Court Opinion

ID: 9884464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:58:15.583668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:06.180931
License: Public Domain

Marbtjry, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Horney and McWieliams, JJ., concurred.
I cannot agree with the majority that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of the defendant’s primary negligence. I am of the opinion that the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence legally sufficient to prove the breach of the duty of exercising ordinary care in the maintenance of its parking lot owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs, which resulted in Margaret Cain’s injuries.
On February 27, 1964, the plaintiffs were driven to the shopping center, which they had visited on numerous occasions in all types of weather, by their daughter-in-law, Clara Cain. They arrived at the shopping center some time between 6:30 and 6:50 p.m. while it was dusk and parked in the northwestern part of the lot. From there the three walked in a driving lane to one of the stores on the eastern side of the lot in order to make a purchase of shoes.
All three were aware of the existence of areas of dampness on the surface of the lot after their arrival. While she was parking her automobile, the daughter-in-law first observed the dampness which she said was located “where the cars run and water *601comes from the corner of the Sinclair Station,” which was in the northwestern corner of the lot. She also observed dampness in the eastern driveway immediately in front of the store to which they were proceeding and saw snow piled along the curb there. The plaintiff, Norton R. Cain, upon alighting from the automobile, observed an area of dampness which extended over the area where his wife later fell, about fifteen or twenty feet from the parked car. Margaret Cain “splashed her stocking” while walking from the parked car toward the store.
After the purchase of shoes was made the plaintiffs waited in front of the store while Clara Cain returned to the parked automobile and placed the shoes in it. She again observed dampness in front of the store where the shoes were purchased, but at that time she did not notice the dampness in the vicinity of the parked car. The damp areas observed by Clara Cain and by the plaintiffs were not frozen, either upon their arrival at the shopping center or upon Clara Cain’s return to the car to place the shoes in it.
Clara returned by the same route, and the three then walked along the sidewalk in front of the stores located on the southerly side of the parking lot to a store where Margaret Cain purchased a dress. When they left the store, they zigzagged their way through parked cars toward their automobile, Margaret Cain following her daughter-in-law. It was dark by then, but the lights on the lot were turned on and the lot was well illuminated. While walking toward the car, the plaintiffs had no difficulty seeing, but the shadows in the areas between the parked cars somewhat reduced the visibility. At about 7:15 p.m., Margaret Cain, who was carrying only her purse, slipped and fell just as she emerged from parked cars and began to walk across the driving lane toward the car of her daughter-in-law. This was the same lane in which she had splashed her stocking earlier. After she fell she discovered that she had slipped on a thin glaze of ice which she had not noticed before. Clara Cain testified that the ice upon which her mother-in-law fell was part of a sheet of ice which extended in a ribbon from a pile of snow at the northwest corner of the lot. On February 27, 1964, the temperature dropped from thirty-three degrees at 5 :00 p.m. to thirty-one degrees at 6:00, 7:00, and 8:00 p.m. Accord*602ing to the testimony the glaze on which Margaret Cain slipped formed some time after Clara Cain returned to the parked car with the shoes, which was approximately fifteen to twenty minutes before the accident.
The weather conditions on the day of the accident were clear and, as described by the plaintiffs, “moderate for that time of February.” There had been a light snow on February 10 and heavy snows on February 11 (8.6 inches) and on February 17-18 (7 inches). The snow on the parking lot in question had been pushed from the parking area in front of the stores and piled along the grass embankments at the northwest corner of the parking lot, at the south and east sides of the service station. The method used in removing the snow from this parking lot was common to that used in snow removal from other such lots in the area. The snow was not hauled away, nor was the entire lot salted or sanded, for to do either would have been prohibitively expensive. By February 27 there was no trace of snow on the ground, except for mounds of plowed and shoveled snow along the sides of streets and elsewhere throughout the county. Both plaintiffs were aware of this, as there were piles of snow alongside of their own driveway. There was a period of thawing and freezing, but no temperatures below freezing were recorded for the two days prior to the accident during the hours the lot was open for business.
The parking lot was under the control and supervision of the defendant. It was constructed of blacktop and was gently graded so that any water which fell or formed on the lot would drain toward drains located in the southeasterly part of the lot where the stores formed an angle as in an “L.” Defendant employed a maintenance man whose duty was to salt the driveway entrances and sidewalks in front of the stores, as well as any patches of ice he might discover on the surface of the lot. He ordinarily remained at work until about 5 :00 p.m., and did so on the day of the accident. No one was employed to patrol the lot during the evening. Prior to the accident, the evidence showed there had been no complaints or claims made for injuries as the result of icy conditions on the surface of the parking lot.
The duty of an owner or operator of a parking lot is to main*603tain the premises in a reasonably safe condition in view of its contemplated use and the purpose for which the invitation has been extended, or at least, to warn invitees against the dangers attendant upon the parking lot’s use, which are not known to them nor obvious to any ordinarily intelligent person, and which either were known or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to have been known to the operator or owner. Lexington Market v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 197 A. 2d 147. Restatement (Second), Torts, Section 343. See cases cited in 14 A.L.R.2d 780, Liability of owner or operator of parking lot or station for personal injuries. However, the owner or operator of the parking lot is not an insurer of personal safety. Lexington Market v. Zappala, supra. Cf. Moulden v. Greenbelt, 239 Md. 229, 210 A. 2d 724; Hawkins v. So. Md. Fair Assn., 237 Md. 90, 205 A. 2d 286.
The important question in this case is whether the defendant could have been found to have acted unreasonably in permitting the snow removal company hired by it to pile snow, pushed from the parking areas, on the grass embankments surrounding the parking area where the water from the melting snow would flow across the lot to the drain, and in not sanding or salting the damp areas created by the melting snow.
The majority found it unnecessary to decide whether the “defendant could be held negligent in allowing the flow of water from one end of the lot to the other,” yet it held that “it could have been found to have been negligent * * * [in piling snow in the northwestern part of the lot in light of the drainage pattern and the weather] without providing sufficient drains to catch the water at a point reasonably near to its source” and that “the jury could have found that reasonable care demanded that the wet area be salted, as a precaution, before the ice had formed.”
A reasonable interpretation of this holding would require, in order to avoid liability, the construction of an intricate network of drains throughout a parking lot to catch surface water from melting snow. This requirement would impose an unreasonable burden on the parking lot owner as its duty is only to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, not in an absolutely safe condition. See Safeway Stores v. Bolton, 229 Md. 321, *604182 A. 2d 828; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail Co., 224 Md. 439, 168 A. 2d 393; Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Con. Co., 183 Md. 285, 37 A. 2d 263.
The nature of the land and the purpose for which it is used must be taken into consideration in determining the degree of care that is owed to the invitee. Restatement (Second), Torts, Section 343, comment e. A distinction must be drawn between the conditions existing inside a place of business and outside. The duty as to the maintenance of floor conditions is higher inside the inviter’s place of business for the reason that invitees are examining merchandise and that the inviter invites a condition in which their attention is diverted to the inspection of merchandise. Crawford v. Soennichsen, 175 Neb. 87, 120 N. W. 2d 578 (1963). See Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 223 Md. 235, 164 A. 2d 273; Ludloff v. Hanson, 220 Md. 218, 151 A. 2d 753; Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 157 Md. 448, 146 Atl. 282. Shopping center parking lots are generally unprotected from the weather and are constructed for the purpose of providing patrons of the stores with convenient places to park their automobiles. It is often that one sees piles of snow, which has been removed from the surface of open air parking lots, located so as to keep the optimum amount of parking spaces open and easily accessible to the stores. This condition is one which is relatively normal after a snowfall. There was evidence to show that there was no store or shopping center parking lot in the area where snow was removed or could be removed in such a manner that water which melted therefrom did not flow across all or part of the surface of the parking area. The evidence also showed that piles of shoveled snow existed throughout the county on the day of the accident. The injuries Margaret Cain suffered were not the result of any abnormal, unusual, or extraordinary condition of the .defendant’s parking lot. See Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., supra; Morrison v. Suburban Trust Co., 213 Md. 64, 130 A. 2d 915. See also Chalmers v. Tea Company, 172 Md. 552, 192 Atl. 419.
In removing the snow from the surface of the lot, defendant certainly did not aggravate a dangerous condition. If the snow had not been removed, it would probably have formed ruts and ridges of ice which would not only have driven away customers, *605but if any one of the invitees had slipped and had been injured, no doubt defendant would be found guilty of negligence in maintaining its parking lot. Cf. Beaney v. Carlson, 174 Ohio St. 409, 189 N. E. 2d 880, 882 (1963). Langley Park Apts. v. Lund, Adm’r, 234 Md. 402, 199 A. 2d 620. The only reasonable and practical place the snow could have been piled so that it did not interfere with or create a hazard to automobile or pedestrian traffic was on the grass embankments or on a place farthest from the area of the lot in general use by the invitees. Trucking the snow or salting or sanding the entire lot was shown to be prohibitively expensive.
The method of snow removal used in this parking lot was common to that used on similar lots in the area. The majority opinion was correct in stating that proof that a businessman follows the standards in his trade is not conclusive of due care, but it cut short the rule which continues on to state that such proof is very strong evidence of due care. Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 407-08, 174 A. 2d 53. “* * * [t] he owner discharges his obligation to exercise due care toward those to whom he owes a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition if he conforms to established custom in the particular instance, provided that such customary method of construction and maintenance is not inherently dangerous or obviously improper.” Long v. Joestlein, 193 Md. 211, 216-17, 66 A. 2d 407. Although there were occasional areas of dampness, some of which were created by melting snow and some of which were created by water dripping from automobiles, the evidence demonstrated that the well-illuminated parking lot was not defective nor maintained in a dangerous condition.
The majority makes much of the fact that the maintenance man employed by the defendant did not sand or salt the damp areas before the ice had formed. The evidence showed that on the two days prior to the accident the temperature did not drop below freezing during the hours the lot was open for business. The ice on which Margaret Cain slipped was formed fifteen or twenty minutes before the accident. Certainly the defendant cannot be deemed guilty of negligence because of any failure to discover and eliminate the patch of ice within such a short period of time. Compare Fitz Simons v. National Tea Company, 29 *606Ill. App. 2d 306, 173 N. E. 2d 534 (1961), where the ice from melting snow was nearly two inches thick and had been accumulating on the parking surface for about two or three weeks. It may well be that a parking lot operator should anticipate that water on the surface of the parking lot from melting snow or dripping automobiles may occasionally freeze, but he is not an insurer, and it would be unreasonable to hold that it is his duty to continuously inspect and sand any and all ice as soon as it occurs, even if it is assumed that periodic inspections are necessary. Cf. Lexington Market v. Zappala, supra. Defendant did not create an artificial condition on the surface of the parking lot. The dampness on the surface of the lot was the result of a rise in temperature causing the snow to melt and of water dripping from automobiles. The icy conditions formed as the result of a sudden drop in the temperature. The presence of ice that has formed as a result of drainage from snow shoveled from walks and driveways is not such an artificial condition as to create any unreasonable danger to pedestrians. Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 349 Ill. App. 63, 109 N. E. 2d 921 (1952); Taggart v. Bouldin, 111 N.J.L. 464, 168 Atl. 570 (1933); Mahoney v. Perreault, 275 Mass. 251, 175 N. E. 467 (1931).
Furthermore, defendant’s knowledge of the conditions on the parking lot was not superior to that of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had made numerous visits to the shopping center in all types of weather. They and the defendant were aware that the temperature on the day of the accident had not dropped below freezing and that piles of snow remained along streets and sidewalks. The defendant knew the parking lot was damp in areas as a result of melting snow, and the plaintiffs observed areas of dampness in the general location in which the daughter-in-law’s car was parked. It is universally known that if the temperature dropped to or fell below thirty-two' degrees, the dampness would probably freeze on the surface of the open-air parking lot. Although Margaret Cain testified she did not see any ice before she slipped, the ambulance driver, who arrived shortly after the accident, testified that the ice was visible to him from a standing position. In view of all the evidence it cannot be said that there existed any latent or concealed peril.
There is no liability on the part of an inviter to protect a *607customer from hazards which are known to the customer and are so apparent that he may reasonably be expected to discover them and be able to protect himself. Generally, the liability of an owner or occupant of the premises is predicated on proof of his superior knowledge, actual or constructive, of danger to which the invitee is subjected and of which the invitee is unaware. Lexington Market v. Zappala; Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc.; Morrison v. Suburban Trust Co., all supra.
As stated by Judge Hammond (now C.J.) in Glaze v. Benson, 205 Md. 26, 32, 106 A. 2d 124, in reviewing Restatement, Torts, Sec. 343, and the decision in Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Con. Co., supra:
“ '* * * it is to be noted that the comparative knowledge of the parties is the test of liability,—that is to say, the knowledge of the defendant as opposed to. the knowledge of the person injured.’ Two conditions must concur, if the possessor of the land is to be held liable: (1) a realization that the condition constitutes an unreasonable risk to the patron; and (2) the absence of reason to believe that the condition will be discovered by the patron or the risk realized by him.”
The evidence showed that there had been no complaints about icy conditions on the parking lot. This is not conclusive, Thompson v. District of Columbia, D.C. Mun. Ct. of App., 182 A. 2d 360 (1960), but in light of the facts that dampness on the surface of a parking lot is not an unreasonable condition of an outdoor parking lot during the winter and that in this case the ice formed in such a short time, it can be said as a matter of law that the defendant created and maintained no. unreasonable risk to the plaintiff. Brent v. Bank of Aurora, 219 P. 2d 391 (Sp. Ct. Colo. 1955). See Langley Park Apts. v. Lund, Adm’r, supra; State Fair v. Henderson, 164 Md. 587, 165 Atl. 698. Margaret Cain had opportunity shortly before slipping and falling on the ice to know as much or more than the owner about the icy conditions in the parking lot. There is no room for disagreement among reasonable men that the dangers present under the facts considered in the light most favorable to the plain*608tiff were universally known and equally apparent to both that plaintiff and defendant, and accordingly, there should be no liability imposed upon the defendant. Crenshaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 72 N. M. 84, 380 P. 2d 828 (1963); Watts v. Holmes, 386 P. 2d 718 (Sp. Ct. Wyo. 1963).
I am of the opinion that there was no legally sufficient evidence to show that the defendant breached any duty owed by it to the plaintiffs and that the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence on the ground of the lack of primary negligence should have been granted. It follows that the questions of contributory negligence and of assumption of risk need not be considered. I would reverse the judgment without a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Judges Horney and McWilliams concur in the views herein expressed.