Court Opinion

ID: 9478216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:43:15.969059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:18.282529
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
with whom BROWNING, Circuit Judge, concurs:
Doggett advances an additional theory of liability: He argues that the good Samaritan doctrine applies and creates a duty in Gorman’s companions to prevent him from driving while under the influence of alcohol. This argument has merit as it applies to the petty officers who were with Gorman in Bunker 33. The Supreme Court recently decided that when an obviously intoxicated off-duty soldier shoots a rifle at persons driving by on a public street, the government is liable under the FTCA for its negligence in allowing the soldier to leave the naval base with a loaded rifle in his possession. Sheridan v. United States, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988). The Court held:
By voluntarily adopting regulations that prohibit the possession of firearms on the naval base and that require all personnel to report the presence of any such firearm, and by further voluntarily undertaking to provide care to a person who was visibly drunk and visibly armed, the Government assumed responsibility to “perform [its] ‘good Samaritan’ task in a careful manner.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65, 76 S.Ct. 122, 124, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955).
Id. at 2455.
In this case, the Navy has voluntarily adopted a regulation prohibiting intoxicated personnel from driving off the naval base. But the regulation does not stop there. It is materially different from the regulation involved in Sheridan because, in addition to prohibiting the conduct at issue, it also undertakes to provide care for the personnel involved. Specifically, the regulation provides that intoxicated personnel shall be detained, allowed to undergo a medical examination, and referred to an alcohol abuse program coordinator, and makes their welfare and protection of “primary concern.” Because the regulation both prohibits the conduct at issue and undertakes to provide care to drunken personnel, we conclude that the government assumed the “responsibility to ‘perform its “good Samaritan” task in a careful manner.’” Id.; see Williams v. State, 34 Cal.3d 18, 23, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137 (1983) (under California law, good Samaritan who undertakes to come to the aid of another is “under a duty to exercise due care in performance”). Thus if the petty officers on whom the regulation imposed the duty were or should have been aware that Gorman was intoxicated, and negligently failed to provide care for him as required by the regulation, the government would be liable.7
We therefore hold that the complaint should not have been dismissed insofar as it alleged breach of a duty by the petty officers drinking with Gorman. We remand for further proceedings on this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The complaint was properly dismissed insofar as it alleged breach of a duty by the bartender or the enlisted men who were Gorman’s drinking companions; the complaint should not have been dismissed insofar as it alleged breach of a duty by Gorman’s petty officer drinking companions or the security guard. The cause is REMANDED for further proceedings.

. Because care of the intoxicated personnel is the primary concern of the regulation, the primary duty is owed to those personnel. However, we believe the regulation was also enacted for the purpose of protecting individuals both on and off the naval base who might be endangered by a drunk driver. Thus the duty created by the regulation was owed not only to Gorman, but also to third-party motorists such as Dog-gett.