Court Opinion

ID: 9752751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:32:49.186909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:21.715857
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion of my learned colleague. I note only the following.
First, the definition of a “firearm” contained in 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6102 is not the only such definition given to the term by the legislature. See e.g. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(e) (defining “firearm” under mandatory minimum sentences as any weapon including a starter gun which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive____). Nonetheless, I am persuaded by the Majority’s reasoning that because the Uniform Firearms Act was passed as a part of the same legislation as the receiving stolen property statute, we may assume that a legislative scheme was established and thus should insert the definition of § 6102 into § 3903. Compare Commonwealth v. Fitzhugh, 360 Pa.Super. 217, 520 A.2d 424 (1987) (finding it inappropriate to supplant definition of “firearm” given in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102 into 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712, where definition of “firearm” is already supplied).
Second, although I agree with the majority that a sentencing error occurred, I hasten to add that it resulted from trial error originally. The question of what degree of receiving stolen property appellant committed is dependent upon several substantive issues of fact, i.e. whether the stolen rifle appellant received was within the ambit of the “firearm” definition described in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102; whether appellant was “in the business of” receiving stolen property; and the value of the rifle. Such issues must be decided by the jury at trial. See Commonwealth v. Sparks, 342 Pa.Super. 202, 492 A.2d 720 (1985). Failure to *199instruct the jury to do so instantly prevented the necessary findings from being made.
Normally, such trial error requires reversal and remand for a new trial. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Draxinger, 345 Pa.Super. 554, 498 A.2d 963 (1985) (refusing to instruct jury to make findings on appropriate degree of homicide required remand for new trial). However, because appellant has argued to us on appeal that error occurred only in sentencing, we are bound to remand for resentencing. Here, because the fact finder was not instructed to find as to higher degrees of the crime, and because the trial court is unimpowered to do so at sentencing, see Commonwealth v. Sparks, supra, no finding as to any higher degree of receiving stolen property may be considered of record. The jury’s verdict of guilty must be considered a finding of guilt as to only the lowest degree of culpability. Thus, as the majority ably concludes, appellant must be resentenced on only the lowest degree of receiving stolen property.