Court Opinion

ID: 9768475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:05:24.373201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.182514
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING Ward, J. In this case a divided court on February 28,1955, made an interpretation of §§ 2 and 20 of Act 555 of 1953 which, for the purposes of this opinion, was to this effect; appellant must file his record with the clerk of this court (a) within 90 days after the notice of appeal is given or (b) within the time as extended by the trial court. It was further held that any extension of time [made by the trial court] must be made before the said 90 days period expires or it must be made before the expiration of any previous extension. It was also held that where there was a noncompliance with the above requirements because of an unavoidable casualty this court could, under its inherent powers, permit an appeal. The three judges of this court who dissented to the original opinion thought, as we understand it, that the failure of an appellant to file his record in this court within the 90 days period or within any extension thereof would not automatically constitute a bar to the appeal but thought that, under such a situation, this court would, have the discretion to allow or disallow the appeal. The dissenting judges based their views, at least partially, on the following sentence found in said § 2: “Failure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of judgment or decree appealed from shall not.affect the validity of the appeal, but shall be ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.” It must be recognized that the language quoted above is not readily reconcilable with the language in § 20 relating to the 90 days period and extension thereof. It must also be recognized that this situation constitutes a valid ground for conscientious differences in views and conclusions, as exemplified by the division of this court. It must therefore be conceded by fair minds as a demonstrative fact that able and studious practitioners could not be expected to interpret alike the language in the two sections mentioned. This being true a situation has arisen where justice may be denied a litigant because of the acts of his attorney where the attorney himself could not be justly criticized. Considering all that has been said, fairness and justice calls for any justified relief we can grant to litigants who had no warning of our rule of procedure as laid down in the original opinion. This can be done without disturbing the rule by extending the effective date of the original opinion. Some members of this court manifestly feel that this cannot be done without doing violence to established precedents. However it appears that previous pronouncements of this court on related matters justify the action here taken. (a) Caveats. In two recent cases [Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S. W. 2d 973, and O’Brien v. Atlas Finance Co., 223 Ark. 176, 264 S. W. 2d 839] we extended the effective date of our opinions as to certain classes of litigation. It is true that the situations in those cases were not exactly analogous to those of the case under consideration, but the reason that prompted the action in both instances was the same— to avoid hurting innocent people. In the instances cited we realized litigants had relied on our former decisions, while here we realize litigants had to rely on procedural statutes which were ambiguous. It is significant also that in the caveat opinions we were dealing with substantive rights, while here we are dealing only with procedural matters. (b) Per Curiam orders. Likewise on two different occasions we have recently issued per curiam orders which lend justification for this procedure. 1. On June 8, 1953, we issued this order. “The court expects, within the near future, to revise its rules with a view of harmonization with Act 555 of 1953. Pending that action the court, under its inherent rulemaking power, authorizes litigants (at their option) to proceed under Act 555 or under the earlier statutes— which by reference are hereby adopted as temporary rules of the court — and the present rules of the court.” When the above order was issued Act 555 was as much the law of this state as it now is. Not only so, but the whole procedure [nullified by Act 555] was as invalid as it now is. So, from June 8, 1953, to January 10, 1954 [when the new rules were promulgated] we in effect ignored said §§ 2 and 20 and breathed life into dead statutes. It appears conceded now that our action was justified under the circumstances then existing. 2. On October 25, 1954, we issued this order. “The court’s revision of its rules, effective January 10, 1954, requires that the appellant’s abstract in every case be preceded by a concise statement of the case and by a numbered list of the points to be relied upon for r'eversal, and that arguments in the brief be presented under sub-headings corresponding to the outline of points to be relied upon. Rule 9, printed in 221 Ark. 965. “After Jan. 1, 1955, the Clerk is directed to reject any brief not prepared in accordance with the rules.” Thus it appears we felt justified in extending the effective dates of one of our rules for a period of more than two months. It is, of course, desirable that the rules of this court should be constant and uniformly enforced once they have been clearly defined. However, rules are instruments to achieve and not to thwart justice, and while they are in a formative stage and where no harm results rigidity may well be relaxed in the interest of justice. The conclusion is therefore that the original opinion [here considered on rehearing] shall be effective only as of May 15, 1955, and the clerk of this court is directed to accept and file the record tendered by appellant herein. On authority of the original opinion herein we issued orders sustaining the clerk in refusing to allow the records to be filed in No. 635 Neal v. Cummins, No. 651 Fike v. Newlin, and No. 696 Wilson v. Morse Mill Co. Case No. 687 Wills v. Hill is now pending on a motion to dismiss the appeal. On all of these cases just mentioned the record was refused for basically the same reason for which the record herein was refused. Accordingly the clerk is directed to accept the record in the above, mentioned cases. Also since there may be other cases where the record would be barred solely because of the rule announced in the original opinion, the clerk, in such instances, is directed to accept until May 15,1955, the tender of records, provided, of course, they are tendered within seven months after entry of the judgment or decree appealed from. Justices Millwee, George Rose Smith and Robinson concur. '>■ The Chief Justice and Justice MoFaddin dissent.