Court Opinion

ID: 9611632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:58:38.342262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:09.683732
License: Public Domain

*268COOPER, Justice,
Concurring.
Scott Phillips was a resident of Franklin, Kentucky, located approximately 100 miles southeast of Metropolis, Illinois. He and his friend, Mike Randolph, intended to spend the evening of August 31 — September 1, 1996, gambling at a riverboat casino docked at Metropolis. The two had made hotel reservations for the night in nearby Paducah and checked into their hotel room before proceeding on to Metropolis. As recited in the majority opinion, Randolph left the casino before Phillips and returned to the hotel. Phillips told Randolph he would return to the hotel later, by taxi if necessary. Ultimately, Phillips was offered a ride “home” by Appellant Harper and her three companions, Burden, Van-over and Platt.
Harper and her companions were residents of Owensboro, Kentucky, located approximately 100 miles northeast of Metropolis and 100 miles due north of Franklin. They had driven from Owens-boro to Metropolis that day and intended to (and did) return to Owensboro that night. While it would not have been out of their way for Harper and her companions to drive Phillips to his hotel room in Paducah, it would have been 100 miles out of their way to drive him to Franklin. Phillips was killed and robbed on 1-24 in Christian County about half way between Paducah and Franklin. A jury could believe from this evidence that Phillips did not intend to return to Franklin that night, but desired to return to his hotel room in Paducah; and that Harper and her companions drove Phillips to Christian County for the express purpose of robbing and/or killing him. Thus, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence sufficed to support Harper’s convictions of complicity to murder and robbery.
I also concur with the majority’s holding that the complicity instructions, which were premised upon KRS 502.020(1), ie., “complicity to the act,” were erroneous in failing to require the jury to find that Harper intended that Phillips would be robbed and killed. Intent that the crime be committed is an element of complicity under KRS 502.020(1). However, I would not reverse on that issue; for the complicity instructions given by the trial judge were word-for-word identical to the complicity instructions tendered by Appellant. Commonwealth v. Southwood, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 897 (1981); Mason v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 140 (1978). In fact, the trial judge initially prepared correct instructions, but ultimately accepted the Commonwealth’s erroneous argument that complicity under KRS 502.020(1) does not require an intent on the part of the accomplice that the crime be committed. Appellant did not argue otherwise and did not object to the instructions as given. RCr 9.54(2).
Nor would I reverse because of the failure to include an instruction on complicity to manslaughter in the first degree. Appellant’s counsel conceded during the instruction conference held on July 28, 1999 that an instruction on complicity to first-degree manslaughter was not warranted by the evidence. That concession was not withdrawn during the final instruction conference held on July 29,1999.
However, Appellant did tender an instruction on complicity to second-degree manslaughter, albeit incorrectly warded, and objected to the trial court’s failure to instruct on that offense as a lesser included offense. As pointed out in Tharp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2000), homicide is a “result” offense, thus triggering the provisions of KRS 502.020(2), ie., “complicity to the result.” Harper could be convicted of complicity to second-degree manslaughter if the jury believed she actively participated in the ac*269tions of the principal actors, Burden and Vanover, without the intent that those actions would result in Phillips’s death, but with an awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result, if her disregard of that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the circumstance. KRS 507.040(1); KRS 501.020(3). Under KRS 502.020(2), the mens rea of the principal actor is immaterial and the accomplice’s culpability is determined by his/her own mens rea, whether intentional, wanton or reckless. The facts of this case would support instructions under KRS 502.020(2) not only on complicity to intentional murder and complicity to second-degree manslaughter, but also on complicity to wanton murder and complicity to reckless homicide, e.g.:
INSTRUCTION NO_

Complicity to Murder

You will find the Defendant guilty of Complicity to Murder under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about September 1, 1996 and before the finding of the indictment herein, Enos Burden and/or George Vanover killed Scott Phillips by shooting him with a pistol;
B. That prior to the killing, the Defendant, Tamara E. Harper, had solicited, counseled, commanded, or engaged in a conspiracy with Burden and/or Van-over to rob or harm Phillips;
AND
C. That in so doing:
(1) The Defendant intended that Phillips would be killed;
OR
(2) The Defendant was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death to Phillips and thereby caused the death of Phillips under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.
INSTRUCTION NO_

Complicity to Second-Degree Manslaughter

If you do not find the Defendant guilty under Instruction No. -, you will find the Defendant guilty of Complicity to Second-Degree Manslaughter under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about September 1, 1996 and before the finding of the indictment herein, Enos Burden and/or George Vanover killed Scott Phillips by shooting him with a pistol;
B. That prior to the killing, the Defendant, Tamara E. Harper, had solicited, counseled, commanded, or engaged in a conspiracy with Burden and/or Van-over to rob or harm Phillips;
AND
C. That in so doing, the Defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that Phillips would be killed, and that her disregard of that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation.
INSTRUCTION NO_

Complicity to Reckless Homicide

If you do not find the Defendant guilty under Instruction No._or Instruction No. _, you will find the Defendant guilty of Complicity to Reckless Homicide under this Instruction if, *270and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about September 1, 1996 and before the finding of the indictment herein, Enos Burden and/or George Vanover killed Scott Phillips by shooting him with a pistol;
B. That prior to the killing, the Defendant, Tamara E. Harper, had solicited, counseled, commanded, or engaged in a conspiracy with Burden and/or Van-over to rob or harm Phillips;
AND
C. That in so doing, the Defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that Phillips would be killed, and that her failure to perceive that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation.
Under the evidence presented in this case, a jury could also have found Harper guilty of homicide under the modified “felony murder” doctrine described in Bennett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 322 (1998), i.e., that she was an accomplice to an armed robbery during which the victim was killed by another participant in the robbery. See 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 3.30 (4th ed. Anderson 1993) for sample specimen instructions embodying this theory of homicide liability. Neither party requested instructions on that theory of the case.