Court Opinion

ID: 9567435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:53:49.866776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:36.620046
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring specially.
It has generally been considered questionable appellate practice to address and decide issues which are not necessary to the disposition of an appeal, particularly where those issues involve the state and federal constitutions. “It is a well established principle .. . that this Court ‘will not pass upon questions of constitutionality until presented in a cause demanding rulings thereon.’ ” State v. Hightower, 101 Idaho 749, 757, 620 P.2d 783, 791 (1980) (quoting Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Huff, 58 Idaho 587, 599, 76 P.2d 923, 928 (1938). See Swensen v. Buildings, Inc., 93 Idaho 466, 463 P.2d 932 (1970); Hill v. Schultz, 71 Idaho 145, 227 P.2d 586 (1951). Given the Court’s conclusion that Goodrick has no standing to raise his claim that I.C. § 18-6605 is unconstitutional as applied to consenting adults, I am at a loss to understand why the Court then goes on to make gratuitous statements in the area of sentencing disparity, and also with regard to the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. My concurring vote is cast solely *815on the basis that Goodrick has no standing to assert the constitutional rights of consenting adults, in which class he here did not fit. Since Goodrick’s entire argument turns on convincing us that I.C. § 18-6605 is unconstitutional as applied to consenting adults, it is totally unnecessary to address his ultimate argument concerning the validity of his sentence.
To clarify Goodrick’s position, I will set forth his arguments in the correct sequence. Goodrick argues (1) he has standing to challenge the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-6605 as applied to consenting adults, (2) I.C. § 18-6605 is in fact unconstitutional as applied to consenting adults, (3) I.C. § 18-6605 therefore applies only to nonconsensual acts of sodomy (i.e., acts coerced through threats or violence), (4) the offense of assault with intent to commit sodomy is therefore a lesser included offense of the crime of sodomy, (5) the maximum penalty for sodomy is five years,1 the maximum penalty for assault with intent to commit sodomy is fifteen years, and (6) imposition of a greater sentence for a lesser included offense than could have been imposed for the greater offense violates the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.2 As can be readily seen, this entire house of cards relies for its foundation on Goodrick’s initial premise — that he has standing to assert the constitutional rights of consenting adults. Goodrick makes no other argument, and since the Court concludes that his foundational premise is without merit, there is no need to gratuitously go beyond that point. “While [Goodrick] may very well entertain a concern for [his] innocent fellow men . . . it is a well-established principle of constitutional law that such concern does not confer upon [Goodrick] the requisite standing to mount the attack.” State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 596, 570 P.2d 259, 274 (1977) (Bistline, J., dissenting).3
The Court’s position on the standing issue is much the same as it took in State v. Carringer, supra, note 1. In Carringer, however, the Court properly declined to proceed to the merits of the constitutional argument, notwithstanding that in Carringer the merits involved the very statute on which the standing question was decided, while here the standing question merely removes the linchpin in Goodrick’s attack on his sentence. Nevertheless the same principles militating against the gratuitous resolution of constitutional issues should apply.
Based upon my conclusion that Goodrick has no standing to mount his constitutional assault, I agree with the majority that the sentence imposed should be affirmed.

. To reach this conclusion we would have to overrule State v. Carringer, 95 Idaho 929, 523 P.2d 532 (1974), in which a sharply divided court held that the maximum penalty for sodomy was solely up to the discretion of the sentencing court.

. The Court’s observation that the assault may in some cases be more heinous than the actual commission of the crime is undoubtedly correct. It is unnecessary to decide, however, what effect that has on the constitutionality of disparate sentences.

. Lopez should be overruled. To leave it stand until the Court is one day differently comprised serves only to bring undue confusion into case law. The Court there sustained a “facially vague” attack on the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing prostitution. It purported to distinguish the contrary result in Carringer by observing that “[i]n Carringer, unlike the case at bar, the ugly facts of the specific conduct of the defendant were before the Court.... and we have no knowledge of the acts allegedly performed by Lopez.” Lopez at 588, 570 P.2d 259. The Court rather blithely had already mentioned that the appeal record (brought up by Lopez — not the State) failed to include a reporter’s transcript of the evidence adduced against Lopez. There was, however, even more wrong with the Lopez opinion than that particular item, but on that basis alone, it should be disavowed. The Court will not likely ever again follow its teaching.