Court Opinion

ID: 9546799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:35:22.735593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:51.245108
License: Public Domain

OPINION
COMPTON, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether an out-of-state plaintiff may be statutorily required to post a bond for anticipated costs and attorney fees as a condition of maintaining suit in an Alaska court. The statutory requirement is challenged on a variety of constitutional grounds.1
We hold that the statute violates equal protection of law under the Alaska Constitution because it unreasonably restricts nonresident access to Alaska courts.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Robert Patrick resided in Alaska from 1981 to 1986. During that time he leased a truck to Lynden Transport, Inc. (Lynden) for its use in Alaska, and drove trucks for Lynden in Alaska. Upon leaving Alaska, Patrick moved to Idaho, where he currently resides.
In February 1987 Patrick initiated the instant suit. He is seeking damages for himself and a class of truck owners whose leases Lynden has allegedly breached. Lynden filed a motion for cost bond pursuant to AS 09.60.060.2 Lynden’s counsel asserted that Patrick was not an Alaska resident.
*1377Following oral argument on the issue, the trial court ordered that proceedings be stayed until Patrick posted a $5,000 bond to cover Lynden’s anticipated costs and attorney fees. Patrick filed a petition for review in this court. We granted the petition, requesting specifically that the parties brief the following issues:
(a) Does AS 09.60.060 infringe upon the rule-making authority of the supreme court, in violation of article IV, section 15 of the Alaska Constitution?
(b) Does AS 09.60.060 violate Patrick’s right to due process under the state and federal constitutions?
(c) Does AS 09.60.060 violate Patrick’s right to equal protection under the state and federal constitutions?
(d) Does AS 09.60.060 violate Patrick’s rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the federal constitution?
II. DISCUSSION
We begin our analysis of Alaska’s nonresident security bond statute by observing that application of AS 09.60.060 does not result in a complete bar to litigation in an Alaska court. Instead, the statute requires that a nonresident plaintiff post a bond covering anticipated costs and attorney fees “which may be awarded against the plaintiff.” There is no comparable requirement for resident plaintiffs. Thus, the effect of the statute is to discriminate between those nonresidents who can afford to post a bond for costs and attorney fees and those nonresidents who cannot, as well as to discriminate between nonresidents and residents generally. Such discrimination leads us to conclude that the statute is best analyzed on equal protection grounds. It is the Alaska state constitutional analysis we hereafter apply. Our reference to federal law is for comparative purposes.
Under a federal equal protection analysis, when a statute infringes upon a fundamental interest the state must show that the statutory classification furthers a compelling state interest, yet utilizes the least restrictive means available. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 615 (1969). When a statute infringes upon an economic interest, the federal constitution demands only that the state show that the statutory classification is rational. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-63, 101 S.Ct. 715, 722-23, 66 L.Ed.2d 659, 667-68 (1981).
We have written that
[i]n reviewing equal protection claims under the Alaska constitution this court uses a “ ‘uniform-balancing’ test which placets] a greater or lesser burden on the state to justify a classification depending on the importance of the individual right involved.” Alaska Pacific Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984). (citing State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978)). See also Wise, Northern Lights — Equal Protection Analysis in Alaska, 3 Alaska L.Rev. 1, 29-35 (1986). The minimum burden the state must meet is the rational basis test described in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976). Brown, 687 P.2d at 269. This rational basis test questions whether the classification is “reasonable, not arbitrary” and rests “upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Isakson, 550 P.2d at 362. Under this test, we will not “hypothesize facts which will sustain otherwise questionable legislation.” Id. Thus, the minimum burden that the state must meet when defending legislation challenged on equal protection grounds under the Alaska constitution is greater than that required under the United States Constitution. The burden on the state increases in proportion to the primacy of the interest involved. Eventually this burden reaches the functional equivalent of the federal compelling state interest test in those cases where fundamental rights and suspect categories are at issue. Brown, 687 P.2d at 269.
Herrick’s Aero-Auto-Aqua Repair Serv. v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 754 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Alaska 1988) (footnotes omitted).
*1378Under the Alaska state constitutional analysis, there are three steps involved in our review:
First, it must be determined ... what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment.
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Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served by a challenged statute.
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Third, an evaluation of the state’s interest in the particular means employed to further its goals must be undertaken.
Alaska Pacific Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984).
In the case at bar, the most difficult step in the analysis is determining the primacy of the interest involved. It is clear that under both federal and Alaska law, an unlitigated claim is considered a property interest. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973). As a result the claim cannot be taken away from the plaintiff by government action without due process of law. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429, 102 S.Ct. at 1154, 71 L.Ed.2d at 274; Bush, 516 P.2d at 1218-19.
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that certain plaintiffs have a fundamental right to have their claims litigated. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), the Court held that a state must provide access to the courts for indigents seeking divorces who were unable to pay court filing fees. The Court reached its conclusion because of the state’s monopoly over the legal status of marriage and divorce. Id. at 375-76, 91 S.Ct. at 784-85, 28 L.Ed.2d at 117-18. In another context, the Court has written that “[t]he right of access to the courts ... is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 964 (1974) (decision in the context of prisoners’ rights).
Boddie is, however, a narrow holding. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375-76, 382, 91 S.Ct. at 784-85, 788, 28 L.Ed.2d at 117-18, 122. It is narrow because the Court recognizes very few types of cases where the state maintains a monopoly over the legal relationships between parties, or where those legal relationships are of significant constitutional interest. Thus, in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973), the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, held that due process did not require the bankruptcy court to waive $50 in fees for an indigent seeking bankruptcy protection. The Court in Kras reasoned that a debtor has a number of means, outside the court system, by which he can obtain redress from creditors. In addition, Kras’ debt relationships “[did] not rise to the same constitutional level” as Boddie’s marital relationship. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445, 93 S.Ct. at 638, 34 L.Ed.2d at 635. Thus, denying an indigent debtor access to the court system did not deny him “a fundamental interest that [would be] gained or lost depending on the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy.” Kras, 409 U.S. at 445, 93 S.Ct. at 638, 34 L.Ed.2d at 636.
The dissenters in Kras correctly observed, we believe, that irrespective of the plaintiff’s private means of restructuring his debt,
it is the government nevertheless that continues to enforce that obligation, and under our “legal system” that debt is effective only because the judicial machinery is there to collect it. The bankrupt is bankrupt precisely for the reason that the State stands ready to exact all of his debts through garnishment, attachment, and the panoply of other creditor remedies. The appellee can be pursued and harassed by his creditors since they hold his legally enforceable debts.
And in the unique situation of the indigent bankrupt, the government provides the only effective means of his ever being free of these government-imposed obligations. As in Boddie, there are no *1379“recognized, effective alternatives, [401 U.S.] at 376, 91 S.Ct. at 785, 28 L.Ed.2d 113.
Kras, 409 U.S. at 455, 93 S.Ct. at 643, 34 L.Ed.2d at 642 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
We have construed the right to court access under the Alaska Constitution to be an important right. In Bush we recognized that a “legal right” exists only so long as one may obtain redress through the court system. We wrote:
The judicial process exists to reduce inchoate claims to money judgment where private settlement is unavailing (or to extinguish them as non-meritorious). Judgments may be executed or assigned for substantially their face value, presuming solvency of the debtor. Unliti-gated claims for personal injury have slight market value. Deprivation of access to the courts thus denies both the ability to reduce the claim to a money judgment and the ability to collect the claim or otherwise convert it into property of an appreciable value and liquid nature during the parole status. Because the only reasonable use of the “property” represented by an unlitigated claim is reduction to judgment followed by collection or assignment, deprivation of that use deprives the claimant of the whole value of his property so long as he remains non sui juris.
516 P.2d at 219.
Thus, we conclude that even though access to a court may not be a fundamental right,3 on Alaska’s sliding equal protection scale the right is an important one. Statutory infringement upon that right is deserving of close scrutiny. The purposes served by the statute and the legislature’s chosen means for effectuating those purposes must be examined.
Lynden argues that the purpose of the statute is to provide security for costs and attorney fees that may be awarded against a plaintiff, from whom it may be difficult to collect because of the plaintiffs nonresidence. While this purpose may be legitimate,4 we do not believe the legislature’s chosen means to effectuate this purpose are sufficiently well-tailored to its ends where the important constitutional right of access to the courts is infringed. The statute is both overinclusive and un-derinclusive. First, it is overinclusive because it requires that a bond be posted by all nonresident plaintiffs. Yet it cannot be assumed that all nonresident plaintiffs will be uncooperative in paying cost and attorney fee awards entered against them. Nor can it be assumed that all nonresident plaintiffs will not have assets easily attachable in satisfaction of a cost and attorney fee award. Second, the statute is underin-clusive because it assumes that only nonresident plaintiffs will be difficult debtors. The statute ignores the fact that resident plaintiffs also may be uncooperative in paying cost and attorney fee awards and that defendants may have a more difficult time collecting from illiquid resident plaintiffs than from liquid foreign plaintiffs. See Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 365 (Alaska 1976) (statute violated equal protection where classification both overinclusive and underinclusive).
*1380We recognize that statutes requiring security bonds of nonresidents currently exist in a number of states. See, e.g., Cal. Civ.Proc.Code § 1030 (West Supp.1987); N.Y.Civ.Prac. L. & R. § 8501 (McKinney 1981); Or.Rev.Stat. § 20.160-.170 (1987); Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 4.84.210 (1962 and Supp.1987). Generally, however, these states do not have a rule comparative to Civil Rule 82, which allows partial compensation for attorney fees as a matter of course. Costs and attorney fees are not inconsequential.5
We conclude that a statute which restricts access to Alaska courts by means of a bond requirement for only nonresident plaintiffs is not sufficiently related to the purpose of providing security for cost and attorney fee awards to defendants to withstand a challenge under the Alaska Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law.6
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the order of the trial court is REVERSED.
MATTHEWS, C.J., dissents.

. In Ware v. City of Anchorage, 439 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1968), this court upheld the statute against a challenge based on Article IV, § 15 of the Alaska Constitution. In view of our disposition of the equal protection challenge, we need not reconsider our holding in Ware.

. AS 09.60.060 provides:
Security for costs where plaintiff a nonresident or foreign corporation. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of the state or is a foreign corporation, security for the costs and attorney fee's, which may be awarded against the plaintiff, may be required by the defendant, if timely demand is made within 30 days after the defendant discovers that the plaintiff is a nonresident. When required, all proceedings in the action shall be stayed until an undertaking executed by one or more sufficient sureties is filed with the court to the effect that they will pay the costs and attorney fees which are awarded against the plaintiff, for not less than $200. A new or an additional undertaking may be ordered by the court upon proof that the original undertaking is insufficient in amount or security.

. We disagree with Patrick’s contention that the statute violates his fundamental right to travel by imposing a durational residency requirement. Patrick states that if he “wished to avoid the cost and fee bond requirement, he would have to reside in Alaska throughout the penden-cy of the litigation.” Such a conditional residency would not make Patrick a resident of Alaska. Residency is a question of intent. See Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1988). The statute talks of nonresidents, not nondomiciliar-ies, and establishes no durational requirements. AS 09.60.060.

. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 551-52, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1228, 93 L.Ed. 1528, 1539 (1949) (cost bond requirement in stockholder derivative action did not violate due process). We observe, however, that in the past the state has declined to intervene in litigation over the constitutionality of AS 09.60.-060. The state has consistently said that it "does not assert any independent interest in the continuing validity of the statute_" Letter from Grace Berg Schaible, Attorney General, to David Lampen, Clerk of the Supreme Court (April 30, 1987) (regarding Rice v. The Upjohn Co., Supreme Court No. S-2055). Accord Statement of the State of Alaska (February 19, 1986) (regarding Crittenden v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Supreme Court No. S-1369). The state also declined to intervene in the instant case. Letter from Grace Berg Schaible, Attorney General, to David Lampen, Clerk of Appellate Courts (Aug. 14, 1987).

. Patrick convincingly demonstrates that Civil Rule 82 attorney fee awards often amount to considerable sums, citing thirteen recent cases in which this court affirmed attorney fee awards ranging from $4,000 to over $348,000. See Steenmeyer Corp. v. Mortenson-Neal, 731 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Alaska 1987) ($17,500 award upheld); Crook v. Mortenson-Neal, 727 P.2d 297, 306 (Alaska 1986) ($15,337.60 award upheld); Tolstrup v. Miller, 726 P.2d 1304, 1307-08 (Alaska 1986) ($5,000 award without trial upheld); Dahle v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 725 P.2d 1069, 1074-75 (Alaska 1986) ($55,000 award upheld); Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1203 (Alaska 1986) ($17,000 award upheld); Wickwire v. Arctic Circle Air Services, 722 P.2d 930, 935 (Alaska 1986) ($12,000 award upheld); Horton v. Hansen, 722 P.2d 211, 217-18 (Alaska 1986) ($21,932.11 award upheld); Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 950-51 (Alaska 1986) ($79,781.88 award upheld); Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Tundra Tours, Inc., 719 P.2d 1020, 1037-38 (Alaska 1986) ($172,414.89 award upheld); Alaska State Fed’n of Labor v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 713 P.2d 1208, 1211-12 (Alaska 1986) ($8,700 and $5,550 awards to separate defendants upheld); Smith v. State, 706 P.2d 1160, 1164 (Alaska 1985) ($65,000 award upheld); Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, 705 P.2d 913, 918 n. 10 (Alaska 1985) ($4,000 award upheld); Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 412 (Alaska 1985) ($348,264 award upheld).
Cases cited by our dissenting colleague do not involve cost bonds in amounts remotely close to the amounts that potentially can be required in Alaska when attorney fees are taken into account. See, e.g., Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140 (1st Cir.1976) (cost bonds ranging from $500 to $2,500 per plaintiff upheld); Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Gonzalez, 114 Misc.2d 1007, 452 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y.Civ.Ct.1982) ($150 cost bond); Wright v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 116 Ariz. 391, 569 P.2d 821 (1977) ($250 cost bond); State v. Superior Court, 195 Wash. 426, 81 P.2d 286 (1938) ($2,000 cost bond for 53 plaintiffs, statutory maximum of $200 per plaintiff). In Re Merrill Lynch Relocation Management, Inc., 812 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.1987), did not involve a pre-litigation bond at all.

. As a result of our disposition we need not discuss the parties’ arguments regarding whether the statute violates federal equal protection, state or federal due process, the federal constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, or this court’s rule-making authority arising from the Alaska Constitution.