Court Opinion

ID: 9897463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:18.462732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.696937
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion HO

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                ORBITZ WORLDWIDE, LLC; ORBITZ                           No. 85111
                LLC; ORBITZ INC.; TRAVELSCAPE
                LLC; TRAVELOCITY INC.; CHEAP
                TICKETS INC.; EXPEDIA INC.;
                EXPEDIA GLOBAL LLC; HOTELS.COM
                LP; HOTWIRE INC.; BOOKING
                HOLDINGS INC.; PRICELINE.COM
                LLC; TRAVELWEB LLC;
                TRAVELNOW.COM INC.; AGODA                                SEP 28 2023
                INTERNATIONAL USA LLC; HOTEL                           ELI
                                                                    CLEM"               URT
                TONIGHT INC.; AND HOTEL                            BY
                                                                         1EF pEpure CLERK
                TONIGHT LLC,
                Petitioners,
                vs.
                THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
                CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
                MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT JUDGE,
                Respondents,
                  and
                THE STATE OF NEVADA; MARK
                FIERRO; AND SIG ROGICH,
                Real Parties in Interest.

                           Original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
                challenging a district court order denying a motion for summary judgment.
                           Petition denied.

                Pisanelli Bice, PLLC, and Todd L. Bice, Las Vegas; Ballard Spahr LLP and
                Joel E. Tasca and David E. Chavez, Las Vegas,
                for Petitioners Agoda International USA LLC, Booking Holdings Inc.,
                Cheap Tickets Inc., Expedia Global LLC, Expedia Inc., Hotel Tonight Inc.,
                Hotel Tonight LLC, Hotels.com LP, Hotwire Inc., Orbitz Inc., Orbitz LLC,
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                 Orhitz   Worldwide,     LLC,    Priceline.com    LLC,   Travelweb     LLC,
                 Travelnow.corn Inc., Travelocity Inc., and Travelscape LLC.

                 Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, and Anne Marie Seibel and Tiffany
                 J. deGruy, Birmingham, Alabama,
                 for Petitioners Agoda International USA LLC, Booking Holdings Inc.,
                 Priceline.com LLC, and Travel Web LLC.

                 McDermott, Will & Emery LLP and Catherine A. Battin and Jon Dean,
                 Chicago, Illinois,
                 for Petitioners Hotel Tonight Inc. and Hotel Tonight LLC.

                 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP and Douglas W. Baruch and Elizabeth B.
                 Herrington, Washington, D.C.,
                 for Petitioners Cheap Tickets Inc., Expedia Global LLC, Expedia Inc.,
                 Hotels.com LP, Hotwire Inc., Orbitz Inc., Orbitz LLC, Orbitz Worldwide,
                 LLC, Travelnow.coin Inc., Travelocity Inc., and Travelscape LLC.

                 Aaron D. Ford, Attorney . General, and David J. Pope, Senior Deputy
                 .Attorney General, Carson City,
                 for Real Party in interest . the State of Nevada.

                 Clark Hill PLLC and Dominic P. Gentile, Michael Vincent Cristalli, and
                 Mark S. Dzarnoski, Las Vegas,
                 for Real Parties in Interest Mark Fierro and Sig Rogich.

                 BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.1

                       'The Honorable Linda Marie Bell, Justice, recused herself and did not
                 participate in the decision 'of this matter.
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                                  OPINION
-By the Court, CADISH, J.:
             In this writ proceeding, we consider an issue of first impression
regarding NRS 357.080(3)(b), which prevents a private plaintiff -from
maintaining an action u.nder the Nevada False Claims Act (NFCA) i.f the
action is based on the same allegations or .transactions that are the subject
of a civil action to which- the State or a political subdivision is already a
party.   Specifically, we address whether NRS 357.080(3)(b) requires
dismissal of a private NFCA action brought on behalf of the State, where a
county brings a subsequent suit on its own behalf against-the. same parties
based on the same allegations or transactions as the private aCtion to
establish liability. We conclude that NRS 357.080(3)(b) does not contain a
sequencing requirement,' and thus when applicable this statute requires
dismi.ssal of the private NFCA actjon even if the civil action on. behalf Of th.e
State or a political subdivision was filed aer the private action. We further
conclude that when a civil action has been brought by or or behalf of a state
governmental entity, NRS 357.080(3)(b) presents no bar to .a separate
private action on behalf of a different 'governmental entitÿ, even- where the
two suits involve the same allegation's or transactions. -ApplYing this
interpretation' to the instant case, we deny the request for writ relief
because, even assuming' the private and goernniental actions here involve
the same allegations or tranSactions, the two actions are brought on behalf
  t.wo separate• governmental entities. Petitioners haVe thus failed :to
demonStrate that the law requires the district court to .dismiSs thiS priViate
action such that writ relief is warranted here.
                                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            Real   parties   in   interest    Mark   Fierro   and Sig.   Rogich

                (collectively, relators) commenced.a private action on behalf of real party in
                interest the State of Nevada against petitioners, all of whom. are online
                travel companies (collectively, OTCs). Relators asserted a cause of z:iction
                under the NFCA, alleging that OTCs knowingly avoided obligations to pay
                transient-lodging taxes2 mandated by the Clark County Code and state law
                by engaging in a scheme to collect the tax from their customers based on a
                retail room rate but remit the tax to the county and State based en a lower,
                discounted rOom rate negotiated between OTCs and hotels.3 In other words,
                relators alleged that OTCs negotiated with hotels to rent a room at a certain
                rate, called the wholesale rate; OTCs then marked up the. price, called th.e
                retail rate, to customers. Relators al.lege that OTCs then calculated their
                transient-lodging tax obligation according to the wholesale rate, yet they

                collected from customers the transient-lod.ging tax Obligation according to
                the retail rate and pocketed the difference. Following the procedure set
                forth in NRS 357.110, the. Attorney General declined 'to intervene and
                permitted relators' action te proceed..

                      2 NRS 244.3352(1) mandates that counties impose transient-lodging
                taxes. Transient-lodging taxes are based on the gross receipts received. by
                transient-]odging establish.ments, as that term is defined, :from their
                occupants. Id. These taxes are collected by the counties and apportioned
                between the counties and the State under applicable law. NRS 244.3354.

                      3As we  explain below, this type of private lawsu.it, on behalf of an
                allegedly defrauded government en.tity, is sometimes referred to as a qui-
                tam case.
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                            Over a year later, Clark County filed its own lawsuit against
                the same OTCs named in this qui-tam lawsuit, which OTCs removed to
                federal court. Clark County's lawsuit included several claims, -all based on
                allegations that OTCs knowingly avoided payment of .transient-lodging
                taxes owed to Clark County under county and state law by engaging in a
                scheme to collect a transient-lodging tax from its customers based on "the
                full retail price" charged to those customers but remit the same transient-
                lodging tax to Clark County based on "the • disconnted wholesale price"
                negotiated between OTCs and hotels.
                            Following the commencement of Clark County's lawsuit, OTes
                moved for sumrhary judgment on the NFCA claim in this private action.
                They argued that the government-action bar un.der NRS 357.080(3)(b)
                precluded the action from proceedini; becaUse, as relators cOnceded, the
                allegations and transactions that were the subject of the private .action were
                now th.e subject of a separate civil action cornmenced by Clark Connty.
                Relators countered that the government-acti.on bar did not preclude
                relators' action on behalf of the State, as the bar only applied to a private
                action that involved the same governmental entity and th.e same theories of
                liability as the separate governmental entity's-action.
                            During a hearing on the motion, the district court raised
                whether NRS 357.080(3)(b)'s language creates a sequencing requirement,
                such that the statute precludes a private suit that involves* the sank:
                allegations or transactions as a goVernmentalentity's suit only if the private
                suit was instituted after the governinental entity's snit. Ultimateiy, the
                district court denied summary judginent on. this baSis. It-found that Clark
                County's action was based on. • the same underlying allegations or
                transactions that are the subjed of relators? private -actiOn. Hiiwever. it

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                reasoned th.at the "already" la.ng,uage in NRS 357.080(3)(19 "contemplates
                first in time." .A.ecordingly, the district court concluded that the
                government-action bar did not 9.pply here because Clark County did not
                bring its action until after commencement of the private action; thus, it was
                "not 'already a party" to its own action for purposes of the section.
                            Subsequently, the district court granted. the relators' motion for
                leave to amend pursuant to a joint stipulation in which OTCs reserved the
                right to object. to •-the • amended 'complaint under NRS 357.080(3)(b).
                Relators' amendment sought to clarify • that the •• original comPlaint
                encchipassed recovery of transient-lodging taxes due tothe State u.nder the
                ordinances of each county in 'which theY were imposed; rather than only
                Clark County. Thus, in the amended complaint, relators again asserted
                t.heir 1\TFCA elaim on behalf of the State and included neW allegationS that
                UrCs had knowingly and improperly deprived the State of taxes owed to it
                pursuant. to the codeS of Clark, Washoe, Douglas, Lyon, and 13.ye- Counties,
                ;as weii as state law,- by remitting their transient-lodging taxes based on.the
                loWer negotiated room rate, rather than the higher retaiIroorn rate. •
                              BefOre relators filed their amended complai.nt but after the joint
                stipulation., OTCs moved for reconSideration of the order den.ying shramary
                jud.girient on the ground that the diStriCt Court's; in(ernretation of -MIS
                357.0809)(b) conflicted with itS plain:language. TheY contended that the
                applicatiorrof the statute depehd.ed Merely on the existence of-the two suits,
                regardless • of sequence. OTCs alio 'argued • that relators'. amended
                allegations extending the alleged tak-avoidance scheme to Other Nevada
                counties did not sufficiently differentiate the prilia.te‘ shit from the Clark
                Couhty suit- and, thus, did. not overcome the gOvernment-action bk.e.
                OTC's' vieW, the purported failure te pay th'e
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                regard.less of where the tax wae, levied, relied on the same statewide
                statutory sources and the same alleged statewide unlawful practices. OTCs
                also argued that, regardless of the amendment, the bar continued to apply
                with re.spect to the alleged violations. of Clark County's ordinances because
                those allegations overlapped the allegations in the Clark County action and

                showed that the two suits rested on the same allegations or transactions.
                             Objecting to reconsideration, relators argued that the amen.ded
                complaint, in superseding the original,. precluded reconsid.eration -as to
                OTCs' attacks on the original complaint. RelatorS also' contended that the
                amended complaint's inclusion of new allegations regarding transient-
                lodging taxes in multiple counties differentiated their suit from the Clark
                County suit and overcame the government-action bar. Following a hearing,
                the district court denied reconsideration without articulating a rationale.
                This writ petition followed.
                                                 DISCUSSION
                We elect to entertain the petition for writ relief
                            A writ of mandamus. is available to correct clear error or .an
                arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion when there is ne..other plain,
                speedy, and adequate legal remedy.4          Inn Game Thch., Inc. v.. Second

                Judicial .Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556. 558 (2008); see State
                u. Eighth Judicial Dist.. Court (Anzalone), 118 Nev. 140, 146, 42 P.3c1 233,

                      4Although OTCs alternatively seek a. writ of prohibition, to the extent
                that the government-action bar implicateS a challenge to the district court's
                jurisdiction., we conclude that prohibition relief is not a.ppronriate ifere,
                consistent with our analysis of mandamus relief. See .Goicoechea V. .firourth
                judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 287; 289, 607. P..2d 1140, 1141 (1980) (holding
                that a writ of prohibition "will not issue if the courf sought to be restrained
                had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter under consid.eration.").
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                237 (2002) (observing that writ-of-mandamus relief "is available 'to compel
                the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty
                resulting from an office, trust or station,' or to control manifest abuse of
                discretion" (quoting NRS 34.160)). "Writ relief is an .extraordinary remed.y
                that . . only issue[s] at the 'discretion of this court." Anzalone, 118 Nev. at
                146, 42 P.3d at 237. "[B]ecause an appeal from the final judgment typically
                constitutes an adequate and speedy legal remedy, we generally decline to
                consider writ 'petitions that challenge interlecutory district court orders
                denying motions to dismiss" or for summary judgment. lilt? Game _Tech.,
                124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558. Notwithstanding our general policy,
                however, we have elected to exercise our discretion and entertain a writ
                petition in situations where "an important issue of law needs clarification
                and considerations of sound judicial economy and ad.ministration militate
                in.favor of [considering the petition]." Id. at 197-98, 179 P.3c1 at 559.
                            This petition raises purely legal questions regarding the effect
                of NRS 357.080(3)(b) where the government entity's suit was filed after the
                private action and the two at-issue lawsuits involve tWo d.istinct
                governmental entities. Additionally, the issues of first impression raised by
                this petition are of statewide importance. Because the NFCA. authorizes
                private parties to recover .fraudulently obtained government funds and
                return those funds to the public fisc, any interpretation... of NRS
                357.080(3)(b) touches on the private enforcement of a. governmental entity's
                owed claims and a governmental entity's control over the manner in .-vvhich
                private plaintiffs litigate falSe claims. Moreover, the interpretation of: NRS
                357.080(3)(b) at the early stages of litigatien furthers judicial economy, as
                the - statute presents a total bar .;(3 litigation in certain. Situations:.
                Accordingly, we elect to exercise our discretion and- entertain the writ

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petition to answer whether NRS 357.080(3)(h) barE., a private suit on behalf
of a, governmental entity where a different governmental entity
so.bsequently sues the same parties based on the same allegations or
              •
transactions as the private suit.5
The NFCA's government-action bar
          Modeled after the 1986 amen.dments to its 17ederal counterpart,
the. NFCA aims "to expose and combat attempted fraud against the
government."' Ina Game Thch., 124 Nev. at 198;.. 179:P.3d .at 559; see also
NRS 357.040(1)-.(enumerating "acts" for which "aperson." may beThable to
the- State or a political subdivision"). In so doing,. the NIT.A allows- the
Attorney General or the Attorney General's designee to bring a.n action
thereunder against any "person" who commits a prohibited "a.ct" against the
State or a political subdivision of the:State and recolier 'monetary darnages,
including treble damages. See NRS 357.040(1)(a)-(i), (2) (listing "acts" for
which civil liability exists and available dainages) NRS .357.070(1)42)
(permitting Attorney General; or district or city attorney by designation, to
b•ring cause of action under the NMA).
                 At the .sarne time, the NFCA • authorizes so.-•Called qui-tan
:. 4,-.tions by which "a private plaintiff . . : bring[s] an. action ; on his or her
ovv-ri accOunt and that dale State Or a. political subdi-,yision ; or both th.e State
and a politica]. subdivision," for violations thereunder. See NRS 357.080(1):

      • 'We are not persuaded by relators' argument that this writ petition is
;moot. Regardless Of ',vhether the amended complaint superseded the
        na.! complaint, the •amended complaint did not F.; ubstaiiti, ly alter the
interpret,ative . issue concerning, NRS 357.080(3)(h) presented . in tIns
petitien. Thus, the amended cornplaint neither •J!ividers ti tegaì issite
.:1-.):3tract nor. prevents us frOm granting -effectual relief to-the 'prevailing
party.

                                         9
                see generally United States v. Kitsap Physicians Sem, 314 F.3d 995, 997 n.1
                (9th Cir. 2002) ("`Qui. tam is shorthand for [a] Latin phrase . . . . In practice
                the phrase means 'an action. under a statute that allows a private person. to
                sue for a penalty,. part of which the government or• some• specified public
                institution will receive.'" (citations and italicization omitted)).        Once

                brought, "no person other than the Attorney General or the Attornu
                General's designee may intervene or bring a related action pursuant to [the
                NFCA] based on the facts underlying the first [private] action.."G' NRS
                357.080(2); see generally Grynberg eX rel. United States v: Exxon. Co:, USA
                (.1h re Nat. Gas Royalties Qui Tarn Litig.), 566 F.3d 956, 961(l0th Cir: 2009)
                (describing the analogous federal provision as the "first-to-file bar," which.
                `-functions both to eliminate parasitic plaintiffs who piggyback off the claims
                of a prior relator, and to encourage legitimate relators to file q-uicklY- by
                protecting the spoils of the first to bring a. claim").
                             NRS 357.080(3) nevertheless precludes:certain qui-tam actions.
                The at-issue subsection, known as the government-action bar, limits private
                actions as follows:
                             faJn action may not be maintained by a private ••
                             plaintiff pursuant to this chapter . . . [W. the action .
                             is based upon allegations or transactions that are
                             the subject •of a civil action or an administrative

                      Gif the Attorney General or the Attorney General's designee elects to
                intervene in the qui-tam acticn, then the private plaintiff muat effectively
                cede control of the litigation over to the Attorney General or the Attorney
                General's designee. See NRS 35.7.110(3). But if, as occurred here, the
                appropriate official declines to intorvene, "the private plaintiff -niay proceed
                with the action." NRS 357.1.1.0(2). The State did not proyid.e any briefing
                in this writ proceeding, presumably because the Attorney General
                previously declined to intervene in the action.
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                          proceeding for a monetary penalty to which the
                          State or political subdivision is already a party.
                NRS 357.080(3)(b); see also United States ex. rel. Bennett v. Biotronik,
                876 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2017) (referring. to "the 'government-action
                bar"' in the NFCA's counterpart under the federal False Claims Act). We
                have not yet had the occasion to interpret the scope of NRS 357.080(3)(b) in
                an analogous situation, and thus, we have made only general remarks
                regarding the provision. See,              Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial
                Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 132, 139, 127 P.3d 1088,1094 (2006) (stating, without
                interpreting the statute, that Igjenerallv, a false claims action may not be
                maintained if administrative or court proceedings involving the same
                underlying facts and allegations were previously instigated").
                            OTC's argue that the distriet court clearly erred in interpreting
                the unambiguous language of NRS 357.080(3)(b) as containing a 'sequencing
                requirement. They focus on t.he district court's interpretation. of Lhe %.v -ords
                "maintain" and "already," arguing the Legislature's decision to. substitute
                !mai.ntain" for the federal la.w's use of llring" as to a priVate plaintiff's
                action supports that the two terms are not synonymous. APnlying their
                interpretation, OTCs argue that NRS 357.030(3)(b) bars the private action
                here, even though the Ciark County a.ction came after the private action.
                            Relators    counter    that    OTCs'    interpretation .of     NRS
                357.080(3)(b) as purportedly requiring dismissal of. a private 1.tawsuit
                behalf of the State because a • separate political subdivision filed a
                subsequent lawsuit on its own behalf premised on the same allegationS .or
                transactions conflicts with the plain. language of the statute, 'Which
                distinguishes between "the State" an.d "political subdivisions" of the Stai-,e.
                They reason that because the two at-issue suits involve different state

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                gDvenamenW entities, Nits 357 vm_143) does not 11 re:Aude rekitors'
                private action from proceeding.
                            The application of NRS 357.080(3)(b) to the undisputed facts is
                a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. In. re Resort
                at Surnmerlin Litig., 122 Nev. 177, 182, 127 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2006). We
                enforce the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute, see City of Reno v.
                Y.!.I.rbide, 135 Nev. 113, 115-16., 440 P.3d 32, 35 (2019), and strive to
                interpret sectien.s "in harMony -With the statute . as a•-whole,"• Brandi
                Banking & Tr: Co. V. Windh . aven & Tollway, LLC, 131. Nev. 1_55, 158, 347
                P.3d 1038, 1040 '(2.015). In deter:Mining the meanin.g of a statUte, We: give
                undefined words in the Statute their "plain and ordinary m.eaning.". la.re
                Resort at Surnmerlin Litig., 122 Nev. at 182, 127 P.3d at 1079. Further,
                when a..statute haS been mOdeled 'after a federal statute, we consider
                intez'praation of• the federal • statute as "'helpful" insig;:it for our
                ir;terpretation of the corresponding state. laW. See int?, Game. Tech,,' 122
                     at :150, i27' P.3d -   1101 . We resort to external Sources or rnles•4
                   :Lutory conStruction only in the event that ambiguity, tirlanguage that
                gives rise to More than one "reasonable" interpretation, exists in—the
                statute. See Univ.' & Cmty. Coll. Sys. Of Nev. v. Nevadans for SOund G60,,
                120 Nev.-712, 731, 100 P.3d .179,. 193 (004).                  •

                     NRS 357.080(3)(b) may apply even where the qui-tarn action precedc,
                   • the State's .or political subdivision's action
                           The statutory-interpretation .dispute . here concerns li,ow the
                words ."maintain" and 'already" relate to each other. While neither word is
                defined within. the MICA, under the COM.Tlion definition, 'niaintain" means
                to 'continue (somethingr Maintain, Black's Law Dictionary 1142 (1,1th ea.
                2019); see also American 1.-leritae Dictionary 1058 (5th ed. 2011) (defining

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                     maintain. as "[t]o keep up or carry on; continue"). 7 We have, in interpreting
                     other statutes, noted a difference between the words "maintain" and
                     "bring." See, e.g., Madera .v. State Indus. .Ins. Sys., 114 Nev. 253, 258-59,
                     956.P.2d 117, 120-21 (1998); Nat'l Mines Co. .v. Sixth. judicial Dist. Court,
                     34 Nev. 67, 77-78, 116 P. 996, 1000 (1911). In National Mines Co., we
                     discussed a statute that conferred the right to "institute and maintain" an
                     action. 34 Nev. at 77-78, 116 P. at 1000. Interpreting this language, we
                     reasoned as follows:"
                                  The word "maintain," as usedlrequently in statutes -
                                  in reference to action.s, comprehends the institution
                                  as well as the support of the action., and the statutes
                                  of this state contain In.any instances where it is
                                  used in this broader sense. It is used• in other
                                  instances to express a nleaning corresponding to its
                                  more        restricted      and       more       proper
                                  definition, . . . where [the term] [is] construed not to .
                                  comprehend the institution of an action, but merely
                                  the support th.ereof. In [the statute] the two words
                                  are used together, "institute and maintain"; and
                                  hence both are u.sed in their restricted sense.
                     Id. (citations omitted). Likewise; in Madera, we considered a I-:7tatute that
                     used the terms "'brought' or 'maintained,' and we acknowledged that these
                     terms sometimes convey similar meanings. 114 Nev. at 258, 956 P.2d at
                     120-21. Nevertheless, we concluded that the statute's uSe of "maintain
                     extended that statute "topending matters,' not just future matters. See id.
                     at 258-59, 956 P.2d at 120-21. In so concluding, we reasoned. that the
                     Legislature's use of "maintain" alongside "brought" evidenced. an intent to

                           7The definition of"maintain" in the versions of diCtionaries at the time
                     of the statute's passage in 1999 are identical to the definitions in. the current
                     edition.s. See Maintain., Black's Law Dictionary 965 (7th ed. 1999);
                     American Heritage DictiOnary 1084 "(3d ed. 1996).
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                apply different meanings to the terms; such that the word "maintain" meant
                to continue or uphold an action, rather than to commence or institute it. See
                id. at 259, 956 P.2d at 121.
                             Like the statute in Madera, NRS 357.080 uses the terms
                "maintain" and "bring" at different points, indicating the Legislature's
                intent to distinguish the two terms rather than collapse them. See generally
                2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes & Statutory
                Construction § 46.6 (7th ed.• 2007) [hereinafter- Suthertand] ("Different
                words used in the same, or a similar, statute are assigned different
                meanings whenever possible."). Nor does the ordinary meaning of "already"
                preclude giving independent meaning to "maintain," as the former. term
                may, but does not always, convey succession.           See. American: Heritage
                Dictionary 53 (5th ed. 2011) (defining "already" an adverb, as "Thrly'this or a
                specified time," and noting tb.at it• functions as "an intensive" at times).8
                . Moreover, it can simply apply to the time at which the motion to dismiSs is

                made, at which point such a civil action is "already" pending.
                            Although the Legislature patterned the NFCA after federal
                legislation, it departed from the federal counterpart in Substitting
                "maintain" for "bring." Compare 31            § 3730(e)(3) ("In no ex:Tentmay- a
                person bring an action under [the act] . : . which is haSed upon al]egations
                or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an.administrative civil.
                money penaltY proceeding in which. the, GovernMent is already a partY.'.
                (empha.sis added)), with NRS 357.080(3)(b) •- ("Ain action may not be

                      8The 1992 edition of American, Heritage Dictionary provides it
                definition of "already" as "tidy this or a specified time; before," while also
                noting that "already" can be "[u]sed as an intensive." See American Her4age
                actionary 54 (3d ed. 1996). Blaclz's Law Dictionary does not kfine
                "already."
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                  maintained by a private plaintiff . . . [ijf the action is based upon allegations
                  or transactions that are the subject of a civil a.ction . . . to which the State
                  or political subdivision is already a party." (emphasis added)). Generally,
                  "[w]hen the Legislature adopts a. statute substantially similar to a federal.
                  statute, 'a presumption arises that the Negislature knew and intended to
                  adopt the construction placed. on the federal statute by federal courts." Ina
                  Ggme Tech., 122 Nev. at 153, 127 P.3d at 1103. Yet here, the Legislature
                  rejected the federal FCA's sequeneing language and the caselaw's
                  construction of that language in its use of "maintain" as opposed to "tiling:"
                  C)r. 2B Sutherland, supra, at § 52:5 ("[W]hen a legislature Models a statute
                  after a uniform. act., but does not adopt particular language, coUrts conclude
                  the omission was 'deliberate,' or 'intentional,' and.• that the legiSlature
                  rejected a Partieular policy Of the uniform. act."). •
                              Accordingly,    then,   the • goyernment-actiiin     bar       in   NRS
                  357080(3)(b) contains no sequencing requirement, andeit therefore may
                  apply even where the qui-tam aCtion precedes the Si:kite's or *Aka].
                  subdivision's action," because it precludes not just the. bringing. of a private
                  Snit but also the maintaining of one, conveying • the continued pursUit
                  thereof.   While the district court erred in determining that• NRS
                  357.080(3)(b) contains such a sequerycing•requirement, .an issue remain.s as
                  to wh.ether the statute requires dismiSsa1 'Where the Private and
                  gOvernment suits concern the interests of different goVernMent entities..

                       ' 9We note, however, that pursuant to NRS 357.080(2), only the    •

                  Attorney General or their designEtp may assert claims pursuant. •to the
                  NFCA in a goVernment civil. action when it is filed after the qui-tam action.
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                                                        15
                      NRS 357.080(3)(b) does not bar a qui-tarn action on behalf of one
                      governmental entity where the separate civil action has been brought
                      by or on behalf of a different governmental entity, even if the two suits
                      involve the same allegations or transactions
                           . Application of NRS 357.080(3)(b) requires comparison of two
                "actions": the first action is the cne brought by a Private.plaintiff under NRS
                357.080(1), and the second action, i.e., "a civil action," refers to the one to
                which "the State or political subdivision is already a party." Importantly, a
                disjunctive is used in the latter clause. to describe the "civil . action,'
                signaling that the terms "the State" and "political subdivision" convey
                distinct meanings. See United States v. Harris,• 838 F.3d. 98, 105 (2d Cir.
                2016) ("Established canons of statutory construction 'ordinarily • suggest
                that terms connected by a disjunctiVe be given separate meanings."
                '(quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 44.2 U.S. 330, 339 (1.979))).' in authorizing
                the first action' by a private plaintiff, the statute elseWhere .maintains the
                disjunctive when referring to "the State" and 'political subdivision.' • See
                NRS 357.080(1) (IA] private plaintiff may bring an action pursuant to thi.s
                chapter . . . on his or h.er own. account and that of the State or a. political
                subdivision, or both 'the State and a political subdivision.'" -(emptfases
                added)). Indeed, the NFCA confirms distinct meanings of"the State" and a
                "political subdivision," aS the latter term is nOt 'defined as coextensive .with
                the former term.     See .NRS 357.0'30 (defining "political subdivision' aS
                including counties, cities, a.nd "any other local government" entitY). •
                            Thus, whenthe governinent-action bar in subsection' 3(b) efers
                to a "civil action" to which -"the State or political subdivision ísalready a
                party" (emphasis .added), it refers back to the specific State
                subdivision on whose account the privo.te Plaintiff haS brought an action
                pursuant to subsection 1. See NRS- 357.080(1) & (3); see alSo .American

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                Heritage Dictionary 1803 (5th ed. 2011) ("the," a definite article, us:ed i;o
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                "denote particular, specified persons or things"). A contrary interpretation
                collapses "the State" and "political .subdivision" into one entity, i.e., the
                 government," as any governmental. entity's lawsuit premised on the same
                CC

                allegations or transactions would foreclose a private plaintiff from. pursuing
                recovery on behalf of a distinct entity. While the government-action bar in
                the federal FCA refers to "the Government" as one entity, see 3]. U.S.C.
                § 3730(e)(3), the plain language of the NFCA. makes clear that a claim may
                be brought on behalf of either the State or a political subdivision, or both.
                Such an interpretation makes sense in light of the distinction between state
                governmental entities in other contexts. Cf. Zebe v. county of Lander, -1.12
                Nev. 1482, 1484-85, 929 P.2d 927, 928-29 (1996) (concluding that because
                "each county, acting th.rough its district attorney., has specific jurisdiction
                over acts conducted within its bOrders,": one county d.oe's not bin.d' a second
                county absent. f`the second county's [express] consent"); Clark .Cou'uty
                Lewis, 88 Nev. 354, 356-57:498 P.2d 363, 365 (1972) (noting that 'the
                ceunty• as a political subdivision has the power to compromise disputed
                claims or causes of action brought against it").
                            Applying this understanding to 'the Undisputed thets, NRS
                357.080(3)(b) does not require dismissal. of relatcirs' private action. Relators
                allege that OTCs engaged in a. fraudulent scheme throughout the state. to
                avoid tra.nsient-lod.ging tax Obligations. • According to the • ainended
                coMplaint, •those transient-lodging ta.xes were assessed. in'Clark; Washoe,
                Douglas, Lyon, and Nye counties Under their resPective *countY:cOdes and
                state law. However, relators seek recoverý of the portion of the transient-
                lodging tax to which the State., not the respective county authorities, was
                entitled, and thus bring this case only on.their own account and that Of tiie
                State--not that of any political subdivisions. By contrast; the State is not
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                                                      17
                        a. party to the action brought. by Clark County. Even a.ssuming the actions
                        involve the same allegations or transactions, the two governmental entities,
                        and the claims pertaining to each, involved in the private action and he
                        "civil action" remain distinct. Thus, regardless of which. suit came first,
                        NRS 357.080(3)(b) does not preclude relators from maintaining tb.e present
                        qui-tam action.
                                     We also disagree with OTCs' assertion that failure to apply the
                        governinent-action•bar u.surps legislative intent to enSure that gOvernipent
                        officials, rather than private parties, Control goVernméntal claiy.ns and.
                        encourages private 'parties to make law and• policy decisions that affect
                        governmental interests. The NEVA ineentivizes priVate citiiens tó recover
                        fiauduiently obtained- funds from violators on behalf of and fOr:the .benefit
                        of the State or a political subdivision, while bearing the upfront financial
4,44,                     id..material burdens of litigation. See,        NRS 357.210(1):.(2) (perMittirig
                        riQrivate plaintiff to receive 'anywhere from 15 to 30 percent of a' recovery.
                        depending- on whether the Attorney Gen€ral. or the Attorney General's
                        d.cSignee intervened). Further, the Legislature has cOnferred control- over
                        false-claims litigation exclusively on -the Attorney: General,. not, a S OTCs
                        su.ggest, on all state or local' glivernment Officials. -8tee Simiainian v.Ural.); ez
                        Cmt.;1. Coll. Sys: of Nev., 122 Nev. 187,190, 128 P.3d. 1057, 1059 ("Nevada's
                        FCA permits the Attorney General,. or a private:!qui tam' plaintiff acting'. On
                        his. own behalf and. on that of the 'State, to maintain ''an.aCtion- for treble
                        dainages against 'a person' who, a m.ong other things-, presents a false claith
                        for payment or • approval . . ." (ernphasis added)). •For exaMPle, the
                        Legislature permits and -.mandates only the- Attorney General. or the •
                        Attorney .General's designee• to investigate alleged -NITA liability: NRS
                        357.070(1), (2). And a priv,ete plaintiff who files a qui-tam action muSvfb!st
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                give the Attorney General the opportunity to intervene, regardless of
                whether the suit is brought on behalf of the State or a political subdivision.,
                or both., See NRS 357.080(4)-(5); NRS 357.110(1)..
                             If the Attorney General does intervene, the Attorney Generaï
                takes over the litigation. See, e.g., NRS 357.120(3) (giving the Attorney
                General the authority to settle the action.).     However, if the A.ttorney

                General declines to intervene, the private plaintiff assumes "the same
                rights in conducting the acticin as the Attorney General 'ore the Attorney
                General's designee would have had." NRS 357.130(1). Even šo;• the 'private
                plaintiff must continue to provide the Attorney General with all pleadings

                associated wi.th the matter.    Id.   MoreoVer, the Attorney General may
                nevertheless intervene even after initially declining to intervene.       NRS

                357.130(2)-(3). While these varieus subsections: emphasize the Attorney
                General's authority over false :claims actions, they do ndt convey a general
                intent to ensure the government, as if it constitutes a • single entity,
                maintains control or supervision over false claiMs litigated by• private

                plaintiffs. Indeed, nowhere in NRS Chapter 357 does the NFCA authorize
                an independent local entity, such as Clark 'County, 'abSent the Attorney
                General's designation, to intervene in or otherWise control a private .duit• to
                protect its interests.
                             Moreover, OTCs' focus On the substantial control given to the
                Attorney General ignores a crucial aspect of the NFCA that if the •Attorney
                General declines to intervene in. the pri.vate action., as occurred here, the
                Attorney General has in effect auth.orized the private plaintiffs, to litigate
                as if they were the Attorney General. See NRS 357.130(1). Thus, a decision
                to decline to intervene also involves a degree of control by the Atthrney
                General and, likewise, acknowledges that the private litigation of the

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                State's or a political subdivision's claims may proceed. Further, here, the
                Attorney General did. not designate a county attorney to investigate and
                bring.an NFCA claim related .to Clark County's interests. In this respect,
                Clark County's suit, which includes no NFCA claim, is not directly
                implicated in relators' matter, as there is no overlap between the private
                plaintiffs' NFCA claim and the political subdivision's claims.
                            Finally, even in vesting the Attorney General with. substan.tial

                control over false-claims litigation, the Legislature has also expressed a
                policy that the State and its political su.bdivisions benefit from the private
                pursuit of false-claims litigation.   In.deed, private enforcement not -onlY

                saves the State and political subdivisions from expending resources to
                                                                                         •
                pursue these claims but also results in positive returns to those entities.
                While, undoubtedly, some private plaintiffs. pursue these claims out of a
                clegree of self-interest, the Legislature has clearly endorSed financial
                incentives to encourage private plaintiffs to do so. See NRS 357.21.0(1)-(2)
                (allowing the private plaintiff to take a percentage of the ultimate recovery).
                Nor d.o these incentives harm the State or political subdivision, as they
                ultimately result in recovery to those entities and come out of the
                wrongdoer's pocket. Thus, consideration of the NFCA.as a whOle,•along With.
                its purpose, supports our interpretation of NRS 357.080(3)(b) a§ giving
                independent. meaning to "the State" and"political subdivision.". -
                                             • CONCLUSION                             •

                            '171ne government-action 'bar in NRS 357.0800)(6) prevents a
                private plaintiff from maintaining a private NFCA action if the aCtion
                based on the • same allegations or transactions that •are subject to a ciVil
                action to which the State or a-political subdivisiOn is -already a pa:rtji. We
                hold that application of this prevision precludes continuing 'an existing

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                I\IFCA case by a private plai.ntiff even if the government entity brings its
                civil action after the private case is initiated. However, we further conclude
                that the govcrnment-action bar applies only where the two at-issue Szlits
                involve the same governmental. entity as a party. Such an interpretation.
                preserves the Legislature's intent to differentiate between the terms "the
                State" and "a political subdivision" and acknowledges that the reference in
                NRS 357.08O(3)(b) to "the State or political subdivision" means the entity
                that is a. party to the Private plaintiffs suit.
                             hirthermOre, our :interpretation also• comporta with the
                plirpose cif the. NFCA as a whole tO incenti,vize priva.te plaintiffs . tolitigate
                instances of fraud against the State or a political subdivision to free • up the
                re;3pective governmental entities' resources 'kir Other purposes. 'Nor does
                such an interpretation interfere with the .Attorney General's: control. over
                  yate NITA suits, as. the Attorney General has the right to intervene arid
                1.1S.T.; other Procedural mechanisMs toxercise a Certain amount of.control.

                             Applied here, NRS 357.080(3)(b) does not bar relators frOm
                Maintaining the instant suit because although the two at-issue-actionS may
                involVe the Same allegation.s or transactions to establish- liability,:relatori
                acti6n i.s 'brought on beh.all 6f the State and ilot on behalf Of anY
                subdivisions, while Clark County'S action is on behalf of itself and. the State

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                is n.ot a party thereto. Accordingly, we deny the OTCs' petition for writ
                relief.10

                                                                  e,

                We concur:

                         4sai..g
                      A/c‘.
                Stiglich

                                                j.

                Parraguirre

                      loThe stay thi.s court granted on August 18; 2022, is vacated, nnd. the
                relators may proceed with their action in di.strict court.
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                                                     22
                         LEE, J., concurring:
                                      While I concur in the resiilt reached by the majority, I write
                         separately to voice my disagreement with the majority's interpretation of
                         NRS 357.080(3)(b).
                                      The statute is admittedly ambiguous given its concurrent use
                         of the words "maintain" and "already," which creates a contradiction that
                         must be reconciled to give the statute effect. See State v. Lucero, 127 Nev.
                         92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011) ("[W]hen 'the statutory language lends
                         itself to two or more reasonable interpretations,' the statute is ambiguous,
                         and we may then look beyond the statute in determining legislative intent."
                         (quoting State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004))).
                         I note that the majority's interpretation is not an unreasonable one.
                         However. their interpretation of"already" as encompassing future events is
                         strained.
                                      NRS 357.080(3)(b) states, in pertinent part, that "[a]n action
                         may not be tnaintained         [i]f the action is based upon allegations or
                         transactions . . . [in a] proceeding . . . to which the State or political
                         subdivision is already a party." (Emphases added.) "Already," as ordinarily
                         used, means that something occurred prior to the idea it modifies. "Already"
                         here simply means that the State or political subdivision must have been a
                         party to the proceeding prior to the plaintiff s action. If the State or political
                         subdivision's proceeding "already" existed prior to the plaintiffs action.,
                         then the action may not be maintained. Thus, there is a natural sequenci.ng
                         requirement in NRS 357.080(3):

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                              hi holding that the govern.ment-action bar does not import a
                sequencing requirement, the majority consults the legislative history of the
                statute a.nd compares NRS 357.080(3)(b) with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3).
                Because Nevada's Legislature changed the word "bring" to "maintain," the
                majority asserts that the Legislature intended to reject any sequencing
                requirement. While this is not an unreasonable interpretation, one would
                have to turn a blind eye to the word "already," which in and of itself conveys
                sequencing.
                              I'submit that the single word change from."bring" to "Maintain"
                is not a clear indication of legislative intent. Instead, the use of "maintain"
                instead. of "bring" ha.s its Ordinary meaning: even if the plaintiffs somehow
                managed to bring this action after a related proceeding, they may .not
                continu.e the action if the State or political subdivision began the related
                proceeding prior to the plaintiff s action.
                              In addition to an assessment of legislative history when dealing.
                with an ambiguous statute, We look 'to reason              tiid public Pcilicy
                considerations to decipher legislative intent. Lucero, 127 NeV. at 95, 249
                P.3d at 1228. ("PO interpret an ambiguous statute, We loOk•to the lagi;51ative
                history and construe the statute in a ma.nner that is corisistent wAh reason.
                and pUblic policy."). As a practical matter, it doe's not Make sense to permit
                qui-ta.m actions, only for a political subdivision to swoop in at any time. It
                is not clear Why any private plaintiff would take the risk of fUnding tliis
                form of litigatión giVen the majority's interpretation. •Recognitio.n a the
                inherent sequencing set• forth in the government4tction bar promotes the
                legislative policy • of incentivizing, encouraging, and enabling 'private
                plaintiff qui-tain actions.

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                                     But because the government-action bar is inapplicable in this
                         matter for the reasons set forth in the majority's opinion, I concur with the
                         remainder of the majority's opinion.

                                                                                            J.
                                                            Lee      Opt-,

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( (4 I 947,1 =1.affir,