Court Opinion

ID: 9899888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:12.418857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.015863
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Dominguez CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096163

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 95F09901)

           v.

 ROMULO DOMINGUEZ,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Romulo Dominguez guilty of lewd and lascivious acts on
his granddaughter when she was under 14 years old. At his trial, three other relatives
testified to defendant’s past sexual abuse of them when they were younger. The trial
court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison and imposed a 15 percent limit on
presentence credits. On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of the testimony
regarding the other sexual offenses, the trial court’s sentencing decision, and the 15
percent limit on credits. We affirm.

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                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Y.D., defendant’s granddaughter and the victim of the charged crimes, testified at
defendant’s jury trial that defendant sexually touched her on two separate occasions. The
first time was in the summer of 1994 at defendant’s son’s house when Y.D. was about
seven years old. Y.D. was swinging on a rope in the house’s basement alone with
defendant, who started tickling her and then grabbed or massaged Y.D.’s vaginal area
over her clothes. Defendant told her to not tell anyone and threatened she would never
see her mother if she did. The second incident happened in late 1994 or early 1995, when
Y.D. was seven or eight years old, in the living room of the same house. Y.D.
remembered defendant put her on his lap while he had an erect penis, but could not
remember any particulars about how he touched her, just that it made her uncomfortable.
However, in 1995 shortly after both events, she told police and other family members that
defendant had “touched her down there.”
       Before trial, the trial court found testimony from three other female relatives about
defendant’s sexual abuse of them admissible as propensity evidence under Evidence
Code section 1108.1 At trial, these three relatives testified that defendant sexually abused
them when they were between five and 12 years old, with all of the incidents occurring in
Mexico.
       The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of committing a lewd and
lascivious act on a child under 14 years old, the first count’s lewd act occurring between
January 1995 and May 1995 (1995 conviction) and the second count’s lewd act occurring
during the summer of 1994 (1994 conviction).
       At sentencing, defense counsel argued for leniency because of defendant’s
advanced age and significant health issues. The trial court stated it agreed with defense

1      Undesignated section references are to the Evidence Code.

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counsel that defendant “is an advanced age, he’s 87 now, and [has a] diminishing health
condition,” but the allegations were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court
found the other victims’ testimony provided “strong evidence of the defendant’s
character and propensity to commit the charged crimes against [the victim]. [¶] I saw
and I heard their testimony. It was very credible.” The court then imposed the midterm
of six years for the 1995 conviction and one-third the midterm of two years for the 1994
conviction, for an aggregate term of eight years. The court awarded a total of 1,047 days
of credit based on 911 actual days and found “[h]e’s entitled to another 15-percent of
good-time/work-time credit, because this violent felony he’s being sentenced to state
prison on which is an additional 136 days of credit.”
       Defendant appeals.
                                      DISCUSSION
                                              I
                      The Trial Court Did Not Err By Admitting The
              Sexual Offense Propensity Evidence That Occurred In Mexico
       Defendant first challenges the trial court’s admission of the other victims’
testimony as propensity evidence under section 1108. When a defendant is accused of a
sexual offense, section 1108 permits evidence of other sexual offenses to show
propensity to commit such crimes. (§ 1108, subd. (a); People v. Falsetta (1999)
21 Cal.4th 903, 911 [“the Legislature enacted section 1108 to expand the admissibility of
disposition or propensity evidence in sex offense cases”].) The term “sexual offense” is
defined as “a crime under the law of a state or of the United States that involved” certain
enumerated forms of sexual conduct. (§ 1108, subd. (d)(1).)
       Defendant challenges the admission of the other victims’ testimony by arguing
“foreign acts that occurred outside of California, outside a state, and outside the United
States were definitionally not a crime, and not sexual offenses.” He therefore reasons the

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testimony regarding acts occurring in Mexico was inadmissible under section 1108. We
disagree.
       The appellate court in People v. Miramontes (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1085
rejected this exact argument. There, the trial court also admitted testimony regarding
sexual abuse in Mexico under section 1108 and the defendant argued on appeal these
“Mexican offenses fail to qualify as the kind of sex offenses enumerated in the statute.”
(Id. at pp. 1098-1099.) When holding that the evidence was admissible, the appellate
court reasoned the defendant’s argument “ma[de] no sense” because the definition of
sexual offense “clearly describes conduct that is prohibited by California law, even
though it did not take place in California. . . . The principal consideration in this inquiry
is whether the comparable prior, essentially similar, conduct occurred, not where it
occurred.” (Id. at p. 1099.) The court analogized this inquiry with the “rules allowing
use of a prior out-of-state conviction for enhancement of punishment.” (Id. at pp. 1099-
1100.) It also reasoned section 1108’s legislative intent supported this conclusion, which
was to “ ‘relax the evidentiary restraints’ ” against propensity evidence “ ‘to assure that
the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other sex offenses in evaluating
the victim’s and the defendant’s credibility.’ ” (Id. at p. 1101.) Thus, “there is no reason
as a matter of law, logic or statutory construction to withhold reliable evidence of such
foreign prior uncharged misconduct from a jury.” (Ibid.)
       Defendant contends that Miramontes was wrongly decided because the plain
language of the statute prohibits the admission of prior acts committed in Mexico and that
California lacks jurisdiction to declare conduct occurring outside its borders a crime.
These arguments are unavailing and we thus adopt Miramontes and apply its reasoning
here to conclude the trial court did not err in finding evidence of defendant’s prior sexual
misconduct admissible even though it occurred in Mexico.
       Defendant also asserts, without further explanation or argument, “The Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments were further prejudicially violated.” (Underscoring omitted.)

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To the extent he is making a due process challenge, our Supreme Court has found
“section 1108 survives [a] due process challenge.” (People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th
at p. 922.) We must adhere to this precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
                                             II
             The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Imposed
                            The Midterm For The 1995 Conviction
       Defendant next makes two challenges to the trial court’s reasons for imposing the
midterm sentence for the 1995 conviction. He first contends the trial court’s reliance on
the other victims’ testimony was “erroneous for all the reasons fully elucidated,” meaning
because the acts occurred in Mexico. We have already rejected this argument. Thus, for
the reasons discussed ante, we similarly reject defendant’s reassertion of it here to
support sentencing error.
       Defendant also contends the trial court “erred in failing to consider the 87-year old
[defendant]’s severely impaired and diminishing health as a mitigating circumstance.”
(Underscoring omitted.) We need not delve into the standards and analysis applied to
review of a sentencing decision because the record simply does not support this
argument. The trial court explicitly acknowledged defendant “is an advanced age, he’s
87 now, and [has a] diminishing health condition” before providing countervailing
reasons to justify the sentence imposed. Defendant does not explain how this statement
does not show the trial court considered these circumstances as mitigating factors, even
though the People argued this point in their brief. Accordingly, we find no support for
defendant’s argument, and therefore conclude there was no error in the trial court’s stated
reasons for the sentence it imposed.

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                                             III
                     Defendant Is Not Entitled To Additional Credits
       Defendant finally contends the trial court erroneously imposed a 15 percent limit
on his presentence credits under Penal Code section 2933.1 because the conduct for the
1994 conviction occurred before enactment of this provision, violating California and
federal constitutional ex post facto clauses. We disagree.
       Penal Code section 2933.1, subdivision (c) states, “[T]he maximum credit that
may be earned against a period of confinement . . . following arrest and prior to
placement in the custody of the Director of Corrections, shall not exceed 15 percent of
the actual period of confinement for any person specified in subdivision (a).”
Subdivision (a) describes “any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed in
subdivision (c) of [s]ection 667.5.” (Pen. Code, § 2933.1, subd. (a).) And under
subdivision (d) of Penal Code section 2933.1, “[t]his section shall only apply to offenses
listed in subdivision (a) that are committed on or after the date on which this section
becomes operative.” This section became operative on September 21, 1994. (Stats.
1994, ch. 713; People v. Camba (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 857, 867.)
       Defendant’s conduct underlying his convictions occurred in early 1995 for the
1995 conviction and the summer of 1994 for the 1994 conviction. There is no dispute the
1995 conviction occurred after the effective date of Penal Code section 2933.1, but the
parties disagree as to the effect the 1994 conviction has on the calculation of defendant’s
credits.
       We are unaware of any published case addressing this exact situation, but there are
several cases analyzing a similar circumstance where a defendant is convicted of both a
qualifying felony and a nonqualifying felony. The leading case on this issue is People v.
Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, which held Penal Code section 2933.1,
subdivision (c)’s use of the language “ ‘any person’ ” means it “applies to the offender
not to the offense and so limits a violent felon’s conduct credits irrespective of whether or

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not all his or her offenses come within [Penal Code] section 667.5.” (Ramos, at p. 817.)
Our Supreme Court later cited this rule with approval, further explaining Penal Code
section 2933.1, subdivision (c)’s application to an “ ‘actual period of confinement’ ”
means “[a] period of presentence confinement is indivisibly attributable to all of the
offenses with which the prisoner is charged and of which he is eventually convicted.”
(In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 775, italics omitted; see also People v. Nunez (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“The absence of criticism affirms the soundness of Ramos’s
distillation that the 15 percent limit to presentence conduct credits applies to the offender,
not the offense”].)
       This reasoning applies here. Defendant’s convictions are for a felony listed in
Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). (See Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(6).) And
the conduct underlying the 1995 conviction occurred after September 21, 1994, so it is
not barred by Penal Code section 2933.1, subdivision (d). Thus, defendant is a person
described in Penal Code section 2933.1, subdivision (a) by virtue of the 1995 conviction.
As a person qualifying under subdivision (a), the 15 percent limitation under
subdivision (c) applies to his entire presentence confinement.
       This conclusion does not violate ex post facto prohibitions. “[T]wo critical
elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be
retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must
disadvantage the offender affected by it.” (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 29,
fn. omitted.) “ ‘In general, application of a law is retroactive only if it attaches new legal
consequences to, or increases a party’s liability for, an event, transaction, or conduct that
was completed before the law’s effective date. [Citations.] Thus, the critical question for
determining retroactivity usually is whether the last act or event necessary to trigger
application of the statute occurred before or after the statute’s effective date.’ ”
(In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258, 1273.)

                                               7
       Defendant was serving presentence time, in part, for conduct occurring prior to
September 21, 1994. But that conduct did not qualify defendant for the 15 percent
limitation. Instead, defendant qualified for the limitation because of the act underlying
the 1995 conviction, which occurred after Penal Code section 2933.1’s operative date.
Put another way, had defendant not committed the additional lewd act in 1995, the 15
percent limitation would have not been applicable to him. The trial court therefore
properly applied the credit disadvantage at issue because of posteffective date conduct
and was not impermissibly retroactive.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 /s/
                                                 ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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