Court Opinion

ID: 9560597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:51:57.17906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:02.030867
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting in Case No. A90A1124.
There is no genuine issue of material fact that the employee’s involvement in the company picnic “arouse out of” and was “in the scope of” his employment. Workers’ compensation should be the exclusive remedy in this case.
Why was young Hood at the park when he drowned? The following is undisputed.
Melvin Hood was a dishwasher, cleaner, odd job performer, and salad bar maintainer at the Pizza Hut restaurant. He drowned at a company picnic. Swimming had not been advertised, but it was permitted.
*114The idea of the picnic was conceived by the area manager. Its purposes were to emphasize to employees the importance of a new product so as to promote its sales, to provide a fringe benefit of recreation for employees and their families, and to act as a recruitment and retention incentive. The event was designated the “Athens Area 1988 Makin-It-Great picnic and softball games.” The invitation stated: “We want to kick off hand-tossed traditional pizza with a Spring blast! Come out for a great time.”
Management planned, arranged, and paid for the event and sent park tickets, maps, and an invitation to each of its area restaurants. The map indicated that Pizza Hut signs would be displayed. Management organized the food set-up and presided over softball games, which were organized at prescribed times. Management controlled the picnic and the activities.
All employees were invited. Attendance was strongly encouraged although not required. Work schedules of those desiring to attend were manipulated so they could do so. Those who did not care to attend worked instead if they agreed to, and split shifts accommodated others. Pay was not affected by attendance or non-attendance. Management made transportation arrangements in some instances.
Do these circumstances conclusively mean that Melvin Hood’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment? OCGA § 34-9-1 (4).
Melvin Hood was obviously at the picnic because he was an employee of Pizza Hut, although it was on his own time, and he was not obligated to attend. The event was fully sponsored by his employer in its capacity as employer. The rationale for the picnic was for more than employee morale; it was manifestly driven by goals of promoting a new product and thereby increasing sales as well as retaining a stable work force. These were direct benefits to the employer.
In considering the facts here over against the facts in other company-sponsored picnic cases discussed in 1A Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, 5-121, § 22.23 (a) (1990 Rev.), and cases cited by the parties, as well as the principles set forth in Larson and the two closest cases in Georgia (Crowe v. Home Indem. Co., 145 Ga. App. 873 (245 SE2d 75) (1978), and City Council of Augusta v. Nevils, 149 Ga. App. 688 (255 SE2d 140) (1979)), I conclude that the law of workers’ compensation applies so as to entitle Pizza Hut to summary judgment. OCGA § 34-9-11. The activity was sufficiently work-related, the activity was totally initiated, paid for, and controlled by employer’s agents, and the employer derived more than mere morale-engendering benefits such as would arise from any recreational activity. It appears clear that the primary moving force for the picnic was to “have achieved . . . economic [and] business benefit from the [picnic].” City Council of Augusta, supra at 689.
*115Decided November 27, 1990
Rehearing denied December 18, 1990
Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Bryant, E. Davison Burch, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James T. McDonald, Jr., for appellant (case no. A90A1124).
Nicholson & McArthur, John R. Nicholson, Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Theodore Freeman, Phillip E. Friduss, for appellant (case no. A90A1382).
Winburn, Lewis & Barrow, Gene Mac Winburn, John J. Barrow, for appellees.
This is in keeping with Georgia’s policy of liberal construction of workers’ compensation coverage. Gulf American &c. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ga. App. 179, 180 (257 SE2d 44) (1979).
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.