Court Opinion

ID: 9408029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 14:11:01.922304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.277222
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Beales, O’Brien and Athey
              Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

              ADONAY POLANCO CABRERA
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1038-22-4                                    JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
                                                                                    JULY 11, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                                              Penney S. Azcarate, Judge

                              (John W. Pickett; Pickett Law Group, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
                              Appellant submitting on brief.

                              Aaron J. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a jury trial, Adonay Polanco Cabrera was convicted of first-degree murder,

              statutory burglary, and grand larceny.1 On appeal, Polanco Cabrera contends that the trial court

              erred in admitting evidence that he fled to El Salvador following the murder and in admitting into

              evidence autopsy and crime scene photos of the victim. He also contends that the trial court erred in

              denying his motion to strike for failing to prove the offense date alleged in the indictment and in

              denying his motion to strike based on the insufficiency of the evidence to convict him of murder.

                                                      I. BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, [as] the prevailing party at trial.” Scott v.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                       On appeal, Polanco Cabrera does not challenge his convictions for statutory burglary or
              for grand larceny.
Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016). As the Supreme Court has stated, “This principle

requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth,

and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair

inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68 (2015)

(quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).

       In November 2016, Leif Erick Ohlsson and Polanco Cabrera were engaged in a romantic

relationship. In the afternoon of November 22, 2016, Ohlsson picked up Polanco Cabrera and

Polanco Cabrera’s roommate, Fredy Cisneros Agustin, from their apartment. They first drove to

a park and then went out to dinner. After dinner, they purchased beer and cocaine before

arriving at Ohlsson’s apartment around 11:00 p.m. that evening.

       At Ohlsson’s apartment, Polanco Cabrera and Cisneros Agustin used cocaine, and all

three of them (including Ohlsson) listened to music and drank beer. Cisneros Agustin testified

that, when Polanco Cabrera finished the cocaine, Polanco Cabrera asked Ohlsson “for more

money to buy more cocaine” and for Ohlsson’s car. Ohlsson gave Polanco Cabrera money for

the cocaine but refused to let him use the car. According to Cisneros Agustin, Ohlsson’s refusal

to let Polanco Cabrera use the car made Polanco Cabrera angry, and Polanco Cabrera told

Cisneros Agustin, “I think I’m going to kill this old man.”

       Soon thereafter, Cisneros Agustin went to use the bathroom. He testified that, while he

was in the bathroom, he heard Ohlsson yell, “No, Adonay, no, Adonay, please, no, please, no.”

When Cisneros Agustin exited the bathroom, he saw Ohlsson on the floor and Polanco Cabrera

using a shoelace to strangle Ohlsson. Polanco Cabrera had braced his foot against the back of

Ohlsson’s neck and was pulling the shoelace tight around his neck. Ohlsson’s face was purple,

and blood hemorrhaged from his mouth. When Cisneros Agustin asked Polanco Cabrera what

he had done, Polanco Cabrera responded, “I killed him.” Cisneros Agustin testified that

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Polanco Cabrera instructed him to drop a nearby marble bust onto Ohlsson’s body.

Cisneros Agustin complied, dropping the marble bust on Ohlsson’s head.

       Cisneros Agustin testified that he and Polanco Cabrera then left Ohlsson’s apartment

around 12:00 a.m. or 12:30 a.m. on November 23, 2016. Before they left, they took a safe,

several paintings, and Ohlsson’s car keys.2 They then called Jose Perez Amaya and Gabriel

Coca, and the four of them went to a park and opened the stolen safe. The four men returned to

Polanco Cabrera’s apartment and divided the stolen items. Polanco Cabrera gave

Cisneros Agustin two watches that were taken from the safe. Then, around 5:00 a.m.,

Polanco Cabrera and his friends returned to Ohlsson’s apartment to steal a carpet and some more

paintings. Apartment security cameras recorded them entering the building and departing with

Ohlsson’s property.

       The next day, November 24, 2016, Cisneros Agustin called the police to report Ohlsson’s

murder. Fairfax County police officers Brian McCarthy and Mario Colorado responded to the

call and spoke with Cisneros Agustin. Both officers testified that, during their initial interactions

with him, Cisneros Agustin “appeared intoxicated.” Cisneros Agustin handed over the watches

stolen from Ohlsson’s safe and told the officers that he had been drinking with friends two days

prior during which “a shoelace was used to kill the American.” Cisneros Agustin initially

claimed that they had “accidentally” killed the man after the man had made a derogatory

comment about Hispanics and that they left his body on a table. During a police interview with

Detective John Long, Cisneros Agustin explained that Polanco Cabrera had strangled Ohlsson

with a shoelace.

       2
        Security cameras recorded Polanco Cabrera and Cisneros Agustin leaving the apartment
complex with the items they stole from Ohlsson’s apartment.
                                             -3-
       Based on the information provided by Cisneros Agustin, police searched both Ohlsson’s

apartment and the apartment that Cisneros Agustin shared with Polanco Cabrera. In Ohlsson’s

apartment, police found Ohlsson’s body covered by a bolt of fabric and lying face-down on the

floor in the hallway between the bathroom and the study. A marble bust lay beside Ohlsson’s

head. They also noticed that there were “some empty spots” on the wall “where perhaps picture

frames were missing.” When police searched Polanco Cabrera’s apartment, they found some of

the stolen picture frames and paintings in Polanco Cabrera’s sleeping area.

       Police arrested Cisneros Agustin late on November 24, 2016. Perez Amaya and Coca

were also arrested around this time. Fairfax County police were unable to arrest Polanco Cabrera

because he fled to El Salvador shortly after the murder. On December 14, 2017, a grand jury

indicted Polanco Cabrera for the murder of Leif Erick Ohlsson “[o]n or about the 23rd day of

November, 2016,” for statutory burglary, and for grand larceny. In 2020, El Salvador extradited

Polanco Cabrera to the United States.

       During an August 18, 2020 police interview, Polanco Cabrera admitted that he,

Cisneros Agustin, and Ohlsson were in Ohlsson’s apartment on the night of Ohlsson’s murder.

He also admitted that he participated in taking the safe and paintings from Ohlsson’s apartment,

that they took Ohlsson’s car, that they went to a park to try to open the safe, and that he got

scared so he fled to El Salvador. He denied killing Ohlsson, instead claiming that, on the night

of the incident, he received a phone call from Sandra Chavez and went out on the balcony to talk

to her. When he returned inside the apartment, he found Ohlsson dead on the floor. However, at

trial, Chavez testified that she did not remember speaking with Polanco Cabrera at all during the

month of November 2016.

                                                -4-
       At trial, Cisneros Agustin testified against Polanco Cabrera under a cooperation

agreement with the Commonwealth.3 He admitted that he struck Ohlsson with the bust but

maintained that he feared that Polanco Cabrera would kill him if he did not do so. On

cross-examination, Cisneros Agustin acknowledged that, over the course of the approximately

five years between the murder and Polanco Cabrera’s trial, his statements about the details of the

murder may have had some discrepancies, but he explained that he was heavily intoxicated

during the incident and could not recall all the details. He also acknowledged that he previously

sought to withdraw his guilty pleas and accused his court-appointed attorney of forcing him to

plead guilty. However, he maintained that his testimony at trial was true.

       Dr. Meghan Kessler, an expert in forensic pathology, testified at trial that Ohlsson died

from strangulation and from blunt force injuries to his head. Dr. Kessler opined that Ohlsson

sustained “blunt force” injuries behind his right ear. He also had “petechial hemorrhages” and an

“abrasion impression around his neck” from “a probable ligature,” which Dr. Kessler further

testified were consistent with “strangulation by a shoelace.”4 According to Dr. Kessler, Ohlsson

was alive when he was strangled and when he suffered the blunt force injuries.

       At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Polanco Cabrera of first-degree murder,

statutory burglary, and grand larceny. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Polanco Cabrera now appeals to this Court.

       3
         Cisneros Agustin acknowledged at trial that he had pled guilty to first-degree murder
and grand larceny under a plea agreement that limited his possible active sentence to 40 years of
incarceration, provided that he “fully and truthfully cooperat[ed] in the investigation and
prosecution of any and all co-Defendants in this case,” including Polanco Cabrera.
       4
           Autopsy photographs clearly show a ligature mark around Ohlsson’s neck.
                                               -5-
                                            II. ANALYSIS

                                    A. Admissibility of the Evidence

       An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit certain evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 692, 697 (2019) (“Decisions

regarding the admissibility of evidence ‘lie within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not

be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Michels v. Commonwealth, 47

Va. App. 461, 465 (2006))). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse

of discretion has occurred.” Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009).

             1. Admissibility of Evidence of Polanco Cabrera’s Flight to El Salvador

       In his first assignment of error, Polanco Cabrera contends that “[t]he trial court erred by

allowing admission of evidence of the Appellant’s flight where the probative value of the

evidence was clearly outweighed by the prejudicial effect.” Generally, evidence of an accused’s

“[f]light following the commission of a crime is evidence of guilt, and the jury may be so

instructed.” Ricks v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 330, 335 (2002) (quoting Clagett v.

Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 93 (1996)). “Evidence of flight from authorities that occurred days,

or even months, after a crime is admissible, as ‘[a]ny flight at a time when it may be to avoid

arrest, prosecution, or confinement tends to show a consciousness of guilt.’” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 103 (1991)). Notably,

“introduction of evidence of flight does not depend upon issuance of a warrant” or the defendant

speaking with law enforcement about the crime before fleeing. Id. (emphasis added). Instead,

“to show a ‘consciousness of guilt,’ a nexus must exist between the flight and the alleged

offense.” Id. Thus, “[t]he evidence must establish appellant had some knowledge that he might

be a suspect in the killing.” Id.

                                                  -6-
       During his police interview in 2020, Polanco Cabrera admitted that he was present at

Ohlsson’s apartment during the violent murder of Ohlsson (who had been his lover), that he stole

valuable items from the deceased, and that he took Ohlsson’s car. Furthermore, in that same

interview, Polanco Cabrera actually admitted that he fled to El Salvador after the murder because

he was scared. This admission, taken in conjunction with his knowledge of the crime and his

presence at the scene of the crime, certainly supports the conclusion that Polanco Cabrera “had

some knowledge that he might be a suspect.” Id. Indeed, Polanco Cabrera’s conduct of quickly

fleeing the country after Ohlsson’s murder and his later statements to law enforcement tended to

prove that “immediately after the killing” of Ohlsson, Polanco Cabrera “sought to avoid any

contact with law enforcement officials and the courts.” Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497,

513 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the probative value of

this evidence against its potential prejudicial effects and in admitting this evidence.

                       2. Admissibility of Crime Scene and Autopsy Photos

       In his second assignment of error, Polanco Cabrera contends that “[t]he trial court erred

by allowing admission of autopsy photos and crime scene photos of the victim’s deceased body

where the probative value of the evidence was clearly outweighed by the prejudicial effect.”

Specifically, he argues that the photographs had little probative value because the manner of

Ohlsson’s death was not in dispute and that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed

the photographs’ probative value.

       “A defendant’s stipulation” regarding “the cause of the victim’s death does not allow the

[defendant] to sanitize the evidence and thus preclude the Commonwealth from introducing

photographs showing the dead victim, even if the pictures may be considered gruesome.”

Burnette v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 462, 485 (2012). Indeed, “[a]ccurate photographs of a

crime scene are not rendered inadmissible solely because they are gruesome, and autopsy

                                                -7-
photographs of the victim are admissible to show the atrociousness or vileness of a crime.”

Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 482 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1191 (2008).

Although “[s]uch photographs must nevertheless be excluded if their prejudicial effect

substantially outweighs their probative value,” that “weighing is left to the discretion of the trial

court and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. Furthermore, the

Supreme Court has held that such evidence is admissible to establish “motive, intent, method,

malice, premeditation and the atrociousness of [the defendant’s] crimes.” Orbe v.

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 402 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Chichester v.

Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 326 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995)), cert. denied, 529

U.S. 1113 (2000).

       Here, the Commonwealth was not required to accept Polanco Cabrera’s stipulation

regarding the cause of Ohlsson’s death. See Burnette, 60 Va. App. at 485. In addition, the

autopsy and crime scene photographs, which depicted the brutality of Ohlsson’s murder, were

highly probative of Polanco Cabrera’s malice and premeditation (two elements of first-degree

murder). See Orbe, 258 Va. at 402. The photographs also corroborated Cisneros Agustin’s

account of the incident, rendering the photographs essential to the Commonwealth’s case given

Polanco Cabrera’s attempts to discredit Cisneros Agustin’s testimony. Thus, the photographs

were highly probative and essential to the Commonwealth’s case, and the probative value was

not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to Polanco Cabrera. See Washington v.

Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 551 (1984) (“One who creates such a scene may not complain if

an accurate depiction of his handiwork later confronts him in court.”), cert. denied, 471 U.S.

1111 (1985). Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the autopsy and crime scene photographs.

                                                 -8-
               B. Alleged Variance in the Offense Date Specified in the Indictment

       In his third assignment of error, Polanco Cabrera contends that “[t]he trial court erred in

denying the Appellant’s motion to strike where the offense date alleged in the indictment for

murder was inconsistent with the date of offense proven at trial.” The indictment alleges that

Polanco Cabrera murdered Ohlsson “[o]n or about the 23rd day of November, 2016.” (Emphasis

added). The evidence adduced at trial shows that Polanco Cabrera killed Ohlsson sometime

between 11:00 p.m. on November 22, 2016 and 12:30 a.m. on November 23, 2016. Thus, the

evidence clearly established that Ohlsson was murdered on or about November 23, 2016, and no

variance or inconsistency between the date alleged in the indictment and the evidence exists. See

Purvy v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 260, 266 (2011) (“A variance occurs when the criminal

pleadings differ from the proof at trial.”). Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err

in denying Polanco Cabrera’s motion to strike.

               C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for First-Degree Murder Conviction

       In his fourth assignment of error, Polanco Cabrera contends that “[t]he trial court erred by

denying the Appellant’s motion to strike the murder offense where the evidence was insufficient

as a matter of law.” As acknowledged by Polanco Cabrera on brief, Cisneros Agustin’s

testimony at trial provided direct evidence that Polanco Cabrera strangled Ohlsson on or about

November 23, 2016. Furthermore, Cisneros Agustin’s testimony established that

Polanco Cabrera also instructed Cisneros Agustin to drop a marble bust on Ohlsson. However,

Polanco Cabrera argues that Cisneros Agustin’s testimony was inherently incredible and,

therefore, insufficient to sustain his conviction.

       When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, “a reviewing court does not

‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt,’” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 663 (2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

                                                 -9-
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing party in the trial court,” Riner v.

Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 330 (2004), “[w]e must instead ask whether ‘any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’” Crowder,

41 Va. App. at 663 (quoting Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257 (2003) (en banc)).

“This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic

facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

        Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has often stated, “[t]he trier of fact is the sole judge of

the credibility of the witnesses, unless, as a matter of law, the testimony is inherently incredible.”

Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (alteration in original) (quoting Walker v.

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-71 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000)), cert. denied, 549

U.S. 960 (2006). “To be ‘incredible,’ testimony ‘must be either so manifestly false that

reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to be false by objects or things as to

the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Id. (quoting Cardwell v.

Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414 (1968)). The fact that a witness is also a co-defendant

“testifying pursuant to a plea agreement involving the present crime” does not render that

witness’s testimony inherently incredible, Yates v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 140, 144 (1987),

nor does the fact that a witness may have given inconsistent statements during the investigation

of a crime, Juniper, 271 Va. at 415. These circumstances are “appropriately weighed as part of

the entire issue of witness credibility, which is left to the jury to determine.” Id.

        The record supports the trial court’s ruling that Cisneros Agustin’s testimony was not

inherently incredible as a matter of law. At trial, Cisneros Agustin testified unequivocally that

Polanco Cabrera strangled Ohlsson to death with a shoelace and that, at Polanco Cabrera’s

                                                 - 10 -
direction, he dropped a marble bust on Ohlsson’s head. Physical evidence, including Ohlsson’s

autopsy and crime scene photographs, corroborated Cisneros Agustin’s testimony. See Lambert

v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 760 (2019) (holding that a witness’s testimony was not

inherently incredible when it was corroborated by other evidence). Specifically, Dr. Kessler

testified that Ohlsson sustained fatal injuries from blunt force injuries and from strangulation.

Autopsy photographs show a clearly visible ligature mark about the width of a shoelace, and

crime scene photographs show a marble bust lying next to Ohlsson’s head.

       Although Cisneros Agustin was intoxicated during the incident and provided inconsistent

descriptions of the incident to police, the jury was entitled to consider those circumstances in

weighing his credibility. See Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019) (holding

that inconsistencies in a witness’s account do not necessarily render his testimony inherently

incredible); see also Burnette v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 578, 581-82 (1939) (holding that a

witness’s intoxication bears on his credibility but does not necessarily render his testimony

“unworthy of belief”). Furthermore, Cisneros Agustin’s testimony is not rendered inherently

incredible simply because he was an accomplice to Ohlsson’s murder and testified in hopes of

ingratiating himself to the Commonwealth, as it is well-settled that a defendant “may be

convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Johnson v. Commonwealth,

224 Va. 525, 527 (1982); see also Yates, 4 Va. App. at 144 (holding that a co-defendant’s

testimony is not inherently incredible merely because he testified under a plea agreement). Each

of the foregoing circumstances was appropriately submitted to and decided by the jury as part of

the jury’s credibility determination.

       In short, the Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently incredible,

and was sufficient to prove that Polanco Cabrera murdered Ohlsson. Consequently, we uphold

Polanco Cabrera’s conviction for first-degree murder.

                                               - 11 -
                               III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                   Affirmed.

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