Court Opinion

ID: 9783535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:48:25.737887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:25.234189
License: Public Domain

JACK CARTER, Justice,
dissenting.
The jury was not allowed to hear that Johnny Ward shot at a group including Greg Thomas, a few days before this incident. Thomas had identified Ward as the shooter and had given such a statement to the police. Both the original aggravated assault and the murder occurred a few days apart near the same place. So at the time Thomas was killed, he was the eyewitness for an aggravated assault for which Ward was arrested. If Thomas were not available, Ward would be the beneficiary. According to Taylor, within ten minutes Ward was seen a few blocks from the scene of the murder. The jury heard none of this, but only heard that Ward was brought in and questioned for this murder, but was released.
It is unclear when the “Able Term” entry was made (which inaccurately stated that Ward was charged with this murder). But, if this evidence had been admitted, a strong argument could have been presented that at the time the notation was entered, a representative of the District Attorney’s Office (the admitted source of the entry) believed that Ward was not prosecuted for the aggravated assault because he had been charged with the murder of “the only witness in this case” (Thomas).
Caldwell should have been allowed to present this evidence showing the connection of Ward to Thomas and the fact that a representative of the District Attorney’s Office had at one time believed that the only reason Ward was not charged for the first assault was that he had been charged with the murder of Thomas.
These facts are completely different from cases such as Dickson, where the excluded evidence was a comparison of photographs and judgments of prior offenses. In Wiley, the defense admitted the person proposed as the alternate perpetrator was too simple to plan and execute an elaborate arson even though he had recently been in and around the property.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that alternative perpetrator evidence is inadmissible unless a nexus is shown between the crime charged and the alleged alternative perpetrator. A nexus is a connection. The evidence here reveals a sufficient nexus to allow this evidence to be presented.
Since the evidence was relevant, it should be admitted unless the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Tex.R.Evid. 408. The trial court found that to allow this evidence would require a mini-trial of the aggravated assault charge and cause confusion. I see no *53reason for a mini-trial on the assault charge; the identifying witness was dead. The pertinent issue is not whether Ward was in fact guilty of the previous assault charge, but that Thomas had identified him as the assailant, that Ward was in the area where it occurred, and at one time, a representative of the District Attorney’s Office thought the charge for assault had not been pursued against Ward because he (Ward) murdered the eyewitness (Thomas). I do not find this evidence to be unfairly prejudicial. The majority opinion supports its conclusion by observing that the trial court cited Taylor’s contrary testimony that Ward was not the murderer for its decision to exclude Caldwell’s proffer. The fact that contrary evidence is presented cannot be a determining factor in the decision to exclude evidence; it was the function of the jury to consider this evidence together with the State’s evidence of guilt, resolve any conflicts, and then make its determination.
Finally, the court should examine if the error was harmful. First, it must be determined if this error was one of a constitutional violation. Exclusion of evidence may be a constitutional violation if (1) a state evidentiary rule categorically and arbitrarily prohibits the defendant from offering relevant evidence that is vital to the defense; or (2) when a trial court erroneously excludes relevant evidence that is a vital portion of the case and the exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense. Ray v. State, 178 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (citing Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 659-62 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.2002)). Here, only the second category is involved.
Was Caldwell precluded from presenting a defense on a vital portion of the case? Evidence was introduced by the State that Ward, along with another, was brought in after the murder for questioning. This was portrayed as being “common” to bring in “everybody they can.” Gunshot residue was taken from Ward, at which time Ward inquired as to how long residue would remain on the hands. Ward was “fully cooperative.” On cross-examination, it was established that Ward was found at a convenience store somewhere close to the scene of the murder. Caldwell testified, but had no evidence concerning Ward’s possible involvement in the murder.
This evidence does not present Caldwell’s evidence of Ward’s possible involvement in the murder. It was portrayed as routine police investigation that in effect cleared any consideration of Ward as the perpetrator. The evidence that would have been vital to this defense was the fact that Thomas had identified Ward as the assailant in the previous aggravated assault and that at one time, a representative from the District Attorney’s Office thought Ward had been charged with the murder of Thomas. The erroneous exclusion of evidence prevented Caldwell from presenting his only real defense — that Ward, who was near the scene of the murder, had a strong motive in the demise of Thomas. Consequently, this is error of a constitutional nature, and we must reverse unless it is determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a).
Without the jury hearing any inculpato-ry evidence concerning Ward, it was permitted to hear that the investigating officers had cleared him of any wrongdoing. To determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the exclusion of this evidence would not contribute to the conviction, we must be assured the jury would not believe this proffered evidence linked Ward to the murder. While no one can ever know what a jury would have done if provided *54with other evidence, the trial court’s ruling prevented the jury from even considering this relevant evidence. I do not think it is reasonable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the conviction. The judgment should be reversed for a new trial.
I respectfully dissent.