Court Opinion

ID: 9939482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 23:02:17.334377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:17.525895
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 P. v. Schleuder CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

    THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166768
    v.
    GEORGE LEROY SCHLEUDER,                                             (Lake County Sup. Ct.
                                                                         Case No. CR962589)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         George Leroy Schleuder, a registered sex offender, was found guilty of
failure to timely report a change of address as required by Penal Code section
290.013.1 On appeal, Schleuder raises two claims. First, he argues there was
insufficient evidence that he willfully violated section 290.013. Second, he
argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution
and various assessments without holding a hearing on his ability to pay. We
affirm.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In 1989, Schleuder was convicted of an offense requiring him to register
under section 290. Over thirty years later, Schleuder was charged with
inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant with a prior conviction (§ 273.5,
subd. (f)(1); count 1) and failure to notify of an address change (§ 290.013,

1        Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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subd. (a); count 2). The information alleged Schleuder had three prior
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (§ 667, subd. (b)–(j);
§ 1170.12.)
         In August 2022, a jury convicted Schleuder of battery on a cohabitant
(§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), a lesser included offense of count 1. The jury deadlocked
on failure to notify of an address change (count two) and the trial court
declared a mistrial on that count. The prosecution elected to retry count 2.
Retrial Evidence
         The parties stipulated that Schleuder had been convicted in 1989 of an
offense requiring him to register under section 290.
         In August 2021, Schleuder and his former girlfriend, J.F., moved into a
mobile home community in the City of Lakeport. Before moving, Schleuder
filled out a Sex Offender Registration form to notify the Lakeport Police
Department (Department) of his change of address. A records technician
instructed Schleuder to read the form and initial the paragraphs explaining
the requirements of section 290, indicating he understood the requirements.
Schleuder was provided a copy of the completed form.
         On the morning of January 5, 2022, Schleuder and J.F. got into an
argument. J.F. left the mobile home; when she returned about an hour later,
Schleuder was no longer there. Schleuder attempted to return later that
night, but he was unable to enter because the door’s chain lock was secured.
Within a day or two, J.F. changed the locks and Schleuder never returned to
live in the mobile home. Schleuder received an eviction notice a few days
later.
         Sometime in January 2022, Schleuder began staying at his friend’s
home in in another city, Clearlake Oaks. Schleuder told his friend that his
girlfriend had “kicked him out” and he had “no other place to stay.” With his

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friend’s permission, Schleuder parked his truck in the backyard of his friend’s
home and slept in his truck. Through February 2022, Schleuder spent the
night in his friend’s backyard approximately three days a week. Schleuder
asked if he could use his friend’s address to register as a sex offender shortly
after he started staying in his backyard and his friend refused.
      A former Lakeport police officer, Melissa Bedford, testified for
Schleuder. She testified that sometime around the end of January 2022, a
man who looked like Schleuder came into the office asking vague questions
about registering as a sex offender if he lived in different areas of Lake
County. She asked the man whether he lived in the City of Lakeport, but he
avoided answering her question. When the individual started asking more
detailed questions about the registration process, Bedford directed him to the
records supervisor, who answered the rest of his questions. Bedford never
asked the man for his name or whether he needed to register. She believed
the man might have been Schleuder based on a photograph in the
Department’s database, but she was unable to identify him at trial. The
records supervisor testified that she did not recognize Schleuder and testified
that there was no record Schleuder contacted the Department between
January 5, 2022, and February 14, 2022.
      On February 14, 2022, Schleuder filled out a Sex Offender Registration
form to update his address and notify the Department that he had moved out
of the jurisdiction. Schleuder was arrested later that same day.
Verdict and Sentencing
      The jury found Schleuder guilty (§ 290.013, subd. (a)) and also found
true the special allegations that Schleuder had been convicted of three prior
felonies.

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       The trial court sentenced Schleuder to seven years and four months in
state prison, comprised of three years on count 1, inflicting corporal injury on
a domestic partner with a prior conviction and 8 months on count 2, failure to
register as a sex offender, doubled under the Three Strikes law. The court
ordered Schleuder to pay a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $40
court operation assessment (§ 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).
                                    DISCUSSION
   I. Failure to Report a Change of Address
       Schleuder contends there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for failure to timely file a change of address as required for a sex
offender. Having examined the record to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence in support of the conviction, we disagree. (People v.
Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118 [“ ‘ “We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence. . . . . We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s
credibility.” ’ ”].)
       Based on his 1989 conviction, Schleuder was required to register with
the chief of police of his city of residence, or the sheriff of the county if his
residence was in an unincorporated area or a city without a police
department. (§ 290.) “A person who last registered at a residence address
pursuant to the Act who changes his . . . residence address . . . shall, in
person, within five working days of the move, inform the law enforcement
agency . . . with which he . . . last registered of the move, the new address or
transient location, if known.” (§ 290.013, subd. (a), italics added.)
       “ ‘Residence’ means one or more addresses at which a person regularly
resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there, such as a

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shelter or structure that can be located by a street address, including, but not
limited to, houses, apartment buildings, motels, hotels, homeless shelters,
and recreational and other vehicles.” (§ 290.011, subd. (g).) Section 290.013
also applies if the registrant who was previously registered at a residence has
now become transient. (People v. Armas (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1178.)
Thus, the registrant must notify the agency within five days of any change of
address or location, regardless of whether they have a new address. (People
v. Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 647.)
      “To be convicted of failure to register as a sex offender, a defendant
must have actual knowledge of the duty to register as a sex offender.
[Citation]. . . . . ‘[A] sex offender is guilty of a felony only if he “willfully
violates” the registration or notification provisions of section 290. [Citation.]
The word “willfully” implies a “purpose or willingness” to make the omission.
[Citation.] Logically one cannot purposefully fail to perform an act without
knowing what act is required to be performed . . . . A jury may infer
knowledge from notice’ ”—and other circumstantial evidence—“ ‘but notice
alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement.’ ” (People v.
Aragon (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 504, 509–510, 511.)
      There is ample evidence Schleuder knew of his obligation to register
under section 290.013. Indeed, he registered for over 30 years without issue
and had recently been reminded of the requirements when he registered with
the Department in August 2021, at which time he signed a form
acknowledging that he understood the requirement to register. While this is
sufficient to establish his knowledge of the registration requirements, there
was also additional evidence. (See People v. Wallace (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
1088, 1099 [evidence of “repeated notice” regarding legal duty to register
upon change of address sufficient to infer actual knowledge]; People v. Vigil

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(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 485, 502 [notification of change of address established
awareness to notify law enforcement of any change in residence address].)
For example, his friend testified that Schleuder asked about using his
address to register. (People v. Aragon, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 504 at p. 511
[“[a] jury may infer actual knowledge from notice and other circumstantial
evidence”].) And Bedford testified that a person resembling Schleuder asked
questions about the registration requirements for transients, testimony the
jury was free to credit.
      Schleuder argues it was reasonable for him to believe that he had a
right to remain in the mobile home until February 9, 2022, based on the
eviction notice. He further asserts that his registration on February 14 was
both timely and evidenced an intent to comply with the law. However, “ ‘ “if
the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may
not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 1118.) While Schleuder’s act of registering could show an intent to
comply with the law, it also shows his awareness of the requirement to
register upon changing his address. Therefore, we find that there was
substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that Schleuder failed to
register within the required timeframe and will not upset that finding where
there might also be a reasonable contrary finding.
II.   Restitution Fines and Court Assessments
      Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1168
(Dueñas), Schleuder contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights

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without first determining whether he had the ability to pay the fines and
assessments the court imposed on him.2 This claim is forfeited.
      It is the defendant’s burden to raise the issue of inability to pay fines,
fees, and assessments and to present evidence of inability to pay. (People v.
Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490.) Here, defense counsel did not
object to imposition of the fines at the sentencing hearing, which was held
more than three years after Dueñas was decided. (See People v. Frandsen
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153; People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
609, 624.) Although a party may be excused for failing to raise an issue in
the trial court when an objection would have been futile or wholly
unsupported by the substantive law then in existence (People v. Welch (1993)
5 Cal.4th 228, 237), Schleuder fails to establish that such is the situation
here. We join the numerous opinions finding the Dueñas claim forfeited in
similar circumstances. (See, e.g., People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
175, 563–564; People v. Greeley, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 624; People v.
Frandsen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153.)
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

2      The question of whether a trial court must consider a defendant’s
ability to pay before imposing fines, fees, and assessments is currently before
the California Supreme Court in People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47,
review granted November 13, 2019, S257844.

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                                  _________________________
                                  Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A166768/People v. Schleuder

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