Court Opinion

ID: 9351579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-02 00:00:24.000493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:00:53.304517
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4247      Doc: 27         Filed: 12/30/2022     Pg: 1 of 4

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4247

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        TIMOTHY ANTONIO FLANAGAN,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00218-FDW-DCS-2)

        Submitted: October 5, 2022                                  Decided: December 30, 2022

        Before WYNN and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Marilyn G. Ozer, MASSENGALE & OZER, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
        for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Elizabeth M. Greenough, Assistant
        United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte,
        North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4247      Doc: 27         Filed: 12/30/2022      Pg: 2 of 4

        PER CURIAM:

               In 2007, Defendant-Appellant Timothy Antonio Flanagan received a five-year

        suspended sentence for state firearm and drug offenses. In 2011, he received a five-year

        active sentence for a state drug-trafficking offense. Also in 2011, his probation related to

        his 2007 conviction was revoked, and that sentence activated to run concurrently with his

        newly imposed 2011 sentence. In 2019, he pled guilty to new federal drug-related charges.

        The presentence report relating to the 2019 offenses ascribed to Flanagan ten criminal-

        history points. Three of those points related to his 2007 conviction. He objected to their

        inclusion in his criminal-history calculation, arguing that, because the sentence relating to

        his 2007 conviction activated to run concurrently with the sentence relating to his 2011

        conviction, he did not “actually serve[] a period of imprisonment” relating to his 2007

        conviction for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.2. The

        district court rejected his argument, determining that both his 2007 and 2011 offenses were

        active sentences for which he served time—despite their concurrent nature.

               Flanagan now appeals, contending that the district court erred in ascribing criminal-

        history points for the 2007 sentence. When an appeal challenges an application of the

        Sentencing Guidelines, we “must determine whether the sentence is procedurally

        reasonable.” United States v. Velasquez-Canales, 987 F.3d 367, 369 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing

        United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019)). “In determining procedural

        reasonableness, we consider, among other things, whether the [district court] properly

        determined the Sentencing Guidelines range.”        Id. at 370–71 (alteration in original)

        (quoting United States v. Lynn, 912 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2018)). “[W]e review factual

                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4247       Doc: 27        Filed: 12/30/2022      Pg: 3 of 4

        findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d

        212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir.

        2010)).

               In calculating a criminal-history category, three points should be added “for each

        prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a).

        The Guidelines define “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed . . . for

        conduct not part of the instant offense.” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1). “In the case of a prior

        revocation of probation, . . . [the district court should] add the original term of

        imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The resulting total

        is used to compute the criminal history points for § 4A1.1(a) . . . .” Id. § 4A1.2(k)(1). The

        Guidelines commentary clarifies that “[t]o qualify as a sentence of imprisonment, the

        defendant must have actually served a period of imprisonment on such sentence.” Id.

        § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2.

               We are not persuaded by Flanagan’s argument that he did not actually serve time

        for his activated 2007 conviction because it was effectively subsumed by his concurrent

        2011 sentence. This Court’s recent decision in United States v. Skaggs is directly on point.

        23 F.4th 342 (4th Cir. 2022). There, we considered the nature of days spent serving

        concurrent sentences, concluding that an incarcerated person “serve[s] one day of each of

        his . . . concurrent prison terms on each day of his sentence.” Id. at 346. Thus, at the

        conclusion of Flanagan’s five-year term of incarceration for the concurrent 2007 and 2011

        convictions, he had “fully served” each of these discrete sentences—not just one or the

        other. Id. Consequently, Flanagan “actually served a period of imprisonment” relating to

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4247      Doc: 27        Filed: 12/30/2022     Pg: 4 of 4

        his 2007 conviction, regardless of its concurrent nature. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2. The

        district court committed no legal error in reaching that conclusion, and it properly

        determined Flanagan’s Sentencing Guidelines range by including the 2007 conviction in

        its criminal-history-score calculation—rendering his ultimate sentence procedurally

        reasonable.

              Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

                                                    4