Court Opinion

ID: 9864885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:15:44.232417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:26.059996
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stone
dissenting.
The principal question involved in this case concerns notice. Was it necessary and, if so, was is properly served?
The tenant originally held under written lease for one year, from March 1, 1942, to March 1, 1943, and continued in possession without any additional lease for several years thereafter. That by such holding over with the landlord’s consent the tenancy became one from year to year is too well established to be questioned in this jurisdiction. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Shakespeare, 115 Colo. 520, 175 P. (2d) 389, 171 A. L. R. 1058; Ochsner v. Langendorf, 115 Colo. 453, 175 P. (2d) 392; Hallett, Trustee v. Barnett, 51 Colo. 434, 118 Pac. 972; Hurd v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77.
Section 7, chapter 70, ’35 C.S.A., provides: “Notice to Quit. — In all cases of tenancy, from year to year, the same may be terminated by notice, in writing, to quit, duly served three months prior to the end of the year; * * I am not unaware of the statement in Hancock *440v. Central Shoe & Clothing Co., 53 Colo. 190, 125 Pac. 123, that notice to quit is not necessary to a tenant holding over. However, this statement is in conflict with the plain terms of the statute and is contrary to the great weight of authority. Anno. 156 A. L. R. 131. I am also aware of, but not impressed by, the distinction sought to be made between tenancy from year to year by lease, and such tenancy resulting from holding over, found in some opinions. Anno. 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 848; 32 Am. Jur. 797, §947. Our statute makes no such distinction, and I am unable to distinguish, as a matter of fair dealing, between the right to notice of termination by a tenant who has been permitted to remain in possession from year to year on the expiration of a term lease, and such right by a tenant whose original lease was from year to year. If we are to hold that no notice is necessary, notwithstanding the statute, we should so hold explicitly.
If notice is necessary, the remaining question is the sufficiency of the service of notice by registered mail. Section 7 of our statute, above cited, requires not merely that notice in writing be given, but that it be “duly served.” Further, the statute specifically sets out the different methods by which such notice, may be served. ’35 C.S.A., c. 70, §8. Therefore, it would seem to be mandatory that there should be a compliance with one of those methods in order to make effective service. Among those methods, service by mail is not included. If we are to hold that the landlord may select the post office department as his delivering agent for service of notice to quit, as in Craig v. Heil, 47 A. (2d) 871, we should so hold explicitly. If we are to hold that it is immaterial how service is made, so long as the tenant admits having actual notice, we should so hold explicitly. Instead of so doing, the court in the majority opinion lays down the rule that an admission of improper service is a waiver of proper service. This is indeed a novel *441legal doctrine. It not only belies the very nature of waiver, but would nullify any statute requiring any specific method of service, in that an admission that service had been made in some other way than provided by statute would thereby be made sufficient.
For the above reasons I dissent.