Court Opinion

ID: 9775158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:46:21.806955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:21.865678
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice. At issue here is the constitutional validity of Ark. Stat. Ann. § .31-501 (Repl. 1962), in so far as it authorizes a pre-judgment garnishment without notice. The trial court, relying upon Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1969), held the statute void in so far as it authorized the issuance of a garnishment by a clerk without notice and prior to judgment. For reversal appellant, G.A.C. Trans-World Acceptance Corporation, points out that the garnishment here involved is against certain accounts receivable due to appellee, Jaynes Enterprises, Inc., a business corporation and contends that the holding in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, is limited to wages. In making its argument appellant recognizes that the United States Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972), has construed the Sniadach case contrary to its contentions. However, it says that since the Fuentes case is only a four to three decision with two justices not participating, there is a question as to its effectiveness as a precedent. Cases from other jurisdictions have gone both ways upon the contentions made. Roofing Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P. 2d 1327 (1973), would support appellant’s position. Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P. 2d 146 (Alas. 1972), supports the trial court’s position. There are some dissenting opinions in both cases. For a number of reasons, we are inclined and do accept the interpretation of the Sniadach ruling as set forth in the Fuentes case until such time as the United States Supreme Court rules to the contrary. Some of such reasons are: 1. Other decisions of the United States Supreme Court such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1969), and Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1970), have extended the same Due Process principle of notice and a fair hearing to welfare rights and the suspension of a driver’s license; 2. It is most illogical to say that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires notice and an opportunity to be heard only when dealing with wages, welfare rights and drivers licenses but that no such notice and an opportunity to be heard are prerequisites to depriving a citizen of any other property or rights that he may possess; 3. The statute in question is admittedly void as to wages and is not necessarily severable so as to remain valid to other assets; and 4. The General Assembly, following the Fuentes case, has by Act 144 of 1973, enacted a rather practical procedure for giving of notice to defendants against whom a writ of replevin is sought — inferentially it would not be impossible to make a similar provision with respect to garnishment proceedings. Finally appellant argues that the appellees, Jaynes Enterprises Inc., d/b/a, Jaynes Mobile Homes, Bill Jaynes and Violet Jaynes, waived any right to a prejudgment hearing by signing a guaranty giving the appellant, in case of default, the right to take possession of contract rights and/or accounts or proceeds of the sale thereof wherever found and giving it the right to enter for such purposes without legal process. We find no merit to this contention. (1) The waiver contention under a somewhat similar contract was held not to preclude a preseizure hearing in the Fuentes case, supra. (2) This issue was not raised in the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (3) Furthermore, appellant did not rely upon the provision of its contract but invoked the aid of the court under the garnishment statute. Affirmed. George Rose Smith, Brown and Fogleman, JJ., concur.