Court Opinion

ID: 9664147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:04:34.019052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:02.602614
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, J.
(dissenting). This writer is unable to agree with the prevailing opinion in this case. In the majority opinion it is stated as follows:
“The parties agree that the note is a negotiable instrument, MCLA 440.3104(1); MSA 19.3104(1), and that plaintiffs are holders, MCLA 440.1201.(20); MSA 19.1201(20), with a right to enforce the note in their own names, MCLA 440.3301; MSA 19.3301. As the signatures on the note are not in dispute, plaintiffs are entitled to recover by merely producing the note. MCLA 440.3307(2); MSA 19.3307(2). This plaintiffs did during the direct examination of Jack Behrens. This is all plaintiffs were required to do.”
Pertinent to the issue before the Court is the following statute:
“Want or failure of consideration is a defense as against any person not having the rights of a holder in due course (section 3305).” MCLA 440.3408; MSA 19.3408.
*431For further light on the law, we turn to 18 Callaghan’s Michigan Civil Jurisprudence, Negotiable Instruments, § 34, pp 341-342, which reads as follows:
“Section 30 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that absence or failure of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due course; and partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise. As between the original parties, a promissory note must be supported by a sufficient consideration, and, as between such parties, the consideration of a note may always be inquired into. A want of consideration may always be shown in defense to an action upon the note between the original parties.”1
This writer points out that in this case the defendants did assert the defense of no consideration. It is obvious that there was no consideration for this particular note because there was no contract between plaintiffs and defendants upon which the consideration for the note could be based.
Mr. Jack Behrens, one of the plaintiffs, testified on cross-examination in part as follows:
“Q. Now, Mr. Behrens, the construction itself was done by the Behrens Construction Company, correct?
“A. Yes, it was.
“Q. Yet the note on the alleged indebtedness from Mr. and Mrs. Apessos runs to you and your wife?
“A. Yes, it does.
“Q. Your wife is not a stockholder of this company, is she?
“A. No, she is not a stockholder.
“Q. Who else is a stockholder other than yourself?
“A. Donald Gr. Johnson.
“Q. Who is Donald Gr. Johnson?
“A. My superintendent.
*432“Q. What percentage ownership does he have?
“A. A small percent. I believe five percent.”
From the foregoing testimony it is evident that Mrs. Behrens is not a stockholder of the corporation, that Mr. Behrens is not the only stockholder, and there is no allegation or proof in the record to show that Mr. and Mrs. Behrens were acting as agents for the corporation.
The note here in question was between the plaintiffs, as individuals, and the defendants. The Behrens Construction Company was not, in any way, a party to it. The consideration for the note could only be based upon the contract between the Behrens Construction Company and the defendants. There was no showing of any consideration based upon a business relationship of any kind between the defendants and the individual plaintiffs. There is no allegat: n that the plaintiffs agreed to pay the money to be received on the note to the Behrens Construction Company or if paid that they would have done so. Therefore, the payment of this note by defendants would not, in any manner, discharge any debt which may or may not be owed' to the Behrens Construction Company.
Based upon the evidence in the record, the trial judge was justified in his finding that there was a lack of consideration for the giving of the note.
The prevailing opinion cites the case of Levitz v Capitol Savings & Loan Co, 267 Mich 92 (1934), as dispositive of the issue before the Court. However, this writer points out that the facts in that case are not analogous to those present in the instant case. Therein the promisee agreed to pay the principal and in fact did so. That case being distinguishable on the facts is not applicable herein.
I would affirm with costs to the defendants.

 Present applicable statute is: MCLA 440.3306(b), (e); MSA 19.3306(b), (c).