Court Opinion

ID: 9579293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:53:21.85555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:25.628413
License: Public Domain

*485Fox, President,
dissenting:
I am not in accord with the result reached by the majority in this case. I do not question the statements of law contained in the two syllabus points, but I do not think the facts in the case at bar require that the defendants be given a new trial under the principles stated in said points. Of course, a person charged with a criminal offense, or criminal contempt, is entitled to a fair trial, the benefit of counsel, and a reasonable opportunity to prepare for his defense. But, in cases of contempt where the power and dignity of a court is involved, the matter should be firmly and promptly disposed of.
We start out with the proposition that this is a country governed by law, and that our courts are entitled to respect and that their orders and decrees should be obeyed. No litigant should be permitted to take the law into his own hands, and when he does so he cannot complain if the courts are quick to respond to this challenge to their power. The facts involved in this controversy are not discussed in detail in the majority decision; but we know this: The Circuit Court of Brooke County issued an injunction restraining certain people' from engaging in certain practices; and we know that it is alleged in the contempt proceeding that the defendants named disre-, garded this injunction. In the trial had, the court found sufficient evidence to justify the fines and imprisonments imposed. What the court would have done had the defendants testified or furnished other proof tending to show their innocence, we do not know. They did not testify nor introduce the testimony of others, because they say that the trial court refused to give them time before trial to prepare therefor. Whether or not the trial court erred in that respect is the sole question involved herein.
As held by the majority, a motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the case. In this case that discretion was exercised by the trial court when a re*486quest by the defendants for a delay of a week or ten days for the trial of the case was refused by said court. We must bear in mind that this controversy had been in existence several days, and that defendants present counsel was employed at the beginning of the litigation, and was familiar with the circumstances and the situation generally. While the rule in the contempt proceeding was issued on January 16, 1950, it may not have been served until a day or two later; and it is true, that on account of the absence of their counsel, defendants did not have an opportunity to consult with him until probably the 19th of January, and the hearing on the matter was held oh January 20. On the face of it, it would seem that this was a short time in which to prepare for a hearing of a case of this character, but for the fact that both defendants and their counsel were fully familiar with what was involved, and the further fact that the defendants must have known who their witnesses would be, and what the facts were as to themselves. In such circumstances, we cannot hold as a matter of law that the circuit judge abused the discretion which he undoubtedly had to require the case to be heard on the return day of the rule. The circumstances of this case indicate that the defendants were not prejudiced; that they were then as well able to make their defense as they would ever be. The circuit judge was acquainted with the facts and the situation generally, and his judgment was worth more than the judgment of this Court who deal with the situation from afar. There had been a brazen defiance of the decree of the Circuit Court of Brooke County by someone. Naturally, the judge of that court felt that he could not permit that character of conduct, and that the situation called for a prompt trial and prompt punishment in the event of a finding of guilt. When, in such circumstances, we overrule a judgment of a circuit court, we weaken its power, cause it to lose prestige, and strike a deadly blow against courts everywhere within our jurisdiction. Not only this: We invite lawlessness and at the same time palsy the arm of the Court as an agent of the State in the preservation of law and order.
*487There is another and more serious matter involved in this case, and that is the suggestion that an attorney-representing persons charged' with criminal contempt may go into court and attempt to lay down thé terms upon which he and his clients will appear and try the case. We do not mean to criticize counsel. If he believed that he would require more time to prepare for the trial of his case, it was his duty to appear and move the court for a continuance or postponement of the case, and this is what he did. But after the court had denied his motion, we do not think he was justified in refusing to present to the court his defense, to. the extent that he was able to make it. An opportunity was afforded him to prepare his plea. True, the time allowed was short, but a simple plea of not guilty would have covered all matters of fact. After the trial had progressed to the point where the State had completed its case, defendants were given until the following day to present their evidence. True, this offer was made after the evidence for the State was presented, and an opportunity for cross-examination had possibly passed, although that might have been corrected, had request for right to cross-examination been made. All of these offers to give the defendants time in respect to filing pleas and offering evidence were refused. These refusals were couched in most courteous terms, but the whole matter resolved itself into this: The defendants, through their counsel, asked for a postponement for a specific time, and when the trial court refused that request, they declined to make a defense, and, in effect, told the court “if you will not play the game on our terms, we will refuse to play.” If this attitude toward courts is to be approved by this Court, what becomes of the standing, the power, and the prestige of the judiciary of this State.
We do not want to be understood as wishing to depart in the slightest degree from the fundamental rules of law under which a person is entitled to a fair trial, the benefiit of counsel, and full opportunity to present his defense. I do not disagree with the statements in the *488majority opinion on that point. That, however, is always a relative matter. In some, cases time is required to familiarize counsel with the facts of the case, and in others little time is required for such purpose because he already knows the facts. This, we think, is such- a case. The charges against the defendants were acts of violence and destruction of property. They either did or did not commit such wron'gs. They could have easily, and in a short time, presented all of the proof they had bearing upon their guilt or innocence. They knew what the charges were. The circuit court being familiar with all of these facts, it felt that a trial of the case should not be delayed. On reaching this conclusion, the defendants refused to participate in the trial, and withheld evidence which might have established their innocence, or at least raised doubt as to their guilt. They failed to testify. In these circumstances, we think the court was entirely justified in hearing the charges and making its finding. The correctness of this finding is not discussed in the majority opinion, but as I view the case the evidence supports the finding and judgment of the trial court. The only issue decided was whether the trial of the case should have been postponed. In the circumstances of this case, that matter should have been left to the very wide discretion of the trial court, and, in my opinion, the exercise of that discretion was not abused in this case.
I am authorized to state that Judge Haymond joins in the views herein expressed.