Court Opinion

ID: 9606368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:25.064666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.339605
License: Public Domain

AMBRO, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join Judge Greenberg’s well-crafted and in-depth opinion. I mention two more matters, not necessary to the outcome of this case, that I nonetheless deem of concern.
The jury’s initial compensatory award to Acumed of $0 reflected the conclusion, mentioned in note 17 of Judge Green-berg’s opinion, that Acumed cannot prove the “actual legal damage” necessary to establish tortious interference with contractual relationships. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 530 (3d Cir.1998). By denying Acumed compensatory damages, the jury indicated that Acumed had not shown “the loss of the benefits of the contract or prospective relation!,] or consequential, emotional or reputational losses!,] resulting from the defendant’s conduct” required to satisfy Pennsylvania’s description of tortious interference with existing or prospective contractual relations. Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa.Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36, 40 (1991) (applying and interpreting § 774A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); see also *232Birl v. Phila. Elec. Co., 402 Pa. 297, 167 A.2d 472, 474 (1960). Accordingly, even if the District Court had been correct in determining that Acumed had satisfied the other elements of the tort, it should have granted appellant judgment as a matter of law on the basis of Acumed’s failure to establish actual damages. See Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 325 F.2d 2, 22 (3d Cir.1963); 21 Stuart M. Speiser, et al., The American Law of Torts § 31:94 (1992).
In addition, assuming that Acumed had somehow proven the necessary elements of tortious interference with contractual relations (which, as noted, it could not if the harm to it was nil), the District Court should not have instructed the jury to award Acumed $1 in nominal damages. The Court justified this instruction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b) and Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 415-16 (9th Cir.1993), as a measure needed to resolve the “apparent inconsistency” between the jury’s $0 compensatory award and $100,000 punitive award to Acumed. Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Serv., Inc., No. 05-2711, 2007 WL 1500051, at *2-3 (E.D.Pa. May 18, 2007). This does not work.
First, I believe that Pennsylvania law does not permit nominal damages for tor-tious interference violations. Section 907 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines nominal damages as “a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established a cause of action but has not established that he is entitled to compensatory damages.” Pennsylvania courts have interpreted this definition to permit nominal damages only in tort cases “where harm is not a requisite to the cause of action.” Carter v. The May Dep’t Store Co., 853 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa.Super.Ct.2004). But, as stated, harm is a required element of tortious interference with existing or prospective contractual relationships. See Pawlowski, 588 A.2d at 40; Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337, 1343 (Pa.Super.Ct.1987), appeal denied 519 Pa. 667, 548 A.2d 256 (Pa.1988).36
Second, even if an award of nominal damages were permitted, the District Court should not have done so here. As discussed in Judge Greenberg’s opinion, the trial court could have taken a number of approaches once it learned that the general verdict and jury answers were inconsistent. But regardless of its chosen approach, it was required to apply Pennsylvania law that holds “that no award for punitive damages may be made where actual damage has not been suffered.” Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648, 652 (1959); see also Smith v. Grab, 705 A.2d 894, 901 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997); Sulecki v. Southeast Nat’l Bank, 358 Pa.Super. 132, 516 A.2d 1217, 1219 (1986). Thus, instead of resolving the inconsistent verdict by instructing an award of nominal damages, the Court should have entered a judgment vacating Acumed’s punitive damages award. Cf. Cooper Distrib. Co., Inc., v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 281-84 (3d Cir.1995) (vacating a punitive damages award for tortious interference where the jury found actual harm but $0 in compensatory damages).
Third, the District Court’s instruction did nothing to counter the quick conclusion that the compensatory/punitive award ratio (1/100,000) here was untenable under *233Pennsylvania law, see Reading Radio, Inc. v. Fink, 833 A.2d 199, 214 (Pa.Super.Ct.2003) (“[A] reasonable relationship must still exist between the nature of the cause of action underlying the compensatory award and the decision to grant punitive damages.”), and constitutional standards, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003) (“[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
In sum, the jury’s initial decision not to grant Acumed a compensatory award for actual damages ends the game for it. Tor-tious interference with existing or prospective contractual relations cannot be found, and thus punitive damages are not available. Instructing the jury to award $1 in compensatory damages was an unfitting effort to change these results, and the compensatory/punitive award ratio it created was off the chart of reasonableness.

. This conclusion comports with accepted tort analysis, see, e.g., Action House, Inc. v. Koolik, 54 F.3d 1009, 1014 n. 4 (2d Cir.1995) (noting with approval the holding in Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 90, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d 289, 292-94 (1993), that nominal damages are not allowed in tortious interference claims); 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 6.6(2) (2d ed.1993). But see Fishkin v. Susquehanna Partners, G.P., 563 F.Supp.2d 547, 590 (E.D.Pa.2008) (awarding nominal damages on a claim of tortious interference with existing contractual relations).