Court Opinion

ID: 9407189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 00:00:33.616338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:36.031928
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30557        Document: 00516809759             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-30557
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                                     July 5, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Keith Jenkins,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:22-CR-64-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Keith Jenkins pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess
   with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine (count one) and
   possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute (count
   two). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)–(B), 846. Relying on the
   presentence investigation report (PSR), the district court determined that,

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-30557

   pursuant to Sentencing Guideline § 5G1.1(c)(2), the Guidelines required
   count one’s statutory minimum of 120-months’              imprisonment and
   sentenced Jenkins accordingly. See § 841(b)(1)(A) (count one carrying 10-
   year mandatory minimum), (b)(1)(B) (count two carrying five-year
   mandatory minimum); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2) (“[T]he sentence may be
   imposed at any point within the applicable guideline range, provided that the
   sentence . . . is not less than any statutorily required minimum sentence”.).
          Jenkins challenges his sentence as procedurally and substantively
   unreasonable. He maintains the district court procedurally erred by failing to
   apply the First Step Act of 2018’s (FSA) safety-valve provision, 18 U.S.C. §
   3553(f); imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence; and failed to explain
   its reasons for the sentence. The Government agrees that Jenkins was eligible
   for the statutory safety valve and concedes that the court, by failing to apply
   the provision, miscalculated the Guidelines sentencing range.
          Although post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, the district
   court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating
   the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51
   (2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved objection to
   an ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an
   abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 51; United States v. Delgado-Martinez,
   564 F.3d 750, 751–53 (5th Cir. 2009). In that respect, for issues preserved in
   district court, its application of the Guidelines—including its legal
   interpretation of § 3553(f)—is reviewed de novo; its factual findings, only for
   clear error. E.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th
   Cir. 2008); United States v. Towns, 718 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2013).
          As noted, the parties agree that Jenkins was eligible for FSA’s safety-
   valve provision. It states that, in cases involving defendants convicted of
   certain controlled-substance offenses who meet specified criteria, a district

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                                    No. 22-30557

   court “shall impose a sentence pursuant to Guidelines”, as promulgated by
   the U.S. Sentencing Commission, “without regard to any statutory
   minimum sentence”. § 3553(f) (emphasis added); see United States v. Miller,
   179 F.3d 961, 964 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The safety valve provision is an exception
   to the general rule under the Guidelines that, if the statutory mandatory
   minimum sentence is greater than the maximum Guideline range, the
   statutory sentence must be the Guideline sentence.”).
          The Guidelines also include a safety-valve provision, which generally
   mirrors § 3553(f), and provides a two-level offense level reduction for
   defendants who satisfy the safety-valve requirements.            See U.S.S.G.
   §§ 2D1.1(b)(18); 5C1.2(a).     The Guidelines, however, have not been
   amended since passage of FSA; therefore, the Guidelines safety valve
   currently excludes defendants with more than one criminal-history point,
   while the statutory safety valve does not. See § 3553(f); § 5C1.2(a)(1).
          The PSR determined that Jenkins’ Guidelines sentence was 120
   months, even though the mandatory minimum should not have applied
   because Jenkins qualified for the § 3553(f) safety valve. See § 841(b)(1)(A);
   § 3553(f).    The court adopted the PSR, including this Guidelines
   miscalculation. Further, the PSR erroneously stated that, pursuant to FSA,
   the court had the discretion to grant a two-level reduction to the offense level
   even though Jenkins had more than one criminal-history point. In doing so,
   the PSR and the court conflated § 3553(f) with § 5C1.2(a)(1). The court’s
   remarks—specifically, the statement that it “found no reason” to apply the
   safety valve—also demonstrate it believed the application of FSA’s safety
   valve was discretionary.
          Because the error affected “the district court’s selection of the
   sentence imposed”, it was not harmless, and we need not consider Jenkins’
   other assertions concerning substantive reasonableness and the court’s

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   failure to state reasons for the sentence. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d at 753
   (citation omitted).
          The conviction is AFFIRMED; the sentence VACATED; and this
   matter is REMANDED to district court for resentencing consistent with
   the FSA.

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