Court Opinion

ID: 9792929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:39:32.587317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:49.435853
License: Public Domain

NOYES, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for two reasons: waiver of rights and lack of jurisdiction.
Waiver of Rights
These victims waived their restitution rights by failing to act despite having notice of the need for action. They received and ignored letters from both the county attorney and the probation office requesting them to contact the probation officer and give information about their losses and their sentencing recommendation. The victims admitted to the court that they received the notice, did *455nothing, and had no explanation for why they did nothing.
A.R.S. section 13-804(D) (Supp.1993) requires the probation office to “make reasonable efforts to contact any victim.” The victims were in fact contacted in this case, by mail, but they did not respond. The presentence report advises: “As the victim has failed to respond to this officer’s request for restitution, no restitution will be recommended to the court.” If the court or the county attorney had a problem with the sufficiency of the probation officer’s investigation or report, the time to do something about it was prior to sentencing. See AR.S. § 13-804(F) (“If the court does not have sufficient evidence to support a finding of the amount of restitution or the manner in which the restitution should be paid, it may conduct a hearing upon the issue----”); see also AR.S. § 13-804(G) (providing that the restitution order “may be supported by evidence or information introduced or submitted to the court before sentencing or any evidence previously heard by the judge during the proceedings”) (emphasis supplied).
Lack of Jurisdiction
Rule 26.16(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: “The judgment of conviction and the sentence thereon are complete and valid as of the time of their oral pronouncement in open court.” Similarly, the suspension of sentence and imposition of probation is final and complete at the time of pronouncement by the court. Burton v. Superior Ct., 27 Ariz.App. 797, 800, 558 P.2d 992, 995 (App.1977) (citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 16 and State v. Fuentes, 26 Ariz.App. 444, 549 P.2d 224, approved, 113 Ariz. 285, 551 P.2d 554 (1976)). Although the court can modify or add to the conditions of probation during the term of probation, AR.S. § 13-901(0 (Supp.1993), it cannot increase the amount of court-ordered payments unless defendant has violated probation. Burton, 27 Ariz.App. at 800, 558 P.2d at 995.
The majority distinguishes Burton on its facts and on grounds that its correctness has been called into question by State v. Foy, 176 Ariz. 166, 859 P.2d 789 (App.1993), State v. Holguin, 870 P.2d 407 (App.1993), and State v. Steffy, 173 Ariz. 90, 839 P.2d 1135 (App.1992). Although none of these cases discusses Burton, I respectfully suggest that two are distinguishable from Burton and the other is consistent with it. Steffy addresses an insurance reimbursement issue and does nothing to suggest that the court has jurisdiction to order a post-judgment increase in restitution. Foy reaches a different result than Burton, but Foy did not have to reach the jurisdictional issue; it struck a post-judgment increase in restitution on the facts.
Holguin is consistent with Burton. In Holguin, restitution was not ordered at sentencing because the victim was out of contact in Saudi Arabia. 870 P.2d at 409. By the time the defendant was back in court on a petition to revoke probation, the victim was in contact with the court. Id. At resentencing, the court imposed restitution and was affirmed on appeal. Id., 870 P.2d at 409. Holguin holds that “the assessment of restitution at a sentencing proceeding after the failure to complete a suspended sentence is appropriate.” 870 P.2d at 410. Burton holds that “[wjhere additional burdens are imposed on the probationer, such as additional restitution, as in this case, the record must contain evidence that the probationer violated a condition of probation upon which to base the burden.” 27 Ariz.App. at 800, 558 P.2d at 995.
The majority also implies that Burton has been called into question by Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1 (“Victims’ Bill of Rights^). The Victims’ Bill of Rights does many things, but I respectfully suggest that it cannot be fairly construed to change existing law regarding a trial court’s jurisdiction on post-sentence restitution issues. AR.S. section 13-805(A) (Supp.1993), which defines the trial court’s post-sentence jurisdiction regarding restitution and other court-ordered payments, provides that “[t]he trial court shall retain jurisdiction of the case for purposes of modifying the manner in which court-ordered payments are made until paid in full, or until the defendant’s sentence expires.” (Emphasis supplied.) Nothing in that statute confers jurisdiction on the court for a post-sentence increase in the amount of a court-ordered payment.
*456I respectfully suggest that we should follow the reasoning and policy expressed in Burton. If Appellant is ever resentenced following probation violation proceedings, the trial court can at that time revisit the restitution issue.