Court Opinion

ID: 9366612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 15:04:26.90704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:53.950264
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2021-CA-0892-MR

JAMES HIGHTOWER                                                       APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-00049

DONNA REED, CLASSIFICATION
BRANCH MANAGER; AND ADAM
NOEL, ASSISTANT UNIT
ADMINISTRATOR                                                         APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND COMBS, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: James Hightower appeals from the Franklin Circuit

Court’s order dismissing his complaint for failing to state a claim and being

untimely. We affirm.
                                       FACTS

             James Hightower (hereinafter “Hightower”) is serving a life sentence

after being convicted of several felony offenses, including being a persistent felony

offender in the first degree. In July of 2014, he was serving his sentence at the

Kentucky State Penitentiary (hereinafter “KSP”) in Eddyville and had been placed

in protective custody due to prior difficulties with other inmates. At that time, the

Kentucky Department of Corrections (hereinafter “DOC”) undertook to evaluate

the placement of inmates in protective custody. Hightower was visited by several

DOC Classifications employees, among them Donna Reed (hereinafter “Reed”).

Hightower contends that Reed and others failed to give him notice of his right to

appeal a decision by this classification committee prior to his transfer. Hightower

was ultimately transferred to Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex (hereinafter

“EKCC”).

             Shortly after he was transferred to EKCC, he was seriously assaulted

by a fellow inmate. He was airlifted to University of Kentucky Medical Center

where his treatment included a tracheostomy. He was discharged from the hospital

and thereafter was housed at several correctional facilities.

             In 2020, while housed at KSP yet again, he began having difficulty

eating, with food becoming lodged in his throat. The medical staff at the

institution sent him to a local medical facility for evaluation and it was determined

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that scar tissue from the tracheostomy had formed and was preventing him from

swallowing effectively. He underwent a procedure to alleviate the condition in late

2020.

             In 2021, Hightower filed a complaint against Reed and other DOC

Classification personnel in Franklin Circuit Court. The complaint alleged that

proper procedures had not been followed when he was transferred from KSP to

EKCC in 2014. Hightower argued that since he was not properly notified of his

transfer, he was unable to appeal it and because of that inability, he was transferred

where he was ultimately assaulted. This assault led to the tracheostomy which led

to the formation of scar tissue in 2020. In other words, Hightower alleges that

because proper procedures were not followed in 2014, the named Appellees are

liable for the medical event he suffered in 2020.

             The trial court found that Hightower had failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted. Further, the court found that the complaint was

untimely. We affirm both holdings.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should only be granted

if it appears that the party forwarding the claim could not prevail under any set of

facts.

             The court should not grant the motion unless it appears
             the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under

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             any set of facts which could be proved in support of his
             claim. In making this decision, the circuit court is not
             required to make any factual determination; rather, the
             question is purely a matter of law.

James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App. 2002) (internal quotation

marks and footnote omitted).

             As our review is purely a matter of law, the standard of review is de

novo. “Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial

court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo.” Fox

v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010).

                                      ANALYSIS

             Hightower alleged his due process rights were violated by the failure

to follow Corrections Policy & Procedure (hereinafter “CPP”) 18.1(F)(2), which

requires notification of a classification committee’s decision to an inmate. After

receiving the notification, an inmate then has five (5) working days in which to

appeal the classification decision pursuant to CPP 18.1(M)(1). Hightower stated to

the trial court that he did not receive notification of the classification decision, thus

depriving him of the right to appeal the decision.

             The circuit court held that an inmate has no due process rights in the

CPP:

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                       A due process violation requires a showing of
                deprivation of a Plaintiff’s liberty caused by government
                action. Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 438, 485 (6th Cir.
                1995). The violated liberty must arise from the U.S.
                Constitution or state law. Beard v. Lindsay, 798 F.2d
                874, 875 (1976) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
                466 (1983)). The due process right the Petitioner asserts
                come [sic] not from the U.S. Constitution nor state law,
                but rather from the prison procedural regulations. Prison
                regulations do not grant due process rights to inmates.
                Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1976) [sic], 115
                S. Ct. 2293, 2299, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995). Therefore,
                Plaintiff was not deprived of any due process rights by
                Defendants alleged violation of C.P.P. 18.1.

                We agree. Because Hightower was alleging a deprivation of due

process as the basis of his claim, the fact that he had no due process rights in the

prison procedural regulations requires the conclusion that he failed to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted.1

1
    See White v. Boards-Bey, 426 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Ky. 2014):

                        Prison regulations, even those which include mandatory
                language such as “shall,” do not automatically confer on the
                prisoner an added procedural due process protection. This Court
                refuses to render a prison official’s failure to comply with the
                DOC’s own regulations as a per se denial of procedural due
                process. To do so would be to expand the protections outlined in
                Wolff [v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d
                935 (1974)] to include the extensive procedural requirements set
                forth in the CPP and other countless prison regulations and
                policies, a deviation from which would render that divergence a
                violation of a prisoner’s due process rights.

.

                                               -5-
              The circuit court went on to hold that it appeared Hightower was

alleging negligence on behalf of the named Appellees, arguing that it was their

failure to ensure he was notified of their decision regarding his placement which

led to his failure to appeal, which in turn led to his transfer to the prison where he

was assaulted. The court held that this was too attenuated to form a basis for

holding the Appellees responsible. We point out that Hightower was not even

alleging that the Appellees were responsible for the injuries he received from the

assault, but rather for the formation of scar tissue which occurred years later. See

generally Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Graham, 410 S.W.2d 619, 620

(Ky. 1966) (where original act complained of “only furnishes the occasion of the

injury, it is not the proximate cause thereof.”)

              It was the assault itself, not the formation of scar tissue years later,

that was the genesis of the injury. Thus, the trial court correctly held that the

claim, even had it been viable, was out of time as Hightower had only one year

from the assault in which to file the claim, pursuant to KRS 413.140(1)(a).2 We

affirm this holding as well.

2
 “(1) The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action
accrued:

       (a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of her husband,
       his wife, child, ward, apprentice, or servant[.]”

                                                -6-
                               CONCLUSION

            We affirm the Franklin Circuit Court’s order dismissing Hightower’s

claim against the Appellees.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

James Hightower, pro se                 Kristin Wehking
Central City, Kentucky                  Frankfort, Kentucky

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