Court Opinion

ID: 9703387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:53:52.682197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:48.251288
License: Public Domain

ALPERT, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that “the lower court did not err in submitting this case to the jury.” I agree. Unfortunately, *170the majority also holds that it was reversible error “to deny the employer the right to have Sweeney present at the counsel table.” In my view, the error, which the trial judge promptly and candidly acknowledged, did not constitute reversible error. Therefore, for the two reasons set forth below, I dissent.

Harmless Error

First, in my view, the error was harmless beyond doubt. The majority relies on Safeway Stores, Inc., et al. v. Watson, 317 Md. 178, 562 A.2d 1242 (1989) as their reason for reversal. There, the Court posited two questions concerning the correct interpretation of the sequestration rule:
1) what, if any, nexus is required between the ‘party that is not a natural person’ and the person designated by that party to be its representative, and 2) to what extent, if any, does a trial judge have discretion to disapprove the designation made by the party?
Id. at 180, 562 A.2d 1242. ■ The Court then concluded that “a party that is not a natural person has very broad latitude in the selection of a representative when witnesses are excluded, and the exercise of this right is not subject to the discretion of the trial judge.” Id. at 183, 562 A.2d 1242.
In the instant case, there is no dispute as to whether the trial court erred. The issue is whether the error requires reversal, or whether it was harmless. In establishing that the error was reversible, the majority did not find that the Employer suffered any actual prejudice — nor does the record reveal any. Instead, the majority simply stated that the “[ajppellee [Bobbitt] has failed- to overcome the presumption of prejudice.” 96 Md.App. at 164, 623 A.2d at 1315 (emphasis added).
The existence of such a “presumption,” as the majority correctly states, was made apparent in Watson: “We conclude that it is appropriate to presume prejudice from the wrongful exclusion of a party, or its representative, from a trial.” 317 Md. at 184, 562 A.2d 1242. The quoted sentence, however, is immediately followed by the following language:
*171Experienced trial attorneys and judges understand the importance of ‘humanizing’ a corporate defendant in a jury trial. Moreover, a party is entitled to be present to have a first hand view of the proceedings for purposes of evaluating the constantly changing prospects or exigencies for settlement, and to participate in tactical decisions that must be made, sometimes quickly, in the course of a trial.

Id.

It is obvious that the rationale given in Watson for the presumption was unhampered in this case. The Employer was “humanized,” and their representative was present and involved in the development of the entire two-and-one-half day trial, less fifteen minutes.1
The presumption espoused in Watson is, of course, a rebut-table one. In Watson, however, unlike the case sub jud/ice, the representative was excluded from the entire trial — not just fifteen minutes. The question thus raised is whether Sweeney’s absence for fifteen minutes of testimony from a two-and-one-half day trial sufficiently prejudiced the Employer. In my view, it didn’t; the fifteen minute absence could hardly have influenced the outcome of the litigation. See Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 320, 529 A.2d 356 (1987). Therefore, under the particular circumstances of this case, I believe that any presumption resulting from Sweeney’s absence was sufficiently rebutted, and any error resulting from the sequestration harmless.

Waiver

Second, I believe that the Employer’s conduct, following Sweeney’s return to the courtroom, was in the nature of a waiver. During the course of Bobbitt’s direct examination, the trial judge called counsel to the bench and advised them that she was allowing the appellants’ designee (i.e., Sweeney) to return to the courtroom. Appellants’ counsel responded, *172“Unfortunately, [Bobbitt’s] halfway finished with her testimony,” whereupon the trial court advised said counsel, “Well, you’re going to cross-examine.”
At this point, though presented with an adequate opportunity to do so, appellants’ counsel requested no further relief. He did not, for example, ask for a recess in order to confer with the Sweeney, who purportedly could assist said counsel in cross-examining Bobbitt2. Nor did counsel request a continuance in order to provide Sweeney with an opportunity to review a transcript of the proceedings he missed. In short, the Employer did nothing to preserve its right to complain about its fifteen-minute sequestration (as distinct from its total sequestration), nor did it attempt to take any actions of record in order to minimize any theoretical prejudice which might have resulted from said sequestration3.
While appellants are correct that the burden is upon the Bobbitt to establish that the sequestration did not influence the outcome of the litigation, I believe that that is clear beyond doubt and that, therefore, the appellee has met' that burden. Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Appellee argues in her brief that the designated witness was missing for 15 minutes in a 2Í6 day trial. That allegation of fact was not disputed by appellants in their reply brief.

. While it is arguable that Bobbitt’s testimony at trial was expansive, it seems clear to me that the able and experienced trial counsel certainly could have — and would have — conferred with Sweeney if counsel anticipated any difficulty with Bobbitt’s cross-examination.

. Indeed, the fact that the Employer took no such actions of record appears, under the circumstances of this case, to support the inference that the Employer suffered no prejudice at all. In this regard, we note that, due to the particular "appellate” posture of this case (i.e., this case had been previously tried before the Commission), appellants’ counsel — prior to trial — had the opportunity to review with the designee the testimony previously given by Bobbitt.