Court Opinion

ID: 9964239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 15:01:08.605426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.663959
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-2345   Document: 21     Page: 1   Filed: 04/29/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  SHERRY G. LUCAS,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

         UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                       2023-2345
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. CH-0752-16-0448-I-1.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 29, 2024
                 ______________________

    SHERRY G. LUCAS, Calumet City, IL, pro se.

     MATNEY ELIZABETH ROLFE, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, DEBORAH ANN BYNUM, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________
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 2                                              LUCAS v. USPS

     Before REYNA and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges, and
                 ALBRIGHT, District Judge. 1
 PER CURIAM.
     Ms. Sherry G. Lucas petitions for review of a Merit Sys-
 tems Protection Board (“Board”) decision affirming the
 United States Postal Service’s removal of Ms. Lucas from
 her position as Manager of Customer Service, EAS-22, at
 the Gary, Indiana Post Office for insubordination. Lucas
 v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. CH-0752-16-0448-I-1, 2017 WL
 1148037 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 23, 2017) (App’x 23–42 2); Lucas v.
 U.S. Postal Serv., No. CH-0752-16-0448-I-1, 2023 WL
 4274177 (M.S.P.B. June 29, 2023) (App’x 63–75). We af-
 firm.
                      I.   BACKGROUND
     Ms. Lucas began her employment with the Postal Ser-
 vice in 1998. App’x 11 ¶ 1. At the time of her removal, she
 served as Manager of Customer Service at the Gary, Indi-
 ana Post Office. App’x 11 ¶ 4–5; App’x 13 ¶ 21.
     In 2013, the National Association of Letter Carriers
 Union (“NALC”) filed a class action grievance alleging, in-
 ter alia, that the Postal Service––through the actions of
 Ms. Lucas––had violated provisions of the National Agree-
 ment, the Joint Statement on Violence and Behavior in the
 Workplace, and certain other policies. App’x 11 ¶ 6. On
 February 12, 2014, the agency and NALC entered into a

      1  Honorable Alan D Albright, District Judge, United
 States District Court for the Western District of Texas, sit-
 ting by designation.
     2   Respondent submitted appendix pages 1 through
 75 with its brief. Petitioner submitted additional appendix
 pages numbered 76 through 138 with her reply brief. Be-
 cause they are numbered consecutively, we refer to these
 pages as a single appendix.
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 LUCAS v. USPS                                                3

 pre-arbitration settlement agreement resolving the griev-
 ance. App’x 12 ¶ 8. The agreement provided that Ms. Lu-
 cas would “make a public apology to letter carriers in the
 Gary office . . . .” Id. (citing Agency File (“AF”), Tab 4N).
      In March 2014, the NALC filed a grievance protesting
 certain contractual violations by the agency, including Ms.
 Lucas’s failure to comply with the settlement agreement.
 App’x 12 ¶ 9. The NALC contended that a talk Ms. Lucas
 gave to letter carriers in Gary did not constitute the apol-
 ogy agreed upon in the settlement agreement. AF, Tab 4M
 at 5. After the NALC and the agency were unable to re-
 solve the grievance, they appealed to arbitration. App’x 12
 ¶ 10. In 2015, the arbitration award issued, and the arbi-
 trator agreed with the NALC that Ms. Lucas’s talk failed
 to provide the agreed-upon apology. App’x 12 ¶¶ 12–13.
 The arbitrator directed Ms. Lucas to issue a public apology
 to letter carriers in the Gary office and provided the specific
 text for her to read. App’x 12 ¶ 12; IAF, Tab 4M at 33.
     Labor Relations Specialist Mark Moore also advised
 Ms. Lucas that she was required to issue the apology set
 forth by the arbitrator. App’x 13 ¶ 14. She refused. App’x
 13 ¶ 15. On October 28, 2015, Acting Postmaster Bobby
 Goins twice ordered Ms. Lucas to issue the apology. App’x
 13 ¶ 16. Similarly, Acting Manager of Post Office Opera-
 tions Keith Blane told Ms. Lucas twice that she had to give
 the apology by October 30. App’x 13 ¶ 17. On October 29,
 Mr. Goins again directed Ms. Lucas to give the apology by
 October 30 and further explained that appropriate action
 would be taken if she refused. App’x 13 ¶ 18. Ms. Lucas
 continued to refuse to apologize. App’x 25.
     In December 2015, Mr. Goins issued Ms. Lucas a notice
 of proposed removal charging her with “Unacceptable Con-
 duct – Insubordination,” based on her failure to comply
 with the arbitrator’s decision and subsequent orders.
 App’x 101–106. Ms. Lucas responded to the notice through
 her union representative. App’x 84. In this response, Ms.
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 Lucas made several arguments, including “that she did not
 make the alleged statements” and that “it violated her
 [r]eligious beliefs to lie,” that the agency had engaged in
 religious discrimination, and that her removal “violat[ed]
 [] several of the Douglas [f]actors.” App’x 84–86. In May
 2016, the agency issued a letter of decision finding that the
 charge was supported and that the evidence warranted her
 removal. App’x 1.
       Ms. Lucas appealed her removal to the Board, where
 she was represented by counsel. App’x 6–9. Shortly after
 filing, the administrative judge entered an order directing
 Ms. Lucas to “specifically identify whether she is alleging
 religious discrimination as an affirmative defense and if so
 the factual bases for her claim on these matters,” as well
 as to identify any other affirmative defenses with specific-
 ity. 3 App’x 111. Finally, the order advised Ms. Lucas on
 “the burdens of proof concerning the affirmative defense al-
 leged by the appellant and what is necessary for her to
 prove her defense.” 4 App’x 112. Ms. Lucas later confirmed
 that she “is waiving any affirmative defenses.” App’x 17;
 App’x 51 n.1 (“Appellant acknowledges that her original
 representative represented that no affirmative defenses
 would be filed . . . .”).
     In March 2017, the Board issued its initial decision af-
 firming the agency’s decision to remove Ms. Lucas. App’x

     3   The order noted that Ms. Lucas may have been
 raising “religious discrimination as an affirmative de-
 fense,” explaining the “appeal form state[d] the appellant’s
 religion barred her from telling a ‘lie’ and thus she could
 not comply with management’s instruction for her to im-
 plement an arbitrator’s decision.” App’x 111.
     4   Among the defenses detailed, the order explained
 that Ms. Lucas could “assert that the agency failed to ac-
 commodate her religious beliefs . . . , even if the reasons for
 her discharge were otherwise proper.” App’x 117.
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 LUCAS v. USPS                                              5

 23–24. The administrative judge first held that the agency
 met its burden to prove insubordination, defined as “the
 willful and intentional refusal to obey an authorized order
 of a superior officer which the officer is entitled to have
 obeyed.” App’x 27. The administrative judge rejected Ms.
 Lucas’s assertions that she was not bound by the arbitra-
 tion award or that the arbitrator lacked the authority to
 require her to make a public apology. App’x 29–31. The
 administrative judge then determined the agency estab-
 lished the necessary nexus between the sustained charge
 and a legitimate government interest, such as the effi-
 ciency of the service. App’x 31–32. Finally, the adminis-
 trative judge held that the agency properly considered the
 Douglas factors to determine the appropriate penalty and
 that removal did not exceed the limits of reasonableness.
 App’x 36.
     Ms. Lucas petitioned for review of the initial decision,
 making a number of additional arguments. App’x 45. In
 her petition, she argued––for the first time––that “Federal
 employees cannot be compelled to say something in viola-
 tion of their First Amendment Rights.” App’x 51. There-
 fore, she asserted that agency management “lacked the
 lawful authority to compel [Ms. Lucas] to issue an apology
 in violation of her First Amendment rights . . . .” App’x 54.
 She acknowledged that she had waived her religious dis-
 crimination defense but argued that she does not consider
 “challenging the validity of [the] order on First Amendment
 grounds” to be an affirmative defense. App’x 51 n.1 (em-
 phasis omitted).
      In the Final Order, the Board denied the petition and
 affirmed the initial decision, “conclud[ing] that the peti-
 tioner has not established any basis under [5 C.F.R.
 §] 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.” App’x 64.
 The Board found that Ms. Lucas had not raised her First
 Amendment argument below and held that “she may not
 raise it for the first time on review.” App’x 68.
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 6                                                LUCAS v. USPS

    Ms. Lucas timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                        II. DISCUSSION
     We set aside a Board decision if it is “(1) arbitrary, ca-
 pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
 ance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by
 law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsup-
 ported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also
 Standley v. Dep’t of Energy, 26 F.4th 937, 942 (Fed. Cir.
 2022), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2873 (2022).
     In her briefing before this court, Ms. Lucas asserts that
 she “had the right to refuse to issue the ordered apology on
 religious grounds” and that the Board erred by finding she
 waived or forfeited the argument. Pet’r’s Br. 2. In addition,
 she asserts that “[t]he punishment exceeds the bounds of
 reasonableness” and “should have been mitigated under
 the Douglas [f]actors.” Id.
                               A.
     First, we address Ms. Lucas’s constitutional argument.
 Ms. Lucas asserts she “had the right to refuse to issue the
 apology on religious grounds under the First Amendment”
 because “it was against [her] religious belief to issue a false
 statement.” Pet’r’s Br. 2. She argues that “[a]n order is not
 authorized if it requires an employee to give up their Con-
 stitutional rights.” Id. (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
 U.S. 493 (1967)). Because agency “[m]anagement had no
 authority to order [her] to violate [her] Constitutionally
 protected religious beliefs . . ., [she] did not commit insub-
 ordination.” Id.
     Before addressing the merits of Ms. Lucas’s argument,
 we must determine whether Ms. Lucas properly raised this
 argument before the Board. See Wallace v. Dep’t of the Air
 Force, 879 F.2d 829, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Ordinarily, ap-
 pellate courts refuse to consider issues not raised before an
 administrative agency.”). The Board declined to address
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 LUCAS v. USPS                                                7

 Ms. Lucas’s First Amendment argument in her petition for
 review, finding that she had not raised it below and “may
 not raise it for the first time on review.” App’x 68. On ap-
 peal, the U.S. Postal Service asserts that “the MSPB did
 not err by failing to address Ms. Lucas’s religious liberties
 claims” because “[t]he MSPB is under no obligation to en-
 tertain arguments that were raised for the first time on ap-
 peal.” Resp’t’s Br. 8. Ms. Lucas insists that “[t]he MSPB’s
 holding that this issue was not raised at hearing level is
 just wrong.” Pet’r’s Br. 2. As explained below, we hold that
 the Board did not abuse its discretion by declining to ad-
 dress Ms. Lucas’s First Amendment argument.
     Ms. Lucas asserts she raised her First Amendment ar-
 gument in several places: “It was in the charging letter[;]
 it was set out in the response to the charging letter[; and]
 it was noted . . . in the decision letter and in hearing testi-
 mony.” Pet’r’s Br. 2. However, all of these instances “ei-
 ther were not sufficiently explicit or were not before the
 Board.” Wallace, 879 F.2d at 832. The charging letter, the
 response to the charging letter, and the decision letter do
 not constitute statements properly raised before the Board.
 See id. (holding that a statement made to the agency in re-
 sponse to its notice of proposed removal was not a state-
 ment made before the Board). Moreover, the hearing
 testimony confirmed that the issue was not raised “with
 sufficient specificity and clarity,” and “[t]he Board cannot
 be faulted for refusing to consider the issue.” Wallace, 879
 F.2d at 832; see also App’x 131–133.
      Ms. Lucas failed to timely raise her First Amendment
 argument before the administrative judge, raising it for the
 first time before the Board in her petition for review. See
 Initial Appeal File (“IAF”), Tab 16 at 5–6 (pre-hearing sub-
 mission presenting issues without raising First Amend-
 ment argument); IAF, Tab 24 at 4–15 (closing brief
 challenging orders to apologize on several bases but failing
 to raise First Amendment argument); App’x 54–57 (peti-
 tion for review raising this First Amendment argument).
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 8                                                LUCAS v. USPS

 Instead, her argument before the administrative judge fo-
 cused on whether the National Agreement requiring com-
 pliance with arbitration awards applied to Ms. Lucas. IAF,
 Tab 24 at 4–15. The Board properly declined to review this
 newly raised First Amendment issue. See Carson v. Dep’t
 of Energy, 398 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
 Banks v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980));
 App’x 68. The Board generally does not address issues not
 adjudicated by the administrative judge unless there is
 “[n]ew and material evidence or legal argument . . . that,
 despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available
 when the record closed.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (listing crite-
 ria for granting a petition for review). Ms. Lucas did not
 contend that there was new and material evidence or argu-
 ment that was not available when the record closed. See
 App’x 54–57.
     Ms. Lucas may not raise her First Amendment argu-
 ment for the first time in this court. See Wilder v. Merit
 Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
 “Where, as here, the Board denied review of the adminis-
 trative judge’s initial decision, this court will not consider
 issues not raised before the administrative judge.” Elmore
 v. Dep’t of Transp., 421 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
 “We discern nothing in this case . . . that induces us to de-
 part from the general principle and determine an issue that
 was not properly raised before or decided by the Board.”
 Wallace, 879 F.2d at 833.
     Ms. Lucas’s argument does not fall into any of the cat-
 egorical exceptions we have recognized to the general re-
 quirement to raise issues below. Although Ms. Lucas
 appears before us pro se, she was represented by counsel
 before the Board. App’x 9. Accordingly, we do not apply
 the “less demanding standard” for pro se litigants “in re-
 quiring that . . . issue[s] have been raised explicitly below.”
 Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
 (en banc), superseded on other grounds by Pub. L. No. 107–
 330, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 2820, 2832 (2002). Forfeiture may
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 LUCAS v. USPS                                               9

 not be appropriate for “structural constitutional chal-
 lenges” or “constitutional challenges to statutes or other
 agency-wide policies” that “fall outside the adjudicators’ ar-
 eas of technical expertise” or where adjudicators “are pow-
 erless to grant the relief requested.” Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S.
 83, 92–93 (2021). Here, Ms. Lucas does not assert such a
 structural or general challenge. Instead, the relief she
 seeks is available before the Board, and her argument is
 well within the Board’s expertise. See Elgin v. Dep’t of
 Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 12, 23 (2012) (noting the Board “rou-
 tinely adjudicates . . . claims that an agency took adverse
 employment action in violation of an employee’s First . . .
 Amendment rights” and that its expertise may be brought
 to bear in addressing such claims). Ms. Lucas’s argument
 does not fall into one of the recognized exceptions for con-
 stitutional arguments.
      Ms. Lucas further argues that she “was not advised by
 the Administrative Judge that asserting the order to apol-
 ogize violated [her] First Amendment rights constituted an
 affirmative defense” and that she therefore “never waived
 this argument.” Pet’r’s Br. 3. Her argument is unpersua-
 sive. The Board and administrative judge were under no
 obligation to inform her that her First Amendment argu-
 ment was an affirmative defense. Ms. Lucas relies on
 Hulett v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 54 (2013),
 for her assertion. Pet’r’s Br. 2; Pet’r’s Reply Br. 1. How-
 ever, Hulett does not establish that the administrative
 judge must inform an appellant of all possible affirmative
 defenses. Rather, Hulett establishes the Board’s obliga-
 tions when an appellant properly raises an affirmative de-
 fense and demonstrates no intent to waive such defenses.
 Hulett, 120 M.S.P.R. at 58. Here, Ms. Lucas––represented
 by counsel––failed to raise a First Amendment defense in
 the first instance. Moreover, even if Ms. Lucas did not per-
 sonally waive her First Amendment argument or under-
 stand its nature as an affirmative defense, her attorney
 waived this defense on her behalf, and Ms. Lucas is bound
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 10                                               LUCAS v. USPS

 by this action. See Rowe v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 802 F.2d
 434, 437 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is well settled that a person is
 bound by the consequences of his representative’s conduct,
 which includes both his acts and omissions.”).
     In sum, we hold that Ms. Lucas failed to properly raise
 her First Amendment argument before the Board, and we
 decline to address it on the merits here.
                               B.
     We now address the penalty of removal. Ms. Lucas ar-
 gues that––based on certain mitigating factors, the reasons
 for her refusal to apologize, her 17 years of service, and
 work record––“the penalty of removal should have been
 mitigated under the Douglas [f]actors.” Pet’r’s Br. 2. She
 also asserts that “[t]he punishment exceeds the bounds of
 reasonableness.” Id. We disagree.
     When reviewing a penalty, “[t]he Board is required to
 determine whether the agency has responsibly balanced
 the factors delineated in [Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5
 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981)].” Holmes v. U.S. Postal Serv., 987
 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
 and citation omitted). However, “[t]he determination of
 which Douglas factors apply in a particular case and the
 weight to be given the relevant factors lies primarily within
 the agency’s broad discretion to determine the appropriate
 penalty for a particular case.” Zingg v. Dep’t of Treasury,
 IRS, 388 F.3d 839, 844 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
      The agency considered several factors to determine the
 appropriate penalty, including the “nature and seriousness
 of [the] offense,” Ms. Lucas’s notice of the proper conduct
 for postal employees, her “potential for rehabilitation” in
 view of her failure to accept responsibility, her position as
 a manager, her years of service with a record of no disci-
 pline for performance, and her justification that apologiz-
 ing “would be tantamount to lying,” which would “violate[]
 [her] religious beliefs.” App’x 3–4. Although her length of
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 LUCAS v. USPS                                               11

 service and record without discipline were mitigating fac-
 tors, the agency found that “a reduction of the penalty of
 removal [was] unwarranted.” App’x 4. The agency further
 found that “[her] removal will promote the efficiency of the
 service.” Id.
     The Board found that the agency “appropriately con-
 sidered the relevant factors enumerated in Douglas” and
 “exercised [its] discretion within the tolerable limits of rea-
 sonableness in reaching the decision to remove [Ms. Lucas]
 from her employment with the Postal Service.” App’x 36.
 In reviewing the penalty, the Board primarily considered
 testimony of Mr. Lawrence Dauby, the deciding official.
 App’x 33–34. He explained that Ms. Lucas’s misconduct
 was “very serious, particularly given her seniority” and
 role, and “risk[ed] damaging the agency’s [crucial] relation-
 ships with union partners.” App’x 34. He further testified
 that Ms. Lucas willfully refused to apologize over a thirty-
 day period, indicating “she had no potential for rehabilita-
 tion,” and she “had taken absolutely no responsibility for
 her actions.” Id. He also “testified that he considered her
 17 years of service and clean disciplinary record” but that
 they “were not sufficient to reduce the penalty because her
 misconduct went to the exact core of management’s rela-
 tionship with the unions and had the potential to create
 chaos within the organization.” Id. (internal quotation
 marks and citation omitted). The Board also addressed Ms.
 Lucas’s argument that her penalty was inconsistent with
 the penalty received by another employee for insubordina-
 tion, crediting Mr. Dauby’s testimony explaining why the
 situation was not comparable. App’x 35.
      Ms. Lucas fails to establish any error or abuse of dis-
 cretion in this analysis. First, she argues that she “issued
 the first written apology as instructed.” Pet’r’s Br. 2. But
 this apology is irrelevant to her removal: She was removed
 for failing to comply with later orders given after this ini-
 tial statement was determined to be insufficient. App’x 1.
 She also asserts that a USPS policy statement issued after
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 12                                              LUCAS v. USPS

 her Board hearing provided that she “was to be provided
 full opportunity to respond to the allegations against [her]
 at the grievance level which was never provided.” Pet’r’s
 Br. 2 (emphasis added). However, Ms. Lucas does not ex-
 plain why the policy statement has any bearing on the ap-
 propriateness of the removal penalty for a charge we
 otherwise sustain. See Yeschick v. Dep’t of Transp., F.A.A.,
 801 F.2d 383, 385 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming the Board’s
 decision where the petitioner failed “to state how [certain]
 factors could have served to mitigate the penalty of re-
 moval”). Moreover, the Board found “such an argument
 does not outweigh the seriousness of her repeated and in-
 tentional offenses.” App’x 69. Here, the Board did not
 abuse its discretion in making this determination.
      Lastly, Ms. Lucas asserts “the reasons for [her] refusal
 to issue the apology” should have mitigated the penalty of
 removal. Pet’r’s Br. 2. We have never required the agency
 or the Board to consider the petitioner’s alleged justifica-
 tion for insubordination as a mitigating factor. See, e.g.,
 Nagel v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 707 F.2d 1384,
 1385–87 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming decision to remove pe-
 titioner for insubordination where the Board found “peti-
 tioner’s belief” that an agency order was improper “did not
 lessen the gravity of the offense”); Ferrone v. Dep’t of Lab.,
 797 F.2d 962, 966–67 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Rather, all that is
 required is that the Board “articulate[] and consider[] [the
 Douglas] factors [it finds] to be relevant to [a] petitioner’s
 case,” as it did here. Nagel, 707 F.2d at 1386. The Board
 found her justification to be irrelevant, noting that Ms. Lu-
 cas “did not raise an affirmative defense of discrimination
 based on religion.” 5 App’x 69. We see no error in the

      5  The deciding official considered this justification
 and declined to credit it because he found it to be incon-
 sistent based on her willingness to give a talk that she
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 LUCAS v. USPS                                                13

 Board’s determination that her justification––regardless of
 which Douglas factor it might be considered under––was
 not relevant. See Nagel, 707 F.2d at 1386–87 (“We hold
 that no reversible error was committed by the board in this
 case when it discussed only those factors listed in the Doug-
 las case it deemed relevant.”). Moreover, in light of her jus-
 tification and failure to accept responsibility, there is no
 indication that if Ms. Lucas were given a lesser penalty,
 she would eventually comply with the directive to issue an
 apology. See App’x 34; Ferrone, 797 F.2d at 966–67 (“[T]o
 reinstate [petitioner], at once or after a suspension, still de-
 fiant and still refusing to do what the agency ordered,
 would be tantamount to a total victory for the forces of in-
 subordination.”).
      This “court will not disturb a penalty unless it exceeds
 the range of permissible punishment or is so harsh and un-
 conscionably disproportionate to the offense that it
 amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Gonzales v. Def. Logis-
 tics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (internal
 quotation marks and citation omitted). Considering “the
 severity of [Ms. Lucas’s] offense” and “its impact on the
 agency’s mission,” we conclude the penalty is within the
 limits of reason. App’x 35.
                       III. CONCLUSION
      We have considered Ms. Lucas’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm the Board’s final decision.
                         AFFIRMED
                             COSTS
 No costs.

 “stated was an apology to comply with the initial pre-arbi-
 tration settlement.” App’x 3.