Court Opinion

ID: 9945748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:12:31.159555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.295015
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                 In The Supreme Court

   Stephen R. Edwards, Individually and as Personal
   Representative of the Estate of Steven Redfearn Stewart,
   Respondent,

   v.

   Scapa Waycross, Inc., Petitioner.

   Appellate Case No. 2022-001574

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

                   Appeal from York County
            Jean H. Toal, Acting Circuit Court Judge

                      Opinion No. 28193
        Heard February 6, 2024 – Filed February 28, 2024

                         AFFIRMED

   C. Mitchell Brown, of Nelson Mullins Riley &
   Scarborough LLP, of Columbia; William Peele Early, of
   Pierce, Sloan, Wilson, Kennedy & Early, LLC, of
   Charleston; and S. Christopher Collier, admitted pro hac
   vice, of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, of Atlanta,
   GA, all for Petitioner.

   Mona Lisa Wallace and William M. Graham, both of
   Wallace & Graham, PA, of Salisbury, NC; Kathleen
   Chewning Barnes, of Barnes Law Firm, LLC, of
             Hampton; Thomas H. Hart, III and Gregory Lynn Hyland,
             both of Hart, Hyland Shepherd, LLC, of Summerville; and
             Frederick John Jekel, of Leventis & Ransom, of Columbia,
             all for Respondent.

             Caroline Marie Gieser, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.,
             of Atlanta, GA, for Amici Curiae American Tort Reform
             Association, National Association of Manufacturers,
             National Federation of Independent Business Small
             Business Legal Center, Inc., National Association of
             Mutual Insurance Companies, American Property
             Casualty Insurance Association, and American Coatings
             Association.

             Erik. R. Zimmerman, admitted pro hac vice, and Stephen
             M. Cox, both of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., of
             Chapel Hill, NC, for Amici Curiae The Chamber of
             Commerce of the United States of America, and The South
             Carolina Chamber of Commerce.

JUSTICE JAMES: In this asbestos/mesothelioma case, we granted a writ of
certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision (1) affirming the trial court's denial
of Petitioner Scapa Waycross, Inc.'s (Scapa) motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, which was based on the ground Respondent failed to introduce legally
sufficient evidence of causation; (2) affirming the trial court's order granting
Respondent's motion for a new trial nisi additur; and (3) affirming the trial court's
denial of Scapa's motion for reallocation of pretrial settlement proceeds. Edwards
v. Scapa Waycross, Inc., 437 S.C. 396, 878 S.E.2d 696 (Ct. App. 2022).

       We dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted with respect to the
issues of additur and the reallocation of settlement proceeds.1 We affirm the court

1
 In its brief to this Court, Scapa argues for the first time that S.C. Code Ann. § 15-
38-50 (2005) imposes a restriction on a plaintiff's ability to allocate settlement
proceeds in a manner most advantageous to the plaintiff. The court of appeals
mentioned section 15-38-50 in its opinion, but not in the context now argued by
Scapa. 437 S.C. at 422-23, 422 n.3, 878 S.E.2d at 710 & n.3. Scapa's argument is
not preserved, so we do not address it. See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant,
338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000), for "the long-established
of appeals' reasoning on the causation issue, but we address the issue to reaffirm
South Carolina's adherence to the substantial factor causation test we adopted in
Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 373 S.C. 179, 644 S.E.2d 724 (2007).
       In Henderson, we pronounced:

       In determining whether exposure is actionable, we adopt the
       "frequency, regularity, and proximity test" set forth in Lohrmann v.
       Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162[-63] (4th Cir. 1986):
       "To support a reasonable inference of substantial causation from
       circumstantial evidence, there must be evidence of exposure to a
       specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of time
       in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked."

373 S.C. at 185, 644 S.E.2d at 727 (emphases added); see also Lohrmann, 782 F.2d
at 1162 (applying Maryland law to a pipefitter's products liability claims and
restating the substantial factor test employed in Maryland products liability cases:
"To establish proximate causation in Maryland, the plaintiff must introduce evidence
[that] allows the jury to reasonably conclude that it is more likely than not that the
conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result."
(emphasis added)). While the Lohrmann substantial factor test relaxes the "but-for"
requirement that applies in traditional tort cases, the test still requires the plaintiff to
show "more than a casual or minimum contact with the product." Lohrmann, 782
F.2d at 1162.

        In a products liability case, whether the plaintiff's theory is strict liability,
negligence, or breach of warranty, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's defective
product was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See Bray v. Marathon Corp.,
356 S.C. 111, 116, 588 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2003). To prove proximate cause, a plaintiff
must establish both causation in fact and legal cause. Small v. Pioneer Mach., Inc.,
329 S.C. 448, 463, 494 S.E.2d 835, 842 (Ct. App. 1997). To establish causation in
fact, the plaintiff must show the injury complained of would not have occurred "but
for" the defendant's conduct, and to establish legal cause, the plaintiff must establish

preservation requirement that the losing party generally must both present his issues
and arguments to the lower court and obtain a ruling before an appellate court will
review those issues and arguments."
the plaintiff's injury was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. See
id.

       A defendant "cannot be charged with that which is unpredictable or could not
be expected to happen. A plaintiff therefore proves legal cause by establishing the
injury in question occurred as a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
act." Id. at 463, 494 S.E.2d at 843 (citation omitted) (first citing Bramlette v.
Charter–Medical–Columbia, 302 S.C. 68, 393 S.E.2d 914 (1990); and then citing
Greenville Mem'l Auditorium v. Martin, 301 S.C. 242, 391 S.E.2d 546 (1990)). The
plaintiff may prove proximate cause by direct or circumstantial evidence, or some
combination of the two. Small, 329 S.C. at 464, 494 S.E.2d at 843.

       The Lohrmann causation test takes into the account the reality that "most
plaintiffs sue every known manufacturer of asbestos products." 782 F.2d at 1162.
Some defendants are dismissed pretrial or at the directed verdict stage for lack of
evidence, some defendants settle, and some defendants go to trial. Id. Applying the
test to Scapa's liability, it was incumbent upon Stewart to prove he was exposed to
Scapa asbestos-containing dryer felts on a regular basis over an extended time in
proximity to where he worked.

       Scapa argues it was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because
the evidence presented by Stewart fell short of the Lohrmann causation standard.
Scapa points to the court of appeals' citation of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
opinion in Rost v. Ford Motor Company2 and claims the court of appeals improperly
approved the use of the cumulative dose theory rejected in Henderson and
Lohrmann. We disagree. The court of appeals did not adopt a new causation test.
Moreover, the court correctly noted Dr. Frank did not rely on the cumulative dose
theory as a basis for his opinion that Scapa asbestos-containing dryer felts was a
substantial factor in causing Stewart's mesothelioma. The trial court properly
allowed Dr. Frank to explain to the jury that as the amount of asbestos accumulates
in the body, the likelihood of developing mesothelioma increases. Dr. Frank's
ultimate opinion was that Stewart's exposure to Scapa asbestos-containing dryer felts
during his employment at Bowater was a substantial factor in causing his
mesothelioma. Dr. Frank's testimony satisfied the requirements of Henderson and
Lohrmann, and, as a whole, the evidence in the record created a jury issue on the
issue of Scapa's liability.

2
  151 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2016). Because we hold the court of appeals did not deviate
from the Lohrmann test in this case, we need not decide whether the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania did or did not base its decision in Rost on the substantial factor test.
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals.

AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW, and HILL, JJ., concur.