Court Opinion

ID: 9959390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 17:01:03.241946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.351908
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 11 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAURIE L. LEVERING,                             No.    23-35110

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05290-SKV

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Washington
                 Sarah Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted April 1, 2024**
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK,*** District
Judge.

      Laurie Levering appeals the district court decision affirming the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable William Horsley Orrick, United States District Judge
for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). Levering

applied for disability insurance benefits in 2018, alleging disability due to

fibromyalgia, osteopenia, arthritis in her hip and lower back, and depression. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de

novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.

      1.     The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) considered the requisite

factors and applied the correct legal standard in evaluating the medical opinion

evidence from Brooke Elliott, Levering’s treating physician assistant. Under the

applicable regulations, the ALJ does not “give any specific evidentiary weight,

including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must weigh several factors, particularly “the extent

to which a medical source supports the medical opinion” and “the extent to which

a medical opinion is ‘consistent . . . with the evidence from other medical sources

and nonmedical sources in the claim.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791–92

(9th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)).

When rejecting a medical source’s opinion, the ALJ must provide “an explanation

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 792.

      The ALJ discounted Elliott’s opinions that Levering’s pain “prevents her

from being able to stand for long periods of time,” has been constant and difficult

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to control, and has a “negative impact” on her quality of life. The ALJ did not err

in discounting these opinions as not justified by any reason or identified evidence,

and as inconsistent with the medical record. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d

853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (an ALJ permissibly discounted the treating physician’s

opinion where, among other factors, the examination notes did not include “the

sort of description and recommendations one would expect to accompany a

finding” of disability); Woods, 32 F.4th at 794 (no error where an ALJ found a

medical provider’s opinions of limitations “on a fill-in-the-blank questionnaire”

not persuasive because they were not supported by any explanation or pertinent

exam findings); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)

(inconsistency between a physician’s opinion and the medical record constitutes a

“specific and legitimate reason” to discount the opinion). Elliott’s opinions

include little supporting explanation, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination that the opinions were inconsistent with other evidence in the record,

which suggested Levering’s pain was fairly well controlled.

      The ALJ’s duty to develop the record was not triggered, despite the

vagueness of Elliott’s opinions, because Elliott did not support those opinions and

the opinions were contradicted by other medical evidence in the record. See Ford

v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n ALJ’s duty to develop the

record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the

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record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” (quoting

Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001))).

      And, given the other reasons for rejecting Elliott’s opinions, it was at most

harmless error that the ALJ discounted Elliott’s opinions based on her letter being

unsigned. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n error

is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s

decision and the error ‘does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate

conclusion.’” (citations omitted)), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1502(a).

      Levering’s challenge to the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”)

revised regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, is foreclosed by our recent holding that

“[t]he Social Security Administration’s 2017 medical-evidence regulations fall

within the broad scope of the Commissioner’s authority under the Social Security

Act, and the agency provided a reasoned explanation for the regulatory changes,

making the regulations neither arbitrary nor capricious under the [Administrative

Procedure Act].” Cross v. O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2024).

      2.     The ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for

discounting Levering’s subjective testimony that the symptoms from her

fibromyalgia and pain were disabling. Specifically, the ALJ identified: medical

evidence that Levering’s fibromyalgia and pain were largely controlled with

                                         4
medications, although flare ups and side effects led to adjustments; Levering’s

general failure to report the severity of her symptoms to her medical providers that

she reported to the SSA; and Levering’s activities were inconsistent with the extent

of her claimed limitations. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007)

(an ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony if the claimant’s daily activities

contradict the testimony); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (an

ALJ may cite a lack of corroborating medical evidence as one factor in the

credibility determination); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996)

(an ALJ may discredit a claimant’s subjective allegations based on “prior

inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the

claimant that appears less than candid”).

      3.     The ALJ did not err in not addressing the lay testimony of Levering’s

boyfriend because that testimony was duplicative of Levering’s subjective

testimony. If there was error, it was inconsequential and harmless. See Molina,

674 F.3d at 1115.

      4.     The ALJ did not err in determining Levering’s residual functional

capacity nor did it err at step five. Levering’s arguments are wholly dependent on

her contentions that the ALJ improperly discounted Elliott’s opinion as well as the

subjective and lay testimony, and we already concluded that those contentions fail.

See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008). For the

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same reasons, the hypothetical given to the vocational expert was proper. See

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The

ALJ was not required to incorporate evidence from the opinions of [claimant]’s

treating physicians, which were permissibly discounted.”); see also Robbins v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n hypotheticals posed to a

vocational expert, the ALJ must only include those limitations supported by

substantial evidence.”).

      AFFIRMED.

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