Court Opinion

ID: 9852264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:26.632664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.804653
License: Public Domain

MCGRAW, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
(Filed July 25, 2001)
I would reverse Brown’s conviction for the same reasons expressed in my dissent to State v. Lightner, 205 W.Va. 657, 520 S.E.2d 654 (1999), in that “any deviation from th[e] constitutional requirement [of twelve jurors] must be accomplished through a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Id. at 664, 520 S.E.2d at 661 (McGraw, J., dissenting). Resort to plain error analysis is therefore misplaced in this context, and a violation of the constitutional right to a twelve-person jury must be presumed prejudicial absent an affirmative showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647, 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975) (“Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Contrary to the position taken by the majority, the fact that the alternate did not actively participate in deliberations is far from dis-positive, as prejudice may arise “either because the alternates actually participated in the deliberations, verbally or through ‘body language’; or because the alternates’ presence exerted a ‘chilling’ effect on the regular jurors.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1780, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (citations omitted). Since I would reverse and remand for a new trial on this issue, I respectfully dissent.