Court Opinion

ID: 9731703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:55:15.417652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.561096
License: Public Domain

OPINION BY
Judge LEADBETTER.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from the August 20, 2003, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court), which sustained the appeal of Thomas Helt (Helt) and vacated DOT’S one-year suspension of Helt’s operating privilege imposed pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1).1 The sole issue presented in this case is whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to beheve that Helt was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
The trial court, following a trial de novo, found the following relevant facts. On February 12, 2002, at approximately 2:15 a.m., Corporal Kenneth F. Massey of the Upper Chichester Township Police Department was dispatched to investigate a one-vehicle accident. Upon arriving at the scene, Corporal Massey observed a brown van that had struck a telephone pole. The van was unoccupied, but Corporal Massey saw a man sitting nearby on the curb. *265Corporal Massey had been acquainted with the man for years and knew that his last name was Jordan. Corporal Massey also saw a woman who had stopped at the accident scene standing outside her vehicle.
Corporal Massey questioned Jordan, who told Corporal Massey that he had been a passenger in the van; Jordan said that “Tom” was driving the vehicle and that Tom lives at Bender Drive. Jordan provided no other details, and Corporal Massey did not request further information from him. Corporal Massey then proceeded to question the woman at the scene, Kara Maggio. Maggio told Corporal Massey that she came upon the accident and saw a white male standing in the street near the van. The man had asked Maggio for a ride to his home, and Maggio provided it.
Accompanying Corporal Massey in his police vehicle, Maggio directed police approximately 2/10 of a mile to 605 Bender Drive, the house where Maggio had dropped off the other man only a short time before. Corporal Massey and Mag-gio approached the house and were able to see Helt through the front window; Mag-gio identified Helt as the person she had driven from the accident scene. Helt also was known to Corporal Massey from previous contacts.
Corporal Massey knocked on the door, and, when Helt answered, Corporal Massey asked if he and the other officers with him could enter the house. Helt permitted the officers to enter, and the officers proceeded to question Helt about his involvement in the accident. In response, Helt denied any involvement, stating that he had been home all night. Corporal Massey observed that Helt’s eyes were red and glassy and that he had a very strong odor of alcohol on his breath. Corporal Massey was unable to gauge Helt’s balance because Helt was bothered by a foot injury, unrelated to the accident, which affected his ability to stand. Corporal Massey placed Helt under arrest for driving under the influence (DUI).
The police then transported Helt to police headquarters. On the way, they stopped at the scene of the accident, where Jordan identified Helt as the driver of the van. After arriving at the police station, Corporal Massey read Helt the requisite implied consent warnings from the DL-26 form and requested that Helt take a breath test. Helt refused to submit to the testing.
By notice dated September 12, 2002, DOT informed Helt that his driving privilege was being suspended for a period of one year, effective October 17, 2002, based on his February 12, 2002, refusal to submit to a chemical test. Helt filed an appeal from that suspension, which the trial court sustained, concluding that DOT failed to offer sufficient evidence to sustain its burden of proof. Specifically, the trial court held that DOT’S evidence did not establish that Corporal Massey had reasonable grounds to believe that Helt was driving the van involved in the accident while under the influence of alcohol. Common pleas stated:
In the instant case, the evidence showed that without any explanation, valid or otherwise, the police chose to believe the self-serving statements of an individual at the scene of a one-vehicle accident to the effect that he was not the driver and to focus their investigation solely upon an individual who at best could be placed at the accident scene but without any corroborating evidence of his involvement in the incident.
Commonwealth v. Helt, (No. 02-11435, filed October 31, 2003), common pleas op. at 6. DOT now appeals to this court, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that *266DOT failed to prove that Corporal Massey had reasonable grounds to believe that Helt was operating the van while intoxicated.
It is well-established that in order to sustain a suspension of operating privileges under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, the Bureau must establish that the licensee: (1) was arrested for driving under the influence by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was warned that refusal might result in a license suspension. Banner v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 445, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (1999). The last three elements are not here in issue, only the first.
Unquestionably, the Bureau must as a threshold matter establish that the arresting police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee operated or physically controlled the vehicle’s movement while under the influence of alcohol. In assessing whether it has met this burden, we consider the totality of the circumstances and determine, as a matter of law, whether a person in the position of the arresting officer could have reasonably reached this conclusion. Banner, 558 Pa. at 446-447, 737 A.2d at 1207. We do not require the same quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause for a criminal prosecution, id., and it is not necessary that the police officer’s belief ultimately prove correct. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Malizio, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 57, 618 A.2d 1091, 1094 (1992). Reasonable grounds exist if the officer could have concluded that the licensee drove the vehicle. See Banner, 558 Pa. at 446, 737 A.2d at 1207. An officer’s belief that the licensee was driving will justify a request to submit to chemical testing if one reasonable interpretation of the circumstances supports the officer’s belief. See also, Vinansky v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 665 A.2d 860, 863 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995). Because this is an issue of law, our review is plenary.
Based upon the historical facts found by common pleas, recounted above, we have no hesitancy in concluding that Corporal Massey’s belief that Helt was the driver of the van was reasonable. Significantly, common pleas accepted as truthful the officer’s testimony concerning his observations. That is where common pleas’ role as fact-finder ended. Common pleas erred in substituting its judgment as to what inference should be drawn from the circumstances the officer observed; the test is whether the officer’s conclusion was reasonable as a matter of law, not whether common pleas might have concluded otherwise had he stood in the officer’s shoes. This is particularly true since Corporal Massey, not the trial court, observed the demeanor, appearance and behavior of Helt, as well as that of Jordan and Maggio, on the night of the incident. Those observations were sufficient to support the officer’s reasonable belief that Helt drove the vehicle while intoxicated and, therefore, justified the request that he submit to chemical testing.
Accordingly, we reverse.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 6th day of August, 2004, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, dated August 20, 2003, in the above captioned matter is hereby REVERSED, and the suspension of Thomas Helt’s operating privileges is REINSTATED.

. Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code authorizes DOT to suspend the driving privileges of a licensee for one year where the licensee is placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the licensee refuses a police officer’s request to submit to chemical testing.