Court Opinion

ID: 9738006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:40:19.392027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.170436
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Emmert, C. J.
The issue in this original action squarely presents the nature of a preliminary hearing on a felony charge before the Municipal Court of Marion County. Before the hearing the relator filed an affidavit for a change of judge under §9-1316, Burns’ 1942 Replacement. This section gives the right to the state or a defendant on a prosecution by indictment or affidavit to “apply for a change of judge on the ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had by reason of the interest, bias or prejudice of the trial judge.”
This court is a special statutory court, and §4-2516, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, states: “a special judge may be appointed as provided by law relating to changes of venue from the judges of the circuit court.” Section 4-2504, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, provides that “all cases involving violations of the criminal statutes of this state shall be governed primarily, and where the same are not inconsistent with this act, by all relevant provisions, not only of the Criminal Code, but also of those relating to the jurisdiction and powers and to the procedure and practice that is now or may be hereafter prescribed for magistrates courts by the Acts of 1939, chapter 164 [§§4-3801—4-3809].” Section 4 of Ch. 164 of the Acts of 1939, adopted by reference in the amendment to the act creating the Municipal Court of Marion County, has several subsections concerning jurisdiction.
“(b) The magistrates court shall have and exercise original jurisdiction concurrently with the *479original jurisdiction which is now exercised in such county by the circuit court, superior court, criminal court, municipal court or city court, in all cases of petty larceny and in all other violations of the laws of the state for which the penalty provided cannot exceed a fine of five hundred dollars [$500] or imprisonment in the county jail or state farm for a period not exceeding six [6] months, or both such fine and such imprisonment.
“(d) The court shall have and exercise within the county the powers and jurisdiction now or hereafter conferred upon or exercised by justices of the peace in all cases of crimes and misdemeanors and in related proceedings such as surety of the peace, except as otherwise herein provided. . . .
“(e) If the penalty which the magistrate is authorized to impose is, in his opinion, not adequate to the offense in any case brought before him, he may so find, and in such case he shall hold such prisoner to bail for his appearance before the proper court or commit him to jail in default of such bail.” Section 4-3804, Burns’ 1946 Replacement.
On the third count of the affidavit for the second offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, which is a felony, §47-2001(b), Burns’ 1952 Replacement, the court’s jurisdiction as to the felony was the same as a justice of the peace if such charge had been filed before him. It is well settled that in such a case the justice of the peace has jurisdiction to hold a preliminary hearing upon which the defendant could be discharged, or find there was probable cause to recognize the defendant to appear before the criminal court. Section 9-704, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.1
*480The language of the cases is very clear on this.
“In respect to the latter grade of offenses they have only the powers of an examining court, and can neither acquit nor convict thereof. They can only hear and commit or bind over the accused to answer before a court having jurisdiction to try the offense, or discharge the accused, as the evidence may warrant; and a discharge by a justice does not prevent another prosecution. The State v. Morgan, 62 Ind. 35.” State v. Hattabough (1879), 66 Ind. 223, 225.
“This is so, because a justice of the peace, under our law, has no jurisdiction to either acquit or convict a defendant charged with a felony, his only authority in such a case being that of an examining court to hear and discharge, or commit and bind over, the defendant to appear before a court having jurisdiction to try the case. This point is settled by the decision of this court in the case of State v. Hattabough, 66 Ind. 223.” Seibert v. State (1884), 95 Ind. 471, 480.
In Carson v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 273, 279, 183 N. E. 544, an affidavit was filed in the city court of Marion charging him with unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor and further alleging two prior convictions under the liquor laws.
The statutes concerning conviction for a lesser or included offense are as follows:
“A defendant is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. When there is a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he must be acquitted. When there is a reasonable doubt in which of two [2] or more degrees of an offense he is guilty, he must be convicted of the lowest degree only.” Section 9-1806, Burns’ 1942 Replacement (Acts 1905, ch. 169, §261, p. 584).
“Upon an indictment or affidavit for an offense consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degrees charged in the indictment or affidavit, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto or of an attempt to commit the *481offense.” Section 9-1816, Burns’ 1942 Replacement (Acts 1905, ch. 169, §271, p. 584).
“In all other cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment or affidavit.” Section 9-1817, Burns’ 1942 Replacement (Acts 1905, ch. 169, §272, p. 584).
Under these statutes Carson could have been convicted, as he was convicted, of a misdemeanor. The affidavit in the city court did not have the endorsed approval of the prosecuting attorney, and this was not necessary on a misdemeanor charge before a justice of the peace or in a city or municipal court for an offense within the jurisdiction of such court. Parish v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 44, 141 N. E. 786.
After Carson had been convicted of the misdemeanor in the city court he appealed to the Grant Circuit Court, where Carson filed a motion to quash the affidavit, which was overruled. The court held this ruling of the Circuit Court was correct inasmuch as the affidavit charged an included misdemeanor within the jurisdiction of the city court where the affidavit was first filed. The reasoning of the court was as follows: *482This is not dicta, but ratio decidendi necessary to decide the issue on the motion to quash.
*481“The affidavit in the city court charged the misdemeanor of possessing intoxicating liquor, under §2717 Burns’ 1926. It also alleged that appellant had been convicted on two prior charges of violating the liquor law in the city court of Marion, giving the numbers of the cases and the sentences imposed, the effect of this allegation being to charge the felony defined by the same section of the statute. Under this affidavit the city court of Marion could convict the appellant if it found that he was guilty of the misdemeanor charged and was not guilty of the felony charged. If such court had found that he was guilty of the felony it would, for such offense, have had authority only to recognize him to appear and answer such charge in the circuit court.” Page 279.
*482The opinion in Carson v. State, supra, on this point has never been overruled, and the dissenting opinion by Judge Travis was only on the question of the search warrant. There is no confusing language in the opinion. There is a typographical error on page 279, where the motion to quash is referred to as a demurrer, but a motion to quash is analogous to a demurrer to a complaint in a civil action. Therefore under the Carson case, supra, the Municipal Court of Marion County did have jurisdiction to try the relator on the misdemeanor charge contained in the felony charge.
“ 'The trial is a judicial examination of the issues, whether of law or of fact, in an action.’ §2-1901, Burns’ 1946 Replacement; Casad v. Holdridge (1875), 50 Ind. 529, 530; Denbo v. Wright, Admr. (1876), 53 Ind. 226, 228; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Collins (1924), 82 Ind. App. 41, 54, 142 N. E. 634, 143 N. E. 712.” State ex rel. Talkington v. Hoffman, Judge (1947), 225 Ind. 475, 477, 76 N. E. 2d 252.
The proceedings before the respondent court are adversary in character. The court does have jurisdiction under the statutes to try the relator on the misdemeanor charge included in the felony charge. The relator could enter a plea of not guilty, and in the event he neglected to do so before the trial, the statute (§9-1201, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, Ingram v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 25, 99 N. E. 2d 410) enters a plea of not guilty for him. The judge of the Municipal Court has jurisdiction to enter a finding and a judgment that relator is guilty of the misdemeanor charge, and a finding and a judgment that he is not guilty of the felony charge. Even if a felony charge does not contain a misdemeanor charge, at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing *483the judge should enter a finding and judgment either discharging the accused, or that he is guilty as charged in the affidavit, and that he be recognized to appear and answer said charge in the criminal court, and then fix the amount of recognizance bond. Ewbank, Indiana Criminal Law (2d Ed.) §150, p. 87. The court’s duties under a charge for a felony that contains a misdemeanor charge, or under a felony charge which does not contain an included offense, involved a judicial examination of law and of fact.
The error in assuming that the case at bar could not be tried, or a charge of felony not containing an included offense of a misdemeanor could not be tried lies in reasoning that jeopardy must attach, or a judgment must be res judicata, before there can be a trial. An interlocutory order, or an interlocutory judgment as it was known before the Code, is not final and is not res judicata in many cases, yet there is a trial, or a hearing as it is referred to in equity, in every case where the proceedings are adversary and there has been no default. Under the Probate Code of 1881 and amendments thereto, an order for the sale of real estate of a decedent to make assets for the payment of debts results in an interlocutory order, which is appealable as such. 1 Henry’s Probate Law & Practice (5th Ed.) §250 and authorities cited. Many adverse interests may be presented under the issues in such a proceeding, and the hearing of evidence may take days. For this court to hold there must be a final judgment before there can be a trial upsets all the well decided cases in the books to the contrary, and arbitrarily limits the right to a change of judge without statutory sanction. A final divorce decree which fixes the custody of the children of the parties is not final in the sense that it decrees the custody can never be modified. Henderson v. Kleinman *484(1953), 231 Ind. 657, 109 N. E. 2d 905. Nor is a final divorce decree of a sister state fixing the custody of the children, where the decree may be modified subsequently, within the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. Scott v. Scott (1949), 227 Ind. 396, 86 N. E. 2d 533; New York v. Halvey (1947), 330 U. S. 610, 67 S. Ct. 903, 91 L. Ed. 1133.
If the charge against the relator had been for forgery, no included offense would have been within the affidavit. On a preliminary hearing the Municipal Court could have entered a finding and a judgment that the accused be discharged. This would not have placed the accused in jeopardy, or prevent the refiling of the same charge in the Criminal Court of Marion County, but it would have terminated the prosecution under the affidavit filed in the Municipal Court. The fact that jeopardy does not attach on a felony charge, and the judgment is not res judicata as to the felony charge, does not and can not prevent the proceedings from being a trial, and a judicial examination of law and fact.
No judge is selected by Divine Providence to try every issue that comes before him. Our Forefathers who drafted the 1851 Constitution contemplated the Legislature would make laws for changes of venue in civil and criminal cases. Clause 4, §22 of Article 4, Constitution of Indiana. It has not been the policy of this court to narrowly construe the right to a change of judge. State ex rel. Jones v. Geckler, Judge (1938), 214 Ind. 574, 577, 16 N. E. 2d 875; State ex rel. Newkirk v. Sullivan C. C. (1949), 227 Ind. 633, 88 N. E. 2d 326. It is quite obvious that the substantial rights of an accused may be seriously affected by bias and prejudice in this sort of a proceeding.
Nor should this court casually overrule prior precedents if there is to be stability in the law. Carson v. *485State (1932), 204 Ind. 273, 183 N. E. 544, supra, is clearly reasoned and correctly decided, both as a matter of principle and upon authority. It is not a case where the reasons for the rule have ceased to exist, or there never was any reason for the rule in the first place, either of which may be good cause for overruling a prior precedent. If this court is to overrule prior precedents in order to force a result in a particular case, we will administer justice by men and not by law, and have the law declared by judges and not by courts. The majority opinion judicially legislates by reading into the statute what is not there—a requirement that there be a final judgment that is res judicata before there can be a trial.
Relator’s contention that he would be deprived of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by refusal to grant the change of judge has no merit. The relator has not made a case where the trial judge was trying his own lawsuit or had a financial or relationship interest in the matter. See State ex rel. Parker v. Vosloh (1944), 222 Ind. 518, 54 N. E. 2d 650.
The temporary writ of prohibition should be made permanent.
Note.—Reported in 127 N. E. 2d 897.

. “. . . and it shall be the duty of such magistrate to immediately docket the cause . . . and to hear the cause, and either acquit, convict or punish or hold to bail the offender, or if the offense be not bailable, commit him to jail as the facts and the law may justify.” Section 9-704, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.