Court Opinion

ID: 9786855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:03:49.201905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:47.802923
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
11 95 I respectfully dissent.
196 While the trial court "[gave] the defendants the benefit of the doubt" and proceeded on the assumption that all the products sold by Dr. John's should be afforded *353some level of First Amendment protection, the lead opinion has accepted Midvale's contention that the sale of sexual novelties is "unprotected commercial speech which falls beyond the ambit of First Amendment protection." I disagree.
197 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-71, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, albeit to a lesser extent than some other speech. Midvale's assertion that Dr. John's has "no expressive intent ... beyond simply making a sale" misses the point, since for more than twenty-five years the Court has consistently held that "speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' " is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 762, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973.). That a seller's interest in communicating regarding his wares is predominantly economic "hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment." Id. The underlying assumption that the expressive intent of the seller is dispositive is also mistaken, since the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy considered not only the seller's interest in communicating, but also the interests of consumers and society generally, concluding that it is essential to the proper functioning of a free market economy that individual decisions regarding the allocation of resources be informed and intelligent. Id. at 765, 96 S.Ct. 1817.
1 98 The expressive nature of the products being sold is also irrelevant to a determination of whether the doctrines of commercial speech apply. Whether products or services are expressive in nature is significant in determining whether a restriction on the sale of those products or services must satisfy the requirements of the O'Brien test for content-neutral time, manner, and place restrictions affecting mingled expressive and non-expressive conduct, but it has no relevance to the doctrine of commercial speech. - United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 LEd.2d 672 (1968). Indeed, the cases that have recently refined the commercial speech doctrine have largely arisen out of disputes regarding advertising for products with little or no claim to expressive content. See, eg., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 LEd.2d 532 (2001) (regulation of tobacco advertising and sales practices) 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (ban on advertising the price of liquor); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 LEd.2d 341 (1980) (ban on advertising by electrical utility companies); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (pharmacists advertising the prices of prescription drugs). So long as commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, that speech falls within the ambit of First Amendment protection. Lorillard Tobaceo, 533 U.S. at 554, 121 S.Ct. 2404; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500, 116 S.Ct. 1495; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343.1
T99 The lead opinion's position on the nature of the underlying speech in this case allows it to avoid the special status accorded First Amendment rights in its analysis of standing. Facial challenges, while generally disfavored, are "permitted in the First Amendment context where [a] licensing *354scheme vests unbridled discretion in the decisionmaker and where the regulation is challenged as overbroad." FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. at 215, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 LEd.2d 603 (1990). That an inability to operate is due to a failure to apply for a license rather than to the licensing process is irrelevant: "One who might have had a license for the asking may ... call into question the whole scheme of licensing." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). A licensing scheme that allows the postponement of administrative and judicial decisions regarding the issuance or denial of a license makes a facial challenge particularly appropriate: "where a scheme creates a 'risk of delay," such that 'every application of the statute create[s] an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas, we have permitted parties to bring facial challenges." FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 223-24, 110 S.Ct. 596 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 55, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984)).
{100 It is evident to me from the foregoing that Dr. John's failure to apply for an appropriate business license does not affect his ability to challenge the ordinance. I also conclude that the prior restraint doctrine is applicable to licensing schemes for sexually-oriented businesses. I believe the lead opinion is mistaken in its conclusion that the ordinance is more properly analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. While the holding of FW/PBS may be difficult to ascertain in some respects, it is clear that, Justice White's dissent notwithstanding, six justices agreed that such licensing schemes are to be analyzed as prior restraints. 2
101 Dr. John's contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as a prior restraint, since it makes no mention of the availability of prompt judicial review in the event of an administrative decision denying a license. The lead opinion concludes that the prior restraint doctrine does not apply because it was Dr. John's failure to apply for a license, and not the licensing scheme, that resulted in the business's inability to operate, and because licensing schemes are properly analyzed as content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions rather than as prior restraints.
1 102 It is well-settled that our legal system accords special protections to speech. First Amendment jurisprudence is honeycombed with tests designed to limit the state's power to impinge on the expression of political and religious ideas, and in recent years the United States Supreme Court has held that some level of First Amendment protection is also available for types of speech not generally viewed as vital to a vibrant public discourse, such as commercial speech and nude dancing. See, eg., 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 496, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (stating that "the First Amendment protect[s] the dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech about lawful products and services"); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (observing that nude dancing is expressive conduct, but falling only "within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection"). Government attempts to censor speech, even when part of efforts to isolate obscenity, which remains unprotected by the First Amendment, face a particularly heavy burden: "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to [the] Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963). While prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), establishes three strin*355gent safeguards that must be met in order for a prior restraint to pass constitutional muster. In order to be valid, a system of censorship must provide that
(1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period during which the status quo must be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that decision must be available; and (8) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of proof onee in court.
FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 596 (restating Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59, 85 S.Ct. 734).
1103 The Court has more recently adapted the Freedman rules to analyze schemes that, rather than prohibiting certain activities outright, create special licensing rules for businesses specializing in targeted classes of goods or services. In FW/PBS, the Court, reasoning that licensure schemes and systems of censorship pose related risks, used two of the three Freedman safeguards to analyze and strike down a Dallas Hcensing scheme for sexually-oriented businesses. "Like a censorship system, a licensing scheme creates the possibility that constitutionally protected speech will be suppressed where there are inadequate procedural safeguards to ensure prompt issuance of the Heense." FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226, 110 S.Ct. 596. While at least six justices on the FW/ PBS court indicated that licensing schemes for sexually-oriented businesses should be analyzed under the prior restraint doctrine, the fractured nature of the opinion has created substantial difficulties in understanding the extent to which the Freedman factors apply. Justice Brennan, joined by two other justices, maintained that all three Freedman factors should apply with their original force to a licensing scheme. Id. at 239, 110 S.Ct. 596. Justice White, joined by one other justice, contended that the licensing scheme at issue would be more properly analyzed as a content-neutral time, manner, and place restriction than as a prior restraint. Id. at 244, 110 S.Ct. 596. Justice Scalia argued that the Dallas licensing scheme should not be subject to First Amendment serutiny at all. Id. at 253, 110 S.Ct. 596. Justice O'Connor, joined by two other justices, wrote the opinion generally treated as crucial for determining the holding of the case. In Justice O'Connor's view, because a "licensing scheme .. not present the grave 'dangers of a censorship system, " only the first two Freedman safeguards are essential. Id. at 228, 110 S.Ct. 596 (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58, 85 S.Ct. 734). In Justice O'Connor's formulation, licensing schemes targeting sexually-oriented businesses may impose prior restraints only for a brief specified period and must also provide for prompt judicial review; the censor is required "to go to court and to bear the burden in court of justifying the denial." Id. While the federal circuits have split over the meaning assigned to "prompt judicial review," it is clear, at least, that a majority of justices on the Court agreed that licensure schemes targeting sexually-oriented businesses are properly analyzed under the prior restraint rubric. . does
$104 Prior restraint doctrine is intended to prevent two constitutional evils: granting "unbridled discretion" to a government decision-maker, and failing to impose time limits within which a license or denial must be issued. Id. at 225-26. The Freedman procedural safeguards are intended to guard against these evils by requiring both a speedy conclusion to the administrative process for issuance or denial of licenses and the prompt availability of judicial review of the final administrative decision.
1 105 The Dallas ordinance regulating sexually-oriented businesses at issue in FW/PBS failed to make adequate provisions for either of the first two Freedman safeguards. The Dallas ordinance provided that a license would issue within thirty days provided an applicant met pertinent requirements, but also required that business premises pass several safety inspections prior to the issuance of the license. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 596. Since no time limits were provided within which those inspections were to be completed, the apparent certainty and brevity of the time line for administrative decisionmaking were undermined by the possibility that required inspections could come only after protracted delay, if at all. Id. The *356possibility that protected speech will be suppressed for a potentially indefinite period is precisely what the doctrine of prior restraint is intended to prevent: "Where the licensor has unlimited time within which to issue a license, the risk of arbitrary suppression is as great as the provision of unbridled discretion. A scheme that fails to set reasonable time limits on the decisionmaker creates the risk of - indefinitely - suppressing - permissible speech." - Id. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 596.
T106 In amending the ordinance some nine months before the proceeding below, Midvale has been partially successful in curing the constitutional time limitation infirmities identified by the Court in FW/PBS. The ordinance now provides that the initial decision granting or denying a license must be made within forty-five days after receipt of an application. Midvale City, Utah, Code § 5.56.180(E). If an agency charged with reviewing the premises does not disapprove the premises within this period, the premises are deemed approved by that agency. Id.
T107 While the particular defect from which the Dallas ordinance suffered in FW/ PBS is avoided by this revision, the ordinance nonetheless falls short of the requirement that a licensing scheme "provide an effective limitation on the time within which the licensor's decision must be made." FW/ PBS, 493 U.S. at 228, 110 S.Ct. 596. The revised ordinance does provide for a brief time frame within which the initial decision to grant or deny a license must be made, but it thereafter reintroduces the possibility of indeterminate delay in the administrative appeals process. License denials may be appealed to the business license administrator, who "shall schedule a hearing before the hearing board within twenty ... days from the date of the appeal unless such time shall be extended for good cause." Midvale City, Utah, Code § 5.56.360(B) (emphasis added). Following the hearing the license administrator provides the city administrator with ree-ommendations. "After the hearing, the license administrator shall have seven working days, unless extended for good cause, in which to render findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision to the City Administrator." _ Id. § 5.56.860(E) (emphasis added). These provisions create the possibility that an administrative appeal could be delayed by government applications for extensions "for good cause." Because the appeals portion of the ordinance does not define what constitutes good cause or provide for any limitation on how long an extension may be, I believe the possibility for abuse exists.3 Building some flexibility into the time lines governing the administrative appeals process does not necessarily create a prior restraint, but provi*357sions so flexible that they could allow indefinite delays for unspecified reasons do. The ability to litigate the meaning of "good cause" or the length of a particular delay is no substitute for the brief and defined period for administrative decision-making that FW/ PBS requires. If Midvale wishes to include some provision for permissible delays in the administrative appeals process, I believe it must provide guidance as to what constitutes good cause and include outside limits on delays so that the appeals process will be concluded within a brief, specified period. I believe the ordinance, as it now stands, fails to provide the first Freedman safeguard required by FW/PBS, and is therefore an unconstitutional prior restraint.
108 Justice RUSSON acted on this opinion prior to his retirement.

. The lead opinion apparently takes the view that selling sexual novelties, unlike advertising the sale of sexual novelties, is not speech at all, but rather completely non-expressive conduct outside the ambit of the First Amendment protection. This argument was not clearly made either in Midvale's briefs or in oral argument. A recent United States Supreme Court decision, moreover, entertains a rather broad definition of commercial speech. In Lorillard Tobacco the United States Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson test for restrictions on commercial speech to a Massachusetts regulation requiring that tobacco products be displayed in locations accessible only to sales personnel. Because the regulation in question was found to pass constitutional muster under Central Hudson, the Court did not need to determine whether or not there is a "cognizable speech interest in a particular means of displaying ... products," but in assuming, arguen-do, that a First Amendment right might attach to product display, the Court has recently demonstrated an openness to expansive definitions of commercial speech. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 569, 121 S.Ct. 2404.

. While such a diversity of opinion inevitably leads to interpretive dilemmas, there is precedent to guide lower courts in deriving a holding from a fractured United States Supreme Court decision: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977). That an opinion is fragmented is not a justification for treating any one opinion from the court as being as authoritative as any other. Even if no single rationale commands a majority, a position clearly in the minority cannot be taken as the holding of the Court.

. The ordinance's failure to provide clear time limits on its administrative appeals process also complicates its ability to satisfy the second Freedman - requirement, - the - availability of prompt judicial review. An ordinance's provision for uncertain administrative review may make the availability of prompt judicial review equally uncertain; an ordinance is "inadequate under any interpretation of 'prompt judicial review' [when] it creates the risk that expressive activity could be suppressed indefinitely prior to any judicial review of the decision to deny a license." Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1066, 115 S.Ct. 1697, 131 L.Ed.2d 560. Judicial review, prompt or not, is generally unavailable under Utah law until administrative remedies have been exhausted: "parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review." Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ¶ 11, 44 P.3d 724 (citing Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 14, 34 P.3d 180 (internal citations omitted)).
The Midvale ordinance makes no provision for judicial review, and accordingly has nothing to say as to whether exhaustion is necessary as a prerequisite to judicial review. These omissions lead to an ambiguity as to the prerequisites that must be fulfilled before judicial review is available that is unacceptable in the area of First Amendment rights. It is essential that "the freedoms of expression ... be ringed about with adequate bulwarks." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963). The first Freedman factor is designed to provide an applicant with a swift administrative decision as to whether a license will be granted or denied, the second to ensure that prompt judicial review is available. A procedure that creates the possibility of indefinite delays in the administrative appeals process and then compounds that uncertainty by failing to provide a mechanism that will assuredly circumvent the faulty appeals process does not provide the guarantee of a speedy administrative determination required by United States Supreme Court precedent. The Midvale ordinance guarantees neither a swift resolution to the administrative process nor access to the courts as an alternative to a full administrative appeal.