Court Opinion

ID: 9909583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 18:07:23.400577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:58.621232
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Pamboukis v. Summit Cty. Domestic Relations Court, 2023-Ohio-4507.]

       STATE OF OHIO                    )                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                        )ss:                    NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
       COUNTY OF SUMMIT                 )

       KONSTANTINOS PAMBOUKIS

               Relator
                                                               C.A. No.         30865
               v.

       SUMMIT COUNTY DOMESTIC
       RELATIONS COURT, ET AL.
                                                               ORIGINAL ACTION IN PROHIBITION
               Respondents

Dated: December 13, 2023

       PER CURIAM.

       {¶1}    Relator, Konstantinos Pamboukis, has filed a complaint seeking a writ of

prohibition to order Respondents, Summit County Domestic Relations Court and Visiting Judge

Joseph Guilito, to grant his request for public records – copies of recordings of hearings in his case

– pursuant to R.C. 149.43. Respondents have moved to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and

Mr. Pamboukis has replied. For the following reasons, we grant the motion to dismiss.

       {¶2}    When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must

presume that all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489,

490 (1994). A complaint can only be dismissed when, having viewed the complaint in this way,

it appears beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to the relief

requested. Goudlock v. Voorhies, 119 Ohio St.3d 389, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7. With this standard

in mind, we turn to the facts of the complaint.
                                                                                       C.A. No. 30865
                                                                                           Page 2 of 5

       {¶3}    The complaint alleges that Mr. Pamboukis sought recordings of hearings from

various proceedings in his divorce case held in the Summit County Domestic Relations Court. The

complaint alleges he sought the recordings from a staff member, Tom, who never provided them.

When he was not able to obtain the recordings, he filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition.

The complaint named the Summit County Domestic Relations Court as the only respondent. He

later filed an amendment to his complaint to name Visiting Judge Joseph Guilito as an additional

respondent.

       {¶4}    Respondents moved to dismiss. As it relates to the Summit County Domestic

Relations Court, respondents argued the court is not sui juris and, therefore, the complaint as it

relates to the court must be dismissed. As for Judge Guilito, Respondents moved to dismiss

because Mr. Pamboukis alleged he was entitled to relief under the Public Records Act, not the

Ohio Rules of Superintendence, prohibition is not the appropriate remedy for denial of public

records, and he did not meet the requirements for a writ of prohibition.

                     Summit County Domestic Relations Court is not sui juris

       {¶5}    The complaint sought a writ of prohibition against the Summit County Domestic

Relations Court. Courts, however, are not sui juris. Page v. Geauga Cnty. Prob. & Juvenile Court,

Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2491, ¶ 3. Because the court cannot be sued in its own right, the

motion to dismiss is granted as it relates to the Summit County Domestic Relations Court.

                       The complaint must be dismissed as to Judge Guilito

       {¶6}    For this Court to issue a writ of prohibition, relator must establish that: (1) the

judge is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law,

and (3) the denial of the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists. State

ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. Court, 77 Ohio St.3d 447, 448 (1997). “[T]he purpose of a writ
                                                                                       C.A. No. 30865
                                                                                           Page 3 of 5

of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction.” State

ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). A writ of prohibition “tests and determines

solely and only the subject matter jurisdiction” of the lower court. State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v.

Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1988).

        {¶7}   Viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light required by Civ.R. 12(B)(6),

the complaint does not state a claim for prohibition upon which relief can be granted. The

complaint alleges that respondent has exercised judicial power to deny him access to the recordings

he wants. It further alleges that respondent is about to exercise its power to continue to deny him

access to the recordings. Finally, it alleges that Mr. Pamboukis is entitled to the public records

pursuant to R.C. 149.43(a).

        {¶8}   “The threshold issue in public-records cases is whether the Public Records Act or

the Rules of Superintendence govern the request.” State ex rel. Ware v. Kurt, 169 Ohio St.3d 223,

2022-Ohio-1627, ¶ 10. The Supreme Court has noted the importance of this distinction:

        Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the Public Records Act.
        State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of
        Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6. Mandamus is also the
        correct method by which to compel responses under the Rules of Superintendence. Sup.R.
        47(B). Accordingly, the vehicle through which a requesting party seeks to obtain public
        records in mandamus is significant. If the requester seeks public records through the
        incorrect vehicle, then he or she is not entitled to receive the records through a mandamus
        action. Parisi, 159 Ohio St.3d 211, 2019-Ohio-5157, 150 N.E.3d 43, at ¶ 21.

Id.at ¶ 12.

        {¶9}    The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]o determine the appropriate vehicle, we

consider the nature of the records requested. Generally, if the records requested are held by or

were created for the judicial branch, then the party seeking to obtain the records must submit a

request pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47.” State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified

Grievance Committee, 159 Ohio St.3d 211, 2019-Ohio-5157, ¶ 21. Here, Mr. Pamboukis sought
                                                                                         C.A. No. 30865
                                                                                             Page 4 of 5

access to court records: recordings of hearings in his Domestic Relations Court case. That request

should have been made pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Ohio Rules of Superintendence

but, instead, the complaint relies on R.C. 149.43 as the basis for the claim. Because he used the

wrong vehicle to obtain court records, this action must be dismissed. Further, prohibition is not

the correct remedy to challenge the denial of access to public records. Because the complaint

sought a writ of prohibition, rather than a writ of mandamus, it must be dismissed.

        {¶10} Finally, there is no allegation in the complaint that Judge Guilito exceeded his

jurisdiction, as would be required for this Court to issue a writ of prohibition. The complaint’s

allegation that respondent exercised judicial power to deny him access to records and will continue

to do so in the future does not meet the requirements for this Court to grant a writ of prohibition.

There has been no allegation that Judge Guilito lacked or exceeded jurisdiction to act in Mr.

Pamboukis’s case. Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed.

                                             Conclusion

        {¶11} Considering the allegations in the complaint as true, we conclude that Mr.

Pamboukis’s complaint does not state a claim for a writ of prohibition upon which relief can be

granted.

        {¶12} Because Mr. Pamboukis cannot prevail on the facts he alleged, the petition is

dismissed. Costs of this action are taxed to Mr. Pamboukis. The clerk of courts is hereby directed

to serve upon all parties not in default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

See Civ.R. 58(B).

                                                        JENNIFER A. HENSAL
                                                        FOR THE COURT
                                                                      C.A. No. 30865
                                                                          Page 5 of 5

CARR, J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

KONSTANTINOS PAMBOUKIS, Relator.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JENNIFER M. PIATT, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondents.