Court Opinion

ID: 9548978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:11:30.812795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:41.918683
License: Public Domain

*558DISSENTING OPINION OF CIRCUIT JUDGE
SPENCER
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
The trial court initially granted a summary judgment motion in favor of defendant on all issues except negligence with respect to maintenance and location of the subject towel rack. Subsequently, the trial court granted a second summary judgment motion filed by defendant based on the special statute of limitation set forth in HRS § 657-8, and the complaint was dismissed.
Pending the appeal of this case, HRS § 657-8 was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Shibuya vs. Architects Hawaii Ltd, 65 Haw. 26, 43-44, 647 P.2d 276, 288 (1982). However, this Court has repeatedly held that where the trial court has reached a correct conclusion, its decision will not be disturbed on the ground that the reason it gave for its action was erroneous. Black Construction Corp. v. Agsalud 64 Haw. 274, 285 n.20, 639 P.2d 1088, 1095 n.20 (1978). Thus, if a summary judgment for the defendant is a correct conclusion, this Court may affirm the decision even though the trial court’s reasoning, viz., the applicability of HRS § 657-8, was erroneous.
I certainly agree with the majority opinion that there is a duty owed by a hotel operator to maintain a bathroom adjoining a hotel room in a reasonably safe condition for the use of the guest. I also agree that whether the duty was breached is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact to determine.
However, in an appropriate case, this Court can and should decide as a matter of law whether a duty has been breached. See, e.g., Pickering vs. State, 57 Haw. 405, 557 P.2d 125 (1976); Carreira vs. Territory, 40 Haw. 513, 516 (1954).
The material facts in this case are undisputed. The plaintiff, an adult, while rising from a sitting position after using the hotel room toilet, grabbed a towel rack affixed to the adjacent wall and used it in an attempt to pull herself to a standing position. The rack tore loose from the wall causing plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries. The subject towel rack had the appearance of a wall fixture designed to hold towels and plaintiff had previously used it for this purpose. It did not have the appear*559anee of a fixture designed to be a handrail.
In Friedrich v. Dept. of Transportation, 60 Haw. 32 at 36, 586 P.2d 1037 (1978), this Court said in connection with a negligence suit against the State for injuries suffered by a plaintiff who fell into shallow water from a State-owned pier:
The duty of care which the State, as an occupier of the premises, owed to appellant traditionally does not require the elimination of known or obvious hazards which appellant would reasonably be expected to avoid. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965).
A pertinent analysis set forth in 2 Harper and James, Torts, 327.13 (1956), quoted with approval in Friedrich v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 60 Haw. at 36 nt. 1, is as follows:
People can hurt themselves on almost any condition of the premises. That is certainly true of an ordinary flight of stairs. But it takes more than this to make a condition unreasonably dangerous. If people who are likely to encounter a condition may be expected to take perfectly good care of themselves without further precautions, then the condition is not unreasonably dangerous because the likelihood of harm is slight. This is true of the flight of ordinary stairs in a usual place in the daylight. It is also true of ordinary curbing along a sidewalk, doors or windows in a house, counters in a store, stones and slopes in a New England field, and countless other things which are common in our everyday experience. It may also be true of less common and obvious conditions which lurk in a place where visitors would expect to find such dangers. The ordinary person can use or encounter all of these things safely if he is fully aware of their presence at the time. And if they have no unusual features and are in a place where he would naturally look for them, he may be expected to take care of himself if they are plainly visible. In such cases it is enough if the condition is obvious, or is made obvious (e.g., by illumination). The knowledge of the condition removes the sting of unreasonableness from any danger that lies in it, and obviousness may be relied on to supply knowledge. Hence the obvious character of the condition is incompatible with negligence in maintaining it. If plaintiff happens to be hurt by the condition, he is barred from recovery by lack *560of defendant’s negligence towards* him, no matter how careful plaintiff himself may have been. If an invitee has a cramp at the head of a flight of stairs and falls down it, his own freedom from fault will not help him to a recovery. 2 Harper and James, Torts, § 27.13 (1956).
In my opinion the defendant in the present case was perfectly reasonable in assuming that the plaintiff would know better than to use a towel rack as if it was designed and intended to support the weight of a person. The defendant cannot be said to have breached a duty of reasonable care owed to plaintiff merely by maintaining a towel rack, on a wall next to the toilet, which could not support the weight of a person.
I believe the material issues of fact are undisputed and the absence of negligence ought to be decided in favor of the defendant as a matter of law.