Court Opinion

ID: 9931639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:09:23.447133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:58.134487
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0781-22

SUPREME ELASTIC CORP.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WALTER SCHULEIN, and
UNIVERSAL INDUSTRIAL
SUPPLY, INC.,

     Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________

                   Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided February 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No. C-
                   000056-19.

                   Kates Nussman Ellis Farhi & Earle, LLP, attorneys for
                   appellant (Michael B. Farhi and Sandra M. Barsoum,
                   on the briefs).

                   Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl,
                   attorneys for respondent Walter Schulein (James E.
                   Stahl and John J. DeLuca, Jr., of counsel and on the
                   brief).
            Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, PC,
            attorneys for respondent Universal Industrial Supply,
            Inc. (Steven L. Fox, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Supreme Elastic Corp. (Supreme) appeals from the October 7,

and November 14, 2022 orders granting summary judgment to defendant

Universal Industrial Supply, Inc., (UIS) and defendant Walter Schulein,

respectively. We affirm.

                                       I.

      We glean the following facts from the motion record. Supreme is a textile

manufacturer specializing in yarn and fabrics that can be used to create personal

protective equipment (PPE). UIS distributes gloves and safety products to

multiple entities. Schulein worked for Supreme between 2005 and 2019, and

briefly worked for UIS after separating from Supreme. According to Schulein,

Supreme hired him "to initiate [its] Tuff[-]N[-]Lite line of [PPE], which

[wa]s . . . primarily used by glass manufacturers."

      Schulein considered himself "an expert in knitted textiles," "hav[ing]

worked in [the] industry for several decades." In his role as Supreme's Northeast

Marketing Manager, his duties included servicing existing accounts, locating

new accounts, and identifying new clients and markets for plaintiff's products.

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                                       2
      When Supreme hired Schulein, he signed the corporation's employee

handbook.    Section 5.11 of the handbook, entitled "Confidential Company

Information," stated, in part:

            any employee who improperly copies, removes
            (whether physically or electronically), uses[,] or
            discloses confidential information to anyone outside of
            the [c]ompany may be subject to disciplinary action up
            to and including termination. Employees may be
            required to sign an agreement reiterating these
            obligations.

      According to Supreme, its employees also were required to sign a non-

disclosure agreement (NDA). Schulein testified during his deposition that "[he]

had to sign something" when Supreme hired him and it "may have been a[n

NDA]." However, prior to the entry of the October 7 and November 14, 2022

orders, Supreme failed to produce any NDA signed by Schulein.

      In 2015, while Schulein was still employed at Supreme, Supreme and UIS

entered into a Distribution and Representation Agreement (Agreement), under

which UIS agreed to distribute and sell certain safety and clothing products

offered by Supreme, such as goods from Supreme's "Tuff-N-Lite," "Lite-N-

Lite," and "Micro-Texpur" lines. Supreme terminated the Agreement in 2017,

alleging UIS breached its terms, including representing competing products.

UIS denied Supreme's allegations and accused Supreme of violating the

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                                      3
Agreement by "contact[ing UIS]'s customers and disclos[ing] confidential

information, including pricing," to "gain a commercial advantage for Supreme."

      On February 24, 2019, Schulein forwarded an email from his Supreme

email account to his personal email account which contained a folder of files

from Supreme, including various sales reports. He did not notify Supreme of

his actions. According to Supreme, Schulein

            uploaded over 150 files from his Supreme laptop
            computer onto an external hard drive that contained
            confidential and proprietary information[,] including
            but not limited to patent information, design
            information, pricing tiers, profit margins, customer
            contact information, customer lists, marketing plans,
            customer leads, product design information, profit
            margins, and sales data.

      Schulein later admitted to downloading files from his work email "to a

personal hard drive," but claimed he "did this to protect [him]self in the event

Supreme alleged [his] performance was insufficient and gave [him] too small of

a bonus or fired [him], as they did to [his] former co[-]worker." Additionally,

Schulein stated "Supreme's accounting department initially emailed [him] the

documents . . . so [he] could keep track of customer sales and ensure that each

customer was in the proper pricing tier."        He also asserted Supreme's

"accounting department emailed [its] salespeople an updated spreadsheet every

month" and "[n]one of these documents, nor the emails the accounting

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                                       4
department sent them in, were marked confidential in any way[,] to [his]

knowledge."

      Schulein resigned from Supreme two days after he downloaded Supreme's

files and transferred them to his personal hard drive. The same day he resigned,

Supreme's CEO sent an email terminating him. Supreme's CEO also asked him

to return his company car, a 2016 Toyota Camry, to Supreme's headquarters in

North Carolina. After consulting with an attorney, Schulein left his company

car in front of his house. Schulein's attorney notified Supreme that the company

car could be retrieved with all other company property inside the vehicle.

Schulein's counsel further informed Supreme the company car would be left at

a nearby airport if not retrieved from the front of Schulein's home.

      Approximately three weeks after Schulein separated from Supreme, he

spoke with UIS's CEO, informing the CEO Schulein no longer worked for

Supreme. After meeting with UIS's president and CEO in April 2019, Schulein

was offered employment and began working for UIS.

      Shortly before Schulein accepted UIS's job offer, Supreme filed a

complaint against Schulein.      In September 2019, Supreme amended its

complaint to name UIS as an additional defendant. In its twelve-count amended

complaint against defendants, Supreme asserted claims for: (1) injunctive relief;

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                                        5
(2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;

(4) interference with contractual relations; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; (6)

breach of the duty of loyalty; (7) tortious interference with prospective economic

gain; (8) conversion; (9) misappropriation of trade secrets and conspiracy to

convert trade secrets; (10) violation of the Computer Fraud Abuse Act, 18

U.S.C. § 1030; (11) violation of the Computer Related Offenses Act, N.J.S.A.

2A:38A-1 to -6; and (12) unfair competition. Some counts of the amended

complaint, including counts two, five, and six, were lodged only against

Schulein.

      In 2020, the trial court appointed Richard Shaklee, a Special Discovery

Master, to facilitate the discovery process. Two years later, after the parties

exchanged discovery, UIS filed a motion for summary judgment against

Supreme; Supreme opposed the motion.

      On June 10, 2022, Judge Francis R. Hodgson, Jr. heard argument on the

motion. As the judge began to address individual counts of Supreme's amended

complaint, the judge informed Supreme's counsel that Supreme would need "to

prove . . . [Schulein] used [Supreme's] information to unfairly compete," and

Supreme "lost . . . business from . . . companies that he solicited." The judge

asked what testimony Supreme could elicit at trial "to prove that [Schulein]

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                                        6
accessed or used this information to [Supreme's] detriment," understanding it

was Supreme's "obligation . . . to come forward with [its] case."

      In response to the defense's argument that "there was not a separate

document at any time signed by Schulein that prohibited [him] from competing,"

the judge told Supreme's counsel, "I don't know any . . . case law that says that

a party can use a . . . written agreement against someone that they can't

produce[,] and they can't tell me what's in it. Let alone . . . that the person should

be on notice to be found to violate it." The judge added that even if Schulein

worked for a competitor,

             [w]ithout a non-compete and without a[n NDA], a
             [seventy]-year old salesman is permitted to quit one job
             and go work for somebody else. And, in fact, is even
             permitted to go solicit his former customers without a
             non-compete or [NDA,] as long [as] he doesn't violate
             duties of loyalty.

      Judge Hodgson further questioned Supreme's allegation under the seventh

count of the amended complaint, i.e., defendants engaged in tortious

interference with Supreme's prospective economic gain. He told Supreme's

counsel,

             I don't think [you] can make your case . . . unless you
             show . . . [Schulein] was using something he shouldn't
             have been able to use. I don't see any evidence where
             that was done. . . .

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                                          7
                   . . . New employers aren't . . . liable for what the
             employee does if they don't know about it. . . . You
             have to show me something that says that [UIS] . . .
             should have known about it, because that's the test[.]

      Further, the judge stated Supreme needed to demonstrate that what

Schulein downloaded was confidential, and "what steps [Supreme] took to

protect the information" at issue. Next, the judge stated he "need[ed] to know

what [Supreme's] damages were." In summarizing his concerns, the judge

remarked, "I guess [those are] the two main things[:] the damages and the steps

[Supreme] took to protect [its] information. I'm going to need those things in

order to finalize a decision in this matter."

      Before the hearing concluded, Schulein's counsel informed the court he

would "now . . . move for . . . summary judgment," having had the benefit of

hearing the discussion between the judge and counsel. When the judge asked

why Schulein would not simply "join" UIS's motion, Supreme's counsel

objected, arguing Schulein joining UIS's motion would not be "fair" because

certain "counts against [Schulein] . . . ha[d not] been briefed." The judge

replied:

             [Y]ou'll recall . . . earlier . . . when I started going
             through . . . those first few counts—the contract counts,
             I needed to address those in the context of the counts
             against UIS . . . . And so, I . . . basically gave an
             indication of where we're going with those . . .

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                                         8
            counts . . . . If [Schulein's counsel] wants to add
            something else, [and address] the conversion count[,]
            for instance, if he wants to . . . join the motion and also
            add . . . something on the conversion count or . . . other
            counts, where he is alone [on the count,] . . . he could
            do that.

                 But [Supreme's counsel] is right. . . . I'm not
            going to decide those [counts pertaining only to
            Schulein] without [giving Supreme's counsel] . . . an
            opportunity to respond.

      After Schulein's counsel stated he would "do [his] own work" on "counts

that are only against Schulein," and would only "amplify or provide additional

information" he felt necessary regarding counts of the amended complaint where

Schulein was "joined in with [UIS]," Supreme's counsel stated, "in the interest

of fairness and procedure," "if [Schulein's counsel is] going to make his own

motion, he should[ not] bootstrap onto [UIS's motion]. I should have a chance

to oppose it."

      The judge agreed, acknowledged defendants also would be given the

opportunity to reply to Supreme's supplemental admissions, and told Supreme's

counsel that "in the meantime," the court expected Supreme's counsel would "be

thinking about all the questions [the judge] had and [would] come back [to court]

a little bit [more] prepared next time, . . . to answer [the judge's] questions."

Supreme's counsel replied, "Fair enough, Your Honor."

                                                                           A-0781-22
                                        9
      In August 2022, after Supreme submitted additional certifications and

exhibits to the court in opposition to the summary judgment motion, Schulein's

counsel wrote to Judge Hodgson, with a copy to counsel, advising Schulein

would be "adopt[ing] all of the arguments of . . . [UIS], with respect to the

pending [s]ummary [j]udgment matter" and "[r]equest[ing] . . . [s]ummary

[j]udgment as to those specific [counts in the amended complaint] addressed

solely to the alleged conduct of Schulein."        Schulein's counsel also stated

Schulein "adopt[ed] the responses," and "join[ed] in the application of UIS for

[s]ummary [j]udgment."

      In the same letter, Schulein's attorney argued that "[w]ith respect to the

confidentiality and the protection afforded the material" Schulein downloaded,

it "was available to [Supreme's a]ccounting [d]epartment, other sales personnel

and to . . . Schulein"; Supreme did not "protect the information"; and "the

information was provided to . . . Schulein in an unsolicited manner ."

Additionally, Schulein's attorney stated Schulein did not disclose "the alleged

pirated information" "to any person or entity." Further, counsel argued Supreme

submitted "no evidence to support any [of its] claim[s] for damages."

      Finally, Schulein's counsel submitted Schulein's August 12, 2022

certification with his letter. In the certification, Schulein stated he "did not show

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                                        10
anyone at UIS the documents [he] downloaded [from his Supreme account] to

[his] personal hard drives, nor did [he] access th[o]se documents once [he] began

employment with UIS." Schulein also certified he saved the information he

retrieved "to an external drive for [his] attorney to review in preparation for

litigation." Further, Schulein stated some of the names of potential clients he

recommended to UIS were clients he "remembered working with while

employed with Supreme," but "through research," he also identified other

potential clients for UIS who, "to [his] knowledge, . . . never worked with

Supreme."

      Supreme's counsel subsequently wrote to Judge Hodgson, objecting to the

court considering Schulein's certification or allowing Schulein to "adopt" UIS's

arguments, claiming Schulein's submissions were "extremely prejudicial" and

"violative of the Rules of Court."

      The parties appeared before Judge Hodgson for additional argument on

October 7, 2022. At the outset of the hearing, the judge announced Schulein

"ha[d] joined th[e] motion." The judge then permitted Schulein's attorney and

counsel for the other parties to state their positions on the pending motion.

      As argument progressed, the judge concluded "there would be no . . .

foundation for [Supreme's] complaint had" Schulein not downloaded

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                                       11
information from Supreme, which "raise[d] the issue of what impact the

download ha[d] on . . . th[e] case." Thus, the judge stated he would decide

whether the material Schulein downloaded was "protectable," "whether that

protectable information was used, and if it was used, whether [there were]

damages."

      Next, recognizing Supreme "conceded . . . [counts one, ten, and eleven]

of the amended complaint" "should be dismissed as . . . moot," the judge

addressed the remaining counts of the complaint. He noted the foundation of

Supreme's complaint rested on "four basic allegations," specifically:        (1)

"[Schulein] downloaded and transmitted information to himself prior to his

resignation"; (2) "the information downloaded and transmitted constituted trade

secrets, confidential and proprietary information"; (3) Schulein "shared this

information with UIS"; and (4) "defendants used this information to unfairly

compete with plaintiff."

      Against this backdrop, the judge referenced count two of Supreme's

complaint—breach of contract—and found Supreme never produced an NDA

signed by Schulein, and "[t]here was no competent evidence . . . the parties

established essential terms [of a contract or] that the terms were breached." In

that vein, the judge found "the employee handbook signed by [Schulein] . . .

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                                      12
contain[ed] a prominent disclaimer [that the handbook] d[id] not constitute a

contract," but even if Schulein violated a provision in the handbook that stated

"company finances, pricing, products, product development, . . . marketing

strategies, suppliers and . . . essential customers would remain confidential," any

"penalty for downloading" this information, "up to and including termination,"

"no longer applie[d]" to Schulein once he resigned or was terminated by

Supreme.

      Judge Hodgson further found "there [wa]s no competent evidence of

disclosure" of the downloaded material by Schulein. The judge stated Supreme's

"evidence show[ed Schulein] accessed the download[ed information] two

times[,] both after the litigation began and before his employment with UIS.

There is no competent evidence in the record that [Schulein] shared the

documents with anyone . . . other than his lawyer." Moreover, the judge found

that even if Schulein identified customers UIS could call after Schulein began

working for UIS, the identities of glass purchasers were "publicly available," so

Supreme failed to show Schulein improperly identified potential customers.

Accordingly, the judge dismissed count two of the amended complaint.

      Regarding count three—breach of covenant of good faith and fair

dealing—the judge found "the covenants d[id] not apply because neither

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                                       13
[defendant was] subject to a contract." He explained, "[n]o contract [was]

presented as to [Schulein,] and the parties . . . agreed that the . . . [A]greement

between . . . Supreme and UIS [wa]s no lon[g]er in effect."

      As to count four of the complaint—interference with contractual

relations—Judge Hodgson stated,

            [Supreme] allege[d] [Schulein] used confidential
            information to sell PPE to [Supreme]'s customers.
            Critically, [Supreme] and its alleged customers were
            not operating under any contract[; customers] were
            really buying goods from [Supreme] as needed, as a so-
            called      purchase     order[-]to[-]purchase       order
            arrangement working under the Uniform Commercial
            Code. . . . [T]his lack of contract [defeats] this claim.

      Next, the judge collectively addressed counts five and six, whereby

Supreme alleged Schulein breached his fiduciary duty and his duty of loyalty to

Supreme by downloading and transferring confidential information to himself

while employed by Supreme. The judge rejected these claims, stating,

            in the absence of [a] covenant not to compete after
            termination of employment, an employee may
            anticipate the future termination of his employment
            and[,] while still employed[,] make arrangements for
            some new employment by a competitor [or] the
            establishment of his own business in competition with
            the employer. The only restriction to such action is that
            he may not solicit his employer's customers for his own
            benefit before he gets terminated [from] his
            employment, nor may he do so through other similar

                                                                             A-0781-22
                                       14
            actions in direct competition with the employer's
            business.

      The judge also acknowledged that shortly before Schulein separated from

Supreme, he "saved information originating from his employer" and

"emailed . . . information . . . to himself," which "included patterns, sales data,

customer contact information, and price lists." However, the judge stated, "there

is no competent evidence that [the] information downloaded was confidential or

that it was used by [Schulein] . . . to gain a competitive advantage." Instead, the

judge found the evidence showed Schulein "downloaded this information for his

own protection . . . after he left the company," believing "Supreme was

litigious, . . . [and] that Supreme m[ight] contest his performance once he

left . . . and deny him what they owed [him]." Further, the judge reiterated "[t]he

evidence showed that the downloaded material was only accessed two times

after litigation began and prior to [Schulein's] employment with UIS," "to

preserve the information for his lawyer."

      Additionally, the judge found "[t]he totality of the evidence provided by

Supreme supporting the misuse of the transferred information was that

[Supreme] was contacted by . . . some of its customers who stated . . . [Schulein]

was soliciting them with Supreme['s] profit and sales information and that names

of [Supreme's] customers were listed in an email to UIS."          But the judge

                                                                             A-0781-22
                                       15
concluded that after Supreme received this report, "the specific contacts . . . who

allegedly relayed the information [that Schulein solicited them] could not be

identified in discovery, nor could [the] complaining customers who made these

allegations."

      The judge also found that because the case involved "an industry where

glass manufacturers and those individuals who could use this type of material

are available publicly," the names of customers were "available publicly on the

internet." And considering Schulein "worked in this business for [fifty] years,"

the judge determined Schulein "kn[e]w the individuals who worked in the glass

business and . . . need[ed] . . . protective equipment." Moreover, the judge

concluded Schulein "was not prevented from taking information that he[]

learned during the course of his career . . . and using it subsequently," given

"there[ was] no non-solicitation and no non-compete clause . . . presented [by

Supreme] in this case."

      Next, the judge found "no evidence in the record that Supreme was harmed

by the transferred information." He reasoned that although Supreme "assert[ed

it suffered] a reduction in gross sales attributable to [Schulein]," Supreme failed

to "prov[e] any nexus between" a loss of its former customers and Schulein

working for UIS. The judge also stated, "there's no indication by any expert as

                                                                             A-0781-22
                                       16
to what [caused] the reduction[]" in Supreme's sales. "It could be . . . [due] to

COVID. There is no evidence that [Supreme] lost customers or sales[,] or

potential sales[,] that were in progress as a result of defendant[s'] conduct."

      Regarding count seven—tortious interference with prospective economic

gain—the judge stated,

                   [t]o prove this cause of action[,] a plaintiff must
            establish that there was some reasonable expectation of
            economic advantage[,] that the defendants interfered
            with this expectation intentionally and without
            justification or excuse, that absent this interference,
            there was a reasonable probability that plaintiff would
            have received the anticipated benefit[,] and that the
            plaintiff was damaged thereby. . . .

                   ....

                   A new employer will not face liability for an
            employee's use of a prior employer's trade secrets
            unless the new employer is aware or had reason to know
            that the employee was using proprietary information.

      Based on these standards, the judge explained Supreme could not prevail

on this count unless it "prove[d] that but for . . . defendant[s'] wrongful actions,

it [wa]s reasonably probable . . . Supreme would have entered into a particular

future contractual relationship with [an] identified customer." He concluded,

"[a]lthough there [wa]s evidence that [Schulein] removed computer data from

Supreme, there [wa]s no evidence [Schulein] used the information or that its

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                                        17
purported use damaged Supreme. Moreover, there [wa]s no evidence that the

subject downloads should [have been] treated as trade secrets."

      Turning to count eight—conversion—the judge acknowledged conversion

was defined as "the wrongful exercise of dominion or control over property

owned by another inconsistent with that owner's rights." He found Schulein

decided not to return a company car to North Carolina, but instead, worked with

his attorney to "mak[e] it available in New Jersey at a New Jersey airport at

[Supreme's] request." The judge characterized this incident as a "business

disagreement," versus Schulein exercising "control over [Supreme's] property"

to such a degree that his conduct "g[a]ve rise to the claim of conversion."

      In addressing count nine—misappropriation of trade secrets and

conspiracy to convert trade secrets—Judge Hodgson referred to the New Jersey

Trade Secrets Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 56:15-1 to -9. Quoting N.J.S.A. 56:15-2, he

explained a trade secret is defined as

            information held by one or more people[,] . . .including
            a formula, pattern, business data, . . . or process that
            derives independent economic value . . . from not being
            generally known to, and not being readily
            ascertainable . . . by[,] [an]other person who can obtain
            economic value from its disclosure or use; and . . . [i]s
            the subject of efforts that are reasonabl[e] under the . . .
            circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

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                                         18
      The judge concluded the information Schulein downloaded did not meet

the statutory definition of a trade secret. The judge explained the "prices paid

by customers [we]re known to the sales[]people and [we]re on the invoices."

Also, the judge found potential "customers [we]re easily identified" because

"[t]hey're glass manufacturers."

      Additionally, the judge noted that for Supreme to prevail on this count, it

would have to show not only that a trade secret existed, but

            that information comprising the trade secret was
            communicated in confidence[,] . . . that the secret
            information was disclosed by [Schulein] in breach of
            that confidence, that the secret information was
            acquired by a competitor with knowledge of the . . .
            breach of confidence and that the secret information
            was used by the competitor to the detriment of
            [Supreme], and finally[,] that [Supreme] took
            precautions to [ensure] the secrets remain[ed] secret.

      Judge Hodgson found even if Supreme established the information

Schulein downloaded constituted trade secrets, which it did not, Supreme "did

not establish that its sales information and price tiering w[ere] the subject of

efforts that were . . . reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secret."

The judge found the prices Supreme charged to its customers,

            were obtainable and indeed were obtained simply by
            asking [a] customer what they were paying for the PPE.
            Further, the identity of public companies and the
            contact person for those companies [we]re either

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                                       19
            known to [Schulein] through his years of work
            experience or obtainable through the internet.
            Similarly, [Schulein]'s understanding of the materials
            used in manufacturing at Supreme were learned through
            years of experience as a sales[]person, and . . . even
            before that. It is evident . . . from his deposition that he
            knows the product.

      Finally,   regarding   count    twelve—unfair       competition—based     on

defendants' alleged "wrongful misappropriation of [Supreme's] trade secrets and

proprietary and confidential information," Judge Hodgson stated he "previously

addressed the issues with regard to . . . [Supreme's] ability . . . to claim [its]

property as protected." As "the same analysis applie[d] to" count twelve, the

judge concluded that count, too, would be dismissed.

      Accordingly, Judge Hodgson entered an order on October 7, granting

UIS's summary judgment motion and dismissing Supreme's amended complaint,

but only "as against [UIS]." The entry of summary judgment solely in UIS's

favor prompted Schulein's attorney to ask the court for dismissal of Supreme's

amended complaint as to his client.

      On November 14, 2022, Judge Hodgson wrote to counsel for the parties,

stating:

            I have reviewed the correspondence concerning
            [Supreme]'s dispute as to whether defendant, Walter
            Schulein, was a part of the recently heard summary
            judgment—he was. Schulein participated in both

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                                       20
            hearings and provided formal notice on August 12,
            2022, that he was joining and adopting the arguments
            of defendant, UIS. Plaintiff replied and objected to the
            submission on August 17, 2022. During the October 7,
            2022, hearing[,] this [c]ourt addressed the issue at
            approximately 9:29 [a.m.], stating that Schulein had
            joined. Finally, there was no prejudice to any party[.]
            UIS's statement of facts and arguments were simply
            adopted by Schulein, which were addressed by the
            [c]ourt at both the June and October [2022] hearings.

                                        II.

      On appeal, Supreme raises various overlapping arguments, contending the

trial court erred by: (1) "granting summary judgment to . . . Schulein[] without

a proper application" and "deciding issues that were outside of the summary

judgment motion[,] without affording [Supreme] . . . notice and an opportunity

to be heard"; (2) "ignor[ing] credible evidence" and "assum[ing] the role of

factfinder in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants ," without

"mak[ing] all inferences in favor of [Supreme,] as required under R[ule] 4:46-

2(c)"; and (3) granting defendants summary judgment, even though they were

not entitled to this relief "as a matter of law." These arguments are unavailing.

      "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the trial court." Norman Int'l, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 251 N.J. 538,

549 (2022) (quoting Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511

(2019)). Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,

                                                                             A-0781-22
                                       21
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

4:46-2(c). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide

whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting

& Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)

(quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 935 (App. Div.

2007)), overruled in part on other grounds, Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of

Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 563 (2012). "[A]n issue of [material fact] is genuine

only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by

the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom

favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier

of fact." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).

      A party does not create a genuine issue of fact simply by offering a sworn

statement. Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 2004).

Also, "'conclusory and self-serving assertions' in certifications without

explanatory or supporting facts will not defeat a meritorious motion for

summary judgment." Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415,

425-26 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440 (2005)).

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      "A party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely by

submitting an expert's report in [their] favor," but rather, the expert's report must

create a genuine issue of material fact. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

142 N.J. 520, 544 (1995). Moreover, an expert's opinion must be grounded in

facts or data, not just "a mere conclusion." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 54

(2015) (citations omitted).

      "Competent opposition requires 'competent evidential material' beyond

mere 'speculation.'" Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div.

2014) (quoting Hoffman, 404 N.J. Super. at 426). "[F]acts which are immaterial

or of an insubstantial nature, . . . fanciful, frivolous, gauzy[,] or merely

suspicious," are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Globe

Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 529)

(internal quotations omitted).

      In addressing a summary judgment motion, the trial court "must analyze

the record in light of the substantive standard and burden of proof that a

factfinder would apply in the event that the case [was] tried." Ibid. Accordingly,

"neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the

cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action."

Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38.

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      Rule 4:46-1 provides that a motion for summary judgment "shall be

returnable no later than 30 days before the scheduled trial date, unless the court

otherwise orders for good cause shown." The Rule does not establish time

requirements "that must be met in every case for due process demands to be

satisfied." Seoung Ouk Cho v. Trinitas Reg'l Med. Ctr., 443 N.J. Super. 461,

474 (App. Div. 2015).      Instead, the time requirements "provide a useful

background for assessing whether [the party opposing the motion] had an

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Ibid.

      A trial court "should assure itself that the parties have had a reasonable

opportunity to obtain and submit material information to the court" before

granting summary judgment. Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 264 (1992).

"Due process is not a fixed concept . . . but a flexible one that depends on the

particular circumstances." Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995).

      Next, it is well settled that employees owe an "undivided loyalty" to their

employers "while [they are] still employed." Auxton Comput. Enters., Inc. v.

Parker, 174 N.J. Super. 418, 423-24 (App. Div. 1980). As Judge Hodgson

recognized during the October 7 hearing, if an employee is not subject to a non-

compete agreement, that employee

            may anticipate the future termination of [their]
            employment and[,] while still employed[,] make

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                                       24
            arrangements for some new employment by a
            competitor . . . . The only restriction to such action is
            that [the employee] may not solicit [the] employer's
            customers for [the employee's] own benefit before [the
            employee has] terminated [their] employment . . . .
            This would constitute a breach of the [undivided]
            loyalty which the employee owes to [the] employer
            while . . . still employed.

      Guided by these standards, we discern no basis to disturb either challenged

order. We add the following comments.

      Initially, Supreme argues it did not have notice or an opportunity to be

heard before Judge Hodgson decided issues "outside of [UIS's] summary

judgment motion" and before the judge dismissed Supreme's complaint as to

Schulein. Such contentions are belied by the record. In fact, the record shows

Supreme was on notice as of the June 10, 2022 hearing that Schulein intended

to join in UIS's application and the judge permitted him to do so over Supreme's

objection. However, the judge also stated, "[Supreme's counsel] is right. . . .

I'm not going to decide those [counts pertaining only to Schulein] without

[giving Supreme's counsel] . . . an opportunity to respond." Judge Hodgson then

adjourned the June 10 hearing to allow Supreme more time to address the

concerns the judge outlined at that hearing, including Supreme's ability to prove

its allegations against defendants, and that it suffered damages due to their

actions. In fact, the judge stated during the June 10 hearing:

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                                      25
                   I need . . . more context with damages. . . .
            [B]ecause I have the understanding [Supreme is] . . .
            circumstantially arguing that [Schulein] used the
            [alleged        confidential]        information       [he
            downloaded] . . . . to unfairly compete[.] I'm going to
            want . . . evidence. . . . [Y]ou're going to have to show
            me . . . he left and the next year[,] . . . this is what
            [Supreme] lost in business from . . . companies . . . he
            solicited.

      As mentioned, the judge did not resume argument until October 7, 2022,

at which time he permitted Supreme to further argue the merits of its case and

address defendants' additional submissions.        Under these circumstances,

Supreme was not deprived of notice or an opportunity to be heard before the

judge dismissed its amended complaint against defendants.

      We also reject Supreme's argument the judge failed to draw all reasonable

inferences in its favor before granting summary judgment to defendants. In fact,

the record shows the judge was aware the parties engaged in extensive

discovery, including depositions and the exchange of expert reports, and had the

benefit of a special discovery master. Yet more than three years after Supreme

filed its amended complaint, it never produced an NDA, a non-solicitation, or a

non-compete agreement signed by Schulein. It also failed to establish the

material Schulein downloaded from his Supreme email account and transferred

to his personal account was confidential, or that he shared it with UIS.

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                                       26
      Therefore, we have no reason to disturb Judge Hodgson's findings that

"[t]here [was] no evidence . . . [Supreme] lost customers or sales or potential

sales that were in progress as a result of defendant[s'] conduct," and "[t]he

totality of the evidence provided by Supreme supporting the misuse of the

transferred information was that it was contacted by . . . some of its customers

who stated that [Schulein] was soliciting them," yet "the specific contacts . . .

who allegedly relayed the information [that Schulein contacted them using

Supreme's downloaded information] could not be identified in discovery, nor

could [the] . . . customers who made these allegations."       Accordingly, we

discern no error in the judge's decision to award summary judgment to

defendants.

      To the extent we have not addressed Supreme's remaining arguments, they

are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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