Court Opinion

ID: 9565363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:19:35.13705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:35.150711
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Sharp
dissenting:
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Moore and add the following additional observations.
The rationale of the majority opinion is: (1) that G.S. 1-15 (b), by its terms, has no application to any action for wrongful death or to an action for personal injuries when the injury is instantaneous and immediately apparent; and (2) that since plaintiff’s intestate sustained no injury until the time of his death, no statute of limitation bears upon plaintiff’s action except G.S. 1-53(4), which prescribed a two-year period for the bringing of an action for wrongful death.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, it is my view that plaintiff’s suit is barred by the interaction of G.S. 1-15 (b) and G.S. 28A-18-2, the statute which authorizes an action for wrongful death. Our wrongful death statute has remained basically unchanged since 1868 and, like the majority, I begin my analysis of this case with it.
In pertinent part G.S. 28A-18-2 provides:
“(a) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another, stick as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so liable, and his or their personal representatives or collectors, shall be liable to an action for damages, . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The clear meaning of the italicized clause is that had the deceased survived the injuries which caused his death and had he been legally entitled to recover damages therefor, his per*198sonal representative then has a cause of action for his wrongful death based on whatever legal rights the decedent possessed at the time of his death. If the deceased had no legal rights, his administrator has none. The proviso thus refers not only to a deceased’s substantive rights, but to the procedural limitations attending those rights. Therefore, if the deceased was barred by the applicable statute of limitations at the time of his death from maintaining an action for personal injuries then his personal representative will also be barred from maintaining an action for wrongful death resulting from those injuries.
This construction follows that of a majority of the jurisdictions which have considered this problem. See page 5 of the majority opinion and cases therein cited. It is also the rationale adopted by this Court in Brown v. Casualty Co., 285 N.C. 313, 204 S.E. 2d 829 (1974). In Brown, the plaintiff’s intestate died on 26 April 1969 when his car left the highway and crashed after having been struck in the rear by a hit-and-run driver. The plaintiff sought to recover the policy limit from the deceased’s automobile liability insurance carrier under the uninsured motorist rider which required the insurer “to pay all sums which the insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile. ...” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff brought her suit on 25 April 1972.
In Brown v. Casualty Co., supra, we held that “[t]o be ‘legally entitled to recover damages’ a plaintiff must not only have a cause of action but a remedy by which he can reduce his right to damages to judgment,” id. at 319, 204 S.E. 2d at 833, and that the defense of the statute of limitations stands upon the same plane as any other legal defense. Since the insured had died, any suit against the hit-and-run motorist to recover for his wrongful death would have had to have been brought within two years of the death. G.S. 1-53(4). Therefore, a recovery based on the insured’s legal rights also had to meet the two-year bar. The suit against Casualty Company having been filed almost three years after the accident and death, we held that the insured was not “legally entitled to recover” from the unidentified uninsured motorist and hence the plaintiff, his personal representative, could not recover from his insurer.
There can be no significant difference between the import of the italicized phrase in the insurance policy, which required *199the insurer to pay the sums which the insurer was “legally entitled to recover as damages” from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile, and the similar phrase in the wrongful death statute giving a personal representative a cause of action when the death of his decedent was caused by the wrongful or negligent act of another such as would, had the injured party lived, “have entitled him to an action for damages therefor.” It matters not that one clause is found in an insurance contract and the other in the statute books. The same logic which compelled the first construction compels the second.
In support of its conclusion that the plaintiff’s action is not barred by the statute of limitations, the majority cites Causey v. R. R., 166 N.C. 5, 81 S.E. 917 (1914). This case holds, inter alia, that the statute does not begin to run against a personal representative’s action for wrongful death until the demise of the decedent, notwithstanding the fact that his action for the personal injuries which caused his death was barred when he died.
The facts in Causey v. R. R., supra, were these: Causey, a railroad employee, died on 7 June 1912 from injuries sustained on 1 December 1903 as a result of the negligence of defendant Railroad. On 27 December 1903, in consideration of $75.00, the Railroad’s claim agent obtained a release from the injured Causey. In the action brought by Causey’s administrator in 1912 for his wrongful death, the release was set aside and the plaintiff allowed to recover for his intestate’s wrongful death.
At the time of Causey’s death both his action to rescind the release and to recover for his personal injuries were barred by the statute. Notwithstanding, this Court held that although “ [o] rdinarily, the bar of the statute is a good defense against the administrator, if available against the intestate,” in an action for wrongful death there was no privity between the administrator and his intestate. Therefore, the lapse of time between the injury and the death of the intestate would not bar the administrator’s action for wrongful death, which did not come into existence until the death. The rationale was that the statutory requirement that the deceased, at the time of his death, must have been entitled to recover for the injuries which caused his death relates to the character of the injury without regard to the question of time of suit or death.
*200Causey had not been decided two years before the Court began to back away from that decision. In Edwards v. Chemical Co., 170 N.C. 551, 87 S.E. 635 (1916), the Court held that the intestate’s action for personal injuries and his administrator’s action for wrongful death were based on “a single wrong,” and a defendant who had compensated the deceased for his injuries during his lifetime did “not answer the description of ‘the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued.’ . . . ” The Court said, “The statute may well be construed as meaning that the party who at the time of the bringing of the action ‘would have been liable if death had not ensued’ shall be liable to an action notwithstanding the death, etc.” Id. at 555, 87 S.E. at 637. With reference to Causey the Court said: “We were referred by counsel to Causey v. R. R., 166 N.C. 5, as being in contravention of our present ruling, but we do not so interpret the decision.” Id. at 555, 87 S.E. at 637.
Not since Mitchell v. Talley, 182 N.C. 683, 109 S.E. 882 (1921), a case involving only a personal representative’s right to attach the property of the defendant in a wrongful death action, has this Court cited Causey in any case involving the wrongful death statute. When infrequently cited during the past 55 years, it has been with reference to fraud as grounds for rescission of an instrument.
It is my view that the decision in Causey was clearly wrong. It cannot be reconciled with the express words of the wrongful death statute, and it is inconsistent with the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Casualty Co., supra, rendered in 1974, sixty years later. Causey should be specifically overruled forthwith and not left, like a misplaced street sign, to create confusion. See Williams v. General Motors Corporation, 393 F. Supp. 387, 395 (1975).
Since a personal representative’s action for wrongful death is barred by any statute of limitation which would have barred his decedent’s action for personal injuries, the question we must decide here is whether the deceased Raftery, had he lived, could have maintained an action. Defendant contends that had Raftery survived his injuries, G.S. 1-15 (b) (1971) would have prevented him from maintaining an action. This statute provides:
“(b) Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than one for wrongful death, having as an essential element bodily injury to the person or a defect in or *201damage to property which originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant or ought reasonably to have been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such cases the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last act of defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.”
As noted earlier, the majority’s first contention with reference to G.S. 1-15 (b) is that it has no application to this case because wrongful death is specifically excepted from those actions deemed to have accrued at the time the personal injury, defect in or damage to property is or should have been discovered by the claimant. This same contention, along with the effect of G.S. 1-15 (b) upon the wrongful death statute (G.S. 28A-18-2), was considered in Arrowood v. General Motors Corp., 539 F. 2d 1321 (4th Cir. 1976). That case involved an action for wrongful death arising out of an instantaneously fatal automobile accident which was caused by a concealed defect in a car purchased by decedent more than three years before his death. Except when quoted, the analysis of G.S. 1-15 (b) by Russell, Circuit Judge, who wrote the opinion of the court in Arrowood, is summarized below:
1. By the “excepting phrase” in G.S. 1-15 (b) the legislature expressed its intention that this section should not “permit an action for wrongful death, whether one arising out of a product defect or otherwise, to be begun more than two years after death; it intended that § 1-53(4) should continue to control the accrual date of actions for wrongful death and the time when the statute of limitations should begin to run. Specifically, it did not intend to delay the accrual of . . . wrongful death actions involving a product defect until discovery of the defect, which was the effect of § 1-15 (b) for personal injury actions, but intended that the accrual of such action should remain the date of death as fixed by § 1-53(4).” 359 F. 2d at 1324.
2. Without the excepting language, G.S. 1-15 (b) would have changed the date on which the statute of limitations began to run on an action for wrongful death involving a product defect from the date of death to “the time when the defect in the product causing death was discovered or by the exercise of due diligence should have been discovered.” (However, the period *202for discovery “shall not exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.”) Without the excepting clause, “the accrual of a right of action in such a situation [would be] identical for personal injury actions and for wrongful death actions”; and, in some cases, the omission of the exception of wrongful death actions would have extended the time for the accrual of such an action far beyond two years from the date of death. To this extent G.S. 1-15 (b) would have amended G.S. 1-53(4). Id. To prevent this result the General Assembly inserted the exception for wrongful death.
3. “The excepting phrase in § 1-15 (b), though, did not mean that actions for wrongful death due to an allegedly defective product were to be held to accrue, and the statute of limitation to begin to run, as of the date of the purchase of the product. ...” When G.S. 1-15 (b) is considered along with the wrongful death statute itself, it is clear that it bears directly on the one basic condition for the right to an action for wrongful death, i.e., that “ ‘injured party,’ if he had lived, could have maintained an action for personal injuries. If he could, the action for wrongful death exists; if he could not, the action does not exist.” Id.
4. When G.S. 1-15 (b) removed the requirement that an action for personal injuries arising out of a concealed product defect must be brought within three years after purchase of the product it removed the requirement not only for any suit for personal injuries not barred on the date of its ratification (21 July 1971) but also “for the hypothetical [suit for personal injuries] stated in § 28-173 [now 28A-18-2] by way of a condition to the maintenance of an action for wrongful death. However, ... [a]n action for wrongful death must still be brought within two years from death as expressly provided in § 1-53(4) and not two years from the discovery of the defect in the product. This was the purpose, and the sole purpose, as we see it, of the excepting phrase in § 1-15 (b).” Id. at 1325.
I find no flaw in Judge Russell’s interpretation and analysis of G.S. 1-15 (b). Thus interpreted G.S. 1-15 (b) bars plaintiff’s right to recover for Raftery’s death because, at the time of the injury which caused his death, more than ten years had elapsed since “the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.”
*203The majority view that obvious personal injuries caused by a defect in or damage to property not readily apparent at the time of its origin are not within the purview of G.S. 1-15 (b) is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute and too strict a construction to be reasonable. See Arrowood v. General Motors Corp., supra at 1322-23. As already noted, causes of action affected by G.S. 1-15 (b) are those, other than one for wrongful death, “having as an essential element bodily injury to the person or a defect in or damage to property which originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin.” (Emphasis added.) The pronoun its refers equally to an injury to the person, a defect in property, and an injury to property. Read in context it also refers, by necessary implication, to bodily injury caused by a defect in property not apparent at the time of its origin.
In this case, taking the allegations of the complaint as true —which we must do at this stage of the proceedings — a defect in the crane, which was not apparent at the time of its origin in 1953, was the proximate cause of the bodily injury which resulted in the death of plaintiff’s intestate in 1972. This concealed defect in property would have been “an essential element” in intestate’s action for his personal injuries, had he survived them. However, since the defect had not been discovered for more than 10 years after its origin, G.S. 1-15 (b) would have barred his -action. That section therefore relates to and bars plaintiff’s action for wrongful death. G.S. 28A-18-2.
The majority’s assumption that in an action for an obvious personal injury caused by a hidden defect in property, the pronoun its (as used in G.S. 1-15 (b)) refers to the personal iujury alone, enures to plaintiff’s benefit in this case. However, it will inevitably operate to the detriment of many future claimants and lead to some absurd results. For instance, this limited interpretation will extend the time for bringing an action in a situation similar to that in Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459, 142 S.E. 2d 1 (1965), where a plaintiff sued to recover damages for the destruction of his home by a fire caused by a defective furnace, but it will bar the same plaintiff if he sues to recover for personal injuries sustained in the same blaze.
As the majority correctly observed, “The purpose of G.S. 1-15 (b) was to give relief to injured persons from the harsh *204results” flowing from such cases as Jewell v. Price, supra; Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E. 2d 508 (1967); and Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E. 2d 320 (1952). See Green v. M.T.D. Products, Inc., 449 F. 2d 757, 758 (4th Cir. 1971) “where the pertinent cases are collated.” In view of this manifest legislative purpose I can only perceive G.S. 1-15 (b) as having been broadly drawn to cover all cases where a claimant is exposed to a dormant peril which causes him injury at a time past the limits of otherwise applicable statutes of limitation, but not more than “10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.” This case falls within the 10-year proscription.
Under this interpretation, the right of plaintiff’s intestate to recover for his personal injuries, had he survived, not only was barred by the passage of time before he ever suffered any injury, but also it might just as well have banished before he was born. The majority seems to have adopted its interpretation of G.S. 1-15 (b) in order to avoid this result. However, even within the majority’s construction, the statute operates to bar many causes of action before the claimant suffers injury. For example, the current owner of the crane is barred by G.S. 1-15 (b) from recovering for the hidden defect which caused its failure in 1972. Indeed, his right was barred in 1963, three years before he bought the crane from its original purchaser. However, we must face the fact that solons cannot eliminate the possibility that in unusual situations hardships may result from the application of any statute however salutary its operation in general. Indubitably there can be perils and defects which will not cause injury until long after their origin. It is equally true that the passage of time may make impossible the proof of valid substantive defenses to an action based upon allegations of ancient wrongs or defects. This could be such a case.
Here it appears from the affidavits considered by the trial judge at the hearing upon the motions for summary judgment (1) that defendant-manufacturer had had no contact with the crane in suit since its sale to the J. M. Thompson Company in June 1953; (2) that Thompson Company used the crane in its general construction business for 13 years before selling it in 1966 to intestate’s employer, Roger K. Barbour, t/'a Industrial Welding Service; and (3) that Barbour had similarly used the crane for 6 years before it failed and caused intestate’s death.
*205In any event, the General Assembly has decided that for certain injuries resulting from nonapparent perils, the statute of limitations shall begin to run from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief. That decision necessarily implies that some causes of action will be barred before the injury occurs or becomes reasonably discoverable. A sound public policy requires that at sometime an end must be put to liability, even if some meritorious claims are thereby cut off. The ultimate purpose behind statutes of limitation has not been to goad procrastinating claimants into asserting their rights but to protect defendants from claims which are too old to be adequately refuted. “The purpose of a statute of limitation is to afford security against stale demands, not to deprive anyone of his just rights by lapse of time. ... In some instances, it may operate to bar the maintenance of meritorious causes of action. When confronted with such a cause, the urge is strong to write into the statute exceptions that do not appear there. In such case, we must bear in mind Lord Campbell’s caution: ‘Hard cases must not make bad laws.’ ” Shearin v. Lloyd, supra at 371, 98 S.E. 2d at 514.
For the reasons stated, I join with Justice Moore in voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing plaintiff’s action.
Justice Copeland joins in this dissenting opinion.