Court Opinion

ID: 9772265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:12:35.452042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.085247
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s disposition of point of error five. The majority holds that the State giving notice of intent to use prior felony convictions on Friday before trial began on Monday is reasonable, therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The majority acknowledges the trial judge originally sustained the objection1 and reversed himself upon learning the State had maintained an “open file” policy and defense counsel had knowledge of the felony convictions and judgments prior to receiving the State’s notice.
As recognized by the majority, three courts have looked at this issue. In Neuman v. State, 951 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.App.— Austin 1997, no pet.) the court held under the reasonable notice requirement of Tex. R.Crim. Evid. 404(b)2 that a prosecutor’s open-file policy did not comply with Rule 404(b)’s notice requirement, citing Buchanan v. State, 911 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.Crim.App.1995),3 and that receipt of the notice on the morning of trial was not reasonable notice.
In Hernandez v. State, 914 S.W.2d 226, 234-38 (Tex.App. — Waco 1996, no pet.), the court also held that a prosecutor’s open-file policy did not comply with Rule 404(b)’s notice requirement, citing Buchanan v. State, and that notice given on the Friday afternoon before trial on Monday was not reasonable notice and therefore error. The court then concluded the error was harmless.
In Self v. State, 860 S.W.2d 261, 263-64 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1993, pet. refd), the court observed there were no cases addressing the meaning of “reasonable notice” under Rule 404(b) and held that a five-day notice was sufficient since the defendant only requested the notice nineteen days before trial.
In this case, the trial judge was correct in sustaining the objection initially; he fell into error when the prosecutor persuaded him the open file policy was relevant to the notice requirement. The admitted evidence was two prior felony probations which had been revoked. These convictions were argued by the prosecutor as a reason, in addition to the *925offense committed, for the maximum sentence to be imposed. The jury complied. In light of this, I am unable to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment. Tex.R.App. P. 81(b)(2)(re-placed) or that the error did not affect a substantial right of the defendant. Tex. R.App. P. 44.2(b). Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The objection was based upon TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(g) (Vernon 1989) which states:
On timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to introduce evidence under this article shall be given in the same manner required by Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. If the attorney representing the state intends to introduce an extraneous crime or bad act that has not resulted in a final conviction in a court of record or a probated or suspended sentence, notice of that intent is reasonable only if the notice includes the date on which and the county in which the alleged crime or bad act occurred and the name of the alleged victim of the crime or bad act. The requirement under this subsection that the attorney representing the state give notice applies only if the defendant makes a timely request to the attorney representing the state for the notice.

. Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 404(b), Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts, provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided, upon timely request by the accused, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State’s case in chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction.

. In Buchanan, 911 S.W.2d at 15, the court wrote:
We cannot conclude that the mere opening of its file containing an offense report detailing extraneous evidence satisfies the requirement of giving notice of "intent to introduce” such evidence. The mere presence of an offense report indicating the State’s awareness of the existence of such evidence does not indicate an "intent to introduce” such evidence in its case in chief.