Court Opinion

ID: 9465721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:53:39.446401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:19.711045
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the result reached by the majority in this case because I do not believe that, on the record before us, we can conclude that petitioner Ervin G. Taylor intelligently waived his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), instructs that before a criminal defendant can represent himself he must knowingly and intelligently forego the benefits of representation by counsel. Faretta commands that the knowing and intelligent waiver1 must be evaluated under the test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), which states:
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.
Id. at 464-65, 58 S.Ct. at 1023.
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (plurality opinion of Black, J.). As Faretta concludes,
*1293Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). See, e. g., United States v. King, 582 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1308-09 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct. 2267, 56 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978); Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1977); Ford v. Wainwright, 526 F.2d 919, 921-22 (5th Cir. 1976).
Applying the standards of Faretta to the facts of this case, I cannot agree that the colloquy between Taylor and the trial court indicates that Taylor made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In that colloquy, ante at 1285, after Taylor stated he did not wish his attorney to represent him further, the court raised the issue of proceeding pro se; no mention was made of the possibility that new counsel might be appointed. The court praised the competence of Taylor’s attorney (Cain, the public defender), heard Taylor state that he wanted Cain discharged because “it’s like [Cain] just might not be in my best favor,” id. at 1285, and offered to allow Taylor to proceed pro se. The court chose not to ask Taylor why he mistrusted Cain (had it done so, it might have disabused Taylor of the main cause for his mistrust, his failure to comprehend the felony-murder rule). But more importantly, the court never pointed out to Taylor the complexities of trying a criminal case or the dangers of representing oneself in a complicated murder trial involving the felony-murder rule, with a co-defendant (Farley), whose interests were in conflict with those of Taylor, represented by counsel.2 In my view, the court did not carry out that “penetrating and comprehensive examination” called for by Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. at 724, 68 S.Ct. at 323, and did not make Taylor “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.
The majority compares Taylor with the petitioner in Faretta and seems to conclude that Taylor made as knowing and intelligent a decision to proceed without counsel as did Faretta. See id. at 835-36, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. I cannot agree. Unlike Faretta, who informed the trial court weeks before trial that he wished to represent himself and demonstrated considerable study of procedural and evidentiary law, id. at 808 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. at 2528, Taylor announced his intention only after trial had already commenced and exhibited no particular procedural or evidentiary knowledge. In fact, on several occasions during the trial, when the prosecutor’s objections to Taylor’s style of examining witnesses were sustained, Taylor simply abandoned his questioning. Taylor, like Faretta, was to some degree literate, but the record does not indicate that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will to be tried without counsel. Unlike Faret-ta, Taylor was not informed by the trial court that he “would be required to follow all the ‘ground rules’ of trial procedure.” Id. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. I cannot agree that the court’s subsequent decision to give Taylor greater latitude in the conduct of his defense adequately substituted for the direct and detailed warning Faretta received before he finally decided to represent himself. Id. at 808 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. at 2527.
In Part V (Conclusion) of its opinion, ante at 1291-1292, the majority initially declines to decide whether a strict waiver analysis should be applied to a criminal defendant who, after jeopardy has attached, dismisses his counsel and decides to appear pro se. Under Faretta and its prog*1294eny a Johnson v. Zerbst analysis should be applied regardless of when a defendant articulates his desire to dismiss his attorney and represent himself. To be sure, the trial judge’s task of determining whether a defendant is making a knowing waiver of counsel may be more sensitive and difficult once jeopardy has attached, but this must not lead us to apply a different, and lower, standard, as I am convinced the majority has done. See United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 785, 787-88 (5th Cir. 1978).
The majority states that the trial court substantially complied with Faretta. As I have already stated, I do not feel that the interchange between the court and Taylor sufficed fully to apprise Taylor of the magnitude of his decision. The majority then maintains that Taylor was not prejudiced by representing himself, as if a failure to comply with Faretta can be excused if no prejudice results. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), however, holds that the sixth amendment right to counsel is so fundamental to a fair trial that its violation can never be treated as harmless error. Thus, Taylor need not show that he was prejudiced by the lack of counsel; prejudice, or the lack of it, is irrelevant. At any event, in my view it is clear that Taylor was prejudiced. A reading of the trial transcript discloses occasions when he would have been far better served had he been represented by competent counsel. Had Taylor appealed his conviction, which competent counsel may well have advised, his conviction for attempted armed robbery would have been reversed just like that of his co-defendant, Farley, ante at 1284 n. 2. See Farley v. State, 238 Ga. 181, 231 S.E.2d 761 (1977). As a result, he would not be serving consecutive sentences.
In concluding that the state trial judge committed constitutional error in this case, I have been guided by several other decisions dealing with pro se representation and waiver of the right to counsel. In Fillippini v. Ristaino, 585 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1978), the district court denied habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner who waived counsel after several extended discussions with the trial judge regarding the need for representation. During these conferences the judge offered to appoint new counsel. The petitioner acknowledged the importance of counsel in defending one charged with armed robbery, as petitioner was, but repeatedly refused the court’s proffer of assistance. He had been represented by counsel in a prior armed robbery prosecution. Unlike Taylor, Fillippini was fairly and fully warned of the risks of his proposed course of action, had prior experience with the offense for which he was tried, and obviously made his decision to represent himself “with his eyes open.” Similarly, in United States v. King, 582 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1978), the defendant waived counsel after the trial judge “engaged in a lengthy colloquy with [him] in an attempt to dissuade him from self-representation. He warned King of the seriousness of the charges, the potential penalty, the advantages of legal training and the likelihood of complex legal issues arising at trial.” Id. at 889. The Fourth Circuit held that this explanation was enough, when coupled with the defendant’s responses, to indicate an “eyes open” waiver. In United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1978), “[b]efore granting appellant’s request the trial court conducted a lengthy colloquy with him, recommending that he continue his representation by counsel. The court found for the record that Jones was in possession of his faculties, literate and reasonably articulate.” Id. at 788. Consequently, the defendant’s waiver of counsel was found to be knowing and intelligent. United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct. 2267, 56 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978), upheld one co-defendant’s waiver after “an extended discussion [with the court] in which [this defendant] played a major role,” id. at 1309, but reversed the conviction of the other defendant because the record did not indicate a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. Finally, this court in Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977), held that when a defendant expresses the desire to waive counsel and proceed pro se “a trial judge should engage in a dia*1295logue with such a defendant, explaining to him the consequences of defending pro se.” Id. at 892. We also observed in Chapman that the demand to proceed pro se should be stated unequivocally. Id. at 892-93. In the light of these decisions, I do not see how we can say that Taylor’s conviction can withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Badger v. Cardwell, 587 F.2d 968, 972 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1978).
In summary, Taylor was not adequately made aware by the trial court of the problems and disadvantages inherent in proceeding pro se. It was the trial judge, not the defendant, who initiated the idea of going forward without counsel. Once the judge indicated that the defendant would remain without counsel if he insisted on the discharge of the public defender, no effort was made to undertake a penetrating and comprehensive examination to determine whether the right to counsel was being waived. I find nothing in this record that indicates a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of that right. I respectfully dissent.

. The majority states that in this case counsel was not waived, but rather was dismissed. Ante at 1290. This is at best a semantic distinction. The fact remains that Taylor proceeded to trial without counsel; in doing so, he either waived the right to the presence of counsel or he did not.
In all Faretta -type cases, including Faretta itself, previously retained or appointed counsel has been dismissed by a defendant. E. g., United States v. King, 582 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1978); Ford v. Wainwright, 526 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1976). The Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), standard of knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel called for in Faretta clearly applies when, as here, counsel is dismissed and a defendant proceeds to represent himself in a criminal trial.
The majority cites, ante at 1290, to note 15 of Faretta as having some special significance, although it does not explain why it is important here. In fact, note 15 of Faretta points out that two different, but closely intertwined, sixth amendment issues are involved in cases such as Faretta or the one now before us: (1) waiver of the right to adequate representation by counsel, and (2) exercise of the independent right to self-representation. When a defendant chooses to exercise his right to proceed pro se, he necessarily chooses to waive his right to counsel. Hence, the right recognized in Faretta entails the application of the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of waiver.

. Before trial, Cain, then representing all the defendants, had moved the court to appoint separate counsel for each defendant, and the motion was granted.