Court Opinion

ID: 9681302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:47:52.526331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.176219
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I strongly disagree with the granting of a rehearing and the destruction of the physician-patient privilege. I agree with the majority that the original statute was entirely too broad. It did, in effect, prevent a physician from testifying about any information he had obtained through the doctor-patient relationship. The original rule was justifiably seen as being overly broad. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 503 is a very long and detailed rule. The rule’s first sections define “patient,” “physician” and “psychotherapist.” Then section (4) reads as follows: A communication is “confidential” if not intended to be disclosed to third persons, except persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family. (b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, his physician or psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family. Section (d) sets out the exceptions to the foregoing rule. For example, there is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness or examinations by order of a court or when the condition is claimed as an element of a defense. Therefore, it is plain all privilege relating to criminal matters and institutionalization for mental illness is excluded from the rule. The rule, of course, can be waived by the patient himself. We really have under consideration here the old statute involving “any information” against the new rule which relates to “confidential communication.” The appellant is the person who requested the treatment in this case. It would have been impossible for him to make a request without communicating in some manner with the party from whom he was requesting treatment. The myopic narrowness with which the majority now views confidential communications in fact destroys the rule in its entirety. If a medical technician is allowed to testify as to the description of the injuries or ailment or disease, even though the patient had requested it to remain confidential, it would in effect present a situation where there could be no “confidential communication.” The situation existing here is one of the most personal types of cases that can be involved in a physician-patient relationship. To allow the state to poke its nose into the privilege existing between the appellant and the person treating him for his condition would render the privilege meaningless. The purpose of the rule is to allow diagnosis and treatment of persons who can be confident that the intimate details of their physical or mental condition are not made public. I cannot see where the abrogation of this rule would enhance either the public interest or the criminal justice system. The rules were very carefully thought out and were studied over a long period of time and were formulated specifically for the purpose of allowing privileged communications except for instances set out as exceptions in the rule. I feel that the sole reason for allowing in this particular communication was to enhance the state’s probability of conviction. The state never claimed the matter was relevant to the defense of the crime or probative of any issue. This is not the purpose for which the rule was intended, and the state had as good a chance of conviction without this information as with it. I feel the original opinion was absolutely correct and if the present majority opinion prevails, then the rule may as well be stricken from the book. Therefore, I would deny the rehearing.