Court Opinion

ID: 9368356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 21:00:59.451354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.211523
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 16-4471

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        DONTE MAURICE JOHNSON,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
        Ellen L. Hollander, Senior District Judge. (1:14-cr-00345-ELH-1)

        Submitted: December 30, 2022                                      Decided: February 2, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: William B. Purpura, LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM B. PURPURA,
        Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Christina Ann Hoffman, Jason Daniel Medinger,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Donte Maurice Johnson pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to brandishing a

        firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), and Hobbs

        Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a). The district court sentenced Johnson

        to 183 months’ imprisonment and imposed a five-year term of supervised release with

        certain conditions. On appeal, Johnson’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

        California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal

        but questioning whether Johnson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary due to errors in

        the plea agreement that were discovered at the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. Johnson was

        notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. The

        Government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on the appellate waiver in Johnson’s

        plea agreement.     We deny the Government’s motion to dismiss, affirm Johnson’s

        convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.

               We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and “will enforce the waiver

        if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v.

        Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016). A waiver is valid if it is “knowing and

        voluntary.” Id. Our review of the record reveals that Johnson’s appeal waiver is valid and

        enforceable. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that

        generally, “if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights

        during the [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that

        the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid” (internal

        quotation marks omitted)).

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               But even a knowing and voluntary appellate waiver cannot bar a nonfrivolous

        challenge to the validity of the defendant’s guilty plea. See id. at 364. Before accepting a

        guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant

        of, and determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the charge to which he is

        pleading guilty, the minimum and maximum penalties he faces, and the rights he is

        relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court must also ensure

        that the plea was voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises outside of those

        in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and that a sufficient factual basis supports

        the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

               Our review of the Rule 11 colloquy did not reveal any errors affecting Johnson’s

        substantial rights. Although errors in the plea agreement created confusion during the plea

        hearing, the district court clearly explained the errors and their consequences to Johnson,

        and Johnson indicated that he understood. See United States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86, 88

        (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that, where “information given by the court at the Rule 11 hearing

        corrects or clarifies the earlier erroneous information given by the defendant’s attorney and

        the defendant admits to understanding the court’s advice, the criminal justice system must

        be able to rely on the subsequent dialogue between the court and defendant” (internal

        quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, Johnson ultimately pleaded guilty to a less

        serious offense than that included in the original plea agreement. See United States v.

        Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that the determination of whether a

        defendant was prejudiced by an error includes consideration of whether “the consequences

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        at stake are particularly severe” (internal quotation marks omitted)).       We therefore

        conclude that Johnson’s plea was knowing and voluntary.

               However, our review pursuant to Anders revealed a meritorious issue that falls

        outside the scope of Johnson’s appellate waiver. “[I]n order to sentence a defendant to a

        non-mandatory condition of supervised release, the sentencing court must include that

        condition in its oral pronouncement of a defendant’s sentence in open court.” United

        States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Rogers, 961

        F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020)).      This directive applies to “any set of discretionary

        conditions—even those categorized as ‘standard’ by the [Sentencing] Guidelines.” Rogers,

        961 F.3d at 297-98. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court—which

        did not have the benefit of these decisions when it sentenced Johnson—did not comply

        with this directive with respect to non-mandatory conditions of supervision appearing in

        the judgment. Thus, Johnson was not sentenced to those conditions, and a remand for

        resentencing is required. See Singletary, 984 F.3d at 344, 346-47.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no

        other meritorious grounds for appeal. Accordingly, we deny the Government’s motion to

        dismiss, affirm Johnson’s convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.

        This court requires that counsel inform Johnson, in writing, of the right to petition the

        Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Johnson requests that a petition

        be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

        move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

        that a copy thereof was served on Johnson.

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              We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                          AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                           VACATED IN PART,
                                                                            AND REMANDED

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