Court Opinion

ID: 9854970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:36.515646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:37.730693
License: Public Domain

MACY, Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case but for different reasons from those which have been expressed in the majority opinion. I believe that the majority opinion unnecessarily strains the meaning of the constitutional and statutory language “used primarily for” and “a governmental purpose” to reach a result which could be achieved by applying the plain meaning of that language. The phrase “used primarily for” does not have the same meaning as the individual word “primarily.” I believe that the Legislature intended for the exemption to apply to property which is used predominantly for a “governmental purpose.” The plain meaning of “governmental purpose” is any governmental purpose. Our constitution and statutes do not specify that, in order to qualify for the exemption, the governmental entity which owns the property must be the same entity which makes use of the property.
In my opinion, the phrase “used primarily for a governmental purpose” means that, when the property is used predominantly for a governmental purpose by any governmental entity, it is exempt from taxation. When the property is not used predominantly for a governmental purpose, it is subject to taxation. When this reading of the plain language of the constitution and the statutes is applied to the facts of this case, it becomes clear that the City of Lander’s property was exempt from taxation. The property was owned by the City of Lander and was used entirely for a governmental purpose — one half as a city hall and one half as office space for a state agency. No evidence existed which suggested that any nongovernmental activities were being conducted on the premises. The county board of equalization’s decision was contrary to law.
For these reasons, I agree that the district court’s ruling should be affirmed.