Court Opinion

ID: 9679157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:42:53.462952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:10.849574
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Presiding Judge.
By an information alleging one prior felony conviction, defendant was charged with escape from the Missouri State Penitentiary. Sections 556.280 and 557.351.1 The court found that defendant had been convicted previously of a felony, sentenced and imprisoned therefor; a jury found him guilty as charged. The court assessed defendant’s punishment at imprisonment for three years in custody of the Department of Corrections and, after defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial was overruled, sentenced him in accordance with the verdict and the punishment assessed. Defendant appeals.
He briefs three points on which he relies for reversal: (1) that the court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction ; (2) that the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the information based on the ground that the magistrate, knowing defendant to be an indigent person, refused his request that counsel be appointed to represent him at his preliminary hearing; and, (3) that the court erred in overruling his second motion to dismiss the information based on the ground that the information was of no force and effect and the court was without jurisdiction of the case, because the information was not brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after defendant’s request, as required by § 222.100.
Counsel was appointed for defendant in the circuit court on February 23, 1966. Counsel thereafter represented defendant throughout the proceedings in that court and on appeal to this court and has been loyal and diligent in his efforts in defendant’s behalf.
The evidence introduced by the state is brief and is as follows: On August 21, 1965, defendant was a prisoner lawfully confined in the custody of the State Department of Corrections in the penitentiary at Jefferson City, Missouri, pursuant to a judgment of the circuit court of Jasper county on June 14, 1965, sentencing him to imprisonment for a term of seven years. His full-time release date is May 29, 1972; his three-fourths-time release date is August 29, 1970. Shortly after 5 o’clock, A. M., on August 21, 1965, he disappeared from the penitentiary while assigned to work in the prison dining hall. Defendant was apprehended in St. Louis by the police of that city and returned to the penitentiary on October 18, 1965. The state fur*77ther presented evidence that defendant had not been granted probation or parole and that his sentence had not been commuted by executive order at any time subsequent to his sentence. Defendant offered no evidence.
The evidence is circumstantial, as defendant says. He contends that this circumstantial evidence is insufficient, because not inconsistent with his innocence and does not point so clearly and satisfactorily to guilt as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. He cites two cases2 applying this well-known rule to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, but neither is applicable to the facts in this case. Defendant argues that the evidence is not inconsistent with his innocence, because “ * * * appellant may have been in St. Louis * * * under a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testifican-dum at the time he was apprehended * *; ” that the state should have by its evidence negated this possibility as an excuse for his absence from the penitentiary between August 21 and October 18, 1965.
The state was not required to anticipate and negate as a part of its case every conceivable theory of excuse for defendant’s absence from the penitentiary. There is no merit in defendant’s contention. The evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury and the court did not err in overruling defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Slicker, Mo., 342 S.W.2d 946, 948 [4]; State v. Baker, 355 Mo. 1048, 199 S.W.2d 393, 396 [9].
The transcript on appeal does not contain the proceedings in Magistrate court but it does contain defendant’s motion to dismiss the information on the ground that he requested and was denied appointment of counsel to represent him at the preliminary hearing. At a hearing on this motion counsel agreed that defendant requested of the Magistrate that counsel be appointed to represent him at his preliminary examination, and that the request was refused.
Defendant contends that the Magistrate’s refusal to appoint counsel deprived him of a full and fair preliminary hearing; that he was thereby deprived of rights guaranteed by Rule 23.03, V.A.M.R., § 544.350, RSMo 1959, §§ 10 and 18(a) of Article I, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S., and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
There is nothing in the record before us to show that defendant was in fact denied a full and fair preliminary hearing by the absence of counsel, or that he was otherwise prejudiced or deprived of constitutional rights by the Magistrate’s refusal to appoint counsel.
Counsel for defendant recognizes that this court has consistently held that the lack of counsel at a preliminary hearing does not deprive an accused of constitutional rights, absent some prejudice to the accused at that hearing, but he insists that the court should reconsider its decisions on this point. This question was considered by the court as late as June 10, 1968, and we adhered to our previous decisions on the point. See State v. Peck, Mo., 429 S.W.2d 247, adopted June 10, 1968; State v. Turley, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 75, 76 [3], and cases therein cited. We continue to adhere to those decisions.
The court did not err in overruling defendant’s first motion to dismiss the information.
In the third and last point on appeal defendant asserts that the court erred in overruling his second motion to dismiss the information. In that motion he sought to invoke the provisions of the “Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law,” §§ 222.080-222.150.
The motion alleges that on January 20, 1966, defendant, pro se, wrote a letter ad*78dressed to the Clerk for Magistrate and Circuit courts of Cole county, with a copy to the Cole county prosecuting attorney, requesting “ * * * immediate disposition of charges pending against me in Magistrate and Circuit Courts of Cole County, Missouri as required by law. Said charge being escape from ‘lawful confinement’ at the Missouri State Prison * * * ”; that he was not brought to trial on the information pending against him within one hundred eighty days after filing of the information in the trial court; that the parties did not stipulate for any continuances and that the court did not, for good cause shown in open court, grant additional time beyond one hundred eighty days within which to bring the information to trial; that no continuance was granted on notice to defense counsel with an opportunity for counsel to be heard; that for those reasons the court is without jurisdiction of the case, the information has no force and effect, and should, therefore, be dismissed.
It was agreed that defendant’s letter was received January 21, 1966, by the Magistrate court and that it is now in the Circuit court file; also, that a copy of the letter was received by the Prosecuting Attorney.
The record shows that a complaint charging defendant with escape from the penitentiary was filed in Magistrate court on October 22, 1965; preliminary hearing was held February 9, 1966; information was filed in Circuit court February 23, 1966; on March 21, by agreement of counsel, the case was set for trial on April 21, 1966, but at the request of defense counsel that setting was cancelled; thereafter on motion of defendant, pro se, the Judge of the circuit was disqualified and on April 19, Judge Samuel E. Semple was transferred to hear the case; on June 30, defendant appeared with counsel before Judge Semple, was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for trial for September 23, 1966; the case was not tried on the latter date, because of a death in the trial judge’s family; the next date Judge Semple had available for a trial of this case was February 16, 1967, and on November 21, 1966, the following docket entry was made by the Clerk, pursuant to the Judge’s order: “Continued for want of time to try for the September and December terms of Court. Set for trial on February 16, 1967.” The case was tried on the latter date.
Subsection 1 of § 222.080 provides: “Any person imprisoned in a correctional institution of this state may request a final disposition of any untried indictment or information pending in this state against him while so imprisoned. The request shall be in writing addressed to the court in which the indictment or information is pending and to the prosecuting attorney charged with the duty of prosecuting it, and shall set forth the place of imprisonment.”
Section 222.090 provides: “The request shall be delivered to the director of corrections, who shall forthwith:
“(1) Certify the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state board of parole and probation relating to the prisoner; and
“(2) Send by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, one copy of the request and certificate to the court and one copy to the prosecuting attorney to whom it is addressed.”
Section 222.100, upon which defendant relied for dismissal of the information, provides :
“Within one hundred and eighty days after the receipt of the request and certificate by the court and prosecuting attorney or within such additional necessary or reasonable time as the court for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, may grant, the indictment or information shall be brought to trial; provided, that the parties may stipulate for a continuance or that it may be granted on notice to the attorney of record *79of an opportunity for him to be heard. If, after such request, it is not brought to trial within that period, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried indictment or information be of any further force or effect; and the court shall issue an order dismissing the same with prejudice.”
The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law, enacted by the General Assembly in 1959 (Laws of 1959; House Bill 259),3 has not been heretofore construed by the courts of this state. We have the view that in adopting the Uniform Law suggested by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, with the modifications and changes described in footnote 3, the General Assembly intended deliberately to provide a procedure for release of detainers available to those persons against whom there is pending a prosecution commenced by information filed by a prosecuting attorney or those commenced by indictment; not to those against whom criminal proceedings have been commenced in Magistrate court by complaint. Our constitution,4 statutes,5 Rules,6 and the decisions of this court7 make a distinction between prosecutions commenced by indictment or information and criminal proceedings commenced by complaint authorizing only the issuance of a warrant. In enacting §§ 222.080-222.150, the General Assembly must be charged with knowledge of this distinction and an intent to refer to and signify the same distinction.
The courts of other states, in construing laws (enacted before the Uniform Laws) requiring the discharge of an accused on the denial of a speedy trial, have held that statutes referring to indictments or infor-mations are inapplicable to criminal proceedings commenced by and pending on a complaint. See: State v. Schnell, 107 Mont. 579, 88 P.2d 19, 21 [3], 121 A.L.R. 1082; People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal.2d 677, 140 P.2d 381, 385 [10]. See also: 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 468 a, p. 32.
No indictment or information was pending against defendant when his request for “immediate disposition of charges” was lodged in the Magistrate court on January 21, 1966.8 No such request was addressed by defendant to a court having jurisdiction of indictments or informations after the information was filed.
We hold that our Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law provides a procedure for the disposition of untried indictments and informations only; not to complaints pending in Magistrate courts.
*80Furthermore,- no request complying with the Uniform Law was addressed (presented) by defendant to any court. To comply with the Law defendant was required by § 222.090 to deliver his request to the Director of Corrections so that officer could certify to certain information and send the request and that information to the proper court and prosecuting official. So far as the record shows defendant did not even attempt compliance with this requirement. In Brimer v. State, 195 Kan. 107, 402 P.2d 789 [2], the Supreme Court of Kansas, referring to that State’s Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, said, at l. c. 793: “ * * * the right to invoke that statute requires compliance by the prisoner with all its provisions including the preparation by him and the mailing by the warden of his notice for request of disposition of detainer to the court in which the untried indictment, information or complaint is then pending against him.”
For the reasons stated, the trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s second motion to dismiss.
Our review of other matters required by Rule 28.02, V.A.M.R., discloses no error.
The judgment is affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion by HENLEY, P. J., written in Division One, is adopted as the opinion of the Court en Banc. The judgment is affirmed. All concur except Seiler, J., who concurs in result in separate opinion filed.

. All statutory references are to RSMo 1959 and V.A.M.S.

. State v. Stoner, Mo., 395 S.W.2d 192, 196 [4]; State v. Murphy, 356 Mo. 110, 201 S.W.2d 280, 282 [4].

.The latest pocket part supplement (at page 36) to Volume 9B, Uniform Laws Annotated, shows that two other states, Kansas (in 1959 — §§ 62.2901 to 62.2908, K.S.A.) and Minnesota (in 1967 — § 629.-292, M.S.A.) have adopted “Uniform Acts” on the subject of “Detainers” in substantially the same language as that suggested by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 365. The suggested uniform law would apply to requests for disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint. The Kansas statute uses the words of the suggested uniform law, referring to indictments, informations or complaints; whereas, the Minnesota and Missouri statutes refer to indictments or informations only. Also, the National Conference uniform law suggests that the period within which the charge shall be brought to trial be ninety days. The three states adopting the law have doubled that time period, Minnesota providing for six months and Kansas and Missouri one hundred eighty days.

. Constitution of Missouri, Article I, § 17.

. Sections 545.010 and 544.020, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.

. Buies 21.01 and 21.08, Buies of Criminal Procedure, V.A.M.B.

. State v. McQueen (Mo.1955), 282 S.W.2d 539, 541 [4]; State v. Madden, 324 Mo. 877, 24 S.W.2d 1003, 1004 [5]. See also: City of Richland v. Null, 194 Mo.App. 176, 185 S.W. 250, 251 [2].

. We note, parenthetically, that if §§ 222.-080 and 222.100 could be said to apply to proceedings commenced by complaint in Magistrate court, and we hold herein they may not, those proceedings were disposed of on February 9, 1966, within nineteen days after defendant’s request.