Court Opinion

ID: 4156817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2017-03-30 16:10:21.912616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:20.461438
License: Public Domain

Matter of Varriale v City of New York (2017 NY Slip Op 02513)

Matter of Varriale v City of New York

2017 NY Slip Op 02513

Decided on March 30, 2017

Appellate Division, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 30, 2017

Tom, J.P., Moskowitz, Feinman, Gische, Kapnick, JJ.

3572 652189/14

[*1]In re Suzanne Varriale, Petitioner-Appellant,
vCity of New York, et al., Respondents-Respondents.

Glass Krakower LLP, New York (Bryan D. Glass of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Kathy Chang Park of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lynn R. Kotler, J.), entered November 10, 2015, which, after a hearing, denied the petition to vacate the determination of respondent New York City Board of Education, dated July 7, 2014, which terminated petitioner's employment as a tenured school teacher, and dismissed the proceeding, unanimously affirmed, without costs.	Although petitioner was a thirteen-year employee with no prior disciplinary history, and no charges had ever previously been preferred against her, in light of the seriousness of the allegations herein, the penalty of termination was not shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Altsheler v Board of Educ. of Great Neck Union Free School Dist., 62 NY2d 656, 657 [1984]). The record showed that petitioner strayed from her duties as a school teacher by deliberately escalating a confrontation with a student by yelling expletives and threatening him with violence. Even after security personnel defused the situation by removing the student from the classroom, petitioner subsequently confronted him again, later that day, yelling at least six times that her husband, an armed police officer, would kill him. Petitioner then brought her husband to school the following morning, to the student's scheduled class in the gymnasium, although the student, having been suspended from school, was not there (compare Riley v City of New York, 84 AD3d 442 [1st Dept 2011]). Further, as noted by the hearing officer, had the student been in class that morning, the possibility of violence occurring was very real, and petitioner conveyed a message to other students that she could not rely upon school authorities to control threats of violence against a teacher by a student.
Petitioner also showed no remorse nor appreciation for the seriousness of her conduct (see e.g. Matter of Villada v City of New York, 126 AD3d 598, 599 [1st Dept 2015]) to support a finding that she would not engage in similar conduct if faced with such circumstances in the future. Petitioner declined to take the stand, and thus, the hearing officer was permitted to draw the
strongest inference against her permitted by the record (Matter of Carangelo v Ambach, 130 AD2d 898, 900 [3d Dept 1987], appeal denied 70 NY2d 609 [1987]).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
ENTERED: MARCH 30, 2017
CLERK