Court Opinion

ID: 9630506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:12:33.168765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:39.221809
License: Public Domain

Concurring opinion of
Justice GRAVES.
It is evident that the dissent feels passionately about the issues under consideration. I respect the dissent and have given careful consideration. However, for the reasons previously set forth in my dissenting opinion in Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 363, 381-82 (Ky.2004) (Graves, J., dissenting) and consistent with the basic principles of chemistry explained in Commonwealth v. Hayward, 49 S.W.3d 674 (Ky.2001), I concur with the majority’s sound analysis and well reasoned disposition in this case.
Unyielding polemics and polarizing arguments are not necessary for the presentation of a rational explanation of the legal justification for the change in my vote from Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky.2003).
I agree with the dissent’s learned explanation of the history and importance of the doctrine of stare decisis. As the dissent points out, “stare decisis [is] the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.” Ante at 618-19 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986)). However, the dissent also acknowledges the following historical fact: “American courts never adopted the nineteenth century English rule that precedents are absolutely binding in all circumstances. They instead reserved the right to overrule decisions that were absurd or egregiously incorrect.” Id. (quoting Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. Va. L.Rev. 43, 55 (2001)).
In the context of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, Justice Souter has described the doctrine, in its current form, as follows:
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and, perceived integrity of the judicial process. Adhering to precedent ⅛ usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.’ Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’ Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather it ‘is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609-11, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J., *609concurring) (citations and quotations omitted). In Kentucky, we have adhered to this prevailing understanding of the doctrine. See, e.g., Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky.1993) (“it is our duty to continually re-examine our prior decisions to prevent perpetuation of error”); Corbin Motor Lodge v. Combs, 740 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Ky.1987) (precedent may be overturned where the need is compelling); Daniel’s Adm’r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471 (1941) (“This wholesome rule [stare decisis ] is not inflexible or so imperative as to require perpetration of error .... ”); McCormack v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 156 Ky. 465, 161 S.W. 518, 520 (1913) (“Upon the principle of stare decisis, the decisions which have been rendered by a court will be adhered to by such court in subsequent cases, unless there is something manifestly erroneous therein ....”).
Indeed, a brief sampling of our caselaw over a mere two year period reveals no less than seven opinions purporting to overrule precedent previously established by this Court. See Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 871 (Ky.2005) (op. by J. Cooper); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 26-27 (Ky.2005)(op. by J. Keller); Commonwealth v. Mobley, 160 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Ky.2005)(op. by C.J. Lambert); Stopher v. Conliffe, 170 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Ky.2005) (op. by J. Keller); St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 532, 572 (Ky.2004) (op. of the Court); Hampton v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Ky.2004) (op. by J. Graves); Rapier v. Philpot, 130 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Ky. 2004) (op. by J. Johnstone); see also, Regenstreif v. Phelps, 142 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Ky. 2004) (op. by J. Keller)(overruling Court of Appeals precedent); Messer v. Messer, 134 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Ky.2004) (op. by J. Cooper) (overruling Court of Appeals precedent).
Mindful of its disfavored status, the majority carefully considered the merits of the case and determined, as this Court has done at least seven times in the past two years, that compelling reasons warranted a reversal of precedent. This was by no means a display of “judicial activism,” but rather an obligation to halt the perpetuation of egregious error. In hindsight, it is understandable how such error arose.1
Unfortunately, in Kotila, the forensic chemist merely described the maladroit process by which clandestine operators manufacture methamphetamine. Subsequent to Kotila, my research of the chemical literature 2 revealed that methamphetamine may be manufactured with only two *610chemicals, namely, a methamphetamine precursor (usually ephedrine or psue-doephedrine) and a chemical reducing agent3. The other chemicals mentioned in the testimony of Kotila are either catalysts to speed the reaction and other chemical reagents or solvents to remove impurities and byproducts during the synthesis. The auxiliary chemicals convert the crude un-distilled methamphetamine which is unsuitable for human consumption into refined methamphetamine which is marketable for human consumption. Upon further examination in subsequent cases, it became obvious that the scientific testimony utilized in Kotila was incomplete and that such an inadequate understanding of the essential chemical elements of methamphetamine synthesis resulted in an absurd and unworkable interpretation of the applicable statute.
The decision in Kotila is alchemy. The alchemists mixed philosophy and science in the Middle Ages. Modern science has discredited alchemy. We have a duty to accept scientific reality as it is impossible for an opinion of - the Court to alter the fixed and immutable principles of chemistry.
On balance, the majority opinion is scientifically and legally justified. It is by no means a coup or usurpation over settled law, as Kotila’s essential holding existed for a mere six months before it began to be chipped away by subsequent decisions (with this decision coming a mere thirty-two months after Kotila was rendered). While I respect the dissent’s view that the Kotila holding should not be overruled, I wholeheartedly believe that the contrary view taken by the majority is a just and appropriate course within the bounds of proper judicial conduct. I consider it my duty to admit a mistake when the opportunity and circumstances compel remediation. Accordingly, I respectfully concur with the majority opinion.
Scott, J., concurs “heartily” in the burial of Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 Ky.2003). Thirty-one years in the courtrooms of Kentucky have taught me many things, one of which, is “stare deci-sis” does not command the perpetuation of a wrong decision! And when such a respected jurist as Justice Graves says it’s wrong' — -he’s right!

. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, Justice Breyer noted the “inherent difficulty” faced by judges when evaluating science-related issues, and the steps that can be taken to help compensate for the judge’s "comparative lack of expertise” in the subject area. 522 U.S. 136, 147-50, 118 S.Ct. 512, 520-21, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (Breyer,J., concurring) ("[Jjudges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of such decisions.”). Despite this inherent difficulty, Justice Breyer went on to emphasize, however, that "neither the difficulty of the task nor any comparative lack of expertise can excuse the judge from exercising the 'gatekeeper' duties” that the Daubert Rule imposes. Id.

. According to Justice Breyer, some of the steps judges should take in order to compensate for their "comparative lack of expertise” include "increased use of Rule 16’s pretrial conference authority to narrow the scientific issues in dispute, pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to examination by the court, and the appointment of special masters and specially trained law clerks.” Id. at 149, 118 S.Ct. 512. In this case, my prior training in Chemistry permitted me to review and comprehend the relevant chemical literature pertaining to the disputed issue.

. The Merck Index, Thirteenth Edition, § 5975 at 1063 (2001) [.. .Can be prepd by reducing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine: Emde. Helv. Chim. Acta 12, 365 (1929) Uncle Fester, Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture, Chap. 15, p. 109 (6th Ed.2002). (Uncle Fester is a pseudonym for this underground publication by Loompanics Unlimited.)