Court Opinion

ID: 9584325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:55.844036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:34.562409
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J.
I concur in the affirmance of the judgment and in all of the reasoning of the majority with one exception, relating to the peremptory challenge issue. (Ante, this page.) As noted in my concurring opinion in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 374 [197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680], I would not equate the constitutional standard governing peremptory challenges with the standard applicable to challenges for cause, and would not suggest that jurors with reservations against the death penalty are not a “constitutionally cognizable class.” (Ante, this page.) In other contexts, serious constitutional questions would be presented by a statute which authorized the exclusion for cause of a category or “class” of persons on the basis of such shared ideological beliefs.
*162No such problems, however, are presented by this case. Just as a defendant violates no constitutional strictures in using his peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who strongly favor the death penalty, the prosecution may properly use its limited number of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors with reservations about the death penalty. Indeed, this is the classic use of the peremptory challenge—to exclude a prospective juror who a party fears will be unfavorable to him because of the juror’s leanings on an issue related to the case.