Court Opinion

ID: 9480474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:48:59.339287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:42.698434
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that we lack appellate jurisdiction because there was no final order issued by the District Court. I respectfully dissent because I believe that the January 25, 1989 judgment in this case was final, giving this Court appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Appellant Network Communications made a motion to amend its complaint. While it was pending, the District Court filed its Memorandum and Order on January 18, 1989 granting summary judgment for defendant Michigan Bell. In the memorandum, the court noted that the motion for leave to amend was filed December 3, 1988 and that oral argument had been set for February 13, 1989. On January 25, 1989 a separate document entitled “Judgment” was docketed which stated that defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. Following the entry of the judgment, appellant *240told the court on February 6, 1989 that because the suit had been dismissed, the February 13 hearing would not be necessary. The court adjourned the hearing on February 7, 1989.
The majority opinion holds that there is no final order for purposes of appeal under section 1291 because “resurrection of the lawsuit upon amendment of the complaint is ... possible ... [because] the district court has recorded an express intent to adjudicate a pending motion to amend.” Opinion at 238. I would hold that the motion for summary judgment placed the entire case before the District Court for disposition. The fact that a future date was set for oral argument on the motion for leave to amend was ambiguous and did not necessarily indicate an intent to rule on it following disposition of the case on summary judgment. The entry of a separate document entitled “Judgment” indicated that there was a final disposition of the action. No other purpose was served by the separate judgment since the court’s Memorandum and Order had already disposed of the motion.
The majority asserts the rule that “an order dismissing a complaint is not a final order when it is possible for a plaintiff to file an amended complaint resurrecting the lawsuit.” Opinion at 238. It then reasons that because the District Court intended to rule on the motion for leave to amend, it is possible that the suit could be resurrected, assuming leave would be granted. However, the cases cited for this rule, Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati TV 64 Ltd., 845 F.2d 674 (7th Cir.1988) and Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 590 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.1978), are clearly distinguishable. They each involved situations where leave to amend was granted at the time summary judgment was given. See Principal, 845 F.2d at 675 (summary judgment order dismissed counts II through VII “ ‘without prejudice, and plaintiff be and hereby is granted leave to reinstate Counts II through VII upon the filing of a written motion with this Court’") (citation omitted) (emphasis added) and Elfenbein, 590 F.2d at 448 (“[i]t appears to be well established that a district court’s order dismissing a complaint but granting leave to amend the complaint is not final and therefore not appeal-able”) (emphasis added). In the present case there was no disposition of the pending motion to amend when the judgment was entered. In such a circumstance, I believe our decisions in Ellison v. Ford Motor Co., 847 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.1988) and Marks v. Shell Oil Co., 830 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.1987) control the outcome. In these cases we held that where the district court grants summary judgment in the face of a pending motion to amend without first considering the motion, it is an abuse of discretion. More importantly for purposes of this case, in such situations we have unhesitatingly asserted appellate jurisdiction, treating summary judgment in this context as a final judgment.
The majority attempts to distinguish Ellison and Marks by saying that these cases
held that the district court abused its discretion when it disposed of the original complaint by summary judgment or dismissal (respectively) without first considering a pending motion to amend. In neither of those cases did the district court indicate whether the motion to amend was considered. Here, the court in its memorandum opinion accompanying summary judgment clearly stated that it intended to dispose of the motion to amend as previously scheduled.
Opinion at 239. Ellison cannot be distinguished on that basis. There we expressly noted “[t]he [district] court indicated at the beginning of the [summary judgment] hearing that plaintiffs motion to amend ... was pending before it. However, the court did not address the merits of that motion during the course of the hearing.” 847 F.2d at 300. This language is not significantly different from the language in the District Court’s footnote that says the motion hearing was pending. We nonetheless treated the decision as final on appeal and held that the “district court’s failure to consider and rule on plaintiff’s pending motion to amend the complaint was an *241abuse of discretion.” Id. at 300-01.1 The majority’s conclusion that we lack jurisdiction is contrary to the precedent in Ellison and will send conflicting messages to the practicing bar as to when to appeal.
My disagreement with the majority stems, I think, from my belief that it misconstrues what Ellison and Marks mean when they speak of the district court’s need to “consider” a motion to amend before granting summary judgment. The majority seems to read “consider” as “to take note of,” which was purportedly accomplished by the District Court’s footnote indicating that argument on the motion to amend had been scheduled. It is from this fact that the majority says the District Court “considered” the motion to amend before granting summary judgment. However, I believe the better reading of “consider” as used in Ellison and Marks is “to take note of and rule on” the motion to amend.
The instant appeal is also distinguishable from Azar v. Conley, 480 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.1973), which held that an order dismissing a complaint without dismissing the action is different from a judgment dismissing the action. The latter is a final appeal-able order, while the former is not, provided the complaint can be saved by amendment. Id. at 223. Azar did not address the specific problem posed in this appeal. Azar merely held that an order of dismissal is not final when the district court dismisses a complaint without prejudice to further amend, if further amendment would save the action. This appeal, however, involves a situation where a judgment is entered without any reference to a pending motion to amend which is known to be before the district court and is ripe for consideration and decision. The rule of Azar — that the possibility of saving the action through amendment after dismissal of a complaint prevents the dismissal from being final and appealable — does not apply here. Ellison and Marks unequivocally hold that when a motion to amend is pending, failure to rule on it before granting summary judgment is a per se abuse of discretion, treated as an appealable order.
I would hold that the District Court’s judgment was final and appealable under section 1291. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. In Marks, the district court discussed the claims sought to be added in the amended complaint, thus indicating its awareness of the pending motion to amend. This consideration did not prevent finality of judgment.