Court Opinion

ID: 9912591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 20:00:44.672676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:24.260200
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                       For the First Circuit

No. 22-1547

   VIRGINIA CORA WARD, as the administratrix of the estate of
                       EDMUND EDWARD WARD,

                        Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                 v.

              ALPHACORE PHARMA, LLC and BRUCE AUERBACH,

                       Defendants, Appellees.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

        [Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge]

                               Before

                    Rikelman, Selya, and Howard,
                          Circuit Judges.

     Timothy Cornell, with whom Cornell Dolan, P.C. was on brief,
for appellant.
     John M. Allen, with whom McCarter & English LLP was on brief,
for appellee AlphaCore.
     Mark S. Furman, with whom Emily C. Shanahan and Tarlow, Breed,
Hart & Rodgers, P.C. were on brief, for appellee Auerbach.

                          December 22, 2023
                 SELYA, Circuit Judge.         This appeal tests the margins of

a   court's        in     personam     jurisdiction,      consistent        with   the

constraints of the Due Process Clause, see U.S. Const. amend. XIV,

§ 1, and the Massachusetts long-arm statute, see Mass. Gen. Laws

ch. 223A, § 3.           Stripping away unsupported assertions, we uphold

the district court's determination that the appellees, AlphaCore

Pharma, LLC (ACP) and Bruce Auerbach, lacked sufficient contacts

with       the   forum    state   to   permit    the   exercise   of   in    personam

jurisdiction.1           Consequently, we affirm the district court's order

of dismissal.

                                           I

                 We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the

case.       In reviewing a dismissal of a case for lack of personal

jurisdiction based on a prima facie record, we "take the facts

from the pleadings and whatever supplemental filings (such as

affidavits) are contained in the record, giving credence to the

plaintiff's version of genuinely contested facts" and accounting

for "undisputed facts put forth by" the parties.                   Baskin-Robbins

       Because the appellant's claims against ACP and Auerbach
       1

raise a discrete set of issues, we will resolve the appellant's
claims against the remaining appellee in a separate and subsequent
opinion. See, e.g., Alston v. Town of Brookline, 997 F.3d 23, 29
n.1 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d
229, 231 n.1 (1st Cir. 2014).      Relatedly, we note that this
opinion, which is based upon review of a prima facie record, does
not contain the factual details that will appear in the subsequent
opinion (which deals with claims based on a full trial record).

                                         - 2 -
Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st

Cir.   2016).      Withal,      we    do       not    rely     on    any    "unsupported

allegations."     Plixer Int'l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1,

6 (1st Cir. 2018).

           ACP    is    a   limited    liability          company,      which   has   its

principal place of business in Ann Arbor, Michigan.                         In 2013, ACP

was    acquired    by       MedImmune,         a     subsidiary        of    AstraZeneca

Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. (AstraZeneca).                   As of 2012, ACP was the

sole    patent    licensee       of        a       form   of        recombinant    human

lecithin-cholesterol acyltransferase known as ACP-501.

           Auerbach is a citizen and resident of Michigan.                        He was

a principal of ACP, as well as a corporate officer, until ACP was

acquired by MedImmune.

           The decedent, Edmund Edward Ward, was a citizen and

resident of Massachusetts.            Ward was born with an extremely rare

genetic deficiency that inhibited him from being able to produce

virtually any cholesterol.            As a result, Ward eventually came to

suffer from stage-5 kidney failure.

           In 2012, Dr. Ernst Schaefer — Ward's treating physician

in Massachusetts — introduced Ward to Auerbach and to Drs. Robert

Shamburek and Alan Remaley as a potential candidate for ACP-501.

Ward later agreed to participate as the only subject in a long-term

trial of ACP-501.       ACP donated the ACP-501 needed for the trial to

the National Institutes of Health (NIH).                     Despite being diagnosed

                                       - 3 -
as   suffering     from     kidney   failure,     Ward    postponed    dialysis

treatment in order to participate in the trial.

           In January of 2013, Ward traveled from his home in

Massachusetts to the NIH facility in Bethesda, Maryland, to begin

treatment.   During this initial visit, Ward met with Auerbach, who

allegedly told him that the process would take a long time but

urged him to undergo the full course of the treatment, explaining

that "you will get out of it what you put into it."                    Auerbach

allegedly boasted that ACP-501 was "most certainly the solution"

to reverse Ward's kidney failure.

           Until June of 2013, Ward traveled on a weekly basis from

his home in Massachusetts to the NIH facility in Maryland to

receive   injections       of   ACP-501   and   undergo    testing    (including

multiple blood draws).          Beginning in July and continuing through

September of 2013, he journeyed every other week.

           As part of the trial, NIH created a clinical protocol

for Ward's treatment.       ACP and Auerbach each had a hand in drafting

this protocol, though the record lacks clarity as to the roles

that they played.         An early draft of the protocol dated November

20, 2012, provided that, during the first phase of the trial, Ward

would receive ACP-501 injections at the NIH and then, during a

second    phase,    would       receive    them   in      both   Maryland   and

Massachusetts.     The parties dispute whether this iteration of the

protocol became the final operative draft or whether a different

                                     - 4 -
draft, dated December 3, 2012, superseded it.           The later draft did

not provide for any injections of ACP-501 in Massachusetts.2              In

any event, the record makes manifest — and the appellant does not

contest the fact — that all of the ACP-501 injections that Ward

received were administered at the NIH facility in Maryland.

            In September of 2013, Ward withdrew from the clinical

trial.     His decision to end his participation came after he was

informed that his kidney function was rapidly deteriorating and

that he was in urgent need of dialysis.

            We fast-forward to July of 2016.            At that time, Ward

filed a complaint against ACP, Auerbach, Schaefer, Shamburek,

Remaley,    MedImmune,   and   AstraZeneca   in   a    Massachusetts   state

court.     The complaint alleged that Ward had been fraudulently

induced to participate in the clinical trial in order to set the

table for a sale of ACP to MedImmune — a sale that was "based

principally" on the results of his trial.             The complaint further

alleged that "the individual defendants, acting in concert, were

ACP shareholders, owned ACP options or warrants, or otherwise

benefited materially from the sale of ACP to [MedImmune, an

AstraZeneca subsidiary] in secret."

     2It is undisputed that both drafts of the protocol stipulated
that, during the periods in which Ward was at his home in
Massachusetts, he would be monitored by Dr. Schaefer.

                                  - 5 -
           Ward's state-court action contained a gallimaufry of

claims.   One count sounded in fraud, another in lack of informed

consent, and a third in unjust enrichment.         Three other counts

alleged   an   assortment   of   constitutional,   civil    rights,   and

conspiracy claims.

           In short order, the case was removed to the United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts.          See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(d)(2).   As relevant here, ACP and Auerbach moved to dismiss

their claims for want of in personam jurisdiction.          See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(2).    In support, Auerbach submitted two affidavits

in which he attested that neither he nor ACP had any relevant

contacts with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.       Nor had either

of them — these affidavits declared — supplied any good or service

within the state.    Auerbach further attested that all of his and

ACP's activities and communications concerning Ward — including

ACP's involvement in helping the NIH prepare an investigational

new drug application, ACP's donation of ACP-501 to the NIH, his

two meetings with Ward at the NIH in January of 2013, and a brief

telephone call with Ward in September of 2014 — occurred outside

of Massachusetts.    Ward neither submitted any counter-affidavits

nor otherwise refuted Auerbach's representations.

           The district court granted ACP's and Auerbach's joint

motion to dismiss over Ward's objection.       See Ward v. Auerbach,

No. 16-12543, 2017 WL 2724938, at *13 (D. Mass. June 23, 2017).

                                 - 6 -
First, the court concluded that neither ACP nor Auerbach was

subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts premised on

"their own in-forum contacts."                Id. at *10.         Next, the court

determined that neither ACP nor Auerbach "regularly transacted or

solicited business, or engaged in any other persistent course of

conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed

or services rendered in Massachusetts."                  Id.     The court further

determined that neither ACP nor Auerbach caused tortious injury

through any alleged act or omission in Massachusetts.                      See id.

And finally, the court rejected as unsubstantiated joint-venture

and conspiracy theories promulgated by Ward.                   See id. at *10-13.

           After the court entered the order dismissing the case as

to ACP and Auerbach, Ward moved to reconsider.                   He reiterated his

claim that the district court had personal jurisdiction over ACP

and Auerbach because those defendants had "purposeful, specific,

and directed contacts" with Massachusetts.                     He alleged for the

first time — in a lawyer's memorandum — that ACP and Auerbach

supplied   "a    steady   stream      of    ACP-501   to . . . [him]      both     in

Maryland and in Massachusetts" and provided "consulting services

[to] the medical teams in both Massachusetts and Maryland."                      Ward

also newly alleged that ACP and Auerbach availed themselves of

Massachusetts when they "deployed Massachusetts medical facilities

as   injection    and     monitoring        sites   for    ACP-501,     and   thus,

necessarily      relied    on   the        involvement     and     supervision    of

                                       - 7 -
Massachusetts medical personnel as well as the utilization of

Massachusetts medical expertise and facilities."         Unmoved by these

allegations,     the     district     court   denied   the    motion    for

reconsideration.

          Not    all    of   the    defendants   succeeded   in   obtaining

pretrial relief.       The last remaining defendant was Dr. Schaefer,

and the jury rendered a take-nothing verdict in his favor.             This

timely appeal followed.3

                                      II

          It is apodictic that the burden of proving that personal

jurisdiction may be exercised in the forum state rests with the

party seeking to invoke that jurisdiction.             See Motus, LLC v.

CarData Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2022).           The

jurisdictional determination in this case was made at the inception

of the litigation, without the benefit of either pretrial discovery

or an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the familiar prima facie approach

holds sway.     See Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46

F.3d 138, 145 (1st Cir. 1995); Boit v. Gar-Tec Prod., Inc., 967

F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992).

          "Where, as here, a district court dismisses a case for

lack of personal jurisdiction based on the prima facie record,

     3 Ward died during the pendency of this appeal. Virginia Cora
Ward, who is his sister and the administratrix of his estate, has
been substituted in his place and stead.      See Fed. R. App. P.
43(a). We refer to her throughout as the appellant.

                                     - 8 -
rather than after an evidentiary hearing or factual findings, our

review is de novo."        Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34 (quoting C.W.

Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st

Cir. 2014)).    We are not bound by the district court's reasoning,

though, and we are free to uphold the judgment on any ground

supported by the record.       See id.

            Under    the   prima    facie    approach,    an   inquiring   court

"ask[s] only whether the plaintiff has proffered facts that, if

credited,    would   support       all    findings    'essential   to   personal

jurisdiction.'"      Chen v. U.S. Sports Acad., Inc., 956 F.3d 45, 51

(1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 145).                 We draw

the relevant facts from "the pleadings and whatever supplemental

filings (such as affidavits) are contained in the record, giving

credence to the plaintiff's version of genuinely contested facts."

Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34.                  Even so, we do not "credit

conclusory     allegations         or      draw      farfetched    inferences."

Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir.

1994).   Instead, the inquiry must be governed by "evidence of

specific facts set forth in the record" — not simply predicated

upon a plaintiff's "unsupported allegations in their pleadings."

Boit, 967 F.2d at 675. Ordinarily, such evidence will be contained

in affidavits, authenticated documents, and the like, submitted by

one or more of the parties.              See Ticketmaster-N.Y., 26 F.3d at

203.

                                         - 9 -
              The     appellant      must    show         that     our    exercise     of

jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies both the requirements

of the Due Process Clause, see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and

the strictures of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, see Mass.

Gen.   Laws     ch.    223A,    § 3.        Even    though       the     reach   of   the

Massachusetts statute is not congruent with the reach of the Due

Process Clause, see Copia Commc'ns, LLC v. AMResorts, L.P., 812

F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2016), we do not need to inquire into any such

distinctions        here:      the   appellant's          attempted       assertion   of

jurisdiction over ACP and Auerbach plainly does not satisfy even

the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause, see

A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2016).

              Under the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise either

general or specific in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant only if that defendant has "certain minimum contacts

with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not

offend   'traditional          notions      of     fair     play    and    substantial

justice.'"     Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)

(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).                           A state

holds general jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant

maintains contacts that are "so 'continuous and systematic' as to

render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum State."

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919

(2011) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).                      The appellant has

                                       - 10 -
not proffered a claim of general jurisdiction regarding either ACP

or Auerbach and, thus, any such claim has been waived.               See United

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

            To fill this jurisdictional void, the appellant has

advanced a singular claim of specific jurisdiction.                  A litigant

seeking to establish that a court has specific jurisdiction over

a defendant must satisfy three criteria.             "First, the plaintiff's

claim must directly arise from or relate to the defendant's

activities in the forum."           Chen, 956 F.3d at 59.       "Second, the

defendant's forum-state contacts must 'represent a purposeful

availment   of   the    privilege     of   conducting   activities     in   that

state.'"    Id. (quoting Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v. The Deal,

LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2018)).               Third, "the exercise of

specific jurisdiction in the forum must be reasonable under the

circumstances."        Id.    All three criteria must be satisfied to

establish specific jurisdiction.           See id.

                                       III

            With this framework in place, we turn to the particulars

of the case at hand.         The appellant argues that ACP and Auerbach

had   sufficient   related      and   purposeful     contacts   in    and   with

Massachusetts to satisfy the criteria needed for a finding of

specific jurisdiction.         In support, she identifies four alleged

points of contact:

                                      - 11 -
               •   that ACP and Auerbach "contacted Dr. Schaefer in

                   the state."

               •   that they "sent drugs to the state."

               •   that they "oversaw the NIH protocol that delivered

                   the   drug   to    Mr.   Ward"    and,    in   the    process,

                   "obtained data and communications from the state

                   regarding Mr. Ward's condition."

               •   that they reimbursed Ward "for travel to and from

                   the state."

In the appellant's view, these points of contact afford "ample

grounds for personal jurisdiction."

          We do not agree.           On this nearly empty record, it is

luminously clear that neither ACP nor Auerbach may be subjected to

personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts.             We explain briefly.

          To    begin,    we    do   not    take    into    consideration      the

appellant's unsupported claim that ACP and Auerbach reimbursed

Ward for his travel between Massachusetts and Maryland. This claim

is not part of Ward's complaint; it appears for the first time in

his lawyer's memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss.4                   Such a

source   is    insufficient     to    bring    the    allegation        into   the

     4 The lawyer's memorandum does contain an attachment, in the
form of an email from Dr. Schaefer to Auerbach.        That email,
however, merely discusses travel expenses and goes on to say "if
you could reimburse us that would be great." It is unclear from
this email who "us" is, and the appellant offers no clarification.

                                     - 12 -
jurisdictional calculus.         After all, "allegations in a lawyer's

brief    or   legal   memorandum     are    insufficient,     even    under   the

relatively       relaxed     prima     facie     standard,     to     establish

jurisdictional facts."         Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23, 27 (1st

Cir. 2001); cf. Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st

Cir.    1991)    (explaining    that   "mere     allegations    in,    say,    an

unverified complaint or lawyer's brief" are insufficient to fend

off summary judgment).

              The appellant's remaining allegations fare no better.

The prima facie approach does not require us to "credit conclusory

allegations or draw farfetched inferences."             Ticketmaster-N.Y., 26

F.3d at 203.     Yet, this is precisely what the appellant asks us to

do:     the three remaining data points on which she relies comprise

a hodge-podge of conclusory and unsupported allegations.

              We offer an example.      On appeal, the appellant contends

that ACP and Auerbach contacted Dr. Schaefer in Massachusetts.

But in the complaint, there is no inkling that this contact

occurred in Massachusetts.           What is more, Auerbach's affidavits

reveal that it was Dr. Schaefer who initiated contact with Auerbach

about Ward and the potential use of ACP-501 in a clinical trial.

Taken together, these facts defenestrate any claim that ACP and

Auerbach      purposefully   availed       themselves   of   Massachusetts     by

initiating contact with Dr. Schaefer.             See Walden v. Fiore, 571

U.S. 277, 284 (2014) ("[T]he relationship must arise out of

                                     - 13 -
contacts that the 'defendant himself' creates with the forum

State." (emphasis in original) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))).

            Similarly,   the     appellant's    allegation    that    ACP   and

Auerbach    sent    ACP-501    to    Massachusetts   does    not     withstand

scrutiny.    This allegation appears for the first time in the

appellant's motion for reconsideration — and "it is settled beyond

hope of contradiction that, at least in the absence of exceptional

circumstances, a party may not advance new arguments in a motion

for reconsideration when such arguments could and should have been

advanced at an earlier stage of the litigation."             Caribbean Mgmt.

Grp., Inc. v. Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 2020).               So it

is here:     this allegation could easily have been made at the

inception of the case, and the appellant has made no showing of

exceptional circumstances.          It follows that we cannot credit the

belated claim that ACP and Auerbach sent ACP-501 to Massachusetts.

            Here,    moreover,      Ward's     complaint    and     Auerbach's

affidavits make it pellucid that this claim simply is not true:

neither he nor ACP ever sent ACP-501 to Massachusetts, and Ward

was never injected with ACP-501 in that state.             The only supplies

of ACP-501 that the defendants shipped went to Maryland.

            We add that there is no evidence that ACP or Auerbach

oversaw the NIH clinical trial or that either of them obtained

data from Massachusetts regarding Ward's condition.               Although ACP

                                     - 14 -
and Auerbach may have played indeterminate roles in drafting the

clinical protocol, all of the available evidence indicates that it

was Drs. Shamburek and Remaley who headed the trial — and they did

so from Maryland.

              To sum up, the appellant appears to have brought her

suit against ACP and Auerbach on a wing and a prayer.         The evidence

of   record    is   scant,   especially   since   the   appellant   has   not

buttressed her filings with any affidavits, sworn statements,

documentary proof, requests for admission, or the like.             She has

not even made a request for jurisdictional discovery.           Cf. Motus,

23 F.4th at 127-28.

              That ends this aspect of the matter.       The appellant has

made an argument that requires red meat and strong drink — but she

has supported it only with the thinnest of gruel.          Taking what few

facts have been established as a whole and viewing those facts in

the light most congenial to the appellant, see Boit, 967 F.2d at

675, we discern no basis for concluding that either ACP or Auerbach

conducted      activities     that    were    sufficiently    related      to

Massachusetts to satisfy the strictures of the Due Process Clause,

see Chen, 956 F.3d at 59.5

      5As noted above, the district court entertained and rejected
joint-venture and conspiracy theories in furtherance of the
appellant's claim of personal jurisdiction over ACP and Auerbach.
See Ward, 2017 WL 2724938, at *10-13. Because the appellant fails
to develop arguments on appeal in support of either theory, we
deem them waived. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17.

                                     - 15 -
                                 IV

            We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the judgment of the district court, in so far as it concerns the

claims asserted against ACP and Auerbach, is

Affirmed.

                               - 16 -