Court Opinion

ID: 9409308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 19:04:08.319435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.829768
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/17/23 Yasoua v. City of Chula Vista CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 NAMIER YASOUA et al.,                                                         D080544

            Plaintiffs and Appellants,

            v.                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
                                                                               00062842-CU-PA-CTL)
 CITY OF CHULA VISTA,

            Defendant and Respondent.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Reversed with directions.
          Namier Badri Aziz Yasoua and Janette Noel, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
          Glen R. Googins, City Attorney, Karen Rogan, Assistant City Attorney,
and Eric B. Alden, Deputy City Attorney; Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley,
Alena Shamos and Merete Rietveld, for Defendant and Respondent.

          Namier Yasoua and Janette Noel appeal the judgment entered against
them in their action against the City of Chula Vista (the City) for personal
injuries they allegedly sustained when a City police officer who was pursuing
a suspected traffic law violator negligently drove his patrol vehicle into the
back of appellants’ vehicle. The City filed a motion for summary judgment
based on the statutory immunity for collisions involving vehicles being
pursued by police, and, in part because appellants filed no opposition, the
trial court granted the motion. Because the City did not meet its burden to
establish the elements of the immunity it asserted, however, the burden
never shifted to appellants to submit opposition raising a triable issue of
material fact. We therefore reverse the judgment.
                                        I.
                                BACKGROUND
A.    Trial Court Litigation
      Jordan Garcia was employed by the City as a police officer and was on
patrol when he drove his vehicle into the rear of appellants’ vehicle as he
began pursuing a third vehicle he had seen make unsafe traffic lane changes.
After the City denied their claim under the Government Claims Act (Gov.
Code, § 810 et seq.), appellants filed a civil action against the City.
Appellants alleged Garcia’s negligence in operating the City’s vehicle “caused
them severe injury necessitating medical treatment” and “lost earnings,” and
they prayed for general and special damages. The City answered the
complaint that contained a general denial and many affirmative defenses,

including immunity under Vehicle Code section 17004.71 and Government

1      “A public agency employing peace officers that adopts and promulgates
a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on an annual
basis for, vehicular pursuits complying with subdivisions (c) and (d) is
immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to or death of any
person or damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle being
operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been,
or believes he or she is being or has been, pursued in a motor vehicle by a
peace officer employed by the public entity.” (Veh. Code, § 17004.7,
                                        2
Code section 815.2
      During the litigation, the parties communicated by e-mail and
apparently agreed to accept service of discovery requests and responses and
other documents by e-mail. They also filed, or attempted to file, documents
electronically.
      The City moved for summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) on the
basis that it was “directly immune from liability” under Vehicle Code
section 17004.7, and was “immune from direct (non-vicarious) negligence
liability for any conduct associated with its peace officers” under Government
Code section 815, subdivision (a). In support of the motion, the City
submitted a declaration from Garcia describing the events that led up to the
collision between his and appellants’ vehicles. Garcia stated that while he
was on patrol in a marked vehicle, he saw a driver make lane changes in an
unsafe manner and without signaling, and decided to pursue the driver to
make a traffic stop. During the pursuit, Garcia’s vehicle collided with
appellants’ vehicle. Garcia also stated he was familiar with the City’s written
policy regarding vehicle pursuits; had acknowledged in writing he received,
read, and understood the policy; and had completed training on vehicle
pursuits less than five months before he drove into appellants’ vehicle. An

subd. (b)(1).) For the immunity to apply, the policy must meet the minimum
standards prescribed by statute and peace officers must complete annual
training that covers those standards. (Id., § 17004.7, subds. (c), (d).)

2      “Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not
liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the
public entity or a public employee or any other person. [¶] (b) The liability of
a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is
subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including
this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public
entity if it were a private person.” (Gov. Code, § 815.)
                                       3
agent in the City’s police department who trains officers on vehicle pursuits
submitted a declaration describing the annual training and attaching a copy
of the City’s policy. A sergeant in the City’s police department who had
access to the City’s written policies and officers’ training records submitted a
declaration stating the policy on vehicle pursuits in effect when Garcia drove
into appellants’ vehicle was issued approximately two years before the
collision, and the training records showed Garcia had acknowledged the
policy and completed the annual training before the collision. The City
incorporated the information in these declarations into a separate statement
of undisputed material facts that it submitted as part of the summary
judgment motion.
      Four days before the hearing on the motion, appellants sent an e-mail
to counsel for the City that purported to be their opposition to the motion.
The e-mail cited no legal authorities and attached no declarations and no
response to the City’s separate statement. Appellants unsuccessfully tried to
file the opposition with the court electronically.
      The trial court held a hearing and granted the City’s motion. The court
stated “the City, especially in the absence of any opposition, has carried [its]
burden,” and ruled the undisputed material facts showed the City was
immune from liability under Vehicle Code section 17004.7 and Government
Code section 815, subdivision (a). A judgment in favor of the City and
against appellants followed.
B.    Appellate Court Litigation
      Appellants ask us to reverse the summary judgment and allow them to
have a jury trial. Although their opening brief does not set out distinct
claims of error and is difficult to follow, we discern three such claims. First,
appellants claim the summary judgment motion was “unconstitutional”

                                        4
because it deprived them of their right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, appellants claim that
by sending an e-mail to the City’s attorney four days before the hearing on
the motion for summary judgment, they submitted “valid opposition,” which
the court should have accepted and used to deny the City’s “laughable”
motion. Third, appellants claim the trial judge was “corrupt” and “biased”
against them.
      The City filed a motion to strike the portions of appellants’ opening
brief the City contends contain improper and unsupported factual assertions
and arguments about injuries to appellants and their daughter, corruption
and bias of the trial court judge, corruption of the City and its attorney,
appellants’ unfiled opposition to the summary judgment motion, and whether
Garcia was pursuing a suspected traffic law violator when he drove into
appellants’ vehicle. Appellants filed opposition to the motion and included
several documents they allege support the factual assertions and legal
arguments in their opening brief.
      The City filed a respondent’s brief in which it defends the trial court’s
order granting their motion for summary judgment, argues appellants have
not established error, and urges us to affirm the judgment.
      Appellants filed a reply brief in which they assert “[t]he evidence is
overwhelming that the [C]ity . . . cannot claim immunity from this particular
case” but cite no such evidence in the record.
      About two weeks later, appellants filed a “motion introducing existing
evidence” by which they ask us to consider audio and video recordings of “the
scene after the crash,” which they assert “nullify” the City’s immunity
defense. The City opposed the motion on the grounds it was untimely and

                                        5
the recordings appellants sought to add to the record were inadmissible and
not presented to the trial court.
                                        II.
                                    DISCUSSION
      We first dispose of the parties’ motions and then decide the appeal.
A.    Motions
      1.    The City’s Motion
      The City moves to strike the portions of appellants’ opening brief that it
contends contain unsupported facts or improper argument. We perceive
many defects in the brief, including: (1) no separate headings for claims of
error; (2) no citations to the record for most factual assertions; (3) inclusion of
facts that are not in the record; (4) no citation of authorities in support of
legal arguments; and (5) use of an impermissibly small font. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C), (2)(C), (b)(4).) Such defects would allow us to
strike the brief. (Id., rule 8.204(e)(2)(B).) The brief also contains
unsubstantiated accusations of corruption against the trial court judge, the
City, and its attorney and offensive language. An appellate court may “strike
from its files a brief or other document containing disrespectful, scandalous,
or abusive language directed against the courts, officials, or litigants.”
(Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 307, 314 (Carpenter).)
Although we do not condone appellants’ violations of the form and content
rules for briefs and strongly disapprove of their scurrilous accusations, we
deny the City’s motion to strike portions of the opening brief. We instead
exercise our discretion to disregard appellants’ noncompliance with the rules
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C)), and disregard all factual assertions
unsupported by the record and all legal arguments unsupported by authority
(County of Sacramento v. Rawat (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861; Hearn

                                         6
Pacific Corp. v. Second Generation Roofing, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 117,
150; Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622, 632).
      2.    Appellants’ Motion
      Appellants move to add to the record audio and video recordings of
events immediately after the collision between their vehicle and Garcia’s. On
an appeal from a summary judgment, “we take the facts from the record that
was before the trial court when it ruled on th[e] motion.” (Yanowitz v.
L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) “Generally, ‘ “in reviewing
summary judgment, the appellate court must consider only those facts before
the trial court, disregarding any new allegations on appeal. [Citation.] Thus,
possible theories that were not fully developed or factually presented to the
trial court cannot create a ‘triable issue’ on appeal.” ’ ” (Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 502-503,
italics omitted.) Appellants could have presented the recordings to the trial
court in opposition to the City’s motion for summary judgment, but they did
not. It is too late for them now to submit them in an effort to defeat the
motion. (Valdez v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 466, 476;
Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1252, fn. 7.)
Their “motion introducing existing evidence” is denied.
B.    Appeal
      We now turn to the merits of the appeal. Appellants contend “the most
important part of the whole appeal” is that the trial court erred by granting
the City’s motion for summary judgment based on their failure to file
opposition. Appellants assert that throughout the litigation they
communicated with the City’s attorney and exchanged discovery and other
documents via e-mail, and based on that practice they insist they “opposed
the summary judgment directly through an email to [the City’s attorney] and

                                        7
yet on the hearing date . . . the judge handed this baseless unjust ruling and
illegal judgement.” Appellants also contend the City’s assertion of immunity
is “fraudulent” and “laughable,” because Garcia admitted fault in colliding
with their vehicle, he was not in pursuit of another vehicle when the collision
occurred, and he committed perjury by stating otherwise in his declaration.
As we explain below, we reject appellants’ contention they properly opposed
the motion, but conclude their failure to do so did not allow the trial court to
grant the motion for summary judgment, because the City did not sustain its
initial burden on the motion.
      Appellants failed to comply with the procedural requirements for an
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. “An opposition to the motion
shall be served and filed not less than 14 days preceding the noticed or
continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(2).) Nothing in the record shows the court
ordered a different deadline for service and filing of the opposition. At the
hearing on the motion, the City’s attorney told the court that four days before
the hearing he “receive[d] an e-mail from plaintiff, which purport[ed] to be
their opposition,” but it “was never filed with the [c]ourt.” Yasoua responded,
“I tried to do e-filing late, but I think I made a mistake. I thought it filed and
it didn’t.” Although the parties apparently agreed to accept service of
documents by e-mail, service on a party does not constitute filing with the
court. As self-represented litigants, appellants might not have been aware of
the applicable deadlines and other requirements for service and filing nor
familiar with electronic filing of court documents. Nevertheless, “[e]xcept
when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must
apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney
representation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)

                                        8
“ ‘Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct
rules of procedure.’ ” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31.)
Appellants did not do so with regard to service and filing of opposition to the
City’s motion.
      Appellants’ failure to file opposition to the summary judgment motion,
however, did not by itself permit the trial court to grant the motion. “The
opposition papers shall include a separate statement that responds to each of
the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed,
indicating if the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are
undisputed. . . . Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate
statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for
granting the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3), italics added.)
This provision gives the trial court discretion to grant a motion for summary
judgment if the opposing party does not file a proper separate statement, but
only if the moving party has met its initial burden to show there is no triable
issue of material fact and it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
(Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1196; Thatcher v. Lucky
Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1086.) Reviewing the record de novo
(Flores v. City of San Diego (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 360, 372 (Flores)), we
conclude the City did not meet that burden.
      The City moved for summary judgment primarily based on immunity
under Vehicle Code section 17004.7, and therefore had an initial burden to
present evidence to establish each element of the immunity. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subds. (a)(1), (p)(2); Riley v. Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 492, 502 (Riley); Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.) The immunity applies to “[a] public agency
employing peace officers that adopts and promulgates a written policy on,

                                        9
and provides regular and periodic training on an annual basis for, vehicular
pursuits complying with subdivisions (c) and (d).” (Veh. Code, § 17004.7,

subd. (b)(1).)3 An agency that has such a policy and provides the required
training is “immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to or
death of any person or damage to property resulting from the collision of a
vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is
being, has been, or believes he or she is being or has been, pursued in a motor
vehicle by a peace officer employed by the public entity.” (Veh. Code,
§ 17004.7, subd. (b)(1), italics added.)
      The City qualifies as a “public agency” and “public entity” under the
immunity statute (Veh. Code, § 17000, subd. (c); Alcala v. City of Corcoran
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 666, 670-671 (Alcala)), and it submitted evidence in
support of the summary judgment motion that it has a vehicular pursuit
policy and provides police officers annual training on the policy (see pp. 3-4,
ante). But for the immunity to apply, the injuries for which appellants seek
damages from the City must have resulted from the collision of a vehicle that
was being driven by an actual or suspected violator of the law whom Garcia
was pursuing in his patrol vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 17004.7, subd. (b)(1); Riley,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 497-498 [§ 17004.7 “provides a public agency
immunity from liability for collisions involving vehicles being pursued by
peace officers”].) To determine whether the immunity applies, “the critical

3       Vehicle Code section 17004.7, subdivision (c) prescribes minimum
standards the policy must meet. Subdivision (d) of that statute defines
“ ‘[r]egular and periodic training’ ” as “annual training that shall include, at a
minimum, coverage of each of the subjects and elements set forth in
subdivision (c) and that shall comply, at a minimum, with the training
guidelines established pursuant to Section 13519.8 of the Penal Code.” Penal
Code section 13519.8 requires the Commission on Peace Officer Standards
and Training to implement training courses on high-speed vehicle pursuits.
                                           10
question is whether the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the collision of a
vehicle being operated by a fleeing suspect.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 128 (Lewis); accord, Nguyen v. City of Westminster
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1168 (Nguyen).)
      The answer to that question in this case is “no.” The collision that
caused appellants’ injuries was between their vehicle and the patrol vehicle
Garcia was driving, not the vehicle he was pursuing. This case is thus unlike
the cases the City mentioned at oral argument, in each of which the vehicle
being pursued by police was part of the collision from which the plaintiffs’
injuries resulted. (See Ramirez v. City of Gardena (2018) 5 Cal.5th 995, 997
[plaintiff’s decedent was passenger in pursued truck that hit pole after police
vehicle bumped truck]; Riley, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 498 [plaintiff was
struck by pursued car]; Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163 [plaintiff
was struck by dumpster that was struck by pursued van]; Lewis, supra,
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 121 [plaintiffs’ decedent was struck by police car after
jumping or falling off pursued motorcycle as it collided with ground]; but see
Alcala, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 668 [stating, apparently erroneously,
that plaintiffs’ decedent died after his vehicle was hit by police vehicle
pursuing murder suspect; parties’ briefs state that suspect’s vehicle struck
decedent’s vehicle (see 2006 WL 3377727, at p. *5)].) Although, as the City
pointed out at argument, in some of those cases the police vehicle was
involved in the collision from which the plaintiffs’ injuries resulted, in all of
them (with the dubious exception of Alcala) the vehicle being pursued by
police was involved. It is the involvement of the pursued vehicle in the
collision, not that of the pursuing police vehicle, that is necessary for the
immunity to apply. (Veh. Code, § 17004.7, subd. (b)(1); Nguyen, at p. 1168;
Lewis, at pp. 120-121.) Since the vehicle Garcia was pursuing was not

                                        11
involved in the collision from which appellants’ injuries allegedly resulted,
Vehicle Code section 17004.7 is inapplicable on its face, and the trial court
erred by ruling it barred appellants’ action. (See Flores, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 392 [trial court erred by granting summary judgment when
city did not show entitlement to immunity under § 17004.7].)
      The other statute the City invoked in support of its immunity defense
and on which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment (Gov.
Code, § 815, subd. (a)) does not bar appellants’ action either. That statute
states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is
not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of
the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Ibid.) This
codifies the rule that “[i]f the Legislature has not created a statutory basis for
it, there is no government tort liability.” (State ex rel. Dept. of California
Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1002, 1009; see Torres v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850
[“Sovereign immunity is the rule and a public entity may be held liable only if
there is a statute subjecting it to civil liability.”].)
      In their operative complaint, appellants cited as a statutory basis for
liability Vehicle Code section 17001, which provides: “A public entity is liable
for death or injury to person or property proximately caused by a negligent or
wrongful act or omission in the operation of any motor vehicle by an
employee of the public entity acting within the scope of his employment.”
Under this statute, a public entity is liable for injuries proximately caused by
the negligent operation of a police vehicle during pursuit of a suspected law
violator, except when the conditions for immunity under section 17004.7 are

                                          12
met. (Moreno v. Quemuel (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 914, 919; Lewis, supra,

93 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)4
      Appellants alleged in their complaint that Garcia so negligently
operated a City-owned vehicle in the course and scope of his employment by
the City that he caused the collision with appellants’ vehicle that injured
them. In his declaration in support of the summary judgment motion, Garcia
admitted that while he was on patrol for the City, his “patrol vehicle struck
the rear driver’s side of [appellants’] vehicle” during his pursuit of a third
vehicle. He did not deny that he negligently operated his vehicle or that the
collision injured appellants, and the City submitted no other evidence to
refute appellants’ allegations. We determined earlier Vehicle Code section
17004.7 does not apply, because the collision that injured appellants did not
involve the vehicle operated by the suspected law violator who was being
pursued by Garcia. Hence, on the record presented on the summary
judgment motion, the City was liable under Vehicle Code section 17001 and
did not have sovereign immunity under Government Code section 815,
subdivision (a). The trial court erred in ruling otherwise.
      Our conclusion the trial court erred by granting the motion for
summary judgment, because the City did not sustain its initial burden on the
motion to prove the immunity defense it asserted, requires reversal of the

4      The City acknowledges the liability created by Vehicle Code
section 17001, but argues it is not liable under that statute because
section 17004.7 “grant[s] public entities immunity from liability [for] a
collision during an officer’s pursuit of a suspect when the Police Department
has adopted and implemented appropriate vehicle pursuit training and
policies.” (Italics added.) As we explained earlier, however, the immunity
does not apply to any collision that occurs during police pursuit of a suspected
law violator. It covers only a “collision of a vehicle being operated by a fleeing
suspect.” (Lewis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.)
                                        13
judgment. We therefore need not address appellants’ claims of error that the
summary judgment violated their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
and the trial court judge was biased and corrupt. We nevertheless advise
appellants that it is a judge’s duty to make a ruling when a party makes a
motion; and a ruling against a party, even if erroneous, does not indicate
either bias against that party or corruption. (Brown v. American Bicycle
Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674; Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v.
Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219-1220; Ryan v. Welte (1948)
87 Cal.App.2d 888, 893.) We further advise appellants that if they continue
to use abusive and disrespectful language against the trial judge and the
City’s attorney such as that included in the briefs they filed in this court,
their filings may be stricken and they may be held in contempt. (In re
Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247-250; Carpenter, supra, 10 Cal.2d at p. 314;
In re White (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1477-1478; Ruby v. Superior Court
(1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 175, 177.)

                                       14
                                     III.
                               DISPOSITION
     The City’s motion to strike portions of appellants’ opening brief is
denied. Appellants’ “motion introducing existing evidence” is denied. The
judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions to the trial
court to vacate the order granting the City’s motion for summary judgment
and to enter a new order denying the motion.

                                                                     IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

                                     15