Court Opinion

ID: 9649350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:50:08.995614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:09.952652
License: Public Domain

DOYLE, President Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to quash this appeal on the ground that Borough of Ridgway did not intervene in the proceedings before the *753Common Pleas Court and, consequently, lacks standing to appeal to this Court.
The question of a party’s lack of standing or capacity to sue is not a jurisdictional one and the issue may be waived. Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000); Friedlander v. Zoning Hearing Board of Sayre Borough, 119 Pa. Cmwlth. 164, 546 A.2d 755 (1988); McMullen v. Zoning Hearing Board of Harris Township, 90 Pa.Cmwlth. 119, 494 A.2d 502 (1985). In this case, while the Borough failed to file a formal petition to intervene in Brendel’s appeal to the Common Pleas Court, the Borough nonetheless participated in the hearings, filed a trial brief and letter brief, and moved for reconsideration after a decision was entered in favor of Brendel. Brendel did not assert at any time during these proceedings that the Borough did not have standing as a party, and, in fact, the issue of Borough’s party status was first raised sua sponte by the Common Pleas Court when it decided the Borough’s motion for reconsideration. Therefore, I believe that Brendel waived the issue of the Borough’s standing as a party to this action and, for that reason, would deny Brendel’s motion to quash this appeal.1 See Pittsburgh Trust for Cultural Resources v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 145 Pa. Cmwlth. 503, 604 A.2d 298 (1992), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 538 Pa. 618, 645 A.2d 1320 (1994) (where the City filed a petition to intervene outside of the 30 day appeal period, and where prior to filing its petition the City participated in a conciliation conference and submitted a brief, owners waived their right to object to the City’s standing to intervene).
With regard to the merits of the appeal, I would affirm based on the reasoning contained in the Common Pleas Court’s August 28, 2000 and September 18, 2000 opinions.

. Brendel also asserted in his motion to quash that the Borough failed to perfect its appeal to this Court. The notice of appeal filed in this case states that the "Zoning Officer of the Borough of Ridgway hereby appeals to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,” rather than stating that the Borough appeals to this Court. The Borough explains that it “appealed in this matter by and through its appointed official, the Zoning Enforcement Officer. ...” (Answer to Motion to Quash at 1.) The Borough also explained that the attorney who submitted the notice of appeal, David S. Pontzer, represents the Borough in this matter.
While it would have been preferable for the notice of appeal to have specifically named the Borough as the appellant, filing the notice under the name of the Borough officer who has authority to enforce the zoning ordinance does not, in my view, require this appeal to be quashed. Under Section 614 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. § 10614, the Zoning Officer is the appointed zoning administrator of the Borough, and it does not make sense to view the Zoning Officer as a party distinct from the Borough. At most, the Borough committed a technical error in drafting the notice, which I would not characterize as a fatal defect mandating the dismissal of this appeal. See In re McElhatton, 729 A.2d 163 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), petitions for allowance of appeal denied, 558 Pa. 644, 738 A.2d 459 (1999) and 557 Pa. 188, 732 A.2d 1157 (1999) (typographical error in a notice of appeal that incorrectly titled the “appellant” and "appellee” was not a fatal defect in the appeal).