Court Opinion

ID: 9391718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 00:01:07.103965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.038765
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10025         Document: 00516735624             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/02/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-10025
                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                      May 2, 2023
   Juanita Burch,                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Freedom Mortgage Corporation,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:20-CV-3086
                      ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Plaintiff-Appellant Juanita Burch, proceeding pro se,1 challenges the
   district court’s rulings denying her motion to remand and motion to compel,
   and granting Defendant-Appellee Freedom Mortgage Corporation’s motion
   seeking dismissal of her claims with prejudice. As noted in other opinions
   from this court, the history of this and the numerous related cases involving
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
          1
           The Latin term “pro se” means “for oneself, on one’s own behalf.” Thus, a party
   proceeds pro se when he or she is not represented by an attorney.
Case: 22-10025      Document: 00516735624          Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                    No. 22-10025

   bankruptcy proceedings and properties owned by Burch and/or her husband,
   William Burch, is both extensive and convoluted. Indeed, the Bankruptcy
   Court for the Northern District of Texas has designated both Burch and her
   husband as “vexatious litigants” and prohibited them from filing various
   documents related to the properties involved in the 2008 bankruptcy case or
   the 2012 bankruptcy case without securing prior authorization from that
   court. See Order Designating William Burch as a Vexatious Litigant, In re
   Burch, No. 12-46959-mxm7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 10, 2020), ECF No. 824;
   Order Designating Juanita Burch as a Vexatious Litigant, In re Burch, No. 12-
   46959-mxm7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2021), ECF No. 966. And this court
   has imposed sanctions against Burch’s husband on a number of occasions.
   See William Burch v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (Matter of Burch), No. 20-
   11171, 2022 WL 212836, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022) (unpub.) ($250);
   William Burch v. America’s Servicing Co. (Matter of Burch), No. 20-11074,
   2021 WL 5286563, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 12, 2021) (unpub.) ($100); William
   Burch v. America’s Servicing Co. (Matter of Burch), No. 20-11132, 2022 WL
   1402044, at *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2022) ($500); William Burch v. Aurzada
   (Matter of Burch), No. 20-10709, 2022 WL 1421166, at *1 (5th Cir. May 5,
   2022)($500).
          We have carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record in
   this and related cases, and applicable law. Burch’s arguments, even
   construed liberally given her pro se status, identify no reversible error in the
   district court’s rulings.
          As the district court concluded, the requirement that the amount in
   controversy exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, for diversity of
   citizenship subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is

                                              2
Case: 22-10025          Document: 00516735624             Page: 3   Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                           No. 22-10025

   satisfied. 2 Notably, contrary to Burch’s assertions, her claims are not
   premised on or directed to an amount less than $75,000. Rather, Burch
   sought (1) injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure sale of the property
   located at 1713 Enchanted Lane, Lancaster, Texas; (2) removal of Freedom
   Mortgage’s lien and all charges against the property, 3 (3) an order directing
   Freedom Mortgage to endorse an insurance check in the amount of
   $3,682.77, 4 and (4) an award of various compensatory and punitive
   damages. 5 Because Burch’s request for injunctive relief seeks to preclude a
   foreclosure sale of the Enchanted Lane property, the amount in controversy
   is measured by the value of the object of the litigation, i.e., the value of the
   Enchanted Lane property. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
   Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977) (“In actions seeking declaratory or
   injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is
   measured by the value of the object of the litigation.”); Farkas v. GMAC
   Mortg., L.L.C., 737 F.3d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (where the
   object of requested injunctive and declaratory relief was to stop the
   foreclosure sale of property, the property’s value represented the
   jurisdictional amount in controversy). Thus, the district court did not err in
   relying on the Dallas County Appraisal District’s $148,930 valuation of the
   property. 6
          Additionally, relative to Burch’s request for removal of Freedom
   Mortgage’s lien and all charges against the property, the notice of default and
          _____________________
          2
              See Record on Appeal (“R.”) at 904–907, 1705.
          3
              R. at 41–42.
          4
              R. at 42, 73, and 116.
          5
           R. at 41–42. Burch’s requested compensatory damages include sums necessary to
   complete necessary repairs to the property and lost income. R. at 33–34, 37 and 42.
          6
              R. at 905–06, 1705; R. at 16, 153–59.

                                                      3
Case: 22-10025          Document: 00516735624              Page: 4       Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                           No. 22-10025

   foreclosure documents referenced in Burch’s October 9, 2020 state-court
   filings report a total past due amount that, as of August 3, 2020, was
   $93,540.86. 7 And, by certified mail dated September 9, 2020, Freedom
   Mortgage informed Burch that the maturity date of the note “is accelerated,
   and all unpaid principal, interest, fees, charges, and other recoverable
   amounts are now due.” 8
           Burch’s challenges to the district court’s determinations that her
   claims are barred by collateral estoppel principles and Texas’ four-year

           _____________________
           7
               R. at 115–21, 377–78, and 1831–32.
           8
               R. 118–19. Although Burch argues certain amounts should be subtracted (from
   the $93,540.86 total) as the “interest and costs” excluded by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, that
   argument fails given that Burch, as the plaintiff in this matter, not Freedom Mortgage, is
   the party seeking judicial relief relative to these amounts. In any event, certain sums
   otherwise properly denominated as “interest” nevertheless fall outside of § 1332’s
   “interest” exclusion. See Cleartrac, L.L.C. v. Lanrick Contractors, L.L.C., 53 F.4th 361,
   366 (5th Cir. 2022) (purpose of § 1332(a)’s exclusion of interest is to prevent the plaintiff
   from delaying suit until the substantive claim, with accrued interest, exceeds the
   jurisdictional amount); id. at 365–68 (interest that is part of the principal claim is included
   in the jurisdictional amount but interest that arises solely by virtue of a delay in payment is
   not); see also Brown v. Webster, 156 U.S. 328, 329–30 (1895) (interest that is a basis for the
   suit itself is considered for jurisdictional purposes); Danial v. Daniels, 162 F. App’x 288,
   290–91 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpub.) (interest on a note accruing prior to maturity
   is part of amount in controversy; interest accruing after maturity is not) (citing Greene Cnty.
   v. Kortrecht, 81 F. 241 (5th Cir. 1897)); Christiana Tr. v. Henderson, 181 F. Supp. 3d 375,
   378 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (interest accruing on a note prior to maturity (due date of final
   payment) is contractual interest, not an accessory, and is included in amount in
   controversy); 14AA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
   Practice and Procedure, § 3712 (4th ed.) (Westlaw, database updated Aug. 19,
   2022). Expenses are exempted from § 1332(a)’s exclusion of “costs” when, pursuant to
   applicable substantive law, they are an element of the plaintiff’s damage claim; the same is
   true of attorney’s fees awarded as a matter of contractual or statutory right. Wright &
   Miller, supra, § 3712. The November 17, 2005 note for the loan secured by the 1713
   Enchanted Lane property entitles the note holder (to the extent not prohibited by law) to
   payment of all of its costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred in
   the enforcement of the note. R. at 45.

                                                      4
Case: 22-10025          Document: 00516735624                  Page: 5    Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                             No. 22-10025

   limitations       provision     likewise     fail. 9       Although   the   prior   judicial
   determinations of the validity of Freedom Mortgage’s note and lien occurred
   in the course of litigation involving Burch’s husband, nothing in the instant
   record suggests that the district court erred in finding privity between the
   spouses for collateral estoppel purposes. The same is true for collateral
   estoppel’s other requirements. Finally, as the district court concluded,
   Burch has been aware of the basis of her challenge to the validity of Freedom
   Mortgage’s note and lien since 2011. 10 And any arguments that the relevant
   limitations period was tolled during the time that her husband was litigating
   the validity of Freedom Mortgage’s lien demonstrate why collateral estoppel
   principles apply here.
          Burch’s briefs also mention her request that Freedom Mortgage be
   directed to endorse an insurance check in the amount of $3,682.77. The
   district court denied the motion that she filed regarding this check because
   Burch had not obtained the approval of the bankruptcy court to file the
   motion, as required by the bankruptcy court’s February 2, 2021 “vexatious
   litigant” order. 11 Despite mentioning the check, Burch’s briefs do not
   adequately explain why the district court’s ruling was legally incorrect.
   Accordingly, any assertion of error relative to the insurance check in the
   amount of $3,682.77 has been forfeited.
          Given the absence of reversible error, we AFFIRM the district
   court’s December 6, 2021 final judgment dismissing Burch’s claims with
   prejudice and expunging the lis pendens that Burch had recorded relative to
   the Enchanted Lane property.

          _____________________
          9
               R. 907–14, 1705; R. 325–37.
          10
               R. 70–71, 77–81.
          11
               R.1797-99, 2012.

                                                          5
Case: 22-10025      Document: 00516735624            Page: 6    Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                      No. 22-10025

          As a final matter, our review of the court’s docket reveals that,
   following the completion of briefing in this appeal, another panel of this court
   affirmed a district court judgment dismissing, on grounds of preclusion, all
   of Burch’s claims against Rushmore Loan Management Services, L.L.C. See
   Juanita Burch v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C. (Matter of Burch), No.
   22-10349, 2022 WL 14365474, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022). 12 In light of the
   instant ruling and the October 25, 2022 ruling, Plaintiff-Appellant Juanita
   Burch is warned that frivolous or abusive filings in this court, the district
   court, or the bankruptcy court will result in the imposition of sanctions.
          AFFIRMED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.

          _____________________
          12
              Lamentably, neither party supplemented their prior submissions with this
   decision. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(j).

                                               6