Court Opinion

ID: 9767467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:20:17.147773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.307054
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority, in my view, has failed in its attempt to distinguish Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (plurality op. on reh’g) (Garrett III). Simply stated, the majority misreads Garrett in its strained attempt to distinguish it in order to reach the result the majority desires.
In partial justification of its refusal to follow Garrett, the majority states that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not compare the evidence to the entire jury charge in *15Garrett, but only to the application paragraph. Yet, that court stated, referring to Garrett III (Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)):
At first blush, this case seems to require that a measurement of the sufficiency of the evidence be limited to a sole consideration of the application paragraph of the jury charge. This would be misapplication of the rule enunciated in Boozer v. State ..Ortega v. State ...; and Benson v. State.... Boozer, Ortega, and Benson hold that sufficiency of the evidence be measured against the jury charge, which we interpret to mean the entire charge.
Garrett III, 749 S.W.2d at 802-03 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, in Garrett II, the court stated:
We are not persuaded that because the court’s charge abstractly defined transferred intent in a paragraph (designated “3-A”) appearing immediately after the paragraph applying the law of murder to the facts of the case (designated “3”) the jury was therefore authorized to convict appellant on that theory. In no way can the application paragraph (which begins, incidentally: “Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions ... ”) be construed to refer to the abstract definition, so even “reading the charge as a whole,” ... would not inform the jury that it could convict appellant on that theory. Mere juxtaposition does not amount to authorization.
Garrett II, 749 S.W.2d at 789 n. 6 (citations omitted). In view of these clear statements by the Court of Criminal Appeals, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the court did not compare the evidence to the entire charge in Garrett. It therefore follows that its alleged failure to do so cannot justify the majority’s refusal to apply Garrett to the instant case.
The majority also indicates that Garrett is not applicable even if the Garrett court did look to the entire jury charge in reaching its decision. The majority concludes that Garrett does not apply here because the majority states that there is no vehicle for applying the law of transferred intent to the facts, whereas the law of parties does provide such a vehicle. This conclusion is patently baseless because the law does indeed provide a vehicle for applying the law of transferred intent to the facts of a case. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(2) (Vernon 1974); Searcy & Patterson, Practice Commentary, TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04 (Vernon 1974). Again, the majority has failed in its attempt at distinguishing Garrett.
The majority also suggests that Judge Campbell, in Garrett III, expressed concern about Garrett’s effect on later cases. The majority states that Judge Campbell cautioned that Garrett is the product of unusual circumstances and indicated that it should be limited in its scope. The majority then concludes that the holding in Garrett appears to be limited to cases involving transferred intent where the issue concerns sufficiency of the evidence.
This conclusion serves only as the means to the majority’s end and is without support when the statements are considered in context. Quoted in full, Judge Campbell said:
A different concern raised by Garrett II, although it is not mentioned in the State’s motion for rehearing, is its possible effect on subsequent cases. A close inspection of Garrett II reveals that it is the product of an unusual set of circumstances, illustrating the tension between pre- and post-Almanza analysis, which have created a result that appears to be something it is not. At first blush, this case seems to require that a measurement of the sufficiency of the evidence be limited to a sole consideration of the application paragraph of the jury charge. This would be misapplication of the rule enunciated in Boozer ...; Ortega ...; and Benson.... Boozer, Ortega, and Benson hold that sufficiency of the evidence be measured against the jury charge, which we interpret to mean the entire charge.
Garrett III, 749 S.W.2d at 802-03 (citations and footnotes omitted).
First, it should be noted that Judge Campbell’s remarks were directed at Gar*16rett II, not Garrett III. Secondly, his statements do not clearly indicate that Garrett III should be limited in its scope. Thirdly, by adhering to the rule that evidence sufficiency is measured against the entire jury charge, and thereby eliminating any potential misreading of Garrett III, Judge Campbell has eliminated the problem that he identifies as Garrett II’s possible effect on subsequent cases.
In other words, Judge Campbell identified a potential problem with Garrett II that resulted from the fact that it was “the product of an unusual set of circumstances.” He then resolved the problem, thus eliminating any need to artificially limit the scope of Garrett III. Therefore, the majority’s other justification for not following Garrett III is inadequate.
In his first point of error, the appellant has asserted that the evidence, when viewed in light of the charge that was given to the jury, was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery. As the majority acknowledges, the jury charge erroneously failed to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case. Although the charge contained an abstract instruction on the law of parties, it is clear that the application portion of the jury charge authorized conviction only upon a finding that appellant “knowingly or intentionally threatened] or placefd] SANDRA TUBBS in fear of imminent bodily injury or death” or that he “use[d] or exhibit[ed] a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.” Six paragraphs and two pages later, the jury charge contained the abstract instruction on the law of parties.
Since a verdict of “guilty” necessarily means that the jury found evidence of that on which it was authorized to convict, sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the charge that was given to the jury. Boozer, 717 S.W.2d at 608, 610 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). In Garrett II and III, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument that an abstract charge on the law of transferred intent was sufficient to place that theory before the jury, even though the abstract instruction immediately followed the application portion of the charge. 749 S.W.2d at 788, 802. In Garrett II, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that the evidence, viewed in light of the jury charge, was insufficient to support the verdict that Garrett “knowingly” caused the victim’s death. 749 S.W.2d at 788-89, 790. In Garrett III, the court denied the State’s motion for rehearing even though it stated that sufficiency of the evidence must be measured against the entire jury charge. 749 S.W.2d at 803, 804.
In my view, Garrett III controls this case. There is no meaningful or principled distinction between that case and the instant case. Both the law of parties and the law of transferred intent serve to expand criminal liability. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.04, 7.01, 7.02 (Vernon 1974). In both Garrett and this case, the jury charges failed to apply the respective theories of expanded criminal liability to the facts. In Garrett III, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that such failure meant that the theory of transferred intent was not adequately before the jury. 749 S.W.2d at 802. I see no good reason, and in my opinion the majority has not supplied one, for reaching a different result in this case regarding the law of parties.
Based on the foregoing analysis of Garrett, I would hold that the jury charge in the present case did not adequately submit the theory of appellant’s liability as a party to the offense of aggravated robbery. Therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured in light of the only theory available, namely appellant’s liability as a primary actor. If the evidence does not conform to the charge as given, it is insufficient as a matter of law to support the only verdict of “guilty” which was authorized. Boozer, 717 S.W.2d at 610-11.
In examining the evidence, it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Dickey v. State, 693 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). In this case, the essential elements of the crime, in light of the charge that was given to the jury, included “knowingly or intentionally threat*17en[ing] or placing] SANDRA TUBBS in fear of imminent bodily injury or death” or “us[ing] or exhibiting] a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.” Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence simply does not show that appellant did that. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s conviction of aggravated robbery as a primary actor. Under the trial court’s charge, the only verdict authorized in view of the evidence was “not guilty.” See Boozer, 717 S.W.2d at 611.
I would sustain appellant’s first point of error, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and render a judgment of acquittal. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10-11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2146-2147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). However undesirable the result, this Court must follow the law. One may argue that Garrett is bad law, but it is nevertheless the law, and it is binding on this Court. Some commentators have suggested ways to avoid the arguably undesirable result of acquittal in cases like this one. See, e.g., Seymore & Thielman, Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Interaction of the Proof and the Jury Charge, 16 AM.J. CRIM.L. _ (1989). However, I view Garrett III as dispositive of this case until it is either changed or adequately distinguished.1

. In two prior unpublished opinions, this Court rendered judgments of acquittal in substantially similar cases. Both cases involved jury charges that contained only abstract instructions on the law of parties. The evidence in both cases did not support findings that the defendants were guilty as primary actors. Both convictions were reversed based on the authority of Garrett II. See Staten v. State, No. 05-86-00903-CR (Tex. App. — Dallas Aug. 17,1987, pet. refd); Reeves v. State, No. 05-86-00770-CR (Tex.App. — Dallas June 8, 1987, pet. ref'd). I do not cite these cases as authority. See TEX.R.APP.P. 90(i). I do, however, note that by refusing the petitions for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals has declined on two occasions to tell this Court that Garrett II vies wrongly applied in the two cases to which reference is made.