Court Opinion

ID: 9860327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:18:12.585995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:07.823865
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COUSINS, dissenting: On July 15, 1996, SRI, the lessee, filed its amended complaint for forcible entry and détainer against the defendant-appellant, Dennis W. Riggs, the sublessee. The only basis for the eviction was defendant’s failure to pay the rent required by the sublease. In the amended complaint, SRI did not assert breach of the franchise agreement as a ground for the eviction. Defendant did not deny liability or contend the dispute was arbitrable; instead, on July 24, 1996, he moved to dismiss the case on the ground that neither Subway Central, Inc., nor SRI was registered to do business in Illinois. I agree with the part of the majority decision holding that the trial court’s refusal to dismiss on this ground was proper. However, I dissent from the part of the majority decision that reverses the trial court and remands this case for the trial court to enter a stay of the forcible detainer proceeding. In the instant case, after the forcible detainer proceeding had been filed by the lessee, the owners of the subject premises were allowed to intervene in the pending action and file a third-party complaint for possession and rent against SRI because of SRI’s ultimate responsibility for rent due under the master lease. On or about October 31, 1996, defendant vacated the subject premises. At that time, $17,266.79 in rent and related charges was due and owing the landlord. On November 4, 1996, SRI paid the outstanding amounts in full by tendering the landlord a check for $17,266.79. On November 4, 1996, the landlord dismissed its third-party complaint against SRI. On December 5, 1996, SRI moved for summary judgment against defendant on its claim for unpaid rent and related charges. On January 2, 1997, defendant responded by moving in the alternative to stay or dismiss the case. Defendant’s counsel did not dispute that his client owed the claimed amounts but argued, for the first time, that the Connecticut district court’s August 21, 1996, injunction somehow “estopped” or otherwise precluded the trial court from rendering judgment for SRI for defendant’s undisputed breech of the sublease. Defendant also sought to relitigate the fraudulent inducement claim that Judge Dorsey and the second circuit had already rejected, by pleading: “The Sublease, Assignment of Sublease to Dennis Riggs, and Franchise Agreement are products of fraud in the inducement and, accordingly, are unenforceable as a matter of law.” On February 13, 1997, the circuit court denied the motion to stay or dismiss and granted SRI’s motion for summary judgment in the amount of $17,266.79. The court entered and continued the judgment until April 14, 1997. On March 18, 1997, defendant returned to the Connecticut district court in order to obtain a modification of the injunction that had been previously entered in that court by Judge Dorsey. On April 2, 1997, Judge Dorsey entered an order denying defendant’s motion to modify the injunction. The order sets forth that defendant was never barred from asserting legal and factual defenses to the sublease defaults as long as he did not raise issues that the district court had already decided or that were arbitrable under the franchise agreement. On April 14, 1997, without presenting any legal or factual defenses to the rent claim, defendant moved that the circuit court set aside the order granting summary judgment and stay prosecution of the amended complaint. The circuit court denied the motion and entered final judgment in favor of SRI. This appeal followed. On review, the majority has decided to reverse and remand this case and has ordered the circuit court to enter a stay of the forcible entry and detainer proceedings. The majority cites no authority in support of its decision. In my view, the majority errs. The majority writes that “there is no need to restrict defendant to only the limited defenses deemed germane to the ordinary forcible entry and detainer action.” 297 Ill. App. 3d at 288. However, notwithstanding the majority view that this case is not an ordinary forcible entry and detainer case, this case was commenced as a forcible detainer action and remains so. This case must be governed by the evidentiary rules applicable to forcible detainer cases. Proceedings in the instant case have already been unusually unrestricted. A forcible entry and detainer action is a summary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to possession, unimpeded by questions of title and other collateral matters not directly connected with the question of possession. Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 255, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970). The distinctive, limited purpose of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9 — 101 et seq. (West 1996)) is to supply a speedy remedy to permit persons entitled to possession of lands to be restored thereto. Wall v. Goodenough, 16 Ill. 415 (1855); Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 251, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970). Finally, the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion to stay is comparable to a denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the review of the circuit court’s decision is limited to whether there was an abuse of discretion in denying the stay. Chicago Park District v. City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 3d 215, 221, 468 N.E.2d 1261 (1984), aff’d, 111 Ill. 2d 7, 488 N.E.2d 968 (1986). The circuit court committed no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the circuit should be affirmed.