Court Opinion

ID: 9851164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:08:21.409757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.179308
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
1. With respect to Division 3, the jury charges on the similar transaction evidence are marginally sufficient. In response to the question from the juror, the court first gave a whole list of purposes for which such evidence is admissible on contested issues. Then the court said it was solely for the purpose of tending to show, if it did, defendant’s “state of mind” on the indicted occasion of September 17, 1992. Then the court stated it was solely to prove “identity,” that this defendant is the person who sold the cocaine to the officer on that date. Although both of these matters were in issue, that sort of charging can be confusing and can result in the jury using the evidence for any purpose without limitation.
In the final charge, the court repeated the comprehensive list as purposes for which the jury could consider the similar transaction evidence and then instructed it was to be considered “solely with reference to the mental state, identity, or intent of the defendant” as applicable to the offense for which he was on trial “and for no other purpose.” The court’s ruling, at the pretrial hearing, on the limited *289purpose or purposes for which it would be admissible is not of much consequence in terms of what he told the factfinder and how the factfinder used it. The jury should be more clearly instructed so there is no doubt of the strict limitations on the use of this powerful evidence, and the use should be confined to purposes articulated by the State, which must show that the purpose relates to a real issue in the particular case and that this evidence tends to support the State’s theory on that issue. See Morris v. State, 212 Ga. App. 779 (442 SE2d 792) (1994) (Beasley, P. J., concurring specially); Harris v. State, 216 Ga. App. 672 (455 SE2d 387) (1995) (Beasley, C. J., concurring specially). In this instance, I do not conclude that the court’s charge was reversible error.
As to defendant’s submitting instructions on the subject, he has no burden to do so and should not be required to ask for limitations when he believes the evidence is totally inadmissible for any reason. The State has the burden to show, affirmatively, that it is admissible and fits an exception to the rule of inadmissibility for this type of character evidence. Defendant did not agree to any limited purpose, so he could not very well submit a limiting charge. That would concede that it is admissible for that purpose.
2. As to Division 5, the State should be required to provide written notice that it intends to use the earlier conviction for sentencing purposes. We said it is “preferred” in Moss v. State, 206 Ga. App. 310 (5) (425 SE2d 386) (1992), but that urging need not be heeded and was not, in this case. Oral notices can open into a debate and depend on busy lawyers’ recollections; such notices can at least risk misunderstanding. In Moss, appellant’s counsel admitted that he knew it. That is not always going to be the case, and it should not be asking too much of the State to put the notice in writing and file it. After all, what is at stake is life imprisonment for defendant versus a maximum of 30 years. That would mean a lot to drug defendants, most of whom are probably relatively young.
It is notable that, despite the defendant’s pattern of ongoing criminal activities and lack of remorse which prompted the court’s effort to avoid the consequences of the lack of notice, the court could not consider subsection (c) of OCGA § 16-13-30 at all. It does not provide for life imprisonment, and it provides punishment for violation of subsection (a), not (b). Defendant was convicted only of violation of subsection (b). The punishment for a subsection (b) Schedule I or Schedule II narcotic offense is solely in subsection (d). The only way to sentence to life imprisonment for violation of subsection (b) is to consider the prior conviction. Without it, the maximum is 30 years imprisonment.
*290Decided December 1, 1995.
Cloud H. Miller III, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, J. Clayton Culp, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.