Court Opinion

ID: 9635631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:57:01.357806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:31.207001
License: Public Domain

WILNER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the Court and in most of Judge Eldridge’s opinion. The one part of the opinion with which I take issue is the suggestion that there is some substantive difference between an abuse of discretion and an arbitrariness and capriciousness standard of review and the conclusion flowing from that suggestion that, unless the reviewing court declares the ruling or decision under consideration to be arbitrary or capricious, it may not reverse that ruling or decision even upon a finding that the ruling or decision (1) is prejudicial to the complainant, and (2) so exceeds the bounds of the agency’s discretion with respect to the matter as to constitute an abuse of the agency’s discretion. For one thing, this is a matter that need not be addressed in this case; whether there is some definable distinction between abuse of discretion and arbitrariness is not before us. In any event, the Court seems to be suggesting a distinction that really does not exist.
The Court seems disturbed because the Court of Special Appeals, in its opinion, made the comment that termination of *293King’s employment was “disproportionate to the offense.” I agree that, as a general proposition, a reviewing court may not reverse or modify an agency decision because it believes that a sanction imposed by the agency was “disproportionate.” Proportionality review is not for the court unless it reaches the point of the decision exceeding the bounds of the agency’s lawful authority or discretion and, for that reason, being arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The imposition of sanctions for violations of laws administered by the agency is a matter committed by the Legislature to the Executive Branch agency, not to the courts, and so long as the sanction imposed is one that was within the Constitutional and statutory authority of the agency to impose and was not imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, the court has no business second-guessing the agency’s decision. That is really all we need to say, if we need to say anything.
To declare the much broader principle that a Circuit Court may not reverse an agency decision or ruling that the court finds constitutes an abuse of the agency’s discretion is both unnecessary and, in my view, misleading. That goes far beyond the matter of proportionality review of sanctions. The fact that the words “abuse of discretion” do not appear in the judicial review section of the Maryland APA does not mean that agencies are immune from judicial review when, in fact, they abuse their allowable discretion, either under common law principles or under the APA. In a nutshell, this is, to me, a semantic matter, of what language the court should use. The challenge by the complaining party should be stated in the statutory language, that the ruling or decision is arbitrary or capricious, and the court’s ruling on the challenge should also use that terminology. That is not to say, however, that there is some difference between the two concepts. It seems to me that a decision or ruling that exceeds the bounds of the agency’s discretion is, for that reason, either arbitrary or otherwise unlawful, and, in either event, if prejudicial, is subject to reversal by a reviewing court.
The issue of whether an agency decision or ruling may be reversed for abuse of discretion does not depend on how much *294discretion the agency actually has in the matter. That is generally a matter of substantive law. The scope or range of discretion varies, depending on the subject matter and the effect of the ruling. Whether the scope of discretion is broad or narrow, however, the judicial review issue emerges only when the agency has abused whatever discretion it has and the ruling resulting from that abuse is prejudicial to the complaining party.
The judicial review provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (title 5 U.S.C. § 706) directs a reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be:
“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title [when evidentiary hearing is required] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to de novo trial by the reviewing court.”
(Emphasis added).
The judicial review provision of the Maryland APA (Md. Code, § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article) covers much the same ground but is worded differently. It authorizes a reviewing court to reverse or modify the agency decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision:
“(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker;
(iii) results from unlawful procedure;
*295(iv) is affected by any other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.”
(Emphasis added).
The Court concludes from the fact that the words “abuse of discretion” do not appear in § 10-222(h), as they do in § 706 of the Federal Act, that rulings constituting an abuse of the agency’s discretion are beyond judicial remediation unless they also are arbitrary or capricious. That suggests that there is some difference between the two concepts — that a ruling may constitute an abuse of discretion yet not be arbitrary or capricious. Such a notion finds no support in the law, however, which regards the terms “abuse of discretion” and “arbitrary or capricious” as meaning the same thing — the one often being defined by reference to the other.
In Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631, 635 n. 7, rehearing denied, 979 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.1992), appeal after remand, 35 F.3d 560 (1994), the court declared outright that the difference between an “abuse of discretion” standard and an “arbitrary and capricious” standard was semantic, not substantive. In reviewing the decision of a plan administrator under ERISA, the court noted that the District Court had referred to an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, rather than the “abuse of discretion” standard that the Fifth Circuit court had used, but concluded that there was “only a semantic, not a substantive difference” between the two labels. Id,., at 635 n. 7. To the same effect are Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 n. 5 (8th Cir.1996); Canseco v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 93 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir.1996); and Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 n. 1 (10th Cir.1996). See also United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 697 (D.C.Cir.1947) (abuse of discretion means action which is arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable); Torrance v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 119 So.2d 617, 619 (La.App.1960) (abuse of discretion results from conclusion reached capriciously or in an arbitrary manner); N.L.R.B. v. Guernsey-*296Muskingum Electric Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 10 (6th Cir. 1960) (in review of agency decision, abuse of discretion equated with arbitrary action not justifiable in view of situation and circumstances); Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 998 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed.Cir.1993) (abuse of discretion occurs when decision is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary); Haworth, Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., 12 F.3d 1090, 1092 (Fed.Cir.1993) (abuse of discretion occurs when decision is simply arbitrary and unjustifiable in view of the circumstances); Heat and Control, Inc. v. Hester Industries, Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Fed.Cir.1986) (abuse of discretion occurs when decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful); State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 696, 441 S.E.2d 295 (1994); Aero-Lite Window Co. v. Jackson, 115 Ohio App. 257, 184 N.E.2d 677, 678 (1962). Some courts have defined “abuse of discretion” as occurring when “no reasonable person could take the view” adopted by the lower tribunal, which, to me, is the same as saying when the decision is arbitrary. See United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir.1995). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), the Supreme Court looked at the components of § 706(2)(A) together, as if they articulated one standard.
I cannot conceive of a ruling or action that legitimately could be found to result from an abuse of the agency’s allowable discretion and yet not be arbitrary or capricious. If there is such a range, what is it and how would one define it? Even, if one could conjure up a setting in which a ruling or action could be regarded as constituting an abuse of discretion but yet not be arbitrary or capricious, it surely would result from an unlawful procedure, be affected by “any other error of law,” or be unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and be reversible on one of those grounds. The Court, I fear, has, quite unnecessarily, injected an area of uncertainty in this already difficult area of law.