Court Opinion

ID: 9416645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:50:46.84366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.790795
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice DANIEL:
Whilst I concur entirely in the conclusion just declared by the eourt, that the case now decided is in its features essentially 'the same with that of Cooper v. Roberts, formerly before us, and. reported in the 18th of Howard, p. 173,’I am unwilling to place my own opinion upon the fact of the identity of the two cases, irrespective of the reasons or principles on which the former of those cases was. determined. That case was elaborately discussed by counsel; was, as the opinion of the court evinces, deliberately considered; the theory and objects of the system adopted by the Government for the distribution of public lands carefully examined, correctly expounded, and properly sustained by the decision. In the reasoning of the court, the cherished objects aimed to be secured by that theory,viz: the advancement of “religion, morality, and knowledge,”. *485as indispensable for the existence of good government, and for the happiness of mankind; the obligation for the maintenance, of schools and the means of. education as necessary for the endB proposed, as declared in the third article of the ordinance of 1787, are prominently and correctly set forth as guides in the' interpretation and application of the policy and system of the Government in disposing of the public domain. It seems scarcely to admit of rational doubt, that it was in pursuance of this policy, and as deemed best calculated for its s.uccessful accomplishment, that in the surveys made or to be made of the public lands, the sixteenth section of every township, being central,, (and therefore more than any other-section could be,) connected with the several interests of the township, was appropriated for the use of schools. Admitting these to be the policy and theory of the Government, designed as it has been declared to lay the foundation of social and political good, it would seem to follow that nothing short of the highest and most overpowering public considerations, or an absolute -inability or want of power, should be permitted to defeat or in any degree to control them. Surely speculations for private emolument, and still less such as might be attempted through the-exercise of irregular or doubtful authority, should not be permitted to affect them.
The power vested in the President to reserve from sale such portions of land as he should deem necessary for public uses, may be classed as one of those paramount considerations, constituting a public or national necessity, reaching even to the defence of the country by fortifications or arsenals. In the same category may be placed the sanctimony of the rights of property and possession existing and vested in territories anterior to their acquisition by the united States; rights guarantied by treaty stipulations. In. the same light may be viewed the withholding temporarily from sale lands in which were minerals and salt springs. All these restrictions or reservations are exceptions merely, and should be carried no farther than their terms expressly or necessarily require. They can with no propriety be regarded as forming in themselves a system; much less as overturning a system designed to be as far as practicable general and uniform, and proclaimed from its origin to be founded in wisdom and in a solemn sense of public good, and as such to be fostered and sustained. Every new State has come and will come into the Union relying on the faith of this pledge; and even upon the concession of a power in the Government to violate that pledge, such a violation could be referred to no principle of .justice, and should thereto e -never be imputed but upon proofs the most positive and unequivocal. *486The sixteenth section of each township could not, it is true, be specifically designated and possessed anterior to a survey of the public lands; but the right to that seótion and its appropriation existed in contract or pledge by virtue of the ordinance and the laws of the United States, and the right of possession and enjoyment was matured by the execution of the surveys. It cannot be supposed that this right, so important, was destroyed or impaired by an agreement for temporary occupancy, made without reference to any survey of division of the lands, made, too, without legitimate authority; nor can such right be affected by any ordinary allowance of pre-emption, because the pledge of the Government is pre-existing, is express, and therefore paramount.
The State of Michigan was admitted into the Union under the pledge given her by the general land system of the United States; her right to the sixteenth section of each township was under that pledge fully .recognised. It could not therefore, consistently with good faith, be ■ displaced by ah arrangement irregular in its origin, and temporary in its character, in its tendencies and operation conflicting with a preceding, general, and beneficial system of policy., No effectual adversary rights could grow out of su'ch an arrangement. Upon the view's herein expressed, I am in. favor of an affirmance of the judgment in this cause, not merely on the ground that this cause is essentially the-same with that already decided between these parties, as reported in the 18th of How'ard, p. 173, but also because the opinion of this_court upon the law and the facts of the last-mentioned cause commands my entire approbation.