Court Opinion

ID: 9543935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:42.986349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:31.247783
License: Public Domain

Bogdahski, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result but would hold that the composite picture of the assailant is an integral part of the victim’s statement of identification. United States v. Moskowitz, 581 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871, 99 S. Ct. 204, 58 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1978) (Friendly, J., concurring); People v. Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d 571, 581-82, 411 N.E.2d 223 (1980). See 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence § 801 (a) [01], p. 801-52 n.3. See also Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 46, 438 A.2d 1157 (1981).
The majority has decided that the composite picture is not a statement. The federal rules of evidence codify the common law definition of a state*283ment as, “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.” Fed. E. Evid. 801 (a). At the time this composite picture was assembled, the victim clearly intended to assert that her assailant resembled the picture.
The state offered this statement to prove the truth of the victim’s assertion. But as I view the circumstances of this case the state sought to capitalize on the greater credibility which attaches to an earlier identification and to use the earlier identification as substantive evidence.1 Because this earlier statement was made out of court, it was hearsay.
An exception to the hearsay rule should be made here.2 Exceptions to the rule have been created “where the statements are made under conditions deemed to render them equal in reliability and trustworthiness” to those made under “the sanction of an oath and the test of cross-examination.” *284Cherniske v. Jajer, 171 Conn. 372, 376-77, 370 A.2d 981 (1976); General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Capitol Garage, Inc., 154 Conn. 593, 597, 227 A.2d 548 (1967). An identification of an accused made by a witness after perceiving him is usually more trustworthy than a later, in-court identification. As stated in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 n.3, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967), quoting from People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 626, 354 P.2d 865 (1960), “[ujnlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first impeached . . . evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial identification is impeached, because the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness’ mind. . . . The failure of the witness to repeat the extrajudicial identification in court does not destroy its probative value, for such failure may be explained by loss of memory or other circumstances. The extrajudicial identification tends to connect the defendant with the crime, and the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination.”
Statements of prior identification have been admitted in this state under the same reasoning. State v. Frost, 105 Conn. 326, 341,135 A. 446 (1926). This is in accord with the trend to admit such statements. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, supra; People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 101 N.E.2d 457 (1951); *2854 Weinstein & Berger, op. cit., § 801 (d) (1) (c) [01]; 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1130 (3d Ed. 1940); annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 449.
When, as here, the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning such an identification, the ont-of-conrt statement of identification should be admissible as a hearsay exception.

If the state offered the composite only as part of an in-court statement by the victim, I would agree with the majority’s statement that “the composite picture was no more than a pictorial representation of the testimony of the witness through whom it was offered.” In that ease the statement would not be hearsay.

 Federal courts would reach the same result by a different route. Under § 801 of the federal rules of evidence such a statement, by definition, is not hearsay.
“(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if —
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (0) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him.”