Court Opinion

ID: 9703007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:36:43.384106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.822469
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL,
Judge, dissenting.
I dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority that “under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the arrest was lawful;” rather, I believe that the facts and circumstances of this case clearly demonstrate that appellant’s arrest was a mere subterfuge to search appellant and his car in order to obtain evidence of crime. Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
The law applicable to arrest for traffic offenses is codified in Md. Transportation Code Ann. § 26-202. Since the offense for which appellant could have been arrested is not one of the offenses specifically enumerated in subsections (a)(1) or (a)(3) and subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) are inapposite, we direct our attention to subsection (a)(2) which provides:
(a) In general — A police officer may arrest without a warrant a person for a violation of the *15Maryland Vehicle Law, including any rule or regulation adopted under it, or for a violation of any traffic law or ordinance of any local authority of this state, if: ...
(2) The person has committed or is committing the violation within the view or presence of the officer, and either:
(i) The person does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity; or
(ii) The officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person will disregard a traffic citation ...
Because the trial judge found that Parker furnished sufficient evidence of identification, this appeal turns upon the meaning and application of subsection 2(ii).
The majority correctly concludes that “reasonable grounds” as used in the statute is synonymous with “probable cause”. Edwardsen v. State, 231 Md. 332, 337, 190 A.2d 84 (1963) (“the ‘reasonable grounds’ or ‘probable cause’ may consist of facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information... ”) Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 421, 158 A.2d 80 (1960) (“... a peace officer may arrest without a warrant, provided there were reasonable grounds to believe at the time of arrest that a felony had been committed and that the person arrested had committed the offense, [emphasis added]”.) Johnson v. State, 8 Md.App. 187, 191, 259 A.2d 97 (1969) (“... [T]he rule of probable cause is [a] non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, ..., but more evidence than would arouse a mere suspicion.”) See also Murray v. State, 236 Md. 375, 203 A.2d 908 (1964); Ford v. State, 37 Md.App. 373, 377 A.2d 577 (1977). As such, as the majority has correctly set forth, *16“reasonable grounds” requires less evidentiary justification than would be required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the violator will not appear, but more than would be required to arouse a “reasonable suspicion”, which “involves a significantly lower degree of objective evidentiary justification than does probable cause... ”. Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597, 606, 420 A.2d 270 (1980). Furthermore, the test of the existence or non-existence of reasonable grounds is an objective one. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Section 26-202(a)(2)(ii) does require that probable cause exist with regard to prospective, rather than retrospective conduct, which, as the majority stresses imposes a duty on the officer at the scene to prognosticate; however, it does not signal the lessening of the quantrum of evidentiary justification for an arrest or the permissibility of applying a more subjective standard to the probable cause determination on review. The objective test remains both viable and mandatory. It is in this context that we must determine if the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence and as enunciated by the trial judge, objectively constitute “reasonable grounds to believe that the person will disregard a traffic citation.”
Our threshold task, when reviewing a probable cause determination, is to identify objective factors which directly relate to the probability of non-compliance with a citation. It is against such factors that the officer’s initial determination and the court’s later one must be judged. Md.Rule 4-216(f) provides some guidance:
(f) Factors Relevant to Conditions of Release. — In determining which conditions of release will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required, the judicial officer, on the basis of information available or developed in a pretrial release inquiry, may take into account:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the nature of the evidence against the de*17fendant, and the potential sentence upon conviction, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance;
(2) The defendant’s prior record of appearance at court proceedings or flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings;
(3) The defendant’s family ties, employment status and history, financial resources, reputation, character and mental condition, length of residence in the community, and length of residence in the state;
(4) The recommendation of an agency which conducts pretrial release investigations;
(5) The recommendation of the State’s Attorney;
(6) Information presented by defendant’s counsel;
(7) The danger of the defendant to himself or to herself or others;
(8) Any other factor, including prior convictions, bearing on the risk of a wilful failure to appear.
I recognize, of course, that the information contemplated by this rule will be developed in a more leisurely fashion and will be more complete in the context of a bail hearing than is possible at the scene of an arrest; however, it is obvious to me, given the purpose of the rule — to “reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required” (emphasis added), Md.Rule 4-216(d) — that the factors enumerated are also relevant to a similar determination required to be made to justify an arrest. Therefore, although the rule requires that the determination whether and under what circumstances a defendant will appear at trial be made at a different and later stage of the criminal prosecution than the determination required by § 26-202(a)(2), I think the factors enumerated in subsection (f), particularly numbers 1, 2, 3, 6,1 and 8, being objective in nature, are helpful in *18judging whether “reasonable grounds to believe that the person will disregard a traffic citation” existed in this case. Another factor relevant to this determination is whether the officer sought to issue the person a citation, the receipt of which the person refused to acknowledge, See Transp. art. § 26-203(b) and (c).2 With this background, I now proceed to consider the case sub judice.
No question of the propriety of the stop of appellant’s vehicle has been raised and, because appellant was driving without a license, it is clear that a violation of the traffic laws had occurred.3 Therefore, only the facts before the court and those factors4 enunciated by the trial judge as forming the reasonable grounds for the officer’s belief that appellant would disregard a traffic citation need be considered.
The trial judge relied on the following factors: (1) appellant was nervous; (2) appellant “did not supply that degree *19of evidence as to his identity, which includes, I find his address, to put the officer’s mind at ease”; (3) appellant produced a prison identity card; and (4) appellant “made a suspicious move putting a bag and attempting to hide from the officer’s view, a bag.” He concluded that “all of these factors together furnish objective reasonable grounds to believe that he would not show up, that he would disregard the traffic citation,” thus focusing on the appropriate standard. The trial judge’s concluding remarks, however, reflect an entirely different focus:
I admit it is not that powerful a case that there cannot be a cogent argument, as there has been by Mr. Hedgepeth, but I also believe that if that officer had released that defendant and let him drive away in that ear, that that officer himself would have been subject to criticism by his superiors, who would have said why did you let that man go under these circumstances, because if you suspected something illegal was going on when he put the lid on the console chamber down, if you had any suspicions at all, you can bet your boots that any evidence that there might be, would disappear once you let him go, and I think the officer may well be subject to censor if he had not arrested the defendant.
It is in this context that the evidence and the findings of the trial judge must be independently, reflectively judged.5® The evidence does not support the trial judge’s findings that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest appellant. Three of the four factors enumerated by the trial judge are directly relevant to, and probative of, a belief that appellant may have been engaged in criminal activity. If germane at all to appellant’s probable non-compliance with a citation, they are only indirectly and tangentially so. Obvious in this regard is the reliance on appellant’s secreting of a bag *20when he was stopped. That act unquestionably was suspicious, and unquestionably aroused the officer’s suspicion that criminal conduct was afoot. That act, however, at best, sheds but little light on the probability of appellant’s compliance with a traffic citation had one been issued to him. Similarly, appellant’s “attitude, nervousness”, assuming that a violation of the traffic laws — even a minor one5 — does not legitimately engender some nervousness, when viewed in the context of this case, tells us a great deal more about appellant’s possible involvement in criminal activity than it does about his likelihood to obey a citation.6 The display of a prison identification card is the least helpful yet; at best, it is neutral. Although it shows that appellant had been in prison for a more serious charge, the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom do not support the conclusion that appellant would fail to comply with a traffic citation, especially since, in this case, none of those inferences rises above speculation. Thus, taken singly or as a group, these factors do not come close to establishing reasonable grounds to believe that appellant would not comply with a citation.
The failure to provide an address is a significant factor in predicting whether a person will obey a citation. The trial judge properly found that appellant did not supply an address. Even so, the circumstances of this case do not provide the required evidentiary justification for the arrest.
*21The only offense for which probable cause7 to charge and/or arrest existed was driving without a license, the maximum penalty for which is a five hundred dollar ($500) fine and, as to which, a court appearance may not be required.8 When stopped, appellant either volunteered or supplied upon request, the following information, which was verified: a visual inspection of the engine area of the car verified that there was a problem with the transmission; a stolen car check verified that the car was not reported stolen and was registered to a female friend of appellant’s;9 and a license check verified what appellant volunteered— that he did not have a driver’s license. Significantly, the license check did not disclose that appellant had outstanding traffic citations or that his privilege to drive was either suspended or revoked. Although it contained no address, appellant did supply, as the court found, identification on request. And contrary to the officer’s professed fear, appellant did not flee or attempt to flee. Juxtaposed *22against this background are the following: the officer did not ask appellant for his address and, in fact, testified at trial that he was not interested in appellant’s address. The arrest was. made, in the officer’s words, “[bjecause I didn’t think that everything was going together ..., honestly, as far as his attitude, nervousness. He was placed under arrest for no Maryland driver’s license, the ID part of it.” 10
This is not a case in which pertinent information was requested and refused or the pertinence of information explained, but still not produced. Here, the information relied upon at trial was not requested at the scene because the officer apparently deemed it unimportant. The trial judge’s reliance on appellant’s failure “[to] supply that degree of evidence as to his identity, which includes, I find, his address, to put the officer’s mind at ease” imposed a requirement that appellant negate at the scene of his arrest, and in a vacuum, the existence of probable cause for the officer to believe that he would not obey a citation and, in effect, made the test for judging the existence of that probable cause a subjective one, totally dependent on the officer’s state of mind.11 Appellant could not possibly meet the burden thus placed on him. He could not know unless he was told what the standard was which he was required *23to negate, nor could he know, again without having been told, what would satisfy the officer. The officer, on the other hand, is permitted to arrest a minor traffic violator without obligation to first request relevant information or to explain its importance.
I would hold that when an arrest has been made pursuant to § 26-202(a)(2)12 the record must objectively reflect the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested will not comply with a traffic citation. This may require, depending upon the circumstances, that the officer affirmatively develop and verify relevant information at the scene. Such a requirement will not be onerous since much of that information is readily available or may be obtained as a result of checks routinely made. For example, the nature of the offense, including the potential sentence, and the evidence against the defendant are matters uniquely within the knowledge of the arresting officer; aspects of the defendant’s community stability, such as, for example, his address and employment status, are proper, indeed, necessary, subjects of interrogation; and, in the context of a traffic violation, information regarding the defendant’s prior record of non-compliance with citations may be obtained as a part of the normal license check procedure. Of course, a defendant’s refusal to acknowledge receipt of a traffic citation after its issuance would be such clear and objective reasonable grounds. In short, prior to the arrest of the traffic law offender, generally the officer must afford the offender an opportunity to provide information relevant and necessary to an assessment of his or her likelihood of compliance with a citation.
I agree with appellant that the officer’s actions in this case were motivated by a desire to investigate suspected criminal activity and not by any concern that appellant would not obey a citation. Likewise, close scrutiny of the *24court’s analysis, although partially couched in the appropriate statutory language, reveals that the court applied, in reality, the wrong standard. The precipitating event in the chain leading to appellant’s arrest was the officer’s belief that appellant secreted a bag from him. Thereafter, the way in which the officer viewed appellant’s actions was colored by the officer’s suspicions that appellant was engaged in criminal activity: appellant’s nervousness was attributed to a cause other than his having violated the traffic laws and appellant’s display of a prison identification card was viewed as corroborating those suspicions. Fortuitously, appellant did not have a driver's license. This fact thus became, for the officer, the vehicle to discover the nature of the criminal activity he suspected. As the concluding comments of his ruling demonstrate, the trial judge adopted and legitimized this faulty premise. This arrest was a mere subterfuge for the search for evidence that followed.

. It is not likely defendant’s attorney will be present at the scene of the arrest for traffic violation. Therefore the information required by *18number 6 must be read as being information obtained from the defendant, himself.

. Transp. art. § 26-203(b) and (c) provide:
(b) Officer to make request and advise of the possibility of arrest. —On issuing a traffic citation, the police officer shall request the person to sign the statement on the citation acknowledging its receipt. If the person refuses to sign, the police officer shall advise the person that failure to sign may lead to the person's arrest.
(c) Refusal prohibited. — On being advised that failure to sign may lead to his arrest, the person may not refuse to sign. If the person continues to refuse to sign, the police officer may arrest the person for violation of this section or, as provided in § 26-202(a)(5) of this subtitle, for the original charge, or both.

. Transp. art. § 16-101(a)(l) provides:
(a) In General. — An individual may not drive or attempt to drive a motor vehicle on any highway in this state unless:
(1) he holds a driver’s license issued under this title ...

. Neither the trial judge, nor the majority deigns to elucidate how these factors support the conclusion that appellant would not comply with a citation. I find this failure on the part of the majority to be significant since it has itself recognized that when reviewing the trial judge’s conclusions, ”[o]ur duty is to make an independent reflective constitutional judgment.” It is not evident to me, from its opinion, that it has so judged the trial judge's conclusions.

a. The majority inexplicably fails to mention the trial judge’s concluding remarks and, thus, neither explains them, nor reconciles them with the factors the trial judge earlier found to be dispositive of probable cause.

. A cogent argument may be made that driving without a license is not a minor offense. It is a five point violation, see § 16-402(a)(9), and for a second or subsequent conviction, the maximum penalty is one year in jail, $500.00 fine or both. See § 27-101(f), infra.

. The specific observations were:
"[h]e was rubbing his face, and walking to the front of the car, and repeating, man, I should not have been driving the car, and all that stuff, you know, you got me”; without request, appellant got out of the car, "walking fast” causing him (the officer) to think he might run away; and he (the officer) thought appellant "was on something.”

. There is no contention, with which we agree, that probable cause for arrest for a charge other than the traffic offense was shown.

. See Trans, art. § 27-101 which provides:
(a) Violation of vehicle laws a misdemeanor. — It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law unless the violation is declared to be a felony by the Maryland Vehicle Law or by any other law of this State.
(b) Penalties — $500.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of any of the provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law is subject to a fine of not more than $500.00.
But See Trans, art. § 27 — 101(f) which provides:
(f) Same — $500 and 1 year. — Any person who is convicted of a violation of any of the provisions of § 14-103 of this article (“Possession of motor vehicle master key”), or of a second or subsequent violation of any of the provisions of § 16-101 of this article ("Drivers must be licensed”) or § 21-902(b) of this article ("Driving while under the influence of alcohol”) is subject to a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year or both.

. It is unclear from the record whether it was verified at the scene that the registered owner of the car was appellant’s friend. It is clear however that appellant’s characterization of the registered owner as his friend was not disputed at trial.

. Later, on cross-examination the officer testified that it was the lack of a license, without reference to "the ID part of it", which formed the basis for the arrest. He also testified later that he was concerned about the prison ID.

. Despite its protestations to the contrary, I believe the majority does adopt and apply a subjective test. The majority does say that its task is to "resolve for ourselves the ultimate second level facts of this case — the existence or non-existence of (‘reasonable ground’) probable cause to believe that the appellant would not appear at trial"; however, as I read the majority opinion, it simply defers to the officer’s prognostication, finding it reasonable, without in any way independently and reflectively analyzing those “second level facts.” In this regard, the majority’s observation, "Quite naturally, [the officer’s] prognostic ability is a reflection of his training, experience and intelligence, all of which contribute to his ability to reason", is instructive. Moreover, I think it interesting that we are provided with no indication of the training, experience and intelligence of the officer to whose judgment the majority so readily and facilely defers.

. I envision that in most instances a citation will be issued; therefore, the propriety of an arrest will generally be determined by reference to Transp. art. § 26-203(b) and (c), supra.