Court Opinion

ID: 9892735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 18:05:43.431417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:45.548205
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/24/23 Nunez v. 4 Earth Farms CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 JESUS NUNEZ,                                                        B321574

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 20STCV24490)
          v.

 4 EARTH FARMS, LLC,

          Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
     Buus Law Group and William Buus, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Neufeld Marks and Paul Marks, for Defendant and
Respondent.

                          ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
      Plaintiff Jesus Nunez sued 4 Earth Farms, LLC (4 Earth)
in 2020, alleging 4 Earth breached the parties’ written contract
when it refused to pay him for trucking services he provided in
2016 and 2017. 4 Earth sought summary judgment of Nunez’s
claim, asserting there was no written contract and any oral
contract was time barred. Nunez contended the written contract
was reflected in a series of text messages he exchanged with a
4 Earth employee. The trial court granted summary judgment.
We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Nunez is in the commercial transportation business.1 In
2020, Nunez delivered a batch of invoices to 4 Earth seeking
payment for trucking services he provided between June 30, 2016
and September 2, 2017. The invoices totaled $96,575. 4 Earth
refused to pay the invoices. According to Nunez, 4 Earth’s in-
house counsel told him it was “ ‘not clear whether any contract or
agreement existed with 4Earth,’ ” or “ ‘who agreed to this
pricing.’ ” Further, counsel indicated that “ ‘after 4 years, with no
one here that knows anything about this, and pricing that there’s
no evidence we agreed to, I don’t see how we can pay these
invoices.’ ”
      In June 2020, Nunez filed a complaint against 4 Earth
asserting a single claim for breach of contract “founded upon an
instrument in writing.” The complaint alleged that “[i]n or about
June of 2016, 4 Earth Farms and Mr. Nunez exchanged several

1     The parties dispute whether Nunez provided trucking
services to 4 Earth as a sole proprietor, or through his
corporation, South Side Transportation, Inc. We need not
address that issue for purposes of this appeal and refer generally
to “Nunez.”

                                 2
digital text messages in which Mr. Nunez agreed to transport
market produce for 4 Earth Farms from certain locations within
California to 4 Earth Farms’s place of business in Commerce,
California, and 4 Earth Farms agreed to pay Mr. Nunez for such
transportation of market produce.”
       4 Earth moved for summary judgment. 4 Earth
acknowledged it had used Nunez’s trucking services, providing
evidence that Nunez’s company appeared in 4 Earth’s vendor
database no later than 2004, and it had records of paying Nunez’s
corporation “[u]p until 2019.” However, 4 Earth argued it does
not enter into written contracts with the trucking companies it
uses, it had not entered into a written contract with Nunez, and
any claim based on an oral contract was barred by the statute of
limitations.2 In support of the motion, 4 Earth offered the
declaration of Jesus Becerra, a transportation manager, who
indicated 4 Earth does not typically enter written contracts with
its trucking vendors, and while he recalled making oral
agreements with Nunez, he did not recall entering any written
contracts with him. Becerra further declared that “[w]here
4Earth (and not the shipper) has agreed to pay for
transportation, it is commonly invoiced for transportation at least
bi-weekly, and 4Earth thereafter makes payment in the ordinary
course of business. If a trucker is not paid promptly—especially
for close to $100,000—it ceases providing services, and begins
barraging the non-paying company with collection calls.” Becerra
declared he did not recall whether 4 Earth or the shipper agreed

2     4 Earth additionally contended that even if Nunez’s claim
was not time barred, he could not enforce any contract with
4 Earth because he lacked a proper commercial motor carrier
permit to operate as a sole proprietor.

                                3
to pay for transportation on the loads reflected in the challenged
invoices, and he did not recall Nunez ever complaining about not
being timely paid for services he provided to 4 Earth.
       In opposition to the motion, Nunez argued a written
contract was reflected in text messages he exchanged with
Becerra between July 2016 and September 2017. Nunez declared
he was unable to attach the original messages to his summary
judgment briefing because they were stored on an old cell phone
and did not transfer to his newer phone. Nunez explained, “The
only way I knew to create a hard copy version of those text
messages at that time was to cut and paste them to a separate
document. By doing so, unfortunately, the identity of the texter
is not shown and neither is the date, but I have handwritten the
dates of the texts and have indicated the identity of the texter.
That information was based upon information obtained from my
cell phone at that time as well as my present memory of events.”
       The resulting exhibit was 13 pages of exchanges, with
Nunez’s notations. For example, the first page of the exhibit
reflects the following, which appears to be text message
exchanges between July 22 and July 28, 2016:3

3      Nunez’s handwritten notations are identified here in
italics. Nunez used first names or nicknames in his notations; we
have used last names, as noted, in brackets. Only the first page
of the exhibit indicated a year—2016. Nunez’s handwritten
notations appeared to indicate the message were in chronological
order, bearing dates on page 1: July 22, 25, 26, 27, and 28; page 2:
July 28 (continued), July 29 and 30; page 3: July 30 (continued),
August 1 and 2; page 4: September 1, 2, 3, 6, 7; page 5:
September 7 (continued), 8, 9; page 6: September 9 (continued),
10, 12, 13, 14; page 7: September 14 (continued), 15, 16, 17;

                                 4
                    July 22
             You got a truck in mendota for 10 plts bro [Becerra]
             Yes I do [Nunez]
             Ok I’ll send you the info [Becerra]

                    July 2016
             Got it thanks [Nunez]
             [writing illegible] What’s the pric[e] bro [Becerra]
             $750 [Nunez]
             Ok thanks [Becerra]
      [25]   Can you pickup half load in mendota [Becerra]
             No truck till        morning
             Ok no problem
      [26]   Need a truck up north? [Nunez]
             Checking [Becerra]
             Working on los banos load we’re confirming [Becerra]
             Ok let me know [Nunez]
             ????? [Nunez]
             I’m checking sorry give me a minute [Becerra]
             It’s a go I’ll send you the pickup number [Becerra]

             Loading today: PU# 161036 [Becerra]
             Three Star Organic Cantaloupes
             560 9s

             Pick up Address:
             461 G STREET        [Becerra]
             LOS BANOS, CA, 93635

page 8: September 17 (continued),19, 20; page 9: September 20
(continued); page 10: September 24, 28; page 11: September 28
(continued); page 12: October 8, 10, 12; page 13: October 19. It
appears all dates were in 2016.

                                 5
       SHIPPING # 209 826-8449
       Please confirm
       Got it thanks [Nunez]
[27]   Good morning he[y] bro you got an ETA on the
       cantaloupe [Becerra]
       I told my driver [Nunez]
       Ok thanks [Becerra]
       Everything good [Becerra]
       Good thanks [Nunez]
       Got a mendota got a truck [Becerra]
       How many pallets [Nunez]
       9 watermelon 1 honeydew [Becerra]
       Let me know if you can’t bro [Becerra]

       Got it
       FYI this place is open 24hrs [Becerra]
       What place [Nunez]
       Here [Becerra]
       I was talking to your driver this morning he didn’t
       know it was open he said he would’ve come
       earlier [Becerra]
       I didn’t know either. I told him because most places
       are open at that time
       I’m in the neighborhood of you can come out [Nunez]
       Almost home bro [Becerra]
       Damn!!! [Nunez]
       What time you get out [Nunez]
[28]   Good morning any work today? [Nunez]
       Give me a minute [Becerra]
       Tick tock anything [Nunez]
       4E PO#395826 (Oceano) [Becerra]
       18-plts Org Mini Watermelons
       Pick up address
       Lompoc Valley Cooling [Becerra]
       1501 N. L St
       Lompoc, CA 93436

                          6
     Similarly, the exhibit reflects the following exchanges
between Nunez and Becerra on September 24, 2016:
            Please arrange to pick up [Becerra]

            293-Org Cilantro 4e po#402552
            211-Org Mini peppers 4E PO#402551

            4e po#402549
            387-Org Zucchini med
            527-Org Zucchini fcy/xcy

            4e po#402548
            319-Org squash med
            477-Org Squash fcy/xcfcy

            4e po#402550
            64-Org Squash Zucc. (Yellow Gold Bar)

            Please confirm 1 truck bro [Becerra]
            I called cooler they say 2 trucks, its about
            45 pallets [Nunez]
            Yup send 2 trucks bro [Becerra]
            That’s a big 10-4 [Nunez]
            Thank you for everything [Nunez]
            No problema [Becerra]
            Good morning any melons today [Nunez]
            Checking [Becerra]
            Melons??? Lompoc???? [Nunez]
            No melons today gonna see about Lompoc [Becerra]
            926-Org Spinach

            The rest fill with Zucc 429 total let me know what
            you can load to fill one truck I will send po’s shortly
            So just one truck right
            Yes load spinach fill zucchini
            There working on PO’s

                                 7
            10-4
            Hey bro you got anything going up towards
            Watsonville I got 3 plts supplies to that same place
            let me know4
     One exchange in the exhibit explicitly referenced “rates.”
Nunez’s handwritten notations appear to indicate that on
September 7, 2016, he and Becerra texted:
            Please confirm
            1 Lompoc [Becerra]
            Lompoc just called me, they have 2 truckloads they
            need moved out. FYI
            Do you want to check on that [Becerra]
            Who calls you from over there [Nunez]
            Another thing just to be on the same page, rates:
            $75 per pallet on partials [Becerra]
            $1100 out of Mendota/Los Banos [Becerra]
            $950 out of Lompoc [Becerra]
            10-4 [Nunez]
            Don’t want to get anybody in trouble
            Yea I know they shouldn’t be calling though
       However, other messages also appeared to include
discussion or ongoing negotiations of rates or prices. The exhibit
reflects a text exchange on July 29, 2016, in which Becerra sent
Nunez a pickup address, Nunez confirmed, and Becerra added:
“They didn’t harvest cilantro and spinach he’s just loading all the
squash go ahead and bring that home we’ll talk about price.”
Likewise, the last page of the exhibit appears to reflect text
messages on October 19, 2016:

4    Although this last section suggests a back and forth
exchange, Nunez’s notations identified Becerra as the only texter.

                                 8
           Can you get a half load at Lompoc [Becerra]
           Yes [Nunez]
           Ok bro send you the info [Becerra]
           Try to get a melon load [Nunez]
           Melons are done up that way [Becerra]
           Well let’s follow them [Nunez]
           How much you paying out of Nogales [Nunez]
           Let you know in a bit [Becerra]
           4E PO#405172 (8 plts) [Becerra]
           509-Org Mini Sweets [Becerra]

           Please confirm [Becerra]
           Hey if I got 10 plts of supplies how much will charge
           us from here to Bakersfield tomorrow [Becerra]
           $750 [Nunez]
           Did you get the $$ for Nogales [Nunez]
           1200 [Becerra]
           That’s a good number [Nunez]
           I’ll confirm on Bakersfield [Becerra]
           Can you get a Lompoc today [Becerra]
           The load would be for       early at Santa Cruz can
           you do it [Becerra]
           Yes [Nunez]
           Loads in Santa Cruz [Becerra]
           Yes I will send you the info [Becerra] . . . .
      Nunez asserted the messages were writings that formed
the basis of his breach of contract claim. At the summary
judgment hearing, Nunez further argued any ambiguity in the
text messages could be resolved with extrinsic evidence.
      The trial court held the text messages were not “merely
ambiguous;” rather, they lacked necessary material terms to form
a contract and were “akin to invoices upon a prior agreement.”
The court concluded the parties entered an oral agreement
governed by the two-year statute of limitations and the claim was

                               9
therefore untimely. The court granted summary judgment to 4
Earth. Nunez timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4
Cal.5th 607, 618.) A defendant moving for summary judgment
has the initial burden of showing a cause of action lacks merit
because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of
action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 853 (Aguilar).) If the defendant satisfies this initial burden,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence
demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 850.)
       “ ‘ “ ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision de novo,
considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing
papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.” ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ’
[Citation.]” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th
340, 347 (Hampton).)
II.    The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary
       Judgment
       Nunez alleged he entered a written contract with 4 Earth
governing all deliveries for which the complaint seeks damages.
The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that

                                10
Nunez could not establish the existence of a written contract. We
find no error.
       A. 4 Earth satisfied its burden of showing Nunez
          could not establish an element of his claim
       As the party moving for summary judgment, 4 Earth had
the initial burden of showing Nunez’s claim lacked merit. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 853.) 4 Earth offered evidence that it did not have a written
contract with Nunez and it typically does not enter formal
written contracts with truckers, but instead places individual
orders by phone and sometimes by text message. 4 Earth also
argued Nunez could not prove the existence of a written contract
or produce a written, signed agreement containing the material
terms of any purported contract. Finally, in the absence of a
written contract, 4 Earth argued any breach of contract claim
would be based on an oral contract and thus time-barred. The
trial court properly concluded 4 Earth made a sufficient initial
showing to shift the burden to Nunez to demonstrate a triable
issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2);
Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
       B. Nunez failed to demonstrate the existence of a
          written contract
       Nunez’s complaint asserts a claim for “breach of contract
founded upon an instrument in writing,” corresponding with
Code of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (a), which
establishes a four-year limitations period for such actions. Nunez
contends the text messages “set forth the most important terms
of the contract agreed upon between Nunez and Becerra,”
specifically that Nunez would “perform[ ] trucking services for
4Earth when called upon for agreed-upon rates.” He further

                               11
contends the messages “clearly define what each party was
required to do, and provide a reasonable basis for determining
the existence of a breach.” Nunez’s theory is that the written
messages between the parties governed their relationship and set
forth their obligations as a whole.5
       “[A] claim is founded upon a writing only when it ‘relies
upon the language within a written instrument or contract.’
[Citation.]” (JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 678, 686.) The writing “must contain the items of
the agreement and the obligations sued upon.” (Bank of America
v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 638, 645.) A
written contract “results when there is a writing containing all
terms and acceptance by the party to be charged.” (Mitchell v.
American Fair Credit Assn. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1351
(Mitchell).)
       The evidence Nunez proffered to oppose summary
judgment failed to establish a written instrument or contract.
The complaint alleges a specific theory that the breaches
identified in the complaint—4 Earth’s nonpayment of the
invoices—were governed by the parties’ written contract, which
Nunez asserts is contained in the text messages. The text
messages do not support this theory.
       For example, Nunez alleges that “[i]n or around June
2016,” he and 4 Earth exchanged text messages that set forth the

5     At the summary judgment hearing, Nunez argued in the
alternative that “each communication constitutes a separate
contract.” The trial court rejected this argument and Nunez did
not raise it in his appellate briefing. Any such argument is
therefore abandoned. (Case v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 397, 402 [“[O]ur review is limited to
contentions adequately raised in [appellant’s] briefs”].)

                               12
parties’ agreement. Yet, the earliest text messages Nunez
proffered were from July 2016, and they discussed specifics of
individual delivery jobs. The messages did not set forth the
terms of an agreement, including payment, or provide a
description of the parties’ obligations. Nunez further alleges
4 Earth failed to pay him for transportation services he
performed on or around June 30, 2016, out of Mendota. But the
text messages do not begin until July 22, 2016, and they do not
reference, describe, or memorialize any agreement as to services
prior to that date. Nunez next alleges 4 Earth failed to pay for
transportation services he provided on or around July 22, 2016,
out of Mendota, totaling $1,100. However, the text message
exchanges on or around July 22 either did not include a price
term, or indicated the price was $750.
       Even assuming, as Nunez argues, the message referencing
rates for “partials” and deliveries out of Mendota, Los Banos, and
Lompoc was a material term of the parties’ agreement that
governed all deliveries from those locations, the message was not
sent until September 7, 2016. However, Nunez alleges 4 Earth
breached the written contract by failing to pay 59 invoices for
services he provided prior to that date. Nunez also alleges
4 Earth breached the contract by failing to pay for transportation
services out of Pismo Beach, Watsonville, Santa Cruz, West
Sacramento, and Santa Maria, yet the text messages included no
discussion of rates out of those cities, or any general provisions
that would govern the parties’ agreement with respect to those
locations.
       Similarly, Nunez’s handwritten notations indicate a final
message date of October 19, 2016, yet he alleges 4 Earth
breached the contract by failing to pay for transportation services

                                13
in January, July, and September 2017. The text messages
include no general terms by which it would be possible to
determine what the parties’ agreement was as to the January,
July, or September 2017 transportation services, or whether
4 Earth breached the parties’ agreement. Other than identifying
the “rates” message, Nunez neither attempts to explain how the
text messages correspond to the alleged breach of contract, nor
points to any particular message or messages as setting forth the
terms that would establish that 4 Earth breached the contract by
failing to pay the challenged invoices.
       Indeed, the messages do not establish Nunez had any
general obligation to perform deliveries, as he argues, “when
called upon.” For example, around July 25, 2016, Becerra asked
Nunez by text message if he could “pickup half load [sic] in
[M]endota.”6 Nunez declined this request and Becerra replied it
was “no problem.” This was not indicative of an agreement or
promise sufficiently definite to establish the terms of any future
performance.
       “ ‘When the evidence clearly shows . . . that the only (and
the complete) subject matter that is under consideration is left for
further negotiation and agreement, there is no contract, not for
vagueness or indefiniteness of terms but for lack of any terms.’

6     4 Earth argues on appeal “there is no indication of who is
doing the talking” in the text messages. However, 4 Earth did
not object to the admissibility of the text messages or Nunez’s
handwritten notations below and the trial court did not exclude
them. On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we
consider all evidence in the papers, except that to which
objections were sustained. (Hampton, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
p. 347.) Thus, we accept and consider Nunez’s handwritten
notations.

                                14
[Citation.]” (Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38,
59.) The text messages do not reflect a contract governing the
deliveries Nunez performed for 4 Earth. Instead, the parties
“ ‘left for further negotiation and agreement’ ” the fundamental
question of whether Nunez would deliver produce for 4 Earth at
all. (Ibid.)
        Citizens Casualty Co. of New York v. Otis Clark & Co.
(1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 294 (Citizens) is instructive. In Citizens,
the respondent insurance brokers orally agreed to obtain three-
year term reinsurance policies for the benefit of the appellant.
The brokers subsequently issued a cover letter and binder for the
reinsurance. The cover letter indicated the brokers had obtained
reinsurance as previously agreed; the binder did not specify the
term of the reinsurance. (Id. at pp. 297–298.) When the
appellant learned years later that the reinsurance policies were
only for one year, it sued for breach of contract. The appellant
argued the letter and binder constituted a written agreement,
and a four-year statute of limitations applied under Code of Civil
Procedure section 337. (Id. at pp. 298–299.)
        The court of appeal rejected the argument, concluding that
the letter was “merely a statement that the oral agreement has
been performed. It is not sufficient that the cause of action is in
some way remotely or indirectly connected with an instrument in
writing or that the instrument is a link in the chain establishing
the cause of action. The instrument itself must contain the
contract to do the thing for the nonperformance of which the
action is brought. . . . [¶] Before a duty may be implied from a
writing, the writing should be one which created the duty.
[Citation.] The letter . . . did not purport to itself establish the
terms of an agreement . . . .” (Citizens, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at

                                 15
pp. 299–300.) Instead, the letter “reminded the receiver of the
oral agreement to which the letter was referring and reported
upon the progress [the respondent brokers] had made in fulfilling
its oral agreement. The letter, coupled with the binders, could be
considered the work product of an agreement more readily than it
could be considered the agreement itself. As such, it is evidence
of the agreement rather than the agreement.” (Id. at p. 300.)
       Similarly, here, the text messages do not purport to
establish the terms of an agreement as Nunez has alleged. They
may be evidence of an agreement, and, as the trial court
recognized, the evidence suggests Nunez and 4 Earth had an oral
contract. Nunez provided trucking services for 4 Earth, and
4 Earth acknowledged it used and paid for Nunez’s services “up
until 2019.” But to the extent the parties had a contract
governing the terms of their arrangement, as in Citizens, the
writings Nunez produced do not themselves purport to establish
the terms of that agreement. The messages convey piecemeal
details and logistics for various individual deliveries. They are at
best “evidence of the agreement rather than the agreement.”7
(Citizens, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 300; Lucioni v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 150, 165 [oral contract is not
treated as a written contract for statute of limitations purposes
“simply because a party offers some written evidence of
performance”].)

7     Since we conclude Nunez failed to establish the existence of
a written contract, we need not consider 4 Earth’s argument that
any contract was void because Nunez did not possess a valid
motor carrier permit.

                                16
       C. The court properly declined to consider extrinsic
          evidence in analyzing the text messages
       Nunez also argues the trial court erred when it “refused” to
consider extrinsic evidence in analyzing the text messages.
Specifically, Nunez contends “to the extent the trial court found
[the text messages] to be uncertain,” it should have considered
the declarations of Nunez and Becerra to clarify any ambiguities.
We disagree.
       A court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the
meaning of an ambiguous term in a contract. (Wolf v. Superior
Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1350.) However, “extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to add to, detract from, or vary the
terms of a written contract.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 39.) Here,
the text messages fail to establish a written contract, but this
failure is not the result of any ambiguous term. Rather, as
discussed above, the text messages are missing fundamental
contractual terms altogether. The alleged contract cannot be
forced into existence by reference to other documents, and the
trial court properly declined to consider extrinsic evidence for
that purpose. (Ibid.; see also Mitchell, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1351 [written contract must contain all terms].)

                                17
                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover its costs
on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                        ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                 EGERTON, J.

                              18