Court Opinion

ID: 9711205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:26:20.018112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.793870
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the decisions reached by the majority, except for that part which affirms appellant’s burglary conviction. I would reverse that conviction, and remand the case for retrial on that charge. The charge of burglary and the final instructions informed the jury that appellant was charged with breaking and entering the dwelling of another with the intent to commit a felony therein. The felonious intent was not described in the charge or in the instructions in any more particular manner. When a burglary charge fails to designate the particular felony which the accused intended to commit, it is insufficient to charge an offense. Bays v. State (1959), 240 Ind. 37, 159 N.E.2d 393. The fatal defect in such a pleading is not that it fails to define the term “felony” as used in the charge, or that it fails to employ the term “specific” to modify the term “felony”— the two alleged defects actually considered by this court in the case found dispositive in the majority opinion, Blackmon v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 586— but is instead its failure to designate the particular felony intended at the time of entry.
The question remains as to whether this issue is properly presented to this Court for a decision in this appeal in light of appellant’s failure to raise it in a motion to dismiss. It has been held that a pleading which is insufficient to charge an offense *234fails to define the issues for trial and to provide a basis for pronouncement of a judgment. The issue under prior law could therefore be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment following trial. Burnett v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 520, 255 N.E.2d 529. The statute permitting that motion has been repealed. Under present practice a challenge to the sufficiency of the information must be made within twenty days prior to the omnibus date. I.C. 35-34-1-4(a)(4). While this is certainly a good rule, and should be enforced, it cannot be permitted to define the limits of judicial power to insure the legal integrity of criminal judgments. Here, both the burglary charge and the jury instructions were defective. Neither designated the particular felony intended at the time of entry. It is the state of mind at the time of entry which is the crucial and essential element and not the state of mind at some later time. Did the jury decide that appellant intended to steal something when he entered the home? Did it decide the intent was to carry the knife which was strapped to his side? Did it decide instead that he intended to rape? Or did it decide instead that he intended to do some terrible wrong? As judges, we cannot know the basis of the jury verdict; and we should therefore not permit the judgment to stand, but should reverse it.
This is the case of Mireles v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 64, 300 N.E.2d 350, revisited. I dissented there. Vague charges and instructions of this sort sound no better to me today.