Court Opinion

ID: 9757205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:24:48.056333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:36.131370
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that part of the majority opinion affirming the denial of relief from Mr. Taylor’s conviction for murder. I dissent from that part of the majority opinion granting relief with respect to Mr. Taylor’s death sentence. Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to introduce evidence in the death penalty phase that had a significant possibility of being more harmful than helpful to Mr. Taylor’s defense.
Mr. Taylor was already incarcerated for the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl in the bathroom of McCluer North High School when he murdered his cellmate, Shaekrein Thomas. The evidence established that on October 8, 1999, without provocation, Mr. Taylor got out of his bed, put his shoes on for stability, and then struck Mr. Thomas in the face. A fight ensued and Mr. Taylor strangled Mr. Thomas for 10 or 15 minutes until he died. Approximately two hours later, Mr. Taylor called the prison guards to remove Mr. Thomas’ body because it was in Mr. Taylor’s way. Mr. Thomas’ body had a bite mark in the middle of his back, a swollen left eye, a right eye nearly dislodged from its socket, and other abrasions on his abdomen and cheek. There was also evidence that a sexual act had occurred.
Mr. Taylor’s defense in the guilt phase was that, by reason of mental disease or defect, he was not responsible for his actions. His attorneys introduced evidence from five mental health experts that Mr. Taylor suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, with one of the experts stating that Mr. Taylor lacked the capacity to know and appreciate the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his acts. The jury rejected this defense.
*256During the penalty phase of the trial, the only evidence introduced by the prosecutor concerned Mr. Taylor’s previous rape and murder of Christine Smetzer, described above. In turn, the only evidence introduced by Mr. Taylor’s attorneys was the testimony of the superintendent of the Crossroads Correctional Center that Mr. Taylor could be housed in administrative segregation for the rest of his life with minimal danger to others.
The majority opinion finds that Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel was ineffective for not introducing a “treasure trove” of mitigating evidence, that Mr. Taylor was abused as a child, suffered from early-onset mental illness, had struggled with school, was suicidal at age ten, etc. I disagree. Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel specifically investigated and considered the possibility of introducing this evidence. Counsel made the strategic decision not to introduce this evidence, fearing that it might be more harmful than helpful to Mr. Taylor.
Specifically, concerning Mr. Taylor’s mental health records, trial counsel stated:
I mean, it would have been great if we could have introduced the records and there weren’t harmful things in there. I am sure we would have. It’s just that we decided that we didn’t think it was the best option.
Counsel also stated:
And there were some other — there was one person in particular that was meeting with him once a week that seemed to have some indications that she — -I believe it was a woman, and I think it was a psychologist, notes like that met with him once a week — that indicated she was not convinced that he had a mental disease and that he was malingering.
Concerning Mr. Taylor’s school records, trial counsel stated:
Upon looking at his behavior and upon discussing Michael’s behavior with his family, one thing that we were somewhat concerned about, knowing that the onset of schizophrenia is generally late teens or early twenties would be the common onset for schizophrenia, we were very cautious about presenting evidence that would make Michael appear to be like a bad seed from the start. So basically looking through the school records, we just weren’t that interested in putting on the school records or people involved with the school records for that reason. (Emphasis added).
Likewise, one of the exhibits Mr. Taylor now claims should have been introduced also shows that, as a ten-year-old boy, he “becomes very aggressive and can be violent.” Exhibit 43 records that Mr. Taylor has “a history of uncontrollable school behavior which includes fighting, profanity, and overall disruptiveness in class.” Also, certain prison documents that trial counsel chose not to introduce suggested that Mr. Taylor’s symptoms may not have been genuine. For example, Exhibit 12, states:
Although Mr. Taylor had reported a lengthy psychiatric history including many suicide attempts, he never attempted suicide while incarcerated at Potosí or Fulton. He also reported a history of self mutilation as directed by the “father of darkness,” but until October 3,1999, there were no reports of this behavior in any of the psychiatric, psychological, or medical progress notes.
Mr. Taylor’s prison reports also indicate that he assaulted a guard and that a weapon was found in his cell.
Trial counsel’s strategic concerns prompting them not to introduce this evidence are more than reasonable. The murder committed by Mr. Taylor was brutal and senseless. Mr. Taylor’s delay in calling the guard and then calling only to *257have the body removed from his way was particularly calloused. Any reference to Mr. Taylor’s past would only highlight his previous murder of Christine Smetzer and add even more emotional force to the prosecutor’s request for the death penalty. Instead of creating jury sympathy as the majority seems to imply, this evidence would more likely have convinced the jury that Mr. Taylor was “a bad seed from the start” for whom only the death penalty is appropriate.1
Trial counsel for Mr. Taylor was in an extremely difficult situation. The jury had already rejected Mr. Taylor’s defense of mental disease or defect. The jury knew that Mr. Taylor had committed two atrocious murders. Whether it was better to introduce evidence of a lifetime of abuse, mental illness, violence and disruptiveness that might result in jury sympathy or might instead focus the jury upon Mr. Taylor’s past, including the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl, or whether to introduce evidence that Mr. Taylor could be safely removed from other human beings by solitary confinement is a decision no attorney would want to make. Simply because the jury imposed the death penalty does not mean that trial counsel made the wrong decision or was a constitutionally ineffective lawyer.
Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel was in a better position to evaluate trial strategy than are the judges of this Court. We have consistently held that “[tjrial strategy is not ground for ineffective assistance of counsel.” Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Mo. banc 2006); Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 736 (Mo. banc 2003); Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 516 (Mo. banc 2006). This is not the case to change that law.
The judgment as to the penalty phase, as well as the guilt phase, should be affirmed.

. As to the Brady issue, the suppressed impeachment evidence was not material in that there is not a reasonable probability that the penalty phase would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense. The state’s jailhouse witness, Perschbacher, had been already discredited by the court and found to be not credible through other impeachment. The decision by defense counsel not to put on additional mitigation evidence and to rely only upon the testimony of the superintendent of the Crossroads Correctional Center precludes the possibility that such a violation was prejudicial in the penalty phase.