Court Opinion

ID: 9958225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 16:00:52.214715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.527306
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3272        Document: 010111028041      Date Filed: 04/08/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                                FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             April 8, 2024
                            _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                            No. 23-3272
                                                     (D.C. Nos. 2:22-CV-02382-DDC &
  ROOSEVELT RICO DAHDA,                                   2:12-CR-20083-DDC-2)
                                                                  (D. Kan.)
           Defendant - Appellant.
                          _________________________________

                ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                       _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                     _________________________________

        Petitioner Roosevelt Rico Dahda, appearing pro se, requests a certificate of

 appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255

 application. For the reasons stated below, we deny his request for a COA and dismiss the

 matter.

                                              I.

        A federal jury found Petitioner guilty of several drug convictions including

 conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute more than

 1,000 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846.

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-3272     Document: 010111028041          Date Filed: 04/08/2024       Page: 2

 For his crimes, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas sentenced

 Petitioner to 201 months in prison and ten years of supervised release, but we remanded

 for resentencing. United States v. Dahda, 852 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d,

 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018). The district court resentenced Petitioner to 141 months in prison

 and six years of supervised release. Petitioner again appealed, but we affirmed. United

 States v. Dahda, 854 F. App’x 267 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 323 (2021)

 (“Dahda II”). Petitioner moved to vacate his sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but the

 district court dismissed Petitioner’s motion, also denying Petitioner a COA. Petitioner

 now requests from us a COA to appeal the district court’s dismissal.

                                              II.

        To receive a COA, Petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a

 constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

 § 2253(c)(2)). A petitioner makes such a showing if he demonstrates “that reasonable

 jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

 resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve

 encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)

 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). When a district court denies

 a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds, a petitioner requesting a COA must also show us

 that reasonable jurists would find debatable the correctness of the procedural ruling. Id.

 When we can rule based on the procedural question without addressing the constitutional

 merits question, we often do so. Id. at 485. We liberally construe pro se filings, but we

 do not advocate on the petitioner’s behalf. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1

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 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187–88 (10th Cir.

 2003)).

                                              A.

        Petitioner argues the district court improperly sentenced Petitioner under 21

 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)—which carries a twenty-year maximum sentence—instead of

 under § 841(b)(1)(D)—which carries a five-year maximum sentence. First, Petitioner

 argues that the § 841(b)(1)(C) enhancement “requires a finding, beyond a reasonable

 doubt, that the charged quantity (1,000 kilograms) was individually attributable to the

 defendant.” This argument is unpersuasive because the jury found beyond a reasonable

 doubt that the “scope of the agreement involved more than 1,000 kilograms of

 marijuana.” And under § 841, a court may penalize defendants for distributing controlled

 substances “involving . . . 1,000 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a

 detectable amount of” marijuana, not just for the amounts individually attributable to the

 defendant. Accordingly, reasonable jurists could not debate whether the district court

 should have granted relief on this basis. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

        Second, Petitioner argues that the jury, not the sentencing judge, should have

 made the factual determination necessary to trigger the § 841(b)(1)(C) enhancement,

 violating his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. But Petitioner failed to raise this

 issue in his § 2255 petition. We will not consider COA arguments not presented in the

 district court. United States v. Viera, 674 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing

 McDonald v. Kinder–Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 922, 999 (10th Cir. 2002)). So if a

 petitioner does not make an argument in his habeas petition, he waives that argument in

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 seeking a COA. Owens v. Trammell, 792 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing

 Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1222 n.13 (10th Cir. 2013); Jones v. Gibson, 206

 F.3d 946, 958 (10th Cir. 2000); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999)).

 In his § 2255 petition, Petitioner argued that “[n]othing in the jury instructions required

 the government to prove, or the jury to find, that more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana

 were individually attributable to [Petitioner].” This argument is distinct from the one he

 now raises: “the sentencing judge impermissibly made this determination,” in violation of

 his “Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a jury of his peers.” Petitioner failed to invoke

 his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and did not assert prejudice to his Sixth

 Amendment rights. Accordingly, we hold this argument waived and do not consider it.1

                                              B.

        Petitioner argues that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment right to due

 process by failing to conduct a colloquy before imposing an enhanced sentence under

 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). To qualify for § 2255 relief, Petitioner must show that the absence of

 a § 851 colloquy constituted “a fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a

 complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Addonizio, 422 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)

 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). So to receive a COA on this

 basis, Petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether the absence of an

 § 851 colloquy resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

        1
         Even if Petitioner had raised this Sixth Amendment issue in his § 2255 petition,
 it would not be a basis for relief because Petitioner misrepresents the proceedings. As
 discussed, the jury—not the judge—found that the scope of the agreement involved more
 than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana.
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        But according to the district court, Petitioner “received ample notice that the court

 intended to” impose an enhanced sentence under § 851(b). Additionally, the district

 court found that Petitioner could not reasonably have believed that he would not be

 sentenced under enhanced maximum penalties—even without a colloquy. This

 factfinding suggests that the district court’s procedure did not adversely affect Petitioner.

 And Petitioner does not contest the district court’s fact finding, instead arguing that the

 scale of his case merits a colloquy.2 But because Petitioner has not shown how the lack

 of a colloquy constituted a miscarriage of justice, Petitioner fails to show that reasonable

 minds could differ about whether the district court should have resolved his § 2255

 petition differently.

                                               C.

        Petitioner argues the district court violated his rights under the First, Fifth, and

 Sixth Amendments by imposing a thirty-three-month upward sentence variance. But

 Petitioner inaccurately portrays the proceedings before the district court. Petitioner

 claims the district court imposed this upward variance because Petitioner encouraged his

 codefendant—Sadie Brown—to reject a proposed plea agreement. To the contrary, the

 district court imposed the upward variance because Petitioner tried to obstruct justice by

 communicating with Brown: Petitioner was “involved in threatening, intimidating, or

        2
           Petitioner argues: “The district court’s reasoning might make sense in the typical
 smaller case. But [Petitioner]’s case was epic. It involved a large conspiracy, a lengthy
 jury trial on the merits, allegations of unlawful government wiretapping, United States
 Supreme Court review, two appeals and two sentencings.”
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 unlawfully influencing [Brown]’s decisions in this case” and “attempted to get her to

 testify falsely.”

                                              1.

        Petitioner argues the district court violated his First Amendment rights by

 imposing a thirty-three-month upward variance based on his statements to his co-

 defendant. If a defendant “fails to raise an issue on direct appeal, he is barred from

 raising the issue in a § 2255 proceeding, unless he establishes either cause excusing the

 procedural default and prejudice resulting from the error or a fundamental miscarriage of

 justice if the claim is not considered.” United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 341 (10th Cir.

 1996) (citing United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir. 1994)). Petitioner

 admits that he did not challenge on direct appeal his obstruction of justice variance for

 violating his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Petitioner may not raise this issue.

        But we have recognized an exception to the collateral-review bar. A petitioner

 may raise an issue he failed to raise on direct appeal if a material intervening change in

 law establishes grounds for relief. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570

 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993). Petitioner attempts to invoke this exception, arguing that he has

 shown cause for not raising his First Amendment claim on direct appeal because of the

 Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen,

 597 U.S. 1, (2022). But because Bruen only concerned the Second Amendment right to

 bear arms, Id. at 70, reasonable jurists cannot differ about whether Bruen constitutes a

 material intervening change of law about whether the First Amendment protects

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 statements obstructing justice. Thus, Petitioner may not raise his First Amendment

 argument in this proceeding.

                                               2.

        Petitioner also claims this upward variance violated his Fifth Amendment right to

 due process because “the factual basis for the variance . . . no longer exists” after the

 district court reduced Brown’s sentence. We already rejected the basis for this argument

 in Dahda II, 854 F. App’x at 270, and we reject it now for the same reasons. As we wrote

 in Dahda II, the district court varied upward on Petitioner’s sentence because he

 obstructed justice. Id. And because Petitioner’s sentence (141 months) fell within the

 guidelines range (135 to 168 months), “the district court committed no error . . . when it

 again applied a 33-month upward variance at resentencing.” Id. Because the district

 court committed no error, reasonable minds could not differ on whether the district court

 should have resolved the § 2255 petition differently.

                                               3.

        Petitioner argues that his sentence is affected by the same “Sixth Amendment

 constitutional infirmities that affected [Brown]’s sentence,” citing Alleyne v. United

 States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). But beyond this bare assertion, Petitioner offers no argument,

 factual basis, or explanation about why the upward variance conflicts with Alleyne, nor

 has Petitioner asserted why an error in Brown’s sentencing would affect the legitimacy of

 Petitioner’s sentence. We won’t serve as an advocate on his behalf. See Yang, 525 F.3d

 at 927 n.1 (quoting Ledbetter, 318 F.3d at 1187–88). Even affording Petitioner’s Brief

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 solicitous construction, reasonable minds cannot differ about whether the upward

 variance violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights.

                                              D.

        Petitioner argues that his counsel was constitutionally deficient in defending him

 against each of the above violations, violating his Sixth Amendment right to effective

 counsel. To prevail on this claim, Petitioner must demonstrate that his counsel’s

 performance “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and that the deficient

 performance resulted in prejudice.” United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208,

 1216 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). To

 establish prejudice, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that his case would

 have had a different result but for his counsel’s deficient performance. Beavers v. Saffle,

 216 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

        Even assuming that Petitioner received constitutionally deficient representation,

 Petitioner has not shown that he would have received a different judgment or sentence

 but for his representation. Thus, Petitioner has not established that reasonable jurists

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Appellate Case: 23-3272     Document: 010111028041         Date Filed: 04/08/2024     Page: 9

 could differ about whether the district court should have resolved his § 2255 petition

 differently on his Sixth Amendment claims.

                                             III.

        Petitioner has failed to establish that reasonable minds could differ on whether the

 district court should have resolved his § 2255 petition differently. So we deny Petitioner

 a COA and do not reach the merits of his petition.3

        MATTER DISMISSED.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Joel M. Carson III
                                               Circuit Judge

        3
         Because the district court granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis
 on March 18, 2024, we dismiss Appellant’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
 pauperis as moot.
                                              9