Court Opinion

ID: 9410468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 14:07:21.961443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.917479
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
07/21/2023 09:07 AM CDT

                                                       - 724 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        314 Nebraska Reports
                                                SPARKS V. MACH
                                                Cite as 314 Neb. 724

                             Kayleen Sparks, appellant, v. David Mach,
                               Special Administrator of the Estate
                                 of Leo Mach, deceased, appellee.
                                                   ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed July 21, 2023.     No. S-21-1041.

                 1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court affirms a
                    lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted
                    evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
                    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that
                    the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing
                    a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light
                    most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted,
                    and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible
                    from the evidence.
                 2. Limitations of Actions. The determination of which statute of limita-
                    tions applies is a question of law.
                 3. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
                 4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an
                    appellate court has an obligation to resolve the questions independently
                    of the conclusion reached by the trial court.
                 5. Decedents’ Estates: Claims. The Nebraska Probate Code provides
                    two methods of presenting a claim against a decedent’s estate: Under
                    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2486(1) (Reissue 2016), a claim can be presented
                    by filing a written statement thereof with the clerk of the probate
                    court, or under § 30-2486(2), a claim can be presented by commenc-
                    ing a proceeding against the personal representative in any court that
                    has jurisdiction.
                 6. Decedents’ Estates: Limitations of Actions. Under the Nebraska
                    Probate Code, the first statute of limitations to apply will accomplish
                    a bar.
                 7. Statutes. Absent anything to the contrary, statutory language is to
                    be given its plain meaning, and a court will not look beyond the
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                               SPARKS V. MACH
                               Cite as 314 Neb. 724

      statute or interpret it when the meaning of its words is plain, direct,
      and unambiguous.
 8.   Decedents’ Estates: Claims: Limitations of Actions. Under Neb. Rev.
      Stat. § 30-2484 (Reissue 2016), the running of any statute of limita-
      tions, measured from some event other than the death of and subsequent
      advertisement for claims against a decedent, is suspended during the
      2 months following the decedent’s death but resumes thereafter as to
      claims not barred pursuant to any applicable statute of limitations.
 9.   Decedents’ Estates: Debtors and Creditors: Limitations of Actions.
      The 2-month suspension in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2484 (Reissue 2016)
      means that by reason of a debtor’s death, 2 months is added to the nor-
      mal period of limitations before a debt is barred.
10.   Decedents’ Estates. The Nebraska Probate Code should be liberally
      construed to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
11.   Decedents’ Estates: Claims. The probate code does not authorize a
      claimant to present a claim against the estate by commencing an action
      against a former personal representative who has been discharged and
      whose appointment has been terminated.
12.   ____: ____. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2404 (Reissue 2016), a claim
      against a decedent’s estate cannot be commenced before the county
      court has appointed a personal representative.
13.   Decedents’ Estates: Actions. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2486(2)
      (Reissue 2016), an action against a decedent’s estate is not commenced
      unless a claimant files a lawsuit against the personal representative of
      the estate.
14.   Decedents’ Estates: Executors and Administrators: Statutes. Because
      a personal representative is not a natural person, but an entity created by
      statute through a court order of appointment, when an estate is closed
      and the personal representative discharged, there is no viable entity or
      person to sue.
15.   Decedents’ Estates: Executors and Administrators: Pleadings. An
      otherwise valid amended complaint, filed after a complaint filed pre-
      maturely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2404 (Reissue 2016) but after the
      appointment or reappointment of a personal representative, is sufficient
      to commence a proceeding within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat.
      § 30-2486(2) (Reissue 2016).
16.   Limitations of Actions: Pleadings. Under certain situations as set forth
      in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-201.02 (Reissue 2016), an amended complaint
      may relate back to the commencement date of an earlier complaint.

 Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Moore, Riedmann, and Welch, Judges, on appeal thereto
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     314 Nebraska Reports
                            SPARKS V. MACH
                            Cite as 314 Neb. 724

from the District Court for Douglas County, Todd O.
Engleman, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded with directions.

    William J. Pfeffer, of Pfeffer Law Offices, for appellant.

  Kyle Wallor, of Lamson, Dugan & Murray, L.L.P., for
appellee.

  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

    Cassel, J.
                       I. INTRODUCTION
   The Nebraska Court of Appeals held that Kayleen Sparks’
action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident was
a “nullity,” because the original complaint was filed against the
other driver’s closed estate and its discharged special admin-
istrator. 1 This appeal turns upon whether the defective filing
could be “cured” upon reopening the estate, reappointing the
special administrator, and then filing an amended complaint.
If so, we must determine whether Sparks commenced the
proceeding within the applicable statute of limitations under
the Nebraska Probate Code (NPC). 2 Because we conclude that
Sparks timely remedied the situation, we reverse.

                      II. BACKGROUND
   Because this appeal focuses on a statute of limitations, spe-
cific dates matter. Among them are the dates of the accident,
the decedent’s death, the filing of Sparks’ complaint, the reap-
pointment of a special administrator, and the other filings and
service of process in the damage suit.
1
    See Sparks v. Mach, 31 Neb. App. 461, 470, 982 N.W.2d 834, 841 (2022).
2
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-401 to 30-406, 30-701 to 30-713, 30-2201 to
    30-2902, 30-3901 to 30-3923, 30-4001 to 30-4045, 30-4101 to 30-4118,
    and 30-4201 to 30-4210 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2022).
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                        SPARKS V. MACH
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 724

                 1. Motor Vehicle Accident
   On March 3, 2017, Sparks and the decedent, Leo Mach
(Mach), were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Mach died
on September 6 of unrelated causes, prompting the opening
of his estate and the appointment of David Mach (David) as
special administrator. In December 2019, Mach’s estate was
closed, and David was discharged as special administrator. It
appears to be undisputed that David did not send Sparks a copy
of any notice to creditors.

              2. Lawsuit Against Mach’s Estate
   On February 24, 2021 (shortly before 4 years after the
accident), Sparks filed a complaint in the district court against
“DAVID MACH, Special Administrator for THE ESTATE OF
LEO MACH,” alleging Mach’s negligence in the March 3,
2017, accident. The court issued a summons the same day the
complaint was filed, on February 24. This was the first, but not
the only, summons issued by the district court. The complaint
did not allege that the complaint was seeking only to pursue
liability insurance proceeds; instead, it was silent regarding
that matter.
   After filing the complaint, Sparks learned the estate was
closed and David had been discharged as special administrator.
Sparks filed an application in the county court to reopen the
estate and reappoint David as special administrator.
   On March 5, 2021 (4 years and 2 days after the date of the
accident), the county court granted Sparks’ application and
reappointed David as special administrator.
   On March 8, 2021, Sparks served David with the first sum-
mons and the original complaint. In response, David filed a
motion to dismiss, alleging lack of personal jurisdiction, insuf-
ficiency of service of process, and failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
   On April 21, 2021, Sparks filed an amended complaint,
asserting that although David had previously been discharged
as special administrator, Mach’s estate had been reopened
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     314 Nebraska Reports
                             SPARKS V. MACH
                             Cite as 314 Neb. 724

and David reappointed as special administrator. On the same
date (April 21), the court issued a second summons.
   Two days later, on April 23, 2021, David was served with
the second summons and the amended complaint. On that same
date, Sparks also filed a motion to again amend the complaint.
These events occurred within 4 years and 2 months from the
date of the accident.
   The district court held two hearings on David’s motion to
dismiss and Sparks’ motion to amend. Citing Nebraska case
law, David argued that Sparks’ original complaint was a legal
nullity because it was filed prior to the reopening of the estate
and reappointment of David as special administrator. Sparks
countered that process was served only after the estate was
reopened and David was reappointed. Sparks further argued
that even if the original filing was improper, her amended
complaint—which was filed after David’s reappointment—
should relate back to the original filing under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-201.02 (Reissue 2016). The court overruled David’s
motion to dismiss and sustained Sparks’ motion to amend.
   On June 1, 2021 (more than 4 years and 2 months after the
accident), Sparks filed her second amended complaint and
initiated service upon David and his attorney by certified mail
and electronic service. In response, David filed an answer
and a motion for summary judgment. David’s answer noted
that Mach’s estate was not reopened, and he was not reap-
pointed as special administrator, until March 5, 2021—2 days
after the 4-year statute of limitations for negligence actions 3
had run.

               3. Summary Judgment Order
   Following a hearing, the district court entered an order
granting David’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing
Sparks’ action with prejudice. The court’s decision turned on
3
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (Reissue 2016).
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     314 Nebraska Reports
                             SPARKS V. MACH
                             Cite as 314 Neb. 724

three issues. First, citing a specific provision 4 under the NPC
and a Court of Appeals’ decision, 5 it found that Sparks’ attempt
to commence an action on February 24, 2021, before David’s
reappointment as special administrator on March 5, rendered
the action a “nullity.” Second, the court stated that Sparks’
action failed to comply with the 4-year statute of limitations
for negligence actions, which the court found expired on
March 3. Finally, the court rejected Sparks’ argument that her
second amended complaint should relate back to the date of the
original filing. It stated: “Because [Sparks’] original Complaint
is a legal nullity, there was not a pending action for [Sparks’]
Second Amended Complaint to relate back to.”

            4. Motion to Reconsider and Vacate
   Sparks filed a motion to reconsider and vacate regarding the
dismissal of her action. She argued that the court erred in its
interpretation of § 30-2404, because, she asserted, a suit was
not “commenced” until the date of service. Sparks pointed out
that David was served after the estate was reopened and David
was reappointed as special administrator. Therefore, Sparks
contended, the original filing was not a “nullity.”
   Following a hearing, the district court overruled Sparks’
motion to reconsider or vacate and adhered to its order grant-
ing summary judgment and dismissing the action. Sparks filed
a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals.

                5. Court of Appeals’ Decision
   The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order.
It considered three issues, which it characterized as matters
of law.
   First, it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that
Sparks’ original complaint was a legal nullity. It explained,
in part: “Nebraska appellate courts have long held that a
4
    § 30-2404.
5
    Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, 20 Neb. App. 458, 825 N.W.2d 224 (2013).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                              SPARKS V. MACH
                              Cite as 314 Neb. 724

personal representative is not a natural person, but, rather, an
entity created by statute through a court order of appointment.” 6
Therefore, “when an estate is closed and the personal represent­
ative discharged, there is no viable entity or person to sue.” 7
The court considered four prior cases 8 involving “claims” filed
against closed estates and rejected Sparks’ argument that this
case was distinguishable. It reasoned:
      Although Sparks argues that she “quickly rectified the
      fact that the estate had been closed,” . . . the fact remains
      that there was no estate open or special administrator
      appointed at the time the complaint was filed. Nor are
      we persuaded by the fact that David was served with the
      original complaint after he was reappointed as special
      administrator. The controlling fact remains that Sparks
      filed her original complaint, and thus commenced a pro-
      ceeding to enforce a claim against Mach’s estate, before
      the estate was reopened and David was reappointed.
      Sparks’ actions to rectify the situation occurred after the
      statute of limitations had run. 9
The appeals court did not elaborate on the applicable statute
of limitations.
   Second, it rejected Sparks’ argument that the relation-back
doctrine applied. It stated:
         Sparks is generally correct that her pleadings com-
      ply with the relation-back doctrine found in Neb. Rev.
6
    Sparks v. Mach, supra note 1, 31 Neb. App. at 466, 982 N.W.2d at 839
    (citing Pilger v. State, 120 Neb. 584, 585, 234 N.W. 403, 404 (1931)
    (“[e]xecutors and administrators in Nebraska are creatures of statute”)).
7
    Sparks v. Mach, supra note 1, 31 Neb. App. at 466, 982 N.W.2d at 839
    (citing Correa v. Estate of Hascall, 288 Neb. 662, 850 N.W.2d 770 (2014),
    and Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, supra note 5).
8
    See, Correa v. Estate of Hascall, supra note 7; Babbitt v. Hronik, 261 Neb.
    513, 623 N.W.2d 700 (2001); Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, supra note 5;
    Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).
9
    Sparks v. Mach, supra note 1, 31 Neb. App. at 469-70, 982 N.W.2d at 841
    (emphasis supplied).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                              SPARKS V. MACH
                              Cite as 314 Neb. 724

      Stat. § 25-201.02(1) (Reissue 2016). . . . However, the
      Nebraska Supreme Court has held that an amended com-
      plaint does not relate back to the original complaint under
      § 25-201.02 when the original complaint was a nullity.
      See, Kelly v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 295 Neb. 650, 889
      N.W.2d 613 (2017); Reid v. Evans, 273 Neb. 714, 733
      N.W.2d 186 (2007). 10
It concluded that § 25-201.02 does not allow for relation back
to cure the defect that rendered the original complaint in this
action a legal nullity. In other words, “[b]ecause Mach’s estate
was closed and the special administrator discharged, there was
no action pending at the time of Sparks’ original complaint and
nothing for the amended complaint to relate back to.” 11
   Third, the Court of Appeals found that summary judgment in
David’s favor was appropriate. It explained that because it had
already determined that Sparks’ original complaint was a nul-
lity and that the relation-back doctrine did not apply, “there is
no genuine issue as to any material facts and David is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” 12
   Sparks filed a timely petition for further review, which we
granted. We directed the parties to submit supplemental brief-
ing addressing the applicable statute or statutes of limitations.
The parties promptly submitted supplemental briefs, which we
have considered in resolving this appeal.

                III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Sparks assigns that the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that (1) the original complaint was a legal nullity, and any
potential error was not rectified before the running of the stat-
ute of limitations, and (2) the amended complaint did not relate
back to the original complaint.
10
     Sparks v. Mach, supra note 1, 31 Neb. App. at 470-71, 982 N.W.2d at 841.
11
     Id. at 472, 982 N.W.2d. at 842.
12
     Id.
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                              SPARKS V. MACH
                              Cite as 314 Neb. 724

                 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] An appellate court affirms a lower court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as
to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives that
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
the evidence. 13
   [2-4] The determination of which statute of limitations
applies is a question of law. 14 Likewise, statutory interpreta-
tion presents a question of law. 15 When reviewing questions
of law, an appellate court has an obligation to resolve the
questions independently of the conclusion reached by the
trial court. 16

                        V. ANALYSIS
   Sparks’ negligence claim against Mach’s estate is governed
by the NPC, which provides that a claim, in respect to the
estates of deceased persons, includes liabilities of the decedent
whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise. 17 The parties’
arguments hinge on several aspects of this complicated statu-
tory scheme.
   We begin by setting forth David’s general “nullity” argu-
ment and Sparks’ general response. We next discuss in detail
numerous provisions of the NPC and the uniform act upon
13
     Clark v. Scheels All Sports, ante p. 49, 989 N.W.2d 39 (2023).
14
     Doe v. McCoy, 297 Neb. 321, 899 N.W.2d 899 (2017).
15
     McGill Restoration v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 313 Neb. 658, 986 N.W.2d
     32 (2023).
16
     In re Adoption of Faith F., 313 Neb. 491, 984 N.W.2d 640 (2023).
17
     See § 30-2209(4).
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              Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                       314 Nebraska Reports
                               SPARKS V. MACH
                               Cite as 314 Neb. 724

which these statutes are based, as well as relevant com-
ments provided by the drafters of the uniform act. Finally,
we address the parties’ specific arguments regarding prior
Nebraska appellate court cases and the application of the
relation-back doctrine to Sparks’ claim. Because the facts of
this case are not in dispute, we address the issues on appeal
as a matter of law.
                 1. David’s “Nullity” Rationale
   At oral argument, David iterated a concession, which is con-
sistent with his briefing, that all of his arguments are based on
a single premise. David contends that Sparks’ purported failure
to comply with § 30-2404 rendered her action a “nullity.” The
district court and the Court of Appeals agreed with David.
   Section 30-2404 states, in part, that “[n]o proceeding to
enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his succes-
sors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a
personal representative.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under the NPC,
the term “personal representative” includes a special adminis-
trator. 18 Thus, because Sparks’ original complaint attempted to
commence a proceeding against a discharged special admin-
istrator, David argues that § 30-2404 bars her claim. Moreover,
based on his nullity argument and the date of the accident,
David contends that “[Sparks’] claim is barred regardless of
how one calculates the statute of limitations.” 19
   In any event, the parties agree in their supplemental brief-
ing that § 25-207 provides the applicable statute of limita-
tions pursuant to a specific NPC provision 20 regarding claims
for liability insurance proceeds, that § 25-207 allows 4 years
from the accrual of the cause of action in which to commence
the action, and that the cause of action accrued on the date
18
     See § 30-2209(33).
19
     Supplemental brief for appellee on petition for further review at 16.
20
     § 30-2485(c)(2).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                        SPARKS V. MACH
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 724

of the accident on March 3, 2017. They disagree regard-
ing the potential application of a 2-month “suspen[sion]” in
§ 30-2484.
   Sparks maintains that, for purposes of the statute of limita-
tions, the original complaint she filed on February 24, 2021,
or the first amended complaint she filed on April 21 consti-
tuted necessary commencement of a proceeding against the
decedent’s estate. Sparks further argues that her efforts to
“cure” any deficiency in the original complaint occurred prior
to May 3 (4 years and 2 months after the accident)—the date
on which Sparks asserts that the statute of limitations would
have expired. Again relying on his nullity argument, David dis-
putes that Sparks’ efforts had this effect. David maintains that
Sparks’ only option was to file a new action before the statute
of limitations had run.
                2. Probate Code Framework
   Before turning to the parties’ specific arguments, we recall
several statutes in the NPC bearing on claims and statutes
of limitations, as well as certain provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), upon which the NPC statutes are mod-
eled. We focus on three topics: proper presentation of claims
against the estates of deceased persons, the potential applica-
tion of several statutory bars, and the effect of the 2-month
“suspen[sion]” in § 30-2484.
                     (a) Presentation of Claim
   [5] For purposes of any statute of limitations, the NPC
instructs that the proper presentation of a claim under § 30-2486
is equivalent to commencement of a proceeding. 21 That section
provides two methods of presenting a claim against a dece-
dent’s estate: Under § 30-2486(1), a claim can be presented
by filing a written statement thereof with the clerk of the pro-
bate court, or under § 30-2486(2), a claim can be presented
21
     § 30-2484.
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                      314 Nebraska Reports
                              SPARKS V. MACH
                              Cite as 314 Neb. 724

by commencing a proceeding against the personal representa-
tive in any court that has jurisdiction. As noted above, the term
“personal representative” includes a special administrator. 22
   In this case, David argues that there is no evidence in the
record establishing that Sparks filed a “written statement of
the claim” with the county court clerk in compliance with
§ 30-2486(1). Although Sparks filed an application in the
county court to reopen the estate and reappoint the special
administrator, David suggests that that was insufficient for
purposes of presenting a claim and protecting the statute of
limitations. Instead, he argues, Sparks attempted to commence
an action under § 30-2486(2) by filing a claim against the dis-
charged special administrator of the decedent’s estate, without
the estate’s being reopened. David maintains that this attempt
was a nullity.
                    (b) Statutes of Limitations
   To determine whether Sparks’ action was a nullity, we first
must determine which statute of limitations applied. In Lenners
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 23 the Court of Appeals pro-
vided a detailed discussion of the statutory bars that may have
potential application under the NPC. We agree with the court’s
discussion there and draw upon it here.
   The comment to the UPC section 24 upon which § 30-2484
was modeled points out that several statutes of limitations
may have potential application in a particular case and that
the first to apply controls: “[T]he regular statute of limitations
applicable during the debtor’s lifetime, the non-claim provi-
sions of [UPC] Sections 3-803 and 3-804, and the three-year
limitation of [UPC] Section 3-803 all have potential appli-
cation to a claim. The first of the three to accomplish a bar
22
     See § 30-2209(33).
23
     Lenners v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 18 Neb. App. 772, 793 N.W.2d
     357 (2010).
24
     See Unif. Probate Code § 3-802, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 266 (2013).
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                             SPARKS V. MACH
                             Cite as 314 Neb. 724

controls.” 25 Section 30-2485 corresponds to UPC § 3-803, 26
and § 30-2486 generally tracks UPC § 3-804. 27
   [6] In addition to the regular statute of limitations for negli-
gence actions, there are five provisions of the NPC that could
act to impose a bar. Four of these provisions fall within the two
categories identified in the comment—the nonclaim provisions
and the 3-year limitation. There is one other nonclaim provi-
sion under yet another statute. The comment instructs us that
the first statute to apply will accomplish a bar. We adopt the
rationale of the comment and hold that under the NPC, the first
statute of limitations to apply will accomplish a bar.
   The first statutory bar, which applies only if the claim
against the decedent arose before the decedent’s death, is
that of § 30-2485(a)(1). It bars claims not presented within 2
months after publication and mailing of notice to creditors of
the estate.
   The second statutory bar, which also applies only if the
claim arose before death, is that of § 30-2485(a)(2). It bars
claims not presented within 3 years after the decedent’s death
if proper notice to creditors has not been given.
   The third statutory bar, under § 30-2485(b), applies to
claims arising at or after the decedent’s death and bars claims
not presented within 4 months after the claim arose.
   The fourth statutory bar flows from § 30-2486(3). It bars
commencement of a proceeding to enforce a claim that has
been presented by filing a statement of claim with the probate
court, if the proceeding is commenced more than 60 days after
the personal representative mailed a notice of disallowance.
   The last statutory bar is set forth in § 30-2488(a). It applies
where a notice of disallowance is given by the personal
25
     Id., comment, 8 (part II) U.L.A. at 266.
26
     Unif. Probate Code § 3-803, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 271 (2013).
27
     Unif. Probate Code § 3-804, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 300-01 (2013). But see
     Lenners v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra note 23 (observing
     Nebraska rejected one of UPC’s methods for presentation of claim).
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                              SPARKS V. MACH
                              Cite as 314 Neb. 724

representative after a claim has been allowed and the claim-
ant fails to commence a proceeding against the personal rep-
resentative within 60 days after the mailing of the notice
of disallowance.
   Crucially, § 30-2485(c)(2) eliminates any potential appli-
cation of the first three of these five statutory bars. Section
30-2485(c) states: “Nothing in this section[, i.e., § 30-2485,]
affects or prevents: . . . (2) [t]o the limits of the insurance
protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the
decedent or the personal representative for which he or she is
protected by liability insurance.”
   Here, the parties agree in their supplemental briefs that
Sparks’ claim sought relief only as to liability insurance pro-
ceeds. Thus, § 30-2485(c)(2) renders inapplicable the potential
bars of § 30-2485(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b).
   We digress to observe that had Sparks alleged in her com-
plaint or amended complaint that she was seeking only to
establish liability of the decedent for which he was protected
by liability insurance, the supplemental briefing here would
have been eliminated or greatly simplified. Another decision
of the Court of Appeals noted that the lawsuit there failed to
allege that the claims being asserted were limited to recovery
of only liability insurance coverage, and it suggested in dicta
that that shortcoming would seem to be fatal. 28 Here, however,
the parties’ supplemental briefs both accept this exception from
the nonclaim statutes and agree that Sparks’ claim is limited to
the proceeds of the decedent’s liability insurance.
   Returning to our discussion of the statutory bars, Sparks
argues that the absence of a notice of disallowance of her
claim renders inapplicable the other two of these five statu-
tory bars. Section 30-2486(3) provides a bar for failure to
commence a proceeding within 60 days after the personal
representative has mailed a notice of disallowance when a
claim has been presented by filing a statement of claim with
28
     Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, supra note 5.
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the probate court. And § 30-2488(a) provides a comparable
bar for a claim disallowed after being first allowed, where the
claimant fails to commence a proceeding within 60 days after
mailing of the notice of disallowance. Here, it appears to be
undisputed that David has neither filed nor mailed a notice of
disallowance. Thus, there has been no triggering of the poten-
tial bars of § 30-2486(3) or § 30-2488(a)—the only remaining
possibilities under the NPC.
   This leaves only the regular statute of limitations as a pos-
sible bar.
             (c) 2-Month “Suspension” in § 30-2484
   We next consider the potential application and effect of the
2-month period referred to in § 30-2484, which Sparks relies
upon in her briefing. Section 30-2484 provides, in relevant
part, that the running of certain statutes of limitations is “sus-
pended” for a 2-month period as to claims not subject to the
statutory bars discussed above. It states:
      The running of any statute of limitations measured from
      some other event than death and advertisement for claims
      against a decedent is suspended during the two months
      following the decedent’s death but resumes thereafter as
      to claims not barred pursuant to the sections which fol-
      low[, i.e., § 30-2485(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b); § 30-2486(3);
      and § 30-2488(a)]. 29
This provision is modeled after a similar provision in the UPC,
which states that the running of such statutes of limitations is
suspended for a 4-month period. 30 Nebraska, however, adopted
a shorter period of 2 months.
   Turning to Sparks’ arguments, she first asserts that the
2-month period applies, because “[t]he running of the stat-
ute of limitations is measured as of the date of the accident
when [Sparks] incurred her injuries, and is not measured by
29
     § 30-2484.
30
     See Unif. Probate Code, supra note 24, § 3-802(b), 8 (part II) U.L.A. 266.
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the date of death of the decedent or advertisement for claims
against the decedent.” 31 Because we have determined that
Sparks’ action is not subject to the nonclaim statutes and that
the regular statute of limitations is the only applicable bar, we
agree that the 2-month period in § 30-2484 applies.
   Next, we consider the effect of the 2-month period. Sparks
argues that the regular statute of limitations “was tolled during
the two months following the decedent’s death and resumed
thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the subsequent
[NPC] statutes.” 32 Based on her interpretation of § 30-2484,
Sparks suggests that the statute of limitations ran 4 years and 2
months after the March 3, 2017, accident, on May 3, 2021. We
have previously articulated that concept. 33 But there, we did so
in dicta.
   In support of her argument, Sparks points to the comment to
the UPC section upon which § 30-2484 is modeled. It states, in
relevant part: “This section means that four months is added to
the normal period of limitations by reason of a debtor’s death
before a debt is barred.” 34
   One can envision a statute that merely precludes enforce-
ment of the statute of limitations for a specific period, but dur-
ing which the statute continues to run. Although neither party
contends that § 30-2484 is such a statute, we must consider
the possibility.
   Viewing the word “suspend” in isolation does not answer
the question. Dictionary definitions 35 contemporaneous with
the NPC’s adoption generally focus on a temporary period
of delay.
31
     Supplemental brief for appellant on petition for further review at 9.
32
     Id. (emphasis supplied).
33
     See Babbitt v. Hronik, supra note 8.
34
     Unif. Probate Code, supra note 24, comment, 8 (part II) U.L.A. at 266.
35
     See, e.g., Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English
     Language, Unabridged 1837 (2d ed. 1973); The American Heritage
     Dictionary of the English Language 1296 (1969); Black’s Law Dictionary
     1615-16 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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   [7-9] Here, in context, the meaning of the word “suspended”
becomes clear. It is preceded by the phrase “[t]he running of
any statute of limitations” and followed by the phrase “but
resumes thereafter,” which indicates that the running of the
statute of limitations stops at the decedent’s death and resumes
after the 2-month “suspen[sion].” 36 Absent anything to the con-
trary, statutory language is to be given its plain meaning, and
a court will not look beyond the statute or interpret it when
the meaning of its words is plain, direct, and unambiguous. 37
We hold that under § 30-2484, the running of any statute of
limitations, measured from some event other than the death
of and subsequent advertisement for claims against a decedent,
is suspended during the 2 months following the decedent’s
death but resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to
any applicable statute of limitations. Further, the 2-month sus-
pension in § 30-2484 means that by reason of a debtor’s death,
2 months is added to the normal period of limitations before a
debt is barred.
   [10] Our interpretation promotes uniformity in two ways.
First, several other states with comparable probate code stat-
utes have reached similar conclusions. 38 Second, our read-
ing of the statute does not differ from the UPC’s comment.
Thus, it is consistent with the idea that the NPC should be
liberally construed to make uniform the law among the var-
ious jurisdictions. 39
36
     § 30-2484 (emphasis supplied).
37
     Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, 300 Neb. 825, 916 N.W.2d 698 (2018).
38
     See, e.g., Hamilton v. Blackman, 915 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1996); Matter
     of Estate of Stirling, 537 N.W.2d 554 (N.D. 1995), disapproved on
     other grounds, Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 831 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 2013);
     Matter of Estate of Chase, 125 Ariz. 270, 609 P.2d 85 (Ariz. App. 1980);
     Howland v. Estate of Beardslee, No. 206796, 1999 WL 33438130 (Mich.
     App. July 30, 1999). See, also, Martel v. Stafford, 157 Vt. 604, 603 A.2d
     345 (1991) (discussing purpose of suspension period under UPC).
39
     See § 30-2202(a) and (b)(4).
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  Here, we conclude that with the 2-month extension of the
4-year limitations period by operation of § 30-2484, Sparks’
cause of action would have been time barred after May 3,
2021. Thus, the crux of this appeal is whether the actions taken
by Sparks before May 3 could “cure” the defect in the origi-
nal filing.

                    3. Filing Claim Before
                     Reopening of Estate
   In her first assignment of error, Sparks assigns that the
Court of Appeals erred in finding that the original complaint
was a legal nullity and that any potential error was not recti-
fied before the running of the statute of limitations. That said,
Sparks recognizes that prior Nebraska appellate court decisions
have rejected “claims” that were filed against closed estates.
David maintains that § 30-2404 bars Sparks’ action, because
the original complaint attempted to commence a proceeding
against a discharged special administrator.
   [11-14] Nebraska law is clear that the probate code does
not authorize a claimant to present a claim against the estate
by commencing an action against a former personal represent­
ative who has been discharged and whose appointment has
been terminated. 40 Under § 30-2404, which lies at the heart of
David’s nullity rationale, a claim against a decedent’s estate
cannot be commenced before the county court has appointed
a personal representative. 41 And under § 30-2486(2), an action
against a decedent’s estate is not commenced unless a claim-
ant files a lawsuit against the personal representative of the
estate. 42 We have previously stated that because a personal
representative is not a natural person, but an entity created by
statute through a court order of appointment, when an estate
40
     Mach v. Schmer, supra note 8.
41
     See Babbitt v. Hronik, supra note 8.
42
     Id.
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is closed and the personal representative discharged, there is
no viable entity or person to sue. 43
    But the Nebraska appellate courts have not previously artic-
ulated whether a “claim” filed against a discharged personal
representative can be remedied—after the reopening of the
estate and reappointment of the personal representative—by
filing an amended complaint within the statute of limitations.
The NPC is silent on this issue.
    In addressing David’s nullity argument, the Court of Appeals
primarily relied upon four cases. 44 Sparks contends that the
facts here are distinguishable. More specifically, Sparks argues
that the Court of Appeals’ decision “creates an unwarranted,
incurable error, while simultaneously suggesting that the error
is curable but not successfully cured in the particular case.” 45
Based on his nullity argument, David maintains that the only
way for Sparks to “cure” the defect was to timely file a sepa-
rate action after the estate was reopened and the special admin-
istrator was reappointed.
    To determine whether Sparks’ situation is distinguishable,
we revisit the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals.
    In two of the cases, Mach v. Schmer 46 and Estate of Hansen
v. Bergmeier, 47 the deceased tortfeasor’s estate was never
reopened and the personal representative was never reap-
pointed. In those cases, the Court of Appeals essentially rea-
soned that because the estate remained closed throughout the
litigation, there was no legal entity to sue. Additionally, in
Estate of Hansen, the court reasoned that the statute of limita-
tions had run. Thus, summary judgment in the former personal
representatives’ favor was appropriate.
43
     Correa v. Estate of Hascall, supra note 7.
44
     See, id.; Babbitt v. Hronik, supra note 8; Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier,
     supra note 5; Mach v. Schmer, supra note 8.
45
     Brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 3.
46
     Mach v. Schmer, supra note 8.
47
     Estate of Hansen v. Bergmeier, supra note 5.
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                               SPARKS V. MACH
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   Here, Sparks successfully moved to reopen the estate and
reappoint the special administrator within the statute of limita-
tions. To that extent, we agree that her case is distinguishable
from Schmer and Estate of Hansen.
   The other two cases, Babbitt v. Hronik 48 and Correa v.
Estate of Hascall, 49 are more similar to Sparks’ situation. In
those cases, the estate was reopened and the personal repre-
sentative was appointed (or reappointed) during the litigation.
Nonetheless, the actions failed due to other defects.
   In Babbitt, the plaintiff sued a decedent individually and
apparently learned after filing the complaint that the decedent
had died. 50 The plaintiff later served the reappointed personal
representative the complaint, which still named only the dece-
dent individually as the defendant. We stated: “Although the
personal representative was reappointed, we conclude that an
action against [the decedent’s] estate was never commenced
because the only petition filed by [the plaintiff] was against
[the decedent] individually and not against the personal rep-
resentative. The action brought against [the decedent] indi-
vidually was a nullity.” 51 We further noted that by the time the
plaintiff requested the reappointment of the personal represent­
ative, her claim was time barred by more than a month under
§§ 25-207 and 30-2484.
   Here, Sparks did not sue the decedent individually. Each
iteration of Sparks’ complaint named David in his capacity as
special administrator of Mach’s estate. Additionally, Sparks
requested the reappointment of the special administrator prior
to the running of the statute of limitations. Thus, we agree that
the facts here are distinguishable from Babbitt.
   In Correa, the plaintiff sued the former personal repre-
sentative and then apparently learned that the estate was
48
     Babbitt v. Hronik, supra note 8.
49
     Correa v. Estate of Hascall, supra note 7.
50
     Babbitt v. Hronik, supra note 8.
51
     Id. at 514, 623 N.W.2d at 702.
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previously closed. 52 Citing Estate of Hansen, we explained that
“[the plaintiff] failed to properly bring suit against the estate
or the personal representative, because the estate had been
closed and the personal representative had been discharged.” 53
We continued: “No doubt understanding her legal position,
[the plaintiff] filed an emergency motion to reopen the estate
and assign a special administrator for purposes of service,
which was granted. The newly appointed special administra-
tor was served with the complaint on June 28, 2013.” 54 We
then stated:
        But this was insufficient to save [the plaintiff’s] suit.
     Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-217 (Reissue 2008), “[a]n
     action is commenced on the date the complaint is filed
     with the court,” but “shall stand dismissed without preju-
     dice as to any defendant not served within six months
     from the date the complaint was filed.” In this case,
     [the plaintiff’s] suit was not served on the new special
     administrator within 6 months, or by March 14, 2013,
     and thus it stood dismissed without prejudice. The dis-
     trict court lacked jurisdiction over [the plaintiff’s] sub-
     sequent motions, and this court lacks jurisdiction over
     [the] appeal. 55
Relevant to this appeal, we further noted that any “claim”
against the estate in that case was untimely.
   We again agree that Sparks’ case is distinguishable. Unlike
the plaintiff in Correa, Sparks served the reappointed special
administrator within 6 months of filing her “claim.” To the
extent that the original summons (issued before reappointment)
was a nullity, the second summons—issued and served after
reappointment—did not share that defect. Thus, the action was
not dismissed by operation of law under § 25-217.
52
     Correa v. Estate of Hascall, supra note 7.
53
     Id. at 666, 850 N.W.2d at 774.
54
     Id. at 667, 850 N.W.2d at 774.
55
     Id. at 667, 850 N.W.2d at 774-75.
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   Because the fatal defects in the prior cases are not present
here, we reject David’s nullity rationale. We certainly agree
that Sparks’ February 24, 2021, complaint was not effec-
tive and, in that sense, was a nullity. But we must determine
whether Sparks’ attempts to remedy the situation amounted
to the valid commencement of an action within the statute
of limitations.
   We determined above that the applicable limitations period
ran 4 years and 2 months after the date of the March 3, 2017,
accident—in other words, on May 3, 2021. This is significant.
   [15] Upon our review of the record, the estate was reopened
and the special administrator was reappointed before May 3,
2021. Likewise, Sparks subsequently filed the first amended
complaint and served a summons before May 3. We hold that
an otherwise valid amended complaint, filed after a complaint
filed prematurely under § 30-2404 but after the appointment
or reappointment of a personal representative, is sufficient to
commence a proceeding within the meaning of § 30-2486(2).
Therefore, Sparks’ amended complaint validly commenced a
proceeding against the newly reappointed special administrator
under § 30-2486(2).
   It may be that the amended complaint would more properly
have been considered a supplemental pleading under Neb.
Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1115(d), which requires leave granted upon
motion. 56 Sparks’ amended complaint added the events of
reopening and reappointment, which had not occurred at the
time of her original complaint. The commentators discuss
the confusion between an amended complaint and a supple-
mental pleading, noting that prejudice to an opposing party is
doubtful and observing that the distinction is sometimes com-
pletely ignored. 57
56
     See John P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure, § 15:15 (2023).
57
     See, id.; 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
     § 1504 (2010).
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  The only question remaining is whether the relation-back
doctrine applied to Sparks’ second amended complaint, which
she filed after May 3, 2021.

                        4. Relation Back
    Sparks assigns that the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that the amended complaint did not relate back to the origi-
nal complaint. Reading her assignment literally, we disagree.
Our rationale above depends upon timely commencement by
the first amended complaint. Because we have determined that
the first amended complaint was timely, it is not necessary that
it relate back to the original complaint.
    [16] But there is also a question regarding the effect of her
second amended complaint, which was filed after the extended
statute of limitations. Under certain situations as set forth in
§ 25-201.02, an amended complaint may relate back to the
commencement date of an earlier complaint. 58
    Here, the Court of Appeals observed that Sparks was
“generally correct” that her pleadings met the requirements
under § 25-201.02. 59 But it ultimately concluded, based on
David’s nullity argument, that the relation-back doctrine did
not apply. Had Sparks not remedied the situation within the
statute of limitations, we would agree with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion.
    On these facts, we have determined that Sparks validly
commenced a proceeding upon filing the first amended
complaint within the statute of limitations. Sparks’ second
amended complaint met the requirements for relation back
under § 25-201.02. Accordingly, we conclude that Sparks’
second amended complaint relates back to the date of the first
amended complaint.
58
     Correa v. Estate of Hascall, supra note 7.
59
     Sparks v. Mach, supra note 1, 31 Neb. App. at 470, 982 N.W.2d at 841.
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                       VI. CONCLUSION
   We conclude that Sparks’ first amended complaint, which
she filed after the decedent’s estate was reopened and the
special administrator was reappointed, validly commenced a
proceeding within the applicable limitations period. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Sparks’ actions
to cure the defect in filing took place after the statute of limita-
tions had run. Finally, because the Court of Appeals’ discussion
of Sparks’ relation-back argument was premised solely upon
its determination that Sparks’ action was a nullity, it was also
incorrect. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand the cause to that court with directions to reverse the
judgment of the district court and remand the cause to that
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                 Reversed and remanded with directions.