Court Opinion

ID: 9720096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:15:23.952406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:31.768757
License: Public Domain

RACANELLI, P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the result discharging the order to show cause but would dismiss the petition solely on the grounds of mootness.
*547On October 2, 1982, petitioner originally sought relief from this court in a petition for habeas corpus challenging the constitutionality of an order denying bail under the provisions of Proposition 4 approved by the voters at the June 1982 election (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12). The challenged order was based upon evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing in support of the then pending charge of violation of Penal Code section 653f, subdivision (b) (two counts of soliciting the crime of murder).
On November 9, 1982, we summarily denied the petition.
On December 9, 1982, acting upon petitioner’s renewed application for habeas relief,1 our Supreme Court issued an order to show cause returnable before this court. The matter was heard and submitted for decision on this court’s February 1983 regular calendar.
On March 8, 1983, and during submission, the two counts of soliciting murder were ordered dismissed in conjunction with petitioner’s entry of a no-contest plea to a related drug charge. Accordingly, the matter before us is now procedurally moot.
While I recognize that in appropriate circumstances an issue of broad public interest should be decided on the merits (see e.g., In re Newbern (1961) 55 Cal.2d 500, 505 [11 Cal.Rptr. 547, 360 P.2d 43]), I would not reach the important substantive questions presented on the limited record before us which fails to adequately address equally searching and interrelated questions of procedural due process as the majority candidly acknowledges (ante, p. 544, fn. 4). Nor can I agree that the focus of Eighth Amendment guarantees is singularly confined to questions of judicial abuse in setting bail (see e.g., United States v. Edward (D.C.App. 1981) 430 A.2d 1321, 1350-1362, 1365-1372, dissenting opns. of Ferren, Mack, JJ., respectively)2 or that the record reflects clear and convincing evidence beyond the requisite reasonable cause to file felony charges so as to justify—without more—a denial of the right to bail with its attendant impairment of fundamental individual guarantees (see Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 435-440 [166 Cal.Rptr. 149, 613 P.2d 210]). We should undertake a thorough and careful analysis of the full spectrum of related constitutional rights and guarantees directly implicated by the dramatic change in organic law before reaching any decision sanctioning the odious concept of preventive detention historically associated with a repressive totalitarian state.
*548Since it is most probable that the important concerns which remain to be considered will undoubtedly arise upon a full record squarely presenting such substantive and procedural constitutional issues (see In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 25 [89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737]), I would dismiss the instant petition as moot and discharge the order to show cause.

The application raised both state and federal claims of unconstitutional denial of bail, substantive due process, right to assistance of counsel and the right to jury trial.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the statute under review in Edwards, unlike the 1982 amendment herein, limits the period of pretrial detention without bail and provides specific procedural safeguards in conducting the required evidentiary hearing.