Court Opinion

ID: 9901831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 17:02:01.028172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.425339
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                 SUMMARY
                                                          November 22, 2023

                               2023COA111

No. 22CA0656 Nicola v. Grand Junction — Torts — Wrongful
Death; Damages — Actions Notwithstanding Death —
Limitation on Damages — One Civil Action Rule; Courts and
Court Procedure — Limitations for Persons Under Disability —
When a Statute Begins to Run — Death of Person Under
Disability

     In this wrongful death and survival action, a division of the

court of appeals determines that the “one civil action” rule set forth

in section 13-21-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023, of the Wrongful Death Act

bars the plaintiff from asserting wrongful death claims in this

lawsuit where the plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit asserting

wrongful death claims against a different defendant, settled the

claims asserted in the first lawsuit, and then voluntarily dismissed

the first lawsuit without prejudice. Thus, the division affirms the

district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s wrongful death claims.
     The division also determines under what circumstances

section 13-81-103(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023, requires the personal

representative of a decedent who was a person under a disability to

bring a survival claim within one year of the decedent’s death. The

division concludes that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies only when a

person who was under a disability at the time of their death (1) had

a legal representative and (2) died after the expiration of the

applicable statute of limitations but less than two years after the

legal representative was appointed. Because the decedent did not

have a legal representative and did not die after the expiration of

the applicable statute of limitations, the division concludes that

section 13-81-103(1)(b) does not bar the plaintiff’s survival claims.

Because the division further concludes that the plaintiff filed his

complaint within the applicable statute of limitations, it reverses

the district court’s dismissal of his claims for negligence and

premises liability.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                         2023COA111

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0656
Mesa County District Court No. 20CV30323
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

John Nicola, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of
Danielle Nicola,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

City of Grand Junction and Public Service Company of Colorado, d/b/a Xcel
Energy,

Defendants-Appellees.

          JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
               AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

                                  Division V
                          Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
                        Gomez and Taubman*, JJ., concur

                         Announced November 22, 2023

Killian, Davis, Richter & Kraniak, PC, J. Keith Killian, Damon Davis, Grand
Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Goldman, Nicholson & Mack, PC, Michael A. Goldman, Elizabeth A. Phillips,
Durango, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee City of Grand Junction

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, Franz Hardy, Stephanie S. Brizel,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Public Service Company of Colorado,
d/b/a Xcel Energy

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
¶1    Plaintiff, John Nicola, individually and as the personal

 representative of the estate of Danielle Nicola,1 appeals the district

 court’s judgment dismissing his complaint against defendants,

 Public Service Company of Colorado, d/b/a Xcel Energy (Xcel

 Energy), and the City of Grand Junction (Grand Junction). Nicola

 brought wrongful death and survival claims against Xcel Energy

 and Grand Junction arising from the death of his daughter,

 Danielle, who was struck by a vehicle while crossing an intersection

 when the streetlights allegedly were not working. Danielle died

 from her injuries.

¶2    Resolving this appeal requires us to address two matters of

 first impression. First, we must determine whether the “one civil

 action” rule set forth in section 13-21-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023, of the

 Wrongful Death Act bars a second lawsuit for wrongful death where

 a plaintiff previously filed a wrongful death lawsuit against a

 different defendant, settled the claims asserted in the first lawsuit,

 and then voluntarily dismissed the first lawsuit without prejudice.

 1 For clarity, we refer to John Nicola as Nicola and to Danielle Nicola

 as Danielle throughout the opinion. We mean no disrespect by
 doing so.
                                    1
 We conclude that it does. As a result, we affirm the district court’s

 judgment dismissing Nicola’s wrongful death claims.

¶3    Second, we must determine whether section 13-81-103(1)(b),

 C.R.S. 2023, requires the personal representative of a decedent to

 bring a survival claim within one year of the decedent’s death,

 where the decedent was a person under a disability without a legal

 representative. We conclude that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies

 only when a person who was under a disability at the time of their

 death (1) had a legal representative and (2) died after the expiration

 of the applicable statute of limitations but less than two years after

 the legal representative was appointed. Because Danielle did not

 have a legal representative and did not die after the expiration of

 the applicable statute of limitations, we conclude that subsection

 (1)(b) does not bar Nicola’s survival action.

¶4    Because Nicola filed his complaint within the applicable

 statute of limitations, we reverse the district court’s judgment

 dismissing his survival claims for negligence and premises liability.

                           I.    Background

¶5    In November 2018, Danielle was crossing a street in Grand

 Junction when a vehicle struck her. According to Nicola’s

                                    2
 complaint, the streetlights in the vicinity were not working at the

 time of the accident. Danielle sustained serious injuries and never

 regained full consciousness or the ability to speak, communicate, or

 make decisions prior to her death nineteen days later. The parties

 agree that Danielle’s injuries made her a “person under disability”

 as that term is defined in section 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2023. No

 conservator, guardian, or legal representative was appointed for

 Danielle before her death.

¶6    In May 2019, Nicola filed a lawsuit against the driver of the

 vehicle that hit Danielle, asserting two wrongful death claims. In

 March 2020, Nicola settled that first lawsuit and filed a notice of

 voluntary dismissal under C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1).

¶7    In December 2020, Nicola filed a second lawsuit against Xcel

 Energy and Grand Junction, asserting wrongful death claims and

 survival claims for negligence and premises liability. Nicola alleged

 that Xcel Energy and Grand Junction each had duties to maintain

 adequate street lighting for the area, that Grand Junction had a

 duty to warn of dangerous conditions on its property, and that the

 defendants’ breach of those duties was a cause of Danielle’s death.

                                   3
¶8    Xcel Energy and Grand Junction moved to dismiss under

 C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

 granted, arguing in relevant part that the wrongful death claims

 were precluded under the “one civil action” rule set forth in section

 13-21-203(1)(a) of the Wrongful Death Act and that the survival

 claims were barred by either a one-year statute of limitations under

 section 13-81-103(1)(b) — calculated from the date of Danielle’s

 death — or a two-year statute of limitations under section 13-80-

 102(1)(h), C.R.S. 2023 — calculated from the date of the accident.

 The district court granted the motions to dismiss, concluding that

 the Wrongful Death Act barred Nicola’s second suit.

¶9    Because the court appeared to have erroneously dismissed the

 survival claims under the Wrongful Death Act, Nicola filed a

 C.R.C.P. 59 motion to amend the judgment as to those claims. The

 court acknowledged that it had erred by dismissing Nicola’s survival

 claims under the Wrongful Death Act but nonetheless concluded

 that the survival claims were untimely under section 13-81-

 103(1)(b) and section 13-80-102(1)(h). Thus, the court dismissed

 Nicola’s complaint.

                                   4
         II.   Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law

¶ 10    We review de novo a district court’s judgment dismissing a

  complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

  granted under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v.

  Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 16. We accept as true the

  factual allegations in the complaint and, viewing them in the light

  most favorable to the plaintiff, determine whether the complaint

  states a plausible claim for relief. Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

  Ins. Co., 2021 COA 89, ¶ 24; see Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶¶ 9,

  24.

¶ 11    We also review de novo issues of statutory construction.

  Carousel Farms Metro. Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 2019 CO 51,

  ¶ 40. In doing so, our primary task is to give effect to the legislative

  intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words

  and phrases used. Id. We read the statute in the context of the

  entire statutory scheme, giving consistent and sensible effect to all

  its parts. Id.; see also §§ 2-4-101, -201, C.R.S. 2023; A.M. v. A.C.,

  2013 CO 16, ¶ 8. And we avoid constructions that would render

  any words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd

  results. Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16.

                                     5
  When the language of a statute is clear, we enforce it as written.

  Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18.

                       III.    Wrongful Death Claim

¶ 12   Nicola contends that the district court erred by concluding

  that his wrongful death claims against Xcel Energy and Grand

  Junction are barred by the “one civil action” rule. Under the

  circumstances presented by this case, we disagree.

                              A.   Applicable Law

¶ 13   “Under Colorado law, there exists no other cause of action for

  the death of another other than a statutory claim brought under the

  Wrongful Death Act, section 13-21-202,” C.R.S. 2023. Steedle v.

  Sereff, 167 P.3d 135, 140-41 (Colo. 2007). The Wrongful Death Act

  allows an heir of the decedent to maintain an action and recover

  damages to which the decedent would have been entitled “if death

  had not ensued.” § 13-21-202; see also Duke v. Gunnison Cnty.

  Sheriff’s Off., 2019 COA 170, ¶ 24.

¶ 14   As relevant here, the Wrongful Death Act provides that “[t]here

  shall be only one civil action . . . for recovery of damages for the

  wrongful death of any one decedent.” § 13-21-203(1)(a). “The

  words ‘only’ and ‘one’ are self-evident, leaving no room for doubt

                                       6
  that Colorado law forbids multiple actions for the recovery of

  damages for the wrongful death of a decedent.” Hernandez v.

  Downing, 154 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Colo. 2007). An “action” is “a

  proceeding on the part of one person, as actor, against another, for

  the infringement of some right of the first, before a court of justice,

  in the manner prescribed by the court or law.” Id. (quoting Clough

  v. Clough, 10 Colo. App. 433, 439, 51 P. 513, 515 (1897)); see also

  C.R.C.P. 2 (“There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil

  action.’”); C.R.C.P. 3(a) (“A civil action is commenced . . . by filing a

  complaint with the court . . . .”).

¶ 15   Thus, the plain and unambiguous language of the statute

  “bars a second civil action for wrongful death based upon the death

  of the same decedent.” Est. of Kronemeyer v. Meinig, 948 P.2d 119,

  121 (Colo. App. 1997); see also Hernandez, 154 P.3d at 1069 (The

  statute “means what it says when it limits wrongful death claims to

  ‘only one civil action’ for the death of one decedent.” (quoting § 13-

  21-203(1))). Under the Wrongful Death Act, “[p]ursuing in a

  sequential manner several wrongful death actions, against different

  defendants, and asserting different causes of death, is prohibited.”

  Kronemeyer, 948 P.2d at 121; see also Lanahan v. Chi Psi

                                        7
  Fraternity, 175 P.3d 97, 100 (Colo. 2008) (the damages cap in

  section 13-21-203(1)(a) applies on a per claim basis because the

  statute permits one claim per decedent); Steedle, 167 P.3d at 136

  (“The Wrongful Death Act allows a person’s heirs to recover

  damages for the wrongful death of that person but limits damages

  by requiring that all claims pursuant to the death of one person be

  combined into one civil action.”) (citations omitted).

       B.     Nicola’s Wrongful Death Claims Are Precluded by the “One
                                  Civil Action” Rule

¶ 16        Nicola contends that the district court erred by applying the

  “one civil action” rule to bar his wrongful death claims because

  (1) his first lawsuit was not a “civil action” barring a second suit

  since he voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice, and (2) his

  settlement with the tortfeasor driver should not bar him from

  bringing a second suit against other, non-settling parties.

¶ 17        It is undisputed that Nicola filed and voluntarily dismissed a

  prior lawsuit asserting wrongful death claims against the driver of

  the vehicle that struck and ultimately killed Danielle. The question

  before us is whether that lawsuit — which ended in a voluntary

  dismissal without prejudice after settlement with the driver — was a

                                         8
  “civil action” barring subsequent actions for Danielle’s wrongful

  death. We conclude that it was.

¶ 18   Nicola voluntarily dismissed his first lawsuit pursuant to

  C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1). Because the notice of dismissal did not say that it

  was a dismissal with prejudice, the dismissal was without

  prejudice. See id.; USIC Locating Servs. LLC v. Project Res. Grp. Inc.,

  2023 COA 33, ¶ 16.

¶ 19   Relying primarily on federal precedent, Nicola argues that a

  voluntary dismissal pursuant to C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) places the parties

  in the same position as if the action had never been filed. See

  Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th

  Cir. 1991) (noting that “[i]t is hornbook law that, as a general rule, a

  voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though

  the action had never been brought” when rejecting the plaintiff’s

  argument that filing an earlier lawsuit tolled the statute of

  limitations). Nicola urges us to interpret Colorado’s rule

  consistently with federal precedent to conclude that a voluntary

  dismissal without prejudice results in no “civil action” having been

  filed. See Alpha Spacecom, Inc. v. Hu, 179 P.3d 62, 64 (Colo. App.

                                     9
  2007) (federal authorities interpreting the comparable federal rule

  are persuasive when interpreting C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)).

¶ 20   But a voluntary dismissal under C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) does not

  leave the parties exactly where they were had the lawsuit never

  been brought because a plaintiff may only voluntarily dismiss with

  impunity once. If the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a second

  lawsuit based on or including the same claim, that dismissal

  operates as an adjudication on the merits. C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1). Had

  the first lawsuit never been filed, there would be no consequence for

  dismissing the second lawsuit.

¶ 21   More importantly, the parties to Nicola’s first lawsuit were not

  left in the same positions they would have been had that action

  never been filed. Nicola filed a lawsuit against the tortfeasor driver

  and asserted wrongful death claims that were fully resolved by

  settlement. Before the lawsuit was filed, Nicola had not recovered,

  and the driver had not paid, any damages for Danielle’s wrongful

  death; after the lawsuit was dismissed, Nicola had recovered, and

  the driver had paid, such damages. Thus, we conclude that

                                    10
  Nicola’s first lawsuit against the driver was a “civil action” barring

  subsequent wrongful death claims for Danielle’s death.2

¶ 22   We are not persuaded otherwise by Nicola’s argument that a

  “civil action” requires a final adjudication on the merits by a judge

  or jury. Nicola cites Hernandez to support his contention, but

  Hernandez does not go so far. Although the supreme court

  reasoned that “[t]he singular nature of a civil action does not end

  with the filing of one complaint in one court,” it did so in the

  context of concluding that severing certain claims and transferring

  them to a different venue would violate the one civil action rule even

  though the claims had originally been brought together in a single

  2 We do not opine on whether a lawsuit filed and voluntarily

  dismissed without prejudice and without resolution of the claims
  through settlement constitutes a “civil action” because those are not
  the facts before us, and any such opinion would be purely advisory.
  See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 49 (the court “is not
  empowered to give advisory opinions based on hypothetical fact
  situations”) (citation omitted). And because we do not decide
  whether a voluntary dismissal without some resolution of the
  claims constitutes a “civil action,” we reject Nicola’s contention that
  our interpretation would lead to absurd results, such as a voluntary
  dismissal of a federal case that could not be refiled in state court or
  a dismissal for filing in the wrong venue that could not be refiled in
  the correct venue. Our holding is limited to cases where the
  wrongful death claims asserted in the first lawsuit were resolved
  through a settlement.

                                     11
  complaint. Hernandez, 154 P.3d at 1070-71. It did not hold that a

  civil action does not exist without an adjudication by the trier of

  fact.

¶ 23      Nicola’s interpretation of the one civil action rule would allow

  serial wrongful death lawsuits against different defendants,

  potentially asserting different causes of death, so long as each case

  was settled rather than litigated to a judgment by a judge or jury.

  That is not what the Wrongful Death Act contemplates. See

  Hernandez, 154 P.3d at 1070; Kronemeyer, 948 P.2d at 121. Nicola

  resolved the wrongful death claims he asserted in his first

  complaint, leading to his dismissal of that complaint without

  prejudice. Thus, his first lawsuit was a civil action.

¶ 24      We are also unpersuaded by Nicola’s argument that his

  settlement with the driver should not preclude him from later suing

  non-settling parties. He argues that a “civil action” does not

  contemplate “pre-litigation settlements involving no judicial

  proceeding[s].” He urges us not to follow Barnhart v. American

  Furniture Warehouse Co., 2013 COA 158, ¶ 2, in which a division of

  this court concluded that a prelitigation settlement barred a

  subsequent wrongful death proceeding. He contends that Barnhart

                                       12
  was wrongly decided, and we should decline to follow it. But we do

  not have to weigh in on Barnhart or otherwise decide whether a

  prelitigation settlement, standing alone, constitutes a “civil action”

  because we do not have such a settlement here. We have the

  commencement of judicial proceedings by the filing of a complaint

  followed by a settlement resolving the claims asserted.

¶ 25   We also note that the record shows that Nicola was aware of

  possible claims against Xcel Energy and Grand Junction because

  he served Grand Junction with a notice of intent to file a lawsuit for

  failure to maintain the streetlights while his first lawsuit was

  pending. Nicola essentially asks to be able to file a lawsuit

  asserting a wrongful death claim against one defendant — fully

  aware that other parties could be at fault, yet choosing not to name

  those parties — settle the wrongful death claim with the named

  party, and dismiss the first lawsuit; then, years later, file another

  lawsuit asserting wrongful death claims arising out of the same

  death against the parties he knew could be at fault, but he did not

  name in the first suit. Allowing him to do so would be contrary to

  the plain language of the Wrongful Death Act.

                                     13
¶ 26   Under these circumstances, we conclude that Nicola’s first

  lawsuit, in which he asserted wrongful death claims against the

  driver, was a civil action and that the district court correctly

  concluded that section 13-21-203(1)(a) bars the wrongful death

  claims asserted in his second lawsuit against Xcel Energy and

  Grand Junction.

                           IV.   Survival Claims

¶ 27   Nicola contends that the district court erred by concluding

  that his survival claims are time barred under section 13-81-

  103(1)(b). We agree.

¶ 28   To resolve this contention, we first discuss how statutes of

  limitation apply to survival actions. Then we explore when statutes

  of limitation are tolled and when they begin to run against persons

  under a disability. Finally, considering these principles together,

  we conclude that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies only when a

  person under a disability (1) had a legal representative and (2) died

  after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations but less

                                     14
  than two years after the legal representative was appointed.3

  Because neither condition applied to Danielle, section 13-81-

  103(1)(b) does not bar Nicola’s survival claims. And because Nicola

  filed his complaint within the applicable statute of limitations, the

  district court erred by concluding that his survival claims are

  untimely.

       A.     How Statutes of Limitation Apply to Survival Actions

¶ 29   Under section 13-20-101, C.R.S. 2023, all causes of action,

  except actions for slander or libel, survive the death of the person in

  favor of whom the action has accrued, and may be brought by the

  personal representative of the deceased. Because the personal

  representative stands in the shoes of the deceased, see Publix Cab

  Co. v. Colo. Nat’l Bank of Denver, 139 Colo. 205, 212-13, 338 P.2d

  702, 706 (1959); Sharon v. SCC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co., 2019

  COA 178, ¶ 12, a survival action is deemed to have accrued to or

  3 In addition, for section 13-81-103(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023, to apply, the

  person under a disability must die before termination of their
  disability and the claim must be one that survives the decedent’s
  death. It is undisputed that both of these requirements are met in
  this case.

                                    15
  against the personal representative when it would have accrued to

  or against the deceased had they survived, § 13-20-101(2).

¶ 30   Section 13-80-112, C.R.S. 2023, addresses how statutes of

  limitation run on survival claims:

             If any person entitled to bring any action dies
             before the expiration of the time limited
             therefor and if the cause of action does by law
             survive, the action may be commenced by the
             personal representative of the deceased person
             at any time within one year after the date of
             death and not afterwards if barred by provision
             of this article.

¶ 31   The phrase “if barred by provision of this article” is significant

  for two reasons. Id. First, it confirms that the statutes of limitation

  set forth in article 80 apply to survival actions. Second, it

  establishes that if the condition precedent is met — that is, if the

  person entitled to bring the action dies before the applicable statute

  of limitations expires — the personal representative can still bring

  the claim within one year of death, even if that date lies beyond the

  otherwise applicable statute of limitations.

¶ 32   Thus, if a person dies after the statute of limitations has

  expired on their cause of action, any survival claim is barred. But if

  the person dies before the statute of limitations expires, the

                                    16
  personal representative may commence an action within one year

  after the date of death or before the otherwise applicable statute of

  limitations expires, whichever period is greater. See 7 John W.

  Grund et al., Colorado Practice Series, Personal Injury Torts &

  Insurance § 9.23, Westlaw (3d ed. database updated Dec. 2022).

   B.   How Statutes of Limitation Apply to Persons Under Disability

¶ 33    Section 13-81-103 tolls the running of any statute of

  limitations against a “person under disability” during the period of

  disability. Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1986)

  (“Although section 13-81-103(1)(a) speaks in terms of the running

  of the applicable statute of limitations against a person under

  disability . . . and not in terms of suspending or tolling the

  limitation period during the period of disability, there can be no

  question that the statute is intended to toll the applicable statute of

  limitations during the period of disability.”); see also In re Estate of

  Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981). A “person under disability” is

  “any person who is a minor under eighteen years of age, a mental

  incompetent, or a person under other legal disability and who does

  not have a legal guardian.” § 13-81-101(3).

                                     17
¶ 34   But section 13-81-103 also establishes when a statute of

  limitations begins to run against a person under a disability. Under

  subsection (1)(a),

             If such person under disability is represented
             by a legal representative at the time the right
             accrues, or if a legal representative is
             appointed for such person under disability at
             any time after the right accrues and prior to
             the termination of such disability, the
             applicable statute of limitations shall run
             against such person under disability in the
             same manner, for the same period, and with
             the same effect as it runs against persons not
             under disability. Such legal representative, or
             his successor in trust, in any event shall be
             allowed not less than two years after his
             appointment within which to take action on
             behalf of such person under disability, even
             though the two-year period expires after the
             expiration of the period fixed by the applicable
             statute of limitations.

  § 13-81-103(1)(a). A “legal representative” is “a guardian,

  conservator, personal representative, executor, or administrator

  duly appointed by a court having jurisdiction of any person under

  disability or his estate.” § 13-81-101(2). The “applicable statute of

  limitations” means “any statute of limitations which would apply in

  a similar case to a person not a person under disability.” § 13-81-

  101(1).

                                    18
¶ 35   Under subsection (1)(a), court appointment of a legal

  representative for a person under a disability “averts the . . . legal

  disability for purposes of litigating” the rights of that person,

  “thereby rendering inapplicable the tolling provisions.” Elgin v.

  Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411, 414 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds

  by Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, ¶ 44. Once a legal

  representative is appointed, the statute of limitations begins to run

  as though the disability has been removed or terminated. Even so,

  subsection (1)(a) expressly extends the period within which a legal

  representative can bring a claim on behalf of the person under a

  disability for an additional two years from the date of appointment.

  § 13-81-103(1)(a).

¶ 36   Under subsection (1)(b),

             If the person under disability dies before the
             termination of his disability and before the
             expiration of the period of limitation in
             paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and the
             right is one which survives to the executor or
             administrator of a decedent, such executor or
             administrator shall take action within one year
             after the death of such person under disability.

  § 13-81-103(1)(b). The parties dispute the meaning of subsection

  (1)(b), which we discuss in detail below.

                                     19
¶ 37   Finally, under subsection (1)(c),

             If the disability of any person is terminated
             before the expiration of the period of limitation
             in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no
             legal representative has been appointed for
             him, such person shall be allowed to take
             action within the period fixed by the applicable
             statute of limitations or within two years after
             the removal of the disability, whichever period
             expires later.

  § 13-81-103(1)(c). Under subsection (1)(c), a person under a

  disability who survives and whose disability is removed is entitled to

  the benefit of the longer of the applicable statute of limitations or

  two years from the date the disability was removed to bring an

  action. See Mohammadi v. Kinslow, 2022 COA 103, ¶ 24 (cert.

  granted May 22, 2023).

               C.   When Section 13-81-103(1)(b) Applies

¶ 38   The district court held that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies

  when a person under a disability dies before the disability is

  removed — regardless of whether a legal representative has been

  appointed for that person — and that it requires the executor or

  administrator to bring a survival claim within one year after the

  date of death notwithstanding any other statute of limitations.

  Because Nicola did not file his suit against Xcel Energy and Grand

                                     20
  Junction within one year of Danielle’s death, the court concluded

  that Nicola’s survival claims were time barred.

¶ 39   Xcel Energy and Grand Junction contend that the district

  court’s interpretation was correct, and that subsection (1)(b) simply

  provides the executor or administrator a fixed period of time — one

  year from the date of death — to file an action, regardless of

  whether the person under disability had a legal representative and

  notwithstanding any otherwise applicable statute of limitations.

  But Nicola contends that subsection (1)(b) creates a classic “if-then”

  statement: only if the limitations period in subsection (1)(a) is

  running and the person under a disability dies before it expires,

  then the estate has one year from the date of death to sue under

  subsection (1)(b). He further argues that the limitations period in

  subsection (1)(a) only runs — satisfying the condition for

  application of subsection (1)(b) — when a legal representative has

  been appointed for the person under a disability.

¶ 40   Based on the plain language of the statute, read in harmony

  with other statutes governing survival actions, we conclude that

  section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies only when a person under a

  disability (1) had a legal representative and (2) died after the

                                     21
  expiration of the applicable statute of limitations but less than two

  years after the legal representative was appointed.

¶ 41   Subsection (1)(a) provides that the statute of limitations runs

  against a person under disability as it would against anyone else if

  a legal representative has been appointed. See § 13-81-103(1)(a).

  “If” is “widely understood” to introduce a “condition necessary ‘for

  the truth or occurrence of the main statement of a sentence.’”

  People v. Salazar, 2023 COA 102, ¶ 16 (quoting United States v.

  Flores, 664 F. App’x 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2016)). If the condition is

  not met — that is, if a person under disability does not have a legal

  representative — the applicable statute of limitations is tolled. See

  Southard, 714 P.2d at 897.

¶ 42   Subsection (1)(b), in turn, addresses a situation where “the

  person under disability” dies before the expiration of “the period of

  limitation in [subsection (1)(a)].” § 13-81-103(1)(b) (emphasis

  added). The definite article “the” particularizes the subject “person

  under disability,” focusing on the “person under disability”

  previously referenced in subsection (1)(a) — one for whom a legal

  representative has been appointed. See Coffey v. Colo. Sch. of

  Mines, 870 P.2d 608, 610 (Colo. App. 1993) (applying “the familiar

                                    22
  principle of statutory construction that the use of the definite article

  particularizes the subject which it precedes”).

¶ 43   The other condition that must be satisfied before subsection

  (1)(b) applies — that the person under disability dies “before the

  expiration of the period of limitation in paragraph (a) of this

  subsection (1)” — further supports this interpretation because there

  is no “period of limitation” in subsection (1)(a) that accrues, runs, or

  expires if the person under a disability does not have a legal

  representative. See Southard, 714 P.2d at 897 (section 13-81-103

  suspends the running of the statute of limitations until either the

  disability is removed or a legal representative is appointed). A

  person under a disability who dies without a legal representative

  will always die before the expiration of the period of limitation in

  subsection (1)(a) because the period of limitation does not run

  against them until their disability is removed by death. Thus, the

  only way to give meaning to this condition is to conclude that

  subsection (1)(b) applies only when the person under a disability

  has a legal representative. See Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO

  48, ¶ 21 (“In interpreting a statute, we aim to give effect to every

  word and presume that the legislature did not use language idly.”).

                                     23
  Only then is it possible for the person under a disability to die after

  the expiration of the period of limitation in subsection (1)(a), which

  runs against them only if they have a legal representative. See

  Southard, 714 P.2d at 897.

¶ 44   But what does the phrase “period of limitation in paragraph (a)

  of this subsection (1)” mean? § 13-81-103(1)(b). It cannot mean

  simply “the applicable statute of limitations” because that is a

  separately defined term. See § 13-81-101(1); see also Colo. Med.

  Bd. v. Off. of Admin. Cts., 2014 CO 51, ¶ 19 (“[T]he use of different

  terms signals the General Assembly’s intent to afford those terms

  different meanings.”). Moreover, subsection (1)(a) refers to two

  potentially different periods of limitation — “the applicable statute

  of limitations” and a period “not less than two years after” the

  appointment of a legal representative. § 13-81-103(1)(a).

¶ 45   To determine the meaning of “period of limitation in paragraph

  (a) of this subsection (1),” we must interpret section 13-81-103(1)(b)

  in harmony with section 13-80-112, the statute that generally

  governs how statutes of limitation operate against survival claims.

  See Elgin, 994 P.2d at 416 (“Statutes governing the same subject

  must be reconciled if possible.”). Under section 13-80-112, if a

                                    24
  person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration of the

  applicable statute of limitations, their personal representative has

  the longer of the period remaining under the applicable statute of

  limitations or one year from the date of death to bring a survival

  action.

¶ 46   As noted, although the statute of limitations does not run

  against a person under a disability, see Southard, 714 P.2d at 897,

  once a legal representative is appointed, the statute of limitations

  runs against that person “in the same manner, for the same period,

  and with the same effect as it runs against persons not under

  disability.” § 13-81-103(1)(a). In other words, if a person under a

  disability has a legal representative, they are treated the same for

  statute of limitations purposes as a person who does not have a

  disability (except that their legal representative is entitled to a

  minimum of two years to bring a claim, as discussed below). For

  this reason, section 13-80-112 applies equally to a survival action

  for a person not under a disability and to a survival action for a

  person under a disability who has a legal representative. In either

  case, if the person entitled to bring the claim dies before the

  expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the personal

                                     25
  representative may bring a survival claim within the time remaining

  under the statute of limitations or a year from the date of death,

  whichever is longer. Nothing in the plain language of either section

  13-80-112 or section 13-81-103 suggests otherwise.

¶ 47   Against this backdrop, interpreting section 13-81-103(1)(b) to

  apply when a person under a disability dies before the expiration of

  the applicable statute of limitations creates either a conflict or a

  superfluity with section 13-80-112. If under such circumstances

  section 13-81-103(1)(b) shortens the time to bring a survival claim

  by depriving the personal representative of the benefit of a longer

  amount of time remaining under the applicable statute of

  limitations, it conflicts with section 13-80-112. See Southard, 714

  P.2d at 898 (section 13-81-103 is intended to apply to any statute

  of limitations in this state unless there exists a special statute

  pertinent to the claim that conflicts). And if under such

  circumstances section 13-81-103(1)(b) extends the time to bring a

  survival claim by giving the personal representative another year

                                     26
  from the date of death, it is superfluous because section 13-80-112

  already provides that extension.4

¶ 48   We are obligated to interpret statutes, where possible, to avoid

  or resolve inconsistencies and give effect to every word. See Larimer

  Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. 1303 Frontage Holdings, LLC, 2023 CO

  28, ¶ 56. We can achieve that end by interpreting section 13-81-

  103(1)(b) to provide an extension of the statute of limitations for a

  personal representative who brings a survival action when the

  person under a disability dies after the expiration of the applicable

  statute of limitations — taking the claim outside the scope of

  section 13-80-112 — but before the expiration of the additional two-

  year period contemplated by section 13-81-103(1)(a).

  4 Because the legislature enacted the predecessor to section 13-80-

  112 before the predecessor to section 13-81-103, see Ch. 114, sec.
  1, § 13-80-112, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 701; R.S. 1868, § 17; Ch.
  126, sec. 3, 1939 Colo. Sess. Laws 450, we presume it knew that
  the law already provided that when a person dies before the
  expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, their personal
  representative has either the time remaining under the statute of
  limitations or a year from death, whichever is greater, to bring a
  survival claim. See In re Harte, 2012 COA 183, ¶ 24. Therefore,
  section 13-81-103(1)(b) must mean something else. See Nieto v.
  Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 21.

                                      27
¶ 49   Recall that subsection (1)(a) grants a legal representative “not

  less than two years after his appointment” to commence an action

  on behalf of a person under a disability “even though the two-year

  period expires after the expiration of the period fixed by the

  applicable statute of limitations.” § 13-81-103(1)(a). Thus,

  subsection (1)(a) contemplates the existence of a period after

  expiration of the applicable statute of limitations during which the

  legal representative is authorized to take action that otherwise

  would be barred by the statute of limitations. Subsection (1)(b)

  then provides that, if the person under a disability dies before the

  expiration of “the period of limitation in paragraph (a) of this

  subsection (1),” their executor or administrator must take action

  within a year of the date of death. § 13-81-103(1)(b). To give

  harmonious effect to both section 13-80-112 and section 13-81-

  103, “the period of limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1)”

  must refer to the period after the expiration of the applicable statute

  of limitations but before the two-year anniversary of the legal

  representative’s appointment.

¶ 50   Thus, when the statutes governing survival actions are read in

  harmony, they dictate the following scheme: If the person under a

                                     28
disability dies before the applicable statute of limitations expires,

section 13-80-112 applies. The personal representative then has

the longer of the applicable statute of limitations or one year from

the date of death to bring the survival action. If the person under a

disability dies after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations

but less than two years after the legal representative was appointed,

section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies. The personal representative, who

has already been given more time beyond the applicable statute of

limitations, then has one year from the date of death to bring the

survival action.5 In both scenarios, the person entitled to bring the

claim or their personal representative gets the full benefit of the

applicable statute of limitation plus some additional time.6

5 Our interpretation is also consistent with section 15-12-109,

C.R.S. 2023, which provides as follows:
           No statute of limitations running on a cause of
           action belonging to a decedent which had not
           been barred as of the date of his death shall
           apply to bar a cause of action surviving the
           decedent’s death sooner than one year after
           death. A cause of action which, but for this
           section, would have been barred less than one
           year after death is barred after one year unless
           tolled.
6 Xcel Energy argues that our interpretation is unsupportable

because it presumes that the legislature “enacted legislation that

                                   29
¶ 51   Thus, we conclude, based on the plain language of the statute,

  that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies only when the person under a

  disability (1) had a legal representative and (2) died after the

  expiration of the applicable statute of limitations but less than two

  years after the legal representative was appointed.

¶ 52   We reject Xcel Energy and Grand Junction’s contrary

  arguments. We acknowledge that subsection (1)(c) expressly

  applies when a person survives their disability and “no legal

  representative has been appointed” — demonstrating that the

  legislature knew how to say when a provision applies to a person

  without a legal representative — and that subsection (1)(b) does not

  contain similar language. § 13-81-103(1)(b), (c). But unlike

  subsection (1)(b), subsection (1)(c) does not refer back to “the person

  under disability”; instead, subsection (1)(c) refers to “any person”

  whose disability is terminated before “expiration of the period of

  limitation in [subsection (1)(a)].” § 13-81-103(1)(b), (c) (emphasis

  added).

  wholly left out a fairly typical circumstance where a person under
  disability does not have a legal representative appointed when they
  die.” But, as we have explained, in this “fairly typical
  circumstance,” section 13-80-112, C.R.S. 2023, applies.

                                     30
¶ 53   And although subsection (1)(c)’s cross-reference to “the period

  of limitation” in subsection (1)(a) is confusing given that it is only

  possible for such period to expire if a legal representative has been

  appointed for a person under a disability, we are not tasked with

  resolving that potential ambiguity. And we note that, without

  reference to the period of limitation in subsection (1)(a), the

  supreme court and other divisions of this court have interpreted

  subsection (1)(c) to mean that, upon termination of the disability,

  the person may take action within the applicable statute of

  limitations or two years from removal of the disability, whichever is

  longer. See Rudnicki, ¶ 16; Daigle, 634 P.2d at 75; Mohammadi,

  ¶¶ 18-24.

¶ 54   Because our interpretation is based on the plain,

  unambiguous language of the statute, we need go no further, see

  Elder, ¶ 18, but our interpretation also furthers the end to be

  achieved by the statute and avoids absurd results, demonstrating

  that it is the only reasonable interpretation. See id. (“A statute is

  ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of multiple

  interpretations.”); Agilent Techs., Inc., ¶ 16 (“We must avoid

  constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous

                                     31
  or that would lead to illogical or absurd results.”); Colo. Sun v.

  Brubaker, 2023 COA 101, ¶ 47 (“An alternate interpretation is

  unreasonable and therefore creates no ambiguity if it ‘would lead to

  illogical or absurd results.’” (quoting Elder, ¶ 18)); Salazar, ¶ 20

  (considering whether plain language interpretation furthers the

  statute’s purpose).

¶ 55   Our interpretation furthers the purpose of section 13-81-103,

  which is to toll or suspend the running of statutes of limitation to

  protect persons under a disability during the period of disability.

  See Southard, 714 P.2d at 897; Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414. By contrast,

  interpreting subsection (1)(b) to shorten the time a personal

  representative otherwise has to bring a survival action for a person

  under a disability — regardless of whether that person had a legal

  representative — would contravene that purpose.

¶ 56   Our interpretation also avoids absurd results. Under Xcel

  Energy and Grand Junction’s interpretation of section 13-81-

  103(1)(b), Nicola had one year from the date of Danielle’s death to

  bring a survival claim because she was a person under a disability

  when she died. In other words, because Danielle did not die the

  same day she was injured, but instead lived for nineteen days in an

                                     32
  unconscious state, Nicola had just one year from the date of her

  death to bring the claim. But had Danielle died the same day she

  was injured, Nicola would have had at least two years to bring the

  claim. See §§ 13-80-112, 13-80-102(1)(h). The legislative scheme

  reflects no intention or justification for such disparate treatment.

¶ 57   Grand Junction counters that our interpretation leads to a

  more absurd result, positing the following hypothetical:

             Suppose a person (“Sue”) suffers an injury
             involving a motor vehicle accident on January
             1, 2010 that renders her legally disabled. Sue
             remains disabled for the following four years
             without a legal representative, although she
             has a parent who is aware of her condition, is
             prepared to become the executor or
             administrator of her estate in the likely event
             of her death, and presumably would file a
             survival action on behalf of her estate upon
             her death. On January 1, 2014, still disabled
             and without a legal representative at the time,
             Sue passes away.

  Grand Junction argues that “[a] clear reading” of section 13-81-

  103(1)(b) would require that Sue’s parent act within a year of her

  death by bringing an action by January 1, 2015, whereas our

  interpretation “would allow Sue’s parent until January 1, 2017 —

  seven years after the injury — to file a survival claim on behalf of

  Sue’s estate.” Grand Junction argues that such a delay is absurd.

                                    33
¶ 58   Although we agree with Grand Junction’s explanation of how

  the statutes operate under our interpretation, we disagree that the

  result is absurd. Tolling the statutes of limitation for persons under

  a disability is the unequivocal purpose of section 13-81-103,

  regardless of whether the person under a disability dies or their

  disability is removed. See Southard, 714 P.2d at 897. And

  application of section 13-81-103 has led to even longer delays than

  the one in the hypothetical. See Rudnicki, ¶ 38 (explaining that an

  unemancipated minor without a legal representative may bring a

  negligence claim as late as the minor’s twentieth birthday); Tenney

  v. Flaxer, 727 P.2d 1079, 1080, 1084-85 (Colo. 1986) (even though

  a minor’s injury occurred in 1962, the statute of limitations was

  tolled until guardians were appointed for the minor in 1980 and

  they timely brought suit two years later in 1982).

           D.   Nicola’s Survival Claims Are Not Time Barred

¶ 59   The parties do not dispute that, because of her injuries,

  Danielle was a “person under disability” from the date of the

  accident until the date of her death, see § 13-81-101(3), so we will

  assume without deciding that this is true. As a result, the statute

  of limitations on her claims against Xcel Energy and Grand

                                   34
  Junction did not begin to run until her death removed her

  disability. See Southard, 714 P.2d at 897. Necessarily, Danielle

  died before expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. It is

  also undisputed that Danielle was not appointed a legal

  representative. Thus, section 13-80-112 governs Nicola’s survival

  claim. Section 13-81-103(1)(b) does not apply.

¶ 60   Under section 13-80-112, Nicola had the longer of the

  applicable statute of limitations — which began to run on the date

  Danielle’s disability was removed by her death — or one year after

  the date of Danielle’s death to bring a survival action. Xcel Energy

  and Grand Junction argue that the two-year statute of limitations

  in section 13-80-102(1)(h) applies, while Nicola argues that the

  three-year statute of limitations in section 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), C.R.S.

  2023, applies. But we need not resolve that dispute. Nicola filed

  the survival action within two years of Danielle’s death, making it

  timely under the shorter of the two statutes of limitation. Thus, we

  conclude that the district court erred by dismissing Nicola’s survival

  claims as untimely.

                                     35
                             V.     Attorney Fees

¶ 61   Xcel Energy and Grand Junction each request attorney fees

  and costs pursuant to section 13-17-201, C.R.S. 2023. Under

  section 13-17-201(1), a defendant is entitled to recover reasonable

  attorney fees when any tort action is dismissed before trial under

  C.R.C.P. 12(b). But because we have determined that Nicola’s

  survival claims should be reinstated, we conclude that Xcel Energy

  and Grand Junction are not entitled to attorney fees. See Colo.

  Special Dists. Prop. & Liab. Pool v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, ¶ 60 (“[T]he

  statute does not authorize recovery if a defendant obtains dismissal

  of some, but not all, of a plaintiff’s tort claims.”).

                              VI.    Disposition

¶ 62   We affirm the part of the district court’s judgment dismissing

  Nicola’s wrongful death claims but reverse the part of the judgment

  dismissing Nicola’s negligence and premises liability survival claims

  and remand the case for further proceedings on those claims.

       JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

                                      36