Court Opinion

ID: 9941304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:30.042831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:32.620885
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals
                    NO. 2022-CA-0078-MR

CASEY ARNOLD, INDIVIDUALLY;
CASEY ARNOLD AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF CHAD ARNOLD; AND CASEY
ARNOLD AS NEXT FRIEND AND
GUARDIAN/CONSERVATOR FOR
MILES ARNOLD                                        APPELLANTS

             APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v.           HONORABLE BRIAN PRIVETT, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 15-CI-00064

MEDIPORT, LLC; DR. TIMOTHY
CARROLL; LANDMARK AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY; RICHARD
COVINGTON; RSUI INDEMNITY
COMPANY; STEVE MORRIS; AND
WESTFIELD INSURANCE
COMPANY                                              APPELLEES

                          OPINION
                     AFFIRMING IN PART
                      AND DISMISSING
                          IN PART

                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: In this wrongful death action, Casey Arnold, individually and

as administratrix of the Estate of Chad Arnold and as Next Friend and Guardian/

Conservator of Miles Arnold (referred to collectively as Arnold), appeals the May

2018 summary judgment of the Scott Circuit Court in favor of Westfield Insurance

Company (Westfield) and the July 2021 summary judgment entered in favor of

Landmark American Insurance Company and RSUI Indemnity Company (referred

to collectively as Landmark). With respect to the judgment in favor of Westfield,

we affirm. We dismiss the appeal of the judgment entered in favor of Landmark.

             On February 12, 2013, Chad and Casey Arnold signed up online to

participate in an extreme, five-kilometer foot race (the Rampage event) to be held

at Kentucky Horse Park (the Horse Park) on March 2, 2013. The race through the

Horse Park was one commonly referred to as “extreme” because it incorporated an

obstacle course for runners to navigate. The Arnolds read the website established

by the Rampage event organizers indicating that an ambulance and paramedics

would be available at the venue in case of an emergency.

             Mediport, LLC (Mediport) is in the business of providing on-site care

to individuals in need of medical assistance prior to the arrival of emergency

medical services. In 2013, it provided a range of services, including basic first aid,

basic life support, and advanced life support services. Mediport provided services

on a contract basis and regularly provided emergency medical technicians and/or

                                         -2-
paramedics to some of Kentucky’s horse racing facilities, including Keeneland

Race Course, Red Mile Race Track, and the Horse Park. Their services were

aimed at trainers, jockeys, and other equestrian professionals at various locations

over the course of each track’s meet.

            Prior to March 2, 2013, it agreed to provide basic life support services

during the Rampage event to be held at the Horse Park and to transport those

participants requiring emergency care to a location within the Horse Park where

they would be met by an ambulance. Basic life support services generally included

care provided to those experiencing cardiac arrest, respiratory distress, or an

obstructed airway. Mediport provided two passenger vans, two emergency

medical technicians, and a paramedic to the Horse Park on race day. However, it

did not agree to provide ambulance services or advanced life support services

during the event.

             On March 2, 2013, the Arnolds registered in person with event

organizers at the Horse Park. After the race had begun, Chad Arnold collapsed and

experienced cardiac arrest. Casey Arnold began CPR and a member of their racing

group called 911. A Mediport employee responded to the emergency in a van and

provided assistance with a handheld apparatus aimed at assisting with breathing

while chest compressions continued. The second emergency medical technician

and the paramedic arrived soon after in the second van. None of the individuals

                                         -3-
responding on behalf of Mediport had access to a defibrillator. Chad Arnold was

promptly loaded into the second Mediport van, and CPR continued while he was

transported to a designated location where the local fire department took over his

care. Despite these measures, Chad Arnold died shortly thereafter.

                 At all relevant times, Mediport was insured under a liability policy

issued by Landmark. The policy provided medical professional liability (MPL)

coverage. Its terms provided that Landmark would pay sums that the insured

became obligated to pay as damages and associated claim expenses “arising out of

a negligent act, error or omission . . . in the rendering of or failure to render

professional services as described in the Business Description on the

Declarations.” The policy also advised the insured that its coverage limits would

be eroded by the costs incurred to defend the insured against a claim -- including

attorney fees.

             Separately, the policy provided Commercial General Liability (CGL)

coverage. This coverage was triggered by bodily injury caused by an

“occurrence,” defined as an “accident, including continuous or repeated exposure

to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The coverage limits

available pursuant to this provision were also subject to erosion by claims

expenses.

                                            -4-
             Landmark’s policy expressly provided that the MPL coverage and

CGL coverage were mutually exclusive. There is no dispute that Mediport was

aware of the policy’s provisions -- including its eroding coverage limits.

             Mediport was also insured under a compulsory automobile liability

policy issued by Westfield. The policy comported with Kentucky’s Motor Vehicle

Reparations Act. It provided that Westfield would pay sums that the insured must

pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this

insurance applies, caused by an “accident” and resulting from the ownership,

maintenance, or use of a covered auto.

             In February 2014, Arnold filed a wrongful death action. Mediport

was among the many named defendants. The complaint alleged that Mediport’s

agents or employees “failed to resuscitate and/or perform reasonable and proper

emergency lifesaving medical treatment and/or protocols for at least ten (10)

minutes”; “negligently rendered and/or failed to render medical treatment”;

negligently failed “to have policies procedures, or standards regarding the response

to medical emergencies”; “negligently instituted inadequate policies, procedures,

or standards regarding the response to medical emergencies”; “were negligent by

failing to train, instruct, and supervise [agents or employees] concerning the

response to medical emergencies”; and “were negligent in responding to the

decedent’s medical emergency.” The complaint alleged that their negligence was

                                         -5-
the proximate cause of Chad Arnold’s death. There was no allegation that Arnold

sustained any injuries while being loaded, transported, or unloaded from the

Mediport van.

             Landmark undertook Mediport’s defense under the MPL coverage

provided by the policy. It did not consider the CGL coverage applicable under the

circumstances. In October 2014, during discovery, Mediport provided to Arnold a

copy of its Landmark policy. Although Arnold was made aware of the policy’s

eroding limits provision, Arnold did not make a formal demand for the Landmark

policy limits for nearly a year during which the litigation continued. Finally, once

Arnold made a demand, Landmark offered to tender the limits, minus the costs of

Mediport’s defense. Arnold rejected the offer, and litigation continued.

             In November 2015, three individual defendants were added to

Arnold’s wrongful death action: Richard Covington, a paramedic and co-owner of

Mediport; Steve Morris, a paramedic and co-owner of Mediport; and Dr. Timothy

W. Carroll, Mediport’s medical director. Landmark undertook the defense of

Mediport’s principals under the same terms of the policy.

             In December 2015, Mediport disclosed the existence of its automobile

policy with Westfield. After it was made aware of the claims asserted against

Mediport, Westfield filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to seek a declaration that

                                         -6-
the auto policy issued to Mediport did not provide coverage. Arnold filed a motion

to dismiss, asking the federal court to exercise its discretion under the Declaratory

Judgment Act to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Ultimately, the federal district

court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed Westfield’s complaint, and

thus the issues could be addressed in the pending state court action.

             At a hearing conducted in early-February 2016, Arnold contended that

if the Westfield policy had been disclosed on a timely basis, Westfield would have

defended the claim and Landmark’s coverage limits would not have been eroded

by the costs of litigating the claim. Subsequently, on February 19, 2016, Arnold

filed a motion to file a fourth amended complaint naming Mediport’s insurers as

defendants. The motion was granted.

             In this complaint, Arnold sought a declaratory judgment regarding the

nature and extent of Mediport’s liability coverage under the Westfield and

Landmark policies. The complaint also included a bad faith claim against

Landmark and an allegation that Mediport and its agents were liable under a theory

of “negligen[ce] per se by virtue of their independent and collective violations of

Kentucky statutes and regulations, including the maintenance, use, and equipping

of the vehicles involved in the event.”

             Westfield filed an answer to Arnold’s fourth amended complaint and

asserted a counterclaim and cross-claim for declaratory judgment regarding its

                                          -7-
policy. Landmark filed its answer to the fourth amended complaint on June 24,

2016, specifically raising the issue of Arnold’s standing to pursue a direct action

against the insurer of an alleged tortfeasor.

             On June 27, 2016, a settlement was reached in the wrongful death

claim against Mediport and the individual defendants associated with Mediport. In

an agreement filed under seal, Mediport agreed to entry of a final judgment against

it for $1.00. Mediport, the individual defendants, and “all of [their] affiliates,

directors, shareholders, officers, insurers, employees, representatives, attorneys,

agents, independent contractors, successors and assigns” were released from all

further claims and demands related to the wrongful death action.

             An additional lump sum payment to settle the claims was funded by

Landmark and Westfield. While any and all disputes between Arnold and

Mediport and Arnold and the individual defendants were resolved, the terms of the

settlement agreement provided, among other things, that “this Release shall not bar

Arnold from pursuing the following four (4) claims:”

             Arnold may seek to obtain monetary sanctions against
             [law firm] under CR 11 or 37 as set forth in the Arnold’s
             [sic] briefs filed with the Court on February 25, 2016 and
             March 21, 2016.

             ....

             Arnold may seek to obtain a ruling that the Westfield
             policy provides coverage for their claims in the Action.

                                          -8-
             ....

             Arnold may seek to obtain a ruling that the Landmark
             policy does not contain eroding limits and/or the eroding
             limits are against Kentucky public policy.

             ....

             Arnold may pursue a bad faith claim against Landmark
             and/or RSUI, subject to all of its defenses and appeals.

            If a court were to determine that the terms of the Westfield policy

provided coverage, Westfield was to make a further lump sum payment to Arnold.

If Arnold prevailed against Landmark, Landmark also agreed to pay to Arnold an

additional sum certain equal to the costs of its insured’s defense. (The agreed

judgment and order of dismissal were entered in mid-August 2016. To

recapitulate, Arnold was awarded a judgment against Mediport in the amount of

$1.00, and the claims against Mediport and the individual defendants associated

with Mediport were dismissed.)

                On July 21, 2016, Westfield filed a motion for summary judgment.

Westfield argued that its policy provided coverage only for “bodily injury” caused

by an “accident” which results “from the ownership, maintenance, or use” of a

covered vehicle and that this coverage was inapplicable under the circumstances.

In the alternative, it argued that the policy excluded coverage for bodily injury

“resulting from the providing or the failure to provide any medical or other

professional services.” It contended that Arnold’s claims clearly involved the

                                         -9-
failure to provide medical care or other professional services -- the specific subject

matter of the exclusion.

                In 2017, the parties filed extensive briefs in the trial court

regarding the separate coverage issues. Arnold contended that Mediport’s CGL

coverage provision applied under the circumstances, not the MPL coverage, and

that the CGL coverage limits had not been eroded by the costs of defending

Mediport. Landmark argued that Arnold, a third-party claimant, was not in privity

of contract with Landmark and that it otherwise lacked standing to dispute its

decision to cover the loss under the MPL coverage as agreed by its insured. In the

alternative, it contended that Mediport’s CGL coverage had an unambiguous and

enforceable eroding limits provision as well. It noted that the eroding limits

provision is not uncommon in commercial policies and argued that because the

insurance purchased by Mediport was not compulsory, the policy’s provisions

agreed upon by insured and insurer did not violate public policy.

                In an order entered on May 21, 2018, the trial court concluded that

the Westfield automobile policy did not provide coverage for Arnold’s claims

against Mediport. It concluded, in part, as follows:

             During the running of the race, Chad Arnold collapsed on
             the course, and subsequently died of cardiac arrest. The
             vehicle Mediport sent to respond to the emergency had
             no medical or emergency equipment and could only be
             used to transport Mr. Arnold and had no capacity to
             provide any life-saving services. The issue for this court

                                         -10-
            to decide is whether this failure of Mediport is covered
            by the terms of the insurance contract.

            ....

            The plain meaning of the language of this policy
            indicates that the insured is indemnified for injuries
            caused by an automobile accident and does not cover
            events not directly related to the operation of a motor
            vehicle. There is no language concerning proper
            equipment or specialized services such as responding to a
            medical emergency. The court cannot read additional
            coverage into an insurance contract. The closest word
            would be Maintenance, but the clear context is the proper
            care of a motor vehicle to ensure that it is safe to operate,
            not that it have specialized equipment for a specialized
            service. There is no evidence in this case that the policy
            buyer or seller had any intent to provide or purchase a
            policy that covered responses in a medical emergency
            with a properly equipped vehicle. That type of policy
            would have very specific language concerning the
            equipment required.

            Therefore, this Court rules that the insurance policy in
            this case does not provide coverage to Mediport
            concerning the operation of its vehicle at the scene of this
            tragic event. To hold otherwise would require this court
            to expand the terms of the contract which it cannot
            legally do.

This order of May 21, 2018, as to Westfield was not made final and appealable.

                On July 8, 2021, the trial court granted summary judgment to

Landmark. It concluded that because Arnold was not a party to the contract of

insurance and had not been assigned Mediport’s rights against Landmark in the

settlement, Arnold lacked standing to pursue an action with respect to the coverage

                                        -11-
issue. It observed that that “[a]n assignment of rights could have been easily

obtained during the settlement with Mediport, however, that was not done.” The

court concluded there was no just cause for delay and made the order final and

appealable.

                    By order entered on December 22, 2021, the court’s order of May

21, 2018, in favor of Westfield was made final and appealable. Arnold’s motion to

alter, amend, or vacate the court’s order of July 8, 2021, in favor of Landmark was

denied. This appeal followed. Proceedings were stayed for a time so that the trial

court could consider Arnold’s motion filed pursuant to CR1 60.02. Once that

motion was denied, the matter was ripe for our consideration.

                Because the issue is paramount, we first address Arnold’s argument

that the circuit court erred by concluding that she lacked standing to seek a

declaratory judgment concerning the eroding limits provisions of the liability

policy issued to Mediport by Landmark. Arnold contends that she has standing to

pursue a direct action against Mediport’s insurer because an agreed judgment was

entered against the insured, and the parties’ settlement agreement provided that she

could “seek to obtain a ruling that the Landmark policy does not contain eroding

limits and/or eroding limits are against Kentucky public policy.” We disagree.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                          -12-
                In its judgment, the circuit court considered its authority under the

provisions of our declaratory judgment statute. KRS2 418.045 provides a statutory

action to “[a]ny person interested under a deed, will or other instrument of writing,

or in a contract, written or parol . . . provided always that an actual controversy

exists with respect thereto[.]” The provisions of KRS 418.065 permit the trial

court to “refuse to exercise the power to declare rights, duties, or other legal

relations in any case . . . where the declaration or construction is not necessary or

proper at the time under all the circumstances.”

                The circuit court observed that Arnold was not a party to the contract

of insurance and had not been assigned any rights by the insured, Mediport. Citing

Commonwealth v. Yamaha Motor Manufacturing, 237 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky.

2007), the court concluded that as a stranger to the contract, Arnold could not

pursue a declaration of rights because she lacked a judicially recognized interest in

the subject matter of the action. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to enter a

judgment.

                Section 109 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that the “judicial

power of the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice

which shall be divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court of

general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court and a trial court of limited

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -13-
jurisdiction known as the District Court.” Section 112(5) of the Kentucky

Constitution grants circuit courts “original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not

vested in some other court” and “such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by

law.” (Emphasis added.)

             In Commonwealth Cabinet for Health and Family Services,

Department for Medicaid Services v. Sexton by and through Appalachian Regional

Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. 2018), the Supreme Court of Kentucky

observed that the issue of constitutional standing is not subject to waiver.

Consequently, in order to ensure that only justiciable causes are entertained in our

Court, each court of the Commonwealth must consider the issue of constitutional

standing -- even where a party opponent has failed to raise the issue.

             In Sexton, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the federal standard

for standing announced in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct.

2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992), holding that in order for a party to sue in

Kentucky, the initiating party must have the requisite constitutional standing to do

so as determined by three requirements: (1) injury, (2) causation, (3)

redressability. The plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the

defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the relief

requested. Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 196. Because standing is a prerequisite to

                                         -14-
invoking the jurisdiction of the circuit court, standing to sue must be determined at

the time the action is filed. Its absence requires that the complaint be dismissed.

             An injured party clearly has standing to sue a tortfeasor’s insurance

carrier and to maintain an action to collect a judgment in his/her favor against the

named insured tortfeasor. Willis v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 251 (Ky.

App. 1981). However, by filing her fourth amended complaint, Arnold was not

attempting to collect a judgment in her favor against the alleged tortfeasor, who

was Landmark’s insured. She lacked standing to pursue a declaratory judgment

action against Landmark -- both to determine whether the insurer could rely on the

MLP coverage provision of its policy as a basis to pay the claim and whether its

eroding limits provision was applicable or enforceable.

             At the time that Arnold brought her declaratory judgment action

against Landmark seeking relief concerning the terms of its policy, Arnold had not

yet suffered an injury fairly traceable to Landmark’s conduct or obligations.

Arnold merely anticipated that a judgment could and would be entered against

Mediport in her wrongful death action and that she could then rely upon the limits

of Mediport’s liability coverage to satisfy it. But, critically, at the time her action

against Landmark was initiated, she had no judgment. Without it, she could not

establish a financial interest in the proceeds of Mediport’s insurance coverage

sufficient to constitute a justiciable interest in the specific terms of the policy.

                                          -15-
             When a judgment was later entered against Mediport and the

individual defendants, it was for a single dollar. There was no indication that the

judgment was not -- or could not -- be satisfied by Mediport and the individual

defendants who settled every claim against them in exchange for it. Arnold still

lacked a justiciable interest in the coverage provided by Landmark. Even when a

settlement was reached directly with Landmark, Landmark did not (nor could it)

agree to waive its right to contend that Arnold lacked standing to file the

declaratory judgment action in circuit court in the first place. Most importantly,

Arnold was required to establish her standing to pursue the action to invoke and

the jurisdiction of the circuit court at the time her action was filed.

            Because Arnold lacked the requisite standing to pursue the action

against Landmark at the time the fourth amended complaint was filed, she never

properly invoked the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Because “the justiciable

cause requirement applies to cases at all levels of judicial relief[,]” where the

original jurisdiction of the circuit court was never properly invoked, this Court is

constitutionally precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over the matter to

decide the appeal on its merits. Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 196-97. We do not reach

the merits of Arnold’s arguments with respect to Landmark because she lacks the

constitutional standing necessary to invoke the exercise of our appellate

                                          -16-
jurisdiction. Consequently, we are compelled to dismiss the appeal of the summary

judgment entered in favor of Landmark.

             We now consider the appeal of the summary judgment entered in

favor of Westfield. Westfield does not challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit

court. Because it filed a counterclaim in the action for declaratory judgment

concerning its duty to defend its insured, Mediport, against Arnold’s wrongful

death action, we are persuaded that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was

properly invoked.

              CR 56.03 provides that summary judgment should be granted only

where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The propriety of

summary judgment is a purely legal question involving no findings of fact. Benton

v. Boyd & Boyd, PLLC, 387 S.W.3d 341 (Ky. App. 2012).

             The following principles govern the interpretation of insurance

contracts:

             Interpretation of insurance contracts is generally a matter
             of law to be decided by the court. As such, it is subject
             to de novo review on appeal. Under the reasonable
             expectation doctrine, ambiguous terms in an insurance
             contract must be interpreted in favor of the insured’s
             reasonable expectations and construed as an average
             person would construe them. But “[o]nly actual
             ambiguities, not fanciful ones, will trigger application of
             the doctrine.” Absent ambiguity, terms in an insurance
             contract are to be construed according to their “plain and

                                         -17-
             ordinary meaning.” Insurance polices [sic] should be
             construed according to the parties’ mutual understanding
             at the time they entered into the contract, with this mutual
             understanding to be deduced, if at all possible, from the
             language of the contract itself. Exceptions and
             exclusions in insurance policies are to be narrowly
             construed to effectuate insurance coverage. But
             “[r]easonable conditions, restrictions, and limitations on
             insurance coverage are not deemed per se to be contrary
             to public policy.”

Hugenberg v. West American Ins. Company/Ohio Cas. Group, 249 S.W.3d 174,

185-86 (Ky. App. 2006) (citations omitted).

             We first address Arnold’s contention that the circuit court erred by

concluding that no coverage was available under the provisions of Mediport’s

automobile liability policy. Again, the circuit court concluded that there was no

coverage because the “plain meaning of the language of this policy indicates that

the insured is indemnified for injuries caused by an automobile accident and

does not cover events not directly related to the operation of a motor vehicle.”

(Emphasis added.) We conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting

summary judgment in favor of Westfield.

             As is typical, the commercial automobile policy issued to Mediport by

Westfield provides: personal injury protection benefits, uninsured motorists

benefits, underinsured motorists benefits, comprehensive physical damage

coverage, and collision coverage. It provides liability coverage for its insured

where the insured must pay damages because of bodily injury caused by an

                                        -18-
accident “resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered auto.” A

policy endorsement defines a number of exclusions to which the insurance does

not apply, including bodily injury “resulting from the providing or failure to

provide any medical or other professional services.” The policy provides that

Westfield has no duty to defend its insured in any action seeking damages for

bodily injury to which the insurance does not apply.

             In her brief, Arnold contends that Mediport was negligent in the

“operation, use, ownership, and maintenance/equipping of the vehicles and Chad

Arnold’s transport.” (Emphasis added.) She cites the inability of the first

emergency medical technician to quickly open the rear door of the first van in

order to access a backboard used to place Chad Arnold into the second van for

transport. According to Arnold, the inability to open the rear door quickly meant

that the EMT had to resort to the side door -- resulting in an allegedly significant

delay in Chad’s being transported to the ambulance. She argues that Mediport was

negligent by: failing to include necessary life-saving equipment in its vans,

including equipping the vehicle with a defibrillator and radios necessary for

communication; failing to inspect the vans to ensure that they were in good

working order; failing to respond properly to the incident; and by failing “to

load/unload cargo” properly.

                                         -19-
            The complaint did not allege that Chad Arnold had been injured

during any part of his being loaded, transported, or unloaded from Mediport’s van.

Arnold argues that none of the acts or omissions upon which the tort claims are

based required medical or professional training or the provision of medical

services. Thus, she contends that none was excluded from coverage pursuant to

the terms of the policy.

             In examining the provisions of the automobile liability policy, we

must decide whether the claims asserted against Mediport are claims for bodily

injury caused by an accident “resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of

a covered auto.” As did the trial court, we conclude that Chad Arnold’s injuries

were not caused by an accident of any kind “resulting from” the ownership,

maintenance, or use of Mediport’s vans. We also note that a similar phrase,

“arising out of,” has been construed expansively by the courts:

             The words “arising out of . . . use” in an automobile
             liability insurance policy, are broad, general and
             comprehensive terms meaning “originating from,” or
             “having its origin in,” “growing out of” or “flowing
             from” . . . . All that is required to come within the
             meaning of the words “arising out of the . . . use of the
             automobile” is a causal connection with the accident.

Insurance Co. of North America v. Royal Indemnity Co., 429 F. 2d 1014, 1017-

1018 (6th Cir. 1970)(citations omitted). See also 43 AM.JUR.2d Insurance § 708

                                         -20-
(2005) stating that “‘[a]rising out of’ the use or occupancy of a motor vehicle

requires a causal connection between the injuries and the vehicle.”

             We agree with the circuit court that Mediport’s alleged failures (i.e.,

to equip the van with sufficient life-saving equipment, to inspect the vans to ensure

that they were in good working order, to respond properly to the incident, and to

properly load/unload cargo) do not describe an accident resulting from the

ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle as provided by the terms of the policy.

Liability coverage for this alleged negligence is simply not contemplated -- nor is it

encompassed -- by the plain language of the policy. There is no causal connection

between Chad Arnold’s injuries and the use or operation of the insured’s vehicles.

There is no evidence whatsoever indicating that an accident or injuries were caused

by the driving of the vehicles to the scene, their presence at the scene, and/or the

use of one to transport Chad Arnold to an ambulance.

             On the contrary, Chad Arnold’s injuries were wholly independent of

the use, operation, and ownership of Mediport’s vehicles. Because the bodily

injuries suffered by Chad Arnold lack the necessary causal connection to the use of

a motor vehicle as required by the clear language of the automobile liability policy,

it provides no coverage. Consequently, we need not consider application of the

exclusions described in the policy. The trial court did not err by granting summary

judgment in favor of West American regarding the automobile policy.

                                         -21-
             Next, we address the issue of the duty to defend. We note that the

allegations of a complaint “cannot compel a defense if coverage does not exist.”

Thompson v. West American Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. App. 1992)

(quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Vance, 730 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Ky. 1987)). The

obligation to defend arises out of the insurance contract, not from the allegations of

the complaint against the insured. Id. We conclude that Westfield had no duty to

defend Mediport where there was no possibility of coverage under the

circumstances.

             Lastly, we address the motion of Mediport and the individual

defendants (Timothy Carroll, Richard Covington, and Steve Morris) to be

dismissed as parties to the appeal. The motion was passed to this merits panel by

order of the Court entered on January 13, 2023. For purposes of appeal, a person is

a necessary party if the person would be necessary for further proceedings in the

circuit court if the judgment were reversed. Land v. Salem Bank, 279 Ky. 449, 130

S.W.2d 818 (1939); McBrearty v. Kentucky Community and Tech. College System,

262 S.W.3d 205 (Ky. App. 2008). Each and every claim against these parties

included in the wrongful death action was dismissed as settled, and a judgment was

entered against them. None of the issues presented on appeal concerns their

liability, and they would not have been necessary parties if we had reversed the

                                         -22-
judgment of the circuit court. Consequently, they are not necessary parties to these

proceedings. Their motion is hereby granted.

             To recapitulate, the appeal of the judgment in favor of Landmark is

dismissed; the judgment in favor of Westfield is affirmed; and Mediport and the

individual defendants are dismissed as parties to the appeal. We shall issue a

separate order granting the motion of Mediport and these individuals to dismiss

them as parties.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -23-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES TIMOTHY
                           CARROLL, MEDIPORT, LLC.,
A. Neal Herrington         RICHARD COVINGTON, AND
Christopher H. Morris      STEVE MORRIS:
Louisville, Kentucky
                           D. Christopher Robinson
                           Griffin Terry Sumner
                           Louisville, Kentucky

                           Anthony J. Caruso
                           Cincinnati, Ohio

                           BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                           WESTFIELD INSURANCE
                           COMPANY:

                           John W. Walters
                           Lexington, Kentucky

                           Elizabeth M. Bass
                           Hendersonville, Tennessee

                           BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
                           LANDMARK AMERICAN
                           INSURANCE COMPANY AND
                           RSUI INDEMNITY COMPANY:

                           Mindy G. Barfield
                           Kyle R. Bunnell
                           Lexington, Kentucky

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