Court Opinion

ID: 9387267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 15:00:29.443048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.633658
License: Public Domain

22-832
   Iraq Telecom Ltd. v. IBL Bank S.A.L.

                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                           SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

                At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
   in the City of New York, on the 17th day of April, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:

                      PIERRE N. LEVAL,
                      DENNY CHIN,
                      RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
                           Circuit Judges.
   ___________________________________________________

   IRAQ TELECOM LIMITED,

                               Petitioner-Appellee,

                      v.                                                          No. 22-832

   IBL BANK S.A.L.,

                               Respondent-Appellant. ∗
   __________________________________________________

   ∗
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
For Respondent-Appellant:                    MITCHELL R. BERGER (Gassan A.
                                             Baloul, on the brief), Squire Patton
                                             Boggs (US) LLP, Washington, DC.

For Petitioner-Appellee:                     DEREK L. SHAFFER, Quinn Emanuel
                                             Urquhart     &      Sullivan,  LLP,
                                             Washington, DC (Kevin S. Reed,
                                             William B. Adams, Quinn Emanuel
                                             Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York,
                                             NY; Kristen Tahler, Quinn Emanuel
                                             Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Los
                                             Angeles, CA; Alex H. Loomis, Quinn
                                             Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP,
                                             Boston, MA, on the brief).

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Denise Cote, Judge).

      UPON     DUE     CONSIDERATION,           IT   IS   HEREBY     ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      IBL Bank S.A.L. appeals from the district court’s order denying its request

to stay enforcement of Iraq Telecom Limited’s approximately $3 million arbitral

award against IBL (the “Award”) pending a decision in an ongoing proceeding in

Lebanon challenging the Award. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

                                        2
      Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention” or “Convention”), a district court

“may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the

award” if “an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award” has

been made in the jurisdiction in which the award was made. Convention on the

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 6, June 10, 1958, 21

U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, implemented by 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. In Europcar Italia,

S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., we provided “[g]uidance” regarding this provision,

advising that district courts “should . . . consider” a non-exhaustive list of six

factors designed to “adequately represent[] the various concerns that come into

play when a district court is asked to adjourn enforcement proceedings to await

the outcome of parallel foreign proceedings.” 156 F.3d 310, 317–18 (2d Cir. 1998);

see also Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 377 F.3d 1164, 1172

(11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that district courts should “balance the Convention’s

policy favoring confirmation of arbitral awards against the principle of

international comity embraced by the Convention”).

                                           3
      We review a district court’s decision regarding the stay of enforcement

proceedings for abuse of discretion. See Europcar, 156 F.3d at 316–17; see also LLC

SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova, 985 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (commenting

that “it is difficult to conceive of a greater delegation of discretion than” the

delegation to district courts under Article VI of the New York Convention). “A

district court abuses its discretion if it (1) bases its decision on an error of law or

uses the wrong legal standard; (2) bases its decision on a clearly erroneous factual

finding; or (3) reaches a conclusion that, though not necessarily the product of a

legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding, cannot be located within the

range of permissible decisions.” Villiers v. Decker, 31 F.4th 825, 831 (2d Cir. 2022)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard of review here, we

hold that the district court did not err in determining that the six Europcar factors,

on balance, weighed against staying enforcement of the Award despite the

pending Lebanese annulment action.

      First, the district court reasonably determined that the two most important

Europcar factors – (1) “the general objectives of arbitration,” i.e., “the expeditious

resolution of disputes and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation,”

                                          4
and (2) “the status of the foreign proceedings and the estimated time for those

proceedings to be resolved” – weighed against staying enforcement. 156 F.3d

at 317–18.   Specifically, the district court found that the general objectives of

arbitration strongly militated in favor of enforcing the Award immediately, as

“[f]urther delay[] to await the resolution of the annulment action, which [was] in

its earliest stage” and for which “IBL ha[d] not provided any reliable [timeline]

estimate, or even any estimate,” “would only protract this long-running and

contentious dispute.” Sp. App’x at 19. On appeal, IBL primarily contends that

the district court erred by not adequately considering the potential for future delay

and the ramifications for international comity should the Award be annulled in

Lebanon, which would require further litigation to set aside the enforcement

judgment here. We decline to disturb the district court’s conclusion on that basis,

however, as its additional finding that “IBL ha[d] not shown that it [was] likely to

succeed on either of the two grounds on which it relies in its annulment

proceeding” largely neutralizes these concerns. Id. at 20–21.

      To be sure, IBL also challenges the district court’s assessment of IBL’s

prospects for success in the Lebanese annulment action, but we find this argument

                                         5
to be unavailing. The district court’s finding echoed statements it had made in a

previous order regarding attachment, decided after briefing in which IBL declined

to substantively respond to Iraq Telecom’s likelihood-of-success arguments and

evidence. Even though the district court’s statements were dicta in the context of

the attachment order, IBL was on notice of the district court’s dim view of its

likelihood of success, as well as the central role likelihood of success could play in

the stay analysis.       See, e.g., Stileks, 985 F.3d at 881.        Yet, when subsequently

briefing its request for a stay, IBL again presented no developed argument that it

was likely to succeed in its annulment action. Under these circumstances, IBL has

presented no persuasive argument that the district court exceeded its discretion

by adhering to its prior view that IBL’s grounds for annulment were meritless.

See Doe v. Trump Corp., 6 F.4th 400, 409–11 (2d Cir. 2021). 1

1 IBL suggests that one of its grounds for annulment has gotten stronger in the wake of ZF
Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., which held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 does not authorize discovery
in aid of private arbitration, and which was decided after briefing of the parties’ stay motion had
concluded but about a month before the district court’s stay decision was issued. See 142 S. Ct.
2078, 2089–91 (2022). But on this record, we are not convinced that ZF Automotive has any
bearing on the key question the Lebanese court will face in the annulment action: whether the
arbitral tribunal violated international public order by considering evidence validly obtained (at
least at the time) through 28 U.S.C. § 1782. See J. App’x at 372–73 & n.6; Gary B. Born,
International Commercial Arbitration 3321–26 (2d ed. 2014); see also Opinion & Order at 5–7 & n.5,
In re Ex Parte Application of Iraq Telecom Ltd., No. 18-mc-458 (LGS) (OTW) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2019),
Doc. No. 47 (granting Iraq Telecom’s section-1782 application based not on the pending Lebanese
                                                 6
       Second, the district court reasonably determined that the characteristics of

the foreign proceeding “counsel[ed] against a delay” in enforcement. Sp. App’x

at 19–20; see Europcar, 156 F.3d at 318 (advising district courts to consider as part

of this factor “(i) whether [the foreign proceedings] were brought to enforce an

award . . . or to set the award aside . . . ; (ii) whether they were initiated before the

underlying enforcement proceeding so as to raise concerns of international comity;

(iii) whether they were initiated by the party now seeking to enforce the award in

federal court; and (iv) whether they were initiated under circumstances indicating

an intent to hinder or delay resolution of the dispute”). In stark contrast to the

detailed arguments IBL now advances on appeal, in the district court IBL merely

asserted that this factor favored a stay because “there is no evidence that IBL’s

annulment proceeding was filed for the purpose of creating unnecessary delay, or

that it will in fact do so.”     Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 117 at 10.       Presented with this

conclusory argument, the district court did not exceed its discretion on this factor,

given that the enforcement proceeding was indisputably filed before the Lebanese

private arbitral proceeding, but rather on a pending proceeding in the Dubai International
Financial Centre Court, which no intervening party argued was not a “foreign tribunal” within
the meaning of section 1782).
                                             7
annulment proceeding (whether or not IBL knew it at the time) and that, as the

district court permissibly found, “the weakness of [IBL’s] arguments in the

annulment action reinforce[d] the impression that IBL is simply seeking to delay

the inevitable confirmation.” Sp. App’x at 19–20.

      Third, the district court reasonably determined that the “balance of the

possible hardships to each of the parties,” Europcar, 156 F.3d at 318, “also

weigh[ed] against IBL’s request” for a stay, Sp. App’x at 20. In Europcar, we

explained that when analyzing this factor, district courts should “keep[] in mind

that if enforcement is postponed under Article VI of the Convention, the party

seeking enforcement may receive ‘suitable security.’” 156 F.3d at 318. Seizing

upon this language, IBL contends on appeal that the district court erred by failing

to consider several ways in which IBL had already provided adequate security for

the Award. Unfortunately, once again, IBL did not properly preserve most of

these arguments. Instead, IBL argued below only that a stay would not cause

hardship to Iraq Telecom because IBL had “already complied with the [Award] by

issuing a check payable to [Iraq Telecom] in the full amount awarded,” Dist. Ct.

Doc. No. 117 at 10 (emphasis omitted) – an argument the district court

                                        8
appropriately rejected given that, under Lebanese law, IBL’s attempt to pay Iraq

Telecom through the tender and deposit procedure constituted only an offer to

pay a debt, which Iraq Telecom had refused to accept, as it was entitled to do, see

Sp. App’x at 9–10.

      Fourth, and finally, the district court reasonably determined that one

Europcar factor – “whether the award sought to be enforced will receive greater

scrutiny in the foreign proceedings under a less deferential standard of review,”

Europcar, 156 F.3d at 317 – “support[ed] a delay in [enforcement] . . . only slightly,”

Sp. App’x at 20–21. In reaching this conclusion, the district court granted IBL its

premise that “a Lebanese court in an annulment action may be able to rely on a

broader range of grounds to vacate the Award,” but found that “IBL ha[d] not

shown that that additional authority will be of benefit to it.” Id. at 20; see also CBF

Indústria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 2017)

(explaining that jurisdictions other than the jurisdiction where the award is made

“may refuse enforcement only in the limited grounds specified in Article V of the

New York Convention” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because we see no

abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that IBL was not likely to

                                          9
succeed in its Lebanese annulment action (as previously discussed), we cannot

hold that the district court abused its discretion by viewing this factor as only

slightly favoring a stay, and as not strong enough to outweigh the rest of the

Europcar factors.

       We have considered IBL’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. 2 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                              FOR THE COURT:
                                              Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2 In letters submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), the parties have
informed us that a Lebanese court is expected to reach a decision in the annulment action by April
27, 2023, after which time the parties may appeal to a higher court in Lebanon. But any decision
reached by the Lebanese court cannot retroactively render the district court’s decision – which
was proper based on the record before it at the time – an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United
States v. Apple Inc., 787 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2015). Of course, depending on the outcome of
the Lebanese annulment proceeding, IBL may be free to pursue other relief in the district court.
See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). But that, again, is of no moment in this appeal of the district
court’s denial of a stay.
                                                10