Court Opinion

ID: 9905184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 21:10:02.984424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:34.222470
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                    DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                             JUDGES:
 ANTOINETTE EVANS                                    :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
                                                     :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                         Plaintiff-Appellant         :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
                                                     :
 -vs-                                                :
                                                     :       Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023
 DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT                           :
 OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES                          :
                                                     :       OPINION
                      Defendant-Appellee

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                Appeal from the Delaware County Court of
                                                         Common Pleas, Case No. CVF 09 0491

 JUDGMENT:                                               Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY                                  November 27, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellant                                 For Defendant-Appellee

 THOMAS CONDIT                                           BARTHOLOMEW T. FREEZE
 P.O. Box 12700                                          GENEVIEVE M. HOFFMAN
 Cincinnati, OH 45212                                    JOSEPH G. BOGDEWIECZ
                                                         Capitol Square Office Building
                                                         65 East State Street, Suite 800
 DAVE YOST                                               Columbus, OH 43215
 Attorney General
 By: DAVID E. LEFTON                                     PATRICK J. SCHMITZ
 Unemployment Compensation Unit                          SANDRA R. MCINTOSH
 30 East Broad Street, 26th Floor                        SCOTT SCRIVEN, LLP
 Columbus, OH 43215                                      250 E. Broad St. Suite 900
                                                         Columbus, OH 43215
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 Gwin, P.J.

          {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Antoinette Evans [“Evans”] appeals the March 9, 2023

 Opinion entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the

 decision of the State of Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission

 (“Commission”) which declined to review a hearing officer's determination that Evans's

 employer had just cause to terminate her employment, and disallowing her application for

 unemployment compensation benefits.

                                           Facts and Procedural History

          {¶2} In 2008, Evans joined the Olentangy Local School District ("District") as a

 "Cafeteria/Study Hall Aide" at Olentangy Liberty High School] ("Liberty"). 1R. at 159-160;

 2R. at 8831. Evans received an Employee Handbook or access to an online copy when

 she was hired. 1R. at 167.

          {¶3} Evans would daily converse with her students about a wide range of topics,

 some school-related and some not. Topics would include schools, jobs, the wrestling

 team, global events, and whatever students might bring up that day. 2R. at 695-696.

 According to the District, Evans's responsibilities were to: (1) exhibit professional

 behavior; (2) ensure student safety; (3) observe and report inappropriate student

 behavior; (4) engage the public with tact and diplomacy; (5) interact positively with

 staff, students, and parents; (6) promote good public relations; and (7) serve as a

 positive role model for students. 2R. at 446.

          1 For clarity, the telephone hearing held before the Commission and the record of this case will be

 referred to as, “   R.   ,” signifying the volume and the page number.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         {¶4} The District employs a progressive disciplinary policy. 1R. at 170. During

 Evans's employment, the District disciplined her on four separate occasions, the last

 of which led to her alleged constructive discharge that is the subject of this appeal.

 2R. at 442.

            Evans's discipline for her off-duty Facebook posts and comments - April 2019

                                              and September 2020

         {¶5} The District first disciplined Evans in April 2019 for several of her comments

 and posts on Facebook. 2R. at 445; 447. One post depicted the actor Jussie Smollett with

 a statement that "Jesse [sic] Smollett swearing on his mother. Folks he will have judgment

 day. His black privilege and star quality will not help him when he goes before God!" 2R.

 at 521. Evans also shared a picture of a transgender couple with a caption that the

 individuals in the photo are the gender of their biological sex, and commented, "She's a

 he" on a story concerning a transgender female wrestler. 2R. at 519; 522. Finally, Evans

 posted a picture of several members of Congress referred to as “the Squad” with the

 caption “We are being TAKEN OVER from WITHIN!!!! What’s it gonna [sic] take

 America?!" 2R. at 520.

         {¶6} When Evans made these comments and posts, her Facebook profile was

 publicly available and identified her as a District employee. 2R. at 445-446. On or around

 April 1, 2019, the District received 10-15 complaints about Evans's Facebook posts from

 parents, Liberty alumni, and members of the public. 2R. at 515. Multiple students also

 visited guidance counselors to discuss the posts, and at least three teachers told

 administrators that the posts were a major topic amongst the Liberty student body. 2R. at

 515.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         {¶7} On April 2, 2019 - the day after the District became aware of the posts -

 Liberty Principal Michael Stamer ("Principal Stamer") placed Evans on paid leave. 2R. at

 515. Soon after, on April 4, 2019, Evans and representatives from the District met to

 discuss the incident, and the next day, the District suspended Evans for four days without

 pay and required her to complete professional training. 2R. at 445 447. In a letter to her

 announcing its decision, the District explained that Evans's posts "attracted negative

 publicity because they contradicted [the District's] mission as a public school district to

 'facilitate maximum learning for every student.'" (Emphasis in original) 2R. at 445-446.

 Additionally, the District determined that Evans's posts raised questions about her ability

 to "credibly enforce Board policies ... that require employees to report incidents of bullying

 or harassment, hold students accountable for acceptable technology use, and ensure the

 care and protection of all students." 2R. at 446. Finally, the District warned Evans that -

 because her conduct concerned the fundamental expectations of her job - she could face

 disciplinary action up to and including termination for exhibiting unprofessional conduct in

 the future. 2R. at 447. On April 9, 2019, Evans signed the suspension letter and

 acknowledged that she understood it. 2R. at 447. The training included training on the

 Professional Code of Conduct for Educators. 1R. 164.

         {¶8} Evans faced discipline again in September 2020 for commenting on another

 user's Facebook post that said, "If your students know your political affiliation you have

 failed as a teacher. Teachers are there to help students think for themselves not like you

 [,]" with, "Tell that to the English Department!" 1R. at 170; 2R. at 483-484, 498. Although

 Evans’s profile was no longer publicly available, she removed her comment shortly after

 a Liberty English teacher questioned the intent behind Evans's remark. 2R. at 483. When
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 asked about the incident, Evans claimed that her comment was not directed toward

 anyone at Liberty but toward the English Department at her daughter’s former college.

 2R. at 483. The District, however, did not find this explanation credible because the post

 did not mention Evans’s daughter, or her college. 2R. at 483. Further, the District noted

 that Evans’s daughter had graduated from college more than eight years ago. Id.2 Evans

 was given a "Documented Warning” after it had determined that Evans’s comment

 “reflected poor professional judgment and/or violated” the District’s social media policy

 and the Licensure Code of Professional Conduct for Ohio Educators. 2R. at 483.

                   Discipline for in-school remarks – October 2020 and April 7, 2021

         {¶9} On October 14, 2020, Evans had a conversation with a student "M.S."

 Evans started that conversation by mentioning the experience of a Black student who had

 recently transferred to Liberty and whom Evans thought “hated" her new school. 2R. at

 472.

         {¶10} M.S. explained that the other student had transferred from a more diverse

 school, seemingly as an explanation for that student's challenges at Liberty. 2R. at 472.

 Evans downplayed this and recounted that she had experienced discrimination as a child

 because, as an Italian-American in that era, Evans "wasn't considered white." 2R. at 472.

 Evans also said that during certain parts of America's past, Italian Americans had it worse

 than Black Americans and were lynched more often. 2R. at 472. At some point in the

 conversation, M.S. mentioned that she was Black, and Evans asked, "Oh, you consider

 yourself that?" 2R. at 472. When M.S. confirmed her identity, Evans responded, “For the

 last two years I thought you were Indian because you’re always studying." 2R. at 472. In

         2 Evans’s corrected the District that her daughter had graduated four years, not eight, years prior

 to Evans’s comments. 2R. at 487.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 a previous conversation, Evans asked M.S. if her parents had been born in America. 2R.

 at 472.

         {¶11} When M.S. shared her experiences as a Black student who had

 encountered race-related bias and discrimination at Liberty, Evans began to cry because

 she could not believe that other Liberty students would behave in such a way. 2R. at 472.

 Evans remained upset, and M.S. spent the last five minutes of the class period comforting

 her. 2R. at 472.

         {¶12} The District held an investigatory meeting on November 16, 2020. 2R. at

 470. In place of formal discipline, the District required Evans to attend individualized

 training to - according to the District's November 17, 2020 disciplinary letter to Evans -

 "assist [her] with appropriate interactions with diverse students in the district." 2R. at 470.

         {¶13} Up to this point, the District provided Evans with training, in lieu of

 termination, in the following areas: implicit bias, building a safe and supportive school

 environment, separate trainings on the professional use of social media, microaggression

 and restorative education and separate trainings involving the Code of Professional

 Responsibility for Educators3. 1R. at 163-164.

         {¶14} The final disciplinary incident occurred during a morning study hall on April

 7, 2021. 1R. at 160; 2R. at 528. While Evans cleaned partitions that were used to limit the

 spread of COVID-19, she said to a student, "Can you believe the coronavirus came from

 China and that China is making money from sales of PPE to the United States?"

 (hereinafter referred to as "COVID comment") 1R. at 160; 2R. at 545, 883. A student of

 Chinese descent who was sitting nearby overheard the comment and left the study hall

         3 April 4, 2019, September 4, 2019 and August 21, 2020. 1R. at 164.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 out of frustration and anger. 1R. at 182; 2R. at 545; 546. That student reported the incident

 to an assistant principal and received support from a guidance counselor. 2R. at 546. The

 student reported that the student felt offended, hurt, attacked and overall anger. 1R. at

 179.

         {¶15} On the evening of April 7, 2021, Principal Stamer told Evans not to report

 to work the next day. 2R. at 883. On April 8, 2021, the District placed Evans on paid

 administrative leave and scheduled an investigatory meeting for April 14, 2021 ("April

 14th Meeting"), but the District did not inform Evans why she was placed on leave. 1R. at

 205; 2R. at 542; 883. During the April 14th Meeting, Evans was accompanied by Gary

 Yashko ("Yashko"), who was a friend and real estate attorney. 2R. at 542. In attendance

 on behalf of the District were Assistant Director of Human Resources Jennifer Iceman

 ("Iceman"); Principal Stamer, a Liberty assistant principal, and an attorney for the District.

 (1R. at 161; 2R. at 542.) Iceman ran the meeting, the purpose of which was to collect

 information regarding the April 7, 2021 incident. 1R. at 162; 2R. at 883.

         {¶16} Iceman asked Evans if she remembered having a conversation with the

 student, the content of the conversation, whether Evans had been provided training

 regarding implicit bias and cultural responsiveness, microaggressions and the code of

 professional responsibility. 1R. at 162-163.

         {¶17} At first, Evans stated that she could not recall the incident. 1R. at 163. Evans

 eventually did admit to making the comment. 1R. at 208. Iceman asked Evans if she saw

 how her comments could be considered offensive. Evans responded, “yes, I can see

 that.” 1R. at 164. When asked if she could see how her comments could make a student

 of Asian descent feel uncomfortable, Evans responded, “I’m not sure.” Evans
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 acknowledged that she had reviewed the professional code of conduct during her three

 previous disciplinary proceedings. 1R. at 164. When asked what her interpretation of her

 obligation with regard to her students was in light of her training, Evans responded “I

 understand what I’m supposed to do and I didn’t do what I was supposed to do.” 1R. at

 164. When asked if she considered her COVID comment to be in violation of the Code of

 Professional Conduct, Evans stated that she saw her comment as an economic

 statement. Id. Evans commented that “I sometimes make mistakes, I didn’t do it

 deliberately, do anything on purpose.” 1R. at 165. When asked what the administration

 could do to help her, Evans replied, “I don’t’ know what to say.” Id.

         {¶18} The District did not allow Evans to present evidence or call witnesses. 1R.

 at 161-165; 2R. at 883. Evans and Attorney Yashko were provided time to speak at the

 end of the meeting. 2R. at 852; 861.

         {¶19} At the conclusion of the hearing the matter was taken under advisement.

 1R. at 165. Evans was informed that she would be informed of the decision of the Board

 at a later time. Id. She remained on paid administrative leave. Id. at 165-166.

         {¶20} The following day, on April 15, 2021, the District called Attorney Yashko to

 inform him that the District's representatives would recommend that the Board of

 Education terminate Evans's employment. 2R. at 883-884. The District also told Attorney

 Yashko that Evans had the option to resign before the formal termination process began.

 2R. at 165-166, 716-718. On April 16, 2021, Evans resigned in a letter stating: "In lieu

 of termination, I hereby resign my position ...at Olentangy Liberty High School effective

 as of the end of my current contract for the 2020/2021 school year." 2R. at 443; 884. The
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 Board of Education accepted Evans's resignation on April 22, 2021, and Evans's last day

 as a District employee was May 27, 2021. 2R. at 884.

                                    Denial of Unemployment Benefits

          {¶21} Evans filed her Application for Determination of Benefit Rights on January

 23, 2022, which was initially denied. 2R. at 882. Evans appealed that denial, and on

 March 23, 2022, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS") issued a

 Redetermination denying Evans's application, finding that she had been discharged with

 just cause. 2R. at 882. On April 12, 2022, Evans appealed to the Unemployment

 Compensation Review Commission ("UCRC"). 2R. at 882. Hearing Officer Delores

 Evans4 ("Hearing Officer) held a telephone hearing on June 10, June 28, and July 21,

 2022. 2R. at 882.

          {¶22} During the UCRC hearing, Evans testified, “would I say it [the COVID

 statement] to an Asian student, probably not. But this kid was a white kid who I actually

 had a good relationship with. I just didn’t think anything of it.” 1R. at 209. Evans explained

 her reasons for resigning in lieu of termination,

                 Well, I thought that if I resigned that that would give me the ability to

          work in other school districts. So, I had because my retirement… well, I can

          just go and uh, you know I can substitute…in another school district ….

 1R. at 212. Evans attempted to rescind her resignation six weeks later because, “I didn’t

 realize that was of no value” referring to her resignation and her ability to find work in a

 4 Nothing in the record suggests that Hearing Officer Delores Evans is related to Appellant Antoinette
 Evans.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 different school district. 1R. at 212; 2R. at 865-866. She further testified that she was

 informed that “basically what happened is illegal.” Id.

         {¶23} Attorney Yashko testified at the UCRC hearing that he informed Evans that

 she did not have to resign, instead she could opt for a full Loudermill hearing. 2T. at 720.

 Iceman testified that if she had not opted to resign, Evans would have received a

 Loudermill hearing. 2R. at 860. A Loudermill hearing was not scheduled in Evans’ case

 because the District received her resignation letter. Id.

         {¶24} Evans called K.H. and J. K. parents from OLSD to testify at Evans' UCRC

 hearing about their objections to leftist politics, perverse sexuality, and other offensive

 topics in OLSD classrooms, hallways, and curricula.

         {¶25} On July 29, 2022, the Hearing Officer concluded that Evans left her position

 under disqualifying conditions and that the District had just cause to discharge her, which

 precluded unemployment compensation (hereinafter, "Decision"). 2R. at 885. On August

 24, 2022, UCRC denied Evans's request for further review of the Decision. 2R. at 933.

         {¶26} On September 21, 2022, Evans filed an appeal to the Delaware County

 Court of Common Pleas.

         {¶27} In her appeal, Evans maintained that she was constructively discharged due

 to disciplinary action that violated her constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth

 Amendments to the United States Constitution. Judgment Entry Affirming the Decision of

 the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, filed Mar 9, 2023 at 7 [hereinafter

 “Judgment Entry”]. Specifically, she identified five assignments of error in the Decision:

 (1) her COVID comment was constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public

 concern; (2) the District employed policies and an "unwritten (and unknowable) speech
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 code" that represent unconstitutional content and viewpoint discrimination; (3) the District

 arbitrarily enforced its policies against her and other conservatives, contra the Fourteenth

 Amendment's Equal Protection Clause;(4) the District's policies were unconstitutionally

 vague; and (5) she did not receive the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Due

 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment before the District coerced her resignation.

 Id. at 7-8.

                                            The trial judge’s decision

         {¶28} Concerning Evans’s First Amendment claims and whether Evans's COVID

 comment is constitutionally protected, the trial judge after carefully reviewing the federal

 standards concerning protected speech and the facts presented during the UCRC hearing

 concluded, “On the whole, these facts demonstrate that Evans spoke as a private citizen.”

 Judgment Entry at 11.

         {¶29} The trial judge next concluded,

                 Undoubtedly, COVID has been a matter of public concern since at

         least March 2020, and it continues to make headlines even now. Similarly,

         COVID's origin and China's role in the pandemic featured prominently in the

         public discourse throughout that period. Under the test outlined in Pickering,

         it is immaterial whether Evans's COVID comment was true, inappropriate,

         or controversial. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387, 107 S.Ct.

         2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). Thus, because Evans spoke as a private

         citizen on a matter of public concern, her COVID comment is entitled to at

         least some First Amendment protections.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 Judgment Entry at 12 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). The trial judge then

 considered the balancing test described in Pickering v. Bd. of Edn. of Twp. High School

 Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The trial judge

 first concluded,

                  Evans's COVID comment was "couched in terms of political debate,"

          as COVID and China's role in the pandemic have featured as hot-button

          political issues. Likewise, Evans lacked specialized knowledge on those

          topics, and her comment did not expose the District's or Liberty's inner

          workings. The fact that COVID's origin and any financial impact on China

          from the international response to the virus's spread were entirely unrelated

          to Evans's employment duties diminishes any public interest in her speech.

                  All told, I find that the public's limited interest means that Evans's

          speech does not fall into the "highest rung" of protected speech under the

         First Amendment.

 Judgment Entry at 14. The trial judge proceeded next to,

                 Analyze the District's interest, as an employer, "in promoting the

         efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."

         Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Toward this end, I may consider Evans's past

         conduct to place her speech in context. Kirkland u. City of Maryville, Tenn.,

         54 F.4th 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 152).

         {¶30} To gauge the District's interest in promoting efficiency, the trial judge noted

 “there are four ‘pertinent considerations,’ which call for an assessment of the degree to

 which Evans's speech: (1) impaired harmony among co-workers or discipline by
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 superiors; (2) interfered with close working relationships that require personal loyalty and

 confidence; (3) impeded her job performance or interfered with the District's regular

 operation; and (4) undermined the District's mission. Rankin [v. McPherson], 483 U.S.

 [378, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987)] at 388.” Judgment Entry at 14. The trial

 judge found that Evans’s conduct became a frequent source of tension within the high

 school, with teachers reporting that her behavior was "all that students are talking

 about" on at least one occasion. 2R. at 515. Further, from April 2019 through April

 2021, Evans's conduct caused multiple students to report her conduct and prompted

 more than a dozen parents, teachers, and Liberty alumni to file complaints with the

 District. Judgment Entry at 15. The trial judge found that the first consideration-which

 calls for him to weigh any disruption to harmony among co-workers and any impact

 on workplace discipline - supports the District. Id.

         {¶31} Next, the trial judge analyzed whether Evans's speech interfered with

 close working relationships and whether it hindered her job performance or the

 District's operations. Id. The trial judge concluded,

                 Evans's comment hurt her relationship with her students. In her

         position, Evans had the fundamental obligation to be a positive role

         model. And more importantly, she was tasked with the care of minors, a

         relationship where trust is paramount. The extent to which Evans damaged

         her relationship with her students is demonstrated by the fact that her

         conduct caused at least two students to report her behavior to the school

         and one to request a transfer out of Evans's classroom.

 Judgment Entry at 16. The trial judge concluded, “that the impact on working relationships
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 is a significant interest that weighs in the District's favor.”

         {¶32} The trial judge found Evans's speech did affect her job performance and the

 District's operations. “Beyond serving as a positive role model, Evans's responsibilities

 were to: (1) exhibit professional behavior; (2) ensure student safety; (3) observe and

 report inappropriate student behavior; (4) engage the public with tact and diplomacy; (5)

 interact positively with staff, students, and parents; and (6) promote good public relations.”

 2R. at 446. Judgment Entry at 16. The trial judge noted that Evans's pattern of

 inappropriate behavior points to an inability on her part to learn from her mistakes or

 to change her behavior to meet her employer's needs and expectations. Id.

         {¶33} Next, the trial judge considered the effect of Evans's conduct on the

 District's mission, and found Evans, on multiple occasions, undermined the District's

 mission to "facilitate maximum learning for every student.” Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).

 On balance, the trial judge found that the District's interest in promoting the efficiency of

 its services outweighs Evans's First Amendment interests in making her COVID

 comment. Id. at 18. The trial judge concluded, “the District did not violate Evans's First

 Amendment right to speak on a matter of public concern.” Id. at 19.

         {¶34} Concerning Evans’s arguments on content and view point discrimination

 under the First Amendment, the trial judge found, “Evans admitted that the District did not

 tell employees or students that they could not discuss COVID, effectively dispelling her

 claim that the District discriminated based on the content of her comment. 2R. at 687.

 Likewise, the Hearing Officer's findings demonstrate that the District's actions were not

 taken simply to avoid the ‘discomfort and unpleasantness’ that accompany an unpopular

 viewpoint, but instead in response to the disruption that Evans's comment caused. As
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 already discussed, Evans's COVID comment materially and substantially disrupted

 Liberty's learning environment. I, therefore, conclude that the District did not engage in

 unconstitutional content or viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.”

 Judgement Entry at 19.

         {¶35} Concerning Evans’s Fourteenth Amendment claims the trial judge found

 that the District's policies, on their face, do not target any suspect classifications; Evans

 does not allege that she is a member of a class that would warrant heightened scrutiny;

 Evans has provided little evidence beyond bare assertions that the District selectively

 enforced its policies to target conservatives; and the record in fact indicates that the

 District enforced its policies against a "liberal" teacher for improper social media use and

 discussions in the classroom. See 2R. at 838-842. The trial judge found that “the District

 did not target a suspect class when it enforced its policies.” Id. at 21-22.

         {¶36} Further, “The United States Supreme Court's holding in Engquist v. Oregon

 Department of Agriculture explicitly excluded the ‘class-of-one’ theory from public-

 employment cases. 553 U.S. 591, 607, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) (‘the

 class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment

 context’). Nothing Evans puts forward detracts from that observation or Engquist's

 applicability to her case.” Judgment Entry at 24.

         {¶37} Finally, the trial judge found Evans's vagueness challenge fails because the

 District's policies and her training on those policies, provided sufficient notice that her

 COVID comment would lead to discipline. Id. at 26. The trial judge found Evans’s

 arguments “concerning and unwritten (and unknowable) speech code" to be
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 unpersuasive because she did not identify this supposed speech code or provide

 evidence that it exists. Id.

         {¶38} The trial judge found Evans’s claim that she was coerced to resign was not

 supported by the record. The judge pointed to the fact that she was accompanied at the

 meeting by Attorney Gary Yashko. Attorney Yashko received the District's call that it

 would recommend termination. Attorney Yashko even helped Evans draft her letter of

 resignation. 2R. at 716. Further, Attorney Yashko told Evans that, had she requested a

 hearing to call her own witnesses and present evidence before an impartial adjudicator,

 she would have had such an opportunity. 2R. at 720, 884. Judgment Entry at 28-29.

         {¶39} The trial judge affirmed the UCRC's determination. Id. at 30. On March 9,

 2023, the trial judge issued a 30-page decision finding that the UCRC's determination

 was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                              Assignments of Error

         {¶40} Evans raises one Assignment of Error,

         {¶41} “I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE UCRC'S

 DETERMINATION THAT APPELLEE OLENTANGY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT

 HAD TERMINATED APPELLANTS' EMPLOYMENT FOR CAUSE.”

                                        Standard of Appellate Review

         {¶42} An appeal of a decision rendered by the Commission is governed by R.C.

 4141.282(H), which provides, in pertinent part:

                 If the court finds that the decision is unlawful, unreasonable, or

         against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise,

         such court shall affirm the decision of the commission.

         {¶43} A reviewing court may not reverse the commission's decision simply

 because “reasonable minds might reach different conclusions.” Williams v. Ohio Dept. of

 Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶ 20.

 Pursuant to R.C. 4141.282(H), a reviewing court may reverse the Commission’s decision

 “only if it is unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.”

 Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 1995-Ohio-

 206, 653 N.E.2d 1207 (1995), paragraph one of the syllabus. This standard applies in “all

 reviewing courts, from the first level of review in the common pleas court, through the final

 appeal in” the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. at 696.

         {¶44} “The claimant has the burden of proving [his or] her entitlement to

 unemployment compensation benefits * * *.” Irvine v. State Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev.,

 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985); Sturgeon v. Lucas Plumbing & Heating,

 Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010010, 2012-Ohio-2240, ¶ 4. Pursuant to R.C.

 4141.29(D)(2)(a), an individual is not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if

 he or she has been “discharged for just cause in connection with the individual’s work.”

 The term “just cause” has been defined as “‘that which, to an ordinarily intelligent person,

 is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.’” Irvine at 17, quoting Peyton

 v. Sun T.V., 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12 (10th Dist. 1975). The high court explained:

                 The determination of whether just cause exists necessarily depends

         upon the unique factual considerations of the particular case. Determination

         of purely factual questions is primarily within the province of the referee and
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         the board. Upon appeal, a court of law may reverse such decisions only if

         they are unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the

         evidence. Like other courts serving in an appellate capacity, we sit on a

         court with limited power of review. Such courts are not permitted to make

         factual findings or to determine the credibility of witnesses. The duty or

         authority of the courts is to determine whether the decision of the board is

         supported by the evidence in the record. The fact that reasonable minds

         might reach different conclusions is not a basis for the reversal of the

         board's decision. Moreover, “[o]ur statutes on appeals from such decisions

         [of the board] are so designed and worded as to leave undisturbed the

         board's decisions on close questions. Where the board might reasonably

         decide either way, the courts have no authority to upset the board's

         decision.” (Citations omitted.)

 Irvine, 19 Ohio St.3d at 18, 482 N.E.2d 587; Warrensville Hts. v. Jennings, 58 Ohio St.3d

 206, 207, 569 N.E.2d 489(1991); Case W. Res. Univ. v. Statt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

 97159, 2012-Ohio-1055, ¶ 10.

         {¶45} “[W]hat constitutes just cause must be analyzed in conjunction with the

 legislative purpose underlying the Unemployment Compensation Act. Essentially, the

 Act's purpose is ‘to enable unfortunate employees, who become and remain involuntarily

 unemployed by adverse business and industrial conditions, to subsist on a reasonably

 decent level and is in keeping with the humanitarian and enlightened concepts of this

 modern day.’” (Emphasis sic.) Irvine at 17, quoting Leach v. Republic Steel Corp., 176

 Ohio St. 221, 223, 27 O.O.2d 122, 199 N.E.2d 3 (1964); Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job &
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶ 22. However,

 “[t]he Act does not exist to protect employees from themselves, but to protect them from

 economic forces over which they have no control. When an employee is at fault, he is no

 longer the victim of fortune's whims, but is instead directly responsible for his own

 predicament. Fault on the employee's part separates him from the Act's intent and the

 Act's protection. Thus, fault is essential to the unique chemistry of a just cause

 termination.” Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d at

 697–698, 653 N.E.2d 1207; Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d

 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶23. Fault, however, is not limited to willful or

 heedless disregard of a duty or a violation of an employer's instructions. Williams v. Ohio

 Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶

 24, citing Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d at 698.

 Fault may arise from willful or heedless disregard of a duty, a violation of an employer's

 instructions, or unsuitability for a position. Williams at ¶ 24; Moore v. Ohio Unemp. Comp.

 Rev. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-756, 2012-Ohio-1424, ¶ 21.

         {¶46} Just cause for dismissal exists when an employee's actions demonstrate an

 unreasonable disregard for the employer's best interests. See, e.g., Midwest Terminals

 of Toledo Internatl., Inc. v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–

 15–1193, 2016–Ohio–973; Kohl v. Health Mgt. Solutions, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No.

 15AP–17, 2015–Ohio–4999, ¶ 18; Hartless v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 4th Dist.

 Pickaway No. 10CA27, 2011–Ohio–1374 ¶ 22; Ehrhart v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family

 Servs., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3726, 2016-Ohio-5786, ¶ 21.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         {¶47} Thus, this Court must determine if the Review Commission's finding that

 Evans was terminated with just cause was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the

 manifest weight of the evidence. In other words, the issue is whether Evans has the right

 to unemployment compensation benefits because the District terminated her employment

 without just cause as defined within the unemployment context. Case W. Res. Univ. v.

 Statt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97159, 2012-Ohio-1055, ¶ 13.

         {¶48} We are required to focus on the decision of the commission, rather than that

 of the trial court. Irvine v. State Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 482

 N.E.2d 587 (1985), ¶18; Huth v. Director, Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Services, 5th Dist.

 Tuscarawas No. 2014 AP 03 0011, 2014-Ohio-5408; Perkins v. Ohio Dep't of Job &

 Family Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-900, 2019-Ohio-2538, 2019 WL 2605225, ¶

 11, citing Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 6th Dist. No. L-07-1260, 2008-Ohio-1958, 2008 WL

 1837254, ¶ 12; Meinerding v. Coldwater Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Education,

 3rd Dist. No. 10-19-06, 2019-Ohio-3611, 143 N.E.3d 1147, ¶ 18.

               Issue for Appellate review: Whether the UCRC's decision is unlawful,

                  unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                     The record does not support that Evans was coerced to resign

         {¶49} Evan’s first argues that her resignation was coerced. [Appellant’s brief at

 18-19].

         {¶50} In her decision, the Hearing Officer noted, “an employee who resigns in

 anticipation of being discharged must be judged by the same criteria as if the discharge

 had actually taken place. In such a case, the employee has just cause to quit employment
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 only if the employer does not have just cause to discharge the employee.” UCRC Decision

 July 29, 2022 at 5, 2R. 882. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), provides, in relevant part:

                 (D) * * * [N]o individual may * * * be paid benefits * * *:

                 (2) For the duration of the individual’s unemployment if the director

         finds that:

                 (a) The individual quit his work without just cause or has been

         discharged for just cause in connection with the individual’s work, * * *.

         {¶51} Thus, the Hearing Officer utilized the correct standard. In the case at bar,

 the focus is on whether the District had just cause to terminate Evans’s employment. The

 Hearing Officer concluded that the District “had just cause to discharge [Evans]. [Evans’s]

 misconduct was contrary to the employer’s best interests and represents fault that will

 serve to suspend her unemployment compensation benefits.” UCRC Decision July 29,

 2022 at 7. “Because the District had just cause, Evans quit her employment with the

 District without just cause when presented with an inevitable discharge.” Id.

         {¶52} As the trial court noted, the record supports that Evans was accompanied

 at the April 14th meeting by Attorney Gary Yashko. Attorney Yashko received the District's

 call that it would recommend termination. Attorney Yashko helped Evans draft her letter

 of resignation. 2R. at 716. Further, Attorney Yashko told Evans that, if she requested a

 hearing to call her own witnesses and present evidence before an impartial adjudicator,

 she would have such an opportunity. 2R. at 720, 884. Evans testified that when she

 submitted her letter of resignation, she had hopes of attaining employment in a different

 school district. 1R. at 212.

         {¶53} The record supports that Evans had three prior disciplinary violations and
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 had attended investigatory meetings with counsel in 2019 and 2020. The record supports

 that Evans had time and the opportunity after the April 14, 2021 meeting to discuss her

 options with an attorney and weigh her decision. The District further allowed Evans to

 finish out the school year, which allowed her to work an additional six weeks after she

 submitted her resignation. Evans contends that because she could not access her school

 email account she was constructively discharged. However, Evans presented no

 evidence that she asked for a Loudermill hearing, or that the District would have denied

 her such a hearing had she requested one in lieu of resigning.

         {¶54} Thus, the UCRC decision that Evans quit her employment with the District

 without just cause when presented with an inevitable discharge is supported by

 competent, credible evidence, and is not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest

 weight of the evidence.

          The record contains competent, credible evidence that Evans resigned in lieu of

                                   requesting a Loudermill hearing

         {¶55} Evans next argues the that the District violated Evans' procedural due

 process rights by terminating her employment without a hearing. [Appellant’s brief at 20-

 21].

         {¶56} In Ohio, a state-employed teacher or aide possesses a property interest in

 continued employment. See R.C. 124.11 and 3319.081. Before the state may deprive an

 employee of that interest, the Due Process Clause requires certain procedural

 safeguards, an example being a Loudermill hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v.

 Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). As the Loudermill

 Court noted in the pre-deprivation due process hearing, “The tenured public employee is
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the

 employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. See Arnett v.

 Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 170–171, 94 S.Ct., at 1652–1653 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at

 195–196, 94 S.Ct., at 1664–1665 (opinion of WHITE, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419

 U.S., at 581, 95 S.Ct., at 740. To require more than this prior to termination would intrude

 to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an

 unsatisfactory employee.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105

 S.Ct. 1487, 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). See also, Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp.,

 AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 68 Ohio St.3d 175, 177,

 624 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (1994) (discussing pre and post                       deprivation hearing

 requirements).

         {¶57} The record establishes that at the April 14, 2021 investigatory meeting

 Evans was given notice of the charges against her, an explanation of the District’s

 evidence, and at the end of the hearing an opportunity for her and Attorney Yashko to

 speak in order to present her side of the story. 1R. at 162-165; 2R. at 528; 852; 861.

 Evans admitted that she was permitted to speak at the meeting. 2T. at 683. The record

 further establishes that Evans was accompanied at the meeting by Attorney Gary Yashko.

 1R. at 206; 2R. at 709. Attorney Yashko received the District's call that it would

 recommend termination. Attorney Yashko helped Evans draft her letter of resignation. 2R.

 at 716. Further, Attorney Yashko told Evans that, if she requested a hearing to call her

 own witnesses and present evidence before an impartial adjudicator, she would have

 such an opportunity. 2R. at 720, 884. Evans testified that when she submitted her letter

 of resignation, she had hopes of attaining employment in a different school district. 1R. at
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 212. Iceman testified that if she had not opted to resign, Evans would have received a

 Loudermill hearing. 2R. at 860. A Loudermill hearing was not scheduled in Evans’ case

 because the District received her resignation letter. Id.

         {¶58} Appellate courts are not permitted to make factual findings or to determine

 the credibility of the witnesses; but the reviewing court does have the duty to determine

 whether the Review Commission’s decision is supported by the evidence in the record.

 Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 73

 Ohio St.3d 694, 653 N.E.2d 1207 (1995). This leaves the board’s role as a factfinder

 intact. Id. Where the commission might reasonably decide either way, this Court has no

 authority to upset the Commission’s decision. Bonannvo v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family

 Services, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2012 AP 02 0011, 2012-Ohio-5167; Williams v. Ohio

 Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031.

 “Every reasonable presumption must be in favor of the [decision] and the findings of fact

 [of the Review Commission].” Id.

         {¶59} We find the record contains competent, credible evidence supporting the

 Hearing Officer’s finding that “[Evans] would have been given a proper due process

 hearing prior to being formally discharged, but she was offered the option of resigning.

 On April 16, 2021, [Evans] submitted her resignation, effective at the end of the 2020-

 2021 school year. On April 22, 2021, the Board accepted [Evans’s] resignation effective

 May 27, 2021.” UCRC Decision July 29, 2022 at 5. Evans presented no evidence that

 she asked for a Loudermill hearing, or that the District would have denied her such a

 hearing had she requested one in lieu of resigning.

         {¶60} After reviewing the record, we find that the UCRC’s decision that the District
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 did not violate Evans' procedural due process rights by terminating her without a hearing

 is not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              The District's interest in promoting the efficiency of its services outweighs

  Evans's First Amendment public concern interests in making her COVID comment and

                    did not result in viewpoint or content-based discrimination

         {¶61} Evans next contends that the District disciplined her in retaliation for her

 speech on a matter of public concern, and resulted in content-based and viewpoint-based

 discrimination. [Appellant’s brief at 22-25; 26-27]. Specifically, Evans argues that because

 all the students were wearing masks, and she was always wearing PPE while cleaning,

 and "I know the district spent a half a million dollars on PPE,” her China comment was

 directly relevant to the District’s operations. [Appellant’s brief at 23].

         {¶62} As recognized by the trial judge, Evans admitted that the District never told

 employees or students that they could not discuss COVID. 2R. at 687. Further, as noted

 by the trial judge, Evans was not ordered to make the COVID comment, and the factual

 backdrop behind her speech shows that she spoke as a private citizen, not as a District

 employee. 1R. at 203. Her knowledge of COVID and its origins was limited to the internet,

 social media, and news reports, just as any other citizen. Evans had no official

 responsibility to investigate the virus, its origin, or China's role in the pandemic. 2R. at

 685-687. However, as the trial judge noted, “because Evans spoke as a private citizen on

 a matter of public concern, her COVID comment is entitled to at least some First

 Amendment protections.” Judgment Entry at 12.

         {¶63} In Rankin v. McPherson, the United State Supreme Court noted a balancing

 test is applied in order to accommodate the dual role of the public employer as a provider
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 of public services and as a government entity operating under the constraints of the First

 Amendment. 483 U.S. 378, 384, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315(1987). The speaker’s

 interest in making the statement must be balanced against “the interest of the State, as

 an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its

 employees.” McPherson, 483 U.S. at 388, citing Pickering v. Bd. of Edn. of Twp. High

 School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968).

         {¶64} Pertinent considerations concern whether the statement impairs discipline

 by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working

 relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the

 performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the

 enterprise. Pickering, 391 U.S., at 570–573, 88 S.Ct., at 1735–1737.

         {¶65} From April 2019 through April 2021, Evans's conduct caused multiple

 students to report her conduct and prompted more than a dozen parents, teachers,

 and Liberty alumni to file complaints with the District. Judgment Entry at 15. Upon our

 own review of the record, we find that the record contains competent, credible

 evidence that demonstrates Evans's comment hurt her relationship with her students

 and the parents. 1T. at 172-73; 174; 175; 187; 2R. at 472-474; 515.

         {¶66} Evans had multiple disciplinary incidents, disrupting the high school’ s

 operation and its learning environment each time. Because of this, the Hearing

 Officer found that Evans "appear[ed] to be either unable or unwilling to fully

 comprehend the significant impact of her conduct on students and the broader

 community, the disruption to a positive school environment, and the effect on the

 school's public image." UCRC Decision July 29, 2022 at 5.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         {¶67} The record supports that Evans was informed as early as 2019 that her

 insensitive comments were contradictory to the District’s mission statement and “created

 considerable disruption to our operation.” 2R. at 446. (Apr. 5, 2019 letter to Evans from

 Todd R. Meyer, Chief Operations Officer regarding the Apr. 4, 2019 pre-disciplinary

 hearing). (Evans signed this letter on April 9, 2019. 2R. at 447). In response to a question

 during the investigatory hearing, Evans stated that she was not familiar with the

 Professional Code of Conduct for Educators. 2R. at 511.

         {¶68} In a letter dated September 29, 2020, Evans was informed that her comment

 with respect to “Tell that to the English Department,” demonstrated a repeated and

 persistent pattern of poor judgment. 2R. at 483. Evans was further informed that her

 comments have compromised her ability to work with staff, created a negative influence

 for students and violated a position of trust as a positive role model for students. Id. Evans

 was directed “to refrain from engaging in any other unprofessional or unethical behavior

 or violations of Board policies. If you do not follow these directives, you will face further

 disciplinary action up to and including termination.” Id

         {¶69} The District provided Evans with training, in lieu of termination, in the

 following areas: implicit bias, building a safe and supportive school environment, separate

 trainings on the professional use of social media, microaggression and restorative

 education and three separate trainings involving the Code of Professional Responsibility

 for Educators5. 1R. at 163-164; 2R. at 480.

         {¶70} Here, Evans, on multiple occasions, undermined the District's mission to

 "facilitate maximum learning for every student."                (Emphasis in original) 2R. at 445.

         5 April 4, 2019, September 4, 2019 and August 21, 2020. 1R, at 164.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 Further, this was Evans's fourth infraction in two years. And yet, as observed by the

 Hearing Officer, Evans "continued to voice her opinions" “without regard to her role [,] and

 . . . her conduct clearly displayed that she could not be trained to act in the employer's

 best interests." 2R. at 884-885.

         {¶71} Upon our own review of the record, we agree with the trial judge’s

 comprehensive analysis concluding that “the District's interest in promoting the

 efficiency of its services outweighs Evans's First Amendment interests in making her

 COVID comment.” We further agree with the trial judge that the record contains

 competent, credible evidence that the District did not engage in content-based or

 viewpoint-based discrimination. The record contains competent, credible evidence that

 Evans was aware that her comments were affecting her job performance, her relationship

 with the students, and the District's operations and mission statement. The decision of

 the UCRC is not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                   Evans was not denied equal protection

         {¶72} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment directs that all

 similarly situated individuals be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

         {¶73} Evans presented no evidence that she is a member of a suspect class

 warranting a strict scrutiny analysis. Evans’s argument that the District targeted her for

 her conservative views is not supported by the record. Iceman testified that the policies

 apply to all faculty and staff. 1R. at 172. She further testified that Evans was not

 disciplined because of her political views. Id. at 176. The record reflects that, concerning

 the 2019 comments a second District employee was also disciplined. 1R. at 216; 2R. at
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 515. Further, the District enforced its policies against a "liberal" teacher for improper social

 media use and discussions in the classroom. See, 2R. at 838-842.

         {¶74} From April 2019 through April 2021, Evans's conduct caused multiple

 students to report her conduct and prompted more than a dozen parents, teachers,

 and Liberty alumni to file complaints with the District. Judgment Entry at 15. See also,

 1T. at 172-73; 174; 175; 187; 2R. at 472-474; 515. This was Evans's fourth infraction

 in two years. Evans was advised in 2019 and in 2020 how her comments were impacting

 the work environment, her relationship with the students, parents and her co-workers.

 Evans was advised that her insensitive comments were contradictory to the District’s

 mission statement and “created considerable disruption to our operation.” 2R. at 446. The

 District provided Evans with training, in lieu of termination, in the following areas: implicit

 bias, building a safe and supportive school environment, separate trainings on the

 professional use of social media, microaggression and restorative education and three

 separate trainings involving the Code of Professional Responsibility for Educators6. 1R.

 at 163-164; 2R. at 480.

         {¶75} As the trial judge correctly noted, the United States Supreme Court's

 holding in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture explicitly excluded the "class-of-

 one" theory from public-employment cases. 553 U.S. 591, 607, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170

 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) ("the class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the

 public employment context"). Evans does not attempt to show or to argue in this appeal

 that Engquist is not applicable to her case.

         {¶76} Upon our own review, we find that the record contains competent, credible

         6 April 4, 2019, September 4, 2019 and August 21, 2020. 1R. at 164.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 evidence supporting that the District did not target a suspect class and did not deny Evans

 equal protection, and the decision of the UCRC is not unlawful, unreasonable or against

 the manifest weight of the evidence.

          Evans individualized training for prior disciplinary infractions sufficiently informed

                   Evans of the District’s expectations for employee behavior

         {¶77} Evans next contends that the District has an “unwritten (and unknowable)

 speech code” that is void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

 Clause. [Appellant’s brief at 28-29].

         {¶78} The Hearing Officer found that Evans,

                 [H]ad a prior history of counseling, specialized training, and discipline

         after making disparaging public social media posts, asking inappropriate

         questions about a student’s parent’s’ nationality, and making racially-

         charged and insensitive comments to a Black student. Although [Evans]

         asserted that she had no intention of harming anyone through her posts or

         commentary, she appears to be either unable or unwilling to fully

         comprehend the significant impact of her conduct on students and the

         broader community, the disruption to a positive school environment, and the

         effect on the school’s public image. The investigation team found [Evans]

         to be untrainable due to her inability to adapt to the societal changes around

         her (specifically at OLHS).

                                                     ***

                 [Evans] acknowledged, in hindsight, that she should not have made

         her October 2020 comments or her April 7, 2021 statement. [Evans]
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         received training and counseling in 2019 and 2020 but nevertheless

         continued to voice her opinions without regard to her role and the

         employer’s immense task and precarious position. [Evans] did not exhibit

         professionalism, sound judgment, or promote good public relations, and her

         conduct clearly displayed that she could not be trained to act in the

         employer’s best interest.

         {¶79} The record demonstrates that Evans received training on November 23,

 2020, December 2, 2020 and December 9, 2020 on microaggression and restorative

 education. 1R. at 163; 2R. at 480. Evans further received trainings on the professional

 use of social media; trainings on the Code of Professional Conduct for Educators on April

 4, 2019, September 4, 2019 and August 21, 2022, and training on implicit bias and

 building a safe and supportive school environment. 1R. at 163-164; 2R. at 480. These

 training sessions all took place before Evans made her April 7, 2021 COVID comments.

 Evans admitted that she understood “what I am suppose to do and I didn’t do what I was

 suppose to do.” 1R. at 164. She further admitted that she was advised April 2, 2019 and

 September 29, 2020 that any future violations of school policy would result in discipline

 up to and including termination of employment. 1R. at 169; 2R. at 445; 682. The April 5,

 2019 letter regarding Evans’s “Unpaid suspension, Directives and Final Warning” clearly

 informed Evans that her “insensitive comments” contradicted the District’s mission

 statement and created “considerable disruption” to the District’s operations. The letter

 clearly informed Evans of her “essential functions” as an employee. Evans was also

 advised that concerns were raised by “several students, parents and/or other members

 of the public.” 2R. at 445.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 advised that concerns were raised by “several students, parents and/or other members

 of the public.” 2R. at 445.

         {¶80} Thus, competent, credible evidence supports the finding that Evans knew

 or should have known that her COVID comments could lead to discipline. The record

 does not support Evans’s contention that she was unaware her COVID comments could

 lead to discipline. The decision of the UCRC that the District’s policies are not void for

 vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is not unlawful,

 unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Evans’s rights

 under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not violated.

                                                   Conclusion

         {¶81} Upon our own review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the

 UCRC decision is supported by competent, credible evidence, and is not unlawful,

 unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

         {¶82} Based on the foregoing, Evans’s assignment of error is overruled.

         {¶83} The March 9, 2023 judgment entry of the Delaware County Court of Common

 Pleas is affirmed.

 By Gwin, P.J., and

 Wise, J., concurs;

 King, J., dissents
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 King, J. dissents

         {¶ 84} I would reverse the determination of the UCRC because I conclude Evans's

 COVID "microaggression" does not represent just cause sufficient to deny benefits. The

 majority of the panel concludes otherwise; therefore, I dissent.

         {¶ 85} To begin, I disagree that the burden of proof rests on any claimant. The

 current formulation of the statute states, "No person shall impose upon the claimant or

 the employer any burden of proof as is required in a court of law." R.C. 4141.281(C)(2).

 As our colleagues in the Seventh District recognized, this statutory change supersedes

 prior case law. Struthers v. Morell, 164 Ohio App.3d 709, 2005-Ohio-6594, 843 N.E.2d

 1231, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.). Under this proper formulation, we cannot uphold a UCRC

 determination under the notion that a claimant failed to carry the burden of proof. In my

 view, this error in formulation was present in the trial court's opinion, and then repeated

 in the majority's opinion. See, Trial Court's March 9, 2023 Judgment Entry at page 10.

         {¶ 86} The purpose of unemployment compensation is to provide financial

 assistance to individuals who have lost their employment through no fault of their own,

 i.e., without just cause. See Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., 61 Ohio St.2d 35, 39,

 399 N.E.2d 76 (1980). In order to accomplish this purpose, we are directed to liberally

 interpret certain statutes. R.C. 4141.46. In this context, both the Third and Seventh

 Districts have concluded that the legislative intent is to presume that employees are

 entitled to receive benefits. Tomlinson v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services,

 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-02, 2009-Ohio-3414, ¶ 6; Abate v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel

 Corp., 126 Ohio App.3d 742, 748-749, 711 N.E.2d 299 (7th Dist.1998). The Second,

 Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Districts arrived at a similar conclusion as well. Bates v.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 Airborne Express, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 506, 2010-Ohio-741, 928 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 9 (2d

 Dist.); Schivelbein v. Riverside Mercy Hospital, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1208, 2012-

 Ohio-3991, ¶ 13; Shephard v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, 166 Ohio

 App.3d 747, 753, 2006-Ohio-2313, 853 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.); Niskala v. Director,

 Ohio Department of Job & Family Services, 9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0086-M, 2011-

 Ohio-5705, ¶ 9; Bennett v. Department of Job and Family Services, 10th Dist. Franklin

 No. 11AP-1029, 2012-Ohio-2327, ¶ 6. It also appears the Twelfth District reached the

 same conclusion.

         {¶ 87} Before the Twelfth District, the UCRC argued that this presumption in favor

 of awarding benefits was improper, but the court of appeals rejected the argument.

 Harmon v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-

 08-105, 2022-Ohio-1142, ¶ 31-32. Our colleagues' determinations are further bolstered

 by the subsequent Supreme Court of Ohio case holding courts are no longer required to

 defer to administrative agency interpretations. TWISM Enterprises, L.L.C. v. State Board

 of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, --- N.E.3d ---, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶

 3.

         {¶ 88} For the sake of statewide consistency, I would follow the overwhelming

 majority of our sister appellate courts and begin with the proposition a claimant is entitled

 to receive benefits. In this light, under R.C. 4141.281(C)(2), the hearing officer must

 ensure that evidence at hand is sufficient to overcome the presumption a claimant is

 entitled to receive benefits before denying benefits. As it relates here, the hearing officer

 was required under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2) to determine if the submitted evidence sufficiently

 demonstrated that Evans was terminated for just cause.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         {¶ 89} I agree with the majority that the hearing officer correctly reviewed the

 alleged inevitable discharge under the standard of whether the employer had just cause

 to terminate employment. But I do not agree the evidence before the hearing officer was

 sufficient to demonstrate just cause and thus rightly deny Evans benefits.

         {¶ 90} Whether a claimant's conduct rises to the level of just cause is not subject

 to a bright line rule, instead it must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Irvine v. State

 Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 482 N.E.2d 587

 (1985). Although, the Supreme Court did provide some rough guidance by stating: "

 'Traditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinarily intelligent

 person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.' " Id., quoting Peyton

 v. Sun T.V., 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12, 335 N.E.2d 751 (10th Dist.1975).

         {¶ 91} Moreover, there is a distinction between the conduct that may warrant

 dismissal and "the further degree of misconduct or fault required on the part of the

 employee to justify a denial of unemployment benefits." James v. Ohio State

 Unemployment Review Commission, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-976, 2009-Ohio-5120,

 ¶ 12. In other words, an employer may have the right to discharge an employee for certain

 conduct, but that does not automatically equate to just cause under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)

 to deny that employee benefits. In that regard, it is entirely possible Evans would fail to

 win a wrongful discharge claim, yet be entitled to receive benefits. As I explain below, it

 is unnecessary to directly reach the constitutional issues raised, although I view it

 presents a much more significant obstacle to the denial of benefits than stated by the

 majority.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

         {¶ 92} The proximate conduct at issue here is Evans's overheard COVID

 comment: "Can you believe the coronavirus came from China and that China is making

 money from the sales of PPE to the United States?" The school district's concern was

 not so much that this statement was made, but rather its impact on a particular student

 who was of Asian descent and became upset after hearing this comment. Indeed, the

 school district's brief referred to the statement itself as an "Anti-Asian microaggression."

 While the facts surrounding the origin of COVID-19 continue to be hotly debated, the

 statement itself lacks the sort of racially charged slurs, opinions, statements, or distasteful

 "joking" that usually precede an employee's discharge.

         {¶ 93} In my view, whatever legal authority an employer has to punish a

 microaggression with termination, a microaggression will usually fall well short of

 demonstrating sufficient just cause to overcome a worker's presumption to unemployment

 benefits. In support of the UCRC's decision, the school district gestures at the broadly

 worded statement of principles adopted by the school district, and that Evans violated

 those rules. Again, violations of those laudable aspirations might well support lawful

 discharge, but not necessarily the denial of unemployment benefits. Ordinarily, the UCRC

 reviews the violation of company rules that are far more objective, such as being ready

 for work at the assigned start time, using internet for only business purposes, procedures

 for use of sick time, and so on. The workplace rules at issue here approach the "be a

 good employee and support company objectives" level of specificity that is, in my view,

 insufficient to support a finding of just cause for violating a company rule.

         {¶ 94} As I read the record, Evans has been repeatedly disciplined and on

 November 17, 2020, she was placed on something roughly equivalent to a last chance
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 agreement. We can assume without deciding that on November 17, 2020, just cause

 existed to terminate her. But the school district decided to proceed otherwise. If the

 conduct at issue here were truly actionable, then her prior conduct would be relevant and

 would certainly support the UCRC's finding. But the school district gave her another

 chance, which it cannot now take back. Because the single microaggression is not either

 a violation of workplace rules or independent evidence of her unsuitability for her position,

 the prior discipline is of no import.

         {¶ 95} Finally, I believe much of the discussion by the trial court and majority is

 unnecessary. With regard to Evan's claimed constitutional violations of equal protection

 and procedural due process, I fail to see how either is relevant to whether Evans's

 microaggression was sufficient just cause to support the UCRC's denial of her

 unemployment benefits. Those may well be independent claims related to wrongful

 discharge she can raise in another forum, but, as explained above, we do a disservice to

 the purpose and structure of the Unemployment Compensation Act to interject those here.

         {¶ 96} Regarding the free speech claims, I agree the UCRC has to ensure that any

 denial of unemployment benefits comports with the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,

 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). But the

 trial court's analysis expressly placed the burden on Evans to prove a first amendment

 violation. This was an error under R.C. 4141.281(C)(2). The factors examined by the

 federal district court in Brandenburg v. Housing Authority of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, 897 (6th

 Cir.2001), placed the burden on the former employee because the employee as plaintiff

 had the burden of proof. That is not the case here. Thus, this illustrates the danger of
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

 conflating standards relevant to wrongful discharge cases with the standard of just cause

 under the unemployment compensation system.

         {¶ 97} Further, whenever the UCRC has to assure itself it is behaving

 constitutionally in denying benefits, it should proceed cautiously in applying federal

 precedent. As illustrated above, the framework in which those cases arise are often

 remarkably different. Moreover, as discussed by Judge Murphy in Bennett v. Metropolitan

 Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee, 977 F.3d 530, 547 (6th

 Cir.2020) (Murphy, J., concurring), the "state-as-the-employer" free speech law revolves

 around "two incomparable values—a public employee's interest in speaking about politics

 and a public employer's interest in its efficient operations." If the balancing in federal

 court is a delicate affair with the benefit of discovery and the adversarial nature of

 litigation, then the UCRC should be circumspect in denying benefits under any framework

 driven by "two incompatible values."

         {¶ 98} Thus, in my view, in many circumstances, with the difficulty in assessing

 this area of the law coupled with the presumption of awarding benefits, the discharged

 worker should receive benefits and thus avoid consideration of this perilous doctrine

 altogether. It follows then that I am not nearly as convinced as the trial court and the

 majority about a conclusion to deny benefits premised on the lack of merits of the free

 speech claim here. I would conclude the UCRC's determination of just cause was

 unreasonable and thus believe it should be reversed on that ground.
[Cite as Evans v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]