Court Opinion

ID: 9709909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:57:09.16532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:52.531206
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: After reviewing the majority opinion in the above-captioned case, I must respectfully dissent. The record reveals that at the November 1988 meeting, the defendants acted as though they were abiding by section 4.4 of the employee handbook. The defendants did not operate as though the employee handbook was rendered a virtually meaningless document by the much emphasized disclaimers. Rather, the defendants’ contemporaneous construction of the employee handbook found the plaintiff to be entitled to a hearing. Indeed, the defendants must have believed they were bound by the requirements of the employee handbook or else they wouldn’t have subscribed to what they thought were the appropriate procedures. The majority opinion, however, unlike the defendants, considers the employee handbook a meaningless document. The majority opinion significantly limits the holding in Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314. It is true that the language in the employee handbook at issue in Duldulao contained specific language such as “always” and “never.” However, the language of the employee handbook in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille (Minn. 1983), 333 N.W.2d 622, which our supreme court relied on in Duldulao, did not contain specific language and yet was found to constitute a valid offer to the employee. Whether any particular personnel manual modifies any particular employment-at-will relationship and becomes part of the particular employment contract is a question of fact. Evidence relevant to this factual decision includes the language used in the personnel manual as well as the employer’s course of conduct and oral representations regarding it. In addition, if an employer chooses to issue a policy statement or handbook, and by language or action encourages reliance thereon by the employee, the employer cannot then treat the policy as illusory and only selectively abide by it. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital (1984), 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170. Furthermore, the majority opinion emphasizes the supposed clarity of the disclaimers. This court, however, is not limited to analyzing only the language found in the employee handbook. Indeed, the majority here points out that the presence of a disclaimer will not always prevent a particular statement in an employee handbook from becoming a term of a contract of employment. (See Perman v. ArcVentures, Inc. (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 758, 554 N.E.2d 982.) In the instant case, the defendants acted as though they were complying with the terms of the employee handbook. They gave no indication that the disclaimers applied or prevailed over the plaintiff’s claims. The majority opinion here, however, seems to reward the ambiguous language found in the employee handbook and ignores the defendants’ own attempt to abide by the terms of the employee handbook. Surely, our supreme court in Duldulao did not wish to convey a message encouraging illusory employee handbooks. In any case, I believe a fact question exists whether the terms of the employee handbook combined with the defendants’ actions created contractual rights for the plaintiff. The trial court’s granting summary judgment for the defendants should be reversed. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.