Court Opinion

ID: 9610803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:47:36.80667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:04.812003
License: Public Domain

Andersen, C.J.
(dissenting) — I would affirm the defendant's conviction of statutory rape in the second degree. I disagree with the holding of the majority that the defendant, who had previously been convicted of the crime of possession of stolen property in the third degree, had not been convicted of a crime which "involved dishonesty".4 To steal is "dishonest". To possess stolen property knowing it was stolen is "dishonest". Evidence of the prior convictions of the defendant and his witness was, therefore, admissible to impeach them and the trial court did not err by so ruling.
The impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime rule adopted by the Supreme Court of this state which pertains to convictions of crimes other than felonies is clear and unambiguous. It reads as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime ... (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(Italics mine.) ER 609(a)(2).
Court rules are to be read the same as statutes, in that the words therein are to be given their ordinary meaning.5 Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no *167room for judicial interpretation,6 and the meaning must be derived from the rule itself.7 When a rule or statute is not ambiguous, there is no need to examine legislative history to construe it.8
Applying the foregoing principles to ER 609(a)(2), set out above, it is apparent that: the rule is clear, unambiguous and leaves no room for judicial interpretation; the meaning of the rule should be derived from the rule itself; and there is no need for examining the legislative history of the federal counterpart of our rule. By any view of the statutory definition of the crime of possession of stolen property in the third degree (footnote 4), the crime "involved dishonesty", therefore, evidence of the conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes under ER 609(a)(2).
Beginning with the language of the rule itself, the word "dishonesty" means "deceiving, stealing, etc." Webster's New World Dictionary (College ed. 1968). Moreover, as Chief Justice Burger wrote for the court when he served on the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, "[i]n common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, . . . are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a man's honesty and integrity." (Footnote omitted.) Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 20 L. Ed. 2d 287, 88 S. Ct. 1421 (1968). Accord, United States v. Ackridge, 370 F. Supp. 214, 218 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974). Here, the defendant's recent conviction of possession of stolen property in the third degree was probative of his credibility as a witness, and the jury was entitled to evaluate his trial testimony in light of his past disregard for the law. The trial court did not err in so ruling.
The legislative history of the equivalent federal rule, to *168which the majority refers, has been aptly referred to as a "tortured path".9 It is unnecessary to resort to that legislative history in order to inject an esoteric concept such as "crimen falsi" into a hitherto unambiguous rule, and to do so will only lead to uncertainty and confusion. Elsewhere in the legislative history of the federal rule, for example, it is pointed out that the term "crimen falsi" has definitions other than that quoted by the majority from the legislative history.10
Since the concept of "crimen falsi" has, however, been read into this state's ER 609(a)(2) by the majority, it should be noted that many other decisions dealing with that concept have reached conclusions precisely to the contrary of that which the majority reaches herein.
People v. Spates, 77 Ill. 2d 193, 32 Ill. Dec. 333, 395 N.E.2d 563 (1979) is one such example. As pointed out in Spates by the Supreme Court of Illinois, that state has adopted proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609, which in its pertinent parts is substantially the same as our rule.11 In Spates, 77 *169Ill. 2d at 201, 395 N.E.2d at 567, the court stated the issue thusly: " [t]he issue here thus becomes whether the crime of misdemeanor theft is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, so that a conviction for that offense is admissible for the purpose of impeaching a witness." The Illinois Supreme Court then went on to point out that, as in the present case, " [t]he defendant argues that only a conviction which falls into that class of crime characterized at common law as crimen falsi should be admitted to impeach a witness. "
In dealing with this issue, the Spates court stated in pertinent part:
Additionally, a close look at the crimen falsi offenses reveals that most of the offenses covered by that term— perjury, subornation of perjury, bribery of a juror, communicating with jurors and witnesses — are felonies. Evidence of conviction of those crimes is admissible under proposed Rule 609(a)(1), independent of the requirement of dishonesty or false statement.
People v. Spates, 77 Ill. 2d at 202, 395 N.E.2d at 568. Further, it disposes of arguments, which the majority opinion in the case before us accepts, as follows:
Therefore, were we to limit the types of misdemeanor convictions which are admissible to impeach to the crimen falsi offenses and crimes of deception, as argued by the defendant, we would restrict the rule to the point where its use would be extremely rare. This we refuse to do. We therefore hold that theft is a crime falling within proposed Rule 609(a)(2), involving dishonesty or false statement.
Support for our holding is obtained by reference to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 650 (1971) where "dishonest" is defined as a "breach of honesty or trust, as lying, deceiving, cheating, stealing, or defrauding * * *." (Emphasis added.) Assuming that the drafters of the Federal rules of evidence intended the natural meaning of their words, we can perceive no reason why proposed Rule 609(a)(2) should not encompass both theft, as an act of dishonesty, as well as perjury, as an act *170of false statement. This interpretation is especially justified since the rule is written using the disjunctive conjunction "or," designating that either of two alternatives would fall within the rule. Since crimes involving affirmative misstatements are presumably included by the phrase "false statement," crimes involving conduct that is dishonest, of which theft is surely one, are included by the term "crimes involving dishonesty."
People v. Spates, 77 Ill. 2d at 202-03, 395 N.E.2d at 568.
The court in Spates concluded its discussion of the issue as follows:
The more sensible approach is that a conviction for theft, of whatever type, will be admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness. This interpretation of proposed Rule 609(a)(2) has been more often accepted by our appellate court, and we think it the better approach.
People v. Spates, 77 Ill. 2d at 203-04, 395 N.E.2d at 568. I agree.
In State v. Melendrez, 91 N.M. 259, 572 P.2d 1267 (Ct. App. 1977), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico construed that state's evidence rule 609(a)(2) which reads like this state's ER 609(a)(2). After analyzing "crimen falsi", that court succinctly concluded:
Shoplifting involves cheating or stealing, that is, dishonest conduct, and such conduct reflects adversely on the veracity of the shoplifter. The question concerning the shoplifting conviction was a proper question.
State v. Melendrez, 91 N.M. at 261, 572 P.2d at 1269.
The State of Alaska has also dealt with this precise issue in several decisions. In Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1978), the defendant asserted (as the defendant in effect does here) that larceny is not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement within the terms of Alaska Criminal Rule 26(f). The Supreme Court of Alaska quoted the same committee report that the majority relies on here, but came to a different conclusion. It held:
Appellant points out that the conference report on the analogous Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
*171"By the phrase [dishonesty and false statement] the committee means crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretenses, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of untruthfulness, deceit or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully." Moore, Federal Practice, Rules Pamphlet, Part 2, p. 626 (2d ed. 1975).
Larceny is not expressly included within this list. However, we agree with those courts and commentators who have held that larceny and embezzlement, among others, disclose the kind of dishonesty and unreliability which bear upon the veracity of persons perpetrating those crimes. As to this question we find no error.
(Footnote omitted.) Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d at 1284.
The viability of Lowell was affirmed in Richardson v. State, 579 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Alaska 1978), which approved impeachment on the basis of a prior conviction for petty larceny, and more recently in Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 475-76 (Alaska 1980).
Another illustrative recent opinion on the issue is that of the Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. White, 86 Ill. App. 3d 19, 23-24, 41 Ill. Dec. 74, 407 N.E.2d 572, 577 (1980). That court summarized as follows:
We recognize that a conviction for theft, of whatever type, is admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness. (People v. Spates (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 193, 395 N.E.2d 563). The crime of buying and receiving stolen property falls within the broad boundaries of the crime of theft. Moreover, it has been held that a defendant's prior misdemeanor conviction for receiving stolen property is admissible because the nature of the offense involves dishonesty. (People v. Barnett (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 174, 340 N.E.2d 116.) Consequently, it cannot be said that defendant's prior conviction was not probative as to aiding the jury in evaluating defendant's truthfulness.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion in limine to bar the admission of this evidence at trial.
The foregoing are selected cases holding to the contrary of the majority opinion. Other jurisdictions holding to this *172same effect include: Indiana, Iowa, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.12
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial court not only did not err in its ruling on the impeachment issue but, to the contrary, followed the clear unambiguous language of a duly adopted court rule of this state, ER 609(a)(2), as it was obligated to do. Even if it were for some reason considered necessary to explore the vagaries of the "crimen falsi" concept, I would still affirm based on the rationale of the Illinois, New Mexico and Alaska courts quoted above, and of the many other courts which also hold as they do. To rule as the majority does is, in the words of People v. Spates, 77 Ill. 2d at 202, 395 N.E.2d at 568, to "restrict the rule to the point where its use would be extremely rare." If ER 609(a)(2) is not a good rule of court, it should be changed or repealed; it should not be construed out of existence.
Neither am I persuaded that the trial court committed reversible error in any of the other respects claimed by the defendant, therefore, I would affirm his conviction.
Reconsideration denied July 20, 1982.
Review denied by Supreme Court October 22, 1982.

'Possessing stolen property' means knowingly to receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto." RCW 9A.56.140(1).
"A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the third degree if he possesses stolen property which does not exceed two hundred fifty dollars in value." RCW 9A.56.170U).

 State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett District Justice Court, 90 Wn.2d 794, 797, 585 P.2d 1177 (1978).

 Roza Irrig. Dist. v. State, 80 Wn.2d 633, 635, 497 P.2d 166 (1972).

 In re Lehman, 93 Wn.2d 25, 27, 604 P.2d 948 (1980).

 State v. Atkinson, 19 Wn. App. 107, 118, 575 P.2d 240 (1978).

 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence 609-11 (1981).

 In the commentaries to the first draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advisory Committee on the rules of evidence observed: "Unless one practices in a jurisdiction which has statutorily defined crimen falsi, the common law definition of 'any crime which may injuriously affect the administration of justice, by the introduction of falsehood and fraud' is applicable. This definition has been held to include forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery, conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness or to accuse of crime, obtaining money under false pretenses, stealing, moral turpitude, shoplifting, intoxication, petit larceny, jury tampering, embezzlement and filing a false estate tax return. In other jurisdictions, some of these same offenses have been found not to fit the crimen falsi definition." See 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence 609-16 (1981).

 The proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609 adopted in Illinois was as follows:
"(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contend-ere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." People v. *169Spates, 77 Ill. 2d 193, 32 Ill. Dec. 333, 395 N.E.2d 563, 567 (1979).

 See, e.g., Geisleman v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ind. 1980); State v. Webb, 309 N.W.2d 404, 413 (Iowa 1981); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435, 443 (1981); State v. Thomas, 220 Kan. 104, 551 P.2d 873, 876 (1976); State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1323-24 (Me. 1981); Commonwealth v. Woods, 275 Pa. Super. 392, 418 A.2d 1346, 1351 (1980); State v. Holtcamp, 614 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).