Court Opinion

ID: 2964741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:24.450689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:00.676099
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2035

                                     KELLI SWAIN,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

             LAURA SPINNEY, EDWARD HAYES, AND THE TOWN OF NORTH READING,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                  [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Stahl, Circuit Judge
                                        _____________
                             Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge
                                     ____________________
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Michael Tyler,  with whom Michael Edward  Casey was  on brief, for
            _____________             _____________________
        appellant.
            Douglas  I. Louison,  with whom  Regina  M.  Gilgun and  Merrick &
            ___________________              __________________      _________
        Louison were on brief, for appellees.
        _______

                                 ____________________

                                    June 25, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  Kelli Swain was subjected to
                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            a strip search and visual body cavity inspection, while being

            held in  a cell  in the  North Reading,  Massachusetts police

            station.   This search occurred  after Swain had  been in the

            cell for twenty  minutes, and more than an hour after she was

            arrested.  She was arrested with her boyfriend as a result of

            his  shoplifting; she  was  suspected of  having possessed  a

            small baggie of marijuana.  The search was ordered, she says,

            by  a police  officer immediately  after he  had interrogated

            her,  while knowing she was  represented by counsel.   He had

            become angry with Swain for saying she knew nothing about her

            boyfriend's shoplifting.  Swain's  boyfriend, who was also in

            custody, whose shoplifting had triggered the arrests, and who

            had an extensive criminal  record, including drug crimes, was

            not  strip-searched.     The  charges   against  Swain   were

            eventually nol prossed.

                      Swain brought suit under 42 U.S.C.   1983 and Mass.

            Gen.  Laws  ch. 12,     11H,  11I,  alleging that  the search

            humiliated  her and  caused  lasting emotional  damage.   The

            district court  granted summary judgment for  the defendants.

            The court held that  there were no material facts  in dispute

            which would support  Swain's claims that  the search was  not

            reasonable under  the Fourth Amendment and  that the officers

            were not entitled to immunity.   We hold that, as  alleged by

            Swain, a jury could find that the search was not justified by

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                                          2

            a reasonable suspicion,  and that  the jury  should have  the

            opportunity to resolve the  factual disputes pertinent to the

            issue  of   whether  the   officers  were  entitled   to  the

            protections of qualified immunity.   Swain fails, however, to

            meet the  exacting standards for municipal  liability under  

            1983, even on  her version  of the facts.   Accordingly,  the

            judgment of the district court with respect to the individual

            defendants is reversed, but the grant of  summary judgment as

            to the Town of North Reading is affirmed.

                                          I.

                      We  review the facts in the light most favorable to

            Swain, the party opposing summary judgment.  On May 18, 1993,

            Kelli  Swain and  her  boyfriend,  Christopher Milbury,  went

            apartment hunting in the Danvers, Massachusetts area.  Around

            10:00  a.m., after the couple  had been driving  for a little

            while,  Milbury told  Swain that  he needed  to pick  up some

            things at Moynihan  Lumber.   Swain waited in  the car  while

            Milbury went into the  store; he was gone about  ten minutes.

            When Milbury got back,  he placed a bag  behind the seat  and

            started to leave the parking  lot.  As they drove out  of the

            parking lot, Swain saw  Moynihan Lumber employees pointing at

            the car; she  also saw a police cruiser pulling  into the lot

            just as she and Milbury were pulling out.

                      Swain  became very  upset.   She  began questioning

            Milbury about what was going on.  Then, after they had driven

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                                          3

            200  or  300  yards,  the  police  cruiser,  which  had  been

            following the  couple since  the parking lot,  turned on  its

            blue lights  and its  siren; Milbury  pulled their  car over.

            Officer Robert  Marchionda then  approached  the vehicle  and

            Milbury got out of the car.  Swain remained in the  car for a

            minute or two,  and then got out  when she saw Milbury  being

            handcuffed.   As  Swain  got out,  she  dropped a  baggie  of

            marijuana on the ground  about three feet away from  the car.

            Officer Marchionda  had seen Swain  put her hands  behind her

            back and  drop an object  onto the grass,  but could not,  at

            that point, identify the  object.  Officer Marchionda radioed

            for backup, and another  officer, Officer Romeo, arrived soon

            thereafter.   Swain  then  approached the  officers, but  was

            stopped  by one of them,  who restrained her  with his hands.

            She asked what  was going on,  and was told that  Milbury was

            suspected  of taking  things from  Moynihan Lumber.   Officer

            Marchionda then arrested Swain and handcuffed her.   While he

            was handcuffing her,  he saw  that the dropped  object was  a

            baggie of marijuana.  He retrieved it.  Swain was pat frisked

            at the scene, but nothing was found on her person.

                       When the police searched  the car, they found $400

            worth of hardware  in the  trunk, which had  been taken  from

            another store in Gloucester, Massachusetts, and  another $400

            worth of  sawblades, wrapped in  a hardware flyer,  under the

            front  seat.   Swain  was  surprised to  see  the merchandise

                                         -4-
                                          4

            there.   The  police implied  that she  was an  accomplice to

            Milbury's  theft;  she kept  saying  that  she  did not  know

            anything about it.   Milbury also told the police  that Swain

            was innocent.

                      Neither of  the officers  ever asked her  about the

            marijuana on the  ground.  Swain did  not see anyone pick  up

            the marijuana and did  not know if  anyone had seen her  drop

            it.

                       After about thirty minutes at the scene, Swain and

            Milbury were transported  in a  police cruiser  to the  North

            Reading Police Station.   When  she got to  the station,  her

            handcuffs  were removed.  Swain was seated at a booking desk,

            and an  officer had  her sign  a rights card.   Matron  Laura

            Spinney, the chief  of police's secretary, was  called to the

            booking desk because a female was under arrest.

                      While in the booking area, Swain asked to go to the

            bathroom.   Matron Spinney escorted  her to a  bathroom,  but

            did not  come in with  her.  Swain  was allowed to  close the

            door almost all of  the way, leaving it  open just a  little.

            Spinney stood outside the  door to the room, where  she could

            hear Swain using the facilities, but could not see Swain.  

            Swain  then returned to the  booking area, and  was told that

            she  could  make a  phone call.   She  was  shown to  a small

            office, and a police  officer stood outside.  She  called her

            attorney and spoke with him for five to ten minutes.

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      While  Swain was  seated in  the booking  area, her

            pocketbook was searched by  Spinney.  Spinney found cigarette

            rolling papers  in the  pocketbook.   No one  discussed these

            papers  with Swain.    At that  point,  one of  the  officers

            advised  Swain that marijuana had been found at the scene and

            that  she  was going  to be  charged  in connection  with it.

            Swain denied that it was her marijuana. 

                      Swain  was  then  fingerprinted  and  photographed.

            Officer  Ed  Hayes,  the  prosecuting  officer and  detective

            department supervisor,  ordered Matron Spinney  to take Swain

            to a  cell.  Spinney pat  frisked Swain before taking  her to

            the cell and  found nothing on her.  Swain  was left alone in

            the  cell  for about  twenty  minutes.   According  to Swain,

            Sergeant  Hayes  then  came  to her  cell  and  attempted  to

            question  her  about Milbury's  criminal  activities.   Hayes

            yelled at Swain, telling her that she was lying, and that she

            should tell him  what was going  on.   Swain, who was  crying

            hysterically, kept repeating that she honestly knew nothing. 

            According to Swain,  Hayes' questioning lasted  approximately

            fifteen minutes and then he "walked out in a huff."

                      Hayes states that he only  stayed with Swain in the

            cell  area   for  approximately  one  minute.     He  has  no

            recollection  of what  he discussed  with Swain,  but asserts

            that  it would  be  normal  procedure  for  him  to  talk  to

            detainees  to advise them about  their arraignments.  He does

                                         -6-
                                          6

            not  recall interrogating  Swain about  Milbury's activities,

            but cannot state  that he did not  do so.    Milbury, who was

            located  in  another cell  where he  could  hear but  not see

            Swain, stated that  he heard  Hayes talking to  her and  also

            heard Swain crying and saying that she was innocent.

                      About five  to ten minutes after  Hayes' departure,

            Spinney returned and apologetically informed Swain that Hayes

            had  ordered her  to  strip  search  Swain.    It  is  Hayes'

            testimony  that he  believes  he would  have  ordered such  a

            search prior to speaking  with Swain.  Spinney does  not know

            whether  the search was  ordered before or  after Hayes spoke

            with Swain, but knows that Hayes did not order a strip search

            when  he originally told Spinney  to take Swain  to the cell.

            Spinney states, however, that the  order to strip search came

            almost  immediately after she brought Swain  to the cell, and

            not a significant amount of time later.  

                      Swain  could  not  understand  why  she  was  being

            searched and  began crying again. Spinney  then ordered Swain

            to remove all of  her clothing except for  her bra.   Spinney

            shook out  each item as Swain took it off.  Spinney then made

            Swain  bend over  and spread  her buttocks.   Swain  was very

            upset and shaking uncontrollably the entire time.   Swain was

            then  told she  could  get dressed.    Spinney found  nothing

            during  her  search.   The  entire  procedure lasted  fifteen

            minutes.   Hayes had not told  Spinney what to look  for, but

                                         -7-
                                          7

            Spinney  knew that marijuana had been found at the scene, and

            assumed that she was looking for drugs. 

                      Swain asserts that, before  she was asked to strip,

            Spinney  assured Swain that the video camera in the cell area

            was already off. Swain did not  see her turn the camera  off.

            Chief of  Police Henry  Purnell testified, however,  that the

            station cameras, including  the one in  the female cell,  are

            constantly left on.  Videotapes are sometimes made from these

            cameras,  but the  Department has  no policies  or procedures

            concerning the making, storage,  or retention of these tapes.

            Matrons  are  instructed to  turn  the  cell  camera off,  by

            pressing a button, when conducting  a search.  Spinney states

            that  she turned  the camera  off with  a wall  switch before

            searching Swain, but  does not recall telling  Swain that the

            camera was off  or making  any comments about  the camera  at

            all. 

                      Milbury, who had an extensive criminal record,  was

            never strip searched.   Hayes was aware of Milbury's  history

            of drug convictions and  knew that Milbury was  on probation,

            having pulled the  records while booking Milbury.   Swain had

            no prior criminal convictions.

                      Officer  Hayes,  for his  part,  tells  a different

            story.  He asserts that he ordered the strip  search of Swain

            immediately  upon  his arrival  at  the  booking desk,  which

            occurred as soon as he was informed that the arrests had been

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                                          8

            made,  and, he believes, before he spoke with her.  According

            to Hayes, he ordered the search because the arresting officer

            showed  him the marijuana and  informed him that  Swain was a

            principal suspect  in a narcotics incident.   He also asserts

            that  he  suspected Swain  of  carrying  a concealed  weapon,

            although  he   acknowledges  that  this  was   a  generalized

            suspicion  of narcotics  suspects,  rather  than a  suspicion

            based on any characteristics of Swain.

                      Later that day, Milbury and Swain were arraigned in

            Woburn District Court and released on their own recognizance.

            All charges  against Swain  were eventually "nol  prossed" or

            continued  without a  finding.    Swain  suffered  continuing

            emotional  trauma  as  a  result  of  the  search  and sought

            counseling.     

                      The  Town  of  North  Reading's   policy  on  strip

            searches is outlined  in a memo on "Inventory Search Policy,"

            prepared in 1989 by training officer Lieutenant Edward Nolan.

            The  Policy states that: "A  strip search of  the arrestee is

            warranted only if the  police have probable cause  to believe

            that  the arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons on his

            body."  Chief Purnell testified that, in any arrest involving

            drugs, all arrestees are strip searched.  The shift commander

            -- normally the highest-ranking officer  on duty -- makes the

            determination of when a strip search is warranted. 

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                                          9

                      The Municipal Police  Institute (MPI), a  statewide

            police  association, publishes a  book called "Police Manual:

            Policies  & Procedures."   Chief  Purnell testified  that the

            North  Reading  police  adhere  to  the  MPI  policies.   The

            relevant MPI policy is as follows:

                      A   strip  search   of  an   arrestee  is
                      warranted    only   if    officers   have
                      reasonable suspicion to believe  that the
                      arrestee  is   concealing  contraband  or
                      weapons on his body.

                      1.   All body strip-searches must  be approved
                           by   the  officer-in-charge,   who  shall
                           consider the following question:

                                Is  the crime  one that  is normally
                                associated    with    weapons     or
                                contraband?

                           Only if  the answer  to this  question is
                           yes and  there is a  reasonable suspicion
                           that   the   arrestee   has  weapons   or
                           contraband  on his  person  will  a  body
                           strip-search be authorized.

                      2.   Body  cavity  searches   should  not   be
                           conducted    without the express approval
                           of the officer-in-charge,  and require  a
                           search warrant signed by a judge.     

            However,  both  Sergeant Hayes  and Matron  Spinney testified

            that they were unaware that North Reading had any policy with

            regard  to strip searches.   Hayes testified that  it was his

            policy  to strip  search individuals whenever  narcotics were

            involved in the case.  Nonetheless, he  did not order a strip

            search of Milbury.

                                         II.

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                                          10

                      Swain claims, under 42 U.S.C.   1983 and Mass. Gen.

            Laws ch. 12,     11H, 11I, that Laura Spinney,  Edward Hayes,

            and the Town of  North Reading violated her rights  under the

            United States and  Massachusetts Constitutions by  subjecting

            her to  an unreasonable  search.   On defendants'  motion for

            summary judgment, the district  court held that, under United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1975), the search  of
            ______    _____

            Swain  was within  the bounds  of the  Fourth Amendment.   It

            thought  Klein unaffected  by Bell  v. Wolfish, 441  U.S. 520
                     _____                ____     _______

            (1979).  The district court further  held that the individual

            defendants were, in any event, entitled to qualified immunity

            from suit.   As to  the Massachusetts law  claims, the  court

            found that,  in this  area, Massachusetts  constitutional law

            tracked the  federal standards.  Finally,  the district court

            found that  Swain had failed  to meet the  exacting standards

            for municipal liability under   1983.

                      Swain argues  on appeal  that the police  must have

            probable  cause to  believe  that an  arrestee is  concealing

            weapons or contraband in order to strip search that arrestee.

            She further argues that, even if the search needed only to be

            supported by  a reasonable  suspicion, no such  suspicion was

            present  and that the officers  are thus not  entitled to the

            protections of qualified immunity. 

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                                          11

                      We  review  the district  court's grant  of summary

            judgment  de novo.   EEOC v.  Amego, Inc., 110  F.3d 135, 141
                      _______    ____     ___________

            (1st Cir. 1997).  

                                         III.

                      A  strip  and  visual  body  cavity  search  of  an

            arrestee must  be justified, at  the least,  by a  reasonable

            suspicion.   Because  a jury  could find  that  Officer Hayes

            acted  without  a   reasonable  suspicion   that  Swain   was

            concealing  drugs or weapons, we find that Swain has stated a

            claim  against  the   individual  defendants  sufficient   to

            withstand a motion for  summary judgment.  Furthermore, while

            some  courts have  suggested that  a higher  standard may  be
                                                 ______

            necessary to justify  a strip search  and visual body  cavity

            inspection, it  was clearly  established at  the time  of the

            search  that  the  Fourth   Amendment  requires  at  least  a
                                                             _________

            reasonable suspicion  to  conduct these  types  of  searches.

            Significant factual disputes remain, rendering  it impossible

            to  resolve  conclusively the  immunity  question on  summary

            judgment.

            A. Strip  Searches, Visual  Body Cavity Inspections,  and the
            _____________________________________________________________

            Fourth Amendment
            ________________

                      "[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a  full

            search of the person is not only an exception  to the warrant

            requirement  of   the  Fourth   Amendment,  but  is   also  a

            'reasonable' search under that  amendment."  United States v.
                                                         _____________

                                         -12-
                                          12

            Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).  Thus, under Robinson, if
            ________                                         ________

            the arrest was lawful,  a searching officer does not  need to

            have  any further  justification for  performing a  full body

            search of an arrestee.  See United States v. Bizier, 113 F.3d
                                    ___ _____________    ______

            214, 217 (1st  Cir. 1997).   Moreover, a  search incident  to

            arrest need not  occur at the scene  of the arrest, but  "may

            legally be conducted  later when the  accused arrives at  the

            place of detention."  United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800,
                                  _____________    _______

            803 (1974).

                      However, Robinson  did not hold  that all  possible
                               ________

            searches  of an arrestee's body are automatically permissible

            as a  search incident to  arrest.  To the  contrary, any such

            search must still be reasonable:

                      Holding  the Warrant  Clause inapplicable
                      to  the  circumstances present  here does
                      not   leave  law   enforcement  officials
                      subject to no restraints.   This type  of
                      police conduct "must [still] be tested by
                      the     Fourth    Amendment's     general
                      proscription     against     unreasonable
                      searches and seizures."

            Edwards, 415 U.S. at 808 n.9 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
            _______                               _____    ____

            1, 20 (1968)).  In Robinson  itself, the Court noted that the
                               ________

            search at  issue, while  thorough, did  not have "extreme  or

            patently abusive  characteristics."  414 U.S.  at 236 (citing

            Rochin  v.  California,  342 U.S.  165  (1952)).    Later, in
            ______      __________

            Illinois  v.  Lafayette,  462  U.S.  640  (1983),  the  Court
            ________      _________

            explicitly stated that "[w]e  were not addressing in Edwards,
                                                                 _______

            and do not discuss  here, the circumstances in which  a strip

                                         -13-
                                          13

            search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate."  Id. at
                                                                   ___

            646 n.2.   "Robinson simply  did not authorize"  a strip  and
                        ________

            visual  body cavity search.  Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d
                                         ______    ____________

            1437, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Mary Beth G.  v. City of
                                        ________ ____________     _______

            Chicago,  723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir. 1983)("[T]he Robinson
            _______                                              ________

            court simply  did not  contemplate the  significantly greater

            intrusions   that   occur[]"   in  a   visual   body   cavity

            inspection.). 

                      A strip and visual body cavity search thus requires

            independent analysis under the Fourth Amendment.   In Bell v.
                                                                  ____

            Wolfish,  441 U.S. 520  (1979), the Supreme  Court noted that
            _______

            "[t]he test  of reasonableness under the  Fourth Amendment is

            not capable of precise definition or mechanical application."

            Id. at 559.   Rather, the evaluation of the constitutionality
            ___

            of a warrantless search

                      requires a balancing of the need  for the
                      particular search against the invasion of
                      personal rights that the  search entails.
                      Courts  must  consider the  scope  of the
                      particular intrusion, the manner in which
                      it  is  conducted, the  justification for
                      initiating it,  and the place in which it
                      is conducted.

            Id.   In Wolfish,  the Supreme  Court applied this  balancing
            ___      _______

            test  to a  prison policy  that required  arraigned pre-trial

            detainees  to   "expose  their   body  cavities  for   visual

            inspection  as a part of a strip search conducted after every

            contact visit  with a  person from outside  the institution."

            Id. at 558.   Noting that "this  practice instinctively gives
            ___

                                         -14-
                                          14

            [the Court] the most pause," id. at 559, the Court found only
                                         ___

            that  visual body cavity  searches can "be  conducted on less

            than probable  cause."  Id. at  560.  In so  holding, Wolfish
                                    ___                           _______

            "did not, however, read out of the Constitution the provision

            of  general  application  that   a  search  be  justified  as

            reasonable under the circumstances."  Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d
                                                  _____    ____

            796, 800 (2d Cir. 1986).

                      In applying the Wolfish balancing  test to searches
                                      _______

            of  the type  to  which  Swain  was  subjected,  courts  have

            recognized that strip and visual body cavity searches impinge

            seriously upon the values that the Fourth Amendment was meant

            to protect.  These  searches require an arrestee not  only to

            strip naked  in front of a  stranger, but also  to expose the

            most private  areas of her body to others.  This is often, as

            here, done  while the person  arrested is required  to assume

            degrading  and  humiliating  positions.    Our   circuit  has

            "recognize[d], as  have all  courts that have  considered the

            issue, the severe if  not gross interference with a  person's

            privacy that  occurs when guards conduct  a visual inspection

            of  body cavities."   Arruda v. Fair, 710  F.2d 886, 887 (1st
                                  ______    ____

            Cir.  1983).    The  Seventh  Circuit  has  described  "strip

            searches  involving the  visual  inspection of  the anal  and

            genital  areas  as   demeaning,  dehumanizing,   undignified,

            humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive,

            signifying degradation  and submission."   Mary Beth  G., 723
                                                       _____________

                                         -15-
                                          15

            F.2d  at 1272  (internal quotation  marks omitted);  see also
                                                                 ________

            Wood v.  Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir 1996) ("[A] strip
            ____     _______

            search can hardly be characterized  as a routine procedure or

            as a minimally invasive means of maintaining prison security.

            Indeed, a  strip search, by  its very nature,  constitutes an

            extreme  intrusion  upon  personal  privacy, as  well  as  an

            offense  to the dignity of  the individual."); Kennedy v. Los
                                                           _______    ___

            Angeles   Police  Dep't,   901  F.2d   702,  711   (9th  Cir.
            _______________________

            1990)("Strip  searches involving  the  visual exploration  of

            body cavities are dehumanizing and humiliating.").

                      On  the other side of the scales, courts must weigh

            the  legitimate needs  of  law  enforcement.    Institutional

            security  has  been  found  to  be  a  compelling  reason for

            conducting warrantless strip and visual body cavity searches.

            See, e.g., Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559 (prisoner  strip searches
            ___  ____  _______

            after contact visits justified because detention facility "is

            a unique place fraught with serious security dangers").  Some

            courts  have held that a warrantless strip search may also be

            justified  by the  need  to discover  and preserve  concealed

            evidence of a crime.   See, e.g., Justice v.  Peachtree City,
                                   ___  ____  _______     ______________

            961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992).  But see Fuller, 950 F.2d
                                                 _______ ______

            at 1446 (strip and  visual body cavity search with  less than

            probable cause only permitted to protect institutional safety

            and  security;  search  for  evidence must  be  justified  by

            probable cause).

                                         -16-
                                          16

                      Balancing  these  interests, courts  have concluded

            that, to be  reasonable under Wolfish, strip and  visual body
                                          _______

            cavity searches  must be justified  by at least  a reasonable

            suspicion that  the  arrestee  is  concealing  contraband  or

            weapons.1  See,  e.g, Justice,  961 F.2d at  192; Masters  v.
                       ___   ___  _______                     _______

            Crouch,  872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir. 1989); Weber, 804 F.2d
            ______                                        _____

            at 802; Stewart  v. Lubbock  County, 767 F.2d  153, 156  (5th
                    _______     _______________

            Cir.  1985); Giles v. Ackerman,  746 F.2d 614,  615 (9th Cir.
                         _____    ________

            1984); Mary Beth  G., 723 F.2d at 1273.   This court has held
                   _____________

            that the reasonable suspicion standard is the appropriate one

            for justifying strip  searches in other contexts.   See Wood,
                                                                ___ ____

            89  F.3d   at  929   (prison  visitors);  United   States  v.
                                                      _______________

            Uricoechea-Casallas, 946  F.2d 162, 166 (1st  Cir. 1991)(non-
            ___________________

            routine  border searches);  cf. Burns  v. Loranger,  907 F.2d
                                        ___ _____     ________

            233, 236-38 (1st Cir.  1990) (officers protected by qualified

            immunity for warrantless strip search of arrestee where there

            were  exigent circumstances  and  probable cause  to  believe

            controlled substance  would be found on  arrestee's person). 

            Accordingly,  it  is  clear  that  at  least  the  reasonable

            suspicion  standard  governs  strip and  visual  body  cavity

            searches in the arrestee context as well.

                                
            ____________________

            1.  As noted above, the Ninth Circuit has held that, absent a
            threat  to  institutional  security, the  higher  showing  of
            probable cause is required to justify such a search.  Fuller,
                                                                  ______
            950 F.2d at 1446.

                                         -17-
                                          17

                      Defendants, and the  court below, rely upon  United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1975).  In that case,
            ______    _____

            the  defendant, who was arrested after a sale of cocaine, was

            subjected to a strip search, including a visual inspection of

            his rectum.   Id. at 299.  This court approved that search as
                          ___

            "[a] post-arrest  search of  the person, plainly  approved by

            Edwards," and  found that a lack  of individualized suspicion
            _______

            that  the suspect was  harboring evidence did  not render the

            search unreasonable.  Id. at 300 & n.2.  
                                  ___

                      Klein  was decided before significant Supreme Court
                      _____

            precedent  in the  area,  and we  are  bound by  the  Supreme

            Court's  developing  doctrine.    Klein  predates  Lafayette,
                                              _____            _________

            decided in 1983, where the Supreme Court stated that  Edwards
                                                                  _______

            did  not answer  the  question of  when  a strip  search  was

            appropriate.  Lafayette,  462 U.S.  at 646 n.2.   Klein  also
                          _________                           _____

            predated  Wolfish,  with  its  explicit  recognition  of  the
                      _______

            invasiveness  of  strip  and  visual  body  cavity  searches.

            Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558.  Subsequent to Klein, and sensitive
            _______                                  _____

            to  the developing  doctrine,  this  circuit  has  repeatedly

            recognized that strip and/or  visual body cavity searches are

            not routine, and must be carefully evaluated.  See Burns, 907
                                                           ___ _____

            F.2d at 236-37;  Bonitz v.  Fair, 804 F.2d  164, 170-72  (1st
                             ______     ____

            Cir.  1986); Blackburn v. Snow,  771 F.2d 556,  564 (1st Cir.
                         _________    ____

            1985); Arruda, 710 F.2d  at 887.  Accordingly, to  the extent
                   ______

            that Klein held  that strip and  visual body cavity  searches
                 _____

                                         -18-
                                          18

            are simply searches incident to arrest, and do not need to be

            further tested for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,

            it  does not  survive  Lafayette, Wolfish,  and this  court's
                                   _________  _______

            subsequent strip search decisions. 

            B. The Search of Swain
            ______________________

                      Turning  to  the  particular search  at  issue,  we

            conclude, taking all the facts in the light most favorable to

            Swain,   that  a  jury   could  find  that   the  search  was

            unreasonable   and  thus   violated  the   Fourth  Amendment.

            Accordingly,  we find  that  Swain has  stated a  trialworthy

            claim under 42 U.S.C.   1983.   On these facts, there appears

            to be the distinct possibility that Officer Hayes ordered the

            strip search  in retaliation for his  failed interrogation of

            Swain  in her cell, imposing  sexual humiliation on  her as a

            punishment  for  what he  perceived  as  her non-cooperation.

            Hayes'  angry  response  to  Swain's  inability   to  provide

            information about Milbury's activities  and the timing of the

            search  raise this inference.  This possibility distinguishes

            this  case from Klein, where  the court found  that there was
                            _____

            "no evidence that the stripping was a pretext to humiliate or

            degrade."  Klein, 522 F.2d at 300.2  We  must   thus  examine
                       _____

                                
            ____________________

            2.  We also recognize that, under United States v. Whren, 116
                                              _____________    _____
            S. Ct. 1769 (1996), a police officer's subjective motivations
            do not  serve to  invalidate a  search for  exclusionary rule
            purposes, so  long as  the search was  objectively reasonable
            under the circumstances.   Whren, however, also stressed that
                                       _____
            "the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the  law
            based on considerations such  as race," id. at 1774,  and, we
                                                    ___

                                         -19-
                                          19

            whether, on these facts, an objective  officer would have had

            a  reasonable suspicion  that Swain  was concealing  drugs or

            contraband on her  person.  Three factors  suggest that there

            were  not adequate  grounds to justify  the strip  and visual

            body cavity search of Swain.   First, there is the timing  of

            the search.  Swain had been alone in the cell for some period

            of  time  before  she was  searched  and  no  one thought  it

            important to  search  her before  she  angered Hayes  by  not

            giving  him   the  information  he  sought.     Perhaps  more

            importantly,  she had been allowed  to go to  the bathroom by

            herself,  unobserved, prior to being taken to her cell.  This

            also  indicates that no one thought she had secreted drugs in

            her  private parts.    Cf. Burns,  907  F.2d at  238  (common
                                   ___ _____

            knowledge  that  drug  users   and  dealers  with  controlled

            substances on their persons often attempt to flush drugs down

            the  toilet).  If a warrantless strip search may be justified

            by the need to avoid  the destruction of concealed  evidence,

            Swain already had had  ample opportunity to destroy any  such

            evidence.  To the extent there was any reason to believe such

                                
            ____________________

            would assume, gender.   The exclusionary rule, as the Supreme
            Court  recognized in  Malley  v. Briggs,  475  U.S. 335,  344
                                  ______     ______
            (1986), balances different interests than  those in a    1983
            action.  ("While  we believe the  exclusionary rule serves  a
            necessary  purpose, it  obviously does  so at  a considerable
            cost  to the society as a whole, because it excludes evidence
            probative  of guilt.  . .  .   On the  other hand,  a damages
            remedy  for [a  Fourth  Amendment violation]  imposes a  cost
            directly on the officer  responsible . . ., without  the side
            effect of hampering a criminal prosecution.").

                                         -20-
                                          20

            evidence  still existed,  further delay  to obtain  a warrant

            would  not   have   significantly  increased   the  risk   of

            destruction.   This was  particularly true because  Swain was

            kept under observation and recorded by video camera while  in

            the holding cell.

                      Second, as noted, the most compelling justification

            for  warrantless strip  and  visual body  cavity searches  is

            institutional security.  It  is uncontroverted that, prior to

            her  arraignment, Swain  was the  only person in  the women's

            holding  cell  of  the North  Reading  Police  Station.   Her

            arraignment  was later the  same afternoon, and  she was then

            released,  on her own recognizance.   There was  no risk that

            she  would come into contact with other prisoners, or be able

            to smuggle  contraband or weapons into  a secure environment.

            Hayes  stated that  he  believed that  Swain, as  a narcotics

            suspect,  might have been carrying  a concealed weapon but he

            did not assert  that Swain posed  a threat  to his safety  or

            that of  others in  the police  station.   The  institutional

            security justification  thus appears  to be absent  from this

            case.  

                      Third, there  is the differential treatment  by the

            police  of  the young  woman and  her  boyfriend.   Swain and

            Milbury   were  first  pulled   over  because   of  Milbury's

            shoplifting activities.  Officer  Hayes stated that, prior to

            searching Swain,  he had examined both  Swain's and Milbury's

                                         -21-
                                          21

            records. Officer Hayes knew that Milbury was on probation and

            had  a history of drug  convictions.  By  contrast, Swain did

            not  have a  criminal  record.   Milbury  had told  officers,

            including Hayes, that the marijuana was his.  Yet Milbury was

            not strip searched.  If there was an objective basis -- apart

            from  retaliation -- for stripping Swain,  it would have been

            objectively  reasonable, and  more so,  to search  Milbury as

            well.

                      On  the other  hand,  Swain did  drop  a baggie  of

            marijuana at the scene of the crime.  Officer Hayes expressed

            the view (belied by his failure to strip search Milbury) that

            a strip search was  justified whenever narcotics are involved

            in  the case.   This is  not consistent with  either the Town

            policy,  which requires  probable cause,  or the  MPI policy,

            which requires an  individualized suspicion,  even where  the

            crime involves contraband  or weapons.   The record does  not

            reveal  how much marijuana  was in the  baggie Swain dropped,

            nor  does  it  reveal   whether  possession  of  that  amount

            constitutes  a misdemeanor  or a  felony  under Massachusetts

            law.  Nothing in the record suggests that Swain was suspected

            of being a distributor of marijuana.  The fact that Swain may

            have possessed  some unspecified  amount of marijuana  is not

            enough  to  overcome,  as  a  matter  of  law,  the  factors,

            discussed  above, under which a jury could find the search of

            Swain unreasonable.

                                         -22-
                                          22

                      Accordingly,  we  hold that  a jury  could lawfully

            find that there was no objectively reasonable basis for strip

            searching  Swain and that, on these facts, Swain has stated a

            claim  for violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free

            from  unreasonable searches that  survives defendants' motion

            for summary judgment.

            C. Qualified Immunity
            _____________________

                      Defendants  assert  that they  are,  in  any event,

            entitled to  qualified immunity  from suit.    There are  two

            prongs  to the  qualified immunity  analysis. First,  was the

            constitutional right in  question clearly established  at the

            time  of the alleged violation?   St. Hilaire  v. Laconia, 71
                                              ___________     _______

            F.3d 20, 24  (1st Cir. 1995).  That is a  question of law for

            the  court.   Elder v.  Holloway, 510  U.S. 510,  516 (1994).
                          _____     ________

            Second,  would  a  reasonable,  similarly  situated  official

            understand   that  the   challenged  conduct   violated  that

            established right?  St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at 24.  
                                ___________

                      The  Fourth  Amendment   right  to  be   free  from

            unreasonable strip searches has long been clearly established

            in this circuit, as elsewhere.   See Burns, 907 F.2d at  236;
                                             ___ _____

            Blackburn,  771 F.2d at 569 ("It can hardly be debated that .
            _________

            .  .  in 1977,  [there  was] a  'clearly  established' Fourth

            Amendment right to  be free of unreasonable  searches.").  As

            discussed  above, Klein's  holding  that such  a search  is a
                              _____

            reasonable search  incident to  arrest had been  abrogated by

                                         -23-
                                          23

            subsequent  Supreme Court  and First  Circuit cases,  and had

            been  squarely  rejected  by  the  other  circuit  courts  to

            consider the issue.  See Fuller,  950 F.2d at 1446, 1449 n.11
                                 ___ ______

            (holding that strip search with visual body cavity inspection

            was  not justifiable as a  search incident to  arrest but was

            governed by higher standard, and rejecting Klein);  Mary Beth
                                                       _____    _________

            G., 723 F.2d at 1271 n.7 (searches like the one  in Klein are
            __                                                  _____

            only constitutional  where there is a  reasonable belief that

            arrestee is concealing  contraband; routine post-arrest strip

            search of misdemeanants is unconstitutional); see also Weber,
                                                          ___ ____ _____

            804 F.2d at 801 nn. 6 & 7, 803 (holding that it was, in 1986,

            "clearly established" that policy of routine strip and visual

            body cavity  searches of arrestees was  unconstitutional, and

            citing  "ten opinions  from seven  circuits" that  refused to

            condone such searches).  Defendants themselves agree that the

            search  must be evaluated  under the  reasonableness standard

            articulated by the 1979 Supreme Court decision in Wolfish. 
                                                              _______

                      The  question   is  thus  whether   an  objectively

            reasonable officer  would understand  that a strip  search of

            Swain  was, under  these circumstances,  unreasonable.   This

            prong of the inquiry,  while requiring a legal determination,

            is highly fact specific, and may  not be resolved on a motion

            for summary judgment when material facts are substantially in

            dispute.    2  Nahmod,   Civil  Rights  and  Civil  Liberties
                                     ____________________________________

                                         -24-
                                          24

            Litigation: The Law of Section 1983   8.08, at 136-39 (3d ed.
            ___________________________________

            1991).   

                      The  ultimate  question   of  whether   a
                      reasonable police officer,  on the  basis
                      of information known  to him, could  have
                      believed his actions  were in accord with
                      constitutional  rights  is a  question of
                      law, subject to  resolution by the  judge
                      not the jury.  But if there is  a factual
                      dispute,  that  factual  dispute must  be
                      resolved by a fact finder.

            St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at 24 n.1  (internal citations omitted);
            ___________

            Figueroa-Rodriguez v.  Aquino, 863 F.2d 1037,  1041 (1st Cir.
            __________________     ______

            1988)("While the  qualified immunity inquiry  is ultimately a

            question of law, it  may also necessitate determining certain

            of the essential facts.")(citing  Anderson v. Creighton,  483
                                              ________    _________

            U.S.  635 (1987)); see also  Consolo v. George,  58 F.3d 791,
                               ________  _______    ______

            794 (1st Cir.)  (where law is clearly  established, and there

            is ample evidence that officers acted unreasonably, proper to

            submit  issue  of objective  reasonableness  to  the jury  on

            special  interrogatories),  cert.  denied,  116  S.  Ct.  520
                                        _____________

            (1995).

                      We recognize that the  immunity question should  be

            resolved,  where possible, in  advance of trial.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Veilleux  v.  Perschau,  101  F.3d  1,  2  (1st  Cir.  1996).
            ________      ________

            However, disposition  of the question on  summary judgment is

            not  always   possible.    Here,  some   material  facts  are

            significantly in dispute.  Swain's story and that  of Officer

            Hayes conflict on   the timing of the relevant  events.  Some

                                         -25-
                                          25

            proffers are supported  or contradicted  by other  witnesses,

            including Spinney and  Milbury.  Hayes contends that,  as the

            officer in charge of the investigation, he ordered the search

            immediately  upon being  informed that a  narcotics violation

            had occurred.  The timing of  when the search was ordered  is

            essential to  a determination of whether  defendants' conduct

            was objectively  reasonable. There  are thus  factual issues,

            potentially turning on credibility,  that must be resolved by

            the  trier of  fact.   Only  after  the resolution  of  these

            conflicts  may  the trial  court  apply the  relevant  law on

            objective reasonableness.3 

                      We   also  recognize   that  police   officers  are

            protected  in  close  cases  by  the  doctrine  of  qualified

            immunity, and that immunity serves to protect law enforcement

            from  the chilling  threat of  liability.   Vargas-Badillo v.
                                                        ______________

            Diaz-Torres,  --- F.3d ----, 1997 WL 276662 (1st Cir. May 30,
            ___________

            1997); Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112  F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.
                   _____    _________________

            1997)  (patent violation  of  law necessary  to strip  police

            officers  of  qualified  immunity).     On  the  other  hand,

            qualified  immunity does  not  protect  "those who  knowingly

            violate  the law."    Malley v.  Briggs,  475 U.S.  335,  341
                                  ______     ______

                                
            ____________________

            3.  In St.  Hilaire, we  noted  that the  proper division  of
                   ____________
            functions   between   judge  and   jury   on   the  objective
            reasonableness inquiry  may  be accomplished  either  through
            special  interrogatories or through carefully structured jury
            instructions.    St. Hilaire,  71 F.3d  at  24 n.1;  see also
                             ___________                         ________
            Nahmod, supra,   8.08,  at 137.  We leave  that decision here
                    _____
            to the trial court.  

                                         -26-
                                          26

            (1986).  Here, further  resolution of the facts  is necessary

            to determine whether or not this case falls into the category

            of "close cases" in  which the police are accorded  "a fairly

            wide zone of protection."  Roy v. Inhabitants of the  City of
                                       ___    ___________________________

            Lewiston, 42  F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir. 1996).  On the facts as
            ________

            related  by Swain,  Officer  Hayes used  a warrantless  strip

            search  and  visual body  cavity  inspection  as  a  tool  to

            humiliate and degrade her in  retaliation for her refusal  to

            respond to interrogation.

                      Independently  of the  issue  of  allegations  that

            Officer  Hayes  deliberately violated  the  law  in order  to

            retaliate,  as forbidden  by Malley,  Swain also  asserts the
                                         ______

            search is not,  on its facts,  objectively reasonable.   This

            search, on Swain's allegations,  occurred after she had ample

            opportunity to  dispose of any  hidden evidence and  when she

            was alone in  a monitored  cell, posing no  danger to  others

            that  might justify  hastily  proceeding without  a  warrant.

            Such allegations,  if true, do  not represent a  "close case"

            but a flagrant violation  of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee

            against unreasonable searches.  Whether those allegations are

            true or not must be resolved by the finder of fact.  

            D. Municipal Liability
            ______________________

                      Swain  claims that  the  Town of  North Reading  is

            liable for the injuries that she suffered.  The Supreme Court

                                         -27-
                                          27

            has recently clarified the  necessary showing for a  claim of

            municipal liability under   1983:

                      [I]n Monell and  subsequent cases we have
                           ______
                      required  a  plaintiff seeking  to impose
                      liability  on a municipality under   1983
                      to  identify  a  municipal   "policy"  or
                      "custom"  that   caused  the  plaintiff's
                      injury.
                      . . . .

                           As  our    1983  municipal liability
                      jurisprudence illustrates, however, it is
                      not enough for a    1983 plaintiff merely
                      to identify conduct properly attributable
                      to the municipality.   The plaintiff must
                      also   demonstrate   that,  through   its
                      deliberate conduct,  the municipality was
                      the  "moving  force"  behind  the  injury
                      alleged.   That is, a plaintiff must show
                      that  the municipal action was taken with
                      the requisite degree  of culpability  and
                      must  demonstrate  a  direct causal  link
                      between  the  municipal  action  and  the
                      deprivation of federal rights.

            Board of the County Comm'rs  v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382,  1388
            ___________________________     _____

            (1997)  (discussing Monell v.  New York City  Dep't of Social
                                ______     ______________________________

            Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and progeny).  
            ______

                      Here,  Swain  predicates municipal  liability  on a

            failure to properly communicate to the police force a uniform

            policy on  when strip searches  are appropriate  and who  may

            authorize  them.  This failure  to train, Swain alleges, rose

            to the level of  conscious indifference to the constitutional

            rights of arrestees.  Swain accurately notes that the various

            police personnel, including the  police chief, expressed some

            confusion as to when strip searches are warranted.  

                                         -28-
                                          28

                      The Supreme Court addressed failure to train claims

            in Brown:
               _____

                      We   concluded   in   Canton    that   an
                                            ______
                      "inadequate training" claim could  be the
                      basis  for    1983 liability  in "limited
                      circumstances."  We  spoke, however, of a
                      deficient training "program," necessarily
                      intended to apply  over time to  multiple
                      employees.    Existence  of  a  "program"
                      makes proof of fault at least possible in
                      an   inadequate  training  case.    If  a
                      program  does not  prevent constitutional
                      violations, municipal  decisionmakers may
                      eventually be  put on  notice that a  new
                      program is  called for.   Their continued
                      adherence  to an approach  that they know
                      or  should know  has  failed  to  prevent
                      tortious   conduct   by   employees   may
                      establish the conscious disregard for the
                      consequences  of  their  action   --  the
                      "deliberate  indifference"--necessary  to
                      trigger municipal liability.

            Id. at 1390 (discussing and citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
            ___                                ______    ______

            378 (1989)).

                      Swain  does   not,  however,  point  to  any  other

            incidents in  which the  North Reading police  force violated

            the rights of arrestees through strip and visual body  cavity

            searches.   There    was thus  "no  notice to  the  municipal

            decisionmaker,  based  on  previous violations  of  federally

            protected rights, that his approach is inadequate."  Id. 
                                                                 ___

                      The Supreme  Court has  left  open the  possibility

            that a  failure-to-train claim can succeed  without showing a

            pattern of  constitutional violations.  "[I]n  a narrow range

            of  circumstances, a  violation of  federal  rights may  be a

            highly  predictable consequence  of  a failure  to equip  law

                                         -29-
                                          29

            enforcement officers with specific tools  to handle recurring

            situations."  Id. at 1391.  
                          ___

                      This is  not that  case.   Officer Hayes  and Chief

            Purnell agreed  that every  officer was supplied  with policy

            guidelines,  including periodic updates.   Lieutenant Nolan's

            memo  requiring strip  searches to  be justified  by probable

            cause  was such an update.   The police  officers also agreed

            that the MPI, colloquially known as the  "police manual," was

            to  be followed by, and  was available to,  the North Reading

            force.  Apparently,  not all  the officers  had a  consistent

            understanding of those materials.   However, it is undisputed

            that North  Reading did have  an appropriate policy  that was

            distributed to  the force; absent prior claims,  it cannot be

            reasonably inferred  that Chief Purnell knew,  or should have

            known,  that his  officers  were not  executing that  policy.

            Accordingly,  Swain  cannot  make  the  requisite showing  of

            "deliberate indifference"  to her constitutional  rights.  We

            affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the Town of  North

            Reading.

            E. State Law Claim
            __________________

                      The  Massachusetts  Declaration of  Rights, article

            14,   gives  every   person  the  right   to  be   free  from

            "unreasonable searches."  The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act,

            Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12,    11H, 11I, provides a private right

            of action for persons who are deprived of rights protected by

                                         -30-
                                          30

            either federal or  state law.   The district court  concluded

            that  the  protections  of  article  14  tracked  the  Fourth

            Amendment protections  of the federal  Constitution, and that

            the  search of  Swain was reasonable  under both  federal and

            state  law.  We agree  that cases like  Rodriques v. Furtado,
                                                    _________    _______

            575  N.E.2d  1124  (Mass.  1991),  indicate  that  the  state

            constitution  provides  at  least  the  level  of  protection

            against  strip and visual  body cavity  searches as  does the

            federal  Constitution.    However,  in  some  instances,  the

            Supreme  Judicial  Court  has  concluded  that  "art[icle] 14

            provides  more substantive protection  to criminal defendants

            than does the Fourth Amendment."   Commonwealth v. Upton, 476
                                               ____________    _____

            N.E.2d 548,  556-57 (Mass. 1985) (rejecting  federal standard

            for   determining  probable   cause  based   on  confidential

            informant tips);  see also Commonwealth v.  Blood, 507 N.E.2d
                              ________ ____________     _____

            1029  (1987).  The Supreme Judicial Court has also noted that

            the Massachusetts  law on body cavity  searches under article

            14 remains uncharted territory.  Rodriques, 575 N.E.2d at 884
                                             _________

            n.8.  The SJC  did remark, however, that the federal cases on

            searches in  prisons  were not  "germane"  to a  body  cavity

            search of a suspect for evidence "because of the 'diminished'

            Fourth  Amendment  rights of  prisoners and  their visitors."

            Id. (citations omitted).   This remark certainly suggests the
            ___

            possibility  that  Massachusetts   law  might  place  greater

                                         -31-
                                          31

            limitations  on  the  use of  strip  and  visual body  cavity

            searches of arrestees than the federal Constitution does.  

                      We need  not attempt  to predict fully  what course

            Massachusetts  law will take.  The Massachusetts Constitution

            certainly does not provide  less protection than federal law.
                                        ____

            Having  found  that  the  search  of  Swain  may   have  been

            objectively unreasonable under  the federal Constitution,  we

            conclude that the law of the Commonwealth would at least view

            the search  similarly, and  we therefore reinstate  her state

            law claim against the individual defendants.

                      Defendants contend that Swain cannot prove that her

            injuries  were  perpetrated  by  "threats,  intimidation,  or

            coercion" as  required under  Massachusetts law.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Planned  Parenthood  League v.  Blake,  631  N.E.2d 985,  990
            ___________________________     _____

            (Mass. 1994).  The Supreme Judicial Court has accepted that a

            "threat" may be defined  as an "exertion of pressure  to make

            another  fearful or  apprehensive  of injury  or harm";  that

            "intimidation" may  be defined as "putting [a person] in fear

            for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct"; and that

            "coercion" may be  defined as the application of  physical or

            moral  force so as to force someone to do something she would

            otherwise  not have  done.  Id.   On  the facts  here, a jury
                                        ___

            could  find  that Officer  Hayes  used  the strip  search  to

            humiliate or punish Swain and as a means of exerting moral or

            psychological  pressure  designed  to  weaken  her  perceived

                                         -32-
                                          32

            resistance to her questioning.   This could indeed constitute

            "intimidation"  or  "coercion"  within  the  meaning  of  the

            statute.

                      The judgment  of the  court below is  affirmed with
                                                            affirmed
                                                            ________

            respect  to the  Town  of North  Reading,  and reversed  with
                                                           reversed
                                                           ________

            respect to the individual defendants.

                                         -33-
                                          33