Court Opinion

ID: 9959238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 14:02:14.46576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:41.155174
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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 22-CM-0898

                          RONALD MAZIARZ, APPELLANT,

                                           v.

                            UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

                       Appeal from the Superior Court of the
                               District of Columbia
                               (2021-CMD-004515)

                        (Hon. Robert D. Okun, Trial Judge)

(Argued March 5, 2024                                      Decided April 11, 2024)

      Jason K. Clark, for appellant.

      Steven B. Snyder, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew M.
Graves, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb and John P. Mannarino,
Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

     Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, DEAHL, Associate Judge, and
GLICKMAN, Senior Judge.

      BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge: In August 2021, Ronald Maziarz was

charged with one count of simple assault and one count of possession of a prohibited

weapon after he assaulted a taxi cab driver with a hammer. After initially being

found incompetent—and later competent—to proceed to trial, Mr. Maziarz was
                                          2

transferred to Mental Health Community Court (“MHCC”) where he was offered an

agreement in which he would plead guilty in exchange for deferred sentencing.

Under the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Maziarz’s charges would be dismissed

if he remained compliant with the requirements of MHCC for four months. At the

MHCC hearing, Mr. Maziarz testified that he had assaulted the driver because he

was possessed by demons.        The MHCC judge said that he could not accept

Mr. Maziarz’s plea unless he took full responsibility for his actions, noted multiple

times that Mr. Maziarz might have a valid insanity defense, and transferred the case

back to misdemeanor court. A third competency evaluation found Mr. Maziarz

competent to proceed to trial and, after a bench trial, Mr. Maziarz was found guilty

of simple assault and possession of a prohibited weapon.

      On appeal, Mr. Maziarz argues that the trial court erred in failing to conduct

a Frendak inquiry 1 into whether he intelligently and voluntarily waived the insanity

defense. He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to obtain a written and

oral waiver of his right to a jury trial. We agree with Mr. Maziarz and hold that the

pre-trial evidence raised a substantial question of Mr. Maziarz’s sanity at the time of

the offense such that the trial judge should have conducted a Frendak inquiry.

Further we hold that, because the possession of a prohibited weapon charge carries

      1
          See Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
                                           3

a possible penalty of more than six months’ incarceration and, thus, requires a jury

trial, the trial court erred in not obtaining a written and oral waiver of Mr. Maziarz’s

right to a jury trial. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to conduct a Frendak

inquiry and, depending on its outcome, either vacate both convictions or reverse only

the possession of a prohibited weapon charge and enter a judgment for the lesser

charge of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon, which does not require a

jury trial.

                I.     Factual Background & Procedural History

                                   A. The Assault

       On Sunday, August 8, 2021, sixty-one year-old Ronald Maziarz approached

Mulushewa Alemu’s taxi cab and asked to be driven to 1845 Harvard Street. Once

at the address, Mr. Maziarz asked Mr. Alemu to wait while he went inside.

Mr. Maziarz returned a few minutes later with one or two bags, told Mr. Alemu that

he had been kicked out of his apartment, and asked to be taken to a shelter on New

York Avenue. After driving for a little while, Mr. Maziarz asked Mr. Alemu to turn

around and take him back to Harvard Street; Mr. Maziarz told Mr. Alemu that he

may be able to stay with someone else.
                                        4

       Once back at Harvard Street, Mr. Alemu parked the car and Mr. Maziarz

opened one of his bags. “[A]fter a little while,” Mr. Maziarz struck Mr. Alemu with

a hammer a few times, causing Mr. Alemu to lose consciousness. When he regained

consciousness, Mr. Alemu struggled with Mr. Maziarz, but was able to gain control

of the hammer and shout for someone to call 911. At this point, Mr. Maziarz stayed

in the cab while Mr. Alemu hit the cab with the hammer and yelled at Mr. Maziarz

in an effort to keep Mr. Maziarz from exiting the vehicle. A passerby who heard the

commotion asked another passerby to call the police. When the police sirens were

audible, Mr. Maziarz exited the cab, put a backpack on the ground, and sat on the

bag.

       Officer Martinez responded to the scene and saw Mr. Maziarz sitting on what

he described as a luggage bag. Mr. Maziarz told Officer Martinez that he was

depressed.

                             B. Pretrial Proceedings

       On August 9, 2021, Mr. Maziarz appeared for his initial presentment hearing

before Magistrate Judge Judith Pipe. During the proceeding, Mr. Maziarz responded

“[n]o, ma’am” when asked whether he understood his rights; commented that he

could not come back to court due to being homeless and malnourished; and stated
                                           5

that “his resistance was low” when asked to return to the courthouse the following

day to speak to the doctors at the urgent care clinic.

      At the initial status hearing before Judge Wellner on November 15, 2021,

Mr. Maziarz’s trial counsel, Jose Molina, informed the court that Mr. Maziarz was

absent because he had been involuntarily committed into Washington Hospital

Center. The status hearing was rescheduled for February 7, 2022.

      At the February 7, 2022 status hearing, Mr. Molina informed the court that

Mr. Maziarz had been discharged from the mental health wing of Washington

Hospital Center on January 4th, 2022. The court was also informed that Mr. Maziarz

did not have a phone and that his community support worker would be coordinating

his ability to appear in court.

      On February 25, 2022, Mr. Molina requested a preliminary competency

evaluation from the Department of Behavioral Health (“DBH”) to which the

government did not object. The evaluation was conducted on March 10 by Elizabeth

Teegarden, PhD and consisted of a 45-minute interview and a review of

Mr. Maziarz’s medical records. The report found that Mr. Maziarz was engaged in

dedicated mental care services, was diagnosed with unspecified psychosis

(according to DBH’s computerized information system), and experienced anxiety,

depression, and paranoia. Dr. Teegarden also noted that, when she asked about the
                                           6

not guilty by reason of insanity plea, Mr. Maziarz responded, “[t]hat’s what

happened to me,” and that he “sometimes feels ‘insane.’” Ultimately, Dr. Teegarden

found that Mr. Maziarz was incompetent to proceed with trial because he did not

possess sufficient factual and rational understanding of the legal process or sufficient

present ability to consult and work with his attorney with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding.

      On March 18, 2022, Judge Wellner ordered a full competency screening from

DBH upon finding that, consistent with the initial screening, Mr. Maziarz appeared

to be incompetent to stand trial. The second evaluation was conducted by Lia N.

Rohlehr, PhD, ABPP on April 4, 2022, and consisted of a 30-minute interview.

Dr. Rohlehr found that Mr. Maziarz was receiving monthly antipsychotic

medication and remained cooperative and in behavioral control (but appeared

depressed and anxious). Ultimately, Dr. Rohlehr determined that Mr. Maziarz was

competent to proceed to trial because he was able to discuss his case and the legal

system in a coherent manner, and because his mental illness “should not prevent him

from learning or communicating effectively.”

      On April 29, 2022, consistent with the DBH evaluation, Judge Wellner found

that Mr. Maziarz was competent to proceed to trial. Judge Wellner also introduced

the potential for Mr. Maziarz to be screened for Mental Health Community Court
                                          7

(“MHCC”). On June 10, the court was informed that Mr. Maziarz was eligible for

Mental Health Supervision and Mr. Maziarz was transferred to the MHCC calendar.

      At the initial MHCC hearing on June 26, 2022, Judge Iscoe, the presiding

judge, explained that, while in MHCC, Mr. Maziarz would have to take regular drug

and alcohol testing and follow the requirements of mental health services.

Additionally, the government offered Mr. Maziarz a deferred sentencing agreement.

The government also raised concerns about Mr. Maziarz’s competence and ability

to voluntarily and knowingly enter a plea, but Mr. Molina stated that he did not think

there was a competency issue.

      At the June 28, 2022 hearing, the court was informed that Mr. Maziarz

remained fully compliant with his supervision requirements. The government also

informed the court of the plea agreement, which was that, in exchange for

Mr. Maziarz pleading guilty to simple assault, the government would defer

sentencing “for a period of four months starting today.” If Mr. Maziarz continued

to comply with all of the conditions of MHCC, he would be allowed to withdraw his

guilty plea at the end of the four months and his case would be dismissed.

      By the MHCC hearing on August 4, 2022, Mr. Maziarz had remained

compliant with MHCC conditions and was determined eligible to enter his plea

agreement. While under oath, Mr. Maziarz stated—for the first time in the record—
                                           8

that he hit Mr. Alemu with the hammer because he was possessed by demons and

was being controlled by some kind of force that he could not stop. In response,

Judge Iscoe noted that he could only accept the plea if Mr. Maziarz was willing to

accept responsibility. Judge Iscoe then mentioned four times that he thought there

might be a valid insanity defense available, and transferred the case back to

misdemeanor court.

      On August 24, 2022, Judge Wellner, once again the presiding judge over

Mr. Maziarz’s case, expressed concern about Mr. Maziarz’s competence to proceed

to trial, noting that demonic possession strongly suggests a potential competency

issue. The government shared this concern and Judge Wellner ordered another

competency screening. The competency screening took place on August 29, 2022,

lasted 25 minutes, and was conducted by Dr. Rohlehr, who found Mr. Maziarz

competent to proceed to trial. The court adopted this determination in the September

7, 2022 hearing. During this hearing, the court also noted that the insanity defense

was available for Mr. Maziarz to raise at trial.

                                    C. The Trial

      Mr. Maziarz’s case proceeded as a bench trial before Judge Okun on

November 15, 2022. The government called three witnesses: Mr. Alemu, Mr. Ian

Hoffman, the passerby, and Officer Alphonzo Martinez. As a preliminary matter,
                                         9

the government raised the issue that Mr. Molina intended to raise a diminished

capacity claim and could not raise a not guilty by reason of insanity plea because it

was not properly noticed. The court noted that a diminished capacity defense is not

recognized in this jurisdiction.

      Following the testimonies of Mr. Alemu, Mr. Hoffman, and Officer Martinez,

Mr. Molina called Mr. Maziarz to the stand. Mr. Maziarz testified that, when he was

in Mr. Alemu’s cab, he saw two demons. He stated that the demons had full control

of him, and he had no intention to hit Mr. Alemu, but he kept getting possessed.

      Judge Okun ultimately ruled that Mr. Maziarz was guilty of simple assault

and possession of a prohibited weapon (“PPW(b)”). In so ruling, Judge Okun found

that Mr. Maziarz intended to possess the hammer used to hit Mr. Alemu and that he

intended to use violence against Mr. Alemu. Importantly, Judge Okun noted that the

insanity defense could not have been raised at trial because Mr. Molina did not give

notice of it, and that Mr. Molina presented an impermissible diminished-capacity

defense. Further, the court did not credit Mr. Maziarz’s testimony that he hit

Mr. Alemu because of demons because it found that his testimony was completely

contradicted by his statement to police just moments after the attack about being

“depressed.” Instead, the court credited Mr. Maziarz’s statement to police and noted

that he did not mention any demons shortly after the attack.
                                             10

       Mr. Maziarz was sentenced to 180 days on both charges to be served

concurrently, all of which was suspended, and eighteen months’ supervised

probation. This timely appeal followed.

                                   II.      Discussion

       On appeal, Mr. Maziarz argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to conduct a Frendak inquiry of Mr. Maziarz and that the trial court plainly

erred in failing to obtain a valid written and oral waiver of Mr. Maziarz’s right to a

jury trial.

                              A.         Frendak Inquiry 2

       Mr. Maziarz argues that, because the pre-trial record suggests a substantial

question of his sanity at the time of the charged offenses, the court was required to

conduct a Frendak inquiry. We agree.

       2
         The government argues that this court should not follow Frendak because
the underlying rationale (that courts have discretion to impose an unwanted insanity
defense) has been undermined. However, the case cited by the government for this
proposition is neither from our jurisdiction nor in opposition to Frendak. See United
States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a district court
must honor a competent defendant’s choice to not raise the insanity defense).
                                            11

      The Frendak inquiry is derived from the 1979 case Frendak v. United States,

408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979). In Frendak, the trial court—under the Whalem Rule 3—

raised the insanity defense against the defendant’s opposition.          However, the

Frendak ruling narrowed the scope of Whalem in concluding that, while the trial

court has discretion to raise the insanity defense sua sponte when the defendant does

not have the capacity to do so, the court cannot raise the defense over the defendant’s

voluntary and intelligent rejection. Frendak, 408 A.2d at 378 (emphasis added).

The court made this conclusion based on two Supreme Court cases which permitted

defendants to waive constitutional rights only after the trial judge had assurance that

the defendant was capable of making a voluntary and intelligent choice. Id. 4 In

reaching this conclusion, the Frendak court distinguished between three

determinations that the trial court must make when the defendant’s mental condition

at the time of the offense, and the time of trial, are at issue:

      3
        In Whalem v. United States, the court considered whether a defendant who
was competent to assist in his defense may refuse to plead insanity even though there
is evidence to support an insanity defense and held that, while the defendant may
refuse to raise the insanity defense, they may not prevent the court from raising it.
346 F.2d 812, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[I]n the pursuit of justice, a trial judge must
have the discretion to impose an unwanted defense on a defendant.”).
      4
         Both cases concern the defendant’s right to control their defense. See North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (it is not unconstitutional for a trial judge
to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who professes belief in his innocence, but
insists on pleading guilty); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)
(out of respect for the individual’s choice, a court cannot require a defendant to
accept an attorney when they wish to appear pro se).
                                          12

             (1) whether the defendant is presently competent to stand
             trial; (2) if so, whether he or she, based on present mental
             capacity, can intelligently and voluntarily waive the
             insanity defense and has done so; (3) if not, whether the
             court sua sponte should impose the insanity defense based
             on evidence of the defendant’s mental condition at the
             time of the alleged crime.

Briggs v. United States, 525 A.2d 583, 591 (D.C. 1987) (quoting Anderson v.

Sorrell, 481 A.2d 766, 769 (D.C. 1984)).

      Regarding the second prong, now known as the Frendak inquiry, the

court held that,

             [W]henever the evidence suggests a substantial question
             of the defendant’s sanity at the time of the crime, the trial
             judge must conduct an inquiry designed to assure that the
             defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives
             available, comprehends the consequences of failing to
             assert the defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the
             defense. The scope of the inquiry for this determination
             will vary according to the circumstances present in each
             case, especially in relation to the background and
             condition of the defendant. . . . [A] cursory explanation or
             a rote interrogation cannot satisfy the court’s duty.

Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380. Thus, Frendak clarifies that when evidence suggests a

substantial question of the defendant’s sanity and there is the possibility of an

insanity defense, the court must make specific findings as to whether the defendant

has made an intelligent and voluntary decision on whether to raise or waive the

defense. Id. at 381.
                                         13

                                   1.    Analysis

      We review the trial judge’s failure to conduct a Frendak inquiry for abuse of

discretion. Patton v. United States, 782 A.2d 305, 312 (D.C. 2001) (citing Frendak,

408 A.2d at 379 and Briggs, 525 A.2d 583, 593 (D.C. 1987)). A court “abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law.” District of Columbia v. Capital Petroleum

Grp., 296 A.3d 402, 412 (D.C. 2023) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting

Vining v. District of Columbia, 198 A.3d 738, 745 (D.C. 2018)). This court has

previously addressed circumstances both where Frendak inquiries should have been

conducted by the trial court and where no Frendak inquiry was required.

      In Briggs, we considered whether there was enough evidence in the record to

trigger a sua sponte Frendak inquiry when there were questions about the

defendant’s competency to proceed to trial, the defendant stated that they would not

plead insane, and the defendant refused to cooperate with a productivity

examination. 525 A.2d at 592. Ultimately, we concluded that a Frendak inquiry

was required because the circumstances (appellant’s flood of bizarre letters and pro

se pleadings; psychiatric evaluations evidencing appellant’s long-term mental illness

and questioning his competency; appellant’s refusal to cooperate with court-ordered

examinations; and appellant’s expressed desire to waive an insanity defense despite

his counsel’s representation that an insanity defense was possible) raised substantial
                                           14

questions of appellant’s sanity. Id. at 593. Specifically, this court noted that the trial

court’s own perceptions of appellant’s mental condition, while not determinative,

implied that the court itself believed that further inquiry into a possibility of the

insanity defense was necessary. Id. This court also found that the court should have

ascertained whether appellant’s apparent, long-term mental illness could have been

a basis for insanity at the time of the offense. Id.

      Similarly, in Patton, this court also found that a Frendak inquiry was required

because the defendant’s bizarre pretrial behavior; the defendant’s desire to assert an

insanity defense during trial; the defendant’s lack of cooperation with mental health

professionals and denial of his mental illness during trial; a psychologist’s concern

about the defendant’s mental illness during sentencing; and the trial judge’s serious

concern about defendant’s mental illness should have given the trial court notice of

its responsibility to conduct a Frendak inquiry. 782 A.2d at 313.

      Additionally, the court found that a Frendak inquiry was required in Phenis

v. United States, 909 A.2d 138, 156-57 (D.C. 2006) because there were clear

indications of mental illness during the time of the offense and during the period

after the offense; both the defense and government made numerous comments and

filings about a possible insanity defense; pre-sentencing evaluation indicated severe
                                          15

mental illness; and evidence suggested a high likelihood that the defendant was

suffering from psychosis during the offense.

      On the contrary, in Howard v. United States, this court determined that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a Frendak inquiry because

there was no substantial question of appellant’s sanity where an uncontested

productivity report found the appellant criminally responsible for the offense and

because no causal link existed between appellant’s mental illness and the crime. 954

A.2d 415, 421-22 (D.C. 2008). See also Robinson v. United States, 565 A.2d 964,

967-68 (D.C. 1989) (concluding that there was not a substantial question of the

appellant’s sanity at the time of the offense sufficient to trigger a Frendak inquiry

because, despite evidence indicating that appellant may have been insane at the time

of the crime, an uncontested productivity examination found that appellant was not

insane at the time of the offense). In Howard, the appellant, though initially deemed

incompetent to stand trial, was ultimately deemed competent to stand trial,

competent to waive the insanity defense, and criminally responsible for the offense.

954 A.2d at 418. Distinguished from the above cases, however, the productivity

report conducted in Howard was based on a large amount of information from

multiple sources—including the appellant’s own statements “that he understood the

wrongfulness of his act at the time of the offense,”—and there was no reason to

question it. Id. at 421.
                                         16

      We believe that, as in Briggs and Patton, there are several factors which

indicate that a Frendak inquiry should have been conducted here: (1) Mr. Maziarz’s

statements at the initial presentment (namely, his responding “[n]o ma’am” when

asked whether he understood his rights and saying that his “resistance is low” when

he was asked to return to court for clinical services); (2) Mr. Maziarz’s involuntary

commitment into the mental health wing of Washington Hospital Center;

(3) Mr. Maziarz’s testimony that he was controlled by demons at the time of the

offense, both at the MHCC hearing and the misdemeanor trial; (4) DBH’s initial

finding that Mr. Maziarz was incompetent to proceed to trial and that he suffered

from paranoid ideation and unspecified psychosis; 5 (5) the government’s repeated

questioning of Mr. Maziarz’s competency; (6) the MHCC’s repeated concerns about

Mr. Maziarz’s mental health and suggestions that there may be a valid insanity

defense available; and (7) the trial court’s acknowledgment of the availability of the

defense.

      We find that, taken together, these facts raise a substantial question of

Mr. Maziarz’s sanity at the time of the offense. See Briggs, 252 A.2d at 594 (finding

that taken together, appellant’s pre-trial behavior, evidence of appellant’s long-term

      5
        Importantly, the subsequent two evaluations finding that Mr. Maziarz was
competent to proceed to trial occurred after he had been receiving and complying
with mental care services. This possibly indicates that Mr. Maziarz may have been
suffering from untreated mental illness at the time of the offense.
                                             17

mental illness, and appellant’s resistance to an insanity defense were enough to

trigger a Frendak inquiry). The government argues that the record did not raise a

substantial question of Mr. Maziarz’s sanity at the time of the offense because he did

not report that he had been controlled by demons during the offense until the MHCC

plea. We disagree. The absence of record facts indicating insanity until critical

moments in a trial does not absolve the trial court of the responsibility to conduct a

Frendak inquiry. See Briggs, 252 A.2d at 593 (“[T]he absence of record evidence

of bizarre behavior until the day after the indictment—a year after the crime and six

months after apprehension and detention—is [not] enough to eliminate trial court

responsibility for a Frendak inquiry.”). 6

      6
         The government also argues that Mr. Maziarz’s Frendak claim should be
rejected because he does not claim that he would plead not guilty by reason of
insanity. However, under Frendak, the trial court still has a “duty to confront the
insanity issue if the evidence adduced in the proceedings raises a substantial question
as to a defendant’s mental responsibility at the time of the crime.” Patton v. United
States, 782 A.2d 305, 314 (D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, “[t]he strength of the individual’s potential insanity defense should not
be a factor in the court’s decision, except to the extent that such evidence is useful
in determining whether the defendant presently is capable of rationally deciding to
reject the defense.” Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 380-81 (D.C. 1979).

       We are also troubled by the government’s assertion that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a Frendak inquiry because Judge Okun, in
not crediting Mr. Maziarz’s testimony, found that he did not need to address the issue
of insanity. We are not convinced that a lack of evidence at trial demonstrating
insanity diminishes the need for a Frendak inquiry when, as here, there was not a
proper investigation or presentation of an insanity defense. In fact, we believe that
                                           18

      There are many reasons why Mr. Maziarz may not have mentioned being

possessed by demons until the MHCC hearing. As he contends in his brief,

Mr. Maziarz likely did not have the opportunity to explain his conduct or address

the court concerning the facts of the offense until the plea hearing, and most defense

attorneys would advise their client not to discuss the facts of the case outside of the

defense team prior to this time.       Additionally, Mr. Maziarz did not have the

opportunity to testify about the offense until the MHCC hearing, and it is unclear

whether any of the competency evaluations included questioning about his state of

mind during the offense because they were primarily focused on his understanding

of the legal process. Further, until the MHCC hearing and the November 15, 2022

trial, Mr. Maziarz may have been more concerned about his living conditions than

recounting the events of the crime. 7 In any event, we find that there is sufficient

record evidence of Mr. Maziarz’s possible insanity, that this evidence undoubtedly

raises substantial questions of his sanity at the time of the offense, and that the trial

the lack of record evidence that Mr. Maziarz waived the defense provides even
greater reason for the trial court to conduct a Frendak inquiry.
      7
       Mr. Maziarz stated, in the second competency evaluation, that he only thinks
about suicide or becomes paranoid when thinking about the offense.
                                         19

court erred in not inquiring into whether he voluntarily and intelligently waived the

insanity defense. 8

      Because the trial court has discretion to determine the scope of the inquiry, it

may be sufficient for the court to make a decision on Mr. Maziarz’s ability to raise

or waive the defense by advising him of the possible consequences of the insanity

plea, ensuring that he understands those consequences by questioning him about his

reasons for accepting or rejecting the defense, and considering the record evidence

of his mental capacity. Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380. If, after such an inquiry, the court

still needs additional information, it also has discretion to order psychiatric

      8
        While the ultimate responsibility to conduct a Frendak inquiry fell upon the
misdemeanor trial court, a Frendak inquiry could, and perhaps should, have been
conducted during the MHCC plea hearing because Mr. Maziarz’s testimony about
being possessed by demons raised a substantial question of his sanity during the
offense. See Gorbey v. United States, 54 A.3d 668, 697 (D.C. 2012) (“[O]nce the
court was faced with a substantial question . . . as to appellant’s mental capacity at
the time of the crime, it should have conducted a full Frendak inquiry.” (quoting
Patton, 782 A.2d at 311)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Given
Mr. Maziarz’s testimony admitting that he committed the crime, but could not fully
control his actions, a finding that Mr. Maziarz wished to raise the insanity defense
during the MHCC plea hearing, and that he was insane at the time of the offense,
may have allowed him, with advice from counsel, to consider the feasibility of
entering an Alford plea pursuant to the terms of the MHCC agreement. See Alford,
400 U.S. at 37 (“An individual accused of [a] crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling
or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”).
                                         20

evaluations to determine whether the defendant’s mental illness has impaired their

ability to decide whether to raise or waive the defense. Id.

      Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to conduct a Frendak inquiry to

ensure that Mr. Maziarz has been fully informed of the availability of the insanity

defense, understands the consequences of asserting or failing to assert the defense,

and freely chooses to raise or waive the defense. Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380.

                         2.     Procedure After Remand

      Briggs, 525 A.2d 594-595, outlines guidelines for the procedure after remand.

The first step is to determine whether or not Mr. Maziarz made a voluntary and

intelligent waiver of the insanity defense. If the court concludes that Mr. Maziarz

made a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the insanity defense at the time of trial,

his conviction for simple assault will stand and his conviction for PPW(b) will be

reversed and remanded with instruction for the trial court to enter judgment on the

lesser-offense of attempted PPW(b). 9      If, however, the court concludes that

      9
         As discussed infra, we must vacate the PPW(b) conviction because it was
obtained in violation of Mr. Maziarz’s right to a jury trial. An appropriate remedy,
in this circumstance, is to allow judgment on the convictions that do not require a
jury trial. This includes letting the simple assault conviction stand and instructing
the trial court to enter judgment on the lesser-offense of attempted PPW(b), which
does not require a jury trial.
                                          21

Mr. Maziarz did not make a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the insanity defense,

then the court shall determine whether he now wishes to waive the insanity defense.

      If Mr. Maziarz voluntarily and intelligently wishes to waive the defense, his

simple assault conviction will stand and his conviction for PPW(b) will be reversed

and remanded for entry on the lesser-included offense. However, if Mr. Maziarz

does not want to waive the defense, or the court determines that he is incapable of

making a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the defense, the court shall order a

productivity or psychiatric examination to obtain an evidentiary basis to determine

whether there is sufficient evidence for an insanity defense.

      If Mr. Maziarz cooperates with the examination, and the court concludes that

there is sufficient evidence that he may have been insane at the time of the offense,

his convictions will be vacated and the trial court shall order a new insanity phase of

the trial (which is to be a jury trial unless Mr. Maziarz expressly waives his right).

If Mr. Maziarz cooperates with the examination and the court concludes that there

is insufficient evidence to raise an issue of insanity, his conviction for assault will

stand and his conviction for PPW(b) will be reversed and remanded for entry on the

lesser-included offense. If Mr. Maziarz does not cooperate with the examination,

the court shall make an evidentiary determination based on other evidence in the

record.
                                          22

                                  B.     Jury Trial

      The parties agree that the trial court erred in failing to obtain a written and

oral waiver of Mr. Maziarz’s right to a jury trial. They also agree that the appropriate

remedy is to reverse Mr. Maziarz’s conviction for Possession of a Prohibited

Weapon (“PPW(b)”) and remand to the trial court with instruction to enter judgment

on the lesser-included offense of attempted PPW(b).

                                   1.     Analysis

      We review the trial court’s failure to obtain a waiver of Mr. Maziarz’s right

to a jury trial for plain error. Miller v. United States, 209 A.3d 75, 78 (D.C. 2019);

Fortune v. United States, 59 A.3d 949, 957 (D.C. 2013).

      Mr. Maziarz was charged with PPW(b) pursuant to D.C. Code § 22-4514(b).

Because a violation of D.C. Code § 22-4514(b) carries a possible penalty of greater

than six months, see D.C. Code § 22-4515 (“Any violation of any provision of this

chapter for which no penalty is specifically provided shall be punished

by . . . imprisonment for not more than 1 year . . .”), Mr. Maziarz was required to

be tried by jury unless he expressly waived the right. Fortune, 59 A.3d at 956-57;

see D.C. Code § 16-705 (“In a criminal case tried in the Superior Court in which,

according to the Constitution of the United States, the defendant is entitled to a jury
                                           23

trial, the trial shall be by jury, unless the defendant in open court expressly waives

trial by jury and requests trial by the court, and the court and the prosecuting officer

consent thereto.”); see also Jackson v. United States, 498 A.2d 185, 188 (D.C. 1985)

(noting that the Supreme Court, in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), held

that an offense that holds a potential sentence of six months or more is sufficiently

severe to require trial by jury). We find that the trial court’s failure to obtain such a

waiver violated Mr. Maziarz’s constitutional right to a jury trial for a criminal

offense punishable by more than six month’s incarceration.

      Additionally, the trial court’s failure to obtain Mr. Maziarz’s waiver of his

right to a jury trial is structural error requiring reversal. Fortune, 59 A.3d at 957

(“[T]he failure to make the prescribed determination of waiver is a structural

error . . . that obviates the need for further inquiry into whether the defendant’s

substantial rights were affected by the error.”).        We therefore conclude that

Mr. Maziarz’s PPW(b) conviction must be reversed.

      This court has adopted the principle that appellate courts may direct the entry

of a judgment for a lesser-included offense when a conviction for a greater offense

is reversed on grounds that only affect the greater offense. Willis v. United States,

692 A.2d 1380, 1383 (D.C. 1997) (citing Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,

307 (1996)). Attempted PPW(b) is a lesser-included offense of PPW(b) because the
                                         24

elements of attempted PPW(b) are subsumed within PPW(b). Diggs v. United

States, 966 A.2d 857, 861 (D.C. 2009). It follows that, in proving PPW(b), the

government necessarily proved attempted PPW(b). Id. Moreover, the grounds for

reversing Mr. Maziarz’s PPW(b) conviction (failure to obtain a jury trial waiver) do

not apply to attempted PPW(b) because attempted PPW(b) carries a penalty of less

than 6 months and, thus, does not require a jury trial. See D.C. Code § 22-1803

(“Whoever shall attempt to commit any crime . . . shall be punished . . . by

imprisonment for not more than 180 days . . .”).

      Further, where the government has opted against retrial of an appellant on the

greater offense, and asked the court to remand the case or enter a judgment on the

lesser inchoate offense, this court has directed the trial court on remand to enter a

judgment of conviction on the lesser-included inchoate offense. Diggs, 966 A.2d at

861-2. Here, the government “opt[s] against retrying Maziarz before a jury on the

greater offense of PPW(b).” Therefore, it is appropriate for this court to reverse

Mr. Maziarz’s PPW(b) conviction and remand with instruction to enter a judgment

for attempted PPW(b). Accordingly, depending on the result of the Frendak inquiry,

we hold that Mr. Maziarz’s PPW(b) conviction should be either vacated or reversed

and remanded with instruction to enter a judgment for attempted PPW(b).
                                          25

                                 III.    Conclusion

      Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in not conducting a Frendak

inquiry and by not obtaining a valid oral and written waiver of Mr. Maziarz’s right

to a jury trial. Therefore, we remand for a Frendak inquiry according to the

procedure as laid out in this opinion.

                                                         So ordered.