Court Opinion

ID: 9741700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:00:47.066074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.563258
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). The chancellor found:
“Although plaintiff must be charged with constructive knowledge of the existence and amount of the 1956 assessment, it did not receive a tax statement from the new city in that year and, hence, did not have actual knowledge of the excessive assessment until April, 1957, when it attempted to pay the tax on one of the lots. It then offered to pay the tax to the *169comity treasurer under protest but that offer was refused. Obviously and it is conceded, the plaintiff neither appeared before the board of review nor made prior inquiry at the city offices in regard to the assessment.”
It is difficult to assume that plaintiffs, engaged in land transactions, did not know that the 1956 tax was due in July, 1956. Appellants cannot rely upon the fact that they did not receive a tax notice to excuse their failure to make any effort to pay the July, 1956, levied tax until March, 1957. The chancellor correctly found that under our tax laws “plaintiff must be charged with constructive knowledge of the existence and amount of the 1956 assessment.”
Appellants’ chancery action asks the chancellor to hold that the tax for 1956 be considered as paid under protest. Appellants never paid nor offered to pay the 1956 tax, but requested the county treasurer to accept the 1957 assessment in lieu of the 1956, contrary to the provisions of CL 1948, § 211.58 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev §7.102), which provides: “That
neither taxes nor special assessments which are delinquent may be paid under protest to the county treasurer.” Appellants appealed to the court because the county treasurer refused to violate the statute.
It is conceded that appellants did not appear before the board of review. The board of review was created by law to correct alleged erroneous assessments, and appellants were subject to the jurisdiction of said board. Nailing to take advantage of the relief the board was authorized by law to grant, appellants were estopped to seek relief in court, as established by the following decisions:
First National Bank of St. Joseph v. Township of St. Joseph, 46 Mich 526, 530:
“If a person does not see fit to have his assessment corrected and perfected, when it is in his power to do *170so, it must be assumed that a failure to complain is equivalent to an admission of correctness.”
Meade v. Haines, 81 Mich 261, 265:
“The plaintiff did not appear before this board, nor in any manner avail himself of its provisions, to correct the alleged erroneous assessment. This is a complete bar to his recovery here, even if he could otherwise maintain his suit.”
Fletcher Paper Co. v. City of Alpena, 172 Mich 35, 39:
“It is well settled by the repeated decisions of this Court, covering a period of more than 30 years, that the board of review is the constituted tribunal for the correction of unjust or unequal assessments, and that a taxpayer who is subject to the board’s jurisdiction, and fails to make his appeal to that tribunal, cannot later appeal to the courts for redress. The board of review is a tribunal provided by law in which the taxpayer may appear and contest an unequal or excessive assessment; and his failure to so appear estops him from assailing the assessment afterwards.”
The statutory provisions and previous decisions of this Court, which I believe applicable to this appeal, are not commented upon by Justice Black — evidently on the theory that they can be ignored by a chancellor applying equity.
In Sorrick v. Consolidated Telephone Company of Springport, 340 Mich 463, 469, we said:
“It must be admitted that the equities of the case are strongly in favor of defendant. However, we are unable to close our eyes to another fundamental rule of equity, i.e., that equity follows the law.”
In J. W. McCausey & Co. v. Gittleman, 201 Mich 8, 16, we said:
“We do not conceive that the plainly expressed provisions of the lien law are less imperative because *171by the statute a chancery court is made the forum in -wnich the attached liens may be enforced. While equity courts are said to be given special jurisdiction to deal with and correct that wherein the law is deficient because of its universality, they do not rise above or have power to change the law, either statute or common.”
In Consumers Power Company v. County of Muskegon, 346 Mich 243, 247, we stated:
“Contrary to the theory that we should apply the general equitable rules in a taxation case of this nature are the cases of Langford v. Auditor General, 325 Mich 585; and Bateson v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich 582. In the Langford Case we stated (pp 590, 591):
“ ‘Grovernmental powers of taxation are controlled by constitutional and statutory provisions. C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich 659. Hence, it is not possible to adjudicate issues arising under taxation laws by the general application of equitable principles. This phase of the law seems to have been overlooked by plaintiffs who stress their right to relief in the instant case on equitable, rather than legal, grounds.
“ ‘ “The collection of duly levied taxes for governmental purposes is a governmental function and the collection officer cannot, by mistake or misinformation, work an estoppel, enforceable in a court of equity. The fact, and not the misinformation, controls.” Lovett v. City of Detroit, 286 Mich 159, 161, 162.’ ”
In Corkins v. Ritter, 326 Mich 563, 568, we said:
“If plaintiff could not have a new trial, it follows he could not bring a separate action in equity, as equity will not allow indirectly what may not be done directly.”
In his opinion Justice Black asks this Court to overrule Consumers Power Company v. County of Muskegon, supra. In that case we held:
*172“Governmental powers of taxation are controlled by constitutional and statutory provisions.”
“Issues arising under taxation laws may not be adjudicated by the general application of equitable principles.”
“The equitable principles of ‘windfall’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ cannot be applied in an action at law to recover taxes not paid under protest.”
“The obligation to pay taxes is purely a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in the method pointed out by express statute, hence, refunds or a credit of taxes, even though erroneously paid, may not be made or even voluntarily refunded in the absence of statutory authority so to do.” (Syllabi.)
Subsequent to our decision in Consumers Power Company v. County of Muskegon, supra, the legislature enacted PA 1958, No 209 (approved by the governor May 5, 1958), section 53a thereof providing:
“Any taxpayer who is assessed and pays taxes in excess of the correct and lawful amount due because of a clerical error or mutual mistake of fact made by the assessing officer and the taxpayer may recover the excess so paid, without interest, if suit is commenced within 3 years from the date of payment, notwithstanding that the payment was not made under protest.” CL 1948, § 211.53a (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 7.97 [1]).
I agree with my Brother that this provision is pendente legislative enactment and cannot be given retroactive effect, and add thereto that the amendment only affects taxpayers who are assessed and pay taxes in excess — which does not apply to appellants, who failed or refused to pay the tax.
I disagree with his statement that “the legislature since handing down of Consumers and entry of de*173cree herein has provided what our majority in Consumers should have upheld, that is, the right of a taxpayer to recover the amount of mistakenly levied and unconscionably collected property taxes.”*
: This Court does not create the law governing taxation. To grant relief to taxpayers who failed to pay taxes within the prescribed time and who failed to appeal to the statutory created board of review, will necessitate legislative enactment to that effect.
This decision will not be confined to the appellants in this appeal, but will establish tax principles applicable to the huge number of property owners who constitute the taxpayers of our State. In regard to Justice Black’s recommendation that the Consumers Power Company Case, supra, be overruled, I call attention that the adoption of his contention will constitute not only an overruling of Consumers but of numerous decisions of this Court (as referred to above), holding that: (1) Governmental powers of taxation are controlled by constitutional and statutory provisions, hence it is not possible to adjudicate issues arising under taxation laws by the general application of equitable provisions; (2) The collection of duly levied taxes for governmental purposes is a governmental function, and the collection officer cannot by mistake or misinformation work an estoppel enforceable in a court of equity; (3) The board of review is the constituted tribunal for the correction of unjust or unequal assessments, and a taxpayer who fails to make his appeal to that tribunal cannot later appeal to the courts for redress; (4) Delinquent taxes cannot under protest be paid to the county treasurer.
The adoption of the opinion to which I dissent would constitute a declaration on our part that while *174we realize that the tax laws clearly, unequivocally and definitely notify property owners that they should not bring" tax problems to the courts without first appealing to the board of review, we have, by this decision, decided not to follow this position in certain instances where the courts decide the tax collection would constitute unjust enrichment. If adopted, the quéstions naturally arise: What overtax constitutes unjust enrichment? Is not the overtax of $1 unjust enrichment to that amount? How long can the taxpayer wait after the time allowed him to appeal to the board of review before he commences his action in equity?
We are not dealing with a case where tax officials fraudulently conspired to overtax. A mistake was made. It clearly appears that the mistake could have been rectified by appellants had they requested relief from the board of review. If they had sought relief from the board and been denied, this Court would have granted relief.
To write exceptions to the tax laws eliminating the requirement that the taxpayer first seek relief from the board of review would create problems in our courts and with tax-collection officials which we refuse to create.
The decree should be affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, J., concurred with. Kelly, J.

 This quotation appeared in Justice Black’s original opinion. The matter has been changed in the second and third revisions of his opinion.