Court Opinion

ID: 9943705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-24 18:11:31.284243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:48.454241
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00435-CV

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                        IN THE INTEREST OF M.R.B., A CHILD

                         On appeal from the 36th District Court
                            of San Patricio County, Texas.

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

  Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
          Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

        Appellant W.B. 1 appeals the trial court’s judgment involuntarily terminating his

parental rights with respect to minor child M.R.B. 2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001.

We affirm.

       1 We refer to appellant and the child by initials in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).

        2 The trial court’s judgment also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of M.R.B.’s biological

mother, who is not a party to this appeal.
                                         I.      ANDERS BRIEF

        W.B.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that she has

diligently reviewed the entire record but “is unable to identify any nonfrivolous grounds for

appeal.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective

& Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no

pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination

appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file

an Anders-type brief.”). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents

a professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an

appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.

proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points

of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and

procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”); see also In re N.F.M., 582

S.W.3d 539, 543–44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.) (discussing the

requirements of an Anders-type brief in an appeal from a final order terminating parental

rights).

        Counsel has informed this Court in writing that she has: (1) notified W.B. that she

has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided W.B. with copies of both

pleadings; (3) informed W.B. of his rights to file a pro se response, 3 to review the record

preparatory to filing that response, and to seek review if we conclude that the appeal is

        3 In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response

need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response
should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in
deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

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frivolous; and (4) supplied W.B. with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate

record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. More than an adequate time has passed, and W.B.

has filed neither a motion for pro se access to the record nor a pro se response.

                                     II.     INDEPENDENT REVIEW

        Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio,

488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have

reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no reversible error.

See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature

of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the issues raised in the briefs

and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). We have specifically

reviewed the trial court’s findings under parts (D) and (E) of family code § 161.001(b)(1),

and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to

those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (holding

that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court

detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D)

or (E) of the Family Code”).

                                    III.     MOTION TO WITHDRAW

        W.B.’s counsel has filed an amended motion to withdraw. 4 See Anders, 386 U.S.

        4 Counsel further requests, should this Court identify any non-frivolous grounds for appeal, that “the

deadline to submit a brief on the merits be extended and [appellant] be appointed new counsel.” In light of
our conclusion herein, counsel’s request is denied as moot.

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at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“If an attorney believes the

appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant.”). However, when

an Anders brief is filed in a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed

counsel extends to “all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of

a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for

withdrawal, a motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id.

Counsel is permitted to withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client

has no grounds to seek further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not

constitute good cause. Id.

        Here, counsel’s amended motion does not show “good cause” for withdrawal other

than her inability to identify any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s

amended motion to withdraw is denied. See id. 5

                                            IV.      CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Any other pending motions are denied as

moot.

                                                                              DORI CONTRERAS
                                                                              Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
22nd day of February, 2024.

        5 The Texas Supreme Court has noted that, in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations

[in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders
brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

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