Court Opinion

ID: 9957893
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Date Created: 2024-04-05 16:01:43.777072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:01.911017
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                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12852
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        NIHAD AL JABERI,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00031-RSB-CLR-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12852

        Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
               Nihad Al Jaberi appeals his convictions and sentences for at-
        tempted smuggling, failure to notify a common carrier, and sub-
        mitting false or misleading export information. He contends that
        there was insufficient evidence of his guilt because law enforce-
        ment did not conduct certain surveillance and because of alleged
        inconsistencies in witness testimony. He also argues that failure to
        notify a common carrier and submitting false or misleading export
        information are both lesser included offenses of smuggling and
        therefore asserts that his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy
        Clause. Next, he argues that his due process rights were violated
        because the Government failed to correct false witness testimony
        and made prejudicial statements. Finally, he asserts that his sen-
        tences are procedurally and substantively unreasonable because
        they subjected him to double jeopardy and were greater than nec-
        essary. For the reasons below, we affirm Al Jaberi’s convictions
        and sentences.
                                  I. Background
               In February 2021, a federal grand jury returned a three-count
        indictment against Al Jaberi. Count One charged Al Jaberi with
        smuggling in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) by willfully and know-
        ingly attempting to export nine firearms from the United States,
        contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) and 13 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1). Of the nine
        firearms listed in Count One, relevant here was the “Magnum
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        22-12852               Opinion of the Court                         3

        Research, model Desert Eagle, .44 caliber pistol.” Count Two
        charged Al Jaberi with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) by knowingly
        delivering firearms to a common carrier without giving the carrier
        written notice that the firearms were being transported or shipped.
        Count Three charged Al Jaberi with violating 13 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1)
        by knowingly causing a freight forwarder to submit false and mis-
        leading export information through a Shippers Export Declaration
        and an Automated Export System by falsely declaring the contents
        of a shipment to be only spare auto parts.
                                      A. Trial
                During its opening statement, the Government stated that
        Al Jaberi contracted with a common carrier to send a shipping con-
        tainer to Iraq. It explained that Al Jaberi made an atypical request
        to load the shipping container himself. It added that although
        Al Jaberi told the common carrier that he was sending auto parts,
        he loaded nine firearms into the shipping container. The Govern-
        ment also stated that law enforcement searched the container be-
        fore it left port and discovered the firearms, including “a .44 [cali-
        ber] Magnum Desert Eagle.”
                During the Government’s case, Valery Baranouski—the
        owner of the common carrier company North Atlantic Logistics
        (NAL)—testified as follows. NAL contracted with Al Jaberi to ship
        a container with spare auto parts in it from Georgia to Iraq. Typi-
        cally, NAL would load the shipping containers at their own facility.
        But because of the pandemic, NAL sent the container to Al Jaberi’s
        facility for loading to reduce human contact. Al Jaberi and NAL
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12852

        agreed that the container would be delivered directly to Al Jaberi
        on July 24, 2020, and picked up three days later. On July 27,
        Al Jaberi emailed a bill of lading to NAL that described the cargo
        only as “auto parts.” The next day, NAL electronically submitted
        this information to the United States Customs and Border Protec-
        tion’s (CBP) Automated Export System (AES).
               On cross-examination, defense counsel showed Baranouski
        a copy of the shipping container’s bill of lading. He testified that
        the document “indicate[d] that the cargo was loaded and shipped
        from KHM Auto, Inc.,” at “1810 Auger Drive” and confirmed that
        this was at Al Jaberi’s instruction.
                The Government also called CBP Agent Nichole Hamm to
        testify. Agent Hamm testified that her team searched Al Jaberi’s
        outbound shipping container on August 4, 2020. Her team found
        a camp stove box wrapped in green cellophane against the back
        wall of the container. The box contained disassembled firearms
        that were also wrapped in green cellophane.
               After Agent Hamm’s testimony, the Government called
        CBP Supervisor John Wilcher. Wilcher testified that one of the
        firearms was “a .50 caliber Magnum Research Desert Eagle.”
        When Wilcher testified that CBP found a magazine for “the .50-cal-
        iber Desert Eagle,” the Government repeated, “.50-caliber Desert
        Eagle, all right.” And, in the trial transcripts, the court reporter
        labeled the exhibit for this firearm as a “.50 caliber Magnum Re-
        search Desert Eagle.”
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        22-12852              Opinion of the Court                        5

               The Government then called Special Agent Ariel Leinwand
        of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security,
        Office of Export Enforcement (BIS). Special Agent Leinwand testi-
        fied that in October 2020, the BIS searched Al Jaberi’s home. Dur-
        ing its search, the BIS discovered three key pieces of evidence:
        (1) the same type of green cellophane that the firearms were
        wrapped in; (2) retail boxes for the firearms that were found disas-
        sembled in the shipping container; and (3) a paper retail purchase
        receipt for one of the firearms found in the shipping container. BIS
        agents also interviewed Al Jaberi. According to Special Agent Lein-
        wand’s testimony, Al Jaberi admitted that he shipped these fire-
        arms to Iraq without informing the common carrier of the fire-
        arms. Al Jaberi also admitted that the firearms were his and that he
        packed them in the container without informing the common car-
        rier.
              On cross-examination, Special Agent Leinwand testified that
        the BIS did not investigate KHM Auto. Inc. or 1810 Auger Drive.
        And Special Agent Leinwand did not recall uncovering any com-
        munication between Al Jaberi and individuals in Iraq about the
        shipment.
               The Government’s final witness was BIS Special Agent Jon-
        athan Gray. During his testimony, Special Agent Gray recognized
        an exhibit as “the Magnum Research, Model Desert Eagle .44-cali-
        ber.” The Government showed Special Agent Gray several photo-
        graphs and he testified as follows. The series of photos came from
        Al Jaberi’s cellphone and showed the container being progressively
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12852

        packed with cargo. Al Jaberi’s cellphone also contained photos of
        firearms discovered in the shipping container. During the search
        of Al Jaberi’s home, law enforcement took photos that showed a
        roll of green cellophane wrap and cases matching the firearms.
               On cross-examination, Special Agent Gray testified to the
        following. In February 2021, the BIS arrested Al Jaberi and imme-
        diately interviewed him. During the interview, Al Jaberi admitted
        that he loaded the container. Special Agent Gray was shown a
        photo of the shipping container, in which it appeared that the stove
        box containing firearms was not located “all the way in the back”;
        instead, there were “vehicles behind it.”
               Before closing arguments, Al Jaberi moved for acquittal un-
        der Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 and argued
        that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt. Al Jaberi asserted
        that no government witness identified him as the defendant. He
        asserted that there was insufficient proof that he loaded the con-
        tainer, and that any statement that he made regarding having done
        so was “contradicted by the other evidence.” He posited that he
        never certified the container’s contents because another individual
        did, and he had no reason to know that NAL required written no-
        tice of the firearms. He also argued that Baranouski’s testimony
        contradicted the Government’s assertion that Al Jaberi knowingly

        1 Rule 29(a) states in relevant part: “After the government closes its evidence

        or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must
        enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insuffi-
        cient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).
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        22-12852                Opinion of the Court                          7

        caused the filing of false or misleading export documentation. The
        District Court denied Al Jaberi’s motion.
               In its closing argument, the Government stated that
        Al Jaberi tried to smuggle “a .44-caliber Desert Eagle.” It asserted
        that Al Jaberi “paid through some electronic payment Mr. Eugene
        McNair $525, presumably for” one of the firearms. The Govern-
        ment also posited that Al Jaberi “removed the actual camping stove
        from the box,” and in its place, CBP found dissembled firearms.
               Before jury deliberation, the District Court reminded the ju-
        rors that they “must consider only the evidence” and that “any-
        thing the lawyers sa[id was] not evidence.” United States v. Al Jaberi,
        No. 4:21-cr-00031-RSB-CLR-1, Doc. 114 at 68:14–17 (S.D. Ga. Nov.
        8, 2022). And the District Court explained the final element of
        smuggling, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554(a), required that Al Jaberi
        knowingly exported a firearm
               in violation of at least one of the laws listed in the in-
               dictment, that is, A, that the defendant knowingly de-
               livered or caused to be delivered a container contain-
               ing the firearms to a common carrier for international
               shipment without providing written notice of the
               presence of the firearms to the carrier . . . . That’s
               18 [U.S.C. §] 922(e); or, B, that the defendant know-
               ingly filed or caused another to file inaccurate or mis-
               leading information through the United States Ship-
               per’s Export Declaration or [AES], and that’s
               13 [U.S.C. §] 305.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12852

        Id., Doc. 114 at 74:2–14. The jury found Al Jaberi guilty on all
        counts.
                                B. Sentencing Hearing
               The U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga-
        tion report (PSR) for the sentencing hearing. The PSR grouped
        Al Jaberi’s offenses and calculated a base offense level of twenty-six
        under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2M5.2(a)(1)
        (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021). The PSR recommended that Al Jaberi
        receive a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for ob-
        struction of justice, resulting in a total offense level of twenty-eight.
               When the offense level was combined with a criminal his-
        tory category of I, the PSR recommended a Guideline range of sev-
        enty-eight to ninety-seven months’ imprisonment followed by one
        to three years’ supervised release. Count One carried a maximum
        term of ten years’ imprisonment, while Counts Two and Three
        each carried a maximum term of five years each. Each count au-
        thorized the court to impose a term of supervised release of not
        more than three years, with multiple terms of supervised released
        running concurrently.
               The PSR also stated that there was no identifiable victim of
        Al Jaberi’s conduct. As to the basis for the obstruction of justice
        enhancement, the PSR noted that Al Jaberi requested another indi-
        vidual to (1) “create a false bill of sale for the firearms” and (2) lie
        to law enforcement to hide the origin of the firearms. Regarding
        Al Jaberi’s personal characteristics, the PSR stated that he married
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        22-12852                Opinion of the Court                           9

        his wife in 2007 and that he has three minor children from this mar-
        riage.
               Al Jaberi objected to the facts as alleged in the entirety of the
        PSR’s offense conduct section, and the factual allegations underly-
        ing his two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
                In his sentencing memorandum, Al Jaberi stated that “[d]es-
        pite the image portrayed at trial, [he] is known by others as a kind,
        loving, and helpful husband and father who has never engaged in
        criminal conduct.” He noted his personal history as an immigrant
        who “save[d] his family after receiving threats from the militia” in
        Iraq and obtained legal permanent resident status in the United
        States in 2016. He added that he “has lived [a] life contrary to the
        stereotypical smuggler” and “had too much to give up to intention-
        ally seek to hurt anyone.” He requested that the court consider
        that he was “unduly prejudiced” by a Government witness’s mis-
        statement that the Desert Eagle was .50 caliber, because “a .50 cal-
        iber firearm sounds more militaristic than a .44 caliber.”
                 Al Jaberi also stated that “there were too many inconsisten-
        cies . . . for him to have been convicted, including . . . [t]he location
        of the stove box containing the disassembled firearms.” He posited
        that he should not have been convicted because “the [G]overn-
        ment did not investigate the loading company . . . even though the
        [G]overnment had documents . . . which showed the loading com-
        pany’s involvement and responsibility for loading the container
        and for making the reports . . . to be forwarded to the shipping
        company.” He also submitted five letters from family and friends
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-12852

        describing his good character. A letter from Al Jaberi’s wife de-
        scribed him as “a loving husband and father . . . whose wife and
        kids need him.”
               At the sentencing hearing, Al Jaberi maintained his objec-
        tions to the factual allegations in the PSR but stated that there was
        “no reason to litigate [the objections] today, particularly given that
        the objections d[id] not affect the [G]uidelines.” The court said that
        it “reviewed the entirety of the record” and overruled each of
        Al Jaberi’s objections to the PSR. And it noted that Al Jaberi “at-
        tempt[ed] to obstruct justice by creating false documents, as set
        forth in the [PSR].”
               The District Court determined Al Jaberi’s total offense level
        to be twenty-eight and criminal history category to be I. This re-
        sulted in a Guideline range of seventy-eight to ninety-seven
        months’ imprisonment, one to three years’ supervised release, and
        a $25,000 to $250,000 fine.
               As for the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors, 2 the Government as-
        serted that Al Jaberi continued to refuse to accept responsibility

        2 Those factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

        history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence im-
        posed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
        provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to crimi-
        nal conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes, and pro-
        vide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
        care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the
        kinds of sentences available; (4) the sentencing guidelines’ recommended
        range; (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
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        22-12852                  Opinion of the Court                              11

        despite the strong evidence of his guilt and argued that the firearms
        at issue included “impressive powerful handguns . . . intended for
        something violent and unlawful.” The Government requested
        ninety months’ imprisonment followed by three years of super-
        vised release.
               Al Jaberi noted his loving family, community-mindedness,
        and lack of criminal history. He added that there was no identifia-
        ble victim of his conduct and that he would likely be deported and
        separated from his family following his sentence. Al Jaberi argued
        that his case involved “a mere nine firearms” and that the § 3553
        factors would be satisfied by a seventy-eight-month sentence.
               Prior to rendering its sentence, the District Court stated that
        it had considered the parties’ arguments, the PSR, Al Jaberi’s sen-
        tencing memorandum, and the § 3553 factors. The District Court
        judge also stated that he was familiar with Al Jaberi’s case because
        he presided at trial. The court sentenced Al Jaberi to “94 months
        as to Count 1 and 60 months as to each of Counts 2 and 3, all to be
        served concurrently” and three years’ supervised release on all
        counts to be served concurrently. The court also ordered that
        Al Jaberi be released to Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
        for deportation proceedings following his release.
              Although the District Court recommended that Al Jaberi be
        given credit for the time he had served in custody, it did “not find

        Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and
        (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7).
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12852

        any reason to depart from the sentence called for by application of
        the [G]uidelines.” The District Court added that it would impose
        this sentence “regardless of the [G]uidelines” because it was an ap-
        propriate sentence. And it explained that Al Jaberi “continue[d] to
        lie” despite “an overwhelming amount of evidence” of his guilt.
        The court then asked if there were any objections to the sentence,
        and Al Jaberi replied, “No objection . . . , other than those previ-
        ously stated.” Al Jaberi timely appealed.
                                  II. Legal Standards
                A few different standards govern our review. First, “[w]e
        review the sufficiency of the evidence to support [a defendant’s]
        conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favora-
        ble to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and
        credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v.
        Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). “The
        district court’s denial of [a] motion[] for judgment of acquittal will
        be upheld if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the evi-
        dence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
        Id. But when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
        on a ground not argued before the district court, we review for
        plain error. United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir.
        2016). “To establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) error;
        (2) that is plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and (4) that se-
        riously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
        proceedings.” United States v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 1229, 1246 (11th Cir.
        2022).
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        22-12852                Opinion of the Court                         13

                Second, “[w]hile we usually review de novo claims of double
        jeopardy, we review issues not properly raised before the district
        court, such as the instant one, for plain error.” United States v. Bobb,
        577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “When ‘the
        explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an
        issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from
        the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.’” United
        States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
        (quoting United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (per curiam)).
                Third, “[t]ypically, we review . . . a claim of prosecutorial
        misconduct de novo.” United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1206
        (11th Cir. 2017). “But when, as here, the defendant[] do[es] not
        object at trial or otherwise raise the issue before the district court,
        . . . we review only for plain error.” Id. “Reversal on the basis of
        prosecutorial misconduct requires that the misconduct be so pro-
        nounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of
        the trial.” United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286, 1308 (11th Cir.
        2013) (quoting United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1065 (11th Cir.
        2012) (per curiam)).
              Last, we review the reasonableness of a sentence “under a
        deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States,
        552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “[T]he party challenging the sentence bears
        the burden to show that it is ‘unreasonable in light of the record
        and the [§] 3553(a) factors.’” United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204,
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-12852

        1224 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez,
        550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008)).
                                  III. Discussion
                Al Jaberi makes four arguments on appeal: (1) there was in-
        sufficient evidence to convict him; (2) his convictions and sen-
        tences violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; (3) the Government’s
        alleged prosecutorial misconduct—i.e., its misstatements and fail-
        ure to correct testimony—violated his due process rights; and
        (4) his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
        None have merit. We review and reject each argument in turn.
                            A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
               Al Jaberi argues that there was insufficient evidence to sus-
        tain his convictions and that the District Court erred by denying his
        motion for judgment of acquittal. He asserts that law enforcement
        neither surveilled nor investigated the location where the shipping
        container was loaded. Al Jaberi adds that the Government failed to
        offer evidence about any communications between him and any-
        one in Iraq about the firearms. Last, he contends that the Govern-
        ment witnesses offered inconsistent testimony about the location
        of the box containing the firearms. We disagree.
              Although Al Jaberi moved for a judgment of acquittal, he did
        so on different grounds than those raised here. We therefore re-
        view his arguments here for plain error. See Baston, 818 F.3d at 664.
              The District Court did not err—plainly or otherwise—by
        denying Al Jaberi’s motion for acquittal. A reasonable juror could
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        22-12852                    Opinion of the Court                                 15

        have concluded that the evidence established his guilt on all three
        counts beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 The Government presented
        evidence that Al Jaberi admitted that the firearms discovered in the
        shipping container were his, that the shipping container was des-
        tined for Iraq, and that he did not inform the shipper that the cargo
        included firearms. The Government also presented evidence,
        through witness testimony and photos, that Al Jaberi hid the fire-
        arms in the container without disclosing their existence to the com-
        mon carrier and submitted false information about the cargo’s con-
        tents that was eventually uploaded to AES. And the Government
        submitted evidence that the firearms’ cases, a physical receipt for
        one of the firearms, and the same green cellophane wrap as was
        found in the container were all found in Al Jaberi’s home.
               That Al Jaberi hid the firearms within his cargo without dis-
        closing their existence was strong circumstantial evidence of his
        criminal intent. Cf. United States v. Singer, 963 F.3d 1144, 1166 (11th
        Cir. 2020) (“Singer’s failure to tell United States law enforcement
        about the items raised a reasonable inference that he was trying to
        hide the items from United States officials . . . .”). And, in the

        3 As an aside, Al Jaberi’s insufficient evidence argument is inadequate.        His
        brief omits a distinct statement of facts section, which was (and continues to
        be) required under our rules at the time his brief was filed. See 11th Cir. R.
        28-1(i)(ii) (Dec. 1, 2022). Nor does Al Jaberi indicate which of the three counts
        lacked sufficient evidence or how the evidence was insufficient on at least one
        element. As “[t]he Seventh Circuit memorably said . . . appellate judges ‘are
        not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.’” Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of
        Corrs., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Dunkel,
        927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12852

        context of photos showing that Al Jaberi loaded the container,
        there is sufficient proof that Al Jaberi took a substantial step toward
        exporting the firearms in violation of U.S. law. See id. at 1160–61;
        18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Al Jaberi’s failure to disclose the firearms on the
        bill of lading’s cargo description—which was later uploaded to
        AES—is also sufficient to sustain his convictions under
        18 U.S.C. § 922(e) and 13 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1).
               Al Jaberi’s assertions that the evidence was insufficient be-
        cause law enforcement did not surveil the loading location or be-
        cause the Government provided no proof of any communications
        between him and anyone in Iraq are meritless. “It is not necessary
        that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of inno-
        cence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that
        of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evi-
        dence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
        v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir. 1990).
               Al Jaberi’s argument about the alleged inconsistent witness
        testimony goes toward the weight and credibility of the evidence—
        not its sufficiency. We see nothing in the witness testimony to
        overcome the substantial deference we afford to the jury’s credibil-
        ity determinations. See United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255
        (11th Cir. 2015). Nothing in the testimony was “contrary to the
        laws of nature, or . . . so inconsistent or improbable on its face that
        no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” Id. (quoting United States
        v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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        22-12852                    Opinion of the Court                                  17

               In short, there was sufficient evidence to convict Al Jaberi on
        all three charges. And the District Court did not err by denying
        Al Jaberi’s motion.
                                       B. Double Jeopardy
                Al Jaberi next argues that the District Court committed plain
        error because his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
        He contends that Counts Two and Three are lesser included of-
        fenses of Count One under the Blockburger test. 4 In support of this
        argument, Al Jaberi relies on Singer. According to Al Jaberi,
        Singer held that, to establish smuggling, the Government must
        prove that the defendant actually violated all essential elements of
        the underlying “law or regulation” that rendered the exportation
        illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Embedded within his double jeop-
        ardy argument, Al Jaberi also argues that he was severely preju-
        diced by ineffective trial counsel because his trial counsel did not
        raise the double jeopardy issue. 5 We disagree.

        4 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

        5 Because Al Jaberi’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is “not designated

        as [a] discrete issue[] in his brief to this Court and [is] not supported by . . .
        substantive analysis, [it is] not properly before us.” United States v. Goodwin,
        765 F.3d 1306, 1319 n.5 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Sappupo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
        Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that an appellant aban-
        dons a claim by failing to list it in his statement of issues, failing to “devot[e] a
        discrete section of his argument to [it],” raising it “in a perfunctory manner
        without supporting arguments and authority,” or embedding it within a larger
        argument (first quoting Cole v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 517, 530 (11th Cir.
        2013), abrogated on other grounds by Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020); then
        citing Walter Int’l Prods., Inc. v. Salinas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1413 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011);
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12852

               “The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause guaran-
        tees that no person shall ‘be subject for the same offence to be twice
        put in jeopardy of life or limb.’” Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1371 (quoting
        U.S. Const. amend. V). “This guarantees against . . . multiple pun-
        ishments for the same offense.” Id. Generally, “when a defendant
        has violated two different criminal statutes, the Double Jeopardy
        Clause is implicated when both statutes prohibit the same act or
        transaction or when one act is a lesser included offense of the
        other.” Id.
               To determine whether dual statutory provisions prohibit
        the same offense we apply the Blockburger test. See Blockburger v.
        United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The Blockburger test analyzes
        “whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
        does not.” Id. “Our analysis focuses on the proof necessary to es-
        tablish the statutory elements of each offense, not the actual evi-
        dence presented at trial.” Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1372. “Specifically, we
        need not examine the facts alleged in the indictment to support the
        counts nor the ‘practical significance’ of the theories alleged for

        and then citing United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir.
        2003)).
            Moreover, “[w]e will not generally consider claims of ineffective assistance
        of counsel raised on direct appeal where the district court [neither] enter-
        tain[ed] the claim nor develop[ed] a factual record.” United States v. Bender,
        290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). “The preferred means for deciding a
        claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
        ‘even if the record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel’s perfor-
        mance.’” United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010) (quot-
        ing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003)).
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        22-12852                 Opinion of the Court                              19

        each count.” United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir.
        2007). That is true even when, as here, “charges are interrelated,
        [but] are not interdependent.” Id. at 1188. 6
               Al Jaberi has not shown that the District Court plainly erred
        for two reasons. First, Al Jaberi has not identified that the pur-
        ported error was plain. To do so, he would have to cite precedent
        from the Supreme Court or this Court holding that the convictions
        on Count One and either Count Two or Three violate the Double
        Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Campo, 840 F.3d 1249, 1267
        (11th Cir. 2016). Al Jaberi has not cited any such cases.
               Second, Al Jaberi has shown no error under the Blockburger
        test. A review of the three statutes under which Al Jaberi was con-
        victed reveals that each statute entails different elements from the
        others.

        6 In Hassoun, we acknowledged that

               there may remain a few specific circumstances in which we are
               required to look beyond the elements of the offenses in order
               to assess potential multiplicity problems, such as in a “contin-
               uing criminal enterprise” prosecution where a drug conspiracy
               is separately charged, or in cases where two counts are charged
               under the same statutory provision.
        476 F.3d 1181, 1186–87 (11th Cir. 2007). These circumstances are not present
        here.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                   22-12852

               Count One—the attempted smuggling charge—alleged that
        Al Jaberi violated 18 U.S.C. § 554(a), which provides:
                   Whoever fraudulently or knowingly . . . attempts
               to export or send from the United States, any . . . ob-
               ject contrary to any law . . . of the United States . . . ,
               shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
               than 10 years, or both.
                Count Two—the failure to notify a common carrier
        charge—alleged that Al Jaberi violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), which
        states:
                  It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
               deliver or cause to be delivered to any common or
               contract carrier for transportation . . . , any package
               or other container in which there is any firearm or
               ammunition without written notice to the carrier that
               such firearm or ammunition is being transported or
               shipped . . . .
               And Count Three—the submitting a false or misleading ex-
        port information charge—alleged that Al Jaberi violated 13 U.S.C.
        § 305(a)(1), which provides:
                  Any person who . . . knowingly submits false or
              misleading export information through . . . the Auto-
              mated Export System (AES) shall be subject to a fine
              not to exceed $10,000 per violation or imprisonment
              for not more than 5 years, or both.
                To recap, § 554(a) penalizes the specific act of attempting to
        illegally export contraband abroad. See 18 U.S.C. § 554(a).
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        22-12852                   Opinion of the Court                                21

        Whereas § 922(e) penalizes the failure to provide a common carrier
        with written notice that cargo contains a firearm. Id. § 922(e). And
        § 305(a)(1) penalizes the act of submitting false or misleading ex-
        port information through AES. 13 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1). Though
        there is “substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the[se]
        crimes,” a conviction under these three statutes does not violate
        the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Iannelli v. United States,
        420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
               Contrary to Al Jaberi’s argument, Singer does not alter our
        analysis.7 Singer neither involved a Double Jeopardy Clause chal-
        lenge nor held that, to establish attempted smuggling, the Govern-
        ment must prove an actual violation of the underlying law or reg-
        ulation that rendered the exportation illegal under § 554(a).
               Al Jaberi is correct about one thing: in discussing the § 554(a)
        smuggling conviction, Singer stated “we hold that, as the government
        charged Singer, it was required to prove both that Singer violated
        50 U.S.C. § 1705 and 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(a) and that Singer knew of
        the facts that made his conduct a violation of these provisions.”
        963 F.3d at 1158 (emphasis added). But the issue in Singer was
        whether the defendant had to know that his attempted smuggling

        7 In Singer, the defendant was charged (and convicted) under 18 U.S.C. § 554(a)

        for attempting to smuggle modems to Cuba without a license contrary to
        50 U.S.C. § 1705 and 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(a). United States v. Singer, 963 F.3d 1144,
        1148, 1155 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 1705(c), which requires a mens rea of will-
        fulness, makes it unlawful for a person to violate or attempt to violate “any
        license, order, regulation, or prohibition.” 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c). And
        15 C.F.R. § 746.2(a) requires a license to export certain items to Cuba.
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12852

        violated the law. Singer did not ask whether the Government had
        to prove the defendant violated each of the elements underlying
        the law or regulation he attempted to violate. So this holding is
        inapplicable.
               Al Jaberi’s interpretation of Singer contradicts the law of at-
        tempt. Attempt is an inchoate crime that never requires the Gov-
        ernment to prove all the essential elements of the completed of-
        fense. As we noted in Singer, “[t]o prove attempt, the government
        must show two things: that the defendant (1) had ‘the specific in-
        tent to engage in criminal conduct with which he was charged; and
        (2) had taken substantial steps toward to the commission of the of-
        fense that strongly corroborates his criminal intent.’” Id. (quoting
        United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 351 (11th Cir. 2018), abro-
        gated on other grounds by United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022)).
        The Government need not prove all the elements of § 554(a), let
        alone all the elements of the underlying law or regulation that
        made the attempted smuggling illegal. See, e.g., United States v.
        Rivero, 889 F.3d 618, 623 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The government did not
        have to prove the elements necessary to convict Rivero under [22
        U.S.C.] § 2778(c), because conviction under § 2778(c) is not an ele-
        ment of the offense violating § 554(a).”); United States v. Cardenas,
        810 F.3d 373, 374 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding similarly).
               Al Jaberi has not shown that his convictions under
        18 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), 922(e), and 13 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) violate the
        Double Jeopardy Clause. Nor has he shown that the District Court
        plainly erred by sentencing him for his convictions.
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        22-12852                Opinion of the Court                          23

                                    C. Due Process
               Al Jaberi also argues that his due process rights were violated
        because of the Government’s alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
        He asserts that the Government (1) failed to correct false testimony
        and (2) made misstatements in its opening and closing arguments.
        Neither argument is persuasive.
                       i. Failure to Correct False Testimony
                Al Jaberi first claims that he was unduly prejudiced by CBP
        Supervisor Wilcher’s testimony that the Desert Eagle was a .50 cal-
        iber, not a .44 caliber as alleged in the indictment. He asserts that
        “a .50 caliber firearm is definitely more militaristic than a .44 caliber
        firearm and made him more guilty in the jury’s mind.” And
        Al Jaberi argues that the Government’s failure to correct Wilcher’s
        testimony “was material in that the Government focused on the
        ‘high caliber’ aspect” and “apparently influenced the court re-
        porter” to erroneously label the Government’s trial exhibit as a .50
        caliber Magnum Research Desert Eagle.
                The Supreme Court has held that the Government’s failure
        to correct false evidence can violate due process rights, and a de-
        fendant may challenge such violations via a Giglio claim. See Giglio
        v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972); see also United States v.
        Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 2001). To prevail on a Gi-
        glio claim, the defendant must establish that (1) the Government
        knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what it
        later learned was false testimony, and (2) the falsehood was mate-
        rial. Dickerson, 248 F.3d at 1041. “Perjured testimony ‘must be
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12852

        given with the willful intent to provide false testimony and not as
        a result of a mistake, confusion, or faulty memory.’” Horner,
        853 F.3d at 1206 (quoting United States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 763
        n.4 (11th Cir. 2002)). “[F]alse testimony is deemed material if there
        is a reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have affected
        the judgment of the jury.” United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152,
        1208 (11th Cir. 2010).
               As noted above, Al Jaberi preserved no due process claim.
        We therefore review his due process claim for plain error.
        See United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 904–05 (11th Cir. 1990).
        Like his double jeopardy claim, Al Jaberi’s due process claim fails
        under plain-error review. Al Jaberi has not cited any binding prec-
        edent that directly holds that misstating the caliber of a firearm the
        defendant was convicted of smuggling constitutes prosecutorial
        misconduct, much less violates due process. So we cannot say that
        any purported error is plain.
                Nor can we say any error occurred. Al Jaberi has not al-
        leged—much less demonstrated—either that Wilcher’s misstate-
        ment was willful or that the prosecutor’s failure to correct it was
        knowing, rather than reckless or negligent. See Dickerson, 248 F.3d
        at 1041; Horner, 853 F.3d at 1206. How could he? The prosecutor,
        Special Agent Gray, and the Government’s Exhibit 19 all described
        the firearm as a .44 caliber. These accurate descriptions show that
        Wilcher’s misstatement and the prosecutor’s failure to correct it,
        were honest mistakes.
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        22-12852                 Opinion of the Court                           25

                What’s more, Wilcher’s misstatement was immaterial. The
        illegality of Al Jaberi’s actions did not depend on the caliber of the
        firearms. Instead, his actions were illegal because he tried to smug-
        gle firearms abroad. There is no “reasonable probability” that the
        jury would have acquitted Al Jaberi but for Wilcher’s misstate-
        ment. See United States v. Nerey, 877 F.3d 956, 970 (11th Cir. 2017).
        Al Jaberi has not shown that Wilcher’s misstatement and the pros-
        ecutor’s failure to correct amounted to plain error, such that a due
        process violation occurred.
                              ii. Prosecutor’s Comments
               Al Jaberi next argues that the Government misstated that he
        made the unusual request to load the shipping container, when it
        was NAL that unilaterally decided to have Al Jaberi load it. He also
        claims that the Government’s statement that he removed the
        camping stove and replaced it with firearms lacked evidentiary sup-
        port. Last, Al Jaberi contends that the Government’s closing argu-
        ment contained “unwarranted speculations, with alarming words
        such as ‘presumably.’” For instance, he cites the prosecutor’s com-
        ment that Al Jaberi “paid through some electronic payment
        Mr. Eugene McNair $525, presumably for the Baretta APX.” 8 Per
        Al Jaberi, these comments, individually or collectively, give rise to
        a due process violation.

        8 According to Special Agent Gray, McNair was the original purchaser of the

        Baretta handgun.
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12852

               “A prosecutor’s comments in [opening statements and] clos-
        ing [arguments] must be viewed in the context of the trial as a
        whole.” United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 505 (11th Cir. 2014).
        Opening statements and closing arguments “assist the jury in ana-
        lyzing the evidence, and although a prosecutor may not exceed the
        evidence presented at trial during [his or] her closing argument, [he
        or] she may state conclusions drawn from the trial evidence.” Id.
        “Yet, a prosecutor is free to suggest during oral argument what the
        jury should conclude from the evidence before it.” United States v.
        Rivera, 780 F.3d 1084, 1100 (11th Cir. 2015).
               “Prosecutorial misconduct justifies a new trial only if the re-
        marks in question were both (a) improper and (b) prejudicial to the
        defendant’s substantial rights.” Nerey, 877 F.3d at 970. “A prosecu-
        tor’s remarks, suggestions, insinuations, and assertions are im-
        proper when they are calculated to mislead or inflame the jury’s
        passions.” United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1044 (11th Cir.
        2015). And “[s]ubstantial rights are prejudiced when there is ‘a rea-
        sonable probability . . . that, but for the remarks, the outcome of
        the trial would have been different.” Nerey, 877 F.3d at 970 (omis-
        sion in original) (quoting United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947
        (11th Cir. 2006)). “Yet, substantial evidence establishing guilt may
        counteract claims of prejudice.” Id.
                Al Jaberi also failed to preserve this argument, so we review
        it for plain error. See United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1199
        (11th Cir. 2021). Here too, Al Jaberi fails to show plain error. He
        points to no binding precedent that holds that the prosecutor’s
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        22-12852               Opinion of the Court                        27

        purported mischaracterizations were either improper or prejudi-
        cial. Any purported error therefore is not plain.
               Nor are we convinced there was error for two reasons. First,
        “because the statements of counsel are not evidence, the district
        court may rectify improper prosecutorial statements by instructing
        the jury that only the evidence in the case is to be considered.”
        United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1541 (11th Cir. 1992). That is
        what the District Court did here. It instructed the jury that it:
        “must consider only the evidence admitted that [the court had] ad-
        mitted in the case” and explained that “[e]vidence includes the tes-
        timony of witnesses and the exhibits admitted. But anything the
        lawyers say is not evidence and isn’t binding on you.” Al Jaberi,
        No. 4:21-cr-00031-RSB-CLR-1, Doc. 114 at 68:14–17.
               Second, the prosecutor’s alleged misstatements about
        Al Jaberi’s request to load the container, the camping stove, and
        the $525 payment are largely irrelevant or are logical inferences
        from the trial evidence. The prosecutor’s comment that Al Jaberi
        wanted to load the container is immaterial to the crimes charged.
        Al Jaberi twice admitted that he loaded firearms into the shipping
        container. That was the crux of the crime—not where he loaded
        them, who chose that location, or the reasons behind those choices.
        We cannot say that the prosecutor’s comment changed the out-
        come of the trial. See Nerey, 877 F.3d at 970.
              As for the prosecutor’s camping stove and payment com-
        ments, both are logically inferred from supporting evidence. A
        prosecutor “may state conclusions drawn from the evidence.”
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12852

        United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997). The
        evidence showed that Al Jaberi put the firearms into a box that was
        originally labeled as containing a camping stove and loaded that
        box into the shipping container. It could be inferred that Al Jaberi
        removed the stove before putting the firearms in the box. The ev-
        idence also showed that McNair bought the Baretta APX 9-mm pis-
        tol on June 13, 2018, Al Jaberi paid him $525 on April 6, 2019, and
        Al Jaberi searched the internet for spare parts for the same gun on
        April 29 and May 8, 2020. It was reasonable to infer that Al Jaberi
        “presumably” paid McNair for the gun.
               We are satisfied that the prosecutor’s comments did not vi-
        olate Al Jaberi’s due process rights. The prosecutor’s comments
        were not calculated to mislead or inflame the jury’s passions. And
        Al Jaberi has not shown that plain error occurred.
                            D. Sentencing Reasonableness
                Al Jaberi’s final argument concerns his sentences. He argues
        that his sentences are procedurally unreasonable because they
        were imposed under simultaneous convictions thereby violating
        the Double Jeopardy Clause.             He also argues that his
        ninety-four-month sentence is substantively unreasonable because
        it “overstates the seriousness of what is attributable to him” and “is
        greater than necessary to meet the need to protect the public” be-
        cause he presents a low risk of recidivism based on statistics of sim-
        ilarly aged individuals. He adds that his personal characteristics,
        lack of minimum sentences for his convictions, and the lack of any
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        22-12852               Opinion of the Court                         29

        “identifiable victim” demonstrate that a lower sentence would be
        adequate. We disagree.
               In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first con-
        sider whether the district court committed a procedural error.
        See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A district court commits a procedural sen-
        tencing error when it imposes a sentence based on clearly errone-
        ous facts, fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Guidelines
        range, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, treats the Guidelines
        as mandatory, or fails to explain the chosen sentence. Id.
              After ensuring that a sentence is procedurally sound, we
        then consider whether it is substantively reasonable. Id.
               District courts are required to impose sentences suffi-
               cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
               the factors and purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2),
               which include the need to reflect the seriousness of
               the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
               punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct,
               and protect the public.
        United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 957 (11th Cir. 2016); 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a)(2). And district courts “must consider the nature and cir-
        cumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the de-
        fendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable [G]uide-
        lines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Com-
        mission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
        the need to provide restitution to the victim.” Id.; 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12852

               “[T]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a
        matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and
        we will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant fac-
        tors.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (quoting United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 663 F.3d 1305, 1311
        (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). “A district court abuses its discretion
        when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were
        due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper
        or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in
        considering the proper factors.”            United States v. Suarez,
        893 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Blake,
        868 F.3d 960, 978 (11th Cir. 2017)).
               A district court’s failure to specifically mention certain miti-
        gating factors “do[es] not compel the conclusion that the sentence
        crafted in accordance with the § 3553(a) factors was substantively
        unreasonable.” See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 873 (11th
        Cir. 2010). “The district court is not required to explicitly address
        each of the § 3553(a) factors or all of the mitigating evidence.”
        United States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021) (per cu-
        riam). Instead, “[a]n acknowledgment the district court has con-
        sidered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will
        suffice.” Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324.
               We will vacate a district court’s sentence as substantively
        unreasonable “only if we are left with the ‘definite and firm’ con-
        viction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment
        in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that is
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        22-12852                 Opinion of the Court                            31

        outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
        the case.” United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir.
        2020) (quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir.
        2010) (en banc)). “A sentence imposed well below the statutory
        maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United
        States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014).
               The District Court did not abuse its discretion because
        Al Jaberi’s sentence was both procedurally and substantively rea-
        sonable. Al Jaberi’s sentence was procedurally reasonable because,
        as explained above, there was no double jeopardy violation. 9 And
        his sentence was substantively reasonable because the District
        Court did not fail to consider relevant factors due significant
        weight, give significant weight to an improper factor, or clearly err
        in considering the proper factors. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. The
        District Court stated that it had considered the parties’ arguments,
        the PSR, Al Jaberi’s sentencing memorandum, and the § 3553 fac-
        tors. True, the court emphasized Al Jaberi’s untruthfulness despite
        the substantial evidence of his guilt. But the court permissibly at-
        tached greater weight to Al Jaberi’s personal characteristics and his
        offense conduct. See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327
        (11th Cir. 2013) (“[S]ignificant reliance on a single factor does not
        necessarily render a sentence unreasonable.”). And though the
        District Court did not explicitly discuss Al Jaberi’s mitigating

        9 As this is the only procedural reasonableness argument Al Jaberi makes, he

        has abandoned any other challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his
        sentences. See Sappupo, 739 F.3d at 681–82.
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                22-12852

        evidence, it was not required to. See Snipes, 611 F.3d at 873. In any
        event, the District Court stated that it considered Al Jaberi’s sen-
        tencing memorandum, which presented his mitigation evidence.
        Al Jaberi’s ninety-four-month sentence was also within the Guide-
        lines’ range, and it was twenty-six months below the statutory max-
        imum, both of which support our conclusion that his sentence is
        reasonable. See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 656.
              In short, we discern no abuse of discretion. Al Jaberi’s be-
        low-Guidelines sentence was both procedurally and substantively
        reasonable.
                                 IV. Conclusion
               Al Jaberi has not shown that the District Court erred. The
        evidence was sufficient, such that the District Court properly de-
        nied Al Jaberi’s motion for acquittal. And we identify no double
        jeopardy or due process violations. We also conclude that the Dis-
        trict Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Al Jaberi.
        Al Jaberi’s convictions and sentences are therefore affirmed.
              AFFIRMED.