Court Opinion

ID: 9954128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:38.110892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.302210
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Strull, 2024-Ohio-1118.]

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                  CASE NOS. 2023-A-0044
CITY OF ASHTABULA,                                        2023-A-0047
                                                          2023-A-0048
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                Criminal Appeals from the
         - vs -                                 Municipal Court

STEPHEN ARTHUR STRULL, II,
                                                Trial Court Nos. 2021 TRC 01426 A
                  Defendant-Appellant.                           2021 TRC 01426 B
                                                                 2021 TRC 01426 C

                                             OPINION

                                     Decided: March 25, 2024
                                 Judgment: Reversed and remanded

Cecilia M. Cooper, Ashtabula City Solicitor, and Catherine R. Colgan, Assistant
Ashtabula City Solicitor, 110 West 44th Street, Ashtabula, OH 44004 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).

Stephen Arthur Strull, II, pro se, 6405 South Main Street, Apt. 7, P.O. Box 111, North
Kingsville, OH 44068 (Defendant-Appellant).

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

        {¶1}      Defendant-appellant, Stephen Arthur Strull, II (“appellant”), appeals his

convictions and sentences for operating a vehicle while under the influence and traffic

control lights. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

        {¶2}      A complaint was filed in the Ashtabula Municipal Court on June 1, 2021,

charging appellant with two counts of Operating a Vehicle While Under the Influence, first-

degree misdemeanors, pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 4511(A)(1)(h),
Counts A and B, respectively, and Traffic Control Lights, a minor misdemeanor, pursuant

to R.C. 4511.13(C), Count C.

        {¶3}    The following day, appellant appeared at arraignment without counsel. The

trial court read the complaint and explained appellant’s statutory rights. Appellant entered

not guilty pleas on all counts. A $1,500 personal recognizance bond was set with the

condition that appellant could not operate a motor vehicle without a court order and

participation in NAP.1

        {¶4}    On December 14, 2021, appellant’s counsel filed a motion to suppress. A

hearing was held on January 21, 2022. The judge overruled the motion to suppress at the

conclusion of the hearing. A supplemental motion to suppress was filed on August 16,

2022. A second hearing was held on November 1, 2022. On January 23, 2023, appellant’s

counsel filed a motion to determine competency to stand trial. A competency evaluation

was filed on March 3, 2023. A status hearing on competency was held on March 17, 2023.

        {¶5}    Acting pro se, appellant filed a motion in limine on May 9, 2023, and a

motion for continuance on May 30, 2023. The trial court denied the motion for continuance

as moot the following day. Appellant subsequently filed a written waiver of counsel on

June 1, 2023. On June 2, 2023, the case proceeded to a jury trial. Appellant appeared

pro se with standby counsel.

        {¶6}    During trial, the State presented the testimony of the arresting officer,

Trooper Hayes, and several exhibits, including the dash cam video, the citation, and the

breathalyzer results. After the State rested its case-in-chief, appellant was asked if he

was calling any witnesses. He indicated that he was not going to take the stand but

1. Notification of Active Probationers program.
                                                  2

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
wanted to introduce several exhibits. The trial court asked appellant if he was resting his

case, and appellant responded, “[a]s far as I wanted to assure that the weather, and the

instructions for the Intoxilyzer, I believe it would be important to read the instructions for

the Intoxilyzer 8000. Just a couple things about instructions - -” The judge then asked:

“[s]o are you moving to submit some exhibits into evidence?” Appellant responded in the

affirmative. When it became clear that certain exhibits would not be introduced without

testimony, the appellant asked if he could change his mind and testify. The trial court

denied that request because appellant had rested his case. A close reading of the record

shows that defendant neither said he rested nor appeared to understand that he may

have previously foreclosed his ability to testify.

        {¶7}    At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found appellant guilty on counts A and

B. The trial court found appellant guilty on Count C. A drug/alcohol and mental health

assessment was ordered.

        {¶8}    Sentencing was held on July 27, 2023. The trial court sentenced appellant

to 90 days in jail with 84 days suspended and one year of probation on Count B.

Appellant’s driver’s license was suspended for one year.2

        {¶9}    Appellant filed his notice of appeal on August 10, 2023. Upon limited

remand from this court, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry, indicating that

appellant was convicted of all counts, that Counts A and B merged for purposes of

sentencing, and that the State elected to proceed on Count B.

        {¶10} Appellant raises the following 11 assignments of error:

2. Transcripts from the sentencing hearing were not made part of the record.
                                                   3

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
             [1.] The trial court made an error by deciding that the
             defendant broke the law by proceeding through a
             malfunctioning traffic control light.

             [2.] The trial court made an error by deciding there was
             reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the
             arrest.

             [3.] They did not allow me to testify!!! [sic]

             [4.] The judge did not allow me to be labeled as an
             experienced witness concerning the matter of tampering with
             video footage.

             [5.] They tampered with the breathalyzer evidence.

             [6.] They also erred by showing the jury the inadmissible
             evidence. Plus I never got the whole discovery.

             [7.] The judge did not allow a continuance when I really
             needed it and I am certain that it was in compliance. I think
             this was due to myself not being able to read her sloppy
             handwriting.

             [8.] I needed the breathalyzer certificate to bring to the jury
             trial but no one ever gave it to me.

             [9.] They did not let me bring in all my relevant credible
             evidence.

             [10.] The judge did not let the jury decide if it was legal to go
             through a broken light. Also, she did not allow me to read the
             law on red light to show the jury my mind set why I went
             through the light.

             [11.] The judge and Mrs. Cooper and Lori Lamer tag teamed
             and were biased so badly through the whole thing.

      {¶11} The assignments of error will be addressed out of order.

                                              4

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
        {¶12} In the third assignment of error appellant asserts the trial court did not allow

him to testify.3

        {¶13} “A defendant in a criminal case has the due process right to take the witness

stand and to testify in his or her own defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, 107

S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643,

28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).” State v. Lute, 2016-Ohio-7978, 76 N.E.3d 664, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.). “The

right to testify and to present a complete defense also may implicate the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct.

2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986).” Id.

                A defendant’s right to testify is not without limitation and may,
                in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate
                interests in the criminal trial process. One such interest is the
                trial court’s authority to exercise reasonable control over the
                mode and order of presenting evidence in order to insure that
                the proceedings are effective for the ascertainment of the
                truth. See Evid.R. 611(A)(1). Thus, a trial court has some
                discretion in ruling on a party’s motion to reopen their case
                and present evidence out of its regular order. Columbus v.
                Grant (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 96, 97, 439 N.E.2d 907; State v.
                McMahon (Apr. 14, 1993), Scioto App. No. 92 CA 2075,
                unreported. In exercising its discretionary power in this
                regard, a trial court must give due consideration to the
                defendant’s constitutional right to due process. Restrictions of
                a defendant’s right to testify may not be arbitrary or
                disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.
                Rock v. Arkansas, supra, at 49. See, also, State v. Sinkfield
                (Sept. 1, 1993), Montgomery App. No. 13180, unreported.

State v. Skeens, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 95CA24, 1997 WL 243488, *4 (May 6, 1997).

        {¶14} “Moreover, ‘* * * a defendant’s constitutional right to testify is contingent

upon a timely demand by the defendant.’ State v. Stewart, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2001-

3. Appellant’s brief does not comply with App.R. 16(A)(7). He provides no citation to the record or any
case law to support to his argument.
                                                     5

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
A-0011, 2002-Ohio-3842, ¶ 53; see * * * Lute * * * [at] ¶ 26 (holding that a defendant has

a right to testify in his or her own behalf at trial if he or she chooses. (Emphasis added)).”

State v. Smith, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2022-P-0034, 2023-Ohio-1533, ¶ 14.

       {¶15} “‘[A] trial court is not required to conduct an inquiry with the defendant

concerning the decision whether to testify in his defense.’” Id., quoting State v. Bey, 85

Ohio St.3d 487, 499, 709 N.E.2d 484 (reasoning that a defendant is not denied his right

to testify when there is nothing in the record to support that the defendant “misunderstood

or was unaware of his right to testify” or that he “wanted to testify and was denied the

opportunity to do so”). “As with any other constitutional right, the right to testify may be

waived.” Stewart at ¶ 53.

       {¶16} In Skeens, the defendant sought to testify after the defense had rested. The

Fourth Appellate District held: “Yet because the case had not yet been presented to the

jury for its deliberation, we believe the appellant’s right to full access to the courts required

expeditiousness to take a back seat to the exercise of his substantive right to testify. * * *

Because the denial of the right to testify affects a fundamental constitutional interest, we

must determine whether it results in error per se, i.e., automatic reversal, or if it is subject

to a harmless error analysis.” Id. at *5.

       {¶17} The Skeens Court determined that it was subject to harmless error analysis.

       {¶18} Specifically, the Court concluded:

              [W]e do not believe a defendant who waits until the matter
              has been submitted to the jury retains an absolute right to
              testify. This case * * * presents a difficult question of whether
              error per se is involved. Given the fact that the issue here
              involves reopening the case after both parties had rested,
              we conclude use of the harmless error analysis is
              appropriate, even though it seems at first blush to constitute
              a structural defect. In sum, because there is no evidence in
                                               6

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
              the record to establish that appellant was precluded from
              taking the stand before the parties had rested, we conclude
              this error is more in the nature of a trial error rather than a
              structural defect.

Id. at *5.

        {¶19} In Skeens, the defense presented several witnesses in their case-in-chief.

The appellate court ultimately determined that the error was harmless beyond reasonable

doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id. at *7.

        {¶20} In the instant case, the following exchange took place outside the presence

of the jury after the State had rested its case:

              [APPELLANT]: If it’s okay, I decided that I don’t really think I’m
              gonna be a witness myself. But there were just a couple of
              questions I was gonna ask Officer Hayes about the
              malfunction. Am I allowed to do that, ask Officer Hayes again?

              [TRIAL COURT]: No. No, he’s - -

              [APPELLANT]: So he’s done testifying.

              [TRIAL COURT]: Yes. You’ve already cross examined him.
              Yes.

              [APPELLANT]: Alright. Okay. Alright. As far as that goes, if I’m
              not allowed to ask about the malfunction stuff - - As far as, I’m
              not gonna testify.

              [TRIAL COURT]: Okay.

              [APPELLANT]: I’m not gonna come up under oath, because I
              mean I’ve talked a lot, and I don’t want to take the good juror’s
              time by saying too much. I feel like I stated a lot of stuff. I don’t
              want to take too much of your time. So I don’t think I’ll testify.

              [TRIAL COURT]: Okay. Alright. So are you resting your case?

              [APPELLANT]: As far as I wanted to assure that the weather,
              and the instructions for the Intoxilyzer, I believe it would be
              important to read the instructions for the Intoxilyzer 8000. Just
              a couple things about instructions - -
                                               7

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
               [TRIAL COURT]: So are you moving to submit some exhibits
               into evidence?

               [APPELLANT]: Yes, Your Honor. I am doing that.

T.p., p.131-132.

       {¶21} Appellant then sought to introduce several exhibits. The State objected to

the introduction of Defendant’s Exhibit A. The following exchange occurred:

               [STATE]: There’s be[en] no foundation laid for the admission
               of Document A.

               [APPELLANT]: I did testify, though, Your Honor - -

               [TRIAL COURT]: You haven’t testified yet, Mr. Strull.

               [APPELLANT]: as far as - -

               [TRIAL COURT]: And you just stated you’re not testifying, so
               --

               [APPELLANT]: Can I change my mind about that? Testify
               then?

               [TRIAL COURT]: No.

               [APPELLANT]: I can’t?

               [TRIAL COURT]: You just rested your case.

               [APPELLANT]: I - -

               [TRIAL COURT]: Okay. So - -“

T.p, p. 133.

       {¶22} The trial court then proceeded to rule on the admission of Defendant’s

Exhibit A.

                                             8

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
       {¶23} The State argues in its brief that the trial court did not deny appellant the

right to testify but instead denied a request to reopen the case after the appellant rested.

We disagree.

       {¶24} First, appellant did not express on the record he was resting his case but

instead indicated that he wished to introduce exhibits. Therefore, this court is not

convinced that appellant rested his case. Further, the trial court also told appellant that

he had not testified yet. Based on this exchange, it is not evident in the record that

appellant understood his right to testify or understood that he was waiving that right.

Where a criminal defendant seeks to testify prior to resting their case and is denied the

opportunity to do so, it is reversible error.

       {¶25} It is arguable that appellant rested his case, since appellant sought to

discuss the admission of exhibits, and this generally occurs once the party rests their

case. As such, this court will also review for harmless error.

       {¶26} Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error and provides: “[a]ny error, defect,

irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” A

reviewing court must evaluate prejudice to the defendant to determine whether

substantial rights were affected. State v. Morris, 141 Ohio St.3d 399, 2014-Ohio-5052, 24

N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 23, 27. Reviewing courts shall focus on the impact the error had on the

verdict and the strength of the remaining evidence. Id. at ¶ 25.

       {¶27} In State v. Lute, 2016-Ohio-7978, the Fourth District determined that the

denial of a defendant’s request to testify, which occurred prior to the State beginning

closing arguments, was error. In Lute, the defense rested its case after calling a witness,

but without calling the defendant to the stand. Id. at ¶ 22.

                                                9

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
        {¶28} The Fourth District Court of Appeals determined:

               Given the circumstances of this case—especially the fact that
               the first trial in which Lute testified resulted in a hung jury and
               a mistrial—the denial of Lute’s right to testify did affect his
               substantial rights. Accordingly, after reviewing the entire
               record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s error in
               denying Lute the right to testify was harmless beyond a
               reasonable doubt. This decision is not a comment in support
               of either Lute’s or the State’s version of facts; rather, this
               decision is written to preserve the right to testify in one’s
               defense as a fundamental constitutional right.

Id. at ¶ 32.
        {¶29} While factually similar in certain respects, there are some distinguishing

features. Unlike Skeens, appellant did not present any witnesses. Unlike Lute, appellant

did not have a prior trial wherein he was permitted to testify and which resulted in a hung

jury.

        {¶30} In the instant case, the State presented a single witness, the arresting

officer, as well as several exhibits. Appellant, without formally resting his case, attempted

to introduce several exhibits, and a single exhibit was admitted into evidence. Appellant

presented no other witnesses. While the State may only need to present a single witness

to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, in consideration of the denial of a

defendant’s right to testify where the defendant did not present any other witnesses, we

conclude that the denial affected his substantial rights. Considering the defendant’s

assertions, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s denial of his right to testify is harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Lute at ¶ 32. As the Fourth Appellate District acknowledged,

“this decision is written to preserve the right to testify in one's defense as a fundamental

constitutional right” and is not an endorsement of one set of facts over another. Id.

                                               10

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048
       {¶31} Further, even if we construe the exchange between appellant and the trial

court as a request to reopen his case, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of the

request was an abuse of discretion. “It is well-established that the trial court, in

maintaining reasonable control over the mode and presentation of evidence, has wide

discretion to permit evidence to be offered out of order. * * * This includes the decision to

allow a party to reopen its case to present additional proof.” State v. Howard, 12th Dist.

Warren No. CA2009-11-144, 2010-Ohio-2303, ¶ 12. A trial court’s decision on party’s

motion to reopen their case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of

discretion is “‘the trial court’s “failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-

making.”’” State v. Raia, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-0020, 2014-Ohio-2707, ¶ 9,

quoting State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). The trial court abused its discretion when

it denied appellant’s request, effectively barring him from presenting his case to the trial

court. As such, appellant’s third assignment of error has merit.

       {¶32} Because we have determined that the third assignment of error is

dispositive, the remaining assignments of error are overruled as moot.

       {¶33} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Ashtabula Municipal

Court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

                                             11

Case Nos. 2023-A-0044, 2023-A-0047, 2023-A-0048