Court Opinion

ID: 9850138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:36.813684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.237451
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Under our law construing the Georgia Fair Dismissal Act, OCGA § 20-2-940, “any evidence” will suffice to support findings of the State Board of Education on the question whether an employee was insubordinate. Terry v. Houston County Bd. of Ed., 178 Ga. App. 296, 297 (342 SE2d 774) (1986). It is undisputed that months after receiving written instructions to provide a fitness-for-duty medical certification before returning to work, Brawner signed an attendance roster and attended a staff meeting at the pre-planning session of August 2, 2004, without providing the certification. Because these facts amount *17to some evidence to support a finding that Brawner was insubordinate, I respectfully dissent.
Sent months before the incident in question, the local board’s letter of February 2, 2004, is perfectly clear that “[f]ollowing an absence for personal illness . . . , the employee must provide ... a fitness-for-duty report completed by an appropriate health care provider prior to being restored to duty,” with the report stating “that the employee is able to resume work.” Brawner’s own testimony establishes that she knew she could not resume her duties in August 2004, because “I was still sick. I was three weeks out of surgery. . . . I knew that I was on long-term disability, which has no end until I get well.” Indeed, her doctors “would not release [her] to return to work,” but informally approved her attendance “for one day if I sat down and did very little except listen to my principal and check on my room.”
Fitness-for-duty reports like the one required here have at least two complementary purposes: to protect an overzealous employee from returning to work when she is not medically ready, and to shield the employer from tort claims that might arise from injuries sustained in a premature return to work. Requiring such a report is reasonable under the law of this or any other jurisdiction, and Brawner’s failure to provide it raised a question of fact concerning her insubordination. See Terry, supra at 297 (State and local boards “have a legitimate interest in securing the employ only of those fit to serve the public interest”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Jones v. Alabama State Tenure Comm., 408 S2d 145 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (tenured teacher’s refusal to perform scheduled supervision duty supported tenure commission’s finding that he was insubordinate); Cook v. Plainfield Community School Dist., 301 NW2d 771 (Iowa App. 1980) (teacher’s failure to develop programs in compliance with directives and to complete staff evaluations provided sufficient evidence of insubordination).
As both the State Board and the superior court held, the question whether Brawner’s reporting to the pre-planning day and signing an attendance sheet amounted to a “return to work” is one of fact, as is the question whether her failure to supply the required certification of fitness was wilful. Neither we nor the superior court are empowered to interfere with a local board’s acts of administration “unless the board has grossly abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or contrary to law.” (Footnote omitted.) Clinch County Bd. of Ed. v. Hinson, 247 Ga. App. 33, 36 (1) (543 SE2d 91) (2000) (reversing superior court’s reversal of State Board’s recommendation of termination where some evidence supported the State Board’s decision). The record in this case provides some evidence to support the judgment of the State Board that Brawner returned to work without *18providing the required fitness-for-duty report, and that this act amounted to insubordination. I therefore dissent.
Decided March 28, 2007
Reconsideration denied April 12, 2007
Kramer & Patel, Michael E. Kramer, Shalini A. Patel, for appellant.
Brock & Clay, Clement C. Doyle, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ellington joins in this dissent.