Court Opinion

ID: 9571261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:21.857944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:39.490139
License: Public Domain

*54ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent;
The defendants broadcast over their radio station the following conversation between an unknown caller and defendant Wilcox:
CALLER: . . . now, you cannot name me, you cannot tell me, nor any of these Democratic callers, where that man is qualified to handle 29 million dollars of the taxpayers’ money, that’s cornin’ up in here. He has not had any qualifications, his schooling is not for that, uh uh, he’s in debt with his brothers in here, through the state, because they don’t pay their bills. Now, now let’s look a little bit further. What kind of an outfit does that man run down there?
WILCOX: I don’t know. Is he a business man?
CALLER: Business man.
Demman, right across the street from the Utah Power & Light Company.
WILCOX: Oh.
CALLER: If, if you want to go to the Go-Go Girls, that’s it. If you want to go buy liquor by the drink, that’s it. If you want to, ha, I won’t say it.
WILCOX: Ha, ha.
CALLER: If you want to get to other places on here, it’s, it’s available for ya, uuh.
WILCOX: Well, then, he’s qualified as a, well, I won’t' say.
CÁLLER: He’s qualified.
WILCOX: Ha, ha, ha. •
CALLER: He’s qualified for the, uh right in with the underworld, ’n I think uh if he can get in in here, he wants to make these laws prosperous for his business out here.
The plaintiff at the time not only was a candidate for office but was also a business man. He claims that directly and by innuendo he was accused of engaging in criminal activity which amounted to a felony. Such statements, if false, are actionable. The applicable law is found in 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel & Slander § 135, as follows :
[Although a candidate for office puts his qualifications in issue, it has been well said that while he may be canvassed, he cannot be calumniated. Thus, it is defamatory, and in proper circumstances actionable, to charge a candidate for office with having committed a crime, or to make against him other accusations involving moral turpitude; to charge that he is not eligible for office, . . .; or to charge him with having championed measures opposed to the moral interests of the community, where such a charge is made as a statement of fact, and not as a mere opinion or inference drawn from any specified acts.
Plaintiff further alleged and defendants admit that there is a seven-second delay after words are spoken before they are broadcast and Mr. Wilcox could' have "pre*55vented the broadcast of any statement within seven seconds after it was made.
Almost immediately after the broadcast an official of the corporate defendant made a public apology, saying:
Yes. I certainly want to talk. Uh . All communicasters on this station have been given instructions that individual candidates in this election are not to be libeled. And as a matter of fact, communicasters have been told that individuals are not to be allowed to campaign for or against candidates in this election. Mr. Demman has been libeled on this station, it sound like, and uh on behalf of KS double X, I’m offering a public apology to Mr. Fred Demman. Uh . . accusations have been allowed to be made against him, Larry has no idea whether or not they are true, and he had no right to allow them on the air, and there will be no airing of further accusations such as this and uh . . . we certainly do offer a very public apology to Mr. Fred Demman.
An apology made after a defamation is no defense to the cause of action. It might affect an award of damages but is not a defense.
The defendants rely on the provisions of Section 45-2-5, U.C.A.1953, Replacement Vol. 5A, which reads:
No person, firm, or corporation owning or operating a radio or television broadcasting station or network of stations shall be liable under the laws of libel, slander or defamation on account of having made its broadcasting facilities or network available to any person, whether a candidate for public office or any other person, or on account of having originated or broadcast a program for discussion of controversial or any other subjects, in the absence of proof of actual malice on the part of such owner or operator. In no event, however, shall any such owner or operator be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of such station or network by or on behalf of any candidate for public office.
It is to be noted that the conversation was not uttered by or on behalf of any candidate for public office and that plaintiff alleged actual malice on the part of defendant Wilcox.
The defendants further rely on Section 45-2-7, U.C.A.1953, Replacement Vol. 5A, which contains the following language:
In no event, however, shall any such person, firm, or corporation be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement or act published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound broadcast unless it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party that such person, firm, or corporation has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement or act in such broadcast. .
*56The plaintiff alleged that Wilcox failed to exercise due care in preventing the publication.
The defendants made a motion for summary judgment and filed an affidavit wherein they claimed that there was no evidence of malice or failure to exercise due care to prevent the broadcast of the utterances complained of.
In considering a ' motion for summary 'judgment the court looks- only to see if 'there are ho genuine issues of fact in dispute. It does not weigh the evidence- or draw inferences therefrom.'-
On October 28, 1971, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On November 10 following, the court set aside the summary judgment signed on October 28, 1971, and in his written order stated that the parties had stipulated that all depositions theretofore 'taken should be published and the matter bé considered on its merits. No such stipulation appears in' the record. The statement in the judge’s second summary judgment does not say • the' parties stipulated 'that'the case could be considered on the ’ merits. It says that the matter- could be so 'considered. The matter before the- court was a motion for summary judgment: The 'first ruling of the court was made without "the’benefit of depositions taken.' It-thus 'appears to me that the intention of the parities and of the judge was to have all of the available evidence before the court, so he could more correctly determine the matter which was before him, to wit: whether there was a material issue of fact to be determined. A demand for jury trial was made and- the jury fee paid. In fact, the record shows that the case was set for trial for January 20, 1972. The court did not determine the case on the merits. It made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. See Rule 52, U.R.C.P. It merely ordered:
1. That the Summary Judgment entered herein on October 28, 1971, be and it hereby is vacated.
2. That defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be and it hereby is granted and that the action be and it hereby is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
-- Both- parties state in their- briefs that the appeal, is from the granting of a summary judgment, and neither party claims -that the case was tried on the merits.
I think there are genuine and material issues of fact to be resolved upon evidence given, and for that reason I would reverse the summary judgment rendered and remand the case for trial. I think the plaintiff should have his costs on this appeal.
- CROCKETT, J., concurs - in the - views .expressed in- .the- dissenting opinion of El- ' Lett, J. ::