Court Opinion

ID: 9788294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:39:41.088059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:07.644429
License: Public Domain

HALL, Judge,
concurring in the result.
¶ 34 I agree with the lead opinion that Appellant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the amendment to the indictment on the first day of tidal. However, regardless of prejudice, Rule 13.5(b) is violated when an amendment changes the nature of the offense. State v. Bruce, 125 Ariz. 421, 423, 610 P.2d 55, 57 (1980) (explaining that the type of formal or technical defect that may be remedied pursuant to Rule 13.5(b) is one that “does not operate to change the nature of the offense charged or to prejudice the defendant in any way”) (emphasis added); see 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.5(b) (3d ed.2007) (citing “general agreement that [the prohibition against amendments that charge a different offense] stands without regard to the absence of prejudicial surprise”). As my colleagues acknowledge, adherence to the Sanders’ majority would require us to find that the amendment here changed the nature of the charged offense. And if the amendment here did indeed change the nature of the offense with which Appellant was charged, then it was prohibited by Rule 13.5(b) and the trial court abused its discretion by granting it. Moreover, again pursuant to Sanders, the only appropriate remedy is automatic reversal. Although the lead opinion’s decision not to apply Sanders’ automatic-reversal rule under the circumstances of this case in which Appellant is unable to show any prejudice is commendable, I doubt that there is a principled basis on which both Sanders and the lead opinion’s analysis can co-exist.11 Instead, I would find that the amendment here did not change the nature of the offense, thus overruling Sanders on this issue. However, even assuming that the amendment did change the nature of the offense and should therefore have been denied, I would nonetheless apply the harmless-error doctrine and affirm the conviction. To do so, however, requires that Sanders’ prejudicial-per-se analysis be rejected. My colleagues decline to take this step; therefore, I write separate*444ly to explain why I believe the harmless-error doctrine should apply when a trial court erroneously overrules a defendant’s objection to a prosecutor’s motion to amend an indictment or information pursuant to Rule 13.5(b).
¶ 35 I begin by reviewing the analytical steps taken by the Sanders’ majority in reaching its prejudicial-per-se holding. First, the court described Rule 13.5(b)12 as the procedural equivalent of the Sixth Amendment’s notice requirement. 205 Ariz. at 213-14, ¶¶ 16-19, 68 P.3d at 439-40 (asserting that the Arizona Supreme Court drafted Rule 13.5(b) as the procedural “mechanism” to regulate compliance with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”). Second, a defendant’s claim that he has not been provided adequate Sixth Amendment notice of the nature of the charge is determined by examining the charging instrument alone. Id. at 214, ¶ 20, 68 P.3d at 440 (holding that the Sixth Amendment “is violated by an amendment that actually modifies an essential element of the offense charged”) (quotation omitted). Third, Sanders relies on federal case law for the proposition that “an amendment that actually modifies an essential element of the offense charged ... is reversible per se.” Id. (quotation omitted). Fourth, Sanders found that the amendment substituting A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) as the underlying theory of assault in place of § 13-1203(A)(3) changed the nature of the aggravated-assault offense. Id. at 216-17, ¶¶ 31-33, 68 P.3d at 442-43 (holding “these two types of assault are in fact distinctly different crimes” and that the amendment “changed the nature of the originally charged offense”). Having determined that the amendment changed the nature of the offense, the court thus concluded that “a finding of inherent, or per se, prejudice is required” regardless of the absence of actual prejudice. Id. at 220, ¶ 53, 68 P.3d at 446. If I understand this line of reasoning correctly, Sanders stands for the proposition that any post-indictment amendment that changes the nature of the offense is reversible per se. Id. at 214, 220, ¶¶ 20, 50, 68 P.3d at 440, 446 (“What we hold is that an amendment that changes the nature of the charged offense is prejudicial per se.”).13
¶ 36 I believe that Sanders’ prejudicial-per-se analysis is theoretically flawed. The initial error in Sanders is its claim that Rule 13.5(b) is the procedural equivalent of the Sixth Amendment’s notice requirement. This claim is the linchpin of its analysis because it paved the way for the court’s decision to treat an amendment changing the nature of the offense in violation of Rule 13.5(b) as a constitutional violation that requires automatic reversal. 205 Ariz. at 214-15, ¶¶ 21-22, 68 P.3d at 440-41. The court did not describe the error as “structural,” but its determination that any such error is reversible-per-se implies that it was, thereby precluding harmless-error review. See State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 199 n. 7, ¶ 29, 68 P.3d 418, 425 n. 7 (2003) (“[SJtruetural errors *445require automatic reversal.”).14
¶ 37 Although the concerns underlying Rule 13.5(b) and the Sixth Amendment notice requirement overlap, superimposing one upon the other is apt to lead to doctrinal confusion because they have different origins and claimed violations of each must be analyzed separately. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 1361, 1372 (10th Cir.1988) (Seymour, J. dissenting) (“Although two of the purposes of an indictment are to provide a defendant with notice of the charges against him and to ensure that he is tried only on charges found by a grand jury, these two functions are separate. They involve different considerations and different dispositive factors.”); Fawcett v. Bablitch, 962 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir.1992) (concluding that defective state charging document does not violate due process unless “inadequate notice [leads] to a trial with an unacceptable risk of convicting the innocent” and “[a]rguments pro and eon about the requisites of indictments therefore do not matter.”).
¶ 38 Certainly, an elementary principle of due process is that a person accused of a crime must be provided “reasonable notice” of the specific charge against him. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (“A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense ... are basic in our system of jurisprudence ----”). This principle is embodied within Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.2(a): “The indictment or information shall be a plain, concise statement of the facts sufficiently definite to inform the defendant of the offense charged.” Thus, an indictment that complies with Rule 13.2(a) provides the notice to which a defendant is entitled by the Sixth Amendment. But it is entirely different to say, as Sanders implicitly does, that the constitutional sufficiency of an indictment is determined solely by reference to the indictment. Although courts do look initially to the information or indictment in assessing the adequacy of notice, Calderon v. Prunty, 59 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir.1995), the claim in Sanders that the Sixth Amendment requires that all essential elements be plead in the charging instrument, is, as LaFave notes, “a dubious proposition.” LaFave et al. at § 19.3(a). Although such an assertion might have had some merit before the advent of liberal discovery rules, appellate courts now examine the entire course of the trial proceedings when reviewing a claim that a defendant was not provided constitutionally adequate notice of the nature and cause of the accusation. See, e.g., Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190, 195 (4th Cir.2002) (rejecting habeas petitioner’s claim that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are satisfied “only when the defendant is notified of the elements of the charged offense in the charging document ”) (emphasis in original); Calderon, 59 F.3d at 1009-10 (concluding that defendant received adequate notice of the nature of the charge through the prosecutor’s opening statement, the evidence introduced at trial and the trial court’s description of the crime scene when ruling on his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecutor’s case); Parker v. State, 917 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla.Crim.App.1996) (holding that whether the charging document “gives the defendant notice of the charges against him and apprises him of what he must defend against at trial ... will be made on a case-by-case basis” in which the court “will look to the ‘four corners’ of the Information together with all material that was made available to a defendant at preliminary hearing or through discovery to determine whether the defendant received notice to satisfy due process requirements”).
*446¶ 39 More importantly, in assessing the adequacy of Sixth Amendment notice, the determinative question is almost always whether the defendant was actually prejudiced. See, e.g., Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 932, 934-36 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that failure of indictment to charge felony murder did not violate the Constitution when defendant “had five days of actual notice [prior to closing arguments] of the prosecution’s intention to rely on a felony-murder theory”); Wilson v. Lindler, 995 F.2d 1256, 1264 (4th Cir.1993) (Widener, J. dissenting) (concluding that constructive amendment of indictment did not violate habeas petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right when he received actual notice of prosecution’s theory of case “at least before the jury was sworn, and almost certainly weeks before”), adopted, 8 F.3d 173, 175 (4th Cir.1993) (en banc); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th Cir.1992) (defendant received adequate notice of the prosecution’s felony-murder theory through testimony adduced during course of trial and when the prosecution requested a felony-murder instruction two days before closing arguments); Hulstine v. Morris, 819 F.2d 861, 863-64 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that “[d]ue process requirements may be satisfied if a defendant receives actual notice of the charges against him, even if the indictment or information is deficient”; concluding that defective indictment did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right because defendant was made fully aware of charges and potential punishment during plea proceedings); see also McKaney v. Foreman ex rel. County of Maricopa, 209 Ariz. 268, 273, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 18, 23 (2004) (rejecting argument that Sixth Amendment requires that aggravating factors in capital case be specified in indictment: “Even though aggravating factors need not be specified in the charging document, an accused in the State of Arizona is accorded notice under the rules of criminal procedure that complies with constitutional requirements.”); cf. Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 n. 2 (9th Cir.1989) (acknowledging that “[a]n accused could be adequately notified of the nature and cause of the accusation by [means other than the primary charging document] — for example, a complaint, an arrest warrant, or a bill of particulars” because “the Constitution itself speaks not of form, but of substance”).
¶ 40 The majority in Sanders relied on federal case law applying the “constructive amendment” doctrine, under which a defendant is conclusively determined to be prejudiced when errant jury instructions permit a defendant to be convicted of an offense that was not formally charged. 205 Ariz. at 214, ¶ 20, 68 P.3d at 440 (citing Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.1990)). There are several reasons why the doctrine should not have been invoked in Sanders as an exception to the requirement that a defendant claiming a Sixth Amendment notice violation show actual prejudice. First, an indictment that is actually amended on motion of the state pursuant to Rule 13.5(b) is the antithesis of an indictment that has been constructively amended during the trial. See United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259-60 (3rd Cir.2006) (“An indictment is constructively amended when, in the absence of a formal amendment, the evidence and jury instructions at trial modify essential terms of the charged offense in such a way that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for an offense differing from the offense the indictment returned by the grand jury actually charged.”) (emphasis added). Second, the constructive amendment doctrine was adopted primarily in response to actions by federal prosecutors and judges that had the effect of circumventing the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-19, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (finding “fatal error” when the evidence and the court’s jury instructions permitted defendant to be convicted of an uncharged crime: “Although the trial court did not permit a formal amendment of the indictment, the effect of what it did was the same____ [The] variation here [between pleading and proof] destroyed the defendant’s substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.”); see also United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir.2006) (“Constructive amendments are forbidden as they violate the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.”). The grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, is inapplicable to *447the states. See McKaney, 209 Ariz. at 270, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d at 20; State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 205, 639 P.2d 1020, 1030 (1981). Third, even to the extent that the Sixth Amendment might support application of the reversible-per-se constructive-amendment rule in Arizona in certain circumstances, it is a rule that has been interpreted very narrowly by federal courts. See, e.g., Morrison, 981 F.2d at 428 (distinguishing Sheppard — -repeatedly cited by Sanders in support of its reversible-per-se holding- — as a “narrow ruling” in which the prosecutor conceded he had “ambushed the defendant with a charge of felony-murder without adequate notice”); Stephens, 59 F.3d at 935 (same).
¶ 41 That Sanders erred by conflating the Sixth Amendment and Rule 13.5(b) becomes further evident when one examines the origins of the Rule. Although the Fifth Amendment is not itself binding on the states, both it and Rule 13.5(b) can be traced to the common-law prohibition against amendments to an indictment not consented to by the grand jury. See B.H. Glenn & C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Power of Count to Make or Permit Amendment of Indictment, 17 A.L.R.3d 1181, § 2 (2004) (“At common law the requirement that an accused could be held to answer for a serious offense only on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury was generally held to preclude the amendment of an indictment by the court.”). The purpose of the common-law rule was to protect citizens from having to face serious criminal charges except upon a finding of probable cause made by an impartial tribunal. See, e.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887) (“If it lies within the province of a court to change the charging part of an indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have been, or what the grand jury would probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an indictment by a grand jury, as a prerequisite to a prisoner’s trial for a crime, and without which the [Fifth Amendment] says ‘no person shall be held to answer,’ may be frittered away until its value is almost destroyed.”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 626, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. 270 (“The very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.”); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962) (“Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused ... to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.”).
¶42 The traditionally strict application of the rule frequently resulted in criminal charges being dismissed on technicalities in common-law courts. See, e.g., Territory v. Martinez, 5 Ariz. 55, 55-56, 44 P. 1089, 1089 (1896) (finding a fatal variance between indictment charging larceny of a steer and evidence showing that the animal was actually a spayed cow). To alleviate what came to be perceived as the unnecessary harshness of the common-law rule, many states adopted statutes or rules that disallowed claims of technical insufficiency in order to “prevent the failure of justice.” See People v. Johnson, 104 N.Y. 213, 10 N.E. 690, 691-92 (1887); see also, State v. Turnbaugh, 79 Ohio St. 63, 85 N.E. 1060, 1061-62 (1908) (discussing change to common-law rule by Ohio statute providing that variance between the allegations of the indictment and evidence offered to prove them “shall not be deemed ground for an acquittal of the defendant [ ] unless ... material to the merits of the ease, or ... prejudicial to the defendant”); State v. Smith, 153 Minn. 167, 190 N.W. 48, 52 (1922) (“If the strict rules of the common law ... were to be applied, we are not prepared to say that this indictment would stand the test; but these rules have been modified by our statutes, and we think the objections here urged are within the purview of the statutory provision that ‘no indictment shall be insufficient ... by reason of a defect or imperfection in matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of the *448substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.’ ”) (citation omitted).15
¶ 43 Likewise, Arizona enacted similar provisions that preserved the grand jury’s role as a bulwark against government oppression but permitted indictments to survive despite technical but non-prejudicial flaws. Section 834 of the 1901 Penal Code provided: “No indictment is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of a substantial right of the defendant upon its merits.” Analogous provisions were included in Arizona’s first two statutory codes in 1913 and 1928. See Rev. Stat. Ariz. Penal Code § 944 (1913); Ariz. Rev.Code § 4983 (1928). As part of the 1939 Arizona Code, the legislature enacted § 44-748, which, in addition to containing similar language regarding the insufficiency of the indictment, explicitly authorized a trial court to: (1) “at any time cause the indictment ... to be amended” as to “any defect or imperfection in, or omission of, any matter of form only[;]” (2) “at any time cause the indictment ... to be amended in respect to any ... variance [regarding the particulars of the offense] to conform to the evidence^]” and (3) “postpone the trial” if “the court is of the opinion that the defendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon the merits by any such defect, imperfection or omission or by any such variance ...In deciding whether the defendant was prejudiced, the court was to “consider all the circumstances of the case and the entire course of the prosecution.” § 44-748(3). To obtain relief on appeal, a defendant had to “affirmatively show[]” that he was “in fact prejudiced thereby in his defense upon the merits.” § 44-478(4). In 1956, § 44-748 was replaced, with no substantive changes, by Criminal Rule 145. Rule 145 was in turn superseded by Rule 13.5(b), which has remained unchanged since it was promulgated in 1973. The comment to Rule 13.5(b) provides: “This standard follows existing case law.” See also State v. Singh, 4 Ariz.App. 273, 277, 419 P.2d 403, 407 (1966) (explaining that Rule 145 “was designed to prevent the over-technical ruling” of the type represented by Martinez).
¶ 44 Based on the foregoing, I believe it is clear that Rule 13.5(b) is not, as posited by Sanders, the procedural mechanism chosen by the supreme court to enforce the notice component of the Sixth Amendment — although it frequently serves that purpose as well. Rather, it is intended to preserve the traditional role of the grand jury as an impartial body of citizens that stand between the government and those it would accuse of serious offenses. Indeed, the common-law heritage of Rule 13.5(b) is reflected in its three-sentence structure. The first sentence sets forth the traditional common-law rule: “The preliminary hearing or grand jury indictment limits the trial to the specific charge or charges stated in the magistrate’s order or grand jury indictment.” The second sentence qualifies the common-law rule by permitting non-substantive amendments: “The charge may be amended only to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or technical defects, unless the defendant consents to the amendment.” The third sentence automatically conforms the charging document to correspond with insubstantial variations in the evidence: “The charging document shall be deemed amended to conform to the evidence adduced at any court proceeding.”
¶ 45 It follows that Sanders’ use of a Sixth Amendment-type analysis when examining whether an amendment violated Rule 13.5(b), particularly one that results in reversal regardless of prejudice, is ill-conceived. Because Rule 13.5(b) is a procedural rule, a violation of it should be reviewable under the harmless-error doctrine. Instead, Sanders’ prejudicial-per-se holding insulates a violation of Rule 13.5(b) from harmless-error review by elevating the Rule to the status of the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause. See Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, *4491072 (D.C.Cir.1969) (“Because the leading amendment case of Ex parte Bain rested explicitly upon the Constitution, and because it apparently excludes any notion of a non-prejudidal amendment to the indictment, the concept of harmless error has not been applied to amendments.”).
1146 In summary, I agree with my colleagues that Appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment. But that finding does not free us from the need to determine whether the amendment nonetheless violated Rule 13.5(b) because it changed the nature of the charged offense. For reasons I previously set forth in my dissent in Sanders, I do not believe the amendment here changed the nature of the offense. Accordingly, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the amendment. Even assuming, however, that Sanders’ distinct-offense analysis is correct and that the amendment to Appellant’s indictment therefore violated Rule 13.5(b), I would find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances of this case.

. In my dissent in Sanders, I asserted that aggravated assault on a peace officer in violation of A.R.S. § 13 — 1204(A)(5)—now § 13-1204(A)(8)(a) — was a single offense that could be committed by alternative means. 205 Ariz. at 224-25, 73-78, 68 P.3d at 450-51. However, a person who assaults a peace officer by causing any physical injury to the officer was guilty then — and now — of a class 5 rather than a class 6 felony. Therefore, I should have staled that aggravated assault on a peace officer charged as a class 6 felony, that is, when the underlying theory of the assault is based on A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) (intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury) or -1203(A)(3) (knowingly touching another person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke such person), is a single offense regardless of the manner of its commission. In such circumstances, present here as in Sanders, Rule 13.5(b) prohibits the amendment only if the defendant would be prejudiced were the court to grant it.

. For the convenience of the reader, I repeat the full text of Rule 13.5(b):
Altering the Charges; Amendment to Conform to the Evidence. The preliminary hearing or grand jury indictment limits the trial to the specific charge or charges stated in the magistrate’s order or grand jury indictment. The charge may be amended only to corred mistakes of fact or remedy formal or technical defects, unless the defendant consents to the amendment. The charging document shall be deemed amended to conform to the evidence adduced at any court proceeding.

. Although the State included a dangerous nature allegation in the indictment pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(P), it was not an element of the crime of aggravated assault as charged by the grand jury. Indeed, the dangerous-nature allegation could have been filed by the State at any time at least twenty days before trial. Id.; see also Ariz. R.Crim. P. 13.5(a). Rather, it placed defendant on notice that if the jury found him guilty of aggravated assault as originally charged, it would then be asked to make a separate finding whether he intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to suffer serious physical injury. To put it another way, had the amendment not been granted, ihe underlying theory of the assault would have remained unchanged and the jury would not have been instructed on intentional or knowing assault as the theory underlying the aggravated assault charge. Accordingly, neither I nor my colleagues perceive the State’s addition of the dangerous-nature allegation to the indictment as a basis for distinguishing Sanders' distinct-offense analysis.

. For purposes of my analysis, I assume that an amendment that erroneously alters the nature of the charge in violation of the Sixth Amendment would constitute structural error because it would "affect the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and thus taint the framework within which the trial proceeds.” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 565, ¶ 12, 115 P.3d 601, 605 (2005) (quotation omitted). But see State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552, ¶ 45, 65 P.3d 915, 933 (2003) (“Most errors that we consider on appeal, even those involving constitutional error, constitute trial errors ... [in which] we consider whether the error ... was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, 94, ¶ 22, 118 P.3d 37, 42 (App.2005) (noting that violations of court rules are subject to harmless-error analysis).

. One consequence of the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause being inapplicable to the states is that state courts are not bound by Ex Parte Bain, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment as incorporating the strict common-law rule as it existed when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791. Accordingly, "federal cases involving indictments are of little value when evaluating the sufficiency ... of a state accusatory pleading.” Wilson, 995 F.2d at 1264 (Widener, J. dissenting).