Court Opinion

ID: 9702959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:34:28.169623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.174322
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my judgment the majority’s conclusion that the Commonwealth failed to comply with the mandate of Rule 1100 is unwarranted. Although I have no quarrel with the majority’s recitation of the procedural history of this needlessly protracted case, I am unable to agree that the period after the informations had been quashed and before they were reinstated must be charged against the Commonwealth. Similarly, I am unable to agree that the Commonwealth failed to establish due diligence. Therefore, I am unable to join the majority’s deci*161sion to order appellant’s discharge. For reasons hereinafter discussed, however, I would award a new trial.
On October 4, 1979, the trial court erroneously quashed informations charging Alfred Bennett with robbery and possession of an instrument of crime at the same time it properly granted a defense motion to quash informations charging Bennett with other offenses. The court rescinded its order with respect to the present charges of robbery and possessing an instrument of crime and reinstated the infor-mations on January 8, 1980. The majority charges the intervening time against the Commonwealth for Rule 1100 purposes. I disagree. I am of the opinion that the learned trial judge was correct in holding this time excludable.
In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 487 Pa. 197, 409 A.2d 308 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the time period between a refusal to indict by one grand jury and the approval of an indictment by a second grand jury was excludable for purposes of determining compliance with Rule 1100. The court stated: “Rule 1100 is an administrative method by which we seek to give substance to the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial for criminal defendants____ The speedy trial guarantee is ‘concerned with limiting the period of “anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.” ’ ” Id., 487 Pa. at 202, 409 A.2d at 310 quoting Commonwealth v. Leaming, 442 Pa. 223, 225, 275 A.2d 43, 44 (1971) and United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627, 630 (1966). In the case sub judice, as in Johnson, the defendant was, during the period when he believed the charges quashed, “totally free from any anxiety or concern regarding these charges____” Id. 487 Pa. at 203, 409 A.2d at 311.
There was here no attempt on the part of the prosecution to evade the requirements of Rule 1100. The parties appear to be in agreement that the charges were mistakenly quashed by the trial court after it had been presented with a defense motion to quash only those charges arising out of a wholly separate incident. Thus, it was the action of the trial court and not conduct, direct or indirect, by the Com*162monwealth which caused a temporary termination of the prosecution. Because there was no attempt by the prosecution to circumvent Rule 1100, the interval of time between October 4, 1979 when the charges were quashed and January 8, 1980, when the trial court reinstated them, should not be charged against the Commonwealth but should be excluded.
I must also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the record fails to support the trial court’s finding that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in bringing Bennett to trial. On February 5, 1980, Bennett failed to appear for trial; and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest on February 11, 1980. He was not found until April 30, 1980, when he showed up in the Delaware County Prison. A timely Commonwealth extension petition was scheduled for hearing and continued on five separate occasions before a series of three hearings commenced on July 16, 1980. On May 27, 1980, the first extension hearing was continued because Bennett had not been brought from prison. A second hearing, scheduled for June 6, 1980, was continued because Bennett was then on trial in Media, Delaware County. Two other continuances were made necessary because the Clerk’s file could not be found and was unavailable. On July 2, 1980, the hearing was continued at Bennett’s request. Hearings were held on July 16, July 25, and August 28, 1980. On the last date, the Honorable Lynne M. Abraham took the matter under advisement because of its complex history. The Commonwealth’s petition was granted on September 16, 1980, and the time for trial was extended for a period of sixty days. Thereafter, there was an additional extension, to which Bennett expressly agreed, until February 28, 1981. Trial commenced on February 9, 1981.
The original rúndate for Rule 1100 purposes was December 12, 1979. However, the periods between October 4, 1979 and January 8, 1980 (96 days) and from February 5, 1980 to April 30, 1980 (85 days) were excludable. This excludable time caused the run date to be moved forward to *163June 9, 1980. Although trial was thereafter delayed by the continuances of the hearing on the Commonwealth’s extension petition, such delay cannot be attributed to a lack of due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth. Two delays were traceable directly to Bennett’s motion for a continuance and to his presence in Delaware County for trial on other charges. The three remaining continuances, although unfortunate, were attributable to breakdowns in duties assigned to judicial officers and not to the prosecution. Therefore, I am forced to conclude, as did Judge Abraham, that the failure to commence trial within the time allowed by Rule 1100 was not attributable to a lack of due diligence by the Commonwealth. An extension, therefore, was properly granted.
Although I am unable to agree that Bennett is entitled to be discharged,1 I am constrained to conclude that he must be granted a new trial for at least two reasons.
The trial court initially agreed to instruct the jury in accordance with Commonwealth v. Sexton, 485 Pa. 17, 400 A.2d 1289 (1979) that a request for a pre-preliminary hearing lineup had been denied, but then refused to do so. In my opinion, Bennett was entitled to such an instruction, and it was error to refuse to give it.
The only evidence connecting Bennett to the robbery was the identification testimony of the taxi driver who had been robbed. Defense counsel moved for a lineup prior to the preliminary hearing. The motion was denied when it was represented to the court that the victim had had a good opportunity to view the robber at the time and place of the offense and had identified Bennett from a photographic display shown to him immediately following the robbery. In fact, as was determined during a pre-trial hearing and again at trial, the victim had been unable to identify Bennett following the photographic display. He could say only that Bennett “looked like the man,” but was unwilling or *164unable to make a positive identification. A prompt pre-pre-liminary hearing lineup would have provided a less suggestive setting than the one-on-one confrontation provided by the preliminary hearing.
The harm in denying the pre-preliminary hearing lineup, however, could have been cured by instructing the jury that Bennett had been “denied the opportunity for a more objective identification and for that reason the subsequent less reliable identification could be viewed with caution.” Commonwealth v. Sexton, supra, 485 Pa. at 25, 400 A.2d at 1293. The trial court ruled pre-trial and again during trial that such an instruction was appropriate and promised that the same would be given. In fact, the instruction was not given to the jury. The failure to give a Sexton charge was aggravated by the trial court’s failure to convey fully to the jury the cautionary instructions required by Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820 (1954). Such a cautionary instruction is required where the testimony of an identification witness has been weakened by a prior inability to make a positive identification. The trial court, although reciting the positive aspects of the victim’s opportunity to observe the robber, failed to instruct the jury regarding the effect of the victim’s prior inability to identify Bennett as the robber.
Bennett is also entitled to a new trial because the jury was permitted to hear irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence. Approximately three and one-half months after the robbery of the taxi driver, appellant was arrested in his apartment pursuant to a warrant charging him with a different offense. The Commonwealth, over objection, was permitted to show at trial in the instant case that when police arrived to make the arrest, appellant was found crouched and hiding in a darkened kitchen. In my judgment, Bennett’s attempt to conceal himself, without more, did not show consciousness of guilt in connection with the charges in the instant case and should not have been received for that purpose.
*165As a general rule, evidence of flight or concealment to show guilty knowledge is admissible only when the circumstances are such as to justify an inference that the accused’s actions were motivated by a belief that police officers were aware of his wrongdoing and were seeking him to prosecute therefor. The fact that the accused has been involved in other criminal activity, it has been held, affects the weight of the evidence but does not render it inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa.Super. 50, 62, 418 A.2d 605, 611 (1980). In the Rough case, however, the accused was arrested for a rape which had occurred only two days before. “The mere fact that other criminal activity occurred at about the same time[,]” said the Court, “does not warrant barring this evidence.”
However, the immediacy requirement is important. As the interval between the crime charged and the concealment expands, evidence of defendant’s knowledge that he is being sought for the crime becomes an increasingly important factor in determining whether an inference of guilt concerning the specific crime charged can properly be drawn. See: United States v. Jackson, 572 F.2d 636, 640-641 (7th Cir.1978). See also: United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1051 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847, 99 S.Ct. 147, 58 L.Ed.2d 149 (1978); United States v. White, 488 F.2d 660, 662 (8th Cir.1973). Not only was there a three and one-half month delay in the instant case, but the police in fact were not seeking appellant to arrest him for the charge for which he was tried. Thus, it is difficult to perceive the legitimacy of an inference that he concealed himself because he was conscious of guilt on the offense for which he was being tried. An inference of guilty knowledge of the specific offense for which appellant was being tried in this case was so uncertain and ambiguous and the evidence so prejudicial that, in my judgment, it should not have been received. It did nothing to establish Bennett’s guilt of the offense for which he was being tried and, therefore, was irrelevant. See: Commonwealth v. Todt, 318 Pa.Super. 55, 64-65, 464 A.2d 1226, 1230 (1983); Com*166monwealth v. Simpson, 316 Pa.Super. 115, 121-22, 462 A.2d 821, 824 (1983); Commonwealth v. Krajci, 283 Pa.Super. 488, 495, 424 A.2d 914, 917-918 (1981).
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.

. There is absolutely no merit in appellant’s additional contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the charges against him.