Court Opinion

ID: 2964061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:19:52.407702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:33:19.366819
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-2055

                             MARIA DE LOS A. PAGES-CAHUE,
                                MARIA PILAR LOPEZ, AND
                             GILBERTO IZQUIERDO-SANTIAGO,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.

                           IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPA A,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                      [Hon. Justo Arenas, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                          _____________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                _____________________

               Enrique  J.  Mendoza-M ndez,  with   whom  Mendoza  &  Bac ,
               ___________________________                ________________
          Francisco M. Troncoso  and Troncoso  & Becker  were on  brief for
          _____________________      __________________
          appellants.
               James D. Noel III, with whom Ledesma, Palou & Miranda was on
               _________________            ________________________
          brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    April 25, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.  Plaintiffs-Appellants Mar a de
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          los A.  Pages-Cahue ("Pages"),  Mar a Pilar L pez  ("L pez"), and

          Gilberto    Izquierdo-Santiago    ("Izquierdo")    (collectively,

          "Appellants")  appeal  the  district  court's  grant  of  summary

          judgment to Appellee Iberia L neas A reas de Espa a ("Iberia") on

          claims  of age  discrimination  under the  Age Discrimination  in

          Employment Act of 1967, as amended ("the ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621 et
                                                                         __

          seq.   Pages also seeks appeal  of the district court's  grant of
          ___

          summary judgment to Iberia on her claim under Puerto Rico Law No.

          80,  29  L.P.R.A.   185a  et seq.1    L pez appeals  the district
                                    ______

          court's grant of summary  judgment to Iberia on her claim  for an
                              
          ____________________

          1  Appellants'  brief only  attempts to raise  an argument  under
          Puerto Rico Law No. 80 with respect  to Pages.  The brief makes a
          reference to Law No. 80,  suggesting implications for L pez' ADEA
          claim,  but does  not actually  include an  argument for  a claim
          under Puerto Rico  Law No.  80.  Therefore,  L pez and  Izquierdo
          have waived  any issues regarding  the district court's  grant of
          summary  judgment on  their Law  No. 80  claims.  See  Frazier v.
                                                            ___  _______
          Bailey, 957 F.2d  920, 932 n.4 (1st Cir. 1992)  (noting that "[a]
          ______
          state law claim  which is not addressed  in a brief is  waived").
          Pages' Law No. 80 claim, however, has not been waived.

             Similarly, appellants have not included any argument regarding
          Puerto Rico Law No.  100 beyond a passing reference  under Pages'
          Puerto Rico Law No. 80 claim.  As a result,  appellants have also
          waived any issues regarding the district court's grant of summary
          judgment on their Law No. 100 claims.  Id.
                                                 ___

             While appellants'  counsel asserted  at oral argument  that we
          should  not  find  these   arguments  waived  because  the  facts
          necessary to them were  argued in the context of  their appellate
          brief's  ADEA argument, we must disagree.   In the absence of any
          discussion beyond citations to these Puerto Rico statutes, and in
          the  absence of  any submitted argument,  we conclude  that these
          arguments are waived.   See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,
                                  ___ _____________    _______
          17 (1st Cir. 1990)  ("Judges are not expected to  be mindreaders.
          Consequently,  a  litigant has  an obligation  'to spell  out its
          arguments  squarely and  distinctly,'  or else  forever hold  its
          peace.")  (quoting Rivera-G mez v.  de Castro, 843  F.2d 631, 635
                             ____________     _________
          (1st Cir. 1988)).

                                         -2-

          unpaid balance of sick leave and overtime compensation due  under

          Puerto Rico  Law No. 379 of May 15, 1948, as amended, 29 L.P.R.A.

          271 et  seq., ("Law 379"  or "Puerto  Rico Overtime  Compensation
              _______

          Act"),  and Puerto Rico Law No. 96  of June 26, 1959, as amended,

          29 Laws of P.R. Anno. 246 et seq. ("Law 96").  We affirm.
                                    ______

                                    I.  BACKGROUND
                                    I.  BACKGROUND

                    The  following  facts are  not  in dispute.    In 1992,

          Iberia's  net loss for  its San Juan  operations was $14,305,504.

          For the seven prior years, plus the year 1992, Iberia's  net loss

          in San Juan was $136,795,292.  Beginning in the year 1991, Iberia

          implemented   a  worldwide  reorganization   of  its  operations,

          including  substantial cutbacks in Puerto Rico.   During the time

          period  from May  1991  to  November  1992,  14  of  Iberia's  32

          employees in Puerto  Rico were  laid off or  otherwise ceased  to

          work  for Iberia.  On September 30, 1992, the three appellants in

          this case were discharged.

                    This  appeal  also  contains  several  disputed  facts.

          Because we must determine  whether the disputes of fact  are both

          genuine and  material, we  discuss  these disputed  facts in  the

          course of our discussion of the law.

                               II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                               II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    We examine a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
                                                           _______

          the  evidence, and  all reasonable  inferences therefrom,  in the

          light  most favorable  to the  party resisting  summary judgment.

          Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir. 1995);
          _______    _________________

          see LeBlanc  v. Great Am.  Ins. Co.,  6 F.3d 836,  841 (1st  Cir.
          ___ _______     ___________________

                                         -3-

          1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1398 (1994).  Summary judgment is
                 ____________

          properly  granted where  the pleadings,  depositions, answers  to

          interrogatories,   and   admissions   on  file,   together   with

          affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

          material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

          as  a matter of law.  Fed. R.  Civ. P. 56(c); see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d
                                                        ___ _______

          at 841; Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1116.
                  _______

                                   III.  DISCUSSION
                                   III.  DISCUSSION

                                A.  The ADEA Claims  
                                A.  The ADEA Claims  

                               1.  The Legal Framework
                               1.  The Legal Framework

                    In  ADEA discrimination  lawsuits, plaintiffs  bear the

          ultimate burden of proving that their ages were the determinative

          factor in their discharge,  "that is, that [they] would  not have

          been  fired but for  [their] age."   LeBlanc, 6 F.3d  at 841; see
                                               _______                  ___

          Mesnick  v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991),
          _______     _________________

          cert. denied,  504 U.S.  985 (1992).   "At  least where  there is
          ____________

          little  overt evidence  of age  discrimination, the  case usually

          follows  the ritualized  burden-shifting  paradigm" presented  in

          McDonnell  Douglas  v.  Green,   411  U.S.  792,  802-05  (1973).
          __________________      _____

          LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841.   See, e.g., Goldman v. First  Nat'l Bank
          _______                   ___  ____  _______    _________________

          of  Boston,  985 F.2d  1113, 1117  (1st  Cir. 1993);  Lawrence v.
          __________                                            ________

          Northrop Corp., 980  F.2d 66,  68 (1st Cir.  1992); Mesnick,  950
          ______________                                      _______

          F.2d at 823-24.

                    Under the McDonnell Douglas test,  plaintiffs must open
                              _________________

          with  a  prima facie  showing  of  certain standardized  elements

          suggestive of possible  discrimination.  LeBlanc, 6 F.3d  at 842.
                                                   _______

                                         -4-

          It  is undisputed that the  employment actions that  gave rise to

          the instant case took  place as part of  a reduction in  Iberia's

          work force.  As a result,  each of the Appellants was required to

          make a prima  facie showing (1)  that he or  she fell within  the

          ADEA's protected age  group -- that is, more than  forty years of

          age;  (2) that  he or  she  met  Iberia's legitimate  performance

          expectations; (3)  that he or she  experienced adverse employment

          action;  and (4)  that  Iberia did  not  treat age  neutrally  or

          retained younger persons in  the same position.  See  Woodman, 51
                                                           ___  _______

          F.3d at 1091; Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 479 (1st
                        ____    _____________________

          Cir. 1993).

                    Establishment  of  the   prescribed  prima  facie  case

          creates a presumption that  the employer engaged in impermissible

          age discrimination.  LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842; Goldman, 985 F.2d at
                               _______                 _______

          1117.  However, to rebut this presumption, the employer need only

          "articulate  a  legitimate   nondiscriminatory  reason  for   the

          employee's  termination."  LeBlanc,  6 F.3d at  842; Goldman, 958
                                     _______                   _______

          F.2d at  1117.   Once the  employer meets this  burden in  an age

          discrimination  case, however, "the McDonnell Douglas presumption
                                              _________________

          'drops out of the picture.'"  LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843 (quoting St.
                                        _______                         ___

          Mary's Honor Ctr.  v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113  S. Ct. 2742, 2749
          _________________     _____

          (1993)).  The trier of fact then  must simply determine, based on

          the evidence,  whether the  employer's decision to  terminate the

          plaintiff  was  motivated   by  intentional  age  discrimination.

          LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843.
          _______

                                         -5-

                    In the  context of a summary  judgment proceeding, once

          the  employer articulates  a legitimate,  nondiscriminatory basis

          for  its  adverse  employment  decision, the  plaintiff,  "before

          becoming entitled to  bring the  case before the  trier of  fact,

          must show  evidence sufficient  for the factfinder  reasonably to

          conclude that the employer's decision to discharge him or her was

          wrongfully based on age."   LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843;  see Goldman,
                                      _______                  ___ _______

          985  F.2d at  1117;  Lawrence,  980 F.2d  at  69-70.   Direct  or
                               ________

          indirect evidence of discriminatory  intent may suffice, but "the

          evidence  as a  whole . . . must be  sufficient for  a reasonable

          factfinder to infer that the employer's decision was motivated by

          age animus."  Connell v. Bank  of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.3
                        _______    _______________

          (1st Cir. 1991); see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 836; Goldman, 985 F.2d at
                           ___ _______                 _______

          1117.  Thus, a district  court's grant of summary judgment to  an

          employer  will  be upheld  if the  record  is devoid  of adequate

          direct   or   circumstantial    evidence   of   the    employer's

          discriminatory intent.  

                               2.  L pez and Izquierdo
                               2.  L pez and Izquierdo

                    We  treat L pez'  and  Izquierdo's  respective  appeals

          together because the same case law governs both.

                    The district court found that L pez failed to present a

          prima facie case.   It found that  while she satisfied the  first

          three required elements of the prima facie case -- she belongs to

          the protected  class, her job  performance was adequate,  and she

          was discharged -- she failed to satisfy the fourth element.  That

          is, she  failed to  show either  that  Iberia did  not treat  age

                                         -6-

          neutrally  or  that younger  persons  were retained  in  the same

          position.   Here we  assume, without  concluding, that  L pez has

          demonstrated  a prima facie case,  since doing so  does not alter

          the outcome of  our analysis.   In contrast,  the district  court

          concluded  that Izquierdo  demonstrated a  prima facie  case, but

          that he  failed to present  sufficient evidence for  a reasonable

          trier  of fact to infer  that Iberia's decision  to terminate him

          was motivated by age animus.

                    On appeal,  L pez argues that the  district court erred

          because, in fact, she  did produce evidence both that  Iberia did

          not treat age neutrally and that younger persons were retained to

          do  her functions.  With respect to age neutrality, L pez asserts

          that Iberia  never considered  her seniority  in its decision  to

          terminate her, as she argues  is required by Puerto Rico Law  No.

          80.2   However, she cites no authority for the proposition, which

          we reject,  that Puerto Rico Law  modifies the ADEA to  take into

          account discrimination against  more senior  employees, not  just
                              
          ____________________

          2  Law No. 80 provides, in relevant part, that

                      it shall  be the duty of  the employer to
                      retain   those   employees   of   greater
                      seniority  on  the  job with  preference,
                      provided  there  are positions  vacant or
                      filled by employees of less  seniority in
                      the   job   within   their   occupational
                      classification which may be held by them,
                      it being understood that preference shall
                      be given to  the employees discharged  in
                      the event that within the  six (6) months
                      following their layoff the employer needs
                      to employ  a  person in  like or  similar
                      work . . . .

          29 L.P.R.A.   185(c) (entitled "Order of retaining employees").

                                         -7-

          older employees.  She  also points to  the fact that, during  the

          reduction in  force, she was not  offered employment alternatives

          made  available to Galo Beltr n ("Beltr n")  (age 35) and Ernesto

          Rodr guez  ("Rodr guez")  (age  48).    Furthermore,  L pez  also

          maintains  that  her  functions  were  taken  over by  a  younger

          employee,  Alga  Rivera ("Rivera")  (age  33),  hired soon  after

          L pez' termination.

                    Similarly, Izquierdo  (age 45) contends on  appeal that

          the  fact that he was  not considered for  retention or immediate

          re-hiring  as  a Sales  Agent,  as Beltr n  and  Rodr guez3 were,

          shows that Iberia  did not treat age  neutrally in the course  of

          its  reduction in  force.   Izquierdo also  alludes to  a younger

          individual  in  a  different   department  than  Sales,  who  was

          allegedly  offered the opportunity  to continue  work at  a lower

          salary.   However, since Izquierdo failed to proffer any evidence

          that  this other department experienced a reduction in force at a

          similar time  period, or  that Izquierdo was  qualified for  this

          position, it would plainly be unreasonable to infer a lack of age

          neutrality from this  evidence.   As a result,  we consider  only

          Izquierdo's arguments  regarding Beltr n and Rodr guez.   We note

          that Izquierdo  does not point to  evidence contravening Iberia's

          position that Beltr n and Rodr guez were simply re-hired at lower
                              
          ____________________

          3   Izquierdo argues that although Rodr guez  is older, Izquierdo
          was  more  senior at  the time  of  his dismissal.    However, an
          inference of age  animus would be plainly  unreasonable where the
          retained  person  was  older.    And   Izquierdo  has  not  cited
                                 _____
          authority,  and we have not  found any, for  the proposition that
          more  senior,  but  younger,  employees fall  within  the  ADEA's
          protected class.

                                         -8-

          pay  to do the same job they  had done previously.  Neither L pez

          or Izquierdo  has argued  or adduced  evidence that  Sales Agents

          Beltr n and Rodr guez were not, as the district  court concluded,

          occupying  positions  below  that  of  Coordinators   L pez4  and

          Izquierdo.

                    In  Holt v. Gamewell Corp.,  797 F.2d 36,  38 (1st Cir.
                        ____    ______________

          1986),  we  confronted arguments  similar to  those of  L pez and

          Izquierdo.  In that  case, the appellant manager argued  that, in

          lieu of dismissing  him, his employer should  have discharged one

          of the employees he  supervised and given that job  to appellant.

          Thus,  we   rejected  that  argument  as   unsupported  by  legal

          authority,  as in  the instant  case, and  as requiring  that the

          court encroach too far  into areas which should  be left to  "the

          company's legitimate management."  Id. at 38.
                                             ___

                    The  Second Circuit's  opinion in  Parcinski v.  Outlet
                                                       _________     ______

          Co., 673 F.2d 34, 37 (2d  Cir. 1982), provides a strong statement
          ___

          of the concerns to  which Holt alludes.  Considering  an argument
                                    ____

                              
          ____________________

          4   L pez has also  argued that, while  she was appointed  to the
          position  of "Coordinator B" of  the Sales Department  on May 25,
          1990, her title was fictitious, as she was actually an "Executive
          Secretary."   This  contention  has several  problems.   Although
          argued to the court, it was never supported by a sworn statement.
          Additionally, L pez herself contradicted this proposition; in her
          deposition, she  stated that "regardless  of what they  wanted to
          call me, my work was [as a] Sales Coordinator."  Finally,  L pez'
          appointment to "Coordinator  B" took place  three years prior  to
          her discharge.   It seems  unlikely that Iberia  promoted her  to
          this fictitious position  three years in advance  with the intent
          of  later using that  title to  discriminate against  her.   As a
          result, we conclude that the district court correctly  found that
          this  contention  could  not  reasonably  be  inferred  from  the
          evidence presented.

                                         -9-

          resembling that of the instant case and of the appellant in Holt,
                                                                      ____

          the court stated that:

                      Assuming there were lower echelon, poorer
                      paying    jobs   in    the   restructured
                      enterprise   which   [appellants]    were
                      qualified to fill,  [the employer]  would
                      be  met  with  serious   morale  problems
                      arising out of the substantial reductions
                      in  responsibilities  and  salaries  that
                      would accompany such moves.

          Id.; see Ridenour v. Lawson Co.,  791 F.2d 52, 57 (6th Cir. 1986)
          ___  ___ ________    __________

          (stating  that "[w]here  an  employer reduces  his workforce  for

          economic  reasons, it incurs no  duty to transfer  an employee to

          another position within the  company"); Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem.,
                                                  ______    ______________

          636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1980).

                    In  accord with  the reasoning  behind these  cases, we

          conclude  that we  must reject  L pez' and  Izquierdo's arguments

          comparing their  dismissals to Iberia's treatment  of Beltr n and

          Rodr guez,  and L pez'  argument with  respect to  Rivera.   Even

          assuming, without holding, that  L pez and Izquierdo stated prima

          facie  cases, we reject their  arguments that anti-age animus can

          be reasonably inferred from  the fact that they were  not offered

          alternative  employment opportunities,  as Beltr n  and Rodr guez

          were.     Accordingly,  we  also  reject   L pez'  argument  that

          discriminatory animus can be  reasonably inferred from the hiring

          of  Rivera  for a  position inferior  to  L pez' previous  job as

          "Coordinator B."   Because we conclude that  the evidence adduced

          by  L pez and Izquierdo, taken as true, cannot suffice to support

          a reasonable inference of anti-age animus, we uphold the district

          court's grant of summary judgment on their ADEA claims.

                                         -10-

                                      3.  Pages
                                      3.  Pages

                    The  district court  found  that  Pages demonstrated  a

          prima facie case, but failed to present sufficient  evidence from

          which  a  reasonable  factfinder  could  infer  anti-age  animus.

          Because  it  does  not  change our  analysis,  we  assume without

          concluding that the district court properly found that Pages (age

          51) carried  her burden of presenting  a prima facie case.   As a

          result, we review her case to determine whether the evidence as a

          whole was  sufficient to  support a  reasonable inference  of age

          animus in the decision to dismiss her.  LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 836.
                                                  _______

                    Pages argued  that  Iberia's anti-age  animus could  be

          inferred by comparing her  dismissal with the retention of:   (1)

          Mar a  Garc a ("Garc a")  (age 61),  an Executive  Secretary; (2)

          Sandra Medina ("Medina") (48), an Executive Secretary; (3) Rivera

          (33), a Sales  Assistant; and  (4) Nitza Al s  ("Al s") (30),  an

          employee  of an  independent contractor  who performed  functions

          similar to  Pages'.   Even assuming that  three comparisons  with

          non-discharged  employees could permit  an inference  of anti-age

          animus in a  reduction in force  case as a  matter of law,  these

          three particular  comparisons cannot.   First, Garc a is  in fact

          older than Pages, a fact that  Pages does not dispute.  Second, a

          reasonable inference of  anti-age animus cannot be drawn from the

          comparison of the retention of Medina, an  executive secretary at

          Iberia's administrative offices in  Miramar, Puerto Rico, and the

          discharge of Pages,  "Secretary to the  Airport Manager," at  the

          airport  in Isla Verde, Puerto Rico.  Pages does not dispute that

                                         -11-

          the  position of Airport Manager  had been eliminated.   Thus, to

          retain  her rather than Medina, Iberia would have had to transfer

          Pages  to another position  or location.   And,  as noted  in the

          discussion of  L pez and Izquierdo, Appellants  cite no authority

          for  the proposition that  an employer conducting  a reduction in

          force  must  offer  such transfers  or  relocations  --  in fact,

          authority exists for the proposition that  employers face no such

          obligation.   See Holt, 797 F.2d at 38; Ridenour, 791 F.2d at 57;
                        ___ ____                  ________

          Parcinski, 673 F.2d  at 37.  We must reject  any inference of age
          _________

          animus drawn from  a comparison of Pages with Rivera for the same

          reason   we  rejected  comparisons   between  L pez  and  Rivera:

          employers  conducting a reduction in force  face no obligation to

          offer  "lower echelon,  poorer  paying jobs  in the  restructured

          enterprise" to all older  employees.  Parcinski, 673 F.2d  at 37;
                                                _________

          see Holt, 797 F.2d at 38.
          ___ ____

                    Finally,  the comparison  with  Al s  cannot justify  a

          reasonable  inference of  anti-age  animus because  Al s was  not

          employed  by  Iberia, but  by  another  company, G.M.D.,  with  a

          contract  to perform  services  for  Iberia.   This  circuit  has

          previously stated that

                      [a] discharged employee 'is  not replaced
                      when  another  employee  is  assigned  to
                      perform   the   plaintiff's   duties   in
                      addition  to other  duties,  or when  the
                      work   is   redistributed   among   other
                      existing  employees  already   performing
                      related  work.'    Rather, 'a  person  is
                      replaced  only  when another  employee is
                      hired  or  reassigned   to  perform   the
                      plaintiff's duties.'

                                         -12-

          LeBlanc,  6 F.3d  at 846 (citations  omitted) (quoting  Barnes v.
          _______                                                 ______

          GenCorp,  Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
          ______________                                  ____________

          U.S.  878  (1990)).   Thus, to  reasonably  infer that  Pages was

          replaced  by a younger employee,  we would have  to conclude that

          Pages'  duties, and no others,  were allocated to  Al s, and that

          Al s  should  be  considered an  Iberia  employee.    However, in

          Mitchell v. Worldwide  Underwriters Ins. Co.,  967 F.2d 565,  566
          ________    ________________________________

          (11th Cir. 1992), the court rejected as insufficient to establish

          a  prima facie case, without  more, an employee's  claim that his

          employer  assigned  his   work  to   an  independent   contractor

          corporation that  decided to employ  younger employees to  do the

          work.  What is more, the instant  case has a grave flaw that  was

          not present  in Mitchell: Iberia's contract  with G.M.D. predates
                          ________

          the  reduction in force  that gave rise  to Pages'  claim.  Since

          Pages  has  failed to  present  evidence  suggesting that  Iberia

          could, at its  discretion, retain her  and have G.M.D.  eliminate

          Al s, any inference of age animus drawn from Iberia's "retention"

          of Al s would be simply unreasonable.

                    As  a result,  we conclude  that the  comparisons Pages

          points  to cannot support a reasonable inference of age animus on

          the part of Iberia.

                       B.  Pages' Puerto Rico Law No. 80 Claim
                       B.  Pages' Puerto Rico Law No. 80 Claim

                    Pages  also argues  that  the District  Court erred  in

          granting summary  judgment for Iberia  on her claim  under Puerto

          Rico Law No. 80.  Law No. 80 provides, in relevant part, that 

                      [e]very employee in commerce, industry or
                      any  other   business  .   .  .   who  is

                                         -13-

                      discharged from his  [or her]  employment
                      without good cause,  shall be entitled to
                      __________________
                      receive from his employer, in addition to
                      the salary he may have earned:

                      (a)  The  salary  corresponding   to  one
                      month, as indemnity;
                      (b)  An additional  progressive indemnity
                      equivalent to  one week for  each year of
                      service.

          29  L.P.R.A.   185a (emphasis added).  In response, Iberia argues

          that it had "good  cause" to discharge Pages, pointing to   185b,

          which provides that "[j]ust cause . . . shall be understood to be

          . . .  reorganization   changes  .  .  .   [or]  [r]eductions  in

          employment made  necessary by a  reduction in the  anticipated or

          prevailing  volume of production, sales or profits at the time of

          the  discharge."   29  L.P.R.A.    185b(e)-(f).   Pages  has  not

          presented evidence to rebut  Iberia's evidence that it eliminated

          its Sales Department after  it had incurred substantial operating

          losses in San Juan.

                    However, Pages  points to   185c,  which provides that,

          where  employees  are  discharged  due  to  reorganization  or  a

          reduction  in production, sales or profits, "it shall be the duty

          of the employer to retain those employees of greater seniority on

          the job with preference,  provided there are positions  vacant or

          filled by employees  of less  seniority in the  job within  their

          occupational classification  which may be  held by them .  . . ."

          29  L.P.R.A.   185c.  In the context  of her Law No. 80 argument,

          Pages  suggests  that a  comparison  of  her discharge  with  the

          retention  of Executive  Secretaries Garc a  and Medina  raises a

          genuine issue of material fact as to whether Iberia complied with

                                         -14-

          Law No. 80.  According to Pages, she was more  senior than Garc a

          or Medina.

                    In  fact,  Pages  has  provided no  evidence  to  rebut

          Garc a's testimony, in  her sworn affidavit,  that Garc a has  in

          fact been with Iberia as long or longer than Pages.  We thus turn

          to  the comparison  with Medina,  since the record  evidence does

          suggest that Medina  was less  senior than Pages.   Pages  argues

          that even though  Medina's position was in Miramar,  Puerto Rico,

          and Pages'  was at the airport in  Isla Verde, Iberia should have

          given  Pages the option to transfer to Miramar to replace Medina.

          This argument  neglects two different  provisions in Law  No. 80.

          First,  Law No.  80 states  that seniority  need not  be followed

          where "there is a clear and conclusive difference in favor of the

          efficiency  or capacity  of the  workers compared  . .  . ."   29

          L.P.R.A.    185c.    The relevant  evidence  shows that  Medina's

          position at the Miramar office and Pages' position at the airport

          in Isla  Verde were not  fungible.  Medina had  worked in Miramar

          since  1972, while  Pages had  worked in  Isla Verde  since 1970.

          Without more  evidence, the district court could  have found that

          no genuine  issue of material fact was  raised as to the relative

          efficiency of  keeping Medina in  her own  position, rather  than

          transferring Pages, as  it was Pages'  airport position that  was

          being eliminated.

                    Furthermore, Pages ignores    185c(a), which states  in

          relevant part that

                      [i]n  the case  of discharges  or layoffs
                      . . .  in  companies  that  have  several

                                         -15-

                      offices . . . and whose usual and regular
                      practice  is  not  to transfer  employees
                      from  one office  . .  . to  another, and
                      that said units  operate in a  relatively
                      independent   manner   with   regard   to
                      personnel aspects, the  seniority of  the
                      employees    within    the   occupational
                      classification  subject   to  the  layoff
                      shall   be   computed   by  taking   into
                      consideration only those employees in the
                      office .  . . in which  said layoff shall
                      occur.

          29 L.P.R.A.   185c(a).  Iberia has argued throughout that all but

          one  position at the Airport  has been eliminated  since 1991, in

          accord with its reorganization plan, and that  transfers were not

          possible  due  to the  different nature  of  the tasks  which the

          airport  employees performed  as compared  to the  Miramar office

          employees.   The  only evidence  to which  Pages points  fails to

          generate an issue  of fact,  since neither she,  nor Medina,  nor

          Garc a, has  apparently been  transferred since 1970,  when Pages

          began work at Iberia.

                    As a  result, we affirm  the district court's  grant of

          summary judgment to Iberia on Pages' Law No. 80 claim.

                       C.  L pez' Puerto Rico Law No. 379 Claim
                       C.  L pez' Puerto Rico Law No. 379 Claim

                    L pez  also challenges  the district  court's grant  of

          summary judgment on her  claim under Puerto Rico Law  No. 379 for

          overtime pay she  contends Iberia owed her.  Puerto  Rico Law No.

          379  states,  in  pertinent  part,  that  "forty  hours  of  work

          constitute a  workweek," 29 L.P.R.A.   271,  "extra working hours

          are . . . hours that an employee works for his employer in excess

          of  forty during any week,"    273(b), and  "[e]very employer who

          employs  or permits an employee to work during extra hours, shall

                                         -16-

          be  bound to pay  him for each  extra hour  a wage rate  equal to

          double the rate agreed upon for regular hours,"   274.   

                    The  district   court,  however,  concluded   that  the

          overtime  provisions did not apply  to L pez, since    288 states

          that Law No. 379 does not  apply to exempt "employees" working as

          "executives, administrators, or professionals, as these terms may

          be defined by the Puerto Rico Minimum Wage Board."  29 L.P.R.A.  

          288; see, e.g.,  Lehman v. Ehret Inc., 103 D.P.R.  264, 267 (P.R.
               ___  ____   ______    __________

          1975)  (discussing the  definition  of  "administrator").   L pez

          challenges the  district court's application of  the Minimum Wage

          Board's Regulations.

                    Under the  authority granted it  by   288,  the Minimum

          Wage  Board promulgated  regulations  by  substantially  adopting

          definitions found in the federal  regulation on the same  matter.

          See Santiago  v. Corco,  114 D.P.R.  267,  269 (P.R.  1983).   On
          ___ ________     _____

          appeal,  both  parties  argue   for,  and  we  agree   with,  the

          application of the short test, since it is undisputed that Pages'

          weekly  salary  was  "not  less than  $295,"  as  the  regulation

          requires for the  short test's application.   Regulation No.  13,

          Article  III(f),  Fourth Revision,  Commonwealth  of Puerto  Rico

          Minimum Wage Board (1990).  As a result, she is excluded from the

          coverage of Law No. 379's provisions if:

                      (a) [she] perform[ed] office or nonmanual
                      field work directly related to management
                      policies    or   to    general   business
                      operations  of  the  employer  or  of the
                      customers of the employer; and

                                         -17-

                      (b)   [she]  customarily   and  regularly
                      exercise[d]  discretion  and  independent
                      judgment.

          Id., Article III.
          ___

                    L pez  argues that  a  genuine issue  of material  fact

          existed as to whether she performed office  work directly related

          to  management  policies  or  general  business  operations,  and

          whether she  customarily and  regularly exercised discretion  and

          independent judgment.   She argues specifically that she  did not

          perform  supervisory  functions  and  that she  was  in  fact  an

          "Executive  Secretary"  despite  her  title of  "Coordinator  B."

          However, Article III(a)  and (b) contain no  requirement that one

          perform  supervisory functions.  To be exempted from Law No. 379,

          one need  only perform  "office .  . .  work directly related  to

          management policies or to  general business operations of [one's]

          employer."  Article III(a).   Thus, L pez' first assertion,  even

          if  believed, cannot create a genuine issue that would preclude a

          grant of summary judgment  for Iberia, since it fails  to respond

          to any relevant requirement in Regulation No. 13.

                    As  a result, we turn to L pez' contention that she was

          an Executive  Secretary rather than  a Coordinator, and  that Law

          No.  379 cannot  apply to  her  as an  Executive  Secretary.   In

          addressing  this assertion  in the  ADEA context,  see  supra, we
                                                             ___  _____

          rejected  this contention  as unsupported  by a  sworn statement,

          explicitly and directly contradicted by her sworn deposition, and

          rebutted  by  evidence Iberia  proffered.   However, in  the ADEA

          context  the standard of review was whether L pez showed evidence

                                         -18-

          sufficient for the factfinder reasonably to conclude that she was

          discharged due  to discriminatory  intent.   We noted  in passing

          that because Iberia's alleged mistitling of her position occurred

          three  years' before her discharge,  that fact, together with her

          lack  of  evidence,  rendered  any  age  inference  unreasonable.

          However,  while it would be unreasonable  for a finder of fact to

          think that an employer mistitled an  employee's position to cloak

          its age  discrimination years  later, it would  not be  similarly

          unreasonable to  believe that  employers seeking to  avoid paying

          overtime would mislabel a  position to take advantage of  Law No.

          379's exemptions for managers, professionals and administrators.

                    As  a result, we evaluate L pez'  argument that she was

          in fact  an "executive  secretary,"  assuming without  concluding

          that she  adequately  proffered evidence  to raise  this issue.  

          Neither party has cited Puerto Rico case law interpreting Law No.

          379  with  respect  to supervisory  duties  or  to  the title  of

          "Executive  Secretary."   To  determine whether  L pez' assertion

          could create a triable issue of fact, we may consider the federal

          regulations which implement the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

          See L pez Vega v. Vega Otero, Inc., 103 P.R.R. 243,  246-47 (P.R.
          ___ __________    ________________

          1974) (deciding  that where appellee  was an executive  under the

          provisions of  the  Federal  Fair Labor  Standards  Act  and  its

          regulation,  he could not  maintain a claim  against his employer

          for extra  hours); Rodr guez v.  Concreto Mixto, Inc.,  98 P.R.R.
                             _________     ____________________

          568, 575-76 (P.R. 1970)  (determining whether or not  an employee

          or  worker is a person employed in a bona fide executive capacity

                                         -19-

          by  following the rules set forth in  29 C.F.R.   541.1 et seq.).
                                                                  ______

          These regulations, in describing those exempt as "administrative"

          employees, note that 

                      [i]n modern industrial parlance there has
                      been  a  steady  and  increasing  use  of
                      persons  who assist  an executive  in the
                      performance   of   his   duties   without
                      themselves  having  executive  authority.
                      Typical  titles of persons  in this group
                      [include] .  . . executive secretary. . .
                                       ___________________
                      .  

          29 C.F.R.   541.201 (emphasis added).  As a result, even assuming

          that  she was an  Executive Secretary, that  would not disqualify

          her from being an  exempt employee, assuming that she  did office

          work  related   to  management  policies  and   general  business

          operations,  and that  she  customarily  and regularly  exercised

          discretion and independent judgment.  Iberia's submitted evidence

          and L pez' co-appellant Izquierdo's testimony as to L pez' duties

          both presented ample evidence that L pez exercised discretion and

          independent judgment.  In particular, Izquierdo stated that L pez

          helped him supervise sales personnel; coordinated the work of the

          salesmen; attended social and  civic activities "to represent the

          company"; and  exercised her own  discretion with respect  to her

          work.    Because  L pez  failed  to  present  evidence  to  rebut

          Izquierdo's  testimony,  and  given  Iberia's  evidence that  she

          exercised discretion  and independent judgment,  we conclude that

          no  issue of fact existed regarding this  point.  As a result, we

          conclude that she falls under  Regulation No. 13's exemption from

          Law No.  379,  and  thus  the district  court  correctly  granted

          summary judgment on her overtime pay claim to Iberia.  

                                         -20-

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    As  a result  of  the foregoing,  the  judgment of  the

          district court is affirmed.
                            affirmed
                            ________

                                         -21-