Court Opinion

ID: 9851219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:09:08.449334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:51.537827
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring.
I fully concur in the majority’s reversal of the Court of Appeals holding that the evidence in this case “[was] sufficient to create a question of fact regarding whether the bank knew or should have known of the unreasonable risk.” Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, 216 Ga. App. 159, 161 (453 SE2d 752) (1995). I believe that the Court of Appeals incorrectly found the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in this case because of its misconstruction of the holding of this Court in Savannah College of Art &c. v. Roe, 261 Ga. 764 (2) (409 SE2d 848) (1991). The Court of Appeals correctly relied upon Savannah College of Art &c. for the premise that, in cases of injury by a third-party criminal act, the proprietor does not have a duty, the breach of which is actionable under OCGA § 51-3-1, unless the proprietor had knowledge of an unreasonable risk of criminal attack. Savannah College of Art &c., supra, 765. In that case, this Court applied the well-established principle that the existence vel non of any duty upon the proprietor is dependent upon evidence that the proprietor “knew or should have known” that there was an unreasonable risk of criminal attack. Savannah College of Art &c., supra, 766. The knowledge of the unreasonable risk of criminal attack may indeed be “demonstrated by evidence of the occurrence of prior substantially similar incidents.” Savannah College of Art &c., supra, 765. See also McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590 (302 SE2d 130) (1983). However, the Court of Appeals erred in equating the proprietor’s knowledge of the unreasonable risk, which may be either actual or constructive, with the proof of that knowledge by showing the proprietor’s knowledge of the occurrence of previous substantially similar criminal incidents. If there is evidence of the occurrence of substantially similar prior criminal attacks and of the knowledge of the proprietor thereof, then there is a jury question as to whether or not the proprietor had sufficient actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk of criminal attack so as to have the duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent a subsequent similar criminal attack. Thus, I submit that knowledge of any prior similar incidents must be actual, but if there *115is such actual knowledge, the proprietor still will not be liable unless, because of that knowledge, (1) he had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk of criminal attack so as to impose upon him the duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent future attacks, and (2) the evidence shows a breach of that duty.
Decided December 4, 1995 —
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1995.
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Philip P. Taylor, Fred M. Valz III, for appellant.
Robert C. Koski, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this opinion.