Court Opinion

ID: 9794459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:06:04.121786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:55.870224
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
I dissent. The evidence introduced by the
prosecution to impeach the testimony of its witness Barbara Cruikshank was properly admitted. At the preliminary hearing she unequivocally stated that as she passed the store someone was in the lighted prescription room, that that person had turned towards her, and that that person was Jerry Newson. At the trial she testified that she had looked in the store but had seen no one. The prosecution was thus taken by surprise. Her testimony at the trial was not purely negative in character as it would have been had she testified that she did not know whether anyone was in the store because she had not looked. Such testimony constituted an affirmative declaration that there was no one in the store visible to her. Since it was the contention of the prosecution that the homicides had been committed at the time she had theretofore stated that she had seen the defendant in the store her subsequent testimony was certainly damaging and subject to impeachment.
The majority opinion incorrectly infers that there was a delay in instructing the jury as to the proper use of the impeaching evidence. When counsel for the defendant asked that the jury be informed that the prior contradictory statements did not constitute present testimony but could only be employed to impeach present testimony, the court declared that the law was as stated in that request. A formal instruction to the same effect was later given. The jury was thus twice informed as to the limited effect of the impeaching testimony. The jury was specifically told, “. . . you are instructed that the evidence of any such contradictory statement is not received for the purpose of proving the truth of *49what was then said, but only for the purpose of testing the credibility of the witness; you are permitted to consider said evidence only for that reason. ...” The impeaching evidence was admitted solely to cast doubt on the veracity of the witness’ present testimony which was contrary to her previous statements that she had seen no one in the store when she peered into it at the time the murders were claimed by the prosecution to have been committed. That the jury so considered the evidence is the only reasonable . assumption. Its admission was not error.
Having declared that error was committed, the majority opinion then concludes that a miscarriage of justice has re-suited if it cannot be shown that a different verdict was improbable. The language of the constitutional provision itself should govern. It provides that no judgment shall be set aside ‘‘unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. ’ ’ That provision clearly calls for a realistic appraisal of the entire record on a case-by-case basis to determine whether in the presence of error a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Here there was no error. Even if there were the record makes it clear that no miscarriage of justice has resulted from the judgment of conviction.
The defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime at the probable time of its commission was sufficiently established by the evidence. Independent witnesses testified that the defendant was in the immediate vicinity about 8:40 p. m. on the night in question. Barbara Cruikshank, the witness whose hostility to the prosecution was apparent, testified that she had spoken to the victims about 8 :50 p. m. and that at about 9 p. m. the defendant’s car was parked next to the door later identified as that from which the murderer’s exit was made. It was shown that it was the regular habit of the slain salesgirl to leave the store about 9 p. m., the usual closing time. An expert testified that the gun used by the defendant in the housing project robbery, and one to which he had access, was the lethal weapon.
The majority opinion concedes that evidence of the housing project robbery was admissible to show the defendant’s ownership of a gun of the same caliber as that used in the homicides. It cannot rightly be said that proof of certain details of that robbery were improperly admitted. Those details were not *50of such a nature as to increase the danger of prejudice beyond that created by the admittedly competent proof of the commission of that crime.
The defendant’s own statements and conduct at various times subsequent to his arrest definitely establish his guilt. At the trial he offered an entirely different explanation of his whereabouts at the time of the crime than that twice given to investigating officers. His change in position occurred after his original “alibi” had been exploded. His explanation was that he had been confused when he gave the first version yet it was one he chose to tell a second time after a steak dinner and a good night’s sleep. The witnesses on whom he relied to establish the second version were impeached as to statements indicating that Newson had been with them in the period around 9 p. m.
At a time when the defendant was being questioned only in regard to the housing project robbery and before the drugstore crime had been mentioned he asked what the penalty was for robbery. On being informed of the penalty in such eases he inquired as to the penalty imposed if someone was killed in a robbery. When informed that in that case the penalty was death or life imprisonment, he hesitated and then confessed to the housing project robbery.
The defendant was given several “lie detector” tests to which he offered no objection. He was told that one test was designed to reveal whether he had used a real gun in the housing project robbery. At its conclusion an officer told him that they thus knew that he had used a real gun and the defendant then for the first time conceded this fact. He was told that the next test would determine whether he had committed the drugstore crime. The officer testified: “After that test was completed I walked around in front of the defendant again . . . and I said to him. ‘I am very sorry that you pulled that job at the drug store. ’ He was sitting at the . . . desk . . . and when I said that, he put his head forward so that he cradled his head in his arm and we sat there for a short while looking at each other, and I said to him, again, ‘I am very sorry. I would be very sorry for anyone that had gotten themselves into as much trouble as you did,” and he kept sitting there and not saying anything, and we just sat there for a little while and then I said to him again I was very sorry for him, I would be sorry for anyone that got into as much difficulty as he apparently had gotten into, and then he looked over toward me and said, ‘Yes, you are *51right, I killed them. I killed the two people in the drug store.’ And then he turned and put his head in his arms so I could not see his face ... I sat there for a while and he continued to put his head in his arms across the top of the desk, and after a short while I said to him, ‘Do you care to talk about it’ and he shook his head, so we waited a little while longer and .1 said: ‘How did you get into the store?’ and he said, ‘They let me in the front door.’ Then I said, ‘How did you get out of the store’, and he said, ‘I went out the back door.’ I said, ‘How did you do that?’ and he said that was very easy and he put his hands together like that (indicating) and made a motion up.” In view of the evidence of the defendant’s admission that he had committed the murders the jury was justified in rejecting his later explanation that throughout his interrogation he was merely “kidding.”
The defendant was asked by an officer if his later inability to reconcile an inconsistency in his alibi explanation was not due to the fact that he would thus again admit he had committed the drugstore crime. The defendant looked around the room and then slowly nodded his head in the affirmative. The defendant informed a fellow prisoner that he had spent the evening of the drugstore murders with a girl named Cruikshank who knew what had happened and knew how to keep her mouth shut.
There is abundant evidence in the record to establish the defendant’s guilt. He had a full and fair trial and the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
Eespondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 24, 1951. Shenk, J., voted for a rehearing.