Court Opinion

ID: 9668092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:02:04.837395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:42.931747
License: Public Domain

LAWRENCE G. CRAHAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I respectfully concur in result.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly rendered summary judgment on a single count of a six count petition. Although the briefs of the parties leave the somewhat confusing impression that Plaintiffs attempted to assert both a general negligence count and a medical malpractice count against Dr. Cor-rado, only one count of the petition pertains to Dr. Corrado.
In Count V of the petition, Plaintiffs claimed that they were injured as a direct result of the following conduct of Dr. Cor-rado:
a. Negligently and carelessly failing to be available and to promptly respond to the AUDRAIN emergency department’s requests for consultation;
b. Negligently and carelessly failing to abide by the AUDRAIN bylaws and policies requiring him, pursuant to the call schedule he prepared, to serve as the on-call general surgeon on November 5,1994;
c. Negligently and carelessly “signing out” his general surgery on-call obligations and responsibilities to a physician, who was not a qualified general surgeon and who lacked hospital privileges to perform general surgery, and who CORRADO did not expect to perform general surgery procedures such as the kind required by plaintiff;
d.Negligently and carelessly failing to notify AUDRAIN and its emergency department personnel that he would not be fulfilling his on-call general surgery responsibilities or that Dr. Jolly would be “covering” for him.
In the trial court, Defendant prevailed on the ground that the undisputed facts established that there was no physician-patient relationship. Plaintiff never alleged there was a physician-patient relationship, that Dr. Corrado ever treated her or that her injuries resulted from Dr. Cor-rado treating her or failing to treat her. She claims she was injured because Dr. Corrado’s conduct in the particulars set forth above caused her to be transported to a hospital that wasn’t equipped to treat her severe injuries instead of being transported to an almost equidistant hospital that was fully equipped to treat her, thus delaying treatment for several hours and exacerbating her injuries.
Athough Plaintiffs urge on appeal that Defendant did not conclusively establish the absence of a physician-patient relationship due to an arguable conflict in the evidence over whether Dr. Corrado spoke to Dr. Jolly or Dr. Welsh before Mrs. Millard was transported to the University of Missouri Medical Center, the point is essentially irrelevant. In their petition, Plaintiffs do not claim that the decision to transport Mrs. Millard to the University of Missouri Medical Center was negligent. Thus, whether Dr. Corrado did or did not participate in that decision is essentially irrelevant because Plaintiffs do not contend that such “treatment,” if it occurred, caused her any injury.
Plaintiffs have, however, stated a claim for negligence against Dr. Corrado regardless of whether there was a physician-patient relationship. Specifically, the Re*54statement (Second) of Torts, section 324A, which has been recognized and applied by Missouri Courts, provides a basis for recovery that is not dependent upon the existence of a .physician-patient relationship.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 324A provides in relevant part:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm,
or....
This section has been recognized as a basis for recovery under Missouri law at least since 1983. Brown v. Michigan Millers Ins. Co. Inc., 665 S.W.2d 630, 632-36 (Mo.App.1983); Bowman v. McDonald’s Corp., 916 S.W.2d 270, 286-87 (Mo.App.1995). It is essentially a restatement of the doctrine, long recognized in Missouri law, that a duty may be assumed or undertaken, and when so assumed, a defendant must exercise reasonable care in carrying out the duty. Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Co., 262 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Mo.1953).
In this case, Plaintiffs have provided evidence sufficient for a jury to find all of the elements required for recovery. It is undisputed that Dr. Corrado undertook to render service as the on-call surgeon for Audrain Hospital. The purpose of having an on-call surgeon is to protect third persons such as Mrs. Millard who may suffer serious injuries requiring prompt surgical intervention. Dr. Corrado arranged for Dr. Jolly, who was not authorized to perform general surgery, to cover for him, thus creating a foreseeable risk that a seriously injured person such as Mrs. Millard would be transported to a facility that had no one available to treat her injuries and that the resulting delay in obtaining proper treatment would exacerbate those injuries. Although Dr. Corrado claims he notified the emergency department and the switchboard operator that he would be unavailable, the available records do not reflect such notice. Even assuming such notice was given, a jury could still find that such actions were insufficient under the circumstances. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 324A, comment b, liability may also be predicated on failure to exercise reasonable care to protect third persons upon discontinuing the undertaking. Finally, Plaintiffs produced substantial evidence that Dr. Corrado’s actions resulted in a delay in obtaining treatment for her injuries, thus increasing the risk of harm. Under such circumstances, Dr. Corrado is not entitled to summary judgment and the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.