Court Opinion

ID: 9666630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:23:14.604603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:31.482829
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting.
But for the majority’s discussion of the provisions of article I, section 13, prohibiting laws retrospective in operation, I would agree with what the majority says. Because I do not agree with the analysis contained in section III of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent.
The majority neatly avoids a discussion of the merits of the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws by holding that school districts may not raise a challenge to an act of the legislature. This is because, the majority reasons, the school districts are in-strumentalities of the state and the state can waive its own rights.
The majority’s reasoning rests on two broad, unstated, but intertwined principles: First, that an entity created by the people with the consent of the legislature is the state for purposes of legal challenges to legislation that violates article I, section 13. Second, that the legislature with the assent of the governor may choose to ignore an absolute prohibition to certain kinds of legislative action in the constitution when the constitution creates an obstacle to the legislature’s will.
As to the first proposition, the majority finds support in State ex rel. Independence School District v. Jones, 653 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. banc 1983). “School districts are bodies corporate, instrumentalities of the state established by the statute to facilitate effectual discharge of the General Assembly’s constitutional mandate to establish and maintain free public schools.... ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 185. This statement is not entirely correct. School districts are not established by the legislature. Six-member school districts are permitted by the legislature. Section 162.211, RSMo 1994, provides that “[a] six member school district may be established by the voters of (1) any city or town_” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff school districts in this case are local government entities created by local voters “as authorized in Section 162.211.” They are not directly-created instrumentalities of the state as would be, for instance, the department of elementary and secondary education. In formation and purpose, the plaintiffs are more municipal corporations than they are state entities. Of course, one could argue that *861municipal corporations are state instrumen-talities, too. If one follows the majority, municipalities cannot challenge the legislature’s enactment of laws retrospective in operation, either. But do we really want to say that? I think not. Local governments exist as much to insulate citizens from distant government as to carry out the state’s duties. Charter cities authorized by the constitution have all powers that the state does not deny them by law. But based on the majority’s prose, there is no logical firewall that prohibits the majority’s holding from extending to cities and counties.
Even if one takes Jones as good law on the establishment point, one need only turn the page of the Jones opinion to discover that Jones assumes a broader legal role for school districts than does the majority. Here is the rest of what Jones says:
From the cases it is apparent the rule in this state has been that absent legislation to the contrary and so long as in furtherance of its duties a school district is empowered to initiate any action that would be available to a private individual in the same circumstances. This action [to challenge the state tax commission’s procedure for determining “percent of true value”] is indisputably in furtherance of plaintiffs’ duties, and were plaintiffs private individuals, it would be said that they have a legally protectible interest at stake. Plaintiff school districts are direct beneficiaries of the statutory right to certain portions of appropriate state school funds.
Id. at 186. Surely the plaintiff school districts — created at the option of the local citizenry and receiving not only state money but local tax revenue to support their operations — have a legally protectible interest in paying only so much of their state funds/local tax revenues to the public school retirement system as the law requires. And surely they have a legally protected interest in pursuing a remedy under the now-final judgment these plaintiffs obtained that the retirement system had violated the law in requiring these plaintiffs to contribute an amount calculated under an illegal, regulation that included health benefits in the salary base. See Savannah R-III School District v. Public School Retirement System, 912 S.W.2d 574 (Mo.App.1995).
The majority admits that its analysis “would be different had any one of the named parties been a teacher.” (Op. at 859). Under Jones, that ends the inquiry. The school districts can sue because an individual could pursue the remedy.
The second proposition that lurks beneath the surface of the majority’s holding is much more troubling. According to the majority and the cases on which it relies, the state can waive the application of unequivocal constitutional provisions prohibiting certain kinds of legislation if it chooses to do so.
This is troubling because the plain language of the constitution is so contrary to the majority’s position. Article I states:
In order to assert our rights, acknowledge our duties, and proclaim the principles on which our government is founded, we declare:
ijc ^ ‡ ‡
Section 18. That no_law_retro-spective in its operation_can be enacted.
(Emphasis added.) Mo. Const, art. I, sec. 13.
The language of the constitution is clear. It admits no exceptions nor does it permit the legislature to waive its limitations for any purpose. Yet, the majority declares that this principle upon which Missouri government is founded does not limit the legislature except when the legislature legislates in a manner directly affecting citizens.
No person voting to adopt this provision of the constitution would believe what the majority says this language permits. No person would assume that the word “no” really means “sometimes the legislature may.” And yet, that is where this ease leads us by relying on judicial creations that feed off one another while ignoring the constitution’s plain words.
And are those judicial creations the sort that ought to recited by rote, especially in light on the plain language of the constitution? A brief look at the history of the exception upon which the majority relies reveals its questionable parentage.
In 1877, the United States Supreme Court decided that a provision of the Louisiana constitution prohibiting retrospective laws did not apply “to legislation recognizing or *862affirming binding obligations of the State.” New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 655, 24 L.Ed. 521 (1877). Although one wonders on what authority the United States Supreme Court claimed to interpret purely state constitutional provisions, the statement apparently recognizes without explicitly saying so, that under the federal constitution, a state could not adopt legislation “impairing the obligation of contracts.” U.S. Const, art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1. That this is so is beyond serious argument.
This Court’s opinion in Graham Paper Co. v. Gehner, 332 Mo. 155, 59 S.W.2d 49, 51-2 (banc 1933), is the lynehpin of the majority’s position in this case. Gehner offers no analysis of the Missouri constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws. Instead, it adopts without critical assessment the dicta in New Orleans v. Clark and cites Corpus Juris. The majority also cites State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb, 467 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Mo. banc 1971). Cobb merely cites Gehner and Corpus Juris, and Corpus Juris Secundum, the last of these being an update of Corpus Juris.
Stare decisis serves exceedingly well in most instances. Precedent should be given the benefit of the doubt when applied as a product of a reasoned process. But as this case shows, terse, blind acceptance of precedent proves too incestuous when the people’s constitution is at stake.
There exists a second line of cases that say that the retrospective operation prohibition does not apply unless the law affects a past transaction or vested right. See Hope Mutual Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483, 484 (1866); Andres v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 730 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Mo. banc 1987). If one were to apply this line of cases, which reasoned stare decisis would dictate we do, the plaintiffs in this case would remain in court. This is because the new statute terminates their pre-existing, vested right to maintain an action for monies had and received. Palo v. Stangler, 943 S.W.2d 683, (Mo.App.1997).
Thomas Jefferson described a written constitution as a “peculiar security.” He supposed that committing a constitution to writing and placing it where all could consult its text might protect the nation and its inhabitants against persons holding interpretive office who might otherwise ignore fundamental precepts in favor of the pressures of expediency and the demands of personal preference. Jefferson’s notion apparently rested on the yet-untested hope that the American judiciary would prefer the intention of the people expressed in the words of their constitutions over the acts of their agents conspiring in legislative bodies. The cases on which the majority opinion relies are evidence enough that Jefferson’s hope held no long-term promise.
I would employ the unambiguous words of the constitution — not the policy creations of judges — to determine the meaning of the constitution. In employing that standard, it is apparent that section 169.030.3 applies to transactions that took place prior to the effective date of the statute. This is definition-ally a law retrospective in operation that affects a vested right. Since the constitution permits no such law, I would declare section 169.030.3 unconstitutional and would permit the school district plaintiffs in this case to continue their efforts to recover monies paid the retirement system under an unlawful regulation.