Court Opinion

ID: 9845767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:58.687928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.403760
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting on denial of petition for rehearing.
The Court, by the same four to one vote which resulted in a majority opinion, has now brushed aside the Evans’ petition for rehearing, or, alternatively, a modification which would erase this Court’s endorsement of what is aptly referred to as “nothing short of an armed invasion” and “a show of force” amounting to an invasion of privacy.
The brief which has been presented to us on behalf of Mr. Evans is compelling, thus making it difficult to understand the ready denial, especially where the Court tenders not one word of explanation or reasoning. It is indeed disappointing to see the Court moving backward when it has the capability to strive for, and achieve the ends of justice in all cases, not just a select few. Attached for the perusal of a candid bench and bar is the succinct, eloquent brief to which the Court turns a deaf ear and an unseeing eye.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE PROCEDURE
It is feared that the Court has overlooked a very important procedural error committed by the District Court. No mention of this procedural error, one way or the other, is noted in the Court’s Opinion but, if the Court agrees that this error did occur, the case should be remanded and not affirmed.
A pivotal fact on which the Court did rely was Dr. Stott’s opinion formed after reading the medical records of Mrs. Evans, that her death could not have been caused by the incident which forms the basis of this action.
The Court’s Opinion at p. 91, refers to Dr. Stott’s opinion and cites it with approval reflecting the great esteem which the law reserves for practitioners of the healing arts. In truth, Dr. Stott’s opinion becomes one of the pivotal aspects of this Court’s decision. Dr. Stott has rendered his opinion and it counters the opinion of the husband of the deceased. The Court has ruled that we do not concern ourselves with that opinion because it is only a laymen’s opinion grounded only upon 30 years experience with this deceased woman. A husband who has caressed, loved, shared with, and intimately known the deceased woman for more than 30 years is of absolutely no importance and the holding of the case so indicates. His opinion pales into nothing when set against the conclusion of a physician who did not witness the triggering event, who did not know the deceased woman, who did not interview the witnesses or read the depositions of the witnesses or converse with or read the *223depositions of the examining or treating physicians, who did not examine the body, who had no autopsy report to read, but who did read some medical records kindly set before him by Defendant’s counsel.
Since this important, pivotal, opinion of Dr. Stott comes to us by way of an Affidavit, why, the Court might ask, is there no deposition of Dr. Stott? Why is there no cross-examination of Dr. Stott? Why does this court not have a countervailing affidavit from a physician?
The answer is found at p. 21 of Appellant’s Brief. The reason why Dr. Stott’s opinion stands like the Colossus of Rhoades over this case, an uncontradicted beacon of truth and light, is that it was not timely submitted by Defendant’s counsel. Discovery was to cut off on January 13, 1989. Two days before and after office hours, some 47 witnesses were identified by the Defendants by way of supplemental answers to interrogatories. The response of plaintiffs was to move the Court to exclude all of the testimony of all of these suddenly identified witnesses, one of whom was Dr. Stott. That Motion in Limine and 13-page supporting brief was timely filed and noticed for hearing before the Court for January 30th. But the Trial Court refused to take up that motion.
Dr. Stott’s opinion by way of Affidavit was not filed with the Court until the date of January 17, 1989, which was only 13 days before the argument for Summary Judgment. A Motion to Strike the Affidavit was made during oral argument by Plaintiff’s counsel (TR 43 II. 2-5), but the trial court never got around to hearing that motion or the Motion in Limine, instead having an off-again-on-again approach to the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment which literally lasted all day having been interrupted by many delays. When the Court summarily stalked off the bench at 5:00 o’clock stating that there were some things to attend to, the Motions relative to Dr. Stott’s evidence were still not addressed.
The objection to Dr. Stott’s offer of evidence was filed primarily because the Plaintiffs could not cross-examine nor file a counter-affidavit. Rule 56(c) seems to be quite clear in stating that Affidavits shall be served at least 28 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The reason for this rule is also apparent. That is so the adverse party can serve opposing affidavits at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. If observed, this might save everyone some time and trouble because questions of fact would appear and then obviate the necessity for argument on Rule 56.
If we take away from the record the Affidavit of Dr. Stott, we are not left with any valid medical opinion that the death of Mrs. Evans was not caused by the incident. The depositions of Dr. Spafford, Dr. Swartling, and Dr. Bontrager have been reviewed and none state that there is no chance of a causal connection between the incident and the death of Mrs. Evans. Dr. Spafford comes closest at pps. 25 and 26 of his deposition but he never does state that the death was not connected. He does say at pps. 28-29 that stress can cause heart damage. The point is, however, that without Dr. Stott’s affidavit, Defendants have zero evidence on which to base their Rule 56 motion and that does not seem to have been taken into account by the Court in its opinion.
The second reason for the Petition for Rehearing is to argue, if indeed the Court needs argument, on the case of Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978). It is clear from the portion of that case cited by Justice Bistline that the majority opinion is reflective of a misreading of the Robertson decision. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion itself states, “a different situation might well be presented, as the District Court noted, if State law ‘did not provide for survival of any tort actions’ [Shaw v. Garrison ], 391 F.Supp. [1353] at 1363 [ (E.D.La.1975) ], or if it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive____” It is quite likely that the United States Supreme Court would find that Mrs. Evans’ § 1983 action should survive her death and indeed, this Court should likewise rule.
*224The holding of this Court does seem to be anomalous to fundamental notions of fair play and civil liberties. What public policies are advanced by allowing police officers to violate the civil rights of a citizen and to pay for those violations of civil rights if the citizen lives but fortuitously escape payment if the citizen dies? What possible public policy is advanced by allowing the wrongdoer to escape without paying for the wrong that he does?
Hypothetically, if there were a citizen who has no heirs, is not this Court stating to law enforcement officers within the state, “shoot to kill,” because if they are successful in their violation of civil and constitutional rights, the cause of action abates upon the' death and the activities of the police officers never have to be justified or accounted for. What possible public policy is advanced by this interpretation of the law? Why should death cause an abatement in a civil rights case where the law attempts to proscribe behavior, not necessarily to compensate the victim.
Clearly, § 1983 beginning with Monroe v. Pape, and down to the present day indicates that law enforcement agencies are to be held accountable for their violations of the Constitution or statutes which protect property or liberty interests. What possible public policy is advanced by this Court’s ruling that a cause of action abates with the death of the person who was victimized by illegal and unconstitutional police activity? This writer can think of none. None were offered by the Court in its decision. The decision is clear but the foundation for it or the metaphysics involved are not articulated.
Finally, the Court seems to ground its decision upon the fact that the officers were “lawfully” serving a writ of execution. Perhaps this point was lost on the Court and bears repeating: there were six police officers that came with numerous police vehicles in order to surround this farm house and seize farm equipment. They would not take a check for the judgment but ultimately forced the farm wife to travel into town to get a certified check from her banker. When she handed over that certified check, then the officer who received the check radioed to the others at the farm and they then, and only then, vacated the premises.
This is nothing short of an armed invasion. It was an unreasonable show of force and violates the privacy interest of the First Amendment and the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the Court has not appreciated the argument being made here. If it has appreciated the argument and finds that it is entirely appropriate for such a show of force and that this does not even present a jury question as to whether the privacy or property interests of the surviving Plaintiff, Mr. Evans, were violated, then it is submitted that this Court has passed up a good opportunity to protect Idaho citizens in their homes against unreasonable police conduct. Why do we not submit a case like this to the citizens of Twin Falls County for their verdict? The assumption which underlies this Court’s decision seems to state that as long as there is a valid writ in the hand of the policeman he cannot violate the civil rights of a citizen with the other. No case stands for that proposition and it is hoped that this decision will be modified accordingly.