Court Opinion

ID: 9661116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:29:34.588888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:06.885110
License: Public Domain

*232Frank T. Gallagher, Justice
(specially concurring).
I have carefully considered the majority and minority opinions and it is undisputed that there is a material variance between the bill passed by the legislature and the one approved by the governor. This being so we are confronted with the proposition as to whether we should overrule our former decisions that a material variance between the bill passed by the legislature and the one approved by the governor invalidates the entire enactment. Bull v. King, 205 Minn. 427, 286 N. W. 311; Freeman v. Goff, 206 Minn. 49, 287 N. W. 238.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Thomas Gallagher would overrule those decisions while the dissent of Mr. Justice Murphy seeks to distinguish without overruling them. Both dissents advocate that we adopt the rule of severability which permits the unconstitutional part of a law duly enacted to be severed from the constitutional part. That rule has been applied in cases where the bill approved by the governor was the same bill which was passed by the legislature and subsequently a supreme court declared parts of the statute unconstitutional. I favor such a rule where there are no material variances as it permits the elimination of the unconstitutional parts of a statute without destroying the function of that part of the law which is constitutional.
However that is not the situation which we have before us here inasmuch as neither dissent disputes a material variance which under our previous decisions invalidates the entire act. Because of that distinction I cannot see how the rule of severability can be applied to a MU which never became a law. In other words how can we separate the bad part from the good part of something that never existed?
Even though we attempted to say that it makes no material difference whether the state auditor or the commissioner of administration formulated and prepared the system or that the variation occurred in some minor section, we cannot ignore the fact that it is apparent from a review of the house and senate journals that it did make a difference to the members of both houses which of those *233officials -would have the principal responsibility of preparing the system. It was only after a conference committee from the house and senate made recommendations that the state auditor was designated “with the advice and assistance of the commissioner of administration and the post-auditor” to formulate and prepare the system.
Justice Murphy’s dissent cites State v. Minnesota Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. 218 Minn. 229, 15 N. W. (2d) 568, to support its contention that in construing the constitutionality of a legislative enactment the court must be guided by the rule of construction that effect be given the intent of the legislature. I heartily agree with that principle of construction, but an examination of that case discloses that the court there was considering a statute which had passed the legislature and was signed by the governor in the same form as the bill passed by the legislature. Again in State ex rel. Grozbach v. Common School Dist. No. 65, 237 Minn. 150, 54 N. W. (2d) 130, and the cases cited therein, this court was considering the severability of the unconstitutional parts of a statute passed by the legislature and approved by the governor in the same form. Other Minnesota cases cited by the minority involving the doctrine of severability refer to statutes duly passed and not to Mils approved in a materially different form from those passed by the legislature.
I have also considered the cases from other jurisdictions cited by him, the principle of which we have heretofore rejected. I do not consider them of sufficient weight to justify our reversing the well-established decisions of our own court.
While I am not eternally attached to the doctrine of stare decisis without regard to changing conditions, I do feel that much weight must be given to our own decisions before we substitute for them the decisions of foreign jurisdictions, especially if it appears that we have previously rejected such outside authorities and if it also appears that our own decisions make sound law and have been relied upon by lawyers and other courts for years.
With another session of the legislature due to convene within a year, it seems logical that the present material differences can readily be corrected in a subsequent enactment of the law.
*234For the reasons herein stated I therefore respectfully concur with the majority.