Court Opinion

ID: 9792298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:26:45.672502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:41.838440
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar Mrs. Mi-ehaelson’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty against her ex-husband. Because the record does not support such a conclusion, I dissent.
I.
The majority finds res judicata inapplicable because Ruth Michaelson could not raise the issue of corporate mismanagement in the divorce proceeding. It also finds collateral estoppel inapplicable because the breach of fiduciary duty claim was neither actually litigated nor necessarily adjudicated in the prior case.
*704A. Res Judicata
Res judicata ensures the finality of judgments by barring the same parties from retrying all claims decided or which could have been decided in a prior proceeding. Winscom v. Garza, 848 P.2d 126 (Colo.App.1992). Res judicata bars subsequent actions with “identity of subject matter, identity of cause of action, and identity of capacity in the persons for which or against whom the claim is made.” City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 9, 445 P.2d 52, 55 (1968).
The majority opinion defines the “same claim or cause of action” requirement as the injury for which the relief is demanded and not the legal theory asserted. Maj. op. at 699. It characterizes Ruth Michaelson’s injury as the fault providing the grounds for the divorce. Id. at 699. Since the property division relates back to the 1965 divorce, the majority maintains only injuries arising before 1965 could be the basis for res judicata. Id. at 699.
Such analysis ignores the unique facts in this case. Although the trial court properly used the law of 1965 to divide the marital property, nothing precluded Mrs. Michaelson from raising more recent claims directly related to the property division. In fact, a review of the record fully supports the conclusion that she raised her claim of mismanagement of the corporate assets and the trial court recognized that claim in its judgment.
Mrs. Michaelson’s injury in the property division proceeding was Mr. Michaelson’s possession of her fifty-percent interest in the corporation.1 In support of her claim for pre-judgment interest, she listed Mr. Mi-chaelson’s corporate misconduct.2 The trial court limited her recovery to a 1965 valuation and awarded her interest. Instead of appealing that decision, she attempted to reliti-gate the same claim in a breach of fiduciary duty action.3 The 1989 property division proceeding conclusively determined the Mi-chaelsons’ rights to the corporate assets.4
“Res judicata prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978). Assuming ar-guendo, that Mrs. Michaelson asserted different claims in the two proceedings, res judicata required all available claims be brought before the court.
In Miller v. Lunnon, 703 P.2d 640 (Colo.App.1985), the court held the dissolution of a partnership barred a later claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Res judicata bars “plaintiffs even though they seek different relief.” Id. at 643. Res judicata required Mrs. Mi-chaelson to assert the stockholder claim at the property proceeding when the court divided the corporate assets.
In rejecting Mr. Michaelson’s res judicata argument, the majority relies on the court’s 1965 valuation of the property. The majority misapplies the principle. Res judicata focuses on the conduct of the party bringing an action rather than on the trial court’s final determination. The trial court does not have to determine the issue in the favor of a plaintiff or defendant for the issue to be barred in future litigation. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 18-19 (1980). Here, the court rejected Mrs. Michaelson’s argument to value the property as of 1989 and instead awarded her interest after find-*705mg that Mr. Miehaelson owed her a fiduciary duty as a partner and as president of the family corporation in which she was a fifty-percent shareholder. Mrs. Miehaelson chose to receive the lump sum payment from Mr. Miehaelson rather than appeal the trial court’s determination.
Mrs. Michaelson’s claims, both in the property division proceeding and her subsequent civil case, centered on her rights to the corporate assets. She requested her share of the dissolved corporation in her motion for permanent orders. She asserted that Mr. Miehaelson breached his fiduciary duty. Both actions involve the same claim. Res judicata now bars her breach of fiduciary duty claim.
B. Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues which have been determined in a prior proceeding in the following circumstances:
(1) the issue precluded is identical to an issue actually litigated and necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceeding; (2) the party against whom estoppel is sought was a party to or was in privity with a party to the prior proceeding; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the pri- or proceeding.
City and County of Denver v. Consolidated Ditches Co., 807 P.2d 23, 32 (Colo.1991) (quoting Industrial Comm’n v. Moffat County Sch. Dis., 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo.1987)). The majority holds that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was neither actually litigated nor necessarily adjudicated in the property division trial. Maj. op. at 700.
“When an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated within the meaning of this Section.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 emt. d (1980). Although a party traditionally raises an issue through a pleading, it can arise from “an affirmation on one side and the denial on the other of some material point of law or fact as developed by the evidence.” IB James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.443[3] (2d ed. 1988). A court need not make an express finding addressing an issue to actually litigate that issue. Schmidt v. Frankewich, 819 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Colo.App.1991).
The motions and briefs filed by Mrs. Mi-chaelson and the transcript of the property division proceeding establish she raised the issue of Mr. Michaelson’s breach of fiduciary duty. In her Motion to Appoint Receiver and Motion for Permanent Orders, she alleges the same wrongful conduct which forms the core of her breach of fiduciary duty claim.
In those motions, Mrs. Miehaelson alleged that Mr. Miehaelson dissolved the corporation without her knowledge, failed to pay her what she was entitled to, and failed to fully disclose the assets of the corporation. Further, in her supplemental briefs to the trial court she specifically claims “[Mr. Michael-son] diminished the value of the corporation through numerous means, violating his fudi-eiary [sic] duty to the corporation” and “[Mr. Miehaelson] has repeatedly attempted to prevent [Mrs. Miehaelson] from receiving anything. This is in violation of [Mr. Michael-son] fiduciary duty to manage and protect the parties assets for their benefit.”
In the breach of fiduciary duty claim, Mrs. Miehaelson alleged that Mr. Miehaelson failed to provide her with knowledge as to the corporate assets, failed to disclose his intention to dissolve the corporation, dissolved the corporation without notifying her, and failed to pay to Mrs. Miehaelson her share of the value of the corporation. The claims are the same.
The majority quotes closing statements by Mr. Michaelson’s attorney, regarding the dissolution of the corporation to establish that the issue was not litigated.5 Maj. op. at 700. Those statements do not indicate the parties did not litigate the issue. Rather, they show the issue of the corporation’s wrongful disso*706lution was raised and deserved comment from opposing counsel in closing argument.
The identity of an issue is not limited to the precise terms in which the party describes them. Rather, the identity refers to the substantive identity. In re Tagne, 137 B.R. 495, 503 (Bankr.D.Colo.1991). The substance of Mrs. Michaelson’s claims in the property proceeding and the stockholder action centered on her right to the corporate assets prior to its dissolution and Mr. Mi-chaelson’s related misconduct. In the property proceeding, Mrs. Michaelson consistently raised the issue, presented evidence and cross-examined Mr. Michaelson concerning his misconduct, the very basis of her stockholder’s claim. She sought the same remedy in both cases, fifty-percent of the dissolved corporation. The trial court found Mr. Mi-chaelson breached his fiduciary duty and awarded her interest. Maj. op at 703 n. 9. The breach of fiduciary duty claim was actually litigated.
The majority also maintains the issue was not necessarily adjudicated. Maj. op. at 701-703. A determination of the issue must be necessary to the judgment to fulfill the requirements of collateral estoppel. IB James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.443[4] (2d ed. 1988). The majority states no evidence in the record demonstrated that the trial court, in the property action, factored Mr. Michaelson’s misconduct into the property division or the award of interest. Maj. op. at 701. The majority maintains the trial court only considered marital fault in dividing the property. I disagree with the majority’s interpretations of the record and the trial court’s order.
Prior to the award of interest, the trial court made several findings. First, the court found the Mr. Michaelson owed Mrs. Mi-chaelson a fiduciary duty. Second, the trial court found that Mr. Michaelson wrongfully withheld monies after they became due. Third, the court found he “filed false and misleading documents with the Colorado Secretary of State which failed to identify Mrs. Michaelson as equal shareholder and partner.” Finally, the court found Mr. Michael-son intentionally failed to pay property taxes in order to have Mrs. Michaelson’s name removed from the deed. Due to deliberate failure to pay property taxes, the trial court specifically valued the property of Block 5, Norwood as of 1985. These findings clearly indicate the trial court considered factors other than marital fault and took them into consideration in awarding interest since these incidents occurred after the divorce in 1965.6
The majority disagrees with Mr. Michael-son’s contention that the interest award compensated Mrs. Michaelson for her breach of fiduciary duty claim. Maj. op. at 700. The majority states the interest compensated Mrs. Michaelson for the unlawful retention of marital assets by Mr. Michaelson and not from mismanagement of the corporation. Maj. op. at 702. The majority assumes the interest must compensate Ruth Michaelson exclusively for the breach of fiduciary duty in order for that issue to be necessarily adjudicated.7 Id. I disagree.
The interest award served more than one purpose. It compensated Mrs. Michaelson for her loss of use of the property. It also redressed the claims of misconduct. The majority cannot ignore that the trial court prefaced its award of statutory interest by listing several incidents of Mr. Michaelson’s misconduct. Mr. Michaelson’s wrongful withholding of monies was only one factor. Maj. op. at 703 n. 9. Contrary to the majority’s position, this demonstrates these acts did provide some basis for the interest award. Further, in the property division and breach of fiduciary duty proceedings, Mrs. Michael-*707son alleged Mr. Michaelson withheld her share of the corporation’s value. The interest for the corporation assets compensated her for that claim.
The record clearly demonstrates that Ruth Michaelson raised and litigated the issue of Mr. Miehaelson’s misconduct. The issue affected the award of interest and, therefore, was necessary to the judgment. Mrs. Mi-chaelson accepted the trial court’s determination of these issues and did not appeal. She cannot relitigate the same issues decided in the property division by simply renaming the cause of action while asking the court for the same relief. I would affirm the court of appeals’ decision that res judicata, and collateral estoppel bar Mrs. Michaelson breach of fiduciary duty claim.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON and Justice LOHR join in this dissent.

. The record indicates Mrs. Michaelson argued for a 1989 valuation of the property and her fifty-percent interest in the dissolved corporation in the property division proceeding.

.The facts are undisputed as to Mr. Michael-son's misconduct. He filed false and misleading documents with the Colorado Secretary of State which did not identify Mrs. Michaelson as a shareholder, willfully failed to pay taxes to allow property to go to a tax sale in order to repurchase the property without Mrs. Michaelson’s name on the deed, and wrongfully dissolved the corporation.

. In the breach of fiduciary duty trial the court awarded her one-half of the corporate assets between the years of 1965 and 1987. The court awarded no other damages.

. The court of appeals indicates no property division proceeding took place concurrently with the divorce decree because the parties appealed the divorce decree. Michaelson v. Michaelson, 167 Colo. 58, 445 P.2d 211 (1968).

. The majority quoted Mr. Michaelson's attorney that Ervin Miehaelson had all the corporation property on the table and so the dissolution of the corporation did not make a difference.

. The court did make findings of marital fault. However these findings focused on occurrences during the marriage such as harassment, alcoholism and abuse. The court listed the findings relating to Mr. Michaelson's mismanagement when it considered an award of interest.

. The majority maintains "if the interest adjustment were intended as an award of damages for a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court would have included only the properties which were a part of the corporation as the basis for calculating interest. Instead, the award of interest ... include[d] the children’s bank accounts, other marital property and the various family investments.” Maj. op. at 702.