Court Opinion

ID: 9528550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:56.925927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:59.264347
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
Concurring and Dissenting. I concur in the judgment insofar as it invalidates Proposition 140’s purported restrictions on the retirement benefits of incumbent legislators.
Otherwise, I dissent.
In this case, we are presented with a broad challenge to Proposition 140—the promotionally self-styled “Political Reform Act of 1990”—under both the United States and California Constitutions. As will appear, the attack is successful on at least two separate and independent points: the initiative violates the single-subject rule of the state charter and also amounts to an unconstitutional revision of that instrument.
I. Proposition 140 and the Single-subject Rule
Beyond any doubt, Proposition 140 violates the single-subject rule on its face and, as a result, is invalid: “An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d).)
At the outset, I must observe that “The initiative process is out of control in California. Voters are often unable to comprehend all that an initiative measure proposes to accomplish, and they are often asked to vote on a multitude of issues by casting a single ballot.” (Note, Putting the “Single” Back in the Single-Subject Rule: A Proposal for Initiative Reform in California (1991) 24 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 879, 929 (hereafter Note).) Much, of course, is at stake. The inference is compelled by a consideration of the staggering costs of initiative campaigns. For example, in 1988 proponents and opponents spent more than $130 million in attempting to persuade the voters of the merits of their respective positions. (Id. at p. 889, fn. 55.)
Regrettably, I must also observe that in large part, the blame for this chaos must be laid to the court. “One way” to prevent such a situation “is by limiting measures to a single subject.” (Note, supra, 24 U.C. Davis L.Rev. at *537pp. 929-930.) Such a means is available: the single-subject rule—which was designed to simplify and clarify initiatives (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats, and Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 1948), pt. I, argument in favor of Prop. 10, p. 8)—“is already part of the California Constitution . . . .” (Note, supra, 24 U.C. Davis L.Rev. at pp. 929-930.) But it is now notorious—and irresponsible—that “the California Supreme Court is reluctant to enforce it. In over forty years, the court has never invalidated an initiative measure for violating the single-subject rule.” (Id. at p. 896, italics added.) It is also notorious—and irresponsible—that the court not only “avoid[s] invalidating initiatives under the single-subject rule,” but also “avoid[s] altogether a meaningful application of the rule.” (Id. at p. 899.)
I return to Proposition 140. In my concurring and dissenting opinion in Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077], I discussed the single-subject rule at length with regard to Proposition 115 and its 31 sections. (52 Cal.3d at pp. 357-364 [conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.].) The substance of that discussion was this: “. . . [T]he single-subject rule requires an initiative measure to constitute a coherent enactment in and of itself. It is not enough for such a measure to be capable of bearing some label of indefinite scope. It follows that the ‘reasonably germane’ test [which is used to apply the rule] must contain as its ultimate criterion whether an initiative measure is internally interrelated as a whole and parts. A standard that focuses on whether the measure is capable of bearing some label is simply empty.” (Id. at p. 364 [conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.].)
Examined under the foregoing principles, Proposition 140 does not satisfy the single-subject rule. The rule requires a coherent enactment. The test is whether the initiative is internally interrelated. The measure here fails.
By its very terms, Proposition 140 reveals itself to be incoherent: it lacks the requisite internal interrelationship. The initiative embraces three separate and independent subjects—subjects that are unquestionably of major significance. The first concerns term limits for 132 elected state officials, excluding—for no discernible reason—only the Insurance Commissioner. The second deals with restrictions on the retirement benefits of legislators only. The third relates to limits on expenditures by the Legislature and no other branch of government.
The Legislative Analyst so understood Proposition 140. Indeed, in the analysis presented to the voters in the Ballot Pamphlet, he expressly declared that “This initiative makes three major changes to the California Constitution.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats, and Amends, to Cal. Const, with *538arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1990), analysis of Prop. 140 by Legis. Analyst, at p. 69 (hereafter Ballot Pamphlet).)
Proposition 140 must be read to have, as a broad purpose, the transformation of the California Constitution from an instrument that allows—and in the view of the initiative’s proponents, actually invites—the election and reelection to the Legislature of “politicians,” to one that prohibits such a result and in fact encourages service by “citizens.”
Such a reading is compelled by the clear meaning of Proposition 140’s plain words. Its provisions seek to bar any professional cadre from entering into, or arising out of, the Legislature.
This reading is confirmed by all the Ballot Pamphlet arguments relating to the initiative. Of course, proponents and opponents expressed conflicting opinions as to the wisdom of such a transformation. But both recognized its reality.
The majority find no single-subject violation. They reason that the initiative deals with a “unifying theme or common purpose” that they call “incumbency reform.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 512.) Such a theme is not “unifying”; such a purpose is not “common.” The term “incumbency reform” is nothing more, and nothing less, than a seductive label of indefinite scope—a label that can be applied to any “grab bag” containing any provisions, no matter how numerous or heterogeneous, that relate to some officeholder in some way. It begs reality to hold that an initiative that “makes three major changes to the California Constitution” (Ballot Pamp., supra, analysis of Prop. 140 by Legis. Analyst, at p. 69) embraces only one subject. But the majority cavalierly do so.1
II. Proposition 140 and the Revision Requirements
Proposition 140 amounts to an unconstitutional revision of the state charter on its face and, as a result, is invalid.
Article XVIII of the California Constitution, which is entitled “Amending and Revising the Constitution,” provides for (1) amendment by proposal of *539the Legislature or initiative by the people and (2) revision by proposal of the Legislature or constitutional convention called by the Legislature with the approval of the people. Manifestly, these procedures are exclusive. Thus, an amendment may be effected only by legislative proposal or popular initiative. And a revision may be effected only by legislative proposal or constitutional convention. It follows that a popular initiative may amend but may not revise. (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 260; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 221 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].)
“Amendment” and “revision” are not defined in article XVIII or elsewhere in the California Constitution in express terms. But almost 100 years ago, in Livermore v. Waite (1894) 102 Cal. 113 [36 R 424], the court suggested their meaning.
At that time, article XVIII provided “two methods” for effecting changes in the Constitution: revision by constitutional convention and amendment by legislative proposal. (Livermore v. Waite, supra, 102 Cal. at p. 117.)
The Livermore court declared: “Under the first of these methods the entire sovereignty of the people is represented in the convention. The character and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that body is freed from any limitations other than those contained in the constitution of the United States. . . . The constitution itself has been framed by delegates chosen by the people for that express purpose, and has been afterwards ratified by a vote of the people, . . . and the provision in article XVIII that it can be revised only in the same manner, and after the people have had an opportunity to express their will in reference thereto, precludes the idea that it was the intention of the people, by the provision for amendments authorized in the . . . article, to afford the means of effecting the same result which . . . has been guarded with so much care and precision. The very term ‘constitution’ implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term ‘amendment’ implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.” (Livermore v. Waite, supra, 102 Cal. at pp. 117-119.)
More than 50 years later, in McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330 [196 P.2d 787], the court considered whether the so-called “California Bill of Rights,” if approved, would effect an amendment or a revision.
*540At the threshold, the McFadden court set out the principles stated in Livermore. It then proceeded to determine their applicability to initiatives. “The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution in 1911 [citation] applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of ‘laws and amendments to the Constitution’ and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision.” (McFadden v. Jordan, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 333.) It went on to explain: “The differentiation” “between amend and revise” “is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. . . . The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment and revision.” (Id. at p. 347.)
Among other things, observed the McFadden court, the “California Bill of Rights” would (1) add what were in actuality 12 articles in 208 sections with over 21,000 words to a document containing 25 articles in 347 sections with about 55,000 words; (2) repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of those 25 articles; (3) treat a minimum of 4 new topics; and (4) substantially curtail the functions of both the legislative and executive branches. (McFadden v. Jordan, supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 334-345.)
“Applying the long established law to any tenable view of the facts which have been related,” the McFadden court concluded, “it is overwhelmingly certain that the measure now before us would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or ‘such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purposes for which it was framed.’ ” (McFadden v. Jordan, supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 349-350, quoting Livermore v. Waite, supra, 102 Cal. at pp. 118-119.)
Next, in Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, the court addressed the question whether Proposition 13, which added article XIII A to the California Constitution, was amendatory or revisory. It stated: “Taken together our Livermore and McFadden decisions mandate that our analysis in determining whether a particular constitutional enactment is a revision or an amendment must be both quantitative and qualitative in nature. For example, an enactment which is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions may well constitute a revision thereof. However, even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in *541the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also.” (22 Cal.3d at p. 223.) Applying the foregoing standard, the court determined that Proposition 13 had insufficient qualitative or quantitative effect to constitute a revision.
Then, in People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587], a plurality of the court considered in dictum whether a 1972 initiative measure was amendatory or revisory. The measure added section 27 to article I of the California Constitution, validating the death penalty as a permissible punishment under that instrument. The plurality concluded that the initiative effected an amendment only: “In Amador Valley, we observed that ‘even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. . . .’ (P. 223.) Section 27, however, accomplishes no such sweeping result.” (25 Cal.3d at pp. 186-187 (plur. opn.) [dictum].)
Next, in Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, the court addressed whether Proposition 8, as a whole, was amendatory or revisory. Applying the “dual analysis” of Amador Valley, which “examines] both the quantitative and qualitative effects of” an initiative “upon our constitutional scheme,” the court concluded that the measure “did not accomplish a ‘revision’ . . . .” (32 Cal.3d at pp. 260-261.)
Finally, in In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744], the court considered whether section 3 of Proposition 8, which added article I, section 28, subdivision (d), to the California Constitution, was revisory. It had first determined that section 3 of the initiative abrogated the judicially created exclusionary rule as a remedy for the violation of a criminal defendant’s state constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It reasoned that the people’s exercise of the legislative power to restrict judicial authority in this area “does not, either qualitatively or quantitatively, ‘accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of [judicial authority] as to amount to a revision’ of the Constitution” because such power is constitutionally recognized and its use in this matter does not amount to “a sweeping change either in the distribution of powers made in the organic document or in the powers which it vests in the judicial branch . . . .” (37 Cal.3d at pp. 891-892.)
In light of the case law, the definitional standard applicable for purposes of article XVIII of the California Constitution is as follows. A “revision” denotes a change that is qualitatively or quantitatively extensive, affecting the “underlying principles upon which [the Constitution] rests” or the “substantial entirety of the instrument.” (Livermore v. Waite, supra, 102 Cal. at *542p. 118.) By contrast, an “amendment” denotes a change that is qualitatively and quantitatively limited, making a modification “within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better cany out the purpose for which it was framed.” (Id. at pp. 118-119.)2
I now turn to the question whether Proposition 140 amounts to an unconstitutional revision.
As explained above, the initiative has as a broad purpose the transformation of the California Constitution from an instrument that allows, and perhaps actually invites, the election and reelection to the Legislature of “politicians,” to one that prohibits such a result and in fact encourages service by “citizens.”
I observe at the outset that the wisdom of Proposition 140 is of no consequence to the analysis. To be sure, the initiative may be judged foolish and impractical. But it may also be viewed otherwise. Certainly, the exercise of governmental authority by “citizens” as opposed to “politicians,” including the wielding of legislative power, has long been an ideal within the Western political tradition, and sometimes even a reality. (See Maio, Politeia and Adjudication in Fourth-Century B.C. Athens (1983) 28 Am. J. Juris. 16, 17-23.) Again, however, the desirability of the measure is immaterial.
The basic governmental plan of California is established, of course, by the California Constitution. The powers are the legislative, executive, and judicial. (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3.) The branches that are vested with those powers are, respectively, the Legislature {id., art. IV, § 1), the Governor {id., art. V, § 1), and the judiciary {id., art. VI, § 1).
The nature of the three powers and the function of the three branches have been settled since virtually the inception of our polity.
*543In Nougues v. Douglass (1857) 7 Cal. 65, the court stated: “The three great departments are essentially different in their constitution, nature, and powers, and in the means provided for each by the Constitution, to enable each to perform its appropriate functions. These three departments are all equally necessary to the very existence of the government, [fl The legislative power is the creative element in the government, and was exercised partly by the people in the formation of the Constitution. It is primarily [sic] and original, antecedent and fundamental, and must be exercised before the other departments can have anything to do. Its exercise is a condition precedent, and the exercise of the executive and judicial functions are conditions subsequent. The legislative power makes the laws, and then, after they are so made, the judiciary expounds and the executive executes them.” (Id. at pp. 69-70, italics in original.)
Manifestly, Proposition 140 amounts to an unconstitutional revision because of its significant effect on the Legislature.
As the discussion above reveals, the Legislature is a fundamental component of the state constitutional system. It is one of the “three great departments” and is “necessary to the very existence of the government.” (Nougues v. Douglass, supra, 7 Cal. at pp. 69-70.) Indeed, its power is the “creative element” in the scheme. (Id. at p. 70.)
Moreover, the Legislature must be deemed fundamentally altered by any substantial change in its nature or character.
Finally, the change that would be effected by Proposition 140 would be substantial. In the state’s history, only two such changes have clearly been of this sort: the movement from a full-time Legislature with broad powers to a part-time body subject to narrow limitations, which was effected when the present Constitution superseded the original instrument in 1879; and a movement in the opposite direction, which was accomplished under the successful proposal of the California Constitutional Revision Commission in 1966. The change here would be of similar magnitude: “citizens” would be put in the Legislature in the place of “politicians.”
In Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, we held that section 3 of Proposition 115 amounted to an unconstitutional revision because of its significant effect on the judiciary. The provision in question, designed to amend article I, section 24, of the California Constitution, would have restricted the power of state courts to interpret certain state constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Like the Legislature, the judiciary is one of the “three great departments” and is “necessary to the very existence of the government.” (Nougues v. Douglass, supra, 7 Cal. at pp. 69-70.) Also like *544the Legislature, it must be deemed fundamentally altered by any substantial change in its nature or character. The change threatened by section 3 of Proposition 115 would have been such.
It follows a fortiori that an initiative that would put laypersons into the judiciary in the place of jurists would amount to an unconstitutional revision because of its significant effect on that branch. Clearly, such a provision would go far beyond section 3 of Proposition 115 in fundamentally altering the courts by effecting a substantial change in their nature and character.
If an initiative like the foregoing would be an unconstitutional revision, so too Proposition 140. The one would improperly affect the judiciary, the other the Legislature.
In sum, Proposition 140 would fundamentally alter a fundamental component of the state constitutional system by effecting a substantial change in the nature and character of the Legislature. Such an alteration, of course, would be qualitatively extensive, affecting the “underlying principles upon which [the Constitution] rests.” (Livermore v. Waite, supra, 102 Cal. at p. 118.) Therefore, it would be revisory.
The majority conclude to the contrary. They reason that Proposition 140’s possible future consequences for the Legislature are not dispositive. I agree. They also reason that the initiative does not affect the Legislature’s constitutional structure or powers. Again, I agree. But as explained above, a judiciary comprising laypersons is fundamentally different from one made up of jurists—even if its structure and powers are the same. Similarly, a Legislature of “citizens” is fundamentally different from one of “politicians.” It is a “citizen” Legislature that is the measure’s object and also its necessary and inevitable effect.
The majority’s claim that “the initiative process may represent the only practical means of achieving the kind of ‘reforms’ of the Legislature involved here” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 506, italics added) is simply immaterial. The initiative process is not a proper means of achieving “reforms” that are revisory. True, “our Constitution plac[es] ‘[a]ll political power’ in the people” and recognizes their “ ‘. . . right to alter or reform [government] when the public good may require.’ ” (Id. at p. 511, italics deleted.) But it also restricts the wielding of that power and the exercise of that right through various provisions—among which, of course, are the requirements governing revision.
*545III. Conclusion
For all the reasons stated above, I would invalidate Proposition 140 in its entirety as violative of the single-subject rule and as unconstitutionally revisory.3

I recognize that the majority opinions in Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 245-253 [186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274], and Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, 346-349, furnish some support for the conclusion of the majority here. But the reasoning of Brosnahan in this regard is demonstrably faulty. (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, at p. 299 [dis. opn. of Mosk, J.]; Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, at pp. 363-364 [conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.].) So too is that of Raven. (Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, at pp. 364-365 [conc, & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.].) It is never too late, or too early, to correct error. My colleagues, however, fail to take the opportunity presented by this case to overrule Brosnahan and Raven to the extent that they are implicated here. No justification or excuse appears.

It could perhaps be argued that the definitional standard may require modification. In Livermore, the court reasoned in substance that “revision” denoted qualitatively or quantitatively extensive change because the process of revision as then defined, i.e., by constitutional convention, was exceptionally difficult. In McFadden, the court adhered to that reasoning because its predicate still obtained. In Amador Valley, the court recognized that a change had been wrought: formerly, “a constitutional revision could be accomplished only by the elaborate procedure of the convening of, and action by, a constitutional convention" (22 Cal.3d at p. 222, italics in original); now, it can also be effected by the relatively simple procedure of legislative proposal (id. at p. 221). The court implied the change was “significant.” (Id. at p. 222.) But it apparently failed to appreciate precisely what its “significance” was. Because the process of revision as now defined is slightly, if at all, more difficult than the process of amendment, “revision” might perhaps be deemed to denote a change that is slightly, if at all, more extensive than that accomplished by “amendment.” In a word, if an “amendment” is a modification “within the lines of the original instrument,” a “revision” is any change beyond those lines in any degree.

Because of the result I reach, I need not proceed further. I note in passing that Proposition 140 is also arguably invalid as a bill of attainder proscribed by article I, section 10, clause 1, of the United States Constitution. Bills of attainder, within the meaning of the federal charter, are “legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial . . . .” (United States v. Lovett (1946) 328 U.S. 303, 315 [90 L.Ed. 1252, 1259, 66 S.Ct. 1073].) In substance and effect, the measure here is such: it is a popular initiative that imposes the nonjudicial penalty of disqualification on the “easily ascertainable members” of the Legislature who were its primary targets. With apparent reason, the punishment of disqualification is visited on those who are convicted of certain crimes specified in the Constitution and statutes of California. (See Gov. Code, § 1021.) With no reason whatever, the same penalty now awaits those who were Proposition 140’s primary targets. With less reason still, it also awaits all others who hold or will hold the offices specified in the initiative.