Court Opinion

ID: 9819565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:27:50.625954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:05.810634
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MALLEY, dissenting: In my view, the majority fails to abide by the norms of statutory construction, which “forbid[ ] a court to canvass legislative history for evidence of legislative intent if the meaning of a provision can be determined from its text.” Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 134 (1993). I believe the majority unwarrantedly invokes legislative history, complicating what need be nothing more than a straightforward application of a statute’s plain text. The first recourse in statutory construction is the text of the statute. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the court must enforce the law as written, without considering extrinsic aids. County of Du Page v. Graham, 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151 (1985). The majority, however, resorts to extrinsic aids before finding an ambiguity in the text of section 2—118.1. In fact, the majority employs the extrinsic aids in finding an ambiguity. The majority claims that the text of section 2—118.1 is susceptible to two conflicting yet reasonable interpretations, one allowing the refiling of petitions beyond the 90-day period, the other not. The latter reading is reasonable, the majority asserts, because: (1) “From reading section 2—118.1 *** in its entirety ***, it is apparent that the legislature intended rescission hearings to be resolved in an expeditious manner.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 682. (2) “These rescission proceedings are conducted expeditiously to ensure that the interests of the State and the rights of the defendant are protected.” 339 111 App. 3d at 682. (3) “By ensuring that the hearing is conducted promptly, the State can be assured that impaired drivers will be quickly removed from the road.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 682. (4) “Moreover, through expeditious proceedings, the defendant is afforded due process rights and the opportunity to possibly regain his driving privileges.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 682. If the majority were following the dictates of statutory construction, it would look only to the text of the statute in deriving these propositions. It does not so confine itself, however, but relies for all four propositions on the supreme court’s assertions in Moore regarding the purpose of the summary suspension procedure. The issue in Moore was whether the results of a hearing on a petition to rescind the summary suspension of driving privileges could have a preclusive effect on similar issues raised in a DUI proceeding. The propositions above are the majority’s paraphrases of the following remarks in Moore: (1) “These [summary license suspensions] *** serve the salutary purpose of promptly removing impaired drivers from the road.” Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 166. (2) “To insure that the State has not violated any due process rights a motorist might have in retaining his or her driving privileges until convicted ***, the legislature has also created a mechanism whereby the motorist may file a written petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his or her license and receive a hearing.” Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 166-67. (3) “[T]he summary suspension hearing is not part of the criminal process but is, rather, merely an administrative device that is designed to remove impaired drivers from the road promptly.” Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 168. (4) “The legislature has specifically directed that the license suspension proceedings are to be swift and of limited scope.” Moore, 138 IH. 2d at 169. (5) If the findings of the court in summary suspension hearings are given preclusive effect in DUI proceedings, then “[t]he goal of conducting swift hearings for the sole purpose of determining whether a court has sufficient reason to rescind summary suspension of a motorist’s driving privileges will be thwarted.” Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 169. Some of these remarks are merely descriptions of the statutory provisions (e.g., section 2—118.1 permits a driver to petition for rescission), while others are statements of legislative intent and purpose, glosses that go beyond the plain text of the statute (e.g., the implied consent law serves the “salutary purpose” of removing impaired drivers from the roadways).1 While Moore rightly invoked legislative intent because the question it faced was not answered by the text of section 2—118.1, but required an understanding of the text’s purpose, the question sub judice is answered decisively by a plain reading of section 2—118.1 and the savings provision of section 13—217. The Code of Civil Procedure applies in all matters of procedure not controlled by other statutes. 735 ILCS 5/1—108(b) (West 2000). By its terms, section 13—217 of the Civil Code itself has broad scope, applying to “any *** act *** where the time for commencing an action is limited.” 735 ILCS 5/13—217 (West 2000); see also Portwood, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 486 (“[T]he plain language of section 13—217 indicates that it is a general, catch-all saving provision; it applies to real estate actions, personal injury actions, or ‘any other’ action that might be subject to a limitations period”); In re Estate of Breault, 113 Ill. App. 2d 356, 361 (1969) (phrase “to any other act” indicates that section 13 — 217 applies to all civil actions authorized by any statute that limits the time for commencing an action). Although the application of section 13—217 to section 2—118.1 is a question of first impression in Illinois, precedents provide some firm guidance. The savings provisions of section 13—217 and its predecessors have been held to apply to a variety of causes of action whose authorizing statutes specify time limitations on the initial filing of a claim but do not suggest any such limitations on the refiling of a claim. See, e.g., Winger v. Franciscan Medical Center, 299 Ill. App. 3d 364, 369 (1998) (claims under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 1996))); People ex rel. L’Minggio v. Parker, 65 Ill. App. 3d 296, 298 (1978) (claims under the Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 106 3/4, par. 51 et seq.) (replaced by the Illinois Parentage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1451 et seq.)) (now 750 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 2000))); Breault, 113 Ill. App. 2d at 362 (claims under the Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 3, par. 1 et seq.) (now 755 ILCS 5/1—1 et seq. (West 2000))); but cf. Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 183 Ill. 2d 459, 468-69 (1998) (section 13—217 not applicable to contract actions under the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 26, par. 2—725) (now 810 ILCS 5/2—725 (West 2000))), which contains its own savings provision governing such actions). It is clear from the comprehensive language of section 13—217 that the legislature intended the savings provision to govern the refiling of a petition for a judicial hearing under section 2 — 118.1(b) that the plaintiff had voluntarily dishiissed. Section 2—118.1 contains neither its own savings provision nor any other indication that section 13—217 was not intended to so apply. Nothing in the text of section 2—118.1 supports the majority’s reading. Certainly, the time limits in section 2—118.1 will by force ensure that proceedings under the section are rapid. However, it simply is not apparent from the text of section 2—118.1 that the legislature was so insistent on expediency that it intended to foreclose the application of the savings provision. “There is no rule of construction which allows the court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.” People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). The majority has prematurely invoked extrinsic aids of construction. However, even if it were appropriate to look beyond the text of section 2—118.1, the majority would still be in error. The short time periods of section 2—118.1 may evince a desire for expediency, but not expediency for expediency’s sake. As Moore emphasizes, what the legislature sought in enacting the implied consent law was, first, the summary suspension of the driving privileges of an impaired driver, and, second, an expedited judicial determination of whether the suspension was warranted. Swiftness in these two functions serves the dual purposes of insuring public safety (People v. Hedeen, 181 Ill. App. 3d 664, 669 (1989)) and protecting the due process rights of a driver whose driving privileges have been summarily suspended (People v. Ullrich, 328 Ill. App. 3d 811, 817 (2002)). Neither goal is thwarted if the driver is permitted to withdraw his petition and refile it after the 90-day period: his license remains suspended after he withdraws the petition (hence the public is protected), and the delay caused by the withdrawal is entirely his choice (thus no due process concern). Therefore, neither the text of the statute nor the intent behind it lends any support to the majority’s position.   Moore cites no authority supporting its assertions regarding the legislature’s purpose. I have found no such authority. For instance, it is not clear where in section 2—118.1 or elsewhere in the Vehicle Code the legislature has “specifically directed that the license suspension proceedings are to be swift and of limited scope.” Moore, 138 Ill. 2d at 169. I am aware of no such explicit pronouncement. Possibly, the Moore court regards the narrow time frames and limited scope of the section 2—118.1 proceeding as an implied direction from the legislature. Or perhaps Moore is relying on extratextual authority that it fails to mention.