Court Opinion

ID: 9725165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:33:13.575725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:11.472007
License: Public Domain

Oliver, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
The district court adjudicated the law point submitted to it, as follows:
“That the contract executed by and between the plaintiffs and defendant to perform architectural services in the State of Iowa was executed at a time when the plaintiffs were not registered as architects in the State of Iowa as required by the provisions of Chapter 118 of the Code of Iowa, and more particularly Section 118.6 thereof, and in violation of Section 118.14 thereof, and is therefore illegal and void, and the plaintiffs cannot maintain an action upon said contract.”
Based upon this conclusion the district court thereafter *1183dismissed the action and rendered judgment against plaintiffs for costs.
Chapter 118, Code 'of 1958 (1962) entitled, Registered Architects, is not a revenue measure. One reason is, it is not designed to produce revenue. All moneys received are held in a fund to pay operating expenses. Chapter 118 is in the Police Power Division of the Code. It is a regulatory measure for the protection and safety of the public. The text in 3 Am. Jur., Architects, at page 998, states “It is well settled that the state may, in the exercise of the police power, thus regulate the profession # * # »
6 C. J. S., Architects, at page 296, states:
“A legislature having authority to deny the right to practice architecture to all except those duly qualified may also deny the right to unqualified architects to advertise and to hold themselves out as such, and it may forbid using the name of ‘architect’ by one not entitled to use it, as well as forbid the practice of architecture by one not entitled to practice.”
At page 297:
“Under statutes directed against the use of the title only, or failing to provide that a license is a prerequisite to the practice of architecture, and failing to penalize such practice without a license, unlicensed architects are not precluded from practicing their profession so long as they do not hold themselves out to be architects * * * .”
The text in 3 Am. Jur., Architects, at page 999, states:
“* * * The effect of the failure of an architect or one holding himself out as an architect to procure a license to practice his profession on the validity and enforceability of a contract for his services or upon his right to recover for services rendered seems to depend upon the purpose of the legislature in requiring the license. If the purpose in requiring a license is to furnish protection to the public by preventing incompetent persons from assuming to act in a particular capacity, the contract of an unlicensed person is invalid. Accordingly, the rule has been laid down that the failure of one holding himself out as an architect to procure a license required for public protection and to bar those lacking in the requisites of learning *1184and skill precludes recovery for professional services rendered in his capacity as an architect. Nor is his contract rendered enforceable by virtue of the fact that his einployer was informed that he did not have a license.”
See annotations in 30 A. L. R. 851; 42 A. L. R. 1228; 118 A. L. R. 651.
It may be observed the majority cites no statements from texts which refer especially to architects and cites only two contrary decisions from other jurisdictions. This might lead to the erroneous conclusion that these two were the only decisions directly in point and that the decisions were evenly balanced in number. The one of these which the majority elects to follow is Dunn v. Finlayson, 104 A.2d 830, Municipal Court of Appeals, D. C. That case held the wrongful use of the title, architect, did not deprive the user of the right to recover for services legally rendered. However, a footnote to the Dunn case states:
“Our holding in this respect may appear to be contrary to the holdings in Sherwood v. Wise, 132 Wash. 295, 232 P. 309, 42 A. L. R. 1219, and Hickey v. Sutton, 191 Wis. 313, 210 N.W. 704. Many cases dealing generally with the question may be found in the annotations in 30 A. L. R. 834, 42 A. L. R. 1226, and 118 A. L. R. 646.”
Hence, it appears the Municipal Court of Appeals realized this was a minority rule. However, there was little possibility the Dunn decision would thereafter cause trouble in that jurisdiction since it was based upon a statute no longer in existence.
F. F. Bollinger Co. v. Widmann Brewing Corp., 339 Pa. 289, 292, 293, 14 A.2d 81, 83, denied recovery for architectural and engineering services under a contract governed by “The Architects Act”, stating:
“* * *. Only those who have registered are entitled to use the designation ‘registered architect’, and the use of the title ‘architect’ is restricted to those previously engaged in the practice of the profession who have filed an affidavit to that effect with the board. Section 13, as amended by the Act of 1933, provides : * * it shall be unlawful for any person * * * to enter upon the practice of architecture in the State of Pennsylvania, or to hold himself or herself forth as an architect or as a *1185“registered architect”, ® * * unless he or she has complied with the provisions of this act. * ® * This act shall not be construed to prevent persons other than architects * * * from designing buildings and supervising their construction, provided their drawings are signed by the authors with their true appellation as engineer or contractor or builder or carpenter, but without the use in any form of the title of architect.’ Section 14 makes violation of the act a misdemeanor, and prescribes penalties therefor.”
In that case the plaintiff pointed out there was no express prohibition against the enforcement of contracts made in violation of such statutes. But the court said:
“* * *. However, it is well settled that the courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of unlawful contracts which are founded upon transactions in violation of a public policy declared by the legislature. We have followed this principle and denied recovery for services where there has been a failure to comply with statutory requirements for licensing and registration. In many such cases there was no express provision in the statutes denying recovery upon the contract.”
In Sherwood v. Wise, 132 Wash. 295, 300, 232 P. 309, 311, 42 A. L. R. 1219, 1223, one Travis represented himself to be an architect and signed as an architect plans and specifications made by him for the construction of an apartment house. In denying recovery the court stated:
“This act does not in express terms make the mere rendering of architectural service by one not holding a license certificate unlawful, nor does it in express terms make a contract for such services by one not holding a license certificate unlawful and unenforceable; but the language of the act manifestly expresses the legislative intent that it shall be unlawful for one not holding a license certificate to assume the professional title of architect and as such enter into a contract to render architectural services. Now that is just what Travis did with reference to the construction of this building.”
Another case directly in point is Hickey v. Sutton, 191 Wis. 313, 210 N.W. 704.
The majority opinion decides the case on the ground that, *1186chapter 118 “does not go to the extent of declaring the contract for architectural services void.” It cites no authority for this decision.
Garfield, C. J., and Thompson and Snell, JJ., join in this dissent.