Court Opinion

ID: 9694655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:50:02.721928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:04.163910
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
My approach to this case differs from that of the majority but still leads me to the conclusion that appellant’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license must be affirmed.
The trial court at the conclusion of the trial refused to charge the jury in accordance with the standard “red book” instruction suggested for the particular crime at issue here and instead omitted the last phrase contained in the charge as set forth in No. 4.81 of the Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia (3d ed. 1978). Appellant urges the court’s refusal to employ the suggested instruction in full constitutes reversible error. I agree that the instruction as given with this omission was error; however, under the circumstances, it was harmless error.
With all deference, the majority’s approach in my view has unduly extended the statute, D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204, to make the crime charged one of strict liability. By approving the trial judge’s instruction which omits placing upon the government the burden of proving a general intent to commit one element of the crime, the majority sanctions a potential prosecution of one who in good faith and with due care obtains a license to carry a pistol but whose license is somehow faulty or invalid. This statutory construction results in strict liability which is contrary to authority and to the rules of statutory construction.
In Brown v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 66 A.2d 491, 493 (1949), this court placed the burden of proving the lack of a license on the government by deciding that § 22-3204 proscribes an act composed of two elements: (1) carrying the pistol, and (2) without a license. In Cooke v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 223, 275 F.2d 887 (1960), the federal appellate court construed § 22-3204 to require proof of a general intent.1 “All that is needed [to prove a violation of such code provision] is an intent to [do] the proscribed act.” Cooke v. United States, supra, 107 U.S.App.D.C. at 225, 275 F.2d at 889. Thus, since the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a general intent to commit the act, which *606act is composed of two elements, it must prove a general intent by the defendant to be without a license when carrying a pistol.2
We pointed out in Brown v. United States, supra at 493, that “[t]he statute [22-3204] being criminal, penal, prohibitive, and in derogation of common law, it must be given a strict rather than a liberal construction.” (Emphasis added.)
For these reasons I am of opinion the court erred in failing to give the “red book” instruction. However, because of the overwhelming evidence against appellant and the lack of any evidence that appellant was unaware that he was without a license to carry a pistol in the District, the error in the court’s instruction on intent was harmless. Hall v. United States, D.C.App., 383 A.2d 1086, 1090 (1978). Accordingly, I agree that the conviction should be upheld.

. Nonetheless, there have been repeated attempts, as in Brown v. United States, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 708 (1977), and here at trial, to defend against the charge on the ground that the government was bound to prove a specific intent on the part of a defendant.

. There does not seem to be any confusion regarding the other element; it seems settled that the government must prove a general intent to carry a pistol. Mitchell v. United States, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 216 (1973).