Court Opinion

ID: 9467709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:54:24.339433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:28.738160
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Although appellant’s 1972 demotion is the most striking act of discrimination complained of, I read his affidavit filed in opposition to appellee’s motion to dismiss to allege at least one cognizable discriminatory action occurring after the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) became effective for federal employees. Appellant alleges that his office underwent a further reorganization in January, 1976, under which his “position has been further reduced from chief of a division (Mechanical Engineering) to simply an engineering staff.” This alleges a reduction in his supervisory responsibility. At oral argument counsel for appellant stated:
[I]n 1976 his position was further reduced in scope. He became what is called an “engineering staff.” He had no division under him and no agency-wide responsibilities.
The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976), prohibits discrimination not only in compensation, hiring or discharge, but also, like its counterpart in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), any discrimination in “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” The quoted language is broad, Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972) (Title VII), and includes critical reductions in responsible assignments or supervision over others. Cf. EEOC Dec. No. 70350, 2 FEP 498 (1969) (assignment of sole black salesman to all black accounts prohibited).
Nor can I conclude as a matter of law that the district court is without jurisdiction to entertain a claim predicated in part on the January, 1976 reorganization. Even if appellant’s administrative complaint did not allege the 1976 reorganization as an act of discrimination — a fact that cannot be ascertained without a copy of the administrative complaint — this suit should not be barred if the
allegations . . “encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the [administrative complaint] . . ..” In other words, the “scope” of the judicial complaint is limited to the “scope” of the [administrative] investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the [administrative] charge of discrimination.
Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970) (Title VII), quoting King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F.Supp. 943, 947 (N.D.Ga.1968).1 The limited record now before us does not permit a finding that the scope of the administrative investigation reasonably to be expected to grow out of appellant’s complaint was not as broad as the scope of the facts alleged in appellant’s affidavit filed in the district court. In fact, *818the record documents suggest the administrative investigation was a broad one. The letter of final administrative disposition issued to the appellant suggests that Mr. Macellaro’s entire employment history since the 1972 reorganization may have been examined to determine whether it revealed evidence of age discrimination.2
Because I think appellant has sufficiently alleged at least one act of discrimination occurring after the effective date of the ADEA for federal employees to survive this motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and because there is not sufficient evidence in this.record from which to conclude that he has failed to fulfill the jurisdictional prerequisites to suit under the ADEA, I dissent.

. See also Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 78, 478 F.2d 979, 988 (D.C.Cir.1973) (Title VII):
If the Commission viewed Macklin’s complaint as stating a broad-gauged attack on Spector’s continuing hiring practices, we see no reason to construe his allegations in a crabbed, artificial manner. Quite the reverse, we think, along with other courts, that the matters the Commission proceeds to investigate should assist in determining the scope of the complaint for purposes of applying Title VII’s jurisdictional requirements.

. The letter stated as follows:
The essence of Mr. Macellaro’s complaint, is that the position of General Engineer is being structured to function in the same capacity as a position from which Mr. Macellaro was previously RIF’d in order to promote a younger employee, without offering the position to Mr. Macellaro. The record shows that the position in question is not like that one previously held by Mr. Macellaro. Further, the position came about as the result of a reorganization promoted by Department, and not the Bureau. I can find no evidence that the Bureau has resurrected Mr. Macellaro’s former position or that a younger employee is being advanced in preference to Mr. Macellaro because of his age.
Joint Appendix 47.