Court Opinion

ID: 9536210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:56:16.208975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:29.105500
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the Berkeley ordinance impermissibly suppresses rights of free expression of California citizens. It clearly violates First Amendment principles, both of freedom of speech and association, as repeatedly expressed by the United States Supreme Court. It also contravenes similar guarantees contained in article I, section 2, of the California Constitution.
Provisions of the ordinance have been litigated before. Its section prohibiting any person from making “any contribution to any candidate or committee” was struck down in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Berkeley (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 123 [131 Cal.Rptr. 350]. The provision before us prohibits any individual, corporation, or other entity from contributing more than $250 to any campaign in support of, or opposition to, any ballot measure. A citizens’ committee organized itself to oppose a rent control ballot measure at the Berkeley general election of April 1977. The committee raised money from interested citizens and groups to assist its campaign, and the majority now authorizes the forfeiture into the Berkeley City Treasury of $18,600 of the committee’s donated funds.
The ordinance impairs two constitutional rights of the donors and contributors to the committee. Each is fundamental. Each is constitu*833tionally protected. First, is the citizen’s right of free speech and of unrestricted expression. The First Amendment prohibits Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech.” A similar guarantee, expressed somewhat differently, appears in article I, section 2, of our state Constitution, and provides that “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”
With specific application to the free speech limitations contained in the ordinance before us, it has been held by the highest authority that campaign restrictions “operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such política:! expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ [Citation.] Although First Amendment protections are not confined to ‘the exposition of ideas,’ [citation] ‘there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,...’ [Citation.] This no more than reflects our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ [citation].” (Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1, 14 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 685, 96 S.Ct. 612].)
The second right, which is restricted by the Berkeley law, is that of free association. As we observed last year “contribution limitations restrict the contributor’s freedom of association,...” {Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 43 [157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46].) This associational right has also been repeatedly described by the United States Supreme Court as a “‘basic constitutional freedom,’ Kusper v. Pontikes [1973] 414 U.S., at 57, that is ‘closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.’” (Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 25 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 691]; Shelton v. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 486 [5 L.Ed.2d 231, 236, 81 S.Ct. 247]; Bates v. Little Rock (1960) 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 [4 L.Ed.2d 480, 485, 80 S.Ct. 412].)
The reality of this limitation on a donor’s associational rights is immediately disclosed when it is noted that the Berkeley ordinance *834permits expenditures without limit to influence the results of the election by advertising or other means. John Q. Citizen himself may spend unlimited funds for or against the rent control measure. Yet, if the same citizen exercising a right to associate with others of like mind seeks to give to a committee which either supports or opposes the same ballot proposition, the contribution may not exceed $250. Although the majority approves this result, Justice Rouse speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeal was eminently correct in describing this consequence as “a supreme anoipaly” because thereby “a contributor is entitled to less protection when he exercises his First Amendment rights of free speech and association, than if he exercised only his right to free speech.” One fundamental right receives greater protection than two in combination. Such a result is wholly untenable and cannot be valid constitutional law. “If a person’s independent speech cannot be restricted constitutionally, neither can his speech through association.” (Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Political Committees in the 1976 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments (1977) 86 Yale L.J. 953, 967.)
When two such fundamental rights of a citizen, free speech and association, are conjoined, any attempted restriction “‘is subject to the closest scrutiny.’” (Buckley, 424 U.S. at p. 25 [46 L.Ed.2d at p. 691].) We have said that any impairment may be supported only when “the restraints imposed are nonetheless justified as incidental to the promotion of a ‘substantial’ or ‘compelling’ governmental interest, unrelated to speech, and unattainable by means less intrusive upon First Amendment rights.” (Hardie v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 371, 377 [134 Cal.Rptr. 201, 556 P.2d 301].) In so concluding we have but echoed similar expressions by the high court: Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 21 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 684-685, 689]; N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 438 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S.Ct. 328].)
More recently, in a case in which the Supreme Court invalidated an outright ban on expenditures or contributions by corporations aimed at influencing the vote on ballot measures, the court emphasized that when restraints on First Amendment rights are at issue “‘The state may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling’ [citations], ‘and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest.’ [Citation.] Even then, the State must employ means ‘closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment....’ [Citations.]” (Italics added, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 786 [55 L.Ed.2d 707, 724, 98 S.Ct. 3126].)
*835What, then, is the compelling interest requiring imposition of a restraint so substantial on two rights so fundamental? The majority identifies it thus: “large contributions to a local ballot measure campaign threaten our electoral system and potentially pervert the purpose of initiative procedures;. . .” (Ante, p. 831.) My colleagues of the majority urge a theory that public confidence in the electoral processes is undermined by permitting unrestricted contributions in ballot measure elections. It is noteworthy that it is not the fact of a danger but the potential of a danger that alone generates the compelling interest found by the majority. It will readily be seen that this wholly untested political hypothesis is not based upon any record but rather upon the opinions and conclusions of “commentators on our political scene,” “a political scientist,” or a “student of the California initiative process.” (Ante, p. 828.) Moreover, the “commentators” and “students” have hardly been unanimous in their support of contribution limitations to ballot measures. (For contrary views, see generally, Note, supra, 86 Yale L.J. 953; Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term (1978) 92 Harv. L.Rev. 5, 163; Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment (1971) 46 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 900; Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 29 Vand.L.Rev. 1327.)
The majority’s conclusion that there is such a “threat” to our electoral system thereby “potentially” inhibiting the initiative process may or may not be correct. There is no record before us and in this connection the procedural posture of the case should be noted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the citizens’ committee which attacked the ordinance. Assuming, only for purposes of analysis, that the trial court was improvident in the entry of its summary judgment invalidating the ordinance, it is manifestly unfair for the majority on the other hand to sustain the ordinance without affording the citizens’ committee an opportunity to challenge or rebut the opinions and views of the “commentator,” “political scientist,” and “student” on which the majority wholly relies. The study of a Colorado ballot measure, or a 16-year-old analysis which concludes that the California initiative and referendum process is “largely a tool of interest groups” would make interesting background material for a political debate. Unquestioned and unverified, however, these opinions do not constitute the hard evidentiary support needed to demonstrate a state’s present and compelling interest in the suppression of the multiple First Amendment rights of our California citizens. The existence of such a threat and its potential are wholly undocumented. Indeed the only empirical data that appear in the record are studies of spending on statewide initiative campaigns *836in California during the period 1954-1974. The studies conducted by a Sacramento research organization, reveal that in 28 statewide contests the highest spenders won 14 times and lost 14 times. I must leave to the reader what that arithmetic proves.
The rationale for the ordinance’s restrictions, viewed as sufficient by the majority, is the danger of “corruption” of the initiative process through the infusion of unlimited sums of money by “large contributors” (ante, p. 827) favoring or opposing a ballot measure. This, the majority argues, will destroy the electorate’s “confidence in our political system.” (Ante, p. 829.) In the absence, however, of some affirmative showing “by record or legislative finding” this precise reasoning, central to the majority opinion, was flatly rejected, as to corporate contributors, by the Bellotti court, supra, 435 U.S. 765, at pages 789-790 [55 L.Ed. 2d, p. 726], in these words: “[T]here has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government.” Similarly, there has been “no showing” whatever that large contributors, corporate or otherwise, have thwarted or perverted the initiative in California, which at present appears to be alive and well and increasingly used.
The majority further concludes that candidate and ballot measure elections “differ very little” and that, as in candidate elections, large contributions have “equivalent potential to pervert the purpose of the initiative and more generally corrupt the electoral process.” (Ante, p. 826.) But again, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed this reasoning, noting, “Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections, [citation] simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue. To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution ‘protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.’ [Citation.]” (Bellotti, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 790 [55 L.Ed.2d at pp. 726-727].) (Italics added.)
The same result was reached July 11, 1980, by a unanimous Fifth Circuit in which it sustained a district court’s invalidation of similar statutory limit on contributions to a committee supporting a referendum measure. The Court of Appeals noted: “When people elect a candidate, they choose someone to whom they can delegate their political decision-*837making. The people’s need to prevent large contributors from improperly influencing this representative decisionmaker is critical. In contrast, when people vote on a referendum proposal, they directly decide the pertinent political issue for themselves. Large contributions for publicity by one group or another do not influence the political decisionmakers —in this case, the voters themselves—except in a manner protected by the first amendment.” (Let’s Help Florida v. McCrary (5th Cir. 1980) 621 F.2d 195.) For identical views from the Second Circuit, see Schwartz v. Romnes (1974) 495 F.2d 844, 851-853, and from the Ninth Circuit see C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson (1978) 583 F.2d 421, 425.
Directly answering and rejecting the majority’s assertion that, unless restricted, “the domination... by large contributors leaves other citizens with a stilled voice,. . .” {ante, pp. 826-827) the high tribunal emphasized, “. . . the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed ‘to secure “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,”’ and ‘“to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan [(1964) 376 U.S. 254] at 266, 269, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States [1957] 354 U.S., at 484. The First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discussion. [Citation.]” {Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 [46 L.Ed.2d 659, 704-705], italics added.)
Thus, point by point, I find the majority’s rationale wholly inconsistent with and opposed to the First Amendment free speech and associational pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court, which are binding upon us under federal supremacy principles.
Moreover, the majority does not attempt to answer Justice Rouse’s perceptive analysis of the meaning of “corruption” within the initiative context: “The term ‘corrupt’ implies the existence or expectation of a political quid pro quo. In addition, the term ‘corruption’ subtly conveys the impression that there is a deviation from an objective standard. Such a belief can have no validity. In a democratic system, objective ‘truth’ is that which the majority subjectively chooses to adopt. Hence it is delusive to maintain that a declaration by the electorate can be ‘cor*838rupt.’ The price of free speech is that we must put up with opinions which we may deem to be the purest humbug, untainted by any trace of truth... . (N.A.A.C.P. v. Button [1963] 371 U.S. 415, 445.)”
Beyond this, however, there is inherent in the majority position an underlying theme that to me is disturbing, namely, that somehow the California electorate needs to be “protected” from free spending “special interests” which will mislead the voters at election time with slanted propaganda, confusing them into making decisions that are unwise for them. This whole approach is very dubious for several reasons.
I note that section 112 of the Berkeley ordinance requires that the city shall publish in Berkeley newspapers, and in such other newspapers as the Berkeley Fair Campaign Practices Commission considers appropriate, a list of all contributors of over $50 to all candidates or committees. These publications shall occur at least twice during the last seven days of the campaign. The sources of initiative financing thus are matters of public record freely available to the electorate before an issues election. (See C & C Plywood Corp., supra, 583 F.2d at p. 425.)
The majority, in my opinion, substantially underestimates the sophistication, intelligence and political maturity of the California electorate. It is a reasonable assumption that the average voter understands that the initiatives and referenda, statewide or local, are sponsored and supported by groups or individuals who may have “axes to grind” and who are beneficially interested in the result.
The increasing use of the initiative and referendum and the rising costs of elections, as noted by Justice Rouse, are hard facts of the present political scene. Doubtless $250 does not buy as much free speech today as it did in 1974 when the ordinance was adopted, suggesting the not altogether pleasing prospect that under the majority’s rationale a citizen’s most fundamental First Amendment rights may expand and contract with the Consumer Price Index.
Regardless of the foregoing, however, I wholly disagree with the premise underlying the majority’s assumptions which betrays an overprotective “father knows best” syndrome. I find nothing in either Constitution, federal or state, or in law or policy which permits a city council to quantify or measure out the amount of information or misinformation which the electorate may receive in a ballot measure campaign. In my view, a city council has no authority to permit $250 *839worth of free speech and association and then, drawing the line, to confiscate for the city treasury all sums in excess thereof donated either by supporters or opponents who wish to be heard on an initiative measure.
The long arm of government does not belong in this arena where the direct voice of the people is heard through the initiative or referendum. Where the clash of contesting ideas, opinions and arguments in many forms culminates in the ultimate expression of the people’s will, through an issues election, let the people be the sole judge. Let them separate for themselves the wheat of truth from the chaff of falsehood. They need no self-appointed protective guardian to measure for them the amount of public issue information, misinformation or argument which is to be available for their consideration. Justice Jackson put it very well in his concurring opinion in Thomas v. Collins (1945) 323 U.S. 516, 545 [89 L.Ed. 430, 448, 65 S.Ct. 315]: “The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind.... In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.”
The controlling principle is fundamental: “Government is forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern themselves. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 S. Ct. Rev. 245, 263. The First Amendment rejects the ‘highly paternalistic’ approach of statutes like § 8 which restrict what the people may hear. [Citations.]” (Bellotti, supra, 435 U.S. fn. 31, pp. 791-792 [55 L.Ed.2d p. 727], italics added.) In similar fashion, in my view, the First Amendment prohibits adoption of ordinances which restrict how much the people may hear on public issues. This is the clear import of the recent First Amendment expressions of the high court. In the words of one interpretive commentator: “The court [in Bellotti] properly deemed it safer to entrust the marketplace of ideas to private and diverse individuals and groups than to allow state controls over speakers and messages. The Court’s approach is consistent with recent decisions invalidating paternalistic state restrictions on commercial speech. The public can be trusted to evaluate political and commercial messages in light of their sources before making political and consumer decisions.” (Ely, supra, 92 Harv. L.Rev. at pp. 168-169.)
There can be no doubt that a rent control measure is a “governmental affair” of broad interest to landlords, tenants and to the public at *840large. A free flow of information to an electorate which decides this issue is wholly salutary. Public comment and discussion, pro or con, is highly desirable and should be encouraged. Thus, the speech is protected.
Finding it impossible to square either the majority’s rationale or its holding with numerous United States Supreme Court decisions, several of them very recent, which define in broad terms the reach of the First Amendment protections for American citizens, I conclude that the ordinance before us is constitutionally flawed.
Doubtless, the Berkeley City Council in adopting the contribution restrictions of the ordinance was well intentioned. Nonetheless, it was misadvised for it violated the First Amendment in trenching on two fundamental rights of our citizens without any demonstration of the requisite degree of compelling interest. The limitations of the ordinance cannot stand when considered in the light of this overriding pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Bellotti, supra, at pages 791-792 [55 L.Ed.2d at pages 727-728]: “[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate. But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment.” [Fn. omitted.]
I would affirm the judgment.
Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.