Court Opinion

ID: 9580480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:05:18.867615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:17.901538
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I wholeheartedly agree with the majority’s holding that Eastern is entitled to prejudgment interest on the wrongfully assessed taxes. However, as much as I sympathize with the majority’s desire to allow Eastern also to collect attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 based on the county’s alleged bad faith and stubborn litigiousness, I am persuaded by constitutional and statutory law that the county enjoys sovereign immunity from that claim.
With certain specific exceptions set forth in the Georgia Constitution, “[a] county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute.” OCGA § 36-1-4. See Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. II, *896Sec. II, Par. IX; Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390 (330 SE2d 95) (1985); Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. I; Clark v. State, 240 Ga. 188 (240 SE2d 5) (1977). See also Wood v. Floyd County, 161 Ga. 743, 745-746 (131 SE 882) (1925); Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126 (249 SE2d 573) (1978).
Suits against counties and municipalities to recover refunds of erroneously or illegally collected taxes are, of course, specifically authorized by OCGA § 48-5-380. As pointed out by the majority, to allow recovery of prejudgment interest in such suits is not to sanction any additional “cause of action” against the taxing authority but is merely to afford the taxpayer full restitution of the benefit the taxing authority has received as a direct result of the overpayment. However, a claim for attorney fees based on the taxing authority’s alleged bad faith and stubborn litigiousness quite obviously is not an intrinsic element of a tax refund claim. Indeed, unlike a tax refund claim, such a claim is not even considered liquidated. See Wahnschaff Corp. v. O. E. Clark Paper Box Co., 166 Ga. App. 242, 244 (2) (304 SE2d 91) (1983); Brannon Enterprises v. Deaton, 159 Ga. App. 685, 687 (285 SE2d 58) (1981). Rather, an OCGA § 13-6-11 claim for attorney fees seeks an entirely separate and distinct type of recovery based on aggravating factors over and above those giving rise to the original claim against the defendant. Consequently, it in effect asserts a separate cause of action, albeit one which is not cognizable in its own right but must be asserted in conjunction with some other cause of action. See Citibank v. Knowles, 168 Ga. App. 664 (310 SE2d 18) (1983).
Because there is currently no statute specifically authorizing the recovery of attorney fees as expenses of litigation in a suit against a county, I am compelled to reach the conclusion that the county enjoys sovereign immunity from such claims. The Supreme Court’s holding in DeKalb County v. Trustees &c. Elks, 242 Ga. 707 (251 SE2d 243) (1978), upon which the majority relied in all but the final draft of its opinion in this case, provides not even remote support for a contrary view. In the first place, the issue there was whether attorney fees were recoverable not as a penalty for bad faith or stubborn litigiousness but as an element of just and adequate compensation in eminent domain proceedings. In the second place, the Court’s holding in that case was that attorney fees were not recoverable in such proceedings in the absence of specific legislative authorization. To the extent that this court’s decision in DeKalb County v. Daniels, 174 Ga. App. 319 (6) (329 SE2d 620) (1985), may be considered authority for the majority’s holding in Division 4 of the present case, it contravenes statutory and constitutional law and should be overruled rather than followed.
I am authorized to state Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this opinion.
*897Decided July 13, 1987
Rehearing denied July 31, 1987
Theodore M. Forbes, Jr., Frederick G. Boynton, Edward H. Was-muth, Jr., for appellant.
Harold T. Daniel, Jr., William C. Gentry, for appellee.