Court Opinion

ID: 9573041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:46:59.845641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:12.015117
License: Public Domain

Justice QUINN
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In rejecting the court of appeals’ conclusion that the defendant’s conviction for either first-degree sexual assault or sexual assault on a child merged with the defendant’s conviction for second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, the majority adopts a cramped analysis of the merger doctrine and fails to apply that doctrine in a manner consistent with our prior precedent.
The majority proceeds from the mistaken premise that the applicability of the merger doctrine in this case must “be based on double jeopardy principles.” Maj. op. at 1060. The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions protect an accused from a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, from a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and under certain circumstances from multiple punishments for the same offense in a single trial. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); Boulies v. People, 770 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Colo.1989). To be sure, the double jeopardy protections of the federal and state constitutions countenance cumulative punishment in a single trial for statutory offenses proscribing the same conduct as long as the legislature has specifically authorized cumulative punishment for those offenses. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679-80, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); People v. Haymaker, 716 P.2d 110, 115-17 (Colo.1986). The rule of merger, on the other hand, “precludes a conviction for a crime that is the lesser included offense of another for which the defendant has also been convicted in the same prosecution.” Boulies, 770 P.2d at 1282; see also People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 35, 525 P.2d 435, 438 (1974); People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 62, 65-66, 507 P.2d 875, 877 (1973).
*1065The merger rule is a creation not only of judicial precedent but also of legislative enactment. Section 18-l-408(l)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986), states that a defendant may not be convicted of more than one offense if the other offense is lesser included. An offense is lesser included when “[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.” § 18-l-408(5)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986). The critical question in this case is whether either the crime of first-degree sexual assault or the crime of sexual assault on a child is a lesser included offense of the crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault. In contrast to the majority, my analysis of the structure and text of the Colorado Criminal Code leads me to conclude that the crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault includes the lesser crime of either first-degree sexual assault or sexual assault on a child.1
I.
Section 18-1-104(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986), defines the term “offense” and “crime” as meaning “a violation of, or conduct defined by, any state statute for which a fine or imprisonment may be imposed.” Every felony “offense” so defined must fall into any one of five classes of felonies created by the Criminal Code. § 18-1-104(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Section 18-3-302, 8B C.R.S. (1986), creates several distinct and separate types of second-degree kidnapping. Subsections (1) and (2) of this statute provide as follows:
(1) Any person who knowingly, forcibly, or otherwise seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping.
(2) Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian commits second degree kidnapping.
As defined in these subsections, second-degree kidnapping is a class 4 felony, which is punishable by a minimum of two years and a maximum sentence of eight years imprisonment. §§ 18-3-302(5) & 18 — 1— 105(l)(a)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Section 18-3-302(3)(a) defines and punishes as a more severe form of kidnapping criminal conduct that satisfies not only the elements of second-degree kidnapping but also the additional element that the victim kidnapped “[i]s a victim of a sexual assault.” The crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault is a class 2 felony punishable by a minimum of eight years and a maximum of twenty-four years imprisonment. §§ 18-3-302(3)(a) & 18-1-105(l)(a)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
“Sexual assault” as used in the second-degree kidnapping statute is a generic term that includes several types of sexual offenses. One such offense is first-degree sexual assault, which involves the knowing infliction of sexual penetration on the victim through the application of physical force or violence or causing submission of the victim by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping. § 18-3-402(l)(a) & (b), 8B C.R.S. (1986). First-degree sexual assault is a class 3 felony, but if the offender is armed with a deadly weapon and uses a deadly weapon to cause submission of the victim, the crime is a class 2 felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not greater than twice the maximum term in the presumptive range. §§ 18-3-402(2), (3)(c) & (4); 18-l-105(l)(a)(IV); and 18-l-105(9)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Another crime included within the category of “sexual assault” is the offense of sexual assault on a child, which consists of knowingly subjecting a child less than fifteen years of age to sexual contact. § 18-3-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986). Sexual assault on a child is a class 4 felony, but is a class 3 felony when the offender commits the offense by the use of force, intimidation, or threat, and is punishable in the latter instance by a minimum of four years and a maximum of sixteen years *1066imprisonment. §§ 18-3-405(2) & 18-1-105(l)(a)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
The crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault thus encompasses various types of sexual assault proscribed by the Colorado Criminal Code. By so defining the crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, the General Assembly has prescribed as the allowable unit of prosecution for that offense any second-degree kidnapping accompanied by any type of sexual assault proscribed by the Criminal Code. In terms of the allowable unit of prosecution, therefore, second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault is analytically similar to the statutory definition of felony murder, § 18-3-102(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986), which authorizes as an allowable unit of prosecution for first-degree murder criminal conduct consisting of certain enumerated felonies — i.e., arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first or second-degree, sexual assault on a child, escape, or an attempt to commit any one of these offenses — whenever in the course or in furtherance of the underlying felony the death of a person other than a participant is caused by anyone. We held in Boulies v. People, 770 P.2d at 1282, that the merger rule prohibited a conviction for aggravated robbery where the defendant also had been convicted of felony murder based on his causing the death of the victim during the course of the aggravated robbery. That same analysis, in my opinion, is controlling here.
II.
The charges filed in the instant case fall within the allowable unit of prosecution established by the Colorado Criminal Code. The defendant was charged with six substantive crimes committed against two teenage girls on August 30, 1986: two counts of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-302(3)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986); two counts of first-degree sexual assault by causing submission of the victims by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping, and by the use of a deadly weapon, in violation of section 18-3-402(3) & (4), 8B C.R.S. (1986); and two counts of sexual assault on a child in violation of section 18-3-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986). In addition, two counts charged the defendant with a crime of violence involving the use or possession and threatened use of a deadly weapon during the commission of second-degree kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault, and thus subjected the defendant to a punishment not greater than twice the maximum term authorized for the crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault. § 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986).
In light of the statutory definition of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, which necessarily includes both first-degree sexual assault and sexual assault on a child as types of sexual assault within the allowable unit of prosecution for the crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, it necessarily follows that the defendant’s convictions for either first-degree sexual assault or sexual assault on a child were necessarily included as essential elements of the greater inclusive offense of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault. The defendant’s conviction for second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault was based on proof, essential to a conviction for that crime, that he committed the crime of second-degree kidnapping against both victims and in the course thereof he either committed first-degree sexual assault against the victims or committed the crime of sexual assault on a child. Under these circumstances, the convictions for either the lesser included offense of first-degree sexual assault or the lesser included offense of sexual assault on a child merged into the conviction for the greater inclusive offense of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault. See Boulies, 770 P.2d at 1282; People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24, 26, 525 P.2d 431, 433 (1974); Hancock, 186 Colo. at 35, 525 P.2d at 438; Bugarin, 181 Colo. at 65-66, 507 P.2d at 877.
In reaching a contrary result, the majority places substantial reliance on our decision in People v. Powell, 716 P.2d 1096 (Colo.1986), which held that, in the context of a double jeopardy challenge, the class 4 *1067felony of second-degree kidnapping could be constitutionally elevated to a class 2 felony of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of first-degree sexual assault. 716 P.2d at 1104-05. Powell, however, did not address whether first-degree sexual assault encompassed by the crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault was a lesser included offense for purposes of the merger doctrine. By reason of the issue raised in Powell, this court’s analysis necessarily drew upon double jeopardy principles, relying primarily on our decision in People v. Haymaker, 716 P.2d at 115-17, which in turn followed the analysis of Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, and held that a court may impose cumulative punishment in a single trial for statutory offenses proscribing the same conduct as long as the legislature has specifically authorized cumulative punishment for those offenses.
Powell provides no support for the proposition that the legislature intended to authorize separate convictions for second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault and first-degree sexual assault or sexual assault on a child when, as here, proof of the crime of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault necessarily establishes all the elements required to prove either of these sexual offenses. Such a reading of Powell not only is contrary to a long line of Colorado precedent precluding dual convictions for both a greater inclusive and lesser included offense, e.g., Boulies, 770 P.2d at 1282; Hancock, 186 Colo. at 35; 525 P.2d at 438; Rivera, 186 Colo. at 26, 525 P.2d at 433; Bugarin, 181 Colo, at 65-66, 507 P.2d at 877, but also is irreconcilably at odds with the express provisions of section 18-l-408(l)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986), which precludes dual convictions for both a greater inclusive and a lesser included crime.
I acknowledge that section 18-3-402(3) & (4), 8B C.R.S. (1986), classifies first-degree sexual assault as a class 2 felony when the offender is armed with a deadly weapon and uses the weapon to cause submission of the victim, and also requires a person convicted of that crime to be sentenced in accordance with section 18-l-105(9)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986), which sets the penalty at greater than the maximum in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for a class 2 felony. The maximum sentence for second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, in contrast, is the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for a class 2 felony. Although the People rely on this difference in maximum penalties in arguing that first-degree sexual assault is not a lesser included offense of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, what the People’s argument overlooks is that the applicability of the merger rule turns on an analysis of the elements of the arguably greater inclusive and lesser included offenses and not on the maximum penalties authorized for those respective crimes. Furthermore, to the extent that a deadly weapon was involved in the commission of second-degree kidnapping involving a sexual assault, the use of such weapon would qualify as a crime of violence and as an aggravating circumstance, both of which could support a penalty of not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, see §§ 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986); 18-l-105(9)(c), 8B C.R.S. (1986), thus rendering second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault and also involving the use of a deadly weapon the equivalent in terms of penalty to first-degree sexual assault involving the use of a deadly weapon.
III.
The court of appeals, in my view, correctly affirmed the defendant’s convictions for two counts of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault, vacated the defendant’s convictions on two counts of first-degree sexual assault and two counts of sexual assault on a child, and remanded the case with directions to the trial court that it reinstate the defendant’s convictions “for whichever of these two [lesser] crimes the trial court determines, under the facts of *1068this case, not to be a lesser included offense of second degree kidnapping involving sexual assault,” and then that it resen-tence the defendant for his convictions for the two counts of second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault and for those two other convictions not deemed to be a lesser included offense of those greater inclusive convictions for second-degree kidnapping involving sexual assault. People v. Henderson, 794 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Colo.App.1989). Such disposition gives as much effect to the jury’s verdicts as can be done without running afoul of the merger doctrine. See People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 247 (Colo.1983).
I would affirm the judgment of the court of the appeals.
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR and Justice KIRSHBAUM join in this dissent.

. Citations to the Colorado Criminal Code are to those provisions in effect on the date of the crimes charged against the defendant, August 30, 1986.