Court Opinion

ID: 9560081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:42:40.107128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:05.003287
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the judgment of the majority, I base my decision upon a wholly different rationale from that advanced in Division 1. At the time of appellants’ arrests, Agent Markonni had not complied with the technical requirement of OCGA § 35-8-9 (a): completion of a certified basic training course for peace officers. However, OCGA § 35-8-9 (b) authorizes the certifying council to recognize and give credit, in lieu of completion of such course, for instruction received which is at least equivalent to the required basic training. Although Agent Markonni obtained no formal waiver pursuant to OCGA § 35-8-9 (b), the evidence adduced on the hearing of appellants’ motion to suppress clearly shows Markonni’s training and experience as a law enforcement officer to be at least the equivalent of a basic training course. Inter alia, Markonni testified that he has sixteen years of experience as a federal law enforcement officer, eight of which have been spent in the enforcement of drug laws in major air*813ports in this country. For five of these eight years, Markonni has been assigned to the Atlanta airport detail. Indeed, in the particular area of police work in which he is employed and during the course of which he arrested appellants, Markonni’s training and experience would certainly far exceed that offered in a basic training course.
Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of a formal waiver of his compliance, it is reasonable to assume that such would be credited to Markonni in lieu of the required basic training course. I find, as apparently did the trial judge, Markonni to be in substantial compliance with the spirit of OCGA § 35-8-9 sufficient to make a valid arrest for violation of OCGA § 16-10-25. See generally Harvey v. State, 165 Ga. App. 7 (2) (299 SE2d 61) (1983); Davis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 312 (2) (295 SE2d 131) (1982). In light of the foregoing, I concur in affirming the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to suppress.