Court Opinion

ID: 9840040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 00:00:36.746697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:14.471387
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30568         Document: 00516895904             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/14/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                     United States Court of Appeals

                                      ____________
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                                                                    FILED
                                                                           September 14, 2023
                                       No. 22-30568
                                     Summary Calendar                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                   Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Aron Winter Mosquera-Castro,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Middle District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:17-CR-13-4
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Aron Winter Mosquera-Castro was convicted by a jury of one count
   of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute at least
   one kilogram of heroin, four counts of unlawful travel in aid of a racketeering
   enterprise, and three counts of unlawful use of a communications facility. He
   appeals his conviction on multiple grounds.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30568       Document: 00516895904           Page: 2     Date Filed: 09/14/2023

                                      No. 22-30568

          Mosquera-Castro maintains that the district court violated his Sixth
   Amendment rights by preventing him from fully cross-examining a witness.
   He alleges that he was prohibited from asking Commander William Tanner
   Jenkins of the East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office about a letter of reprimand
   that he received for purportedly making false statements during an internal
   investigation. He asserts that he could not sufficiently confront Jenkins about
   an issue that concerned his credibility.
          Confrontation Clause issues that were properly presented at trial are
   reviewed de novo, subject to review for harmless error, while Confrontation
   Clause claims that were not asserted below are reviewed for plain error only.
   United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2007). In the absence of
   a constitutional violation, we review the district court’s restrictions on cross-
   examination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d 555,
   558-59 (5th Cir. 2006). We need not decide whether Mosquera-Castro raised
   the issue in the district court because his claim lacks merit under any standard
   of review. See United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008).
          Mosquera-Castro has not shown that the district court’s limitation of
   cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause or exceeded the district
   court’s discretion. See United States v. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 491 (5th Cir.
   2013); United States v. Heard, 709 F.3d 413, 433 (5th Cir. 2013). The record
   reflects that there was no direct or definitive evidence that Jenkins made false
   statements and indicates that the reprimand was rescinded and that no other
   sanction was imposed. Thus, the evidence did not establish conclusively that
   Jenkins was untruthful and, if presented without limitation, seemingly would
   not have left the jury with a significantly different impression of his reliability.
   See United States v. Templeton, 624 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2010). The district
   court otherwise properly excluded the evidence on the basis that the minimal
   probative value of allowing cross-examination on an unrelated and temporally
   remote issue with limited value as evidence of Jenkins’s trustworthiness was

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                                     No. 22-30568

   substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice or jury confusion. See Fed.
   R. Evid. 403; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); United
   States v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d 438, 449 (5th Cir. 2016). The trial court’s decision
   in that regard did not violate the Confrontation Clause. See Dvorin, 817 F.3d
   at 449; Reagan, 725 F.3d at 491. The limits that the district court imposed on
   the questioning of Jenkins, who was subject to cross-examination in a manner
   that exposed the jury to facts from which it could make inferences as to his
   reliability on the minor issues to which he testified, fell within the reasonable
   constraints that the district court could impose. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at
   679-80; Reagan, 725 F.3d at 491; Templeton, 624 F.3d at 224-25.
          Mosquera-Castro argues that the district court erroneously denied his
   motion to suppress wiretap evidence. He maintains that normal investigative
   techniques were working when the Government applied for a wiretap order.
   He thus asserts that the wiretaps were unlawful because the Government did
   not satisfy the necessity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). We review a
   district court’s authorization of a wiretap for clear error, United States v.
   Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 604 (5th Cir. 1998), and consider de novo whether the
   Government satisfied the necessity requirement, United States v. Smith, 273
   F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Here, the affidavit filed in support of the application for authorization
   for a wiretap established that wiretaps were necessary. The affidavit detailed
   that the interception of communications was the only investigative technique
   with a reasonable likelihood of securing evidence that would fulfill the goals
   of the investigation. The affidavit detailed investigators’ use or possible use
   of traditional investigative techniques, noted their practicality or adequacy,
   described their limitations and risks, and stated what they accomplished or
   likely would accomplish vis-à-vis the aims of the investigation. The affidavit
   noted the prospective or retrospective failure of these techniques, see United
   States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir. 1978), and demonstrated that

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                                    No. 22-30568

   investigators did not resort to wiretaps where traditional techniques would
   have sufficed. Regardless of whether traditional methods yielded inculpatory
   evidence, the methods did not produce or seem likely to yield the information
   that investigators sought or needed as to the offenses being investigated. See
   United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1425 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
   Webster, 734 F.2d 1048, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1984). The Government did not
   have to exhaust all conceivable options before seeking a wiretap. Kelley, 140
   F.3d at 605; Krout, 66 F.3d at 1424-25, and the affidavit in this case supplied
   a factual predicate adequate to support the finding that traditional techniques
   failed, reasonably appeared unlikely to succeed if tried, or were too dangerous
   to use. See Kelley, 140 F.3d at 605; § 2518.
          Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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