Court Opinion

ID: 9761352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:40:08.211638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:22.699030
License: Public Domain

ONION, Judge
(dissenting).
“In criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, a conviction in a criminal case cannot be sustained if the evidence leaves any reasonable doubt as to guilt of the accused.
“No exact rule exists for determining in each case what constitutes reasonable doubt. On the contrary, what constitutes reasonable doubt in a particular case must necessarily be determined by the facts of the case. To sustain a conviction, however, two things are essential. First, it must be shown that the offense charged was actually committed. Second, there must also be proof, of a degree of certainty greater than a mere possibility or strong suspicion, that tends to show that the accused was the person who either committed the crime or else participated in its commission.” 24 Tex. Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 724, p. 393.
“In criminal cases, a conviction may properly be had on circumstantial evidence alone. Indeed, circumstantial evidence is frequently just as convincing in a criminal case as direct evidence. To sustain a conviction on circumstantial evidence, however, the basic facts from which it is sought to infer the ultimate fact of guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by direct evidence. The basic facts must also be consistent not only with each other, but also with the ultimate fact of guilt sought to be inferred from the basic facts. In short, the circumstances relied on, when considered as a whole, must be of a conclusive nature; they must lead to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused is guilty and exclude all other reasonable hypotheses except guilt. They must pro-
duce, in net effect, a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no other person committed the offense charged.” 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 729, p. 403.
“In criminal cases, a judgment of conviction, to be sustained on appeal, must be supported by evidence that produces a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. The evidence will be insufficient to sustain the conviction where, although not leaving the accused free from suspicion of guilt, it still fails to show his guilt to a moral certainty, so as to exclude all reasonable doubt.
“In ascertaining whether the guilt of the accused has been established to a moral certainty, the appellate court will review the evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent. The Court will not presume any acts against the accused that are not shown to have been committed by him. Furthermore, a conviction will not be sustained on appeal if the evidence does not sufficiently establish all material elements of the offense charged.” 24 Tex.Jur. 2d., Evidence, Sec. 742, p. 422.
The facts in this case must be examined in light of these well established rules:
The evidence shows that Helen Kelley, the deceased, a woman in her late forties or fifties who was separated from her husband Jack, spent practically every day in Mary’s Lounge buying drinks or “mootching” drinks. August 23, 1966, was no exception. On that evening at approximately 10:30 p. m. the deceased, a woman named Louise and the appellant were joined by Ima Slater, the State’s principal witness. Ima Slater had been drinking whiskey all day with her common law husband, John Cook. When he fell asleep she adjourned to Mary’s Lounge and there joined the threesome. Because of her inebriated condition, she was refused service at the lounge but drank whiskey from appellant’s partially filled bottle.
*533At the lounge’s midnight closing time, the appellant and the three women left together. After taking Louise home it appears the appellant suggested that they go for a picnic and a swim, and after purchasing groceries they proceeded to a place on the San Jacinto River near Magnolia Gardens, which is described in the record as a tavern-cafe or dance hall. There at a picnic site a quarter of a mile from such tavern in a wooded area with fishing camps in the near vicinity, appellant built a fire. As noted in the majority opinion, they had all continued to drink wine on the way and were intoxicated. While Mrs. Slater was roasting wieners at the fire appellant had built, appellant suggested to the deceased who had remained in the car that they go swimming, to which she replied, “Leon, you know I can’t swim.” He is then reported to have said, “Let’s go swimming, you need a bath anyway.” Mrs. Slater related that appellant “was sort of teasing her.” (Helen) Mrs. Slater stated that she did not see what apparel the deceased and the appellant wore when they left to go down to the river bank to a log embedded in the sand because she had her back to them. From her position at the campfire Mrs. Slater was unable to see the log in the river, but she did hear voices laughing, giggling, talking, and some splashing of water. She heard no outcry, scream or commotion. She related that this continued for 30 or 40 minutes, until appellant returned to the fire and told her that he had left Helen sitting on the leg and asked her to join them. Mrs. Slater then called “Helen” a number of times but received no answer, and then she and appellant went halfway down to the river but Mrs. Slater retreated because she was afraid of the water and could not swim.
It is true that Mrs. Slater testified that appellant said something to the effect that they “were in this together,” but the following is her exact testimony on the subject:
“Q. What did he say after you called and she didn’t answer?
“A. I believe he said something about we are in this together. I said what together and I said let’s go, if something happened, let’s go away. I can’t remember just everything. I was so panicky.
“Q. You do know he said we’re in this together ?
“A. Yes.
“Q. What did you say?
“A. I don’t remember.
“Q. What did he say?
“A. I guess he was referring if she took her life or if she drowned accidentally.”
After their unsuccessful endeavor to locate the deceased, Mrs. Slater and the appellant remained by appellant’s automobile for approximately 4 hours. At dawn they left and stopped at a coffee shop on the Beaumont highway to get coffee, but Mrs. Slater made no outcry to the proprietor, waitress or other people present.
Mrs. Slater revealed that on the way back to town appellant threw something out of the car, but admitted that she didn’t know what it was and had assumed it was “bottles.” She did not see appellant throw any clothing out of the car. She did not testify that she saw any of the deceased’s clothing in the car or at the campsite after the deceased’s disappearance, nor did she. reveal at what point on the trip back to town she had seen appellant throw something from the car. Subsequently, appellant took her to the home of a friend (Mrs. Whickliff) whom she had met when both were confined in jail on charges of drunkenness, but she did not report the incident at the river to the police. Mrs. Slater admitted that her recollection of the entire incident was hazy. It was shown that she had been convicted of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated, and had been committed to the Austin State Hospital as an alcoholic both before and after the alleged offense.
*534The following day after the officers had taken Mrs. Slater to Magnolia Gardens, she was able to direct them to the campsite and the log in the river. Without her assistance the officers discovered what appeared to be the deceased’s dress (and slip) and shoes at points ¾0 of a mile and ½ of a mile from the campsite on a public road accessible to all who entered or left the area. She testified that she did not remember “how we came out or in.” The deceased’s panties, hose and brassiere were never found.
Deputy Sheriff Conley did testify that he waded knee-deep in the water by the log, but he did not examine the last five or six feet of the log extending into deep water to determine whether there were branches on the log, snags or logs on which a person standing or sitting there drunk would be likely to catch his or her neck. Further, he did not testify that he examined the ground surrounding the log to determine if there were footprints leading off in an opposite direction than the campsite.
Helen Kelley’s nude body was found floating face down in the San Jacinto River about 9:30 or 10 a. m. on August 24, 1966, approximately three or four hundred yards south of Magnolia Gardens Tavern, a quarter of a mile from the campsite in question. The autopsy performed revealed that at the time of her death, the alcohol content in her blood was .310 or, as the medical examiner pointed out, she was more than three times drunk.
The medical examiner further testified that there were some recent hemorrhages into the strap muscles of the neck, and that “this type of hemorrhages are the result of something or someone restraining this portion of the anatomy and an individual resisting this restraint.” * * * “That something or someone had applied force to that portion of the anatomy.” Further, he related “[sjomething either hits the body or the body hits something is one way this can occur and another is that if the body, certain portions of the body are restrained and force applied to break that restraint and there are forces at work. This can be caused by both.” The medical examiner did express the opinion that the force applied to the strap muscles was similar to those seen in strangulation cases but testified the same bruises could be produced if someone was trying to save a person from drowning and grabbed the person’s neck.
The medical examiner further testified that the deceased did not die of strangulation as such, but died as a result of suffocation from drowning. He further related that while it was his opinion that she died within an hour or two of 1 a. m., there was the possibility that she could have died at any time from 1 a. m. until her body was found. He explained that some of the bruises found on her body could have been caused by logs or driftwood in the river.
It is true that the appellant was arrested some six months later in Vidor near Beaumont, but there is meager evidence to indicate flight. There is no showing that he did not live or work there at the time and the record indicates that he was seen in Mary’s Lounge sometime after the alleged offense, and there is no showing that he departed Harris County suddenly after the alleged offense. It is observed that after the deceased’s disappearance he remained at the campsite four hours to await her re-appearance despite Mrs. Slater’s plea of “Let’s go.”
The appellant did not testify but offered the testimony of his sister-in-law, who stated that she knew the deceased who had stayed with her on one occasion because she had no place else to go and had been sleeping in parked cars. The sister-in-law testified that the deceased was always stumbling and falling down from drinking. Appellant further offered the testimony of another witness who frequently bought the deceased drinks at Mary’s Lounge just to keep her from bothering him.
It further appears to have been common knowledge among the deceased’s acquaintances and friends that she was despondent *535over her year old separation from her husband.
The evidence fails to reflect any motive on the part of the appellant. They had no quarrel or argument at the lounge, nor at the picnic site. Mrs. Slater heard no sounds of any struggle or outcry or scream, and she further testified that appellant and the deceased had always been good friends.
It is well settled that a showing or lack of a showing of a motive for the crime is a factor to be weighed in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to produce moral certainty of the accused’s guilt.
Can it be said that it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased met her death as a result of a criminal act ? If that has been shown, is there proof of a degree of certainty greater than a mere possibility or strong suspicion that tends to show that the accused is the person who committed the crime? I think not, even if we consider the hysterical hearsay statements of the admitted alcoholic Slater, set out and relied upon in the majority opinion, as to her suspicions, fears and feelings. Are the circumstances sufficiently strong to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the 3-times-drunk deceased did not either accidentally or purposefully fall off the log into water and was swept to her death against logs and debris in the river, or that she wandered off in search of Magnolia Gardens or one of the various nearby fishing camps in order to “mootch” another drink and there met her death at the hands of parties unknown?
I cannot conclude that the facts set forth above, upon which this conviction rests, are sufficiently strong to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the accused even when considered in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. See Hodges v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 490, 321 S.W.2d 307.
I respectfully dissent.
MORRISON, J., joins in this dissent.