Court Opinion

ID: 990363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:20:16.357667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:48.087501
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                         No. 96-4055
MARIO JONES, a/k/a Mario Dufreen
Jones,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-95-31)

Submitted: August 22, 1996

Decided: September 12, 1996

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Margaret M. Cain, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P.
Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Ray B. Fitzgerald, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Mario Jones pled guilty to one count of distributing crack cocaine,
21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1981 & Supp. 1996). Pursuant to an oral
plea agreement, a related charge was dismissed. Jones was sentenced
to a term of 115 months imprisonment. He contends on appeal that
the district court erred in failing to address mitigating factors which
might justify a downward departure: his voluntary cooperation with
authorities, his age, and his health. United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Guidelines Manual §§ 5K1.1, p.s., 5H1.1, p.s., 5H1.4, p.s. (Nov.
1995). He seeks resentencing or vacation of his guilty plea. We
affirm.

The probation officer recommended an upward departure under
USSG § 4A1.3, p.s., because Jones had 23 criminal history points. At
the sentencing hearing, Jones's attorney asked him to testify about the
information he voluntarily provided to investigators at the time of his
guilty plea. Jones stressed that he had given the information solely out
of concern for his brother, who was also involved in drug dealing.
Jones also described in detail his medical problems: sleep apnea and
asthma which requires him to sleep with the assistance of an oxygen
machine which must be monitored by another person while he sleeps.
Because of Jones's cooperation and his medical condition, defense
counsel requested a sentence at the low end of the guideline range.*

The district court explicitly considered Jones's cooperation in
deciding not to depart upwardly as recommended by the probation
officer. The court also recommended that Jones be placed in a facility
equipped to give him the medical treatment he needed. While Jones
may have hoped for a downward departure, he did not request a
downward departure. He has thus forfeited review of the issue unless
plain error occurred. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725 (1993).
_________________________________________________________________
*Jones's age (26) was not discussed.

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A district court's decision not to depart is normally not reviewable
on appeal, United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 819 (1990). If the court's decision not to depart is
based on a finding that it lacks legal authority to depart, that legal
decision is reviewed de novo. United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861,
863 (4th Cir. 1992). Because Jones never requested a downward
departure, the court did not determine whether it had authority to
depart. We find that plain error did not occur.

Jones claims in his appeal brief that the government promised him
a substantial assistance motion in return for his guilty plea and failed
to fulfill its promise. However, he made no mention of such a promise
in the district court and he did not move to withdraw his plea. Conse-
quently, we find no basis for vacating the guilty plea.

The conviction and the sentence are therefore affirmed. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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