Court Opinion

ID: 9718299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:20:33.576237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:36.128568
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Boberts:
I would reverse the decree of the trial court and hold that the burden of proof on the issue of ownership was erroneously placed on the appellant. The simple principle which controls ownership disputes is that the person or entity with the clearest prima facie ownership is entitled to retain possession and title unless and until another party comes forward with evidence sufficient to overcome the effect of the prima facie case. I do not believe that this general principle is any different where one of the claimants is a decedent’s estate, and I feel that our case law is entirely consistent with this view. Unfortunately, the majority has misconstrued our prior case law and erroneously abandoned the general principle in this class of cases.
A brief summary of the facts of the four leading cases in this area will be helpful in understanding the problem. In Culhane’s Estate, 334 Pa. 124, 5 A. 2d 377 (1939), the decedent placed in her own safe deposit box a sum of money which represented the entire *193proceeds of a distribution with respect to a bank account in which she and the claimant had a joint interest. In Hendrickson Estate, 388 Pa. 39, 130 A. 2d 143 (1957), the decedent’s daughter claimed that a diamond ring, which was her mother’s and which was in the decedent’s possession from the date of his wife’s death until his own demise, had been given to her by her mother before her death and was in the decedent’s possession merely for safekeeping. In Donsavage Estate, 420 Pa. 587, 218 A. 2d 112 (1966), one of the decedent’s close friends claimed ownership of several stock certificates which turned up in her possession shortly after decedent’s death endorsed in blank and which she claimed decedent had given her three days before he passed away. And in Pappas Estate, 428 Pa. 540, 239 A. 2d 298 (1968), the decedent’s brother, who had lived with the decedent, claimed ownership by virtue of gift of numerous unendorsed stock certificates which turned up in his possession shortly after decedent’s death.
The circumstances of this case are most closely analogous to those of Culhane’s Estate, where we held that the estate, through the accountant, had the burden of showing that the funds were the decedent’s and that the joint tenant had not retained her one-half interest. The majority admits that Culhane’s Estate is the most apposite of the cases, but asserts that the later decisions undermined its holding. It is at this point that I disagree with the majority, since I believe that the subsequent decisions are consistent with Culhane’s Estate and merely represent the proper application of the general principle to different fact situations. In each of the three subsequent decisions the strongest case of prima facie ownership lay in the estate, and the burden of proof was therefore properly allocated in accordance with the general principle. I do not believe that the cases stand for the proposition that the burden *194of proof on the issue of ownership always lies with the party whose claim is adverse to the estate regardless of which claimant has the strongest case of prima facie ownership.
Applying the general principle to the instant case, it is clear that the appellant has established the strongest case of prima facie ownership. It was uncontroverted that the funds in the disputed bank account represented the proceeds from the sale of the suvivorship property, and there was no indication that appellant ever relinquished her right to the fund.* As in Gulhhane, the estate ought to bear the burden of proof on the issue of ownership.

 The effect of the majority decision is that the estate’s unexplained possession of the proceeds from the sale of the survivor-ship property created a presumption of a valid inter vivos gift, a ruling which is directly contrary to all prior case law on the subject, see, e.g., Marietta Estate, 390 Pa. 255, 135 A. 2d 372 (1957), and cases cited therein.