Court Opinion

ID: 9723322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:11:48.575012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:46.950864
License: Public Domain

Scott, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion of the court, but would add my own thoughts on the difficulties and confusion inherent in the *425driving-under-the-influence and implied-consent enforcement scheme. The implied-consent law is found in Minn. St. 169.123, subd. 2, which provides in part:
“Any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent subject to the provisions of this section and section 169.121, subdivision 2, to a chemical test of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood.”
Minn. St. 169.123, subd. 4, provides in part:
“If a person refuses to permit chemical testing, none shall be given, but the commissioner of public safety, upon the receipt of a certificate of the peace officer that he had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person had been driving or operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and that the person had refused to permit the test, shall revoke his license or permit to drive * * * for a period of six months.”
This entire statutory procedure has been widely held to be a civil administrative function. Upon a driver’s refusal to submit to chemical testing, the administrative revocation procedure is automatic. Should the driver submit to a test, information acquired in this civil proceeding is available for use as evidence in a criminal prosecution.1 We are not directly concerned with the criminal phase of the dual-purpose, implied-consent law, except to the extent that this effort to gather constitutionally admissible evidence in a criminal prosecution may cause a “chilling effect” because of the hovering threat of the severe penalty of losing one’s driver’s license for 6 months and suffering resulting financial and physical burdens, including more expensive insurance in the future as well as possible loss of employment.
*426A second resultant “chilling effect” which may result from the procedure may be the utter confusion that rages in a driver’s mind when he is told both that he has a right to remain silent and a right to an attorney, and then told that he must decide whether he will submit to chemical testing without attorney consultation.
Despite the civil character of this procedure, it may nevertheless be factually compared with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. ed. 2d 694 (1966), in which the United States Supreme Court established standards for procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Necessarily, under Miranda, should the defendant demand that an attorney be present, all interrogation in the absence of counsel must cease. However, in the instant case, evidence obtained after the appellant requested an attorney was admitted before the jury. Although this was a civil proceeding, the reasoning we employed in State v. Roberts, 296 Minn. 347, 353, 208 N. W. 2d 744, 747 (1973), still applies:
“We hold that the testimony by the interrogating officer that defendant requested counsel when asked if he had committed the crime had no legitimate probative value or any other proper use, and it was error to allow its admission. Since the jury was likely to infer from the testimony that defendant was concealing his guilt, admission of the testimony was constitutional error because its effect was to penalize defendant impermissibly for exercising his constitutional privilege.”
We also held, in State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N. W. 2d 863 (1973), that the admission into evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit to chemical testing in a prosecution for driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, Minn. St. 169.121, was violative of defendant’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination. In the similar case of State v. Schlinger, 299 Minn. 212, 216 N. W. 2d 835 (1974), the admission of such evidence was again held to be prejudicial error mandating reversal.
*427Obtaining chemical evidence indicating the percentage of alcohol in the bloodstream involves Fourth Amendment protections, and the right to counsel and right to remain silent are Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Therefore, these quasi-criminal statutory procedures dealing with persons already under arrest are dangerously close to violations of constitutional protections. Part of the problem is the confusion which results from the arrest procedure involved. At least a portion of this confusion may have been the result of intoxication here. Yet a great part of this uncertainty must be attributed to the inconsistencies found within the implied-consent law itself, which denies one the right to an attorney before testing, while Minn. St. 169.123, subd. 3, provides that “ [s] aid person shall have the right to immediately communicate with his attorney.”
This court has discussed the issue of whether refusal to submit to chemical testing was based upon a confusion spawned by a Miranda warning in juxtaposition to the demand that one answer without assistance of counsel. State, Dept. of Highways, v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N. W. 2d 441 (1971); State, Dept. of Public Safety, v. Nystrom, 299 Minn. 224, 217 N. W. 2d 201 (1974). It is at least suggested that an intelligent layman, whether or not under the influence of an intoxicant, might find it difficult in some circumstances to understand the apparent contradictions as to the availability of an attorney.
Because of the availability of statutory grounds for decision, we have not reached the issue of whether the totality of circumstances in this case amounts to a violation of due process or whether other particular constitutional provisions were violated. We reserve such a decision for some possible future factual setting.
On November 5, 1976, the following was filed:

 It should also be noted that L. 1976, c. 341, provides for the revocation of a driver’s license for 90 days by the commissioner of public safety upon receipt of chemical-test results that the person’s blood contains .10-percent or more alcohol.