Court Opinion

ID: 9696677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:54:47.094126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:25.209331
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) enunciated the test for resolving a defendant’s claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, indicating in the process that the critical inquiry “must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 685-86, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93. The test the Court announced assesses *261the likelihood that the assistance rendered pursuant to counsel’s obligation “to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case,” 'id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695, was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. It stated the test:
“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.1 The Court also was clear: “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id.
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668 (1984) is an exception to Strickland v. Washington; it presumes unconstitutionality, under the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, when defense counsel “entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668. The purpose of this, and the other exceptions outlined in Cronic, is to avoid lengthy, costly, and unnecessary litigation when the adversarial process clearly has been compromised. Id. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d at 667. In the situations identified in Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59, 104 S.Ct. at 2046-47, 80 L.Ed.2d at 667-68, the circumstances “are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified,” id. (See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696, stating that “[prejudice ... is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not *262worth the cost.”), and they “involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668.).
Because Cronic is an exception to Strickland and contemplates a meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case, as with Strickland, see 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697-98, deference to trial strategy must be paid when determining its applicability. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d at 667. A trial strategy, to be entitled to deference, as contemplated by Cronic, I would have thought, would have the intent, if not the effect, and a reasonable possibility, see Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 427, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990), of furthering the defendant’s interests. Thus, the strategy should be a potentially effective approach, that is not only available, but which also has a reasonable, legally valid basis.
Counsel for Le’Bon Walker, the petitioner, after making the pre-trial argument that it was unconstitutional to try the petitioner in absentia, and, when that argument was unsuccessful, attempting to excuse himself from the trial and later proffering to the court a jury nullification argument, which was also rejected, remained silent throughout the trial, failing to make an opening statement to the jury, to call witnesses, to cross examine the state’s witnesses, to make objections, to make any motions or to make any substantive closing argument to the jury. This strategy, characterized by these omissions, the majority effectively says, see Walker v. State, 391 Md. 233, 256, 892 A.2d 547, 557-58 (2006), constituted a reasonable trial strategy, a meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case within the meaning of Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668, and, thus, entitled to deference.
I do not agree. First, I question whether counsel’s actions reasonably can be considered a trial strategy; certainly, it *263cannot be logically characterized as reasonable. Apparently, the sole basis for counsel’s failure, refusal is perhaps more accurate, to participate in the trial was his intention to make a jury nullification argument. Such an argument is improper, see Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 178, 423 A.2d 558, 564 (1980); Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236 (1858), and, thus, impermissible. Counsel should have known, therefore, that he would not be allowed to argue that the jury could nullify the discretionary ruling entrusted to, and made by, the trial court; he should have known that, because such an argument is improper, it would be determined by the trial court to be unreasonable and would be prohibited. It should have been clear to any reasonable attorney that a jury nullification argument would be a fruitless gesture, a failure. It is just as clear, or should be, that if a “trial strategy” simply has no chance of furthering counsel’s client’s interests, it cannot rightly, or in any sense, be considered “reasonable” and is simply not entitled to even the slightest deference. Here counsel’s “strategy” was no strategy at all.2
Unless counsel’s refusal to participate at trial was trial strategy, it is absolutely clear, beyond any doubt, that counsel failed to subject the prosecution’s case to any meaningful adversarial testing and, thus, failed to provide effective assistance under Crome. Indeed, on this record it is quite clear that he neither tried to do so, nor intended to.
Certainly the fact that the petitioner’s counsel made one, initial argument to the court, outside the jury’s presence, that the in absentia issue, decided only a short time earlier, rendered him incapable of fully representing his client did not meaningfully test the prosecution’s case. In doing so, he was, in essence, arguing a point which had already been decided by *264the court and, thus, was not an issue in the prosecution’s case against the petitioner which it was required to prove. Nor was the jury nullification argument a testing of the State’s case and it was not intended to be. It merely would have invited the jury to disregard the State’s evidence and the trial court’s discretionary ruling, on policy grounds, not reject the State’s case on the merits.
The majority, relying on Warner v. Ford, 752 F.2d 622 (11th Cir.1985), and U.S. v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245 (2nd Cir.1986), holds that the petitioner’s counsel, by not participating in the petitioner’s in absentia trial, acted strategically. Walker v. State, 391 Md. 233, 257-60, 892 A.2d 547, 561-63 (2006). It determined that, because the court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance,” id. at 258, 892 A.2d at 562, a petitioner must overcome the presumption that his counsel’s actions constituted trial strategy. Accordingly, it opines, a case-by-case analysis under Strickland is the proper procedure. Id. at 258-60, 892 A.2d at 562-63. Neither Warner nor Sanchez proves the majority’s point regarding the case sub judice.
In Warner, defense counsel did not participate in voir dire, made no pretrial motions, made no opening statement, did not cross examine the State’s witnesses, did not call any defense witnesses, did not object to any of the State’s evidence, offered no defense evidence, and made no closing argument. 752 F.2d at 624. He did move for a directed verdict, and moved for a mistrial three times, however. Id. at 625. At post-conviction proceedings, defense counsel testified that “his silence reflected a trial strategy in the face of overwhelming evidence against his client.” Id. The trial court, relying on that testimony, found a sufficient basis on which to conclude that counsel’s silence was a reasonable trial strategy. Id. It distinguished the case from Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir.1984), infra, in that Warner had admitted his guilt, so his case was not subject to much question, the evidence against him was overwhelming, and counsel had testified that he was *265prepared. Id. The court found, accordingly, no ineffectiveness of counsel.3
In Sanchez, the defendant also was tried in absentia. He had met his attorney once, 790 F.2d at 248, and then was released on bail, from which he did not return. Id. Therefore, Sanchez’s counsel stood silent during the entire trial, except that he made two objections to the court, one regarding its decision to try his client in absentiat id,., and the second, when he joined Sanchez’s co-defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Sanchez had not been denied effective assistance of counsel, stating that
“where, as here, the defendant by his own obstructive conduct precludes his counsel from pursuing an intelligent active defense, the concerns of Cronic . .. are not involved .... ”
Id. at 254.
The decisive and critical concern expressed by the court in Sanchez, that Sanchez could have forever blocked his being brought to justice and prevented his own trial from ever being held, by refusing to cooperate and evading arrest, id., is not present in this case, at least to anywhere near the extent that it was in Sanchez. While that is a concern that can be, and often is, expressed in every case in which the issue of trial in absentia is a possibility, it was especially acute in Sanchez, being the prime rationale for the decision. No such magnitude of concern is warranted in this case. While Sanchez did *266not cooperate with his counsel, the petitioner had done so until the time of his flight. Sanchez had a history of obstructive conduct; Walker did and does not. The concerns underlying the Sanchez decision are simply not present in the case sub judice.
“The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing ... if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-7, 104 S.Ct. at 2045-46, 80 L.Ed.2d at 666. The purpose of Cronic is to maintain the integrity of the adversarial system, which depends on a balance of power between prosecution and defense. Id. at 655, 104 S.Ct. at 2044-45, 80 L.Ed.2d at 665. This, in fact, is the reason for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 (1963). As we have seen, the Supreme Court has characterized the ineffective assistance proscribed by Cronic as “a complete failure” to test the State’s case, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 562, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1851, 152 L.Ed.2d 914, 928 (2002)—if counsel is denied during a critical stage of the trial, or if no attorney could have provided defendant with effective assistance given the surrounding circumstances. Thus, the proper focus is on whether there was a failure actually to test the prosecution’s case meaningfully. Id. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668.
To be sure, the Cronic holding is narrow, as the Supreme Court made clear in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851, 152 L.Ed.2d at 928, observing: “When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case, we indicated that an attorney’s failure must be complete. We said ‘if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful testing.’ Cronic, supra, at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668 (emphasis added).” In that case, defense counsel had cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses, had *267not called any defense witnesses, and waived closing argument. Id. That the Cronic holding is narrow does not, however, indicate that the test it announced is meaningless.
Requiring a complete failure to test the State’s case does not mean that, for a defendant to succeed, defense counsel must be shown to have done absolutely nothing to test the State’s case. Just because counsel may have opened his mouth at some point during the trial to make a comment or offer some other non-substantive or innocuous expression does not mean he or she has meaningfully tested the prosecution’s case. In several “sleeping lawyer” cases, attorneys who napped during at least one critical stage of the trial have been found to have failed to provide effective assistance even when, during their conscious moments, they expertly cross-examined state witnesses, objected, and introduced evidence. See Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 686 (2d Cir.1996) (when an attorney was “repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time during which the defendant’s interests were at stake” a structural flaw occurred, resulting in prejudice, even though attorney put on defense and called witnesses during times of consciousness); Javor v. United, States, 724 F.2d 831, 833-35 (9th Cir.1984) (unconscious or sleeping counsel is inherently prejudicial, as partial absence is prejudicial as a matter of law, despite attorney having presented vigorous, adequate arguments during times of consciousness); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir.2001) (prejudice presumed when attorney has slept or remained unconscious through critical stages of the trial regardless of counsel’s adequacy when awake). Thus, an attorney can meaningfully fail to test the prosecution’s case even though he may have said something during trial, and not remained completely silent.
Although not an in absentia, case, Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir.1984), is instructive. There, the defendant was tried, on several counts, for the sexual abuse of his stepchildren. Id. at 1247. Prior to trial, Martin’s counsel [hereinafter “counsel”] filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial. Id. When these motions were not heard before trial started, counsel deter*268mined that he would “rely on [his] Motions,” id., which reliance would be reflected by his declining to participate at trial; he would not “put on any proof’ or cross examine witnesses. Id. Although he refrained from participating in jury selection, he did make an opening statement to the jury. In that statement, Counsel explained that he would not participate in the trial and gave reasons for that decision. Id. Consistently thereafter, counsel did not cross-examine witnesses, did not call any witnesses, did not object, and did not make a closing argument. Martin was convicted.
On habeas corpus review, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Having determined that counsel’s conduct was a “deliberate trial tactic,” id. at 1249, and fully cognizant of the requirement that it afford much deference to such decisions, that court concluded that counsel’s decision to rely on that tactic was unreasonable, counsel’s failure to participate being due to his misunderstanding of state law. Id. That and the fact, specifically noted by the court, that Martin had a good defense meant, said the court, that counsel had not rendered “professionally competent assistance.” Id. It concluded that Martin demonstrated both prejudice under Strickland, and that there was no meaningful testing of the prosecution’s case under Cronic, i.e., that “the attorney’s lack of participation deprived Martin of effective assistance of counsel at trial as thoroughly as if he had been absent.” Id. at 1250.
Martin’s counsel had done something at trial, he was not, as here, completely non-participatory—-he had filed pretrial motions, argued that they should be heard, and then, once he had decided on his trial strategy, shared it with the jury, explaining that he intended to remain silent and why.4 Nevertheless, on the basis of what he did not do, challenge the State’s case in a meaningful way, the court found that his actions amounted to a complete lack of meaningful adversarial testing under Cronic.
*269Comparing the performance of Martin’s counsel to that of the petitioner’s, it is apparent that, there is little to choose with respect to the level and nature of the legal assistance rendered. Perhaps counsel for Martin provided a degree of assistance better than that rendered by petitioner’s counsel— unlike the petitioner’s counsel, who addressed only the court with regard to his strategy, Martin’s counsel addressed the jury, the very body charged with observing and determining the outcome of the adversarial proceedings. In no way, in any event, can the representation by petitioner’s counsel be considered to be qualitatively different, and certainly it was not better, than that rendered by Martin’s counsel and, so, is entitled to no greater deference.
The majority distinguishes Walker from Martin because Martin had a good, likely truthful defense and because the evidence against him was not overwhelming, as it was against Walker. Walker v. State, 391 Md. 233, 256-57, 892 A.2d 547, 560-61 (2005). Such an analysis places the cart before the horseit argues, in essence, that Walker was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because he was guilty anyway. Furthermore, the Martin court’s discussion of Martin’s strong defense and likely innocence has nothing to do with its Cronic analysis. The court performed both a Strickland, Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d at 1249-50, and a Cronic, id., analysis, finding that Martin had not received effective assistance under either standard. Martin, 744 F.2d at 1251. That Martin had a strong defense in the face of limited evidence, therefore, went to whether, under Strickland, he had been prejudiced. Id. at 1249. In so concluding, the court described several actions which counsel could have undertaken, and which would have been consistent with his role as counsel; his failure to do any of them amounted to prejudice under Strickland. Id. at 1250. Specifically the court stated:
“While arguing his motion to dismiss or continue, Martin’s attorney told the court that Martin had stated that he denied the charges against him. The attorney knew that Martin was willing to testify and had no criminal record. The only direct evidence against Martin was the testimony *270of his stepdaughters; if Martin had been called to testify the jury would have heard his denial and his theory that the girls were encouraged to falsify the incident, and would have been able to judge the credibility of the defendants and of his stepdaughters in reaching a verdict.”
Martin, 744 F.2d at 1250.
In addressing Cronic, the Martin court focused on whether counsel’s failure to participate in the trial made the adversarial process unreliable. It concluded that counsel’s refusal to participate meant that Martin was unable to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, and thus the Cronic test failed as well. Id. at 1250-51. It explained:
“Because his attorney refused to participate in any aspect of the trial, Martin was unable to subject the government’s case against him to ‘the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing’ the essence of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The attorney’s total lack of participation deprived Martin of effective assistance of counsel at trial as thoroughly as if he had been absent. This was constitutional error even without any showing of prejudice.”
Id. at 1250-51 (citations omitted).
Whether, therefore, the state’s case against Walker was strong or weak is immaterial to a Cronic analysis; regardless of what type of case the state has, it still must be subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. Cronic presumes ineffective assistance whenever it is clear that the adversarial system has so broken down that it is impossible for prejudice to be avoided, Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656, 104 S.Ct. at 2045, 80 L.Ed.2d at 665; that occurs when the tools essential to the adversarial system are not utilized, with the result that there is, in reality, no adversity of position.
That Martin perhaps had a stronger defense than Walker does not mean the test applicable to each case is different, that one is entitled to greater assistance—adversarial testing, if you will—than the other. After-the-fact evaluation of the strength of the State’s case should not be a factor in the application of the test, with one result, a finding of effective *271assistance, obtaining when the evidence of guilt is strong, and another, a finding of ineffective assistance, when it is weak or not so strong. Cronic does not require that the adversarial testing be successful, or likely so, just that it be meaningful. It follows, therefore, that however strong the evidence of the petitioner’s apparent guilt, it certainly was possible for his attorney meaningfully to test the prosecution’s case.
Martin is not alone. See also United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.1991) (attorney’s concession of a lack of reasonable doubt to the jury was failure to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and, thus, a failure to provide effective assistance under Cronic). See also Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 686 (2d Cir.1996) (when an attorney was “repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time during which the defendant’s interests were at stake” a structural flaw occurred, resulting in prejudice, even though attorney put on defense and called witnesses during times of consciousness); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833-35 (9th Cir.1984) (unconscious or sleeping counsel is inherently prejudicial, as partial absence is prejudicial as a matter of law, despite attorney having presented vigorous, adequate arguments during times of consciousness); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir.2001) (prejudice presumed when attorney has slept or remained unconscious through critical stages of the trial regardless of counsel’s adequacy when awake).
The majority makes several other arguments in support of its conclusion that the petitioner’s counsel rendered effective assistance: the State’s case was meaningfully tested by the petitioner’s co-defendant, Walker v. State, 391 Md. at 256, 892 A.2d at 560; the petitioner’s counsel had a sufficient period of time to prepare for trial and was prepared, id. at 253, 892 A.2d at 559; the evidence against the petitioner was overwhelming and, so, there was little that the petitioner’s counsel could have done. id. at 256, 892 A.2d at 560; a decision in the petitioner’s favor invites abuse, in that defendants will be able to disrupt trials and avoid being brought to justice, id. at 258-*27259, 892 A.2d at 562. None of these arguments is persuasive, if even relevant.
First, that the attorney for the petitioner’s eo-defendant subjected the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing with respect to that attorney’s client is an insufficient basis on which to argue that the case against the petitioner was meaningfully tested. The sixth amendment right is a personal right, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1343, 149 L.Ed.2d 321, 331(2001); thus, the petitioner had a right to his own effective counsel, in the State’s case against him. It is immaterial that a co-defendant’s counsel was effective in the State’s case against that co-defendant. The majority does not cite any case in which the Supreme Court, or any court, for that matter, has held that the meaningful adversarial testing requirement can be satisfied, or is satisfied, as to all defendants, by the efficient and effective representation of a co-defendant by that co-defendant’s counsel. I certainly know of none and have been unable to find any.
Second, the amount of preparation time defense counsel has or the extent of defense counsel’s actual preparation is not necessarily predictive of his or her actual performance in an in absentia situation. Indeed, it may not be material to that situation at all. However much preparation time the petitioner’s counsel had to prepare this case for trial and however well prepared he actually was certainly did not inure to the petitioner’s benefit in this case. The record reflects a complete failure of representation of the petitioner whatever counsel’s level of preparedness and however long it took to achieve that level.
Third, and as discussed above, Cronic presumes prejudice in certain situations. Thus, whether the petitioner was guilty, or how voluminous the proof of that guilt, is not the proper question. The only relevant question is whether, by doing nothing, or as close to nothing as one could get, counsel discharged his responsibility to render effective assistance of counsel. By doing nothing, counsel did not further his client’s interest in having the gears of the adversary system engaged, *273to the end of testing the strength of the State’s case. The majority, noting the overwhelming evidence against the petitioner, suggests that it cannot conceive of a way in which defense counsel could have any more meaningfully tested the state’s case. Walker v. State, 391 Md. at 256, 892 A.2d at 560. It takes little imagination to realize the obvious-he could and should have, at the least, tested the State’s witnesses’ ability to recall, observe and relate accurately that to which they offered testimony.
Finally, the majority’s concern that defendants will abuse the system, and successfully so, were the Court to find a Cronic exception in cases where defendants have deliberately rendered themselves unavailable for trial is, to my mind, terribly overblown and unrealistic. As I piece it together, the fear is that defendants, on a broad scale, will abscond to avoid a trial already scheduled, knowing that, if their attorneys remain silent, they will get a new trial. I have not the slightest doubt that attorneys, officers of this Court, held to high ethical standards of conduct, will not so easily be used or so easily acquiesce in this way.
This case does create a concern with respect to attorney representation in in absentia cases. After this case, no meaningful review of attorney performance will be possible or necessary in this kind of case. This Court has provided a blueprint for attorneys faced with trial in absentia, one that will insulate them from findings of ineffective assistance of counsel: adopt a strategy to “do nothing;” that strategy even can be coupled with one that does not make sense or that is improper. Why, with this high level instruction, would, or should, an attorney do anything beyond remaining silent? After all, the Court has instructed that a non-participatory strategy is enough, and to do more would, or could, subject the attorney to post-conviction proceedings at which he could be determined to have provided ineffective assistance.

. This Court has characterized the test somewhat differently, substituting “reasonable possibility,” Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 427, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990), for the phrase, "reasonable probability,” used by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). We explained: " ‘Substantial possibility,' of course, is the term we used to define the 'may well’ standard we adopted in Yorke [v. State, 315 Md. 578, 556 A.2d 230 (1989)]. We think the standard, as so defined, aptly describes the prejudice standard the Supreme Court adopted in Strickland."

. Holding in reserve, for use during closing arguments to the jury, of a jury nullification argument, in which the jury would be asked to disregard all that had transpired because the court chose to proceed with trial in the defendant's absence is about as reasonable and as likely to succeed as holding in abeyance an argument already rejected by the trial court during pre-trial proceedings, to be sprung on the jury during closing argument.

. It legitimately and logically may be argued that defense counsel in Warner v. Ford, 752 F.2d 622 (11th Cir.1985), as a matter of fact, did subject the prosecution’s case to meaningfttl adversarial testing in that he made substantive motions during trial, before the jury. The office of such motions, by their very nature, is to call the prosecution’s case into direct question. In response to such a motion, we may assume, because judges are presumed to know the law and to follow it, Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 25 U.S. 64, 69-70, 6 L.Ed. 552, 554 (1827); Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 126, 213 A.2d 475, 479 (1965); Albrecht v. State, 132 Md. 150, 156, 103 A. 443, 445 (1918), that the court critically and impartially evaluated the evidence and found it sufficient. Defense counsel in this case made no such motions.

. The majority states that Martin was not advised of his counsel's trial strategy, but Martin was in the courtroom when his counsel clearly explained to the jury the purpose of his silence.