Court Opinion

ID: 9633987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:10:54.010086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:46.729833
License: Public Domain

Justice ERICKSON,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the Denver District Court did not exceed its jurisdiction by ordering the Department of Corrections (DOC) to remove backlogged, state-sentenced prisoners from the Denver County Jail before it removed state-sentenced prisoners from other county jails. See maj. op. at 55-56. In People v. Lockhart, 699 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Colo.1985), we held that DOC officials are officers of the court for the limited purpose of taking custody of prisoners and that a district court has jurisdiction to direct DOC officials to take custody of such prisoners. Here, the Denver District Court, on September 28, 1987, issued a final order requiring the DOC to remove backlogged, state-sentenced prisoners from the Denver County Jail. The DOC failed to comply with the Denver District Court order and the Denver District Court properly exercised its jurisdiction to enforce that order in a contempt proceeding. See id.; In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 511 (Colo.1991) (stating that the judiciary has the power to enforce its own judgments and orders). Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals holding that the Denver District Court may order the DOC to remove state-sentenced prisoners from the Denver County Jail prior to removing state-sentenced prisoners from other county jails.
I respectfully dissent from the holding in part IV of the majority opinion that the Denver District Court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the DOC to disregard the April 2,1991, order entered by the Arapahoe County District Court in People v. Christy, No. 89CR77 (Arapahoe County Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 1991) (Arapahoe Order). See maj. op. at 57-58. In my view, the Arapahoe Order was void insofar as it conflicted with the Denver District Court’s September 28, 1987, order.
The Denver District court had jurisdiction over the DOC and the subject matter when it issued its September 28,1987, order concerning removal of state-sentenced prisoners from the Denver County Jail. The Arapahoe County District Court entered its 1991 order setting up a system of statewide prioritization of backlogged, state-sentenced prisoners more than four years after the Denver District Court’s order.
In Public Service Co. v. Miller, 135 Colo. 575, 313 P.2d 998 (1957), we established that the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is controlled by the principle of priority, stating: It seems that hornbook law would prevent a conflict of decisions of two courts of concur*59rent jurisdiction and avoid unnecessary duplication and multiplicity of suits. It has long been settled that the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter has exclusive jurisdiction.
Id. at 577, 313 P.2d at 999; see also Utilities Bd. of Lamar v. Southeast Colo. Power Ass’n., 171 Colo. 456, 458, 468 P.2d 36, 37 (1970) (“It is familiar law that, once a court takes jurisdiction of an issue and of parties, it thereafter has exclusive jurisdiction of the subject and matters ancillary thereto.”).
I agree with the cross-petitioners that “notwithstanding the existence of the Denver order, the Arapahoe County District Court entered an order which either conflicted with, changed or negated all or parts of the Denver order.” Because the Denver District court first acquired j mis diction over the parties and the subject matter, the Arapahoe County District Court lacked jurisdiction to modify the Denver District Court’s order. Thus, the Arapahoe Order was void to the extent that it conflicted with the Denver District Court’s order and the Denver District Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in enjoining the DOC from following the Arapahoe Order. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from part IV of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to say that Justice KIRSHBAUM and Justice MULLARKEY join in this concurrence and dissent.