Court Opinion

ID: 9407733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-08 19:09:53.555868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.725687
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00047-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

LAYNE ALAN DEROUEN,                                                         Appellant,

                                         v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 36th District Court
                         of Aransas County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                   Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

      Appellant Layne Alan Derouen appeals his conviction of aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony enhanced as a repeat felony offender, for

which he received a life sentence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42(b), 22.02(a)(2).

By a single issue, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that he used a deadly weapon. We affirm.

                                    I.     BACKGROUND

       Appellant was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 1) and

possession of a controlled substance (Count 2). Count 1 alleged that appellant:

       on or about the 14[th] day of June, 2022, in said County and State and
       anterior to the presentment of this Indictment, did then and there
       intentionally or knowingly threaten Jonathan Everett with imminent bodily
       injury by putting gasoline on said Jonathan Everett and chasing him with a
       lighter in an attempt to light him on fire, and did then and there use or exhibit
       a deadly weapon, namely a lighter during the commission of the assault.

The case was tried to a jury wherein seven witnesses testified, and thirty-eight exhibits

were admitted. We summarize the relevant testimony and evidence below.

       Deputy Cody Coulston from Aransas County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO) testified that

he was on duty for a night shift patrol on June 14, 2022. Deputy Coulston responded to a

call and, upon arrival, encountered Jonathan Everett. Deputy Coulston observed that

Everett’s shirt “had a wet stain” that smelled like gasoline on it and his arm “was glistening

like it was wet.” Screenshots of Deputy Coulston’s body camera were admitted as

exhibits, corroborating his observations. Deputy Coulston also noted that the area around

Everett’s trailer was wet with a substance that also smelled like gasoline.

       ACSO Deputy Brandon Garcia arrived to assist. Deputy Garcia testified that he

observed Everett’s shirt and right arm to be covered with a substance that smelled like

gasoline and confirmed that the area around Everett’s trailer was wet with a substance

that smelled like gasoline. Deputy Garcia explained that after arresting appellant, he

conducted a search of appellant’s person and recovered an orange and black torch lighter

from appellant’s back right pocket. The lighter was admitted as an exhibit.

                                              2
       Everett testified that on June 14, he was changing the locks on a trailer that had

been gifted to him by a friend when appellant “came around the front of the [trailer] and

threw gasoline on [him] and told [him he] needed [to] get off the property.” Everett stated

that after appellant threw the gasoline on him, appellant “kept lighting a torch lighter” so

Everett went inside the trailer. However, appellant “followed [Everett] inside and kept

lighting the torch lighter and telling [Everett that he] needed to get out of there.” According

to Everett, appellant made gestures to ignite the gasoline on him while appellant was

within arm’s reach. Because Everett was concerned that the gasoline was going to be lit

on fire, he “shooed the lighter away more than once.” Sometime after law enforcement

arrived, Everett complained that his skin was burning, so Deputies Coulston and Garcia

called for medical assistance to examine Everett; however, Everett declined any transport

to a hospital and the medical technicians just helped him clean the gasoline off his skin.

       Following an off-the-record charge conference, the trial court reconvened the jury

and read the jury charge. Appellant did not object to the charge as written. The jury charge

included the definition of a deadly weapon, id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B), the elements of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, id. § 22.02(a)(2), and all other requisites of a

charge. The charge directed the jury as follows:

       Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you believe from the
       evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 14[th] day of June,
       2022, in the County of Aransas, and State of Texas, as alleged in Count 1
       of the indictment, [appellant], did then and there, intentionally or knowingly
       threaten [Everett] with imminent bodily injury by putting gasoline on said
       [Everett] and chasing him with a lighter in an attempt to light him on fire, and
       did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, namely a lighter during
       the commission of the assault, you will find [appellant] “GUILTY” of
       “Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon.” If you do not so believe, or if
       you have a reasonable doubt thereof, then you will find [appellant] “NOT

                                              3
       GUILTY” of “Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon.”

       The jury found appellant guilty. During the punishment phase, appellant pleaded

“true” to two enhancement paragraphs, enhancing his punishment to twenty-five to ninety-

nine years’ imprisonment or imprisonment for life. Id. § 12.42(d). The jury sentenced

appellant to life in prison. This appeal followed.

                                II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “The Constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (citing

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970)). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,

we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” to determine

whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010) (adopting the standard of review for a sufficiency challenge as set out by

Jackson). When a reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict, it “is required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because

the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their

testimony.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. “[A] factfinder may disbelieve some or all of a

witness’s testimony, even when that testimony is uncontradicted.” Hernandez v. State,

161 S.W.3d 491, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

       “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt

of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper

v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d

45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Juries may “draw multiple reasonable inferences as long
                                           4
as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial.” Id. at 15. If the record

supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflict in

favor of the prosecution and defer to that resolution. Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683,

687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. “However, juries are not

permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported

inferences or presumptions.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15. “[A]n inference is a conclusion

reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them” while

“[s]peculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and

evidence presented.” Id. at 16.

       Sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements of the criminal

offense as defined by state law. Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252–53 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). However, review of the “[s]ufficiency of the

evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the

hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 687 (quoting Malik

v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A hypothetically correct jury

charge “accurately sets out the law and adequately describes the offense for which the

[appellant] was tried without increasing the State’s burden of proof or restricting the

State’s theories of liability.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14 (citing Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

       Sometimes, a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue turns upon the meaning of
       the statute under which the [appellant] is being prosecuted. In those
       situations, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
       verdict, we ask if certain conduct actually constitutes an offense under the
       statute, which is a question of law we review de novo.

Flores v. State, 620 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (cleaned up).

                                             5
                                  III.   APPLICABLE LAW

       “A person commits [aggravated assault] if the person commits assault as defined

in § 22.01 and the person uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the

assault.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2). As relevant here, a person commits assault

if he intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury, including the

person’s spouse. Id. § 22.01(a)(2). A deadly weapon is “anything that in the manner of its

use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). “‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a

substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or

protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Id.

§ 1.07(a)(46).

       When conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review to a deadly weapon finding,

we engage in a two-step process. Flores, 620 S.W.3d at 158 (citing McCain v. State, 22

S.W.3d 497, 502–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). The first step is to determine whether the

object could be a deadly weapon under the facts of the case. Id. “Generally speaking, the

nature of the object itself does not limit whether that object may be a deadly weapon;

rather, it is only the manner of the [appellant]’s use or intended use that provides any

meaningful limitation to the broad statutory definition.” Id. at 158–59 (cleaned up). The

second step is to determine whether the object was “used or exhibited” during the

commission of the offense. McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503. Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) “does not

require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury; an object is a deadly

weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing

                                             6
death or serious bodily injury.” Id.

                                       IV.   ANALYSIS

       The evidence in this case is undisputed: appellant threw gasoline on Everett’s

body, demanded that Everett leave the property, then moved within arm’s length of

Everett’s person with a lit torch lighter. Indeed, appellant does not argue that the evidence

was insufficient to prove those facts; rather, appellant seems to argue that the lighter

alone, as used under the present circumstances, does not constitute a deadly weapon.

       As to the first inquiry of whether the lighter constitutes a deadly weapon, the facts

of the case are such that if appellant was successful in using the lighter to ignite the

gasoline on Everett’s body, Everett could have suffered serious bodily injury. See Flores,

620 S.W.3d at 158; Lozano v. State, 860 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, pet.

ref’d) (upholding a finding that a lighter constituted a deadly weapon where appellant used

it to start a house fire, killing four people); see also Ellis v. State, No. 2-02-416-CR, 2004

WL 177851, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 29, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (affirming a deadly weapon finding where testimony showed

appellant poured gasoline on complainant and threatened to ignite it with a cigarette

lighter). Therefore, appellant’s use of the lit torch lighter could be used as a deadly

weapon under the facts here. See Flores, 620 S.W.3d at 158. The fact that the item

described as a deadly weapon—lighter—would be used in conjunction with something

else—gasoline—has no bearing on whether the item constitutes a deadly weapon; rather,

appellant’s threatened or intended use under the facts of the case is what makes an object

                                              7
a deadly weapon. 1 See id. Accordingly, the first inquiry into whether the object used

constitutes a deadly weapon is satisfied. See id.

        As to the second inquiry, we consider whether appellant used or exhibited the

lighter during the commission of the offense. See McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503. Everett

testified that appellant exhibited the lighter and ignited it while within arm’s reach of him.

See id.; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Appellant argues that “[t]he evidence in this case

proved that a lighter, without use in conjunction with gasoline, is not a deadly weapon”

because “[n]othing was set on fire and [Everett’s] injury came from the gasoline on his

skin.” However, § 22.02(a)(2) makes it an offense to use or exhibit a deadly weapon

during the commission of an assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2); McCain,

22 S.W.3d at 503 (concluding a knife in appellant’s pocket was a deadly weapon used or

exhibited for the purposes of the offense where the knife was exposed such that

complainant could see it). Thus, the jury could have inferred that appellant threatened or

intended to use the lighter to ignite the gasoline on Everett. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.02(a)(2) (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15

(permitting juries to draw inferences). As such, the second inquiry is also satisfied.

        Measuring the evidence against a hypothetically correct jury charge, we conclude

         1 To the extent appellant intends to argue that the indictment or jury charge contained error, those

arguments are waived for inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Mosley v. State, 666 S.W.3d
670, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (declining to address arguments by appellant where they were
inadequately briefed). Appellant specifically attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, including the standard
of review for sufficiency but does not include any statutes, rules, or case law addressing either the
indictment or the jury charge. See Ukwuachu v. State, 613 S.W.3d 149, 157 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020)
(“[W]e are bound by our procedural rules to consider the complaint that was actually raised by
[a]ppellant . . . .”); Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“It is incumbent upon
[a]ppellant to cite specific legal authority and to provide legal arguments based upon that authority.”).

                                                     8
the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s use of a deadly weapon. See Malik,

953 S.W.2d at 240. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting any other element of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2).

Accordingly, appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

                                   V.     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                          CLARISSA SILVA
                                                          Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
6th day of July, 2023.

                                               9