Court Opinion

ID: 9668248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:07:22.903203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:44.095930
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. The majority holds as a matter of law that a bank owes no duty to protect its Automated Teller Machine customers against criminal activity, even when it is the bank that has invited those customers onto the premises to do business at those machines. The majority, furthermore, makes its decision without adopting or using any standard for assessing under what circumstances a duty of care might be owed, either for this case or for any case in the future. The upshot of this decision is that a bank need do nothing to protect its customers at ATM’s where crime has already occurred. It need not provide better illumination, more sophisticated cameras, proximity to well-traveled thoroughfares, or elimination of hiding places. It owes no duty of care. Because I believe that under certain circumstances a duty of care does attach in this unique context where money is dispensed out in the open at all hours of the day or night, the issue of whether the bank was negligent should have been submitted to the jury for resolution. To be sure, a bank’s customer — Boren, in this case — bears a substantial responsibility for her own safety in using an ATM during off-hours. And a jury might well find that a bank is not predomi-nandy liable for injury caused by a criminal at an ATM because the danger was known or obvious. But that is not the point. The point is whether the bank owed any duty to its patrons to act reasonably to minimize criminal activity at the Baseline ATM. I believe that it did and that it cannot completely wash its hands of that duty merely because the danger was criminal in nature. The facts of this case more than suggest that a climate for crime existed at the Baseline ATM. We have the unique situation of money dispensed outdoors at night without bank employees around for protection. That in itself is a special temptation to the criminal element. We have a previous crime committed at the ATM within three months of the Boren robbery. We have criminal statistics illustrating that this ATM was located in one of the highest violent crime areas of the city. We know that the Baseline ATM was Worthen National Bank’s oldest “drive-through” ATM in Little Rock. A security expert raised questions by affidavit about safety factors at this site such as its location away from well-traveled public roads and the insufficiency of the lighting. Surrounding foliage that provided cover for criminals and the inadequacy of the surveillance cameras were other security lapses raised by Boren. Considering these factors, another robbery like Boren experienced was not merely conceivable, it was likely to occur. Moreover, the aggregate of all of these circumstances leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the bank was aware that a risk to its patrons existed. A duty of care should follow that knowledge. Other jurisdictions have looked to the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a duty exists. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985); Torres v. United States Bank, 670 P.2d 230 (Or. App. 1983); see also Sun Trust Banks, Inc. v. Killebrew, 266 Ga. 109, 464 S.E.2d 207 (1995) (Justice Sears concurring). Justice Sears in her concurring opinion in Killebrew makes the point precisely: Many of the methods for protecting ATM customers are simple and already in place. They include increased lighting and surveillance, placing ATMs in the front of banks, informing customers regarding self-protection, and providing secured enclosures. In fact, in Georgia, increased lighting and customer education are now mandated by law. Finally, a holding that an operator of an ATM has a duty to provide reasonable protection to its customers is not a holding that a bank is an insurer of its customers. After establishing a duty, an injured customer must still prove that the bank breached that duty and that that breach was the proximate cause of the customer’s injuries. 266 Ga. at 112, 464 S.E.2d at 210. What apparendy drives the majority to its conclusion is the worry that assessing some duty of care against the bank in this case will open the floodgates to a torrent of litigation against all businesses. That fear is unfounded. This case involves only Automated Teller Machines and the bank’s responsibility to take some action to safeguard its business customers and to minimize criminal activity at that location. The ATM method of doing business cannot equate to that of a convenience store or to other merchandizing establishments. None of those businesses dispenses money out in the open at all hours of the night without people being present. ATM’s, in short, are a unique experiment. Nor am I persuaded that requiring some protective action by the bank (lighting, cameras, elimination of hiding places) shifts the responsibility to protect against crime from the public to the private sector. It merely requires the bank to be sensitive and sensible with respect to the people with whom it does business. Such protective action falls into the category of pure common sense. And it is essential in this day and age. I have no doubt that customers of the Baseline Road ATM who live in the area would welcome better lighting and cameras and a more secure setting so that they can do business during off-hours with an enhanced sense of safety. The majority’s argument is that the bank should not be saddled with the burden of protecting against unexpected criminal activity. But criminal activity is a “dangerous instrumentality” that was reasonably anticipated in this context and should have been minimized by some protective action. The Restatement (Second) of Torts clearly supports a duty of care under these circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 344, Comment f, pp. 225-226 (1965). Moreover, this court has placed a duty on businesses in other situations where the peril was known to exist, albeit hidden, even when the visitor was on the premises as a mere licensee as opposed to a business invitee. See, e.g., Lively v. Libbey Memorial Physical Medicine Ctr., Inc., 311 Ark. 41, 841 S.W.2d 609 (1992). Perhaps protective action was taken by the bank. But we do not know one way or the other. Thus, it is an issue that should be litigated. In granting Worthen National Bank’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court invoked Page v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975); and Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962), in its letter opinion as well as Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d 250 (1994). That authority is not controlling. The majority opinion appropriately discounts the landlord-tenant case of Bartley v. Sweetser, supra, and further correctly declines to accept or adopt the specific harm test used by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Page v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., supra, and by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Cornpropst v. Sloan, supra. In addition, the 1962 case of Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, supra, dealt with the duty to provide police protection in a housing project. Not only is that case categorically different from an ATM case, but the precise issue of providing police protection is not before us. The issue in the instant case is whether any duty of care was owed to minimize the potential for a criminal incident. I believe that a duty was owed, and for that reason I respectfully dissent. Whether the bank satisfied its duty in this case and whether Boren placed herself in a precarious situation that was known and obvious were issues for the jury to resolve. Corbin, J., joins.