Court Opinion

ID: 9726072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:30:00.752967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:39.777635
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I join in Justice Hanson’s dissent. I write separately to make a number of additional points. The court excuses the state’s misconduct stating that “based on our existing case law, Balck could reasonably have believed that his obligation under Rule 4.2 was to provide Clark’s lawyer with notice and an opportunity to be present at the post-arraignment interviews.” The court makes that statement without any explanation as to why Balck’s belief could be reasonable. Given the plain, clear, and unambiguous language of Rule 4.2, any belief that the rule required only notice and the opportunity to be present could not be reasonable. The rule provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other law*356yer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct. 4.2 (emphasis added). Comment three to the rule further clarifies: “The rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct. 4.2 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
The rule, in its simplicity, cannot be read to require only that the state was obligated to provide notice and the opportunity to be present to Clark’s counsel. Nor can our case law. In Miller, we clearly stated that “only the party’s attorney can approve the direct contact and only the party’s attorney can waive the attorney’s right to be present during a communication between the attorney’s client and opposing counsel.” State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn.1999). This language requires that opposing counsel obtain both the party’s attorney’s approval for direct contact with the attorney’s client and the attorney’s waiver of the right to be present during the communication with the attorney’s client. Approval and waiver necessarily require the party’s attorney to affirmatively act. No affirmative action would be required if mere notice by opposing counsel and the opportunity to be present were sufficient. Here, there is nothing in the record that would support the conclusion that Clark’s attorney approved Frazier’s and Doran’s direct contact with Clark or that Clark’s attorney waived the right to be present during any of the communications at issue.
Even if there were some legitimate basis for Balck to have reasonably believed that under Rule 4.2 only notice along with the opportunity to be present was required, indeed, if in fact that was all the rule actually required, the state nonetheless engaged in serious misconduct. Although there is some indication in the record that Clark’s attorney may have had notice1 of the second July 26 communication between Clark, Frazer, and Doran, there has been no showing that Clark’s counsel had the opportunity to be present. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record before us that would support the conclusion that Clark’s counsel ever received adequate notice along with the opportunity to be present during the August 3 communications. Thus, there was no demonstrated compliance with what Balck allegedly thought the rule to be.
There are two final points that must be made. First, the court focuses on the “poor communication” on both sides and Balck’s “repeated! ] attempts] to meet what he reasonably believed to be his professional obligations.” To the extent that the court’s opinion may be read to suggest that Clark’s attorneys’ failure to respond to the purported notice and opportunity to be present during the communications at issue constitutes consent sufficient to mitigate the misconduct, there is no basis in the law for such a suggestion. Second, I feel compelled to state explicitly that the state’s violation of Rule 4.2 cannot be excused or mitigated by the fact that Balck may have been frustrated by the manner in which Clark’s attorneys responded or the substance of those responses to the state’s efforts to communicate with Clark. In fact, comment six to Rule 4.2 specifically provides that a lawyer may seek a court order to authorize communication with a represented person if “uncertain” whether such communication would be permissible or in “exceptional circumstances.” Minn. R. Prof. Conduct. 4.2 cmt. 6. Counsel’s *357frustration does not mitigate a violation of the rule; rather, counsel’s failure to seek a court order aggravates the misconduct.
For these additional reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Neither Handley nor Balck positively remember whether they spoke on the day of Clark’s arraignment.