Court Opinion

ID: 9790834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:00:12.823727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.938026
License: Public Domain

OPINION
MOORE, Justice.
John Bozarth, a pilot for Atlantic Rich-field Company (ARCO), was fired after he refused to participate in ARCO’s random *3drug-testing program. Bozarth sued, claiming that the dismissal was really in retaliation for whistle-blowing. Bozarth had repeatedly complained about unsafe practices in ARCO’s aviation department.
Shortly after filing suit, Bozarth applied for state unemployment insurance benefits. These were denied on the grounds that Bozarth’s discharge was due to work-related misconduct. The denial was upheld by the Appeals Tribunal of the Employment Security Division. No appeal of this decision was taken.
After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. ARCO’s motion was granted. The court based its decision on two alternative grounds. The first was collateral estoppel. Bozarth was bound by the decision of the Appeals Tribunal which established that his dismissal was the result of his misconduct. Second, even if Bozarth was not bound by the decision of the Appeals Tribunal, there was no genuine issue of material fact. Bozarth failed to introduce admissible evidence that his firing was based on any reason other than his refusal to take the drug test. The trial court stated:
Because [Bozarth] and [ARCO] were represented at the Employment Security Division Appeals Tribunal, because the issues argued here are identical to those argued before the Appeals Tribunal, and because [Bozarth] did not appeal the Tribunal’s final decision on the termination issue, the Court concludes that [Bozarth] is collaterally estopped from litigating before this forum the circumstances leading to his termination and that his refusal to participate in the drug-testing program was misconduct. DeNardo v. State, 740 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1987).
[ARCO] prevails even without resort to a collateral estoppel analysis, for there exists no genuine issue of fact regarding the circumstances leading to [Bozarth’s] termination. Although [Bozarth] argues that he and his immediate supervisor, John Schmidt, were in conflict over [Bo-zarth’s] participation in the National Guard and [Bozarth’s] “whistle-blowing”, he fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact thereby. Camron Cooper, the ARCO supervisor who made the decision to terminate [Bozarth], maintains she was not aware of [Bozarth’s] conflict with Schmidt and based her decision to terminate [Bozarth] solely upon [Bo-zarth’s] refusal to participate in [ARCO’s] drug-testing program. [Bo-zarth] dismisses Cooper’s testimony as ludicrous, but such dismissal is not sufficient. The Cooper testimony stands un-rebutted in this record by any opposing admissible evidence. No genuine issue of material fact is created.
ARCO then moved for attorney's fees, seeking an award equal to seventy percent of the attorney’s fees incurred, $156,425. The court found a slight overcharge, and determined that a reasonable fee for the services performed by ARCO’s attorneys was $152,000. The court then awarded fifty percent of this amount, $76,000, as partial compensation under Civil Rule 82. In addition, the court awarded $14,600 in costs.
On appeal, Bozarth claims that the court erred in granting summary judgment to ARCO because the decision of the Appeals Tribunal of the Employment Security Division should not have been given preclusive effect, and because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasons for Bozarth’s termination.1 In addition, Bozarth claims that the award of attorney’s fees is excessive and that the cost award is the product of several errors.
We affirm the decision of the trial court on the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact. The record demonstrates that the decision to fire Bozarth was made by Camron Cooper, a senior vice-president of ARCO, and that she made that decision solely on the basis of his refusal to participate in ARCO’s drug-testing program. Cooper asserted that she knew nothing about Bozarth’s safety complaints *4or about other conflicts with his immediate supervisors. This assertion stands unre-butted in the record.
A private employer may, with notice, require its employees to take a test for drugs. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989). Failure of an employee to comply with a reasonable order of his employer is cause for discharge. Central Alaska Broadcasting v. Bracale, 637 P.2d 711 (Alaska 1981). Bozarth was ordered to submit to a drug test after being notified of ARCO’s drug-testing program, and he refused to submit. Under the above authorities, this failure was a legitimate basis for Bozarth’s discharge.
Opposing the award of attorney’s fees, Bozarth argues that some of ARCO’s attorneys billed at an excessive hourly fee. Bozarth cites Municipality of Anchorage v. Baugh Construction and Engineering Co., 722 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1986). To calculate an award under Civil Rule 82, the trial court in that case reduced attorney’s fees billed at $200 per hour for in-trial work and $175 for out-of-trial work, to $120 and $105 respectively. The issue in Baugh, however, was not whether $175 per hour was excessive. The issue was whether the trial court made a mathematical error in calculating the hourly rate it would allow. Baugh does not stand for the proposition that attorneys may not reasonably charge $175 per hour.
Hourly fees of $165-$175 were charged by the more senior members of the law firm defending ARCO. These fees were represented to be the standard fees for those attorneys. No persuasive evidence has been presented that they are unreasonable. Further, because much work was done by firm associates, the average hourly fee charged ARCO was about $136 per hour. This rate likewise has not been shown to be unreasonable.
In the context of this case, while the court’s award of attorney’s fees seems high, we are unable to say that the work performed by ARCO’s attorneys was not necessary or appropriate, or that billing $152,000 for their services was unreasonable.2 Awarding fifty percent of this amount falls comfortably within the partially compensatory standard of Civil Rule 82. Brunet v. Dresser Olympic Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc., 660 P.2d 846, 847-48 (Alaska 1983); Stevens By Park View Corp. v. Richardson, 755 P.2d 389, 396 (Alaska 1988). Therefore, the award of attorney’s fees is valid.3
With respect to costs, Bozarth challenges the allowance of costs for certain unspecified depositions, arguing that “[deposition costs may be awarded only where the depositions are actually used at trial, or where depositions were actually relied upon in ruling on a pre-trial motion.” Civil Rule 79(b) allows as awardable costs “the necessary expense of taking depositions for use at trial and producing exhibits....”
In Kaps Transport, Inc. v. Henry, 512 P.2d 72 (Alaska 1977), we interpreted Civil Rule 79(b) broadly to allow an award for the cost of depositions taken in good faith which were reasonably necessary, even if they were not actually used at trial. We noted that depositions might be used to support a pre-trial motion, or for cross-examination, or to preserve the testimony of a witness who might become unavailable. Id. at 78. Implicit in our discussion in Kaps is the conclusion that it is not *5possible to make a clear distinction between depositions taken for discovery purposes and depositions taken in preparation for trial. That is illustrated by this case. ARCO contends credibly that all depositions were taken for purposes such as preservation of testimony, cross-examination, and impeachment, as well as discovery. We conclude the actual use standard which Bozarth advocates is in conflict with the reasonably necessary standard of Kaps, and that the award of costs met the latter standard and was not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.

. Both parties assume for the purposes of this point on appeal that Bozarth could be discharged only for cause.

. Bozarth sought an award of compensatory damages in excess of $500,000; numerous pretrial motions were made; and at least twenty-one depositions were taken.

. The award of $76,000 in attorney’s fees against a dismissed employee is nonetheless disturbing. It tends to cast doubt on the continued desirability of Civil Rule 82. The rule is grounded on basic fairness. One who has been forced to litigate in order to vindicate one’s rights should be reimbursed in part for litigation expenses. It may be, however, that costs of litigation have increased to such an extent that the prospect of having to pay Rule 82 fees deters a broad spectrum of our populace from the voluntary use of our courts. We have asked our Civil Rules Standing Committee to review this question. In this case, however, we can conceive of no principled basis by which the award of attorney's fees granted by the superior court can be reduced or vacated.