Court Opinion

ID: 9372938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:40.377435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.991515
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     NICOLE S. ELMORE,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        CH-0752-16-0416-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: February 2, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Tinita Cole, Dayton, Ohio, for the appellant.

           Demetrious A. Harris, Esquire, and Anita Carmichael, Dayton, Ohio,
             for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed the appellant’s removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT
     the agency’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        On November 9, 2015, the parties entered into a settlement agree ment
     resolving the appellant’s prior removal appeal. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4
     at 6-9. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, the agency agreed, in
     relevant part, to rescind the appellant’s removal and to reinstate her to the
     position of Medical Support Assistant (MSA) after she served a 5 -day suspension.
     Id. at 8. In exchange, the appellant agreed to the provisions of a Last Chance
     Agreement (LCA), which provided, in relevant part, that she would adhere to
     Section IX of the agency’s Employee Handbook, VA Directive 5011 (Hours of
     Duty and Leave), and all other policies, procedures, and processes reg arding
     interactions with staff and veterans. Id. at 6, 9. The appellant further agreed that
     her failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the LCA would result in
     her immediate removal and that she waived all appeal rights in connection with a
     removal pursuant to the LCA. Id.
¶3        On January 5, 2016, the agency reinstated the appellant. IAF, Tab 1 at 8.
     On March 24, 2016, the Program Director of the Mental Health Service (Program
     Director) notified the appellant that she was being charged with 2 h ours of
     absence without leave (AWOL) in connection with an unauthorized absence from
     her workstation between 8:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on March 1, 2016. IAF, Tab 4
     at 11. He notified her that he considered her response that she was, in fact, at her
     workstation between 8:00 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. on that date, but decided to proceed
     with the charge because her response was inconsistent with the statements of two
     other employees and his own observation. Id. at 11, 16. As a result, the agency
     reinstated the appellant’s prior removal and removed her from her position
     effective May 13, 2016. IAF, Tab 1 at 8-9.
                                                                                            3

¶4         The appellant appealed her removal to the Board, arguing that she did not
     violate the LCA.     Id. at 1-2, 14-15.     After holding the appellant’s requested
     hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the
     appellant proved that she did not violate the terms of the LCA and, therefore, that
     the appeal rights waiver was not enforceable. IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision (ID)
     at 11-12. Accordingly, she reversed the appellant’s removal. ID at 12.
¶5         The agency petitioned for review of the initial decision, and the appellant
     responded in opposition to the agency’s petition for review. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         The Board lacks jurisdiction over an action taken pursuant to an LCA in
     which an appellant waives her right to appeal to the Board. Bruhn v. Department
     of Agriculture, 124 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 9 (2016). An appellant may establish that an
     appeal rights waiver should not be enforced against her by showing, as relevant
     here, that she complied with the LCA. Id. If an appellant raises a nonfrivolous
     allegation that she complied with an LCA, she is entitled to a jurisdictional
     hearing to determine whether she, in fact, complied with the LCA. 2 Id. At the
     hearing, the appellant must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
     evidence. 3 Garcia v. Department of Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1344
     (Fed. Cir. 2006)(en banc); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).
¶7         Here, as noted above, the appellant argued that she did not breach the LCA
     because she was not AWOL, as alleged by the agency. IAF, Tab 1 at 15, Tab 4
     at 2. In support of this claim, she submitted her March 9, 2016 response to the

     2
       Nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction are allegations of fact that, if proven,
     could establish a prima facie case that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
     3
      A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
     person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
     contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                       4

     Program Director regarding the potential AWOL charge, in which she stated that
     she was at her desk between 8:00 a.m. and 9:45 a.m., at which time she took her
     break, and returned to her desk at 10:07 a.m. IAF, Tab 4 at 16. The appellant
     explained that, during her break, she was assisting a veteran in the hallway and
     called an agency Social Worker to further assist the veteran. Id. She stated that
     she and the veteran met the Social Worker in the hallway and talked to him
     together for approximately 15 minutes.      Id.   She also submitted a number of
     witness statements, some of which supported her version of events and some of
     which supported the agency’s position that the appellant was not at her work
     station for 2 hours, as well as documents showing work she performed at
     8:35 a.m., 8:37 a.m., 10:28 a.m., 10:36 a.m., 10:46 a.m., and 11:00 a.m. on the
     date in question.   Id. at 1-2, 12-15, 17-20, 25-47.   Because of the conflicting
     evidence, the administrative judge found that it was appropriate to hold a
     jurisdictional hearing to determine whether the appellant breached the LCA by
     being away from her workstation for 2 hours on March 1, 2016, in violation of
     agency policies. IAF, Tab 7.
¶8        At the hearing, the Program Director conceded that the appellant’s 2 hours
     of AWOL should be reduced to account for her authorized 15 -minute break, but
     he maintained that she was away from her desk between 8:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.
     and that her duties required her to be at her desk.      Hearing Transcript (HT)
     at 7-14 (testimony of the Program Director). He testified that he was in and out
     of the workstation area during that period and noticed for the first time at around
     8:30 a.m. that the appellant was not at her desk.      HT at 8 (testimony of the
     Program Director). He also testified that, because the Mental Health Clinic was
     understaffed that morning, he called T.D., another MSA, to fill in and that she
     arrived on the unit at about 9 a.m. Id. According to the Program Director, T.D.
     informed him at 10 a.m. that the appellant had not been to the unit since she
     arrived. Id. He further testified that he personally saw the appellant return to the
     unit at around 10:30 a.m. Id. at 9.
                                                                                        5

¶9          T.D. confirmed the Program Director’s testimony, testifying that she arrived
      on the unit at approximately 9 a.m., that the appellant was not at her desk at that
      time, and that the appellant did not return to the unit until ap proximately
      10:30 a.m.     HT at 33-35 (testimony of P.D.).     Her earlier report of contact
      similarly stated that she came to the Mental Health Clinic at around 9 a.m. on
      March 1, 2016, to cover the staffing shortage and that the appellant was not there
      until approximately 10:30 a.m. or 10:45 a.m. IAF, Tab 4 at 14.
¶10         The agency’s Suicide Prevention Case Manager (Case Manager) testified
      that she saw the appellant in the hallway chatting with two men at 8:25 a.m.—
      before her daily 8:30 a.m. meeting—and saw her again chatting with the same
      two men near a stairwell after the meeting. HT at 25, 27-28 (testimony of the
      Case Manager).       Her earlier written report of contact provided the same
      information, but clarified that she saw the appellant talking to the two men near
      the elevator after her meeting at approximately 10:45 a.m. on the date in question
      IAF, Tab 4 at 13. She further testified that she saw T.D. in the Mental Health
      Clinic that morning. HT at 28 (testimony of the Case Manager).
¶11         Contrary to the testimonies of the Program Director, T.D., and the Case
      Manager, the appellant testified that she was at her duty station between 8 a.m.
      and 9:45 a.m., that she took her authorized break at 9:45 a.m., and that she
      returned to her duty station at 10:07 a.m. on March 1, 2016.         HT at 21-23
      (testimony of the appellant). She testified that, contrary to the testimony of the
      agency witnesses, T.D. did not work in the Mental Health Clinic that morning.
      Id.
¶12         A Clinical Nurse Specialist testified that, as stated in her March 9, 2016
      report of contact, she saw the appellant at her duty station at approximately
      9:30 a.m., which she remembered because the appellant said “hello” to a patient
      she had just seen. HT at 18 (testimony of the Clinical Nurse Specialist); IAF,
      Tab 4 at 20.
                                                                                           6

¶13         In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that all of the
      witnesses testified in a straightforward and truthful manner , but concluded that
      the agency’s evidence was inconsistent with the record as a whole and that the
      evidence supporting the appellant’s position was more persuasive. ID at 9 -11.
      Specifically, she found that the appellant’s version of events was supported by the
      hearing testimony of the Clinical Nurse Specialist who testified that she saw the
      appellant at her workstation at 9:30 a.m. and the unsworn written statements of
      three other MSAs, the Social Worker, and the veteran.              Id.   The written
      statements of two MSAs confirmed the appellant’s statement that T.D. did not in
      fact work on the unit on the morning in question, further noting that T.D. did not
      report to the unit until approximately 3:50 p.m. 4 IAF, Tab 4 at 17-18. One of
      these statements also confirmed the appellant’s testimony that the appellant left
      for a break at approximately 9:45 a.m. with a veteran and that she was not gone
      for 2 hours.   Id. at 17.   The Social Worker’s written statement confirmed the
      appellant’s earlier written statement regarding her meeting with the veteran,
      stating that she called him at 9:58 a.m., he went to meet her and the veteran on
      the stairway in front of the service elevator, and he spoke to them for
      approximately 12 to 15 minutes.       Id. at 15.   The veteran’s written statement
      indicated that he spoke to the appellant at the front desk for approximately
      5 minutes after making his follow-up appointment. Id. at 19. He stated that the
      appellant informed someone that she was going to take her break and that she
      walked outside to the waiting area with him, talked to him for approximately 3 to
      4 minutes, and called another employee to assist him. Id. He stated that they
      walked back to the stairway to meet the other employee and they spoke to him for
      approximately 10 minutes before the appellant left. Id. Another MSA submitted

      4
        As noted above, the Program Director testified that he called T.D. on the morning of
      March 1, 2016, and asked her to cover a staffing shortage on the unit. HT at 8
      (testimony of the Program Director). He further testified that T.D. arrived on the unit
      at 9 a.m. Id.
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      a written statement indicating that she inquired about the appellant’s whereabouts
      at approximately 9:45 a.m. or 10 a.m. on March 1, 2016, and that, upon the
      appellant’s return, she stated that she had been on a break. Id. at 12.
¶14         The administrative judge did not credit the hearing testimony of the Case
      Manager, finding that, although there was no evidence of bias or motivation to lie
      on her part, her testimony that she saw the appellant talking to the two men at
      8:25 a.m. and 10:45 a.m. on March 1, 2016, conflicted with the “uncontroverted
      documentation” showing that the appellant was at her desk performing her duties
      at 8:35 a.m., 8:37 a.m., 10:28 a.m., 10:36 a.m., and 10:46 a.m. ID at 10. She also
      found that the Case Manager’s testimony—that she recalled hearing other MSAs
      wondering about the appellant’s whereabouts—was inconsistent with the
      statements of the two other MSAs who indicated that, except for the period
      between 9:45 a.m. and 10 a.m., they were aware of the appellant’s whereabouts.
      Id.
¶15         The administrative judge additionally found that, although there was no
      evidence or motivation to lie on the part of T.D., she could not credit her
      statements in light of significant, contradictory evidence in the record. ID at 11.
      In particular, the administrative judge found that T.D.’s testimony that she
      arrived at the Mental Health Clinic at 9 a.m. on March 1, 2016, was contradicted
      by the appellant and two other MSAs who all stated that T.D. did not work on the
      unit that morning. Id. The administrative judge also appeared to find that T.D.’s
      testimony that the appellant did not return to the unit until 10:30 a.m. or
      10:45 a.m. conflicted with the Program Manager’s testimony that she informed
      him that the appellant had returned at 10 a.m. ID at 10-11.
¶16         In light of these findings, the administrative judge concluded that the
      appellant was away from her desk from approximately 9:45 a.m. to approximately
      10:07 a.m. on the date in question, a time period that exceeded her authorized
      break by 7 minutes. ID at 11. The administrative judge declined to sustain the
      charge of AWOL for a 7-minute period and, by extension, to find that the
                                                                                         8

      appellant violated the LCA. Id. She concluded that, although the appellant may
      have minimally exceeded her authorized break period, the record reflects that her
      whereabouts were known, that she was still on her unit, and that she was assisting
      a veteran.   Id.   Therefore, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      conduct did not violate the agency’s policy and that she did not breach the LCA.
      Id.
¶17         On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge made erroneous
      credibility determinations, improperly credited the written statements over
      hearing testimony, erroneously referred to some written statements as testimony,
      failed to account for the fact that the documentation showing when the appellant
      performed duties also shows that she did not perform any duties between
      8:37 a.m. and 10:28 a.m., and misconstrued the hearing testimony of the Program
      Director. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-12.
¶18         In resolving credibility issues, the trier of fact must identify the factual
      questions in dispute, summarize the evidence on each disputed question, state
      which version she believes, and explain in detail why she found the chosen
      version more credible, considering such factors as: (1) the witness’s opportunity
      and capacity to observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s character;
      (3) any prior inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of
      bias; (5) the contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or
      its consistency with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the
      witness’s version of events; and (7) the witness’s demeanor.               Hillen v.
      Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). The Board must defer to
      an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based,
      explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a
      hearing, and may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently
      sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288,
      1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Thus, the Board may overturn demeanor-based credibility
      determinations when the administrative judge’s findings are incomplete,
                                                                                        9

      inconsistent with the weight of the evidence, and do not reflect the record as a
      whole. Rapp v. Office of Personnel Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 13 (2008).
¶19         As noted above, the administrative judge found that all of the agency
      witnesses testified in a straightforward and truthful manner but that the evidence
      supporting the appellant’s version of events was more persuasive.         ID at 9.
      Although we defer to the administrative judge’s determination regarding the
      demeanor of each witness, we agree with the agency that the administrative judge
      incorrectly represented the Program Director’s hearing testimony, which appeared
      to factor into her credibility determinations.    Specifically, the administrative
      judge found that T.D.’s hearing testimony that the appellant did not return to the
      unit until 10:30 a.m. or 10:45 a.m. was contradicted by the Program Manager’s
      testimony that T.D. informed him that the appellant returned at 10 a.m. ID at 10-
      11. The Program Manager actually testified, however, that T.D. informed him at
      10 a.m. that she had not yet seen the appellant and that he noticed the appellant
      return to the unit at 10:30 a.m. HT at 9 (testimony of the Program Director). He
      did not testify that T.D. informed him at 10 a.m. that the appellant had returned.
      Id.
¶20         In addition, we agree with the agency that the administrative judge failed to
      properly weigh the testimonial and documentary evidence of record. Specifically,
      in crediting the appellant’s version of events over the agency’s version of events,
      the administrative judge relied heavily on the unsworn written statements of
      individuals who did not testify at the hearing. ID at 9 -11; IAF, Tab 4 at 12, 15,
      17-19.    Although hearsay evidence is admissible in Board proceedings,
      assessment of the probative value of hearsay evidence necessarily depends on the
      circumstances of each case. Adamsen v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R.
      331, ¶ 16 (2011); Borninkhof v. Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 83-84
      (1981). The Board generally evaluates the probative value of hearsay evidence
      by considering various factors that include the availability of persons with
      firsthand knowledge to testify at the hearing, whether the out-of-court statements
                                                                                          10

      were sworn, whether the declarants were disinterested witnesses to the events and
      whether their statements were routinely made, the consistency of the out-of-court
      statements with other statements and evidence, whether there is corroboration or
      contradiction in the record, and the credibility of the out -of-court declarant.
      Adamsen, 116 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶ 16; Wallace v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 89 M.S.P.R. 178, ¶¶ 6-11 (2001), review dismissed, 41 F. App’x 455
      (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, however, the administrative judge failed to consider any
      of these factors in crediting the unsworn out-of-court written statements over the
      hearing testimony of the agency witnesses. 5 ID at 9-11.
¶21         Moreover, it does not appear that the administrative judge appropri ately
      considered or weighed the hearing testimony of the agency witnesses. Generally,
      live testimony is more probative than an out-of-court statement. Social Security
      Administration v. Whittlesey, 59 M.S.P.R. 684, 692 (1993), aff’d, 39 F.3d 1197
      (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table); Dubiel v. U.S. Postal Service, 54 M.S.P.R. 428, 432
      (1992) (stating that the probative value of unsworn hearsay statements regarding
      facts at issue is generally reduced when contradicted by live testimony regarding
      the same matter); Robinson v. Department of Health & Human Services,
      39 M.S.P.R. 110, 115 (1988) (finding that hearsay evidence may not be
      sufficiently probative, in light of contradictory live testimony, to sustain an
      agency’s burden by preponderant evidence). We agree with the administrative
      judge that the Case Manager’s testimony that she saw the appellant at 8:25 a.m.
      and 10:45 a.m. may be entitled to less weight because it conflicts with the

      5
        The record reflects that the administrative judge granted all of the appellant’s
      requested witnesses, including the veteran and the Social Worker. IAF, Tab 12. The
      appellant subsequently withdrew her request for the Social Worker to testify at the
      hearing. IAF, Tab 18 at 3. The veteran, although approved as a witness, did not testify
      at the hearing. HT at 3. It does not appear that either party called as witnesses the
      three MSAs whose written statements supported the appellant’s version of events. IAF,
      Tab 12 at 3. It is unclear from the record, however, whether any of the individuals who
      submitted written statements in support of the appellant’s version of events were
      unavailable to testify at the hearing.
                                                                                           11

      documentation showing that the appellant performed her duties 8:35 a.m. and
      10:26 a.m. on March 1, 2016.          IAF, Tab 4 at 25-38, 44.         However, the
      administrative judge did not explain why the unsworn written statements are
      entitled to more weight than the straightforward hearing testimony of the Program
      Director and T.D, which, as discussed above, are consistent with each other. 6 ID
      at 9-11.
¶22         In light of the foregoing, we find that remand is necessary to allow further
      development of the record and, if appropriate, a supplemental hearing.               In
      addition, the administrative judge should order the agency to submit t ime and
      attendance records, if available, or other evidence showing when T.D. worked on
      March 1, 2016.       The administrative judge then should explore the issues
      identified above, determine the appropriate weight that each type of evidence is
      due, and issue a new initial decision fully addressing all of the record evidence.

                                            ORDER
¶23         For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the regional
      office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      6
       As correctly noted by the agency, the administrative judge improperly referred to the
      written statements of two MSAs as testimony. ID at 10 (noting that the other MSAs
      both testified that they were aware of the appellant’s whereabouts); IAF, Tab 4 at 12,
      17. It is unclear, however, whether this error factored into her credibility analysis.