Court Opinion

ID: 9563868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:48:49.442742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:06.333937
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Justice,
concurring specially.
Contending that the proposed amendment at issue in this case violates the Georgia Constitution’s Single Subject Rule and is being presented to the voters through affirmatively misleading ballot language, appellants ask this Court to overrule the trial court’s refusal to enjoin appellee from placing the proposed amendment on the November 2 ballot. Relying upon the “general rule” that courts of equity will not interfere in matters of elections, the majority affirms the trial court, asserting that “the judiciary does not have any jurisdiction to block further consideration of the proposed amendment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Majority Opinion, p. 573. The dissent would recognize an exception to the general rule in those rare cases where Georgia citizens may be damaged by “entering the voting booth and being confronted with a ballot measure that proposes amending the constitution in multiple ways,” (footnote omitted), Dissenting Opinion, p. 580, and thus would remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the proposed amendment violates the Single Subject Rule.
While I agree with the majority that the constitutional principle of separation of powers limits the judiciary’s involvement in matters of elections, Georgia case law recognizes exceptions to the general rule that courts of equity will not enjoin an election. Cheney v. Ragan, 151 Ga. 735, 741 (108 SE 30) (1921). “One of these exceptions is where the constitutional rights of citizens and taxpayers are sought to be invaded by an attempt to make an unconstitutional or inapplicable law operative through the means of an election. [Cits.]” Marbut v. Hollingshead, 172 Ga. 531, 538 (158 SE 28) (1931). The cases cited by the Marbut Court in support of its ruling were based on the principle “that such election would bring about confusion, subject citizens and taxpayers to damages, and cause a multiplicity of suits.” Id. See also Bergman v. Dutton, 203 Ga. 672, 680 (48 SE2d 101) (1948) (“ ‘if under the guise of an election which is really unauthorized by law, the property or person of the citizen is imperiled, equity will interfere’ ”). I realize that none of the cases that recognize an exception to the *576general rule have involved an attempt to enjoin a proposed constitutional amendment. But this Court has jurisdiction over election cases, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (2), and thus we have the authority under our equity jurisdiction “to do complete justice.” OCGA§ 23-1-7. “To say that [the general] rule is without exception seems to be purely arbitrary.” Cheney, supra at 741. Accordingly, while the gravity of a ballot measure proposing an amendment to our State Constitution must necessarily weigh on the decision whether intervention in equity is required, I cannot agree with the majority that such an intervention is outside our jurisdiction.
I agree in principle with the dissent’s position that the judiciary may enjoin an election involving a proposed constitutional amendment in those very rare situations where the proposal violates the Single Subject Rule. An injunction is appropriate in light of the serious consequences to the democratic election process, as discussed by the dissent, that are created when voters are presented with a proposal with that particular constitutional flaw. Nevertheless, I cannot join with the dissent because of the manner in which the dissent would dispose of the case before us.
The proposed amendment at issue here is on the ballot for the general election scheduled November 2, 2004. Advanced voting has already begun; in less than one week the precinct polls will open and the final votes will be cast. Yet the constitutionality of the proposed amendment that appellants seek to enjoin has never been addressed. The trial court that heard appellants’ complaint did not reach the issue whether the proposed amendment violates the Single Subject Rule, nor is it for this Court to make that initial determination. The dissent proposes to remand the case to the trial court with direction that it reach the merits of appellants’ challenge. But as matters stand now, there is not sufficient time left before the November 2 general election for the parties to present their arguments and the trial court to research and rule upon this difficult issue of constitutional law. It would be a disservice to all three branches of our government — the legislative, which passed the proposed amendment; the executive, which has the obligation to present the proposed amendment on the ballot for the November 2 general election; and the judiciary, both at the trial and appellate levels, which must assess the constitutionality of the proposed amendment — to insist that this matter be resolved in less than one week. Most importantly, it would be a disservice to the citizens of Georgia who have the right to cast their vote for or against a proposed amendment currently on the ballot that has not been declared unconstitutional by any court in this State.
I agree with the dissent that voters do sustain damage when they are called upon to vote for a ballot measure that violates the Single Subject Rule and that the democratic process must necessarily suffer *577as a result. But voters and the democratic process also suffer when time constraints compel the swift resolution of complex constitutional issues. Such rushed rulings can serve only to undermine the public’s faith in the legitimacy and accuracy of the judicial process.
Therefore, under the circumstances present in this case, where there has been no legal determination that the proposed amendment violates the Single Subject Rule, I believe it better serves the law and the citizens of Georgia to allow the proposed amendment to remain on the November 2 general election ballot. Should the proposed amendment be approved by a majority of the voters of Georgia on November 2, any damage the voters may have sustained by the alleged violation of the Single Subject Rule may be ameliorated by post-election judicial review of the amendment’s constitutionality. It is for this reason that I join the majority’s opinion in judgment only.