Court Opinion

ID: 9463922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:20:25.591724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:21.711777
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
“He jests at scars that never felt a wound.”
William Shakespeare
“Those who do not feel pain seldom think that it is felt.”
Samuel Johnson
At 9:00 A.M., on May 18, 1976, when the District Judge ordered this case to trial, appellant Pastor, who had a previous history of advanced triple-vessel coronary artery disease, myocardial infarction, hypertension and severe angina pectoris, which the District Judge had earlier acknowledged to be a “concededly serious heart condition”, was on his way to the Mt. Sinai Hospital.1 The hospital history showed that he had suffered “two hours of severe anterior chest and left arm pain unrelieved by 20 nitroglycerine tablets”; that he was in severe distress on admission, was given three or four injections of morphine, was administered oxygen and was treated with nitroglycerine, and medication for premature heart beats. Electrocardiogram studies taken on admission showed that there were ST segment depressions in leads V4, V5 and V6, which had not been present previously; and, on the advice of his physician, appellant was placed in the hospital’s coronary care unit for further observation and treatment.
Both the court appointed physician, Dr. Texon, and Pastor’s attending physician, Dr. Kuhn, agreed that appellant was suffering from myocardial ischemia and that this was a “true anginal episode” for which he should have sought medical attention.2 Indeed, Dr. Texon, who examined appellant on the evening of May 18, recommended that he be kept in Mt. Sinai Hospital “for at least another 24 hours. . . . ” Dr. Tex-on advised the court on May 19 that, “if improvement continues, such as had occurred from morning to evening of yesterday, [appellant] would suffer no great risk of further infarction by being moved to a facility possibly next to the Court on the next day.”3
*943In the face of this uncontroverted and undisputed medical testimony, I am unable to understand how my colleagues justify their characterization of this episode as a “bluff”. I find even more disturbing the sinister implication in the majority’s suggestion that appellant’s symptoms “could have been self-induced”. If the record indicates that appellant deliberately courted the possibility of another coronary infarct by “self-inducing” the condition which brought about his May 18 hospitalization, my brothers should say so. Insinuations, conjecture and suspicion, particularly when of a malicious nature, have no place in the opinions of this or any other court. Hodgson v. Okada, 472 F.2d 965, 969 (10th Cir. 1973); Tyrrell v. Dobbs Investment Co., 337 F.2d 761, 765 (10th Cir. 1964); 89 C.J.S. Trial § 634 (1955). The unconiradieted medical proof was that appellant suffered a “true anginal episode” and that proper medical treatment mandated his hospitalization.4
Having now set the scene at the hospital, let us shift our attention to the courtroom to see what transpired there on the morning of May 18. So that the record will by crystal clear, a transcript of the proceedings is set forth in full in the margin.5 As is *944obvious from the quoted record, the District Judge, without any supporting medical information concerning appellant’s then existing condition, decided that appellant was engaged in a “deliberate attempt to frustrate this Court in bringing this case to trial. . . . ” She peremptorily rejected the request of appellant’s attorney and the suggestion of the United States Attorney that “a determination be made first as to whether [appellant] is in fact sick before proceeding.” She threatened appellant’s counsel with contempt of court for simply attempting to ask a question. Finally, she revoked appellant’s bail and ordered the United States Marshals to “go and get him.” The District Judge’s subsequent pique because the Marshal, faced with the inhumane task of forcibly removing appellant from the coronary care unit of the' Mt. Sinai Hospital, failed to carry out her order, is disclosed in other portions of the record. This, my colleagues hold, constitutes proper judicial deference to the defendant’s constitutional right to be present during the selection of the jury. I respectfully disagree.
*945The wheels of justice would not have ground to a jarring halt if the District Judge had delayed the selection of a jury for only a short time in order that appellant’s counsel might secure a medical report from his client’s doctor. The holding of the District Judge that the failure of appellant’s attorney to secure such a report between 8:00 A.M., when he first learned of appellant’s attack, and 9:00 A.M., when court convened, constituted a “voluntary absence by the defendant”, was completely arbitrary and unwarranted and flew squarely in the face of the Supreme Court’s oft repeated admonition that “courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Moreover, because waiver of the constitutional right to be present throughout the trial is strictly personal to the defendant, it could not have occurred through the failure of his attorney to act with the alacrity which the District Judge demanded, even if the attorney was not blameless in this regard. Cf. United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908, 89 S.Ct. 1018, 22 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969); Greenberg v. United States, 280 F.2d 472, 475-76 (1st Cir. 1960). That the medical reports, for which the District Judge refused to wait, would have mandated a two day delay in the trial is uncontroverted, as is evidenced by the fact that, following Dr. Texon’s testimony on May 19, the Judge adjourned further proceedings until May 20. If appellant was “bluffing” on the 18th, he was “bluffing” on the 19th; and the trial could have proceeded in his absence.
Looking back on events from the sanctity of this Courts ivory tower, my colleagues are critical of the fact that Dr. Kuhn was not called at 7:00 A.M. when appellant’s onset of pain occurred and did not examine appellant until he reached Mt. Sinai Hospital, 180 minutes after the first “attack”. (The quotes are my colleagues’.) They also criticize appellant’s attorney for attempting to arrange for the court appointed physician to examine his client, brushing aside the attorney’s explanation that he did not think the District Judge would believe appellant’s own physician, a completely justifiable assumption, it would appear, from a review of the Judge’s subsequent conduct. Can a finding that appellant intentionally waived his constitutional right to be present during the selection of the jury be constructed upon such a weak foundation as this? I think not.
My colleagues dig deep indeed to justify the District Judge’s conduct on May 18 by referring to appellant's display of pills and a hospital wristband during the course of the trial6 and his wearing of what they term a “see-through” shirt which permitted the jury to see the heart monitoring device attached to his chest.7 If this was egregious conduct on the part of an ill and hospitalized defendant, which is a matter not at all free from doubt, it certainly cannot be relied upon as justification for improper conduct of the District Judge which took place before the trial commenced.
The majority also relies on the rule that where an evidentiary hearing is conducted to determine whether appellant voluntarily absented himself from trial, “the trial judge’s findings which form the basis of his or her decision on the issue will not be disturbed unless found to be clearly errone*946ous.” (Emphasis added.) However, the record is clear that the District Judge conducted no hearing of any sort prior to ordering the selection of a jury. The findings upon which my brothers rely so heavily were made in an opinion filed in support of an oral order denying a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. Although the order was made in open court prior to the taking of the appeal, the opinion was not filed until several months thereafter, which was subsequent to the filing of the record on appeal and appellant’s brief.
We have said on numerous occasions that the docketing of an appeal wholly removes the case from the jurisdiction of the trial court and deprives it of the power to make any further orders. United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918, 89 S.Ct. 241, 21 L.Ed.2d 206 (1968); United States v. Habib, 72 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1934). In United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944, 92 S.Ct. 2040, 32 L.Ed.2d 331 (1972), we specifically held that, once a notice of appeal has been filed, the District Court is deprived of jurisdiction to act upon motions for a new trial. There is, therefore, a serious question in my mind whether a District Judge can retain jurisdiction following the taking of an appeal from a judgment of conviction by the simple expedient of making an oral order and reserving the right to file supportive findings at a later date.8
Assuming, however, that we are prepared to treat the District Judge’s opinion as something other than an additional appellee’s brief, a strong argument may nonetheless be made that we should not be bound by the ex post facto findings contained therein. The District Judge did not order the case to trial on the basis of these post trial findings, but, instead, proceeded solely upon her own arbitrary determination that appellant was engaged in a deliberate attempt to frustrate the court in bringing the case to trial. If full and complete review of this procedure can be thwarted through application of the “clearly erroneous” rule to exculpatory post trial findings by the trial court, a defendant’s constitutional rights rest on rather shaky grounds. It will be the rare judge indeed who does not find his own conduct to have been blameless. See Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1104 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977). Where, as here, the judge departs from her role as impartial arbiter over matters in dispute between litigants and takes an adversary posture against one of them, contrary to the wishes and suggestions of both, substantial justice for the injured party might well require that subsequent findings, made in attempted justification of the judge’s conduct, be given closer scrutiny than is mandated by the “clearly erroneous” rule. Cf. United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977); Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 851 (2d Cir. 1977); Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272-74 (1st Cir. 1967).
I do not rest my dissent on this argument, however, because I conclude that the District Judge’s finding that appellant did not suffer a physiological impairment so severe and so serious as to excuse his absence from court on the morning of May 18 was in direct contradiction of the undisputed medical evidence and was therefore clearly erroneous. I also conclude that the District Judge was patently in error in holding that the failure of appellant’s attorney to have a medical report available for the court at 9:00 A.M. on May 18 constituted a voluntary absence by appellant and a knowing and intentional waiver of his constitutional right to participate in the selection of the jury.
*947My brothers say that I err in basing my dissent on what transpired on the morning of May 18, 1976. They prefer to rely upon events which occurred six months earlier and one week later. The District Judge’s specific holding was that appellant’s failure to have a doctor’s statement in court at 9:00 A.M. on May 18, 1976 constituted a voluntary absence and justified starting the trial without appellant being present to participate in the selection of the jury. His lawyer’s failure to produce this statement did not occur in 1965 or later in 1966; it occurred on May 18, 1976.
My position, simply put, is that if there was not “persuasive evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver on the part of [appellant] himself,” Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), rather than a “choice made by counsel not participated in by [appellant],” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439, 83 S.Ct. 822, 849, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), the District Judge’s finding of waiver based upon the attorney’s questionable lack of diligence cannot stand.
My further position, also simply put, is that appellant’s right to absent himself on the morning of May 18, 1976 should not be determined by what his physical condition was in September 1965, or by the gruesome test of whether he survived the trial. If appellant was properly in Mt. Sinai Hospital while the District Judge was proceeding with the selection of his jury, the trial should not have proceeded in his absence. On this crucial issue, I do not consider only the evidence tending to support appellant’s contentions, as the majority opinion seems to imply. Both appellant’s doctor and the court-appointed doctor agreed that appellant’s hospitalization on May 18, 1976 was proper. As to this salient feature of the case, there was no other medical testimony. This was it. This was the opinion of both the partial and the impartial physician, each of whom was completely familiar with appellant’s medical history and, despite the omniscience of Federal judges, was better qualified than we to pass upon the necessity for appellant’s hospitalization.
With all due respect to my colleagues, their argument concerning indefinite adjournments which “probably” would have occurred, severance, separate trials, etc., would, if advanced by a litigant, be properly termed a “red herring”. No one quarrels with the right of a District Judge to proceed with a trial, with or without the defendant being present, when there is medical proof that the defendant is physically able to be present and participate in the trial. The undisputed, I repeat, undisputed proof was that on the morning of May 18, 1976, appellant was properly hospitalized and therefore physically unable to be present.
It is not a pleasant task to pass critical judgment upon the conduct of another judge, and the easy road for me would be to join with my colleagues in their facile approval of what has transpired in this case. However, if we judges are to be consistent in our application of constitutional principles, we should hold ourselves to no less exacting standards than those we demand of police officers who are not blessed, as we are, with legal degrees and presumed knowledge of the law. See, e. g., United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S.Ct. 3221, 49 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1976); United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1976) (Motley, J., dissenting). In this manner only can the “high reputation of federal criminal justice and the policy of complete and even-handed fairness for the defendant” be maintained. United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726, 738 (2d Cir. 1973).9 Recognizing, as we do, that the extreme pressures on our trial judges sometimes cause them to “give vent to their frustrations,” United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973), we have said that “grave errors which result in serious prejudice to a defendant cannot be ignored simply because they grow out of *948difficult conditions.” Id. Because I am convinced that the District Judge committed grave prejudicial error which this Court should neither ignore nor condone, see United States v. Toliver, 541 F.2d 958, 964 (2d Cir. 1976), I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of appellant Pastor’s conviction and vote to remand for a new trial.
I agree with my brothers that the judgment of appellant Weiner should be affirmed.

. The trial was originally scheduled to commence on May 17, and Pastor was present in court on that day.

. The following are excerpts from the testimony of Dr. Texon, the court appointed physician:
Q. And based upon what you observed you are not suggesting, are you, that Mr. Pastor should not have sought medical attention, are you?
A. I am not suggesting that at all. Every pain has to be paid attention to.
Q. Isn’t it a fact that sound medical practice would indicate that he should indeed seek medical attention under those circumstances?
A. That’s right.
Q. After reviewing the medical records and after examining the patient, Dr. Texon [you] used the very words which I said that this attack was possibly more severe clinically than usual?
A. That’s quite possible.
Q. And putting that aside just so we are clear, whether or not he suffered it on this morning or on previous mornings, on any occasion when these symptoms were present or this condition existed Mr. Pastor in terms of sound medical practice should medically seek medical attention. Isn’t that true?
A. That’s true.

. My brothers do not contend that I have misquoted the medical history above set forth. They say only that laymen such as I are overly impressed by medical terminology, the implication, of course, being that laymen such as they are not. For the benefit of the lay reader of this dissent, the written opinion of Dr. Texon, the court’s own doctor, reads in pertinent part as follows:
“Discussion: The recurrence of chest pain in this patient with known coronary occlusive *943atherosclerosis and previous myocardial infarction raises the question of possible further acute myocardial infarction. For this reason the patient was properly advised by his personal physician to be evaluated in the Emergency Room and then admitted to the coronary care unit (Ames) at Mt. Sinai Hospital. The patient was closely monitored by Ekg. and blood studies beginning about 10 AM on 5/18/76. Ekgs. showed transient ST segment changes and no significant change in the blood enzymes to establish a diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction. The transient Ekg. changes (reverting to the previous state) indicated that the patient did have some transient myocardial ischemia. The absence of pulmonary congestion, fever, and cardiac irregularity together with the control of chest pain with medication strongly suggests that the episode of chest pain about 7 AM on 5/18/76 was another episode of angina pectoris—possibly more severe clinically than usual—but still reversible and not an episode of acute myocardial infarction. “Opinion: In view of the clinical course to date of chest pain as described but the absence of objective evidence of acute myocardial infarction in this patient, I believe 24 hours of further observation in the hospital are indicated. If improvement continues and no evidence of objective Ekg. or blood enzyme changes are [sic] found, I believe the patient may participate in a court procedure on Thursday, 5/20/76. Re-evaluadon at appropriate intervals is advised.”
I find no complicated medical terminology in Dr. Texon’s statement that appellant was “properly” advised by his physician to be evaluated in the Emergency Room and then admitted to the coronary care unit. While this was “properly” taking place, the District Judge was improperly proceeding with the selection of the jury which subsequently found appellant guilty.

. I find a curious inconsistency between my brothers’ argument that appellant’s anginal episode was a “bluff’ predicated solely upon his complaint of pain and their further assertion that appellant’s “other symptoms” could have been self-induced.

. The Court: Is the Government ready to proceed?
Mr. Timbers: The Government is ready to proceed, your Honor.
The Court: Is the defendant ready to proceed?
Mr. Cooper: The defendant Pastor is not ready' at this time.
The Court: Is the defendant Weiner ready to proceed?
Mr. Sparks: Yes, your Honor.
Mr. Cooper: If I may explain:
I received a call in my home at about 8:15 this morning from Mr. Kuh who is counsel of record in this case for Mr. Pastor. Mr. Kuh informed me that he had been informed by Mr. Pastor’s wife that Mr. Pastor had another heart problem I believe early this morning; that she had to administer oxygen; that she could not even get Mr. Pastor clothed this morning he was in such bad shape.
Mr. Kuh further informed me that upon hearing that he called Dr. Texon, not having been able to reach Mr. Timbers, who I believe was on his way in from Connecticut. He asked Dr. Texon if he could go to the hotel where Mr. and Mrs. Pastor were staying and examine Mr. Pastor and, if necessary, admit him to the hospital. Dr. Texon said he could not do that; that he is not authorized by the Court to do that; that he doesn’t have a Court order and therefore he would not do that.
I was informed that Mr. Kuh within the last 15 minutes called Dr. Texon again. Dr. Texon still said he was not able to go to Mr. Pastor. I believe Dr. Texon said that he would be in his office and if Mr. Pastor could get to his office he would be able to examine him there, but my information is that Mr. Pastor was not in condition even to be dressed, no less to go out of the room.
*944In talking with Mr. Kuh in the last five minutes he told me that he also called Dr. Kuhn who was to get back to Mr. Kuh within the next ten minutes and" inform him as to what his findings are. I don’t know whether Dr. Kuhn will be able to see Mr. Pastor or not.
The Court: By when?
Mr. Cooper: He is going to call back in the next ten minutes. I don’t think he will have seen him by then.
What I would request is this: I know Dr. Texon has been examining Mr. Pastor at the Court’s direction. I would believe if Dr. Tex-on were ordered to examine him again that he would. I believe the reason Dr. Texon said he wouldn’t at this time is because he wasn’t authorized.
I would ask that the Court through a phone call at least now order Dr. Texon to examine Mr. Pastor at Mr. Pastor’s hotel.
The Court: I don’t have any doctor’s certificate here, Mr. Cooper, saying that Mr. Pastor is unable to attend court this morning, so his bail is revoked and the United States Marshals are ordered now to go and get him. We are going to proceed in his absence.
Mr. Cooper: May I ask—
The Court: If you say another word you are going to need a lawyer.
Now, let’s go.
(Pause.)
The Court: Mr. Timbers, do you have something to say?
Mr. Timbers: Yes, your Honor.
The Government is prepared to have Mr. Pastor examined and to have him placed in the Metropolitan Correctional Center if necessary. The Government would apply, however, to defer the selection of a jury to determine whether Mr. Pastor has purposefully absented himself from court today. The Government is concerned that if by chance Mr. Pastor should for once in fact be sick there might be Sixth Amendment problems in choosing a jury in his absence. The Government would apply at this time that a determination be made first as to whether he is in fact sick before proceeding.
Mr. Cooper: May I say something?
The Court: The application is denied.
Mr. Cooper: May I bring the Court up to date?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Cooper: I spoke to Mr. Kuh against (sic). He said that he had spoken with Dr. Kuhn who in turn spoke with Dr. Texon. I believe it is the consensus of both Dr. Kuhn and Dr. Texon that Mr. Pastor should be examined. These arrangements were made before the Court made its previous order this morning.
Mr. Pastor, I believe, is at this time, if he has not already arrived, is on his way to Mount Sinai Hospital’s emergency room either by ambulance or taxi, whichever was able to be arranged first. I believe Dr. Texon is aware of this fact now.
I would ask the Court that the Court’s reason for revoking bail and ordering the marshals to get him because there was no doctor’s note, to at least give us an hour to get the note. This set of circumstances was just brought to my attention and I believe just happened. It was not possible to get a doctor’s note down here by that time.
The Court: The application is denied.
Mr. Cooper: If your Honor please, before we proceed I would make the same objections to having to go forward without Mr. Pastor at this time. I believe he has a right to be here until it is determined—
The Court: He has a right to be here, but he also has a responsibility to present a doctor’s certificate saying that the is unable to be here. This is a deliberate attempt to frustrate this Court in bringing this case to trial and I’m not going to hear it again. That is my conclusion, that this was done deliberately to frustrate this Court from selecting a jury this morning at 9 o’clock as you full well knew as did Mr. Kuh and Mr. Pastor.
Mr. Cooper: You are not saying it is a deliberate attempt.
The Court: I just ruled that it is my view that it is because I changed the schedule and Mr. Kuh didn’t like it, so we are going ahead. Let’s go into the courtroom.

. Except for the periods when he was required to be in court, appellant was hospitalized under court ordered guard throughout the course of the trial, remaining in the coronary care unit of Mt. Sinai Hospital until May 25, at which time he was transferred to a private room. If appellant was “bluffing”, as my brothers so knowledgeably conclude, the naiveté of the professionally trained medical personnel at Mt. Sinai Hospital, who kept him in the coronary care unit until May 25th, closely monitoring his heart throughout this time, borders upon the incredible.

. The District Judge described the shirt as a “light shirt through which the jurors could see a bandage on his chest which covered certain electrical contacts necessary for certain monitoring or treatment which he was receiving at the hospital.”

. Lest there be any implication that appellant committed some additional impropriety in perfecting his appeal in a timely manner, I point out that the sentence imposed upon him was stayed on condition that that appeal be promptly perfected within the time allowed by the rules.
Reference to the judgment of conviction also discloses that the District Judge recommended to the Attorney General that appellant be confined to an institution “with appropriate facilities for his heart condition.” This was done, I presume, so that medical help would be available in the event appellant “bluffed” another heart seizure.

. If public respect and support for our judicial system is to be maintained, it is important not only that justice be done, but that it appear to be done. The appearance of justice takes on added significance in this case because of the District Judge’s prior denial of appellant’s motion that she recuse herself because of alleged bias and prejudice against him.