Court Opinion

ID: 9910448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 18:01:00.841472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:06.463545
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 15 2023
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAZMIK HOVSEPYAN, et al.,                        No.   22-16277

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,           D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00899-MCE-CKD
                                                 Eastern District of California,
 v.                                              Sacramento

GEICO General Insurance Company,
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                  Morrison England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted December 13, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, KOH, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiffs Razmik Hovsepyan, Suren Hovsepyan, and Shushanik

Paskevichyan (collectively, “plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of GEICO General Insurance Company (“GEICO”).

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      Our review of a district court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion is de

novo. Alexander v. Nguyen, 78 F.4th 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2023). A party is

entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is proper where the undisputed

material facts demonstrate a claim is time-barred.” Bennett v. Ohio Nat’l Life

Assurance Corp., 309 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 784 (Ct. App. 2023).

      Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing (“breach of the implied covenant claim”) was barred by the statute of

limitations.1 The parties agree that the statute of limitations for a breach of the

implied covenant claim is two years. Archdale v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins.

Co., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 647 n.19 (Ct. App. 2007). Plaintiffs filed their

complaint in state court against GEICO on September 18, 2018, alleging that

GEICO breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its

handling of plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist claims following a February 2015 car

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  Plaintiffs’ opposition to summary judgment in the district court did not discuss
the statute of limitations. This Court applies a “‘general rule’ against entertaining
arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed before the district
court.” Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Bolker v. Comm’r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, we
decline to consider plaintiffs’ arguments on this issue raised for the first time on
appeal.

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accident. Therefore, to fall within the statute of limitations, plaintiffs’ breach of

the implied covenant claim must have accrued on or after September 18, 2016.

      A claim accrues when “events have developed to a point where plaintiff is

entitled to a legal remedy.” Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975). A

breach of the implied covenant claim “does not accrue until the damages have been

sustained.” Bennett, 309 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 784 (quoting Thomson v. Canyon, 129

Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 533 (Ct. App. 2011)). “[K]nowledge of the facts, rather than

knowledge of the available legal theories or remedies, starts the statute of

limitations.” Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (Ct. App. 1990)

(emphasis in original).

      Here, Plaintiffs were aware of the facts supporting their breach of the

implied covenant claim by April of 2016. First, plaintiffs contend that GEICO

breached the implied covenant because GEICO took no meaningful action toward

communicating with the plaintiffs or resolving plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist

claims in the months after the accident. However, the record shows that GEICO

attempted to communicate with plaintiffs and resolve plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist

claims by requesting medical release forms and contacting plaintiffs’ counsel about

plaintiffs’ medical treatment status at least eight times in the six months after the

car accident.

      Second, Plaintiffs contend that GEICO breached the implied covenant by

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extending delayed and unreasonably low settlement offers. However, the record

shows that plaintiffs were aware of this alleged breach on or before April 15, 2016,

when plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to GEICO alleging that GEICO’s low

settlement offers constituted “bad faith.”

      Finally, plaintiffs contend that GEICO breached the implied covenant by

spending “nearly a year investigating Plaintiffs’ [uninsured motorist] claims”

without explaining the reason for its “delay to do an independent medical

examination.” However, in plaintiffs’ counsel’s April 15, 2016 letter, counsel

complained that GEICO had not yet ordered independent medical examinations of

the plaintiffs, which shows plaintiffs’ counsel’s knowledge of the allegedly

dilatory progress of GEICO’s investigation. In that letter, counsel also stated that

he was collecting “further evidence for my client’s subsequent insurance bad faith

claim.”

      As further confirmation that plaintiffs were aware of their breach of the

implied covenant claim in April of 2016, plaintiffs’ counsel testified in his

deposition that he “one hundred percent” believed that GEICO had breached the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in “April of 2016.”

      Plaintiffs also sustained the alleged harm in April of 2016. In their response

to GEICO’s statement of undisputed facts in support of summary judgment,

plaintiffs did not dispute that “they suffered immediate harm as a result of

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GEICO’s alleged bad faith in April 2016 in the form of personal liability for

medical expenses.”

      There is no genuine dispute of material fact as to when plaintiffs’ breach of

the implied covenant claim accrued. Because the claim accrued in April of 2016,

the two year state of limitations bars the claim, and GEICO is entitled to summary

judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

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