Court Opinion

ID: 9560485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:49:52.840042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:57.330066
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
Retired, dissenting.
With exhaustive scholarly, detail, this court traces the history of Wyoming game management. Intertwined with that history, this court also comprehensively reviews excerpts from developed principles of statutory construction. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo.1991), Urbigkit, J., specially concurring. This court then continues to resolve whether state owned and managed wildlife which inflicts injury on property interests of a private individual is to be defined as an injury without remedy {injuria absque damno) through statutory interpretation. Cf. Parker Land and Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 796 F.Supp. 477 (D.Wyo.1992). With appreciation of the detailed Wyoming history and recognition that statutory interpretation still remains an inexact science, I respectfully dissent.
I conclude conversely to the majority. If the livestock operator, with adequate proof, can demonstrate how the disease-spreading state wildlife inflicts that scourge on the property of a private individual, I believe a remedy for damage should not be denied to the party injured. There is nothing found in Wyoming legal history or governmentally-applied responsibilities that should justify a countervailing decision based on plain meaning of a statute or otherwise. The Wyoming Game and Fish Commission should be financially responsible for the results of their management of wildlife which, by negligence or inattention, spreads contagious livestock diseases. That intendment to meet the constitutional responsibilities of Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 331 can be found within the laws which are the subject of this review and consequent decision.
An opinion writer does not need exhaustive research to understand that representatives of the livestock industry were substantially numbered in the past annual and biennial sessions of the Wyoming legislature. We could then judicially notice their intelligence and the comprehensive attention which has been given to the responsibilities of the legislature to support and assist this important state industry.2 It is hard to believe that a Typhoid Annie danger, such as the spread of brucellosis to the cattle of private ranchers, was to be an acceptable or required risk of coexistence between the livestock operator and the *1081state agency responsible for wildlife management.
Additionally, I apply another tenant of statutory interpretation, presumed constitutionality, Paravecchio v. Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo.1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 915, 108 S.Ct. 1088, 99 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988), for a result that would not justify the taking of private property for public benefit contrary to Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 33. A safe haven permitting the state agency to maintain its assets in a fashion which spreads disease from public property onto private lands and into the livestock operator’s cattle herds could properly be considered to be that level of confiscation of property for “public benefit.” State Highway Commission v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390 (Wyo.1966).
Consequently, I would find no impedance in the Game and Fish damage statute, Wyo.Stat. § 23-1-901 (1991), precluding damage recovery resulting when game animals spread contagious diseases. Within a result-defined comparison, there is little difference between the predatory characteristics of some kinds of wildlife who kill the animals of a rancher for food or otherwise or the bacilli, bacteria or virus which are nurtured by the wildlife and spread into the cattle herds with an equally damaging conclusion.
It is appropriate to note, as the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, with statutory construction that “the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstances, is finished.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594, 120 L.Ed.2d 379, cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3026, 120 L.Ed.2d 897 (1992). See also Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, -, 111 S.Ct. 599, 603, 112 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991). The second stage in statutory interpretation seeking legislative intent, Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d 214, is to find a consistent and realistic intendment which includes the presumed desire of the legislature to recognize its legislative duty to “protect, obey and defend,” in providing for constitutionally guaranteed interests. That guarantee should include the ownership of private property and a correlative right to compensation when damaged by governmental agency invasion. Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 33; State Highway Commission v. Rollins, 471 P.2d 324, 328 (Wyo.1970).
The specific statutes which require our analysis, in addition to Wyo.Stat. § 23-1-901, are, currently, Wyo.Stat. § 23-1-101(a)(xiii) (1991), § 23-l-302(a) (1991), and § 23-2-107 (Supp.1992).3
*1082The majority opinion achieves its conclusion to leave the wild bison out of the state regulatory and ownership system, including responsibility for damage, by two exclusionary determinations. First, it is announced that the wild bison, different from elk, moose or other wildlife, is neither a big nor a trophy game animal under the statutory construction of the damage statute, Wyo.Stat. § 23-1-901. It is then concluded that the terminology in that statute, “damaged by,” cannot be extended to the transmission of contagious infectious conditions from the state herds to private livestock.
It is my persuasion that the historical analysis used, although clearly accurate in text, cramps the plain meaning of the English language and ignores the conclusive right of the damaged private individual for compensation for harm caused within Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 33.
This cramped and illogical construction is achieved by ignoring the fact that the wild bison are wildlife and, as such, are a state source of private property damage. I do not accept any thesis which in original concept concludes that sovereign immunity limits state taking liability under the express constitutional provision. To differentiate the wild bison from the elk and moose develops a convoluted and partially inoperative result for the statutes and precludes their constitutional application equally to identifiably similar state wildlife. See State Bd. of Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805, 809 (Wyo.1980).
The legalistic fallacy in the majority’s “plain meaning” construction is confinement of right to damage recovery by applying the generically different hunting license statutes as the criteria for definition of words which have both a description in the licensing statutes and an obvious meaning in general text as a character of property owned by the state. I fail to read into the statute exclusions from damage responsibility based on availability for the issuance of licenses to hunt, which would mean, under the circumstances of this case, that pre-1989 bison damage was not com-pensable, but once you could hunt buffalo, if a license was obtained, then compensation for damage caused by the state-owned wildlife then also became available. The thesis is not determinable to me that in 1987 and 1988, wild bison as state-owned wildlife did not come within the damage statute until the 1989 enactment changed their wildlife character into a trophy game animal characteristic for licensing purposes. Consequently, I would find damage-caused coverage for wild bison to exist under Wyo.Stat. § 23-1-901 equally with the huntable elk and moose, which come similarly within the mammal family of state-owned wildlife.
There is another misconception in damage liability analysis in the majority decision. Unlike eating the pasture or destroying the haystacks, these wildlife do not cause damage to a tangible real property interest of the livestock operator. It is the contagious condition with which they are infected and which is consequently spread to alleged disease-free livestock that occasions the source and substance of this litigation. There is general recognition that the entity that maintains diseased livestock is liable for the spread of a contagious condition to the livestock of others creating a civil cause of action from which recovery can follow. Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U.S. 468, 16 S.Ct. 1064, 41 L.Ed. 230 (1896). A similarity exists with developing litigation today where the person infected with AIDS infects another without providing caution or warning. In the case of the wild bison, obviously in the empirical sense, they are blameless; it is the owners and the system of game management from which injury *1083and compensable damage may arguably flow as a civil cause of action. Hall v. Miller, 143 Vt. 135, 465 A.2d 222 (1983). It is simply to state an apparent fact that private property is taken by the “public” when diseased wild game animals damage and destroy personal property (livestock).
Consequently, within the context of Wyo. Stat. § 23-1-901 and Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 33, the taking by contagious disease epidemic is an issue different from either the crop damage inquiry or the trophy animal killing of privately owned livestock. It is, however, damage caused by state wildlife for which compensation should properly be paid.
It is my view that the legislature had already directed this result in existing enactments. However, with the majority decision, the future can only provide answers for this significant societal problem by new legislation. Consequently, I challenge the legislature to correct the injustice which this decision creates. Appellant may not be benefitted, but certainly the ingenuity and the challenge to governmental responsibility can now be thoughtfully addressed by future legislative sessions.
I would have provided a remedy for the injury with an appropriate construction of existing state statutory provisions. Lacking that capacity, I commend careful attention of the membership of the legislature and the involved industries of this state to work together to provide the answer through future legislation.
I dissent in the belief that the right to recover for the damage is included in present laws, but further recognize my hope for future attention by the Wyoming legislature under these circumstances.
The foregoing, in the context of a general dissent, only makes sense if it is recognized that the section in the majority opinion on sufficiency of the evidence was added after this dissent had been written. A decision on the further subject was required in order to maintain some agreement of a majority of the court. Following the supplementation of the majority opinion, the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas and the specially concurring opinion of Justice Cardine were composed.
At this juncture, where the present majority makes a sufficiency of the evidence determination in decision to justify affirming the initial decision, I write to recognize my dissent on that subject also. It is my persuasion that the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission really decided the case on a statutory interpretation and then threw in sufficiency of the evidence for good measure. Carefully, comprehensively and completely reading the record lead me, initially and now at this time, to conclude that the Commission was not only incorrect on statutory interpretation, but also incorrect regarding the hearing evidence which provides adversely, in my opinion, a clear persuasion for game animal infection of the rancher’s livestock. In reality, the agency was just protecting itself from damage payment obligation.
Consequently, I dissent at this stage in the final decision, which is adverse to the livestock operator, rather than concurring specially to reverse by application of statutory interpretation principles.

. Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 33 states that ‘‘[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation.”

. The amicus brief filed in behalf of the Mountain States Legal Foundation and the Wyoming Stock Grower’s Association appropriately recognizes that the Stock Grower’s Association represents 1,500 ranchers, which are a vitally important economic interest for the economy of Wyoming.

. "Wildlife” means all wild mammals, birds, fish, amphibians, reptiles, crustaceans and mollusks, and wild bison designated by the Wyoming game and fish commission and the Wyoming livestock board within Wyoming.
Wyo.Stat. § 23 — 1—101(a)(xiii).
(a)The commission is directed and empowered:
(i) To fix season and bag limits, open, shorten or close seasons on any species or sex of wildlife for any type of legal weapon, except predatory animals, predacious birds, protected animals, and protected birds, in any specified locality of Wyoming, and to give notice thereof;
(ii) To establish zones and areas in which trophy game animals may be taken as game animals with a license or in the same manner as predatory animals without a license, giving proper regard to the livestock and game industries in those particular areas[.]
Wyo.Stat. § 23 — 1—302(a)(i) and (ii).
(a) Any person who will be fourteen (14) years of age or older prior to September 15 of the season for which the wild bison license is issued and who qualifies under W.S. 23-2-106 may apply to the department for a wild bison license.
(b) A resident applicant shall pay a license fee of two hundred twenty dollars ($220.00). A nonresident applicant shall pay a license fee of one thousand three hundred fifty dollars ($1,350.00) and shall pay the fee required by W.S. 23-2-101(e).
(c) The commission shall promulgate reasonable rules and regulations regulating wild bison licenses and the management of wild bison.
Wyo.Stat. § 23-2-107.
A bison (buffalo) is a mammal. A wild bison is a wild mammal and also a state-owned wild animal. Generic recognition of the state ownership was first found in 1973 Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 249, where wildlife was defined as all wild animals. The more specific terminology was added in 1979 Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 140, where wildlife was defined, inter alia, as "all wild mammals." The wild bison hunting statute, which *1082provided for licensing to hunt this state animal by conversion into an available game animal for hunting, came with 1989 Wyo.Sess.Laws ch. 23, which added these buffalo (wild bison) as a licensed object for the Wyoming hunting experience. With creation of the wild bison hunting license, contribution from each issued license provides revenue for the game damage fund.
This new hunting prospect does not come cheaply with a resident’s license fee of $220 and a nonresident's license fee of $1,350. Obtainable within a lottery licensing process, only the mountain goat licensing fee of $1,500, effective January 1, 1991, is more expensive, with grizzly bears and mountain sheep (if any licenses are issued) equal in license fee cost.