Court Opinion

ID: 9927200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:07:12.49183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.809135
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1004-21

CHRIS DOE,1

          Plaintiff-Appellant/
          Cross-Respondent,

v.

RUTGERS, THE STATE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY,

          Defendant-Respondent/
          Cross-Appellant,

and

CASEY WOODS, in his official
capacity as the interim OPRA
Administrator and Records Custodian
of RUTGERS UNIVERSITY,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________

1
  Chris Doe is a fictitious name used to protect the confidentiality of the school
records which are the subject of this appeal. See L.R. v. Camden City Pub. Sch.
Dist., 452 N.J. Super. 56, 80 (App. Div. 2017) (noting the Legislature's desire
"to safeguard from public access a citizen’s personal information with which it
has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the citizen’s
reasonable expectation of privacy" (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1)).
            Submitted October 11, 2023 – Decided January 26, 2024

            Before Judges Sumners and Smith.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-1651-18.

            Jamie Mark Epstein, and Cohn Lifland Pearlman,
            Herrmann & Knopf LLP, attorneys for appellant/cross-
            respondent (Jamie Mark Epstein and Walter Michael
            Luers, on the brief).

            McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP,
            attorneys for respondents/cross-appellant (Michael
            O'Brien Boldt, of counsel and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

      This appeal stems from parallel actions filed by plaintiff Chris Doe to

obtain records from defendants, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey,

and Casey Woods, interim Open Public Records Act (OPRA) administrator and

records custodian of Rutgers University, under OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13.

In a published decision, we held plaintiff was entitled to his own student

disciplinary records and ordered defendants to comply with his OPRA requests.

Doe v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J. (Doe I), 466 N.J. Super. 14, 31 (App. Div.

2021). We remanded to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff was

entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party in an OPRA action under

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Id. at 31.

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                                      2
      Plaintiff subsequently filed new OPRA requests claiming he was entitled

to obtain additional records under Doe I. Defendants identified several thousand

pages responsive to plaintiff's requests and advised him he could obtain the

records after paying "special service charges."

      Refusing to pay, plaintiff filed a second OPRA action, claiming

defendants denied his new OPRA requests by imposing special service charges

in violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA),

20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1). A month later, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce

litigant's rights under Doe I's trial court docket and a motion to obtain attorney's

fees arising from this motion. Rutgers removed plaintiff's second OPRA action

to federal court and filed a cross-motion in state court to enforce a settlement

agreement it had previously reached with plaintiff in Doe I.

      The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to enforce litigant's rights and

motion for attorney's fees but granted in part Rutgers' motion to enforce

settlement. After plaintiff filed the within appeal and Rutgers cross-appealed

from those orders, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

dismissed plaintiff's second OPRA action in Doe v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J.,

No. 21-17811 (KM) (AME), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91897, at *15 (D.N.J. May

20, 2022), and plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit.

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      While the federal court appeal was pending, plaintiff filed his merits brief

in this appeal, which, like his federal brief, argued defendants denied his 2021

OPRA requests by imposing special service charges unlawful under FERPA.

The Third Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument in an unpublished decision

affirming the District Court. Doe v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J. (Doe II), No.

22-2087, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 4626, at *8-9 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023).

      Based upon our review of the record, the parties' arguments, and

applicable legal principles, we now dismiss plaintiff's appeal regarding his

motion to enforce litigant's rights as collaterally estopped by Doe II; dismiss his

appeal as to his motion for attorney's fees; and affirm the trial court's order

granting in part Rutgers' motion to enforce settlement.

                                         I.

      We first address plaintiff's motion to enforce litigant's rights and motion

for attorney's fees. Our analysis of these motions is, as summarized above,

intertwined with the federal litigation that led to Doe II.

                                        A.

      In March 2018, plaintiff submitted two OPRA requests seeking records

related to disciplinary proceedings he had faced as a graduate business student

at Rutgers University-Newark.       His requests included financial, academic,

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                                         4
administrative, and communications records within specific parameters. The

trial court denied plaintiff's OPRA requests and attorney's fees.

      Plaintiff appealed.    We concluded plaintiff was entitled to "his own

academic transcripts, discipline records, and financial records" but agreed the

rest of plaintiff's requests were overbroad, as they required Rutgers' records

custodian "to exercise his discretion, survey staff, or undertake research to

determine if he was responsive to the request[s]." Doe I, 466 N.J. Super. at 28-

31. In addition, "[w]e remand[ed] for the trial court to determine whether

plaintiff [was] entitled to any attorney's fees related to his efforts to obtain these

records." Id. at 31.

      Three months after Doe I was issued, plaintiff submitted two more OPRA

requests to defendants. This time, the requests were for "file[s on plaintiff] kept

by" and "emails, memos, text messages, voice mail, letters, etc., sent or received

by" seven individuals who were witnesses in plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings

or members of the disciplinary committee. Defendants identified 1,960 pages

responsive to plaintiff's first request and 4,608 pages responsive to his second

request. Defendants advised plaintiff he had to pay special service charges

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totaling $7,0202 for the time defendants needed to review the documents and

redact other students' personally identifiable information before giving the

records to him. Plaintiff refused to pay.

      In August 2021, plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show

cause in the Law Division seeking an order compelling Rutgers and Jewell

Battle, in her official capacity as the OPRA administrator and records custodian

of Rutgers University, to comply with his 2021 OPRA requests and rescind the

service charges. The complaint alleged the special service charge violated

FERPA and 34 C.F.R. § 99.11(b) and "constructive[ly] den[ied] . . . access under

OPRA." Defendants removed this new OPRA action to federal court.

      Before the complaint was removed, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce

litigant's rights under Doe I's state court docket, claiming defendants had failed

"to provide [him] copies of his own discipline records . . . [and] of

communications of persons involved in [his]" disciplinary proceedings. The

court denied the motion, concluding Doe I did not automatically entitle plaintiff

to documents outside of "[his] official disciplinary record" "contain[ing] some

information that may have some connection to [plaintiff's] disciplinary"

2
  Defendants charged hourly rates of $45 for forty pages (no charge for the first
four hours), totaling $2,025 for forty-nine hours to review the first batch of
records and $4,995 for 115 hours to review the second batch.

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proceedings.     The court's bench decision did not address plaintiff's

accompanying motion for attorney's fees, but the court issued a separate order

denying the motion when it denied the motion to enforce litigant's rights.

      After plaintiff appealed both orders, the District Court dismissed

plaintiff's second OPRA action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 3

on May 20, 2022. Doe, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91897, at *15. The District

Court4 ruled FERPA did not apply to plaintiff's requests for emails and other

correspondence "by the professors who sent and received them" because those

materials are not "education records" subject to FERPA. Id. at *12-13. The

court added even if they were education records, federal law did not prohibit the

special service charges "to review, redact, and copy the records and provide

them to plaintiff," as FERPA permits copying fees and neither FERPA nor its

regulations address redaction fees. Id. at *13 n.7. Separately, the court also

found the charges reasonable under OPRA, which permits "a special service

3
   12(b)(6) motions are the federal counterpart to Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to
dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
4
  The District Court's holding as to the special service charges only applied to
plaintiff's second 2021 OPRA request, as the court separately concluded the first
request was time-barred by the forty-five-day statute of limitations for OPRA
actions. Id. at *8-11; see Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 70 (2008).
Neither party raised this issue on appeal, and plaintiff argues before us that
FERPA prohibited the special service charges for both requests.
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                                       7
charge . . . based upon the actual direct cost of providing" copies of the requested

records. Id. at *13-14 (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(c)).

      Two months after the District Court issued its decision, plaintiff filed his

merits brief in this appeal. Five months later, the Third Circuit issued Doe II,

affirming dismissal of plaintiff's second OPRA action and concluding "neither

FERPA nor OPRA bars Rutgers from collecting a service fee . . . for the email

correspondence responsive to" plaintiff's new requests. 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS

4626 at *8-9. We requested supplemental briefing on whether Doe II had any

impact on the issues raised in this appeal.

                                        B.

      Before us, plaintiff repeats his argument that defendants' improper

imposition of special service charges equates to a denial of his OPRA requests.

He contends FERPA's implementing regulation, which prohibits an educational

institution from "charg[ing] a fee to search for or to retrieve the education

records of a student," 34 C.F.R. § 99.11(b), also prohibits defendants' special

service charges. He further claims OPRA disallows the special service charges

because they are not reasonable fees "based upon the actual direct cost of

providing the copy or copies" of the requested records. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(c).

Defendants contend Doe II collaterally estops plaintiff from continuing to make

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these arguments, which are "identical" to the analysis the Third Circuit rejected

on these issues.

      Plaintiff counters: (1) Because Doe II's holding only applies to the 2021

OPRA request for which the District Court analyzed the legality of the special

service charge, he may continue to challenge the other request's special service

charge in this appeal; (2) Doe II erroneously held plaintiff "was not entitled to

free access to any of his own students records because [defendants] alleged they

were not maintained by a central custodian as required by FERPA"; and (3) Doe

II never addressed FERPA in relation to defendants' special service charge. We

are unpersuaded and dismiss his appeal as collaterally estopped by Doe II.

      Collateral estoppel "bars relitigation of issues in suits that arise from

different causes of action." Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super.

168, 173 (App. Div. 2000) (citing United Rental Equip. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas.

Ins. Co., 74 N.J. 92, 101 (1977)). The doctrine arises "[w]hen an issue of fact

or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and

the determination is essential to the judgment." Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire

& Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 85 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)).

      Plaintiff reiterates the same interpretations of FERPA and OPRA he

unsuccessfully raised in his second OPRA action. The Third Circuit rejected

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                                       9
plaintiff's interpretation of FERPA as prohibiting defendants' special service

charges and found the charges reasonable under OPRA. Doe II, 2023 U.S. App.

LEXIS 4626 at *8-9. "A judgment 'on the merits' in a federal court will preclude

a later action on the same merits in a state court." Reid v. Reid, 310 N.J. Super.

12, 19 (App. Div. 1998). Thus, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from raising

these claims again. See Allesandra v. Gross, 187 N.J. Super. 96, 104 (App. Div.

1982) (observing issues in one action that were "actually litigated and

determined" in a prior action are "conclusive" (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident &

Cas. Ins. Co., 26 N.J. 307, 313-14 (1958))).

      Contrary to plaintiff's claim, the Third Circuit addressed FERPA's effect

on the special service charges. The court explicitly stated "neither FERPA nor

OPRA bars Rutgers from collecting a service fee." Doe II, 2023 U.S. App.

LEXIS 4626 at *9.      Plaintiff inaccurately contends Doe II allows him to

relitigate OPRA claims the District Court deemed time barred. He cannot,

through this appeal, repeat the rejected arguments for the time barred OPRA

request. See, e.g., First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J.

342, 351-55 (2007) (precluding the plaintiff's re-argument of the same issue in

an action on the note and a foreclosure action).

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                                       10
                                         C.

      Plaintiff's entitlement to relief hinges on whether defendants denied him

access to records we directed them to provide to him in Doe I. See Asbury Park

Bd. of Educ. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 369 N.J. Super. 481, 486 (App. Div. 2004).

"The scope of relief in a motion in aid of litigants' rights is limited to remediation

of the violation of a court order." Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 371 (2011);

see also R. 1:10-3. As defendants' special service charges were both lawful

under FERPA and reasonable under OPRA, plaintiff now has no basis to claim

defendants denied his 2021 requests. Thus, even assuming arguendo Doe I

entitled plaintiff to the requested records, defendants did not violate our

directive by "denying" plaintiff's requests.

      Though we need not address whether the files and faculty communications

plaintiff requested constitute disciplinary records under Doe I, we add for the

sake of completeness that he relies solely on the fact the requested files might

contain information about his disciplinary proceedings. Defendants would have

to "collect" correspondence to and from the seven individuals plaintiff named

and filter for materials pertaining specifically to his disciplinary process. See

Lagerkvist v. Off. of the Governor, 443 N.J. Super. 230, 237 (App. Div. 2015).

Thus, the trial court correctly discerned Doe I does not contemplate defendants

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                                         11
undertaking such an effort to provide plaintiff's "discipline records." See 466

N.J. Super. at 28-30.

                                       D.

      As to his motion for attorney's fees, plaintiff argues the trial court erred

in failing to properly place factual findings and legal conclusions on the record

when denying the motion. See R. 1:7-4(a). We find no reversible error there,

as the court cogently placed factual findings and legal conclusions on the record

when denying plaintiff's motion to enforce litigant's rights (i.e., the motion for

which plaintiff had sought attorney's fees).     As such, plaintiff suffered no

prejudice when the trial court denied him attorney's fees for a motion in which

he did not prevail. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal of the

court's order denying his motion for attorney's fees is also dismissed.

                                       II.

      We now turn to Rutgers' cross-appeal related to the parties' settlement

efforts.

      In Doe I, we "remand[ed] for the trial court to determine whether plaintiff

[was] entitled to any attorney's fees related to his efforts" in his initial OPRA

action. 466 N.J. Super. at 31. The parties subsequently began settlement

negotiations. Plaintiff emailed Rutgers proposing that "if Rutgers offers us

$47,500, we would accept that in full and final satisfaction of our counsel fees

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                                       12
[claim]." Rutgers responded, "[o]n the basis of your e-mail below, we have a

settlement at $47,500.        Please confirm."       Plaintiff promptly replied

"[c]onfirmed."

      Rutgers drafted a settlement agreement reflecting the agreed-upon terms.

Before the parties signed a final agreement, however, plaintiff expressed

concern to Rutgers over the settlement payment counting as income paid to

plaintiff, which would increase his tax obligations. Plaintiff asked Rutgers to

"gross up" the settlement by providing additional consideration to offset the

potential tax liability. Rutgers refused. Plaintiff also refused to provide Rutgers

with a Form W-9, a tax form containing information Rutgers needed to report

the settlement payment to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

      After plaintiff filed his motions, Rutgers cross-moved to enforce the

settlement agreement, which plaintiff opposed. The trial court granted Rutgers'

motion in part and issued an order stating the university must pay the agreed-

upon $47,500 sum but "[s]ubmission of a W-9 or 1099 form from [plaintiff] is

not necessary for" Rutgers to pay.

      Rutgers asks us to modify the trial court's order by requiring plaintiff to

submit a W-9. The university contends this requirement will "give effect to the

principal terms of the settlement while incorporating ancillary terms that would

permit [Rutgers] to comply with its legal obligations." Rutgers further claims

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                                       13
federal tax laws require it to report the settlement as income paid to plaintiff and

plaintiff prevents Rutgers from following these laws by not providing a W-9.

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6041A, 6045(f); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6041-1(f).                 While we

acknowledge Rutgers' federal tax obligations,5 they do not warrant modifying

the court's order.

      Settlement agreements are "governed by principles of contract law."

Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 379 (2007). "[I]f parties agree

on essential terms and manifest an intention to be bound by those terms, they

have created an enforceable contract." Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J.

427, 435 (1992). Once parties form an enforceable contract, the agreement

remains binding even if a final "writing does not materialize because a party

5
     Indeed, the IRS Code explicitly illustrates the reporting obligations
settlements trigger:

             Attorney P represents client Q in a breach of contract
             action for lost profits against defendant R. R settles the
             case for $100,000 damages and $40,000 for attorney['s]
             fees. Under applicable law, the full $140,000 is
             includible in Q's gross taxable income. R issues a check
             payable to P and Q in the amount of $140,000. R is
             required to make an information return reporting a
             payment to Q in the amount of $140,000. For the rules
             with respect to R's obligation to report the payment to
             P, see [26 U.S.C. § 6045(f)] and the regulations
             thereunder.

             [26 C.F.R. § 1.6041-1(f)(2).]
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                                        14
later reneges." Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 46 (App. Div.

1995) (quoting Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J. Super. 575, 596 (App. Div. 1993)).

      Under these principles, plaintiff formed a binding contract with Rutgers

by accepting its offer: if Rutgers paid $47,500 to plaintiff's lawyers, he would

deem his claim to attorney's fees fully satisfied. See Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys.

Corp., 111 N.J. 276, 289 (1988) ("The essential requirement of consideration is

a bargained-for exchange of promises or performance . . . ."). This exchange

encompassed all the agreement's essential terms, which did not include the

mechanics of how Rutgers would pay the settlement. See Lahue, 263 N.J. Super.

at 596. The parties settled over plaintiff's attorney's fees, but not plaintiff's or

Rutgers' tax obligations. Because they agreed exactly how much Rutgers would

pay and precisely what plaintiff had to do in exchange, the trial court properly

concluded Rutgers must pay plaintiff the agreed-upon sum.

      As to Rutgers' argument that it cannot satisfy its tax obligations unless

plaintiff provides a W-9, this issue is immaterial to the settlement's

enforceability.   The settlement is enforceable even if its tax implications

inconvenience one or both parties. See Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328,

342 (App. Div. 1999) (observing courts need not "make a better contract for

either party"). The trial court's order did not prohibit Rutgers from ever seeking

plaintiff's W-9 or reporting the settlement to the IRS. It simply directed Rutgers

                                                                              A-1004-21
                                        15
to pay plaintiff even if he did not provide the requested tax form. Rutgers points

to no authority requiring plaintiff to provide a W-9 before it pays the settlement.

See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6041-1(f)(1).

      To the extent we have not addressed the parties' remaining arguments, it

is because we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Dismissed as to plaintiff's appeal, affirmed as to Rutgers' cross-appeal.

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