Court Opinion

ID: 9640339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:03:28.730321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:37.210249
License: Public Domain

HOLMES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
1 think the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. Under the case of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,1 we are bound by the Alabama law, which is so clear, full, and explicit as to render it unnecessary for us to look elsewhere for guidance.
The principal question on this appeal is whether or not the alleged publication was libellous per se. That issue was presented with meticulous care by the complaint; it was met pointedly by the demurrer; it was decided by the court below before the new federal rules of civil procedure became effective, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c; and, in this court, it has been fully and fairly presented in the briefs and oral arguments of all parties as a decisive issue in the case. Therefore, the court below was correct in its ruling on the demurrer, even though the article be construed as libellous per quod. 2
An inducement or innuendo is not necessary where the publication is libellous per se, but must be used when it is defamatory per quod. Section 9460 of the Alabama Code of 1923 does not abrogate the common-law rule in this respect. This section was the law when the case of Penry v. Dozier, 161 Ala. 292, 49 So. 909, was decided. Therein the court said, 161 Ala. page 299, 49 So. page 913:
“The sufficiency of complaints has been several times tested by this court since the enactment of these statutory provisions, and it has been held that, when the words complained of in libel or slander import or impute a crime, then the complaint may be very simple and brief, but, if the words used are susceptible of different meanings, some of which are libelous or slanderous, and others innocent, or if they are ambiguous or uncertain, or if uttered ironically, then the complaint must set forth enough antecedent or attendant facts to raise the implication that the offense charged was intended. Merely asserting in the complaint that the defendant intended to charge a certain crime is not enough unless the unaided words import that he did. If the words used do not import or impute a crime, they may be attended in the complaint with others, called inducements, occasions, colloquiums, and innuendoes, such as to make the complaint sufficient which would be otherwise insufficient. As Judge Stone says, these give point and direction to what otherwise would seem innocuous. Long v. Musgrove, 75 Ala. 158. * * * But if the words are unequivocally actionable per se — that is, charging a crime — then an innuendo will be treated as mere surplusage. 25 Cyc. p. 452.”
In Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Waterman, 188 Ala. 272, 66 So. 16, 18, Ann.Cas. 1916E, 900, the court said:
“If the language is not per se actionable, then facts, as inducements and colloquia, must be alleged to show the sense in which the language was used, that it applied to the plaintiff, and that, as so applied, it is actionable by him.” See, also, White v. Birmingham Post Co., 233 Ala. 547, 172 So. 649; Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 114 So. 357, 55 A.L.R. 171; Choctaw Coal & Mining Co. v. Lillich, 204 Ala. 533, 86 So. 383, 11 A.L.R. 1014.
From these decisions, the rule in Alabama is that, where the article imputes the commission of a crime, or is otherwise clearly defamatory, no inducement, innuendo, or colloquium is necessary, but if the words are reasonably susceptible of different meanings, some of which are innocent, then the complaint must contain the necessary allegations to make the defamatory import clearly appear. Where such allegations are necessary, no libel per se is stated.
Where the question relates to the plaintiff’s conduct of his business, the rule in Alabama is stated in Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Waterman, supra, 188 Ala. at page 285, 66 So. at page 20, Ann.Cas.1916E, 900 (quoting from Ware v. Clowney, 24 Ala. 707), in which the court said:
“The authorities generally concur in upholding this action in three classes of cases which injuriously reflect upon the trade, profession, or business of an individual, namely: First, when the words charge the person with a want of fidelity in his trade or profession generally; secondj where they *437charge such person with dishonesty, corruption, or want of integrity in a particular case; and, third, where the words impute ignorance or want of skill and capacity in general terms.”
If we examine the publication, we find it in substance as follows:
Baldwin planter says state deal cuts spud prices. Corte says man handling prison farm does not care about returns. Dumping of potatoes from a 1,000-acre state-owned planting at the Atmore Prison Farm today was blamed as a contributory reason for the deplorable condition of the early Irish potato market. The Alabama State Board of Administration had let the huge Atmore planting out on consignment to Albert Miller of Chicago. He has been dumping the potatoes with no thought of the market. He makes his commission, and doesn’t care about prices. If potatoes were shipped with some thought of the market price itself, rather than just a commission, several hundred cars daily would not be rolling into northern and eastern markets, glutting those centers.
There is no imputation to Albert Miller of want of fidelity in his trade or business. The article is devoted to a particular transaction, a deal with the State Board of Administration. Nothing is said about the way he conducted the rest of his business, or that he had any other business. Therefore, the publication does not meet the first test laid down in the Age-Herald case. The second test, want of fidelity, is also lacking. The disposition of the potatoes had been let on consignment, under a state deal, to Albert Miller, who had been dumping them on the market. It was further said that Miller “makes his commission, and does not care about prices.” The language used clearly indicated that Miller was a factor and the State Board of Administration was his principal. The word consignment implied an agency and connoted delivery of the property, the title remaining in the assignor. 3
The well-settled rule that an agent is bound by the instructions of his principal is applicable to the relationship between a factor and his principal. 4 The language used does not show that Miller & Company was unfaithful to its agency. Appellee insists that the article shows a breach of fidelity upon its face; but thei e is nothing in the language used which would imply that Miller & Company had violated its contract or the instructions it had received from the State Board of Administration. The contrary is necessarily implied, because the presumption is that men do not violate the law, that parties perform according to their contracts, and that factors obey the instructions of their principals. 5
The statement that he makes his commissions indicates that he performed his contract and was not unfaithful, because otherwise he would have forfeited all claim to commission or other compensation.6 Therefore, the language used is neither necessarily subject to the inference that Miller was unfaithful to the State Board of Administration nor guilty of dishonesty or want of integrity, nor does it impute ignorance or want of skill and capacity. If Miller was acting in obedience to instructions (and the language is susceptible of the construction that he was), the article cannot be said to be libellous per se. Furthermore, if he was obeying instructions, if he had no alternative but to sell, regardless of the market, he was bound to be indifferent to prices. If his principal was satisfied, the price could not legally be of any concern to him. In the law of libel the test is the import of the language used, and the courts cannot ignore it in determining its legal effect.
The case of Gaither v. Advertiser Co., 102 Ala. 458, 14 So. 788, shows how carefully the Alabama court scrutinizes the language for an innocent construction. For a case from this circuit, see Dun v. Maier, 5 Cir., 82 F. 169.
The Alabama authorities cited herein convince me that the alleged publication was not libellous per se, and I respectfully dissent from the judgment of reversal.

 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487.

 Hendrix v. Mobile Register, 202 Ala. 616, 81 So. 558; Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 163 Ala. 348, 356, 50 So. 1008; Labor Review Pub. Co. v. Galliher, 153 Ala. 364, 45 So. 188, 15 Ann.Cas. 674.

 12 Corpus Juris, 526.

 12 Corpus Juris, 359, Sec. 36.

 22 Corpus Juris, 146.

 Fordyce v. Peper, C.C., 16 F. 516, 519, 520; Story’s Agency, Sec. 333, 334; 1 Pars.Cont. 99.