Court Opinion

ID: 9884605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:03:09.789341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:03.631702
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, also dissenting: I join in the dissent of Chief Justice Underwood and add thereto the following: The majority opinion does not focus on what I consider to be the critical aspect of the question of classification. The majority is concerned with the characteristics of the various drugs discussed and their effects on the human body and behavior pointing out similarities and differences. I do not consider these comparisons important. Instead we must be concerned with the purpose of the classification and the problems the legislature was attempting to alleviate thereby. In Billings v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 97, at 102, 47 L.Ed. 400, 23 S.Ct. 272, the court stated: “Things may have very diverse qualities, and yet be united in a class. They may have very similar qualities, and yet be cast in different classes. — All classification must primarily depend upon purpose — the problem presented”. In 1931 marijuana, opium and cocoa leaves were classified together in the Narcotic Drug Control Law (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1931, Ch. 38, par. 192(a) et seq.) and penalties were provided for the illegal sale and possession thereof. In 1957 Illinois adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1957, ch. 38, par. 192.28-2.17.) The list of drugs brought within the Act had increased to eleven in number and by 1967 the number of drugs included in the classification had grown to fifteen. A reading of these various Acts makes it clear that the legislature was not attempting to classify drugs of similar characteristics and effects but was attempting to classify these drugs for the purpose of combating the social evil found in the illegal sale, possession and use of the same. In 1967 the legislature enacted the Drug Abuse Control Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1967, Ch. 1111/2, par. 801 et seq.) In this Act, as the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, drugs of diverse characteristics and effects are grouped together for the purpose of controlling the illegal traffic in the various members of the class. The majority opinion concludes that marijuana more closely resembles the new list of drugs classified under the Drug Abuse Act, thus rendering the present classification of marijuana violative of the equal-protection clause. The conclusion of the majority ignores the fact that traffic in marijuana had been a social problem of sufficient magnitude to warrant legislative action for many years. Material submitted with the briefs indicates that although a relatively small percentage of marijuana users become addicted to the so-called “hard drugs” a high percentage of “hard drug” addicts first became acquainted with the use of drugs through the use of marijuana. Also, certain studies indicate that marijuana is the most widely used drug among the young drug users. These are facts which the legislature may well have considered as justification for retaining marijuana under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and for not classifying it with the drugs listed in the Drug Abuse Control Act. The presumption of the reasonableness of the classification is with the State and the same will not be set aside as a denial of equal-protection if any facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. Salsburg v. Maryland 346 U.S. 545, 98 L.Ed. 281, 74 S.Ct. 280; Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584, 79 L.Ed. 1070, 1073, 55 S.Ct. 538. The defendant’s brief has also focused on the characteristics and effects of the various drugs and has ignored the problem-to-be solved approach. The burden is on the defendant to present evidence which shows that the apparently reasonable basis for this classification does not exist. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 99 L.Ed. 563, 75 S.Ct. 461; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 81 S.Ct. 1101.) The defendant has failed to produce any evidence concerning the nature of the traffic in the various drugs or the need to control the same. The presumption of the validity of the classification must therefore prevail. A further reason for my dissent concerns the failure of the defendant to present any evidence on the subject of the invalidity of the classification. A motion to quash the indictment raised the question but no evidence was offered by the defendant at the hearing thereon. The evidence offered at the trial concerned the question of guilt or innocence and not characteristics and effects of the drugs. The majority opinion acknowledges that “we must begin with the presumption that the classification is valid and must impose the burden of showing invalidity on the party challenging the classification.” This burden is not satisfied by argument or briefs but by coming forward with proof, by presenting evidence. This the defendant has not done so there is no basis in the record for the findings and comparisons set forth in the majority opinion concerning the properties of the various drugs. Both the defendant and the People filed lengthy briefs containing citations to and quotations from many, many, articles, reports, and studies. The briefs represent a very detailed and well prepared presentation of the entire subject but are not evidence. The burden was on the defendant to present facts and circumstances in evidence from which the determination could be made that the classification in question violates the equal-protection clause. (Gadlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 414 Ill. 89, 95; Thillens v. Hodge, 2 Ill.2d 45, 56; Thillens v. Morey, 11 Ill.2d 579, 591.) In Union Cemetery Ass’n v. Cooper, 414 Ill. 23 this court held that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that would sustain it, and the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed in the absence of proof or judicial knowledge to the contrary. There is a great diversity of opinion as to the effects of marijuana. As the majority opinion states, knowledge in this area is not nearly complete. This court cannot, therefore, take judicial notice thereof. (People v. Price, 257 Ill. 587, 594.) The defendant having offered no evidence thereon, this court cannot make findings and comparisons of marijuana with the other drugs. With the record in this state, the defendant has not sustained the burden of proving the classification invalid.