Court Opinion

ID: 9373589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:02.920185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.396628
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARIO CHIOVITTI,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-21-0212-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: July 12, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Matthew Floyd Gunn, Esquire, Toledo, Ohio, for the appellant.

           Keshat Lemberg, Vienna, Ohio, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his removal appeal as untimely filed. For the reasons discussed below,
     we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     REMAND this appeal to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
     with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        Effective March 10, 2020, the agency removed the appellant from his
     position as a GS-6 Police Officer based on the charge of conduct unbecoming a
     Federal employee. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 15-19, Tab 10 at 91. The
     agency decision notice informed the appellant that he could contest the agency
     action either by filing a grievance under the negotiated grievance procedure or by
     filing an appeal with the Board, but not both. IAF, Tab 1 at 17 -18. The decision
     also informed the appellant that a grievance had to be filed no later than
     14 calendar days after the date he received the letter and that a Board appeal had
     to be filed no later than 30 days after the effective date of his removal or his
     receipt of the decision, whichever was later.      Id. at 17.   The decision further
     informed the appellant that, if a Board appeal was not submitted within 30 days,
     it could be dismissed as untimely filed unless a good reason for the delay was
     shown. Id. at 17-18.
¶3        On March 27, 2020, the appellant’s union filed a grievance of his removal
     on his behalf. IAF, Tab 5 at 25. The agency issued an April 15, 2020 decision
     denying the grievance on procedural grounds, and the union invoked arbitration
     on April 30, 2020. Id. at 27-28, 31.
¶4        Approximately a year after the union invoked arbitration, at the end of April
     2021, the parties, through their attorneys, discussed whether the appellant could
     contest the removal under the negotiated grievance procedure because of his
     purported status as a probationary employee and the fact that actions against
     employees serving in a probationary period are not subject to arbitration. 2 IAF,

     2
      At the time of the appellant’s appointment to the Department of Defense, a covered
     employee, as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 1599e, was required to serve a 2-year probationary
     period. On December 27, 2021, President Biden signed into law the National Defense
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (2022 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat.
                                                                                         3

     Tab 5 at 39-43; see Yates v. Department of the Air Force, 115 F. App’x 57, 59
     (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that “Congress has explicitly forbidden the
     arbitration process from addressing issues concerning employee actions taken
     during probationary periods”). The representatives then agreed that the agency
     would not contest Board jurisdiction over an appeal of the appellant’s removal if
     the union withdrew the grievance from arbitration. IAF, Tab 5 at 37. On May 1,
     2021, the appellant’s representative informed the arbitrator that the union was
     withdrawing the grievance; and the arbitrator confirmed, without comment, that
     he would cancel the hearing. Id. at 37, 48. That same day, the appellant filed the
     instant Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1.
¶5        Two weeks later, on May 14, 2021, the agency representative learned of the
     existence   of   a   2018   agreement     between    the   Transportation    Security
     Administration (TSA) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) governing
     the movement of employees between the TSA, where the appellant previously
     worked, and positions in the competitive service, such as the appellant’s Police
     Officer position. IAF, Tab 8 at 13-14, Tab 10 at 76-77. Paragraph 6 of that
     agreement states that an employee appointed under the agreement who has
     previously completed a probationary or trial period will not be required to serve a
     new probationary or trial period. IAF, Tab 10 at 77.
¶6        After the appellant filed a Board appeal of his removal, the administrative
     judge issued an order informing the appellant that his appeal appeared to be
     untimely filed and providing him an opportunity to submit evidence and argument
     showing that the appeal was timely filed or that good cause existed for the delay

     1541. The 2022 NDAA repealed the 2-year probationary period for DOD appointments
     made on or after December 31, 2022. Pub. L. No. 117-81, § 1106, 135 Stat. 1541,
     1950. That change does not affect the outcome of this appeal. Because the appellant
     had more than 2 years of current continuous service, when his prior Government service
     was tacked to his service as a Police Officer, the agency explained that the appellant
     had Board appeal rights even though he was serving in a probationary period with the
     agency. IAF, Tab 5 at 41; see McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d
     1339, 1341-43 (Fed. Cir. 20 02).
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     in filing. IAF, Tab 3. The appellant responded that good cause existed for his
     untimely filed appeal because the agency provided him with incorrect appeal
     rights in its removal decision when it stated that he could contest the action
     through the negotiated grievance procedure, he detrimentally relied on that
     misinformation when he filed a grievance concerning his removal, and he
     diligently pursued his right to appeal to the Board once he obtained the correct
     information. IAF, Tab 5 at 5. The appellant also argued that his election to
     contest the removal through the negotiated grievance procedure was not valid
     because of the agency’s misinformation. Id.
¶7        On August 26, 2021, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     finding the Board appeal 387 days late and dismissing it as untimely filed without
     good cause shown. IAF, Tab 13, Initial Decision at 1, 3 -4. The administrative
     judge did not address the appellant’s misinformation argument. The appellant has
     filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a response, and the appellant has
     replied to that response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.
                                       ANALYSIS

     The appeal was untimely filed.
¶8        An appellant bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that his
     appeal has been timely filed. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(B). With exceptions
     not applicable here, an appeal must be filed with the Board no later than 30 days
     after the effective date of the action being appealed, or 30 days after the date of
     the appellant’s receipt of the agency’s decision, whichever is later.      5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.22(b)(1).
¶9        Here,    the   appellant    was   removed   from    his   position,   effective
     March 10, 2020. IAF, Tab 10 at 91. The appellant indicated that he received the
     removal decision on March 9, 2020. IAF, Tab 1 at 4. Thus, his appea l was due
     on April 9, 2020. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b)(1). However, the appellant did not file
     his appeal until May 1, 2021, over a year past the deadline. IAF, Tab 1.
                                                                                                5

      Remand is required to determine whether the agency provided misinformation to
      the appellant that constitutes good cause for the filing delay.
¶10             The Board will excuse an untimely filing if a party shows that he exercised
      due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular cir cumstances of the
      case. 3     Pirkkala v. Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 13 (2016);
      Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). The issue
      presented by this appeal is whether good cause exists for the appellant’s untimely
      filed appeal based on the purportedly incorrect information in the agency decision
      notice regarding the avenues available to the appellant to challenge the removal. 4
      The Board has held that agency misinformation about appealing an adverse action
      may constitute good cause for an untimely filing. See Foley v. Department of
      Health & Human Services, 84 M.S.P.R. 402, ¶ 11 (1999) (finding good cause for
      an untimely filed appeal based on the agency providing “materially erroneous
      notice of appeal rights”); Floyd v. U.S. Postal Service, 44 M.S.P.R. 37, 40 (1990)
      (remanding an appeal to determine whether an agency official misinformed the
      appellant’s representative regarding the commencement of the filing period);
      McClure v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 32 M.S.P.R. 672, 677

      3
        The appellant argues that the agency agreed not to challenge that good cause existed
      or that the Board had jurisdiction over the appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; IAF, Tab 5
      at 37, Tab 8 at 6. Although an agency can stipulate to matters of fact, legal
      conclusions, such as Board jurisdiction or the existence of good cause, are not subject
      to stipulation. See King v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 105 M.S.P.R. 21, ¶ 16 n.2
      (2007) (stating that, while the parties can stipulate to facts, the question of Board
      jurisdiction is a legal question not subject to stipulation); Ludlum v. Department of
      Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56, ¶ 27 (2000) (stating that the Board is not bound by stipulations
      of mixed questions of fact and law), aff’d, 278 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 20 02).
      4
        We recognize that this appeal also may present an election of remedies issue. When,
      as here, an appellant elects to file a grievance before filing his Board appeal, it does not
      constitute good cause for an untimely filing.            McNeil v. U.S. Postal Service,
      98 M.S.P.R. 18, ¶ 10 (2004). If the appellant received misinformation about his options
      to challenge the removal, the election is not binding. Agoranos v. Department of
      Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 15 (2013). The resolution of whether the appellant
      received misinformation in this appeal will be decided by resolving the good cause
      issue.
                                                                                               6

      (1987) (finding an appeal timely filed when the agency failed to properly inform
      an employee of his Board appeal rights).
¶11         As explained above, the agency informed the appellant in the decision
      notice that he could contest the removal through the negotiated grievance
      procedure or by filing a Board appeal.         IAF, Tab 1 at 17-18.        The appellant
      elected to contest the action through the negotiated grievance procedure , and,
      approximately a year later, just prior to the hearing before the arbitrator, the
      parties’ representatives discussed whether the appellant’s removal was arbitrable
      because of the appellant’s purported status as a probationary employee and the
      fact that actions against probationary employees may not be contested through the
      arbitration process. 5 IAF, Tab 5 at 39-43; see Yates, 115 F. App’x at 59. Based
      on those discussions, the appellant’s union then withdrew the arbitration request,
      and he promptly filed a Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 5 at 37.
¶12         The fact pattern set forth above has the initial appearance of an
      agency-provided misinformation scenario, but, as noted, under an agreement
      between TSA and OPM, the appellant’s prior service with TSA may mea n that the
      appellant was not a probationary employee at the time of his removal by the
      agency. Such a finding would mean that the appellant’s removal was subject to
      arbitration and the information in the decision notice regarding the appellant’s
      ability to challenge the removal through the negotiated grievance procedures was
      correct. Resolution of whether the appellant was serving in a probationary period

      5
         The appellant argues that the agency’s assertions in April 2020 regarding the
      arbitrability of the appellant’s removal constitute misinformation establishing good
      cause for the untimely filing of the Board appeal. PFR File, Tab 4 at 7-8. The
      appellant cites no legal authority to support this assertion. An agency’s position during
      litigation, even if incorrect, is not equivalent to misinforming an appellant of his appeal
      rights in the agency decision notice, particularly when, as here, the appellant was
      represented by counsel. If, after appropriate due diligence, the appellant’s counsel
      disagreed with the agency regarding the arbitrability of the appellant’s removal, he
      could have presented that issue to the arbitrator for decision. The arbitrator had already
      issued a December 2020 decision addressing one agency argument and finding that the
      grievance was procedurally arbitrable. IAF, Tab 5 at 30, 35.
                                                                                          7

      is thus central to the timeliness determination in this appeal and is dependent on,
      among other things, the appellant’s employment at TSA.
¶13         The record reflects that the appellant previously worked at TSA pri or to
      transferring to the agency, but the exact time period and circumstances of that
      prior service is unclear. For example, the appellant’s attorney asserted that the
      appellant was employed by TSA from 2014 to October 27, 2018, and a coworker
      provided a letter stating that the appellant worked at TSA for 4 years. IAF, Tab 5
      at 6, Tab 9 at 47. In addition to the inconsistency in these statements, neither is
      entitled to significant evidentiary weight. 6 The statements of a representative in a
      pleading are not evidence, Marcantel v. Department of Energy, 121 M.S.P.R. 330,
      ¶ 6 n.1 (2014), and the statement of the coworker is not sworn or made under
      penalty of perjury thus reducing its probative value, Adamsen v. Department of
      Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶ 17 (2011) (finding an unsworn unsupported
      statement not to be probative of the matter asserted). Moreover, the agreement
      between TSA and OPM contains specific conditions that must be met for the
      agreement to apply. IAF, Tab 10 at 76-77. Based on the current record, it is not
      possible to determine whether those conditions have been met such that the
      agreement covers the appellant’s transfer from TSA to the agency. Thus, remand
      is necessary.
¶14         On remand, the administrative judge shall afford the parties the opportunity
      to present evidence and argument regarding whether the appellant was serving in
      a probationary status at the time of his removal, including whether the agreement
      between TSA and OPM applies such that the appellant was not required to serve a
      new probationary period at the agency. 7      The administrative judge shall then

      6
        The record contains the Standard Form 50 documenting the appellant’s transfer from
      TSA to the agency. IAF, Tab 8 at 20-21. It does not address the appellant’s
      probationary status nor reference the agreement between TSA and OPM. Id.
      7
        On review, the appellant objects to the administrative judge having telephoned the
      agency’s representative to inquire after her health, after she filed a motion to stay
      deadlines/responses citing health issues as the basis for the motion . PFR File, Tab 1
                                                                                               8

      determine whether the agency provided misinformation regarding the appellant’s
      ability to challenge his removal through the negotiated grievance process and,
      if so, whether that misinformation constitutes good cause for the untimely filed
      Board appeal. If the administrative judge finds that good cause exists, he shall
      adjudicate the appellant’s appeal.       If the administrative judge finds that good
      cause does not exist, he may dismiss the appeal as untimely filed without good
      cause shown. 8

                                              ORDER
¶15         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Northeastern
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                               /s/ for
                                                   Jennifer Everling
                                                   Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      at 6 n.1, 9. The appellant requests that, if the appeal is remanded, that it be assigned to
      a new administrative judge. Id. at 9. The agency representative confirms that the call
      she received from the administrative judge did not concern the merits of the app eal or
      the Board’s jurisdiction and was brief and focused on her health. PFR File, Tab 3
      at 10-11.    Administrative judges are not prohibited from engaging in ex parte
      conversations regarding procedural matters, such as extensions of time. See Vidal v.
      Department of Justice, 113 M.S.P.R. 254, ¶ 6 (2010) (finding that ex parte
      communications regarding procedural matters are not prohibited); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.102
      (prohibiting ex parte communications regarding the merits, as opposed to procedural
      aspects, of matters before the Board). The administrative judge’s conversation with the
      agency’s representative does not violate the prohibition on ex parte communications,
      and the appellant’s argument provides no basis to assign this appeal to a new
      administrative judge on remand.
      8
        If the appellant’s Board appeal is untimely filed without good cause shown, t o the
      extent that the appellant’s union withdrew the request for arbitration based on a
      misunderstanding that the appellant’s removal was not arbitable, any remedy for such a
      misunderstanding rests in the arbitration process.