Court Opinion

ID: 9547382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:46:39.927265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:40.766305
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I dissent from that part of the court’s opinion affirming the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea to the charge of assault in the first degree. The record of the providency hearing on the defendant’s guilty plea to that charge does not adequately support the determination by the court which accepted the guilty plea that the defendant understood the critical elements of the crime of assault in the first degree. Furthermore, although I concur in that part of the opinion which holds invalid the defendant’s guilty plea to the charge of assault in the second degree, I cannot endorse the strong implication in the majority opinion that, were it not for the court’s incorrect explanation of the deadly weapon element of the charge, the charge of second degree assault would have been readily understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence from a mere reading of the charge without further explanation by the court and, thus, would have been so understood by the defendant.
Crim.P. 11(b)(1), which was in effect at the time of the guilty plea in this case, expressly provides that the court shall not accept a guilty plea without first determining “[t]hat the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense to which he is pleading and the effect of his plea.” An understandingly made plea of guilty requires that the record affirmatively show the defendant’s understanding of the critical elements of the charge to which the plea is tendered. People v. Muniz, 667 P.2d 1377 (Colo.1983); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo.1982); People v. Gorniak, 197 Colo. 289, 593 P.2d 349 (1979); People v. Colosacco, 177 Colo. 219, 493 P.2d 650 (1972). The time at which a defendant’s knowledge about an offense is critical is necessarily that period during which the guilty plea is proffered and accepted. Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391 (Colo.1985). Compliance with Crim.P. 11(b) requires a court accepting a guilty plea to explain the critical elements of the crime in terms that are understandable to the defendant. E.g., Watkins, 655 P.2d at 837; People v. Cumby, 178 Colo. 31, 495 P.2d 223 (1972). Although a principal factor in determining whether this requirement has been satisfied is the “degree to which the charge itself is readily understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence from a mere reading of the information without further explanation by the court,” Muniz, 667 P.2d at 1382-83, it by no means follows that the mere reading of a nontechnical charge conclusively establishes the requisite compliance with Crim.P. 11(b)(1). On the contrary, the ultimate criterion of Crim.P. 11(b)(1) is whether the defendant, not the hypothetical person of ordi*239nary intelligence, actually understands the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense to which the guilty plea is made. If the record shows that the defendant’s intellectual capacity is below that of a person of ordinary intelligence, then it is incumbent upon the court to supplement the mere reading of the charge by an additional explanation so that the record “clearly show[s] facts which manifestly indicate the defendant’s knowledge” of the charge. Colosacco, 177 Colo, at 222, 493 P.2d at 651.
I cannot categorize the crimes to which the defendant pled guilty as offenses readily understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence without some additional explanation by the court. The critical elements of assault in the first degree, as charged in the information, are: (1) with specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person, (2) causing or attempting to cause such injury, (3) by means of a deadly weapon. § 18-3-202(l)(a), 8 C.R.S. (1978). Serious bodily injury means bodily injury “which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body.” § 18-l-901(3)(p), 8 C.R.S. (1978). A person acts “with intent” when his conscious objective is to cause the particular result proscribed by the statute defining the offense. § 18-1-501(5), 8 C.R.S. (1978). The significance of the term “with intent to cause serious bodily injury” thus requires some understanding of both the technical sense in which “intent” is employed in the Colorado Criminal Code and the statutory definition of serious bodily injury. See People v. Sanders, 185 Colo. 356, 358, 524 P.2d 299, 300 (1974) (defendant’s affirmative response to court’s question whether he understood the meaning of “assault to rob” not sufficient to establish an understanding^ made plea of guilty, because the crime of assault to rob “is not a crime whose elements are readily apparent and understandable to a non-lawyer”). In accepting the defendant’s guilty plea to assault in the first degree, the court merely recited the basic elements alleged in the information and made no effort whatever to explain these elements in terms to which the defendant might relate.
The elements of the crime of assault in the second degree, as charged against the defendant, are also somewhat technical, including as they do: (1) with specific intent to cause bodily injury to another person, (2) causing or attempting to cause such injury, (3) by means of a deadly weapon. § 18-3-203(l)(b), 8 C.R.S. (1978). An attempt is the taking of some substantial step towards the commission of the offense beyond mere preparation. People v. Weller, 679 P.2d 1077, 1082 (Colo.1984). It cannot reasonably be assumed that the average person would understand the significance of this element without some additional explanation by the court. Furthermore, like the crime of assault in the first degree, the crime of assault in the second degree is a specific intent offense. This means that the defendant’s conscious objective in engaging in certain conduct must be to cause bodily injury to another person, as opposed to scaring or bringing about some other reaction in that person. See § 18 — 1— 501(5), 8 C.R.S. (1978). “Bodily injury,” as defined by statute, means “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition.” § 18-l-901(3)(c), 8 C.R.S. (1978).
Even were I to accept the majority’s assumption that the elements of assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree are readily apparent to a person of ordinary intelligence without further explanation by the court, the record in this case quite conclusively shows that the defendant was not a person of ordinary intelligence. The psychiatric reports filed with the court in connection with the defendant’s insanity plea indicate that the defendant had “an I.Q. of about 80,” was “illiterate and unable to read and write,” and functioned at an intellectual level compatible with a fourth grade education. These reports, which were called to the attention of the Crim.P. 35 court at the postconviction hearing, serve to confirm the fact that, in view of the defendant’s marginal intellectual capacity, a much more specific and *240thorough explanation of the charges was required of the court which accepted the guilty pleas. In the absence of such explanation, I find an inadequate basis in the record to affirmatively support a determination that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the elements of the crimes to which he pled. I would therefore hold both pleas legally infirm.