Court Opinion

ID: 9468980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:28:43.474167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:09.090480
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because I believe that the proper characterization of Fort Courage is essentially a jurisdictional issue, a question of law to be decided by the court and subject to de novo review here. Jurisdiction is always a question of law to be determined by the district court. E.g., United States v. Jones, 480 F.2d 1135, 1138 (2d Cir. 1973) (and cases cited therein). The majority concludes that we have a fact issue and therefore an element of the offense of possession because that is how it reads in 18 U.S.C. § 1156. It holds that since possession of intoxicants is made non-criminal *780in a non-Indian community, the nature of the situs becomes an element of the offense. But this does not at all follow.
Although the statute generally forbids all such possession “in the Indian country,” it excludes from the definition of “Indian country” all “fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities,” * and also excludes “rights-of-way through Indian reservations.” The problem is that we are dealing with legislation in which Congress chose to impose jurisdiction discretely, not uniformly-
As examples, 18 U.S.C. § 7 sets forth five categories of the exercise of “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” They include “the high seas” and “lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive concurrent or [i.e., shared with the states] jurisdiction thereof.” Title 18 U.S.C. § 13, the so-called “Assimilative Crimes Act,” applies to any of the places and things described in § 7 the criminal prohibitions of the state in which situated, if the particular conduct is not made punishable by an enactment of Congress.
Normally, acts performed outside the territorial boundaries of the United States are not within the reach of the criminal laws of our courts although they may be punishable elsewhere. E.g., United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Quinn, 525 F.2d 222, 223 (1st Cir. 1975); Hemphill v. Moseley, 443 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1971). See United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 1980). In the broadest sense, therefore, jurisdiction is always the predicate, not an element, of every offense.
The majority relies solely, and in my thinking unjustifiably, on United States v. Mazurie, 487 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973). That case found determination of a situs as a non-Indian community to be an element of the offense to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the term “non-Indian community” was not sufficiently precise. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and holding that the land at issue was not a non-Indian community. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). The Supreme Court did not reach the issue whether the government or the defendant had the burden of proof with respect to this issue. Id. at 550 n.9, 95 S.Ct. at 714 n.9.
In our case, the proposed opinion’s finding that this issue must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt means that different juries might reach different conclusions with respect to the same tract of land. This possibility would appear to make the statute unconstitutionally vague, thereby conflicting with the Supreme Court’s contrary determination.
The view that status as a non-Indian community is an issue of law is directly supported by United States v. Morgan:
This court, in reviewing the characteristics presented in this case to the district court in' regard to the status of appellant’s localities, is actually reviewing a legal conclusion made by the court, namely, whether or not such surroundings can be termed a non-Indian community, or part of same, under the federal statute employing such term as an exception.
614 F.2d 166, 170 (8th Cir. 1980). This case has never been overturned and in my view accords this issue the proper treatment.
Involved here is essentially a territorial determination (Indian country as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1156). In United States v. Jones, 480 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit held that the characteristics of an area of land the alleged situs of a crime is a question of law. Whether defendant’s challenged acts were performed within that area is a question for the trier of fact. Id. at 1138. The court stated:
Counsel have not cited, nor have we found, a case where it has been contended that the question of acceptance of jurisdiction or the location of territorial boundaries should be determined by a jury. There are many cases in which it is clear that these questions have been determined by the court.
*781Id. Similarly, the opinion in this case cites no authority, except the Tenth Circuit’s vacated decision in Mazurie, in contradiction.
Finally, the instant case simply is an inappropriate vehicle in which to address this subject. The issue does not arise out of a jury trial in which the judge took it away from the jury, but was the court’s finding in a bench trial. The judge made no special finding that the prosecution had proved this “element” of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; but under Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, no special finding was required unless requested. United States v. Pace, 454 F.2d 351, 356 n.6 (9th Cir. 1972). Any reliance on United States v. Mazurie, supra, 487 F.2d 14, is misplaced. In that case the Tenth Circuit found that the district judge could not have found that this purported element of the offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt because the term “non-Indian community” was unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Mazurie, supra, 419 U.S. at 549, 95 S.Ct. at 710. In this case the majority does not and cannot say that the district judge could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the situs was not a “non-Indian community.”
I would affirm the conviction.

The same generality of prohibition, with the same words of exclusion appear in § 1154 relating to sale, etc., of intoxicating liquors. See also § 1161.