Court Opinion

ID: 9862986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:40:48.028444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:45:42.400542
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
Appellees insist on motion for rehearing that we are in conflict with the cases hereinafter cited in our holding that there-was an overlapping with respect to the issues on damages.
As we understand the authorities,, they are to the effect that a plaintiff who. complains of a nuisance may sue in one-action both for his personal injuries and for the damages done to his realty. Recovery for loss in value of the realty depends on his ownership of the realty or of some interest therein. Recovery for personal injuries does not depend on ownership of the realty he occupies. If the-nuisance is permanent, he may recover, if *527he owns the realty, for depreciation in its value caused by the nuisance. If the nuisance is temporary, he may recover for depreciation in the value of the use of the realty during the continuance of the nuisance. See the authorities cited in our original opinion, and also Vann v. Bowie Sewerage Co., 127 Tex. 97, 90 S.W.2d 561.
As we interpret the issues submitted to the jury, one set of them inquired as to damages suffered by appellees in decrease of the use and enjoyment of their home, while another set inquired as to damages suffered in loss of value of the home. The evidence warranted submission of issues both with respect to temporary damage and with respect to permanent damage, because, as is stated in our original opinion, vapors escaped for a period of several months from the vent pipes into appellees’ home, the vent pipes then were moved and raised to a greater height, and after that time damages were no longer suffered from this source. Thus, the evidence supported the theory of temporary damages up to the time the vent pipes were moved, and permanent damages based on the depreciation in value as of the time appellant had completed its efforts to eliminate the objectionable features of the plant. But, as is pointed out in the original opinion, the issues on permanent damage inquired as to value immediately before and immediately after the installation of the plant. This resulted in an overlapping of the two items of damage.
Statements in appellees’ brief and in their motion for new trial indicate that they treat the first set of issues as pertaining to a claim for personal injuries, rather than as a claim for temporary damage to the property. They may have been so intended, but, as we read all of the issues touching on the matter, they did not have that effect.
The cases cited on this question in ap-pellees’ brief are the following: Daniel v. Fort Worth & R. G. Ry. Co., 96 Tex. 327, 72 S.W. 578, where plaintiff sued for depreciation in the value of his property, and also alleged that plaintiff and his wife had been subjected to great physical and mental discomfort, and had been vexed, harassed and annoyed, in the sum of $500. Although, as we said in our original opinion, there is some language in the opinion which, taken apart from its context, might appear to support the contentions advanced by appellees in the case before us, the actual holding of the court was that plaintiff could recover in the same action for the physical injuries suffered by his wife and himself and for the loss in value of his property, and that the trial court erred in limiting recovery to the item of property damage. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Reeves, Tex.Com.App., 256 S.W. 902, where a recovery of $100 for annoyance and inconvenience was upheld when there was also a recovery for depreciation in the value of the property owned by plaintiffs. The court cited the opinion in the Daniel case, supra, and interpreted it, as we do, as a suit for depreciation in value of the property and for “physical and mental discomfort to the occupants of the home.” Columbian Carbon Co. v. Tholen, Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W.2d 825, 826, writ refused, where recovery was allowed for diminished value of the property and also for “unreasonable discomfort, annoyance, and inconvenience to the appellee’s wife and himself in their persons.” Olivas v. El Paso Electric Co., Tex.Civ.App., 38 S.W.2d 165, where a general demurrer was sustained. The opinion is not specifically in point on the question before us. Citizens’ Planing Mill Co. v. Tunstall, Tex.Civ.App., 160 S.W. 424, 425, where recovery was upheld both for depreciation in value of the property and for “inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort” suffered by plaintiffs. The cited cases are not, as we view the matter, in conflict with what we hold in the case before us.
We have also carefully examined the other contentions presented in the motion for rehearing, but remain of the opinion that our original holdings were correct.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.