Court Opinion

ID: 9928175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:28.498865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:22.765018
License: Public Domain

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                           IN RE NIYA B.*
                              (AC 46488)
                     Alvord, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
   trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
   child, N. Shortly after N’s birth, she was placed in the care and custody
   of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. N was
   later adjudicated neglected and the court ordered specific steps for the
   mother to facilitate her reunion with N. While N was in the custody of
   the petitioner, the mother tested positive multiple times for alcohol and
   illegal drugs and was arrested multiple times for operating a motor
   vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The petitioner
   filed a termination petition that alleged that, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-
   112 (j) (3) (B) (i)), N had been adjudicated neglected and that the mother
   had failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would
   encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, given the
   age and needs of N, she could assume a responsible position in N’s life.
   At the termination trial, the mother presented expert testimony from
   F, a clinical psychologist, who had previously written a report recom-
   mending reunification with N. Held that the trial court correctly con-
   cluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent mother
   had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation, as required
   by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i): the record contained sufficient evidence to
   support the court’s determination, including that, although the mother
   had used and completed some services offered to her by the Department
   of Children and Families, including for substance use, relapse prevention
   and mental health counseling, multiple urine tests and drug screens
   presented clear and convincing evidence that she continued to have
   substance use issues, that she demonstrated a lack of insight or outright
   refusal to acknowledge her substance use, including by her claims that
   every drug test over a three year period had produced a false positive,
   by her denial that any of her arrests for operating a motor vehicle under
   the influence was her fault, despite evidence in each instance that she
   had glassy or bloodshot eyes and impaired speech or behavior and she
   smelled of alcohol, and by her testimony at trial that these arrests were
   merely evidence of ‘‘slipping,’’ not relapse, and she refused to engage
   in most of the recommended treatments; moreover, the mother could
   not prevail on her claim that the court misinterpreted F’s testimony
   regarding, inter alia, whether she had gained adequate insight into her
   substance use issues and whether her instances of substance use
   throughout the history of the case suggested a failure to rehabilitate,
   as the court did not and was not required to rely on F’s expert testimony,
   F’s report recommending reunification was prepared sixteen months
   before the trial and F was unaware of the mother’s more recent positive
   test results for drugs and alcohol, F ultimately testified that, at the time
   of the trial, he was not sure of his position as to reunification, and he
   had stated in his report that the mother minimized her substance use
   and its impact on her parenting and the lack of stability in her life.
    Argued November 13, 2023—officially released January 22, 2024**

                             Procedural History

   Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Juvenile Mat-
ters, and tried to the court, Hon. John Turner, judge
trial referee; judgment terminating the respondents’
parental rights, from which the respondent mother
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
  John E. Tucker, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (petitioner).
                          Opinion

   SEELEY, J. The respondent mother,1 Erin R., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families (commissioner), terminating her parental
rights with respect to her minor child, Niya B. On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly
determined that she had failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).2 We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
   The following relevant facts, which the court found
by clear and convincing evidence, and procedural his-
tory, are relevant to this appeal. On March 13, 2020,
the Department of Children and Families (department)
invoked a ninety-six hour hold and placed Niya in the
care and custody of the commissioner. On March 17,
2020, the commissioner sought an order of temporary
custody, which the court granted, and filed a neglect
petition. Also on March 17, 2020, the court ordered
preliminary specific steps for the respondent to facili-
tate her reunion with Niya.3
   On January 15, 2021, the court approved a concurrent
permanency plan of reunification for Niya with the
respondent or termination of parental rights and adop-
tion. On December 7, 2021, the court again approved a
concurrent permanency plan of reunification with the
respondent or termination of parental rights and adop-
tion. On the same date, the respondent entered a plea of
nolo contendere to an allegation of neglect, specifically
that Niya was being permitted to live under circum-
stances injurious to her well-being. The court adjudi-
cated Niya neglected and committed her to the care
and custody of the commissioner. The court ordered
final specific steps for the respondent on the same day.4
   On January 10, 2022, the respondent filed a motion
to revoke the commitment, arguing that she was ‘‘ready,
willing, and able to immediately assume full-time guard-
ianship and care of the minor child . . . [that] the
cause for commitment no longer exist[ed],’’ and that she
was engaging in services and had substantially complied
with all of the specific steps ordered by the court. On
January 19, 2022, the commissioner filed an objection
to the respondent’s motion to revoke commitment,
asserting that the respondent had not been compliant
with urine screens, that she had tested positive for
cocaine on October 4 and 20, 2021, that she had been
driving without a license to her visits with Niya, that
she was unemployed, and that ‘‘[a] cause for commit-
ment still exist[ed] and it still [was] in the best interest
of the child.’’ On March 9, 2022, the commissioner filed
a petition to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
The termination petition alleged, pursuant to § 17a-112
(j) (3) (B) (i), that Niya previously had been adjudicated
neglected and the respondent had failed to achieve the
degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage
the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, given
the age and needs of Niya, she could assume a responsi-
ble position in Niya’s life.
   The termination of parental rights trial was held on
June 20, August 29 and 31, and November 7, 29 and 30,
2022. The court consolidated the respondent’s motion
to revoke commitment and the commissioner’s objec-
tion thereto with the termination of parental rights trial.
During the trial, the commissioner presented testimony
from the following witnesses: ‘‘Kevin Zaloski, a special
investigations detective with the Danbury . . . Police
Department; Brian Durling, a lieutenant with the Ridge-
field . . . Police Department; Terrance Howaux, a
patrolman with the Brookfield . . . Police Depart-
ment; Ryan Howley, a patrolman with the Danbury . . .
Police Department; Ebony Davidson, a team leader at
Connecticut Counseling Center; Kelsey Dlugozima, a
licensed clinical social worker for Central Naugatuck
Valley Health Services; Dr. Kevin Berry, a [department]
social worker supervisor; and Angel Santiago, a [depart-
ment] social worker.’’ The respondent testified and pre-
sented additional testimony from the following wit-
nesses: ‘‘Eliezer Ortiz, program manager for the Safe
Family Recovery Program; Altagracia Trinidad, a
licensed professional counselor; Sharone Williams, a
recovery support specialist; and Dr. Bruce Freedman,
a licensed psychologist who [was] qualified as an expert
in clinical and child psychology. The child’s attorney
called no witness[es] . . . .’’
   On January 20, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision in which it terminated the respondent’s
parental rights. After setting out the procedural history
and making the relevant jurisdictional findings, the
court stated that it had ‘‘thoroughly reviewed the veri-
fied petition [and] all the exhibits, and ha[d] heard and
carefully considered the testimony of all the witnesses.
In addition, the court ha[d], with notice to the parties
and without their objection, taken judicial notice of the
chronology of the proceedings, the filings and submis-
sions of pleadings, petition, court hearings’ memoranda,
and the dates and contents of the court’s findings,
orders, rulings, and judgments.’’ The court concluded
that ‘‘[t]he credible and relevant evidence offered at
trial, and [its] review of the judicially noticed court
records, support[ed]’’ its findings of facts ‘‘by clear and
convincing evidence.’’
   Relevant to the adjudicatory phase5 of the termination
proceeding, the court concluded, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the department had made reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent and Niya and that the
respondent had ‘‘failed to achieve the degree of personal
rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that
within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs
of [Niya], she could assume a responsible position in
the life of [Niya].’’ In support of that conclusion, the
court made the following relevant factual findings.
  The respondent ‘‘has a significant history of trauma
and issues related to substance use6 dating back to her
childhood.’’ (Footnote added.) She is the mother to two
other children, A and K, who were removed from her
care by New York’s Child Protective Service (NYCPS)
and ‘‘placed in the care of their maternal grandmother
due to concerns of substance use by [the respondent].
A and K have continuously been in the care of their mater-
nal grandmother since 2010.’’ Furthermore, ‘‘[a]ccording
to NYCPS records, [the respondent] has a history of
minimizing her substance use and attempting to alter/
mask her urine drug screens. Her history includes sev-
eral drug charges in the state of [New York], a referral to
drug court, and not completing drug court successfully
which resulted in jail time.’’
   In March, 2020, the respondent, who was nine months
pregnant with Niya, was arrested in Danbury on multi-
ple counts of possession of a controlled substance, mul-
tiple counts of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, and possession of drug para-
phernalia. Specifically, the police found ‘‘[a] large zip
lock bag containing [two] smaller bags of cocaine and
[one] small bag of heroin and/or fentanyl, drug para-
phernalia, packaging material, and a scale . . . in the
bedroom she occupied within the house where she
resided with [two] other people. There was also $2240
found in her purse. She denied using or selling drugs.’’
  Four days later, on March 8, 2020, the respondent
checked into Danbury Hospital to deliver Niya and
tested positive for cocaine. She left the hospital against
medical advice. The respondent then went to Phelps
Memorial Hospital in New York. On learning that she
would be tested for substances at that hospital as well,
the respondent left on March 9, 2020, and went to West-
chester Medical Center in New York. On March 10,
2020, the respondent gave birth to Niya at Westchester
Medical Center, at which time the department became
involved with the respondent ‘‘when [this information]
was reported to [the department’s] Careline.’’7 Both
Niya and the respondent tested negative for illegal sub-
stances at that time.
  The respondent ‘‘denied any illicit drug use’’ to the
department and claimed that ‘‘the positive test result
for cocaine on March 8, 2020, at Danbury Hospital, was
a false positive.’’ On March 23, 2020, the respondent
completed a substance use screening at Help, Inc.,
through the Travisano Network.8 The results of her
urine screen, which were reported on May 4, 2020,9
showed that she tested positive for alcohol, cocaine
and fentanyl. It was recommended that the respondent
participate in intensive outpatient treatment (IOP),
which she began on May 4, 2020. ‘‘Upon admission into
the IOP program, [the respondent’s] clinician at Help,
Inc., identified her as being at the precontemplation
stage of change.10 Her counselors reported that she was
either unaware or unwilling to see how substance use
affected her life and that change was needed.’’ (Foot-
note added.) On May 6, 2020, the respondent tested
positive for alcohol, cocaine and fentanyl. On June 8,
2020, the respondent tested positive again for fentanyl.
   On July 13, 2020, the respondent received a certificate
from Help, Inc., ‘‘certifying that she had ‘successfully’
completed its IOP program. Successful completion of
the IOP program required negative drug screens, regular
attendance, and active participation in groups. Although
[the respondent] was deemed to have successfully com-
pleted the IOP program, she struggled with relapsing
while in the program, as was evidenced by her recurring
positive drug screens. In July, 2020, Help, Inc., recom-
mended [that] she participate in its relapse prevention
program. [The respondent] agreed and complied. She
commenced the relapse prevention program in July,
2020. On August 27, 2020, she tested positive for
cocaine. She denied and disputed the results of the
positive test.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The court further
noted that ‘‘[e]ach time [the respondent] had a positive
drug or alcohol test result she would say it was a mis-
take.’’
   ‘‘On August 28, 2020, [the respondent] informed her
counselor at Help, Inc., [that] she would seek services
elsewhere. She contemporaneously discontinued par-
ticipating in treatment at Help, Inc. On October 13,
2020, she was formally discharged unsuccessfully. Her
discharge issued with the recommendation that, after
a thirty day period of sobriety, she reengage in IOP
services to begin again to address the underlying moti-
vations for her substance use and to adopt healthier
coping skills.’’ At trial, Dlugozima ‘‘credibly testified
. . . that, at the time of [the respondent’s] discharge
on October 13, 2020, there had been no change in [the
respondent] from the date of her admission; she had
not begun to make strides in understanding the problem
behaviors involved with her substance use, how sub-
stance use affected her life, that changes in her life
were needed, the underlying motivations for her sub-
stance use, and to adopt healthier coping skills.’’ Upon
discharge, ‘‘Travisano/Help, Inc., also reported that [the
respondent’s] . . . prognosis was poor and recom-
mended [that] a higher level of care [was needed] than it
provided, either ‘in-patient if necessary’ or residential.’’
   The respondent ‘‘continued to deny she was having
issues with substances and refused to engage in inpa-
tient treatment.’’ Instead, the respondent sought and
began outpatient treatment at Connecticut Counseling
Center in October, 2020. On November 9 and 25, 2020,
the respondent’s urine screens were marked as suspi-
cious due to her low creatine levels.11 On December 29,
2020, the respondent submitted to a hair test at the
department’s request, which showed that she was nega-
tive for all substances12 retroactive for ninety days.13
However, on April 5, 2021, the respondent’s urine test
again was deemed suspicious.
   On March 1, 2021, the respondent was arrested in
Bedford, New York, for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol.14 On March 5, 2021, she
tested positive for alcohol and later admitted that she
had consumed alcohol. The respondent ‘‘was scheduled
to complete substance treatment on July 26, [2021] with
the recommendation she continue meeting with her
individual therapist for management of her stress, anxi-
ety and depression. However, [the respondent] did not
make it to July 26. She inexplicably disengaged from the
program. [Connecticut Counseling Center] discharged
her unsuccessfully on July 7, 2021. Her discharge sum-
mary stated she was discharged with no goals met.’’15
(Footnote omitted.)
   On September 3, 2021, the police arrested the respon-
dent in Ridgefield and charged her with operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. A
police officer observed a vehicle that was swerving all
over the road and traveling at only eighteen miles per
hour in a forty miles per hour zone. The respondent was
the operator and sole occupant of the vehicle. ‘‘After
she was stopped, the officer observed an open empty
beer can and an open empty nip bottle in the center
console. . . . Several more nip bottles were found in
her purse. She was mumbling and her speech was
slurred. An odor of alcohol was detected emanating
from her and the passenger compartment. The officer
had to repeat himself several times as [the respondent]
had difficulty focusing on what he was saying and [on
what] was going on.’’
   On September 17, 2021, the respondent was arrested
in Brookfield and charged with operating a motor vehi-
cle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and
operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. A
police officer observed that the respondent had failed
to stop at a stop sign and then crossed ‘‘over a double
yellow line, nearly striking the police officer’s cruiser,
and forcing him off the road to prevent a head-on colli-
sion. She continued to drive erratically . . . .’’ The offi-
cer further observed that she again had crossed over
the double yellow line and that she had ‘‘failed to stop
at two more stop signs before she was stopped.’’ He
also noted that ‘‘her speech was slurred, her eyes were
glassy and bloodshot’’ and there was an odor of alcohol
emanating from her mouth. She was administered a
Breathalyzer test, which showed readings of 0.195 and
0.191, well over the legal limit of 0.08.
  At the end of September, 2021, the respondent recom-
menced IOP substance use treatment at Connecticut
Counseling Center. On September 27, 2021, the respon-
dent had a urine screening through Connecticut Coun-
seling Center, which once again showed suspiciously
low creatine levels, an indication that ‘‘her urine had
been diluted.’’ On October 4, 2021, the respondent
tested positive for cocaine. The respondent later denied
using cocaine and disputed the validity of the test. She
‘‘denied having substance issues,’’ however, she did
state ‘‘to her social worker . . . Santiago that she was
drinking alcohol more because of Covid, her depres-
sion, and seeing an empty nursery every day. She admit-
ted to getting a bigger and bigger bottle every time she
went back to the liquor store. [The respondent] stated
further she understood she’d ‘messed up and that she
should not have been drinking that way . . . .’ ’’ On
October 20, 2021, the respondent again tested positive
for cocaine, although she later denied any use of the
drug.
   As discussed previously in this opinion, the respon-
dent’s driver’s license had been suspended after her
first September, 2021 arrest for the charge of operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
or drugs. ‘‘Thereafter, in October, 2021 . . . Santiago
and other [department] personnel observed her contin-
uing to drive to and from the [department’s] office and
[to] visits with [Niya]. [The department] provided her
with a bus pass, which she admittedly did not use.’’
   In December, 2021, Connecticut Counseling Center
successfully discharged the respondent ‘‘with the rec-
ommendation she attend mental health treatment,
relapse prevention, and [Narcotics Anonymous] meet-
ings. [The department’s] Regional Resource Group16
substance use clinician recommended that [the respon-
dent] enter an inpatient program at the Midwestern
Connecticut Council on Alcoholism (MCCA). MCCA
reported that it had no beds available at that time.
MCCA recommended [that] [the respondent] connect
with the Sobering Center for inpatient treatment. [The
respondent] said no to inpatient treatment, did not fol-
low through with the recommendation, and did not
participate in residential treatment. Instead, she
attended mental health treatment and engaged in
relapse prevention at [Connecticut Counseling Center]
as had been recommended . . . .’’ (Footnote added.).
   On February 15, 2022, a social worker for the depart-
ment spoke with the respondent over the phone and
observed that the respondent was slurring her speech,
rambling, and incoherent.17 He was concerned and went
to her home, where he ‘‘observed a nip bottle of vodka
. . . in a white bag outside of her door.’’ On February
17, 2022, the respondent was found lying in the street
by a Danbury police officer. Officer Howley, the
responding officer, testified that the woman was the
respondent and that she was hysterical and covered in
blood. He observed that she appeared to be under the
influence, as ‘‘[s]he was mumbling, her speech was
slurred, rambling, and hard to understand. She was
staggering and unable to stand on her feet by herself.
She was uncooperative and belligerent. She smelled
like alcohol and appeared to be under the influence of
alcohol.’’
  On March 24, 2022, the respondent had positive urine
and Breathalyzer tests for alcohol. As a result of the
positive tests, the respondent was ‘‘discharged unsuc-
cessfully from Relapse Prevention’’ on March 30, 2022.
Connecticut Counseling Center determined that the
respondent needed a ‘‘higher level of care’’ and recom-
mended that she return to intensive outpatient treat-
ment. On May 23, 2022, the respondent tested positive
for codeine, which, as Davidson from Connecticut
Counseling Center testified, is an opiate. On June 9,
2022, the respondent had another urine test that was
inconclusive or suspicious due to its low creatine levels.
On August 9, 2022, the respondent tested positive for
marijuana. She later acquired a medical marijuana card
to use to treat her stress and anxiety.
   In its memorandum of decision, with respect to the
statutory ground for termination, the court determined,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent
had failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilita-
tion that would encourage the belief that, within a rea-
sonable period of time, given the age and needs of Niya,
she could assume a responsible position in Niya’s life.
The court found that, at the time of adjudication, the
respondent was ‘‘presenting problems [that] included
substance use, lack of insight into her substance use,
unemployment, and possible incarceration due to pend-
ing criminal charges and three charges of [operating a
motor vehicle while] under the influence.’’ The court
noted the respondent’s ‘‘history of abusing drugs. Multi-
ple urine tests and drug screens through October 12,
2022, present clear and convincing evidence of alcohol
abuse and continued drug use.’’ The court also noted
that Dr. Freedman, who conducted a psychological eval-
uation of the respondent, wrote that ‘‘ ‘[the respondent]
minimizes her substance [use], the impact on her par-
enting, and the lack of stability in her life.’ ’’
   The court addressed the respondent’s claim that
every positive drug test result was a false positive, stat-
ing: ‘‘The court discounts her claim that every positive
drug result for her was a false positive and finds her
multiple claims of false positive tests by different pro-
viders and testers throughout a period of three years
to be far less likely and not credible.’’ Rather, the court
determined that the hair tests, which provided a three
month look back period, showed that she was abstinent
in using illicit drugs ‘‘for only a period of months.’’ The
court observed that ‘‘[the department] recommended
and urged [the respondent] to get into inpatient treat-
ment. She refused.’’ Further, the court determined that,
on the basis of ‘‘the evidence presented during the trial,
it is clear and convincing to the court that she has not
rehabilitated, nor has she made significant, substantial,
and sustained progress with her substance use and men-
tal health issues since December 7, 2021, particularly
when she’s feeling stressed or anxious.
   ‘‘Since December 7, 2021, [the respondent] has con-
tinued to slip and relapse, even though she completed
programs and was stepped down from the [IOP] to
Relapse Prevention and Women’s Groups. She has con-
tinued to deny and minimize having substance use
issues. Moreover, she has failed to gain substantial
insight into her substance use. Although she has used
and completed some services and has taken some posi-
tive steps in preparing for reunification, she has taken
limited responsibility for her own problems and for
having repeated positive drug test results. Her problems
continue to be substance use and lack of insight into
her substance use, and she faces possible incarceration
due to her pending criminal charges and three charges
of [operating a motor vehicle while] under the influence.
. . . The court cannot find reason to be encouraged
that within a reasonable time, considering [Niya’s] age
and needs, [the respondent] will be able to assume a
responsible [role] in her life. The level of rehabilitation
[the respondent] has achieved falls short of that which
would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future
date she can assume a responsible position in [Niya’s]
life, considering [Niya’s] age and needs.’’ In the disposi-
tional phase of the termination of parental rights trial;
see footnote 5 of this opinion; the court considered and
made the requisite factual findings pursuant to § 17a-
112 (k)18 and concluded that the commissioner had
proven by clear and convincing evidence that terminat-
ing the respondent’s parental rights was in Niya’s best
interest. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and
rendered judgment terminating the respondent’s paren-
tal rights. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be
set forth as necessary.
  The respondent’s sole claim on appeal is that there
was insufficient evidence to support the court’s deter-
mination that she had failed to rehabilitate in accor-
dance with § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), meaning that she
had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that,
within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs
of Niya, she could assume a responsible role in her life.
We disagree.
  We begin by setting forth the following relevant legal
principles and standard of review. ‘‘Proceedings to ter-
minate parental rights are governed by § 17a-112. . . .
Because a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his
or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must
be strictly complied with before termination can be
accomplished and adoption proceedings begun.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Anthony S., 218
Conn. App. 127, 138, 290 A.3d 901 (2023). Section 17a-
112 (j) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may grant a peti-
tion filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the [d]epartment . . .
has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and
to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with
subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court
finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except
that such finding is not required if the court has deter-
mined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or
determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are
not required, (2) termination is on the best interest of
the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found
by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected,
abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and
the parent of such child has been provided specific
steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the
parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to
achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, con-
sidering the age and needs of the child, such parent
could assume a responsible position in the life of the
child . . . .’’
   ‘‘The trial court is required, pursuant to § 17a-112, to
analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates
to the needs of the particular child, and further . . .
such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reason-
able time. . . . The statute does not require [a parent]
to prove precisely when [he or she] will be able to
assume a responsible position in [his or her] child’s life.
Nor does it require [him or her] to prove that [he or
she] will be able to assume full responsibility for [his
or her] child, unaided by available support systems.
It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he or she]
has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would
reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date
[he or she] can assume a responsible position in [his
or her] child’s life. . . . Personal rehabilitation as used
in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)] refers to the restoration of
a parent to his or her former constructive and useful
role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the
critical issue is not whether the parent has improved
[his or her] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but
rather whether [he or she] has gained the ability to care
for the particular needs of the child at issue. . . . [The]
completion or noncompletion [of the specific steps],
however, does not guarantee any outcome. . . .
Accordingly, successful completion of expressly articu-
lated expectations is not sufficient to defeat a depart-
ment claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient
rehabilitation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Phoenix A., 202 Conn. App. 827,
841–42, 246 A.3d 1096, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 932, 248
A.3d 1 (2021)
  ‘‘During the adjudicatory phase of a termination pro-
ceeding, a court generally is limited to considering only
evidence that occurred before the date of the filing of
the petition or the latest amendment to the petition,
often referred to as the adjudicatory date. . . . Never-
theless, it may rely on events occurring after the [adjudi-
catory] date . . . [in] considering the issue of whether
the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that
the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life
within a reasonable time.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Nev-
aeh G.-M., 217 Conn. App. 854, 877–78, 290 A.3d 867,
cert. denied, 346 Conn. 925, 295 A.3d 418 (2023).
    ‘‘A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from
both the trial court’s factual findings and from its
weighing of the facts in assessing whether those find-
ings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly . . . the appropriate
standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency,19
that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably
concluded, upon the facts established and the reason-
able inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative
effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ulti-
mate conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard,
we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable
to sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . We
will not disturb the court’s subordinate factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . A factual find-
ing is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by
any evidence in the record or when there is evidence
to support it, but the reviewing court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Brian
P., 195 Conn. App. 558, 569, 226 A.3d 159, cert. denied,
335 Conn. 907, 226 A.3d 151 (2020). Thus, ‘‘[i]t is not
the function of this court to sit as the [fact finder] when
we review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . . In
making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given
the most favorable construction in support of the [judg-
ment] of which it is reasonably capable. . . . In other
words, [i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have
reached its conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even
if this court disagrees with it.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Caiden B., 220 Conn. App. 326, 362–63,
297 A.3d 1025, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 904, 301 A.3d
527 (2023).
  ‘‘Construing the record before us in the manner most
favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court,
as we are obligated to do’’; In re Anthony S., supra,
218 Conn. App. 148; we conclude that there is sufficient
evidence in the record to support the court’s finding
that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation, considering the age
and needs of Niya, as would encourage the belief that,
within a reasonable time, she could assume a responsi-
ble position in Niya’s life. The court detailed in its mem-
orandum of decision how the respondent’s ongoing sub-
stance use and refusal to acknowledge her substance
use issues supported its determination that the respon-
dent had failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). Specifically, the court noted
that ‘‘[m]ultiple urine tests and drug screens through
October 12, 2022, present[ed] clear and convincing evi-
dence of alcohol abuse and continued drug use. She
minimizes her substance abuse, its impact on her par-
enting, and the lack of stability in her life. She claims
every positive drug test result for her was a false posi-
tive. The court discounts her claim that every positive
drug test result for her was a false positive and finds
her multiple claims of false positive tests by different
providers and testers throughout a period of three years
to be far less likely and not credible.’’ (Footnote omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
   It is well established that a ‘‘respondent’s failure to
acknowledge the underlying personal issues that form
the basis for the department’s concerns indicates a fail-
ure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilita-
tion. See In re Kamora W., 132 Conn. App. 179, 190,
31 A.3d 398 (2011) (respondent refused to acknowledge
drug or alcohol problem); In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.
App. 619, 626–27, 5 A.3d 575 (2010) (respondent failed
to acknowledge habitual involvement with domestic
violence); In re Christopher B., 117 Conn. App. 773,
784, 980 A.2d 961 (2009) (respondent blamed others for
problems); In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 834,
863 A.2d 720 (respondent’s inability to admit she had
substance abuse problem thwarted her ability to
achieve rehabilitation), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875
A.2d 43 (2005); In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 481,
771 A.2d 244 (2001) (respondent failed to recognize her
need for recommended counseling).’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569,
589–90, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015). ‘‘[A]s a general proposi-
tion, the failure to acknowledge and make progress in
addressing the issues that led to a child’s removal may
be one of many contributing factors to a court’s determi-
nation that a parent has failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation.’’ In re Mariana A.,
181 Conn. App. 415, 432, 186 A.3d 83 (2018).
   Although the respondent made repeated representa-
tions to the department and service providers that she
did not have a substance use problem, the overwhelm-
ing evidence before the court established otherwise.
The court found and the record reflects that the respon-
dent frequently denied her substance use and its impact
on her ability to assume a responsible role in Niya’s
life and refuted the validity of almost every test result,
both in her interactions with the department and her
service providers. During the trial, Berry testified that,
every time he ‘‘tried to engage [the respondent], she
denied that she [had] engaged in any substance use.’’ He
further testified that, after he received the test results
in June, 2020, in which she tested positive for fentanyl,
he attempted to engage the respondent, but ‘‘[s]he
denied using any substances. She reported that she
thinks that she tested positive because her nail came
into contact with fentanyl.’’ Santiago testified that, after
the respondent called him on February 15, 2022, during
which conversation ‘‘her words were slurred . . . [and
she] didn’t seem to be stable,’’ he went to her home
and observed a vodka bottle, the size of a nip, outside
the respondent’s house. Despite this incident, when he
attempted to address these concerning events with the
respondent, she denied any use of alcohol.
   One example of the respondent’s minimization of her
substance use occurred at a meeting with the depart-
ment in October, 2021, after the respondent had been
arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence as a result of three separate
incidents on March 1, and September 3 and 17, 2021.
During the meeting with the department, she stated
that ‘‘none of the [charges for driving while under the
influence] were her fault and that she was just in a bad
situation and was [unjustly] blamed for alcohol being in
the car.’’ We note that the record belies the respondent’s
assertions. The arresting officers in each incident
observed that the respondent was operating a motor
vehicle in a manner that caused them to investigate
further.20 Each officer observed that the respondent
had bloodshot and glassy eyes and impaired speech or
behavior. The officers also indicated that they smelled
an odor of alcohol emanating from her.21 Her statement
that the charges were not her fault, in effect, places the
blame on others for her own conduct and, thus, further
supports the court’s determination that she lacked
insight into her alcohol and substance use issues. The
respondent continued to minimize her drug and alcohol
use during her testimony at trial by referring to her
multiple arrests for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol as ‘‘slipping’’22 and said
that ‘‘it wasn’t a long-term ongoing thing. It was about
a two week situation . . . .’’ However, when the court
asked the respondent when her last drink was, she
stated that it was in March of 2022. She further testified,
multiple times, that she had not used any drugs since
Niya was born, despite the multiple positive drug tests
for cocaine, fentanyl, and codeine. The court did not
find credible the respondent’s testimony that every posi-
tive drug test was a false positive.
  In addition to denying her continued substance use,
the respondent refused to engage in the treatment that
was recommended by the department or its service
providers. In October, 2020, the respondent was unsuc-
cessfully discharged from outpatient treatment pro-
vided through Help, Inc., after she discontinued treat-
ment. The respondent ‘‘discontinued treatment after
denying the results of a positive drug screen . . . .’’23
The discharge summary ‘‘recommended that [the
respondent] be moved to a higher level of care, includ-
ing inpatient/residential services’’ and, after at least
thirty days of sobriety, then the respondent could return
to IOP ‘‘and begin again to address the underlying moti-
vations for substance use and the adoption of healthier
coping skills.’’ Despite the recommended higher level
of care, the respondent ‘‘refused to attend inpatient
treatment and denied having issues with substances.’’
Similarly, in October, 2021, after the respondent’s third
arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence, the department consulted with its substance
use clinician regarding this case, and ‘‘it was recom-
mended for [the respondent] to get into residential treat-
ment.’’ The respondent, however, chose to disregard the
department’s recommendation and subsequently tested
positive for cocaine use in October, 2021.
    Several months before the trial began in this case,
the respondent was unsuccessfully discharged from her
relapse prevention group counseling after she tested
positive for alcohol on March 24, 2022, and due to her
‘‘lack of regular attendance.’’ On May 23, 2023, the
respondent tested positive for codeine. Thus, the fact
that she was discharged unsuccessfully from therapy
several times and continued to test positive for alcohol
and illicit substances after she had engaged in services
addressing her substance use issues for more than three
years, supports the court’s finding that the respondent
had failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a-
112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
   The evidence shows that the respondent’s struggles
with alcohol and substance use, her denial and minimi-
zation of her use and her lack of insight in understanding
how her continued use of alcohol and substances was
negatively impacting her life were the primary concerns
of the department throughout its involvement with the
respondent. ‘‘[I]n determining whether a parent has
achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may
consider whether the parent has corrected the factors
that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether
those factors were included in specific expectations
ordered by the court or imposed by the department.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Nevaeh G.-M.,
supra, 217 Conn. App. 877. The totality of the evidence
establishes that the factors that led to Niya’s initial
commitment—the respondent’s substance use, her
denial and minimization of her use and her lack of
insight—have not been corrected.
  The respondent bases much of her challenge to the
court’s finding of the statutory ground of failure to
rehabilitate on the assertion that the court misinter-
preted the testimony of Dr. Freedman. Specifically, the
respondent argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court’s decision is
mistaken as to the testimony given by [the court-
appointed evaluator], Dr. Freedman, who recom-
mended reunification, and the nature of recovery.’’ The
respondent asserts that the court’s decision relied on ‘‘a
mistaken interpretation of Dr. Freedman’s testimony,’’
particularly regarding whether the respondent had
gained adequate insight into her substance use issues,
the reliability of the respondent’s urine screens, and
whether her various incidents of substance use through-
out the history of the case suggest a failure to rehabili-
tate within the meaning of the statute. We disagree.
   First, the court did not rest its decision on the testi-
mony of Dr. Freedman. The majority of the support for
the court’s determination comes from the respondent’s
multiple infractions for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence, her multiple positive drug tests
throughout the case, and her frequent denials of sub-
stance use despite overwhelming evidence to the con-
trary. Second, ‘‘ ‘[a]lthough expert testimony may be
accorded great weight when it is offered, there is no
requirement for expert testimony in termination of
parental rights cases.’ In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382,
400, 852 A.2d 643 (2004); see also In re Angela C., 11
Conn. App. 497, 498–99, 528 A.2d 402 (1987) (trial court
was not required to accept expert’s opinion on issue
of whether to terminate parental rights nor was testi-
mony of another expert required to support court’s
judgment); In re Teshea D., 9 Conn. App. 490, 493, 519
A.2d 1232 (1987) (finding no merit to respondent’s claim
that expert testimony was required to support court’s
finding that termination was in child’s best interest
because, ‘[a]lthough both our Supreme Court and this
court have often, in this regard, looked to the testimony
of mental health experts . . . such expert testimony
is not a precondition of the court’s own factual judg-
ment as to the child’s best interest’ . . .).’’ In re Kas-
maesha C., 148 Conn. App. 666, 682–83, 84 A.3d 1279,
cert. denied, 311 Conn. 937, 88 A.3d 549 (2014). As there
is no requirement that the parties present, nor that
the court rely on, expert testimony in a termination of
parental rights case, the court was free to accept, reject,
or only partially rely on the expert testimony of Dr.
Freedman.
   Finally, although portions of Dr. Freedman’s testi-
mony were positive for the respondent, he frequently
contradicted himself, particularly after being asked
about the impact of new evidence of the respondent’s
ongoing substance use issues. In its memorandum of
decision, the court stated that, ‘‘[a]ccording to Dr.
Freedman, [the respondent] should have eight months
to a year of demonstrated sobriety to qualify for reunifi-
cation or caring for [Niya]. She has not achieved a
sustained period of sobriety of at least eight months to
a year. . . . When asked how he would classify [the
respondent’s] substance use, Dr. Freedman described
her as ‘somebody who has episodic slips or relapses of
some kind, and then gets back on track and abstains
for a period of time. . . . She is still a client who is in
recovery, has been in recovery, and has had episodic
slips and relapses—but is still in recovery.’ ’’
   At trial, Dr. Freedman was called as a witness by the
respondent. During direct examination, Dr. Freedman
testified that his opinion, ‘‘which is from sixteen months
ago,24 was that I thought [the respondent] showed good
potential for reunification. So, that opinion is from six-
teen months ago . . . all the documents that I reviewed
suggested that that wasn’t acted upon. My recommenda-
tions weren’t acted upon so, a number of things have
happened since then, but do I think that that indicates
that she’s not a candidate for reunification? No, it
doesn’t indicate that.’’ (Footnote added.) At that point,
the court asked Dr. Freedman to clarify his testimony,
at which time he stated that his understanding was
that the last positive test for any substances by the
respondent was in March, 2022, and that, on that basis,
the respondent was ‘‘getting close’’ to having ‘‘ a year
of demonstrated sobriety after substance abuse prob-
lems . . . to qualify for caring for a child . . . .’’ Dr.
Freedman’s positive opinion on rehabilitation was
based on his understanding that the respondent had
last used substances in March, 2022, when, in fact, she
had tested positive for codeine in May, 2022, had a
suspicious urine test in June, 2022, and had tested posi-
tive for marijuana in August, 2022.
  On cross-examination, when asked what it would
mean for the respondent if there was substance use
in May and August, Dr. Freedman testified that ‘‘that
certainly argues against her . . . and it shows that . . .
that’s only been . . . three months . . . that’s not very
long and so if there’s a slip then . . . it’s harder to
support reunification.’’ He ultimately testified that he
was ‘‘not sure’’ of his position as to reunification. Dr.
Freedman also testified that it could be ‘‘potentially a
problem’’ for a person with a substance use problem
to use marijuana ‘‘even if they used it for medicinal
purposes,’’ as experiencing a high could cause other
drug problems for that person.25
   Furthermore, Dr. Freedman wrote in his psychologi-
cal evaluation that the respondent ‘‘minimizes her sub-
stance [use], its impact on her parenting, and the lack
of stability in her life.’’ This report was admitted as a
full exhibit for the court’s consideration. ‘‘It is well
established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the
trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony.
. . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony
is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is
privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably
believes to be credible. . . . On appeal, we do not retry
the facts or pass on the credibility of witnesses. . . .
It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to
reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or
disbelieve any expert testimony. . . . The trier may
accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of
an expert offered by one party or the other.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re G. H., 216 Conn. App.
671, 688, 286 A.3d 944 (2022). The court was entitled
to rely on and to credit Dr. Freedman’s previous state-
ment in his report that the respondent ‘‘minimizes her
substance [use], its impact on her parenting, and the
lack of stability in her life.’’
   Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of the
respondent’s multiple instances of substance use during
the three year period of the department’s involvement,
her unwillingness to acknowledge her continued sub-
stance use issues, and her minimization of her sub-
stance use issues, we conclude the record contains
sufficient evidence to support the court’s determination
that the respondent failed to achieve the requisite
degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112
(j) (3) (B) (i), regardless of whether and to what extent
the court credited any portion of Dr. Freedman’s testi-
mony.26
  In sum, we conclude that, when construing the evi-
dence in the manner most favorable to sustaining the
court’s judgment, as our standard of review requires,
there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s deter-
mination that the respondent failed to achieve such a
degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage
the belief that, within a reasonable time, she could
assume a responsible position in Niya’s life.
   The judgment is affirmed.
   In this opinion the other judges concurred.
   * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
   ** January 22, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
   1
     John Doe, the father of the minor child, is not involved in this appeal.
The trial court found that John Doe had abandoned Niya ‘‘in the sense
that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
responsibility as to [her] welfare . . . .’’ and that there was ‘‘no ongoing
parent-child relationship . . . such as ordinarily develops as a result of a
parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral
and educational needs of the child.’’ Accordingly, the court terminated his
parental rights. Our references in this opinion to the respondent are to
the mother.
   2
     The attorney for the minor child filed a statement adopting the brief
filed by the commissioner.
   3
     The preliminary specific steps required the respondent, inter alia, to take
part in counseling and make progress toward both parenting and individual
treatment goals; accept in-home support services referred by the department
and cooperate with them; submit to a substance use evaluation and follow
the recommendations about treatment, including inpatient treatment if nec-
essary, aftercare and relapse prevention; submit to random drug testing;
not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine; cooperate with service
providers recommended for counseling, in-home support services, and sub-
stance use assessment and treatment; cooperate with court-ordered evalua-
tions or testing; get and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income;
and not get involved with the criminal justice system.
    4
      The final specific steps were similar to the preliminary specific steps;
see footnote 3 of this opinion; with a few relevant additions, namely, that
the respondent must make progress toward her treatment goal, which was
‘‘[t]o gain insight into . . . her substance use and behaviors and how that
impacts her ability to parent,’’ and that she must not drive without a valid
driver’s license.
    5
      ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by . . . § 17a-
112. . . . Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental
rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional
phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether
one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth
in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. . . . If the
trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then
it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the
trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of
the child. . . . The best interest determination also must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 133 n.7, 290 A.3d 901 (2023).
    6
      Throughout its memorandum of decision, the court primarily used the
phrase ‘‘substance use’’ rather than ‘‘substance abuse’’ in accordance with
the most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, the DSM-5-TR, and as recommended by the National Institutes
of Health. See National Institute on Drug Abuse, Words Matter: Preferred
Language for Talking about Addiction (June 23, 2021), available at https://
nida.nih.gov/research-topics/addiction-science/words-matter-preferred-
language-talking-about-addiction (last visited January 17, 2024). We do as
well, and our references to the term ‘‘substance use’’ throughout this opinion
are to the use of both drugs and/or alcohol by the respondent.
    7
      ‘‘‘Careline is a department telephone service that mandatory reporters
and others may call to report suspected child abuse or neglect.’ In re Kather-
ine H., 183 Conn. App. 320, 322 n.4, 192 A.3d 537, cert. denied, 330 Conn.
906, 192 A.3d 426 (2018).’’ In re Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 136 n.9,
290 A.3d 901 (2023).
    8
      The Travisano Network, as well as Help, Inc., both of which programs
the respondent took part in, are affiliated with Central Naugatuck Valley
Health Services.
    9
      After the March 23, 2020 substance use screening, but before the results
had been reported, Help, Inc., recommended that the respondent engage in
substance use treatment. The respondent declined treatment and instead
‘‘sought a second substance use evaluation at the Wheeler Clinic to determine
whether she was an active user. Wheeler Clinic reported that her instant
urine screen at its clinic on April 21, 2020, was negative for all substances and,
thus, did not recommend substance treatment for her. The recommendation
from Wheeler Clinic was based on the April 21, 2020 instant urine screen
and [the respondent’s] self-report of no substance use issues.’’
    10
       Dlugozima, a clinical social worker with Central Naugatuck Valley
Health Services, which was providing services to the respondent, testified
that the ‘‘precontemplation stage of change regarding substance use is that
an individual either is not aware that substance use is causing problems in
other areas of their lives, or that they are not really willing to see how the
substance use has impacted [their lives]. They’re not at a point where they’re
able to see that some change needs to happen.’’
    11
       Low creatine levels may indicate that urine has been diluted. At various
times throughout her treatment, the respondent’s test results were marked
as suspicious due to low creatine. However, the court determined that it
was never ‘‘established that the urine specimens provided by [the respon-
dent] were not from her, had been diluted, contaminated, tampered with,
or were otherwise untrustworthy.’’
    12
       The hair test performed on the respondent tested for cocaine, opioids,
fentanyl, phencyclidine, amphetamines, and marijuana. The hair test per-
formed on the respondent does not test for alcohol use.
    13
       Davidson testified at trial that hair test results ‘‘go back ninety days.’’
We also note that the respondent had a urine test on March 5, 2021, that
was positive for alcohol and cocaine, which was then followed by a hair
test on March 18, 2021, that was negative for all substances. As the trial
court noted in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[t]he court accepts the . . .
hair test results as the more accurate and reliable test for the presence of
drugs than the urine screens administered . . . .’’ Accordingly, the court
did not appear to rest its decision on the March 5 urine test, and we do not
consider it relevant to our conclusion.
   14
      At trial, the police report for this incident was admitted as a full exhibit.
The officer indicated that he had observed a vehicle stopped on the shoulder
of a road. When he approached the vehicle, the respondent was the operator.
The officer wrote that he ‘‘was able to detect a strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage [emanating] from her breath along with blood shot glassy eyes.’’
At the police department, the respondent provided a breath sample, ‘‘which
yielded a [blood alcohol content] of 0.17.’’
   15
      The evidence reflects that the treatment goals included that the respon-
dent would learn healthy coping skills to utilize when her mental health
symptoms increased, she would be able to identify triggers that increase
her mental health symptoms, and she would be required to provide urine
drug screens and submit to Breathalyzer tests on request.
   16
      The department’s Regional Resource Group consists of ‘‘[a] group [of]
clinicians in . . . mental health or substance use’’ who help to ‘‘figure out
what services are available’’ to those families or individuals with whom the
department is involved.
   17
      The court specifically noted in its memorandum of decision that it found
the social worker’s testimony about this incident credible.
   18
      General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where
termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether
to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and
shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent
of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child
by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)
whether the [d]epartment . . . has made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as
amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any applicable court order
entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent,
and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under
such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to
the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who
has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one
year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5)
the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such
parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest
of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including,
but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact
with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent,
provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications
or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communica-
tion with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent
to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relation-
ship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent
of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic
circumstances of the parent.’’
   19
      Although the respondent claims that evidentiary sufficiency is an
improper standard of review in child protection cases and should be replaced
with the clear error standard, she also concedes that, as an intermediary
appellate court, we are bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in In re
Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 588, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015), in which the court held
that ‘‘the appropriate standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency
. . . .’’ See, e.g., In re Angelina S., 223 Conn. App. 52, 64 n.12,          A.3d
      (2023).
   20
      With respect to her March, 2021 arrest, the officer approached the
respondent’s vehicle because it was stopped on the right shoulder of the
road. The respondent was the operator and she claimed that ‘‘they had run
out of gas and were waiting [for] a tow,’’ although the key was in the ignition
and the vehicle was running.
   As to her September 3, 2021 arrest, the officer observed that the respon-
dent’s vehicle ‘‘swerved repeatedly over the yellow line, its speed was incon-
sistent, and the [respondent] was having trouble navigating minor curves
in the roadway.’’
   With respect to the respondent’s September 17, 2021 arrest, the officer
observed that the respondent’s vehicle failed to stop at several stop signs,
crossed over the yellow line numerous times, made an improper turn and
then crossed over the double yellow line, which required the officer to pull
off to the far side of the road ‘‘to prevent a head-on collision.’’
   21
      As to the respondent’s September 3, 2021 arrest, the officer observed
an open beer can ‘‘in the center console cup, as well as an open ‘nip’ bottle
of liquor.’’
   22
      The respondent attempts to differentiate between ‘‘slips’’ in her sobriety
and relapsing. She argues that ‘‘[t]he various instances in which [she] tested
positive for an illegal substance or alcohol . . . were deemed slips by her
treatment providers.’’ The respondent relies on the testimony of Williams,
who defined ‘‘relapse’’ as ‘‘when an individual who is maintaining sobriety
picks up a substance and uses that substance for a period of time.’’ However,
the respondent cites to no authority or precedent to establish a distinction
between ‘‘slipping’’ or relapsing in terms of its implications for the respon-
dent’s ability to rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).
Furthermore, given the multiple positive drug tests and alcohol related
infractions throughout the course of the department’s involvement in Niya’s
life, the respondent’s attempt to minimize these incidents by categorizing
them as ‘‘slips’’ in her sobriety is unavailing.
   23
      While receiving services at Help, Inc., she tested positive for alcohol,
cocaine and norfentanyl on May 6, 2020; for fentanyl on June 8, 2020; and
for cocaine on August 20, 2020.
   24
      We note that Dr. Freedman’s evaluation was conducted in July, 2021.
In the time between when the evaluation was conducted and when the trial
began, the respondent was arrested twice for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence, had multiple positive drug tests for cocaine, had
a positive urine test and Breathalyzer test for alcohol, and tested positive
for codeine.
   25
      Although the respondent correctly notes in her appellate brief that
the court’s memorandum of decision omitted the word ‘‘potentially’’ while
quoting from this portion of Dr. Freedman’s testimony, we believe that the
court accurately conveyed the intended meaning of his testimony about the
risks posed for a hypothetical drug user, given that he testified, just a few
moments later, that, ‘‘if they’ve had a drug problem in the past, that’s risky
for them to be using it in that way because it’s experiencing a high of any
kind [and] could set off other drug problems.’’
   26
      We also note that the respondent’s argument asks us, essentially, to
focus on only the positive portions of Dr. Freedman’s testimony and to
disregard the trial court’s credibility determinations and weighing of evi-
dence, which is not the role of an appellate court in a termination of parental
rights case. See, e.g., In re Caiden B., supra, 220 Conn. App. 372 (‘‘[a]lthough
the respondent encourages us to focus on the positive aspects of his behavior
and to ignore the negatives, we will not scrutinize the record to look for
reasons supporting a different conclusion than that reached by the trial
court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted).