Court Opinion

ID: 9525158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:00:22.89966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:11.454134
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I agree with my colleagues in citing Collins v. Board of Trustees, 155 Ill. 2d 103 (1993), for the principle that in determining legislative intent, which is the primary inquiry a court of review must undertake, no paragraph should be interpreted so as to render that paragraph meaningless. Unfortunately, the majority’s interpretation of subsection 3 of section 2 — 616(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 616(d) (West 1998)) would render subsection 4 meaningless. Subsection 3 reads as follows: “(3) [S]ervice of summons was in fact had upon the person [or] his or her agent or partner, as the nature of the defendant made appropriate, even though he or she was served in the wrong capacity or as agent of another, or upon a trustee who has title to but no power of management or control over real property constituting a trust of which the person is a beneficiary[.]” 735 ILCS 5/2— 616(d)(3) (West 1998). Subsection 4 reads as follows: “(4) [T]he person, within the time that the action might have been brought or the right asserted against him or her, knew that the original action was pending and that it grew out of a transaction or occurrence involving or concerning him or her[.]” 735 ILCS 5/2— 616(d)(4) (West 1998). I contend that a reading of subsection 3 as the majority has done would render subsection 4 meaningless. Subsection 4 specifically addresses the actual or implied knowledge that a person would have during the time in which that person or entity could be sued within the statute of limitations. In subsection 4 the language is that the “person *** knew that the original action was pending” (emphasis added) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 616(d)(4) (West 1998)), which implies that that person had knowledge of the action during the time that that person could be served, and that knowledge is viewed from a point after the person could no longer be sued within the statute of limitations. To have subsection 4, which contemplates the examination of knowledge prior to the running of the statute of limitations, have any effect or meaning, subsection 3 must be read without the limitation of service being accomplished within the original statute of limitations. Otherwise, subsection 4 is meaningless and superfluous. A reading of subsection 3, however, without the limitation of service within the original statute of limitations means that, in order to come under section 2 — 616, the plaintiff must have accomplished actual service, whether before or after the running of the statute of limitations. That meaning is consistent with a reasonable reading of subsection 4 and the other subsections of section 2 — 616. Accordingly, I dissent.