Court Opinion

ID: 9405217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 20:01:16.450621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.332041
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 ZAYN AL ABIDIN MUHAMMAD
 HUSAYN (ISN #10016),

                 Petitioner,
 v.                               Civil Action No. 08-1360
                                  (EGS)
 LLOYD AUSTIN, et al.,

                 Respondents.

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

      Pending before the Court is journalist Raymond Bonner’s

(“Movant”) Motion to Intervene and Unseal. See ECF No. 317. Upon

careful consideration of the motion, opposition, reply thereto,

the notices of supplemental authority submitted by movant and

the Government, the applicable law, and for the reasons

explained below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART,

AND FOUND AS MOOT IN PART.

      Following the classification review ordered by the Court

of, among other records in this case, those Movant seeks to

unseal, see Min. Order (Apr. 22, 2016); the Government filed on

the docket public versions of all the records Movant seeks to

unseal, see generally docket for Civil Action No. 08-1360.

Fourteen of the records contain no redactions; the remaining
twenty-two contain redactions. 1 Accordingly, the motion is MOOT

as to the fourteen records with no redactions.

I.   Movant May Intervene In This Case

     “[T]hird parties may be allowed to permissively intervene

under [Fed.] Rule [Civ. P.] 24(b) for the limited purpose of

seeking access to materials that have been shielded from public

view either by seal or by protective order.” E.E.O.C v. Nat’l

Children’s Ctr. Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Here, Movant seeks to intervene to gain access to materials that

are sealed on the docket in this case, and also gain access to

materials that have been designated by Executive Branch

authorities as classified. See generally Mem. of Law in Supp. of

Mot. to Intervene (“Mot. to Intervene”), ECF No. 317-1. In view

of the liberal interpretation of Rule 24(b) by the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”),

see Nat’l Children’s Ctr. Inc., 146 F.3d at 1045; and the lack

of opposition by the Government, see Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 4

n.3, 2 the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion and permits Movant to

intervene for the limited purpose of seeking access to sealed

and classified records. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee

Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 2d. 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2009)(Hogan, J.)

1 ECF Nos. 333 and 350 are the same record.
2 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page
number of the filed document.

                                2
(allowing members of the press to intervene in this action for

the limited purpose of opposing the government’s Motion to

Confirm Designation of Unclassified Returns as “Protected").

II.   The Court Will Assume A Qualified First Amendment Right of
      Access

      Movant seeks to intervene to gain access to materials that

are sealed on the docket in this case, and also to gain access

to materials that have been designated by Executive Branch

authorities as classified. See generally Mot. to Intervene, ECF

No. 317-1. Following the completion of the briefing on the

instant motion, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion reversing the

district court opinion upon which Movant relies to assert his

right of access to classified materials here. See id. at 15, 18

(citing Dhiab v. Obama, 70 F. Supp. 3d 486 (D.D.C. 2014)). In

Dhiab, the district court granted news media organizations’

motion to intervene and unseal classified videotapes that had

been filed on the docket in that case. See generally id. The

D.C. Circuit reversed. See Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087 (D.C.

Cir. 2017). The panel was unanimous in reversing the district

court, but divided on whether the First Amendment guarantees a

right of public access to classified documents filed in

Guantanamo Bay habeas corpus proceedings. See id. at 1096, 1098-

1107.

                                 3
     The panel agreed, however, that “[e]ven if intervenors had

a qualified First Amendment right of access” to the classified

materials in that case, national security considerations made

that access unavailable. See id. at 1096. First, the court noted

that “[t]he government identified multiple ways in which

unsealing these recordings would likely impair national

security,” citing “the government’s expert judgment” as

expressed in various declarations filed with the Court. Id. The

court dismissed the district court’s characterization of the

declaration of the Commander of the Joint Task-Force Guantanamo

as “speculative,” because while the district court “thought it

knew better,” it, unlike the Commander, who “made his

declaration on personal knowledge,” “had no day-to-day

experience with the people being detained at Guantanamo and had

no special insight into their mindset.” Id. at 1097. The court

stated that

          [i]t bears repeating that the government “has
          a compelling interest in protecting ... the
          secrecy of information important to our
          national security....” McGehee, 718 F.2d at
          1143 (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
          at 509 n.3, 100 S.Ct. 763 (per curiam)
          (emphasis and alteration in original)). See
          also C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175, 105 S.
          Ct. 1881, 85 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1985); United
          States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir.
          1989). The district court did not disagree
          with the “SECRET” classification of these
          recordings, and neither did the intervenors.
          By definition, “the unauthorized disclosure of
          [the recordings] reasonably could be expected

                                4
          to cause serious damage to the national
          security.” Executive Order No. 13,526 §
          1.2(a)(2). The district court had no basis for
          ruling that publicly releasing the recordings
          could not be expected to cause such harm.

Id. at 1098.

     Accordingly, the Court will assume a qualified First

Amendment right of access to the classified information for the

purpose of this motion and will evaluate whether the Government

has met its burden under the Press-Enterprise II 3 standard.

III. Analysis

     A. The Information Is “Properly Classified”

     Executive Order 13526 (“E.O.”), governs the classification

of national security information. The E.O. authorizes

classification “only if all of the following” four criteria are

met: (1) an original classification authority classifies the

information; (2) the U.S. Government owns, produces, or controls

the information; (3) the information is within one of eight

protected categories listed in Section 1.4 of the E.O.; and (4)

the original classification authority determines that the

unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be

expected to result in damage to the national security, and

identifies or describes that damage. E.O., § 1.1(a).

3
 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for the
County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).

                                5
         Here, the declarations first confirm that the information

was classified by an original classification authority. See DoD

Decl., ECF No. 411-1 at 3 n.3; FBI Decl., ECF No. 411-2 at 4

n.1. Second, they confirm that the U.S. Government owns,

produces, or controls the information. See DoD Decl., ECF No.

411-1 at 3 n.3; FBI Decl., ECF No. 411-2 at 4 n.1. Third, they

confirm that the information falls within one of the eight

protected categories. See DoD Decl., ECF No. 411-1 at 3 n.3; FBI

Decl., ECF No. 411-2 at 4 n.1. The Government explains that

here, the categories are military operations, E.O. 13526 §

1.4(a); foreign government information, E.O. 13526 § 1.4(b);

intelligence activities, E.O. 13526 § 1.4(c); foreign relations,

including confidential sources, E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d); or

capabilities relating to the national security, E.O. 13526 §

1.4(g). Fourth, the declarations confirm that unauthorized

disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in

identifiable or describable damage to the national security. See

DoD Decl., ECF No. 411-1 at 3 n.3; FBI Decl., ECF No. 411-2 at 4

n.1. 4

         Movant fails to contest whether any of these requirements

have been met. See generally Reply, ECF No. 436. Rather, he

4 Although there is no unclassified version of the declaration
from the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), the Government
addresses the fourth criteria as to CIA information in its
Opposition briefing. See Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 12, 38-40.

                                    6
makes a number of broad, and largely unsupported claims: that

“[m]uch of the redacted information withheld could not properly

be classified under Executive Order 13526,” id. at 21; that

“[t]he docket . . . reveals a history of reckless

overclassification, id. at 22; and raises the issue of “[t]he

CIA’s documented misuse of its classification authority

regarding [Petitioner],” id. at 23-24.

     Based on the record here, the Court concludes that all four

requirements have been met here. With regard to the first three

requirements, the Court has explained supra how they were met.

With regard to the fourth, the Court appropriately defers to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); but at the

same time “must assure [itself] that the reasons for the

classification are rational and plausible ones.” McGehee v.

Casey, 718 F2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Morley v.

CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2007)(noting in the context

of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) that “a plausible

assertion that information is classified” is all that is

required to invoke Exemption 1 covering classified information).

In infra Section III.B.1., the Court concludes that it is both

                                7
rational and plausible that the official disclosure of the

information at issue in each category reasonably could be

expected to result in damage to the national security that is

identified or described. For these reasons, the Court concludes

that the information is properly classified.

     B. Application of the Press-Enterprise II Standard

     In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court considered

whether the public has “a First Amendment right of access to the

transcript of a preliminary hearing growing out of a criminal

investigation.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of

California for the County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986). To

answer that question, the Supreme Court determined that the

government must demonstrate: (1) a compelling interest in non-

disclosure; (2) a substantial probability that disclosure will

harm these interests; and (3) there is no alternative to

nondisclosure that will protect the government’s compelling

interests and the restriction is narrowly-tailored. See id. at

13-14.

                                8
            1. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
               Interest in Nondisclosure of Each Category of
               Classified Information At Issue 5

     The DoD affiant avers “on personal knowledge and

information made available to [him] in the course of [his]

official duties” that

          This declaration is provided to explain the
          bases for the redaction of DoD intelligence
          information in the public versions of the
          filing submitted in response to the Court’s
          Minute Orders of April 22, 2016 and June 10,
          2016 pertaining to the Motion by Non-Party
          Raymond Bonner to Intervene and Unseal Court
          Records (ECF No. 317-1). This information
          meets the requirements for classified national
          security information pursuant to E.O. 13526
          and is properly classified. It is not
          available for declassification and public
          release, or release to individuals not having
          both the appropriate security clearances, and
          appropriate need to know, to access the
          content of the information pursuant to E.O.
          13526, section 4.1.

DoD Decl., ECF No. 411-1 ¶ 4.

                 a. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                    Interest in Non-Disclosure of Intelligence
                    Reports, Including Sources and Methods

     In this category, “DoD and FBI have withheld from

disclosure information which reveals or could tend to reveal

intelligence sources, capabilities, or methods.” Opp’n, ECF No.

5 Movant does not object to nondisclosure with respect to two
categories: (1) the identities of intelligence personnel and (2)
the Guantanamo Detention facilities information, see Reply, ECF
No. 436 at 19-20; accordingly, the Court will not address those
categories.

                                9
411 at 7. The DoD Declaration, based on the “personal knowledge

and information made available to me in the course of my

official duties,” DoD Declaration, ECF No. 411-1 ¶ 1; explains

that

            Disclosure   of    information   which   reveals
            intelligence sources, capabilities or methods
            could lead to the identification of DoD
            intelligence priorities and allocation of
            resources to support those priorities which
            may indicate gaps in our intelligence. In
            particular, information which reveals Human
            Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counterintelligence
            (CI) information and/or these requirements at
            operational     and    strategic    levels    is
            classified. It is classified, and closely
            controlled,   because    it   can   reveal   the
            existence of past and present law enforcement
            operations, past or current intelligence
            operations (including the names of these
            operations), and past and present source
            information, planned operations, and past and
            present intelligence gathering methodologies.
            Public release of classified HUMINT and CI
            gathering, which would likely diminish the
            effectiveness of future operations using those
            methods, if the specifics of this type of
            information were publicly known. Revelation
            could immediately and significantly hinder
            current and future intelligence collection,
            negatively impacting both national security
            and force protection of military activities
            and intelligence operations and putting our
            core personnel and human sources at greater
            risk.

Id. ¶ 9.

       Movant responds that the Government “provides no evidence

that withholding information in this category is necessary to

protect against harm to national security,” asserting that

                                  10
“[t]he defense of this category consists entirely of conclusory

and speculative assertions of harm that are constitutionally

insufficient.” Reply, ECF No. 436 at 16. However, Movant fails

to rebut the Government’s citation to Supreme Court precedent

recognizing a “compelling [government] interest in” “providing

intelligence sources with an assurance of confidentiality that

is as absolute as possible.” C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159

(1985). And the Government has explained precisely how

disclosure of “intelligence sources, capabilities or methods”

could damage national security—it “could significantly hinder

current and future intelligence collection.” DoD Decl., ECF No.

411-1 ¶ 9. The damage is both identified and described.

     In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

                               11
                  b. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                     Interest in Non-Disclosure of Factual or
                     Intelligence Gathering

      The Government states that “the disclosure of factual

information uncovered by United States intelligence activities

would reasonably be expected to harm the same interests as the

direct disclosure of sources and methods.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at

32. The DoD Declaration explains that disclosure of this

information “could cause serious harm to national security by

providing our enemies and adversaries with information about

intelligence sources and methods, known gaps in intelligence and

the types of information of interest to the United States”

thereby adversely impacting the effectiveness of United States

military and intelligence activities. DoD Decl., ECF No. 411-1 ¶

16.

      Movant responds that the Government’s public justification

for this category consists of a single sentence—“[c]ontinued

nondisclosure is therefore necessary to protect the United

States from hostile activities by these adversaries,” Reply, ECF

No. 436 at 16; but fails to rebut the Government’s citation to a

prior decision in this case. In Detainee Litigation II, Judge

Hogan found that factual intelligence data should be protected

from release, even where that information is unclassified,

holding that “names and locations . . . or other locations of

interest as they pertain to counter-terrorism intelligence

                                12
gathering, law enforcement, or military operations, where the

Government has not previously acknowledged publicly its

knowledge of those names or locations.” 787 F. Supp. 2d at 20.

     The Government has explained how disclosure of this

information could damage national security—in addition to the

reasons explained supra Section III.B.1.a., disclosure would

“provid[e] our enemies and adversaries with information about

sources and methods, knowns gaps in intelligence, and the types

of information of interest to the United States” thereby

compromising the effectiveness of intelligence activities. DoD

Decl., ECF No. 411-1 ¶ 16. The damage is both identified and

described.

     In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

                               13
                 c. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                    Interest in Non-Disclosure of Intelligence
                    Assessments and Conclusions

     The Government argues that “[t]he likely harms to national

security that warrant nondisclosure of intelligence sources and

methods likewise demonstrate the propriety of the Government’s

nondisclosure of intelligence conclusions: the analytic products

of intelligence professionals.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 33. The

DoD Declaration explains that “[p]ublic disclosure of our

intelligence assessments and their significance would lead to

scrutiny or surveillance by terrorist networks, their

supporters, and other current and potential adversaries.” DoD

Decl., ECF No. 411-1 ¶ 16.

     Movant responds that the Government’s public defense of

this category is entirely redacted, Reply, ECF No. 436 at 16;

but fails to rebut the Government’s citation to caselaw it

argues establishes that the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting from disclosure “the analytic products of

intelligence professionals,” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 33-34.

     The Government has explained how disclosure of this

information could damage national security—“[p]ublic disclosure

of our intelligence assessments and their significance would

lead to scrutiny or surveillance by terrorist networks, their

supporters, and other current and potential adversaries.” DoD

                               14
Decl., ECF No. 411-1 ¶ 16. The damage is both identified and

described.

     In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

                 d. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                    Interest in Non-Disclosure of Interrogation
                    Details, Plans and Assessments of
                    Effectiveness

     This category includes “[i]nformation about the use,

effectiveness, or specific details about the implementation of

many interrogation techniques, including recommendations for

future interrogation techniques.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 10; see

also DoD Decl., ECF No. 411-1 ¶ 19 (describing the contents of

Summary Interrogation Reports (“SIRs” and Memoranda for the

Record “MFRs”). The DoD Declaration explains that “information

regarding the use, effectiveness, or specific details about the

                               15
implementation of certain interrogation techniques, including

recommendations for future interrogation techniques is

classified.” DoD Decl., ECF No. 411-1 ¶ 20. The DOD Declaration

clarifies that “the types of interrogation approaches used, as

they are approved by Executive Order 13491 and included in the

Army Field Manual” are not classified, but that what is

classified is

            the manner and strategy in which they were
            employed with a specific detainee or in a
            specific interrogation. Public dissemination
            of the particulars regarding the tactics,
            methodologies    and   efficacy   of    certain
            techniques and approaches would lead to
            detainees becoming familiar with such tactics
            an thereby developing their own methods of
            evading such techniques. This could diminish
            the future utility and value of these
            methodologies and techniques as a means to
            gain intelligence vital to protecting our
            national    interests.    Release    of    this
            information will therefore inhibit future
            intelligence collection and could cost the
            Government the ability to utilize these
            methods in the future, as well as result in
            the loss of intelligence while new methods are
            being developed to replace those that became
            non-viable due to detainees’ familiarity with
            them.

Id. ¶ 20.

     With regard to Interrogation Plans, the DoD Declaration

explains that such a plan

            lists    collection    objectives,    approach
            techniques, preparation and liaison tasks, and
            an    interpreter    usage    plan.    Planned
            interrogation approaches and techniques are
            classified when a given detainee is still in

                                  16
          detention to allow for continued use to gain
          information   to    assist   with   continuing
          intelligence gathering and law enforcement
          investigations.   If   this   information   was
          publicly revealed, it could identify the
          existence and nature of a current intelligence
          operation, the types of information that may
          be undergoing exploitation and how the
          information is being actively exploited. Past
          information about interrogation plans is
          classified to prevent disclosure of cumulative
          information about the interrogation process,
          including techniques which were utilized and
          the   detainee’s   responsiveness    to   those
          techniques. Such cumulative information could
          be used to formulate counter-interrogation
          techniques.

Id. ¶ 22. The DoD Declaration states that there are SIRs and

MFRs of detainees that corroborate aspects of Petitioner’s

activities. Id. ¶ 23

     Movant argues that this category should be rejected as a

basis for any redaction because “[n]o harm can plausibly be

expected to result from disclosures about the effectiveness of a

CIA torture program that has already been publicly described in

detail and judged ineffective, and is now prohibited both by

executive order and statute.” Reply, ECF No. 436 at 23. However,

the Government notes that

          [c]ertain categories of information about the
          CIA’s detention and interrogation program are
          not classified . . . including “the fact that
          the detention and interrogation program was a
          covert action program authorized by the
          President by a September 17, 2001 Memorandum
          of Notification, the names a descriptions of
          authorized enhanced interrogation techniques
          used in connection with the detention and

                                17
          interrogation    program   and    the   specified
          parameters within which the techniques could
          be    applied,     the   authorized      enhanced
          interrogation    techniques    applied    to  119
          individuals as described in Appendix 2 of the
          Executive Summary of the Committee Study of
          the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program
          (“SSCI Report”) officially acknowledged to
          have   been   in    CIA  custody,     information
          regarding the conditions of confinement,
          treatment, as applied to those 119 individuals
          and mentioned in Appendix 2 of the Executive
          Summary of the SSCI report, and allegations of
          torture, abuse, or mistreatment by those 119
          individuals mentioned in Appendix 2 of the
          Executive Summary of the SSCI report.

Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 35 n.28.

     Movant fails to address the authority cited by the

Government. In the FOIA context, D.C. Circuit concluded “that it

is both plausible and logical that the disclosure of information

regarding the interrogation of detainees would degrade the CIA’s

ability to carry out its mission” and would interfere with “the

CIA’s ability to effectively question terrorist detainees.” ACLU

v. Dep’t of Justice, 628 F.3d 612, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see

also ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2012).

     The Government has explained how disclosure of this

information could cause serious harm to national security—

“[d]isclosure of these details of the effectiveness of

particular interrogation techniques would ‘diminish the future

utility and value of these methodologies and techniques as a

means to gain intelligence’ as they ‘became non-viable due to .

                                 18
. .   familiarity with’ the techniques by those interrogated in

the future.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 34 (quoting DoD Decl. ¶ 20).

The damage is both identified and described.

      In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

                  e. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                     Interest in Non-Disclosure of CIA
                     Information Related to the RDI Program That
                     Remains Properly Classified

      The Government states that “this information is properly

classified because disclosure to the public would reasonably be

expected to raise serious, and in some cases, exceptionally

grave, harm to national security.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 12

(citing CIA Decl. and ex parte filing). Movant does not have the

ability to access classified information and so requests that

the Court review “the specific redactions predicated on [this]

                                19
category[y], applying the Press-Enterprise II standard and

demanding explanations from the government about its specific

redactions.” Reply, ECF No. 436 at 21.

     The Court has reviewed the classified CIA Declaration and

ex parte filing. The Government has explained how disclosure of

this information “would reasonably be expected to raise serious,

and in some cases, exceptionally grave, harm to national

security.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 12, 38. The harm is both

identified and described.

     In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

                               20
                 f. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                    Interest in Non-Disclosure of Information
                    Related to the CIA’s Foreign Liaison
                    Relationships

     The Government states that “this information is properly

classified because disclosure to the public would reasonably be

expected to cause serious harm to national security.” Opp’n, ECF

No. 12 (citing CIA Decl. and ex parte filing). Movant does not

have the ability to access classified information and so

requests that the Court review “the specific redactions

predicated on [this] category[y], applying the Press-Enterprise

II standard and demanding explanations from the government about

its specific redactions.” Reply, ECF No. 436 at 21.

     The Court has reviewed the classified CIA Declaration and

ex parte filing. The Government has explained how disclosure of

this information “would reasonably be expected to cause serious

harm to national security.” Opp’n, ECF No. 12, 38. The harm is

both identified and described.

     In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

                                 21
disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

                 g. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                    Interest in Non-Disclosure of Clandestinely
                    Collected Foreign Intelligence Information
                    Collected by the CIA

     The Government states that the release of the foreign

intelligence information collected by the CIA must be prevented

to avoid harms to national security. Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 12

(citing CIA Decl.). Movant does not have the ability to access

classified information and so requests that the Court review

“the specific redactions predicated on [this] category[y],

applying the Press-Enterprise II standard and demanding

explanations from the government about its specific redactions.”

Reply, ECF No. 436 at 21. However, Movant fails to address the

Government’s arguments set forth below.

     The Government argues that disclosure of this information

would be likely to harm national security because “in the

intelligence field, disclosure of a discrete piece of

information be itself may be innocuous, but in conjunction with

other, seemingly harmless bits of information, may reveal

sensitive information that could harm national security.” Opp’n,

ECF No. 411 at 38.

                               22
     The Court has reviewed the classified CIA Declaration. The

Government has explained how disclosure of this information

would be likely to harm national security. The harm is both

identified and described.

     In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

                 h. The Government Has Demonstrated A Compelling
                    Interest in Non-Disclosure of CIA
                    Administrative Information

     The Government states that some types of administrative

information—such as the markings used for documents and other

information—must be withheld from disclosure “where such

information is classified to avoid harms to national security.”

Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 12, 39 (citing CIA Decl.). Movant does not

have the ability to access classified information and so

requests that the Court review “the specific redactions

                               23
predicated on [this] category[y], applying the Press-Enterprise

II standard and demanding explanations from the government about

its specific redactions.” Reply, ECF No. 436 at 21.

     The Court has reviewed the classified CIA Declaration. The

Government has explained how disclosure of this information

would be likely to harm national security. The harm is both

identified and described.

      In view of the deference the Court properly gives to the

considered judgment of the Executive Branch, see e.g., Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927

(D.C. Cir. 2003)(“[W]e have consistently deferred to executive

affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found

it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”); the Court

concludes that it is both rational and plausible that the

disclosure of this information “reasonably could be expected to

result in damage to the national security,” E.O. 13526 §

1.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the Government has a compelling interest

in protecting this information from disclosure.

            2. The Government Has Demonstrated A Substantial
               Probability That Disclosure Will Harm the
               Government’s Interests

     The Government states that its declarations establish that

there is a “substantial probability” that the harms articulated

for each category, see supra Section III.B.1, will occur if the

information is disclosed: “[t]he Government’s declarants explain

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the serious likely harms that would flow from disclosure of the

classified information here, and rationally and logically

articulate why these harms are likely to occur.” Opp’n, ECF No.

411 at 40 (citing DoD Decl.)

     Movant fails to meaningfully respond—stating only that

“[t]he government fundamentally fails to make a logical and

plausible showing that release of the 22 records remaining at

issue would create a substantial probability of harm to national

security.” Reply, ECF No. 436 at 9. Movant further asserts that

the government has “[m]erely assert[ed] that national security

is implicated without meaningful explanation or clarification—as

the government repeatedly does—is woefully inadequate under the

First Amendment.” Id.

     Movant is wrong; the Government has provided detailed

explanations of the damage to national security that could

reasonably be expected from disclosure. The Court carefully

considered them and determined that for each category of

information at issue, the Government demonstrated it is both

rational and plausible that the disclosure of each category of

information “reasonably could be expected to result in damage to

the national security,” E.O. 13526 § 1.1(a)(4). See supra

Section III.B.1. Movant is also wrong in claiming that

information that is already publicly available cannot result in

harm to national security. See Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 317-1

                               25
at 26. Rather, the weight of authority recognizes the

distinction between official and unofficial disclosure. See

e.g., United States v. Zubaydah, 142 S.Ct. 959, 970 (2022);

Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir.

1983)(“[E]ven if a fact . . . is the subject of widespread media

and public speculation, its official acknowledgment by an

authoritative source might well be new information that could

cause damage to the national security.”). For these reasons, the

Government has demonstrated a substantial probability that

disclosure will harm the Government’s interests.

            3. The Government Has Demonstrated That There Is No
               Alternative To Non-Disclosure That Will Protect
               the Government’s Compelling Interests and the
               Restriction Is Narrowly Tailored

     The Government states that its declarants explain that “the

harms to national security flow directly from any disclosure of

the withheld information, and so there is no alternative short

of nondisclosure that can adequately protect against these

harms.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 42. The Government points to the

public redacted versions of the documents at issue, arguing that

the “withholding of the classified information redacted from

these documents is narrowly tailored to the compelling interests

in national security served by nondisclosure.” Id. (cites a

case). Movant fails to respond to the Government’s argument. See

generally Reply, ECF No. 436.

                                26
     The Court has already concluded that it is both rational

and plausible that the disclosure of each category of

information “reasonably could be expected to result in damage to

the national security.” See supra Section III.B.1. Accordingly,

there is no alternative to nondisclosure that will protect the

government’s compelling interests. And because redacted versions

of the documents have been filed on the docket in this case, the

restriction is narrowly tailored. See In re Motions of Dow

Jones, 142 F.3d 496, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(noting that the media

was able to receive “non-protected details about what transpired

before the court”).

     C. Continued Nondisclosure Subject to A Pending Motion For
        Protection Is Appropriate

     The Government states that the “CIA has also withheld from

public release any information which is the subject of a pending

motion for protection pursuant to the governing protective

order.” Opp’n, ECF No. 411 at 13 (citing CIA Decl. and

describing the protective orders in the Guantanamo Bay habeas

litigation). Movant argues that this category should be rejected

as a basis for withholding information, but provides no

authority in support of his objection. Reply, ECF No. 436 at 24.

The Court agrees that continued non-disclosure of information

subject to a pending motion for protection is appropriate. The

TS/SCI Protective Order in this case provides as follows:

                               27
          Should    government      counsel     in    these
          consolidated cases wish to have the Court deem
          any document or information “protected,”
          government   counsel     shall    disclose    the
          information    to    qualified     counsel    for
          petitioners—i.e., counsel who have satisfied
          the necessary prerequisites of this TS/SCI
          Protective Order for the viewing of protected
          information—and attempt to reach an agreement
          about the designation of the information prior
          to   filing   a    motion    with   the    Court.
          Petitioners’    counsel     shall   treat    such
          disclosed information as protected unless and
          until the Court rules that the information
          should not be designated as protected.

TS/SCI Protective Order, ECF No. 77 ¶ 35. Requiring disclosure

at this time “would effectively moot” this Court’s future

ruling. See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d

Cir. 2004)(once information is unsealed, questions of continued

nondisclosure are moot because courts “do not have the power . .

. to make what has thus become public private again”).

IV. Conclusion and Order

     For the reasons explained above, it is hereby

     ORDERED that Motion to Intervene and Unseal, ECF No. 317,

is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, AND FOUND AS MOOT IN PART.

     SO ORDERED.

Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
          United States District Judge
          June 27, 2023

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