Court Opinion

ID: 9754682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:09:36.859613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:56.361478
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
As the majority correctly notes, an application for a stay is ancillary to an appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1702; 1781. Consequently, the validity of any such application necessarily depends upon whether the court to which the underlying appeal has been taken, has jurisdiction of the subject matter.
On the other hand, a request for a preliminary injunction is an original action which, in the situation where the party sought to be enjoined is the Commonwealth, is an action falling within the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a).
Thus, the threshold question in this case is whether the Commonwealth Court had the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain appellee’s petition for review from the department’s decision to revoke its license. I think not.
It is unquestioned that the basis, for appellee’s claimed property right was a contract entered into between itself and the Commonwealth. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Judie, Inc., 30 Pa.Cmwlth. 259, 373 A.2d 478 (1977). Pursuant to that contract the licensee agreed to comply with all *383the terms of the State Lottery Law.1 72 P.S. § 3761-1 et seq. In return for this agreement, and in consideration of other terms not here relevant, the Commonwealth conferred upon appellee the benefit of a license to sell lottery tickets. However, the Commonwealth, after having learned of appellee’s convictions on charges of theft by deception, revoked that license, thereby denying it the benefit of the contract. If, as appellee claims, this denial was improper, the remedy, as I see it, would be a breach of contract claim. By law such a claim, when brought against a Commonwealth agency, must initially be brought in the Board of Claims. 72 P.S. 4651-4.2 See Ezy Park v. Larson, 499 Pa. 615, 454 A.2d 928 (1983).3
If, as appellee further argues, it was entitled to have its breach claim resolved prior to a revocation, the corporation would have the option of going to the Commonwealth Court to seek a preliminary injunction against any intervening action sought to be taken by the Department.
I see no constitutional problems with proceeding in this manner, since appellee would be granted its opportunity to be heard, in a forum empowered to grant an adequate remedy, i.e., monetary damages.4 At the same time appellee would retain its equitable action in the Commonwealth Court to seek a permanent injunction against the proposed revocation should the breach claim be successful.
Although one may criticize this perceived splitting of the cause of action, such criticism should not be directed here. *384It is the legislature which has set the jurisdictional limits of the Commonwealth Court and Board of Claims. We are called upon only to interpret those enactments. It is beyond our power to rewrite those acts merely because we would have it differently.5
Furthermore, despite the labels attached to this application by the parties below,6 it appears that Judge Blatt considered the request as one for an injunction, rather than as a stay. In this regard, I note that she described the proceeding as one coming under the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761, Memorandum Opinion at 4; and imposed upon the Commonwealth the affirmative duty of reinstating appellee’s license.7
I would treat this case as a direct appeal from an original action for preliminary injunctive relief commenced in the Commonwealth Court. However, since our decision in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process Gas, 502 Pa. 805, 467 A.2d 805 (1983), the standards for reviewing a request for a stay are substantially similar as those for reviewing a request for a preliminary injunction. Compare Gillette Company v. Master, 408 Pa. 202, 182 A.2d 734 (1962). Therefore, I agree with the majority’s analysis regarding the propriety of a “stay” in this case, and I concur in the decision to reverse.
Finally, I would emphasize that the question of whether due process requires hearings prior to suspension and/or revocation, remains for the Commonwealth Court, as does the question as to whether the license at issue is or is not a property right. See Majority Opinion at 380.
*385Insofar as the majority has decided that the “stay” entered by the Commonwealth Court should be vacated, I concur in the decision to reverse. I do not, at this juncture, wish to express a definitive opinion on the merits of the appellee’s due process claim.

. Act of August 26, 1971, P.L. 351, No. 91, § 1 et seq.

. Act of October 5, 1978, P.L. 1104, No. 260 § 3 as amended.

. From an adverse determination on the merits by the Board the appellee would still retain its constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal to the Commonwealth Court. See 2 Pa.C.S. § 701 et seq.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 763.

. The majority’s decision seems to dictate the anomalous result of requiring the department to develop and implement hearing procedures, where they have not previously been required, while the legislatively created Board of Claims will sit idle, wasting its acquired expertise.

. I wish to emphasize that the statutory scheme set up by the legislature seems quite adequate, and I in no way intend my comments as critical of the system they have devised.

. We are clearly not bound by the labels which the parties affix to their filings. See Pomerantz v. Goldstein, 479 Pa. 175, 387 A.2d 1280 (1978).

. In this regard the majority correctly notes that "appellee sought injunctive relief.” Majority Opinion at 372.