Court Opinion

ID: 9494768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:46:00.042593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:36.203888
License: Public Domain

*726JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Haywood’s December 1997 crack possession under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The evidence was admissible to show Haywood’s intent to distribute crack in the sale to Spears at issue here and his knowing possession of crack at that time.
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, if more probative than prejudicial, is admissible to prove knowledge or intent. See United States v. Dabish, 708 F.2d 240, 242 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam). Similarity of the prior or subsequent act to the charged act is one of the key factors supporting admissibility under Rule 404(b). Id. at 242-43. Today the court cites no relevant authority for its conclusion that possession of a moderate quantity of drugs, such as the nearly golf ball-sized crack rock that Haywood had when stopped in December 1997, is too dissimilar tó be admissible under Rule 404(b) to show intent to distribute the same drug at an earlier time.1 The Fifth Circuit case cited, United States v. Skipper, 74 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir.1996), does not support that proposition. Skipper merely held that the possession of 2.89 grams of crack was not sufficient evidence to permit a conviction for possession of crack with intent to distribute. That has little to do with whether such evidence is admissible for that purpose.
The Fifth Circuit recognizes that distinction. Like a number of sibling circuits, it follows a rule of admissibility that dictates a result opposite to the court’s result today: other acts of drug possession, regardless of quantity, are routinely admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove intent to distribute drugs at another time. See United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that with a proper limiting instruction, other acts of possessing drugs, “even in an amount consistent only with personal use,” are per se admissible to prove intent to distribute); United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (11th Cir.1997) (“evidence of prior personal drug use [is admissible] to prove intent in a subsequent prosecution for distribution of narcotics”).
This rule is especially plausible if it is narrowed to cases such as Haywood’s, where the drug in the prior or subsequent possession and the drug the defendant is charged with distributing are the same. Evidence that a defendant carries a certain kind of drug with him suggests a degree of involvement in the trade that tends to support an inference of intent to distribute that drug at another time. Cf. United States v. Templeman, 965 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir.1992) (“Evidence of Tem-pleman’s personal use of cocaine indicates potential motives for his distribution of cocaine: to finance his own use of the drug and to assure himself of a ready supply. Evidence that Templeman used drugs with others indicates that he had opportunity to distribute drugs because he knew who would be potential customers.”). The court fails to recognize this probative value.
Even if we hold that a rule such as the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits’ is in*727appropriate, we should hold that the legitimate probative value of Haywood’s possession was not outweighed by the undue prejudicial effect of the evidence.2 Indeed, Haywood’s subsequent possession was doubly relevant, because it was also evidence that Haywood knowingly possessed crack that he intended to sell to Spears. Other crimes evidence is admissible to show knowledge. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); Logan, 121 F.3d at 1178 (“prior possession of drugs ... is admissible to show such things as knowledge”). Knowing possession is an element of the offense for which Haywood was convicted. See United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir.2001). And knowledge was at issue in the trial: Haywood’s chief defense was to claim (despite overwhelming evidence that Haywood was present during the sale of crack to Spears) that Liles sold the drugs to Spears without Haywood’s involvement. Against that background, the fact that Haywood and Liles were found together in December 1997 and Haywood had crack on his person at that time is substantially probative of Haywood’s knowing possession at the earlier time and his intent to distribute to Spears.
At a minimum, the district court’s decision to admit the evidence did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion, as required for reversal. Any need to exclude was eminently debatable. There was thus no reversible error under Rule 404(b).3
Since in my view the evidence of the subsequent crack possession also easily met the admissibility requirements of Rules 402 (relevance) and 403 (probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice), essentially for the reasons discussed above, I would uphold Haywood’s conviction. I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion.

. In analyzing whether the conduct was substantially similar, the court works to distinguish three unpublished opinions of this circuit, each of which found a prior drug possession admissible to show intent to distribute. See supra pp. 721 -22 (opinion of the Court). The proper approach to this case is open in any event, since "unpublished opinions are never controlling authority.” Fonseca v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 246 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir.2001) (Gilman, J.).

. Even those courts that disagree with the broad rule of admissibility in intent-to-distribute cases gauge the admissibility of prior or later possessions on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir.1989).

. Even supposing the district court’s decision to admit the evidence of the later crack possession was an abuse of discretion, I think the trial’s outcome was not "substantially swayed” by the supposed error. See supra at p. 724 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). The evidence of Haywood's guilt was powerful without the subsequent crack possession. It is well summarized in the district court’s order denying Haywood's motion for acquittal:
Spears testified that he bought crack from a man named Emo. This purchase took place in Apartment 7 of the [apartments] where Emo's sister lived.... Spears picked Haywood out of a photographic lineup as Emo the very week these events occurred, and later identified Haywood in open Court.
In addition to this identification, more than one witness testified that Haywood used to wear his hair in an Afro. FBI agents observed Spears talking with a man with an Afro just moments before the controlled buy.... Liles testified that drug transactions carried out at Apartment 7 were attributable to Emo, an alias used by Haywood. Finally, a recording of the drug deal was played at trial and, because both Spears and Liles had testified, the jury could perform a comparison of their voices with those of the men recorded on tape.
[Spears] stood firm in his testimony in the face of a vigorous cross examination at trial. He consistently stated that he bought the crack from Haywood. If anything, the presence of Liles in Apartment 7, and his limited participation in the deal between Haywood and Spears, supports a conviction of both Haywood and Liles. It certainly does not exonerate Haywood, or establish that Spears has a poor memory.
(App.418-19) (footnote omitted).