Court Opinion

ID: 9621250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:54:33.393634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:59.767702
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The defendant earnestly insists that the evidence demanded a verdict in his favor, and for that reason any error committed by the court in denying the motion for new trial was harmless to the plaintiff.
The petition alleged that some of the acts of negligence that caused the death of the plaintiff’s husband were that, on the occasion when he was fatally injured by being struck with an automobile driven by the defendant, the defendant was negligent in operating his automobile in violation of Code (Ann. Supp.) § 68-301 at a greater speed than under the alleged circumstances was reasonable and safe; and that the defendant was negligent in not having his automobile under control, and negligent in not turning his automobile to the left so as to avoid striking the deceased. The evidence showed that the tragedy occurred about Dalton in the highway leading from Dalton to Chatsworth; that *616the defendant’s automobile was headed in the direction of Chats-worth; that the deceased, who lived on the side of the highway— which was the right side of the highway for those traveling from Dalton—had just stepped out of his driveway on the pavement preparatory to going over to the bus which he intended to board; that the road was straight for two hundred feet from that point toward Dalton and was dry at the time. As to the speed of the plaintiff’s automobile, from the testimony of some of the witnesses, it could be reasonably inferred that the deceased, who weighed between 170 and 180 pounds, was knocked 33 feet by the impact of the defendant’s automobile; and one of the witnesses, who observed the defendant’s automobile approach the deceased, testified it was traveling at a speed of from 45 to 50 miles per hour. There was other evidence of speed, which we think hardly necessary to recite here. It is obvious from the evidence that we have referred to that a jury was authorized to decide that the speed at which the defendant drove his automobile was greater than was reasonable and safe under the circumstances related.
There was also testimony that the right tire marks of the defendant’s automobile at the deceased’s driveway were within eighteen inches of the edge of the pavement; that the skid marks extended 28 feet in the direction of Dalton and the direction from which the defendant approached the driveway, and 14 feet past the driveway; and that the right fender and light on the defendant’s car were damaged-—all of which indicated that the deceased was struck at a point very close to the entrance to his driveway. There was a conflict in the testimony as to whether the defendant could have seen the deceased in time to have avoided hitting Him if .he had his automobile under such control as ordinary care would dictate. The defendant testified that he did not see the deceased until he struck him, and the defendant’s witness testified that he could see the defendant’s automobile approaching the deceased for about 150 yards before striking him.
Since, according to some of the witnesses, the paved portion of the pavement was 20 feet wide, and other witnesses testified that the bus was pulling off the pavement on the opposite side from that where the deceased entered upon it, the jury could logically infer that, if the defendant had exercised ordinary care, he could *617have turned his automobile to the left and avoided colliding with the deceased. This is true though a defendant’s witness, the driver of the bus, stated that in his opinion, had the deceased turned to the left, he would have struck one of two cars that had just passed him. It was not clearly understandable just how the defendant’s automobile by turning to the left could have struck an automobile that had already passed traveling in the same direction. But all of these matters were for consideration by the jury.
So we conclude that there was some evidence that supported the plaintiff’s contentions that the defendant was negligent in the specified particulars on the occasion under investigation.
The case was not one in which a verdict in the defendant’s favor was demanded by the evidence.
Of course, if the deceased’s own carelessness was the sole proximate cause of his death, or if he was not in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, he could not recover. The only evidence as to lack of care on his part was that he did not look in the direction of Dalton before stepping on the pavement. The defendant’s bus driver testified that the defendant’s car was apparently 150 feet from him after he was either on the pavement or very near its edge. The evidence did not disclose whether he had looked in the direction of Dalton before he went upon the paved portion of the road. In these circumstances it was a question for the jury whether he was guilty of such negligence as would debar his wife’s right to recover for his death.
Ground 2 of the defendant’s motion for a rehearing is based upon the contention that the ownership of a policy in a mutual insurance company is not such interest as would disqualify a juror from serving on a jury which was deciding a case in which the mutual insurance company had an interest.- The defendant contends that there would be no vested interest because the policyholder would only receive dividends as declared by the board of directors of the insurance company. Stockholders in most corporations only receive dividends when declared by the board of directors of that corporation. Therefore, this contention of the defendants is without merit.
In Gossett v. State, 201 Ga. 809 (41 S. E. 2d 308), it was held that policyholders of a mutual insurance company would be dis*618qualified because the ownership of such policies would give to jurors a personal intei’est in the verdict of the case. In that case it was not stated what type of mutual policies were held by the jurors and, after a perusal of the record in that case, it was disclosed that no copy of the policy was made a part of the record, and it is assumed that the court was not concerned with what type of mutual policy the jurors held. Therefore, this ground of the motion for a rehearing is without merit for the reasons assigned.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff did not show that she was forced to use her peremptory challenge to rid the jury of Springfield. This court ruled that the plaintiff was denied one of the six peremptory strikes to which she was entitled. The record shows she used six strikes to rid the panel of jurors who were objectionable to her. If Springfield had not been allowed to remain on the panel, but had been replaced by another juror, the plaintiff might have selected the new juror in preference to the jurors allowed to remain on the jury. Therefore, the plaintiff was denied one of the peremptory strikes.

Rehearing denied.

Felton, C. J., and Nichols, J., concur.