Court Opinion

ID: 9914233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 20:09:02.351143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:39.437051
License: Public Domain

J-A25031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  KEVIN FRENCH                                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  AGNIESZKA PATKOWSKA                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 696 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
                         No(s): FD 21-007549-0007

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                          FILED: December 29, 2023

       Appellant, Agnieszka Patkowska (“Mother”), appeals from the order

granting Appellee, Kevin French (“Father”), shared physical custody of their

daughter (“Child”).1 After careful review, we remand for further proceedings.

       Mother and Father married in 2009, and Child was born in 2015. The

couple separated in February 2021 when Father moved out of the marital

home. On March 24, 2021, Father filed a complaint in divorce raising claims

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Neither party has requested that they be identified in the caption by their

initials due to the sensitive nature of this custody matter. Therefore, we use
the parties’ names in the caption “as they appeared on the record of the trial
court at the time the appeal was taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(1), (2). We will,
however, refer to the minor involved in this dispute as “Child” so as to protect
her identity.
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of divorce, custody, and equitable division of the marital estate. 2      In his

custody claim, Father requested shared legal and physical custody of Child.

       On April 22, 2021, Mother filed a petition for a protection from abuse

(“PFA”) order alleging verbally abusive and threatening behavior by Father

during interactions in the prior week, as well as three instances in which Father

had strangled her in 2019 and 2020 and a 2020 incident when Father threw a

metal tool at Mother causing a cut on her head. A temporary PFA order was

issued on the same date that the petition was issued, and Father was ordered

to have no contact with Child. The parties resolved the PFA matter through a

May 28, 2021 consent order that extended the term of the temporary PFA

order through April 21, 2022 but provided that Father could continue to seek

custody of Child.

       The parties were initially ordered to participate in a custody mediation

in May 2021, but it was cancelled upon Mother’s filing of a domestic violence

waiver pursuant to local rule. See Allegheny County Civil and Family Court

Rule 1915.3(c)(viii).       The parties participated in a conciliation before a

domestic relations officer on August 9, 2021, which did not lead to an

agreement on custody. On September 7, 2021, the parties entered into an

interim consent order providing that Mother had primary physical custody of

Child and Father had supervised partial physical custody on Tuesday and

____________________________________________

2 As of the date of Mother’s appeal from the at-issue custody order, the divorce

and equitable division claims had not been resolved.

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Sunday every week, with Father’s total amount of custody increasing from

four to six hours over the following two months. The order further provided

that Father was required to participate in a domestic abuse education and

intervention group and Mother was required to enroll Child in therapy with a

provider with a background in domestic violence.

      On October 23, 2021, Mother filed an indirect criminal contempt (“ICC”)

complaint against Father related to an incident two days’ prior in which

Mother, while she was picking Child up from school, observed Father standing

outside the school in a “very aggressive stance.” ICC Complaint, 10/23/21.

On November 30, 2021, an order was entered continuing the ICC complaint

generally for six months, extending the temporary PFA order to July 21, 2022,

and providing that Father shall not be in the vicinity of Child’s school at pick-

up and drop-off time. The order further provided that Father did not admit

guilt. On December 6, 2021, a second interim custody consent order was

entered providing that Father would have supervised partial physical custody

on Tuesdays and Sundays for a total of eight hours per week.

      On January 25, 2022, Father submitted a motion for special custody

relief seeking the removal of the supervision requirement for his custody

periods. The trial court denied this motion. The trial court then held judicial

conciliations on March 7, April 12, and June 15, 2022. At the conciliations,

the trial court received information regarding Father’s individual and group

therapy and Child’s therapy. In an April 14, 2022 order, the court noted its

concern that Mother was participating in Child’s individual therapy and

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directed Father to become more involved in Child’s therapy. The court also

ordered that Father be allowed to begin having unsupervised visits with Child.

In a May 12, 2022 order, the court directed that Bruce Chambers, Ph.D.,

conduct a custody evaluation.

      Following the judicial conciliations, the trial court allotted three days for

testimony and evidence at trial.      The trial court conducted an in camera

interview with Child on October 26, 2022, but no substantive testimony was

taken at the interview.     On December 8, 2022, after a second pre-trial

conference, the trial court issued an interim custody order expanding Father’s

unsupervised custody time to overnights from Saturday morning to Sunday

evening each week.

      The trial court scheduled trial to take place on February 1, 2, and 9,

2023. The court ordered the parties to submit a pre-trial statement identifying

each of their witnesses, including expert witnesses, a week in advance of trial.

In Mother’s pre-trial statement, she identified several fact witnesses, including

her mother, Iwonna Windak, and a neighbor, Elizabeth Green; in addition, she

identified two expert witnesses, Beth A. Bliss, Psy.D., and Kelly M. Champion,

Ph.D. Upon receipt of Mother’s pre-trial statement, Father submitted a motion

in limine seeking to preclude the testimony of Dr. Champion, who Mother

intended to call to offer an opinion on the effect of domestic violence on

children.   On January 31, 2023, the trial court entered an order granting

Father’s motion and precluding Dr. Champion’s testimony. Mother made an

oral motion for reconsideration of this order one the first day of trial, N.T.,

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2/1/23, at 5-7, which the trial court denied by order entered on February 2,

2023 without prejudice to Mother raising this issue after the testimony of the

other expert witnesses.   Following a third day of trial, Mother submitted a

written motion for reconsideration of the grant of Father’s motion in limine,

which the trial court denied in a March 24, 2023 order.

      During the first day of trial, Father called Dr. Chambers, who performed

the court-ordered custody evaluation and who completed his direct testimony

on that day. Father also began his direct testimony on the first day of trial.

The following day, Father concluded his direct testimony and Mother began

cross-examining Father. Father also called two employees from the company

that supervised several of Father’s visits with Child, and Mother presented the

testimony of her current and former therapists out of order. The third day of

trial began with Mother’s cross-examination of the custody evaluator, Dr.

Chambers, and then Father completed his redirect of Dr. Chambers. Mother

then called her expert, Dr. Bliss, as a rebuttal witness to Dr. Chambers before

Father concluded his case by calling a neighbor of the marital home who

testified that she had never detected anything problematic in the interactions

between Father, Mother, and Child.

      After the third day of trial, as a result of the fact that Mother had not

yet begun to present her case-in-chief aside from the brief testimony of three

witnesses out of order, the trial court scheduled a fourth day of trial on March

27, 2023. The court also entered an interim custody order expanding Father’s

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custody of Child to Fridays after school to Sunday evening and on Wednesdays

after school to 7:00 p.m.

      The fourth day of trial, the only day exclusively set aside for Mother to

present her case, was taken up entirely by Mother’s own testimony. During

Mother’s testimony, the trial court stated that there was a “time crunch” and

trial needed to end early to allow the court to handle an emergency motion in

another matter; the court set firm deadlines during the day for the conclusion

of Mother’s direct, cross-examination, and redirect testimony. N.T., 3/27/23,

at 102-03, 119-20, 160, 170, 224-25, 241. When Mother’s counsel requested

to call two additional witnesses, Ms. Windak and Ms. Green, following Mother’s

testimony, the trial court recognized that Mother had not been able to call an

equal number of witnesses as Father but informed Mother that her case was

“done” and that “trial is over.” Id. at 269-71.

      In its May 15, 2023 order, the trial court granted Father’s custody claim

and awarded Father shared legal and physical custody of Child.          Order,

5/15/23.    The trial court issued an accompanying opinion in which it

thoroughly addressed the sixteen custody factors set forth in Section 5328(a)

of the Child Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). As relevant here, the court

found that factor 2 concerning the present or past abuse perpetrated by a

party was neutral. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(2) (“The present and past abuse

committed by a party or member of the party’s household, whether there is a

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can

better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.”).

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The court recited the various allegations of abuse in the PFA and ICC

proceedings, the testimony as to the alleged abuse by Mother and Father, and

the testimony by Mother’s two therapists as to the fact that she may have

PTSD from the abuse. Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/23, at 18-20. The court then

concluded that it “cannot ascertain whether the abuse alleged by Mother

actually occurred.” Id. at 21. The court stated that it did not find Mother’s

allegations of abuse persuasive due to the “inconsistencies and exaggerations

in Mother’s testimony, as well as the credibility in Father’s testimony.” Id. at

20. The court additionally noted that “very little testimony was directed to

the impact [the abuse] had on Child.” Id. at 21. This timely appeal followed.3

       Mother presents the following issues on appeal:

       1. Whether the trial court’s preclusion of two of Mother’s key
       factual witnesses called to testify about Father’s abuse—in a case
       where the effect of the abuse on the parties’ child was
       fundamental to the trial court’s ultimate decision to award joint
       custody—was erroneous and an abuse of discretion requiring
       reversal of the custody order and a new trial?

       2. Whether the trial court’s decision to exclude Mother’s expert in
       child psychology, in circumstances where she was fully qualified,
       her testimony was well-founded, and would have been relevant
       and probative to, among other things, the effects of domestic
       violence on children, and where the issue of abuse was
       fundamental to the trial court’s decision to award joint custody,
       was erroneous and an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal of
       the custody order and a new trial?

____________________________________________

3 Mother filed a concise statement of errors with her notice of appeal as
required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), and the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion on August 4, 2023.

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      3. Whether the trial court’s decision to allow Father the unfettered
      ability to present his case each day of trial in the four-day custody
      trial, while restricting Mother to less than one full day to present
      her case, constituted an abuse of discretion that denied Mother a
      full and fair hearing, requiring reversal of the custody order and a
      new trial?

      4. Whether the trial court’s decision to allow Father, over Mother’s
      objections, to introduce an unauthenticated and incomplete video
      of a custody exchange of the parties’ child, which Father used to
      impugn Mother’s credibility, constituted an abuse of discretion
      that caused Mother severe prejudice requiring reversal of the
      custody order and a new trial?

Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (suggested answers omitted).

      Our standard of review is as follows:

      In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
      and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
      of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
      record, as our role does not include making independent factual
      determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
      and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial
      judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
      However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or
      inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether
      the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
      evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial
      court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in
      light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

Graves v. Graves, 265 A.3d 688, 693 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

      The paramount concern in any child custody case is the best interests

of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5328(a), 5338(a); D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467,

474 (Pa. Super. 2014). “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-

case basis, considers all factors which legitimately have an effect upon the

child’s physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.”     D.K.D. v.

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A.L.C., 141 A.3d 566, 572 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).             When

awarding any form of custody, the trial court must set forth its consideration

of each of the sixteen Section 5328(a) custody factors on the record or in a

written opinion or order. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5323(d), 5328(a); Graves, 265 A.3d

at 694, 700; S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 402-03 (Pa. Super. 2014);

J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2011). The trial court must

give “weighted consideration” to any custody factor “which affect[s] the safety

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a); see also M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331,

338 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, including expert

testimony, as well as the court’s overall management of the presentation of

evidence at trial, are within the sound discretion of the trial court and should

not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.            Commonwealth v.

Purnell, 259 A.3d 974, 984 (Pa. 2021); Calisto v. Rodgers, 271 A.3d 877,

884 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc); Nobles v. Staples, Inc., 150 A.3d 110,

113 (Pa. Super. 2016).      An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment but will only be found when the trial court makes a manifestly

unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious decision, fails to apply the law, or allows

prejudice, bias, or ill will to influence its decision. Calisto, 271 A.3d at 884-

85; Gregury v. Greguras, 196 A.3d 619, 633 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

“To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be

erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Calisto,

271 A.3d at 884 (citation omitted); see also Gregury, 196 A.3d at 633.

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         We initially address Mother’s first and third issues together, as they are

related.     In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by preventing her from calling two witnesses who would have

testified as to Father’s abuse of her, Mother’s mother, Ms. Windak, and a

neighbor, Ms. Green. Mother asserts that the trial court’s reasoning as stated

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion—that these two witnesses would have been

cumulative of the testimony of her two therapists, the testifying experts, and

Mother’s own testimony regarding abuse—contradicts the basis stated by the

court when Mother attempted to call the witnesses that Mother had simply run

out of time to present any more evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 18-

19; N.T., 3/27/23, at 269-71 (upon Mother’s request to call two additional

witnesses, trial court stating “I gave you an extra day. You are done. The

trial is over.”). Mother contends that both of the court’s rationales are flawed

as Mother was given insufficient time relative to Father and hampered from

presenting her case in the time that was allotted to her and further that the

two witnesses would not have been cumulative as no other non-party

witnesses testified that the abuse occurred. Mother maintains that the refusal

to allow her to call the two witnesses was troubling in light of the lower court’s

decision that it “cannot ascertain whether the abuse alleged by Mother actually

occurred.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/23, at 21. According to Mother, “[h]ad

the trial court allowed all the evidence of abuse[,] the trial court’s custody

decision should have, and likely would have, gone differently.” Mother’s Brief

at 21.

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       In her third issue, Mother asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion by not providing her sufficient time to present her case compared

to the time allotted to Father. Mother notes the requirement in our caselaw

that “[c]ustody hearings should be comprehensive [and] all witnesses who

can contribute should be heard” and that the court must “ensure that as full

and complete a record as possible is created when a decision as important as

the welfare of a child is at issue.” Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 167 (Pa.

1993); Bednarek v. Velazquez, 830 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2003);

see also Tettis v. Boyum, 436 A.2d 1056, 1064 (Pa. Super. 1983). While

Mother admits that the trial court was not required to give the parties exact

equal time when presenting their cases, she highlights the significant disparity

here where the trial court provided her only one full day to present her case

to Father’s three and then rushed her to complete her case on her designated

day.

       Upon a careful review of the record, we agree with Mother that the trial

court abused its discretion by not allowing her to present two additional

witnesses to testify as to the alleged abuse that Father perpetrated on Mother.

While Mother was allowed to call three witnesses out of order on the first three

days of trial, our review of the transcript reveals that the testimony of these

three witnesses was comparatively brief and Father was allotted far more time

overall for his witnesses. Indeed, evidence of this disbalance can be seen

based upon the fact that Father was permitted to call a neighbor to testify that

she saw “nothing over the edge” during the parties’ interactions and she was

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“shocked” when she found out that Mother had filed a PFA, N.T., 2/9/23, at

196-98, yet Mother was not allowed to call another neighbor who would have

provided a different account of the alleged abuse. While this Court is normally,

and with good reason, reticent to interfere in the trial court’s handling of a

trial, we find it necessary to do so here so that the lower court may issue its

ruling affecting the welfare of Child on as full and complete of a record as

possible. Moore, 634 A.2d at 167; Bednarek, 830 A.2d at 1270; Tettis, 436

A.2d at 1064. Moreover, we highlight that the trial court is required to give

“weighted consideration” to any custody factor that “affect[s] the safety of the

child,” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a); see also M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 338, and the

question of whether Father committed past abuse towards Mother potentially

affects Child’s ongoing safety.

      We do not, however, agree with Mother’s broader challenge to the trial

court’s allotment of time at trial, and we do not accede to Mother’s request

that we remand for an entire new trial with parity of time allocated to the

parties. While Mother complains that the trial court “interrupted” her counsel

numerous times during the course of trial and otherwise prevented her from

efficiently conducting examination of the relevant witnesses, id. at 35-38, we

agree with the trial court’s explanation that it was simply “caution[ing]”

Mother’s counsel at various points during trial “to be judicious” with her

examination of witnesses on specific incidents and issues and advising counsel

not to overly focus on Father’s alleged abuse of Mother at the expense of other

matters bearing on Child’s best interests. Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/23, at 20;

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see, e.g., N.T., 2/2/23, at 85, 187-91; N.T., 2/9/23, at 225-28; N.T.,

3/27/23, at 17-18, 88-91. The trial court appropriately exercised its authority

in managing the parties’ presentation of evidence to prevent time wasting and

to protect the truth-determining purpose of trial, specifically as to the sixteen

custody factors that the trial court was required to consider in its custody

ruling. Pa.R.E. 611(a) (trial court shall “exercise reasonable control over the

mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to,”

inter alia, “make those procedures effective for determining the truth” and

“avoid wasting time”); Purnell, 259 A.3d at 985; see also Graves, 265 A.3d

at 700 (trial court is required to set forth its consideration of all custody factors

with its custody order).

      We next turn to Mother’s second issue challenging the trial court’s grant

of Father’s motion in limine excluding Mother’s proposed expert witness on

the effect of domestic violence on children, Dr. Champion. Mother notes the

court’s inconsistent explanations for the expert’s preclusion, first ruling in its

order granting the motion in limine that the expert was not competent to

testify while reasoning in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that Dr. Champion had no

relevant expertise to offer where she had not met with Child or the parties

and further that her testimony would have been cumulative of the other two

experts, Dr. Chambers and Dr. Bliss. Order, 1/31/23; Trial Court Opinion,

8/4/23, at 17-18.       Mother contends that each of these rationales are

unfounded: Father did not mount a challenge to Dr. Champion’s qualifications

in the motion in limine and in any event Dr. Champion was amply qualified;

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an expert is not required to have personally interacted with the parties to offer

an opinion; and Dr. Champion’s testimony would not have been cumulative of

the other two experts as her testimony would have been offered from a

different clinical perspective focusing narrowly on the effect of parental abuse

on children.

      Based upon our review of the record, we agree with Mother that the trial

court’s grounds for excluding Dr. Champion are either legally incorrect or

unsupported by the record. With respect to the trial court’s initial grant of the

motion in limine based upon Dr. Champion’s lack of “competen[cy] to proffer

her expert opinion in this custody matter,” Order, 1/31/23, at 1, we note that

Father’s motion in limine and supporting memorandum was not filed of record

and does not appear in the certified record. However, based upon our review

of the trial court’s scheduling order for the motion in limine, Mother’s response

thereto, and Mother’s later motion for reconsideration, it appears that Father

did not challenge Dr. Champion’s competency in his motion. Order, 1/27/23,

at 1 (noting that Father indicated intent to file motion in limine challenge

whether Mother could offer two “opposing experts” at trial); Mother’s

Memorandum of Law and Response to Motion In Limine, 1/30/23, at 2-3

(unnumbered) (arguing that Dr. Champion and Dr. Bliss would not offer

conflicting opinions but instead the experts would corroborate one another);

Mother’s Motion for Reconsideration, dated 3/20/23 and filed 4/20/23, ¶4

(asserting that the crux of Father’s argument was that Dr. Champion’s

testimony should be excluded because she had not engaged with the parties

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in any way and could not offer an opinion as to this specific case and because

her testimony would be cumulative and unnecessary). Furthermore, it does

not appear that the trial court reviewed Dr. Champion’s curriculum vitae or

otherwise considered her “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”

before excluding Dr. Champion on competency grounds. Pa.R.E. 702.

      To the extent the trial court justified the exclusion of Dr. Champion in

its Rule 1925(a) opinion on the fact that Dr. Champion “had never met with

the parties” and would only offer “general expert” testimony, Trial Court

Opinion, 8/4/23, at 17, this ruling contradicts our rules of evidence which

provide that an expert need not base their opinion on personal knowledge.

See Pa.R.E. 703 (“An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case

that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.”)

(emphasis added); Pa.R.E. 602 & Comment (stating that personal knowledge

requirement of lay witnesses set forth in Rule 602 does not apply to an expert

who may “base an opinion on facts not within the expert’s personal

knowledge”). Therefore, the mere fact that Dr. Champion did not meet with

the parties or Child could not serve as the basis for her exclusion.

      Finally, we find no support for the trial court’s ruling that Dr. Champion’s

opinion would have been cumulative of that of Dr. Bliss. Trial Court Opinion,

8/4/23, at 17-18. Dr. Bliss was offered as a rebuttal expert to Dr. Chambers,

who performed a court-ordered custody evaluation and recommended that

Father be given shared physical custody of Child. N.T., 2/1/23, at 75, 117.

Dr. Bliss’s testimony focused on the role of a custody evaluator and several

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deficiencies she noted in the custody evaluation report authored by Dr.

Chambers. N.T., 2/9/23, at 132-33. While Dr. Bliss’s testimony touched upon

Dr. Chambers’ consideration of Father’s alleged domestic abuse in rendering

the recommendation, id. at 152-54, Dr. Champion was not offered to rebut

Dr. Chambers, but instead she would have educated the court, from her

perspective   as   a   clinician   and   researcher,   on   the   current   scientific

understanding the effect witnessing interpersonal violence has on a child

throughout her life. Mother’s Memorandum of Law and Response to Motion

In Limine, 1/30/23, at 2; Mother’s Motion for Reconsideration, dated 3/20/23

and filed 4/20/23, ¶¶11, 14-15. The trial court itself recognized that Child’s

perspective on this issue was not sufficiently addressed at trial, highlighting

in its opinion that “very little testimony was directed to the impact [the abuse]

had on Child.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/23, at 21. We have recognized that

expert testimony with such distinctly focused perspectives as that of Dr. Bliss

and Dr. Champion should not be barred as cumulative, even where the experts

are presented by the same party and practitioners in the same field. See

Hassel v. Franzi, 207 A.3d 939, 953-54 (Pa. Super. 2019) (testimony from

two medical experts who “approached the standard of care from different

clinical perspectives” was corroborative, not cumulative).

      Nevertheless, on the record presently before us, the trial court’s decision

to exclude Dr. Champion constitutes harmless error for the reason that the

court found that insufficient evidence had been presented to show that abuse

occurred; therefore, Dr. Champion’s general testimony as to the effect of

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abuse on children could not have swayed the lower court’s custody

determination. Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/23, at 20-21; Calisto, 271 A.3d at

884 (“To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be

erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.”) (citation

omitted); see also Gregury, 196 A.3d at 633. The court’s conclusion that

Mother had not proved abuse occurred fell squarely within the trial court’s

authority as the arbiter of the evidence. Graves, 265 A.3d at 693. However,

in light of our decision to remand this matter to allow Mother to present two

additional witnesses on the question of abuse, see supra, we must also

reopen the decision to allow the trial court to consider Dr. Champion’s

testimony as to the effects of abuse on Child. Accordingly, on remand, if the

trial court determines that abuse occurred after considering Mother’s new

evidence, then the court should also permit Mother to call Dr. Champion to

testify on the effect of that abuse on Child.

      In her final issue, Mother argues that the trial court improperly admitted

an unauthenticated and incomplete video recording of a custody exchange

that Father admitted during cross-examination of Mother. Mother contends

that no steps were taken to authenticate the video under the applicable

evidentiary rule. Mother emphasizes her prejudice from the admission of this

evidence as the trial court cited this specific incident as evidence of

“inconsistencies and exaggerations” in Mother’s account of Father’s alleged

abusive conduct directed toward her. Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/23, at 20-21.

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       As stated above, during cross-examination of Mother, Father’s counsel

sought to introduce a video recording of a September 9, 2022 custody

exchange that was recorded by Father’s mother; Mother had previously

testified that Father approached her with fists clenched and red-faced during

this exchange. N.T., 3/27/23, at 257-59, 263. Mother’s counsel initially only

objected to the admission of the video’s sound pursuant to the Wiretapping

and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701-5782, which

objection the trial court overruled. N.T., 3/27/23, at 260-61. After the video

was played and Mother was examined regarding its contents, Father’s counsel

sought to enter the zip drive containing the video as an exhibit. Id. at 265-

66. At that point, the trial court asked Father whether the video “accurately

depict[ed] what occurred,” and Father responded in the affirmative. Id. at

266.      Mother’s counsel then noted her objection to the admission of the

recording on the basis that paternal grandmother, the person who recorded

the video, “isn’t here to authenticate taking the video and it does not

accurately depict the entire exchange . . .” Id. The trial court overruled the

objection. Id. at 267.

       We find no merit to Mother’s claim. Authentication generally entails a

“low burden of proof,” requiring only that the proponent “produce evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”

Pa.R.E. 901(a); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d 814, 818 (Pa. Super.

2022). The author or individual who created the evidentiary item need not

testify    for   the   item’s   authentication,   but   instead   evidence   may   be

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authenticated by testimony from a witness who has knowledge “that an item

is what it is claimed to be.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1); see also Commonwealth v.

Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2006); Gregury, 196 A.3d at 633-34; Zuk

v. Zuk, 55 A.3d 102, 112 (Pa. Super. 2012). Furthermore, “[d]emonstrative

evidence such as photographs, motion pictures, diagrams and models must

be authenticated by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately represents that which it purports

to depict.” Pa.R.E. 901, Comment; see also Serge, 896 A.2d at 1177.

      Here, the authentication requirement was satisfied when Father testified

that the video recording accurately depicted what occurred during the

September 9, 2022 custody exchange.            See N.T., 3/27/23, at 266 (“THE

COURT: . . . So does [the video recording] accurately depict what occurred?

[FATHER]: Yes.”); Pa.R.E. 901, Comment; Serge, 896 A.2d at 1177. Father

was not required to present the testimony of paternal grandmother to testify

as to her recording of the video as he was present at the captured incident

and had knowledge that the video is what it was claimed to be.          Pa.R.E.

901(b)(1); Serge, 896 A.2d at 1177; Gregury, 196 A.3d at 633-34.

Therefore, Mother is not entitled to relief on her final issue.

      Based upon our conclusions outlined above, we remand for the trial

court to conduct an additional proceeding at which Mother may present

testimony from two additional fact witnesses, Ms. Windak and Ms. Green, on

the subject of Father’s alleged abuse of Mother. If, after consideration of this

new evidence as well as the evidence previously received, the trial court finds

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that any abuse actually occurred, it shall also permit Dr. Champion to offer

expert testimony regarding the effect of domestic violence on children. The

trial court may also receive any other evidence at this further proceeding that

it deems relevant to Child’s best interests.       Following its receipt of this

additional evidence, the trial court shall issue a new final custody order based

upon its consideration of the Section 5328(a) factors.4

       Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

 12/29/2023

____________________________________________

4 The trial court’s May 15, 2023 custody order shall remain in effect pending

further ruling by the lower court.

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