Court Opinion

ID: 9963091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 16:07:46.658477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:40.884143
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
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Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40903

RUTH GARCIA ARAGON,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FORREST BRUNSON; BRUNSON
ELECTRICAL; and BRECCO, INC,

      Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY
Daniel A. Bryant, District Court Judge

Marshall Law, P.C.
Stephen R. Marshall
Albuquerque, NM

King Law Firm
Ian F. King
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Civerolo, Gralow & Hill
Justin L. Robbs
Hannah R. Jiacoletti
Albuquerque, NM

The Law Offices of Montoya & Murphy-Kollar
Gino L. Montoya
Oklahoma City, OK

for Appellees

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
MEDINA, Judge.

{1}     Plaintiff Ruth Aragon appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint
against Defendants Forrest Brunson (individually), Brecco, Inc., and Brunson Electrical
because Plaintiff failed to serve Defendants with reasonable diligence under Rule 1-
004(C) NMRA. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred because (1) Plaintiff served
the complaint within a reasonable time after the statute of limitations expired; and (2)
Defendants were not prejudiced by the delay in service. Plaintiff also argues that the
district court’s decision denied her equal protection under the law by improperly limiting
her access to the court system. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2}     This case arises from an alleged car accident in Alamogordo, New Mexico
between Plaintiff and Defendant Brunson in June 2019. Plaintiff alleged various
negligence-based personal injury claims against Defendant Brunson and claims of
vicarious liability against Defendant Brecco, Inc. and Defendant Brunson Electrical.
Before filing her complaint, Plaintiff sent Defendants a demand letter in an attempt to
resolve the matter without litigation. The parties did not come to a resolution, and
Plaintiff filed her complaint on June 10, 2021. Plaintiff did not obtain a summons or
attempt to serve any of the Defendants after filing the complaint. According to
Defendants, neither Plaintiff nor her counsel informed them or their insurers that she
filed the complaint.

{3}     The case remained inactive for approximately six months. On December 9, 2021,
Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew, Plaintiff’s new counsel simultaneously entered his
appearance, and the district court entered an order requiring in part that Plaintiff serve
each Defendant with the summons and the complaint. Defendants hired counsel in April
2022 to represent them and discover “what was going on with this case.” Defendants’
counsel looked at the court docket and discovered that new counsel had entered an
appearance on behalf of Plaintiff, and on April 4, 2022, counsel for Defendants emailed
Plaintiff’s new counsel asking whether they had served the complaint on Defendants.
Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond until June 21, 2022, when Plaintiff asked whether
defense counsel could accept service on behalf of the Defendants. Defendant’s counsel
replied that he would have to confer with Defendants. The statute of limitations ran on
Plaintiff’s claims on June 13, 2022—three years after the alleged accident. See NMSA
1978, § 37-1-8 (1976) (stating that actions “for an injury to the person” must be brought
“within three years”). Plaintiff served Defendants with the complaint on June 30, 2022,
slightly over a year after the complaint had been filed.

{4}    On August 1, 2022, all three Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
under Rule 1-012(B)(5) (insufficiency of service of process) and (B)(6) NMRA (failure to
state a claim). Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to serve Defendants with
reasonable diligence, and Plaintiff’s claims had already expired because the failure to
serve did not toll the statute of limitations. Defendants attached an April 4, 2022 email,
as an exhibit to their motion to dismiss in which defense counsel asked Plaintiff’s new
counsel whether Plaintiff had served Defendants and, if so, to provide the service
information.

{5}    Plaintiff responded that service was timely because service may take place within
a period of time that includes the length of the statute of limitations plus a reasonable
time thereafter. Plaintiff argued the timing was reasonable and Defendants’ motion
should be denied because Plaintiff served Defendants less than one month after the
statute of limitations expired. Defendants replied that the actual issue was not the
timeliness of service, but whether Plaintiff exercised diligence in attempting service
under Rule 1-004(C)(2) (stating that service of process “shall be made with reasonable
diligence”).

{6}     During a hearing on the motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate an intent to pursue her claims because Plaintiff did not attempt to serve
Defendants for more than a year after filing the complaint and during that time Plaintiff
made no attempt to contact Defendants other than to ask if Defendants’ attorney would
accept service. Defendants argued they suffered both factual and procedural prejudice
by the delay, pointing out that witnesses memories had faded, documents relating to the
incident had become unavailable, and the scene of the accident has since changed.
Procedurally, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s delay forced Defendants to lose the
option to remove the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction and forced
Defendants to lose the ability to exercise a preemptory excusal against the assigned
district court judge in state court. Plaintiff reiterated her arguments from her briefing: a
defendant need only be served within a reasonable time of the end of the statute of
limitations, and case law did not support Defendants’ prejudice argument because
Defendants were aware of a potential lawsuit from the prefiling negotiations.

{7}     At the conclusion of the hearing the district court found that the statute of
limitations was not tolled by the mere filing of the complaint stating,

       At about a year after the incident occurred, the court finds that after the
       filing of the complaint, nothing was happening in this case. There were no
       communications between the parties, no conversations between counsel,
       no [inaudible] discussion of whether or not the parties would agree that the
       statute of limitations should be tolled [inaudible] to give opportunity to
       negotiate. No summons was issued, no action was taken so the court
       finds that in fact, the statute of limitations was not tolled and that the step
       necessary to toll the statute of limitations, service of process on the
       Defendants did not occur until after the statute of limitations.

The district court entered an order, finding: (1) “Plaintiff filed her complaint on June 10,
2021”; (2) “[a]fter filing, Plaintiff failed to obtain a summons or make any attempt to
serve until June 21, 2022”; (3) “Plaintiff was aware of the lack of service”; and (4)
“Plaintiff had the information necessary to locate and serve Defendants.” The district
court concluded that “[a]ccordingly, because Plaintiff did not exercise reasonable
diligence in prosecution of her suit, the statute of limitations was not tolled by the filing
of Plaintiff’s complaint on June 10, 2021.” This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{8}     Plaintiff argues that we should review the district court’s order de novo. Contrary
to Plaintiff’s framing of the issue as to whether the complaint was barred by the statute
of limitations, Defendants’ arguments and the district court’s order are based on
whether Plaintiff served Defendants with reasonable diligence as required by Rule 1-
004(C)(2). See Prieto v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program (H.E.L.P.), 1980-NMCA-114,
¶ 12, 94 N.M. 738, 616 P.2d 1123 (holding that the district court “in the exercise of its
inherent power and in its discretion, independent of statute, may dismiss a case for
failure to prosecute when it is satisfied that plaintiff has not applied due diligence in the
prosecution of [their] suit”). “A district court’s determination that a plaintiff failed to act
with reasonable diligence under Rule 1-004(C)(2), and whether the complaint should be
dismissed as a result, is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” Murphy v. Lash, 2024-
NMCA-031, ¶ 18, ___ P.3d ___ (A-1-CA-39628, Oct. 26, 2023). The district court’s
determination of whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence is “based on a
standard of objective reasonableness.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{9}     Here, the district court found that “Plaintiff failed to obtain a summons or make
any attempt to serve [Defendants] until June 21, 2022[,]” even though “Plaintiff filed her
complaint on June 10, 2021.” Based on our review of the record, we agree. Plaintiff
provided no reasoning, explanation, or justification for the delay in service in either her
response to Defendants’ motion or at the motion hearing. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to
explain the delay of service on appeal, instead focusing on whether service was
reasonably timely only from the standpoint of the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff failed to provide the district court with facts regarding any attempts Plaintiff
made to serve Defendants with the complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations or explanation why Plaintiff made no such attempts despite Plaintiff’s
knowledge of Defendants’ locations. See id. ¶ 19 (considering the circumstances before
the district court when reviewing dismissal of a complaint under Rule 1-004(C)(2)).
Simply put, Plaintiff provides no circumstances demonstrating the district court erred
when it determined that “Plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in prosecution of
her suit.”

{10} When a “[district] court determines that a plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence
in serving process on a defendant, the court must exercise its discretion to determine
whether the delay warrants dismissal of the complaint.” Romero v. Bachica, 2001-
NMCA-048, ¶ 23, 130 N.M. 610, 28 P.3d 1151. In the proceedings below, Defendants
argued they were prejudiced by the delay in service because the delay harmed
Defendants’ factual investigation into the alleged accident and forced Defendants to
forgo certain procedural, litigation options. Given these arguments, the district court’s
determination was not “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the [district] court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn from such facts and circumstances” necessary to find an abuse
of discretion. Martinez v. Segovia, 2003-NMCA-023, ¶ 29, 133 N.M. 240, 62 P.3d 331
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we hold that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to serve
with reasonable diligence.

{11} Finally, Plaintiff contends that the district court’s decision violated her equal
protection rights by creating two classes of plaintiffs—those that file early to preserve
their claims and those that do not. This argument was not preserved at the district court
and is underdeveloped in Plaintiff’s briefing on appeal. Therefore, we decline to address
this argument further. See Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701
(“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately developed.”); ITT
Educ. Serv., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244,
959 P.2d 969 (stating that this Court will not consider propositions that are unsupported
by citation to authority); State v. Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 33, 292 P.3d 493 (“We
generally do not consider issues on appeal that are not preserved below.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{12} Further, we observe that this Court has previously discussed at length the district
court’s inherent authority to control and manage its own docket and the cases before it,
including dismissing cases because a plaintiff has failed to prosecute a case. Prieto,
1980-NMCA-114, ¶ 12; see also Belser v. O’Cleireachain, 2005-NMCA-073, ¶ 3, 137
N.M. 623, 114 P.3d 303 (recognizing a district court’s inherent authority to manage
cases before it); Pizza Hut of Santa Fe, Inc. v. Branch, 1976-NMCA-051, ¶ 8, 89 N.M.
325, 552 P.2d 227 (stating that district courts have control over their dockets and
inherent power to manage their own affairs to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases).

CONCLUSION

{13} For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s
complaint.

{14}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge