted alone in killing the victim, and
the defendant does not put forth, by way of briefing or oral
argument, any factual or legal theory in support of his petition,
the defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing for relief
under section 1172.6.” (Ibid., citing Patton, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 657, rev.gr.)
       This case does not involve the “sole perpetrator” scenario
presented in Patton and Pickett. Rather, the record of conviction
in this case⎯that is, the preliminary hearing transcript,

                                15
information, and plea colloquy⎯established there were two
defendants, both of whom were charged with the attempted
murder of Garcia, and neither of whom admitted that he
personally discharged a firearm. Indeed, the identity of the
actual shooter was unknown. The record is silent as to any
specific theory of defendants’ criminal liability, and the
prosecution was not limited to pursuing any particular theory.
       Further, we decline to impose the additional burden
implicit in the People’s argument, which would require the
petitioner to make an offer of proof or submission of evidence to
rebut any facts taken from a preliminary hearing transcript.
(See Davenport, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 483 [the requirement
at the prima facie stage that a petitioner counter evidence from
the preliminary hearing “allocates to petitioners an evidentiary
burden that should be on the state [citation], and effectively
raises ‘ “the prima facie bar [that] was intentionally and correctly
set very low” ’ ”]; cf. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 713 [“We
agree . . . that a defendant may still challenge prior adverse
special circumstance findings in other types of proceedings, just
as the defendant could have before section 1172.6 was enacted.
But nothing in section 1172.6 says that a defendant must always
do so before seeking resentencing”].) In short, “a petitioner who
alleges that he or she could not currently be convicted of a
homicide offense ‘because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)) puts at issue all
elements of the offense under a valid theory.” (Curiel, supra, __
Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal. Lexis 6622, p. *51].) And “[o]nly where the
record of conviction contains facts conclusively refuting the
allegations in the petition may the court make credibility
determinations adverse to the petitioner.” (Flores, supra, 76

                                 16
Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) If the record of conviction—including the
preliminary hearing transcript—contains conflicting evidence
regarding the petitioner’s guilt under current law, the trial court
is not authorized to resolve that conflict at the prima facie stage.
(Id. at pp. 991–992.)
                          DISPOSITION
       The orders denying appellants’ petitions for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6 are reversed. Both matters are
remanded to the superior court for issuance of orders to show
cause and further proceedings in accordance with Penal Code
section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      CHAVEZ, J.

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