Court Opinion

ID: 9703921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:12:48.458711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.825143
License: Public Domain

IRMA S. RAKER, Judge (Retired Specially Assigned),
concurring:
I join the majority opinion hold that there is no duty of care owed to Mr. Gourdine by respondent, insulin manufacturer Eli Lilly and Company. I write separately to state that, in addition to the majority’s reasoning, I would adopt the “learned intermediary” doctrine in Maryland.
The trial court based its hold, in part, on the learned intermediary doctrine. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, stating in relevant part as follows:
“With respect to prescription drugs, ‘Maryland law recognizes the ‘learned intermediary’ doctrine, which provides that manufacturers need only warn the prescribing physician and not the patient directly.’ Ames v. Apothecon, Inc., 431 F.Supp.2d 566, 572 (D.Md.2006); see also Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 523, 276 A.2d 36 (1971). Stated alternatively, under the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer of a prescription drug has no duty to directly warn patients. Diane S. Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1998). It follows, therefore, that since there'is *761no duty on the part of prescription drug manufacturers to directly warn users of the drug of possible adverse effects, the manufacturer has no duty to warn a nonuser such as Gourdine. See Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 117 Ill.2d 507, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387, 393 (1987) (applying the learned intermediary doctrine and holding that drug manufacturers owed no duty to warn a third party who was injured by a patient using their products).”
Gourdine v. Crews, 177 Md.App. 471, 478-79, 935 A.2d 1146, 1150 (2007) (footnote omitted).
In my view, the learned intermediary doctrine squarely addresses the issue of duty in this case and should be adopted as Maryland law. As described by the majority opinion in this case,
“[t]he ‘learned intermediary’ doctrine ‘imposes on a manufacturer of prescription drugs or devices a duty to give adequate warnings to physicians, dentists, and other licensed health care professionals, including nurses, who may prescribe these products. Under the doctrine, a manufacturer which has adequately warned the physician, in almost every circumstance, has no duty to warn a patient.’ 2 Frank C. Woodside, III, Drug Product Liability Section 14.02[2] (2002).”
Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 731 n. 8, 955 A.2d 769, 775 n. 8 (2008). The United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit explained the reasoning behind the learned intermediary doctrine as follows:
“We cannot quarrel with the general proposition that where prescription drugs are concerned, the manufacturer’s duty to warn is limited to an obligation to advise the prescribing physician of any potential dangers that may result from the drug’s use. This special standard for prescription drugs is an understandable exception to the Restatement’s general rule that one who markets goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in his products. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 388 (1965). Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in *762formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the propensities of the drug as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies then, who must warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the counter, in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as a ‘learned intermediary’ between manufacturer and consumer.”
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
As the majority notes, id. at 743-44, 955 A.2d at 782-83, most states addressing the issue of drug manufacturers’ duty to warn have adopted the “learned intermediary” doctrine. See, e.g., Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 447 So.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Ala.1984); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1200 (Alaska 1992); West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 806 S.W.2d 608, 614 (1991); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal.3d 51, 107 Cal.Rptr. 45, 507 P.2d 653, 661 (1973); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257 Conn. 365, 778 A.2d 829, 835 (2001); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 400 (Del.1989); Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So.2d 102, 104 (Fla.1989); McCombs v. Synthes, 277 Ga. 252, 587 S.E.2d 594, 595 (2003); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 117 Ill.2d 507, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387, 392 (1987); Humes v. Clinton, 246 Kan. 590, 792 P.2d 1032, 1039 (1990); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 770 (Ky.2004); Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So.2d 688, 691 (Miss.1988); Hill v. Squibb & Sons, E. R., 181 Mont. 199, 592 P.2d 1383, 1387-88 (1979); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 260 Neb. 552, 618 N.W.2d 827, 842 (2000); Niemiera by Niemiera v. Schneider, 114 N.J. 550, 555 A.2d 1112, 1117 (1989); Martin v. Hacker, 83 N.Y.2d 1, 607 N.Y.S.2d 598, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (1993); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 *763(1981); Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tenn. 1994).
The learned intermediary doctrine is well established and provides a clear, straightforward and sensible resolution to the case sub judice. We should adopt it in Maryland.