Court Opinion

ID: 9609964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:34:09.590809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:54.944024
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ
dissenting:
The majority holds that the respondent trial court erred as a matter of law by accepting the defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial over the objection of the prosecution. See maj. op. at 185. Because I believe the majority fails to give proper deference to the trial court’s ruling in this ease, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The facts of this ease, which are subject to some dispute, ape set forth here to assist an understanding of the fact-based decision made by the trial court. The undisputed portion of the facts establish that the defendant, Edward Finley, was a passenger in a ear driven by Damon Birch. The car was traveling at a high rate of speed and Finley was sitting on the passenger door window seal when the ear, was stopped by Denver police officers. The dispute arises as to what, if anything, Finley was doing while seated on the window seal. The police officers allege that they stopped the car because they observed Finley holding something in his hands while stretching his arms across the roof of the car. The officers believed that the defendant had a gun and was attempting to shoot at an adjacent car. Finley contends that he had nothing in his hands while seated on the window seal. After stopping the car, the police searched the vehicle and found a shotgun under the passenger seat.
Finley was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a dangerous weapon (a short shotgun).1 After the officers learned that Finley had a prior felony conviction, he was charged with possession of a weapon by a previous offender (“POWPO”). See § 18-12-108, 6 C.R.S. (1997). The information alleged that Finley had two prior felony convictions: one for menacing with a deadly weapon and the other for possession of a weapon by a previous offender (the offense charged in this proceeding). Based on these prior convictions, Finley was also charged with two counts of being an habitual offender.
Before trial, Finley invoked his statutory right to waive a jury trial. See § 18-1-406(2), 6 C.R.S. (1997). Finley based his motion on his concern that knowledge of his *194previous convictions could improperly persuade the jury that he committed the offense at issue in this case and therefore could compromise his due process right to a fair trial. See discussion infra Part II. The jury would learn about his previous felonies because a prior conviction is an element of the POWPO charge. Thus, relying on the theory that a trial judge is less likely to be influenced by inappropriate considerations, the defendant attempted to waive his right to a jury trial. In response, the prosecution invoked its statutory right to force a jury trial. See § 16-10-101, 6 C.R.S. (1997). Whether the trial court was obliged to proceed to jury trial, on these particular facts and in the face of these competing motions, is the subject of this rule to show cause.
II.
It is well-settled that evidence of a defendant’s prior felony convictions may unduly influence a jury’s decision on the defendant’s guilt. Colorado and federal courts have acknowledged this axiom on a myriad of occasions. The problem with this evidence is that it may lead a jury to a decision based on improper grounds, such as
generalizing a defendant’s earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent momentarily).
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, -, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997); see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76, 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-19, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 100-03 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 985-86 (10th Cir.1986); United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir.1982); People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1372-73 (Colo.1994); People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Colo.1994); People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 551 (Colo. 1981).'
This evidence presents even greater danger when it relates to previous crimes of a nature similar to the charged offense. Thus, prior to the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence (“CRE”), Colorado decisional law followed the exclusionary principle that, subject to narrow exceptions, the inherent prejudice in “other-crimes” evidence renders such evidence inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. See People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 (Colo.1991); People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64, 67, 596 P.2d 751, 753-54 (1979).2
After the adoption of the CRE, this court articulated a four-part test to determine whether evidence of prior acts is admissible. See People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo.1990). The test incorporates CRE 401 by first asking whether the evidence tends to prove the existence of a material fact (i.e. whether the evidence is logically relevant). Then, the Spoto test turns to CRE 404(b), which prohibits admission of evidence of other crimes “to prove the bad character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.” A court must determine whether the logical relevance of the evidence is independent of the intermediate bad character inference prohibited by CRE 404(b). Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318. Finally, even if the evidence survives the first three parts of the analysis, Spoto directs a court to consider whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. IcL; see CRE 403.
Thus, because of its potential to prejudice the jury unfairly, evidence of similar crimes is not generally admissible in a criminal trial, regardless of its relevance. In the instant ease, the danger of this prejudice prompted Finley to waive his right to a jury trial. The facts of Finley’s case present an especially high risk that a jury may be influenced by impermissible prejudice because the defendant was convicted of not one, but two felonies, both of which arguably display a tendency to commit the specific offense at issue here.
*195The behavior that the prosecution plans to attribute to Finley at trial, wielding a gun at a passing car, is similar to Finley’s prior conviction for menacing with a deadly weapon. A jury may conclude that Finley is guilty of the behavior in this case simply because he has been convicted of similar behavior in the past. Moreover, Finley was also convicted of possession of a weapon by a previous offender, the very offense charged in this case. The defendant’s concerns that his previous convictions might unduly prejudice him in the eyes of a jury were reasonable.3
With this expression of the prejudice attendant to evidence of prior similar crimes, and with reference to our historical treatment of this evidence, I now examine whether the trial court dealt properly with this issue in the case before us.
III.
A threshold matter in this ease is the statutory pronouncement that a defendant may waive his or her right to a jury trial only if the prosecution consents to the waiver. See § 16-10-101, 6 G.R.S. (1997). In People v. District Court, 843 P.2d 6 (Colo.1992), we held that the Colorado Constitution does not abide an unqualified prosecution consent requirement. See-District Court, 843 P.2d at 11; see generally Colo. Const, art. II, §§ 23, 25. In cases where “an accused may be subjected to an unfair proceeding before a biased jury,” the accused’s due process right to a fair trial is violated by denying waiver of a jury trial, even in the face of prosecutorial opposition. District Court, 843 P.2d at ll.4 A defendant seeking such a waiver on due process grounds must “raise due process concerns in the trial court.” Id. We decided in District Court that, “ ‘[T]he trial judge ..., by the nature of our judicial process, is in the best position to assure that a defendant’s right to a fair trial ... will be substantially protected.’ ” Id. (quoting Stapleton v. District Court, 179 Colo. 187, 193, 499 P.2d 310, 312 (1972)). The majority now removes this decision from- the court that we believed was in the better position to assure a fair trial. See maj. op. at 187.
Having previously determined that this decision is within the trial court’s discretion, the appropriate question in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion. This standard of review is especially suitable in the context of this original proceeding pursuant to C.AR. 21. An original proceeding under C.AR. 21 is not a substitute for an appeal and is limited to an inquiry into whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. See People v. District Court, In and For Eagle County, 898 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Colo.1995); Hayes v. District Court, 854 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Colo. 1993); Halliburton v. County Court, 672 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Colo.1983). Because the trial court is clearly charged with the initial responsibility to decide whether there is a due process violation, it has the jurisdiction to make the decision, even if the decision is wrong.5 Our focus should be on whether the *196trial court abused its discretion.6' An abuse of discretion occurs only when a trial court’s ruling is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable. See Boettcher & Co., Inc. v. Munson, 854 P.2d 199, 211 (Colo.1993).
IV.
In a POWPO trial, the prosecution must prove a prior conviction in order to substantiate the offense. In the context of the federal counterpart to Colorado’s POWPO statute, a number of courts have held that, where a prior conviction is essential to proving the crime, it is not unfairly prejudicial to introduce evidence of the prior conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.1993). Nonetheless, in this same context, the United States Supreme Court has held that the name and nature of a prior felony conviction are unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, where an admission to the fact of the conviction is available. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 655.
The majority acknowledges that the holding of Old Chief deals with the unfair prejudice attendant to evidence of prior similar crimes, but declines to address the merits of that case. See maj. op. at 191. Instead, the majority concludes that, because Old Chief dealt with Federal Rule of Evidence 403 rather than the Due Process Clause, Old Chief does not require the majority to reach a different result. See id. This conclusion is undeniably correct.
However, the fact that Old Chief does not compel this court to reach a certain result does not mean that the reasoning of Old Chief is of no value to the resolution of this ease. Old Chief dealt with admission of prior crimes evidence in the context of a felon with a gun statute. There, as here, the fact of a prior conviction was an element of the offense. There, as here, the defendant raised the concern that a jury might be unduly prejudiced by this evidence. There, as here, the prosecution claimed that, because the prior conviction was an element of the offense, it could never be unduly prejudicial. There, the Court rejected the prosecution’s argument. Because the defendant had admitted to the fact of the prior conviction, the Court held that the name and nature of the prior conviction presented no legitimate probative value, and instead merely served to unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at-: — , 117 S.Ct. at 654-56. Thus, Old Chief has persuasive value, in this case, in determining whether the prosecution’s need to introduce evidence of the name and nature of Finley’s convictions should prevail over Finley’s at*197tempts to avoid an unfair trial before a biased jury.7
The trial court below was presented with these competing concerns to consider in light of Finley’s constitutional right to a fair trial. The trial court discussed the due process concerns with the prosecution and the defendant at length. Some detail of these discussions is useful to give context to the trial court’s rulings and to understand the judge’s narrow focus on this particular case. The trial court heard arguments .about the prejudicial nature of the defendant’s prior convictions, and tried to ascertain whether the prosecution intended to present evidence of both felonies at trial. Although the POWPO statute requires the prosecution to prove the fact of only one prior felony conviction, the prosecution preserved its right to present the name and nature of both prior convictions. The trial court also investigated bifurcating the elements of the charge, so that the jury would not hear evidence of the prior felonies unless and until it decided that the defendant actually possessed a weapon, and concluded that our caselaw precludes this option. See People v. Fullerton, 186 Colo. 97, 525 P.2d 1166 (1974).
The trial court also considered employing a limiting jury instruction to address the danger of an unfair trial. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this court have frequently acknowledged that, while limiting jury instructions are often adequate to deal with potentially prejudicial evidence:
[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); see Vigil v. People, 731 P.2d 713, 717 (Colo. 1987) (noting that limiting jury instructions inadequate where “ ‘such evidence is so prejudicial that the jury will unlikely be able to erase it from their minds’” (citations omitted)); People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 30 (Colo.1981) (“We cannot ignore the practical and human limitations of the jury system ... For the jurors in this case to [separate the probative component of the evidence from its unduly prejudicial component] is a feat beyond their ‘ability and almost certainly beyond their willingness.’ ” (citations omitted)); People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 591 (Colo.1981) (“[T]he trial court’s cautionary instruction to the jury is not sufficient under thése circumstances to offset the inflammatory nature of this testimony and its likely effect on the jury’s deliberations.”); see also People v. Goldsberry, 181 Colo. 406, 410, 509 P.2d 801, 803 (1973); Edmisten v. People, 176 Colo. 262, 276, 490 P.2d 58, 65 (1971); People v. Gillispie, 767 P.2d 778, 780 (Colo.App.1988).
Furthermore, if limiting jury instructions were always a sufficient method to handle prejudicial evidence, CRE 403 and CRE 404(b) would be unnecessary. CRE 403 gives a trial court the authority to exclude evidence from the jury’s consideration where the probative value of the evidence- is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court would have no occasion to exclude such evidence if jury instructions were always adequate to cure the danger of unfair prejudice. Similarly, the trial court would have no reason to exclude evidence of prior crimes under CRE 404(b) if the court could simply and adequately instruct the jury to disregard such evidence as it pertains to bad character and propensity to act in conformity therewith. Clearly, “curative” jury instructions are not always so adequate. Finley’s desire to avoid a jury trial reflected his fear, supported by caselaw and the CRE, that limiting jury instructions might not adequately address the danger of an unfair trial in his ease. Because it shared Finley’s misgivings about the sufficiency of limiting jury instructions in this *198case, the trial court determined that such instructions were not an appropriate option.
In reaching its initial ruling, the trial court was cognizant of the following: (1) the prejudice generally associated with prior similar acts evidence and Colorado’s longstanding restrictive policy concerning the admissibility of such evidence, (2) the enhanced prejudice associated with the specific prior felonies in this case, (3) the fact that the prosecution might present evidence of both felonies (thereby increasing the likelihood of unfair prejudice) and (4) the fact that the prosecution would be allowed to present all evidence concerning Finley’s prior convictions at a bifurcated proceeding related to the habitual counts. The trial court then ruled, “[F]or all of these reasons, I find that Mr. Finley’s right to due process in this proceeding may be compromised if this case proceeded by jury trial.”
The prosecution then moved the trial court to reconsider. In support of this motion, the prosecution presented various “less drastic” alternatives to a bench trial. The prosecution also emphasized that, regardless of whether the trial court accepted any of the proffered alternatives, the prosecution intended to appeal the court’s initial ruling. The prosecution presented various stipulations which called for the defendant to stipulate to the fact of the prior convictions and to the precise names of the felonies. The prosecution also proposed that Finley stipulate.to the fact and name of one of the prior felonies and allow the prosecution to present evidence of the other felony to the jury. Because such detailed stipulations did little or nothing to lessen the prejudicial effect of hearing about the prior convictions, the trial court did not believe that these proposals adequately addressed the due process concerns.8 Finley did not flatly reject these detailed stipulations. Finley indicated his distaste for these detailed proposals, but he agreed that they may be his “third choice of how to try this [case].”
The trial court then asked the prosecution if it was willing to accept the defendant’s admission to only the fact of a prior felony conviction. See generally Old Chief, 519 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 655 (finding that “there is no cognizable difference between the evi-dentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimate probative component of the official record [of conviction]”). The prosecution initially rejected this stipulation despite the fact that, as noted, only the fact of a prior conviction is required to prove a POWPO charge.9 Finally, after noting that this option was not its first choice and preserving its right to appeal the trial court’s initial ruling, the prosecution agreed to accept the defendant’s stipulation to the fact of the felonies only.
At this point in the motion to reconsider, the trial court indicated that it was inclined to rely on its initial ruling. In light of the determination of the prosecution to postpone trial and pursue this original proceeding regardless of which stipulations were made (as evidenced by the prosecution’s expressed intent to appeal the trial court’s initial ruling), the trial court was not persuaded that the motion to reconsider had served this case productively. Clearly sensing this, the defendant asked the court to deny the motion to reconsider and indicated that he was not willing to accept the stipulation to the fact of the felonies, “if the jury would become aware of that.”
Consequently, after methodically evaluating the alternatives to a bench trial, the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion to reconsider. The court took care to emphasize that its ruling turned on the peculiar facts of this case, and did not decide that every de*199fendant in a POWPO case has an unconditional right to waive a trial by jury.10
This careful and exhaustive process is precisely what we asked of a trial court in District Court. There is support in the record and in the caselaw for the trial court’s decision, regardless of whether our decision would be different. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s ruling was not manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the defendant to waive his right to jury trial over the prosecution’s objection.
V.
I feel compelled to briefly address the majority’s expressed view that the due process issue resolved by the trial court is broader than the specific facts of this case. See maj. op. at 187-188. The majority asserts that it “see[s] no difference between the argument made here and an argument raised by any other defendant who was previously convicted of a POWPO or a violent felony.” Id. There is no need to engage in such speculation. The salient issue presented by this case is whether the decision to accept waiver of a jury trial is within the discretion of the trial court. In other words, do we really mean what we said in District Court? If so, then the trial court’s ruling should stand whenever it enjoys support in the record and is not manifestly unreasonable. In this, as in countless other instances involving application of law to facts, we should leave to trial courts the business of sorting out the differences, if any, between this case and factual situations presented by future cases.11
In effect, the majority holds that a defendant’s due process right is never violated by refusing to grant a waiver of a jury trial where the prosecution objects, even in cases where a reasonable mind may find that the probative value of the evidence to be admitted at trial is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 655. The majority creates uncertainty as to whether trial courts have the jurisdiction to decide such claims and what standard will be used to review any decision a trial court makes. In contrast, District Court left this decision within the sound discretion of the trial court.
VI.
To summarize, we have previously decided that the trial court is in the best position to balance a defendant’s right to due process of law with the prosecution’s statutory right to force a jury trial. In the instant case, there is substantial support for the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion by allowing the defendant to *200waive his right to a jury trial. Because I believe the majority substitutes its discretion for that of the trial court, in conflict with standard abuse of discretion analysis, I respectfully dissent.
BENDER, J., joins in this dissent.

. The driver was charged with unlawful carrying of a weapon and subsequently entered a guilty plea to that charge.

. See also Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 284, 344 P.2d 455, 458 (1959) ("evidence of similar acts has inhering in it damning innuendo likely to beget prejudice in the minds of jurors, and ... tends to inject collateral issues into a criminal case which are not unlikely to confuse and lead astray the jury”).

. As the United States Supreme Court has held:
In dealing with the specific problem raised by [the federal felon with a gun statute] and its prior conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.... Where a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious ....
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 652.

. I agree with the proposition, discussed by the majority, that a defendant does not normally have a constitutional right to waive a jury trial. See maj. op. at 189. Our holding in District Court, however, establishes that a defendant does have a constitutional right to waive trial by jury in cases where his or her right to due process may be compromised by a jury trial.

.The majority holds that the respondent trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in making this due process decision. See maj. op. at 187. The majority provides two bases for this conclusion. First, “the respondent court erred as a matter of law.” Id. Second, although a trial court may have general jurisdiction over a particular class of case, the trial court exceeds its jurisdiction in a particular case where it acts contrary to statute. See id. at 186-187; see also Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 105, 329 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1958). Thus, the majority holds that, although the respondent court has jurisdiction over this class of case, it exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a bench trial on due process grounds because section 16-10-101 forbids a trial court from making this decision where the prosecution *196objects. See § 16-10-101, 6 C.R.S. (1997). If section 16-10-101 were the only relevant law bearing upon this issue, I would agree. However, our decision in District Court established that a trial court does have the jurisdiction to make this due process decision, despite the provisions of section 16-10-101. Consequently, the majority’s holding is founded on the inaccurate premise that, whenever a trial court errs as a matter of law in making a particular decision, the court loses its otherwise valid jurisdiction to make this decision.

. The majority cites Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.1993), as authority for treating this decision by the trial court as strictly one of law. See maj. op. at 187, n. 4. Evans, however, is inapposite here because that court’s decision to treat the constitutional issue before it as strictly one of law was based on the fact that the issue concerned only legal, as opposed to factual, questions. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1274-75. As authority for this decision, Evans relied on Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1550 (10th Cir.1991), which held that the determination of whether a court applied a correct legal standard is a question of law. Neither Evans nor Lafferty held that a trial court’s factual findings relevant to a legal determination should be reviewed de novo, even where the applicable legal standard is constitutionally-based. Thus, the respondent trial court’s factual finding that a jury will be unduly prejudiced by the facts of this case, see discussion infra Part IV, should be accorded the great deference ordinarily extended to findings of fact. See District Court, 843 P.2d at 11; People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 260 (Colo.1996) (responsibility of assuring that jurors are fair and impartial is vested in trial judge and judge's decision is disturbed only upon showing of abuse of discretion). The majority concedes that, where a trial court finds that a jury will be unduly prejudiced, a trial by that jury offends due process. See maj. op. at 190 (stating that trial by jury offends due process where defendant shows pre-trial publicity renders fair trial impossible).

. Indeed, the determination of whether a jury trial is fundamentally unfair, in violation of due process, turns in part on the impartiality of the jury. We should be concerned when the jury hears evidence the probative value of which is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Such evidence could bias a jury. “Where an accused may be subjected to an unfair proceeding before a biased jury,” the accused’s right to due process is violated. District Court, 843 P.2d at 11; see also Pacific Mutual Life Insur. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1055, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (Kennedy, J„ concurring in judgment) ("A verdict returned by a biased or prejudiced jury no doubt violates due process”).

. The prosecution’s reluctance to stipulate to anything less than the full names of the felonies implies that the prosecution itself believed that the names of the felonies provide more than simply an element of the POWPO offense. Evidently, the prosecution believed that this information might prejudice the jury in ways that the mere fact of the felonies might not.

. Furthermore, the prosecution indicated that it may offer more than the official record of conviction at trial, but may also present witnesses to discuss the nature of the prior convictions.

. In its initial ruling, the court stated:
I do think it’s important that I look at the nature of the two prior felony convictions. They are menacing and possession of a weapon, which is the very charge Mr. Finley’s charged with here. I think that increases the due process problem in this case, increases the chance that the jury would use this information, even though it’s an element of this offense, for propensity; and I don’t know any sensible way to get around that.
... So the only thing we’re left with to solve this problem is a limiting instruction. And I find, under the circumstances of this particular case, that the limiting instruction of the kind that I articulated with [the prosecutor] in my colloquy with him would be insufficient — or may be insufficient to overcome this — this inherent problem with jurors punishing Mr. Finley, not for what he’s charged with in this case, but for what he’s done in past cases. So for all of those reasons, I find that Mr. Finley’s right to due process in this proceeding may be corn-promised if this case proceeded by jury trial and, therefore, Mr. Finley’s motion for a bench trial is granted, over the People’s objection and over the People’s insistence under 16-10-101 that we proceed by jury.

. Similarly, I do not believe the holding of Spencer v. Texas requires a contrary conclusion. 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967). The majority cites this case in support of the proposition that the federal Due Process Clause does not forbid a jury from ever hearing evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction while considering a new charge against the defendant. See maj. op. at 188-190. However, the trial court did not decide that admission of such evidence is per se unconstitutional. Rather, it determined that Finley’s two prior convictions involved behavior so similar to Finley’s alleged conduct in the substantive offense as to create a due process violation in this case. Spencer’s holding is consistent with my view that trial courts may investigate whether this evidence does violate due process in certain cases.