Court Opinion

ID: 9830675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:22:38.572316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:43.736174
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Due to the earnest insistence of appellees in their able motion for rehearing, we have again reviewed the questions passed upon in the original opinion, and because it appears from said motion that we perhaps have not made the exact holding in this case indisputably clear, we are constrained to make the following additional observations:
Appellees insist that we have in effect ■constructed a new method of passing title to real estate heretofore unknown to the law. Such was not the intention of the decision, and if it has that effect, it, of course, would be clearly erroneous; but if we have not misunderstood the law relating to tenancy in ■common, it is the rule that where one tenant in common conveys the whole of the property that other tenants in common who ratify or acquiesce are estopped to deny the validity ■of the conveyance so ratified. In 38 Cyc. title Tenancy in Common, p. 106, the rule is stated:
“Tenants in Common, being owners of several interests, may ratify the acts of each other and acquiesce therein; and generally such ratification or acquiescence with full knowledge of material facts is effective; and after such ratification or estoppel, or after such ratification or acquiescence the ratifying parties and their .grantees are estopped from denying the effect thereof.”
As supporting this text a large number of ■cases from different jurisdictions are cited. Most of them relate to the ratification by one tenant in common of the deed of his cotenant ■conveying a specific parcel of the common property and holding that where such a deed is ratified by a tenant in common he is bound thereby. On page 111 of the same volume of Cyc. as cited last above, there is a further ■statement:
, “An unauthorized sale or conveyance of the whole property by one tenant in common may ■be ratified by the others. The nonconsenting tenant may be estopped from denying the passage of title to the vendee if he does any act to ratify or confirm the sale.”
In Tiffany, on Real Property, voL 1, p. 682, it is said:
“A conveyance by a cotenant of a specific portion of the land may, it has been frequently stated, be validated by a ratification thereof by the other cotenants. In s'o far as this means that in States in which a conveyance by a co-tenant of his undivided interest in a specific tract of land is ordinarily invalid as against the other cotenants, it is valid even as against them in case they acquiesce therein, it appears to be a reasonable qualification of the doctrine.”
To the same effect is the rule as stated in 7 R. C. L. §§ 72, 75, and 77, pp. 877, 879, and 882.
In section 75, it is there said:
“A joint tenant or tenants in common cannot sell the whole common property without the authority of his cotenants; for he has no implied authority to dispose of his cotenant’s interest in the common property and any attempt on his part to do so is ineffectual. In case of such a sale a nonassenting tenant has two courses open to him. He may treat the attempted sale of his interest as annulled, and if the grantee refuses to admit him to possession of the premises may bring ejectment and recover such possession, or he may at his election affirm what has been done; and treat the money received for his interest as money received to his use.”
While it is true that ordinarily ratification is applied to the act of one who purports to act as agent for another without his authority, but it has been applied in many varying classes of cases to the act of one person in dealing with the property of another without his previous consent, and has been specifically applied in this state to the act of one cotenant in dealing with the common property without the previous consent of his cotenant, Broom v. Pearson (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 895. The only objection that could be urged to the application of the rule laid down in Broom v. Pearson, supra, to this case, would arise from the statute of frauds, but as pointed out in the original opinion, the acts relied upon to constitute ratification in this case were in writing and identified the land, specifically referred to the interest of the respective parties thereunder, and in effect stated that the ratifying parties recognized that appellants held a valid lease upon said land for the purpose of mining for oil and gas.
Appellees vigorously assert, however, that these division orders are not conveyances and cannot be construed as such, nor did we so hold, but we.do believe that they are available as evidence of ratification and acquiescence, and that unexplained they constitute indisputable evidence thereof. A review of the matter has confirmed the belief that the law relating to tenancy in common *624as applied to tlie facts of tMs case requires a holding that the uncontradicted evidence shows a ratification on the part of, appellees of the lease executed by Hill and wife. Ap-pellees characterize as “remarkable” the statement in the opinion that:
“When appellants drilled the first productive well on said premises, appellees had, as to the oil produced therefrom, open to them two courses; one was to take one-fourth of the oil less one-fourth of the expense of drilling said productive well and operating the same, or to ratify the lease executed by the Hills and take their proportion of the royalty and cast upon appellants the burden of paying all expenses.”
If this statement is remarkable, we have the consolation that it did not originate in this court. It is an exact quotation from Mills and Willingham on the Law of Oil and Gas as found on page 270 thereof, and as set forth in 7 R. O. L. § 75, p. 879, and is exactly what the Supreme Court of Louisiana said in Liles v. Producers’ Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So. 339. AVe quote from the syllabi:
“Owners of an undivided interest in lands, subject to oil leases granted by their co-owners, who have been deprived of their share of the profits from the oil taken from the land have the choice of one of two remedies: One ex delicto, as for d'amages for an offense or quasi offense, the measure. of damages for which would be the value of the oil and gas wrongfully extracted; the other for the money which their co-owners and the lessees had received from the oil and gas obtained from the land and appropriated to their own use, thereby ratifying the leases made of their interest by their co-owners.”
To the same effect are the cases of Sommers v. Bennett, 68 W. Va. 157, 69 S. E. 690; Patterson v. Clem, 79 W. Va. 666, 91 S. E. 654. The suggestion is 'made in the motion ■that if the doctrine announced above was correct that the appellees would have been entitled to recover of Hill and wife one-fourth of the bonus money or down payment made by appellant for the second lease, and that this is not the law. This is exactly what is held in the case of Sommers v. Bennett, supra. We again quote from the syl-labi:
“Where land * * * has been leased for oil and gas purposes by a cotenant * * • * without the consent of the other cotenant, * * * but. such lease is subsequently ratified in a suit for an accounting of rents and profits, the accounting should include all money received by the lessor, cotenant * * * by way of bonus money, * * *■ and from royalty oils and gas rentals, or otherwise, accruing under such lease.” •
The statement criticized may be remarkable, but tire quotations from the above cases indicate that it is not without respectable authority to support it. While the question is not presented for decision, we see no objection to it on either logical or equitable grounds. If one tenant in common assumes to deal with the whole property and to convey the whole of the common property, then his cotenant should certainly have the right to ratify the sale of the property and claim his share of the profits arising from the sale. Further complaint is made of the holding because the opinion acquiesces in the trial court’s conclusion of fact that there was no prejudice to appellant and that we have in effect applied the doctrine of estoppel while' agreeing with the trial court that one of the main elements was lacking. Ratification is a species of estoppel, and where an act of another has been ratified by the complaining party, the ratifying party is es-topped to deny the effect of the act which he has ratified, but change of position is not an essential element of ratification as is required in the application of the rule of estop-pel in pais. What we mean to say is that, the uncontradicted facts showing ratification, appellees are thereby estopped to deny the effect of the last lease executed by the Hills and that as relates to this matter prejudice or change of position is not required.
While recognizing the deservedly great legal reputation and distinguished ability of the counsel for appellees, we must follow our own conclusion, which is that the decision made is a correct one, and that the motion for rehearing should be overruled, and it is so ordered.