Court Opinion

ID: 9712986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:04:28.431068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.626864
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I would have limited the scope of review, as we are obligated to do by Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, and affirmed the judgment appealed from. Other than an unusual claim that the trial court should not have considered the interest matter, Joan raises only one controlling issue: Is the finding of fact that the property cannot be partitioned without great prejudice to the owners clearly erroneous?
The significant finding is camouflaged in 15 pages of recitations variously labeled “findings of fact” or “conclusions of law,” most of which only remotely address the only issue in the case. The pertinent finding is divided into two parts, which include the following statements:
“VI.
“(h) The personal property cannot be divided without great prejudice to the owners.... ”
“XI.
“... that partition of Schnell Ranch cannot be accomplished without great prejudice to the owners; ...”
Joan could have argued that: (1) there were inadequate findings, Struchynski v. Decker, 194 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1972), or they do not disclose the basis for the decision, Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass’n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829 (N.D.1974), or they are too “sparse and conelusory,” Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 1200, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960); (2) the findings are without substantial evidentiary support, Winter v. Winter, 338 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D.1983), or, even though there is some evidentiary support, this court should be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, Gross v. Sta-Rite Industries, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D.1983); or (3) that the finding was induced by an erroneous view of the applicable law, Winter v. Winter, supra. Instead, as I interpret Joan’s argument, she urges that we give her a trial de novo, which was abolished in 1971 by the repeal of § 28-27-32, NDCC; or that we should view the facts differently somehow than the trial court did, which we have repeatedly said we are not entitled to do, see Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 332 N.W.2d 54, 60 (N.D.1983); or that we should substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, which we are also not permitted to do, State v. Livingston, 270 N.W.2d 556, 557 (N.D.1978).
Trial judges do have the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses which gives them an advantage that Rule 52(a) recognizes and which was recognized even when appeals resulted in trials de novo. See my concurring opinion in Jerry Harmon Motors v. Farmers U. Grain Term., 337 N.W.2d 427 (N.D.1983); also Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576, 585 (N.D.1979).
We are guided by a rule of reasonableness in our interpretations of statutes (§ 1-02-38(3), NDCC) and when we examine people’s conduct (§ 31-11-05(33), NDCC), and that means that we always try to avoid ludicrous and absurd results, Skoog v. City of Grand Forks, 301 N.W.2d 404 (N.D.1981). I see no reason for treating Rule 52(a), NDRCivP any differently.
It may be very likely that if I had been the trier of fact in this case instead of *723Judge Wilson, I would have found as a fact that:
“The partition of the real and personal property in this case will not result in great prejudice to the owners.”
Nevertheless, Judge Wilson did not arrive at a ludicrous or absurd result. I think that I understand the basis of his decision. There is substantial evidence which supports the finding that he made. I am not convinced that a mistake has been made or that the decision was induced by any erroneous views of the law. I have no inclination to retry the case, and I have some doubts about the omniscience of appellate courts. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L.Rev. 751 (1957).