Court Opinion

ID: 9539202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 11:09:26.892566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:36.677320
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 3, 2023

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-21-00439-CR
                           ———————————
               DARRELL ANTHONY ADELL, JR., Appellant
                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 149th District Court
                           Brazoria County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 87429-CR

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found appellant, Darrell Anthony Adell, Jr., guilty of the felony

offense of murder1 and assessed his punishment at confinement for life. In sixteen

issues, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b), (c).
conviction, his appeal should be abated, and the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress evidence, admitting certain evidence, and denying his motion

for mistrial and motion for new trial.

      We affirm.

                                    Background

Complainant’s Mother

      Yolanda Cantu testified that she was the mother of the complainant, Trish

Rodriguez, who was thirty-nine years old at the time of her death. According to

Yolanda, after the complainant graduated college, she worked at Dow Chemical at

the Lake Jackson office. Yolanda and the complainant’s sister, Monica, previously

lived with the complainant at the complainant’s house located at 54 Greenvale

Court in Lake Jackson, Texas. When the complainant married Robert Rathkamp,

he moved into the complainant’s home with the complainant, Yolanda, and

Monica. Eventually, the complainant and Rathkamp separated and divorced after

the complainant became pregnant with appellant’s child.           After becoming

pregnant, the complainant stopped “hear[ing] from” appellant, and the complainant

subsequently terminated her pregnancy.

      Later, after the complainant’s divorce, the complainant and appellant entered

into a relationship, and the complainant became pregnant again with appellant’s

child. The complainant was excited about the baby and had “always wanted to

                                         2
have a baby.”     “[A]t first,” appellant was “around” during the complainant’s

pregnancy, but when the complainant found out that appellant had “another

girlfriend,” the complainant and appellant stopped “seeing each other.” Appellant

did not attend any doctors’ appointments with the complainant during her

pregnancy. The complainant’s child, T.A.A.R. (the “child”), was born on February

6, 2017. After the child’s birth, the complainant called appellant. The child lived

with the complainant, Yolanda, and Monica at the complainant’s house following

his birth.

       When the complainant returned to work after the child’s birth, the child went

to “Kool Kidz” daycare. The daycare was not far from the complainant’s home—

about five minutes away. The daycare was also close to the complainant’s work,2

and the complainant would leave work during the day to visit the child and to

breastfeed him when he was an infant. The complainant “always check[ed] on [the

child] on her breaks” from work.

       According to Yolanda, the complainant normally dropped the child off at

daycare, and the complainant normally picked the child up from daycare.

Occasionally, appellant would pick the child up from daycare.             When the

complainant had to travel for work, appellant was responsible for dropping the

2
       Yolanda testified that the complainant’s office was about ten minutes from the
       complainant’s home.

                                          3
child off at daycare in the morning because the child would be staying with

appellant while the complainant traveled.

        Yolanda further testified that she and Monica continued to live with the

complainant until November 2017. And after she and Monica moved out of the

complainant’s home in November 2017, the complainant and the child lived there

together. In December 2017, Yolanda became aware that the complainant and

appellant were back in a relationship.

        In January 2018, appellant moved into the complainant’s home.      After

appellant moved into the complainant’s home, Yolanda’s visits with the

complainant and the child decreased, and she only visited when appellant was not

around. Appellant and the complainant remained in a relationship until December

2018.

        At some point in early 2019, Yolanda learned that the complainant and

appellant were no longer in a relationship. The complainant seemed upset about

the breakup but also relieved. The complainant was the person that ended the

relationship, and she “seemed more herself” and happier. She “seem[ed] like she

was going to be able to finally move on.”

        On February 9, 2019, Yolanda attended a birthday party for the child at

appellant’s house in Angleton, Texas. Appellant had purchased his house around

November 2017. In February 2019, the house appeared to be “under construction.”

                                         4
      On February 15, 2019, Yolanda saw the complainant and the child, and the

complainant told Yolanda that she had asked appellant to leave her house. The

complainant said that “she was going for full custody and child support but that

[appellant] mustn’t know until right before the [court] date.”3 The complainant

specifically told Yolanda that appellant “couldn’t know about the child support

until right before the court date,” which was supposed to be at the beginning of

March 2019.     The complainant also told Yolanda that her relationship with

appellant “wasn’t meant to be.” And she said: “Mama, I can’t tell you what he did

to me. I just can’t tell you.” The complainant was trembling when she said that.

The complainant and Yolanda discussed changing the locks to the complainant’s

home, but they were not changed prior to the complainant’s death.

      Yolanda subsequently saw the complainant on February 16, 2019 and on

February 17, 2019. On February 17, 2019, the complainant spent some time

loading appellant’s “stuff” from the complainant’s home into her sport utility

vehicle (“SUV”). When Yolanda left the complainant’s home on February 17,

2019, the complainant was going to go to appellant’s home to drop off his things.

Yolanda either spoke to the complainant on the telephone or communicated with

the complainant by text message on February 18, 2019.           Yolanda and the

complainant made plans to spend the day together on February 22, 2019, along
3
      Yolanda noted that previously in 2017, the complainant had asked for child
      support, but “child support [was not] established” then.

                                        5
with the child and Monica. The complainant also had plans to see a friend on

February 22, 2019 for a playdate with the child at about 3:00 p.m.

      On February 19, 2019, the complainant came to Yolanda’s house with the

child to cook dinner. While at Yolanda’s home, the complainant discussed that

appellant would be picking up the child from daycare on February 21, 2019

because the complainant was meeting up with her friend, Bryn Mikel. But the

complainant was still going to take the child to daycare on the morning of February

21, 2019. The complainant and the child left Yolanda’s home about 8:45 p.m. or

9:00 p.m. on February 19, 2019 and went home. The complainant called Yolanda

when she arrived home that night. Before the complainant left on February 19,

2019, Yolanda reminded her to lock all the doors and windows at her house, and

the complainant responded: “Yes, [m]ama.”

      On February 20, 2019, Yolanda spoke to the complainant on the telephone

twice. Yolanda believed, based on her conversations with the complainant, that the

complainant planned to eat dinner with the child at her home that night. The last

time that Yolanda spoke to the complainant was on February 20, 2019.

      Yolanda explained that on February 21, 2019, she did not hear from the

complainant.    At about 8:30 a.m., Yolanda became concerned because the

                                         6
complainant had not called her that morning, which was unusual.4 Yolanda called

the complainant repeatedly and sent her multiple text messages. At 5:00 p.m.,

Yolanda left work and went straight to the complainant’s home.

      When Yolanda arrived, she saw the complainant’s SUV in the driveway,

which was unusual. Yolanda went to the front door of the complainant’s house

and found it unlocked. The glass storm door attached to the wooden front door

was also unlocked and a pair of keys was in the lock of the wooden front door.

The wooden front door was slightly open, and the whole house was dark. It was

unusual for the complainant’s house to be dark if the complainant was home.

      Yolanda walked into the primary bedroom. She heard “water running,” so

she went into the primary bathroom and turned on the light.              She saw the

complainant’s body in the bathtub.5       When she touched the complainant, the

complainant was “ice-cold.” Yolanda started screaming, rushed to the living room,

and called for emergency assistance.6

4
      Yolanda testified that the complainant called her every morning before work while
      she was driving the child to daycare.
5
      The trial court admitted into evidence photographs of the complainant’s body in
      the bathtub.
6
      The trial court admitted into evidence the audio recording of Yolanda’s telephone
      call for emergency assistance. During the call, Yolanda stated that she had not
      heard from the complainant all day and she had come to the complainant’s house.
      The complainant was naked, “ice-cold,” and bleeding, and “[t]here was no way
      that [the complainant] could have killed herself.” Yolanda stated that she did not
      know the whereabouts of the child, who was two years old at the time.

                                           7
      As to the complainant’s general behaviors, Yolanda explained that the

complainant always ate healthily. She was not clumsy and was very athletic. The

complainant never left the front door open to allow a visitor to just walk into her

house. And she never left a key in her front door to allow someone to let himself

in even if she knew the person was coming over. The complainant kept her home

locked. She would not have left the front door to her house open all day.

      According to Yolanda, the key that opened the wooden front door of the

complainant’s house fit the home’s other exterior doors, including the back door

and the side door in the primary bedroom; every door used the same key except for

the glass storm door that was attached to the wooden front door on the

complainant’s home. And the complainant did not drink wine or champagne in the

bathtub. As to appellant, Yolanda stated that she had never seen appellant “get

physical” with the complainant.

Complainant’s Friend Weaver

      Patricia Weaver testified that she worked at Dow Chemical and she met the

complainant around 2011 or 2012. After a while of working together, she and the

complainant became friends. In 2012, the complainant was married to Rathkamp,

but she later got divorced. After the complainant’s divorce, Weaver learned that

the complainant was seeing appellant, but there were times when the complainant

and appellant “were not seeing each other.”

                                         8
      In 2016, Weaver found out that the complainant was pregnant with the child.

The complainant was excited about her pregnancy.            But, when Weaver met

appellant in 2016, she felt that the complainant “was much more smitten with him

than he was with her.”      In October 2016, the complainant came to speak to

Weaver, and the complainant was very upset. She told Weaver that appellant had

been cheating on her.

      When it was time for the complainant to give birth to the child, Weaver

drove her to the hospital, accompanied by Yolanda and Monica. Appellant came

to the hospital after the complainant had given birth to the child.

      Around February 11, 2019, Weaver spoke to the complainant about her

relationship with appellant. Weaver told the complainant that if appellant “was

cheating on her again that she should . . . get legal things settled with him with

regard[] to [the child].” Weaver and the complainant also discussed appellant

moving out of the complainant’s home. Weaver told the complainant that “it

would be best if she had an amicable split with [appellant] . . . and then she could

go on with permanent changes to her home, like changing [the] locks.”

      Weaver saw the complainant on February 17, 2019, and the complainant was

very happy. By that time, appellant was living in his home in Angleton, and the

complainant was living at her house with the child.

                                           9
        When Weaver saw the complainant for lunch on February 19, 2019, though,

the complainant’s mood had shifted; she appeared concerned. Weaver saw the

complainant again on February 20, 2019, and she appeared “very antsy, very

nervous.” Weaver offered to let the complainant stay at her house on the night of

February 20, 2019, but the complainant declined the offer.

        On February 21, 2019, Weaver did not see the complainant at work. Weaver

thought it was unusual that the complainant missed a work meeting that morning

because the complainant always called Weaver when she was not going to come to

work, yet she had not called.

        In the afternoon, Weaver went to the complainant’s office because other

co-workers had noticed that the complainant was not at work. The complainant’s

office was dark, and the door was locked. Weaver spoke to other co-workers,

including the complainant’s supervisor, and no one had seen her at work. When

Weaver checked the complainant’s work calendar, the complainant had a full day

of meetings scheduled for that day, which she had missed.

        The complainant was a responsible person, and she would not have

intentionally missed a full day of work meetings. Weaver attempted to call the

complainant and sent her text messages. Weaver and Sandra Springs, another

co-worker and friend, decided to go to the complainant’s home to see if she was

okay.

                                        10
      When Weaver arrived at the complainant’s house on February 21, 2019, it

was dark, but Weaver saw the complainant’s SUV at the house. Weaver initially

drove past the complainant’s house. When she drove back by the house, another

car was parked outside. Weaver rolled down her windows, and she could hear

“someone screaming that [the complainant] was dead.” Weaver saw Yolanda and

Monica come out of the complainant’s house.

      As to the complainant generally, Weaver testified that the complainant had

surveillance video cameras installed at her home and she was able to check the

surveillance video cameras through an application on her cellular telephone. The

complainant was excited about her career and had future career goals.

Complainant’s Friend Springs

      Springs testified that she worked at Dow Chemical and she met the

complainant there around 2004 or 2005.         Over the years, Springs and the

complainant developed a friendship. When Springs would visit the complainant’s

home, she would “walk up to the door and knock on the glass [storm] door,” which

was usually locked. The complainant did not leave a key in the front door of her

home. And Springs never let herself into the complainant’s home herself. The

complainant kept her home well-lit.

      Previously, the complainant lived with Yolanda and Monica, and eventually

Rathkamp, the complainant’s husband, moved in.         After the complainant got

                                        11
divorced, Springs learned, around 2015 or 2016, that the complainant was dating

appellant.7

      In 2016, the complainant became pregnant with the child, and appellant was

the father.   The complainant was very excited about the pregnancy.        At the

beginning of the pregnancy, the complainant and appellant were in a relationship,

but at some point during the complainant’s pregnancy, the relationship ended.

After the child was born and the complainant had returned to work, Springs

learned that the complainant and appellant “were trying to work things out.” In

2018, appellant moved into the complainant’s house, and Yolanda and Monica

moved out.     Appellant lived with the complainant for a little over a year.

Appellant moved out of the complainant’s home in February 2019.

      During Springs’s last conversation with the complainant, she asked the

complainant if she would be Springs’s “backup driver to take [her] to [her] dental

surgery” on February 22, 2019 if Springs’s husband was unable to do so. The

complainant told Springs that she would rearrange her schedule for Springs if

Springs’s husband could not drive her to the surgery.

      On February 21, 2019, Springs attempted to contact the complainant at work

about giving her a ride to her surgery the next day. Springs tried to contact the

complainant through an internal messaging system at work, but the system never
7
      Springs noted that she later learned that the complainant had an affair with
      appellant during her marriage to Rathkamp.

                                        12
showed that the complainant was at work that day.            Springs also called the

complainant and sent her text messages later in the day, but she did not receive a

response. It was unlike the complainant to not show up when she was supposed to

be somewhere.

      When Springs could not get ahold of the complainant, she had another

co-worker go by the complainant’s office. The co-worker found the office door

locked and the lights off. This concerned Springs because it was unusual behavior

for the complainant.     Eventually, Springs and Weaver decided to go to the

complainant’s home.

      At the complainant’s house, Springs saw the complainant’s SUV in the

driveway. After initially driving by the complainant’s house, Springs returned and

saw Yolanda’s car there. Springs saw the front door to the complainant’s house

open. Yolanda came out yelling that the complainant “was dead.” Yolanda also

said that appellant “did this.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

Complainant’s Friend Mikel

      Mikel testified that the complainant was one of her best friends. Mikel

previously worked at Dow Chemical and met the complainant through work.

Whenever Mikel went over to the complainant’s home, she would knock on the

front door or ring the doorbell. The complainant did not leave a key in the front

                                          13
door for Mikel to use to come in on her own.              Mikel also noted that the

complainant was not clumsy.

      According to Mikel, while the complainant was married to Rathkamp, she

became pregnant, but appellant,8 not Rathkamp, was the father of her child. The

complainant terminated that pregnancy. The complainant told Mikel that she had

“been with” appellant while she was married.

      In 2016, the complainant became pregnant again. Appellant was the child’s

father. During the complainant’s pregnancy, her relationship with appellant was

“on and off.” Mikel described the complainant and appellant’s relationship as

“very tumultuous.”      At one point while the complainant was pregnant, the

complainant “found out that [appellant] was seeing another woman,” and she

stopped speaking to appellant after that. The complainant did not tell appellant

that she gave birth to the child until after the child was born.

      After the child’s birth, the complainant and appellant did not immediately

resume their relationship. Around the child’s first birthday, appellant reached out

to the complainant about “try[ing] [to] have [a] relationship again.” “[A]ll [the

complainant] wanted was for them to be a family and [to] have a family for [the

child].” The complainant “really wanted to make [the relationship with appellant]

work.”    Mikel noted that the timing of appellant’s renewed interest in a
8
      Mikel stated that she had met appellant at work while appellant worked at Dow
      Chemical.

                                           14
relationship with the complainant “seemed odd” because it coincided with the

complainant and appellant’s discussions to “renegotiate” their custody and support

agreement related to the child.     Appellant appeared “opportunistic.”      But the

complainant decided to enter into a relationship with appellant again.

      At some point after the complainant resumed her relationship with appellant,

Yolanda and Monica moved out of the complainant’s home, and appellant moved

in. As to the complainant’s relationship with appellant, Mikel stated that “[t]here

w[ere] always . . . problems going on and trouble.” But the complainant stayed

with appellant because she “really want[ed] to make [it] work.” By late 2018

though, the complainant had realized that the relationship was “not going to work”

and she “need[ed] to move on.”

      Mikel stated that during the complainant’s relationship with appellant it was

“more difficult” to spend “time with her because [the complainant] would kind of

have . . . restrictions” and “could only meet” on certain days.9 Mikel and the

complainant had to make plans far in advance to see each other. If Mikel and the

complainant ever planned to get together and the complainant needed to cancel,

she would always tell Mikel. She would never just not show up.

9
      Mikel noted that while the complainant was in a relationship with appellant, she
      spent less time with her family. Appellant’s demeanor with the complainant’s
      family was “cold.” He was not “family-friendly.”

                                         15
      According to Mikel, she and the complainant mainly communicated through

text messages.    And the complainant was very responsive to Mikel’s text

messages. On February 20, 2019, Mikel and the complainant had a text message

conversation about their plans to go to a salon and then to dinner on the evening of

February 21, 2019. In that text message conversation, they spoke about how they

could not wait to see each other the next day.

      On February 21, 2019, Mikel sent the complainant a text message in the

morning to tell the complainant “how excited [she] was to see her.”             The

complainant did not respond, which Mikel thought was weird. Later in the day,

Mikel sent the complainant a text message stating that she was “on [her] way to the

salon.”

      When the complainant did not meet her at the salon, Mikel knew that

something was wrong.       Mikel called the complainant several times, but the

complainant did not answer.      Mikel then sent a text message to appellant at

5:48 p.m. on February 21, 2019 that said:

      Hey [appellant] it’s [Mikel]. I haven’t heard from [the complainant]
      and she was supposed to meet me over 20 minutes ago at our . . . appt.
      [H]ave you heard from her??

Appellant responded to Mikel’s text message at 8:01 p.m., stating:

      No. She messaged me last night but nothing from today. I picked up
      [the child] this morning and he’ll be with me through the weekend but
      we didn’t speak. I believe she is avoiding me. Things have[] been
      []growing weird since she came back from her last trip.
                                         16
At 8:02 p.m., appellant sent Mikel another text message, saying:

      Did [you] get a hold over [sic] her? My family is here at the house
      right now. We are supposed to have dinner here tomorrow but she
      hasn’t mentioned anything about it.

Mikel responded to appellant’s text messages at 8:02 p.m., stating:

      Okay. Well glad [the child] is safe and sound with you. I still haven’t
      heard from her and I’m a little worried. I don’t have anyone else’s
      phone number to contact.

Appellant then told Mikel that he would “call [the complainant] after dinner.”

Complainant’s Friend Janeth

      Janeth Rodriguez testified that she worked at Dow Chemical and had met

complainant through work. In October 2017, at a lunch with the complainant,

Janeth learned that the complainant and appellant had a child together but were not

in a relationship. From October 2017 onward, Janeth and the complainant stayed

in contact. In 2018, the complainant and appellant “got[] back together.”

      Janeth attended the child’s second birthday party on February 9, 2019, which

was held at a house in Angleton. The complainant and appellant did not interact a

lot during the party. The home where the party was held was being remodeled.

      Janeth further testified that she had lunch with the complainant on

February 18, 2019. During their lunch, the complainant said that she and appellant

were not in a relationship anymore. The breakup “was fresh”; the complainant

said that she and appellant “had split up the week before.”             It was the
                                        17
complainant’s decision to end the relationship, and she felt comfortable with her

decision. The complainant also expressed concern about Janeth sending her text

messages because it appeared that the complainant’s text messages were being

monitored.

        According to Janeth, on February 18, 2019, only the complainant and the

child were living at the complainant’s home. Appellant “was moving his things

out.” The last time that Janeth heard from the complainant was on February 18,

2019.

Complainant’s Friend Welch

        Lauren Welch testified that she worked at Dow Chemical and had met the

complainant at work. Because she and the complainant had children near the same

age, they would have playdates together. At some point, after the child was born,

Welch learned that the complainant was in a relationship with appellant.

        Welch and the complainant had set up a playdate for their children on

February 22, 2019. They ran into each other at work on February 19, 2019, and

the complainant “looked distressed” and said that they “need[ed] to catch up.”

That night, Welch reached out to the complainant by text message and asked to get

together with her on the afternoon of February 22, 2019. They made plans for the

complainant and the child to go to Welch’s home that day.

                                        18
      During Welch’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of

the text message conversation between Welch and the complainant, during which

they made plans for a playdate on February 22, 2019 around 2:30 p.m. or 3:00 p.m.

In her text messages to Welch, the complainant used the letter “u” instead of the

word “you.” The complainant responded to Welch’s text messages promptly.

      Welch testified that the complainant never called to cancel their plans for

February 22, 2019. Welch found out on the evening of February 21, 2019 that the

complainant had died.

Complainant’s Cousin Kimberly

      Kimberly Cantu, the complainant’s cousin, testified that while the

complainant was married, she had an affair with appellant. The complainant met

appellant while they both worked at Dow Chemical. As a result of the affair, the

complainant got divorced.

      In December 2015, Kimberly became aware that the complainant was in a

relationship with appellant again.     At some point, the complainant became

pregnant, and appellant was the father of the child. The complainant told Kimberly

about her pregnancy in August 2016. At the time, the complainant and appellant

were still in a relationship, and the complainant was excited about having the child.

In November 2016, though, Kimberly learned that the complainant and appellant

had broken up because appellant “had another girlfriend in California.”

                                         19
      The complainant had the child on February 6, 2017. The complainant and

appellant were not in a relationship when the child was born. In December 2017,

the complainant told Kimberly that she and appellant were back in a relationship.

The complainant and appellant’s relationship continued into 2018.

      In 2018, Kimberly learned that appellant had bought a house in Angleton.

But appellant still lived at the complainant’s home. In 2018, the complainant also

notified Kimberly that she had concerns about her text messages being monitored.

      During Kimberly’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy

of a text message conversation between Kimberly and the complainant from June

10, 2018. In the conversation, the complainant told Kimberly: “I need to catch u[10]

up on my life” and “[b]ut not over phone or text.” Kimberly then asked: “Are

things rough with you and A,”11 and the complainant responded: “Yeppers.”

Kimberly replied: “Don’t tell me they are being monitored.” And the complainant

said: “Might be[]”12 and “[i]t’s better to talk in person anyways.”13

      Kimberly further testified that the complainant and appellant remained in a

relationship through the end of 2018 and into January 2019. But in February 2019,

10
      Kimberly noted that the complainant used the letter “u” instead of the word “you”
      in her text messages.
11
      Kimberly testified that “A” meant appellant’s name.
12
      Kimberly testified that the complainant meant that her text messages “[m]ight be”
      being monitored.
13
      Kimberly also testified that the complainant used the letter “r” instead of the word
      “are” in her text messages.

                                           20
Kimberly learned that the complainant and appellant had broken up.                 The

complainant sent Kimberly text messages on February 16, 2019, which was the last

conversation that Kimberly had with the complainant. In those text messages,

Kimberly learned that it was the complainant’s idea to break up with appellant.

      During Kimberly’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy

of Kimberly’s text message conversation with the complainant on February 16,

2019. In the conversation, Kimberly asked the complainant if she and appellant

were “[r]eady for marriage,” and the complainant replied: “Well[] no. He is

moving out and I’m staying here. I asked him to leave earlier this week.” The

complainant further stated that appellant did not “have much left” at her house and

that he had “been taking stuff most of the week.” The complainant explained:

      I mean it sucks and it hurts but I’m sure this is what is needed[.] He
      was never going to marry me....I realized that awhile ago[.] So I
      wanted to get thru holidays and [the child’s] birthday and gave myself
      alot of time to think about it[.]

Further, the complainant told Kimberly that the breakup was her idea. And that

she had told appellant that they “should stop and go [their] separate ways and focus

on coparenting [the child],” and “[h]e said ok.” The complainant told appellant:

“[U][14] should move to ur[15] house in angleton and I should stay here and he said

14
      The complainant used the letter “u” instead of the word “you” in her text messages
      to Kimberly.
15
      The complainant used the letters “ur” in her text messages to Kimberly.

                                          21
Ok.” The complainant said that she and appellant “r on good terms” but she was

“ready to move on with [her] life.”

      Kimberly testified that at the end of her text message conversation with the

complainant on February 16, 2019, she and the complainant made plans for the

complainant and the child to visit Kimberly on February 23, 2019.               The

complainant and the child were going to spend the night at Kimberly’s house.

Kimberly never received a follow-up text message or telephone call from the

complainant canceling their plans.

      As to the complainant’s behaviors generally, Kimberly testified that the

complainant was not clumsy. She did not fall or trip or bump her head on things.

When Kimberly would visit the complainant at the complainant’s house, the

complainant never left a key in the door for Kimberly to use to unlock the door and

come into the house.     If Kimberly ever found the wooden front door of the

complainant’s house unlocked, then the glass storm door was always locked. Even

when the complainant knew that Kimberly was coming over to visit, Kimberly

would still have to ring the doorbell to be let into the complainant’s home. And the

complainant always had “every light in the house on” if she was home. Kimberly

also noted that the complainant had surveillance video cameras at her house.

      As to the complainant and appellant’s relationship generally, Kimberly

testified that the complainant tried to make her relationship with appellant work.

                                        22
Kimberly did not have any knowledge about appellant ever “beat[ing]” up the

complainant. But Kimberly stated that the complainant would not have told her

that kind of information because the complainant was “[t]oo proud.” Kimberly

observed that appellant was emotionally abusive to the complainant. And when

the complainant would travel for work appellant would not let her “FaceTime”16

with the child.

Complainant’s Therapist

      Angela Gaston, a licensed clinical social worker, testified that she had been

the complainant’s therapist. The complainant began seeing Gaston in 2015, while

the complainant was still married to Rathkamp, because she had an affair and “she

was trying to sort through her marriage and see what she wanted to do.”

Eventually, the complainant got divorced, and Gaston became aware that the

complainant was in a new relationship with appellant.                After that, the

complainant’s therapy sessions focused on the complainant’s relationship issues

with appellant.

      According to Gaston, the complainant’s relationship with appellant was not

a healthy one. Appellant was verbally and emotionally abusive. At some point,

16
      “FaceTime is a[] [cellular telephone] application that allows individuals to make
      video calls from telephones. FaceTime also may be run from other electronic
      devices.” See Perone v. State, No. 14-12-00969-CV, 2014 WL 1481318, at *2
      (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 15, 2014, no pet.) (not designated for
      publication) (internal footnotes omitted).

                                          23
the complainant became pregnant. Although “emotionally the [complainant’s]

relationship [with appellant] was very difficult,” the complainant was excited to

have a child and to “be a mom.”

      At one time, Gaston advised the complainant to end her relationship with

appellant. And although the complainant “would try” to do so, “something would

happen” and the complainant and appellant “would get back together.”              For

instance, appellant would “give [the complainant] a call” or they would “run into

each other and start talking again.”       Gaston stated that appellant gave the

complainant “a lot of mixed messages” and he would “talk[] to other women,”

which upset the complainant. One day, appellant would “want[] to be together and

then the next day he didn’t.” The relationship was “a constant roller coaster.”

Gaston found appellant’s behavior to be manipulative and controlling.

      While reviewing portions of her notes from her therapy sessions with the

complainant, Gaston stated that appellant did not want to pay child support. The

complainant felt “[f]earful of [appellant’s] intentions and [the] impact on” the child

and she felt that she could not trust appellant. (Internal quotations omitted.) In

January 2018, complainant reported to Gaston that appellant was upset with her

and she felt “vulnerable and used.” (Internal quotations omitted.)          Appellant

“ha[d] turned her life upside down again.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

                                         24
      In May 2018, the complainant told Gaston that she felt appellant was

deceitful and had been giving her “mixed messages.”             (Internal quotations

omitted.)   The complainant had confronted appellant about his inappropriate

relationship with another woman, and appellant “responded by being angry and

denying any inappropriate behavior.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In June 2018,

the complainant reported to Gaston that she felt appellant was “emotionally

abusive to her” because he would not allow her to see the child on FaceTime while

she was traveling for work. (Internal quotations omitted.) And in September

2018, the complainant expressed that she was fearful of appellant.

      Gaston opined that appellant’s behavior constituted “emotional blackmail”

because it made the complainant “afraid that if she didn’t do what [appellant]

said,” “he would . . . keep the child from her.” The complainant was fearful of

appellant because he had threatened to take the child and leave so that she would

never see the child again.

      Gaston also testified that the complainant had turned down promotions at

work because appellant did not want her to take a job that required her to relocate.

The complainant told Gaston that appellant had “difficulty coping when things d[id

not] go his way” and when appellant would “get[] upset,” the complainant would

try to “be less reactive” so that their conflicts would be less. (Internal quotations

omitted.)

                                         25
      Numerous times the complainant told Gaston that she was fearful of

appellant, but she did not tell Gaston that appellant physically abused her.

However, the complainant did report that appellant had threatened her by saying:

“You better not push me,” and by referring to “his past and knowing . . . people

[who] could . . . harm her.”     (Internal quotations omitted.)      Gaston more

specifically explained that appellant “had warned [the complainant] not to push

him and that he knew people [who] could make her disappear.” And appellant

“basically warn[ed] her about his past,” by telling her that “he could never talk

about [it] because it was so dangerous.” The complainant never expressed fear

about anyone other than appellant. Appellant never attended a therapy session

with the complainant.

      During Gaston’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence copies of

Gaston’s notes from her therapy sessions with the complainant. In March 2017,

the complainant reported that appellant did not want to pay child support related to

the child, but they were able to reach a temporary agreement that would be in

effect until January 2018. The complainant did not trust appellant and was fearful

of appellant’s intentions. In January 2018, the complainant reported that appellant

had told her that he “wanted to work things out” and she had put going back to

“[c]ourt over custody [related to the child] . . . on hold.” (Internal quotations

                                        26
omitted.) She felt “very vulnerable and used” and that appellant had “turned her

life upside down again.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

      In May 2018, the complainant expressed that appellant was continuing to be

deceitful with her, she felt that appellant was manipulative, deceitful, and

misleading, and appellant had been engaging in an inappropriate relationship with

another woman.     When the complainant confronted appellant about the other

relationship, he became angry and denied any inappropriate behavior. In June

2018, the complainant reported that appellant was continuing “to be emotionally

abusive to her and [had] with[held] [the child] from her when she was out of

town.” In September 2018, the complainant expressed that appellant “trie[d] to

control every aspect of her life,” she was “[a]lways afraid of making [appellant]

upset,” and she was afraid that appellant would not “allow her to see/talk with [the

child] when she [was] away” traveling for work.

Agreed Temporary Order and Motion to Modify Child Support

      Krista Harris, a paralegal who previously worked with the complainant’s

attorney, William Terry, testified that the complainant had retained Terry to

represent her in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Harris noted that

when the child was about three months old, a temporary order had been put in

place related to the custody and care of the child. Under the temporary order,

appellant was not required to pay child support, but beginning on April 15, 2017,

                                        27
he was required to pay $750 a month into certain accounts for the benefit of the

child.

         During Harris’s testimony, a copy of an Agreed Temporary Order from May

5, 2017 was admitted into evidence. The Agreed Temporary Order adjudicated

appellant to be the father of the child, and it appointed the complainant and

appellant as temporary joint managing conservators of the child. The complainant

was given the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence. The

Agreed Temporary Order also set forth a custody agreement for the child.

         As to child support, the Agreed Temporary Order stated that the complainant

and appellant had agreed that no child support would be paid by either party at the

time. Instead, the complainant and appellant would open a joint money market

account or checking account for the benefit of the child. The purpose of the

account was for the child’s necessities, such as diapers, clothes, and expenses for

the health, education, safety, and welfare of the child. The complainant and

appellant were ordered to contribute $300 each per month to the account. The

complainant and appellant were also ordered to set up an individual savings

account for benefit of the child and for his needs beyond high school.          The

complainant and appellant were ordered to contribute $450 each per month to that

account.

                                          28
      Harris explained that a few days before February 15, 2019, the complainant

met with Terry to discuss filing a motion to modify the Agreed Temporary Order

and she expressed her desire to seek child support from appellant. On February 15,

2019, Harris called the complainant to ask if the complainant was ready to file the

motion to modify. The complainant “said, no, that she had asked [appellant] to

move out of [her] residence and she didn’t want to file it until he had moved out.”

The complainant wanted to wait to file the motion to modify until after appellant

had “moved out of her home.” The complainant said that appellant “would be mad

and she wanted to avoid any confrontation.” Harris called the complainant again

on February 20, 2019 to see if appellant had moved out of the complainant’s

house. The complainant said that he had moved out and “she wanted to go ahead

and file [the motion to modify] to seek . . . child support.” The complainant was

concerned about when appellant would receive a copy of the motion to modify.

She told Harris that appellant would be upset and mad about the motion to modify

and she “wanted to be prepared for him to call her.” The complainant did not say

that she was scared that appellant would physically hurt her.          She said that

appellant was “going to be angry about the child support so she wanted him to be

moved out of the house before she filed [the motion to modify] and once it was

filed she wanted to be prepared for when he would get a copy of it.”

                                        29
      After speaking with the complainant, Harris filed the motion to modify

around 3:00 p.m. on February 20, 2019. Appellant’s attorney got notice of the

motion to modify immediately after it was filed—meaning appellant’s attorney

would have been notified a little after 3:00 p.m. on February 20, 2019 that the

complainant had filed a motion to modify the Agreed Temporary Order.

      During Harris’s testimony, a copy of the Motion to Modify Temporary

Order, filed by Harris on behalf of the complainant on February 20, 2019 at

3:08 p.m., was admitted into evidence. The motion to modify states that on May 5,

2017, the complainant and appellant entered into the Agreed Temporary Order.

Since that time, “financial circumstances ha[d] materially changed” and the

complainant was requesting modification of the temporary order. The complainant

specifically requested that the support ordered to be paid by appellant in the

Agreed Temporary Order “be increased to conform to the guideline amount.”17 A

hearing was set on the complainant’s motion to modify for March 6, 2019.18

      Terry testified that the complainant retained him as her attorney in 2016 for

“a paternity action” because she was having the child in February 2017 and she

wanted to “establish the [child’s] biological father and to set out the rights and

17
      Harris testified that “the guideline amount” meant the child support guidelines in
      the Texas Family Code. According to Harris, for one child, the Texas Family
      Code required child support to be set at twenty percent of the parent’s net income.
18
      Harris testified that the March 6, 2019 hearing did not go forward because of the
      complainant’s death on February 21, 2019.

                                          30
duties and obligations of the father.” According to Terry, appellant was the child’s

father. After the child was born, Terry filed the paternity action on the

complainant’s behalf. At some point in 2017, the complainant and appellant went

to court for a hearing about temporary orders. The complainant drafted a proposed

agreement related to visitation with the child and child support. At that time, Terry

had calculated that appellant would owe about $1,186 a month in child support.

As Terry explained, in Texas, “if [someone has] one child, the [child support]

obligation is 20 percent of [the] person’s net resources,” so appellant’s child

support calculation was based on his “pay stub.” Appellant did not agree to the

complainant’s proposed agreement requiring him to pay child support.             But

eventually, the complainant and appellant agreed to a temporary order that

provided for the complainant and appellant “to set up a joint account for the benefit

of the child” and both “to contribute money into the account.” While viewing the

Agreed Temporary Order, Terry testified that the complainant and appellant agreed

to each pay $300 a month into an “Account for Child’s Necessaries.” (Internal

quotations omitted). And the complainant and appellant would each pay $450 a

month into an “Account for Beyond High School Needs.” (Internal quotations

omitted.) Thus, under the Agreed Temporary Order, appellant was to pay $750

each month related to the child. Terry did not know if appellant was actually

paying $750 each month like the Agreed Temporary Order required.

                                         31
      Terry further testified that the complainant met with him on February 10,

2019 to request that a motion to modify the Agreed Temporary Order be filed. In

the motion to modify, the complainant sought changes to child support and

possession and access to the child because a material and substantial change of

circumstances had occurred.

      In their meeting, Terry learned that appellant had been living with the

complainant, but the complainant “wished to change those arrangements.” The

complainant explained that appellant had been “having contact with other women

over the internet” and the complainant “didn’t think they were going to make it” as

a couple. The complainant also told Terry that she was afraid of appellant, and she

was “concerned about [appellant] getting served with [the motion to modify] while

he was still in the [complainant’s] house.”        The complainant did not want

appellant’s attorney to receive the motion to modify until appellant had moved out

of her home. Terry agreed not to file the motion to modify until after appellant had

moved out.

      Terry also explained that the motion to modify was filed on the

complainant’s behalf on February 20, 2019 and a hearing was set on the motion for

March 6, 2019.     But that hearing never took place.       Terry learned that the

complainant had died “within a day of” the filing of the motion to modify. Upon

the complainant’s death, her case was dismissed.

                                        32
      As to the complainant and appellant’s relationship generally, Terry testified

that he knew that the complainant “was very afraid of [appellant] and what his

actions were capable of and she didn’t want to make [appellant] mad.” Terry did

not recall the complainant ever telling him that appellant had physically harmed

her. But she had mentioned appellant’s “temper and how mad he would get about

certain things and how controlling he was and how he didn’t like her being around

her family and other people.”

      Jamie Wilson, a legal assistant who worked for appellant’s attorney, Scott

Brown, testified that on February 20, 2019, she received a motion to modify from

Terry’s law firm related to the child. Upon receiving the motion to modify, she

informed Brown that the motion had been received, and he asked her to notify

appellant that the motion to modify had been filed by the complainant. Wilson

called appellant on February 20, 2019 to tell him about the motion to modify.

Wilson spoke to appellant on the telephone that day. On the morning of February

21, 2019, Wilson sent appellant a follow-up email, with a copy of the motion to

modify attached, and she notified him of the hearing date set for the motion.

                                         33
      During Wilson’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of

Wilson’s February 21, 2019 email to appellant, which was sent at 9:13 a.m.19 That

email states:

      Per our discussion yesterday, please find attached the Motion to
      Modify Temporary Order[] that our office received from opposing
      counsel. Note your hearing is set for March 6, 2019 at 9:30 a.m. in
      the 300th Judicial District of Brazoria County.

The copy of the email admitted into evidence also contains a response email from

appellant to Wilson at 12:22 p.m. on February 21, 2019.

Law Enforcement Officers

      Officer Mears

      Lake Jackson Police Department (“LJPD”) Officer C. Mears testified that he

was on duty on February 21, 2019 when he was dispatched to 54 Greenvale Court

in Lake Jackson, Brazoria County, Texas, at about 5:30 p.m., in response to an

emergency-assistance call about “an unresponsive female in a bathtub.” When he

arrived, he went inside the home and found the complainant in the bathtub in the

primary bathroom. The water in the bathtub was “trickling slightly.” There was a

wine glass on the floor. As Mears walked around the house, he saw a cellular

telephone on the bed in the primary bedroom. He also saw keys in the front door

19
      Lake Jackson Police Department (“LJPD”) Detective R. Pierce testified that a
      printed copy of this email was found by law enforcement officers in appellant’s
      SUV. A printed copy of the motion to modify filed by the complainant on
      February 20, 2019 was attached to the email.

                                         34
to the home. Nothing in the home looked like “someone [had been] trying to

burglarize [it].”

       Officer Kimbrell

       Former LJPD Officer T. Kimbrell testified that while on duty on February

21, 2019, he was “called out” to 54 Greenvale Court in response to a medical

emergency. When Kimbrell arrived, he saw keys in the home’s front door. He

also noticed a surveillance video camera positioned near the front door of the

home. When Kimbrell went into the primary bathroom, he saw a “body in the tub”

and a broken wine glass on the bathroom countertop and on the floor. The back

door to the home was unlocked.

       Detective Pate

       Former LJPD Detective T. Pate testified that on February 21, 2019, he

received a call from another law enforcement officer asking him to come to 54

Greenvale Court to assist with “processing the scene” following “a suspicious

death.” Pate arrived at the single-story house at about 7:15 p.m. At the front door

to the home, Pate saw a key in the lock that had a “Hawaiian shirt key chain”

attached to it.

       Detective Pate proceeded to the primary bathroom in the home, where he

saw the complainant deceased in the bathtub. “She was lying on her right side,”

and she had “a wine or some sort of bottle next to her, kind of in her arms.” The

                                        35
wine bottle had blood and the complainant’s hair on it.20 There was blood in the

bathtub, and the complainant was naked and “cold to the touch.” When law

enforcement officers moved the complainant’s hair, they saw that the complainant

“had a pretty good size cut on the top of her head.” It was “a really jagged gash in

her head.” The complainant’s eye was “bruised and swollen.” She was “bleeding

from the nose area.” And “[s]he was in rigor mortis stage.” Pate also saw a

broken wine glass on the floor of the primary bathroom, and there were “shards of

glass from that [wine glass] on the [bathroom] counter[top]” as well. Pate noted

that outside the bathtub were two socks and “a nightgown-style shirt” on the floor

that were soaking wet.

      Detective Pate explained that based on the scene in the primary bathroom, it

did not appear that the complainant had fallen in the bathroom or in the bathtub.

And law enforcement officers could not find “any indication that she had

[accidentally] hit her head on anything.”        There were no hand towels in the

bathroom and no bathing towels near the bathtub, which would indicate that the

complainant was not intending to bathe. Pate believed that the complainant had

been “bludgeoned over the head with some object.”

20
      Detective Pate noted that the bottle was consistent with other wine bottles found in
      the primary bedroom. Texas Ranger T. Norsworthy testified that no fingerprints
      were found on the wine bottle, not even the complainant’s fingerprints, which was
      surprising, and led him to believe that the scene in the primary bathroom was
      staged.

                                           36
      Detective Pate further testified that while he was in the primary bathroom,

another law enforcement officer used “a Bluestar agent,”21 which was designed to

“reveal[] blood that ha[d] been wiped or washed away.”22 The Bluestar agent was

applied to both sinks in the primary bathroom, and “there was a bright, blue glow”

on the bathroom countertop “to the left” of the right-side sink and “down” into the

sink and “into the drain.” There were also “bright blue streaks” on the countertop

in front of the right-side sink that led “down the bowl.” And there was “a pretty

heavy glow of blue puddled” where the “soap dispenser” was located on the

bathroom countertop.23     There was no blood visible to the naked eye on the

countertop though. The only toiletries were on the left side of the bathroom

countertop; there were no toiletries near the right-side sink.

      As to the primary bedroom, Detective Pate explained that there was a wine

refrigerator in the bedroom, and the complainant’s cellular telephone was found at

the foot of the bed. There were some blood droplets on the bed, on the sheets, on a

21
      Texas Ranger Norsworthy testified that “Bluestar is a chemical enhancing agent
      that allows typically nonvisual blood to be seen” and law enforcement officers
      “use it in . . . crime scenes that have been cleaned up.” (Emphasis omitted.)
22
      Detective Pate noted that the Bluestar agent could “glow for [another] liquid
      [other] than blood.” And Texas Ranger Norsworthy testified that the Bluestar
      agent could give a “false positive[] for irons, rust, . . . turnips, potatoes” and
      bleach. However, he noted that the presence of bleach at the crime scene could
      indicate that it was used “to destroy DNA or clean up a crime scene.”
23
      Texas Ranger Norsworthy testified that he did not believe that the Bluestar agent
      caused a “false positive” when it was used in the complainant’s primary bathroom
      that day.

                                          37
couple of pillowcases, and on the duvet cover. There were also blood droplets

along the side of the bed closer to the nightstand, which Pate described as “almost

as if [they were] leading to the bathroom.” Pate believed that the complainant was

injured while she was lying in bed and she was transported to the primary

bathroom.

      Detective Pate further opined that the scene at the complainant’s home was

staged to make it look like the complainant was intoxicated. The wine bottle that

was in the complainant’s arms and the broken wine glass in the primary bathroom

looked like they had been placed there after the complainant had died. There was

no blood evidence consistent with a slip and fall in the primary bedroom or the

primary bathroom. And Pate saw no signs of a “break-in” or a forced entry. The

complainant’s wallet and laptop were still inside the home.24

      Detective Bailey

      Former LJPD Detective S. Bailey testified that on February 21, 2019, he

responded to a call at 54 Greenvale Court. Upon arrival, Bailey entered the home

through the front door, and he noticed that there was a set of keys in the “dead-bolt

lock” in the wooden front door.

24
      Detective Pierce also testified that “the person who came into the [complainant’s]
      house did not take her wallet” and “the person who went into [the complainant’s]
      house and killed her did not take [the complainant’s] laptop,” even though it was
      “a[n] item of value.” The complainant’s wallet still had money and credit cards
      inside when it was found by law enforcement officers in her home.

                                          38
         Detective Bailey went to the primary bathroom and saw the complainant in

the bathtub naked. The complainant was cold to the touch, and she “had rigor

mortis,” which indicated that she had not died “in the preceding few minutes.”

The water was turned on but was not running at a normal rate. The water was not

coming out fast. Bailey noticed blood coming from the complainant’s head. There

was also blood in the bathtub.

         Detective Bailey saw a wine or champagne bottle near the complainant’s

head and arms. And he noticed a broken wine glass partially on the floor and

partially on the countertop in the primary bathroom. There was no evidence that

the broken wine glass ever had wine or champagne inside it. This made Bailey

feel like “the scene was staged.” Bailey did not notice anything in the primary

bathroom that would indicate that the complainant was injured due to “a slip and

fall.”

         In the primary bedroom, Detective Bailey saw droplets of blood next to the

bed on the floor near the nightstand as well as droplets of blood in the bedding near

the head of the bed.      This blood did not seem consistent with “any type of

accident,” such as a slip and fall in the primary bathroom. It also did not appear

that the complainant had slipped and fallen in the bed and then walked to the

primary bathroom because there was no trail of blood from the bed to the primary

bathroom.

                                         39
      Detective Bailey further testified that an inspection of the complainant’s

house did not indicate that there had been any forced entry. And there was no

evidence that “there had been an attempt to burglarize the [complainant’s] house.”

Valuable items were still in plain view in the home. Bailey testified that based on

law enforcement officers’ investigation, it appeared that the complainant died in

the early morning hours of February 21, 2019, “[s]ometime prior to 2:31 a.m.”

      While speaking with Yolanda at the scene, Detective Bailey learned that the

child, who was two years old at the time, also lived in the house with the

complainant and that appellant had been living in the complainant’s house, but

“that living situation” had recently changed. At the time, no one at the scene knew

the location of the child. Bailey was given appellant’s address, and he and LJPD

Detective D. Hawkins drove to appellant’s house in Angleton to look for the child

and to speak with appellant about the complainant’s death.

      When Detective Bailey left the complainant’s house around 10:00 p.m. on

February 21, 2019, he drove with Detective Hawkins to appellant’s house in

Angleton. It took about fifteen minutes to get to appellant’s house from the

complainant’s home.     Upon arrival at appellant’s house, Bailey and Hawkins

parked outside of the gate, and Hawkins called appellant on his cellular telephone.

Hawkins noted that it was weird that appellant did not ask why the law

enforcement officers wanted to speak to him. Appellant came outside of his house

                                        40
and met the officers at the gate. Bailey and Hawkins then notified appellant of the

complainant’s death. Appellant responded: “You’re kidding me” and “hung his

head.” Bailey and Hawkins told appellant that they needed to check on the safety

of the child, and appellant invited the officers into his home to check on the child

and to speak with him.

      Inside appellant’s home, Detective Bailey saw the child sleeping in the

family room on “two sofas [that had been] pushed together to keep him from

rolling off onto the floor.” The child appeared fine, but he was not in a bedroom.

Bailey noted that appellant’s house was “sparsely furnished,” and appellant said

that he was remodeling the house and “cleaning it up.” Bailey did not smell fresh

paint in the house.

      While at appellant’s house, appellant voluntarily agreed to an interview with

the law enforcement officers. Detective Bailey testified that, during appellant’s

interview on February 21, 2019, appellant told the officers that the child was

supposed to stay with him from February 21, 2019 until February 24, 2019. He

was supposed to return the child to the complainant on February 24, 2019.25

Appellant also told the officers that the complainant had sent him a text message at

25
      Detective Hawkins testified that appellant’s house on February 21, 2019 did not
      look like it had been prepared for the child to stay there for an entire weekend.
      Thus, the child staying at appellant’s house on February 21, 2019 may not have
      been a planned decision, but rather a sudden decision. During appellant’s
      February 27, 2019 interview with Texas Ranger Norsworthy, appellant agreed that
      his home did not appear to be set up for the child to stay with appellant.

                                          41
2:31 a.m. on February 21, 2019, which appellant stated was strange behavior.26

And appellant said that it was abnormal for the complainant not to respond to his

text messages.

      Appellant further told the law enforcement officers that every year he and

the complainant went “back to court to review their temporary order[]” related to

the child. But he also stated that he was not aware “what changes were coming” to

his and the complainant’s arrangement related to the child. Appellant told the

officers that he had not been served with the complainant’s motion to modify.

Detective Bailey considered appellant’s statement as an attempt to convey that

appellant “was not aware of what[] [was] going on” related to the motion to

modify.27

      Detective Bailey also noted that appellant said that he had a key to the

complainant’s home, and it was normal for the complainant to leave her key in the

26
      A copy of the text message from the complainant’s cellular telephone to appellant
      on the morning of February 21, 2019 was admitted into evidence during Detective
      Bailey’s testimony. A text message from the complainant’s cellular telephone,
      which appellant stated was sent to him at 2:31 a.m., said: “Anthony I know it’s
      early and you have to wake up soon but please stop by on your way to work.”
27
      Detective Bailey noted that this statement by appellant was contradicted by the
      email that Wilson sent to appellant about the complainant’s motion to modify.
      Appellant received Wilson’s email in the morning on February 21, 2019 and
      before he spoke with Bailey and Detective Hawkins. Hawkins testified that a
      printed copy of Wilson’s email with a printed copy of the complainant’s motion to
      modify was found by law enforcement officers in appellant’s car. Hawkins also
      testified that the complainant’s motion to modify stated that the complainant was
      seeking an “increase” in child support from appellant by “a lot.”

                                          42
front door of her home. Appellant stated that the complainant had three video

surveillance cameras outside of her house, but the surveillance camera at the back

of her house was not working.

      Appellant confirmed that he went into the complainant’s home on the

morning of February 21, 2019 and took the child, but he stated that he did not

speak to the complainant. Appellant told the law enforcement officers that he

“drove all the way to work in Houston” and then “dr[o]ve back to Lake Jackson” to

pick up the child and take him to daycare, before then “driv[ing] back to Houston

to work.” According to appellant, he had a flexible work schedule that allowed

him to drop the child off at daycare and not be at work until 9:00 a.m.

      While speaking with appellant on the night of February 21, 2019, Detective

Bailey noted that appellant said that his parents were “going to be really freaked

out” about the complainant’s death, but appellant did not appear to be “freaked

out” himself. Appellant did not show much emotion. Appellant also stated that

“he didn’t see any reason why anybody would want to attack [the complainant],”

which Bailey found odd since he and Detective Hawkins had told appellant that the

officers did not know yet whether the complainant had died from “a slip and fall or

if she was murdered or if it was suicide.”

      Detective Bailey further testified that appellant gave inconsistent statements

during his interview on February 21, 2019.         And appellant made some odd

                                         43
statements, such as: “My timeline should be very clear.”28 Appellant told the law

enforcement officers that he and the complainant were not in a relationship, and he

was dating other women. But, according to appellant, he and the complainant had

dinner plans for February 22, 2019.

      During Detective Bailey’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence

an audio recording of appellant’s February 21, 2019 interview. In that interview,

appellant stated that the complainant’s friend, Mikel, had contacted him earlier in

the evening on February 21, 2019 because she had plans with the complainant, and

appellant had told Mikel that he would try and call the complainant.            When

appellant asked, during his interview, “what happened” to the complainant,

Detective Hawkins told appellant that they “didn’t know yet.” Hawkins then

reiterated that the complainant had died, but he did not know “why or how” at that

point. Appellant told the officers that he did not see why anyone would “attack”

the complainant.     Appellant described his house to the officers as a work in

progress and stated that he was doing remodeling work on the home.29 He stated

that his mother had been at his home earlier in the evening on February 21, 2019

helping him paint.

28
      Detective Hawkins testified that “timeline” is “more a police term” and appellant
      was “trying to establish an alibi.” (Internal quotations omitted.)
29
      Appellant also noted that he was “trying to run a mead business” at his house,
      which he had been working on for the past two years.

                                          44
      Detective Hawkins asked appellant, during the interview, about the last time

he had spoken to the complainant, and appellant responded that the complainant

had sent him a text message at 2:31 a.m. that morning, which was strange

behavior. But according to appellant, he did not get the text message until he was

at work in Houston at 5:19 a.m.

      When appellant saw the text message, he contacted his work supervisor,

Kevin Henson, and told him that the complainant’s behavior was “abnormal” and

he needed to go check that everything was okay with the child. Appellant then

went to pick up the child from the complainant’s house in Lake Jackson and took

him to daycare. When he got to the complainant’s house on the morning of

February 21, 2019, around 6:45 a.m., the child had just woken up. The child had

been sleeping in the primary bedroom, he was getting out of bed, and he was not

dressed. The complainant was not in the primary bedroom, but appellant stated

that it “sounded like” the complainant was taking a shower. Appellant did not see

the complainant though, and the complainant did not say anything. After dropping

off the child at daycare, appellant returned to work in Houston.

      After appellant finished work, he picked the child up from daycare and

brought the child to his house in Angleton. According to appellant, it was planned

for the child to spend February 21, 2019 to February 24, 2019 with him, and it was

always planned that appellant would take the child to daycare on the morning of

                                         45
February 21, 2019.30 Yet appellant stressed how difficult the morning was for him

because he was “all the way in Houston” at work and then he drove “all the way

back” to Lake Jackson to pick up the child. Appellant noted the complainant’s

failure to respond to his text messages on the morning of February 21, 2019 was

abnormal behavior.

      Appellant further told Detective Hawkins, during his interview, that he had a

key to the complainant’s house, but when he arrived at the complainant’s home on

February 21, 2019, the complainant’s key was already in the front door, which

appellant characterized as “normal for” the complainant. Appellant also stated that

there were three surveillance video cameras outside of the complainant’s house.

Two of the surveillance video cameras worked, but the camera at the back of the

house did not.

      As to the complainant’s and appellant’s custody arrangement for the child,

appellant stated during his interview that every year31 he and the complainant went

back to court to “re-do [their] temporary order[]” and they were in that “phase”

30
      Appellant stated that he had previously taken the child to daycare when the
      complainant was traveling for work, and his “flexible schedule” at work allowed
      him to come to work at 9:00 a.m. on the days that he needed to take the child to
      daycare. Taking the child to daycare on February 21, 2019 was “normal”
      according to appellant.
31
      Detective Hawkins testified that law enforcement officers learned through their
      investigation that this was not something that happened “every year” between the
      complainant and appellant. A date for the complainant and appellant to return to
      court related to the child was not set until February 20, 2019 when the
      complainant filed the motion to modify.

                                         46
currently.32   Appellant described his relationship with the complainant as

“co-parents” and stated that they were not intimate.33 But he also stated that they

had planned to move into appellant’s house in Angleton as a family, and they had

planned to have dinner at appellant’s house on February 22, 2019. They had not

been having any “marital issues,” although appellant also told Detective Hawkins

that there were other women in his life.

      Further, appellant stated, during his interview, that the complainant was

“emotional.” And appellant referred repeatedly to his “timeline,” and he stated

that his “timeline” should be clear as to when he was at the complainant’s house

that day, when he dropped the child off at daycare that day, and when he reported

to work that day.

      Detective Hawkins

      Detective Hawkins testified that on February 21, 2019, at 5:50 p.m., he was

called “for a death investigation” at 54 Greenvale Court. Upon arrival, Hawkins

noticed that the front door to the home had a key in the lock. The key had a

keychain attached to it that was shaped like a t-shirt. Hawkins noted that there did
32
      Appellant told Detective Hawkins, during his interview, that both he and the
      complainant “did not want child support.” And he and the complainant had set up
      a joint account for the child’s needs. He stated that he had not been “served” with
      “child support” papers, but he knew that the complainant had contacted her lawyer
      so that the temporary order could be “updated.” Appellant also stated that he
      knew the complainant had filed something.
33
      Upon further discussions with appellant though, Detective Hawkins learned that
      appellant and the complainant had sexual intercourse in January 2019.

                                           47
not appear to be any signs of a burglary having taken place in the home or that

someone had been searching the home for valuables. There were no signs of

forced entry into the home.

      Detective Hawkins explained that after entering the house, he went to the

primary bedroom and found a cellular telephone at the foot of the bed, which

“seemed in an odd position.” And according to Hawkins, law enforcement officers

had found blood on the sheets and pillows in the bed, which indicated to Hawkins

that “a harmful event occurred inside” the primary bedroom. There was also blood

on the floor next to the bed. But there was no blood leading from the bed in the

primary bedroom to the primary bathroom, which indicated that “the crime scene

[had been] cleaned.”

      After Detective Hawkins entered the primary bathroom, he saw the

complainant naked in the bathtub. The complainant had blood in her hair, and a

wine bottle next to her.34 “[R]igor mortis was fully set [in],” and the complainant

had “[a] large wound on the left side of the top of her head.” There was also a

broken wine glass on the floor of the primary bathroom and on the countertop,

which looked like it had “had been broken over the counter instead of dropped or

something like that.”     Hawkins found the position of the wine glass to be

suspicious. There were no signs of a struggle in the primary bathroom.
34
      Detective Hawkins noted that there were similar wine bottles “in the ‘his’ portion
      of the ‘his and her’ closets” in the primary bedroom.

                                          48
      Detective Hawkins also noted that there was no bathing towel near the

bathtub, which made the scene look like “it wasn’t an accident” because the

complainant “wouldn’t have been taking a bath on her own” without a towel. Law

enforcement officers determined that the scene looked “staged.”           Cleaning

products were found in the cabinet under the sink in the primary bathroom, and

according to Hawkins, it looked like the primary bathroom had “been cleaned up.”

      Because the child was not found in the complainant’s home, Detective

Hawkins and Detective Bailey went to appellant’s house to see if they could locate

the child. They drove to appellant’s house in Angleton at about 10:00 p.m. on

February 21, 2019. Appellant’s home was about fifteen minutes away from the

complainant’s home. When they arrived at appellant’s home, Hawkins called

appellant and stated that he needed to meet with appellant in person about

something important. Hawkins was purposefully vague because he wanted to see

“what [appellant] would say.” But appellant did not ask Hawkins what the law

enforcement officers wanted to see him about, which Hawkins found suspicious.

Hawkins did not release specific information to appellant about the complainant’s

death for investigative reasons.

      When appellant came out to the gate in front of his home, he invited

Detective Hawkins and Detective Bailey into his house, and the officers saw the

child sleeping inside. Appellant also voluntarily participated in an interview with

                                        49
the law enforcement officers. At the beginning of appellant’s interview, appellant

brought up a text message from the complainant right away and “practically threw

his cell[ular] [tele]phone at” Hawkins. This was unusual behavior in Hawkins’s

opinion. Appellant allowed Hawkins to photograph the text message sent from the

complainant’s cellular telephone to appellant on February 21, 2019. The text

message was sent at 2:31 a.m. and stated: “Anthony I know it’s early and you have

to wake up soon but please stop by on your way to work.”35 (Internal quotations

omitted.) In response, appellant sent the complainant the following text message:

“Trisha I just sat down at my desk...What’s on your mind?” (Internal quotations

omitted.)   But there was no response sent from the complainant’s cellular

telephone. Appellant then sent the complainant another text message saying: “Is

[the child] dressed? I’m about to pull up.” (Internal quotations omitted.) The

complainant’s cellular telephone again sent no response. Finally, appellant sent the

complainant a text message stating: “Just dropped off at [d]aycare. He was in fine

spirits. I have to get back to work so we’ll have to talk later. I meet with the

lawyer this evening. Plan to have my parents over later to visit. Unless you have

changed your mind I was still planning dinner for us at my place Friday.”36

35
      Detective Hawkins noted that in this text message sent from the complainant’s
      cellular telephone, the word “you” is spelled out correctly as “Y-O-U” and the
      word “your” is spelled out correctly as “Y-O-U-R.” (Internal quotations omitted.)
36
      During Detective Hawkins testimony, copies of additional text messages between
      the complainant and appellant from January 2019 were admitted into evidence. In
                                         50
(Internal quotations omitted.) Hawkins testified that the text message from the

complainant’s cellular telephone to appellant at 2:31 a.m. on February 21, 2010

was not “consistent” with the complainant’s regular text message pattern because it

did not include the letter “u” in place of the word “you.” (Internal quotations

omitted.) However, the text message from the complainant’s cellular telephone

was consistent with the way that appellant wrote his text messages in which he

used the whole word “you” and did not abbreviate the word with a single letter.

(Internal quotations omitted.)

      Detective Hawkins further testified that he called appellant on February 22,

2019 and told appellant that the complainant’s death “looked like it was murder.”

But he did not tell appellant about the condition of the complainant’s body or that

the complainant was found in the bathtub in the primary bathroom in her home.

      On February 25, 2019, Detective Hawkins interviewed appellant again at

appellant’s home. An audio recording of appellant’s interview with Hawkins was

admitted into evidence. During his interview, appellant told Hawkins that he was

at the complainant’s house on the night of February 19, 2019.37 He had dinner at

      those text messages from appellant to the complainant, he spells the word “you”
      “Y-O-U,” but in her text messages to appellant, the complainant spells the word
      “you” with just the letter “u.”
37
      Detective Hawkins testified that law enforcement officers found a receipt from
      “Wild West BBQ in Angleton” dated February 19, 2019, with a timestamp of
      6:32 p.m. Hawkins testified that the receipt was significant because appellant had
                                          51
the complainant’s house on that night.38 On February 20, 2019, the complainant

had dinner plans with Yolanda. He did not see the complainant on February 20,

2019.

        As to the morning of February 21, 2019, appellant again stated that he went

to work before he went to pick up the child to take him to daycare. Appellant

emailed Henson at work, and he called Henson. He told Henson that he would be

coming back to work. According to appellant, it was normal for him to go to work

around 5:00 a.m. Appellant noted that when he was at the complainant’s house on

the morning of February 21, 2019, he thought the complainant was taking a shower

and the primary bathroom door was closed.

        Appellant, during his interview, also told Detective Hawkins that he knew

that it was normal for law enforcement officers to think that the “spouse” “did it.”

And he stated that he went to work on February 25, 2019. Hawkins told appellant

that there was “no way” that the complainant’s death was “an accident.”

        Detective Hawkins testified that Texas Ranger Norsworthy interviewed

appellant on February 27, 2019.39        While listening to appellant’s interview with

        told Hawkins that he had dinner with the complainant at her home that night, but
        the receipt showed “dinner for one person in Angleton.”
38
        Appellant also stated that if he did not have dinner at the complainant’s house on
        February 19, 2019, then she had dinner at his house that night.
39
        A videotape recording of Texas Ranger Norsworthy’s interview with appellant on
        February 27, 2019 was admitted into evidence.

                                            52
Norsworthy at trial, Hawkins noted that appellant lied during his interview with

Norsworthy about what he had done on February 25, 2019 and appellant lied that

there had not been a significant change in his relationship with the complainant

before the complainant’s death.40 And although appellant stated in his interview

that he felt “rattled,” Hawkins noted that appellant never appeared “rattled” during

the times that he saw appellant on February 21, 2019, February 25, 2019, and

February 27, 2019. According to Hawkins, appellant made inconsistent statements

in his February 27, 2019 interview.

      Detective Hawkins further testified that during the interview with Texas

Ranger Norsworthy, appellant stated that the complainant’s “pay scale [was]

slightly higher than his,” but through his investigation Hawkins learned that the

complainant’s “pay scale” was “significantly higher” than appellant’s. Although

appellant tried to make it seem like he and the complainant were making similar

salaries, the law enforcement officers’ investigation revealed that they were not.

      Additionally, Detective Hawkins noted that appellant, during his interview,

stated that the first time that he and the complainant were supposed to return to

court about their temporary order related to the child, appellant decided to move in

40
      Detective Hawkins noted that on February 21, 2019, appellant sent his mother,
      Rosemarie Adell, a text message stating that he and the complainant had “split up”
      after the child’s birthday in February 2019. (Internal quotations omitted.)
      Hawkins also testified that appellant lied, during his interview, about having had
      dinner with the complainant on February 19, 2019.

                                          53
with the complainant. And appellant told Texas Ranger Norsworthy during his

interview that although he saw the complainant’s key in the front door of her home

on February 21, 2019 when he went to pick up the child, he did nothing about it

and left it in the front door. Of particular importance to Hawkins, appellant, when

discussing his actions on the morning of February 21, 2019, stated that after going

to work, he went “back to” the complainant’s house to “see how things were

going.” (Emphasis added.)

      Detective Hawkins further testified about his continuing investigation of the

complainant’s death. Through the investigation, he learned that the complainant

left work at 4:46 p.m. on February 20, 2019, and she picked up the child from

daycare at 4:52 p.m. The complainant’s last communication before her death was

a work email that she sent on February 20, 2019 at 9:25 p.m.

      According to Detective Hawkins, an analysis of appellant’s cellular

telephone showed that appellant received an incoming text message from the

complainant’s cellular telephone at 2:31 a.m. on February 21, 2019. Appellant

then sent the complainant a text message at 5:19 a.m., stating: “Trisha I just sat

down at my desk...What’s on your mind?” Appellant next called Kenneth Haught,

a co-worker, at 5:36 a.m., for about one minute. At 6:16 a.m., appellant received a

text message from Kevin Henson, stating that he had seen appellant’s email and to

keep him updated. At 6:43 a.m., appellant sent the complainant a text message

                                        54
asking if the child was dressed and stating that he was “about to pull up.” (Internal

quotations omitted.)    Appellant did not call the complainant.       At 6:45 a.m.,

appellant called Henson, and at 7:19 a.m., appellant sent the complainant a text

message telling her that he had dropped the child off at daycare and that he was

going to meet with his attorney that night.41       Hawkins further testified that

appellant had multiple communications with his mother, Rosemarie, on February

21, 2019. In his text messages with Rosemarie, appellant told her that he had

received a letter from his attorney and that the complainant “wishe[d] to increase

the funds that [he] put forth for the child” so his previous discussion with

Rosemarie on the night of February 20, 2019 had been “accurate.” Appellant

noted that it was the complainant’s decision to “get lawyers” involved in his and

the complainant’s relationship. (Internal quotations omitted.) Rosemarie also

mentioned to appellant about getting a roommate to help with his “monthly bills to

hang on to [his] house.” Although appellant made multiple telephone calls during

the day on February 21, 2019, he did not call the complainant once.

      At 4:45 p.m. on February 21, 2019, appellant called “Waste Connections”

from his cellular telephone. And around 5:00 p.m. on February 21, 2019, appellant

took several photographs of the child and himself at his house on his cellular

41
      This indicated to Detective Hawkins that appellant had made plans to meet his
      attorney before the morning of February 21, 2019, meaning appellant was aware
      of the motion to modify at the time of the complainant’s death.

                                         55
telephone. At 5:48 p.m., appellant received a text message from Mikel about the

complainant’s whereabouts.    Appellant responded to Mikel’s text message at

8:01 p.m. Appellant told Mikel that he would call the complainant “after dinner.”

(Internal quotations omitted.) But appellant never made a telephone call to the

complainant that night. Detective Hawkins opined that this was because appellant

already knew that the complainant was dead.

      Detective Hawkins also testified that following the complainant’s death,

appellant purchased a new cellular telephone. When law enforcement officers

examined the new cellular telephone, they found artwork depicting a nude female

in a bathtub.

      As to the complainant’s finances, Detective Hawkins testified that the

complainant’s salary at Dow Chemical was $12,452 a month or about $150,000 a

year. As to appellant’s finances, Hawkins explained appellant made about $7,850

a month. Appellant’s salary was “about 60 percent of what [the complainant]

made.”

      When appellant purchased his home in Angleton in November 2018, his

loan amount was $244,000 and his monthly mortgage payment was $2,329.52.

Appellant’s credit card bill from February 6, 2019 showed that he had a balance

due of $7,314, and he was “over his credit limit by” $514.98. At the time of the

complainant’s death, appellant was past due on his car payments.

                                       56
      As to the joint account that appellant and the complainant had set up for the

child, Detective Hawkins testified that the account was opened on April 28, 2017.

On December 11, 2018, appellant “took out a loan advance” on the child’s account

in the amount of $15,000, and he took that $15,000 out of the child’s account in

December 2018. On March 5, 2019, appellant took an additional $6,500 out of the

child’s account, which was money that had previously been put into the account in

addition to the $15,000 loan advance that appellant had received. Thus, between

December 2018 and March 5, 2019, appellant took $21,500 out of the child’s

account.

      Detective Hawkins testified that “income disparity and being forced to pay

child support” could “anger a person.” And child support would be a financial

strain on appellant. When asked if appellant had “a lot of debt,” Hawkins replied:

“Yes.”

      During his testimony Detective Hawkins viewed videotape recordings from

the surveillance video cameras at the complainant’s house.42          The videotape

recording from February 11, 2019, when appellant still lived at the complainant’s

house, showed appellant walking up to the front door of the home, with a large set

42
      Texas Ranger Norsworthy testified that law enforcement officers were able to
      obtain surveillance videotape recordings from the two surveillance video cameras
      located on the front side of the complainant’s home. There were no surveillance
      videotape recordings from the surveillance video camera at the back of the
      complainant’s house.

                                         57
of keys in his hand, and opening the door with his keys. The videotape recording

from February 16, 2019, after appellant had moved out of the complainant’s home,

showed appellant walking up to the front door of the home and waiting to be let

into the home; he knocked on the door and did not walk straight inside. The

videotape recording from February 17, 2019, when appellant no longer lived at the

complainant’s house, also showed appellant waiting at the front door of the home

to be let inside. And the videotape recording from February 18, 2019 showed

appellant waiting at the front door of the complainant’s home to be let inside.

Hawkins testified that on February 16, 17, and 18, 2019, appellant did not

approach the complainant’s home holding his keys in his hand, and he stopped at

the front door each time.

      Notably, the videotape recordings from February 21, 2019—the day of the

complainant’s death—showed appellant arriving at the complainant’s home at

6:45 a.m., and appellant approached the front door of the home holding a set of

keys. According to Detective Hawkins, the videotape recordings from that day

showed appellant taking the keys out of his pocket as soon as he got out of his

SUV. The keys in appellant’s hand were not the same large set of keys that

appellant had used to open the complainant’s front door on February 11, 2019.

The videotape recordings from February 21, 2019 also showed appellant leaving

                                       58
the complainant’s home carrying the child,43 but appellant did not have any keys in

his hand when he left the complainant’s home. Hawkins noted that appellant’s

behavior when he arrived at the complainant’s home on February 21, 2019—the

day of the complainant’s death—was much different than when he approached the

complainant’s home on February 16, 17, or 18, 2019, when the complainant was

alive. And, according to Hawkins, the keys that were found in the complainant’s

front door when Yolanda and others arrived at the complainant’s home later in the

day were the same ones that were in appellant’s hand on the morning of February

21, 2019.

       In conclusion, Detective Hawkins opined that the person who killed the

complainant had to have been “intimately familiar” with her. He had to have

known how to get in the complainant’s house and which of the surveillance video

cameras at the complainant’s house did not work. He also had to have known that

the complainant loved wine. Hawkins added that, during the investigation of the

complainant’s death, appellant never expressed a desire of “finding [her] true

killer.”

43
       Texas Ranger Norsworthy testified that appellant can be seen on the surveillance
       videotape recordings from February 21, 2019 leaving the complainant’s house
       about fifteen minutes after he initially arrived.

                                          59
       Texas Ranger Norsworthy

       Texas Ranger Norsworthy testified that he interviewed appellant on

February 27, 2019. Norsworthy noted that during appellant’s interview, he was

emotionless, monotone in his speech, and robotic in his actions. Norsworthy also

observed that although the interview focused on the death of the complainant—the

mother of appellant’s child—appellant “lacked empathy in her death.”44

       Texas Ranger Norsworthy described appellant as self-centered. Instead of

having an emotional reaction to the news of the complainant’s death, appellant

focused on “what he was going to have to do as a single father and how he was

going to have to deal with [the child] when he had to go to work.” When appellant

described “problems around the[] relationship” with the complainant, they were the

complainant’s “issues.” And appellant was very honest about his “polygamist

lifestyle.”

       Texas Ranger Norsworthy also observed that during appellant’s interview, if

Norsworthy was “talking about [appellant] and something that would benefit him,”

appellant was “extremely open and g[ave] a very good, honest, elaborate answer.”

But if Norsworthy was “talking about the events leading up to [the complainant’s]

murder,” then appellant was “intentionally vague” and “skirt[ed] the issue.”

44
       Texas Ranger Norsworthy also described appellant has having “essentially no
       emotion and no empathy for others.”

                                        60
      Further, Texas Ranger Norsworthy noted that appellant would “often

double-talk” and was “all over the board with his speech and his stories and his life

history.” Appellant also “downplay[ed] the judicial proceedings” related to the

complainant’s motion to modify that were set to occur, saying that it was “no big

deal” and “a preplanned event that happen[ed] annually.”         At the same time

though, appellant described the complainant as “so emotional” about the child

custody and child support issues. And appellant complained that law enforcement

officers had not told him anything about what had happened to the complainant.

      According to Texas Ranger Norsworthy, in discussing the events of

February 21, 2019, appellant, during his interview, told “an unbelievable story”

about how he “essentially st[ole] [the child] from the [complainant’s] house

without any direct communication with [the complainant].” And appellant was

very evasive about his whereabouts on February 20, 2019, which Norsworthy

found to be odd because appellant’s movements on February 20, 2019 were “very

explainable.” There was no evidence that appellant had been at the complainant’s

home on February 20, 2019.

      Texas Ranger Norsworthy also testified that appellant had accessed the

surveillance video camera system from the complainant’s house on the morning of

                                         61
February 21, 2019, but he did not delete any surveillance videotape recordings.45

Appellant knew that the surveillance video camera at the back of the complainant’s

home was not working, and he said so “multiple times” in his interview. Based on

the printed copy of an email found in appellant’s car, Norsworthy believed that

appellant had spoken to his attorney on February 20, 2019 about the complainant’s

motion to modify.

Medical Examiner

      Dr. Satish Chundru, a medical examiner, testified that he performed the

autopsy on the complainant’s body.46 The complainant was thirty-nine years old at

the time of her death. An external examination of the complainant’s body showed

that she had a large laceration on the left side of her scalp. Her left eye was

swollen and discolored, and there was an abrasion or contusion on her left facial

cheek. Dr. Chundru described the laceration on the left side of the complainant’s

scalp as “a pretty extensive injury.” The complainant also had bruising on the right

side of her scalp and a “fresh” bruise on her hand. (Internal quotations omitted.)

45
      Detective Hawkins noted that during appellant’s interview with Texas Ranger
      Norsworthy, appellant stated that he “rarely check[ed]” the surveillance video
      camera system from the complainant’s home, but he did so on the morning of
      February 21, 2019. According to Hawkins, looking at the surveillance video
      camera system was consistent with “making sure there’s not something on there
      [that] you don’t want found.”
46
      A copy of Dr. Chundru’s autopsy report was admitted into evidence.

                                         62
      Underneath the complainant’s head laceration, Dr. Chundru found multiple

skull fractures. If the complainant had fallen, there would have been a single skull

fracture—not multiple ones like Dr. Chundru found. The multiple skull fractures

found on the complainant would have resulted from being hit “with, like, a

hammer or something like that.” Multiple fractures did not result from a simple

fall. Either the complainant’s head had hit an object multiple times or an object

had hit the complainant’s head multiple times. Dr. Chundru opined that multiple

“blow[s]” to the complainant’s head produced the fractures. The fractures likely

caused the complainant’s eye-bruising because blood would have seeped into her

eyelids as a result of the fractures.

      Dr. Chundru also discovered a hemorrhage around and within the

complainant’s brain, and the complainant had bruising of the brain. Hemorrhages

in or around the brain and bruising on the brain were signs of “pretty severe

trauma.”    According to Dr. Chundru, the complainant had a subarachnoid

hemorrhage, meaning that blood was directly touching the complainant’s brain

tissue and irritating the brain. This could cause a person to die because the

irritation would have caused the heart and lungs to stop functioning.            The

complainant also had a subdural hemorrhage, which could lead to death because

“when it gets so big . . . it pushes on the brain.” The bruising on the complainant’s

brain would also have irritated her brain.

                                         63
      Dr. Chundru further testified that a toxicology report for the complainant

revealed that she did not have any alcohol or narcotics in her system. She only

tested positive for caffeine and cough medicine.

      According to Dr. Chundru, the complainant’s cause of death was blunt force

head injuries. The complainant’s injuries were not the result of a “slip and fall.” A

number of different objects could have caused the blunt force injuries to the

complainant’s head, including the wine bottle found near the complainant in the

primary bathroom. The object just needed to be blunt and hard.            Either the

complainant’s injuries were caused by the object striking the complainant’s head

repeatedly or the complainant’s head striking the object repeatedly. In sum, Dr.

Chundru explained that blunt force was used on the left side of the complainant’s

skull, which caused multiple fractures and bleeding in her brain and resulted in the

complainant’s death. The blunt force used could have caused serious bodily injury

and death.   And the manner of the complainant’s death was homicide.             The

complainant did not die of natural causes.

Appellant’s Work History

      Todd Gentile testified that he worked at LyondellBasell as an operations

supervisor, and he previously supervised appellant at work from May 2016 until

June 2018. Appellant was employed as a maintenance instrument and electrical

engineer at LyondellBasell.     According to Gentile, appellant had issues with

                                         64
attendance at work. The workday was supposed to start at 6:30 a.m. and end at

3:00 p.m., and appellant was supposed to be at work by 6:30 a.m. Eventually,

because of appellant’s attendance issues, a modified schedule or a flexible

schedule was developed for him, which allowed appellant to come to work at

6:00 a.m., and he would “be on the clock if he got in[to] [work] by” that time.

Appellant would not be considered “late” until 6:30 a.m.       After the modified

schedule was created for appellant, he did not have attendance issues at work. In

2018, Henson took over as appellant’s supervisor.

         Henson testified that he worked at LyondellBasell as “the maintenance team

lead.”    Henson became the “team lead” in May 2018 and that role involved

supervising appellant at work. Appellant was paid hourly and was likely paid

between $35 and $45 per hour. The standard work hours for maintenance team

employees, including appellant, was from 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.          However,

appellant was allowed to start work anytime between 6:00 a.m. and 6:30 a.m.

because he had a long drive to work and needed some flexibility on when he could

arrive. But, if appellant needed to come into work later than 6:30 a.m., he had to

communicate with Henson ahead of time, and they would discuss what appellant’s

modified hours would be.

         Henson further testified that he knew that appellant had a child, and the

child’s mother usually took the child to daycare. But when the child’s mother was

                                         65
traveling for work, it was appellant’s responsibility to take the child to daycare in

the morning. When those times occurred, appellant would request that his work

hours be modified so that he would start work at 8:00 a.m. and leave work at

4:00 p.m.   Appellant would speak to Henson in advance about the need for

modified work hours because he had to take the child to daycare.              It was a

“planned” change, and Henson would approve the request before the fact.

      According to Henson, on February 21, 2019, appellant called Henson while

Henson was driving to work. Appellant told Henson that “he would be late

because he had to take [the child] to daycare.” But appellant did not tell Henson

that he had already been at work that morning or that he had sent Henson an email

at 5:27 a.m.47 Appellant had never called Henson while Henson was on the way to

work to tell him that he needed to take the child to daycare. Appellant had always

told Henson ahead of time the days that he would need to take the child to daycare,

and Henson would approve it. But appellant did not let Henson know in advance

that appellant would need a modified schedule on February 21, 2019. Henson saw

appellant at work on February 21, 2019 around 9:15 a.m. or 9:30 a.m.

      When Henson and appellant talked at work about the reason appellant was

not there at his normal time, appellant told Henson that he and “the mother of [the

47
      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of an email from appellant to Henson
      on February 21, 2019. The email was sent at 5:27 a.m. and stated: “Kevin, I need
      [to] take care of some family business this morning. I’ll try to be back in the
      office before lunch. Please call me when you get this message.”

                                          66
child] were going through custody or child support issues at that time.” Appellant

told him that such conversations about child support happened once a year.

Appellant called Henson around 11:00 p.m. on February 21, 2019 and told him that

he needed to take February 22, 2019 off work “in regard[] to what [they] had

discussed earlier” in the day.

      Henson next saw appellant at work on February 25, 2019, and appellant

spoke about “the reason he needed to stay home” on February 22, 2019. Appellant

told Henson that the complainant “had been killed and that he was talking with law

enforcement . . . about all that.” Appellant told Henson that the complainant was

found in the bathtub.

      During Henson’s testimony, “badge records” from LyondellBasell were

admitted into evidence. Those records show that appellant arrived at work at

5:03 a.m. on February 21, 2019 and left work at 5:36 a.m.48 Appellant returned to

work at 8:57 a.m. and left again at 11:36 a.m. Appellant then returned to work at

12:07 p.m. and left work for the day at 3:09 p.m. On February 25, 2019, appellant

arrived to work at 8:36 a.m. and left work at 2:22 p.m.

      Kenneth Haught testified that he worked at LyondellBasell as a maintenance

technician, and he had worked with appellant since 2014 on the maintenance team.

In 2016, appellant was in a relationship with the complainant “off and on.” In
48
      Henson testified that this meant that appellant was at work for less than
      thirty-three minutes on the morning of February 21, 2019.

                                         67
2017, appellant and the complainant had the child. Appellant told Haught that he

and the complainant had an “agreement” about “some kind of account set up for

[appellant] to be able to put money in for” the child. At some point, appellant

bought a house in Angleton. According to Haught, the property was “huge” and

“[a] lot of work needed to be done” on the house.

      On February 21, 2019, Haught and another co-worker called appellant in the

morning, and appellant “said something was going on and he didn’t want to talk

about it.” Haught later learned about the complainant’s death on the internet, but

he never told appellant that he knew that the complainant had died.

      At the beginning of March, when appellant returned to work following the

complainant’s death, appellant never mentioned the complainant’s death to

Haught.   Appellant spoke to Haught about “marrying” the complainant after

Haught already knew that she had died. Haught found it odd that appellant never

mentioned the complainant’s death to him because Haught knew the complainant

and Haught had worked closely with appellant.

      Haught noted that he had seen appellant “get mad and inappropriately lose

his temper.” But he had never seen appellant “physically threaten anybody.”

Appellant liked things to be done his way. And he would manipulate situations so

that they would be in his favor.

                                        68
Daycare Employees

      Arlene Hernandez testified that she worked at Kool Kidz daycare, where she

is an owner and the cook. The daycare was in Lake Jackson near the Dow

Chemical office.    Hernandez met the complainant when the complainant was

pregnant with the child because the complainant came to tour the facility.

Appellant was the father of the child.

      After the child was born, he started attending the daycare when he was six or

seven weeks old because the complainant went back to work. While the child was

an infant, the complainant would come to the daycare every day during her lunch

break to breastfeed the child. When the child got old enough to eat regular food,

the complainant would send him with meat, potatoes, carrots, or cabbage, fruit, and

homemade muffins for lunch. The child’s lunch would have a glass container with

a red lid for the meat and vegetables and a separate container for the fruit. The

complainant would send the child with one muffin.         The child’s lunch was

packaged the same way every day. The complainant also sent the child to school

with milk that she would buy from a dairy farm. The daycare employees were not

allowed to provide the child with the daycare’s milk. The complainant would put

the child’s lunch in the refrigerator at the daycare when she dropped the child off

or she would bring it to Hernandez. The child did not have a lunchbox or lunch

                                         69
bag. If the complainant was going to let the child eat the “school lunch” at the

daycare, she would tell Hernandez ahead of time.

      According to Hernandez, if the complainant was not traveling for work, then

she would always bring the child to daycare in the morning and pick him up in the

afternoon. And if the complainant was traveling for work, she would tell the

daycare employees who would be dropping the child off and picking the child up.

If the complainant was not going to be the person dropping the child off or picking

the child up, she would always let the daycare employees know. If the child was

not going to come to daycare one day, the complainant would tell the daycare

employees in advance. If the complainant was going to deviate from the normal

drop-off or pick-up schedule or the child’s normal meal format, she would

“[a]lways” let someone at the daycare know.

      Hernandez testified that on February 21, 2019, she arrived at the daycare at

about 5:45 a.m. At 7:00 a.m., the daycare feeds the children breakfast. Normally,

the child arrived at the daycare between 7:30 a.m. and 7:45 a.m., or 8:00 a.m. On

February 21, 2019, the child was at the daycare early enough to eat breakfast,

which Hernandez found to be odd because he had never eaten breakfast at the

daycare before that day.     Hernandez noted that even in the past when the

complainant was traveling and appellant was responsible for dropping the child off

at daycare, appellant still fed the child breakfast before he arrived at the daycare.

                                         70
Hernandez later learned that appellant had dropped the child off on the morning of

February 21, 2019.     The complainant had never spoken to Hernandez about

appellant dropping the child off on February 21, 2019.

      Hernandez further testified that when she went to look for the child’s food at

lunchtime on February 21, 2019, she could not find it in the refrigerator.

Hernandez could not find it because the child’s food had been brought in a lunch

bag, and the child had never brought a lunch bag before. Inside the lunch bag, was

a plastic bowl, three muffins in a baggie, and no fruit. The child’s lunch had never

been packaged that way. Meat and potatoes were in the plastic bowl, but they were

“all on top of each other,” which was not the normal way that the complainant

packed the child’s lunch. Hernandez had never seen the complainant “package

three muffins in a baggie for” the child either. The lunch bag also contained a

plastic sippy cup, which the complainant had never used for the child before.

Previously, when the complainant had been out of town for work, appellant had

brought the child’s lunch to the daycare in the same glass containers that the

complainant used.

      Jessica DeLaGarza testified that she worked at Kool Kidz daycare and was

one of the owners. DeLaGarza explained that she met the complainant while the

complainant was pregnant with the child.       The complainant worked at Dow

Chemical, and the daycare was about one minute away from the Dow Chemical

                                        71
office. The child started attending daycare when the complainant went back to

work after his birth.

      DeLaGarza explained that the child was not allowed to eat the lunches

provided by the daycare, and the complainant would bring the child’s lunch and

milk to daycare daily. DeLaGarza did not get to the daycare until after 8:00 a.m.,

but she stayed through pickup in the afternoon. The complainant was almost

always the person who picked the child up from daycare in the afternoon.

Occasionally, appellant or the complainant’s mother would pick the child up from

daycare. When appellant was the person responsible for picking up the child, the

complainant would send text messages to DeLaGarza to ask if the child had “left

yet or been picked up yet.”

      DeLaGarza testified that the complainant was “a perfect mother” and the

child was her top priority. The complainant “gave up her lunch breaks to be with

him.” She was particular about everything the daycare did with the child, and she

was “a very good mom.” Occasionally, the child would not attend the daycare on a

Friday because the complainant and Yolanda spent the day with the child.

      When the complainant traveled for work, appellant would be responsible for

picking up the child from daycare. The complainant notified DeLaGarza when she

would be traveling for work. The complainant would call DeLaGarza’s cellular

telephone to let her know if someone else was dropping off or picking up the child.

                                        72
The complainant always informed DeLaGarza if someone other than the

complainant was dropping the child off at daycare or picking him up from daycare;

this happened “[e]very time.”

      DeLaGarza further testified that when the child first began attending

daycare, the complainant paid for the childcare costs.      Several months later,

appellant started making cash payments, but his cash payments were not made

consistently and were never a consistent amount of money.

      On February 20, 2019, the complainant picked the child up from daycare.

The complainant and DeLaGarza talked for about twenty minutes that day. During

their conversation, the complainant did not tell DeLaGarza that appellant would be

dropping the child off at daycare the next day, February 21, 2019. That evening

DeLaGarza did not receive any telephone calls or text messages from the

complainant letting DeLaGarza know that appellant would be dropping the child

off at daycare on February 21, 2019.

      On February 21, 2019, other daycare employees asked DeLaGarza if she had

been told that appellant, rather than the complainant, was going to drop off the

child that morning, and DeLaGarza stated it was out of the ordinary for no one at

the daycare to have been told ahead of time that appellant would be doing the drop

off. DeLaGarza also noted that the child’s lunch was packaged oddly that day,

                                       73
which was weird because the complainant was consistent on the things that she

brought for the child’s lunch and the way they were packaged.

      The week following the complainant’s death, DeLaGarza saw appellant. He

wanted to talk about bringing the child back to the daycare, and he wanted to

remove the complainant’s family members from the list of persons who were

authorized to pick up the child from daycare. Appellant added his sister to the list

of persons authorized to drop off and pick up the child from the daycare, and he

stated that he would be the person “picking up or dropping off” the child.

Appellant did not express any concern over the complainant’s death.

      When DeLaGarza asked how the child was doing after the complainant’s

death, appellant stated that he was “happy” and “his self” and he “didn’t notice a

difference.” Appellant also told DeLaGarza that the child would be “[f]ine without

his mother.” Later, DeLaGarza offered to go get milk for the child from the dairy

farm that the complainant bought her milk from so that the child could continue

drinking the same milk, but appellant did not accept that offer.

      DeLaGarza also testified that the last time that the complainant traveled for

work “[s]hortly before her passing,” DeLaGarza asked appellant: “Aren’t you so

excited [the complainant] is returning tomorrow[?]” (Internal quotations omitted.)

And appellant said: “No, it’s so much easier without her here.”            (Internal

quotations omitted.)

                                         74
      Gisela Garcia testified that she previously worked at Kool Kidz as a teacher.

Normally, the complainant would drop off and pick up the child from daycare.

When the complainant was out of town, she would always tell the daycare

employees that appellant would be dropping off and picking up the child. If the

complainant was not going to be dropping off or picking up the child the next day,

she would tell the daycare the day before.

      On February 20, 2019, Garcia saw the complainant when she picked up the

child. The complainant did not tell Garcia that appellant would be dropping off or

picking up the child the next day. As of February 20, 2019, Garcia believed that

the complainant would be dropping off the child the next morning.

      Garcia stated that she worked on February 21, 2019, and she got to work

about 7:00 a.m. When she arrived at work, she saw appellant there with the child.

The child arrived at school at 7:07 a.m., which was early for him. Garcia was

surprised by this because the complainant did not tell anyone at the daycare that

appellant would be dropping the child off that day. At drop off, Garcia was given

the child’s lunch in a lunchbox that she had never seen before. Appellant told

Garcia that he would be back in the afternoon to pick up the child.

                                         75
Appellant’s Relationships49

      Patricia Davis testified that she dated appellant in high school and they dated

“off and on” after high school. At some point, Davis learned that appellant was

going to “have a child with someone,” but appellant told her that he and that

person had just “agreed to have a child”; “they weren’t actually involved in a

relationship.”

      Around February 2019, Davis’s relationship with appellant “started again,”

and they had sexual intercourse. Appellant did not tell Davis that he was involved

in another relationship at that time. On the night of February 19, 2019, appellant

came to Davis’s home, and they had sexual intercourse. On February 20, 2019,

Davis and appellant sent messages to each other through Facebook Messenger.50

Appellant told Davis that he went to visit his parents that night. At 10:12 p.m. on

February 20, 2019, appellant sent Davis a message stating: “Well I’m about to

begin the first coat in the master bath. It’s the largest bath so let me put this coat

on and see what time it is. Maybe you’ll still be awake.” (Internal quotations

49
      Additional women testified at trial about their relationships with appellant between
      2016 and 2019.
50
      See Edwards v. State, 497 S.W.3d 147, 155 n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
      2016, pet. ref’d) (“Facebook Messenger is a mobile tool that allows users to
      instantly send chat messages to friends on Facebook. Messages are received on
      [users’] mobile phones.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Hassan v.
      Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-01003-JST, 2019 WL 3302721, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July
      23, 2019) (order) (noting plaintiff used Facebook Messenger application to
      communicate with others via calls and instant messages).

                                           76
omitted.) At 10:14 p.m., appellant said that he was “[a]bout to start” and he would

“let [Davis] know how it [went].” (Internal quotations omitted.) Appellant also

mentioned maybe being able to see Davis later that night.

      Davis testified that she did not see appellant on the night of February 20,

2019, and she went to sleep. At 3:18 a.m. on February 21, 2019, appellant sent

Davis a message saying: “Good morning.” (Internal quotations omitted.) And at

3:48 a.m., appellant sent Davis another message that said: “Did you fall asleep on

me[?]” (Internal quotations omitted.) At 3:49 a.m., appellant tried to call Davis.

Appellant then sent Davis another message at 3:50 a.m., asking: “Is your door

unlocked? I was hoping to stop by for awhile on my way to work.” (Internal

quotations omitted.) Davis noted that her dog never alerted her that morning that

appellant stopped by her house.

      At 6:00 a.m., Davis responded to appellant’s messages and told him that she

had fallen asleep. When Davis asked appellant if he had “been up all night,”

appellant responded: “2 maybe 3 hours. I’ve been trying to work till midnight and

usually get up before my 4 am alarm.” (Internal quotations omitted.) At 6:37 a.m.,

appellant told Davis that he would be “at work” soon.

      Davis further testified that after the complainant’s death, she spoke to

appellant through Facebook Messenger on March 2, 2019.           When she asked

appellant if law enforcement officers had “found out the cause of [the

                                        77
complainant’s] death,” appellant stated that he “d[id] not believe so” and that law

enforcement officers had not “given [him] much details.” (Internal quotations

omitted.)   On March 11, 2019, appellant, in a conversation with Davis over

Facebook Messenger, told her that law enforcement officers would not “even tell

[him] what happened” and they would not “talk to [him] about the facts.” (Internal

quotations omitted.)

      As to appellant generally, Davis stated that she would not characterize him

as loyal or faithful. Appellant never tried to physically harm her.

      Yulenty Deal testified that she worked at LyondellBasell and she met

appellant at work.     In 2018, Deal, who was married at the time, was in a

relationship with appellant, and it was her understanding that appellant was not in a

relationship with the complainant at that time. While they were together, appellant

and Deal would go to hotels to have sexual intercourse after work.

      Deal saw appellant at work on February 25, 2019, after the complainant’s

death. Appellant came to speak with her in her laboratory. He “looked a mess.”

Appellant told Deal “what happened” to the complainant.               He said that the

complainant was found in her house and in the bathroom and that law enforcement

officers had given him that information.51 Appellant stated that he did not know

51
      Detective Hawkins testified that he did not give appellant any details about the
      complainant’s death on February 21, 2019, and when Hawkins spoke to appellant
      on February 22, 2019, he only told appellant that it looked like the complainant
                                         78
what had caused the complainant’s death.       Later that day, Deal had sexual

intercourse with appellant at a hotel in Channelview, Texas. Deal ended her

relationship with appellant in 2020.

Appellant

      Appellant testified that on February 20, 2019, he set his alarm for 4:30 a.m.

or 5:00 a.m. to get up for work, and he got to work about 6:00 a.m. and left work

about 4:00 p.m. that day. While at work on February 20, 2019, he received a

telephone call from Wilson, who worked for appellant’s attorney, and she told him

that a motion to modify had been filed by the complainant. Appellant knew then

that the complainant “wanted more child support” and that the complainant was

seeking “[f]inancial support.”

      Appellant further testified that after work on February 20, 2019, he got a

haircut. At some point, he went to visit his mother, Rosemarie, at her house and

then went home. No one was at appellant’s house with him on the night of

February 20, 2019, and appellant stated that no one could “verify” that he was at

his home “all night.”      Appellant started painting inside his house around

10:15 p.m. on February 20, 2019, and he estimated that he painted for two or three

hours. Appellant also testified that he slept three or four hours on the night of

      had been murdered, but he did not provide appellant with any further details.
      Hawkins did not call appellant anytime before appellant spoke to Deal on
      February 25, 2019 and give him details about the complainant’s death.

                                        79
February 20, 2019 and into the morning on February 21, 2019, after he finished

painting. And he woke up about 3:00 a.m. on February 21, 2019. After waking

up, appellant “tr[ied] to see” Davis, and he went to her house that morning. He

tried to wake her up by sending her messages, but he did not go to the door of

Davis’s home. When asked what he was doing at 2:31 a.m., when a text message

was sent from the complainant’s cellular telephone, appellant stated: “Probably

sleeping.” Appellant arrived at work around 5:00 a.m. on February 21, 2019,

which he admitted was “unusual” and “abnormal” for him. Because he had gone

to Davis’s home earlier that morning and could not wake her up, he stated that his

choices were to either “[g]o back home or go to work,” so he went to work an hour

early. It took appellant an hour to drive to work, and he did not have preapproval

to come into work that early. Appellant did not see the text message from the

complainant’s cellular telephone until he was at work.

      Appellant further testified that he then left work, after only being there for a

few minutes, and he drove an hour to pick up the child and take him to daycare.

Appellant made no telephone calls to the complainant that morning after seeing the

text message from her cellular telephone. Appellant agreed that he should have

called the complainant that morning.

      After appellant picked up the child from the complainant’s house, he

dropped him off at daycare and went back to work. Appellant testified that he

                                         80
dropped the child off at daycare about forty minutes earlier than the time the child

was normally dropped off. After work, appellant picked the child up from daycare

and went to his house. He then called “Waste Connections” to come by his home

and pick up trash. Appellant stated he was surprised when law enforcement

officers showed up at his house around 10:00 p.m. that night.

      When appellant returned to work on February 25, 2019, he told Henson that

the complainant had died, and when Henson asked appellant for details, appellant

stated that the complainant had been “found in her bathtub.”                 Appellant

acknowledged that law enforcement officers had not previously told him how the

complainant had died or “where she was located,” but he said that the fact that the

complainant had been found in the bathtub “had been released to the public.”

Appellant stated that his family had told him about the bathtub because “of what

was being posted on Facebook.”52

52
            Facebook, Inc. is an online social media and social
            networking service company. In general, the Facebook
            service can be accessed from devices with Internet
            connectivity, such as personal computers, tablets[,] and
            smartphones. After registering, users can create a customized
            profile [page] revealing information about themselves. Users
            can post text, photos and multimedia of their own devising
            and share it with other users as friends[.]
      Jeansonne v. State, 624 S.W.3d 78, 90 n.13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021,
      no pet.) (alterations in original); see also Woodhouse v. United States Gov’t, No.
      2:21-cv-06372-SB, 2021 WL 6333468, at *8 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2021) (order)
      (noting Facebook, Inc. has changed its name to Meta Platforms, Inc.).

                                          81
      Appellant described himself as not an “emotional guy.” And he stated that

he had heard people describe him as “cold,” “distant,” “manipulative,” and

“calculat[ed].” Appellant also agreed that he “plan[ned] ahead.” And he stated

that law enforcement officers did not tell him the cause of the complainant’s death.

Appellant admitted that he did not have dinner with the complainant on February

19, 2019, which he had previously told law enforcement officers he had done, and

he stated that he must have gotten his days “mixed up.”

      Appellant testified that when the complainant was in town, she usually took

the child to daycare. And the complainant was in town on February 21, 2019.

Appellant agreed that if the complainant was in town, it was “very unlikely” that

she would ask appellant to take the child to daycare in the morning, especially on a

day that she was going to work. And on February 21, 2019, the complainant was

supposed to go to work. The complainant would have had to drive past the

daycare on the way to her work.

      Appellant agreed that he should not have gone over to Davis’s home on the

morning of February 21, 2019, and he should not have gone to work at 5:00 a.m.

because he was supposed to take the child to daycare on the morning of February

21, 2019. His decision to drive to work did not make sense if he was supposed to

take the child to daycare. Appellant stated that his behavior on February 20, 2019

and February 21, 2019 was “odd,” and he agreed that his behavior was “extremely

                                        82
suspicious.” Appellant also agreed that after receiving Mikel’s text messages on

February 21, 2019 and telling Mikel that he would call the complainant, he should

have actually called the complainant.

      As to his finances, appellant stated that in 2019 his “[t]otal compensation”

was $142,900.02, but his direct compensation was $111,367.03 and he would have

received less than that after taxes.53 The $15,000 loan that appellant took out

against the child’s account was used for the remodeling of appellant’s house. And

appellant admitted that he withdrew $6,500 from the child’s account. Appellant

also noted that he was over his credit limit on his credit card, and his SUV was

repossessed in 2020 for his failure to make payments.54

                               Sufficiency of Evidence

      In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to

support his conviction because “[n]o direct evidence . . . link[ed] [a]ppellant to the

53
      A copy of appellant’s “Total Compensation Statement” for 2018 was admitted into
      evidence and it stated that his “[b]ase [e]arnings” were about $93,000.
54
      We note that additional witnesses testified at trial and additional evidence was
      admitted into evidence. The Court has reviewed the complete record in the instant
      appeal, including all testimony and evidence presented during trial. See TEX. R.
      APP. P. 47.1, 47.4; Sullivan v. Arguello Hope & Assocs., PLLC, No.
      03-18-00144-CV, 2018 WL 6424200, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 7, 2018,
      no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and
      its procedural history, we do not recite them in this opinion except as necessary to
      advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for it.”); see also
      Obernhoff v. Nelson, No. 01-17-00816-CV, 2019 WL 4065017, at *18 n.19 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting appellate
      court reviewed complete record).

                                           83
murder of [the complainant],” “there was no evidence that [a]ppellant’s [SUV] or

his cell[ular] [tele]phone w[ere] anywhere near [the complainant’s] address at the

suspected time of the murder or that he was the mysterious person observed on

various [neighborhood] surveillance [video]tape[] [recordings]” near the time of

the murder, “no forensic evidence was presented [at trial] that place[d] [a]ppellant

at or near the scene of the murder at a time when the [complainant’s] death

occurred,” “[a]ppellant was never identified nor was his [SUV] ever seen at or near

[the complainant’s] house during the early morning hours” on the day the

complainant died, and “there [was] no evidence that [a]ppellant [was the person

that] staged the [murder] scene” or “cleaned the scene.”

      We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any

“rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Williams v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our role is that of a due

process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact’s finding of the

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Moreno v. State, 755

S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We defer to the responsibility of the

fact finder to resolve conflicts fairly in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw

reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. That said, our

                                         84
duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a

conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense of which he is

accused. Id.

      We note that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a court must

consider both direct and circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007); see also Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012) (evidence-sufficiency standard of review same for both direct and

circumstantial evidence). Circumstantial evidence is just as probative as direct

evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can

be sufficient to establish guilt. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State,

214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). For evidence to be sufficient, the State

need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with a

defendant’s guilt. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Cantu v. State, 395 S.W.3d 202,

207–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d).            Rather, a court

considers only whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable

based on the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most

favorable to the jury’s verdict. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d

at 13. The jury, as the judge of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, could

choose to believe or not to believe the witnesses, or any portion of their testimony.

                                         85
Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Jenkins v. State, 870

S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).

      A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly

causes the death of an individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1). A

person also commits the offense of murder if he intends to cause serious bodily

injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of

an individual.55 See id. § 19.02(b)(2). A person acts intentionally, or with intent,

with respect to the result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire

to engage in the conduct or cause the result.          Id. § 6.03(a).     A person acts

knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is

aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b); see

also Schroeder v. State, 123 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“Murder is

a ‘result of conduct’ offense, which means that the culpable mental state relates to

the result of the conduct, i.e., the causing of the death.”). “‘Serious bodily injury’

means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death,

55
      Here, the indictment alleged that appellant committed the offense of murder under
      both theories, and the trial court instructed the jury accordingly. See TEX. PENAL
      CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2). In response to the trial court’s charge, the jury
      returned a general verdict of guilty. When a trial court submits alternative theories
      of conviction to the jury, and the jury returns a general verdict, we will uphold the
      verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support any one of the alternative theories.
      See Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Hollins
      v. State, Nos. 01-14-00744-CR, 01-14-000745-CR, 2015 WL 5076298, at *4 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
      publication).

                                           86
serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function

of any bodily member or organ.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(46).

      “Intent is almost always proven by circumstantial evidence.” Trevino v.

State, 228 S.W.3d 729, 736 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, pet.

ref’d); see also Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Direct

evidence of the requisite intent is not required . . . .”); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d

739, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). “A jury may infer

intent from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words,

and conduct of the accused, and the method of committing the crime, and from the

nature of wounds inflicted on the victim[].” Trevino, 228 S.W.3d at 736. A jury

may also infer knowledge from such evidence. See Stahle v. State, 970 S.W.2d

682, 687 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d); Martinez v. State, 833 S.W.2d 188,

196 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d). In determining a defendant’s guilt, a

jury may consider events that occur before, during, and after the commission of an

offense. See Pitonyak v. State, 253 S.W.3d 834, 844–45 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008,

pet. ref’d); Martin v. State, 151 S.W.3d 236, 245 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004,

pet. ref’d); see also King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)

(jury may consider evidence showing consciousness of guilt).

      The evidence presented at trial shows that the complainant’s body was found

naked in the bathtub in her home on February 21, 2019. There is no evidence that

                                         87
the complainant died from natural causes, a “slip and fall,” an accident, or from

suicide. When law enforcement officers found the complainant, she had blood in

her hair and “[a] large wound on the left side of the top of her head.” The wound

was “a really jagged gash in her head.” The complainant’s eye was “bruised and

swollen,” and she was “bleeding from the nose.”

       Dr. Chundru, who performed the autopsy on the complainant’s body,

testified that the complainant had a large laceration on the left side of her scalp.

Her left eye was swollen and discolored, and there was an abrasion or contusion on

her left facial cheek. Dr. Chundru described the laceration on the left side of the

complainant’s scalp as “a pretty extensive injury.” The complainant also had

bruising on the right side of her scalp and a “fresh” bruise on her hand.

       Underneath the complainant’s head laceration, Dr. Chundru found multiple

skull fractures.    The multiple skull fractures would have resulted from the

complainant being hit “with, like, a hammer or something like that.” Either the

complainant’s head hit an object multiple times or an object hit the complainant’s

head multiple times.        Dr. Chundru opined that multiple “blow[s]” to the

complainant’s head produced her skull fractures. The skull fractures likely caused

the complainant’s eye-bruising because blood would have seeped into her eyelids

as a result of the fractures.

                                         88
      Because the complainant had been hit in the head, the complainant had a

hemorrhage around and within her brain and the complainant had bruising of the

brain. According to Dr. Chundru, the hemorrhages in or around the complainant’s

brain and the bruising on the complainant’s brain constituted signs of the

complainant suffering “pretty severe trauma.”              The complainant had a

subarachnoid hemorrhage, meaning that blood was directly touching the

complainant’s brain tissue and irritating the brain, which could have caused the

complainant to die because the irritation would have caused the complainant’s

heart and lungs to stop functioning.        The complainant also had a subdural

hemorrhage, which would have caused her to die because “when it gets so

big . . . it pushes on the brain.” The bruising on the complainant’s brain would also

have irritated her brain.

      In summation, Dr. Chundru testified that the complainant’s cause of death

was blunt force head injuries. A number of different blunt and hard objects could

have caused the blunt force injuries to the complainant’s head, including the wine

bottle found near the complainant in the primary bathroom.56             Either the

complainant’s injuries were caused by the object striking the complainant’s head

repeatedly or the complainant’s head striking the object repeatedly. According to

Dr. Chundru, blunt force was used on the left side of the complainant’s skull,

56
      The wine bottle had the complainant’s blood and hair on it.

                                          89
which caused multiple fractures and bleeding in her brain and resulted in the

complainant’s death.     The blunt force used by the person who killed the

complainant could have caused serious bodily injury and death. This evidence

supports a finding that someone intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the

complainant or that someone intended to cause serious bodily injury to the

complainant and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the

death of the complainant.57 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2); see

also Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The

defendant’s culpable mental state may . . . be inferred from the extent of the

[complainant’s] injuries.”).

      Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that he was

the person who intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the complainant or

the person who intended to cause serious bodily injury to the complainant and

committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of the

complainant because “[n]o direct evidence . . . link[ed] [a]ppellant to the murder of

[the complainant],” “there was no evidence that [a]ppellant’s [SUV] or his

cell[ular] [tele]phone w[ere] anywhere near [the complainant’s] address at the

suspected time of the murder or that [appellant] was the mysterious person

57
      The jury need not unanimously agree on the manner or the means of the
      commission of the complainant’s murder. See Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767,
      773–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 746 n.27 (Tex.
      Crim. App. 2005).

                                         90
observed on various [neighborhood] surveillance [video]tape[] [recordings]” near

the time of the murder, “no forensic evidence was presented [at trial] that place[d]

[a]ppellant at or near the scene of the murder at a time when the [complainant’s]

death occurred,” “[a]ppellant was never identified nor was his [SUV] ever seen at

or near [the complainant’s] house during the early morning hours” on the day the

complainant died, and “there [was] no evidence that [a]ppellant [was the person

that] staged the [murder] scene” or “cleaned the scene.”

      But circumstantial evidence is just as probative as direct evidence in

establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish

guilt. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. A lack of

physical or forensic evidence tying a defendant to a murder scene is only a factor

for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence. See Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d

452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006); see also Sample v. State, No. 05-19-01254-CR, 2021 WL

3042670, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding evidence sufficient to support defendant’s

murder conviction despite fact that State offered no forensic evidence linking

defendant to murder); Cuellar v. State, No. 08-18-00133-CR, 2021 WL 2184512,

at *6–7 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 28, 2021, no pet.) (not designated for

publication) (holding evidence sufficient to support capital murder conviction even

                                        91
though defendant argued no physical evidence connected him to murder scenes);

Binder v. State, No. 2-01-447-CR, 2003 WL 298380, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Feb. 13, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (lack of

physical evidence in case did not make evidence insufficient to support

conviction). The law requires no particular type of evidence. Johnson v. State,

560 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

      Here, the jury heard evidence that appellant had a motive to kill the

complainant. Although motive is not an element of the offense of murder, such

evidence is relevant as a circumstance tending to prove guilt. See Nelson v. State,

405 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d); Russo v.

State, 228 S.W.3d 779, 794 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d); see also

Barrientos v. State, 539 S.W.3d 482, 493 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017,

no pet.) (“Evidence showing motive to commit murder is a significant

circumstance indicating guilt . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).

      At trial, the State presented evidence that on February 20, 2019, the day

before she died, the complainant filed a motion to modify requesting that appellant

be required to pay child support in an amount greater than the support he had been

paying under the previously established temporary order. Appellant was aware of

the complainant’s filing of the motion to modify and that the complainant was

seeking more money from him to support the child. Appellant was also aware that

                                           92
the complainant made more money than he did but she still wanted him to pay

child support. The complainant was afraid of appellant and of what his reaction

would be to her filing the motion to modify.

      The State further presented evidence as to why the complainant’s filing of

the motion to modify would have prompted appellant to kill the complainant.

Notably, appellant was in a difficult financial situation at the time of the

complainant’s death. He was spending a large amount of money remodeling his

home and on his mortgage. Appellant was over his credit limit on his credit card at

the time of the complainant’s death, he was behind on his car payments, and he had

taken out a $15,000 loan against the child’s account. Between December 2018 and

March 2019, appellant withdrew $21,500 from the child’s account, which was

money designated for the child’s necessities.      Appellant’s mother expressed

concern about appellant losing his home on the day the complainant died. Yet, if

the complainant had been successful on her motion to modify, appellant would

have been required to pay more child support than he had been paying under the

temporary order that had been in place for almost two years. See Nelson, 405

S.W.3d at 124 (noting State presented evidence that defendant had “a financial

motive to murder the complainant”); Russo, 228 S.W.3d at 794 (at time of murder,

defendant was having financial difficulties).

                                         93
      The State also presented evidence that appellant was controlling and

manipulative over the complainant and the child.         And the complainant had

recently ended her relationship with appellant and forced him to move out of her

home. Appellant, before the complainant’s death, had made comments about it

being easier to care for the child when the complainant was not around, and

appellant had previously withheld access to the child when the complainant

traveled for work. On the day of the complainant’s death, appellant ensured that

he had custody and control over the child.

      Additionally, the State presented evidence that appellant was selfish and

self-centered. He was verbally and emotionally abusive to the complainant and

frequently engaged in infidelity. See Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 265 (relationship

difficulty can establish motive for murder); Nelson, 405 S.W.3d at 124 (evidence

of affair during relationship may provide motive for partner’s murder). Appellant

had previously threatened the complainant that “he knew people that could make

her disappear” if she acted in a way that he did not like. See Nisbett, 522 S.W.3d

at 265–66 (“Prior behavior by the defendant toward the deceased can also be

relevant   to   a   determination   of   whether   the   defendant   murdered   the

[complainant].”).

      The State also presented evidence that appellant had the opportunity to kill

the complainant. See id. at 265 (“Opportunity when coupled with motive . . . is

                                         94
indicative of guilt.”).   On the night of February 20, 2019 and into the early

morning of February 21, 2019, appellant was alone. He sent Davis a message on

his cellular telephone through Facebook Messenger around 10:14 p.m. on February

20, 2019, but appellant did not send any more messages to Davis or anyone else

that night. And appellant did not send Davis another message on his cellular

telephone until 3:18 a.m. on February 21, 2019. That left a period of about five

hours where appellant was not in contact with anyone.

      Further, the State presented evidence that appellant’s house was only about

fifteen minutes away from the complainant’s house. Appellant had a key to the

back door of the complainant’s home, and he knew that the surveillance video

camera at the back of the complainant’s house did not work. The back door to the

complainant’s home was found unlocked by law enforcement officers later in the

day on February 21, 2019.

      Additionally, the State presented evidence that the complainant’s cellular

telephone was found on the foot of the bed in the primary bedroom in an odd

location.   Although a text message was sent from the complainant’s cellular

telephone to appellant at 2:31 a.m., the text message was written in a style that

resembled appellant’s style of texting, rather than the complainant’s style of

texting. Appellant, having previously lived in the complainant’s home, would

have also known that there was a wine refrigerator in the primary bedroom and that

                                        95
there were wine bottles in the “his” side of the “his and her” closets in the primary

bedroom.    It is likely that a wine bottle was used in the commission of the

complainant’s murder.58

      Although appellant notes that no evidence presented at trial showed that his

cellular telephone was near the complainant’s house around the suspected time of

her death and that his car was not seen near the complainant’s home in the early

morning hours of February 21, 2019, the absence of such evidence does not

establish that appellant was not at the complainant’s home when the complainant

was killed.59 See, e.g., Floyd v. State, No. 02-22-00082-CR, 2023 WL 2033831, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 16, 2023, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (holding evidence sufficient to support aggravated robbery conviction

even though no “cell-phone evidence” showed defendant “was in Fort Worth on

the day of the incident”).

      And we note that the record is replete with inconsistent statements by

appellant and implausible explanations from appellant.60 See Guevara v. State, 152

58
      A wine bottle, with the complainant’s blood and hair on it, was found near the
      complainant’s body in the primary bathroom.
59
      The jury, as the judge of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, could choose to
      believe or not to believe the witnesses or any portion of their testimony. Sharp v.
      State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d
      626, 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).
60
      Due to their volume, we do not specifically detail all of appellant’s inconsistent
      statements and implausible explanations that are contained in the record. See TEX.
      R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                           96
S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Attempts to conceal incriminating

evidence, inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations to the police are

probative of wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.”); see also

Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 266 (inconsistencies in defendant’s story provide

evidentiary support for conviction); Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 668

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (inconsistent statements and implausible explanations to

law enforcement are strong evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt). As

detailed above, appellant asserted, among other things, that on the night of

February 20, 2019, he started painting his home around 10:15 p.m. He painted for

two or three hours, and he purportedly woke up about 3:00 a.m.—earlier than he

normally did for work.

      Further, after waking up early, appellant drove an hour to work, arriving an

hour earlier than he normally did. Appellant agreed that this was “unusual” and

“abnormal” behavior for him. Appellant made the hour-long drive to work even

though he asserted that the complainant and he had planned for him to take the

child to daycare that morning61 and even though his early arrival to work had not

been preapproved by his supervisor.

61
      Although appellant asserted that it was the plan that he would drop off the child at
      daycare on February 21, 2019, no one at the daycare was ever informed of this
      plan, which was unusual.

                                           97
      Additionally, according to appellant, although he used his cellular telephone

to contact Davis in the early morning hours of February 21, 2019, he claimed that

he did not see the text message from the complainant’s cellular telephone until he

was at work around 5:00 a.m. He then immediately left work and drove an hour

back to Lake Jackson to pick up the child. Appellant made no attempt to call the

complainant after he received the abnormal text message from her cellular

telephone or during the entire time that he drove to her home. At trial, appellant

agreed that it would have made sense for him to call the complainant that morning.

      Upon arriving at the complainant’s house around 6:45 a.m., appellant

walked straight into the complainant’s home, without knocking, even though he no

longer lived there. Appellant also had a different key in his hand than his large set

of keys that he had previously used to enter the complainant’s house on February

11, 2019, when he still lived there. When appellant left the complainant’s home

carrying the child, he was no longer carrying a key.62 Appellant then took the child

from the complainant’s home without ever speaking to the complainant. As Texas

Ranger Norsworthy explained, in discussing the events of February 21, 2019,

appellant told “an unbelievable story” about how he “essentially st[ole] [the child]

from the [complainant’s] house without any direct communication with [the

complainant]” on the morning of February 21, 2019. Appellant dropped the child
62
      A key was later found in the complainant’s front door by Yolanda and law
      enforcement officers.

                                         98
off at daycare more than forty minutes earlier than normal and without the child’s

normal lunch.

      At trial, appellant acknowledged that if the complainant was in town, then it

was “very unlikely” that she would have asked appellant to take the child to

daycare in the morning, especially on a day that she was going to work. And on

February 21, 2019, the complainant was supposed to go to work. The complainant

would have had to drive past the daycare on the way to work that morning.

Appellant also agreed that his decision to drive an hour to work on the morning of

February 21, 2019 did not make any sense if he was also supposed to take the child

to daycare that morning.    See Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 757 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (attempts to create false alibi are

evidence of guilt). And appellant acknowledged that his behavior on February 20,

2019 and February 21, 2019 was “odd” and “extremely suspicious.”                See

Washington v. State, 567 S.W.3d 430, 439 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018,

pet. ref’d) (jury could infer defendant’s guilt by his strange behavior); see also

Johnson v. State, Nos. 14-17-00312-CR, 14-17-00313-CR, 2018 WL 3911148, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (“out of the ordinary behavior” supported reasonable

inference of consciousness of guilt (internal quotations omitted)); Bunsow v. State,

No. 08-07-00066-CR, 2009 WL 146503, at *7 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 22, 2009,

                                        99
pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (jury could have inferred that

defendant’s odd behavior was indication of guilt).

       We also note that appellant’s guilt may generally be inferred from his words

and actions.63 See Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d at 668. The State presented

evidence that when Detective Bailey and Detective Hawkins arrived at appellant’s

house on the night of February 21, 2019, after the complainant’s death, appellant

did not ask the officers why they were there to see him. And appellant only

responded, “You’re kidding me,” when he was told of the complainant’s death.

On the night of February 21, 2019 and afterward, appellant appeared emotionless

regarding the complainant’s death. Following the complainant’s death, appellant

“lacked empathy in her death” and instead focused on himself and the hardships

that her death had caused him. Appellant never appeared “rattled” or “freaked out”

by the complainant’s death. And he never expressed a desire to find her “true

killer.”

       The State also presented evidence that appellant, when he returned to work

on February 25, 2019—four days after the complainant’s death—told multiple

co-workers that the complainant’s body had been found in the bathtub or in the

bathroom of her home—information that law enforcement officers purposefully

63
       In addition to what is discussed below, we note that the background section details
       numerous words and actions by appellant from which his guilt could be inferred.
       See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                           100
did not disclose to appellant. See McDaniel v. State, No. 14-08-1085-CR, 2010

WL 1704741, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 29, 2010, no pet.) (not

designated for publication) (information contained in defendant’s confession

“could only have been provided by someone who knew details concerning the

shooting or was present when [the complainant] was shot”). Appellant also had

sexual intercourse with a co-worker on February 25, 2019 at a hotel after work and

before returning to Lake Jackson.         And during law enforcement officers’

investigation of the complainant’s death, they found artwork depicting a nude

female in a bathtub on appellant’s new cellular telephone that he purchased after

the complainant’s death. Cf. Dorsey v. State, 117 S.W.3d 332, 335–36 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. ref’d) (evidence in murder trial that defendant rented

movie with plot similar to events surrounding murder was relevant to motive and

intent).

       Viewing all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to

the jury’s verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond

a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of

the complainant or appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to the

complainant and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the

death of the complainant.      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2).

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s

                                        101
conviction for the offense of murder. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359–

63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (analogous case holding evidence sufficient to support

defendant’s conviction for offense of murder).

      We overrule appellant’s first issue.

                                Motion to Suppress

      In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress certain evidence recovered from his SUV because “there [was]

no evidence within the four corners of the [search warrant] affidavit that place[d]

[a]ppellant’s [SUV] at or near the murder scene at the time the murder allegedly

occurred,” which rendered the search warrant for his SUV invalid.

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a

bifurcated standard of review. See Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of

discretion and the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. At a

suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge

of the witnesses’ credibility, and it may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any

part of the witnesses’ testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

When, as here, a trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the

evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we assume that the

                                         102
trial court made implied findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those

findings are supported by the record. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29,

35–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see also Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s implied

findings, especially those based on an evaluation of witness credibility or

demeanor. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We

will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is

correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. at 447–48. This is so even

if the trial court gives the wrong reason for its decision. Laney v. State, 117

S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); State v. Brabson, 899 S.W.2d 741, 745–

46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995), aff’d, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

      The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 9 of the Texas Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; State v. Betts, 397

S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The Fourth Amendment requires that

“no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or

affirmation.” U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.06. A search warrant may be obtained from a magistrate

only upon the submission of an affidavit setting forth substantial facts establishing

probable cause. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b). The affidavit must set

                                          103
forth specific facts establishing that a specific offense has been committed, the

item to be seized constitutes evidence of the offense or evidence that a particular

person committed the offense, and that the item is located at, or on the person,

place, or thing to be searched. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(c).

      When a magistrate construes a probable cause affidavit, he is permitted to

“interpret the affidavit in a non-technical, common-sense manner and may draw

reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances contained within its four

corners.” State v. Jordan, 342 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). On a

complaint that evidence obtained during a search should be suppressed because the

magistrate had no probable cause to issue a search warrant, we apply a “great

deference” standard of review to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause.

Id. “Probable cause exists if, under the totality of the circumstances set forth in the

affidavit before the magistrate, there is a ‘fair probability’ that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place at the time the warrant is

issued.”   Id. at 568–69 (internal footnote omitted).         In our review of the

magistrate’s determination, we determine whether “‘the magistrate had a

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’” Id. at 569 (quoting

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).                  And we employ a

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–37. The Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals has explained: “The issue is not whether there are other

                                         104
facts that could have, or even should have, been included in the affidavit;” instead,

“we focus on the combined logical force of the facts that are in the affidavit.”

Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (emphasis omitted).

And the truthfulness of the factual showing providing probable cause for a warrant

does not mean “‘truthful[ness]’ in the sense that every fact recited in the [search]

warrant affidavit is necessarily correct.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165,

(1978). “[S]o long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]

that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment

requires no more.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (second and third alterations in original)

(internal quotations omitted).

      Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

certain evidence recovered from his SUV, i.e., “pleadings” and a “receipt from a

[barbecue] restaurant,” because the affidavit supporting the search warrant for his

SUV contained “no evidence . . . that place[d] [a]pellant’s [SUV] at or near the

murder scene at the time the murder allegedly occurred.”

      Here, for purposes of this opinion, we will presume, without deciding, that

law enforcement officers’ search of appellant’s SUV violated the Fourth

Amendment and the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.

Cf. Uvukansi v. State, No. 01-14-00527-CR, 2016 WL 3162166, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 2, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

                                        105
publication). Notably though, when the trial court erroneously denies a motion to

suppress and admits evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that

error is subject to a harm analysis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Hernandez v. State,

60 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Santiago v. State, No.

04-19-00317-CR, 2020 WL 4808723, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 19, 2020,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Marcopoulos v. State,

548 S.W.3d 697, 707 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (appellate

court must determine whether trial court’s erroneous denial of motion to suppress

harmed defendant). We must reverse the trial court’s judgment of conviction

unless we determine “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to

the conviction or punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see also Neal v. State, 256

S.W.3d 264, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Uvukansi, 2016 WL 3162166, at *8. In

applying the harmless-error test, the primary question is whether there is a

“reasonable possibility” that the error might have contributed to the conviction.

Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (internal quotations

omitted).

      We are directed that our harm analysis should not focus on the propriety of

the outcome of the trial. Instead, we must calculate, as much as possible, the

probable impact of the evidence on the jury in light of the existence of other

evidence. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We

                                        106
“should take into account any and every circumstance apparent in the record that

logically informs an appellate determination whether ‘beyond a reasonable doubt

[that particular] error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment,’” and if

applicable, we may consider the nature of the error, the extent that it was

emphasized by the State, its probable collateral implications, and the weight a juror

would probably place on the error. Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a)). This requires us to evaluate

the entire record in a neutral, impartial, and even-handed manner and not “in the

light most favorable to the [State].” Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 586 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1989) (internal quotations omitted), disagreed with in part on other

grounds by Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 821–22; Daniels v. State, 25 S.W.3d 893, 899

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Error does not contribute to the

conviction or punishment if the jury’s verdict would have been the same even if

the erroneous evidence had not been admitted. Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

      Although appellant asserts in his briefing that the trial court erred in denying

his motion to suppress certain evidence recovered from his SUV, he wholly fails to

explain whether or how that erroneous ruling contributed to his conviction or

punishment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a) (“If the appellate record in a criminal case

reveals constitutional error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of

                                         107
appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court

determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the

conviction or punishment.”); cf. Martinez v. State, No. 13-21-00191-CV, 2022 WL

3724107, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 30, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant did not adequately brief

complaint trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress where he did not

explain whether or how that ruling contributed to his conviction or punishment).

      To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to

authorities.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue on appeal if he

does not adequately brief that issue by not providing supporting arguments,

substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. See

id.; Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Cardenas v.

State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d

889, 901 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Here, appellant’s brief

contains no argument, substantive analysis, or citation to authorities or to the

record to show that he was harmed by the trial court’s purported erroneous denial

of his motion to suppress evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Wyatt v. State, 23

S.W.3d 18, 23 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“We will not make appellant’s

arguments for him . . . .”); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 210 (Tex. Crim.

                                        108
App. 1995) (where appellant’s point of error inadequately briefed, appellant

“presents nothing for our review”); Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1995) (failure to adequately brief issue, either by failing to specifically

argue and analyze one’s position or provide authorities and record citations, waives

any error on appeal), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d

249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also Reule v. M & T Mortg., 483 S.W.3d 600, 615

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“[W]ithout proper citation,

the voluminous nature of th[e] record makes it difficult to discern where there is

any support for many of [appellant’s] complaints.”). Accordingly, we hold that

appellant waived his complaint that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress because of inadequate briefing. See, e.g., Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393

(holding issue inadequately briefed where “appellant d[id] not address the question

of whether the alleged error . . . was harmless”); Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 900–01

(holding defendant waived complaint trial court erred in admitting certain evidence

because brief did not contain any argument that he was harmed by purportedly

erroneous admission); see also Leleo v. State, Nos. 01-20-00034-CR,

01-20-00035-CR, 2022 WL 243917, at *37–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Jan. 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (declining to

address issue that was inadequately briefed and explaining not appellate court’s

role to construct defendant’s argument for him).

                                         109
                               Admission of Evidence

      In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting

certain testimony and other evidence because its admission “violated the

attorney[-]client privilege.” See TEX. R. EVID. 503. In his fourth, sixth, eighth,

ninth, and eleventh issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting

certain testimony and other evidence because it constituted hearsay. In his fifth,

seventh, tenth, and twelfth issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred in

admitting certain testimony and other evidence because it violated his Sixth

Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” See U.S.

CONST. amend. VI.

      We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Walker

v. State, 321 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. dism’d). A

trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without

reference to any guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d

372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). When considering a trial court’s decision to

admit evidence, we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless it falls outside the

“zone of reasonable disagreement.” Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). We will uphold a trial court’s

                                          110
evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling. De

La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

A.    Attorney-Client Privilege

      In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the

testimony of Wilson, a legal assistant employed by appellant’s attorney, about

“communications between [a]ppellant’s attorney’s office [and appellant] regarding

[the] motion to modify . . . filed [by the complainant] on February 20, 2019” and

the copy of a February 21, 2019 email from Wilson to appellant because their

admission “violated the attorney[-]client privilege.” See TEX. R. EVID. 503.

      “In general, privileges are exclusionary rules of evidence that may be used to

suppress relevant evidence.” McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d 622, 642–43 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (internal quotations omitted). We

review the trial court’s ruling denying applicability of a privilege for an abuse of

discretion. Porter v. State, 513 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2017, pet. ref’d). We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if “the trial court

applied an erroneous legal standard, or when no reasonable view of the record

could support the trial court’s conclusion under the correct law and the facts

viewed in the light most favorable to its legal conclusion.” Porter, 513 S.W.3d at

700 (internal quotations omitted). The party asserting a privilege has the burden of

                                         111
showing that the privilege applies. Porter, 513 S.W.3d at 700; McAfee, 467

S.W.3d at 643.

      The Texas Rules of Evidence protect from disclosure the communications

between a client and his counsel when they are kept confidential and are made to

facilitate the rendition of legal services. See TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1); Cameron v.

State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Porter, 513 S.W.3d at 700. The

scope of the privilege is limited to communications “made by a client seeking legal

advice from a lawyer in [the lawyer’s] capacity as such and the communication

must relate to the purpose for which the advice is sought.” Porter, 513 S.W.3d at

700 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also State v.

DeAngelis, 116 S.W.3d 396, 403–04 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.).

      The application of the attorney-client privilege depends on whether the

communication sought to be protected is “confidential.” Austin v. State, 934

S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (internal quotations omitted); Williams v.

State, 417 S.W.3d 162, 185–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

“A communication is ‘confidential’ if not intended to be disclosed to third persons

other than those” to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of

professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the

transmission of the communication. TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(5); see also McAfee, 467

S.W.3d at 642.

                                       112
      Disclosure by the attorney does not waive the privilege absent the client’s

consent. Porter, 513 S.W.3d at 700; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 643. The client can

waive the privilege by voluntarily disclosing or consenting to the disclosure of a

significant part of the privileged matter. TEX. R. EVID. 511; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d

at 643.

      Here, we will presume, for purposes of this opinion, that the trial court erred

in   admitting      the   complained-of    portion   of    Wilson’s   testimony    about

“communications between [a]ppellant’s attorney’s office [and appellant] regarding

[the] motion to modify . . . filed [by the complainant] on February 20, 2019” and

the copy of a February 21, 2019 email from Wilson to appellant about the motion

to modify because it violated the attorney-client privilege. But we must still

perform a harm analysis to determine if the trial court’s purported error requires

reversal of the trial court’s judgment. See Wright v. State, 374 S.W.3d 564, 580–

81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (presuming, without

deciding,   trial     court   erred   in   admitting      evidence    in   violation   of

attorney-work-product privilege and performing harm analysis); Sanford v. State,

21 S.W.3d 337, 344–47 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.) (after concluding trial

court erred in admitting certain testimony in violation of attorney-client privilege,

conducting harm analysis), abrogated on other grounds by Motilla v. State, 78

S.W.3d 352, 356 n.25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Pierce v. State, No.

                                           113
03-03-00536-CR, 2005 WL 1842759, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 3, 2005, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining if trial court erred in

admitting testimony in violation of attorney-client privilege, appellate court may

reverse only if error affected substantial rights).

      The admission of evidence in violation of the attorney-client privilege

constitutes non-constitutional error. See Sanford, 21 S.W.3d at 344–45; see also

Olejnik v. State, No. 13-10-307-CR, 2011 WL 2475503, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 23, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Pierce, 2005 WL 1842759, at *3. Non-constitutional error requires

reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of the defendant. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 44.2(b); Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A

defendant’s substantial rights are affected “when the error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953

S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).               We will not overturn a criminal

conviction for non-constitutional error if, after examining the record, we have fair

assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect.

Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–94.

      We review the entire record to determine the effect or influence of the

wrongfully admitted evidence on the jury’s decision. Id.; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at

355–56.    In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was improperly

                                          114
influenced, we consider the testimony and physical evidence, the nature of the

evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the alleged error and how it

might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case. Barshaw, 342

S.W.3d at 94; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56. The weight of evidence of the

defendant’s guilt is also relevant in conducting the harm analysis. Neal, 256

S.W.3d at 285; see also Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–60. And we may consider

closing statements and voir dire, jury instructions, the State’s theory, any defensive

theories, and whether the State emphasized the alleged error. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d

at 355–56; Hankins v. State, 180 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet.

ref’d).

          Appellant fails to assert in his briefing that he was harmed by the admission

of the complained-of portion of Wilson’s testimony and the admission of the

February 21, 2019 email from Wilson to appellant. See Petriciolet v. State, 442

S.W.3d 643, 653–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (even if

trial court improperly admitted evidence, appellate court must still determine

whether defendant was harmed by erroneous admission); see, e.g., Cardenas, 30

S.W.3d at 393 (holding defendant waived complaint on appeal because he

inadequately briefed issue by failing to address whether alleged error was

harmless); Chaves v. State, 630 S.W.3d 541, 555, 557–58 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (holding defendant waived complaint trial court erred in

                                           115
admitting certain evidence because he “failed to adequately brief his assertion that

he was harmed by the admission of” complained-of evidence); Ford v. State, No.

01-17-00213-CR, 2018 WL 1473948, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (appellate court need

not determine whether trial court erred in admitting exhibits where defendant did

not argue in briefing that he was harmed by purportedly erroneous admission of

exhibits); Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 900–01 (“Here, we do not address whether the

trial court erred in admitting the complained-of extraneous-offense evidence

because even were we to conclude that the trial court erred in admitting such

evidence, appellant, in his brief, does not argue that he was harmed by its

admission.”).

      To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities

and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue on appeal

if he does not adequately brief that issue by not providing supporting arguments,

substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. See

id.; Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Busby v.

State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555,

557–58. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized, an appellate

court has no obligation to construct and compose issues, facts, and arguments with

                                        116
appropriate citations to authorities and the record for the appellant. See Wolfe v.

State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 342–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Busby, 253 S.W.3d at

673; see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5 (“We will not make appellant’s

arguments for him . . . .”). A brief that does not comply with Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 38.1 presents nothing for an appellate court to review. See

Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210.

      Here, appellant’s brief contains no argument, explanation, substantive

analysis, or citation to authorities to show that he was harmed by the trial court’s

purportedly erroneous admission of the complained-of portion of Wilson’s

testimony and the admission of the February 21, 2019 email from Wilson to

appellant.   See Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5 (“We will not make appellant’s

arguments for him . . . .”). Accordingly, we hold that appellant has waived, due to

inadequate briefing, his complaint on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting

the complained-of portion of Wilson’s testimony and the copy of a February 21,

2019 email. See, e.g., Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393 (holding issue inadequately

briefed where “appellant d[id] not address the question of whether the alleged

error . . . was harmless”); Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 557–58 (holding defendant

waived complaint trial court erred in admitting certain evidence because

appellant’s brief “contain[ed] no argument, explanation, substantive analysis, or

citation to authorities to show that he was harmed by the trial court’s purported

                                        117
erroneous admission of the State’s [evidence]”); Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *6;

Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 900–01 (defendant waived complaint trial court erred in

admitting certain evidence where he failed to “identify[] the harm that he suffered

as a result of the admission of the complained-of evidence”).

B.    Hearsay

      In his fourth issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the

testimony of Harris, a paralegal who previously worked with Terry, the

complainant’s attorney, about “conversations . . . she had with [the complainant]

regarding the filing of [a] motion to modify” because “any statement made by [the

complainant] to . . . Harris” was hearsay. In his sixth issue, appellant argues that

the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Terry, the complainant’s

attorney, about “the details of [a] conversation . . . he had with [the complainant]

concerning the filing of the motion to modify” because the testimony constituted

hearsay. In his eighth issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting

the testimony of Weaver, the complainant’s friend, about “statements . . . she

made” to the complainant “during a conversation they [had] concerning [the

complainant’s] relationship with appellant” because “the statement[s] made

by . . . Weaver were in fact hearsay.” In his ninth issue, appellant argues that the

trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Kimberly, the complainant’s cousin,

about “her conversations with [the complainant] about [the complainant’s]

                                         118
relationship with [a]ppellant and that [the complainant’s] text messages were being

monitored” because the testimony constituted hearsay.          In his eleventh issue,

appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Gaston, the

complainant’s therapist, about “statements made by [the complainant] about her

relationship with [a]ppellant” because the statements constituted hearsay.

      “Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted in the statement. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d) (internal quotations

omitted). Hearsay is generally not admissible unless allowed by statute or rule.

TEX. R. EVID. 802.

      1.     Harris

      In his briefing related to his fourth issue, appellant generally complains

about Harris’s testimony “concerning conversations that she had with [the

complainant] regarding the filing of [a] motion to modify,” but appellant provides

minimal record citations to direct the Court to the specific portions of Harris’s

testimony about which he complains.64 See Thomas v. State, 701 S.W.2d 653, 662

64
      We note that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record to
      determine if the record supports appellant’s argument. See Alvarado v. State, 912
      S.W.2d 199, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (appellate court is not required “to pore
      through hundreds of pages of record in an attempt to verify an appellant’s
      claims”); Thierry v. State, 288 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
      2009, pet. ref’d); see also Belle v. State, 543 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“[W]e are under no duty to make an
      independent search of the record to determine whether an assertion of reversible
      error is valid.”). The appellant bears the burden of showing that the record
      supports the contentions raised, and he must specify the place in the record where
                                         119
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (“It is well settled that mere reference to pages in the

record does not sufficiently identify testimony, objections thereto, and the court’s

rulings thereon to constitute a ground of error.” (emphasis added)); see also Reule,

483 S.W.3d at 615 (“[W]ithout proper citation, the voluminous nature of th[e]

record makes it difficult to discern where there is any support for many of

[appellant’s] complaints.”). From what this Court can discern, appellant appears to

complain about this portion of Harris’s testimony:

      matters upon which he relies or of which he complains are shown. See Thomas v.
      State, 701 S.W.2d 653, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (“It is well settled that mere
      reference to pages in the record does not sufficiently identify testimony, objections
      thereto, and the court’s rulings thereon to constitute a ground of error.”); In re
      C.A.J., No. 01-19-00704-CV, 2021 WL 243900, at *27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] Jan. 26, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Gonzalez v. State, No.
      02-14-00229-CR, 2015 WL 9244986, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 17,
      2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Parties are required
      to provide citations to the record in support of their arguments . . . .”); see also
      TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Without appropriate record citations, a brief does not
      adequately present an issue for appeal. See Toldson v. Denton Indep. Sch. Dist.,
      No. 02-18-00394-CV, 2019 WL 6205245, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov.
      21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). To the extent that appellant attempts to complain
      about portions of Harris’s testimony other than those quoted above, we hold that
      his complaints are waived due to inadequate briefing. See id. at *12–14 (noting
      difficulties with imprecise citation to record and holding issue waived for
      inadequate briefing); In re Caldwell-Bays, No. 04-18-00980-CV, 2019 WL
      1370316, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 27, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem.
      op.) (noting party’s citations to record were imprecise and identifying what court
      “believe[d] she [was] referring to”); Parker v. State, No. 02-12-00092-CR, 2013
      WL 4714371, at *5 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 30, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem.
      op., not designated for publication) (addressing admission of testimony that
      appellate court could discern defendant complained about and holding, to extent
      defendant’s argument could be construed to cover any other evidence, argument
      was waived due to inadequate briefing because of imprecise record citations).

                                           120
[State]:                  So yesterday when we were speaking
                          with the jury you mentioned that you
                          had two conversations with [the
                          complainant] regarding when the
                          filing of that modification was going
                          to occur; correct?

[Harris]:                 Yes, ma’am.

[State]:                  Okay. That very first conversation,
                          can you remind us about when that
                          was?

[Harris]:                 It was February --

[Appellant’s attorney]:   . . . Objection. And frankly I can’t
                          remember what is on the record, but
                          I’m going to object to this line of
                          questioning based on attorney-client
                          privilege, based on right to confront
                          and based on hearsay.

The Court:                I’ll overrule.

[State]:                  . . . Can you tell us when the first
                          conversation was?

[Harris]:                 February 15th.

[State]:                  Of what year?

[Harris]:                 2019.

[State]:                  And the basis of that conversation,
                          was it in regards to [the complainant]
                          having concerns about when [the
                          motion to modify] was going to be
                          filed?

                           121
[Harris]:   Yes. She had -- she wanted to file the
            motion to modify to seek child
            support.

....

[Harris]:   And she wanted to wait until
            [appellant] had moved out of her
            residence.

[State]:    Did she say why she wanted him to be
            moved out before that motion was
            actually filed?

[Harris]:   Yes.

[State]:    Why?

[Harris]:   She said that he would be mad and
            she    wanted    to   avoid   any
            confrontation.

[State]:    Okay.    And then there was a
            subsequent follow-up conversation.
            Do you remember when that was?

[Harris]:   February 20th. It was a -- the first
            conversation, I believe, was on a
            Friday. The second one was the
            following Wednesday. I contacted
            her to see if he had moved out of the
            residence. She said that he had. And
            I asked if she was ready to file the
            motion. She said, yes, she wanted to
            go ahead and file it to seek the child
            support.

....

             122
      [Harris]:                        And she was concerned about when
                                       he would get a copy of it.

      [State]:                         Did she express why she was
                                       concerned when he would get a copy
                                       of it?

      [Harris]:                        Again, she knew he would be mad
                                       and she wanted to -- she -- she knew
                                       he would be mad, and she wanted to
                                       be aware of when to expect a phone
                                       call from him.

      The erroneous admission of evidence constitutes non-constitutional error.

Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Solomon v. State, 49

S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).          Non-constitutional error requires

reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of the defendant. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 44.2(b); Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–94. The defendant’s substantial rights are

affected “when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” King, 953 S.W.2d at 271. We will not overturn a

criminal conviction for non-constitutional error if, after examining the record, we

have fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight

effect. Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–94.

      We review the entire record to determine the effect or influence of the

wrongfully admitted evidence on the jury’s decision. Id.; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at

355–56.    In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was improperly

influenced, we consider the testimony and physical evidence, the nature of the
                                        123
evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the alleged error and how it

might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case. Barshaw, 342

S.W.3d at 94; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56. The weight of evidence of the

defendant’s guilt is also relevant in conducting the harm analysis. Neal, 256

S.W.3d at 285; see also Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–60. And we may consider

closing statements and voir dire, jury instructions, the State’s theory, any defensive

theories, and whether the State emphasized the alleged error. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d

at 355–56; Hankins, 180 S.W.3d at 182.           Notably, error in the admission of

evidence may be rendered harmless when substantially the same evidence is

admitted elsewhere at trial without objection. See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713,

717–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

      Our review of the record reveals that Harris, in other portions of her

testimony, stated, without objection, that she had a conversation with the

complainant on February 15, 2019. Harris recounted that the complainant, prior to

February 15, 2019, had met with Terry, her attorney, to discuss the filing of a

motion to modify. Harris had called the complainant “to ask if she wanted to go

forward with the modification, and she said yes.”65               Harris “asked [the

65
      Although appellant objected to this statement by Harris, appellant did not to do so
      based on hearsay. See Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App.
      2004) (objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different
      legal theory on appeal); Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App.
                                          124
complainant] if she was ready to go ahead and file it.” And “[s]he said, no, that

she had asked [appellant] to move out of the [her] residence and she didn’t want to

file it until he had moved out.” The complainant “wanted to wait until [appellant

had] moved out of her home.”

      Further, we note that Terry, in portions of his testimony, stated, without

objection, that the complainant had told him that “she was . . . afraid of” appellant.

And that the complainant’s “main point . . . was [that] she didn’t want [appellant]

to find out about th[e] motion [to modify] until after he was out of [her] house.”

Terry agreed not to file the motion to modify “until [appellant] was out of [the

complainant’s] house.” Terry also stated that he knew the complainant “was very

afraid of [appellant] and what his actions were capable of and she didn’t want to

make him mad.” And the complainant had “mention[ed] [appellant’s] temper and

how mad he would get about certain things and how controlling he was and how he

didn’t like her being around her family and other people.”66

      As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained, the erroneous

admission of evidence is harmless when “other [similar] evidence was received

      1995); see also Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The
      point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”).
66
      Although appellant objected to this statement by Terry, appellant did not do so
      based on hearsay. See Heidelberg, 144 S.W.3d at 537 (objection stating one legal
      basis may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal); Broxton, 909
      S.W.2d at 918; see also Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339 (“The point of error on appeal
      must comport with the objection made at trial.”).

                                         125
without objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling.” Coble, 330

S.W.3d at 282 (internal quotations omitted); see also Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d

188, 192–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (error in admission of evidence cured where

same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection); Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 717–

18 (erroneous admission of evidence is harmless when equivalent evidence is

admitted elsewhere without objection); Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991) (error in admission of evidence may be rendered harmless when

“substantially the same evidence” is admitted elsewhere without objection);

Pacheco v. State, No. 01-18-00605-CR, 2020 WL 4299581, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] July 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (defendant did not object to other portions of witness’s testimony that

were substantially similar to portion of testimony he complained of on appeal).

      Based on the foregoing, we hold that even if the trial court erred in

overruling appellant’s hearsay objection to the above-quoted portion of Harris’s

testimony, any error was harmless because it was duplicative of evidence admitted

elsewhere without objection. See Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 897–98 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1994) (holding law enforcement officer’s erroneously admitted hearsay

testimony did not harm defendant when testimony of other trial witnesses proved

same facts); Washington v. State, 485 S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (noting error in admission of evidence may be rendered

                                        126
harmless when substantially same evidence is admitted elsewhere without

objection).

      We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

      2.      Terry

      In his briefing related to his sixth issue, appellant generally complains about

Terry’s testimony “concerning the details of [a] conversation . . . he had with [the

complainant] concerning the filing of the motion to modify,” but he only directs

this Court to one portion of Terry’s testimony.67 See Thomas, 701 S.W.2d at 662

(“It is well settled that mere reference to pages in the record does not sufficiently

identify testimony, objections thereto, and the court’s rulings thereon to constitute a

ground of error.” (emphasis added)); see also Reule, 483 S.W.3d at 615

(“[W]ithout proper citation, the voluminous nature of th[e] record makes it difficult

to discern where there is any support for many of [appellant’s] complaints.”). In

that portion of Terry’s testimony, he stated:
67
      As previously stated, an appellate court is not required to search the appellate
      record to determine if the record supports appellant’s argument. See Alvarado,
      912 S.W.2d at 210; Thierry, 288 S.W.3d at 86; see also Belle, 543 S.W.3d at 879.
      The appellant bears the burden of showing that the record supports the contentions
      raised and must specify the place in the record where matters upon which he relies
      or of which he complains are shown. See Thomas, 701 S.W.2d at 662; In re
      C.A.J., 2021 WL 243900, at *27; Gonzalez, 2015 WL 9244986, at *4; see also
      TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Without appropriate record citations, a brief does not
      adequately present an issue for appeal. See Toldson, 2019 WL 6205245, at *13.
      To the extent that appellant attempts to complain about a portion of Terry’s
      testimony other than that which is quoted above, we hold that his complaints are
      waived due to inadequate briefing. See id. at *12–14; In re Caldwell-Bays, 2019
      WL 1370316, at *8; Parker, 2013 WL 4714371, at *5 n.3.

                                         127
      [State]:                        And what -- can you tell us what she
                                      advised about her being afraid?

      ....

      [Appellant’s counsel]:          I’m going to object; hearsay and
                                      relevance.

      The Court:                      Overruled.

      [Terry]:                        She said she was afraid and concerned
                                      about [appellant] getting served with
                                      those papers while he was still in the
                                      house and she didn’t want us to -- to
                                      serve his attorney until after he was
                                      out of the house.

      As noted above, the erroneous admission of evidence is harmless when

“other [similar] evidence was received without objection, either before or after the

complained-of ruling.” Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 282 (internal quotations omitted);

see also Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 192–93 (error in admission of evidence cured where

same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection); Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 717–

18 (erroneous admission of evidence is harmless when equivalent evidence is

admitted elsewhere without objection); Mayes, 816 S.W.2d at 88 (error in

admission of evidence may be rendered harmless when “substantially the same

evidence” is admitted elsewhere without objection); Pacheco, 2020 WL 4299581,

at *11 (defendant did not object to other portions of witness’s testimony that were

substantially similar to portion of testimony he complained-of on appeal).

                                        128
      Notably, Terry, in other portions of his testimony, stated, without objection,

that the complainant told him that “she was . . . afraid of” appellant. And that the

complainant’s “main point . . . was [that] she didn’t want [appellant] to find out

about th[e] motion [to modify] until after he was out of [her] house.” Terry agreed

not to file the motion to modify “until [appellant] was out of [the complainant’s]

house.” Terry also testified that he knew the complainant “was very afraid of

[appellant] and what his actions were capable of and she didn’t want to make him

mad.” And the complainant had “mention[ed] [appellant’s] temper and how mad

he would get about certain things and how controlling he was and how he didn’t

like her being around her family and other people.”68

      Further, Harris, in portions of her testimony, stated, without objection, that

she had a conversation with the complainant on February 15, 2019. And that the

complainant, prior to February 15, 2019, had met with Terry to discuss the filing of

a motion to modify. Harris called the complainant “to ask if she wanted to go

forward with the modification, and she said yes.”69 When Harris “asked [the

68
      Although appellant objected to this statement by Terry, appellant did not do so
      based on hearsay. See Heidelberg, 144 S.W.3d at 537 (objection stating one legal
      basis may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal); Broxton, 909
      S.W.2d at 918; see also Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339 (“The point of error on appeal
      must comport with the objection made at trial.”).
69
      Although appellant objected to this statement by Harris, appellant did not to do so
      based on hearsay. See Heidelberg, 144 S.W.3d at 537 (objection stating one legal
      basis may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal); Broxton, 909
                                          129
complainant] if she was ready to go ahead and file it,” “[s]he said, no, that she had

asked [appellant] to move out of the [her] residence and she didn’t want to file it

until he had moved out.” The complainant “wanted to wait until [appellant had]

moved out of her home.”

      Based on the foregoing, we hold that even if the trial court erred in

overruling appellant’s hearsay objection to the above-quoted portion of Terry’s

testimony, any error was harmless because it was duplicative of evidence admitted

elsewhere without objection. See Burks, 876 S.W.2d at 897–98 (holding law

enforcement officer’s erroneously admitted hearsay testimony did not harm

defendant when testimony of other trial witnesses proved same facts); Washington,

485 S.W.3d at 638–39 (noting error in admission of evidence may be rendered

harmless when substantially same evidence is admitted elsewhere without

objection).

      We overrule appellant’s sixth issue.

      3.      Weaver

      In his briefing related to his eighth issue, appellant complains about

Weaver’s testimony “concerning statements that she made in response to

statements by [the complainant].” Specifically, appellant asserts that the trial court

erred in admitting the following testimony of Weaver:

      S.W.2d at 918; see also Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339 (“The point of error on appeal
      must comport with the objection made at trial).

                                         130
      [State]:                          . . . Did you give [the complainant]
                                        any advice?

      [Weaver]:                         I did.

      [State]:                          Okay. What was your advice?

      ....

      [Appellant’s counsel]:            That’s hearsay and relevance.

      The Court:                        Overrule as to what [Weaver] said . . .

      ....

      [Weaver]:                         I told [the complainant] that if
                                        [appellant] was cheating on her again
                                        that she should, as I had told her
                                        before, get legal things settled with
                                        him with regards to [the child]. And
                                        she had asked me --

      ....

      [Weaver]:                         So I told her that after thinking about
                                        the situation that it would be best if
                                        she had an amicable split with
                                        [appellant], that -- and then she could
                                        go on with permanent changes to her
                                        house, like changing the locks.

      As previously explained, the erroneous admission of evidence constitutes

non-constitutional error. Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 280; Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365.

Non-constitutional error requires reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of

the defendant. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–94. The

defendant’s substantial rights are affected “when the error had a substantial and
                                         131
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King, 953 S.W.2d

at 271. We will not overturn a criminal conviction for non-constitutional error if,

after examining the record, we have fair assurance that the error did not influence

the jury or had but a slight effect. Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–94.

      We review the entire record to determine the effect or influence of the

wrongfully admitted evidence on the jury’s decision. Id.; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at

355–56.    In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was improperly

influenced, we consider the testimony and physical evidence, the nature of the

evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the alleged error and how it

might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case. Barshaw, 342

S.W.3d at 94; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56. The weight of evidence of the

defendant’s guilt is also relevant in conducting the harm analysis. Neal, 256

S.W.3d at 285; see also Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–60. And we may consider

closing statements and voir dire, jury instructions, the State’s theory, any defensive

theories, and whether the State emphasized the alleged error. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d

at 355–56; Hankins, 180 S.W.3d at 182.

      Appellant failed to assert in his briefing that he was harmed by the

admission of the complained-of portion of Weaver’s testimony. See Petriciolet,

442 S.W.3d at 653–55 (even if trial court improperly admitted evidence, appellate

court must still determine whether defendant was harmed by erroneous admission);

                                         132
see, e.g., Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393 (holding defendant waived complaint on

appeal because he inadequately briefed issue by failing to address whether alleged

error was harmless); Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555, 557–58 (holding defendant

waived complaint trial court erred in admitting certain evidence because he “failed

to adequately brief his assertion that he was harmed by the admission of”

complained-of evidence); Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *6 (appellate court need not

determine whether trial court erred in admitting exhibits where defendant did not

argue in briefing that he was harmed by purportedly erroneous admission of

exhibits); Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 900–01 (“Here, we do not address whether the

trial court erred in admitting the complained-of extraneous-offense evidence

because even were we to conclude that the trial court erred in admitting such

evidence, appellant, in his brief, does not argue that he was harmed by its

admission.”).

      To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities

and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue on appeal

if he does not adequately brief that issue by not providing supporting arguments,

substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. See

id.; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d

at 555, 557–58. An appellate court has no obligation to construct and compose

                                        133
issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and the record

for the appellant. See Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 342–43; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673; see

also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5 (“We will not make appellant’s arguments for

him . . . .”). A brief that does not comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

38.1 presents nothing for an appellate court to review. See Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d

at 210.

      Although appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the

complained-of portion of Weaver’s testimony, appellant’s briefing contains no

argument, explanation, substantive analysis, or citation to authorities to show that

he was harmed by the trial court’s purportedly erroneous admission.70 See Wyatt,

23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5 (“We will not make appellant’s arguments for him . . . .”).

70
      In his reply brief, appellant attempts to redress his failure to “brief whether the
      admission of . . . Weaver’s testimony over a hearsay objection resulted in harm
      under [a] non-constitutional harm analysis” by stating that “[i]t is clear that the
      testimony of . . . Weaver violated [a]ppellant’s substantial rights to a fair trial.”
      This is not sufficient. See King v. State, 17 S.W.3d 7, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston
      [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (“Conclusory arguments . . . present nothing for our
      review.”); see also Chaves v. State, 630 S.W.3d 541, 558 (Tex. App.—Houston
      [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (holding defendant inadequately briefed issue, where
      although he argued trial court erred in admitting exhibits, he only provided two
      conclusory sentences asserting he suffered harm); Brown v. State, Nos.
      01-18-00594-CR, 01-18-00595-CR, 2020 WL 4210630, at *4 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
      publication) (defendant waived appellate complaint where brief contained single
      conclusory sentence without citation to appropriate authority); Linney v. State, 401
      S.W.3d 764, 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (“We need
      not decide th[e] issue . . . because [defendant’s] conclusory statement that the
      cumulative harm of the trial court’s errors adversely affected his substantial rights
      is insufficient to maintain his burden to adequately brief the point of error.”).

                                           134
Accordingly, we hold that appellant has waived his complaint on appeal that the

trial court erred in admitting the complained-of portion of Weaver’s testimony due

to inadequate briefing. See, e.g., Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393 (holding issue

inadequately briefed where “appellant d[id] not address the question of whether the

alleged error . . . was harmless”); Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 557–58 (holding

defendant waived complaint trial court erred in admitting certain evidence because

appellant’s brief “contain[ed] no argument, explanation, substantive analysis, or

citation to authorities to show that he was harmed by the trial court’s purported

erroneous admission of the State’s [evidence]”); Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *6;

Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 900–01 (defendant waived complaint trial court erred in

admitting certain evidence where he failed to “identify[] the harm that he suffered

as a result of the admission of the complained-of evidence”).

      4.    Kimberly

      In his briefing related to his ninth issue, appellant generally complains about

Kimberly’s testimony that the complainant “told her that her [tele]phone calls and

text messages were being monitored.” And appellant generally complains that

Kimberly “read text messages from [the complainant]” during her testimony. But

                                        135
appellant does not specifically identify in his briefing the portions of Kimberly’s

testimony about which he complains.71

      To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (emphasis added). An

appellant waives an issue on appeal if he does not adequately brief that issue by not

providing supporting arguments, substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record. See id.; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Busby, 253

S.W.3d at 673; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555, 557–58.

      Further, it is well settled that “mere references to pages in the record does

not sufficiently identify testimony, the objections thereto, and the court’s rulings

thereon to constitute a ground of error.” Thomas, 701 S.W.2d at 662; see also

Thierry v. State, 288 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.

ref’d). An appellate court need not “scour the records” for support of appellant’s

assertion of error. Ahmad v. State, 615 S.W.3d 496, 502 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Thierry, 288 S.W.3d at 86; see also Reule, 483 S.W.3d at 615

71
      In the portion of his briefing where he states that Kimberly was erroneously
      “permitted to testify that [the complainant] told her that her [tele]phone calls and
      text messages were being monitored” and allowed to “read text messages from
      [the complainant],” appellant only discusses his objection to Kimberly’s testimony
      based on the Confrontation Clause and does not mention any hearsay objections
      that he purportedly raised.

                                          136
(“[W]ithout proper citation, the voluminous nature of th[e] record makes it difficult

to discern where there is any support for many of [appellant’s] complaints.”).

      The appellant bears the burden of showing that the record supports the

contentions raised and must specify the place in the record where matters upon

which he relies or of which he complains are shown. See Thomas, 701 S.W.2d at

662; In re C.A.J., No. 01-19-00704-CV, 2021 WL 243900, at *27 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 26, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Gonzalez v. State, No.

02-14-00229-CR, 2015 WL 9244986, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 17,

2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(i).   Without appropriate record citations, a brief does not adequately

present an issue for appeal.     See Toldson v. Denton Indep. Sch. Dist., No.

02-18-00394-CV, 2019 WL 6205245, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 21,

2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210 (brief that does

not comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 presents nothing for

appellate court to review). Because appellant did not identify the portions of

Kimberly’s testimony about which he complains with appropriate citations to the

record, we hold that appellant waived his complaint related to Kimberly’s

                                        137
testimony due to inadequate briefing.72 See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Lucio, 351

S.W.3d at 896–97; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555, 557–58.

      5.     Gaston

      In his briefing related to his eleventh issue, appellant generally complains

that Gaston testified “about historical events that occurred between [a]ppellant and

[the complainant].” Appellant fails to direct this Court to the specific portions of

Gaston’s testimony about which he complains, and instead tells the Court to “see

[the] statement of facts” in his appellant’s brief.

      To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (emphasis added). An

appellant waives an issue on appeal if he does not adequately brief that issue by not

72
      We also note that Janeth, the complainant’s friend, testified that prior to her death,
      the complainant “express[ed] . . . concern” about Janeth sending her text messages
      because “it appear[ed] as if [her] text messages were being monitored.” And
      Yolanda, the complainant’s mother, testified about the complainant’s text
      messages being monitored by appellant. Appellant does not complain on appeal
      that the trial court erred in admitting Janeth’s or Yolanda’s testimony about the
      complainant’s text messages being monitored. Thus, to the extent that appellant
      has not waived his complaint about Kimberly’s testimony due to inadequate
      briefing, the testimony about which he generally complains is duplicative of
      evidence admitted elsewhere that he has not challenged on appeal. See Burks v.
      State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 897–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding law enforcement
      officer’s erroneously admitted hearsay testimony did not harm defendant when
      testimony of other trial witnesses proved same facts); Washington v. State, 485
      S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (noting error
      in admission of evidence may be rendered harmless when substantially same
      evidence is admitted elsewhere without objection).

                                           138
providing supporting arguments, substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record. See id.; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Busby, 253

S.W.3d at 673; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555, 557–58.

      Further, it is well settled that “mere references to pages in the record does

not sufficiently identify testimony, the objections thereto, and the court’s rulings

thereon to constitute a ground of error.” Thomas, 701 S.W.2d at 662; see also

Thierry, 288 S.W.3d at 86. An appellate court need not “scour the records” for

support of appellant’s assertion of error. Ahmad, 615 S.W.3d at 502; Thierry, 288

S.W.3d at 86; see also Reule, 483 S.W.3d at 615 (“[W]ithout proper citation, the

voluminous nature of th[e] record makes it difficult to discern where there is any

support for many of [appellant’s] complaints.”).

      As previously explained, the appellant bears the burden of showing that the

record supports the contentions raised and must specify the place in the record

where matters upon which he relies or of which he complains are shown. See

Thomas, 701 S.W.2d at 662; In re C.A.J., 2021 WL 243900, at *27; Gonzalez,

2015 WL 9244986, at *4; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Reule, 483

S.W.3d at 615 (“[W]ithout proper citation, the voluminous nature of th[e] record

makes it difficult to discern where there is any support for many of [appellant’s]

complaints.”). Without appropriate record citations, a brief does not adequately

present an issue for appeal. See Toldson, 2019 WL 6205245, at *13; see also

                                        139
Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210 (brief that does not comply with Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 38.1 presents nothing for appellate court to review). Because

appellant did not identify the portions of Gaston’s testimony about which he

complains with appropriate citations to the record, we hold he has waived his

complaint related to Gaston’s testimony due to inadequate briefing.

      Additionally, we note that appellant, in his briefing, fails to argue, explain,

and provide substantive analysis and citations to authorities to show that he was

harmed by the trial court’s purportedly erroneous admission of Gaston’s testimony

“about   historical    events    that    occurred     between      [a]ppellant     and    [the

complainant].”73 An appellate court has no obligation to construct and compose

issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and the record

for the appellant. See Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 342–43; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673;

73
      In his reply brief, appellant attempts to redress his failure to explain
      “how . . . Gaston’s testimony and notes . . . caused him to suffer harm under [a]
      non-constitutional harm analysis” by stating that “[i]t is clear that the testimony
      of . . . Gaston . . . violated [a]ppellant’s substantial rights to a fair trial.” This is
      not sufficient. See King, 17 S.W.3d at 23 (“Conclusory arguments . . . present
      nothing for our review.”); see also Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 558 (holding defendant
      inadequately briefed issue, where although he argued trial court erred in admitting
      exhibits, he only provided two conclusory sentences asserted that he suffered
      harm); Brown, 2020 WL 4210630, at *4 (defendant waived appellate complaint
      where brief contained single conclusory sentence without citation to appropriate
      authority); Linney, 401 S.W.3d at 783 (“We need not decide th[e]
      issue . . . because [defendant’s] conclusory statement that the cumulative harm of
      the trial court’s errors adversely affected his substantial rights is insufficient to
      maintain his burden to adequately brief the point of error.”).

                                            140
see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5 (“We will not make appellant’s arguments for

him . . . .”).

       Thus, we further hold that appellant waived his complaint related to

Gaston’s testimony due to inadequate briefing because appellant failed to assert in

his briefing that he was harmed by the admission of Gaston’s testimony “about

historical events that occurred between [a]ppellant and [the complainant].” See,

e.g., Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393 (holding issue inadequately briefed where

“appellant d[id] not address the question of whether the alleged error . . . was

harmless”); Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 557–58 (holding defendant waived complaint

trial court erred in admitting certain evidence because appellant’s brief

“contain[ed] no argument, explanation, substantive analysis, or citation to

authorities to show that he was harmed by the trial court’s purported erroneous

admission of the State’s [evidence]”); Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *6; Wilson, 473

S.W.3d at 900–01 (defendant waived complaint trial court erred in admitting

certain evidence where he failed to “identify[] the harm that he suffered as a result

of the admission of the complained-of evidence”).

C.     Confrontation Clause

       In his fifth issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the

“testimony of [a] conversation between . . . Harris,” a paralegal who worked with

the complainant’s attorney, and the complainant because appellant “objected to any

                                         141
statement made by [the complainant] to . . . Harris as . . . violating [his] right to

confront” and appellant “was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine” the

complainant. (Internal quotations omitted.) In his seventh issue, appellant argues

that the trial court erred in admitting “statements made by [the complainant] to her

lawyer . . . Terry concerning [a]ppellant” because appellant made a “confrontation

objection” at trial and appellant “was not afforded the opportunity to

cross-examine” the complainant. (Internal quotations omitted.) In his tenth issue,

appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Kimberly,

the complainant’s cousin, that the complainant “told her that her [tele]phone calls

and text messages were being monitored” and erred in admitting copies of the “text

messages from [the complainant] concerning her belief that her text messages were

being monitored” because appellant made a “confrontation objection” at trial and

appellant “was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine” the complainant.

(Internal quotations omitted.) In his twelfth issue, appellant argues that the trial

court erred in admitting “testimony [of] . . . Gaston, [the complainant’s] therapist,

concerning details of events that occurred during the relationship between [the

complainant] and [a]ppellant” because appellant made a “confrontation objection”

at trial and appellant “was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine” the

complainant. (Internal quotations omitted.).

                                        142
      The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution provides that

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be

confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also

Sohail v. State, 264 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet.

ref’d) (“A defendant has a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the

witnesses against him.”).     The Confrontation Clause provides two types of

protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify

against him and the right to conduct cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,

480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988)

(Confrontation Clause “guarantees [a] defendant a face-to-face meeting with

witnesses appearing before the trier of fact”). The Confrontation Clause bars the

admission of testimonial statements of a witness who does not appear at trial unless

that witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for

cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); Russeau,

171 S.W.3d at 880.

      Here, we will presume, for purposes of this opinion, that the trial court erred

in admitting the complained-of testimony of Harris, Terry, Kimberly, and Gaston

and the complained-of text-message evidence because the admission of such

evidence violated appellant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the

witnesses against him.” See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. But, even if the trial court’s

                                        143
erroneous admission of evidence constituted a violation of appellant’s

constitutional rights, we must still perform a harm analysis and must reverse a

judgment of conviction unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error did not contribute to the conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Henriquez

v. State, 580 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d);

see also Lee v. State, 418 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2013, pet. ref’d) (“A Confrontation Clause violation is constitutional error that

requires reversal unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was

harmless.”).

      In conducting the harm-analysis, the critical inquiry is not whether the

evidence supported the verdict absent the erroneously admitted evidence, but rather

“the likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a contributing factor in the

jury’s deliberations.” Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);

see also Henriquez, 580 S.W.3d at 429. We must “calculate, as nearly as possible,

the probable impact of the error on the jury in light of the other evidence.”

McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). While our review

must focus on the error and its effect, “the presence of other overwhelming

evidence that was properly admitted which supports the material fact to which the

inadmissible evidence was directed may be an important factor in the evaluation of

harm.”    Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).                In

                                         144
determining if the constitutional error may be declared harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt, we may consider: (1) how important the out-of-court statement

was to the State’s case; (2) whether the out-of-court statement was cumulative of

other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or

contradicting the out-of-court statement on material points; and (4) the overall

strength of the State’s case. Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690; Gutierrez v. State, 516

S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d).

      Appellant fails to assert in his briefing that he was harmed by the admission,

over his Confrontation-Clause objection, of the complained-of portions of Harris’s,

Terry’s, Kimberly’s, and Gaston’s testimony and the complained-of text-message

evidence. See Petriciolet, 442 S.W.3d at 653–55 (even if trial court improperly

admitted evidence, appellate court must still determine whether defendant was

harmed by erroneous admission); see, e.g., Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393 (holding

defendant waived complaint on appeal because he inadequately briefed issue by

failing to address whether alleged error was harmless); White v. State, No.

01-20-00238-CR, 2022 WL 2674214, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July

12, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding defendant’s

challenge to testimony based on Confrontation Clause waived because defendant

“fail[ed] to address in any way how he was harmed by its admission, an element he

[was] required to establish on appeal”); Bradshaw v. State, No. 01-19-00611-CR,

                                        145
2020 WL 7062589, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 3, 2020, no pet.)

(mem.     op.,    not    designated    for    publication)    (defendant     waived

Confrontation-Clause complaint where he failed to argue he was harmed by

allegedly erroneous admission of evidence); Crawford v. State, 595 S.W.3d 792,

801 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. ref’d) (holding defendant waived

complaint trial court erred in admitting certain testimony that violated his right to

confrontation because defendant “d[id] [not] explain how he was harmed as a

result”); Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *6 (appellate court need not determine

whether trial court erred in admitting exhibits where defendant did not argue in

briefing that he was harmed by admission of exhibits); Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 900–

01 (“Here, we do not address whether the trial court erred in admitting the

complained-of . . . evidence because even were we to conclude that the trial court

erred in admitting such evidence, appellant, in his brief, does not argue that he was

harmed by its admission.”).

      As previously explained, to assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief

“must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

appropriate citations to authorities.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives

an issue on appeal if he does not adequately brief that issue by not presenting

supporting arguments, substantive analysis, and citation to authorities. See id.;

Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at

                                        146
555, 557–58. An appellate court has no obligation to construct and compose

issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and the record

for the appellant. See Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 342–43; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673;

see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5 (“We will not make appellant’s arguments for

him . . . .”). A brief that does not comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

38.1 presents nothing for an appellate court to review. See Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d

at 210.

      Although appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain

complained-of testimony and text-message evidence in violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation, his briefing contains no argument, explanation,

substantive analysis, or citation to authorities to show that he was harmed by the

trial court’s purported erroneous admission.74 See Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5

74
      In his reply brief, appellant attempts to redress his “failure to brief the harm
      resulting from the admission” of the complained-of testimony and the
      complained-of text-message evidence, but even in his reply brief appellant fails to
      explain “the likelihood that the [trial court’s purported] constitutional error was
      actually a contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Scott v. State, 227
      S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Henriquez v. State, 580 S.W.3d
      421, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). And he fails to
      analyze: (1) how important the complained-of out-of-court statements were to the
      State’s case; (2) whether the complained-of out-of-court statements were
      cumulative of other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of evidence
      corroborating or contradicting the complained-of out-of-court statements on
      material points; and (4) the overall strength of the State’s case. Scott, 227 S.W.3d
      at 690; Gutierrez v. State, 516 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
      2017, pet. ref’d). Appellant, in his reply brief, does not remedy his failure to
      provide argument, substantive analysis, or citation to authorities to show that he
      was harmed by the trial court’s purported erroneous admission of the
                                          147
(“We will not make appellant’s arguments for him . . . .”). Accordingly, we hold

that appellant waived, due to inadequate briefing, his complaints in his fifth,

seventh, tenth, and twelfth issues that the trial court erred in admitting the

complained-of testimony of Harris, Terry, Kimberly, and Gaston and the

complained-of text-message evidence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation. See, e.g., Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393 (holding issue inadequately

briefed where “appellant d[id] not address the question of whether the alleged

error . . . was harmless”); Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 557–58 (holding defendant

waived complaint trial court erred in admitting certain evidence because

appellant’s brief “contain[ed] no argument, explanation, substantive analysis, or

citation to authorities to show that he was harmed by the trial court’s purported

erroneous admission of the State’s [evidence]”); Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *6;

Wilson, 473 S.W.3d at 900–01 (defendant waived complaint trial court erred in

admitting certain evidence where he failed to “identify[] the harm that he suffered

as a result of the admission of the complained-of evidence”).

      complained-of testimony and the complained-of text-message evidence. Cf. Cantu
      v. State, No. 13-08-00666-CR, 2010 WL 4922914, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus
      Christi–Edinburg Nov. 30, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
      publication) (where defendant’s only discussion of harm was contained in his
      reply brief, defendant did not remedy his failure to perform harm analysis); see
      also Ward v. State, No. 14-15-00473-CR, 2016 WL 6238339, at *4 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2016, pet. ref’d) (argument not raised until reply
      brief was waived).

                                        148
                                Motion for Mistrial

      In his thirteenth issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for mistrial because the State asked Detective Hawkins “whether

[a]ppellant intentionally caused the death of [the complainant] by causing a blunt

trauma injury to her head” and “all witnesses, whether expert or lay[,] . . . [are

prohibited] from opining about [the] guilt or innocence of [the] accused.”

      We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.

Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In applying an

abuse-of-discretion standard of review, we uphold the trial court’s decision to deny

a mistrial “if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id.; see also

Griffin v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404, 416 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet.

ref’d). In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a

mistrial, we balance three factors: (1) the severity of the misconduct (including its

prejudicial effect), (2) the effectiveness of the curative measures taken, and (3) the

certainty of the conviction or punishment assessed absent the misconduct.

Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Verdine v. State, No.

01-18-00884-CR, 2020 WL 1584468, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr.

2, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      “Mistrial is an appropriate remedy in extreme circumstances for a narrow

class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors.” Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880,

                                         149
884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Archie v. State,

340 S.W.3d 734, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (granting motion for mistrial is

appropriate only when “the objectionable events are so emotionally inflammatory

that curative instructions are not likely to prevent the jury from being unfairly

prejudiced against the defendant” (internal quotations omitted)); Hawkins, 135

S.W.3d at 77 (mistrial is trial court’s remedy for improper conduct that is “so

prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and

futile” (internal quotations omitted)); Williams, 417 S.W.3d at 175 (“A mistrial is

an extreme remedy and should be exceedingly uncommon.”). Otherwise, when the

prejudice is curable, an instruction by the trial court to disregard eliminates the

need for a mistrial. Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

      Appellant’s complaint that the trial court erred in denying his motion for

mistrial relates to the following portion of Detective Hawkins’s testimony:

      [State]:                        Did this defendant intentionally cause
                                      the death of [the complainant] by
                                      causing blunt trauma to her head?

      [Appellant’s counsel]:          I’m going --

      [Hawkins]:                      Yes.

      [Appellant’s counsel]:          -- to object. That calls for speculation
                                      and invades the province of the jury.

      The Court:                      Sustained.

                                        150
      [Appellant’s counsel]:            I ask that the jury be instructed to
                                        disregard the statement.

      The Court:                        The answer given after the objection
                                        was made will be disregarded.

      [Appellant’s counsel]:            And I’m required to move for a
                                        mistrial.

      The Court:                        Denied.

      To preserve error for appellate review, the record must show an objection

“stat[ing] the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the

trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint,

unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a); see also Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A

party fails to preserve error when the contention urged on appeal does not match

with the specific complaint made in the trial court. Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687

691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339 (“The point of

error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”). In other words,

an objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different legal

theory on appeal. See Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004); Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Ex

parte Nelson, No. 01-19-00325-CR, 2019 WL 6315197, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 26, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (“[I]ssues on appeal must track the arguments made in the trial
                                         151
court.”); Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet.

ref’d) (“Where a trial objection does not comport with the issue raised on appeal,

the appellant has preserved nothing for review.”).

      On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for mistrial after Detective Hawkins testified that appellant “intentionally cause[d]

the death of [the complainant] by causing blunt trauma to her head” because

Hawkins was prohibited from expressing an opinion during his testimony “about

[the] guilt or innocence of” appellant. See Boyde v. State, 513 S.W.2d 588, 590

(Tex. Crim. App. 1974).      But at trial, appellant did not object to Hawkins’s

testimony because it constituted an improper opinion by a lay witness. See TEX. R.

EVID. 701. Instead, appellant objected that Hawkins’s testimony “call[ed] for

speculation” and “invade[d] the province of the jury.”75 See Coggins v. State, No.

04-17-00532-CR, 2018 WL 5927980, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 14,

2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining difference

between speculation objection and objection for improper lay witness opinion);

Liller v. State, No. 08-15-00125-CR, 2018 WL 1959679, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—El

Paso Apr. 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (holding defendant

75
      We note that appellant’s objection that Detective Hawkins’s testimony “invade[d]
      the province of the jury” is no longer a valid objection under Texas law following
      the adoption of Texas Rule of Evidence 704. See Ortiz v. State, 834 S.W.2d 343,
      348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
      Ellison v. State, 201 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Mock v. State, 848
      S.W.2d 215, 225 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, pet. ref’d).

                                         152
failed to preserve complaint testimony improper under Texas Evidence Rule 701

when only raised speculation objection at trial); Burks v. State, No.

05-13-00852-CR, 2014 WL 5141663, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 14, 2014, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant did not preserve his

complaint trial court erred in admitting improper lay witness opinion, where only

made speculation objection in trial court); Hurst v. State, 406 S.W.3d 617, 621–23

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (explaining “province of the jury” objection

“is too imprecise to preserve error” and noting such objection did not preserve

error for appellate complaint under Texas Rule of Evidence 701 (internal

quotations omitted)); Contreras v. State, No. 12-10-00045-CR, 2011 WL 3273966,

at *1–4 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 29, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (defendant’s complaint on appeal that trial court erred in allowing

impermissible testimony on ultimate issue of guilt not preserved by

invading-province-of-jury   objection    at   trial);   Hawkins   v.   State,   No.

08-07-00180-CR, 2009 WL 783257, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 26, 2009, no

pet.) (not designated for publication) (defendant’s invading-province-of-jury

objection at trial did not preserve appellate complaint under Texas Rule of

Evidence 701); see also TEX. R. EVID. 602, 701.

      “Where a trial objection does not comport with the issue raised on appeal,

[an] appellant . . . preserve[s] nothing for [our] review.” Wright, 154 S.W.3d at

                                        153
241; see also Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(appellate court should not address merits of issue not preserved for appeal).

Because appellant’s complaint on appeal does not match the specific objections he

made in the trial court in response to the complained-of portion of Detective

Hawkins’s testimony, we hold that appellant has not preserved his complaint that

the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.

                               Motion for New Trial

      In his fourteenth issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for new trial because “of the evidence presented.” In his fifteenth issue,

appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider “evidence or

arguments presented in writing in accordance with the trial court’s instructions”

when ruling on his motion for new trial because such “evidence and pleadings

were timely delivered.”

      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of

discretion. McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and uphold

it if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d

109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We do not substitute our judgment for that of

the trial court; rather we decide whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or

                                          154
unreasonable. Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112; Biagas v. State, 177 S.W.3d 161, 170

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).

      Appellant’s argument in his briefing related to his fourteenth and fifteenth

issues is difficult to discern.76   Yet, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1

requires an appellant’s brief to “contain a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities.”        TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue when his briefing does not adhere with rule

38.1’s clarity requirement.         See Aybar v. State, Nos. 12-09-00320-CR,

12-09-00321-CR, 2010 WL 3158583, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 11, 2010, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Muniz v. State, Nos.

12-07-00363-CR to 12-07-00365-CR, 2009 WL 1492838, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler

May 29, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (appellant

waives issue when he “fail[s] to make a[] cogent argument”); cf. Lara v. State, No.

04-14-00553-CR, 2015 WL 9487578, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 30,

76
      The State argues that appellant waived his motion-for-new-trial issues because
      they are multifarious. A multifarious issue is one that embraces more than one
      specific ground. Stults v. State, 23 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
      Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d); see also Prihoda v. State, 352 S.W.3d 796, 801 (Tex.
      App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref’d) (defendant’s complaint was multifarious
      “because it [was] based on more than one legal theory and raise[d] more than one
      specific complaint”). We have discretion to “refuse to review a multifarious issue
      or we may elect to consider the issue if we are able to determine, with reasonable
      certainty, the alleged error about which the complaint is made.” Prihoda, 352
      S.W.3d at 801; see also Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tex. Crim. App.
      2010).

                                         155
2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding defendant

waived ineffective-assistance-of-counsel complaint where his argument in brief

was difficult to discern). To the extent we can discern appellant’s arguments

related to the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial, we will address them

below. Cf. Wilson v. State, No. 04-15-00471-CR, 2016 WL 4124068, at *1 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Aug. 3, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (addressing portion of defendant’s complaint that appellate court

could discern from his briefing).

      Appellant, in his briefing, appears to complain about the trial court’s failure

to consider Defense Exhibit 7, an audio recording of an interview of former

Brazoria County district clerk Rhonda Barchak, in ruling on appellant’s motion for

new trial. At the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial, Barchak testified that

she previously was the district clerk for Brazoria County. And she previously gave

a statement to a Texas Ranger. Barchak asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination and refused to answer any further questions at the

new-trial hearing. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1, 5

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“[E]very person has the right to avoid self-incrimination

by exercising the privilege provided him by the Fifth Amendment . . . . He may

choose to remain silent rather than to respond to questions when the answers to

those questions would tend to incriminate him.” (internal footnote omitted)).

                                        156
      On appeal, appellant asserts that Defense Exhibit 7, the audio recording of

Barchak’s interview with a Texas Ranger, was admissible under Texas Rule of

Evidence 803(24) as “a statement against interest.” See TEX. R. EVID. 803(24);

Walter v. State, 267 S.W.3d 883, 889–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (explaining

generally “the hearsay rule excludes any out-of-court statement offered to prove

the truth of the matter asserted,” but exception to hearsay rule allows admissions of

statements made against declarant’s interest). But appellant does not adequately

brief his complaint about the trial court’s failure to consider Defense Exhibit 7

when ruling on appellant’s motion for new trial.

      As previously noted, to assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief “must

contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue on

appeal if he does not adequately brief that issue by not providing supporting

arguments, substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to authorities and to the

record. See id.; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673; Chaves,

630 S.W.3d at 555, 557–58. Here, appellant has not provided a clear and concise

argument, substantive analysis, or citation to appropriate authority to support his

complaint that the trial court erred when it did not consider Defense Exhibit 7

                                        157
when ruling on appellant’s motion for new trial.77 See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see

also Dowling v. State, 608 S.W.3d 896, 901–02 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2020, no pet.) (appellant who does not provide citation to appropriate authorities to

support his argument waives issue); Garcia v. State, No. 13-08-00740-CR, 2010

WL 4901389, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 30, 2010, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (appellant’s failure to provide clear and

concise argument with citation to appropriate authority to support his contention

waived issue).

      As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized, an appellate court

has no obligation to construct and compose issues, facts, and arguments with

appropriate citations to authorities and the record for the appellant. See Wolfe, 509

S.W.3d at 342–43; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673; see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5

77
      For instance, appellant wholly fails to address in his briefing whether the
      declarant, Barchak, realized that her statement during her interview with the Texas
      Ranger subjected her to criminal liability at the time she made her statement—a
      necessary part of the analysis of whether Defense Exhibit 7 was admissible as a
      statement against interest. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Walter v. State, 267
      S.W.3d 883, 890–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (for statement to be admissible under
      Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24) it must be established that statement, when
      considering all circumstances, subjected declarant to criminal liability, declarant
      realized that when she made statement, and sufficient corroborating circumstances
      clearly indicated truthfulness of statement); see also Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18,
      23 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“We will not make appellant’s arguments for
      him . . . .”); Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210 (where appellant’s point of error
      inadequately briefed, appellant “presents nothing for our review”); Lawton v.
      State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (failure to adequately brief
      issue, either by failing to specifically argue and analyze one’s position or provide
      authorities and record citations, waives any error on appeal), overruled on other
      grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

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(“We will not make appellant’s arguments for him . . . .”). A brief that does not

comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 presents nothing for an

appellate court to review. See Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210.

      Further, we note that appellant, to the extent that he appears to assert in his

briefing, that the trial court erred in failing to consider “material disclosed during

the new trial hearing,” he does so relying on a docket sheet entry from October 20,

2021—five days after the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial and a day

after the trial court signed its order denying appellant’s motion for new trial. That

docket sheet entry states: “All exhibits requested to be considered after evidence

was closed were not considered since opposing counsel had no opportunity to be

heard.” It is unclear how the docket sheet entry supports appellant’s assertion that

the trial court erred in failing to consider “material disclosed during the new trial

hearing.” In any event, we do not consider it. Docket sheet entries are not part of

the record because they are inherently unreliable and lack the formality of orders

and judgments. State v. Shaw, 4 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no

pet.); see also Sellers v. State, No. 01-12-00163-CR, 2013 WL 3868167, at *3

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (recitations on docket sheet are not evidence).

                                         159
      Appellant cites nothing in the actual record to support his assertion. Thus,

we hold that appellant has not shown that the trial court failed to consider certain

unidentified “material disclosed during the new trial hearing.”

      Finally, to the extent that appellant has attempted to raise any other

complaints in his fourteenth and fifteenth issues related to the trial court’s denial of

his motion for new trial, we hold that they are waived due to inadequate briefing.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; Torres v. State, 979 S.W.2d 668, 675–76 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (where appellant’s argument was confusing and

appellate court could not “discern what contention [a]ppellant [was] making,”

nothing was presented to court for review); see also Kennedy v. Staples, 336

S.W.3d 745, 754 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (where appellant’s

complaints lacked coherence, declining to address any further arguments that

appellate court could not clearly glean from appellant’s briefing).

                                     Abatement

      In his sixteenth issue, appellant argues that this Court should abate this

appeal and remand the case to the trial court “to consider all of the evidence

discovered during the October 15, 2021 [motion-for-new-trial] hearing” because

the trial court, in ruling on appellant’s motion for new trial, “refused to consider

the evidence or information produced on October 15, 2021.”

                                          160
      To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and

concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (emphasis added). An

appellant waives an issue on appeal if he does not adequately brief that issue by not

providing supporting arguments, substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record. See id.; Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Busby, 253

S.W.3d at 673; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555, 557–58. An appellate court has no

obligation to construct and compose issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate

citations to authorities and the record for the appellant. See Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at

342–43; Busby, 253 S.W.3d at 673; see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23 n.5 (“We will

not make appellant’s arguments for him . . . .”). A brief that does not comply with

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 presents nothing for an appellate court to

review. See Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210.

      In his briefing, appellant provides no support for his assertion that this Court

should abate this appeal, nor has he provided this Court with any meaningful

analysis to support his request.78 See Jones v. State, No. 11-19-00251-CR, 2021

WL 3413794, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding defendant, who failed to provide support for

78
      To the extent that appellant, in his reply brief, attempts to direct this Court to
      purportedly relevant authority, we note that the authority cited does not support his
      abatement request. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring citation to appropriate
      authority).

                                           161
his appellate complaint, waived his complaint for appellate review); Coffey v.

State, Nos. 10-17-00057-CR, 10-17-00058-CR, 2019 WL 2557499, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Waco June 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(defendant who provided no support for complaint waived issue on appeal).

      Further, we previously denied appellant’s request for abatement on February

1, 2022.     Appellant provides no argument or authority to support our

reconsideration of his request for abatement. Thus, we hold that appellant has

waived, due to inadequate briefing, his argument that this Court should abate this

appeal and remand the case to the trial court “to consider all of the evidence

discovered during the October 15, 2021 [motion-for-new-trial] hearing.” See TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Osuna v. State, No. 14-15-00871-CR, 2016 WL 5853290, at *3

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (overruling defendant’s abatement request where defendant cited

no authority requiring abatement).

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                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                              Julie Countiss
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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