Court Opinion

ID: 9596846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:53:27.410385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:54.432466
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
concurring in the result only.
Because the majority’s opinion is based on controlling precedent, I concur with the majority’s determination that the City of Winston-Salem and Officer Kearns, in her official capacity, are entitled to partial summary judgment based on governmental immunity for any damages up to and including $250,000.00.1 concur in this result only because of constraints of the doctrine of sovereign immunity adopted by our Supreme Court and resulting interpretations. I write separately to emphasize the unfairness of this outcome and to reiterate a view voiced many years ago by then Judge (later Chief Judge) Naomi *309Morris that although extensive reasons exist for the abolition of sovereign immunity in tort, “until the Supreme Court or the General Assembly finds these reasons to be persuasive” we are bound by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Vaughn v. County of Durham, 34 N.C. App. 416, 421, 240 S.E.2d 456 (1977); Steelman v. New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971); See also, Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 322, 222 S.E.2d 412, 424-425 (1976).
Summary judgment requires that we view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 563, 343 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1968). From the plaintiff’s perspective, the record establishes that Ms. Jones attended the fair with her two daughters, ages six and eight. They stood in line for one of the rides at the fair, called the “Himalaya” when Officer Kearns entered the area on horseback. In an apparent attempt to disperse people that had assembled in the “Midway” area of the fairgrounds a few feet away from Ms. Jones and her children, Officer Kearns rode her horse directly into the gathering using profanity and shouting to the crowd of people to “move out of the way.” The horse became very excited; then lunged sideways and backward into the line of people at the “Himalaya” and stepped on Ms. Jones’ foot. The horse remained on her foot for several seconds until another fair patron moved the horse.
The record further indicates that this was not the first time Officer Kearns had been involved in an incident while riding her police horse. Plaintiff’s evidence showed that prior to Ms. Jones’ injury, Officer Kearns had engaged in a race with a middle-school child, while playing “Cops and Robbers.” While chasing the child, the child fell in the path of the horse and the horse kicked the child. The child later received treatment at a local hospital and Officer Kearns’ supervisor told her not to race children on the school grounds anymore.
If the issue before us today was whether the facts in the instant case are sufficient to withstand a claim of negligence, there is little doubt that we would find for Ms. Jones and award a trial on the merits. However, because the offending party is a governmental entity and its employee, she gets virtually nothing because our State continues to employ a doctrine of questionable validity — sovereign immunity.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, or governmental immunity, shields a municipality and its officers or employees sued in their offi*310cial capacity from suit for torts committed while the officers or employees are performing a governmental function. Taylor v. Ashburn, 112 N.C. App. 604, 607, 436 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1993), cert. denied, 336 N.C. 77, 445 S.E.2d 46 (1994). Sovereign immunity is absolute unless the municipality consents to be sued or waives its immunity through the purchase of liability insurance. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-485(a) (1994); See EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain, 108 N.C. App. 24, 27, 422 S.E.2d 338, 340 (1992).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first adopted by our Supreme Court in 1889 in Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 9 S.E. 695 (1889). Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971). Earlier North Carolina cases had expressly rejected the doctrine. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 289 N.C. at 312, 222 S.E.2d at 418 (citing cases that had rejected the doctrine of sovereign immunity prior to Moffitt). The origins of this ‘judge-made’ doctrine derived from feudal England where “ ‘the king could do no wrong.’ ” Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. at 592, 184 S.E.2d at 241. Following this rationale, the monarchy was sovereign and could not be liable for damage to its subjects. Id. at 592, 184 S.E.2d at 241. Accordingly, when a city or town acts in its governmental capacity, the municipality incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers.
It is well established that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been under vigorous attack for many years. See, e.g., Comment, Waiving Local Governmental Immunity in North Carolina: Risk Management Programs Are Insurance, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 709 (1992); Norman W. Shearin, Jr., Municipal Immunity From Tort Liability: Judicial Abrogation, 5 Wake Forest Intra. L. Rev. 383 (1969); Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 Duke L.J. 888 (1964); James M. Talley, Jr., Judicial Abrogation of the Doctrine of Municipal Immunity to Tort Liability, 41 N.C.L. Rev. 290 (1963). As early as 1957, in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, the Supreme Court of Florida retreated from its previously announced position on sovereign immunity. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1193; See Steelman v. New Bern, 279 N.C. at 593, 184 S.E.2d at 242. In abolishing this doctrine, the Court in Hargrove recognized that sovereign immunity “had been erroneously transposed into our democratic system and that the time had arrived to declare this doctrine anachronistic not only to our system of justice, but to our traditional concepts of democratic government.” 96 So.2d at 132; Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d at 1195. That Court then held that an individual who suffers a direct per*311sonal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment is entitled to redress for the wrong done. Id. at 593, 184 S.E.2d at 242.
When Steelman was decided, fifteen jurisdictions, in addition to Florida, had already overruled or greatly modified the doctrine of sovereign immunity in tort actions. 279 N.C. at 593, 184 S.E.2d at 242.1
In Steelman v. New Bern, our Supreme Court suggested: “It may well be that the logic of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unsound and that the reasons which led to its adoption are not as forceful today as they were when it was adopted.” 279 N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243. The Court, however, declined to abolish a municipality’s sovereign immunity from tort liability for the negligence of its agents acting in the scope of their employment. It reasoned that, although the doctrine was ‘judge-made,’ the General Assembly had recognized it as the public policy of the State by enacting legislation which permitted municipalities to purchase liability insurance and thereby waive their immunity to the extent of the amount of insurance obtained. Id. at 594, 184 S.E.2d at 242-243. The Court further recognized that .“despite our sympathy for the plaintiff in this case, we feel that any further modification or the repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly, not this Court.” Id. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243. Subsequent case law regarding the abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity restated the same view expressed in Steelman that any changes in the doctrine should come from the General Assembly, not the Court. See, e.g., Orange Co. v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 192 S.E.2d 308 (1972).
Then, in 1976, in Smith v. State, 289 N.C. at 313, 222 S.E.2d at 419, our Supreme Court chose not to defer to the Legislature, but instead, under its own authority abolished sovereign immunity in contract actions. The Court held that “whenever the State of North Carolina, through its authorized officers and agencies, enters into a valid contract, the State implicitly consents to be sued for damages on the contract in the event it breaches the contract.” 289 N.C. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423-424. In so doing the Court recognized the prevailing consideration that “[a] citizen’s petition to the legislature for relief from the state’s breach of contract is an unsatisfactory and frequently a totally inadequate remedy for an injured party, . . . [and that] courts are a *312proper forum in which claims against the state may be presented and decided upon known principles.” Id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d 423.
Interestingly, in dissent to the majority’s view in Smith, Justice I. Beverly Lake, Sr., although vigorously arguing that the Court had exceeded its authority in abolishing sovereign immunity in contract actions, astutely pointed out that since the Court had done so, it was error to limit the abrogation to contract actions only:
Another relatively minor error in the decision is the limitation of the demise of sovereign immunity to actions on contracts. If the courts of North Carolina have jurisdiction to hear and determine Dr. Smith’s suit for alleged wrongful discharge from employment, why not Joe Jones’ suit for trespass, negligent injury to person or property, or malicious prosecution?
Smith, 289 N.C. at 339, 222 S.E.2d at 412 (Lake, J., dissenting).
The answer to Justice Lake’s question is the same now as it was then — our Supreme Court should likewise consider the abolition of sovereign immunity in tort actions. Individuals subjected to injury or death proximately caused by the negligent acts of agents or employees of a municipality who have acted within the scope of their authority are entitled to redress for the wrong done. Reflecting this sentiment, the General Assembly enacted G.S. § 160A-485(a) which provides that a municipality is empowered, but not required, to waive governmental immunity by securing liability insurance. Such immunity is waived only to the extent of insurance so secured. Some municipalities have voluntarily relinquished the shield of sovereign immunity by obtaining liability insurance.2 Given the fact that municipalities are not required to take such action, what would motivate a municipality to purchase -insurance and waive its inherent authority to refuse to pay claims for damages? When a city obtains liability insurance, this action reflects a moral response by the city to provide its citizens relief for injuries sustained at the hands of its city’s negligent agents or employees. Although it is admirable for some cities to waive sovereign immunity when not required to do so, such responsibility should be a requirement for all. The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields this responsibility.
The unjust and unfair result rendered in the instant case by the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity compels a reexam*313ination of this common law doctrine. Ms. Jones received a 35% permanent partial disability rating for her right foot and a 10% permanent partial disability rating for her right leg as a direct result of the incident at the fair. Additionally, she incurred medical bills in excess of $37,000.00. Yet, Ms. Jones may be left without any remedy if her damages do not exceed $250,000.00. This result can no longer be justified in our modern democratic society. Indeed, over forty years ago, our Supreme Court acknowledged that “ ‘the current trend of legislative policy and of judicial thought is toward the abandonment of the monarchistic doctrine of governmental immunity.’ ” Lyon & Sons, Inc. v. Board of Education, 238 N.C. 24, 27, 76 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1953). The eighteenth century logic that “ ‘the king could do no wrong,’ ” Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. at 592, 184 S.E.2d at 241, has outlived its time.

. At the time of Smith v. State, 289 N.C. at 313, 222 S.E.2d at 419, an opinion that I later point out, abolished sovereign immunity with regard to contract actions, twenty-four states had judicially abrogated or otherwise modified the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it relates to tort actions against the state.

. As noted previously, the City of Winston-Salem has waived its sovereign immunity for damages exceeding $250,000.00.