Court Opinion

ID: 9754960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:19:40.339545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.103543
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
In view of the ten year history in which these two School Districts have resisted their obligation to devise and implement a realistic and effective desegregation plan for their respective districts, I am at a loss to understand the Commonwealth Court’s and this Court’s willingness to accept a belated voluntary plan as being in compliance with the previous directives of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (Commission) and the prior orders of the Commonwealth Court. I fail to perceive any transformation that could cause a reasonable person to believe that a District which has demonstrated such reluctance in the past to come to grips with the serious problems of racial imbalance within its school population will now, without any coercive stimulant, aggressively seek the eradication of this evil. The majority opinion fails to reach the critical issue presented in these appeals, i. e. the scope of review of the Commonwealth Court in an enforcement proceeding of this nature. Finally, I believe the majority has reached issues which were unnecessary to the resolution of the lawsuits before us and that its decision to dispose of these questions *432on the record before us was jurisprudentially unsound. I therefore dissent.
I. SCOPE OF REVIEW
While the issue of the appropriate scope of review of the Commonwealth Court in an action for enforcement brought by the Commission under section 10 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (Act) of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 960 (Supp.1978-79), is applicable to both cases, I will in this opinion discuss the question within the framework of the Philadelphia case since in that instance it provides the basis for my reaching a result different from that reached by the majority. It is, however, to be understood that in each instance the appropriate scope of review is the same in my judgment. The Commission contends, and I agree, that the “substantial evidence test” is the standard by which the Commonwealth Court was required to review the recommendations and findings of the Commission in this matter.
No area is more amenable to the administrative agency concept than that of human relations. Because of the pervasive and insidious nature of discrimination it can only be effectively attacked on a case-by-case basis by an agency that has developed an expertise in ascertaining its presence and in the designing of remedies to combat it.1 This Court *433has recognized that courts, with their numerous areas of concern and their ever increasing case loads, are particularly unsuited to assume such a task:
“Moreover, having expressed its findings and goals in an early section, the Legislature undoubtedly envisioned a case-by-case approach to the elimination of racial imbalance in public schools. Most observers agree that when courts are forced to devise and supervise programs whose goal is the elimination of racial imbalance they are acting in an area alien to their expertise. These observers would prefer to see de facto segregation attacked by the community itself utilizing other organs of the government. The Human Relations Commission, whose function is to work with the parties to the dispute in an attempt to alleviate the source of the friction through ‘conference, conciliation and persuasion,’ and whose procedure is considerably more flexible than the courts, is, as the Legislature recognized, better equipped to deal with this problem than the courts. ‘In each case, the interests protected by adherence to neighborhood attendance zones must be weighed against the substantiality of the racial imbalance in the community’s schools. An agency such as the'1 Human Relations Commission is best equipped to make these difficult judgments, and flexible enough to enter appropriate remedial orders.’ ”
Pa. Human Rel. Com. v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 179, 233 A.2d 290, 301-302 (1967) (footnote omitted).
The General Assembly established the Commission and charged it with the responsibility “[t]o formulate policies to effectuate the purposes of [that] act” and to “initiate, receive, investigate and pass upon complaints” charging unlawful discriminatory practices. 43 P.S. § 957 (1964 & *434Supp.1978-79). The Commission must first seek compliance through “conference, conciliation and persuasion.” Id. § 956 (Supp.1978-79). If this approach proves inadequate, the Commission is then empowered to hold hearings, make findings of fact, and issue final orders. Id. Such final orders are reviewable under section 10 of the Act in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Agency Law, 71 P.S. § 1710.41 (1962 & Supp.1978-79). 43 P.S. § 960 (Supp.1978-79). Where an appeal of the order is taken pursuant to section 10 by an aggrieved party, it is clear that the Commonwealth Court has accepted that its scope of review is limited to the substantial evidence test.2 In Midland Hts. Homes v. Pa. Human Rel. Com., 17 Pa.Cmwlth. 563, 565-566, 333 A.2d 516, 517 (1975), that court stated:
*435“As stated in Section 10 of the Act, 43 P.S. § 960 (Supp.1974-1975), our scope of review is governed by the Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, as amended, 71 P.S. § 1710.1 et seq., whereby we are to determine whether the Commission’s adjudication ‘is not in accordance with law’ or whether ‘any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence.’ See Wilkinsburg School District v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 378, 295 A.2d 609 (1972).
Although on this record, we, if we had been the fact-finders, might have reached a contrary determination, nevertheless, we must conclude that there is sufficient substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
I can find no justification for interpreting section 10 as allowing a broader scope of review where the Commonwealth Court is called upon to enforce the Commission’s order than the court has in reviewing the propriety of the order in the first instance. Particularly where the requested enforcement only entails the court’s review of the Commission’s judgment that a submitted plan by the District is not in compliance with an order the court has already considered and found appropriate, I find no reason why that court should be allowed to substitute its judgment.3 It is clear *436that the judgment in such a case is the type that is expected to be within the agency's expertise. Where the agency is forced to depend upon the courts for the enforcement function, the agency’s role becomes merely advisory in nature if the court is allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Instructive on this issue is the language of this Court in Com. Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Pa. Power Co., 461 Pa. 675, 693-95 & n.17, 337 A.2d 823, 832-833 & n.17 (1975):
“The confusion over that which transpired below lies in the fact that neither the Clean Air Act nor the Air Pollution Control Act anticipate that a court would prepare its own order to abate air pollution without ‘agency assistance.’ The Acts provide for an Administrative Process, i. e., the application of state standards to specific sources through agency orders and a court's ‘enforcing function’ to compel compliance with such agency orders. See 35 P.S. § 4001 et seq. and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. Under these Acts, if an agency order or decision is challenged, review is limited to administrative review.
Here, unlike other cases in this area, the ‘enforcing court,’ in what appears to be a good faith attempt to *437ameliorate an already drawn out conflict between PPC and the DER, formulated its own order, including its own commitment date. ‘Agency input’ as anticipated by the statutes was never added and consequently had not been reviewed.”
“It is important to note that the DER was given the opportunity to make a ‘reviewable’ decision but chose instead to file for contempt. Had the DER decided to pass on the acceptability of the PPC application, state administrative remedies would have become available and likewise court review of agency findings. See North American Coal Corp. v. Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa. Cmwlth. 469, 279 A.2d 356 (1971); Standard Lime and Refractories Company v. Department of Environmental Resources, 2 Pa.Cmwlth. 434, 279 A.2d 383 (1971). Only in this context (pursuant to Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, 71 P.S. § 1710.4) would judicial review have been as limited as DER now suggests.17
The pertinent language of section 10 provides:
“When the Commission has heard and decided any complaint brought before it, enforcement of its order shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in such court, together with a transcript of the record of the hearing before the Commission, and issuance and service of a copy of said petition as in proceedings in equity. When enforcement of a Commission order is sought, the court may make and enter, upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings set forth in such transcript, an order or decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside, in whole or in part, the order of the Commission, . . ”
*43843 P.S. § 960 (Supp.1978-79).
This Court has stated:
“The canons of statutory construction require that a statute be read in a manner which will effectuate its purpose, a task which compels consideration of more than the statute’s literal words. E. g., Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Bd. of School Directors, 418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965); Rossiter v. Whitpain Twp., 404 Pa. 201, 170 A.2d 586 (1961); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Corp., 321 Pa. 359, 184 A. 31 (1936); Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 46 P.S. § 551. In ascertaining this legislative purpose, especially when the act in question is a manifestation of a fundamental policy of the Commonwealth, courts may properly consider the historical setting which gave impetus to its enactment. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Corp., supra; Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 155 A. 112 (1931); 50 Am.Jur. § 295 (1944). Thus even if we assume arguendo that the interpretation we have adopted is not apparent solely from the wording of the statute, any latent ambiguity disappears once we examine the circumstances of its passage.”
Pa. H. R. C. v. Chester School Dist., supra, 427 Pa. at 166-67, 233 A.2d at 295. First, the language of the statute gives rise to an inference that the court should confine its consideration to the record as developed during the proceedings before the agency. I do not accept the majority’s liberal interpretation which would permit the Commonwealth Court to take additional testimony. Second, there is nothing in the Act that suggests that the Commonwealth Court is at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. As has been stated, the legislature clearly intended that the Commission serve as an organ to ferret out and eradicate discriminatory practices. If we interpret section 10 as allowing the Commonwealth Court to have a scope of review beyond the substantial evidence test, we are therefore again relegating the Commission to an advisory capacity only and *439vesting in the court the ultimate judgment in these matters. To do so would clearly frustrate the legislative intention of creating an agency with the expertise in the area and vesting within that agency the power to carry out the purposes of the Act.
The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), crystallized the responsibility of government to eliminate segregation within the schools of this nation. That concept, as it has evolved, has required that all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy. North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 28 L.Ed.2d 586 (1971); Pa. H. R. C. v. Chester Sch. Dist., supra. Any decision to require less would contravene the mandate that every effort must be made to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile Co., 402 U.S. 33, 37, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 28 L.Ed.2d 577 (1971). See also Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973); Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). Moreover the fact that the realization of this responsibility first occurred in situations involving de jure segregation does not lessen the responsibility where offensive racial imbalance is present as a result of de facto segregation. Pa. H. R. C. v. Chester Sch. Dist., supra:
“In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States ushered in a new era of constitutional development when it held segregated educational facilities deprived children of minority groups the opportunity to obtain an education equal to that received by their Caucasian counterparts. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). The consolidated cases decided in Brown involved areas where the state gave active support to a dual system of schools, and for several years the greatest emphasis was placed upon achieving compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate in the southern states. See, e. *440g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5, 19 (1958). However, Negro leaders recognized that their children were not receiving equal educational opportunities in northern communities, where the schools were frequently segregated on a de facto basis, and in the late fifties they began to focus their attention on this problem. See, e. g., Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F.Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940, 82 S.Ct. 382, 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961).” Id. 427 Pa. at 167, 233 A.2d at 295.
When the substantial evidence test is employed to the recommendation and request of the Commission in the Philadelphia case it is, in my judgment, evident that there was a rational basis for the position urged by the Commission, and that the Commonwealth Court abused its discretion in denying the Commission’s request for enforcement.
The factual history in the Philadelphia case has been outlined in the majority opinion and I will not repeat it here. I do believe, however, that certain aspects should be emphasized and clarified. The majority opinion focuses upon the Commission’s amended Final Order of September 25, 1972. This tends to obscure the fact that the order sought to be enforced by the Commission is for purposes of this case the same as the order it issued on June 7,1971. This order came under judicial scrutiny when the School District of Philadelphia (District) took an appeal to the Commonwealth Court. That action resulted in an affirmance of the Commission’s order as it relates to the matters presently before this Court.4 In that decision the Commonwealth Court accepted the Commission’s findings that there was de facto segregation in the District’s pupil population.
*441It is also significant that the Order of June 7, 1971 anticipated the completion of a desegregation plan by the beginning of the 1974-75 school year. We have now completed the 1977-78 school year and a satisfactory plan has yet to be designed or implemented. When we consider that the discussions relating to the racial imbalance among the students within the District began in 1968, it becomes apparent that a decade has passed without a resolution of this urgent problem. In this setting of procrastination and delay the majority contends that it is reasonable to accept an entirely voluntary plan for desegregation of the system. Further, it condones withholding any mandatory measures until February 1, 1980.5
The essence of the Commission’s objection is its unwillingness in face of the history of this litigation to accept the plan without mandatory features. Specifically, the assurances sought are that the District’s plan should have included guarantees that a control would be maintained over admissions to program elements to stimulate desegregation; to guarantee an immediate realignment of school boundaries in contiguous attendance areas where racial imbalance exists; and a commitment by the District to a plan of involuntary desegregation should the proposed voluntary plan fail to accomplish the desired result. In view of the history of the case, the Commission’s reluctance to consent to the plan offered was, in my judgment, a reasonable position.
The Commonwealth Court reasoned:
“In a ‘manner of speaking, it might be said that the School District of Philadelphia became segregated by action of the people on a voluntary basis by their selection of their neighborhood of residence. It does not seem inappropriate, therefore, to attempt to achieve desegregation by the equally voluntary action of the people in the selection of the schools their children will attend.’ ”
*442Pa. H.R.C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 30 Pa.Cmwlth. 644, 647, 374 A.2d 1014, 1016 (1977).
This is the most blatant example of a court substituting its judgment for that of the agency charged with the responsibility of dealing with the problems in areas of its expertise. It also illustrates the danger of allowing courts to dabble in areas beyond their competence. The fallacy of this reasoning is so obvious that it should not require a response, however, since my brethren seem to be impressed, I am compelled to do so.
Unquestionably the segregated pattern in the school population is in large measure reflective of a segregated residential pattern. It is, however, erroneous to assume that the selection of residence in America today is the “voluntary” choice of all of the citizens of this society. One of the recognized evils of racial prejudice is that it forces those subjected to its insidious poison to accept housing which is substandard and located in the least desirable sections. Discrimination deprives minorities of the freedom of choice in the selection of their residence that most members of majority classes possess.
“There are many social and economic causes for the rigidified residential patterns which dominate our communities, and despite anti-discrimination laws the barriers to integrated housing are often difficult to breach. Indeed the way to attack discrimination in housing and employment may be to begin with a program of quality integrated education. The best way to demonstrate the ‘inherent worth of [one’s] neighbor’ is to place individuals in a situation where they are exposed to their neighbor. This is especially true if a child can become aware of his neighbors’ capabilities before his prejudices have had a chance to develop, but inter-racial cooperation may also have a beneficial effect on the thinking of adults. Thus, participation in such school activities as the P.T.A. may promote a better understanding which is the crucial first step toward the achievement of a truly integrated society. To paraphrase Mr. Justice HOLMES, one such experience may be worth several volumes of sociology.” (footnote *443omitted) Pa. H.R.C. v. Chester Sch. Dist., supra, 427 Pa. at 170-71, 233 A.2d at 297.
To me it is more reasonable to adopt the Commission’s view that since the racial imbalance in our school population is, in large measure, created by involuntary residential patterns forced upon the minority members of the community, it is not inappropriate to impose involuntary measures upon the school district majority to alleviate these conditions. In making this statement, I am particularly aware that one of the dominant concerns of those seeking restrictive and exclusive residential patterns is the racial complexion of the school their children will be attending. To remove the exclusivity of the school population would, in my judgment, assist in large measure in overcoming the present resistance to change in the residential patterns.6
*444Therefore, I am of the view that it cannot be said that there was not a reasonable basis for the Commission’s disapproval of the plan submitted by the Philadelphia School District. Under the substantial evidence test the Commission’s position should have been sustained and the plan presently before the Court rejected.
II. JURISDICTION
I also take exception to the majority's disposition of the jurisdictional question in this case (majority op. at 1244— 1245). The parties did not press the jurisdictional issue before this Court, and there is no dispute that this Court has general subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case. The underlying question involves the root of that jurisdiction, i. e., whether this Court’s review should be jurisdiction-ally based upon section 203 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, 17 P.S. § 211.203 (Supp.1978-79), or upon the discretionary jurisdiction authorized by section 204(a), id. § 211.204(a). In my view, it is unwise for the majority to resolve such an important question without the benefit of thorough briefs and arguments by the litigants.7
III. THE MANDATE IN THE PITTSBURGH CASE
My final point of contention concerns the majority’s mandate in the Pittsburgh case. Preliminarily I note that I still *445adhere to this Court’s holding in Pa. H.R.C. v. Norristown Area School Dist., 473 Pa. 334, 374 A.2d 671 (1977), that the Commission’s Recommended Elements are not inflexible administrative regulations but rather are advisory guidelines. In keeping with this holding, the majority today remands the Pittsburgh case to the Commonwealth Court with instructions to modify its order in a manner consistent with the majority opinion. The majority then goes into considerable detail as to the nature and extent of the mandated modification.8 I am of the opinion that such a mandate is totally unnecessary, is wasteful of judicial resources, and creates the possibility of further appellate review and the delay attendant thereto.
This Court has thoroughly considered the allegations and arguments of all parties to this appeal and is therefore in an excellent position to modify the order itself in precisely the manner in which it directs the Commonwealth Court to act. See note 8, supra. There can be no doubt that this Court is empowered to modify lower court orders, and considering the interests of judicial economy and avoidance of delay in a matter of grave significance to the citizens of Pittsburgh, I can find no justification for placing another judicial hurdle in the path of final resolution of this case. It is at least conceivable that the Pittsburgh Board of Education may be dissatisfied with the Commonwealth Court’s modified order. In such an event, the Board may again elect to appeal to this Court on the grounds that the court’s modified order is inconsistent with today’s majority opinion. If I understand the majority’s jurisdictional discussion, this Court would *446then be compelled to entertain such an appeal, because under the majority view section 203 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, 17 P.S. § 211.203 (Supp.1978-79), governs the instant case. This possibility of further appellate review could be avoided if this Court itself would simply modify the Commonwealth Court’s order.
The parties have had their day or days in court, and it is now time for them to move forward in the process of providing a racially integrated school system for the children of Pittsburgh. The majority’s mandate merely sows the seeds for the future frustration of that process.
ROBERTS and MANDERINO, JJ., join in this dissent.

. This Court stated recently:
“From the outset, we note that the Legislature, in an attempt to deal comprehensively with the basic and fundamental problem of discrimination, clothed the Human Relations Commission with authority to ‘. . . take such affirmative action including but not limited to . [several specific courses of action] as, in the judgment of the Commission, will effectuate the purposes of this act, and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.’ Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, supra at § 9, 43 P.S. § 959 (Supp.1973) (emphasis added). The words ‘as in the judgment of the Commission’ indicate to us that the Legislature recognized that only an administrative agency with broad remedial powers, exercising particular expertise, could cope effectively with the pervasive problem of unlawful discrimination. Accordingly, the Legislature vested in the Commission, quite properly, maximum flexibility to remedy and hopefully eradicate the ‘evils’ of discrimination. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, supra at *433§ 2(a), 43 P.S. § 952(a) (Supp.1973). The legislative mandate that the provisions of the Act be ‘construed liberally’, noted supra, serves to reinforce this view.
We thus recognize that the expertise of the Commission in fashioning remedies is not to be lightly regarded.”
Pa. Human Rel. Com. v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass’n, 453 Pa. 124, 133-34, 306 A.2d 881, 887 (1973) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

. The term, “substantial evidence” has been defined by the U. S. Supreme Court as follows:
“Substantial evidence . . means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 299, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
In Pa. Human Rel. Com. v. Feeser, 469 Pa. 173, 364 A.2d 1324, 1327 n.9 (1976), we stated:
9. Section 10 of the PHRA, id. § 10, 43 P.S. § 960, provides that review of PHRC orders shall be in accord with the provisions of the Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, as amended, 71 P.S. § 1710.1 et seq. (1962). Section 44 of the Administrative Agency Law, id. § 44, 71 P.S. § 1710.44, sets forth the standard of review:
“[T]he court shall affirm the [agency] adjudication unless it shall find that the same is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in accordance with law, or that the provisions of sections thirty-one to thirty-five [relating to the procedure to be used at the administrative hearing] . . have been violated . . . or that any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence.”
See, e. g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Chester School District, 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967); Midland Heights Homes v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 563, 33 A.2d 516 (1975); General Electric Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 316, 321, 334 A.2d 817, 821 (1975). See also, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass’n, 453 Pa. 124, 133-34, 306 A.2d 881, 887 (1973).

. Prof. Louis Jaffe, in his work, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (1965), made a searching inquiry into the judicial role in the enforcement of agency orders. The following passages are particularly enlightening:
“Occasionally the Supreme Court has characterized the district courts and courts of appeal exercising powers of judicial review and enforcement as ‘courts of equity.’ This has encouraged litigants to invoke the traditional broad powers of the chancellor to temper with mercy the harsh application of rules. The court will be asked to mitigate, remit, or suspend the sanction imposed by the administrative order or regulation. This appeal to the alleged equitable powers of the court ordinarily will fail; the court, if relief is granted, will seek to justify its action on the ground that the agency’s action is in excess of statutory warrant. It must be admitted that to characterize the court as a ‘court of equity’ is not apt. The chancellor’s jurisdiction is broad and original. But in our *436situation it is the agency which has original jurisdiction in the sense of the power to choose from among valid competing solutions. The reviewing court’s basic role is to decide whether the chosen solution is valid.”
“There is a considerable body of law concerning judicial control of administrative remedies, most of it — in the federal sphere — dealing with the Labor Board and the Trade Commission. Though characteristically the agencies are allowed broad discretion in formulating remedies, the Supreme Court has developed principles of control. Thus the question may be raised whether the order bears an ‘appropriate relation to the policies of the Act’; whether ‘the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act’, whether the Board has ‘patently traveled outside the orbit of its authority so that there is, legally speaking, no order to enforce.’ The concept most, usually applied in testing the sanction imposed by the order is the distinction between what can be justified as appropriate to right the wrong and what cannot be so justified.” Id. at 263, 267.

 Review of an agency decision permits the court to ask only whether ‘based on the full record before the agency, the agency’s action was arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion.’ See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Company, 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973); Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331 (1954); and Bortz Coal Company v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa.Cmwlth. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971). Here, however, there was no decision on record by the agency.

. The Commonwealth Court did remand the cause to the Commission. This action was necessitated by provisions in that order relating to requirements that the District adopt affirmative recruitment programs to correct de facto racial imbalance in the professional and non-professional staffs. The Amendment of the June 7, 1971 order to bring it into compliance with the Commonwealth Court’s directive was accomplished by deleting all provisions relating to staff integration. Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations Com., 6 Pa. Cmwlth.Ct. 281, 294 A.2d 410 (1972).

. The sincerity of the District is best gleaned from the plan offered by it in response to the Commonwealth Court’s order of October 1, 1974. This plan called for the creation of a Metropolitan School District embracing Philadelphia and school districts in adjacent counties. The political obstacles in such a proposal should have been apparent to even the most naive.

. I am not unmindful of those who place the neighborhood school system on a preferred pedestal. My response to them is the statement of Mr. Justice ROBERTS in Pa. H.R.C. v. Chester Sch. Dist., supra:
“The argument that the Commission’s order will destroy the neighborhood school system completely distorts the historical rationale of neighborhood schools. Traditionally, the neighborhood school has been an exercise in democracy, ‘a single structure serving a heterogeneous community in which children of varied racial, cultural, religious, and socio-economic backgrounds were taught together — -the proverbial melting pot.’ One educator has recalled: ‘Most men and women over 40 recall a childhood schooling in which the sons and daughters of millowners, shop proprietors, professional men, and day laborers attended side by side. School boundaries, reaching out into fields and hills to embrace the pupil population, transcended such socio-economic clusterings as existed.’
However, increasing population density in our nation’s urban areas have caused neighborhoods to shrink drastically until today convenience is the most common justification for school attendance zones. Thus, ‘because of rigid racial and socio-economic stratification, ethnic and class similarity has become the most salient present-day neighborhood characteristic, particularly in urban areas. The neighborhood school, which encompasses a homogeneous racial and socio-economic grouping, as is true today, is the very antithesis of the common school heritage.’ Rather than neighborhood schools, we have all too frequently developed a system of ghetto schools. Integration need not see the demise of neighborhood schooling, although unquestionably new patterns of districting will have to occur.”
*444Id. 427 Pa. at 174-75, 233 A.2d at 299, quoting Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented, 16 West-Res.L.Rev. 502, 507 (1964); Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, 40 (U.S. Comm, on Civil Rights, 1967). (footnote omitted).
Today, heterogeneity is not the economic and social difference, but rather the ethnic, religious and racial differences that exist in our present community. The true neighborhood concept is one reflective of our present population where each student has the benefit of the association of those with whom he must compete in the life which he is preparing to enter.

. The majority reaches its result on the jurisdiction question relying on the implicit premise that the enforcement proceeding under section 10 is an independent, separate and distinct proceeding. If, however, you view the entire proceeding as commencing with the administrative action below (conciliation, conference, complaint, hearing and order) the appeal of that order and the subsequent enforcement, the majority reasoning appears erroneous.

. The majority states:
That order should make clear the District’s obligation to prepare and submit a plan which addresses the problem of school desegregation in good faith and in realistic fashion. The District’s Plan should take into account the Recommended Elements and the significance they will have for the deliberations of the Commission in its review of the plan. The order should, however, provide some degree of flexibility in recognition of the fact that a plan which fails to satisfy some aspect of the Recommended Elements may prove acceptable if the District demonstrates that substantial and persuasive justification exists for any such departure.
Majority op. at-.