Court Opinion

ID: 9697874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:35:29.231404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.513651
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. Today, the majority rules that the police have unlimited access to the prescription records of every pharmacist in the state of Vermont and may, without warrant or probable cause, search those records in hopes of finding violations of law, not by pharmacists, but by patients. In other words, as a consequence of today’s ruling, the prescription records of all persons held by a Vermont pharmacist are open to unrestricted surveillance by the police.
One of the great conservative justices of the United States Supreme Court once observed that <([t]he history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.” McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.). The requirements of probable cause and valid search warrants are surely among the most valued procedural safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in our constitution. An insistence upon the observance of these requirements is one of the principal defining qualities between totalitarian governments and governments devoted to the protection of the liberties of free men and women. Today’s decision, albeit motivated by a well-meaning desire to curb the abuse of prescription drugs, represents a perilous .step away from these constitutional values.
The majority permits the warrantless search in this case based on an exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches of commercial enterprises. This is despite the fact that, from the outset, the State admits the search was aimed at gathering criminal evidence against an individual patient rather than conducting a routine administrative inspection of a regulated business. Because I believe that allowing warrantless searches to uncover criminal evidence under the guise of the administrative search exception undermines Arti*90ele 11 of the Vermont Constitution and disregards our recent case law interpreting that constitutional provision, I dissent.
Article 11 protects the people of this state from unreasonable, warrantless governmental intrusions into their private affairs. State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 10, 587 A.2d 988, 994 (1991). There is little doubt, and indeed both the trial court and the majority agree, that individuals have a privacy interest in their prescription records. Such records “contain extremely private and potentially embarrassing information” about the patient. Commonwealth v. Slaton, 383 Pa. Super. 301, 328, 556 A.2d 1343, 1356 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing law review articles regarding confidentiality of health records), aff’d, 530 Pa. 207, 608 A.2d 5 (1992). They may disclose highly personal facts concerning a person’s lifestyle, ailments, or sources of stress and anxiety. See Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 108 n.7 (2d Cir. 1973) (members of public know ailments for which drugs commonly prescribed). These are matters of great sensitivity that go to the heart of our concerns for privacy. This fact is recognized by the very statutory provision that permits inspection of pharmacy records, which is entitled “Records confidential.” See 18 V.S.A. § 4211. That provision allows inspection “only to federal or state officers or their specially authorized agent whose duty it is to enforce the federal drug laws,” and forbids those who gain knowledge of any prescription from divulging such knowledge, except in connection with a prosecution. Id. (emphasis added); see also V.R.E. 503 (patient has privilege to prevent “any other person” from disclosing confidential communications made for purposes of treatment).
Where a privacy interest is implicated, warrantless searches are permitted only in exceptional circumstances that are factually and narrowly tied to an exigency or special needs. See State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 87, 616 A.2d 774, 781 (1991); State v. Berard, 154 Vt. 306, 312, 576 A.2d 118, 121 (1990). An exigency is created by particular circumstances of the moment, not by shifts in the political winds or by society’s “perceived exigencies of the day.” See Kirchoff, 156 Vt. at 12, 587 A.2d at 995-96. Thus, the trial court’s allusion to the “drug crisis” cannot limit the protection afforded by our constitution against intrusive governmental searches. See People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 501, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1345, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 937 (1992) (respon*91sibility of judicial branch not to respond to temporary crises or shape law to advance goals of law enforcement, but rather to safeguard constitutional rights). Moreover, when “special needs” require warrantless searches in certain regulatory contexts, we have always insisted that such searches be carried out through objective guidelines that preclude law enforcement officers from targeting specific individuals. See Berard, 154 Vt. at 314, 576 A.2d at 122 (routine search of prisoners’ cells); State v. Record, 150 Vt. 84, 88, 548 A.2d 422, 425 (1988) (random DUI roadblock). In short, this Court has permitted warrantless regulatory searches in circumstances evincing special needs, but only when explicit guidelines ensure that the searches are not a pretext for singling out individuals.
Against this backdrop, the majority permits the police to inspect the prescription records of an individual based on an officer’s hunch that they will provide evidence that the individual has committed a crime. The majority arrives at its holding by concluding that the warrantless inspection was a proper search of a “pervasively regulated” business. This is a remarkable conclusion considering that the “pervasively regulated industry” exception adopted by the majority is an exception to the warrant requirement of an administrative search, and that not even the State contends that this particular search was administrative in nature. Therefore the warrantless search could only be supported by exigent circumstances or special needs, none of which was present here.
The application of the administrative search exception is disturbingly ironic in this case considering that, because of our aversion to warrantless searches, we have refused to follow federal precedents that derogate “the central role of the judiciary in Article Eleven jurisprudence.” Berard, 154 Vt. at 310, 576 A.2d at 120; see also State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479, 487, 536 A.2d 902, 907 (1987) (judiciary must “review and restrain overreaching searches and seizures by the government”). Yet, today the majority permits governmental intrusion that would not be permitted even under federal law. The federal counterpart to § 4211, 21 U.S.C. § 880, requires an administrative warrant, albeit under a diminished standard, to inspect pharmacy records unless the officer has the consent of the owner or there is an emergency situation. That statute contains another provi*92sion requiring “probable cause” for the issuance of search warrants “relating to offenses involving controlled substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 879. The fact that the federal law includes a traditional warrant provision strongly suggests that searches of pharmacy records undertaken to collect evidence of a crime requires a full-blown warrant based on probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 444-45, 436 N.E.2d 925, 932 (1982).
Nothing in the language of § 4211 suggests that the provision was intended to do anything more than to provide the authority for officers to make random, routine compliance inspections of the records of controlled premises. Cf. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. at 11-12, 587 A.2d at 995 (statutory provisions providing the public with certain privileges on private land do not evidence intent to limit landowners’ right to pursue their affairs free from unregulated governmental intrusion). It is highly questionable whether the generally worded provision, which merely states that pharmacy records shall be open for inspection by law enforcement officers to enforce the drug laws, sufficiently limits the scope of bona fide administrative searches to pass constitutional muster under the test recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (statute permitting warrantless administrative searches must limit discretion of inspectors, as well as time, place and scope of searches); Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 501, 593 N.E.2d at 1344, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (statutory provision allowing warrantless administrative searches of vehicle-dismantling businesses held to violate state constitution because only restriction statute contained is requirement that searches occur during business hours). But certainly it cannot authorize warrantless searches against individuals. If the legislature did intend the provision to allow police to make warrantless inspections of the prescription records of individuals suspected of criminal activity, then the statute violates Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution.
The primary evil Article 11 sought to avoid was the issuance and enforcement of general warrants. Record, 150 Vt. at 85, 548 A.2d at 423 (citing Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328, 346 (1855)). Indeed, the abuse of warrants was one of the primary causes of the colonies’ revolt against the crown and of the development of *93search and seizure provisions in colonial constitutions predating the federal constitution. Savva, 159 Vt. at 85, 616 A.2d at 779-80. Administrative searches, such as those authorized by-statutes that concern regulated industries, are “‘the 20th-cen-tury equivalent’ of colonial writs of assistance . . . which were general warrants authorizing officials to search any and all residential and commercial premises ... to enforce various trade regulations and ... to halt the rampant smuggling of untaxed goods.” Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 497-98, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 364 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). Given the similarity between searches made pursuant to the English general warrants outlawed by the colonists and administrative searches made pursuant to modern-day statutory provisions, we are bound to narrowly and precisely construe such provisions so as not to subvert the basic privacy interests protected by our constitution. See id. By allowing police to inspect, without warrant, the prescription records of individual citizens suspected of criminal activity, the majority ignores the rationale for allowing searches of certain industries without judicial oversight — that such searches are routine, random, and limited to ensuring that highly regulated businesses comply with administrative regulations — and thereby allows law enforcement agencies to circumvent the warrant requirement that we have so conscientiously guarded in the past.
Moreover, the owners of pervasively regulated businesses are on notice of the special government interest in their affairs, and they impliedly consent, by engaging in such businesses, to the abridgement of certain rights in exchange for the right to do business at all. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (warrantless inspection scheme of Gun Control Act poses limited threat to justifiable expectation of privacy because dealer who chooses to engage in pervasively regulated business does so with understanding that his business records will be subject to inspection). This is a far cry from the individual who, afflicted with disease or injury, is prescribed a regulated drug by a physician in the course of medical treatment. That person has no choice but to have the prescription filled by a pharmacist. If the drug prescribed is one in which the police have an interest, the mere act of having that prescription filled *94now permits the police to intrude on that person’s private affairs by reviewing the prescription, looking for other prescriptions, and, as occurred in this case, having one’s doctor or doctors questioned. Article 11 simply does not permit the statute to go that far.
Although I ground my dissent on Article 11, I believe the instant search would be improper even under the United States Supreme Court’s ever-narrowing interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative searches undertaken for regulatory purposes as well as to searches for criminal evidence, but that warrants for administrative searches need not be supported by probable cause in the traditional sense because they “are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime.” Id. at 537. Soon after Camara, the Court created an exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches when the particular industry is subject to close governmental supervision and an authorizing statute provides specific procedures governing the scope of the search. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (Gun Control Act); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (regulation of liquor industry).
This exception is relevant, however, only within the context of administrative searches, as evidenced by the United States Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on administrative searches. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). In Burger, the Court reversed a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that struck down a statute permitting police to conduct warrantless searches of automobile junkyards. New York’s highest court had struck down the law because it authorized searches “undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme.” People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 493 N.E.2d 926, 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (1986). The Supreme Court held that the “discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper [warrantless] administrative inspection [of a closely regulated industry] does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added). The Court pointed out, however, that *95it was “undisputed that the inspection was made solely pursuant to the administrative scheme,” and that there was “no reason to believe that the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of respondent’s violation of the penal laws.” Id. at 716-17 n.27.
Contrary to the majority’s statement herein, motive of the officers conducting the search is a relevant consideration under Burger. The Court in Burger was concerned with a routine administrative investigation that uncovered criminal evidence, not with a criminal investigation unrelated to any administrative search. Commonwealth v. Slaton, 530 Pa. at 213, 608 A.2d at 8. The Burger holding is much more limited than the majority’s holding here, which gives its blessing to an inspection whose sole purpose from the start was to gather evidence that defendant had committed a crime. It is irrelevant that defendant was charged with a criminal violation defined in the same statute that authorizes inspection of pharmacy records. The point is that defendant’s medical records were targeted for discovery; they were not the incidental discovery of a lawful administrative search.
The situation here is similar to the one in Slaton, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently upheld the suppression of evidence obtained by narcotics agents, who first inspected prescription records of a suspected individual with the consent of the pharmacist, and then returned to inspect more records after the focus of the investigation had turned to the pharmacist. According to the court, the “primary flaw” in the State’s position was its characterization of the agents’ action as an “administrative search,” which the court labeled as an attempt “to diminish [the defendant’s] expectation of privacy in the premises searched.” Id. at 212, 608 A.2d at 7. Distinguishing the United States Supreme Court’s Burger decision as being concerned with a routine investigation that was initially conducted to ascertain compliance with administrative regulations, the court stated:
In the case at bar, the narcotics agents’ only purpose in searching Slaton’s pharmacy was to investigate alleged activity. This was true even when the first search was conducted. The agents never claimed to have any administrative purpose but instead, declared at the outset that *96their desire was to gather additional information for an ongoing criminal investigation whose subject at that time was someone other than Slaton. The search, therefore, was not an administrative inspection conducted, as the Burger case requires, on a regular basis, but a discretionary act by officials who were involved in an ongoing criminal investigation. Since it was never claimed that the searches were administrative, the question of the parameters of an administrative search is not relevant here. The traditional Fourth Amendment warrant requirements for a valid search, therefore* apply in this case.
Id. at 214, 608 A.2d at 8; see also Frodyma, 386 Mass, at 438-441, 436 N.E.2d at 928-29 (because entire justification for lesser showing required to obtain administrative warrant is grounded on limited scope of administrative search, such warrant cannot be used to search for evidence of a crime); People v. Pace, 101 A.D.2d 336, 340, 475 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (1984) (court concluded it need not consider whether statute allowing warrantless administrative searches had sufficiently specific guidelines to pass constitutional muster because “[w]hen a search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection the administrative search rationale is simply inapplicable”). But cf. State v. Rednor, 203 N.J. Super. 503, 509, 497 A.2d 544, 547 (1985) (in determining constitutionality of search, court must concern itself with propriety of conduct, not motivation of searcher).
The lower federal courts have adopted conflicting positions on whether the motivation of law enforcement officers should affect the validity of an administrative search warrant. Compare United States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70, 74 (6th Cir. 1982) (validity of administrative search warrant should depend on manner and scope of search, not motivation of inspector); United States v. Prendergast, 585 F.2d 69, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1978) (same), with United States v. Russo, 517 F. Supp. 83, 84-86 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (administrative warrant cannot support search of records to gather evidence for possible prosecution); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 164-66 (D. Md. 1980) (once purpose of search shifts from administrative compliance to quest for criminal evidence, government must secure warrant supported by full probable cause because individual’s privacy interest is heightened). The majority cites three cases *97for the proposition that the intent of the police to uncover suspected criminal activity cannot taint an otherwise valid administrative search. Those cases are hardly a ringing endorsement for the majority’s point of view. First, all three cases construe the Fourth Amendment, yet, as noted, this Court has repeatedly stated that it will not follow precedents that derogate the central role of the judiciary in Article Eleven jurisprudence. See, e.g., State v. Berard, 154 Vt. at 310, 576 A.2d at 120. In one of the cases, the court stated that it need not decide whether it would allow warrantless administrative searches pursuant to criminal investigations in situations where the government had, as an institution, committed itself to the prosecution. Acklen, 690 F.2d at 74. In another, an intermediate appellate state court construing the Fourth Amendment said, absent any analysis, that the motivation of police in searching a pharmacist’s records was irrelevant. State v. Rednor, 203 N. J. Super, at 509, 497 A.2d at 547. But the gist of its holding was revealed in the sentence that followed, wherein the court concluded that the pharmacist had no expectation of privacy in the records because he had willingly engaged in a business subject to pervasive government regulation. Id. In the third case, United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1987), the court lamented the fact that it was compelled to allow law enforcement to use administrative search warrants as a subterfuge for investigating suspected criminal activity. Id. at 1166 (“We are not happy with a mode of justification by which the government is allowed to do in two steps what if done in one would violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
State courts that have recently addressed the same issue, however, have not felt so constrained. In addition to the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases already cited, the highest courts of New York and Ohio have recently held that law enforcement authorities must obtain a warrant based on probable cause before searching regulated enterprises as part of an ongoing criminal investigation, even where statutory law permits administrative searches of the enterprises. Despite the Supreme Court’s relatively limited holding in Burger, the New York Court of Appeals recently rejected that analysis and determined that the same statute it had earlier struck down under the Fourth Amendment also violated the state constitutional *98provision prohibiting unreasonable governmental searches. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 593 N.E.2d at 1339, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 931. The court grounded its holding on the “fundamental assumption” that an administrative-search exception cannot be invoked when the search is undertaken to uncover evidence of a crime, and the underlying regulatory scheme is designed to give police a means of enforcing criminal sanctions. Id. at 497, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935; see also Burger, 482 U.S. at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In the law of administrative searches, one principle emerges with unusual clarity and unanimous acceptance: the government may not use an administrative inspection scheme to search for criminal violations.”). According to the court, without this limitation, the exception would swallow the rule and permit police to circumvent traditional warrant requirements. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 497, 593 N.E.2d at 1343, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has also recently held that the search and seizure provision of the state constitution prohibits police from searching for criminal evidence pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless “administrative” searches. State v. Penn, 61 Ohio St. 3d 720, 723, 576 N.E.2d 790, 792-93 (1991). In that case, police and agents of the state board of pharmacy inspected the prescription records of a pharmacy after the police had already begun a criminal investigation of the pharmacist. Calling the State’s attempt to “shelter itself” behind the administrative powers of the board “disingenuous,” the court stated that “the board cannot act as a surrogate for the police to obviate the constitutional duty of obtaining a search warrant” before gathering evidence of general criminality. Id. at 726, 576 N.E.2d at 794.
I recognize that it will not always be easy, as it is in this case, to determine whether a search is truly administrative in character or merely an attempt to uncover evidence of a crime. But this difficulty does not permit us to abdicate our duty to protect the citizens of this state from unconstitutional searches. If we are to allow law enforcement officials to inspect personal records, without judicial oversight, pursuant to an exception that permits routine administrative searches, we cannot then shrug our shoulders in helplessness while police exploit that exception by using it to gather evidence on individuals suspected of crimi*99nal activity. Suspicion on the part of the police should not'invalidate an otherwise valid administrative exception, but when police have specific information that triggers a search made solely for the purpose of gathering criminal evidence against an individual, a warrant based on probable cause is required. People v. Brigante, 131 Misc. 2d 708, 715, 501 N.Y.S.2d 583, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (the litmus test for determining whether inspection is valid administrative search is whether purpose of search was to gather evidence of a crime, not whether the police had suspicions of criminal activity).
Our constitution requires a warrant when the government seeks to uncover evidence of criminal activity. Cf. State v. Dorn, 145 Vt. 606, 616-17, 496 A.2d 451, 457 (1985) (assuming, without deciding, that seizure of prescription records from barn of pharmacy owner suspected of welfare fraud required a warrant based on full probable cause). We cannot allow police to circumvent our steadfast stricture against warrantless searches by wearing the masks of administrative officials while pursuing criminal investigations. Because the instant search violated Article 11, evidence gathered from it must be suppressed. Further, because the search of the pharmacy was unlawful, and the police uncovered evidence during that search that led them to contact and interview defendant’s prescribers, I believe that the evidence obtained by police in conversations with those prescribers was tainted and, therefore, must also be suppressed. See State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 439-41, 450 A.2d 336, 342-43 (1982) (illegality of first confession tainted second confession).
There is one other point about the majority’s opinion that deserves mention. Even if the search of defendant’s pharmaceutical records had been lawful, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that admission of the statements police obtained from defendant’s physicians was harmless error. The majority agrees that the court’s reasoning for allowing admission of the statements — that the statements were non-privileged because they were found to be made in an attempt to obtain illegal drugs — is flawed because it allows the State to declare a communication nonprivileged after the doctor-patient confidentiality has been breached. Nevertheless, the majority upholds the court’s ruling, stating that admission of the evidence was harmless because the police sought only to find out *100from the prescribers whether they would have prescribed the medication if they had known of other concurrent prescriptions.
I do not understand the majority’s reasoning. The patient’s privilege is very broad. Our law prohibits physicians from disclosing “any information acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable the provider to act in that capacity.” See State v. Raymond, 139 Vt. 464, 470-71, 431 A.2d 453, 457 (1981) (privilege prevented nurse from testifying that the defendant had alcohol on his breath); see also V.R.E. 503(b) (privileged information includes “confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of [the patient’s] physical, mental, dental, or emotional condition”). Certainly the information disclosed in this case meets these definitions, and the majority does not argue otherwise.
Once we conclude the communication is privileged, we cannot call it harmless unless “‘it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict regardless of the error.’” State v. Wright, 154 Vt. 512, 519-20, 581 A.2d 720, 725 (1989) (quoting State v. Hamlin, 146 Vt. 97, 106, 499 A.2d 45, 52 (1985)). That is hardly the situation here. The doctors’ statements that they were unaware of other prescriptions, and that they would not have prescribed the medication if they had known of the other prescriptions, constituted the principal element of the charged crime — obtaining a regulated drug by concealment of a known fact. See 18 V.S.A. § 4223(a)(3). The issue cannot be dismissed in summary fashion merely by concluding that the evidence is harmless.
Accordingly, I dissent not only from the majority’s conclusion that the warrantless search of defendant’s prescription records was lawful, but also from the conclusion that admission of statements made to police by defendant’s doctors was harmless error.
I am authorized to say that Justice Morse joins in this dissent.