Court Opinion

ID: 9890618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 18:04:16.955069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:38.645004
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Hunter CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    B317559
                                                                (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                             Super. Ct. No. BA491968)

           v.

 BRANDON EUGENE HUNTER,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
      Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Appellant and defendant Brandon Eugene Hunter (Hunter)
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his
right to represent himself without a hearing and without
consideration of the factors outlined in People v. Carson (2005) 35
Cal.4th 1 (Carson). Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Underlying Charges
      Hunter was charged by amended information with fleeing a
pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly
(count one) and misdemeanor hit and run driving resulting in
property damage (count two). It was further alleged Hunter
suffered one prior conviction in March 2011 pursuant to Penal
Code sections 667, subdivision (b), and 1170.12, subdivision (b).

B.    Hunter’s Self-Representation
      At the preliminary hearing, the trial court granted
Hunter’s request to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). Hunter completed and
signed a Faretta waiver, acknowledging that he could not “speak
over the court or opposing counsel,” and was required to “treat
the court and opposing counsel with professionalism, respect and
dignity.” He further acknowledged he understood the court could
“consider events that occurred both inside and outside of the
courtroom when considering whether or not to revoke [his] pro
per status, and that the right of self-representation is not a
license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.” Hunter
represented himself at subsequent court hearings.
      On April 13, 2021, Judge Renee Korn filed a notice to
revoke Hunter’s pro per status after a hearing on multiple

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motions he had filed. The trial court noted that since his
arraignment, Hunter’s behavior had become “increasing[ly]
disruptive and obstructive” and he “repeatedly interrupt[ed]
during the court proceedings.” In particular, the court found that
during a hearing on April 9, 2021, Hunter’s “behavior worsened
from his prior court appearances and he became unmanageable
and defiant.” “Hunter became increasingly out of control. [He]
refused to accept th[e] court’s rulings and repeatedly challenged
the court. . . . Ultimately, the last [10] minutes of the court
session resulted in [Hunter] yelling and threatening both the
court and the prosecution with lawsuits.” The court found
Hunter had abused his pro per status and his in-court behavior
constituted “serious and obstructionist misconduct that seriously
threaten[ed] the core integrity of th[e] court and further trial
procedures.”
       The trial court allowed Hunter to address why his pro per
status should not be revoked on April 16, 2021. At the hearing,
Hunter repeatedly interrupted and disrespected the court. When
Judge Korn was explaining why Hunter’s conduct was
inappropriate, he interjected, “You’re still talking ma’am, like,
you’re going on and on. You’re just being repetitive here.” After
the court gave Hunter several warnings his pro per status could
be revoked, it allowed Hunter to remain in pro per as he
appeared to indicate he understood his behavior was improper.
       On June 10, 2021, Hunter’s case was assigned to Judge
Mildred Escobedo for trial. At the beginning of the proceedings,
the trial court went over the rules for defendants representing
themselves and instructed, “Never, ever interrupt me nor any
other party speaking. I will give you a chance to speak when
your time comes. Do not interrupt.” When the court asked for

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information regarding the witnesses he planned to call, Hunter
insisted he was expecting to speak to his investigator before the
proceedings. The court observed that Hunter did not seem to be
prepared for trial and was not answering its questions. However,
once the investigator arrived, the court took a recess to allow
Hunter to speak with him.
      During the recess, the following exchange occurred:

     “The court: The record should reflect that Mr.
     Hunter is interrupting [and] is speaking to the court
     disrespectfully, has made reference to having talked
     to Judge Korn about something. Now he is
     interrupting me, speaking over me and obstructing.
     Another disruption, Mr. Hunter --

     [Hunter]: This is a recess.

     The court: I will revoke your privilege for pro per
     status if you continue in this fashion. Let me make
     clear.

     [Hunter]: I’m going to get you on judicial misconduct,
     so don’t worry about it.

     The court: The court is going to revoke his status.
     Counsel, you’re in. Ten minutes.”

     When the proceedings resumed, the trial court reinstated
Hunter’s pro per status, but it again warned Hunter it could
revoke his status if he continued not following the rules,

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obstructing, interrupting, and acting unprofessionally. Hunter
responded, “If the court follow [sic] their rules and you maintain
that non-judicial bias -- that non-bias judicial referee that you’re
supposed to . . . [¶] then we have no issue.” Hunter went on to
accuse Judge Escobedo of being “in cahoots” with Judge Korn,
adding that Judge Escobedo was “acting worse than [Judge]
Korn.” He further remarked, “I’m trying to figure out what’s
going on with these women judges.” The court found Hunter’s
statements “completely and entirely disrespectful and uncalled
for.”
      The trial court proceeded to rule on and grant one of the
People’s motions in limine to admit limited evidence regarding an
outstanding warrant for foundational purposes, to which Hunter
objected on hearsay grounds. Hunter refused to accept the ruling
and complained to a third person off the record, and the court
repeated its warning that it would revoke his pro per status.
Despite the court’s many admonishments, Hunter continuously
interrupted the proceedings, threatened to file a lawsuit against
Judge Escobedo, and exclaimed he was not going to let the trial
move forward. In between Hunter’s interruptions, the court
explained, “Hunter does not . . . let the court continue in the
proceedings. He continues to override . . . [¶] His outburst in
court, his interruptions of court proceedings . . . [¶] the court is
going to revoke pro per status.”
      The trial court then attempted to speak with Hunter’s
stand-by counsel, but Hunter continued to disrupt the
proceedings and asserted that he refused the appointment of
counsel. The court informed Hunter that if he continued to
interrupt, he would be removed from the courtroom. A recess
was then taken to have him removed. The court later had

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Hunter returned to the courtroom, but Hunter was again
removed and placed in the detention lockup because he did not
change his behavior.
       The hearing resumed, and the trial court expressed a
concern as to whether Hunter was competent to stand trial. The
court noted that although Hunter had been given the chance to
remain in pro per, he “would not respond as appropriate,
wouldn’t follow the instructions of the court, the formality of the
court.” The court added, “I was hesitant to revoke [his status],
but his conduct just didn’t permit me to conduct a trial.” Shortly
thereafter the court noted, “Hunter just caused a complete and
utter melee in the lockup with deputies. He is -- he is out of
control.” After a pause in the proceedings, the court stated
“[Hunter was] using force on [the] deputies as best as he can,”
and the court declared a doubt as to Hunter’s competency under
Penal Code section 1368 and suspended proceedings.
       Proceedings were reinstated five months later with Hunter
represented by counsel. Hunter pled no contest to counts one and
two pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. The trial
court struck Hunter’s prior strike conviction and sentenced him
to 16 months in state prison on count one and 180 days in county
jail with credit for time served on count two. Hunter timely
appealed.

                          DISCUSSION
A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
      Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to
represent themselves at trial. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at
p. 819.) “That right is not without limits, however. [Citation]
‘“[The] government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and

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efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest
in acting as his [or her] own lawyer.”’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Becerra (2016) 63 Cal.4th 511, 518.) A trial court may terminate
a defendant’s pro per status if he or she “engages in ‘“deliberate
dilatory or obstructive behavior”’ that ‘threatens to subvert “the
core concept of a trial” [citation] or to compromise the court’s
ability to conduct a fair trial.’” (Ibid., quoting Carson, supra, 35
Cal.4th at p. 10.)
       “‘When determining whether termination is necessary and
appropriate, the trial court should consider several factors in
addition to the nature of the misconduct and its impact on the
trial proceedings,’ including: (1) ‘the availability and suitability
of alternative sanctions,’ (2) ‘whether the defendant has been
warned that particular misconduct will result in termination of in
propria persona status,’ and (3) ‘whether the defendant has
“intentionally sought to disrupt and delay his trial.”’ [Citation.]
The intention to disrupt and delay trial is, in many instances,
sufficient to order termination.” (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th
448, 494–495 (Ng); see Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10.) No
one consideration is dispositive; rather, the totality of
circumstances should inform the court’s exercise of its discretion.
(Carson, at p. 11.)
       We review a ruling revoking a defendant’s in propria
persona status for abuse of discretion (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th
at p. 12), and “[a] court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a
strong showing of clear abuse.” (Ng, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 495.)
We “accord due deference to the trial court’s assessment of the
defendant’s motives and sincerity as well as the nature and
context of his [or her] misconduct and its impact on the integrity
of the trial in determining whether termination of Faretta rights

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is necessary to maintain the fairness of the proceedings.”
(Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 12.) In conducting our
deferential review, we recognize that “the extent of a defendant’s
disruptive behavior may not be fully evident from the cold
record,” and that the trial court “is in the best position to judge
[a] defendant’s demeanor.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th
701, 735 (Welch).)

B.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
       Revoking Hunter’s Pro Per Status
       Hunter contends the trial court erred by revoking his pro
per status without a hearing and without considering the factors
outlined in Carson. We disagree.
       The June 10, 2021, hearing began with Hunter
continuously interrupting and making disrespectful comments,
such as when he accused Judge Escobedo of being “in cahoots”
with Judge Korn, and remarked he was “trying to figure out
what’s going on with these women judges.” After the trial court
granted the People’s motion in limine, Hunter refused to accept
the ruling and engaged in disruptive behavior that continued
throughout the proceeding. Further, contrary to Hunter’s claims,
the court did not revoke his status “as soon as he disagreed with
the court’s ruling.” The court constantly warned Hunter it would
revoke his pro per status if his inappropriate behavior continued,
and even gave him a second chance to proceed in pro per after
initially revoking his status. The warnings had no effect on his
conduct. (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10.) He continued to
demonstrate his unwillingness to follow rules of procedure or
courtroom protocol, and he abused the dignity of the courtroom,
jeopardizing the integrity of the trial. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S.

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at p. 834, fn. 46.) In addition, given Hunter’s multiple outbursts,
during which he stated he would not allow the trial to go forward
after the court’s ruling on the motion, the court could reasonably
find that Hunter “intentionally sought to disrupt and delay his
trial.” (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 10.)
       Hunter’s argument that the trial court did not explain on
the record why it was revoking his pro per status is unpersuasive.
“In a case of in-court misconduct, the record documenting the
basis for terminating a defendant’s Faretta rights is generally
complete and explicit, without the need for further explanatory
proceedings, because there is a contemporaneous
memorialization either by the court reporter’s recording events as
they transpire in the courtroom or by the trial court’s describing
them for the record.” (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 11.) Not
only does the record reflect Hunter engaged in disruptive and
dilatory conduct, but the court also explained before revoking his
pro per status that Hunter’s outbursts were not allowing the
proceedings to continue. The court clarified, “Hunter would not
respond as appropriate, wouldn’t follow the instructions of the
court, the formality of the court,” and while the court was
hesitant to revoke his pro per status, “his conduct . . . didn’t
permit [the court] to conduct a trial.”
       Furthermore, as to Hunter’s contention that the trial court
did not discuss alternative sanctions, Hunter does not suggest
what alternatives were available. Nor did Hunter file a reply
brief responding to the People’s argument that there were no
feasible alternatives to revoking his status, given his in-court
behavior. Alternative sanctions are more suitable where
misbehavior is removed from the courtroom setting and less
likely to affect the fairness of trial. (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at

                                 9
p. 10.) Hunter’s misconduct took place in the courtroom and after
the court warned him multiple times that his failure to abide by
its instructions would result in the loss of his pro per status.
Moreover, as to Hunter’s assertion that the court revoked his
status without first conducting a hearing, Hunter fails to cite any
authority holding a hearing is required prior to terminating a
defendant’s pro per status.
       Additionally, although Hunter tries to characterize his
conduct as “merely disagreeing” with the court , the trial court is
in the best position to determine whether a defendant should be
allowed to continue acting in pro per status, and we recognize
that “the extent of a defendant’s disruptive behavior may not be
fully evident from the cold record.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 735.) Here, the court had ample opportunity to observe
Hunter’s misbehavior and found it precluded the court from
holding a trial. We will not disturb that exercise of discretion
absent a clear showing of abuse.
       Lastly, Hunter seemingly contends revocation was not
warranted based on his conduct at the June 10, 2021, hearing
because he had previously made 11 court appearances without
incident. However, the record does not support Hunter’s
characterizations of his past conduct. On April 13, 2021, Judge
Korn filed a notice to revoke Hunter’s pro per status, which
stated that since his arraignment, Hunter had become
increasingly disruptive and obstructive, and she described him as
“unmanageable and defiant.” At the April 16, 2021, hearing,
Hunter continuously interrupted, spoke over, and disrespected
Judge Korn, and although Hunter had been previously warned at
that hearing that his status could be revoked, his obstreperous

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behavior continued at the June 10, 2021, hearing in front of
Judge Escobedo.
       Hunter’s conduct gave the trial court a reasonable basis for
believing his self-representation would pose an unreasonable risk
of future disruption. The court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating his right to represent himself.

                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                          MORI, J.
      We concur:

            CURREY, P. J.

            COLLINS, J.

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