Court Opinion

ID: 9697596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:22:45.113247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:01.324818
License: Public Domain

*307ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
Because the Commonwealth failed to make á good faith effort to locate the missing witness, I must conclude that admission of the witness’s prior testimony was improper under the terms of the Act of 1887 1 and impermissible under the confrontation clause of the Constitution of the United States.2 I therefore dissent.
Appellant's trial was scheduled to begin on November 13, 1972. In preparation for trial, the Commonwealth notified the grandmother of a witness, Mark Dorsey, that Mark was to testify at trial. The Commonwealth also contacted the officials at St. Michael’s School for Boys where Mark was committed and arranged to have him released to his grandmother’s custody so that he would be available to testify. On the morning of the trial, Mark’s grandmother left Mark alone for a few minutes in front of her house. He took advantage of the opportunity to run away.
The grandmother upon discovering that Mark had disappeared, proceeded to the courthouse alone. Upon reaching her destination she called her home to determine if Mark had returned. When her call went unanswered, she informed the district attorney of Mark’s flight. She later testified during trial that Mark had run away on previous occasions and that she had no idea where he might be.
Upon learning that Mark had absconded, the district attorney made no effort to contact the grandmother’s neighbors or Mark’s friends to determine if they had seen Mark or knew of his whereabouts. Nor did he ask the police to seek the witness in the neighborhood where *308he was last seen. Instead, content with the thought that he might still have Mark’s testimony introduced into evidence by reading the transcript of the prior trial into the record, the district attorney did nothing.
The use of the prior testimony of a witness who is unavailable at time of trial is permissible under the confrontation clause because the previous opportunity for cross-examination “ "afford [s] the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972), quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1936, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).3 Nevertheless, the confrontation clause requires that, where possible, the prosecution must afford the defendant an opportunity for cross-examination in which the accused may test the recollection and sift the conscience of the witness and compel him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they might judge from his words, his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). Although use of prior testimony may be permitted by the confrontation clause, it is clear that the prosecution may avail itself of this less-preferred technique only when it makes a good faith effort to secure the attendance of the witness and fails. Barber v. Page, supra (prosecution may not use prior testimony of witness incarcerated in another state where it has failed to make a good faith effort to have custody transferred to permit witness’s appearance at accused’s trial); compare Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra (prosecution may use prior testimony of witness residing in another *309country despite absence of any effort to obtain his attendance because there was no procedure by which his attendance could be compelled); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).
Similarly, in interpreting the Act of 1887, we held that prior testimony is admissible under the provisions of that statute only when a good faith effort has failed to locate the missing witness. Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975).
In the present case, upon learning that the witness had absconded, the district attorney failed to make even the most minimal efforts to find the witness.4 In Blair we stated that the Commonwealth need not prove that “the witness has disappeared from the face of the earth” in order to have his prior testimony admitted. Here, the Commonwealth failed even to try to establish that the witness had left the block where he was last seen. I cannot conclude that in this case the Commonwealth did enough to establish the necessity of limiting appellant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination. In these circumstances I cannot agree that the Commonwealth made the good faith effort necessary to comply with the terms of the statute or the dictates of the confrontation clause. I dissent.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of May 23,1887, P.L. 158, § 3, 19 P.S. § 582 (1964).

. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is made applicable to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).

. “This exception has been explained as arising from necessity and has been justified on the ground that the right of cross-examination initially afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.”
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1320, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968).

. The district attorney apparently knew of the missing witness before appellant’s non-jury trial began. Therefore the delay that might accompany an attempt to locate the witness would not have seriously stalled a trial already in progress.