Court Opinion

ID: 9560661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:53:25.456066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:05.278121
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
specially concurring:
I write separately to more fully discuss appellant’s sole assignment of error. This Court has held that a police officer may stop a motorist when the officer is convinced that the manner in which a vehicle is being driven constitutes a menace to the travelling public. See England v. State, 560 P.2d 216, 218 (Okl.Cr.1977). In Atterberry v. State, 726 P.2d 898, 899 (Okl.Cr.1986), this Court recognized that a police officer has a right and a duty to investigate unusual or suspicious circumstances. A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop in the absence of probable cause, when he “observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An investigatory stop must be justified, however, by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion by creating an objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). See Peters v. State, 725 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 (Okl.Cr.1986) (police may make an investigative stop of a person in the absence of probable cause consistent with the fourth amendment under limited circumstances, when they have a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 838 (Okl.Cr.1986).
In the instant case, Officer Norwood first observed the appellant driving very slowly in a residential area in Mangum around 2:30 a.m. Around 3:00 a.m., Officer Norwood again observed the appellant driving extremely slow in a residential area where thefts had been reported. After Officer Norwood stopped the appellant, he observed her stagger out of her vehicle, and he smelled a strong odor of alcohol upon her person. On the basis of the foregoing record, I must conclude that Officer Norwood appropriately conducted an investigatory stop based on specific and articula-ble facts which reasonably warranted his limited detention of the appellant to investigate possible criminal activity. The law enforcement purposes of protecting the public and prevention of crime justified the reasonable actions taken, and it is clear that Officer Norwood diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicions quickly. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed. 2d 605 (1985).
The initial stop by Officer Norwood did not constitute an arrest, and the appellant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated by this reasonable police action. After he lawfully stopped the appellant, his observance of her staggering and his detection of the odor of alcohol on her person was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe she had or was committing the public offense of Driving Under the Influence. See 22 O.S.Supp.1982, § 196(5). Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, I concur in affirming the judgment and sentence.