Court Opinion

ID: 9956943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:01:10.840047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.096500
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

NANCY CINTRON,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          AT-0752-17-0078-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: April 2, 2024
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Ed Passman , Esquire, and Kevin L. Owen , Esquire, Silver Spring,
        Maryland, for the appellant.

      Nicole Davis , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

      Melissa Martinez , Esquire, and John Schettler Chamblee , Esquire,
       Peachtree City, Georgia, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed the agency’s removal action.        For the reasons discussed below, we
GRANT the appellant’s petition for review; AFFIRM the administrative judge’s
findings regarding the agency’s charges and the appellant’s claim of national
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

origin discrimination; MODIFY the initial decision to find that the appellant did
not establish harmful procedural error; VACATE the administrative judge’s
findings on nexus, the penalty, and the appellant’s claims of retaliation for equal
employment opportunity (EEO) and union activities; and REMAND the case to
the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant was a second grade teacher at Brittin Elementary School, an
elementary school for children of military members and certain civilian
employees.    Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 7, 73.           By letter dated
January 28, 2016, the agency notified the appellant that her performance under
Critical Element 1 of her performance plan was unacceptable and that she was
being placed on a 60-day performance improvement plan (PIP). IAF, Tab 13 at
69-80. In May 2016, the appellant’s performance under Critical Element 1 for
school year 2015-2016 was rated “Unacceptable.” Id. at 12. On July 27, 2016,
the agency proposed her removal under chapter 75 of title 5 of the United States
Code based on the following four charges: (1) unacceptable performance;
(2) failure to properly supervise students; (3) failure to follow posted lesson plan;
and (4) inappropriate interactions with students. IAF, Tab 8 at 35-51. Charge 1
was based on the appellant’s alleged unacceptable performance under Critical
Element 1 of her performance plan. Id. at 35-47. The deciding official sustained
the proposed removal effective September 30, 2016. Id. at 69-71. The appellant
subsequently filed an appeal in which she alleged, inter alia, that the agency
committed harmful procedural error, discriminated against her on the basis of her
national origin, and retaliated against her for her protected EEO and union
activities. IAF, Tab 1 at 7.
      After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
sustaining the appellant’s removal.     IAF, Tab 37, Initial Decision (ID).      The
administrative judge found that the agency proved each of its four charges by
                                                                                     3

preponderant evidence. ID at 4-36. The administrative judge then considered the
appellant’s affirmative defenses and found that she failed to establish that her
removal was the product of discrimination based on national origin or retaliation
for having been involved in EEO and union activities. ID at 36-38. In addition,
the administrative judge found that the agency established the nexus requirement
and that the penalty of removal was reasonable under the circumstances.            ID
at 38-40.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
File, Tab 3. The agency has filed a response to the appellant’s petition. PFR
File, Tab 5.
               DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      On review, the appellant alleges that the administrative judge applied the
incorrect standard for determining if the agency retaliated against her for her
union activity. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6-11. In addition, the appellant contends that,
regardless of whether the administrative judge applied the correct standard to this
claim, the administrative judge erred in failing to address record and testimonial
evidence relating to this allegation. 2 Id. at 11-23. The appellant also asserts that
the administrative judge failed to properly adjudicate her affirmative defense of
reprisal for protected EEO activity.     Id. at 23-25.    In addition, the appellant
alleges that the administrative judge failed to make sufficient findings regarding
her allegation of harmful procedural error. Id. at 25-29. As set forth below, we
find that a remand is necessary for further adjudication of the appellant’s
retaliation claims.

The agency met its burden of proving its charges.
      As previously noted, under Charge 1, the agency charged the appellant with
unacceptable performance. IAF, Tab 8 at 35. The administrative judge found
that the agency proved all five specifications that were sustained by the deciding

2
  Because we agree that the administrative judge applied the incorrect standard to the
appellant’s claim of reprisal for union activity, we need not address this argument.
                                                                                    4

official under this charge. 3 ID at 4-28; IAF, Tab 8 at 35-47, 69. Under each
specification, the agency charged the appellant with failing to meet a different
performance “substandard” under Critical Element 1 of her performance
standards. IAF, Tab 8 at 35-47. On review, the appellant offers no basis for
revisiting the administrative judge’s well-founded conclusions concerning this
charge. Because the record reflects that the administrative judge considered the
evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned
conclusions, we affirm the administrative judge’s findings regarding Charge 1.
See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no
reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings where she considered the
evidence      as    a     whole,   drew   appropriate     inferences,    and    made
reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services,
33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
      Similarly, the administrative judge found that the agency proved Charge 2
—failure to properly supervise students—which had one underlying specification.
ID at 28-29; IAF, Tab 8 at 47. Under the specification, the agency charged the
appellant with leaving her students unattended in her classroom while she was
speaking to another teacher in the hallway. IAF, Tab 8 at 47. We discern no
basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s determination that the agency
established        this     specification—and     thus      the     charge—through
documentary evidence and live testimony. See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06;
Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. at 359.
      As for Charge 3, failure to follow the appellant’s posted lesson plan, the
administrative judge found that the agency established two specifications
3
  The agency initially charged the appellant with six instances of misconduct under
Charge 1. IAF, Tab 8 at 35-47. Specifically, under Specification 2, the agency charged
the appellant with failing to meet Critical Element 1, Substandard (c) of her
performance plan. Id. at 36-38.        Under a separate specification also listed as
Specification 2, the agency charged the appellant with unacceptable performance under
Critical Element 1, Substandard (d) of her performance plan. Id. at 38-39. The
deciding official did not sustain the second Specification 2; thus, the administrative
judge properly did not consider that specification. Id. at 69; ID at 4.
                                                                                          5

underlying the charge. ID at 30-31. Under this charge, the agency charged the
appellant with failing, on six different dates, to follow a scheduled time for a
specific classroom activity. IAF, Tab 8 at 47-49. The administrative judge found
that the deciding official only sustained two of the specifications and that the
agency proved these specifications by preponderant evidence.                ID at 30-31.
Again, the appellant has provided nothing on review that would require us to
revisit the administrative judge’s findings that the agency proved these two
specifications, and accordingly, the charge. 4
       Finally, the administrative judge also found that the agency proved Charge
4, inappropriate interactions with students. ID at 32-36. Under the specifications
in support of the charge, the agency charged the appellant with making negative
comments to students that, in certain instances, allegedly embarrassed students.
IAF, Tab 8 at 49-50. The administrative judge found that the agency established
two out of the three specifications listed in support of the charge and, thus, that it
proved its charge.      ID at 32-36; see Burroughs v. Department of the Army,
918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that “proof of one or more, but not
all, of the supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge”).           The
administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved Charge 4 was based in part
on credibility determinations. ID at 35-36. The Board must give deference to an
administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly
4
  The administrative judge found, based on the deciding official’s testimony, that the
deciding official sustained only two of the specifications underlying Charge 3 because
the others concerned math. ID at 29-30. However, the decision letter states that all six
specifications under Charge 3 were sustained by the deciding official. IAF, Tab 8 at 69.
The deciding official did note in the decision letter that observations relating to math
were not considered in deciding the penalty. Id. at 70. To the extent the administrative
judge erred by not considering the other four specifications underlying the charge, any
such error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights . Panter v. Department of
the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is
not prejudicial to a party's substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial
decision). Specifically, because “proof of one or more, but not all, of the supporting
specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge,” Charge 3 can nonetheless be sustained
based on the specifications that the administrative judge did consider and uphold.
See Burroughs v. Department of the Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
                                                                                      6

or implicitly, on the observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a
hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has
“sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.        Haebe v. Department of Justice,
288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The appellant has not provided a basis for
disturbing the administrative judge’s credibility determinations or other findings
regarding the two sustained specifications under Charge 4.
         Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
established its four charges.

The appellant has not established harmful procedural error.
         As previously noted, the appellant alleges on review that the administrative
judge failed to adequately address her allegation of harmful procedural error.
PFR File, Tab 3 at 25-26.       The appellant asserts that the agency violated the
applicable collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by failing to give her a
reasonable opportunity to improve her performance prior to her removal. 5 Id.
at 25.
         The administrative judge recognized that the appellant raised this
affirmative defense in an order and summary of prehearing conference.             IAF,
Tab 31 at 8. The administrative judge properly advised the parties in the order
that, to establish harmful procedural error, the appellant must establish that the
procedural error was likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion
different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error.
Id.; Doe v. Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 90, ¶ 7 (2015).
         The administrative judge, however, does not appear to have analyzed this
allegation as a harmful error claim in the initial decision.              Rather, the
administrative judge appears to have considered it in analyzing whether the

5
  The applicable CBA states that, “[i]n those instances where improvement is necessary,
the [a]gency shall provide assistance to improve unacceptable performance prior to
proposing any performance-based action.” IAF, Tab 8 at 21. The CBA requires, among
other things, that the agency provide the employee with “a reasonable opportunity to
improve performance.” Id.
                                                                                   7

agency established its charge of unacceptable performance.         ID at 27.    The
administrative judge considered the appellant’s arguments that the principal of
Brittin Elementary School, who supervised the appellant during her PIP, only
criticized her, never told her how to improve, and was disruptive during the
classroom. ID at 27. After carefully considering the record, the administrative
judge found these assertions to be unsupported.      Id. Among other things, the
administrative judge noted that the principal tried to help the appellant improve
her performance by giving her written notes from her observations and meeting
with her to discuss them.     Id.    The administrative judge also noted that the
principal arranged for specialists from the school to work with the appellant and
provide her with additional training. Id.
      We therefore find that the administrative judge addressed the appellant’s
allegation that the agency did not provide her with a reasonable opportunity to
improve, and we discern no reason for disturbing the administrative judge’s
findings on this issue. To the extent the administrative judge erred in considering
this issue in analyzing Charge 1 rather than as an allegation of harmful procedural
error, any such error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights because
the administrative judge apprised the appellant on how to establish such an
affirmative defense and the appellant failed to meet her burden of proof on this
claim. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984)
(finding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party's substantive
rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).         Because the
administrative judge did not explicitly consider this allegation under the
analytical framework that is applicable to harmful procedural error claims, we
modify the initial decision to find that the appellant failed to establish any such
claim of harmful procedural error.
                                                                                     8

Remand is necessary for adjudication of the appellant’s allegation of reprisal for
having engaged in union activity.
       The administrative judge applied a general reprisal standard in the initial
decision when analyzing the appellant’s allegation that the agency retaliated
against her for her protected union activity. 6     ID at 37-38.     However, such a
standard is inapplicable to claims, like the one here, that allege reprisal for
participation in union-related activities under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B).
See Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶¶ 9-11 (2015). Section
2302(b)(9)(B) makes it unlawful for an individual to take, fail to take, or threaten
to take or fail to take a personnel action because of the employee “testifying for
or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred
to in [5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)] (i) or (ii).” Performing union-related duties are
protected activities under section 2302(b)(9).     Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 10.
Under such circumstances, this reprisal claim should be analyzed under the
burden-shifting standards set forth in section 1221(e). Id., ¶ 12.
       We therefore vacate the administrative judge’s findings regarding the
appellant’s allegation of reprisal for union activity.           Upon remand, the
administrative judge should apprise the appellant of her burden of proof on this
claim, afford the parties an opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue, and
hold a supplemental hearing if requested. The administrative judge must first
determine whether the appellant established that she engaged in such protected
activity, then consider whether that activity was a contributing factor in the
removal at issue in this appeal.     Id., ¶ 13.   If the appellant establishes those
factors by preponderant evidence, then the administrative judge must consider
whether the agency met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of the appellant’s protected activity.
Id., ¶ 14.

6
  The administrative judge also provided the appellant with the incorrect standard on
this claim, and on the appellant’s allegation of reprisal for prior EEO activity, in an
order and summary of prehearing conference. IAF, Tab 31 at 8.
                                                                                      9

The administrative judge applied the incorrect standard to the appellant’s
allegation of retaliation for protected EEO activity.
      After the initial decision was issued, the Board clarified the proper analytic
framework for adjudication of discrimination claims and claims of retaliation for
protected EEO activity.        Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget,
2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21-25, 30.         Under Pridgen, the appellant bears the initial
burden of proving by preponderant that the prohibited consideration was a
motivating factor in the agency's action. Id., ¶¶ 21, 30. Here, in considering the
appellant’s allegation of reprisal for protected EEO activity, the administrative
judge applied a general reprisal standard. ID at 37. The use of this standard was
in error. See id., ¶ 32. 7
      Thus, we vacate the administrative judge’s findings on the appellant’s
allegation of reprisal for protected EEO activity. On remand, the administrative
judge should instruct the parties of the standards of proof applicable to a claim of
EEO reprisal and provide them with an opportunity to further develop the
evidence on this issue.        The administrative judge’s new decision should
incorporate the correct standard for analyzing the appellant’s allegation of
reprisal for EEO activity. In the new initial decision, if the appellant fails to
prove her affirmative defenses of reprisal for EEO and union activities, than the
administrative judge may adopt her original findings regarding nexus and the
penalty. See Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 11 (2016).

7
  Regarding the appellant’s affirmative defense of national origin discrimination, the
administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole in finding that the appellant
failed to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in her removal. Because we
discern no error with the administrative judge’s motivating factor analysis or
conclusions regarding the appellant’s discrimination claim, it is unnecessary for us to
address whether discrimination or retaliation was a but-for cause of the removal action.
See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-25.
                                                                              10

                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.