Court Opinion

ID: 9545211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:08:22.894378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:19.323815
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that the evidence does not support a finding the children were dependent and neglected as defined by the Act. In addition to the above basis for reversal, I find further error in the cavalier manner in which the hearing was conducted.
The law in Oklahoma requires a bifurcated juvenile hearing. The first phase is an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the allegations of a petition are supported by the evidence and whether a child should be adjudged to be a ward of the court; the second phase is that of disposition, to determine what order of disposition should be made with respect to a child adjudged to be a ward of the court.1
The hearing in this case was not bifurcated. The court heard evidence as to both issues at the same time. The order declared the children to be wards of the court and determined custody. There was no opportunity for any independent study to be made on behalf of the interests of the children, or for any of the other guidelines of 10 O.S.1971, § 11152 to be met. A two *255phase trial gives the court an opportunity to request independent evaluation of the circumstances as a factor for it to consider in making a disposition.3
The order herein giving custody to grandparents is in effect a termination of father’s parental rights without statutory and due process procedural protections. See 10 O.S. 1976 Supp. § 1130.4 A hearing such as the court held here circumvents and defeats the legislative policy of this state evidenced by our children’s code.
Additionally we note the trial court also ignored 10 O.S.1971, § 24 which provides:
“Appointment of counsel — Compensation. — (a) When it appears to the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires counsel but is indigent and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court shall appoint counsel. In any ease in which it appears to the court that there is such a confiict of interest between a parent or guardian and child that one attorney could not properly represent both, the court may appoint counsel, in addition to counsel already employed by a parent or guardian or appointed by the court to represent the minor or parent or guardian, provided that in all counties having Public Defenders, said Public Defenders shall assume the duties of representation in proceedings such as above.
(b) In all cases other than in counties where Public Defenders are appointed, the court shall, where counsel is appointed and assigned allow and direct to be paid by the county in which the proceedings or trial is held, out of the court fund of said county, a reasonable and just compensation to the attorney or attorneys for such services as they may render. Provided, that such attorney shall not be paid a sum to exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) for services rendered in preliminary proceedings, and such compensation shall not exceed Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) for services rendered during trial.” (Emphasis supplied).
An agency of the state did not institute this proceeding; the grandparents did. No counsel was appointed.
Once a child is declared to be dependent or neglected and made a ward of the court, the state becomes vitally interested in such a child and stands in the position of “parens patriae.”5 In Matter of Paul, 555 P.2d 603, 604 (Okl.1976) held: “Once that adjudication has been made, and the child and his life is subject to the juvenile system, the court becomes more the friend of the child with the intent to help him.” It is incum*256bent upon the state, once the child is made a ward of the court, to either enter the proceeding or to provide someone to represent the interests of the child at the dis-positional phase of the hearing.
In this proceeding the state was not made a party and the court did not appoint anyone to represent the children. Such a proceeding should not stand. Judicial parsimony becomes judicial inertia if this court chooses to ignore blatant disregard for litigants rights because it is not a necessary adjudication in the appeal.6
Once a child is declared to be a ward of the court, the state may not be excused attendance at a subsequent dispositional hearing. It is the state’s responsibility to protect the interests of such a minor.7 The presence of appointed counsel, public defender, guardian ad litem, or other counsel for the state is mandated at a dispositional hearing.
There is some authority representation might be required at the adjudicatory hearing as well. If the state has initiated the proceeding, the presence of the representative of the state has been held to protect the interest of the child.8 However, if the state is not initially involved, the court certainly may appoint counsel to represent the child from the outset. This is especially indicated in an intra-family quarrel such as this. Three rights or interests must be considered, first that of the child; second, that of the parent and third, that of those who for years discharged some of the obligations of parents — in this case the latter being the grandparents.9 All three of these categories have a right to representation and where the minor involved is not capable of demanding counsel it is prudent for the trial judge to require it. Although this might be a financial burden on a smaller county, this may certainly be considered a public responsibility of the Oklahoma Bar.10
If a child is not represented by individual counsel, each attorney presents his arguments from the viewpoint of his client, with the child caught in the middle. Beneath each side’s argument in terms of the best interests of the children, lies the desire to win the case for his client — who is not the child. If the court appoints an attorney for the child, testimony is presented and cross-examination done by an advocate who is truly interested only in the welfare of the child. While the legal precedent for the right of children to be represented by counsel is expressly limited to criminal hearings, the Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1977) recognized children have legal rights entitled to the protection of representation by counsel. The protection of due process has been afforded adults in noncriminal proceedings; it is time to extend this same protection to children.11

. See 10 O.S.1976 Supp. § 1101(f), (g); Couch, “Delinquency and the Unholy Alliance; A Formula For Success?” 48 OBJ Quarterly 137, 144 (1977).

. Section 1115 provides:
“Dispositional hearings — Additional reports or evidence. — (a) After making an order of adjudication, the court shall hold a dispositional hearing, at which all evidence helpful in determining the proper disposition best serving the interest of the child and the public, including oral and written reports, may be admitted and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value, even though not competent for the purposes of the adjudicatory hearing.
(b) Before making an order of disposition, the court shall advise the District Attorney, the parents, guardian, custodian or responsible relative, or their counsel, of the factual contents *255and the conclusion of reports prepared for the use of the court and considered by it, and afford fair opportunity, if requested, to controvert them.
(c) On its own motion or that of the District Attorney, or of the parent, guardian, custodian, responsible relative or counsel, the court may adjourn the hearing for a reasonable period to receive reports or other evidence and, in such event, shall make an appropriate order for detention of the child, or his release from detention subject to supervision by the court, during the period of the continuance. In scheduling investigations and hearings, the court shall give priority to proceedings in which a child is in detention, or has otherwise been removed from his home, before an order of disposition has been made.”

. See Matter of Paul, 555 P.2d 603 (Okl.1976); In re Marriage of Tweeten, 563 P.2d 1141 (Mont.1977).

. For example Section 1130(A)(3) provides a court may terminate rights of a parent to a child by:
“A finding that a parent who is entitled to custody of the child:
^ * * *
‡ ⅜ ⅜
c. is unfit by reason of debauchery, intoxication, or habitual use of narcotic drugs, or repeated lewd or lascivious behavior or other conduct that is detrimental to the physical or mental health or morals of the child, and the parent has failed to show that the conditions have been corrected within a period of six (6) months after the child, or children, were adjudged dependent or neglected and a permanent termination of parental custody of the child, or children, is necessary to protect its physical or mental health or morals; provided further, that the court may extend the time in which such parent may show the condition has been corrected, if, in the judgment of the court, such extension of time would be in the best interest of the child or children.”

.See Matter of Adoption of Morrison, 560 P.2d 240 (Okl.1976).

. This argument was not presented by either party and it is not determinative of this appeal. However, where a child has no representation he has no opportunity to submit the question to this court. Such a fundamental right may not be waived by the other parties involved.

. Matter of Schatz, 560 P.2d 183 (Okl.1977); Also see in Matter of F., 30 A.D.2d 933, 293 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1968).

. In re Custody of Minor, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 94, 250 F.2d 419 (1957); Stubben v. Flathead County Department of Welfare, 556 P.2d 904 (Mont.1976).

. Gibson v. Dorris, 386 P.2d 186 (Okl.1963).

. See Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 26 which states in any proceeding under that act “counsel must be provided for a child not represented by his parent, guardian or custodian." Also see 4 Op.Atty.Gen. 441, No. 71-407 (1972); 10 O.S.1971, § 24(a).

. Grumet, “The Plaintive Plaintiffs; Victims of the Battered Child Syndrome.” 4 Fam.L.Q. 296, 314 (1970).