Court Opinion

ID: 9391182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 15:00:50.487051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.850342
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11091    Document: 47-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11091
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       TAVION DA'SHAURD WARREN,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cr-80157-DMM-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11091      Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2023     Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11091

       Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tavion Da’Shaurd Warren appeals his conviction and sen-
       tence for, inter alia, knowingly brandishing a firearm in relation to
       a crime of violence—a carjacking—in violation of the Armed Ca-
       reer Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924. On appeal, Warren ar-
       gues that, in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021),
       the district court erroneously found that carjacking is a “crime of
       violence” for purposes of § 924(c).
              We review de novo whether an oﬀense is a crime of violence
       under § 924(c). United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.
       2020).
               Our prior-panel-precedent rule mandates that “a prior
       panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
       it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-
       preme Court or by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer,
       531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
              To convict a defendant for carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119,
       "the government must prove that the defendant (1) with intent to
       cause death or serious bodily harm (2) took a motor vehicle (3) that
       had been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign
       commerce (4) from the person or presence of another (5) by force
       and violence or intimidation." United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065,
       1096 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d
       679, 684–85 (3d Cir. 1999)); 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Important here, the
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       22-11091                Opinion of the Court                            3

       intent element of the statute is satisﬁed if “at the moment the de-
       fendant demanded or took control over the driver’s automobile the
       defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver
       if necessary to steal the car . . . .” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S.
       1, 12 (1999).
              To qualify as a crime of violence, an oﬀense must meet the
       deﬁnition of § 924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements clause,” which deﬁnes a
       “crime of violence” as a felony oﬀense that “has as an element the
       use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
       person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
              We have held that carjacking under § 2119 satisﬁes
       § 924(c)(3)(A) because it has “an element requiring that one take or
       attempt to take by force and violence or by intimidation.” In re
       Smith, 829 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2016) (denying a second or
       successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 application raising a claim that, in light
       of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 576
       U.S. 591 (2015), federal carjacking was no longer a crime of vio-
       lence under the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B)).
               In Borden, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal of-
       fense that requires only a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as
       a “violent felony” under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Borden, 141
       S. Ct. at 1821–22. In her plurality opinion, Justice Kagan noted that
       the 11th Circuit likewise “concluded that only a statute conﬁned to
       purposeful or knowing conduct can count as such a violent felony.”
       Id. at 1823 n.2 (citing to United States v. Moss, 920 F.3d 752 (11th Cir.
       2019), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 928 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.
USCA11 Case: 22-11091      Document: 47-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2023     Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11091

       2019), vacated and opinion reinstated, 4 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2021)).
       Therefore, our precedent clearly remains in line with the Supreme
       Court’s holding in Borden, and we remain bound by our previous
       holdings that carjacking is a crime of violence under § 924(c).
              Warren’s argument that federal carjacking under § 2119 is
       not a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A) is fore-
       closed by our prior-panel-precedent rule, and we aﬃrm the district
       court’s ruling.
             AFFIRMED.