Court Opinion

ID: 9729613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:44:24.854917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.993166
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.,
dissenting. I dissent from today’s holding because I bélieve the plain meaning of 13 V.S.A. § 7031(b) requires the trial *65court to credit defendant for days spent in detention in connection with the second offense.
I do not agree with the majority’s assertion that its holding is consistent with our prior cases. We have applied the plain meaning of § 7031(b) to all of our presentence credit determinations for nearly two decades. See, e.g., In re Lampman, 135 Vt. 226, 228, 373 A.2d 547, 548 (1977) (credit allowed for time in question, even though part of previous sentence was also “spent in custody in connection with the [subsequent] escape charge”). We relied on the plain meaning of § 7031(b) notwithstanding much of the federal case law now cited by the majority. But today the majority has taken it upon itself to effectively redraft the statute in an effort to reach what it believes is a more reasonable result.
To justify abandoning our precedent, the majority imagines a “logical extreme” in which a defendant receives quadruple credit for sentences to be consecutively served. Ironically, this Court has already entertained such a hypothetical in State v. Percy, 158 Vt. 410, 421, 612 A.2d 1119, 1127 (1992). In Percy, we eschewed an over-literal interpretation and instead applied the plain meaning and achieved a principled result consistent with the statute’s legislative purpose. Specifically, we rejected Percy’s argument that he receive credit for forty years rather than ten years, because the purpose of § 7031(b) was to provide equal sentencing treatment for persons who could not raise bail.1 Id. at 422, 612 A.2d at 1127. We concluded that where sentences are imposed consecutively, credit shall be applied toward one but not all subsequent sentences. Id. at 421-22, 612 A.2d at 1127. Significantly, Percy received a single credit toward one of the four subsequent charges for time he also served against his first conviction.
The majority’s reliance on Zera’s dictum as additional justification to stray from the plain meaning is equally unpersuasive. Zera’s discussion of stricter release conditions supported the Court’s application of the plain meaning by pointing out that the more restrictive conditions demonstrated that Zera was serving time in connection with the escape charge. In re Zera, 137 Vt. 421, 424-25, 406 A.2d 396, 398 (1979).
*66I also disagree with the majority’s alternative construction because it does nothing to further the legislative purpose of § 7031(b). See Marden v. Walton, 142 Vt. 204, 207, 455 A.2d 321, 322 (1982) (this Court should construe statute to effectuate legislative intent). The purpose of § 7031(b) is to ensure that offenders unable to make bail serve a sentence no longer than more affluent defendants who are free on bail before a conviction. In re Perry, 137 Vt. 168, 170, 400 A.2d 1013, 1015 (1979). As we explained, the proper limiting factor of § 7031(b) is whether the time served is “in connection with” the offense for which credit is sought. Marden, 142 Vt. at 207, 455 A.2d at 322.
Under the revised construction, if the conduct that leads to revocation of parole also leads to a conviction on new charges, defendant is allowed credit only toward the paroled sentence. The controlling inquiry is now whether parole is ultimately revoked, not whether defendant is detained because he could not afford bail. “Tf [the legislature] had wished to exclude from the operation of the statutes those who would not be released from custody even if they posted bail that exception could easily have been spelled out.’” In re Lampman, 135 Vt. at 229, 373 A.2d at 548 (quoting Mancinone v. Warden, 294 A.2d 564, 568 (Conn. 1972)).
The statute plainly requires the court to give presentence credit for “any days spent in custody in connection with the offense for which sentence was imposed.” 13 V.S.A. § 7031(b). The statute does not proscribe credit for time served concurrently with another sentence or pending parole revocation hearings. See People v. Simpson, 174 Cal. Rptr. 790, 793 (Ct. App. 1981) (plain meaning of presentence credit statute provides no exceptions and permits credit for presentence detention notwithstanding parole board’s simultaneous credits). We should not read such exceptions into the statute.2 See Marden, 142 Vt. at 207, 455 A.2d at 322 (Court may not by judicial interpretation expand the language or plain meaning of statute). Our obligation is to enforce the statute according to its terms. Revising the purpose and effect of § 7031(b) is the Legislature’s responsibility. The majority’s suggestion that without revising our interpretation of § 7031(b) the parties would be enticed into manipulating the timing of judicial proceedings is pure conjecture. In addition, I do not see how *67the application of the plain meaning restricts the trial court’s control over sentencing. Establishing sentencing guidelines is the Legislature’s province; implementing them is the judiciary’s domain.
Because defendant’s pretrial detention was imposed in connection with the new charges, the trial court decision denying defendant credit for time spent in jail in connection with the assault charge should be reversed.

 Percy was convicted of sexual assault and received an eighteen-to-twenty-year sentence in his first trial. At a second trial for crimes committed while he was awaiting his first trial, Percy was convicted and given four additional sentences totalling forty-two to sixty years. These subsequent sentences were to be served consecutively to the first sentence. We affirmed the trial court award of ten-years’ credit towards Percy’s subsequent sentences for time spent in custody prior to the second trial.

 Notably, had the parole board authorized defendant’s release pending revocation hearings, 28 VS.A. § 551(e), his pretrial detention would have required credit towards the subsequent offense.