Court Opinion

ID: 9476654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:01:37.94177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:26.112499
License: Public Domain

LAY, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In the instant case, Article III of the collective bargaining agreement addresses grievance procedures. The Court quotes section 4, paragraph (f) of that Article and holds that although the arbitrator has the authority to hear incentive rate disputes, all that he may do is determine their reasonableness, apparently leaving to the company the duty to correct any unreasonable incentive rate.
Article V, section 6 of the agreement discusses the implementation of the incentive plan. At section 6(g), the agreement prescribes the process to change incentive standards: “Incentive standards will not be changed except to the extent that equipment, tools, materials, methods, layout, etc., are changed and affect the time standard for the job.” (Emphasis added). This section makes no provision for the company to change the incentive standard as a result of a grievance. Thus, if the majority’s reading of the agreement were correct, then the arbitrator could not change the incentive standard and the company would not have to do so either. Such a reading of the agreement would necessarily leave the grieving party without a remedy, even though the arbitrator determined the grievance to be meritorious.
However, a closer reading of the agreement demonstrates that such an anomalous *1218result is unnecessary. Article III, section 5 of the collective bargaining agreement indicates that the arbitrator does indeed have the authority to fashion an appropriate remedy. Section 5 provides: “When rates or evaluations are adjusted during any steps of this procedure as a result of a grievance, the adjustment shall be effective from the date the grievance was first presented in writing to the Company.” (Emphasis added). When that section is read in conjunction with the prescribed methods of changing incentive standards, there can be little doubt of the existence of the arbitrator’s power to grant the relief which he did in this instance.
Such a reading of the agreement is more closely aligned with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of an arbitrator’s duties:
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (emphasis added).
In United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods., Litton Sys., Inc., 728 F.2d 970 (8th Cir.1984) this court sitting en banc reversed the panel decision and adopted the reasoning and substance of Judge Arnold’s dissent. Id. at 972. The adoption of that dissent demonstrated this court’s recognition of the arbitrator’s role:
I am not sure I should have awarded this particular kind of relief, or indeed that the arbitrator was correct in interpreting the contract. But those questions are, in all but the clearest cases, the arbitrator’s business, not ours. Moreover, we are admonished to be particularly deferential when reviewing an arbitrator’s remedy.
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). * * *
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties’ confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment____ The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). In view of the Supreme Court’s clear command that we defer to an arbitrator’s judgment, and especially to his remedy, I would enforce the arbitrator’s award in its entirety.
United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods., Litton Sys. Inc., 704 F.2d 393, 401 (8th Cir.1983) (Arnold, J. dissenting), vacated, 728 F.2d 970 (8th Cir.1984) (en banc) (adopting panel dissent by J. Arnold in 704 F.2d 393).
Our court has also clearly set forth the guidelines for judicial review of an arbitrator’s finding and awards:
[T]he decision of an arbitrator will not be questioned by the courts as long as the arbitrator has acted within the scope of his authority as defined in a duly negotiated collective bargaining agreement. In determining whether an arbitrator has exceeded his authority, the agreement must be broadly construed with all doubts being resolved in favor of the arbitrator’s authority. This approach reflects the strong national labor policy *1219favoring arbitration as set forth by the Supreme Court in what has become known as the Steelworkers Trilogy.
Resilient Floor and Decorative Covering Workers, Local Union 1179 v. Welco Mfg. Co., Inc., 542 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir.1976) (citations omitted).
Applying the role of the arbitrator and appropriate judicial review to the instant case clearly demonstrates that the arbitrator acted within his authority in fashioning the remedy he did.