Court Opinion

ID: 9897564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:11.543328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:31.266176
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                    APPELLATE DIVISION
                                    DOCKET NO. A-3155-21

BRANDON MEREDITH HARDY,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,                 APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
                                                     August 9, 2023
v.                                                APPELLATE DIVISION

SUSAN D. JACKSON,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________

            Submitted March 28, 2023 – Decided August 9, 2023

            Before Judges Messano, Gilson, and Gummer.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No.
            L-2250-21.

            Brandon Meredith Hardy, appellant pro se.

            Malamut & Associates LLC, attorneys for respondent
            (Robert N. Wright, Jr., on the brief).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

GUMMER, J.A.D.

      Plaintiff Brandon Hardy and the person he wants to marry are

incarcerated at different federal prisons. Plaintiff filed a complaint claiming

defendant Susan D. Jackson, the New Hanover Township Municipal Clerk and
Registrar, had violated his civil rights by applying the requirement in N.J.S.A.

37:1-7 and -8 that couples appear in person to obtain a marriage license.

Plaintiff appeals an order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and

granting defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. We affirm.

                                        I.

      Because of the early procedural stage of the case, we accept the facts

alleged in the complaint as true, giving plaintiff "every reasonable inference of

fact." Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl,

P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp

Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). We begin with a summary of those

facts and the applicable statutes.

      N.J.S.A. 37:1-7 authorizes a "licensing officer" to issue a marriage

license to "contracting parties who . . . personally . . . apply therefor . . . ."

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 37:1-8, the licensing officer "shall, before issuing a

marriage . . . license, require the contracting parties . . . to appear before him

and subscribe and swear to an oath attesting the truth of the facts respecting

the legality of the proposed marriage . . . ." Both statutes contain a provision

for individuals who intend to be married pursuant to N.J.S.A. 37:1-17.3, a

statute that applies to "member[s] of the Armed Forces of the United States or

the National Guard who [are] stationed overseas and serving in a conflict or a

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war and [are] unable to appear for the licensure and solemnization of [their]

marriage." Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 37:1-17.3, a member of the Armed Forces

serving overseas "may enter into [a] marriage . . . by the appearance of an

attorney-in-fact, commissioned and empowered in writing for that purpose

through a power of attorney." Under N.J.S.A. 37:1-7 and -8, that attorney-in-

fact may appear on behalf of the Armed Forces member serving overseas to

obtain the marriage license and take the required oath. Thus, except for certain

members of the Armed Forces, people who want to get married must appear in

person before the licensing officer to take the required oath and to obtain a

marriage license.

      Plaintiff is incarcerated at a federal prison located in Fort Dix, New

Jersey. He wants to marry Matthew J. Galloway, who is incarcerated in a

federal prison located in Yazoo City, Mississippi. Apparently aware of the in -

person requirement to obtain a marriage license, plaintiff sent a letter to

defendant "seeking alternative avenues to marry Galloway . . . includ[ing]

floating the possibility of a marriage-by-proxy."1 In a July 13, 2021 letter,

defendant advised plaintiff "there will be no way that we can process a

marriage application for you and your husband-to-be." She informed plaintiff

1
  We take that description from the complaint. A copy of the letter was not
included in the record.

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that under New Jersey law, "proxies are only for the [m]ilitary [p]ersonnel if

one party is stationed in another location and they must go through a difficult

process to get it done." She recommended plaintiff "see what the other s tate's

requirements are to get married while incarcerated."

      In a July 19, 2021 letter, plaintiff responded, asking if "there [was] any

last recourse available that would allow" him and Galloway to marry and

suggested defendant's "office" consult with "Township legal counsel."         He

contended they had a "constitutional right to marriage" and questioned why

they could not proceed "in the same manner New Jersey state law enables

Armed Service members stationed/deployed worldwide to exercise their right

to marry."

      Defendant replied in a July 26, 2021 letter, stating the applicable statute

"state[s] that both applicants must be present in person, along with one (1)

witness over [eighteen] years of age, in the municipality in which one or both

applicants reside . . . ." She informed him he would have to wait until both he

and Galloway were "in New Jersey in the municipality in which [he] reside[s]

in order to file." She then suggested he write to the State Registrar and the

Department of Health or speak to his local legislator if he wanted to pursue the

matter further. She concluded that "the law is the law" and recommended

Galloway inquire about Mississippi's laws.

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      In an August 2, 2021 letter to State Registrar Vincent Arrisi, plaintiff

advised that because he and Galloway were incarcerated, they were "absolutely

unable to fulfill the requirements [to obtain a marriage license] . . . [and] thus,

completely barred from exercise of [their] First Amendment Right to

Marriage." He requested an exemption from the requirements so that he and

Galloway could marry.

      In an August 11, 2021 letter, Arrisi confirmed New Jersey law "requires

both applicants to appear before the licensing officer for the application

process, take an oath in front of the licensing officer and have a witness sign

the application on behalf of both applicants."           He noted that virtual

applications had been permitted pursuant to Executive Order No. 135 during

the COVID-19 related state of emergency, but that provision had been

rescinded on July 7, 2021. He suggested plaintiff research other states' laws

regarding virtual marriage licenses or seek a court order.

      On October 18, 2021, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against

defendant, citing the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to

-2. Plaintiff alleged "[d]efendant's failure to process and issue a license for

[p]laintiff and Galloway to join together in marriage violates [plaintiff's] (and

Galloway's) rights and constitutes a continuing violation of Due Process and

Equal Protection Clauses under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

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States Constitution."         For relief, plaintiff sought a "[p]reliminary and

permanent injunction ordering [d]efendant to cease excluding [p]laintiff and

individuals incarcerated within Burlington County . . . who seek application to

marry individuals out-of-state and/or [are] unable to otherwise physically

appear within the jurisdiction consequent [to] incarceration/detention . . . ."

      Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, enjoining defendant from

"[r]equiring [p]laintiff . . . and . . . Galloway[] [to] physically appear before a

Burlington County New Jersey License Officer as pre-requisite for obtaining a

license to marry in light of their incarceration precluding which." Plaintiff's

motion was not supported by a certification from either plaintiff or Galloway

indicating they had submitted an application to marry pursuant to applicable

federal regulations. See, e.g., Bureau of Prison, Dep't of Just., Marriages of

Inmates, Application to marry, 28 C.F.R. § 551.13 (2022) ("A federal inmate

confined in a Bureau institution who wants to get married shall submit a

request to marry to the inmate's unit team.").       Nor was it supported by a

certification from Galloway demonstrating his intent to marry plaintiff. See

Bureau of Prison, Dep't of Just., Marriages of Inmates, Eligibility to marry, 28

C.F.R. § 551.12 ("An inmate's request to marry shall be approved provided:

. . . (c) The intended spouse has verified, ordinarily in writing, an intention to

marry the inmate . . . .").

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      After hearing argument, the motion judge rendered a decision on the

record. Acknowledging "the interplay of the State statute and the overarching

concept . . . that marriage is a social good," the judge found "[t]he legislature

outlined how things had to happen" and "it's something that the legislature has

to change, not a judge." The judge concluded he was "constrained to deny

[plaintiff's] application and to . . . grant . . . defendant's application."

      On appeal, plaintiff argues the motion judge had the ability to use his

equitable powers to enjoin defendant's "continued enforcement of the 'in -

person'    marriage      pre-condition,"       which     plaintiff    contends      was

"unconstitutional" as applied to him. We disagree and affirm.

                                               II.

      We review a decision on a Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal motion "de novo,

without deference to the judge's legal conclusions."            McNellis-Wallace v.

Hoffman, 464 N.J. Super. 409, 415 (App. Div. 2020). Rule 4:6-2(e) provides

that a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted."      The Rule tests "the legal sufficiency of the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint." Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746. To

defeat a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, a plaintiff does not have to prove his or her case

but must establish the complaint contains "allegations which, if proven, would

constitute a valid cause of action." Kieffer v. High Point Ins. Co., 422 N.J.

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Super. 38, 43 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J.

Super. 462, 472 (App. Div. 2001)). When a complaint "fail[s] to articulate a

legal basis entitling [the] plaintiff to relief," the "court must dismiss the

plaintiff's complaint." Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App.

Div. 2005).

      When interpreting a statute, a court must consider the statute's plain

language, which is the "best indicator" of the legislature's intent in enacting the

statute. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); see also Savage v.

Township of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 305 (App. Div. 2022). The plain

language of N.J.S.A. 37:1-7 and -8 clearly shows the Legislature intended to

require people who want to be married to appear in person before the licensing

officer to take an oath regarding the validity of the marriage and to apply for a

marriage license. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 37:1-17.3 clearly shows the

Legislature intended to provide a marriage-by-proxy procedure only for

members of the Armed Forces and National Guard serving overseas.

      Plaintiff does not dispute that interpretation of the statutes. Instead, he

contends the enforcement of the in-person requirement was "unconstitutional"

as applied to him and that the motion judge could have used his equitable

powers to enjoin the enforcement of that statutory requirement. Plaintiff is

wrong on both points.

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      The trial judge did not find the requirement to be unconstitutional, and

plaintiff has not cited to any case finding it unconstitutional. Plaintiff instead

relies on the CRA, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

      The CRA provides a cause of action to a party who has been deprived of

a right secured by the federal or state constitution by a person acting under

color of law. N.J.S.A. 10:6-2. The Act is modeled after the federal Civil

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and "provid[es] the citizens of New Jersey

with a State remedy for deprivation of or interference with the civil rights of

an individual."   Harris v. City of Newark, 250 N.J. 294, 304-05 (2022)

(quoting Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 212 (2014)).

      "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands

that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws,' meaning that all persons similarly situated should be

treated alike." State v. Pimentel, 461 N.J. Super. 468, 489 (App. Div. 2019)

(quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439

(1985)). When a statute "imposes on a fundamental right, the law is subject to

strict scrutiny review, and will be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause

only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Ibid. Laws

are presumptively valid, and the Legislature is owed substantial deference.

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Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. N.J. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 234 N.J.

483, 514 (2018). A challenger to a law must show that the law's "repugnancy

to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. (quoting State v.

Buckner, 223 N.J. 1, 14 (2015)). "To overcome the strong presumption of

validity and 'deference [due] to any legislative enactment,' the challenger must

demonstrate -- 'unmistakably' -- that the law in question 'run[s] afoul of the

Constitution.'" Buckner, 223 N.J. at 14 (alterations in the original) (quoting

Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 459 (2006)).

      In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 82, a prison regulation permitted

inmates to marry but only with the prison superintendent's approval, which

was given only when there were "compelling reasons to do so" such as

pregnancy. The Supreme Court found the regulation unconstitutional: "It is

undisputed that Missouri prison officials may regulate the time and

circumstances under which the marriage ceremony itself takes place. . . .

however, the almost complete ban on the decision to marry is not reasonably

related to legitimate penological objectives." Id. at 99. The Court held that

although inmates had the right to marry, that right was still "subject to

substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration." Id. at 96.

      The statutes plaintiff challenges are not prison regulations that create an

"almost complete ban on the decision to marry" and that are "not reasonably

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related to legitimate penological objectives." Id. at 99. Instead, they are laws

that apply to all individuals who want to marry and are reasonably related to

the legitimate goal of ensuring the validity of marriages. That the Legislature

chose to provide a marriage-by-proxy procedure for those who serve in the

Armed Forces and National Guard overseas does not render the statutes

unconstitutional.

      Plaintiff's argument that the motion judge could have used his equitable

powers to enjoin defendant's enforcement of the statutory in-person

requirement is without merit. A court's equitable authority is not boundless.

"[I]n all cases, equity follows the law." West Pleasant-CPGT, Inc. v. U.S.

Home Corp., 243 N.J. 92, 108 (2020) (quoting Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245,

280 (2016)). "[E]quity follows the law" is an "equitable maxim . . . which

instructs that as a rule a court of equity will follow the legislative and

common-law regulation of rights, and also obligations of contract." Dunkin'

Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 100 N.J. 166, 183 (1985); see

also Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes, 396 N.J. Super. 553, 561 (App. Div. 2007)

(finding "it is well-established that 'equity follows the law,' particularly where

a statute is involved").

      As we recently held in Board of Education of East Newark in the County

of Hudson v. Harris, 467 N.J. Super. 370, 382 (App. Div. 2021),

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     Although "the maxim [equity follows the law] does
     not bar the crafting of a remedy not recognized by
     legislation or found in the common law, . . . it does
     prevent the issuance of a remedy that is inconsistent
     with recognized statutory or common law principles."
     [In re Est. of Shinn, 394 N.J. Super. 55, 67 (App. Div.
     2007)]. Stated differently, equity may "soften[ ] the
     rigor of the law," Giberson v. First Nat'l Bank of
     Spring Lake, 100 N.J. Eq. 502, 507 (Ch. 1927), but
     "will not create a remedy that is in violation" of it.
     Shinn, 394 N.J. Super. at 67. "Undoubtedly, equity
     follows the law more circumspectly in the
     interpretation and application of statute law than
     otherwise." Giberson, 100 N.J. Eq. at 507. "Were it
     otherwise, a judge's personal proclivities alone could
     negate the will of the Legislature." Shinn, 394 N.J.
     Super. at 68.

Affirmed.

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