Court Opinion

ID: 9927948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 16:16:47.282061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:28.616430
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Athey, Friedman and Raphael

              PAUL LOUIS HERRMANN, S/K/A
               PAUL LOIS HERMANN
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1714-22-2                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                 JANUARY 30, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
                                              David E. Johnson, Judge

                              (Todd M. Ritter; Hill & Rainey, on brief), for appellant.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Liam A. Curry, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Paul Louis Herrmann (“Herrmann”) was convicted in the Chesterfield County Circuit

              Court (“trial court”) on one count of robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58. Herrmann asserts

              that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to prove he was the perpetrator. After

              examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is

              unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule

              5A:27(a). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        I. BACKGROUND

                     We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing

              party in the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting

              Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). Doing so requires that we “discard the

              evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

       On February 2, 2021, Nabila Naseri (“Naseri”) was working as the lone cashier at a Shell

gas station and convenience store located in Chesterfield County when an unidentified man

entered the store. The man, who brandished a large knife, told Naseri “this is a robbery” and

“give me all the money.” Naseri was then instructed to open the cash register and put all the

money in a bag. Frightened, Naseri complied, and the man left with the stolen money. Naseri

then contacted the store manager before reporting the robbery to law enforcement.

       Chesterfield County Police Officer Jacob Bellamy (“Officer Bellamy”) arrived first at the

store and asked Naseri for a description of the robber. Naseri was only able to identify him as a

masked white male, around 40 or 50 years old who was “short and fat.”1 Officer Bellamy

reviewed the store’s surveillance video, which depicted a man wearing blue jeans, a two-tone

white hoodie with maroon sleeves, and a Champion ball cap. The video showed the suspect

entering the store before walking directly behind the counter, speaking to Naseri, and producing

a knife.2 The suspect also wore a blue surgical mask, and his hoodie had an emblem on the left

chest area. Officer Bellamy also reviewed video from the cameras surveilling the parking lot,

which captured the white male suspect driving away in a black Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck

with farm use tags. This video showed the truck also had distinctive chrome sideview mirrors, a

spare tire attached to the back of the bed of the truck, and several decals affixed to the left back

window. After viewing the video, Officer Bellamy issued a BOLO.3

       1
         The arrest warrant provides that Herrmann is a white male who is five feet, six inches
tall, who was born on March 11, 1963, and who weighs 238 pounds.
       2
           This video footage was later entered into evidence at trial and played for the jury.
       3
         A BOLO is a “be on the lookout” dispatch to police officers with “a description of what
the suspect had looked like, if he left on foot or vehicle, [and] the direction of travel.”
                                                 -2-
        Chesterfield County Police Officer Jacob Wells (“Officer Wells”) was on patrol when he

received the BOLO and began searching for the black Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck in an

area near the store. Officer Wells had recently seen a black pickup truck meeting the BOLO

description located in the parking lot of the InTown Suites at Center State Hotel (“InTown

Suites”) about a half a mile from the store. He proceeded to InTown Suites where he found a

black pickup truck. This truck was not a Chevrolet, unlike the truck in the surveillance video.

The officer then exited his police cruiser to approach the truck. An older black male approached

Officer Wells claiming that he was the owner of the pickup truck. Since the older black man did

not meet the suspect’s description relayed in the BOLO, Officer Wells proceeded to the hotel to

inquire about the black Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck he had previously seen in the parking

lot of the hotel. As a result, the hotel subsequently provided Officer Wells with a copy of

Herrmann’s DMV transcript showing that Herrmann, who resided at the hotel, did own a

Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck with farm use tags. Officer Wells then relayed this information

to his fellow officers.

        The day after the robbery, Chesterfield County Police Detective Jeffrey Whitlock

(“Detective Whitlock”) surveilled the InTown Suites’s entrance to “get a visual” on Herrmann or

his vehicle. Whitlock observed Herrmann leaving the hotel, entering his black Chevrolet pickup

truck with farm use tags, and exiting from the parking lot. Whitlock communicated this

information to his law enforcement team including Officer Jack Webster (“Officer Webster”)

who subsequently conducted a traffic stop involving Herrmann’s pickup truck. During the traffic

stop, Officer Webster confirmed that Herrmann both matched the suspect’s description and was

wearing black shoes similar to those worn by the suspect. The stickers on the back window of

Herrmann’s truck also matched the stickers on the suspect’s truck used in the robbery. When

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pulled over, Herrmann even volunteered that, “whatever I did, I’m sorry.” The Chesterfield

County police then brought Herrmann in for questioning related to the robbery.

       Herrmann subsequently engaged in a videotaped interview at the police station. In this

interview, Herrmann, like the suspect, wore a white Champion baseball cap and black “kitchen”

shoes. During the recorded interview, Herrmann viewed a still photo from the surveillance

footage of the store robbery, and he admitted that the person who robbed the store looked “a lot

like” him. Herrmann also admitted that he owned the black Chevrolet Silverado truck, that no

one else used the truck in the months leading up to the robbery, and that he was the only person

who drove the truck on the date of the robbery.

       At trial, Naseri testified to what she experienced during the robbery, but she did not

identify Herrmann as the perpetrator. Then Trelaine McGlone (“McGlone”), property manager

for the InTown Suites, testified that Herrmann had checked into the hotel in 2017 and that, at the

time of the robbery, the hotel was “going through an eviction process with him because he owed

a balance to the hotel” of around $2,000. McGlone also confirmed that Herrmann drove a

Chevrolet truck with farm use tags and that she had seen him on the day of the robbery wearing

jeans and a hoodie. McGlone also testified that Herrmann failed to pay any portion of his $2,000

debt either on the day of the robbery or on the following day.

       The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of Forensic Investigator Katherine Chavis

(“Chavis”) who testified that she recovered evidence from Herrmann’s room at the InTown

Suites the day after the robbery, including a hoodie identical to the one worn by the robbery

suspect, several pieces of mail addressed to Herrmann, and a blue medical mask similar to the

one worn by the perpetrator. Chavis also searched Herrmann’s truck. She found his vehicle

insurance information in the glove compartment and confirmed that the truck was registered to

Herrmann. She also documented the number, location, and appearance of the decals on the rear

                                               -4-
window of the truck. She found packages of blue face masks similar to the ones used by the

robbery suspect, and a standard Virginia license plate was found stored behind the driver’s seat.

Chavis also testified that she photographed Herrmann’s truck which matched nearly every

physical characteristic of the robbery suspect’s vehicle, including the color, make, model, farm

use tags, and chrome side mirrors with a spare tire in the truck’s bed.

       The Commonwealth played an audio recording at trial for the jury of a roadside interview

of Herrmann who, after being read his Miranda4 rights, denied participation in the robbery. In

the recording, Herrmann explained that he had recently lost his job as a butcher at a Publix

grocery store and was addicted to alcohol, regularly consuming between 30 to 40 beers per day.

He also confirmed that he had been living at the InTown Suites for the past three and a half years

and was behind on his rent.

       During a recess, Juror 124 approached a bailiff and advised that he may know one of the

Commonwealth’s witnesses—Officer Wells. Outside the presence of the jury, Juror 124 advised

the trial judge that he and Officer Wells grew up together and played football for the same team

in school. He also stated that they knew each other in elementary and high school but were

“never super close.” He further stated that they did not socialize and that he had not seen Officer

Wells in “over seven or eight years.” The trial court permitted further voir dire of the juror

beginning with the attorney for the Commonwealth who inquired whether the former relationship

with Officer Wells would in any way cause Juror 124 to be biased one way or the other against

the defendant or the Commonwealth. Juror 124 answered, “No, sir.” The juror also confirmed

that he could be “fair and listen to all of the evidence” and follow “the Judge’s -- the Court’s

instructions regarding the law and applying the law to the facts in this case.” The juror also said

       4
           Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                               -5-
he “would not in any way believe that [Officer Wells] is more trustworthy or honest than anyone

else.”

         After both parties completed voir dire of Juror 124, Herrmann objected to Juror 124

remaining on the jury and moved to strike him for cause. The Commonwealth argued in

response that the juror’s answers on voir dire failed to show any bias or prejudice that indicated

that he could not impartially perform his duties as a juror. Finding that the prior relationship

between Juror 124 and Officer Wells did not “reach the level that would require this Court to

dismiss” Juror 124, the trial court denied the motion to strike Juror 124 for cause.

         After the Commonwealth rested its case, Herrmann moved to strike the evidence and

argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Herrmann committed the robbery. In support

of his motion, Herrmann reminded the trial court that Naseri could not identify him as the

perpetrator. He also emphasized that the cash, the knife, and the plastic bag used to take the

money from the store were never recovered. He further noted the lack of fingerprints, DNA, or a

confession. After presenting his evidence, Herrmann renewed his motion to strike, arguing that

Officer Wells did not investigate the owner of the first black truck with farm use tags and

suggested that the elderly black man who claimed ownership of the truck was likely the true

perpetrator of the crime. The trial court denied both motions to strike, and the jury subsequently

returned a guilty verdict. Herrmann filed a post-trial motion to set aside the verdict, which the

trial court denied. Herrmann appealed from the final order.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                                      A. Standards of Review

         “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

                                                -6-
(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)). Therefore, we view the evidence “in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and determine whether ‘any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Farmer v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 402, 416 (2013) (quoting Commonwealth v.

McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 20 (2011)).

       Likewise, “a trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause ‘will not be

disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest error amounting to an abuse of discretion.’”

Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329-30 (2005) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth,

262 Va. 823, 826 (2001)). The underlying question of juror impartiality is one of fact, and the

trial court’s determination on the subject is “entitled to great deference on appeal” unless

“plainly wrong or unsupported by the record.” Huguely v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 92, 121,

127 (2014). The reviewing court defers to the “trial court’s decision whether to exclude or retain

a prospective juror because the trial court ‘sees and hears the juror.’” Weeks v. Commonwealth,

248 Va. 460, 475 (1994) (quoting Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246 (1990)). In

addressing whether the juror should have been struck for cause, the appellate court must consider

                                                 -7-
the juror’s “entire voir dire, not just isolated portions.” Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362,

401 (2006) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 191 (2004)).

         B. The record contains sufficient evidence to support Herrmann’s conviction.

       Herrmann does not deny that a robbery occurred; he merely asserts that the evidence

failed to prove he committed the robbery. He further contends that because the evidence failed

to rule out his theory that someone else committed the offense, his conviction should be

reversed. We disagree.

       Robbery is the “taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his

person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation.” Jones v.

Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 307, 316-17 (2019) (en banc) (quoting Jay v. Commonwealth, 275

Va. 510, 524 (2008)). It is well-settled that “the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the

identity of the accused as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cuffee v. Commonwealth,

61 Va. App. 353, 364 (2013) (quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 423 (2003)).

However, any element of a crime, including the identity of the suspect, may be proved by

“circumstantial evidence.” Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375 (1999). Indeed,

“[c]ircumstantial evidence is competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence

provided that the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable

hypothesis except that of guilt.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 629 (2019)

(alteration in original) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “The

statement that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence is

simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 30 (2012) (quoting Kelly v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 258 (2003) (en banc)).

                                                -8-
       To that end, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is not ‘viewed in isolation’ because the

‘combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may

lead a reasonable [fact finder]’ to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty.”

Rams v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 27 (2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting

Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)). Therefore, identity may be proven

when “all the circumstances of time, place, motive, means, opportunity[,] and conduct concur in

pointing out the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.” Schlimme v. Commonwealth, 16

Va. App. 15, 18 (1993) (quoting Potts v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1093, 1097 (1991)). To

evaluate “an appellant’s alternate hypothesis of innocence in a circumstantial evidence case, we

must determine . . . ‘whether a reasonable [fact finder], upon consideration of all the evidence,

could have rejected [the appellant’s] theories in his defense and found him guilty of [the charged

crime] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277 (2004)

(second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Hudson, 265 Va. at 513).

       Here, the evidence sufficiently supported the jury’s finding that Herrmann committed the

robbery. First, in viewing the Commonwealth’s evidence in the light most favorable to it, we

find the video recording in this case establishes that an individual identified as a white male,

short in stature and overweight, entered the store, displayed a large knife, and ordered Naseri to

put all the money from the cash register into a plastic bag. It also shows the perpetrator then

exiting the store, entering a black Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck that displayed farm use tags,

and driving the truck away from the store. This truck had a spare tire in the bed and identifiable

stickers on the rear window.

       The Commonwealth further established that Herrmann’s truck was also a black Chevrolet

Silverado pickup truck with farm use tags, which was located in close proximity to the location

of the robbery. And it showed that Herrmann, “as a white male, short in stature and

                                                -9-
overweight,” met the robbery suspect’s description. Herrmann conceded that he did not allow

anyone to use the truck on the day of the robbery. Herrmann also frequented the store and lived

less than a mile from it. During his interview, Herrmann wore a baseball cap matching the cap

the assailant wore when committing the robbery. The police found a white hoodie with maroon

sleeves and an emblem on it—identical to the hoodie worn by the robber—in Herrmann’s room,

where he lived alone. Also in his room was a box of blue surgical masks, the type worn by the

perpetrator, and his license plate was stored behind the seat of his truck and replaced with the

farm use tags, suggesting that Herrmann hid his license plate for purposes of eluding detection

through displaying these tags alone. When stopped by police, Herrmann did not express surprise

or shock and instead directly said, “whatever I did, I am sorry.”

       Thus, we cannot conclude that the jury was plainly wrong in determining that Herrmann

committed the robbery. The totality of the circumstances proved that he had the opportunity, the

motive, the means, the knowledge, and the method necessary to commit the robbery. In fact, the

combined force of the concurrent and related circumstances, along with all reasonable inferences

drawn from the proven facts, would lead any reasonable fact finder to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that Herrmann committed the crime.

       Although the knife used by Herrmann and the cash stolen were not recovered, those facts

do not alter our analysis. Herrmann was not detained until the day after the robbery, affording

him sufficient time to dispose of both the knife and any cash stolen. Bearing in mind the

evidence pointing to his culpability, Herrmann’s denials are unavailing and would lead any

reasonable fact finder to conclude that he was “lying to conceal his guilt.” Flanagan v.

Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App.

505, 509-10 (1998)). Moreover, Herrmann’s suggestion that the owner of the other black truck

parked at the Intown Suites might be the guilty culprit is not born out by the record. The elderly

                                               - 10 -
black man did not meet the description of the suspect, and the man’s pickup truck was not a

Silverado. “[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that

flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant.” Ragland v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 519, 531 (2017) (quoting Case v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 14,

23 (2014)). Hence, based on the voluminous evidence the Commonwealth adduced concerning

the robbery and the truck utilized to flee the scene of the robbery, the jury was entitled to

disregard Herrmann’s hypothesis of innocence and conclude that Herrmann’s truck was the very

same black Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck that was captured on video immediately following

completion of the robbery.

       In short, we find that the evidence presented at trial was competent, credible, and

sufficient to prove that Herrmann was the white male who entered the store, brandished the

knife, and stole the money. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that the evidence was

sufficient to support the conviction.

             C. The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss Juror 124 for cause.

       Herrmann also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss Juror 124 for

cause after learning that the juror had known Officer Wells. We disagree.

       “It is uncontroverted that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an

impartial jury.” Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 125, 135 (2019) (citing U.S. Const.

amend. VI; Va. Const. art. I, § 8). “This is one of the most fundamental rights afforded by the

criminal justice system.” Id. “In recognition of this bedrock right, the Court has recognized that

‘a prospective juror must be able to give [the accused] a fair and impartial trial. Upon this point

nothing should be left to inference or doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v.

Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 265, 270 (2011)). “It is a trial court’s responsibility to ensure that

jurors are free from bias.” Id.

                                                - 11 -
        Here, after the juror informed the trial court that he had known Officer Wells from

elementary school through high school, the trial court permitted the parties to engage in

additional voir dire of the juror to determine whether he could be a fair and impartial juror given

the nature of the previous relationship. Juror 124 explained that while he and Officer Wells grew

up together and played football for the same team in school, they were never close, and they had

not seen each other for many years. Juror 124 and Officer Wells did not socialize, and Juror 124

repeatedly stated that his prior relationship with Officer Wells would not cause him to be biased

against either the defendant or the Commonwealth. Juror 124 also said he did not consider

Officer Wells to be more trustworthy or honest than anyone else. He also insisted that he could

be fair, listen to the evidence, and follow the court’s instructions regarding the law and its

application to the facts.

        Thus, the trial court had the “opportunity . . . to observe and evaluate the apparent

sincerity, conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of [Juror 124] first-hand,” Pope v.

Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 123-24 (1987), along with his “tenor, tone, and general

demeanor,” Telegus v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 475 (2007), and was satisfied that Juror 124

could be impartial. A juror’s personal knowledge of a witness—with nothing more—is

insufficient to impute bias or prejudice. See, e.g., Perez v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 648, 656

(2003) (“We have long held that a juror’s relationship to a witness does not require his dismissal

per se.”). Nothing in the record supports the assertion that Juror 124 was “sensible of any bias or

prejudice” that might affect his ability to perform his duties as a juror. Code § 8.01-358. Thus,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Juror 124.

                                                 - 12 -
                                         III. CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding the evidence

sufficient to support the conviction. We further hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to strike Juror 124 for cause. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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