Court Opinion

ID: 9710335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:07:11.848596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.949594
License: Public Domain

WEISBERGER, Chief Justice
concurring in part and dissenting in part with whom Justice GOLDBERG joins.
I concur fully in the opinion written by Justice Lederberg in all respects save that portion of the opinion which affirmed the propriety of the sentence imposed. For the following reasons I must dissent in respect to the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
The evidence in this case overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the defendant, John R. Pacheco, Jr., procured the services of Jonathan Tretton to murder Jennifer Lee Bailey. The evidence also established beyond a reasonable doubt that Tretton committed the murder in a manner “involving torture or an aggravated battery to the victim” as required by G.L.1956 § 11-23-2(4).
There was no evidence to establish that this defendant participated in the acts of torture or aggravated battery since he was not at the scene of the crime.
There is no question that he should be punished as a principal for the act of first-degree murder because he participated in the premeditation and the conspiracy to commit the act of murder.
As is pointed out in the majority opinion, Jonathan Tretton in a separate trial was sentenced to life imprisonment, but was not subjected to the penalty of life imprisonment without parole. I agree with the majority that the State was not collaterally estopped from seeking in the case at bar this ultimate penalty solely by reason of the fact that the codefendant was not subjected to the same penalty.
Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that unwarranted disparity between sentences imposed upon codefendants should be avoided. Moreover, in the case at bar, I have serious doubts concerning whether this defendant meets the requirements for this extreme penalty under the provisions of § 11-23-2, which provides in pertinent part that:
“Every person guilty of murder in the first degree * * * (3) committed at the direction of another person in return for money or any other thing of monetary value from that person; or (4) committed in a manner involving torture or an *985aggravated battery to the victim * * * shall be imprisoned for life and if ordered by the court pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12 such person shall not be eligible for parole from imprisonment.”
First, it is clear that Tretton committed the murder at the direction of Pacheco for money. The defendant did not plan the murder at the direction of any other person for money or any other thing of monetary value. Consequently, he is ineligible for that finding of an aggravating circumstance. It is true, as the majority points out, that the trial justice instructed the jury that this defendant was eligible for such a finding. I believe that charge was erroneous, but also recognize that counsel for defendant failed to object to the instruction.
However, on an appeal from a sentence this Court pursuant to G.L.1956 § 12-19.2-5 reviews the imposition of the sentence de novo and is not bound by the findings of the jury or the trial justice as to the imposition of this extreme penalty. Life imprisonment without parole is Rhode Island’s equivalent of the death penalty. Because of the grave severity of the punishment, the Legislature has given the defendant upon whom such a sentence is imposed the right to appeal the sentence to this Court and has given this Court complete discretion to ratify or reduce the sentence to life imprisonment. This is not a situation in which we review deferentially the imposition of a sentence by the trial court. We exercise our judgment de novo. This means that we review both the facts and the law to determine whether the sentence is appropriate.
In reviewing both the facts and the law, I am of the opinion that this defendant did not meet the requirements of § 11-23-2(3) in that he did not commit the crime for money at the direction of another person. I am further of the opinion that he did not participate in or command the torture and aggravated battery to the victim that was certainly committed by Tretton.
This defendant planned a heinous crime. He is certainly guilty of murder in the first degree. I believe that he deserves the mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. Nevertheless, I am bound by the provisions of the statute and cannot rely upon an erroneous charge to the jury (even though without objection) or upon erroneous findings of the trial justice. In the exercise of my independent judgment reviewing the facts and the law de novo, I am constrained to conclude that this defendant should not be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but should be sentenced to life imprisonment, the mandatory penalty for murder in the first degree in the absence of proof of the aggravating statutory circumstances.