Court Opinion

ID: 9523321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:39:09.422439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:53.602456
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Arterburn, J.
\I concur with Chief Justice Emmert in the granting of a new trial in this appeal on the ground the jury was erroneously instructed. I further concur with respect to all questions considered in his opinion except that of variance between the proof and the indictment. In my opinion, the variance is immaterial and I further think the error, if any, must be raised by an objection specifically pointed out to the trial court at the time it arises.
The indictment alleged that one, Trigg, was killed by *542the defendant with a hand grenade “loaded with nitroglycerine.” Judge Emmert has done a scholarly bit of chemical explosive research which is highly instructive, showing that T. N. T. with which the grenade was loaded contains no nitroglycerine in fact. Of this scientific fact we must assume judicial knowledge. As a result there is variance in the language of the charge from the proof on trial.
Since the majority of the court brothers, Bobbitt, Achor and Landis, agree with me on the question of variance and this case is to be retried, I deem it expedient to offer some guidance to the trial court and counsel in the further proceedings in this case.
The question arising here for our decision is whether or not the variance between the proof that the hand grenade contained T. N. T., and the charge in the indictment that it was loaded with nitroglycerine, is a fatal variance and vitiates the trial and conviction of murder in the second degree.
Not all variances between allegations in the charge and the evidence at the trial are fatal. Technical and trifling errors in spelling causing a slight varianee in names, places, time, values, etc., are usually not sufficient to invalidate criminal proceedings. State v. Rardon; State v. Montgomery (1943), 221 Ind. 154, 46 N. E. 2d 605; 40 C. J. S., Homicide, §175, p. 1075.
The strict technical rules formerly covering the subject have been greatly relaxed in recent years either by statute or more liberal views of the court. The modern trend of judicial decisions is in the direction of determination of the question of variance in criminal proceedings on the basis of substance rather than an arbitrary technical reason. The courts are guided primarily by the constitutional safe*543guard protecting the accused. Schuble v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 299, 79 N. E. 2d 647; Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 106; 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., p. 1804.
The super technicality demanded by the old common law served its purpose in a period when punishment was shockingly severe. The practical sense of the present age demands that the guilt or innocence of an accused shall be determined upon proof and that immaterial variances and refinements shall not be available as technicalities to escape punishment for the commission of a crime. Lucas v. State (1918), 187 Ind. 709, 121 N. E. 274.
Courts have been subjected to frequent criticism in the past in this field. Procedure is a means to an end; it is not an end in itself. It should not thwart a decision on the merits. Every party is entitled to a fair trial on meritorious issues arrived at, but not to a trial which is not upon the merits. A miscarriage of justice does not enhance either the standing of the judicial system or the prestige of the legal profession.
In this case, as too often occurs, the charge has been made more specific than is required by the law, with the result that upon presentation of the evidence, there is a variance from a specific allegation in the indictment. An allegation that the hand grenade was loaded with “a dangerous and high explosive” or like language would have sufficed in this case.
It is frequently said that if the state sees fit to be more specific in the allegation of the offense charged than the law requires, the state is, nevertheless, bound to prove such detailed specification without variance upon trial. This is not a correct statement of the principle involved. Unnecessary descriptive material in a charge is surplusage. It need not be *544established in the proof and if there is a variance in the evidence from such unnecessary particularity it does not vitiate the proceedings unless it is shown that the defendant has been misled or prejudiced thereby. Schuble v. State, supra; Dixon v. Howard (Case No. 15,403), (3 Sumn. 12), 26 Fed. Cas., p. 388; Boos v. State (1914), 181 Ind. 562, 105 N. E. 117; Foust v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 76, 161 N. E. 371. This is in harmony with the statutory enactment in Indiana. Acts 1905, ch. 169, §192, p. 584, being §9-1127, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.
Fansler, J. in McCallister v. State (1940), 217 Ind. 65, 26 N. E. 2d 391, on page 71 said in this connection:
“The decisions indicate a tendency to tolerate a greater variance between allegations and proof where the allegations are hot necessary. But, from what we have seen from Chitty, it appears that the early cases, like the later ones just cited, looked to the materiality of the variance. It is true that in the Dennis case, and in other early Indiana cases, it is said that unnecessary descriptive allegations must be proven precisely as charged. In some of these cases the variance may have been material, but the court seems to have considered that the variance would be fatal regardless of materiality. The conclusion cannot be approved, since it is not supported by precedent or sound reason and has not been countenanced in the modern cases.” (Our italics.)
When we seek the reason behind the rule defining the material or fatal variance as distinguished from an immaterial one in a criminal proceeding, it becomes apparent where the line is drawn. It has been said:
“In determining whether a variance is material, the question to be decided is, does the indictment so far fully and correctly inform the defendant of the criminal act with which he is charged that, *545taking into consideration the proof which is introduced against him, he is not misled in making his defense, or placed in danger of being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense?”
Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 106, supra.
This court has said:
“... A variance, to warrant a reversal of a judgment on appeal to this court, must be a substantial one, such as might mislead the defense, or expose the defendant to the peril of being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.” (Our italics.) Oats v. State (1899), 153 Ind. 436, 439, 55 N. E. 226.
In other words, the test is, (1) was the defendant misled by the variance in the evidence from allegations and specifications in the charge in the preparation and maintenance of his defense, and was he harmed or prejudiced thereby?; (2) will the defendant be protected in the future criminal proceeding covering the same event, facts, and evidence against double jeopardy? State v. Rardon; State v. Montgomery, supra, 21 Ind. L. 3., p. 50, and cases cited.
The logic of this test becomes compelling because of two constitutional guaranties of the accused in criminal prosecutions.
Under Art 1, §13, of the Constitution of Indiana, the defendant is entitled “to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof.” Item No. 1 above meets this requirement if the charge contains allegations sufficiently definite that the defendant will not be misled as to the offense with which he is charged, and which he must prepare to meet upon the trial. The charge would be sufficiently specific if the defendant can reasonably anticipate the nature of the evidence with which he will be confronted on trial.
*546Art. 1, §14, of the Constitution of Indiana also provides that “no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.”
Item No. 2 above requires that the charge must be sufficiently specific so that in any event after jeopardy has attached, if a second like charge is filed covering the same evidence, events or facts against the accused, the defendant will be protected. United States v. Remington (C. C. A. 2d 1933), 64 F. 2d 386.
It, therefore, becomes evident that a variance of the proof on the trial in the criminal case from the allegation charged, to be immaterial and of no consequence upon the trial, must avoid and not contravene the two constitutional guaranties set forth above. With these two constitutional provisions in mind as a guide, we have in this state also a statutory provision which is pertinent to this question.
“No indictment or affidavit shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the same be set aside or quashed, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings be stayed, arrested or in any manner affected for any of the following defects:
“Tenth. For any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the' defendant upon the merits.” §9-1127, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, supra.
The statute applicable to variances in civil procedure seems to- be nothing more than a restatement of one of the common law principles here considered.
“No variance between the allegations in a pleading and the proof is to be deemed material, unless it have actually misled^ the adverse party, to his prejudice, in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. Whenever it is alleged that a party has been so misled, that fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and it must be shown in what respect he has been misled. . . .” *547Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, §130, p. 240, being §2-1063 Burns’ 1946 Replacement.
In other words it seems to be well settled in this state and most jurisdictions that the accepted rule in determining the materiality of a variance in a criminal proceeding is that it must be of such substantial character as to mislead the accused in preparing and maintaining his defense or the variances of such a degree as is likely to place him in second jeopardy for the same offense.
In this connection the point has been made by the state that there is no showing in this record that any objection was made by defendant at the time the evidence was offered by the state with reference to the variance in the trial, specifically setting forth the variance between the proof offered and the charge in the indictment. It is further urged that the question is raised for the first time on appeal. The defendant contends otherwise. It is unnecessary to determine this particular question of fact since there will be a retrial. Nevertheless, we should call the trial court’s and counsel’s attention to the law in this state which requires that to raise the question properly, the defendant shall not only object to the introduction of any evidence varying from the specifications in charge at the time it is tendered, but should point out to the trial court the specific variation and that the defendant is thereby either misled and prejudiced in his defense or runs the risk of being placed in jeopardy for the second time for the same offense.
In Utley v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 210, 91 N. E. 2d 355, the defendant claimed a material variance in the evidence from the place specified in the offense charged where the kidnapping was alleged to have taken place.
Emmert, Judge, speaking for the court, stated in part on page 215:
*548“Even if this witness were in error as to his answers, still no reversible error has been presented as to variance, since such error may only be saved by objecting to the evidence, which is a variance, at the time of its introduction at the trial, and if there be error in the court’s ruling on the admission of such evidence, it must be assigned as a cause for a new trial, [citing authorities.] There were no objections made to the testimony as to the place from which the victims had been kidnapped, and there was no error in any ruling by the trial court in this matter.”
See also: Gillespie v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 154, and cases therein cited, 142 N. E. 220.
. Also, Myers, J., speaking for this court in Mates v. State (1929), 200 Ind. 551, 557, 165 N. E. 816, said:
“If appellant believed there was a fatal variance between the averments of the affidavit and the proof in the case, he ought to have' seasonably interposed his objections in this respect during the trial in the lower court, and in the event of an adverse ruling have assigned it as a reason for a new trial.”
There is reason in this rule. The trial court at the time of the objection should have the opportunity to determine whether or not the defense is prejudiced or injured by surprise or for other reasons. The court also has an opportunity to determine whether or not the defendant may be placed in jeopardy a second time with the same evidence being offered under the charge then being tried.
Of course, where the variance is of such a character or so great that an essential allegation of the offense has not been proved, there also may be a failure of evidence to sustain the verdict or finding. In such a case the error also may be raised under such a specification in a motion for a new trial, or on a motion for a directed verdict or finding. It should be *549noted that the error raised in such a way is predicated primarily upon a total failure of proof of an essential element of the crime charged and not upon a mere variance in the proof.
Such is the situation with reference to the charge of issuing a fraudulent check to obtain property (a car) and proof shows it was given for credit. The statute .specifies giving such a check to obtain “money, merchandise, property, credit, or thing of value.” Acts 1927, ch. 201, §6, p. 576, being §10-2105, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.
In Rogers v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 443, 44 N. E. 2d 343, at page 445, this court said:
“The giving of a check to obtain property and the giving of a check in payment of an obligation are separate and distinct offenses, and it necessarily follows that evidence of one is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of the other.”
In such instances there is a total failure of proof on an essential statutory element of the crime. That is not an immaterial variance such as we have here. McCormick v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 393, 127 N. E. 2d 341.
We recognize that the degree of variance in the proof from the allegations in the offense charged can be so wide that it is patent that an essential allegation of the offense charged is not proved or that offense which is proved is not the same one that is described in the charge. In the latter instance the defendant would be subjected to the risk of double jeopardy. For example, an indictment charging the defendant with murder “by striking and wounding and forcibly throwing said Mollie Starbuck and Beulah May Starbuck into a well” will not sustain a conviction on evidence which showed that Mollie Starbuck was put in great fear and agitation by the threats of the defendant and to the *550extent that she lost her reason and jumped into the well and that by reason of her exposure and fright she died. Gipe v. State (1905), 165 Ind. 433, 75 N. E. 881.
A conviction based on an indictment for homicide by poisoning will not be sustained with proof of the commission of the homicide with a deadly weapon such as a gun. 30 C. J. Homicide, §340, p. 135; 40 C. J. S. Homicide, §182 (c), p. 1083; Sharwin’s Case, 1 East, P. C., p. 341.
However, where an indictment charged the defendant with murder by administering poison, stating specifically the kind of poison used although it need not have done so, it was not necessary that the proof correspond to the specific poison. Carter v. State (1851), 2 Ind. 617.
In another homicide case a variance was held immaterial where the indictment alleged a gun and the proof showed a pistol was used. Sullivan v. State (1924), 163 Ark. 353, 258 S. W. 980.
An allegation of a pistol and proof of a revolver used in the killing was held immaterial variance. State v. Barr (1937), 340 Mo. 738, 102 S. W. 2d 629.
An allegation of the use of a “revolving pistol” and the proof showing an automatic pistol was used, was held an immaterial variance. State v. Webb (1914), 254 Mo. 414, 162 S. W. 622.
In State v. Spahr (1917), 186 Ind. 589, 117 N. E. 648, this court said on page 592:
“In the present case, the indictment charges that appellee killed Littler by striking him with a shovel but some of the evidence tended to show that he struck him with a stone or a brick. The nature of the attack, however, is essentially the same in either event and proof of either act would sustain a verdict of guilt as against an objection based solely on the ground of variance.”
Chief Justice Spencer, in the Svahr case, quotes from 1 Michie on Homicide, pp. 559, 560 and 561 as follows:
*551“As to the allegation of the instrument by which death is inflicted, or the assault committed, there is no variance where the proof shows that another instrument than that alleged was used, where it was of a similar nature and caused the same character of wound or injury.”
“The question in each case is whether the nature and character of the injury and the manner and means of inflicting it as proved is practically and substantially, though not identically, the same as that alleged. Thus, evidence as to a dagger, sword, bayonet, hatchet or other cutting instrument has been held to support the averment of a knife; striking with a stick, club, metal bar, or pistol an allegation of striking with a rock; striking with a piece of iron an allegation of striking with a piece of plank; shooting with a pistol, shotgun, rifle, musket, or any kindred weapon, an allegation of killing or assaulting with a gun; shooting with a gun an allegation of shooting with a pistol and strangling with a scarf or cord, an averment of strangling or choking with the hands.” (Our italics.)
Of course, one charged with using a gun loaded with gunpowder and bullet to kill another could not be convicted under proof that a bow and arrow, blow gun, or poison was used, since, as stated above, the instrument must be “of a similar nature and cause the same character of wound or injury.” There is very little difference in the case before us, where it is charged the hand grenade was loaded with
nitroglycerine, and proof showed it contained T.N.T. than a case of a defendant charged with murd'er by shooting with a gun loaded “with gunpowder and leaden bullets” and the proof on trial showed that a steel bullet was used, or where the defendant is charged with using a certain kind of poison and the proof was that of another kind. Such a variance is immaterial under ordinary circumstances, in the absence of an objection and a showing that the de*552fendant is surprised and harmed in making his defense. Utley v. State, supra; Gillespie v. State, supra; Mates v. State, supra; Oats v. State, supra; Bigstaff v. State (1930),. 182 Ark. 174, 30 S. W. 2d 213.
Nitroglycerine and T.N.T. are much of the same general nature. Both are high explosives commonly used in the same general field. No issue was made during the trial in this case as to the character of the explosive, which would have any effect upon the manner or circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offense. No showing was made that the defendant was surprised by such immaterial variation in the evidence during the trial.
We do not wish to be understood as saying that under no circumstances would the variances above designated as immaterial be considered ■ material or fatal. It is conceivable that in some circumstances arid situations such variances might, upon proper objection at the proper time in the trial court, with a showing that the defendant has been misled in the preparation of his defense or case, become material. This might be true where the factual issues in the case on trial so developed that the extent of the explosion or other matters affecting its character went to the merits of the defense. In such a. case, however, it is the duty of the defendant to make timely and proper objection when such variances occur in the trial with the suggestion and showing that he is thereby prejudiced and is being injured and harmed in the defense of his case, and has been misled in the preparation of same.
The variance here does not meet the test necessary .to make it material and fatal to the criminal proceedings, namely, that the variance has misled the defendant in making his defense or places him in danger of double .jeopardy and being tried a second time for the same acts.
*553It seems to us that we should not set a precedent in this case which would permit a defendant from evading punishment, for no reason other than an immaterial variance in the proof and the allegations in the crime charged, which is as slight as that in this case, without a showing of being harmed or prejudiced by such deviation.
As previously stated, we feel a new trial should be granted in this case, but not upon error committed with reference to a variance in the proof from the charge.
Bobbitt, Achor and Landis, JJ., concur.
Note.—Reported in 130 N. E. 2d 35.