Court Opinion

ID: 9540882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:28.992264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:27.426093
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because, in my opinion, the interpretation of the phrase "interest in real property" as it is used in TR. 4.4(A)(5) is too narrow. The purpose of adopting a "long arm" statute is to extend to the maximum the ability to obtain personal service on non-residents with the limitation that such personal jurisdiction comports with the 14th Amendment due process requirements described in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. See 1 Harvey, Indiana Practice, Rule 4.4 at p. 128.
Since T.R. 4.4(A)(5) places no restriction on the type of interest in real property necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction the lien aspect of a mortgage referred to in Indiana Department of State Revenue et al. v. Colpaert Realty Corp. (1952), 281 Ind. 463, 109 N.E.2d 415 is adequate when considered in the context and purpose of the rule.
Additionally, I am of the opinion that the quote in the majority opinion from the case of Shaffer v. Heitner (1977), 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 58 L.Ed.2d 683, provides a proper foundation for both the letter and spirit of T.R. 4.4(A)(5) and its future application in this jurisdiction.