Court Opinion

ID: 9614079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:22:11.588236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:57.836773
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J.,Concurring and Dissenting.
—I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert evidence offered by the prosecution, but I cannot join in the majority’s analysis of the trial court’s ruling on the good character evidence proffered by defendant or, in particular, in the conclusion that the trial court’s error in excluding much of this evidence was not prejudicial. Past California decisions have repeatedly recognized that in cases of this nature, in which a defendant is accused of a sexual offense against a child and the jury’s determination necessarily turns on the relative credibility of the defendant and the alleged child victim, a defendant’s right to introduce evidence of his good moral character is of crucial importance. Such evidence may be the only, or at least the most significant, evidence that an innocent defendant can present to support his own denial of the offense. As a consequence, the authorities suggest that in this context the erroneous exclusion of such good character evidence generally cannot be found harmless. This general principle has particular force in the present case because the record discloses that this was a much more closely balanced case than the majority opinion allows. Given the nature of the trial court’s error and the state of the evidence, I believe that reversal is clearly required.
I
In analyzing the trial court’s ruling, it is helpful to begin with a brief overview of the general rules governing character evidence in criminal proceedings. (See generally Wydick, Character Evidence: A Guided Tour of the Grotesque Structure (1987) 21 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 123.) In California, as in virtually all jurisdictions in this country, the prosecution in a criminal case *1314is not permitted to present evidence of the bad character of the defendant to prove that the defendant committed the charged offense unless and until the accused presents evidence of his own good character. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1101, subd. (a), 1102, subd. (b).) The defendant, on the other hand, is specifically authorized by statute to present good character evidence in any criminal case. (See Evid. Code, § 1102, subd. (a).)
In Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469 [93 L.Ed. 168, 69 S.Ct. 213], the leading United States Supreme Court decision on the subject, Justice Jackson explained the basis for permitting a defendant to introduce such good character evidence: “[The] line of inquiry firmly denied to the State is opened to the defendant because character is relevant in resolving probabilities of guilt. He m ay introduce affirmative testimony that the general estimate of his character is so favorable that the jury may infer that he would not be likely to commit the offense charged. This privilege is sometimes valuable to a defendant for this Court has held that such testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.... [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 476 [93 L.Ed. at p. 174], fn. omitted. See also People v. Jones (1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 223-224 [266 P.2d 38].)
Although it has sometimes been suggested that the sharp distinction between the right of the defendant and that of the prosecution to open the inquiry into the defendant’s character is attributable to the law’s traditional solicitude for the criminal defendant and to the extremely prejudicial nature of bad character evidence, a leading textbook maintains that the disparate rules also reflect the relative probative value of good character evidence as compared to bad character evidence: “Evidence that the criminal defendant has a bad character may show his capacity to engage in crime but is little proof that he was involved in the particular crime charged, while proof of his good character puts him in a class of people who are highly unlikely to engage in criminal conduct. We admit the latter, not merely because it is less prejudicial to the defendant, but because it is much more probative of guilt or innocence.” (22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure (1978) § 5236, p.381.)
Although good character evidence may be more probative of guilt or innocence than bad character evidence, it is important to recognize that good character evidence, of even the most positive and probative sort, does not purport to establish conclusively that the defendant could not have committed the charged offense. “[Ó]ne should not ignore the fact that persons of good character may commit a criminal act. The fact that they usually do not do so, or probably do not do so, only makes it improbable, not impossible, for the defendant to have committed the act.” (Boiler, Proof of the Defendant's Character (1974) 64 Mil. L. Rev. 37, 44.) Nonetheless, as *1315the quoted passage from Michelson v. United States, supra, 335 U.S. 469, 476 [93 L.Ed. 168, 174], explains, a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jurors consider such probabilities in determining whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense.
It is also relevant to keep in mind that a defendant’s introduction of good character evidence is by no means a risk-free proposition. “Two grave risks face the criminal defendant who chooses to . . . offer[] evidence of her good character. The first and most serious risk . . . arises when the prosecutor cross-examines the defendant’s character witnesses. . . . [W]hen cross-examining either a reputation or opinion witness, the prosecutor can inquire about specific acts in the defendant’s past to assess the value of the reputation or opinion testimony. . . . [Although in] theory, the trier of fact cannot use the prosecutor’s questions about specific acts as evidence that the acts occurred . . . [and] upon request, the defendant is entitled to a limiting jury instruction^] ... [it is well recognized] that jurors probably cannot follow a judge’s instruction not to use the question and responses about specific acts as evidence that the acts did occur. . . . The second risk is [that] . . . the prosecutor can call rebuttal witnesses to testify that the defendant’s character is bad. As Justice Jackson explained in Michelson, a part of ‘[t]he price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him.’ ” (Wydick, Character Evidence: A Guided Tour of the Grotesque Structure, supra, 21 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 123, 144-149, fns. and citations omitted.) Accordingly, as the Court of Appeal explained in People v. Pangelina (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [199 Cal.Rptr. 916]: “For [these] reason[s], most experienced criminal lawyers do not present character evidence unless their client’s reputation is unassailable.”
In sum, the right of a criminal defendant to present good character evidence is an important, and at times even a crucial, right, but the consequences that flow from a defendant’s decision to open up the subject of character make the right most valuable to those whose character or reputation is unimpeachable.
II
As the majority indicate, defendant proposed to present evidence of his good character with respect to two separate traits—(1) his character for truthfulness and veracity and (2) his good moral character with regard to sexual matters. The trial court ruled that if defendant testified, he could present evidence of his good reputation for truth and veracity. At the same *1316time, however, the court rejected the proposed testimony relating to defendant’s good moral character with regard to sexual matters.
In analyzing the trial court’s ruling on the latter point, the majority note that defendant set forth a summary of the proposed testimony in a written offer of proof. The majority opinion is critical of the wording of defendant’s offer of proof, yet it never quotes the offer of proof in full, but instead proceeds to divide the offer of proof into discrete segments and to analyze each segment separately. I believe the majority’s analysis obscures the governing legal principles and results in a distorted view of defendant’s offer of proof.
Instead of parsing defendant’s offer of proof into distinct segments, we should begin by identifying, first, the particular “character or trait of character” of which defendant was entitled to present evidence, and, second, the general kinds of evidence defendant could produce to prove such character trait. Once these general principles are understood, we will have an appropriate basis for assessing defendant’s offer of proof.
As to the initial point—the particular trait of character that is relevant when a defendant is charged with a sex offense against a child—the majority opinion ultimately recognizes that in this type of case a defendant is entitled to present evidence of his “good moral character,” it being understood that, in this context, “moral” refers to sexual morality. (See ante, maj. opn., p. 1311.) While the majority opinion discusses the point only very briefly, the brevity of that discussion should not obscure the fact that it is well established, in California and throughout the country, that a defendant charged with a sex offense is entitled to present evidence of his “good moral character.” (See, e.g., People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d 219, 222; People v. Castillo (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 194, 198 [42 P.2d 682]; Knorr v. State (1987) 103 Nev. 604 [748 P.2d 1, 2-3 & fn. 2]; State v. Miller (Utah 1985) 709 P.2d 350, 354; Thomas v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 1984) 669 S.W.2d 420, 423; State v. Davis (1950) 231 N.C. 664 [58 S.E.2d 355]; State v. Baldanzo (1930) 148 N.J.L. 498 [148 A. 725, 67 A.L.R. 1207]. See generally Note, Have You Heard? Cross-Examination of a Criminal Defendant's Good Character Witness: A Proposal for Reform (1976) 9 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 365, 368-369, fn. 17; Mauet, Reputation Evidence in Criminal Trials (1976) 58 Chi.B.Rec. 72, 72-73.) As these numerous authorities demonstrate, just as a defendant may present evidence of his “honest” character to raise a doubt of whether he committed a charged embezzlement, or evidence of his “peaceable” or “nonviolent” character to counter a charge of assault, a defendant who is charged with a sex offense against an adult or a child has always been permitted to present evidence of his “good moral character” for the jury’s *1317consideration in determining whether there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
As to the second point—the kinds of evidence that a defendant may produce to prove that he or she possesses such a character trait—the answer is clearly provided in the Law Revision Comment accompanying Evidence Code section 1102. That comment explains: “The three kinds of evidence that might be offered to prove character as circumstantial evidence of conduct are: (1) evidence as to reputation, (2) opinion evidence as to character, and (3) evidence of specific acts indicating character.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 1102, p. 13.) With respect to reputation and opinion evidence, the comment states: “Reputation evidence. Reputation evidence is the ordinary means sanctioned by the cases for proving character as circumstantial evidence of conduct. [Citations.] Both Sections 1102 and 1103 codify the existing law permitting character to be proved by reputation. [](] Opinion evidence. There is recent authority for the admission of opinion evidence to prove character as circumstantial evidence of conduct. [Citation.] However, opinion evidence generally has been held inadmissible. [Citations.] []f] The general rule under existing law excludes the most reliable form of character evidence and admits the least reliable. The opinions of those whose personal intimacy with a person gives them firsthand knowledge of that person’s character are a far more reliable indication of that character than is reputation, which is little more than accumulated hearsay. [Citation.] The danger of collateral issues seems no greater than that inherent in reputation evidence. Accordingly, both Section 1102 and Section 1103 permit character to be proved by opinion evidence.” {Ibid.) With respect to evidence of specific acts, on the other hand, the comment explains that section 1102 codifies the preexisting rule precluding the use of such evidence to prove the defendant’s character. (29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code, § 1102, supra, at pp. 13-14.) Thus, as this comment makes clear, Evidence Code section 1102 specifically authorizes a defendant to establish his character through either reputation evidence or opinion evidence, and the opinion evidence which the comment specifically commends as the “most reliable form of character evidence” is “[t]he opinions of those whose personal intimacy with a person gives them firsthand knowledge of that person’s character . . . .” (29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code, § 1102, supra, at p. 13.)
When defendant’s offer of proof is viewed against the background of these general principles, it becomes clear, in my view, that all of the evidence defendant proposed to introduce was properly admissible as good character *1318evidence. I set forth the offer of proof in its entirety in a footnote.1 Read as a whole, the offer indicates that defendant intended to call three lay witnesses to testify as to his good moral character with regard to sexual matters, sets forth each witness’s long and close personal relationship with the defendant, and indicates that the witnesses were prepared to testify on the basis of their own opinion and of their knowledge of defendant’s reputation in the community. As we have seen, this is precisely the kind of good character evidence that is admissible in a case of this nature under Evidence Code section 1102.
Instead of reading the offer of proof as a whole, however, the majority treat it as if it were, in effect, four distinct offers of proof—(1) an offer to prove defendant’s normal or nondeviant sexuality based on the lay witnesses’ observations of defendant with adult women, (2) an offer to prove defendant’s nonlewd disposition towards children based on the lay witnesses’ observations of defendant with children, (3) an offer to have the lay witnesses testify to the bare, conclusory opinion that defendant has a high moral character, and (4) an offer to present evidence of defendant’s reputation in the community for sexual normalcy. Viewing the offer of proof in this disjointed fashion, the majority ultimately conclude that the trial court erred in excluding items (2), (3), and (4), but properly excluded item (1). The majority defend the trial court’s exclusion of this portion of the *1319proposed testimony on the ground that the lay opinion testimony encompassed in item (1) was not based on the witnesses’ “own perception” as required by Evidence Code section 800, subdivision (a).
In my view, the majority’s conclusion on this latter point is flawed on a number of grounds. First, as already indicated, the majority’s basic error lies in the failure to read the offer of proof as a whole. When the offer of proof is viewed in its entirety, it is clear that defendant was simply proposing to call three close friends to testify that he was a person of good moral character with regard to sexual matters, i.e., that it would have been out of character for him to have committed the sexual offense with which he was charged. Defendant did not make separate offers of proof with regard to the witnesses’ observations of defendant with adults and with children; rather, the single offer of proof was intended to show that the proposed witnesses were close and longtime friends of defendant who had had the opportunity personally to observe him in many social settings, both with adults and with children, and that, on the basis of those observations, the witnesses were of the opinion that defendant’s general character was inconsistent with having committed the sexual offense of which he was accused.
In context, it seems evident that the proposed testimony by the lay witnesses that, in their opinion, defendant was not “sexually deviant,” was not intended as a clinical, psychological diagnosis; the witnesses, after all, were clearly to be called as lay witnesses. Instead, the proposed testimony, reasonably interpreted, was simply another way of phrasing the witnesses’ opinion that defendant was a person of good moral character with regard to sexual matters, that is, a person whose character was inconsistent with sexually molesting a young girl. Because, as the majority recognize, defendant was unquestionably entitled to introduce lay opinion testimony as to his good or high moral character, I conclude that all of the testimony embodied in the offer of proof was properly admissible as evidence of defendant’s good moral character.
Second, even if it were proper to view this portion of the offer of proof in isolation, the record clearly belies the majority’s conclusion that the trial court could properly exclude the proposed testimony as not based on the witnesses’ “own perception.” The offer of proof leaves no doubt that the proposed opinion testimony was to be based on the personal perceptions and observations of each of the witnesses. Each of the two female witnesses was a personal friend of the defendant who had dated him over a relatively lengthy period of time and had had an intimate sexual relationship with him; the male witness was also a close personal friend who had known defendant over many years, had double-dated with him on many occasions and knew many of the women defendant had dated. Each of the witnesses *1320had formed her or his opinion as to defendant’s character on the basis of the witness’s personal experience with defendant in different settings over a considerable period of time. Thus, the proposed testimony clearly rested on the “personal perceptions” of the witnesses. None of the cases cited by the majority even remotely supports their contrary conclusion.
Although the majority purport to rely on the theory that the proposed witnesses’ testimony was not based on their “own perceptions,” in reality the majority’s conclusion appears to rest on the quite distinct proposition that a lay witness whose opinion of a defendant’s character is based only on observations of the defendant’s conduct with adults cannot properly give character testimony which is relevant to a charge that the defendant engaged in deviant sexual conduct with a child. That proposition, however, is inconsistent with the basic principle that evidence of a defendant’s good moral character is admissible when a defendant is charged with a sex offense against a child. Past decisions have routinely approved the admissibility of good moral character testimony in such cases without inquiring whether the good character witnesses had personal knowledge of the defendant’s conduct with children as well as with adults. (See, e.g., People v. Wrigley (1968) 69 Cal.2d 149, 153-154, 165-166 [70 Cal.Rptr. 116, 443 P.2d 580]; People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d 219, 222; People v. Anthony (1921) 185 Cal. 152, 156 [196 P. 47]; People v. Hurd (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 865, 877-880 [85 Cal.Rptr. 718]; People v. Ray (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 182, 187 [9 Cal.Rptr. 678]; People v. Neal (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 765, 767 [194 P.2d 57].) These decisions implicitly recognize that it would be improbable or unlikely for a person of a. good moral character to commit a sex offense against either an adult or a child. Thus, just as a witness who has formed an opinion as to a banker’s character for honesty on the basis of his or her observation of the banker’s handling of depositors’ funds is permitted to testify to the banker’s honest character if the banker faces a charge of shoplifting from a department store, so may a witness testify to a defendant’s general good moral character with regard to sexual matters even if the witness’s opinion does not rest on observations of the defendant under the same specific circumstances as the alleged offense.
To be sure, the prosecution would be entitled to counter such evidence with the kind of expert testimony that the prosecution in fact presented in this case, advising the jury that a person who has normal sexual relationships with adults may commit lewd and lascivious acts with a child. But the fact that the prosecution may be able to present reasons for the jury to discount the probative value of a defendant’s good character evidence does not justify the trial court in excluding the evidence altogether. The majority have cited no case, and my own research has disclosed none, which suggests that a witness’s testimony as to a defendant’s good moral character may be *1321excluded unless the witness has personal knowledge of the defendant’s conduct with children.
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly excluded the opinion testimony of the proffered witnesses insofar as it rested on the witnesses’ observations of defendant with adults, rather than with children. In my view, defendant was entitled to present to the jury all of the good character evidence that he offered at trial.
Ill
The majority correctly conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of the two female witnesses (1) that defendant was a person of high moral character, (2) that he did not have a reputation in the community for being sexually attracted to young girls, and (3) that, based on their observations of his conduct with their daughters, he is not a person who is disposed to lustful or lewd conduct with children. The majority go on, however, to hold that the error was not prejudicial. I disagree with this holding, even if the majority have correctly determined the extent of the trial court’s error.
While good character evidence may be valuable to a person accused of any crime, past California cases have recognized the unique importance of good character evidence in a case such as this, in which there is no physical evidence to which an innocent defendant can point to disprove the serious child molestation charge that has been made against him and in which his vehement denial of the accusation can easily be dismissed by the jury as self-serving.
In People v. Adams (1939) 14 Cal.2d 154, 167-168 [93 P.2d 146], our court spoke at some length of the importance of scrupulously protecting the rights of an accused in a case of this nature, explaining in part: “In such a situation, the only defense available, ordinarily, to the accused is his own denial of any asserted misconduct, together with evidence of a former good reputation-, otherwise, he is utterly defenseless .... Errors committed either by the prosecution or by the court in the course of the trial, which ordinarily might be considered trivial and as of no material consequence from a standpoint of adverse effect upon the rights of a defendant, may become of great importance when committed in a case of the character of that here involved.” (Italics added.)
Similarly, many other cases have recognized that, in this context, evidence of an accused’s good moral character may be the only evidence, in addition to his denial of the charges, that an innocent defendant can present *1322in his own defense (see, e.g., People v. Anthony, supra, 185 Cal. 152, 156; People v. Neal, supra, 85 Cal.App.2d 765, 771), and have emphasized that, because of the inherently inflammatory nature of an accusation of child molestation, it is required in such cases “ ‘that there be [a] rigorous insistence upon observance of the rules of the admission of evidence’ ” (People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d 219, 226, quoting People v. Evans (1952) 39 Cal.2d 242, 251 [246 P.2d 636]) and that “errors which in other contexts] might be trifling may have more serious import” (People v. Burton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 328, 341 [11 Cal.Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 433]). In People v. Stanley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 812, 820 [63 Cal.Rptr. 825, 433 P.2d 913], our court, after referring to most of the above authorities, observed that “in a sex case where the only witness is the victim and his story is totally uncorroborated, almost any error is serious and is likely to be prejudicial.”
Here, the trial court’s erroneous ruling completely deprived defendant of the opportunity to present a potentially crucial portion of his defense. As a result of the ruling, the jury never learned that defendant had a good reputation in the community with regard to his sexual morality or that defendant’s close friends, who had the opportunity to observe him in numerous social settings over a lengthy period of time, were of the opinion that he had a high moral character which was inconsistent with molesting a young girl. Under the cases cited above, it appears clear that the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of all of defendant’s evidence of his good moral character is, in itself, sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal.
Furthermore, reversal is particularly warranted here because the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that this was a much more closely balanced case than the majority opinion suggests.
To begin with, the circumstances of the incident as described by the victim, while perhaps not as “weirdly improbable” as the testimony described in People v. Castillo, supra, 5 Cal.App.2d 194, 195-196, 198 (see maj. opn., ante, p. 1312), appear unusual even within the universe of child molestation incidents. By all accounts, the events leading up to the alleged molestation of Stephanie were entirely innocent. Defendant had met Anita, Stephanie’s mother, at a church dance and had dated her for several weeks prior to the day of the alleged incident. On the day in question, defendant went with Anita and her three children to Toys-R-Us to buy birthday presents for Stephanie, and then they all returned to defendant’s house to play with the new gifts. After playing with the toys for some time, all five went into defendant’s bedroom, where defendant’s only television set was located. Defendant and Anita lay down on the bed, with the two girls on either side of them, to watch television; the young son took a nap on the floor at the foot of the bed. After a half hour or more, the young boy awoke *1323and his mother got up from the bed and sat with him for several minutes at the foot of the bed. According to Stephanie’s testimony, it was at this point that defendant allegedly began putting his hand under her underwear, while Anita, whom defendant was dating, was still in the room, seated only a few feet away at the foot of the bed. Although the jury certainly was entitled to believe Stephanie’s testimony in this regard, the unusualness of the alleged conduct—a molestation committed in the immediate presence of the victim’s mother—could reasonably have raised at least some question in the minds of the jury as to the accuracy of the alleged victim’s testimony.
Second, although the opinion maintains that the defense did not “suggest any persuasive motive for Stephanie to lie” about the incident with defendant (see maj. opn., ante, p. 1312), defendant’s testimony at trial did suggest such a motive. Defendant testified that the incident in question was precipitated after Anita left the bedroom when Stephanie moved her arm next to his genitals as he and the two girls were lying on the bed watching television. Defendant stated that he removed Stephanie’s hand and told her not to touch him there, indicating that her mother would not like that conduct. He testified that Stephanie was upset by the reprimand, left the room, and then told her mother that defendant had improperly touched her. Defendant further testified that when Anita confronted him about the incident, he described Stephanie’s conduct to her and she responded, “yeah, I can believe that. She’s pretty aggressive at times.” Although the jury was clearly not compelled to believe defendant’s testimony, his testimony provides at least a plausible explanation of why Stephanie, then nine years of age, might have lied about the incident.
Finally, there is considerable evidence which suggests that Anita may herself not have believed her daughter’s version of the incident, at least initially. As the opinion recognizes, a few minutes after Stephanie reported the alleged molestation to Anita, Anita and all three children, including Stephanie, went out to dinner with defendant, and then, a week or two later, Anita went on another date with defendant in the course of which the two engaged in sexual intercourse. While it is possible that Anita would have acted in this manner even if she believed defendant had molested her daughter, her conduct at least lends some support to defendant’s version of the events. In addition, Anita never reported the incident to the police. The matter did not come to light until Stephanie related the incident at school many months later, after a presentation to her class by a visiting sex-abuse-education consultant.
In light of all the evidence, I find the majority’s harmless error determination clearly unsupportable. As the authorities discussed earlier make clear, even when there is no other evidence to support a defendant’s denial *1324of an accusation of child molestation, evidence that the defendant’s character is of such a nature that it would be unlikely for him to have committed the charged offense may be sufficient, in itself, to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. (Michelson v. United States, supra, 335 U.S. 469, 476 [93 L.Ed. 168, 174].) Particularly when considered with the other evidence in this case, the erroneously excluded good character evidence could certainly have led the jury to conclude that the prosecution had not proven defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In a case of this nature, where the precedents teach that “almost any error is serious and is likely to be prejudicial” (People v. Stanley, supra, 67 Cal.2d 812, 820), the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of a potentially crucial component of defendant’s defense cannot properly be found harmless.
IV
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and direct that court to reman d this case to the superior court for a new trial.
Panelli, J., concurred.

 Defendant’s offer of proof stated: “Defendant has made an offer of proof regarding the introduction of character witnesses pursuant to Evidence Code, section 1102. These witnesses will testify in general as follows:
“1. That they know the defendant. Two of the witnesses are women and have dated him for period [szc] of time of approximately six months but continued their friendship with him after the dating took place. The third witness is a college friend who double dated with him and has gone on vacations with defendant.
“(a) The women character witnesses can testify that they have dated the defendant and in the course of their relationship became intimate sexually. That as a result of such occasions and other intimate moments, it is their opinions [szc] based upon their personal perceptions, that defendant is not what may be referred to as ‘sexually deviant’, i.e., a person whose sexual behavior is out of the ordinary, in that his sexual drives appeared normal and ordinary. In their opinion, based upon their intimate contact with defendant, the defendant is a person of high moral character.
“In addition, the women, during the course of their contact with defendant came into contact with persons knowing the defendant and came to know his reputations [szc] in his community for normalcy in his sexual tastes.
“(b) That each woman also has a daughter and during the course of their relationship, as a result of observations of defendant’s contacts with their children, they observed no inordinate behavior by defendant or by their children. As a result, it is their opinions [szc], based upon personal perceptions, that defendant is not a person of lustful or lewd conduct with children.
“(c) The third witness is a college friend of defendant. They attended Fresno State together. They became good friends and many times double dated. He has met many of the women defendant dated. That as a result of observations of his conduct with the women, then and thereafter, it is his opinion based upon personal perceptions, that defendant is not a sexual deviant and is a person of normal heterosexual drives.”