Court Opinion

ID: 9745537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:08:45.448512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.396579
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(dissenting). I do not agree that the judge properly allowed the motion for summary judgment. Consequently, I dissent from the result reached by the court. I believe that the court’s action today too firmly closes the door of implied warranty against those injured consumers whose commercial rela*194tionships with merchants do not satisfy the formalities of a completed lease or sale.
In Massachusetts, we have not formally adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Instead, we have taken the view that the Legislature has made the law of warranty “a remedy intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict liability theory of recovery that has been adopted by a great many other jurisdictions.” Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 639 (1978). Our “warranty” cause of action encompasses aspects of social policy normally associated with tort law and “jettison[sj many of the doctrinal encumbrances of the law of sales.” Id. at 640. The court today unfortunately retrieves one of those encumbrances in its strict limitation of implied warranties. In my view, the court moves in the wrong direction. We should seek to join those jurisdictions that follow the enlightened views expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, supra. Indeed, until today, I had thought the court committed to that course. See, e.g., Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 630 (1978).
Even if the court adhered solely to the policies of the Uniform Commercial Code, it gives too narrow a construction to the relevant provisions of the Code. General Laws c. 106, § 2-314 (1984 ed.), provides in part: “(1) Unless excluded or modified by section 2-316, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”1 Subsection (1) states that a warranty is implied not in the sale of goods, but in the “contract for their sale.” As we pointed out in Back v. Wickes Corp., supra, the warranty applies equally to leases. *195See ante at 189. “ ‘ Contract for sale [or lease].’ includes both a present sale [or lease] of goods and a contract to sell [or lease] goods at a future time.” G. L. c. 106, § 2-106 (1) (1984 ed.). This definition is intended to limit the application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to contracts for transactions in goods. It is not intended to limit its application to situations in which a sale or lease has already occurred. See Comment 1 to § 2-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 U. L. A. (Master ed. 1976). “ ‘ Contract’ means the total legal obligation which results from the parties’ agreement . . . .” G. L. c. 106, § 1-201 (11) (1984 ed.). “ ‘ Agreement’ means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance . . . ,”G. L. c. 106, § 1-201 (3) (1984 ed.). This broad language demonstrates that the provisions of G. L. c. 106 are to be construed liberally to achieve the intent of the parties. See G. L. c. 106, § 1-102 (1984 ed.).
It is proper, therefore, in considering whether an implied warranty was made, to examine the entire bargain of the parties, as shown by the evidence or — on a motion for summary judgment — as revealed in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The record contains the answers of the defendant Donahue Chevrolet to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories. Donahue Chevrolet admits that the elder Day was a potential customer given permission in accordance with Donahue’s test-drive policy to drive the motor vehicle involved in the accident. In my view, the plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed.
The test drive was a bailment for mutual benefit.2 The plaintiffs may have been able to demonstrate that the over-all trans*196action of an automobile sale or lease might include a bailment, which, standing alone, would otherwise seem to have been gratuitous,3 but, as one part of the entire transaction, would come within the statute. Cf. Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass’n, 53 Misc. 2d 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (transaction in its entirety a service contract, but plaintiff may be able to prove a sale; motion to dismiss denied); Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. 1984) (use of suturing needle in surgery was “transaction in goods” raising implied warranty under UCC). It is conceivable that in the usage of the automobile trade, the loan of an automobile, or even the furnishing of chauffeured transportation, to a customer or potential customer might be considered part of the inducement, or consideration, for the sale or lease of an automobile. Cf. Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 216 Or. 567, 575 (1959) (automobile loaned to service customer would create bailment for mutual benefit if bailor held out offer to public that in return for consideration of business to be transacted he would create this benefit for bailee). If such an integration of the relationship between the dealer and the customer were proved to be part of the parties’ agreement, I would hold that from that transaction implied warranties arise. Because the contract may be for a future sale or lease, the automobile sold or leased need not yet have changed hands for the contract to exist.

 Subsection (3) of G. L. c. 106, § 2-314 provides: “Unless excluded or modified by section 2-316, other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.” I address primarily the application of subsection (1), the implied warranty of merchantability. It may be that the Legislature, through subsection (3), has provided a remedy for some plaintiffs otherwise foreclosed under subsection (1).
Although we have said that warranty in Massachusetts is as comprehensive as strict liability theory in other jurisdictions, cases like this one provide a demonstration that this may not be true. For an otherwise-foreclosed plaintiff in the future, an action based on the strict liability theory of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts might be appropriate.

 A bailment for mutual benefit is a contract in which the bailment was made and accepted for the purpose of deriving benefit or profit. A test drive of an automobile is a bailment for mutual benefit. See Wilcox v. Glover Motors, Inc., 269 N.C. 473, 481 (1967). See also cases collected in 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 21 (1980). I find no difficulty in the concept that at least some bailments for mutual benefit come within the definition of leases as contemplated by the Legislature when it enacted St. 1973, c. 750.

 “A distinction should be made between ‘pure’ gifts having no sales overtones, and those that are part of an advertising arrangement with the ultimate aim of making a sale. The former should be beyond the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability, whereas the latter can be considered so closely allied to selling as to become a sale for purposes of section 2-314.” 2 W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2-314:03, at 323 (1984).