Court Opinion

ID: 9538104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:30:35.911595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:30.874428
License: Public Domain

WELCH, J.
(dissenting). I think in the body of the opinion and in the conclusion reached there is a disregard and a violation of the principle of law stated in the first paragraph of the syllabus.
It is not shown or indicated that in this unusual case the constitutionally guaranteed private rights of “Choctaw” could have been afforded any character of protection whatever except by the order made.
It seems to me that in making the order that was made the Commission was exercising the police power with due regard for the constitutionally guaranteed private rights of “Choctaw” and in the interest of the public welfare. It seems that the Commission considered it not necessary to impose such burden on “Choctaw” as to almost destroy it in the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed private rights of “Company.” The Commission apparently was diligently seeking to protect such rights of “Company”, and also to give due regard to the rights of “Choctaw” to continue to exist.
I think a more thorough application of the syllabus rule above mentioned might well lead to an affirmance of the order appealed from.
There is ample authority by statute and decision sustaining the power of the Commission, and making it the duty of the Commission, to protect private rights as well as they can be protected along with the enforcement of the proration laws.
In the opinion (p. 259 of 205 Okla.) the majority assumes or indicates a conclusion that the Commission order requires “Company” to “surrender” its property to another corporation. This overlooks the fact that “Choctaw” is to pay for the gas it receives at what apparently is a fair price at the place and in the manner it is to receive it, since the opinion recites nothing to the contrary as to the price fixed.
In the opinion (p. 260 of 205 Okla.) appears this statement which I heartily approve, to wit:
“Although private rights yield to the exercise of the police power, they are not to be totally annihilated thereby, or interfered with to a greater extent than reasonably necessary, taking into consideration the real object to be accomplished. Grison Oil Corp. v. Corp. Comm., supra.” (186 Okla. 548, 99 P. 2d 134.)
It seems to me the Commission was acting in compliance with that rule when it undertook to provide that although the private rights of “Choctaw” should yield to the police power, they are not totally annihilated thereby, or interfered with to a greater extent than reasonably necessary.
When “Choctaw” produces this gas it will have same as a commodity for *262sale. It is in the business of producing and selling gas. When it sells some of it to “Choctaw”, assuming the price is fair, it is not hurt, assuming it has ample gas to supply its other customers. Thus its business interest is promoted, and at the same time “Choctaw” is permitted to continue to exist. Why not affirm the order of the Commission and thereby approve this exercise of the police power with the demonstrated scrupulous regard for constitutionally guaranteed private rights of both “Company” and “Choctaw”, and in the public welfare of the cities and the state institution referred to?