Court Opinion

ID: 9735519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:20:33.683545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:59.497444
License: Public Domain

Dissent
Jackson, J.
This dissent is directed to the single proposition that the majority opinion is in error in holding the instruction in question was erroneous and required reversal.
The instruction in question reads as follows :
“You are instructed that defendant, Ralph Johnson Adams, is not required to disprove the acts of negligence contained in the amended complaint of Carmen Deckard, but the burden is upon Carmen Deckard to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant, Ralph Johnson Adams, was negligent in one or more acts as charged in plaintiff’s amended complaint, and that one or more of such negligent acts was the sole proximate and direct cause of injuries to *129plaintiff, Carmen Deckard, and failing so to do, your verdict should be against plaintiff, Carmen Deckard, on her amended complaint herein.”
In order to sustain the theory on which the majority opinion grants the transfer the instruction must be mandatory. The criterion that determines whether or not an instruction is or is not mandatory is laid down in Vance v. Wells (1959), 129 Ind. App. 659, 159 N. E. 2d 586, which holds:
“ . . . A mandatory instruction unequivocally charges the jury that if they find from a preponderance of the evidence that a certain set of facts exists, they must render a verdict in accordance therewith, either for the plaintiff or in favor of the defendant. It positively directs the jury to find for one party and against the other. It is necessary that all the essentials to either party’s right to recover must be included in such an instruction. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Barker (1942), 110 Ind. App. 648, 40 N. E. 2d 348. Defendant’s Instruction No. 1 does not attempt to do this, but merely informs the jury generally as to the care the law required of the two drivers and the guest, in accordance with the law as stated in the other instructions given.”
It being apparent that the instruction complained of is not mandatory, we can then rely on the rules laid down in the following cases:
“ . . . If, considering the instructions as a whole, they fully and fairly instruct the jury as to every material fact in controversy, they will be considered as sufficient. Error in any particular instruction will not justify a reversal unless it be of such a nature as to vitiate the whole charge to the jury and such charge is vitiated only when the instruction is so erroneous that it must be concluded that the jurors have been misled as to the law of the case. Hough v. Miller (1942), 112 Ind. App. 138, 44 N. E. 2d 228, Jones v. Kasper (1941), 109 Ind. App. 465, 33 N. E. 2d 816; Koeneman v. Aldridge (1954), 125 Ind. App. 176, 122 N. E. 2d *130345.” Stull v. Davidson et al. (1955), 125 Ind. App. 565, 579,127 N. E. 2d 130.
“The instructions must be considered as an entirety. In reality there is but one instruction— one charge — given to the jury. But because of the serial nature of thought and expression, the charge necessarily must consist of several paragraphs, each of which is devoted to some particular feature of the case; and it is for convenience only that these paragraphs are numbered and designated as separate instructions. No instruction is to be regarded as independent and isolated, but rather as a related and connected part of the entire charge. The rule is that error in a particular paragraph will not justify a reversal unless it be of such a nature as to vitiate the whole charge. The entire charge is vitiated only when it is so erroneous that the jurors must have been misled as to the law of the case. Shields v. State (1897), 149 Ind. 395, 406, 49 N. E. 351. . . .” Indianapolis Traction, etc., Co. v. Thornburg (1921), 74 Ind. App. 642, 646,125 N. E. 57.
The following paragraph from the Appellate Court opinion Deckard v. Adams (1964), 197 N. E. 2d 317 found on page 319, I think covers the case at bar and reads as follows:
“Instructions to the jury are viewed as a whole, and the appellant’s argument, while ingenious, would lead us into a semantic swamp wherein we could easily become mired. The instruction was one of the instructions given on the burden of proof, and the court further instructed the jury that the burden of proving contributory negligence rested with the appellee. Under these circumstances it is apparent that the jury would not be so misinstructed as to require us to reverse.”
Transfer should be denied.
Note. — Reported in 203 N. E. 2d 303.