Court Opinion

ID: 9947497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 21:18:24.399331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:29.613904
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                            No. 84204-8-I

           Respondent/Cross-Appellant,           DIVISION ONE

               v.
                                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 JOSE LEONARDO COLINDRES,

           Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

       SMITH, C.J. — Jose “Leo” Colindres was charged with two counts of rape

of a child in the first degree. He was convicted only on the first charge. On

appeal, Colindres contends that the trial court erred by, (1) denying his motion for

mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, (2) imposing both a victim penalty

assessment and DNA collection fee, and (3) imposing community custody

conditions that are not sufficiently related to his offense. Colindres also asserts

that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction

following the use of impeachment evidence. He argues that an in camera review

is necessary to determine if the trial court properly released all discoverable

material to the defense, and finally, he asserts cumulative error. Finding no error

concerning his conviction, we affirm but remand for the court to strike the victim

penalty assessment, DNA collection fee, and community custody conditions.

                                        FACTS

       Charlene Caceres and Edwin Hernandez met and began dating when they

were 19 and 16 years old, respectively. They had four children together: two
No. 84204-8-I/2

daughters (N.C., A.C.), and two sons. N.C. is the oldest of those children; A.C. is

the second oldest. Jose “Leo” Colindres is Caceres’ brother and N.C.’s uncle.

       Caceres and Hernandez briefly married but separated only a few weeks

later. Following the separation, Caceres moved to California with the children

and Hernandez stayed in Washington to work.

       The living situation in California was crowded, and the four children shared

one bed in their mother’s room. Hernandez visited frequently. Caceres

eventually agreed that the children could live with Hernandez for the summer.

Colindres volunteered to chaperone the children on a Greyhound bus from

California to Washington. N.C. was 10 years old when she moved to her father’s

home in Auburn. A.C. was eight years old.

       In Hernandez’s home, the children shared a room but each had their own

bed. The girls shared bunkbeds and the boys each had a toddler “car bed.”

Colindres slept on the couch. By the end of the summer, the children did not

want to return to California. It was ultimately decided that they would stay with

Hernandez in Washington. Colindres volunteered to stay in Washington as well,

offering to babysit the children while Hernandez worked. Hernandez left for work

early, leaving Colindres in charge of getting the children ready for school and

picking them up in the afternoon. As a result, Colindres was alone with N.C. for

several hours most days.

       N.C. testified that Colindres raped her four times while she lived in

Washington. One incident occurred in her bedroom after Hernandez had left for

work. She testified that Colindres woke her two younger brothers and moved

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them to a different room before shutting the door, pulling N.C.’s pants down, and

vaginally raping her. The motion roused A.C., who complained about the noise

before falling back to sleep. After the rape, Colindres brought the two boys back

to bed.

       N.C. recalled another assault that took place in the afternoon. N.C. was

alone with Colindres in the dining room while her siblings were upstairs.

Colindres “made [N.C.] pull down [her] pants” and played a video on his phone,

depicting “something a fourth grader shouldn’t see.” N.C. could not recall exactly

what he showed her. Colindres then vaginally raped her. When he stopped,

Colindres told N.C. to dress herself and went to the bathroom.

       N.C.’s younger sister, A.C., testified that Colindres entered their bedroom

on several occasions and made the boys leave. She described one occasion

where Colindres climbed into N.C.’s bunk. She observed that Colindres’s

clothing was “halfway on” and his body was “moving up and down . . . on top of

[N.C.].”

       In October 2018, Hernandez’s ex-girlfriend Kristina Nagle came over for

dinner with her daughter, C.G. C.G. was treated “like another sister” by the

family and was about two years older than N.C. During this visit, A.C. told C.G.

about Colindres’s abuse. C.G. told her mother, who then told Hernandez.

Hernandez spoke with his daughters in private, and N.C. confirmed that

Colindres had raped her.

       Hernandez confronted Colindres with N.C.’s allegations, at which point

both N.C. and Hernandez testified that Colindres began crying and said he “was

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No. 84204-8-I/4

sorry that it happened.” Hernandez immediately kicked Colindres out of the

house and sent him back to California the next day. Hernandez did not initially

report the abuse, concerned that CPS might remove the children, but contacted

law enforcement several days later. Colindres was charged with two counts of

first degree rape of a child.1

       Colindres testified at trial. He acknowledged taking care of the children

but categorially denied any sexual abuse. He also denied apologizing. He

claimed that he was shocked and angry at the accusation; he also stated that he

repeatedly told Hernandez to call law enforcement if Hernandez really believed

N.C.

       Caceres also testified. She understood the rape allegation but did not

know any specifics. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Caceres

about her experience being raped as a child. Caceres became visibly upset at

these questions. The prosecutor also asked Caceres a number of questions

about whether she was present while Colindres was babysitting, noting her lack

of presence in the Washington home. At the end of questioning, the prosecutor

stated that she was not there when Colindres assaulted her daughter. At that

point, Caceres began crying.

       The jury convicted Colindres on the first count of rape of a child, but

acquitted him on the second. The court imposed a standard range indeterminate

       1 The incident in the bedroom was charged as count one. The incident in
the dining room was charged as count two. At trial, N.C. also testified to a third
incident where Colindres woke her up and instructed her to undress. She
refused, and as punishment for disobeying, Colindres forced her to sleep on the
floor. This was not separately charged.

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No. 84204-8-I/5

sentence of 120 months to life in prison and lifetime community custody.

Colindres appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

                                  Motion for Mistrial

       Colindres contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking

Caceres questions about being raped and that the trial court erred in failing to

grant a mistrial based on that misconduct. We conclude that Colindres fails to

establish that the prosecutor’s conduct resulted in prejudice and thus, that the

court did not err in denying the mistrial.

       “The decision to deny a request for mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial

misconduct lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and it will not be

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 86,

882 P.2d 747 (1994). A trial court abuses its discretion in denying of a motion for

mistrial if “ ‘no reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusion.’ ”

State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 765, 278 P.3d 653 (2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting State v. Hopson, 113 Wn.2d 273, 284, 778 P.2d 1014

(1989)). A mistrial is appropriate “ ‘only when the defendant has been so

prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can insure that the defendant will be

tried fairly. ” State v. Rodriguez, 146 Wn.2d 260, 269, 45 P.3d 541 (2002)

(quoting State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692, 701, 718 P.2d 407 (1986)). The trial court

is in the best position to determine prejudice. State v. Garcia, 177 Wn. App. 769,

777, 313 P.3d 422 (2013).

       Here, Colindres argues that prosecutorial misconduct entitles him to a

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No. 84204-8-I/6

mistrial. If a defendant objects to the conduct at trial, to show prosecutorial

misconduct he must establish that the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper

and prejudicial in the context of the entire record and the circumstances at trial.

State v. Koeller, 15 Wn. App. 2d 245, 260, 477 P.3d 61 (2020). Conduct is

prejudicial if the defendant can show a substantial likelihood that the error

affected the jury verdict. State v. Molina, 16 Wn. App. 2d 908, 968, 485 P.3d 963

(2021).

       In general, “ ‘when a party opens up a subject of inquiry on direct or cross-

examination, [they] contemplate[] that the rules will permit cross-examination or

redirect examination, as the case may be, within the scope of the examination in

which the subject matter was first introduced.’ ” State v. Rushworth, 12 Wn. App.

2d 466, 473, 458 P.3d 1192 (2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Gefeller,

76 Wn.2d 449, 455, 458 P.2d 17 (1969)). Therefore, such questioning is

appropriate behavior. Rushworth, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 473. Conduct is not

improper if a defendant cannot establish that conduct is unreasonable or

inappropriate. Koeller, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 263. In contrast, conduct is improper if

it appeals to the passions or prejudices of the jury, intending to incite anger or

desire for revenge. State v. Elledge, 144 Wn.2d 62, 85, 26 P.3d 271 (2001).

       Colindres alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by (1) asking

Caceres a number of questions about her own assault as a child, and

(2) repeatedly asking Caceres about being out-of-state while Colindres assaulted

N.C. Colindres objected to both lines of questioning at trial.

       The first instance was not improper conduct. Defense counsel introduced

                                          6
No. 84204-8-I/7

the subject of Caceres’s rape on direct examination. In an attempt to explain that

N.C. understood the mechanics of sex from her mother’s explanation, rather than

personal experience, defense counsel elicited testimony that Caceres taught the

girls about inappropriate touching as a response to her own assault. Defense

counsel finished his direct examination on that topic. On cross-examination, the

State followed up with questions about how Caceres’s experience with sexual

assault was the reason she talked to the girls about what to do if anyone touched

them inappropriately. Because defense counsel first asked Caceres about this

topic, the prosecutor’s questions were within the scope of the subject matter as

introduced and these questions did not constitute improper conduct.

      As to the second instance, the conduct was improper and inappropriate,

which the State concedes. The State acknowledges that the prosecutor’s

repeated questions about Caceres’s absence were cumulative and unnecessarily

provocative. The questions brought Caceres to tears and appear aimed at

eliciting an emotional response from the jury. Because this line of questioning

attempted to play on the passions and prejudices of the jury, it was inappropriate

and constituted improper conduct. Colindres has established that the

prosecutor’s conduct was improper.

      Although the questioning was improper, Colindres fails to establish

prejudice. The questions that the prosecutor asked of Caceres were centered

around the alleged assault in the dining room and the fact that she was out of the

state when it happened. Colindres was acquitted on that charge. And while he

alleges prejudice, Colindres received a favorable verdict on that charge.

                                        7
No. 84204-8-I/8

Colindres cannot show that the outcome of the trial court would have been

different absent the improper conduct.

       Because Colindres was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s misconduct,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. Apart from his

claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Colindres does not provide any other basis to

support the motion for mistrial.

                          Comment on Pre-Arrest Silence

       Colindres asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on

Colindres’s exercise of his constitutionally protected right to pre-arrest silence

and used it as substantive evidence of his guilt. As Colindres failed to raise this

issue below, we decline to reach it.

 1. Waiver

       In general, we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

RAP 2.5(a). And if an objection on one specific ground is overruled at trial, a

party may not rest that objection upon a new ground on appeal. State v. Koepke,

47 Wn. App. 897, 911, 738 P.2d 295 (1987); State v. Pappas, 195 Wash. 197,

200-201, 80 P.2d 770 (1938).

       At trial, Colindres objected to the prosecutor’s statement that

“Mr. Colindres himself never called the cops even though he said they should

have been called” based on burden shifting. The court overruled Colindres’s

objection. On appeal, Colindres argues that this same statement was a violation

of his Fifth Amendment right to silence. He asserts that “the objection was meant

to convey that Colindres has no burden to come forward to speak with the police,

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No. 84204-8-I/9

which implicates the right to remain silent.” Relying on State v. Braham, 67 Wn.

App. 930, 935, 841 P.2d 785 (1992), Colindres asserts that a claim is preserved

for review if the specific ground for the objection is apparent from the context.

But Braham is distinguishable.

       In Braham, the defendant broadly objected to testimony as irrelevant. 67

Wn. App. at 935. Then, on appeal, the defendant argued that the probative value

of the evidence was outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial impact. Id. The court

held that the specific objection argued on appeal could be inferred from the

context of the broader objection below. Id.

       In contrast, here, Colindres argues a different basis for the objection on

appeal than he did before the trial court. Before the trial court, Colindres

objected based on burden shifting. On appeal, he contends the objection

referenced his right to remain silent. These are entirely different objections. The

prohibition on burden shifting stems from the Fourteenth Amendment rather than

the Fifth Amendment. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 713,

286 P.3d 673 (2012) (shifting burden of proof to the defendant is improper under

Fourteenth Amendment); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215, 97 S. Ct.

2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977) (“shifting of the burden of

persuasion . . . is impermissible under the Due Process Clause” of the

Fourteenth Amendment). The latter cannot be inferred from the former.

Because Colindres raised a different objection before the trial court, he cannot

now raise an alternative basis for the objection on appeal.

                                          9
No. 84204-8-I/10

 2. Manifest Constitutional Error

       In the alternative, Colindres asserts that he may raise this issue for the

first time on appeal because it is a manifest constitutional error. We disagree.

       “[M]anifest errors affecting a constitutional right may be raised for the first

time on appeal.” State v. A.M., 194 Wn.2d 33, 38, 448 P.3d 35 (2016); RAP

2.5(a)(3). To establish manifest constitutional error, the defendant has the

burden of showing that (1) the error was “truly of constitutional dimension” and

(2) the error was “manifest.” If correct, an error is of constitutional dimension if “it

implicates a constitutional interest as compared to another form of trial error.”

State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). We do not presume an

alleged error is of constitutional magnitude. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 98. An error

is manifest if there is a “ ‘plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted

error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.’ ” A.M.,

194 Wn.2d at 38 (quoting O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99). A defendant may establish

that an error has practical and identifiable consequence at trial if otherwise

inaccessible evidence is admitted over the objection of counsel. A.M., 194

Wn.2d at 39.

       As to the first prong, Colindres fails to show that the error was truly

constitutional. Typically, a claim that someone impermissibly commented on

prearrest silence would rise to a constitutional level. A.M., 194 Wn.2d at 39;

State v. Curtis, 110 Wn. App. 6, 11, 13, 37 P.3d 1274 (2002). “The right against

self-incrimination is liberally construed.” State v. Easter, 130 Wn.2d 228, 236,

922 P.2d 1285 (1996). It might take the form of refusing to answer the police pre

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No. 84204-8-I/11

or post-Miranda,2 or simply not engaging prior to arrest. State v. Lewis, 130

Wn.2d 700, 705, 927 P.2d 235 (1996); Easter, 130 Wn.2d at 236; A.M., 194

Wn.2d at 39. And the right against self-incrimination is clearly of truly

constitutional dimension.

         In this case, however, the police were not involved. In fact, there was no

investigation until days later. The conversation about calling the police occurred

when Colindres was speaking with his former brother-in-law, in response to N.C.

and A.C.’s accusation. To consider Colindres’s choice not to call the police pre-

arrest silence would be to stretch pre-arrest silence past its logical point, even

before a report has been made to the police or the initiation of an investigation.

We do not do so. Because the statement does not implicate Colindres’s Fifth

Amendment right, the error is not one of truly constitutional dimension.

         Colindres also fails to satisfy the second prong because he does not

demonstrate how the statement affected his rights at trial. Defense counsel, not

the State, introduced the fact that Colindres told Hernandez to call the police.

Colindres himself testified that “[he] told [Hernandez] to call the cops more than

once.” Defense counsel revisited the topic a while later, asking Colindres about

denying the rape allegations. Colindres responded, “I kept telling them to call the

cops if that’s what [Hernandez] believed—call the cops.” In using this statement

as a measure of credibility, defense counsel put at issue whether the statement

supported a determination that Colindres was credible. The prosecution simply

         2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694

(1966)

                                          11
No. 84204-8-I/12

presented a different perspective on evidence already in the record. Here, the

evidence was not otherwise inaccessible. Defense counsel had already

presented evidence to the jury that Colindres had repeatedly told Hernandez to

call the police. The jury also heard that law enforcement was not informed until

five days later, when Hernandez reported the incident. The jury could have

easily made the connection that Colindres did not call the police. Colindres

cannot establish that the prosecutor’s passing reference to the idea that

Colindres could have called the police himself had any practical and identifiable

consequence at trial. Therefore, the prosecutor’s comment did not constitute

manifest constitutional error warranting review.

                         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Colindres argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request a

limiting instruction following the use of impeachment evidence. We conclude that

defense counsel was deficient in failing to request the instruction but that

Colindres again failed to demonstrate prejudice.

       We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v.

Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017). The Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State

Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. Estes, 188

Wn.2d at 457. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must

establish that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that deficiency

resulted in prejudice. State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).

Performance is deficient if it falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness

                                         12
No. 84204-8-I/13

based on consideration of all the circumstances.” State v. McFarland, 127

Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). To show prejudice, the appellant

must show a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that but for the deficient performance, the

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. State v. Jones, 183

Wn.2d 327, 339, 352 P.3d 776 (2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). “The admission of

evidence which is merely cumulative is not prejudicial error.” State v. Todd, 78

Wn.2d 362, 372, 474 P.2d 542 (1970). There is a strong presumption that

representation was effective. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260

(2011). And “[w]hen counsel’s conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial

strategy or tactics, performance is not deficient.” Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 863.

       Colindres contends that counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to

request a limiting instruction after the prosecution used a prior inconsistent

statement to impeach A.C. On direct examination, A.C. testified that she had

seen her uncle’s body moving up and down on N.C., but nothing more. Before

trial, in an interview with a Child Forensic Investigator, A.C. voiced that she had

seen her uncle remove clothing and “do his middle part in [N.C.’s] butt.” When

asked about the earlier interview at trial, A.C. could not remember what she had

told the investigator. As a result, the prosecution introduced statements from the

interview to impeach A.C. by prior inconsistent statement. Defense counsel did

not request a curative instruction.

       Failing to request a limiting instruction can be a strategic decision. Here,

however, because the prior statement addressed a factual issue central to the

                                         13
No. 84204-8-I/14

outcome of the case, defense counsel should have requested a limiting

instruction so that the jury did not consider the statements as substantive

evidence of guilt. Without a limiting instruction, the jury was free to use that

statement as substantive evidence of guilt. There was no legitimate reason in

this case for defense counsel not to request the instruction. Counsel fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.

       Although counsel’s performance was deficient, Colindres fails to

demonstrate that deficiency caused prejudice. Colindres argues that the State

relied on this evidence to establish penetration, a necessary element of the rape

of a child charge, and that other testimony was insufficient to meet this element.

But A.C.’s testimony was not the only evidence of penetration. N.C. also testified

that Colindres vaginally raped her. And N.C.’s physical examination showed

evidence of penetration. Even if the jury relied on A.C.’s interview as substantive

evidence of guilt, such evidence was cumulative. There was sufficient evidence

without the interview statements for the jury to find the element of penetration

beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, Colindres cannot establish that the lack

of limiting instruction affected the outcome of trial. Colindres does not establish

prejudice and therefore, counsel was not ineffective.

                     Victim Penalty Assessment and DNA Fee

       Colindres contends that the victim penalty assessment (VPA) should be

stricken because he is indigent. He also asserts that the DNA3 collection fee

should be stricken. We remand for the court to strike the VPA and DNA

       3   Deoxyribonucleic acid.

                                         14
No. 84204-8-I/15

collection fees from the judgment and sentence.

       In July 2023, the legislature amended RCW 7.68.035 to prohibit the

imposition of a victim penalty assessment if the court finds a defendant indigent

at the time of sentencing. The legislature also eliminated DNA collection fees.

Recently amended RCW 43.43.7541 provides that the court shall waive any DNA

collection fee previously imposed upon a motion by the defendant. These

amendments apply retroactively in this case because Colindres’s appeal was

pending when the amendments took effect. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 15,

530 P.3d 1048 (2023).

       Here, neither party disputes that Colindres was indigent at sentencing4

and that the VPA should be stricken. Likewise, although the statute technically

requires Colindres to move for the court to strike the DNA fee, neither party

disputes that the fee should be stricken.

       We remand for the court to strike both the VPA and the DNA collection

fee.

              Community Custody Provisions for Drugs and Alcohol

       Colindres asserts that the community custody requirement that he be

available for drug and alcohol testing at the request of his community corrections

officer (CCO) or treatment provider unconstitutionally invades his right to privacy.

His conviction did not involve drug or alcohol use. We remand to strike the

community custody conditions about drug and alcohol use.

       4 The trial court did not explicitly make a finding that Colindres was
indigent at sentencing, it only noted that it would waive all non-mandatory fees.

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No. 84204-8-I/16

      Constitutional challenges to community custody may be raised for the first

time on appeal. State v. Reedy, 26 Wn. App. 2d 379, 395, 527 P.3d 156, review

denied, 1 Wn.3d 1029, 534 P.3d 798 (2023).

      Generally, sentencing courts may impose and enforce crime-related

prohibitions and affirmative conduct as a condition of community custody. State

v. Martinez Platero, 17 Wn. App. 2d 716, 725-26, 487 P.3d 910 (2021). That

said, there must be “a reasonable relationship between the condition and the

defendant’s behavior.” Martinez Platero, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 726.

      Here, the State concedes that there was no evidence at trial that alcohol

or drug use contributed to Colindres’s offense and therefore, that the community

custody conditions related to drug and alcohol use are unsupported. We remand

for the court to strike the community custody conditions concerning drug and

alcohol use.

                                In Camera Review

      Colindres contends that this court should independently review documents

that the trial court denied to compel production of to determine whether the court

appropriately barred his access. Following an in camera review, we conclude

that the trial court appropriately denied Colindres’s motion to compel production.

      “A defendant is entitled to appellate review of [an] in camera hearing.”

State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 822-23, 699 P.2d 1234 (1985). Therefore, we

performed an in camera review. Following that review, we conclude that the trial

court appropriately denied Colindres’s motion to compel production and that he

was not inappropriately barred from accessing the documents at issue.

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No. 84204-8-I/17

       “It is within the trial court’s discretion to deny a motion to compel discovery

and we will not disrupt the ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” State v.

Johnson & Johnson, 27 Wn. App. 2d 646, 212, 536 P.3d 204 (2023), review

denied, 2 Wn.3d 1019 (2024). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is

manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable

reasons. State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 283-84, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007).

       Generally, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not

privileged, which is relevant to the subject involved in the pending action.”

CR 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” ER 401.

Evidence may be privileged under both attorney-client privilege and the work

product doctrine. Attorney-client privilege applies to communications and advice

between an attorney and client and extends to documents that contain privileged

communications. Soter v. Cowles Pub. Co., 162 Wn.2d 716, 745, 174 P.3d 60

(2007). Similarly, the work product doctrine protects documents and tangible

things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. CR 26(b)(4). Work product

documents do not need to be prepared personally by counsel; they are privileged

as long as they are prepared by or for the party in anticipation of litigation.

Doehne v. EmpRes Healthcare Mgmt., LLC, 190 Wn. App. 274, 283-84, 360

P.3d 34 (2015).

       Here, the trial court first concluded that the documents at issue were not

relevant, stating “[n]o portion of the documents reviewed by this court appears to

                                          17
No. 84204-8-I/18

pertain to the defendant’s case or to his alleged victim.” This was not an abuse

of the trial court’s discretion. As the documents do not address the defendant,

the victim, or any facts relating to the case at hand, they do not serve to make

the existence of any related fact more or less probable.

       The trial court also concluded that the documents at issue were protected

both by attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The trial court did

not abuse its discretion in concluding as such. The documents are privileged

under attorney-client privilege because they were prepared at the request of

general counsel to assist a health care provider in determining potential

corporate liability in an unrelated case. The documents also constitute work

product because they were prepared, at the direction of counsel, in anticipation

of litigation. The fact that Colindres was not the intended opponent in that

anticipated litigation does not mean that the documents are not work product.

       The trial court appropriately denied Colindres’s motion to compel

production as the material was not relevant and was privileged. Colindres was

appropriately barred from accessing the documents at issue.

                                 Cumulative Error

       Colindres lastly argues that, even if a single error alone is not enough to

warrant reversal, the combined effects of many errors denied him a fair trial

under the cumulative error doctrine. We disagree.

       The cumulative error doctrine applies when “several trial errors that

standing alone may not be sufficient to justify reversal but when combined may

deny a defendant a fair trial.” State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390

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No. 84204-8-I/19

(2000). “The test to determine whether cumulative errors require reversal of a

defendant’s conviction is whether the totality of the circumstances substantially

prejudiced the defendant and denied him a fair trial.” In re Pers. Restraint of

Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 690, 327 P.3d 660 (2014) (abrogated on other grounds

by State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018)). The defendant bears

the burden of proving cumulative error. In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d

296, 332, 868 P.2d 835 (1994).

       Here, there are only two established trial errors. The first is the

prosecutor’s inappropriate behavior in cross-examining Caceres. The second is

defense counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction. As discussed, neither

error resulted in prejudice. Because reversal under the cumulative error doctrine

requires circumstances that substantially prejudiced the defendant and Colindres

has failed to show prejudice, reversal is not warranted.

       We affirm Colindres’s convictions but remand for the court to strike the

victim penalty assessment, DNA collection fee, and community custody

conditions.

WE CONCUR:

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