Court Opinion

ID: 9853075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:41:57.900475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:40.548610
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge.
I amend my earlier dissent by adding the following review of the process by which the appellate courts of Georgia have usurped the authority of the factfinder in premises liability cases. The decisions of this Court have so twisted, limited, and misapplied certain holdings of the Supreme Court of Georgia as to create a gauntlet of premises liability analysis through which plaintiffs almost certainly cannot, pass.
The substantive genesis of present premises liability opinions is generally stated to be Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). Alterman Foods involved a plaintiff who wore a built-up shoe because one of her legs was shorter than the other as a result of an automobile accident some 15 years prior to her fall on the defendant’s property. At the time of her fall, Ligón had noticed nothing unusual about the floor in that it was “ ‘slippery and highly polished as usual.’ ” 246 Ga. at 621. There were no marks or streaks on the floor or stains on her clothing and no one, including Ligón, detected any foreign substance on the floor, or could determine why she fell.
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, this Court reversed, and the Supreme Court reversed our holding, reinstating the grant of summary judgment. See also Ligon v. Alterman Foods, 154 Ga. App. 440 (268 SE2d 701) (1980). The Supreme Court discussed various prior premises liability decisions by the appellate courts of Georgia with assorted factual scenarios and then divided “slip and fall” cases into “foreign substance” cases (those in which a foreign substance has fallen onto defendant’s floor) and “slippery floor” cases (those in which defendant’s floor has been made dangerously slippery by waxing or other treatment). 246 Ga. at 622.
The Supreme Court held that Alterman Foods was a “slippery floor” case, not a “foreign substance” case, and based its ruling on the *154fact that “[Ligón] could not determine what it was that caused her fall,” (emphasis in original) and “[p]laintiff did not introduce any evidence of the quality of material used or the methods which defendant used in waxing and maintaining its floor.” (Emphasis omitted.) 246 Ga. at 624. “She merely stated that she slipped and fell.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. The Supreme Court further held that “[t]he slip and fall cases involving foreign substances are inapplicable in an instance [such as Alterman Foods] where the plaintiff alleges that he fell because of the slippery [floor caused by defendant].” Id. at 623-624. Conversely, “slippery floor” cases such as Alterman Foods should not be applicable to “foreign substance” cases such as the subject case. Thus, the “foreign substance” analysis of Alterman Foods was dicta as it was inapplicable to the facts thereof and was not the basis for the Court’s holding therein.
It is thus clear that the Supreme Court did not intend to establish a “bright line” analysis of all future “foreign substance” cases. Rather, the Court intended, through the hypothetical analysis of such cases to establish guidelines by which future “foreign substance” cases might be fairly decided on a case-by-case basis. Justice in each case would result from a balancing of the rights of victims to have their cases tried before a jury of their peers, with the right of defendants to minimize the cost of meritless or frivolous claims. As to the latter category, the Alterman Foods decision predates the enactment of OCGA § 9-15-14, the frivolous litigation statute, which now provides relief to defendants who are truly the victims of frivolous claims. Indeed, the enactment of OCGA § 9-15-14 was intended to provide a legal remedy for defendants in frivolous lawsuits.
If plaintiff’s case is as weak as contended, and defendant is as innocent as contended, a jury will surely so conclude. Defendant would then be free to seek reimbursement of its litigation expenses under OCGA § 9-15-14. Of course, a jury would apply a credibility test to the testimony of all witnesses, including the store clerk who testified on behalf of his employer that he had just inspected the subject location minutes before the subject incident. The jury would be free to reject or accept such testimony. Under the summary process presently employed, a defendant may submit an affidavit from an employee, whose salary it pays and whose duty it may have been to inspect the premises, stating that, in fact, the employee had timely inspected the subject spot and found no foreign substance. What if the employee had, in fact, not performed his duties, shall he risk termination by saying so, or sign the affidavit? What if the employee had, in fact, performed the inspection, but had done so in a negligent manner? Can it not be argued that the plaintiff’s fall supports the fact of a negligent inspection to the same extent as the inspector’s testimony establishes that the foreign substance was not present at *155the time of the inspection? What it presents is a jury question.
Under our present premises liability analysis process, this Court has determined that the fact of inspection establishes conclusively that the foreign substance was not present at the time of the fall. This conclusion allows a defendant, but not a plaintiff, to create evidence after the incident that is essentially irrefutable, regardless of its truth. Evidence so created often entitles defendant to summary judgment under the majority’s holding. The object of all legal investigation is truth, and the analysis and holdings of the majority invite falsehood. Under the majority’s analysis no evidence so created is subject to a credibility test by a jury. Indeed our Court has established the credibility of defendant’s affidavits as a matter of law.
The right to determine the credibility of witnesses is exclusively within the province of the jury, and where the outcome may be controlled by such determination, the case is not properly subject to summary adjudication. Likewise, the evidence must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party, and where the respondent/plaintiff relies in part upon inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence to establish the elements of his or her claim, such inference may not be defeated by an affidavit from defendant. Such affidavit merely creates an issue of fact for jury resolution. Any such contest between a reasonable inference and direct evidence as to a controlling fact may not be resolved by summary process. Our Court has sought to separate itself from its historic position on this matter, and the opinions are legion which include the statement that “ordinarily, negligence is a question for resolution by a jury,” and then proceed to hold, however, that the case therein involved is resolvable by summary process.
In premises liability cases, our Court has tended to take holdings narrowly drawn to a particular case and find that such holding controls a totally distinguishable fact situation. Premises liability cases are very fact intensive, and therefore it is exceedingly dangerous to state that what was an appropriate application of the law in one case is necessarily controlling in another similar, but distinguishable case. The selection of an inappropriate maxim from our gallery of controlling principles may bring about an unjust result.
This fact was recognized by the Supreme Court as it dealt with Alterman Foods, by its inclusion of a potpourri of premises liability principles therein. With the passage of time, those Alterman Foods principles which support summary judgment for a defendant have predominated premises liability analysis while other principles which favor a plaintiff have taken a back seat or been given lip service.
An example of the unbalanced application of premises liability principles is the overuse of adages such as: (1) “Normally a proprietor *156is permitted a reasonable time to exercise care in inspecting the premises and maintaining them in a safe condition”; and (2) “[T]he proprietor is under no duty to continuously patrol the premises.” Alterman Foods, 246 Ga. at 622. The majority fails to analyze the balance of the second principle stated above, which is “in absence of facts showing that the premises are unusually dangerous.” Id. Unusually dangerous, compared to what? Other food stores? Other departments within the same store? Too often our analysis ignores the potential for constructive knowledge by the defendant when the incident occurs in a hazardous location, i.e., the produce section. Such section is replete with hazardous conditions caused by foreign substances dropped by customers and employees on restocking and water sprayed by employees on the produce and spilled on the floor. The floor, by its pattern, is generally of such a nature that it is difficult to detect spills, especially water, unless caught in a light reflection.
Given the stores’ general knowledge of the heightened danger of such conditions, why are they not charged with a heightened duty of care under such conditions? Why does not the rule as stated in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Gresham, 260 Ga. 391 (394 SE2d 345) (1990), apply: The proprietor is bound to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of which he or she has superior knowledge. Why does the proprietor’s knowledge of the fact that foreign substances continuously and routinely create dangerous conditions for their customers, not create a jury question as to their standard of care as cited in Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991)? This is especially true in the subject case, where the store’s own policy required regular sweeping and inspection of the premises. This policy creates an inference that sweeping is required because many dangerous conditions may be difficult to detect by inspection. In my view, it was the intention of the Supreme Court that such factors be weighed in determining the appropriateness of summary judgment in only clear cases, without factual dispute being removed from a jury’s consideration.
In the subject case, the special concurrence selectively relies on Lau's Corp. v. Haskins.
Lau’s Corp. contains the following language: “The particular standard of care to be applied and whether the owner breached that standard are usually issues to be decided by a jury. However, these issues may be decided by the court in plain and palpable cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusion to be reached.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 493. The special concurrence ignores the plain language of Lau’s Corp. that “summary judgment is appropriate when the court, viewing all the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most *157favorable to the non-moving party, concludes that the evidence does not create a triable issue as to each essential element of the case.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 495. The special concurrence and similar rulings by this Court routinely ignore the requirement that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (notwithstanding the lip service given to this principle). They also ignore the fact that the non-moving party may rely upon reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence to meet his or her burden. The primary failure of this Court is in not recognizing, accepting, and addressing inferences raised by the evidence and credibility issues.
Decided December 5, 1996
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1996.
Orin L. Alexis, for appellant.
Brannen, Searcy & Smith, Daniel C. Cohen, for appellee.
The present state of premises liability analysis is also inconsistent with our position as a comparative negligence state, and not a contributory negligence state. Our process permits negligent defendants to escape having their negligence weighed by a jury against the negligence of the plaintiff, regardless of the relative degree of negligence, and to thereby totally avoid liability even where their negligence exceeded the plaintiff’s.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion and to Judge Andrews’ special concurrence. I also dissent to Judge Beasley’s special concurrence as it would appear she would ignore the fact that we have notice pleading, not issue pleading, in Georgia. She also ignores the fact that the evidence of record must be considered in addition to the complaint.
I would implore the Supreme Court of Georgia or the Georgia legislature to restore to victims the right to have their cases tried by their peers and to release the stranglehold this Court has imposed upon victims’ rights through judicial activism and an improper usurpation of the authority of Georgia juries.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins this addendum.