Court Opinion

ID: 9432132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:34:16.960948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:32.622820
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Today the Court squarely rejects the proposition that a governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong. Ante, at 564-565. I endorse this focus on the future benefit, rather than the remedial justification, of such decisions.1
I remain convinced, of course, that racial or ethnic characteristics provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment only in extremely rare situations and that it is therefore “especially important that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 534-535 (1980) (dissenting opinion). The Court’s opinion explains how both elements of that standard are satisfied. Specifically, the reason for the classification — the recognized interest in broadcast diversity — is clearly identified and does not imply any judgment concerning the abilities of owners of different races or the merits of different kinds of programming. Neither the favored nor the disfavored class is stigmatized in any way.2 In addition, the Court demonstrates that these cases fall within the extremely narrow category of governmental decisions for which racial or ethnic heritage may provide a rational basis for differential treatment.3 The public interest in broadcast diver*602sity — like the interest in an integrated police force4 diversity in the composition of a public school faculty 5 or diversity in the student body of a professional school6 — is in my view unquestionably legitimate.
Therefore, I join both the opinion and the judgment of the Court.

See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 511-513 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 313-315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

 Cf. Croson, 488 U. S., at 516-517; Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 545, and n. 17.

 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 452-454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (in examining the “rational basis” for a classification, the “term ‘rational,’ of course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members *602of the disadvantaged class”); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U. S. 464, 497, n. 4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the level of scrutiny appropriate in equal protection cases).

 See Wygant, 476 U. S., at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

 See id., at 315-316. See also Justice O’ConnoR’s opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in Wygant, recognizing that the “goal of providing ‘role models’ discussed by the courts below should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty.” Id., at 288, n.

See Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 311-319 (1978).