Court Opinion

ID: 9791824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:18:32.662486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.771490
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.

There is nothing presented under the petition for rehearing filed herein that was not heretofore considered by the court in reaching its decision of December 10,1962, except a matter relating to the establishment of a point system for the evaluation of the operating records of all persons operating motor vehicles under Act 113, Session Laws of Hawaii, Regular Session of 1961. Under this Act “relative values to the various violations of the traffic laws of the State and of traffic ordinances of its counties” were assigned as follows:
“(1) Heedless and careless driving........3 to 6 points
*******
“(9) Inattention to driving; negligent driving....................1 to 4 [points]”
The Act does not specifically refer to the statutes or ordinances in question. It can safely be assumed, however, that “heedless and careless” driving, as set forth in the Act refers to the offense set forth in R.L.H. 1955, § 311-1. An examination of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1955, as amended, discloses no statute relating to “inattention to driving; negligent driving” and such must be covered by county ordinance, if at all. No such ordinance has been called to our attention and we are not permitted to take judicial notice of county or city and *346county ordinances on this subject if they exist. Territory v. Yoshikawa, 41 Haw. 45.
Petitioner contends in his petition for rehearing that:
“By the above assignment of points and by the wording of the offenses, it indicates a legislative intent to make the offense of careless driving an offense which requires more than mere negligence as the standard of conduct as compared to inattention to driving which denotes the requirement of mere negligence.”
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to impute to the legislature the power to breathe the intent into the expressed language of a related though wholly independent legislative body. At best, Act 113 is inconclusive as nowhere therein is set forth the standard of conduct required for either of the offenses above referred to. While it may be true that there is an ordinance1 defining inattention to driving which sets up a standard of ordinary negligence as determinative of such offense, so does the plain language of the heedless and careless driving statute, R.L.H. 1955, § 311-1. Act 113 merely indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to treat, for the purpose of imposing points, the statutory offense of heedless and careless driving as requiring more reprehensible conduct than the offense of inattention to driving as covered by ordinance.
Even if we were able to glean from Act 113 that the legislature enacting it intended to ascribe to heedless and careless driving, R.L.H. 1955, § 311-1, a standard of conduct requiring more than ordinary negligence and what is commonly referred to in the law as gross or criminal negligence, still we would be unable to disregard the plain and clearly expressed statutory language of R.L.H. 1955, § 311-1 adopted by a previous legislature. *347Cf., Pub. Ut. Comm. v. Narimatsu, 41 Haw. 398, 401; Irwin v. Ahia, 29 Haw. 1, 5. “The intention of the legislature is to be obtained primarily from the language used in the statute. * * * Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for construction and the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning.” Kauai v. McGonagle, 33 Haw. 915, 920.
Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied without argument.

 Cf., R.L.H. 1955, § 149-86(48).