Court Opinion

ID: 9492913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:53:21.520531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:33.209984
License: Public Domain

KING, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The question before us today is whether a district court should respond to a request from a criminal trial jury with an instruction defining reasonable doubt. We reheard this case en banc to reconsider our position in this regard. I write separately because I believe it is inappropriate to deny a criminal jury an explanation of reasonable doubt when the jury has explicitly requested a definition.
The bases for my view, explained more fully below, are: (1) proof beyond a reasonable doubt is fundamental to our criminal justice system; (2) a trial court should assist a jury in every way possible in the fulfillment of its obligations; and (3) the term “reasonable doubt” can be defined in a manner readily understood by, and of assistance to, a trial jury. I would require a reasonable doubt instruction be given when the jury requests a definition, and I propose an instruction substantially similar to that advocated by the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”). Because I find error in the district court’s failure in this case to define reasonable doubt in response to the jury’s request, I respectfully dissent.
I.
While long a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system, it was not until 1970 that the Supreme Court expressly afforded constitutional stature to the reasonable doubt concept. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In Winship, the Court held that the due process mandates of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that every element of a charged offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In so holding, the Court emphasized the importance of the reasonable doubt standard in our criminal justice system:
The [reasonable doubt] standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence — that bedrock “axiomatic and elementary” principle whose “enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”
Id. at 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895)).1 Recognizing the fundamental unfairness that would result from permitting a criminal defendant to be convicted and imprisoned on the lesser standard of proof sufficient in civil cases, the Court explained the rationale underlying the reasonable doubt standard applicable in a criminal prosecution:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon *701conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Echoing these sentiments, the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Winship provides perhaps the most persuasive justification for the Court’s decision: “I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” Id. at 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (Harlan, J., concurring).
II.
Although it has explicitly held that the reasonable doubt standard is mandated by due process, the Supreme Court, subsequent to its 1970 Winship decision, has offered little guidance as to if, when, or how the concept of reasonable doubt should be defined for a criminal jury. Indeed, as Judge Ervin’s opinion points out, ante at 696, the Court has never required trial courts to define reasonable doubt. Neither, however, has the Court ever ruled that the concept of reasonable doubt is incapable of definition, or that trial courts should not, as a matter of course, provide a definition. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 26, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Though we have never insisted that district courts in this Circuit define reasonable doubt, we have historically accorded them the discretion to provide a definition when the jury asks for one.2 According to Judge Ervin, we should not require district courts to define reasonable doubt because the term “has a self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror which judicial efforts to define generally do more to obscure than to illuminate.” Ante at 698 (quoting Headspeth, 852 F.2d at 755, see supera note 2 (citation omitted)). However, the persuasiveness of this reasoning is substantially undermined in instances, such as here, where the jury itself has entreated the district court to define reasonable doubt. As my distinguished former colleague acknowledged, “[w]e understand that when a jury specifically requests a definition of reasonable doubt during deliberations, there is a risk that the jury may be confused over what standard of proof to apply in a criminal case.”3 Ante at 698.
The meaning of “reasonable doubt” is not as overwhelmingly evident to lay jurors as some courts have assumed. Though each word in the term appears regularly in common parlance, they do not, when coupled without further explanation, “necessarily convey the high standard of *702proof that the due process clause requires.” United States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869, 873 (9th Cir.1991) (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).4 The potential for confusion among jurors is poignantly illustrated by the acknowledged reality that trial judges, despite their extensive legal training and professional experience, themselves often have difficulty articulating the meaning of reasonable doubt. Simply put, if “judges and legal scholars struggle to define reasonable doubt, it is unrealistic to expect a lay jury to properly grasp and apply the stark words.” State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 P.2d 970, 973 (Ariz.1995).
Nevertheless, despite the potential for juror confusion, Judge Ervin concluded that attempts to define reasonable doubt are “more dangerous than leaving a jury to wrestle with only the words themselves.” Ante at 698. With all respect to the experience and acumen of this eminent jurist, I disagree. In my view, it serves little purpose to instruct the average juror that she must be convinced of guilt beyond a “reasonable doubt,” absent some intelligent elaboration on the meaning of the term.5 One of a trial judge’s most important responsibilities is to assist jurors with their understanding of applicable legal principles. See United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 34 (4th Cir.1995) (“The purpose of jury instructions is to instruct the jury clearly regarding the law to be applied in the case.”) (citations omitted). Without sufficient instruction, “the jury becomes mired in a factual morass, unable to draw the appropriate legal conclusions based on those facts.” Id. The failure of a trial court to offer a definition of reasonable doubt, after the jury has requested assistance with the term, is an abdication of its responsibility.
The positions taken by some of our sister circuits strongly support the view that reasonable doubt should, at least in some circumstances, be defined. In Blatt v. United States, 60 F.2d at 481 (3d Cir. 1932), the Third Circuit held that the failure to define reasonable doubt constituted “error prejudicial to the defendant.” Sixty years later, in United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1286 n. 4 (3d Cir.1992), the Third Circuit adhered to Blatt by approving a “model” instruction that included a definition of reasonable doubt. Similarly, in Friedman v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir.1967), the Eighth Circuit held that the failure to define reasonable doubt upon request by the defendant would constitute error. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has approved a set of model jury instructions that include a definition of reasonable doubt. United States v. Harris, 974 F.2d 84, 85-86 (8th Cir.1992). The Tenth Circuit has also concluded that jurors should be instructed on the meaning of reasonable doubt. See Holland v. United States, 209 F.2d 516, 523 (10th Cir.1954) (holding that the accused is entitled to a definition of reasonable doubt); see also United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir.1974) (concluding that defendants are entitled to have the meaning of reasonable doubt explained to the jury).
*703The rule in these three circuits is more stringent than the modest one I espouse today. I do not maintain that the jury must always be instructed on the meaning of reasonable doubt, or even that — as a prophylactic measure — a trial court must accede to the defendant’s request for such an instruction. I merely say that, when the jury’s confusion is demonstrably palpable, i.e., the jury has requested that reasonable doubt be defined, a real danger exists that the defendant may be convicted on less than the certainty demanded by the Constitution. Accordingly, in that circumstance, I would require the presiding judge to guide the jury down the appropriate path by defining reasonable doubt.6
In addition, the position of the Fifth Circuit is not quite as muddled as has been suggested. Admittedly, in Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1061 (5th Cir. 1987), that court broadly stated that attempts to define reasonable doubt are disfavored. However, it is acknowledged that Thompson is distinguishable because it involved a state collateral attack, rather than a direct appeal. Ante at 697 n. 3. Accordingly, Thompson should not be construed as the Fifth Circuit’s adoption of a strict “no-definition” rule. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that reasonable doubt should be defined. See United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 128-29 nn.1-2 (5th Cir.1994) (observing that “in contrast” to those circuits that discourage defining reasonable doubt, it has repeatedly encouraged district courts to do so).
In the Sixth Circuit, the status of instructions defining reasonable doubt is not completely clear. As has been noted, the District Judges Association of the Sixth Circuit, in promulgating model instructions defining reasonable doubt, indicated that:
Sixth Circuit decisions have rather consistently proceeded on the assumption that some definition should be given, with the only real question being what the definition should say.
Ante at 697 n. 3 (citation omitted). While the model instructions were subsequently approved, see United States v. Goodlett, 3 F.3d 976, 979 (6th Cir.1993), the Sixth Circuit has not explicitly required district courts to define reasonable doubt.
The considerable legal support in the federal courts for defining the concept of reasonable doubt is well-grounded in reality, empirical studies having demonstrated that juries often do not understand what the phrase means.7 As Justice Ginsburg *704stated in her concurring opinion in Victor, “[s]everal studies of jury behavior have concluded that ‘jurors are often confused about the meaning of reasonable doubt’ when that term is left undefined.” 511 U.S. at 26, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Henry Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, Or Not To Define, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1716, 1723 (1990) (citations omitted)). The danger of such confusion is that it increases the likelihood of an unjust result, i.e., that jurors may vote to convict on less than the constitutionally required standard of proof, or that jurors may vote to acquit when the proper result is to convict.
III.
In declining to require trial judges to define reasonable doubt under the circumstances of this case, five of my colleagues conclude that the concept is incapable of being defined clearly, and that attempting to define it would only further confuse the jury.8 I am unpersuaded. Admittedly, reasonable doubt is not a precise concept. Nevertheless, “even if definitions of reasonable doubt are necessarily imperfect, the alternative — refusing to define the concept at all — is obviously not preferable.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. at 26, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Despite its somewhat nebulous nature, I am convinced that reasonable doubt can be defined in simple terms that are readily understood by — and of assistance to — a criminal jury.
I find such simplicity and clarity to be embodied in the definition of reasonable doubt approved in 1987 by the FJC. This succinct instruction was discussed with approval by Justice Ginsburg in her concurring opinion in Victor. I propose today a slightly modified version of the FJC definition, providing as follows:
The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the government’s proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you are not firmly convinced of his guilt, you must find him not guilty. *705If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
*704The sole distinction between the instruction suggested here and that sponsored by the FJC lies in the last sentence thereof. In its closing sentence, the FJC instruction provides:
*705I would amend this provision to make its language consistent with the penultimate sentence of the FJC instruction. I am convinced that consistency is the best approach, and I find further support in United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.1987), where we criticized the “real possibility” aspect of the FJC instruction. In Porter, the district court had charged the jury in accordance with the FJC instruction. On appeal, the defendants challenged the “real possibility” language of the instruction, arguing that it was confusing and improperly shifted the burden of proof. While concluding that the district court’s instructions taken as a whole properly placed the burden of proof on the prosecution, we criticized the “real possibility” terminology, writing that,
Implying the evidence must show a real possibility of innocence to justify acquittal trenches on the principle that a defendant is presumed to be innocent.
Id. at 973 (emphasis added). Judge Butz-ner’s criticism of the “real possibility” language is persuasive, and I have concluded that the slight modification of the FJC instruction, explained above, would render it of greater assistance to perplexed jurors.
I am not alone in this conclusion; indeed, a virtually identical modification of the FJC instruction has been endorsed in a recent publication of the Texas Law Review. Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 105 (1999). In his detailed and astute analysis of various issues relating to reasonable doubt instructions, Professor So-lan recognizes the merits of this modification, writing,
The [modified FJC] instruction reminds jurors that not every doubt is a reasonable one. But its main focus is to tell the jurors that the real issue is whether the government has made a strong, convincing case. It is marginally superior to the FJC’s instruction [because it eliminates the “real possibility” language that tends to shift the burden of proof, as recognized by Porter ].
Id. at 118. Moreover, as Professor Solan points out, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted a definition of reasonable doubt nearly indistinguishable from the one I propose today. See State v. Medina, 147 N.J. 43, 685 A.2d 1242, 1251-52 (N.J.1996).9 Professor Solan explains that, by eliminating the “real possibility” language, the New Jersey instruction avoids the tendency of the FJC instruction to shift the burden of proof. Solan, 78 Tex. L. Rev. at 118.10
In my view, this modified FJC instruction effectively and adequately conveys the meaning of reasonable doubt in clear and concise terms. While eliminating the concerns raised by Judge Butzner in Porter, this modified instruction maintains the positive features of the FJC instruction. In particular, the proposed instruction continues to
inform[ ] the jurors that the prosecution must prove its ease by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, but not *706necessarily to an absolute certainty.... [Contrasting the preponderance of the evidence standard and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard] is a useful way to frame the issue for the jury.
Williams, 20 F.3d at 132 n. 5. It is this feature, the juxtaposition of the requisite standard of proof in civil cases with the more stringent criminal trial standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is the FJC instruction’s greatest asset. As the Fifth Circuit in Williams pointed out, contrasting the civil and the criminal standards of proof is an effective means of framing the issue for the jury. While making clear that “reasonable doubt” is a higher standard of proof than that necessary in civil cases, the instruction does not unduly disadvantage the prosecution; it clearly states that proof beyond a reasonable doubt “does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt.”
Furthermore, the modified FJC instruction ensures that the government’s obligation to carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is properly understood by jurors. The language of this instruction thus focuses “on what the government must do — not on what the defendant has been able to accomplish. It tells jurors not to accept the government’s model unless they are convinced that it is the right one.” Solan, 78 Tex. L. Rev. at 144.
Accordingly, I find this slightly modified FJC instruction to be a cogent and comprehensible statement of the reasonable doubt standard. Because I believe this definition of reasonable doubt to be a fully acceptable instruction, and vastly preferable to none at all when the jury has requested assistance, I would approve its use under the limited circumstances at issue here.11
IV.
The integrity of the judicial process requires that the appropriate standard of proof be scrupulously apphed by criminal trial juries; hence, an adequate understanding by juries of the reasonable doubt standard is necessary for our system to function properly. To ensure the rigorous application of the proper standard of proof in our criminal justice system, I would require that trial courts define reasonable doubt in the limited circumstances presented in this case, that is, when the jury has exphcitly requested a definition.12 Re-*707cause the district court failed to provide such a definition in response to the jury’s request, I find reversible error.13
I am honored to state that Judge Mur-naghan, Judge Wilkins, and Judge Traxler concur in this dissenting opinion.

. Due process is satisfied by nothing less than a juror's understanding that he or she may not vote to convict a defendant based upon a belief "that the defendant is probably guilty....” United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 728 (3d Cir.1999) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182(1993))(emphasis added).

. See e.g., United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir.1991) ("The only exception to our categorical disdain for definition is when the jury specifically requests it.”); United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 894 n. 12 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting the "limited exception to our general proscription in those cases where jurors are demonstrably confused or uncertain ... ”) (citing Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475 (4th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir. 1992) (construing Ricks to suggest that reasonable doubt should be defined when "the jury is 'demonstrably confused or uncertain’ and requests such an instruction”); United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1988) ("We have frequently admonished district courts not to attempt to define reasonable doubt in their instructions to the jury absent a specific request from the jury itself.”), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 597, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1987) ("This court has urged trial courts to avoid defining reasonable doubt unless requested to do so by the jury ...”).

. See also Henry A. Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, Or Not To Define, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1716, 1723-24 (1990) ("A jury’s request for a definition of reasonable doubt must be an indication that it does not understand what the term means.”), cited in Victor, 511 U.S. at 26, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

. See also Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning To A Critical Concept, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 677, 688-89 (1995) ("[Ajlthough reasonable doubt is not a Latin term like res ipsa loquitur or a technical term like ‘accessory after the fact' or 'aider and abettor,' it is more than merely the sum of the two common words 'reasonable' and 'doubt.' It is a legal term of art.”).
Moreover, the fact that certain words are commonly used should not otherwise prevent them from being defined for the jury. Jury instructions frequently define simple words and phrases that are part of the everyday lexicon of the average lay juror, such as "attempt,” "knowingly,” "agreement,” and "conspiracy.” Cohen at 690 (citations omitted).

. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316—17, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (ruling that simply instructing a jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard does not satisfy the constitutional mandate of Winship; the Winship doctrine requires more than merely a trial ritual). As Judge Wiggins made plain in his dissent in Nolasco, "[sjimple repetition of the phrase 'beyond a reasonable doubt' does not adequately communicate to jurors the degree to which they must be convinced.” 926 F.2d at 874 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).

. Hypothetically, there are several scenarios in which a definition of reasonable doubt might be given. For example, (1) district courts could define reasonable doubt as a matter of course in all criminal cases; (2) district courts could give such an instruction at the request of either party; (3) such an instruction could be required only in response to a request from a defendant; or (4) a definition of reasonable doubt could be given when the jury’s confusion leads it to request one.
As noted, our review today is limited to the fourth scenario: whether a district court should define reasonable doubt when requested to do so by a criminal jury. I would reserve for another day questions as to whether reasonable doubt should be defined under other circumstances.

. See, e.g., N.L. Kerr, et al., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgment of Mock Jurors, 34 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 282, 292 (1976). In this study, the results of mock trials demonstrated that there was greater uncertainty among individual jurors and more disagreement within the jury as a whole when reasonable doubt was not defined, and that more deadlocked juries resulted.
In another study, D.U. Strawn & R.W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Judicature 478, 480-81 (1976), researchers conducted a series of studies on jurors in Florida and collected the following data: twenty-three percent believed that when the evidence was evenly balanced between guilt and innocence, the defendant should be convicted; only fifty percent understood that the defendant did not have to present any evidence of his innocence; two percent thought the burden of proving innocence rested on the defendant. Based on these findings, the authors concluded in a subsequent article that jurors should be advised that certain phrases in instructions do not have their ordinary *704meaning, but instead have specific legal meaning, including "burden of proof" and "reasonable doubt”. D.U. Strawn, et al., Reaching a Verdict, Step by Step, 60 Judicature 383, 387 (1977).

. In support of this determination, Judge Er-vin points to our decision in United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir.1998), where we wrote that "efforts to define reasonable doubt are likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept....” However, this language does not necessarily indicate that the term is incapable of definition or that a proper definition should not be given. Indeed, notwithstanding our traditional skepticism of defining reasonable doubt, we have approved of some of the definitions offered by trial courts. See, e.g., United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1060 (4th Cir.1985) (while arguing that reasonable doubt definitions only confuse juries, we wrote, "In no way [was the definition offered by the court] 'misleading or confusing’ and, viewed in the context of the charge as a whole, [the court’s definition] ‘correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt.’ ”); United States v. Mahabir, 1997 WL 297498, at *5 (4th Cir. June 4, 1997) (per curiam) (holding that the FJC definition of reasonable doubt offered by the district *705court was a "cogent” statement of the reasonable doubt standard).

. The last sentence of the instruction adopted by the New Jersey court in Medina reads, "If, on the other hand, you are not firmly convinced of defendant’s guilt, you must give defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.” Id. at 1252.

. In this regard, Professor Solan thus recommends that the FJC instruction, as modified by the court in Medina, be adopted and given by those courts that have not yet done so, arguing that the superiority of this instruction stems
not from its semantic fidelity to the reasonable doubt standard but from its greater success in promoting important values. To lose sight of this point is to accept a formulaic approach to our system of criminal justice rather than an approach that recognizes the values that led to the adoption of the reasonable doubt standard in the first place.
Id. at 145.

. The “hesitate to act” instruction suggested by Judge Widener, ante at 700, is also a suitable alternative, even though that particular instruction has been subject to criticism. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 24-25, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Likewise, giving the FJC instruction in its original form would be a far superior practice than simply ignoring a perplexed jury’s request.

. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Weeks v. Angelone, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), does not impact the -views expressed in this opinion. Weeks involved a habeas corpus petitioner who sought relief from his state court conviction and death sentence. As such, the petitioner was obliged to demonstrate a violation of clearly established Federal law to be entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West 1994 & Supp.1999). The specific issue before the Court was whether "the Constitution is violated when a trial judge directs a capital jury's attention to a specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circumstances.” Id. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 729. Finding no constitutional violation, the Court denied relief.
By contrast, our ability to find error in this case is not confined to constitutional violations because, in evaluating the propriety of reasonable doubt instructions, “the Constitution is not our only benchmark.” Williams, 20 F.3d at 128. Even if the district court's refusal to define reasonable doubt in response to the jury’s request does not run afoul of the Constitution, we may find error "if we are persuaded that the district court’s juty instruction is not acceptable.” Id. Our basis for doing so rests in the inherent supervisory powers of federal courts, pursuant to which we “may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress .... to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Pursuant to the inherent supervisory power of-this Court, we should require dis*707trict courts to define reasonable doubt when presented with a jury request to do so.

. Since I would establish a new rule for criminal prosecutions requiring district courts in this Circuit to define reasonable doubt when requested to do so by the jury, I am compelled to vote to reverse the convictions in this case and remand for retrial. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (holding that new rules for criminal prosecutions must be applied retroactively to all cases not yet final, including cases pending on direct appeal).