Court Opinion

ID: 9474130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:48:51.658272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:55.194568
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The dissent to the panel opinion is incorporated here by reference, see 751 F.2d at 975-77.
The en banc majority reiterates the position that a criminal defendant may only invoke collateral estoppel based upon a pri- or acquittal. There is no doctrinal explanation for this view in the majority opinion, nor in the cases cited therein. I remain convinced that the prior acquittal requirement is an unintended quirk in the case law and defeats the purpose of the double jeopardy clause and Ashe.1 A party should clearly be able to raise defensively the determination of an issue of ultimate fact from a prior adverse adjudication if it is to his or her advantage in a subsequent proceeding, whether that proceeding is civil or criminal. In this case, the same parties litigated the identical issue concerning Flit-tie’s post-murder conduct a second time, and consequently he was twice-tried and twice-punished for the same offense.
There is an alternative ground supporting Flittie’s double jeopardy claim. The Supreme Court has stressed in several recent decisions that whether the same conduct may be prosecuted under separate offenses is a question of legislative intent. See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, — *946U.S. -, -, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764, 771 (1985); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). If the court determines that the legislature clearly intended that the same conduct be punished twice under separate offenses, there is no violation of the double jeopardy clause. In Garrett, for example, the Supreme Court analyzed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention, and Control Act of 1970 and determined that Congress intended that a defendant could be prosecuted for both continuing criminal enterprise and the underlying predicate offense of conspiracy. — U.S. at----, 105 S.Ct. at 2412-16, 85 L.Ed.2d at 772-76. In this case, it is inconceivable that the South Dakota legislature intended that Flittie’s post-murder conduct be punished as both “conspiracy” and “accessory-after-the-fact.” Conspiracy is defined in the statute in terms of an agreement to commit an offense in the future, S.D.Codified Laws Ann. § 22-3-8, and accessory-after-the-fact is defined in terms of assistance to another person who has already committed an offense, id. § 22-3-5. Under either a legislative intent or collateral estoppel analysis, the state subjected Flittie to double jeopardy.
I also am of the view that the admission of Flittie’s conversation with Harris violated the fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination and Flittie’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The majority all but concedes that Flittie’s Miranda rights were violated, see supra n. 17, but contends that the admission of the video tape was harmless error. The majority concludes that the tape contained only a few marginally incriminating statements which did not relate to the aceessory-after-the-fact charge. I disagree. I find that the video tape contains numerous incriminating statements which focused almost entirely on Flittie’s post-murder conduct and the accessory-after-the-fact charge. As required by his agreement with the state, Harris misrepresented to Flittie that Downs had been requesting more money for his role in the murder. This exchange was obviously conceived by the state to elicit incriminating statements from Flittie concerning his payments to Downs, and as the following excerpts indicate, it was entirely successful:
I paid him pretty square, as far as I am concerned.
******
I don’t see how he [Downs] can say anything * * * because he’s gonna be the one to get fingered worse than anybody.
******
I put out quite a few bucks to get him down to Tucson, to get him out of the area, and * * * I covered for him.
******
I know I paid him over seven grand.
******
There ain’t nothing I can tell him until I get a job or something. I think three [thousand dollars more] is a little * * * high.
******
I can’t see where he’d be so stupid to risk a * * * murder rap.
Although the state also called several witnesses to testify concerning Flittie’s aid to Downs after the murder, I cannot conceive of evidence more damaging in terms of its impact on the jury than Flittie’s own admissions on video tape. Certainly this evidence buttressed the rest of the state’s case. Thus, admitting the video tape was clearly prejudicial.
Accordingly, I must dissent.

. I note that this is not a case involving nonmu-tual collateral estoppel, which would involve other complicating factors if extended to criminal cases. Cf. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 21-25, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2006-08, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) (rejection of aider and abettor’s collateral estoppel argument in relation to acquittal of principal).