Court Opinion

ID: 9838028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-03 14:06:26.491558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:59.625077
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Texas
                            ══════════
                             No. 21-1117
                            ══════════

            The Duncan House Charitable Corporation,
                               Petitioner,

                                    v.

                  Harris County Appraisal District,
                              Respondent

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
               On Petition for Review from the
     Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                            PER CURIAM

      Duncan House Charitable Corporation applied for a charitable
tax exemption for the 2017 tax year covering its fifty percent ownership
interest in an historic home in Houston. The appraisal district denied
the exemption, the review board denied Duncan House’s protest, and
Duncan House filed suit for judicial review. Meanwhile, the deadline
for Duncan House to apply for an exemption for the 2018 tax year
passed.   Although Duncan House never applied for the charitable
exemption for 2018, it protested the district’s 2018 appraisal because the
district failed to apply the charitable exemption. After the review board
denied that protest, Duncan House amended its trial court petition to
also challenge the denial of the 2018 exemption.        The trial court
dismissed the 2018 claim for want of jurisdiction because Duncan House
never applied for the 2018 exemption.
      Duncan House took an interlocutory appeal from that order, and
the court of appeals affirmed. ___ S.W.3d ___, 2021 WL 5831399, at *4
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 9, 2021). It determined that,
“under the plain language of the statute, the timely filing of an
application for the charitable organization exemption is a statutory
prerequisite for a charitable organization to receive the exemption.” Id.
at *3. Thus, “because Duncan House did not comply with a statutory
prerequisite of filing an application for the charitable organization
exemption for the 2018 tax year, it could not receive the exemption. As
a result, neither the Appraisal Review Board nor the trial court had
jurisdiction to grant a charitable organization exemption to Duncan
House for 2018.” Id. at *4.
      In its petition for review in this Court, Duncan House argues that
the trial court erred by dismissing its claim for the 2018 exemption
because the Tax Code did not require it to apply for the 2018 exemption
and, even if it did, that requirement is not jurisdictional. We need not
decide whether the application requirement is jurisdictional because the
requirement does not apply at all if it is ultimately determined that
Duncan House is entitled to the 2017 exemption.
      Generally, a person claiming a property-tax exemption must
apply for the exemption, and must do so annually, “each year the person
claims entitlement to the exemption.” TEX. TAX CODE § 11.43(a), (b).
But some exemptions, “once allowed, need not be claimed in subsequent

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years” and, with limited exceptions, “the exemption applies to the
property until it changes ownership or the person’s qualification for the
exemption changes.” Id. § 11.43(c). Exemptions allowed for charitable
organizations that meet the requirements of Sections 11.18 and 11.184
fall within this exception to the annual-application requirement. Id.
§ 11.43(b), (c). When the exception applies, the chief appraiser may
require a subsequent application to confirm the person’s continuing
qualifications, but only by delivering a written notice that a new
application is required, along with an application form. Id. § 11.43(c).
      The issue of whether Duncan House is entitled to the 2017
exemption remains pending in the trial court. If the courts ultimately
conclude that Duncan House did not qualify for the exemption in 2017,
Duncan House’s failure to timely apply for the 2018 exemption will
preclude it from receiving the exemption for 2018. But if the courts
ultimately allow the exemption for 2017, Duncan House will then be
entitled to the exemption for all “subsequent years”—including 2018—
even if not timely “claimed,” unless and until the chief appraiser gives
written notice requiring a subsequent application. Id.
      The court of appeals erred by holding that Duncan House’s failure
to timely apply for the 2018 exemption precludes it from receiving that
exemption even if it ultimately qualifies for the 2017 exemption. Thus,
without hearing oral argument, TEX. R. CIV. P. 59.1, we reverse the court
of appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

OPINION DELIVERED: September 1, 2023

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