Court Opinion

ID: 9495986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:14:51.240909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:18.201406
License: Public Domain

ROTH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The Majority’s decision to remand this case for a new trial is based on only two questions. The District Court excluded both questions when the government objected to them. The first question, asked by defense counsel to Sly Sylvester, was
Q. Did anyone explain to you what the penalties for five kilos is under the guidelines?
MR. RIVETTI: Your Honor, I object to these questions regarding the penalties for five kilos.
THE COURT: Okay. Penalties should not be discussed in the case, I would agree.
The second question, asked by defense counsel to Kathleen Yearwood, was
Q. And you know that you’re here, you’re facing a heavy sentence - what did your attorney, Mr. Reister, tell you you’re facing?
MR. RIVETTI: Your Honor, again I object to discussing the penalties here.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. I think the point’s been made that she knows by testifying she might get a reduction.
Both questions are addressed to the specific penalty to be imposed for a particular offense - either the offense with which the witness was charged or the offense with which the witness could have been charged if the government had not charged him with a lesser offense in return for testifying against his co-eonspirators.
As established in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1481, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), cited by the Majority, the District Court, when it limits cross-examination, should consider the potential effect of the foreclosed cross-examination on the jury’s evaluation of the witness. Here, defense counsel had cross-examined Sylvester and Yearwood about their cooperation agreements with the government and the benefits each hoped to get as a result of testifying against Chandler, including the benefit Sylvester received by being charged with dealing only in 3 ounces of cocaine, rather than in five kilograms. I believe that, as a consequence of the decision in this case, a district judge in the future will have to conclude that, if a cooperating witness has been cross-examined about the benefits of his or her bargain with the government and defense counsel wants to go further to inquire about the specific penalty which could have been imposed on that witness, the question must be permitted. I consider such a limitation on the District Court’s wide discretion in controlling cross-examination to be unwarranted.
First, it is well recognized that, when cross-examination has presented a sufficient opportunity to expose witness bias, there is very little probative value in a question about the precise sentence which the witness might face. See United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1153 (1st Cir.1995). In such circumstances, the *226District Court may properly limit cross-examination to preclude testimony about the penalty which might be imposed. Id.; see also Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1992);5 United States v. Ambers, 85 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir.1997). My review of the record here convinces me that both Sylvester’s and Yearwood’s motives, in testifying to obtain benefits from the government for their cooperation, had been spelled out to the jury by cross-examination. At that point, there comes into play the discretion which is accorded to the District Judge to control the extent of cross-examination. See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 918-19 (3d Cir.1992). The Court of Appeals should not second guess the decision, either to admit the question on exact penalty or to exclude it. Indeed, I do not have to agree with the trial judge’s decision to admit or exclude in order to acknowledge that that decision is permitted within the allowed scope of discretion.
Moreover, there are well-recognized reasons to exclude testimony on the exact penalty a cooperating witness might face. When the defendant on trial has committed offenses similar to those committed by a cooperating witness, the impact of the extent of the potential penalty may deter the jury from making a finding of guilt. See Cropp, 127 F.3d at 358-59. Furthermore, the difficulty under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines of estimating what the ultimate penalty may be has discouraged trial courts from opening up the subject. See Ambers, 85 F.3d at 176-77.
In arriving at the decision that Chandler was deprived of an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Sylvester and Kathleen Yearwood, the majority concludes that Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) governs its analysis. In Davis, the trial court had prohibited the defendant from cross-examining a key prosecution witness about his status as a juvenile probationer. The Supreme Court held that the defendant should not have been precluded from probing the witness’s possible bias in testifying. Id. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105. I find, however, that Davis is distinguishable from the present case in that here the defendant was permitted to probe the existence of bias in the expectation of both Sylvester and Kathleen Yearwood that their testimony would result in a lesser punishment for them. The complaint here is not that the probing of bias was prohibited entirely but that the extent of the probing was limited. From my review of the record, I conclude that this limitation was permissible under Van Arsdall and that Davis does not speak to the crucial issue before us of the limitation, rather than the prohibition, of cross-examination which is aimed at probing bias.
Finally, even if cross-examination as to the exact penalty that might be imposed on Sylvester and Kathleen Yearwood should have been permitted, I would nevertheless affirm Chandler’s conviction because, in light of the extensive evidence against her, the error was harmless. For example, included in the testimony given by government witnesses, but not mentioned by the Majority, was the fact that Chandler made repeated deposits into a bank account of large amounts of cash, totaling over $8,000, when she had no legitimate source for these funds. In addition, Kathleen Yearwood’s sister, Annette, testified that she overheard Chandler and *227Kathleen discussing cocaine trafficking activities and that “more than a few times” when Chandler and other co-conspirators were in Annette’s New York apartment, Annette saw “lots of money” on the kitchen table and once or twice she saw packaged drugs. I believe that both of these examples give direct evidence of Chandler’s involvement in drug trafficking. Therefore, unlike the Majority, I cannot conclude that the limitation of cross-examination contributed to the jury’s judgment of conviction.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that Chandler’s judgment of conviction should be reversed.

. Judge Poliak, the author of the Majority's decision here, dissented in Brown on the ground that the defendant was not afforded "the constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry” if the exact penalty he escaped by cooperating with the government was not disclosed to the jury. Id. at 221.