Court Opinion

ID: 9855064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:19:01.232688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.715318
License: Public Domain

Cureton, Judge:
(Concurring.)
I agree with Judge Goolsby that the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict for Green Bull should be reversed. In an action based on strict tort liability where a design defect is alleged, plaintiff’s case is complete when he has proven the product, as designed, was in defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user when it left the control of the manufacturer and the defect caused his injuries. Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 328 S.E. (2d) 108 Ct. App. 1985); Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E. (2d) 735 (1983). The test for determining whether a product is defective is whether the *273product is unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate consumer given the conditions and circumstances that foreseeably attend the use of the product. Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E. (2d) 129 (1982); Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E. (2d) 176 (1978). While it is true that almost any product can be made safer, the pertinent inquiry is whether the product as supplied is unreasonably dangerous. Claytor, 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E. (2d) 129. Both industry standards and the state of the art at time of manufacture are relevant to show the reasonableness of the product’s design. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 462 S.E (2d) 321 (Ct. App. 1995).
Experts for both parties testified the ladder’s aluminum design did not violate any safety standard, and that a fiberglass designed ladder was not the industry standard at the time the ladder was manufactured. It is common knowledge that an aluminum ladder will conduct electricity. I would hold as a mater of law that there is nothing inherently unreasonably dangerous about a ladder made of aluminum. Nevertheless, Anderson’s expert testified that the hazard presented by the use of aluminum ladders by persons in the roofing business was well know in the ladder industry at the time of the ladder’s manufacture. Thus, he opined that as a minimum, the ladder was unreasonably dangerous to this class of consumer if placed in their hands without proper warning. This opinion is partly supported by the fact Green Bull placed a warning on the ladder. A product may be deemed defective, although faultlessly made, if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of the user without a suitable warning. Marchant v. Lorain Div. of Koehring, 272 S.C. 243, 251 S.E. (2d) 189 (1979). By the same token, a product is not defective for failure to warn of an obvious danger. Dema v. Shore Enter., 312 S.C. 528, 435 S.E. (2d) 875 (Ct. App. 1993). The question here presented is whether Green Bull, knowing the foreseeable use of the ladder, had a duty to warn its users against the hazard of bringing the ladder into contact with electrical lines, and if so, whether the warning it placed on the ladder was adequate.
I agree with Anderson that the evidence gives rise to a reasonable inference that Green Bull had a duty to warn consumers of the hazard of injury accompanying use of the ladder *274around electricity. Livingston v. Noland Corp., 293 S.C. 521, 362 S.E. (2d) 16 (1987) (manufacturer of a product is liable for failing to warn if it has reason to know the product is likely to be dangerous for its intended use; it has no reason to believe the consumer will realize the potential danger; and it fails to exercise care to inform of facts which make it likely to be dangerous). Anderson’s expert testified that the deficiency in Green Bull’s warning was that it did not instruct users to shorten the ladder to the length necessary for each particular use. The ladder came in three eight-foot sections and was assembled by McLees’ employer. The expert testified that no more than sixteen feet of ladder was needed for this job and if the ladder had been shortened to sixteen feet, the accident would never have happened. I find it difficult, under the facts of this case, to lay the blame at Green Bull’s door for McLee’s employer using three sections of the ladder when only two sections were sufficient. Further, I would hold as a matter of law that a warning admonishing a user to keep the ladder clear of electrical wires is just as effective as one instructing a user to shorten the ladder to its required length for a particular use. Whether the ladder is kept away from electrical lines by shortening it or by its placement, the result is the same.
Finally, Anderson argues in her brief that there is at least an inference that McLees’ death caused by arcing, which can occur when an object comes in close proximity to an electrical source, and that the instant warning does not in any way address that hazard. While Green Bull’s witness on cross-examination testified that arcing was possible, he did not present that as a probability in this case. In fact, he ends this colloquy with Anderson’s counsel with the statement that if McLees had kept the ladder “clear of all utility and electrical wiring as everybody knew you were supposed to do then we wouldn’t be here today.” Moreover, both briefs speak in terms of the ladder coming in contact with the electrical line. Thus, even if we were to conclude that arcing was a hazard that required a warning, there is no evidence that the lack of such warning was the proximate cause of McLees’ death. Having concluded the warning in this case was adequate, I would reverse.