Court Opinion

ID: 9744154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:54:57.063211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.056365
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority disposition of issues I & II. However, I disagree with the court’s treatment of the punitive damages issue.
In Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor (1977), 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 our Supreme Court reexamined the application of punitive damage awards to claims arising from a breach of contract. The court observed that where the conduct of a party in breaching his contract also established all the elements of a common law tort, punitive damages might be awarded.1 362 N.E.2d 847. The court, apparently intending an expansion of the foregoing,2 then stated that punitive damages might be available “whenever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression mingle in the controversy.” 362 N.E.2d 847.3 The court then stated that in either instance, to justify a punitive award “it must appear that the public interest will be served by the deterrent effect” of the award. 362 N.E.2d 848.
While some further delineation may be necessary to clearly draw the lines prescribed by Hibschman, it is not necessary to our decision in this case.
The basic contentions are simple. The addition contracted for did not meet the purchaser’s expectations. It appears there were deviations from the plans and specifications. The controlling question is whether the deviations were reasonable or merely negligent on the one hand, or whether they were accomplished through fraud or a reckless indifference to the probable consequences on the other.4
If the facts established the latter, I have no problem identifying the public interest to be served in requiring that the builders of public buildings be deterred from fraudulently disregarding building code requirements or those contained in the plans and specifications they have agreed to comply with.
The problem presented in the present appeal is that while the appellant might have attempted to demonstrate on the facts in evidence that fraud, recklessness, etc. were not established, he has totally failed to do so. Since it appears that the trier of fact might have inferred such intent from the evidence and the court indeed did so infer, we may not reweigh the evidence or search the record to find it disputed. Borkholder has simply failed to demonstrate error on the facts, and accordingly, the award should be affirmed.

. Assuming that the conduct was of the aggravated kind necessary to any award of punitive damages.

. Compare Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett (1906), 167 Ind. 491, 79 N.E. 503.

. Citing Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp (1976), 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173.

. In this regard it is interesting to note that neither party attaches much significance to the fact that the builder employed the architect and that his agreement with the purchaser was essentially to supply the addition in a good and workmanlike manner.