Court Opinion

ID: 9369216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 07:09:37.701744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.487330
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed February 3, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00221-CR

                 EX PARTE DENNY C MACKEY, Appellant

               On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court
                           Kaufman County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 19-00324-422-F

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Molberg, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle
                       Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
      Appellant Denny C. Mackey brings this appeal to challenge the trial court’s

denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus and motion to quash. Mackey was

indicted for aggregate theft of over $100,000 but less than $200,000. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 31.09. Mackey alleges the statute of limitations prevents the State from

proceeding with its re-indictment of his case and his application for writ of habeas

corpus should have been granted. We affirm.

                                BACKGROUND

      Mackey was arrested for abuse of official capacity related to allegations he

stole money from the Crandall Volunteer Fire Department in 2013 and was later
indicted in 2017 for theft of over $100,000 but less than $200,000 from the Crandall

Volunteer Fire Department. See id. § 31.03(e)(6). According to the probable cause

statement, members of the Crandall Volunteer Fire Department suspected Mackey,

who was the secretary/treasurer, obtained two loans from American National Bank

on behalf of the Crandall Volunteer Fire Department. No one in the chain of

command had authorized those loans and there was evidence Mackey used funds

from those loans as well as other Crandall Volunteer Fire Department funds for his

personal benefit.

      In October 2019, the State filed a motion to amend the indictment and change

the offense from theft to aggregate theft under the same facts and circumstances. The

trial court granted the State’s motion to amend. In November 2019, the State re-

indicted the case to the present indictment for aggregate theft between $100,000 and

$200,000 from the Crandall Volunteer Fire Department. The re-indictment included

a paragraph with tolling language. Mackey filed a motion to quash the indictment

and following a hearing on Mackey’s motion, the State filed a motion to amend the

indictment to make adjustments recommended by the trial court: change the heading

to reflect the proper penal code section and clean up the tolling language paragraph.

The trial court granted the motion to amend and denied Mackey’s motion to quash.

Mackey filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus and motion to quash, and in

March 2022, filed an amended application for a writ of habeas corpus and motion to

quash. In his amended motion, Mackey alleges the indictment:

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      1.       was amended over his objection and charged him with an
               additional or different offense or prejudiced [his] substantial
               rights in violation of Article 28.10(c) of the Texas Code of
               Criminal Procedure;

      2.       was not an indictment brought before a grand jury and violated
               article 1.05 of the code of criminal procedure, the Texas
               Constitution and the United States Constitution;

      3.       failed to give Mackey sufficient notice of the nature and cause of
               the accusation against him as required by the code of criminal
               procedure, the Texas Constitution, and the United States
               Constitution;

      4.       was untimely and violated the statute of limitations and failed to
               allege the proper tolling language;

      5.       denied Mackey his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the code of
               criminal procedure, the Texas Constitution, and the United States
               Constitution; and

      6.       violated Mackey’s Due Process Clause of the United States
               Constitution.

After a hearing, the trial court denied Mackey’s application for writ of habeas corpus

and motion to quash. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law

stating in regards to Mackey’s issue about the tolling language and statute of

limitations:

      31.      A prior indictment tolls the statute of limitations under Article
               12.05(b) for subsequent indictments so long as both indictments
               allege ‘the same conduct, same act, or same transaction[;]’
               Hernandez [v. State], 127 S.W.3d [768], 772 [(Tex. Crim. App.
               2004)];

      32.      Defendant received actual notice of the State’s accusations, and
               was able to adequately prepare a defense;

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      33.    The Indictment from cause 16-00261-422-F tolls the statute of
             limitations in this cause because it alleges the same conduct, act,
             or transaction;

      34.    Therefore, the Amended Indictment of January 8, 2021 is not
             untimely and does not violate the statute of limitations.

This appeal followed.

                                    JURISDICTION

      Mackey’s issue alleges the trial court erred by denying his application for writ

of habeas corpus and motion to quash and finding the statute of limitations tolled

with the initial indictment. However, the State challenges this Court’s jurisdiction to

consider Mackey’s appeal. It argues Mackey is essentially appealing the denial of

his motion to quash the indictment which is an interlocutory appeal and not

cognizable as a pre-trial appeal.

I.    Applicable Law

      A pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy. Ex parte Ingram,

533 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A defendant may use a pre-trial writ

of habeas corpus in very limited circumstances: (1) to challenge the State’s power

to restrain him at all; (2) to challenge the manner of his pretrial restraint; and (3) to

raise an issue that, if meritorious, would bar prosecution or conviction. Ex parte

Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam). Habeas relief is

not available if the defendant has an adequate remedy by post-conviction appeal. Ex

parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

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      Generally, pre-trial habeas relief is not appropriate to test the sufficiency of

the indictment. Ex parte Tamez, 38 S.W.3d 159, 160–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

An exception applies when prosecution of the offense is barred by the statute of

limitations because “the defect is incurable and irreparable.” Ex parte Smith, 178

S.W.3d at 802. If the pleading, on its face, shows that the offense is barred by

limitations, then the indictment is so fundamentally defective that the trial court does

not have jurisdiction and habeas corpus relief should be granted. Ex parte Lovings,

480 S.W.3d 106, 110 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Because

Mackey asserts the State’s indictment is barred by the statute of limitations, we have

jurisdiction to review the indictment by which he is charged. Ex parte Tamez, 4

S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999), aff’d, 38 S.W.3d 159 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001). We review this question of law de novo. See Ex parte de la Cruz,

466 S.W.3d 855, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

II.   Analysis

      As an initial matter, we have no jurisdiction to consider the portion of this

appeal of the motion to quash because it is interlocutory in nature and the law has

not authorized such an interlocutory appeal. See Ahmad v. State, 158 S.W.3d 525,

526–27 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). We dismiss that portion of the

appeal for want of jurisdiction.

      We have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the denial of pretrial

habeas. See Ward v. State, ––S.W.3d––, ––, No. AP-77,096, 2020 WL 3265251, at

                                          –5–
*1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 17, 2020). Pretrial habeas is usually unavailable to test the

sufficiency of a charging instrument. Ex parte Edwards, ––S.W.3d––, ––, No. PD-

1092-20, 2022 WL 1421507, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 4, 2022). A challenge to

limitations is a challenge to the substance and sufficiency of the indictment. See id.

at *2. However, an indicted person may raise a limitations challenge when the face

of the indictment “shows the prosecution is barred by limitations.” Ex parte Doster,

303 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

      Mackey argues the re-indictment charged him with a different offense than

that original indictment issued in 2017, therefore the re-indictment falls outside of

the statute of limitations. On the face of the re-indictment, the State included a tolling

paragraph referencing the 2017 indictment for the 2013 offense that tolls the statute

of limitations. The statute of limitations for theft is five years. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 12.01(4)(A). “The time during the pendency of an indictment,

information, or complaint shall not be computed in the period of limitations.” Id. art.

12.05(b); see Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

      The State’s re-indictment charged Mackey with the same set of conduct, acts,

or transactions that Mackey was initially indicted for back in 2017 and included a

sufficient tolling paragraph. See Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 724. Therefore, we

hold the prior indictment tolled the statute of limitations and on its face, the

indictment does not show it is barred by the statute of limitations. See Hernandez,

127 S.W.3d at 772; Ex parte Edwards, 2022 WL 1421507, at *4; cf. Tamez, 38

                                          –6–
S.W.3d at 161. The trial court did not err by denying the habeas petition. We overrule

Mackey’s issue.

                                  CONCLUSION

       Under this record, we conclude the trial court did not err by denying Mackey’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus. We overrule his issue and affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

                                           /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                           ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                           JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
220221F.U05

                                         –7–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

EX PARTE: DENNY C MACKEY,                    On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Kaufman County,
                                             Texas
No. 05-22-00221-CR                           Trial Court Cause No. 19-00324-422-
                                             F.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
                                             Kipness. Justices Molberg and
                                             Carlyle participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 3rd day of February 2023.

                                       –8–