Court Opinion

ID: 9558822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:17:43.137508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:36.874361
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree that evidence of defendant’s uncharged Michigan offense was properly admitted under either the common plan theory advanced by the majority or the corroboration theory urged by Justice Arabian. However, the majority reject the Court of Appeal’s rationale for admission of the uncharged offense, i.e., that it was relevant to show defendant’s intent. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 422.) On this point, I part company with the majority. They fail to persuade me that the divergent accounts given by defendant and the complaining witness made evidence of defendant’s criminal intent irrelevant for any purpose.
I agree that once the fact finder credited either Denise B.’s claim of forcible rape at gunpoint, or defendant’s claim of intercourse with the complainant’s actual consent, there could be no further legitimate dispute about defendant’s criminal intent. I also accept that because rape is a general intent crime (People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 199, 209 [249 Cal.Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 765-766 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267]), the prosecution need only prove wilful commission of the proscribed conduct (intercourse accomplished against the victim’s will by specified means [Pen. Code, § 261]), and defendant’s subjective state of mind is not itself a fact which must be independently resolved unless there is some evidence permitting the inference that he entertained a reasonable though mistaken belief in consent (People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 360-361 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143,153-156 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337]). However, contrary to the reasoning advanced both by the instant majority and by the majority in People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d *43377, 88, footnote 7 [201 Cal.Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1], those principles do not mean that proof of intent is immaterial unless there is evidence of reasonable mistake.
Whenever, as here, the accused concedes he had intercourse with the victim on the charged occasion, evidence that he did so with intent to commit rape is obvious, logical, and proper circumstantial evidence that he actually engaged in that proscribed conduct. Indeed, evidence of his criminal intent may be particularly relevant as evidence of his actual conduct when the only two witnesses—he and the complainant—provide sharply contrasting versions of the sexual encounter.
For example, and by analogy to the majority’s reasoning in a companion case (People v. Ewoldt, ante, 380, pp. 393-394 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]), if defendant had written a letter stating he intended to rape Denise B., or any suitable victim he encountered, we would admit that letter to prove that when having intercourse with Denise B., he acted against her will by unlawful means. We would not exclude the intent evidence as immaterial simply because rape is a general intent crime. Nor would we assume that the witnesses’ divergent accounts, each of which established defendant’s state of mind if credited, had removed the “issue” of intent from the case.
It follows that if the circumstances of the accused’s criminal sexual misconduct on other occasions tend to establish that he harbored criminal sexual intent toward the current complainant, and that he therefore acted in conformity with that intent, such other misconduct is material as “an intermediate fact ‘from which [the ultimate fact actually in dispute] may [logically and naturally] be presumed or inferred.’ . . .” (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883], fn. & citation omitted.)1
What limits do Evidence Code sections 1101 and 3522 impose upon the use of uncharged crimes for this purpose? Section 1101, subdivision (b) makes specific reference to both “intent” and “plan” as exceptions to the general rule against use of other crimes to prove charged offenses. Contrary *434to the majority’s suggestion, nothing in the statute implies that intent is a fact provable by other crimes only when it is an element of the charged offense. Indeed, the use of other crimes to establish an intermediate inference of “intent” is closely related to the use of such crimes to establish an intermediate inference of “common plan, scheme, or design.” In each instance, the valid purpose of the evidence is to show that on the occasion of the charged offense, the accused harbored a particular criminal state of mind, and that he acted accordingly.
The particular circumstances of defendant’s Michigan offense appear highly relevant to his intent against Denise B., apart from his mere propensity to commit rape. Theresa H., the Michigan victim, testified that defendant, a stranger, hijacked her car early one morning and announced his intent to rob her. He then drove her to a secluded location, “jumped on top” of her, said he was going to rape her, and began intercourse.
This unrebutted evidence shows more than the minimal elements of a rape upon Theresa H. It establishes with stark clarity that defendant had the actual, subjective, and specific purpose to proceed by criminal means—i.e., to accomplish the intercourse against Theresa’s will, and by means of force or fear.
Moreover, as both the majority and Justice Arabian explain, the forcible armed rape committed by defendant against Theresa H. included features markedly similar to the circumstances surrounding the charged offense. The two incidents were only six weeks apart. This repetitive similarity creates a strong inference that defendant’s intercourse with Denise B., like his intercourse with Theresa H., was undertaken with a criminal purpose to rape, and that he therefore did accomplish his intercourse with Denise, as with Theresa, against her will by means of force or fear. For this reason, I have no difficulty in concluding that neither section 1101 nor section 352 barred use of the Michigan rape to show defendant’s similar intent against Denise B. as intermediate evidence that he raped Denise B.
Since enacted as a codification of existing law (see Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 1101, p. 10), subdivision (b) of section 1101 has made clear that this statute is no bar to the admission of other acts committed by the accused insofar as they are relevant to prove any material fact in issue besides “his or her [mere] disposition to commit such an act.” The absolute prohibition imposed by section 1101 itself is thus quite narrow, and the variety of situations in which questions of admissibility might arise is infinite. It may occasionally be clear as a matter of law that section 1101 is an absolute bar to the admission of *435particular other-crimes evidence (see Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 317), but such easy solutions will be the exception, not the rule.
This makes it difficult to resolve other-crimes issues through the application of arbitrary rules purporting to interpret section 1101. Instead, the task of evaluating whether such evidence is being offered solely for a prohibited purpose, or is otherwise more prejudicial than probative, should proceed case by case. The responsibility should fall primarily upon trial judges exercising their careful discretion under section 352. Section 352, not section 1101, should provide the principal practical balance between the respective rights and interests of the accused and the People. Appellate review should afford the appropriate degree of deference to the trial court’s balancing efforts.
For reasons already stated, I believe defendant’s Michigan offense was not mere propensity evidence, but was relevant to common plan, corroboration, and intent, from which his commission of the charged conduct could be inferred. Accordingly, section 1101 was no absolute bar to admission of this evidence. Moreover, the majority correctly conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence under section 352. I therefore concur in the judgment.

Other crimes cannot be admitted unless relevant to an “ultimate fact" which is “ ‘actually in dispute’ ” (27 Cal.3d at p. 315), but, as Thompson makes clear, the fact proved by the other crimes need not itself be the ultimate fact; it may be merely an “intermediate fact” which forms a link in the chain of inferences leading to the ultimate fact. (Id., at pp. 315-317.) Thus, even if intent is not an express element of the criminal charge at issue, other crimes may still be admissible to prove intent as an intermediate fact from which criminal conduct, the ultimate fact in dispute, may be inferred. By failing to address this principle, some cases have unduly circumscribed the concept of intent as a basis for the admission of other criminal conduct.

All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code.