Court Opinion

ID: 9552487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:11:38.321939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:59.282747
License: Public Domain

*443Soule, J.
(dissenting) — As in State v. Hultman, 21 Wn. App. 878, 587 P.2d 599 (1978), I recognize that the decision of the majority is not only supported, but compelled by the present decisions of the Supreme Court of this state. State v. Williams, 87 Wn.2d 916, 557 P.2d 1311 (1976); State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870, 557 P.2d 847 (1976); State v. Jack, 87 Wn.2d 467, 553 P.2d 1347 (1976); State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (1975).
It should be noted in State v. Williams, 87 Wn.2d 916, 557 P.2d 1311 (1976), that the court speaks of a fundamental right to a speedy trial, citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967). In so doing, the issue is confused because in Klopfer, the court was referring to the constitutional right to a speedy trial, a far different thing than a right to a speedy trial within a specific length of time arising from a set of rules which by their very title and terms relate to procedure only.
In my opinion, the rigid and inflexible application of CrR 3.3 results in a gross miscarriage of justice in this case and my dissent is for the purpose of conveying to the citizens of Clallam County and the state of Washington, the fact that it is the present state of the decisional law with respect to CrR 3.3 which is responsible for this unwholesome situation whereby a rapist is to be placed beyond the power of the law to punish him because his trial date was set 6 days over the 60-day limit. There is no claim of prejudice arising from the lapse of that 6-day period. The enormity of the situation is compounded by the colloquy at the time of the trial setting. That colloquy is set forth in the majority opinion.
In my judgment, defendant's trial counsel4 had an obligation on December 22 to plainly state to the trial judge that his willingness to accept a February date did not mean that he was willing to go beyond 60 days from the date of *444initial appearance.5 His conduct trapped the trial judge and was acceded to by his client who may be presumed to have been thoroughly experienced in the ways of criminal procedures, he having been twice previously convicted of serious felonies.6 The defendant should not be permitted to profit by the misleading silence of his counsel and of himself.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held that it has inherent power to waive the requirements of its own rules in particular cases when the purposes of justice so require. Ashley v. Superior Court, 83 Wn.2d 630, 521 P.2d 711 (1974); Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation, 83 Wn.2d 163, 517 P.2d 197 (1973); O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969). While the exercise of the power has not been without criticism (see dissents in Carter v. University of Wash., 85 Wn.2d 391, 407, 536 P.2d 618 (1975) and Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation, supra), it is now a recognized practice in this jurisdiction.
In my opinion, justice to the public requires that CrR 3.3 be not mechanically applied but rather, on the present facts, that the draconian remedy of dismissal be avoided, something which cannot be done at the level of the Court of Appeals, but can be done by the Supreme Court since the rules are theirs, not ours. The propriety of reconsidering *445the rigid application of the rule is reinforced because the vice of the old rule has now been recognized by the amendment of CrR 3.3. Subsection (d) thereof now places the duty upon the defendant to object within 10 days of receiving notice of the trial setting if he does want a trial within the 60- to 90-day limits, and failure to object timely is deemed a waiver of the right.
Therefore, I dissent.
Reconsideration denied July 2, 1979.
Appealed to Supreme Court August 21, 1979.

 On appeal, defendant is represented by different counsel.

(CPR) DR 7 — 102(A) (5) prohibits knowingly making a false statement of fact. On December 22, it was evident that the court misunderstood the import of counsel's statement about the February date. Upon perceiving that the court had a mistaken understanding of counsel's meaning, and failing to speak up, that statement became the equivalent of a false statement of fact. The duty then arose under (CPR) DR 7 — 102(A)(3) to disclose his more restricted meaning. It is also my belief that failure to correct the misapprehension left with the trial court by the statement about the acceptability of a February trial date, was a violation of defense counsel's oath of an attorney, subsection 5, in that his conduct affirmatively misled the trial court. Trial counsel was an experienced public defender who undoubtedly was aware of the tactical advantage of quietly permitting a case to be set beyond 60 days from December 19, 1977.

defendant was convicted of robbery in Nevada in 1975 and of breaking and entering in Virginia in 1973. In both instances, the trial judge in the present case found that he had been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings.