Court Opinion

ID: 9702994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:36:10.381143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.300529
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, J.,
dissenting.
Under the State’s and the majority’s interpretation of Maryland Code (1977, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 16-103.1 of the Transportation Article, Alavez, now a resident of Maryland, will always be ineligible to obtain a driver’s license in Maryland because of New Jersey’s policy of refusing a driver’s license to a person whose “continued presence in the United States is [unauthorized under Federal Law.” New Jersey’s policy in this respect is directly contrary to Maryland’s public policy, *740which does not require that non-citizens of the United States demonstrate federally authorized presence in this country as a condition for obtaining a Maryland driver’s license.
A person in a similar position as Alavez, but who had resided in Maryland ever since his or her arrival in the United States, or who had moved to Maryland from another state without a lawful presence requirement for a driver’s license, would now be eligible for a Maryland driver’s license. An interpretation of § 16-103.1, which makes a Marylander’s eligibility for a driver’s license dependent upon which state the individual came from, is, in my opinion, arbitrary and unnecessary.1 It is an interpretation presenting serious constitutional problems under the equal protection component of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
I would reverse the decisions below and direct that the case be remanded to the MVA for a new determination, treating Alavez in the same manner as a person whose Maryland driver’s license was suspended by the MVA because the person obtained the Maryland license by using a false document.2
The majority opinion takes the position that “[tjhere is nothing uncertain or ambiguous about” § 16-103.1 of the *741Transportation Article, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
“The Administration may not issue a driver’s license to an individual:
(1) During any period for which the individual’s license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused or canceled in this or any other state____”
Nevertheless, this Court has held that “very broad and sweeping” statutes, or “[gjeneral statutes ... which, if given their broadest and most encompassing meaning, give rise to constitutional questions, have regularly been the subject of narrowing constructions so as to avoid the constitutional issues.” Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 729, 580 A.2d 176, 183 (1990). See also, e.g., Board of Trustees of Employees’ Retirement System of City of Baltimore v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 317 Md. 72, 97-98, 562 A.2d 720, 732-733 (1989) (This Court construed broad delegation of legislative power language to be advisory only, to “avoid[ ] casting substantial doubt upon” the validity of the statutory language); Yangming Marine Transport Corp. v. Revon Products U.S.A., Inc., 311 Md. 496, 509-510, 536 A.2d 633, 640 (1988) (A construction of the statute in accordance with its literal meaning would present a substantial issue under the federal Constitution’s Commerce Clause, and, therefore, this Court construed the statute narrowly); In Re James D., 295 Md. 314, 327, 455 A.2d 966, 972 (1983) (This Court decided “ ‘to construe the statute more narrowly than its literal wording,’ ” in order to avoid a substantial constitutional question); Mangum v. Md. St. Bd. of Censors, 273 Md. 176, 187-192, 328 A.2d 283, 289-292 (1974) (Construing the definition of “obscenity” narrowly in light of First Amendment requirements).
Section 16-103.1(1) of the Transportation Article, with the majority’s broad construction of the statute, presents serious constitutional issues. Like the statutes involved in the above-cited cases, it should be construed more narrowly to avoid those constitutional issues.
*742The statute is sweeping, rendering a Maryland resident ineligible for a Maryland driver’s license if previously he or she had a driver’s license revoked, suspended, or canceled in any other state, or was refused a driver’s license in any other state. Moreover, “any other state,” for purposes of this statute, even includes the Provinces of Canada. See §§ 11-101 and 11-161 of the Transportation Article. In addition, if the statute is given its broadest possible meaning, as the majority does, the grounds for the action in “any other state” are irrelevant. Even if those grounds would not disqualify a native Marylander from obtaining a driver’s license, and even if the grounds are discriminatory, arbitrary, or contrary to strong Maryland public policy, the action in the “other state” would render the applicant ineligible for a Maryland driver’s license. Literally, if the “other state” had suspended the applicant’s driver’s license because of his or her race, color, national origin, gender, religion, or any other arbitrary reason, the applicant, after moving to Maryland, would be ineligible for a Maryland driver’s license.
The broad, sweeping interpretation of § 16-103.1(1), advocated by the MVA and adopted by the majority, is illustrated by the following colloquy during the oral argument before this Court:
“Judge Eldridge: Let me ask you a hypothetical, [perhaps an] unrealistic hypothetical, but it will illustrate a point. Suppose the Province of Quebec passes a statute that says anyone who cannot speak French doesn’t get a license and everybody who has a Quebec driver’s license who doesn’t speak French gets suspended for life.
“Judge Wilner: Until you learn to speak French.
“Judge Eldridge: So let’s say somebody who’s unable to learn French comes to Maryland, resettles in Maryland, has had his [Quebec] license suspended because he’s not French-speaking and applies to MVA for a Maryland’s driver’s license. Are you going to give it to him or not?
“Counsel for MVA: Well if the person truthfully fills out the application, and reports----
*743“Judge Eldridge: Truthfully. [He] says I’m suspended in Quebec, attaches ... the Quebec statute.
“Counsel for MVA: I believe that Canadian ...
“Judge Eldridge: No Constitutional argument, ... the U.S. [Constitution], you know, doesn’t apply to Quebec.
“Counsel for MVA; I believe that ...
“Judge Eldridge: But Quebec, as I understand, is a state under the statute.
“Counsel for MVA: I believe a Canadian suspension would be reported under the national driver registry and the MVA would reject that application, as it’s required to do by statute.
“Judge Eldridge: Under my hypothetical he could never drive in Maryland unless he [goes] back to Quebec, learns to speak French, and gets a Quebec driver’s license, correct?
“Counsel for MVA: Well, I’m not ...
“Judge Eldridge: That’s a yes or no question.
“Counsel for MVA: Whether he would never be able to ... he may have a legal remedy, 1 don’t know that it’s in Maryland. It might be a federal remedy. But I would agree that in Maryland he doesn’t have a remedy....
“Judge Eldridge: By federal, [do] you mean federal in Canada, or federal here?
“Counsel for MVA: Yeah, federal in ... well maybe both. Perhaps. But I don’t believe he has a Maryland remedy under the licensing laws. That suspension is in effect and the MVA is under [a] mandatory duty to reject it.
“Judge Raker: So your answer is yes to Judge Eldridge’s question?
“Counsel for MVA: Yes.
“Judge Eldridge: You won’t give him a license?
“Counsel for MVA: Won’t be ... he’ll plainly be rejected.
A person whose presence in the United States is federally unauthorized, who has been refused a driver’s license in New Jersey because of his or her immigration status, and who later becomes a resident of Maryland, will be ineligible for a *744Maryland driver’s license under the MVA’s and the majority’s interpretation of § 16-103.1(1) of the Transportation Article. On the other hand, a person whose presence in the United States is federally unauthorized, who has been given a driver’s license in Maine, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington or any other state having the same driver’s license policy as Maryland’s, and who later becomes a resident of Maryland, will be eligible for a Maryland driver’s license.
Making a Maryland resident’s eligibility for a Maryland driver’s license depend upon which state or province was the person’s previous residence certainly appears to lack any rational basis. Moreover, the grounds of refusal in the other state or province could be utterly arbitrary or discriminatory. The MVA’s and the majority’s interpretation of § 16-103.1(1) obviously presents substantial issues under the equal protection component of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See, e.g., Maryland Green Party v. Board of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 156-164, 832 A.2d 214, 231-236 (2003); Frankel v. Board of Regents, 361 Md. 298, 312-318, 761 A.2d 324, 331-335 (2000); Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 416-427, 635 A.2d 967, 969-975 (1994); Kirsch v. Prince George’s County, 331 Md. 89, 104-108, 626 A.2d 372, 379-381 (1993); Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704-728, 426 A.2d 929, 940-954 (1981). A narrower construction of § 16-103.1(1) would avoid the significant equal protection issues presented by the majority’s broad construction of the statute.
In the absence of congressional legislation governing the issue, the eligibility of Maryland residents, whose presence in Maryland is federally unauthorized, to obtain Maryland driver’s licenses is a policy matter for the General Assembly of Maryland. This is true regardless of one’s individual political position about the issue. The General Assembly’s policy decision concerning the issue should be respected by the Judiciary and the MVA. Clearly, Maryland’s public policy in this regard should not be dictated by “any other state” including foreign provinces, particularly when it results in *745similarly situated Maryland residents being treated differently without any rational basis.
Judge Greene authorized me to state that he joins the views expressed in this dissent.

. According to a November 2007 Report of the National Immigration Law Center, at least eight states do not have lawful presence requirements as a condition for drivers licenses. Several other states do not have such a statutory requirement but, apparently, may have such a requirement administratively.

. The majority, in footnote 4, states that, even if Alavez were treated the same as a person whose Maryland driver’s license was suspended for using a false document, "it would avail Alavez naught.” The majority's statement is erroneous. If Alavez had a Maryland driver’s license suspended because he used a false document to obtain the license, he would not face a lifetime suspension. Neither side disputed this fact at oral argument. Instead, it was pointed out that he could apply for reinstatement of his Maryland driver’s license and it could be reinstated after 12 months. See § 16-208(a)(l) of the Transportation Article which prohibits the MVA from suspending "a license of privilege to drive for a period of more than 1 year.” Even if a license is revoked because of points, it may be reinstated after a period of time. See § 16-208(b)(2)(ii) of the Transportation Article.