Court Opinion

ID: 9743028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:24:22.606953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.647396
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. I agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the appellate court and would affirm the judgment on the ground that the plain language of section 114 — 4(c)(2) proscribed the granting of the People’s request for continuance. Turning to the question decided by the majority, the record shows that on November 14, 1973, when the motion for severance was allowed, the People and defendant were in agreement, and stated to the court, that the “term” for defendant was “not until January 17 [1974].” At that time the court set defendant’s trial for November 19, 1973, and on November 19 defendant answered ready for trial. The People moved for continuance, and that delay, and all delays thereafter, were caused by the People. To hold, on this record, that a new period of 120 days commenced on November 14 effects a complete perversion of section 103 — 5(c). Fortunately the addition of subparagraph (f) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 103—5(f)), although enacted too late to aid this defendant, will preclude the repetition of the injustice which results from the action of the majority.