Court Opinion

ID: 9912958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 16:37:10.094385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:32.916727
License: Public Domain

j39 Nev., Advance Opinion (90

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   ANDREW YO UNG,                                        No. 83243-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                                Fll En
                   Respondent.                                                  JUL 20 2023
                                                                              ELIZ/    H A. BRO'
                                                                            CLEM' F   UP PME

                                                                           BY
                                                                                IEF DEPUTY CLERK

                               Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
                   verdict, of 12 counts of burglary; 4 counts of larceny from the person, victim
                   60 years of age or older; 3 counts of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card;
                   and 1 count of grand larceny. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
                   Jacqueline M. Bluth, Judge.
                               Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

                   Yampolsky & Margolis and Jason R. Margolis, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                   Attorney, and Parker P. Brooks and John Afshar, Deputy District
                   Attorneys, Clark County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and. BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

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                                                          OPINION

                         By the Court, GIBBONS, C.J.:
                                     During June, July, and August 2020, appellant Andrew Young
                         and an accomplice carried out a series of thefts, generally against elderly
                         victims, during which one of them would distract the victim while the other
                         surreptitiously took the victim's wallet.      After, Young purchased or
                         attempted to purchase items from stores using the credit and debit cards
                         from the wallets taken from his victims. Young was eventually identified
                         by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and convicted
                         of 20 various counts of burglary, larceny, and fraudulent use of a credit or
                         debit card (cards).
                                     On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Young raises
                         numerous issues, the vast majority of which were unpreserved as a result
                         of counsel's failure to contemporaneously object at trial.      This opinion
                         illustrates the importance of making timely objections to preserve the
                         record in order to facilitate appellate review.     While most of Young's
                         arguments are resolved under existing law, this opinion addresses in
                         particular Young's argument that the district court erred in denying his
                         motion for mistrial or, alternatively, in declining to excuse a juror based on
                         the seated juror's expression of sympathy for victims who testified during
                         trial.   In discussing the issue surrounding this juror, this opinion
                         distinguishes the different types of juror bias, offering guidance on how to
                         navigate such a claim if it arises during trial. We also provide additional
                         clarity concerning jury instructions related to larceny-from-the-person
                         charges to ensure that jurors are properly instructed on all elements of that
                         crime, as stated in the Nevada 2023 Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal.

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                                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                   Counts 1-5 (two counts of burglary; larceny front the person, victim 60 years
                   of age or older; grand larceny; and fraudulent use of a card)
                                Young and his accomplice approached Mary Campo, age 72,
                   while she was sitting at a gaming machine inside the Rampart casino. One
                   of the men showed Campo a piece of paper while asking her questions. As
                   Campo answered the man's questions, the other man stood behind her.
                   When the two men left, Campo reached into her purse and discovered her
                   wallet was missing. Although it is unclear from the record exactly where
                   her purse was situated while she was at the garning machine, it was not on
                   her person.     Her wallet contained her cards and approximately $1.400.
                   Campo's bank contacted her that same night and reported that her card had
                   been used at a 7-Eleven convenience store in Las Vegas.
                                 Detective Grimes of LVMPD retrieved surveil.lance video from
                   the casino, video footage from the 7-Eleven, and a receipt from Young's card
                   transactions at the 7-Eleven.     At trial, while testifying and narrating
                   footage depicting the theft involving Campo, Grimes stated that when the
                   two men approached Carnpo, one of thern used his jacket to conceal Campo's
                   view of his arm and he grabbed sornething from very close to Campo and
                   then hid it under his jacket.
                                 Detective Grimes later became aware of a separate theft of an
                   elderly wornan's wallet involving two male suspects at the nearby Suncoast
                   Hotel and Casino.' When Grimes saw the video from this later incident, he
                   "immediately recognize[d] it's the same two Males from the" Campo
                   incident. Grirnes testified that one of the two men wore the same shoes

                         1The separate wallet theft referenced here is included in the State's
                   indictment as count 22.
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                   during both incidents. Gri.mes spoke with Detective Janecek, who was
                   investigating the Suncoast wallet theft, after LVMPD's facial recognition
                   section identified one of the suspects in police body camera footage as Young
                   based on his white shoes bearing a di.stin.ctive black stripe.2
                   Count 6 (burglary)
                               Young also participated in stealing Lydia Hefner's wallet inside
                   a Walmart. As Hefner, age 68, finished shopping and headed toward the
                   checkout stand, a Walxnart employee, Vianca Eskildsen, ran .toWards
                   Hefner and asked• if Hefner had her wallet 'in het purse. Hefner looked
                   inside her purse and discovered her wallet was missing. Eskildsen had been
                   observing Young walking through the store and using his jacket to conceal
                   his arm while he hovered over customers. As her suspicion about Young
                   grew, Eskildsen called INMPD. Once police officers responded. to the call
                   and arrived at the Walmart, they entered the .Walmart security office and
                   watched the live surveillance footage of Young: At trial, Eskildsen testified
                   that the video showed Young taking Hefner's wallet but of her purse.
                               Officer Wheeler was one of the -officers who accompanied
                   Eskildsen to the security office and observed Young stealing on • live
                   surveillance. Wheeler testified that Walrnart security showed him "footage
                   of a male that they've had problems with before, [and] that they're
                   concerned about him trying to steal." The officers took Young into Custody,
                   searched him, and recovered• a wallet belonging to Hefner. Young tbld the
                   offiCers he found the wallet on the floOr, but Wheeler testified he. Witnessed
                   Young live by surveillance camera taking the wallet from Hefner's purse.

                         The police body camera footage referenced here, related to count •6,
                         2
                   was recorded and obtained from Young's interaction with Officer Wheeler
                   during a wallet theft at Walmart.
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                      Counts 7-8 (burglary and la ceny from the person, victim 60 years of age or
                      older)
                                  Rhonda Hatche , age 63, was carrying her purse while riding in
                      the Caesars casino elevator with her mother. Hatcher testified that there
                      were two men also in the el vator and that one of the men claimed he was
                      blind and asked if he had     ushed the correct button. After exiting the
                      elevator, Hatcher felt sornet ing was wrong, so she looked in her purse. She
                      discovered her wallet was g ne and immediately filed reports with security
                      and LVMPD.       While filli g out the security report, Hatcher received
                      notifications from her bank asking if she authorized certain transactions
                      using her cards. Hatcher ever authorized anyone to possess or use her
                      cards.
                                  Detective Jacobi z reviewed substantial video surveillance from
                      this theft and other theft and fraud incidents that occurred over the
                      summer. He identified You g in the casino elevator video played during his
                      testimony at trial. During is testimony, Jacobitz commented that he felt
                      Young was "smooth" and th t. Young had "been doing this for a long time.
                      He's good." However, Jacobi z immediately admitted he had no information
                      as to how long Young had been "doing this" and that these comments
                      reflected his opinion. Youn did not object, nor did he move to strike this
                      portion of Jacobitz's testimony. Jacobitz also stated that he believed the
                      two men in the elevator were a team because they were not using the
                      elevator to go to a hotel room and the two men left the casino after returning
                      to the ground floor. Over objection, Jacobitz also testified he learned that
                      Young was not registered at. the hotel.

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                    Counts 9- 10 (burglary and larceny from the person, vi,e6m 60 years of age or
                    older)
                                Joanne Frank, age 77, was approached in an Albertsons
                    supermarket by two men, one of whom was later identified as Young. One
                    of the men began asking her questions. She spoke with the man for about
                    15 minutes. As soon as the two men left, she noticed that her backpack
                    purse, which she was wearing at the tirne, had been opened. She left the
                    store without purchasing anything and discovered her wallet was missing
                    from her backpack purse but stated she "didn't feel a thing" during her
                    encounter with the two rnen. Her bank contacted her to report her card was
                    used to atternpt to make a purchase, but the transaction was declined.
                    Counts 11- 14 (burglary and fraudulent use of cards)
                                I3arbara Bowen, age 80, was approached by a man while
                    shopping at Walm art with her daughter. Bowen was securing an item from
                    the shelf when the man told her he wanted the same item, and Bowen
                    handed him one. The man thanked her and left. Bowen had her purse
                    sitting in the bottom portion of her shopping cart. When she tried to pay
                    for an item, she realized her wallet was missing, and after confirming the
                    wallet was not in her car, Bowen reported the wallet missing to Walmart
                    security. Bowen's cards were used to make two unauthorized purchases at
                    a Walmart and a GarneStop store, and another attempted transaction, at a
                    Walgreens, was declined.
                                An employee at GameStop testified that Young entered the
                    store and made purchases with a card that was later determined to be
                    Bowen's. On a later date, Young made a purchase at the GameStop with a
                    card belonging to Montho Boone. During both visits, Young is seen on video

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                   wearing similar clothing. Young purchased a Vanilla Visa prepaid gift card'
                   during both visits to the GameStop.
                               An employee at Walgreens also testified that Young visited the
                   store and attempted to purchase a Vanilla Visa card and cigarettes. Young
                   was not able to complete any transactions at Walgreens after the cards he
                   used were declined multiple times. The same Walgreens employee testified
                   that on another occasion a man with similar clothing visited the store and
                   attempted to purchase a Vanilla Visa card.
                   Counts 15-16 (burglary and larceny from the person, victim 60 years of age
                   or older)
                               Young was also involved in an incident at the Flamingo casino
                   with Serry Mello, age 69.. who, with his spouse, was inside the elevator
                   heading to their room. Young and another .man entered the casino elevator
                   with Mello and his spouse. Fifteen minutes after Mello arrived at his hotel

                   room, he received a phone call from his bank reporting suspicious activity
                   on his card. Mello discovered he did not have his wallet, which had been in
                   the front pocket of his pants, and reported that he had not authorized the
                   suspicious transactions.
                              Detective Cipriano investigated the incident and obtained
                   surveillance footage taken in the hotel elevator. After working with other
                   detectives and reviewing other video evidence during his investigation,
                   Cipriano identified Young as one of the men in the elevator.

                        3A Vanilla Visa card is a basic credit card that allows a purchaser to
                   add a pre-paid balance, subject to a limit, to the card. These cards can be
                   used for payment at any store that accepts Visa cards.
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                   Counts 17-20 (burglary and fraudulent use of cards)
                               Montho Boone, age 81, testified that she visited Walmart with

                   her daughter and had her wallet inside her purse. She stated her purse had
                   been zipped closed and was sitting in the upper portion of her shopping cart,
                   tied to the cart using the cart's belt. Boone was browsing in the produce

                   section and turned away from her cart for a short time. When she turned
                   back, her purse was unzipped, and her wallet was gone. Boone and her
                   daughter reported the wallet missing to Walmart security. Boone's bank
                   notified her that her cards were used to make several transactions at
                   GameStop and Walgreens, though some were declined.
                               Detective Liske investigated and visited the GameStop and

                   Walgreens where Young apparently used Boone's cards. He obtained video
                   from the two businesses. Liske's partner was investigating the incident
                   involving Bowen,      so the   two compared video      footage   from   their

                   investigations. In comparing the videos, Liske observed that the suspect
                   was an "older Black male adult . . . wearing the same exact clothing in all
                   the instances."
                   Count 21 (burglary)
                               Tina Leigh, age 60, visited Walmart with her purse strapped
                   into her shopping cart. She testified that she encountered a tall man in one
                   of the aisles who asked her "a ridiculous question about" mixing two
                   cleaning supplies. She responded and turned away. As she turned away,
                   she saw another man stick his hand in her purse and take something. She
                   checked her purse and discovered her wallet was gone. She stated the man
                   who reached into her purse had a jacket draped over his arm.            Leigh

                   testified that she felt the two men were working as a team because the taller
                   man left as soon as she saw the other man reach into her purse. Leigh

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                   learned from her bank that someone tried to use her cards within an hour
                   of the theft, but the transactions were stopped after Leigh reported her
                   cards were stolen.
                               Detective Liske testified that video surveillance showed one
                   man distracting Leigh while the other reached into her purse and took her
                   wallet. He also testified that in the three theft investigations in which he
                   reviewed video footage (the thefts involving Boone, Bowen, and Leigh), it
                   appeared one suspect wore the same t-shirt and white shoes with a black
                   stripe and always had a jacket draped over his left arm. Liske testified that
                   this Walmart theft became significant because Young was identified at
                   Walmart when confronted and recorded on body camera and given a citation
                   by Officer Wheeler outside the store. Liske testified that Young wore the
                   same shoes during all three theft incidents he investigated. Finally, Liske
                   testified that Young also wore the same shoes when Young was finally
                   arrested, and police impounded the shoes as evidence.
                   Count 22 (burglary)
                               Barbara Angersbach testified regarding an incident at a casino
                   that involved Young and another man approaching her at the gaming
                   machines. Angersbach, age 83, had her purse next to her as she was playing
                   one of the slot machines. Her purse was open when Young and the other
                   man approached her. She told the two men they needed to be six feet away
                   from her because of COVID restrictions. Angersbach testified she did not
                   see either man put any money into any machines to play. The two men left
                   after agreeing they could not be so close to Angersbach. When she reached
                   into her purse to find her glasses, she noticed her wallet missing. On her
                   way home, her bank contacted her about suspicious activity with her cards.
                   She filed a police report the next day.

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                              Detective Grimes reviewed the video surveillance footage and
                   recognized the two men as the same pair of suspects from the Campo
                   incident.  The shorter man was wearing the same shoes during both
                   incidents. Grimes submitted photographs to the LVMPD facial recognition
                   section and eventually learned that an identification was made using body
                   camera footage from Young's encounter with Officer Wheeler outside of
                   Walmart. Grimes testified that in both casino incidents, as well as in the
                   Albertsons' incident, one of the suspects wore the same shoes and shorts
                   and was recognizable because of his bald head and limp or unusual gait.
                              Detective Byrd from the facial recognition•section testified that
                   he reviewed different incidents, including the Walmart incident involving
                   Hefner and Officer Wheeler when Young was given a citation. He also
                   examined video surveillance footage related to the thefts that occurred
                   inside elevators. During his trial testimony. Byrd identified the suspect in
                   all the videos as Young and identified hirn inside the courtroorn. He stated
                   that he was able to identify Young because Young had a "shiny bald head."
                   wore "white-colored headphones with some black accents," carried a "black
                   jacket," had "glasses clipped to the front of his shirt," had "very distinct
                   eyes," and wore the sarne "white and black shoes." The headphones, black
                   jacket, and shoes were distinct features that, according to Byrd, appeared
                   in almost every surveillance video he viewed when trying to identify the
                   suspect. Young also had walked with a distinct dip that was like a linip or
                   some kind of awkward sideways movement. Byrd identified Young as the
                   individual depicted in six videos showing either a theft-related offense or
                   fraudulent use of a credit or debit card.
                               The State's second superseding indictment charged Young with
                   the following 22 counts: counts 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 22
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                   (burglary); counts 2, 8, 10, and 16 (larceny from the person, victim 60 years
                   of age or older); count 3 (grand larceny); and counts 5, 12, 14, 18, and 20
                   (fraudulent use of a credit or debit card).
                               Following the jury trial, Young was found guilty on all counts
                   except counts 14 and 20, which involved the alleged fraudulent use of cards
                   at Walgreens. He was sentenced under NRS 207.010(1)(b), Nevada's large
                   habitual criminal statute, for counts 1, 6, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 21, and 22. The

                   district court sentenced Young to serve concurrent and consecutive prison
                   terms totaling 90 years to life in the aggregate. Young now appeals.
                                                    ANALYSIS
                               We first address Young's arguments related to the trial
                   proceedings that the district court improperly admitted evidence of prior
                   bad acts, improperly allowed. testifying police officers to •narrate and
                   describe the thefts while surveillance video footage was played for the jury,
                   and allowed for inadmissible hearsay evidence to be presented to the jury.
                   We then turn to Young's arguments that the district court erred in denying
                   Young's rnotion for mistrial based on a juror's showing of sympathy for
                   Young's victims and that the district court improperly allowed counsel to
                   argue in the presence of that juror. Next, we address Young's arguments
                   that the district court gave erroneous jury instructions and that there was
                   insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.    Finally, we address
                   Young's sentencing arguments.
                   The district court did not improperly admit evidence of uncharged bad acts
                               Young argues that the district court erroneously admitted prior
                   bad act evidence but concedes he did not raise this issue before or during

                   trial. Young specifically argues that certain testimony by LVMPD officers
                   gave rise to the inference that he committed prior, unspecified bad acts. The
                   testimony Young highlights includes (1) Officer Wheeler testifying that he
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                   responded to the call from Walmart because Walmart employees reported a
                   "male that they've had problems with before" and they were "concerned
                   about him trying to steal"; (2) Detective Jacobitz identifying Young based
                   on his review of substantial video surveillance and testifying that Young
                   was "smooth," "good," and "[h]e's been doing this for a long time";
                   (3) Detective Cipriano's testimony that he identified Young by watching a
                   lot of video surveillance footage; and (4) Detective Grimes' testimony that
                   he identified Young after performing a records check on his name and date
                   of birth and finding a match in the LVMPD system. Young argues these
                   statements by LVMPD officers constituted "de facto bad act evidence" that
                   required a pretrial hearing regarding admissibility because the officers'
                   testimonies allowed jurors to speculate that Young was dangerous or had a
                   criminal character, thus making it seern more likely that he committed the
                   charged crimes. The State responds that the issue is waived because Young
                   did not object below and that it did not offer bad act evidence, so a pretrial
                   hearing was unnecessary.
                               This court will consider and correct an unpreserved err r only
                   when an appellant demonstrates "that: (1) there was an 'error'; (2) the error
                   is 'plain,' meaning that it is clear under current law frorn a casual insilection
                   of the record; and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights."
                   Jerernias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018) (citing GILeen v.
                   State, 1.19 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003)). "[A] plain error af ects a
                   defendant's substantial rights when it causes actual prejudice or a
                   miscarriage of justice (defined as a 'grossly unfair' outcome)." ld. at 51, 412
                   P.3d at 49. The appellant holds the burden of showing that his subst ntial
                   rights were affected and that he was actually prejudiced. See Phenix v.

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                   State, 114 Nev. 1.16, 119. 954 .P.2d 739. 740 (1998). However, review of
                   forfeited errors is discretionary. Jereatias, 134 Nev, at 52, 412 P.3d at 49.
                               We conclude Young has not. demonstrated that the statements
                   he identifies as de facto bad act evidence are clearly bad act evidence from
                   a casual inspection of the record.         None of those staternents clearly
                   constituted le]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts" to prove Young's
                   character or show that he acted in conformity therewith.              See NRS
                   48.045(2). Young argues that the statements- "gave rise to the inference"
                   that he committed prior bad acts. Although the officers' statements may
                   have referenced past crimes that Young committed, and could possibly have
                   been admitted in error, because there was no objection, it cannot be
                   determined if the statements were referring merely to Young's criminal
                   conduct during the surnmer months of 2020 or other crimes or bad actS.
                   That criminal conduct from 2020 was directly at issue during Young's trial
                   and the basis of the State's charges against Young and would -not be
                   evidence of uncharged crimes. Further. even with an inference of past
                   wrongdoing by Young, he fails to demonstrate that any error caused by the
                   officers' statements affected his substantial rights, espeeially in light of the
                   significant evidence establishing Young's guilt—his identification and
                   pattern and inanner of distract thefts during the summer of 2020.
                               To the extent Young takes issue with the lack of a pretrial
                   hearing and Detectives JacobitZ, Cipriano, and Grimes teStifying that they
                   reviewed surveillance video from theft crimes that occurred over the
                   summer months of 2020 before identifying Young as a suspect, this
                   testimony was relevant t.o explain their involvement in this case and why
                   they took the actions they did during their investigations. Further, the
                   evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because it related to other charges in

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                   the case, all of which occurred during the summer of 2020. and was not
                   clearly prior bad act evidence. Cf. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 405, 990
                   P.2d 1263, 1269 (1999) (holding that a district court's failure to conduct a
                   hearing regarding the admissibility of prior bad acts does not require
                   reversal of an appellant's convictions if "(1) the record is sufficient to
                   determine that the evidence is admissible under Tinch; or (2) the result
                   would have been the same if the trial court had not admitted the evidence");
                   Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997) ("To be
                   deemed an admissible bad act, the trial court must determine, outside the
                   presence of the jury, that: (1) the incident is relevant to the crime charged;
                   (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative
                   value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
                   prejudice."), holding rnodified by Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. 108, 270 P.3d
                   1244 (2012).
                               As for the statements by Officer Wheeler and Detective
                   Jacobitz, we conclude that their testimonies were isolated, nonspecific, and
                   did not affect Young's substantial rights.       Walmart security having
                   "problems" with Young and worrying he was "trying to steal" and Jacobitz
                   believing that Young had "been doing this for a long time," though possibly
                   referencing Young's past criminal behavior and experience as a thief using
                   a distraction technique, could just as easily have been referring to Young's
                   contemporaneous conduct or other charged criminal conduct occurring
                   during the summer of 2020, but absent an objection, the record was not
                   developed and we cannot determine the context with accuracy. Thus, under
                   a casual inspection of the record, and when considering Young's substantial
                   rights in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we decline to conclude
                   that the district court plainly erred. Further, the district court did not
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                   improperly fail to conduct a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the
                   officers' statements because the State did not seek to offer bad act evidence,
                   and what was elicited was not intentionally caused to be revealed by the
                   State at trial. Nevertheless, it is concerning that multiple questionable
                   statements were made, and we caution the State to better prepare and
                   control its witnesses to ensure a fair trial.
                               Young additionally argues that the district court should have
                   offered a limiting instruction regarding the jury's consideration of the
                   alleged bad act evidence.      Young argues that the State should have
                   requested the instruction and that the district court was required to
                   instruct the jury before the admission of bad act evidence.         The State
                   responds that any comment during the officers' testimonies was not so
                   inherently prejudicial that it required the district court to act sua sponte to
                   p reclude testi mony.
                               The failure of a district court to proffer a limiting instruction is
                   reviewed for nonconstitutional error under NRS 178.598. Mclellan v. State,
                   124 Nev. 263, 269, 182 P.3d 106, 111 (2008). The test set forth in NRS
                   178.598 mirrors the test used by federal courts as set forth in Kotteakos v.
                   United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946), which asks "whether the error had
                   substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
                   verdict." Mciellan, 124 Nev. at 269-70, 182 P.3d at 111 (quotation marks
                   omitted). If the appellant suffered no prejudice as determined under this
                   test, then the conviction stands. Id. at 270, 182 P.3d at 111. Here, any
                   actual error would be deemed harmless in light of the brief and equivocal
                   nature of the alleged improper evidence and the overwhelming evidence of
                   Young's guilt.      Therefore, we conclude that Young fails to establish
                   reversible error.

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                   The district court did not plainly err in allowing officers to narrate during
                   testimony about the content of the surveillance footage
                               Young argues that the district court erred when it allowed
                   LVMPD officers to narrate the events and identify Young in surveillance
                   video played by the State because the officers did not have independent
                   knowledge of Young aside from their review of video during their respective
                   investigations. Young did not object at any time below, so we again review
                   for plain error. See Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48.
                                Both parties cite Burnside v. •State, 131 Nev. 371, 352 P.3d 627
                   (2015) to support their contentions about whether the officers' testimonies
                   were permissible narrations and identifications of Young..           Burnside
                   requires that a testifying officer "have some prior knowledge or familiaritY
                   with" the individual or the defendant they ident.ify in video surveillance. Id.
                   at 388, 352 P.3d at 639. However, when an officer's testimony describing
                   surveillance footage is founded upon the use of independent evidence to
                   confirm the identity of the person in the video, there is no invasion upon the
                   prbvince of the jury. See id.
                               The LVMPD officers who testified had sufficient prior
                   independent knowledge through their review of video and photographs from
                   their investigations, or from personal interaction with Young, to allow thern
                   to identify Young. Additionally, Officer Wheeler identified Young before
                   dny other LVMPD officer identified Young; therefore, the officers who
                   identified Young after Wheeler also relied upon Wheeler's identification.
                   Wheeler had sufficient prior knowledge of Young's appearance because
                   Wheeler observed Young in Walmart by a live surveillance camera' and
                   interacted with Young in person outside of Walmart before issuing him a
                   citation for petty theft. Therefore, Young fails to show plain error regarding
                   the officers' identification of Young.
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                                As to the issue of narrating during the State's presentation of
                   video evidence, we again conclude that Young fails to demonstrate plain
                   error.   See id. at 388-89, 352 P.3d at 640 (holding that narration of
                   surveillance video assisted jurors in understanding the evidence, given the
                   complexities of the surveillance cameras and the piecing together of videos
                   from hours of recordings).      The videos presented during trial were
                   comprised of footage from numerous days, times, and locations. The State
                   presented video surveillance from inside different stores, elevators, and
                   casinos. The surveillance also fluctuated in terms of quality and clarity.
                   Given the complexity and variations of the videos, the district court could
                   have reasonably concluded that the officers' narration was necessary to
                   assist jurors in understanding what was occurring. See id. at 388, 352 P.3d.
                   at 639 (noting that narration of surveillance videos is proper when it
                   "assist[s] the jury in making sense of the images depicted in the videos").
                   The narration was also highly relevant, given how Young and his
                   accomplice carried out their thefts. Young's thefts involved distraction,
                   which may not have been visible or apparent to jurors without the officers'
                   narration. Therefore, we conclude that Young has not shown error, plain or
                   otherwise.
                   The district court's admission of Detective Jacobitz's statement was not
                   reversible error
                                Young argues that Detective Jacobitz's statement that Young
                   and his partner were not registered guests of the hotel where they stole
                   Hatcher's wallet constituted inadmissible hearsay because Jacobitz learned
                   this information from an outside source, most likely a hotel employee. The
                   State argues it was nonhearsay offered to show the effect on Jacobitz and
                   his investigation rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
                   Although Young initially objected on hearsay grounds when Detective
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(0) 19,I7B
                       Jacobitz testified, "I later come to find that they're not registered to the
                       hotel," he failed to renew his objection or move to strike the testimony after
                       the district court allowed the State to lay a foundation for the information
                       elicited from Jacobitz's testimony.
                                   The admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
                       discretion. Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 267, 182 P.3d at 109. The rule precluding
                       the admission of hearsay does not apply to statements offered only to show
                       that the statement was made and that the listener was affected by the
                       statement. See NRS 51.035; Wallach v. State, 106 Nev. 470, 473, 796 P.2d
                       224, 227 (1990) (holding that a detective should have been allowed to testify
                       about a victim's statement "that the assailant 'tore off her clothes" to
                       explain why the detective examined the clothes).          On one hand, tbe

                       statement that Young was not a registered hotel guest could arguably have
                       been offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Young was in a hotel
                       elevator heading toward guest sleeping rooms. If he were not a guest, the
                       inference is significant in suggesting he may have been there for nefarious
                       purposes. However, Jacobitz's testimony also explained why he opined that
                       the surveillance footage from the elevator showed that Young was working
                       in conjunction with the other man in the elevator to steal Hatcher's wallet.
                       Where Young failed to renew his objection to the testimony after the district
                       court permitted the State to lay a foundation for it, we cannot determine in
                       the first instance whether it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
                       if it was nonhearsay or a hearsay exception may have applied. And we
                       cannot say the district court plainly erred in admitting it.
                                   But even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting
                       Jacobitz's statement, any error would have been harmless because it was a
                       minor piece of information related to the charged crime of theft of Hatcher's

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40)   194 714   ADS.
                                                             18
                   wallet. Further, the evidence against Young for this offense and as a whole
                   was overwhelming, where Young and his accomplice were in the elevator
                   with Hatcher and distracted. her, and her wallet was missing from her purse
                   after she exited. See Tabish v. State, 119 Nev. 293, 311, 72 P.3d 584, 595
                   (2003) ("Harmless error analysis applies to hearsay errors.").
                   The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young's motion for
                   a mistrial and in not excusing a juror for his display of sympathy to victims
                                During the third day of trial, a seated juror, no. 11, wrote a note
                   for the district court asking [w]ould you mind if I give each of the victims
                   $2.000 in an envelope after they are excused?" The .note was addressed
                   during a recess, outside of the presence of the jury, and juror no. 11 was
                   asked to stay inside the courtroom. Juror no. 11 was then canvassed by the
                   court and by Young. The court explained the importance of not forming
                   opinions until the end of the trial and the duty to remain fair and impartial.
                   Juror no. 11 assured the court that his note was only motivated by his desire
                   to help the elderly 'victims who lost money. He stated that his offer to donate
                   money had nothing to do with Young as a defendant and he would remain
                   fair and impartial and not form opinions until the end of the case. He
                   further explained that he helps victims all the time and he gave the note to
                   the court during trial and not at the conclusion of trial because he did not
                   think he would have an opportunity to contact the victims or obtain their
                   contact information after the trial concluded. Young moved for a mistrial
                   following juror no..11's exit from the courtrbom, which was denied, and the
                   district court did not remove juror no. 11 from the jury.
                               Young argues that the district court should have granted his
                   motion for a mistrial or at least excused juror no. 11 for bias after the juror
                   wrote the note to the court. Young further argues that the jurcr's donduiA
                   undermined his impartiality and constituted inferable bias, and that the
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                        district court's decision to allow the juror to remain on the jury panel
                        amounted to reversible error. We conclude that the district court did not
                        abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial and in not removing
                        juror no. 11. Juror no. 11's statement did not establish inferable bias, as
                        Young argues. Instead, the statement suggested actual bias, so the district
                        court undertook efforts to rehabi.litate juror no. 11 and found him to be
                        impartial, and Young does not directly challenge the district court's
                        rehabilitation efforts on appeal.
                                    The denial of a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of
                        discretion. Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 984, 36 P.3d 424, 433 (2001)
                        (citing Smith v. State, 110 Nev. 1094, 1102-03, 881 P.2d 649, 654 (1994)).
                        Likewise, the decision to retain or remove a juror is reviewed for abuse of
                        discretion. See Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 795-96, 121 P.3d 567, 578
                        (2005) (reviewing a for-cause challenge against a prospective juror for an
                        abuse of discretion); see also Nelson v. Commonwealth, 589 S.E.2d 23, 30-
                        31 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to
                        decisions regarding challenges for cause to both seated jurors and
                        venirepersons).
                                    Whether a juror is biased is determined by the district court
                        acting within its discretion. Sayedzada v. State, 134 Nev. 283, 291, 419 P.3d
                        184, 192 (Ct. App. 2018). Traditionally, juror bias was either actual or
                        implied. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936). Actual bias,
                        or bias in fact, is the existence of "a state of mind that prevents the juror
                        from being impartial." Sayedzada, 134 Nev. at 289, 419 P.3d at 191 (citing
                        United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1997)). A court. generally
                        finds actual bias based upon the juror's voir dire answers. Rosales-Lopez v.
                        United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion). For instance, if
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   I93711   , \115br,
                                                              20
                   a juror admits to partiality and cannot unequivocally say they would be
                   impartial, that juror should be removed for actual bias. See Preciado v.
                   State, •130 Nev. 40, 44, 318 P.3d 176, 179 (2014) ("Prospective juror # 304's
                   statement that a graphic photo would make her believe the defendant was
                   guilty (without proof that the defendant caused the [injury] depicted in the
                   photo) cast doubt on her impartiality" and required her removal for cause.).
                                By contrast,      implied bias,   or   presumed   bias,   is "bias

                   conclusively presumed as matter of law," generally due to the juror's prior
                   knowledge or relationship to the case or parties. Wood, 299 U.S. at 133. At
                   common law, implied bias could be found in situations where the juror was
                   "related to or [had] worked with a party, or [had] some interest in the
                   outcome of the case." Sayedzada, 134 Nev. at 290, 419 P.3d at 191-92.
                   Although the Nevada Legislature "codified elements of the common law's
                   implied bias in the civil context" within NRS 16.050,4 it has not explicitly
                   done so in the criminal context.       Id. at 290, 419 P.3d at 192; see NRS

                   175.021(1) ("Trial juries for criminal actions are formed in the same manner
                   as trial juries in civil actions.").

                         4 NRS 16.050(1) states that challenges for cause may be taken on one
                   or more of the following grounds, amongst others: a want of any of the
                   qualifications prescribed by statute to render a person competent as a juror;
                   consanguinity or affinity within the third degree; standing, being a member
                   of the family of either party or a partner, or united in business with either
                   party; having served as a juror or been a witness on a previous trial between
                   the same parties for the sarne cause of action or being then a witness
                   therein; interest on the part of the juror in the event of the action, or in the
                   main question involved in the action; having formed or expressed an
                   unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action, or the main
                   question involved therein; the existence of a state of mind in the juror
                   evincing enmity against or bias to either party.
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(0) I .4.171i
                                A third type of bias, inferable bias, is determined when a judge
                   exercises "discretion to infer bias from the facts elicited during voir dire
                   where those facts show an average person in the juror's situation would be
                   unable to decide the matter objectively."       Id. at 291, 419 P.3d at 192.
                   Importantly, inferable bias has only been found in limited circumstances,
                   namely where the juror has engaged in activities similar to those activities
                   at issue in the case being tried such that a reasonable person in the juror's
                   position could not compartmentalize their past experiences to objectively
                   judge the case. Id. This can occur, for example, when the juror was a victim
                   of the same type of crime charged against the defendant. See, e.g., id. at
                   292, 41.9 P.3d at 193 (stating that bias could be inferred where prospective
                   juror was the victim of the same type of crime charged and stated that these
                   experiences made her "angry" and that she "could be biased" against the
                   defendant); Torres, 128 F.3d at 48 (stating that bias could be inferred. where
                   prospective juror admittedly engaged in the structuring of cash deposits,
                   which was similar to the conduct for which the defendant was on trial).
                               If a juror's statements establish implied or inferable bias, it
                   does not matter whether that juror subsequently expresses impartiality;
                   that juror must be removed. Sayedzada, 134 Nev. at 291, 419 P.3d at 192
                   C[O]nce facts are elicited that permit a finding of inferable bias, then, just
                   as in the situation of implied bias, the juror's statements as to his or her
                   ability to be impartial become irrelevant." (quotation marks omitted)). By
                   contrast, if a juror's statements suggest actual bias, the juror c.an still serve
                   if the district court, after canvassing the juror, determines that they "will
                   be impartial despite the bias." Sanders Li. Sears-Page, 131 Nev. 500, 507,
                   354 P.3d 201. 206 (Ct. App. 2015); accord Sayedzada, 134 Nev. at 290, 419

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                                                          99
(LB I947B     •
                      P.3d at 191.. Therefore, our resolution of this issue turns on whether juror
                      no. 11's statements demonstrated inferable bias or actual bias.
                                  Contrary to Young's argument, juror no. 11's short one-sentence
                      question asking if he could make a cash donation to the victims after they
                      were excused did not establish inferable bias, which therefore could not be
                      rehabilitated. After the district court was notified of the juror's request, the
                      district court and the parties questioned the juror regarding that issue.
                      Juror no:11 expressed sympathy for the victims, explained that he had the
                      financial means to help them, and he had made similar philanthropic gifts
                      in the past. Juror no. 11 gave no indication that he had been a victim of
                      similar crimes or otherwise shared life experiences with the victims that
                      would have made it impossible or difficult for him to judge this case fairly.
                      The court's discussion and questioning with juror no. 11 demonstrated that
                      he did not have an implied or inferable bias.
                                  Nevertheless, while we conclude that juror no. 11's statement
                      did not establish an implied or inferable bias, his note and explanation to
                      the district court did suggest actual bias because it was an expression of
                      sympathy for the victims.       Numerous state and federal courts have
                      addressed the issue of juror sympathy under an actual bias standard. See
                      Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 398-99 (2010); Miller v. Webb, 385
                      F.3d 666, 673-75 (6th Cir. 2004); Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 796
                      (9th Cir. 1998); Williams u. State, 67 S.W.3d 548, 561 (Ark. 2002); People v.
                      Harris, 247 A.D.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Boone v. State, 60 S.W.3d
                      231 237 (Tex. App. 2001).
                                  When a juror expresses actual bias, that juror may remain on
                      the jury if they affirm that they can set aside the source of bias to judge the
                      case solely on the evidence. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) ("It is

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             ..far.
                                                            23
071 1947B
                   sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
                   verdict based on the evidence presented in court."). As this court explained
                   in Sanders, "k]f a juror's statements suggest actual bias, the trial court
                   must properly question the juror to determine if the juror will be impartial
                   despite the bias." 131 Nev. at 507, 354 P.3d at 206 (citing Thompson v.
                   Altheimer & Gray, 248 IF.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 2001)). A juror's statements
                   of impartiality are not talismanic and must be considered together with the
                   totality of the facts involved. Sayedzada, 134 Nev. at 289, 419 P.3d at 191
                   (citing Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 581, 119 P.3d 107, 125 (2005), overruled
                   on other grounds by Farrner v. State, 133 Nev. 693, 698, 405 P.3d 114, 120
                   (2017)). A juror is successfully rehabilitated when they can "state without
                   reservation that [the juror] had relinquished views previCously expressed
                   which were at odds with their duty as impartial jurors." Weber, 121 Nev. at
                   581, 119 P.3d at 125.
                                As long as the district court "sufficiently questions the juror and
                   determines the juror can set aside any bias and be impartial, we will
                   generally defer to the trial court's decision." Sanders, 131 Nev. at 508, 354
                   P.3d at 206. Again, the district court has "broad discretion" to determine
                   whether a juror's answers demonstrate actual bias, Sayedzada, 134 Nev. at
                   290, 419 P.3d at 191, and is in the best position to evaluate juror demeanor
                   and credibility, Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 n.14 (1984)
                   ("Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror
                   credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror. is
                   saying.").
                                Here, the district court questioned juror no. 11 outside the
                   presence of the rest of the jury after he gave the note to the court asking if
                   he could give money to the victims. In response, the district court stated
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                                                         24
                   that it had no control over the activities of jurors after the case was over
                   and it could not prohibit gifts to the alleged victims at that time.
                   Nevertheless, the court reminded juror no. 11 that the jury had been
                   admonished throughout the trial not to form or express any opinions until
                   the matter was finally submitted to it for a decision. The district court
                   stated it needed to ensure that juror no. 11 could remain fair and impartial
                   to both sides and that he must wait until the end of the trial to form a final
                   opinion after deliberating with all the jurors.
                               Juror no. 11 affirmed twice that he could remain fair and
                   impartial for the remainder of the trial. He explained that his desire to help
                   had nothing to do with the case or the defendant but came from being the
                   type of person that likes to regularly help others.        The district court
                   specifically asked him if he had discussed this issue with other jurors, and
                   juror no. 11 responded that he had only mentioned it to the marshal. Upon
                   questioning by defense counsel, juror no. 11 was steadfast that he would be
                   fair and impartial. The district court concluded that removing juror no. 11
                   was not required because he had not engaged in misconduct or provided any
                   gifts, and he stated that he would be fair and irupartial.5

                         5We recognize that the district court cited to Hernandez v. State, 118
                   Nev. 513, 50 P.3d 1100 (2002), in its efforts to address juror no. 1.1's
                   sympathy for the elderly victims. On appeal, the State also relies on
                   Hernandez, and Young did not address the issues related to juror no. 11 in
                   his reply brief. Despite the factual similarities between this case and
                   Hernandez, Hernandez is not controlling. In Hernandez, the Nevada
                   Supreme Court held that reversal was not required Where a motion fOr a
                   mistrial was denied when certain jurors purchased a gift for the murder
                   victim's daughter following the guilt phase of the trial but before the penalty
                   phase and kept the gift in the jury room during the penalty phase
                   deliberations. Id. at 521-22, 50 P.3d at 1106-07. The supreme court held
                   that the jurors' discussion about the gift was not misconduct, but even if it
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                                                         25
                                We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
                   when it found that juror no. 11 would be fair and impartial and had not
                   discussed the idea of a gift with other jurors. See United States v. Tsarnaev,
                   595 U.S.     „       142 S. Ct. 1024, 1036 (2022) (holding that a federal court
                   of appeals cannot extend its supervisory powers to overturn a federal
                   district court's broad discretion to manage jury selection and to decide what
                   questions to ask prospective jurors absent an abuse of discretion by the
                   district court).
                                While the facts of this case support an argument that juror no.
                   11 exhibited actual bias, and many judges would have excused the juror and
                   replaced him with an alternate juror, Young failed to raise an argument
                   under an actual bias theory to this court. Young also did not challenge the
                   sufficiency of the district court's canvass of the juror, and any argument
                   that he was not rehabilitated is waived. See Belcher v. State, No. 82255,
                   2022 WL 1261300, at *3 (Nev. Apr. 27, 2022) (Order of Affirmance)
                   (concluding that an objection not reraised on appeal is waived); see also
                   Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668,
                   672 n.3 (2011) (holding that arguments not raised in appellant's opening
                   brief are waived).

                   was, it was hot prejudicial because the conduct "merely dernonstrate[d] that
                   the jury was sympathetic to an innocent child, who was a collateral victim
                   of the murder." Id. at 522, 50 P.3d at 1107. Hernandez dealt solely with
                   the issue of juror misconduct and possible prejudice resulting therefrom,
                   which is subject to abuse of discretion and harmless error review, see id., as
                   opposed to the failure to remove a biased juror, which (if proven) is
                   reversible error. See Sanders, 131 Nev. at 511, 354 P.3d at 208 ("Under
                   Nevada law, when a failure to remove a biased juror results in an unfair
                   empaneled jury, the error is reversible.").
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                                                          26
(01 1947B
                               In any event, the jurors were properly instructed that "[a]
                   verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion"
                   and jurors are presumed to follow district court orders and instructions.
                   Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1333, 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006).
                   Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
                   denying Young's motion for a mistrial and in not removing the juror.
                   The district court did not err by not immediately stopping Young from
                   arguing and challenging the juror's conduct in the presence of that juror
                               Young argues that the district court failed to ensure that juror
                   no. 11 was not present when Young challenged his partiality. He argues
                   the district court should have excused the juror before the argument
                   commenced because his presence during the argument put Young in an
                   antagonistic position with the juror for the remainder of the trial. The State
                   argues that Young did not raise this issue below and it is waived.
                               We conclude that Young invited any possible error that may
                   have occurred because defense counsel caused the issue he now raises on
                   appeal. Specifically, Young began arguing and challenging the juror's
                   impartiality while the juror was present, and the district court attempted
                   to direct his argument toward the court. The court stepped in to stop
                   defense counsel from further arguing. We decline to consider Young's
                   argument given his counsel's role in the alleged error. Cf. Belcher v. State,
                   136 Nev. 261., 275, 464 P.3d 1013, 1028 (2020) (concluding that a party
                   cannot challenge on appeal as error testirnony which that same party
                   invited, induced, or provoked).
                               However, even if we consider the argument, because Young did
                   not raise the issue below, it was waived, and we can only review for plain
                   error. See Jerernias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48. Under plain error
                   review, we conclude that Young fails to offer any cogent argument or
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(01 1947H
                                                        27
                   authority that a substantial right was affected. See Maresca v. State, 103
                   Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (explaining that this court need not
                   consider an appellant's argument that is not cogently argued or lacks the
                   support of relevant authority). Therefore, Young has not demonstrated
                   plain error.
                   The district court misstated the law in jury instruction number     other
                   challenged jury instructions were accurate statements of the law
                                Young argues that five jury instructions were misstated and
                   that this court should reverse counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, and 10 under a plain error
                   review. The State concedes, and we agree, that jury instruction number 10
                   misstated Nevada law regarding when property is deemed taken "from the
                   person" for purposes of a conviction for larceny from the person, and the
                   conviction for count 2 should be reversed.
                                  A district court holds broad discretion in settling jury
                   instructions. Jackson. v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).
                   A district court's decision to proffer a particular instruction to the jury is
                   reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id. "An abuse of discretion
                   occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds
                   the bounds of law or reason." Id. Additionally, when a party fails to object
                   to or request a jury instruction, appellate review is precluded "unless the
                   error is patently prejudicial," thus requiring "the court to act sua sponte to
                   protect the defendant's right to a fair trial." McKenna, 114 Nev. at 1052,
                   968 P.2d at 745; Green, 119 Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at 95; see also Flanagan v.
                   State, 1.1.2 Nev. 1409, 1423, 930 P.2d 691, 700 (1996).
                                  The erroneous larceny-from-the-person instruction given as
                   instruction 10 allowed the jury to convict even if the property taken was not
                   physically connected to the victim in some way. It stated, "Property is
                   deemed taken 'from the person' of the victith if the property was within the
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   19•17ft
                                                          28
                         victim's reach, inspection, observation, disposition or control." Such an
                         instruction is clearly wrong. Further, the evidence regarding count 2 did
                         not show that Campo's wallet was taken from her person, and Campo's
                         testimony failed to establish exactly where her purse was located before her
                         wallet was taken from it, but the purse was not on her person. Therefore,
                         we reverse Young's conviction for larceny from the person related to the
                         theft of Campo's wallet (count 2) because of the improper instruction and
                         because the evidence does not show that Carnpo exerted control over her
                         purse when Young took her wallet.
                                     However,    as   to   the    remaining    larceny-from-the-person
                         convictions, the evidence established that Young took property from the
                         person of the victims when he stole their wallets from either a purse held
                         on the victims' person or worn as a backpack. Therefore, we see no basis to
                         reverse the remaining larceny-from-the-person convictions because of the
                         erroneous instruction. To avoid instruction error going forward, district
                         courts should consider the recently adopted Nevada Pattern Jury
                         instructions: Criminal in settling jury instructions. As pertinent here, the
                         pattern jury instruction for larceny from the person includes the following
                         language:

                                         The crime of LARCENY FROM THE
                                     PERSON consists of the following elements:
                                           (1) The Defendant takes the property;
                                           (2) From the person of another;
                                           (3) Without the person's consent;
                                          (4) With the intent to steal or appropriate the
                                     property to his or her own use.

                                     The crime of larceny from the person does not
                                     require violence, force, or fear, but does require an
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                                                                 29
                               actual taking from the person of another. The
                               crime is not committed if the property is taken only
                               from a person's immediate presence, or from a
                               person's constructive control or possession.
                               Property is taken "from the person of another" if it,
                               at the time of the taking, is in some way actually
                               upon or attached to the person, or carried or held in
                               actual physical possession, such as clothing,
                               apparel, or property held or carried in the hands, or
                               by other means, upon the person, or things
                               contained therein, or attached thereto.

                   Nevada Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal § 15.06 (State Bar of Nevada
                   2023).
                             Still, Young's conduct not only resulted in the larceny of the
                   other victims' property, but he also invaded their privacy, which is the
                    gravamen of the offense" of larceny from the person. See Terral v. State,
                   84 Nev. 412, 414, 442 P.2d 465, 466 (1968) (holding that the essence of the
                   crime of larceny from the person "is that the person of another has been
                   violated and" the person's privacy directly invaded); see also Ibarra v. State,
                   134 Nev. 582, 589, 426 P.3d 16, 22 (2018) (concluding the "objective" of NRS
                   205.270 is "discouraging theft that carries an unacceptable risk of violating
                   the victim's . . privacy").    We analyze the remaining larceny-related
                   convictions next.
                         Instruction number 10 (larceny frorn the person)
                               Young contends that the larceny-from-the-person convictions
                   related to the thefts of Hatcher's and Frank's wallets; and the associated
                   burglary convictions, should be reversed based on the misstatement of law
                   in jury instruction number 10. Young contends that Hatcher and Frank
                   testified that their wallets were stolen out of their purses, which were on or
                   close to their bodies, and that but for the error in the instruction, jurors may
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IC» WOK    cOSPo
                                                         30
                   have concluded that the theft of their wallets was too far removed to
                   constitute larceny from the person. According to Young, if jurors did not
                   find sufficient proof to convict Young for the larceny-from -the-person
                   charges, then they may not have found proof for the associated burglary
                   convictions. We disagree.
                               The larceny-from-the-person convictions related to the wallet
                   thefts of Hatcher and Frank are valid because Young took those wallets
                   from the person of the victims. Though Young contends that taking a wallet
                   from the purse of a victim is too attenuated to constitute a taking "from the
                   person," the Nevada Supreme Court has held that similar type of conduct
                   is the type of conduct NRS 205.270 seeks to punish. See Terral, 84 Nev. at
                   414, 442 P.2d at 466 (holding that lilt is important to restrict the coverage
                   of NRS 205.270 to pickpockets, purse snatchers . . and the like"). These
                   notions were again articulated in the supreme court's decision in Ibarra.
                   Ibarra labeled Terral "Wile seminal Nevada cdse interpreting the"
                   requirement that larceny from the person requires the taking of property
                   from the person of another. 134 Nev. at 588, ,426 P.3d at 21. The supreme
                   court underscored that "pickpockets, purse snatchers... and the like
                   resemble one another" because they all "take property from the person of
                   their victim." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Stealing wal.lets from victims
                   like Hatcher and Frank, who were carrying their purses, invaded their
                   privacy and undoubtedly falls within the conduct prohibited by NRS
                   205.270. Thus, we affirm the larceny-from-the-person convictions related
                   to the Hatcher and Frank wallet thefts.6

                         6As noted, the correct jury instruction under the Nevada Pattern Jury
                   Instructions: Criminal is section 15.06, defining larceny from the person.
                   Further, under NRS 175.161(3), "[e]ither party may present to the court any
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                               We also decline to reverse the associated burglary charges, as
                   Young fails to demonstrate plain error or present proof that the instruction
                   was patently prejudicial.     A burglary offense is complete when the
                   perpetrator unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling or other building
                   with the specific intent required by the statute. See Funderburk v. State,
                   125 Nev. 260, 263, 212 P.3d 337, 339 (2009); Carr v. Sheriff, 95 Nev. 688,
                   689-90, 601 P.2d 422, 423 (1979); see also NRS 205.060(1) (providing that
                   burglary requires that a person unlawfully enter or remain in a business
                   'with the intent to commit grand or petit larceny . . . or any felony"). Given
                   the testimony from multiple LVMPD officers and employeeS that Young
                   entered the businesses and later attempted to fraudulently use the victims'
                   cards, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt Young unlawfully entered
                   and/or remained in those businesses with the requisite intent. Young's
                   specific intent is further evident from the officers' testimony that Young did
                   not purchase any items or gamble at the casinos when he entered the
                   Walmarts, other stores, and various hotels and casinos to steal wallets, nor
                   did he otherwise behave like a consumer or a patron. Thus. we conclude
                   that the associated burglary convictions are not impacted by the erroneous
                   jury instruction, and we decline to reverse those convictions.
                         Instruction numbers 13 and .14 (lesser offenses)
                               Young argues that the district court's instructions guiding the
                   jury to consider lesser-included offenses improperly relieved the State of its
                   burden of proof in violation of Young's due process rights. The district court

                   written charge, and request that it be given. If the court believes that the
                   charge is pertinent and an accurate statement of the law, whether or not the
                   charge has been adopted a a model jury instruction, it must be given."
                   (Emphasis added.)
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                       recited transition instructions for grand larceny and petit larceny (number
                       13) and fbr larceny from the person and larceny (number 14).7 Young argues
                       that the language used suggested that all 12 jurors must reject the greater
                       offenses before they could consider the lesser offense. We again disagree
                       and conclude that both transition instructions comport with due process
                       and that Young has not shown plain error. See Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 50.
                       412 P.3d at 48.
                                   We note first that Young • offered or requested these
                       instructions. Therefore, any possible error was invited by him and need not
                       be considered. Cf. Jones u. State, 95 Nev. 613, 618, 600 P.2d 247, 250 (1.979)
                       (holding that the appellant was estopped from raising any objection on
                       appeal regarding the admission of incriminating information because his
                       attorney elicited the details of the incriminating information during cross-
                       examination); see also Belcher, 136 Nev. at 275, 464 P.3d at 1028
                       (concluding that a party cannot challenge on appeal as error testimony
                       which that same party invited, induced. or provoked).

                             7 Instruction number 13 stated the following:

                                   You shall find the defendant guilty of Petit Larceny
                                   if:
                                   1. Some of you are not convinced beyond a
                                   reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
                                   Grand Larceny and
                                   2. All twelve of you are convinced beyond a
                                   reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the
                                   crime of Petit Larceny.
                             The larceny-from-the-person and larceny transition instruction used
                       substantially similar language.
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                               Regardless, the instruction on the lesser offenses did not

                   constitute plain error because the language did not require all jurors to
                   agree that Young was not guilty of grand larceny as a condition precedent
                   to finding him guilty of petit larceny. Additionally, given the overwhelming
                   evidence of theft establishing Young's guilt, there was no actual prejudice
                   resulting from the district court's instruction on the lesser-included
                   offenses.
                               Finally, Young mischaracterizes the instruction given by the
                   district court. based on the Nevada Suprerne Court's holding in Green, 119
                   Nev. 542, 80 P.3d 93. The instruction given by the diStrict court followed
                   the "unable to agree" approach explained in Green, and the instruction. does
                   riot expressly require unanimous agreement on acquittal by the jury. See
                   id. at 545-46, 80 P.3d at 95. The supreme court adopted the "unable to
                   agree" instruction approach as the "correct transition         instruction";

                   therefore, the instruction comports with Green. Šee id. at 547-48, 80 P.3d
                   at 96-97. The transition instructions thus align with the supreme court's
                   adopted approach because the instruction.s required that one or more jurors
                   find Young not guilty of grand larceny and that all jurors agree that Young
                   was guilty of petit larceny. We note also that count 3 charged grand larceny
                   by stealing $1400 from Mary Campo, and Young does not argue that the
                   amount stolen was less than $650 making the offense petit 'larceny)? Thus,
                   we conclude that Young has not demonstrated plain error with regard to

                         8By failing to challenge the grand larceny charge as to the amount
                   stolen from Campo that is the basis for count 3, Young's argument regarding
                   the transition instruction is meritless considering that Young Would have
                   been guilty of grand larceny, as opposed to petit larceny, regardless of any
                   alleged instruction error.
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c(), I947B
                   the transition instructi.ons, and we decline to reverse Young's convictions
                   related to these instructions."
                   The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Young's convictions
                               Young argues that the State failed to present sufficient
                   evidence to sustain his convictions because neither the victims nor the store
                   employees who testified identified him as one of the men in the wallet thefts.
                   Young MS() argues that the            burglaries occurred    in   commercial
                   establishments where an individual could "have a multitude of intentions
                   upon entry.'
                                  A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence asks "whether,
                   after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
                   any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
                   crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 202, 163
                   P.3d 408, 414 (2007) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). A jury's
                   verdict will remain undisturbed when it is supported by substantial
                   evidence. Cunningham, v. State, 94 Nev. 128, 130, 575 P.2d 936, 937 (1978).

                          "Young also challenges jury instruction numbers 22 and 23, which
                   instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and on determining
                   Young's guilt or innocence only on the evidence from the case. We decline
                   to reverse any convictions based on Young's challenges to these instructions
                   under plain error review because the Nevada Supreme Court has previously
                   deerned identical instructions appropriate. See Blake, 121 Nev. at 799, 121
                   P.3d at 580 (holding that use of the Word "until" in instructing the jury that
                   "[t]he Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved" did not
                   suggest that appellant's guilt would eventually be proven because the
                   instruction, read as a whole, also "plainly contemplated that guilt might not
                   be proven"); Guy v. State, 108 Nev. 770, 778, 839 P.2d 578, 583 (1992)
                   (holding that use of "guilt or innocence" language was "appropriate and
                   necessary" because it instructs the jury to ignore the culpability of other
                   suspects or partners in the criminal acts when deciding whether the
                   appellant is guilty as charged).
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                   It is the function and responsibility of the jury, not the court, to evaluate
                   "the weight of the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses."
                   Rose, 123 Nev. at 202-03, 163 P.3d at 41.4 (quotation marks omitted). In
                   considering the totality of the State's evidence in the light most favorable to
                   the prosecution—video evidence depicting Young engaging in many wallet
                   thefts and the testimony of several INMPD officers who identified Young
                   based on several factors depicted across all theft incidents, including his
                   clothing, shoes, and jacket around his arm—the evidence supports the jury s
                   verdict that Young committed the theft-related offenses. The same applies
                   to the evidence establishing the burglary offenses.
                               This overwhelming evidence supports the jury's verdict, and we
                   uphold Young's convictions. Officers testified that the videos showed Young
                   entering the businesses working in tandem with an accomplice to steal
                   wallets. One of the men would function as a distractor, neither of the two
                   entered the businesses as customers, the two would immediately leave after
                   taking the wallets, and Young, who walked with an unusual gait, would
                   enter nearby stores after taking the wallets to fraudulently use the stolen
                   cards. Therefore, we conclude that a rational juror could find the evidence
                   sufficient to support Young's convictions.
                   Whether Young received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing
                               Young argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
                   at his sentencing because his counsel failed to raise any argument regarding
                   the sufficiency of Young's prior convictions and did not offer any argument
                   that could have mitigated Young's sentence. We decline to address this
                   issue on the merits, as Young has not satisfied any exceptions that would

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                   allow him to raise this issue on direct appeal.'" See Archanian u. State, 122
                   Nev. 1019, 1036, 145 P,3d 1008, 1020-21 (2006).11
                                                     CONCLUSION
                               Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the district
                   court did not err in allowing juror no. 11 to remain on the jury panel when
                   the juror's statement suggested actual bias because the district court
                   undertook efforts to rehabilitate the juror and found him to be impartial,
                   and Young does not challenge the district coUrt's rehabilitation efforts o.n
                   appeal.

                         1°Young    raises two arguments related to the district court's
                   adjudication and sentencing of him as a habitual criminal. First, Young
                   argues that the district court should have held a separate hearing before
                   sentencing him as a habitual criminal, as required under NRS 207.016.
                   Second, Young argues he was entitled to a separate jury trial regarding the
                   State's habitual criminal allegations. However, in 2007, in a separate
                   criminal appeal concerning a conviction for larceny from the person and
                   sentencing under the habitual criminal statute, Young raised similar
                   arguments regarding the application of the habitual criminal statute, and
                   the Nevada Suprerne Court issued an order affirming Young's conviction
                   and sentence. See Young u. State, Docket No. 47936 (Order of Affirmance,
                   June 27, 2007) (unpublished disposition). Further, we conclude that Young
                   forfeited these claims, as he failed to raise them below, see Jeremias, 134
                   Nev. at. 52, 412 P.3d at 49, and even if we considered each argument, Young
                   fails to demonstrate plain error by the district court as to either issue. See
                   id. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48.

                          ilYoung additionally argues that cumulative error warrants reversal
                   of the jury's convictions. However, we conclude that the district court did
                   not commit any error other than the error in giving jury instruction nUrnber
                   10. In light of the existence of only one true error by the district court, we
                   decline to reverse based on this argument. See Belcher, 136 Nsv. at 279,
                   464 P.3d at 1031 (concluding that cumulative error requires multiple
                   errors).
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                                    However, we conclude that the district court gave an incorrect
                      jury instruction as to the larceny-from-the-person charges and Young's
                      conviction under count 2 must be reversed. We offer the correct wording for
                      an instruction for larceny from the person based upon the Nevada Pattern
                      Jury Instructions: Criminal. Nevertheless, the jury instruction error did
                      not undermine the guilty verdicts for the other similar charges. Further,
                      we find no reversible error as to any of Young's other convictions or his
                      sentence based upon his arguments. Thus, we affirm the judgment of
                      conviction as to all counts except count 2 and reverse and remand for the
                      district court to strike count 2 from the judgment and enter an amended
                      judgment.

                                                                                         C.J.
                                                           Gibbons

                      We concur:

                          d
                      Bulla
                             eralao"•--aaax",

                                                      J.

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                                                            38