Court Opinion

ID: 9663757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:50:03.249014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.202607
License: Public Domain

Targonski, J.
(dissenting). There is agreement with the majority that the modern trend allows rather general standards when there is a delegation of authority to an administrative body. However, I feel that when definite standards are not *71spelled out, adequate safeguards must be present in order to fulfill the requirements of due process. This rule has been stated in Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §2.00, 1970 Supp, pp 40-41 as follows:
"The focus should no longer be exclusively on standards; it should be on the totality of protections against arbitrariness, including both safeguards and standards. The key should no longer be statutory words; it should be the protections the administrators in fact provide, irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to say. The focus of judicial inquiries thus should shift from statutory standards to administrative safeguards and administrative standards.”
This theory achieved the force of law in Warren v Marion County, 222 Or 307, 314; 353 P2d 257, 261 (1960), when that Court accepted it in the following manner:
"The important consideration is not whether the statute delegating the power expresses standards, but whether the procedure established for the exercise of the power furnishes adequate safeguards to those who are affected by the administrative action.” (Emphasis in original.)
Although a general standard may be found in this delegation, I feel that there are no adequate safeguards to protect the individual from arbitrary action. It must be remembered that a person’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property is one of the fundamental rights in this country and cannot be taken away by the unfettered discretion of the Legislature.
In the instant case, however, the individuals are not only subject to this legislative discretion, they also must carry the burden in proving that the petitioner abused its discretion in finding that it is *72necessary to acquire an individual’s property when there is no evidence as to the yardstick employed in reaching the agency’s conclusion.
The statute in question, MCLA 213.366; MSA 8.261(6)(d) provides in part that the petition for acquisition of property shall contain:
* * *
"(b) A statement of purpose for which the property is being acquired, and any other pertinent matter of things, and may pray for any other or further relief to which the petitioner is entitled by law.”
The obvious purpose of this provision is to state why the property must be taken. The general rule appears to be that:
"Where the statute, in prescribing the essentials of the report, does not expressly require a statement of the necessity or utility of the road, such a statement is unnecessary.” 39 CJS, Highways, § 62, p 985.
In the instant case, the statute does require a statement of necessity and this must be complied with. However, a reading of the statement of purpose in the instant case, reveals that it merely states the reasons for acquisition in conclusionary terms. In order to give proper notice to the property owner, I feel it must state the underlying facts and specific reasons why a particular piece of property must be acquired for the public good.
The injustice of this procedure is compounded by the fact that the burden of proving an abuse of discretion is placed upon the individual property owner. In Kalamazoo Road Commissioners v Dosca, 21 Mich App 546, 548 (1970), this Court stated the prevailing rule to be:
"A declaration of necessity by the condemning au*73thority serves as prima facie evidence of the necessity and consequently makes it incumbent upon the property owner to show the contrary.”
This procedure puts an unfair and unjust burden upon the property owner. The individual is put to a considerable expenditure of time and money to prevent the taking of his property.
Furthermore, he must attack the statement of necessity when he has not been notified of what specific need there is for his property. This burden should be placed on the petitioner, who has stated that there is a necessity and who is in the better position to carry the burden.
Therefore, I feel that the opinion of the lower court should be affirmed but on the grounds stated in this dissent.