Court Opinion

ID: 9353826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:12.537298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:53.934909
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/12/23 Anguiano v. City of Manteca CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

DELIA ANGUIANO,                                                                              C091966

                   Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Super. Ct. No. STK-CV-UPI-
                                                                                      2017-0002927)
         v.

CITY OF MANTECA,

                   Defendant and Respondent.

                                          SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL
         Plaintiff Delia Anguiano brought a personal injury action against defendant City
of Manteca (City) after she tripped and fell on a rise in a sidewalk. The City brought a
motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on the bases that (1) the
defect in the sidewalk on which Anguiano tripped was trivial as a matter of law and
Anguiano lacked evidence to show it was obviously dangerous; and (2) there was no
evidence that the City had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerousness of

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the sidewalk, which the City would need to have in order for liability to attach to the
City.
        On appeal, Anguiano takes issue with the trial court’s conclusion that the defect at
issue was trivial. Anguiano weaves into her analysis arguments regarding whether the
condition was obvious, which are more aptly relevant to the issue of whether the City had
constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous nature of the sidewalk’s condition. (See
Gov. Code, § 835.2 [constructive notice requires the condition to be “of such an obvious
nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the
condition and its dangerous character”]; Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 508, 520 [“A defect is not obvious just because it is nontrivial”].)
        In its responding brief, the City argues the defect was trivial as a matter of law;
Anguiano failed to properly address the trial court’s finding that the City lacked notice of
the allegedly dangerous condition and this court should not now review the issue; and the
City had neither actual nor constructive notice of the existence of a dangerous defect.
The City also argues we should not be able to consider this appeal because it was
untimely, and it asks us to reconsider an evidentiary ruling made by the trial court if we
are inclined to reverse the judgment.
        Because we will affirm the judgment on the basis that the defect at issue was
trivial as a matter of law, we need not consider the question of whether the City had
notice of the allegedly dangerous condition or the City’s request to reconsider evidentiary
rulings. We will, however, briefly consider the City’s argument that the appeal was
untimely.

                       FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

        Pleadings

        Anguiano filed the First Amended Complaint (complaint) which is the operative
complaint in this action, on May 8, 2017. The complaint alleged a single personal injury

                                               2
cause of action against the City for premises liability. Plaintiff alleged she was injured
because of a dangerous condition of public property and the City had actual or
constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition with sufficient time prior to the injury
to have corrected the condition. Specifically, Anguiano alleged that on June 7, 2016, she
was seriously injured when she tripped on a raised sidewalk crack in the 1300 block of
West Yosemite Avenue in Manteca then fell to the ground. Anguiano sought
compensatory damages for lost wages, medical expenses, general damages, and loss of
earnings. The City answered the complaint on June 7, 2017.

       Motion for Summary Judgment

       In January 2019, the City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was
entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, the City argued that the undisputed
material facts established that the sidewalk condition upon which Anguiano tripped and
fell was not dangerous as a matter of law. Second, the City argued that Anguiano could
not establish that the City had sufficient advanced actual or constructive knowledge of
the allegedly dangerous property condition to have been able to take steps to remedy the
condition prior to Anguiano’s fall. The hearing on the motion was continued twice to
allow the parties to engage in further discovery.

       City’s Evidence Submitted with the Moving Papers

       The City included portions of Anguiano’s deposition testimony with its moving
papers. In her deposition, Anguiano described the weather on the day of the incident as
“clear” and “nice.” She testified that she did not see an uplifted section of sidewalk prior
to her fall. She described the fall by saying, “when I walked out of the check cashing
place, I just walked off to the sidewalk and [the] next thing I know I was on the ground.”
She fell forward, and when she looked back to where she had tripped, she saw the raised
edge of the sidewalk. During her deposition, she stated she never measured the height of
the edge where she tripped and admitted she did not know how high it was.

                                             3
         In the responses to special interrogatories submitted with the moving papers,
Anguiano contended the sidewalk was in a dangerous condition “based upon the height
differential in the sidewalk panels at the property where she was injured, and the
substantial damage[s] and cracks to the sidewalk at the property where she was injured.”
         The City submitted the declaration of its finance director, Jeri Tejeda, in support
of the motion. He declared that the City’s risk management department maintains an
electronic access log that documents every citizen complaint and claim made with the
City dating back to 2004. He said he personally reviewed the log and, other than
Anguiano’s claim, located no other claims or complaints regarding the sidewalk
condition on the 1300 block of West Yosemite Avenue. He also stated, “I am unaware of
any complaints, claims or injuries involving any sidewalk condition on the 1300 block of
West Yosemite Avenue from the City’s annual inspections prior to Delia Anguiano’s
fall.”

         Plaintiff’s Opposition Evidence

         In her initial response to the motion, Anguiano did not dispute that the day of her
accident was a clear and nice day.
         Anguiano submitted portions of her deposition testimony with her opposition
papers. She testified about a copy of a photograph she submitted with her claim to the
City. She could not approximate when she took the photo. On the photo, she marked
approximately 15 feet from the door of the check-cashing store and four feet from the
curb, which is where she estimated she fell. The photograph is not a close-up, and does
not provide a good visual of the condition of the sidewalk in the approximate area where
Anguiano alleges she fell, but based on what can be seen, it looks like she has estimated
that she tripped and fell on the transition between two panels on the left half of the
sidewalk, with the check-cashing store to her left and the curb and a tree to her right. Her
car was parked further along the sidewalk, some distance beyond the tree.

                                               4
       Anguiano submitted portions of the deposition of Lucky Shaw, who appears to be
a City employee. He stated he and one of his crew members went out to inspect the area
the day they received notice of Anguiano’s fall, and the next day he sent a crew out to
ramp and grind the area.
       During his deposition, Shaw reviewed a series of six photographs. One
photograph, taken on September 27, 2016, shows a photo of the sidewalk and check
cashing store located at 1330 West Yosemite. He describes the sidewalk as “broken and
raised” and agrees that it is “broken in several locations.” He described a photograph
including a level and tape measure as showing the transition of the raised sidewalk. He
took the measurements. He estimates the height differential shown in one photograph is
one and 3/4 inches (1 3/4”). He estimates other measurements reflected in the series of
photos were one inch (1”), and between 1 inch (1”) and one and 1/4 inches (1 1/4”).
       Looking at the series of photographs used during Shaw’s deposition—and
comparing it to Anguiano’s marked photograph and deposition testimony regarding
where she fell—it appears that the general area around where Anguiano fell was two
sidewalk panels wide. Treating the side of the sidewalk where the check cashing
business was located as the left side, the curb as the right side, and the area a panel would
cover as a section, the two lower sections and upper-left section were concrete slabs, and
the upper-right section was a dirt well where a tree grew. The upper-left panel and the
lower-right panel have both been pushed up so they are raised above the lower-left panel.
The height difference between the two left panels, where Anguiano’s marked photograph
suggests she fell is at an incline, with the difference being approximately one inch (1”) at
the left edge and approximately one and three-quarter inches at the right edge (1 3/4”).
There was a crack in the lower-right panel, running from approximately the middle of the
top edge to the panel’s bottom left-hand corner. Viewed in conjunction with the
photograph Anguiano submitted with her claim, these photographs show that to the
extent there are broken and raised panels along the block, they are panels immediately

                                              5
abutting the tree. The path of the panels on the left side appears to be fairly smooth, with
only the rise between the two panels where Anguiano appears to have tripped—i.e., there
are no cracks with jagged edges or broken panels in the footpath from the front of the
check cashing store to the panels where Anguiano represented she fell.
       Shaw also testified a bit about Government Outreach, a computer-based
application the City uses to file complaints and concerns. It is a website that citizens can
access to file complaints; so if a citizen has a complaint regarding sidewalks, they can go
to the website and file a complaint and the complaint will be forwarded to him.
       Anguiano also submitted portions of the deposition of Tejeda. He testified about
the City’s log that tracked claims filed against the City. He testified the log would only
keep track of formal claims against the City. Direct citizen complaints would not be
reflected in the log. He testified the City also has a trip and fall log where it keeps citizen
complaints. It is an excel file that dates back to 2017, which means any of the claims
reflected in the log would have been received after Anguiano allegedly tripped on the
City’s sidewalk.

       Plaintiff’s Supplemental Opposition Evidence Submitted After First Continuance

       Following the court’s first continuance of the hearing on the motion, Anguiano
submitted a declaration of Maria Elena Fabila. According the declaration, Fabila was
working at a business located on the south side of the 1300 block of West Yosemite
Avenue on the day of the accident, where she had been employed for several years before
June 2016. She stated that prior to the date Anguiano was injured, she “observed the
sidewalk in various states of disrepair, including, but not limited to, substantial cracking
and raised sidewalk panels adjacent to trees.” She stated that pictures attached to her
declaration—which appear to be black and white copies of four out of the six
photographs used in the Shaw deposition—accurately depicted the condition of the
sidewalk as it had existed from at least the beginning of 2016.

                                               6
       Anguiano also submitted a declaration of Brian Carroll following the trial court’s
first continuance. According to the declaration, Carroll began working at a business on
the south side of the 1400 block of West Yosemite Avenue on September 14, 2015,
which would be approximately 10 months before Anguiano’s fall. The business was
across the street from the portion of the 1300 block of West Yosemite Avenue at issue.
Carroll said that since he began working at his job, he has seen cracks and raised
sidewalk panels adjacent to trees on the south side of the 1300 block. He could see the
conditions in the 1300 block just by looking or walking on the south side of the street.
He said from September 2015 forward, he saw the conditions of the 1300 and 1400
blocks progressively worsen.
       Carroll verified that a photograph attached to his declaration accurately depicted
the condition of the sidewalk for several months prior to the summer of 2016. The
photograph’s quality is not good, and it appears to capture the defect at issue from a
distance—roughly three fairly long sidewalk panels away. However, you can surmise
from the photograph that there is a rise of some degree between the two panels. Carroll
also declared a batch of photos date stamped September 27, 2016— which appear to be
black and white copies of four out of the six photographs used in the Shaw deposition—
accurately depict the condition of the 1300 block for several months prior to the summer
of 2016.

       City’s Supplemental Evidence Submitted After Second Continuance

       The City included portions of the deposition of Maria Fabila with supplemental
evidence it submitted after the trial court’s second continuance of the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment.
       The following exchange occurred during the deposition:
              “Q. Okay. The second sentence of paragraph four is, ‘I observed the
              sidewalk in various states of disrepair, including but not limited to

                                             7
substantial cracking and raised sidewalk panels adjacent to trees.’ Is that
true?
“A. Just the one in front of my store, the tree in front of my store, the
panels or panel in front of my store.
“Q. Okay. So the paragraph says, ‘I observed the sidewalk in various
states of disrepair.’ Do you agree with that?
“A. I mean, I actually didn’t see it raising, if that’s what that means.
“Q. Okay. Would you describe the sidewalk as in various states of
disrepair? [¶] . . .
“A. . . . I mean it was raised.
“Q. Okay. So then the next part says, ‘Including but not limited to
substantial cracking.’
“A. I don’t remember -- well, I mean, if it raised it was -- the roots caused
it to crack, that’s how it was able to raise.
“Q. Okay. So do you -- would you say that in the area there is substantial
cracking?
“A. Not to my recollection. . . . [¶] All I remember is that particular panel
next to the tree in front of my store.
“Q. Okay. And so the next part is, ‘Raised sidewalk panels adjacent to
trees.’
“A. Panel one.
“Q. So there is one panel that was raised?
“A. Well, I think it was two where it cracked in half or the two panels and
the cracked and that’s how they were raised.
“Q. Okay. So as I am understanding it there would be two pieces?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay. So there is one raised?

                                  8
              “A. Uh-huh, yes.
              “Q. Okay. And that’s what you had observed?
              “A. Yes.
              “Q. Okay. But you had not observed other states of disrepair like
              substantial cracking?
              “A. Not that I made a mental note of, I mean.”
       When pressed further about her statement in her declaration that the sidewalk
condition was obvious, Fabila admitted she could not say if it was obvious to anyone
else. She testified, “I would park in front of it so as not to encounter it. Because I know
myself and I probably would have been the first victim, but --so I parked up front past the
front door so I wouldn’t have to.” She stated she wouldn’t walk across the portion of
sidewalk at issue.
       The City also included portions of the deposition of Brian Carroll with its
supplemental filings. During his deposition, Carroll said he is familiar with the street on
which Anguiano fell because he has walked in the area a few times to go to a nearby
liquor store. He said as far as he can remember, “that whole area of [the] sidewalk was
not level when I was hired.” But he also said he has never walked on the sidewalk in
front of the check cashing store. “I never stood in that exact spot, but that whole stretch
of sidewalk was uplifted from the trees.”
       He admitted he could not say the first time he noticed this specific raise in the
sidewalk. When asked if he ever noticed the specific raise, he answered, “[t]hat specific
raise followed the rest of that sidewalk. I mean, I can’t tell you that that specific raise
was any better or any worse than the sidewalk—you know, going west of the sidewalk,
going east. I couldn’t tell you that.” He knew the sidewalk generally had raises going
back to 2014, and with respect to that spot, “it was the same as the rest of the sidewalk. It
was just the trees were all planted at the same time. There would be no reason for it to be
any different. . . . [¶] . . . I remember driving by and seeing it raised, but that’s all I

                                               9
remember.” When asked if he could recall driving by and seeing that specific raise he
said, “[s]ure.” He said, “[t]he day I got hired that whole area was like that.” “But that
specific spot, I couldn’t tell you exactly how bad. Whenever this person tripped and fell,
I couldn’t tell you exactly how bad it was. But that sidewalk was never level until, you
know, they repaired it.” The following exchange occurred:
              “Q. What I understood you to say is that you don’t remember this specific
              raise, but you do know that the entire sidewalk had raised problems?
              “A. Correct.
              “Q. Okay.
              “A. Yes. [¶] . . . [¶]
              “Q. Okay. So you don’t know when this specific raise would have arisen,
              you just know the entire sidewalk has problems since September 2014?
              “A. Correct.”

        Anguiano’s Supplemental Opposition Evidence Submitted After Second
Continuance

        Anguiano submitted portions of Carroll’s deposition testimony as part of her
supplemental evidence submitted after the second continuance. When counsel asked him
about the “specific area” he said, “[a]ctually, yes, I remember it being lifted. Sure. I
never walked that area. I drove by it every day, not hard to miss when you’re driving
down the street and you see it. Obviously it was there.” When pressed further he said,
“[i]t was no different than the rest of the sidewalk, the parts I remember. Okay. Whether
it was before the rest of the area that were lifted or it came after I couldn’t tell you. But I
remember that part of the sidewalk being lifted, yes. . . . [¶] . . . Just by driving by it every
day.”

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       The Trial Court’s Ruling

       After initially issuing a tentative ruling denying City’s motion, on October 24
2019, the trial court granted City’s motion for summary judgment.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

                                  Timeliness of the Appeal

       Before we address the central issues in this appeal, we dispense with the City’s
argument that Anguiano did not file a timely notice of appeal. In light of emergency
orders issued in early 2020, the notice was timely.
       The trial court entered its judgment on January 29, 2020. The City had notice of
entry of the judgment personally served on Anguiano on January 31, 2020. On April 1,
2020, Anguiano served a notice of appeal on defendant by mail and email. However, the
notice was not filed until May 19, 2020.
       The City argues that Anguiano’s deadline to file a notice of appeal under
California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a) (Rule 8.104) was April 1, 2020, and, because the
notice of appeal was filed 48 days later, we must dismiss the appeal as untimely.
Anguiano argues that COVID-19 emergency orders issued by the trial court tolled the
period of time to file a notice of appeal between March 17, 2020, and May 27, 2020, and,
therefore, the notice of appeal was timely.
       Rule 8.104(a) requires a party to file a notice of appeal, “on or before the earliest
of: [¶] (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of
appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the
judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the
notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’
of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service;
or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.”

                                              11
       Sixty days from January 31, 2020, was March 31, 2020, Cesar Chavez Day, a
California State Holiday, which would have meant that, absent an exception, the notice of
appeal had to be filed by April 1, 2020. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 12a, subd. (a), 135; Gov.
Code, §§ 6700, subd. (a)(6), 6717; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.10(a).) However, Rule
8.104 contains an exception that applies here.
       Rule 8.104(b) allows a court to extend the date to file a notice of appeal under
Rule 8.66. (Rule 8.104(b) [“Except as provided in rule 8.66, no court may extend the
time to file a notice of appeal”].) Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.66(a) (Rule
8.66), “[i]f made necessary by the occurrence or danger of [a] . . . public health crisis, or
other public emergency, . . . the Chair of the Judicial Council, notwithstanding any other
rule in this title, may: [¶] (1) Toll for up to 30 days or extend by no more than 30 days
any time periods specified by these rules; or [¶] (2) Authorize specified courts to toll for
up to 30 days or extend by no more than 30 days any time periods specified by these
rules.” Additionally, under Rule 8.66(c), “[i]f made necessary by the nature or extent of
the public emergency, with or without a request, the Chair of the Judicial Council may
renew an order issued under this rule prior to its expiration. An order may be renewed
for additional periods not to exceed 30 days per renewal.”
       On March 17, 2020, the trial court issued an order under authority granted to it by
Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye that deemed March 17, 2020, to March 30, 2020,
holidays as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure, section 12a, subdivision (a)
(Section 12a), which provides, “[i]f the last day for the performance of any act provided
or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday, then
that period is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday.” On
April 3, 2020, the trial court issued a similar order, also under Chief Justice Cantil-
Sakauye’s authority, deeming April 1, 2020, through May 1, 2020, holidays as
contemplated by Section 12a. Again, on April 28, 2020, and also under Chief Justice
Cantil-Sakauye’s authority, the trial court issued a third order deeming May 1, 2020,

                                              12
through May 27, 2020, holidays as contemplated by Section 12a. We have taken judicial
notice of these orders.
       Under these orders, the “next day that [was] not a holiday” after Cesar Chavez
Day, March 31, 2020, for purposes of filing a timely notice of appeal in the trial court
was May 28, 2020. (See Section 12a.) Thus, under these orders, which provided
permissible extensions to file the notice under Rules 8.66 and 8.104(b), the notice of
appeal was timely filed on May 19, 2020.

                                              II

                          The Defect Was Trivial as a Matter of Law

       A.     The Standard of Review

       A court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “In
determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the
court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to
which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted
by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted
by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Ibid.)
       “ ‘A defendant moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of showing
that the plaintiff’s causes of action have no merit, and the defendant meets this burden by
making a prima facie evidentiary showing that one or more elements of each cause of
action cannot be established, or there is a complete defense to each cause of action.’
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849–851 [] (Aguilar); Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to produce evidence of a triable issue of material fact concerning the

                                              13
challenged element or defense. (Aguilar, supra, at pp. 849–851; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2).) ‘There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing
the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ (Aguilar, supra, at
p. 850.) Throughout the motion, however, the moving party bears an overall burden of
persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 850 & fn. 11.)” (Huckey v. City of
Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1103 (Huckey).)
        We review orders granting motions for summary judgment de novo. (Huckey,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103.) In so doing, we consider “all of the evidence adduced
on the motion (except evidence the trial court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted
inferences the evidence reasonably supports.” (Mayes v. La Sierra University (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 686, 697; see also Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
“The appellate court must liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.
(Zubillaga v. Allstate Indemnity Co. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1021 [].) The trial
court’s reasons for granting the motion are not binding on appeal, because the appellate
court reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878 [].)” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103.)

        B.     Liability Under the Government Claims Act

        The Government Claims Act (Act) (Gov. Code, § 810, et seq.) governs the City’s
liability.
        Under the Act, “[e]xcept as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury
caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the
property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was
proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a

                                              14
reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he
public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section
835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the
dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code, § 835, subd. (b).) Thus, if the property was not in a
dangerous condition at the time of the injury, the government has no liability.
       “An initial and essential element of recovery for premises liability under the
governing statutes is proof a dangerous condition existed.” (Stathoulis v. City of
Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 566 (Stathoulis).)
       A “dangerous condition” is statutorily defined to mean “a condition of property
that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of
injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).)
       The Act also specifies when a court may find a condition is not dangerous as a
matter of law: “[a] condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this
chapter if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff,
determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor,
trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable
person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such
property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
       A trivial danger does not require the danger to be non-existent. (Huckey, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109 [a height differential was not a dangerous condition as defined
by the Act, even though “[t]o be sure, the height differential posed some risk of injury”].)
“It is a matter of common knowledge that it is impossible to maintain a sidewalk in a
perfect condition. Minor defects are bound to exist. A municipality cannot be expected
to maintain the surface of its sidewalks free from all inequalities and from every possible
obstruction to travel. Minor defects due to continued use, or action of the elements, or

                                              15
other cause, will not necessarily make the city liable for injuries caused thereby. What
constitutes a minor defect is not always a mere question of fact. If the rule were
otherwise the city could be held liable upon a showing of a trivial defect.” (Whiting v.
National City (1937) 9 Cal.2d 163, 165.)
       “The trivial defect doctrine is not an affirmative defense. It is an aspect of duty
that a plaintiff must plead and prove. (Cadam v. Somerset Gardens Townhouse HOA
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 383, 388 [].)” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) The
trivial defect standard represents a recognition “of the difficulty of maintaining heavily
traveled surfaces in perfect condition [and] is the practical recognition that minor defects
inevitably occur, both in construction and maintenance, and that their continued existence
is not unreasonable. In such case, irrespective of the question of notice of the condition,
no liability may result.” (Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 724
(Fielder).)

       “In appropriate cases, the trial court may determine, and the appellate court may
determine de novo, whether a given walkway defect was trivial as a matter of law.
(§ 830.2; Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 569.) ‘Where reasonable minds can
reach only one conclusion—that there was no substantial risk of injury—the issue is a
question of law, properly resolved by way of summary judgment.’ (Caloroso v.
Hathaway[ (2004)] 122 Cal.App.4th [922,] 929 (Caloroso).) If, however, the court
determines that sufficient evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may
differ as to whether the defect presents a substantial risk of injury, the court may not
conclude that the defect is trivial as a matter of law. (Kasparian v. AvalonBay
Communities, Inc.[ (2007)] 156 Cal.App.4th [11,] 28.)” (Huckey, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104-1105, fn. omitted.)
       “As to what constitutes a dangerous or defective condition no hard-and-fast rule
can be laid down, but each case must depend upon its own facts.” (Fackrell v. San Diego

                                             16
(1945) 26 Cal.2d 196, 206.) “In determining whether a given walkway defect is trivial as
a matter of law, the court should not rely solely upon the size of the defect . . . although
the defect’s size ‘may be one of the most relevant factors’ to the court’s decision.
(Fielder[, supra,] 71 Cal.App.3d [at p. ]734 [].) The court should consider other
circumstances which might have rendered the defect a dangerous condition at the time of
the accident. (Ibid.) [¶] These other circumstances or factors include whether there were
any broken pieces or jagged edges in the area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or
other material obscured a pedestrian's view of the defect, the plaintiff's knowledge of the
area, whether the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the weather at the
time of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any other accidents. (Fielder[],
supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 734; Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 567.) In sum,
‘[a] court should decide whether a defect may be dangerous only after considering all of
the circumstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more dangerous
than its size alone would suggest.’ (Caloroso, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 927.)”
(Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.)
       “The court’s analysis of whether a walkway defect is trivial involves as a matter of
law two essential steps. ‘First, the court reviews evidence regarding type and size of the
defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence
of any additional factors [bearing on whether the defect presented a substantial risk of
injury]. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous
to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of
law . . . .’ (Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 567–568.)” (Huckey, supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105; see also Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 749, 757.)
       “Sidewalk elevations ranging from three-quarters of an inch to one and one-half
inches have generally been held trivial as a matter of law. (Caloroso, supra,
122 Cal.App.4th at p. 927, citing Barrett v. City of Claremont (1953) 41 Cal.2d 70, 74 []

                                              17
[and cases cited therein] and Fielder[], supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 724, fn. 4 [same].)”
(Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.) And a height differential on a sidewalk of up
to one and 7/8 inches (1 7/8”) has been found, when considered along with other factors,
to be trivial. (See Beck v. Palo Alto (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 39, 41-42.)
       Factors considered in the second half of the analysis include the presence—or lack
of presence—of “broken concrete pieces or jagged concrete edges in the height
differential or seam between the two concrete panels at the time plaintiff fell,” and
whether it is known that another person has tripped and fallen on the same defect, and
that, as far as the City knew, no other persons other than plaintiff had tripped or fallen on
the height differential. (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108; see also Fielder,
supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 734.) “The court should also look at other factors such as
whether the accident occurred at night in an unlighted area.” (Fielder, at p. 734.)

       C. Application

       Applying step one of the trivial-defect analysis, we note that the undisputed fact
that the rise between the two slabs of the sidewalk where Anguiano fell was one and 3/4
inches (1 3/4”), at its highest along its slant. Thus, the size of the rise is within a range
that courts have found trivial when taking into account surrounding circumstances. (See
Beck v. Palo Alto, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d at pp. 41-42.)
       Next, we consider other factors. The City checked its logs dating back to 2004,
and found no record of claims or complaints of others being injured on the 1300 block of
West Yosemite, and Anguiano produced no evidence that others had fallen at the same
spot. When Anguiano fell, it was a bright and nice day. While other panels of the
sidewalk along the right side of it also show some cracking and rising, “there were no
broken concrete pieces or jagged concrete edges in the height differential or seam
between the two concrete panels” where Anguiano marked on a photograph as where she

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fell, and the rise was not so close to other defects in the larger sidewalk to render the rise
more perilous to navigate. (See Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
       It is true that Carroll, Shaw, and Fabila all offered some testimony about broken
and raised panels in the general area where Anguiano fell. However, when pressed
during her deposition, Fabila said all she could really recall that was of note was some
cracking and raising of one panel adjacent to a tree in front of her store.
       Similarly, when asked about his recollections during his deposition, Carroll talked
about panels along the stretch of sidewalk being “uplifted from the trees,” and admitted
he “never stood in that exact spot” and that that he could not say whether the “specific
raise” at issue was better or worse than the rest of the sidewalk. Viewed in tandem with
the photographs Anguiano produced, all this establishes is that panels closest to trees in
the 1300 block of West Yosemite Avenue sometimes broke and had cracks, but the path
Anguiano claimed she was walking on when she fell had only the one height differential.
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff we find no reasonable person would
conclude that the sidewalk’s condition where Anguiano fell created a substantial risk of
injury when used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it
would be used. The defect was trivial as a matter of law and, therefore, not dangerous
within the meaning of the Government Code. (See Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
       Anguiano argues the fact that Fabila said she was afraid to walk on the sidewalk
near where Anguiano fell and the court’s reversal of its tentative decision both show that
reasonable minds could differ on the dangerousness of the sidewalk. As to Fabila’s
statement about being hesitant to walk on that area of the sidewalk, here there is no
evidence that any of the sidewalk damage—that is, no damage even arguably relevant to
proving the defect that caused plaintiff’s fall—was more than trivial as the law allows it
to be defined. There is no evidence Fabila’s hesitation to walk on any area of the
sidewalk signals otherwise; her subjective fear to walk on a portion of the sidewalk, even

                                              19
if it were the same portion where the accident took place, is not dispositive or even
relevant to our determination that the defect in the sidewalk was trivial.
       As to Anguiano’s argument about the tentative ruling, it is unpersuasive. The trial
court’s decision to change its tentative decision merely means that, after further
consideration and based on the law and the facts, the trial court was not persuaded that
the defect in the sidewalk was more than trivial. The trial court’s further consideration of
the matter does not require a conclusion that, here, reasonable minds can differ on the
trivial nature of the sidewalk defect. Carried to its logical conclusion, if a trial court
decided a particular defect in a slip and fall case was not trivial and a court of appeal was
prepared to decide that it was, the court of appeal would be precluded from reversing the
trial court simply because the two courts’ views on the law and the facts differed.
       Anguiano also argues that the City produced no substantial evidence that would
obviate a conclusion that the defect here was trivial, focusing on the fact that the City has
not produced expert testimony regarding how Anguiano’s fall likely occurred, unlike in
Huckey, where the expert’s opinion became central to the parties’ arguments and the trial
court’s decision.
       In Huckey, experts were used by the parties primarily to measure the height
differential between two panels where the plaintiff fell, because by the time anyone got
around to measuring the differential, the differential had been ground down. (Id., supra,
37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1096-1097, 1099.) To the extent they opined as to the possible
footpath of the plaintiff, the opinion was offered in order to explain how the expert
established the range for the height differential between the two panels where the plaintiff
likely tripped and fell. (See id. at p. 1097.) In contrast, here, Anguiano marked on a
photograph the approximate spot where she fell. In conjunction with her marked
photograph, Shaw took measurements of the size of the rise between the two panels
where Anguiano estimated she fell before the City ground and ramped the differential.
The City did not need to submit an expert opinion to establish a range of the possible

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height differential where Anguiano fell: at its highest, the rise was one and 3/4 inches
(1 3/4”). Considered with the surrounding circumstances, even if Anguiano’s foot hit the
highest point of the rise, the defect was still trivial.

                                         DISPOSITION
       We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(1), the City is awarded its costs on appeal.

                                                     HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

DUARTE, J.

RENNER, J.

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