Court Opinion

ID: 9525532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:04:40.171001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:19.449225
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Fitzgerald concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Carman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke. Justice Karmeier took no part in the decision. OPINION The circuit court of Clinton County declared unconstitutional section 6 — 206(a) (43) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(43) (West 2008)) on due process grounds. As applied in this case, section 6 — 206(a)(43) requires suspension of driving privileges if a person receives court supervision for unlawful consumption of alcohol under 21 years of age. Illinois Secretary of State Jesse White (Secretary) appealed the circuit court’s judgment directly to this court under Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 111. 2d R. 603). For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment declaring section 6 — 206(a) (43) unconstitutional. I. BACKGROUND The defendants in this consolidated appeal, Zachary R. Boeckmann and Chelsey M. Maschhoff, were each charged with unlawful consumption of alcohol by a person under 21 years of age (235 ILCS 5/6 — 20(e) (West 2008)). The defendants filed motions to declare unconstitutional sections 6 — 206(a)(38) and (a)(43) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(38), (a)(43) (West 2008)). Those sections generally authorize the Secretary of State to suspend or revoke a defendant’s driving privileges upon conviction or disposition of court supervision for the charged offenses. Defendants alleged sections 6 — 206(a) (38) and (a) (43) violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. Defendants pled guilty to unlawful consumption of alcohol as charged. The trial court placed them on court supervision for 90 days and, the following day, declared sections 6 — 206(a)(38) and (a) (43) unconstitutional. After those orders were filed, the Secretary entered an appearance and the trial court granted him leave to file petitions to vacate the findings of unconstitutionality. In his petitions, the Secretary asserted he did not receive notice of the defendants’ motions seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. In response to the petitions, the trial court vacated its orders declaring sections 6 — 206(a) (38) and (a) (43) unconstitutional and allowed the defendants to file supplemental motions challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Defendants then filed motions alleging sections 6 — 206(a)(38) and (a)(43), as applied, violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions as well as the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The Secretary stipulated that under section 6 — 206(a) (43) of the Vehicle Code, he was required to suspend for three months the driving privileges of any person receiving court supervision for a violation of section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Control Act (235 ILCS 5/6 — 20 (West 2008)). The trial court subsequently found section 6 — 206(a)(43) unconstitutional on due process grounds as applied to the defendants. The trial court held this court’s decision in People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), controlled because a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the offenses. The defendants’ other constitutional challenges based on the equal protection and proportionate penalties clauses were rejected by the trial court. The trial court made the additional findings mandated by Supreme Court Rule 18 (210 111. 2d R. 18), when a statute is declared unconstitutional. The Secretary appealed the trial court’s orders declaring section 6 — 206(a)(43) unconstitutional directly to this court as permitted by Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603). II. ANALYSIS The Secretary contends the trial court erred in finding section 6 — 206(a)(43) violates due process as applied to the defendants. According to the Secretary, suspension of the defendants’ driving privileges for unlawful consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in highway safety. The Secretary maintains that preventing young people who consume alcohol from driving is a reasonable means of furthering the interest in highway safety. The Secretary also argues the suspension of defendants’ driving privileges under section 6 — 206(a)(43) is a reasonable means of promoting the legitimate public interest in deterring underage consumption of alcohol. Citing this court’s decision in Lindner, defendants contend that suspending their driving privileges does not bear a rational relationship to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles because no vehicle was involved in the commission of their offenses. Defendants further argue suspension of driving privileges in all cases of underage consumption of alcohol is not a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in highway safety. We begin by noting that statutes are presumed constitutional. People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 178, 199 (2009). To rebut the presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish a constitutional violation. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 200 (2009). This court must construe a statute in a manner upholding its constitutionality if reasonably possible. Cook County Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (2009). Accordingly, we will resolve any doubt on the construction of a statute in favor of its validity. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008). The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 263 (2008). This court has held a driver’s license is a nonfundamental property interest. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 179. When a statute does not impact a fundamental constitutional right, the applicable standard for reviewing whether it conforms with substantive due process is the rational basis test. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d at 205. Generally, a statute violates the constitutional guarantee of due process under the rational basis test if it does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose, or is arbitrary or discriminatory. Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 307; Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 122 (2004); Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. In applying the rational basis test, we must identify the public interest the statute is intended to protect, determine whether the statute bears a rational relationship to that interest, and examine whether the method chosen to protect or further that interest is reasonable. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. Rational basis review is highly deferential, but it is not “toothless.” People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 596 (2006), quoting Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389, 394, 97 S. Ct. 431, 434 (1976). Legislation must be upheld if there is a conceivable basis for finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. The legislature’s judgments in drafting a statute are not subject to judicial fact finding and “may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003). We must first determine the public interest section 6 — 206(a)(43) is intended to protect. In examining the public interest of similar Vehicle Code provisions in Lindner, this court considered the Vehicle Code as a whole, the substantive provisions of the challenged sections, and the Vehicle Code’s statement of purpose. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. We observed that the stated purpose of the Vehicle Code contained in section 6 — 204(a) is preventing people from driving if they demonstrate an unfitness to operate a motor vehicle safely. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Further, the challenged statute sections generally enumerate offenses connected to operating or owning a vehicle safely and legally. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. We concluded, therefore, that the challenged provisions were intended to protect the public interest in “the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. The statement of purpose in section 6 — 204 is still directed at preventing people from driving after they have shown an unfitness to operate a vehicle safely. 625 ILCS 5/6 — 204(a) (West 2008). Additionally, the statute section challenged here describes offenses and behavior largely connected to operating a motor vehicle safely and legally. 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206 (West 2008). Accordingly, as in Lindner, we conclude section 6 — 206 is intended to promote the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. We must, therefore, determine whether section 6 — 206(a)(43) bears a reasonable relationship to the public interest in the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. As applied in this case, section 6 — 206(a) (43) provides for suspension of driving privileges when a person has received court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/6— 206(a)(43) (West 2008). The statute will be upheld if a conceivable basis exists for finding it rationally related to the identified legitimate public interest. See Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. Here, the General Assembly may have believed that a young person who has a driver’s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving after consuming alcohol unquestionably furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. Defendants, nonetheless, contend this court’s decision in Lindner compels a finding that section 6 — 206(a) (43) violates due process. According to defendants, Lindner held that suspending driving privileges violates the constitutional guarantee of due process if a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the offense. In Lindner, the dispute focused on identifying the public interest the challenged statute was intended to protect. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. This court noted that the State apparently conceded the unconstitutionality of the statute if the defendant’s argument on the statute’s purpose were accepted. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180-81. We agreed with the defendant’s argument that the statute served the public interest in the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Without any argument from the State on the point, we then concluded revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license did not bear a reasonable relationship to that public interest because a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the defendant’s sex offenses. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83. Defendants assert this court should follow “[t]he principle in Lindner that if no car is involved, like here, then to suspend driving privileges would violate due process.” Defendants, however, rely on a narrow reading of Lindner. We have subsequently explained the rationale in Lindner, stating “[tjhere was no rational relationship between sex offenders and safe driving, and on that basis the statute was found unconstitutional.” People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1991), citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 183. We have further explained that in Lindner, the revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license did not bear a rational relationship to the public interest to be served because the defendant’s crimes “neither involved a motor vehicle nor bore any rational relationship to his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely.” Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 604, citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83. Accordingly, the rationale in Lindner is broader than simply determining whether a vehicle was involved in the offense. Rather, the critical determination is whether the revocation of driving privileges bears a rational relationship to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles. In Lindner, there was no connection between the defendant’s sex offenses and his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. In contrast, defendants’ underage consumption of alcohol would certainly impact their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. The legislature could have rationally believed young people who have a driver’s license and consume alcohol illegally may also drive after consuming alcohol, regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved in the charged offense. On this point, we note that the appellate court has held suspension of driving privileges for the use of false identification in an attempt to obtain alcohol is rationally related to the safe and legal operation of a motor vehicle. Freed v. Ryan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 952, 957 (1998). The appellate court held the legislature could rationally speculate that licensees under 21 years of age may use false identification to obtain alcohol, leading on balance to an increase in driving under the influence or driving after consuming alcohol. Freed, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 957. See also Horvath v. White, 358 Ill. App. 3d 844, 852-53 (2005) (distinguishing Lindner and holding suspension of driver’s license for possession of another’s identification card is rationally related to the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, particularly when the identification card reflected a legal drinking age). We likewise conclude that suspension of defendants’ driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. Defendants also contend that suspending their driving privileges is not a reasonable method of protecting the public interest because they had no plans to drive after consuming alcohol. As we have found, there is a rational relationship between suspending a person’s driver’s license for underage consumption of alcohol and the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved in the particular offense. The legislature may reasonably determine a young person consuming alcohol under the legal age may also drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving after consuming alcohol furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. We, therefore, conclude that suspension of defendants’ driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol is a reasonable method of promoting the public interest despite the absence of a motor vehicle or plans to drive in these circumstances. We further note that courts from other jurisdictions have upheld similar statutes against substantive due process challenges. See State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171-72, 125 P.3d 522, 527-28 (2005) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver’s license suspension for underage purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol); State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 268 (Alaska 2000) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring revocation of driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol); People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 494 (1991) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring suspension of driving privileges for underage possession of alcohol); Commonwealth v. Strunk, 400 Pa. Super. 25, 33-34, 582 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1990) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring driver’s license suspension for underage possession or consumption of alcohol). Those courts have generally recognized a rational relationship between suspending a person’s driver’s license for underage possession or consumption of alcohol and the governmental interest in highway safety. See Bennett, 142 Idaho at 172, 125 P.3d at 528; Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d at 267-68; Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493-94. While these decisions are not binding on this court, they may be considered as persuasive authority. See People ex rel. O’Malley v. 6323 North LaCrosse Avenue, 158 Ill. 2d 453, 458-59 (1994); Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 275 (1957). The special concurrence asserts Lindner was wrongly decided and should be overruled because it defined the public purpose of the statute too narrowly. The parties do not ask this court to overrule Lindner or present any argument on that issue, however. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this court’s prior decisions should not be overturned absent “good cause” or “compelling reasons.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007). Lindner engaged in a detailed analysis of the statute’s purpose that has been accepted for more than 21 years. Lindner should not be overruled without the benefit of a developed argument by the parties on the issue. We need not overrule Lindner to conclude that the license suspensions in this case do not offend due process. We need only apply the highly deferential rational basis standard to decide that the license suspensions do not violate defendants’ constitutional rights to due process. The rational basis test is satisfied if there is a conceivable basis for finding a statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. As discussed above, the weight of authority from our appellate court and other jurisdictions supports a finding that suspension of driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest in highway safety. Accordingly, without any argument from the parties on the issue, we should not reach Lindner. Moreover, overruling Lindner will not affect the result in this case. Of course, parties in a future case may argue that Lindner should be overruled and this court may properly consider the issue at that time. We only conclude that it is not appropriate to address the issue in this case where the parties have not raised or argued it. In sum, we conclude that suspending defendants’ driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol is rationally related to the legitimate public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. Section 6 — 206(a) (43), as applied in this case, provides a reasonable method of furthering that interest. Accordingly, section 6 — 206(a)(43) does not violate defendants’ constitutional rights to substantive due process. Defendants also argue section 6 — 206(a)(43) is unconstitutionally arbitrary as applied because the Secretary does not exercise the discretion granted by the statute in determining whether to suspend a person’s driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol. Rather, the Secretary issues a suspension in every case. Defendants contend the Secretary’s failure to exercise discretion is arbitrary and results in a due process violation. In his reply to this argument, the Secretary contends he does not have discretion in determining whether to suspend a person’s driving privileges under section 6 — 206(a)(43). The Secretary maintains section 6 — 206(a)(43) requires a three-month suspension when a person receives court supervision for underage consumption of alcohol. Defendants’ argument is premised on the construction of section 6 — 206(a)(43) as granting the Secretary discretion in determining whether to suspend a person’s driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol. Accordingly, this argument presents a question of statutory construction subject to de novo review. See People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 44 (2009). The fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009). The best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (2009). Section 6 — 206 of the Vehicle Code is entitled, “Discretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit; Right to a hearing.” 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206 (West 2008). Section 6 — 206 generally authorizes the Secretary to issue a suspension or revocation of driving privileges in 45 enumerated circumstances. In many of those circumstances, the statutory language is purely discretionary. For instance, subsection (a)(3) allows the Secretary to suspend or revoke driving privileges upon a showing that a person has been repeatedly involved in collisions or has repeated traffic offenses indicating an inability to operate a motor vehicle safely or disrespect for traffic laws. See 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(3) (West 2008). Other subsections require specific action by the Secretary, however. In particular, several subsections call for suspension of driving privileges for a certain length of time. See 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(15) (West 2008) (“the suspension shall be for one year” upon conviction of criminal trespass to a vehicle); 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(21) (West 2008) (“the suspension shall be for one year” upon conviction of leaving the scene of an accident involving vehicle damage over $1,000); 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(29) (West 2008) (“driving privileges shall be suspended for one year” upon conviction of certain Usted offenses committed while operating a vehicle); 625 ILCS 5/6— 206(a)(30) (West 2008) (“driving privileges shall be suspended for 5 years” upon second or subsequent conviction of offenses Usted in paragraph 29); 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(32) (West 2008) (“the suspension shall be for 3 years” upon conviction of aggravated discharge of a firearm while inside a motor vehicle). The provision involved in this case, section 6 — 206(a)(43), states: “The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing of the person’s records or other sufficient evidence that the person: $ Í $ [h]as received a disposition of court supervision for a violation of subsection (a), (d), or (e) of Section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 or a similar provision of a local ordinance, in which case the suspension shall be for a period of 3 months[J” 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(43) (West 2008). Similar to the other subsections described above, subsection (a) (43) requires specific action when a person receives court supervision for the underage consumption of alcohol offenses involved here. The statute provides “in which case the suspension shall be for a period of 3 months.” 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(43) (West 2008). Subsection (a) (43) provides for suspension as the only possible action as shown by the phrase “the suspension shall be.” The legislature used “the suspension” rather than a less specific reference such as “any suspension.” Moreover, the use of “shall be” indicates suspension is the mandatory action. See People v. Ousley, 235 Ill. 2d 299, 311 (2009) (when the issue is whether the statutory language has the force of a command, the word “shall” generally indicates the legislature intended to impose a mandatory obligation). The mandatory nature of the suspension is also shown by the provision of a specific period of three months. The statutory language, therefore, provides for a mandatory consequence of a three-month suspension in these circumstances. Thus, we conclude the Secretary does not have discretion in determining whether to issue a suspension of defendants’ driving privileges under section 6 — 206(a)(43). Rather, section 6 — 206(a)(43) provides for mandatory suspension. We note that our interpretation of section 6 — 206(a) (43) is consistent with our duty to construe statutes in a manner upholding their constitutionality when reasonably possible. See Cook County Republican Party, 232 Ill. 2d at 239. Given our conclusion that section 6 — 206(a) (43) does not allow for exercise of discretion by the Secretary, we must reject defendants’ claim that the statute is arbitrary as applied and, therefore, results in a due process violation. Finally, defendants renew their argument that suspension of their driving privileges under section 6 — 206(a) (43) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). Defendants argue that suspension of their driver’s licenses, in addition to the criminal penalties imposed for underage consumption of alcohol, results in cruel and degrading punishment. The proportionate penalties clause in the Illinois Constitution is coextensive with the federal constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 206-07. Both provisions apply only to the criminal process involving a direct action by the government to inflict punishment. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 518 (2006). The critical determination, therefore, is whether suspension of the defendants’ driving privileges is a direct action by the government to inflict punishment. We have determined that section 6 — 206(a)(43)’s purpose is to promote the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. Section 6 — 206(a)(43) is, therefore, intended to provide for safe highways, not to punish licensees for underage consumption of alcohol. Indeed, we have previously stated statutory summary suspension of a driver’s license is not penal in nature because it is intended to protect the public rather than punish a licensee. People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 501 (1988). Accordingly, we conclude the proportionate penalties clause does not apply here because suspension of defendants’ driving privileges under section 6 — 206(a) (43) is not a direct action by the government to inflict punishment. In sum, we conclude that suspension of defendants’ driving privileges under section 6 — 206(a)(43) does not violate their constitutional rights to due process or the proportionate penalties clause. The trial court’s orders declaring section 6 — 206(a)(43) unconstitutional must, therefore, be reversed. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court declaring section 6 — 206(a)(43) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutional and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded. JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.