Court Opinion

ID: 9446630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:00:00.647923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:43.367347
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Respectfully, but as earnestly as lies within me, I dissent. My brothers say that the child was struck “in the vicinity of a path * * * ”; that “this diagram, or plat, showed the spot where the child was hit as being some distance from the point at which the path, if projected, would cross the track. It was at least 12 to 15 feet down track from such point”; that “there is no evidence that the child entered the railroad right-of-way at the path rather than at some other point where the yard abutted the track.” In those statements, with their supporting footnote and niceties of measurement, my brothers take a position in favor of the appellant which it did not itself take in the testimony of its witnesses upon the trial, and for which it did not there contend and does not contend on this appeal. As I read the record, there has never been any disputed issue that, if there was a path, the child was in it. With deference, I do not think that the diagram or the photographs sent up as original exhibits support the con-*706Btruction which my brothers place on them, but assuming that they do, such a construction should not influence the disposition of this appeal. That is because of the well-established principle expressly recognized by the appellant in its brief (p. 5) that “ * * * we concede that the evidence must be considered in its most favorable aspect to the plaintiff, with every fair and reasonable inference which the evidence justifies.” The only witness who was in position to judge the child’s exact location with respect to the path was the child’s father, who, in a desperate effort to rescue his son, had reached a point “eight or ten feet of him before the train struck him.” He testified:
“Q. How far was the child off of that path when it was hit, that is if the path had been projected right on over the railroad? A. Well, I would say he was right in it.” (Record p. 51.)
The jury was the fact-finding body, and it had a right to believe this testimony, and especially so, since neither of the other eye witnesses testified to the contrary.a
The existence of the path was denied by the Railroad, but the evidence is all one way. Indeed, the Railroad’s attorney himself stated, “I admit that there’s something there which you can call a path if you want to call it one.” (Record p. 59.)
There was no conflict in the testimony as to the habitual use of the path by members of the public. Ten witnesses so testified. I refer briefly to the testimony of five of them. Mr. Futch testified that his family and people living in the houses back of him had used the path across the track from as far back as 1942. Mrs. O. C. Dorsey testified that she had known of this crossing for the time she had been in Junction City, about twenty years. Mr. Matthew Webster testified that he and his family had used it since 1925. Mr. Robert L. Hollis, thirty-six years old, had lived in Junction City all of his life and testified that the crossing had been there ever since he could remember. Mr. M. J. Hester, the Mayor of Junction City, had lived there all of his life, forty-two years, and testified that he had crossed the railroad tracks at that point “thousands of times,” and that members of his family crossed there.
Of course, there was no direct evidence of knowledge of the private crossing by members of the railroad crew in charge of the operation of the train. Rarely, if ever, can such direct evidence be available, unless the plaintiff is so fortunate as to obtain admissions from the Railroad’s employees. Unexpectedly, in this case, there were admissions, carefully guarded it is true, on the part of the locomotive engineer of knowledge of “a little streak down there,” and on the part of the brakeman of knowledge of “a trail or something there.”1
It is a strange rule which permits the Railroad to let the members of its crew in charge of the operation of a train remain ignorant of a condition involving *707danger to members of the public, necessarily known to other employees and to the Railroad itself. Knowledge should be imputed to members of the crew. Of course, knowledge on the part of the train crew could be proved by circumstances. As said in 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, Sec. 272, p. 260: “In many instances facts can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence is usually the only means of proving intent, knowledge, * *
The Supreme Court of Georgia, speaking in Shaw v. Georgia R. R., 1906, 127 Ga. 8, 55 S.E. 960, 961, 962, said:
“In view of the evidence in this case upon the question of frequent use of the railroad track, at the particular place of the homicide, by pedestrians as a pathway, known to the defendant company, we think, as a question of fact, it should have been submitted to the jury to say whether or not the use was shown to exist to such an extent as to require those operating the cars of the defendant to anticipate the presence of persons on the track. If the evidence was such as to require them to anticipate the presence of pedestrians on the track, then they were bound to use ordinary care to avoid injury to any one who might be on the track at that place. To do this would depend upon the particular conditions surrounding each case, but, among others, the condition of the machinery, the condition of the track, the capacity for stopping within a given distance, and the capacity for discovering any one on the track within that distance, are matters which should be taken into consideration and observed by the engineer in approaching a part of the track where, from the publicity and frequency of its use by pedestrians, he has reason to apprehend the presence of one * * *. ‘Where the circumstances are such that the employés of the company in charge of one of its trains are bound, on a given occasion, to anticipate that persons may be upon the track at a certain place, they are under a duty to take such precautions to prevent injury to such persons as would meet the requirements of ordinary care and diligence.’ ”
In Macon & B. Ry. Co. v. Parker, 1907, 127 Ga. 471, 56 S.E. 616, 617, the Georgia Supreme Court reiterated:
“* * * In Shaw’s Case, supra [55 S.E. 960], it was expressly ruled that the question as to whether there was such use by pedestrians, and whether the use was of such character as to put the defendant and those operating its trains upon notice and require them to anticipate the probable presence of pedestrians at that particular place, were questions of fact for determination by the jury. * * * ”
In an earlier private path case, Bullard v. Southern Ry. Co., 1902, 116 Ga. 644, 43 S.E. 39, 41, it had been said:
“* * * jj. wag £or jury, and not for the court, to say what was the measure of its duty under all the circumstances of the case. * * -x-»
Under the evidence in this case, even if the Georgia decisions did not so clearly make the Railroad’s duty and its breach questions for the jury, I would still say that they were such under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under the federal decisions. Of course, the Seventh Amendment applies to diversity cases, the same as to others tried in federal courts. Wright v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 5 Cir., 1952, 198 F.2d 303, 305; Reuter v. Eastern Air Lines, 5 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 443, 445. The Supreme Court recently spoke in a diversity case as follows:
“ * * * The federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial *708functions between judge and jury and, under the influence — if not the command — of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752 [62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed. 1166].”
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 1958, 356 U.S. 525, 537, 78 S.Ct. 893, 901, 2 L. Ed.2d 953. Two per curiam reversals of our Fifth Circuit within the past few years have, in effect, admonished us that verdicts in diversity eases are protected by the Seventh Amendment.2 Nevertheless, with deference, I submit that the present decision makes it obvious that we have not yet learned that lesson.
The evidence was amply sufficient from which the jury could have found negligence, even gross negligence, on the part of the Railroad crew. The child was easily observable, dressed as he was in a diaper and a bright red and white shirt. When the father first saw him after the train blew, the child was standing up in the middle of the track facing away from the house.
“A. Yes, sir, and then he turned to come back.
"Q. Was he standing up? A. Yes, sir, and he walked back to the rail and he put his little hand on the rail and stepped over on the head of the tie.”
The train was a local freight which originated at Fitzgerald and was destined for Manchester, Georgia. It was not running on any strict time schedule, but could pass through Junction City at any time from 11:30 in the morning to 9:00 at night (Record pp. 38, 51). It consisted of two diesel unit locomotives, twenty-four freight cars, and a caboose. Six of the cars were empty, three were loaded with scrap iron, one was loaded with feed, and fourteen had been picked up at Brown Sands, two miles south of Junction City, loaded with sand. The extra diesel locomotive had been picked up at Oglethorpe for the purpose of handling the heavy load of sand. The approximate total tonnage, according to the conductor, was 1495 tons.
The train approached Junction City traveling in a northwesterly direction on a five degree curve to the left. This curve continues until it reaches a point 361 feet south of the station. The grade for about a mile approaching Junction City is a one per cent downgrade, and the last 1424 feet from the scene of the accident is a seventy-seven one-hundredths per cent downgrade. The locomotive had crossed the public road only 322 feet before it struck the child.
The engineer was seated on the right hand side and the fireman on the left hand side of the lead diesel locomotive, both seats being about 10 or 12 feet back from the front of the locomotive. The accident occurred at about 6:18 P.M. on May 14, 1957. The sun was shining brightly directly into the cab but at a changing angle as the locomotive rounded the curve. According both to the fireman and to the engineer the sun interfered with their vision to some extent.
No necessity was shown for a local freight train so heavily loaded, traveling downgrade, around a curve, into the bright afternoon sun, within two miles after taking on the heaviest part of its load, to gather a speed of forty-five miles per hour when passing through a community where pedestrians might be expected, so that it could not be brought to an emergency stop within a distance of more than a third of a mile.
Evidently implying that the excessive speed was not the proximate cause of the child’s death, my brothers say: “Even if the train had been traveling only fifteen miles per hour, the evidence showed that *709it could not have been stopped before reaching the child.” They overlook at this point three other simultaneous movements: (1) the child, young as it was, was moving toward a place of safety; (2) the fireman was trying to get out to the front of the engine to shove the child off of the track; (3) the father was racing toward his child and was within “eight or ten feet of him before the train struck him.” If the train had been traveling fifteen miles per hour, one or more of those three movements would probably have saved the child’s life. Certainly, it was open to the jury so to find.
I agree with the district court that it was for the jury to say whether the employees in charge of the operation of the train should have anticipated the probable presence of a person or persons on the track at the point where the path crossed and whether they were negligent, under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, in running the train through Junction City at a speed of forty-five miles per hour.
I think that the judgment should be affirmed.

 In the face of such uncontradicted testimony, I feel sure that the plaintiff’s attorneys did not intend to stipulate their client out of court.

. Engineer Phiel testified:
“Q. You knew of the path to the section foreman’s house, didn’t you? A. Well, I didn’t know whether it was a path or not. I had noticed a little streak down there, but I hadn’t noticed that it was a path. I hadn’t never seen anyone going back and forth on it.”
Brakeman Melvin testified:
“Q. Mr. Melvin, did you know of the existence of this path down from the seetion bouse which led on over towards the station? A. No, sir.
“Q. Had you ever noticed it? A. I have never noticed there being a public path there.
“Q. Well, whether you call it public or not, have you ever noticed it? A. Well, I noticed looked like a trail or something there, but whether it was a path I don’t know.
“Q. In the time that you had been over there you had seen people about that area, hadn’t you? A. The times I’ve been by there, the times I’ve stopped there I’ve never saw anybody cross that place.”

. Swafford v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 1955, 350 U.S. 807, 76 S.Ct. 80, 100 L.Ed. 725, reversing 5 Cir., 220 E.2d 901, a railroad grade crossing case, and Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1956, 352 U.S. 874, 77 S.Ct. 16, 1 L.Ed.2d 77, reversing 5 Cir., 232 F.2d 13; see Protection of Jury Trial — Diversity Cases, by Dean Leon Green, 35 Texas Law Review 768.