Court Opinion

ID: 9794826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:12:27.84539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:09.170666
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION OP
LEVINSON, J.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I believe, however, that the issues raised in this case are of *187sufficient importance to merit further discussion.
Before proceeding, in fairness to the prosecution, I am compelled to fill in an egregious omission from the majority’s statement of the facts. The effigy apparatus did not consist simply of two undifferentiated man-size figures hanging from a crossbar as the court’s opinion implies. On the contrary, the effigies were very provocative in nature. One effigy, dressed in a cowboy hat and boots and labeled “LBJ”, was hanging by its neck from a noose in a death-like stance. The other effigy, an armless figure dressed in khaki-colored clothing and wearing a military cap, was labeled “Pentagon” and was hanging by its neck from a rope in a similarly gruesome fashion. On the crossbar was a sign reading “NUEEMBUEG JUSTICE FOE WAB CBIMINALS.” The defendants were among those maintaining control over the effigies.
Also it should be noted that, although there were at least 130 Honolulu Police officers assigned to the East-West Center, only ten of that number were assigned to confine their attention to the area where individuals were picketing.
A. Reservation of Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.
An apparent error was committed by the trial judge, although it was not specified as such by the defendants. The Hawaii Eules of Criminal Procedure do not appear to provide for the reservation of a decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal which is made following the close of the prosecution’s evidence. See H.B.Cr.P., Eule 29(a). The only provision in the rules for reservation of decision relates to a motion made following the close of all the evidence. H.B.Cr.P., Eule 29(b). It would seem, therefore, that all motions for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the prosecution’s evidence should be decided by the judge before the trial continues. If the evidence pre*188sented by the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, the State has not met its burden of proof, and I have serious doubts about forcing a defendant in such circumstances to go through the needless and burdensome task of meeting the charges against him. See Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1958).
B. Test on Appeal in Criminal Cases.
The majority has concluded, correctly in my opinion, that “the State failed to marshal sufficient evidence to sustain a charge of disorderly conduct.” There is, however, a large gap in its analysis of this case. Nowhere is it indicated what the test is and how it was applied by the court to arrive at its conclusion. The fact that defense counsel in this case (or in any other case in recent times) has not had the foresight to pinpoint this issue for our consideration does not give us reason to ignore it. In any criminal case on appeal where the question of sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction comes into play, a necessary concomitant is a test which considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and measures it against a legal standard which should have been met before the jury was permitted to decide upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant. If the practicing bar is not given the needed guidance on what the test is and how it is to function, how can we expect defense counsel to isolate properly and discuss the relevant issue in appealing a client’s conviction? Vague, generalized, and porous opinions emanating from this court can only confound, not clarify. It is not enough to decide cases strictly on a case-by-case basis using unknown standards or those known only to ourselves as judges; we must strive for known clarity and consistency.1 I think we are derelict in *189our duty if we delay any longer the needed clarification.
A perusal of this court’s opinions which state the test to be applied in reviewing a conviction discloses a singular lack of precision in describing what the test is. It has been recently described as simply “whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.” State v. Kekaualua, 50 Haw. 130, 132, 433 P.2d 131, 133 (1967); State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 533, 423 P. 2d 438, 445 (1967). However, in Cummings, this court repeated with approval the test given in State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, 54 (1961) as follows: “a jury verdict in any case involving conflicting evidence and depending on the determination of credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence is invulnerable when attacked on appeal if there is any substantial evidence amounting to more than a mere scintilla tending to support the findings necessary to the verdict rendered.” (Emphasis added.)2
Today I would reaffirm the rule that a jury verdict of guilty must be accepted by the appellate court if its findings are supported by “substantial evidence.” However, I believe the use of the term more than a mere scintilla in describing the nature of substantial evidence is confusing and should hereafter be avoided. The two phrases are patently inconsistent. Black’s Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines “scintilla of evidence” as “a metaphori*190cal expression to describe a very insignificant or trifling item or particle of evidence.” “More than a scintilla” has been equated by this court to “more than a mere trifle or suspicion of guilt of the offense charged.” Territory v. Legaspi, 39 Haw. 660, 664 (1953). It would appear that comparing substantial evidence with words which mean an insignificant quantum is to use anomalous rhetoric.
Furthermore, the test on appeal in criminal cases as heretofore applied by this court does not seem to be accurately described by the label substantial evidence amounting to more than a mere scintilla. The present case is a good example. The court’s opinion as supplemented by mine recites a detailed description of relevant and material evidence introduced for the purpose of showing disorderly conduct. There were the provocative and distasteful effigies surrounded by a solidly packed crowd containing sharply divided factions. The pro-Johnson demonstrators were obviously not sedentary or altogether peaceful. They were weaving their way through the crowd en masse and were jockeying with the anti-Vietnam group for a position close to the speaker’s stand. Some of their number tore down anti-Vietnam signs and attempted to rip an anti-Vietnam banner. There were angry mutterings and comments. There were only ten policemen assigned to the area containing the pickets. There was a physical contact between Sarant and a police officer initiated by the former in his efforts to resist the police seizure of the effigies. It is not inconceivable that the responses by the defendants to the police requests and the continued display of the effigies might have triggered an uncontrolled disturbance among the people gathered. There is some evidence to support such a conclusion. A fair appraisal of the evidence would, in my opinion, result in a finding that there was more “than a mere trifle” of evi*191dence to show a serious disturbance was imminent, i.e. that there was more than a mere scintilla to support the charge. And yet, the court reverses the convictions while leaving the scintilla rule unscathed and intact. If my brothers feel that “the State failed to marshal sufficient evidence to sustain a charge of disorderly conduct” because there was not more than a scintilla of evidence to sustain the charge, I submit that they are using the phrase “more than a mere scintilla” as an undefined term of art whose meaning can only be that which is more than a quantum which itself is more than a literal scintilla. It is this sort of paradox which demonstrates the uselessness and confusion resulting from the continued existence of the scintilla rule.
The “substantial evidence” required to support the jury verdict of guilty ought to be that which would justify a reasonable trier of fact in finding that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged beyond any reasonable doubt.3 A significant number of other jurisdictions follow this rule. See, for example, United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841, 844 (4th Cir. 1968); Nagell v. United States, 392 F.2d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Bassett, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193 at 203-04 (1968). In one case, Territory v. Gagarin, 36 Haw. 1 (1941), this court used unambiguous language in clearly explaining the characteristics of the evidence required to sustain a verdict. The court said that a reversal is not required if there was “substantial, competent evidence before the jury from which reasonable men, acting conscientiously and with a desire to arrive at the truth and do justice, could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the elements of the crime charged were established.” 36 Haw. at 5. Unfortunately, the wis*192dom of this case has been left fallow in the years following that opinion.
The term substantial evidence cannot be the equivalent of any evidence. The evidence must be reasonably capable of being believed so that it is “of ponderable legal significance,” In re Teed's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 2d 638, 644, 247 P.2d 54, 58 (1952).
As long as there is a reasonable doubt as to guilt remaining at the close of the evidence, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof. Therefore, the trial court is in error if it denies a motion for judgment of acquittal in such circumstances.
This approach does not require the appellate court to reconcile conflicting evidence, a practice proscribed by Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492 (1952), nor does it require us to interfere with a jury decision based on the determination of the credibility of witnesses or the weight of conflicting evidence, State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. at 33, 361 P.2d at 54. It looks only to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to meet the required standard, assuming full weight is given to the evidence most favorable to the prosecution.
I recognize that this court has always shown a healthy respect for stare decisis and that the argument can be made that the scintilla rule has been given eternal life. I think this court should reject any “doctrine of disability at self-correction.” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940). Stare decisis does not command that we perpetuate our errors.
C. Conduct of the Defendants.
The State contends that the responses to the police requests constituted the disorderly language and conduct from which a breach of the peace might have followed as the direct result. In applying the foregoing test to the *193evidence as discussed in the court’s opinion and supplemented herein, a reasonable trier of fact would certainly have had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendants.
Since it is conceded by the State that the activities engaged in by the defendants were lawful at the time the request was made to remove the effigies, the request by the officer can be viewed only as one which had no force of law to compel compliance.4 It can be seen as no more than an attempt to exercise autocratic power by fiat. To call the subsequent arrests “due process of law” would be a diaphanous euphemism. “Laws ... are to be made by representatives chosen to make laws for the future, not by police officers whose duty is to enforce laws already enacted and to make arrests only for conduct already made criminal.... To let a policeman’s command become equivalent to a criminal statute comes dangerously near making our government one of men rather than of law.” Gregory v. Chicago, 89 S.Ct. 946, 951 (1969). (Concurring Opinion of Black, J.).
Even though the police requests had no legal force behind them, a negative response could, conceivably, have constituted disorderly conduct if the response had been made with the intent or likelihood that a breach of the peace would result from it. However, there is no evidence showing such intent and insufficient evidence to show the likelihood in this case. The refusal to obey a police order per se cannot constitute disorderly conduct. People v. Smith, 19 N.Y.2d 212, 278 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (1967).
That the defendants earnestly and vigorously protested *194their impending incarceration is not to be doubted. But these protests were nothing more than many spirited innocent persons would naturally offer, and they cannot be made to justify an illegal arrest. There was no threatening, abusive or obscene language used by the defendants. There were only queries and protests against the police action.

 It is time that appellate counsel bring this question squarely before us so that we may emerge from the fog bants of avoidance to the sunshine of enlightenment.

 Numerous variations of the scintilla rule have been stated in the following Hawaii cases:
Territory v. Lam Bo, 23 Haw. 718, 719 (1917)
Territory v. Young, 32 Haw. 628, 634 (1933)
Territory v. Legaspi, 39 Haw. 660, 664 (1953)
State v. Foster, 44 Haw. 403, 409, 354. P.2d 960, 964 (1960)
State v. Sorenson, 44 Haw. 601, 610, 359 P.2d 289, 294 (1961)
State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, 54 (1961)
State v. Yoshino, 45 Haw. 206, 219, 364, P.2d 638, 646 (1961)
State v. Hassard, 45 Haw. 221, 231, 365 P.20 202, 207 (1961)
State v. Arena, 46 Haw. 315, 324, 379 P.2d 594, 601 (1963)
State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 534, 423 P.2d 438, 445 (1967)

 See my concurring opinion in State v. Kekaualua, 50 Haw. 130, 134, 433 P.2d 131, 134 (1967) for another discussion of this concept.

 The State conceded this point by inference in oral argument when it agreed that the arrests would not have been justified if the defendants had politely and quietly declined to remove the effigies when asked.