Court Opinion

ID: 9726053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:29:00.602775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.183070
License: Public Domain

STONE (W. A.), J., Dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority that the undisputed facts entitle respondent to judgment as a matter of law.
At the crux of this controversy is the meaning of the term “resident of the same household” as the insured. The term is not defined in the policy. As the majority has noted, a policy provision is ambiguous if it is capable of two or more constructions, at least two of which are reasonable. (Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 912 [226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920]; Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 541, 548 [184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 896].)
The term “resident of the same household” has no absolute meaning, (Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. Boisseranc (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 775, 781 [312 P.2d 401].) The meaning of this language varies according to the circumstances and whether the language is found in terms of inclusion or exclusion. (Ibid.) When ambiguous language is found in an exclusionary clause, it must be construed narrowly against the insurer. (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 808 [180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764].)
I recognize that the meaning of this term is not ambiguous when applied in the context of the nuclear family or even in the circumstances of an extended family. What renders the use of the term ambiguous in the context of this case is the shared custody of a minor child, a child who lives part-time with each parent. In such a case, which household is the residence of the minor child for purposes of the family exclusion clause?
The trial court determined that, for the purpose of liability insurance coverage, Sean was a resident of his father’s household because the accident occurred during that part of the week when Sean lived with his father. At first blush, that resolution seems sensible. However, it is unclear from the court’s analysis whether it concluded that Sean was at all times a resident of *186both households or whether his residence rotated from one household to the other. In the former event, Sean would always be excluded from coverage under the policy of each parent pursuant to the family exclusion clause. In the later case, he would be excluded from coverage depending upon in which household he was living at the time of an accident. This ambiguity is in a sense irrelevant since in either case coverage would be excluded given the facts before us. However, I believe there is a third construction of the term which would favor coverage.
Government Code section 244 provides in part as follows: “In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed:
“(b) There can only be one residence.
“(d) The residence of the parent with whom an unmarried minor child maintains his or her place of abode is the residence of such unmarried minor child.”
Likewise, Welfare and Institutions Code section 17.1 reads in part: “(a) The residence of the parent with whom a child maintains his or her place of abode . . . determines the residence of the child.”
The effect of the foregoing statutes, coupled with the rule compelling a narrow construction of language of exclusion, is that a minor child who is the subject of an order for shared or joint physical custody has only one residence which is to be considered his or her primary residence. Thus, under this interpretation of the term, it remains to be determined whether Sean’s primary residence was with his mother or whether his primary residence was with his father. In my view, this interpretation of the term “resident of the same household” is reasonable and could require coverage.
Our task is not to settle which of the three interpretations of the policy language is the most reasonable or to determine which ranks highest on the spectrum of reasonable interpretations. Rather, our task is to determine whether any reasonable interpretation would result in coverage.
A policy of insurance is an adhesion contract and, as such, if a term is ambiguous, under long-settled principles of insurance contract interpretation that term must be construed against the insurer. (CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 614 [222 *187Cal.Rptr. 276] [“Any ambiguity in an exclusionary clause will be strictly interpreted against the insurer, and reasonable doubts as to uncertain language must be resolved in favor of the insured.”]; Harbor Ins. Co. v. Central National Ins. Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1042 [211 Cal.Rptr. 902] [“[D]oubtful policy obligations, and ambiguities therein, must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage . . . .”]; Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co., supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 548 [“A cardinal rule of interpretation is that, where a provision of an insurance policy is susceptible of two constructions, it should be construed most strongly in favor of the policyholder.”]; Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. Boisseranc, supra, 151 Cal.App.2d at p. 780 [“[I]n determining whether the trial court’s construction is reasonable any ambiguities in the policy must be interpreted against the insurer.”].)
Our function may be analogized to that of a jury in a criminal action that is based on circumstantial evidence. CALJIC No. 2.01 instructs the jurors that if circumstantial evidence “is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other to his innocence,” they must “adopt that interpretation which points to his innocence . . . .” Likewise, we must examine the reasonable interpretations of the particular policy language, and if one such interpretation provides coverage, the construction must be against the insurer.
Safeco did not carry its burden of establishing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It was error to grant the motion for summary judgment.
I would reverse the judgment.