Court Opinion

ID: 9963442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:00:55.040192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:51.176358
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MICAH PATTERSON,                                DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         SF-1221-22-0263-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: April 24, 2024
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Micah Patterson , Springfield, Illinois, pro se.

      Latriece Jones , Mobile, Alabama, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,
VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND this appeal to the Western Regional
Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                  2

                                BACKGROUND
      In   December    2020,   the    agency   appointed   the   appellant   to   a
competitive-service position as a GS-9 Agricultural Engineer in the agency’s
Natural Resources Conservation Service.        Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1
at 15-16, Tab 12 at 14. The agency terminated him in September 2021, prior to
the completion of his probationary period, for alleged misconduct occurring
between August and September 2021. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8.
      The appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
alleging that the agency subjected him to a hostile work environment and
terminated him in reprisal for the following protected disclosures, most of which
he made in September 2021: (1) the agency failed to obtain approval from the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for its performance appraisal system;
(2) the appellant’s team leader, who was responsible for training the appellant,
violated the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Privacy Act) by disclosing details of the
appellant’s performance appraisal in front of coworkers who did not have a need
to know; (3) the team leader took incorrect measurements at a construction
project, allowing the project to “pass”; and (4) inconsistencies between the
“Worksheet for Determination of Hazards Classification and Job Class for Dams
and Structures” and external requirements made it unclear whether the team
leader had proper job approval authority. IAF, Tab 1 at 18-23, 29-30, 34, Tab 9
at 31-32. OSC closed its investigation and informed the appellant of his Board
appeal rights. IAF, Tab 1 at 34-35.
                                                                                        3

      The appellant timely filed this IRA appeal raising the same claims. 2
IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 19-23, Tab 7 at 4-9, 11-12, 14-23. The administrative judge
issued an order informing the appellant of his burden to establish Board
jurisdiction over his IRA appeal.         IAF, Tab 3.      In response, the appellant
submitted a narrative statement detailing each disclosure along with his
correspondence with, and additional information submitted to, OSC. IAF, Tab 7
at 4-55. The agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. IAF, Tab 12 at 5-13.
      The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2, 14. She found
that the appellant exhausted his administrative remedies with OSC, but that he
failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that his disclosures were protected under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). ID at 7-13.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the
agency has filed a response.      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 3, 5.          On
review, the appellant disputes the merits of his termination and disagrees with the
administrative judge’s findings regarding his disclosures. 3          PFR File, Tab 3
at 9-30.

2
  This is the second appeal that the appellant has filed regarding his termination. The
same administrative judge previously issued an initial decision dismissing his prior
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Patterson v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket
No. SF-315H-22-0049-I-1, Tab 9, Initial Decision (0049 ID) at 1, 7. She found that the
appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over his termination as an otherwise appealable
action or an IRA appeal. 0049 ID at 4-6. As relevant to the instant IRA appeal, she
reasoned that the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal claim was premature because he
had not yet exhausted his OSC remedy. 0049 ID at 6. That decision became final after
neither party filed a petition for review. 0049 ID at 7; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113 (stating
that an initial decision generally will become the Board’s final decision 35 days after
issuance unless a party files a petition for review).
3
  The appellant also alleges for the first time on review that his second-level supervisor
made fraudulent and defamatory statements related to the accuracy of the appellant’s
work. PFR File, Tab 3 at 30-31. The Board lacks jurisdiction over these tort law
claims. See Paul v. Department of Agriculture, 66 M.S.P.R. 643, 650 (1995).
Therefore, we decline to consider this argument on review.
                                                                                       4

                 DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an appellant must show
that he exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous
allegations of the following: (1) he made a protected disclosure described under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity as specified in 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). 4 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)
(3), 1221(a)-(b); Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5
(2016). Specifically, protected whistleblowing occurs when an appellant makes a
disclosure that he reasonably believes evidences a violation of law, rule, or
regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.             5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8); Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget , 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 52.
The proper test for determining whether an employee had a reasonable belief that
his disclosures were protected is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge
of the essential facts known to, and readily ascertainable by, the employee could
reasonably conclude that the actions evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or
regulation, or one of the other conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 52.
      On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s findings
regarding each of his alleged protected disclosures. PFR File, Tab 3 at 8-16, 19,
4
  The administrative judge stated that, in determining whether disclosures are protected,
the Board only reviews the appellant’s characterization of the disclosures to OSC, not
his later characterization of those statements. ID at 8. After the initial decision was
issued in this case, the Board clarified the substantive requirements of exhaustion.
Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security , 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. An appellant may
give a more detailed account of his whistleblowing activities before the Board than he
did to OSC. Id. (citing Briley v. National Archives and Records Administration,
236 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). However, regardless of the standard the
administrative judge used, she determined that the appellant exhausted all of his alleged
protected disclosures. ID at 7 & n.5; IAF, Tab 7 at 4-10. The parties do not dispute
this finding and we discern no basis to disturb it.
                                                                                     5

21-25, 27-29.    We agree with the administrative judge’s findings as to the
appellant’s disclosures regarding the agency allegedly failing to obtain OPM
approval of its performance appraisal system, 5 the team leader allegedly taking
incorrect measurements at a construction project, and inconsistencies between the
“Worksheet for Determination of Hazards Classification and Job Class for Dams
and Structures” and external requirements. However, for the reasons set forth
below, we find that the appellant has established jurisdiction over his claims
arising out of his disclosure involving the Privacy Act.

The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that his team leader violated the Privacy Act
by criticizing the appellant within earshot of others.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant stated only a vague
allegation of wrongdoing when he disclosed to his first-level supervisor that, in
September 2021, his team leader “breach[ed his] confidentiality” by “heavily
criticizing [the appellant] in terms of [his] ‘Performance Appraisal’ outside of
confidence and with other employees present.”         ID at 10; IAF, Tab 9 at 32.
On review, the appellant argues that he provided specific details regarding this
disclosure. PFR File, Tab 3 at 19. We agree.

5
  On review, the appellant argues that he raised additional agency wrongdoing relating
to the performance appraisal system with OSC. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10-15. In addition
to referencing his correspondence with OSC in the record below, the appellant also
attaches correspondence with OSC beginning in April 2022. We have considered the
appellant’s new evidence and argument to the extent they implicate the Board’s
jurisdiction, a matter that may be raised at any time during Board proceedings.
Pirkkala v. Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 5 (2016). However, we find
that the appellant’s new evidence and argument do not establish jurisdiction. To the
extent the appellant alleges that he made disclosures to OSC beginning in April 2022
regarding information he learned during the course of this appeal, that information
could not have formed the basis of his belief that the agency had committed wrongdoing
at the time he made his disclosures in September 2021. Similarly, although the
appellant’s December 27, 2021 correspondence to OSC constitutes protected activity
under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C), that activity could not have been a contributing factor
in his September 2021 termination.         See Orr v. Department of the Treasury,
83 M.S.P.R. 117, ¶ 15 (1999) (observing that protected disclosures made after the
agency took a personnel action could not have been a contributing factor in that
personnel action).
                                                                                  6

      In order to be protected, the appellant must have had a reasonable belief
that he was disclosing a violation of law, rule, or regulation.      See 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8)(A); Hupka v. Department of Defense, 74 M.S.P.R. 406, 410 (1997).
The appellant need not prove that the matter disclosed actually established one of
the types of wrongdoing listed under section 2302(b)(8)(A); rather, he must show
that the matter disclosed was one which a reasonable person in his position would
believe evidenced any of the situations specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Hupka, 74 M.S.P.R. at 410.      The appellant, who is not a lawyer, may have
reasonably believed that his team leader violated the Privacy Act by discussing
his performance in a location where others could overhear. See id. (finding that
an appellant, who was not a lawyer and whose duties did not require him to be
familiar with the intricacies of the Privacy Act, reasonably believed that the
agency violated the Privacy Act when it disclosed his medical information before
he signed a medical release).
      Here, the appellant’s disclosure, in its entirety, alleged “a breach of
confidentiality” by his team leader, who “was heavily criticizing [him] in terms of
[his] ‘Performance Appraisal’ outside of confidence and with other employees
present.”   IAF, Tab 9 at 31-32.    He did not indicate in his disclosure to his
first-level supervisor where or when the alleged conversation took place, what the
team leader stated, or who was present to overhear the discussion.              Id.
On review, the appellant provides details regarding his disclosure, alleging the
team leader “directly cited the performance appraisal.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 17, 19.
He also relies on statements provided by the agency in support of its motion to
dismiss. Id. at 17-18. We consider these statements because they are integral to
the appellant’s claim, and he has referred to them in his petition for review. See
Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1369 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (stating that, although the Board may not deny jurisdiction by crediting the
agency’s interpretation of the evidence, “the Board may consider sources such as
                                                                                       7

‘matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to
judicial notice, [and] matters of public record’” (citation omitted)).
      One of these statements was completed by the appellant’s team leader on
September 16, 2021, and is addressed to the appellant’s first-level supervisor.
IAF, Tab 12 at 151-52.        The team leader recounted a disagreement with the
appellant during which he advised the appellant that his performance had
“regressed” since earlier in the month, that he needed to complete previously
identified items to be “fully successful at his current employment level,” and that
he was not “adequately support[ing] the . . . office.”         Id. at 152.     A second
statement from one of the appellant’s coworkers, who overheard some of the
conversation, also indicated that the team leader “brought up [the appellant’s]
overall work performance.” Id. at 154. It appears that the discussion did not take
place behind closed doors. Id.
      The appellant made his disclosure to his first-level supervisor that
“confidentiality is breached” on September 17, 2021.           IAF, Tab 9 at 31-32.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the appellant’s belief that his disclosure
evidenced wrongdoing, we look to the context in which he made his disclosures.
See Ontivero v. Department of Homeland Security , 117 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶¶ 15,
19-20 (2012) (considering the fact that an agency manager agreed with the
appellant’s   concerns   as    supporting   the   conclusion      that   the   appellant
nonfrivolously alleged that she disclosed wrongdoing). Any doubt or ambiguity
as to whether the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of reasonable belief
should be resolved in favor of finding jurisdiction. Id., ¶ 18.
      Here, resolving any doubt in the appellant’s favor, we find that
he nonfrivolously alleged that, 1 day before he sent his email expressing concern
about a breach of confidentiality to his first-level supervisor, the same supervisor
received a statement from the appellant’s team leader reflecting that he advised
the appellant that his performance was less than satisfactory.            IAF, Tab 12
at 151-52. Again resolving any doubt at this stage in the appellant’s favor, we
                                                                                  8

assume that the appellant’s first-level supervisor also received a statement from
his coworker around the same time reflecting that she overheard some of this
discussion.    Id. at 154.   With this background, we find that, although the
appellant’s disclosure was somewhat terse, his first-level supervisor had
sufficient information to flesh out the relevant facts. Therefore, we find that the
disclosure, in context, was specific and detailed.
      Further, we find that a person in the appellant’s position could reasonably
believe that discussing his performance in a place where the discussion could be
overheard violated the Privacy Act.         See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4)-(5), (b)
(prohibiting an agency from disclosing information about an individual that is in
a group of records retrievable by name or other personal identifier). In light of
our finding here, we find it unnecessary to address other pleadings and evidence
that the appellant cites on review as supporting his position that this disclosure
was protected. PFR File, Tab 3 at 17, 19 (citing IAF, Tab 1 at 20, Tab 8 at 62,
Tab 11 at 46-47, 52).

The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that his Privacy Act disclosure was a
contributing factor in his termination.
      The appellant argues on review that the agency subjected him to a hostile
work environment and terminated him in retaliation for the above protected
disclosures.   IAF, Tab 1 at 34, Tab 9 at 14, 23.     In cases involving multiple
alleged disclosures or activities and multiple personnel actions, when an appellant
makes a nonfrivolous allegation that at least one personnel action was taken in
reprisal for at least one alleged protected disclosure or activity, he establishes
Board jurisdiction over his IRA appeal.       Peterson v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 8 (2011).      As discussed above, we find that the
appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he made a protected disclosure concerning a
purported Privacy Act violation.
      Because she found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that he
made a protected disclosure, the administrative judge did not reach the issue of
                                                                                   9

whether he nonfrivolously alleged that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a
personnel action. ID at 13. Therefore, we have considered these issues here.
      As an initial matter, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that
the agency took a personnel action against him. A probationary termination is a
personnel action.   5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii); Scalera v. Department of the
Navy, 102 M.S.P.R. 43, ¶ 15 (2006).             The record contains the appellant’s
September 2021 notice of probationary termination, and the agency indicated
below that it had terminated the appellant’s employment that month.             IAF,
Tab 1 at 7-10, Tab 12 at 6.
      On review, the appellant argues that he proved contributing factor under
the knowledge-timing test. PFR File, Tab 3 at 31-32. To satisfy the contributing
factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage in an IRA appeal, an appellant need
only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact or content of the protected
disclosure was one factor that tended to affect the personnel action in any way.
Abernathy v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 37, ¶ 15. One way to establish
this criterion is the knowledge-timing test, under which an employee may
nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel
action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking
the personnel action knew of the disclosure and that the personnel action occurred
within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Id. The Board has
held that personnel actions occurring within 1 to 2 years after the protected
disclosures are sufficient to meet the timing portion of the test.        Id.   The
knowledge portion of the knowledge-timing test can be met with allegations of
either actual or constructive knowledge.        Id.   An appellant may establish an
official’s constructive knowledge of a protected disclosure by demonstrating that
an individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure influenced the official
accused of taking the retaliatory action. Id.
                                                                                      10

       As discussed above, on September 17, 2021, the appellant sent an email to
his   first-level   supervisor   alleging   that     his   team   leader   breached   his
confidentiality.    IAF, Tab 9 at 31-32.           The agency’s State Conservationist
terminated the appellant 12 days later. IAF, Tab 1 at 6-10. The termination letter
references the confrontation during which the appellant alleges that his team
leader breached confidentiality as a basis for the appellant’s termination. IAF,
Tab 1 at 8. Further, around the same time as the appellant’s disclosure to his
first-level supervisor, it appears that his team leader submitted a statement to her
about the confrontation, discussed above, indicating that he had raised with the
appellant the issue of his performance.        IAF, Tab 12 at 151-52.         Therefore,
although the termination letter does not specifically reflect the involvement of the
appellant’s first-level supervisor in the termination decision, this information is
sufficient to constitute a nonfrivolous allegation that the appellant’s supervisor,
who was aware of his disclosures, influenced the State Conservationist, who
signed his termination letter.        Therefore, we remand this appeal for a
determination of whether the appellant proved this claim on the merits.
       At this time, we do not reach the issue of whether the appellant
nonfrivolously alleged that he was, leading up to his termination, subjected to a
hostile work environment. Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), a “significant
change in duties, responsibilities or working conditions” is a personnel action.
To amount to a “significant change” under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), an agency
action must have a significant impact on the overall nature or quality of an
employee’s working conditions, responsibilities, or duties.                  Skarada v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 15.                        We leave the
determination of whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged he suffered such a
significant change, and whether his Privacy Act disclosure contributed to it, for
the administrative judge on remand.          See Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service,
2022 MSPB 21, ¶ 22 (recognizing that the Board’s administrative judges are in
                                                                                11

the best position to, among other things, develop the record and simplify the
issues).
      On remand, the administrative judge must first determine whether the
appellant nonfrivolously alleged that his Privacy Act disclosure was a
contributing factor in a hostile work environment. See Scmittling v. Department
of the Army, 219 F.3d 1332, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the Board
may not make findings on the merits of an IRA appeal unless it first determines
that it has jurisdiction over the matter). Following that determination, she should
hold the appellant’s requested hearing on the merits of his claims arising out of
his alleged Privacy Act disclosure. IAF, Tab 1 at 2; see Graves v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22 (2016) (explaining that once an
appellant establishes jurisdiction over his IRA appeal he is entitled to a hearing
on the merits).

                                     ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Western
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
In the remand initial decision, the administrative judge may reincorporate
prior findings as appropriate, consistent with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.