Court Opinion

ID: 9477389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:22:26.015929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:51.436551
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Judicial and administrative economy are, of course, desirable goals, but I see no basis for our short-circuiting the administrative process in this case. In fact the government has suggested that something might be gained by recourse to administrative remedies. I share the hunch of the majority that Kawitt will not get his waiver from the Navy. But neither my hunch nor its hunch is a sufficient basis for finding futility as a matter of law.
The records are full of instances of both the under-age and the over-age serving with distinction in the armed forces. The chances of Kawitt’s coming under enemy fire do not appear strong, but by subjecting himself to military discipline he could not have been entirely certain where the circumstances of the day might have taken him. My impression is that the services have never taken a stern view of those who joined up either before or after their years allowed.
The courts of appeals have been of one mind in requiring administrative exhaustion in military cases such as this one. See Muhammad v. Secretary of the Army, 770 F.2d 1494, 1495 (9th Cir.1985) (citation omitted) (“Strict application of the exhaustion requirement in military discharge *955cases maintains the balance between military authority and the federal courts.”); Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 637-38 (5th Cir.1980) (citation omitted) (“In the military context, the exhaustion requirement promotes the efficient operation of the military’s judicial and administrative systems, allowing the military an opportunity to fully exercise its own expertise and discretion prior to any civilian court review.”); Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 979, 983 (7th Cir.1974) (citation omitted) (“ ‘[A] plaintiff challenging an administrative military discharge will find the doors of the federal courthouse closed pending exhaustion of available administrative remedies.’ ”). These cases and other decisions do, of course, recognize a futility exception to the exhaustion requirement. The cases hold, however, that the futility exception is extremely narrow where the issue is recourse to military administrative remedies. The military must have the initial opportunity to apply its own regulations. In Kawitt’s case the Navy has indicated that a waiver of the maximum age rule was available, that Kawitt had not requested such a waiver and that the Navy has granted age waivers in many other instances. The Board of Correction of Naval Records must be given an opportunity to interpret and apply its regulations to Kawitt’s case.
It is not necessary for us now to determine whether or not Kawitt had a property right in his military employment. The majority says he had not since he lied about his age in order to enlist. I am not at all sure about such a “false pretenses” theory. It may seem not inequitable in Kawitt’s case since he was a land-locked sailor. If instead he had gone down with his ship at sea, I doubt that many legal conclusions would have been drawn from the state of his enlistment papers. Again I think it very sound policy to leave these matters in the first instance to the proper military authorities. See Muhammad, 770 F.2d at 1496 (claimed constitutional violation could be corrected through administrative appeal).
I concur in the $500 sanction because of Kawitt’s obdurate insistence on citing the vacated opinion in West (an opinion which I authored, by the way).
I therefore respectfully dissent to the extent indicated.