Court Opinion

ID: 9469599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:44:58.387623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:28.346943
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Notwithstanding the fact that on consideration of Mr. Ivery’s defense that he was set up by his employer or its agents, a cross section of the community concluded that reasonable doubt rebutted the government’s theory that he was caught red-handed,1 the earlier arbitrator’s decision established the existence of probable cause 2 that Mr. Ivery stole from the mails. As explained by the majority, that determination is both final between the United States and Mr. Ivery, and fatal to the present cause of action by operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Mr. Ivery challenges the application of collateral estoppel on two fronts. He first argues that the arbitrator had authority to interpret only the labor agreement and not to decide a federal tort suit. However, case law cited with approval by the Supreme Court allows preclusion of relitigation in a civil suit when an arbitral board has determined that a discharge was for cause. See United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421 n.18, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1559 n.18, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966) citing Bower v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 214 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1954). Since the arbitrator’s task in the present case was to determine the cause of Ivery’s termination, Bower and similar authorities are dispositive of his first contention.
Mr. Ivery replies that a recent line of Supreme Court precedent distinguishes such authorities as Bower v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra, when liability is founded upon a federal statute. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 101 *415S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); cf. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (state court affirmance of agency determination).
Mr. Ivery reads these cases too broadly. Both Barrentine and Alexander rely upon a statute providing “minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.” Barren-tine, 450 U.S. at 737,101 S.Ct. at 1443. But beyond a substantive guarantee, both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1976), at issue in Alexander, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (1976), at issue in Barrentine, evidence an intention to separate the public law right from “majoritarian processes” of collective bargaining. Id. at 738, 101 S.Ct. at 1443, quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 94 S.Ct. at 1021. Overlapping remedies were intended. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 — 49, 94 S.Ct. at 1019-20.
The Federal Tort Claims Act does not create a minimum guarantee nor can it be said to be a part of our nation’s labor dispute resolution mechanism. The Act was designed to eliminate sovereign immunity. E.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 152, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1852, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963); United States Government v. Employees Insurance Co., Inc., 612 F.2d 705, 706 (2d Cir. 1980). It creates no new causes of action, rather it accepts liability in circumstances which would render a nongovernmental defendant liable. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141, 71 S.Ct. 153, 157, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). The Federal Tort Claims Act did not create a separate right from an existing scheme of enforceable duties;3 and no overlapping remedy was intended: “[T]he primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidently benefitted those already well provided for, it appears to have been unintentional.” Id. at 140, 71 S.Ct. at 156.
Appellant has cited no authority for the conclusion that the exception to collateral estoppel for statutory guarantees invoked in Barrentine and Alexander is applicable to this Federal Tort Claims Act context. The authorities just reviewed strongly stand against that conclusion. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.

. I cannot agree with the gratuitous characterization of Mr. Ivery’s defense as a “cock and bull story.” Ante at 5. However, since the jury verdict may not be construed as a finding in conflict with the probable cause determination, the application of collateral estoppel is not barred by general equitable considerations. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 334, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1445, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 89 (6th Cir. 1980).

. The Supreme Court of Michigan has defined probable cause as follows:
To constitute probable cause, there must be such reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant an ordinarily cautious man in the belief that the person arrested is guilty of the offense charged.
A person may have “probable cause” for making a criminal complaint from information received from others, which he honestly believes to be true, and of such a character, and obtained from such sources, that businessmen generally, of ordinary care, prudence, and discretion, would act upon it under such circumstances, believing it to be reliable.
Gooch v. Wachowiak, 352 Mich. 347, 351-52, 89 N.W.2d 496, 498-99 (1958).

. The purpose of Congress to replace the cumbersome private bill procedure for victims of governmental wrongdoers, see, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1853, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1975), is altogether different from the creation of an additional legal remedy. A private bill is an act of legislative grace and in no sense a right of the party to be benefitted thereby. Further, the Federal Tort Claims Act was intended to replace and not to supplement that procedure.