Court Opinion

ID: 9881125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 18:04:05.615813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:09.959522
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 P. v. Dekalb CA1/4

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A162755
                           v.                                          (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
 JAMES DEKALB,                                                         No. 05-190796-3)
         Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant James Dekalb seeks reversal of a judgment of conviction
issued upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree burglary and two
misdemeanors. He was sentenced to 12 years in state prison for the burglary
offense.
         At trial, Dekalb presented an expert psychologist who testified that
Dekalb had a mental disorder and that the disorder impaired his thinking
and planning ability. On the strength of this testimony, Dekalb argued he
lacked specific intent to commit burglary.
         Dekalb claims error for multiple reasons, but principally because the
trial court allowed the prosecutor to impeach his expert psychologist with
inadmissible testimonial hearsay from medical records prepared the day
before the subject incident. Dekalb also argues that the prosecutor engaged
in prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct.

                                                               1
      We reject these arguments. Assuming arguendo that there was court
error or prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude any such error or misconduct
was harmless on this record. Accordingly, we affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
   A. The Charges Against Dekalb
      In May 2019, the Contra Costa District Attorney filed an information
charging Dekalb with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),1 illegal
possession of tear gas with a prior conviction (§ 22810, subd. (a)), and illegal
possession of a stun gun (§ 22610, subd. (a)), all arising out of an incident
that occurred on February 25, 2019. The district attorney further alleged
that Dekalb had been convicted of several different serious or violent felonies
(§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d) & (e), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c), &
1203, subd. (e)(4)).
   B. Pre-Trial Proceedings
      After his counsel expressed a doubt about his competency to stand trial,
Dekalb was examined by a court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Marlin Griffith.
In July 2019, the court, based on a report by Dr. Griffith, found that Dekalb
was unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or work
with his counsel in presenting a defense and committed him to the
Department of State Hospitals for restoration of his competency. Sixteen
months later, in November 2020, the court, based on a report by Dr. Griffith,
found Dekalb competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings.
      Prior to trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to exclude as not relevant
police officer testimony that, beginning two days before the subject incident,
on February 23, 2019, Dekalb was placed on a psychiatric hold under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 5150. Dekalb’s counsel contended the evidence,

      1 Undesignated references are to the Penal Code.

                                         2
including a report that the officer found Dekalb wandering into traffic and
talking nonsensically, was relevant because it showed Dekalb, just a few days
before the incident, exhibited the kind of “non-linear, non-planned,
disorganized thinking” that was at the heart of the defense. The court
granted the prosecutor’s motion.
      Dekalb’s defense sought to raise a reasonable doubt that he intended to
steal things when he entered the victim’s home, a necessary element of first
degree burglary,2 contending his mental condition impeded his ability to form
that intent. His defense counsel retained Dr. Griffith to conduct another
psychiatric examination of Dekalb about a month before trial and sought to
introduce Dr. Griffith as an expert witness. The prosecution moved to
exclude testimony by him regarding Dekalb’s mental state at the time of the
incident or, in the alternative, for the court to hold a hearing under Evidence
Code section 402 to consider the issue.
      The trial court held the section 402 hearing. It barred Dr. Griffith from
testifying about Dekalb’s competency to stand trial; limited his testimony to
mental diseases, defects, or disorders that affect a person’s ability to form
specific intent; and issued a ruling regarding Dekalb’s psychiatric hold that is
at the heart of this appeal.
      The background and specifics of that ruling are as follows. Prior to the
section 402 hearing, the defense sought to have Dr. Griffith testify regarding
medical records created during the psychiatric hold, on February 23 and 24,
2019 (5150 records), that the defense had subpoenaed. The prosecution and

      2 See section 459 (“Every person who enters any house . . . with intent

to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary”); section
460, subdivision (a) (“Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house . . . is
burglary of the first degree”).

                                          3
the court thought such testimony would raise “a Sanchez hearsay problem,”3
but the court allowed defense counsel to question Dr. Griffith on the subject
at the section 402 hearing. Defense counsel neglected to ask Dr. Griffith
about the records, but proffered that Dr. Griffith would testify they were
relevant to the question of Dekalb’s mental state at the time of the
February 25, 2019 incident. The court ruled that Dr. Griffith could not
volunteer any testimony about the records because it would constitute
hearsay under Sanchez. It directed Dr. Griffith to make “no mention about
that 5150 . . . , so I don’t want you to volunteer any testimony on it, . . . so just
don’t mention it.” It also denied defense counsel’s request to present more
limited testimony about the records, stating the defense had “enough with
Dr. Griffith based on his own personal evaluation of Mr. DeKalb that he
exhibited all the symptoms of being bipolar,” the records did not add
anything to Dr. Griffith’s testimony, and the defense would be able to ask a
hypothetical drawing from the facts of the case.
      Dekalb’s counsel then noted the prosecutor, in her cross-examination of
Dr. Griffith at the hearing, had referred to a note in the 5150 records
indicating that Dekalb “had a coherent and goal-oriented thought process at
one point” and asked the court to exclude this reference as also involving
inadmissible hearsay. The court denied this request, telling Dekalb’s counsel
there was a difference in how the two sides were using the records because
the prosecutor was “not using [the 5150 records] for the truth of the matter.
It could be completely false that he was goal directed. The difference . . . is
that . . . [Dr. Griffth] says he relied upon those records and it’s not consistent
with his diagnosis and impression and opinions. [¶] So it almost doesn’t
matter what it was except that it’s different from what the doctor says his

      3 See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez).

                                         4
opinion is. So there’s a big difference between letting it come in for the truth
of the matter, which is what you want to do, which is not proper because it’s
hearsay, and [the prosecutor’s] use of it as impeachment.” At Dekalb’s
counsel’s request, the court said it would instruct the jury that the
prosecutor’s use of the 5150 records was “solely for impeachment and . . . not
for the truth of the matter,” but did not so instruct to the jury.
   C. The Prosecution’s Case
      1. Eyewitness Testimony
      At trial, the prosecution presented three eyewitnesses of the subject
incident and its immediate aftermath. First, Andrea Z., testifying through an
interpreter, said that she returned to her Antioch, California home at about
1:00 p.m. on February 25, 2019, after doing an errand to find a strange man
in her home. Her testimony on direct was somewhat confused. At first, she
indicated she was by her car when she saw the man and began running after
him, but then said she first saw the man inside her house. The man carried a
briefcase that was not hers, some candles, some boxes, and two of her jewelry
chains, which she took back from him. When she took the chains, he threw
the boxes down and pepper-sprayed her.
      After a lunch recess, Andrea Z. testified that she was nervous and the
details of the incident, two years old at the time of trial, were fuzzy. Asked
further about the incident, she said she was inside her house when she saw
the strange man in her bedroom. She saw him take her chains (which she
also called bracelets), which she had left out on a bedroom vanity. She
chased him and her jewelry fell to the ground. She picked them up and
continued to chase the man to see what else he had. He then pepper-sprayed
her, which prevented her from seeing anything else.

                                        5
      Andrea Z. further testified that at the time of the incident, she always
left her house doors unlocked. The front fence around the house was closed
but a back fence was open.
      On cross-examination, Andrea Z. said she had had two strokes since
the incident, which she said on redirect “blocked” her memory. On cross, she
again said she saw the strange man when getting out of her car, and also said
that she “saw something weird” and went into her house.
      Asked on cross if she recalled speaking twice to a defense investigator,
she said she recalled speaking by phone once in March 2021 to a woman, with
her daughter’s translation help. She denied telling the investigator that she
saw the man coming out of her house when she got out of her car, saying she
told her she saw him coming out her room, and she denied telling the
investigator that she took things out of the man’s hands when she chased
him. Rather, she said, when she chased him, “he had a lot of stuff in his
hands” and let go of her chains. She also said he pepper-sprayed her from
about a meter away, and denied telling a female police officer in February
2019 that he sprayed her from about 30 feet away. She acknowledged that
she did not see the man had any crowbars or pry bars or the like, nor see any
damage to her door or windows.
      The second eyewitness was H.S., who lived across the street from
Andrea Z. At about 1 p.m. on February 25, 2019, he saw Dekalb walking
away from his family’s car and papers from the car everywhere, as if the car
had been rummaged through. From a distance, he followed Dekalb, who was
“pacing down the street frantically,” and called 911. Dekalb started yelling
things at him. Andrea Z. also followed Dekalb and said he had broken into
her home and stolen things. Dekalb pepper-sprayed Andrea Z. from a
distance of five to ten feet away and she stopped pursuing him, but H.S.

                                       6
continued on. Dekalb threw the spray can down and speed walked away,
though he stopped to tie his shoes many times. He also briefly spoke to a
neighbor sitting on a stoop. About 15 to 20 minutes after H.S. began
following him, police arrived and detained Dekalb. H.S. showed police the
location of the pepper spray can.
      The third eyewitness was an Antioch police detective, who testified that
H.S. flagged him down and directed him to Dekalb, who matched the
dispatcher description of a fleeing suspect wearing a dark-colored hoodie and
bandana over his face; that Dekalb did not resist police, and was found to
have a working stun gun in his sweatshirt pocket and nothing else of
significance, such as stolen items; that he detained Dekalb and placed him in
his patrol car in less than five minutes, told him his Miranda4 rights, which
Dekalb said he understood, and five minutes later drove Dekalb for about five
or 10 minutes to a police station.
      The detective further testified that Dekalb continually cursed at the
detective and rambled about unrelated matters without the detective talking
to him. In the middle of doing so, Dekalb spontaneously made comments
about the burglary, saying, “ ‘That jewelry wasn’t even that nice,’ ” “ ‘The
bitch was coming at me so, yeah, I sprayed her,’ ” and, “ ‘That place wasn’t
even locked, and all that shit was just lying there.’ ” The detective wrote
these statements down as soon as he arrived at the police station and
included them later in his report.
      2. Testimony About a Prior Incident
      Dekalb’s grandmother testified that Dekalb stole items from her house
on a weekend in 2015 when she was out of town. She returned to her house
after her neighbor called and said her truck was gone to find her truck and

      4 See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

                                       7
numerous items from her home missing, including all of her and her
husband’s jewelry, a laptop, a pistol, and three long guns. A security door in
the garage was torn open and the house keys hanging inside the garage door
were gone. Police recovered a missing gun and jewelry from Dekalb’s
backpack. When the grandmother called Dekalb about the gun, he said he
did not know what she was talking about and that he had been at Bible
study.
      During cross-examination, the trial court, upon the prosecutor’s
relevance objection, prohibited the grandmother from testifying about
whether Dekalb began acting strangely when he was 18 or 19 years old and
denied the defense request for a side bar on the subject.
   D. The Defense Case
      At trial, Dr. Griffith, who said he was a clinical forensic psychologist,
was allowed to testify as a defense expert in the field of clinical and forensic
psychology and the diagnosis of bipolar disorder. On direct, he testified that,
as a court-appointed psychologist, he examined Dekalb in June 2019. He
concluded at the time that Dekalb’s “diagnosis was unclear” but thought his
behavior, demeanor, and comments “were consistent with . . . schizoaffective
disorder bipolar type.”
      According to Dr. Griffith, the “schizo” part of schizoaffective disorder
involves “hallucinations, delusions, [and] thought disorder” and the
“affective” part involves “unstable moods, be it manic or depressive mood
states.” “Bipolar type” identifies “the mood aspect of the disorder as more
prominent.” A manic state involves an “elevated and expansive mood or
increased level of energy,” a person being “hyper verbal,” and “excessive
activities” with the person having “several balls in the air . . . without
completing anything.” With bipolar disorder, “the thought process is . . . not
focused, jumping from one subject to another. It’s disorganized in that sense.

                                        8
The person is distractible, not able to . . . really think things through or plan
things in a normal fashion.” “The thought process is not focused in the sense
that the person is thinking through . . . what the situation is or what they are
about to engage in. Their thought process is sort of jumping back and forth.”
A person might exhibit impulsive behavior.
      Dr. Griffith further testified that he met with Dekalb in June 2019 for
about 40 minutes. Dekalb “was extremely agitated, he lacked focus, he was
rambling nonstop. I was not able to get him to respond to the questions that
I was asking him. He was on his own course.” Dr. Griffith “did not observe
any psychotic symptoms,” such as hallucinations, and thought it was
“questionable” whether Dekalb was having any delusions, but he “just wasn’t
on subject long enough to kind of understand what was going on.”
      Dekalb’s counsel then posed a hypothetical to Dr. Griffith that was
tailored to the defense view of the facts. The hypothetical included that a
man walks into a stranger’s house in the middle of the day without any
burglary tools and walks back out with a few bracelets and candles, which he
returns or discards upon being confronted by the homeowner. He then speed
walks down the sidewalk without running into other properties, stopping to
talk briefly to a person sitting on his stoop, does not run from police, and
upon being detained continues to make obscene and off-topic comments,
mostly speaking to himself. Four months later, he’s observed being
“extremely agitated, non-focused, rambling nonstop, unresponsive to simple
questions.” Dekalb’s counsel asked Dr. Griffith if the man displayed
symptoms consistent with schizoaffective disorder bipolar type.
      Dr. Griffith said his “diagnostic impression” was that “many of the
behaviors . . . would be consistent” with that disorder based on “some
rambling, disorganized thought process, [and] disorganized behavior”; he

                                        9
clarified upon further questioning, “I guess not necessarily disorganized
behavior, but certainly not goal-directed behavior.”
      On cross-examination, Dr. Griffith was asked about his March 2021
report, in which he concluded that Dekalb was suffering from schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar 1, which was the manic type. He testified that he based his
conclusion on “[a] review of medical records that I had access to at that time,
to add to my observations of, and conclusions.” Asked about whether
planning could be present for those with bipolar disorder who experience
disorganized planning, Dr. Griffith said that planning was not a single
activity, and that “[i]t certainly can vary from one end of mild planning to
extremely excessive planning. So I guess the answer would be yes, there
could be some planning even if the person is disorganized. It’s probably more
on the disorganized . . . plan end of the spectrum.” Also, Dr. Griffith
acknowledged that the DSM-5, which was the recognized manual of all the
mental illnesses in his field, notes an increase in goal-directed activity in
both bipolar 1 and 2 types.
      The prosecutor then asked, “Are you aware of medical records from
February 24th, 2019, that note Mr. DeKalb’s thought process was goal-
directed and coherent?” Dr. Griffith said he saw the note. On redirect, he
testified that he did not prepare the note, and that it did not change his
diagnosis of Dekalb’s bipolar disorder because the disorder could be in
remission at any particular point and could be exacerbated by stress
conditions and trauma.
      After Dr. Griffith testified, Dekalb’s counsel again asked that the 5150
records subpoenaed by the defense be admitted into evidence, indicating that
they came with a declaration by the custodian of records so as to overcome a
hearsay objection, an apparent reference to the business records hearsay

                                       10
exception.5 Counsel argued the prosecutor’s cross-examination opened the
door to the records, contended the prosecutor had misleadingly left out that
the 5150 records indicated Dekalb displayed a goal-oriented and coherent
thought process at a time when he was given antipsychotic medication, and
argued a violation of Dekalb’s state and federal due process rights had
occurred that should be remedied by the admission of the 5150 records. The
court said it continued to find any evidence of Dekalb’s 5150 hold “not
relevant to the charges,” that the prosecutor’s questioning did not “open the
door to the 5150 by any stretch of the imagination,” and denied the defense
request.
      Dekalb also presented the testimony of his defense investigator, who
said she spoke by phone in Spanish to Andrea Z. in April 2019 and March
2021; and also testified that Andrea Z. said in both phone calls, with minor
differences, that on the day of the incident she came home to find a man in
her driveway holding two of her chains, that she took the chains out of his
hands, that the man pepper-sprayed her from about 25 feet away, and that
she was never in the house with the man at the same time.
   E. Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal
      During deliberations, the jury’s written questions to the court included,
“Do we have to all agree that there was intent in order for a guilty verdict on
count one (459)?” The court responded, “Yes.”
      The jury found Dekalb guilty of all three counts. The court found
Dekalb had suffered a May 2017 prior conviction for a serious or violent
felony, which satisfied certain enhancement or strike allegations, and
dismissed the two section 667.5, subdivision (b) allegations. The court
sentenced Dekalb to the aggravated term of six years for first degree

      5 See Evidence Code sections 1271, 1560–1567.

                                      11
burglary, which it doubled because of the prior strike allegation to 12 years in
state prison. It sentenced him on the remaining two misdemeanor counts to
terms of 364 and 60 days in county jail that were already satisfied by
Dekalb’s custody credits, awarded him additional conduct credits, and
imposed various fines and fees.
      Dekalb filed a timely notice of appeal.
                             II. DISCUSSION
   A. Any Trial Court Error Regarding the Prosecutor’s Impeachment
      of Dr. Griffith Was Harmless
      Dekalb argues the trial court prejudicially erred by letting the
prosecutor impeach Dr. Griffith with a portion of the 5150 records which
noted that Dekalb displayed a goal-oriented and coherent thought process the
day before the incident.
      In support of this claim, Dekalb contends that the prosecutor’s
impeachment evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code
section 352 and was inadmissible “testimonial” hearsay in violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington
(2004) 541 U.S. 36. But his primary contention is that the trial court erred
because the impeachment evidence involved case-specific hearsay prohibited
from admission under Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665.
      In Sanchez, our Supreme Court held in relevant part that case-specific
statements related by a prosecution expert concerning the defendant’s gang
membership constituted inadmissible hearsay under California law.
(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 670.) The court adopted the following rule:
“When an expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and
treats the content of those statements as true and accurate to support the
expert’s opinion, the statements are hearsay. It cannot logically be
maintained that the statements are not being admitted for their truth. If the

                                      12
case is one in which a prosecution expert seeks to relate testimonial hearsay,
there is a confrontation clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of
unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination, or forfeited that right by wrongdoing.” (Id. at p. 686, fn.
omitted.) The court disapproved of its prior decisions holding that the
matters upon which an expert relied in forming an opinion are not offered for
their truth or that a limiting instruction, coupled with a trial court’s
evaluation of the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence under Evidence
Code section 352, sufficiently addresses hearsay or confrontation concerns.
(Sanchez, at p. 686, fn. 13.)
      Dekalb further contends that the trial court’s error here was similar to
that found by the appellate court in People v. Malik (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
587 (Malik). In Malik, the trial court allowed the prosecution, in the course
of cross-examining a defense expert in post-traumatic stress disorder, to
relate certain case-specific testimonial hearsay statements contained in
various police and sheriff reports spanning more than a decade indicating
that the defendant had engaged in violence in the past. (Id. at pp. 594–596.)
The appellate court “found no authority standing for the proposition that the
breadth of permissible cross-examination extends to the admission of case-
specific testimonial hearsay in violation of a defendant’s right of
confrontation,” characterized the circumstances before it as “arguably
represent[ing] the flip side of Sanchez,” and concluded that “the reasoning of
Sanchez applies equally in these circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 597, 598.) It
concluded the trial court’s admission of the testimonial hearsay via cross-
examination violated the defendant’s right of confrontation, although it also
concluded the error was harmless. (Id. at pp. 598–600.)

                                       13
      We agree that the circumstances of this case are similar to those
discussed in Malik insofar as they suggest the court’s admission of the
prosecutor’s impeachment evidence violated Sanchez. Nonetheless, we
conclude we do not need to decide this issue, nor further discuss the merits of
any of Dekalb’s other arguments, because, assuming there was error, it was
harmless, as we now discuss.6
      As Dekalb acknowledges, “[w]e evaluate prejudice resulting from the
allowance of expert testimony in violation of Sanchez under the standard of
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which requires reversal if ‘it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of error.’ (Id. at p. 836; see People v.
Ochoa (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 575, 589.)” (People v. Jeffrey G. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 501, 510.) We evaluate Evidence Code 352 error under the
state standard as well. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226–227.)
      It is true that, in one strand of this argument, Dekalb invokes
Crawford v. Washington, thereby suggesting we should apply the federal
standard for prejudice. But “[t]estimonial statements are those made

      6 The trial court initially excluded the 5150 records on Sanchez hearsay

grounds during the section 402 hearing. Later, during trial, when Dekalb’s
counsel began arguing to the court that the 5150 records were admissible,
apparently under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the
court said that, regardless, it would exclude the records as not relevant to the
issues of the case, despite the defense contention that Dekalb’s mental
condition raised a reasonable doubt that he entered Andrea Z.’s house with
the intent to steal. On appeal, Dekalb does not challenge the court’s view of
the relevance of the 5150 records and, in any event, the issue is of no
consequence in light of our conclusion that any error was harmless under the
circumstances of the incident and the limited significance of Dr. Griffith’s
trial testimony.

                                       14
primarily to memorialize facts related to past criminal activity, which could
be used like trial testimony. Nontestimonial statements are those whose
primary purpose is to deal with an ongoing emergency or some other purpose
unrelated to preserving facts for later use at trial.” (Sanchez, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 689.) Dekalb does nothing to establish the testimonial
nature of the 5150 records used by the prosecutor and nothing in the trial
record indicates they were testimonial in nature. Regardless, our conclusion
that any error by the trial court was harmless would be the same under the
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” federal standard for evaluating
prejudice articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.
      Dekalb argues the trial court’s error was prejudicial because this was a
close case, as indicated by the jury’s question to the court on the issue of
intent, in which relatively minor changes in the record can be important, and
because the court’s error went directly to the heart of his defense.
      We conclude this was not a close case regarding Dekalb’s intent to
burglarize Andrea Z.’s house, notwithstanding the jury’s question for the
court, and that there was an overwhelming amount of circumstantial
evidence indicating that Dekalb entered Andrea Z.’s house with the intent to
steal things, none of which Dekalb grapples with in arguing prejudice. This
evidence includes Andrea Z.’s testimony that she found Dekalb at around
1:00 p.m. taking jewelry from her bedroom after he entered her house, that
he ran out of the house when she discovered him in her bedroom, that he
dropped stolen items as she chased him, and that he pepper-sprayed her as
she approached him; H.S.’s testimony corroborating that he encountered
Dekalb acting suspiciously in the vicinity of his family’s car and that he and
Andrea Z. followed Dekalb, who pepper-sprayed Andrea Z., discarded the
spray can, and speed walked away; and the detective’s testimony indicating

                                       15
that Dekalb, when he was detained, matched the description of a fleeing
suspect wearing a hoodie and a bandana, was found to have a working stun
gun in his sweatshirt pocket, and volunteered to the detective that the
jewelry “wasn’t even that nice,” that he deliberately sprayed Andrea Z., and
that her house “wasn’t even locked” and the items he took from the house
were “just lying there.”
      This evidence strongly points to the conclusions that Dekalb, having
with him a hoodie, bandana, pepper spray, and a working stun gun in order
to prevent his identification and arm himself, found and entered an unlocked
house in the middle of the day, when people were more likely to be at work or
school, in order to search its interior for items to steal, found and took
potentially valuable items—jewelry—in a bedroom and, knowing he was
caught in the act of burglary, fled upon being discovered and, aware he was
being followed, discarded the items he had stolen before the police could
arrive. These conclusions are confirmed by his spontaneously offered
statements to a police detective in the minutes after the incident that
pointedly highlighted matters directly relevant to his entering an unlocked
house to steal things. To add to this evidence, Dekalb’s own grandmother
testified that he had broken into her home in 2015 and stolen things from her
as well, providing further support for the conclusion that Dekalb committed a
burglary of Andrea Z.’s house.
      Dekalb’s theory about his lack of intent is a stretch given the facts of
the case: in effect, he contends that, in the thrall of a mental disorder, he just
happened to enter a fenced-off, unlocked house in the middle of the day with
no particular intent in mind before being discovered taking jewelry from a
vanity in the bedroom of the house and seeking to evade those who followed

                                       16
after him as he fled. This theory is fatally undermined by the evidence we
have discussed.
        Further, Dr. Griffith’s testimony, without the prosecutor’s challenged
impeachment evidence, was far less than definitive regarding whether
Dekalb entered Andrea Z.’s house with the intent to steal things. Dr. Griffith
acknowledged that, though during his June 2019 examination of Dekalb,
Dekalb behaved in a manner consistent with schizoaffective disorder bipolar
type, Dr Griffith could not reach a diagnosis for him at that time. Further,
Dr. Griffith, while he testified that in his opinion Dekalb suffered from a
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 1, that could result in disorganized thinking
and affect his ability to plan, did not testify that the disorder prevented
Dekalb from entering Andrea Z.’s home with the intent to steal things. To
the contrary, his testimony merely suggests this might be the case, while also
stating that “disorganized” planning “can vary from one end of mild planning
to extreme excessive planning. So . . . yes, there could be some planning even
if the person is disorganized.” Dr. Griffith also acknowledged that the “DSM”
manual, which all psychologists use to diagnose mental illness, states that in
a bipolar and manic episode there is an increase in goal-directed activity for
bipolar 1 (Dr. Griffith’s specific diagnosis for Dekalb in March 2021). And he
further testified that the disorder can be in remission at any time. In short,
Dr. Griffith’s testimony amounted to little more than speculation about
Dekalb’s state of mind when he entered Andrea Z.’s house on February 25,
2019.
        In sum, assuming the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor’s
challenged impeachment, it was not reasonably probable that Dekalb would
have fared better in the absence of such an error and, further, any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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   B. Any Prosecutorial Misconduct Also Was Harmless
      Dekalb also argues the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct in
violation of his federal and state rights to due process.
      1. Relevant Proceedings Below
      The parties’ closing arguments focused primarily on whether or not
Dekalb entered Andrea Z.’s house with the intent to steal things, some
portions of which are relevant to Dekalb’s misconduct claim.
      Specifically, in his closing argument, Dekalb’s counsel argued that the
“[p]rosecutor also, in her cross-examination, referred to, well, how come your
opinion’s not affected by this note from the day before, February 24, 2019? A
note that at that time Mr. DeKalb was goal-oriented and coherent. Who
produced that note? Dr. Griffith told you it wasn’t him. [¶] The prosecution
has presented this note as a reason to doubt Dr. Griffith’s testimony. She’s
presented zero evidence about where that note came from, who authored it
and under what circumstances.” The court interrupted to admonish counsel
that he had “crossed the line” because “that was subject to a motion outside
the presence of the jury” and a court ruling, and was not the prosecutor’s
fault. When counsel continued, he added, “And, in any event, Dr. Griffith
told you that it did not affect his opinion.”
      In rebuttal, the prosecutor, in arguing that Dr. Griffith’s testimony was
unreliable, said, “I also asked [Dr. Griffith], as [Dekalb’s counsel] also
addressed in his closing, . . . if [he] was aware that there were medical
records on February 24, 2019, which . . . noted Mr. Dekalb possessed goal-
oriented behavior or thought process. Dr. Griffith conceded and said, ‘Yes.’
And so just only last month were we provided with this bipolar diagnosis.”
      Also in rebuttal, the prosecutor said, “Mr. DeKalb might have bipolar.
I don’t know that that was proven to you based on Dr. Griffith’s testimony at
all. [Dekalb’s counsel] perhaps raised the possibility, but is it reasonable?

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No.” Dekalb’s counsel objected that this was improper argument that
constituted prosecutorial misconduct and, when the court asked for a further
explanation, suggested a side bar so that he could explain his objection. The
court indicated it would discuss the matter later on the record and the
prosecutor continued with her argument. The prosecutor went on to argue,
“Even if we accept that Mr. DeKalb has bipolar, it does not negate the intent.
Mental health might make us do things we don’t like, but it doesn’t mean
that we did not intend to do those things.”
      At the conclusion of closing argument, the trial court gave further
instructions to the jury, including, “The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the required intent
or mental state, specifically the intent to commit a theft when he entered a
building. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of burglary. [¶] I want it clear to all jurors that at no
point in time does the burden shift to the defense, okay? There may have
been some—a little bit of slippage there, [the prosecutor], on that aspect, but
it’s clear, Ladies and Gentlemen, that it is the People’s burden all around.
You understand that? Okay.”
      Later, after the jury was dismissed for the day, Dekalb’s counsel argued
that a mistrial was in order. He contended the prosecutor committed
misconduct by her remarks, since she “knows full well that Mr. DeKalb does,
in fact, have schizoaffective disorder bipolar type,” including because he spent
months during the pendency of the case being “treated precisely for that
disorder,” and, therefore, the prosecutor deliberately made false statements
to the jury. The court rejected the misconduct claim because the prosecutor
was entitled to argue from the evidence presented by Dr. Griffith and said

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that any improper inference by the prosecutor did not rise to such serious
misconduct as to require a mistrial.
      The court appears to have agreed with Dekalb’s counsel that the
prosecutor’s remarks had improperly shifted the burden to the defense to
prove Dekalb had a bipolar disorder, but ruled that its re-instruction to the
jury that the defense had no burden of proof cured the impropriety.
      2. Legal Standards
      “Under the federal Constitution, a prosecutor commits reversible
misconduct only if the conduct infects the trial with such ‘ “unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’ (Darden v.
Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181.)” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th
539, 612.) “ ‘[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 914 [regarding
a prosecutorial misconduct claim].)
      “By contrast, our state law requires reversal when a prosecutor uses
‘deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury’
(People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447) and ‘ “it is reasonably probable that
a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without
the misconduct” ’ (People v. Wallace [(2008)] 44 Cal.4th [1032,] 1071). To
preserve a misconduct claim for review on appeal, a defendant must make a
timely objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the
prosecutor's improper remarks or conduct, unless an admonition would not
have cured the harm. (People v. Tafoya [(2007)] 42 Cal.4th 147, 176.)”
(People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 612.)
      3. Analysis
      Dekalb contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by using a
hearsay statement—her reference to 5150 records indicating that Dekalb

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displayed a goal-oriented and coherent thought process the day before the
incident—under the guise of impeachment, arguing in closing that Dekalb
was not bipolar when she knew he was in fact bipolar, and shifting the
burden to prove intent to the defense, thereby deliberately misleading the
jury into concluding Dekalb had the intent to commit burglary when he
entered Andrea Z.’s house.
      The parties debate various issues regarding Dekalb’s misconduct claim,
including the People’s contentions that Dekalb forfeited the claim by failing
to ask for an admonition below and, regarding the merits, that the prosecutor
was merely commenting on the persuasiveness of Dr. Griffith’s testimony and
on the state of the evidence during closing argument.
      We need not address these issues because, assuming solely for the sake
of argument that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and Dekalb
preserved his claim for appeal, conclusions we do not reach here, the
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the same reasons
that caused us to conclude that any trial court error regarding the
prosecutor’s impeachment of Dr. Griffith was harmless.
      In addition, Dekalb gives us no reason to doubt that the trial court
acted within its discretion when it concluded that its further instruction to
the jury after closing argument that the prosecution alone bore the burden of
proof cured any burden-shifting suggested by the prosecutor’s rebuttal
remarks argument about the defense failure to show Dekalb suffered from
bipolar disorder. (See People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 673–674
[“ ‘ “Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a
speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion
in ruling on mistrial motions,” ’ ” which ruling is reviewed for abuse of
discretion].)

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                        III. DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
                                           STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

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