Court Opinion

ID: 9832152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:40:23.67835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:30.096415
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[2] Under a holding that brothers were not beneficiaries within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1913 (Vernon’s Sayles’ Statutes, art. 5246kk), this cause was originally reversed and rendered in appellant’s favor. The question having in the meantime reached the Supreme Court, in the case of Vaughan et al. v. S. W. S. Ins. Co., action upon the motion for rehearing filed by appellees was postponed to await a disposition of the Vaughan Case. That has since been made; the Supreme Court, iu an opinion rendered December 11, 1918 (206 S. W. 920), having decided the matter adversely to our view. Accordingly, in recognition of superior authority, it is now held that the appellees did come within the terms of the statute referred to.
[3] The further question of whether or not they gave the notice of injury and made the claim for compensation required by article 5246ppp of ■ the same act was not passed upon before, because rendered immaterial by the conclusion that they could not in any event become beneficiaries.
Now, however, that matter must be determined. The insistence that no such notice was given nor claim made is presented under assignments 6 to 10, inclusive, of appellant’s brief. After careful consideration of them, we conclude that they cannot prevail, and that the trial court did not err in holding the letter of September 8, 1915, from Brooks and English to James Stewart & Co. to be a sufficient notice and claim under the provisions of the last-meiitioned section of the act — that is, article 524Gppp — which requires the notice to be given as soon as practicable after the injury, and the claim for compensation to be made within six months after the death of the employé. The undisputed facts about and following the letter are reflected in these findings of the court:
“Claim for compensation was made upon James Stewart & Co., the subscriber, within six months after the death of Peter Zyloni, as required by the Compensation Act of Texas, said claim being embodied in a letter dated September 8, 1915, written by Messrs. Brooks & English, attorneys at law, of Erie, Pa., a copy of which is as follows:
“ ‘September 8, 1915.
“ ‘James Stewart & Co., Care S. A. R. By. Company, Galveston, Texas — Gentlemen: On i March 26, 1915, at about 9:30 a. m., as we are *186informed, P. Zyloni, or Pete Zeurloines, while in your employ was killed, Ms neck being broken by tbe falling upon him of a gin pole. Erom the evidence which has been furnished us and as offered at the coroner’s inquest, this appears to be a case of liability on your part. A friend of the deceased, who is familiar with the facts in the case, is very anxious to have the brother, who resides in Erie, put his case in the hands of an attorney in Galveston. Realizing that perhaps you have an insurance company we are writing to ascertain whether you or the company desire to adjust this matter without litigation, and if so, to give you an opportunity to do it through us as attorneys for the estate of the deceased.
“ ‘Unless we heat from you, or some one representing you within ten days, we take it for granted you do not care to negotiate.
“ ‘Tours very truly.’
“On September 14, 1915, the said subscriber, •Tames Stewart & Co., wrote the said Brooks & English, acknowledging receipt of their letter of September 8th. On September 27, 1915, Brooks & English wrote a letter to the American Indemnity Company reading as follows: ‘On September 8th. we wrote a letter to James Stewart & Co., a copy of which is inclosed, and they have referred us to you for adjustment of same.’
“This letter was received by the American Indemnity Company on September 30, 1915. On September 30, 1915, defendant wrote and mailed to Brooks & English (and which they received) a letter, a copy of which is as follows:
“ ‘Galveston, Texas, September 30, 1915.
“ ‘Messrs. Brooks & English, Attorneys at Law, Erie, Pennsylvania — Gentlemen: Re LC-3210 Peter Zyloni v. James Stewart & Co. We have for acknowledgment your favor of the 27th inst., transmitting copy of letter of the 8th instant, addressed to Messrs. James Stewart & Co., at Galveston, concerning the injury and death of the above party. You are correct in your statement that Zyloni was killed while in the employ of James Stewart & Co., but we do not believe you are correct in your belief that there is liability on the part of our policy holder.
“ ‘Under the provisions of our policy and the law under which it was written we are agreeable to handling the claim with you, but before giving you any definite 'advices, we will request that you kindly advise us if there are any other surviving relatives than the brother to whom you refer. At the time of the death an effort was made to get in touch with this party’s brother, who was then in Shenandoah, Pa.
“ ‘If you can consistently do so, please let us have the desired information and upon receipt of same we shall be glad to write you further.
“ ‘Very truly yours,
“ ‘J. H. Booth, Claims Superintendent.’
“On October 11, 1915, Brooks & English replied to such letter of defendant, giving the information requested by defendant as to identity of relatives of Peter Zyloni, reading as follows: ‘Replying to your letter of the 30th ultimo, will say that the only relative of Cassmer Zyloni, whom we represent, is a brother John Zyloni, living at Scranton, Pennsylvania. My client, however, is the older one and would be entitled to take out letters of administration, but if a satisfactory settlement with these two brothers could be agreed upon their release would be sufficient.’
“On October 14, 1915, defendant acknowledged receipt of the Brooks & English letter of the 11th inst., thanking them for the information contained therein, and for the first time declining to entertain any claim on account of the death of Peter Zyloni, asserting that Zyloni was killed March '26, 1915, and that no person had made claim for compensation as provided by the Texas Employers’ Liability Act within six months after the date of death, and asserting that any claim was now barred.’’
The main assault upon the sufficiency of this letter as constituting compliance with the statute lies in the contention that, since it was neither sent nor presented to appellant direct, and nowhere in its body purported to claim compensation, it could not be construed to be such, nor would it as notice inure to the benefit of appellees, because it did not emanate immediately from themselves. Neither objection is thought to be tenable.
Under the authorities generally, so far as we are advised, a claim' for compensation does not have to be preferred in any particularly set or formal manner. It is said in Glass Workmen’s Compensation, subd. E, p. 85:
“ ‘Claim for compensation’ means, not the institution of proceedings before the tribunal by which the compensation is to be assessed, but a notice of claim of compensation sent to the workman’s employer. The claim need not be for a definite sum nor in writing. A request for arbitration is a sufficient ‘claim for compensation,’ and a letter containing a notice of the accident and a description of the injuries and a request to know what compensation would be allowed, and a further request for an immediate answer, is a claim for compensation. So a document wherein a workman made a claim for compensation for an injury received upon a designated day, ‘as per claim in the Employer’s Liability Act,’ is a valid claim.”
See 1 Honnold’s Workmen’-s Compensation, § 212, pp. 762, 763.
As to the matter of notice, the undisputed facts here showed not only that both the employer and the insurer knew of the employes death within two days thereafter, but that the insurer gave notice thereof to his relatives. In those -circumstances, it would seem foolish, or at least a useless thing, to nevertheless require a further and direct notice of that same occurrence from his beneficiaries to the insurer before they could be said to be in position to claim the compensation provided. We do not think this statute should be so construed, concluding rather that notice from attorneys in the manner shown in the Brooks & English letter would be sufficient.
We do not find it necessary to determine *187the question of whether the finding of the Industrial Accident Board was res adjudi-cata of the whole controversy, and do not do so, because the trial court independently found all the facts, which are not as such anywhere attacked, entitling appellees to the judgment obtained, as follows:
“Apart, however, from said decision and award of said board and independent thereof, I find that the plaintiffs are entitled as the legal beneficiaries of said Peter Zyloni, deceased, to have and recover of and from the defendant said compensation for the death of said Peter Zyloni the sum of $7.20 per week, the same being 60 per cent, of the average weekly wage of the said Peter Zyloni, for the full period of 360 weeks from and after March 26, 1915, such compensation being payable in the sum of $756 principal and $45.36 interest, making in all $801.36, being the total weekly compensation which has accrued up to this time, and the further compensation, hereafter to be payable each week, at the rate of $7.20 per week until the expiration of the full period of 360 weeks from and after March 26, 1915.”
Since, therefore, this recovery may rest upon the separate determination of the necessary facts by the court below, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether or not that court was under the duty of doing what the record thus affirmatively shows it did do, that is, of accepting as final and binding the conclusions of the Accident Board, without itself going into these fact issues. This deduction applies with like effect to the court’s other and antecedent conclusion that appellees were in fact the legal beneficiaries of their deceased brother, that matter also having been in the quoted findings disposed of independently of the Board’s action; so that, even if the Accident Board had specifically adjudged appellees to be the , legal beneficiaries, which our original opinion shows was not done, there would still be no necessity of a holding upon the question of whether or not its decree in that respect was res adjudicata. If any expressions in our former opinion may be taken as indicating a contrary view, they are accordingly now so modified as to accord with the conclusion here stated.
The motion for rehearing is granted, our former judgment set aside, and that of the court below is in all things affirmed.
Motion for rehearing granted, and trial court’s judgment affirmed.