Court Opinion

ID: 9566167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:36.075044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:18.836096
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
Gooden was a truck driver and was stopped on his way from work just after 3:00 a.m. when he was about five to ten minutes from home. He testified that he intended to have his wife come for the vehicle.
I agree that justification for the warrantless search of the vehicle could not lie on the exception that it was a search incident to arrest. The officers conducting it did not consider it as being necessary, incident to arrest, but rather considered it an inventory search after the decision had been made to impound it. The search did not occur until after defendant was on his way to the station with the arresting officer. There was not even a remote opportunity for defendant to obtain weapons or contraband from the vehicle at that point. Thus the theory underlying New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (101 SC 2860, 69 LE2d 768) (1981), does not apply.
Was it a valid inventory search? No, because there was no good faith opportunity for defendant to have his wife come for the car, although the arresting officer had begun to allow an arrangement to be made, by moving the car to a safe place to await pick-up.
The question is whether it was a legitimate impound. The officers’ testimony is that defendant said it would take 35-45 minutes for someone to come for his car and that they explained to him that the “unwritten policy” of Riverdale was to allow only 15 minutes. It was 3:30 a.m. and defendant intended for his wife to come, but he did not tell the officers who he wanted called or that his home was only 5-10 minutes away, after they refused to permit him to make the call. *298They did not ask for the phone number or the name of the person to be called. There were three officers present at the time. The location of the car was not a hazard. Was this a reasonable offer under the circumstances?
“Impoundment of a vehicle is valid only if there is some necessity for the police to take charge of the property. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (96 SC 3092, 49 LE2d 1000) (1976).” Whisnant v. State, 185 Ga. App. 51, 52 (2), 53 (363 SE2d 341) (1987). “Where the impoundment is unreasonable the resulting inventory search is invalid. [Cit.]” State v. King, 191 Ga. App. 706, 707 (382 SE2d 613) (1989).
“[T]he property of a citizen is protected from unnecessary intrusion or limitation of use by its owner . . . the state’s right to impound [is] founded on a doctrine of necessity.” State v. Ludvicek, 147 Ga. App. 784, 785 & 786 (250 SE2d 503) (1978). In that case the court upheld a finding of unreasonable inventory search based on lack of necessity because “we do not believe it would have been unreasonable for the arresting officer to seek instructions from [the owner] inasmuch as he had been told she was the owner, he had verified the accuracy of that information, he knew where she was located and there was an available driver to deliver the car to [the owner] which driver was an occupant of the premises where [the owner] was waiting.” Id. at 787. In noting that a different result might be reached if the owner could not be located after a reasonable effort, the court implies that the police are obliged to exert some effort to secure the vehicle and the rights of privacy before impounding it. Impoundment always requires an inventory search. See also State v. Thomason, 153 Ga. App. 345, 348 (3) (265 SE2d 312) (1980), and Judge Shulman’s dissent in State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141, 146 (2) (293 SE2d 529) (1982), which illustrate that the State has the burden of showing that impoundment is reasonable as necessary. The latter correctly states, “if the impoundment of an automobile is unreasonable, the inventory search which follows is invalid, and the fruits thereof must be suppressed.” The Fourth Amendment principle which must not be lost sight of is that “[¡Impoundment of a vehicle is valid only if there is some necessity for the police to take charge of the property. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (96 SC 3092, 49 LE2d 1000) (1976).” Whisnant v. State, supra at 53.
In State v. Darabaris, 159 Ga. App. 121, 123 (282 SE2d 744) (1981), the court adopted the trial court’s articulation of the following rule: “ ‘(W)here the officer knows the identity of the owner ... in question, he should make at least a reasonable effort to determine the owner’s wishes regarding disposition of the vehicle and that only after such a reasonable effort is made would the necessity for impoundment attach.’ ” As reiterated there, the State’s interests in im*299pounding and inventorying a vehicle are to protect the owner’s property, to protect the police from potential danger, and to protect the police from false claims of stolen or lost property; the Fourth Amendment’s interest is to protect the individual’s right of privacy.
Decided June 28, 1990
Rehearing denied July 11, 1990 — Cert, applied for.
Herbert Shafer, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Albert B. Collier, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Here the police did not offer to call whoever it was defendant/ owner sought to have come for the car, did not ascertain who it was, did not find out from that person how long it would take for him or her to arrive. If its custody had been given to defendant’s designee, the interests sought to be served by a police inventory would have been satisfied.
“ ‘ “Factual and credibility determinations . . . made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous.” ’ ” State v. Escobar, 193 Ga. App. 535, 538 (388 SE2d.534) (1989). “ ‘In the absence of evidence of record demanding a finding contrary to the judge’s determination [of the reasonableness of impounding the vehicle], this court will not reverse the ruling ....’” State v. Thomason, supra at 351.
Considering the evidence in favor of denial of the motion, the State failed to show, as in Stobhert v. State, 165 Ga. App. 515, 516 (301 SE2d 681) (1983), that impoundment was reasonably necessary and thus a valid incursion into Gooden’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The search was not a valid exercise , of the law enforcement agency’s caretaking function, which was recognized in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441 (93 SC 2523, 37 LE2d 706) (1973). See also the other cases cited there.
This analysis is made solely under the strictures of the Fourth Amendment and, because defendant did not raise it, not under the mandate of the Georgia Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII, which should have been considered first.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.