Court Opinion

ID: 9940501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 17:12:30.900637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:56.314787
License: Public Domain

698                  February 14, 2024                No. 94

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
                REES GILMORE DIKEOS,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
               Yamhill County Circuit Court
                  18CR36194; A173183

   Ladd J. Wiles, Judge.
   Argued and submitted September 26, 2023.
   Daniel C. Bennett, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
   JOYCE, J.
   Judgment of dismissal on count of tampering with a wit-
ness reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)   699
700                                                        State v. Dikeos

           JOYCE, J.
          Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for
second-degree murder, ORS 163.115, and from a judgment of
dismissal for the charge of tampering with a witness, ORS
162.285. On appeal, defendant has filed four briefs: an open-
ing brief submitted through counsel, a pro se supplemental
brief, a second supplemental brief submitted through coun-
sel, and a reply brief.1 Several of defendant’s claims of error
revolve around evidence that officers found in the victim’s
trash bin. Officers photographed those items—a stocking
cap and a firework box—but testified that they had then
returned the items to the garbage. Based on the officers’
explanations that they had not retained the physical items,
defendant moved pretrial to dismiss, arguing that the state
violated his due process rights by failing to preserve excul-
patory evidence. The trial court denied that motion and, at
trial, the officers explained that they had disposed of the
evidence because they could not link the items to the vic-
tim’s death.
         After trial, and while defendant’s appeal was pend-
ing, the state found the evidence in its possession. The
stocking cap and firework box had not, as the officers tes-
tified, been discarded; instead, the items had been put in
a box and sealed with evidence tape, initialed by one of the
officers who had testified that he had returned the evidence
to the trash, given its apparent lack of evidentiary value.
Defendant again moved to dismiss and also moved for a new
trial under ORCP 64 B based on the discovery of new evi-
dence. The trial court denied both of those motions.
         On appeal, defendant assigns error to the denial
of both of his motions to dismiss, as well as the denial of
his motion for a new trial. Defendant further assigns error
to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial after
defendant learned midtrial that the state failed to dis-
close a conversation that it had with a key witness. In his
third assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial
court erred when, after granting his motion for judgment of
acquittal on the tampering with a witness charge, the court
    1
      Defendant’s pro se supplemental brief raises the same three assignments of
error as in defendant’s opening brief.
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                              701

entered a judgment “dismissing” that charge, rather than
acquitting him. We reverse the judgment of dismissal for
defendant’s tampering with a witness charge and remand
for an entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge. We
otherwise affirm.
                I. BACKGROUND FACTS
         We provide a brief overview of the background
facts, which are undisputed unless we state otherwise. We
describe the facts related to the evidence that officers testi-
fied that they had discarded, but that the state ultimately
found in its possession, in a separate section below.
         Defendant and the victim, J, were acquaintances who
both shared a passion for guns. Defendant would frequently
purchase firearms from J. The day before J died, J put defen-
dant in contact with a person who was also purportedly will-
ing to sell defendant a firearm. However, when defendant met
with J’s contact, the individual robbed defendant. During the
robbery, defendant fired some shots, but no one was hit.
         Defendant contacted J the night of the robbery
through Facebook Messenger, on which defendant used the
username “Hwhite Mahn.” Defendant did not mention the
robbery or the shooting; instead, defendant told J that he
had not met up with J’s contact at all. However, defendant
did tell J that he was not willing to do future transactions
with any of J’s friends and that he “[didn’t] want to talk to
or see anyone [that he didn’t] know.” J told defendant that he
could help defendant secure a gun and they made plans to
meet the following day for defendant to give J cash for a gun
and some drugs.
         The next day, defendant and J met outside of a
business in Newberg. J arrived at the location with his
friends, Haney and Corral, who were also J’s housemates.
When defendant arrived, J approached defendant and they
exchanged a few words. During this interaction, defendant
shot J multiple times, causing J’s death. Defendant ran
away unharmed.
        After defendant fled, police arrived and interviewed
witnesses. Several witnesses reported that they had heard
702                                           State v. Dikeos

a number of fireworks go off as the shooting occurred. At
least one witness suggested that the fireworks could have
been used as a possible diversion to distract from a planned
shooting.
        That evening, officers interviewed Haney, and he
told the officers that he knew that J had planned to meet
someone who went by the name of “Hwhite Mahn.” The
police were ultimately able to connect defendant to J’s death
following a series of interviews and after learning that
defendant was the user responsible for the “Hwhite Mahn”
Facebook account.
        The state charged defendant with one count of
second-degree murder, ORS 163.115, and one count of tam-
pering with a witness, ORS 162.285. At trial, the primary
issue was whether defendant acted in self-defense.
         During the trial, Haney testified that he witnessed
the shooting. Haney recalled watching J approach someone
in an alley who he identified as defendant. Haney described
that he saw J open his arms as if to give defendant a hug.
According to Haney, defendant then took two steps back and
fired three or four shots into J’s stomach. In response, Haney
testified that he ran towards J and that defendant shot at
him twice but missed. Haney stated that, in response to get-
ting shot at, he pulled out his .380 caliber pistol and fired
shots at defendant, but that defendant was able to run away.
         Defendant also testified at trial but presented a dif-
ferent version of events; defendant claimed that he shot J
in self-defense. Defendant testified that J approached him
that night with his hands in his pockets. As J approached,
defendant recalled that he noticed two of J’s friends walking
away from J and that J asked him, “what’s up, you got the
money[?]” Defendant explained that this made him “really
nervous” because the combination of the presence of J’s
friends and J’s behavior was “reminiscent of what [he] had
seen or what—[he] had been told” when he got robbed the
night before. Defendant testified that he asked J what was
going on with J’s friends and that J responded, “[O]h which
homies, which homies, the ones you shot at[?]” Defendant
stated that J then pulled out a pistol and cocked it, which
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                            703

made defendant think that J intended to shoot him. In
response, defendant testified that he shot J three times.
Defendant further testified that as he fled, he turned around
to see J on the ground, still holding his gun. According to
defendant, it was J, and not Haney, who then shot at defen-
dant but missed. Defendant was able to run away unharmed.
        During closing argument, the state argued that
defendant believed that J had set him up to be robbed the
day before J’s death. As such, the state’s theory of the case
was that defendant shot and killed J as revenge for J set-
ting him up to be robbed. Consistent with defendant’s self-
defense theory, during closing argument, defendant argued
that J and his housemates—Haney, Corral, and Schaad—
had plotted to rob defendant the night of the incident. In
particular, defendant contended that he shot J three times
“in a moment brought on by fear that he was about to be
robbed at gunpoint or that [J] was actually going to shoot
him.”
        The trial court dismissed defendant’s tampering
with a witness charge and the jury ultimately found defen-
dant guilty of second-degree murder.
   II. FACTS RELATING TO STOCKING CAP AND
                FIREWORKS BOX
         As noted above, three of the claims of error on
appeal involve evidence that officers initially said they did
not retain, but that the state ultimately located in an evi-
dence locker after defendant had been tried and convicted.
We describe the facts giving rise to those claims of error in
detail here.
         As part of the investigation, the state recovered and
photographed certain physical evidence, but, when defense
counsel sought access to that physical evidence from the
state, the state informed counsel that the physical evidence
had been “destroyed.” The particular physical evidence at
issue consisted of several pieces of clothing, including a
stocking cap with eye holes cut out, as well as an empty
box of mortar style fireworks; the state had recovered those
items four days after the shooting from the trash can out-
side of the residence that J had shared with a number of
704                                                          State v. Dikeos

witnesses, including Haney, Corral, and Schaad. After the
state informed him that the evidence had been destroyed,
and before trial, defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that
“he was deprived of due process when state actors failed
to preserve the physical evidence, and thus destroyed
potentially extremely important and possibly exculpatory
evidence.”
         During the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss,
Sergeant Baltzell, an officer involved in the investigation,
testified. He explained that, as part of the investigation, offi-
cers arranged to have Waste Management seize the garbage
can from the residence that J shared with Haney, Corral, and
Schaad. At this point, officers had not yet identified defen-
dant as a suspect and “had no real clear direction on where
to go,” so they seized the garbage can to look for items that
“link[ed] to what occurred [the] night of the incident.”
         Baltzell explained that he and Detective Eubanks
looked through the trash bags and photographed several
items that had been recovered, including articles of dark
clothing, an empty box of mortar style fireworks, and a black
stocking cap with holes cut out for eyes. However, Baltzell
testified that he decided not to retain those items because
he “didn’t see them as being associated with the homicide”
and did not consider them to have “any evidentiary value.”
He acknowledged knowing that someone had reported hear-
ing fireworks around the time of the shooting, but he fur-
ther testified that, at the time he searched the garbage, he
“didn’t see a connection between a firework going off and
the homicide.” Similarly, he acknowledged that, at some
point in the investigation, he became aware that another
witness reported seeing someone present at the scene wear-
ing a “stocking cap” or a “beanie with a bill” and that he
learned “later” in the investigation that a video from a sur-
veillance camera positioned near the scene showed Corral
prior to the shooting wearing a stocking cap.2 However,
Baltzell explained that, at the time he discarded the items,
    2
      Based on Baltzell’s testimony at the pretrial hearing, it is unclear whether,
at the time that he discarded the evidence, he had already seen the video.
Defendant below did not rely on the footage from the surveillance camera in sup-
port of his motion to dismiss so it is unnecessary for us to determine how, or
whether, to factor in the video.
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                              705

he did not connect the stocking cap with the eyes cut out to
the shooting; in his words, “nobody said that somebody was
wearing a ski mask.” The officers thus did not submit either
of those items for any forensic testing and, Baltzell testified,
discarded them. The trial court denied defendant’s pretrial
motion to dismiss, a ruling that we explore in greater detail
below.
         After defendant’s trial and conviction and after
defendant filed his appeal, the state discovered a box at the
Newberg Police Department that contained the evidence
that police had recovered from the garbage can outside of
J’s residence. Contrary to Baltzell’s prior testimony during
the pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss and
during trial—that he had not seen any evidentiary value in
the items and, thus, had discarded them—the box contain-
ing the evidence had been in the state’s possession since it
was initially recovered.
         After the state discovered the box of evidence, the
parties jointly moved this court for a limited remand to the
trial court for the purposes of deciding a motion for a new
trial during the pendency of this appeal. We granted that
motion.
          At the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial,
defendant also made an oral motion to dismiss “based on the
[s]tate’s negligence in preservation of these objects.” During
the hearing, Baltzell and Eubanks both testified. Baltzell
recalled testifying at defendant’s pretrial hearing that he
and Eubanks had decided to throw away the items retrieved
from J’s garbage can, including clothing, a stocking cap with
eye holes cut out, and an empty box of fireworks, because
they did not see any evidentiary value in those items at the
time. Baltzell further testified that he did not believe that
the items had been placed into evidence; however, he did
acknowledge that the box of evidence had been discovered
with evidence tape on it and that he had written his initials
on the box and dated it January 16, 2018. Baltzell stated
that he had no memory of putting the box in the evidence
locker or anything similar and that he did not recall initial-
ing or dating the tape on the box. Baltzell testified that he
“truly believed” that the items had been thrown away.
706                                                        State v. Dikeos

         Eubanks testified that an evidence technician had
located the missing box of evidence in a secure area of the
Newberg Police Department’s garage. Eubanks explained
that, after he informed the district attorney’s office that the
box had been discovered, he sent the items to the Oregon
State Police Crime Laboratory for testing. Eubanks testified
that the test results indicated that hair fibers found on the
stocking cap contained a mixed profile assumed to contain
DNA from three contributors, including at least one male.
Eubanks further testified that the lab had found finger-
prints from one of J’s housemates, Schaad, and one print
from J on the empty box of fireworks. Additionally, Eubanks
stated that he did not recall anyone at the police department
deciding to put the items in a box or to keep the items as
evidence. Eubanks testified that he did not believe that the
presence of the evidence tape and dated initials indicated
that the box contained evidentiary items because “a number
was never given to it[,] and it was not cataloged or treated
as evidence.” The trial court denied defendant’s post-trial
motion to dismiss and his motion for a new trial—rulings
that we consider separately and in greater detail below.
               III.   MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
         We begin with defendant’s second supplemental
assignment of error, in which defendant contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. We
begin there because, in our view, it is more appropriate to
begin with what we know the facts to be, rather than with
what the officers described during the pretrial motion to
dismiss hearing and during trial. As explained above, after
defendant learned that the state had discovered in its pos-
session the box of evidence containing the items originally
retrieved from the trash can outside of J’s shared residence
and after we granted the limited remand, defendant filed a
motion for a new trial based on new evidence. In particular,
defendant argued that the physical items themselves, the
fingerprints on the fireworks box, and the hair fibers on the
stocking cap constituted newly discovered evidence that was
exculpatory and warranted a new trial under ORCP 64 B.3
    3
      Defendant’s motion and arguments below (and again on appeal) raise only
a claim that the trial court should grant the new trial under ORCP 64 B; neither
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                                                 707

          The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new
trial. It found that Eubanks and Baltzell did not “inten-
tionally li[e],” but that “they certainly were mistaken about
facts” because of “negligent, maybe reckless, just—just incor-
rect handling of what was seized.” Nevertheless, as “egre-
gious” and “upsetting” as the officers’ conduct was, the court
decided that the newly discovered evidence was not “material
in the sense that it would change the results” as ORCP 64 B
requires. We review the trial court’s denial of the motion for
a new trial for an abuse of discretion, State v. Disorbo, 54
Or App 877, 882-85, 636 P2d 986 (1981), and affirm.
        ORCP 64 B(4) allows for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. A trial court may grant a new trial
based upon newly discovered evidence if the evidence meets
six requirements:
    “[It must] (1) be such as will probably change the result if
    a new trial is granted; (2) have been discovered since the
    trial; (3) be such as could not have been discovered before
    the trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) be material to
    the issue; (5) not be merely cumulative of former evidence;
    and (6) not be merely impeaching or contradictory of former
    evidence.”
State v. Howard, 205 Or App 408, 416, 134 P3d 1042,
rev den, 341 Or 198 (2006) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Whether evidence would “probably change the result if
a new trial is granted” is an inquiry that goes to the materi-
ality of that newly discovered evidence. State v. Simon, 294
Or App 840, 871 n 29, 433 P3d 385 (2018), rev den, 365 Or
502 (2019) (“The issue for the trial court, therefore, narrowed
to the materiality of the evidence—whether it would ‘prob-
ably change the result if a new trial is granted.’ ” (Quoting
Greenwood Products v. Green Forest Products, 357 Or 665,
684, 359 P3d 219 (2015)).

below nor on appeal does he suggest that he was constitutionally entitled to a new
trial. For example, he does not develop a claim under Napue v. Illinois, 360 US
264, 269, 79 S Ct 1173, 3 L Ed 2d 1217 (1959), which governs due process claims
centered on the presentation of false testimony at trial, and the failure to correct
such testimony, when the falsity is not discovered until later. Rather, defendant’s
due process claims, as argued both to us and the trial court, have centered exclu-
sively on the state’s ostensible failure to preserve physical evidence. Accordingly,
we are not called upon to address the due process implications of Baltzell’s trial
testimony regarding his disposition of the evidence.
708                                            State v. Dikeos

         At the outset, we note our agreement with the trial
court’s conclusions that the officers’ conduct was negligent
and, in its words, “upsetting.” Defendant did not have the
benefit of what is indisputably relevant evidence during his
trial because of the officers’ conduct. That said, ORCP 64 B
requires a defendant to satisfy six inquiries and we defer
to the trial court’s findings of fact “if they are supported by
evidence in the record.” Golik v. CBS Corp., 306 Or App 202,
213, 472 P3d 778 (2020); Simon, 294 Or App at 872 (stating
that the defendant, “as the moving party,” had the burden to
prove that “the newly discovered evidence * * * would likely
change the outcome at trial”); cf. also Gragg v. Hutchinson,
217 Or App 342, 347, 176 P3d 407 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 401
(2008) (“Because the trial court is usually in a better posi-
tion to evaluate the circumstances of each case and the prej-
udicial effect, if any, of any claimed irregularity, we defer to
the trial court’s conclusions regarding prejudice.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)). So framed, we agree with the
trial court that a new trial was not appropriate.
          Defendant was able to present evidence of the empty
box of fireworks and the stocking cap at trial through photo-
graphs and through testimony from Eubanks and Baltzell;
thus, the question reduces to whether the admission of the
physical items themselves or the fingerprints or DNA found
on them would probably change the result. To recap, offi-
cers found the stocking cap and fireworks box in the trash
can outside of J’s shared residence; testing of those items
revealed that there were hair fibers on the stocking cap that
contained a mixed profile assumed to contain DNA from
three contributors, including at least one male, and that
there were fingerprints on the empty box of fireworks—mul-
tiple fingerprints from one of J’s housemates, Schaad, and
one fingerprint from J.
        As explained above, defendant’s theory of the case
was that J and his housemates had planned to rob defen-
dant that night and that, in furtherance of that plan, J had
had a gun and threatened defendant with it, causing defen-
dant to shoot J in self-defense. During trial, Schaad testi-
fied that the empty box of fireworks belonged to him and
that he had set off the fireworks roughly a week before the
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                              709

shooting. However, defendant argued that the fireworks box
found in the trash can was the box of the same fireworks
that had been launched during the shooting and that the
fireworks were intended to hide the noise of the shooting
that J and his housemates anticipated would occur during
their robbery of defendant. As to the stocking cap, defen-
dant asserted that witnesses and surveillance footage in
evidence indicated that, before the shooting, Corral was
wearing a cap that matched the cap found in the trash, and
that shortly after the shooting, Corral had removed the cap
and disposed of it. Defendant contended that the fact that
the cap had eye holes cut out of it supported his theory that
J and his roommates intended to rob defendant.
        With that background in mind, we begin by consid-
ering the evidentiary value of the stocking cap and the DNA
found on it. At trial, a critical point of dispute between the
state and defendant was whether the stocking cap found in
the trash was the same hat that Corral was seen wearing
the night of the shooting. However, neither the physical cap,
the hairs found on it, nor the DNA from the hairs would
add anything to the jury’s ability to decide to whom the cap
belonged or whether it was in fact the same hat Corral was
seen wearing that night. Thus, the cap, hairs, and DNA
were not evidence that would “probably change the result.”
Simon, 294 Or App at 871 n 29 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
         Similarly, who set off the fireworks, and why, was
important to defendant’s self-defense theory. However, even
against that backdrop, the physical fireworks box and the
fingerprints found on it are not evidence that would prob-
ably change the result. That is so because Schaad testi-
fied that the empty box of fireworks belonged to him and
because defendant was able to present photographs of and
testimony about the fireworks box to establish that the box
had been found in the trash outside J’s and his housemates’
residence. In light of that evidence, Schaad’s fingerprints on
the fireworks box would add nothing to the jury’s consider-
ation of defendant’s self-defense theory. As to J’s fingerprint,
it would add some minimal amount of persuasive value to
defendant’s theory that J was part of a conspiracy with
710                                            State v. Dikeos

his housemates. However, given that defendant was able
to present evidence that the fireworks box was discovered
in the trash outside J’s and his housemates’ residence and
given that Schaad testified that the fireworks box belonged
to him, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that that
minimal additional persuasive value would not probably
change the result.
         Defendant also contends that he is entitled to a new
trial because this newly discovered evidence constitutes
additional evidence that could be used to impeach the offi-
cers’ testimony. In particular, defendant points to the fact
that, until the objects were rediscovered after trial, “no offi-
cer acknowledged that they had lost the evidence. Instead,
Baltzell testified that the objects were photographed but not
collected.” Thus, defendant argues that he is “entitled to a
new trial where he can * * * present the deeply conflicting
versions of Baltzell’s story to a new jury.” We do not agree.
Under the standard articulated in ORCP 64 B(4), impeach-
ment value alone is not enough to justify a new trial.
         Finally, to the extent that defendant contends
that the jury’s assessment of his self-defense theory would
have been affected by Baltzell’s testimony—later shown to
be incorrect—that he discarded the cap and fireworks box
because he “couldn’t link [the items] to the * * * homicide,”
we disagree. Although we agree with defendant—and the
trial court—that it is concerning that Baltzell’s untrue testi-
mony was presented to the jury, we nevertheless agree with
the trial court’s assessment that it did not affect the jury’s
assessment of defendant’s self-defense theory. As explained
above, the information that defendant had about the stock-
ing cap and fireworks box—testimony from the officers about
what they found and photographs of the items—was the key
information that defendant needed to support his self-defense
theory. At trial, defendant emphasized that key information
and questioned Baltzell’s investigation based on his pur-
ported choice to discard the evidence notwithstanding its
potential importance. Under these circumstances, the fact
that Baltzell testified that he had not believed that the evi-
dence was worth saving, and therefore, had returned it to the
garbage after photographing it, did not undermine the jury’s
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                                               711

evaluation of defendant’s self-defense theory and, in particu-
lar, its assessment of whether the state had met its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act
in self-defense. Cf. State v. Acree, 205 Or App 328, 335-36, 134
P3d 1069 (2006) (concluding that the defendant was entitled
to a new trial where the newly discovered evidence “probably
would have led a reasonable person to a different conclusion
from that reached by the jury” because the “only evidence
probative of [the] defendant’s guilt” was the officer’s testi-
mony that the scales were found in plain view, testimony that
was contradicted by video evidence discovered after trial).
        We thus conclude that the trial court was not
required to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial.
            IV. PRETRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
         Defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss—made
before the state located the evidence—was based on defen-
dant’s claim that the items, which the parties then believed
had been discarded, supported his theory that he was acting
in self-defense from a plot that J and J’s friends had to harm
defendant.4 More specifically, defendant argued that his Due
Process rights were violated by the failure to preserve the
evidence because it was apparent that the evidence in ques-
tion was relevant because the stocking cap looked like a hat
that a witness reported seeing an individual involved in the
shooting wearing at the scene. Defendant also argued that
the fireworks box had apparent evidentiary value because
the fireworks box matched the style of fireworks that were
heard in the area at the time of the incident. Defendant
maintained that the stocking cap supported his theory that
J and his friends intended to harm him; relatedly, defen-
dant also argued that the box of fireworks suggested that
J and his friends had specifically planned to shoot him and
had anticipated using the fireworks as a diversion tactic.
         The state argued that the evidence at issue had lit-
tle or no evidentiary value and that the officers did not act
in bad faith.
    4
      To the extent that the state argues that defendant’s pretrial motion to dis-
miss is moot given that the evidence at issue was discovered post-trial, we dis-
agree. Its subsequent discovery does not change the fact that defendant faced
trial without the benefit of the evidence.
712                                                       State v. Dikeos

         The trial court denied defendant’s motion to dis-
miss, concluding that the state did not violate defendant’s
right to due process when the officers discarded5 the evi-
dence. The trial court explained that the evidence at issue
did not constitute material, exculpatory evidence—a legal
term of art, as discussed below—because its value was “not
immediately apparent.” The trial court also concluded that
the items did not constitute potentially useful evidence—
also a legal term of art, as discussed later—and that the
police did not act in bad faith in discarding it.
         With that factual background, we turn now to the
legal standards governing the motion to dismiss. “In deter-
mining whether a constitutional right of defendant was vio-
lated, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact so long
as they are supported by sufficient evidence in the record * * *
[and] must decide whether the trial court correctly applied
legal principles to those facts.” State v. Zinsli, 156 Or App 245,
249-50, 966 P2d 1200, rev den, 328 Or 194 (1998). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant access
to evidence in the prosecutor’s possession that is “material
either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady v. Maryland, 373
US 83, 87, 83 S Ct 1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). Relatedly,
due process also imposes a duty on the state to preserve cer-
tain evidence obtained during its investigation. California v.
Trombetta, 467 US 479, 488, 104 S Ct 2528, 81 L Ed 2d 413
(1984). What a defendant must prove to establish a due pro-
cess violation resulting from the state’s failure to preserve
evidence depends on the quality of the evidence at issue;
that is, different tests apply depending on whether the lost
or destroyed evidence constitutes “material, exculpatory evi-
dence” or “potentially useful evidence.” State v. Faunce, 251
Or App 58, 64, 67, 282 P3d 960 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 203
(2013). Regardless of the quality of the evidence, the burden
is on the defendant to make the necessary showings. United
States v. Marshall, 109 F3d 94, 98 (1st Cir 1997).
         The quality of the evidence depends on the circum-
stances that existed before it was destroyed. If the evidence
    5
      We frame this claim of error around “discarded” evidence, because—based
on the officers’ statements—that was the posture that the parties believed that
the evidence was in at the time of defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss.
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                                               713

possessed “an exculpatory value that was apparent before
the evidence was destroyed” and was of such a nature that
it “might be expected to play a significant role in the sus-
pect’s defense,” then it was “material, exculpatory evidence.”
Trombetta, 467 US at 488-89. In that case, a due process
violation occurs if “the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.”
Id. at 489. If the exculpatory value of the evidence was not
apparent before it was destroyed, the evidence is “poten-
tially useful.” In that case, the defendant can establish a
due process violation by proving that the state acted in bad
faith when it failed to preserve the evidence. Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58, 109 S Ct 333, 102 L Ed 2d 281
(1988). Whether the state acted in bad faith “is reviewed as
a question of fact.” State v. Walker, 323 Or App 234, 241, 522
P3d 868 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 827 (2023).
A.   The exculpatory nature of the evidence was not immedi-
     ately apparent.
         Here, defendant argues that the stocking cap and
empty fireworks box were materially exculpatory evidence
for four reasons: (1) because they “would have supported
defendant’s theory that he was defending himself from an
attempted robbery”; (2) because, as a result of the state’s
failure to preserve the evidence, “no one was able to test the
items”; (3) because the evidence was “inherently suspicious”;
and (4) because the “potential evidentiary value of a stock-
ing cap with eye holes cut out is immediately apparent.”
         We address those arguments in turn, keeping in
mind that the question is whether, under the circumstances
as they existed before the evidence was destroyed, the evi-
dence had apparent exculpatory value. We begin with defen-
dant’s first argument. At the time that the evidence was not
preserved, the investigation into the shooting was four days
old, and no suspect had been identified.6 Thus, defendant
was not a suspect, and his theory of self-defense did not yet
    6
      Based on our review of the record, the parties and the trial court appear to
have operated under the assumption that the state’s decision to discard the evi-
dence occurred simultaneously with its discovery of the evidence and its decision
to photograph the items. Thus, we also use that as the relevant point at which to
analyze whether the evidence had an exculpatory nature that would have been
apparent to the state.
714                                                           State v. Dikeos

exist. Accordingly, whether the items would have supported
defendant’s ultimate theory of the case—that he was acting
in self-defense—has no immediate bearing on the analysis.7
         As for defendant’s claim that the evidence was mate-
rially exculpatory because no one was able to test the evi-
dence, that is an argument relevant to the question of whether
the evidence was potentially useful,8 see Youngblood, 488 US
at 57 (explaining that evidence is potentially useful if “no
more can be said than that it could have been subjected to
tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defen-
dant”), but it does not demonstrate that the evidence had
“an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence
was destroyed,” Trombetta, 467 US at 489 (emphasis added).
Defendant argues that, because the evidence could not be
tested, he lost access to evidence that, had it been available
to be tested, might have produced exculpatory evidence. But
any potential exculpatory value the items may have had was
not apparent at the relevant time, because tests were neces-
sary to ascertain whether the items could produce evidence
that was exculpatory or not.
         Next, we address defendant’s third argument; to the
extent that defendant’s argument is that the evidence was so
“inherently suspicious” that it clearly implicated the victim
and his housemates in wrongdoing that led to the victim’s
death and, thus, obviously had exculpatory value for anyone
(other than the victim and his housemates), including defen-
dant, we disagree. The Due Process Clause does not impose
“an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to pre-
serve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary
significance in a particular prosecution.” Youngblood, 488
US at 58. Rather, “[w]hatever duty the Constitution imposes
on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited
    7
      As addressed in greater detail below, this case is unusual in the sense that
the arguments are framed in the context of a failure to preserve when, in fact,
the items were later rediscovered in the state’s possession. That said, this claim
of error addresses whether, based on the record as it existed at the time that
defendant made his first motion to dismiss and in light of the trial court’s factual
finding that the evidence had been destroyed, the trial court correctly ruled that
the state’s destruction of the evidence did not violate defendant’s right to due
process. That the evidence was later discovered has no bearing on that question.
    8
      We address the merits of defendant’s alternative argument about potential
usefulness in more detail below.
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                             715

to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role
in [a] suspect’s defense.” Trombetta, 467 US at 488.
          It may be true, as defendant implies, that some
items may be so inherently suspicious so as to immediately
make their exculpatory nature known. For example, and as
Baltzell acknowledged during his pretrial testimony, had
officers found ammunition or a handgun, those items would
likely have had immediately apparent exculpatory value in
a case where officers knew that the victim had been shot. In
contrast, here, the evidence at issue—a stocking cap and an
empty box of fireworks—is not the sort of evidence that, in
the fourth day of an investigation with no identified suspect,
obviously relates to who killed the victim. As Baltzell testi-
fied, at the time he discarded the evidence, he “didn’t see a
connection between a firework going off and the homicide”
and also did not connect the stocking cap with the eyes cut
out to the shooting because “nobody said that somebody was
wearing a ski mask.” Thus, at the time the evidence was not
preserved, the evidence was not so inherently suspicious as
to have apparent exculpatory value. See Faunce, 251 Or App
at 67-68 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the state
should have preserved the pistol because it was exculpatory
evidence by its “mere existence”; although we agreed that
the gun was “relevant, additional evidence to corroborate
[the] defendant’s defense—that another * * * individual * * *
shot [the victim]—we disagree[d] that [that] evidence alone
[was] exculpatory” and because the “defendant was able to
establish [at trial] that [the suspect] had a similar black
powder pistol,” “the mere admission of the pistol itself into
evidence would have added little to his defense”).
         Finally, defendant contends that, because the
stocking cap had “potential evidentiary value,” it constitutes
materially exculpatory evidence. Defendant’s description of
the evidence as having potential evidentiary value is specu-
lation and is inconsistent with the notion that the nature of
the evidence was such that the exculpatory value of it was
apparent. See United States v. Drake, 543 F3d 1080, 1090
(9th Cir 2008) (explaining that mere speculation regarding
the exculpatory value of evidence is not sufficient to estab-
lish that evidence is apparently exculpatory); see also Bullock
716                                           State v. Dikeos

v. Carver, 297 F3d 1036, 1056 (10th Cir 2002) (stating that
speculation about the “potential[ ] exculpatory nature” of
evidence requires a showing of bad faith to prove a due pro-
cess violation). Defendant’s arguments, again, suggest that
the evidence could—at most—constitute potentially useful
evidence.
        We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly
concluded that, at the time the evidence was not preserved,
the exculpatory nature of the evidence was not immediately
apparent.
B. The trial court’s conclusions that the officers did not act
   in bad faith are binding on appeal.
         Defendant argues, in the alternative, that if the
empty box of fireworks and the stocking cap with the eye
holes cut out do not constitute materially exculpatory evi-
dence, then they are potentially useful evidence, and he con-
tends that the state acted in bad faith when it failed to pre-
serve those items. We disagree on the latter point. The trial
court found that the state did not act in bad faith when it
decided to destroy the evidence, and the pretrial record sup-
ports that finding. “The presence or absence of bad faith by
the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must nec-
essarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory
value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.”
Youngblood, 488 US at 57 n *. Here, there is no evidence
in the record to suggest that, at the time the evidence was
destroyed, the officers knew that the evidence could be
favorable to defendant or that the officers acted with “a
conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” Jones
v. McCaughtry, 965 F2d 473, 478 (7th Cir 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Baltzell testified at the pretrial
hearing that it was not apparent to him that these items
could be exculpatory or that the items could be linked to the
shooting, and the trial court credited that testimony. That
finding is binding on appeal.
         In sum, under the applicable law and given the
trial court’s factual finding, the trial court correctly denied
defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss.
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                                                 717

            V. POST-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
         In defendant’s first supplemental assignment of
error, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his
post-trial motion to dismiss. As explained above in our
discussion of defendant’s motion for a new trial, the court
concluded that the officers’ actions were “negligent,” but
accepted Eubanks and Baltzell’s testimony that they hon-
estly believed that the items had been destroyed when they
testified at defendant’s trial. The court found that the offi-
cers did not lie or commit perjury at the prior motion to dis-
miss hearing, but, rather, were mistaken about what had
happened to the evidence. The trial court also concluded
that the evidence was not material. It therefore denied both
defendant’s motion for a new trial and motion to dismiss.
         On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred in denying his post-trial motion to dismiss because
the state violated his due process rights by failing to pre-
serve the stocking cap and empty box of fireworks.9 In sup-
port of his argument that the trial court erred in denying
his post-trial motion to dismiss, defendant “relies on and
incorporates the arguments [that he] advanced in [his] First
Assignment of Error.” Thus, defendant reprises his conten-
tion that the evidence was materially exculpatory and also
reprises his argument in the alternative that the evidence
was potentially useful and that the state acted in bad faith
when it failed to preserve the items by misplacing them.
         So framed, and in the absence of any arguments
as to why the post-trial discovery of the evidence compels
a different result, the fact that the evidence was rediscov-
ered post-trial has no bearing on whether the evidence had
    9
      Although the evidence at issue was found and was, in fact, preserved,
defendant nevertheless argued at the post-trial hearing that the trial court
should grant his motion to dismiss “based on * * * the [s]tate’s failure to properly
preserve * * * potentially exculpatory information.” Defendant now presents that
same argument to us on appeal.
At oral argument, defendant acknowledged that his second motion to dismiss
mirrored his first—that is, that the question for the trial court, and now us, on
the second motion is whether the state violated defendant’s due process rights
when it failed preserve evidence that defendant could have used during his trial.
However, because the record before the trial court was different when it decided
the post-trial motion from the record before it when it decided the pretrial motion,
we address the two assignments of error separately.
718                                            State v. Dikeos

an exculpatory value that would have been apparent to the
state at the time the state failed to properly preserve the
items. Thus, for the same reasons articulated in our dis-
cussion of defendant’s first assignment of error, we conclude
that the evidence at issue does not constitute materially
exculpatory evidence.
         Consistent with our analysis of defendant’s first
assignment of error, we also conclude that the post-trial
record supports the trial court’s finding that the state did not
act in bad faith in its handling of the evidence. Although, as
the trial court concluded, the state’s conduct in misplacing
the box of evidence reflects that the state acted negligently,
the trial court concluded that the officers did not “inten-
tionally lie[ ]” about what had happened to the evidence or
“intentional[ly] obstruct[ ]” defendant’s ability to present a
defense. Furthermore, although defendant argues that “the
police action was so clearly negligent that it amounted to
bad faith,” negligent conduct is not enough to constitute bad
faith. See Youngblood, 488 US at 58 (explaining that there
was no bad faith on the part of the police where the police’s
failure to preserve evidence could “at worst be described as
negligent”). Thus, the record supports the trial court’s find-
ing that the state did not act in bad faith.
         In sum, the state’s failure to preserve evidence did
not violate defendant’s due process rights and the trial court
correctly denied defendant’s post-trial motion to dismiss.
              VI. MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
         In defendant’s second assignment of error, defen-
dant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion for mistrial after the state failed to disclose a con-
versation that a detective had with a witness that was favor-
able to defendant. We review the denial of a motion for a
mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 24,
791 P2d 836 (1990). However, “[i]t is not legally permissible
for a trial court to deny a new trial for a Brady violation if
there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evi-
dence would have resulted in a different outcome * * * or, put
another way, if the government’s suppression undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial.” State v. Deloretto, 221
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                              719

Or App 309, 321, 189 P3d 1243 (2008), rev den, 346 Or 66
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We affirm.
        During trial, defendant’s counsel was questioning
Eubanks about what happened to the .380 caliber pistol
that Haney claimed to have been wearing and using that
night. The following exchange occurred:
   “[Defense Counsel]: Are you telling me you spoke to * * *
   Haney after July, 2018, about the substantive question of
   where the .380 handgun—how the .380 handgun left the
   scene?
   “[Eubanks]: Yes.
   “* * * * *
   “[Defense Counsel]: And * * * Haney told you some infor-
   mation about that?
   “[Eubanks]: He did.
   “[Defense Counsel]:   And did you reduce that to a police
   report?
   “[Eubanks]: No, I did not.
   “[Defense Counsel]: Did you discover that to the Defense?
   “[Eubanks]: No, I did not.”
         Following that exchange, and outside of the jury’s
presence, defendant argued that Eubanks’s failure to include
that information in a report or produce that information to
the defense amounted to a discovery violation and moved for
a mistrial.
          The trial court observed that it did not know what
Haney had said to Eubanks. Eubanks then clarified, “[S]
ome time just shortly before the trial * * * or during the pro-
cess in serving [Haney,] * * * I asked him, you know, I’d still
like to know what happened [to the gun], where it went, and
[Haney] told me I don’t want to get in trouble. I don’t want
to tell you.”
         The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a mis-
trial. Although the trial court described the state’s failure
to provide that information to defendant as a discovery
720                                            State v. Dikeos

violation, it concluded that it did not find that there was “any
[prejudice] that would support a mistrial or a dismissal.”
         After the trial court denied defendant’s motion,
Eubanks testified in front of the jury that, when he served
Haney with a subpoena, he asked Haney what had happened
to the .380 caliber handgun that he used the night of the
shooting. Eubanks further testified that Haney responded,
“I don’t want [to] get [in] any trouble, I’m not going to tell
you.”
         Turning to the relevant legal standards, the failure
to disclose “evidence favorable to an accused * * * violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 US at 87. However, where
the prosecution fails to disclose evidence favorable to an
accused, the dispositive question is “whether there was a
reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would
have resulted in an acquittal or, put slightly differently,
whether in the absence of the undisclosed evidence the court
nonetheless reached a verdict worthy of confidence.” State v.
Bray, 281 Or App 584, 600, 383 P3d 883 (2016), aff’d, 363 Or
226, 422 P3d 250 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
         Although the state’s failure to disclose the conversa-
tion with Haney constitutes a discovery violation, we agree
with the trial court that the state’s violation is not of such
magnitude that it “undermines confidence in the outcome of
the trial.” Deloretto, 221 Or App at 321 (internal quotation
marks omitted). While it is evident that this information
was not disclosed to defendant when it should have been,
evidence of the state’s conversation with Haney was pre-
sented to the jury through Eubanks’s testimony. As a result,
this is not a case in which a discovery violation actually
resulted in any evidence being omitted from the trial. To
the extent that defendant argues that he was prejudiced by
this late disclosure because he was unable to cross-examine
Haney regarding those statements, that argument also fails
because defendant could have—but did not—recall Haney
to question him about this new disclosure. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defen-
dant’s motion for a mistrial.
Cite as 330 Or App 698 (2024)                               721

  VII.   TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS ACQUITTAL
         Finally, we turn to defendant’s third assignment of
error, in which he contends that the trial court erred when
it entered a judgment stating that his charge for tampering
with a witness was “[d]ismissed” rather than reflecting an
acquittal. We agree.
         During trial and at the end of the state’s case, defen-
dant moved for a judgment of acquittal for the charge of
second-degree murder and for the charge of tampering with
a witness. As to the charge of tampering with a witness, the
state conceded that it had failed to present evidence that the
witness was legally summoned to an official proceeding—
an element of that offense under ORS 162.285. In response,
the court stated that the tampering with a witness charge
was “dismissed” and later entered a judgment stating that
“Count # 2, Tampering with a Witness is Dismissed.”
         On appeal, defendant argues that, because he
moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the state’s
case and because the state conceded and the court found
that the evidence would not support a verdict against defen-
dant, the court was obligated to enter an acquittal. The
state contends that defendant’s argument is not preserved
because defendant did not object when the trial court stated
that the tampering with a witness charge was “dismissed”
and, alternatively, that the judgment is correct.
         We begin with preservation. Defendant’s claim of
error falls into one of the narrow circumstances in which
the rules of preservation do not apply—namely, a situation
in which the nature of the problem was not apparent until
after the judgment was entered. See Peeples v. Lampert, 345
Or 209, 220, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (“In some circumstances,
the preservation requirement gives way entirely, as when a
party has no practical ability to raise an issue.”); State ex rel
DHS v. M. A. (A139693), 227 Or App 172, 182, 205 P3d 36
(2009) (the appellant did not need to preserve an issue con-
cerning the judgment’s lack of statutorily required findings
because she had no practical ability to raise the issue until
after the court entered the judgment).
722                                           State v. Dikeos

          Here, in ruling on defendant’s motion, the trial
court stated “Count 2 * * * is dismissed. That—that one’s
out.” It was reasonable for defendant to interpret the court’s
response as an indication that his motion had been granted
as he had requested. Framed a slightly different way, it was
not evident that the trial court was intentionally making a
distinction between “dismissal” and “acquittal” and choos-
ing one over another. Because the error would not have been
apparent to defendant until after the judgment was entered,
defendant had no practical ability to raise the issue until
after the court entered the judgment. Under those circum-
stances, preservation was not required.
         As to the merits, ORS 136.445 governs motions for
judgment of acquittal and the standard for granting that
motion: “In any criminal action the defendant may, after
close of the state’s evidence or of all the evidence, move the
court for a judgment of acquittal. The court shall grant the
motion if the evidence introduced theretofore is such as
would not support a verdict against the defendant.”
        Here, as the state conceded below, no evidence sup-
ported a conviction for witness tampering. Because the evi-
dence introduced at trial did not support a verdict against
the defendant on the charge of tampering with a witness,
ORS 136.445 required the court to enter a judgment of
acquittal. Therefore, the trial court erred when it entered a
judgment of dismissal instead of an acquittal.
        Judgment of dismissal on count of tampering with a
witness reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.