Court Opinion

ID: 9481547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:22:26.749469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:23.527907
License: Public Domain

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with my colleagues that the liability issues were correctly decided by the district court. I also agree that the instruction regarding discovery abuse by Collectors’ Guild improperly delegated to the jury the authority to participate, in effect, in the imposition of discovery sanctions that are the proper province of the district court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b). Further, although I deem it a very close issue on this record, I can concur in the ruling that this instruction constituted “plain error.” 1 Finally, in view of Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir.1984), I agree that the instructional error could not be cured by remittitur.
I disagree, however, with the majority's determination not to reach the issue whether the district court’s preclusionary rulings were proper. The district court addressed the issue, inter alia, as follows:
It is quite apparent that, through his incomplete answers, Munn [the president of Collectors' Guild] intended to mislead counsel for plaintiff into believing that the information he sought no longer existed, a fact that was flatly contradicted by defendant’s attempt to introduce computer printouts containing inventory data at the end of the trial.
Plaintiff represented to the court that, prior to trial, he never received a single document in respect to his discovery requests and defendant did not dispute this representation.
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Defendant’s abuse of discovery, failure to list the documents in the pretrial order and its production of responsive documents on the eve of trial — and, even more disturbingly, in the middle of trial — would have fully justified the court’s wholesale exclusion of all the inventory evidence.
Werbungs und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors Guild, Ltd., 728 F.Supp. 975, 981-82 (S.D.N.Y.1989).
To say the least, I see no clear error or abuse of discretion in any of the foregoing, and therefore think that we should affirm the preclusionary rulings of the district court, rather than invite a further appeal on that issue. See United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 60 n. 23 (2d Cir.1985).
*1029In addition, it seems to me that the terms of the remand excessively limit the district court’s discretion, at least by implication. The majority states that:
to ensure a more orderly retrial on damages, the district court may, in its discretion, permit the parties to conduct further discovery for a reasonable period of time. In addition, the parties are directed to indicate before trial the evidence they plan to introduce and to notify the district court before trial of all reasonably anticipated evidentiary objections.
The likely inference from this direction is that, absent settlement, there is to be a further trial as to damages in this already protracted litigation. In addition, given the majority’s refusal to address the district court’s preclusionary rulings, the safest course on remand would be to allow admission of previously precluded evidence. I regard all of this as an unwarranted intrusion upon the discretion afforded the district court by Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). Accordingly, I would reverse for instructional error, specify that we find no error in the district court’s preclusionary rulings, and remand without any directions or intimations that would further limit the discretion of the district court in addressing the issues of damages and discovery sanctions.

. As we said in Modave v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 501 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.1974) (Friendly, J.):
[I]t is worth noting that the "plain error” phrase is found in F.R.Cr.P. 52, not in the civil rules. Except perhaps for errors that could not have been corrected on proper objection, the doctrine applicable in civil cases is the more limited one of "fundamental error,” see New York Central R.R. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318-319, 49 S.Ct. 300, 303-304, 73 L.Ed. 706 (1929) — an error so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial.
Id. at 1072. Rule 52(b) "plain error" trumps the provision in Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 that requires timely and specific objection in order to preserve a claim of error in a jury instruction, and "fundamental error” in the civil context trumps the substantially identical requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 51.