Court Opinion

ID: 9749198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:27:35.680596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:44.998131
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I dissent. In my view, the issue presented by this case should be governed by the adoption of the standard contained in the Restatement 2d, Torts, §§436(2), 436(3) (1965), which provide: “(2) If the actor’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability. (3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in his presence.”
Jurisdiction after jurisdiction which has considered this problem has recognized the injustice inherent in the so-called “impact” rule, until a preponderance now have abandoned that requirement as a predicate to recovery.* The time is long overdue for this Commonwealth to do likewise.
*283I fail to comprehend the unreasonable fear of encouraging fictitious claims which seems to pervade any consideration of this issue. Why should that possibility be any more prevalent here than in any other area of the law, and why should the usual processes of litigation be inadequate to deal with this problem should it arise? Moreover, why should such speculation be the basis of denying compensation to those who have actually suffered injury through the negligence of another? Being unable to answer these questions satisfactorily, I must dissent.

 Restatement 2d, Torts, §436 (1965), Reporter’s Notes, Appendix, pp. 166-1T0, and cases cited therein.