Court Opinion

ID: 9696268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:43:06.166553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:20.423787
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The defendant and three other men were riding together in an automobile. *729The automobile was parked, and two men left the automobile and shortly thereafter two attendants at a nearby gasoline station were robbed. The occupants of the automobile were arrested soon after the robbery.
The defense at the defendant’s trial was that he had remained in the automobile and was not part of the concert of action against the victims.
Shortly after the four occupants of the automobile and other persons were arrested, the victims of the crime were allowed to view them through a one-way window at a police station without a formal lineup and without compliance with the Wade1 rule entitling accused persons to the aid of legal counsel at a lineup.
At the trial, one of the victims was certain of his identification of the defendant as one of the assailants. The other victim was unsure of his identification of the defendant. Another witness, who lived in the neighborhood and who saw the robbers walking back from the service station and enter the parked automobile, gave testimony incriminating the defendant2 but could not identify him as one of the men she saw walking back from the station.
Even if there was sufficient evidence without the victims’ identification testimony to justify submission of the case to the jury, it is apparent that without their testimony the jury could well have concluded that the people had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was part of the illegal concert of action.
*730Although the Wade issue was not properly preserved at the trial level,3 it is of sufficient importance on this record4 so that we should remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the people can establish “by clear and convincing evidence”5 that the in-court identifications of the defendant were based on observations at the time of the crime rather than on the illegal confrontation identification. 6 If the in-court identification testimony is inadmissible, the erroneous admission of such testimony at the defendant’s trial cannot be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Recently, in People v. Schumacher (1971), 384 Mich 831, the Supreme Court entered an order remanding a case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the complainant’s in-court identification of the defendant was of independent origin. The Supreme Court’s order does not state the facts. They appear in our Court’s opinion, People v. Schumacher (1971), 29 Mich App 594, 596.
Schumacher had been identified through the use of photographs and, as here, a one-way mirror. He was not represented by counsel when he was so identified. There was no objection to the identification procedures at the trial. Our Court acknowledged *731that this did not preclude appellate review. We said that, nevertheless, the people are obliged to establish by “clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was based on observations of the suspect not connected with the identification procedures under attack.” However, we affirmed Schumacher’s conviction because we concluded that the record presented demonstrated that the in-court identification was not attributable to the erroneous procedures.
The significance of the Supreme Court’s order in Schumacher, remanding for an evidentiary hearing, is that it makes clear both that failure to object at the trial level does not necessarily bar the granting of appellate relief and also that when a question regarding identification procedures is raised a full evidentiary hearing focused on that question will generally be required — that we ought not to attempt such a determination on a scanty, incomplete record.
It may appear at such an evidentiary hearing that the defendant is entitled to a new trial for another reason. During cross-examination of witnesses the fact that the victims had viewed and identified the defendant at the illegal confrontation was brought out in the presence of the jury. This testimony was inadmissible because of Wade; under Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 US 263, 273 (87 S Ct 1951, 18 L Ed 2d 1178), the people are not entitled to an opportunity to show that this testimony (regarding the illegal confrontation identification) had an independent source. In Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court declared at p 273 (87 S Ct 1957, 18 L Ed 2d 1186):
“Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to insure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused’s *732constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup.”
Accordingly, unless it appears on remand that the defendant or his attorney had knowledge of the illegal confrontation before the cross-examination testimony just mentioned (see fn 3), knowledge which would have enabled the defendant to obtain, outside the presence of the jury, an evidentiary hearing as to the illegal confrontation before any in-court identification testimony — thereby avoiding revealing to the jury that the defendant had been identified at the illegal confrontation — a new trial should be ordered unless, as set forth in Gilbert, the trial judge is able to declare a belief that the illegal confrontation identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a declaration of harmlessness could, of course, be made only if it is decided on remand that the in-court identifications of the defendant were based on observations at the time of the crime, not on the illegal confrontation identification. This because the exclusion on remand of the in-court identification testimony would leave insufficient admissible evidence to permit a declaration beyond a reasonable doubt that the illegal confrontation identification testimony did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.7

 United States v. Wade (1967), 388 US 218 (87 S Ct 1926, 18 L Ed 2d 1149).

 See People v. Schumacher (1971), 384 Mich 831, remanding for a full evidentiary hearing even though there was other testimony (see People v. Schumacher [1971], 29 Mich App 594, 596) implicating the defendant; there, as here, a description of clothing like the clothing the defendant was wearing.

 The record is silent as to whether the defendant was aware of the one-way window identification before the trial. The fact that he had been so viewed by the victims did not come out at the_ preliminary examination. The defendant was represented by assigned counsel both at the trial and on appeal.

 See Rivers v. United States (CA5, 1968), 400 F2d 935, and United States v. Valez (CA8, 1970), 431 F2d 622, both holding that a confrontation in violation of an accused person’s Wade rights was plain error entitling him to a new trial (Rivers) or an evidentiary hearing (Vales) on the confrontation question even though the issue had not been properly preserved at or before the trial. See, generally, People v. Shirk (1970), 383 Mich 180, 194; People v. Degraffenreid (1969), 19 Mich App 702, 715.

 United States v. Wade, (fn 1), supra, p 240.

 See People v. Hutton (1970), 21 Mich App 312, 330.

 See Chapman v. California (1967), 386 US 18, 23, 24 (87 S Ct 824, 828; 17 L Ed 2d 705, 710, 24 ALR3d 1065), reh den 386 US 987 (87 S Ct 1283, 18 L Ed 2d 241).