Court Opinion

ID: 9917100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 16:14:43.25568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.009031
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                         2024 WY 4

                                                           OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                   January 11, 2024

 REMI LARSEN,

 Petitioner,

 v.                                                         S-23-0063

 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Respondent.

                                   Original Proceeding
                               Petition for Writ of Review
                            District Court of Sheridan County
                         The Honorable Darci A.V. Phillips, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A.
      Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Jeremy Meerkreebs, Assistant Appellate
      Counsel.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General;
      Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Donovan Burton, Assistant
      Attorney General.

Before FOX, C.J., KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before
final publication in the permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Remi Larsen moved the circuit court to suppress evidence in her pending
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance prosecution. The court granted Ms.
Larsen’s motion. The State subsequently filed a petition for an interlocutory writ of review
in the district court to challenge the circuit court’s suppression order. The district court
granted the State’s petition and later reversed the circuit court’s order after considering the
parties’ briefing. We then granted Ms. Larsen’s petition to review the district court’s order.
We conclude the district court abused its discretion when it initially granted the State’s
petition for an interlocutory writ of review. We reverse with instructions to reinstate the
circuit court’s suppression order.

                                           ISSUE

[¶2] The dispositive issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it
granted the State’s petition for an interlocutory writ of review.

                                           FACTS

[¶3] On February 2, 2022, Ms. Larsen called 911 alleging her neighbor, David Lamers,
assaulted her with a club-type object outside her apartment building. Sheridan Police
Officer Alex Murray and Corporal Chase Philipp responded to the call. Ms. Larsen was
seated in her vehicle when Officer Murray arrived. Officer Murray questioned Ms. Larsen
about the incident. She told Officer Murray that Mr. Lamers accosted her outside of her
apartment building, yelled at her about her dog, smacked pepper spray out of her hand, and
threatened her with a dog toy generally used to throw tennis balls. She also expressed
concern about Mr. Lamers videotaping her from his apartment.

[¶4] Around the time Officer Murray was questioning Ms. Larsen, Corporal Philipp had
walked into the common area of Ms. Larsen’s apartment building. He smelled a strong
odor of marijuana and believed it was emanating from Ms. Larsen’s apartment. Corporal
Philipp informed Officer Murray of the marijuana odor. Officer Murray confirmed with
Ms. Larsen the location of her apartment and proceeded to walk into the common area
where he confirmed the marijuana smell. Officer Murray returned to Ms. Larsen and asked
her: “Will you come to your apartment with me real quick?” Ms. Larsen inquired why and
he stated, “It just reeks of marijuana in there. I just want to make sure it’s not coming from
yours.” Ms. Larsen replied, “Oh, no, I. . .” Officer Murray then stated “Okay. Can we
walk through there real quick?” Ms. Larsen unequivocally stated “No.”

[¶5] Officer Murray continued to question Ms. Larsen. He asked her how much
marijuana she had and she responded, “Just a little bit. Not a lot.” Officer Murray explained
to Ms. Larsen that if she only had a little bit he would just issue a ticket. Ms. Larsen
expressed concern about receiving a ticket because she was not sure if she was still on

                                              1
probation and asserted again that she only had a small amount of marijuana. The officer
again asked her to retrieve the marijuana and assured her that he would only give her a
ticket. Ms. Larsen exited her vehicle and led Officer Murray to her apartment. 1

[¶6] Ms. Larsen unlocked her apartment door while Officer Murray stood behind her.
She asked Officer Murray to stay at the threshold of the apartment. While Ms. Larsen went
to retrieve the marijuana, Officer Murray took a step inside and looked around purportedly
for officer safety. Corporal Philipp stood outside the apartment in the hallway. When Ms.
Larsen returned to Officer Murray with a container of marijuana, he asked if she had given
him the full amount. Ms. Larsen again went back into her apartment and retrieved
additional marijuana.

[¶7] Ms. Larsen was cited for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance under
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) (2023). She later moved to suppress the marijuana
evidence obtained from her apartment, arguing in relevant part that she did not voluntarily
consent to Officer Murray’s warrantless entry into her home, no exigent circumstances
existed to justify Officer Murray’s warrantless entry, and the evidence was obtained in
violation of her right against unreasonable search and seizures.

[¶8] The circuit court held a suppression hearing at which Corporal Philipp, Officer
Murray, and Ms. Larsen testified. The court ruled from the bench. It held the State failed
to prove by clear and positive testimony that Ms. Larsen consented to the search. The court
found Ms. Larsen twice said “no” to Officer Murray’s requests to enter her apartment,
Officer Murray persisted in seeking consent, and these facts demonstrated Ms. Larsen only
acquiesced to Officer Murray’s entry rather than voluntarily consented. The court further
stated:

               I will also add this, I am taking judicial notice of the fact that
               five days after this event I witnessed Mr. Lamers and this
               young lady in my courtroom for [a] protection order. I think
               prior to that, you can ask every one of my clerks about Mr.
               Lamers’ attitude and how Mr. Lamers came across and his,
               frankly, bullying.

               I saw this young lady distraught five days later. And I get to
               bring that with me to this bench, of how distraught she was
               over that situation.

1
  The officers similarly requested consent from Mr. Lamers to search his apartment. Mr. Lamers denied
the request and the officers did not enter.

                                                 2
              So taking that all into account, she was distraught that day. She
              was concerned. She was scared. She acquiesced to go back
              into that apartment.

              And I’m going to go back to this. Mr. Lamers can say no once
              and that’s fine. How often does a young lady have to say no?

(emphasis added). The court soon after issued a written order incorporating the factual
findings from the hearing. The written order did not address the judicial notice the court
took during the oral ruling but instead made additional factual findings, reiterated the
court’s conclusion that Ms. Larsen acquiesced rather than consented to Officer Murray’s
entry into the apartment, and held Officer Murray’s warrantless entry into Ms. Larsen’s
apartment violated the Fourth Amendment, thus warranting suppression of the marijuana
evidence.

[¶9] The State petitioned the district court seeking an interlocutory writ of review of the
circuit court’s suppression order under W.R.A.P. 13.02. The State asserted a writ of review
was necessary because, among other alleged errors, the circuit court erroneously concluded
Ms. Larsen’s consent was involuntary, the court erroneously took judicial notice of Ms.
Larsen’s demeanor from a separate hearing, and the court erroneously suppressed the
evidence. Ms. Larsen asked the court to deny the petition, arguing the State was not entitled
to extraordinary relief while the criminal matter remained pending. She noted such relief
is only available to the State in rare and unusual circumstances involving issues of first
impression, constitutional magnitude, and great public import. The district court granted
the State’s petition, which we discuss further below.

[¶10] After receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments, the district court issued a written
order reversing the circuit court. Ms. Larsen subsequently filed a petition for writ of review
of the district court’s order in this Court. We granted her petition.

                                       DISCUSSION

[¶11] We review a district court’s grant of a petition for an interlocutory writ of review
under an abuse of discretion standard. See W.R.A.P. 13.01(b); W.R.A.P. 13.02 (providing
that district courts may grant interlocutory writs of review in criminal actions); State v.
Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 445, 447 (Wyo. 2004) (citation omitted). “A district
court does not abuse its discretion if it could reasonably conclude as it did.” Winney v.
Jerup, 2023 WY 113, ¶ 14, 539 P.3d 77, 82 (Wyo. 2023) (citations omitted). However, as
discussed below, precedent expressly limits a district court’s discretion to grant the State
an interlocutory writ of review of a criminal pretrial order. See State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d
629, 632 (Wyo. 1984); State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Wyo. 1997); see also Newman,
2004 WY 41, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d at 447 (citing Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153, 156 (Wyo. 1985)).

                                              3
    I.       Precedent expressly limits a district court’s discretion to grant the State
             interlocutory writs of review in criminal matters to rare and unusual cases that
             present questions of first impression, constitutional magnitude, and great
             public import.

[¶12] Historically, the State had no right to a direct appeal from adverse trial court
decisions in a criminal case unless it was expressly granted by statute. State v. Ginther, 77
P.2d 803, 803 (Wyo. 1938); see also Ken v. State, 2011 WY 167, ¶ 32, 267 P.3d 567 (Wyo.
2011) (noting the State “in a criminal case does not have the right of direct appeal” (citing
Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Wyo. 1994))). Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-102 through
-104 affords the only statutory procedure by which the State may seek review of an adverse
criminal ruling—a bill of exceptions. 2 Notably, a bill of exceptions permits this Court only
to determine specified issues for future cases. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-104(b). It does not
“reverse nor in any manner affect the judgment of the court in the case in which the bill of
exceptions was taken.” Id.; Crozier, 882 P.2d at 1236 (citation omitted). Until the 1980s,
we held the bill of exceptions procedure was the exclusive means for the State to challenge
adverse rulings in criminal cases. Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶¶ 10–15, 88 P.3d at 448–51;
State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977, 979 (1906) (“It is only upon a
compliance with the provisions of the statute in question that this court obtains jurisdiction
to review any ruling of the district court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions.”);
see also State v. Selig, 635 P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1981) (citations omitted).

[¶13] We first departed from this rule in Mengel where the Court granted the City of
Laramie a writ of review from a municipal court order suppressing evidence of a DUI
defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-105(f)
(1983), repealed by 2011 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 178, § 2. City of Laramie v. Mengel, 671
P.2d 340, 341–42 (Wyo. 1983). The municipal court held the statute was unconstitutional
because it violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. Id. Upon review, this
Court stated Article 5, section 3 of the Wyoming Constitution gave it the authority to grant
such writs especially when an appeal would not be “plain, speedy and adequate.” 3 See id.
at 344 (quoting Call v. Town of Afton, 278 P.2d 270, 273 (Wyo. 1954)). We characterized
our decision to grant a writ of review as discretionary. Id. at 345. And we explained:

2
  A bill of exceptions is “a formal written statement of exceptions taken to the decisions, rulings,
instructions, or opinion of the trial court, setting forth the proceedings on the trial, the acts of the trial court
alleged to be erroneous, the objections and exceptions to such acts, and the grounds for such objections and
exceptions, all authenticated by the trial court.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 417 (October 2023
update); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-102.
3
  Article 5, section 3 of the Wyoming Constitution states, in part: “The supreme court shall also have power
to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and other writs necessary and
proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction.”

                                                         4
              The City of Laramie has no appeal from the order of its
              municipal judges, and it does not have available to it even the
              review encompassed by the statutes providing for a bill of
              exceptions. The issue, further is one in which the people of the
              City of Laramie and the people of the State of Wyoming in
              other cities where the ruling of the Municipal Judges of the
              Municipal Court of the City of Laramie might be followed
              have an interest. The ruling itself is premised upon
              constitutional grounds and makes the issue one of
              constitutional magnitude. . . .

              The question sought to be reviewed in this case we perceive to
              be one of great public import and of first impression.

Id. (citations omitted).

[¶14] We later expanded this reasoning to authorize interlocutory review of a district
court’s suppression order even when a bill of exceptions was available. Heiner, 683 P.2d
at 632–33; see also State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 602 (Wyo. 1994) (granting interlocutory
review of a suppression order); Evans, 944 P.2d at 1124 (same). In Heiner, the defendant
was charged with arson and arson with intent to defraud his insurer. 683 P.2d at 630–31.
The defendant’s insurer provided the prosecution an inventory sheet the defendant had
prepared to list property allegedly destroyed in a fire. Id. at 631, 633. The defendant
moved to suppress the inventory sheet arguing the insurer was acting as an agent of the
police and the sheet was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. See id. at 631, 635.
The district court suppressed the evidence. Id. at 631.

[¶15] This Court granted an interlocutory writ of review. See id. at 632–33. We reasoned
a writ of review “subserves a good purpose in instances in which an appeal (or a bill of
exceptions) is not plain, speedy and adequate.” Id. at 632 (citing Call, 278 P.2d 270). We
then held a bill of exceptions is an inadequate remedy when the State seeks to challenge
suppression orders that can result in defendants obtaining acquittals. Id. Further:

              In this case, like City of Laramie v. Mengel, the rulings of the
              district court were premised upon constitutional grounds,
              which results in the presentation to this court of issues of
              constitutional magnitude. Whether [written statements a
              defendant made to a private actor merit constitutional
              protection] is a significant question of first impression in the
              State of Wyoming. Consequently, we conclude that because
              of the importance of the evidence suppressed or the use of
              which is potentially denied to the State of Wyoming; the
              constitutional magnitude of the issues raised; and the

                                             5
                 importance of determining the rule with respect to such matters
                 in the State of Wyoming, the court appropriately exercised its
                 discretion in granting the writ of certiorari in this case.

Id. at 632–33. 4 As in Mengel, we held the writ was appropriately granted only because no
adequate remedy existed, and the issue was a matter of first impression, constitutional
magnitude, and great public import. See id.

[¶16] In State v. Sodergren, we further emphasized that we would only exercise our
discretion to grant the State an interlocutory writ of review “in unusual circumstances and
upon rare occasions.” 686 P.2d 521, 528 (Wyo. 1984). Mengel, Heiner, and Sodergren
have since operated to narrowly confine our discretion to grant the State interlocutory writs
of review in criminal cases. See Evans, 944 P.2d at 1124; see also Newman, 2004 WY 41,
¶¶ 8–20, 88 P.3d at 447–52 (discussing Wyoming’s jurisprudence on granting the State’s
petitions for writs of review in criminal cases). 5 We now consider whether the district
court appropriately exercised its discretion to grant the State a writ of review here.

    II.      The district court abused its discretion because this case cannot be reasonably
             characterized as rare and unusual.

[¶17] The district court found that a bill of exceptions did not provide the State an
adequate remedy. Then, the district court explained it granted the State an interlocutory
writ of review because the issue of the circuit court taking judicial notice of Ms. Larsen’s
demeanor from a separate hearing raised a matter of first impression in Wyoming, and
Officer Murray’s warrantless search of Ms. Larsen’s home implicated the Fourth
Amendment and thus was an issue of constitutional magnitude and great public import.
We agree with the district court that a bill of exceptions would not provide a “plain, speedy,
or adequate remedy” where suppression of the key evidence—the marijuana—was at issue.
See Heiner, 683 P.2d at 632 (“[T]he inadequacy of the bill of exceptions after an acquittal
is patent.”). We differ with the district court, however, in finding the State’s challenge of
the circuit court’s suppression order raised questions of constitutional magnitude and issues
of great public import. Accordingly, this case cannot be reasonably characterized as rare
and unusual.

4
  In instances where the State seeks review in a criminal case outside the bill of exceptions procedure, this
Court exercises the same narrow discretion regardless of whether the State seeks review through a writ of
review or writ of certiorari. See Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶¶ 7–8, 88 P.3d at 447–48 (discussing the State’s
petition for a writ of review); Heiner, 683 P.2d at 632 (discussing the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari).
5
  In Newman, this Court acknowledged a defendant’s constitutional right against double jeopardy also may
limit the State’s ability to seek a writ of review. Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶¶ 22–23, 88 P.3d at 453. Because
this case involves interlocutory review of a pretrial criminal order, we do not need to analyze whether Ms.
Larsen was twice put in jeopardy when the district court granted the writ.

                                                        6
[¶18] Ms. Larsen’s motion to suppress was grounded in the Fourth Amendment. It did
not, however, raise any constitutional questions of first impression. The constitutional
rules governing an officer’s warrantless search of a home are well established. See, e.g.,
Woods v. State, 2023 WY 32, ¶¶ 15–17, 527 P.3d 264, 267–68 (Wyo. 2023); Hawken v.
State, 2022 WY 77, ¶¶ 14–21, 511 P.3d 176, 181–84 (Wyo. 2022); Fuller v. State, 2021
WY 36, ¶¶ 9–10, 481 P.3d 1131, 1134 (Wyo. 2021). The district court did not take issue
with these rules or conclude that the circuit court had seriously erred in applying them. To
the contrary, the district court relied in part on the same case law and legal principles as
the circuit court. It simply reached a different conclusion about the voluntariness of Ms.
Larsen’s consent based on the evidence presented. The district court’s grant of the writ of
review was therefore not grounded in the constitution; rather, it was grounded in the circuit
court’s judicial notice comments during the suppression hearing.

[¶19] Judicial notice is an evidentiary matter governed by the Wyoming Rules of
Evidence 201. It is patently not a question of constitutional magnitude. W.R.E. 201(b)
only allows judicial notice of adjudicative facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” in that
they are “generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or . . . capable
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.” Id. Judicial notice generally involves establishing adjudicative facts that
are “matters of common knowledge.” Davison v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm’n, 2010
WY 121, ¶ 20 n.5, 238 P.3d 556, 563 n.5 (Wyo. 2010) (listing cases taking such judicial
notice).

[¶20] By comparison, the cases in which this Court has granted the State an interlocutory
writ of review after a suppression hearing each involved “significant questions” of first
impression directly related to the constitutional issues raised in the hearing. See Heiner,
683 P.2d at 636–37 (holding for the first time the requirements of Miranda are not invoked
by an insurance company questioning a private citizen); Evans, 944 P.2d at 1127–29
(holding the State had the burden of proof to demonstrate the accused’s confession was
voluntary as a matter of due process); see also Welch, 873 P.2d at 604–05 (holding for the
first time that an officer may develop reasonable suspicion based solely on observing
lawful conduct and the reasonableness of an officer’s detention of a vehicle “is to be
measured by whether the police acted diligently under all the circumstances of the case and
whether the detention involved delay unnecessary to a legitimate police inquiry” (citations
omitted)).

[¶21] The propriety of the circuit court’s judicial notice comments did not similarly
implicate a “significant question” directly related to how the Fourth Amendment applied
to the seizure of marijuana from Ms. Larsen’s apartment. 6 The judicial notice of Ms.

6
 The circuit court’s judicial notice comments are not dispositive of whether the consent exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies in this case. While trial courts can take judicial notice
of their own records in cases closely related to the one before it, In re K.L.S., 2004 WY 87, ¶ 37, 94 P.3d

                                                    7
Larsen’s demeanor from a prior civil proceeding did not determine whether she was
entitled to constitutional protections, Heiner, 683 P.2d at 636–37, whether the circuit court
applied the correct burden of proof, Evans, 944 P.2d at 1127–29, or whether the court
applied the appropriate legal analysis under the Fourth Amendment, Welch, 873 P.2d at
604–05. Instead, the judicial notice was an evidentiary matter incidental to the circuit
court’s constitutional analysis, as evidenced by the fact the circuit court never even
referenced the judicially noticed facts in its written order.

[¶22] The State’s petition for a writ of review also failed to articulate a matter of great
public import. Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶ 20, 88 P.3d at 452 (citation omitted); Mengel, 671
P.2d at 345. This case involves the suppression of a misdemeanor amount of marijuana.
It does not involve any crimes against persons or felonious activity, or implicate separation
of powers, the constitutionality of state statutes, or constitutional questions of first
impression. This case is unlike those we previously have deemed of great public import
when granting the State an interlocutory writ of review. See, e.g., Newman, 2004 WY 41,
88 P.3d 445 (analyzing constitutional questions and separation of powers issues after a
district court declared a mistrial involving aggravated assault and battery and dismissed the
charges with prejudice); Welch, 873 P.2d 601 (analyzing constitutional questions related
to the suppression of over 347 pounds of marijuana in a felony intent to deliver a controlled
substance prosecution); Heiner, 683 P.2d 629 (analyzing a constitutional question of first
impression involving suppressed evidence related to arson and fraud); Mengel, 671 P.2d
340 (analyzing a constitutional question of first impression related to the constitutionality
of a statute after evidence relevant to a DUI prosecution was suppressed).

[¶23] In sum, whether the circuit court improperly took judicial notice during a
suppression hearing cannot be reasonably characterized as a “rare and unusual”
circumstance involving a question of constitutional magnitude or great public import. As
such, the district court abused its narrow discretion when it granted the State an
interlocutory writ of review. 7 See Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d at 447 (citation
omitted).

1025, 1034 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted), the circuit court erred when it took judicial notice of Ms.
Larsen’s demeanor from a separate civil proceeding. Ms. Larsen’s demeanor from a separate proceeding
is clearly not generally known within the jurisdiction or capable of accurate and ready determination. See
W.R.E. 201(b); In re CPR, 2009 WY 76, ¶ 6, 209 P.3d 879 (Wyo. 2009) (finding the district court abused
its discretion when it judicially noticed facts not “generally known” in its jurisdiction).
7
  Our grant of Ms. Larsen’s petition for a writ of review is distinguishable from the district court’s grant of
the State’s petition. The district court’s erroneous grant of an interlocutory writ of review and reversal of
the circuit court’s suppression order affected Ms. Larsen’s constitutional rights. And, although Ms. Larsen
could have appealed the district court’s order if she was convicted and sentenced, the interests of judicial
economy demanded we consider the district court’s order at this time. See Saunders v. Hornecker, 2015
WY 34, ¶¶ 14–15, 344 P.3d 771, 776 (Wyo. 2015) (granting a writ of certiorari in part due to “the interests
of judicial economy”).

                                                      8
[¶24] The district court’s order is therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to
reinstate the circuit court’s suppression order.

                                           9