Court Opinion

ID: 9855626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:28:21.422992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:16.517555
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 38. (dissenting). Rules of statutory interpretation are designed to help courts discern the intent of the legislature, not to serve as blinders. In this case, the majority opinion uses the plain language rule to shield its eyes from the legislative intent to exclude motor vehicle offenses from consideration both as a predicate offense and a present offense under the habitual offender statute.
¶ 39. The majority opinion maintains that the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000) unambiguously excludes motor vehicle offenses from consideration as predicate offenses and just as clearly includes motor vehicle offenses when determining whether a present offense makes the perpetrator a habitual criminal. Specifically, the majority asserts that under § 939.62, the word "crime" means all felonies and misdemeanors, but that the terms "felony" and "misdemeanor" mean only those crimes that are not motor vehicle offenses. Thus, the "any crime" language of § 939.62(1) discussing present offenses that trigger the habitual offender statute "unambiguously" includes motor vehicle offenses.
¶ 40. A rule of interpretation cannot, by itself, be dispositive in interpreting a statute because almost *95every rule can be countered by an opposing rule.1 Here, the majority opinion employs the plain language rule without acknowledging a counterpart. Statutes plain on their face are not to be read so as to lead to an absurd result. "A court will always reject an unreasonable construction of a statute where a reasonable construction appears, and this is so notwithstanding that the statute is to be strictly construed."2
¶ 41. According to the majority, a person convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant or other drug on five occasions who then commits a drug offense cannot be sentenced as a repeater because the predicate offenses were all for motor vehicle violations.
¶ 42. In contrast, however, a person engaged in the same criminal offenses but in a slightly different order will be punished with a significantly higher sentence. If the drug conviction occurred first, followed by five OWI convictions, the defendant could be sentenced as a repeater. Similarly, if two OWI convictions were followed by the felony drug conviction and then three more OWI convictions, the defendant would again be considered a repeater.
¶ 43. The more reasonable construction is to read Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000) as excluding motor vehicle offenses from the entirety of the statute. In this way, all persons convicted of the same types of crimes *96receive the same enhanced punishment; the timing of the convictions is irrelevant.3
¶ 44. Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999-2000). The history of § 939.62 demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to distinguish between present offenses and predicate offenses when excluding motor vehicle offenses under the habitual criminality statute. Section 939.62 began as Wis. Stat. § 359.12 (1949), and the plain language of § 359.12 clearly excludes motor vehicle offenses from the operation of the entire statute.4
*97¶ 45. Under the 1949 version, subsection (l)(a) defines a repeater as someone convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment (except escapes under section 346.40 or 346.45(2))" who has either been convicted of a "felony" or three "misdemeanors" within the previous five years. Subsection (l)(b) then defines "felony" and "misdemeanor." The statute explains, "as to crimes committed in Wisconsin, 'felony' and 'misdemeanor' have the same meaning given in [the Wisconsin statutes]." For crimes committed outside of Wisconsin, a felony is a crime punishable by one year of imprisonment or more, and a misdemeanor is any other crime.
¶ 46. Subsection (l)(b) then concludes by stating broadly that "motor vehicle offenses under ch. 85, fish and game law offenses in violation of ch. 23 or 29 or offenses against equivalent laws of other states are not to be considered crimes for purposes of this section."5 Thus, reading (l)(b) back into (l)(a), the statute defines a repeater as a person convicted of a crime that, is not a motor vehicle offense or fish and game law offense or escape.
*98¶ 47. William Platz, the author of Wisconsin's criminal code, supports this reading.6 He commented at the time that one of the features of the habitual offender law as it read in 1949 was to exclude "motor vehicle and fish-and-game laws" from "the operation of this statute."7
¶ 48. The parties agree that Wis. Stat. § 359.12 (1949) underwent only minor changes with the enactment of the 1955 Code. Most relevant to the case at hand, the legislative committee notes to Assembly Bill 100, enacting the criminal code, explain that "the only change" between the former subsection (1) and its counterparts in the current subsections (2) and, (3) is that "under the new section fish and game law violations are considered crimes in calculating whether a person is a repeater."8 The implication is that the status of motor vehicle offenses was to remain the same as it was in the 1949 version — excluded from the operation of the statute.
*99¶ 49. I conclude from the clear legislative history that the legislature did not intend to apply the penalty enhancement provisions of Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1) (1999-2000) to further increase an already enhanced penalty for a motor vehicle offense under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(c) (1999-2000).
¶ 50. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
¶ 51. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About Houi Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).

 Falkner v. N. States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 124, 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977).

 The majority opinion misses this point entirely. The majority argues only that it is neither absurd nor unreasonable for the legislature to create a statutory scheme permitting the double enhancement of a sentence so long as each enhancer is based on a separate and distinct prior conviction. Nowhere does it address the true absurdity resulting from its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.62: double enhancement is permitted when a person commits a drug offense and then an OWI but not when a person commits the same OWI and then the same drug offense.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 359.12 (1949) reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Sentence of repeater: (1) Definitions. As used in this section, unless context or subject matter otherwise requires:
(a) "Repeater" means a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment, (except escapes under section 346.40 or 346.45(2)), who, within 5 years prior to commission thereof, had been convicted of a felony or on 3 separate occasions during such 5-year period had been convicted of misdemeanors by any criminal court or courts of this state or of the United States or of any other state or territory of the United States, which conviction or convictions remain of record and unreversed, whether pardoned therefore or not (except on grounds of innocence) and whether or not sentence on such conviction was stayed, suspended or withheld. No time *97during which such person was in actual confinement serving a criminal sentence shall be included in such 5-year period.
(b) As to crimes committed in Wisconsin, "felony" and "misdemeanor" have the meaning given in section 353.31; otherwise "felony" is any crime under the laws of the United States or any other state or territory which carries a possible penalty of imprisonment for one year or more in a state prison or penitentiary or a federal penitentiary; and "misdemeanor" is any crime under the laws of the United States or any other state or territory which does not carry a possible penalty sufficient to constitute it a felony, and includes crimes punishable only by a fine. Motor vehicle offenses under chapter 85, fish and game law offenses in violation of chapter 23 or 29 or offenses against equivalent laws of other states are not to be considered crimes for purposes of this section.

 Wis. Stat. § 359.12(l)(b) (1949) (emphasis added).

 William Platz was a Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General and the principal draftsman of the revised criminal code. This court has consistently turned to his articles and comments on revisions to the criminal code as authoritative and persuasive evidence of the legislature's intent in drafting the criminal code. See, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 168 Wis. 2d 802, 484 N.W.2d 549 (1992); State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986); State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 330 N.W.2d 564 (1983); State ex rel. Gebarski v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 80 Wis. 2d 489, 259 N.W.2d 531 (1977); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964).

 See William A. Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wisconsin Code of Criminal Procedure, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 236, 241.

 Wis. Legis. Council, V Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, at 51 (1953).