Court Opinion

ID: 9585731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:03:20.404654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:15.598648
License: Public Domain

Rhodes, Justice
(dissenting) :
The earliest zoning measures enacted in this country declared that nonconforming uses of property would be terminated after such uses had been “abandoned”. As a legal term of art, “abandonment” was uniformly held to consist of two elements: (1) An intent on the part of the property owner to permanently relinquish the nonconforming use; and (2), an overt act, or failure to act, manifesting abandonment. In an attempt to avoid the problems inherent in proving intent, some cities enacted zoning measures which provided for termination of nonconforming uses after they had been “discontinued”. However, because the courts have generally construed “discontinuance” as being synonymous with “abandonment”, some municipalities are now resorting to a third *455type of measure in an attempt to avoid intent problems and promote the speedy elimination of nonconforming uses. Called “discontinuance — time limitation” acts, these measures provide that a nonconforming use is terminated after a specified period of time in which the nonconforming use has not been exercised.
See 82 Am. Jur. (2d), Zoning and Planning §§ 214-216 (1976).
The Charleston enactment is a “discontinuance — time limitation” measure. As reflected in the cases we have examined and as set out in an excellent discussion by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in City of Minot v. Fisher, 212 N. W. (2d) 837 (N. D. 1973), these “discontinuance —time limitation” measures have been subjected to three different interpretations by the courts.
One interpretation is that “discontinuance” is synonymous with “abandonment” and, even though the time limitation period has run, an intent to abandon or relinquish the nonconforming use must still be proved before such use is terminated. Dubitzky v. Liquor Control Commission, 160 Conn. 120, 273 A. (2d) 876 (1970).
Another interpretation is that an intent to abandon need not be proved; passage of the discontinuance time period, alone, extinguishes the nonconforming use, Canada’s Tavern, Inc. v. Town of Glen Echo, 260 Md. 206, 271 A. (2d) 664 (1970).
Under the third interpretation, which was adopted by the court in Minot, upon expiration of the discontinuance time period, a presumption arises that the property owner intended to relinquish the nonconforming use; however, the presumption does not apply if the cessation or non-exercise of the nonconforming use is due to circumstances beyond the control of the property owner, Merchese v. Norristown Borough Zoning Board of Adjustment, 2 Pa.Cmwlth. 84, 277 A. (2d) 176 (1971).
*456The first interpretation was applied to the City of Charleston ordinance by the master while the circuit court followed the second view. I would adopt the third construction.
As the court in Minot, supra, stated: “The third judicial view of the loss of nonconforming uses is, we believe, the most equitable. This view presumes abandonment after the designated period of nonuse has passed, but avoids a due process challenge by not applying the presumption of abandonment in situations where the cessation of use was beyond the control of the property owner.” 212 N. W. (2d) at 841; accord, Marchese, supra; and see dissenting opinion in Canada’s Tavern, supra. I agree. Further, I feel that this view more nearly accords with our prior decision in the case of Conway v. City of Greenville, 254 S. C. 96, 173 S. E. (2d) 648 (1970). Although Conway involved the issue of intent to abandon and did not involve the type of zoning ordinance under review in the present action, we held in that case that a nonconforming use was not extinguished when the cessation of such use was due to reasons beyond the control of the property owner.
The mental incompetency of Hiott during all times in question is undisputed. It is only logical that before a presumption of intent to relinquish a nonconforming use can prevail, the person to whom the intent is to be attributed should, himself, legally have the mental capacity to form that intent if, as here, he has no guardian or committee to exercise control over the property.
I would reverse.
Lewis, C. J., concurs.