Court Opinion

ID: 9721629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:03:59.70158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.768262
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The circumstantial evidence before the jury was insufficient to justify its finding that the defendant caused the intoxication of Watson. Although the majority cites the supreme court case of Kingston v. Turner, they pay it scant heed. It must be remembered that it is no longer sufficient to make a case in a dramshop action by a mere showing that an allegedly intoxicated person consumed some intoxicants in a dramshop. The proof must be that the consumption of intoxicants at a particular dramshop caused the intoxication. From Kingston v. Turner: “Prior to its amendment in 1971, the Act provided that every person who is injured in person or property by an intoxicated person has a right of action against any person who, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, ‘causes the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person.’ (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 43, par. 135.) Under this provision recovery could be founded merely on a showing of the resultant intoxication and the consumption of some liquor in defendant’s tavern. (See Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of the 1971 Amendment, 74 U. Ill. L.F. 466, 469 (1974).) The essential element of a plaintiff’s case was that injury had been sustained in consequence of the intoxication of another and that the alcoholic liquors served by the defendant dramshop ‘contributed in some degree, no matter how slight,’ to the intoxication. Osborn v. Leuffgen (1942), 381 Ill. 295, 298. The 1971 amendment to article VI, section 14, eliminated the ‘in whole or in part’ language from the statute. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 43, par. 135.) While the amendment was not designed to alter the ‘legislative intent to place the responsibility for damages occasioned by the use of alcohol on those who profit from its sale’ (Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of the 1971 Amendment, 74 U. Ill. L.F. 466, 477 (1974)), it was intended to limit liability and curb the widespread abuse occurring under this provision (see Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of the 1971 Amendment, 74 U. Ill. L.F. 466, 470 (1974)). This narrowing of liability was accomplished by shifting the emphasis away from the results of the consumption of alcoholic liquors. Recovery may now only be sought against any person who, ‘by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication.’ (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 43, par. 135.) Under the amended provisions, a defendant must have caused the intoxication and must not merely have furnished a negligible amount of liquor. (Nelson v. Araiza (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 534, 540-41.)” Kingston v. Turner (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 445, 456-57. The plaintiff’s proof that Watson was caused to be intoxicated by alcoholic liquor he consumed at KaJo’s is based solely upon the testimony of his drinking partner Crozlyn that Watson was not intoxicated when they arrived at KaJo’s at about 7:30 p.m. and the testimony of other witnesses that Watson was intoxicated following the collision. There was no witness to testify that Watson drank anything at all in KaJo’s. Crozlyn did not see him drinking. Four witnesses for defendant, obviously not believed by the jury, testified that either Watson was not at KaJo’s on the evening in question or that they did not see him at KaJo’s at that time. If Watson had consumed enough alcoholic liquor at KaJo’s to have caused his intoxication, it would have been such a notable event that someone would have remembered. But aside from that, other evidence must be factored into the circumstantial evidence considered by the jury. That evidence is that Watson started drinking about five hours before he got to KaJo’s and that he continued drinking while riding around in his car with Crozlyn and while at the Herrin Eagles. The emergency medical technician testified that there were upwards of 20 beer bottles in Watson’s car following the collision. Also, no one knew what time Watson left KaJo’s that evening. Crozlyn said Watson left before he did; he thought it was 10 p.m. to 11 p.m. Watson remembered nothing. It is entirely possible that Watson resumed drinking in his car or that he went to another tavern after leaving KaJo’s. If Crozlyn is to be believed when he stated that Watson was not intoxicated when he arrived at KaJo’s, why is he not also to be believed when he said that he never saw Watson take a drink at KaJo’s? It would be a reasonable assumption to make that Watson became intoxicated as a result of drinking elsewhere than at KaJo’s. I realize that in summarizing the foregoing evidence before the jury I have indulged in speculation. The point is, though, that the jury also indulged in speculation when it found on the basis of this evidence that Watson’s intoxication was caused by alcoholic liquor that he consumed at KaJo’s. Admittedly, proof that a dramshop had caused the intoxication of a person could be comprised of circumstantial evidence, nevertheless the quality and quantum of the evidence must suffice to meet the burden of proof imposed by law. In this case the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden of proof. The sole limitation on the use of circumstantial evidence is that inferences drawn therefrom must be reasonable (Pearson v. Ford Motor Co. (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 188, 336 N.E.2d 528; Gearhardt v. American Reinforced Paper Co. (7th Cir. 1957), 244 F.2d 920) and the conclusion reached must be the only one that could reasonably be drawn (Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois (1917), 277 Ill. 96, 115 N.E. 149; Heiden v. Gaddbery (1959), 23 Ill. App. 2d 260, 162 N.E.2d 260). These authorities are reflected in the wording of the jury instruction on circumstantial evidence found in Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil 2d, No. 1.03: “A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of facts or circumstances which give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the facts sought to be proved.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff seeks to isolate the statement of Crozlyn that Watson was not intoxicated when they arrived at KaJo’s and the testimony of the post-collision witnesses that Watson was intoxicated as being the only factors for consideration by the jury in making their finding that defendant caused Watson’s intoxication. As I have related, the evidence, when considered as a whole, does not reasonably give rise to the inference made by the jury. Their verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and I accordingly dissent.