Court Opinion

ID: 9846639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:36.416127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:40.968671
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the Atlanta City Council’s creation of the Taxicab Bureau was not an ultra vires act (Div. 1) and that the trial court was correct when it dismissed the Association’s claim for damages because the ordinances which authorize the imposition of fines on the Association’s members did not impose unconstitutional vicarious criminal liability (Div. 4). However, I believe the majority goes astray when it declares portions of the City’s ordinances to be unconstitutional violations of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Div. 2) and does not address the Association’s equal protection claim (Div. 3), and when it concludes the Association’s ante litem notice was timely (Div. 5). Because I believe the Association did not sufficiently plead or prove any injury to support *353its assertion that the ordinances’ residency requirements were unconstitutional, I believe the trial court should have dismissed the request for a declaration of unconstitutionality under the Commerce Clause for lack of standing. Because I do not believe that an ante litem notice filed after the commencement of litigation is valid, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the Association’s claim for damages. Accordingly, I dissent to Divisions 2, 3, and 5 of the majority opinion.
1. The majority takes the unprecedented step of declaring a city ordinance to be an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution without any allegation or proof of injury. When the Association raised its concern about the constitutionality of the residency requirement in its first amended complaint, it did so by merely paraphrasing the two applicable ordinance sections and asserting they violated the Commerce Clause. There was no recitation of facts setting out how the ordinances were defective or how they harmed the Association or its members. However, a residency requirement is not a per se violation of the Commerce Clause, so merely identifying the disputed ordinances is insufficient to establish an injury. See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U. S. 204 (103 SC 1042, 75 LE2d 1) (1983) (executive order upheld under a Commerce Clause challenge, which required half of all workers employed on city-funded construction projects to be residents of the city); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (93 SC 2230, 37 LE2d 63) (1973) (residency requirements for in-state tuition rates are constitutional if they provide an opportunity for someone from out of state to demonstrate that they have become a bona fide state resident). In its fourth amended complaint, the Association only added a request “[t]hat this Court declare that the residency requirement for ownership of CPNCs is unconstitutional . . . ,” again without any assertion of facts underlying the request.
The majority opinion improperly addresses the merits of the Association’s Commerce Clause claim in the face of the requirement that an association “must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate and threatened injury as a result of challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.... [Cit.]” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U. S. 333, 342 (97 SC 2434, 53 LE2d 383) (1977) (expounding on the first prong of the three-prong “associational standing” test it set forth in Hunt and which this Court adopted in Aldridge v. Ga. Hospitality &c. Assn., 251 Ga. 234, 235 (1) (304 SE2d 708) (1983)).1
*354The key requirement for standing to bring a constitutional challenge in Georgia is that the plaintiff show either that he or she was injured in some way by the operation of the statute, ordinance, or administrative action, or that the statute has an adverse impact on that party’s rights. See Tennille v. State, 279 Ga. 884, 885 (622 SE2d 346) (2005); Agan v. State, 272 Ga. 540, 542 (1) (533 SE2d 60) (2000); State of Ga. v. Jackson, 269 Ga. 308, 310 (496 SE2d 912) (1998); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (1) (383 SE2d 555) (1989). This “injury-in-fact” requirement was clarified in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (112 SC 2130, 119 LE2d 351) (1992), when the Supreme Court determined that, at “an irreducible constitutional minimum,” a plaintiff who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must allege he “suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, [cits.] and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”. . . .’” (emphasis supplied). See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (99 SC 1601, 60 LE2d 66) (1979) (plaintiff must “show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant”) (emphasis supplied).
In Lujan, the Court clearly set out the level of specificity that must be “shown” before a plaintiff may properly be afforded standing. Thus, proper standing requires, at a minimum, that a plaintiff clearly allege an injury somewhere in his pleadings. If these factual allegations of injury are not present in the complaint, supporting affidavits, or other evidence, then the trial or reviewing court must dismiss the complaint. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (95 SC 2197, 45 LE2d 343) (1975). See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 735 (92 SC 1361, 31 LE2d 636) (1972) (upholding dismissal of complaint because plaintiff “failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the ... development [of Mineral King Mountain]. Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the respondents.” (emphasis supplied). See also *355United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669 (93 SC 2405, 37 LE2d 254) (1973) (Courtruled plaintiffs had standing because their complaint alleged they had personally suffered aesthetic and environmental injuries from the Interstate Commerce Commission’s decision to increase freight rates).
In contrast, the Association in the case at bar never satisfied the minimum constitutional standing requirements because the Association did not allege a single fact or “concrete or particularized” injury that would establish standing to bring a Commerce Clause challenge. The Association failed to allege, for example, that any of its members had an out-of-state buyer to whom they were prevented from selling a CPNC; that the Association represented an out-of-state party who was denied the right to purchase a CPNC by virtue of their residence; or even that the market for CPNC buyers has been limited in any way because of the requirement. Even during the hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment, the Association rested its entire challenge on equal protection grounds and did not argue the Commerce Clause issue, again forgoing an opportunity to establish how its members were injured. In short, the Association has failed to “show” how the CPNC residency requirement injured it or its members by having an “adverse impact on [the party’s] own rights.” South Ga. Nat. Gas Co., supra.
Division 2 of the majority opinion overlooks this deficiency and declares the ordinance to be an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause without any identifiable claim in the record of either an “actual or imminent” injury. Lujan, supra at 560. Rather than adhere to the requirement that an injury-in-fact be established in the pleadings, affidavits and other evidence produced by the plaintiff, the majority opinion supplies the injuries the majority believes the members of the Association might suffer as a result of the residency requirement. In an effort to reach the merits of the Association’s suggestion that the City’s ordinance violates the Commerce Clause, the majority resorts to granting the Association standing based on this Court’s post-hoc recitation of injuries the majority perceives might result from the hypothetical future enforcement of a statute.
The majority opinion, quoting Preservation Alliance of Savannah v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 202 Ga. App. 116, 117 (413 SE2d 519) (1991), states that a plaintiff normally must show “it has interests or rights which are or will be affected by the [ordinance].”2 A future *356injury may suffice if it is “imminent,” as opposed to “conjectural or hypothetical,” and the Supreme Court has generally only allowed standing on this basis if a plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief and alleges a “substantial likelihood of future harm.” See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 51 (111 SC 1661, 114 LE2d 49) (1991) (standing granted to seek declaratory judgment because plaintiffs alleged they were suffering a current injury and “would continue to suffer that injury until they received the probable cause determination to which they were entitled.”). See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 (103 SC 1660, 75 LE2d 675) (1983) (no standing to enjoin the police from using a chokehold because plaintiff did not show a “sufficient likelihood” that he would be subjected to a chokehold in the future).
However, even the most generous interpretation of the Association’s pleadings in this case does not suggest that the Association alleged facts that give rise to a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief. The Association has never alleged “an actual controversy or circumstances showing a necessity for a determination to guide and protect [its members] from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct. . . .” Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 215 (518 SE2d 879) (1999). The Association has alleged nothing but the existence of the ordinance at issue and made a request that it be found to be an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause. In the absence of pleadings or proof showing injury or uncertainty or insecurity, the majority opinion is, in essence, issuing an “erroneous advisory opinion which rules in [the Association’s] favor as to future litigation over the subject matter____” Id. See also Fourth Street Baptist Church of Columbus v. Bd. of Registrars, 253 Ga. 368 (1) (320 SE2d 543) (1984) (a court “has no province to determine whether or not a statute, in the abstract, is valid or to give advisory opinions.”).
Allowing the Association, based on the record as it has been developed to this point, standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance without requiring the Association to have shown in its pleadings, affidavits or evidence, some kind of injury means that “anyone who objects to the enforcement of any particular statute [has] standing to file a constitutional challenge even though he or she is not directly affected by that statute. Such a holding [renders] the concept of ‘standing’ meaningless.” Adams v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections, 274 Ga. 461 (553 SE2d 798) (2001). Without a showing of an actual or *357imminent injury through specific pleadings, affidavits or other evidence, a plaintiff may not challenge a statute’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, no matter how egregious a violation the majority opinion may hypothesize, and I cannot join what I believe is an advisory opinion concerning the constitutionality of an ordinance of the City of Atlanta. That portion of the trial court’s judgment addressing the Commerce Clause issue should be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court with direction that the portions of the amended complaints asserting a Commerce Clause violation be dismissed.
2. Because I disagree with the majority’s approach to the Commerce Clause issue, I must also disagree with its handling in Division 3 of the Association’s equal protection challenge to the ordinance’s requirement that an applicant for a CPNC be a Georgia resident for at least one year. I believe the merits of the challenge should be addressed under the rational basis test since the Association’s members do not comprise a suspect class and holding a CPNC issued by the City is not a fundamental right, and the trial court’s decision upheld.
[T]he legislative classification created by the ordinances can withstand constitutional assault when the classification is based on rational distinctions and bears a direct and real relation to the legitimate object or purpose of the legislation____A classification will be upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge so long as under any conceivable set of facts, it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate end of government not prohibited by the Constitution.
(Punctuation omitted.) Old South Duck Tours v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 873 (3) (535 SE2d 751) (2000).
The trial court concluded a rational basis existed for the one-year residency requirement after finding it “fosters better familiarity with the City of Atlanta and encourages commercial ties to the community.” While it maybe true, as the Association suggests on appeal, that there are means other than a state-wide residency requirement that would better serve the goals of achieving familiarity with Atlanta and encouraging commercial ties to the Atlanta community, our task is not to pass on the wisdom of the legislative classification but only to determine whether it is reasonable. See State of Ga. v. Heretic, 277 Ga. 275 (1) (588 SE2d 224) (2003). In light of the expansive area beyond the municipal boundaries of the City of Atlanta that the Association’s members serve, a state residency requirement is not unreasonable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding the requirement did not violate equal protection.
*3583. With regard to the majority opinion’s discussion of vicarious criminal liability,3 I agree that the ordinance does not impose the vicarious criminal liability condemned by this Court in Davis v. City of Peachtree City, 251 Ga. 219 (304 SE2d 701) (1983); rather, the ordinance is the embodiment of that which this Court endorsed in Davis: “civil violations providing civil penalties such as fines or revocation of licenses [to] be used for offenses for which the individual was not morally blameworthy and does not deserve the social condemnation ‘implicit in the concept “crime.” ’ ” Id. at 222.
The distinction between the stigma of a criminal conviction and the imposition of civil punishment drawn in Davis v. City of Peachtree City and endorsed by this Court today is appropriate. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, relying heavily on Davis v. City of Peachtree City, also has concluded that “criminal penalties based on vicarious liability .. . are a violation of substantive due process and that only civil penalties would be constitutional.” State v. Guminga, 395 NW2d 344 (Mn. 1986). Other courts have used imprisonment as the factor which distinguishes between constitutional and unconstitutional vicarious criminal liability, thereby making the imposition of fines pursuant to a criminal conviction constitutional vicarious criminal liability. See, e.g., Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F3d 1358, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U. S. 1053 (120 SC 1554, 146 LE2d 459) (2000) (due process prohibits government from imprisoning a person without some proof of some form of personal blameworthiness, so owner of adult entertainment establishment could be held liable for acts of servants, employees, and agents acting within their scope of authority only if the penalty did not involve imprisonment); State v. Hy Vee Food Stores, 533 NW2d 147, 151 (S.D. 1995) (imposition of a $200 fine on corporation after employees sold alcohol to underage minors did not violate corporation’s due process rights); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575 (155 A2d 825) (1959), cert. denied, 363 U. S. 848 (80 SC 1624, 4 LE2d 1731) (1960) (imprisonment of individual owner for employee’s action of selling alcohol to underage minor violated due process, but imposition of a fine did not). By focusing on the stigma of a criminal conviction rather than the stigma of imprisonment pursuant to a criminal conviction, Georgia is more protective of the third party.
*3594. As stated earlier, I find myself in disagreement with the majority with regard to the efficacy of the ante litem notice filed in this case. In its order granting summary judgment to the City, the trial court dismissed the Association’s claims for damages, citing the Association’s failure to comply with the ante litem notice requirements of OCGA § 36-33-5 prior to filing the lawsuit against the City. OCGA§ 36-33-5 (a) provides: “No person, firm, or corporation having a claim for money damages against any municipal corporation on account of injuries to person or property shall bring any action against the municipal corporation for such injuries, without first giving notice as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section.” Subsection (b) requires presentation of the claim in writing to the municipality’s governing authority “for adjustment” within six months of the happening of the event upon which the claim is predicated, and states “[n]o action shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal corporation until the cause of action therein has first been presented to the governing authority for adjustment.” Subsection (c) gives the municipality’s governing authority 30 days to consider and act upon the claim.
On appeal, the Association acknowledges it did not serve the City with ante litem notice prior to filing suit, but contends the ante litem notice it served three months after initiating litigation complied with the statute because, upon being made aware of its ante litem deficiency, the Association had dismissed its claims for damages, served the City with ante litem notice, waited the requisite 30 days, and then amended its complaint to seek damages. The majority reverses the trial court’s ruling on the ground that the Association did not pursue the claim for damages it initially had filed, but pursued the claim for damages it filed after it had dismissed the first claim and served the City with ante litem notice in mid-litigation. I cannot endorse the Association’s sleight of hand.
“Since the right to sue a municipality is statutory, the legislature may attach a notice-of-claim requirement as a precondition to maintenance of such a suit.” Shoemaker v. Aldmor Mgmt.,249 Ga. 430, 432 (291 SE2d 549) (1982). Giving ante litem notice is a condition precedent to filing suit against a municipality. Jones v. City of Austell, 166 Ga. App. 808, 809 (305 SE2d 653) (1983). Where the original complaint made no allegation that the claim had been presented to the governing authority of the municipality, the complaint set out no cause of action. Saunders v. City of Fitzgerald, 113 Ga. 619, 620 (38 SE 978) (1901); Hooper v. City of Atlanta, 26 Ga. App. 221, hn. 3 (105 SE 723) (1921).
The purpose and intent of the General Assembly in requiring ante litem notice prior to filing suit is fourfold:
*360to afford the officials of an offending city opportunity to investigate the complaint at a time when the evidence is more readily available, [2] to afford them opportunity ... to take proper steps to abate [a nuisance] before the effects thereof become great or far reaching, [3] to bar a claimant’s right of recovery for any and all claims arising by reason of matters that may have transpired or existed . . . more than six months prior to the giving of the required ante litem notice, and [4] to afford the city an opportunity to negotiate a settlement of such claims as it may determine to be meritorious before litigation is commenced, thus protecting the interests of the general public by reducing the exposure of the funds in the city treasury. . . .
City of Gainesville v. Moss, 108 Ga. App. 713 (1) (134 SE2d 547) (1963), overruled on other grounds, City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635 (452 SE2d 488) (1994). Allowing a party to give the required ante litem notice after suit has been filed and while there is pending between the same parties litigation concerning the same subject matter defeats several of the purposes behind requiring ante litem notice. The looming shadow cast by the active litigation between the municipality and the plaintiff deprives the municipal governing authority of a meaningful opportunity to investigate and severely hampers the municipal governing authority’s ability to negotiate a settlement of the claim for money damages. This is especially true when, as here, the basis for the claim for money damages is the procedure followed in the operation of certain ordinances and the ante litem notice was filed when there was pending between the parties a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the same ordinances. The Association’s filing of ante litem notice in mid-litigation effectively deprived the City of the opportunity to address the procedures for which the Association sought monetary damages since any action taken by the City in response to that ante litem notice likely would impact adversely the related pending litigation in which the Association and the City were locked.
In overruling the holding in City of Atlanta v. Fuller, 118 Ga. App. 563 (a) (164 SE2d 364) (1968), the majority acknowledges that ante litem notice cannot be accomplished by amendment after suit is filed because “that would defeat the very purpose of OCGA § 36-33-5, which is to provide the municipality with an opportunity to investigate before litigation is commenced so as to determine whether suit can be avoided.” Maj. op. at 351. As shown above, the same rationale applies when a party files an ante litem notice in an effort to seek money damages in a pending lawsuit. In order to give effect to the important purposes behind the requirement that ante litem notice be *361given before a lawsuit is filed, the claim for money damages in the present case must be dismissed since the lawsuit of which it is a part was filed before the ante litem notice was given and remained pending while the ante litem notice procedure was initiated. The trial court was correct when it determined the Association had not given timely ante litem notice and dismissed the Association’s claim for monetary damages as a result thereof. Because I believe the majority errs when it reinstates the claim for monetary damages on the ground that the ante litem statute authorizes a party engaged in litigation with a municipality to file an ante litem notice, wait the requisite 30 days, and amend its complaint to seek monetary damages, I respectfully dissent.
Decided November 30, 2006.
George B. Spears, for appellant.
R. Roger Bhandari, Laura J. Broward, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins this dissent in its entirety and Justice Hines joins Division 4 of this dissent.

 In addition to the adoption of the Hunt “associational standing” test in Aldridge, this *354Court has frequently turned to the U. S. Supreme Court’s case law concerning “Article III” standing to resolve issues of standing to bring a claim in Georgia’s courts. See, e.g., Lambeth v. State, 257 Ga. 15, 16 (354 SE2d 144) (1987), quoting County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 154-155 (99 SC 2213, 60 LE2d 777) (1979) (“a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on [the party’s] own rights”); and South Ga. Nat. Gas Co. v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm., 214 Ga. 174 (104 SE2d 97) (1958), quoting Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, 238 U. S. 41, 54 (35 SC 671, 59 LE 1192) (1915) (to properly challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance or state law, a plaintiff must show he is “within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him...” or otherwise deprives him of a protected right).

 Neither of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in support of this proposition suggests a statement of future injury is sufficient. In each case, both of which involve injunctive relief, this Court stated that in order to maintain an action challenging a statute, the plaintiff must *356show that the interests or rights of the complainant are affected by the statute. Davis v. Jackson, 239 Ga. 262, 264 (236 SE2d 613) (1977); West v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 136 (84 SE2d 30) (1954).

 Vicarious liability is not strict liability:
With strict liability, there must be a showing that the defendant personally engaged in the necessary acts or omissions; only the requirement of mental fault is dispensed with altogether. By contrast, with vicarious liability it is the need for a personal actus reus that is dispensed with, and there remains the need for whatever mental fault the law requires on the part of the employee [or agent or servant],
LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, Vol. 2, § 13.4. See also Davis v. City of Peachtree City, 251 Ga. 219, 220, n. 1 (304 SE2d 701) (1983).