Court Opinion

ID: 9539713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:09:00.326222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:15.559909
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority held that where the plaintiff’s employment is terminable at will, the employer, with or without cause and regardless of the motives involved, can discharge the employee without incurring liability, and that the trial court erred in denying the defendant company’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
As to the wrongful termination claim, the majority has adequately stated Georgia’s extremely broad rule. This rule has been adopted by our Supreme Court and the rule has long been established in this court. Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613 (250 SE2d 442) (1978); Nelson v. M & M Prods. 168 Ga. App. 280, 281 (308 SE2d 607) (1983); Land v. Delta Air Lines, 130 Ga. App. 231 (203 SE2d 316) (1973).
I believe, however, that the rule is much too harsh and the more enlightened view is that adopted by other states. “A cause of action for wrongful termination exists where an employee at will alleges public policy violations.” Perks v. Firestone Tire Sec. Co., 611 F2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Palmateer v. Intl. Harvester Co., 85 Ill2d 124 (421 NE2d 876) (1981); Harless v. First Nat. Bank, 162 W.Va. 116 (246 SE2d 270) (1978), permitting a cause of action for retaliatory termination; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal3d 167 (610 P2d 1330) (1980), permitting a cause of action where termination was based on refusal to commit a criminal act. Even this court has recognized the inadequacies in our existing law. Evans v. Bibb Co., 178 Ga. App. 139 (342 SE2d 484) (1986).
Recognizing abounding precedent, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the wrongful termination claim should have been dismissed. I, therefore, concur with the majority insofar as it relates to *169the wrongful termination claim.
Decided December 5, 1986.
Anthony O. L. Powell, for appellant.
However, we must not confuse this State’s position on wrongful termination with the availability of relief under similar, but distinct, causes of action. For instance, violations of civil and constitutional rights (City of Atlanta v. Mahony, 162 Ga. App. 5 (289 SE2d 250) (1982); see also Moss v. Central State Hosp., 179 Ga. App. 359 (346 SE2d 580) (1986)) provide other causes of action in cases where termination of employment is part of the wrong done to plaintiff. We have such a case here.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the defendant caused her to be subjected to a polygraph test that contained no questions relevant to plaintiff’s qualifications for employment. She was subsequently fired due to allegedly unreliable answers. The record shows that customers who asked defendant’s agent where the plaintiff was were told that she was fired after flunking a polygraph test and that she was a thief who had been caught red-handed. Appellant contends that these defamatory words were spread throughout plaintiff’s community and prevented her from becoming employed. Plaintiff properly made out a claim for invasion of privacy under these allegations. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367 (151 SE2d 496) (1966).
Contrary to assertions in the majority opinion, the claim for invasion of privacy was not dismissed. Sometime subsequent to the filing of her complaint, the plaintiff filed an amendment to her original complaint, setting out specifically that she asserted a claim for invasion of privacy in this case. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss of which this appeal is concerned, the trial court expressly recognized that the complaint as originally filed already stated a claim for invasion of privacy and that, therefore, the amendment was superfluous. We agree with the trial court that the amendment was superfluous. Under notice pleading (OCGA § 9-11-8 (f)), the complaint was sufficient to set out a claim for invasion of privacy. The majority fails to distinguish between the dismissal of the amendment, which occurred merely because it was superfluous, and the dismissal of the claim, which did not occur. The trial court expressly recognized the plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy.
Since there is presently a viable claim in this case for invasion of privacy, the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss should be affirmed insofar as it relates to invasion of privacy.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge McMurray, and Judge Pope join in this opinion.
*170N. David Wages, for appellee.