Court Opinion

ID: 9704222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:27:12.257466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:58.740228
License: Public Domain

*136STEINMETZ, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree with the majority's conclusion that the legislation prescribing special procedures for the siting and construction of the Menomonee Valley prison violate equal protection. I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that the substantive decision to site a prison in the Menomonee Valley is not a private or local law which violates art. IV, sec. 18. I agree with the court of appeals that the specific designation of the Menomonee Valley site is a local or private law, and therefore it cannot be joined in a bill with other subjects and the subject must be expressed in the title of the bill. Accordingly, I would invalidate the designation of the Menomonee Valley prison site, as well as the special procedures regulating the construction of the prison. I do not conclude, however, that the legislature absolutely is prohibited from siting a prison in the Menomonee Valley. Article IV, sec. 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not absolutely proscribe private or local laws, but only imposes a special procedure for enactment of such laws.
The decision in Monka v. State Conservation Comm., 202 Wis. 39, 231 N.W. 273 (1930), provides the key to defining a private or local law. The Department of Health and Social Services interprets this decision to mean that any legislation affecting a statewide interest is not a private or local law, even if it operates territorially upon a limited section of the state. The department relies upon the following statement in Monka, 202 Wis. at 42:
"All that is held by the state, as proprietor, trustee, or in some governmental capacity, is a matter of general and state-wide concern, wherever located, and whenever it constitutes the subject of proposed *137legislation the bill relating thereto is not merely a matter of local interest or concern, or a merely 'local' bill, within the meaning of sec. 18, art. IV, Const."
This interpretation of Monka derives from the court's decision in Soo Line R. Co. v. Transportation Dept., 101 Wis. 2d 64, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981):
"In Monka the court rejected plaintiff's contention that a law applicable only to Lake Michigan and not to all outlying waters was a local law. The court concluded that a law applicable to Lake Michigan was not a 'local law' merely because it operates only upon a particular section of the state. Where the subject matter of the enactment is of general and state-wide concern, the court held the law is not a local bill within the meaning of sec. 18, art. IV. The court expressly stated that it was supplementing the definition of local law as set forth in Isenring, to state that the court considered the operation of a bill to extend to the whole state 'when the subject thereof is such that the state itself has an interest therein as proprietor, or as trustee, or in its governmental capacity, for the benefit or in the interest of the general public.' Monka, supra, 202 Wis. at 46."
The department has not misquoted the Monka decision. It has, however, construed the quoted material from that decision out of context. The following additional language also appears in Monka and is crucial to any generalization about the holding in that decision:
"We approve the conclusion [in Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 85 N.W. 131 (1901)] that— " 'An act is "general" as contradistinguished from and inconsistent with "local," in the sense the *138latter term is used in sec. 18, art. IV, of the constitution, only when its operation extends to the whole state, or perhaps to the whole of some class of localities therein which the legislature may constitutionally make upon the principles recognized and approved for the classification of cities for the purpose of general legislation.'
"However, the writer of the opinion in that case does not seem to have taken into contemplation the class of legislation, if general, state-wide interest and character, with which we are concerned in this action. Supplementing the conclusion there stated, we now add that the operation of a bill is considered to extend to the whole state, so that it is not a mere local bill, when the subject thereof is such that the state itself has an interest therein as proprietor, or as trustee, or in its governmental capacity, for the benefit or in the interest of the general public. That, of course, does not include a bill which merely imposes a burden or confers a benefit upon specified persons or localities, which do not constitute a legitimate class for the purpose of general legislation under the established principles of classification of cities for such purpose." 202 Wis. at 45-46. (Emphasis added.)
I construe this passage to mean that legislation affecting a statewide interest is not necessarily a local law, even if it operates on a limited area of the state. However, the passage also states that legislation affecting a statewide interest is not necessarily a general law. The test that Monka establishes for a local or private law is whether the legislation imposes a burden or confers a benefit upon persons or localities "which do not constitute a legitimate class for the purpose of general legislation under the established principles of classification of cities for such purpose." The department ig-*139ñores this unambiguous and decisive qualification of the Monka passage on which it relies.
The rules relating to the classification of cities were first stated in Johnson v. Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 390-92, 60 N.W. 270 (1894). The court held in that decision that: (1) a classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another; (2) the classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only. It must not be so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers within the class; and (4) to whatsoever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof. A fifth test was added to this list in State ex rel. Risch v. Trustees, 121 Wis. 44, 55, 98 N.W. 954 (1904): The characteristics of each class should be so far different from these other classes as to reasonably suggest, considering the public good, the need for substantially different legislation.
This court has applied the five factor test in cases subsequent to Monka to decide the private or local law issue. Lamasco Realty Co. v. Milwaukee, 242 Wis. 357, 375-77, 8 N.W.2d 372, 8 N.W.2d 865 (1943), applied this test to determine whether a law was private or local under art. IV, sec. 18. Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee County, 224 Wis. 373, 377, 271 N.W. 416 (1937), also held that the basis of classification, whether it be population, area, or some other basis, must be germane to the purpose of the law. Columbia County v. Wisconsin Retirement Fund, 17 Wis. 2d 310, 321, 116 N.W.2d 142 (1962), also evaluated the appropriateness of a classification in applying art. IV, sec. 18. These later cases have special significance because the court decided *140them after Monka and applied the classification test which I believe Monka mandates.
I recognize that the five factor test has been applied only as a guide for evaluating classifications and not as an absolutely unbending rule. For example, a statute affecting a closed class is not necessarily unconstitutional if the classification is germane to the unique problems of the class. Thus, Lamasco Realty, 242 Wis. at 377, discusses the appropriateness of Milwaukee as the basis of a legislative classification:
"It is a well-known fact that Milwaukee is the only city of the first class in the state; that it is not probable that that class will be augmented at any time within the foreseeable future, nevertheless the requirements of a metropolitan city like Milwaukee as against the smaller municipal corporations of the state are so obvious that any other result would be opposed to the public welfare."
Nonetheless, I consider the five factors to provide a useful set of inquiries to evaluate a legislative classification in order to determine whether it arbitrarily confers benefits or imposes burdens. In Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 359, 177 N.W.2d 131 (1970), the court summarized the ultimate distinction between an appropriate municipal classification and an inappropriate classification:
" 'A law is special as opposed to general if, by reason of some intrinsic limitation on its scope of application, it is arbitrarily made to apply to some particular thing, location, person or group of persons and thereby grants privileges or imposes burdens which, but for the limitation, would apply to a larger class, each member bearing the same relationship to the subject matter of the law in question. *141More specifically, a law pertaining to municipalities is special if, by reason of its being made applicable to a particular municipality or group of municipalities, it arbitrarily grants privileges or imposes burdens upon less than all the municipalities to which the particular law would naturally apply in the absence of the limitation. Thus, legislation made applicable on its face to a named city, or to a group of cities identified by their population or by some other named characteristic, is potentially special, depending upon whether or not the particular restrictive characteristic is deemed to be arbitrarily selected.'" Quoting from John M. Winters, Classification of Municipalities, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. (1962).
The majority disclaims any relationship between equal protection analysis and analysis of a private or local law under art. IV, sec. 18. This distinction and separate treatment does not hold true when considering the historical basis for art. IV, sec. 18. In prohibiting private or local legislation, unless separately identified, there is an inherent requirement of treating classes or people equally so that one group does not receive separate beneficial or harmful treatment without a separate bill being identified and considered. That is another but more selective treatment of equal protection but with special constitutional protections.
Because I believe that Monka and subsequent decisions by this court unambiguously define a private or local law in terms of the appropriateness of the classification, I cannot accept the majority's test for a local or private law. The majority concludes that the appropriateness of dissimilar treatment of private or local interests is not a relevant inquiry under art. IV, sec. 18. At pages 113-114.1 find this conclusion to be novel and irreconcilable with the purpose of art. IV, sec. 18, which *142the majority correctly defines as "to avoid the specter of favoritism and discrimination, a potential which is inherent in laws of limited applicability." At pages 107-108. The problem of discriminatory treatment, by conferring benefits or burdens on too narrow a basis, is the essence of the limitations on private or local laws. Therefore, I would continue to evaluate such laws under the test of Monka.
I also believe that the majority's substitute test for a private or local law will involve the court in legislative second guessing which will create a multitude of litigation. The majority states that a law conferring special benefits or burdens is private or local unless the legislation involves a matter of statewide interest and the legislation will have a direct and immediate effect on the statewide interest. At pages 114-115. I believe that the "direct and immediate effect" test is vague and requires the court to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislative means in relationship to the legislative purpose. I do not believe that this is a proper issue for judicial determination. The test is imprecise and ignores competing legislative goals, such as fiscal constraints, which may limit the "direct and immediate effect" of legislation.
More importantly, I do not believe that the "direct and immediate effect" test has any relevance to the interests protected by art IV, sec. 18. The fact that legislation may be effective does not ease the burden on local or private interests. Therefore, consistent with the purpose of art. IV, sec. 18, I would determine whether a bill is local or private on the basis of whether it "imposes a burden or confers a benefit upon specified persons or localities, which do not constitute a legitimate class for the purpose of general legislation." Monka, 202 Wis. at 46. This is the test the court has *143previously applied; it is a more relevant test; it is an easier test to apply; and it does not require the court to determine some arbitrary level of statutory effectiveness.
The majority's working definition of a direct and immediate effect also is too impracticable to be useful. The test apparently requires a systemwide impact on a matter of state interest. This requirement is indicated by the majority's application of the test to the facts of the Soo Line decision. The majority acknowledges that the construction of railroad crossings is a matter of a "state responsibility of statewide dimension." At page 117. The majority concludes, however, that "[t]he espoused statewide concern for highway safety was not sufficiently specific, nor was the effect on statewide highway safety direct and immediate." At page 117. The majority apparently reasons that legislation does not have a direct and immediate effect unless it impacts on the entire subject matter of statewide interest. Under this definition, any geographically specific location for highway construction set forth in untitled legislation with other matters would be a private or local law. A specific bridge, crossing or stretch of highway would never have a direct and immediate effect on the entire subject matter of highway safety. Not even 1-94 construction could qualify as a subject matter which has a direct and immediate effect on "statewide highway safety." I disagree that legislation must have a system-wide impact in order to have a direct and immediate effect on a matter of statewide interest.
Even applying the majority's test, it means that a bill which does not regulate the entire subject of concern, for example, highway safety, and which imposes site-specific burdens, is a private or local law which *144cannot be included in the budget bill. Applying this reasoning to the facts of this case, the prison siting legislation violates art. IV, sec. 18. The legislation relates to a subject of statewide concern, prison overcrowding, but it does not regulate the entire subject. It deals only with a specific part of the problem, a single prison in the Menomonee Valley in Milwaukee. This prison legislation is every bit as local or private as the railroad crossing at issue in Soo Line. The legislation by its terms applies to a prison to be:
"[L]ocated in Milwaukee in the area bounded on the north by highway 194, on the south and west by the Menominee [statutory spelling] river and on the east by 35th street on property owned by the Milwaukee road railroad on March 28, 1983. The department may acquire additional land owned by the Milwaukee road railroad on March 28,1983, on the west and south sides of and contiguous to the Menominee river." 1983 Wis. Act 27, sec. 953p.
I also disagree with the majority's "direct and immediate effect" test because it is essentially a balancing test to determine whether the statewide benefits outweigh the effect of the legislation on local or private interests. If the legislation is of statewide interest with statewide effect, it can never be a private or local bill under art. IV, sec. 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution, no matter what effect it has on the locality or individuals involved. Under this test, legislation specifically siting a toxic waste dump, or a maximum security prison as in this case, would not be a local or private law. I disagree with this analysis and would abide by the court's reasoning in Monka. I disagree that a new test is needed, and I find it surprising that the court only now has discovered the true test for analyzing a constitu*145tional provision that has existed since 1848 and has been previously challenged.
The majority's test for a private or local law will not permit accountability on issues affecting local or private interests. The test still requires legislators to vote for a comprehensive budget bill with its many concerns and fiscal necessities without voting directly on matters of private or local effect. Accountability is sacrificed, not because legislators are unaware of the private or local provisions of the budget bill, but because they cannot vote their convictions on such provisions without affecting the entire budget bill. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, therefore, a legislator could credibly claim to oppose a local or private provision, despite voting for the entire budget bill.
Applying the Monka test for a private or local law to the present case, I conclude that the entire prison siting legislation is unconstitutional. I do not dispute that the issue of prison siting affects a statewide concern. That conclusion, however, is not dispositive of the constitutional issue. Although the subject of prison siting may be of statewide interest, I consider the imposition of special burdens on the plaintiffs in this case in order to facilitate construction of a prison to be an impermissible classification.
First, the legislation severely curtails the procedural requirements for siting a prison in Milwaukee. For example, the legislation only provides for an informational hearing rather than a full contested hearing in cases to which the statute applies. The substantial detriment that this distinction imposes on Milwaukee residents, to the exclusion of all other residents, is thoroughly discussed in the majority opinion. The purported rationale for this special burden is the need to *146respond expeditiously to prison overcrowding in Wisconsin. The problem of prison overcrowding is alleged to be most severe in southeast Wisconsin and the goals of the criminal justice system are said to be best served by community-based prisons. It is not that prison overcrowding is most severe in southeast Wisconsin, but rather that the potential prison population is greatest from the urban section of southeast Wisconsin. The legislation imposes the special prison siting provisions on any new metropolitan correctional institute which is specifically designated by the legislature, by statute, between July 2, 1983, and January 1, 1985, in a city having a population of500,000 or more. The legislation therefore creates a classification for prison siting that is based on three factors: (1) population, (2) time, and (3) statutory designation. The decisive question in this case is whether these classifying criteria are germane to the purpose of the legislation or arbitrarily impose burdens on Milwaukee residents.
I do not believe that the classification is germane to the legislative purpose. First, the legislation classifies on the basis of population, rather than specifically identifying the locations where prison overcrowding is most in need of relief. Assuming that the greatest need for new prisons is limited geographically to Milwaukee county, the legislation should classify on the basis of geography rather than population. In Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee County, 224 Wis. at 377-79, this court considered a very similar attempt to legislate for a specific area, i.e., Milwaukee county, while stating the basis for the classification in terms of population. The purpose of the legislation, however, was unrelated to a classification by population. Peculiarities relating to the City of Milwaukee's charter motivated the legislation in*147volved in that case and not the special problems of an urban population. The court accordingly ruled the statute unconstitutional. Similarly, in Lamaseo Realty, 242 Wis. at 377, the court approved of classifications by population when unique problems are associated with the population size, for example, problems of urbanization. Columbia County, 17 Wis. 2d at 322, also noted that it is constitutional to classify cities according to population on the theory that metropolitan problems deserve a special classification under a general law.
In this case, the purpose of the statute relates to the alleged need for a community-based prison in Milwaukee. This is not a peculiar problem of Milwaukee's size, however, as the Fiad Report indicates that prisons are also needed elsewhere in the state. For example, the Fiad Report recommended that a maximum security prison also be built in the Racine-Kenosha area. The exclusion of any prison site in that area from this legislative restriction illustrates the statute's arbitrary limitation to cities with a population of 500,000 or more. Also, there is no reason to believe that expedited procedures are especially needed in large cities based on unique opposition to prisons. Opposition to prison siting is not a problem specifically related to population size.
The use of a population criterion to expedite prison construction also is inappropriate because the need for new prisons is not a unique Milwaukee problem. The Fiad Report recommended construction of 23 correctional facilities throughout the state. The majority of the new prisons were recommended for the southeast part of the state. The Fiad Report did not single out Milwaukee from this broader geographical region for *148all of such prison construction, however. In fact, within the various regions, the Fiad Report made no site specific recommendations. The limitation of the statutory restrictions in this case only to Milwaukee, therefore, is arbitrary. There is no reason why a prison to be built within Milwaukee county, but outside the city of Milwaukee, should be treated differently than the Menom-onee Valley prison. There is also no justification why any prison built in the Racine-Kenosha area should be treated differently than this prison. The need for this prison to be in Milwaukee is nowhere shown to be greater than the need for other recommended prisons. All the recommended correctional facilities affect the statewide overcrowding problem, thereby making it arbitrary to lessen the procedural requirements for only one facility.
The other classifying criteria, time and statutory designation, are also not germane to the purpose of the legislation. The special siting procedures apply only to prisons designated between July 2,1983, and January 1,1985. This small window of applicability is not rationally related to the purpose of alleviating prison overcrowding. Time as a factor has no inherent relationship to alleviating prison overcrowding. By itself, the passage of time will not solve the problem of excess prisoner population. The state, by its legislature or its agencies, must take affirmative steps to build prisons. Such steps will not necessarily be taken in a year and one-half. Thus, a classification based solely on the time of prison siting, rather than the magnitude of the prison population problem, is not rationally related to its purpose.
The further statutory limitation to prisons designated by the legislature by statute also is a ruse to arbi*149trarily discriminate against Milwaukee. As a practical matter, most correctional facilities are designated by agency decision. Thus, the limitation of the special siting provisions to statutory designations has no relevance to the problem of prison overcrowding. Even agency siting decisions made during the period of the statute's applicability are not covered by the expedited procedure. This limitation has no relationship to the purpose of alleviating prison overcrowding. It is simply further evidence of the improper and transparent attempt to limit the expedited siting procedure to the Me-nomonee Valley prison. Because there is no unique reason for expediting this one prison, I conclude that the classification is improper and renders the legislation regulating the procedural aspects of the prison construction an unconstitutional private or local law.
Whether the specific site designation also violates the local or private law provision of the Wisconsin Constitution is a more difficult question. The department contends that not every site-specific appropriation is a private or local law requiring passage in a separately titled bill. The department's argument essentially is that the business of budgeting governmental expenses requires a comprehensive appropriation process. The department then concludes that requiring separate legislation for site-specific appropriations will fragment the budgeting process. The constitutional issue implicated by site-specific appropriations, however, must be given precedence over governmental convenience. Thus, the issue is simply whether the specific site designation confers benefits or imposes burdens on an improperly narrow class of persons.
The intensity of the local opposition to the prison siting legislation indicates that it does not confer a spe*150cial benefit on these plaintiffs. Whether the legislation designating a specific prison site imposes burdens on legally recognizable interests of the plaintiffs is more complicated. The plaintiffs allege that construction of the prison in the Menomonee Valley will affect environmental concerns. In the absence of a statutory basis, the environmental effects of a state building project, not constituting a nuisance, would not be legally recognized burdens for purposes of art. IV, sec. 18. Significantly, however, specific statutory recognition of environmental concerns exists in Wisconsin. In the companion case to this one, Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club, et al. v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, 130 Wis. 2d 56, 387 N.W.2d 245 (1986), we specifically recognized that "allegations of injuries to aesthetic, conservational, environmental, health, and recreational interests" are protected by the Wisconsin Environmental Protection Act, sec. 1.11, Stats. No. 85-0855 at page 65. Thus, when siting legislation affects environmental interests, the legislation imposes special burdens if it deprives affected persons of the protection to which other persons are entitled by WEPA.
ply an appropriation measure, whereby funds are allocated in a comprehensive budget bill for a prison that had already been approved. The Menomonee Valley siting legislation is substantive legislation authorizing a specific project. Section 46.05(lo)(a), Stats., directs the department to establish a prison at a specific location. Without the authorizing provisions included in the appropriations bill, the Menomonee Valley prison decision would not exist.
*151Including a state building site in substantive legislation has a major limiting effect on the rights of affected parties. Section l.ll(2)(c)3, Stats., requires consideration of alternatives to a proposed action in an environmental impact statement (EIS). In the companion Brewers case, in which the court evaluated the adequacy of the department's EIS on the Menomonee Valley site, we noted that "several courts have found the description of alternatives to be the heart of the environmental impact statement." No. 85-0855 at page 73. Nonetheless, the court concluded in that case that an EIS does not have to consider alternatives when the legislature has designated a specific site for a prison. No. 85-0855 at pages 74-75. This holding severely limits the usual rights of objectors to major state building projects. Because the limitation only applies to persons affected by the Menomonee Valley prison site, I consider the classification to be too narrow. Therefore, the siting legislation also is an improper local or private law. I note that the remedy for this defect is separate legislation for statutorily designated building projects which cause major environmental impacts. This result is reasonable given the absence of the consideration of alternatives in the EIS. Designation by separate legislation promotes the underlying goal of legislative accountability.
The siting designation also is a private or local law because it constitutes a decision to buy a specific entity's property. Section 46.05(lo)(a), Stats., directs the department to buy the designated property from the Milwaukee Railroad Company. There can be no dispute that we would hold the siting legislation to be a local or private law if the railroad had brought this action. A law authorizing the state to purchase a specific enti*152ty's property epitomizes what is prohibited by art. IV, sec. 18. Furthermore, the ultimate characterization of the law as a private bill is not dependent upon the identity of the objecting party. The siting bill either is or is not a private law, and the answer to that question does not depend on who is asking for a determination. The status of the parties may affect standing, but it does not affect the definition of a private or local law.
The plaintiffs have standing to object to the constitutionality of the siting bill, in any event. The test for standing to make a constitutional challenge to a statute is stated in St. ex rel. 1st Nat. Bank v. M&I Peoples Bank, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 308-09, 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980), to include two inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff personally has suffered some threatened or actual injury; and (2) whether the constitutional provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood to grant persons in the plaintiffs' positions a right to judicial relief. In the companion Brewers case, this court specifically held that the threatened environmental effects of the Menomonee Valley prison satisfy the first standing inquiry. No. 85-0855 at pages 69-70.
The second prong of the standing test also is satisfied because art. IV, sec. 18 obviously was intended to protect against "sweetheart deals" between the legislature and private individuals or entities. I acknowledge that a legislative decision to purchase an individual's property may be an unwanted decision — if the property owner does not want to sell. On the other hand, the decision to buy may be welcome — if the owner desires to sell as here. Furthermore, the state's jurisdictional offer to purchase under its eminent domain powers cannot be challenged by anyone except the property owner. Finally, as noted above, the legislature *153does not have to consider alternative sites in an EIS when it statutorily designates project sites. In these circumstances, I believe art. IV, sec. 18 was intended to permit these plaintiffs to challenge the site designation bill. It is reasonable for all parties involved to require the legislature to make site selection and land purchase decisions in separate legislation. Legislative accountability is facilitated by this process, as required by art. IV, sec. 18. The purpose of that constitutional provision requires that someone other than the property owner also have standing to challenge laws directing the purchase of specific property. Sweetheart deals otherwise would be inscrutable. For this reason, I also believe that the plaintiffs have standing and that the purchase decision is an improper local or private law.
I conclude this discussion of the private or local law issue by noting that the analysis is consistent with the purpose of art. IV, sec. 18. That constitutional provision was adopted as a result of public reaction against the use of special legislation on substantive matters, which abuse amounted to the exercise of judicial power, such as by enacting laws which "fixed penalties, awarded new court trials, adjusted solvencies and granted divorces." Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers, 79 (1950). In Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131 (1901), this court further stated the laudatory purpose of art. IV, sec. 18 :
"We are dealing with an important constitutional restriction upon legislative power. Courts that refer to such an objection to a law as the one here presented as technical, misconceive the situation. The framers of the constitution, in adopting sec. 18, art. IV, intended to guard against the danger of legisla*154tion, affecting private or local interests, being smuggled through the legislature under misleading titles, by requiring every bill affecting such interests to be under a title likely to call attention of the lawmakers to its character, and likewise the attention of the people affected, to the end that every member of the legislature may intelligently participate in considering such bill and all objections thereto may be presented." (Emphasis added.)
The Isenring case was decided in 1901 before the modern, sophisticated maneuver of including substantive law in budget bills became common. The conclusion in Isenring, however, is perhaps even more appropriate today in requiring every member of the legislature to intelligently and independently consider bills of a substantive nature so that all objections may be presented while considering the issue, with legislators ultimately casting a vote for or against it. When a local bill is included in the budget, legislators are not required to vote yes or no on the specific issues, but only cast a vote for or against the entire budget bill, which contains many necessary fiscal matters. It would be more conducive to representative government if legislators were required to specially vote on a local issue, such as the siting of this prison, and therefore have to face their constituents in regard to their vote. That is what the court held in the Isenring case, and we have never retreated from that wise interpretation of art. IV, sec. 18.
Finally, accepting the Soo Line test for a local or private law, it would not validate the legislation at issue in this case. The department urges us to apply the Soo Line test to decide whether the prison siting legislation violates art. IV, sec. 18. The court's entire con-*155elusory reasoning in that case consisted of the following paragraphs:
"It is difficult to conceive of a legislative enactment more particularly addressed to a specific geographical location or a specific entity. In light of the definition of private or local law set forth in our prior cases and the rationale of sec. 18, art. IV, Wis. Const., we conclude that sec. 923(48)(a) is a private or local law.
"We must now determine whether ch. 418, Laws of1977, meets the requirements which sec. 18, art. IV, Wis. Const., imposes on sec. 923(48)(a), a private or local enactment. The law cannot embrace more than one subject and the subject must be expressed in the title.
"Ch. 418, Laws of 1977, is, as we noted previously, the budget review bill. Without elaborating, it is obvious from the nature of the act, the length of the act and the numerous sections in the act, that the budget review bill embraces many subjects in addition to the question of the Soo Line Railroad crossing." 101 Wis. 2d at 77.
This simple statement of the rule of law would, if applied, lead to the conclusion that the designation of the prison siting is a private or local law.
Under any analysis, therefore, the prison siting legislation is a private or local law that cannot be included in the budget bill. The 1983 budget bill is an omnibus statute of more than 400 pages embracing a broad range of subjects, including one site-specific provision, the prison siting legislation. Nothing could be more clear, when avoiding the politics of the issue, that this is a local bill prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution. It does not do to say that this conclusion will stall construction of the Menomonee Valley prison, because *156to expedite construction contrary to constitutional guarantees allows the end to justify the means. Also, the legislature is not prohibited from funding the prison in the budget bill. It simply cannot designate the site or the site review procedures in the budget bill. Accordingly, I would invalidate the site designation provisions of the budget bill and therefore dissent. I also concur with the majority's decision as to the procedural provisions of the bill being unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection under the Wisconsin Constitution.