Court Opinion

ID: 9528519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:46.960249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:56.713015
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I would reverse the order of the trial court denying Brown’s motion for a new trial. I would do that for two reasons. First, I believe that the motion for a new trial should have been granted as a matter of justice. Second, I believe that the adaptation of the test from Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928), as gloss upon the rule articulated in Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84 (Wyo.1967), converts our standard for evaluating a motion for a new trial premised upon newly discovered evidence from an objective to a subjective standard. In doing so, we transfer the task of evaluating the credibility of a witness from the jury in arriving at its determination of guilt or innocence to the presiding judge who makes the determination with all of the testimony available after the jury has made the determination without having the complete story of the witness.
Addressing first the matter of justice, my reflection leads to the conclusion that our system of criminal justice empowered MCX to bring about her father’s incarceration. While other testimony and evidence usually appears to corroborate the accusation of a complaining witness, without the accusation there would be no corpus de-licti to corroborate. Not infrequently convictions are had, and sustained, based solely upon the testimony of the complaining witness. That is the nature of the empowerment that flows to a victim from our system. My position is that, if the system empowers one to achieve a conviction by complaining to law enforcement authorities and then testifying in court, a balance in the scales of justice requires that the same empowerment be extended to set aside the conviction. Because of the nature of these charges, only MCX and Brown know with certainty whether the criminal conduct occurred. Brown, on this record, was steadfast in denial. MCX, after first testifying that the criminal conduct occurred, now states, presumably after being advised of the consequences of perjury, that it did not occur. I believe that justice demands that the same fact finder be afforded an opportunity to weigh the issue of credibility with the entire story before it, and a new trial affords that opportunity. This is how the power of the victim should be balanced.
With respect to the adjustment in the Opie test, I am satisfied that the test has *867served the court well for almost twenty-five years. It has been utilized in both civil1 and criminal cases.2 Our application of the test has been consistent. We have uniformly required that all four aspects of the Opie test be satisfied before we can consider an abuse of discretion. Those requirements have not been adjusted, and they are set forth in Opie, as adopted from United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir.1944), cert. dismissed 323 U.S. 806, 65 S.Ct. 264, 89 L.Ed. 643 (1944), as follows:
“ * * * (1) That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; (3) that it is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted; and (4) that it is not cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in relation to which there was evidence at the trial.” Opie, 422 P.2d at 85.
There can be little question in this case that the admission of perjury on the part of MCX came to Brown’s attention after his trial. In light of the pre-trial assertions of MCX, it obviously was not owing to the want of due diligence that Brown did not learn of it sooner. It clearly is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict if the new trial should be granted. It is so different from the evidence introduced by the State at trial that it cannot be perceived as cumulative. All four of the Opie criteria are satisfied in this instance. The thrust of the majority opinion is that the presence of those factors makes no difference if the trial judge determines that the recantation is false.
Our authorities are clear that we must identify an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court if we are to reverse the order denying the motion for a new trial. I would find such an abuse of discretion in the adoption, in effect, of the Larrison test by the trial court when it concluded to reject the new evidence on the ground that it is false. When the trial court reached that conclusion after the hearing at which MCX testified in support of the motion for a new trial, a subjective test was adopted in lieu of the objective standard captured in Opie. If Larrison is not the law, then there was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
In several cases, this court has dealt with the problem of recantation as newly discovered evidence relying on the Opie test. Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364 (Wyo.1990); Burns v. State, 574 P.2d 422 (Wyo.1978); Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837 (Wyo.1977); and Daellenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679 (Wyo.1977). Prior to Opie, this court had said:
“Recanting testimony is viewed with suspicion, and when the trial judge, acting on a motion for a new trial, refuses to believe it, the appellate court, ordinarily at least, will feel bound by the decision.” Espy v. State, 54 Wyo. 291, 318, 92 P.2d 549, 559 (1939).
This approach has been followed subsequent to Opie. Sims v. State, 495 P.2d 256 (Wyo.1972). See Flaim v. State, 488 P.2d 153 (Wyo.1971). Certainly, the court has *868been comfortable with the application of that rule in considering contrary affidavits by co-defendants, as in Bums and Daellen-bach, and in a case in which the affidavit offered was contrary to the affiant’s testimony in his own trial. Jones. In each instance, however, the court was addressing the recantation in the context of the Opie rule and arriving at a determination that the new evidence was not so material that it would produce a different result if a new trial were granted. In each case, there was a lot of evidence establishing the existence of the crime other than the testimony of the witness who recanted, and the recantation testimony clearly was improbable in light of the other evidence. Yet, the court in Espy gave the State the option of a new trial or accepting an affirmance on manslaughter rather than murder because it concluded that the recantation testimony refuted the testimony of the recanting witness that may have been crucial on the issue of malice leading to the verdict of murder in the second degree. Clearly, the court spoke in the context of materiality, not veracity.
The only case that involves a recantation by a victim witness is Lacey. This court affirmed a denial of a motion for a new trial based upon this ruling by the trial court:
“ ‘[I]t is my judgment that in any event, that the recanted testimony by Mrs. Lacey is totally without credibility and probably because of coercion or emotional turmoil brought about by the husband-wife relationship.’ ” Lacey 803 P.2d at 1367.
The difference between Lacey and the instant case becomes clear when one examines the language of the court in returning to the matter when it was raised under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court said:
“Given the lack of credibility attributed by the district court to Diane’s recanting testimony and the evidence supporting her original story, we simply cannot hold that either of Appellant’s attorneys acted unreasonably or that Appellant has shown he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ performance or lack of performance.” Lacey, 803 P.2d at 1371 (emphasis added).
Lacey thus is cast into the same mold as the cases in which co-defendants have recanted.
This case is different from the prior cases, including Lacey. Under the Opie standard, neither this court nor the trial court could say that the recanting testimony was not so material that a different verdict might be returned if a new trial were granted. See Espy, 92 P.2d 549. The validity of the recanting testimony could not be compared with other evidence of the corpus delicti introduced at trial. It is only by invoking the gloss of Larrison that the motion for a new trial can be denied. If Opie is followed, the new trial should be granted. I would reverse the trial court, finding an abuse of discretion in the failure to apply Opie, and would order a new trial.
In my view, this is the only manner that the court can maintain the objective standard that should be used to evaluate a motion for a new trial based upon a claim of newly discovered evidence. It is also the correct way to balance the scales and effect justice in this case.

. Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426 (Wyo.1985); Murphy v. Stevens, 645 P.2d 82 (Wyo.1982); Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., 634 P.2d 908 (Wyo.1981); Shaw v. Shaw, 544 P.2d 1004 (Wyo.1976); Barbour v. Barbour, 518 P.2d 12 (Wyo.1974); and John B. Roden, Jr., Inc. v. Davis, 460 P.2d 209 (Wyo.1969).

. Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364 (Wyo.1990); King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo.1989); Kavanaugh v. State, 769 P.2d 908 (Wyo.1989); Best v. State, 769 P.2d 385 (Wyo.1989); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo.1988); Keser v. State, 737 P.2d 756 (Wyo.1987); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo.1987), appeal after remand 766 P.2d 1149 (Wyo.1988); Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132 (Wyo.1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 907, 107 S.Ct. 1353, 94 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo.1986); Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008 (Wyo.1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 228, 83 L.Ed.2d 157 (1984); Lansing v. State, 669 P.2d 923 (Wyo.1983); Grable v. State, 664 P.2d 531 (Wyo.1983); Siegert v. State, 634 P.2d 323 (Wyo.1981); Burns v. State, 574 P.2d 422 (Wyo.1978); Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837 (Wyo.1977); Daellenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679 (Wyo.1977); Salaz v. State, 561 P.2d 238 (Wyo.1977); Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330 (Wyo.1974); Flaim v. State, 488 P.2d 153 (Wyo.1971); Kennedy v. State, 470 P.2d 372, reh'g denied 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo.1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 933, 28 L.Ed.2d 218 (1971); and Ballinger v. State, 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo.1968).