Court Opinion

ID: 9660219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:07:55.175959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:16.538889
License: Public Domain

HOGAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. Essentially I agree with what Judge Titus has said in his dissent, but I would confine my remarks to the facts of this case. In the particular circumstances, I perceive no infringement of defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth amendment rights because the defendant did not request that MAI-CR2d 3.76 be given. If defendant had requested that instruction and the trial court had refused it, then, in light of the State’s thin case, I would have considered the refusal of MAI-CR2d 3.76 to be plain error. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 304-305, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 1121-1122, 67 L.Ed.2d 241, 254 (1981). I find no request for any limiting instruction and consequently, no infringement of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Rather, my view as to the present case is that defendant’s conviction upon the evidence presented is insufficient to satisfy the due-process requirement that the State present evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979). I find no record evidence other than defendant’s unexplained possession of recently stolen property to support the charge of stealing without consent. Such evidence might permit the inference that defendant received stolen property, as defined and denounced by § 570.080, RSMo 1978, V.A.M.S., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845-846, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2362-2363, 37 L.Ed.2d 380, 387 (1973), but if the conviction is to be supported by permissible inferences, then the evidence necessary to invoke the inference must be sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes, supra, 412 U.S. at 843, 93 S.Ct. at 2361-2362, 37 L.Ed.2d at 386. I realize that there was no necessity of proving appropriation from the person of the owner; the property taken was livestock. Section 570.030(3Xh), RSMo 1978. Nevertheless, § 570.030.1 requires appropriation “with the purpose to deprive” and it is fundamental that the defendant’s conduct and his mental state must coincide. W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law at 642 (1972). Because there is no proof in my view, of the time or the circumstances in which the defendant came in possession of the cattle, his unexplained possession of recently stolen property does not permit any rational trier of fact to infer the necessary coincidence of conduct and intent. For that reason, I believe the standards enumerated in Jackson, supra, have not been met and the defendant should stand discharged.