Court Opinion

ID: 9836912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:29.589678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.284939
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge, with whom CRAWFORD, Judge,
joins (dissenting):
Appellant was charged with placing his hand inside the underwear of 8-year-old MR (the daughter of a close family friend) and touching her vagina with an intent to satisfy his lust. He was also charged with putting his hand on the thighs and breast of 13-year-old LL (his niece) and putting his finger inside her vagina with intent to satisfy his lust. Finally, he was charged with putting his tongue inside the mouth of LL -with intent to satisfy his lust. Thus, the prosecution was particularly required by law1 to prove appellant’s sexual desires or passions as an essential part of this child sexual abuse case. See United States v. Whitner, 51 M.J. 457 (1999) (fact that element not disputed does not remove prosecution’s burden of proof), citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475,116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).
Moreover, both MR and LL testified that appellant committed the charged acts. Appellant also testified but denied committing the charged offenses. He did say, however, that he was awakened one night by LL putting his arm to her chest, which he immediately stopped and told her, “This isn’t right.” Obviously, whether appellant committed the charged acts was the critical issue in this case. Consequently, evidence of a sexual motive on his part for such acts assumed a heightened probative value in these one-on-one credibility contests. See generally United States v. Mann, 26 MJ 1, 3 (CMA 1988).
The testimony of appellant’s daughter, AM, that he repeatedly sexually abused her from the ages of 4 to 13 clearly demonstrated his “unusual” sexual desire for young girls such as the alleged victims in this case. See United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.1997). In addition, this evidence established a motive for the doing of charged sexual acts against MR and LL as an outlet for these long-standing desires. See Whitner, supra at 460-61. It also indicated a method of operation entailing deliberate exploitation of his adult position of authority to accomplish his desired sexual gratification. United States v. Meac-ham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997). Finally, the military judge repeatedly warned the members that they could not use the evidence to show appellant had a bad character and therefore probably committed the charged offenses. United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, (9th Cir.1990).
I disagree with the majority’s selective discounting of the relevance of this uncharged-misconduct evidence for these Mil. R.Evid. 404(b) purposes. The majority focuses on distinctions without a difference, ie., father instead of an uncle or head of visited household, appellant’s home as crime situs instead of a relative’s house, and minor age differentials at various times of the misconduct. In my view, these distinctions neither singularly nor together support a determination of irrelevance. See Mil.R.Evid. 401 (any tendency to make existence of fact of consequence more probable or less probable).
Turning to the Mil.R.Evid. 403 question, that portion of AM’s testimony concerning oral sodomy is a much closer call, but one which is properly entrusted to the trial judge. See United States v. Johnson, 49 MJ 467, 475 (1998) (no abuse of discretion in admitting prior sexual misconduct evidence where Mil.R.Evid. 403 question given “thoughtful consideration by the military judge”). The defense asked the military judge to excise certain testimony from AM that she and appellant engaged in consensual oral sodomy. He did not grant this request because he concluded that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact, assuming proper limiting instructions were given.
The precise question before us is whether the military judge abused his discretion in determining that this evidence was not unfairly or “unduly” prejudicial. See generally *125United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). In other words, did the judge clearly err in finding no genuine and disproportionate risk that the members would be so inflamed by this evidence that they would ignore other evidence in this ease and convict appellant simply on the basis of the uncharged misconduct. See United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 351 (4th Cir.1998). I would find no clear error by the trial judge in this regard and avoid the temptation to decide this issue de novo.
Oral sodomy between a father and daughter, consensual or not, is obviously outrageous. Yet, evidence of such conduct was not necessarily unduly inflammatory in the context of this case. The charged misconduct in part was similarly egregious, i.e., digital penetration of a child visitor by an adult head of household. Cf. United States v. Munoz, 32 MJ 359, 365 (CMA1991) (fondling alone charged). Moreover, other acts of sexual misconduct by appellant on AM, such as fondling and digital penetration, were similar to those charged and properly evidenced in this case. In these circumstances, the military judge could reasonably conclude that there was little chance that appellant would be convicted of sexual crimes against MR and LL, simply because appellant’s daughter was also permitted to testify that appellant committed oral sodomy upon her. See generally United States v. Van Metre, supra; Johnson, 132 F.3d at 1283-84.
In conclusion, I still might vote to reverse this case on the basis of the «trial judge’s rulings excluding evidence that LL and her mother were sexually abused by LL’s grandfather (appellant’s father). See generally United States v. Pagel, 45 MJ 64, 70 (1996) (Sullivan, J., concurring in the result). However, the military judge allowed defense counsel to cross-examine the alleged victim concerning its proposed-transferred intent defense and he declined. Accordingly, I would vote to affirm this case.

. Para. 87b(l)(d), Part IV, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.); Art. 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 934.