Court Opinion

ID: 9828721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:39:02.794362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:52.180086
License: Public Domain

SMITH, J.
The paving company brought this suit against Holt and wife to recover the amount of an assessment made against them by the city of San Antonio for work done and material furnished by the paving company, in paving the street in front of plaintiffs in error’s homestead, on Nolan street in said city. Int addition to the assessment made by the city and the issuande of paving certificates in pursuance thereof, the obligation of 'plaintiffs in error was further evidenced by mechanics’ and material-men’s liens, executed in favor 'of the paving company by Mr. and Mrs. Holt, before any of the materials were furnished or work was done by the company. The jury, in response to a peremptory instruction from the court, returned a verdict in favor of the paving company for the amount of the debt, and for foreclosure of the contract lien;, the jury determined that $100 was a reasonable attorney’s fee in the case, which was assessed against Holt. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the verdict, and the Holts have appealed.
It appears from the pleadings and evidence that the paving certificates on which the suit is based in part were dated, and the issuance thereof authorized, on April 14,1921, at a time when Sam O. Bell was mayor and Fred Fries was city clerk; whereas, the certificates were actually signed six weeks later, on June 1, 1921, by Mayor O. B. Black and City Clerk Ben H. Cordell, who had in the meantime superseded Bell and Fries. It is contended by plaiptiffs in error that this discrepancy between the date of the certificates and the execution thereof by the city officials • rendered them void. This contention is urged in plaintiffs in error’s first proposition of law, which purports to be predicated upon plaintiffs in error’s eighth, ninth, twelfth, thirteenth, eighteenth, twenty-first, thirty-ninth, and forty-ninth assignments of error. We overruled this proposition, along with the assignments to which it may be germane. We are of the opinion that the discrepancy between the date and the execution of an instrument or contract becomes material only when the rights, liabilities, obligations, or remedies of the parties, or either of them, are affected thereby. It does not appear that the parties were so affected in this instance, and the discrepancy is therefore immaterial.
The statute (Rev. St. art. 1015) provides that' the property owner against whom or Avilóse property paving (assessments have “been made, shall have the right, within ' twenty days thereafter,” to bring suit to set aside or correct the assessment “or any proceeding with reference thereto, on account of any * * * invalidity therein”; that thereafter the owner “shall be barred from any such action, or any defense of invalidity in such proceedings or assessments * * * in any action in which the same may be brought in question.”
• Plaintiffs in error have grouped 25 of their assignments of error under the one proposition, that the 20-day limitation, for reasons stated, does not apply in this case. It appears that these assignments are each directed at the action of the court in disposing of the pleadings in the case, which cover 57 pages of the transcript. The pleadings affected are not shown in the brief, nor are the exceptions, nor the court’s ruling thereon, and it would be an almost interminable task for this court to search the record and locate and segregate these matters and allocate them appropriately to plaintiffs in error’s proposition. It is asserted generally in the one proposition that the 20-day period of limitation is inapplicable to plaintiffs in error’s case, “because such 20 days expired long be-fóte work was commenced, .and because the defects therein complained of rendered the proceedings void; defendants’ complaints therein included, among others, that the work was not done according to the contract between the city and paving company, and therefore no liability attached because the paving company breached its contract with the city and did not comply therewith, for the reason that no such complaint could be made before the work was completed and certainly not before it was begun.” This proposition is, as stated, predicated upon 25 different assignments of error; each of which appears to raise a separate and distinct question of law, and is directed to the action of the court in sustaining a particular exception to plaintiffs in error’s answer. We will -consider this proposition only for the purpose of making a general application of the law thereto.
It seems to be settled that if the proceedings of the governing body under which the paving is done are void, the validity thereof may be attacked at any time. Elmendorf v. City of San Antonio (Tex. Com. App.) 242 S. W. 185. It would seem true on the contrary, then, that if such proceedings are merely voidable, but not void, the 20-day limitation applies and will be enforced. Otherwise the statute is useless and serves no purpose whatever. As presented here, it does not affirmatively appear from plaintiffs in error’s proposition, or statement, or argument thereunder, that plaintiffs in error alleged facts showing that the assessment made by the city against their property, or any particular proceeding under the assessment, was void, and as it does appear that this suit *287was filed more than twenty days after all the matters complained of occurred or accrued, plaintiffs in error’s second proposition will be overruled, in so far as it is therein contended .that the assessment or proceedings thereunder were invalid.
It is further contended in plaintiffs in ■error’s second proposition that the paving “work was not done according to the contract between the city and the paving company, and therefore no liability attached, because the paving company breached its contract with the city and did not comply therewith, for the reason that no such complaint could be made before the work was completed and certainly not before it was begun.” In the statement under this proposition neither the pleadings nor the exceptions which were sustained thereto are set out, and there is nothing in plaintiffs in error’s brief by which the soundness of their contention may be determined. As stated, the pleadings in the case cover 57 pages in the record, and we must decline to undertake to eke out of those pleadings all the allegations and exceptions appropriate to plaintiffs in error’s proposition, which is, on that account, overruled.
Plaintiffs in error’s third proposition Of law is that—
“In pleading ordinances of a city, or special legislative acts in reference thereto, the contents thereof as well as the dates of their adoption should be substantially stated; courts not taking judicial knowledge of same.”
This .proposition is predicated upon 12 different assignments of error, in each of II of which complaint is made of the overruling of a specific exception urged by plaintiffs in error to defendant in error’s trial petition, and in the twelfth of which complaint is made of the admission of certain testimony. In this way the one proposition covers 12 different questions of law, although it states only the one general proposition, quoted above. Although that proposition may correctly state an abstract principle, it will be overruled in this particular case on authority of article 1011, R. S., and Elmendorf v. City of San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S. W. 631.
When this cause was finally called in the court below, plaintiffs in error filed a motion to postpone the trial to await the outcome of a certain cause then pending in another district court of Bexar county, in which the city of San Antonio had sought to establish that the paving certificates herein sued upon were illegally issued and were' therefore void. This motion was overruled, but later on in the trial was renewed, when it was shown that the other suit had been transferred to the court in which the instant suit was being tried. The court below again overruled the motion to postpone. -The former suit had been pending about 10 months, and its progress towards final disposition was shown to have been such as to warrant the court below in proceeding to the trial of the instant case, without reference to the other suit. Plaintiffs in error’s fourth proposition of law, complaining of this matter, will therefore be overruled.
Plaintiffs in error’s fifth proposition of law is that—
“The matters pleaded in defense were sufficient to defeat plaintiff’s cause of action, and the evidence offered in support of and tending to support same, being also sufficient, the court should not have peremptorily instructed the "jury.”
This proposition is too general, within itself, to require consideration; but the action of the court in directing a verdict was fundamental in its nature, and should be considered even though not assigned as error. We have examined the record, however, and find no errors apparent on the face thereof.
The judgment is affirmed.