Court Opinion

ID: 9725223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:35:31.861926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:12.682024
License: Public Domain

*1356Hays, J.
I respectfully dissent.
In my humble opinion, if the rule announced under Division I of the majority opinion becomes the law of Iowa the day of rapid railway passenger and freight service is at end. Even assuming that every grade crossing in the state is equipped with gates or electric sound and light equipment, this would still make the majority announced rule applicable.
I do not find particular fault with the statements set forth as to the general statutory law relative to the last dear chance. I do disagree with the holding of the majority that the factual situation, presented in the instant case, brings it within those statutory rules.
True, on an appeal such as is now under consideration we must accept the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, but even this established rule must mean within reason as revealed by the entire record. Such has not been the case here. The record clearly shows that both parties tried the case upon the speed of the train, at the time in question, being 30 to 35 miles' per hour and that of the truck, the same. There is one shred of evidence, admitted over a proper objection, that the train’s speed was 20 miles per hour but, in my opinion, such becomes of no consequence when,viewed in the light of the entire record. The same situation exists as to the blowing of the train’s whistle. One witness, who lived near the tracks, states she did not hear a whistle after the train passed the elevator some 1300 feet south of the crossing, although she was especially listening for it. Two • other witnesses, living nearby, say they did not hear a whistle but were not paying any particular attention to it. One witness states he was working near the track and heard the crossing whistle and later the emergency blasts. The record is replete' with testimony that the distress whistle was blowing almost continuously after the train came within three or four hundred feet of the crossing.
The majority opinion as to the last-clear-chance rule is based primarily upon the testimony of the fireman and brakeman, who were riding in the engine, that when the truck and train were each about 500 to 600 feet from the crossing he told the engineer “Keep blowing the whistle because I don’t think he sees us.” The truck kept coming and the brakeman said to the engineer “Just *1357keep blowing the whistle because the truck is still coming and I don’t think he sees us.” Also, the engineer testified that when about 200 to 300 feet from the crossing he was told “there was a truck approaching from the west and it didn’t look like he was going to stop.” The record shows these statements were made in connection with the request “to keep blowing the whistle.” Based upon these facts, the majority opinion says the above facts warrant the finding “that the trainmen were aware plaintiff was in peril when he approached the crossing oblivious of impending danger.” If these were the only facts appearing in the record, I could perhaps accept such a conclusion, but other very material facts are there and must be considered.
Testimony was offered and rejected to the effect that it is customary for drivers of automobiles “to approach a railway crossing at a continuous speed right up to the crossing and abruptly stopping.” The majority opinion seems to accept defendant’s contention that such custom is so common as to warrant the rejection of such testimony. Judicial notice of such fact may be taken. This fact, especially upon the motion to direct and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, assumes considerable importance upon the question of “peril” and the trainmen’s realization thereof.
The record clearly shows by plaintiff’s own witness, J. Stannard Baker, the distance in which the truck and train could be stopped when traveling at given speeds. As to the train: at 30 miles per hour — 341 feet; at 35 miles per hour — 451 feet. As to the truck: at 30 miles per hour — 104 feet; at 35 miles per hour — 133 feet. This expert witness was then asked:
“Q. Using the center of the crossing as the starting, if the steptank of the * * * truck * * * were at the starting point; if the rig was 45 feet in overall length and headed east, calculate the time it would take for the tractor traveling at a specified speed to clear the crossing and clear the railroad train passing northbound; could you do this? A. Yes. Q. Given the conditions specified in the last question and a speed of the truck of 30 miles per hour; how much time would it take for the truck-tractor to clear the crossing and clear the railroad train passing-northbound? A. It would take approximately 9%oo of a second.” *1358At 35 miles per hour the truck would clear in approximately %0 of a second.
“Q. * * * the train traveling at 30 miles per hour, 300 feet from the crossing, if the emergency brakes were applied at this distance what time would be gained by such braking? A. It would take about 300 feet for the train to stop so that the time saved would be — there would be no collision.” At 35 miles per hour at 300 feet from the crossing if the emergency brakes were applied at this distance, you would gain 1 and %0 seconds.
Under this record based upon plaintiff’s own testimony, plaintiff was not actually in peril so long as he had it within his power to stop — short of a collision. This distance was 104 feet at 30 miles per hour; 133 feet at 35 miles per hour. Thus it is without dispute in the record that when plaintiff passed into the danger zone — 104 feet or 133 feet from the crossing — depending upon the speed, when actually he was in peril, nothing the trainmen could do would have avoided the collision. Up to the point of the danger zone (power to stop), if judicial notice is taken of the custom of drivers to approach a railway crossing at high speed and abruptly stop (in other words — to fail to start slowing the car before the danger zone is reached), I am not able to agree with the majority opinion that the trainmen “knew or reasonably should have known the plaintiff was in peril.” In this connection a statement appearing in Williams v. Mason City & Fort Dodge Ry. Co., 205 Iowa 446, 453, 214 N.W. 692, is very much in point. It is:
“Travelers in motor vehicles frequently and customarily drive toward an oncoming train and stop just before going upon the tracks, in order to permit the train to proceed on its way. There is in such conduct, however, no ‘peril’ until such wayfarer fails to stop in a zone of safety. Those in charge of the train have a right to assume that he will not drive into danger. * * *
“ ‘Those engaged in the operation of raffway trains are not bound to anticipate that drivers of automobiles and trucks upon the highways will be guilty of negligence in approaching crossings without taking reasonable measures to ascertain the approach of a train. If the rule were otherwise, the last clear chance doctrine would require the trainmen, at the peril of *1359being held responsible for an accident, to slow down every time they should observe an oncoming motorist in a position where, if he did not see the train, he might negligently collide with it.’ ”
Assuming that the brakes on the train had been set when the train was 300 feet from the crossing, which is the distance the train was when the above statements of the brakeman and fireman were made, the collision would have been avoided by a hairbreadth or a matter of a split second. This holding is certainly contrary to our decisions that hold that “negligence should not ordinarily be predicated on an emergency confronting a driver who has only three seconds to make a decision. * * * ‘To predicate negligence on two seconds of time is in and of itself a monumental refinement.’ ” See Menke v. Peterschmidt, 246 Iowa 722, 733, 69 N.W.2d 65, and cited authorities.
If it be assumed that the trainmen were negligent in not slowing the train when they first saw the truck approaching with no apparent reduction of speed, which seems to be the majority view, this does not create a last-clear-chance situation. In Menke v. Peterschmidt, 246 Iowa 722, 727, 69 N.W.2d 65, 69, we overruled Bridenstine v. Iowa City Electric Ry. Co., 181 Iowa 1124, 1131, 165 N.W. 435, and said: “It is defendant’s negligence after he discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should hme discovered the plaintiff’s danger that brings the doctrine into effect.” (Italics mine.) In Strom v. Des Moines and Central Iowa Ry. Co., 248 Iowa 1052, 1071, 82 N.W.2d 781, 792, Justice Garfield, speaking for the court, said: “The injured party may not ordinarily invoke the last-clear-chance doctrine where there is a collision between his moving motor vehicle and a train at a crossing. Such a vehicle approaching a railroad does not usually reach a position of danger until it can no longer be stopped or turned aside and there is seldom appreciable time thereafter for the trainmen, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid the collision.”
Such clearly is this case, quaere — are Menke v. Petersehmidt; Williams v. Mason City & Fort Dodge Ry. Co., 205 Iowa 446, 214 N.W. 692, both supra, and kindred cases, now overruled ?
*1360I would reverse, sustain the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and dismiss plaintiff’s petition.
Larson, J., joins in this dissent.