Court Opinion

ID: 9609742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:30:49.519907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:52.120631
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the trial judge was correct in granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In addition to the facts recited in the majority opinion, the evidence before the trial judge showed that neither before, at the time of, nor after her fall did the plaintiff or any of her witnesses see or find anything on the floor where the plaintiff had been walking which would have caused the plaintiff to fall (R. 94, 95, 97, 105); that the plaintiff knew nothing that anyone, including the defendants, did or did not do which made her fall or which contributed to her falling (R. 133); that the plaintiff does not know what caused her to fall (R. 93, 94, 95, 97).
Other evidence showed that the floor had been cleaned prior to the wrestling matches on October 14, 1972; the floor had no defects at that time or since; and no repairs had been made on the floor since October 14,1972 (R. 183). This was the first time that anyone had fallen at the arena during a wrestling attraction (R. 180, 183).
In disposing of an appeal in a case such as the one before us, we are governed by the following fundamental legal principles: (1) the plaintiff must prove" 'that the defect in the floor which caused the plaintiff to slip, if a *445patent defect, was for some reason not connected with any negligence on her part not patent or obvious to such plaintiff.’... [Cit.] (2) 'Before an owner can be held liable for the slippery condition of the floor, produced by the presence of a foreign substance, proof must be shown that he was aware of the substance or would have known of its presence had he exercised reasonable care.’... [Cit.] (3) 'In the absence of [proof] of facts showing actual knowledge on the part of the defendants of the presence of the substance on the floor, or showing facts and circumstances from which it would be inferred that the defendants had knowledge of the presence of the substance on the floor, the defendants would not be charged with negligence in failing to remove a substance placed there by someone else.’. .. [Cit.] (4) Where there are no conditions making the premises unusually dangerous, the law does not require the proprietor to provide a constant patrol . . . [Cit.]” Emory University v. Williams, 127 Ga. App. 881, 883 (195 SE2d 464) and cits. The record in this case is utterly devoid of any evidence which would satisfy the foregoing criteria. The plaintiff has failed to show the existence of any material fact which would authorize a recovery. The plaintiff must show the existence of a defect in the premises and the defendant’s awareness thereof, either actual or constructive. The plaintiff has shown only that she stumbled, fell and was hurt. This is not enough. The defendants are not insurers of the plaintiffs safety, which is what the majority opinion amounts to holding.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Bell and Judges Clark and Marshall join me in this dissent.