Court Opinion

ID: 9789546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:38:14.445685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:23.102674
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice
(dissenting).
I concur with Justice Maughan in his dissent and add these comments.
The plaintiff is seeking an evidentiary hearing in order to allow him the opportunity to prove factual allegations in his petition concerning inaccuracies in a pre-sen-tence report which he claims could and did affect his sentence. All statutory references are to the Utah Code Ann., 1953, unless otherwise indicated.
Sec. 77-35-12 states:
When discretion is conferred upon the court as to the extent of punishment, the court, at the time of pronouncing the judgment, may take into consideration any circumstances, either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, which may then be presented to it by either party.
And Sec. 77-35-13 in relevant part provides:
*862The circumstances must be presented by the testimony of witnesses examined in open court . . . . No affidavit or testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, shall be offered to or received by the court or a judge thereof in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, except as provided in this section.
The main opinion reasons that these sections are inapplicable as the District Court — in its sentencing of the defendant— had no discretion “as to the extent of the punishment” noted in Sec. 77-35-12. I believe nothing is more critical or significant concerning punishment than a determination whether a defendant will be sent to jail or prison or will be placed on probation without incarceration. And certainly the District Court had discretion concerning this matter. Therefore, I believe Secs. 77-35-12 and 77-35-13 are clear and applicable.
Assuming however that these sections are not controlling, then I believe Circuit Judge Goldberg makes a valid and compelling analysis in United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 555-556 (5th Cir., 1973) where he said:
It is true, as the government argues, that a majority of jurisdictions, including the Fifth Circuit, have denied defendants an absolute right to see and thereby rebut information in a presentence report. . Such assertions do not, however, dispose of this case. While the due process guarantee in Townsend has been judicially limited in order to preserve the confidentiality of the presentence report when and if in the district court’s discretion such confidentiality is desirable, and to prevent the sentencing process from turning into a full scale evidentiary-type hearing, it has also been widely recognized that where a sentencing judge explicitly relies on certain information in assessing a sentence, fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be given at least some opportunity to rebut that information. [Emphasis in original.]
In this case, I believe the plaintiff — at minimum — is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if the alleged inaccuracies in the pre-sentence report were relied upon by the sentencing judge, and if so, that he be given an opportunity to rebut the same.
Also, concerning the main opinion’s statement that the plaintiff’s petition is not a basis for habeas corpus because this matter could have been raised by appeal, I believe the reasons for not raising it thereby are sufficient to allow an evidentiary hearing as noted above.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of WILKINS, J.