Court Opinion

ID: 9378620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-11 01:00:31.457769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.182119
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30312     Document: 00516673179          Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/10/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals

                   for the Fifth Circuit                                           Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                           March 10, 2023

                                   No. 22-30312                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk

   Jeanelle D. Cooper, as the personal representative of Mr. James L.
   Cooper, for substitution in place and stead of Mr. James L. Cooper,
   deceased,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Cornerstone Chemical Company,

                                                            Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:20-CV-1454

   Before Jones, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Appellant Jeanelle D. Cooper, on behalf of the estate of her late
   husband James Cooper, challenges the district court’s order granting

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-30312        Document: 00516673179              Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/10/2023

                                         No. 22-30312

   summary judgment for Appellee Cornerstone Chemical Company.1 For the
   following reasons, we AFFIRM.
                                    BACKGROUND
           James Cooper worked for Cornerstone Chemical Company and its
   predecessor companies from April 1991 until his termination in
   February 2020. During his employment, Cooper was a member of United
   Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
   and Service Workers International Union, Local USW 13-447.                           The
   collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Cornerstone and the
   Union consequently governed Cooper’s employment.
           Cooper became a full-time crane operator in 2010. In March 2018, he
   received a seven-day suspension for “deliberate misrepresentation or
   concealment of evidence.” Cornerstone then terminated Cooper in May
   2018 after he struck his crane against a post near a fuel pump. Cornerstone,
   however, revoked Cooper’s termination, and the parties entered a last
   chance agreement (“LCA”). That agreement required compliance with “all
   Cornerstone Chemical Company’s policies, procedures and work
   standards,” and stated that any “violation[ ], no matter the severity, will
   result in the termination of [Cooper’s] employment with Cornerstone
   Chemical Company.”             Cooper also agreed that, should Cornerstone
   discharge him “for an alleged violation of the terms of this Last Chance
   Agreement, [he] may not utilize the grievance and arbitration procedure
   within the [CBA].”

           1
            Appellant also purports to challenge the district court’s denial of her motion for
   reconsideration. But Appellant did not provide any argument as to this issue in her opening
   brief. This issue is consequently forfeited. See DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 290 (5th
   Cir. 2009) (issues raised for first time in reply brief are forfeited).

                                               2
Case: 22-30312      Document: 00516673179          Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/10/2023

                                    No. 22-30312

          In January 2020, Cooper left a crane that was attached to an
   approximately 3,000-pound pipe located sixty feet overhead unattended with
   the engine running. The parties debate whether the pipe was “suspended”
   or attached to a structure. Cornerstone terminated Cooper pursuant to the
   LCA after a six-day investigation. The notice listed the following reasons:
             You left the crane unattended with a load of approximately
             3000 pounds suspended in the air;
             You did not engage the services of a competent person to
             determine if your decision to leave the area was safe;
             You left the crane’s engine running; and
             You did not enable the crane’s swing brake when you left
             the scene.
          Cooper in response brought this action, alleging Cornerstone fired
   him because of his age, in violation of Federal and Louisiana law, and
   breached the LCA and/or CBA, in violation of Section 301 of the Labor
   Management Relations Act (“LMRA”).               The district court granted
   Cornerstone’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellant’s
   claims. It also denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal,
   Appellant challenges the district court’s order granting summary judgment.
                                 DISCUSSION
          This court reviews a district court’s order granting summary
   judgment de novo. Tango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., LLC, 322 F.3d
   888, 890 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine
   dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
   a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Here, the district court properly
   granted summary judgment against Appellant.

                                         3
Case: 22-30312         Document: 00516673179               Page: 4       Date Filed: 03/10/2023

                                           No. 22-30312

                              A. Age Discrimination Claims
           To establish a claim for age discrimination, a “plaintiff must show that
   his age was the ‘but-for’ cause of his termination.” McMichael v. Transocean
   Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 934 F.3d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 2019). The only
   issue here is whether Appellant presented “substantial evidence indicating
   that the proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for Cooper’s
   termination was “a pretext for [age] discrimination.” Laxton v. Gap, Inc.,
   333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003).2
           Cooper admitted during his deposition to having left the crane
   running and unattended. Cornerstone argued in its motion for summary
   judgment that this alone constituted a safety violation and thus a terminable
   offense under the LCA. Appellant did not attempt to rebut this assertion
   until her motion for reconsideration.               The district court deemed this
   argument forfeited. We agree. See U.S. Bank NA v. Verizon Comms., Inc.,
   761 F.3d 409, 426 (5th Cir. 2014) (“This court will typically not consider an
   issue or a new argument raised for the first time in a motion for
   reconsideration in the district court.”). And Appellant’s non-forfeited
   pretext arguments that could conceivably extend to this violation are
   meritless.
           Because Appellant has failed to rebut Cornerstone’s legitimate,
   nondiscriminatory reason for firing Cooper, Appellant’s age discrimination
   claims fail. See Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir.

           2
             “Because the [Louisiana Age Discrimination Employment Act] is identical to the
   [ADEA],” the same analysis applies to Appellant’s federal and state law discrimination
   claims. Robinson v. Bd. of Supervisors for the Univ. of La. Sys., 225 So.3d 424, 431 (La. 2017)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                                 4
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                                       No. 22-30312

   2001) (“The plaintiff must put forward evidence rebutting each of the
   nondiscriminatory reasons the employer articulates.”).
                                   B. LMRA Claim
          Section 301 of the LMRA provides an employee a federal cause of
   action against both his employer for breach of a CBA and his union for breach
   of the duty of fair representation. Bache v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 840 F.2d 283, 287
   (5th Cir. 1988). “Because of the intricate relationship between the duty of
   fair representation and the enforcement of a collectively bargained contract,
   the two causes of action have become ‘inextricably interdependent’ and
   known as a ‘hybrid § 301/fair representation’ suit.” Id. at 287–88 (quoting
   DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164–65, 103 S. Ct.
   2281, 2290–91 (1983)). To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove
   both that the employer violated the CBA and that the union breached its duty.
   See Gibson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 380 F.3d 886, 888 (2004).
          Appellant’s complaint states a single cause of action for “Breach of
   Contracts/Breach of Duty of Fair Representation” in violation of Section 301
   of the LMRA. Cornerstone argued in its motion for summary judgment that
   this cause of action failed because Appellant did not demonstrate the Union
   breached its duty of fair representation.           Appellant’s entire response
   consisted of two conclusory sentences: “Because of the facts and arguments
   [made in support of Cooper’s age discrimination claims], Cooper did not
   commit an unsafe act when he operated his crane on January 27, 2020[.]
   Cornerstone breached the LCA when it fired him on February 3, 2020.”3
   The district court thus granted summary judgment for Cornerstone, holding

          3
            In a separate section, Appellant argued “the union breached its duty of fair
   representation by not pursuing grievances on [Cooper’s] behalf.” Appellant has since
   abandoned this argument.

                                            5
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                                        No. 22-30312

   Appellant had “not demonstrated that Local USW 13-447 breached its duty
   of fair representation, an essential element of [her] section 301 claim.”
           Appellant, for the first time in her motion for reconsideration and now
   on appeal, contends she does not have to prove the Union breached its duty
   of fair representation because the LCA precluded Cooper’s use of the CBA’s
   grievance and arbitration procedures. Appellant has forfeited this argument.
   See U.S. Bank, 761 F.3d at 426; United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 447
   (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have often stated that a party must ‘press’ its claims.
   At the very least, this means clearly identifying a theory as a proposed basis
   for deciding the case—merely ‘initmat[ing]’ an argument is not the same as
   ‘pressing’ it.” (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original)). But even
   if Appellant did not, Cooper’s admitted failure to turn off the crane in
   violation of company policy provided Cornerstone ample ground to
   terminate him pursuant to the LCA.4 See Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v.
   Se. Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 1997) (court may affirm on
   any grounds supported by record and argued in district court).
          In short, the district court correctly granted summary judgment
   against Appellant on her LMRA claim.
                                   CONCLUSION
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

           4
             As noted above, Appellant did not challenge this conclusion in her response to
   Cornerstone’s motion for summary judgment and therefore forfeited any argument to the
   contrary. See U.S. Bank, 761 F.3d at 426.

                                              6