Court Opinion

ID: 9954603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:03:56.95887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:59.259654
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Molina CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097923

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 21FE016518)

           v.

 JORGE ENRIQUE MARTINEZ MOLINA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In the early morning hours of September 25, 2021, defendant Jorge Enrique
Martinez Molina entered the house of his former wife, R.D. R.D. woke up to find
defendant standing next to her bed. Defendant pointed his gun at R.D.’s head and then
put it on the nightstand. He attempted to have sex with her, inserted his fingers in her
vagina, and orally copulated her.
         A jury found defendant guilty of assault with intent to commit rape, forcible
sexual penetration, forcible oral copulation, and assault with a firearm, and found true
enhancement allegations that defendant personally used a firearm. The trial court

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sentenced defendant to 30 years to life in prison plus 16 years. On appeal, defendant
contends the trial court prejudicially erred by providing a misleading and nonresponsive
answer to a question submitted by the jury during deliberations relevant to the forcible
oral copulation count, requiring reversal of that count. We disagree and will affirm.
                                       BACKGROUND
       A second amended information charged defendant with assault with intent to
commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220; count one),1 forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd.
(a)(1); count two), forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); count three), and
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count four). In connection with counts one
through three, the information alleged defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b).) The information also alleged five aggravating circumstances. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (2), (8), (11), (b)(1).)
                                    The Prosecution Case
       R.D. had been married to defendant for 10 years and they had two children
together. They divorced in 2010, but, after a few months, they got back together for
another four or five years. When defendant, who was in the National Guard, deployed,
R.D. and defendant ended their relationship. Upon his return in November 2020,
defendant told R.D. he wanted to work things out and R.D. agreed. The reconciliation
lasted a few months, but R.D. asked him to move out in June 2021.
       By this time, the relationship had grown complicated. Defendant wanted to know
where R.D. was at all times and with whom she was spending time. After he moved out,
he retained a key to the house. In July 2021, R.D. found an AirTag tracking device in her
purse. She confronted defendant about the AirTag, but defendant “denied
everything . . . .” According to the parties’ daughter, defendant denied the AirTag was

1      Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

                                                2
his, yet he asked to have it back. R.D. found another AirTag under the carpet of her truck
behind the gas pedal. She had allowed defendant to borrow the truck, and no one else
had access to it.
       Defendant and R.D. had consensual sex for the last time on September 15, 2021.
R.D. suggested the possibility of getting remarried, and that is when she discovered
defendant was engaged to another woman. R.D. grew upset. Later that day, R.D. texted
defendant, “I hate you. You make me feel like . . . I’m not worth nothing.”
       On September 25, 2021, R.D. went out dancing. Defendant sent R.D. text
messages telling her to “come get his gun.” He later sent her a text message stating he
was going to her apartment. R.D. did not respond to defendant’s texts or answer his calls
and eventually blocked his number.
       R.D. arrived at home at 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning. She checked the street for
defendant’s car but did not see it. She turned off the light in her room and went to bed.
       Within an hour, R.D. awoke because the light was on. She saw defendant standing
next to her bed. Defendant asked her where she had been, who she had been with, and
who she went out to have sex with. R.D. told him to leave.
       Defendant pulled a gun from behind his back. He grabbed R.D.’s hands, climbed
on top of her, and pointed the gun at her head. Defendant said he was being deployed
and “he had to fuck [her] one more time before he left.” R.D. said no, told defendant she
did not want to have sex with him, and told him to stop. Defendant placed his gun on the
nightstand and started pulling down R.D.’s pajama bottoms, eventually getting them off.
She continued telling him to stop. Defendant told R.D. she was going to be with him and
he would kill anybody that got close to her. He started pulling his pants down.
Subsequently, he tried to take off R.D.’s pajama shirt. Defendant again climbed on top of
R.D., grabbed his gun, and pointed it at her head.
       Defendant tried to have sex with R.D., but he was not able to, so he put two
fingers in her vagina. Initially, R.D. testified she did not remember if defendant also put

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his mouth on her vagina. However, after she refreshed her recollection with a police
report, she remembered defendant putting his mouth on her vagina. She testified
defendant performed oral sex on her for approximately five minutes. She fought back
with her legs. She also told defendant she was menstruating, but he “said he didn’t give a
fuck.” She remembered she was lying down and looking up when defendant had his
mouth on her vagina. Meanwhile, defendant was using his hand to hold R.D. down. She
continued to try to push defendant away with her legs while he was performing oral sex
on her. Defendant then tried to get R.D. to perform oral sex on him, but she fought back.
Defendant said that, since R.D. was not “cooperating,” he was going to leave. R.D.
called 911.
       Detective Allison Daniele testified R.D. reported that defendant forcibly orally
copulated her, penetrated her vagina with his fingers, and sucked on her breasts. Later,
R.D. made a pretext phone call to defendant. A recording of the pretext phone call was
played for the jury.
       A forensic nurse who examined R.D. testified as an expert in forensic sexual
assault examinations. R.D. had an upper arm bruise, wrist abrasions, swelling of her
bottom lip, a breast bruise, and a suction injury on her breast. The nurse collected oral
swabs, perioral swabs, neck swabs, breast swabs, “four swabs on the outside of the
vaginal area which is called the mons pubis,” and vaginal swabs. She specified that the
mons pubis area is “part of the top of the vaginal area.” R.D. testified that she told the
nurse who examined her that defendant “threatened [her] with a gun and that he tried to
rape [her] with his penis, but he couldn’t, so he raped [her] with his fingers and his
mouth.” She believed she told the nurse that defendant sucked on her breasts.
       The prosecution also played a video recording of a detective’s interview with
defendant. In the interview, defendant acknowledged he undressed R.D., tried to have
sex with her, and kissed her. He initially said nothing else happened. He did not

                                              4
remember having oral sex with her. Later, asked if he remembered giving R.D. oral sex,
and if she asked for oral sex, he said he did not remember.
       Defendant acknowledged, both in the pretext phone call with R.D. and in his
interview with the detective, that he was drunk during the incident. He told R.D. during
the pretext phone call he did not even recall how he got home afterward. He told the
detective he was “fucking drunk,” and that he had more than 10 beers that night. Law
enforcement obtained a buccal swab from defendant as well as contact samples from his
hands and fingernail scrapings.
       A criminalist testified as an expert in DNA testing and analysis and performed
DNA testing in this case. She testified that there were two contributors to a nonsperm
fraction of a swab taken from R.D.’s mons pubis, and it was exceedingly likely defendant
was one of the contributors. She could not say whether any of the DNA from the mons
pubis swab came from saliva. There were also two contributors to the perioral swab
taken from R.D., and, again, it was highly likely defendant was one of the contributors.
                                    The Defense Case
       Three witnesses testified to defendant’s nonviolent character.
                                  Verdict and Sentencing
       The jury found defendant guilty on all counts, found the firearm enhancement
allegations to be true, and found true four circumstances in aggravation. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (2), (8), (11).) The trial court dismissed all firearm enhancements
other than the one attached to count one. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) The trial court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 30 years to life plus 16 years determinate,
consisting of consecutive terms of 15 years to life on counts two and three, a determinate
upper term of six years on count one, and 10 years on the firearm enhancement. The trial
court imposed and stayed an upper term of four years on count four. (§ 654.)

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                                        DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                   Additional Background
       The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200, in part, as follows:
“Some words or phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that are different from
their meanings in everyday use. These words and phrases will be specifically defined in
these instructions. . . . Words and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are
to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.”
       With regard to count three, the trial court instructed the jurors, in part, that oral
copulation involves contact “between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or
anus of another person.” (CALCRIM No. 1015.)
       During deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the trial court asking: “[i]s the
female [b]reast considered a sexual organ,” and “[i]s the . . . [m]ons [p]ubis considered a
sexual organ.”
       The trial court contacted the parties by e-mail. The trial court noted there had
been no evidence pertaining to whether the breast or mons pubis are sexual organs. The
trial court indicated it saw two ways to answer the question. It could either refer the jury
to the language of CALCRIM No. 200 stating that “[w]ords and phrases not specifically
defined in these instructions are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings,”
or it could answer “ ‘no’ ” to each question. The trial court opined that the latter “may
border on introducing ‘evidence’ . . . .”
       Defense counsel did not object to either of the trial court’s proposed responses.
The prosecutor requested a response indicating the mons pubis is part of the female
genitalia based on language from a nonpublished case. Defense counsel did not agree
with the prosecutor’s proposed response.
       The trial court and the parties conferred in court. Defense counsel pointed out that
the jury’s question asked whether the mons pubis was a sexual organ, not genitalia.

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Defense counsel also contended that giving the prosecutor’s proposed response would
amount to placing a “finger on the scale.” The trial court declined to give the
prosecution’s proposed response.
       The trial court returned to its proposal to refer the jurors to CALCRIM No. 200.
The trial court asked if everyone was “okay with that,” and both defense counsel and the
prosecutor agreed. Defense counsel subsequently reiterated, twice, that he agreed with
the proposed response.
       Ultimately, the trial court responded to the jury: “Please refer to Instruction
number 200, . . ., which states: Words and phrases not specifically defined in these
instructions are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.” Approximately
20 minutes later, the jury indicated it had reached its verdicts.
                                               II
                                  The Parties’ Contentions
       Defendant asserts the trial court prejudicially erred in providing a misleading and
nonresponsive answer to the jury’s questions. He asserts the female breast and the mons
pubis are not sexual organs within the meaning of section 287, and the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury to that effect. Therefore, defendant maintains his conviction on
count three, forcible oral copulation in violation of section 287, must be reversed.
Defendant does not raise contentions concerning any other count.
       The People respond that defendant forfeited his contention by failing to object and
by agreeing with the trial court’s proposed response. In any event, the People assert
defendant’s claim lacks merit because, whether or not defendant is correct that the breast
and the mons pubis are not sexual organs within the meaning of section 287, defendant
has failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury to review
CALCRIM No. 200.
       We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s
questions, and, even if it did, any error was harmless.

                                               7
                                              III
                                          Forfeiture
       Defendant did not object to the trial court’s response to the jury’s question, and, in
fact, agreed with it. These circumstances typically would result in forfeiture. Defendant,
however, argues that we may review his claim under section 1259.
       Section 1259 provides, in part: “The appellate court may . . . review any
instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the
lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259.)
“[T]he failure to object to an instruction in the trial court waives any claim of error unless
the claimed error affected the substantial rights of the defendant, i.e., resulted in a
miscarriage of justice, making it reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained
a more favorable result in the absence of error.” (People v. Andersen (1994)
26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.) “ ‘Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected
the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of
the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in
prejudice if error it was.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087,
quoting Andersen, supra, at p. 1249.)
       As another court persuasively concluded, “[b]ecause section 1259 directly
addresses the issue of waiver of instructional error, it logically follows that it would
govern the waiver issue involving a trial court’s response to a jury’s question implicating
a jury instruction, triggering section 1138.” (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47,
66, fn. 12, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844, fully briefed, citing People v.
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 505-506.) Under these circumstances, and in light of
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we address the merits of defendant’s
contentions.

                                               8
                                               IV
                                      Standard of Review
       “ ‘ “It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial
court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those
principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are
necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 154, disapproved on another ground in People v. Schuller (2023)
15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.)
       “[S]ection 1138 imposes on the trial court a mandatory ‘duty to clear up any
instructional confusion expressed by the jury.’ ” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1016.) “ ‘When a jury asks a question after retiring for deliberation, “. . . [s]ection
1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with information the jury desires
on points of law.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “This does not mean the court must always elaborate on the
standard instructions. Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete,
the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are
sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information. [Citation.] Indeed, comments
diverging from the standard are often risky. [Citation.] . . . . But a court must do more
than figuratively throw up its hands and tell the jury it cannot help. It must at least
consider how it can best aid the jury. It should decide as to each jury question whether
further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely reiterate the instructions
already given.” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.)
       “An appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any
decision by a trial court to instruct, or not to instruct, in its exercise of its supervision
over a deliberating jury.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 745-746.) Under the
abuse of discretion standard, we will not disturb a trial court’s ruling “except on a
showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently

                                                9
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Rodriguez
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)
                                               V
                                     Abuse of Discretion
       Count three, forcible oral copulation (§ 287), required the prosecution to prove,
among other things, that defendant committed an act of oral copulation involving contact
“between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person.”
(CALCRIM No. 1015.) The jury’s note asked, “[i]s the female [b]reast considered a
sexual organ,” and “[i]s the . . . [m]ons [p]ubis considered a sexual organ.” As the People
argue, even assuming defendant is correct that neither the female breast nor the mons
pubis is a “sexual organ” within the meaning of section 287, this does not establish the
trial court abused its discretion in its response.
       The trial court’s response was that the jurors should refer to CALCRIM No. 200
and its directive that “[w]ords and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions
are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.” “When attempting to
ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the
dictionary definition of that word.” (Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122; accord, Hammond v. Agran (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1181,
1189 [“in the absence of specifically defined meaning, a court looks to the plain meaning
of a word as understood by the ordinary person, which would typically be a dictionary
definition”].) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “sexual organ” as
“an organ of the reproductive system; esp: an external generative organ.” (Webster’s 3d
New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 2082.) The Oxford English Dictionary defines “sexual
organs” as “the organs of sexual generation in animals or plants.” (9 Oxford English
Dict. (1978) p. 582, col. 1.) With this understanding of the term “sexual organ” in mind,
we conclude defendant has not established the trial court abused its discretion in
responding to the jury’s question.

                                               10
       We cannot conclude the trial court’s response was wrong or a misstatement of the
law, although “a trial court’s response to a jury question can be erroneous even if it does
not technically misstate the law.” (People v. Fleming (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 754, 766.)
The trial court’s response directed the jury to a means to understand the term “sexual
organ,” on which the jurors sought clarity. It certainly did not indicate the female breast
and the mons pubis were sexual organs.
       The trial court’s response amounted to more than the court “figuratively
throw[ing] up its hands and tell[ing] the jury it cannot help.” (People v. Beardslee,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97.) The record makes clear that the court considered at length
how it could best aid the jury. (See ibid.) The court proposed two possible responses,
considered suggestions from the parties, and entertained argument on the matter. The
court sought to avoid any response that, in effect, would direct a verdict or would
constitute a substantive response verging on “providing evidence.” We conclude the
court’s response would have aided the jury in its deliberations. Defendant has not
established the trial court abused its discretion by referring the jury to the language of
CALCRIM No. 200.
                                             VI
                                          Prejudice
       Even if we concluded the trial court did abuse its discretion in its response,
reversal is only warranted if the error was prejudicial. The “law requires us to affirm a
jury verdict despite instructional error if the error was harmless.” (People v. Hendrix
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 941.)
       Here, defendant argues the purported error constituted a failure to properly instruct
the jury on an element of the crime, and therefore the federal standard of harmless error
under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, applies. (Cf. People v. Schuller,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 243 [jury misinstruction that relieves prosecution of the burden to
prove an element of the crime violates the federal Constitution].) The People assert any

                                             11
error was harmless under either Chapman or the state law standard of People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, which “applies ‘ “ ‘to incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or
wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 942.) We conclude defendant was not
prejudiced under any standard.
       Under the Chapman test, the more rigorous of the two harmless error standards,
the “reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause,
including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3.)
To determine whether the People have satisfied their burden of proving the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, “we examine the entire record and must reverse if
there is a ‘ “ ‘reasonable possibility’ ” ’ that the error contributed to the verdict.”
(People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671.) By contrast, under the Watson test, “ ‘a
defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been
obtained absent the error.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955; People v.
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
       Initially, R.D. testified she did not remember if defendant put his mouth on her
vagina. However, after she refreshed her recollection with a police report, she
remembered defendant putting his mouth on her vagina. In fact, she testified defendant
performed oral sex on her for approximately five minutes. She remembered she was
lying down and looking up when defendant had his mouth on her vagina. Defendant was
using his hand to hold her down. She fought back with her legs and told defendant she
was menstruating, but he “said he didn’t give a fuck.” R.D. continued to try to push
defendant away with her legs while he was performing oral sex on her.
       R.D. told the nurse who examined her that defendant “raped [her] with his fingers
and his mouth.” She also told Detective Daniele that defendant forcibly orally copulated
her. Thus, based on R.D.’s testimony and her statements to the examining nurse and

                                               12
Detective Daniele, there was clear and strong evidence defendant committed forcible oral
copulation.
       By contrast, there was no evidence contradicting the conclusion defendant
committed forcible oral copulation, only defendant’s statements to the detective that he
could not remember doing so. For example, in his police interview, defendant
acknowledged he undressed R.D., tried to have sex with her, and kissed her, although he
initially denied doing anything else. He subsequently said he did not remember having
oral sex with her. Later, asked if he remembered giving R.D. oral sex, and if she asked
for oral sex, he said he did not remember. Defendant acknowledged, both in the pretext
phone call and in his interview with a detective, that he was drunk during the incident.
He told R.D. during the pretext phone call he could not even recall how he got home
afterward. He told the detective he was “fucking drunk,” and that he had more than 10
beers that night. Under these circumstances, defendant’s statements that he did not
remember if he performed oral sex on R.D. did little, if anything, to undermine her
testimony and statements that he forcefully orally copulated her against her will.
       Based on the totality of the evidence, the language of CALCRIM No. 1015
instructing the jury on forcible oral copulation, and the nature of the trial court’s response
to the jury’s questions, directing the jurors to the language of CALCRIM No. 200, we
conclude it is not reasonably possible the trial court’s response contributed to the verdict
that defendant was guilty of forcible oral copulation on count three. In other words, any
alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                             13
                                   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 \s\     ,
                                            Krause, J.

We concur:

      \s\                 ,
Hull, Acting P. J.

     \s\                  ,
Mauro, J.

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