Court Opinion

ID: 9704523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:38:03.078761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.185819
License: Public Domain

Danhof, J.
(dissenting). It is axiomatic in the law that where statutory language is plain, certain and unambiguous, such language is not subject to construction by the courts. In the words of Justice Cooley:
"There are certain well-settled rules for the construction of statutes, which no court can safely disregard. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the courts have nothing to do but to obey it. They may give a sensible and reasonable interpretation to legislative expressions which are obscure, but they *703have no right to distort those which are clear and intelligible. The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, is what should govern * * * .
"And, believing as I do, that a high and sacred regard for law and constitutional order is being begotten of these times, I regard it as especially important that the judiciary should do nothing to postpone or to check this result by decisions which strain or bend the meaning of words to meet unexpected emergencies.” People v Blodgett, 13 Mich 127, 167-168, 173 (1865).
See also Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244, 249; 191 NW2d 307 (1971). Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 648-649; 97 NW2d 804 (1959). Jones v Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich 1, 9-10; 84 NW2d 327 (1957).
In order for this Court to reach the conclusion propounded by the majority we must find the following:
(1) That the statutory language in question, to wit: "shall be approved by the local legislative body”, is susceptible of more than one meaning.
(2) That the most proper meaning of "local legislative body” consistent with legislative intent is "the local legislative body with the approval of the executive, if required by the municipality”.
I cannot agree that either of these conclusions is warranted. Nothing could be plainer than the term "legislative body,” as employed in this context. To what purpose would the state Legislature add the modifier "legislative” if they intended that the local executive should join in the approval process? The Legislature could have chosen to employ terms such as "local unit of government” or "local legislative body and executive”, but did *704not do so. The term "legislative body” has only one plain meaning and we are bound by that meaning.
The ■ majority relies upon what it infers the meaning of O’Halloran v Mayor & Recorder of Jackson, 107 Mich 138; 64 NW 1046 (1895), to be. At the outset I note that O’Halloran construes the liquor act of 1887, 1887 PA 313, long since repealed, which act does not contain the term "local legislative body”. Nevertheless, the majority looks to O’Halloran for aid in interpreting this term.
O’Halloran was decided by concluding that "the approval of the mayor was unnecessary”. The case does not address the question of the mayor’s authority to veto legislative approval where such authority appears to be granted by local ordinance or charter. Hence, any discussion of this question is dictum and the majority’s authority is inference upon dictum.
The majority agrees that the exclusive power to regulate liquor in this state is vested in the Legislature and in the Liquor Control Commission. Const 1963, art 4, § 40. The statute here in question, MCLA 463.17; MSA 18.988, constitutes a delegation of exclusive legislative power to the City of Southfield’s "legislative body”. The statute does not, and the city charter cannot, confer any authority upon the mayor of that city. I, therefore, conclude that the ruling of the circuit court was correct and I would affirm its judgment.