Court Opinion

ID: 9745978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:46:05.400296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:07.074726
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARMAN, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that in this case the defendant was properly convicted of felony murder predicated on mob action. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that this court has long recognized that the predicate felony underlying a charge of felony murder must have an independent felonious purpose. 236 Ill. 2d at 244. However, I write separately because this focus on an independent felonious purpose is undermined by the majority’s decision to decline either to expressly adopt or reject the same-act doctrine. In this way, the majority confuses, rather than clarifies, the issue for prosecutors and courts. As I outlined in a special concurrence in Davis, jurisdictions throughout the United States have adopted different approaches for determining whether a particular felony may properly serve as a predicate offense for felony murder. One of those methods is the same-act doctrine. Under this doctrine, application of the felony-murder rule is precluded whenever the act that constitutes the predicate felony is the same act that results in the death of the victim. This court has not expressly adopted the same-act doctrine. Indeed, this court’s decision in People v. Viser stands as a de facto rejection of the doctrine. In Viser, this court affirmed the defendant’s felony-murder conviction even where the victim’s death was caused by the same acts that constituted the predicate aggravated battery. Since Viser, however, our line of cases on this issue has strayed from a focus on the intent of the defendant to a focus on the act or acts committed by the defendant. In People v. Morgan, the court first reached the conclusion, recognized by the majority in this case, that the predicate felony underlying a charge of felony murder must have an independent felonious purpose. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 458. However, elsewhere in the opinion, the court concluded that “where the acts constituting forcible felonies arise from and are inherent in the act of murder itself, those acts cannot serve as predicate felonies for a charge of felony murder.” Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 447. As I later noted in my partial dissent in Pelt, the use of this phrase altered, perhaps unintentionally, the focus of the inquiry.2 Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d at 445 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The effect of this change in focus was to shift the analysis to one consistent with the same-act doctrine. Under this language from Morgan, a defendant may not be convicted of felony murder unless he performs a separate felonious act in addition to the act that causes the death. Pelt provided an opportunity to clarify Morgan, and return the focus of the inquiry to the defendant’s intent. However, the Pelt majority, citing Morgan, focused on whether the predicate felony “involved conduct with a felonious purpose other than the conduct which killed the infant.” (Emphases added.) Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d at 442. In that case, the single act of throwing the infant was held to be both the basis for the aggravated battery conviction and the act underlying the killing. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d at 442. Thus, the aggravated battery could not serve as a predicate offense for felony murder. The result of the Pelt analysis, as I noted in a concurrence in Davis, is that to be a predicate felony for felony murder, the felony “must not only have a felonious purpose apart from killing the victim *** but also must involve at least two separate acts.” Davis, 213 Ill. 2d at 493 (Garman, J., concurring). This is the definition of the same-act doctrine. I noted at that time that if this doctrine were to be adopted by the court, it should do so “unequivocally and thereby give clear guidance to prosecutors and trial courts.” Davis, 213 Ill. 2d at 495 (Garman, J., concurring). In the present case, this court again has the opportunity to clarify Morgan and its progeny and do one of two things. First, the majority could return the felony-murder analysis to the proper question — whether the defendant acted with the purpose of committing an independent felony apart from the homicide. The majority ostensibly has done so when it reaffirms that the court has “consistently recognized that the predicate felony underlying a charge of felony murder must have an independent felonious purpose.” 236 Ill. 2d at 244. Nonetheless, the majority also undermines its conclusion by repeatedly referencing, with approval, that language from Morgan, Pelt and Davis, and implicitly relying on what is, in effect, a formulation of the same-act doctrine. The second alternative would be for the court to expressly adopt the same-act doctrine. The majority already conveys, if unintentionally, an adherence to its principles. For example, the way the majority structures and prioritizes this court’s conclusions from Morgan reveals its unspoken reliance on the same-act doctrine. Rather than lead with the court’s holding in Morgan, which emphasized the need to demonstrate an independent felonious purpose, the majority begins its summary of Morgan by citing the “arise from” and “inherent in” language. The majority’s discussions of Morgan, Pelt and Davis also reinforce the doctrine, framing the issue in terms of acts, conduct, or “same evidence.” I would disagree with the adoption of the same-act doctrine, for the reasons I set forth in Davis. Davis, 213 Ill. 2d at 495-97 (Garman, J., concurring). However, adopting the doctrine expressly would surely be more helpful to the bench and bar than the course the majority continues to take. As it stands, the majority declines to adopt the doctrine in name. Instead, the majority purports to embrace a standard based on intent while also imposing a requirement that there must be both an act that constitutes a forcible felony and a separate act that results in the victim’s death. In the present case, the majority’s analysis does not affect the result. As the majority notes, defendant and his friends first chased down the victim. Defendant then threw a bat at the victim. Ultimately, defendant stabbed the victim at least once. 236 Ill. 2d at 242. There is no doubt that defendant acted with the intent to commit mob action. Further, because defendant committed several acts, including throwing the bat and stabbing the victim, the majority’s additional standard can also be met. Thus, here, under either an intent standard or under the majority’s analysis, defendant’s conviction is upheld. Suppose, however, that defendant and his friends searched for the victim with the same intent they had in this case, to “g[e]t [the victim] good,” but when they found him, defendant struck only one blow as his friends restrained the victim, and that blow resulted in his death. Under the same-act doctrine and under the majority’s analysis, a felony-murder conviction could not stand. Although defendant would have been acting with an independent felonious purpose, the act proving the felony would have “arisen out of’ and been “inherent in” the act of murder itself. This is not the result intended by our legislature. Our legislature has clearly expressed the intent that when a defendant intends to commit a forcible felony, his committing that felony is a sufficient basis to impose liability for murder if the victim dies as a result. There is nothing in the statute that would impose felony-murder liability on the defendant who strikes the victim multiple times, but not impose liability on the defendant who strikes the victim only once. The majority’s approach continues to obscure the felony-murder analysis. Therefore, I would again suggest that when the next case arises, this court should either expressly adopt the same-act doctrine, and overrule Viser, or expressly reject it and return the focus of our inquiry to whether the defendant acted for the purpose of committing an independent felony apart from the homicide. JUSTICE BURKE joins in this special concurrence.   Later, in Davis, I also noted that the Morgan court incorrectly attributed the “inherent in” language to the appellate court majority, rather than to the appellate concurrence. Correct or not, however, this language has now been adopted by this court and must be addressed.