Court Opinion

ID: 9570471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:23:28.612841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:53.412351
License: Public Domain

Miller, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with Division 1 of the majority opinion that the court clearly erred in directing a verdict in favor of the Sonenberg Company. I dissent, however, as to Division 2, because I believe that Redi-Floor’s decision to obtain a judgment against Manor Associates Limited Partnership has rendered the error harmless. Redi-Floors had the right, as do all plaintiffs, to pursue mutually exclusive remedies prior to the verdict; but once Redi-Floors procured a judgment order which was reduced to writing against Manor Associates, that constituted an election of alternative remedies that precluded plaintiff from pursuing the excluded remedy against Sonenberg.
A corollary to the principle that a nondisclosing agent is personally liable is that “[t]he contract liability of a principal and his agent is not joint, and after election to proceed against one, the other can*626not be held.”29 As the plaintiff may not obtain judgment against both, he must make an election prior to judgment as to whether he wants a judgment against the agent or against the principal.30 If the plaintiff does not expressly announce an election, his taking a judgment against the principal constitutes an election and precludes any further action against the agent.31 Here, after the court entered a directed verdict in favor of Sonenberg, Redi-Floors (1) had every opportunity to reevaluate its case and to obtain court permission to dismiss its case without prejudice against Manor Associates instead of proceeding further or (2) could have had the court withhold entry of judgment (once the verdict against Manor Associates was obtained) until an appeal of the directed verdict was decided. In either case, Redi-Floors could have then brought this issue here as an appeal from the directed verdict without electing to obtain a judgment against Manor Associates. Redi-Floor’s decision to obtain a judgment against the principal, however, was an election and precludes it from pursuing Sonenberg further.
This does not denigrate or diminish the right of Sonenberg or of any plaintiff to pursue alternative theories or to elect between mutually exclusive remedies, whether against multiple defendants or one defendant. Rather, it simply enforces the time-honored principle under Georgia law that the election — at least as to alternative actions in the principal/agent area of law — must take place prior to judgment being entered against either.
In this regard, I note that Campbell v. Alford32 indicated that an election is not made until the plaintiff obtains a satisfaction of his judgment against the principal. Campbell relied on two authorities: (1) OCGA § 9-2-4, which allows a plaintiff to pursue any number of consistent or inconsistent remedies against the same person or different persons until obtaining a satisfaction from some of them, and (2) Adams v. Cox,33 which, citing to this statute and Newby v. Maxwell,34 held that obtaining a judgment against a corporation did not preclude a plaintiff from pursuing an action against the corporation’s sole shareholder to recover the same damages. Adams, however, expressly distinguished its facts from those cases where the joint contractual liability of both the principal and agent is sought (as here), *627for in such circumstances binding authority is clear that a monetary judgment may not be obtained against both parties.35 Thus, the very authority relied on in Campbell acknowledges that OCGA § 9-2-4 does not apply to allow judgments against both the principal and the agent. As more recent controlling authority confirms that a plaintiff may obtain a judgment against either the principal or agent but not both,36 Redi-Floor’s obtaining the judgment against the principal here constituted a binding election, whether or not the judgment is ever satisfied.37 Accordingly, I would overrule Division 1 of Campbell.38
Decided March 29, 2002
Isenberg & Hewitt, Harriet C. Isenberg, for appellant.
Olim & Loeb, Jay E. Loeb, for appellee.
The majority suggests that Spalding Ford Lincoln-Mercury v. Turner Broadcasting Systems39 stands for the proposition that obtaining a judgment against an agent does not necessarily constitute an election to proceed against the agent instead of against the principal. I respectfully disagree. Spalding Ford did not involve the circumstance of electing between alternative remedies as we have here today, but rather involved a written contract in which the principal and agent expressly agreed to joint and several liability. Thus, OCGA § 9-2-4 would apply in Spalding Ford so as to allow the pursuit of both parties until the judgment was satisfied.40
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent as to Division 2 of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this opinion.

 (Citation omitted.) Kingsberry Homes v. Findley, 242 Ga. 362, 365 (2) (249 SE2d 51) (1978); accord Watson v. Sierra Contracting Corp., 226 Ga. App. 21, 26 (a) (485 SE2d 563) (1997) (physical precedent only); see Wylly v. S. Z. Collins & Co., 9 Ga. 223, 239 (2) (1851); Brown-Wright Hotel Supply Corp. v. Bagen, 112 Ga. App. 300, 302 (145 SE2d 294) (1965).

 Crolley v. Haygood Contracting, 201 Ga. App. 700, 703 (3) (411 SE2d 907) (1991).

 Watson, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 26 (a).

 155 Ga. App. 689-690 (1) (272 SE2d 553) (1980).

 152 Ga. App. 376, 377-378 (1) (262 SE2d 634) (1979).

 121 Ga. App. 18, 19 (2) (172 SE2d 458) (1970).

 Supra, 152 Ga. App. at 378 (1); see Kingsberry Homes, supra, 242 Ga. at 364-365 (2), and cases cited therein.

 Crolley, supra, 201 Ga. App. at 703 (3).

 Cf. Watson, supra, 226 Ga. App. at 26 (a).

 Supra, 155 Ga. App. at 689-690 (1).

 202 Ga. App. 505, 507 (2) (415 SE2d 26) (1992).

 See id.; cf. Adams, supra, 152 Ga. App. at 378 (1).