Court Opinion

ID: 9770788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:21:37.723808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.818198
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that the judgment should be affirmed; however, I do not find that appellant received a more severe sentence on retrial than he received in his first trial.
The majority is correct in holding that unless a defendant’s conduct after the first trial justifies a more severe sentence, a trial court on retrial may not assess a defendant a more severe sentence than he or she received in the first trial. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2081, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
The majority then holds that the five-years confinement appellant received on retrial was a more severe sentence than the 10-year probated sentence he received in his first trial. The majority makes this assumption without citing any authority to support the proposition that a five-year confinement sentence is more severe than a 10-year probated sentence. The Pearce and Bingham cases cited by the majority did not involve a situation such as the one involved in this case.
In Pearce, the defendant received a prison term of 12 to 15 years at his first trial and then the trial court, on retrial, added another eight years confinement to the prison term assessed in the first trial. 395 U.S. at 713-14, 89 S.Ct. at 2074-75. The Supreme Court held that the harsher sentence on retrial could not stand because the defendant was denied his constitutional rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 725-26, 89 S.Ct. at 2080-81. In Bingham, the defendant received a 10-year prison sentence in his first trial. Bingham v. State, 523 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). On retrial, the trial court assessed the defendant a 12-year prison sentence. Id. The court held that the sentence on retrial was a harsher sentence and could not stand under the reasoning of Pearce. Id. at 949-50. Both cases involved comparing prison sentences, not a probated sentence with a prison sentence.
The Texas case which has dealt with the issue of whether a prison sentence is a more severe sentence than a probated sentence is Lechuga v. State, 532 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). In Lechuga, the trial court gave the defendant a three-year prison sentence at his first trial. Id. at 582. On retrial, the trial court gave the defendant a five-year prison sentence, which was probated for five years. Id. The defendant’s probation was later revoked. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant was denied due process under the fourteenth amendment because the sentence he received on retrial was more severe than the sentence he received in his first trial. Id. at 587-88. In Lechu-ga, the State argued that a five-year prison sentence, which was probated for five years, was less severe than a three-year prison sentence. Id. at 586. The court rejected this argument because a five-year prison sentence is longer and more severe than a three-year prison sentence, notwithstanding the fact that the five-year prison sentence was probated. Id. at 587-88. The court held that the fact that the defendant received a probated sentence on retrial did not make the sentence received on retrial less severe. Id. at 588. “Does the granting of probation for five (5) years cure such constitutional error? We think not.” Id.
The Lechuga court, following McCulley v. State, 486 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.1972), found that probation is not part of the definition of “sentence.” Id. at 587. The court went on to hold that “to give the words ‘more *376severe’ as used in Pearce a different meaning than longer sentence would make every question of whether Pearce has been violated ‘purely subjective’ defying ‘objective application.’ ” Id. The court reasoned that only the length of the prison sentence should be considered when determining whether a sentence is more severe, not what impact the prison sentence, coupled with probation, may have on the individual defendant. Id. at 587.
As the Lechuga court points out, if it is held that a five-year prison sentence is more severe than a 10-year probated sentence, where will the lines be drawn for future cases? Id. at 587 n. 2. The majority implies that because any defendant would opt for probation over confinement, a prison sentence is more severe than a probated sentence. Applying the majority’s reasoning, that the impact on the defendant determines whether a sentence is more or less severe than another, the question must be asked, is a two-month prison sentence more severe than a 10-year probated sentence? A six-month prison sentence? A one-year prison sentence? A two-year prison sentence? Where will the line be drawn?
Also, if the impact on the defendant is used to determine whether a sentence is more or less severe than another, must courts then consider “good time credits” a person may earn in prison, which would make the defendant eligible for parole after serving a fraction of his or her sentence? See Lechuga, 582 S.W.2d at 587 n. 2.
The majority opinion departs from the holding and reasoning adopted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Lechuga. As the court in Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) stated:
The State cites Lechuga ... for the proposition that five years probation is a greater punishment than three years confinement. That was not the holding in Lechuga. In the majority opinions on both original submission and on rehearing it was held that assessment of punishment at five years was greater than that of three years.
Using simple arithmetic and supported by the Lechuga case, which was reaffirmed by the Sanders case, I would find in this case that a five-year prison sentence on retrial is not a longer or more severe sentence than the ten-year prison sentence that was probated, and originally imposed at the first trial.
I would overrule appellant’s points of error.
I would affirm the judgment.