Court Opinion

ID: 9901358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 18:01:35.320702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.550747
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANEY BROWN; BING GUO;                    No. 22-55700
JUNXIAN ZHANG,
                                           D.C. No.
              Plaintiffs-Appellants,    2:20-cv-10971-
                                          DOC-AGR
 v.

DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC;                    OPINION
STEPHEN C. DURINGER; PETER
WONG; JUDY WONG,

              Defendants-Appellees,

and

DOES, 1-10,

              Defendant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Central District of California
       David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

       Argued and Submitted September 11, 2023
                 Pasadena, California

                Filed November 21, 2023
2              BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

      Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., MICHELLE T.
    FRIEDLAND, and ERIC D. MILLER, Circuit Judges.

            Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

                          SUMMARY *

                  Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

   The panel reversed the district court’s summary
judgment, which held that an action under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act was barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.
    Janey Brown and other tenants filed suit against the
Duringer Law Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer,
alleging that Duringer violated the Act by filing a
memorandum of costs in state court proceedings concerning
an unlawful-detainer judgment.
    The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, by vesting
jurisdiction over state-court appeals in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 precludes a federal district court
from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action
asking the court to overturn an injurious state-court
judgment. The panel held that the doctrine is limited to cases
(1) brought by state-court losers (2) complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments (3) rendered before the

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
             BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC                3

district court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.
    The panel concluded that the tenants’ action did not
challenge a memorandum of costs on which the state court
already had rendered judgment, but rather a later
memorandum. Because there was no relevant state-court
judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of the costs in
the later memorandum, Rooker-Feldman did not apply.

                        COUNSEL

Louis P. Dell (argued), Law Office of Louis P. Dell,
Burbank, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Edward L. Laird II (argued) and Stephen C. Duringer, The
Duringer Law Group PLC, Anaheim Hills, California; Curtis
T. Greer IV, Kimball Tirey & St John LLP, Irvine,
California; for Defendants-Appellees.
4             BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

                         OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

    Janey Brown, Bing Guo, and Junxian Zhang
(collectively, Tenants) filed suit against the Duringer Law
Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer (collectively,
Duringer) in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. In their complaint, Tenants allege that
Duringer violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, by filing an October
2020 memorandum of costs pursuant to § 685.070(b) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure (the Code). In Tenants’
view, the October 2020 filing sought duplicative interest on
their back rent as well as unreasonable attorneys’ fees in
connection with Duringer’s debt collection efforts. The
district court concluded that Tenants’ federal suit constituted
an improper appeal of a state-court judgment and thus was
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We disagree.
Tenants’ FDCPA action does not attack any state-court
judgment regarding the October 2020 memorandum of
costs, and therefore the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
bar the action. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 2005, Peter and Judy Wong (the Wongs) leased an
apartment to Tenants. The lease agreement stated that “[i]n
the event of a default by Tenant hereunder, Tenant shall pay
to Landlord all costs incurred by Landlord . . . including
attorneys’ fees.” In 2010, Tenants breached the lease
agreement by failing to pay rent, and the Wongs hired
Duringer to initiate an unlawful-detainer action pursuant to
§ 1161(2) of the Code. On June 21, 2010, the California
Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the Wongs for
             BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC                5

$2,705, composed of $1,785 in back rent and incidental
damages, $500 in attorneys’ fees, and $420 in other costs.
    For over nine years, Duringer did not attempt to enforce
the judgment on behalf of the Wongs. Then, in February
2020, Duringer filed an application for renewal of the
judgment pursuant to § 683.120 of the Code, as well as a
memorandum of costs. In the memorandum of costs,
Duringer sought $2,570 in post-judgment interest and
$2,592 in post-judgment costs, including attorneys’ fees
incurred from June 2018 to December 2019. Tenants did not
object to the claimed costs within the ten days required under
state law, and thus the claimed costs were added to the
judgment. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.070(c), (d).
    In July 2020, the Wongs applied for a writ of execution.
See id. § 699.510(a). The clerk of the court issued the writ,
levying Janey Brown’s bank account. Brown then requested
that the court quash the writ of execution. The Superior
Court denied Brown’s request, explaining that her filing did
not comply with California’s procedural requirements and
rejecting Brown’s assertions that Duringer committed fraud
and that she “knew nothing of this lawsuit and was never
served.” Three days later, Brown filed a claim of exemption
pursuant to § 703.520(a) of the Code. In the filing, Brown
reported a monthly income of $1,215 and argued that the
levy “robs [Brown of her] chance to live” due to, in part, her
mother’s significant medical costs. The Superior Court
denied the exemption.
    In November 2020, Duringer received the levied funds
on behalf of the Wongs, which fully satisfied the writ
stemming from the renewal of judgment and the February
2020 memorandum of costs. However, shortly before
receiving those levied funds, Duringer filed a second
6            BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

memorandum of costs, seeking $2,750 in accrued interest
and $3,780 in costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating
the first memorandum of costs. Duringer never applied for
a writ of execution to enforce this second memorandum of
costs, and thus the court never took any further action
regarding the claimed costs.
    On December 2, 2020, Tenants filed suit against
Duringer, alleging violations of the FDCPA. Tenants moved
for partial summary judgment on the issue of Duringer’s
liability for these violations. Duringer cross-moved, arguing
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the district court
of jurisdiction and that, in any event, Tenants’ FDCPA
claims failed on the merits as a matter of law. The district
court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Tenants’
claims and granted Duringer’s cross-motion for summary
judgment without reaching the merits of those claims. It did
not adjudicate Tenants’ motion for partial summary
judgment. Tenants timely appealed.
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a district court’s ruling on a summary
judgment motion. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 769 (9th
Cir. 2008). We also determine de novo whether a district
court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action. Singh
v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir.
2019).
                        ANALYSIS
    Section 1257 of Title 28 authorizes the U.S. Supreme
Court to hear appeals from “[f]inal judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a State” if they raise a
federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman
             BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC                7

doctrine provides that § 1257, by vesting jurisdiction over
state-court appeals in the Supreme Court, necessarily
“precludes a United States district court from exercising
subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be
empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of
authority,” if the action asks the federal district court to
“overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92
(2005). The doctrine occupies “narrow ground” and applies
only in “limited circumstances.” Id. at 284, 291; see also
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam)
(“[O]ur cases since Feldman have tended to emphasize the
narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.”). Namely, it “is
confined to . . . cases [1] brought by state-court losers [2]
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3]
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284.
     In this case, the district court interpreted Tenants’
FDCPA claims as attacking the validity of the costs Duringer
claimed in its February memorandum of costs, on which the
Superior Court already rendered judgment. We disagree
with the district court’s interpretation. A fair reading of
Tenants’ complaint and the subsequent record shows that
Tenants seek to remedy the harms caused by Duringer’s
filing of the October memorandum of costs, not the February
memorandum, as the district court assumed. For instance, in
their complaint, Tenants allege that the October
memorandum “claimed duplicat[ive] interest and
unreasonable collection costs.” At summary judgment,
Tenants conceded that the Superior Court had already
rejected Brown’s motions relating to the costs in the
February memorandum.
8             BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

    Once we properly construe Tenants’ action as
challenging the October memorandum, our Rooker-Feldman
analysis becomes straightforward. There is no relevant
state-court judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of
the costs in the October memorandum. Brown never filed a
motion to tax costs, so the state court never used that vehicle
to decide the accuracy of the costs. Moreover, Duringer did
not apply for a writ of execution, so Brown never moved to
quash—giving the state court no opportunity to assess the
costs claimed in the memorandum. Simply put, the October
memorandum was not the subject of any state-court
judgment.
    Duringer’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First,
Duringer argues that we should broadly interpret “judgment”
in our Rooker-Feldman analysis to include the original 2010
unlawful-detainer judgment and that because Tenants
“undoubtably lost the state court Eviction Action,” they are
state-court losers. However, even if we were to adopt
Duringer’s broad conception of “judgment” at prong one of
our analysis, Duringer would still fail to meet prongs two
and four. Since the 2010 unlawful-detainer judgment does
not purport to rule on the accuracy of the costs claimed in
the October memorandum (as would have been impossible
given that the judgment was entered over a decade earlier),
Tenants would be neither complaining of injuries caused by
the state-court judgment (i.e., prong two) nor inviting district
court review and rejection of that judgment (i.e., prong four).
    Second, Duringer posits that Tenants’ claims
“necessarily require[] the [federal] court to determine the
accuracy of the amount approved by the state court on the
Writ of Execution” enforcing the February memorandum of
costs. However, Tenants’ claims assume the accuracy of the
costs obtained through the February memorandum and
                BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC                       9

accompanying writ; Tenants challenge only the allegedly
duplicative interest and unreasonable attorneys’ fees
Duringer claimed in the October memorandum. Because
there is no relevant state-court judgment addressing those
issues to improperly appeal, we reverse the district court’s
holding that Rooker-Feldman precludes it from exercising
jurisdiction over Tenants’ FDCPA claims.
     After this appeal was briefed, we sua sponte raised the
question whether Tenants have Article III standing to pursue
their claims. Because the question of standing was not
addressed by the district court and because Tenants may
wish to submit evidence in support of their claimed injuries,
we remand so the district court can address this issue in the
first instance. See Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884,
891 (9th Cir. 2004). 1
                         CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary
judgment order is REVERSED, and this case is
REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

1
  We may consider the appeal of the Rooker-Feldman issue without first
reaching the standing issue. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping
Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[T]here is no mandatory sequencing
of jurisdictional issues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).