Court Opinion

ID: 9883671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:09:25.568118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:28.714127
License: Public Domain

BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). The proof of the government in this case was: That Solomon and Benjamin Feuehtbaum jointly owned a farm in New Jersey; that on it was their dwelling house, and near by a dairy; that under it was a cellar, where ice was stored; that from the dairy to the cellar of the house was a tunnel about 75 feet in length, which served to drain the water from the ice to a sewer in the dwelling house. That Morris Mansbach, the accused, came to the premises and asked Benjamin “if he could rent a dark place some where on the farm.” He was shown the cellar under the icehouse, and he then said to Benjamin “that just suited him and then he made arrangements with me that I should work for him for $100 a week,” after two weeks raised to $150. That Mansbach then brought in his large touring car, from time to time, the equipment suitable for distilling corn whisky, brought the workmen, and personally assisted in outfitting the distillery. During the two weeks required to equip . it, amongst other apparatus he brought were two stills of 200 gallons each and two of 150 each. Near the house six barrels of 50 gallons each were sunk underground and connected by pipes with the dairy cellar, so that the whisky as distilled would pass to them. Leading from the sunken barrels into the cellar of the house were pipes or hose, through which the liquor could be siphoned from the barrels by one who was in the house cellar. It was also proven that the dairy cellar,had no windows in it, and the outside entrance which led into it was closed up after the apparatus was installed. Access to the dairy was only had through the drain tunnel, which was lighted by lanterns, and access from the house to its cellar, and consequently to the tunnel entrance, was cut oft when cellar stairs were drawn up. The steam used in operating the dairy was carried down to operate the stills. The proofs showed that, after the plant was installed, Mansbaeh, for four months, brought to it in his automobile all the sugar corn used in distilling, came every Monday and paid Benjamin Feuehtbaum his weekly wages, paid for repairs and a weekly coal bill of five tons, and each week took away some 40 to 50 gallons of corn whisky.
As the stills were steam-fed from the dairy, the entire operations of stilling and storing were carried on underground, as access to the dairy cellar could only be had through the dwelling house 75 feet away, as the passageway from the house to the cellar only existed when the stairs were swung to position, and as the Feuchtbaums continued farming and Mansbaeh brought all the supplies and carried away all the products by night, the conditions, if these proofs were believed, were ideal for successfully carrying on illicit distilling.
It is not pertinent to detail how the government officers discovered the place, further than to say that, when they visited the house, they met such a strong smell of corn mash that they trailed it to the house cellar, and, while exploring the latter, they caught Benjamin Feuehtbaum emerging from the tunnel with a lighted lantern. Digging thereafter between the house and dairy, they located the tunnel. Thereupon the Feuchtbaums admitted their guilt, and, when subsequently indicted 'with Mansbaeh on the present indictment, pleaded guilty, went on the stand as witnesses for the government, and proved the foregoing facts.
In addition thereto, the record presents these additional facts: While the officers were arresting the Feuchtbaums, Mansbaeh came along the highway in his car and turned off to come to the Feuchtbaums’ house. Seeing a number of persons about, he backed out and started to go away, when an officer jumped on the running board, arrested him, and found several bottles of corn whisky in the pockets of his ear. Asked whether he was owner of the still, “he made no answer,” and in response to the assertion of the officer, “You are paying Benny $100 a week,” his answer was, “That has got to be proved.” The proofs also showed the Feuchtbaums had paid no tax, given no bond, and had not registered the illicit stills which Mansbaeh had brought to the premises. But, in addition to these proofs of the government, the record shows that Mansbaeh, in addition to his plea of not guilty, went on the stand. He denied that he had rented the premises; denied that he had employed the Feuchtbaums; denied he had furnished and installed the stills and plant; denied he had brought the supplies and that he had paid for the coal or paid wages. Showing his relation to illicit liquor transactions, he proved affirmatively he had theretofore been convicted for the *226illegal possession of liquor and on cross-examination, admitted lie had been convicted three times in New York and New Jersey, for such illegal possession of liquors; that he had been introduced to the Feutchbaums by some man he could not locate; that he visited the Feuehtbaums for the purpose of buying liquor from them; that “he (Feuchtbaum) wanted to know who I am, and where' I lived, and they said they notified him, and, if I am the right fellow, they would do business with me”; that later he went back, saw the stills several times, and got from 40 to 50 gallons of liquor from them weekly thereafter, paying $4 and $5 a gallon therefor.
Mansbaeh, in his testimony, also referred to the matter of still registration, and was asked by his counsel the question whether he “set up certain stills, and have in your possession and custody and under your control such stills, and fail and neglect to register the same with the collector of internal revenue of the United States.” To which he answered: “I did not.” Exactly what Mansbaeh meant by his answer to this negative pregnant question may be uncertain, but it is certain that he either meant that he had, or that he had not, registered the stills, and the jury, thus having before it this testimony in the matter of registration, could fairly infer from his answer that he had not registered the stills, all relationship with which he denied. Moreover, when, later, the question of registration was raised, the court gave his counsel the privilege of recalling and asking Mansbaeh about it, saying, “You can ask Mansbaeh,” which permission counsel declined.
Under all these proofs of the government, in view of the fact that Mansbaeh went on the stand, showed he had no connection with the stills, but showed his knowledge of their illegal character, of his being invited by the court to give his testimony as to registration or the contrary, and of the legal fact that in view of his own testimony, showing the clandestine, illegal character of these stills, he could not make a legal registration of a distillery which, the proofs show, had no taint of legality, was it the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury he could not be convicted? In . other words, as we see it, the simple question: Was it the duty of the government to show that Mansbaeh had not legally registered an illegal still? To me it is clear that, under such proofs of the illegal character of the stills, the defendant, when he pleaded not guilty, and thereafter went on the stand and based his defense on the fact that, while he knew of the- illegal character of the stills, he had had no part in erecting or operating them, the burden was on him, and not the government, to prove compliance, with the law by registration, if' that bore on the issue and was a matter of defense.
But, apart from my own view in that regard, I am moved by the reasoning of adjudged eases, to a few of which I refer. The situation here was stronger than in United States v. McCurry, 281 F. 532, where the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit said:
“It is next assigned as error that the lower court erred in instructing the jury that the burden was upon the defendant to show the registration of the still and the filing of the bond. The court instructed the jury that the prosecution need only prove the circumstances from which can he presumed lack of registry and bond filed, whereupon the burden shifted to defendants to prove registration and filing of bond. A circumstance of great significance against the registration of the still and filing of a bond by the appellants was the fact that they made no claim of ownership, interest in, or knowledge of the still. This was in accordance with their plea of not guilty, and was a practical admission that they had not registered the still, nor given bond therefor.”
I note, also, that the present ease does not rest on presumptions raised by the plea of not guilty, nor on the defendant not going on the stand and resting on the presumption of innocence. He went on the stand and proved his defense, and from the testimony he gave as to registration the jurors could draw their 'own inference from his omission to prove facts which he knew and could make clear. He showed his knowledge of the illicit character of these stills, he bought their illegal product, and when he was allowed by the court to say whether he had, or had not, registered the still, he, by his counsel, declined to state whether he had, or had not, done so. The situation was one to which Barton v. United States, 267 F. 174, applied, and in which the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit held:
“There is no rule of reason that the same rule of reason and law should not apply as in the case of other unlawful possession of property. An illicit still is unlawul property, and its operation an unlawful act, and its possession would logically justify the same inference that would arise in the possession of stolen goods. It is a mere presumption, creating only a prima facie inference of guilt, and may be rebutted either *227by circumstances, or by the direct testimony of the parties charged, or of other.”
In the conflict of opinion between the present decision and that of the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. McCurry, supra, I find myself in accord with the latter decision, and therefore constrained to respectfully record this, my dissent, from the reversal of the sentence imposed on Mansbach on the first count of the indictment. In other respects I concur.