Court Opinion

ID: 9691376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:27:57.469432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:17.537998
License: Public Domain

*18MILLER, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority holding that the trial court erred in giving the unavoidable accident instruction.
I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s holding that the trial court should have either directed a verdict or granted a judgment n.o.v. to plaintiffs. In my view, the evidence was totally insufficient to establish that defendants were negligent as a matter of law, and therefore a jury issue exists.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants’ negligence flowed from their failure to “properly set the brakes” and “to maintain the brakes” on the truck. There are four relevant statutory safety standards involved in plaintiff’s claim: SDCL 32-30-5, 32-18-13, -15, and -26. (The majority does not refer to SDCL 32-30-5, but the jury instruction given and the record made at the instruction settlement proceedings clearly indicates that it was a significant factor.) Generally summarized, those statutes set the following standards:
SDCL 32-30-5 provides that no driver of an unattended vehicle shall “... permit it to stand unattended without effectively setting the brake thereon....” (Emphasis added.)
SDCL 32-18-13 requires that vehicles "... shall be equipped with parking brakes adequate to hold the vehicle on any grade on which it is operated....” (Emphasis added.)
SDCL 32-18-15 requires that “[t]he parking brakes shall be so designed that when once applied they shall remain applied with the required effectiveness despite exhaustion of any source of energy or leakage of any kind.” (Emphasis added.)
SDCL 32-18-26 requires that “[a]ll brakes shall be maintained in good working order and shall be so adjusted as to operate as equally as practicable with respect to the wheels on the opposite side of the vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)
By its Instruction No. 14, the trial court advised the jury as follows:
There are statutes in the State of South Dakota that provide:
‘No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without effectively setting the brake thereon. All brakes shall be maintained in good working order.’1
By Instruction No. 15, the jury was advised that if they found a violation of the safety statutes (Instruction No. 14) it amounted to negligence as a matter of law and if such violation was found by them to be the proximate cause of the accident, they should find defendants negligent.
My principal problem with the majority opinion is that it assumes and holds that there was a clear violation of the safety statutes. It overlooks the legitimate evi-dentiary dispute, which then raises a jury issue. Arguably, at issue, was: whether the driver set the brakes on the vehicle (SDCL 32-30-5); whether the vehicle was equipped with effective brakes (SDCL 32-18-13); whether the effectiveness of the design of the brakes was adequate (SDCL 32-18-15); and whether the brakes were properly maintained and adjusted (SDCL 32-18-26).2
I suggest that several of the cases heavily relied upon by the majority are not applicable or dispositive here. Martino v. Park Jefferson Racing Ass’n, 315 N.W.2d 309 (S.D.1982), upheld a denial of a directed verdict and approved a jury instruction; Leslie v. City of Bonesteel, 303 N.W.2d 117 (S.D.1981), was an appeal from a trial to the court, sitting without a jury; Engel v. Stock, 88 S.D. 579, 225 N.W.2d 872 (1975), involved facts establishing a clear, undis*19puted violation of statutes; Grob v. Hahn, 80 S.D. 271, 122 N.W.2d 460 (1963); Albers v. Ottenbacker, 79 S.D. 637, 116 N.W.2d 529 (1962). Lovell v. Oahe Elec. Co-op., 382 N.W.2d 396 (S.D.1986), involved a violation of a safety standard in an ultrahazardous activity (transmission of high voltage electricity).
In Lovell, supra, this court distinguished between “evidence of negligence” and “negligence per se” indicating that the distinction
is very marked in that with the former there must be an adjudication as to whether or not the statute violation constitutes negligence whereas in the latter, negligence necessarily follows proof of the violation.
382 N.W.2d at 398.
In my opinion, we are dealing here with “evidence of negligence.” In support of my legal position, I specifically adopt the relevant portions of Justice Henderson’s dissent in Lovell, wherein he stated:
This majority assumes too much from its appellate perch; it assumes that the [plaintiffs] were per se negligent....
382 N.W.2d at 404.
If there is such evidence as to allow reasonable minds to differ, the case must be submitted to the jury.
382 N.W.2d 405.
Thus, there are over 50 years of compelling precedent that this reviewing Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party on a motion for directed verdict and to give said nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. These cases, now cited in this dissent, vividly portray the grave mistake of this Court in its function on a standard of review of evidence in a civil action. When this Court is faced with whether or not there is substantial evidence to sustain the cause of action, we are to take the same approach as the trial court in its determination. We, as well as the trial court, are simply not free to weigh the evidence or gauge the credibility of the witnesses. We have no right to look upon the courtroom from our offices at the state capítol and determine who was telling the truth and who was not and which witness was the better qualified to observe and which expert witness had the best opinion. These are all matters for the jury.
382 N.W.2d at 406.
This decision strikes at the heart of the right to a trial by jury, guaranteed to us by our forefathers.

Id.

The defendants in this case, just like plaintiffs in Lovell, are entitled to the trial by jury “guaranteed to us by our forefathers.” Reasonable minds could differ as to whether the statutes were violated. From my appellate perch, I cannot assume that defendants were negligent per se and I suggest that the majority improperly makes such an assumption.
The plaintiffs have alleged negligence and they must establish it by competent proof. In my view, although they may have presented sufficient evidence to convince a jury that defendants were negligent, they have totally failed to establish such conduct as a matter of law.
I am authorized to state that SABERS, J., joins in this concurrence in part and dissents in part.

. Even though not objected to in form by either counsel, I suggest that it would be better practice to separately advise the jury of the relevant statutes (at least in separate paragraphs), rather than to attempt to mold them into one all-inclusive paragraph, misleading the jury into believing that it is considering only one statute.

. The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding SDCL 32-18-13 and -15 even though they are arguably applicable.