Court Opinion

ID: 9422652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:03:46.373111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:38.134021
License: Public Domain

*305Mr. Justice Goldberg,
with whom Mr. Justice
Harlan joins,
.concurring.
As is apparent from the opinions filed today, delineation of . the constitutionally permissible relationship between religion and government is a most' difficult and sensitive-task, calling for the careful exercise of both judicial and public judgment and restraint. The considerations which léad the Court today to interdict the clearly religious practices presented in these cases are to me wholly compelling; I have no doubt as to the propriety of the decision and therefore join the opinion and judgment of the Court. The singular sensitivity and concern which surround both the. legal and practical judgments involved impel me, however, to add a few words in further explication, while at the same time avoiding repetition of the carefully and ably framed, examination of history and authority by my Brethren.
The First Amendment’s guarantees, ás applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, foreclose not only laws' “respecting an establishment of religion” but also those “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These, two proscriptions are to be read together, and in light of the single end which they are designed to serve. The basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is. to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of • attainment of that end.
The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither engage in nor compel religious practices,' that it effect no favoritism among sects. or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief. But devotion even to these simply stated objectives presents no easy course, for the unavoidable accommodations necessary to achieve the *306maximum enjoyment of each and all of them are often difficult of discernment. . There is for me no simple and clear measure which by precise application can readily and invariably demark the permissible from the impermissible.
It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of government toward religion must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterférence and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it.
Neither government nor this Court cán or should ignore the significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive historically from religious teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances the First Amendment may require that it do so. And it seems clear to me from the opinions in the present and past cases that the Court would recognize the propriety of providing military chaplains and of the teaching about religion, as distinguished from the teaching of religion, in the public schools. The examples could readily be multiplied, for both the required and the permissible accommodations between state and church frame the relation as one free of hostility or favor and productive of religious and political harmony, but without undue involvement of one in the concerns or practices of the other. To be sure, the judgment in each case, is a delicate one, but it must be made if we are to do loyal service as judges to the ultimate First Amendment objective of religious liberty.
*307The practices here involved do not fall within any sensible or acceptable concept of compelled or permitted accommodation and involve the state so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to those very divisive influences and inhibitions, of freedom which both religion clauses of the First Amendment preclude. The state has. ordained and has utilized its facilities to engage in unmistakably religious exercises — the devotional reading and recitation of the Holy Bible — in a manner having substantial and significant import and impact. That it has selected, rather than written, a particular devotional liturgy seems to me without constitutional import. The pervasive religiosity and direct governmental involvement inhering in the prescription of prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, during and as part of the curricular day, involving young impressionable children whose school attendance is statutorily compelled,. and utilizing the prestige, power, and influence of school administration, staff, and authority, cannot realistically be termed simply accommodation, and must fall within the interdiction of the First Amendment. I find nothing in the opiniop of the Court which says more than this. And, of course, today’s decision does not mean that all incidents of government which import of the religious are therefore and without more banned by the strictures of the Establishment Clause. As the Court declared only last Term in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 435, n. 21:
“There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer’s professions .of faith in a Supreme Being, or *308with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State . . . has sponsored in this instance.”
The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic measure create none of the dangers-which it is designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of religion as to have meaningful and practical impact. It is of course true that great consequences can grow from small beginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.