Court Opinion

ID: 9882553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:34.217713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:35.824371
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Buffenbarger v. Estate of Meyer, 2023-Ohio-2760.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    HIGHLAND COUNTY

ROBERT THOMAS BUFFENBARGER,
 ET AL.,                                                                    :

                                                  Plaintiffs-Appellants,         :       Case
                                                  No. 22CA10

                                                  v.                             :
                                                             NUNC PRO TUNC
ESTATE OF WILLIAM AUGUSTUS                        :          DECISION & JUDGMENT ENTRY
 MEYER, ET AL.,
                                                  :
                                                  Defendants-Appellees.

_______________________________________________________________

                                            APPEARANCES:

Donald A. Cox, Orient, Ohio, for appellants.

Joshua Gunsher and Michael P. Richardson, Fairfield, Ohio, for
appellees.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL APPEAL FROM PROBATE COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:7-26-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}    This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas

Court, Probate Division, summary judgment in favor of Kurt A.

Buffenbarger (Kurt) and James T. Buffenbarger (Tad)1 as

coexecutors of the estate of William Augustus Meyer, defendants

      The depositions sometimes refer to James T. Buffenbarger
as Thad. Throughout this opinion, we have chosen the nickname
that appears in appellees’ brief, Tad.
                              2
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

below and appellees herein.
Robert Thomas Buffenbarger (Tom), Bruce Timothy Buffenbarger

(Tim), and additional parties,2 plaintiffs below and appellants

herein, assign the following error for review:

            “DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANT THE
            SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE COURT BELOW BASED
            UPON THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW SET FORTH
            IN OHIO CIVIL RULE 56?”

     {¶3}   William Augustus Meyer, the decedent, was an elderly

man who never married or had children.    Two of the decedent’s

nephews who lived in the area, Kurt and Tad, along with Tad’s

wife, Carla Buffenbarger, helped care for him until his death on

November 8, 2020.

     {¶4}   On March 11, 2021, the decedent’s last will and

testament was filed in probate court.    The will bequeathed

various amounts of money to some of the decedent’s relatives and

to charitable organizations.    Each of the following nieces and

nephews received $5,000:    Linda Meyer, Vicky Meyer, Kurt Warner,

Timothy Buffenbarger, Sally Sagel, and Tom Buffenbarger.

Another niece, Tisha Golden, received $20,000.    The will left

the primary residence to Kurt and the residual estate to Kurt

and Tad.    The will also appointed Kurt and Tad as the estate’s

     2
       The additional plaintiffs listed in the complaint are
Vicki Anne Gierhart, Linda Meyer, Sara Jane Sagel, Kathy Dye
Edwards, and William Rawers.
                                                                     4
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

personal representatives.   Additionally, the will recites that

the decedent signed the document on October 31, 2020, before two

disinterested witnesses, contains a “certificate of

acknowledgment” to indicate that on October 31, 2020 the

decedent acknowledged the will before Michelle Nephew, a notary,

and each page of the will contains the decedent’s signature.

    {¶5}   On May 4, 2021, appellants filed a will-contest

complaint and alleged they are estate beneficiaries and the will

admitted to probate is invalid.    Appellants claimed, inter alia,

that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity, the will was not

properly witnessed, the “will is the product of undue influence,

manipulation, deceit, and coercion,” and the “will is a fraud

and a fake.”

    {¶6}   On July 22, 2022, appellees filed a summary judgment

motion and asserted that appellants have no evidence to create a

genuine issue of material fact as to validity of the will.     In

response, appellants argued that genuine issues of material fact

remain because of witness credibility, the decedent’s

testamentary capacity, whether the will had been properly

witnessed and whether Kurt unduly influenced the decedent.     To

support their argument, appellants relied upon the depositions

that had been filed in the case.
    {¶7}   In reply, appellees asserted that appellants did not

produce competent evidence to show that genuine issues of

material fact remain for a factfinder to resolve.    In

particular, they pointed out that because none of the appellants

have personal knowledge of the circumstances that surrounded the

preparation and execution of the will, they are not competent to

testify to the decedent’s testamentary capacity, to the will’s

execution, or whether the will is the product of undue

influence.

    {¶8}   A review of the depositions reveal that, before the

decedent’s death, Kurt explained he had some discussions with

him about a will.   The decedent was familiar with radio-talk-

show host Dave Ramsey and “his will kit.”   Kurt told the

decedent that “he needed something like that.”   Kurt also found

what appeared to be a handwritten will worksheet in the

decedent’s house and brought it to the decedent, who at that

point resided in a medical facility.   Kurt asked the decedent if

the worksheet contained the provisions the decedent wanted to

include in his will, and he confirmed that it did.    Kurt then

used the will worksheet to prepare the will the decedent signed.

    {¶9}   Kurt took the will to the decedent in the hospital and

he read the will.   Kurt then left the room before the decedent
                                                                    6
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

signed the will.   Approximately ten minutes later, Kurt returned

to the room and picked up the signed will.

    {¶10} Tamson Connelly, a registered nurse, witnessed the

decedent sign the will.   She stated that the other witness,

Candace Schnee, also was present in the room.    Connelly thinks

that a notary also may have been in the room, but she does not

specifically recall whether a notary actually was present.

Connelly did not remember precisely how long she was in the

room, the time of day she witnessed the signature, or anything

specific about the decedent.    Also, Connelly does not know if

the decedent read the will.    She explained, however, that she

has witnessed wills in the past and when she does so, she

ensures that the person is the “right patient” by asking for the

person’s name and checking the person’s arm band.    As part of

her process, Connelly would ask the person if he or she was

aware that she had been asked to witness their signature and she

“would stand there and watch him sign his name before I would

sign my name that I saw him sign his name to the document.”

Connelly stated that, if she saw anything that led her to

believe that the person was being pressured, she would say

something.
    {¶11} Candace Schnee, a nurse practitioner, also witnessed

the decedent sign the will.    Schnee stated that she, Connelly

and a notary were all present in the room when the decedent

signed the will, but she does not recall specific people in the

room.    Schnee indicated that the decedent was in the bed and the

will may have been on a bedside table or a clipboard, but she

does not recall.    She also does not know if the decedent read

the will.    Schnee stated that she had not witnessed a will

signature in the past, but she had witnessed other legal

documents.    She explained that, before she would sign a document

as a witness, she would assess the room and the patient to “read

everything going on in the room” and would engage in

conversation to ensure that the person understood “where they

are, who they are.”    Schnee stated that she would not sign a

document if she felt that something was not right, or if she

thought that the person signing did not know what the person was

doing.

    {¶12} Linda Jane Meyer testified that she was surprised to

learn that the decedent had a will because two of the decedent’s

sisters told her over the years that the decedent “will never

write a will, or he will leave it all to the church if he did.”

Meyer was not surprised, however, that the decedent left the

majority of the estate to Kurt and Tad, because “they were the
                                                                       8
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

ones [who] were looking after him.”   Meyer did not have personal

knowledge regarding the decedent’s medical condition in the year

preceding his death, except what she heard from Kurt.        Meyer

also did not have any personal knowledge surrounding the

decedent’s execution of the will.

    {¶13} Sara Jane Sagel testified that she did not believe

that the will admitted to probate is “legitimate.”     She

admitted, however, that she was not present when the decedent

executed the will and had no personal knowledge of the

circumstances that surrounded the will’s execution.     Sagel

stated that she obtained some information about the decedent and

his medical condition from Tad or Carla Buffenbarger.        Sagel

believes that the will is invalid due to some “red flags.”       She

did not think that an attorney drafted the will, and the will

contained language “to bypass Probate and to offer an asset

inventory to the beneficiaries,” and the will provided for “no

accounting of the Estate.”   She also found it odd that one of

her cousins is not listed in the will, “as if she had already

passed,” but the cousin’s two children are included.     Sagel

additionally thought that the decedent’s signature appeared

“weak” whereas his initials “seemed to have a lot of strength.”

She also questioned why the addresses for the will’s witnesses
appeared to have been written by the same person and why the

witnesses did not complete the information on their own.

    {¶14} Mary Kathleen Edwards stated that she found the will

suspicious because it bequeathed money to one of her aunt’s

children, but not to the aunt alive at the time the decedent

signed the will.   She did not believe that the decedent would

have left the aunt out of his will.

    {¶15} Tim testified that Kurt texted him after the decedent

passed and informed Tim that the decedent looked over the will

“very carefully and signed his initials on each page as the

witnesses looked on.”   However, Tim has no personal knowledge of

the circumstances that surrounded the decedent’s signing of the

will and only knew “what Kurt told [him].”   Tim also has a

picture of the decedent, dated October 31, 2020, the date the

decedent signed the will.   Tim believes that the photo shows the

decedent “to be in very ill health” and “as if his mind is not

very cognitive.”   Tim agreed, however, that he is not a nurse,

doctor, or other medical professional, and has no firsthand

knowledge of the decedent’s medical diagnoses.    Tim stated,

however, that he “knew he was in bad shape.”     Tim believes that

the will is invalid for the following reasons: (1) one cousin

“who was alive at the time was not listed as a beneficiary, but

yet her children were,” and this cousin’s absence from the will
                                                                  10
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

is “very suspicious,” (2) some cousins were not included while

some were, (3) the will stated “there would be no inventory of

assets,” which he thought suspicious, and (4) “the massive

discrepancy” in the amount left to some of the relatives

compared to Kurt and Tad.    Tim did not think the decedent was

the type of person who would have a large disparity in the

disposition of his assets.

    {¶16} Tim also stated that he did not think that the

decedent had a will because either Kurt or Tad told him, at some

point in the past, that the decedent had “a folder with stuff in

it that would tell how to take care of things.”    Although Tim

agreed that Kurt or Tad found the folder that contained the

handwritten will worksheet that Kurt used to prepare a

computerized print-out of the decedent’s will, Tim questioned

whether the decedent had actually prepared the worksheet.    He

pointed out that the writing is in pencil and then someone used

a pen to trace over the pencil.    Tim also questioned why the

decedent did not include “Madeline and Kathy,” but included

“Tish and Kurt Warner.”     He explained that Madeline was Tish and

Kurt’s mother and that bequeathing money to Tish and Kurt, but

not to their mother, made “no sense.”    In Tim’s opinion, “the

Will is fraudulent.”   He based his opinion upon “Kurt’s previous
actions regarding a previous uncle’s Estate and also the way in

which this Will came out of nowhere.”    He thought that the

estate assets should have been mostly equally divided among the

number of living relatives with a little extra for Kurt and Tad.

Tim also thinks the will is fraudulent because “some of the

signatures are not [the decedent’s] signatures” and “[the

decedent’s] initials were not put there by [the decedent].”

“The signatures, the way it was witnessed, the fact that Kurt

drew it up, and the beneficiary list” all seem suspicious to

him.    Tim believes that Kurt made the will and the decedent did

not read it thoroughly before he signed it.

       {¶17} Tim also is not certain that the witnesses actually

watched the decedent read the will and sign it as he read it.

He thinks that the witnesses should have watched the decedent

write his signature on each page, but does not believe the

witnesses did so “because they’re hospital staff and that would

be time consuming, and I don’t know that they could be away from

their job that long to do it.”    Tim agreed, however, that he is

“making some assumptions to get to [his] conclusion.”

Furthermore, Tim does not think that the two nurses who

witnessed the decedent sign the will were “given all the

instructions required to make it valid, in that they were

supposed to see that he seemed of sound mind and that they
                                                                     12
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

watched him read it and signature each page, initial it.”      Tim

summed up his theory about the will’s validity as follows:

         [The decedent’s] physical condition deteriorated to
    the point where Kurt, possibly Carla, saw that he wasn’t
    going to last very much longer, and not having had a
    Will written, Kurt decided to get on the computer and
    generate one, and put it – and put it to his liking, and
    he then went to [the decedent], and I don’t know how he
    presented it to him.
         And then it was – the pages were signed and he
    signed the final page. And I believe there was – because
    Kurt is the Executor, made himself Executor, you know,
    I think he – that he then made it very favorable to him
    on the distribution of the Estate.
         I believe he either forged signatures in the past
    to become the [power of attorney] of his accounts, and
    I believe his actions regarding our [previous uncle’s]
    Estate showed deception and dishonesty.3

    {¶18} Tom Buffenbarger believes that the decedent’s overall

medical issues “would have had an impact on his ability to

understand what he was doing with” the will.   Carla told Tom

that the decedent “was not able or knowledgeable about signing

his own health care documents, such as admittance to a

hospital.”   Tad also told him that the decedent “was in bad

shape.”   Tom explained his concerns about the will:

         The names listed, the amounts, the omissions and
    knowledge from many, many years ago, [the decedent]
    stated on several occasions that when he died, we would

    3
       The deposition testimony does not shed much light on
Kurt’s previous actions regarding a different uncle’s estate,
except that Kurt was named the executor of this other uncle’s
estate.
     – everything would go to whoever was left of us, the
     nieces and nephews.
          He had no wife, no children, no other close
     relatives, you know, family relatives left.          In
     addition, seeing that Thad [sic] and Kurt were named as
     the Executors, the concern was Kurt.

     {¶19} Tom recalled that the last time he heard the decedent

state that he wanted to distribute his estate to his nieces and

nephews was at least ten years earlier.   Tom also claimed that

the decedent had said that he had binders stored with

“everybody’s name” on them that “represented [the decedent’s]

last wishes.”   However, he never saw these purported binders.

     {¶20} On October 13, 2022, the trial court entered summary

judgment in appellees’ favor and dismissed the will-contest

complaint.   The court determined that appellants failed to

establish genuine issues of material fact as to whether the

decedent lacked testamentary capacity, whether the decedent had

been unduly influenced, and whether the will had been properly

witnessed.   This appeal followed.

                                I.

     {¶21} In their sole assignment of error, appellants assert

that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in

appellees’ favor.4   Appellants claim that the facts “are subject

     4
       We observe that appellants’ brief does not contain a table
of contents, a table of cases, or a statement of the case or
citations to authority that support the primary assertions made
                                                                 14
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

to many different interpretations and give rise to many issues

of credibility and inferences that can be drawn from the conduct

of the parties.”

                               A.

(although it does cite to authority in support of the summary-
judgment standard). See App.R. 16(A)(1), (2), and (5). Under
App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant’s brief shall include “[a]n
argument containing the contentions of the appellant with
respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the
reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which
appellant relies.” Moreover, appellate courts should not
perform independent research to create a litigant’s argument.
State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19
N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714
F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“‘”appellate courts do not sit
as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but
[preside] essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented
and argued by the parties before them”’”); accord State v.
Lykins, 4th Dist. Adams No. 18CA1079, 2019-Ohio-3316, ¶ 57.
“[W]e cannot write a party’s brief, pronounce ourselves
convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s favor. That’s not
how an adversarial system of adjudication works.” Xue Juan Chen
v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 2013). Consequently,
although we would be within our discretion to disregard the
assignment of error, in the interest of justice we will
addresses the arguments that appear to be raised in appellants’
brief and as appellees have responded in their appellate brief.
See In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio St.3d
271, 2011-Ohio-2638, 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 14; Robinette v. Bryant,
4th Dist. Lawrence No. 14CA28, 2015-Ohio-119, ¶ 33 (within
court’s discretion to disregard any assignment of error that
fails to present case citations cases or statutes in support.
    {¶22} Appellate courts conduct a de-novo review of trial-

court summary-judgment decisions.   E.g., State ex rel. Novak,

L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128

N.E.3d 209, ¶ 8; Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611,

2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 13; Grafton v. Ohio Edison

Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

Accordingly, an appellate court need not defer to a trial

court’s decision, but instead must independently review the

record to determine if summary judgment is appropriate.

Grafton, 77 Ohio St.3d at 105.

    {¶23} Civ.R. 56(C) provides in relevant part:

         * * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith
    if    the    pleadings,     depositions,    answers    to
    interrogatories,    written    admissions,    affidavits,
    transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of
    fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as
    stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be
    rendered unless it appears from the evidence or
    stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation,
    that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and
    that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the
    motion for summary judgment is made, that party being
    entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed
    most strongly in the party’s favor.

    {¶24} Therefore, pursuant to Civ.R. 56, a trial court may

not award summary judgment unless the evidence demonstrates

that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be
                                                                   16
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law; and (3) after viewing the evidence most strongly

in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to

but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the

nonmoving party.   E.g., State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lucas Cty.

Prosecutor’s Office, 164 Ohio St.3d 151, 2021-Ohio-1241, 172

N.E.3d 143, ¶ 8; Pelletier at ¶ 13; Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,

50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

    {¶25} Under Civ.R. 56, the moving party bears the initial

burden to inform the trial court of the basis for the motion and

to identify those portions of the record that demonstrate the

absence of a material fact.   E.g., Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio

St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).   The moving party cannot

discharge its initial burden with a conclusory assertion that

the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case.    E.g.,

Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 147, 677

N.E.2d 308 (1997); Dresher, supra.   Rather, the moving party

must specifically refer to the “pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts

of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of

fact, if any,” which affirmatively demonstrate that the
nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

claims.   Civ.R. 56(C); Dresher, supra.

         [U]nless a movant meets its initial burden of
    establishing that the nonmovant has either a complete
    lack of evidence or has an insufficient showing of
    evidence to establish the existence of an essential
    element of its case upon which the nonmovant will have
    the burden of proof at trial, a trial court shall not
    grant a summary judgment.

Pennsylvania Lumbermens Ins. Corp. v. Landmark Elec., Inc., 110

Ohio App.3d 732, 742, 675 N.E.2d 65 (2nd Dist.1996).    Once the

moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party bears a

corresponding duty to set forth specific facts to show that a

genuine issue exists.   Civ.R. 56(E); Dresher, supra.   More

specifically, Civ.R. 56(E) states:

         * * * * When a motion for summary judgment is made
    and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
    may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
    party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by
    affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
    set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
    issue for trial.    If the party does not so respond,
    summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
    against the party.

    {¶26} Additionally, when trial courts consider summary-

judgment motions, Civ.R. 56(C) specifies that the court may

examine only “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of

evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, [that are]

timely filed in the action.”   See also Whitt v. Wolfinger, 2015-
                                                                  18
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

Ohio-2726, 39 N.E.3d 809, 813–14, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.); Davis v.

Eachus, 4th Dist. Pike No. 04CA725, 2004-Ohio-5720, ¶ 36; Wall

v. Firelands Radiology, Inc., 106 Ohio App.3d 313, 334, 666

N.E.2d 235 (6th Dist.1995).   Furthermore, a trial court

generally may consider only evidence that would be admissible at

trial.   Lowe v. Cox Paving, Inc., 190 Ohio App.3d 154, 2010-

Ohio-3816, 941 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.), citing Tokles &

Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 631, fn.

4, 605 N.E.2d 936 (1992) (“Only facts which would be admissible

in evidence can be * * * relied upon by the trial court when

ruling upon a motion for summary judgment”). “Deposition

testimony, in particular, must be admissible under the rules of

evidence” and “must be based on personal knowledge.”   Turnmire

v. Turnmire, 2022-Ohio-3968, 200 N.E.3d 604, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.)

(citations omitted).

    {¶27} Evid.R. 602 provides, in part, that a “witness may not

testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to

support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the

matter.”   “‘Personal knowledge’ is ‘[k]nowledge gained through

firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a

belief based on what someone else has said.’”   Bonacorsi v.

Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 320, 2002-Ohio-
2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 26, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th

Ed.Rev.1999) 875, and citing Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence 213,

Section 602.1 (2002) (“The subject of a witness’s testimony must

have been perceived through one or more of the senses of the

witness. * * * [A] witness is ‘incompetent’ to testify to any

fact unless he or she possesses firsthand knowledge of that

fact.”); accord 1 McCormick on Evidence 40, Section 10 (5th

Ed.1992) (“[a] person who has no knowledge of a fact except what

another has told him does not, of course, satisfy the

requirement of knowledge from observation.”).   Thus, “[e]vidence

is inadmissible under Evid.R. 602 if the witness could not have

actually perceived or observed what [the witness] is testifying

about.”   Turnmire at ¶ 27, citing M. B. A. F. B. Fed. Credit

Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc., 681 F.2d 930, 932 (4th Cir.

1982), citing 2 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 658 (Chadbourn Rev.

1979), and 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, Section

602(02) (1981).   Consequently, “‘[m]ere speculation and

unsupported conclusory assertions are not sufficient’” to meet

the nonmovant’s reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts to

show that a genuine issue exists.   Bank of New York Mellon v.

Bobo, 2015-Ohio-4601, 50 N.E.3d 229, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), quoting

Loveday v. Essential Heating Cooling & Refrig., Inc., 4th Dist.

Gallia No. 08CA4, 2008-Ohio-4756, ¶ 9.
                                                                    20
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

    {¶28} We additionally observe that not every factual dispute

precludes summary judgment.     Rather, only disputes as to the

material facts preclude summary judgment.     Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986) (“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.”).    “As to materiality,

the substantive law will identify which facts are material.”

Id. at 248; accord Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 617

N.E.2d 1123 (1993).

    {¶29} Moreover, any disputed material facts must present

genuine issues, meaning that “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.

2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, (1986).    For this reason, the summary-

judgment evidence must reveal more than “some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts.”    Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89

L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted).    Accordingly, if “the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’”   Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586–587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)

(citation omitted).

    {¶30} In the case at bar, as we explain below, even if some

disputed facts exist, none are material facts that raise genuine

issues that would preclude summary judgment.

                                  B.

    {¶31} We initially note that in a will-contest action, an

order that admits a will to probate “is prima-facie evidence of

the attestation, execution, and validity of the will.”      R.C.

2107.74.   Thus, a will admitted to probate is rebuttably

presumed to be valid.   Krischbaum v. Dillon, 58 Ohio St.3d 58,

64, 567 N.E.2d 1291 (1991).     When a rebuttable presumption

arises, “a party challenging the presumed fact must produce

evidence of a nature that counterbalances the presumption or

leaves the case in equipoise.    Only upon the production of

sufficient rebutting evidence does the presumption disappear.”

Myocare Nursing Home, Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 98 Ohio St.3d

545, 2003–Ohio–2287, 787 N.E.2d 1217, ¶ 35.    Once the

presumption of a will’s validity arises, the burden of proof

shifts to the will contestants to prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the will is invalid.     Stanek v. Stanek, 2nd

Dist. Greene No. 2018-CA-39, 2019-Ohio-2841, ¶ 35, citing

Bustinduy v. Bustinduy, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 98-CA-21, 1998 WL
                                                                    22
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879121, *2 (Dec. 18, 1998), citing Golding v. Ohio Natl. Bank of

Columbus, 115 Ohio App. 465, 466, 185 N.E.2d 577, (10th

Dist.1962).

    {¶32} In the case sub judice, the trial court admitted the

will to probate.   Therefore, the will enjoys a presumption of

validity and the burden falls upon appellants to produce

evidence to demonstrate that genuine issues of material fact

remain regarding the will’s validity.     Appellants appear to

assert that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether

(1) the will was properly witnessed, (2) the decedent had

testamentary capacity, and (3) the will was the product of undue

influence.

                                   1

    {¶33} R.C. 2107.03 sets forth the requirements for the

execution of a will.     A will must be in writing and “signed at

the end by the testator or by some other person in the

testator’s conscious presence and at the testator’s express

direction.”   R.C. 2107.03. Additionally, “[t]he will shall be

attested and subscribed in the conscious presence of the

testator, by two or more competent witnesses, who saw the

testator subscribe, or heard the testator acknowledge the

testator’s signature.”     R.C. 2107.03. “‘[C]onscious presence’
means within the range of any of the testator’s senses,

excluding the sense of sight or sound that is sensed by

telephonic, electronic, or other distant communication.”     R.C.

2107.03.

    {¶34} To attest and subscribe involves “two acts: (1) an

‘act of the senses’ by personally observing the signing or

acknowledgment of signature by the testator and (2) a physical

act of signing the document, under the observation of the

testator, to prove that the attestation occurred.”   In re Estate

of Shaffer, 163 Ohio St.3d 497, 2020-Ohio-6973, 171 N.E.3d 281,

¶ 17, citing Tims v. Tims, 22 Ohio C.D. 506, 14 Ohio C.C.(N.S.)

273 (1911), quoting Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Wills,

Section 330 (2d Ed.1892).   A competent witness within the

meaning of R.C. 2107.03 is a witness who “satisfies the elements

of R.C. 2317.01.”   Shaffer at ¶ 16, citing Rogers v. Helmes, 69

Ohio St.2d 323, 432 N.E.2d 186 (1982), paragraph one of the

syllabus.   R.C. 2317.01 provides:

         All persons are competent witnesses except those
    of unsound mind and children under ten years of age
    who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of
    the facts and transactions respecting which they are
    examined, or of relating them truly.

    {¶35} In the case at bar, the will contains the decedent’s

signature and the signatures of two witnesses, nurses at the

medical-care facility where the decedent was hospitalized.
                                                                   24
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Appellants did not put forth any evidence to suggest that the

nurses are not competent witnesses.     None of the evidence

suggests they were of unsound mind or under ten years of age.

Furthermore, both nurses stated in their depositions that, even

though they could not recall the precise details that surrounded

the execution of the will, they did recognize that they signed

the will.   They explained their normal procedure and observation

when they witness a patient sign a legal document and the nurses

said they would have followed this usual procedure when they

witnessed the decedent sign the will.    Moreover, their usual

procedure indicates they would not have signed as witnesses if

they were not within the decedent’s conscious presence.

Consequently, the evidentiary materials submitted to the court

demonstrate that the nurses are competent witnesses and that

they attested and subscribed the will in the decedent’s

conscious presence.

    {¶36} Appellants argue that a genuine issue of material fact

exists and point out that the nurses thought that a notary had

been present at the time that they signed the will and that this

mystery notary somehow establishes a genuine issue of material

fact regarding the execution of the will.    We do not agree.    The

presence or absence of a notary does not affect the fact that
(1) the two nurses, according to their usual procedures, would

have witnessed the decedent subscribe his name to the will, and

(2) they signed the will as witnesses and would not have done so

if they had any question regarding the decedent’s conscious

presence.   See Ayer v. Morenz-Harbinger, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-190687, 2020-Ohio-6861, ¶ 42 (will contestant cannot “create a

triable issue based solely on [witness’s] lack of memory as to

the details of the execution”).   Moreover, appellants did not

cite any authority to support their assertion.

    {¶37} We therefore disagree with appellants that genuine

issues of material fact remain as to the will’s execution.

                                  2

    {¶38} Appellants also assert that genuine issues of material

fact remain regarding the decedent’s testamentary capacity.      “A

person who is eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind and

memory, and not under restraint may make a will.”   R.C. 2107.02.

A testator is of sound mind and memory and has testamentary

capacity when the testator: (1) understands the nature of the

business in which the testator is engaged; (2) comprehends

generally the nature and extent of the testator’s property; (3)

holds in the testator’s mind the names and identity of those who

have natural claims upon the testator’s bounty; and (4)

appreciates the testator’s relation to the members of the
                                                                     26
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testator’s family.    Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E.

503 (1917), paragraph four of the syllabus.     Testamentary

capacity ordinarily is determined as of the will-execution date.

Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (1928),

paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds,

Kirschbuam v. Dillon, 58 Ohio St.3d 58, 64, fn. 9, 567 N.E.2d

1291 (1991).    “However, evidence of the testator’s mental and

physical condition, both at the time the will was executed and

within a reasonable time before and after its execution, is

admissible as casting light on [the testator’s] testamentary

capacity.”    Riley v. Tizzano, 4th Dist. Washington No. 06CA3,

2006, ¶ 15.

    {¶39} In the case sub judice, we agree with the trial

court’s conclusion that appellants did not submit evidence to

establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding

the decedent’s testamentary capacity.    None of the appellants

had been in contact with the decedent at, or within a reasonable

time before or after, he executed the will.     In fact, the last

time any appellant had been in the decedent’s presence was

approximately 18 months before his death.     Thus, none observed,

or had an opportunity to evaluate, the decedent’s testamentary

capacity at or near the time that he executed the will.
Consequently, appellants lack personal knowledge of the

decedent’s mental or medical state near the time that he signed

the will.   Instead, appellants base their claims about the

decedent’s testamentary capacity upon unsupported conclusions

that his poor health rendered him unable to understand what he

was doing when he signed the will.   The two witnesses to the

will, however, stated that, although they could not precisely

recall the circumstances that surrounded the execution of the

will, they would not have signed as witnesses if they had doubts

regarding the decedent’s testamentary capacity.    Furthermore,

although appellants complain that no one explained the will to

the decedent, appellants did not cite any authority that

requires someone to verbally explain the contents of a will to a

decedent in order for the decedent to have testamentary

capacity.

    {¶40} Additionally, even if the decedent may have been in

poor health at the time that he signed the will, poor health

does not necessarily equate to a lack of testamentary capacity.

Instead, any “[s]uch health decline must have actually affected

the testator’s capacity to execute the will.”     Foelsch v.

Farson,2020-Ohio-1259, 153 N.E.3d 601, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.); accord

Meek v. Cowman, 4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA31, 2008–Ohio–1123,

¶ 17 (no evidence existed that decedent lacked testamentary
                                                                  28
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

capacity, even though he had been declared incompetent and on

medication for dementia, when no evidence established how the

dementia affected the decedent or that dementia rendered him

unable to understand what he was doing when he made his will);

In re Estate of Goehring, 7th Dist. Columbiana Nos. 05 CO 27 &

05 CO 35, 2007–Ohio–1133, ¶ 54 (genuine issue of material fact

did not exist even though testator had Alzheimer’s disease when

testator executed the will; no evidence indicated that disease

“actually affected the testator’s capacity to execute the

will”); Martin v. Dew, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP–734, 2004–

Ohio–2520, ¶ 20 (no genuine issue of material fact when evidence

did not show that “decedent was affected by dementia on the date

she executed the will, and the uncontradicted statements by the

individuals who witnessed her sign the will indicate she was

alert, oriented, and had testamentary capacity”); Robinson v.

Harmon, 107 Ohio App. 206, 206, 157 N.E.2d 749 (2d Dist.1958)

(“Evidence that a person who executed a will was suffering from

some of the infirmities of old age, such as failing eyesight,

tremor of the hand in writing and a tendency to talk to himself

and to change subjects frequently in conversation, does not of

itself show a lack of testamentary capacity.”).
    {¶41} In the case before us, the will’s admission to probate

constitutes prima-facie evidence of its validity, and the two

witnesses’ deposition testimony demonstrates the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decedent’s

health condition actually affected the decedent’s testamentary

capacity.   Moreover, appellants did not present any admissible

summary-judgment evidence to contradict the two witnesses’

deposition testimony.   Rather, appellants offered unsupported

conclusions and speculation.

    {¶42} Consequently, we conclude that appellants did not

establish that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to

the decedent’s testamentary capacity.

                                  3

    {¶43} Appellants further contend that the decedent’s will is

a product of undue influence.    A will is invalid if it is the

product of undue influence.     Riley v. Tizzano, 4th Dist.

Washington No. 06CA3, 2006-Ohio-6625, ¶ 20, citing West v.

Henry, 173 Ohio St. 498, 510-511, 184 N.E.2d 200 (1962).      “A

testator is unduly influenced by another when the testator is

restrained from disposing of property in accordance with his own

wishes and instead substitutes the desires of another.”       Id.   To
                                                                  30
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

establish undue influence in a will-contest action, the will

contestant must prove by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) a

susceptible testator, (2) another’s opportunity to exert [undue

influence], (3) the fact of improper influence exerted or

attempted and (4) the result showing the effect of such

influence.”   Redman v. Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc. of

Pennsylvania, 69 Ohio St.3d 98, 101, 630 N.E.2d 676 (1994),

citing West, 173 Ohio St. at 510-511.

         “[G]eneral influence, however strong or
    controlling, is not undue influence unless brought to
    bear directly upon the act of making the will.” West,
    supra at 501. Further, “[t]he mere existence of undue
    influence, or an opportunity to exercise it, although
    coupled with an interest or motive to do so, is not
    sufficient, but such influence must be actually
    exerted on the mind of the testator with respect to
    the execution of the will in question.” Id.

Riley at ¶ 25.

    {¶44} Furthermore, a will is not presumed to be the product

of undue influence simply because a testator “‘disposes of his

property in an unnatural manner, unjustly, or unequally, and

however much at variance with expressions by the testator

concerning relatives or the natural objects of his bounty.’”

West, 173 Ohio St. at 502, quoting 94 Corpus Juris Secundum,

1074, at Section 224.   Instead, an unnatural, unjust, or unequal

property disposition – or one that varies from a testator’s
previous expressions – “‘does not invalidate the will, unless

undue influence was actually exercised on the testator.’” Id.,

quoting 94 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1074, at Section 224.     We

additionally note that the relevant time period to evaluate the

existence of undue influence “is the time at or near the

execution of the will” or at “a reasonable period before and

after the execution of the document.”     Knowlton v. Schultz, 179

Ohio App.3d 497, 2008-Ohio-5984, 902 N.E.2d 548, ¶ 22 (1st

Dist.).

    {¶45} In the case sub judice, our review reveals that the

record contains no evidence to establish that the will is the

product of undue influence, or that anyone actually exerted

undue influence on the decedent.     Instead, the will admitted to

probate matches a handwritten will that the decedent had

prepared.     According to Kurt, before the decedent’s death he

confirmed that the handwritten will accurately set forth his

wishes.     Once again, no evidence exists that anyone exercised

undue influence over the decedent that resulted in a will that

did not reflect the decedent’s wishes.     The will admitted to

probate matches the wishes that the decedent had documented in a

handwritten will.    Appellants offer no evidence to establish a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the will was the

product of undue influence.     Instead, all of their arguments are
                                                                32
HIGHLAND, 22CA10

based upon speculation and innuendo, not admissible summary-

judgment evidence.

    {¶46} In sum, we believe that appellants have not

established the existence of any genuine issues of material fact

regarding the validity of the will.   Consequently, the trial

court did not err by entering summary judgment in appellees’

favor.

    {¶47} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellants’ sole assignment of error and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                                JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that
appellees recover of appellants the costs herein taxed.

     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court, Probate
Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                    For the Court

    BY:__________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.