Court Opinion

ID: 9948065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 15:03:48.252375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:03.287916
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2021-3118
                 _____________________________

WILLIAM FRANKLIN SCOTT JR,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
William E. Davis, Judge.

                          March 6, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     William Franklin Scott, Jr., appeals his convictions for two
counts of sexual battery on a person under twelve years by person
eighteen years or older and three counts of lewd or lascivious
molestation on a person under twelve years by a person eighteen
years or older. He argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal on four of the five counts
because the only evidence offered in support of these charges was
child hearsay and (2) the prosecutor made improper statements
during rebuttal closing argument warranting reversal. We affirm
the second issue without further comment. We affirm the first
issue for the reasons set forth below.
                                  I

     In each of the counts listed on the information, the State
alleged separate acts as the basis of the charge. In the first count,
the State alleged Scott digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina.
Count II claimed Scott placed his mouth on the victim’s vagina. In
Count III, the State claimed Scott intentionally touched the
victim’s buttocks in a lewd or lascivious manner. And in Count V,
it was alleged Scott touched the victim’s vagina with an object.

     The victim was eight years old at the time of trial. She
testified that she was in the first grade and five or six years old
when the incident occurred. She described that Scott, who was her
mother’s live-in boyfriend, touched her vagina with his hands, and
that she later told her mother what had happened. The State
asked the victim whether Scott ever put his mouth on her vagina,
and the victim answered in the affirmative. The victim could not
recall at trial whether Scott’s hands ever penetrated her, whether
it hurt when he touched her, or whether he touched her with
anything other than his hands.

     A recording of the victim’s forensic interview was admitted as
evidence and published to the jury. During the interview, the
victim claimed that Scott rubbed her buttocks and vagina, and
when he rubbed her vagina, it would hurt. She stated that when it
hurt, she told Scott to rub her on the outside because it did not
hurt there. The victim explained that Scott had used a pink toy
that vibrates and called the toy a “grownup toy.” The victim alleged
that Scott had her rub his penis with her hand and that he told her
he would give her a dollar if she was able to make white stuff come
out. She further claimed that Scott had put his mouth on her
vagina.

     The nurse practitioner that conducted the victim’s physical
examination testified that the victim made similar claims during
the examination. Additionally, Scott’s residence was searched
pursuant to a search warrant, and during the search, a pink sex
toy was found.

                                 2
    At the conclusion of Scott’s trial, he was convicted as charged.
He was sentenced to consecutive life sentences on each count and
designated a sexual predator.

                                  II

     On appeal, Scott argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal because there was no
corroborating evidence to support the child’s hearsay evidence and
that child hearsay alone is insufficient to support his conviction. A
trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is
reviewed de novo, “with the evidence and all reasonable inferences
from the evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to the
State.” Kish v. State, 145 So. 3d 225, 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). “A
trial court should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal
‘unless there is no view of the evidence which the jury might take
favorable to the opposite party that can be sustained under the
law.’” Jackson v. State, 25 So. 3d 518, 531 (Fla. 2009) (quoting
Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 996 (Fla. 2006)).

     As an initial matter, we note that corroborating evidence
exists to support most, if not all, of Scott’s convictions. Regardless,
we would affirm because Appellant’s argument that child hearsay
alone is not sufficient to support his conviction is misplaced.

     Appellant relies on Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007),
and Beber v. State, 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2004), both of which are
distinguishable. This Court recently addressed similar issues and
the applicability of those cases in Godbolt v. State, 319 So. 3d 773
(Fla. 1st DCA 2021). In Godbolt, the defendant appealed his
convictions arising from claims of molestation, claiming
fundamental error occurred when he was convicted of lewd or
lascivious molestation based only on child hearsay statements. Id.
at 774. During the CPT interview, which was played for the jury,
the victim claimed the defendant had touched her buttocks with
his penis while they were in the kitchen. Id. At trial, when the
victim was asked whether the defendant ever used his private part
to touch her, the victim stated that she could not remember. Id. at
775. But the victim testified that she recalled speaking with the
CPT interviewer and that what she told the interviewer was true.
Id.

                                  3
     Distinguishing the facts in Godbolt from those presented in
Baugh and Beber, this Court noted that the victims in those cases
presented inconsistent trial testimony. Id. at 775. In Beber, the
victim testified that the conduct in question never occurred, and in
Baugh, the victim testified that she had made up the allegations.
Id. at 775–76. But in Godbolt, the victim testified that she did not
remember the incident but did remember telling the interviewer
about the incident. Id. at 776–77. This Court affirmed Godbolt’s
conviction stating, “Because the victim did not totally repudiate
her pretrial statements—which the trial court determined carried
the requisite safeguards of reliability for admission as substantive
evidence—we cannot say that the evidence was insufficient to
show that a crime was committed at all.” Id. at 777.

     The facts here are very similar to those presented in Godbolt.
A video of the CPT interview was played for the jury where the
victim made numerous allegations. At trial, she did not remember
many of the claims made, but she did not testify that the claims
did not occur or that she made them up. Rather, as was the case in
Godbolt, she stated that she told the interviewer what happened
and that she told her the truth. Additionally, the nurse
practitioner testified that the victim relayed the same events to
her when she performed her examination. Thus, under Godbolt,
sufficient evidence was submitted to show Appellant committed
the crimes charged.

     Sufficient evidence exists to support Scott’s convictions. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scott’s motion
for judgment of acquittal. We AFFIRM.

KELSEY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., concurs
with opinion.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

                                  4
TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

    To be clear, the appellant does not challenge on appeal the
admissibility of the videotaped interview of the child victim, which
occurred under the hearsay exception found in Florida Rule of
Evidence (“FRE”) 90.803(23). 1 The appellant instead contends that
the victim’s otherwise admissible out-of-court statements about
the appellant’s egregious abuse—by themselves—were not

    1 This manner of citation is purposeful. The hearsay rule, like

most evidentiary rules, is procedural. See Glendening v. State, 536
So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla. 1988); cf. Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1991) (defining court procedure
as encompassing “the course, form, manner, means, method, mode,
order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights
or obtains redress for their invasion” (citation omitted)). The
supreme court has exclusive authority to adopt such a procedural
rule. See Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.8 (Fla.
1978); see also Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 936 (Fla. 2008)
(noting that article V, section 2, subsection(a) of the Florida
Constitution “provides [the supreme court] with the exclusive
authority to ‘adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all
court’”); State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045, 1048 (Fla. 2005)
(explaining that a “statute which purports to create or modify a
procedural rule of court is constitutionally infirm”). Even the
supreme court’s adoption of a rule that “reflect[s] the prevailing
public policy [enacted by the Legislature,] whether by design or by
coincidence[,]” does not give the Legislature license to encroach on
that exclusive authority. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005 n.8.; see also
Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1992). The rules of
evidence (with few exceptions), then, are not, functionally, a
component of the Florida Statutes, which is the Legislature’s
compilation of its own enacted substantive law. There is no sense,
then, in citing to the Florida Statutes to reference the rules of
evidence. Cf. In re Fla. Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla.
1979) (adopting provisions of the Florida Evidence Code as rules of
court “to the extent they are procedural); In re Amend. to Fla.
Evidence Code, 404 So. 2d 743, 743 (Fla. 1981) (adopting
amendments to Florida Evidence Code concerning court procedure
“as part of the Rules of Evidence”).

                                 5
sufficient evidence to support the appellant’s convictions.
According to the appellant, the trial court should have granted his
motion for judgment of acquittal.

     The appellant’s theory for reversal has at its foundation the
mistaken premise that “child hearsay alone is insufficient to
support a conviction.” To support his argument, the appellant
misuses the supreme court’s decisions in Moore, Green, Beber, and
Baugh. 2 Not one of those decisions stands for the proposition that,
in a sex-abuse case like this one, child hearsay—otherwise
admissible under the exception set out in FRE 90.803(23)—should
be treated any differently than other substantive evidence that has
been admitted. All but the Moore decision involved an admitted
pretrial statement by a child that later was recanted, and all of
them (including Moore) hold that those subsequently recanted
statements cannot, alone, serve as sufficient evidence to support a
criminal conviction. None of them hold what the appellant
attempts to argue. 3

    To prevail on his claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the
appellant must demonstrate that there was not “substantial

    2 The citations for these four decisions are as follows: State v.

Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986); State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756
(Fla. 1995); Beber v. State, 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2004); Baugh v.
State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007).
    3   Godbolt involved a fundamental-error analysis, but the
decision still effectively makes this important distinction. See
Godbolt v. State, 319 So. 3d 773, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“Because
the victim did not totally repudiate her pretrial statements—
which the trial court determined carried the requisite safeguards
of reliability for admission as substantive evidence—we cannot say
that the evidence was insufficient to show that a crime was
committed at all.”); see also F.B. v. State, 852 So. 2d 226, 230–31
(Fla. 2003) (explaining that “an argument that the evidence is
totally insufficient as a matter of law to establish the commission
of a crime need not be preserved” because “[s]uch complete failure
of the evidence meets the requirements of fundamental error—i.e.,
an error that reaches to the foundation of the case and is equal to
a denial of due process”).

                                 6
competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment.”
Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666, 671 (Fla. 1975). Our
assessment on this has both a quantitative component
(“substantial”) and a qualitative component (“competent”). When
determining whether the evidence rises to the level of
“substantial,” our focus is on what amount of evidence can be
legally acceptable to a juror. There must be more than a “scintilla”
of evidence before a jury on a question of fact. Schuylkill &
Dauphin Imp. Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871).

    In turn, the question is not “whether there is literally no
evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the
onus of proof is imposed.” Id. It

    means that there must be evidence which supports a
    substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can
    be reasonabl[y] inferred. It must do more than create a
    suspicion of the fact to be established, and must be such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as
    adequate to support a conclusion.

Laney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Orange Cnty., 15 So. 2d 748,
753 (Fla. 1943).

     When we look at the “competency” of the evidence, meanwhile,
we consider the nature of the evidence itself. Simply put, “the
evidence must accord with logic and reason” to be competent.
Andrews v. C.B.S. Div., Maule Indus., 118 So. 2d 206, 210 (Fla.
1960). For instance, when a witness testifies as to a fact based not
on personal observation, but on his or her own inference from
personal observation, the testimony is of questionable competence
to prove the fact. Cf. Pa. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 338
(1933) (explaining how a witness’s testimony that a collision
occurred could not put that fact in dispute when the fact was not
“brought to [the witness’s] attention as a perception of the physical
sense of sight or of hearing,” the witness made only “an inference
to that effect drawn from observed facts which gave equal support
to the opposite inference,” and “all the witnesses who were in a
position to see testified that there was no collision”). A witness’s
testimony in this situation—about his own conclusion “from what
he himself observed”—can be said to “prove[] nothing” (i.e., should

                                 7
be deemed incompetent), “since it is not allowable for a witness to
resolve the doubt as to which of two equally justifiable inferences
shall be adopted.” Id. at 340; see also id. at 341 (explaining further
how testimony about a fact based only on “an inference or
inferences” cannot controvert testimony, based on personal
observation, that is “inconsistent with such inferences”).

     Another way to state the same principle is this: Evidence is
not competent unless it has an indicia of reliability. Cf. Hadden v.
State, 690 So. 2d 573, 578 (Fla. 1997) (“Moreover, we firmly hold
to the principle that it is the function of the court to not permit
cases to be resolved on the basis of evidence for which a predicate
of reliability has not been established. Reliability is fundamental
to issues involved in the admissibility of evidence.”). There is
nothing inherently incompetent about hearsay evidence, including
such evidence admitted in a criminal trial. Cf. Anderson v. State,
655 So. 2d 1118, 1119–20 (Fla. 1995) (“declin[ing] to enunciate a
blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay
testimony”); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980);
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); State v. Jones, 625 So.
2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 957 (Fla.
1999); but cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
(explaining how admission of hearsay still could run afoul of the
constitutional guarantee of confrontation); Fla. R. Evid. 90.802.
Rather, hearsay can be competent evidence, provided there is a
demonstration of its reliability “by reason of something other than
the hearsay itself.” Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 578.

     According to the appellant, though, because the victim could
not remember at trial some of the horrific details of the abuse she
suffered—details necessary to support convictions on the more
serious charges—the hearsay evidence of her prior statements
about those details was not competent on its own to prove the
abuse for which the evidence was submitted. But the victim’s prior
statements were admitted under FRE 90.803(23), after the trial
court made the requisite determinations of reliability. 4 The

    4 That is, the victim’s statements were hearsay but admitted

under an exception to the rule excluding hearsay. See Fla. R. Evid.
90.802 (generally excluding hearsay, subject to specifically
detailed exceptions); Fla. R. Evid. 90.803 (listing types of hearsay

                                  8
appellant does not challenge that admissibility on appeal. The
evidence of those prior statements stands on its own, then, as
competent evidence, regardless of whether the victim could
separately testify to them at trial. Cf. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d
206, 210–11 (Fla. 1988) (rejecting “argument that the child must
be found to be competent to testify [at trial] before the child’s out-
of-court statements may be” admissible as reliable hearsay, and
noting that the requirement that the trial court find sufficient
assurances of reliability itself “furnishes a sufficient guarantee of
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, obviating the necessity
that the child understand the duty of a witness to tell the truth” at
trial).

     Getting back to the appellant’s reliance on Moore, Green,
Beber, and Baugh: The common point across these decisions is that
an out-of-court statement—otherwise determined to be
competent—loses its competence as substantive evidence if the
declarant of the statement either later recants or, while on the
witness stand, directly contradicts the statement; and there also is
no other evidence to demonstrate its reliability. See Moore, 485 So.
2d at 1281–82 (holding that a recanted prior statement is not by
itself capable of supporting a conviction); Green, 667 So. 2d at 761
(same, absent “corroborating evidence” to reduce the risk of a
conviction based on unreliable evidence); Beber, 887 So. 2d at
1251–52 (holding that the victim’s out-of-court statement could not
support defendant’s conviction for capital sexual battery where the
victim directly contradicted that statement under oath at trial);
Baugh, 961 So. 2d at 204 (holding that after the victim recanted
her out-of-court statements regarding defendant’s conduct, the

that are excepted from the rule of inadmissibility). Had the
statements been given under oath and the victim subject to cross-
examination at trial about those statements, the statements would
not have been hearsay and not inadmissible as such. See Fla. R.
Evid. 90.801(2); but cf. Green, 667 So. 2d at 760 (holding that
statements given in a discovery deposition in a criminal case are
not admissible as non-hearsay, prior-inconsistent statements
under FRE 90.801(2)(a)).

                                  9
statements were “insufficient,” standing alone and absent
“corroborating evidence,” to support the conviction). 5

     The victim did neither at trial: She neither recanted her prior
out-of-court statements to child protection investigators—
recounted at trial through admissible hearsay—nor contradicted
those statements during her testimony. Those out-of-court
statements were competent to support the appellant’s sexual
battery convictions, even if there was no other “corroborating”
evidence introduced at trial. The statements also were clear and
specific enough that they were “substantial” evidence, i.e., the jury
reasonably could accept the statements as enough to conclude the
appellant committed the crimes for which he was convicted.
Because the victim’s out-of-court statements were “substantial
competent evidence” that the appellant sexually battered her as
charged, I concur in affirming the appellant’s convictions, along
with the corresponding sentences.

                  _____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

    5 Indeed, as Moore demonstrates, this point applies even to

out-of-court statements that are not hearsay. See 485 So. 2d at
1280–81 (addressing grand jury testimony, admissible under FRE
90.801(2)(a), that the witnesses subsequently recanted in
deposition).

                                 10