Court Opinion

ID: 9378009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 16:01:10.438628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:18.500891
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 ARI AKRAYI,

                        Plaintiff,

                        v.                         Case No. 22-cv-1289 (CRC)

 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
 STATE et. al.,

                        Defendants.

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Plaintiff Ari Akrayi, a United States citizen, has been waiting nearly three years for the

government to adjudicate his Iraqi wife’s U.S. visa application. Claiming unreasonable delay

under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), he filed this suit to compel the State

Department to do so. Akrayi also challenges an internal Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) initiative—the Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (“CARRP”)—

that applies heightened screening to visa applications with potential national security concerns.

Because Akrayi has not met his burden to plausibly allege an unreasonable delay, a violation of

his due process rights, or a concrete injury due to CARRP, the Court will grant the government’s

motion to dismiss the complaint.

 I.    Background

       Mr. Akrayi filed an I-130 visa petition in April 2019 to obtain lawful permanent resident

status for his wife, Zhala Ibrahim Jameel, an Iraqi citizen. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11, 13–15. Almost a

year later, in March 2020, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)

approved the petition. Id. ¶ 15. Akrayi’s petition was then processed by the National Visa

Center (“NVC”), which forwarded the case to the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Id. ¶ 16. Jameel
has yet to be interviewed by the Embassy. See id. ¶¶ 17–18. Akrayi has repeatedly attempted to

obtain a decision from USCIS, including contacting the NVC numerous times. Id. ¶ 19. But to

no avail. Id.

       Akrayi further alleges “[o]n information and belief” that the government is intentionally

delaying a response to Jameel’s visa application through CARRP. Compl. ¶¶ 25–30. The

complaint describes CARRP as an internal DHS policy that flags visa applications that present

potential national security concerns and directs field officers to deny the applications or at least

delay their adjudication. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28. But by casting too wide a net, Akrayi claims, the CARRP

policy errs by labeling “innocent, law-abiding” residents, like Jameel, as “national security

concerns.” Id. ¶ 29. Akrayi also asserts that CARRP targets applications from predominantly

Muslim countries. See id. ¶¶ 26, 30.

       In May 2022, Akrayi brought suit against several government officials and agencies

under the APA’s unreasonable delay provision, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and the Mandamus Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1361. He requests an order directing the government to process Jameel’s visa

application within sixty days and issue her an immigrant visa, and seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief as to CARRP. The government moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

 II.   Legal Standards

       To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ramirez v. Blinken, 594

F. Supp. 3d 76, 85 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). At this

stage, courts must “accept all the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” Banneker

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Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But a court need not accept a

plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “In

determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, [a court] may consider only the facts

alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and

matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial

Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

 III. Analysis

       The government contends first that all of Akrayi’s claims are barred by the doctrine of

consular non-reviewability. After rejecting this contention, the Court will turn to each claim:

(1) unreasonable delay under the APA and Mandamus Act, (2) violation of due process, and (3)

the challenge to CARRP.

       A. Consular Non-Reviewability

       The doctrine of consular non-reviewability “shields a consular official’s decision to issue

or withhold a visa from judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Baan Rao Thai

Rest. v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Saavedra Bruno v. Albright,

197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). As recently clarified by the D.C. Circuit, dismissal

pursuant to the consular non-reviewability doctrine “is a merits disposition under [Rule]

12(b)(6).” Id. at 1027. While the doctrine “clearly applies to final visa determinations,” it “does

not apply to challenges regarding decisions that are not yet final.” Joorabi v. Pompeo, 464 F.

Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2020).

       This Court has consistently held that the doctrine of consular non-reviewability does not

bar claims that the “Government has unreasonably delayed rendering a decision.” Didban v.

Pompeo, 435 F. Supp. 3d 168, 174 (D.D.C. 2020) (Cooper, J.) (holding that consular non-

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reviewability does not bar review of the government’s failure to decide an application); see also

Giliana v. Blinken, 596 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2022) (Cooper, J.) (“[C]laims alleging

unreasonable delay . . . are not barred by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.” (cleaned

up)). This case is no different. Akrayi challenges USCIS’s delay in rendering a decision, and

“not an actual final decision made by a consular officer.” Id. at 19.

       The government nonetheless contends that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Baan Rao Thai

Rest. v. Pompeo bars review here. 985 F.3d at 1024. Not so. Baan Rao held that the doctrine of

consular non-reviewability prevents judicial review of a consular office’s decision to “issue or

withhold” a visa. Id. at 1024–25. Challenging a delay in processing a visa is distinguishable

from challenging a decision to “withhold a visa.” While Baan Rao bars review of the latter, it is

silent as to the former. See Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-1521, 2022

WL 2966333, at *8 (D.D.C. July 27, 2022) (noting that the word “withhold” can imply an active

or passive state of affairs, but that Baan Rao concerned an active visa denial rather than a

“temporary or passive refusal”); Sawahreh v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 22-1456, 2022 WL

4365746, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2022) (rejecting argument that Baan Rao’s use of the word

“withheld” barred review of cases claiming unreasonable delay of visa adjudication). As

“nothing in Baan Rao even hints that it upends” caselaw holding that consular non-reviewability

does not apply to unreasonable delay cases, review of Akrayi’s claim is not barred. See Giliana,

596 F. Supp. 3d at 19.

       B. Unreasonable Delay

       The Court now turns to Akrayi’s contention that the government has unreasonably

delayed the processing of Jameel’s visa, in violation of the APA and Mandamus Act. See

Compl. ¶¶ 7, 22, 32. The APA grants courts the authority to “compel agency action unlawfully

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withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), when an agency does not resolve a matter

presented to it “within a reasonable time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b); see also Mashpee Wampanoag

Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The standards for

reviewing agency inaction—including visa processing delays—are the same under the APA and

Mandamus Act. Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (D.D.C. 2017). The Court will thus

resolve the unreasonable delay claims together.

       To assess whether agency delay is reasonable, courts in this circuit employ the six-factor

test outlined in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC (‘‘TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70

(D.C. Cir. 1984). Although the TRAC framework is a “fact intensive inquiry[,]” it still proves

useful at the motion to dismiss stage. Liu v. Mayorkas, No. 20-cv-654, 2021 WL 2115209, at *3

(D.D.C. May 25, 2021). On a 12(b)(6) motion, courts apply the TRAC factors not to

“determine[e] whether there has been an unreasonable delay,” but instead to evaluate whether a

plaintiff’s complaint alleges “facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for unreasonable

administrative delay.” Id. (cleaned up). The TRAC factors are as follows:

               (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule
       of reason;”

               (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the
       speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that
       statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;

               (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation
       are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;

              (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on
       agency activities of a higher or competing priority;

               (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the
       interests prejudiced by delay; and

               (6) the court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind agency
       lassitude in order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’”

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In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80) (cleaned up).

       Whether an agency’s delay is unreasonable depends on “the complexity of the task at

hand, the significance (and permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the

agency” and “cannot be decided in the abstract, by reference to some number of months or

years.” Didban, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 176 (quoting Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d

at 1102). Thus, in balancing the TRAC factors, courts consider “the importance of competing

priorities in assessing the reasonableness of an administrative delay.” Mashpee Wampanoag

Tribal Council, 366 F.3d at 1100 (cleaned up). Applying the TRAC factors here, the Court finds

that Akrayi has not stated a plausible claim.

               1. TRAC Factors One and Two

       The Court begins with factors one and two: “(1) whether the response time is governed

by a rule of reason, as informed by (2) any congressional timetable.” Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at

20. While courts often consider these two factors jointly, see Milligan v. Pompeo, 502 F. Supp.

3d 302, 317–18 (D.D.C. 2020), the first has been labeled the most important. In re Core

Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Both factors help courts evaluate “whether

the agency’s response time complies with an existing specified schedule and whether it is

governed by an identifiable rationale.” Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Int. v. FDA, 74 F. Supp. 3d 295,

300 (D.D.C. 2014). Here, these factors favor the government.

       The delay in processing, almost three years, does not reach the length that courts have

found unreasonable. While courts have “generally found that immigration delays in excess of

five, six, seven years are unreasonable, [] those between three to five years are often not[.]”

Didban, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 176 (cleaned up) (two-year delay not unreasonable); see also

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Ghadami v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-00397, 2020 WL 1308376, at *8 (D.D.C.

Mar. 19, 2020) (25-month delay for I-130 visa not unreasonable); Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp.

3d 59, 70 (D.D.C. 2022) (same for 30-month I-130 visa delay); Zaman v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-3592, 2021 WL 5356284, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2021) (same for 42-

month delay). Jameel’s application has been delayed for almost three years, and thus falls

comfortably within the range of reasonableness.

       Whether a rule of reason exists is also especially informed by “the resources available to

the agency.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1102. This Court has joined

others in this district in recognizing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the State

Department’s resources for visa processing. See, e.g., Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 20–21

(recognizing that visa services resources “have been strapped” due to the COVID-19 pandemic);

Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 165–66 (D.D.C. 2021) (analyzing the “highly

relevant” impact of COVID-19 on visa processing delays); Khan v. Blinken, No. CV 21-1683

(JEB), 2021 WL 5356267, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2021) (recognizing the “logistical challenges

that COVID-19 has imposed”). The impact of COVID-19 on State Department operations thus

informs the rule of reason analysis for agency inaction.

       In March 2020, “the State Department suspended visa services in all U.S. embassies and

consulates around the world in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.” Dastagir, 557 F. Supp. 3d

at 163. Four months later, in July 2020, the U.S Embassies and consulates entered a “‘phased

resumption of visa services’ . . . as ‘local conditions and resources allow[ed].’” Id. (quoting

Suspension of Routine Visa Servs., U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affs. (July 22,

2020), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/visas-news-

archive/suspension-of-routine-visa-

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services.html?msclkid=cbbb240caf7d11ec99ce2657fe0fe870). Yet, the “pandemic continues to

severely impact the number of visas . . . embassies and consulates abroad are able to process.”

National Visa Center (NVC) Immigrant Visa Backlog Report, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of

Consular Affs., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-

resources/visas-backlog.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2023). There are currently 444,828 applicants,

like Jameel, who are awaiting interviews as of January 31, 2023. Id. (current as of Mar. 1,

2023). Therefore, the delay in visa processing worldwide, including in Abu Dhabi, is an

additional factor in considering the delay here.

       Akrayi responds by citing a trio of out-of-circuit cases, decided pre-COVID, holding two-

year delays as unreasonable for the FBI’s processing of I-485 applications for adjustment to

lawful permanent resident status. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11 (citing Gelfer v. Chertoff, No. C06-

06724, 2007 WL 902382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007); Konchitsky v. Chertoff, No. C07-

00294, 2007 WL 2070325, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2007); and Huang v. Chertoff, No. C07-

0277, 2007 WL 1831105, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2007)). But given the backlog of cases due

to COVID-19 and the reduced pace of visa processing, a nearly three-year delay for an I-130 visa

application is not unreasonable. See Tate v. Pompeo, 513 F. Supp. 3d 132, 151 (D.D.C. 2021)

(finding that the government’s determination of “how to allocate scarce resources in a global

pandemic” outweighs visa applicants’ “interests in immediate adjudication of their visas”). The

Court thus finds that the first two TRAC factors support the government.

               2. TRAC Factor Four

       The fourth factor also favors the government. A “judicial order putting” Jameel’s

application at the front of the line would necessarily “move[] all others back one space and

produce[] no net gain.” Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 22 (citing In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72,

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75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Akrayi does not allege that the government is treating Jameel’s application

differently from those with similar visa applications before the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. See

Bagherian v. Pompeo, 442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 94–96 (D.D.C. 2020). Instead, Akrayi points to cases

in other circuits to buttress his claim that the costs of resource constraints should not fall on

plaintiffs. See Pl. Opp’n at 11–12. While the Court does not wish to minimize the harm felt by

Akrayi and Jameel from being separated, precedent in this circuit recognizes that expediting

review here would merely redirect resources from other cases. See Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at

153–154 (“The Court would be outside its limited role . . . if it required the agencies to invest the

high degree of resources . . . necessary to accurately investigate plaintiffs’ visa

petitions . . . while others would suffer in response.”); Arab, 600 F. Supp. 3d at 71 (collecting

cases stating that “deference must be given to the State Department’s priority-setting and

resource-allocation decisions”). Delays due to resource constraints do not warrant a “judicial

reordering[] of agency priorities.” Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 22 (quoting Bagherian, 442 F.

Supp. 3d at 96).

               3. TRAC Factors Three and Five

       On the other hand, the third and fifth factors favor Akrayi and Jameel. For the third

factor, courts assess whether “human health and welfare are at stake,” and for the fifth, they

evaluate the “nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay.” Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., No. 21-378, 2021 WL 4133618, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2021) (quoting TRAC,

750 F.2d at 80). Here, Akrayi alleges that the delay in processing Jameel’s visa has “irrevocably

harmed [them] by causing a loss of consortium between [them], among other ways.” Compl.

¶ 38. The Court appreciates the harm that has befallen Akrayi and Jameel from the delay in

enjoyment of their married life. The Court thus joins several courts in this district in finding that

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factors three and five weigh in favor of plaintiffs. See, e.g., Varghese v. Blinken, No. 21-CV-

2597 (CRC), 2022 WL 3016741, at *7 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022) (weighing seriously the harm

caused by a married couple’s separation); Didban, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 177 (same).

               4. TRAC Factor Six

       The sixth TRAC factor considers agency impropriety. Akrayi contends that his

allegations about DHS’s CARRP policy suggest bad faith on the part of the government. Pl.

Opp’n at 12–14. But as discussed below, Akrayi’s CARRP claim fails. This factor thus favors

the government.

                                                ***

       On balance, the Court concludes that the TRAC factors favor the government and that

Akrayi has failed to state a plausible claim of unreasonable delay. The Court recognizes that the

delay is substantial and imposes hardship on Akrayi and Jameel, and it encourages the

government to act on the application promptly. But given the impact of COVID-19 on agency

resources, the Court lacks a basis to put Jameel’s application at the front of the line.

       C. Challenge to CARRP

       Akrayi has also failed to establish standing to challenge CARRP, the DHS “internal

policy” used to “investigate and adjudicate applications deemed to present potential ‘national

security concerns.’” See Compl. ¶ 28.1 A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the three

elements of standing: (1) an “injury in fact;” (2) that is fairly traceable “to the challenged

       1
          While the government does not move to dismiss Akrayi’s CARRP claim under Rule
12(b)(1), a court has an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its
jurisdictional authority.” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d
9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). Article III standing is a threshold question of jurisdiction. Grocery Mfrs.
Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

                                                  10
action,” and (3) can be likely “redressed by a favorable decision.” See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (cleaned up).

       While plaintiffs challenging CARRP need not have “concrete proof that they were

subjected to the program to survive a motion to dismiss” for lack of standing, they must raise a

plausible inference they are being injured by CARRP. Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 23–24.

Akrayi recites legal conclusions but does not allege sufficient facts concerning CARRP’s

application to Jameel. He alleges that CARRP “intentionally delays the applications of

applicants such as . . . Jameel due to security concerns” based on “characteristics such as national

origin.” Compl. ¶¶ 25, 29. He further contends that Jameel is “from a predominantly Muslim

country” and that, “[o]n information and belief” the government is “intentionally delaying a

response” due to CARRP. Id. ¶ 26. He adds that the State Department and DHS purportedly

collaborate regularly when carrying out background and security investigations delayed by

administrative processing. Id. ¶ 24.

       But “mere speculation” is insufficient to allege concrete injury from CARRP. See

Giliana, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 23 (dismissing CARRP challenge for lack of standing); Nusrat v.

Blinken, No. 21-2801, 2022 WL 4103860, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2022) (same); Ahmed v.

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-cv-893, 2022 WL 424967, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2022)

(same). Akrayi does not offer any factual allegation raising a plausible inference that CARRP is

being applied to Jameel—the mere presence of a delay is not enough.

       On this score, the Court takes judicial notice that CARRP is not used in the Form I-130

context. See Ghadami, 2020 WL 1308376, at *6 n.3 (“A publicly available document released

from USCIS as a result of FOIA requests states that CARRP does not apply to I-130 visa

applications.” (quoting Fraud Detection & National Security Controlled Application Review and

                                                11
Resolution Program (CARRP) Independent Study, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(Dec. 28, 2011), at 28, https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-

content/uploads/2013/01/FDNS-CARRP-Independent-Study-Powerpoint-v.-1.1-Dec.-28-

2011.pdf)). CARRP’s lack of application to spousal visa applications only confirms that Akrayi

has not alleged any concrete injury from the program. He therefore lacks standing and

defendants are entitled to dismissal on this claim.

       D. Due Process Claims

       Last, the Court addresses Akrayi’s due process claims. Akrayi contends that the delay in

processing his wife’s Form I-130 visa violates his right “to fundamental fairness in

administrative adjudication” under the Fifth Amendment and has caused a “loss of consortium.”

Compl. ¶¶ 36, 38. Akrayi fails to state a claim under either a procedural or substantive due

process analysis.

       To succeed on a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must show “egregious official

conduct” that is “arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Thomas v. District of Columbia, No. 21-

CV-00584 (CRC), 2022 WL 2817855, at *3 (D.D.C. July 19, 2022). And to succeed on a

procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show that an official deprived him “of a liberty or

property interest without providing appropriate procedural protections.” Atherton v. D.C. Office

of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Under either theory, a plaintiff must allege

she “has been deprived of a fundamental right or liberty or property interest.” Meyou v. U.S.

Dep’t of State, No. 21-2806, 2022 WL 1556344, at *5 (D.D.C. May 17, 2022) (cleaned up).

       There is generally “no property right in an immigrant visa,” nor do noncitizens “have a

constitutionally-protected interest in the procedures by which such visas are obtained.” Smirnov

v. Clinton, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2011). Yet, Akrayi posits that he has a protected

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liberty interest in his spouse’s visa. See Pl. Opp’n at 15–16. While new fundamental rights must

ordinarily be tied to historical practice, Akrayi contends that “the Court has recognized [an

exception] . . . for fundamental rights involving ‘marriage and intimacy.’” Id. Circuit law

forecloses this argument. In Swartz v. Rogers, the D.C. Circuit held that a U.S. citizen has “no

constitutional right which is violated” by the deportation of their spouse. 254 F.2d 338, 339

(D.C. Cir. 1958). Courts in this district have routinely applied Swartz in holding that a citizen’s

constitutional right is not “violated by the denial of a spouse’s visa application.” Rohrbaugh v.

Pompeo, 394 F. Supp. 3d 128, 133 (D.D.C. 2019) (Cooper, J.); see also Zandieh v. Pompeo, No.

CV 20-919 (JEB), 2020 WL 4346915, at *7–8 (D.D.C. July 29, 2020) (holding that delay in

waiver adjudication did not violate due process).

       As Akrayi lacks a protected interest in Jameel’s visa, he has not suffered a violation of

his constitutional rights. The government is thus entitled to dismissal on this claim, too.

 IV. Conclusion

       For these reasons, the Court will grant the government’s motion to dismiss. A separate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

                                                             CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
                                                             United States District Judge

Date: March 9, 2023

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