Court Opinion

ID: 9412738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 15:08:20.946065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:12.081301
License: Public Domain

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 1         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

 2 Opinion Number: ________________

 3 Filing Date: July 25, 2023

 4 No. A-1-CA-39807

 5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

 6            Plaintiff-Appellee,

 7 v.

 8 MICHAEL NIETO,

 9            Defendant-Appellant.

10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
11 Cindy Leos, District Court Judge

12 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
13 Santa Fe, NM
14 Van Snow, Assistant Attorney General
15 Albuquerque, NM

16 for Appellee

17 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
18 Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
19 Santa Fe, NM

20 for Appellant
 1                                     OPINION

 2 YOHALEM, Judge.

 3 {1}    A jury convicted Defendant Michael Nieto of battery upon a peace officer,

 4 contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-24 (1971); aggravated assault upon a peace

 5 officer (deadly weapon), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-22 (1971);

 6 aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-

 7 22-1.1 (2003, amended 2022); reckless driving, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section

 8 66-8-113 (1987); resisting, evading or obstructing an officer (arrest), contrary to

 9 NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1 (1981); and leaving the scene of an accident (property

10 damage), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-202 (1978), based on an encounter

11 with police officers on June 16, 2019, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The district

12 court dismissed Defendant’s reckless driving conviction on double jeopardy

13 grounds. Defendant claims on appeal that several of his six remaining convictions

14 are based on the same conduct and violate double jeopardy. Defendant also

15 challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for leaving the

16 scene of an accident. We agree that Defendant’s convictions for resisting, evading

17 or obstructing an officer and for aggravated fleeing a police officer violate double

18 jeopardy and must be vacated. Otherwise, we affirm.
 1 BACKGROUND

 2 {2}    All of the charges in this case arose out of events that occurred on June 16,

 3 2019. That morning, Albuquerque Police Officers Mares and Briones responded to

 4 a call about a man who was asleep behind the wheel of a pickup truck. That man was

 5 later identified as Defendant. Officer Mares arrived first and pulled up behind

 6 Defendant’s truck. Officer Mares was in uniform, was driving a marked police

 7 vehicle, and his emergency lights were on. Leaving his vehicle with its emergency

 8 lights flashing, Officer Mares approached Defendant’s pickup truck. Through the

 9 window, Officer Mares saw Defendant unconscious in the driver’s seat. According

10 to Officer Mares, Defendant “kind of pop[ped] up,” and Officer Mares identified

11 himself as a police officer. At that time, Officer Mares saw a handgun in the

12 passenger seat. Officer Mares opened the driver’s side door, grabbed and held one

13 of Defendant’s hands to his side, and told Defendant to step out of his truck.

14 Defendant refused. By this time Officer Briones had arrived and was assisting

15 Officer Mares. Officer Briones was able to take the gun from the passenger seat and

16 place it on the hood of the truck, out of Defendant’s reach.

17 {3}    Officer Mares testified that, at that point, Defendant put the truck in drive,

18 grabbed him, and pulled him into the truck. Defendant then accelerated and

19 continued to drive for several miles with Officer Mares partially hanging out the

20 door, clinging to the headrest to keep himself from falling to the road, until

                                             2
 1 Defendant’s truck crashed head-on into another vehicle driven by Joaquin Sisneros

 2 and came to a stop, injuring Sisneros and damaging his car.

 3 {4}    Defendant threw Officer Mares out of his truck and began to run with Officer

 4 Mares chasing him. Defendant was tackled 25 to 50 feet away from the impact with

 5 Sisneros’s vehicle in a Burger King parking lot, after having crossed over a couple

 6 of lanes of traffic, a sidewalk, and some landscaping.

 7 DISCUSSION

 8 I.     Double Jeopardy

 9 {5}    The double jeopardy clause “protects defendants from receiving multiple

10 punishments for the same offense.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 38, 409

11 P.3d 902 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see U.S. Const. amend. V;

12 N.M. Const. art. II, § 15. Defendant raises what is known as a double description

13 double jeopardy claim, “in which a single act results in multiple charges under

14 different criminal statutes.” State v. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 644,

15 146 P.3d 289.

16 {6}    In analyzing double description claims, we apply the two-part test set forth in

17 Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223, determining

18 first: (1) whether the conduct underlying the offenses is unitary; and (2) if so,

19 whether the Legislature intended to punish the offenses separately. See State v.

20 Begaye, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 13, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-38797, Jan. 12, 2023). “‘Only

                                             3
 1 if the first part of the test is answered in the affirmative, and the second in the

 2 negative, will the double jeopardy clause prohibit multiple punishment in the same

 3 trial.’” Id. (quoting Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 25.)

 4 {7}    A defendant’s conduct is unitary “if the acts are not separated by sufficient

 5 indicia of distinctness.” State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 12, 476 P.3d 1201

 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court in State v.

 7 Barrera, 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 36, 130 N.M. 227, 22 P.3d 1177 stated,

 8        The “indicia of distinctness” include the separation between the illegal
 9        acts by either time or physical distance, “the quality and nature” of the
10        individual acts, and the objectives and results of each act. Distinctness
11        may also be established by the existence of an intervening event, the
12        defendant’s intent as evinced by his or her conduct and utterances, the
13        number of victims, and the behavior of the defendant between acts.

14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether conduct is

15 unitary, we consider “the elements of the charged offenses, the facts presented at

16 trial, and the instructions given to the jury.” State v. Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 46,

17 470 P.3d 227. If we determine that the conduct was not unitary, there is no double

18 jeopardy violation and our analysis need not proceed further. If we determine,

19 however, that the conduct was unitary, then we must proceed to the second inquiry:

20 “whether the [L]egislature intended multiple punishments for the unitary conduct.”

21 State v. Andazola, 2003-NMCA-146, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 710, 82 P.3d 77.

22 {8}    In answering this second question, we begin, as we always do when analyzing

23 legislative intent, by looking to the plain language of the statute. Begaye, ___-

                                             4
 1 NMSC-___, ¶ 21. If the statute does not explicitly authorize multiple punishments,

 2 we next apply the Blockburger test. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. We use the strict-elements

 3 Blockburger test if the statutory language is clear and provides only a single

 4 alternative. If the statutory language is vague or states alternative bases for

 5 conviction, we use the modified Blockburger test. Id. Both Blockburger tests—

 6 strict-elements and modified—operate as “a kind of surrogate for construing

 7 legislative intent.” Id. ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

 8 strict-elements test is applied directly to clear statutory language to determine

 9 whether each statute requires proof of a fact that the other does not. See State v.

10 Silvas, 2015-NMSC-006, ¶ 12, 343 P.3d 616 (describing the strict-elements

11 Blockburger test).

12 {9}    Where the statutory language serves multiple purposes and can be violated in

13 multiple ways, we apply the modified Blockburger test and instead consider

14 “whether the statute, as applied by the [s]tate in a given case, overlaps with the other

15 criminal statutes so that the accused is being punished twice for the same offense.”

16 Begaye, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We

17 determine how a statute was applied by the state in a given case by looking first to

18 the statutory language, the charging documents, and the jury instructions. See id.

19 ¶¶ 25-26. If these sources, considered together, do not reveal the state’s legal theory,

20 we turn to the opening and closing statements and the evidence at trial to “establish

                                              5
 1 whether the same evidence supported” both convictions. Id. ¶ 26 (internal quotation

 2 marks and citation omitted). Our focus is to ascertain not simply whether the

 3 elements differ, “but whether the same evidence, that is, the same underlying

 4 conduct, is used to support both charges. Id. ¶ 28. If the same evidence supports both

 5 convictions, double jeopardy is violated and the lesser offense must be vacated. See

 6 id. ¶¶ 28, 36.

 7 {10}   We apply these legal principles to each of the convictions challenged by

 8 Defendant as violating his right to be free of double jeopardy.

 9 A.     Defendant’s Convictions for Battery Upon a Peace Officer and
10        Aggravated Assault Upon a Peace Officer Do Not Violate Double
11        Jeopardy

12 {11}   We turn first to Defendant’s argument that the conduct underlying his

13 convictions for battery upon a peace officer and aggravated assault upon a peace

14 officer is unitary and was not intended by the Legislature to be separately punished.

15 We conclude that the conduct was not unitary and therefore, there is no double

16 jeopardy violation.

17 {12}   In determining whether the conduct was unitary, we must determine whether

18 the offenses were separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness by looking at (1) the

19 temporal proximity of the acts, (2) the location of the victim during each act, (3) the

20 existence of an intervening act, (4) the sequencing of the acts, (5) the defendant’s

21 intent as evidenced by his conduct and utterances, and (6) the number of victims.

                                              6
 1 See Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012, ¶ 15, 111 N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624; see also

 2 Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶¶ 15, 16 (“[W]e attempt to determine, based upon the

 3 specific facts of each case, whether a defendant’s activity is better characterized as

 4 one unitary act, or multiple, distinct acts, consistent with legislative intent.”); State

 5 v. Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, ¶¶ 15, 16, 127 N.M. 504, 984 P.2d 185 (recognizing that

 6 acts separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness warrant separate punishments).

 7 We consider whether the acts of a defendant were “performed independently of the

 8 other acts in an entirely different manner, or whether such acts were of a different

 9 nature.” State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 21, 137 N.M. 92, 107 P.3d 532

10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

11 {13}   A conviction of battery on a peace officer requires the jury to find, in relevant

12 part, that the defendant intentionally and unlawfully touched or applied force to the

13 person of a peace officer in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. See § 30-22-24. In its

14 instruction to the jury on battery on a peace officer and in closing argument, the State

15 stated that it sought conviction solely on the basis that Defendant “intentionally

16 touched or applied force to [Officer] Mares by grabbing his body and pulling on it,”

17 threatening the officer’s safety or challenging his authority. To charge and prove

18 aggravated assault on a peace officer, the State argued that Defendant drove in a

19 manner that put Officer Mares in fear of being thrown to the road and injured.

                                               7
 1 {14}   Defendant argues, based on this Court’s decisions in State v. Garcia, 2009-

 2 NMCA-107, ¶ 17, 147 N.M. 150, 217 P.2d 1048, and State v. Mares, 1991-NMCA-

 3 052, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341, that the conduct alleged occurred in one

 4 location, and close in time and sequence, and thus involved a single event that cannot

 5 be punished separately. We are not persuaded that Garcia and Mares are relevant to

 6 our analysis in this case. Both Garcia and Mares involve convictions of multiple

 7 batteries based on several blows of increasing severity delivered by a defendant to a

 8 single victim during a single escalating incident. See Garcia, 2009-NMCA-107, ¶ 6

 9 (involving punching, pushing, and then stomping on the victim’s leg during a fight

10 between two inmates in the same cell); Mares, 1991-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 2-4 (involving

11 punching, choking, pulling hair, and slapping of the victim in the car, on the ground,

12 and in a nearby bush). Although it is true that the battery as described by the State

13 was followed by the assault in what could be seen as an escalating sequence of

14 events, we also must consider whether there are sufficient indicia of distinctness

15 based on differences in “‘the quality and nature’ of the individual acts, and the

16 objectives and results of each act.” Barrera, 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 36 (internal

17 quotation marks and citation omitted). We conclude that there is a significant

18 difference in the “quality and nature” of an act of physically touching an officer,

19 using enough force to pull his body into a truck—the battery established by the State

20 here—and causing the officer, by driving recklessly, to fear falling to the road and

                                             8
 1 being injured. The battery happened at the location of the original encounter between

 2 Defendant and police, and the assault began as Defendant accelerated away and

 3 continued as Defendant drove recklessly, apparently trying to rid himself of Officer

 4 Mares and avoid arrest.

 5 {15}   Based on these distinctions, we hold that the conduct underlying Defendant’s

 6 convictions was not unitary and, therefore, we need not reach the second part of the

 7 double jeopardy analysis. See Begaye, ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 13; see also Swafford,

 8 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 38.

 9 B.     Defendant’s Convictions for Aggravated Fleeing a Law Enforcement
10        Officer and Resisting, Evading or Obstructing an Officer Violate Double
11        Jeopardy

12 {16}   Defendant argues that his convictions for resisting, evading or obstructing an

13 officer and aggravated fleeing from an officer are based on unitary conduct, and that

14 resisting, evading or obstructing an officer, under the State’s legal theory, is a lesser

15 included offense subsumed within aggravated fleeing, violating double jeopardy.

16 We agree.

17 {17}   We understand the State’s argument on appeal to be that the jury could have

18 based the conviction for resisting, evading or obstructing an officer on Defendant’s

19 conduct in continuing to flee Officer Mares on foot after Defendant’s truck was

20 brought to a stop by the collision with Sisneros’s vehicle. The State claims that

21 Defendant’s flight from Officer Mares in a motorized vehicle and his subsequent

                                               9
 1 flight on foot are separate and distinct incidents of fleeing an officer, and are not

 2 unitary conduct for double jeopardy purposes. See Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 54

 3 (allowing the state to presume that the jury relied on different conduct to convict a

 4 defendant of each crime if the record indicates there was separate and distinct

 5 conduct).

 6 {18}    Even assuming that the jury relied on Defendant’s conduct in fleeing on foot

 7 from Officer Mares to convict Defendant of resisting, evading or obstructing an

 8 officer, we do not agree that this conduct was separate and distinct from Defendant’s

 9 conduct in fleeing from Officer Mares by motor vehicle. Defendant relies on our

10 decision in State v. Padilla, 2006-NMCA-107, 140 N.M. 333, 142 P.3d 921,

11 reversed on other grounds, 2008-NMSC-006, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299, to argue

12 that there are insufficient indicia of distinctness between a defendant’s fleeing in a

13 motor vehicle, and then continuing that same flight from the same officer on foot. In

14 a situation virtually identical to this one, this Court held that “it is artificial to parse

15 conduct when a suspect flees from the police in one way and then immediately

16 continues to flee in another way.” Id. ¶ 30; see State v. French, 2021-NMCA-052, ¶

17 19, 495 P.3d 1198 (reaching the same result). Seeing no reason to deviate from this

18 established precedent, we agree with Defendant that Defendant’s flight from police

19 was unitary.

                                                10
 1 {19}   Because all of the elements of resisting, evading or obstructing an officer by

 2 fleeing Officer Mares on foot are subsumed within the greater offense of aggravated

 3 fleeing an officer, Defendant’s conviction of both violates double jeopardy and his

 4 conviction for resisting, evading or obstructing an officer must be vacated.

 5 C.     Defendant’s Convictions for Leaving the Scene of an Accident and
 6        Aggravated Fleeing a Law Enforcement Officer Do Not Violate Double
 7        Jeopardy

 8 {20}   Defendant contends that his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident is

 9 subsumed within his conviction for aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer.

10 We assume, without deciding, that much like Defendant’s conviction for resisting,

11 evading or obstructing a law enforcement officer, his conviction for leaving the

12 scene of an accident relies on Defendant’s conduct in running from Officer Mares

13 and the accident scene and is therefore unitary conduct. We next consider whether

14 the Legislature intended to permit dual convictions. See Begaye, ___-NMSC-___, ¶

15 20.

16 {21}   Our Supreme Court in Begaye directs us to first consider whether the

17 Legislature has explicitly stated an intent to allow multiple punishments. Neither of

18 the statutes at issue here includes such language. See § 30-22-1.1 (defining

19 aggravated fleeing); § 66-7-202 (defining leaving the scene of an accident). We look

20 next to whether these statutes are vague or can be violated in multiple ways. Because

21 both aggravated fleeing an officer and leaving the scene of an accident can be

                                            11
 1 committed in many ways, these statutes are vague and we, therefore, apply the

 2 modified Blockburger test. In applying that test, we compare the conduct the State

 3 relied on to prove aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer and the conduct the

 4 State relied on to prove leaving the scene of an accident.

 5 {22}   We conclude that the conduct necessary to prove aggravated fleeing as

 6 presented by the State and argued to the jury, includes conduct different from the

 7 conduct necessary to prove the crime of leaving the scene of an accident. Proof of

 8 aggravated fleeing a peace officer in this case required that the State establish that

 9 Defendant fled arrest by Officer Mares in a way that endangered the officer. Leaving

10 the scene of an accident, in contrast, required the State to establish that Defendant

11 was involved in an accident that damaged another vehicle and injured its occupant;

12 that Defendant ran from the scene, failing to stop or immediately return; and that

13 Defendant did not satisfy his obligations under the statute to assist the other driver.

14 See § 66-7-202; NMSA 1978, § 66-7-203 (1978). The State was thus required under

15 its theory of the case to present proof of conduct for each crime that was different

16 and distinct from the conduct required under the State’s theory to establish the other

17 crime. We, therefore, presume the Legislature intended multiple punishments. There

18 is no double jeopardy violation.

                                             12
 1 D.     Defendant’s Convictions for Aggravated Assault Upon a Peace Officer
 2        and Aggravated Fleeing a Law Enforcement Officer Violate Double
 3        Jeopardy

 4 {23}   Defendant contends that the conduct underlying his convictions for

 5 aggravated assault upon a peace officer and aggravated fleeing a law enforcement

 6 officer was unitary, and that the Legislature did not intend to punish the two crimes

 7 separately. According to Defendant, the State’s theory of the case relied for both

 8 convictions on proof that Defendant drove recklessly with Officer Mares hanging

 9 out of his truck, with the common intention of ejecting the officer from the truck.

10 The charging documents, the jury instructions, and the State’s closing argument

11 support Defendant’s position that the State relied on the same conduct by Defendant

12 as the basis for both its charge of aggravated fleeing Officer Mares and aggravated

13 assault on Officer Mares. The State’s briefing does not meaningfully distinguish

14 Defendant’s conduct in fleeing from Defendant’s conduct in assaulting Officer

15 Mares. We therefore agree that the conduct was unitary.

16 {24}   We proceed to the second part of the analysis, in which we ask “whether the

17 Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments” for this unitary conduct,

18 violating separate statutes. Begaye, ____-NMSC-____, ¶ 21 (internal quotation

19 marks and citation omitted). Looking first to the language of the two statutes,

20 aggravated assault and aggravated fleeing, neither addresses whether multiple

21 punishments are permitted. See §§ 30-22-1.1, -22. We next turn to the Blockburger

                                            13
 1 test. See Begaye, ____-NMSC-____, ¶¶ 21-22. Both of these statutes can be violated

 2 in multiple ways so we apply the modified Blockburger test, looking to the State’s

 3 theory of the case to determine whether one offense subsumes the other. See id. ¶

 4 24. Although aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer can involve proving that

 5 Defendant endangered the public by driving recklessly, the State in this case relied

 6 on the danger to Officer Mares created by Defendant’s reckless driving as the officer

 7 hung partially out of Defendant’s vehicle to prove aggravated fleeing. This was

 8 exactly the same conduct the State relied on to prove aggravated assault on a peace

 9 officer with a deadly weapon. The deadly weapon described by the State to the jury

10 was the Defendant’s truck, and the deadly force Officer Mares feared was being

11 thrown from Defendant’s truck onto the roadway as Defendant twisted and turned

12 the vehicle in an effort to get free of Officer Mares and avoid arrest. Although

13 aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer requires the State to also prove that

14 Defendant “had been given an audible signal to stop by a uniformed law enforcement

15 officer in an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle,” an additional element

16 does not prevent an offense from subsuming or being subsumed in another offense.

17 See id. ¶ 35 (explaining that a defendant’s double jeopardy rights are violated even

18 though one of the counts requires proof of an additional element).

19 {25}   Therefore, under the modified Blockburger test, given the theory of the case

20 advanced by the State, we conclude that our Legislature did not intend to allow

                                            14
 1 separate punishment for these two offenses. The conviction for aggravated assault

 2 on a peace officer is the greater offense, and so that conviction stands and the

 3 conviction for aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer must be vacated.

 4 II.    Sufficient Evidence in the Record Supports Defendant’s Conviction for
 5        Leaving the Scene of an Accident

 6 {26}   Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction

 7 for leaving the scene of an accident. Defendant claims that, because Officer Mares

 8 tackled him, he never got far enough away to be convicted of having “left the scene

 9 of an accident.” Defendant relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in State v.

10 Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, 316 P.3d 183. In response, the State argues that

11 Almanzar was rooted in a policy to protect victims of domestic violence by allowing

12 officers to arrest a perpetrator who had left the immediate location of the violence,

13 but remained nearby, and that our Legislature had different policy considerations in

14 referring to the scene of an accident in Section 66-7-202. We agree with the State.

15 {27}   “[W]e apply a substantial evidence standard to review the sufficiency of the

16 evidence at trial.” State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d

17 891. In doing so, we determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found

18 the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

19 Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (emphasis,

20 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We “view the evidence in the light

21 most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and

                                            15
 1 resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” Id. “Jury instructions

 2 become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be

 3 measured.” State v. Garcia, 2016-NMSC-034, ¶ 17, 384 P.3d 1076 (alteration,

 4 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). To convict Defendant of leaving the

 5 scene of an accident, the jury was instructed in relevant part, that the State must

 6 prove “[D]efendant did not immediately stop, did not return to and did not remain at

 7 the scene of the accident.” See § 66-7-202.

 8 {28}   We first address Defendant’s argument that we should rely on Almanzar’s

 9 definition of “at the scene” to construe leaving “the scene” of an accident. In

10 Almanzar, under NMSA 1978, Section 31-1-7(A) (1995), addressing a domestic

11 violence incident, our Supreme Court applied a test of reasonableness for

12 considering whether an officer is “at the scene” for purposes of making a warrantless

13 arrest. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 20. Almanzar’s holding is based on policy

14 considerations of protecting victims of domestic violence from aggressors who are

15 still close enough to reinitiate violence against the victim. See id. ¶ 21. In contrast,

16 the policy considerations that led to prohibiting a driver from leaving the scene of

17 an accident were “to prohibit drivers from evading criminal or civil liability, to

18 ensure people receive necessary aid or medical attention, and to deter drivers from

19 thwarting or impeding investigations and avoiding liability for the harm they cause

20 by failing to stop or failing to comply with Section 66-7-203 [to render aid].” State

                                              16
 1 v. Montelongo Esparza, 2020-NMCA-050, ¶ 13, 475 P.3d 815 (internal quotation

 2 marks and citation omitted). Because the purposes served are different from the

 3 purposes of the domestic violence statute at issue in Almanzar, we do not apply the

 4 same test.

 5 {29}   Here, the jury’s task was to determine whether Defendant had fulfilled the

 6 requirements of the statute or intended to return and fulfill them. Defendant’s

 7 testimony stating, “I was trying to flee the scene,” along with the evidence of the

 8 distance he ran before being tackled by an officer was sufficient to enable a

 9 reasonable jury to infer that Defendant had left the scene of the accident without

10 fulfilling his statutory duty to provide reasonable assistance to the other driver. See

11 § 66-7-202 (requiring a person to remain at the scene until the requirements of

12 Section 66-7-203 are fulfilled.).

13 CONCLUSION

14 {30}   We vacate Defendant’s convictions for resisting, evading or obstructing a law

15 enforcement officer and for aggravated fleeing a peace officer, and remand for

16 resentencing. Otherwise, we affirm.

17 {31}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

18                                         __________________________________
19                                         JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

                                             17
1 WE CONCUR:

2 _________________________________
3 ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

4 _________________________________
5 KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge

                                  18