Court Opinion

ID: 9961441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 18:02:28.446168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:45.185639
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2175     Document: 010111034317        Date Filed: 04/18/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          April 18, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  JARROD BLANDIN,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                             No. 23-2175
                                                      (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00228-LF-KK)
  KEVIN SMITH, in his individual capacity                         (D. N.M.)
  as New Mexico State Police Officer;
  NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF
  PUBLIC SAFETY; DANIEL CHAVEZ;
  KURTIS WARD; GREGORY RAMIREZ,
  in their individual capacities,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       New Mexico state police stopped Jarrod Blandin at a DUI checkpoint. Things

 quickly went awry. Mr. Blandin became agitated, yelling at officers and ignoring

 their commands. Eventually Officer Kevin Smith tackled Mr. Blandin (who by that

 point had gotten out of the car) and arrested him.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2175     Document: 010111034317        Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 2

       After the dust settled, Mr. Blandin filed this civil-rights lawsuit under

 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He raised claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

 against Officer Smith alleging unlawful arrest, unlawful search, and excessive force.

 He also raised claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against other

 officers for their failure to intervene against Officer Smith’s alleged excessive force.

       The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity.

 “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a summary judgment motion, the

 plaintiff must show that (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation

 of a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the

 violation.” Wilkins v. City of Tulsa, 33 F.4th 1265, 1272 (10th Cir. 2022). “If, and

 only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear the traditional

 burden of the movant for summary judgment—showing that there are no genuine

 issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

 Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks

 omitted).

       Mr. Blandin’s summary-judgment response “made little, if any, attempt to

 meet his heavy two-part burden.” Rojas v. Anderson, 727 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir.

 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the district court put it, his response

 offered “no discussion of how” the officers’ actions violated his constitutional rights,

 and he failed “to discuss whether the rights at issue were clearly established.”

 R. at 249. He instead asserted—without citing evidence or legal authority—that

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Appellate Case: 23-2175     Document: 010111034317         Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 3

 “there is no dispute that the Plaintiff has a clearly established constitutional right to

 be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” R. at 173.

        Mr. Blandin’s “vague and conclusory statements,” the district court concluded,

 could not overcome qualified immunity. R. at 250. And so the district court granted

 summary judgment to the officers.1

        We review the district court’s decision de novo, Rojas, 727 F.3d at 1003, and

 we have no trouble concluding it was correct. Mr. Blandin’s inadequate response

 failed to meet his burden, so the officers “were entitled to qualified immunity.”

 Id. at 1004.

        Mr. Blandin’s opening brief contains the same flaws as his district-court

 response. The brief recites his version of events without citing evidence. And it

 lacks a complete citation to a single case that might show the officers violated his

 rights. In a section suggesting the summary-judgment decision was part of a

 “judicial cover up,” the opening brief lists eighteen cases. Aplt. Opening Br. at 6,

 8–9. But the brief fails to provide complete citations for these cases, identifying only

 the name of each case, the year of each decision, and (for a few cases) the state in

 which the case arose. Although the brief tersely describes each case, it makes no

        1
          In addition to granting summary judgment on the claims mentioned in this
 decision, the district court dismissed other claims that Mr. Blandin had raised against
 the officers and the New Mexico Department of Public Safety. Mr. Blandin develops
 no coherent challenge to the dismissal orders in his opening brief, so he has waived
 any such challenge. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir.
 1998). He cannot undo that waiver by raising the challenges in his reply brief.
 See White v. Chafin, 862 F.3d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 2017).
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 attempt to explain why the cases suggest the officers in this case are not immune.

 And in place of analysis, the brief offers mere conclusions—for example, that

 “Officer Smith’s actions on the night in question constituted a flagrant violation of

 the appellant’s constitutional rights on multiple fronts.” Id. at 12. In short,

 Mr. Blandin’s briefing gives us no reason to doubt the district court’s decision.

        We recognize that Mr. Blandin represents himself. We have therefore

 construed his filings liberally. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,

 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But we can go only so far. We cannot assume

 the role of an advocate by searching the record or constructing arguments for

 Mr. Blandin. Id. Staying within the boundaries of our judicial role, we have no

 choice but to affirm the district court.

        The district court properly accounted for Mr. Blandin’s pro se status, too. We

 see no support for his contention that the district court “exploited” mistakes he made

 as a pro se litigant “in an effort to shield Officers from accountability.” Aplt.

 Opening Br. at 9. True enough, the district court required Mr. Blandin to comply

 with the procedural rules governing all litigants. But there was nothing wrong with

 that. See Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840.

        The district court also applied the proper summary-judgment standards.

 Arguing otherwise, Mr. Blandin insists that genuine disputes exist over material

 facts. This argument suffers from at least two problems. First, Mr. Blandin tried to

 create factual disputes by citing the allegations in his complaint. At summary

 judgment, however, mere allegations do not suffice; they must be supported with

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Appellate Case: 23-2175     Document: 010111034317       Date Filed: 04/18/2024    Page: 5

 evidence. Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1150–51 (10th Cir. 2006).

 And although courts may treat a complaint “as an affidavit if it alleges facts based on

 the plaintiff’s personal knowledge and has been sworn under penalty of perjury,”

 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991), Mr. Blandin’s complaint was

 unsworn. Second, because Mr. Blandin “failed to meet his burden on the legal

 qualified immunity question,” the burden never shifted back to the officers to show

 that no genuine dispute existed over a material fact and that they were entitled to

 judgment as a matter of law. Rojas, 727 F.3d at 1005.

                                     *      *      *

          We affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Mr. Blandin’s motion

 “requesting the admission of new video evidence,” Mot. at 1, because we “generally

 limit our review on appeal to the record that was before the district court when it

 made its decision,” Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir.

 2008).

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Carolyn B. McHugh
                                             Circuit Judge

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