Court Opinion

ID: 9861730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:23:37.647844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:52.550413
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GROMETER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority decision holding that the use of a general verdict form was improper and that the jury was required to make findings, either in a special interrogatory or within its verdict, as to the medications and dosages the State seeks to involuntarily administer. In rendering its opinion, the majority followed this court’s previous position as stated in In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167 (2000). Since I believe that Nancy M. incorrectly expanded the requirements of section 2 — 107.1(a)(4)(D) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1998)), I dissent. As the majority decision points out, this matter commenced on a verified petition filed by respondent’s psychiatrist, Dr. Tomar, seeking the involuntary administration of the following psychotropic medications: Haldol, Cogentin, Risperdal, Zyprexa, and lithium. Dr. Tomar gave extensive trial testimony as to the risks, benefits, and range of dosages of the medications she proposed to administer to respondent. She explained what each drug was designed to treat and what the side effects might be. Dr. Tomar opined that the benefits of the psychotropic medications would outweigh the risks. The jury returned a verdict finding respondent to be a person who qualified for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The trial court then entered a treatment order that provided in part for the specific medications and range of dosages and authorized their administration by Dr. Tomar and the Elgin Mental Health Center. In a proceeding to authorize the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence each of the seven factors listed in section 2 — 107.1(a)(4) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(a)(4) (West 1998)). In the instant case, the trial court properly submitted to the jury a burden of proof and issue instruction incorporating these seven factors along with a general verdict form. The verdict, signed by the jury, stated, “We, the Jury, find for the Petitioner, and against the Respondent, Frances K[.] We find that the Respondent is someone who qualifies for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.” In signing the verdict, the jury by necessity found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence each of the seven factors enumerated in section 2 — 107.1(a)(4) of the Mental Health Code. One of these seven factors is “[tjhat the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.” 405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1998). I note that section 2 — 107.1(a)(4) was recently rewritten by the legislature. See Pub. Act 90 — 538, § 10, eff. December 1, 1997. Section 2 — 107.1(a)(4)(D) formerly read “[tjhat the benefits of the psychotropic medication will outweigh the harm.” 405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1996). The majority opinion, following the language of Nancy M., adds the requirement that the jury must also specify the medications and anticipated range of dosages that have been authorized. The holding of Nancy M. reads in pertinent part as follows: “Likewise, in a jury trial, the jury, as the finder of fact, should make findings regarding the medications the State seeks to involuntarily administer to a respondent, either in special interrogatories or within its verdict. Those findings should include whether the benefits of a particular medication outweigh the harm. See 405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1998). Thereafter, should a jury ultimately decide a case in favor of the State on the issue of the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, its verdict should show that it clearly intended to authorize the involuntary administration of specific medications.” Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 178. Generally, in civil cases, unless the nature of the case requires otherwise, the jury shall render a general verdict. See 735 ILCS 5/2— 1108 (West 1998). Nothing in my reading of section 2 — 107.1(a)(4) of the Mental Health Code requires the more specialized verdict required by Nancy M. I note that section 2 — 107.1(a)(6) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(a)(6) (West 1998)), which pertains to the treatment order issued by the trial court after the trier of fact renders its verdict, requires the order to designate, among other things, the medications and the range of dosages that have been authorized. Section 2 — 107.1(a)(6) provides: “(6) An order issued under this subsection (a) shall designate the persons authorized to administer the authorized involuntary treatment under the standards and procedures of this subsection (a). Those persons shall have complete discretion not to administer any treatment authorized under this Section. The order shall also specify the medications and the anticipated range of dosages that have been authorized.” 405 ILCS 5/2 — 107.1(a)(6) (West 1998). Section 2 — 107.1(a)(6) does not require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence which medications are to be administered or their respective dosages any more than the statute requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence who shall administer these medications or when they need not be given. I note that section 2 — 107.1(a)(6)’s requirement that the order specify the medications and anticipated range of dosages was added by Public Act 90 — 538, the same public act that rewrote section 2 — 107.1(a)(4). Accordingly, it is only logical to assume that, if the legislature had intended the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence the medications to be administered and their respective range of dosages, it would have added that provision as part of section 2 — 107.1(a)(4). Instead, the legislature added the requirement as part of section 2 — 107.1(a)(6), the section that pertains to the trial court’s order. I would further note that, under the holding of Nancy M., the jury is, in effect, being asked to prescribe the medication and treatment these individuals shall receive. Such a requirement, I believe, goes far beyond the clear legislative scheme. Finally, I would note that respondent did not specifically object to the general verdict form and she did not tender an alternate jury instruction. Generally, the trial court has the discretion to determine the appropriate jury instructions, and its determination will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion (In re Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1015 (1998)). However, a party waives the right to object later, on appeal, to the verdict forms or instructions submitted to the jury where no objection was raised at the time of submission. See People v. Davis, 313 Ill. App. 3d 585, 589 (2000); Forrester v. Patrick, 167 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1988). The majority avoids this problem by finding that the failure to object constituted plain error. I disagree and point out that other panels of the appellate court have found that the failure to list in the treatment order the medications to be administered and the range of dosages authorized was harmless and not reversible error where, as here, there was ample evidence at trial as to the various medications to be administered, their effects, and their proposed dosages. See In re Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (4th Dist. 1998); In re Barry, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1080 (2nd Dist. 1998) (decided prior to effective date of Public Act 90 — 538). For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.