Court Opinion

ID: 9838503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:33.383473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.094365
License: Public Domain

J-S08018-23

                                   2023 PA Super 161

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KEVIN SCOTT DELAMARTER                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1045 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-44-CR-0000316-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:                         FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

       Appellant, Kevin Scott Delamarter, appeals from the judgments of

sentence entered in the Mifflin County Court of Common Pleas following his

jury conviction of endangering the welfare of a child (EWOC),1 and his non-

jury convictions of driving under the influence of a controlled substance (DUI)2

and two summary offenses.3 On appeal, Appellant challenges the weight and

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his EWOC conviction.4       Upon careful

review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

2 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2).

3 75 Pa.C.S. § 3316(a) (prohibiting text-based communications) and 75
Pa.C.S. § 3309(1) (disregarding a single traffic lane).

4 Appellant does not raise any claims concerning his other convictions.
J-S08018-23

       The facts underlying this appeal, as presented during Appellant’s jury

trial, are as follows.     On February 15, 2021, Pennsylvania State Trooper

Zachary Yetter was on regular patrol in a marked vehicle in Granville

Township, Mifflin County, Pennsylvania. See N.T. 5/16/22, 23-24. The day

was clear, and the roads were dry. Id. at 26. At approximately 2:30 p.m.,

Trooper Yetter was traveling northbound on State Route 103 when he “came

up behind a line of traffic that was stopped in the middle of the road[.]” Id.

Because of a turn in the road, the trooper could not see why traffic was

stopped; however, an individual told him that “there [wa]s a crash up ahead.”

Id.

       Trooper Yetter activated his overhead lights and approached the single-

vehicle-involved crash scene. N.T. 5/16/22, 27-29. He saw the driver, later

identified as Appellant, “opening the door … and stepping out of the driver’s”

side of the car. Id. at 28. The car was stopped “in the northbound lane of

State Route 103” but was “still in drive.”5 See id. at 28-29, 31. Trooper

Yetter also observed a “young girl” – later identified as Appellant’s three-year-

old daughter – standing in the backseat with her feet on the floor and her

hands on each of the front seats. Id. at 29-30. Neither Appellant nor his

daughter appeared to have any injuries. See id. at 31. The Commonwealth

____________________________________________

5 Someone eventually put the car “in park” but Trooper Yetter could not recall

who did so. N.T. 5/16/22, 31-32, 55. Regardless, the trooper testified that
Appellant’s car was “[d]isabled” and not capable of being driven from the
scene. See id. at 54.

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presented no eyewitnesses to the accident, and no testimony regarding how

long before the trooper arrived the accident had occurred.

      When Trooper Yetter asked what had happened, Appellant responded

that he was traveling northbound toward Lewistown when he “looked over to

read a text message.” N.T. 5/16/22, 32. At the same time, he “bumped off

the northbound guide rail[,]” which the trooper noted was on the “passenger

side of his car.” Id. at 32-33, 42 (emphasis added). Appellant further stated

that he then “came to a complete stop.” Id. at 33.

      During this interaction, Trooper Yetter observed that Appellant “was

very slow with his movements, very sluggish[,] had a thick, slurred speech[,

a] low mumbling voice[, and] his pupils were constricted[.]” N.T. 5/16/22,

33. The trooper did not smell an odor of alcohol, but asked Appellant if he

had consumed any controlled substances. Id. at 35. Appellant responded

that “he was consuming Suboxone[,]” which the trooper was aware is “taken

for narcotic addiction.”   Id. at 35-36.   There was no testimony, however,

concerning the effect, if any, the consumption of Suboxone has on a person’s

body. Indeed, the trial court ruled that Trooper Yetter did not have sufficient

training to “say unequivocally the Suboxone caused the wreck[,]” but the

trooper was permitted to testify that “based on [his] experience” that he

believed Appellant was impaired by “some type of substance.” Id. at 41, 51-

52.

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      Trooper Yetter testified that his observations at the scene suggested

Appellant’s version of the guide rail collision was not truthful.     See N.T.

5/16/22, 42-44. Specifically, he noticed there was “disabling damage to the

driver’s side of the vehicle[, but] no damage to the [passenger] side of the

vehicle.” Id. at 43. The trooper also observed tire marks in the southbound

lane, “leading up to the guide rail, marks on the guide rail, and then you could

see tire marks coming right to where [the car’s] final rest[ing spot] was.” Id.

at 43-44. Trooper Yetter did not have dash cam video of the accident scene,

nor did he photograph any damage to Appellant’s car or the tire marks he

observed on the road and guide rail.       See id. at 55-56.    Trooper Yetter

included the following diagram of the scene in his crash report:

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Commonwealth Exhibit 2 (police crash report); N.T. 5/16/22, 83-85, 101.

Trooper Yetter documented in his crash report that Appellant admitted that he

was driving forty-five miles per hour, ten miles per hour over the posted speed

limit along State Route 103. Id. at 77.

       Trooper Yetter placed Appellant under arrest for suspicion of DUI and

transported him to a hospital to conduct a blood draw. See N.T. 5/16/22, 45-

48. However, Appellant refused to submit to a blood test. See id. at 46-48,

101; Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (implied consent form). He was later charged

with DUI, EWOC, and summary offenses for disregarding a single traffic lane

and engaging in text-based communications while driving.

       On May 16, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on the EWOC

charge only.6 After the Commonwealth presented its case-in-chief, Appellant

moved for a judgment of acquittal on the EWOC charge, which, following

argument, the trial court denied. See N.T. 5/16/22, 102, 116-17. Appellant

presented no evidence or testimony. Id. at 141-42. That same day, the jury

returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of EWOC. Id. at 179-80; Verdict

Slip, 5/16/22, 1. The trial court subsequently found Appellant guilty of the

remaining offenses. N.T. 5/16/22, 181; Verdict and Order, 5/16/22, 1.

____________________________________________

6 Because a first conviction of DUI carries a maximum term of only six months’

incarceration, it is considered a “petty” offense and does not entitle a
defendant to a jury trial. See Commonwealth v. Kerry, 906 A.2d 1237,
1239-40 (Pa. Super. 2006).

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       Appellant proceeded to sentencing on June 30, 2022, at which time, the

court imposed twenty-four to forty-eight months’ imprisonment for EWOC and

a concurrent term of seventy-two hours to six months’ imprisonment for DUI.7

Sentencing Order, 6/30/22, 1-2.                Appellant did not file a post-sentence

motion. This timely appeal followed.8 Notice of Appeal, 7/26/22, 1.

       Appellant purports to raise the following three issues for our review:

       I.     Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s mot[i]on
              for judgment of acquittal on the [EWOC] count when the
              Commonwealth failed to prove that the Appellant drove his
              vehicle in a manner that created a substantial risk of injury
              which Appellant consciously disregarded[?]

       II.    Whether the weight of the evidence supported the guilty
              verdict on the [EWOC] count when the Commonwealth
              failed to present evidence that Appellant knew the child was
              placed in circumstances that could affect the child’s
              welfare[?]

       III.   Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
              conviction for [EWOC] when the Commonwealth failed to
              prove that Appellant acted knowingly[; i]n other words,
              [did] the Commonwealth present[ ] sufficient evidence that
              the Appellant knew the child was placed in circumstances
              that could threaten the child’s welfare[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers and some capitalization omitted).

____________________________________________

7 The court imposed a fine of $25 for each of the summary offenses.
Sentencing Order, 6/30/22, 1-2.

8 Appellant complied with the trial court’s directive to file a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). See Rule
1925 Order, 7/28/22, 1; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/18/22, 1.

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       Preliminary, we note that Appellant’s second claim is waived for our

review. A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised before the

trial court either orally or in a written motion before sentencing, or in a post-

sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3). Here, Appellant did not

file any written motions challenging the weight of the evidence, and the

transcript from the sentencing hearing is not included in the certified record.9

See Pa.R.A.P. 1911 (“The appellant shall request any transcript required[.]”).

Moreover, we note that Appellant does not present any argument concerning

the weight of the evidence in his brief. Thus, we conclude this claim is waived.

See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 57 A.3d 191, 196-97 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(“Failure to challenge the weight of the evidence presented at trial in an oral

or written motion prior to sentence or in a post-sentence motion will result in

waiver of the claim.”).

       Appellant’s argument focuses only on his challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting his EWOC conviction.10 Our review of a sufficiency

claim is well settled:

____________________________________________

9 We note, too, that Appellant does not assert that he preserved this claim at

the sentencing hearing.

10 Appellant purports to present two issues challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence – the first, asserting the trial court erred when it denied his motion
for judgment of acquittal. See Appellant’s Brief at 5.

       A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of
       the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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              [W]e evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the
              verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
              reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
              Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
              when it establishes each material element of the crime
              charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
              beyond a reasonable doubt.              Nevertheless, the
              Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
              certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
              resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
              and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of
              fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

              The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
              wholly circumstantial evidence. …

       Importantly, the jury, which passes upon the weight and
       credibility of each witness’s testimony, is free to believe all, part,
       or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations & quotation marks omitted).

       Section 4304 of the Crimes Code provides, in relevant part: “A parent

… supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, … commits an

offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty

of care, protection or support.”        18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).   This Court has
____________________________________________

       granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth has failed to
       carry its burden regarding that charge.

Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 86 A.3d 892, 894 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted). Appellant does not differentiate between his first and third issues
in his brief. Because we review both claims under the same standard, we will
address Appellant’s claims as a singular challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (applying sufficiency of evidence standard to claim challenging
denial of motion for judgment of acquittal).

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developed a three-part test for an EWOC conviction. The Commonwealth must

prove:

     [(]1) [T]he accused [was] aware of his/her duty to protect the
     child;

     [(]2) [T]he accused [was] aware that the child [was] in
     circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or
     psychological welfare; and

     [(]3) [T]he accused has either failed to act or has taken action so
     lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected
     to protect the child’s welfare.

Bryant, 57 A.3d at 197 (citations omitted). We further note:

     Endangering the welfare of a child is a specific intent offense
     enacted in broad terms so as to safeguard the welfare and security
     of children.     To be convicted under this statute, the
     Commonwealth must prove a knowing violation of a duty of
     care.

Commonwealth v. Foster, 764 A.2d 1076, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations

omitted and emphasis added).

     A knowing mens rea is defined in the Crimes Code as follows:

     (b) Kinds of culpability defined.--

                                     …

           (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
           element of an offense when:

                 (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
                 the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his
                 conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
                 exist; and

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                     (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he
                     is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
                     will cause such a result.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(2)(i)-(ii).

       Appellant insists the Commonwealth failed to prove that he knowingly

violated a duty of care to his child because the fact that he drove under the

influence of a controlled substance is, alone, insufficient to demonstrate his

specific intent. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant relies on two decisions –

Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302 (Pa. Super. 2012), and

Commonwealth v. Mastromatteo, 719 A.2d 1081 (Pa. Super. 1988) –

where this Court reversed convictions of recklessly endangering another

person (REAP), which requires a lesser degree of culpability, based solely on

the fact that the defendant drove under the influence of a controlled

substance.11 See Appellant’s Brief at 10-12. He insists that more is required,

and alleges, in the present case, “there was no evidence of a tangible indicia

of unsafe driving that created a substantial risk of injury that Appellant

consciously disregarded.” Id. at 14. Appellant maintains that there was “[n]o

evidence [] presented as to erratic driving, driving in the opposite lane,

weaving, or any other description of driving.” Id. He also asserts that the

fact he admitted that he drove ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit,

and “merely looked at a text on his cell phone,” does not establish

____________________________________________

11 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 (“A person commits [REAP] if he recklessly engages

in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.”).

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“recklessness or a violation of a known duty to his daughter.” Id. at 14-15.

Accordingly, he contends we must reverse his conviction.

      A review of our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett,

251 A.3d 811 (Pa. Super. 2021), appears to be a logical starting point for our

analysis as that case involved the review of a sufficiency claim concerning an

EWOC conviction which in turn relied on the sufficiency reviews of the REAP

convictions in Mastromatteo and Hutchins.         In Vela-Garrett, this Court

found that evidence was insufficient for EWOC where the defendant had been

driving with a three-year-old child in his car, a state trooper testified, based

on conducted field sobriety tests, that the defendant was impaired to a degree

to which he was not able to safely drive, and a blood test of the defendant

revealed forty nanograms per milliliter of an inactive metabolite of marijuana.

251 A.3d at 814, 816, 818-19.

      The Vela-Garrett panel held that because it could not conclude that the

defendant had even recklessly endangered his child, pursuant to the prior

REAP decisions in Mastromatteo and Hutchins, then it could not conclude

that the defendant knowingly endangered his child for purposes of his EWOC

conviction, because EWOC required a higher level of culpability than REAP

(knowingly acting rather than recklessly acting). Vela-Garrett, 251 A.3d at

818-19. Quoting Mastromatteo, this Court emphasized that “driving under

the influence of intoxicating substances does not create legal recklessness per

se[,] but must be accompanied with other tangible indicia of unsafe

driving to a degree that creates a substantial risk of injury which is

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consciously disregarded.” Vela-Garrett, 251 A.3d at 817 (emphasis added),

citing Mastromatteo, 719 A.2d at 1083. The panel noted that the arresting

officer did not observe any unsafe driving by Vela-Garrett or any other conduct

that would constitute “tangible indicia of unsafe driving to a degree that

creates a substantial risk of injury which [was] consciously disregarded.”

Vela-Garrett, 251 A.2d at 818. The defendant in that case also pointed out

that he was pulled over for an inspection sticker violation and there was no

evidence that he was speeding, driving erratically, or taking any other action

to indicate that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Id. at 816.

      In Mastromatteo, a police officer observed the defendant driving very

slowly and drifting over the middle line of a road three times before executing

a traffic stop. 719 A.2d at 1082. The defendant’s young son was in the car,

and the defendant “exhibited signs of being intoxicated[.]” Id. Subsequent

chemical testing of the defendant revealed “a .168 blood alcohol level and 570

nanograms per decil[i]ter for marijuana.” Id. On appeal, this Court reversed

the conviction for REAP, opining:

      Our [review] leads us to conclude that driving under the influence
      of intoxicating substances does not create legal recklessness per
      se but must be accompanied with other tangible indicia of
      unsafe driving to a degree that creates a substantial risk of
      injury which is consciously disregarded. Whether, in this
      context, the unsafe driving results from diminished judgment, a
      more cavalier approach to driving or sheer physical incapacitation
      would seem immaterial, as is the degree to which any of these
      factors is actually related to the consumption of alcohol or drugs.
      What is material is actual reckless driving or conduct, for
      any reason, for it is this conduct which creates the peril in

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      question. Since people vary in their response to alcohol we
      believe this is a sound principle.4

            4 Some people may respond to alcohol by driving in a brazen

            and inherently reckless manner as evidenced by speeding
            and reckless weaving through traffic … Other individuals
            may not exhibit any distinguishable difference in their
            driving even though they may be legally intoxicated.
            Indeed, some more prescient individuals, aware that they
            have ingested some alcohol, may even compensate for their
            consumption by being very cautious in their driving. In
            short, there is no hard and fast formula for determining the
            probable effects of alcohol on any given driver or the
            increased risk of danger that alcohol consumption creates
            so as to safely conclude that a driver’s alcohol consumption
            will increase the risk of injury sufficiently to establish legal
            recklessness. Indeed, undoubtedly there are certain drivers
            who will exhibit safer driving conduct while legally
            intoxicated than certain drivers do when they are sober.

Id. at 1083 & n.4 (emphasis added).

      In Hutchins, the defendant was driving his vehicle with his three young

daughters as passengers. 42 A.3d at 304. He made a left turn in front of

another vehicle which resulted in a crash.      Id.   “The force of impact was

enough to deploy the airbags in [the defendant’s] vehicle, and [the other] car

was totaled.” Id. (citation omitted). All three of the defendant’s daughters,

and the other driver, were injured in the accident. Id. at 312. When the

investigating trooper arrived, the defendant “admitted that the accident was

his fault because he was ‘distracted’ and thought that he could make the turn.”

Id. at 304 (citation omitted).       The trooper described the defendant’s

demeanor as “unusually calm” and “flat line[;]” upon questioning the

defendant admitted he had smoked marijuana earlier that day. Id. (citation

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omitted).     Subsequent testing revealed “43ng/ml of carboxy acid [a

metabolite of the marijuana plant]” in the defendant’s blood.       Id. at 305

(citation omitted). Hutchins was later convicted of DUI and four counts of

REAP.

        As in Mastromatteo, on appeal, this Court reversed Hutchins’

convictions for REAP.     First, the panel noted that driving while under the

influence of a controlled substance alone does not establish recklessness per

se. Hutchins, 42 A.3d at 311, citing Mastromatteo, 719 A.2d at 1082.

Rather, additional evidence of unsafe driving is required. In concluding the

facts before it were insufficient to establish the degree of recklessness

required for a conviction for REAP, the Hutchins panel opined:

        [The defendant’s] acts in this matter are deplorable; he got high
        on an illegal substance and then drove his three young daughters
        in his vehicle, resulting in an accident injuring all three of his
        daughters and another innocent driver. Nevertheless, we are
        constrained to agree that, absent additional evidence of his
        reckless driving or conduct, the evidence was insufficient
        to establish that [the defendant] recklessly endangered
        the lives of others. Based upon our holding in Mastromatteo
        and its progeny, the Commonwealth was required to present
        evidence of recklessness in addition to [the defendant’s]
        intoxication. The only other relevant evidence presented in this
        matter is that an accident occurred.       However, that [the
        defendant] exercised poor judgment in negotiating a left
        turn does not equate to recklessness. Unlike the defendant’s
        conduct in [other cases where a conviction of REAP was upheld,
        the defendant] was not observed acting recklessly, for example
        dangerously weaving through traffic in an aggressive manner, or
        driving the wrong way on an off ramp. Consequently, we are
        constrained to vacate [the] judgment of sentence with respect to
        [the] REAP convictions.

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Hutchins, 42 A.3d at 312 (some emphasis added).

      Relying on Mastromatteo and Hutchins, the Vela-Garrett Court

opined:

      [I]t is clear we must reverse [the defendant’s] EWOC conviction.
      As in this case, there was evidence establishing that Mastromatteo
      and Hutchins were impaired when they drove their vehicles. While
      both Mastromatteo and Hutchins exhibited some form of unsafe
      driving – with Mastromatteo’s swerving over the middle line three
      times, and Hutchins’ causing a serious accident with another
      vehicle – our Court held that additional evidence of reckless
      driving or conduct was necessary for the Commonwealth to
      establish that Mastromatteo or Hutchins had recklessly
      endangered the lives of the young children in their vehicles. Here,
      [the corporal] did not observe any unsafe driving by [the
      defendant], or any other conduct that would constitute a “tangible
      indicia of unsafe driving to a degree that creates a substantial risk
      of injury which [was] consciously disregarded.” Accordingly, the
      evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that [the defendant]
      acted recklessly.

             Because we cannot conclude that [the defendant] even
      recklessly endangered his child, we certainly cannot conclude that
      he knowingly did so, as his conviction for EWOC requires … It is
      clear that EWOC’s mens rea of “knowingly” involves a higher level
      of culpability than REAP’s mens rea of “recklessly.”

Vela-Garrett, 251 A.3d at 818 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).

      For purposes of this appeal, we can extrapolate from Vela-Garrett,

Mastromatteo, and Hutchins that the commission of DUI with children in a

vehicle – by itself – is inadequate to sustain convictions under either our EWOC

or REAP statutes.     Our reliance on Mastromatteo and Hutchins upon

reaching the result in Vela-Garrett, however, appears to suggest that EWOC

and REAP each focus on the same type of conduct and differ only as to the

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degree of mental state needed for a conviction so a DUI which is inadequate

to support recklessness for REAP, must also fail to support knowing conduct

for purposes of EWOC. Appellant makes this the central point of his argument,

comparing himself to the defendant in Hutchins, but this line of reasoning

does not prove the insufficiency of the evidence for EWOC. Appellant’s Brief

at 15.

         While we agree with the general proposition that a lesser mens rea

(reckless conduct needed for REAP) is subsumed in a greater mens rea

(knowing conduct for EWOC), and a person could never be convicted of EWOC

based on reckless conduct alone, we must also appreciate that the EWOC and

REAP statutes are not aligned from an elements standpoint.           As we have

explained:

         A conviction for reckless endangerment requires proof of conduct
         that places or may place another person in danger of death or
         serious bodily injury, while a conviction for endangering the
         welfare of children only requires proof of circumstances that could
         threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare. Thus,
         reckless endangerment requires proof of a fact that endangering
         the welfare of children does not. In other words, the element of
         conduct which places or may place a person in danger of death or
         serious bodily injury is not subsumed within proof that a child is
         placed in circumstances that could threaten the child.

Commonwealth v. Martir, 712 A.2d 327, 329-30 (Pa. Super. 1998). By

focusing only on the apparent risk of injury in his claim – as would be the

focus of a sufficiency claim involving a REAP conviction – Appellant incorrectly

treats EWOC as a higher grade of REAP in DUI cases and, in the process, fails

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to properly analyze his sufficiency claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 14 (“In the

case at bar, there was no evidence of a tangible indicia of unsafe driving that

created a substantial risk of injury that Appellant consciously disregarded.”).

      Instead, our analysis in the instant case should be guided by our

Supreme Court’s sufficiency review in Commonwealth v. Howard, 257 A.3d

1217 (Pa. 2021) (holding that evidence was insufficient for EWOC where

Howard placed her child in a ride-for-hire car that did not contain a child car

seat). In Howard, the Supreme Court clarified that, in order to satisfy the

knowing requirement of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1), the Commonwealth must

prove that that a defendant was aware of both their duty of care to their child

when transporting the child and that their conduct endangered the welfare of

their child. Howard, 257 A.3d at 1225. With respect to the latter component

of the mens rea element, the defendant must be aware that they have placed

the child in a perilous or dangerous situation, but they do not have to be aware

of the certainty of a particular result such as a car accident:

      [A] person violates Section 4304(a)(1) if he “knowingly endangers
      the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or
      support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1). “Endanger” is defined, inter
      alia, as “to bring into danger or peril,” or “to create a dangerous
      situation.”         https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
      endanger. Thus, the material element of Section 4304(a)(1) is
      the creation of a perilous or dangerous situation… We emphasize
      that, for purposes of Section 4304, the requirement of Section
      302(b)(2)(i) that the accused be “aware that it is practically
      certain that his conduct will cause such a result” does not require
      that he be certain of a particular harm or injury – for example, in
      this case, a car accident. Again, as it pertains to Section 4304,
      the result of the actor’s conduct is the creation of a dangerous
      situation, which is what Section 4304(a)(1) seeks to prevent.

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Id. (emphasis in original). Moreover, “in determining what conduct violates

the [EWOC] statute, ‘[t]he common sense of the community, as well as the

sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people entertain is

sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case, and to individuate what

particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.’”    Id. at 1222 n.9, quoting

Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 2015).

      Here, the evidence presents us with three factors, in addition to an

instance of DUI with a child in the car, from which we can reasonably infer the

creation of a dangerous situation based on unsafe driving. First, the disabling

damage to the driver’s side of Appellant’s car, along with the tire marks in the

oncoming southbound lane and marks on the guide rail on the southbound

side of the road, supported the reasonable inference that Appellant had

crossed over the opposite lane of traffic and collided with the opposing guide

rail as demonstrated in the trooper’s diagram included in the record. N.T.

5/16/22, 42-44; Commonwealth Exhibit 2.          While there was no witness

testimony presented as to the circumstances of the crash, Appellant admitted

to bumping off a guide rail, though the trooper’s recollection of the scene and

the damage to the car suggested that Appellant was incorrect as to which side

of the road he had struck the rail.    N.T. 5/16/22, 32-33, 42-44.     Second,

Appellant admitted to reading a text message at the time that he collided with

the guide rail. Id. at 32 (Trooper Yetter: “He told me I looked over to read a

text message. When I did so, I bumped off the northbound guide rail.”), 42

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(“He said he was reading a text message and bumped off of the

northbound…”). Third, he admitted to driving ten miles per hour over the

posted speed limit at that time. Id. at 77 (Trooper Yetter: “Whatever I put in

my report is what he would have told me that day … I have in my report that

he was I believe going 45 miles per hour.”).

      The combination of these circumstances demonstrated that Appellant

violated a duty of care to his child and endangered the child by knowingly

creating a dangerous situation. While there is no reason to infer that he had

purposely attempted to drive through an oncoming lane of traffic to hit a guide

rail, his efforts to simultaneously speed and check a text message on his

phone while driving under the influence of a controlled substance led to him

lose control of his car in a manner which easily could have resulted in injury

and psychological trauma to his child. Speeding is one of many factors we

have considered supporting REAP and reckless driving in DUI cases.        See

Commonwealth v. Schmohl, 975 A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(holding that evidence was sufficient for REAP where, inter alia, Schmohl “sped

while DUI”); Commonwealth v. Jeter, 937 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(speeding treated, among other factors, as tangible indicia of unsafe driving:

“Jeter was driving his vehicle on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, so presumably he

was traveling at an increased speed, which could have resulted in substantial

harm to others if an accident had occurred”).     Moreover, while we do not

appear to have addressed examples of texting while driving in our sufficiency

caselaw addressing EWOC and REAP convictions in DUI cases, inattentive

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driving has become a prominent source of motor vehicle-related deaths in this

country. See U.S. Dep’t Transp., NHTSA, Overview of Motor Vehicle Traffic

Crashes in 2021, 23, available at https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/

ViewPublication/813435 (3,522 estimated fatalities          nationally   in 2021

distraction-affected crashes, i.e., a crash involving at least one driver who was

distracted, which constituted 8.2 percent of total traffic fatalities in 2021, and

a 12-percent increase from the prior year).

       The mens rea element for EWOC is supported by the evidence because

it showed that Appellant knowingly operated his vehicle in an unsafe manner,

and it was practically certain that his conduct was causing a dangerous

situation that threatened his child’s physical or psychological welfare. The

absence of the infliction of a physical injury to the child arising from a car

accident or the uncertainty as to that potential outcome at the time of

Appellant’s unsafe driving under the influence of a controlled substance is

immaterial for purposes of our review.12 See Commonwealth v. Krock, 282

A.3d 1132, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“The [EWOC] statute does not require

the actual infliction of physical injury. Nor does it state a requirement that
____________________________________________

12 It is important to note that if we were to base our sufficiency caselaw for

EWOC convictions only on sufficiency analysis in REAP cases, which by the
terms of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705, are singularly focused on the danger of death or
serious bodily injury, we would ignore the EWOC statute’s stated concern for
the psychological welfare of children. In DUI cases, if we focus only on the
likelihood of a car accident when conducting sufficiency review for EWOC
offenses, we will fail to appreciate that the experience of being driven by an
impaired and distracted parent or guardian may be psychologically damaging
for a child even if an accident does not take place.

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the child or children be in imminent threat of physical harm.”) (citation

omitted).

      On this record, where the EWOC statute is intended to cover a broad

range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of children, it

must certainly apply where a defendant commits a DUI with a child passenger

and simultaneously engages in multiple forms of unsafe driving by crossing

through an oncoming lane of traffic while speeding and reviewing a text

message on a cellular phone. See Krock, 282 A.3d at 1137-39 (evidence

sufficient for EWOC where Krock, travelling with three passengers between

the ages of two and seven, operated his truck under the influence of alcohol,

in an unsafe manner, which caused his vehicle to crash into a car, pushing

that car into a concrete barrier, and causing Krock’s truck to roll over onto its

side and fly into the air; “When an adult is driving a vehicle in which a child is

a passenger, common sense dictates that the driver is supervising that child

and, thus, has a duty of care towards those young passengers.             This is

especially so because the driver controls the speed and direction of the vehicle

and regulates the degree of safety in which it is operated.”).

      In his argument, Appellant fails to review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as dictated by the standard of review for his

claim. He alleges that there was no evidence of “tangible indicia of unsafe

driving that created a substantial risk of injury that [he] consciously

disregarded,” noting that there was no evidence “as to erratic driving, driving

in the opposite lane, weaving, or any other description of driving.” Appellant’s

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Brief at 14. This assertion ignores that there was direct evidence of unsafe

driving in the form of Appellant’s own admissions that he had been speeding

and reading a text message when his car struck a guide rail. N.T. 5/16/22,

32, 42, 77. It also ignores that there was circumstantial evidence of unsafe

and erratic driving supporting Trooper Yetter’s conclusion that Appellant drove

through the southbound lane of State Route 103 and struck the guide rail on

the southbound side of road based on the trooper’s observations of the

damage to the driver’s side of Appellant’s car and the tire marks seen in the

southbound lane leading to a marked guide rail on the southbound side and

where Appellant’s disabled car came to a stop. N.T. 5/16/22, 43-44. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“The

Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence”).

      Appellant appears to discount his admission concerning speeding by

referring us, as follows, to Section 3368 of the Vehicle Code which governs

the use of speed-timing devices:

      Appellant reminds the reviewing Court that if a speed timing
      device were used to “clock” Appellant’s speed, that Appellant
      could not be convicted of speeding (if radar was used) unless he
      was going six (6) miles or more above the posted speed limit. See
      75 Pa.C.S.A. §[ ]3368. Moreover, if an electronic device were
      used to calculate speed, the driver could not be convicted unless
      he were driving ten (10) miles an hour above the posted speed
      limit (when the zone is fifty-five (55) miles per hour or less). Id.

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Appellant’s Brief at 14.       His reliance on Section 3368 in these contexts is

unavailing because the evidence of his speeding was established by his own

admission, there was no allegation of any use of a speed-timing device in this

case, and, in any event, we are not addressing a summary traffic offense for

speeding.

      Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred by suggesting that he

was “texting while driving” because “[t]he testimony was clear that [he]

merely looked at a text on his cell phone on the front seat of the car and was

not actively texting.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. Putting aside the fact that we

conduct de novo review of a sufficiency claim and thus we are not limited by

the trial court’s reasoning, we note there is no practical or legal distinction in

these circumstances between whether Appellant was merely reading a text

message or both reading and composing text messages at the time of the

guide rail collision in this case. Our summary traffic statute prohibiting text-

based communications by drivers (of which Appellant was convicted of

violating in this case) equally treats the reading, writing, and sending of text

messages. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3316(a) (“No driver shall operate a motor vehicle on

a highway or trafficway in this Commonwealth while using an interactive

wireless communication device to send, read or write a text-based

communication while the vehicle is in motion.”). The phrase “texting while

driving”    thus   naturally    encompasses      the   act   of   reading   text-based

communications while operating a vehicle.              Appellant’s reading of a text

message supported the EWOC conviction – even in the absence of the

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composition of a text message – because it constituted a knowing engagement

in a distraction from driving that, in addition to speeding and the DUI, created

a dangerous situation for Appellant’s child.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as the verdict winner, the evidence was sufficient for EWOC. Appellant had

an apparent duty of care to his child passenger. He endangered the physical

or psychological welfare of his child when he simultaneously drove ten miles

per hour over the posted speed limit while under the influence of a controlled

substance and was reading a text message while operating his car, and, as a

result of those actions, he crossed over an oncoming lane of traffic, collided

with a guide rail, and crossed back over to his initial lane of traffic after

sustaining disabling damage to his car. Appellant was obviously aware that

his combined actions created a dangerous situation for his child. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029, 1038-39 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en

banc) (holding that evidence was sufficient for EWOC where, even though

defendant was not instructed on the dangers of Shaken Baby Syndome, he

violently shook his child with enough force to cause an abusive head trauma

which could threaten the child’s physical and/or psychological welfare; “[i]t

takes nothing more than common sense for an adult … to know that violently

shaking an infant child with enough force to cause an abusive head trauma

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could    threaten    the    child’s   physical     and/or   psychological   welfare.”).

Accordingly, we affirm.13

        Judgments of sentence affirmed.

        Judge Olson joins this Opinion.

     Judge McCaffery files a Dissenting Opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023

____________________________________________

13 The evidence presented provides no basis to distinguish whether Appellant’s

child was restrained in a child car seat at the time of the guide rail collision.
N.T. 5/16/22, 29-30. Under our analysis, the evidence was sufficient for
EWOC even assuming arguendo that the child was properly restrained in the
seat.

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