Court Opinion

ID: 9775320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:53:58.300359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.031753
License: Public Domain

CARVER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because opinion evidence as to lost profits does not discharge a burden of proof to show “the probable cost to the plaintiff of completing performance” consisting of “proof of the value of materials, labor, and skill required as of the time of breach.”
My view is compelled by Farris v. Smith Erectors, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref’d) from which I quote and emphasize as follows:
*246A contractor who is unjustifiably prevented by the owner from finishing his work may sue and recover as provided by the contract. Smith v. Lipscomb, 13 Tex. 532 (Tex.Sup.1855); Dockery v. Durham, 3 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1927, writ dism’d). His recovery in such case is measured by the difference between the contract price and what it would have cost him to carry out the contract. Waco Tap R. Co. v. Shirley, 45 Tex. 355 (Tex.Sup.1876); Carras v. Birge, 211 S.W.2d 998 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1948, writ ref. n.r.e.). Although he is entitled to recover the profits which the contract would have yielded, he is not entitled to receive, if he has only partially performed the contract, the same amount of money to which he would have been entitled had it been fully executed. Porter v. Burkett, 65 Tex. 383 (Tex.Sup.1886). The burden of proof is upon the contractor to provide the data from which such damages may be computed. Tower Contracting Company v. Flores, 294 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1956, aff’d as modified, 157 Tex. 297, 302 S.W.2d 396). See also 17 A.L.R.2d 968, 988, Sec. 7. This would consist of evidence of the contract price and proof of the probable cost to the plaintiff of completing performance. 13 Am.Jur.2d, Building and Construction Contracts, Sec. 122, pp. 112-113. The probable cost of completing the work might be established by proof of the value of materials, labor and skill required as of the time of the breach. Carras v. Birge, supra; Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 346, pp. 578-80.
A review of the record fails to disclose evidence from which the trial court could have ascertained the probable cost of completing the work under Farris’ contract. Accordingly the trial court could not measure what Farris’ profit would have been had he completed the work. [Emphasis added.]
516 S.W.2d at 283-284.
The majority attempts to justify its holding by relying upon Nichols v. Seale, 493 S.W.2d 589, 595 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1973, rev’d other grounds, 505 S.W.2d 251; however, Nichols may not be so broadly read as to permit a witness, lay or expert, to voice as fact a conclusion based on a broad segment of data. Nichols examined a summary judgment affidavit challenged as being merely conclusory and not reflecting “such facts as would be admissible in evidence” as required by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166-A(e). Chief Justice Guittard in Nichols stated:
No precise line can be drawn between an admissible statement of fact and an inadmissible opinion or conclusion. Almost all testimony involves inferences from sensory data. Rarely can a witness communicate exactly what he saw or heard. He must select, summarize and interpret past impressions as he presently remembers them. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1919 (3d Ed.1940); McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Texas L. Rev. 109, 111 (1945). Trials would be prolonged intolerably if all witnesses were required to detail all relevant data to the full extent of their ability. A witness may testify that an event occurred “about noon” without saying first whether he looked at his watch, observed the position of the sun, or consulted the state of his stomach, although he is subject to cross-examination on these matters. On the other hand, if all witnesses in a trial merely express their opinions on the ultimate issues to be decided, too much reliance is placed on their intelligence, judgment and integrity and the jury does not have adequate data for its decision. The distinction is one of degree depending on how large a segment of data the statement encompasses. 2 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 1394 (2d Ed.1956). The narrower the segment, the more likely the court is to treat the statement as one of fact, as in the example of the estimate of the time of day. The broader the segment of data encompassed by a witness’ statement, the more likely the court is to regard it as an inadmissible conclusion and to require the facts to be stated more *247specifically so that the jury can draw its own inferences. [Emphasis added.]
493 S.W.2d at 593.
It is difficult for me to conceive a broader segment of data than the probable cost of performing a landscape contract, including materials, labor, and skill. Relying on Nichols, I would “require the facts (as to cost of completion) to be stated more specifically so that the jury can draw its own inferences.” I would hold in this case that Williams’ opinion of his lost profits was not evidence of his cost of performance, but was rather an inadmissible conclusion upon which a verdict may not lie. Since the record provides no other proof of damages, the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment has no support in the record.