Court Opinion

ID: 9599166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:15:25.088583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:55.455276
License: Public Domain

FARLEY, Superior Judge
(specially concurring) .
While I am persuaded that the conclusion reached by the majority is sound law, *191I am nevertheless compelled to observe that the issue upon which the case is decided, to wit: a noncompliance with Rules 50(a) and 50(b), was not raised in the briefs before this court.
The sole assignment of error is set out in the majority opinion, and is, as termed therein, poorly drawn. In support of that assignment appellant urges this court to adopt his proposition of law, which is as follows:
“If a will is prepared by a testator who is the victim of undue influence, the entire will is void by that fact, even though he who produced such undue influence is one of several beneficiaries.”
As I interpret the assignment of error and the proposition of law, which must be read together to determine the error of which appellant complains, they seek to align this state with the minority rule which rejects the theory of partial invalidity of wills because of undue influence. Nowhere in the brief of appellant is a procedural error raised, or even alluded to, upon which the case is being reversed.
The rule in - most jurisdictions is that appellate courts will not go beyond the assignments of error to point out any error committed by a lower court, except in capital cases. Some of the predecessors on this court in their commendable desire to do-justice in a particular case have inadvertently, I believe, gone beyond the issues-raised on appeal and sua sponte pointed out errors which were termed fundamental although not assigned by appellant. See the cases of State Consolidated Publishing Co. v. Hill, 39 Ariz. 163, 4 P.2d 668; Ross v. White, 46 Ariz. 304, 50 P.2d 12; Collins v. Superior Court, 48 Ariz. 381, 62 P.2d 131; and Gibbs v. Basham, 53 Ariz. 357, 89 P.2d 630.
Rule X of this court requires that assignments of error must specifically state the ground for seeking a reversal, and this-court has repeatedly dismissed appeals for failing to observe that rule. To require on the one hand a strict observance of Rule X and on the other hand for this court tosua sponte point out error, except of course where there is some justification as in capital cases, is to my mind inconsistent and puts the appellee at a distinct disadvantage, and certainly tends to place a premium on incompetence and to encourage slipshod appeals.
Because, as stated at the outset, I believe-the conclusions reached by the majority are sound law, and because this court has-ample precedent to go outside the assignments to point out error of the trial court, I am obliged to join in the result.