Court Opinion

ID: 9462960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:54:26.108122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:51.961666
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. We cannot determine whether this case is governed by Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F.Supp. 217 (M.D.Ala. 1971), aff’d 405 U.S. 970, 92 S.Ct. 1197, 31 L.Ed.2d 246 (1972), unless we first determine whether the common law of Kentucky, like that of Alabama, requires a married woman to adopt her husband’s surname.
This requirement of the Alabama common law is the .cornerstone of the Forbush opinion. The court stated:
We may commence our analysis of the merits of the controversy by noting that Alabama has adopted the common law rule that upon marriage the wife by operation of law takes the husband’s surname. Roberts v. Grayson, 233 Ala. 658, 660, 173 So. 38 (1937); Bentley v. State, 37 Ala. App. 463, 465, 70 So.2d 430 (1954). Apparently, in an effort to police its administration of the issuance of licenses and to preserve the integrity of the license as a means of identification, the Department of Public Safety has required that each driver obtain his license in his “legal name.” Thus, in conformity with the common law rule, the regulation under attack requires that a married woman obtain her license in her husband’s surname. 341 F.Supp. 221.
Proceeding from this premise, the court held that the regulation was “reasonable” and not violative of equal protection. The court also determined that the underlying state common law rule that a wife must adopt her husband’s surname did not violate equal protection, since it was based upon “a tradition extending back into the heritage of most western civilizations,” and upon a custom common to all 50 states. Further, the court indicated that this was an area where uniformity among the states is important. Finally, the court added to its analysis of both the regulation and the common law rule the observation that because the state provided a simple and inexpensive procedure for name changes, any injury suffered by plaintiff’s class was de minimus compared with the administrative difficulties that the state would experience should the regulation be invalidated.
As this analysis of Forbush demonstrates, its result is bottomed on the settled state of the common law of Alabama. Accordingly, our case can be governed by Forbush if and only if Kentucky, like Alabama, clearly requires a married woman to adopt her husband’s surname.
*585The cases are alike in respect that Kentucky, like Alabama, requires a driver to obtain a license in his legal name. However, the majority opinion does not determine whether the district court was correct in holding that Kentucky, like Alabama, also had a common law rule requiring a married woman to adopt her husband’s surname. Instead, it expressly leaves this question open, stating that it “is better left to more definite resolution by the courts of Kentucky.” Accordingly, it acknowledges the possibility that Kentucky law does not require a married woman to adopt her husband’s surname, and that, as plaintiff alleged in her complaint, there is a class of married women too numerous to be joined in this action who, as was their right under state law, did not adopt their husband’s surnames and have always been known only by their former names. Mistakenly following Forbush, the majority opinion would hold that Kentucky, which requires a driver to be licensed in his legal name, can rationally require persons in plaintiff’s class to be issued licenses in names which under state law are not their legal names and by which they have never been known. Accordingly, the state interests found to be determinative in Forbush, the effective administration of the issuance of licenses and the prsservation of the integrity of licenses as a means of identification, cannot possibly be served by requiring a class of drivers to be issued licenses in names which are not their legal names, and by which they are not and have never been known. It seems equally clear that Forbush, which depends upon a rational justification, does not compel such a result.
It is therefore essential in this case, as in Forbush, to begin analysis by determining whether Kentucky has a common law (or statutory) rule that requires a woman to adopt her husband’s surname when she marries. I do not disagree with the general proposition stated in the majority opinion that conduct under color of state law can violate constitutional rights even if it is not authorized by the state. This statement is applicable where the conduct of a person acting under color of state law violates a specific constitutional prohibition, such as the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The equal protection clause, however, does not prohibit a specific practice, but instead prohibits any action that denies the equal protection of the law. By interpretation, the equal protection clause requires that there be a rational connection between a challenged state rule or classification, on the one hand, and a legitimate state interest that it serves, on the other. It is thus essential to determine what classification or rule the state applies and what state interest is to be benefited in order to determine the rationality of the relationship between the two.
Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority opinion that we can assess the rationality of the state licensing regulation without first determining whether it is (1) a rule that requires married women to hold drivers licenses in their legal names — even if they disagree with the state rule that makes their husbands’ surnames their legal names (Forbush), or (2) (as plaintiff asserts) a rule that requires persons in plaintiff’s class to be issued licenses in names that under state law are not their legal names and by which they have never been known.
The majority opinion suggests that we should decline to decide the state law question, and the parties disagree whether the Kentucky rule is the same as that of Alabama. If a majority of the court believe that this is a proper case for abstention, then I think that we should so state forthrightly, and remit plaintiff to the state courts. If not, I think we must first determine what is the law of Kentucky, and then assess its compliance with the constitutional requirements of the equal protection clause.