Court Opinion

ID: 9776680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:42:05.24362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:41.322709
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree that punitive damages and attorney’s fees are not recoverable. But, the permanent injunction is also improper.
The Savings Association, as holder of a note and deed of trust, was entitled under the terms of the deed of trust to consent, or not consent, to a transfer of the property securing the debt. In February 1981, Nick Nabours, through his attorney, notified the Association that he and his wife intended to purchase a home from Alfred Burke. The Association’s executive vice-president responded by telephone and then in writing that it would not consent to the transfer unless it approved an agreement assuming the existing loan. It also stated that a transfer without its consent would be considered a default. Before the sale closed this was repeated.
The majority indicates that the Nabours-es proceeded with the sale because they relied on waiver. The apparent reason they proceeded, as shown by the record, is that their attorney thought that the due on sale clause would not be upheld by the courts.
There is no evidence to uphold a finding of waiver. Alternatively, the evidence is wholly insufficient to support a finding that the Association waived its right to enforce the agreed terms of the deed of trust given it by Burke.
*363-371The jury obviously did not like foreclosure under a deed of trust. Most people do not. But our job is not to uphold findings which we find pleasing. The Nabourses and their attorney asked the Association if they could disregard the clear terms of the deed of trust. Our decision upholds a jury finding that the Association’s response, “No! No! No!” means “Yes.”
We err in approving a judgment enjoining Longview Savings & Loan Association from exercising a lawful right given it by agreement.