Court Opinion

ID: 9915599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 21:01:08.016054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:57.728584
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4613

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        DAVID TRAVIS NANCE,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (7:20-cr-00056-BO-1)

        Submitted: October 12, 2023                                       Decided: January 4, 2024

        Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief
        Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
        Assistant United States Attorney, John L. Gibbons, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               This case returns to us after our remand to the district court for the resentencing of

        David Travis Nance. Because the district court again failed to meaningfully address

        Nance’s argument for a lower sentence, and because the error is not harmless, we vacate

        the amended judgment and remand for resentencing before a different district judge.

                                                     I.

               Nance pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        § 922(g)(1). The district court calculated an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 37

        to 46 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Nance to 46 months in prison. Nance appealed

        and asserted that the district court had not meaningfully addressed his primary argument

        for a below-Guidelines sentence. Specifically, Nance faulted the district court for not

        addressing his argument based on his family responsibilities: he is the sole caretaker of his

        six-year-old son and also looks after his elderly mother who is disabled. The Government

        agreed with Nance and filed an unopposed motion to remand stating that a “resentencing

        [was] necessary to allow the [district] court to meaningfully address [Nance’s] mitigating

        arguments.” Mot. to Remand at 1, United States v. Nance, No. 22-4139 (4th Cir. Aug. 5,

        2022), ECF No. 22. We granted the Government’s motion and remanded for resentencing.

               On remand, the district court conducted a resentencing hearing and imposed the

        same top-of-the-Guidelines 46-month sentence of imprisonment. In explaining its chosen

        sentence, the court recited the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, described Nance’s criminal

        history, and observed that Nance’s offense was serious. The court added that it had

        “considered” Nance’s arguments for a lower sentence but did not mention any of those

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        arguments, including his argument based on his family responsibilities. J.A. 88. 1 The

        court also imposed a three-year period of supervised release that includes a special

        condition requiring Nance to support his dependents.

               Nance now appeals from the amended judgment entered on remand. Nance asserts

        that the district court again failed to address his argument for a lower sentence based on his

        family responsibilities and that his sentence is thus procedurally unreasonable. The

        Government contends, however, that the record establishes that the district court

        considered and rejected Nance’s family responsibilities argument. And in any event, the

        Government asserts that any procedural error was harmless.

                                                        II.

               We review the procedural reasonableness of Nance’s sentence “under a deferential

        abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743, 748 (4th Cir. 2021)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “a district

        court must conduct an individualized assessment of the facts and arguments presented and

        impose an appropriate sentence, and it must explain the sentence chosen.” United States v.

        Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Our precedents on procedural reasonableness require a district court to “address or

        consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain

        why [it] has rejected those arguments.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir.

        2019). A district court satisfies this requirement “if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines

               1
                   Citations to “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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        the defendant’s particular history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact,

        but as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in response to defense counsel’s

        arguments for a [lower sentence].” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 782 (4th Cir.

        2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). At bottom, the district court’s “explanation need

        not be exhaustive or robotically tick through the § 3553(a) factors,” but it “must be

        sufficient to satisfy [us] that the district court has considered the parties’ arguments and

        has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” United

        States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

                                                     III.

                                                      A.

               Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Nance’s sentence is procedurally

        unreasonable because the district court did not address a non-frivolous argument Nance

        made for imposing a different sentence and explain why it had rejected that argument. See

        Ross, 912 F.3d at 744. Indeed, the district court failed to address Nance’s primary

        argument for a sentence below the Guidelines range: he is the sole caretaker of his young

        son and also looks after his elderly mother who is disabled. Nance’s case is thus much like

        United States v. Lewis, in which we vacated the sentence imposed based on the district

        court’s failure to address the defendant’s mitigation argument related to “his role as a

        working father.” 958 F.3d 240, 245 (4th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we are satisfied that

        Nance’s sentence must be vacated and that he must again be resentenced.

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                                                     B.

               The Government’s appellate contentions do not convince us otherwise. While the

        Government highlights the district court’s statement that it had “considered” Nance’s

        arguments for a lower sentence, we have repeatedly held that a district court should explain

        why it has rejected the defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a different sentence. 2 J.A.

        88; e.g., Ross, 912 F.3d at 744; United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 521 (4th Cir. 2017);

        United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Carter, 564

        F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the district court’s nonspecific statement—

        without more—is not enough to pass our procedural reasonableness review.

               The Government insists, however, that there is more here: the context of the

        resentencing hearing and the district court’s interaction with Nance and his counsel

        throughout the hearing. Starting with context, the Government asserts that “it would be

        anomalous for this [c]ourt to conclude the district court once more failed to consider

        [Nance’s] only argument, when doing so was the sole underlying reason for remand.” Br.

        of Appellee 16. We disagree. In fact, the more anomalous result would be for this court

        to sanction the district court’s failure to meaningfully address Nance’s argument for a lower

        sentence despite our remand order instructing it to do so.

               2
                  The Government relies heavily on our decision in United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d
        199 (4th Cir. 2018). But Gibbs addressed a revocation sentence, which we review much
        more deferentially than an original sentence. Id. at 203. It also bears mentioning that the
        district court in Gibbs at least responded to some of the defendant’s arguments for a lower
        sentence, which is not the case here. Id. at 204-05.

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               Turning to the Government’s reliance on the district court’s interaction with Nance

        and his counsel during the resentencing hearing, we are unpersuaded. After hearing

        Nance’s allocution during which he emphasized his “family[] obligations” and his need to

        “get home” to his young son and elderly mother, the district court simply responded,

        “Okay.” J.A. 76. And after listening to defense counsel’s extensive argument for a lower

        sentence, which tracked Nance’s allocution, the district court asked only, “Is that it?” J.A.

        79. Those responses do not reflect that the district court meaningfully considered Nance’s

        argument for a lower sentence. Cf. Blue, 877 F.3d at 521 (“Reviewing courts may . . . infer

        that a sentencing court gave specific attention to a defendant’s argument for a downward

        departure if the sentencing court engages counsel in a discussion about that argument.”).

               As for the Government’s reliance on the district court’s imposition of the supervised

        release condition requiring Nance to support his dependents, that routine condition cannot

        bear the weight that the Government places on it. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

        § 5D1.3(d)(1)(A), p.s. (2018) (recommending imposition of the support condition

        whenever a defendant has a dependent). To be sure, the district court’s imposition of the

        support condition establishes that the court was aware that Nance has a dependent. But the

        condition does not address the crux of Nance’s argument—that he was already the sole

        supporter of his young son and a within-Guidelines sentence would therefore have a severe

        negative impact on the child. Nor does the requirement that Nance support his dependents

        touch upon Nance’s care for his mother. At bottom, the Government’s arguments do not

        convince us that Nance’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.

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               We also reject the Government’s harmless error contention. To show harmless

        error, the Government must prove that the district court’s error “did not have a substantial

        and injurious effect or influence on the result” of the proceedings. Slappy, 872 F.3d at 210

        (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the Government has not met its

        burden here because “it is plausible [that] the [district] court may have imposed a lower

        sentence” had it meaningfully addressed Nance’s family responsibilities argument. United

        States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir. 2020); see Lewis, 958 F.3d at 245 (“Given

        the district court’s . . . imposition of a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range, a more

        robust consideration of [the defendant’s] arguments and an adequate response to those

        arguments may have resulted in a lesser sentence.”).

                                                     IV.

               For those reasons, we vacate the amended judgment and remand for resentencing

        before a different district judge. See United States v. McCall, 934 F.3d 380, 384-85 (4th

        Cir. 2019) (discussing factors that we consider before reassigning case). We dispense with

        oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                     VACATED AND REMANDED

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