Court Opinion

ID: 9600596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:28:34.273937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:53.282408
License: Public Domain

BERMAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in parts I and II of the majority opinion, but I dissent as to part III. The majority acknowledges that the discussion between the judge and defendant established “a factual basis for the alleged offense.” However, the majority reverses the habitual criminal conviction because the trial court did not “describe the statutory requirement that the entry be obtained without authorization” and that the defendant’s answers to the court’s questions “do not establish that [defendant] knew and understood the essential elements of that offense.”
“A person acts ‘knowingly’ or ‘wilfully’ with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts ‘knowingly’ ... with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.” Section 18-1-501, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Not only did the answers of the defendant demonstrate a knowledge of what he did but in my view his answers demonstrated a higher degree of blameworthiness, to wit: specific intent.
Furthermore, when defendant responded negatively to the trial court’s question as to whether he had permission to enter in the back window, he demonstrated that he knew that he had no authorization to enter, for permission means authorization. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1938). The record also reveals, in that part not quoted in the majority opinion, that the defendant knew that when he entered the house it was inhabited by sleeping people, and knew that he entered for the purpose of getting money, which he accomplished by taking two purses and leaving the premises.
*150The majority refers to Crim.P. 11(b) which requires the court not to accept a plea of guilty without determining that the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense to which he is pleading. Here, the defendant answered in layman’s language to his understanding of the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense. This was sufficient because no specific ritual is required in complying with this rule. People v. Canino, 181 Colo. 207, 508 P.2d 1273 (1973).
The majority’s reliance upon Watkins v. People is misplaced. The reason the reversal was granted in that case was explained by the court as follows: “The crime of conspiracy is a crime of specific intent and its elements are not readily understandable without further explanation.” That is not the case with second degree burglary which is one of the most understandable of crimes. See § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).
Further, the defendant was originally charged with burglary as a class three felony, but the People as a concession amended the charge to a class four felony. See § 18-4-203(2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Under these circumstances, “[i]f he ever had a serious objection to the 1976 plea, this fact should have been made known long before he used the plea as a tool for avoiding a more serious conviction .... [i]t would be the height of sophistry to vacate the defendant’s plea of guilty.” People v. Bernard, 656 P.2d 695 (Colo.1983).
If the law requires a reversal under these circumstances, then indeed, Mr. Bumble’s cynical remark was prophetic. I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.