Court Opinion

ID: 9683428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:28:21.482841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.773435
License: Public Domain

YANEZ, Justice,
concurring.
I am taking the admittedly unorthodox step of concurring to my own opinion in order to address an issue raised by appellant which I consider worthy of our attention. Appellant alleged that the jury foreman lied on his juror information card, and, relying on the juror’s responses, defense counsel did not question that juror during voir dire regarding the substance of those responses. Appellant contends that, because the juror withheld material information, appellant was deprived of his right to select a fair and impartial jury. This contention is meritorious and, if properly preserved, may have warranted a new trial.
I recognize the trend toward promulgating rules which reduce the length of trials without compromising the right to due process of law, and the growing emphasis on juror information cards as a useful means of effecting that end. It is well known that judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys alike rely on the veracity of the responses contained on these cards. However, there is very little case law which addresses the function of these cards, and the degree to which attorneys may rely on their contents without further inquiry during voir due. In this light, I feel that appellant’s claim that a juror lied on a juror information card in a manner that affected the voir dire questioning merits our attention.
When the court distributes jury cards to potential jurors, it does so in the interests of expediency, with the intention of eliciting basic information which would otherwise be brought out during voir dire. See Miles v. State, 644 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1982, no pet.). Such cards or questionnaires serve to minimize the length of voir dire.
Technically, the questions posed on such cards are attributed to the court. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently stated that defense counsel is entitled to rely on the questions asked by the court and prosecutor during voir dire. Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 364 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). It is well-settled law that counsel may strike jurors based solely on their responses in the jury questionnaires. See Satterwhite v. State, 858 S.W.2d 412, 424 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 970, 114 S.Ct. 455, 126 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 204-05 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), aff'd mem., 490 U.S. 754, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 834 (1989); Sanchez v. State, 797 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd). Such cards are considered to be a means of eliciting the possible biases and/or problems of venirepersons. Attorneys may rely on the answers provided in those cards, and based on the cards, must decide whether further inquiry into those *496responses is necessary. Cf. Cornish v. State, 848 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (juror information cards may be considered in evaluating a Batson claim); see also Doby v. State, 910 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref'd) (attorneys are entitled to rely on, and the court is entitled to consider, responses on juror information cards). Although we have not ruled on this issue, we have suggested that counsel should rely on the responses provided on the cards, rather than pose repetitious questions during voir dire. See Tobar v. State, 874 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref'd).
Were the issue properly before us, I would consider any material misrepresentations made or information withheld by venireper-sons on their jury information cards as falling -within the category of misconduct sufficient to warrant a new trial.1 Although we are aware of at least one of our sister courts which has ruled otherwise,21 would conclude that when a potential juror answers a question on a jury card in a manner that would not arouse any reasonable suspicion that the juror might be biased or prejudiced, defense counsel is entitled to rely on the truthfulness and accuracy of that response. In such instance, defense counsel should not be required to inquire further into that response during voir dire in order to preserve error.3 To rule otherwise would undermine one of the primary purposes of the information cards.
Given the significance placed upon these cards by both attorneys and judges as an effective and reliable method of shortening the voir dire process, I write this concurrence with the intention of recognizing their integral role in the voir dire process, as well as the right of counsel to rely of the veracity of those responses without repetitious inquiry.

. See Tex.R.App.P. 30(b); See also Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (discussing effect the withholding of material information by a juror has on the fairness of a trial).

. In Landry v. State, 879 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd), the appellate court addressed a situation where defense counsel relied on a misrepresentation made on a juror information card, and did not pose the same questions again during voir dire. The court concluded that the juror did not "withhold” information, because the attorney was not diligent in asking the proper questions during voir dire. Id.

. I recognize that, in certain instances, a response to a jury card might arouse further inquiries, while others may not. For example, in this case, had Ramirez answered "yes” to each question, counsel might be expected to question him individually on these matters to evaluate their import. In such instances, defense counsel would be notified of a possible prejudice by the response, and his failure to elicit more details during voir dire might constitute a lack of diligence. Also, the clarity of the questions posed is a factor. Compare Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 364 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (juror not considered to have withheld information when question posed was not clear and unambiguous), with Von January v. State, 576 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (new trial warranted where juror withheld answer to direct and unambiguous question).