Court Opinion

ID: 9948816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 23:02:33.263905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:54.456761
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24 (mod.); mod. and part. pub. order 3/7/24 follows unmodified opinion
(attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION FIVE

 FIX THE CITY, INC.,                                 B318346

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                    (Los Angeles County
                                                     Super. Ct.
         v.                                          No. 18STCP02720)

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES,                              ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
                                                   AND DENYING PETITIONS FOR
         Defendant and Respondent.                 REHEARING

                                                   NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

 THE COURT:

       It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 8,
2024, is modified as follows:
       On page 34, the last full sentence of the last paragraph,
beginning “Fix has not provided . . .”, is deleted and replaced with
the following sentence: “Fix has not provided any persuasive
legal authority to support their argument that inclusion of a
mitigation measure in an environmental impact report makes a
policy mandatory in the context of determining general plan
consistency.”
     There is no change in judgment.
     The petitions for rehearing are denied.

RUBIN, P. J.                 MOOR, J.          KIM, J.

                                   2
Filed 2/8/24 (unmodified opinion)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION FIVE

 FIX THE CITY, INC.,                           B318346

        Plaintiff and Appellant,               (Los Angeles County
                                               Super. Ct.
        v.                                     No. 18STCP02720)

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

        Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mary Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
      Strumwasser & Woocher, Beverly Grossman Palmer and
Caroline C. Chiappetti for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Terry Kaufmann
Macias, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Marvin E. Bonilla, John
W. Fox and Kathryn Phelan, Deputy City Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       Appellant Fix the City (Fix) sought a writ of mandate
challenging legislative actions taken by the City of Los Angeles
(City) to regulate development along a portion of a light rail line
running from downtown Los Angeles to Santa Monica. The
relevant legislative actions took place at three separate City
Council meetings: in early July 2018, the City made
amendments to its General Plan and certain community plans; in
late July 2018, the City adopted several zoning ordinances and
referred a specific plan to the City Attorney for legal review; in
November 2019, the City adopted the specific plan. In October
2018, before the specific plan was adopted, Fix’s writ petition
sought an order directing the City to rescind the specific plan and
the implementing ordinances and enjoining the City from
implementing the specific plan, on the grounds that the plan and
its implementing ordinances were inconsistent with the General
Plan.
       Well after the statute of limitations for challenging the
specific plan had expired, the City successfully obtained
judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Fix’s challenge to
the specific plan was premature. The trial court gave Fix two
opportunities to amend its petition to show timeliness under the
relation back doctrine, but ultimately in July 2021, it sustained
the City’s demurrer to Fix’s challenge to the specific plan without
leave to amend. The case proceeded with respect to Fix’s
challenge of the July 2018 zoning ordinances, and in December
2021, the court denied the petition, finding no abuse of discretion
in the City’s determination that the ordinances were consistent
with the City’s General Plan. Fix seeks to reverse both the July

                                    2
2021 order sustaining the City’s demurrer without leave to
amend and the December 2021 judgment in favor of the City.
       On the question of timeliness, Fix contends its challenge to
the validity of the City’s November 2019 specific plan adoption is
timely under the relation back doctrine, because Fix timely
challenged the City’s July 2018 legislative actions, and the
November 2019 adoption of the specific plan was based on the
same general set of facts and involved the same injury as the
earlier legislative actions. The City responds that the relation
back doctrine does not apply, both because Fix’s claim does not
meet the requirements of the relation back doctrine, and because
the statute requiring such challenges to be filed within 90 days of
the legislative act is a statute of repose. We conclude that the
relation back doctrine does not apply to the two distinct
legislative acts—the July 2018 actions and the November 2019
adoption of a specific plan—to render timely the otherwise
untimely challenge to the later legislative act.
       On the question of plan consistency, Fix contends the City
abused its discretion in adopting the July 2018 zoning ordinances
because they were inconsistent with certain provisions of the
City’s General Plan. The City responds that the ordinances do
not violate mandatory provisions of the General Plan, and
alternatively, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of
consistency. We conclude that Fix has not shown the City’s
determination of General Plan consistency was an abuse of
discretion.

                                     3
                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Expo Line Land Use Project

       The Metro Exposition Light Rail Transit Line (“Expo Line”)
is a 15.2-mile-long transit line running along Exposition
Boulevard between downtown Los Angeles and the City of Santa
Monica. The legislative actions at the heart of the current appeal
involve approval of component parts of a larger urban planning
effort, which we will refer to in this opinion as the Expo Line
Land Use Project. The Expo Line Land Use Project comprises a
number of distinct actions taken by the Los Angeles City Council
(City Council), including (1) adopting a specific plan entitled
Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan (the Expo Plan);1
(2) related zoning changes (the Zoning Ordinances); (3) related
amendments to the General Plan/Community Plans (Community
Plan Amendments); and (4) a final environmental impact report
(the FEIR).
       In January 2015, the City released a draft plan for the
Expo Plan, along with a draft environmental impact report
(DEIR). As explained in the 2015 draft plan, the goal of the Expo
Plan was to “consider how land use regulations can foster
building design and a mix of uses around the transit stations that
will encourage transit use and improve mobility for everyone.”
       The legislative actions relevant to this litigation were
carried out at three City Council meetings. On July 3, 2018, the

      1 The geographic scope of the Expo Plan generally includes
areas within one-half mile of five stations along the Expo Line in
the western part of the City.

                                    4
City Council adopted a resolution to certify the FEIR and adopt
the Community Plan Amendments.2 On July 31, 2018, the City
Council adopted the Zoning Ordinances. The City Council
deferred adoption of the Expo Plan until the City Attorney’s
Office completed a legal review. The Zoning Ordinances provided
that they would not take effect until the Expo Plan was adopted.
The City Council adopted the Expo Plan more than a year later,
on November 5, 2019.

Litigation

      On October 25, 2018, Fix filed a verified petition for
peremptory writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive and
declaratory relief (the Initial Petition). Although the Expo Plan
had not yet been adopted, the Initial Petition contained a single
cause of action for General Plan inconsistency that purported to
challenge the City’s adoption of the Expo Plan as inconsistent
with the mandatory policies in the General Plan. The petition
referred to the City’s actions on July 3, 2018 and July 31, 2018,
alleging that the “approvals constituting the Expo Plan and its
implementing resolutions became final on August 2, 2018.” In its
prayer for relief, the petition sought to rescind the actions
purportedly taken in July 2018, including approval of the Expo
Plan, any revisions to community plans, and any ordinances
implementing the Expo Plan.
      A joint case management statement filed in March 2019
acknowledged the Expo Plan had not yet been adopted by the

     2 We have not been asked to determine the validity of the
Community Plan Amendments.

                                   5
City. After the adoption of the Expo Plan in November 2019, two
filings referred to the City’s action: (1) the City filed a case
management statement and (2) the parties filed a joint
stipulation to continue the trial setting conference. On July 7,
2020, the City certified the administrative record and filed an
answer to the Initial Petition. The City’s answer included
affirmative defenses based on the timeliness of Fix’s challenge to
the Expo Plan, including statute of limitations and prematurity.
On prematurity, the City alleged Fix’s claims “are barred, in
whole or in part, to the extent they purport to challenge actions
taken by the City that post-date the filing of the Petition.”
       In September 2020, the City filed a motion for judgment,
arguing that Fix’s challenge to the adoption of the Expo Plan was
untimely. The City argued that the Initial Petition could only be
construed to have challenged the Zoning Ordinances. At the time
the Initial Petition was filed, the City Council had not yet
adopted the Expo Plan, and any challenge to that plan was
premature. More significantly, the City argued that Fix could no
longer challenge the adoption of the Expo Plan, as the City
Council had adopted that plan on November 5, 2019, and Fix did
not timely file an amended or new petition to challenge that
legislative action, and the relation back doctrine did not apply.
Fix did not contest that its Initial Petition had been filed
prematurely, but rather sought to apply the relation back
doctrine to bring a cause of action against the City for its
adoption of the Expo Plan in 2019.
       The court granted Fix leave to amend to allege facts
supporting Fix’s view that its challenge related back to the filing
date of the Initial Petition. Fix then filed a First Amended
Petition containing three causes of action: the first challenging

                                    6
the November 2019 Expo Plan, the second challenging the Zoning
Ordinances, and the third seeking declaratory relief. The City
demurred to the first cause of action, again asserting it was
untimely. After the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave
to amend, in February 2021, Fix filed a second amended petition,
the operative pleading.
       In July 2021, the court sustained the City’s demurrer to the
first cause of action in Fix’s second amended petition, finding the
challenge to the Expo Plan to be untimely, and denying leave to
amend.
       Following briefing and a hearing on the merits of the
remaining two causes of action (Fix’s challenge to the Zoning
Ordinances and its request for declaratory relief), the trial court
took the matter under submission. On December 17, 2021, the
court issued a ruling denying the petition, reasoning that the
City Council’s adoption of the Zoning Ordinances was not an
abuse of discretion, both because the General Plan policies at
issue were not mandatory and because there was sufficient
evidence in the administrative record to support the City’s
determination that the Zoning Ordinances were consistent with
the General Plan. The court entered judgment on January 21,
2022, and this timely appeal followed.

                           DISCUSSION

      Fix raises two contentions on appeal. First, it contends
that under the relation back doctrine, its challenge to the
November 2019 Expo Plan was timely. Second, it contends that
the City Council’s adoption of the Expo Plan and the Zoning

                                    7
Ordinances was an abuse of discretion, because they are
inconsistent with the General Plan. We reject both arguments.

Fix’s Challenge to the Expo Plan is Untimely

        Under Government Code section 65009, subdivision
(c)(1)(A)3, any proceeding to attack a legislative body’s decision to
adopt a specific plan must be filed and served “within 90 days
after the legislative body’s decision.” After prematurely
challenging the November 2019 adoption of the Expo Plan, Fix
did not file an amended petition until almost a year later, in
October 2020. Fix’s October 2020 attack on the Expo Plan can
only be considered timely if it “relates back” to the October 2018
Initial Petition. Based on the particular facts of this case, and
the purpose behind section 65009’s short limitations period, we
conclude the relation back doctrine does not apply.

   1. Overview of Contentions

       Fix contends its otherwise untimely challenge to the 2019
Expo Plan relates back to its Initial Petition, which timely
challenged the Zoning Ordinances. Fix argues that all of its
claims are based on the same general set of facts about which the
City had notice, the same injury, and were caused by the same
instrumentality. The City contends the relation back doctrine
does not apply, because section 65009 is a statute of repose,
relation back would thwart the statutory requirement of

        3 All further statutory references are to the Government
Code.

                                      8
procedural exhaustion, and Fix’s challenge of the Expo Plan does
not meet the requirements for relation back.4

   2. Standard of Review

      “Where the pertinent facts are undisputed, it is a question
of law whether a case is barred by the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, we apply the de novo standard of review.” (Arcadia
Development Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th
253, 260–261.) A trial court’s decision to sustain a demurrer
without leave to amend is reviewed de novo. (Save Lafayette
Trees v. City of Lafayette (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 148, 154
(Lafayette).) “In conducting the review, this court exercises its
independent judgment to determine whether the action can
proceed under any legal theory. [Citation.] Leave to amend
should not be granted if the pleadings disclose the action is
barred by a statute of limitations.” (Ibid.)

   3. Section 65009

         a. Operation of the statute of limitations

       Section 65009 imposes a 90-day statute of limitations on
legal challenges to specified local planning and zoning decisions,
including the adoption of a general or specific plan (id., subd.
(c)(1)(A)), and the adoption of a zoning ordinance (id., subd.

      4 Because we find the relation back doctrine does not apply,
we need not address the City’s arguments that section 65009 is a
statute of repose, or that the procedural exhaustion requirement
prevents application of the relation back doctrine here.

                                     9
(c)(1)(B)). (See Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th
757, 765 (Travis).) Section 65009, subdivision (c)(1), provides in
relevant part that “no action or proceeding shall be
maintained . . . unless” it is filed and served “on the legislative
body within 90 days after the legislative body’s decision” when
the action is one: “(A) To attack” the body’s decision “to adopt or
amend a general or specific plan” (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(A)) or “(B)
To attack” the body’s decision “to adopt or amend a zoning
ordinance” (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(B)). The 90-day limit applies to
“both the filing and service of challenges to a broad range of local
zoning and planning decisions.” (Honig v. San Francisco
Planning Dept. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 520, 526.)
       It makes sense that “[t]he limitations periods set out in the
statute are triggered by specific acts of local land use planning
authorities[,]” (County of Sonoma v. Superior Court (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1312, 1324): that is because “[t]he 90-day period is
attached to the decision under attack, and to no other decision.”
(Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of
Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 388; see 1305 Ingraham,
LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1253, 1261
[discussing requirement of legislative body’s decision]; Urban
Habitat Program v. City of Pleasanton (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
1561, 1571 (Urban Habitat) [the short 90-day period “begins to
run from the date the decision is made”]; Hensler v. City of
Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22 [the statute of limitations on a
challenge to the facial validity of a land-use regulation “runs from
the date the statute becomes effective”].)5

      5 With certain exceptions not relevant to our analysis,
section 65009, subdivision (b) limits legal actions challenging “a

                                     10
         b. Statutory purpose and construction

       Courts have consistently emphasized section 65009’s
express purpose of providing certainty to property owners and
local governments. (§ 65009, subd. (a).) “The express and
manifest intent of section 65009 is to provide local governments
with certainty, after a short 90–day period for facial challenges,
in the validity of their zoning enactments and decisions.” (Travis,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 774 [rejecting plaintiff’s theory of
continuous accrual].) The purpose of the short limitations period
is “thus to alleviate the ‘chilling effect on the confidence with
which property owners and local governments can proceed with
projects’ ([§ 65009], subd. (a)(2)) created by potential legal
challenges to local planning and zoning decisions.) (Id. at p. 765;
Lafayette, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 155 [purpose for the short
time frame applicable to both filing and service was “[t]o provide
certainty for property owners and local governments regarding
decisions by local agencies made pursuant to the planning and
zoning law”].) “The legislative policy behind both Government
Code section 65009 and CEQA is the prompt resolution of
challenges to the decisions of public agencies regarding land use.”
(Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. v. City of Irvine (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121 (Royalty Carpet Mills).)

finding, determination, or decision of a public agency” in the
planning and zoning context “at a properly noticed public
hearing” to those issues that have been brought to the public
agency’s attention at or before the public hearing. (§ 65009, subd.
(b); Weiss v. City of Del Mar (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 609, 619.)

                                    11
       Courts take a restrictive approach to applying section
65009’s limitations period, in light of its express acknowledgment
of California’s housing crisis and its emphasis on reducing delays
and restraints on completion of projects without the cloud of
potential litigation. (See, e.g., Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 774–775; Lafayette, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 155–159.)
For example, “[e]ven if a petition is timely filed under
Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c), if it is not
personally served as required by statute, the petition must be
dismissed.” (Royalty Carpet Mills, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1119; see Wagner v. City of South Pasadena (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 943, 950 [writ petition did not meet the statute of
limitation because it was served on the 91st day].) “The
Legislature provided that the 90–day period of Government Code
section 65009 is an absolute cut-off, beyond which relief for
failure to serve a petition cannot be granted.” (Royalty Carpet
Mills, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1114–1115.)
       In Travis, the Supreme Court considered the applicable
limitations period when an ordinance that was initially valid is
later preempted by state law. Any application of the preempted
ordinance in a specific instance, such as denial of a conditional
use permit, was an adjudicatory decision subject to a 90-day
limitations period under section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E).
(Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 766–769.) Because a facial
challenge would not be to an agency’s decision to adopt a zoning
ordinance, but rather its failure to repeal an ordinance that had
been rendered invalid by state law, a three-year limitations
period under Code of Civil Procedure section 338 applied,
running from the preemptive state law’s effective date. (Id. at
pp. 771–773.) Because the three-year deadline from the effective

                                    12
date of the preempted ordinance at issue in Travis had already
passed, plaintiffs argued for a “continuous accrual” approach,
under which the three-year period would begin when a specific
conditional use permit was denied or the preempted statute was
applied in some way, rather than when the preemptive state law
took effect. (Id. at p. 774.) The court rejected that approach,
reasoning it would “thwart the legislative purpose behind section
65009 without any necessity in justice or fairness.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff’s continuous accrual approach would create an “illogical
contrast,” based solely on whether the ordinance was invalid at
the time of enactment or was later preempted. Ordinances that
were invalid at the time of adoption have a 90-day limitations
period under section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B). Permitting a
facial challenge to a preempted ordinance to be brought at any
time within three years of the ordinance’s application—in
contrast to the date the ordinance was preempted—would
“directly contravene” the “legislative policy of requiring a prompt
challenge, running from the earliest date the action could be
brought.” (Id. at p. 775.)

   4. Relation Back Doctrine

       “Where the statute of limitations has expired before the
filing of an amended complaint, unless an amended complaint
relates back to a timely filed original complaint, the amended
complaint will be time-barred. (Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co.
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 150.) Under the relation back doctrine, to
avoid the statute of limitations bar, the amended complaint must
allege the same general set of facts, refer to the same accident,
same injuries, and refer to the same instrumentality as alleged in

                                     13
the original complaint. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th
383, 408–409.)” (Curtis Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 542, 548; see also Engel v. Pech (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1227, 1236 [relation back doctrine applies to late-
filed claims if they “(1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2)
involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality,
as the original [pleading]”].)
       “The relation-back doctrine . . . requires courts to compare
the factual allegations in the original and amended complaints.
For example, a third amended complaint alleging a cause of
action for age discrimination . . . did not relate back to the filing
of the original complaint because the wrongful conduct described
in the discrimination claim did not arise out of the same set of
facts alleged in the original complaint to support claims of breach
of contract and Labor Code violations. [Citation.] And an
amended complaint alleging the decedent was electrocuted by a
lamp socket and switch manufactured by one entity did not relate
back to an original complaint alleging the electrocution was
caused by a defective hair dryer with a different manufacturer
because, although the pleadings related to a single death at a
single location, they alleged different accidents and
instrumentalities. [Citation.]” (Davaloo v. State Farm Ins. Co.
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 416; see also Foxborough v. Van Atta
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 230–231 [denial of leave to amend was
not error, because proposed amendment to add new cause of
action for negligent advice was untimely and did not relate back
to original complaint for legal malpractice].)

                                     14
   5. Analysis

       Fix goes to great lengths to explain how the 2018 Zoning
Ordinances and the 2019 Expo Plan were closely interrelated.
We do not disagree with this characterization, and we note the
Zoning Ordinances expressly provided they would not become
effective until adoption of the Expo Plan. Although Fix concedes
that its second amended petition “refers to a second legislative
act, the City’s 2019 approval of the ordinance making the Expo
Plan, as approved in 2018, effective,” Fix argues that we should
afford no real significance to the distinct legislative actions, their
timing, and their import in the context of section 65009. We
disagree. As explained below, considering the statutory language
and legislative purpose of section 65009, and in light of the
relevant authorities, we conclude that Fix’s untimely challenge to
the City’s 2019 Expo Plan does not relate back to the timely
challenge of the 2018 Zoning Ordinances. The City’s legislative
actions in July 2018 and November 2019 are distinct
instrumentalities, and the challenge to each legislative action
was subject to its own statute of limitations.

         a. Relation back to premature actions

      In addressing whether the relation back doctrine applies,
Fix underplays the significance of the City’s formal adoption of
the Expo Plan in November 2019, and emphasizes that the
planning and execution of the Expo Line Land Use Project
unfolded over several years. But Fix cannot escape the fact that
the formal decision to adopt the Expo Plan is the most significant

                                      15
conduct at issue in this litigation, and that Fix’s cause of action
did not accrue under section 65009 until the City Council adopted
the Expo Plan in November 2019.
       It is well-settled in California law “that causes of action do
not accrue until after defendants have committed the wrongful
act which gives rise to the cause of action in the first place.” (Lee
v. Bank of America (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 197, 205 (Lee), fn.
omitted, italics added.) In the context of this case, where Fix’s
second amended petition alleges one cause of action to attack the
City Council’s decision to adopt the Expo Plan, and a second
cause of action to attack the City Council’s decision to adopt the
Zoning Ordinances, the wrongful acts at issue are legislative
actions that took place more than a year apart. Fix effectively
concedes in this appeal, as it did in the proceedings below
relating to the City’s motion for judgment on the Initial Petition,
that its Initial Petition was premature to the extent it purported
to attack the Expo Plan, as no cause of action had yet accrued
when Fix initially filed this action. The fact that Fix now seeks
to relate back its cause of action attacking the 2019 Expo Plan to
a date on which that cause of action did not yet exist undermines
application of the relation back doctrine.
       In Lee, the court analyzed whether the relation back
doctrine could save untimely added claims using the date of an
initial pleading, where that initial pleading preceded accrual of
the added claims. Plaintiff was a bank employee who sued her
employer after being demoted with a salary reduction. (Ibid.)
Although her original complaint denominated her claim as
“wrongful termination,” the factual allegations pertained to the
circumstances of her demotion and was filed while she was still
an employee. The bank fired her a month after her lawsuit was

                                     16
filed, and she did not file her first amended complaint until more
than two years later, so the wrongful termination claim would
only be timely if her amended complaint related back to the
original complaint. (Id. at p. 202.) The Lee court explained that
“different acts allegedly leading to the same injuries are not part
of the same general set of facts even though the two different acts
may, in context, have been part of the same ‘story.’ ” (Lee, at
p. 208.) The acts forming the basis for plaintiff’s untimely
termination claim were distinct from those supporting the timely
claim brought after she was demoted. Because plaintiff’s
termination was a distinct wrongful act occurring after she had
filed suit, the later-filed complaint did not relate back to the
original one. (Lee, at pp. 212–214.)6
       Fix does not effectively counter the fundamental reasoning
in Lee: that application of the relation back doctrine to a date
prior to the conduct that is the essential conduct for a cause of
action to accrue makes little sense.7 We find that this reasoning

      6 When a cause of action is “based on facts arising after the
original complaint was filed,” such cases “should be distinguished
from lawsuits which are premature because of some procedural
matter that did not come into existence until after the complaint
was originally filed.” (Lee, at p. 206.)

      7 We are aware that there is contrary authority: the court
in Lee discussed and disagreed with Honig v. Financial Corp. of
America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, which on very similar facts
reasoned that a wrongful termination claim arising after the
initial complaint was filed could be added by an amended
complaint, and the relation back doctrine would apply because
the facts in the original and amended complaints “related to the

                                    17
is particularly significant in the context of section 65009, because
it is a statute of limitations with the express purpose of providing
certainty and finality to local government land use decisions.
(§ 65009, subd. (a).) Creating a situation where a local
government’s legislative process can be disrupted by premature
filings, which are then used to assert later, untimely challenges
to the local government’s ultimate land use decisions, is contrary
to the purposes of section 65009.

         b. Relation back and continuing harms

       Rather than directly confronting the problem of permitting
relation back of a cause of action to a date before that cause of
action had even accrued, Fix invites us to focus on whether the
defendant was on notice of the potential claims from the initial
pleading. Fix essentially contends that the requirements of the
relation back doctrine are satisfied so long as the City could
anticipate the substance of the later amended petition.
       In support of the notice argument, Fix relies heavily on
Bendix Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 921. In
Bendix, the court permitted the plaintiff to seek a refund of
overpaid taxes for tax years 1976 and 1977, even though no

same general set of facts,” and “were in the chain of events
originally pled.” (Honig, at pp. 966–967.) The Honig court found
the amendments permissible because they “finished telling the
story begun in the original complaint,” the parties were fully
aware of the later events, and there was no prejudice. (Id. at p.
966.) However, we agree with the court in Lee that the Honig
court reached its conclusion without persuasively addressing the
problem of a distinct wrongful act. (Lee, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at
p. 212.)

                                     18
timely claim was filed for those years; the court permitted
relation back to an original proceeding that sought refunds for
tax years 1961 through 1975. The court emphasized that where
the conduct alleged in the original pleading gave notice of alleged
wrongful conduct that was of a continuing nature, relation back
should be permitted. The Bendix court addressed the timeliness
question by examining the nature of the newly asserted, untimely
claims: “ ‘If those claims are unrelated to those alleged in the
initial complaint, or rely on conduct or events different from those
involved in the original action, the statute of limitations should
be applied. [Citations.] Where, however, the original pleading
gave notice that the alleged wrongful conduct was of a continuing
nature, supplemental pleadings addressed to the same conduct
should not encounter statute of limitations questions.’ ” (Bendix,
supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 926, quoting William Inglis, etc. v.
ITT Continental Baking Co. (9th Cir. 1981) 668 F.2d 1014, 1057.)
The court determined that the subsequent tax years could be
added: “[t]he supplemental complaint merely restated the
allegations of the initial pleadings and further alleged only that
the claimed violations had continued. Of course, the complaint
was based on new events, but these events are a continuation of
the old cause of action. [Citation.]” (Bendix, at p. 926.) The
Bendix court reasoned that allowing the later, untimely claims to
relate back to the original complaint was preferable, because it
“promotes the purpose of the statute of limitations and fosters the
policy that cases should be determined on their merits.” (Id. at
p. 925, fn. omitted.)
       However, the appellate court deciding ITT Gilfillan, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 581, 586 took a
different view and denied application of the relation back

                                     19
doctrine in similar circumstances. In ITT Gilfillian, the
reviewing court emphasized the difference between an amended
complaint—involving “the same general facts as the original
complaint”—and a supplemental complaint, which “deals with
matters occurring after commencement of the action.” (136
Cal.App.3d at p. 586.) While a new cause of action asserted in an
amended complaint could relate back to the original, a new cause
of action in a supplemental complaint could not, because the new
claim could be asserted in a separate complaint. (Id. at pp. 588–
589.)
       Fix’s analysis of, and reliance on, Bendix fails to grapple
with an essential reason the court permitted relation back: it
found the alleged wrongful conduct was of a continuing nature.
To the extent Bendix suggests that where an initial pleading
fairly alleges a continuing violation, subsequent conduct falling
within that continuing violation can be related back to the
original pleading, we are not persuaded that the causes of action
here comprise continuing violations. Section 65009 in its purpose
and operation separates out each decision of a legislative body on
specified land use determinations as a distinct cause of action
subject to its own 90-day statute of limitations. (See § 65009,
subd. (c)(1)(A) through (E); Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 765–
766.) Indeed, in Travis, our Supreme Court rejected a theory of
continuous accrual as antithetical to the purpose of section
65009. (Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 774.) The concept of
continuing wrongful conduct, as used in Bendix, is inapt because
it ignores the fact that each 90-day statutory period under section
65009 is triggered by a separate legislative action.

                                    20
         c. Instrumentality

       Fix relies heavily on Pointe San Diego Residential
Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265 (Pointe), where the reviewing court
found the relation back doctrine applicable because plaintiffs’
various alleged acts of legal malpractice all “referred to the same
instrumentality (alleged professional negligence)” in the course of
the same litigation. (Id. at p. 278.) Fix describes the
instrumentality here at a similar level of abstraction: “the Expo
Plan’s conflict with the General Plan requirements regarding
infrastructure adequacy.”
       In Pointe, plaintiffs filed suit against a defendant law firm
within one year after discharging the firm from a separate,
ongoing litigation matter. The plaintiffs’ initial form complaint
alleged general negligence, with bare bones factual allegations
that the law firm had failed to use due care in representing
plaintiffs in the identified litigation. (Id. at p. 277.) Plaintiffs
filed their fourth amended complaint more than four years later,
alleging nine distinct causes of action, and giving details about
the dates plaintiffs sustained injuries from each alleged act of
malpractice and facts pertaining to the relation back issue. (Id.
at pp. 272–273.) Each act of malpractice preceded the filing of
the initial complaint. (Id. at p. 271.) The court reasoned that the
initial complaint was sufficient to put the law firm on notice of
the nature of the malpractice claim, including the need to gather
and preserve evidence relating to the underlying litigation, and
“it would defeat this state’s liberal pleading rules and statutory
and judicial policies requiring prompt filing of malpractice
complaints to hold the relation-back doctrine inapplicable here

                                     21
merely because plaintiffs’ original complaint did not contain
detailed allegations of the precise nature of the alleged legal
malpractice.” (Id. at p. 279.)
       Fix argues that just as the Pointe court reasoned that the
plaintiffs’ malpractice claims sprung from a single “primary
right—the right to be free of negligence by their attorneys in
connection with the litigation for which they were retained,” (id.
at pp. 274–275), the two causes of action in Fix’s second amended
petition, the first cause of action challenging the 2019 Expo Plan
adoption and the second cause of action challenging the Zoning
Ordinances, also pertain to the same primary right—the right to
City land use decisions consistent with the General Plan.
       We disagree that Pointe is instructive here as to the nature
of the instrumentalities. In Pointe, the initial pleading was
vague, asserting a single cause of action for malpractice without
detailing specific acts encompassed within that allegation. The
later filed causes of action simply identified the various acts of
malpractice and, significantly, each one of those acts had already
occurred at the time the original complaint was filed. Although
each individual action could be considered a separate cause of
harm, the Pointe court sensibly viewed attorney malpractice as a
single instrumentality.
       We view the instant case as closer to the circumstances in
McCauley v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 1255, relied upon by the City. In McCauley, the
court concluded that an amended complaint asserting an
otherwise untimely challenge to one instance of the defendant’s
political financial reporting did not relate back to the original
complaint. The original 1988 complaint alleged defendant
violated reporting requirements in connection with a 1984 ballot

                                    22
initiative. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in 1991 adding
more violations, including a violation relating to the 1986
election. (Id. at pp. 1258–1259.) The claim based on the 1986
violation would only be timely if it related back to the 1988
original complaint. (Id. at p. 1261.) The reviewing court rejected
as “absurdly broad” plaintiff’s argument that the two violations,
pertaining to two different sets of direct mail in two different
elections, related to the “ ‘same general set of facts.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 1261–1262.) Plaintiff had also argued that because the
discrete violations were part of the defendant’s “ ‘ongoing’ duty to
file campaign reports,” the original complaint alleging violation of
that duty was sufficient to anchor other violations as well. (Id. at
p. 1262.) The court rejected this argument, noting that “to hold
that separate reporting violations could be part of one blurred
‘ongoing duty’ to file reports flies in the face of . . . .” the statutory
scheme, which required private litigants to first give the civil
prosecutor an opportunity to pursue the claim before filing suit.
(Id. at p. 1263.) The McCauley court cited with approval the
analysis in Lee and its rejection of the relation back doctrine,
particularly to circumstances where “[o]ne could even be sued for
acts one has yet to do.” (Id. at p. 1262.)
       Here, Fix’s untimely effort to challenge actions that post-
dated the Initial Petition through the relation back doctrine is
not comparable to the facts in Pointe, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 265,
where the later amendments to the complaint simply filled in to a
broadly pleaded initial complaint the specific instances of
malpractice that existed at the time the initial complaint was
filed. Rather, as in Lee, Fix is challenging conduct that did not
exist at the time of the Initial Petition, and that is distinct from
the conduct that caused a different cause of action to accrue later.

                                        23
Similar to the distinct wrongs at issue in both Lee and McCauley,
each of the two legislative acts at issue are not violations of any
ongoing duty; under the operation of section 65009, they are
distinct land use decisions that are independently actionable. As
such, the relation back doctrine does not apply.
      We are also unconvinced by Fix’s argument that because an
allegation of General Plan inconsistency forms the basis for Fix’s
attacks against both the 2018 Zoning Ordinances and the 2019
Expo Plan, the two claims arise from the same primary right, and
therefore satisfy the “same injury” requirement for relation
back.8

         d. Policy considerations

       We remain cognizant of the case law favoring liberal
application of the relation back doctrine to support the state’s
strong policy of deciding cases on their merits when a defendant
has adequate notice of a claim. (Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills,
Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 685, 715.) However, in the particular
circumstances of this case, those concerns are outweighed by the
need to provide certainty to property owners and local
governments through finality in land use decisions, express
legislative purposes of section 65009’s short limitations period.
Fix counters that the City Council’s actions led to confusion about
when legislative acts took place. However, the City filed a joint
case management statement on November 18, 2019 advising the

      8 We are not persuaded by Fix’s reliance on Atwell v. City of
Rohnert Park (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 692, which Fix acknowledges
did not involve either the relation back doctrine or the statute of
limitations under section 65009.

                                    24
court that the City Council had adopted the Expo Plan on
November 5, 2019. Had Fix filed a supplemental complaint
within 90 days after that legislative act, there would be no
question about the timeliness of its challenge. It did not do so,
and instead it belatedly sought to convince first the trial court
and now this court that its untimely claim should relate back to
the 2018 petition.
       Because this case involves two distinct legislative acts
governed by section 65009’s 90-day statute of limitations, and Fix
failed to timely challenge the second legislative act, we conclude
that the relation back doctrine does not apply.

The City’s Finding of General Plan Consistency Was Not an
Abuse of Discretion

       In its second amended petition and its appellate briefing,
Fix tries mightily to shift the lens through which it seeks to
examine the City’s action, heavily relying on statements made by
the City in other contexts, such as in separate litigation or the
Framework Element draft environmental impact report. But this
case is not about whether the City’s infrastructure is already
broken or stretched too thin, or even whether the increases in
population density associated with the Zoning Ordinances at
issue here will further strain the existing City infrastructure.
       Instead, in determining whether the Zoning Ordinances are
inconsistent with the General Plan, the only question the trial
court needed to examine, and the only issue we are examining
here, is whether the General Plan imposes on the City a clear,
mandatory duty to disallow new development until adequate
infrastructure is in place. We conclude that the General Plan

                                    25
does not impose a mandatory duty to disallow any new
development, but rather to make an express or implied finding of
infrastructure adequacy. Considered in context, there is
substantial evidence to support an implied finding that the
changes enacted through the Zoning Ordinances are supported by
adequate infrastructure because the overall goal is to encourage
more density and mixed uses of property near transportation
infrastructure, namely the new light rail stations.

   1. Overview of Contentions

      Fix contends the General Plan imposes on the City a
mandatory obligation to ensure the adequacy of public
infrastructure and emergency services prior to approving
increases in density. It argues the Zoning Ordinances are
invalid because they are inconsistent with General Plan policies,
specifically the Framework Element Policy 3.3.2 and West Los
Angeles Community Plan Policies 1-2.3 and 16-2.1. The City
contends the Zoning Ordinances are compatible with the General
Plan and the identified policies are not mandatory. It
alternatively argues that if the policies are mandatory, the record
evidence supports a finding of infrastructure adequacy.

   2. Overview of the City’s General Plan and Land Use
      Planning Process

      The City’s General Plan comprises a number of distinct
elements, including 8 elements required under state law, as well
as 35 different community plans. The process for approving
zoning ordinances is described in various provisions of the City

                                    26
Charter, the Los Angeles Administrative Code, and the Rules of
the Los Angeles City Council. As relevant here, when the City
Council adopts a zoning ordinance, it must find the ordinance to
be “in substantial conformance with the purposes, intent and
provisions of the General Plan.” (Los Angeles Charter and
Administrative Code, § 558; see also Los Angeles Muni. Code,
§12.32.)

   3. General Plan and Consistency Requirements

       “A city or county must adopt a ‘comprehensive, long-term
general plan’ for its physical development. (Gov. Code, § 65300.)
The general plan must include ‘a statement of development
policies and . . . objectives, principles, standards, and plan
proposals’ and elements addressing land use, circulation,
housing, conservation, open space, noise, and safety. (Gov. Code,
§ 65302.)” (Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los
Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1194 (Federation).) “The
general plan has been aptly described as the ‘constitution for all
future developments’ within the city or county.” (Citizens of
Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 570.)
“The general plan serves as a ‘charter for future development’
[citation] embodying fundamental policy decisions [citation]. The
policies in a general plan typically reflect a range of competing
interests. [Citation.]” (Federation, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1194.)
       Any legislative action or adjudicatory decision by city or
county government affecting land use must be consistent with the
governing general plan. (City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey (2018) 5
Cal.5th 1068, 1079; Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville

                                    27
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 807, 815 (Lagoon Valley).) “However, ‘ “it
is nearly, if not absolutely, impossible for a project to be in perfect
conformity with each and every policy set forth in the applicable
plan. . . . It is enough that the proposed project will be
compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses and
programs specified in the applicable plan.” ’ ” (Golden Door
Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
467, 498–499.) “A project is consistent with the general plan ‘ “if,
considering all its aspects, it will further the objectives and
policies of the general plan and not obstruct their attainment.” ’ ”
(Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural etc. County v. Board of
Supervisors (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1336 (FUTURE).) A
project is inconsistent with the general plan if it conflicts with a
policy that is “fundamental, mandatory, and clear.” (Endangered
Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orange (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
777, 782.)

   4. Standard of Review

      “ ‘[A] governing body’s conclusion that a particular project
is consistent with the relevant general plan carries a strong
presumption of regularity that can be overcome only by a
showing of abuse of discretion.’ [Citations.] ‘An abuse of
discretion is established only if the city council has not proceeded
in a manner required by law, its decision is not supported by
findings, or the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] We may neither substitute our view for
that of the city council, nor reweigh conflicting evidence
presented to that body. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This review is
highly deferential to the local agency, ‘recognizing that “the body

                                      28
which adopted the general plan policies in its legislative capacity
has unique competence to interpret those policies when applying
them in its adjudicatory capacity. [Citations.] Because policies
in a general plan reflect a range of competing interests, the
governmental agency must be allowed to weigh and balance the
plan’s policies when applying them, and it has broad discretion to
construe its policies in light of the plan’s purposes. [Citations.] A
reviewing court’s role ‘is simply to decide whether the city
officials considered the applicable policies and the extent to which
the proposed project conforms with those policies.’ [Citation.]”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Because an appellate court’s task in
review of a mandate proceeding is essentially the same as that of
the trial court, we review the agency’s actions directly and are
not bound by the trial court’s conclusions. [Citations.]” (Lagoon
Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 816–817.)
       “The enactment of a zoning ordinance is a quasi-legislative
decision. [Citations.] Courts defer to a local entity’s
determination that a zone change is consistent with the
applicable general plan unless ‘based on the evidence before [the]
City Council, a reasonable person could not have reached the
same conclusion. [Citations.]’ ” (Corona-Norco Unified School
Dist. v. City of Corona (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 985, 992 (Corona);
see also FUTURE, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338 [general plan
consistency determination reversed only if no reasonable person
would reach the same conclusion].)
       The same deferential standard applies when a city makes
an adjudicatory decision, such as approving a specific
development project. “Where a consistency determination
involves the application of a general plan’s established land use
designation to a particular development, it is fundamentally

                                     29
adjudicatory. In such circumstances, a consistency determination
is entitled to deference as an extension of a planning agency’s
‘ “unique competence to interpret [its] policies when applying
them in its adjudicatory capacity.” ’ [Citation.] Reviewing courts
must defer to a procedurally proper consistency finding unless no
reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion.”
(Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v. Superior Court (2016)
2 Cal.5th 141, 155.)
       “Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid, and to
overcome the presumption of validity, the petitioner must
produce evidence ‘compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is,
as a matter of law, unreasonable and invalid. [Citations.] There
is also a presumption that the board ascertained the existence of
necessary facts to support its action, and that the “necessary
facts” are those required by the applicable standards which
guided the board. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Corona, supra, 17
Cal.App.4th at p. 993.)

   5. Analysis

     We agree with the trial court that Fix did not meet its
burden to show that the Zoning Ordinances were inconsistent
with the City’s General Plan.9 The language Fix relies upon is
too amorphous to establish a fundamental and specific
inconsistency with a mandatory requirement, particularly when

      9 During appellate briefing, Fix and the City filed separate
requests for judicial notice, asking this court to take judicial
notice of various documents, some of which were before the trial
court and some of which were not. We grant Fix’s request and
note that the City’s request was granted on February 3, 2023.

                                    30
the language at issue is considered in the greater context of the
competing policies and priorities that are included in the scope of
the General Plan as a whole, as well as the Framework Element
and the West Los Angeles Community Plan. (See San Francisco
Tomorrow v. City of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 498,
517 (San Francisco Tomorrow) [rejecting argument that policies
were fundamental, mandatory and clear and that board could not
weigh and balance multiple policies].) We are also not persuaded
by Fix’s argument that statements by the City in other contexts,
including litigation over the Framework Element, transform
permissive language in the General Plan into mandatory
requirements for purposes of determining the consistency of
later-enacted ordinances.

         a. General plan, framework element policy 3.3.2

      Fix contends that under the Framework Element, the City
would not just measure the adequacy of City services and
infrastructure, but also “only approve increases in density when
infrastructure and services were adequate and not threatened.”
The plain language of Policy 3.3.2 of the Framework Element10

      10 The full text of Policy 3.3.2 states:
                                             “Monitor population,
development, and infrastructure and service capacities within the
City and each community plan area, or other pertinent service
area. The results of this monitoring effort will be annually
reported to the City Council and shall be used in part as a basis
to: [¶] a. Determine the need and establish programs for
infrastructure and public service investments to accommodate
development in areas in which economic development is desired
and for which growth is focused by the General Plan Framework

                                      31
does not support Fix’s argument that the General Plan imposes
on the City a clear and mandatory duty to ensure adequate
infrastructure before increasing density. (San Francisco
Tomorrow, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 517, quoting FUTURE,
at p. 1341 [it is critical to consider the nature of the policy and
the purported inconsistency].) Instead, the policy directs the City
to “monitor population, development, and infrastructure and
services capacities” within the City as a whole and within each
community plan area, and to report the results of the monitoring
effort to the City Council. The report then “shall be used . . . as a

Element. [¶] b. Change or increase the development forecast
within the City and/or community plan area as specified in Table
2-2 (see Chapter 2: Growth and Capacity) when it can be
demonstrated that (1) transportation improvements have been
implemented or funded that increase capacity and maintain the
level of service, (2) demand management or behavioral changes
have reduced traffic volumes and maintained or improved levels
of service, and (3) the community character will not be
significantly impacted by such increases. [¶] Such modifications
shall be considered as amendments to Table 2-2 and depicted on
the community plans. [¶] c. Initiate a study to consider whether
additional growth should be accommodated, when 75 percent of
the forecast of any one or more category listed in Table 2-2 (see
Chapter 2: Growth and Capacity) is attained within a
community plan area. If a study is necessary, determine the
level of growth that should be accommodated and correlate that
level with the capital, facility, or service improvements and/or
transportation demand reduction programs that are necessary to
accommodate that level. [¶] d. Consider regulating the type,
location, and/or timing of development, when all of the preceding
steps have been completed, additional infrastructure and services
have been provided, and there remains inadequate public
infrastructure or service to support land use development.”

                                     32
basis to” do four things: (1) measure need and establish
programs for infrastructure and public service investments in
specified areas; (2) modify the City’s forecasts for growth and
capacity; (3) if certain conditions are met, initiate a study to
consider whether additional growth should be accommodated,
and correlate the level of growth with “the capital, facility, or
service improvements and/or transportation demand reduction
programs that are necessary to accommodate that level[;]”
and (4) “[c]onsider regulating the type, location, and/or timing of
development, when all of the preceding steps have been
completed, additional infrastructure and services have been
provided, and there remains inadequate public infrastructure or
service to support land use development.”
      We agree that the language of Policy 3.3.2 requires the City
to monitor the “infrastructure and service capacities” of the 35
community areas within the City, and to study and consider how
resources can be devoted to improving infrastructure where
needed. However, the Policy does not prohibit the City from
increasing density or approving development, even in
circumstances where “there remains inadequate public
infrastructure or service to support land use development.” In
such circumstances, far from prohibiting development when
infrastructure is inadequate, the policy simply requires the City
to consider regulating development. (Policy 3.3.2(d) [“Consider
regulating the type, location, and/or timing of development”].) In
other words, the policy does not expressly prohibit development
based solely on inadequate infrastructure, and therefore does not
prohibit the City from increasing density even in circumstances
where the existing infrastructure is inadequate.

                                    33
       Our conclusion is reinforced by language in Chapter 10 of
the Framework Element, discussing Implementation Programs.
After noting that “not all plan policies can be achieved in any
given action, and in relation to any decision, some goals may be
more compelling than others,” and noting that the chapter
includes over 60 implementation programs, the introduction
provides a bullet point summary of “the principal programs that
are essential in carrying out the policy direction of the
Framework Element.” The two bullet points relevant to our
analysis focus not on prohibiting development, but monitoring
the ongoing balance between development and providing public
services, while also protecting the environment: “A program to
monitor the status of development activity, capabilities of
infrastructure and public services to provide adequate levels of
service, and environmental impacts (e.g., air emissions),
identifying critical constraints. deficiencies and planned
improvements (where appropriate) (P42)” and “An Annual Report
on Growth and Infrastructure that documents the results of the
annual monitoring program (P43).”
       Finally, we are unpersuaded by Fix’s argument that Policy
3.3.2 imposes a mandatory duty because it was part of a plan to
mitigate the development impacts of the Framework Element.
Fix has not provided any legal authority to support their
argument that mere inclusion in an environmental impact report
makes a policy mandatory.

                                   34
         b. West Los Angeles Community Plan, Policies 1-2.3 and
            16-2.1

       Turning to the West Los Angeles Community Plan, while
the language Fix relies on is more targeted than the language in
the Framework Element, it is not mandatory, and it lacks the
clarity and specificity necessary to overcome the presumption
that the Zoning Ordinances are valid and consistent with the
General Plan.
       The West Los Angeles Community Plan embodies a wide
range of policies, and neither Policy 1-2.3 nor Policy 16-2.1 are
specific enough to support a finding of general plan inconsistency.
Policy 1-2.3 states, “Do not increase residential densities beyond
those permitted in the Plan unless the necessary infrastructure
and transportation systems are available to accommodate the
increase.” The associated program note states: “[t]he decision
maker should adopt a finding which addresses the availability
and adequacy of infrastructure as part of any decision relating to
an increase in permitted residential density.” We agree with the
City that the use of the word “should” rather than “shall” or
“must,” weighs against construing the policy (and its suggestion
that the decisionmaker adopt a finding) as mandatory. (Kucera v.
Lizza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1152 [“ ‘may’ and ‘should’ are
ordinarily permissive].) Neither the policy’s reference to
“necessary infrastructure and transportation systems” nor the
program note’s reference to “availability and adequacy of
infrastructure” provides any specific details about what is meant
by the term “infrastructure,” or how to determine whether it is
necessary, available, or adequate. In addition, Policy 1-2.3 is the
third of three policies under the plan’s Objective 1-2: “To reduce

                                    35
vehicular trips and congestion by developing new housing in
proximity to adequate services and facilities.” The other two
policies also prioritize proximity of development to public
transportation.11 Considered in context, it would be reasonable
to infer that the focus of Policy 1-2.3 is on transportation
infrastructure generally. Instead, Fix takes a narrow view
focused on emergency response times. Even if the Policy can be
understood to be referring to infrastructure generally, the lack of
any express method to measure infrastructure adequacy in the
context of the policy undermines Fix’s argument that the Zoning
Ordinances are invalid because they are inconsistent with this
policy. (See Lagoon Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 820–
821 [rejecting project opponent’s characterization of a traffic
circulation policy as a “rigid mandate,” and instead concluding
“the policies actually afford the City a high degree of flexibility in
balancing traffic circulation and land use considerations”].)
       Policy 16-2.1 states “No increase in density shall be effected
by zone change, plan amendment, subdivision or other
discretionary action, unless it is determined that the
transportation infrastructure serving the property can
accommodate the traffic generated.” It is the only policy under
Objective 16- 2: “To ensure that the location, intensity and
timing of development is consistent with the provision of
adequate transportation infrastructure.” The program note

      11 Policy 1-2.1 states:  “Locate higher residential densities
near commercial centers and major bus routes where public
service facilities and infrastructure will support this
development.” Policy 1-2.2 states: “Locate senior citizen housing
within reasonable walking distance of health and community
facilities, services and public transportation.”

                                      36
states: “Decision makers shall adopt a finding with regards to
infrastructure adequacy as part of their action on discretionary
approvals resulting in increased density or intensity.” Given that
the plain language of Objective 16-2 focuses on “transportation
infrastructure,” and the entire Expo Plan Project is premised on
the expansion of a light rail system, applying the presumption
that the City ascertained the existence of necessary facts to
support its action (Corona, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 993), we
conclude that the City implicitly determined that increased
access to public transportation warranted the increases in
density near the Expo Line stations.
       Fix argues that the trial court improperly relied on an
unpublished case, Saunders v. City of Los Angeles, 2012 Cal.App.
Unpub. LEXIS 6965, in concluding that the use of the word
“shall” in Policy 16-2.1 does not necessarily create a mandatory
duty. Because we independently conclude that none of the
policies Fix relies upon establish a clear, mandatory duty
sufficient to undermine the City’s plan consistency
determination, there is no need for us to determine whether the
trial court’s references to Saunders violated rule 8.1115 of the
California Rules of Court.
       Both cases Fix relies on, FUTURE and Endangered
Habitats, involved specific, unambiguous mandatory policies. In
FUTURE, the general plan’s land use policy limited which areas
could be designated as “low density residential” to land
contiguous to “Community Regions” and “Rural Centers,”
preventing the use of the “low density residential” designation for
land that did not meet the description. (FUTURE, supra, 62
Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) The court found invalid the county’s
approval of a low-density residential project on land that was not

                                    37
contiguous to a “Community Region” or “Rural Center,” because
it was inconsistent with a “fundamental, mandatory and specific
land use policy.” (FUTURE, at p. 1342.) In Endangered
Habitats, the court found no reasonable person could conclude the
project in question was consistent with the general plan, where it
violated a “ ‘traffic level of service policy’ ” using the methodology
identified by the policy; the Board had not used the policy’s
express methodology, but instead employed a different
methodology, not sanctioned in the policy, to find that the project
had an acceptable impact. (Endangered Habitats, supra, 131
Cal.App.4th at pp. 782–783.) The court also invalidated proposed
amendments to a specific plan where the general plan required
all new development to comply with all specific plan policies,
while the proposed amendments (which the reviewing court
invalidated as inconsistent with the general plan) would allow a
balancing approach to specific plan requirements and exempt the
project in question from certain specific plan requirements. (Id.
at pp. 785–790.)
       In contrast, both Policy 1-2.3 and 16.2-1 lack the clarity or
specificity necessary to conclude that the City abused its
discretion when it determined—expressly or implicitly—that the
Zoning Ordinances were consistent with the General Plan. (See
Corona, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 993 [presumption that the
board ascertained the facts necessary to support its decision].)
Fix’s argument is closer to the ones rejected in Lagoon Valley,
supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pages 818 to 823 and San Francisco
Tomorrow, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 498. In Lagoon Valley, the
petitioner argued a development project was incompatible with
elements of the general plan and guiding policies in the
transportation element of the general plan, based on anticipated

                                      38
increases in traffic. Even though the general plan’s guiding
policies identified a minimum level of service for all intersections,
a different policy acknowledged that service could be lower in
certain situations. The court noted that the petitioner’s “rigid
reading of the General Plan would essentially rule out
development in the area—a result that is certainly at odds with
the policies expressed in the General and Policy Plans.” (Lagoon
Valley, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 821.) In San Francisco
Tomorrow, the reviewing court also rejected an argument that a
long-term redevelopment project was inconsistent with the
general plan, where an initiative had identified eight “priority
policies” for the general plan, but the court concluded that the
plain language of the priority policies was “neither ‘mandatory’
nor ‘clear.’ ” (San Francisco Tomorrow, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 519–520.) The court noted that “the policies themselves
contain no objective standards, but only subjective standards that
neither prohibit any particular development or type of
development, nor command any particular outcome.” (Id. at
p. 520.)
       Here, because the General Plan—whether we consider the
Framework Element or the West Los Angeles Community Plan—
does not impose a fundamental, specific or mandatory duty, the
question of plan consistency is closer to San Francisco Tomorrow
and Lagoon Valley than FUTURE or Endangered Habits, and so
we find the City’s actions were not an abuse of discretion.

         c. Compatibility/balancing other policies

      The boundaries of the Expo Plan area bring together areas
that “have a unique physical identity in that they comprise

                                     39
approximately 250 acres and are within a transit-oriented area
that, pursuant to the General Plan, should be planned for a
higher density, transit oriented mixed-use development that
reduces vehicle trips; provides greater housing and jobs; and
brings additional services and amenities to the surrounding
residential area.”
      The City Council ultimately adopted consistency findings
contained in the November 9, 2017 Staff Report and findings in
the FEIR concluding that the Expo Plan Project met multiple
objectives of the general and applicable community plans,
including the West Los Angeles Community Plan.
      Because we defer to the City acting in its legislative
capacity in balancing multiple policies, goals, and objectives, we
find there was substantial evidence to support the City’s
determination that the Zoning Ordinances were compatible with
the objectives of the General Plan.

                                    40
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
the City of Los Angeles.

                                        MOOR, J.

We concur:

     RUBIN, P. J.

     KIM, J.

                                  41
Filed 3/7/24

       CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
             SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                     DIVISION FIVE
 FIX THE CITY, INC.,             B318346

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                    (Los Angeles County
                                                     Super. Ct. No. 18STCP02720)
         v.
                                                 ORDER MODIFYING
 CITY OF LOS ANGELES,                            OPINION AND CERTIFYING
                                                 FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
         Defendant and Respondent.
                                                 NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:
      It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 8,
2024, and modified February 27, 2024, is modified as follows:

    1. On page 3, at the beginning of the second full paragraph,
       the phrase “On the question of timeliness,” is replaced with
       the following sentence:
          In the published portion of this opinion, we consider the
          timeliness of Fix’s challenge to the specific plan.

                *Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, this
opinion is certified for publication with the exception of now part B of the Discussion.
2. On page 3, the second full paragraph, the phrase “On the
   question of plan consistency,” is replaced with the following
   sentence:
      In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we consider
      the question of plan consistency.

3. On page 8, the first subheading is revised to read as
   follows:
       A. Fix’s Challenge to the Expo Plan is Untimely.

4. On page 25, the first subheading is revised and a footnote is
   added, as follows:
     B. The City’s Finding of General Plan Consistency Was
     Not an Abuse of Discretion.*

5. On page 25, before the second full paragraph that begins
   “In its second amended petition . . .” insert the following:
      Begin unpublished portion

6. On page 40, after the final paragraph, insert the following:
     End unpublished portion

   There is no change in the judgment.

   *See footnote, ante, page 1.

                                  2
       The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on
February 8, 2024, and modified on February 27, 2024, was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it
now appears that the opinion should be partially published in the
Official Reports and it is so ordered.

____________________________________________________________
RUBIN, J.           MOOR, Acting P. J.             KIM, J.

         Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                           3