Court Opinion

ID: 9548670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:06:49.368451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:16.035657
License: Public Domain

Maupin, J.,
concurring:
I agree with the majority that Skiba may only be convicted of one charge of battery. While I also agree that the remaining conviction should not be disturbed on appeal, I write separately because, in my view, the prosecuting attorney’s final argument observation that “the defendant lied,” without more, did not go beyond the realm of permissible advocacy. But cf. Witherow v. State, 104 Nev. 721, 765 P.2d 1153 (1988). I perceive no difference between a simple argument that a party or a witness has lied or, on the other hand, demonstrating “to a jury through inferences from the record that a defense witness’s testimony is palpably untrue.” Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 927, 803 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1990).
Absent some flagrant violation, such as a prosecutor clearly and specifically injecting his or her own credibility into the proceedings by indicating his or her personal beliefs (i.e., “I wouldn’t be here if I didn’t believe the victim in this case”), attorneys should be able to argue that a witness has lied or has spoken truthfully.1,2 Thus, I believe that a simple argument regarding truth or falsity of a witness’s testimony does not merit reversal, even in a close case, which this is not.3

Ross is correct in noting the impropriety of such arguments as, “ ‘I’m telling you now this woman is lying for her husband.’ ” Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 927, 803 P.2d 1104, 1106 (1990). This is because such statements clearly inject the credibility of the prosecuting attorney into the case.

See Collins v. State, 87 Nev. 436, 439, 488 P.2d 544, 545 (1971) (holding that statements made in closing argument, when made as a deduction or conclusion from evidence introduced at trial, are permissible).

Given their holdings, I must concede that the disposition I now suggest would mark a qualified retreat from Ross and Witherow.