Court Opinion

ID: 9592774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:16:56.359782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:43.488611
License: Public Domain

Springer, C. L,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the court’s affirming the judgment of the trial court; but, I strongly disagree with the plurality’s suggestion that “the absence of a legal or blood relationship between a bystander and a victim should not foreclose recovery” in an emotional distress case. If such became a rule of law, it would permit anyone to prosecute an emotional distress claim merely by showing that (as put in the plurality opinion) “he apprehended [a] serious injury to his loved one.”
Whatever the term “loved one” might encompass, extending this narrow tort to any plaintiff who might claim to “love” some one or another not only creates an undefinable and unmanageable class of plaintiffs, it goes far beyond the generally recognized bounds of this tort. If the plurality’s proposition were ever adopted by a majority of this court, it would be in direct contradiction of our rule in State v. Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 716, 710 P.2d 1370, 1377-78 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1969)), that “the plaintiff and the victim [must be] closely related.” (Emphasis added.) “Best friends” and “loved ones” are not related.
The term “related,” as used in Eaton, has the traditional meaning of being related by blood or marriage. I would agree with the trial court that the relationship of the sisters-in-law comes within the definition of “closely related,” and is not a “distant relationship,” as these terms are employed in Eaton. As I have always *821understood the word “related,” it necessarily applies only to one’s “relations,” which is to say, persons with whom one is “related by blood or marriage.” At common law and traditionally, one could be related either by consanguinity or by affinity. Consanguinity denotes relationship by blood. Affinity denotes relationship by marriage. In dissenting, I do not propose a rule that would identify the line between those mentioned in Dillon who are “closely related” and those who bear a “distant relationship;” but I am prepared to accept sisters-in-law as a close enough relationship to permit recovery in this case under Dillon, and that is the reason that I concur in the result reached by the majority.
Dillon and Eaton speak of close and distant relationships. I take this to mean that persons who are not related1 cannot be the subject of this tort action. Thus, good friends, admired celebrities and dearly-loved pets are excluded.
It would be very disturbing if the court were ever to adopt the rule suggested by the plurality, namely, that “the absence of a legal or blood relationship between a bystander and a victim would not foreclose recovery,” it would vastly expand the scope of liability under this tort. Under such a rule, anyone could claim to have a “close relationship” (as defined by the plurality) with one’s boss, a close acquaintance or an admired rock star — just about anybody — and recover money for the distress suffered when witnessing injury to whomever one is so “closely related.” Juries will now be asked to inspect “the nature and quality of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim,” whatever in the world that expression might mean, and award damages, I guess, baséd on the “nature and quality of the relationship.” I consider this rule to be a very ill-advised one and, therefore, dissent.

I remember reading in one of Norman Cousin’s books that, mathematically, every person on earth is related to all others by no less than the sixteenth degree — sixteenth cousins. Thus, although we are all “related,” I believe that in defining “closely related” in the context of this tort, I see the sister-in-law, brother-in-law relationship as being at the outer limits of the “close” relationship that is required for tort liability.