Court Opinion

ID: 9663025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:07.374786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.978254
License: Public Domain

HEDGES, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the addition of a “Mother Hubbard” clause to an order granting summary judgment does not transform an otherwise partial summary judgment into a final summary judgment. Because this holding is in conflict with the supreme court’s opinion in Mafrige v. Ross, I respectfully dissent. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.1993).
I would hold that the November 4, 1994 summary judgment is a final judgment because of the inclusion of the Mother Hubbard clause. See id. at 592. In Mafrige, the supreme court concluded that the inclusion of “Mother Hubbard” language or its equivalent in an order granting summary judgment makes an otherwise partial summary judgment final for appeal purposes.1 Id. at 590. The court also stated that “[i]f a summary judgment order appears to be final, as evidenced by the inclusion of language purporting to dispose of all claims or parties; the judgment should be treated as final for purposes of appeal.” Id. at 592. In the present case, the district court unquestionably considered the November 4,1994 to be final: “It appearing to the Court that the ruling set forth herein disposes of all parties and all issues in this action, this is a Final Judgment. All other relief not expressly granted herein is hereby denied.”
The majority argues that Mafrige allows the district court to change its “clear intent” to render a final judgment after the date of the judgment’s rendition. The district court in this ease dearly intended the November 4, 1994 to be final (“It appearing to the Court that the ruling set forth herein disposes of all parties and all issues in this action, this is a Final Judgment.”), but the majority rechar-acterizes the November 4 final judgment as an interlocutory judgment based on the district court’s January 23, 1995 change of heart. The district court, of course, had full power to render a corrected or modified judgment if any such judgment was rendered before the district court’s plenary jurisdiction over the November 4 final judgment lapsed, 1. e., on or before December 5, 1994. Tex. R.Civ.P. 329b, 4.
In essence, the majority would either allow a trial court to correct or modify a final summary judgment outside the court’s plenary jurisdiction over the judgment, or allow interpretation of an unambiguous judgment by extrinsic evidence. I cannot agree with either of these approaches because they call the judgment’s finality into question for a potentially indefinite period of time. If a party believes that a judgment rendered against it is erroneous, then the law requires the party to bring a timely attack on that judgment.2 Although our justice system certainly strives to render errorless judgments, public policy demands that all judgments, *57including erroneous ones, become final at some definite point in time.
I am willing to entertain the argument that the trial court clerk’s refusal to prepare a timely designated transcript is a unique situation that reheves the party of the duty to request a motion for extension of time to file the record. See generally Tex.R.App.P. 54(c).3 I am not willing, however, to tinker with the general rules regarding finality of judgments. The majority’s solution to the difficult procedural problem this appeal presents will cause far, far more problems than it will cure.
I would either (1) overrule the motion for rehearing and thus dismiss the appeal because the transcript was not timely filed or (2) grant the motion for rehearing and hold that the failure to file the transcript timely was not the appellants’ responsibility. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The general rule is, of course, that a civil appeal may only be prosecuted from a final judgment. Tex.Civ.Peac & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 1986); North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (1966). The exception to this rule is that the legislature may make interlocutory orders appealable by statute (and presumably by court rule). Continental Mach. Tool Co. v. Merritt, 620 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1981, writ dism’d); see Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, sec. 1, § 15.003(c), 1995 Tex.Sess.Law Serv. 978, 979 (Vernon) (to be codified at TexCiv.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.003(c)) (order allowing or denying intervention or joinder when venue is affected); TexCiv.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (general list of appealable interlocutory orders); Act of May 26, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 588, sec. 1, § 171.017, 1995 Tex. Sess.Law Serv. 3402, 3408 (Vernon) (to be codi-fled at TexCiv.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 171.017) (certain orders related to arbitration); TexFam. Code Ann §§ 3.58(g) (Vernon 1993) (order appointing a receiver in a divorce), 11.19 (Vernon 1986) (certain orders related to the parent-child relationship) & 56.01(c) (Vernon Supp.1995) (certain orders related to juveniles); TexHealth & Safety Code Ann. §§ 81.191 (order for management of person with communicable disease), 574.070(e) (order for mental health services) (Vernon 1992); Tex.Prob.Code Ann. § 5(f) (Vernon 1992) (final probate orders); TexR.Civ.P. 76a(8) (order sealing a court’s file).

. Texas law already allows four direct attacks on a final judgment: (1) motion for new trial or motion to modify or correct the judgment; (2) appeal; (3) writ of error; and (4) bill of review.

. The proposed amendments to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure would eliminate this situation entirely by making it the joint responsibility of the trial court and appellate clerks to prepare and deliver the transcript to the court of appeals.