Court Opinion

ID: 9773435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:45:54.336596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:53.807126
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
In his motion for rehearing, appellee calls to our attention our oversight of the correct description of the property. We copied the description given in the statement of facts as being Section 24 but the supplemental statement of facts does describe the land as the EJ4 of the SW}4 and all of the SE14 of Section 24. The appellant and also the appellee in their respective briefs.refer to the property as Section 24. But this mistake as to the correct description would have no effect as to what mineral interest Keesee was supposed to be buying.
At the time the original promise or agreement was made, there was no writing of any kind made and entered into. *959If appellee was employed to sell the property it was when the oral employment was entered into. The Supreme Court in the case of Denman v. Hall, 144 Tex. 633, 193 S.W.2d 515, 516 stated: “The effect of this statute is to require that contracts by which an agent is employed to buy or sell real estate must be in writing; otherwise they are not enforceable.”
An executed oral contract does not take the agreement out of Article 6573a nor can the real estate broker recover on the doctrine of quantum meruit. Landis v. W. H. Fuqua, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 159 S.W.2d 228 (writ denied); Walker v. Keeling, Tex.Civ.App., 160 S.W.2d 310; Dunn v. Slemons, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W.2d 203.
We are of the opinion and so hold that a reasonable construction of Article 6573a is that a real estate broker cannot recover a commission unless he secures some memorandum in writing, and signed by the owner of the property, of his employment. In other words, the broker should receive some memorandum in writing listing the property for sale with the broker. Ap-pellee’s motion for rehearing is in all things overruled.