Court Opinion

ID: 9824625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:01:01.961626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:12.899206
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The relevancy of the question asked the defendant by his counsel, and to which objection was sustained, “If there had been one burning could you have seen it?” was to show that the tail lamp, if there was one on the Davis truck, was not lighted. The defendant testified in respect to this inquiry: “I was on the right hand side of the road and was looking at the road all the time. When the car passed us we crashed into the truck. I saw no obstruction, a truck or anything else, in the road just prior to the accident. I saw no tail light in front of me. * * * there was no tail light burning on the truck. I was looking in that direction.” This fully answered the question to which the objection was sustained, and, moreover, an affirmative . answer of the witness in the light of his testimony would have been, at most, a mere con-. elusion.
The question held to be relevant and material in Morgan Hill Paving Co. v. Fonville, 222 Ala. 120, 130 So. 807, was how far the witness could see the unlighted barricade, “as’ he came out of that curve going on down the hill, down the decline.” This statement differentiates the holding in that case from the case at bar, and renders that case as inapt to sustain the contention that the court erred herein to appellant’s injury.
The defendant testified: “When I became blinded I removed my foot from the accelerator and pulled to the right * * * as far as I dared. * * * When I took my fóot off the accelerator I did not kick the clutch' and did not put on the brake. * * * The crash came very shortly after I was blinded; in less time than it has taken to tell it. * * * I did not see the truck before the collision. I didn’t see it until I stopped.” In these circumstances, if defendant had had time to do anything other than what he did, he certainly did not know or apprehend the necessity for taking further preventive action to stop the car in avoidance of the collision, and it is not reasonable to assume that he would have done so, and therefore error to reverse cannot be predicated on the action of the court in sustaining the plaintiff’s objection to the question, “Was there any time to do any thing other than that?” If the testimony had shown that defendant saw the track and appreciate its proximity to his ear and the imminent danger of collision, a different question would be presented.
For the same reason, the refusal of the court to allow the defendant to answer the' question, “At the time of the accident did you have the car under control?” was without injury.
In Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481, 483, the suit was by the wife against the husband, and the testimony was to the effect that the wife was operating the car and just immediately before the accident the husband interfered with her operation, and the question, “In your best judgment, you had control of the car, * * * you say?” was held proper as tending to show that the interference of the husband was negligence proximately contributing to the injury.
In the absence of a plea of contributory negligence, the question asked the defendant, “Was Judge Dannelly looking ahead immediately before the accident?” called for immaterial testimony.
The witness Godbold testified on cross-examination: “I am one of the attorneys in this case. I have a financial interest in the result of this case.”
*156Defendant’s counsel in arguing the ease to the j.ury said: “Mr. Godbold has testified that he is financially interested in the result of this suit. It is common knowledge that employment contracts in casest like this provide for a fee of ;-.” On objection to this argument, the court stated: “He may argue that Mr. Godbold has a financial interest in the result of this suit, but there is no evidence before you about the fees that attorneys will receive in this case.” There is nothing in this ruling upon which to predicate error. (Italics supplied.)
The application is without merit, and is due to be overruled. It is so ordered.
Application overruled.
ANDERSON, C. J., and THOMAS and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.