Court Opinion

ID: 9546324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:27:37.602153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:16.270104
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
The judgment of conviction should be set aside for the reason that an essential element of the offense is absent. The evidence affirmatively discloses that the merchandise was resold in the manner as is customary in the food brokerage business. There is no intimation whatsoever that the resales were in any way fraudulent. It is not every debtor who removes, sells, conveys, assigns or conceals with intent to defraud but it is:
“Every debtor who fraudulently removes his property or effects out of this state, or fraudulently sells, conveys, assigns or conceals his property, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors of their rights, claims or demands is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail * * (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 43-2603, A.C.A.1939.
The statute provides the elements of the offense and is the yardstick against which the unlawfulness of the act must be measured. The adverb “fraudulently” modifies the verb “sells”. It restricts the sales to those consummated in a particular manner and categorizes the sales as those which partake of or are characterized by fraud.
The meaning of “fraud” is certain and readily ascertainable. It is defined by Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, as being—
“1. Quality of being deceitful; deceit ; trickery.
“2. The means by which deceit is practiced; artifice; trick. * *
The adverb “fraudulently” is not defined but the adjective “fraudulent” is:
“1. Using fraud; tricky; deceitful.
“2. Characterized by, founded on, or proceeding from, fraud; of the nature of fraud.
“3. Obtained or performed by artifice. * * *
*330Since the intent is specifically set forth in the statute, the qualifying adverb, as twice used therein, must mean that “deceit”, “artifice” or “trickery” accompany the sale or it can have no meaning whatsoever. A construction that deletes an essential element from the statute is an obvious absurdity and is a clear case of judicial tailoring to manufacture a criminal offense. It violates fundamental statutory interpretation consistently adhered to by this court that the various parts and provisions of a statute must be so harmonized as to make them consistent and sensible and to render every word operative, rather than idle or nugatory. Powers v. Isley, 66 Ariz. 94, 183 P.2d 880; Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Hilvert, 63 Ariz. 171, 160 P.2d 331; Hill v. Gila County, 56 Ariz. 317, 107 P.2d 377; Ellery v. State, 42 Ariz. 79; 22 P.2d 838.
To affirm the conviction, as the majority has done, where the facts do not constitute the offense prohibited by statute, is to catagenesize this court’s previous specific utterances:
“ * * * While liberal construction of criminal statutes is enjoined upon us by Sec. 43-102, A.C.A.1939, we are not permitted under the holding ' in State v. Behringer, 19 Ariz. 502, 172 P. 660, 661, to ‘ * * * extend the meaning of the language used by the Legislature to include all cognate or related acts to those actually condemned * * * ’; so by the same reasoning we are not permitted to ignore an element designated by the legislature to be essential to the commission of a criminal offense.” State v. Ferraro, 67 Ariz. 397, 198 P.2d 120, 123.
If the majority believe that the word “fraudulently” is susceptible of a different construction than that of trickery, deceit or artifice, then it is to be acknowledged that the statute is ambiguous.
“A statute, or any sentence, clause or word thereof is ‘ambiguous’ when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons, in either of two or more senses.” Thompson v. Akin, 81 Ill.App. 62.
Assuming but not conceding that the word “fraudulently” is ambiguous and is capable of being construed in other than its commonly understood and accepted meaning, then the construction of innocence must be preferred over that of guilt. In this state the penal statutes “are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.” Sec. 43-102, A.C.A.1939. This statute is word for word identical to California’s and was undoubtedly taken from that state. It was early construed there in the following language:
“ * * * While it is true the rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has been abrogated by the Code, which provides *331that ‘all its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its object and to promote justice,’ it is also true that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arises out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words, or the construction of language used in a statute, and we think the least that can be admitted fairly by those who claim the application of section 1205 to judgments of this kind is that the intention of the legislature to make it applicable to such cases is not clearly and with certainty expressed in the language used. * * * ” Ex parte Rosenheim, 83 Cal. 388, 391, 23 P. 372, 373.
The language quoted in this case has been repeatedly approved under a variety of circumstances:
“ * * * ‘When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted. In other words, criminal statutes will not be built up “by judicial grafting upon legislation * * * (I)t is also true that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.” ’ (People v. Ralph (1944), 24 Cal.2d 575, 581, 150 P.2d 401; People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.2d 121, 143, 169 P.2d 1; see also In re McVickers (1946), 29 Cal.2d 264, 278, 176 P.2d 40; In re Bramble (1947), 31 Cal.2d 43, 51, 187 P.2d 411; People v. Chessman (1951), 38 Cal.2d 166, 182, 238 P.2d 1001; Ex parte Rosenheim (1890), 83 Cal. 388, 391, 23 P. 372; People v. Sayre (1937), 26 Cal.App. Supp.2d 757, 761, 70 P.2d 546.)’’ People v. Western Air Lines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, 744.
All of the texts and nearly every jurisdiction has approved language similar in effect to that used in United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260:
“ * * * Not that penal statutes are not subject to the basic consideration that legislation like all other writings should be given, insofar as the language permits, a commonsensical meaning. But when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.”
Nor can the majority ignore their responsibility under the guise that the fail*332ure of proof of this essential element of the offense was not assigned as error. By statute, Section 44 — 2535(2) A.C.A. 1939, this court on appeal “may review the evidence whether its insufficiency is a ground of appeal or not.” It is settled that this court will review the record to determine if there has been “fundamental error”. State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757; Olson v. State, 36 Ariz. 294, 285 P. 282; Smith v. State, 23 Ariz. 469, 204 P. 1032; Martin v. State, 22 Ariz. 275, 196 P. 673, petition for rehearing denied 22 Ariz. 327, 197 P. 578.