Court Opinion

ID: 9580329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:07.325295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:13.217146
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
It is provided in OCGA § 9-11-1 that the Civil Practice Act “shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every matter.”
The fact that the language in OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) and Uniform Superior Court Rule 14 is permissive does not mean that the trial court is unlimited in its responses to the failure of counsel or a party to answer a calender call. The trial court could not, for instance, dismiss the matter with prejudice because, as the majority notes, the trial court’s discretion in dismissing is limited to a dismissal without prejudice. It is clear from that limitation that the legislature intended to limit the punitive options available to a trial court under these circumstances. The action of the trial court in the present case amounts to no more than a dismissal with prejudice, the entry of judgment without a presentation of the merits, based solely on the absence of a party and counsel. Even under former law which permitted dismissal with prejudice in the context of involuntary dismissals, such a harsh sanction was not to be imposed on the basis of absence alone. Hancock v. Oates, 244 Ga. 175 (259 SE2d 437) (1979). It may be seen, then, that the trial court’s decision to go ahead with the trial in the absence of the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel was merely an indirect means of accomplishing what the legislature has decreed shall not be accomplished directly.
To answer the concern that the decision of the Court of Appeals leaves trial courts at the mercy of dilatory or neglectful attorneys and parties, I would note that there are sanctions in place to deal with the failure of attorneys and parties to appear at the call of cases in which they are involved. An involuntary dismissal without prejudice, with its attendant expense, delay, and inconvenience is one such sanction. The provision in USCR 14, cited by the majority, for holding an attorney in contempt for failure to appear at the call of a case is another. A more creative approach than the entry of a final judgment without the presentation of evidence by the party bearing the burden of proof might be the award to the opposing party of expenses of litigation based on the offending party’s or attorney’s unnecessary expansion of the litigation. Any of those approaches would better serve the ends of justice than the punitive measure imposed by the trial court.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals accurately set out the law *338and applied it to this case. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals; I must, therefore dissent.
Decided June 23, 1992
Reconsideration denied July 16, 1992.
Fain, Major & Wiley, Gene A. Major, Bruce A. Maxwell, for appellants.
Jonap & Associates, John W. Jonap, Arthur C. Nilsen, Siben & Siben, Gerald I. Friedman, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears-Collins join in this dissent.