Court Opinion

ID: 9632112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:03:30.084464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:42.064929
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the majority’s holding in regard to appellant’s unlawful search and seizure contentions. In holding that appellant’s constitutional rights were not violated, the majority relies in part upon the “exigency rule” exception and in part upon the “open-or-plain view” exception to the general rules governing searches and seizures. In Patrick v. State1 the court explained the “exigency rule” in the following manner:
The general rules governing searches and seizures are subject to the excep*605tion of emergency situations, sometimes called the ‘exigency rule.’ The reasonableness of an entry by the police upon private property is measured by the circumstances then existing. The right of police to enter and investigate in an emergency, without an accompanying intent either to seize or arrest, is inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers, and derives from the common law. United States v. Barone (C.A. 2) 330 F.2d 543 (1964). The preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure laws and constitutional guaranties; it is an overriding justification for what otherwise may be an illegal entry. It follows that a search warrant is not required to legalize an entry by police for the purpose.of bringing emergency aid to an injured person. Frequently, the report of a death proves inaccurate and a spark of life remains, sufficient to respond to emergency police aid. As a general rule, we think, an emergency may be said to exist, within the meaning of the ‘exigency’ rule, whenever the police have credible information that an unnatural death has, or may have, occurred. And the criterion is the reasonableness of the belief of the police as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact. Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 318 F.2d 205 (1963); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964); compare Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1200, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958).
In my view, neither the “exigency rule” standing alone or considered with the “open- or-plain view rule” is adequate to sustain the admissibility of all of the items of evidence which appellant claimed were procured as a result of an illegal search and seizure by the police.
It is established that a search and seizure, without a warrant, must be justified under an exception to the constitutional requirement that a search must rest upon a search warrant. In Goss v. State,2 we recognized this precept and in so doing also stated that, “The exception that we are concerned with here is that which recognizes the validity of a search without a warrant where the search is made incident to a lawful arrest.” 3
In my view, the admission in evidence of several exhibits which were obtained by police as a result of their warrantless entry cannot properly be justified by resort either to the “exigency rule” or by a holding that these items were not the products of a true fourth amendment search. For instance, some seven to ten hours after the “spark of life” had surely left the homicide victim, the police retrieved a bullet from the soil beneath the floor of appellant’s home. A second .45 caliber bullet was found only after searching an outbuilding located a considerable distance from appellant’s home, and the .45 weapon was found also as the result of a search. These exhibits can only be held admissible on the grounds that the warrantless search and seizure was made incident to a lawful arrest.
In Ellison v. State, this court said:
There seems to be no exact formula for the determination of reasonableness in connection with a search and seizure so each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.4
In my opinion the facts and circumstances of this record do not demonstrate that an unreasonable search and seizure occurred. As we noted in Weltz v. State,5 “The ap*606plicable constitutional provisions reach only unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here the record discloses a reasonable search and seizure made incident to an initial lawful entry of appellant’s home and contemporaneous to the subsequent lawful arrest of appellant. The crime was committed about 1:20 p. m.; appellant was arrested at approximately 2 a. m.; between 2 a. m. and 3 a. m. the premises were locked up by Officer Knudson, and some seven to ten or more hours later the state police began their search of the premises and seizure of certain items.
In Weltz v. State, we held in part that:
[T]he exigencies of the situation justified the officer’s seizure of the note. In the situation at bar, the constitutional provisions proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures did not prohibit the seizure of the note in order to prevent its destruction or removal.6
In the instant case, it is my opinion that the totality of the circumstances, namely, an untrained local law enforcement officer, an isolated bush village, and the lack of any clear information on the part of the state police in Juneau, prior to their departure for Hoonah, as to what had happened at appellant’s residence, furnished ample justification for the police action which was taken. What is lacking is any evidence of arbitrary intrusion, or invasion, into the premises or privacy of appellant.7 It is my belief that under all the circumstances the search and seizure by the state police properly may be viewed as a continuation of the lawful search which was begun by Officer Knudson incident to his lawful arrest of appellant.8
I, therefore, concur in the majority’s rejection of appellant’s search and seizure arguments. I am in agreement with all other aspects of the majority opinion.

. 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del.1967).

. 390 P.2d 220, 223 (Alaska 1964).

. This exception was later utilized by this court in affirming the lower court rulings in Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1967), and Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686, 699-700 (Alaska 1967).

. 383 P.2d 716, 719 (Alaska 1963). In support of this statement we cited United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653, 659 (1950). We reiterated our Ellison statement in Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502, 506 (Alaska 1967), and Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686, 699-700 (Alaska 1967).

. 431 P.2d 502, 506 n. 21 (Alaska 1967).

. 431 P.2d 502, 507 (Alaska 1967) (footnote omitted).

. In Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 935 (1957), tlie United States Supreme Court said in regard to the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures that:
The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.

. In People v. Williams, 60 Cal.Rptr. 472, 430 P.2d 30, 32 (1967), the court, after stating that, “A defendant’s absence from the scene does not of itself render illegal a search which, in view of the totality of surrounding circumstances, is reasonable” went on to say:
[T]hat the subsequent inventory and seizure at the police impound ‘should be deemed a continuation of the search lawfully begun at the time and place of arrest.’ ⅝ * * [H]ere such action was undertaken in order to permit convenient cataloguing and reduction to possession of articles discovered during the initial search. We consider the latter reason for postponement as adequate as the former. Since the officers could lawfully have taken possession of the evidence at the scene of the initial search, the fact that for reason of convenience they actually did so at a different time and place does not of itself render the entire continuing search process unreasonable.
In line with the Williams case are the following authorities: Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1068 (1968); Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 733 (1967); Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F.Supp. 33, 41 (E.D.Ark. 1965), aff’d, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir.1966); People v. Webb, 56 Cal.Rptr. 902, 424 P.2d 342, 347 (1967); State v. Putnam, 178 Neb. 445, 133 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1965); People v. Moschitta, 25 A.D.2d 686, 269 N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (1966).