Court Opinion

ID: 9853952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:58:14.898147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:20.335604
License: Public Domain

NEED FOR HEARING
Appellant contends in his second argument that the district court’s refusal to hold a hearing on his new trial motion deprived him of his constitutional right to due process. We have held that the decision on whether to grant a evidentiary hearing on a motion for new trial is within the discretion of the trial court. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo.1988). The federal courts are in complete accord. United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. DiPaolo, 835 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir.1987); United States v. Herman, 614 F.2d 369 (3rd Cir.1980); United States v. Molovinsky, 688 F.2d 243 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Chagra, 735 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. O’Dell, 805 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.1986); United States v. Hedman, 655 F.2d 813 (7th Cir.1981); United States v. Bednar, 776 F.2d 236 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Kearney, 682 F.2d 214, 220 U.S.App.D.C. 379 (D.C.Cir.1982). The standard of review of such a decision is whether the district court abused its discretion in deciding the motion without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant seeks to avoid the abuse of discretion standard by claiming that due process requires an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant presents no cogent argument nor citation of authority to support his proposition that due process always requires an evidentiary hearing on a motion *622for new trial. The only authority cited which discusses due process is Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11, 29 S.Ct. 14, 24, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908), which is quoted for the proposition that due process requires notice and opportunity for a hearing. The case contains no reference to a motion for new trial, but is a description of general “principles which must be observed in the trial of criminal and civil causes.” (emphasis added) Twining, 211 U.S. at 110, 29 S.Ct. at 24. We are unable to discern from this case a procedural due process requirement for a hearing on all motions for new trial.
Appellant then seems to address the abuse of discretion standard, arguing that fundamental fairness required an evidentia-ry hearing under the specific facts of his case. He claims that the court unfairly allowed the State to put on live testimony in opposition to his motion for new trial, while he was denied the opportunity to present live witnesses. The record does not support appellant’s assertions.
The testimony that appellant complains of is the testimony at the hearing on his motion to take depositions. At that hearing, counsel for appellant stated that the purpose of the motion was to procure evidence of WH’s medical records to support appellant’s new trial motion. He stated that other defense counsel had seen an “abstract” of WH’s medical records and that the abstract indicated that an examination of the actual records would establish that WH did have an IUD inserted, thus supporting the appellant’s claim that she had perjured herself at trial.
Counsel for the State argued that the depositions were unnecessary because WH had agreed to release the records for examination. WH then testified and consented to release the records, which were introduced as State’s Exhibit No. 1. The testimony elicited by counsel for the State was concerned solely with foundation for the introduction of the records. The only testimony even remotely connected with the subject matter of appellant’s new trial motion was in response to the following questions by appellant’s counsel:
“Q. [WH] have you ever had an IUD?
“A. No.
“Q. Never.
“A. Never.”
The court then called Marilyn Story, who happened to be in the courtroom, as a witness. She was listed by appellant as a potential deponent “to testify concerning her examination of the medical records of [WH].” The court questioned Mrs. Story on the very topic that appellant sought to preserve by deposition. Appellant now takes exception to this procedure, alleging that it was unfair for the court to do so because it came as a surprise to his counsel and that the court was acting as an advocate rather than as a neutral body. While counsel may have been surprised by the court’s decision to call Mrs. Story, he had the opportunity to object and said:
“Your Honor, the only objection I would have is that she is not a Defendant in this case. If the only purpose is to present the, to determine how the records, or where the records were located and what happened to them, we would gladly provide that information.”
Mrs. Story testified that she had been provided access to the records of WH by a doctor who had acquired the records after the death of Dr. Christensen. When asked if she had the consent of WH to review the records, Mrs. Story replied “No, I didn’t. She did not know. She waived her chance to consent when she committed perjury.”
Following the examination by the court, both counsel were allowed to cross-examine the witness. While Mrs. Story’s testimony in open court may have differed from the testimony appellant hoped to obtain by deposition, we fail to see why appellant now complains of the inclusion on the record of testimony he was seeking to obtain by deposition. The State did not, in fact, present any testimony which might logically be considered as opposing his motion for new trial. Appellant’s claim that the State was unfairly allowed to present “surprise” witnesses in opposition to his motion for new trial is simply not supported by the record.
*623We are left with the question of whether the trial judge abused his discretion by receiving evidence at the deposition motion hearing but declining to hold a further evidentiary hearing prior to determination of the new trial motion. Here, appellant is asserting that he has newly discovered evidence which is so material that a new trial would produce a different verdict. He argues that a hearing is needed because otherwise the trial court “cannot, empirically, have the faintest knowledge whether or why the prosecution’s witnesses committed perjury.” From this statement, it appears that appellant contends that his newly discovered evidence is of such- a nature that appellant is unable to present it to the court without an evidentiary hearing.
However, appellant does not identify this evidence, nor does he explain why it cannot be presented to the court without a hearing. The evidence he did present was that WH committed perjury when she testified that she had never had an IUD inserted. The basis for the contention was the WH medical records and an affidavit signed by Parthena Thompson, who states that she knew that WH’s testimony was false because WH had told her that she had an IUD inserted. Appellant also relies on a fragment of a sentence found in the medical records produced at the deposition motion hearing. The excerpt is a handwritten entry which, according to affidavits filed by appellant, reads “27 Feb. 73 to exc-5 Mar 73 doing okay — to hyst or re-insert IUD.” Appellant argues that his evidence “clearly proves that [WH] perjured herself.” Appellant contends that if this evidence had been admitted at trial, he would have been acquitted on all counts.
Appellant does not identify other “newly discovered evidence” which would require an evidentiary hearing. While he lists a few witnesses which he would call if a hearing was held, he does not provide any clues as to the substance of their testimony nor does he explain why such testimony could not be presented by affidavit. He urges that a hearing is needed so that he may engage what Wigmore called “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” — the process of cross-examination. 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367, p. 32 (Chadbourn Rev.1974).
Recitation of legal aphorisms is merely an academic exercise unless accompanied by application to facts, and appellant does not identify the person he wants to cross-examine or the evidence to be produced. Presumably it is WH, the witness he now accuses of perjury. WH has consistently reaffirmed the truth of her trial testimony by affidavit and her testimony when questioned by appellant’s counsel at the deposition motion hearing. While appellant may entertain hopes for a dramatic recantation of her trial testimony under probing cross-examination, the likelihood seems remote. Appellant’s bare hope of such a result is not enough to require a hearing.
It appears that appellant is not seeking a hearing in order to introduce newly discovered evidence, but rather in hopes of discovering evidence to support his motion. A trial court is not required to sponsor a fishing trip in the guise of an evidentiary hearing. Due process does not require multiple opportunities to cross-examine one of the prosecution witnesses on a subject that was at issue during the original trial.
Interestingly, appellant does not raise as an issue the merits of the actual denial of his motion for new trial, preferring to focus his argument on a due process requirement of a hearing. While the State did address the merits of the denial of the motion in its brief, in appellant’s reply brief he specifically states that he is seeking only “an impartial tribunal and an eviden-tiary hearing,” and asks that we “chastise” the State for introducing irrelevant matter. It is clear from this record that there was before the court all the newly discovered evidence appellant had identified; that the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the motion without another hearing; and that the question raised concerning WH’s credibility was not of such significance as would likely have made a difference in appellant’s five convictions of sexually assaulting his patients.
PROCEDURAL DEFECTS
Appellant’s third argument is that the order denying his motion for new trial is *624defective under Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P., as amended after appellant’s new trial motion was filed. Discussion of this argument requires a brief review of the procedural history of this case. Appellant filed his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence on June 18, 1987. On September 2, 1987, the district court filed an order denying the motion on the basis that Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P., provided that a motion that was not determined within ten days of the date of filing was “deemed denied.” On appeal from that denial, we determined that Rule 34 was ambiguous concerning the denial of motions based on newly discovered evidence and held that the “deemed denied” provision was inapplicable to such motions. Story II, 755 P.2d at 231-32. We reversed the order denying the motion and remanded for determination on the merits. Story II, 755 P.2d at 232.
Following remand, the district court established the schedule mentioned earlier to allow appellant to file any additional affidavits or briefing in support of his motion, with the final deadline for appellant’s rebuttal to be September 16, 1988. Due in part to hearings on appellant’s subsequent motions to disqualify the judge and motions to take depositions to support the new trial motion, the court extended the time for appellant to file additional material until November 29, 1988. The court took the matter under advisement and filed its decision letter on February 1, 1989. The order reflecting the denial of the new trial motion was filed on February 27, 1989.
Meanwhile, this court had published an amended version of Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P., on September 21, 1988, which became effective December 13, 1988. Appellant contends his motion should be determined pursuant to the amended rule because the effective date of the rule was prior to the filing of the order denying the motion.
Amended Rule 34 does not apply to motions filed before its effective date. The relevant provisions of the amended rule are:
“(b) * * * A motion for new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be heard and determined and a dispositive order entered within thirty (30) days after the motion is filed unless, within that time, the determination is continued by order of the court, but no continuance shall extend the time to a day more than sixty (60) days from the date that the original motion was filed. When disposition of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is made without hearing, the order shall include a statement of the reason for determination without hearing.”
Appellant argues that the order denying his motion for new trial is “timely barred” because it was not entered within 30 days of the filing of his motion. The argument illustrates its flaw. It would be impossible to comply with the time limits of the amended rule for any motion, like appellant’s, that was filed prior to the publication of the rule. We will not construe a rule to require an impossible result.
Appellant, nevertheless, asserts that the failure to satisfy the time limitation of Rule 34 and to include a statement of reasons for determining the motion without a hearing violated his constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection. Like his due process argument in relation to holding a hearing on a new trial motion, no relevant authority is cited to support these conclusions.
With regard to equal protection, appellant states only his conclusion that the action by the court deprived him of equal protection. He makes no attempt to establish the “invidious discrimination” which is the gravamen of an equal protection violation. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). Therefore, we will not consider these claims further.
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Appellant’s fourth argument is that he was deprived of a fair hearing, due process, equal protection, and meaningful review of his constitutional claims. In addition to the errors he alleges in his brief, he maintains that significant errors occurred during his original trial, and that the cumulative effect of the errors is such that his convic*625tions should be reversed. He does not identify these errors because the “full and complete list * * * is simply too voluminous” but takes comfort in the assertion that “[u]pon a reading of the transcript, such errors are obvious * * *.”
Insofar as appellant is asking that we review the proceedings at his trial, we have already done so in detail. Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo.1986). We do not find reversible error in the present appeal. We must, therefore, decline appellant’s invitation to reverse his convictions based on the “cumulative effect” of phantom errors.
Affirmed.