Court Opinion

ID: 9768855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:53:15.782106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:38.644506
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
Today, the majority overturns appellant’s conviction but not before it (1) redefines the Penal Code definition of “habitation” and (2) acts as a thirteenth juror to reevaluate the evidence presented at appellant’s trial.
I. REDEFINING “HABITATION”
The evidence established that appellant, Elmer Dwayne Blankenship, burglarized a structure at which time he took an air conditioning unit, a lawn chair and a gasoline container. This was uncontested. Appellant, however, did contest in the Court of Appeals that the structure he burglarized was a “habitation” as that term is defined in Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 30.01(1). See Blankenship v. State, 715 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1986).
Burglary of a habitation is a first degree felony, while burglary of a building is a second degree felony. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 30.02. “Habitation” and “building” are defined in Section 30.01, supra:
“(1) ‘Habitation’ means a structure or vehicle that is adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons, and includes:
“(A) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and
“(B) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle.
“(2) ‘Building’ means any enclosed structure intended for use or occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament, or use.”
In Jones v. State, 532 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), this Court set forth a test to be applied in determining whether a structure is a habitation. Uncontent with the Penal Code definition of “habitation” this Court added to the Code’s definition “that the structure or vehicle must at the time of the alleged offense have been actually ‘adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons’ or at least at some prior time used for the overnight accommodation of persons and still ‘adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons.’ ” 532 S.W.2d at 600. (emphasis added).
The Jones Court rationalized this interpretation of the statute with two theories: First, the Court stated that the traditional purpose for holding that a burglar of a habitation should receive a higher penalty than a burglar of a building is to protect private homes. Therefore, the definition of the term “adapted” should be construed in a manner consistent with this policy. Rejecting the traditional, general definition of the term “adapted” (“capable of use” or “made suitable”)1 as too broad, the Jones Court concluded that “the legislature [did not] intended ... to make a ‘habitation’ out *203of every structure or vehicle that could be converted in the future into overnight accommodation of persons or was ‘capable of use as such.’ ” 532 S.W.2d at 600.
Second, the Jones Court attempted to harmonize the definition of “habitation” with the definition of the term “building.” The Court reasoned that since the definition of “building” was a structure intended for use as a “habitation,” then naturally “habitation” could not have the same meaning. Therefore, a habitation had to . be something more than just a place capable of being used as an overnight accommodation or intended to be used as an overnight accommodation.
Thereafter, in Moss v. State, 574 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the Jones ’definition of habitation was perpetuated. We had to emphasize, however, that the structure in question (a house) “was not still adapted for the overnight accommodations of persons.” 574 S.W.2d at 545 (emphasis in the original).2
Our interpretation of “habitation” did not work in Hargett v. State, 534 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). The property involved was a house which the landlord had rented but which the new tenants had not yet occupied. We stated:
“In the instant case, we conclude that the testimony of the owner Clark is sufficient to prove that the house was a habitation when burglarized. It has been rented complete with furniture so that it certainly was adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons. The record is silent as to any utilities. This house was not shown to be a new one which had never been lived in, but one of several houses which Clark ‘rented periodically.’ Clark thought that the tenant Poland had moved some things into the house and after the burglary asked him if ‘he had anything missing.’ Poland’s [This probably should be Clark’s] answer was struck from the record on appellant’s objection.
“The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction.” 534 S.W.2d at 911. (Emphasis added).
Jones was cited in Hargett but no attempts were made to distinguish the Jones’ holding that the structure in question must have been “actually adapted and still adapted” as a habitation.
Some of the Courts of Appeals have resolved cases based upon whether the facts presented were more akin to Jones or to Hargett. The results have not been uniform. Compare Bazroux v. State, 634 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.); Lewis v. State, 631 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no pet.); Trotter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no pet.) (following Har-gett ), with Chandler v. State, 743 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (following Jones, criticizing Blankenship ).3
*204The majority’s holding, relying upon Jones, that “the structure must have been adopted for and at the time of the offense be fit for accommodation overnight,” Opinion p. 200, improperly construes the statute. The inquiry should be whether a reasonable person would find that the structure was adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons. While belongings in the house could be a relevant consideration, the critical inquiry according to the statutory definition should concern the structure itself. Both the majority and Jones have misconstrued and incorrectly applied Section 30.01(1) of the Penal Code.
Jones should be overruled. Its holding that “if the definition of a ‘building’ as a structure intended for use or occupation as a habitation can have any meaning, a structure or vehicle intended to be used as a residence or a dwelling,” is backwards with respect to legislative intent. Instead of limiting the definition of habitation by including “intended for use as a habitation” in the definition of building, it is for more likely that the Legislature wanted to avoid situations which might slip through the two definitions. For example, if the “intended for use as a habitation” language was not included in the definition of building, a burglary of a house which is being built, but not yet completed, would fit neither definition. It is unreasonable to conclude that giving meaning to the words “intended for use” would in any way limit the definition of a structure “adapted for use as a habitation.”
I agree with the Jones perception that a burglary of a habitation should be more severely punished than a burglar of a building, but I cannot agree that the term “adapted” should be construed consistent only with this policy. Prevention of crime is as much a goal as punishment. V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.02(1)(A). As such, and as in this case, a burglar should not be rewarded with an acquittal whenever the structure, which from all outward appearances is adapted for the overnight accommodations of persons, is presently uninhabited for reasons beyond the burglar’s control. It is significant that courts in other jurisdictions with similarly worded statutes have not construed these statutes as the majority does. See People v. Sheirod, 124 A.D.2d 14, 510 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dept.1987); State v. Albert, 426 A.2d 1370 (Me.1981); Hamilton v. State, 354 So.2d 27 (Ala.Crim.App.1977). Indeed, we so construed the statute in the Hargett opinion.
Moreover, as long as the majority perpetuates a nonpenal code definition of habitation, this and other appellate courts will face similar convictions. When the jury deliberates it has before it the definition of “habitation” as found in the Penal Code. No one instructs them, and no one is authorized to instruct them, that “adapt” found in the Penal Code definition of habitation means anything but “capable of use.”
II. THE THIRTEENTH JUROR
There is a more serious problem with the majority’s holding. After the majority redefines “habitation” it undertakes to review the evidence not in the light most favorable to the verdict but as a thirteenth juror who does not understand that a hovel is as much a home as a mansion. The majority writes:
“A house with ‘two bedrooms’ — but no beds — is hardly fit to accommodate persons overnight. That it is wired for electricity will not provide electrical energy for lights and other appliances such as an air conditioner until a meter is installed. Having water available by turning on the main at a water meter outside may be handy in daytime, but not overnight — unless coming out of faucets and taps inside, the water is visible in the dark.” Slip opinion, p. 201.
*205In short, the majority members view the belongings of the house as inadequate for their comfort and proceed to find the evidence insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
The Court of Appeals, in this case, however, did not look merely at the contents of the structure when it deferred to the jury’s finding. That court wrote:
“Since the jury here found the rent house to be a habitation, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to this finding. [Citations omitted.] Our review of the evidence reveals that the rent house had bedrooms, a kitchen, and a living room, and that it was wired for electricity and had a water connection. Jay Weeks [the owner] testified that he had rented the house to tenants in the past and intended to do so in the future. He stated further, without objection, that the house was adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons.... [W]e conclude that the jury had ample evidence from which to conclude that the rent house was a habitation.” Blankenship, 715 S.W.2d at 133.
The Court of Appeals is correct, the majority is not; whether a structure is or is not “adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons” is a question of fact to be resolved in the trial court by the trier of fact. See generally, Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Tuner v. State, 28 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.Cr.App.1930); Dowling v. State, 317 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.Cr.App.1958).
Thus, the issue on appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In Jackson, the Supreme Court wrote:
“[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt_ [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-319, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573-574 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis in the original).4
In this case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury, without objection, that “ ‘Habitation’ means a structure or vehicle that is adapted for the overnight accomodation (sic) of persons.” The jury was also instructed that “a ‘building’ is any enclosed structure intended for use or occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament or use.” Both of these instructions comport with those provided by the Penal Code in the section on burglary.
The jury found appellant guilty of burglary of a habitation. The evidence adduced at trial established that the structure: (1) was a house once lived in by the complainant, (2) is now rented from time to time, (3) has two bedrooms, and (4) is wired for electricity and has water readily available. Among the items stolen was an air conditioning unit (one of two in the house) which the jury could reasonably have assumed was for the comfort of persons who may have occupied in the past or will in the future occupy the house. Moreover, the owner of the house testified that the structure was adapted for the overnight accommodations of persons. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s determination of guilt even if one uses the Jones’ definition of habitation. It is clearly sufficient if one uses the Penal Code definition.
Jones should be overruled and the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed; because the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
W.C. DAVIS and WHITE, JJ, join in this dissent.

. See Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 34 (5th Ed. 1979). See also Random House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 16 (1967); Balintine's Law Dictionary, p. 26 (3rd Ed.1969).

. The majority now emphasizes the word “overnight,” writing that “the structure must have been adapted for and at the time of the offense be fit for accommodation "overnight." Opinion p. 200. The Jones' term "still,” emphasized in Moss, is not even found in the Penal Code’s definition of "habitation." With each successive case the Court strays further from the Code’s original definition.

. In Lewis, the property was a large one-bedroom apartment. While the opinion contains no other facts about the apartment, the stolen property included a portable radio, a television set, microwave oven, and jacket. The Court found sufficient evidence to conclude the structure was a habitation.
In Bazroux, the owner of the house was temporarily out of the country on a twenty-eight day business tour, the kitchen was completely equipped, and the house contained furnish-mgs. The electricity was operating. The Court stated, "Nothing in the record indicates that the premises was in a condition other than one of suitability for the owner’s resumption of normal life upon his return from the periodic travel required in his employment.” 634 S.W.2d at 921. The conviction for burglary of a habitation was sustained. Trotter involved a mobile home which had furniture and household items with the utilities available, but the sewer line was disconnected. The Court of Appeals held this to be habitation although no one lived in the mobile home at the time of the offense. It had formerly been occupied.
In Chandler, the Court of Appeals noted that the logic in Blankenship appeared to conflict with the requirement in Jones, that the premises actually be adapted, and still be adapted, for the overnight accommodation of persons. "Blankenship focusses (sic) more on the sub*204jective character of the premises than on the objective features showing adaptation. Jones, Moss and Hargett all seem to focus on the actual ability of a person to inhabit the premises in the condition which the burglar found the premises. What the structure appeared to be from the outside is irrelevant." 743 S.W.2d at 738. The Corpus Christi court, therefore, held that "[wjhile the apartment in the present case may have been intended for overnight accommodation, and may have been so used in the past, at the time appellant entered the apartment it was not actually so adapted.” Id. at 739.

. Jackson, the seminal case dealing with sufficiency of evidence, is not cited in the majority opinion probably because it does not fit into the majority’s scheme to reevaluate evidence.