Court Opinion

ID: 9623620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:38:08.146148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:28.794957
License: Public Domain

Gardner, Judge,
dissenting:
My brethren of the majority opinion misconstrue the simple issues made by the pleadings of this case and the major issue raised by this appeal.
The major issue of this appeal is Mrs. Landstrom’s contention that there was a breach of the contract of sale between her and Chester Street Associates (CSA), upon which CSA sued.
The majority opinion confuses the law of merger, which presupposes a novation to an earlier contract, with the issue presented by CSA’s complaint, i.e., the enforcement of a specific contract incorporated in the complaint. CSA asks this court to enforce one contract and the majority opinion as*268sumes the authority to enforce another supposed contract in support of CSA’s case.1
CSA’s complaint alleges that (1) in reliance on the power of attorney, CSA and Dent, as attorney in fact for Mrs. Landstrom, entered into a contract of sale for the subject property, (2) the contract is incorporated in the complaint, (3) CSA has performed all of its duties pursuant to the contract, and (4) pursuant to said contract Dent executed the deed to CSA. The complaint then prays that CSA be vested with fee simple title. Mrs. Landstrom denied allegations 3 and 4 and alleged breach of contract because of the terms of the mortgage delivered to Dent.
The contract provided that Mrs. Landstrom was to receive a second mortgage as part of the purchase price. The mortgage delivered to Dent contained a blanket subordination agreement (“this is a second mortgage and shall be subject to and subordinate to any first mortgage that mortgagor (sic) may how have or subsequently execute”). I would hold that the blanket subordination agreement violates the terms of the contract, which made no mention of a subordination agreement. CSA failed to prove it had performed all of its duties under the contract and, to the contrary, affirmatively proved it had not performed its contractual duties because the mortgage it delivered is inconsonant with the contract. CSA disproved its own case and established Mrs. Landstrom’s defense of breach of contract.
I would observe, also, that the mortgage Mrs. Landstrom was to receive was to be a purchase money mortgage. Mrs. Landstrom, under the contract, is entitled to a second mortgage with all of the incidences of a purchase money mortgage. A major incident of a purchase money mortgage is that the mortgagor (CSA in this case) can do nothing in derogation of the lien of the purchase money mortgage. Crystal Ice Co. of Columbia v. First Colonial, 273 S. C. 306, 257 S. E. (2d) 496 (1979). The blanket subordinate agreement is, for this reason, inconsonant with the contract. For this additional reason, I would hold that the delivery of the mortgage containing the blanket subordination agreement constitutes a breach of contract and also a failure of CSA to establish its case.
*269Of more significance, CSA alleges that the deed was delivered to Mrs. Landstrom pursuant to said, contract. How, now, can the majority opinion hold that the closing of the transaction was pursuant to a new contract created by the law of merger? Mrs. Landstrom denied that the transaction was closed pursuant to the contract sued on by CSA and alleged CSA breached the contract. I would hold there is an obvious breach of contract. This court simply should not disregard the pleadings by “reaching up into the sky” to find a totally new contract to enforce.
Had CSA not premised its entire case on the enforcement of the contract and failed to prove its case, the majority opinion would be more understandable, but still, I think, without merit. I would, contra to the majority opinion, hold that Dent had no authority to accept the mortgage delivered. The parties agreed by the contract that Dent’s powers thereafter were limited to a conformance with the contract. The majority opinion cites no pertinent authority that a power once limited2 can be revested with its original power except by the donor (Mrs. Landstrom). Such a proposition does, indeed, defy all reason and logic.
The majority opinion disregards the purposes of pleading and procedure. Chaos must result from decision making laid in any purpose other than a response to the issues made by the case. Aside from this simple observation, ■ the writer, as a judge of equity, would observe that an injustice has been done to Mrs. Landstrom. The high calling of equity is to strive for the very zenith of justice; in this calling, I submit, we miss the mark by permitting the appealed order to stand.
I would reverse and remand with direction that judgment be entered for Mrs. Landstrom without prejudice to CSA’s right to establish their fee simple title to the subject property by the execution and delivery of a mortgage to the contract they sued on or by simply agreeing that the blanket subordination agreement in the present mortgage be deleted.

 See First paragraph, section 1, majority opinion.

 The contract provides that (1) it was the only agreement between the parties, (2) Dent and CSA were bound by it, and (3) it could be enforced by an action for specific performance.