Court Opinion

ID: 9746091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:57:52.070343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:34.168472
License: Public Domain

RAMIREZ, P. J.,
Dissenting.—I respectfully dissent.
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the carjacking and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon were committed to benefit defendant’s gang.*
1
*666I add the following evidence, adduced at trial, to my discussion of this issue: Deputy Anthony Johnson testified that most gang members are afraid of the gang enhancements defendant was facing and when such enhancements are alleged against them, they “backtrack” and try to claim that they were not active in the gang. Deputy Johnson specifically related this fear to defendant by testifying that defendant, in a letter written to a fellow gang member while the former was in custody, congratulated the latter on “beating” the gang enhancement(s) brought against the latter. Sergeant Frank Assumma continued with this theme, testifying, as the majority pointed out (maj. opn., ante, at p. 655) that gang members do not always announce their affiliation, either by word or appearance, when committing crimes and they do this in order to avoid detection and prosecution. In fact, he added it was not often seen, and he had never personally seen, a theft-related crime that was announced unless it involved retaliation. He added that 99.9 percent of the time, victims cannot tell what gang a perpetrator is from because they do not see the indicators, i.e., tattoos, clothing, gang symbols, gang words, yet they know they are dealing with a gang member, just as the victim here seemed to know. He testified that even if a crime is committed by only one gang member, this does not indicate that the crime was not for the benefit of the gang, especially if the crime was, like carjacking, a signature crime for the gang and many of the gang’s members committed such offenses often, as defendant’s gang did.2 He testified that a great deal of the assaultive crimes committed by gang members, i.e., the assaults, attempted murders and murders, result from rivalries between gangs, and help gangs establish and maintain turf and subdue the community in which they operate through fear, which results in a reluctance by residents to interfere in the gang’s criminal activities in the area. The sergeant pointed out that defendant drove to the scene of the crimes in a car, thereby debunking any suggestion that he stole the victim’s truck to *667provide himself transportation. The sergeant also contradicted the defense’s suggestion that defendant stole the truck to support his drug habit by testifying that drug addicts do not steal vehicles to maintain their habit.3 Finally, and most importantly, when asked if retaliation was involved in the carjacking, the sergeant answered in the affirmative, explaining that immediately after getting the truck, defendant drove it to a nearby home of a person with whom he had had previous problems, and got out, holding the shotgun. The person called the police. This contributed further to the sergeant’s opinion that the carjacking had been committed to benefit defendant’s gang. The sergeant pointed out that the truck was found the next day, down the street from defendant’s house, without any effort having been made to conceal it, thus further suggesting that defendant had taken it in order to show up, with shotgun in hand, at the home of the person with whom he had had problems previously.
The majority notes that there was no evidence that the victim of the shotgun brandishing was a rival gang member or had committed any offense against defendant’s gang. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 662.)4 However, gang members do not intimidate just rival gang members—they intimidate anyone in the community, especially those who cross them. This is their currency. Therefore, it matters little that the victim of this crime was not a member of a rival gang or had not committed a crime against defendant’s gang.
People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 92] (Albarran), which the majority cites (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 657-658) was not a case dealing with the sufficiency of the evidence to support a gang enhancement, as does this case. The issue in Albarran was whether gang evidence should have been introduced by the People in order to show motive and intent for the charged offenses. (149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 226-227.) The appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s determination under Evidence Code section 352 that the probative value of the gang evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact. Without addressing the highly inflammatory nature of the particular gang evidence introduced in Albarran (149 Cal.App.4th at p. 220), we note that the appellate court there concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the prosecutor’s argument that the motive for the crime was to gain respect, enhance the shooter’s reputation in the gang, and intimidate the neighborhood. (Id. at pp. 219, 227.) The Albarran court *668noted that the motive for the shooting was not apparent from the circumstances of the crime, and “[i]n the final analysis, the only evidence to support the respect motive is the fact of [defendant’s] gang affiliation.” (Id. at p. 227.) The shooting had occurred during a birthday party the victim hosted at his home for a relative. (Id. at p. 217.) Two male Híspanles with shaved heads fired at the front of the victim’s home. (Ibid.) Then they fled down the street, and one jumped into the car of a neighbor of the victim’s and told the neighbor to drive. (Id. at p. 218.) After she collided with the victim’s car, the other shooter got in her car and also told her drive, but she could not. (Ibid.) The gang expert conceded that he did not know the exact reason for the shooting, but he had been told that members of another gang were at the party and “ ‘by word of mouth, word on the street,’ it was known that [members of the other gang were there].” (Id. at pp. 220, 221.) He claimed that despite the fact that the shooters did not ’’announce'' their gang affiliation during the shooting, people at the party “would know who was present at the party and would also know the shooters.” (Id. at p. 221.) The gang expert concluded that the shootings were gang related because there were two shooters, gang crimes often occur at parties, the crime would intimidate people and, at the time, defendant’s gang was in a gang war.5 (149 Cal.App.4th at p. 221.) The differences between the expert testimony in Albarran and here are too obvious and lengthy to elaborate. To the extent language in Albarran would seem to suggest, as the majority appears to believe (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 658, 661-662), that evidence of announcing one’s gang affiliation during a crime is important or crucial to a conclusion that a crime is for the benefit of a gang, the Albarran court did not have the advantage of Sergeant Assumma’s expert testimony that gang members who commit thefts seldom, if ever, so announce, and his very rational explanation for this.
The majority cites People v. Ferraez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 925, 931 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 640], for the proposition that an expert’s testimony, alone, that a crime benefits a gang, is insufficient without other evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer the same. In Ferraez, the only such evidence was the fact that the defendant was selling drugs in the territory of a gang friendly to his and he admitted that he had asked the permission of this latter gang to do so.6 However, it must be remembered that these facts had meaning only because the expert utilized them to conclude that the crime benefitted the gang. Without such interpretation by the expert, they would have meant little, if anything, to the jury, in terms of the issue it had to decide. This is why *669experts, such as Sergeant Assumma and Deputy Johnson, are necessary in gang cases. Most lay jurors do not know what significance to attach to the fact that a crime occurred in a particular spot or that a person felt the need to ask someone else’s permission to commit a crime. However, evidence from which this jury could conclude the defendant committed these crimes to benefit his gang existed here. Defendant’s use of the truck he stole to commit a crime and for no other purpose were undisputed facts that stood alone, without interpretation by the expert, although the expert’s interpretation of it as a retaliatory act figured into his conclusion that the theft of the truck benefitted the gang.
Like in Albarran, the facts in In re Frank S. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1192 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 839], also cited by the majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 659, 660), are so dissimilar to those here that the case hardly merits mention. However, I will point out the facts upon which the expert in Frank S. concluded that the minor’s carrying a dirk or dagger benefitted a gang: the minor, who once listed himself as an affiliate of a gang: was caught bicycling, alone, with a small bindle of methamphetamine, a concealed knife and a red bandana, then gave a false name to the arresting officer. (141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.) Aside from the appellate court’s problems with the gang’s expert’s conclusion that the minor was an active gang member (id. at p. 1195), the expert concluded that the minor possessed the knife to protect himself, which is what a gang member would do, as well as to use it to attack rival gang members, both of which benefitted his gang. (Id. at pp. 1195-1196.) The appellate court concluded that “nothing besides weak inferences and hypothetical show the minor had a gang-related purpose for the knife, [f] . . . [T]he prosecut[or] presented no evidence other than the expert’s opinion regarding gangs in general and the expert’s improper opinion on the ultimate issue .... The prosecution did not present any evidence that the minor was in gang territory, had gang members with him, or had any reason to expect to use the knife in a gang-related offense.” (Id. at p. 1199.) Here, in contrast, there was evidence about defendant’s use of the truck for an offense involving intimidation.
Finally, People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 459] (Ramon), which the majority cites (maj. opn., ante, at p. 660) is also distinguishable. Ramon, in the company of a fellow gang member, was found driving a stolen truck at least one day after it had been taken. (175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 846-847.) An unregistered handgun, bearing no fingerprints, was under the driver’s seat. (Id. at p. 847.) The ignition had not been damaged and the key in it was normal. A gang expert testified that the truck was stopped in the heart of the territory controlled by defendant’s gang. (Ibid.) The expert opined that a stolen truck and the gun could be used to engage in the list of *670crimes that constituted the gang’s primary activities and both could be used to spread fear and intimidation; therefore, possession of both benefitted the gang. (Id. at pp. 847-848.) The expert relied on the facts that two gang members were together in territory controlled by their gang, and the gun and truck could be used to commit other crimes, to conclude that the crimes benefitted the gang. (Id. at p. 849.) The appellate court determined that this was insufficient, saying “There were no facts from which the expert could discern whether [defendant and his fellow gang member] were acting on their own behalf ... or ... on behalf of the[ir gang]. While it is possible the two were acting for the benefit of the gang, a mere possibility is nothing more than speculation. ... [][].. . [The facts that the two gang members were together and in their gang’s territory], standing alone, are not adequate to establish that [defendant] committed the crime with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by gang members. While [defendant] may have been acting with this specific intent, there is nothing in the record that would permit the People’s expert to reach this conclusion, [f] . . . [f] . . . The issue in the gang enhancement context was whether [defendant] was acting with the specific intent of assisting his . . . gang.” (Id. at pp. 851, 853.) The expert here, however, offered no such opinion and defendant’s intent is not at issue here. Unlike in Ramon, here, there was evidence to contradict defendant’s claim that he committed the carjacking for his own benefit.
Finally, we note the following from Ramon: “The analysis might be different if the expert’s opinion had included ‘possessing stolen vehicles’ as one of the activities of the gang.” (Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 853, italics added.) Here, in contrast, the two experts testified that not only was carjacking one of the primary activities of defendant’s gang, it was one of its “signatures.” Thus, Ramon does not support the majority’s conclusion.7
*671Finally, the majority correctly points out that all the evidence concerning benefitting defendant’s gang pertained to the carjacking and none specifically addressed his possession of the shotgun. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 656, fn. 5.) However, it was his possession of the gun that facilitated the carjacking and made it particularly dangerous and intimidating. I believe the jury could reasonably infer that this violence and intimidation added to the already dangerous crime of carjacking benefitted the gang in the same way the carjacking did.

 As a preliminary matter, the majority fails to note (maj. opn., ante, at p. 652) that the first jury made true findings that defendant had personally used a firearm during the carjacking and the attempted robbery, pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b).

 The majority’s statement that “no testimony was adduced in the present case that carjacking . . . was one of the gang’s activities, although there was testimony that its ‘signature’ crime was vehicle theft” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 661, fn. 7) is belied by the record as follows,
“Q. [By defense counsel to Sergeant Assumma]: [E]ssentially[,] your expert testimony today . . . is . . . that this crime . . . was committed for the benefit of the gang because . . . HD • ■ • HU • • • he was doing this . .. ‘crime’ of carjacking because this is one of the signature crimes that gangs use; correct?
“A. [By Sergeant Assumma]: Correct.”
Deputy Johnson testified that car thefts are the signature crimes for defendant’s gang. When it was pointed out to him that defendant committed a carjacking, not merely a car theft, he responded that while the two crimes are different, carjacking is “[b]y definition . . . still a car theft.”
The majority’s attempt to graft onto the situation here the notion that two crimes must be so distinctively similar to be considered a “signature” of the defendant to permit the admission of evidence of one at the trial of another is misplaced. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 661-662.) Such a concept has no logical applicability to the knowledge of a gang expert that an offense or list of offenses constitute the signature crime or crimes of a particular gang.

 This was the explanation offered by the defense as to why defendant took the victim’s truck.

 The majority’s reference to matters for which evidence was not presented at the first trial (maj. opn., ante, at p. 655, fn. 4) is unnecessary since the jury that determined the truth of these allegations did not hear that evidence. Also unnecessary is its reference to the fact that there was testimony at the first trial that the crimes did not occur in defendant’s gang’s territory. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 662, fn. 8.)

 The expert did not testify that the gang war involved the gang whose members were supposedly at the party, nor the gang to which the victim assertedly belonged. (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 221.)

 The only contrary evidence was, like defendant’s here, Ferraez’s self-serving assertion that he was selling drugs merely for his own benefit.

 The majority seeks to avoid the impact of this statement in Ramon by claiming that the opinion dealt only with the issue of defendant’s intent and not with whether his crimes benefitted the gang. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 661, fn. 7.) First, the majority is incorrect. Ramon dealt with both issues. (“The [Penal Code] section 186.22[, subdivision] (b)(1) enhancement requires the jury to find that the crime was committed for the benefit of a . . . gang and with the specific intent to promote the . . . gang. The only evidence on this issue was provided by the People’s expert witness .... From the[] [facts discussed] . . . , [he] opined that the crime was committed for the benefit of the . . . gang and was intended to promote the [gang], . . . HQ . . . Ramon argues these facts were not sufficient to permit [the expert] to opine that the crimes were committed for the benefit of and with the specific intent to promote the . . . gang.” (Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 849-850.) Second, if, as the majority asserts, Ramon concerns only the issue of the defendant’s intent to assist his gang, it has no place in the discussion of the issue here, which is the sufficiency of the evidence that the crime benefitted the gang. Finally, the majority incorrectly states that there was no evidence adduced at trial that carjacking was one of the primary and/or signature activities of defendant’s gang. (See fn. 2, ante, at p. 666.)