Court Opinion

ID: 9919240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:22.737391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.763433
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Alvarez CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                B323755

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. BA494191)
         v.

JOSE GUADALUPE ALVAREZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       While seated in the front passenger seat of a car at a gas
station, Jose Guadalupe Alvarez pointed a gun at a stranger.
That stranger, Andres Septium Diaz, identified Alvarez at a field
show-up a few hours later. Alvarez ultimately was convicted of
assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a felon.
       Alvarez appeals, arguing the trial court violated his
due process rights by admitting evidence of Septium’s
identification. Before the show-up, an officer told Septium that
the police were pursuing the car Septium had seen at the gas
station, which Alvarez contends was an unduly suggestive
comment. We conclude that, while the officer’s comment was
somewhat suggestive, there was no due process violation because
Septium’s identification of Alvarez was reliable under the totality
of the circumstances. Therefore, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       A.   Alvarez Points a Gun at Septium
       One night in 2021, Septium was driving alone in his car.
As Septium pulled into a gas station, a silver Lexus sedan
blocked him, and the driver honked at him. The front passenger
of the Lexus pointed a gun at Septium from behind the door’s
open window. Septium raised his hands and bent his head down,
then backed his car out of the station and drove away.

                                 2
     B.      Septium Immediately Reports the Assault, and the
             Police Tell Septium They Are Pursuing the Lexus
      Approximately 20 minutes later, Septium flagged down
Officer Eddie Martinez of the Los Angeles Police Department to
report the assault. Around the same time, Officer Michael
Quezada saw a silver Lexus sedan that was reported stolen,
which happened to be the same Lexus involved in the assault.
When Officer Quezada attempted to conduct a traffic stop, the
Lexus sped away. Officer Quezada pursued in his patrol car.
      While Officer Quezada was pursuing the Lexus, Officer
Martinez took Septium to a nearby police station to make a
statement. Septium and Martinez had the following discussion:
      “Officer Martinez: Right now they’re in, how do you say?
Pursuit.[1]
      “Septium: Oh, okay.
      “Officer Martinez: They have it.
      “Septium: Oh, really? The Lexus?
      “Officer Martinez: Yeah, a Lexus. It has to be them. . . .
The car’s stolen.”
      Septium described the incident to Officer Martinez.
Septium said the front passenger who pointed the gun at him
was skinny, 24 or 25 years old, and Hispanic, with “no hair.”
Septium did not get a good view of the driver or see whether the
driver had hair, but he thought the driver was a man. Septium
said he saw another man in the backseat, who Septium also

1     Most of the conversations between Septium and the officers
were in Spanish. Officer Martinez, however, used the English
word “pursuit.”

                                3
thought had no hair. Septium was unsure whether there were
any other people in the back seat.

      C.     The Police Pursue and Detain Alvarez
      Meanwhile, Officer Quezada was pursuing the Lexus. As
the Lexus traveled 90 miles an hour on a freeway, someone in the
car threw a gun out a passenger-side window. Eventually the
Lexus got off the freeway and slowed down in a residential
neighborhood. Two men got out of the car and started running—
one from the front passenger-side door and one from the rear
driver-side door. The front passenger was wearing a black
T-shirt, light pants, and white shoes. The other one was also
wearing a black T-shirt, but with dark pants and dark shoes.
Officer Quezada continued to follow the Lexus, which came to a
complete stop about a minute later. At that point, there were
only two people left in the car—both women.
      An hour later, law enforcement officers found Alvarez
hiding behind some bushes in the backyard of a house near where
the Lexus had stopped. Alvarez was wearing a dark T-shirt, light
pants, and white shoes (like the person who was in the front
passenger seat of the Lexus). Officers detained Alvarez, as well
as the other man they believed had been in the Lexus.

      D.    Septium Identifies Alvarez as the Assailant
      Back at the police station, Officer Martinez told Septium,
“They’re coming in a bit with the suspects and they’re gonna talk
to you.” Eventually Officer Quezada arrived, introduced himself
to Septium, and gave the following admonition: “I’m going to
take you to a place . . . to see if you can identify the person who
was involved. Okay? So, okay the person we have right now is

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. . . temporarily in custody and is a—is a possible suspect. Okay?
Just because the person is in police custody does not indicate that
he is guilty of what happened. Okay? So just because . . . we now
have him detained doesn’t mean that it’s the person who did it.
Okay?” Septium replied: “Yes, that’s fine.” Officer Quezada
continued: “The reason for—for what we are going to do . . . the
[identification], is so you can see if the person—if we can
eliminate the person or [identify] the person we have detained
was the person who committed the crime against you.” Septium
replied: “Oh, okay.”
        After the admonition, Officer Quezada drove Septium to a
nearby parking lot. Officer Quezada told Septium: “We have
four people. You tell me if anyone of [them] committed the crime
or if anyone was inside the vehicle that you recognize.”
        Each of the suspects was seated in the back of a different
patrol car. The first patrol car arrived in the parking lot with a
man who was not Alvarez. When Septium saw the man, Septium
said, “Not that one.” When asked to confirm his statement,
Septium said: “I think so. . . . It’s just that it was, when I saw
them, it was like dark.” The first patrol car drove away.
        The next patrol car arrived with Alvarez seated in the back.
While Septium was looking at Alvarez, he and Officer Quezada
had the following exchange:
        “Officer Quezada: Is it that guy?
        “Septium: Can I see the first person again?
        “Officer Quezada: The other one was taken away
already. . . . These are gonna be women.”
        “Septium: They all look the same. He looked like this guy,
the skinny guy.
        “Officer Quezada: Okay. So you think it is him?

                                 5
       “Septium: Yeah.”
       The final two patrol cars arrived with the two women,
neither of whom Septium recognized. After Septium saw all four
suspects, Officer Quezada asked whether Septium had any
questions. Septium said, “Well, the truth is they both looked the
same,” but he added that “the second one” looked more like the
assailant. Later on, Septium reiterated “it was dark” and “they
look a little bit alike.” Officer Quezada asked: “But the guy you
had said first . . . ‘Oh yes, that’s him’—that’s the one who looked
like the person?” Septium again said “the second one” looked
more like the assailant.

      E.     The People Charge Alvarez with Several Crimes
      The People charged Alvarez with one count of assault with
a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245; count 1)2 and
one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 3).3 For count 1, the People alleged Alvarez
personally used a firearm in committing the offense, within the
meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). For both counts, the
People alleged Alvarez had previously been convicted of two
serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes
law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)

2     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3     There was no count 2.

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      F.     The Trial Court Denies Alvarez’s Motion To Exclude
             Septium’s Identification
       Prior to trial, Alvarez filed a motion to exclude Septium’s
identification of Alvarez at the field show-up, as well as any
in-court identifications Septium might make at trial.4 Alvarez
argued the identification procedure was unduly suggestive
because Officer Martinez told Septium prior to the show-up that
law enforcement officers had the people in the Lexus.
       The trial court denied the motion. The court concluded
that, “on balance, the officers’ conduct was not suggesting it was
Mr. Alvarez” because Officer Quezada admonished Alvarez that
the suspects “may or may not be the people involved in the
incident” and because the officer did not “pressure [Alvarez] into
making the identification.” The court ruled that Officer
Martinez’s statement before the show-up, that the police had the
suspects in the Lexus, was not enough, “on balance, to vitiate
everything that transpired after.” Finally, the court stated
Septium’s limited opportunity to view his assailant went to the
weight of his testimony, but was not sufficient to show the
identification procedure was improper.

       G.     The People and Alvarez Present Evidence at Trial
       Septium, Officer Martinez, and Officer Quezada testified at
trial for the People. Septium identified Alvarez in court as the
person who pointed the gun at him. During cross-examination,
counsel for Alvarez questioned Septium extensively about his
identification of Alvarez on the night of the assault.

4     At the preliminary hearing, Septium identified Alvarez in
court as the person who pointed the gun at him.

                                 7
       The People played for the jury security footage from the gas
station showing the interaction between Septium and the people
in the Lexus. The identities of the people in the Lexus were not
clear from the security footage; however, the license plate of the
Lexus matched the license plate of the Lexus that Officer
Quezada later pursued. The People played footage from the
dashboard camera of Officer Quezada’s patrol car showing the
two men getting out of the Lexus (and the different clothing each
was wearing). Both the People and Alvarez also played for the
jury footage from body cameras worn by Officers Martinez and
Quezada showing their interactions with Septium, including
during the show-up.
       Officer Brian Marukami of the Los Angeles Police
Department testified he searched the area where someone threw
a gun out a window of the Lexus during the pursuit. Officer
Marukami found a black gun on the freeway with one round
loaded in the chamber.
       A forensic print specialist and a fingerprint expert also
testified for the People. Both compared fingerprints lifted from
the inside of the front passenger window of the Lexus to Alvarez’s
fingerprints. Both determined Alvarez’s fingerprints matched
the fingerprints on the window.
       Mitchell Eisen, an expert on “eyewitness memory and
suggestibility,” testified for Alvarez. Eisen stated that “we use
inference” to fill gaps in our memories and that “sometimes this
reconstructive process leads to filling in of new information that
may or may not be accurate.” Eisen also said that, during
traumatic events, people have less ability to accurately remember
details about the event.

                                8
       When discussing eyewitness identifications, Eisen stated
the longer someone is “exposed to view [a] person . . . the better
shot” he or she will “have later on of being able to identify and
pick them out.” Eisen also stated a person is much more likely to
make a false identification during a field show-up—where he or
she is shown “a single individual for identification purposes”—
than when shown a suspect in a group. According to Eisen,
because show-ups are inherently suggestive, it is the best
practice for California peace officers (1) to use show-ups only
when there are time constraints and (2) not to use the term
“suspect” when conducting a show-up, because using the term
makes the procedure more suggestive.

      H.     A Jury Convicts Alvarez, and the Trial Court
             Sentences Him
      The jury convicted Alvarez on both counts and found true
the allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), he
personally used a firearm in the commission of an assault with a
semiautomatic firearm. Alvarez admitted he had two prior
serious or violent felony convictions under the three strikes law.
      At sentencing, the court reduced the conviction on count 1
from assault with a semiautomatic firearm to assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2))5 and dismissed one of the prior
serious or violent felony convictions. On count 1 the court
sentenced Alvarez to a term of nine years (the middle term of

5     The court ruled there was insufficient evidence the gun
Alvarez pointed at Septium was a semiautomatic firearm
because—although the gun had a magazine—no one testified how
the gun worked.

                                 9
three years, doubled under the three strikes law, plus three years
for the enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a)). On
count 3 the court imposed but stayed under section 654 execution
of the upper term of six years. Alvarez appealed from the
judgment.

                          DISCUSSION

       A.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
        “To determine whether the admission of identification
evidence violates due process, ‘we consider (1) whether the
identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary,
and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was nevertheless
reliable under the totality of the circumstances . . . .’” (People v.
Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 768
(Holmes); accord, People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 35
(Sanchez); People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 556 (Clark); see
Sexton v. Beaudreaux (2018) 585 U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 2555, 2559]
[“‘due process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers
use[ ] an identification procedure that is both suggestive and
unnecessary’”].) The defendant has the burden to show the
identification procedure was both unduly suggestive and
unreliable under the circumstances. (People v. Cunningham
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,
412.)
       “A defendant’s claim that an identification procedure was
unduly suggestive is a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’” (People
v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 283; see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 557.) “‘“We review deferentially the trial court’s findings of
historical fact, especially those that turn on credibility

                                 10
determinations, but we independently review the trial court’s
ruling regarding whether, under those facts, a pretrial
identification procedure was unduly suggestive.”’” (People v.
Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 930-931; accord, Holmes, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 768; see Wilson, at p. 283; Clark, at pp. 556-557.)

      B.     Even if the Identification Procedure Was Suggestive,
             Septium’s Identification of Alvarez Was Reliable
             Under the Circumstances
       Alvarez contends the field show-up procedure was unduly
suggestive and unnecessary because, prior to the show-up, Officer
Martinez told Septium that police officers were in pursuit of a
Lexus and “it has to be them.” All single-person show-ups are
“‘inherently suggestive, at least to some extent.’” (Sanchez,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 36.) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
held “such showups are not necessarily unfair. [Citation.]
‘Rather, all the circumstances must be considered.’” (Ibid.;
see People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 753 (plur. opn. of
Lucas, C. J.); People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 136.)
“A violation occurs ‘“only if the identification procedure is ‘so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’”’” (People v. Wilson,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 283; see Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 768; Sanchez, at p. 35.)6

6     Alvarez does not challenge the officers’ use of a field
show-up, rather than a lineup, as unnecessary under the
circumstances.

                                 11
       It would have been better practice for Officer Martinez not
to have told Septium that officers were pursuing a Lexus, that it
“has to be them,” or that they “were coming in with the suspects.”
But even if Officer Martinez’s comments rendered the show-up
suggestive, there was no due process violation because Septium’s
identification of Alvarez was nevertheless reliable under the
totality of the circumstances. (See Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 36-37 [even where “the suggestive nature of the identification
does raise concerns,” the identification may still be “reliable
under the totality of the circumstances” where the “the inherent
suggestiveness of the procedure was outweighed by other factors
confirming the reliability of the identification”]; People v. Arias
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 168 [“When an eyewitness has been
subjected to undue suggestion, the factfinder must nonetheless be
allowed to hear and evaluate his identification testimony unless
the totality of the circumstances suggests a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)].)
       “In assessing the totality of the circumstances, we consider
‘“such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the
suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of
attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her
prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of
time between the offense and the identification.” [Citations.]
“Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the
suggestive identification itself.”’” (People v. Wilson, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 283; see Sexton v. Beaudreaux, supra, 585 U.S. at
p. ___ [138 S.Ct at p. 2559]; Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 768;
Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 35-36.)

                                12
       As an initial matter, to the extent Officer Martinez’s
comments about the Lexus were suggestive, their corrupting
effect was reduced by Officer Quezada’s subsequent admonition
immediately before the show-up that, just because a person was
in police custody, did not mean the person was involved in the
crime. Courts have consistently held such admonitions reduce
the suggestibility of an identification procedure. (See People v.
Garcia (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1360-1361 [no due process
violation, despite that police told the victim “‘they had caught the
guys,’” where police admonished the victim that he was not to
infer guilt from the fact that the individuals were detained and
that he did not have to identify anyone]; People v. Rodriguez
(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1050 [no due process violation where
the “witnesses were shown the four suspects after being
admonished that the shooter might or might not be among
them”]; see also People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 990 [no “‘substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification’” during photographic lineup where the witness
“‘was instructed that he was not to assume the person who
committed the crime was pictured therein, that it was equally
important to exonerate the innocent, and that he had no
obligation to identify anyone’”].) Septium confirmed he
understood the admonition.
       Moreover, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that no one pressured Septium into identifying Alvarez or
any of the other suspects officers showed him. (See People v.
Nguyen (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th at 32, 39 [trial court’s finding law
enforcement officers did not encourage the witness to identify the
suspect “will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence”].)
When Septium viewed the first suspect, he said, “Not this one”;

                                13
Officer Quezada said only, “Okay,” and he told the other officers
“it’s gonna be a negative on this guy.” When Septium said he did
not recognize either of the two women, Officer Quezada said,
“Okay negative, . . . he doesn’t recognize them.” When Septium
viewed Alvarez, Officer Quezada asked only whether Alvarez was
the “guy.” Septium asked whether he could see the first male
suspect again, and Officer Quezada responded he had already
been taken away. Only after Septium then said his attacker
“looked like this skinny one” did Officer Quezada ask Septium to
clarify whether he thought Alvarez was the assailant. While
Officer Martinez’s earlier comments about the Lexus may have
suggested that one of the four suspects was probably Septium’s
assailant, no one persuaded Septium to identify Alvarez or
anyone else specifically. (See People v. Chavez (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 663, 676 [no due process violation where detective
“did not expressly or implicitly attempt to persuade [the witness]
to identify [defendant] as his assailant”]; Nguyen, at p. 39 [no due
process violation where the police “‘did not impermissibly suggest
in any way that [the witness] had to make an identification of the
suspects’”].)7
       Similarly, Officer Martinez’s comments—to the extent they
were suggestive—implicated all four of the suspects, not just
Alvarez. The fact that Septium identified Alvarez but not the
other man indicated he was not heavily influenced by the earlier
comments. (See In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 386
[victim was not influenced by a single-person show-up procedure
where she “positively identified one suspect but made no

7    Indeed, Alvarez does not argue the show-up impermissibly
suggested he was the more likely culprit than the other suspect.

                                14
identification of his companion”]; see also People v. Garcia, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1360 [witness “acted independently of any
suggestion or pressure that may have been expressed” prior to
the lineup where he was “unable to identify any of the defendants
as suspects but did recognize . . . the getaway car”].)
       Other factors confirmed the reliability of Septium’s
identification of Alvarez. For one, Septium had a good
opportunity to view Alvarez. While Septium only saw Alvarez for
a moment during the assault and admitted to Officer Quezada it
was dark, Septium testified Alvarez was only a few feet away
from him. In addition, Septium’s pre-identification description of
his assailant as 24 or 25 years old, skinny, Hispanic, and with no
hair—while somewhat general—matched Alvarez’s appearance
during the show-up.8 Moreover, the lapse of time between the
assault and the identification was short; Septium identified
Alvarez at the show-up an hour and a half after the assault.
(See Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 37 [identification was reliable
where the “showup occurred mere hours” after crime]; People v.
Hall (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 299, 310 [identification was reliable
where “the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation was approximately one hour”].)
       More importantly, there was considerable evidence
confirming Alvarez was the person who pointed the gun at
Septium. Courts have regularly found identifications reliable
where other evidence corroborates the accuracy of the witness’s

8      Alvarez was 26 years old the night of the assault. Septium
testified he recognized Alvarez as his assailant during the show-
up because Alvarez was slim and because he had the same
hairline, forehead, and eyes.

                                15
identification. (See Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 769 [it was
“not substantially likely that [the witness] misidentified [the
defendant], particularly in light of all the additional evidence”];
Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 37 [five-year-old witness’s
identification during a single-photograph show-up was reliable,
where “[p]art of the identification was independently
corroborated by none other than defendant,” and “the physical
evidence corroborated part of what [the witness] told the police”].)
       There was no serious dispute Alvarez was in the front-
passenger seat of the Lexus during Officer Quezada’s pursuit.
Alvarez’s fingerprints were on the inside of the front-passenger
window, Officer Quezada saw a person who looked like Alvarez
(and was wearing the same clothing) get out from the front-
passenger door (an incident captured by Quezada’s body camera),
and police found Alvarez hiding in a backyard a short distance
from where the pursuit ended. (See People v. Nguyen, supra,
23 Cal.App.4th at p. 40 [identification was reliable where
fingerprint evidence placed the defendant at the crime scene].)
The only other man in the Lexus was wearing different clothing,
further confirming Alvarez was the person in the front-
passenger’s seat. (See People v. Chavez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at
p. 676 [identification was reliable where the victim described to
detectives the clothing his assailant was wearing, and the
defendant was the only person in the surveillance camera footage
of the attack wearing matching clothing].) Although it is
theoretically possible, as Alvarez asserts, the occupants of the
Lexus changed seats after the assault on Septium, there was no
evidence supporting such speculation. And there was evidence to
the contrary. Only a short period of time elapsed between the
assault and the beginning of Officer Quezada’s pursuit, and no

                                16
one saw anyone change seats during the pursuit (though Officer
Quezada did see someone throw a gun out the window on the
passenger side).
       It is true Septium was not 100 percent certain of his
identification of Alvarez at the field show-up, admitting both
male suspects looked alike. Septium’s lack of certainty, however,
did not render the identification unreliable. People v. Wilson,
supra, 11 Cal.5th 259 is instructive. In that case the witness
briefly saw the defendant in court at a hearing. (Id. at p. 286.)
A month later, the witness participated in a live lineup where he
could not positively identify the defendant, but stated that,
among the lineup participants, the defendant “most closely
resembled” the person he saw commit the crime. (Ibid.) The
Supreme Court held the witness’s “failure to definitively identify”
the defendant at the lineup did not undermine the reliability of
the identification. (Id. at p. 287.) In particular, the Supreme
Court explained that, to the extent the identification was “useful
to any degree,” it was because it “bolstered the more definitive
identifications” of the defendant by other witnesses. (Ibid.)
Similarly, Septium may not have been certain during the field
show-up Alvarez was the person who assaulted him, but Septium
consistently stated Alvarez looked more like the person who
assaulted him than the other male suspect. Like the witness’s
less-than-certain identification in Wilson, Septium’s
identification was useful at trial to bolster the other
incriminating evidence—namely, the evidence placing Alvarez in
the front-passenger seat of the Lexus at the time of the assault.
       Finally, at trial Alvarez had ample opportunity to (and did)
question Septium about the identification and Officers Martinez
and Quezada about their interactions with Septium. The

                                17
opportunity to question all relevant witnesses significantly
reduced the possibility of any “‘irreparable misidentification.’”
(Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 116; see Holmes,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 770 [identification was reliable where
“[t]he defense was able to thoroughly cross-examine [the witness]
and delve into factors bearing on the reliability of his
identifications”]; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 903
[no due process violation where the “circumstances of the
identification were disclosed to the defense, they were the subject
of thorough cross-examination, and the jury was able to evaluate
the reliability of [the witness’s] identification”]; People v. Cooks
(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 271 [identifications were reliable
where “each witness who identified one of the defendants in court
was cross-examined at length about his or her pretrial
identification”].) Under the circumstances, the identification was
sufficiently reliable that its introduction at trial did not violate
Alvarez’s due process rights. It was up to the jury to consider
how the procedure might have influenced Septium’s identification
of Alvarez and weigh that with the other evidence. (See Manson,
at p. 116 [“Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure
intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some
questionable feature.”]; People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 903 [same]; People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 944
[“[w]hether the witnesses were truthful when they identified
defendant . . . presented credibility questions for the jury to
resolve,” and “presenting the evidence to the jury for its
resolution did not violate defendant’s rights”].)

                                18
                          DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed.

                                   SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                FEUER, J.

                MARTINEZ, J.

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