Court Opinion

ID: 9779202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:40:13.342779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:23.505648
License: Public Domain

OPINION AND ORDER ON SECOND MOTION FOR REHEARING
Following our opinion on rehearing in this case, appellant filed a second motion for rehearing. We grant the motion in part to consider only appellant’s twelfth point.
The substance of appellant’s twelfth point is that the trial court committed fundamental error at the punishment phase of the trial by charging the jury on the law of parole as required by TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon 1981). Appellant correctly points out that article 37.-07 was held unconstitutonal in Rose v. State, No. 69,813, slip op. at TC-87-35-53 (Tex.Crim.App., November 12, 1987, reh’g pending) (not yet reported).1 We disagree with appellant’s contention that the case must be remanded to the trial court for a “harmless error” hearing. The record itself provides an adequate basis for determining the extent of harm caused by the instruction. Having reviewed the record, we find no harm to the appellant that requires reversal.
In Rose, a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that article 37.07 violated both the separation of powers provision and the due course of law clauses of the Texas Constitution. Even though the statute was held unconstitutional, however, the conviction was affirmed because there was no showing of harm to the appellant. See Rose, at TC-87-35-67, n. 9. In making this assessment, the concurring opinions applied the two-tiered test of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (opinion on reh’g).
In this case, there was no objection to the inclusion of the parole and good time instruction. The absence of an appropriate objection dictates the standard of review. Inasmuch as there was no objection, we look to determine whether the error was so egregious and created such harm that appellant has not received a fair trial — in short, “egregious harm.” See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.
In making this determination, “the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant *394information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. The purpose of this review is to illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused. See id. at 174.
The record reflects that appellant was placed on deferred adjudication probation in a previous felony case. The offense for which he was tried in the instant case was, as shown by the evidence, committed five days after being placed on probation. During argument the State placed heavy emphasis on both these facts and asked for a long sentence. Neither the State nor the defense ever mentioned parole in their arguments. In spite of these arguments, the jury decided on a punishment of forty years confinement out of a possible maximum of ninety-nine years.
Based on this record, we cannot say that the instruction caused egregious harm under the Rose/Almanza standard. We therefore overrule appellant’s twelfth point of error.
Appellant’s second motion for rehearing is overruled.

. Although Rose is not yet final due to the pending motion for rehearing, we agree with its rationale regarding the harm of such a jury instruction.