Court Opinion

ID: 9404123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 07:12:33.416127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:11.635219
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 53

                  SUPREME COURT             OF    WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:               2021AP69-FT

COMPLETE TITLE:         Greenwald Family Limited Partnership and Darwin
                        Greenwald,
                                   Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
                             v.
                        Village of Mukwonago,
                                   Defendant-Respondent.

                           REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                      (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:          June 21, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:          February 20, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:               Circuit
   COUNTY:              Waukesha
   JUDGE:               Lloyd Carter

JUSTICES:
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For        the   plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners,        there     were
briefs filed by Joseph R. Cincotta and the Law Offices of Joseph
R. Cincotta, Shorewood. There was an oral argument by Joseph R.
Cincotta.

       For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Remzy        D.   Bitar,   Adam   J.   Meyers,   Gregory   M.   Procopio,    and
Municipal Law & Litigation Group, S.C., Waukesha. There was an
oral argument by Remzy D. Bitar.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Maria Davis and Claire
Silverman for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.

                                2
                                                                          2023 WI 53
                                                                  NOTICE
                                                    This opinion is subject to further
                                                    editing and modification.   The final
                                                    version will appear in the bound
                                                    volume of the official reports.
No.    2021AP69-FT
(L.C. No.   2020CV494)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                             :             IN SUPREME COURT

Greenwald Family Limited Partnership and Darwin
Greenwald,

             Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
                                                                       FILED
      v.                                                          JUN 21, 2023

Village of Mukwonago,                                              Samuel A. Christensen
                                                                  Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Respondent.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                  Affirmed.

      ¶1     ANN   WALSH   BRADLEY,   J.      The     petitioners,         Greenwald

Family Limited Partnership and Darwin Greenwald (collectively,

Greenwald), seek review of an unpublished order of the court of

appeals     that   affirmed   the   circuit    court's        dismissal       of    the

defendant, Village of Mukwonago, due to improper service of a
                                                                            No.     2021AP69-FT

notice of appeal.1               Greenwald contends that dismissal is not

appropriate          in   this    special          assessment     appeal          because      it

satisfied the requirement of Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a)(2019-

20)2 to "serve a written notice of appeal upon the clerk."

       ¶2      Specifically,        Greenwald          advances        that       Wis.    Stat.

§ 801.14(2) controls the manner of service that we must apply

here       because    the   failure       of    Wis.    Stat.     § 66.0703(12)(a)             to

define "serve" renders it ambiguous.                       The Village argues to the

contrary, contending that § 801.14(2) does not apply because the

clerk is not a "party" to the proceedings.                               It additionally

asserts that § 66.0703(12)(a) is unambiguous and requires strict

compliance      such      that    Greenwald's        failure     to     serve      the    clerk

mandates dismissal of the case.

        ¶3     We    conclude     that    the      clerk    is   not    a     party      to   the

proceeding,         and   thus    Wis.    Stat.      § 801.14(2)        does      not    apply.

Additionally, like the court of appeals, we determine that Wis.

Stat.      § 66.0703(12)(a)        is     unambiguous.           The    statute's         plain

meaning mandates service of written notice on the Village clerk,
which      Greenwald      did    not     accomplish.         Therefore,           Greenwald's

failure to comply with § 66.0703(12)(a) requires dismissal of

this action.

       Greenwald Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. Village of Mukwonago, No.
       1

2021AP69-FT, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022)
(summarily affirming the order of the circuit court for Waukesha
County, Lloyd Carter, Judge).

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
       2

the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                               2
                                                                         No.    2021AP69-FT

       ¶4     Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals.

                                              I

       ¶5     In order to provide context for the legal questions

presented,        we   set      forth   an     abbreviated       recitation       of     the

underlying        facts,     describing       the    procedural       steps     that   were

taken, and those not taken.

       ¶6     Greenwald owns properties in the Village of Mukwonago.

In    2019,    the     Village     voted      to    create   a    special       assessment

district       and     levied     special      assessments       against        properties

included within this district.                      At least one of Greenwald's

properties was located in the special assessment district.

       ¶7     Greenwald       challenged       the     special    assessment.            Its

complaint      alleged       jurisdiction          "pursuant     to    Wis.     Stats.     §

66.0703(12) governing the right to appeal special assessments

and other applicable law."

       ¶8     In commencing its challenge, Greenwald filed first a

summons     and      complaint    in    the    circuit    court.        The     next   day,
Greenwald's attorney emailed the Village attorney and the clerk

of the Village.          The email was addressed to the Village attorney

and    asked      if   the      attorney      could    "accept        service    for     the

Village."         The clerk was not included on any subsequent email

communications.

       ¶9     The      Village      attorney          responded        to      Greenwald's

attorney, stating, "Yes we will admit service, please forward

that to me at this point[.]"                  Greenwald's attorney sent back an
email with copies of the summons and complaint, along with a
                                              3
                                                                              No.   2021AP69-FT

template        denominated       "Admission         of   Service        of     Summons      and

Complaint."            The Village attorney signed this document, which

stated:         "I am counsel for the Defendant Village of Mukwonago in

this       action      and   have    received         and    admit       service       of     an

authenticated copy of the summons and complaint on behalf of the

Defendant," and emailed it back to Greenwald's attorney.

       ¶10      Weeks later, Greenwald's attorney again emailed the

Village attorney.               This email message stated, "Attached is a

copy of a notice relative to the Special Assessment matter.

This       is   also    being    mailed   to       your   office    by    regular      mail."

Greenwald's         attorney     additionally        attached      a   cover        letter    to

this email that stated:

       Regarding this matter, I have enclosed a Notice of
       Appeal to be provided to the Clerk of the Village in
       accordance with Wis. Stats. 66.0703(12). Also a check
       in the amount of $150.00 to serve as a bond for costs.
       You have already admitted service of the actual court
       filing and so I gather that the Clerk has actual
       notice   of  [Greenwald]'s   appeal  of   the  special
       assessment. Please let me know if the Village has any
       objection to this filing. Or requires further action
       by Plaintiff to be in compliance with the bond
       requirement.
       ¶11      In response, the Village filed a motion to dismiss.3

It argued that because Greenwald did not serve a written notice

of appeal on the Village clerk, the circuit court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction or competency to proceed.                            The motion also

alleged that Greenwald failed to comply with the specific bond

       3   Wis. Stat. §§ 801.04(1); 802.06(2)(a)2.

                                               4
                                                                          No.     2021AP69-FT

requirements.4         Ultimately, the circuit court granted the motion

and dismissed the action.

       ¶12     Greenwald appealed and the court of appeals summarily

affirmed the circuit court's order.                       Greenwald Fam. Ltd. P'ship

v.    Village    of    Mukwonago,         No.       2021AP69-FT,       unpublished      order

(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022).                   The court of appeals unanimously

concluded       that     Wis.        Stat.          § 66.0703(12)(a)       unambiguously

requires service of a written notice of appeal upon the clerk

and     that    Greenwald's      failure            to    comply   with    this     statute

requires dismissal of the complaint.                         It further disposed of

Greenwald's      reliance       on    Wis.      Stat.      § 801.14(2)      as    misplaced

because "the Village clerk is not and never was a party" to this

case.      Id. at 3.    Greenwald petitioned for this court's review.

                                                II

       ¶13     We are called upon to review the court of appeals'

decision summarily affirming the circuit court's order granting

the Village's motion to dismiss.                         Whether a motion to dismiss

was   properly     granted      is    a    question         of   law    that     this   court
reviews      independently      of     the      determinations          rendered    by    the

circuit court and court of appeals.                       Town of Lincoln v. City of

Whitehall, 2019 WI 37, ¶21, 386 Wis. 2d 354, 925 N.W.2d 520.

       ¶14     This review requires us to interpret several Wisconsin

statutes.       The interpretation of a statute presents a question

of law that we review independently of the determinations of the

       Compliance with the statutory bond requirements, Wis.
       4

Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), is not at issue in this case and we do
not address it.

                                                5
                                                                        No.     2021AP69-FT

circuit court and court of appeals.                  Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR,

2021 WI 54, ¶16, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384.

      ¶15    In    our    examination      we     employ        tools    of     statutory

interpretation that provide guiding principles for our inquiry.

"[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what

the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and

intended effect."             State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane

Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.                               "We

assume      that   the    legislature's         intent     is     expressed       in   the

statutory language."           Id.

      ¶16    "In construing or interpreting a statute the court is

not   at    liberty      to   disregard   the     plain,    clear       words     of   the

statute."      Id., ¶46.        If the text of the statute is plain and

unambiguous, our inquiry may stop there.                 Id., ¶45.

                                          III

      ¶17    It is clear from the plain language of Wis. Stat.

§ 66.0703(12)(a) that in order to file an appeal from a special

assessment, the clerk must be served.5                      That much is not in
dispute.      Rather, what is in dispute is the manner in which such

service may be achieved.

      ¶18    The   Village      argues    service    upon        the    clerk    was   not

accomplished here because nothing was ever actually served on

      5From the outset, the dissent misstates the issue,
resulting in a skewed focus.    In its very first paragraph, the
dissent states:     "At issue is whether legal documents were
properly served on the Village." Dissent, ¶49. This is not the
issue.   Rather, the issue is whether the clerk has been served
in a manner consistent with Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).

                                          6
                                                                 No.     2021AP69-FT

the clerk.     Greenwald, on the other hand, contends that service

was   accomplished     in    a     manner      consistent     with     Wis.    Stat.

§ 801.14(2) when it emailed the notice of appeal to the Village

attorney.

      ¶19   In resolving this case, we look first to the texts of

the   relevant   statutes     and       then   address   each   of     Greenwald's

arguments in turn.          Ultimately, we determine, for the reasons

set forth below, that Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) controls and

that Greenwald's failure to comply with its unambiguous mandate

requires dismissal of this action.

                                          A

      ¶20   We begin our inquiry by examining the text of the

relevant statutes.     The linchpin of Greenwald's argument is that

Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) applies, providing the manner of service

that we must employ here.           It reaches this assertion in part by

arguing that Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) is ambiguous because

"serve" is not defined.

      ¶21   Accordingly, we set forth first the text of Wis. Stat.
§ 801.14(2).     It provides in relevant part:

      Whenever under these statutes, service of pleadings
      and other papers is required or permitted to be made
      upon a party represented by an attorney, the service
      shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon
      the party in person is ordered by the court.
§ 801.14(2) (emphasis added).

      ¶22   Next, we look to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), which

establishes    the   right    of    a    person   with   an   interest    in   land

                                          7
                                                              No.     2021AP69-FT

affected by the determination of a governing body to appeal the

determination to the circuit court:

       A person having an interest in a parcel of land
       affected by a determination of the governing body,
       under sub. (8)(c), (10) or (11), may, within 90 days
       after the date of the notice or of the publication of
       the final resolution under sub. (8)(d), appeal the
       determination to the circuit court of the county in
       which the property is located.    The person appealing
       shall serve a written notice of appeal upon the clerk
       of the city, town or village. . . .
§ 66.0703(12)(a) (emphasis added).             Once the notice of appeal is
served on the clerk, the statute delineates tasks that the clerk

must undertake:

       The clerk, if an appeal is taken, shall prepare a
       brief statement of the proceedings in the matter
       before the governing body, with its decision on the
       matter, and shall transmit the statement with the
       original or certified copies of all the papers in the
       matter to the clerk of the circuit court.
Id.

       ¶23    In examining the text of the statutes, we keep in mind

that "[t]he plain meaning of statutory language is generally the

'"common,"      "ordinary,"     "natural,"       "normal,"    or     dictionary

definition[ ]' of a term."          Wilcox v. Est. of Hines, 2014 WI 60,

¶25,    355    Wis. 2d 1,     849   N.W.2d      280.     Therefore,      in   our

examination, we may "consult a dictionary in order to guide our

interpretation     of   the    common,       ordinary   meanings    of   words,"

Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, ¶12, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959

N.W.2d 305, as would the average reader.

                                         8
                                                                        No.        2021AP69-FT

                                               B

       ¶24     Greenwald argues that Wis. Stat.                  § 801.14(2), which

applies to civil actions generally, controls the resolution of

this case.          It contends that service was accomplished consistent

with that statute when it emailed the notice of appeal to the

Village attorney.

       ¶25     At the outset we observe that there is no directive in

Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) that points to the application of

Wis.    Stat.        § 801.14(2).            The   legislature      has       in     certain

instances          specifically     directed       individuals      to        follow      the

procedures laid out in chapter 801.

       ¶26     For example, Wis. Stat. § 74.37(2)(b)5., providing for

a claim for an excessive tax assessment, directs an individual

filing an appeal to serve a claim "on the clerk of the taxation

district, or the clerk of the county that has a county assessor

system, in the manner prescribed in s. 801.11(4)."                                 See also

Wis. Stat. § 125.12(2)(d) (an individual seeking judicial review

of the revocation or suspension of an alcohol license must serve
pleadings          "on   the    municipal      governing     body    in       the     manner

provided in ch. 801"); Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a) (an individual

bringing       a    claim      against   a    governmental       body     or       officers,

agents, or employees is required to serve a written notice of

the    claim       under    § 801.11).         There   is   no   such     directive        in

§ 66.0703(12)(a).

       ¶27     Admittedly, the legislature need not always explicitly

point to ch. 801 in order for it to apply and this opinion
should not be taken to invoke such a requirement.                         Nevertheless,
                                               9
                                                               No.   2021AP69-FT

although we do not rest our conclusion on this omission, the

lack of a directive informs our discussion.               We are mindful of

the    maxim    that   if   the   legislature    wanted   to    give    such   a

directive, it certainly knows how to do so.

       ¶28     Having examined what Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) does not

direct, we turn to examine its language and discern what it

actually directs:         if a party to the proceeding is represented,

service on that party can be accomplished by service on the

attorney.       § 801.14(2) ("Whenever under these statutes, service

of pleadings and other papers is required or permitted to be

made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall

be    made   upon   the   attorney   unless   service   upon   the     party   in

person is ordered by the court.").6           It follows that if the clerk

       The dissent asserts in conclusory fashion that Wis. Stat.
       6

§ 801.14(2) applies.     See Dissent, ¶69.     It advances that
"Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(2) appears to require that Greenwald
serve the Village attorney, not the Village clerk."          Id.
However, the dissent fails to address whether the municipal
clerk is a "party represented by an attorney," such that
§ 801.14(2) would require service upon the attorney here.
Absent the conclusion that the clerk is a party (a conclusion
the dissent does not reach), the dissent fails to explain how
§ 801.14(2) could apply.

     In contrast to the conclusory assertion above, the bulk of
the dissent's statutory analysis applies § 801.11(4).        The
obvious problem for the dissent is that Greenwald never briefed
or argued that statue below.    Accordingly, neither the circuit
court nor the court of appeals considered it.       We first see
§ 801.11 in Greenwald's reply brief in this court.

                                       10
                                                                              No.        2021AP69-FT

of the Village is a party to this proceeding, then service of

the notice of appeal may be satisfied by serving the clerk's

attorney.

      ¶29   This begs the question:                    is the clerk a party to the

proceeding?            The    word    "party"         in     the    context       of      a    legal

proceeding is commonly defined as "[a] person or group involved

in a legal proceeding as a litigant," Party, American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language 1321 (3d ed. 1992), or "one

(as   a   person,       group,       or    entity)      constituting         alone        or     with

others    one     of    the     sides       of    a    proceeding,          transaction,          or

agreement."              Party,           Merriam-Webster            Online         Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/party                             (last            visited

June 12, 2023).              Greenwald says yes, that the clerk is a party

"because the Clerk is part of the party at issue, the Village."

      ¶30   At     oral        argument,         Greenwald's         attorney          repeatedly

returned    to      the       language       of       Wis.    Stat.        § 66.0703(12)(a),

emphasizing that the written notice of appeal must be served

upon the clerk of the municipality.                          In its briefing, it also
attempted    to     draw       support      from      Outagamie          County     v.    Town    of

Greenville, 2000 WI App 65, 233 Wis. 2d 566, 608 N.W.2d 414, to

emphasize       the       relationship            between          the     clerk         and     the

     Generally, "issues not raised or considered by the circuit
court will not be considered for the first time on appeal."
McKee Fam. I, LLC v. City of Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, ¶32, 374
Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12.    Similarly, "arguments raised for
the first time in reply briefs are generally not addressed'"
Paynter v. ProAssurance Wis. Ins. Co., 2019 WI 65, ¶108, 387
Wis. 2d 278, 929 N.W.2d 113.

                                                 11
                                                                No.   2021AP69-FT

municipality.        Greenwald highlighted a portion of a footnote

stating, "[c]ertainly, the better procedure is for an aggrieved

party to first file its notice of appeal with the circuit court

and then serve the notice on the appropriate party——here, the

town clerk."     Id., ¶12 n.3.       Greenwald appears to conclude based

on this footnote that the clerk is a "party" to this special

assessment challenge.

      ¶31   However, Greenwald reads too much into the use of the

word "party" in this footnote.           It is readily apparent from the

quotation in Outagamie County that the term "party" there is

used in the colloquial sense, referring generally to an entity.

If, as Greenwald contends, clerks can be defined as parties

solely because they are part of the party at issue, then anyone

who is part of the Village could also be classified as a party

to the proceeding.       Surely all municipal employees do not become

parties to legal proceedings against a municipality by virtue of

their employment.

      ¶32   Similarly, Greenwald also reads too much into the use
of the word "of" in Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).                  The language

of   § 66.0703(12)(a)     requires      service   "upon   the   clerk   of   the

city, town or village."          This language does not name the clerk

as a representative of the municipality.                  Rather, it merely

states the job title of the person who must be served.

      ¶33   Municipal clerks, while playing a vital role in the

functioning     of    local   government,     neither     determine     special

assessments     nor     impose     or     enforce    special      assessments.
Additionally,        Greenwald    asserts    that    the    clerk       is   the
                                        12
                                                                 No.   2021AP69-FT

"representative" or the "official representative" of the Village

body politic, but cites no authority for the proposition that in

this context the clerk is synonymous with the Village.                        Put

simply, the fact that the legislature designated the clerk as

the official upon whom a notice of appeal must be served does

not transform the clerk into a party to the lawsuit.

      ¶34    Indeed, Greenwald's preferred construction of the term

"party"     in   Wis.   Stat.    § 801.14(2)    considerably     broadens     this

term.      Such a construction would lead to conflicting statutory

obligations, resulting in confusion to the bar and public.

      ¶35    We are in accord with the admonition advanced in the

helpful     amicus      curiae    brief    of    the    League   of    Wisconsin

Municipalities that warns of the confusion that would result

from Greenwald's statutory interpretation:

      Construing "party" under § 801.14(2) to include a
      clerk simply by virtue of being a municipal officer
      tasked with receiving the notice of appeal will
      completely redefine and substantially broaden the term
      "party," and place the mandatory requirements of §§
      801.14(2) and § 66.0703(12)(a) directly in conflict.
      Such a broad definition would lead to confusion and
      potentially  open   a   Pandora's  box   of  competing
      obligations.
      ¶36    Ultimately, we conclude that the clerk is not a party

to   the    proceeding    and    thus   Wis.    Stat.   § 801.14(2)    does   not

apply.      Such application would broaden the term "party" and

                                          13
                                                                    No.     2021AP69-FT

place     the     two     statutory     provisions       in     conflict,     causing

unnecessary confusion.7

                                           C

     ¶37    We turn next to Greenwald's claims of ambiguity.                        It

argues    that    Wis.    Stat.     § 66.0703(12)(a)      is     ambiguous    because

"serve"    is     not    defined.      Accordingly,       it    advances     that   if

procedural language is ambiguous, it must be liberally construed

to permit a determination on the merits.                      See DOT v. Peterson,

226 Wis. 2d 623, 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999).

     ¶38    In     examining        Wis.   Stat.      § 66.0703(12)(a)'s        plain

language,       several    requirements        are   readily    apparent    from    the

text.     First, a person seeking an appeal under § 66.0703(12)(a)

must file within 90 days after the date of notice or publication

of the final resolution.              Second, and most importantly for our

purposes, the text indicates that one of the steps required for

appeal is serving a written notice of appeal "upon the clerk."

This requirement is important because, as the statute continues,

the clerk must commence with administrative tasks related to the
appeal:     preparing a brief statement of the proceedings and

transmitting the statement with all relevant materials to the

     7 The  Village   additionally  contends  that   Wis.  Stat.
§§ 66.0703 and 801.14 conflict and that because § 801.14 is
general and § 66.0703 is more specific, the latter must control.
See Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶17, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843
N.W.2d 373 ("In the event of 'a conflict between a general and a
specific statute, the latter controls.'"). However, because we
conclude that the clerk is not a party, and Wis. Stat. § 801.14
applies to parties only, it is not necessary to reach this
argument.

                                           14
                                                                       No.       2021AP69-FT

clerk of the circuit court.                   These obligations are unambiguous

and readily discernable by anyone examining the text of the

statute.

     ¶39       The fact that "serve" is not defined does not compel a

finding    of       ambiguity.         "[A]    statute     is   ambiguous        if    it    is

capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons

in two or more senses." Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.                         Our goal in

statutory       interpretation         is     to    ascertain    the   meaning         of    a

statute.        Id.     It is not to search for ambiguity.                       Id.        The

statute unambiguously requires service of a notice of appeal

upon the clerk, meaning that something must be presented or

delivered to the clerk.              That did not happen here and therefore

Greenwald's argument in favor of liberal construction due to

ambiguity is unavailing.

     ¶40       Greenwald       turns     to    the      rules   of   civil       procedure

because, it claims, "[i]nitiating a circuit court challenge to a

special assessment" is unclear and that filing and service of a

summons and complaint is equivalent to filing and service of the
notice    of    appeal.         It   relies        on   Mayek   v.   Cloverleaf         Lakes

Sanitary Dist. #1, 2000 WI App 182, 238 Wis. 2d 261, 617 N.W.2d

235, for this assertion of ambiguity.

     ¶41       In     Mayek,     the        plaintiff      challenged        a        special

assessment by filing a summons and complaint with the circuit

court and, importantly, served it on the clerk.                         Id., ¶2.            The

defendant argued that the plaintiff's actions in serving the

clerk with the summons and complaint did not pass muster because

                                              15
                                                                                 No.     2021AP69-FT

a summons and complaint is not the same as a notice of appeal.

Id., ¶3.

       ¶42     The      court     of     appeals       concluded          that         Wis.    Stat.

§ 66.60(12)             (1997-1998),8           the      predecessor              statute          to

§ 66.0703(12)(a), was ambiguous.                        Id., ¶5.           The language was

determined to be ambiguous because "[a]lthough                                   § 66.60(12)(a)

sets       forth    a     process      to     initiate    an     appeal          of     a     special

assessment,               it      does          not       fully            describe              that

process.       Specifically, it does not prescribe how the appeal is

to be filed in the circuit court."                             Id.        (internal citation

omitted).          Thus, plaintiff's construction of the statute was

reasonable          and     his   "summons        and     complaint             challenging       an

assessment         constitute[d]         a    notice     of    appeal      for        purposes     of

complying with Wis. Stat. § 66.60(12)."                        Id., ¶25.

       ¶43     However,        Mayek     is    inapplicable          to    the    situation        at

hand.       In Mayek, the plaintiff actually served the summons and

complaint on the clerk.                      Id., ¶2.         In this case, Greenwald

served the summons and complaint on the Village attorney only.
Although,          as     explained      in     Mayek,        there       may     be        ambiguity

describing how the appeal is to be filed in the circuit court,

there is no ambiguity in describing the requirement that the

       The statute at issue, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), was
       8

renumbered and amended in 1999.     1999 Wis. Act 150, § 532.
According to the legislative drafting file, amendments to
chapter   66  were  "nonsubstantive,   editorial  changes   that
modernize the language," and "primarily a technical project to
make ch. 66 more useful to those who refer to it."      Drafting
File, 1999 Wis. Act 150, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison,
Wis.
                                                16
                                                                            No.     2021AP69-FT

clerk must be served with a notice of appeal.                                As expressed

above, serving the Village attorney here does not constitute

serving     the     clerk.         Hence,          although      the   Mayek        plaintiff

fulfilled     his     statutory          obligations          to    serve         the     clerk,

Greenwald did not.

                                               D

    ¶44      Finally,      we    turn     to       Greenwald's      remaining           argument

that because the Village attorney initially admitted service of

the summons and complaint, the attorney was then obligated to

accept delivery of future filings.9                        The Village rebuts this

argument    by    asserting       that    even       though      the   Village          attorney

admitted service of the summons and complaint, he did so on

behalf of the Village governing body and not the clerk.

    ¶45      We agree that the Village attorney's act of admitting

service     after    the     first   email          does   not     obviate        Greenwald's

statutory obligation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) to

serve   a    notice    of       appeal    upon       the   clerk       in    this       special

assessment appeal.          The Village attorney's response to the first
email did not in any way imply that he represented the clerk.

Importantly, the email that Greenwald's attorney sent asked the

Village attorney if he would "accept service for the Village."

    9  At oral argument several avenues of potential relief were
advanced by the court. Specifically suggested were the timeline
of filing a notice of appeal, see Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a),
as well as ethical obligations to refrain from contact with a
person represented by counsel.      See SCR 20:4.2.     However,
because those theories were neither briefed here nor argued
below, we do not address them.

                                               17
                                                                          No.    2021AP69-FT

The   Village       attorney        accepted       service     of   the     summons       and

complaint on behalf of the defendant Village only.                                He never

told Greenwald's attorney that he was accepting such service on

behalf     of    the   clerk    as    well.        Thus,      § 66.0703(12)(a)        still

requires Greenwald to serve a written notice of appeal upon the

clerk, which it did not accomplish.

      ¶46       Requiring   compliance          with     procedural        statutes       can

sometimes yield difficult results.                      Yet "[c]ompliance with the

statutory provisions prescribing the manner for proceeding in

the circuit court serves the public policy of maintaining an

orderly and uniform way of conducting court business."                              Aiello

v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis. 2d 68, 72, 556 N.W.2d

697 (1996).

      ¶47       In sum, we conclude that the clerk is not a party to

the proceeding, and as such, Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) does not

apply.      Additionally, like the court of appeals, we determine

that Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) is unambiguous.                           The statute's

plain meaning mandates service of written notice on the Village
clerk,      which      Greenwald       did     not      accomplish.             Therefore,

Greenwald's       failure      to    comply    with      § 66.0703(12)(a)         requires

dismissal of this action.

      ¶48       Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals.

      By    the    Court.—The        decision      of   the    court   of       appeals    is

affirmed.

                                              18
                                                                 No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

      ¶49   ANNETTE     KINGSLAND     ZIEGLER,      C.J.     (dissenting).             I

dissent because the majority incorrectly concludes that Darwin

Greenwald and Greenwald Family Limited Partnership (collectively

"Greenwald")      cannot     challenge        the   levying       of     a     special

assessment    against      Greenwald's       property    because       its    attorney

sent the pertinent service documents to the Village's attorney,

as instructed, rather than to the clerk.                   At issue is whether

legal documents were properly served on the Village.                         The facts

of this case are fairly unremarkable in that it is undisputed

the Village attorney, who asked to be served the documents and

who accepted service of the documents, was served.                           Greenwald

initially notified, in the same email, both the Village clerk

and   the   Village   attorney      that     Greenwald     had    filed       suit   and

inquired who should be served with the documents.                      Specifically,

Greenwald,    through      counsel,   asked     them     both     if    the    Village

attorney "can accept service for the Village."                          The Village

attorney replied to Greenwald alone, removing the clerk from the

email, and said he "will admit service" for the Village.                             The
Village clerk was also not included on future emails, including

the emails that served the legal documents.1                     Now the Village

argues that its attorney is not authorized to accept service,

despite     the   attorney     specifically         accepting      and       admitting

service for the Village.          It was the attorney who removed the

      1It is undisputed that Greenwald thereafter sent the
Village attorney both a summons and complaint and a document
titled "notice of appeal," all within the 90-day statutory time
limit. Either set of documents can serve as a notice of appeal
to the Village, and the Village attorney received both.

                                         1
                                                             No.       2021AP69-FT.akz

clerk from the email, indicating to Greenwald's counsel that

further communication with the clerk was to go through Village

counsel.     Attorneys accept service on behalf of their clients on

a regular basis.      This is nothing new.

    ¶50     To determine how to properly "serve" the Village under

Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), one must look to Wis. Stat. ch. 801

governing service in civil cases.            Under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4),

personally    serving      the   president   or   clerk    is     an     option   for

serving a municipality.            But the Village was represented by

counsel,     who    agreed    to   accept    service,     and      Greenwald      was

therefore not wrong to serve the Village attorney under Wis.

Stat. § 801.14(2).         In fact, that statute may require that the

attorney be served instead of the clerk.            At a minimum, there is

flexibility    in    the     service   requirements       under     the     relevant

statutes.     As further example, one may instead serve whoever "is

apparently" able to receive process.               § 801.11(4)(b).             It is

difficult to see how that is not satisfied by service on the

Village's attorney.          One may also serve a municipality "by some
other method" with the responding party's written consent.                        Wis.

Stat. § 801.18(5)(d).            Again, given that the Village attorney

asked for and accepted service on behalf of the Village, how

isn't that satisfied?         Greenwald successfully served the Village

under either of these provisions.            The Village attorney branded

himself as the person "apparently" able to receive process.                       His

email accepting service also constituted consent on behalf of

the Village to accept service in the manner it was received.                       As

                                        2
                                                                        No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

a result, Greenwald properly served the Village in conformance

with § 66.0703(12)(a), and its lawsuit should proceed.

      ¶51    The majority, nonetheless, concludes Greenwald's claim

must be dismissed because it was the Village attorney instead of

the non-attorney Village clerk who received the documents.                                 The

majority opinion departs from the law and common sense.                                Serving

the   Village      attorney,        like    serving       the    Village       clerk,     here

constitutes        service     of     the     Village      itself.             The     Village

attorney,     like    the    Village        clerk,    represents         the     Village    to

receive process.          Not every village may be in a position to have

a   known    attorney       who     can    accept    service,       and       the    statutes

provide a process for serving villages without attorneys.                                  But

that process is not exclusive.                    Greenwald properly served the

Village, relying          on counsel's acceptance of service.                           Do we

really      expect    lawyers        to      serve    counsel           and     also     serve

represented parties for fear that counsel will later somehow

argue that they were not qualified to accept service for their

client?     The majority does.              I would not.         Importantly, the law
does not dictate such a result.

                              I.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      ¶52    On    March     17,    2020,     Greenwald         filed    a    complaint     in

Waukesha     County       circuit         court   challenging           the     Village    of

Mukwonago's        special         assessment        of     Greenwald's              property.

According to the complaint, Greenwald owns "properties located

in or adjacent to the Village of Mukwonago."                                  The complaint

alleged     that     in     2019,     the     Village       established          a     special
assessment        district        that     included       several        of     Greenwald's

                                              3
                                                                    No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

properties.       The Village mailed Greenwald a notice of the final

resolution on January 16, 2020.              Greenwald alleged the Village's

special      assessment      was     unlawful      because           "[t]he       planned

improvements are not needed or wanted by [Greenwald] and more

importantly will not benefit [its] properties," and because the

Village "impose[d] [the] special assessment against properties

located [in] and governed by the Town of Mukwonago, not the

Village."

       ¶53   Greenwald's      response       to   the        Village's         motion   to

dismiss included several emails Greenwald exchanged with Village

officials.     On March 18, 2020, Greenwald sent an email with the

subject line, "RE:          GFLP et al v. Village 20-CV-494 – Special

Assessment"     to    the   Village    attorney     and       the     Village      clerk.

Another attorney, who also represented the Village, was copied

on the email.        The email states, "[A]ttached are copies of a new

case    file[d]      yesterday     regarding      the    Chapman          Blvd    Special

Assessment.       Please let me know if you can accept service for

the Village."
       ¶54   The Village attorney replied to Greenwald's email two

days later, stating, "Yes we will admit service, please forward

that to me at this point."               The Village attorney copied the

other   attorney      for   the    Village   on   this       reply    email,      but   he

removed the Village clerk from the email.                    The Village clerk was

not included on any further emails.

       ¶55   Greenwald's     attorney    replied        by    email       on   March    23,

2020.     He sent copies of the summons and complaint along with a
template for admission of service.                The Village attorney signed

                                         4
                                                                     No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

the admission of service and returned it to Greenwald the next

day.      The admission states, "I am counsel for the Defendant

Village of Mukwonago in this action and have received and admit

service . . . on behalf of the Defendant."                     The Village attorney

also signed the admission, listed his title as "Attorney for

Defendant," and included his state bar number.

       ¶56     On April 9, 2020, Greenwald sent a notice of appeal to

the Village attorney both by mail and email.                               It included a

cover letter confirming that the Village clerk received notice

and requesting that the Village attorney notify Greenwald of any

deficiencies.           In lieu of filing a responsive pleading, the

Village filed a motion to dismiss based on Greenwald's failure

to personally serve the Village clerk a notice of appeal.

                            II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶57     This     case      presents        a       question         of        statutory

interpretation, which we review de novo.                         Nowell v. City of

Wausau,      2013     WI   88,    ¶19,    351      Wis. 2d 1,        838        N.W.2d      852.

"[S]tatutory        interpretation       'begins      with    the    language          of    the
statute.       If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily

stop the inquiry.'"              State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane

Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting

Seider    v.    O'Connell,       2000    WI    76,    ¶43,    236    Wis. 2d 211,            612

N.W.2d 659).          "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary,

and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined

words     or    phrases        are   given        their      technical          or    special

definitional          meaning."          Id.          "[S]tatutory          language          is
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation

                                              5
                                                                    No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

but    as    part    of   a   whole;       in    relation    to    the    language    of

surrounding or closely-related statutes . . . ."                      Id., ¶46.

       ¶58    "Statutes are closely related when they are in the

same    chapter,      reference     one     another,    or   use     similar    terms."

State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904

N.W.2d 773.

       Any word or phrase that comes before a court for
       interpretation is . . . part of an entire corpus
       juris.     So, if possible, it should no more be
       interpreted to clash with the rest of that corpus than
       it   should   be  interpreted  to  clash   with  other
       provisions of the same law.
Antonin       Scalia      &    Bryan        A.     Garner,        Reading     Law:    The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 252 (2012).

                                    III.    ANALYSIS

       ¶59    The law does not require that the Village clerk be

served      even    though    the   Village      attorney    represented       that   he

would accept service for the Village.                  The issue in this case is

whether Greenwald satisfied its obligation to "serve a written

notice of appeal upon the clerk of the . . . [V]illage" under

Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).                The statute provides in relevant

part,

       A person having an interest in a parcel of land
       affected by a determination of the governing body,
       under sub. (8)(c), (10) or (11), may, within 90 days
       after the date of the notice or of the publication of
       the final resolution under sub. (8)(d), appeal the
       determination to the circuit court of the county in
       which the property is located.    The person appealing
       shall serve a written notice of appeal upon the clerk
       of the city, town or village and execute a bond to the
       city, town or village in the sum of $150 with 2
       sureties or a bonding company to be approved by the
       city, town or village clerk, conditioned for the
       faithful prosecution of the appeal and the payment of
                                  6
                                                                        No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

         all costs that may be adjudged against that person.
         The clerk, if an appeal is taken, shall prepare a
         brief statement of the proceedings in the matter
         before the governing body, with its decision on the
         matter, and shall transmit the statement with the
         original or certified copies of all the papers in the
         matter to the clerk of the circuit court.
§ 66.0703(12)(a).                  The   statute     prescribes          the     procedures

property        owners      must     follow    in   order     to    challenge        special

assessments.           "Procedural statutes are to be liberally construed

so   as        to   permit    a     determination      upon       the    merits      of    the

controversy           if   such     construction     is     possible."            Kincyl    v.

Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 555-56, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968).

         ¶60    There are no exacting requirements as to the form the

notice of appeal must take, but a summons and complaint can

serve as a notice of appeal.2                 Mayek v. Cloverleaf Lakes Sanitary

Dist.        No. 1,    2000    WI    App    182,    ¶¶8-9,    238       Wis. 2d 261,       617

N.W.2d 235.            The statute requires that a property owner must

"serve" a notice of appeal, but it does not answer how one

achieves service.             It does not require any one method.                    Nowhere

does Wis. Stat. ch. 66 define the term "serve," nor does it

establish procedures for accomplishing service.                           Though "serve"
is   a       common    term   in    legal     parlance,3     it    is    further     defined

elsewhere.             Specifically,        the     procedures      for        service     are

       For this reason, any distinction between Greenwald's email
         2

sending the summons and complaint, and the email sending the
notice of appeal, is immaterial.

       See Serve, Black's Law Dictionary 1643 (11th ed. 2019)
         3

("[t]o make legal delivery of (a notice or process)"; "[t]o
present (a person) with a notice or process as required by
law"); Serve, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1649 (3d ed. 1992) ("[t]o deliver or present (a writ or
summons)"; "[t]o present such a writ to").

                                               7
                                                             No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

prescribed in Wis. Stat. ch. 801 concerning commencement of an

action and venue.4

     ¶61    Upon examining Wis. Stat. ch. 801, it becomes clear

why Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) states a property owner must

serve a notice of appeal upon the clerk of the municipality.5

Wisconsin    Stat.    § 801.11(4)    states   the    manner    for     serving   a

summons     for    "political      corporations      or     bodies      politic,"

including counties, towns, cities, technical college districts,

school districts and boards, and villages.                Under § 801.11(4),

one serves a political corporation or other body politic "by

personally serving any of the specified officers, directors, or

agents."    For actions against a village, the statute specifies

"the president or clerk thereof."             Id.    Not every village may

have an attorney, but every village does have a president and a

clerk.    See Wis. Stat. §§ 61.24-25.

     ¶62    This     illuminates    why    Wis.     Stat.     § 66.0703(12)(a)

states property owners "shall serve a written notice of appeal

upon the clerk of the city, town or village."                      It is because
service upon the clerk is itself service upon the municipality.

Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(4) says as much, equating service upon

     4 Speaking out both sides of its mouth, the majority
recognizes "the legislature need not always explicitly point to
ch. 801 in order for it to apply," yet claims Wis. Stat.
§ 66.0703's "lack of a directive informs [its] discussion."
Majority op., ¶27.    The term "serve" is a part of the whole
corpus juris, and we should not do violence upon our consistent
and coherent system of laws by ignoring that fact.
     5 Interestingly, the majority does not engage or quarrel
with the reasoning I employ. It merely jumps to my conclusions
and says it disagrees. See majority op., ¶¶17 n.5, 28 n.6.

                                       8
                                                                                 No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

the    clerk      with     service       upon    the       municipality.                  After       all,

municipalities           are     not     themselves          natural          persons        who      may

themselves        receive        personal     service.             They      are        creatures        of

statute.           See    City     of    Madison        v.       Town       of     Fitchburg,           112

Wis. 2d 224, 240, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) ("It is well settled

that         a         municipality[            is]          a         creature            of          the

legislature . . . .").                  Municipalities rely on the people who

serve    their         communities       as   local     officials,               and     they    cannot

interact         with    outside       entities       unless           it    is        through     those

officials.         Oconto Co. v. Jerrard, 46 Wis. 317, 328, 50 N.W. 591

(1879)    ("The         state    acts    through       its       municipalities,                and     the

municipalities            act     through       their        officers.").                 Here,       the

attorney operates as the attorney for the Village and therefore

as an attorney for the clerk to the extent the clerk acts as a

representative for the Village.                       Serving the attorney a notice

of    appeal      therefore        achieves       service          upon       the       clerk      as    a

representative of the Village.

       ¶63       The     court    of     appeals       in        Mayek,       238        Wis. 2d 261,
discussed the notice of appeal in such a fashion even if it did

not rule on the issue.                 While explaining that "serving a summons

and complaint challenging the assessment constitutes a notice of

appeal" under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), id., ¶7, the court

repeatedly         described           such     service           as        service        upon         the

municipality.             The court said the property owner "reasonably

treated his complaint as a notice of appeal and served it on the

district's        clerk     as    the    method       of     obtaining            service        on     the
district."         Id., ¶8 (emphasis added).

                                                 9
                                                                     No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

       ¶64   Even     if    a    municipal      clerk    is   not     a    party    to    the

litigation, a clerk receiving service in a suit against the

municipality clearly acts on behalf of the municipality while

performing that ministerial function.                    The majority's assertion

to     the   contrary——that            a    municipality's          clerk     is    not     a

representative         of        the       municipality——flatly             ignores       how

Wisconsin's municipalities operate and the roles local officials

play    while   acting          on   behalf     of   those    municipalities.             See

majority op., ¶¶32-33.                 The majority's artificial distinction

between      serving        a        municipality's      clerk       and      serving       a

municipality may create unintended consequences, such as service

upon a clerk being deemed insufficient to affect service upon

the municipality.           The reality is that by serving the municipal

clerk, like serving the attorney, one serves the municipality.

Thus, the question is whether Greenwald served the Village in a

manner permitted under the Wisconsin Statutes.

       ¶65   Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(4) provides that personally

serving the Village clerk is a permissible method for serving
the Village.        However, there is flexibility.                  There are a number

of situations where directly serving the clerk is either not

necessary or not permitted.

       ¶66   For one, serving a village under Wis. Stat. § 801.11

is     permissive,     whereas          service      upon     the    attorney       for    a

represented party under Wis. Stat. § 801.14 is fairly read as

mandatory.      Section 801.11 begins, "A court of this state having

jurisdiction     of    the       subject      matter    and   grounds       for    personal
jurisdiction . . . may               exercise      personal    jurisdiction        over     a

                                              10
                                                                                         No.     2021AP69-FT.akz

defendant by service of a summons as follows" (emphasis added).

However,         service       upon      the     attorney             for       a       represented          party

appears to be mandatory.                        Section 801.14(2) states, "Whenever

under these statutes, service of pleadings and other papers is

required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an

attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless

service      upon       the    party       in    person              is    ordered          by     the   court"

(emphasis         added).           In     other           words,          if       a     municipality         is

represented by counsel, that arguably must take precedence over

other     forms        of     service,          and        a     claimant               should       serve     the

municipality through its attorney.                               There is seemingly only one

exception         to    this       rule:       "unless          service             upon       the    party    in

person is ordered by the court."                               Id.    There is no exception for

serving      a    municipal         clerk.            If        the       statute          did     provide     an

exception permitting service under § 801.11, it would likely say

so.     That statute is referenced in § 801.14(1) regarding parties

in    default,         but    no    similar       reference               exists          in     § 801.14(2).

Section 801.14(2)               instead          discusses                situations               where       "an
attorney . . . has             consented         in        writing          to       accept          service    by

electronic mail," which is exactly what happened in this case.

These all indicate that Greenwald properly served the Village by

delivering the summons and complaint to the Village attorney.

       ¶67       Even if it were the case that service must be affected

through a municipal clerk, the statutes provide alternatives to

serving      the       clerk       directly.           Wisconsin                Stat.          § 801.11(4)(b)

lists one such alternative.                       It states, "In lieu of delivering
the copy of the summons to the person specified, the copy may be

                                                      11
                                                                     No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

left in the office of such officer, director or managing agent

with the person who is apparently in charge of the office."                               Id.

(emphasis added).            We examined this language in Keske v. Square

D   Co.,     58     Wis. 2d 307,      206    N.W.2d 189       (1973).6          The   process

server in Keske attempted to serve a corporation.                          Upon arriving

at the main reception area, the receptionist stated the person

who could receive service was unavailable.                          Id. at 309.           The

process server was instead "specifically directed to serve" a

different individual who "appeared to be in charge."                                  Id. at

313-14.            We     explained        the    statute's     "use       of     the    word

'apparently' can only refer to what is apparent to the person

actually serving the summons."                        Id. at 313.      Even though the

person who received process testified he was not "in charge" of

the office, this was unimportant because of the circuit court's

finding that he "appeared to be in charge."                              Id. at 313-14.

These provisions also suggest that service on the Village is not

as strict as the majority suggests.

       ¶68        Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 801.18(5)(d) is seemingly
even       more    expansive.         It    concerns      service   of     "[i]nitiating

documents," which include a summons and complaint and notice of

appeal.           § 801.18(1)(j), (5)(d).               It requires that initiating

documents "shall be served by traditional methods," which simply

"means            those       methods            of       filing         and          serving

       Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(5)(a) uses the same language with
       6

regard to service upon domestic or foreign corporations or
limited liability companies.       The statute has since been
renumbered from its previous version, Wis. Stat. § 262.05 (1972-
73).

                                                 12
                                                                     No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

documents . . . provided           under       statutes        and     local      rules."

§ 801.18(1)(m), (5)(d).           However, such service by "traditional

methods" is required "unless the responding party has consented

in writing to accept electronic service or service by some other

method."         § 801.18(5)(d).           Section       801.18(5)(d)            therefore

permits service through methods other than those "provided under

statutes" so long as "the responding party has consented in

writing."       That is the case here.

       ¶69    Greenwald properly served the Village under any one of

these statutes.        Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(2) appears to require

that   Greenwald       serve    the   Village        attorney,       not   the    Village

clerk.       The Village attorney said to do so and admitted service.

In the admission of service, the Village attorney confirmed the

Village was represented by counsel in this matter, stating, "I

am    counsel    for   the     Defendant    Village       of    Mukwonago         in    this

action."       The Village attorney signed his name above his title,

"Attorney for Defendant," and provided his state bar number,

clearly conveying that he was operating as the Village's legal
representation in that litigation.                   Under these circumstances,

Greenwald's counsel was between a rock and a hard place.                               If he

instead       serves    the     Village    clerk,        ignoring          the    Village

attorney's instruction to serve him and that he would accept

service for the Village, consequences could ensue.                          An attorney

is expected to communicate through counsel, not directly with

the    other     lawyer's      client.         The    majority       opinion      creates

unnecessary conflict and uncertainty for lawyers who should be
able to accept service for their clients.

                                          13
                                                                         No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

       ¶70      The    Village      attorney's       actions      also     make    sense        in

light     of    the     rules      of    professional         conduct,     which    prohibit

lawyers        from     "communicat[ing]            about       the     subject      of        the

representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented

by    another        lawyer   in    the    matter,      unless    the     lawyer     has       the

consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or

a court order."             SCR 20:4.2(a).          This includes, "[i]n the case

of    a   represented           organization, . . . communications                   with        a

constituent of the organization . . . whose act or omission in

connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization."

Id. ABA cmt.7.              It is at least reasonable to conclude, under

this rule, that once the Village attorney identified himself as

the    Village's        representative,           Greenwald's         attorney     could       not

contact the Village clerk.                 When the Village attorney replied to

Greenwald's           attorney's        initial     email,      the     Village     attorney

removed        the     Village      clerk    from       the     conversation.             As    a

constituent of the Village, the clerk could not be contacted or

directly served by Greenwald's counsel.                        By removing the Village
clerk     from        the     email      conversation,         the      Village     attorney

communicated to Greenwald's counsel that there was no reason to

contact the clerk, and all communication should go through the

attorney.        That was confirmed by the admission of service.

       ¶71      Even if Greenwald was permitted to directly serve the

Village clerk, the Village attorney had the apparent ability to

receive service under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4)(b).                                 Greenwald's

initial        email,    which      included      the    Village       clerk,     asked        for
confirmation that the Village attorney can receive service.                                    The

                                              14
                                                              No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

Village attorney confirmed that he will admit service, and he

did not keep the Village clerk on the email chain.                  In doing so,

the Village attorney directed Greenwald to himself rather than

the Village clerk as a person capable of receiving service on

behalf of the Village.         The Village attorney's representations

rendered him "apparently in charge of the office" such that he

could receive service on behalf of the Village.                 Permitting the

Village to benefit from any apparent misdirection would "produce

a situation whereby a process server becomes a participant in a

game of 'hide 'n seek' at the mercy of secretaries or anyone

else who chooses to prevent him from accomplishing his task."

Keske, 58 Wis. 2d at 315.            This is not a result our service

statutes condone.

      ¶72   Finally,    Greenwald     would    have    properly       served   the

Village under Wis. Stat. § 801.18(5)(d).                   The Village, acting

through the Village attorney, consented to receive process in

the manner it was served.         Over email, the Village attorney told

Greenwald, "Yes we will admit service, please forward that to me
at   this   point."      "[T]he      [village]     attorney     may     bind    the

municipality to the same extent that any attorney may bind his

or her client.    A [village] attorney is clothed with sufficient

apparent    authority    to   bind    a   client     for    services    that   are

routinely and directly connected with the representation. . . ."

10   McQuillian   Mun.    Corp.      § 29:20   (3d    ed.    2022)     (footnotes

omitted)    ("[T]he    universally     accepted      generalization      in    this

matter is that the city attorney has power to institute court
actions and defend actions against the municipality . . . .");

                                       15
                                                                      No.    2021AP69-FT.akz

see also 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1148 (2023) ("A city

attorney may bind the municipality to the same extent that an

attorney      may    bind    a    client,      absent      limitations.").              Acting

through the Village attorney, an individual whose job is to

speak for the Village in litigation matters, the Village gave

Greenwald written consent to serve the Village in the manner it

did.     It cannot be the case——and is not the case under the law——

that Greenwald's action must be dismissed for relying on this

representation.

                                       IV.   CONCLUSION

       ¶73    I conclude that Greenwald properly served the Village

in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).                              To determine

how to properly "serve" the Village under § 66.0703(12)(a), one

must   look    to    Wis.    Stat.       ch.   801      governing    service       in   civil

cases.       Under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(4), though personally serving

the clerk is the default for serving a municipality, the Village

was represented by counsel and Greenwald was in compliance with

the statute in serving the Village attorney under Wis. Stat.
§ 801.14(2).         Even if personal service upon the Village clerk

were required, there is flexibility.                         One may instead serve

whoever        "is     apparently"               able      to       receive        process.

§ 801.11(4)(b).         One may also serve a municipality "by some

other method" with the responding party's written consent.                               Wis.

Stat. § 801.18(5)(d).             Greenwald successfully served the Village

under either of these provisions too.                           The Village attorney

branded      himself    as       the    person      "apparently"      able    to    receive
process.       The Village attorney's email accepting service also

                                               16
                                                No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

constituted consent on behalf of the Village to accept service

in the manner it was received.    As a result, Greenwald properly

served the Village, and its lawsuit should proceed.

    ¶74   For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶75   I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE

ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent.

                                 17
    No.   2021AP69-FT.akz

1