Court Opinion

ID: 9576765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:28:18.232812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:26.810123
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although there appear to be no Georgia opinions directly on point, a series of opinions from other jurisdictions apply an exception to the hearsay rule when considering labels which are required by law to show the contents of the container. The reasoning of these cases is sound and consistent with the general principles of Georgia law, and the evidence should be admitted.
“The statutory exceptions to the rule against the admission of hearsay are not exhaustive and exclusive of all other cases. [Cit.] An exception will be allowed ‘from necessity’ where ‘necessity’ and ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ are established. [Cit.]” McKissick v. State, 263 Ga. 188, 189 (3) (429 SE2d 655) (1993). Roper v. State, 263 Ga. 201, 202 (2) (429 SE2d 668) (1993); OCGA § 24-3-1 (b).
Case law from other jurisdictions confirms the majority’s conclusion that the label on the can of paint is hearsay. See, e.g., In re Michael G., 19 Cal.App.4th 1674 (24 Cal.Rptr.2d 260) (1993) (label on can of spray paint); Moore v. State, 811 SW2d 848 (Mo. App. 1991) (label on pharmaceutical container); In the Interest of T D., 115 Ill.App.3d 872 (450 NE2d 455) (1983) (label on tube of glue); Wirth v. State, 55 Wis.2d 11 (197 NW2d 731) (1972) (label on medication bottle); State v. Mitchell, 18 Ohio App.2d 1 (246 NE2d 586) (1969) (label on drug bottle). But in each of these cases, the court held that the label could be introduced into evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule.
In In re Michael G., a California appellate court affirmed an order declaring the defendant to be a ward of the court by reason of his possession of a substance containing toluene with the intent to inhale for the purpose of intoxication. The court applied a California statute establishing a hearsay exception for “published compilations” that were “generally used and relied upon as accurate in the course of a business.” Id. at 1677. The court reasoned,
*243A label including (rather than excluding) a hazardous substance is inherently trustworthy, in that a manufacturer would have no interest in proclaiming that the product contained such a substance if in fact it did not. . . . The trial court was thus entitled to take judicial notice that the public relies on the dangers and antidotes listed on a label as a matter of common knowledge, and to conclude that the label was generally used and relied on as accurate in the course of a business within the meaning of the [published] compilation exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 1678. Although this result is based on a specific statute, the court found that the labels were inherently trustworthy. And cases from other jurisdictions have found information from labels admissible in the absence of a statutory exception to the hearsay rule.
In Moore, a defendant appealed an order suspending his driving privileges on the ground that he was convicted of driving under the influence based on hearsay evidence. 811 SW2d at 850. With regard to a blood test to determine blood alcohol content, a Missouri statute required the blood tester to use a “sterile needle and sterile vessel” to draw the blood and a “nonalcoholic antiseptic” to clean the skin. The phlebotomist’s testimony that the two items were sterile and that the antiseptic was nonalcoholic was based on the label on their respective packages. The court therefore had to address whether the labels, which were obviously hearsay, could be used to prove the contents of the containers to which the labels were attached.
The Missouri appellate court stated,
labels placed on pharmaceutical and hazardous substances suffice to establish “circumstantial probability of trustworthiness,” and are admissible as evidence to prove the contents of the substances in the containers to which the labels are attached. [Cit.] Otherwise, an array of witnesses would be required to establish qualitative analyses of substances as well as production control and packaging in order for the items to be admissible in evidence.
811 SW2d at 850. The court held that this situation warranted a special exception to the traditional hearsay rule. Id. at 852 (and cases cited therein from Iowa and Maine).
In In the Interest of T. D., the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed an adjudication of wardship alleging a minor had sniffed glue containing “toluol” in violation of state law. 450 NE2d at 456. The court noted that the label was a statement by the manufacturer as to the contents of the product. Id. at 457. The court disagreed that the label *244fell within Illinois’ business record or public document exceptions to the hearsay rule, but found that the label was sufficiently trustworthy to be an exception. Id. at 459. The court went on to explain that it found trustworthiness because the label was required by state law, any misinformation would be a violation of the law and would probably provide a basis for civil liability on the manufacturer, and there was no indication of tampering or adulteration of the contents. Id.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed a conviction of misuse of narcotics which was based in part on a label which stated the bottle contained a substance containing codeine, a narcotic. Wirth, 197 NW2d at 733-734. Citing Wigmore on Evidence, the court held that the surrounding circumstances were sufficient to show probability of trustworthiness of the label and the fact that the substance in the bottle contained a narcotic. Id. at 733. The court quoted Professor Wigmore’s third edition,
“We see that under certain circumstances the probability of accuracy and trustworthiness of [the] statement is practically sufficient, if not quite equivalent to that of statements tested in the conventional manner. ... It is merely that common sense and experience have from time to time pointed them out as practically adequate substitutes for the ordinary test, at least, in view of the necessity of the situation. [5 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.), p. 204, § 1422.]”
Id.
The Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 USC §§ 1261-1278, and the corresponding regulations, 16 CFR 1500, require labeling of substances deemed hazardous, including toluene, with the common or usual name or chemical name of the substance. Failure to provide such a label is considered misbranding and is a violation. 16 CFR 1500.3. As stated in In re Michael G., there is no incentive for the manufacturer to label a product as containing a substance when in fact it did not.
A necessity for an exception to the hearsay rule is established by the fact that an array of witnesses would be necessary to qualitatively analyze the container’s contents and to establish production control and packaging in order to introduce the evidence. Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness for the information contained on these labels are established by the federal law requiring labels, the ubiquitous use of product labels in our society, and the common reliance on these labels. Thus the elements of the necessity exception to the hearsay rule are present, and the can and its label should be allowed into evidence. See McKissick v. State, 263 Ga. at 189. This rule would be strictly limited to the presence of the hazardous sub*245stance, and not to its quantity or quality, and only to those substances required by law to be identified on the label.
Decided June 28, 1999
Reconsideration denied July 21, 1999
Coppedge, Leman & Ward, David L. McGuffey, for appellant.
Kermit N. McManus, District Attorney, Matthew A. Rankin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Finally, contrary to the statement in the majority opinion, the dissent does not rely on Commonwealth v. Harvey, 666 A2d 1108 (Pa. 1995).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Johnson joins in this dissent.