Court Opinion

ID: 9382446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 18:07:37.040063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.467431
License: Public Domain

J-A22045-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    CHRISTINE A. GALL                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    PETER D. GALL                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 22 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered December 6, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                  Civil Division at No(s): Case No. GD-18-7148

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                             FILED: MARCH 27, 2023

        Peter D. Gall appeals from the order that required him to, inter alia,

apply for a supersedeas bond in the amount of $142,256.78. On appeal, Mr.

Gall singularly contends that the court erred by ordering him to apply for this

bond. We quash.

        As cogently summarized by the lower court:

              On August 12, 2021[, the court] entered a verdict in favor
        of … Christine Gall and against … Peter Gall in the amount of
        $118,547.32. Mr. Gall filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court
        … on September 10, 2021 that was docketed at number 1092
        WDA 2021. On October 14, 2021[, the court] ordered Mr. Gall to
        post a bond in the amount of $142,256.78 for a supersedeas of
        the verdict pending the appeal. On October 15, 2021[, the court]
        filed an opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
        Procedure 1925(a) [at that separate docket].

              When Mr. Gall did not post a bond, Ms. Gall served a motion
____________________________________________

   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A22045-22

       to quash appeal for failure to post bond. Mr. Gall filed an answer
       to the motion and counsel for both parties participated in oral
       argument. On December 3, 2021[, the court] ordered Mr. Gall to
       apply for a supersedeas bond, provide Ms. Gall with a proposal for
       using his residence and airplanes to secure the $142,256.78
       obligation and [participate in] additional argument on January 4,
       2022. [Notice of entry of the order was given to the parties on
       December 6, 2022.] On January 3, 2022 Mr. Gall appealed from
       [the court’s] December 3, 2021 order to [this] Court … and filed
       an application for stay pending appeal.

             Following argument by counsel on January 4, 2022, [the
       court] entered an order denying Ms. Gall’s motion to quash
       appeal, denying Mr. Gall’s request for modification of the terms of
       supersedeas and denying Mr. Gall’s application for stay pending
       appeal.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/22, at 1-2 (internal footnote omitted).

       On appeal, Mr. Gall asserts that the court committed an error of law in

ordering him to apply for a supersedeas bond. See Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

       Prior to delving into the substance of his assertion, the posture of this

case1 requires sua sponte consideration of our jurisdiction over the trial court's

____________________________________________

1 Using the lower court’s opinion as a guidepost, we succinctly highlight the
relevant procedural history: (1) Ms. Gall motioned the lower court, requesting
that Mr. Gall post a supersedeas bond related to his appeal from a nonjury
verdict docketed before this Court at 1092 WDA 2021; (2) the court granted
Ms. Gall’s motion in October 2021, which required Mr. Gall to post a bond of
$142,256.78; (3) when Mr. Gall did not post a bond, Ms. Gall motioned to
quash Mr. Gall’s appeal; (4) in response, Mr. Gall, inter alia, filed a “Counter-
Motion to Modify Bond”; (5) in December 2021, the court again ordered Mr.
Gall to apply for a bond and scheduled additional argument on both quashal
and bond-related issues; (6) in January 2021, Mr. Gall filed a document titled
“Answer/Application for Stay Pending Appeal” and simultaneously appealed
from the December 2021 order; and (7) finally, subsequent to Mr. Gall’s notice
of appeal, the court entered yet another order denying Ms. Gall’s motion to
quash, denying Mr. Gall’s supersedeas modification request, and denying Mr.
Gall’s application for stay pending appeal.

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order. See Roman v. McGuire Mem'l, 127 A.3d 26, 31 (Pa. Super. 2015),

appeal denied, 134 A.3d 57 (Pa. 2016) (noting that this Court can raise subject

matter jurisdiction sua sponte).

      We agree with Mr. Gall’s general statement that “[e]xcept as otherwise

prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken …, the trial court … may no

longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). However, despite

this broad Rule, contained within that same section, there are enumerated

exceptions, with one specifically establishing that “[a]fter an appeal is taken

…, the trial court … may: grant supersedeas[.]” Id., at 1701(b)(1).

      In the present matter, the court, following Ms. Gall’s motion, initially

required Mr. Gall to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of 120% of the

August 12, 2021 non-jury verdict in Ms. Gall’s favor. See Pa.R.A.P. 1731(a).

Resultantly, Mr. Gall was required to post a $142,256.78 bond pending his

appeal at 1092 WDA 2021. Instead of complying with this order, Mr. Gall

motioned the court to modify the bond amount in accordance with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1737. See Answer to Quash

Appeal/Counter-Motion to Modify Bond, ¶ 11 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1737); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 1737(a)(4) (allowing a trial or appellate court, at any time, upon

application, notice, and opportunity for hearing to “increase, decrease,

eliminate, or otherwise alter the amount or type of security that … is to be

filed by a party”).

      The official note to Rule 1737 provides that the procedure for appellate

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review of an order resolving an application under this rule must comply with

the procedure outlined in Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1732. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1737, Note; 20A West’s Pa. Practice § 1737:7. Under Rule 1732, if

an application for modification of supersedeas “is denied by the trial court, the

appellant may not appeal the denial for the obvious reason that the denial

order is interlocutory. Rather, the appellant must renew the application, that

is, file a new application, with the appellate court.” 20A West’s Pa. Practice §

1732:4 (footnote omitted); see also In re Passarelli Family Trust, 231

A.3d 969, 974 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing 20A West’s Pa. Practice § 1732:4 and

holding that Rule 1732 requires that, after an application is denied in the trial

court, the proper procedure is for the appellant to then file an application in

the appellate court); Pa.R.A.P. 1732(b) (stating that “approval of or

modification of the terms of any supersedeas … may be made to the appellate

court or to a judge thereof, but the application shall show that application to

the trial court for the relief sought is not practicable, or that the trial court has

denied an application, or has failed to afford the relief which the appellant

requested, with the reasons given by the trial court for its action[]”); Pa.R.A.P.

3315, Note (stating that, after application under Chapter 17 of the Rules of

Appellate Procedure is denied in the trial court, “and a further application has

been acted on by the Superior Court or the Commonwealth Court,” a further

application may be filed in our Supreme Court).

      Given the plain language of Rule 1732, emphasizing that supersedeas

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modification is ordinarily sought in the first instance before the trial court, Mr.

Gall was well within his rights to obtain initial review of the bond amount that

had been set. However, when the court, in its December order, denied any

amendment to that $142,256.78 figure, Mr. Gall “should have filed an

application with this Court instead of filing a notice of appeal.” Passarelli,

231 A.3d at 974.

       As Mr. Gall proceeded in the wrong manner to obtain review of the lower

court’s decision to deny him supersedeas modification relief, we quash this

appeal. See id. (quashing appeal from trial court order denying appellant’s

petition for injunctive relief brought under Rule 1732 based on appellant’s

filing of an appeal in this Court rather than renewing her application that had

been denied below).2

       Appeal quashed.

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2  Notwithstanding the appealability issue under Rule 1732, we additionally
note that Mr. Gall has not demonstrated that he has appealed from either a
final order or one that is interlocutory, yet appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 341;
Forrester v. Hanson, 901 A.2d 548, 554 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“This Court does
not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a non-appealable,
interlocutory order.”). As best can be discerned, Mr. Gall has appealed from
what is essentially an interim order, coming after the court ordered, for the
first time, a supersedeas bond in October 2021, but before the court’s January
2022 tripartite order denying, principally, Mr. Gall’s request for supersedeas
modification. Consequently, it is likely that this Court does not have the
requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Gall’s supersedeas claim and quashal
of his appeal, for this reason, would also be appropriate.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/2023

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