Court Opinion

ID: 9741800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:02:21.437044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:26.456360
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I join the Court in concluding that May’s transmittal of plaintiffs’ notice to the Attorney General satisfied the tort claim notice requirement. The chilling effect which such a ruling could have on communications within the executive branch, however, is important to the resolution of this case. I therefore write separately to note that the communication from May to the Attorney General should not have been subject to disclosure.
While the Record on Agreed Statement is not complete on this point, it appears that plaintiffs discovered through deposing May that he had sent the Attorney General a copy of the tort claim notice. The Highway Commission also answered plaintiffs’ request for admissions by admitting that the Attorney General had timely received a copy of the notice from May. Apparently, no objection was made to these questions. The rule of attorney-client privilege, however, establishes the confidentiality of the communication.
The Attorney General acts as attorney to his client — the State and its agencies. As for actions brought under the Tort Claim Act, he has the duty to advise the Governor concerning compromising or settling a claim or suit brought against the State or its employees, to perfect any compromise or settlement made by the Governor, and to defend, as chief counsel, the State and its employees. Ind.Code § 34-4-16.5-14 (Burns 1986 Repl.).
Beyond his duties concerning tort claims, the Attorney General must “defend all suits that may be instituted ... against the state of Indiana_” Ind.Code § 4-6-2-1 (Burns 1986 Repl.). The Attorney General’s authority to represent the State, its agencies and officers is nearly exclusive, and agencies may not employ any attorney without the written consent of the Attorney General. Ind.Code §§ 4-6-5-3, -6; see In re Property at Marriott Inn (1983), Ind.App., 456 N.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005, 105 S.Ct. 1359, 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985).
The relationship of attorney and client clearly applies to the Attorney General and the state agencies he represents, and the attorney-client privilege should protect communications exchanged in that relationship. Though this Court has never addressed the question directly, the rationale underlying the attorney-client privilege supports its application to state agencies and their attorneys. The privilege protects those in need of legal services by providing for complete and confidential information to an attorney so the attorney may be fully advised in serving the client while assuring the client that these confidences will not be revealed. Colman v. Heidenreich (1978), 269 Ind. 419, 381 N.E.2d 866. A state agency has the same need for confidential legal advice.
Other jurisdictions have recognized the attorney-client privilege between the government and its attorney. See Green v. I.R.S., 556 F.Supp. 79 (N.D.Ind.1982) (attorney-client privilege applicable to relationship between Government attorneys and administrative personnel), aff'd, 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.1984); Riddle Spring Realty Co. v. State, 107 N.H. 271, 220 A.2d 751 (1966) (report made by state employee at *475request of attorney representing state agency privileged); People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Glen Arms Estate, Inc., 230 Cal.App.2d 841, 41 Cal.Rptr. 303 (1964) (appraisal report made by state highway employee and communicated to state’s attorney properly excluded as privileged because the employee was required to make the report, made it as agent of the state, and did so to prepare for litigation).
This privilege is not defeated by the requirement of open public records. Generally, any person may inspect the public records of any public agency. Ind.Code § 5-14-3-3(a) (Burns 1987 Repl.). The legislature has created an exception to this rule for records declared confidential by statute or by Supreme Court rule. Ind. Code § 5-14-3-4(a)(l), (8). Privileged communications between attorney and client are protected by both. Ind.Code § 34-1-14-5 renders attorneys incompetent to testify as to confidential communications made to them in the course of their professional business. This statute is the codification of the attorney-client privilege. Key v. State (1956), 235 Ind. 172, 132 N.E. 2d 143 (construing the predecessor statute, § 2-1714 (Burns 1946 Repl.)). An attorney also has a statutory duty to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client. Ind. Code § 34-1-60-4. This is a further codification of the privilege. Colman, 269 Ind. at 422, 381 N.E.2d at 868. Additionally, privileged communications are excluded from discovery by Trial Rule 26(B)(1), Ind. Rules of Procedure. Thus, a privileged communication between attorney and client is exempt from public inspection because it is declared confidential by statute and Supreme Court rule.1
When a client seeks advice from an attorney in his professional capacity, the communication between attorney and client within the scope of the professional relationship should be treated as strictly confidential. This privilege applies to all communications made to an attorney for the purpose of professional advice or aid, regardless of any pending or expected litigation. Colman, 269 Ind. at 423, 381 N.E.2d at 869.
Here, the communication consisted of a dated memorandum from May to the Claims and Compensation Division of the Attorney General’s office. The memorandum referenced plaintiffs’ claim and informed the Attorney General that a copy was transmitted. A copy of the claim was attached.
May transmitted the memorandum and notice to the Attorney General, the State’s counsel for claims under the Tort Claim Act. Though no litigation was pending, a tort claim notice is the first step in pursuing litigation.against the State. Notifying the Attorney General of a pending claim in effect sought the aid of the State’s attorney in settling or defending the claim. It was therefore privileged.
The existence and content of the notice itself were not privileged. It was a document in the possession of the Highway Commission prior to communication with the Attorney General. A client cannot defeat the production of evidence by passing it into the hands of his attorney. Andrews v. The Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Co. (1860), 14 Ind. 169. The act of communicating the document, however, is distinct from the document itself. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2308 at 595-596 (McNaughton Rev.1961); see In re Navarro 93 Cal.App. 3d 325, 155 Cal.Rptr. 522 (1979) (privilege covers delivery of a public document by attorney to client).
While the document itself does not fall under the attorney-client privilege, the fact that the claim was communicated is privileged and need not have been disclosed to the plaintiffs. May’s memorandum was *476also privileged and not subject to disclosure.
The confidential relationship is a privilege which belongs to the client and may be waived if the client testifies concerning the privileged matter. Key, 235 Ind. at 175, 132 N.E.2d at 145. Here, the Commission revealed privileged information in a deposition and through an admission. The privilege was therefore waived. The Commission did not rely on privilege on appeal or on transfer, and it cannot be a factor in today’s decision. The privilege nevertheless exists, and its existence will likely make today’s case one of a kind.
DICKSON, J., concurs.

. Public records may also be exempted at the discretion of a public agency if the records are intra-agency or interagency advisory and are communicated for the purposes of decisionmak-ing. Ind.Code § 5-14-3-4(b)(6). While this exemption is not particularly applicable to attorney-client confidences, the communication in this case was intra-agency. One purpose for the communication was to allow the Attorney General to determine the advisability of settling the claim, and thus was made for the purpose of decisionmaking. It was therefore exempt from disclosure at the discretion of the agency.