Court Opinion

ID: 9845109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:15:23.038771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:51.835917
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
A review of the salient facts of this appeal is necessary to point out the erroneous rationale of the majority opinion.
On January 13, 1973, one of the Hermanns’ attorneys wrote plaintiffs’ attorneys, who were then representing Stephen McGrath, the husband of the deceased, and requested that McGrath amend his complaint to include an allegation that “the plaintiff is the sole and only heir of the decedent” since McGrath was not bringing the suit as the personal representative. The attorney for the defendants Hermanns closed the letter stating, “Please understand that I have no information leading me to think that there are heirs other than Mr. McGrath, but this is a technical matter that we would wish to have clarified.” Obviously, the Hermanns’ attorney was seeking to guard against multiple wrongful death actions against the Hermanns, exactly what later happened in this case.
On January 18, 1973, the plaintiff McGrath filed an amended complaint alleging “that the plaintiff, Stephen J. McGrath, is the surviving husband and sole and only heir of Carol Jean McGrath, deceased.” McGrath’s case was then set for trial on April 16, 1973, and the parties began preparing for that trial.
Sometime prior to March 13, 1973, the attorneys for McGrath discovered that the Hogans-were heirs of the decedent and had a cause of action for her death. The respondents’ brief indicates that McGrath knew of the existence of the Hogans, the decedent’s parents, at the time he amended his complaint to allege that he was the sole heir of the decedent. Apparently, what was “discovered” in March of 1973 was that the old probate code, I.C. § 14-103 (repealed July 1, 1972), was in effect at the time of the decedent’s death and that under that statute both the Hogans, the surviving parents, and McGrath, the surviving spouse, were heirs. Upon learning that they were heirs entitled to prosecute a wrongful death action against the Hermanns, the Hogans *906retained McGrath’s attorneys to prosecute their claim.1
Despite the fact that our wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-311, clearly contemplates a single action for wrongful death in which all heirs must join, as the majority opinion recognizes, the Hogans consciously chose not to join McGrath’s pending wrongful death action. Rather, the Hogans concluded it would be better strategy for them to pursue a separate lawsuit. Additionally, McGrath did not amend the allegation in his complaint to inform the court and defense counsel that he was not the sole heir.
On Friday, April 13, 1973, three days before the trial of McGrath’s action and approximately a month after McGrath’s attorneys had “discovered” that the Hogans could maintain an action as additional heirs, plaintiffs’ attorneys contacted defendant Hermanns’ counsel to discuss a settlement of the case. According to the affidavit of the Hermanns’ counsel filed in the summary judgment proceeding, plaintiffs’ counsel informed them that:
“[Defendants had missed a point and it seemed obvious to them that defendants were not going to find it if they had not found it by this time; they informed affiant that during legal research they had done about a month ago they had run across a point about which they were certain they were correct; [plaintiffs’ counsel] informed affiant that in [plaintiffs’ counsel’s] opinion it would make a difference in the case; might well be an incentive to us to settle the case; but that they could not and would not reveal what the omission was unless and until affiant would assure them that affiant and his firm would not use the information to be given in any way to delay the beginning of the trial which had been set for case No. 23545 nor would such information be elicited during the trial for the purpose of continuing the trial;.....”
After some discussion the defendants’ attorney agreed to the disclosure of the information on those terms. Plaintiffs’ counsel then disclosed that the decedent’s parents were still living and that they were heirs under the statute and entitled to sue the appellants; that the parents had engaged them to prosecute their claim and that they had authority to settle both their claim and that of McGrath. The respondents’ attorneys then proposed a settlement figure for both claims.
Defendants’ attorney rejected that offer of settlement, and a discussion ensued about the joinder of the Hogans in the pending action by McGrath. The defendants’ affidavit alleges that plaintiffs’ counsel insisted that any move at that time to join the Hogans in the McGrath action would be a breach of the defendants’ attorney’s promise not to delay or seek a continuance of the trial by use of the secret information which he had just disclosed.
The defendants’ counsel’s affidavit asserts that they refused to consider settlement of the Hogans’ claim on the grounds that the Hogans were aware of the pending action by McGrath and had chosen not to join in it, and would therefore be precluded by the statute from asserting their claim. The attorneys, however, were able to reach a negotiated settlement on McGrath’s claim, a dismissal with prejudice of his suit was entered, and the question whether the Hogans could maintain a separate action was left open for later determination.2
*907The majority recognizes that in general all heirs must join or be joined together in one action and that a wrongful death action under I.C. § 5-311 cannot be split. But the majority then concludes that “[b]y voluntarily electing to settle an action with one heir at this time, with full knowledge of non-party heirs, appellants thereby waived the right to insist upon a single action joined in by all heirs.” Ante at 904.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion for two reasons. First, the majority opinion misapplies the single action rule. Second, the question of waiver upon which the majority opinion is bottomed involves a factual issue which cannot be resolved against the defendants in a summary judgment proceeding.
I
In Whitley v. Spokane Ry. Co., 23 Idaho 642, 654, 132 P. 121, 124 (1913), this Court stated that, “It is also clear that the duty to bring [in the non-party heir] was equally as exacting on the part of the [defendant] railroad company as on the part of the plaintiff.... ” The majority opinion recognizes this by noting that the statute itself suggests “that if the action is not brought by the personal representative of the decedent, then all heirs must join or be joined together to prosecute one wrongful death action.” Ante at 903. The Court further notes, in its analysis of the cases from other jurisdictions, that “the cases hold that separate actions usually cannot be maintained by the several beneficiaries entitled under the acts.” Ante at 903. However, after accurately articulating the single action rule, the majority seemingly overlooks the fact that the Hogans were aware of their status as heirs at least a month before the trial of the McGrath action and consciously made the decision not to join in that action. Instead, they chose to file a separate action, as the record indicates, for the purpose of finessing a larger recovery.3 If the decision of the majority is really based upon waiver, as it purports to be, where is the majority’s analysis of the “waiver” which necessarily must result from the Hogans’ knowledge of their claim and the pending lawsuit, and their conscious decision not to join in that lawsuit? And where is the majority’s analysis of the effect of the manner of disclosure of their claims by the Hogans to the Hermanns — the Friday before the opening of the Monday trial of the McGrath lawsuit — and then only after extracting a promise that the Hermanns would not use the “information ... in any way to delay the beginning of the trial.... nor would such information be elicited during the trial for purposes of continuing the trial”? While the majority opinion has stated that the rule of law in these cases is that all heirs have an equal obligation and must join in a pending action, it totally omits any discussion of the obligation of the plaintiffs Hogans to join in the pending action and the “waiver” resulting from their conscious decision not to join.
In support of its decision in this case, the majority relies strongly upon the Georgia case of Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Wells, 204 Ga. 814, 51 S.E.2d 569 (1949), quoting at length from that case. However, what the majority opinion does not point out is that in that case the settlement made by the defendant with some of the heirs was prior to the commencement of any action by any of the heirs. When the five non-settling heirs then brought their action, it was the first and only wrongful death action which had been filed. The Georgia Court held that the settlement pri- or to any action did not preclude a single action brought by all remaining non-settling heirs. That is a far different situation than this case where one of the heirs had filed an action and other heirs consciously decided not to join but to proceed in a separate action.
*908The majority opinion does not discuss the recent case of Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 71 Cal.App.3d 805, 138 Cal.Rptr. 319 (1977), which appears to be essentially identical to this case. The Mayerhoff case was the second action against several wrongful death defendants. In the first, the defendants settled with the plaintiffs, the husband and child of the deceased wife, and that suit was then dismissed with prejudice. Thereafter, the defendants were again sued by the deceased’s parents in another wrongful death action. On these facts, the California court held that the prior suit, even though concluded by settlement, barred a second suit by the other heirs.
I.C. § 5-311, like much of our early day procedural code, was adopted verbatim from the California Code. This Court has regularly held that the decisions of the courts of the state from which statutes are adopted are persuasive in interpreting our similar statutes. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel v. Cal-Cut Pipe Co., 98 Idaho 495, 499, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977); Akichika v. Kellerher, 96 Idaho 930, 933, 539 P.2d 283 (1975); Intermountain Business Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Business Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 541, 531 P.2d 1183 (1975); Simons v. Davenport, 66 Idaho 400, 160 P.2d 464 (1945); Short v. Thompson, 56 Idaho 361, 375, 55 P.2d 163 (1936). At least as early as 1890, the California Supreme Court had construed their statute to permit only one action for wrongful death.
“In our judgment, but one action is permitted, and that action may be brought either by the heirs of the deceased or by his personal representative; and when one action is brought, and the court has obtained jurisdiction of it, that is the only action which the statute permits.” Munro v. Pacific Coast Dredging & Reclamation Co., 84 Cal. 515, 24 P. 303, 304-05 (1890).
The recent statement from the California Supreme Court is equally applicable in Idaho:
“In stating that an action for wrongful death is joint, it is meant, that all heirs should join or be joined in the action and that a single verdict should be rendered for all recoverable damages; when it is said that the action is single, it is meant that only one action for wrongful death may be brought whether, in fact, it is instituted by all or only one of the heirs, or by the personal representative of the decedent as statutory trustee for the heirs; and when it is said that the action is indivisible, it is meant that there cannot be a series of suits by heirs against the tortfeasor for their individual damages.” Cross v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 60 Cal.2d 690, 36 Cal.Rptr. 321, 388 P.2d 353, 355 (1964) (emphasis added).
While the majority opinion correctly states the Idaho rule to be that “all heirs must join or be joined together to prosecute one wrongful death action,” ante at 903, for some reason the majority opinion does not even consider the effect of that rule on the Hogans’ conscious decision not to join the existing action by McGrath. Rather-, the majority finds a talisman which solves the case for them — waiver.
II
The majority’s conclusion that the defendants Hermanns “waived the right to insist upon a single action joined in by all of the heirs,” ante at 904, is a finding of fact made for the first time by this Court on appeal which is totally unjustified by our appellate practice. This case comes to us on appeal from a partial summary judgment in which the trial court struck the defendants’ single action defense. The majority of this Court affirms on a different ground — a factual finding that “by voluntarily electing to settle an action with one heir at this time, with full knowledge of the other non-party heirs, appellants thereby waived the right to insist upon a single action joined in by all the heirs.” Ante at 904. However, “waiver” requires an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Minidoka County v. Krieger, 88 Idaho 395, 399 P.2d 962 (1964); Nelson v. Hopper, 86 Idaho 115, 383 P.2d 588 (1963); Grover v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm’n, 83 Idaho 351, 364 *909P.2d 167 (1961). On more than one occasion this Court has stated that “what constitutes a waiver is essentially a question of intention .... In order to establish a waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear, and a waiver . .. will not be presumed or implied, contrary to the intention of the party whose rights would be injuriously affected thereby unless, by his conduct, the opposite party was misled to his prejudice, in the honest belief that such waiver was intended or consented to.” Smith v. Faris Kesl Constr. Co., 27 Idaho 407, 429, 150 P. 25, 32 (1915), quoted with approval in Grover v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm’n, 83 Idaho 351, 357-58, 364 P.2d 167, 171 (1961).
The majority does not recite all of the facts in the record that relate to the factual issue of waiver. While noting that the settlement made with McGrath and the release “drafted by appellants’ counsel, relates solely to McGrath’s personal damages suffered by the death of his wife,” ante at 904, and that the decedent’s parents were not mentioned, the majority makes no mention of the affidavit of the plaintiff Hogans’ attorney, filed in the summary judgment proceeding, which admits that:
“The negotiations resulted in an understanding between the attorneys representing all parties that the claim of Stephen J. McGrath would be settled for him alone without prejudice to the right of the parents of the decedent to initiate their independent action for her death and further without prejudice to the defendants to raise any defenses that they felt they might have including the defense which they are now asserting.” (Emphasis added.)
On a motion for summary judgment the facts, and all inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 229, 612 P.2d 142 (1980); Wyckoff v. Board of County Comm’n of Ada County, 101 Idaho 12, 607 P.2d 1066 (1980); Jones v. Jones, 100 Idaho 510, 601 P.2d 1 (1979); Nielsen v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 596 P.2d 95 (1979). If “what constitutes a waiver is essentially a question of intention,” and if a waiver “will not be presumed or implied contrary to the intention of the party whose rights would be injuriously affected thereby,” as this Court said in Smith v. Faris-Kesl Constr. Co., supra, and Grover v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm’n, supra, how then on this record can this Court find that the Hermanns’ intention was to waive their right to insist upon a single action joined in by all of the heirs, particularly in view of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s own affidavit which admits that the understanding of all the parties was that the 'defendants Hermanns were not waiving their defense by settling the first action?
The trial court did not spell out the reason for granting the partial summary judgment and striking the Hermanns’ single action defense; however, there certainly was no mention of any “waiver" in the trial court’s decision, and properly so, since it raises factual issues which our prior decisions clearly say cannot be resolved in a summary judgment proceeding. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Copper Min. Co., 100 Idaho 325, 597 P.2d 211 (1979); Nielsen v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 596 P.2d 95 (1979). See also Joyner v. Jones, 97 Idaho 647, 551 P.2d 602 (1976); Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, 549 P.2d 266 (1976). For this Court to make that factual determination for the first time on appeal, on this record which conclusively discloses that there was no intention on the part of the Hermanns to waive their defense, it is difficult to comprehend.

. One of the affidavits in the record in the summary judgment proceeding in this action suggests that the Hogans were not interested in recovering any money for themselves but “were willing that anything they may receive could go to Stephen M. McGrath to increase the total amount he would receive and affiant came away from these discussions with the impression that the plaintiffs in the above case, the parents of Carol Jean McGrath, were really not interested in recovering any money on their own but that they were more interested in getting additional money for Stephen McGrath by virtue of their entry into the case in the settlement of their claim, if any.”

. The affidavit of Michael H. Felton, one of the attorneys for both the husband Stephen McGrath and the plaintiffs Hogans states:
“The negotiations resulted in an understanding between the attorneys representing all parties that the claim of Stephen J. McGrath would be settled for him alone without prejudice to the right of the parents of *907the decedent to initiate their independent action for her death and further without prejudice to the defendants to raise any defenses that they felt they might have including the defense which they are now exerting.” (Emphasis added.)

. See note 1, supra.