Court Opinion

ID: 9676642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:29:20.219807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:50.040088
License: Public Domain

DRAUGHN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I find the majority opinion strains to overemphasize the legal significance of the term “wherever located.” I cannot conceive of a more inclusive description of property defined as being of “every kind and nature, wherever located, now or hereafter belonging to the Mortgagor.” (emphasis added). To me “every kind and nature” encompasses the universe for property inclusion, both tangible and intangible. And when it is coupled with possible future acquisition by the term “now or hereafter belonging,” the all-encompassing description is complete. The term “wherever located” merely covers possible tangible property and does not, in my opinion, presume that all the security must have a physical form and be located in some physical space. Otherwise, why *595use the term “of every kind and nature?” It would be superfluous.
Clearly the term “hereafter belonging to Mortgagor” contained in the security agreement would extend it to after acquired property of whatever “kind and nature” to be received by the debtor Stephens. The amounts due under the BFI agreement are surely not so ephemeral as to exist somewhere outside the definition of “every kind and nature.” I would find they are covered under the Orix security agreement, and since it is prior in filing to that of OmniBank, it prevails.
Accordingly, I would reverse and render, granting the summary judgment of Orix.