Court Opinion

ID: 9711111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:24:36.616979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.354697
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
(dissenting). While defendant raises several allegations of error for review, I agree with the majority opinion that the only substantial issue is whether the court complied with GCB 1963, 785.3(2). Unlike my colleagues of the majority, I believe that the court substantially complied with the requirements thereof and in particular that the court advised the defendant of the nature of the accusation. The record shows that on, the 22d day of August, 1963, the defendant was arraigned on the information, which was read to him in open court. On October 15, 1963, defendant’s experienced legal counsel advised the court that his client desired to plead guilty to the second count — ■ possession of burglar tools.
In People v. Reed (1965), 1 Mich App 60, 62, we stated:
“ ‘The form and manner of this examination has not been prescribed but is left to the discretion of the judge, to be exercised by him in the manner best suited to the parties and the offense.’ ”
This latter quote taken from People v. Bumpus (1959), 355 Mich 374, appears again in substance in People v. Steele (1966), 4 Mich App 352, 356.
While I subscribe to the proposition that the court rule is mandatory in that the trial court must exam*17ine the accused prior to accepting a plea, I do not subscribe to the position that the form and manner of this examination must be the same for all defendants lest there be “a denial of equal protection of the laws.” The court rule could have provided a precise form to be utilized by each judge at the time that the court accepted a plea but this was not done for an apparently good reason. A 16-year-old defendant with no prior criminal experience, not represented by counsel, as in People v. Atkins (1966), 2 Mich App 199, should be examined more thoroughly than a 41-year-old man whose criminal experience extended over two decades, and who was represented by able counsel.
Before accepting a guilty plea in a criminal case, the court must exercise a judicial function and determine what information he must give to a defendant before acceptance of the plea based on his knowledge then at hand. The age of the defendant, his previous criminal experience, his intelligence, and his representation by counsel are some of the factors to be considered by the trial court.
In People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267; People v. Hunn (1965), 1 Mich App 580; and People v. Atkins, supra, the respective ages of the defendants were 19, 20 and 16. In both Hunn and Atkins the defendants were not represented by counsel. In Barrows the defendant had no prior criminal record and, in addition, he “protested his innocence at every point when given an opportunity to do so.” In view of the factual situation present in Barrotvs, I do not feel the decision prohibits the trial court from considering the presence of counsel when approving a plea of guilty. In each of the above cited cases the plea of guilty was set aside.
Perhaps the closest case to the instant one involves the validity of the plea of guilty in People v. Steele, *18supra. There the defendant was 26 years old, was represented by counsel and had prior experience as a defendant in court, and we approved the plea of guilty. The fact that defendant Steele gave a brief recitation of his activities was not relied on or referred to by this Court in its approval of the plea and this fact is insufficient to distinguish the instant case from Steele. In People v. Reed, supra, the defendant’s age was 31, he was represented by counsel and had a prior criminal record. There, again, we approved defendant’s plea. In People v. Bumpus, supra, a 21-year-old defendant with a prior record, who was not represented by counsel, pled guilty and the Court approved such plea.
In evaluating the validity of any plea, it is difficult to set forth a precise yardstick that can be used by the bench and bar to determine what is necessary to meet the requirements of GCK 1963, 785.3(2). It would simplify our task and avoid appeals if the trial court explained each and every element of the offense to the defendant, but we do not believe failure to do so is the sole factor to consider when we are asked to determine the validity of a plea.
We look to the record in the instant case to determine if the plea and its acceptance thereof by the trial court were fundamentally unfair to the defendant. ■ He was represented by able counsel and, at 41 years of age, would not fall into the classification of a young, immature defendant. His criminal experience extended over two decades and it appears that the defendant confined his criminal activities to' a specialized field, that of a nocturnal burglar. The defendant, having pled guilty in the instant ease to possession of burglar tools, can hardly be classified as one who might not be aware of the implements of his chosen profession ánd could no doubt advise the court in detail what tools could best be utilized in a *19burglary. Tbe court did not question the defendant as to whether he knowingly possessed the burglar tools with intent to use or employ the same but, taking into consideration the defendant’s previous criminal experience, this knowledge and intent can be inferred under the circumstances of this particular case.
I would vote to affirm.