Court Opinion

ID: 9605814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:42:12.305139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:10.496950
License: Public Domain

Sprouse, Justice,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the decision expressed in the majority opinion. The decree is set aside for the sole reason that the majority perceives a conflict in the record as to whether the defendant waived his rights to continue in the defense of his divorce action. The trial court’s order reflects that defendant, by counsel, withdrew his answer and counterclaim. The colloquy quoted in the majority opinion shows nothing to the contrary. The defendant appeared at the door of the hearing chamber and simply inquired if his wife intended to proceed with the uncontested case. The defendant offered no objection and there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate he wished to be represented or represent himself at the hearing.
This Court on appeal cannot consider anything that is not in the record, and there is nothing in the record that would warrant setting aside the final decree entered by the trial court. The appellant had been represented by two attorneys before the final hearing. He did not file the pauper’s affidavit until four days after the final hearing.
The majority opinion acknowledges the presumptive correctness of the final order, and then, in my opinion, ignores the presumption. There is nothing in the colloquy between the court, plaintiff, and plaintiff’s counsel to indicate that the defendant’s attorney had not *531been before the court immediately prior to that colloquy. If there is any presumption of correctness to be given the final order, certainly in view of the explicit recitation in the order that defense counsel appeared, it could be presumed that he appeared before the court prior to the hearing. It is not inconsistent to assume that, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the defendant from contesting the divorce, he made one last personal attempt to have his wife drop the proceeding by appearing at the door in person as is reflected in the record.
The majority opinion indicates that the trial court can vacate the judgment if it makes certain findings, but it would seem to me that this direction might be confusing to that court particularly since the judgment has been set aside by this Court. Presumably, the trial court is being instructed to make a finding as to whether the defendant waived his rights to appear, and if no such waiver is apparent, then to grant a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thornton G. Berry, Jr., joins me in this dissenting opinion.