Court Opinion

ID: 9410414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 07:00:16.348292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.630695
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ROGER J. THOMAS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         SF-0752-16-0332-B-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: July 20, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Norman Jackman, Esquire, Lincoln, New Hampshire, for the appellant.

           Maureen Ney, Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
     which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his claims under the Veterans
     Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) and Uniformed Services
     Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), and dismissed as

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     untimely filed his claim under the Whistleblower Pro tection Enhancement Act of
     2012 (WPEA).      For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review as it concerns his USERRA claim, VACATE the remand
     initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional office for further
     adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The agency removed the appellant, effective January 31, 2016, for failure to
     maintain a regular work schedule. Thomas v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-16-0332-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 20.
     The appellant filed a removal appeal with the Board on March 7, 2016. IAF,
     Tab 1. He also alleged whistleblower reprisal and violations of his VEOA and
     USERRA rights. Id. at 4. As to his whistleblower reprisal claim, he indicated
     that he had filed a complaint with Office of Special Counsel (OSC) on May 1,
     2015, but left blank the inquiry on his initial appeal form regarding the date that
     OSC issued its close-out letter. Id. As to his USERRA or VEOA claims, the
     appellant indicated that he filed a Department of Labor (DOL) complaint on
     July 27, 2015, and that DOL made a decision on his complaint. Id.
¶3        The administrative judge notified the appellant that his appeal appeared to
     be untimely filed. IAF, Tab 9 at 1-2. She provided the parties with a notice of
     the appellant’s burden to prove the timeliness of his appeal, or if untimely, that
     there was good cause for the delay. Id. at 3-6. The appellant responded that he
     was untimely due to a medical condition.        IAF, Tab 12.     The agency also
     responded.    IAF, Tab 14.       After considering the parties’ responses, the
     administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely filed without good cause.
     IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision at 11.
¶4        The appellant, through his designated representative, filed a petition for
     review challenging the initial decision.     Thomas v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-16-0332-I-1, Petition for Review (PFR) File,
                                                                                        3

     Tab 3 at 2-3, Tab 4. The Board issued a Remand Order granting the petition for
     review. Thomas v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-
     16-0332-I-1, Remand Order (RO), ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 2016). The Board found that the
     administrative judge properly dismissed the removal appeal as untimely filed.
     RO, ¶¶ 9-17.   However, it remanded the appeal to the administrative judge to
     provide the appellant with the jurisdictional burdens for, and an opportunity to
     present evidence and argument to establish jurisdiction over, his p otential
     USERRA, VEOA, and individual right of action (IRA) appeals. RO, ¶¶ 20-21.
¶5        On remand, the administrative judge issued an acknowledgment order
     informing the appellant of his jurisdictional burdens for the claims he raised on
     appeal. Thomas v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-
     16-0332-B-1, Remand File (RF), Tab 2 at 2-14.            Fourteen days after the
     acknowledgment order was issued, the appellant filed a pleading asking the
     administrative judge to provide him with notice of his jur isdictional burden as
     required by the Remand Order. RF, Tab 3 at 4-7. In response, a staff member in
     the Board’s regional office contacted the appellant and informed him that the
     acknowledgment order contained the required jurisdictional information.          RF ,
     Tab 4 at 1-2. The appellant indicated that he had received the acknowledgment
     order but had not read it. Id. at 2. The administrative judge subsequently ordered
     the appellant to file evidence and argument to show cause why his appeal should
     not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. The appellant did not respond to the
     order, and the agency filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. RF, Tab 5 at 4 -5.
¶6        Without holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued a remand initial
     decision dismissing the appeal. RF, Tab 6, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 14.
     Concerning the appellant’s USERRA claim, the administrative judge found that
     he failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that his removal was due to his prior
     military service. RID at 11-12. Concerning his VEOA claim, the administrative
     judge found that the appellant provided no evidence that he exhausted his
     veterans’ preference claim with DOL. RID at 14. Therefore, the administrative
                                                                                              4

     judge found that the appellant failed to establish jurisdict ion over these claims.
     Concerning the whistleblower reprisal claim, the administrative judge found that
     the appellant received a close-out letter from OSC in August 2015. RID at 9-10.
     Based on this finding, she concluded that his March 2016 initial appe al was
     untimely filed. 2 Id.; IAF, Tab 1 at 35.
¶7         The appellant, through a new attorney representative, has filed a remand
     petition for review challenging the dismissal of his appeal.                  Thomas v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-16-0332-B-1,
     Remand Petition for Review (RPFR) File, Tabs 1, 7. On review, the appellant’s
     new attorney argues that the appellant’s prior representative mishandled his
     appeal and the appellant did not understand that he was required to respond to the
     administrative judge’s orders. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. He further argues that
     the appellant was “preoccupied” by military and job-related injuries. Id. As to
     the appellant’s claim of whistleblower reprisal, the appellant alleges that he
     received a close-out letter but cannot locate it.         He asserts that “more than
     120 days have long since passed after the OSC closed the case,” but he does not
     indicate when he received the close-out letter. Id. at 5. He attaches a copy of an
     OSC complaint that pre-dated his removal, but does not attach the close-out
     letter. RPFR File, Tab 4. As to his USERRA claim, he asserts that management

     2
       The administrative judge stated that she was dismissing the appellant’s potential IRA
     appeal for lack of jurisdiction. RID at 8-10. However, because she found that he did
     not file his appeal within 60 days of receipt of the OSC close-out letter, this finding was
     on timeliness, not jurisdiction.      See Inman v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     115 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 16 (2010) (finding that an administrative judge properly dismissed
     an IRA appeal as untimely filed because the appellant did not file his appeal within
     60 days of OSC notifying him that it was concluding its investigation into his
     allegations of whistleblower reprisal and he had the right to file an appeal with the
     Board). Because the administrative judge properly stated the timeframe for filing an
     IRA appeal and otherwise made appropriate findings, we find that the error o f
     characterizing her finding as jurisdictional is harmless. See Burke v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 299, ¶ 18 (2014) (observing that an administrative
     judge’s alleged procedural error is of no legal consequence unless it is shown to have
     adversely affected a party’s substantive rights).
                                                                                             5

     was antagonistic towards him as a disabled veteran, which resulted in their denial
     of his request for his leave to be protected under the Family and Medical Leave
     Act of 1993 (FMLA), and thus his termination for that leave. RPFR File, Tab 1
     at 6-7. He also attaches an August 24, 2013 news article in support of his claim
     that employees generally are antagonistic towards disabled veterans. 3 RPFR File,
     Tab 1 at 5-18, Tab 2 at 5-15. The agency has responded. RPFR File, Tab 8.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The appellant has established Board jurisdiction over his USERRA discrimination
     claim.
¶8         Under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), “[a] person who . . . has performed . . . service
     in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment,
     retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an
     employer on the basis of that . . . performance of service.”               To establish
     jurisdiction over a USERRA discrimination claim under section 4311(a), the
     appellant must nonfrivolously 4 allege that:       (1) he performed duty or has an
     obligation to perform duty in a uniformed service of the United States; (2) the
     agency denied him initial employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or
     any benefit of employment; and (3) the denial was due to the performance of duty
     or obligation to perform duty in the uniformed service. Gossage v. Department of
     Labor, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 10 (2012); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(3), (b)
     (providing that to establish jurisdiction, an appellant must nonfrivolously allege
     the substantive jurisdictional elements of a USERRA appeal) .                  USERRA,
     however, does not authorize the Board to adjudicate a claim of discrimination
     based on disability alone, even if the underlying disability arose from military
     service. McBride v. U.S. Postal Service, 78 M.S.P.R. 411, 415 (1998). A claim

     3
       The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that he did not
     exhaust his VEOA claim. RID at 14. We decline to disturb this finding on review.
     4
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
                                                                                            6

      of discrimination under USERRA should be broadly and liberally construed in
      determining whether it is nonfrivolous. Gossage, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 10.
¶9            The administrative judge below found that the appellant made nonfrivolous
      allegations that he performed uniformed service and that the agency denied him
      retention in employment by removing him. RID at 11. However, she also found
      that he failed to nonfrivolously allege that the agency’s actions were motivated by
      his military service. RID at 11-12. In light of the appellant’s clarification of his
      claim in his remand petition for review, we find that he has established
      jurisdiction over his USERRA claim.
¶10           On review of the initial decision, the appellant alleged that his supervisor
      denied him rubber boots, resulting in an on-the-job injury, and denied him other
      benefits of employment, such as his requests for FMLA-protected leave, on the
      basis of, as relevant here, his military and veteran status. PFR File, Tab 8 at 16 ,
      20; RO, ¶ 7 n.3. In his remand petition for review, the appellant further claims,
      “antagonism against him, as a disabled veteran, was obvious on the part of
      management . . . .      Eventually, he needed more time off than he could get
      management to authorize and he lost his job because of it.” RPFR File, Tab 1
      at 6.    He states, “When he asked for FMLA the Agency never signed, nor
      authorized it. Essentially, he really lost his job because of the antagonism of
      employees at the VA against disabled veterans and because of the injury caused
      by the gross negligence of the Agency.” Id. at 6-7. The Board can consider any
      new or clarified allegations made in his remand petition for review because
      jurisdiction may be raised at any time during a proceeding .           See Morgan v.
      Department of the Navy, 28 M.S.P.R. 477, 478 (1985).
¶11           Here, the appellant directly connects the alleged denial of his FMLA leave
      and his ultimate removal to the fact of his military service and veteran status, and
      not just to his service-related disability. If an appellant alleges that his status as a
      disabled veteran is the reason an agency has taken an action or denied a benefit,
      he is alleging that the action or denial was “on the basis of” his “obligation to
                                                                                        7

      perform service in a uniformed service.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a); see Davison v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶¶ 12-15 (2011) (finding
      Board jurisdiction over an appellant’s allegation of retaliation based on use of
      leave to which he was entitled only due to his status as a disabled veteran) ;
      Lazard v. U.S. Postal Service, 93 M.S.P.R. 337, ¶¶ 2, 8 (2003) (finding
      jurisdiction under USERRA over an appellant’s claims that his suspension was
      the result of his refusal to perform duties that would have aggravated his
      service-connected injuries and that nonveterans were treated differently) ; Durr v.
      Merit Systems Protection Board, 844 F. App’x 329, 332 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding
      Board jurisdiction when the appellant alleged he was denied medical leave “ for
      reason of [his] status of being a 10-point, military service-connected disabled
      veteran,” and that “if another employee had made a request for leave for medical
      reasons, that such would have been granted”). 5
¶12        Although lacking in detail, the weakness of the appellant’s assertions in
      support of his USERRA claim is not a basis to dismiss that claim for lack of
      jurisdiction; rather, if the appellant fails to develop his contentions, his USERRA
      claim should be denied on the merits.          Randall v. Department of Justice,
      105 M.S.P.R. 524, ¶ 5 (2007). Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s proffered
      allegation is sufficient to establish Board jurisdiction over his USERRA
      discrimination claim.

      The administrative judge properly found that the appell ant’s whistleblower
      reprisal appeal was untimely.
¶13        An appellant must file an IRA appeal within 60 days of receipt of OSC’s
      written notification that it is terminating its investigation into the alleged
      whistleblowing   retaliation.    Inman    v.   Department   of   Veterans   Affairs,
      115 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 16 (2010).     Here, the appellant did not provide a copy of

      5
        The Board may rely on unpublished decisions of the Federal Circuit if it finds the
      court’s reasoning persuasive, as we do here.     Mauldin v. U.S. Postal Service,
      115 M.S.P.R. 513, ¶ 12 (2011).
                                                                                          8

      OSC’s close-out letter, which normally includes such notice, or state when he
      received the letter.   However, he provided a July 30, 2015 letter from OSC,
      informing him that it had made a preliminary determination to close its inquiry
      into his complaint.    IAF, Tab 1 at 17-19.      OSC provided the appellant with
      13 days to respond, and indicated that in the absence of a response, it would send
      him a letter terminating its investigation and advising him of his additional rights.
      Id. at 19.   Based on this letter, and absent any evidence to the contra ry, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant likely received his OSC close -out
      letter in August 2015. RID at 9. Thus, she concluded that his March 2016 appeal
      was untimely. Neither party disputes this finding on review, and we decline to
      disturb it. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 5.
¶14         On review, the appellant offers excuses for his failure to respond to the
      administrative judge’s orders and submits a copy of his OSC complaint.
      RPFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, Tab 4. Because his arguments and evidence do not
      concern the dispositive timeliness issue, we decline to consider them for the first
      time on review.    Roush v. Department of the Interior, 59 M.S.P.R. 113, 118
      (1993) (declining to consider evidence presented for the first time on review
      because, in pertinent part, the evidence was not material to the dispositive
      jurisdictional issue); Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980)
      (finding that the Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first
      time on review absent a showing that it is based on new and mate rial evidence not
      previously available despite the party’s due diligence). To the extent that he is
      arguing that he has established good cause for his delay, the Board has no
      authority to excuse an untimely filed IRA appeal.       Agoranos v. Department of
      Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 8 n.3 (2013).        Accordingly, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant’s WPEA claim is untimely filed.
                                                                                    9

                                         ORDER
¶15        For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the Board’s
      Western Regional Office for further adjudication of the appellant’s USERRA
      claim in accordance with this Remand Order.      On remand, the administrative
      judge may readopt her prior findings dismissing the appellant’s VEOA claim for
      lack of jurisdiction and dismissing his WPEA claim as untimely filed so that the
      appellant will have a single decision with appropriate notice of appeals rights
      addressing all of his claims. See Goldberg v. Department of Homeland Security,
      99 M.S.P.R. 660, ¶ 12 (2005).

      FOR THE BOARD:                                 /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.