Court Opinion

ID: 9961685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 15:07:32.063708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:20.078317
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                           Nos. 126,527
                                                126,528
                                                126,529

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                       STATE OF KANSAS,
                                           Appellee,

                                                 v.

                                      JAMERON E. BONNER,
                                          Appellant.

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DAVID L. DAHL, judge. Opinion filed April 19, 2024.
Affirmed.

       Submitted by the parties for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6820(g) and (h).

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., HURST and COBLE, JJ.

       HURST, J.: Jameron E. Bonner appeals his sentences in three cases arguing that the
district court should have given him a more generous downward durational departure in
his sentences. The cases are consolidated on appeal, and this court granted Bonner's
motion for summary disposition under Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R.
at 48). The State does not object to summary disposition. Finding no error, the district
court is affirmed.

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                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Bonner's appeal relates to his plea agreements in cases 22CR587 and 22CR598.
According to the court's pronouncement at the plea hearing, in 22CR587 Bonner pled
guilty to eight counts of severity level 9 felony burglary, seven counts of misdemeanor
theft, three counts of severity level 9 felony theft, one count of severity level 7 felony
theft, and one count of severity level 5 felony burglary for acts he committed in August
2021. In 22CR598, Bonner pled guilty to two counts of misdemeanor theft and one count
of severity level 9 felony theft for acts he committed in November 2021.

       In July 2022 Bonner pled guilty in these cases pursuant to an initial plea
agreement in which the State agreed to recommend a dispositional departure to probation.
That plea agreement in 22CR587 and 22CR598 permitted the State to recommend any
sentence—including incarceration—"in the event the defendant is arrested, commits a
new offense, violates bond conditions or fails to appear for a court appearance at any time
after the entry of the plea agreement and the time of the sentence being imposed." In
September 2022, before the district court sentenced Bonner pursuant to the initial plea
agreement, he committed new offenses while on felony bond. As a result of those
allegations, Bonner pled guilty to two counts of severity level 9 felony theft and one
count of severity level 9 felony burglary in a third case—22CR1387.

       Before sentencing, Bonner filed one motion for a downward departure in all three
cases, seeking a dispositional departure to probation or—in the alternative—a downward
durational departure to a shorter prison term. Bonner argued the following factors
constituted substantial and compelling reasons for departure: (1) Bonner's cooperation in
expeditiously resolving these cases; (2) Bonner's demonstration of remorse and
acceptance of responsibility; (3) Bonner's relative youth; (4) Bonner's work ethic, career
opportunities, and earning capacity; (5) Bonner's ability to pay restitution; (6) Bonner's
amenability to rehabilitation with the support of his family; (7) probation would better

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serve Bonner's rehabilitation while also protecting society; (8) probation would provide
Bonner the opportunity for rehabilitation and to fulfill his familial and financial
obligations; and (9) Bonner would agree to successful completion of all rehabilitation
programs as a condition of probation. Bonner later filed a supplemental motion for a
downward departure in all three cases.

       The district court did not consolidate the cases for sentencing but conducted a
single sentencing hearing. In 22CR587, the district court sentenced Bonner to a
controlling prison term of 46 months. In 22CR598, the district court sentenced Bonner to
a controlling prison term of 9 months. And in 22CR1387, the district court sentenced
Bonner to a controlling prison term of 9 months. The district court ordered Bonner's
sentences in 22CR598 and 22CR1387 be served concurrently but consecutive to the
sentence in 22CR587. Therefore, the district court's sentences in these three cases
resulted in a total controlling prison term of 55 months. The district court then granted
Bonner's motion for a downward durational departure and reduced his overall controlling
prison term to 48 months. The district court's sentencing journal entries show that the
district court specifically granted a downward durational departure in 22CR587.

       The district court found that "there are substantial and compelling reasons that
[Bonner's attorney] has argued that are persuasive enough to reduce the amount of time
that [Bonner] will be spending with us in prison." The district court further explained:

       "I'm granting you this . . . durational departure for the reasons that have been set forth in
       [your attorneys'] briefs which I thought were great briefs. I just don't feel that there's
       justification to do the things that [your attorney] has asked me to do, and I'll give you the
       reasons for that. And I'm not doing that to scold you because you've always been a good
       guy—you've always been a gentleman up here and very respectful, and I feel bad for you
       that you got into all this trouble at such a young age, but, you know, you're smarter than
       the average guy that comes through here and you are gentlemanly, and we talked about
       this. You worked for [W.H.], didn't you? Over at Popeye's, [W.H.], over at Popeye's?

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Who's a friend. I mean, I know [W.H.] really, really well, and that speaks highly of you
that you work for him. So those are the reasons that I'm granting you this concession.
          "However, the problem that we all had was when you were out after the first case
and then you got into some trouble again, and a judge looks at that. I look at that, and we
all wish that wouldn't have happened because we would have been so happy to be able to
put you on probation, but had you been on probation already for the first case and then
committed those other things, you were facing a probability of being revoked and
imposed in the sentences in the other case, so all in all it's probably turned out better that
you just got it all out of the way at the same time. My reasons for doing this, the sentence
that I did and not giving you probation or work release or Residential is in the Plea
Agreement, the State felt that they cut you a good deal, and they did. I think that they cut
you a really good deal because your attorneys were superb in this case, and the State was
very cooperative because they see something in you that we all see in you.
          "Then the sentences were all basically run together. Let's say if you—you
could've been in prison for most of your adult life, and all of that's cut down to four years,
and you get credit for the time that you spent with us in jail so we're talking about less
than that. And then we move into today and we see that the State is still saying prison is
the right thing to do, and I happen to agree with that.
          "Then we look at Special Rules and they steer us into prison. We look at some of
the other crimes that you have committed, and probably the thing that persuaded me more
than anything was unfortunately the fact that you got into trouble shortly after you got
released on your bond while you were waiting for the sentencing on it.
          "Another thing that I took into account, your people were here for you before.
They were all cordial people, respectful people, and when we have people like that in
your life, I think it gives somebody an opportunity to spring forward into a successful
future.
          "Now—and I owe a responsibility to society, also, and my responsibility to
society says this is what I think. So I look at what the sentence is, and I feel that that's
fair. I think it's very generous, but I think you deserve it and I think you'll be the type of
guy when you go to prison who takes advantage of the opportunities that will be afforded
to you for leadership positions and to do good things, and educational positions."

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       The district court's sentencing journal entry in 22CR587 also enumerated these
bases for departure:

       "● Compelling reasons for departure exist;
       "● Defendant has fully cooperated with expeditious dispositional of this matter;
       "● Defendant has exhibited remorse for the pled offenses and has accepted full
       responsibility for his crimes;
       "● Defendant was 19 at the time of the offense;
       "● Defendant exhibits strong work ethic;
       "● Defendant is committed to repay these individuals for these losses;
       "● Defendant is amenable to rehabilitation, defendant's family is supportive and willing
       to help him succeed in rehabilitation."

   Bonner appealed his sentence in all three cases, and they are consolidated on appeal.

                                             DISCUSSION

       It appears that Bonner appeals the district court's refusal to grant him a downward
durational departure in 22CR598 and 22CR1387 or a more significant downward
durational departure or a dispositional departure in 22CR587. Defendants may appeal
their sentence even if they received a portion of a requested downward durational
departure. K.S.A. 21-6820(a); see State v. Ibarra, 307 Kan. 431, 433, 411 P.3d 318
(2018) (appellate courts have jurisdiction to review departure sentences even if the appeal
is taken by the party receiving a portion of a requested departure sentence). However, this
court "lack[s] jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the district court's denial of a departure
motion from a presumptive sentence" under the revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines
Act (KSGA). State v. Farmer, 312 Kan. 761, Syl. ¶ 1, 480 P.3d 155 (2021); see K.S.A.
21-6820(c)(1).

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       K.S.A. 21-6815(a) requires a sentencing court to impose the presumptive sentence
set forth in the KSGA unless the court finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose
a departure sentence. State v. Morley, 312 Kan. 702, 706, 479 P.3d 928 (2021). The
district court sentenced Bonner within the presumptive sentencing guidelines in cases
22CR598 and 22CR1387 but granted a downward durational departure in 22CR587.
Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the district court's
refusal to grant a downward durational departure in 22CR598 or 22CR1387. See K.S.A.
21-6820(c)(1). However, this court does have jurisdiction to consider whether the district
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Bonner a dispositional departure or a more
generous downward durational departure in 22CR587.

       "Appellate courts review a district court's decision to deny a departure sentence for
abuse of discretion." State v. Fowler, 315 Kan. 335, Syl. ¶ 1, 508 P.3d 347 (2022). A
court abuses its discretion when its decision is (1) so arbitrary or fanciful that no
reasonable person would agree with the decision; (2) based on an error of law; or (3)
based on an error of fact such that substantial competent evidence does not support the
factual findings. Gannon v. State, 305 Kan. 850, 868, 390 P.3d 461 (2017). Bonner, as
the party asserting that the district court abused its discretion, bears the burden of
showing such abuse of discretion. State v. Crosby, 312 Kan. 630, 635, 479 P.3d 167
(2021).

       A district court may depart from a presumptive sentence when it finds substantial
and compelling reasons to do so. A substantial and compelling reason to depart from a
presumptive sentence "is real, not imagined, and of substance, not ephemeral" and
"forces a court—by the case's facts—to abandon the status quo and venture beyond the
presumptive sentence." Morley, 312 Kan. 702, Syl. ¶¶ 3-4. The applicable statute
provides a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors upon which a court may rely in
determining whether substantial and compelling reasons exist justifying a departure from
the presumptive sentence. K.S.A. 21-6815(c)(1); see Morley, 312 Kan. at 706. A

                                               6
mitigating factor is "a substantial and compelling reason justifying an exceptional
sentence whereby the sentencing court may impose a departure sentence outside of the
standard sentencing range for a crime," and it "may result in a dispositional or durational
departure." K.S.A. 21-6803(n); State v. Montgomery, 314 Kan. 33, 35-36, 494 P.3d 147
(2021). In any event, the existence of mitigating factors—even many mitigating factors—
does not compel a sentencing court to depart from a presumptive sentence. Fowler, 315
Kan. 335, Syl. ¶ 2, 339-40 (collecting cases).

       If the sentencing court departs from the presumptive sentence, it is required to
"state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for
the departure." K.S.A. 21-6815(a); State v. Hambright, 310 Kan. 408, 408-09, 415-16,
447 P.3d 972 (2019) (failure of sentencing court to state on the record the substantial and
compelling reasons for the departure results in an illegal sentence). Generally, this court's
review is limited to determining "whether the sentencing court's findings of fact and
reasons justifying a departure: (1) [a]re supported by the evidence in the record; and (2)
constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departure." K.S.A. 21-6820(d);
Montgomery, 314 Kan. at 36. "When reviewing a departure sentence, '[a]s long as one
factor relied upon by the sentencing court is substantial and compelling, the departure
sentence should be upheld.'" 314 Kan. at 37 (quoting State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan. 719,
725, 176 P.3d 160 [2008]).

       In his motion for summary disposition, Bonner merely concludes that "[t]he
district court abused its discretion by refusing to depart to probation for Mr. Bonner and
further abused its discretion by not granting a more generous departure sentence." Bonner
fails to argue how the district court abused its discretion. He does not identify any legal
or factual error upon which the district court relied in reaching its decision and he does
not claim that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court.
Nor could he.

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       As the district court emphasized at the sentencing hearing, Bonner likely would
have been granted a dispositional departure to probation in 22CR587 and 22CR598 had
he not committed new crimes in 22CR1387 while on felony bond. The district court
pointed to Bonner's work ethic, relative youth, acceptance of responsibility, lack of
criminal history, respectful behavior, and family support as reasons supporting
mitigation. The State initially agreed to recommend downward departure. But it was
Bonner's own choices and behavior for that short period between entering the plea
agreement and sentencing that squandered the benefit of the State's favor in that first plea
agreement. Moreover, Bonner's assertion that mitigating factors supported a more
generous downward departure does not render the district court's decision unreasonable.
See Fowler, 315 Kan. 335, Syl. ¶ 2, 339-40. Bonner has fallen short of carrying his
burden to establish that the district court abused its discretion.

                                        CONCLUSION

       Bonner failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in declining to
grant Bonner a dispositional departure or a more generous downward durational
departure. Bonner's sentence is therefore affirmed.

       Affirmed.

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