Court Opinion

ID: 9514202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:45:32.041364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:13.658690
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
concurring in the result.
[¶ 40] I agree this is not a proper case for exercising the Court’s mandatory original jurisdiction. I also agree with the majority’s result of denying the Board’s requested relief. However, on the latter issue, we arrive at our common conclusion by significantly different means.
[¶ 41] The Board has petitioned for exercise of this Court’s mandatory original jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. Ill, §§ 6 and 7. The majority holds we should not, and I agree. Majority Opinion at ¶ 13.
*226[¶ 42] The Board also seeks to invoke this Court’s discretionary original jurisdiction. N.D. Const, art. VI, § 2. A quorum majority but not a constitutional majority of this Court believes we should do so. Majority Opinion at ¶¶ 1, 18. I respectfully disagree.
[¶ 48] We exercise our discretionary original jurisdiction in limited circumstances. This Court has stated,
“Under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 2, this Court has authority to exercise original jurisdiction and to issue remedial writs necessary to properly exercise its jurisdiction. The power vested in this Court to issue original writs is discretionary and may not be invoked as a matter of right. It is well-settled that our power to exercise original jurisdiction extends only to those cases in which the questions presented are publici juris and affect the sovereignty of the state, the franchises or prerogatives of the state, or the liberties of its people. To warrant the exercise of this Court’s original jurisdiction, the interest of the state must be primary, not incidental, and the public — the community at large — must have an interest or right that may be affected.”
Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 58, ¶ 2, 641 N.W.2d 100 (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 44] The Board argues in its brief and the Sponsoring Committee argues throughout that UND’s potential continuing use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo is a matter of important public concern warranting our intervention. I neither doubt nor ignore the Board’s claim that continuing controversy over the nickname and logo may be affecting the University’s “educational environment and reputation, as well as the financial viability of its sports program.” Nor do I discount the Sponsoring Committee’s earnest beliefs and efforts behind seeking to keep the nickname and logo. However, the Board’s concerns about future consequences of the legislation fall short of meeting the legal threshold before this Court can act. So too, the Committee’s concerns about preserving the nickname and logo fail to clear the bar. That threshold requires a question “affect[ing] the sovereignty of the state, the franchises or prerogatives of the state, or the liberties of its people” before our discretionary jurisdiction can be exercised. Kelsh, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 2, 641 N.W.2d 100.
[¶ 45] Perhaps recognizing the logo and nickname controversy would not meet the legal threshold for this Court’s intervention, the Board opened oral argument stating, “The issue before the Court today is not whether UND’s current nickname and logo should continue. The issue is who has the constitutional authority to make that determination.” In turn, the majority correctly explains this Court has exercised discretionary original jurisdiction in prior separation of governmental powers disputes. Majority Opinion at ¶¶ 15-16. However, I find no case where this Court has enjoined the Secretary of State from placing a referred or an initiated measure on the ballot under the circumstances present in this case. I submit we should not do so now.
[¶ 46] Historically, this Court has been selective of the type of eases accepted in the exercise of original jurisdiction. In 1956, former North Dakota Supreme Court Chief Justice Burke wrote the following:
“The Supreme Court has always assumed jurisdiction of controversies concerning the title to a state office. It has accepted jurisdiction in matters concerning the right of a candidate to have his name printed upon the ballot in statewide elections. Among other controversies within the original jurisdiction are *227those concerning the right of franchise, the right of state officers to their pay, and the jurisdictional foundation of the orders of state boards and commissions.
“Some of the controversies which the Court has refused to accept are those concerning the title to an office in a political party, those concerning the division of a county, the matter of the change of location of a county seat, taxpayers’ actions, and questions concerning the discharge of the employees of a public board.”
Thomas J. Burke, The Prerogative Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 32 N.D. L.Rev. 199, 204 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
[¶ 47] This Court generally has continued on the path described by Chief Justice Burke, more recently exercising discretionary original jurisdiction in a conflict between constitutional offices. See State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 266 (N.D.1979) (governor’s constitutional challenge of legislative change to scope and function of lieutenant governor’s duties). Disputes over the exercise of the voting franchise also have warranted exercise of this Court’s original jurisdiction. See Kelsh, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 3, 641 N.W.2d 100 (jurisdiction exercised in legislative redistricting ballot dispute); State ex rel. Kusler v. Sinner, 491 N.W.2d 382, 384 (N.D.1992) (discretionary original jurisdiction exercised over question about “interpretation of the statutory procedure for, and the timing of, a special election to fill a vacancy in the office of United States Senator from North Dakota”); State ex rel. Wefald v. Meier, 347 N.W.2d 562, 564 (N.D.1984) (dispute between the attorney general and the Secretary of State over a referral ballot description). This Court also has exercised jurisdiction to determine whether a constitutional officer has acted beyond his authority. See State ex rel. Olson v. Welford, 65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593 (1935) (Court reviewed governor’s jurisdiction in removing the highway commissioner); State ex rel. Wehe v. Frazier, 47 N.D. 314, 182 N.W. 545 (1921) (Court reviewed governor’s jurisdiction in removing Workmen’s Compensation Bureau commissioner).
[¶ 48] . Viewed from a distance, these citations show we have exercised discretionary original jurisdiction in disputes with general attributes similar to those in this case. However, a closer reading of our case law reveals that we have declined to intervene in the situations most similar to those here. See Municipal Servs. Corp. v. Kusler, 490 N.W.2d 700, 706 (N.D.1992) (denying relief in a constitutional attack on initiated measure as premature and advisory); Preckel v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 634, 244 N.W. 781 Syll. 3 (1932) (“[T]his court will not examine the proposed measure to test the constitutionality of the substance of the act proposed.”); Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 242 N.W. 687, 688 (1932) (refusing to enjoin Secretary of State from placing allegedly unconstitutional initiated measure on ballot).
[¶49] Rather than follow Municipal Servs. Corp., Preckel and Anderson, the majority would reach a different conclusion. The majority’s position warrants a more in-depth consideration of several cases relied on by it or the parties.
[¶ 50] The first is State ex rel. Walker v. Link, 232 N.W.2d 823 (N.D.1975). The Walker decision is relied on in the majority opinion for the proposition that “we have previously exercised our discretionary original jurisdiction to address constitutional ramifications of referendum measures.” Majority Opinion at ¶ 16. While that broad statement is of course true, Walker was not an action to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum on the ballot. 232 N.W.2d at 824. Rather, in Walker the statute appropriat*228ing UND’s budget was referred. Id. Filing of the referral petitions suspended UND’s funding. Id. at 826. The North Dakota Emergency Commission subsequently restored funding for UND’s operations. Id. at 824. A lawsuit was filed, asking this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to annul the Emergency Commission’s appropriation. Id. The issue in Walker was “whether a referral petition filed with the Secretary of State suspends a legislative appropriation to fund a constitutionally mandated function.” Id. at 825. This Court held the constitutional provision to suspend the referred law was in conflict with the provision requiring funding of mandated functions. Id. at 826. The conflict was resolved in favor of funding the constitutionally mandated function, no further relief was provided and the action was dismissed. Id. at 827.
[¶ 51] Walker is different from the present case for a host of reasons. Several important ones include that Walker addressed only the question whether funding of a constitutionally mandated function could be suspended on the filing of referral petitions. That question went to the constitutionality of the referral process itself. Here, no such challenge exists because no one is suggesting repeal of N.D.C.C. § 15-10 — 46 is constitutionally impermissible. In addition, the relief requested in Walker was to enjoin the Emergency Commission. Neither the office of the Secretary of State nor the Secretary’s placement of the referral on the ballot were at issue. Walker therefore provides no guidance on answering the question whether this Court should halt a ballot listing when the statute targeted by referral is alleged to be unconstitutional but the referral process itself is not being attacked.
[¶ 52] The second case warranting further consideration is RECALLND v. Jaeger, 2010 ND 250, 792 N.W.2d 511. The Board argues RECALLND should control our disposition here because the case was decided under the North Dakota Constitution and because it had the effect of keeping a voter-initiated recall proceeding from appearing on the ballot. But again, careful examination shows RECALLND does not lead us to the Board’s requested result.
[¶ 58] The issue in RECALLND was whether the Secretary of State should be ordered to approve a petition to recall a United States Senator. 2010 ND 250, ¶ 2, 792 N.W.2d 511. This Court rejected the requested relief because the proffered “petition [did] not meet the constitutional requirements of a valid recall petition.” Id. at ¶ 26. Doing so, the holding in RE-CALLND was in line with the holding in Walker because the underlying petition process was outside that permitted by the Constitution. Without a similar claim here that the referral itself is unconstitutional, our decision in RECALLND is not helpful to the Board.
[¶ 54] The third case is State ex rel. Askew v. Meier, 281 N.W.2d 821 (N.D.1975). In Askew, petitions were filed seeking to refer legislative approval of the so-called “Equal Rights Amendment” to the United States Constitution. 231 N.W.2d at 822. Relief was sought from this Court to prevent the Secretary of State from placing the referral question on the ballot. Id. at 823. This Court enjoined the Secretary of State from placing the referral on the ballot because “an attempt to reverse the legislative ratification through the referendum process [was] forbidden by Federal constitutional law[.]” Id. at 825. Therefore, in Askew, as in Walker and RECALLND, the matter did not proceed to a public vote because the underlying referral or recall petition itself was unconstitutional. By contrast, no claim is made here that referral of *229N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46 is unconstitutional, so neither the rationale nor the holdings in those eases help guide us to a similar result.
[¶ 55] Reading these and our other original jurisdiction cases together, I conclude the Court’s intervention at this time would be unprecedented. Intervention now also would be ill-advised because of the important competing and conflicting interests between the Board’s and the Legislature’s separation of constitutional powers on the one hand and the right of the people to refer legislation on the other. Therefore, although due to far different reasons, I agree with the result reached by the majority in dismissing the petition without prejudice to the ability to revisit the question if it is not rendered moot by voting on the referred measure in June 2012.
[¶ 56] Daniel J. Crothers