Court Opinion

ID: 9353352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:09:37.412287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:22.442488
License: Public Domain

J-A18013-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
                                                       OF PENNSYLVANIA
                             Appellee

                        v.

    LARRY RICHARD REEL

                             Appellant                No. 1529 WDA 2021

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 9, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
              Criminal Division at No.: CP-33-CR-0000489-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED: JANUARY 11, 2023

        Appellant Larry Richard Reel appeals from the December 9, 2021 order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County (“PCRA court”), which

denied his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-46. Upon review, we vacate and remand.

        The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. As a result

of committing sexual offenses in 2009, on August 17, 2010, Appellant pled

guilty to indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, indecent

assault of an unconscious person and two counts of corruption of minors.1

Years later, on September 23, 2019, Appellant was charged in the instant case

with one count of failure to comply with registration requirements under

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1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), (a)(4),and 6301(a)(1), respectively.
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Section 4915.1(a.1)(1) of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification

Act (“SORNA”), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a.1)(1)2, which became effective on

December 20, 2012.            Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea and,

consistent with the terms of his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him

to 18 months’ to 10 years’ incarceration on April 9, 2020. Appellant did not

file a direct appeal.

        On April 5, 2021, the trial court received two handwritten letters from

Appellant. The court treated the letters as a timely petition for post-conviction

relief. The PCRA court appointed counsel. On August 20, 2021, appointed

counsel filed an amended PCRA petition, asserting ineffectiveness claims.

Specifically, counsel argued that Appellant’s sentence was illegal because

Section 4915.1(a.1)(1), to which he was allowed to plead guilty, did not apply

to him. As a result, Appellant requested that he be permitted to withdraw his

guilty plea. That same day, the PCRA court conducted a hearing, at which

Appellant presented testimony. On December 9, 2021, the PCRA court denied

relief. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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2   Section 4915.1(a.1)(1) provides in pertinent part:
        An individual set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 who is a transient
        commits an offense if he knowingly fails to . . . register with the
        Pennsylvania State Police as required under 42 Pa.C.S.
        §§ 9799.15,     9799.16(b)(6)     (relating  to    registry)   and
        9799.25(a)(7).
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a.1)(1).

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        On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review.

        [I.] Was [Appellant’s] trial counsel ineffective, and [Appellant]
        thereby prejudiced, for not objecting, and allowing [Appellant] to
        enter a guilty plea, and be sentenced, for failure to comply with
        sex offender registration requirements pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.
        § 4915(a.1)(1)[], where there was no factual basis supporting the
        elements of the crime as such statutory violation was impossible
        for [Appellant] to have committed, given that his underlying sex
        crime occurred in 2009, with conviction in 2010, the only relevant
        crime for which there was a factual basis supporting a guilty plea
        appears at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 3. Distilled to its essence, Appellant simply argues that

his counsel was ineffective for permitting him to plea guilty to a crime whose

elements he could not meet.3 Thus, although couched as an ineffectiveness

claim, Appellant seemingly challenges the legality of his sentence.

        “In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA

court’s determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)). Moreover, the

PCRA permits our courts to grant relief from illegal sentences.         See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (“This subchapter provides for an action by which persons .

. . serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 560, 568 (Pa. 2022) (holding

that a challenge to legality of sentence implicates a claim cognizable under

the PCRA). “[T]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim

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3   The Commonwealth did not file a brief in this case.

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may nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an untimely PCRA petition

for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction

over the claim.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super.

2014) (citation omitted).

      Preliminarily, in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017),

our Supreme Court held that the reporting and registration requirements

under SORNA were punitive and that their retroactive application to offenses

committed prior to SORNA’s December 20, 2011 enactment and December

20, 2012 effective date violated the ex post facto clause of the United States

Constitution.     The    Muniz    Court   considered    whether    SORNA      was

unconstitutional as applied to a defendant subjected to an increased

registration period under SORNA. Id. at 1192-93. Muniz was convicted of

indecent assault in 2007 and subject to a ten-year registration requirement

pursuant to then-extant Megan’s Law III (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1 et seq.

(expired)). Id. at 1193. Muniz absconded prior to sentencing. In 2014, he

was apprehended,        sentenced, and    subjected    to   a lifetime   reporting

requirement under SORNA. Id. In summary, our Supreme Court concluded

that SORNA’s notification and registration requirements were punitive rather

than civil, and that SORNA was unconstitutional as applied to Muniz because

it increased the punishment for indecent assault after he committed the

offense.

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       Following Muniz, and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (“Butler I”), rev’d, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. 2020) (“Butler II”),4

the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the prior version of SORNA

(“SORNA I”) by enacting Act 10 on February 21, 2018, and Act 29 on June 12,

2018, which are collectively known as “SORNA II.” See Act of Feb. 21, 2018,

P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”); Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29 (“Act 29”).

SORNA II now divides sex offenders into two subchapters: (1) Subchapter H,

and (2) a newly-added Subchapter I. The now revised Subchapter H limits

the applicability of Section 4915.1 to individuals who committed a sexual

offense on or after December 20, 2012 (the date SORNA I became effective).

The added Subchapter I applies to individuals who committed a sexual offense

on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose period of

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4 In Butler I, this Court held that the provision of SORNA I requiring a court
to designate a defendant a SVP by clear and convincing evidence violates the
federal and state constitutions because it increases a defendant’s criminal
penalty without the factfinder making necessary factual findings beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Butler I, supra. Our Supreme Court, however,
reversed Butler I. See Butler II, supra (holding SVPs are different from
non-SVP SORNA registrants at issue in Muniz because of heightened public
safety concerns based on a determination that SVPs have a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes individual likely to engage in
predatory sexual violent offenses; procedure for designating individuals as
SVPs is not subject to requirements of Apprendi and Alleyne and remains
constitutionally permissible); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (holding any facts, other than fact of prior
conviction, that subject defendant to additional penalty beyond statutory
maximum must be submitted to jury and proven beyond reasonable doubt)
and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, (2013) (holding
any fact that increases mandatory minimum sentence for crime is fact that
must be submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt).

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registration has not expired, or whose registration requirements under a

former sexual offender registration law have not expired.

       With this background in mind, on appeal Appellant suggests that,

despite Muniz and the General Assembly’s subsequent enactment of Act 10

and Act 29, the Commonwealth charged him under an incorrect SORNA I

provision—Section 4915.1(a.1)(1)—that applies only to individuals who

commit an offense on or after December 20, 2012. Because it is undisputed

that Appellant’s sexual offenses occurred in 2009, he claims that the

Commonwealth erred in charging him under Section 4915(a.1)(1) and that

the resulting guilty plea and sentence are illegal. We agree.

       Section 4915(a.1)(1) does not obligate an offender, whose offenses

predate the effective date of SORNA I, to register. As a result, Appellant had

no such duty under Section 4915.1(a.1)(1).5        Accordingly, the PCRA court

erred in failing to grant Appellant’s petition seeking to vacate his conviction

and sentence under Section 4915.1(a.1)(1).           See Commonwealth v.

Rivera, 154 A.3d 370, 381 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (“Our cases clearly

state that a criminal defendant cannot agree to an illegal sentence, so the fact

that the illegality was a term of his plea bargain is of no legal significance.”),
____________________________________________

5  Although we are cognizant of the fact that the Commonwealth likely
committed a technical error in bringing charges under the wrong subsection,
it has not filed a brief or made any argument as to why we may excuse its
error. Separately, we note that Appellant concedes charges sub judice might
have been proper under Section 4915.2, which applies to individuals who
committed a sexual offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before December
20, 2012, and whose period of registration has not expired. We, however,
offer no opinion.

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appeal denied, 169 A.3d 1072 (Pa. 2017). We, therefore, vacate the PCRA

court’s order and remand this matter for further proceedings.

     Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

     Judge Murray joins the memorandum.

     Judge Mclaughlin concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023

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