Court Opinion

ID: 9776801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:44:57.793978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:42.689300
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. The majority fairly and accurately sets out the pertinent facts of this case. However, I disagree as to the application of the law as related to the facts. In my opinion the appellants had a right to intervene. The majority cites ARCP Rule 24 (a) (2) and (b) (2). It is clear to me that appellant comes under the requirements of Rule 24 (a) which, in part, reads: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1)... or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. The language of the preceding statute is clearly mandatory, thus abuse of discretion cannot be involved. Appellant obviously claimed an interest in the transaction upon which the suit was filed. Appellant guaranteed payment of the loan to appellee. The allegations contend appellee breached the very same contract which gave rise to appellee’s claim against the Millars. It seems to me it would be impossible to try the present suit without proving or disproving the very facts upon which appellant relies in support of its cause of action. Certainly the appellees will do nothing to protect appellant’s claim. Appellant has set forth reasons which ". . . may as a practical matter impair or impede ...” its ability to protect an interest. The statutory language clearly says "may,” yet the majority holds that appellant’s statements are mere speculation. It is precisely this sort of reasonable speculation which the statute allows. Furthermore, the majority has promulgated no test or guidelines to guide future litigants through this newly constructed maze of what constitutes speculation or "insufficient reasons” as opposed to reasons which "may” impede a litigant’s ability to protect his rights under the law. I would reverse and remand with instructions to allow appellant to intervene.