Court Opinion

ID: 9471692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:38:59.741141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:32.325270
License: Public Domain

GEE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In colorful if inapposite language, the majority describes defendants as “wretches in Dante’s hell,” “clawing into each other with antagonistic defenses.” While the defenses are to some extent antagonistic, in sober fact they are not antagonistic to the point of being irreconcilable or mutually exclusive. Since this is what our authorities require for severance, I dissent from the reversal of defendants’ convictions.
In our Circuit, antagonistic defenses among defendants require severance only if the defenses are antagonistic to the point of being mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir.1981). The defense of a defendant reaches such a level of antagonism “if the jury, in order to believe the core testimony offered on behalf of that defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony offered on behalf of his co-defendant.” Id. at 1134.
Here no such core considerations prevented the jury from believing Vertucci’s defense (that he was robbed by two unidentified men) and that of Romanello and Mendez (that they had innocently accepted a job to drive the gold to New York). Their defenses were not of their nature irreconcilable or mutually exclusive. Consequently, severance was not required under Berkow-itz.
The majority, however, determines that the statements of Vertucci’s counsel have effectively identified Romanello and Mendez as the persons who robbed Vertucci. Consequently, the majority finds that the core of Vertucci’s defense is that he was robbed of the gold by his co-defendants. The majority goes beyond Berkowitz in inferring from the record that Vertucci identified Romanello and Mendez and that this constitutes the core of his defense. The core of Vertucci’s defense was that he was robbed. Statements that merely imply that Romanello and Mendez perpetrated that robbery are clearly “minor or peripheral matters which are not at the core of his defense,” Berkowitz at 1134: what matter who robbed Vertucci if he was in fact robbed? Berkowitz presented a similar situation: both defendants, accused of a cocaine conspiracy, attempted to minimize their own involvement and to cast the other as the more active participant. Id. at 1132. We held that the core of their defenses was noninvolvement in the criminal activity even though, as here, each implied that the other was guilty. Like these, at their core the defenses of Vertucci, Romanello and Mendez are quite consistent.
Moreover, even had the identity of Ver-tucci’s robbers pertained to the core of his defense, as it clearly does not, the statements of Vertucci’s lawyer did not so sufficiently implicate Romanello and Mendez as to require severance. It is undisputed that at no point during the trial did either Ver-tucci or his counsel ever directly accuse Romanello or Mendez of robbing Vertucci. The majority concludes, however, that Ver-*183tucci’s lawyer identified Romanello and Mendez as the robbers through insinuations in his opening statement to the jury and in testimony elicited in cross-examination of various witnesses.
We have held, however, that implied accusations of a defendant made during the opening statement of a co-defendant’s counsel do not render defenses so. sufficiently antagonistic as to compel severance. United States v. Mota, 598 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir.1979), cert, denied sub nom, Flores v. United States, 444 U.S. 1084,100 S.Ct. 1042, 62 L.Ed.2d 770 (1980). In Mota, counsel for defendant Flores noted that, as to his client, the evidence would probably show what the government contended.1 The co-defendant Mota argued that this opening statement required severance, for if the evidence showed what the government contended as to Flores, it would also establish the guilt of Mota. We held that Mota was not prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion for severance because the trial judge had instructed the jury that the comments of counsel were not evidence and could not be considered as such. Similar instructions were given in this trial, both before the opening statement was made2 and at the end of trial.3 Since the jury was instructed not to rely on the statements of counsel as evidence, the statements are insufficient to implicate Romanello or Mendez.
The majority also suggests that Mendez and Romanello did not receive a fair trial because in cross-examination Vertucci’s counsel elicited testimony that the state had indicted Romanello and Mendez for robbing and kidnapping Vertucci. This testimony was, however, balanced by testimony that the indictments against Romanello and Mendez were dismissed and hence was insufficiently prejudicial to prevent a fair trial. The jury need not have believed that Vertucci was accusing his co-defendants of robbing and kidnapping him.
The majority opinion radically expands the concept of core defense to include not only the essence of a defense (Vertucci was robbed), but also any elaboration of that defense devised by counsel’s ingenuity that could possibly implicate a co-defendant (Vertucci was robbed by Romanello and Mendez). As this result is not compelled by precedent in this field and seems to me both unfortunate and unnecessary, I respectfully dissent.

. Flores relied on the insanity defense.

. Trial record, vol. 9, 12-13.

. Id., vol. 15, 222.