Court Opinion

ID: 9498252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:11:59.540976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:42.415218
License: Public Domain

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
with whom FISHER, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring:
Our affirmance of Thomas’s conviction should not be read as condoning his attorney’s conduct in this case. On the contrary, Thomas’s attorney abdicated one of *1060defense counsel’s most basic responsibilities: to consult with his client about important decisions relating to the representation. See Florida v. Nixon, — U.S. -, -, 125 S.Ct. 551, 560, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
While a carefully tailored concession can be a shrewd trial tactic in certain cases, it is entirely inappropriate for an attorney to make such a concession without prior discussion with the client. Consultation is vital not only to inform the client about his lawyer’s proposed course of action, but also (more importantly) to provide the defendant with an opportunity to object to any contemplated concessions. In the ordinary representation, an attorney should obtain his client’s express consent to a strategy conceding guilt (or any essential element thereof) on any charge or charges; in the unusual circumstance where consent is not possible (as in Nixon, where the defendant exhibited “constant resistance to answering inquiries put to him by counsel and court”), the attorney must at least consult the client in advance in order for the representation to satisfy the constitutional baseline of adequate advocacy. See Nixon, 125 S.Ct. at 561.
For purposes of evaluating Strickland’s incompetence-of-counsel prong, we therefore must draw a firm line that any counsel who makes concessions of guilt not previously discussed with the client is incompetent. It is deficient performance for an attorney to concede his client’s guilt without prior consultation with the client, even where the concession relates to one charge out of several, and even where evidence of guilt is strong.
Because Thomas has not satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, relief here is foreclosed. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, like Nixon’s attorney, counsel for Thomas “was obliged to ... explain his proposed trial strategy” to his client, 125 S.Ct. at 561; having failed to do so, the lawyer performed deficiently. With this understanding, I concur in Judge Rymer’s opinion affirming the judgment.