Court Opinion

ID: 9766531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:52:14.884354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:23.616478
License: Public Domain

*368Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I am unable to agree with the granting of a new trial in this case for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 570, 222 A. 2d 713, 716 (1966).
In its initial opinion the court below denied appellee’s motion for a new trial because of the absence of prejudicial error. However, after reading the statement in Gould v. Argiro, 422 Pa. 433, 220 A. 2d 654 (1966) that any communication in the absence of counsel between judge and jury “requires a new trial regardless of prejudice,” the trial court granted the motion. While I believe the result in Argiro was correct, I do feel that the quoted language is both unfortunate and an incorrect statement of the law and wish to disassociate myself from the reasoning of that opinion. See Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 570, 222 A. 2d 713, 716 (1966) (concurring opinion) ; cf. Heck v. Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140, 226 A. 2d 87 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinion) ; Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 7, 220 A. 2d 634, 636 (1966) (concurring opinion) ; Commonwealth v. Kulik, 420 Pa. 111, 114, 216 A. 2d 73, 74 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
“The reason for prohibiting a trial judge from communicating with a jury ex parte is to prevent the court from unduly influencing the jury and to afford counsel an opportunity to become aware and to seek to correct any error which might occur. Where there is no showing either that the court’s action may have influenced the jury or that its directions were erroneous, then the reason for the rule dissolves.” Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, supra at 572, 222 A. 2d at 716. No such showing has been made in the instant case. The trial court’s written answer to the jury’s inquiry was unquestionably complete and correct as given; it undoubtedly would have been precisely the same had *369counsel been present. Moreover, not only would any objection have been without merit but also this Court would not have disturbed the court’s discretion on this ruling.
Ironically the majority’s view on prejudicial error in a criminal case where the trial judge actually expresses his view as to ivhat the verdict should be, Avith which I also disagree, is far less stringent even though the danger resulting from this improper judicial practice is far more real than has been shown to be the case here. See Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Rundle, 423 Pa. 93, 223 A. 2d 88 (1966).
In my Anew the majority’s action constitutes an unnecessary reproach to the trial judge, creates an undue hardship on the appellant, and is an unneeded addition to the trial courts’ ever increasing backlog.
I dissent.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Musmanno join in this dissenting opinion.