Court Opinion

ID: 9421651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:59:13.032574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:37.986262
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Douglas,
with whom The Chief Justice and MR. Justice Black concur,
dissenting.
The Court concedes that the voluntary observance of a hot cargo provision by an employer does not constitute a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Rela*112tions Act,1 61 Stat. 136, 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (A). I fail to see, therefore, why enforcement of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement outlawing work in nonunion goods violates the Act.
The provision of the collective bargaining agreement in the Carpenters case is typical of those in issue here:
“Workmen shall not be required to handle non-union material.”
That provision was bargained for like every other clause in the collective agreement. It was agreed to by the employer. How important it may have been to the parties — how high or low in their scale of values — we do not know. But on these records it was the product of bargaining, not of coercion. The Court concedes that its inclusion in the contracts may not be called “forcing or requiring” the employer to cease handling other products within the meaning of the Act. Enforcing the collective bargaining agreement — standing by its terms — is not one of the coercive practices at which the Act was aimed. Enforcement of these agreements is conducive to peace. Disregard of collective agreements — the flouting of them — is disruptive. That was the philosophy of the *113Conway’s Express decision of the Labor Board, 87 N. L. R. B. 972, aff’d sub nom. Rabouin v. Labor Board, 195 F. 2d 906; and I think it squares with the Act.
The present decision is capricious. The boycott is lawful if the employer agrees to abide by this collective bargaining agreement. It is unlawful if the employer reneges.
The hostile attitude of labor against patronizing or handling “unfair” goods goes deep into our history. It is not peculiarly American, though it has found expression in various forms in our history2 from the refusal of Americans to buy British tea, to the refusal of Abolitionists to buy slave-made products, to the refusal of unions to work on convict-made or on other nonunion goods. Unions have adhered to the practice because of their principle of mutual aid and protection. Section 7 of the Act, indeed, recognizes that principle in its guarantee that “Employees shall have the right ... to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” We noticed in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 503, that the elimination of “competition from non-union made goods” was a legitimate labor objective.
The reason an employer may also agree to that phase of union policies, the reason he may acquiesce in the inclusion of such a clause in a particular collective agreement, may only be surmised. Perhaps he sees eye to eye with the union. Perhaps he receives important concessions in exchange for his assistance to the union.
Certain it is that where he voluntarily agrees to the “unfair” goods clause he is not forced or coerced in the *114statutory sense. What Judge Clark said in Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees v. Labor Board, 245 F. 2d 817, 822, has not yet been answered:
“In the absence of a prior agreement, work to be done by employees is determined unilaterally by the employer; but where a collective agreement specifies the work to be done, that agreement defines the normal work of the employees and a 'strike’ or ‘refusal’ must be a refusal to do that normal work. The employer obviously cannot impose additional work on the employees contrary to the agreement and then charge that their refusal to perform it constitutes an unfair practice. We see no difference in this respect between tasks exempted by the agreement because they are offensive to health or safety and tasks exempted because their performance is contrary to the interests of organized labor and, in this case, the local itself.”
We act today more like a Committee of the Congress than the Court. We strain to outlaw bargaining contracts long accepted, long used.3 Perhaps these particular pro*115visions have evils in them that should be declared contrary to the public interest. They are, however, so much a part of the very fabric of collective bargaining that we should leave this policy-making to Congress and not rush in to undo what a century or more of experience has imbedded into labor-management agreements. I have not found a word of legislative history which even intimates that these “unfair” goods provisions of collective bargaining agreements are unlawful.

 That provision of the Act reads as follows:
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“ (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; . . .

 See Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor (1945), 581 et seq.; Wolman, The Boycott in American Trade Unions (1916), cc. II, III.

 “Sympathetic support by members of one union for organized workers in other plants or in other trades and industries often finds expression in union agreements. Any union looks upon nonunion conditions of work as a threat to its own union working standards. Consequently it is often provided in agreements that the employer may not require employees to work on material coming from or destined for manufacturers not operating under union agreements. Other agreements limit the prohibition to material coming from employers who have been declared ‘unfair’ to organized labor by an affiliated union. This reduces considerably the list of restricted manufacturers, since many employers who do not deal with organized labor have never been declared ‘unfair’ by unions having nominal jurisdiction. Another alternative merely prohibits work on materials coming from or destined for manufacturers whose employees are on strike. Agreements covering factory production workers may *115require that all building repairs and maintenance work as well as all hauling of goods and materials into and away from the employer’s premises must be done by union workers.” Union Agreement Provisions, U. S. Dept, of Labor, H. R. Doc. No. 723, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 32. And see Collective Bargaining Provisions, U. S. Dept, of Labor, H. R. Doc. No. 282, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 37; Strikes and Lockouts (Preliminary Draft), U. S. Dept. of Labor, February 1947, pp. 28-32; Strikes and Lockouts, Bureau of National Affairs, 1956, 77:351.