Court Opinion

ID: 9655803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:22:27.235348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:22.177937
License: Public Domain

Yeager, J.,
dissenting..
I respectfully dissent. In doing so I do not question the correctness of the statement of facts set forth in the majority opinion. I, however, do not think some important considerations have received appropriate emphasis. Therefore I shall present the dissent as I think the opinion should be, including a statement of facts.
This is an action in equity by Lydia McGuire, plaintiff and appellee, against Charles W. McGuire, defendant and appellant, wherein the plaintiff seeks suitable maintenance from the defendant. The two are husband and wife.
The parties were married in 1919 and have lived ever since in the farm home provided by defendant in Wayne County, Nebraska. At the time of trial plaintiff was 66 and the defendant 79 years of age. No children were born of the marriage. Plaintiff has two daughters by a former marriage. At the time of the marriage defendant owned 160 acres of land and since that time he has accumulated by inheritance and by purchase 240 additional acres. Two acres are occupied by a church. The value of the land at the time of trial was about $84,000. The rental value was at least $6,000. At the time of the trial the defendant owned $104,500 worth of United States Government bonds. He had in certificates of *240deposit and checking accounts $12,768.31. His other personal property was of negligible value. These values are not in dispute.
It appears well to point out here that in this record there is no factual dispute of any kind. The defendant has allowed every statement made by plaintiff on the trial as to his conduct and actions toward her and the testimony of her witnesses as to the value of property to stand unchallenged. •
At the time of the marriage plaintiff had a one-third interest in 80 acres of land left by her former husband. Later this interest was transferred to her two daughters. At the time of trial she had a bank account jointly with one of her daughters in the amount of $5,960.22.
This accumulated amount did not come from any contributions made by the defendant. It doubtless came in large part, if not entirely, from eggs and chickens produced and sold by plaintiff and from the income from the 80-acre farm. It appears that she was in general charge of this farm for her daughters and was permitted to use the proceeds.
From the beginning of the married life of the parties the defendant supplied only the barest necessities and there was no change thereafter. He did not even buy groceries until the last 3 or 4 years before the trial, and neither did he buy clothes for the plaintiff.
As long as she was able plaintiff made a garden, raised chickens, did outside chores, and worked in the fields. From the sale of chickens and eggs she provided groceries, household necessities, and her own clothing. These things she is no longer able to do, but notwithstanding this the defendant does no more than to buy groceries. He buys her no clothing and does not give her any money at all to spend for her needs or desires. Only one incident is mentioned in the record of defendant ever buying plaintiff any clothing. He bought her a coat over 3 years before the trial.
The house in which the parties live is supplied with
*241electricity and there is a gas refrigerator, otherwise it is decidedly not modern.
On these facts the district court decreed that plaintiff was legally entitled to use the credit of defendant and to obligate him to pay for a large number of items, some of which were in the nature of improvements and repairs to the house and some of which were furniture and appliances to be placed in the home. The total cost of these improvements and additions, as is apparent from the decree, would amount to several thousand dollars. As an alternative to a part of this the defendant was permitted, in agreement with plaintiff, to purchase a modern house elsewhere. The defendant was ordered to purchase a new automobile with an effective heater within 30 days. He was ordered to pay traveling expenses of plaintiff for a' visit to each of her daughters at least once each year. It was decreed that plaintiff was entitled in the future to pledge the credit of defendant for what may constitute necessaries of life. The plaintiff was awarded a personal allowance in the amount of $50 a month. An award of $800 was made for services for plaintiff’s attorney.
As grounds for reversal necessary' to be considered herein the defendant says that the decree is not supported by sufficient evidence; that the decree is contrary to law; that the decree is an unwarranted usurpation and invasion of the defendant’s fundamental and constitutional rights; and that the court erred in allowing fees for plaintiff’s attorney.
In support of these assignments the defendant urges that there is' no legal or equitable basis or authority for the maintenance of this action or one such as this. Substantially he says that these parties are husband and wife; that they are living together as such; and that plaintiff is not seeking separation or separate maintenance, therefore no relief is available to the plaintiff through the court.
There is and can be no doubt that, independent of stat*242utes relating to divorce, alimony, and separate maintenance, if this plaintiff were living apart from the defendant she could in equity and on 'the facts as outlined in the record be awarded appropriate relief.
The principle supporting the right of a wife to maintain an action in equity, independent of statute, for maintenance was first announced in this jurisdiction in Earle v. Earle, 27 Neb. 277, 43 N. W. 118, 20 Am. S. R. 667. In the opinion it was said: “While the statute books of this and other states amply provide for the granting of divorces in meritorious cases, yet we do not apprehend that it is the purpose of the law to compel a wife, when the aggrieved party, to resort to this proceeding, and thus liberate her husband from all obligations to her, in order that the rights which the law gives her, by reason of her marital relations with her husband, may be enforced. Such a conclusion would not generally strike the conscience of a court of equity as being entirely equitable.”
Further in the opinion and in determination of the question it was said: “But however that may be, we are of the opinion that courts of equity should have and do have the jurisdiction to grant relief in cases of this kind without reference to the statutes of the state, but by and through the jurisdiction growing out of the general equity powers of the court.”
The principle involved was reannounced in the following cases: Cochran v. Cochran, 42 Neb. 612, 60 N. W. 942; Chapman v. Chapman, 74 Neb. 388, 104 N. W. 880; Price v. Price, 75 Neb. 552, 106 N. W. 657; Rhoades v. Rhoades, 78 Neb. 495, 111 N. W. 122, 126 Am. S. R. 611; Brewer v. Brewer, 79 Neb. 726, 113 N. W. 161, 13 L. R. A. N. S. 222; Sinn v. Sinn, 138 Neb. 621, 294 N. W. 381.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in an exhaustive opinion, has adopted the position taken in this jurisdiction. See Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S. E. 2d 317, 141 A. L. R. 391.
*243If relief is to be denied to plaintiff under this principle it must be denied because of the fact that she is not living separate and apart from the defendant and is not seeking separation.
In the light of what the decisions declare to be the basis of the right to maintain an action for support, is there any less reason for extending the right to a wife who is denied the right to maintenance in a home occupied with her husband than to one who has chosen to •occupy a separate abode?
If the right is to be extended only to one who is separated from the husband equity and effective justice would be denied where a wealthy husband refused proper support and maintenance to a wife physically or mentally incapable of putting herself in a position where the rule could become available to her.
It is true that in all cases examined which uphold the right of a wife to maintain an action in equity for maintenance the parties were living apart, but no case has been cited or found which says that separation is a condition precedent to the right to maintain action in •equity for maintenance. Likewise none has been cited or found which says that it is not.
In primary essence the rule contemplates the enforcement of an obligation within and not without the full marriage relationship. The reasoning contained in the ■opinions sustaining this right declare that purpose.
In Earle v. Earle, supra, it was said: “The question is, whether or not the plaintiff shall be compelled to resort to a proceeding for a divorce, which she does not desire to do, and which probably she is unwilling to do, from conscientious convictions, or, in failing to do so, shall be deprived of that support which her husband is bound to give her.”
This reasoning has received the approval of this court in the later cited cases.
If there may not be resort to equity in circumstances such as these then as pointed out in the following state*244ment from Earle v. Earle, supra, a dim view must be taken of the powers of a court of equity: “As we have already said in substance, there is not much to commend an alleged principle of equity which would hold that the wife, with her family of one or more children to support, must be driven to going into court for a divorce when such a proceeding is abhorrent to her, or, in case of her refusal so to do, being compelled to submit to a .deprivation of the rights which equity and humanity clearly give her; that, in order to obtain that to which she is clearly entitled, she must institute her action for a divorce, make her grievances public, which she would otherwise prefer to keep to herself, and finally liberate a husband from an obligation of which he is already tired, but from which he is not entitled to be relieved.”
Can a principle of equity which requires a wife to leave her home before becoming able to enforce the obligation of her husband to support and maintain her receive in reason a higher commendation than the hypothesis contained in this quotation? I think not.
It is thought that the following from the same opinion should be regarded as controlling here: “It seems to us that a declaration of such a doctrine as the law of the land would place it within the power of every man, who, unrestrained by conscience, seeks to be freed from his obligations to his wife and family, by withholding the necessary comforts and support due them, to compel her to do that for him which the law would not do upon his own application.”
I conclude therefore that the conclusion of the decree that the district court had the power to entertain the action was not contrary to law.
I think however that the court was without proper power to make any of the awards contained in the decree for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff except the one of $50 a month.
From the cases cited herein it is clear that a husband *245has the obligation to furnish to his wife the necessaries of life. These decisions make clear that for failure to furnish them the wife may seek allowances for her support and maintenance. However neither these decisions nor any others cited or found support the view contended for by plaintiff that the court may go beyond this and impose obligations other than that of payment of money for the proper support and maintenance of the wife.
There is no doubt that plaintiff had the right to charge her husband with her necessaries of life and that recovery could be had therefor. No award of a court of equity was necessary to establish this right. Nothing was accomplished by the declaration of that right. The provision relating thereto therefore had no proper place in the decree.
I am of the opinion that the power of the court in such instances as this should not be extended beyond the allowance of sufficient money to provide adequate support and maintenance.
This court, I think, has laid down a sound rule for the guidance of the court with regard to awards in such cases’ as this in Chapman v. Chapman, supra, as follows: “We think that the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to receive such additional competent evidence pertinent to the subject of alimony as may be offered by either party, and to award to the plaintiff such sums, to be paid to her periodically by the defendant, as shall appear to be within his ability to pay and be adequate for her suitable maintenance.”
As pointed out the district court made an allowance of $50 a month. In the light of generally well-known present day economy the conclusion is inevitable that this award is insufficient for the maintenance of the plaintiff. The record before us however does not supply adequate information upon which this court could make a finding as to what would be sufficient.
*246The plaintiff has cross-appealed contending that the allowance is not sufficient. It is concluded that the cross-appeal has merit and accordingly this phase of the case should be remanded to the district court for the taking of evidence in order that finding may be made as to what would be adequate for plaintiff’s suitable maintenance.
The next question is that of attorney’s fee for plaintiff’s attorney. The district court allowed a fee of $800. The objection is to this allowance in its entirety on the ground that courts are without power to award attorney’s fees in cases of this character.
As to allowance of attorney’s fees this court said in Higgins v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 95 Neb. 3, 144 N. W. 1037: “It is the practice in this state to allow the .recovery of attorneys’ fees only in such cases as are provided for by law, or where the uniform course of procedure has been to allow such recovery. As a general rule of practice in this state, attorneys’ fees are allowed to the successful party in litigation only where such allowance is provided by statute.” This pronouncement has received approval in State, ex rel. Charvat v. Sagl, 119 Neb. 374, 229 N. W. 118; Voss v. Voss; 144 Neb. 819, 14 N. W. 2d 849; Shepard v. Shepard, 145 Neb. 12, 15 N. W. 2d 195; Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N. W. 2d 623.
In the very nature of things, this not being a statutory proceeding or one whose procedure is controlled, by statute, resort cannot be had to statute for authority for the allowance of attorney’s fees. It becomes necessary to find the right, if at all, in some course of procedure.
In Kiddle v. Kiddle, 90 Neb. 248, 133 N. W. 181, 3& L. R. A. N. S. 1001, Ann. Cas. 1913A 796, it was said: “It is the settled rule in this court that in a suit by a wife for separate maintenance, or for alimony alone, the court may at any time during the pendency of the suit make allowance to the wife of a reasonable sum as suit *247money, including attorney’s fees, to be paid by the husband as the court may direct.” As authority for this statement Earle v. Earle, supra, Cochran v. Cochran,, supra, Rhoades v. Rhoades, supra, and Brewer v. Brewer,, supra, are cited. Other cases are cited but they are not of importance on the point being made here.
The four cases cited can be regarded as being in point, only on the theory that an award of maintenance in equity as here and an award of maintenance in a statutory action are to be regarded as alimony and that the power of the court to make allowances for costs and attorney’s fees in the two instances is the same.
This being true, it follows that a uniform course of procedure has come into being whereunder attorney’s fees are allowable in such cases as this. It must be said therefore that the district court did not err in making an award of attorney’s fees for plaintiff’s attorney. I do not under the facts and circumstances disclosed think that the fee is excessive.
The decree of the district court should be affirmed as to the award of a fee of $800 for plaintiff’s attorney and as to costs. Otherwise it should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the district court to take evidence and to determine and make such allowances to plaintiff for her suitable support and maintenance as may appear proper in the light of such evidence and appropriate rules of law as set forth, herein.
A suitable allowance should be made for the services of plaintiff’s attorney in this court.