Court Opinion

ID: 9668230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:06:45.335835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:43.854017
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRIS, Justice.
In a timely filed motion for rehearing, Tempie Fortson Worthy asks us to reeonsider our opinion issued in this ease. We have previously concluded that Worthy failed to provide us with a sufficient record to review any claims other than those set forth in her second amended petition. Worthy now contends, among other things, that the record is sufficient for us to review all her claims or, in the alternative, she should be allowed to supplement the record. In connection with the latter argument, Worthy has filed a motion for leave to file a post-submission supplemental transcript. We deny both Worthy’s motion for rehearing and motion for leave. We write separately to address Worthy’s arguments regarding her failure to provide us with a sufficient record.
In our initial opinion, we concluded Worthy faded to provide us with a sufficient record for review because the transcript did not contain her original petition setting forth the specific causes of action upon which the trial court rendered its first summary judgment. The transcript contained only Worthy’s second amended petition in which she alleged claims solely under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The trial court signed a second summary judgment disposing of these claims.
Worthy argues the record is adequate to present the claims raised in her original petition because the claims are “listed” in Collagen Corporation’s (Collagen) motion for summary judgment, which is included in the appellate transcript. Worthy additionally points out that the claims are listed in her brief and this listing is not disputed by Collagen. Although there may be instances where we could review claims listed only in a motion for summary judgment, in this case a mere listing of claims is not sufficient to present the claims for review.
The issue presented on appeal was whether the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted Worthy’s state law claims. The “list” of the claims purportedly set forth in Worthy’s original petition provides us only with the general, descriptive names of the causes of action pleaded. In particular, Collagen’s motion for summary judgment describes Worthy’s causes of action as negli*722gence, gross negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, failure to warn, and fraud in obtaining FDA approval. This list, as contrasted with a pleading made in accordance with well recognized rules of procedure, does not inform us about the specific allegations upon which the claims are based. Without the nature of the allegations supporting the claims before us, any preemption analysis would have to be founded on a “blanket” preemption theory. For example, we would necessarily have to conclude either that all negligence claims are barred or that no negligence claims are barred. Worthy specifically urges us not to apply a blanket preemption analysis, and we agree such an analysis would be inappropriate.
The language of the MDA’s preemption provision is broad but not unlimited. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 360k(a) (West Supp.1995). A state tort claim is preempted only if: (1) the FDA has established regulations specifically applicable to the medical device at issue; (2) the state law claim would impose a requirement different from, or in addition to, the FDA regulations; and (3) the claim relates to the safety and effectiveness of the device or any matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under the MDA. Accord, Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2614, 132 L.Ed.2d 857 (1995). Due to the extensive nature of the premarket approval process, many claims pertaining to Class III medical devices may be preempted. However, there is still the possibility that, based upon the specific facts underlying the claim, one of the three prongs of the test will not be met. To determine how a claim relates to an FDA regulation or requirement, we must review the nature of the allegations specifically supporting the claim asserted. Not to do so would cause us to venture into giving prohibited advisory opinions.
Furthermore, many courts have acknowledged the possibility that certain state-law tort claims will survive preemption. See, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb, Co., 65 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir.1995) (although MDA preempts express warranty claims based on FDA-mandated labeling, packaging, and advertising, it does not preempt express warranties based on manufacturer’s voluntary representations), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1995) (No. 95-1010); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir.) (MDA does not preempt claims such as negligent implantation or removal of devices or claims arising out of contaminated devices), cert. denied 510 U.S. 824, 114 S.Ct. 84, 126 L.Ed.2d 52 (1993). The distinctive feature of a surviving claim is not its label but its factual basis. For example, an analysis of a claim for negligent implantation of a medical device differs greatly from an analysis of a claim for negligent misrepresentation of a device’s effectiveness, although both claims may fall under the label of “negligence.” Therefore, although Worthy points to lists of claims contained in the record, these lists do not provide us with a sufficient basis for a complete review in this case.
Worthy next contends the record is adequate to inform us of the claims raised in her original petition because, as she now maintains, the claims are realleged in her second amended petition. Significantly, Worthy’s counsel expressly stated during oral argument that the second amended petition did not allege any of the causes of action raised in Worthy’s original petition. As we stated in our initial opinion, Worthy’s second amended petition appears to allege claims only under the DTPA. We will not now accept Worthy’s convenient recharacterization of her pleadings solely to avoid the consequences of her failure to provide us with a sufficient record.
Alternatively, Worthy requests permission to file a supplemental transcript containing her original petition. It is well settled that a request to file a post-submission supplemental transcript should not be granted, absent some unusual circumstances, after the appellate court has issued its opinion and rendered its judgment. Irrigation Constr. Co. v. Motheral Contractors, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 336, 344 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1974, no writ). To allow such post-judgment filings would serve only to waste judicial *723resources, interfere with the orderly administration of appellate review, and impair the principle of finality of judgments.
Worthy has made no showing of any unusual circumstances that would justify allowing her to supplement the record at this late date. Indeed, Worthy does not even attempt to explain her failure to include her original petition in the appellate record prior to submission of the case. It is clear that Worthy was aware of the absence of the pleading because she asked this Court before submission for leave to file a supplemental transcript containing her original petition. In her original motion for leave, Worthy specifically stated that her original petition was material to her appeal. As requested, we granted Worthy leave to file a supplemental transcript containing her original petition, but she never did so. As we stated in our initial opinion, it is the appellant who bears the burden of ensuring a sufficient record on appeal. See Bayoud v. Bayoud, 797 S.W.2d 304, 313 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied).
Worthy relies solely on Silk v. Terrill, 898 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.1995), to support her present request to supplement the record. Worthy appears to read Silk as broadly requiring that leave be granted upon any request for post-submission supplementation.
At issue in Silk was whether the record was insufficient for appellate review because of the absence of an affidavit filed in a summary judgment proceeding. The appeals court concluded the record was insufficient, declined to reach the merits of the case, and denied the appellant’s post-submission request to supplement the record. The supreme court held that it was an abuse of discretion not to allow a post-submission supplementation of the appellate record with the missing affidavit. The supreme court’s ruling was based on the following: (1) the contents of the omitted affidavit were never at issue because appellee conceded the affidavit negated every element of her claim; (2) the omitted affidavit was not material to a decision on the merits; and (3) the appeals court was provided with a copy of the omitted affidavit before issuing its opinion. Id. at 766. The supreme court, therefore, remanded the case to the appeals court for consideration of the merits. Silk is inapposite to the facts of this case.
As discussed above, the contents of Worthy’s original petition are central to a preemption analysis because it is the petition that sets forth the specific allegations underlying each of her claims. Unlike Silk, we have no concessions by the appellee that would inform us of the substance of the missing pleading or make the missing pleading unnecessary to a decision on the merits. Furthermore, Worthy never provided us with a copy of her original petition, even improperly filed, before we issued our opinion and rendered judgment on the appeal presented at submission. Indeed, Worthy failed to provide us with a copy of her original petition even after obtaining specific leave to do so.
We deny Worthy’s motion for rehearing. We also deny her motion to file a post-submission supplemental transcript.