Court Opinion

ID: 9567554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:55:22.947272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:40.281419
License: Public Domain

STROUD, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority opinion to the extent that it reverses the SBM order and remands to the trial court for entry of an order that defendant enroll in SBM for life under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A(c), as second-degree rape under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3(a)(2) is an “aggravated offense” as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la). I also agree that the trial court erred in finding that defendant required the “highest possible level of supervision and monitoring” where defendant’s Department of Correction (“DOC”) risk assessment showed a level of “low” risk and the State presented no additional evidence as to defendant’s risk of recidivism. However, I write separately on the issue of whether second-degree rape under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la) is an aggravated offense because I believe that mere citation to State v. McCravey, - N.C. App. -, 692 S.E.2d 409 (2010) is not an adequate rationale for this holding, given the issues raised in this case. In addition, as the SBM statutes were recently enacted and have been the subject of much confusion as to proper application, I believe that a full analysis of the issue may be of some assistance to North Carolina’s district attorneys, counsel for defendants, the DOC, and superior court judges, all of whom are working to address SBM cases in accordance with these new SBM statutes. I also agree with the majority that this Court should grant the State’s petition for certiorari and review the issue of whether defendant’s second-degree rape conviction was an aggravated offense.
The majority holds, and I concur, that second-degree rape under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3(a)(2) (2007) is an “aggravated offense” as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la) (2009). However, this case raises substantially different issues than State v. McCravey as to sec*213ond-degree rape, and the arguments before the trial court all focused upon these very issues. As noted in the majority opinion, the trial court reconsidered whether defendant required SBM based upon commission of an “aggravated offense” or a high risk of recidivism several times, and the fact that defendant’s conviction involved a mentally disabled victim was the reason for much of the debate at the hearing. I therefore believe that a more in-depth analysis of the issue is in order.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3(a) defines second-degree rape as follows:
A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person:
(1) By force and against the will of the other person; or
(2) Who is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know the other person is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.
In McCravey, this Court held that second-degree rape pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3(a)(1) is an “aggravated offense.” - N.C. App. at -, 692 S.E.2d at 420. However, this Court has not previously addressed the issue of whether second-degree rape under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3(a)(2) is an “aggravated offense.” Under subsection (a)(1), “by force and against the will of the other person” is a specific element of the crime, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3(a)(l), which satisfies the definition of an “aggravated offense” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la) requiring commission of the sexual act “through the use of force or the threat of serious violence[.]” Id.
In McCravey, the defendant argued “that the statutory definition of ‘aggravated offense’ in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify what constitutes ‘use of force[.]’ ” Id. at -, 692 S.E.2d at 418. This Court considered the context and purpose of the SBM statute and the case law which has defined “the force required in a sexual offense of this nature.” Id. at — , 692 S.E.2d at 419-20. In McCravey, we held that
The language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la) — ‘through the use of force or the threat of serious violence’ — reflects the established definitions as set forth in case law of both physical force and constructive force, in the context of the sexual offenses enu*214merated in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-27.2, 14-27.3, 14-27.4, and 14-27.5. (emphasis added).
The legislature intended that the same definition of force, as has been traditionally used for second-degree rape, to apply to the determination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la) that an offense was committed by ‘the use of force or the threat of serious violence.’
Id. Although defendant herein was convicted of rape under subsection (a)(2), based upon sexual intercourse with a “mentally disabled” victim, our courts have previously held that attempted second-degree rape under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3(a)(2) is a felony committed “through the use of force or the threat of serious violence[.]” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(la). In State v. Holden, our Supreme Court considered the defendant’s argument that a prior conviction of attempted second-degree rape should not be used as an aggravating factor supporting a sentence of death as a conviction of “a felony involving the use of violence [pursuant to] N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3) (1988).” 338 N.C. 394, 403, 450 S.E.2d 878, 883 (1994). In Holden, the attempted second-degree rape conviction did not specify which subsection of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.3 formed the basis for defendant’s conviction, and the defendant argued that
no evidence was presented from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the attempted second-degree rape involved violence or the threat of violence. He argues that because the State only offered proof of his conviction for second-degree rape by presenting the judgment, it failed to present evidence sufficient to prove the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. He reasons that the conviction is insufficient to prove the use of or threatened use of violence because second-degree rape may be predicated on sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless. N.C.G.S. § 14-27.3(a)(2) (1993).
Id. at 404, 450 S.E.2d at 883. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that “the crime of attempted rape always involves at least a ‘threat of violence’ within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3).” Id. at 405, 450 S.E.2d at 884. The Court went on to explain that
[t]his Court has concluded that for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3), rape is a felony which has as an element the *215use or threat of violence to the person. State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 321, 384 S.E.2d 470, 494 (1989) (quoting McDougall, 308 N.C. at 18, 301 S.E.2d at 319), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604, on remand, 327 N.C. 470, 397 S.E.2d 223 (1990). We have further reasoned that where rape is deemed to have as an element the use or threat of violence, the ‘felony of attempt to commit rape is therefore by nature of the crime a felony which threatens violence.’ State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 170, 443 S.E.2d 14, 30 (1994) (interpreting military law). Under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3), ‘[attempting to commit a crime which inherently involves violence obviously constitutes, at least, a ‘threat of violence.” Id. at 169, 443 S.E.2d at 30. Therefore, the judgment showing that the defendant had previously been convicted of attempted second-degree rape was sufficient, standing alone, to require that the trial court submit the aggravating circumstance that the defendant had committed a prior felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
For purposes of applying this aggravating circumstance, we reject the notion of any felony which may properly be deemed ‘non-violent rape.’ We believe that a more enlightened view of this matter has been expressed in the opinions of military courts which have been cited with approval by this Court. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, rape is always, and under any circumstances, deemed as a matter of law to be a crime of violence. United States v. Bell, 25 M.J. 676 (A.C.M.R. 1987), rev. denied, 27 M.J. 161 (C.M.A. 1988); United States v. Myers, 22 M.J. 649 (A.C.M.R. 1986), rev. denied, 23 M.J. 399 (C.M.A. 1987). As stated in Myers, military courts ‘specifically reject the oxymoronic term of ‘non-violent rape.’ The more enlightened view is that rape is always a crime of violence, no matter what the circumstances of its commission.’ Myers, 22 M.J. at 650. ‘Among common misconceptions about rape is that it is a sexual act rather than a crime of violence.’ United States v. Hammond, 17 M.J. 218, 220 n. 3 (C.M.A. 1984). Green, 336 N.C. at 169, 443 S.E.2d at 30. We conclude, for similar reasons, that the crime of attempted rape always involves at least a ‘threat of violence’ within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3).
Id. at 404-05, 450 S.E.2d at 883-84. The Court also specifically rejected the argument that sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally defective, incapacitated, or statutorily deemed incapable of consenting does not necessarily involve force or a threat of violence.
*216The acts of having or attempting to have sexual intercourse with another person who is mentally defective or incapacitated and statutorily deemed incapable of consenting — -just as with a person who refuses to consent — involve the ‘use or threat of violence to the person’ within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3). In this context, the force inherent to having sexual intercourse with a person who is deemed by law to be unable to consent is sufficient to amount to ‘violence’ as contemplated by the General Assembly in this statutory aggravating circumstance. Likewise, the attempt to have sexual intercourse with such a person inherently includes a threat of force sufficient to amount to a ‘threat of violence’ within the meaning of this aggravating circumstance.
Id. at 406, 450 S.E.2d at 884.
Certainly, if the crime of attempted second-degree rape is a crime which “always involves at least a threat of violence” for purposes of an aggravating factor which may support a sentence of death, there is no reason to consider second-degree rape any differently in the context of enrollment in SBM. I therefore concur with the majority in remand of this matter to the trial court for entry of an order that defendant enroll in SBM for life after his release from prison, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A(c) (2009).
I therefore concur.