Court Opinion

ID: 9666153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:06:46.673412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:24.222662
License: Public Domain

MALONEY, Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning in regard to appellant’s complaint that the court of appeals erred in holding that the error in omission of a jurisdictional element in the information was waived without objection by appellant. The majority holds that such a complaint as to lack of jurisdiction must be raised at trial to preserve error on appeal. I disagree.
The majority relies on Article 1.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that a defendant must object to a “defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences,” or the objection is deemed waived. Article 1.14, V.A.C.C.P. The majority, in focusing on this language, fails to consider the interplay of other relevant provisions of law and, in so doing, overrules the basic and long-held principle that a lack of jurisdiction will render a conviction void and not merely voidable.
Although Article V, § 12 of the Texas Constitution provides that “[t]he presentment of an indictment or information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause,” and Article 27.08 classifies a lack of jurisdiction as a substance defect, other provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure set out the jurisdictional limits of the various types of courts, see e.g., Articles 4.01, 4.05, 4.07, 4.14 and 4.16, V.A.C.C.P. All of these provisions must be interpreted in pari materia to give effect to the substantive jurisdictional requirements set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, the language in Article V, § 12 must be viewed in light of the cases from this Court that prompted its inclusion in the Texas Constitution.
The amendment to the constitution that created this provision was in direct response to a line of cases from this Court that held that a defect of substance in an indictment or information was a fundamental defect and could be raised for the first time on appeal. See e.g. Gengnagel v. State, 748 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Brown v. State, 558 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). The basis for this rule was explained by Judge Odom in Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (concurring opinion):
If the indictment fails to allege an offense against the laws of Texas, then it was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction *168of the trial court, and the conviction was void and subject to attack at any time.... Because such a defect, if shown, is jurisdictional in that it goes to the power of the trial court to hear the case and to enter a judgment of conviction against him, it may be asserted at any time.
Id. at 269.
Additional evidence of the legislature’s and the voters' intent in so amending the constitution can be found in various sources.1 The legislative history, in my view, indicates that the legislature did not intend for this amendment to completely eviscerate substantive jurisdictional requirements.
Furthermore, this Court’s recent decision in Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (interpreting TEX. CONST, art. V, § 12 and Article 1.14, V.A.C.C.P.), recognized that the substance defect listed in category 4 in article 27.08, V.A.C.C.P. (“That it [the indictment] shows upon its face that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction thereof”), is “a type of substance defect that is separate and distinct from one that, before the amendments to Article V, § 12, deprived the trial court of jurisdiction of the case for failure to allege all elements of an offense.” Id. at 267, n. 7.
Finally, a literal reading of article V, § 12(b) could lead to absurd results. If the mere presentment of an indictment could vest jurisdiction in any court, then, absent an objection from the defendant, a capital murder case could be properly tried in a county court. I cannot believe that such a result was the legislature’s or the voters’ intent.
Thus, I would hold that a claim that a court was without statutory jurisdiction to try a particular case may be heard for the first time on appeal; and that a defendant, in failing to object to the charging instrument prior to the commencement of trial, does not waive his right to later claim that the charging instrument showed on its face that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try that case.
In the instant case, however, I would further find that the information was sufficient to aver proper jurisdiction of the case. The information alleged a violation of a Houston City Ordinance that was properly enabled under either TEX.LOC.GOV’T CODE § 215.074 or §§ 243.003 & 243.007.2 *169Although the information was not clear as to which enabling statute was being used to support the prosecution, it was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the trial court under article 27.08, V.A.C.C.P. Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, but on different grounds than does the majority.3
BAIRD and BENAVIDES, JJ., join.

. See e.g., Analyses of Proposed Constitutional Amendments, Texas Legislative Council Information Report, No. 85-3, August 1985:
The courts have classified defects in charging instruments as either fundamental or nonfun-damental. Generally, a fundamental defect is one that is so profound that it renders the charging instrument invalid, voiding any conviction obtained as a result of the prosecution based on the charging instrument. A fundamental defect may be raised at any time, even years after trial. The courts have justified this result by reasoning that if the charging instrument contains a fundamental defect, the court never had jurisdiction of the case: thus the entire prosecution was, in effect, illegal and unauthorized.
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[T]he proposed constitutional amendment would provide that a court has jurisdiction of a case when the charging instrument is presented to it. This change in the law would have a significant impact on the line of cases holding that a fundamental error in a charging instrument deprives the court of jurisdiction of the case. Presumably, the law developed in those cases will no longer be applicable. It is possible, however, that the courts will still find jurisdictional problems in certain defective charging instruments, (emphasis added).
See also Texas House of Representatives, House Study Group, Special Legislative Report No. 120 on 1985 Constitutional Amendments, August 23, 1985:
[The amendment] merely gives the Legislature long-overdue authority to implement the constitutional requirement of written charges in common-sense fashion. By stating flatly that the court has jurisdiction once the indictment, however flawed, is presented, ... [the amendment] would force defendants to examine the indictment closely before trial and make their objections early enough for the state [sic] to make needed corrections. Convicted criminals could no longer comb the Penal Code and precedents for a ritual phrase, omitted or misstated in the indictment, that could serve as a prison-escape clause.

. Taken together, §§ 243.003(a) & 243.007 allow a municipality to issue or deny a permit to operate a sexually oriented business on the basis of the business’s location. Testimony in the instant case indicated that the business in question was denied a permit because it was in violation of location regulations under the Houston City Ordinance.

. Appellant did not raise the issue of whether the information in the instant case was sufficient to provide proper notice. See Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. article I, § 10.