Court Opinion

ID: 9660878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:23:08.623235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.456964
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Unfortunately, the majority opinion completely retries this case, substituting its judgment for a circuit court judge. The rule of deference is completely forsaken. We are bound by the rule that the question is:
[N]ot whether the [Justices] of this Court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law in the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion. F.M. Slagle & Co. v. Bushnell, 70 S.D. 250, 16 N.W.2d 914, 916 (1944).
See Johnson v. Johnson, 477 N.W.2d 603, 606 (S.D.1991). Here, the trial court conducted two days of testimony, weighed the evidence, and issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based upon the evidence before it, the circuit judge decided it was not in the best interests to have a permanent change of residence for Trevor.
Removal is permitted if a move is consistent with the best interests of the child. Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux, 427 N.W.2d 122, 123 (S.D.1988) (citing In re Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808 (S.D.1981), the case upon which Chief Justice Miller relies in his dissent).
There was no testimony to corroborate Stephanie’s singular evidence which was restricted to her self-serving statements. Furthermore, the circuit judge had evidence to establish that Stephanie had a long history of emotional instability and an alcohol drinking problem. At the time when Judge Bradshaw tried this case, Stephanie had a new marriage of less than six months to an itinerant construction worker with an unsettled work history. Obviously, the circuit court judge was concerned with providing a stable environment for this five year old boy.
When Judge Bradshaw tried this case, the proposed move was to Mayfield, Ohio, a suburb just outside the large metropolitan *235area of Cleveland. Justifiably so, the father was concerned with racial, ethnic, traffic, school and criminal problems. Father was extremely concerned with such a move causing an ill effect on this young boy. The circuit judge heard testimony that such a geographical distance affected Trevor’s immediate emotional, disciplinary, school, and medical needs. Obviously, the circuit judge was influenced by such testimony. Both the credibility of the witnesses and weight to be accorded to their testimony is for the trial court to determine. Mellema v. Mellema, 407 N.W.2d 827, 831 (S.D.1987); Scott v. Wagner, 274 N.W.2d 266 (S.D.1979). Judge Bradshaw entered these Findings of Fact which the majority opinion has not characterized as being clearly erroneous:
v.
The parties have cooperated well in planning visitation and have maintained a good relationship as it relates to Trevor. Both parties have demonstrated cooperation and Lee has demonstrated more than the usual amount of care and concern for Trevor.
XIII.
Trevor has resided his entire life in Watertown, South Dakota. He has had the benefit of the care, love and affection of both parents and the association of the majority of his relatives, including his grandparents, cousins and some little friends.
XV.
The removal of Trevor from South Dakota would lessen the frequency of visitation by Lee and also lessen his influence upon the rearing and upbringing of Trevor and the parental input to which Trevor is accustomed.
XVI.
Stephanie may have compelling reasons to move from South Dakota, but there is absolutely no evidence that such a move is consistent with the best interests of Trevor, and, in fact, such a move would disrupt the continuity, stability and good home environment which the law demands for children. (Emphasis supplied mine).
In applying the clearly erroneous standard, our function is not to decide factual issues de novo. People in Interest of D.M., 367 N.W.2d 769, 772 (S.D.1985); Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, P.A., 262 N.W.2d 508 (S.D.1978).
There was, therefore, no abuse of discretion and this circuit judge should not be reversed either under the decisions of this Court or the specific state statutes referred to in the Chief Justice’s dissent. We have long recognized that all courts of our state must judicially recognize and apply the statutes of this state. State v. Myers, 411 N.W.2d 402, 405 (S.D.1987); In re Gibbs, 51 S.D. 464, 214 N.W. 850 (1927). Finally, when Judge Bradshaw decided this case, Stephanie had no knowledge of the housing she would live in, the school her son would attend, or the immediate neighborhood in which the new family would live. Obviously, Judge Bradshaw was concerned with such a shaky situation and held that such a move was not consistent with the best interests of Trevor. In contradistinction, Trevor had a close relationship with numerous relatives in and around the Watertown area. Little wonder that Judge Bradshaw decided the best interests of this boy was in a known environment contrasted to an unknown environment in a suburb of Cleveland.
Subsequent to the formal decision by the trial court, as a result of a telephonic hearing on December 27,1991, as reflected by a transcript here on file, the trial court entered an order dated January 8, 1992 which is a clarification order of the November 1, 1991 judgment. This hearing resulted from a motion by Stephanie because she wanted the right to take Trevor out of the state for an out-of-town visit for a weekend, should she so desire. As a result of this hearing, conducted after the principal action was decided, the trial judge, in fairness, decided that Stephanie could do so but Trevor’s residence was to remain in *236South Dakota. Further, to keep a handle on the situation, the trial court ordered that both the father or the mother had to give reasonable notice to the other party if they were to take the child out of state for a visit and to describe the destination. An appeal was taken by Stephanie of the judgment dated November 1, 1991, as clarified by the order dated January 8, 1992. In an affidavit supporting the motion to clarify, Stephanie made it known that her parents resided in Iowa; her husband, Robert Mack *, resided in Ohio; and her husband’s parents resided in Louisiana. Apparently, the majority would have us believe by its footnote 2 that Stephanie would not try to remove Trevor to a suburb in Cleveland, Ohio, because she found a job in Water-town, South Dakota, in order to remain with the party’s son. Reasoning would have us believe that having married this man, who lives in Ohio, and having fought the trial judge’s decision to not remove Trevor to Ohio, that the subsequent fact that she did marry Mack, is all the reason more that she intends to move to Ohio and take the son of these parties with her, if she wins this appeal. Such a move would entirely frustrate or defeat the father’s influence over his son or visitation with his son on a daily basis. Her marriage to her lover, Mack, is all the reason more as to why Trevor should not be moved to Ohio. It is rewarding the guilty party in a marriage. Lee E. Fortin was granted a decree of divorce from Stephanie L. Fortin. It is noted in the transcript, page 100, that the trial court mentioned, expressly in his decision, that when she got off work that she would go to the bar and stay until the bar closed at night. And that Lee Fortin would take care of the child, not only at these times, but upon a number of occasions when she would absent herself from the home. Mack has two prior marriages. Tr., page 18. During the divorce trial, she admitted she drank intoxicants, at home and “does not go out so much.” Tr., page 23. The transcript further reflects that Stephanie Fortin was romantically involved with Mack at or about the time of the divorce proceedings. Before the divorce, she admitted she told her husband she had gone to Minneapolis to visit an old friend. Later, she admitted that this was a lie, that in truth and fact, she went to Louisiana and visited Mack and his parents (for about 10 days). For her conduct, she should be rewarded? And the father and the little boy’s extended family should not be close to him to give him guidance in life? And so that she can take up with her new husband in a far away place, to accommodate her romantic inclinations?
This decision is a travesty of justice. And, accordingly, I dissent.

 She was not married when the principal action was heard or decided.