Court Opinion

ID: 9691015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:02:00.415924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:09.110976
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting) — Having written what was intended (but failed) to become the opinion of the court, I shall embody in a dissent the considerations which I think demand an affirmance.
There is intended no disagreement here with the early pronouncement in Walters v. Houck, 7 (Clarke) Iowa 72, that since condemnation is the usual proceeding by which a person receives compensation for his property taken for public use the statutory requirements should “be fully and fairly obeyed.” And certainly the command that the commissioners selected to appraise damages shall, before proceeding with the assessment, “qualify by filing with the sheriff a written oath,” was not one to be disregarded. Whether it was in legal substance complied with here is really the crux of this controversy. I agree with the trial court and would affirm.
The parties have acquiesced in the trial court’s statement of facts and have submitted no oral testimony. The trial court says: “The evidence affirmatively shows that each” of six commissioners “signed this purported oath at the request of the sheriff and in his presence.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court also held that once the defendant Board’s application to *1140the sheriff is made “the condemnation proceedings are commenced, and the proceedings thereafter by the sheriff and the appraisers are not judicial, but are administrative.” That conclusion seems sound. At least no one questions it here.
The oath of office of the commissioners is a step in the proceedings but not one- incidental to jurisdiction. Even complete failure of the appraisers to comply with the qualification statute would surely not invalidate what had gone before, notwithstanding the quoted pronouncement of the Idaho Court in Thomas v. Boise City, 25 Idaho 522, 537; 138 P. 1110, 1114: “ ‘All the authorities agree that the failure to take this oath * * * in substantially the form prescribed by law renders all the proceedings invalid.’ ”
There is no connection between the qualifying by the commissioners and the general legality of the decision by the defendant Board to condemn or of the proceedings generally. The only possible contention, it seems to me, would be that the commissioners’ appraisal was invalidated by the sheriff’s failure to sign the jurat to the oath of office he had them sign.
The majority opinion begs the whole question by citations to the effect that “compliance with statutory provisions of this nature is essential.” Of course that is true. But the question here is as to whether there was substantial compliance with the statutory admonition .that “all commissioners shall qualify by filing with the sheriff a written oath.”
What is a “written oath”? Must it be also first orally administered and by the affiant orally assented to? Or must the affiant be first orally “sworn” before being permitted to sign it? I would attach no such barbaric or medieval meaning to the statute. I think a written oath means one the affiant has subscribed before the authorized official. The jurat is simply - evidence it was so subscribed.
As said in 67 C. J. S., Oaths and Affirmations, section 7 (cited in majority opinion) where the jurat is lacking' the fact may be established by other evidence “at least where the oath is in the nature of a pledge required by a.statute.” (Italics’ supplied.) That is of course the case here.
“The courts are not entirely agreed as to the effect of the omission of a jurat * * *. According to the majority view, such *1141an omission is not fatal to the validity of the affidavit, so long as it appeal’s, either from the rest of the instrument or from evidence aliunde, that the affidavit was, in fact, duly sworn to before an authorized officer.” 1 Am. Jur., Affidavits, section 19, page 946. See also 2 C. J. S., Affidavits, section 21d(7); 67 C. J. S., Officers, section 38, page 192, citing State ex rel. Dixon v. Van Patten, 26 Nev. 273, 66 P. 822.
In June v. School District No. 11, 283 Mich. 533, 278 N.W. 676, 679, 116 A. L. R. 581 (a teacher’s action on her contract for salary, withheld because of her claimed failure to take a required oath), plaintiff testified she had taken the oath; and the Michigan Supreme Court held the fact could be (and in fact was thereby) established by other evidence. The majority opinion cites the case and appears to agree other evidence could supply the lack of signature to the jurat.
The trial court here found “the evidence affirmatively shows that each of these six men (the commissioners) signed this purported oath at the request of the sheriff and in his presence.” (Emphasis supplied.) There is no disagreement with or criticism of the finding.
Nor is there any reason from their subsequent procedure to infer any failure on their part to qualify as appraisers. The trial court leaned heavily on Dalbey Bros. Lbr. Co. v. Crispin, 234 Iowa 151, 156, 12 N.W.2d 277, which, as will appear from an examination of it, gave us plenty of trouble in its own right.
It is authority however that to make a valid oath it is sufficient “ ‘there must be * * * in the presence of an officer authorized to administer it, an unequivocal and present act by which the affiant consciously takes upon himself the obligation of an oath.’ ” Certainly these six commissioners knew what they were signing and I would hold it was a “written oath” by any reasonable standard.
I am acutely conscious a dissent should have back of it something more important than mere pride of opinion of the dissenter on some unimportant point of law. We, as members of the court, do resolve many differences. The importance of the result here however seems to justify some protest. To annul what has been actually accomplished, merely because of the *1142sheriff’s omission to sign the jurat, seems unjustifiably technical. Judicial decisions should, when possible, avoid mere technicalities.
There is here no evidence the absence of the jurat has injured plaintiff. His property is taken for public use and he is entitled to just compensation. But the irregularity appearing here has no relation to any complaint as to the propriety of the condemnation or of the adequacy of the amount allowed. The trial court approached the question conscientiously and with a realization of its difficulties.
I would affirm the decision.