Court Opinion

ID: 9892866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 06:09:18.871782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:48.417779
License: Public Domain

REVERSE and DISMISS and Opinion Filed October 17, 2023

                                    S   In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-01001-CV

                          DALLAS COUNTY, Appellant
                                    V.
                            RUTH ISAAC, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
                             Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-00857-C

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Breedlove
                            Opinion by Justice Reichek
      In this interlocutory appeal, Dallas County challenges the trial court’s denial

of its plea to the jurisdiction seeking to dismiss the premises liability claims brought

against it by Ruth Isaac. In a single issue, the County contends the trial court erred

in denying its plea because Isaac presented no evidence to raise a genuine issue of

material fact regarding the County’s actual knowledge of the allegedly dangerous

condition that caused her injury. Because we conclude there was no evidence to

show the County’s knowledge of a condition creating an unreasonable risk of harm,

we reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment dismissing the case.
                                    Factual Background

       On October 2, 2020, Isaac was walking on the sidewalk along Jackson Street

behind the George Allen Courts Building in Dallas when she tripped and fell on the

edge of a section of concrete that was slightly higher than the adjoining section. A

picture of the sidewalk taken immediately after the accident showed the following:

Isaac stated she did not know what the difference in elevation was between the two

sidewalk sections. Greg Gray, facilities director for Dallas County, testified the

difference in height at the time of the accident was approximately three-quarters of

an inch. Isaac sued the County for premises liability alleging she sustained serious

injuries as a result of her fall.

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      Dallas County filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing Isaac’s claims were

barred by governmental immunity because there was no evidence the County knew

about the alleged premises defect before Isaac fell. In support of the motion, the

County submitted excerpts from Isaac’s deposition, excerpts from a deposition taken

of Gray, photographs produced by Isaac in response to discovery requests, and a

declaration by Robby Saye, the Dallas County facilities manager directly responsible

for the George Allen Courts Building.

      In his declaration, Saye testified he had been a facilities manager since 2015

and, as part of his duties, he regularly inspected the sidewalks outside the George

Allen building. According to Saye, Dallas County Facilities was responsible for

maintaining the sidewalks and would make repairs if they were needed. Saye did

not recall noticing a “lip” in the sidewalk at any time before Isaac fell. He further

stated Dallas County Facilities had not received any reports of falls by pedestrians

due to an uneven sidewalk outside the courthouse prior to October 2, 2020.

      Gray confirmed in his deposition testimony that the County had not received

any reports of an uneven sidewalk in the area where Isaac fell. When shown Google

street-view photographs taken in February 2014 and January 2017 (shown below),

Gray acknowledged the photos appeared to show some difference in elevation in the

sidewalk sections, but he could not tell from the pictures the extent of the height

difference.

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–4–
Although the section of sidewalk at issue was at the back of the courthouse, Gray

assumed that some County employees would have walked in the area since February

2014. Gray agreed that, as a general matter, a person could get injured on an uneven

sidewalk and, after Isaac’s fall was reported, measures were taken to eliminate the

lip.

       Isaac admitted in her deposition that she had no evidence the County knew

about the raised area of the sidewalk before she fell. She “imagined,” however, that

they had seen it because it was next to the courthouse.

       Based on this evidence, the County argued Isaac could not show the County

had actual knowledge of a premises condition that created an unreasonable risk of

harm before her accident. Isaac responded there was a material question of fact as

to the County’s knowledge because the evidence showed the condition existed since

at least 2014, and County employees who worked at the courthouse, including Saye,

would have walked in the area during that time. Following a hearing, the trial court

denied the County’s plea to the jurisdiction. The County brought this appeal.

                                     Analysis

       A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea challenging the trial court’s

authority to determine the subject matter of the action. Rawlings v. Gonzalez, 407

S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). The plea can be based on the

pleadings or evidence. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,

226 (Tex. 2004). When, as here, the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional

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facts, we consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties to determine if a

fact issue exists. Id. at 227. The standard of review for a jurisdictional plea based

on evidence “generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 166a(c).” Id. at 228. The burden is on the governmental entity, as

movant, to present evidence sufficient to show the trial court lacks jurisdiction.

Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 391 (Tex. 2016). If this burden

is met, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a disputed issue of

material fact regarding the jurisdictional issue. Id.

      The Texas Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity from personal

injury claims based on the condition of real property “if the governmental unit

would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021. If the claim arises from a premises

defect, the governmental unit owes the claimant only the duty that a private person

owes to a licensee on private property. Id. § 101.022(a). That duty requires the

governmental unit to warn, or to make reasonably safe a condition that creates an

unreasonable risk of harm of which it is aware and the licensee is not. Sampson, 500

S.W.3d at 391.      Actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, and not just

constructive knowledge, is required. Id. at 392. For immunity to be waived, there

must be some evidence from which a jury could infer that the governmental unit not

only knew about the premises condition, but also that the condition created an

unreasonable risk of harm. See Univ. of Tex.-Pan Am. v. Aguilar, 251 S.W.3d 511,

                                         –6–
514 (Tex. 2008); Pitts v. Winkler Cnty., 351 S.W.3d 564, 574 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2011, no pet.). For premises-defect purposes, a condition poses an unreasonable risk

of harm when there is a sufficient probability of a harmful event occurring that a

reasonably prudent person would have foreseen it or some similar event as likely to

happen. Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. 2002); Cohen v.

Landry’s Inc., 442 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet.

denied). “Although there is no one test for determining actual knowledge that a

condition presents an unreasonable risk of harm, courts generally consider whether

the premises owner has received reports of prior injuries or reports of the potential

danger presented by the condition.” Aguilar, 251 S.W.3d at 513.

      To show its lack of actual knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition

created by the raised edge in the sidewalk, the County relies primarily on the

testimony of its facilities personnel who stated there had been no reports of falls or

injuries outside the George Allen building before Isaac fell. There were also no

reports of any raised portions of concrete or uneven areas in the sidewalk. Saye

testified that, although he inspected the sidewalks outside the George Allen building

regularly, he did not recall seeing a “lip” in the sidewalk where Isaac fell. This

testimony was sufficient for the County to meet its initial burden to show it had no

actual knowledge of the alleged premises defect. See City of Dallas v. Monroy, No.

05-22-00012-CV, 2022 WL 4363836, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 21, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op.). The burden then shifted to Isaac to demonstrate a fact issue

                                         –7–
regarding the County’s awareness of what she asserts was a dangerous condition.

Id.

      As evidence to raise a fact issue, Isaac points to the Google street-view

photographs that appear to show a difference in the elevation of the sidewalk sections

dating back to 2014.     Isaac testified these pictures were a “fair and accurate

representation of the uneven/elevated sidewalk” at the time she fell. She argues the

fact that the condition was in existence for over six years before her accident,

combined with the likelihood that County employees traversed the area, was

sufficient to raise a fact issue about the County’s actual knowledge of the allegedly

dangerous condition. We conclude this evidence does the opposite.

      It is undisputed that in the six year period before Isaac fell, no County

employees reported any problems with the sidewalk. It is further undisputed that the

facilities manager did not recall seeing any issues with the sidewalk, and there were

no prior reports of injuries caused by the sidewalk’s condition. That the difference

in elevation between the sidewalk sections existed for many years without causing

any other incidents or injuries, and went either unnoticed or unremarked upon by

County employees, is strong evidence that the condition did not create an

unreasonable risk of harm. See United Supermarkets, LLC v. McIntire, 646 S.W.3d

800, 804 (Tex. 2022) (3/4-inch deep divot in parking lot “profoundly ordinary”);

Dietz v. Hill Country Rests., Inc., 398 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2011, no pet.) (no evidence of unreasonable risk of harm where depressions in

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walkway existed for years without complaints or other falls). At the very least it

demonstrates the County had no actual knowledge of a condition presenting a

sufficient probability of injury that it should have foreseen an injury as likely to

happen. See McIntire, 646 S.W.3d at 804.

      Isaac argues Gray’s testimony agreeing that “an uneven sidewalk would be a

condition that someone could get injured on or around” is sufficient to raise a fact

issue concerning the dangerous nature of the sidewalk. But Gray’s testimony was

nothing more than an acknowledgment that, under some circumstances, an uneven

sidewalk can be hazardous. The testimony was general in nature and did not address

the specific condition made the basis of this suit. Moreover, “testimony that a

condition could injure [a person] is not evidence that it poses an unreasonable risk

of harm.” Id.

      We conclude Isaac failed to present evidence creating a fact issue regarding

the County’s actual knowledge of a condition creating an unreasonable risk of harm.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the County’s plea to the jurisdiction.

We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment dismissing Isaac’s claims for

lack of jurisdiction.

                                           /Amanda L. Reichek/
                                           AMANDA L. REICHEK
                                           JUSTICE
221001F.P05

                                        –9–
                                    S
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

 DALLAS COUNTY, Appellant                       On Appeal from the County Court at
                                                Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
 No. 05-22-01001-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-00857-
                                                C.
 RUTH ISAAC, Appellee                           Opinion delivered by Justice
                                                Reichek. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                                and Breedlove participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order
denying DALLAS COUNTY’s plea to the jurisdiction is REVERSED and the
case is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

      It is ORDERED that appellant DALLAS COUNTY recover its costs of this
appeal from appellee RUTH ISAAC.

Judgment entered October 17, 2023

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