Court Opinion

ID: 9564323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:58:02.46727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:21.135548
License: Public Domain

SLOAN, J.,
dissenting.
The indictment should not be sustained. No one contends that it does not allege sufficiently culpable conduct to charge killing by grossly negligent driving. The only question is: Does it charge something more ?
The issue is settled by State v. Davis, 207 Or 525, 296 P2d 240; State v. Cram, 176 Or 577, 160 P2d 283, 164 ALR 952. The indictment in the instant case is so identical to that in the Davis case that no distinction could be, or has been, attempted. The indictment in the Davis case was held to charge manslaughter. The majority ignores that such was the actual issue presented by and decided by the Davis case. Instead the majority seemingly seizes upon this opportunity to realign and expand the concept of gross negligence, already admitted to be synonymous with confusion. If the indictment is faulty it can be corrected. It is with the departmentalization of gross negligence into that which is ordinary gross negligence and that which is wilful and wanton gross negligence that I am concerned. Despite the protestations of the majority to the contrary, *126a new area in the field of negligence has now been plowed.
It is acknowledged that some of the courts have used “gross,” “wilful” and “wanton” as equivalent terms. Harper and James, Torts, 950, §§15, 16; Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So _ Cal Law Rev 91. This is largely the result, however, of statutory use of the words. The use of such terms to describe inadvertent or negligent conduct has not been free from criticism. Prosser on Torts (2d ed) 151, § 33. Negligence, even though gross, is still inadvertence. The observation that gross negligence and ordinary negligence were “the same thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet; * * *” (Wilson v. Brett (1843), 11 M & W 113) is much quoted. However, since the legislature imposed upon bench and bar the burden to cope with gross negligence we should confine it to the most precise limits possible.
On the other hand wilful conduct denotes and is and should be advertent, intentional or quasi-intentional. Professor Prosser cites Kelly v. Malott, 135 F 74, wherein it is said: “Negligence and wilfulness are as unmixable as oil and water. ‘Wilful negligence’ is as self-contradictory as ‘guilty innocence.’ ” The conclusion can be reached that the greatest confusion that exists with reference to the guest cases has been with regard to those statutes or decisions which have attempted to apply “gross,” “wanton” and “wilful” as equivalent terms. The more sound historical concept differentiates negligent and wilful conduct. 1 Thompson, Negligence 21, § 20; Prosser on Torts, supra; Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, supra. It is the attempt to mix the oil and the water that appears to create much of the confusion.
This court has previously flirted with this premise. *127Monner v. Starker, 147 Or 118, 31 P2d 1109; Smith v. Williams, 180 Or 626, 178 P2d 710, 173 ALR 1220. Later in Rogers, Adm’r. v. So. Pac. Co. et al., 190 Or 643, 649, 277 P2d 979, gross negligence was said to be “nothing more nor less than great negligence.” In Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Or 130, 146, 295 P2d 182, the court, by Mr. Justice Brand, cites the Eogers case as a return to a more direct definition that this court originally had applied to the guest statute. A portion of the opinion in that case is worthy of careful analysis (207 Or at p 145):
“In Turner v. McCready, 190 Or 28, 222 P2d 1010, recognizing the difficulty involved in attempting to give a definition appropriate for all cases, we resorted to an analysis of the specific facts in a long array of our earlier decisions, in an attempt by inclusion and exclusion, to find a guide for future decisions concerning gross negligence. See also, Johnson v. Leach, 197 Or 430, 253 P2d 642. The principles announced and the analysis made may serve to guide the trial judge and this court in determining whether there is or was sufficient evidence to require submission of gross negligence to the jury, but it is impossible to communicate the results of such analysis to a jury in the form of instructions. These considerations have inclined this court in its more recent decisions to the view that after the trial judge has considered the law and the facts, and has concluded that the issue of gross negligence is one for the jury, he would do well to instruct in the simplest possible language concerning the nature of gross negligence. Accordingly, in Rogers, Adm’r v. So. Pac. Co. et al, 190 Or 643, 649, 277 P2d 979, we said, ‘In its simplest definition gross negligence means nothing more nor less than great negligence.’ Again, we spoke of negligence of ‘such an aggravated character as to constitute gross negligence.’
“In Weber, Adm’r v. Te Selle, Adm’r, 191 Or 85, 87, 228 P2d 769, we said:
*128“ ‘In many decisions of this court brought under such statute, we have attempted to define gross negligence inasmuch as the statute itself contains no definition of what constitutes gross negligence in the operation of an automobile. No standard definition applicable to all cases has been or can be discovered. In the recent case of Rogers, Administrator of the Estate of Betsey Lou Rogers v. Southern Pacific Co. et al, and McKenzie, decided on February 21,1951, we said that gross negligence “means nothing more nor less than great negligence.” ’
“While greater detail may occasionally be required in instructions, we think the problem will be greatly clarified if as a rule the jury is instructed in accordance with the simple definition to which we seem to have returned. Only so will it be possible to make clear to the jury the essential difference between gross negligence and wanton misconduct. On one occasion we cited with apparent approval a definition of gross negligence as including wanton misconduct. Gill v. Selling et al, 125 Or 587, 262 P 812. This we must reject. The distinction between gross negligence and wanton misconduct has been repeatedly recognized.”
The majority now repels that direct and more simple limitation of gross negligence which is so much to be desired. The rule now adopted will require the trial courts to explain gross negligence in terms running from something slightly more than ordinary negligence—perhaps the combination of two or more acts of simple negligence (Turner, Adm’r. v. McCready, supra, at Or p 54)—to and including wilful and wanton conduct. The majority does not say under what circumstances or when the court shall explain wilful and wanton conduct to the jury, with its attendant issues of punitive damages and the defense of contributory negligence. Will it be in every case or must the court *129decide whether or not the evidence requires it? We cannot say that gross negligence and wilful and wanton are now synonymous and the latter term abolished. How else will the court define the conduct which will justify punitive damages? Centuries of sound common-law identification and thinking will not be so readily dispelled. Certainly, it could not be said that the term “great negligence” will suffice to explain this entire spectrum to the jury. I am of the firm opinion that the reasoning adopted by the court in Falls v. Mortensen should be preserved and that the term “gross” negligence is only capable of some degree of logical application when limited with the greatest preciseness possible.
The majority attempts to mollify the effect of its holding by applying the announced doctrine to the criminal statutes. It leaves undecided the application of this opinion to civil cases. The implication that it may be applied to guest cases should not be permitted. The uneasy certainty that now prevails in the trial of these cases will now be limited to how well the trial court can divine the will of this court. The admonition of Justice Brand, above, that the detailed analysis of Turner v. McCready cannot be submitted to the jury is pertinent. The majority opinion will stimulate animated discussion between court and counsel in chambers. It will also stimulate the judicial hackle when the court attempts to explain it to the jury. For the reasons stated I would affirm the trial court.