Court Opinion

ID: 9883052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:36:04.954917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:19.324516
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Field
dissenting.
I agree with the majority of the court' in its construction of the different sections of the Revised-Statutes which have been under consideration in this case, except the third clause of § 5336, and the last clause of § 5508.
The third clause of § 5336 declares that if two or more persons in any state or territory conspire “ by force to prevent, hinder, or delay' the execution of any law. of the United *702State's,” each, of' them shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500 or more than $5,000, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a period of not less than six months or more than six years; or by both.such fine and imprisonment.
. By the treaty with Chiha of 1868 the United States recognize the right of Chinese to emigrate to this country, and" declare that in the United States the subjects of that empire shall enjoy the same privileges and' immunities in respect to residence which are enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.
The complaint against the plaintiff in error is, that he conspired with others to'expel by force from the town of Nicolaus, and the county of Sutter, in the State of Cahfomia, the sub- ' jects of the Emperor of China, who were residing and doing business- there, and in furtherance of the conspiracy entered the homes of certain persons of that class, seized them, and forcibly placed them upon a barge on Feather River, on the bank of which the town ,of Nicolaus is situated, and drove them from the county, and thus deprived' them of privileges and immunities conferred by the treaty.
For this alleged offence the plaintiff .in'error, with others, was arrested. 'On application for a habeas corpus for his dis- ' charge, the judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion. This court holds that a conspiracy thus violently to expel the Chinese from'the county and town where they resided and did business, and thus defeat the provisions of the treaty, was not a conspiracy to prevent or hinder by force the execution of a law of the United States, although a treaty is declared by the Constitution-to be the supreme law of the land.
Under the Constitution, a treaty between the United States and a foreign nation is to be considered in two aspects — as a compact between the two nations,- and as a law of our country. As a compact, it depends for its enforcement on the good faith of the contracting parties, and to carry into effect some of its provisions may require legislation. For any infraction of its stipulations importing a contract, the courts can afford nó redress except as provided by such legislation. The matter is one to be.settled by negotiation between the executive depart*703ments of the two governments, each government being at liberty to take such measures for redress as it may deem advisable. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 598; Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis, 454, 459; In re Ah Lung, 9 Sawyer, 306 ; S. C. 18 Fed. Rep. 28.
But in many instances a treaty operates by its own force, that is,'without the aid of any legislative enactment; and such is generally the case when-it declares the rights and privileges which the citizens or subjects of each nation may enjoy in the country of the other. This was so with the clause in some of our early treaties with European nations, declaring • that their subjects might dispose of lands held by them in the United' States, and that their heirs might inherit such property, or the proceeds thereof, notwithstanding their alienage.- Thus the treaty .With Great Britain of 1794 provided that' British subjects then holding lands in the United States, and American citizens holding lands in the dominions of Great Britain, should, continue to hold them according to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles therein, and might grant, sell, or devise the same to whom they pleased, in like manner as if they were natives, and that- neither they nor their heirs nor assigns should, as far as might respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as aliens. Art. 9, 8 Stat. 122. A clause.to the same purport, and embracing also movable property, was in the treaty with France of 1778, art. 11, 8 Stat. 18, and also in that-of 1800, art. 7, 8 Stat. 182. It required no legislation to give force t.o this provision. It was the law of the land by virtue of the Constitution, and congressional legislation could not add to its efficacy. Whenever invoked by the alien heirs, the rights it conferred were enforced by the Federal courts. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 ; Carneal v. Banks, 10 Wheat. 181; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 489, 496. See also the Treaty with the Swiss Confederation of 1850, art. 5, 11 Stat. 590; Hauenstine v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483.
This is so also with clauses, found in some treaties with foreign nations, stipulating that the subjects or citizens of those nations may trade with the United States, and, for that purpose, freely enter our ports with their ships and cargoes, and *704reside and do business here. Thus the treaty of commerce with Italy of February 26, 1871, provides that “ Italian citizens in the United States, and citizens of the United States in Italy, shall mutually have liberty to enter, with their ships and cargoes, all the ports of the United States and of Italy respectively, which may be open to foreign commerce. They shall also have liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts whatever of said territories.” Art. 1, 17 Stat. 845. These stipulations operate by their own force; that is, they require no legislative action for their enforcement. Treaty of commerce with Great Britain of 1815, art. 1, 8 Stat. 228; renewed and continued for ten years by art. 4 of the treaty of 1818, 8 Stat. 249 ; and continued indefinitely by art. 1 of thy treaty of 1827, 8 Stat. 361; treaty with Bolivia of May 13, 1838, art. 3, 12 Stat. 1009; treaty with Costa Kica of July 10, 1851, art. 2, 10 Stat. 917; treaty with Greece of. December, 1837, art. 1, 8 Stat. 498; treaty with Sweden and Norway of July 4, 1827, art. 1, 8 Stat. 346.
The right or privilege being conferred by the treaty, parties seeking to enjoy it take whatever steps are necessary to carry the provisions into effect. Those who wish to engage in com- , merce enter our ports with their ships and cargoes; those who wish to reside here select their places of residence, no congressional legislation being required to provide that they shall enjoy the rights and privileges stipulated. All that they can ask, and all that is needed, is such legislation as may be necessary to protect them in such enjoyment. That they have, I think, to some extent, in the clause punishing any conspiracy to prevent or hinder by force the execution of a law of the-United States. The section in which this clause appears is a reenactment in part of the act of July 31, 1861, and declares, among other things, a conspiracy of two or more persons to overthrow by force the Government of the United States, or to oppose by force its authority, or “ by force' to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of cmy law of the United States,” ■ or by force to seize and possess any of their property against their authority, to be a high crime, and prescribes for it severe punishment. As thus seen, the section is not intended as a *705protection against isolated or occasional acts of individual per-' sonal violence. For such offences the laws of the states make-ample provision. • It is intended to reach conspiracies against the supremacy and authority of the Government of the United States, and against the enforcement of its laws. .It is directed not only against those who conspire to overthrow1 -the government, but those also who conspire to defeat the execution of its laws, including under the latter treaties as well as statutes, and thus permanently deprive others of the rights, benefits, and protection intended to be conferred by such laws.. In the case before us, the purpose of the alleged conspirators was to permanently deprive the Chinese residing in Nicolaus ■— not any particular Chinese, but all of that class of persons — of the right of residence conferred by the treaty. That right is not limited to any particular place; it may be exercised wherever it is lawful for any one to reside without encroachment upon the equal right of others. The conspirators well knew, as every one in California knows, the provision of the treaty and its meaning, and their purpose was to nullify and defeat it.
A .treaty, in conferring a right of residence, requires no congressional legislation for the enforcement of that right; the treaty in that particular is executed by the intended beneficiaries. They select their residence. They are not required, as said above, to reside in any particular place, or do business there. A conspiracy to prevent by force a residence in the town or county selected by them appears to me, therefore, to be a conspiracy to prevent the operation • — • that is, the execution — of a law of the United States, and to be within the letter and spirit of the third clause of § 5336. If the conspirators can expel the Chinese from their residence in the town and county of their, selection without being amenable to any' law of the United States, they can, with like exemption .from legal liability, expel the Chinese from the entire state, and thus utterly defeat, the stipulations of the treaty.
So, also, a conspiracy to prevent by force ships belonging to subjects of a foreign nation---not any particular ship, but ships., generally belonging to them — from entering, our ports with their cargoes would, in my judgment, be a conspiracy to pre*706vent by force the operation of the treaty - with that -nation, which stipulates that its, subjects shall have that privilege. , And in all other cases where a clause of a treaty conferring rights or privileges operates by. its own terms and does not require congressional legislation to give it effect, a conspiracy' to prevent by force their enjoyment is a conspiracy to prevent by force the execution of a law of the United States; 'that' is, to prevent its having, with respect to the rights and "privileges stipidated, any effectual operation. I do not see how Congress, could improve the matter, or do more than it has already done, by declaring that those • who thus conspire by force to deprive parties of the rights or privileges conferred by a treaty should be punished. Its declaration’to that effect would be no more than what the present law provides.
The last-clause of § 5508 declares that “if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway/or on the premises of another, lyith- intent to prevent or hinder the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, [by the Constitution or laws of the United States,] they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned hot more than tenyears ; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
I do not agree with the. majority of the court that this clause is limited in its application only to offences against citizens. The first clause of the section is thus limited, but, in my judgment, the last is more extensive, and reaches an invasion of the premises of any one, whether citizen'or alien, by two or more persons for the unlawful purpose's mentioned. But I am . not clear that the qualification of going “in disguise” on the highway does not also extend to the going on the premises of ' another — and thus render the clause inapplicable to the case before the court; [hough there is much force in the view of Mr. Justice Harlan, that the clause should be read as though , its words were: “If two or more persons go on the highway in disguise, or on the premises of another, with the' intent,” &c., thus making the words “ in disguise ” apply only to the offence on the highway. If his view be.correct, the last pro*707vision of the clause would describe' the exact offence charged against the plaintiff in error and his co-conspirators — that they went op the premises of the Chinese with the intent to deprive them of rights and privileges conferred by the treaty — the law of the land — an intent which they carried out by forcibly expelling the Chinese from the town and county of their residence aud business. But without adopting or rejecting his view, I prefer to place my dissent upon what I deem the erroneous. construction by the court of the third clause of § 5336, in holding that it does not cover this case, but applies only to cases where there has been a forcible resistance to measures adopted by Congress for the execution of a law, or a treaty of the United States. '
The result of the decision is, that there is no national law which can be invoked for the protection of the subjects of China in their right to reside and do business in this country, notwithstanding the language of the treaty with that empire. And the same result must follow with reference to similar fights and privileges of the subjects or citizens resident in this country or any other nation with which we have a treaty with like stipulations. Their only protection against any forcible resistance to the execution of these stipplations in their favor is to be found in the laws of the different states. Such a result is one to be deplored.