Court Opinion

ID: 9532577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:22:44.600806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.213756
License: Public Domain

HESTER, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority concludes not only that appellant’s due process rights were infringed, but also that part of the Juvenile Act is unconstitutional. Due to my inability to agree with either conclusion, I must dissent.
This case had its genesis in 1976 when the children were adjudicated dependent pursuant to a petition by the Child Welfare Services, and were placed with the maternal aunt, Ernestine Taylor. The record indicates that at that time, the appellant-mother was in need of psychiatric care and had in fact been a patient at the Western Psychiatric Institute in Pittsburgh following threats to kill herself and her daughter Jameeda. It further appears that appellant was living with a 17 year-old female, one Aznif Smith, who impersonated a male; that appellant and Miss Smith had been “married” sometime in 1975; that the children were forced to call Miss Smith “daddy”; that Smith exhibited violent tendencies, particularly toward appellant; and that the adverse emotional impact of the lesbian relationship upon the children necessitated their removal from appellant’s home at that time.
On November 29,1978, appellant requested a rehearing on the custody issue, contending that she had “undergone positive psychological evaluation and has been determined competent to properly care for the children.” At the hearing on *589December 20, 1978, it was established that appellant now lives in a comfortable apartment with three bedrooms and a combination living room-dining room and is supported by public assistance. A psychiatric report was received indicating appellant had stabilized and was capable of performing her functions as a parent. In addition, it was alleged that Aznif Smith was no longer with appellant and that the two had had no contact with each other for the past two years. In camera examination of the children revealed that both girls were desirous of rejoining their mother but were extremely apprehensive of the possibility that Aznif Smith, whom they feared, may still be residing in that home. Appellant gave repeated assurances to the court that she was indeed living alone now and that Smith was out of her life. Counsel for Children & Youth Services then called as a witness Ernestine Taylor, the maternal aunt in whose custody the children had resided for the past two years. Miss Taylor testified that she had been informed by an anonymous witness that Aznif Smith was still residing with appellant and was still known as appellant’s “husband”. Counsel’s objection to this testimony on hearsay grounds was overruled. She further stated that the children are afraid of returning to their mother’s custody if Smith is in any way involved. In view of this testimony, the court ordered that the children remain with Miss Taylor pending further investigation of her allegations and afforded Children & Youth Services an opportunity to produce the anonymous witness to whom Miss Taylor referred. It was stated that this witness did not wish his identity to be revealed to appellant and in fact would not testify in appellant’s presence. The court ordered that this witness could testify on the record in the presence of all counsel with the right of a subsequent hearing on the part of appellant and her counsel to refute any statements made by the witness.
On December 27, 1978, Mr. C. appeared with all counsel present but with appellant excluded from the courtroom, over her counsel’s objection. He stated that he had known both appellant and Miss Smith for a number of years; that *590he visits appellant’s home weekly to get his hair styled by her; that he has in this manner learned appellant continues to see Smith and refers to her as “husband”; and that he is aware of violence on the part of Smith toward appellant, necessitating at least one period of hospitalization of appellant.
A third hearing was held on January 3, 1979 to allow appellant to rebut these allegations. Aznif Smith appeared and denied any involvement with appellant over the preceding-two years and stated she had never been “married” to appellant or ever been known as her husband. Appellant and her mother also testified and reiterated that Miss Smith was not involved with appellant at that time and that “nothing comes before [the] kids.” N.T. 1/3/79, p. 39.
The court took all the testimony under consideration and found that the relationship between appellant and Miss Smith continues to exist; that the children are very fearful of Smith and do not want to live in the same house with her; that Smith is a serious emotional and potentially physically harmful influence on the children; and that the best interest of the children would be served if they remained in the custody of the maternal aunt. Appellant does not now dispute the fact that if Miss Smith is still involved with her, then the children should not be returned to her. Her contention is that the in camera hearing of Mr. C., from which she was excluded, violated her right to confront this witness, denying her due process of law.
Preliminarily, we note that the court, in determining the best interests of the children in question, applied the correct legal standard in a proceeding of this sort. Once the child has been wrested from the parents in a dependency proceeding, then any further effort by the parents to regain custody will be judged according to the child’s best interest, as in any custody case. Interest of LaRue, 244 Pa.Super. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976); Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa.Super. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
The Juvenile Act, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2 (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq.), sets forth a two-step *591procedure in any dependency proceeding. In the first, or adjudicatory, stage, the court determines whether, by clear and convincing evidence, the child is “dependent” as defined in § 6302; see, § 6341(c). If a finding of dependency is made, then the court, in the second, or dispositional, stage, may separate the child from the parents if such action is clearly necessary, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b); Interest of Black, 273 Pa.Super. 536, 417 A.2d 1178 (1980); Interest of Pernish-ek, 268 Pa.Super. 447, 408 A.2d 872 (1979); In Re Whittle, 263 Pa.Super. 312, 397 A.2d 1225 (1979), or may order any placement authorized in § 6351 of the Act; cf. In Re DeSavage, 241 Pa.Super. 174, 360 A.2d 237 (1976). Sec. 6341(d) describes the type of hearing the court conducts in the dispositional stage:
(d) Evidence on issue of disposition—In disposition hearings ... all evidence helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not otherwise competent in the hearing on the petition. The parties or their counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert written reports so received and to cross-examine individuals making the reports. Sources of information given in confidence need not be disclosed.
The parties herein do not dispute that the hearings below were dispositional, as the finding of dependency and separation from family occurred sometime ago. See, Stapleton, supra. In such a hearing, the strict formalities of evidence are relaxed in favor of a “comprehensive and searching” inquiry into all relevant evidence. In Interest of Clouse, 244 Pa. Super. 396, 368 A.2d 780 (1976). Thus, evidence “not otherwise competent” is admissible; confrontation between a party and witness is not required so long as the party’s counsel is afforded such an opportunity; and sources of confidential information need not be made known to a party. On its face, Sec. 6341(d) authorized the procedure utilized by the lower court: appellant was prevented from directly confronting and learning the identity of the anonymous *592witness, but her counsel fully and effectively cross-examined him. The crucial testimony of this witness would not otherwise have been available for he had refused to testify in the presence of appellant. I would thus find the in camera hearing conformed in all respects with the liberal procedures of Sec. 6341. The majority concludes that the last sentence of Sec. 6341(d) is constitutionally defective “in its unqualified allowance of testimony into evidence regardless of the opportunity provided to test the veracity and reliability of the declarant.” At 678. The majority’s holding, however, reaches too far because in the instant case there were a wealth of measures employed to assure the “veracity and reliability” of the declarant, Mr. C. Thus, as I shall now discuss, appellant’s right to confront the witness was adequately protected in consonance with the constitution. I would hold the statute is valid.
Were this a criminal proceeding, appellant would have the undoubted right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Bruton v. U. S., 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, however, that the due process right of confrontation is not universally applicable to all hearings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). “Rules of procedure may be shaped by consideration of the risks of error [and] by the consequences which will follow their adoption.” id, at 567, 94 S.Ct. at 2980, citing, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974). Thus, our courts have held that there is no guaranteed right of confrontation in a hearing to determine the competency of an accused to stand trial. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 255 A.2d 519 (1969); nor is there such a guarantee in prison disciplinary proceedings. Wolff; Robson v. Biester, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 487, 420 A.2d 9 (1980). Similarly, in the sensitive area of juvenile proceedings, we have sanctioned the use of in camera examination of children in custody cases out of the presence of the contending parties. Sipe v. Shaffer, 263 Pa.Super. 27, 396 A.2d 1359 (1978); *593Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa.Super. 229, 312 A.2d 58 (1973). And, once the adjudication stage is completed in a delinquency hearing, the child may properly be excluded from the courtroom while the judge determines the appropriate disposition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6336(d); cf. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). These procedures stem from the sensitive nature of the proceeding, viz: “to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1); Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977); cf. Rinker Appeal, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that in the search for the child’s best interest, certain natural rights of the parents may sometimes be subordinated.
No doubt in some instances the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to a non-parent. Experience has taught the unhappy lesson that the parental relationship is not an infallible guarantee that the parent will provide the care and concern essential to a child’s proper development.
Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 368, 416 A.2d 512, 514 (1980). “It must be emphasized that the cardinal concern in all custody cases is the best interest and permanent welfare of the child.” Albright v. Commonwealth ex rel. Fetters, 491 Pa. 320, 323, 421 A.2d 157, 158 (1980).
I am satisfied in the instant case that appellant’s due process rights were not infringed. The “risks of error” in admitting Mr. C’s testimony were minimized by counsel’s cross-examination and by the fact that, in large part, the witness’ statements were corroborated by other evidence. Moreover, in a subsequent hearing, appellant was afforded the opportunity to present any evidence she wished to rebut Mr. C’s allegations. There was thus an “adequate bases of decision” without the necessity of direct confrontation. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1559, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). The “consequences which [would] follow” the presence of appellant in the courtroom during *594the witness’ testimony were at all times manifest: the witness would have simply refused to appear. The children would have been returned to their mother even though Miss Smith was still apparently involved with her.
The children in their expressions of concern to the Court, particularly Tina, indicated a great fear of Aznif Smith, based on the recollections of her involvement with the family prior to removal of the children. There was testimony that when the children went to visit the mother pursuant to court directions, they scampered about the house looking under beds and in closets to determine whether or not Aznif Smith was present.
Opinion of lower court at 11. Faced with such a possibility, the court could not have simply ignored evidence suggesting the relationship between the two women was continuing. Rather, consistent with its duty to make a comprehensive inquiry into the children’s best interests, the court took the testimony of Mr. C. while protecting his anonymity and at the same time affording appellant the right of cross-examination through her attorney. “[A]t least in civil cases, the right [of cross-examination and confrontation] is not all pervasive that it automatically forecloses the possibility that competing consideration may be of equal magnitude.” Tre-harne v. Callahan, 426 F.2d 58, 62 (3 Cir., 1970). Here, the “competing consideration” is the very real probability that two children will be thrust back into an environment which they greatly fear with grave consequences to their welfare.
Given the nature of the proceeding, the peculiar circumstances surrounding appellant’s background, and the steps taken to assure reliability of Mr. C’s testimony I cannot say the court committed error.
Appellant also contends the court erred during the hearing of December 20, 1978 when it allowed the maternal aunt to give hearsay testimony relating to the anonymous witness. However, whatever error may have occurred was certainly cured when Mr. C. actually appeared and testified at the next hearing.
*595In child custody cases, we require the hearing judge to file in every case a comprehensive opinion reflecting a thorough analysis of the record and specifying the reasons for its ultimate decision. Grillo, supra; Bender v. Bender, 261 Pa.Super. 12, 395 A.2d 279 (1978). Moreover, the judge should receive evidence from objective, disinterested witnesses. Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa.Super. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976); Augustine v. Augustine, 228 Pa.Super. 312, 324 A.2d 477 (1974). Where the court has complied with these requirements, his decision is entitled to “great weight”. Clouse, supra, and will not ordinarily be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. McCourt v. Meyers, 268 Pa.Super. 152, 407 A.2d 875 (1979).
Instantly, the hearing judge fully complied with these requirements. Three separate counsel appeared and participated in the hearings.1 A social worker familiar with the case testified and the record shows other caseworkers were also present. The lengthy opinion filed (13 pages) reflects the court’s careful consideration of all pertinent evidence. I could not disturb the ruling below.

. Appellant, the children, and Children and Youth Services were each represented by a separate lawyer.