Court Opinion

ID: 9928168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:15.848522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:32.300186
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/24; certified for publication 1/30/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                     SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION THREE

 In re R.M., a Person Coming                        B327716
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                 Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF                                      Super. Ct. No.
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY                                22CCJP04816A
 SERVICES,
       Plaintiff and Respondent,
       v.
 B.S.,
       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed.
      Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
            _______________________________________
                          INTRODUCTION

       Brittany S. (mother) appeals the court’s findings that there
was jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section
300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g), based on her incarceration, and
its dispositional orders. No evidence was presented that mother
or R.M., Sr. (father)2 abused or neglected the minor, R.M. (born
October 2021), or that they had any debilitating mental
impairment or substance abuse problems. Rather, the court
exercised jurisdiction over R.M. because mother and father were
arrested on murder charges and did not make prior
arrangements for R.M.’s care. We conclude that the court’s order
was not supported by substantial evidence because there was
neither any allegation nor evidence that the parents were unable
to arrange for care of R.M. during their incarceration. We
therefore reverse and vacate the jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders.

        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On December 8, 2022, a car containing mother, father, and
R.M. was stopped after it made an illegal U-turn. Police officers
determined that both mother and father have felony warrants for
murder and took them into custody. Officers also booked the child
and then released him to the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department). Father provided

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.
2 Father is not a party to the appeal.

                                    2
officers the name of paternal grandfather, whom he stated would
be willing to assume care of R.M.
       A social worker arrived at the station and observed the
child, who appeared to be calm and comfortable. He was
appropriately dressed and had no visible marks or bruises. The
social worker was permitted to speak with the parents concerning
the child’s needs, but nothing else due to the nature of the
criminal charges. Mother told the social worker that she also had
an older child, N.G. (R.M.’s half-sister), who lived with paternal
uncle and paternal grandmother.3 Mother provided information
about R.M.’s health and routines. The social worker informed
mother that, due to her being incarcerated, the child would be
taken into protective custody and informed her of the date of the
detention hearing. The social worker told father the same.
       The following day, the social worker spoke with paternal
grandfather, who reported that he was interested in caring for
R.M. The social worker requested the information for all adults in
the home, including valid identification.
       The Department filed a section 300 petition under
subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging that there was a substantial risk
that R.M. would suffer serious physical harm or illness as a
result of parents’ failure to supervise or protect him due to their
arrest for murder (count b-1) and that R.M. had no parent to
provide care, supervision, and the necessities of life because his
parents were arrested for murder (count g-1).

3 According to the detention report, mother initially stated that N.G.

lived with paternal grandmother and paternal grandfather. It was
later clarified that paternal grandmother lived with paternal uncle.

                                   3
      On December 13, 2022, the court detained R.M. In a last
minute information filed with the court on December 16, 2022,
the Department reported that maternal grandmother had called
and stated that she would like R.M. to be placed with her. She
reported that N.G. would go back and forth between her house
and paternal grandmother’s home. Maternal grandmother denied
any history of domestic violence, substance abuse, mental health,
or law enforcement coming to the home and stated that her
partner had a criminal history that was more than 10 years old.
The social worker also spoke with paternal grandmother, who
stated that she resides in a 3-bedroom home with her adult son,
the paternal uncle. She reported that she and paternal
grandfather had been divorced for several years. Paternal
grandmother stated that she would like R.M. released to her and
that she had been caring for him since he was born. She reported
that “most of her grandchildren have been raised by her as she
provides a safe and stable home environment for the children.”
She stated that N.G. goes to visit her maternal grandmother but
preferred to stay with paternal grandmother. The paternal
grandmother stated that her last arrest was in 2005 and denied
any criminal history for herself or paternal uncle. A CLETS
search for paternal grandmother “came back: ‘Hit’ ” but no crime
or arrests were identified in the report.
      At a hearing on December 16, 2022, counsel for R.M.
requested that he be placed with paternal grandmother. The
court ordered that R.M. be placed with paternal grandmother
over the objection of the Department.
      In the jurisdiction/detention report, the Department noted
that N.G. was not included in the petition “as it was later
discovered that she was in the home of [paternal grandmother].”

                                4
A social worker spoke with N.G., who reported that she had been
living with paternal grandmother for approximately six years.
She reported that the household consisted of R.M., paternal
grandmother, and paternal uncle and stated that mother and
father lived in Las Vegas but left N.G. with paternal
grandmother so she could be closer to cousins, aunts, and uncles.
She stated that R.M. mainly lived with mother and father, but
“ ‘they would stay a couple weeks here and then go back.’ ” N.G.
reported that she spoke with mother every day. N.G. stated that
she would prefer to stay with paternal grandmother over her
maternal grandparents.
       A social worker confirmed that mother was still
incarcerated in San Joaquin County Jail with no release
information. Concerning the allegations of the petition, mother
stated: “ ‘That is just accusations, because right now I am
innocent until proven guilty. Right now I have to go through the
legal motions to see if I can qualify for bail.’ ” Mother stated that
there was no official document or power of attorney granting
paternal grandmother custody of R.M. or N.G., but that she
wanted to create a notarized letter in which temporary legal
custody could be established for paternal grandmother only while
mother was incarcerated. Mother expressed interest in receiving
reunification services and participating in court ordered services.
She reported drinking alcohol once a year and denied using
drugs. Father declined to comment on the allegations of the
petition until he was appointed an attorney. Father reported that
he was comfortable with paternal grandmother caring for R.M.
and that he wanted to reunify with his son. Father reported
having a great relationship with the paternal grandparents and
denied ever being exposed to domestic violence, alcohol, or drugs

                                  5
in his parent’s home. Father stated that he drinks socially and
denied using drugs.
       Paternal grandmother reported that the parents call her
daily. She expressed that she was willing and able to care for
R.M. and N.G. and was willing to adopt them or become their
legal guardian.
       In January and February of 2023, the court arraigned
mother and father and appointed counsel for them.
       The court held the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on
February 27, 2023. Counsel for mother sought dismissal of both
allegations, arguing: “Number 1, the arrest is not jurisdictional.
Number 2, an appropriate plan was made with paternal
grandmother now taking care of the child. The child is no longer
at risk of harm.” Counsel for father joined this argument. The
court stated: “Mere fact that we were able to place the child with
a relative is not the way the plan works. It’s a plan ahead of it.”
The court found that the petition was supported by a
preponderance of the evidence and sustained both allegations.
The court further found that there was no reasonable means of
protecting R.M. short of removal. The court ordered family
reunification services for mother and father as well as visitation.4

4 The court also stated that, because the parents were jailed in San

Joaquin County and paternal grandmother also resided in Northern
California, it was the court’s intent to transfer the case to San Joaquin
County. On appeal, the Department seeks to establish that the case
was transferred to San Joaquin County via attachments to its
respondent’s brief. We may take judicial notice of court records outside
the record on appeal (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a) & 452, subd. (d)),
but “a litigant must demonstrate that the matter as to which judicial
notice is sought is both relevant to and helpful toward resolving the
matters before this court. [Citation.]” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006)

                                    6
      Mother timely appealed.

                           DISCUSSION

       Mother contends that the court erred in sustaining the
petition on the ground that the parents were incarcerated
without finding that the parents were mentally or physically
incapable of arranging for R.M.’s care by a relative. The
Department contends that jurisdiction was necessary for R.M.’s
placement with paternal grandmother “to have legal effect, and
for R.M. to be protected from lacking parental support and being
at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm.”
       “ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the
disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) However, we note that the
Department had the burden of proof as to each fact necessary to
sustain the jurisdictional petition, and that mother “was not
required to demonstrate anything” and could prevail “without
making any factual showing at all.” (In re S.D. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078 (S.D.).)

139 Cal.App.4th 408, 418.) The Department made no attempt to satisfy
these requirements in its brief. Thus, we decline to take judicial notice
of the attachments.

                                   7
1.    Substantial evidence does not support the court’s
      exercise of jurisdiction.
       The court sustained the petition under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). “A juvenile court may determine that
a child is subject to the court’s jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that ‘[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result
of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child,’ the willful or negligent
failure of the parent to provide the child with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or the inability of the
parent to provide regular care for the minor due to the parent’s
mental illness, developmental disability or substance abuse.
[Citation.]” (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 560–
561.)
       “Section 300, subdivision (g), authorizes the juvenile court
to adjudge a minor a dependent child of the court where ‘the
minor’s parent has been incarcerated or institutionalized and
cannot arrange for the care of the minor . . . .’ [Citation.] The
careful analysis found in In re Aaron S. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d
202 provides an authoritative interpretation of the statutory
language. The court concluded that ‘[t]he use of the present tense
verb in the statute, “cannot arrange,” indicates that the
circumstances justifying the dependency must exist at the time of
the hearing. [Citations.] Accordingly, section 300, subdivision (g)
applies when, at the time of the [jurisdictional] hearing, a parent
has been incarcerated and does not know how to make, or is
physically or mentally incapable of making, preparations or plans
for the care of his or her child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Monica C. (1995)

                                  8
31 Cal.App.4th 296, 304–305.) “Put another way, ‘neither
incarceration alone nor the failure to make an appropriate
advance plan for the child’s ongoing care and supervision is
sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision
(g).’ [Citation.] Moreover, ‘[n]othing in section 300, subdivision (g)
even requires an incarcerated parent . . . to prove affirmatively
the suitability of [his or] her caretaking arrangements. It
requires only that [he or] she be able to make the
arrangements.’ [Citation.]” (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886,
897 (M.R.).)
        Without more, a parent’s inability to care for or financially
support a child personally due to incarceration is not grounds for
dependency jurisdiction under subdivisions (b)(1) or (g). (See, e.g.,
In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 366 [holding, under
subd. (b), that “incarceration, without more, cannot provide a
basis for jurisdiction”]; In re Monica C., supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at
p. 305 [subd. (g) “requires only that an incarcerated parent
arrange adequately for the care of the child during the period of
his or her incarceration”]; S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077
[“[t]here is no ‘Go to jail, lose your child’ rule in California”]; In re
Andrew S. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 536, 542 [“Neither [section 300,
subdivision (b) nor subdivision (g)] justifies the juvenile court’s
assumption of jurisdiction over an otherwise well-cared-for child
simply because an absent parent has not provided support.”].)
        Mother contends that S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1068 is
instructive and supports reversal. In S.D., the mother left the
two-year-old minor with a relative when she went out to dinner.
(Id. at p. 1071.) The relative was arrested and police took the
minor into custody. (Id. at p. 1072.) The next day the mother was
arrested. (Ibid.) The petition alleged mother was incarcerated

                                   9
and neither parent was available to care for the minor, but there
was no allegation or evidence that the mother was unable to
arrange for the child’s care during her incarceration. (Id. at
p. 1071.) In fact, the record “strongly suggest[ed] that [the
mother] had several options for care of [the minor] during her
incarceration.” (Ibid.) The minor was placed with a maternal
aunt after the detention hearing and again after the 12-month
review hearing. (Id. at pp. 1072–1073, 1075–1076.) The trial
court dismissed the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations,
leaving section 300, subdivision (g) as the sole basis for
jurisdiction. (S.D., at p. 1074.)
       In assessing mother’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to assert a defense to section 300, subdivision
(g), the Court of Appeal found it was “irrelevant that [the mother]
had not already arranged for [the minor]’s care at the time of her
incarceration.” (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) It held
that the issue under section 300, subdivision (g), is whether the
parent could arrange for care, not whether the parent had done
so, and that the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) had
the burden of proof and was required to establish that the parent
could not arrange for care. (S.D., at p. 1078.) On the record before
it, the court had “no problem concluding that SSA failed to
sustain its factual burden.” (Ibid.) The court emphasized that,
under the statute, the parent is not required to affirmatively
prove the caretaking arrangements are suitable. (Id. at p. 1079.)
The statute requires only that the parent is able to make the
arrangements and, if the agency wishes to challenge the
suitability of the arrangement, it must proceed under another of
the clauses in section 300, subdivision (g). (S.D., at p. 1079.)

                                10
       In contrast, the Department contends that the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate under In re Athena P.
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617 (Athena P.). In Athena P., the mother
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (g). The parents were arrested and
several months later, while in custody, the mother gave birth to
Athena and sent her to live with the grandparents. (Id. at
pp. 621–622.) The mother attempted to create a formal custody
arrangement, but the documents were never filed and the
specifics of the arrangement were not known. (Ibid.) In finding
substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional finding, the
court observed that the mother had tried and failed to make the
grandparents temporary legal guardians and never made any
further effort to complete an arrangement for care of Athena. (Id.
at p. 629.) The failure left the grandparents with no legal
authority to consent to medical treatment, authorize
vaccinations, enroll the child in daycare or prove they were
entitled to her custody should that prove necessary; thus, the
mother was, and remained, unable to arrange for the minor’s
care. (Ibid.) The court in Athena P. contrasted the circumstances
before it from those present in S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 1068,
because “the social worker [in S.D.] conceded that the mother’s
failure to give the babysitter a medical consent form, when she
thought she was just going out to dinner, was not a basis for
jurisdiction” and “the mother had never tried to give her sister
legal custody; the dependency had intervened, making it
unnecessary to do so.” (Athena P., at p. 630.) Thus, in S.D., “there
was every reason to assume [the mother] could still make
appropriate custody arrangements.” (Athena P., at p. 630.)

                                11
       We agree with mother that the circumstances of this case
are more similar to S.D. than they are to Athena P. In Athena P.,
the mother was incarcerated for months before she gave birth
and had time to make appropriate arrangements for the child’s
care. Indeed, the mother had made attempts to create a formal
custody arrangement but failed to file the paperwork. Here, the
parents were arrested after a traffic violation and, upon their
first interaction with the Department, were informed that the
Department was taking R.M. into protective custody due to their
incarceration. The record does not indicate that mother or father
had any opportunity to attempt to arrange for R.M.’s care before
the Department intervened. As in S.D., and unlike in Athena P.,
“the mother had never tried to give [paternal grandmother] legal
custody [of R.M.]; the dependency had intervened, making it
unnecessary to do so.” (Athena P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at
p. 630.) Moreover, as in S.D., the record establishes that mother
and father had multiple family members willing to assume care
of R.M., including paternal grandmother, who was already caring
for R.M.’s half-sister, and with whom R.M. was later placed.5 (See
S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071 [finding that mother had

5 Although the Department argues on appeal that, absent jurisdiction,

paternal grandmother “would not be legally obligated to continue
providing care to R.M.[,]” it did not amend the petition to include N.G.,
even though paternal grandmother also does not have legal
guardianship over her. This undermines any claim that the
Department had concerns about paternal grandmother’s reliability.
There is no basis in the record to conclude that paternal grandmother
is not reliable or that R.M. is at risk of abandonment absent the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction. Paternal grandmother cared for N.G. for
approximately six years and expressed a strong interest in caring for
R.M. as well.

                                   12
ineffective assistance of counsel where her attorney agreed that
section 300, subd. (g) applied even though “the record . . . strongly
suggest[ed] that [the mother] had several options for care of [the
minor] during her incarceration”].)
      Further, as in S.D., the Department “pleaded and proved
only that [mother] had been incarcerated, but not that she was
unable to arrange for care of” R.M. (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1077.) The petition here alleged, with respect to both section
300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g): “The child, [R.M.], has no parent
to provide care, supervision and the necessities of life . . . in that
the child’s mother . . . and father. . . were arrested on 12/08/22 for
PC 187 (Murder).” The Department did not allege that either
parent was incapable of arranging for the provision of care,
supervision, and the necessities of life for R.M. We have been
unable to find evidence in the record supporting that the parents
were physically or mentally unable to make appropriate custody
arrangements for R.M., nor does the Department identify any
such evidence on appeal. Indeed, even after the Department’s
intervention, which rendered such efforts “unnecessary” (Athena
P., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 630), mother considered how to
make paternal grandmother’s guardianship of the children
during her incarceration legally binding. The record further
indicates that, despite her incarceration, mother spoke with the
paternal grandmother and N.G. daily, which undermines any
inference that mother was uninterested in her children or
unwilling or unable to arrange for their care. (Compare M.R.,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [no substantial evidence supported
finding that incarcerated father did not or could not plan for the
care of children under § 300, subd. (g), where “he took an interest
in them, and attempted to provide for them to some degree from

                                 13
prison”] with In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 484
[upholding jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (g), and finding lack of
evidence incarcerated father ever showed interest in or
attempted to care for children sufficient for juvenile court to infer
that he was unable or unwilling to arrange for care].)
       In sustaining the petition, the juvenile court stated, “the
mere fact we were able to place with a relative is not the way the
plan works. It’s a plan ahead of it.” Contrary to the court’s
statement, the law provides that “ ‘neither incarceration alone
nor the failure to make an appropriate advance plan for the
child’s ongoing care and supervision is sufficient to permit the
exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (g).’ [Citation.]” (M.R.,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 897, italics added; accord, S.D., supra,
99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077 [that mother had not already arranged
for the minor’s care at the time of her incarceration was
“irrelevant” to determining whether exercise of jurisdiction under
section 300, subd. (g) was appropriate].)
       In sum, we conclude that the Department did not carry its
burden below of demonstrating that something more than the
mere fact of the parents’ incarceration supported jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Further, the court
applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that jurisdiction
was appropriate. We will therefore reverse the court’s true
findings with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction under section
300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g), and its dispositional orders.

                                 14
                         DISPOSITION

      The court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders
are reversed.

                                                      LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      ADAMS, J.

                                15
Filed 1/30/24

                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION THREE

 In re R.M., a Person Coming            B327716
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                     Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF                          Super. Ct. No.
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY                    22CCJP04816A
 SERVICES,
       Plaintiff and Respondent,        Order Certifying Opinion
                                        for Publication
       v.
 B.S.,                                  [No change in judgment]
       Defendant and Appellant.

BY THE COURT: *
The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed January 5, 2024,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. It
appears that our opinion meets the standards set forth in
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The opinion is ordered
published in the Official Reports.

* EDMON, P. J.              LAVIN, J.                  ADAMS, J.