Court Opinion

ID: 9553358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:28:28.190604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:53.485649
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the views expressed in the majority opinion and have signed it. However, I feel impelled to make the following supplementary statement as to my own views on this matter. My primary concern is to emphasize that today, in contrast to some of our older decisions, there is a significantly different legal philosophy or perspective relative to the delegation of legislative powers.
In particular, two things need to be said concerning the decision in United States Steel Corp. v. State, 65 Wn.2d 385, 397 P.2d 440 (1964). First, the statute therein was totally discretionary, for it simply provided that in the event of a delinquent or deficient tax payment, the Tax Commission “may add thereto interest at the rate of not more than six per cent (6%) per annum . . .” (Italics mine.) See Laws of 1961, ch. 15, § 82.32.050. Thus, the administrative agency was given discretion both (a) as to whether any interest, i.e., a penalty would be assessed; and (b) as to the amount of any interest, i.e., penalty to be assessed. In the instant case, RCW 70.94.431 is mandatory and simply provides as follows:
[A]ny person who violates any of the provisions of chapter 70.94 RCW or any of the rules and regulations of the' department or the board shall incur a penalty in the form *263of a fine in an amount not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars per day for each violation.
(Italics mine.) Thus, if there is a violation the statute allows no discretion; a penalty must be imposed. The only discretion which the agency has in the instant case is to establish the amount of the penalty. This factor alone would provide some foundation for distinguishing United States Steel Corp. from the instant case.
However, there is a second and more fundamental aspect to the United States Steel Corp. decision, viz., it was decided prior to our decisions in Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wn.2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972), and Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wn.2d 155, 500 P.2d 540 (1972). These decisions marked a profound and significant change in legal philosophy with respect to the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies. The underlying concern of courts in scrutinizing delegations of power to administrative agencies is to prevent such agencies from arbitrarily exercising such grants of power. Originally, and for some time, up until a few years ago, judicial decisions sought to accomplish this desirable purpose or end by simply requiring that the legislature delineate so-called “standards” by which the administrative agencies ostensibly were to govern their actions relative to delegated legislative power. In retrospect, the effort was a dubious and unrealistic one. It might even be characterized today as judicial oversimplification of a very real, complicated and most important problem in the evolution of modern government.
As the practical need for administrative agencies expanded, the courts increasingly tended to uphold delegations of power which contained trite recitations of nebulous generalities which often were actually ineffectual as “standards.” Gradually, it became recognized that arbitrary administrative action could best be prevented, channeled or controlled by examining the degree to which procedural safeguards are afforded rather than by requiring a state*264ment of so-called “standards.” See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 2.15 (1958). Rody and Barry & Barry marked the transition in Washington from the “standards” approach to the procedural safeguards approach with respect to assessing the validity of a delegation of power to an agency. In particular, and of primary importance, Rody clearly distinguished United States Steel Corp. This was on the basis that it was the absence of adequate provisions for notice, hearing and a factual record which invalidated the delegation of legislative power to the Tax Commission in the United States Steel Corp. case. The essence of Rody is that a delegation will be upheld if there are (1) adequate procedural safeguards; and (2) guidelines which state in general terms that which is to be done, and which set the normally acceptable limits of punitive or compensatory administrative action. The instant case must be analyzed in this framework.
First, there can be no question but that the extensive review provisions contained in the instant statutory pattern constitute adequate procedural safeguards against administrative-agency arbitrariness. The “control officer” of the local authority initiates the action by serving a written notice of penalty upon the violator. No penalty becomes final until the defendant has a full opportunity to be heard by an independent tribunal. To obtain such a hearing, the defendant simply files an “appeal” with the Pollution Control Hearings Board, which is composed of three persons. The defendant has a choice of requesting either a formal or informal hearing. The hearings board must make written decisions and prepare findings of fact in each case decided by it. In addition, an appeal can be taken from the decision of the board to the superior court. If the board holds an informal hearing, the defendant is entitled to de novo review in superior court; if the board holds a formal hearing, the review in superior court is to be held in accordance with the administrative procedure act. Further provisions are also made for appeals to the Court of Appeals and the *265Washington Supreme Court. See RCW 43.21B. Clearly, this comports with the safeguards requirement of Rody.
Next, it is apparent from the statute that there are general guidelines indicating what is to be done. It is argued, however, that there are no explicit standards and that implicit standards will not suffice. This contention, however, disregards our recent unanimous decision in Rody, where in passing upon a similar contention, we observed that “the requisite standards can be gleaned directly and by implication from the legislative provisions themselves.” (Italics mine.) See Rody at page 91. There were two significant features in the statute involved in Rody, to which the instant statute should be compared. First, in Rody the purpose for the award of damages was apparent, viz., to compensate the complainant for the loss of the right to be free from discrimination in housing transactions. In the instant case, the purpose of the penalty is similarly apparent. It is not to compensate any particular individuals, since any penalties recovered go to the general treasury of the authority rather than to injured citizens. Rather, a fair reading of the statute indicates that the purpose is to secure compliance with the policies of the Washington Clean Air Act. Second, in Rody this court thought it “clear by implication” that the amount of the award was to be adjusted to accomplish the purpose of the statute. Rody v. Hollis, supra at 92. (Italics mine.) Similarly, in this case, it is clear by implication that the amount of the penalty should be adjusted to accomplish the purpose of the Washington Clean Air Act. This approach, inherent in Rody and the majority opinion in the instant case, is consonant with the fact that the legislature has traditionally delegated power to the courts to assess fines within legislatively established limits. As we stated in Rody v. Hollis, supra at 93:
Having concluded that the judicial power exercised by this tribunal was properly delegated to it, we can only conclude that the tribunal’s power to fix the amount of the penalty is consistent with due process, since the exercise of similar power by courts of law is universal and *266has been consistently upheld. See Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, 48 L. Ed. 1062, 24 S. Ct. 703 (1904); State v. Smith, 74 Wn.2d 744, 446 P.2d 571 (1968).
In short, Rody is indistinguishable from the instant case and must be followed or overruled. I would follow it.
For the reasons indicated, I concur in the majority opinion.