Court Opinion

ID: 9757794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:59:15.21002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:44.469939
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because of the majority’s refusal to follow four earlier decisions binding this division of the court, including two from this court holding there was “plain error” in similar circumstances.
On direct examination, defense counsel brought out the fact that appellant had pleaded guilty to armed robbery in 1973. Counsel asked for and received a cautionary instruction from the trial court. On cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
Q. Mr. Dorman, you are saying when Officer Green said he saw you go up to Sergeant Hickey on the steps, he is not telling the truth, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. BECKER: Objection.
THE COURT: No, I’ll permit that question.
BY MR. BENNETT:
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when Officer Green said that he saw you take that radio from Sergeant Hickey, he was again not telling you the truth, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when Officer Green said that he saw you walk away with that radio, he was again not telling the truth?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that when he said that you got 90 feet from Sergeant Hickey he was again not telling the truth?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So essentially his entire testimony was just not true, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when Sergeant Hickey said that he saw you ten feet from him holding the radio, again, he was not telling the truth either, was he?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He wasn’t?
A. Right.
Q. So you never touched the radio, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You just walked up to it, looked at it, walked down two steps and you weren’t even touching it and all of these policemen arrested you for no reason at all, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now Mr. Dorman, are you the same Lawrence Dorman that on December 21, 1973 was convicted of first degree burglary?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you the same Lawrence Dor-man that on the same date was convicted of attempted larceny?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you the same Lawrence Dor-man that on March 22,1974, was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, a gun?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you the same Lawrence Dor-man that on November 9th, 1971, was convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon, a gun?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. BENNETT: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
Prior criminal convictions are admissible to impeach a witness, including a criminal defendant who chooses to testify. D.C.Code § 14-305(b) (1981). They are, of course, inadmissible to show a general criminal disposition. Ward v. United States, 386 A.2d *9921180, 1182 (D.C.1978). Whenever a criminal defendant is impeached by prior convictions, there is a risk that the jury, despite a cautionary instruction, will be unable to limit their use to the purpose the law allows. Rather than draw the only permissible inference — that a one-time thief is likely to lie — the jury may draw the impermissible inference that a one-time thief is likely to steal again, and therefore did. However, as we noted in Hill v. United States, 434 A.2d 422, 429 (D.C.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151, 102 S.Ct. 1020, 71 L.Ed.2d 307 (1982):
We are aware of the debate among courts and within academia about the wisdom of informing juries of a defendant’s prior convictions when a defendant takes the stand, given the possibility that even with a cautionary instruction the jurors may not confine their consideration of the pri- or convictions to the question of credibility. Nonetheless, the issue comes down to one of policy, and the Congress had left no doubt that in this jurisdiction, our policy is that when a defendant takes the stand the court must permit the prosecution to attack his or her credibility by introducing recent prior convictions for felonies and other crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.
In carrying out congressional policy, the courts have a responsibility to try to minimize the danger that the jury will draw the forbidden inference of criminal propensity. Thus, the court should not permit the phrasing or the timing of the prosecutor’s questions to suggest to the jury that the prior convictions may be used for purposes other than assessing credibility. Accordingly, we twice have held, as has the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that the prosecution may not ask a defendant whether he or she denies committing the charged offense and then, after eliciting a denial, immediately bring in the prior convictions. Bailey v. United States, 447 A.2d 779 (D.C.1982) (plain error); Fields v. United States, 396 A.2d 522 (D.C.1978) (plain error); United States v. Henry, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 528 F.2d 661 (1976); United States v. Carter, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 149, 482 F.2d 738 (1973).
The government argues, and the majority agrees, that the present case is distinguishable from Bailey, Fields, Henry, and Carter because the two offending questions (italicized above) immediately preceding the impeachment with prior convictions were themselves preceded by — and should be read in the context of — a series of questions (characterized by my colleagues as “rather brief”) in which appellant “placed his credibility as opposed to that of the officers ... directly at issue.” I disagree with that attempted distinction. This prosecutorial approach cannot be justified by constructing a rule whereby an otherwise improper sequence is cleansed if preceded by one or two or ten questions about credibility. I conclude that the questions “So you never touched the radio ... ?” and “You just walked up to it ... and all of these policemen arrested you for no reason at all, ... ?” —which the prosecutor asked immediately before the impeachment by prior convictions — “invited the jury to consider the pri- or convictions as more than evidence relating to the defendant’s credibility.” Henry, supra, 174 U.S.App.D.C. at 94, 528 F.2d at 667.
The government is free to introduce prior convictions, with an appropriate limiting instruction, after the completion of cross-examination (assuming, of course, that the impeachment is immediately preceded by a suitable break,1 from the type of questions complained of here), or in the midst of cross-examination after a series of questions dealing solely with the defendant’s credibility. Impeachment would have been proper here, for example, if the two offending questions had been left out.
It is asking too much of a jury to permit the government to juxtapose the defendant’s denial of present criminal involvement with questions and proof concerning prior criminal involvement, and then to attempt *993to prevent, through a cautionary instruction, the very inference that the mixture of evidence suggests should be drawn.2

. Compare Bailey, supra, 447 A.2d at 782 (brief pause and change of voice tone insufficient).

. That appellant failed to object to the sequence of questions at trial should not affect our decision. The error could not have been cured by the trial court, and “it would make no sense for us to weigh against appellant his failure to object below, under circumstances in which timely objection could not correct the harm done.” Fields, supra, 396 A.2d at 528.