Court Opinion

ID: 9547721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:51:04.121437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:59.674805
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, C.J.
This matter came before the court on a motion for injunctive relief. Petitioners, Seattle School District 1 and others, asked this court to enjoin Governor Spellman from enforcing Executive Order 81-17 as it applied to them. Executive Order 81-17 instituted an across-the-board expenditure reduction program to meet the state's recent financial crisis. Following oral argument on October 5, 1981, this court filed its order denying the requested relief. Since that time the Legislature has met twice in an attempt to solve the financial crises which prompted Executive Order 81-17 and this lawsuit. While forgoing comment on the merits of the Legislature's recent actions, we take this opportunity to emphasize that our October decision was limited to a procedural finding that the petitioners had failed to meet the requirements for issuance of an injunction under our injunction statute, RCW 7.40.
RCW 7.40.020 limits when an injunction may be issued. That section states:
When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of some act, the commission or continuance of *536which during the litigation would produce great injury to the plaintiff; or when during the litigation, it appears that the defendant is doing, or threatened, or is about to do, or is procuring, or is suffering some act to be done in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action tending to render the judgment ineffectual; or where such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining proceedings upon any final order or judgment, an injunction may be granted to restrain such act or proceedings until the further order of the court, . . .
The statute has been generally construed to require that the plaintiff show (1) a clear legal right, (2) a well grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right and (3) substantial injury. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Department of Rev., 96 Wn.2d 785, 792, 638 P.2d 1213 (1982).
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate adequately that there has been an immediate invasion of a clear legal right. Petitioners' reliance on RCW 28A.41.130, § 87(3)(a) of the Appropriations Act and Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) establishes only that they have the right to an ample provision for education. See Seattle Sch. Dist., at 513. They have not yet shown, however, that they have a clear legal right to a particular dollar amount of funding. Consequently, petitioners did not establish the prerequisites for injunctive relief. We could not therefore grant such relief. We reserve comment on the merits of the substantive case until such time as that issue is before us.
Stafford, Dolliver, and Dimmick, JJ., concur.