Court Opinion

ID: 9682218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:07:51.763898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.114903
License: Public Domain

W.H. “Dub” Arnold, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority opinion that, in accordance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 31.1, the trial court erred in accepting Vasquez-Aerreola’s guilty plea without the prosecutor’s assent. I write separately only to suggest that the present rule should be changed. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the requirement of prosecutorial assent to a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial has been criticized. See generally, Fred Anthony DeCicco, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A Reassessment of the “Prosecutorial Veto”, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 1091 (1983) (criticizing prosecutorial “veto” under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a)). Our state constitution grants to the accused the right to trial by jury. Ark. Const, art. 2, § 7. As this right is granted to the accused so that he may be tried by a jury of his peers, then it should follow that the accused should be able to waive this right, in non-capital cases, without assent by the prosecutor. Under the present Rule 31.1, a prosecutor could demand that a defendant accept the plea bargain offered, or force him to be tried by a jury. While I agree that input on the part of the prosecutor is crucial in the ultimate sentencing decision, I do not agree that the prosecutor should have the power to veto a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial. In my view, a better rule would be to allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to the court, while permitting recommendations from the prosecutor regarding sentence. Such a rule would allow an accused to plead guilty and dispense with a trial, thus avoiding delay in the judicial process and crowding of the trial dockets, while allowing input from the State in the sentencing decision. For these reasons, I respectfully concur. Thor-NTON, J., joins.