Court Opinion

ID: 9764252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:17:01.007152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.319426
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Morales v. State, 416 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) construed Article 37.07, § 2(b), V.A.C.C.P., in context as it then existed. Article 37.07, supra, was rewritten by Acts, 1967, 60th Leg., ch. 659, p. 1739, § 22, effective August 27, 1967—af-ter rehearing had been denied in Morales without written opinion. Understandably the Morales Court does not mention that revision.
The pertinent portion of Morales v. State, supra, appears in note 3 of the opinion of the Court in the case at bar, and *388need not be restated. However, to be emphasized is that the 1967 revision of Article 37.07, supra, restructured § 2(b) as originally enacted and then provided precisely what Morales said was not in § 2(b), viz:
“Sec. 3. Evidence of prior criminal record in all criminal cases after a finding of guilty
(a) Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character.” 1
On- this score the opinion in Jackson v. State, 628 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1981), ignores § 3(a), and the majority ought not to indicate by quoting it so fully, that by referring to § 2(b) the opinion in Jackson v. State, supra, touches the problem we are now addressing.
That brings me to McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1978)—a cause in which I .did not participate either on original submission or on rehearing. The Jackson Court read McNew to reject the contention being made by Jackson: “that following an adjudication of guilty on the original charge, a ‘normal bifurcated trial system’ should be followed and a hearing on punishment shall be held in accordance with Y.A.C.C.P., Art. 37.07.” McNew did nothing of the sort, as a careful reading will reveal.
What was contended in McNew is that Article 42.12, § 3d(b), Y.A.C.C.P. requires two separate hearings—
“first a hearing should be held limited solely to a determination by the trial judge of whether he should proceed to an adjudication, and then a second hearing should be held in which guilt is determined. ”
McNew, supra, at 173. That is the contention the Court rejected, essentially for the reason that, as required by § 3d(a), the court at the outset had already heard evidence that “substantiates the defendant’s guilt” before deferring “further proceedings,” id., at 173-174. Thus, there was no need to hear again evidence to support an adjudication of guilt. When McNew held that “only one hearing—that required by Article 42.12, Section 3d(b)—is necessary to afford the appellant the right to due process of law,” id., at 174 the Court was referring to a finding of guilt, and no more.
Article 42.12, § 3d(a) contemplates that a court may defer adjudication of guilt after receiving a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant’s guilt. There is no indication whatsoever that evidence will be reóeived with respect to punishment that may ultimately be assessed. Indeed, the subsection also permits an accused whose adjudication of guilt has been deferred to move in writing for a final adjudication, and it mandates that in that event “the court shall proceed to final adjudication as in all other cases.” Section 3d(b) limits the prescribed hearing to “the determination of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge;” but, that done, it also makes clear that “all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.”
Assessment of punishment is surely a “proceeding,” for Article 37.07, § 3(a) permits the parties to offer evidence of prior criminal record, general reputation and character, and § 3(d) requires that when the judge assesses punishment, “and after the hearing of the evidence hereinabove provided for, he shall forthwith announce his decision ... as to the punishment to be assessed.” Thus, a punishment proceeding is dictated—regardless of its timing.
Accordingly, the McNew Court opined, “[W]e see no reason that once a hearing is held on whether the trial judge should proceed with an adjudication of guilt, the *389trial judge cannot immediately continue with ‘all proceedings, including assessment of punishment ... as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.”
McNew, supra, at 174. Nothing I find in the opinion on rehearing in McNew militates against this construction of the intertwining provisions of the two statutory schemes. To the contrary, when closely read, that which appears at page 177 confirms it.
From what has been written, however, it does not follow that appellant is entitled as a matter of right to more than what he characterizes as “some system” for presenting evidence on punishment. Regardless of what it is labeled, the law positively affords “in all criminal cases after a finding of guilty,” and “[rjegardless of the plea” an opportunity for both sides to offer evidence prescribed by Article 37.07, § 3(a). The record here shows and the court of appeals found appellant had that kind of opportunity. Duhart v. State, 652 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1983).
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.