Court Opinion

ID: 9561700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:14:19.962774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:15.060663
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment reversing the grant of summary judgment to defendants, because the contract provision regarding bonuses is enforceable and there remain questions of fact with respect to whether it was breached. The issue of enforceability is governed in this appeal by the “law of the case” rule, although that rule was abolished as applied in Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263 (161 SE2d 281) (1968). Jebco Ventures v. City of Smyrna, 259 Ga. 599, 601 (1) (385 SE2d 397) (1989). As this Court stated in Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Walker, 216 Ga. App. 786, 787 (1) (456 SE2d 97) (1995), “If the decision of an appellate court [after a ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals] becomes ‘incorrect’ because the law changes — either because of subsequent case law or because of later-enacted statutes — it may not be binding precedent for other situations. However, between the parties to the original decision it remains the law of the case.” The reason given is that to permit otherwise “would result in constant relitigation of issues as the law continually evolves.”
Relitigation of the issue once decided by this Court is simply not countenanced as another method of obtaining relief from its judgment. OCGA § 9-11-60 (h); Braner v. Southern Trust Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 117, 122 (335 SE2d 547) (1985). Motion for reconsideration filed in the Court of Appeals and petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia are the only available methods of attack. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. IV; OCGA § 5-6-15; Court of Appeals Rules 37 and 38. No such petition was filed in this case.
This is not to be confused with the rule that the court will apply the law existing at the time of its decision, even if the law has changed since a prior adjudication by the trial court, or that the trial court should apply the law existing at the time of its decision, even if the law as to unappealed issues has changed since a prior adjudication by this court. Powell v. Dougherty Christian Academy, 215 Ga. App. 551, 552 (451 SE2d 465) (1994).
The additional evidence produced in the trial court after reversal of the first summary judgment did not affect the validity of the original ruling by this Court that the bonus provision was enforceable. The new evidence simply did not change the undisputed facts which were relevant to that issue.
Even if an interim decision in another case changed the law *809which this Court applied in McLean I, it would not affect the integrity of the law of this case in its journey to completion and finality, as stated in Walker, supra. But Arby’s, Inc. v. Cooper, 265 Ga. 240, 242 (454 SE2d 488) (1995), did not change the law as relates to the undisputed facts in this case, anyway. There the Supreme Court held that the original indefiniteness in the bonuses provision of the agreement was not supplanted by performance in the way of payment and acceptance of bonuses which would show the intent of the parties in the ascertainment of the bonuses and thus make the agreement enforceable, because there was an element of discretion left to Arby’s. The Court refused to accept as sufficient a formula by which Arby’s exercised its discretion and paid the employee bonuses in two years, promised specific calculated amounts for two years, and made a partial payment of one of them.
Decided September 18, 1996
King & Croft, Terrence L. Croft, for appellant.
Long, Aldridge & Norman, James J. Thomas II, David Balser, Anthony E. Diresta, for appellees.
This case differs in that it was shown from the parties’ past dealings that they understood the meaning of the term “net proceeds” and the method of establishing the percentage of profits due for the employee’s services. So the bonuses were ascertainable by way of an agreed formula which conveyed the parties’ intention, particularly with respect to the exclusion of operating expenses and the deduction of working capital advances in calculating the bonuses.
Thus, even if the law of the case rule did not apply, the result would be the same. Neither Arby’s nor defendants’ additional evidence undermines the validity of the bonus provision in the employment agreement.