Court Opinion

ID: 9793821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:53:32.145381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:27.472972
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, it is unreasonable to subject petitioner to the jurisdiction of the California courts under the circumstances in this case. Petitioner’s contacts with this state are far too minimal to justify in personam jurisdiction on any of the accepted and recognized bases.
It is uncontradicted that petitioner has never resided in California and has had only two brief, isolated contacts with the state during his entire life. He is a resident of New York, the site of the marital domicile, and he has no business interests in California. As the majority indicates, after the parties separated respondent wife obtained a divorce in Haiti and moved to California where, pursuant to agreement with petitioner, she visited with the children during the summer and holidays. Petitioner maintained custody of the children in New York during the school year.
According to respondent’s affidavit in opposition to petitioner’s motion to quash, in December 1973 “lisa told her father before she left for Christmas vacation that she wanted to live with her mother now.” Petitioner allegedly acceded to lisa’s announcement, bought her a one-way air ticket to California, and since that time has seen lisa in New York only during the summers. As for son Darwin, respondent, in her affidavit, alleged that in January 1976 Darwin called her and told her he wanted to come to San Francisco to live, that she sent him a plane ticket, and that he (and lisa) presently live with respondent in California. (We may assume the truth of the foregoing allegations, although it is noteworthy that petitioner’s own affidavit alleged that respondent induced both lisa and Darwin to leave New York without petitioner’s knowledge or consent.)
*527I have no quarrel with the majority’s statement of general legal principles, derived primarily from our recent decision in Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442 [128 Cal.Rptr. 34, 546 P.2d 322], and cases cited therein. As Sibley explains, however, “The mere causing of an ‘effect’ in California, ... is not necessarily sufficient to afford a constitutional basis for jurisdiction; notwithstanding this ‘effect,’ the imposition of jurisdiction may be ‘unreasonable.’ ” (P. 446.) In determining whether or not to impose jurisdiction, Sibley explains that it is necessary for the court to ascertain whether the defendant “ ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’ ” (P. 447, italics added.) In Sibley, we were quoting from the leading Supreme Court opinion in Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235, 253 [2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1297, 78 S.Ct. 1228], which expressed as follows the controlling principle relevant to our determination: “The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”
Noting that the nonresident’s conduct must be “purposeful,” I disagree with the majority’s application of the foregoing principles to the particular facts of this case. As to lisa, the majority describes petitioner’s conduct as “actively and fully consenting] to lisa living in California” subject only to summer visits in New York, and holds that such conduct constitutes sufficient ground upon which to confer personal jurisdiction over petitioner. In the majority’s eyes, petitioner “purposely availed himself of the full protection and benefit of California laws for the care and protection of lisa on a permanent basis.” (Ante, p. 524.) If, however, we are to give any reasonable meaning to the phrase “purposely availed,” the record before us discloses no evidentiary support whatever, even if we disregard petitioner’s recitation of events and accept respondent’s version. Petitioner may have purchased lisa’s air passage to California, but my reading of the record indicates no purposeful conduct by him which reasonably can be said to invoke the benefits and protections of California laws, thereby conferring in personam jurisdiction over him. At best, petitioner passively acquiesced in his teenaged daughter’s unilateral decision to live in California.
*528The majority reasons, without citation of supporting authorities, that whenever a parent “permits” his minor child to reside in California, the parent thereby “avails himself of the total panoply of the state’s laws, institutions and resources . . . .” (Ante, p. 522.) Yet, can such an act of acquiescence fairly and realistically be viewed as “purposeful” conduct? According to respondent, lisa “told” petitioner that she was going to live with respondent in California. Petitioner’s unresisting assent to lisa’s decision discloses no intent on his part, purposeful or otherwise, to enjoy the “panoply” of California’s resources.
If, however, petitioner’s actions with respect to lisa can be rationalized as “purposeful conduct,” there is no basis on which to support in personam jurisdiction over petitioner as to Darwin. The record reveals that, as to his son, petitioner has done absolutely nothing which can be said to have caused an effect in California. Darwin came to live in California at his own request and without petitioner’s knowledge. Petitioner neither knew of, nor lifted a finger to assist, Darwin’s flight to California. His airplane ticket was paid for by respondent. All that can be said is that when petitioner learned of the development he passively accepted a situation not of his own making. He took no action, direct or indirect, to invoke the protections of California’s laws. Under such circumstances, no basis exists in this record upon which to impose in personam jurisdiction over petitioner as to Darwin.
The majority’s imposition of in personam jurisdiction over absent parents under circumstances such as here presented may well conflict with the “strong” public policy which California courts have asserted favoring the visitation of children with their parents, and encouraging cooperation between parents. (See Judd v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 38, 45 [131 Cal.Rptr. 246]; Titus v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 792, 803 [100 Cal.Rptr. 477].) The rule announced by the majority may encourage a divorced parent such as petitioner to forbid or physically prevent his or her children from visiting a California parent, lest in personam jurisdiction be thereby conferred over the nonresident parent. Such parents may well become extremely guarded and cautious when they suspect that a child’s change of residence is contemplated or effected, either unilaterally or with the connivance of the California parent. Prudent nonresident parents may simply refuse all cooperation and visitation whatever, thus contravening well established public policies.
*529Finally, were we to hold that petitioner’s contacts in California were insufficient to justify imposition of in personam jurisdiction over him, respondent would not be rendered wholly remediless. No reason appears of record why respondent Could not retain New York counsel to pursue the action against petitioner in the state where he resides.
I would issue the writ.
Clark, J., concurred.