Court Opinion

ID: 9897429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:27.20781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:58.062223
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Apr 12 2023, 9:14 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Keith W. Vonderahe                                          Terry Noffsinger
Dirck H. Stahl                                              Kyle Noffsinger
Ziemer, Stayman, Weitzel &                                  KOOI Law Firm, LLC
Shoulders, LLP                                              Noblesville, Indiana
Evansville, Indiana                                         S. Anthony Long
                                                            Long Law Office, PC
                                                            Boonville, Indiana

                                             IN THE

    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Evansville Automotive, LLC,                                 April 12, 2023
d/b/a Kenny Kent Toyota,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant,                                        22A-CT-1601
                                                            Interlocutory Appeal from the
        v.                                                  Vanderburgh Circuit Court
                                                            The Hon. David D. Kiely, Judge
Samantha M. Labno-Fritchley,                                Trial Court Cause No.
individually; as next friend of                             82C01-1901-CT-338
Penelope Rose Fritchley, a
minor; and as personal
representative of the estate of
John Henry Fritchley II,
deceased,
Appellees-Plaintiffs.

                                  Opinion by Judge Bradford.
                               Judges May and Mathias concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023                               Page 1 of 14
      Bradford, Judge.

                                            Case Summary
[1]   In February of 2018, Boonville resident John Fritchley II attempted to remove

      the top of an empty fifty-five-gallon, metal drum (in particular, “the Drum,”

      generally, “drums”) with a cutting torch when it exploded, blowing the top off

      of the Drum and killing him instantly. The top of the Drum—down at which

      John had to have been looking as he cut—bore a warning label, which included

      a red pictogram of a flame with the words “FLAMMABLE LIQUID” and also

      provided, inter alia, “Do not flame cut, braze or weld empty container.”

      Investigation of the incident revealed that the Drum had previously been in the

      possession of Superior Oil Company, Inc., d/b/a Superior Solvents and

      Chemicals, Inc. (“Superior”), who had filled it with a flammable brake-cleaning

      solution called S-1693. From Superior, the Drum had passed to distributor

      Busler Enterprises, Inc. (“Busler”), whose customers for S-1693 included

      Evansville Automotive, LLC, d/b/a Kenny Kent Toyota (“Kenny Kent”). As

      it happens, Kenny Kent had allowed Paul Rhoades—also a Boonville

      resident—to collect its empty drums for some time, apparently for resale.

[2]   In December of 2018, Samantha M. Labno-Fritchley, John’s widow, filed suit

      against Superior, Busler, and Kenny Kent on her behalf, as next friend of her

      and John’s daughter, and as personal representative of John’s estate

      (collectively, “Samantha”). Samantha’s suit included allegations of negligence,

      violations of the Indiana Products Liability Act (“the Act”), negligent infliction

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023       Page 2 of 14
      of emotional distress, and wrongful death. Kenny Kent moved for summary

      judgement, which motion the trial court denied in April of 2022. Kenny Kent

      contends that the trial court erred in denying its summary-judgment motion on

      the grounds that (1) the Act does not apply because it is not in the business of

      selling drums, (2) it had no duty of care to John, (3) there is no designated

      evidence that it ever had the Drum in its possession, and (4) the designated

      evidence establishes as a matter of law that John was more than fifty percent at

      fault. Because we agree with Kenny Kent’s contentions that the Act does not

      apply and that the designated evidence establishes that John was more than fifty

      percent at fault as a matter of law, we reverse and remand with instructions to

      enter summary judgment in favor of Kenny Kent.

                               Facts and Procedural History
[3]   On February 11, 2018, sadly, John was in the process of removing the top from

      the Drum with a cutting torch at his Boonville residence when it exploded,

      propelling the lid upwards, which struck him in the head, killing him instantly.

      According to a report filed by Warrick County Sheriff’s Deputy Jarrett Busing,

      “the explosion caused the [top1] of the drum to pop off and this made contact

      with the deceased.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 23. Samantha later recalled

      that “John purchased the [Drum] and when he got home he set it up in front of

      the garage door, ran the hose to it, and attempted to cut the lid off with a

      1
          Deputy Busing later learned that what he had believed was the bottom of the Drum was actually the top.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023                               Page 3 of 14
      cutting torch.” Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 182. At the time of his death, John

      was employed by Alcoa USA Corporation (“Alcoa”) and had been for at least

      fifteen years. At Alcoa, John had received training for and had worked with:

      combustible dust; critical risk management; fire prevention, protection, and

      extinguishers; hazard communication; performing hot works and hot-work

      permit refresher training module; tri-annual refresher training; workplace

      critical hazard refresher training; and workplace health hazards. John’s hot-

      works training had provided, inter alia, that sparking tools could be an ignition

      source and that one should “[n]ever cut or weld on a drum” because “[h]ot

      work performed on piping, tanks, vessels, containers, and confined spaces that

      contain or previously contained a hazardous, flammable or combustible liquids

      can explode” and “[p]iping, tanks and vessels can explode!!!!!!” Appellant’s App.

      Vol. VII p. 62 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original).

[4]   After exploding, the Drum essentially remained intact but for the top. The

      warning label on the top had also remained intact and included a prominent

      pictogram in red of a flame with the words “FLAMMABLE LIQUID”

      underneath. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11. The warning label also provided,

      in part, as follows:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023        Page 4 of 14
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 175. The entire label, in which the above warning is

circled in red, appeared as follows:

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11. Prior to the explosion, the warning label had

looked approximately like this:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023     Page 5 of 14
      Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 177. So, before the explosion, the label had also

      provided that the Drum had contained “S-1693 Solvent Blend,” or “Heptane

      Isopropanol,” a “Flammable Liquid,” and “Highly flammable liquid and

      vapor.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 177.

[5]   Regarding the source of the S-1693, the Drum’s label indicated that it had been

      manufactured by Superior Oil. Superior Oil sells S-1693 to Busler, an industrial

      commercial distribution customer. Before delivery to Busler, Superior Oil fills

      drums with the S-1693 and affixes warning labels to the drums. Among

      Busler’s S-1693 customers is Kenny Kent, an automobile dealership in

      Evansville that also has a service center.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023      Page 6 of 14
[6]   John’s death was investigated by the Indiana Department of Environmental

      Management (“IDEM”) and the Warrick County Sheriff’s Department.

      During the investigation, it was learned that Kenny Kent had, for some time,

      allowed Rhoades to collect its empty drums, at first only plastic drums that had

      contained windshield-cleaning fluid but eventually also some metal drums that

      had contained S-1693.

[7]   On December 6, 2018, Samantha brought suit against Kenny Kent, Superior,

      and Busler seeking money damages for alleged negligence and violation of the

      Act. In January of 2019, the Warrick Circuit Court transferred the case to the

      Vanderburgh Circuit Court. On November 8, 2021, Kenny Kent moved for

      summary judgment. On December 8, 2021, Samantha filed her response and

      designation of evidence opposing Kenny Kent’s summary-judgment motion.

      On April 7, 2022, after an oral argument the week before, the trial court denied

      Kenny Kent’s summary-judgment motion.

                                  Discussion and Decision
[8]   When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary-judgment motion, we apply

      the same standard as the trial court. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Simrell’s Sports Bar &

      Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Summary judgment is

      appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of

      material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

      Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). To prevail on a summary-judgment motion, a party

      must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element

      of the other party’s claim. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 741 N.E.2d at 386. Once the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023         Page 7 of 14
       moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts

       to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist. Id.

       The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us

       that the trial court erred. Id. “In determining whether there is a genuine issue

       of material fact precluding summary judgment, all doubts must be resolved

       against the moving party and the facts set forth by the party opposing the

       motion must be accepted as true.” Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435,

       438–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied.

[9]    Kenny Kent contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Samantha’s

       claim pursuant to the Act, arguing that there is no designated evidence that it

       has ever been engaged in the business of selling S-1693 drums, a requirement

       for the Act to apply. As for Samantha’s negligence claim, Kenny Kent

       contends that it had no duty of care to John as a matter of law, there is no

       designated evidence that it breached any duty it may have had to John, there is

       no designated evidence tending to show that it ever possessed the Drum, and

       the designated evidence of John’s conduct renders him more than fifty percent

       at fault as a matter of law.

                                         I. Products Liability
[10]   Pursuant to the Act,

               a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of
               commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably
               dangerous to any user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s
               property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023       Page 8 of 14
               product to the user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s
               property if:
                    (1) that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the seller
                        should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm
                        caused by the defective condition;
                    (2) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product;
                        and
                    (3) the product is expected to and does reach the user or
                        consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in
                        which the product is sold by the person sought to be held
                        liable under this article.
       Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1. Whether the Act applies is a question of law. Bayer

       Corp. v. Leach, 153 N.E.3d 1168, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Stegemoller v.

       ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. 2002)). The Act imposes liability upon

       sellers and manufacturers of defective products. Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868

       N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ind. 2007) (citing Morgen v. Ford Motor Co., 797 N.E.2d 1146,

       1148 (Ind. 2003)). The Act “governs all actions that are: (1) brought by a user

       or consumer; (2) against a manufacturer or seller; and (3) for physical harm

       caused by a product … regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories

       upon which the action is brought.” Id. at 810 (citing Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1)

       (ellipsis in Rushford).

[11]   Kenny Kent argues that Samantha’s claim pursuant to the Act fails because

       there is no designated evidence that it is or ever has been engaged in the

       business of manufacturing or selling drums, with the designated evidence

       indicating instead that it is in the business of selling and servicing automobiles.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023               Page 9 of 14
       As Kenny Kent points out, Samantha does not address this argument directly.2

       “An appellee’s failure to respond to an issue raised by an appellant is akin to

       failure to file a brief, and subjects the appellee to reversal upon the appellant’s

       showing of prima facie error on that issue.” Hacker v. Holland, 575 N.E.2d 675,

       676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Day, et al. v. Ryan, 560 N.E.2d 77, 84 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1990)), trans. denied. “Prima facie is defined in this context as at first sight,

       on first appearance, or on the face of it.” State Farm Ins. v. Freeman, 847 N.E.2d

       1047, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).

[12]   As we have noted,

               [the Act] applies to a seller of a defective product provided the
               seller is “engaged in the business of selling such a product.” See
               IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-3(a)(1) [repealed by P.L.1-1998, Sec. 221,
               recodified at Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1(2) with slightly modified
               language]. However, the occasional seller who is not engaged in
               that activity as part of his business is not liable in products liability.
               Perfection Paint v. Konduris (1971), 147 Ind. App. 106, 117, 258
               N.E.2d 681, 686. Thus, for example, the [Act] does not apply to a
               homemaker who sells a jar of jam or a person who sells his used
               car to his neighbor. Restatement Second of Torts § 402A,
               comment (f)[.]
       Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.

       We conclude that Kenny Kent has established prima facie error in this regard.

       The designated evidence, i.e., evidence that Kenny Kent occasionally gave

       2
         Samantha argues instead that Kenny Kent did not have to actually sell drums in order to be subject to the
       Act and that Kenny Kent is a “distributor” pursuant to the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act. We
       agree with Kenny Kent that Samantha’s arguments, even if we were to accept them, do nothing to establish
       that Kenny Kent is in the business of selling drums.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023                             Page 10 of 14
       empty drums to Rhoades and that the drums were nothing more than “a waste

       product” to be discarded, Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 169, without more, falls

       short of establishing that it was “engaged in the business” of selling them. See

       Lucas, 609 N.E.2d at 1202.

                                               II. Negligence
[13]   Kenny Kent also contends that the trial court erred in denying it summary

       judgment on Samantha’s negligence claim. Negligence is a tort that requires

       proof of “(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that

       duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s breach.”

       Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). “Negligence will not be

       inferred; rather, all of the elements of a negligence action must be supported by

       specific facts designated to the trial court or reasonable inferences that might be

       drawn from those facts.” Kincade v. MAC Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2002). “An inference is not reasonable when it rests on no more than

       speculation or conjecture.” Id. “A negligence action is generally not

       appropriate for disposal by summary judgment.” Id. “However, a defendant

       may obtain summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed

       facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id.

[14]   Kenny Kent argues that it did not owe a duty of care to John as a matter of law,

       the designated evidence establishes that it did not breach any duty it may have

       had, and the designated evidence establishes a lack of proximate cause. We

       need not address these arguments, however, as we accept Kenny Kent’s

       argument that the designated evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that John

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023       Page 11 of 14
       was more than fifty percent at fault for his fatal accident. Pursuant to the

       Comparative Fault Act, “[i]f the percentage of fault of the claimant is greater

       than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault involved in the incident which caused

       the claimant’s death, injury, or property damage, the jury shall return a verdict

       for the defendant[.]” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-7(b)(2). It is generally true that “the

       apportionment of fault is uniquely a question of fact to be decided by the fact-

       finder.” Hampton v. Moistner, 654 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). It is

       also true, however, that “‘when there is no dispute in the evidence and the fact-

       finder is able to come to only one logical conclusion[,]’” the “apportionment of

       fault becomes an issue of law solely for the […] court[.]” St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. v.

       Loomis, 783 N.E.2d 274, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Moistner, 654

       N.E.2d at 1195). This is one of those cases.

[15]   The designated evidence shows that the top of the Drum had a conspicuous, red

       pictogram of a flame with the words “FLAMMABLE LIQUID[,]” the notation

       “DANGER Highly flammable liquid and vapor[,]” and a more specific

       warning label that stated that the Drum was “hazardous when empty” and that

       one should not “flame cut, braze, or weld [the] empty container.” Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II pp. 11, 175; Vol. III p. 177. Moreover, there is no question that

       any person bringing a cutting torch to the Drum to remove that top would have

       seen the prominently-displayed warning label. Given that the explosion

       propelled the top upward into John’s face, he was undoubtedly looking down at

       the label when the explosion occurred.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023       Page 12 of 14
[16]   The designated evidence also indicates that, over the course of his fifteen-year

       career at Alcoa, John had received training for and had worked with:

       combustible dust; critical risk management; fire prevention, protection, and

       extinguishers; hazard communication; performing hot works and hot-work

       permit refresher training module; tri-annual refresher training; workplace

       critical hazard refresher training; and workplace health hazards. John was

       trained that sparking tools are an ignition source and that one should “[n]ever

       cut or weld on a drum” because “[h]ot work performed on piping, tanks,

       vessels, containers, and confined spaces that contain or have previously contained

       a hazardous, flammable or combustible liquids can explode,” and “[p]iping,

       tanks and vessels can explode!!!!!!” Appellant’s App. Vol. VII p. 62 (first emphasis

       added; second emphasis in original).

[17]   In light of the clear, unambiguous, and conspicuous warning label on the drum

       stating that it contained “FLAMMABLE LIQUID” and John’s specific

       knowledge through his work and training that cutting on a drum that

       contained, or had previously contained, a flammable liquid with a torch could

       cause an explosion, we cannot conclude that John’s fault must be left to a finder

       of fact. John knew or should have known the risks of cutting into the Drum

       with a torch. See, e.g., Coffman v. PSI Energy, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 522, 529 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2004) (concluding that plaintiff’s negligence was more than the total of

       any alleged negligence on the part of the appellees as a matter of law where

       plaintiff testified that he knew of specific risks associated with using a metal tarp

       frame on a truck near power lines), trans. denied. We conclude that the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023         Page 13 of 14
       designated evidence allows only one conclusion, namely, that John was more

       than fifty percent at fault for the explosion as a matter of law. Because

       Samantha cannot show that Kenny Kent is at least fifty percent at fault, she

       cannot recover, and Kenny Kent is therefore entitled to summary judgment on

       Samantha’s negligence claim.

[18]   We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings

       consistent with this opinion.

       May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023      Page 14 of 14