Court Opinion

ID: 9630713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:18:15.127038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:42.194313
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
Concurring.
I concur with the result achieved by the majority opinion, but I do not agree with much of its reasoning. As correctly determined by the Court of Appeals, KRS 6.350 requires an actuarial analysis for any legislation which would increase the benefits or change the financial liability of any public retirement system before the legislation leaves committee for consideration by the full legislative body and that the actuarial analysis must accompany the legislation. The statute clearly states that an analysis must be prepared by an actuary who is a fellow of the Society of Actuaries, a member of the American Academy of Actuaries or an enrolled actuary under the Employ*788ees’ Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The analysis must indicate the economic effect of the bill on a public retirement system, project the cost of increased benefits and describe assumptions and methods of computation.
It is beyond question that KRS 6.350 relates to an important benefit in connection with the provisions of KRS 21.450. It is a matter of significant public interest. In these days of financial flexibility and dramatic shifts in economic status, it cannot be said that an increase in benefits to one segment of the retirement community could not ultimately impact vested pension benefits of retired employees in other classifications. In this case, it appears that the only information that the members of the General Assembly had in regard to the amendment of KRS 21.450 was to the effect that there was a report from the executive director of the retirement system that says, “I am unable to determine the fiscal impact, if any, of Section 4.”
The argument made by the Board and accepted by the majority opinion that the statute only requires that a request be made to constitute sufficient compliance is totally without merit. As previously noted, KRS 6.350 mandates that the study be set out in detail and attached to the legislation for consideration before it can be enacted. Although the circuit court properly found that this was not accomplished, it nevertheless improperly concluded that the only requirement was that the request be made and that there was substantial compliance with the statute.
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the failure to comply with the clear requirements of the statute render the amendment to KRS 21.450 void with respect to HB 389. The analysis by the Court of Appeals regarding the plain language of the statute is beyond question. KRS 6.350(1) provides that a pension bill “shall not be reported from a legislative committee of either house of the General Assembly for consideration by the full membership of that house unless the bill is accompanied by an actuarial analysis.” The word “shall” is mandatory and not permissive. See KRS 446.010(29).
My greatest difficulty with the rationale presented by the majority is the reference to what it considers merely procedural matters as distinguished from substantive law. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights and duties. Procedural law is an apparatus provided by statute or rule which prescribes a method of legislative operation in enacting substantive provisions. The distinction between substantive and procedural law is that substantive law relates to the rights and duties giving rise to a cause of action while procedural law is the mechanism used for carrying out a practical method of operation. Here, KRS 6.350 defines the responsibility of the General Assembly when amending the pension statutes. The legislature cannot simply ignore the existing statute.
The statute here is not procedural but gives a clear direction as to how the particular law is to be adopted and what conditions must be satisfied. This is not a matter of parliamentary procedure which would be clearly within the realm of the General Assembly, but something that applies to people outside of the legislative body in that it may affect the vested pension benefits of other retired employees.
There is no question that Section 39 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the General Assembly with authority to determine the rules of its own proceedings. See Philpot v. Haviland, Ky., 880 S.W.2d 550 (1994). As noted in my dissent in Philpot v. Patton, Ky., 837 S.W.2d 491 (1992), I firmly believe that this Court cannot tell either house of the General Assembly what *789system or rules it can enact. In other words, the legislature is free to enact its own legislative and procedural rules and that such action cannot be challenged because of their propriety and wisdom. However, because this is a departure from procedural practice and clearly a substantive provision of the law, the failure to comply with KRS 6.350 is fatal.
It has been held, except that in legislation involving contract rights, that each legislature is entirely independent of its predecessor and is vested with complete authority to amend or repeal existing laws at its pleasure. City of Mt. Sterling v. King, 126 Ky. 526, 104 S.W. 322 (1907). Here, the retirement plan in question is a legal contract. KRS 6.525 relates to the governance of such plan and expressly adopts KRS 21.480, which in pertinent part refers to the pension system as an inviolate contract in which the rights and benefits provided therein shall not be subject to reduction or impairment by alteration, amendment or repeal. The constitution of Kentucky in Section 19, protects state pensioners from the General Assembly unilaterally amending statutes that impact the pension system. The constitution provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted. See also 16B. Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 721 (1998).
When the interpretation of a statute affects persons other than current members of the General Assembly, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one. See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 52 S.Ct. 475, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1932). Here, it is entirely possible that the increase in the pension benefits, although totally justified, could potentially jeopardize pension benefits for retired legislators or other state employees. Cf Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App.3d 773, 189 Cal.Rptr. 212 (Cal.Ct.App.1983), which indicates that the California legislature was not free to randomly and unilaterally act without actuarial input from the board overseeing the public retirement system. Many other state courts agree. See Dadisman v. Moore, 181 W.Va. 779, 384 S.E.2d 816 (1989), citing cases. The action of the legislature here, which ignores the statute largely without debate or an informed vote by the entire General Assembly, violates many sections of the Kentucky Constitution, including Section Two, which states absolute and arbitrary power does not exist anywhere in the Republic, not even in the largest majority. See also Kentucky Constitution §§19 and 25.
This Court declined to extend or apply the holding of Valdes, supra, in Jones v. Bd. of Trustees, Ky. Retirement Systems, Ky., 910 S.W.2d 710 (1995). However, Jones, supra, is distinguishable because here, the General Assembly chose to ignore statutes requiring the actuarial analysis before increasing benefits. In Jones, it was argued that the system had independence to set contribution rates.
I doubt if anyone would seriously challenge the proposition that the General Assembly is not above the law. The law as commonly defined includes statutes as well as constitutional provisions. It is the responsibility of this Court to decide in a proper case, whether the actions of the General Assembly comply with the Constitution of Kentucky, or the laws of this Commonwealth. Certainly, there is a procedure for changing statutes and it is well known and regularly and routinely used by the General Assembly in reaching a different conclusion from the effect of a statute originally enacted. Simply stated, it is repeal by direct action of previous legislative pronouncements.
Moreover, there is the opportunity to permit the people of Kentucky to amend the constitution if the General Assembly so *790chooses. Respectfully, I do not believe that the General Assembly can repeal an existing statute by implication. “Repeal by implication finds no favor within the courts.” See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Brock, Ky., 915 S.W.2d 751, 753 (1996).
I do concur with the view expressed by the majority that the amendment of KRS 21.450 by Section 4 of the House Bill is unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly delegates the legislative authority to an administrative agency without sufficient guidance. See Folks v. Barren County, 313 Ky. 515, 232 S.W.2d 1010 (1950), and many other cases as cited by the majority.
There is a vast difference between substantial compliance and no compliance. Here, the legislature failed to follow the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. The statute is mandatory and not directory. The legislature simply made a mistake in approaching the pressing problem of pension modification. The problem is easily corrected by an appropriate legislative enactment.