Court Opinion

ID: 9712313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:51:13.53251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.455380
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I do not believe that there is any evidence of record from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Mansfield relinquished the sack because he was put in fear. It must be remembered that such element was essential to the offense as charged.
It is not sufficient that some person other than the possessor of the property was put in fear. In this respect I agree with footnote 2 of the opinion of Judge Shields.
The evidence below shows, at most, a momentary "tussle." While that evidence may show that the sack was obtained as a result of that tussle, ie., as a result of force, it does not permit an inference that Mansfield was in fear and that, as a result of the fear, relinquished the sack.
It should not be our prerogative to rephrase the charge so as to fit the offense to the evidence. That prerogative belongs to the prosecuting attorney. When the offense as charged is not proved, there should not be a conviction of that charge. Sanford v. State (1971) 255 Ind. 542, 265 N.E.2d 701; McGuire v. State (1875) 50 Ind. 284; McFarland v. State (1979) 2d Dist. 179 Ind.App. 143, 384 N.E.2d 1104.
I would reverse with instructions to vacate the robbery conviction, to enter a conviction of theft, and to resentence Rowe accordingly.