Court Opinion

ID: 9791657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:15:28.255894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.758221
License: Public Domain

*835Neill, J.
(dissenting) — I am in disagreement with the majority on its conclusion that the res ipsa loquitur instruction (No. 5) was properly given. There was insufficient evidence to support the instruction and the instruction was not a correct statement of the doctrine.
It is uncontested that, absent res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. One of the prerequisites to application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that the instrumentality causing the event must be within the exclusive control of the defendant. The majority finds sufficient evidence of exclusive control to justify application of the doctrine. I disagree.
Three members of the train crew, the “D” Street crew foreman and the resident manager of “D” Street Rafting Company all substantially agreed in their testimony on the normal practices followed in these unloading operations. The switch engine would spot the first car under the unloading crane. No further movement of the train would occur until directed by employees of the rafting company. Instructions to move the cars would be given to the switch-man standing at the end of the train near the unloading platform, who would relay them by hand signals to the engineer at the other end of the train.
The three railroad company employees who were present at the time of the accident all testified that the train was originally positioned so that the car farthest from the engine was under the crane. The train was not moved and none of the cars were unloaded until after the accident, which occurred 5 to 10 minutes after they had positioned the first car. However, Mr. Keblbek, a boom man for the rafting company, testified that one car had been unloaded and that the train had been moved immediately prior to the accident. He also testified, contrary to the later testimony of his manager, Mr. Reid, that sometimes the railroad crew was aware of the sequence in which the cars were to be unloaded and that each movement of the train might not be in direct response to individual commands given by rafting company employees. In this specific instance, Mr. Keblbek *836could not say who gave the instructions to move the train.
“Control” does not necessarily mean actual physical control, but can include the present ability to exercise a right of control. See Hogland v. Klein, 49 Wn.2d 216, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956); Edwards v. A.F.J. Distributors, Inc., 58 Wn.2d 789, 364 P.2d 952 (1961). All the witnesses agreed that once the train arrived at “D” Street Rafting Company, the unloading process was essentially directed by employees of that company. While it is true that the hand on the throttle of the switch engine remained that of a railroad employee, and while it may also be true that the engineer had a legal right to refuse to follow any instructions from employees of the rafting company, it does not follow that the railroad so controlled the unloading process that any negligence occurring therein may be automatically attributible to it. Even Mr. Keblbek, who testified that the engine moved immediately before the accident, cannot say who ordered this movement; and he specifically admitted that the engine may have moved under instructions from him or Mr. Reid, both employees of the rafting company. Under these circumstances, I see no basis for the majority’s conclusion that the train was in the “exclusive control” of the railroad at the time of the accident. See Morner v. Union Pac. R. R., 31 Wn.2d 282, 196 P.2d 744 (1948).
As we noted in Vogreg v. Shepard Ambulance Serv., Inc., 47 Wn.2d 659, 289 P.2d 350 (1955), no special witchcraft is invoked by murmuring the Latin phrase, “res ipsa loquitur.” The doctrine is nothing more than a legal formulation of the common sense conclusion that if an instrumentality for which defendant is responsible injures somebody, and this injury would not normally occur without negligence, then defendant is responsible for the injury. But when, as here, the evidence does not establish exclusive control in the defendant, and the possible causes include negligence by others as well as the defendant, or causes involving no negligence at all, then the doctrine does not apply. Therefore, it was error to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The case should have been dismissed upon defendant’s motion at the close of the evidence.
*837Instruction No. 5, to which defendant took exception, reads in relevant part:
[Y]ou are instructed that it is for you to determine whether the manner of occurrence of the death of Claud Miles and the attendant circumstances connected therewith are of such character as would, in your judgment, warrant an inference that the injury would not have occurred had due diligence and care been exercised by the defendant’s employees.
The rule is that when an agency or instrumentality which produces injury is under the control of a defendant or its employees, and the injury which occurred would ordinarily not have resulted if those in control had used proper care, then, in the absence of satisfactory explanation, you are at liberty to infer though you are not required to infer that the defendant, or its employees, were at some point negligent and that such negligence produced the death of Claud Miles.
My concern is with the words “under the control of a defendant or its employees.” These words do not specify for the jury the degree of control (exclusive) that is necessary before res ipsa can be applied. As instructed, the jury could have subjected defendant to the effects of the doctrine upon a finding that defendant had partial control, potential partial control, or any of the other myriad degrees of control ranging from the almost exclusive to the almost nil. If such an instruction is to be given at all,1 it should be given accurately. Here, the instruction is deficient in that it allows the jury to apply the doctrine upon a finding that defendant had any degree of control over the instrumentality. The instruction is plainly erroneous.
*838I would reverse and dismiss.
Weaver and McGovern, JJ., concur with Neill, J.
May 27,1970. Petition for rehearing denied.

 A strong argument may be posited against the giving of res ipsa instructions in any case. Since the function of the doctrine is to surmount a nonsuit, the purpose is fulfilled when the matter is given over to the jury. To add a special instruction on the res ipsa inference is to give that possible inference an unfair advantage over other possible inferences in the case. See Provins v. Bevis, 70 Wn.2d 131, 140, 422 P.2d 505 (1967). The Washington Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions has accepted this view, and recommends that no instruction be given on res ipsa loquitur. 6 Wash. Prac., WPI 22.01, at 131 (1967). I do not reach the question of the continuing validity of such instructions as that issue has not been raised in this case.