Court Opinion

ID: 9518886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:04:16.678238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:47.538633
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.,
{dissenting). The workmen’s compensation appeal board’s finding that in January, 1958, the defendant was disabled by emphysema is not supported by any evidence whatever. While the evidence might support a finding that in January, 1958, the defendant was disabled from working in a plant atmosphere permeated with dust, smoke and gaseous fumes, such as was alleged to be the condition of the atmosphere in the defendant’s plant in and prior to January, 1958, there is no evidence that the defendant had emphysema in January, 1958, or that he could not then have worked in an unpolluted atmosphere.
Conceding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he gave timely notice to his employer, that the question of timeliness and sufficiency of, notice is a question of fact and fact findings of the workmen’s compensation appeal board must be accepted by us if supported by any evidence whatever (Thornton v. Luria-Dumes Co-Venture [1956], 347 Mich 160, 162), it is, nevertheless, our duty to determine what the appeal board, decided and whether *45there is any evidence in the record to support its decision.
The appeal board did not expressly find that the plaintiff knew or had reason to believe1 in January, 1958, that he had emphysema.2 Any implied finding to that effect is unsupported by the record.
Plaintiff’s doctor testified that upon examining the plaintiff in 1964 he discovered that the defendant’s chest was emphysematous. The defendant’s medical expert witness testified that when he examined the plaintiff in 1964 he did not find symptoms of emphysema. There is no basis for a finding that the plaintiff, a common laborer without a medical education, had reason to believe that he had emphysema in 1958.
The disability of being unable to work in a plant with a dusty, smoke, fume-ridden atmosphere and the disability caused by the disease of emphysema, which disease can disable one from working in the *46healthiest atmosphere, are two separate disabilities. There are countless persons who, although unable to work in a dusty, smoke, fume-ridden atmosphere, are entirely capable of working in an atmosphere free of such conditions. And for all that appears on this record, in January, 1958, the plaintiff was only disabled from working in a dirty atmosphere and had not suffered the kind of disability which results from contracting the disease of emphysema.
The injury done the plaintiff when his overexposure to a polluted atmosphere brought about his disablement from further employment in such an unclean atmosphere is separate and distinct from the disease of emphysema even though the subsequently contracted disease could possibly be viewed as an extension or aggravation of the earlier injury.
Since the injury which disables one from working in a dirty atmosphere and the disease which disables one from working in a clean atmosphere are separate and distinct, causing two separate and distinct disabilities, the 120 day statute of limitations begins to run as to each separately when, and not before, the employee knows or has reason to know of the injury, disease or disability for which compensation is sought.3
There is nothing in the record which would support a finding that the plaintiff knew or had reason to believe he had emphysema in 1958. The appeal board’s finding that he was disabled in 1958 and *47that he failed to give notice to his employer within 120 days of the 1958 disablement does not preclude an award of compensation provided the plaintiff gave notice within 120 days of knowing or having reason to believe that he had became disabled by reason of the separate disease of emphysema.
I would reverse and remand to the workmen’s compensation appeal hoard for a new hearing.

 See Gotich v. Kalamazoo Stove Company (1958), 352 Mich 88, 93; Finch v. Ford Motor Company (1948), 321 Mich 469, 476.

 The appeal board found:
“That the emphysema diagnosed by Dr. Chapniek in 1964 was precipitated by the employment hazard and had disabled the plaintiff since January 1958, is the referee’s finding. The supporting evidence is not overwhelming but possibly sufficient to negate our taking a contrary view.”
Parenthetically, the referee did not find that the plaintiff was disabled by emphysema in January, 1958. The referee found that the plaintiff had suffered a personal injury on January 30, 1958, arising out of his employment. There is a difference between the date of injury and the date of disablement. The date of injury in respect to an occupational disease is determined arbitrarily under the statute. It is the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability or death. CL 1948, § 412.1 (Stat Ann 1968 Eev § 17.151) ; CL 1948, §417.2 (Stat Ann 1968 Eev §17.221). See, also, Joslin v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co. (1960), 359 Mich 420, 428.
On January 30, 1958, the plaintiff temporarily left the defendant’s employ to undergo a hernia operation. Upon returning from his convalescence in March, 1958, he did not reenter the defendant’s employ and retired. Thus, January 30, 1958 was the statutory date of injury for any disablement occurring after that date arising out of the alleged conditions of employment at the defendant’s plant.

 Compare Tomasini v. Youngstown Mines Corporation (1962), 366 Mich 503, where the court held that an employer’s knowledge of non-disabling injury, as distinguished from knowledge of disability due to injury, does not toll the limitational iieriod provided in the workmen’s compensation act. Similarly, an employee’s knowledge of one disability, i. e., disability to work in a dirty atmosphere, does not mean that he also knows he is suffering from the disease of emphysema or that he is disabled from working at other locations where the atmosphere is not so polluted.