Court Opinion

ID: 9677346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:49:41.539074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:56.245735
License: Public Domain

GRIMM, Judge.
I respectfully dissent.
The policy language determines the rights and obligations of the parties. Three sections deserve special mention.
First, the Reames’ policy states: “Defined words are printed in bold face italics.” In this opinion, bold print is used where the policy uses bold face italics.
Second, the policy defines the term “insured.” It says “insured means:
1. you;
2. your spouse;
3. the relatives of the first person named in the declarations;
4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of consent of you or your spouse; and
5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by one of the above insureds.”
Third, the policy sets forth when there is no coverage. This policy clause, sometimes referred to as a “household exclusion clause,” states “THERE IS NO COVERAGE: ...
2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO:
* * ⅜ * ⅜ *
c. ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF AN INSURED’S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED’S HOUSEHOLD.”
Applying the policy language from these sections to the facts before us, Richard Bow-den is an insured. Thomas Reames was a named insured and he gave Mr. Bowden permission to use the vehicle. Thus, Richard Bowden was an insured by virtue of paragraph 4, “any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of consent of you.”
Richard Bowden was driving the vehicle when the accident occurred, fatally injuring his wife Debra. Richard and Debra Bowden were living together in the same household. Under the policy, there is no coverage for bodily injury to “any member of an insured’s family residing in the insured’s household.” Because Richard was an insured and Debra was both a member of his family and resided in his household, the policy does not provide coverage for her injuries.
The majority frames the issue as “who is ‘an insured’ and who is ‘the insured.’ ” Majority p. 669. They rely on a discussion of the grammatical difference between “an” and “the” as it modifies “insured” in Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 693 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Mo. banc 1985). In Brooks, apparently the policy did not clearly indicate what was meant by the term “insured.” Id. As a result, the court was free to distinguish between “the insured” and “an insured.”
That freedom does not exist here. Missouri continues to recognize the freedom of contract in automobile liability insurance. Halpin v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. banc 1992).
Here the policy states, “Defined words are printed in bold face italics.” In the household exclusion clause, the term “insured” is printed in bold face italics. The policy definition of “insured” is controlling. A lay person’s definition of insured does not apply when, as here, the policy plainly indicates the technical meaning is intended. See Rodri*670quez v. General Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. banc 1991).
A court is not permitted to create an ambiguity “in order to enforce a particular construction which it might feel is more appropriate.” Id. I cannot find “a grammatical ambiguity in the exclusion itself that suggests an interpretation favoring the insured.” Halpin, 823 S.W.2d at 483. Thus, I cannot affix a meaning to “insured” different from that set forth in the policy.
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment.