Court Opinion

ID: 9957263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 21:04:40.452017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:11.796110
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/3/24 Pfeiffer v. Smart CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                       THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Placer)
                                                            ----

 CHARITIE PFEIFFER,                                                                            C097484

                    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     (Super. Ct. No. SCV0048884)

           v.

 HEATHER L. SMART,

                    Defendant and Respondent.

         This appeal arises out of civil harassment proceedings. After a traffic collision,
plaintiff Charitie Pfeiffer filed a petition for a civil harassment restraining order against
defendant Heather Smart under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.1 The trial court
denied Pfeiffer’s petition without prejudice and later granted Smart’s motion for attorney
fees and costs. On appeal from that order, Pfeiffer argues that Smart was not entitled to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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an award of attorney fees because she was not the prevailing party within the meaning of
section 527.6, as the purported dismissal of Pfeiffer’s petition without prejudice did not
constitute a final judgment. Pfeiffer alternatively argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding Smart attorney fees in the unreasonable amount of $18,939. We
affirm the trial court’s order.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       We briefly summarize the pertinent facts and procedure.
       The Traffic Collision and Civil Lawsuit
       In the summer of 2022, Pfeiffer and Smart lived in Roseville. Their sons played
football on the same team (for ages 10 and under). Smart was the “team mom.”
       In late May 2022, there was a traffic collision involving Pfeiffer and Smart;
Pfeiffer was driving a sport utility vehicle (SUV) and Smart was riding a non-motorized
scooter or stand-up bicycle.2 Neither party called the police and no officer responded to
the scene.
       In early August 2022, Smart and her husband filed a personal injury action against
Pfeiffer, which included a claim for loss of consortium.
       Petitions for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order
       Three days later, Pfeiffer filed a petition for a civil harassment restraining order
against Smart under section 527.6. In support of her petition, Pfeiffer alleged that, after
the traffic collision, Smart’s husband repeatedly threatened her via text messages and
phone calls in an attempt to “extort[]” money, including a voice message demanding
$2,000 for a replacement bicycle. Pfeiffer also alleged that, in an attempt to harass and
intimidate her, Smart “publicly” posted a photograph of her SUV on social media that

2 The parties disagree as to whether Smart was riding a non-motorized scooter or stand-
up bicycle at the time of the traffic collision. This factual dispute is immaterial to the
resolution of the legal issues raised on appeal.

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was accompanied by a “long slander/defamation statement.” According to Pfeiffer, she
and her (crying) young children can be seen in the photograph. The petition additionally
alleged that Smart and her husband continued to harass Pfeiffer after the police “asked”
them to “stop,” that Smart and her husband “had” other people post messages on the
Roseville Police Department’s website, and that Smart was not sending Pfeiffer “football
emails.” The trial court denied Pfeiffer’s petition pending a hearing on the matter. In
doing so, the court determined the temporary restraining order requested by Pfeiffer was
not warranted.
       Less than two weeks later and on the day after Pfeiffer was personally served with
the personal injury complaint, Pfeiffer filed an amended petition for a civil harassment
restraining order against Smart under section 527.6. The amended petition included the
following additional allegations of harassment: Smart, as the “team mom,” refused to
notify Pfeiffer of relevant matters concerning her son and posted two pictures of him on
social media, Smart and her husband followed Pfeiffer home after a football practice and
took photographs, and Smart used her position as “team mom” to locate Pfeiffer’s home
and was in Pfeiffer’s front yard at one point. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order ex parte, which directed Smart to, among other things, stay away from
and not harass or contact Pfeiffer and her son until the completion of the hearing on
Pfeiffer’s amended petition.
       In early September 2022, Smart filed a written response to Pfeiffer’s amended
petition. Smart denied Pfeiffer’s allegations of harassment, objected to the orders
requested (e.g., stay away orders), and asked for an award of attorney fees and costs.3 As
part of her response, Smart provided a written statement detailing the reasons why she
disagreed with the relief requested by Pfeiffer. By way of background, Smart explained

3 At that time, Smart claimed that she had “accumulated $10,453.50 in fees” and would
likely incur “additional fees.”

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that she suffered “significant personal injuries” and her bicycle was “totaled” after
Pfeiffer negligently ran a stop sign and collided with her in a crosswalk. Smart further
explained that she filed a civil lawsuit against Pfeiffer, and that, in Smart’s view, Pfeiffer
was seeking a restraining to prevent her from attending her son’s sporting events as a
“bargaining chip” to assist Pfeiffer in the lawsuit. Smart claimed that Pfeiffer’s
allegations of harassment were not supported by any evidence and could be proven false,
including Pfeiffer’s allegations of harassing phone calls and text messages. According to
Smart, Pfeiffer lied about each and every allegation in her petition, which showed that
she sought a restraining order in bad faith and with malicious intent. Smart noted that she
had been “forced” to file her own petition for a civil harassment restraining order against
Pfeiffer due to false allegations Pfeiffer had made to other parents, and because Pfeiffer’s
friends were harassing her, “talking about guns” to scare her, and trying to get her fired
from her job.4 In support of her position, Smart submitted a variety of evidence,
including phone records.
       Around a week later, Pfeiffer filed a petition for a civil harassment restraining
order against Smart’s husband under section 527.6.5 Pfeiffer alleged that Smart’s

4 The appellate record does not include Smart’s petition for a civil harassment restraining
order against Pfeiffer.
5 This petition is not included in the appellate record. Around the same time as it was
filed, Pfeiffer met with a police officer for the purpose of obtaining an emergency
protective order. During this meeting, Pfeiffer explained the circumstances giving rise to
her civil harassment petitions, and showed the officer a photograph of the scooter/bicycle
Smart was riding at the time of the traffic collision. According to the officer, the
“scooter/bicycle did not match the photograph of the new one [that] [Smart’s husband]
was trying to get Pfeiffer to pay approximately $2000.00 for. However, it matched very
closely, down to the same branding as the one [that] Pfeiffer showed [him] on Amazon
for just $75.00.” In the officer’s view, it appeared that Smart’s husband “was attempting
to defraud Pfeiffer of approximately $1925.00 more than the value of the actual property
involved in th[e] collision based on the evidence provided by Pfeiffer.”

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husband engaged in “harassing behavior” after the temporary restraining order was
granted against Smart, including making “vulgar sounds . . . towards [Pfeiffer] and [her]
children at their school sports activities.” Although not entirely clear, the record suggests
that the petition also included an allegation that Smart confronted Pfeiffer’s husband at a
“sporting event” and “publicly” accused him of domestic violence, which further
harassed . . . Pfeiffer and cause[d] her to fear for her safety and the safety of her family.”
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order ex parte, which directed Smart’s
husband to, among other things, stay away from Pfeiffer until the completion of the
hearing on Pfeiffer’s petition.
       In late September 2022, Smart filed a supplemental opposition to Pfeiffer’s
amended petition. Smart reiterated her argument that there was no evidence to support a
restraining order (including any evidence of harassing phone calls or text messages), and
added that the evidence she submitted showed that each and every allegation made by
Pfeiffer was false. Smart explained that while she did ask for payment from Pfeiffer as
part of settlement negotiations related to the civil lawsuit, she only asked for $1,000, not
$2,000, and that the civil lawsuit was filed in response to Pfeiffer’s refusal to pay the
amount requested. Smart, again, claimed that Pfeiffer sought a restraining order as a
“retaliatory effort,” explaining that Pfeiffer’s petition was filed shortly after she was
served with the personal injury complaint. Smart also claimed that she had “accumulated
significant attorney’s fees for which Pfeiffer should be liable to pay” in the amount of
$36,461.50. In support of her request for attorney fees, Smart submitted a declaration
from her counsel, which included itemized billing records setting forth the hours
expended and hourly rates of the persons that worked on this matter, and a description of
the work they performed. The declaration also identified the expenses incurred by
Smart’s counsel in litigating this matter in the amount of $191.55.

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       Trial Court’s Ruling on the Petitions for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order
       In October 2022, after a hearing where Pfeiffer testified, the trial court issued an
order dissolving the temporary restraining orders and dismissed without prejudice all of
the petitions for a civil harassment restraining order. The appellate record does not
include a reporter’s transcript of this hearing.
       Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
       Three days later, Smart filed a motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to
section 527.6, subdivision (s), arguing that such relief was warranted because she was the
prevailing party on Pfeiffer’s petition for a civil harassment restraining order. Smart
requested attorney fees in the amount of $36,461.50 and expenses in the amount of
$191.55.
       Pfeiffer did not file a written opposition. Instead, Pfeiffer filed a declaration,
asserting that the fee motion should be denied because she did not seek a restraining
order against Smart in retaliation for the civil lawsuit or to “gain an upper hand” in that
lawsuit, and because the fee motion was not properly served. In her declaration, Pfeiffer
requested that the court deny Smart’s “exorbitant and unreasonable” request for attorney
fees and costs because she was not “responsible for any harassment . . . on social media
or in person.”
       In November 2022, after a hearing, the trial court granted Smart’s motion,
awarding her attorney fees in the reduced amount of $18,939 and costs in the amount of
$191.55. In doing so, the court denied Smart’s request for a multiplier.
       Appeal
       Pfeiffer timely appealed from the order awarding fees and costs.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Pfeiffer argues that Smart was not entitled to an award of attorney fees because
she was not the prevailing party within the meaning of section 527.6, as the dismissal of
Pfeiffer’s petition for a civil harassment restraining order “without prejudice” did not

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constitute a final judgment. Pfeiffer alternatively argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding Smart attorney fees in the unreasonable amount of $18,939. As
we next explain, the claims are forfeited. Further, they are meritless.
                                               I
                                          Forfeiture
       As a threshold matter, we conclude that Pfeiffer has forfeited her claims of error.
       A. Applicable Appellate Rules of Procedure
       It is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court’s order is
presumed to be correct and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 564.) All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the trial
court’s order on matters as to which the record is silent, and the appellant must
affirmatively establish error. (Denham, at p. 564.)
       “Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than
general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review.”
(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) “ ‘[O]ne cannot simply say the court erred, and
leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.’ ” (People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.) An appellant has the burden to establish error “by
presenting legal authority on each point made and factual analysis, supported by
appropriate citations to the material facts in the record; otherwise, the argument may be
deemed forfeited.” (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655; see Hodjat v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [“an appellant is
required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it applies in his
case”].) It is not an appellate court’s responsibility to develop an appellant’s arguments.
(Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11.)
Appellate courts may, and ordinarily do, “disregard conclusory arguments that are not

                                              7
supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the
appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287; see also United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
       It is well established that a reviewing court will ordinarily disregard arguments
made for the first time on appeal. (Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 830.) A party who fails to raise an argument in the trial
court has therefore forfeited its right to do so on appeal. (Bhatt v. State Dept. of Health
Services (2015) 133 Cal.App.4th 923, 933; Kern County Dept. of Child Support
Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038.) “The purpose of forfeiture
rules generally is to avoid the unfairness that would occur on review if a party were
permitted to ‘argue the [lower] court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not
asked to conduct.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85,
94.)
       B. Analysis
       For the first time on appeal, Pfeiffer contends that Smart was not the “prevailing
party” within the meaning of section 527.6. Pfeiffer did not file a written opposition to
the fee motion or make this argument in her declaration opposing the motion, and there is
nothing in the record indicating that Pfeiffer raised the argument at the hearing on the fee
motion. Pfeiffer did not file a reply brief after Smart pointed out this deficiency and we
see no reason to excuse it. Accordingly, we deem the argument forfeited. (Kern County
Dept. of Child Support Services, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038.)
       This argument has also been forfeited as a result of Pfeiffer’s inadequate appellate
briefing. In her opening brief, Pfeiffer failed to formulate a coherent argument,
supported by pertinent legal authority, explaining how and why the trial court erred.
Instead, Pfeiffer presented a conclusory one-page argument, with citations to authority
supporting the proposition that a party who obtains a dismissal with prejudice is

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considered the prevailing party for purposes of obtaining attorney fees under section
527.6. (See, e.g., Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1776-1777.) Pfeiffer,
however, failed to make any substantive legal argument, with citation to supporting legal
authority, explaining how and why a defendant (such as Smart) is not a prevailing party
when (as here) a petition filed under section 527.6 is dismissed by the trial court without
prejudice following a hearing on the merits. It is not our role to develop Pfeiffer’s legal
theories or arguments on appeal. We treat an issue as forfeited when, as here, an
appellant makes a conclusory argument that is not supported with reasoned argument and
citations to pertinent authority. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
p. 287; Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.)
       We reach the same conclusion with respect to Pfeiffer’s alternative contention that
the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Smart attorney fees in the unreasonable
amount of $18,939. In the trial court, Pfeiffer only submitted a declaration in opposition
to the fee motion, which merely asserted, without more, that the court should deny
Smart’s request for “exorbitant and unreasonable” attorney fees because Pfeiffer was “not
responsible for any harassment.” Pfeiffer presented no additional argument or legal
analysis in support of her position. Nor did she present any evidence showing that the
fees requested by Smart were unreasonable. Indeed, Pfeiffer made no effort whatsoever
to challenge as unreasonable or unnecessary any of the specific tasks that were performed
in connection with this matter, the number of hours expended on a particular task, or the
billing rates of the persons who worked on this case.
       On appeal, Pfeiffer argues for the first time that the hours expended on this case
for certain matters were unnecessary and therefore unreasonable. Again, Smart points
out that this objection was not raised in the trial court. We agree that Pfeiffer’s
conclusory argument in the trial court was insufficient to preserve this issue for appellate
review. In challenging attorney fees as excessive and/or unreasonable, “it is the burden
of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient

                                              9
argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are
excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in
the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.” (See Premier Medical Management Systems,
Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 [failure to either
attack the itemized billings with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or
obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law
to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable resulted in failure to demonstrate
error].) “ ‘ “Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the
opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider. [Citation.] In our adversarial system, each party has the
obligation to raise any issue or infirmity that might subject the ensuing judgment to
attack. . . .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 564.)
        We note that Pfeiffer’s alternative appellate contention has also been forfeited due
to inadequate appellate briefing. Pfeiffer failed to provide sufficient legal authority and
factual analysis to support this claim of error. In her opening brief, Pfeiffer cited one
case setting forth general principles related to a request for attorney fees, but provided no
meaningful legal analysis explaining how and why the trial court erred under the
circumstances of this case. Indeed, Pfeiffer failed to explain why the fee award (which
amounted to approximately half of the fees requested by Smart) was an abuse of
discretion. Instead, Pfeiffer generally complains that the hours expended on certain
matters were, in her view, unnecessary and/or unreasonable. In short, given Pfeiffer’s
failure to sufficiently develop her argument, we treat the matter as forfeited.
(Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)
        In sum, we conclude that Pfeiffer has forfeited her claims of error. But even if we
were to overlook forfeiture, we see no basis for reversal. Pfeiffer initially contends the
trial court erred as a matter of law by awarding Smart attorney fees because Smart was
not the prevailing party within the meaning of section 527.6. This argument is predicated

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on the theory that the trial court’s dismissal of Pfeiffer’s petition for a civil harassment
restraining order without prejudice does not constitute a final judgment. As discussed
ante, Pfeiffer has not cited any authority supporting her position. And, in any event, we
see no reversible error in the trial court’s implicit determination that Smart was the
prevailing party under section 527.6, subdivision (s). Although Pfeiffer obtained an ex
parte temporary restraining order against Smart pending a hearing on the merits,
Pfeiffer’s petition for a civil harassment restraining order was dismissed by the trial court
without prejudice after the hearing. Under these circumstances, the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that Smart was the prevailing party within the meaning of section
1032, subdivision (a)(4). (See Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 331 [a
defendant is the prevailing party where the trial court orders an involuntary dismissal,
regardless of whether dismissal is with or without prejudice].) Alternatively, the trial
court could have reasonably concluded that, even if Smart was not the prevailing party
under any of the enumerated grounds set forth in section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), Smart
was the prevailing party because she prevailed on a “practical level.” The record reflects
that Smart achieved her litigation objective, which was the avoidance of an order granting
Pfeiffer a permanent civil harassment restraining order. Realizing a litigation objective is
a permissible reason to award attorney fees where, as here, “any party recovers other than
monetary relief and in situations other than as specified” in section 1032, subdivision
(a)(4). (See Pirkig v. Dennis (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1565, italics omitted.) In
short, we see nothing in the record that would support the conclusion that the trial court
erred in implicitly determining that Smart was the prevailing party. Finally, Smart was
arguably the prevailing party under section 527.6 for an additional, independent reason:
Pfeiffer did not recover any relief against Smart. (See § 1032, subd. (a)(4) [“prevailing
party” includes “a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and
a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that
defendant”].)

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       Equally unavailing is Pfeiffer’s contention that the trial court committed reversible
error by awarding Smart attorney fees in the unreasonable amount of $18,939. “The
determination of what constitutes the actual and reasonable attorney fees is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980)
111 Cal.App.3d 215, 228; PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
Smart submitted a declaration from her counsel and itemized billing records in support of
her request for attorney fees in the amount of $36,461.50. The trial court did not award
the full amount requested and denied Smart’s request for a multiplier. Instead, the court
awarded Smart approximately half of the fees she requested--$18,939. In doing so, the
court explained that it carefully reviewed “the moving papers along with the totality of
the court file.” Pfeiffer asks us to reexamine the evidence presented to the trial court and
come to a different conclusion. We decline to do so. (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1208 [“In applying the abuse of
discretion standard of review, it is not the role of the appellate court to substitute its own
view as to the proper decision”].) The question for us is simply whether the trial court’s
decision exceeded the bounds of reason, that is, whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd. (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223,
1240.) Given the limited record before us, we cannot reach such a conclusion.

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                                      DISPOSITION
       The order awarding Smart attorney fees and costs is affirmed. Smart shall recover
her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

                                                         /s/
                                                   Duarte, J.

We concur:

     /s/
Robie, Acting P. J.

    /s/
Ashworth, J. 

 Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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