Court Opinion

ID: 9794988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:15:34.733372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:22:48.468888
License: Public Domain

CURTIS, J.
I dissent. This action was tried by a jury, and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiffs for both compensatory and punitive damages. The appeal is from a judgment, modified in amount only, rendered upon said verdict. All questions of fact in the ease supported by substantial evidence are foreclosed by reason of the verdict of the jury.
The published article which it is claimed was libelous was the outgrowth or, it might be properly said, was the culmination of a dispute between the plaintiffs and various labor groups represented by the defendants. This dispute followed certain transactions by which the plaintiffs purported to sell to each of three individuals, one of whom had been in the employ of the plaintiffs as a driver of one of their milk routes, a truck which had previously been used by the plaintiffs in the delivery of milk in the city of Stockton. It was claimed by defendants that this transaction was not a bona fide sale of the trucks, but was a mere subterfuge whereby the plaintiffs sought to evade certain obligations as employers, such as minimum wages which they were under agreement to pay their drivers, and workmen’s compensation, unemployment benefits and other advantages to which an employee is entitled under the law of this state. On the other hand, the plaintiffs contended that the transactions in dispute were bona fide sales of their trucks to the three individual vendees, and that the latter in the operation of their respective trucks were no longer their employees but independent contractors. Whether these transactions were or were not actual sales of the trucks was a question of fact for the jury, and its verdict in favor of the plaintiffs was a finding that the transactions were bona fide sales and the purchasers of the trucks in their subsequent operations delivering milk over the three routes were not employees of plaintiffs.
The plan under which the plaintiffs proposed to dispose of their milk by means of the sale thereof in wholesale quan*163tities to truck owners, who resold the same at retail to milk consumers, has been referred to as the “vendor system,” and it has been held, as stated in the majority opinion, that the application of economic pressure by labor to abandon such a system is the pursuit of a legally justifiable end, citing among other cases Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products Inc., 311 U.S. 91 [61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed. 63]. Had the published article been confined to statements charging that the plaintiffs had adopted such a plan of doing business, no contention could be made as to its truthfulness, and under the decision last mentioned, the defendants would Have been justified in publishing an article embodying the facts of that controversy. But a reading of the article shows that no mention is made of this new plan under which the plaintiffs were then doing business, but certain definite and positive statements were made regarding the plaintiffs which they now contend were false and maliciously made, and accordingly libelous.
Among these alleged libelous statements appearing in said article the following may be mentioned: 1. Happyholme Dairy violates contracts with teamsters. 2. Because it had violated its signed agreement with Teamsters Local 439. 3. Hired non-union drivers. 4. Drivers were made to furnish their own vehicles. 5. Drivers were put on a straight commission plan. 6. The status of the drivers remained unchanged. 7. The management (Happyholme Dairy) openly violated its word by hiring non-union milk wagon drivers.
The last statement will first be given consideration. There can be no question that if this statement was false and unprivileged, it was libelous, and not even by the most ingenious course of reasoning may it be made to appear otherwise.
In the latest attempt of this court to define libel correctly as defined by section 45 of the Civil Code it is stated that “ ‘Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.’ (Civ. Code, sec. 45.) . . . These definitions have been held to include almost any language which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person’s reputation, either generally, or with respect to his occupation. (Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438, 441 [2 P.2d 383]; Stevens v. Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 62 [214 P. 968]; Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224, 227 [64 P. 290]; Tonini v. Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266, 272 [46 P. 103]); and words *164clearly conveying a meaning within one of the statutory categories are actionable per se.” (Washer v. Bank of America (1943), 21 Cal.2d 822, 827 [136 P.2d 297].)
That the statement charging that plaintiffs had openly violated their word by hiring non-union milk wagon drivers was false is practically conceded hy the majority opinion. But the opinion holds “that it is not necessary to prove the literal truth of an allegedly libelous accusation in every detail, so long as the imputation is substantially true so as to justify the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of the remark.” The “sting” in the accusation against plaintiffs was that they violated their word. The evidence shows that while under their contract with the local union to employ only union drivers, plaintiffs sold all their trucks to third persons so that thereafter they had no need of drivers, and did not thereafter employ in their business any drivers, either union or non-union. Proof of plaintiffs’ sale of their trucks and that thereafter they had no need of truck drivers was not substantial or any proof of the charge that they had violated their word which was the “sting” in the article.
The majority opinion cites the case of Hearne v. DeYoung, 119 Cal. 670 [52 P. 150, 499] in support of the statement just quoted respecting the degree of proof required to show that the article claimed to be libelous was true. That case furnishes a clear illustration of just what is meant by the terms “gist” and “sting” in an article claimed to be libelous. In that ease the defendant published what purported to be an account of a divorce trial between the plaintiff and his wife. The article published stated that the evidence showed that defendant committed an assault upon his wife by hurling dishes at her. It appeared at the trial of the libel action that defendant was not able to show that plaintiff in that suit committed an assault upon his wife by hurling dishes at her, but offered to prove that the evidence in the divorce action did show that defendant in said action committed an assault upon his wife by other means than hurling dishes. The trial court denied the offer and on appeal the judgment in plaintiff’s favor in the libel suit was reversed. In so deciding the court held: (page 675) “The sting, the hurt to the plaintiff is found in the fact that he is charged in the publication by the evidence with having assaulted his wife. . . . Substantially stated, the charge here is that the plaintiff assaulted his wife by hurling dishes at her. Testimony at the divorce trial of an assault of any kind upon his wife, by use *165of force and violence upon the part of the plaintiff, would prove the charge.” In the case before us the “sting,” the hurt to the plaintiffs, is found in the fact that they were charged in the article published with violating their word. Defendants were unable to prove in support of this charge that plaintiffs had hired non-union drivers, but contend that they did prove that plaintiffs, while under contract with Local No. 439 to hire union drivers only in their milk business, had sold their trucks to third parties and thereafter had no need to hire drivers for their trucks, and did not after said sales hire any driver, either union or non-union. The “sting” in the libel was the charge that plaintiffs violated their word, and proof that plaintiffs had put into effect a plan under which they would no longer need drivers cannot be said to be substantial or any proof of the charge, so as to remove the sting from the publication. The article therefore was false as found by the jury.
The majority opinion holds that even if false, the publication was conditionally privileged, and was therefore not libelous, as there was no evidence that the publication was actuated by malice, and therefore the record shows no evidence which supports a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor on that ground. Said opinion holds that the asserted republication of the article in two subsequent issues of the labor journal consisted of nothing more than legitimate “follow up” stories to inform the recipients of the paper of continuing developments of the controversy. No authorities are cited in support of the above statement. Presumably none are to be found. The question is not new in this state. In the early case of Norris v. Elliott, 39 Cal. 72, a case for slander, the court at page 74 held as follows: “Nor did the Court err in admitting proof that the slanderous words were repeated after the action was commenced. This proof was offered and admitted only as a proof of malice and was competent for that purpose. [Citing authorities.]” Again this question came before this court in the ease of Chamberlin v. Vance, 51 Cal. 75, also a case for slander. On page 84 of the opinion it is stated: “The words testified to by the witness Abbott, do not enlarge the meaning of the words of the complaint, if construed in accordance with the averment above recited. The words testified to by the witness were spoken after the commencement of the action, but as they were substantially the same as those declared on, they were admissible to prove the quo animo with *166which the alleged slander was originally published. The words spoken after were of similar import to those spoken before this action was brought. They may be considered a repetition, and so were admissible on the question of malice. [Citing authorities.] ” In the case of Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59 [28 P. 845], likewise an action for slander, the law is stated as follows: (page 69) “Upon this issue the plaintiff was at liberty to introduce any competent evidence of express malice as fully as though it had been alleged in her original complaint and denied in the answer of the defendant; and other utterances of words of similar import would be competent evidence for that purpose. (Evening Journal Ass’n v. Mc-Dermott, 44 N.J.L. 430; 43 Am.Rep. 392; Chamberlin v. Vance, 51 Cal. [75] 84; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 418; Townshend on Slander and Libel, sec. 392.) ”
A still later case than those just cited is the case of Hearne v. DeYoung, 119 Cal. 670, 677 [52 P. 150, 499], already mentioned. Plaintiff sued to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of a publication of an article claimed by plaintiff to have been libelous. The trial court admitted in evidence a second publication of the alleged libelous article made after the institution of said action. It was contended that the admission of this subsequent publication was error, but this court held to the contrary, as follows: (page 677) “When we consider that these publications are only admissible for the single purpose of proving malice actuating the defendant in the original publication, it is difficult to see substantial reasons why the commencement of the action should be a bar to the admission of publications made thereafter; but, whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, in this state we deem the matter settled by the adjudications.” The court then cites Norris v. Elliott, supra, Chamberlin v. Vance, supra, and Harris v. Zanone, supra, in support of its statement that the rule is deemed settled in this state.
Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143 [116 P. 530] was also to the same effect.' That case was approved in Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 Cal. 345 [184 P. 672, 12 A.L.R. 1007], in the following language at page 362 and which admits of no uncertainty: “If the evidence has such logical import, and is not otherwise incompetent, it must be received, and it is for the triers of the fact to determine the weight to be given to such evidence. The fact that it may also tend to establish the publication of other distinct libels, published either before *167or after the one constituting the cause of action, is to he regarded as merely incidental and as not furnishing ground for the exclusion of the evidence. Nor is it material that other actions may thus be shown to exist against the party. Hence, where punitive or exemplary damages are sought in an action for civil libel any evidence (which in no other respect is objectionable), having a logical tendency to prove that the publication was prompted by actual malice, is material, competent, and relevant. This is the plain meaning of Davis v. Hearst, supra, and if there was any question about the state of our law on the subject prior to that decision there is none now. It is inconceivable that since the law provides for recovery upon publications made with actual malice the existence of the fact may not be established by the very best evidence—namely, evidence of other libels tending to show a malicious and vindictive attitude of mind toward the injured party. To hold otherwise would be to recognize a right in the party defamed but deny to him a full opportunity to establish and enforce it.”
In the present case there were publications both before and after the commencement of this action, so that the above rule as to their admission to prove malice applies. This evidence being admissible the question of malice then became a question for the jury. (Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., supra; Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 282 [9 P.2d 505, 81 A.L.R. 908].) The verdict of the jury cannot be construed in any other light than a finding that the statement in the published article that plaintiffs had violated their word was false and malicious. If false and malicious, it was not privileged under subdivision 3, section 47 of the Civil Code, or under any other provision of said section, or under any other law of this state. This finding being supported by substantial evidence is therefore binding on this court.
Other testimony in the record supporting the finding of the jury that the article was published maliciously relates to the statement made by Conby to the plaintiffs that if the new plan was not abandoned “You will never sell much milk. ’ ’ In other words it was a threat to ruin the business of the plaintiffs, which the evidence shows represented an investment of over one hundred thousand dollars, and by which the plaintiffs were supplying a large portion of the inhabitants of the city of Stockton with fresh milk, and employing a number of employees in addition to the former drivers of *168their trucks. These words could not have been spoken in response to any feeling of good will or indifference toward the plaintiffs. They clearly indicate but one sentiment and that was a feeling of ill will and resentment against the plaintiffs, an intention and willingness to vex and hurt those who opposed the wishes of the person uttering them. Their utterance clearly indicated a malicious intent on the part of the latter. “Malice in fact is a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person.” (16 Cal.Jur. 33, sec. 10.)
From what has been said above, it is clear that the statement in the published article that the plaintiffs had violated their word was false and malicious. It is therefore not necessary to go into detail respecting the other statements set out in the previous part of this dissent which were of the same general character as that just discussed. While it may be that they were less injurious and therefore less objectionable, they were nevertheless uttered with the same disregard for truthfulness and with the same willingness to injure the person against whom they were directed. The same penalty must therefore be visited upon those responsible for their publication as is imposed for the publication of the more serious and more objectionable matter set forth in the published article.
While not discussed in the majority opinion, the contention is made by the defendants other than the publishers of the Labor Journal that, conceding all that is said regarding the libelous character of the published article, there is no evidence that said defendants either printed or published, or procured its publication.
The evidence in this case shows that for some three months before the boycott was declared, these defendants were working together in order to persuade the plaintiffs to abandon their new plan of doing business. They held several meetings in which all were present. They had interviews with the plaintiffs and the latter’s employees, and the new drivers of plaintiffs’ trucks. Finally after all their efforts failed, and as a result of the combined efforts of these defendants, it was found necessary to declare a boycott and one was declared against the plaintiffs. But declaring the boycott would have but slight effect upon plaintiffs’ business unless the union labor people of the vicinity were informed of that fact. The most effective way to reach these people was through the columns of the Labor Journal. It was not only the official *169organ of the Labor Council, but was taken by the union labor people generally throughout the city of Stockton and nearby communities. The published article appeared in the Labor Journal immediately after the boycott was declared. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence is that the article was published by these defendants. They were the only persons interested in its publication, and its publication was necessary in order to make effective the boycott which they had declared against the plaintiff. The verdict of the jury finding that these defendants published said article in my opinion is fully supported by the evidence. If the findings of the fact finding body are supported by inferences which may be fairly drawn from the evidence, the reviewing court is without power to disturb such findings. (Pacific Lumber Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., 22 Cal.2d 410, 422 [139 P.2d 892].)
In closing it may be appropriate to call attention to a statement in the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Stone in which Justices Roberts and Frankfurter concurred in the case of Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 [63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796], On page 1358 [63 S.Ct.] will be found the statement referred to and which is as follows: “I think these findings are abundantly supported by the evidence, and hence that it is not within our judicial competence to set them aside—even though, sitting as trial judges, we might have made some other finding. The judgment below, cancelling petitioner’s citizenship on the ground that it was illegally obtained, should therefore be affirmed. The finality which attaches to the trial court’s determinations of fact from evidence heard in open court, and which ordinarily saves them from an appellate court’s intermeddling, should not be remembered in every case save this one alone.”
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed against all of the defendants.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied November 29, 1943. Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., voted for a rehearing.