Court Opinion

ID: 9651803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:51:02.338901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:40.724914
License: Public Domain

ELLIOTT, Bankruptcy Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result, but write to express disagreement with the majority’s ap*824parent approval of cases such as In re Triangle Chemical, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.1983) and In re Twinton Properties Partnership, 27 B.R. 817 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1983) regarding the employment of professionals under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). I favor the “bright line” rule enunciated by Judge Woodward in In re Liddell, 46 B.R. 682 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1985), i.e. no prior approval of employment — no compensation. That rule comports with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Beecher v. Leavenworth State Bank, 184 F.2d 498 (9th Cir.1950), which interpreted former General Order 44. Former General Order 44’s requirements regarding the employment of attorneys have been carried over to the present day. They exist now in the form of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2014 which apply to all types of professionals assisting the trustee or debtor in possession in performing its duties under Title 11.
I also suggest that the indiscriminate use of the term nunc pro tunc has led to the growing confusion reflected by the cases in this area.
The function of an order nunc pro tunc is to record an order actually made, which, through some oversight or inadvertence, was never entered on the records of the court, or which was incorrectly entered. An order nunc pro tunc cannot do more than supply a record of something that was actually done at the time to which it is retroactive.
56 Am.Jur.2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 44 (1971) (footnotes omitted); accord W.F. Sebel Co. v. Hessee, 214 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.1954); A.B.C. Packard Inc. v. General Motors, 275 F.2d 63 (9th Cir.1960); In re Call, 36 B.R. 374 (S.D.Ohio 1984); 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders §§ 57, 59(2) (1969).
The Ninth Circuit remanded for consideration of the entry of a nunc pro tunc order approving the employment of a professional in In re Laurent Watch Co., 539 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.1976). However, that decision does not support an expansion of the traditional remedial function of a nunc pro tunc order. The majority in Laurent Watch noted that “[t]he record in this case discloses that the referee made the determinations required by General Order 44 before appellant performed the services for which he seeks compensation.” Thus entry of a nunc pro tunc order may have been appropriate in those circumstances. When a nunc pro tunc is proper, the court will in fact have given its prior approval to the professional’s employment.
Cases like Triangle Chemicals and Twinton Properties Partnership which permit nunc pro tunc approval of professional employment in the absence of a prior unentered or incorrectly entered order to that effect are wrong. They exceed the narrowly tailored function of a nunc pro tunc order and subvert the prior approval requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). Careless use of language is no substitute for incisive analysis and will lead, as in this area, to muddled law.
I agree with the trial court’s decision to deny a nunc pro tunc order simply because no unentered or incorrectly entered order approving Zilaff’s employment was ever made.