Court Opinion

ID: 9913748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 18:06:34.132544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:48.541710
License: Public Domain

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139 Nev., Advance Opinion 5' q

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DAVID WILLIAM MCCORD, No. 85271
Appellant,

v8 FILED

THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. DEC 2R 7973

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ay. :
GES DEPUTY CLERK

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a bench trial,
of trafficking in a controlled substance, 100 grams or more but less than 400
grams. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Scott N. Freeman,
Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Evelyn Grosenick, Public Defender, and Kathryn FE. Reynolds, Chief Deputy
Public Defender, Washoe County,
for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
District Attorney, and Jennifer P. Noble, Chief Appellate Deputy District
Attorney, Washoe County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, C.J., and LEE and BELL,
JJ.

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OPINION
By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.:

Law enforcement pulled over appellant David McCord because
McCord’s Nevada license plate had a dealership frame around it that
partially covered the word “NEVADA.” According to the deputy who
conducted the stop, although he was able to immediately identify the license
plate and perform a license plate check, McCord’s license plate was not
legible as required by NRS 482.275(4). McCord was later charged with
trafficking in a controlled substance after contraband was found in his car
during the traffic stop. He sought to suppress the evidence on the basis that
the traffic stop was unlawful. T he State argued that the frame on McCord’s
license plate was foreign material and obscured the lettering imprinted on
the plate, in violation of NRS 482.275(4), and served as probable cause for
the traffic stop. The district court agreed and denied the motion to suppress.

In this opinion, we hold that a license plate frame does not
constitute “foreign materials” within the meaning of NRS 482.275(4) anda
license plate is “clearly legible” if the required registration information is
readily identifiable. To hold otherwise would effectively ban license plate
frames. Such an outcome would promote discretionary law enforcement
and potentially subject otherwise law-abiding motorists to arbitrary or, as
here, pretextual traffic stops. Accordingly, the district court erred in
denying McCord’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic

stop because there was no probable cause to support the stop based on a

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violation of NRS 482.275(4). We therefore reverse McCord’s judgment of
conviction and remand for further proceedings. !

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Detective Apryl McElroy of the Regional Narcotics Unit (RNU)
developed a confidential informant whom she instructed to contact McCord
and arrange a purchase of methamphetamine. The RNU informed Deputy
Ned Nemeth, a member of a canine unit, that McCord would be traveling to
Reno and might be in possession of a large amount of methamphetamine.
In an effort to protect the informant’s identity, the RNU asked Deputy
Nemeth to conduct a “wall stop.”* To facilitate this plan, the RNU provided
the deputy with McCord’s name and a description of the vehicle he would
be driving. According to Deputy Nemeth, the RNU often gave him minimal
information about criminal suspects so that he could perform pretextual
traffic stops to build cases against those suspects.

Using the information provided by the RNU, Deputy Nemeth
located McCord’s vehicle and watched for any traffic violations to justify a
vehicle stop. Because Deputy Nemeth observed no moving violations, he
focused on the vehicle’s license plate and the license plate frame. Although
Deputy Nemeth immediately identified the license plate as a standard issue
Nevada plate and was able to perform a license plate check, he concluded

that the license plate nonetheless violated NRS 482.275(4) because the

‘Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted,

“A “wall stop.” as explained by Detective McElroy, is a police
technique where canine units “conduct their own investigation, their own
stop and conduct their own probable cause to stop a suspicious subject or
vehicle that [the RNU] provide to them.”

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dealership frame partially covered the name of the state. Based on that
perceived violation, Deputy Nemeth initiated a traffic stop.

After pulling over McCord, Deputy Nemeth approached the
vehicle and spoke with him. Deputy Nemeth told McCord that he would
issue a warning for the license plate violation and directed McCord to exit
the vehicle to observe the violation. With McCord out of the vehicle, Deputy
Nemeth performed a pat down search, discovered a scale with a white
crystalline substance on it in McCord’s pocket, and asked McCord for
permission to search the vehicle. McCord refused to consent to the search.
Another deputy arrived on the scene shortly after Deputy Nemeth pulled
over McCord. While that deputy worked on the warning citation for the
obstructed license plate, Deputy Nemeth deployed his drug detection
canine, and the canine alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. A
search revealed approximately 187 grams of methamphetamine. As a
result, McCord was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance.

Before trial, McCord moved to suppress the evidence obtained
during the search, arguing that Deputy Nemeth lacked probable cause to
make the stop. The district court disagreed, finding that McCord’s license
plate violated the plain language of NRS 482.275(4) because the plate
holder was “in itself a foreign material” and the words “NEVADA” and
“Home Means Nevada” were obscured by the holder and thus provided
probable cause for the stop. Accordingly, the district court denied the
motion to suppress.

After a bench trial, McCord was found guilty of trafficking in a
controlled substance, 100 grams or more but less than 400 grams, and was
sentenced to serve a minimum of 60 months and a maximum of 150 months

in prison. This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION

McCord argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress and finding that the traffic stop was reasonable. A
motion to suppress evidence presents mixed questions of fact and law. State
v. Beckman, 129 Nev. 481, 485, 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013). We “review[ ]
findings of fact for clear error, but the legal consequences of those facts
involve questions of law that we review de novo.” Id. at 486, 305 P.3d at
916,

The Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV: Nev. Const.
art. 1,§ 18. A traffic stop is a seizure and therefore is subject to the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). Such stops are “reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Jd. at 810.
“The reasonableness requirement strikes a balance between the public
interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers.” State v. Rincon, 122 Nev. 1170, 1175, 147 P.3d
233, 236 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is undisputed that Deputy Nemeth stopped McCord’s vehicle
under the pretext that the license plate frame obscuring the name of the

issuing state violated NRS 482.275(4).? The district court found that there

The State suggests that Deputy Nemeth had probable cause,
independent from the license-plate violation, based on the information
provided by the RNU. Although the State raised this alternative argument
below, the district court denied the motion to suppress based solely on the
alleged violation of NRS 482.275(4) as providing probable cause for the
traffic stop. Therefore, we decline to address the State’s alternative
argument. See McKay v. City of Las Vegas, 106 Nev. 203, 207, 789 P.2d 584,

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was probable cause for the stop because the license plate frame on McCord’s
vehicle covered parts of the lettering imprinted on the plate such that it was
not “clearly legible” and because the license plate frame was “foreign
material.” McCord contends that the district court’s interpretation of the
statute was erroneous.

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we
review de novo. Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011).
When interpreting a statute, the objective “is to give effect to the
Legislature's intent.” Jd. To determine legislative intent, we first look to
the statute’s plain language. Jd. “[W]e interpret clear and unambiguous
statutory language by its plain meaning unless doing so would lead to an
unreasonable or absurd result.” Moore v. State, 136 Nev. 620, 622-23, 475
P.3d 33, 36 (2020).
Proper display of license plates

In relevant part, NRS 482.275(4) provides that “[e]very license
plate... must be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition
to be clearly legible.” The statute thus requires that all license plates meet
two requirements: (1) “be maintained free from foreign materials” and
(2) “be clearly legible.” The use of the conjunctive “and” means that if either
condition is not satisfied, a license plate is not properly displayed. See
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 117 (2012) (explaining that “the conjunction and,” when used
between two elements, “entails an express or implied both before the first

element’). Therefore, we address each requirement in turn.

586 (1990) (declining to resolve an issue because the parties did not litigate
and the district court did not decide the matter).

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Whether the license plate was free from foreign materials

McCord argues that the district court erred in concluding that
the license plate frame constituted a “foreign material” for purposes of NRS
482.275(4). License plate frames “generally surround the periphery of the
plate, leaving the numbers and place of origin readable.” United States v.
Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court acknowledged
McCord’s argument that license plate frames are widely used. Indeed, as
evidenced by the frame at issue here, automotive dealerships regularly
supply frames after a vehicle purchase. And many people attach frames to
show allegiance to a social group, alma mater, or sports team as a means of
self-expression. Although the Legislature did not define “foreign
materials,” we are not convinced that the Legislature intended the term to
include all license plate frames.

We have already determined that maintaining a license plate
“free from foreign materials” is its own requirement under NRS 482.275(4).
But in determining the meaning of that requirement, we cannot read it in
isolation but must construe the statutory provision as a whole. See Orion
Portfolio Servs. 2, LLC v. County of Clark ex rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev.,
126 Nev. 397, 408, 245 P.3d 527, 531 (2010) (recognizing that “[t}]his court
has a duty to construe statutes as a whole’). Consistent with NRS
482.275(4)'s overall focus on visibility and legibility, the Legislature clearly
intended to ensure that drivers display the required registration
information. The purpose of requiring motorists to properly display a
license plate is so that a vehicle, and its owner, can be easily identified. See
generally State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 369 (lowa 2014) (explaining
that “[a]n important purpose of [lowa’s display-of-license-plates law], along
with related sections, is to allow police and citizens to identify vehicles”).

This purpose is not frustrated by a frame designed to go around the license

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plate, securing the plate-—-or the temporary dealer placard affixed after a
sale—to the vehicle, which makes the frame sufficiently connected and
related to the plate itself such that it is not “foreign.” See Foreign, Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2014) (defining “foreign,” in part,
as “alien in character: not connected or pertinent”). Reading the term
“foreign materials” broadly to include any specialty or dealer license plate
frame would yield an absurd result, as “[s]imply driving a car off the dealer’s
lot with that type of license plate frame would amount to a violation and
give officers a basis to stop the car.” State v. Carter, 255 A.3d 1139, 1156
(N.J. 2021). And allowing law enforcement the discretion to stop any vehicle
with a frame attached to the license plate does not further NRS 482.275(4)’s
purpose of ensuring vehicles can be identified. Considering common sense
and the public policy interests underlying NRS 482.275(4), we believe that
the context and intent of the statute requires a narrow application.
Accordingly, we cannot read the requirement that license plates “be
maintained free from foreign materials” as including all license plate
frames.

Other courts have likewise concluded that license plate frames
that do not conceal necessary identifying information do not constitute a
traffic violation. In Whitfield v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained that a literal
interpretation of a license plate display regulation would “effectuate a near-
complete ban on the use of ubiquitous license plate frames.” 99 A.3d 650,
652 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The regulation at issue provided that “|i|dentification
tags shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a clearly legible
condition.” Jd. at 657 (quoting D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 422.5 (2007)). The

court was “not persuaded that a literal interpretation, prohibiting the

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placement of any foreign material over the tag, regardless of whether it
obstructs relevant information, furthers any legitimate purpose and would
not instead border on unreasonable.” /d. at 661. Thus, the court declined
to interpret the language of the regulation “so broadly as to effectuate a ban
on virtually all license plate frames, even those which do not obstruct
identifying information.” /d. at 663: see also State v. Morris, 270 So. 3d 436,
439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that a license plate frame did not
constitute “obscuring matter” and therefore did not violate Florida’s license
plate display statute (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Legislature is empowered to enact traffic laws as it sees fit
to further the compelling public interest in safe roadways. See Hinegardner
v. Marcor Resorts, L.P. V., 108 Nev. 1091, 1096, 844 P.2d 800, 804 (1992)
(observing that when an “issue involves many competing societal, economic,
and policy considerations, the legislative procedures and safeguards are
well equipped to the task of fashioning an appropriate change, if any”). As
other courts have observed, “if the legislature wanted to outlaw license plate
frames, which are most often placed on the plates by auto dealers, it could
have done so.” Morris, 270 So. 3d at 439. Absent a clear prohibition by the
Legislature against the act of applying a license plate frame that does not
prevent a vehicle from being identified, we decline to interpret NRS
482.275(4) as doing so.

Whether the license plate was clearly legible

McCord argues that the district court erred in concluding that
he violated NRS 482.275(4) because the frame completely covered the
phrase “Home Means Nevada” at the bottom of the plate and partially
obscured the word “NEVADA” at the top of the license plate. The State
contends that McCord’s license plate violated the statute because the frame

“intrudes onto the written portion of the plate itself.”

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A license plate frame covering nonessential information
imprinted on a license plate does not violate NRS 482.275(4)

McCord asserts that the license plate frame covering the phrase
“Home Means Nevada” imprinted on the bottom of the license plate is
inconsequential. We agree. As acknowledged above, the Legislature
intended to ensure that required information is displayed for the purpose of
identification. The name of the state song is not necessary identifying
information as required by Nevada law. See Whitfield, 99 A.3d at 664
(holding that law enforcement “made a mistake of law by stopping
appellant’s vehicle ... when the plate’s critical identifying information was
clearly legible and the license plate frame only obstructed the Texas state
nickname on the bottom of the plate”). Under NRS 482.270(8), license
plates must display (1) the alphanumeric registration designation; (2) the
state name, whether in full or abbreviated; and (3) either the calendar year
of registration or the month and year when the registration will expire. A
license plate frame covering nonessential information imprinted on license
plates does not prevent a vehicle from being readily identified. Therefore,
we conclude that a license plate frame covering optional phrases imprinted
on standard or specialty license plates does not violate NRS 482.275(4).

A license plate is properly displayed if the necessary information
ts readily identifiable

McCord argues that the district court erred in concluding that
that the partial covering of the state name provided probable cause for the
traffic stop. Despite the partial obstruction, we agree because the necessary
information displayed on the license plate remained readily identifiable.

NRS 482.275(4) requires a license plate “to be clearly visible”
and “clearly legible.” “Legible” is generally defined as “capable of being read

or deciphered” or “capable of being discovered or understood.” Legzble,

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Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2014). There is a public
policy interest in requiring motorists to display a legible license plate
because “[llaw enforcement officials frequently must determine from tag
numbers whether a vehicle is stolen; whether it is properly registered; or
whether its occupant is suspected of a crime, is the subject of a warrant, or
is thought to be armed.” State v. Hayes, 660 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Kan. Ct. App.
1983); see also Hinojosa v. State, 319 S.W.3d 258, 265 (Ark. 2009) (noting
that “it is important that the name of the license plate’s issuing state be
clearly visible for law enforcement officers to identify vehicles that are the
subject of ‘NCIC BOLOS’ (National Crime Information Center ‘Be on
lookout for’ bulletins), and to facilitate citizens’ identification of lcense
plates in order to report reckless or intoxicated drivers’).

We disagree with the State that NRS 482.275(4) prohibits “even
slight infringements on the legibility of the license plate.” Reading NRS
482.275(4) to prohibit frames that cover a fraction of some lettering on the
license plate provides no guidance to law enforcement. Such an
interpretation would give law enforcement nearly unlimited discretion to
conduct pretextual stops of vehicles, some which may be random or
discriminatory. To avoid similar concerns, the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Carter chose to apply a narrow reading of the New Jersey license plate
display law. 255 A.3d at 1157 (“Because we assume that. the Legislature
would want us to construe the statute in a way that conforms to the
Constitution, we adopt the narrower reading.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Likewise, we construe NRS 482.275(4) narrowly.

Carter further supports our interpretation of NRS 482.275(4),
The Carter court had the opportunity to consider two alleged violations—

one involving a license plate frame that covered the entire phrase “Garden

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State,” and one involving a frame that covered 10 to 15 percent of the same
phrase. 255 A.3d at 1148-49. The court determined that the license plate
display law “require[d] that all markings on a license plate be legible or
identifiable” and concluded there was a traffic violation where the frame
entirely covered “Garden State.” Jd. at 1157 (emphasis added). For the
frame that only partially covered the phrase, however, the court concluded
that there was no traffic violation because the license plate was still legible.
Id. The court focused, as we do, on the legibility of the license plate and not
on the fact that there was a slight obstruction by the frame.

We find further support for our interpretation from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Flores, the court
reviewed the reasonableness of a traffic stop for a license plate frame that
covered the top portion of some of the lettering on the plate that identified
the vehicle as registered in Baja California. 798 F.3d at 647. The police
officer believed that the frame violated an Illinois statute requiring license
plates “to be clearly visible” and “maintained in a condition to be clearly
legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the
plate.” /d. (quoting 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/3-413(b) (West 2013)). The
court explained that license plate frames are prevalent and reasoned that
“fijt seems to us unrealistic—and unreasonable—to expect a wide segment
of the driving population to remove these conventional plate frames in order
to avoid a traffic stop.” Jd. at 648-49. The court concluded that the police
officer could not have reasonably believed that a driver’s use of a license
plate frame found on a “vast number of cars’ violated the law. Id. at 649-
50.

We are not presented, as the Kansas Court of Appeals was, with

a case in which the license plate was issued by another state and the Nevada

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police officer was unable to identify the state name or otherwise identify the
issuing state from the lcense plate. Hayes, 660 P.2d at 1388, 1390
(considering a scenario where the state name was not visible on the out-of-
state license plate and the officer could not identify the issuing state based
on the displayed state nickname and determining that “the covering of the
state name on a vehicle’s license tag renders the tag illegible within the
prohibition” under Kansas’ license plate display law and justified the traffic
stop); see also Nelson v. State, 544 S.E.2d 189, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
(explaining that, “[a]lthough the [Georgia] officer testified that the tag
appeared to be a Texas tag, officers should not be forced to guess at the
origin of a vehicle tag”). Rather, the situation we consider is one where the
deputy was able to immediately identify the issuing state. See Carter, 255
A.3d at 1157 (concluding that a partial obstruction of the words “Garden
State” did not violate the law where the police officer “conceded he could
clearly identify the phrase on the hcense plate’).

In this case, McCord’s license plate was clearly legible.
Although the license plate frame covered a portion of the word “NEVADA,”
the word was still readily identifiable. Deputy Nemeth admitted as much
when he testified that he identified the issuing state as Nevada and was
able to perform a license plate check before initiating the traffic stop.
Because the essential information displayed on McCord’s license plate
remained readily identifiable, we conclude the license plate was legible
within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, we conclude that the district

court erred in finding that McCord’s license plate violated NRS 482.275(4).4

‘The State does not argue that this error was harmless, nor could it,
given that the verdict depended entirely on the evidence obtained during
the traffic stop.

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CONCLUSION

A license plate frame does not in and of itself constitute a
“foreign material” within the meaning of NRS 482.275(4), and a license
plate is “clearly legible” when the required information remains readily
identifiable. To hold otherwise would effectively ban the use of ubiquitous
license plate frames and promote subjective law enforcement. Such an
outcome would be for the Legislature to clearly authorize, not for this court
to divine. Because the identifying information on McCord’s license plate
was readily identifiable, Deputy Nemeth lacked probable cause to justify
the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). We therefore conclude
that the district court erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable
and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand this matter

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.®

Aha Blan Q , Cod.
Stiglich

We concur:

Bell C/ V7

5Given our conclusion, we need not address McCord’s contention that
the district court erred in denying a motion to suppress statements he made
after the traffic stop.

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