Court Opinion

ID: 9366064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 20:01:24.572986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:49.592337
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14486   Document: 83-1      Date Filed: 01/25/2023    Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                No. 21-14486
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       BALDWIN MAYNARD BROWN,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                         ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A201-581-587
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                21-14486

       Before LUCK, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Baldwin Maynard Brown, proceeding pro se, petitions for
       review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision
       denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. After
       review, we deny in part and dismiss in part Brown’s petition.
                    I.    IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
       A.    Underlying Removal Proceedings
             In November 2013, Brown, a native and citizen of Jamaica,
       entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa. In January
       2020, Brown was served with a notice to appear, which charged
       him with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act
       (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for overstaying his
       visa.
             In March 2020, Brown applied for asylum, withholding of
       removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
       Torture (“CAT”). Brown claimed that he had experienced
       persecution as a member of a particular social group—his family.
       Brown also asserted that: (1) he was poisoned and abused in
       Jamaica; and (2) he had been a permanent resident in Canada but
       was prevented from returning to Canada by unknown individuals.
              At the March 25, 2020 merits hearing, Brown testified that:
       (1) he could not return to Canada because he was “tortured,” and
       gases were pumped into his room; and (2) his family members in
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       21-14486               Opinion of the Court                         3

       Jamaica had abused and poisoned him. At the end of the March 25,
       2020 hearing, the IJ denied Brown’s asylum application.
              Brown appealed to the BIA, asserting in his brief to the BIA
       that his sister had connections in the Jamaican government. On
       January 28, 2021, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed
       his appeal. In February 2021, Brown filed a motion to reconsider
       with the BIA, which denied Brown’s motion on May 27, 2021.
       B.     July 2021 Motion to Reopen with the Immigration Court
             In July 2021, Brown filed a motion to reopen with the
       immigration court. Brown asserted that he had obtained
       documents corroborating his statements about the harms that he
       had suffered in Canada and his sister’s links to the Jamaican
       government.
              In August 2021, the IJ denied Brown’s motion to reopen.
       The IJ determined that: (1) Brown’s motion to reopen was
       untimely; (2) the IJ lacked jurisdiction to consider Brown’s motion
       because the BIA, not the IJ, had issued the last decision in his case;
       (3) Brown’s motion did not contain new arguments that were not
       previously raised in his removal proceedings; and (4) the evidence
       Brown attached to his motion did not show his harm was, or would
       be, on account of a statutorily protected ground. The IJ found that
       sua sponte reopening was unwarranted because Brown had not
       demonstrated a “truly exceptional situation.”
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       4                      Opinion of the Court               21-14486

       C.    September 2021 Motion to Reopen with the BIA
              On September 2, 2021, Brown filed with the BIA a “motion
       to accept late-filed motion to reopen.” In this motion, Brown
       asserted that: (1) he mistakenly filed his motion to reopen with the
       immigration court instead of the BIA, (2) he was unable to correct
       this mistake because he was held in quarantine from August 10
       through August 26, 2021, and (3) he was unable to access the
       internet or a phone during that time. Brown attached a letter from
       a homeless shelter stating that he was a resident and was in
       quarantine from August 10 through August 26, at which time he
       tested negative for COVID-19.
             That same day, Brown filed a motion to reopen. Brown’s
       motion stated that he had obtained new evidence regarding the
       harms he suffered and his sister’s connections to the Jamaican
       government.
              In support of his motion to reopen, Brown submitted several
       exhibits, which included, inter alia: (1) medical records that
       purportedly showed the injuries he suffered due to persecution by
       Canadians; (2) documents dated from 2012 to 2015 showing that
       his sister has held positions in the Jamaican government; and
       (3) photographs of his home into which gases were allegedly
       pumped. None of this evidence addressed materially changed
       country conditions in Jamaica or Canada following Brown’s March
       2020 merits hearing.
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       21-14486                  Opinion of the Court                               5

              The BIA denied the motion to reopen. The BIA concluded
       that his motion was untimely, as his motion was not filed within
       90 days of the BIA’s final administrative order. It determined that
       Brown had not shown that his motion fell within any exception to
       the time limitations or that equitable tolling of the deadline was
       warranted.
              Next, the BIA concluded that sua sponte reopening was not
       appropriate. It observed that Brown’s claims were not supported
       by objective evidence showing that he would be eligible for any
       form of relief from removal, and that he had “received a full and
       fair hearing on his claims.”
                                  II.     DISCUSSION
       A.     General Legal Principles
              A nonimmigrant’s motion to reopen removal proceedings
       must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held
       if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or
       other evidentiary material.” INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C.
       § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B).
            Generally, a motion to reopen immigration proceedings
       must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final
       administrative order of removal.1 INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (C), 8 U.S.C.

       1We review the denial of a motion to reopen a removal order for an abuse of
       discretion, and our review is limited to determining whether the BIA’s exercise
       of discretion was arbitrary and capricious. Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
       881 F.3d 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2018).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14486

       § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C). That 90-day deadline does not apply,
       however, to motions that seek asylum or withholding of removal
       based on changed country conditions in the noncitizen’s country
       of removal, “if such evidence is material and was not available and
       would not have been discovered or presented at the previous
       proceeding.” INA § 240(c)(7)(c)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
              Further, the 90-day requirement for filing a motion to
       reopen is subject to equitable tolling. Butka v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 827
       F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). Equitable tolling “requires a
       showing that the litigant (1) has been pursuing his rights diligently,
       and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”
       Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 872 (11th Cir.
       2018) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). “Ignorance of the law
       usually is not a factor that can warrant equitable tolling.”
       Wakefield v. R.R. Retirement Bd., 131 F.3d 967, 970 (11th Cir.
       1997); see also Cadet v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 853 F.3d 1216, 1221–22
       (11th Cir. 2017) (observing that an attorney’s mistake in calculating
       a limitations period did not justify equitable tolling).
             The BIA also may sua sponte grant a motion to reopen at
       any time if it finds that exceptional circumstances warrant
       reopening. Butka, 827 F.3d at 1283; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However,
       the decision to reopen sua sponte is “committed to agency
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       21-14486                   Opinion of the Court                               7

       discretion by law,” and we lack jurisdiction to review it. Lenis v.
       U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008). 2
              To determine whether the agency displays reasoned
       consideration, this Court “look[s] only to ensure that the IJ and the
       BIA considered the issues raised and announced their decisions in
       terms sufficient to enable review.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
       779 F.3d 1284, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015). Although the IJ and the BIA
       must consider all of the evidence submitted, a decision that omits
       the discussion of certain pieces of evidence can nonetheless display
       reasoned consideration. Id. 3
       B.       Brown’s Petition
              The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s
       motion to reopen as untimely. The 90-day period to file his motion
       to reopen began on January 28, 2021, when the BIA issued its final
       administrative removal order. See INA § 240(c)(7)(C), 8 U.S.C.
       § 1229a(c)(7)(C). Consequently, Brown’s September 2021 motion
       to reopen (and even his July 2021 motion filed incorrectly with the
       immigration court) was filed several months after the 90-day
       deadline expired on April 28, 2021.

       2 ThisCourt reviews de novo its subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for
       review. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007).
       3 This Court reviews denovo legal issues, such as whether the agency failed to
       give reasoned consideration to an issue. Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792,
       799 (11th Cir. 2016).
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                       21-14486

              Brown argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the
       90-day deadline because (1) he misfiled the motion to reopen in the
       immigration court on July 27, 2021, and once he discovered his
       error, he could not correct it because he was quarantined due to a
       COVID-19 exposure and (2) he assumed the 90-day deadline ran
       from the date the BIA denied his motion for reconsideration. We
       disagree. First, Brown’s time in quarantine from August 10
       through August 26, 2021, did not prevent him from timely filing his
       motion to reopen because that motion was already several months
       late by August 10, 2021. Second, Brown’s mistaken belief about
       when he needed to file his motion to reopen does not support a
       claim of equitable tolling. See Wakefield, 131 F.3d at 970; Cadet,
       853 F.3d at 1221–22.
              We also reject Brown’s contention that the BIA ignored his
       evidence submitted with his motion to reopen. To the extent
       Brown’s argument relates to the BIA’s decision declining to reopen
       his immigration proceedings pursuant to its sua sponte authority,
       we lack jurisdiction to review this argument. See Lenis, 525 F.3d
       at 1294. 4 In any event, this argument lacks merit. The BIA was not

       4 Brown’s December 27, 2021 petition for review in this Court is timely only
       as to the BIA’s December 15, 2021 denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore,
       to the extent Brown’s petition claims legal error in the IJ’s initial March 25,
       2020 denial of his application for relief from removal, the BIA’s January 28,
       2021 dismissal of his appeal from that denial, and the BIA’s May 27, 2021 denial
       of his motion to reconsider, we lack jurisdiction to review these claims. See
       INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (requiring the petition for review to be
       filed within thirty days after the date of the final order of removal); Dakane v.
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       21-14486                   Opinion of the Court                                9

       required to expressly address each piece of Brown’s evidence in its
       decision, especially when none of this evidence addressed the
       timeliness of Brown’s motion to reopen or materially changed
       country conditions in Jamaica or Canada. Indeed, much of
       Brown’s evidence concerned harms that he allegedly suffered
       when he was living in the United States. Under these
       circumstances, we are satisfied that the BIA gave reasoned
       consideration to Brown’s motion and attached evidence and
       announced its decision sufficiently for meaningful appellate
       review. See Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1302.
              For all these reasons, we dismiss Brown’s petition for lack of
       jurisdiction to the extent he claims the BIA abused its discretion in
       declining to sua sponte reopen his immigration proceedings. We
       deny his petition to the extent he claims the BIA committed legal
       error in denying his September 2021 motion to reopen.
            PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN
       PART.

       U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the
       statutory period for filing a petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional
       and is not tolled by the filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider); Jaggernauth
       v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that the
       finality of a removal order is unaffected by the filing of a motion for
       reconsideration).