Court Opinion

ID: 9882132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 14:27:22.552064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:51.310535
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1142

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                       W.S.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant appeals from the denial of his petition to

 seal, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100C, District Court charges

 of stalking and rape.       On appeal, the defendant claims that his

 petition established good cause for sealing and that it was an

 abuse of discretion for the judge to have denied it. 1              We affirm.

       We review a judge's decision to deny a defendant's petition

 to seal his criminal record for an abuse of discretion.

 Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 297 (2014).             To establish

 such an abuse, the defendant must demonstrate that the judge

 "made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant

 to the decision, such that the decision falls outside the range

 1 The defendant mistakenly claims that the judge allowed a
 previously-filed motion to reconsider, which permitted the two
 charges at issue to be sealed. What the judge allowed was a
 motion to correct a docket entry.
of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).

L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

       On January 27, 2022, the defendant petitioned to seal his

rape and stalking charges under G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second

par.    He claimed that under the revised standard for sealing

articulated in Pon, 469 Mass. at 313, the dismissed charges "do

not serve any criminal justice purpose" and should be sealed "to

protect the defendant's privacy, and to avoid potential negative

consequences, inter alia, with respect to housing, employment,

and loan applications."    We disagree.

       In Pon, 469 Mass. at 316, the Supreme Judicial Court

enumerated six factors for judges to weigh when presented with a

petition to seal:

       "[J]udges should evaluate [1] the particular disadvantages
       identified by the defendant arising from the availability
       of the criminal record; [2] evidence of rehabilitation
       suggesting that the defendant could overcome these
       disadvantages if the record were sealed; [3] any other
       evidence that sealing would alleviate the identified
       disadvantages; [4] relevant circumstances of the defendant
       at the time of the offense that suggest a likelihood of
       recidivism or of success; [5] the passage of time since the
       offense and since the dismissal or nolle prosequi; and [6]
       the nature of and reasons for the particular disposition."

Here, the defendant addressed only three of the six factors, and

did not argue factors two, three, or four.

       Relative to factor one, the judge found that the defendant

had failed to establish an identified disadvantage as to either

dismissed charge, noting that the defendant was "still

                                  2
incarcerated for [the] current charge."   Specific to his rape

charge, the defendant was convicted in Superior Court after

being indicted, and sealing the dismissed District Court charges

does not change that equation.

     As to the dismissed stalking charge, a different panel of

this court held in a prior appeal, before Pon was decided, that

the judge properly denied the defendant's prior petition to seal

that charge.   The panel noted that

     "It is clear from the excerpts of the trial transcript that
     there was evidence at the rape trial that the defendant in
     fact stalked the victim, indicating that the decision not
     to indict on the stalking charge was one of strategy. . . .
     Even more to the point, the defendant has advanced nothing
     (beyond unsupported speculation) remotely close to the risk
     of specific harm that must be shown in order for the judge
     to consider sealing his record. Indeed, we have difficulty
     identifying the harm the defendant might face absent
     sealing, given the lengthy prison sentence he is serving on
     the rape conviction."

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2006).   The

defendant has offered nothing beyond speculation, which does not

                                 3
change the prior panel's conclusion, 2 even when reviewed under

the revised Pon standard for good cause. 3

     Relative to factor five, the judge noted that the defendant

was still incarcerated, but the Commonwealth concedes that,

although not determinative, the passage of time since the

offense did weigh in favor of sealing.   Finally, relative to

factor six, and contrary to the defendant's claim, the dismissed

stalking charge was supported by probable cause, as a panel of

this court concluded in the prior appeal.    In the end, the

judge's weighing of the factors and his denial of the petition

2 The defendant has expressed a concern that his dismissed
stalking charge could bar him from obtaining a license as a
"barber, gas fitter, home inspector, psychologist, mental health
counselor, electrician, or any other professions licensed by the
Division of Professional Licensure." But he offers no credible
reason why the dismissed stalking charge would plausibly prove
an obstacle in this regard where he has two rape convictions and
a prior stalking conviction. See Pon, 469 Mass. at 316-317.

3 For the first time on appeal, the defendant claims that his sex
offender status prevents him from stepping down to a minimum
security facility or a halfway house. This claim is waived.
See Century Fire & Marine Ins. Corp. v. Bank of New England-
Bristol County, N.A., 405 Mass. 420, 421 n.2 (1989) ("An issue
not raised or argued below may not be argued for the first time
on appeal"). Even if it were not waived, the defendant has been
deemed a sex offender as a result of his two Superior Court rape
convictions, not his dismissed District Court rape and stalking
charges.

                                4
to seal fell comfortably inside the range of reasonable

alternatives.    See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27. 4

                                      Order denying petition to
                                        seal affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Meade,
                                        Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ. 5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    October 5, 2023.

4 To the extent that the defendant's additional claims rise to
the level of appellate argument, we find nothing in them that
warrants discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass.
66, 78 (1954).

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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