Court Opinion

ID: 9963889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 15:01:46.920312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:03.199860
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2152   Document: 57     Page: 1   Filed: 04/26/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                    JAMES E. KING,
                       Petitioner

                            v.

            DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                       2022-2152
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. AT-0752-21-0271-I-1.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 26, 2024
                 ______________________

    CHRISTOPHER D. VAUGHN, The Vaughn Law Firm, LLC,
 Decatur, GA, for petitioner.

     ELIZABETH MARIE DURFEE PULLIN, Commercial Litiga-
 tion Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
 Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented
 by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

   Before TARANTO, CHEN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
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 2                                               KING v. ARMY

 PER CURIAM.
      Petitioner James E. King appeals a final decision of the
 Merit Systems Protection Board, in which the Board
 sustained the Department of the Army’s decision to remove
 Mr. King from his position as an army civilian police
 officer. Because the Board’s decision was supported by
 substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with
 the law, we affirm.
                               I
                              A
     Mr. King had been employed by the Department of the
 Army since 2009, as a Department of the Army Civilian
 Police Officer (DACP) at the Directorate of Emergency Ser-
 vices/Provost Marshal’s Office located on Fort Eisen-
 hower, 1 Georgia. In 2014, Mr. King was promoted to a
 higher graded position as a GS-0083-08 DACP officer, com-
 monly referred to as a “Game Warden.” Mr. King remained
 in this position until he was removed in February 2021, af-
 ter the agency sustained three charges of misconduct
 against him.
     The authority and jurisdiction of a DACP working at
 Fort Eisenhower is specifically limited to “performing law
 enforcement or security functions on Fort [Eisenhower].”
 J.A. 275–77 (Aug. 14, 2020 Memorandum for Record de-
 scribing DACP authority and jurisdiction, signed and
 acknowledged by Mr. King); Army Regulation (AR) 190-56,
 ¶ 5-2.a (Mar. 15, 2013). A DACP does not have authority to

     1   During Mr. King’s employment as a DACP, and at
 the time of the Board’s decision, his Army post was known
 as Fort Gordon, Georgia. However, as of October 2023, the
 post has been officially renamed Fort Eisenhower, Georgia.
 As such, this opinion only refers to the Army post under its
 current official name, Fort Eisenhower.
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 KING v. ARMY                                              3

 exercise law enforcement or security tasks outside of Fort
 Eisenhower. J.A. 275; AR 190-56, ¶ 5-2.d. Accordingly,
 DACPs are only permitted to wear their official uniform
 and badge while on duty at Fort Eisenhower or while trav-
 eling to and from work. J.A. 276; AR 190-56, ¶ 5-2.f. With
 limited exceptions, a DACP is not authorized to patronize
 off-post establishments while wearing their official uni-
 form or badge. J.A. 276. Similarly, DACP are prohibited
 from carrying their service weapons while off duty. J.A.
 276; AR 190-56, ¶ 5-2.f.
     When performing law enforcement activities, a DACP
 is subject to the requirements of the Individual Reliability
 Program (IRP), which ensures that individuals performing
 such duties maintain the high standard of “character,
 trustworthiness, and fitness” expected of law enforcement
 and security professionals. J.A. 277; AR 190-56, ¶ 3-3.b. A
 DACP is prohibited from carrying a service weapon or per-
 forming any law enforcement or security duties if they are
 disqualified as unreliable under the IRP. J.A. 277; AR 190-
 56, ¶ 3-8.b. Additionally, because continued qualification
 for the IRP is a condition of employment, AR 190-56, ¶ 3-
 4.b, disqualification can also serve as a basis for removal,
 J.A. 277; AR 190-56, ¶ 2-2.a.
      Should the agency subsequently propose removal, the
 DACP, as an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511, is entitled
 to receive written notice and an opportunity to respond to
 the proposed removal. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (describing pro-
 cedures for removal of civil service employees). The same
 procedural process further establishes the right to appeal
 a final removal decision to the Board. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d).
                              B
     On or around October 16, 2020, the agency began an
 investigation into Mr. King after receiving allegations
 against him for misuse of government property and false
 reporting. Specifically, another officer alleged that
 Mr. King’s game warden truck had been spotted at an off-
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 4                                                KING v. ARMY

 post restaurant during duty hours, when he was expected
 to be on post. Evidence collected during the investigation
 indicated that Mr. King had used his game warden vehicle
 to dine at the alleged off-post restaurant during duty
 hours, without authorization, while wearing his DACP uni-
 form and badge, while in possession of his service weapon.
 The investigating officer also discovered that the official
 duty log Mr. King had filled out for the day in question re-
 flected that he had been performing security checks on post
 at the time of the alleged off-post incident. After collecting
 the necessary statements from the witnessing and report-
 ing officers and the waitstaff of the off-post restaurant, and
 conducting additional interviews with the relevant wit-
 nesses, the investigating officer prepared an Investigators
 Statement, giving “a final report” of the evidence that had
 been collected during the investigation. J.A. 267–68. The
 investigation was completed on November 9, 2020.
     Prior to the October 2020 investigation, the agency
 identified no previous formal disciplinary actions against
 Mr. King during his time as a DACP. However, Mr. King
 had received written counseling from his immediate super-
 visor concerning multiple instances of conduct-related inci-
 dents occurring between May and September of 2020,
 including “irregular attendance,” J.A. 10, and “key control
 concerns,” J.A. 85 (supervisory training officer stressing
 “the importance of key control” after receiving six keys—
 that had been checked out by Mr. King—one of which had
 access to artillery, that had been left hanging in the lock of
 a desk drawer). And on October 19, 2020, Mr. King received
 a Letter of Counseling from the Deputy Director of his de-
 partment addressing “concerns with the accuracy of his
 time and attendance reporting based upon a larger agency
 investigation concerning the conduct of multiple officers.”
 J.A. 10. The letter also stated that “[a]ny future discrep-
 ancy in [Mr. King’s] time and attendance records or en-
 tries . . . [would] subject [him] to disciplinary action.” J.A.
 271.
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 KING v. ARMY                                               5

      On January 6, 2021, Mr. King was permanently decer-
 tified from the IRP based on the agency’s determination
 that he did “not possess the ‘character, trustworthiness,
 and fitness [that] are consistent with the high standards
 expected of law enforcement and security professionals.’”
 J.A. 71 (Decertification Memorandum) (quoting AR 190-56,
 ¶ 3-3.b) (alteration in original). The determination was
 based on documentation including, but not limited to,
 Mr. King’s employment record, previous written counsel-
 ing for conduct related issues, and “information developed
 as part of an investigation into [his] misuse of government
 property and failure to properly account for [his] time in
 official duty records on or about 15 October 2020.” Id.
      That same day, based on the evidence collected during
 the investigation, the agency issued Mr. King a Notifica-
 tion of Proposed Removal based on three charges: (1) Con-
 duct Unbecoming a Law Enforcement Officer (Misuse of
 Government Property); (2) Lack of Candor; and (3) Failure
 to Maintain a Condition of Employment (Decertification
 under the IRP). J.A. 52–62. The Notice laid out the specific
 details relied on to establish the three charges, as well as
 the “aggravating and mitigating Douglas Factors” that
 were considered in deciding Mr. King’s ultimate penalty.
 J.A. 53–56; see Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.R. 280,
 305–06 (1981). Enclosed along with the Notice were the rel-
 evant witness statements, Mr. King’s official duty log en-
 tries, and the IRP Decertification Memo. J.A. 62. The
 Notice also apprised Mr. King of his “right to respond” and
 “furnish affidavits, and other documentary evidence in
 support of [his] response,” and clarified that no removal de-
 cision had been made, or would be made, until after the
 time Mr. King was given to respond. J.A. 56–57. At the con-
 clusion of the Notice, Mr. King was informed of his right to
 appeal any final appealable decisions to the MSPB and pro-
 vided with the necessary details to obtain an appeal. J.A.
 57–61 (listing the four different appeal options available,
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 6                                               KING v. ARMY

 but noting that only one option can be selected, and the se-
 lection would be binding).
     Mr. King, through a union representative, responded
 to the Notice in writing on January 11, 2021. In his re-
 sponse, Mr. King contested the allegations against him, the
 adequacy of the agency’s investigation, and the appropri-
 ateness of his proposed removal. J.A. 72–75. On February
 10, 2021, after considering his response, the agency sus-
 tained the three charges against Mr. King and removed
 him from his position, effective February 12, 2021 (the Re-
 moval Decision). J.A. 63–70. Similar to the earlier Notice,
 the Removal Decision again provided Mr. King with the
 specifications for the three charges against him, the rele-
 vant Douglas factors supporting his removal, and his ap-
 peal options. Id.
                              C
      On March 9, 2021, Mr. King appealed the agency’s Re-
 moval Decision to the MSPB and a hearing was held on
 June 22, 2021. On June 28, 2021, the administrative judge
 assigned to the appeal issued an initial decision, sustaining
 the agency’s charges, denying Mr. King’s affirmative de-
 fenses, and sustaining the agency’s decision to remove
 Mr. King from his position. The administrative judge de-
 termined that the agency had proven all three of its
 charges by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the
 agency had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
 Mr. King’s “penalty of removal promotes the efficiency of
 service.” J.A. 18–23. The administrative judge further de-
 termined that Mr. King had failed to prove all three of his
 affirmative defenses. J.A. 24–29. Finally, the administra-
 tive judge reviewed the agency’s consideration and appli-
 cation of the Douglas factors, and concluded that
 Mr. King’s removal did not exceed the bounds of reasona-
 bleness. J.A. 29–31.
     On September 1, 2021, Mr. King petitioned the Board
 for review of the administrative judge’s initial decision.
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 KING v. ARMY                                               7

 Mr. King argued that the administrative judge erred in
 sustaining the three misconduct charges, erred in finding
 that he did not establish his affirmative defenses (harmful
 error, equal employment opportunity retaliation, and disa-
 bility discrimination/disparate treatment), and erred in
 finding that the penalty of removal was within the bounds
 of reasonableness. Upon reviewing the petition filings, the
 Board concluded that Mr. King had not established any ba-
 sis for which it should grant the petition for review and de-
 nied the petition. J.A. 2; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
 (“Criteria for granting petition or cross petition for re-
 view.”). On June 28, 2022, the Board issued a final order
 affirming the administrative judge’s initial decision, but
 expressly modifying it “to address [Mr. King’s] disparate
 penalty claim.” J.A. 2 (hereinafter, the Board’s decision).
     Mr. King timely filed this petition for review on August
 25, 2022, within 60 days of the Board’s final decision. See 5
 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). This court has jurisdiction pursuant
 to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 2
                              II
      This court must affirm a Board’s decision unless it is
 “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
 wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
 cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
 followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” See
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the Board’s legal determina-
 tions, such as statutory interpretations, de novo and its

     2   Although Mr. King asserted an affirmative defense
 based on equal employment retaliation—which would oth-
 erwise preclude us from having jurisdiction—he has aban-
 doned those claims on appeal, thus providing this court
 with jurisdiction. ECF No. 4, at 1–3; Harris v. Sec. & Exch.
 Comm’n, 972 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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 8                                              KING v. ARMY

 findings of fact for substantial evidence. Archuleta v. Hop-
 per, 786 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
     A decision is supported by substantial evidence when
 there is relevant evidence that “a reasonable mind might
 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” McLaughlin v.
 Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 353 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
 (cleaned up). The burden of establishing reversible error in
 the Board’s decision rests with the petitioner. Harris v.
 Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 142 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir.
 1998).
                             III
     Mr. King presents three specific arguments on appeal.
 We discuss each in turn. First, Mr. King argues that he was
 unconstitutionally removed without due process, in viola-
 tion of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Second,
 Mr. King contends that the Board erred in finding that the
 agency met its burden of proof to sustain the first two
 charges against him. And third, Mr. King asserts that the
 Board failed to properly assess the reasonableness of his
 removal. For the reasons stated below, we reject all three
 of Mr. King’s arguments.
                              A
     As a federal employee as defined by 5 U.S.C.
 § 7511(a)(1), Mr. King has a constitutionally-protected
 “property right in his continued employment” with the fed-
 eral government. King v. Alston, 75 F.3d 657, 661 (Fed. Cir.
 1996). Therefore, in an adverse action for removal,
 Mr. King is entitled to the procedural due process protec-
 tions provided in § 7513 of title 5. See also 5 U.S.C.
 § 7512(1) (listing “removal” as an action covered by the
 statute). Such due process protections “include written no-
 tice of the specific reasons for the proposed action, an op-
 portunity to respond to the charges, and the requirement
 that the agency’s action is taken to promote the efficiency
 of the service.” Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1154
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 KING v. ARMY                                               9

 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Additionally, Mr. King has the right to ap-
 peal his for-cause removal to the Board. Id. (citing
 § 7513(d)). And on appeal, the Board is statutorily man-
 dated to determine whether the agency’s decision was sup-
 ported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing 5
 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B)).
     Mr. King alleges that he was removed from his service,
 and thus “deprived . . . of his interest in continued employ-
 ment” without proper due process. Pet. Br. at 10. We find
 no basis for this allegation. The record establishes that he
 was given written notice of the charges against him and the
 opportunity to respond. And the Board found his removal
 supported the efficiency of the service. Nothing more is re-
 quired.
     Mr. King’s property interest was in his employment as
 a DACP, not in his IRP certification. See Dep’t of Navy v.
 Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988) (holding that an employee
 does not have a right to a security clearance). Additionally,
 unlike removal, IRP decertification is not a reviewable “ad-
 verse action” under § 7512 nor subject to the procedural re-
 quirements of § 7513. As such, Board review of the agency’s
 IRP decision was only available upon the agency’s adverse
 removal action. In light of the aforementioned notice, op-
 portunity, and review procedures afforded to Mr. King,
 there is no question that he received proper due process
 protections related to his removal. Therefore, we reject
 Mr. King’s unsupported argument that he was deprived of
 due process under the Fifth Amendment, and find that the
 Board did not err in sustaining the agency’s third charge of
 failure to maintain a condition of employment.
                              B
     To sustain the first charge against Mr. King for con-
 duct unbecoming a law enforcement officer (misuse of gov-
 ernment property), the Board was required to conclude
 that the agency had shown by a preponderance of the evi-
 dence “(1) that [Mr. King] used (or removed or possessed)
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 10                                              KING v. ARMY

 government property; and (2) the use (or removal or pos-
 session) was without permission.” J.A. 11 (citing Castro v.
 Dep’t of Def., 39 M.S.P.R. 555 (1989)). To sustain the second
 charge against Mr. King for lack of candor, the Board was
 required to conclude that the agency had shown by a pre-
 ponderance of the evidence “(1) that [Mr. King] made state-
 ments which were less than candid, truthful, accurate, or
 complete, involving deception; and (2) such statements
 were knowingly made or withheld.” J.A. 11 (citing Rhee v.
 Dep’t of Treasury, 117 M.S.P.R. 640 (2012)).
      Again, the record establishes that the agency has met
 its burden of proof under both charges. The Board affirmed
 the first charge against Mr. King after finding that the
 agency “presented clear and undisputed evidence that”
 DACP officers “were not authorized to wear their official
 uniforms, badges, or service weapons outside of Fort [Ei-
 senhower] except in special circumstances not presented by
 the facts of this appeal.” J.A. 18. The Board further found
 that the agency had established that Mr. King had violated
 this long-standing policy when he “used his government ve-
 hicle to drive at least ten miles” to the off-post restaurant
 while “in his full uniform.” J.A. 20.
     The evidence used to support the Board’s finding as to
 the agency’s first charge (misuse of government property),
 was also used to support its finding as to the agency’s sec-
 ond charge (lack of candor). Because Mr. King’s official
 duty log for October 15, 2020, placed him on post at the
 same time he was found to have been dining at the off-post
 restaurant, the Board subsequently determined that the
 agency had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
 there was a “significant and deceptive omission from
 [Mr. King’s] official duty log.” J.A. 21.
     Mr. King’s main challenge to the Board’s finding is that
 the DACP uniform policy is “poorly drafted,” Pet. Br. at 19,
 and that his stop at the off-post restaurant was “author-
 ized” because, according to Mr. King, it occurred on October
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 KING v. ARMY                                               11

 9 while enroute to a training area, 3 and not on October 15
 as testified to by the waitress, Ms. Dulce Barajas, that
 served Mr. King during her October 15 shift, and two other
 witnessing officers, id. at 22. But we review the Board’s
 findings for substantial evidence. The Board acknowledged
 “[t]he diverging testimony about when exactly [Mr. King]
 went to” the alleged restaurant, yet after “making credibil-
 ity findings” as to each of the four witness’ testimonies, in-
 cluding Mr. Kings’, the Board concluded that it was “likely”
 and “far more credible” that the incident occurred on Octo-
 ber 15. J.A. 16–18. Additionally, the Board explicitly noted
 that Mr. King’s hearing testimony about when he stopped
 at the restaurant “was flatly inconsistent with his own of-
 ficial duty log entry for October 9.” J.A. 18.
     Because a reasonable mind could accept the testimo-
 nies of Ms. Barajas’ and the other witnessing officers as ad-
 equate to support the conclusion that Mr. King used his
 government vehicle to drive to the off-post restaurant while
 on duty and wearing his official uniform and badge on Oc-
 tober 15, we find that substantial evidence supports the
 Board’s findings as to the first charge of misuse of govern-
 ment property. Additionally, because Mr. King’s official
 duty log for October 15, 2020, clearly omits any details

     3    Despite claiming that he stopped at the alleged res-
 taurant on October 9, 2020, Mr. King’s official duty log for
 that day contains no record of any such stop. Mr. King al-
 leges that, just after beginning his shift, and while on his
 way to a training area, he stopped at the off-post restau-
 rant to use the restroom and get some food after leaving
 post. Pet. Br. at 3. Yet Mr. King’s official duty log shows
 that he traveled from post to the training area at least 10
 miles away, in 14 minutes. J.A. 83. Thus, even under
 Mr. King’s own version of events, he nevertheless inten-
 tionally omitted his stop at the off-post restaurant from his
 official duty log.
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 12                                              KING v. ARMY

 indicating that he left the post while on duty that day, sub-
 stantial evidence also supports the Board’s decision as to
 the second charge of lack of candor.
                              C
     The Board is required to review an agency decision to
 determine whether “the agency-imposed penalty is clearly
 excessive, disproportionate to the sustained charges, or ar-
 bitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.” Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R.
 at 284. But the Board’s function is not to displace the
 agency’s management responsibility; rather, it is to assure
 that the agency has properly exercised its managerial judg-
 ment within “tolerable limits of reasonableness.” Id. at 302.
 Thus, the Board must give due weight to the agency’s pri-
 mary discretion in exercising the managerial function of
 maintaining employee discipline and efficiency. Id. Fur-
 ther, there are twelve articulated factors that agencies are
 expected to consider when determining the appropriate-
 ness of a particular penalty. Id. at 305–06 (listing non-ex-
 haustive Douglas factors). “Only if the Board finds that the
 agency failed to weigh the relevant factors, or that the
 agency’s judgment clearly exceeded the limits of reasona-
 bleness, is it appropriate for the Board then to specify how
 the agency’s decision should be corrected to bring the pen-
 alty within the parameters of reasonableness.” Id. at 306
 (emphasis added).
     Here, the Board reviewed the agency’s “detailed [re-
 moval] decision letter explaining” the specific Douglas fac-
 tors, both mitigating and aggravating, considered when
 determining the appropriate penalty for Mr. King. J.A. 30;
 see also J.A. 64–65. The Board also heard further testimony
 from the deciding officer discussing the specific weight
 given to each relevant factor. Then, after “carefully con-
 sider[ing] the agency’s penalty analysis,” the Board deter-
 mined that “[o]n the whole,” there was no basis to overturn
 the agency’s decision to remove Mr. King from his position.
 J.A. 31.
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 KING v. ARMY                                             13

     Mr. King alleges that the Board failed to properly as-
 sess the reasonableness of his penalty because it “took the
 [a]gency’s word at face-value” “[r]ather than properly re-
 viewing the record.” Pet. Br. at 23. We disagree.
      After sustaining all three of the agency’s charges, the
 Board properly assessed the agency’s consideration of the
 relevant Douglas factors and the weight given to each, and
 determined that in light of the “seriousness of the offense
 for a law enforcement officer,” and Mr. King’s lack of
 “acknowledgement or remorse for such conduct,” the pen-
 alty of removal was within the bounds of reasonableness.
 J.A. 31. The Board also found that because the nature of
 Mr. King’s conduct “involved leaving his assigned duty sta-
 tion to purchase dinner off post and in his full uniform
 while providing false information in his official duty log
 about his whereabouts,” there was clear evidence that his
 removal promotes the efficiency of service. J.A. 23. Because
 there is substantial evidence that Mr. King used his gov-
 ernment vehicle to leave his post, while on duty and with-
 out permission, to make a prohibited stop at an
 unauthorized off-post restaurant while wearing his official
 uniform “including his badge and gun,” and was not truth-
 ful about his whereabouts, J.A. 31, the Board did not err in
 concluding that removing Mr. King from his position as a
 law enforcement officer was not unreasonable.
                             IV
     Because the Board’s decision was supported by sub-
 stantial evidence, and his removal was not unreasonable,
 we affirm.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.