Court Opinion

ID: 9833321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:37:15.173533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:28:14.643056
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The field notes of the Martinez survey No. 6 call to begin at the southeast corner of a league “occupied by a colonist named Phillip Miller.” -It is a reasonable presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that his official survey, whenever made, ran to this corner; hence it is immaterial whether the official field notes of the Miller league copied in the statement of facts herein were made before or after the Martinez surveys were located. In the original brief herein the location of the Miller corners was not called in question by either side. Assuming that these corners were identified, there being no better evidence as to the location of the Martinez surveys, the proper method of locating them would be to protract the north and south lines of the Miller, survey to points on the opposite bank of the river for the upper corner of No. 9, and the common corners of Nos. 9 and 6, and from such corners run out said surveys, courses, and distances as called for in their field notes, and we so held in the original opinion herein.
On the original submission of this ease, our attention was not called to any evidence which we thought was sufficient to rebut this theory. On the contrary, it was strongly supported by a map filed by plaintiffs in error, as a part of their argument, the correctness of which was not then questioned by defendants in error, and which was adopted by us, as appears from our findings of fact herein. This map showed the river at the northwest corner of the Miller survey to run south, so that an extension of the north line of the Miller survey would place the northeast corner of No. 9 immediately across the river from the northwest corner of said Miller. On the supposition that the north line of said survey No. 9 was not actually run, as both parties to this suit assert, and as we believe to be true, it is immaterial that the extension of said line west would cross the river. The only effect of this would be that said survey No. 9 would lose the land included within its boundaries lying east of the river.
The map above referred to further showed that the Trinity river was platted thereon from the 20 meander calls of the Miller survey, and that the river was so found on *398the ground. On motion for rehearing, defendants in error show by a plat of the calls for the meanders of the river in the Miller field notes, that said map is not correct, and counsel for plaintiffs in error admit this to be true. Eor reasons not necessary to state, the mistake in said map does not reflect upon the integrity of the attorneys for plaintiffs in error, and counsel for defendant in error do not charge that it does, but the fact remains that we were misled thereby. The calls for the meanders in the Miller field notes show that, instead of said river running south at the northwest corner of the Miller survey, it runs nearly west and then turns north, west, and south, so that an extension of the north line of the Miller west from its northwest corner would not cross the river .until it reached the point designated on said map as “N. E. Corner No. 9, as defendants contend.” Prom this it will be seen that to locate said survey No. 9 “in front of the Miller survey,” as called for in its field notes — that is, to place it exactly opposite the Miller survey so that its north line will be an extension of the north line of the Miller — its northwest corner would be as claimed by defendants in error. There is, however, no satisfactory evidence as to the location of either corner of the Martinez No. 6. Instead of the southwest corner of the Miller being as indicated on said map, its calls for the meanders of the river would place it 981 varas further west, which would be near the east bank of the Horseshoe Lake.
[8] We have reached the conclusion that we were in error in holding that the district court of Travis county had jurisdiction to try this case. If venue was properly laid in Travis county, it was by virtue of Acts 1900, p. 29, the eighth section of which appears in the Revised Statutes of 1911 as article 5468. Said article authorizes the Attorney General to bring suit when the state or school fund has an interest in the land, and we held that, inasmuch as the state had sold this land upon a credit, the school fund had an interest therein. Upon further consideration, we are of the opinion that the “interest” mentioned in said article must be such interest as would entitle the state to recover the land. A subsequent portion of said article says that the Attorney General shall bring suit “therefor,” which we construe to mean for the land. The state having sold the land in controversy, and said sale being in good standing, it was not authorized to recover the land. The fact that the land had not been paid for would not give it such right. Stephens v. Motl, 82 Tex. 81, 18 S. W. 99; Carey v. Starr, 93 Tex. 514, 56 S. W. 324.
If said article admits of a different construction, the title of the act should be looked to in aid of its construction. Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550, 12 Sup. Ct. 689, 36 L. Ed. 537. Reference to the title of said act discloses the fact that the only mention of bringing suits in said caption is in the following language: “And providing for suit in Travis county against any person claiming any of the lands belonging to the-school fund or any other funds.” The lands-in controversy do not belong to the school fund, nor to any other fund. The purpose of said act, as thus expressed in its caption,, confirms the construction that the Attorney General is authorized to bring suit in Travis: county only in such cases as the state is. authorized to recover the land.
Por the reasons above set out, we are of' the opinion that this ease should be reversed with instructions to the district court of Travis county to transfer the same to Liberty county, and it is so ordered.