Court Opinion

ID: 9469666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:46:19.75408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:30.285464
License: Public Domain

VAN DUSEN, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
While I join in the judgment of the court, I believe our decision is a very close one, see, for example, National Hockey League v. Met. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976), and in view of the remand order, as well as in fairness to the district court, it should be made clear that there is evidence in the record indicating that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to vacate the default judgment in October 1981.
The record contains, inter alia, these findings and temporary orders of the trial judge:
1. On January 9, 1981, the district court granted a temporary restraining order on the basis of a verified complaint and affidavit, using this wording, inter alia, in making its findings and conclusions:
“. . . immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and a hearing had . . ., in that defendant . .. will conceal, dissipate and fraudulently convey assets and therefore plaintiff will be unable to locate these assets to which he has a lawful claim; . ..
“It is ordered that the defendant Alberto M. Bagnasco and each of his agents, successors, deputies, servants and employees, and all persons acting by, through or under him or by or through his order, are hereby restrained . . . from transferring, dissipating, encumbering, or otherwise concealing or removing from the jurisdiction of this Court:
(a) the assets and funds of the joint venture of Farnese & Bagnasco; and,
(b) the defendant’s own personal assets and funds with the limited exception of expenditures necessary for the maintenance and support of defendant and his family.”
(App. 008-009)
As a result of a stipulation of both counsel filed January 21, 1981, the above order was extended in all its terms until February 2, 1981. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this stipulation provided:
“2) It is hereby understood that the parties may request an additional extension of time pursuant to which the Order Granting a Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect;
“3) The defendant agrees to reimburse those reasonable expenses incurred in ob*767taining the presence of a witness who appeared at the duly scheduled hearing from Palm Beach, Florida.”
On January 30, 1981, the order granting the January 9, 1981, TRO was extended in all its terms until further order of the court (App. Oil).
2. The record shows that defendant’s present counsel conceded in November 1981 (App. 198) during a colloquy with the district court, as follows:
“THE COURT: Well, as far as I am concerned your client fully understands the nature of these proceedings. He understands the importance of them. If he has while in one week been so ill at his home that he could not receive communications from you and on another occasion today you are reporting to me that he is no longer at his home, it certainly does nothing to increase my confidence in his believability,....
“MS. AKBARI: ... I realize that you had serious questions as to credibility.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
3. At the same November 1981 hearing, the court made these statements at App. 199:
“THE COURT: Has he communicated with you further since our last [pre-trial] conference? * * * sk * *
“MS. AKBARI: No, I have not been able to reach him. There has been no answer at the phone numbers that I have. I have tried and there have been no answers.
“THE COURT: My observations are that he has just completely ignored the fact that this case is proceeding, as he has completely ignored the commitment that he made to this Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The district judge has rejected applications to vacate the default judgment as recently as October 21, 1981 (App. 177).