Court Opinion

ID: 9596992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:54:52.541232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:36.394947
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
George E. Clowdus, Jr., a branch manager for Saunder’s Leasing System, Inc., of Delaware, Ohio, while driving an automobile of Saunders Leasing System, Inc. in Alabama was involved in an automobile collision with one driven by D. M. Henderson in which Mrs. Peggy Joyce Massey was riding as a guest passenger.
Mr. and Mrs. Massey, as plaintiffs, sued D. M. Henderson and Saunders Leasing System, Inc. for personal injuries arising from the automobile collision, for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and for medical, hospital, surgical, and other expenses.
After discovery, Saunders Leasing System, Inc. moved for summary judgment contending that its branch manager was on a purely personal mission, not connected with his employment and that therefore it was not liable and should be dismissed. The majority holds that the uncontradicted evidence overcomes any presumption of Georgia law that an employee operating his employer’s vehicle at the time of the accident is in the scope of his *569employment and, hence, the summary judgment was properly granted. I disagree and therefore respectfully dissent.
1. The evidence submitted on motion for summary judgment contains an affidavit by Clowdus, the branch manager who was driving the vehicle. The affidavit recites that "this automobile was supplied to affiant to be used by him on company business and for his personal business and pleasure at his discretion.” In the face of this inculpatory language, the majority opinion states that "Saunders Leasing paid all the expenses on the car, including gasoline, and paid Clowdus a straight salary plus bonuses.”
It is true as Clowdus testified that he was on a purely personal mission to pick up his wife and son, but let us not forget that he had earlier testified that the car was furnished to him for "business and . . . pleasure at his discretion.” In summary judgments, all evidence must be construed most strongly against the movant, but here, even if construed most favorably towards the movant, the affidavit shows he was using the car for the very purpose for which it was furnished to him, to wit, "pleasure at his discretion.” Further, certain inferences and presumptions that this automobile was furnished as a part of considerations of his employment cannot be overlooked or swept under the rug. The master recognized that it was beneficial to the master in his employment of his branch manager to allow the branch manager at all times to drive at his own discretion a Saunders Leasing vehicle, paying all the expenses on the car including the gasoline. Hence, at the very least, there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether or not the driver was acting within the scope of his employment. This issue of fact should be resolved by a jury. As was held in McCarty v. Nat. Life &c. Ins. Co. 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 (129 SE2d 408): "Where more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence, the duty of solving the mystery should be placed upon the jury and not the trial judge.” Also see Division 4 on this point.
2. A presumption arises that when a collision occurs involving a vehicle driven by an employee, the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. See Fortenberry & Sons v. Malmberg, 97 Ga. App. 162 (2), 165 *570(102 SE2d 661); Ayers v. Barney A. Smith Motors, 112 Ga. App. 581, 582 (145 SE2d 753); Pest Masters, Inc. v. Callaway, 133 Ga. App. 123 (210 SE2d 243).
3. Of course, such presumption is rebuttable. See Abelman v. Ormond, 53 Ga. App. 753, 761 (187 SE 393). But under any and all circumstances, it is for the jury to say whether the presumption has been overcome. In the Ayers case, supra, the automobile involved in the collision was a demonstrator driven by a company salesman employed on a commission basis only, but he had unrestricted use of the automobile which was being operated under a dealer’s license tag. Hence, it was a full-time assignment of the automobile to him. It was there held that a jury could legitimately infer that the salesman was acting within the scope of his employment, even though the master and servant positively testified that what he was doing was without the scope of his employment. In the Fortenberry case, supra, it was likewise held that because of this presumption it was a jury question as to whether the driver was acting within or without the scope of his employment. It is for the jury, not the judge, to say whether the presumption has been overcome.
4. Where more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence the duty of solving the mystery should be placed upon the jury and not on the trial judge, and a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. See Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 4 (126 SE2d 442); McCarty v. Nat. Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 (129 SE2d 408); Pest Masters, Inc. v. Callaway, 133 Ga. App. 123, 125, supra. The evidence is not uncontradicted, and it does not overcome the inferences and the presumptions in favor of the respondent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pannell and Judge Webb concur in the judgment of the dissent.
Addendum to Dissent.