Court Opinion

ID: 9753254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:05:28.561543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:32.776250
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the amount in Pa.R.Civ.P. 238 delay damages that a defendant owes a plaintiff in a negligence action is to be calculated in accordance with the factfinder’s allocation of fault and that Rule 238 damages awarded against all defendants are to be aggregated with the verdict. For all of the reasons that follow, however, I disagree with and respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion.
*15The majority resolves several questions relating to the collection or calculation of delay damages involving multiple defendants, who include a Commonwealth party. The majority does so by applying a statutory provision to each. First, the majority holds that under § 7102(b) of the Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102 et seq., defendants are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s aggregated delay damages award. Next, the majority holds that the interplay between § 7102(b) and § 8528 of the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521 et seq., restricts the Commonwealth’s joint and several liability for delay damages to the Act’s $250,000 compensatory damages cap. And last, overruling this court’s decision in Woods v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 531 Pa. 295, 612 A.2d 970 (1992), the majority holds that delay damages recoverable from the Commonwealth are to be calculated on § 8528’s cap, not on the factfinder’s actual damages assessment.
My fundamental disagreement with the majority’s analysis of all of these issues centers on its resort to statutes to decide matters of judicial procedure.
Article V, § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution empowers this court to “prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts... if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.... ” Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c). We have held that this power is exclusive. In re 42 Pa.C.S. § 1703, 482 Pa. 522, 394 A.2d 444 (1978).
We have also held that delay damages are procedural, and that Pa.R.Civ.P. 238 represents a legitimate exercise of our Article V, § 10(c) rule-making authority. Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981), appeal dismissed., 456 U.S. 940 (1982), 102 S.Ct. 2002. We have affirmed our holding in Laudenberger repeatedly. See, e.g., Willet v. Pennsylvania Medical Catastrophe Loss Fund, 549 Pa. 613, 702 A.2d 850 (1997); Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 529 Pa. 588, 606 A.2d 427 (1992); *16Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986).
Thus, I believe that questions about delay damages are for this court alone to determine, and that Rule 238, not legislative authority, is dispositive. While I agree that we should consider relevant legislation when faced with issues relating to the assessment and recovery of delay damages, see Pa. R.Civ.P. 127(c)(5), I also believe that this court’s- intent in promulgating the Rule must be paramount in any decision we reach. Pa.R.Civ.P. 127(a).
In the past,, wé have zealously guarded our constitutionally-mandated rule-making power. For example, in In re 12 Pa.C.S. § 1703, without waiting for an adversarial challenge, we declared an express mandate of the General Assembly subjecting our procedures of rule adoption to certain sections of the Public Agency Open Meeting Law violative of Article V, § 10(c) and the separation of powers doctrine. Similarly, any effort by the legislature to encroach upon the terms or operation of Rule 238 through the Comparative Negligence Act, the Sovereign Immunity Act or any other statute would be unconstitutional. I am, therefore, perplexed and troubled by the majority’s willingness to defer to legislative action in deciding the questions of procedure this appeal raises.
In my opinion, the first issue before us concerns what responsibility, if any, Rule 238 imposes upon a defendant to pay the delay damages assessed against his co-defendants. I would pose the issue as follows: Where delay damages are assessed under Rule 238 against multiple defendants, is a plaintiff allowed to recover the entire delay damages award from any one of those defendants or is a plaintiffs recovery from any one defendant limited to the delay damages attributable to him? 1
*17Pa.R.Civ.P. 127 governs the construction of our Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 127 states:
Rule 127. Construction of Rules. Intent of Supreme Court Controls
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of rules is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Supreme Court.
(b) Every rule shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. When the words of a rule are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of a rule are not explicit, the intention of the Supreme Court may be ascertained by considering, among other matters (1) the occasion and necessity for the rule; (2) the circumstances under which it was promulgated; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to be attained; (5) the prior practice, if any, including other rules and Acts of Assembly upon the same or similar subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the contemporaneous history of the rule; and (8) the practice followed under the rule.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 127.
Turning first, as Rule 127 requires, to the language of Rule 238, the latter provides in pertinent part:
Rule 238. Damages For Delay In An Action For Bodily Injury, Death Or Property Damage
(a)(1) At the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, damages for delay shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded against each defendant or additional defendant found to be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of a jury, in the decision of the court in a nonjury *18trial or in the award of arbitrators .... and shall become part of the verdict, decision or award.
(2) Damages for delay shall be awarded for the period of time
* * *
(ii) in an action commenced on or after August 1, 1989, from a date one year after the date original process was first served in the action up to the date of the award, verdict or decision.
ü; * *
(b) The period of time for which damages for delay shall be calculated under subdivision (a)(2) shall exclude the period of time, if any,
(1) after which the defendant has made a written offer of
(i) settlement in a specified sum with prompt cash payment to the plaintiff, or
(ii) a structured settlement underwritten by a financially responsible entity,
and continued that offer for at least ninety days or until commencement of trial, whichever first occurs, which offer was not accepted and the plaintiff did not recover by award, verdict or decision, exclusive of damages for delay, more than 125 percent of either the specified sum of the actual cost of the structured settlement plus any cash payment to the plaintiff; or
(2) during which the plaintiff caused delay of the trial. Pa.R.Civ.P. 238.2
As written, Rule 238 does not explicitly answer whether a plaintiff may call upon any one of multiple defendants against *19whom delay damages are assessed to satisfy all of the delay damages he is awarded. In fact, I find the Rule ambiguous, as to this question. On the one hand, by requiring that delay damages become part of the verdict, decision or award, it vrould appear that the drafters intended that all defendants found liable to the plaintiff on the underlying claim bear responsibility for the plaintiffs full delay damages recovery. On the other, the drafters made it clear that a defendant can avoid the imposition of delay damages by making a timely and reasonable settlement offer. This protection, however, would in large measure disappear if a defendant who complied with the Rule remains responsible to the plaintiff for the noncomplying co-defendants’ share of delay damages.
Looking next to the reasons for and aims of Rule 238 for guidance, as Rule 127 allows in instances of rule ambiguity, I reiterate what this court has previously decided. Pa.R.Civ.P. 127(c)(1), (4). Rule 288 seeks to encourage settlement and achieve a prompt disposition of cases so as to unclutter the courts’ dockets. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 151. The Rule also selves to compensate a plaintiff for the delay in receiving funds rightfully due to him, but which remain in a defendant’s hands during the litigation process. Id. at 154; Costa v. Lauderdale Beach Hotel, 534 Pa. 154, 626 A.2d 566, 570 (1993). In essence, Rule 238 delay damages are “an extension of the compensatory damages necessary to make a plaintiff whole.” Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 504 Pa. 80, 470 A.2d 475, 479 (1983)(quoting Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 154).
I also obseive, as permitted by Rule 127, that the General Assembly favors a plaintiffs full recovery of compensatory damages by making each joint tortfeasor liable for a plaintiff’s *20entire loss in § 7102(b) of the Comparative Negligence Act. Pa.R.Civ.P. 127(c)(5); 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b).
With these principles in mind, I conclude that generally-speaking, under Rule 238, a plaintiff in a multiple defendant lawsuit may recover all of the delay damages awarded him from any one defendant. This, in my view, increases the likelihood that a plaintiff will receive his entire award by shifting from him the financial risk of an insolvent or otherwise recovery-proof defendant. I also conclude, however, that Rule 238 restricts a plaintiffs ability to do so by distinguishing between defendants who comply with the Rule by tendering qualifying offers and defendants who do not. This is consistent with the Rule’s interest in advancing meaningful negotiation and settlement. Thus, I would hold that Rule 238 allows a plaintiff to collect his entire delay award from any noncomplying defendant; allows a non-complying defendant who pays to the plaintiff more than his assessed share of the total delay damages award to seek recoupment from those defendants whose delay damages assessment he is called upon to cover; and does not allow a plaintiff to collect from a complying defendant any delay damages attributable to other defendants from the date the offer which tolled Rule 238 was tendered.3
As to the plaintiffs ability to pursue a Commonwealth party for the full amount of his delay damages award, I see no basis in either the words of the Rule or in its purposes to treat the Commonwealth in a different manner than I have just stated.
At this point, I turn briefly to the merits of the majority’s determination that since a plaintiff is limited in the amount he may recover in compensatory damages from a Commonwealth party under the Sovereign Immunity Act’s $250,000 cap, the rule of joint and several liability in 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b) of the Comparative Negligence Act does not apply to a plaintiffs *21recovery of delay damages from the Commonwealth once 42 Pa.C.S. § 8528(b)’s cap is reached.
Even if I agreed with the majority’s approach, I cannot agree with its conclusion. From my perspective, the majority violates the cardinal rule of statutory construction which is that the object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent as expressed in the plain meaning of a statute’s language. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921.
As I read it, the majority’s construction has merit only if one accepts the proposition that the Sovereign Immunity Act’s “limitations” on the “damages” a plaintiff is permitted to recover from the Commonwealth under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8528(b) means the same thing as [the Comparative Negligence Act’s provision that a plaintiff is unable collect his entire award from a defendant against whom he is “barred” from “recovery”. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b).4 I do not, and cannot see how a limit on damages — a concept which encompasses the understanding that recovery against a defendant is permitted — can be equated with a provision which bars recovery from a defendant entirely.
In Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, 515 A.2d 517 (1986), we held that when the legislature used the phrase “against whom a plaintiff is not barred from recovery” in 42 Pa.C.S; § 7102(b) to describe those defendants who could not be held jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff’s full recovery, it intended to exclude defendants who settled with the plaintiff or who are immunized from liability. Id. at 520. I believe that our holding in Elder and the language of' both the Sovereign Immunity and Comparative Negligence Acts leave no room for the majority’s conclusion in the present case. I cannot accept that the legislature intended the Commonwealth to use the *22compensatory damages cap in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8528(b) to escape the full consequences of joint tortfeasor status under 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b) where, as here, the Commonwealth was not immune from liability and did not settle with the plaintiff prior to verdict.
Lastly, the majority opinion provides three bases for abandoning our holding in Woods to assess delay damages against the Commonwealth based on the actual verdict, as opposed to the Sovereign Immunity Act’s cap. For me, not one of them is persuasive.
The majority begins by taking issue with this court’s prior interpretation of Rule 238’s language. In Woods, we focused on the phrase which provides that “delay damages shall be added to the ‘verdict of the jury, ... the decision of the court in a nonjury trial or ... the award of arbitrators ... and shall become part of the verdict, decision or award....’”, Pa. R.Civ.P. 238(a)(1), and determined that the Rule “is indicative of the intent to have damages apply to the verdict or award itself, which represents the actual factfinder’s assessment of the plaintiffs damage, as opposed to the amount the plaintiff is legally entitled to recover.” Woods, 612 A.2d at 972. The majority states that our interpretation ignored that part of the Rule which states that “ ‘damages for delay shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded against each defendant or additional defendant’ ”, and thus, failed to realize that the Rule actually refers to the “amount the plaintiff is legally entitled to recover.” (Majority Opinion at 767-768) (quoting Pa.R.Civ.P. 238(a)(1)). I am at a loss to understand the majority’s position. In my view, the phrase from Rule 238 upon which the majority presently relies to point out the error in our prior reasoning — “compensatory damages awarded” — is not synonymous with a “plaintiffs recovery”. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of Pennsylvania opinions I have read, “compensatory damages awarded” referred to the amount the factfinder determined a plaintiff should receive from a defendant, not to the amount the plaintiff ultimately recovered.
Next, the majority determines that Woods was inadequate in its analysis of the Rule’s compensatory purpose. According *23to the majority, it was illogical for this court to suggest that the basis for calculating delay damages can be anything other than the $250,000 that the Commonwealth is actually responsible for paying since the amount a plaintiff ultimately recovers in compensatory damages can never exceed that cap. The majority, however, unfairly characterizes the observation we made in Woods when we stated: “[TJhe plaintiff who statutorily has already been denied the full compensation due him or her would be once again deprived of money to which he or she would be otherwise entitled, with only a minimum sanction being imposed on the defendant.” 612 A.2d at 972 (emphasis added). In so stating, we did not voice an intent, as the majority claims, to compensate the plaintiff for delay on amounts he can never receive. Rather, we sought to avoid the imposition of a second deprivation. By calculating delay damages on the actual amount awarded, instead of $250,000, we saw to it that a plaintiff is not denied both the amount in compensatory damages and the amount in delay damages to which he would be entitled but for the statutory cap.
Finally, the majority concludes that we failed in Woods to view this matter from “another perspective”, as we had in Craig, and recognize that by virtue of the cap in the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8528(b), the application of Rule 238 has more than a collateral effect on substantive rights and duties. (Majority Opinion at 768). According to the majority, we impermissibly affected substantive rights by “creat[ing] an uncertainty of outcome to motivate settlement where no uncertainty of outcome otherwise exists”, (Majority Opinion at 768) (emphasis in original), when we reasoned that if delay damages were computed on the statutory cap “ ‘there would be no unknown which would motivate the Commonwealth to discuss settlement.’ ” (Majority Opinion at 768) (quoting Woods, 612 A.2d at 972). In this regard, the majority opinion contains a familiar and fatal flaw of logic — it begs the question. That is to say, the majority assumes the truth of the proposition it seeks to prove by concluding in the first instance that the “uncertainty of outcome” Rule 238 creates is substantive. It is settled; delay damages and Rule 238 are procedur*24al. See, e.g., Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 147. Uncertainty of outcome in a procedural matter is procedural, not substantive. Thus, the majority’s final argument, like its others for overruling Woods, fails.
For me, our analysis in Woods regarding the language, history and operation of Rule 238 is not only correct, but is as compelling today as it was in 1992, when we decided the case. The salutary purposes of the Rule — to encourage settlements, to unclutter the courts, and to compensate the plaintiff for the delay in receiving his recovery — remain worthwhile and must continue to be actively promoted., I would, therefore, uphold our decision in Woods,' in keeping with the doctrine of stare decisis, which we have repeatedly termed a “wise course of judicial action”, Fadgen v. Lenker, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976), and which we have disregarded only when faced with prior holdings that we were clearly unable to support. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877, 888-89 (1973).
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court, affirming the trial court’s order, but for different reasons.
Mr. Justice NIGRO and Madame Justice NEWMAN join this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. I find discussion of this issue in terms of joint and several liability unproductive. Joint and several liability is a principle of tort law that is premised on the theory that the tortious conduct of two or more wrongdoers combined or concurred to cause an indivisible harm that cannot be apportioned, such that the injured parly may seek satisfaction of an entire judgment against all of them jointly or against any one of them individually. Glomb by Salopek v. Glomb, 366 Pa.Super. 206, *17530 A.2d 1362, 1365 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 (1988). By contrast, the question we face concerns the terms and operation of a procedural rule which serves to encourage settlement, facilitate the expeditious resolution of cases, and alleviate the adverse financial consequences a plaintiff sustains due to delay. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 147.

. My agreement with the majority that the delay damages that any particular defendant owes the plaintiff should be calculated in light of the defendant’s apportioned fault is based on the words in Rule 238 which provide that "damages for delay shall be added to the compensatory damages awarded against each defendant or additional defendant found to be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of a jury, in the decision of the court in a nonjury trial or in the award of arbitrators ....” Pa.R.Civ.P. 238(a)(1), and on our interpretation of the Rule in Woods that delay damages are to apply to the "actual factfinder’s assessment *19of the plaintiff’s damage.” 612 A.2d at 972. My agreement that delay damages assessed against multiple defendants are aggregated in the verdict is based on the words in the Rule which provide that “all damages for delay ... .shall become part of the verdict, decision or award.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 238(a)(1). I add that in my view, whether the amount of a defendant's olfer satisfies the Rule should also be measured by taking into account that defendant’s assessed fault. Pa. R.Civ.P. 238(b)(l)(ii). By way of example, an offer by a defendant who was found to have been 10% negligent would satisfy the Rule if the offer came within 125% of 10% of the verdict.

. I would refer Pa.R.Civ.P. 238 to the Civil Procedural Rules Committee to propose any amendments it deemed necessary to be certain that the terms of the Rule are clear in these regards and accomplish these results.

. Section 7102(b) of the Comparative Negligence Act provides in part that a "plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(b). Section § 8522(a) of the Sovereign Immunity Act waives sovereign immunity “as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties” in certain instances and "within the limits set forth in section 8528 (relating to limitations on damages)....” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a).