Court Opinion

ID: 9768470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:05:02.55385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.144668
License: Public Domain

ON state’s motion for rehearing
DAVIDSON, Judge.
The state presses upon us the contention that we erred in concluding that the hearing on appellant’s motion to quash the indictment and the introduction of much testimony in support thereof in his absence constituted a violation of his constitutional guarantee (Art. I, Sec. 10, Texas Const.) to be confronted by the witnesses against him.
In support of the state’s contention, counsel cite cases holding that a hearing on motion for change of venue (Rothschild v. State, 7 Texas App. 519) and motions for continuance (Fossett, et al, v. State, 43 Texas Cr. R. 117, 67 S.W. 322) were matters not a part of a trial proper and therefore were not such as would come within the guarantee of confrontation.
Indeed, the state’s position is supported by the reasoning *446that there can be no trial until there is a valid indictment nor so long as the sufficiency of the indictment is to be determined. The case of State v. Atkinson, et al, 40 S. C. Reports 361, 18 S.E. 1021, appears to support the state’s contention in that particular.
On the other hand, in Garcia v. State, 151 Texas Cr. R. 593, 210 S.W. 2d 574, we called attention to the fact that the constitutional guarantee of confrontation extends not only to the right to be confronted by the witnesses but to cross-examine the witnesses.
Here, there was much testimony introduced upon the vital question as to the sufficiency of the indictment under which the state tried appellant and secured this conviction.
We remain convinced that appellant was entitled to be present and to participate in the cross-examination of the witnesses touching their testimony as to the legality of the indictment. But we do not rest our determination of that question solely upon the doctrine of confrontation. It occurs to us that this question goes much further than that of confrontation, alone, and finds its roots deep in the guarantee of due process.
While no court has been able to give a full and complete definition of the term, “due process,” as used in both our state and federal constitutions, yet we know that it includes and means that an accused shall, in a criminal case, be accorded that fundamental fairness necessary to the due administration of justice. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 42 S. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed 166.
With that idea in view, we look to the facts, briefly:
Here, an ignorant and penniless Negro is being tried for his life for a murder he is alleged to have committed. He is represented not by counsel of his own choosing but by counsel appointed by the court. Shortly before the trial he was stricken with an attack of appendicitis and underwent surgery. When his case was called for trial he was confined in the hospital, physically unable to be in court. He was not absent from court by reason of any wilful or deliberate act on his part.
Appellant’s counsel was required, over objection, to proceed with the hearing on motion to quash, without benefit of his (appellant’s) presence or opportunity of consultation.
*447We are constrained to agree that under such circumstances due process of law required that the hearing of evidence upon the motion to quash the indictment not be conducted in the absence of the appellant.
We have reviewed the entire case and remain convinced that a correct conclusion was reached originally, not only in the particular here discussed but also as to the illegality of the indictment.
Accordingly, the state’s motion for rehearing is overruled.