Court Opinion

ID: 9789328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:34:39.324892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:21.757085
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
¶ 15 I respectfully dissent. I cannot say that the trial court “plainly erred” in not advising Defendant of his right to a “speedy” trial by an “impartial” jury.
¶ 16 To establish plain error a defendant must show that “ ‘(1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error was harmful....’” State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court’s error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court.” Id. at 239; see also State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (rejecting a claim of plain error where “ ‘the trial court did not have the benefit of [a later] appellate decision’ ” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s *1110error in not advising Defendant of his rights should have been obvious to the trial court in light of State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 47 P.3d 101, and State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222. Both of these cases were decided after Defendant in this case had entered his plea. Therefore, I fail to see how these decisions could have been obvious to the trial court. Tamawiecki’s reliance upon State v. Visser, 1999 UT App 19, 973 P.2d 998, (Visser I), is also suspect given that Visser I was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242 (Visser II).
¶ 17 The law in this area remains unclear and unsettled. There is some question as to whether we even have jurisdiction to address Defendant’s rule 11 arguments. See Utah R.Crim. P. 11. Defendant entered his plea on March 8, 2000 and moved to withdraw it 33 days later, on April 10, 2000. After denying his motion, the trial court sentenced Defendant on April 11, 2000. State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68,¶ 11, 31 P.3d 528, held that “the thirty-day limitation on filing a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest runs from the date of final disposition of the case” and not from the date of the plea colloquy. However, in a later case, State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,¶ 3, 40 P.3d 630, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s rule 11 arguments because the defendant “did not move to withdraw his guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea.” (Emphasis added.) Although Reyes cites Ostler, I cannot say that Reyes overruled Ostler. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994) (discussing the standard for overruling precedent).
¶ 18 Furthermore, there is some question as to whether a trial court must use the terms “speedy” trial and “impartial” jury, in order to strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11. In State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ¶ 22, 26 P.3d 203 and Visser II, our supreme court seems to intend to overrule Tamawiecki and its progeny, but this was never done expressly. I therefore cannot say that Tamawiecki and Hittle have been overruled. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398-99.
¶ 19 In Martinez, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the district court strictly complied with rule 11 by informing the defendant about “the right to a jury trial.” 2001 UT 12 at ¶¶ 22-25, 26 P.3d 203. No use of the words “speedy” trial or “impartial” jury were needed to meet the requirements of rule 11. In Visser II, the supreme court stated that “[sjtrict compliance, ... does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed” and “[sjtrict compliance does not require a specific method of communicating the rights enumerated by rule 11.” Vis-ser II, 2000 UT 88 at ¶¶ 11, 13, 22 P.3d 1242. The court then proceeded to conclude that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 although it did not specifically inform the defendant of his “ ‘right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.’ ” Id. at ¶ 13.
' ¶ 20 In contrast, Tamawiecki concluded that the trial court plainly erred when it failed to specifically inform the defendant of her right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at ¶¶ 16-20, 5 P.3d 1222. Tamawiecki relied upon the court of appeals decision in Visser I, which the supreme court later reversed in Visser II. Hittle then relies upon Tamawiecki, in concluding that “the trial court ... [plainly erred by failing] to advise [djefendant of his substantial constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at ¶ 10, 47 P.3d 101.
¶ 21 Because the cases in this area are so inconsistent, the supreme court should reevaluate the caselaw and set up some baseline rules that are clear and easy to follow. In so doing, it should expressly overrule inconsistent cases.1
¶ 22 Based on the foregoing, I cannot say that the trial court plainly erred. I would therefore affirm.

. Controversies such as the one before us should be relatively easy to avoid as a practical matter. The problem we now face could have been avoided if the plea agreement had exactly tracked the rights mentioned in rule 11. In the modern era of word processing and computers, it would not be difficult to modify existing forms (or prepare new ones) that precisely track a defendant’s rule 11 rights.