Court Opinion

ID: 9907417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 15:06:14.332725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:01.415744
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2718-20

FRANK ANGRISANI,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN M. COSTELLO, ESQ.,
and COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC,

     Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________

                   Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided December 6, 2023

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-6033-18.

                   Frank Angrisani, appellant, argued the cause pro se
                   (Ernest W. Schoellkopff, on the briefs).

                   Peter M. Perkowski, Jr., argued the cause for
                   respondents (Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti,
                   LLP, attorneys; Lance Jon Kalik, of counsel and on the
                   brief; Peter M. Perkowski, Jr., and Venanzio Edward
                   Cortese, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      In this legal malpractice case, plaintiff Frank Angrisani appeals from the

Law Division's orders dismissing his complaint against his former attorneys,

defendants Kevin M. Costello and his law firm Costello & Mains, LLC. The

origins of this case go back to plaintiff's 2010 settlement of his lawsuit against

Financial Technology Ventures, LP (FTV), where plaintiff sought damages for

his financial losses as a result of Nexxar's acquisition of a Brazilian money

transfer company, Uno Money Transfer Co. (Uno), as well as the termination of

his employment as CEO of Nexxar.

      Plaintiff retained Larry Orloff, Esq. and his firm Orloff, Lowenbach,

Stifelman & Siegel, PA. (collectively OLSS) to prosecute his claims against

FTV and Nexxar. OLSS withdrew from representing plaintiff, and he retained

defendants to continue to pursue the litigation.      That action ended with a

settlement.

      Discontented with his settlement, plaintiff claimed legal malpractice

against OLSS in a prior lawsuit that was dismissed. On August 17, 2018,

plaintiff filed a five-count legal malpractice complaint against defendants.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants improperly recommended an insufficient

settlement in plaintiff's underlying litigation against FTV and Nexxar, and failed

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                                        2
to file suit against two other law firms, Pillsbury Winthrop (Pillsbury) and Sills

Cummis (Sills), the attorneys for the parties to the joint venture with Nexxar.

        In a trio of orders, the trial court dismissed each of these claims. The

court found that plaintiff's allegations about defendants' handling and settlement

of the FTV and Nexxar litigation, and his claim that defendants failed to sue

Pillsbury were barred by the statute of limitations. The court also found that

plaintiff's arguments concerning Sills failed for lack of proximate cause. The

court further ruled that all three claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral

estoppel.

        Plaintiff challenges all of the trial court's rulings on appeal. Having

considered his contentions in light of the record and the applicable law, we

affirm.

                                        I.

A.      Background

        The parties are fully familiar with the underlying procedural history and

facts of this matter. Therefore, we will summarize only the most salient points

here.

        The essential background of the litigation that spawned plaintiff's legal

malpractice action in this appeal are as follows:

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                                        3
[Plaintiff], an expert in the field of worldwide money
transfers, developed a business plan that resulted in his
creation of a wholly owned corporation, Axxa Group,
Inc. (AGI), in which he deposited his intellectual
property and related business plan information. After
forming AGI, he initiated a search for venture capital
partners willing to invest in the new company.

Eventually [plaintiff] entered into an agreement with
[FTV]. [Plaintiff] continued to serve as chief executive
officer and president of AGI, and was a member of its
board of directors.

In order to develop the business, FTV approved AGI's
acquisition of a Brazilian money transfer company,
[Uno]. [Plaintiff's] authorization to participate in the
ensuing due diligence inquiry, prior to the company's
acquisition, is disputed. It is not disputed that the
company was acquired in November 2003. AGI
subsequently changed its name to [Nexxar]. [Plaintiff]
turned his AGI stock over to the new venture.

      ....

After acquisition, it was learned Uno's operation was
illegal under Brazilian law, and possibly under
American law as well. When [plaintiff] advised the
Nexxar board of Uno's illegality, he claims he was
terminated as a result.

From 2006 to 2010, OLSS, and Orloff individually,
represented [plaintiff] in lawsuits against FTV and
Nexxar seeking to recover damages for [plaintiff's]
significant financial losses as a result of Nexxar's
financially disastrous acquisition of Uno, as well as
from his termination of employment. [OLSS] withdrew
from representing [plaintiff] in 2010.

                                                            A-2718-20
                           4
             [Orloff, Lowenbach, Stifelman & Siegel, PA v.
             Angrisani, No. A-3724-13 (App. Div. Feb. 12, 2016)
             (slip op. at 2-3), certif. denied, 226 N.J. 211 (2016).]

      In May 2010, plaintiff retained defendants to represent him in the FTV

litigation after OLSS was relieved as counsel.         In June 2010, defendants

attempted to reopen discovery, but that motion was denied due to the age of the

case. Thereafter, defendants advised plaintiff to settle his claims in the FTV

litigation and to file a legal malpractice claim against OLSS.

      According to plaintiff, defendants advised him that they "could not try the

case against FTV because of Orloff's legal malpractice in failing to take certain

depositions and take certain actions with regard to evidence and discovery," and

therefore, plaintiff had "'no choice' but to settle the case and then pursue a legal

malpractice claim against [OLSS]." Plaintiff "was reluctant to settle the case"

but, based on defendants' advice, authorized them to settle the FTV litigation.

      On September 14, 2010, plaintiff settled the FTV litigation for $800,000.

On that same date, plaintiff executed a "Settlement Agreement and Mutual

Release of Claims," which contained the following disclaimer directly above

plaintiff's signature line:

             CAUTION: THIS IS A RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS;
             READ BEFORE SIGNING

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                                         5
             I have read the foregoing Settlement Agreement and
             Release of Claims, and I understand its contents. I have
             reviewed the entire document with my attorney, and
             understanding its terms and conditions, agree to abide
             by it.

On September 24, 2010, the parties, through their respective attorneys, executed

a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, dismissing the FTV litigation with

prejudice.

B.    The OLSS Legal Malpractice Litigation

      After settling the FTV litigation, plaintiff retained defendants to sue OLSS

for legal malpractice. After OLSS first sued plaintiff for unpaid legal bills,

defendants filed plaintiff's answer to the complaint and a counterclaim against

OLSS for legal malpractice. Plaintiff later hired Leo B. Dubler, Esq. to serve as

co-counsel with defendants.

      In June 2012, defendants recognized that Dubler was doing the bulk of the

work and they moved to be relieved as plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff agreed and

the trial court issued an order relieving defendants as plaintiff's attorneys.

Dubler was plaintiff's sole attorney in the litigation from that point forward. 1

1
  Plaintiff subsequently sued Dubler and several other attorneys for legal
malpractice.
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                                         6
      On November 26, 2013, the trial court granted OLSS summary judgment,

dismissing all of plaintiff's legal malpractice claims. Plaintiff appealed and we

affirmed in a February 12, 2016 decision. Orloff, (slip op. at 1).

C.    The Present Litigation

      Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 17, 2018, alleging defendants

had been negligent in representing him in the FTV litigation. Plaintiff's claims

of legal malpractice were essentially two-fold: first, defendants improperly

advised him not to pursue his claims in the FTV litigation to judgment, but rather

to accept a settlement that did not reflect their true value and then to sue Orloff

and OLSS for negligence; and second, defendants failed to advise him of

potential claims against Pillsbury and Sills and allowed the statute of limitations

to run on those claims.

      The trial court dismissed plaintiff's legal malpractice claims against

defendants in three separate motions over the course of two years. We address

each of plaintiff's challenges to those rulings in turn.

                                         II.

      Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his legal

malpractice claim for the insufficient settlement. Because plaintiff's claim on

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                                         7
this point was clearly barred by the six-year statute of limitations, we affirm the

court's dismissal of that claim.

      To present a prima facie legal malpractice claim, a claimant must establish

"(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care upon

the attorney; (2) the breach of that duty; and (3) proximate causation." Conklin

v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395, 416 (1996); Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 336 N.J.

Super. 458, 467 (App. Div. 2001). Proximate cause is established by showing

that the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in causing the claimant's

damages. Conklin, 145 N.J. at 419-22. In order to survive a motion for summary

judgment, a legal malpractice plaintiff must show that he or she could have

presented a prima facie case in the matter in which the malpractice allegedly

occurred. Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191 (2005).

      A claim of legal malpractice is subject to the six-year statute of

limitations. McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 419 (2001) (citing numerous cases

applying N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1). Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 provides:

            Every action at law for trespass to real property, for any
            tortious injury to real or personal property, for taking,
            detaining, or converting personal property, for replevin
            of goods or chattels, for any tortious injury to the rights
            of another not stated in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and N.J.S.A.
            2A:14-3 of this Title, or for recovery upon a contractual
            claim or liability, express or implied, not under seal, or
            upon an account other than one which concerns the

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                                        8
            trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant,
            their factors, agents and servants, shall be commenced
            within six years next after the cause of any such action
            shall have accrued.

            [(emphasis added).]

      The New Jersey Legislature did not define the term "accrued" in N.J.S.A.

2A:14-1 or other similar statutes of limitations, and "therefore left to the

judiciary the role of infusing this term with meaning." Palisades at Fort Lee

Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427, 443 (2017). In

construing accrual statutes, the New Jersey Supreme Court has avoided "a rigid

and automatic adherence to a strict rule of law" that would produce unjust

results. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273-74 (1973). "Ordinarily, a cause of

action 'accrues when an attorney's breach of professional duty proximately

causes a plaintiff's damages.'" Vastano v. Algeier, 178 N.J. 230, 236 (2003)

(quoting Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 492 (1993)).

      "The discovery rule is an equitable doctrine created by the courts to

protect unsuspecting persons from statutory limitations periods during which a

claim must be brought or forever lost." Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside, 301

N.J. Super. 262, 273 (App. Div. 1997). Under the rule, a claim does not accrue

until the plaintiff "discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and

intelligence should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable

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                                       9
claim." Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272. The discovery rule "'postpon[es] the accrual of

a cause of action' so long as a party reasonably is unaware either that he has

been injured, or that the injury is due to the fault or neglect of an identifiable

individual or entity." Abboud v. Viscomi, 111 N.J. 56, 62 (1988).

      "Once a person knows or has reason to know of this information, his or

her claim has accrued since, at that point, he or she is actually or constructively

aware 'of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action.'"

Ibid. (quoting Burd v. N.J. Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291 (1978)). Thus, "[t]he

limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know the facts

underlying those elements, not necessarily when a plaintiff learns the legal effect

of those facts." Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492. See also Lapka v. Porter Hayden

Co., 162 N.J. 545, 555-56 (2000) ("We impute discovery if the plaintiff is aware

of facts that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable

claim; medical or legal certainty is not required.").

      "Whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is a

question of law, also reviewed de novo." Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J.

Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016). "The application of the discovery rule is for the

court, not a jury, to decide." Ibid.

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                                       10
      Here, the trial court determined that plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice

relating to the advice defendants provided him concerning the FTV settlement

was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The court stated:

            . . . Plaintiff's action accrued at the time of settlement,
            September 24, 2010, rather than when [plaintiff]
            subsequently consulted Mr. Piekarsky, another
            attorney[, who provided plaintiff with expert reports
            concerning defendants' liability for legal malpractice].

            At the time that [p]laintiff accepted the settlement
            money, he either suffered actual damage or should have
            discovered "through the use of reasonable diligence"
            "facts essential to the malpractice claim," which in this
            case was that the amount [p]laintiff settled for was not
            reflective of what [p]laintiff perceived to be the value
            of his case against FTV. [Plaintiff's] awareness of the
            malpractice claim is evidenced by the language within
            the [c]omplaint, which states, "[plaintiff] was reluctant
            to settle the case, but Costello advised him to settle and
            pursue claims against Orloff. [Plaintiff], in relying
            upon Costello's advice, settled his valuable claims
            against FTV, though the settlement did not reflect the
            value of his claims." Moreover, this [c]ourt does not
            see any reason to doubt that [plaintiff] would
            immediately associate Costello as the cause of his
            injury as Costello was [p]laintiff's attorney when the
            FTV litigation settled.

      Thus, based on the allegations set forth in plaintiff's own complaint, the

trial court correctly determined that plaintiff was aware of the facts underlying

his claim for insufficient settlement at the time he settled the FTV litigation and

dismissed his claims against FTV, which was no later than September 24, 2010.

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                                       11
Plaintiff was admittedly "reluctant to settle the case" because he believed that

"the settlement did not reflect the value of his claims." Notwithstanding his

belief, plaintiff settled the case based on defendants' advice. Because plaintiff

relied on defendants' advice to accept a settlement that he believed was

insufficient, plaintiff had knowledge of the two key elements that triggered the

discovery rule, injury and fault. Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492-93. At the very

least, plaintiff should have known, or by exercise of reasonable diligence and

intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an actionable

claim. Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272.

      Thus, because plaintiff dismissed his claim against FTV on September 24,

2010, via stipulation of dismissal, he had until September 24, 2016, to sue

defendants for malpractice based on the allegedly insufficient settlement.

However, plaintiff did not file his legal malpractice complaint until August 17,

2018, approximately eight years after the accrual of his cause of action and

almost two years beyond that applicable statute of limitations.         Therefore,

plaintiff's insufficient settlement claim was plainly time-barred. McGrogan, 167

N.J. at 419; N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.

      Plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitation should not have run until

after he consulted with Piekarsky and became fully aware of defendants' alleged

                                                                             A-2718-20
                                       12
malpractice is not persuasive, because legal certainty is not required for his

claim to accrue. Lapka, 162 N.J. at 555-56. Plaintiff was aware of his alleged

injury and that defendants were allegedly at fault. Therefore, even if plaintiff

was not aware of his claim at that time, had he exercised reasonable diligence

and intelligence, he would have discovered that he may have a basis for an

actionable claim. Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272.

      Furthermore, plaintiff's argument that defendants were required to advise

him of this alleged malpractice is also unpersuasive. As the trial court also found

in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint on collateral estoppel grounds, plaintiff failed

to establish a fair settlement value of his claims, and therefore, could not show

that the $800,000 settlement was insufficient. Thus, there was no evidence that

the settlement was actually insufficient. As a result, there was no evidence to

suggest that defendants had reason to believe that the settlement was insufficient

and, therefore, they had no duty to advise plaintiff that they may have committed

malpractice by advising him to settle the FTV litigation.

                                                                              A-2718-20
                                        13
      Because plaintiff's claim concerning the inefficient settlement was barred

by the statute of limitations, the trial court correctly dismissed this portion of

his complaint on this ground. 2

                                       III.

      Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred by granting defendants'

motion for summary judgment and dismissing his legal malpractice claim for

failing to sue Pillsbury during the FTV litigation. Because this claim was also

clearly barred by the six-year statute of limitations, we affirm the court's

decision.

      Our review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo,

applying the same legal standard as the trial court. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut.

Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (citing Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22,

38 (2014)). Under that standard, summary judgment will be granted when "the

competent evidential materials submitted by the parties," viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, show that there are no "genuine issues

of material fact" and that "the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as

2
   Therefore, we need not address the trial court's alternative ruling that the
insufficient settlement claim was also subject to dismissal based upon the
collateral estoppel doctrine.
                                                                            A-2718-20
                                       14
a matter of law." Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017)

(quoting Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38); see also R. 4:46-2(c).

      In holding that plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for failing to sue

Pillsbury was barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court noted that,

"[w]hile an exact date of [plaintiff]'s actual knowledge of the actual claim is not

determinable from the undisputed facts presented, the date when a reasonable

person would have known is." The court determined that plaintiff "shou ld have

known of the potential malpractice claim no later than October 2011." The court

explained:

             Over a six-year period between 2005 to 2011[, plaintiff]
             was exposed to information a reasonable person would
             have discovered as a basis for a malpractice claim. . . .

             The [c]ourt observes a timeline as follows. First,
             August 2005, [plaintiff] was shown an email by Jim
             Cornell. May 2007, [plaintiff] discusses potential
             claim against Pillsbury with Orloff. May 2010,
             Costello replaces Orloff in the FTV litigation.
             September 2010, FTV litigation settles. February 2011,
             [plaintiff] brings a counterclaim in [the] Orloff
             litigation against Orloff. October 2011, Dubler sends a
             letter concerning claim of malpractice against Pillsbury
             and [plaintiff]. And August 17th, 2018, [plaintiff] files
             a lawsuit against Costello.

                   Based on all the facts [plaintiff] was exposed to,
             by October 27th, 2011, [plaintiff] should have known
             there was a potential cause of action against . . .
             Pillsbury. . . . Based on . . . that date [plaintiff] had

                                                                             A-2718-20
                                       15
            until October 27, 2017, to file a claim against Pillsbury.
            The core cause of action was initiated August 17, 2018,
            almost 10 months after . . . [the] statute of limitations
            had expired. Thus for the reasons stated above,
            [plaintiff's] claim against Costello for failing to sue
            Pillsbury is dismissed with prejudice.

      We discern no basis for disturbing the trial court's findings of fact or

conclusions of law on this issue. As the court specifically found, between 2005

and 2011, plaintiff knew or should have known that he had a potential legal

malpractice claim against defendants. At the very least, he was "aware of facts

that would alert a reasonable person to the possibility of an actionable claim [.]"

Lapka, 162 N.J. at 555; Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492.

      Plaintiff testified at a deposition that in August 2005, Cornell showed him

a 2003 email correspondence wherein Pillsbury advised FTV that it should

reconsider its acquisition of Uno because Uno's operations violated Brazilian

financial and banking laws and potentially violated United States law. While

plaintiff claimed that Pillsbury never shared the information with him, he

nonetheless became aware of that information no later than August 2005 when

he saw the email.

      Plaintiff also testified that he had requested that Orloff add Pillsbury as a

party to the FTV litigation; and he had a conversation in which he specifically

advised Orloff that he wanted to join Pillsbury. Further, plaintiff certified, in

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                                       16
the Dubler litigation, that "[t]hroughout the first four years of Mr. Orloff's

representation, [plaintiff] continually requested Orloff depose Pillsbury as they

had been an integral part of the formation of Nexxar       . . . [n]onetheless, Mr.

Orloff vehemently refused to depose Pillsbury executives." As a result of his

continued frustration with Orloff's refusal to proceed against Pillsbury, plaintiff

"contacted the U.S. Justice Department and anonymously discussed how a law

firm and a venture capital firm were misleading financial institutions and may

have committed money laundering, [violated] U.S. Patriot Act Laws, and aided

and abetted tax [e]vasion by foreign entities."

      On December 4, 2006, Orloff filed the complaint in the FTV litigation

without naming Pillsbury as a defendant. When defendants replaced Orloff and

OLSS as counsel in the FTV litigation in May 2010, defendants did not amend

the pleading to add Pillsbury. In September 2010, defendants advised plaintiff

to settle his claims in the FTV litigation and, based on that advice, plaintiff

voluntarily settled his claims against FTV and Nexxar.

      On September 14, 2010, plaintiff executed the "Settlement Agreement and

Mutual Release of Claims," wherein he forever released any and all claims

against FTV, Nexxar, and, among others, their attorneys, relating to his

employment and discharge from Nexxar and to the FTV litigation. Specifically,

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                                       17
the settlement agreement contained a disclaimer directly above plaintiff's

signature line which stated, in part: "CAUTION: THIS IS A RELEASE OF

ALL CLAIMS; READ BEFORE SIGNING."

      Plaintiff was aware that Pillsbury was FTV's attorney for the acquisition

of Uno, which plaintiff alleged caused him damages. Thus, plaintiff was aware,

or at the very least should have been aware, that by executing the Settlement

Agreement, he was releasing any and all potential claims he may have had

against Pillsbury. His argument that he was not specifically advised of the

release language in the Settlement Agreement, and therefore was not aware of

the release of his claims against Pillsbury, is not persuasive. The above -cited

provision expressly cautioned plaintiff that he was releasing his claims and i t

advised him to read the document before signing it. Plaintiff, by signing the

document, acknowledged that he had in fact read it, understood it, and agreed to

be bound by its terms.

      Furthermore, under New Jersey law, by signing the settlement agreement,

plaintiff is presumed to have read it and is precluded from claiming that he did

not. "It is the general rule that where a party affixes his signature to a written

instrument . . . a conclusive presumption arises that he read, understood and

assented to its terms and he will not be heard to complain that he did not

                                                                            A-2718-20
                                       18
comprehend the effect of his act in signing." Peter W. Kero, Inc. v. Terminal

Constr. Corp., 6 N.J. 361, 368 (1951). Accord County of Morris v. Fauver, 153

N.J. 80, 110 (1998) (noting the “presum[ption] that the parties to a contract know

the terms of their agreement”). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,

32 N.J. 358, 386 (1960) (As a general rule, "one who does not choose to read a

contract before signing it, cannot later relieve himself of its burdens."). Thus,

it is immaterial that plaintiff claims that he did not read the settlement agreement

in its entirety.

       As a result of the foregoing, the record supports the trial court's conclusion

that plaintiff had actual knowledge that he released his potential claims against

Pillsbury when he executed the settlement agreement and actually dismissed the

FTV litigation, which occurred on September 14, 2010, and September 24, 2010,

respectively.      By relying on defendants' advice to accept and execute the

settlement agreement, which released his potential claims against Pillsbury,

plaintiff had knowledge of the two key elements that triggered the discovery

rule, injury and fault. Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492-93; Lapka, 162 N.J. at 555-56.

       Accordingly, plaintiff had until September 24, 2016, to file his legal

malpractice claim against defendants within the statute of limitations. However,

                                                                               A-2718-20
                                        19
plaintiff did not do so until August 17, 2018, nearly two years after the

expiration of the statute of limitations.

      Moreover, notwithstanding the foregoing, by letter dated October 27,

2011, Dubler advised defendants and plaintiff of plaintiff's potential claims

against Pillsbury and that OLSS had committed legal malpractice by failing to

sue Pillsbury. At that time, defendants and Dubler were assessing OLSS's

potential liability for failing to prosecute plaintiff's claims against Pillsbury.

Specifically, the letter provided:

             In the September to November 2003 time period, it is
             clear that Pillsbury knew that the way Uno was
             operated was illegal. Further, they also learned that it
             was probably a crime under Brazilian law. Pillsbury
             told FTV and never disclosed it to [plaintiff].

                   ....

             Orloff should have filed fraud claims, conspiracy to
             commit fraud claims, securities claims, and a RICO
             claim against Pillsbury and the individuals involved in
             perpetrating the fraud.

             Larry Orloff did not file suit against Pillsbury. Larry
             Orloff did not depose any of the employees of Pillsbury.
             Larry Orloff did not subpoena Pillsbury's records.

      As a result of Dubler's October 27, 2011 letter, which was also sent

directly to plaintiff, plaintiff was advised by legal counsel that he had a potential

claim against Pillsbury and that neither OLSS nor defendants had filed suit

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                                        20
against Pillsbury. Plaintiff had settled all his claims against FTV and Nexxar

and dismissed the FTV litigation, and by signing the settlement agreement, he

was aware that he released any and all potential claims he may have had against

Pillsbury. Peter W. Kero, Inc., 6 N.J. at 368; Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 386.

      Plaintiff contends that he did not become aware of defendants' culpability

until 2018, when he received expert legal opinions from his liability experts

regarding the same. That position is not persuasive because, as set forth above,

the limitations period began to run when he knew or should have known the

facts that form the basis of a cause of action, "not necessarily when a plaintiff

learns the legal effect of those facts." Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492; Lapka, 162

N.J. at 555-56. The record demonstrates that plaintiff learned sufficient facts to

form the basis of a cause of action no later than the date he received the October

27, 2011, letter, which was likely October 28, 2011, 3 since his direct copy was

sent via Federal Express. That letter independently gave plaintiff knowledge of

injury and fault to trigger the discovery rule. Grunwald, 131 N.J. at 492-93;

Lapka, 162 N.J. at 555-56.

3
  Although the letter was sent via facsimile to plaintiff's counsel, his copy was
sent via Federal Express. October 27, 2011, was a Thursday, so plaintiff likely
received his copy of the letter on Friday, October 28, 2011, or Monday, October
31, 2011, as it is unclear from the letter whether it was sent via overnight mail.

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                                       21
      Thus, at the latest, the statute of limitations ran after plaintiff received the

October 27, 2011 letter. Even if he received that letter as late as October 31,

2011, plaintiff was required to file suit against defendants by Octobe r 31, 2017.

However, he did not file suit until August 17, 2018. His legal malpractice claim

against defendants for failing to file suit against Pillsbury was thus time -barred.

      Therefore, we affirm the trial court's determination that plaintiff's claim

concerning Pillsbury was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. 4

                                         IV.

      Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary

judgment to defendants and dismissing his legal malpractice claim for

defendants' failure to sue Sills in the FTV litigation. Again, we disagree.

      The trial court found that plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that

defendants were the proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged damages. In this

regard, plaintiff asserts that defendants should have sued Sills before the statute

of limitations barring such a claim expired. However, the court found that

plaintiff's cause of action against Sills accrued no later than December 2008,

and defendants stopped representing plaintiff in September 2012. After that,

4
  Therefore, we need not address the trial court's alternative ruling that plaintiff's
legal malpractice claim concerning defendants' failure to sue Pillsbury was also
subject to dismissal based upon the collateral estoppel doctrine.
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plaintiff had twenty-seven additional months to sue Sills before the statute of

limitations expired. As a result, the court concluded that defendants could not

have been the proximate cause of any damages plaintiff sustained by not suing

Sills.

         As set forth above, to establish a prima facie legal malpractice claim, a

claimant must prove the existence of an attorney-client relationship, breach of

duty, and proximate causation. Conklin, 145 N.J. at 416. Proximate cause is

established by showing that the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in

causing the claimant's damages. Id. at 419-22. Stated differently, proximate

cause is "any cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by

an efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without

which the result would not have occurred."         Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza

Assocs., 289 N.J. Super. 309, 322 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Fernandez v.

Baruch, 96 N.J. Super. 125, 140 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 52

N.J. 127 (1968)).

         Here, the record does not support the conclusion that plaintiff could

establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice for defendants' failure to sue

Sills. First, Dubler considered a legal malpractice claim against Orloff for his

failure to sue Sills. However, after evaluating Sills's potential liability, Dubler

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decided not to file such a claim. Furthermore, in his May 13, 2013 supplemental

expert report, plaintiff's expert Michael Galpern concluded that Sills did not

deviate from the applicable standard of care or breach any duty to plaintiff by

including an integration clause in the stock purchase agreement involved in the

FTV litigation. Indeed, it is not clear from the record that plaintiff had a viable

claim against Sills.

      Second, the record does not support the conclusion that defendants were

the proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged damages because it is undisputed that

Dubler had sufficient opportunity to consider, investigate, and file a lawsuit

against Sills after defendants withdrew from representing plaintiff. Dubler had

approximately twenty-seven months to evaluate any potential claim but chose

not to file a lawsuit against Sills. Indeed, plaintiff's liability expert, Scott B.

Piekarsky, Esq., confirmed at a deposition that Dubler had approximately

twenty-seven months to evaluate any potential claim but chose not to file a

lawsuit against Sills, and that plaintiff had hired a legal malpractice expert to

assist Dubler in making that evaluation and decision. There was no evidence

that Dubler was prevented from asserting a claim against Sills. Rather, the

record supports the conclusion that Dubler sufficiently considered the issue but

chose not to assert a claim against Sills.

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      Simply put, plaintiff cannot establish that defendants were the proximate

cause of his alleged damages because his subsequent counsel had ample time

and opportunity to file suit against Sills within the applicable statute of

limitations. See 4 Ronald E. Mallen, Legal Malpractice § 33:12 (2023 ed.)

("[W]here a lawyer's employment ends and ample time remains for the client or

successor counsel to complete the task for which the lawyer is sued[,] . . .

causation analysis [establishes that] the lawyer is not liable if there was

sufficient time to complete the task."); id. at § 33:13 ("An accepted proposition

is that a lawyer is not liable for an omission that occurred during the

representation of successor counsel or after withdrawal, where ample time

remained to perform the act or task.").

      This conclusion is firmly supported by our decision in Fraser v. Bovino,

317 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 1998). In Fraser, after a land deal fell through

due to delays caused by an unsuccessful challenge to municipal approval of a

condominium project, Robert Fraser brought actions starting in 1990 against

various parties that opposed the project, and in 1997 William and Donald

Gelnaw instituted a similar action. Id. at 30-33. We held that all the claims in

the Gelnaws' action and several of the claims in Fraser's actions were properly

dismissed pursuant to statutes of limitations. Id. at 34, 36. However, only the

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Gelnaws had included a claim of legal malpractice against their former

attorneys, for failing to ensure that the claims against the objectors were brought

within the statutes of limitations. Id. at 33, 35.

      The Gelnaws claimed to have retained their former counsel in October

1996, by which time the only "conceivably viable" claims against the objectors

were those subject to the six-year limitation period. Id. at 35. However, the

Gelnaws admitted that their former counsel withdrew and "returned the file to

them" three months later, on a date that was "several weeks . . . before the six -

year statute of limitations expired." Ibid. Because the Gelnaws still had several

weeks to pursue the "conceivably viable" claims with new counsel, the

withdrawal of their former counsel did not have a "material adverse effect" on

their interests. Ibid. (quoting RPC 1.16(b)). Without a harm to the Gelnaws

arising from counsel's withdrawal, we upheld the dismissal on summary

judgment of the malpractice claim against them. Ibid.

      Thus, in Fraser, we determined that twenty-four days before the expiration

of the statute of limitations was sufficient time for the attorneys to withdraw

without a material adverse effect on their client's interest. Here, defendants

withdrew from their representation of plaintiff approximately twenty-seven

months prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. That gave Dubler,

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who was already familiar with the case as co-counsel, ample time and

opportunity to file suit against Sills. In fact, Dubler, with the help of plaintiff's

expert, considered doing so and chose not to. Thus, the trial court correctly

determined that defendants' failure to file suit against Sills was not the proximate

cause of plaintiff's alleged loss. 5

      Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision granting defendants

summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for failure

to sue Sills.

      Affirmed.

5
  In light of this ruling, we need not address the trial court's alternative decision
that plaintiff's legal malpractice claim concerning defendants' failure to sue Sills
was also subject to dismissal based upon the collateral estoppel doctrine.

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