Court Opinion

ID: 9686454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:48:37.666278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:19.143728
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur but write specially on “shackling.”
South Dakota has admitted in its briefs before the Court that defendant was shackled and refers to “defendant’s leg irons.” It is bound by its advocacy.
Defendant, in his brief, appeals on the basis that he was shackled with leg irons. On the record, his counsel objected to leg irons.
State goes to great lengths to explain in its brief that any prejudicial effect was mitigated by placing a panel around defendant’s table “so that the jurors could not see the Defendant’s feet and the Defendant was placed in his chair before the jurors came into the courtroom and only left the courtroom after the jurors had departed.” See Motions and Jury Matters Transcript, at pages 12-13. Therefore, this issue should not be skirted. Under the facts here, was there a constitutional impropriety of the restraints imposed? It is a question that the majority initially suggests is before us, but which the majority *58opinion does not meet head-on. I choose to do so.
The most recent expression on physically restraining a defendant in the jury’s presence which I can find is Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-70, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1346, 89 L.Ed.2d 525, 534-35 (1986), setting forth that generally only exceptional circumstances will permit the imposition of physical restraints upon an accused and shackling should only be permitted when justified by an essential state interest. Every defendant, of course, is entitled to a presumption of innocence before the jury. When law enforcement brings the defendant — shackled—into the courtroom, there is a devastating effect on his presumed innocence. A clatter of chains chills the beauty —the impartiality — of the law and the right to a trial by a jury. “The constitution grants every defendant a presumption of innocence ... and the physical presence of shackles clearly erodes the presumption.” Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.1983) (citation omitted). Obviously, if there is threat to the security of the people in the courtroom and society at large, a trial judge owes a duty to protect the court officials, spectators, lawyers, and people in the building. A subjective analysis must emerge and a decision made by the trial judge. The following case reflects some good guidelines:
1. Seriousness of the present charge or charges against the defendant;
2. Defendant’s temperament and character;
3. Defendant’s age and physical attributes;
4. Defendant’s past record;
5. The nature of the facility and the security of the courtroom;
6. Are there any adequate alternative remedies which are available?
State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 367-69, 226 S.E.2d 353, 368 (1976). In my reading on this subject, I am convinced that shackling is absolutely disfavored; only if there are “exceptional circumstances” is it favored. We ultimately arrive at a conclusion that a trial judge has broad discretion in the matter. His conclusion cannot clearly be against reason or evidence. Perhaps the six criteria set forth above may assist our South Dakota trial judges in the future.
Now, let us review the facts in light of the criteria:
1. Defendant was charged with murder and attempted murder, very serious charges;
2. Defendant’s temperament was surly, disrespectful, and his character was bad;
3. Defendant was young enough and strong enough to be physically aggressive;
4. Defendant’s past record was bad;
5. This courtroom was an excellent facility and there were two guards,1 ever so present and watchful (impression on the jury here?);
6. Reasonable alternatives were chosen (panel to hide the leg irons and did not cause the defendant to walk to and fro in the eyesight of the jury).
Defendant argues there were no incidents during the trial itself to justify shackling. True. Did not, however, the two deputies and shackles prevent such outbursts?
Additionally, I note that the defendant’s principal defense was “I blacked out” and “I was unconscious” at the time the offenses were committed. Couple this with his pleas of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity” and the cautious mind begins to believe that we have a defendant, who, by his own admission, is very emotionally/mentally unstable. Therefore, is not the shackling consistent with the defense? Consider, also, that this trial judge previously witnessed an outburst of this defendant where he left the witness stand after he refused to answer several questions and told the judge to go ahead and hold him in contempt. His countenance was one of anger. When he was surrounded by deputies in his camper, he would not peaceably remove himself until he was overwhelmingly surrounded.
*59Therefore, have we not seen defiance, belligerence, and disruption in this defendant? It can reasonably be opined that this trial judge did not abuse his broad discretion. In closing, I urge the trial courts of this state to use shackling only in extraordinary circumstances or in “extreme need.” Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635-36 (7th Cir.1982). Shackling should not become commonplace or the first alternative.2 If adequate alternative remedies are able, they should be employed. avail-

. The record inferentially constructs the factual concept that they were armed.

. History is a great teacher. This nation nearly self-destructed over slavery: men in chains to be sold like cattle! Let us be vigilant about placing chains on people. We are the land of the free, the beacon of freedom, and the Republic to which people still flee from oppression.