Court Opinion

ID: 9910686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-17 23:11:38.069075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:49.560272
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                      CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                      E-filed: Dec 16 2023 12:26PM
                                                      Clerk Review: Dec 16 2023 12:27PM
                                                      Filing ID: 71640409
                                                      Case No.: 2023-SCC-0003-CIV
                                                      NoraV Borja

                         IN THE
                  Supreme Court
                         OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

      IN RE THE ESTATE OF BERNADITA A. MANGLONA,
                        Deceased.

         Supreme Court No. 2023-SCC-0003-CIV

                     SLIP OPINION

                   Cite as: 2023 MP 13

                Decided December 16, 2023

       JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE MARIA TERESA B. CENZON
           JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE ELYZE M. IRIARTE
        JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE BENJAMIN C. SISON, JR.

         Superior Court Civil Action No. 13-0195-CV
           Judge Pro Tempore David A. Wiseman
                      In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

PER CURIAM:
¶1      Appellants, the Co-Trustees for the PB Manglona Family Trust
 (“Appellants”), appeal the order of the underlying Probate Court finding that the
 doctrine of res judicata precluded Appellants from raising a survivorship claim
 over three parcels of real property located in Rota. Appellees, the Co-
 Administrators of the Estate of Bernadita A. Manglona (“Appellees”), contend
 that because the survivorship claim was not raised in a quiet title action between
 these same parties, and which was reduced to a final judgment, the subsequent
 assertion of the claim in Probate Court should be barred.
¶2     For the reasons set forth herein, we AFFIRM the Probate Court’s Order
 Granting Co-Administrators’ Motion for Reconsideration. Further, we G RANT
 Appellees’ Request for Judicial Notice.
                     I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            A. General Background.
¶3      This appeal is the latest in the extensive and contentious litigation
 surrounding the estate of Bernadita A. Manglona (“Bernadita”) who died
 intestate on May 30, 2009. Probate of Bernadita’s estate did not commence until
 approximately four years later in 2013, when Thomas A. Manglona and Priscilla
 M. Torres were appointed co-administrators of Bernadita’s estate.
¶4     Bernadita was married to Prudencio T. Manglona (“PTM”), who passed
 away on or about June 3, 2014.
¶5      The present dispute involves three pieces of real property located in Rota:
 (1) Lot No. 3496; (2) Lot No. 551 R01; and (3) Lot No. 3144 (TD 397)
 (collectively the “Rota Properties”), that have yet to be distributed.
¶6       The Rota Properties initially passed to PTM after Bernadita died. Prior to
 PTM’s passing, he conveyed the Rota Properties, among other assets, into his
 trust, the PB Manglona Family Trust (hereinafter the “PTM Trust”).
    B.     Probate of the Estate of Bernadita A. Manglona (Case No. 13-0195).
¶7      Most of the assets in Bernadita’s Estate were distributed via the probate
 proceedings that commenced in 2013 (the “Probate Case”). These other assets
 are irrelevant to the present issue before this Court.
¶8      As to the Rota Properties, the underlying Probate Court determined on
 March 3, 2015, that, as to ownership, Bernadita’s Estate retained a 50% interest
 in the Rota Properties, with the other 50% retained by the PTM Trust. Appellee’s
 Appx. 058-059.
¶9      However, in the same order, the Court suggested that the Appellants file a
 quiet title action to “further resolve” the dispute as to whether the Rota Properties
 constituted ancestral or marital property, and “to determine this issue or to settle
 the dispute amongst the heirs.” Id. at 059.
                       In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

               C.      The 2015 Quiet Title Case (Case No. 15-0082).
¶ 10    On March 9, 2015, Appellants initiated a quiet title action relative to the
  Rota Properties in the case of Co-trustees for PB Manglona Family Trust v. Co-
  administrators of the Estate of Bernadita A. Manglona, Civ. No. 15-0082 (NMI
  Super. Ct.) (hereinafter the “Quiet Title Case”). Appellants contend that they
  were directed to file the quiet title action by the Probate Court.
¶ 11     In the initial nine-paragraph Complaint,1 Appellants sought to have the
  Rota Properties declared to be ancestral properties, thus giving the PTM Trust
  full ownership over the Rota Properties. Appellants sought no other relief.
¶ 12     Appellees then filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted
  in part on a technical issue. As a result, Appellants filed an Amended Verified
  Complaint to Quiet Title in which one (1) count was set forth, seeking, again, to
  quiet title to the Rota Properties on the grounds that they constituted ancestral
  property.
¶ 13     Appellants then filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied
  by the Superior Court. A second motion for summary judgment was then filed
  by Appellants, which was also denied. No arguments relative to a survivorship
  interest were raised in these motions.
¶ 14    The matter proceeded to a bench trial on March 2, 2017, wherein the Court
  determined that the Rota Properties were marital property and not ancestral lands
  pursuant to 8 CMC § 2902.
¶ 15   Appellants appealed the decision, but the appeal was dismissed by the
  NMI Supreme Court in Co-Trustees For PB Manglona Family Trust v. Co-
  Administrators of Estate of Bernadita A. Manglona, 2018 MP 3.
¶ 16     In the record before this Court, there is no indication that Appellants ever
  raised the issue, or presented an argument, that the Rota Properties should pass
  through a survivorship interest in the Quiet Title Case.
          D.      Post-Quiet Title Case Probate of the Estate of Bernadita.
¶ 17     With the issue of the characterization of the Rota Properties now resolved
  in the Quiet Title Case, the theater of the dispute returned to the probate of
  Bernadita’s estate in probate court. By December 2017, the Rota Properties were
  ready for distribution.
¶ 18    Appellants objected to the distribution of 50% of the Rota Properties,
  arguing, for the first time, that by virtue of being the surviving spouse of
  Bernadita, PTM inherited a one-half interest in all of her properties. As a result,
  they argued, the PTM Trust itself, standing in PTM’s shoes, owned 75% of the
  Rota Properties with Bernadita’s Estate owning the remaining 25%.

1
    The initial Complaint filed on March 9, 2015 was PB Manglona Family Trust v. In re
    the Estate of Bernadita A. Manglona, et al., Case No. 15-0043-CV.
                        In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

¶ 19     Appellants calculate the 75% interest by adding the 50% interest of PTM
  to the 50% survivorship interest they claim of the 50% owned by Bernadita’s
  Estate.
¶ 20     On December 14, 2018, Appellants again objected to the distribution of
  one-half of the Rota Properties, reiterating their claim to a 75% interest in the
  Rota Properties based on PTM’s survivorship interest. Appellants contended that
  neither the passage of time nor waiver could bar their request for a survivorship
  interest. This argument was raised again in Appellants’ December 27, 2018,
  objections. In response, Appellees argued that the doctrine of res judicata barred
  the survivorship claim because it was never raised in the Quiet Title Case.
¶ 21     In its August 1, 2022 Opinion, the Probate Court initially determined that
  res judicata did not preclude Appellants from raising their survivorship claim.2
  The Court reasoned that this was because the survivorship claim was “in essence
  a probate issue” that would “not neatly fit into the adversarial quiet title action.”
  Further, the Court reasoned that the survivorship issue “did not form a singular
  transaction,” such that Appellants were not re-litigating the same claim.
¶ 22      Appellees filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Probate
  Court erred in determining that res judicata did not preclude Appellants’
  survivorship claims. Appellee’s Appx. At 086. Upon further consideration, the
  Probate Court reversed its decision and found that the doctrine of res judicata did
  in fact preclude Appellants’ claims of a survivorship interest. It concluded that
  in initially finding that the issue of survivorship was not relevant in the Quiet
  Title Case, the Court erred, and that the issue should have been raised. Appellee’s
  Appx. at 096.
¶ 23     Appellants then filed the instant appeal.
                               II. JURISDICTION
¶ 24     This Court has jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of the
  Commonwealth Superior Court. NMI Const. art IV § 3. This Court’s jurisdiction
  is undisputed.

2
    Appellant and Appellee failed to include a copy of the Opinion in any of their
    submissions. Appellant failed to file an Appendix to the briefs as mandated under Rule
    30 of the Supreme Court Rules. As a result, portions of the record to which the
    Appellant referred were not included for the Court’s review. Consequently, pursuant to
    Rule 30(f), the Court has proceeded with the appendix filed by Appellee and takes
    judicial notice of other portions of the record not submitted by Appellant. See, Judicial
    Notice, supra.
                         In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

                            III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 25   Res judicata is an issue of law and is reviewed de novo. Piteg v. Piteg,
  2000 MP 3 ¶ I (internal citations omitted).3
                                  IV. DISCUSSION
              A.     The Purposes of Quiet Title Actions and Probate.
¶ 26     At the heart of this case is the issue of whether Appellants should have
  raised arguments regarding their claim of a survivorship interest in the Quite Title
  Case. Therefore, to begin, it is important to differentiate between quiet title
  actions and probate, and to examine the purposes, functions, and limitations of
  each.
¶ 27      CNMI courts have recognized a quiet title action as:
          [A] proceeding to establish the plaintiff’s title to land by bringing
          into court an adverse claimant and there compelling [the adverse
          claimant] either to establish his [or her] claim or be forever after
          estopped from asserting it.
          Songao v. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 4
          NMI 186, 4 n. 15 (1994).4

¶ 28     Further, an action to quiet title “lies against those who, at the time it is
  instituted, are the present claimants to the land under the instrument which
  creates the cloud.” Fusco v. Matsumoto, 2011 MP 17 ¶ 21. Its purpose is to
  determine “the rights and interest in land as between plaintiffs and defendants.”
  Holcomb v. Morris, 457 So. 2d. 973, 976 (1984); see also Sommer v. Misty
  Valley, LLC, 511 P.3d 833, 840 (Id. 2021) (“The cause of action for quiet title
  accrues where another person claims an interest in property ‘adverse to’
  another.”).
¶ 29       By contrast, probate “identifies heirs and distributes what interest the
  decedent had in the property but does not determine ownership in cases where
  title is contested.” Del Rosario v. Camacho, 2001 MP 3 ¶ 51. Additionally, while
  a decree of distribution is “conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or
  devisees insofar as they claim in such capacities, the decree does not determine
  the validity of the deceased’s interest in the property; it merely determines the
  succession or testamentary disposition of such title as the decedent may have
  had.” Id.
¶ 30     Issues of survivorship are appropriately raised in quiet title actions. Quiet
  title actions routinely resolve matters involving rights of survivorship and

3
    This case has no page numbers or paragraph numbers from which to cite. “¶ I” therefore
    references the first paragraph raised in the issue section of the opinion.
4
    This case does not have page or paragraph numbers. The page citation therefore refers
    to the page of the PDF on cnmilaw.org.
                        In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

    disputes as to ownership of real property. For example, In re Estate of Rios, 2008
    MP 5 ¶ 5, was a case in which a probate matter was reopened and proceeded
    concurrently with a quiet title action over ownership interests in certain real
    property belonging to the estate. Other jurisdictions follow a similar practice. See
    Cahill v. United States, 810 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. 2018); Isom v. Bledsoe, 488 So. 2d.
    1356 (1986) (rev’d on other grounds); Hruby v. Wayman, 298 N.W. 639 (Iowa
    1941); Lynch v. Frost, 727 P.2d 698 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
                                  B.     Res Judicata.
¶ 31     Res judicata refers to two concepts related to preclusion. Issue preclusion,
  also referred to as collateral estoppel, “refers to the effect of a judgment in
  foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been already litigated and decided.”
  Del Rosario, 2001 MP 3 ¶ 62. Claim preclusion “refers to the effect of a judgment
  in foreclosing litigation of a matter that has not been litigated, because it should
  have been raised in an earlier suit.” Id. (citing Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F.
  Supp. 2d 725, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1999)). The present case involves the latter
  concept.
¶ 32      Where a “valid and final judgment is rendered on a claim, res judicata will
  bar subsequent litigation on the original claim.” In re Estate of Camacho, 4 NMI
  22, 4 (1993).5 The res judicata effect of a prior judgment depends on the scope
  of the prior cause of action or claim. Id. Res judicata will not only bar matters
  which were previously litigated, but also those matters which should have been
  litigated. Id.; see also Piteg, 2000 MP 3 ¶ 10.
¶ 33    The process of determining the claim or cause of action that may be subject
  to preclusion is “thus aimed at defining the matters that both might
  and should have been advanced in the first litigation.” Santos v. Santos, 3 NMI
  39, 49 (1992). Under res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits of an action
  precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could
  have been raised in that action.” Id. (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101
  (1980)).
¶ 34      The Santos Court summarized the doctrine of res judicata as the following:
          The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has
          entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the
          parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound “not only
          as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
          defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
          which might have been offered for that purpose.” Cromwell v.
          County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). The judgment puts an end
          to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into

5
     This case does not have page or paragraph numbers. The page citation therefore refers
     to the page of the PDF on cnmilaw.org.
                       In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

         litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent
         fraud or some other factor invalidating the judgment.
         Santos, 3 NMI at 48-49 (quoting Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
         U.S. 591, 597 (1948)).

¶ 35     Our Courts have adopted the “transactional analysis” approach in
  determining how a “claim” is defined in the context of res judicata. Taman v.
  Marianas Public Land Corp., 4 NMI 287, 4 (1995).6 Under this framework, “a
  plaintiff’s claim will be barred where it is included in ‘all rights of the plaintiff
  to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction,
  or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.’” Id. (quoting
  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 4). A “transaction” connotes a “natural
  grouping or common nucleus of operative facts.” Id.
¶ 36      Thus, “‘[a]ll claims arising out of one transaction or factual situation are
  treated as being part of a single cause of action, and they are required to be
  litigated together.’” Id. (quoting Brye v. Brakebush, 32 F.3d 1179, 1183 (7th Cir.
  1994)). Claims arising out of the same factual situation or transaction are
  considered the same. Id. at 4.
¶ 37     When determining whether issues in two cases constitute the same
  “transaction,” we adopt a “pragmatic approach” by considering “whether the
  facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether they form a
  convenient trial unit.” Etherton v. Serv. First Logistics, Inc., 807 Fed. Appx. 469,
  471 (6th Cir. 2020).
¶ 38    Res judicata “‘relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple
  lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions,
  encourage reliance on adjudication.’” Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
  Islands v. Cabrera, 1999 MP 2 ¶15 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94
  (1980)). “Individuals are entitled to their day in court, but they are not entitled to
  have several tries in court on their claim.” Id. (citing Sablan v. Iginoef, 1 NMI
  190 (1990)).
¶ 39    Res judicata “applies with special force to quiet title actions.” Roselle v.
  Heirs & Devisees of Grover, 789 P.2d 526, 529 (Id. Ct. App. 1990). Further:
         The parties in a quiet title action rightfully expect conflicting
         claims of ownership to be resolved. The very purpose of a quiet
         title action is to establish the security of title. Nothing could more
         profoundly disturb the security of title than for two judges, in
         separate actions involving the same parties, to enter contradictory
         decrees purporting to “quiet” title in the same property.
         Id.

6
    This case does not have page or paragraph numbers. The page citation therefore refers
    to the page of the PDF on cnmilaw.org.
                       In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

¶ 40     Here, the Parties’ dispute is over their respective ownership interests in the
  Rota Properties. Because this is a dispute over ownership interests, the Quiet
  Title Case was the appropriate forum for the Parties to bring forth their claims to
  the Rota Properties and to resolve the issues surrounding their “rights and
  interests” fully and finally. Indeed, the very purpose of a quiet title action is to
  determine a party’s “rights and interests” in real property over those of an adverse
  party. Holcomb, 457 So. 2d. at 976. Probate, by contrast, does not determine
  ownership and is limited to identifying heirs and distributing property. Del
  Rosario, 2001 MP 3 ¶ 51.
¶ 41     Appellants, who were the plaintiffs in the Quiet Title Case, chose to focus
  the issue in that case narrowly on whether the Rota Properties constituted
  ancestral or marital land in both their initial and amended complaints. As the
  plaintiffs, Appellants had every opportunity to raise any and all arguments,
  claims, or causes of action relative to the Rota Properties, but did not to do so.
  Appellants also filed two motions for summary judgment which similarly limited
  the issues to those raised in the complaint and did not address any purported
  survivorship interest.
¶ 42      Our jurisprudence has explicitly recognized the importance of finality in
  actions to quiet title. As the Songao Court noted, the failure by an adverse party
  to assert a claim in a quiet title action would “forever” estop the party from later
  asserting it. Songao, 4 NMI at 4 n. 15. Inherent in this notion is the requirement
  that any and all claims relative to a property be raised in a quiet title action so
  that a final and binding decision can be made.
¶ 43     The issue of the survivorship interest arose from the same common
  nucleus of operative facts as those alleged in the Quiet Title Case, namely the
  death of Bernadita and the distribution of, and interests in, the Rota Properties.
  The same material facts apply in the determination of whether the Rota Properties
  constituted marital or ancestral land, as they do to the issue of the survivorship
  interest. The issue of the survivorship interest was also part of the series of
  transactions from which the cause of action arose. This is because the
  survivorship interest was directly related to the characterization of the Rota
  Properties as marital land. It necessarily follows that if the Rota Properties were
  not ancestral land, a claim for a survivorship interest could apply. This possibility
  was known, or should have been known, to the parties at the outset of the Quiet
  Title Case.
¶ 44     The parties in the Quiet Title Case were the same as the disputing parties
  in the Probate Case. The Quiet Title Case was fully litigated with opportunities
  to raise multiple claims and theories, discovery was completed, and extensive
  motions were filed. The matter was also litigated to a full and final judgment in
  which it was found that the Rota Properties constituted marital land. The
  preclusive effect of res judicata would therefore apply to all matters that were,
  and should have, been brought in the Quiet Title Case.
                      In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

¶ 45      Additionally, the transactional approach encompasses not just a
  “transaction,” but also “all or any part” of the transaction or “series of connected
  transactions.” Taman, 4. NMI at 4. The survivorship claim is directly connected
  to the issue of ownership, as well as to the characterization of the Rota Properties
  as marital. The facts underlying both the marital or ancestral property issue, as
  well as that of the survivorship claim were the same, involved the same
  properties, the same parties, the same interests, and can and should have been
  addressed together. They overall created a “convenient trial unit” in which all
  issues surrounding the Rota Properties could, and should, have been addressed at
  once to achieve a final resolution to all ownership issues.
¶ 46     Estate of Hanson involved facts similar to the present case. 126 Cal. App.
  2d 71 (1954). In Hanson, a surviving spouse originally brought his claim against
  his late wife’s estate in a quiet title action to determine whether an ownership
  interest in certain real property vested in him. After the surviving spouse’s death,
  a probate matter was commenced to determine how his estate should be
  distributed. Among the heirs bringing a claim were heirs of the late wife,
  claiming that by virtue of certain portions of the estate constituting community
  property, they were entitled to a distribution under California’s probate code. Id.
  at 72.
¶ 47     The California Court of Appeals found that res judicata applied to bar the
  claim of the wife’s heirs. Because the heirs of the late wife were represented in
  the original quiet title action by virtue of the estate’s administratrix’s
  participation in the quiet title action, the Court concluded that the quiet title
  decree “is res judicata against those were heirs of the wife…that that decree is
  binding against [the wife’s] estate and heirs and constitutes as against such heirs
  a conclusive determination that the two pieces of property were the separate
  property of [the husband].” Id. at 76.
¶ 48      The Argus case cited by the underlying Court is also persuasive and
  illustrative of how res judicata applies in a context similar to the present case.
  Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604 (Colo. 2005).
  Argus involved two separate suits relating to claimed ownership interests in
  certain real property in Colorado. Among the issues in the first suit was whether
  a particular provision of a contract between the parties was enforceable regarding
  the land in dispute. The first Argus court found that the provision was void as
  violating the rule against perpetuities and was therefore unenforceable. Id. at 606-
  07. As a result, a second suit was filed in which new claims were raised seeking,
  among other relief, reformation of the contract, pursuant to statute, because the
  rule against perpetuities rendered its provisions void. Id.
¶ 49     The Colorado Supreme Court held that res judicata barred the petitioner’s
  claim. Id. at 606-07. The Court reasoned that res judicata applied because the
  issue in the second case involved the same parcel of land, with the same
  agreement at issue, the same parties (through a successor-in-interest), and that
  the prior quiet title action resolved the matter with a final judgment. Id. at 608.
                       In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

 The very nature of a quiet title action made it “incumbent upon all parties to raise
 any claims, issues or defenses that may affect the court’s adjudication of rights
 in the subject property as all rights are to be determined in a single action.” Id.
 The theory of reformation of the contract was also an “alternative theory” that
 should have been asserted in the first action. Id. at 609. The Court summarized
 its holding as follows:
        Because [the parties] sought quiet title in Argus I, it was
        incumbent upon each party to raise any claims, issues and
        defenses it may have had that would affect the adjudication of
        rights in the parcel. As such, not only could Britton have raised its
        statutory reformation claim as affecting its rights in the parcel, but
        Britton should have raised the claim because the claim directly
        involved the adjudication of its rights in the parcel as part of the
        quiet title claim.
        Id.

¶ 50     The same reasoning in both Hanson and Argus applies to the present
  action. Where Appellants, as plaintiffs, filed a quiet title action, it was incumbent
  upon them to raise any and all claims, even as alternative theories, that would
  have affected the adjudication of rights in the Rota Properties. The survivorship
  claim, as a claim of ownership over the Rota Properties, was a claim that should
  have been raised in the Quiet Title Case because it directly affected the ownership
  rights of the parties to that action.
¶ 51      Other jurisdictions have ruled similarly on the preclusive effect a final
  judgment in a quiet title action has over subsequent actions involving claims that
  were, or should have been, raised in the quiet title action. See Harrison v. Loyd,
  87 Ark. App. 356, 367-68 (2004) (The Arkansas Appellate Court determined res
  judicata barred the appellant’s quiet title claim because he was a statutory heir to
  his father who had previously litigated the case decades earlier.); Bissell v.
  College Dev. Co., 87 Ark. App. 356, 367-68 (2004) (Res judicata barred the
  appellant’s quiet title claim because he was a statutory heir to his father who had
  previously litigated the case decades earlier.); Remilliard v. Authier, 20 S.D. 290
  (1905) (“Whenever, in an action for possession of realty, the question of title is
  put in issue by the pleadings, the judgment prima facie constitutes an estoppel to
  the assertion of any title which exists in the losing party at the time of the former
  suit.”).
¶ 52     The fact that the Probate Court directed the parties to litigate the dispute
  over their rights and interests in the Rota Properties in a separate quiet title action
  is also indicative that the Quiet Title Case was intended to be a full and final
  resolution to all issues surrounding ownership of the Rota Properties.
¶ 53    Finally, raising the issue of ownership of the Rota Properties in the Probate
  Case was inappropriate because probate courts “[do] not determine ownership in
  cases where title is contested.” Del Rosario, 2001 MP 3 ¶ 51. Appellants concede
                      In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

 in their briefs that their survivorship claim is a claim of ownership in the Rota
 Properties. See Appellants’ Reply Br. at 5 (“Trust, which is privy to PTM in this
 matter is not barred from asserting its survivorship ownership of an additional
 25% interest in the disputed properties.”) (Emphasis added).
¶ 54    Thus, by virtue of the issue of a survivorship interest being fundamentally
  a question of ownership, a quiet title action was the appropriate forum to raise
  such a claim so that any and all issues surrounding the ownership of the Rota
  Properties could be addressed at once.
                      i. Ripeness of the Survivorship Claim.
¶ 55    Appellants contend that the issue of survivorship was not, and could not
  have been, raised in the Quiet Title Case because it was not ripe. They argue that
  the ownership issue of the Rota Properties had to be resolved first before the
  survivorship claim could be raised.
¶ 56     A claim is not ripe for adjudication “if it rests upon contingent future
  events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Marine
  Revitalization Corp. v. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 2011 MP 2 ¶ 8. The
  doctrine of res judicata applies to claims that were “ripe at the time of the prior
  judgment.” Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863, 866 (9th
  Cir. 1995).
¶ 57    It is undisputed that the survivorship claim vested immediately upon
  Bernadita’s death. Appellants’ Br. at 6-7; Appellants’ Reply Br. at 3-4 (“PTM’s
  survivorship rights…were perfected on the date of [Bernadita’s] death in May of
  2009”).
¶ 58     Appellants filed the Quiet Title Case to resolve the dispute over ownership
  of the Rota Properties, and, specifically, whether they constituted ancestral or
  marital properties. Because the survivorship interest, which is a type of
  ownership interest, vested immediately upon the death of Bernadita, the issue of
  the applicability of a survivorship interest was ripe for adjudication at the time
  of the Quiet Title Case’s filing. The issue had been ripe, and the purported
  survivorship interest vested, from the time of Bernadita’s death. As a result, when
  the Quiet Title Case was filed to resolve the question of ownership of the Rota
  Properties, it was an appropriate issue that could have, and should have, been
  raised.
¶ 59     Nothing prevented Appellants from, at minimum, raising the survivorship
  interest as an alternative theory of relief. Rule 8(a)(3) of the CNMI Rules of Civil
  Procedure explicitly allows for alternative types of relief to be included in the
  demand for relief sought. Because the survivorship interested vested immediately
  upon death, an alternative theory involving Appellants’ survivorship interest was
  ripe at the time the Quiet Title Case was filed but was not raised.
¶ 60     Nor was the bringing of a survivorship claim contingent upon the finding
  that the Rota Properties were marital property. Such a piecemeal approach to
                       In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

 litigation is disfavored and goes against the very purposes of the res judicata
 doctrine, which are to promote judicial efficiency and prevent the filing of
 multiple lawsuits. See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1225 (1998).
¶ 61      The doctrine of res judicata encompasses not just claims that were brought,
  but also those that “could have been raised in that action.” Santos, 3 NMI at 48-
  49. Parties and their privies are bound not just as to every matter which was
  “offered and received,” but also to “any other admissible matter which might
  have been offered for that purpose.” Id. Evidence that the survivorship interest
  applied and had vested was readily available to Appellants and ripe at the time
  of filing of the Quiet Title Case, but was never brought forth. The finality of the
  judgment of the Quiet Title Case therefore should not be upset as a result.
                       ii. The Onus to Raise Legal Claims.
¶ 62    Appellants further argue that the survivorship interest cannot be
  extinguished by court order or otherwise. They allege that the “plain meaning”
  of 8 CMC § 2913 evidences the Legislature’s intent that as long as a surviving
  spouse outlives the decedent by 120 hours, the mere failure to recognize the
  survivorship interest does not somehow waive or negate this right.
¶ 63     In applying res judicata to bar the survivorship interest claim, a court
  would not be “extinguishing” any right to which a party is entitled. Rather, the
  doctrine of res judicata mandates that a party raise arguments that would affect
  the adjudication of its rights or be forever barred from raising them again.
  Songao, 4 NMI at 4 n. 15. It is therefore incumbent upon the respective parties
  to raise appropriate theories or claims at the appropriate time and venue, or risk
  being precluded from raising them in the future.
¶ 64     Argus again is illustrative on this point. In Argus, the petitioner argued that
  in light of the first court’s finding that the petitioner’s interest in certain real
  property was void as violative of the rule against perpetuities, § 15-11-1106(2)
  of the Colorado Probate Code mandated a reformation of a contract pertaining to
  real property. Argus, 109 P.3d at 609. However, the Colorado Supreme Court
  held that this issue could not be raised as it was barred by res judicata since it
  was an alternative theory that could have, and should have, been raised in the
  previous action. Id.
¶ 65     The Colorado Supreme Court’s holding applied despite the existence of
  statutory authority that would have led to a different result had it been raised at
  the appropriate time and forum. This is no different than the present case.
  Though Appellants correctly cite to authority that would likely establish a
  survivorship interest that vested immediately upon Bernadita’s death, it was
  never raised until after the Quiet Title Case had already reached a final judgment.
  As in Argus, the fact that statutory authority exists conferring a right to a party
  does not absolve that party of the responsibility to appropriately raise their claim
  or be barred from doing so by the res judicata doctrine.
                      In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

¶ 66     To find otherwise would undercut the very purpose of the res judicata
  doctrine and open the door to unnecessary and excessive litigation as parties raise
  new issues and arguments subsequent to the finality of previous judgments.
¶ 67     Further, the notion that a right applies automatically without a party having
  to even raise it undermines the very purpose of a quiet title action, especially
  when, as admitted by Appellant’s counsel during oral argument, that parties
  “knew” of the survivorship issue when the Quiet Title Case was first filed. The
  purpose of a quiet title action is to determine “the rights and interest in land as
  between plaintiffs and defendants.” Holcomb v. Morris, 457 So. 2d. 973, 976
  (1984); see also Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC, 511 P.3d 833, 840 (Id. 2021)
  (“The cause of action for quiet title accrues where another person claims an
  interest in property ‘adverse to’ another.”).
¶ 68     If a party was not required to claim an interest in property due to it simply
  being automatic by virtue of a statute or some other law, the rights and interests
  in that land could not be fully and finally resolved. As the Songao court noted,
  in a quiet title action, the adverse claimant must establish their claim or be
  “forever estopped from asserting it.” Songao v. Commonwealth of the Northern
  Mariana Islands, 4 NMI 186, 4 n. 15 (1994).
¶ 69    As the US Supreme Court has noted in Henderson v. United States, a party
  must still assert a right in a timely manner, or face forfeiture of that right:
        [N]o procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that
        a constitutional right, or a right of any other sort, may be forfeited
        in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make
        timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction
        to determine it.
        568 U.S. 266, 271 (2013) (internal citations omitted).

¶ 70    The law:
        casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and
        of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any
        other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful
        to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate
        them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the
        test of an appeal.
        City of Glendale v. Marcus Cable Associates, LLC, 180 Cal. Rptr.
        3d 726, 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).

¶ 71     A party therefore cannot remain silent on a claim only to later assert that
  the claim was valid by operation of law automatically. The full claim must be
  made or that party will be “forever estopped” from asserting it.
¶ 72    This interpretation also serves a practical purpose. Allowing a party to
  bring claims that they believe, correctly or incorrectly, to have applied to real
                      In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

 estate automatically on a later date, after the complete and final adjudication of
 the matter in a prior venue, would allow for the very type of piecemeal and
 fragmented litigation that the res judicata doctrine seeks to avoid. Further, it
 could also potentially open the door for claim after claim to be raised if all a party
 must do is to allege that their claim applies automatically by operation of law.
                               C. Judicial Notice.
¶ 73    Appellees filed a Request for Judicial Notice (hereinafter “RJN”) pursuant
  to Rule 27(a) of the NMI Supreme Court rules and Rule 201 of the NMI Rules
  of Evidence.
¶ 74     The RJN consisted of ten exhibits relating to the underlying action, the
  Quiet Title Case, and other separate actions involving the same parties. All ten
  (10) exhibits are pleadings or court orders.
¶ 75     Appellants did not file a response to the RJN, thus do not seem to oppose
  it. Still, a court is not required to grant every unopposed motion and may deny
  an unopposed motion if the relief requested has no basis in law. In re Kingman,
  2023 MP 6 ¶ 10 (internal citations omitted).
¶ 76     Rule 201(b) of the NMI Rules of Evidence provides that a court may
  judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is
  generally known within the Commonwealth or (2) can be accurately and readily
  determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
¶ 77    For the Court to take judicial notice, the fact must be free of “reasonable
  dispute” because it is either “generally known” or “capable of accurate and ready
  determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
  questioned.” In re Disciplinary Proceedings of Reynaldo O. Yana and Antonio
  M. Atalig, 2014 MP 1 ¶ 15 (quoting NMI R. EVID. 201(b)).
¶ 78     Further, “[w]e may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public
  record, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), including
  documents on file in federal or state courts. See Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285
  F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).” Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132
  (9th Cir. 2012).
¶ 79     The exhibits proposed by Appellees herein fall within the standard of
  judicial notice set forth in Rule 201(b) as they constitute pleadings and orders
  that are directly relevant to the issues before this Court. They are matters of
  public record and, as evidenced by Appellants’ lack of objection to them, are not
  being disputed.
                                  V. CONCLUSION
¶ 80     For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Appellees’ Request for Judicial
  Notice and AFFIRM the Probate Court’s Order Granting Appellees’ Motion for
  Reconsideration. We, therefore, REMAND this matter to the Probate Court for
  further actions and proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.
                        In re the Estate of Manglona, 2023 MP 13

         SO ORDERED this 16th day of December, 2023.

/s/
MARIA TERESA B. CENZON
Justice Pro Tempore

/s/
ELYZE M. IRIARTE
Justice Pro Tempore

/s/
BENJAMIN C. SISON
Justice Pro Tempore

                                          COUNSEL

Pamela Brown, Counsel for Co-Trustees for the PB Manglona Family Trust, Petitioner-
Appellant.
Co-Administrators of the Estate of Bernadita A. Manglona, Pro Se, Respondent-
Appellee.

                                           NOTICE

This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.
                                                                    E-FILED
                                                                    CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                                    E-filed: Dec 16 2023 01:48PM
                                                                    Clerk Review: Dec 16 2023 01:49PM
                                                                    Filing ID: 71640438
                                                                    Case No.: 2023-SCC-0003-CIV
                                                                    Judy Aldan

                                      IN THE
                                Supreme Court
                                      OF THE

          Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
                  IN RE THE ESTATE OF BERNADITA A. MANGLONA,
                                    Deceased.

                       Supreme Court No. 2023-SCC-0003-CIV
                           Superior Court No. 13-0195-CV

                                   JUDGMENT

        Appellants, Co-Trustees for the PB Manglona Family Trust, appeal the Order
Granting Appellee’s Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons discussed in the
accompanying opinion, the Court AFFIRMS the order and REMANDS the matter for further
actions not inconsistent with the opinion.

       ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2023.

 /s/
JUDY T. ALDAN
Clerk of the Supreme Court