Court Opinion

ID: 9899992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 01:00:32.918948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:57.957581
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30703         Document: 00516973238             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/17/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                               November 17, 2023
                                       No. 22-30703                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   North Atlantic Security Company,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Fabian Blache,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Middle District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:19-CV-379
                      ______________________________

   Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Fabian Blache appeals the district court’s partial denial of his motion
   for summary judgment. We DISMISS for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
          North Atlantic Security Company alleges that Blache violated its
   federal due process rights by revoking its license to operate, and that he
   violated Louisiana state law by informing North Atlantic’s clients of that fact.
   The client-contact claim is the sole claim on which the district court denied

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30703         Document: 00516973238               Page: 2      Date Filed: 11/17/2023

                                          No. 22-30703

   summary judgment. And, as even Blache admits, that claim only sounds in
   state law. Blue Br. 14 (“Here, there is no question that North Atlantic never
   alleged that Blache violated federal law by contacting its clients.”). That is
   perhaps why Blache never invoked federal qualified immunity on that issue
   below. See Blache Mot. Sum. J. ROA.280–95 (not doing so). See, e.g., Tuttle
   v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 976 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (“Federal qualified
   immunity does not apply to state-law claims . . . .”).
           Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court’s appellate jurisdiction is tightly
   circumscribed to reviewing “final decisions.” Accordingly, an “order
   denying a motion for summary judgment is generally not a final decision
   within the meaning of § 1291 and is thus generally not immediately
   appealable.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 771 (2014). The Supreme
   Court has carved out an exception for “collateral orders,” which can include
   the denial of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525,
   530 (1985). Because Blache did not, and could not, invoke the protection of
   federal qualified immunity for his alleged violation of state law, we
   DISMISS this appeal for want of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. †

           _____________________
           †
             Our dissenting colleague does not contest that the amended complaint only raised
   the client-contact claim under state law. Post, at 4. Nor does the dissent contest that Blache
   admits as much. Id. at 5. Instead, the dissenting opinion parses the original, superseded
   complaint, prior to the inclusion of the state-law claim, to infer a federal claim the amended
   complaint omits. Id. at 4. The dissent also rejects Blache’s admission “there is no question
   that North Atlantic never alleged that Blache violated federal law by contacting its clients”
   because that issue was raised sua sponte by the district court. Id. at 5-6. We instead address
   the claims North Atlantic raised.

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   Haynes, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
          I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I conclude
   North Atlantic brought a claim under federal law against Blache, alleging that
   his contact of North Atlantic’s clients violated North Atlantic’s federal due
   process rights. The district court agreed, and it denied summary judgment
   based on qualified immunity for that claim alone. Because Blache moved for
   summary judgment on all claims and the district court ruled on this issue, I
   conclude we have jurisdiction over that decision, and I would reverse the
   district court’s denial of qualified immunity for Blache on North Atlantic’s
   federal client-contact claim.
                                   I.     Background
          Blache served as the executive secretary of the Louisiana State Board
   of Private Security Examiners (the “Board”). The Board is a state agency
   within Louisiana’s Department of Public Safety and Corrections, see La.
   Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:3273(A), which is responsible for regulating the
   private security industry in Louisiana, see id. § 37:3274(A).
          In 2018, Blache received a tip regarding a possible rules violation by
   Joshua Lands, who was working as an armed guard for North Atlantic
   Security Company (“North Atlantic”). Blache investigated and confirmed
   that Lands was working as an armed security guard without authorization,
   and that Lands was not carrying his firearms registration card in violation of
   Board regulations. See id. § 37:3283(B). North Atlantic’s license to operate
   under the Board’s regulations was subsequently revoked, and Blache
   allegedly informed North Atlantic’s customers of this fact. North Atlantic’s
   contracts, which it had obtained through the bidding process with the Office
   of State Procurement, were then awarded to another company. Subsequent
   to this process, the Board held an administrative hearing as to this issue,
   though it is unclear what the outcome of the hearing was.

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                                II.      Jurisdiction
          From the beginning of this lawsuit, North Atlantic has claimed Blache
   violated its federal due process rights when he contacted North Atlantic’s
   clients to tell them that North Atlantic’s license had been revoked. North
   Atlantic’s original petition—titled “PETITION FOR DAMAGES UNDER
   42 USC 1983”—alleged exactly that under exclusively federal law.
   Specifically, North Atlantic alleged that Blache’s actions—including
   “notif[ying] all its customers that North Atlantic could not work in
   Louisiana”—“destroyed [North Atlantic] as a viable company in
   Louisiana.” North Atlantic claimed more than $2 million in damages for,
   inter alia, violation of its Fourteenth Amendment rights. If the client contact
   was not a part of North Atlantic’s federal claims, why mention it? Further,
   the cease-and-desist letter, fine, and revocation alone—if no one knew about
   them—would be unlikely to justify the significant damages claimed.
          Nevertheless, the majority opinion concludes that North Atlantic only
   alleged its client-contact claim under state law. North Atlantic did file a
   revised amended complaint, which added a state law claim alleging that
   Blache’s revocation of North Atlantic’s license and notification of North
   Atlantic’s clients about this revocation violated North Atlantic’s due process
   rights under the Louisiana Constitution. However, the amended complaint
   still included all the same claims from the original petition, and it did not
   remove or withdraw any causes of action included in the original petition.
   The same federal client-contact claim that North Atlantic pled originally was
   also in the amended complaint. The amended complaint therefore raised the
   client-contact claim under both state and federal law (unlike what the
   majority opinion footnote suggests I am stating).
          Blache filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all
   of North Atlantic’s claims, although he did not specifically address his

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                                         No. 22-30703

   alleged wrongful notification of North Atlantic’s clients. 1 In its response,
   North Atlantic reiterated its client-contact allegations in a section addressing
   federal qualified immunity, saying “Blache violated black letter law in several
   respects” including “notifying all the customers of North Atlantic that it
   could no longer work in Louisiana and to get another company.” This
   argument would be irrelevant if North Atlantic had only brought its client-
   contact claim under state law. See Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 976 (5th
   Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (“Federal qualified immunity does not apply to state-
   law claims.”).
           Importantly, the district court also believed that North Atlantic
   brought its client-contact claim under federal law.                The district court
   ultimately held that genuine disputes of material fact precluded granting
   Blache’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity for
   North Atlantic’s federal client-contact claim. That holding is the subject of
   Blache’s appeal—as well as the reason we have jurisdiction to hear it. See
   Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining our jurisdiction
   includes “interlocutory appeals from denials of motions for summary
   judgment” on qualified immunity to the extent the denial turns on issues of
   law).
           Blache’s opening brief first asserts that “there is no question that
   North Atlantic never alleged that Blache violated federal law by contacting
   its clients,” but then concedes that the federal client-contact claim “was
   raised by the district court.” Contrary to Blache’s assertion, the district

           _____________________
           1
             The majority opinion suggests Blache never invoked federal qualified immunity
   on the client-contact claim because he believed North Atlantic did not plead that claim
   under federal law. However, Blache did generally move for summary judgment on the
   whole case and asserted qualified immunity to the constitutional assertions. Additionally,
   both North Atlantic and the district court raised the issue.

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   court did not improperly address that claim because, as described previously,
   North Atlantic had already pled it and reiterated it in subsequent summary
   judgment briefing. North Atlantic confirms as much in its brief before us,
   saying “North Atlantic brought state and federal due process claims . . .
   against Blache” alleging, inter alia, “that Blache violated its constitutional
   rights when he . . . advised North Atlantic’s clients that the license had been
   revoked prior to its Board hearing.” Given that Blache had moved for
   summary judgment on all issues and asserted qualified immunity on
   constitutional claims, the district court addressed it.
           In sum, North Atlantic pled its client-contact claim under federal law
   and has not withdrawn, waived, or abandoned that claim. Denying summary
   judgment on that claim alone, the district court held that genuine issues of
   material fact precluded granting Blache qualified immunity for his alleged
   wrongful notification of North Atlantic’s clients. A district court’s denial of
   a claim of qualified immunity that turns on an issue of law is immediately
   appealable. Id. 2 Accordingly, I conclude we have jurisdiction over the
   district court’s decision to deny qualified immunity on the claim that Blache
   violated federal law when he notified North Atlantic’s clients that North
   Atlantic’s license had been revoked. 3
                                     III.      Discussion
           Because I conclude we have jurisdiction over North Atlantic’s federal
   client-contact claim, I turn next to the question of whether Blache is entitled
   to qualified immunity on that claim. We review de novo a district court’s
           _____________________
           2
             On an interlocutory appeal, we cannot rule on the genuineness of fact issues, but
   we can rule on whether they are material as a matter of law, Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d
   339, 345 (5th Cir. 2006), which is what I am addressing here.
           3
            To the extent Blache appeals any summary judgment ruling on state law issues, I
   agree with the majority that we do not have jurisdiction over those claims.

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   denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. See
   Wallace v. Cnty. of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2005).
          To overcome qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to raise
   fact issues that show (1) the defendant violated constitutional law, and (2) the
   right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged
   misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In most cases,
   showing a right was clearly established requires citation of a relevant case that
   would have put the defendant on notice of the violation. Joseph ex rel. Est. of
   Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020). However, there is a
   “rare” exception to this requirement, under which, “in an obvious case,
   analogous case law is not needed because the unlawfulness of the
   [challenged] conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent
   does not address similar circumstances.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted). For purposes of review, we may limit
   our analysis to the “clearly established” prong if that resolves the qualified
   immunity issue. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37.
          According to the district court, a reasonable jury could conclude that
   Blache’s outreach to North Atlantic’s clients amounted to a final revocation
   of North Atlantic’s contracts that violated the company’s procedural due
   process rights. Regarding the “clearly established” prong, the district court
   held that this was “an obvious case” in which it was unnecessary for North
   Atlantic to identify analogous case law.
          I disagree. The “obvious” cannot be discerned from a “high level of
   generality.” See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v.
   al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)); see also Roe v. Johnson Cnty., No. 21-10890,
   2023 WL 117826, at *2 n.1 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2023) (per curiam) (quotation
   omitted) (noting the “sky high” burden required to show an obvious case).
   That is, North Atlantic fails to substantiate the notion that Blache’s outreach

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   to North Atlantic’s customers regarding the revocation of the company’s
   license prior to the Board hearing is such an obvious constitutional violation
   that North Atlantic did not need to submit analogous precedent to the court.
   For comparison, here “[w]e have nothing approaching the clarity we have
   perceived in other obvious cases,” such as cases in which “it was obviously
   unconstitutional for an officer to shoot—without warning, despite an
   opportunity to warn—a suspect who was pointing a gun to his own head and
   did not know the officer was there.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 337. By contrast, an
   officer shooting a suspected felon off the bridge on a highway was considered
   not to be an “obvious” violation. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11–15. Indeed, North
   Atlantic did not itself even invoke the “obvious case” exception before the
   district court as an explanation for why it would not need to submit analogous
   precedent regarding Blache’s outreach to its clients. I conclude this case
   clearly does not fall within the rare “obvious case” exception.
          To otherwise satisfy its burden, North Atlantic must identify a case,
   or a collection of cases, holding that a government official acting in similar
   circumstances to Blache violated the Constitution. Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330.
   “In other words, [North Atlantic] must point this court to a legislative
   directive or case precedent that is sufficiently clear such that every
   reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
   law.” Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2020). While North
   Atlantic points to “general propositions” relevant to the issue at hand—such
   as property interests in professional licenses and Blache’s authority as
   executive secretary of the Board—these propositions are insufficient to show
   that “every reasonable official would have understood that what [Blache]
   [wa]s doing violate[d] th[e] law.” Id. (emphasis added); see al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
   at 742 (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established
   law at a high level of generality.”). This conclusion is reinforced by the fact
   that the district court did determine that Blache was entitled to qualified

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   immunity on North Atlantic’s cease-and-desist revocation order, as well as
   North Atlantic’s excessive fines claim. As such, I conclude that North
   Atlantic cannot satisfy its burden of proof on the clearly established issue.
   See Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329–30; see also Roe, 2023 WL 117826, at *2
   (determining appellant’s “general propositions” were “insufficient to meet
   the required burden”).
          Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s denial of summary
   judgment based on qualified immunity as to North Atlantic’s federal client-
   contact claim. Since the majority opinion does not reach the merits of that
   decision, I respectfully dissent on that issue.

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