Court Opinion

ID: 9429744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:27:46.478015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:21.255577
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
This case marks the fourth time in recent years that the Court has turned a deaf ear to inmates’ claims that the conditions of their confinement violate the Federal Constitution. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979); Hudson v. Palmer, ante, p. 517. Guided by an unwarranted confidence in the good faith and “expertise” of prison administrators and by a pinched conception of the meaning of the Due Process Clauses and the Eighth Amendment, a majority of the Court increasingly appears willing to sanction any prison condition for which the majority can imagine a colorable rationale, no matter how oppressive or ill-justified that condition is in fact. So, here, the Court upholds two policies in force at the Los Angeles County Central Jail. Under one, a pretrial detainee is not permitted any physical contact with members of his family, *597regardless of how long he is incarcerated pending his trial or how slight is the risk that he will abuse a visitation privilege. Under the other, detainees are not allowed to observe searches of their cells, despite the fact that such searches frequently result in arbitrary destruction or confiscation of the detainees’ property. In my view, neither of these policies comports with the Constitution.
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In Bell v. Wolfish, supra, the Court established a set of principles defining constitutionally permissible treatment of incarcerated persons who have not been convicted of crimes. In the years since Wolfish, I have not abandoned my view that the Court’s decision in that case was fundamentally misconceived. See 441 U. S., at 563-579 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, even if I thought the doctrine enunciated in Wolfish was defensible, I could not abide the manner in which the majority construes and applies that doctrine to dispose of respondents’ challenge to the jail’s rule against contact visitation.
One of the premises of the principal holding in Wolfish was that the plaintiffs’ claims did not implicate any “fundamental liberty interests” such as those “delineated in . . . Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); [and] Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).” Id., at 534-535. Aside from the right not to be punished prior to adjudication of guilt, the only general interest that could be asserted by the plaintiffs in Wolfish, the Court contended, was a “desire to be free from discomfort.” Id., at 534.1 The comparatively un*598important nature of that interest made it possible for the Court to adopt a deferential legal standard: “[A] particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention” passes muster under the Due Process Clause as long as it “is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective,” id., at 539.
The Court today reiterates and relies on the foregoing test. Ante, at 586. In so doing, however, the Court ignores a crucial difference between the interests at stake in Wolfish and in this case. Unlike the Wolfish plaintiffs, respondents can and do point to a fundamental right abridged by the jail’s policy — namely, their freedom to engage in and prevent the deterioration of their relationships with their families.
The importance of the right asserted by respondents was acknowledged by the District Court. “[T]he ability of a man to embrace his wife and his children from time to time during the weeks or months while he is awaiting trial,” the court found, “is a matter of great importance to him.” Rutherford v. Pitehess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 110 (1978).2 Denial of contact visitation, the court concluded, is “very traumatic treatment.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25. Substantial evidence in the record supports the District Court’s findings. William Nagel, an expert in the field of corrections, testified that contact visitation was crucial in allowing prisoners to maintain their familial bonds. Tr. 4174-4175. Similarly, Dr. Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist, testified that denial of contact visitation contributes to the breakup of prisoners’ marriages and generally threatens their mental health. Id., at 4647-4651. *599The secondary literature buttresses these assertions,3 as do the conclusions reached by other courts.4
The significant injury to familial relations wrought by the jail’s policy of denying contact visitation means that that policy must be tested against a legal standard more constraining than the rule announced in Wolfish. Our cases leave no doubt that persons’ freedom to enter into, maintain, and cultivate familial relations is entitled to constitutional protection. E. g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982). Among the relationships that we have expressly shielded from state interference are bonds between spouses, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 (1978), and between parents and their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, supra. The special status of these relationships in our constitutional scheme derives from several considerations: the fact that traditionally they have been regarded as sacrosanct,5 the important role they have played in fostering diversity and pluralism in our culture,6 and their centrality to the emotional life of many persons.7
Determination of exactly how the doctrine established in the aforementioned cases bears upon a ban on contact visita*600tion by pretrial detainees would be difficult. On the one hand, it could be argued that the “withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights” that necessarily accompanies incarceration, Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948), combined with the fact that the inmates’ familial bonds are not altogether severed by such a ban, means that something less than a “compelling” government interest would suffice to legitimate the impairment of the inmates’ rights.8 On the other hand, two factors suggest that only a very important public purpose could sustain the policy. First, even persons lawfully incarcerated after being convicted of crimes retain important constitutional rights;9 presumptively innocent persons surely are entitled to no less.10 Second, we have previously insisted upon very persuasive justifications for government regulations that significantly, but not prohibitively, interfered with the exercise of familial rights;11 arguably, a similarly stringent test should control here. However, a sensitive balancing of these competing considerations is unnecessary to resolve the case before us. At a minimum, *601petitioners, to prevail, should be required to show that the jail’s policy materially advances a substantial government interest. Petitioners have not made and, on this record, could not make such a demonstration.12
It should be emphasized that what petitioners must defend is not their reluctance to allow unlimited contact visitation, but rather their refusal to adopt the specific reforms ordered by the lower courts. The District Court’s order, it should be recalled, was carefully circumscribed:
“Commencing not more than ninety days following the date of this order, the defendants will make available a contact visit once each week to each pretrial detainee that has been held in the jail for one month or more, and concerning whom there is no indication of drug or escape propensities; provided, however, that no more than fifteen hundred such visits need be allowed in any one week. In the event that the number of requested visits in any week exceeds fifteen hundred, or such higher number as the Sheriff voluntarily undertakes to accommodate, a reasonable system of rotation or other priorities may be maintained. The lengths of such visits shall remain in the discretion of the Sheriff.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38.
Petitioners object to this order, and defend their current rule prohibiting all contact between inmates and their families, on two main grounds. Neither of the proffered justifications survives scrutiny.
First, petitioners contend that a ban on contact visitation is necessary to prevent the introduction into the jail of drugs *602and weapons. It must be admitted that this is a legitimate and important goal. However, petitioners fail to show that its realization would be materially impaired by adoption of the reforms ordered by the District Court. Indeed, evidence adduced at trial establishes the contrary. Several witnesses testified that security procedures could be implemented that would make importation of contraband very difficult. Among the precautions effectively used at other institutions are: searches of prisoners before and after visits; dressing of prisoners in special clothes for visitation; examination of prisoners and visitors with metal detectors and fluoroscopes; exclusion of parcels from the visiting area; rejection of visitors who do not comply with visiting rules; and continuous observation of the visiting area by guards. E. g., Tr. 4164-4166, 4232, 4676-4577.13 Mr. Nagel testified that these procedures would “prevent everything except the most extreme methods of introducing drugs into the institution.” Id., at 4170. Further protection against the transmission of contraband from visitors to inmates is provided by the District Court’s restriction of its order to inmates who have been classified as low risk. In short, there is no reason to think that compliance with the lower courts’ directive would result in more than a negligible increase in the flow of drugs or weapons into the jail.14
Second, petitioners contend that allowance of contact visitation would endanger innocent visitors who are placed in near proximity to dangerous detainees. Again, though the *603importance of the objective is apparent, the nexus between it and the jail’s current policy is not. As indicated above, the District Court’s order applies only to detainees who are unlikely to try to escape. And security measures could be employed by petitioners that would make it very difficult for inmates to hurt or take advantage of visitors. See supra, at 602. Finally, the administrators of other institutions that have long permitted contact visits between inmates and their families testified at trial that violent incidents resulting from such visitation are rare, apparently because inmates value their visitation privileges so highly.15
The majority seeks to shore up petitioners’ two arguments with miscellaneous subsidiary claims. In an effort to discredit the limitations on the District Court’s order, the majority argues that determination of which inmates have a sufficiently low propensity to misbehave would be difficult and time-consuming, especially in light of “the brevity of detention and the constantly changing nature of the inmate population.” Ante, at 587. This contention is rebutted by the District Court’s finding that, after an inmate has been incarcerated for a month, jail officials have considerable information regarding his background and behavior patterns, and by evidence in the record that the jail already has a classification system that, with some modification and improvement, could be used to evaluate detainees’ propensities for escape and drug abuse. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33.16 Next, the majority contends that compliance with the Dis*604trict Court’s order would be expensive. Ante, at 588, n. 9. Again, the District Court’s findings are decisive; the court found that only “modest” changes in the jail facilities would be required. App. to Pet. for Cert. 83. More fundamentally, a desire to run a jail as cheaply as possible is not a legitimate reason for abridging the constitutional rights of its occupants. Finally, the majority suggests that the District Court’s order might cause some dissension in the jail, because inmates denied visitation privileges would resent those granted such privileges. Ante, at 587. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to support this speculative observation.
In sum, neither petitioners nor the majority have shown that permitting low-risk pretrial detainees who have been incarcerated for more than a month occasionally to have contact visits with their spouses and children would frustrate the achievement of any substantial state interest.17 Because such visitation would significantly alleviate the adverse impact of the jail’s current policies upon respondents’ familial rights, its deprivation violates the Due Process Clause.
II
The majority brusquely rejects respondents’ challenge to the jail’s policy of refusing to permit detainees to observe *605searches of their cells on the ground that respondents’ claim is foreclosed by the decision in Wolfish. If respondents’ claim were indeed identical to that presented by the Wolfish plaintiffs, I would vote to affirm on this issue for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Wolfish. See 441 U. S., at 576. In fact, however, the two cases differ in a crucial respect, and that difference provides an independent ground for sustaining the judgment below.
The Court in Wolfish held that the policy adopted by the Metropolitan Correctional Center of not allowing pretrial detainees to observe searches of their cells did not violate the Fourth Amendment and did not constitute punishment vio-lative of the Due Process Clause. Id,., at 556-557, 560-561. Respondents in this case make a quite different claim. They assert that the Central Jail’s policy of searching cells and confiscating or destroying personal possessions found therein, without allowing inmates to observe those searches, deprives inmates of property without due process of law. On the record before us, I think respondents’ claim is meritorious.
One of the purposes of the Due Process Clause is to reduce the incidence of error in deprivations of life, liberty, or property. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80-81 (1972). One of the ways such error can be reduced, in turn, is by allowing persons whose interests may be affected adversely by government decisions to participate in those decisions. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), the Court identified a complex of considerations that are helpful in determining whether the Constitution mandates such participation in particular contexts:
“[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce*606dural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id., at 335.
Application of these factors to the facts of the instant case provides strong support for the judgment of the courts below. As the District Court aptly observed, the private interests affected by the jail’s cell-search procedure are important. “The possessions that a man is allowed to keep in his cell are meager indeed, being limited to things like a few pictures, magazines, cigarettes, candy bars, and perhaps an extra pair of socks. Nonetheless, these items are cherished by the inmates.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27-28.18 Next, the District Court found that the risk, under the jail’s current policy, that inmates’ possessions will be destroyed unnecessarily is substantial. Unannounced shakedown searches inevitably are somewhat hasty, and the officers conducting them have significant discretion in deciding what to leave and what to confiscate. Id., at 28. If allowed to observe the process, inmates can persuade the officers to preserve possessions that would otherwise be destroyed. Ibid.19 Finally, to allow detainees to witness searches of their cells *607would impose only slight burdens on the jail officials. In response to the District Court’s original order, petitioners developed alternative methods of conducting shakedown searches, each of which made it possible for inmates to be present. One of those procedures, known as “Method C,” proved to be no less effectual, no more time-consuming, and only slightly more expensive than the practice challenged by respondents.20 The demonstrated feasibility21 and minor cost of this option renders indefensible, in my view, petitioners’ insistence that detainees not be permitted to observe cell searches.
In sum, this seems a classic instance in which an “established state procedure,” as distinguished from “a random and *608unauthorized act by a state employee,” has the effect of causing unnecessary deprivations of private property. Compare Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 435-436 (1982), with Hudson v. Palmer, ante, p. 517, and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 541 (1981). In view of the ease with which petitioners could implement an alternative procedure that would reduce the incidence of wanton destruction of inmates’ possessions, I would affirm the judgment of the courts below that the jail’s current practice violates the Due Process Clause.22
I respectfully dissent.

 The Wolfish plaintiffs did assert various other rights in challenging specific conditions in their prison. See, e. g., 441 U. S., at 548-552 (First Amendment); id., at 555-557 (Fourth Amendment). But the Court did not consider those particular interests in formulating its general standard *598(on which the Court relies today) for determining the constitutionality, under the Due Process Clause, of the treatment of pretrial detainees. See id., at 530, 534-535.

 It should be stressed that, while most of the jail inmates are detained for only brief periods of time (and thus are not covered by the District Court’s order), some are detained for very substantial periods. For example, plaintiffs Rutherford and Taylor were held in the jail pending their trials for 38 months and 32 months, respectively. App. 53.

 See, e. g., Zemans & Cavan, Marital Relationships of Prisoners, 49 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 50 (1958); Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie that Binds, 87 Yale L. J. 1408, 1416, 1424 (1978).

 See Jones v. Diamond, 636 F. 2d 1364, 1377 (CA5), cert. granted sub nom. Ledbetter v. Jones, 452 U. S. 959, cert. dism’d, 453 U. S. 950 (1981); Boudin v. Thomas, 533 F. Supp. 786, 792-793 (SDNY 1982) (pointing out, inter alia, that, when an inmate’s child is too young to talk, denial of contact visitation is the equivalent of denial of any visitation whatsoever); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 602-603 (SDNY), aff’d, 507 F. 2d 333 (CA2 1974).

 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 402 (1923).

 See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925).

 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 652 (1972).

 Cf. Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 291, n. 15 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting a test under which “the strength of the state interest needed to legitimate a statute [would depend] upon the degree to which the statute encroaches upon fundamental rights”)' (emphasis in original; citation omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 569-571 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

 See, e. g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974) (freedom of speech); Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (equal protection of the laws); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974) (“There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country”).

 Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 535, n. 16 (pretrial detainees, unlike sentenced inmates, may not be punished).

 See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 387 (1978) (invalidating a statute that, as applied to most persons, seriously intruded upon, but did not abrogate, the right to marry); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 640 (1974) (striking down administrative regulations that imposed a “heavy burden” on teachers’ right to have children).

Respondents contend that, even if this case were controlled by the standard enunciated in Wolfish, they should prevail, because petitioners have not advanced even a “legitimate governmental objective” in support of the jail’s policy. Because of the manner in which I approach the case, I need not address respondents’ argument on this score.

 The majority implies that the intrusiveness of some of these measures provides an additional justification for petitioners’ refusal to allow any contact visitation. See ante, at 588, n. 9. It is possible that some inmates or visitors might decide to forgo visitation rather than submit to such procedures, but surely the choice should be left to them.

 It should be pointed out that drugs and weapons enter the jail in significant quantities through several other routes. See Tr. 3307, 4526-4527; cf. id., at 4589-4590, 4624-4625 (describing similar problems at other institutions). It would thus be a mistake to think that the jail is currently free of contraband, and that the small amounts that might enter the facility through contact visitation would infect the facility for the first time.

 For example, Arnett Gaston, Warden of the New York City Men’s House of Detention (Riker’s Island), testified that significant physical confrontations have been largely absent from his facility. Id., at 4368. Lloyd Patterson, Superintendent of Deuel Vocational Institution for 10 years, testified that he could recall only three or four incidents during that period. Id., at 4589. Mr. Nagel, drawing on his 11 years of experience in the New Jersey prison system and visits to more than 350 other institutions, corroborated those observations. Id., at 4167-4168.

 Lieutenant Thomas Lonergan testified at trial that, at present, the identities and backgrounds of 70% of the inmates are ascertained within three weeks of their admission. Id., at 4450-4451.

 The feasibility of the limited contact visitation program ordered by the District Court is further suggested by the number of other institutions that have similar programs. Approximately 80% of the inmates in the California prison system are permitted contact visitation. Id., at 4587. It appears that the current policy of the Federal Bureau of Prisons is to allow visitation privileges to both convicted inmates and pretrial detainees. See id., at 1955. In New York City, all except identifiably dangerous pretrial detainees are permitted contact visits with their families. Id., at 4339, 4362. (Indeed, the agency that oversees the operation of the city’s detention facilities has filed a brief contending that contact visitation is feasible and that its denial must be deemed punitive. Brief for New York City Board of Correction as Amicus Curiae 9-29.)

 Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, ante, at 542 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Personal letters, snapshots of family members, a souvenir, a deck of cards, a hobby kit, perhaps a diary or a training manual for an apprentice in a new trade, or even a Bible — a variety of inexpensive items may enable a prisoner to maintain contact with some part of his past and an eye to the possibility of a better future”).

 This last finding is based in part on the District Court Judge’s visit to the jail:
“My own limited observation, as is mentioned in my memorandum of February 15, 1979, revealed an instance upon which the opportunity for a prisoner to make a plea or an explanation on his own behalf resulted in saving his property from confiscation. It was obvious that this fact meant a good deal to him, and I believe that the incident justifies a significant generalization.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28; see id., at 36.

 The District Court described this procedure, and compared it with the jail’s present policy, as follows:
“Method A involved searching all of the cells in a row while the inmates remained in the day room, which is the manner in which searches currently are conducted. In Method C, the men occupying a particular cell were brought from the day room and stood outside their cell while it was being searched. When such search was completed, the men were locked in their cell and the remaining cells were searched successively in the same manner. Methods B and D are so unsatisfactory and expensive that no further comment concerning them is indicated.
“According to the statistics reported by the defendants, Methods A and C take substantially the same amount of time, and C is slightly more expensive, due to the need to utilize a few more deputies to escort the prisoners and to insure against assault upon the deputies that are engaged in searching the cell.” Id., at 35-36; see Tr. 4122-4143 (testimony of Deputy Sheriff Lombardi).

 In their brief, petitioners object to Method C on one ground they did not press below. Relying on a single comment made at trial by Deputy Sheriff Lombardi, petitioners contend that detainees, if allowed to observe cell searches, would learn where they could hide contraband with impunity. Id., at 4116. Deputy Lombardi offered no substantiation for her prediction and indeed, when summarizing petitioners’ objections to Method C, did not consider this point important enough even to mention. See id., at 4132-4133. Especially in the absence of any finding on this issue by the District Court, petitioners’ bald contention seems to me entitled to little weight.

 Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, ante, at 541, n. 4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that the holding of the Court in Hudson does not cover “cases in which it is contended that the established prison procedures themselves create an unreasonable risk that prisoners will be unjustifiably deprived of their property”).