Court Opinion

ID: 9854346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:06:08.207305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:02.228482
License: Public Domain

KITTREDGE, J.:
Travis Anthony Ladson was convicted of first-degree burglary following a three-day trial. Ladson was sentenced on November 10, 2004, to prison for a non-parolable term of twenty-five years. Ladson timely appealed his conviction and sentence. In accordance with standard procedure, Ladson promptly requested the transcript of the trial from the court reporter. Approximately ten months later, in August of 2005, the court reporter finally disclosed that there was no record of the trial court proceedings.
Because of the complete absence of a transcript, Ladson moved this court to reverse the convictions and sentences and for a new trial. Based on the State’s assurance that the record could be easily reconstructed, a judge of this court denied Ladson’s motion and remanded the matter to the trial court to reconstruct the record. More than a year after the trial, the trial judge convened a hearing with trial counsel in an effort to reconstruct the record.
We now have before us what the State contends is a reconstructed record of the trial court proceedings sufficient to permit appellate review. Ladson contends the conclusory and summary nature of the purported record on appeal does not permit meaningful appellate review. Because we find the reconstructed record insufficient for meaningful review of direct appeal issues, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I.
On January 5, 2006, pursuant to this court’s order, the trial judge held a hearing to reconstruct the record for appeal.1 It *322was clear from the outset of this hearing that reconstructing the record from scratch, after such a substantial delay, would be an uphill struggle. The State presented two affidavits from witnesses and “summarized” the testimony of the other witnesses.
The information provided by the State was conelusory. The State usually prefaced its recall of witness testimony with statements like “his testimony generally would be,” “he testified generally to the following,” and “the next witness ... will be by summation.” Ladson took issue with the State’s summary reconstruction of the record. The trial judge, noting that he no longer had his handwritten notes from the trial, typically would conclude with respect to a particular witness that the State presented “an accurate summation of the testimony,” or the State’s general description was “a correct summation of the testimony,” or “the summation presented by the State ... [was] a correct statement.”
When the State concluded its summary of the testimony of one witness, the trial court concurred with the summary as “an accurate reflection of her testimony,” and further held that the witness was “qualified as an expert in her field, and ... the court found her testimony to be credible.” The trial court then remarked, “I do not believe there was any question, at any point in time, as to the chain of evidence regarding these particular fingerprints.” The State corrected the trial court and noted that the witness was not qualified as an expert and further that Ladson’s trial counsel had preliminarily objected to the chain of custody. The trial court promptly agreed and explained the confusion by referring to another witness.
The State, too, had difficulty recalling the witnesses and the testimony. For example, the State had completely forgotten about one witness, whose identity was determined only by reference to Ladson’s trial counsel’s notes. As the Solicitor acknowledged, “the final witness that I have to admit I discovered from [Ladson’s trial counsel’s] notes.”
There is even a dispute as to whether Ladson testified in his own defense. Ladson claims he did not testify. The trial court found otherwise, noting the “court’s remembrance and *323recollection that the Defendant was not credible, and did not help himself in his testimony before the jury.”
The trial court appeared equally confident that the jury returned its verdict the same day it began its deliberations: “My only recollection is that, after the court answered [a question from the jury], that the jury came out relatively soon after that with a verdict.” When confronted with a different recollection from Ladson’s counsel (claiming the jury was excused for the day and reached a verdict the following day), the trial court responded, “I usually require the jury to stay for as long as it takes [until it] come[s] back with a verdict. I don’t ever remember an occasion where I have allowed a jury to go home and come back.” The trial court’s recollection was proven faulty when the State called attention to the juror note dated November 9, 2004, and the jury’s verdict dated the next day, November 10.
The trial court and the State are confident that Ladson made timely objections at trial and moved for a directed verdict “based upon the evidence.” Presumably, the State believes these concessions enlighten Ladson and us to the specific issues to address on appeal.
On January 26, 2006, the trial court issued an “Order for the Record on Appeal.”
II.
Ladson maintains the reconstructed record does not allow for meaningful review of his direct appeal. The State disagrees and asserts this court should find the record adequate for appellate review of the claims Ladson raised at the reconstructed hearing.
It is clear from the record before us that all parties made a diligent effort to reconstruct the record. Despite these good faith efforts, the reconstructed record is largely conclusory, with testimony, objections, and the like recalled only in summary fashion. Thus, we must first determine the analytical framework for assessing the sufficiency of a reconstructed record, followed by a determination if the law warrants a new trial under the record before us.
*324South Carolina jurisprudence recognizes the trial court’s authority to set the record for appeal. In China v. Parrott, 251 S.C. 329, 334, 162 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1968), our supreme court held that where a portion of the court reporter’s notes were lost, the trial judge properly considered affidavits from counsel and the court reporter in reconstructing the record. See also Koon v. State, 358 S.C. 359, 367, 595 S.E.2d 456, 460 (2004) (recognizing a court’s power to remand for a reconstruction hearing), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 105, 610 S.E.2d 494, 501 (2005); Whitehead v. State, 352 S.C. 215, 221, 574 S.E.2d 200, 203 (2002) (finding that when a transcript has been lost or destroyed, an appellate court may remand to have the record reconstructed); Dolive v. J.E.E. Developers, Inc., 308 S.C. 380, 383, 418 S.E.2d 319, 321 (Ct.App.1992) (holding trial court did not err in granting property owner’s request to reconstruct the record of zoning proceeding where portions of original tape of hearing were incapable of being transcribed).
The authority of the trial court in South Carolina to reconstruct the record for appellate purposes aligns our state with the majority of jurisdictions that hold “the inability to prepare a complete verbatim transcript, in and of itself, does not necessarily present a sufficient ground for reversal.” Smith v. State, 291 Md. 125, 433 A.2d 1143, 1148 (1981); e.g., Lewis v. State, 354 Ark. 359, 123 S.W.3d 891, 893 (2003); Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 469, 639 A.2d 696, 699 (1994); State v. Deschon, 320 Mont. 1, 85 P.3d 756, 760 (2004); Lopez v. State, 105 Nev. 68, 769 P.2d 1276, 1280 (.1989); State v. Izaguirre, 272 N.J.Super. 51, 639 A.2d 343, 346 (App.Div.1994); People v. Shire, 23 A.D.3d 709, 803 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (N.Y.App.Div.2005); State v. Quick, 634 S.E.2d 915, 918 (N.C.Ct.App.2006); Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 36 Va.App. 8, 548 S.E.2d 230, 232-33 (2001).
Most jurisdictions require an appellant to demonstrate specific prejudice flowing from an incomplete or reconstructed record. See, e.g., Lewis, 123 S.W.3d at 893 (“[I]t is the appellant’s duty to demonstrate that prejudice results from the state of the record”); State v. Williams, 227 Conn. 101, 629 A.2d 402, 406 (1993) (holding appellant must show “specific prejudice that results from having to address his claims on appeal with the reconstructed record”); Jones v. State, 923 So.2d 486, 489 (Fla.2006) (noting appellant must point to *325prejudice resulting from missing portions of trial transcript); State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 542 P.2d 63, 65 (1975) (holding appellant must demonstrate “specific prejudice” resulting from failure to reconstruct record); Simpson v. Commonwealth, 759 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Ky.1988) (holding a showing of “prejudicial error” in having to proceed using substitute transcript is required); Smith, 433 A.2d at 1148 (noting “defects must be of a prejudicial character”); Commonwealth v. Chatman, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 228, 406 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (1980) (holding'- appellant must “come 'forward with articulable claims [by] which the reconstruction may be judged”); State v. Borden, 605 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Mo.1980) (holding appellant must demonstrate prejudice); State v. Dupris, 373 N.W.2d 446, 449 (S.D.1985) (holding appellant must show “specific error or prejudice” resulting from failure to record entire proceedings of trial); State v. Neal, 172 W.Va. 189, 304 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1983) (“Generally, the failure to report some part of the proceeding will not alone constitute reversible error[;] [s]ome identifiable error or prejudice must be shown by the defendant.”). “[Bjefore a defendant can establish that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of an inadequate reconstructed record, he must identify a specific appellate claim that this court would be unable to review effectively using the reconstructed record.” Harris v. Comm’r of Corr., 40 Conn.App. 250, 671 A.2d 359, 363 (1996). We believe our supreme court would follow a rule requiring the party challenging a reconstructed record on appeal to demonstrate prejudice flowing from an inadequate record.
We conclude from China and its progeny, combined with a review of the law of other jurisdictions, that our supreme court would require a reconstructed record on appeal to allow for “meaningful appellate review.” A new trial is therefore appropriate if the appellant establishes that “the incomplete nature of the transcript prevents the appellate court from conducting a ‘meaningful appellate review.’ ” In re D.W., 171 N.C.App. 496, 615 S.E.2d 90, 94 (2005); see also State v. Chanze, 211 W.Va. 257, 565 S.E.2d 379, 382-83 (2002) (finding criminal defendant is entitled to meaningful appellate review of his lower court proceedings, and if this is not possible from reconstructed record, a new trial is appropriate). For a host of reasons, we find Ladson has established preju*326dice and demonstrated that the reconstructed record before us does not allow for meaningful appellate review.
We recognize that the excellent trial judge did the best he could to reconstruct this case under difficult circumstances. Approximately ten months transpired after the appeal was filed before the court reporter notified the parties (for a reason that is unclear) that her recording equipment failed and no part of the trial was recorded.2 The court reporter’s delay in disclosing the lack of a transcript made a bad situation worse, as the passage of time clearly dimmed the recall of the participants. We, too, must accept our share of the blame, for the remand order of this court required the trial court to reconstruct the record, with no option given to simply conclude that the record could not be reconstructed with the specificity to support meaningful appellate review. Cf. Koon, 358 S.C. at 367, 595 S.E.2d at 460 (denying request to remand for reconstruction of a post-conviction hearing after appellant failed to allege specifics regarding his assignments of error); and Whitehead, 352 S.C. at 221, 574 S.E.2d at 203 (remanding matter to circuit court for reconstruction hearing and instructing, “If the circuit court judge determines that reconstruction is not possible, he shall notify this Court....”).
The hearing to reconstruct the record for this three-day trial on a violent, non-parolable offense took place on January 5, 2006, more than a year after Ladson was convicted and sentenced. We are mindful of the tremendous workloads faced by our fine trial court judges. It is simply unrealistic and unreasonable to think that a trial judge and counsel can— under these circumstances — reconstruct a proper record that will permit meaningful appellate review, especially in light of our issue preservation rules. The continuing dispute as to whether Ladson even testified (much less the content of his purported testimony) is but one example of the trial court and counsel groping in the dark as to what actually happened at trial.
Most cases around the country addressing this subject concern situations where only a part of the trial transcript is unavailable. In many such circumstances, meaningful appel*327late review can occur and the rights of the parties are not prejudiced. In this case, we are essentially left with a bare bones summary of the evidence (with more remaining unknown than known) from a lengthy multi-day and fact-intensive trial that resulted in a non-parolable twenty-five year prison term.
Moreover, the fact of a missing portion of the trial transcript is usually brought to the court’s attention much earlier than the year-plus delay present here. We are left with a few gratuitous references to generic motions and objections, but we do not know the context of the motions, the specific nature of the motions, and whether the challenged evidence was cumulative to other unchallenged evidence. The list of unknowns continues. In short, we are left to speculate, and we decline to do so. See In re Rholetter, 162 N.C.App. 653, 592 S.E.2d 237, 244 (2004) (“If a transcript is altogether inaccurate and no adequate record of what transpired at trial can be reconstructed, the court must remand for a new trial.”).
The record before us does not permit meaningful appellate review. To hold this record is sufficient would guarantee the affirmance of Ladson’s conviction and twenty-five-year nonparolable sentence without a genuine review. We would simply be constrained to affirm based on an insufficient record and issue preservation principles. Moreover, it would effectively foreclose any collateral challenge through post conviction relief or otherwise. We hold Ladson has demonstrated clear prejudice.
We finally remind the State that this court previously remanded this matter to the trial court for the purpose of reconstructing the record on the “assurance” by the State that this was a simple and straightforward case. The State should therefore have no problem retrying this simple and straightforward case.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we are convinced that under the circumstances of this case the reconstructed record lacks the completeness and reliability necessary for this court to *328engage in meaningful appellate review. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SHORT, J., concurs.
ANDERSON, J., concurring in result only in a separate opinion.

. As the original trial took place more than a year before this reconstruction hearing, it was obviously quite difficult to reconstruct the record. Although the hearing was orderly, it took on a conversational tone — counsel and the trial court often informally discussed their recollections of the earlier trial. In fairness to the outstanding trial judge and the parties’ trial counsel, the order of this court left no option but to attempt a reconstruction of the record. As the trial court noted at the outset of the January 26, 2006, hearing, it would do the "best it can ... to reconstruct tire record.”

. At oral argument, the State commented that the court reporter "used tapes that just wouldn't hold sound."