Court Opinion

ID: 9882537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:21.002167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:16.446081
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re J.C., 2023-Ohio-3299.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     PIKE COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:                           :
                                            :
        J.C.                                :   Case No. 23CA920
                                            :
        Adjudicated Abused,                 :
        Neglected, And Dependent            :
        Child.                              :
                                            :
                                            :
                                            :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                            :   ENTRY
                                            :
                                            :   RELEASED 9/14/2023

                                        APPEARANCES:

Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellant.

Rebecca D.L. Waigand, Wellston, Ohio, for Appellees.

Smith, P.J.

        {¶1} Appellant, Amanda Curtis, appeals the trial court’s decision that

granted legal custody of her child, J.C., to Appellees, Karen and John Curtis, the

maternal grandparents. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by determining

that granting legal custody of J.C. to Appellees is in his best interest. For the

reasons that follow, we do not find any merit to Appellant’s assignment of error.

Therefore, we overrule Appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                 2

                                        FACTS

      {¶2} On November 19, 2021, Appellant gave birth to J.C. Shortly

thereafter, Pike County Children Services Board (“the agency”) received a report

that J.C. tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. On November

23, 2021, the court placed J.C. in the agency’s emergency temporary custody. The

next day, the agency filed a complaint that alleged J.C. is abused, neglected, and

dependent and that requested temporary custody of him. The complaint stated that

the parents refused to sign a safety plan to place J.C. in the maternal grandmother’s

care and that the agency nevertheless placed him with the maternal grandmother.

      {¶3} On December 6, 2021, Appellees filed a motion to intervene. They

alleged that J.C. currently is in their care. They further asserted that earlier in

2021, the Jackson County Common Pleas Court awarded them legal custody of

Appellant’s two other children, O.C. and R.C. Appellees later filed a motion for

legal custody of J.C., and the trial court subsequently granted their motion to

intervene.

      {¶4} On January 21, 2022, the court adjudicated J.C. an abused, neglected,

and dependent child and continued him in the agency’s temporary custody pending

disposition.

      {¶5} At disposition, the court placed J.C. in Appellees’ temporary custody

subject to the agency’s protective supervision.
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                  3

      {¶6} On November 10, 2022, the court held a hearing to consider Appellees’

legal custody motion. Pike County Probation Officer Travis Holden testified that

Appellant has participated in drug court since February 2022. Officer Holden

stated that Appellant recently has been doing well and has not had any positive

drug screens or behavioral issues. He explained that the drug court program

consists of four phases and that Appellant is in phase two.

      {¶7} Caseworker Christine Myers testified that the parents have made

progress with their case plan goals but have not yet completed them. Myers

explained that at the moment, neither parent is able to take custody of J.C. She

reported that the parents remain in treatment facilities and that they, thus, do not

have appropriate housing for J.C. Myers nonetheless stated that the parents are

making progress, and the agency considers them to be in compliance with the case

plan. For this reason, the agency has requested a six-month temporary custody

extension.

      {¶8} When asked whether Myers believes that placing J.C. in Appellees’

legal custody is in his best interest, she stated, “that’s a complicated question to

answer.” Myers indicated that J.C. has his needs met with Appellees and that he is

bonded with Appellees and his other siblings who live in the home. Myers also

reported that Appellant interacts appropriately with J.C. and appears bonded to

him. In the end, she stated that the agency’s case plan goal remains reunification.
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                4

      {¶9} The maternal grandmother testified that J.C. has lived with her since he

was five days old. She stated that she also has custody of appellant’s two other

children, O.C. and R.C. The grandmother explained that she obtained custody of

O.C. and R.C. after Appellant and the father abandoned them in her home. She

related that in early 2020, Appellant and the father were living in her home. About

six weeks after R.C.’s birth, the grandmother told Appellant and the father that

they needed to get jobs. Rather than finding jobs, the parents “packed all their

stuff up and then left” without R.C. or O.C. After not hearing from the parents for

about five months, the grandmother decided to seek legal custody of the children.

She related that neither parent appeared at any of the court hearings involving R.C.

or O.C. and that the court later granted her custody of the children.

      {¶10} The grandmother recognized that Appellant and the father have

improved since they started treatment. She stated, however, that when the parents

visit J.C. at her home, they appear “more compatible with each other.” The

grandmother also does not believe that the father appears comfortable providing

care for a baby. Appellant, on the other hand, changed J.C.’s diaper, fed him, and

rocked him to sleep. The grandmother reported that J.C. is doing well in her home.

      {¶11} The maternal grandfather testified that he and the grandmother have

not allowed Appellant to visit R.C. or O.C. when they visit J.C. He explained that

he and the grandmother “think that if they come now get messed up later get all
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                  5

their kids know them or expect them to be there and they not show up [sic]. You

know what I mean? The other kids would take it harder than the baby would.”

The grandfather stated that if the parents continue to do well with their treatment

and remain drug free, then he would be willing to facilitate visits with the other

children.

      {¶12} Appellant testified that she currently lives at Georgie Harris House, a

treatment facility. She explained that on January 3, 2022, she first entered Georgie

Harris House, but she only stayed there until February 22, 2022. Appellant

reported that the facility discharged her due to her attitude. Appellant stated that

she then went to Focus, where she remained until May 2022. At that time, the

facility discharged her, and she went to jail for 16 days. Upon her release from

jail, she went to a third treatment facility. She later encountered transportation

issues, however, and left that facility. In September 2022, she returned to Georgie

Harris House. Appellant claimed that since entering treatment, she has not had any

positive drug screens.

      {¶13} J.C.’s guardian ad litem testified and recommended that the court

place him in Appellees’ legal custody. The guardian ad litem explained that

although he is not opposed to a six-month extension, he is not “sure if the custody

recommendation will change in six months.” Instead, he believed that more time
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                  6

might give him additional information regarding an appropriate visitation plan for

the parents.

      {¶14} On January 9, 2023, the trial court granted Appellees legal custody of

J.C. and denied the agency’s request for a six-month extension. The court stated

that it considered the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051 and found that

it is in J.C.’s best interest to place him in Appellees’ legal custody. The court

granted Appellant and the father visitation time with J.C. This appeal followed.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

      I.       THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT GRANTING
               LEGAL CUSTODY OF J.C. TO HIS MATERNAL
               GRANDPARENTS WAS IN HIS BEST INTERESTS.

                              LAW AND ANALYSIS

      {¶15} In her sole assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court

erred by determining that granting legal custody of J.C. to Appellees is in his best

interest. She asserts that the evidence fails to support a finding that Appellees

“will abide by the visitation orders or foster a relationship between [J.C.] and his

parents.” Appellant states that Appellees “willfully deny” her visitation time or

contact with J.C.’s siblings, O.C. and R.C. She claims that Appellees’ failure to

allow her to visit the other children shows that placing J.C. in their legal custody is

not in J.C.’s best interest. Instead, Appellant implies that if Appellees have denied
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                    7

her the ability to see the other children, then they likewise will deny her visitation

time with J.C.

      {¶16} Appellant additionally contends that she has made “significant

progress” toward the case plan goals and that J.C. “can be reunited with his parents

within a reasonable time.” Appellant thus argues that the trial court erred by

denying the agency’s request for a six-month extension.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

      {¶17} “A trial court has broad discretion in proceedings involving the care

and custody of children.” In re Mullen, 129 Ohio St.3d 417, 2011-Ohio-3361, 953

N.E.2d 302, ¶ 14. Consequently, we review a trial court’s decision to award a

party legal custody of an abused, neglected, or dependent child for an abuse of

discretion, and we afford its decision “the utmost deference.” In re E.W., 4th Dist.

Washington Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, and 10CA20, 2011-Ohio-2123, ¶ 18, citing

Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988); accord In re A.J.,

148 Ohio St.3d 218, 2016-Ohio-8196, 69 N.E.3d 733, ¶ 27, citing Davis v.

Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 417, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997) (stating that “a trial

court’s decision in a custody proceeding is subject to reversal only upon a showing

of abuse of discretion”); In re A.L.P., 4th Dist. Washington No. 14CA37, 2015-

Ohio-1552, ¶ 15; In re C.J.L., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 13CA3545, 2014-Ohio-1766, ¶

12. Ordinarily, “[t]he term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that the trial court’s
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                               8

attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” In re H.V., 138 Ohio

St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, 7 N.E.3d 1173, ¶ 8. In Davis, however, the court

explained the abuse-of-discretion standard that applies in child custody

proceedings as follows:

      The standard for abuse of discretion was laid out in the leading case of
      C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8
      O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, but applied to custody cases in Bechtol v.
      Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178, syllabus:

             “Where an award of custody is supported by a substantial
             amount of credible and competent evidence, such an
             award will not be reversed as being against the weight of
             the evidence by a reviewing court. (Trickey v. Trickey
             [1952], 158 Ohio St. 9, 47 O.O. 481, 106 N.E.2d 772,
             approved and followed.)”

      The reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge has the best
      opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each
      witness, something that does not translate well on the written page. As
      we stated in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77,
      80-81, 10 OBR 408, 410-412, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276-1277:

             “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
             findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the
             trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe
             their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use
             these observations in weighing the credibility of the
             proffered testimony. * * *

             * * * A reviewing court should not reverse a decision
             simply because it holds a different opinion concerning the
             credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before
             the trial court. A finding of an error in law is a legitimate
             ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on
             credibility of witnesses and evidence is not. The
             determination of credibility of testimony and evidence
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                  9

              must not be encroached upon by a reviewing tribunal,
              especially to the extent where the appellate court relies on
              unchallenged, excluded evidence in order to justify its
              reversal.”

      This is even more crucial in a child custody case, where there may be
      much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not
      translate to the record well.

Id. at 418-419 (emphasis sic).

      {¶18} Accordingly, reviewing courts should afford great deference to trial-

court child-custody decisions. A.L.P. at ¶ 16; E.W. at ¶ 19, citing Pater v. Pater,

63 Ohio St.3d 393, 396, 588 N.E.2d 794 (1992). Additionally, because child

custody issues involve some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions that trial

courts are required to decide, courts must have wide latitude to consider all of the

evidence, and appellate courts should not disturb a trial court’s judgment absent an

abuse of discretion. Davis, 77 Ohio St.3d 418; Bragg v. Hatfield, 152 Ohio

App.3d 174, 2003-Ohio-1441, 787 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); Hinton v. Hinton,

4th Dist. Washington No. 02CA54, 2003-Ohio-2785, ¶ 9; Ferris v. Ferris, 4th Dist.

Meigs No. 02CA4, 2003-Ohio-1284, ¶ 20. As the Ohio Supreme Court has

emphasized:

      In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children the
      power of the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly
      important. The knowledge obtained through contact with and
      observation of the parties and through independent investigation
      can not be conveyed to a reviewing court by printed record.

Trickey, 158 Ohio St. at 13.
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                               10

      {¶19} Thus, this standard of review does not permit us to reverse a trial

court’s decision if we simply disagree with it. We may, however, reverse a trial

court’s custody decision if the court made an error of law, if its decision is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, or if substantial competent and credible

evidence fails to support it. Davis, 77 Ohio St.3d at 418-419, 421 (explaining

“abuse of discretion standard” and stating that courts will not reverse custody

decisions as against the manifest weight of the evidence if substantial competent

and credible evidence supports it, courts must defer to fact finder, courts may

reverse upon error of law, and trial court has broad discretion in custody matters).

      {¶20} “While we might be ‘perplexed’ by this hybrid abuse-of-discretion-

manifest-weight standard, the Ohio Supreme Court has not overruled, modified, or

clarified the standard set forth in Bechtol or Flickinger.” In re E.S., 4th Dist.

Pickaway No. 17CA16, 2018-Ohio-1902, ¶ 23, citing A.L.P. at ¶ 23 (Harsha, J.,

concurring). We therefore continue to apply this standard when reviewing child-

custody matters that do not involve the termination of parental rights. E.S. at ¶ 23.

                                PARENTAL RIGHTS

      {¶21} “ ‘The right of a parent to the custody of his or her child is one of the

oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by American courts.’ ” State ex rel.

Otten v. Henderson, 129 Ohio St.3d 453, 2011-Ohio-4082, 953 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 31,

quoting In re Thompkins, 115 Ohio St.3d 409, 2007-Ohio-5238, 875 N.E.2d 582, ¶
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                   11

10; accord In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 19;

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).

Consequently, “[p]arents have a constitutionally protected due process right to

make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children, and the

parents’ right to custody of their children is paramount to any custodial interest in

the children asserted by nonparents.” Mullen at ¶ 11. Nevertheless, a parent’s

paramount right to custody of his or her children “is not absolute.” In re D.A., 113

Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 11. Instead, “ ‘the natural

rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child,

which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’ ” In re Cunningham,

59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d

54, 58 (Fla.App.1974); accord B.C. at ¶ 20. Thus, once an abuse, neglect, or

dependency case “reaches the disposition phase, the best interest of the child

controls.” D.A. at ¶ 11; accord In re Pryor, 86 Ohio App.3d 327, 332, 620 N.E.2d

973 (4th Dist.1993) (stating that “the primary, if not only, consideration in the

disposition of all children’s cases is the best interests and welfare of the child”).

                         LEGAL-CUSTODY STANDARD

      {¶22} After a trial court adjudicates a child abused, neglected, or dependent,

R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) authorizes the court to “[a]ward legal custody of the child to

either parent or to any other person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                12

motion requesting legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal

custodian in a complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any

party to the proceedings.”

      “Legal custody” means a legal status that vests in the custodian
      the right to have physical care and control of the child and to
      determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right
      and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide
      the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all
      subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and
      responsibilities.

R.C. 2151.011(B)(21).

      {¶23} Although legal custody is intended to be permanent in nature, R.C.

2151.42(B), it “is not as drastic a remedy as permanent custody because a parent

retains residual rights and has the opportunity to request the return of the children.”

In re Memic, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2006-L-049, 2006-L-050, and 2006-L-051,

2006-Ohio-6346, ¶ 24 (citations omitted); In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455,

751 N.E.2d 552 (7th Dist.2001).

      {¶24} In order to award legal custody of an abused, neglected, or dependent

child to a parent or other person, a trial court must find, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that legal custody to the parent or other person is in the child’s best

interest. In re K.L.V.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112067, 2023-Ohio-1287, ¶ 28

and 30; In re E.N., 4th Dist. Highland No. 21CA5, 2022-Ohio-116, ¶ 23. “A

‘preponderance of the evidence’ is ‘evidence which is of greater weight or more
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                               13

convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.’ ” In re B.P.,

191 Ohio App.3d 518, 2010-Ohio-6458, 946 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 43 (4th Dist.), quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 1182 (6th Ed.1998).

      {¶25} Although the child’s best interest is the controlling principle in

determining whether to award a parent or other person legal custody, R.C.

2151.353(A)(3) does not list any certain factors that guide the best interest

determination. Moreover, Ohio appellate courts have not settled on any particular

best interest test that a trial court must apply when considering an R.C.

2151.353(A)(3) legal custody award. Instead, courts have looked to the best

interest factors listed in R.C. 3109.04 or R.C. 2151.414, a combination of the two,

or a general best interest test. In re L.W., 3rd Dist. Wyandot No. 16-22-03, 2022-

Ohio-3696, ¶ 62 (“juvenile courts may be guided by the factors listed in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) (the permanent-custody factors) or R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (factors

employed in private-custody disputes)”); In re Z.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-

295, 2021-Ohio-3744, ¶ 31 (“courts have found the factors stated in R.C.

3109.04(F) to be instructive in determining the best interests of the child in an R.C.

2151.353(A)(3) legal custody case”); In re V.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109649,

2020-Ohio-5626, ¶ 32 (“the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) are not mandatory but

instructive when making a best-interest-of-the-child determination in legal custody

matters”); In re F.B.D., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180356, 2019-Ohio-2562, ¶ 12
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                  14

(stating that courts may look to R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C. 2151.414(D)); In re E.H.,

6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-15-044, 2016-Ohio-8170, ¶ 17 (considering both R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) and 3109.04(F)(1)); In re A.K., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 27575,

2017-Ohio-8100, ¶ 13 (“[i]n the context of a legal-custody motion, the pertinent

best-interest factors are found in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)”); In re S.D., 5th Dist. Stark

No. 2013CA0081, 2013-Ohio-5752, ¶ 33-34 (looking to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) for

guidance); In re A.K., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26291, 2012-Ohio-4430, ¶ 25 (“courts

have looked to the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), a

combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding

the best interests of the children”); In re M.A., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-02-

030, 2012-Ohio-545, ¶ 16 (“[a]lthough there is no statutory mandate that the

factors in R.C. 3109.04(F) be expressly considered and balanced before fashioning

an award of custody under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), a juvenile court is certainly

entitled to consider those factors, as well as any other relevant factors, in making

its custody determination”); see also Best Interests of the Child, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (explaining that the best-interest-of-the-child standard

is one “by which a court determines what arrangements would be to a child’s

greatest benefit, often used in deciding child-custody and visitation matters and in

deciding whether to approve an adoption or a guardianship” and listing some of the

best interest factors courts commonly consider as “the emotional tie between the
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                15

child and the parent or guardian, the ability of a parent or guardian to give the child

love and guidance, the ability of a parent or guardian to provide necessaries, the

established living arrangement between a parent or guardian and the child, the

child’s preference if the child is old enough that the court will consider that

preference in making a custody award, and a parent’s ability to foster a healthy

relationship between the child and the other parent”).

      {¶26} This court traditionally has considered the best interest factors listed

in R.C. 3109.04 when reviewing a trial court’s legal custody decision in an abuse,

neglect, or dependency case. E.g., E.N. at ¶ 25; In re A.L.P., 4th Dist. Washington

No. 14CA37, 2015-Ohio-1552, ¶ 17; Pryor, 86 Ohio App.3d at 336 (“in our

opinion, the juvenile courts should consider the totality of the circumstances,

including, to the extent they are applicable, those factors set forth in R.C.

3109.04(F)”). In the case before us, however, the trial court’s judgment entry

states that it considered the factors in R.C. 3019.051. Appellant, however, has not

suggested that the trial court erred by applying R.C. 3109.051. Instead, Appellant

asserts that we should consider the R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) best-interest factors when

reviewing the trial court’s legal-custody decision.

      {¶27} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) lists the following best interest factors:

             (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;

             (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                           16

             division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and
             concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and
             responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns
             of the child, as expressed to the court;

          (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s
              parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly
              affect the child’s best interest;

          (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and
              community;

          (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
              situation;

          (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved
              parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;

          (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support
              payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that
              parent pursuant to a child support order under which that
              parent is an obligor;

          (h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of
              either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded
              guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted
              in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether
              either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated
              an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been
              determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful
              act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent
              or any member of the household of either parent previously
              has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of
              section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented
              offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission
              of the offense was a member of the family or household that
              is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent
              or any member of the household of either parent previously
              has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense
              involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                 17

                 offense was a member of the family or household that is the
                 subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to
                 the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether
                 there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a
                 manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a
                 neglected child;

             (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to
                 a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully
                 denied the other parent's right to parenting time in accordance
                 with an order of the court;

             (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is
                 planning to establish a residence, outside this state.

      {¶28} As with other best interest tests, no one factor is controlling. “Instead,

the trial court considers the totality of the circumstances when making its best

interest determination.” In re K.M., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 16CA17, 2017-Ohio-

1336, ¶ 51 (citations omitted).

      {¶29} In the case at bar, Appellant zeroes in on one best interest factor:

“The [party] more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time

rights or visitation and companionship rights[.]” R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f). She

contends that the maternal grandparents are not more likely to honor and facilitate

her visitation rights with J.C. given their admitted failures to allow her to visit her

other children in their legal custody. Appellant’s argument that we should consider

this one factor in isolation is contrary to the totality-of-the-circumstances approach

that courts apply when evaluating a child’s best interest. We therefore disagree
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                  18

with Appellant that this one factor illustrates that the trial court abused its

discretion by awarding Appellees legal custody of J.C.

      {¶30} Additionally, Appellant’s argument rests upon a credibility

assessment of the maternal grandmother’s testimony that she would comply with

court-ordered visitations and facilitate visits with J.C. The trial court was in the

best position to assess the maternal grandmother’s credibility, and we have no

basis to conclude that the trial court incorrectly credited her testimony.

      {¶31} Appellant also asserts that awarding Appellees legal custody of J.C. is

not in his best interest because she “made significant” case plan progress and

because the agency agreed that she and the father should have more time to

complete all of the case-plan goals. However, even if appellant has significantly

complied with the case plan, as we have observed in the past, a parent’s case plan

compliance may be a relevant, but not necessarily conclusive, factor when a court

evaluates a child’s best interest. In re Ca.S., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 21CA10,

2021-Ohio-3874, ¶ 39-40; In re B.P., 4th Dist. Athens No. 20CA13, 2021-Ohio-

3148, ¶ 57; In re T.J., 4th Dist. Highland No. 2016-Ohio-163, ¶ 36, citing In re

R.L., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27214 and 27233, 2014-Ohio-3117, ¶ 34 (“although

case plan compliance may be relevant to a trial court’s best interest determination,

it is not dispositive of it”); In re S.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102349, 2015-Ohio-

2280, ¶ 40 (“[c]ompliance with a case plan is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                               19

issue of reunification”); accord In re C.W., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 28781,

2020-Ohio-6849, ¶ 19 (“[c]ase-plan compliance is not the only consideration in a

legal custody determination”); In re K.M., 4th Dist. Ross No. 19CA3677, 2019-

Ohio-4252, ¶ 70, citing In re W.C.J., 4th Dist. Jackson No. 14CA3, 2014-Ohio-

5841, ¶ 46 (“[s]ubstantial compliance with a case plan is not necessarily dispositive

on the issue of reunification”).

      Indeed, because the trial court’s primary focus in a [legal]
      custody proceeding is the child’s best interest, a parent’s case
      plan compliance is not dispositive and does not prevent a trial
      court from awarding legal custody to a nonparent. Thus, a
      parent’s case plan compliance will not preclude a trial court from
      awarding legal custody to a nonparent when doing so is in the
      child’s best interest.

Id.; accord In re P.V.A., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-0097, 2023-Ohio-1622,

¶ 19; In re J.M., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 28508, 2020-Ohio-822, ¶ 15.

      {¶32} Accordingly, even if appellant has substantially complied with the

case plan, her compliance does not mean that the trial court had an obligation to

grant the agency’s request for a six-month extension. Rather, the trial court’s

obligation was to make a decision that would be in J.C.’s best interests.

      {¶33} We further note that Appellant has not raised any other specific

arguments regarding the trial court’s best interest determination. Thus, we need

not independently analyze the trial court’s best interest determination. E.g., B.P. at

¶ 56 (“when a parent does not present any analysis of the best interest factors, we
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                  20

ordinarily will not create that analysis for the parent”); State v. Munoz, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 112006, 2023-Ohio-1895, ¶ 21, citing State v. Quarterman, 140

Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19 (“[a]ppellate courts are not

obligated to create, nor should they sua sponte provide, arguments on behalf of

parties”). We simply note that the record does not establish that the trial court

abused its discretion by determining that placing J.C. in Appellees’ legal custody is

in his best interest. Additionally, we observe that the guardian ad litem

recommended that the court place J.C. in Appellees’ legal custody. In re C.F., 113

Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 56 (observing that “[t]he trial

court has discretion to accept the testimony of the guardian ad litem on the child’s

wishes”). The guardian ad litem also stated that he did not believe that a six-month

extension would alter his custody recommendation.

      {¶34} Because the trial court found that placing J.C. in Appellees’ legal

custody is in his best interest, it necessarily determined that granting the agency’s

request for a six-month extension is not in his best interest. See In re J.M., 9th

Dist. Summit No. 30258, 2022-Ohio-3638, ¶ 32 (stating that when a trial court trial

court finds that legal-custody award to nonparent is in the child’s best interest, the

court necessarily must deny any extension of temporary custody); R.C.

2151.415(D)(1) (stating that court may extend temporary-custody order if it

determines, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the extension is in the best
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                21

interest of the child, there has been significant progress on the case plan of the

child, and there is reasonable cause to believe that the child will be reunified with

one of the parents or otherwise permanently placed within the period of

extension”).

      {¶35} For all of the foregoing reasons, we do not agree with Appellant that

the trial court erred by placing J.C. in Appellees’ legal custody. Therefore, we

overrule Appellant’s sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pike App. No. 23CA920                                                                 22

                              JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellant.

      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pike
County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into
execution.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J., & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                 For the Court,

                                 _____________________________
                                 Jason P. Smith
                                 Presiding Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.