Court Opinion

ID: 9817289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 04:12:30.568078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:15.950737
License: Public Domain

ON SECOND PETITION FOR REHEARING.
On the 13th day of July, 1915, on application for a rehearing, the former opinion was reversed, and this case remanded for error in the admission of certain evidence. Counsel for defendant in error, by second petition for rehearing, challenge the correctness of this holding, and also complain for the' reason that they were not given notice under rule 9 of a rehearing of said cause.
. There was in fact no rehearing granted in this case, but same was reversed on petition for rehearing by the plaintiffs in error, to which no response was filed. Rule 9 does not bear the construction for which counsel contend. The latter part of said rule is as follows:
*156“No oral argument will, be allowed on an application for rehearing except upon order of the court, but if such application is granted the case shall be assigned for rehearing and the clerk shall notify both parties or their counsel of the date when such rehearing will be had, and such time may be given for argument or brief as the court shall allow.”
'This rule does not prohibit the court considering and reversing its opinion on an application for rehearing. Should a rehearing be granted, in that event the case should be assigned and notice given in accordance with said rule.
The next reason urged why the opinion reversing the cause should not stand is that the deed of plaintiffs in error was champertous and void, and that judgment should have be,en instructed for defendant in error, which proposition it is claimed was not considered by the court but was entirely overlooked.
The reply of defendant in error to the answer of plaintiffs in error, in which it was sought to plead this question, does not contain any allegation that defendant in error or his grantors were in adverse possession of the land at the time of the deed taken by plaintiffs in error, which it is claimed is void. Neither is there any evidence in the case showing that the defendant in error was in adverse possession at said time. On the contrary, the evidence is that at the time plaintiff in error Harris took the deed in question he examined the land, found no one in possession, and he testified that same was vacant.
In order to avail himself of this statute, it would be necessary to plead and prove adverse possession in che party, or his grantors, who asserts the invalidity of the deed. Powers v. Van Dyke, 27 Okla. 27, 111 Pac. 939, *15736 L. R. A. (N. S.) 96; Miller v. Fryer, 35 Okla. 145, 128 Pac. 713; Ruby v. Nunn, 37 Okla. 389, 132 Pac. 128; Bilby v. Gilliland, 41 Okla. 686, 137 Pac. 687, 139 Pac. 988; Gillum v. Anglin, 44 Okla. 684, 145 Pac. 1145; Huston v. Scott, 20 Okla. 142, 94 Pac. 512, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 721.
Counsel further insist that no exceptions were taken to the admission in evidence of the journal entry of January 12, 1906, and also the journal entry of June 11, 1907. The record shows the following proceedings were had in the absence of the jury:
“By the Court: Judgment entry dated January 12, 1906, signed on that date by Joseph A. Gill, Judge of the United States Court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, and heretofore offered in evidence and heretofore read into the record, will permit this judgment entry to be offered in evidence, and will overrule the objections heretofore made, and will allow the defendants an exception, and this paper may be read to the jury and the defendants and each of them m)ay have an exception the court holding that it is competent as tending to show the age of the allottee, Allie Nash, from the standpoint of the plaintiff at the time they were dealing with him in this case, and at the time they took the deeds upon which they rely upon in this case, all of which being prior to July 27, 1908.”
And when the judgment entry of June 11, 1907, was offered, substantially the same proceedings were had and occurred at that time, the court stating that the defendants and each of them would be allowed an exception. Thereupon the jury were returned into open court and the trial proceeded, and the journal entries referred to were read in evidence before the jury.
The position of counsel is that because, at the time the court ruled that said journal entries were admissible *158in evidence and stated that an exception would be allowed, plaintiffs in error did‘not formally reserve an exception, therefore no exception was in fact taken; and, further, that exceptions should have been taken in opefi court in the presence of the jury at the time the instruments were actually offered and admitted in evidence.
We cannot agree with .this contention. The case relied upon in support of this view (Bank of Cherokee v. Sneary, 46 Okla. 186, 148 Pac. 157) does not sustain the position of counsel. It was there held that where the record fails to show any objection or exception to the instruction, by counsel, but did contain the statement that to the giving of these instructions and to each and every part thereof both plaintiff and defendant were allowed objections and exceptions, an objection to a particular paragraph of the charge would not be considered, for the reason that, treating the remark of the court as an exception by counsel, they are too general to bring in review a specific paragraph of the instructions. In the present case objection was miade to the introduction, of these judgments, which objections were overruled by the court, and at the time he overruled said objections the court announced that exceptions would be allowed to such ruling. This we think was sufficient to preserve the objection and present any question for review that might properly arise upon the ruling of the court thereon.
The remaining question is the admissibility of said judgments in evidence. In the former opinion it was held that these judgments were not admissible in this case, and upon a re-examination of this question we still entertain the same view. While counsel has devoted much time and space in his brief, and petition for rehearing, in *159discussing this question, we are not cited to any authority directly in point upon the proposition presented. The precise question here is whether, in a guardianship proceeding under an application for approval of final report and discharge of the guardian, the court makes a finding that the minor was of age upon a certain date, and approves the report, and discharges the guardian, such finding by the court- is conclusive as to that fact in this proceeding, being a controversy between conflicting -claimants to the allotment of said minor, as a Cherokee freedman. We have been unable'to find a parallel case, but think the proposition is analogous to that presented when an administrator is appointed for the estate of a third person, and it is held by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 314, and by the courts of a number of states, that the fact of such appointment having been made is not even evidence of the death of such person in another proceeding. In the course of the opinion the court says:
“The books abound in cases which show that a judgment upon the precise point in controversy cannot be given in evidence in another suit against one not a party or privy to the record. This rule is applied not only to civil cases, but to criminal cases, and to public judicial proceedings, which are of the nature of judgments in rem.”
A number of cases are reviewed by the court, and it is further said:
“A certificate of naturalization issues from a court of record when there has been the proper proof made of a residence of five years, and that the applicant is of the age .of 21 years, and is of good moral character. This certificate is, against all the world, a judgment of citizen*160ship, from which may follow the right to vote and hold property. It is conclusive as such; but it cannot, in a distinct proceeding, be introduced as evidence of the residence or age at any particular time or place, or of the good character of the applicant. Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 176 [3 L. Ed. 190]; Stark v. Insurance Co., 7 Cranch, 420 [3 L. Ed. 391].”
This case was followed by the same court in Humes v. Scruggs et al., 94 U. S. 22, 24 L. Ed. 51. See, also, 2 Van Fleet’s Former Adjudication, sec. 518.
In-a note to the case of Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, supra, are cited the cases in support of the proposition stated therein.
If, then, the granting of letters testamentary and of administration upon the estate of a third person is not evidence in any other proceeding between different parties as to the death of such third person, or the issuance of letters of naturalization is not evidence of the age of the person therein named, even when it is necessary for the court to determine jthe age of such person before issuing the same, we can see no good reason why a different rule should apply in the present case. When the court approved the final report of the guardian and discharged him, these facts were conclusive upon the world, that is, that his final report had been approved and that he had been discharged as guardian. The mere fact that in making this order it became necessary for the court to consider other collateral matters does not make these other matters conclusive in this action, or even admissible in evidence as tending to prove such facts. If the rule were as contended, it would be possible to obtain valid title to the lands of Indian minors prior to their reaching majority by procuring a judgment from the county court de-*161daring the minor to be of age. This cannot be done, for the county court cannot in a guardianship proceeding decree that a minor has attained his majority when in fact he is still an infant, so as to confer upon him the rights to sell his allotted lands prior to having reached the age required by the acts of Congress to authorize such conveyance.
• The second petition for rehearing is therefore overruled.
All the Justices concur.