Court Opinion

ID: 9672415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:54:35.197112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.932925
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
We granted review of this cause, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 200(c)(1), to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court erred in refusing to remit the full amount of a bond to the surety. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the court of appeals erred, but I disagree completely with the majority’s reasoning.
I first review the relevant facts. Thomas Earl Marks, charged in Robertson County with a misdemeanor, failed to appear for trial on December 7, 1989. On that date the trial court rendered judgment nisi for the State and against Marks and his surety, Vernon Lyles, jointly and severally, in the amount of Marks’ bond. On December 16, 1989, Marks was re-arrested and placed in the Robertson County Jail. On February 7, 1990, the trial court rendered final judgment against the bond. On March 6, 1990, Lyles filed a motion to modify or vacate the final judgment and a second motion for remittitur of the full amount of the bond under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 22.16(a). The trial court denied both motions.
The Tenth Court of Appeals subsequently reversed, holding that the trial court “should have vacated or modified its February 7, 1990, [final] judgment and granted remittitur in accordance with art. 22.16(a).” Lyles v. State, 814 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex.App.—Waco 1991). The court of appeals, citing State v. Matyastik, 811 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), reasoned first that, except for its reference to subsection (c), Article 22.16(a). remained an effective statute requiring remittitur if requested before final judgment. The court reasoned second that Lyles was entitled to remittitur under Article 22.16(a) “even though [he] presented his request for remittitur after final judgment because (1) his response to the [State’s] motion for summary judgment made such a request and (2) at the time final judgment was entered he could have relied on the nine-month-delay provision of article 22.16(c)(1) which was declared to be unconstitutional at a later date.” Lyles v. State, 814 S.W.2d at 412 (emphasis in original).
I believe it is quite plain that the court of appeals was only half right. That is, the court of appeals was correct when it determined that Article 22.16(a) remained an effective statute except for its reference to subsection (c). The court of appeals was surely wrong, however, when it concluded that Lyles was entitled to remittitur even though he filed his motion for remittitur after the trial court rendered final judgment.
Article 22.16 provides in relevant part: (a) After forfeiture of a bond and before the expiration of the time limits set by Subsection (c) of this article, the court shall, on written motion, remit to the surety the amount of the bond ... if:
(1) the principal is incarcerated in the county in which the prosecution is pending;
* * * Sfc ‡ *
(c) A final judgment may be entered against a bond not earlier than:
(1) nine months after the date the forfeiture was entered, if the offense for which the bond was given is a misdemeanor; or
(2) 18 months after the date the forfeiture was entered, if the offense for which the bond was given is felony.
(d) After the expiration of the time limits set by Subsection (c) of this article and before the entry of final judgment against the bond, the court in its discretion may remit to the surety all or part of the amount of the bond....
*506(Emphasis added.) We have held that subsection (c) is violative of our state constitution’s separation of powers provision and is, therefore, of no effect. State v. Matyastik, 811 S.W.2d 102; Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). We have also held, albeit cryptically, that
subsection (a) is contingent upon the time limitations established in subsection (c), and thus has no effect without the invalid provisions. Recently we stated in [Ex parte ] Jones [803 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) ] that “... should part of the bill be held invalid ... the remainder of the statute must be sustained if it is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the [legislative] intent wholly independent of that which has been rejected.” Because subsection (a) cannot be executed or have any effect without utilizing the provisions of subsection (c), we hold that the portion of Art. 22.16(a), V.A.C.C.P., utilizing subsection (c) is invalid under Article 2, § 1 of the Texas Constitution. Thus, remittitur now may be done anytime between forfeiture and entry of a final judgment.
State v. Matyastik, 811 S.W.2d at 104 (emphasis added; citation and some punctuation omitted). Given the principle of stare decisis, the disposition of the case at bar must certainly depend in large part on what we meant in Matyastik.
The majority concludes from its interpretation of Matyastik that subsection (a) is void in to to because of its reference to subsection (c) and that remittitur is now discretionary with the trial court before final judgment under subsection (d). There are several problems with the majority’s analysis, however. First, Matyastik, despite its somewhat oblique discussion, explicitly held that only “the portion of Art. 22.16(a), V.A.C.C.P., utilizing subsection (c) is invalid.” The balance of Article 22.16(a) remains valid and is not unconstitutional, at least not under any theory yet advanced by the majority. Second, there was no discussion in Matyastik concerning discretionary remittitur under subsection (d). Indeed, subsection (d) was never mentioned in our opinion. Third, subsection (a)’s constitutional infirmity — its utilization of subsection (c) — applies with at least equal force to subsection (d). Thus, if subsection (a) falls because of its reference to subsection (c), then subsection (d) must surely fall as well. There is no escaping this conclusion.
In my view, we must have been referring in Matyastik to mandatory remittitur under the surviving portions of Article 22.-16(a) and (d). This interpretation of Ma-tyastik is the only one that is both coherent and gives some effect to the legislative scheme embodied in Article 22.16.
As it was originally conceived by the Legislature, Article 22.16 created a scheme in which sureties on bail bonds had an absolute right to remittitur for a lengthy period of time after forfeiture if one of the conditions specified in subsection (a) was met. Following that set period of time — defined in subsection (c) — discretionary remittitur was still possible under subsection (d) if a request was made before final judgment.1 Thus, the Legislature apparently believed that it was good public policy to give bailbondsmen a strong incentive to return their principals to custody before final judgment. We can still give some effect to this legislative scheme if we construe our holding in Matyastik to refer to mandatory remittitur. Because of the majority’s failure to do so, I respectfully dissent.
MALONEY, J., joins.

. I concur in the result reached by the majority because Lyles filed his motion to vacate the judgment and for remittitur approximately thirty days after the entry of final judgment.