Court Opinion

ID: 9669212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:43:53.204856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:53.972838
License: Public Domain

HUTSON-DUNN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that holds the defendants’ motions for summary judgment were not broad enough to address Farah’s allegation that the defendants should have asserted promissory estoppel in the underlying suit. I believe the defendants’ motions were broad enough to address this claim. I would overrule point of error one in its entirety. Further, I believe the defendants have proved as a matter of law that Farah could not recover on his underlying claim for promissory estoppel. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court with reference to this claim.
Overbreadth of Judgment
The defendants argue in their brief that Farah’s underlying claim for promissory es-toppel was barred by both the statute limitations and the statute of frauds. The majority does not consider the defendants’ arguments because it holds their motions for summary judgment were not broad enough to address Farah’s underlying cause of action for promissory estoppel. I disagree. I believe the defendants’ motions for summary judgment contemplated all causes of action set forth in Farah’s amended petitions.
The defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, and then Farah filed his third amended petition. The defendants did not object when Farah filed his third amended petition. When the record provides no basis to conclude the amended petition was not considered by the trial court, we presume the court considered the new pleadings. Johnson v. Rollen, 818 S.W.2d 180, 182-83 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). Therefore, the inquiry becomes whether the summary judgment was broad enough to cover the new claim(s) in the amended pleadings. See Yancy v. City of Tyler, 836 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied) (motion for summary judgment must be analyzed in light of pleadings to ensure motion defeats every eause of action raised in petition.)
The defendants’ supplement to their motion for summary judgment specifically states that “summary judgment is appropriate insofar as Farah’s legal malpractice claims in this case are based on the loss of any alleged claims against [FCD] and [FCB] in the underlying case.” (Emphasis added.) The defendants also moved “for complete summary judgment ... on the basis that Farah’s claims against the First City entities in the underlying lawsuit were barred as a matter of law.” (Emphasis added.) The defendants’ motions on their face address all claims that Farah alleged in the underlying suit. Therefore, in my opinion, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment were broad enough to address Farah’s underlying claim for promissory estoppel. Accordingly, I proceed to consider whether the defendants have proved as a matter of law that limitations or the statute of frauds barred Farah’s potential claim for promissory estoppel in the underlying suit at the time he hired the defendants.
Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for a promissory estoppel claim is the same as the statute of limitations for a contract claim, i.e., four years. Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 816 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied). The majority opinion holds the defendants did not conclusively prove Farah’s contract causes of action in the underlying suit were barred by the four-year statute of limitations when Farah hired the firm. For the same reasons stated by the majority, I would hold the defendants did not prove as a matter of law that Farah’s potential promissory estoppel claim in the underlying suit was barred by the four-year statute *681of limitations when Farah hired the defendants. I would not affirm summary judgment on Farah’s underlying promissory es-toppel claim on this ground.
Statute of Frauds
When a movant proves its entitlement to summary judgment based on the statute of frauds, the nonmovant may defeat the motion by raising a fact issue on each element of his promissory estoppel defense. “Moore” Burger, Inc., v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 936-37 (Tex.1972); Leach v. Conoco, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 954, 959 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d w.o.j.). To prevent the rendition of summary judgment on an otherwise valid statute of frauds defense, the nonmovant must produce some evidence of the following:
(1) the movant made an oral promise to sign a written agreement that satisfied the statute, and the nonmovant foreseeably relied on the promise to his detriment; or
(2) the movant orally represented the statute of frauds had been satisfied, and the nonmovant relied to his detriment on the misrepresentation.
“Moore” Burger, Inc., 492 S.W.2d at 936-37; Leach, 892 S.W.2d at 959.
The majority holds the defendants conclusively proved Farah’s underlying contract claims against the First City entities were barred by the statute of frauds. I agree with this conclusion. For the same reasons, I would also hold the defendants conclusively proved Farah’s underlying promissory estop-pel claim against the First City entities was barred by the statute of frauds.
Farah did not present any summary judgment evidence to raise a fact issue on his underlying promissory estoppel claim. All of the summary judgment evidence in the record establishes that the promises to Farah were oral. There is no summary judgment evidence the First City entities promised Fa-rah to sign a written agreement that satisfied the statute of frauds. There is also no summary judgment evidence the First City entities misrepresented to Farah that their oral agreement satisfied the statute of frauds.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court on Farah’s potential claim for promissory estoppel in the underlying suit based on the statute of frauds.