Court Opinion

ID: 9775678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:06:49.265195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.125146
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing in which he complains first of that portion of the judgment of this court which di*207rects the clerk of the trial court to “apply said cash deposit toward the payment of the full amount of the aforesaid judgment and costs,” because he contends the judgment reforms and modifies the judgment of the trial court. With this complaint we tend to agree, but not for the reasons urged by appellant.
The judgment of the trial court awarded a cash judgment to appellee in the sum of $90,000.00 to be payable by the appellant in installments of $10,000.00, first payment due and payable on or before 10 days after the entry of the judgment and the balance of $80,000.00 in eight annual installments of $10,000.00 each beginning one year from the date of the entry of judgment, with a like sum becoming due and payable on or before June 24 each year thereafter until the judgment is fully paid.
In accordance with Rule 364(h), T.R.C. P., the clerk of the trial court certifies that the appellant has deposited with said clerk, in lieu of the supersedeas bond, cash equivalent to the amont of the bond as provided by Rule 364(a), T.R.C.P. Appellant in his motion for rehearing, makes the following statement: “Appellant’s counsel recognizes that this Court under Rule 435, T.R.C.P., has the right to modify a judgment when 'it is affirmed, to dispose of the costs, and to render a judgment against the supersedeas bond, if any, for the costs.” (Emphasis added.) Appellant has cited no authority for this statement, and our examination of the problem indicates that the statement is not entirely correct.
We are mindful that the judgment also gave the appellee a lien on the separate property of appellant, as set out therein, to secure and satisfy the payment of the $90,-000.00 awarded to appellee. However, the supersedeas bond was entered into freely and voluntarily as additional security for the payment and satisfaction of the judgment as the price for a stay of the judgment pending appeal.
The requirements and effect of a super-sedeas bond are provided by our rules of civil procedure. Rule 364(a) provides for the amount and the condition of the bond and is the only such provision applicable in a case involving a money judgment, except for sec. (h) of Rule 364 which provides that in lieu of a bond, the appellant may deposit with the clerk cash equivalent to the amount of the required bond. We have found no authority, nor can we advance any logical reason, for the intent and purposes of the supersedeas bond to be altered in any way by a deposit of cash in lieu of the bond. We therefore apply the same principles and rules of law that would apply had this appellant filed a supersedeas bond rather than cash in lieu of the bond.
It is stated in the case of Elliott v. Lester, 126 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1939, n. w. h.) :
“ * * * The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to furnish indemnity to the ap-pellee, and to suspend the remedies allowed for realizing on the judgment. It is security in addition to the personal liability of those responsible for the payment of the judgment, and effectively suspends the remedies for the enforcement of the judgment, pending the appeal. ‘The sole purpose of requiring an appeal or super-sedeas bond must therefore necessarily be to furnish security to the appellee in addition to the personal responsibility of the appellant. Automobile Insurance Co. v. Teague (Tex.Com.App.) 32 S.W.2d 824.’
“In the case of Ford v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 209 S.W. 490, 492, * * * (t)he court said: ‘We hold that an appeal from a judgment of any character, upon a supersedeas bond, does not suspend the judgment, but only stays its execution pending the appeal. * * * The judgment itself remains in full force until it is reversed. If it be affirmed, the appellate court does not enter a new judgment in the case, nor revive the judgment of the trial court, but only removes the impediment to its execution. In this connection, we call attention to the fact that a supersedeas bond, as defined by our *208statute, does not purport to suspend the judgment from which the appeal is taken, but only to suspend “the execution of the judgment.” * * * ’ ” See Rule 364, 368, T.R.C.P.; Renger v. Jeffrey, 143 Tex. 73, 182 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.Sup., 1944); Ex Parte Kimbrough, 135 Tex. 624, 146 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Sup., 1941). “Super-sedeas and Stay of Proceedings” by F. Hastings Pannill, Appellate Procedures in Texas (Matthew Bender & Co., 1964), Chapter 6, p. 6-1.
In Ford v. State, supra, 209 S.W. at page 493 in discussing the effect of a supersedeas bond, we find this statement: “If a case is affirmed, the judgment, sentence, and decree of the appellate court is that the judgment of the lower court shall be enforced. As hereinbefore stated, this does not mean that the judgment of the lower court is revived, but that it has been in force all the time, and that it shall be performed as originally rendered.”
Rule 435, T.R.C.P., provides that when this court affirms the judgment of the trial court it shall render judgment against the appellant “and the sureties on his super-sedeas bond, if any, for the performance of said judgment or decree, and shall make such disposition of the costs as the court shall deem proper, rendering judgment against the appellant and the sureties on his appeal or supersedeas bond, if any, for such costs as are taxed against him. * * * ” The sureties in such instance therefore have a judgment rendered against them not only for the cost but for the judgment of the trial court itself. They act as indemnity, in addition to the personal liability of the appellant to the appellee for the performance of the judgment rendered. See Harris v. Keoun, 135 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1939, writ ref.) and Casray Oil Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 165 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Civ.App., Galveston, 1942, affirmed 141 Tex. 33, 169 S.W.2d 955). This being the case, where appellant has deposited cash in lieu of a bond, then such cash must of necessity serve as indemnity to appellee in addition to appellant’s personal liability for the performance of the judgment. This cash deposit, however, is not in payment of the judgment and costs, but is only security for the payment of such. See Bayoud v. Nassour, 408 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1966, writ ref. n. r. e.).
It is ordered that the judgment of the lower court shall be enforced. Our judgment as previously entered is hereby modified to read as follows: “ * * * and it appearing to the court that cash in lieu of a supersedeas and cost bond has been deposited in the registry of the court below by appellant, Joseph Mea, judgment is hereby rendered against said cash deposit for the performance of said judgment of the trial court in accordance with the terms thereof and costs; in the event there are funds remaining after the performance of the judgment and costs, such funds shall be returned to the appellant; and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.” The clerk of this Court will therefore correct the judgment entry so as to conform to this order.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing in all other particulars is respectfully overruled.