Court Opinion

ID: 9776331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:30:48.539047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.321708
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
In the early portions of the opinion, the majority refers to the deceased by name. However, the latter portions of the opinion refer to the deceased as “the victim.” The latter references clearly establish that the majority’s use of the deceased’s name is gratuitous, unnecessary and, for the following reasons, improper.
The purpose of an appellate opinion is to resolve the case and controversy before the court, and to instruct the bench and bar on legal principles for future application. In so doing, a court should recite only the facts necessary and relevant to decide the case and instruction on the law. See, Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing, 97 (West.1990); and, Joyce J. George, Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook, 103 (3d ed. 1993). Facts which are unnecessary or distracting should be excluded. George, at 103-104. Because the name of a crime victim is seldom necessary to our discussion of the merits of a case, the Court should refrain from referring to the victim by name. See generally, Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, — S.W.2d -, - - - [1995 WL 341575], slip op. pp. 6-7 (No. D-4578, Supreme Court of Texas, June 8, 1995) (The “private details about a ... victim or the victim’s identity may be irrelevant when the details are not uniquely crucial to the case_”).
More importantly, however, our constitution grants crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.” Tex. Const, art. I, § 30. Further, there is a general presumption under Texas law that the public has no legitimate interest in embarrassing facts about private citizens. Star-Telegram, — S.W.2d at -, slip op. pg. 6 (citing Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accid. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex.1976)). Because victimization by crime brings not only the trauma of the crime itself but humiliation and embarrassment, it is improper to further invade a crime victim’s privacy by unnecessarily stating the victim’s name in an opinion. See, Knapp v. Martone, 170 Ariz. 237, 823 P.2d 685, 686, n. 1 (1992). Referring to the names of crime victims typically serves only to further embarrass and traumatize victims and their families. State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 349 S.E.2d 566, 569, n. 1 (1986). Accordingly, as a matter of sensitivity and respect, courts should not refer by name to the victim of an offense unless it cannot be avoided because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 335, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); First v. State, 846 S.W.2d 836, 837, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); State v. Kites, 175 Ariz. 358, 857 P.2d 1212, 1215, n. 2 (1993); State v. Pearson, 1992 WL 70547, 1, n. 1 (Tenn.Cr.App.1992) (unpublished) (practice of court is to avoid mentioning names of victims in sexual related crimes in order to protect victim’s privacy interest); State v. Shamsid-Deen, 324 N.C. 437, 379 S.E.2d 842, 845, n. 1 (1989) (victims of sexual assault); and, State v. McGautha, 617 S.W.2d 554, 555, n. 2 (Mo.Ct.App.W.D.1981). See also, Wilcox v. State, 672 S.W.2d 12, 13, n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1984); and, People v. Brown, 35 Cal.App.3d 317, 320, n. 2, 110 Cal.Rptr. 854, 856, n. 2 (Ca.Ct.App.2d Div.1973).
Believing the reference to the deceased by name in the instant case was improper, I will not join the opinion. With these comments, I join only in the judgment of the Court.