Court Opinion

ID: 9577351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:34:04.214719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:24.996395
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the reversal, of this case on either of the grounds advanced in the majority opinion.
With reference to the discovery motion, the record discloses that the court made careful inquiry in regard to each phase of the motion. I will discuss them in the order in which they appear in the motion and the majority opinion.
(1) It does not appear that any written or taped statement was given by the defendant and none was placed or offered in evidence. (2) Defendant’s counsel stated he knew defendant’s criminal record but wondered if the State had anything else. Two prior convictions were set out in Count II of the information. These were -the only ones mentioned or introduced at the hearing on the habitual criminal count. Defendant’s counsel was fully cognizant of these at all times. *84(3) There was no grand jury investigation. (4) The names of the State’s witnesses were endorsed on the information but the court ordered the State to give defendant’s counsel the addresses of all witnesses. (5) There were no physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, or experiments. (6) There were no documents, papers, books, accounts, photographs, objects, or other tangible things which could be used as evidence except a letter or two thought to have been written by a witness. The court had previously authorized the taking of the depositions of all witnesses and stated that if there were such letters, defendant’s counsel could obtain them when the depositions were taken.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, there was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the court, nor was any prejudice to defendant shown. Clearly there was no error, let alone error with prejudice.
In regard to comments made by the court in the presence of the jury panel, it appears that the Eskew jury was selected but not sworn at the time a previous jury sitting on a DWI case reported in with a verdict of not guilty. The court did not “castigate” this jury but stated that the man acquitted had two previous convictions for DWI and had, at the previous term, been acquitted of auto theft. The court also stated that the jury probably misunderstood the instructions given which was normal for a jury trying its first case. Members of the jury stated they had been dissatisfied with the breath test given the defendant and the court pointed out that they need not have relied only on the breath test but could have considered the tests made by the arresting officer. The jury foreman who testified still thought the defendant would have been acquitted, if the case were reconsidered, notwithstanding the court’s remarks. The court then offered counsel in the present (Eskew) case the opportunity to inquire further on voir dire to which defendant’s counsel re*85plied: “I’ll waive any voir dire, Your Honor.” The ABA Standards mentioned in the opinion of McCown, J., indicate that it is inadvisable for the court to praise or criticize the jury’s verdict. This we can all agree is correct. Nevertheless, whether such comments require reversal depends on their nature and prejudicial effect in each particular instance. Perhaps examination of other decisions on this point will be helpful.
In Pickerell v. Griffith, 238 Iowa 1151, 29 N. W. 2d 588, the trial court made the following remarks directed at plaintiff’s counsel: “ ‘Yes, you better try this lawsuit like a lawyer would try it. * * *
“ ‘Sustained. Let’s get down to the issues here.’ * * *
“ ‘The only persons involved here are the plaintiff and the defendant. We are trying this lawsuit. Confine yourself to the parties involved in the lawsuit.’ * * *
“‘Yes, you have gone over that Shultz business about six times. He may answer again.’ ”
The remarks were held to be prejudicial.
In State v. Edgell, 94 W. Va. 198, 118 S. E. 144, defendant was indicted jointly with one Roy Wetherholt but separately tried. The court, in the presence of some of the Edgell jurors, remarked to Wetherholt on his acquittal that he was “as guilty as sin.” The remarks were referable to Wetherholt’s partner in crime, Edgell, and were held to be prejudicial.
In Milam v. State, 50 Okla. Cr. 439, 298 P. 898, during the progress of a trial a jury returned in another case with a verdict of acquittal and the court stated that in arriving at verdicts jurors should exercise common sense and reason in their deliberations. The court held the remarks were not prejudicial as the crimes were not similar and that the jury was not biased or prejudiced.
In Cabaniss v. City of Tuscaloosa, 20 Ala. App. 543, 104 So. 46, the court castigated jurors for not having *86been able to agree on a verdict. The remarks were held to be without prejudice to the defendant although made in the presence of jurors sitting on his case.
In Anderson v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 544, 131 S. E. 207, during prosecution of a liquor case a verdict was received in a similar type case. The court expressed disapproval of the not guilty verdict but admonished the jury that his remarks should not in any way influence its verdict. Held: Non-prejudicial.
In United States v. Kyle, 469 F. 2d 547 (D. C. Cir., 1972), cert. den., 409 U. S. 1117, 93 S. Ct. 920, 34 L. Ed. 2d 700, three jurors had sat on a case 2 days earlier which had been castigated by a different judge for rendering a not guilty verdict. The court held that there was no prejudice as the jurors had been questioned on voir dire in regard to whether they could render an impartial verdict and would acquit if not convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appeared that the two cases were dissimilar, with different defendants, counsel, and judges.
In view of the general law on the subject as above outlined, it is difficult for me to jump to a conclusion that the. jury was prejudiced in the case before us. Here the only criticism made was that the jury had failed to understand the instructions given, the two cases were dissimilar, there were different defendants and counsel, the defendant’s counsel was given an opportunity for additional voir dire examination which he declined, and the court instructed that the jury could only convict if ponvinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the evidence was reasonably conclusive.