Court Opinion

ID: 9546817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:35:53.209418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:53.959365
License: Public Domain

PORTER, Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the opinion written by Justice THOMAS except wherein it holds the trial court committed reversible error in three respects and that the judgment of conviction should be reversed.
Such opinion holds that the court committed prejudicial error in the admission in evidence of the small, green diary book, State’s Exhibit No. 2. This exhibit contains a list of the names of numerous towns and villages, each followed by a number, and in addition, contains pages of memoranda dated from January 27 to February 27, 1952. Each page is headed by the date and the name and number of a town, for example, “February 9, Nampa 98”. Each page contains short notes of identifying characteristics, such as, color of hair and eyes and whether short or tall. Also, the pages contain notes on physical condition, such as, “tense,” nervous,”' “shock,” “no trouble,” “hard to help”.
At the time the officers arrested appellant, the victim was still sitting on the bed at appellant’s direction and was holding the pencil and paper furnished her. Appellant was in the act of assigning to the victim a number taken from the green diary. The diary was being used in connection with the consummation of the offense and is part of the res gestae. It is material as it tends to corroborate the victim’s testimony.
In People v. Reimringer, Cal.App., 253 P.2d 756, cited in the opinion of Justice THOMAS, a diary, taken from the possession of defendant which merely contained the names and addresses of the victims, was admitted in evidence as showing some connection between the defendant and the complaining witnesses. In the instant case the victim’s name was not in the diary but an identifying number in the book was being assigned by appellant to the victim. The admission of the diary in evidence was not error.
The opinion by Justice THOMAS, holds that the court erred in admitting in evidence “over objection” a certain letter, set out therein and “purportedly written by a woman * * * who was not in anywise identified”. The diary, when offered and admitted in evidence, contained between its pages thirty-three loose sheets or parts of sheets of paper, among which were two letters, one headed “Boise 47”, describing *441the writer’s symptoms and thanking appellant for her services, the other being the letter set out in the opinion by Justice THOMAS. These loose papers contained memoranda similar to that on the pages of the diary. No request was made for the removal of these papers from the diary. No objection was made that such papers were not properly a part of the exhibit. No objection was made to the introduction of these papers and letters other than the general objection to the introduction of the diary. The letter in question was read to the jury at the time of the cross-examination of appellant. No objection was made by appellant to the reading of same at such time, although appellant now complains thereof.
Appellant admits receiving the letter from “Fresno 62” on February 27. She admits writing “Fresno 62” as the heading of a page in the diary dated February 15, which page contains the usual memoranda. She testified the writer of the letter came into appellant’s home while appellant was working on an astrology chart and copied the number. She further testified:
“Q. Getting back to this letter you received from this lady here, what did you think about it when you got that? A. I wondered about it. I didn’t know what to think. I can remember the woman coming in there and looking at that chart and talking about that number all right.
“Q. You remember this woman coming in and looking at the chart? A. Yes, but she was under a'different name than that.
“Q. Did she pay you any money? A. She didn’t give me any money. I didn’t do anything for her. We had a little controversy.
“Q. Over what? A. She wanted me to do something for her, but I don’t know for sure what she wanted. She wanted to know if I couldn’t help her. She was leaving her husband and wanted to know if there was a place in Weiser.
“Q. Help her in what way ? A. I don’t know. She must have wanted an abortion. I couldn’t understand it any other way.
“Q. She asked you * * *. A. Yes, If I knew how.
“Q. What did you tell her? A. I told her I didn’t, my hands were so weak that I couldn’t if I tried.”
This testimony of appellant seems to clearly identify the writer of the letter. The letter was a part of the res gestae and was material as tending to corroborate the testimony of the victim; and would seem to be admissible regardless of the question of its admissibility to prove another crime tending to prove intent or design. In any event, absent a direct objection or challenge to the letter, how can it be now con*442tended the court committed error in respect thereto?
Justice THOMAS holds that the court committed prejudicial error in summarily adjudging one of appellant’s witnesses guilty of contempt of court, fining him and directing the sheriff to take him into custody until the fine was paid, all in the presence of the jury. The witness had testified that the general reputation of appellant for being a law abiding citizen and of good moral character was good. Under cross-examination he made a provocative remark concerning the court and it is not urged that the trial judge was not justified in fining him for contempt of court.
While it is true that opportunity for redirect examination of the witness was not given, such opportunity was not requested by appellant and it is difficult to see how anything further could have been testified to by the witness.
The action of the trial court in proceeding in the contempt matter in the presence of the jury was hasty and ill considered. However, it does not appear that such action tended to disclose the opinion of the court as to the guilt or innocence of appel-' lant or as to the credibility of the witness. Absent other reversible error, such action was not of such prejudicial nature as to require reversal of this case.
It appearing that two Justices concur with me in this opinion, it is ordered by the majority of the court that the judgment of conviction be and is hereby affirmed.
GIVENS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.