Court Opinion

ID: 8853784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 17:23:04.796609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:35.526400
License: Public Domain

CALDWELL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). I concur in the conclusion reached in this case but dissent from this statement in the majority opinion, namely:
“Upon the latter question, however, it is not conclusive upon the national courts. Whether or not such a provision of a contract is against public policy is a question of general law, and not dependent solely upon any local statute or usage.”
The contract referred to is a lease of real estate situated in Iowa. The lease was made and executed,, and its covenants were to be performed, in that state. The supreme court of Iowa held the lease and all its conditions valid under the laws of that state. No decision of the supreme court of the United States has been cited, and it is believed none can be found, holding that this decision of the supreme court of Iowa is not binding on this court. But, however this may be, there is no difference of opinion between the supreme court of Iowa and this court as to the validity of the lease and all its conditions, and there is, therefore, no occasion for this court to express an opinion upon the question whether it would be bound by the decision of the supreme court of Iowa if the two courts differed in opinion on the question of public policy. What is said on this subject is not necessary to the decision of the case, and, moreover, is not law. A “local statute,” declaring such a condition in a lease to be‘either valid or void, would undoubtedly be obligatory on this and all other courts. There are weighty reasons why a *209question of this character should not be 'lightly considered. The most serious blot on the American system of jurisprudence is that whereby a question affecting the rights and liabilities of a citizen may be differently decided by courts of different governments, whose judgments are equally binding- and final. This unfortunate condition of our jurisprudence results from our dual system of government. It has no existence in any other country, and ought to be confined within the narrowest limits possible in this. Nothing can be more repugnant to one's sense of justice, or to a uniform and harmonious administration of the law, than to require the citizen to be bound by conflicting decisions of courts of different governments. Under the operation of this unseemly rule, a suit against one in a state court may be decided one way, and a suit against the same party in the federal court, involving the very same question, may be decided the other way. As a result of these diverse rules of decision, each party to a suit engages in an unseemly struggle to get into that jurisdiction whose rules of decision are believed to be most favorable to his side of the case. It was the hope that this court would overrule the decision of the supreme court of Iowa in a similar case that caused the removal of this case into the circuit court. The class of questions as to which different rules of decision may obtain, and the federal courts may disregard the decision of the state courts thereon, has not been very clearly defined. What is said here has reference, of course, to nonfederal questions, such as the one raised in this case. As to federal questions, there is hut one rule of decision, and one court of last resort. The general statement luis been often made that the federal courts are not bound to follow the decisions of state courts on questions of general jurisprudence, when unaffected by state legislation; but no exact enumeration has ever been made, or ever can be made, of the questions that come within this general definition. Moreover, the decisions of the supreme court relating to the subject are not uniform or harmonious. The question as presented by this record is not free from doubt. It is a question upon which the court should not express an opinion, except when necessary to the decision of the case, and that necessity does not exist in this case.