Court Opinion

ID: 9890859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 17:04:45.253628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:24.426171
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23 P. v. Canizales CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B323141

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. GA110176)
           v.

 RAMON GERARDO
 CANIZALES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
      Christina J. Alvarez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Nancy Lii Ladner, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       Ramon Canizales pleaded no contest to one count of fleeing
or attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer while driving a
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property, in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2,
subdivision (a). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the
trial court sentenced Canizales to the upper term of three years,
but stayed execution of the sentence. The trial court placed
Canizales on formal probation for two years with various terms
and conditions, one of which was that he enter a six-month
residential treatment program.
       Two weeks later Canizales violated the terms of his
probation by leaving the treatment program. Canizales admitted
the violation, and the trial court terminated his probation and
imposed the previously suspended three-year sentence.
       Canizales argues that recent amendments to Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b),1 which limit the trial court’s
discretion to impose an upper-term sentence, apply retroactively
to him and that he is entitled to resentencing under the current
version of the statute. The People agree with Canizales’s first
argument, but not the second, arguing Canizales agreed to the
upper term of three years as part of his plea agreement.
We affirm.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     Canizales Is Charged and Convicted
      Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon Tom
observed Canizales driving a white car speeding through a
residential area and running red lights. When Deputy Tom
attempted to stop Canizales, Canizales drove onto the freeway at
80 or 85 miles an hour, wove in and out of traffic, and crashed.
After the crash, Canizales got out of his car and ran. Deputy
Tom told Canizales to stop, but Canizales ignored his commands
and ran away. Canizales later said he fled because he was on
parole and driving on a suspended license.
      The People charged Canizales with one count of fleeing or
attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer while driving a
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and alleged he had a
prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of
the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)). Canizales agreed to a negotiated disposition that
called for him to plead no contest to the charge; the court to
impose the upper term of three years, suspend execution of the
sentence, and place Canizales on formal probation for two years;
and the People to move to strike the prior serious or violent
felony conviction allegation. At the plea hearing, the trial court
confirmed Canizales understood he was agreeing to the upper
term of three years in prison. The prosecutor, at the court’s
direction, told Canizales that the court would sentence him to the
upper term of three years in prison. The prosecutor stated:
“That’s the maximum sentence for the charge, but [the court] will
suspend execution of the sentence, meaning that you wouldn’t go

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to state prison right now. Instead, you will be placed on
probation for two years. Do you understand that?” Canizales
said, “Yes.” The court asked, “Is there anything you want to ask
your attorney before the prosecutor takes your plea?” Canizales
said, “No.”
       The court accepted Canizales’s plea, found him guilty, and
pursuant to the parties’ agreement sentenced him to the upper
term of three years, with execution of the sentence suspended.
The court placed Canizales on probation and ordered him, among
other things, to enter and complete a six-month residential drug
treatment program (to be followed by recovery bridge housing
and outpatient treatment); not to use or possess narcotics,
alcohol, or marijuana; not to associate with known users or
sellers of narcotics except in a valid rehabilitation program; and
to avoid places where known users and sellers of narcotics and
alcohol congregate. On the People’s motion, the court dismissed
the allegation Canizales had a prior serious or violent felony
conviction.

      B.     Canizales Violates Probation, and the Trial Court
             Imposes the Suspended Sentence
       Canizales violated the terms and conditions of his
probation almost immediately by leaving the treatment center
early. After he was arrested on a bench warrant and brought to
court, he admitted the violation. Counsel for Canizales asked the
court to give Canizales another opportunity to receive treatment.
The court denied the request because Canizales left the program
after only two weeks and did not maintain contact with his
probation officer or the court.

                                4
       Turning to sentencing, counsel for Canizales argued that
under the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), which
require the trial court to impose a sentence that does not exceed
the middle term unless the defendant stipulates to the facts
supporting circumstances in aggravation or a jury finds those
facts true beyond a reasonable doubt, the court could not
sentence Canizales to the upper term. The prosecutor argued the
court should impose the upper term because Canizales had
agreed to it as part of the negotiated disposition: “I believe that
the disposition that was reached before the current version of
[section 1170, subdivision (b),] came into effect, the negotiated
disposition, was for [a] probationary sentence with three years.
He was actually sentenced to three years in state prison, but
execution of the sentence was suspended, and he was placed on
probation. So he already agreed to [the upper] term.” In
addition, citing section 1170, subdivision (b)(4),2 the prosecutor
argued in the alternative, “in an abundance of caution . . . in the

2      Which states: “At least four days prior to the time set for
imposition of judgment, either party or the victim, or the family
of the victim if the victim is deceased, may submit a statement in
aggravation or mitigation to dispute facts in the record or the
probation officer’s report, or to present additional facts. The
court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer’s
report, other reports, including reports received pursuant to
Section 1203.03, and statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution, the defendant, or the victim, or the
family of the victim if the victim is deceased, and any further
evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.” Section 1203.03
refers to a “diagnosis and recommendation concerning the
disposition of defendant’s case” prepared for the court by the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (§ 1203.03,
subd. (b).)

                                 5
event a different court says you have to,” the court should impose
the upper term because, on the merits, the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
       The trial court denied Canizales’s request to reinstate
probation. The court stated Canizales had “a great opportunity
to address” his substance abuse issues, but left the program in
less than two weeks and failed to return to court or maintain
contact with his probation officer until he was arrested on a
warrant. The court stated Canizales “had an opportunity to do
the treatment and an opportunity in the months prior to being
picked up on the warrant to come back to court, contact his
lawyer, address this somehow, but didn’t do so. So the court is
unwilling to reinstate probation.”
       The trial court stated it was “persuaded by the People’s
analysis that the court can consider aggravating factors under
[section 1170, subdivision (b)(4),] as well as mitigating factors, as
well as prior history. And Mr. Canizales has a very significant
history, was on parole at the time for what looks to be a serious
robbery given the sentence that was imposed.” The court found
as aggravating circumstances that Canizales had “prior
convictions as an adult or adjudications of commissions of crimes
as a juvenile” that were “numerous or of increasing seriousness,”
that he had “served a prior prison term,” that he was on
probation or parole when he committed the crime, and that his
“prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory.”
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)-(5).) As a mitigating
circumstance, the court considered that Canizales attended
several voluntary programs while in custody. Finding the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the court
sentenced Canizales to the upper term of three years.

                                  6
                         DISCUSSION

       A.    The Legislature Amends Section 1170, Subdivision (b)
       Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended
section 1170, subdivision (b), to state: “(1) When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2). (2) The court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), allows the court to
“consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (See People v. Flowers
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 685, review granted Oct. 12, 2022,
S276237.)

      B.     Any Error in Imposing the Upper Term Was Harmless
      Canizales argues, the People concede, and we agree the
Legislature’s amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), were
an ameliorative change that applies retroactively to nonfinal
judgments under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 742 because
they limit the trial court’s discretion to impose the upper term.
(See People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465 [the
“ameliorative amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply

                                7
retroactively to all cases not yet final as of January 1, 2022”];
People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039 [“the amended
version of section 1170, subdivision (b) that became effective on
January 1, 2022, applies retroactively in this case as an
ameliorative change in the law applicable to all nonfinal
convictions on appeal”]; see also People v. Esquivel (2021)
11 Cal.5th 671, 674 [“‘The amendatory act imposing the lighter
punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed
before its passage provided the judgment convicting the
defendant of the act is not final.’”].) Where the defendant is on
probation with a suspended sentence and can appeal an order
revoking probation, the case is not final for purposes of applying
the ameliorative legislation. (Esquivel, at p. 673.) But that does
not mean Canizales is necessarily entitled to a new sentencing
hearing. (See People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 700
(Stamps) [“The Estrada rule only answers the question of
whether an amended statute should be applied retroactively.
It does not answer the question of how that statute should be
applied.”].)
       “The Courts of Appeal are split on whether a
defendant . . . who received the upper term under a plea
agreement for a stipulated sentence is entitled to a remand under
[the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)], and the issue
is pending before the Supreme Court.”3 (People v. Fox (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 826, 830; compare id. at pp. 833-834 [defendant is
entitled to a remand that follows the procedure prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Stamps] and People v. Todd (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 373, 381-382 [same], review granted Apr. 26,

3    In People v. Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, review
granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277314.

                                8
2023, S279154 with People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330,
340-341 [defendant is not entitled to a remand], review granted
Apr. 26, 2023, S278690 and People v. Mitchell (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1057-1059 [same], review granted Dec. 14,
2022, S277314.) Until the Supreme Court resolves the issue, and
because counsel for Canizales at oral argument disclaimed any
request for a Stamps-like remand, we follow Sallee and Mitchell
here.
        “A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the
defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be
bound. [Citation.] Should the court consider the plea bargain to
be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it,
directly or indirectly. [Citation.] Once the court has accepted the
terms of the negotiated plea, [it] lacks jurisdiction to alter the
terms of a plea bargain so that it becomes more favorable to a
defendant unless, of course, the parties agree.” (People v.
Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 973, internal quotation marks
omitted; see Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701.) “When a guilty
[or no contest] plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits
such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum
punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the
terms of the agreement.” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921,
930-931; see People v. Wright (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 749, 754.)
When the court approves a plea agreement, the court must
impose the sentence the agreement specifies. (Stamps, at p. 701;
see § 1192.5, subd. (b) [when a “plea is accepted by the
prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court,
. . . the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as
specified in the plea”]; People v. Pixley (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
1002, 1005 [“‘When a defendant who enters into a plea also

                                9
agrees to a stipulated sentence, upon accepting the plea, the trial
court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the
plea.’”]; People v. Cunningham (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1047
[“a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a
sentence within the limits of that bargain”].)
       Thus, had the court at the probation violation hearing
sentenced Canalizes to the upper term of three years based on
the plea agreement, the court would not have exercised any
discretion in selecting the lower, middle, or upper term. (See
People v. Mitchell, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1057-1058 [when
the trial court sentences a defendant pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement, the court has “no opportunity to exercise any
discretion in deciding whether the imposition of the upper,
middle, or lower term would best serve ‘the interests of justice’”],
review granted; People v. Brooks (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1099,
1109 [“‘when a trial court sentences a defendant who has agreed
to a stipulated sentence for a term of years, the trial court
exercises no discretion to decide between an upper, middle and
lower term and may not consider factors in mitigation and
aggravation’”].) Rather, the court would have imposed the
sentence the parties specified in the negotiated plea agreement.
(See People v. Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 971; People v.
King (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 783, 790-791; People v. Segura, supra,
44 Cal.4th at p. 931.) Had the trial court done that, Canizales
would not have been entitled to resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (b). As the court stated in People v. Sallee, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th 330, review granted: “Defendant agreed to a
stipulated sentence pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and
the trial court approved the agreement and imposed the agreed-
upon sentence. The trial court did not exercise discretion to

                                10
choose an upper, middle, or lower determinate term based on
factors in mitigation and aggravation. Nor could the court
exercise discretion to choose an alternative term based on factors
in mitigation and aggravation without effectively withdrawing its
approval of the plea. The trial court therefore did not, and could
not, exercise discretion under section 1170, subdivision (b).
Under the plain language of the statute, the limitations on the
court’s sentencing discretion set forth in section 1170,
subdivision (b), are inapplicable in this context.” (Sallee, at
p. 340.)
       But the reason the trial court gave for resentencing
Canizales to the upper term was not that the court-approved plea
agreement called for it. Instead, the court considered various
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in California Rules of
Court, rules 4.421 and 4.423, found the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors, and purported to (again) select
the upper term of three years. That is exactly the kind of judicial
factfinding section 1170, subdivision (b), prohibits. (See People v.
Gaines (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 142 [under section 1170,
subdivision (b), an “upper term may be imposed when justified by
aggravating circumstances and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found
true by a jury or by the judge in a court trial”]; People v. Govan
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1020, fn. 2 [“Under the amendments
[to section 1170, subdivision (b)], the trial court must impose a
sentence that does not exceed the middle term unless the
defendant stipulates to the facts supporting the circumstances in
aggravation, a jury or a judge in a court trial finds the
aggravating facts true beyond a reasonable doubt, or a prior
conviction supports imposition of the upper term.”]; People v.

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Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 405 [“as section 1170 requires
all aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial court to
meet the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) or (3),
unless imposition of the upper term . . . was harmless, the
sentence must be vacated and the matter must be remanded to
the trial court for resentencing in compliance with section 1170,
subdivision (b)”], review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655.) That
was error.
       The trial court’s error, however, was harmless (under any
standard)4 because the court had already sentenced Canizales to
the upper term and suspended execution of that sentence. (See
People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 927 [“In the context
of upper term sentences imposed under section 1170, former
subdivision (b), most courts have employed some type of harmless
error analysis to determine whether resentencing is unnecessary
under the new law.”], review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281252;
People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 465 [“where a
sentencing factor must be found true by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt and the court fails to submit that factor to the
jury, the error in the court’s reliance on that fact may be subject
to harmless error review as to whether the lack of a finding by
the jury was prejudicial”].) Once Canizales admitted he violated
probation and the court declined to reinstate probation, the court
had no discretion to impose any sentence other than the three-
year upper term. “When the initial sentencing court imposes a

4      The Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Lynch
(May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10,
2022, S274942, to decide what standard of prejudice a reviewing
court should apply when determining whether to remand a case
for resentencing under amended section 1170, subdivision (b).

                                12
state prison sentence but stays execution of the sentencing
pending completion of probation, on a subsequent violation of
probation the court does not have discretion to change the
previously indicated sentence.” (People v. Stuckey (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 898, 916; see People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1415, 1422 [“a trial court does not have power to modify a
previously imposed and suspended sentence when it later revokes
probation and orders the sentence executed”]; People v. Howard
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1088 [“[o]n revocation of probation, if the
court previously had imposed sentence, the sentencing judge
must order that exact sentence into effect”]; People v. Smith
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 399, 404 [“A court that has previously
imposed but suspended the execution of a sentence is bound to
impose that very same sentence.”].) If we were to remand the
case for resentencing, the court would have to impose the upper
term again.
       Moreover, when Canizales agreed to the plea, he agreed to
be bound by it and not to subsequently challenge the existence of
any fact necessary to support his conviction and sentence. (See
People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 [“[w]here the
defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence,
appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court
acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as
the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction”]; Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.412(a) [“[i]t is an adequate reason for a sentence
or other disposition that the defendant, personally and by
counsel, has expressed agreement that it be imposed and the
prosecuting attorney has not expressed an objection to it”].)
By pleading no contest, Canizales avoided the potential of
receiving a longer prison term under the three strikes law and

                                13
(initially) avoided serving any time in prison when the court
placed him on probation. Where, as here, the “‘defendant
maintains that the trial court’s sentence violates rules which
would have required the imposition of a more lenient sentence,
yet the defendant avoided a potentially harsher sentence by
entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that the
defendant waived any rights under such rules by choosing to
accept the plea bargain.’” (People v. Jones (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
735, 744; see People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 776
[“‘defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to
which they agreed’”].)

                        DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.

                                          SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.               MARTINEZ, J.

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