Court Opinion

ID: 9391243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 17:01:03.941083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.076274
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-13296    Document: 51      Date Filed: 05/01/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
               United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 20-13296
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
      versus
      MICHAEL G. HARPER,
      a.k.a. Cuban Mike,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                         ____________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00125-KMM-11
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      2                      Opinion of the Court                20-13296

                           ____________________

          ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                       UNITED STATES
      Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
      PER CURIAM:
             We previously affirmed the district court’s denial of Michael
      Harper’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act
      of 2018. The Supreme Court vacated our prior decision and re-
      manded the case to us for further consideration in light of Concep-
      cion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022). Harper v. United
      States, 142 S. Ct. 2898 (2022).
            Concepcion established that district courts may consider in-
      tervening changes in the law when deciding whether and how
      much to reduce the sentence of a defendant who is eligible for relief
      under the First Step Act. 142 S. Ct. at 2396. And because “district
      courts are always obligated to consider nonfrivolous arguments
      presented by the parties, the First Step Act requires district courts
      to consider intervening changes when the parties raise them.” Id.
      Concepcion also acknowledged, however, that the First Step Act
      explicitly left the decision whether to grant a sentence reduction to
      the district court’s discretion. Id. So although district courts are
      required to consider arguments raised by the parties, “the First Step
      Act does not compel courts to exercise their discretion to reduce
      any sentence based on those arguments.” Id.
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      20-13296               Opinion of the Court                       3

              Harper argues that Concepcion abrogated our holding in
      United States v. Jones that “in determining what a movant’s statu-
      tory penalty would be under the Fair Sentencing Act, the district
      court is bound by a previous finding of drug quantity that could
      have been used to determine the movant’s statutory penalty at the
      time of sentencing.” 962 F.3d 1290, 1303 (11th Cir. 2020). He con-
      tends that Concepcion requires district courts to retroactively ap-
      ply Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), by disregarding
      any drug-quantity finding not made by a jury when calculating the
      movant’s new statutory penalties and Sentencing Guidelines range.
      In his case, he says, this means that his statutory sentencing range
      should be based on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which provides a max-
      imum sentence of 20 years in prison for an offense involving an
      unspecified amount of crack cocaine. And because his Guidelines
      sentence was dependent on his statutory penalty, his Apprendi-ad-
      justed statutory sentence would result in a Guidelines sentence of
      20 years in prison, rather than the life sentence calculated by the
      district court.
             Harper’s argument is foreclosed by our recent opinion fol-
      lowing a Supreme Court remand of one of the four appeals decided
      in Jones. See United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331 (2023). In
      Jackson, we held that Concepcion did not abrogate the reasoning
      in Jones, and we reinstated our prior opinion in that case. Id. at
      1333. His argument is also foreclosed by Concepcion itself, which
      explained that a district court cannot “recalculate a movant’s
      benchmark Guidelines range in any way other than to reflect the
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      4                       Opinion of the Court                 20-13296

      retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. Rather, the First
      Step Act directs district courts to calculate the Guidelines range as
      if the Fair Sentencing Act’s amendments had been in place at the
      time of the offense.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2402 n.6. Using the
      new Guidelines range as a “benchmark,” the court “may then con-
      sider postsentencing conduct or nonretroactive changes in select-
      ing or rejecting an appropriate sentence.” Id.
              The district court here correctly determined that Harper
      was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act be-
      cause he was sentenced for a “covered offense”; namely, conspir-
      acy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine
      base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846. See First
      Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(a)–(b), 132 Stat. 5194,
      5222; Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301. The court also correctly determined
      that Harper’s statutory sentencing range would still be ten years to
      life in prison under the Fair Sentencing Act, based on the court’s
      finding at sentencing that his offense involved 1.5 kilograms of
      crack cocaine, and his Guidelines sentence would still be life in
      prison. See 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A) (2012); Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303;
      see also U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(d)(1), 2A1.1.
             The district court’s order indicates that it considered Har-
      per’s argument based on Apprendi. After correctly calculating Har-
      per’s benchmark Guidelines sentence under the Fair Sentencing
      Act, the court determined that a reduction in Harper’s sentence be-
      low the advisory Guidelines sentence of life in prison would not be
      appropriate. This decision was within the broad discretion
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      20-13296               Opinion of the Court                       5

      afforded to district courts to grant or deny First Step Act motions.
      See First Step Act § 404(c); Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404; Jones,
      962 F.3d at 1304. We therefore affirm.
            AFFIRMED.