Court Opinion

ID: 9541185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:21.936614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:31.416883
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, President Judge,
concurring:
Although I join wholeheartedly in the majority’s disposition of this case, I feel constrained to comment upon the paragraph concerning the allocation of the burden of proof between a natural parent and an adoptive parent. This appears to be a case of first impression in this Commonwealth and as such should not be treated lightly.
The majority cites the Adoption Act for the proposition that an adoptive child has the same rights and duties with respect to his parents as does a natural child. In my *25opinion, it does not necessarily follow from this fact that the adoptive parent and the natural parent of the same child under the circumstances of this case have an equal burden of proof in a custody battle over that child.
Initially, it should be noted that this situation substantially differs from the normal adoption situation. That is, normally the natural parents of a child have signed away or had their parental rights terminated, voluntarily or involuntarily, in favor of the adoptive parents. If the termination or adoption is invalid for some reason, then the natural parents retain their advantage with respect to burden of proof in a custody suit and the purported adoptive parents have become relegated to mere third parties. See generally The New Adoption Act of October 15, 1980, P.L. 934, No. 163, § 1, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101- 2908 (Supp.1980); In re Adoption of R. W. B., 485 Pa. 168, 401 A.2d 347 (1979); In re Adoption of P., 475 Pa. 197, 380 A.2d 311 (1977); Adoption of Baby Girl Fleming, 471 Pa. 73, 369 A.2d 1200 (1977). Thus, in this type of a situation the status of an adoptive parent and that of a natural parent are mutually exclusive.
The instant case, however, is not so easily categorized. Here the natural parent of the child in question has retained her status as such, and her new spouse, by agreement, has become the adoptive parent of the child.1 The crucial fact here is that there has been no voluntary termination of the natural parent’s rights. After the natural mother and the adoptive father separated, the question concerning the burden of proof between them in a custody dispute soon manifested itself. The unique character of this situation, therefore, is that of a dispute between a natural mother who has not terminated any of her rights or duties with respect to her child, and an adoptive father who has voluntarily taken on the rights and concomitant obligations of parenthood.
*26Although there are no Pennsylvania cases directly on point, we can obtain guidance from our case law which holds that a “natural” or “biological” parent has an advantage with respect to the burden of proof in custody suits against third parties. Albright v. Com. ex rel. Fetters, 491 Pa. 320, 421 A.2d 157 (1980); Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512 (1980); In re Hernandez, 249 Pa.Superior Ct. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977). In Hernandez, Judge Spaeth, writing for a majority of this Court, articulated two reasons why the burden of proof is equal when dealing with natural parents inter se and, presumably, not equal when dealing with natural parents as against third parties: (1) the parent’s legal obligation to support his or her child; and (2) the biological relationship which exists between parent and child. Id., 249 Pa.Super. at 281 n.2, 376 A.2d at 651 n.2. Consequently, appellant herein cites the Hernandez case in support of her contention that the father must come forward with “compelling reasons” in order to obtain custody of his adoptive child. When applying the Hernandez rationale to the instant facts it becomes apparent that while the legal obligation of support is present in the relationship between the father and his adoptive son, there is lacking the important biological relationship which was stressed in Hernandez. See also Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. at 372, 416 A.2d at 516. For this reason, I must take exception to the majority’s allocation of an equal burden of proof between the natural mother and the adoptive father in the instant case.
If we are to accept Hernandez and its rationale, then in the interest of consistency and stability, I feel we should follow through with this type of analysis when faced with situations like the present one. In my opinion, therefore, I would treat this case as different from a natural parent versus natural parent suit in which the burden of proof is equal, as well as different from a natural parent versus third party suit in which case the scales are tipped heavily in favor of the parent. Thus, we would be obliged to establish a burden of proof which is not equal, thereby giving weight to the important biological relationship between natural *27parent and child. But, on the other hand, the burden of proof should not be so great as to require an adoptive parent to show “compelling reasons” in order to obtain custody, thereby reflecting a refusal by the courts to unjustifiably relegate an adoptive parent to the position of a mere third party. Thus, with the efficacy of Hernandez still intact, I would be in favor of an intermediate type of burden of proof requiring an adoptive parent to come forward with substantial, as opposed to compelling, reasons why it is in the child’s best interest that custody be established in his or her favor rather than in favor of the child’s natural parent.
This then brings me to my final point: with the courts becoming more attuned to the paramount concern for arriving at custody decisions which are in the best interests of the child, it appears incongruous to be concerned with “prima facie rights”, presumptions, and favorable allocations of the burden of proof to which a natural parent is entitled!2 Our body of recent custody decisions has disfavored the approach which stresses rights and entitlements of the litigants and *28has instead emphasized what custodial arrangement would be in the child’s best interest. See generally Bertin, Emanuel A. and Klein, Vanessa Anthony, Pennsylvania’s Developing Child Custody Law, 25 Vill.L.Rev. 752 (1980) [hereinafter “Bertin & Klein”]. If this is truly the key to our custody decisions, then perhaps it is time to totally disclaim a rights or entitlements type of analysis with respect to the burden of proof. See Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. at 371, 416 A.2d at 515 (1980) (Flaherty, J., concurring) and Bertin & Klein, supra at 758. The litigants should simply be put on an equal footing at the outset, and then the entire realm of facts and circumstances which are relevant to determining who is the best custodial parent should be considered. Whether one of the litigants is a natural parent, an adoptive parent, a relative, or a mere third party, would then simply become one of the factors to be considered in the analysis of what custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child.
By clearly eliminating the presumption per se, and mandating that custody be determined by a preponderance of evidence, weighing parenthood as a strong factor for consideration, custody proceedings would be disentangled from the burden of applying a presumption that merely beclouds the ultimate concern in these cases: the determination of what affiliation will best serve the child’s interest, including physical, emotional, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being. (Emphasis in original).
Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. at 373-74, 416 A.2d at 516-17 (Flaherty, J., concurring) (suggestion that the Hernandez standard be replaced with a clear and simplified version of the best interest test).
Nevertheless, because Hernandez has been adopted by the Supreme Court in Albright and Ellerbe,3 I feel consistency *29requires that an adoptive parent show substantial reasons why he or she should obtain custody of the child in question as opposed to the natural biological parent of such child.

. Although adoption usually terminates all of the natural parent’s rights with respect to his or her child, 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption, §§ 84-85 (1962), the natural mother in the present case retained all of the previous parental rights she previously had with respect to her child because the adoption to which she consented in no way affected her parental rights, but gave adoptive parent’s rights to her new husband. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903.

. In Albright, Justice Nix took the Hernandez Court to task with respect to its distinctions between the “three variations” of the test:
The Hernandez Court also took issue with those decisions that formulated the standard in terms of a presumption in favor of a parent. Commonwealth ex rel. Bendrick v. White, 403 Pa. 55, 169 A.2d 69 (1961); Auman v. Eash, 228 Pa.Super. 242, 323 A.2d 94 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Gifford v. Miller, 213 Pa.Super. 269, 248 A.2d 63 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Galloway v. Galloway, 188 Pa.Super. 313, 146 A.2d 383 (1958). This objection is probably nothing more than a semantic quibble. “Prima facie” is in reality nothing more than a procedural device which assigns the burden of proceeding with the evidence. A fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary. Mineo v. Eureka Sec. F. & M. Ins. Co., 182 Pa.Super. 75, 125 A.2d 612 (1956); Beckman v. Brownback, 341 Pa. 565, 20 A.2d 200 (1941); Johnson v. State, 258 Ind. 648, 283 N.E.2d 532 (1972); Dal. Int’l Trading Co. v. The Milton J. Foreman, 171 F.Supp. 794 (E.D.N.Y.1959); Detig v. Kelley, 17 Ill.App.2d 496, 150 N.E.2d 845 (1958); Herbert v. Whims, 68 Ohio App. 39, 38 N.E.2d 596 (1941); Black’s Law Dictionary 1353 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). The real questions are the quality and quantity of evidence required to overturn the presumption. It is doubtful whether either term, i.e., “presumption ” or “prima facie” is particularly helpful in this regard.
Albright v. Com. ex rel. Fetters, 491 Pa. at 325 26 n. 1, 421 A.2d at 159 n.1.

. See also Wrecsics v. Broughton, 285 Pa.Superior Ct. 90, 426 A.2d 1155 (1981); In re Donna W., 284 Pa.Superior Ct. 338, 425 A.2d 1132 (1980); Palmer v. Tokarek, 279 Pa.Superior Ct. 458, 421 A.2d 289 (1980).
Justice Flaherty’s concurring opinion in Albright proclaims that the views he espoused in Ellerbe have been vindicated. 491 Pa. at 329, 421 A.2d at 161 (Flaherty, J., concurring). In my opinion, however, *29this is less than clear because the Albright majority does purport to follow Hernandez and Ellerbe and does provide the natural parent with a favorable, albeit tempered, burden of proof. I subscribe to the view that the Hernandez line of cases must be repudiated before Justice Flaherty’s proclamation is fulfilled. See Bertin & Klein, supra at 756 n. 33 (“In view of the majority’s holding in Ellerbe, it is submitted that the Hernandez decision would have to be modified or overruled in order for the presumption to be abolished”).