Court Opinion

ID: 9632398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:13:05.072856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:14.994496
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT
dissenting:
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the majority accepts the stipulation, agreement, and conditional admission of misconduct (“stipulation”) entered into by the respondent and the deputy disciplinary counsel. The majority further accepts the inquiry panel’s recommendation of a 180-day suspension as the appropriate discipline for the respondent. I dissent because I would reject the stipulation and the recommendation of a 180-day suspension as too lenient for conduct the majority, itself, describes as “serious,” maj. op. at 1364, and “inherently and insidiously harmful,” id. at 1363. Moreover, respondent’s conduct involves: (1) the use of a controlled substance; (2) driving under the influence and then making false statements to police officers investigating an accident caused by the respondent; and (3) inappropriate sexual conduct with clients. Instead, I would remand the ease to the panel for a full hearing.
I.
The respondent, Fred Y. Boyer, has stipulated to numerous facts and several disciplinary violations. In the stipulation entered into by the respondent and the deputy disciplinary counsel, the parties agreed that acceptance of the stipulation would result in imposition of disciplinary sanctions ranging from a public censure to a 180-day suspension.
A.
The respondent stipulated that he engaged in a sexual relationship -with a client while he represented her in a dissolution of marriage. The respondent admitted that his conduct violated DR 1 — 102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) and DR 5-101 (A) (except with the consent of the client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property, or personal interests).
Additionally, the respondent stipulated that he engaged in sexual intercourse with a woman who had consulted the respondent for a dissolution of marriage and who believed that the respondent had undertaken to represent her in the matter. The respondent again admitted that his conduct violates DR 1-102(A)(6) and DR 5-101(A).
B.
In the stipulation entered into by the respondent and the deputy disciplinary counsel, the respondent admits that he used cocaine occasionally during the years 1990 and 1991. This conduct violates DR 1-102(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude) and C.R.C.P. 241.6(5) (any act or omission violating the criminal laws of a state or of the United States constitutes grounds for lawyer discipline).
C.
The stipulation further states that on May 9, 1992, the respondent had been drinking beer while boating at Lake Loveland. As the respondent drove his car to Boulder, he drove into a roadside ditch. The respondent then told his wife, who exited from behind the driver’s seat, “Remember, you were driving.” When questioned, the respondent told a police officer that his wife was driving the vehicle. It was only after his explanation was refuted by an eye witness and he was confronted by the investigating officer that respondent later admitted that he was driving the vehicle. The respondent submitted to a blood test, which indicated that his blood alcohol level was 0.146%. The respondent pleaded guilty to driving under the influence *1366of alcohol and received a deferred judgment and sentence. The respondent stipulated that his conduct violates DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice) and C.R.C.P. 241.6(5) (violation of the criminal laws of a state or of the United States).
II.
Our precedent provides useful guidelines for the appropriate disciplinary sanction to be imposed in this case. In People v. Crossman, 850 P.2d 708 (Colo.1993), this court suspended an attorney for one year and one day after the attorney stipulated that he had solicited sexual favors from three prospective clients. This court accepted the recommended suspension only after considering various mitigating factors, and stated that “[b]ut for these factors in mitigation, we would reject the recommended [suspension of one year and one day] as too lenient.” Id. at 712. Similarly, in People v. Good, 893 P.2d 101, 104-05 (Colo.1995), we rejected the hearing panel’s recommendation that the respondent attorney be suspended for nine months and instead suspended him for one year and one day due to his sexual relationship with a client.
Additionally, this court has evaluated several disciplinary proceedings involving an attorney’s use of cocaine. In People v. Stevens, 866 P.2d 1378 (Colo.1994), this court suspended an attorney for one year and one day for purchasing crack cocaine. In People v. Abelman, 744 P.2d 486 (Colo.1987), this court suspended an attorney for six months for using cocaine. In People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo.1992), we suspended an attorney for one year and one day for using cocaine and for failing to file or pay federal and state taxes. We imposed a lengthier suspension in Holt than in Abelman because the conduct in Holt was more egregious due to the additional violations beyond the use of cocaine. See Holt, 832 P.2d at 950.
This court has also imposed disciplinary sanctions on an attorney for driving under the influence of alcohol as a violation of DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice) and C.R.C.P. 241.6(5) (violation of the criminal laws of a state or of the United States). See People v. Fahselt, 807 P.2d 586 (Colo.1991).
In light of our precedent, I find that the panel’s recommendation of a 180-day suspension in this case is too lenient. We have found that when an attorney engages in sexual conduct with his client, a one-year and one-day suspension is appropriate, even in consideration of mitigating factors. Indeed, in the last four years, this court has not imposed less than a one-year and one-day suspension on an attorney who has engaged in, inter alia, a sexual relationship with a client. See, e.g., People v. Theodore, 926 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Colo.1996); People v. Dawson, 894 P.2d 756, 758 (Colo.1995); Good, 893 P.2d at 102; Crossman, 850 P.2d at 712. We should thus impose disciplinary sanctions in this case comparable to those imposed in the past.
Furthermore, while we have determined that a six-month suspension is an appropriate disciplinary sanction for an attorney’s use of cocaine, Abelman, 744 P.2d 486, we have held that a one-year and one-day suspension was appropriate when an attorney’s use of cocaine was coupled with other violations of the disciplinary rules, see Holt, 832 P.2d 948. In the instant case, the respondent did not merely use cocaine, but also violated other disciplinary rules by engaging in sexual relationships with his clients and by driving while under the influence of alcohol. The respondent’s case is therefore similar to Holt and should be decided accordingly.
The majority nevertheless states: “Our acceptance of the conditional admission and adoption of a suspension for 180 days hinges upon the evidence in the record of respondent’s mental disability and chemical dependency as causative factors in his misconduct, which factors have been addressed through recovery such that recurrence of the misconduct is unlikely. Absent such mitigation, the conduct would certainly warrant more severe discipline.” Maj. op. at 1363. In addition, the majority concludes “we are persuaded [in part] ... because respondent has demonstrated a meaningful period of successful rehabilitation that has likely arrested the misconduct.” Id. at 1364. It is important to *1367note, however, that the 1992 amendments to the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992 Supp.) (ABA Standards), deleted interim rehabilitation as a mitigating factor.1 See People v. Brady, 923 P.2d 887, 889 (Colo.1996) (“ ‘Interim rehabilitation’ as a mitigating factor was ... deleted in 1992.”). I therefore find the majority’s significant reliance on that factor inappropriate.
In attempting to explain the imposition of the sanction here, the majority further states:
Following the recited instances of misconduct, the respondent began intensive psychotherapy and a medication program, both of which continue to date. Respondent’s treating professionals report a positive prognosis and opine that the treatment arrested the misconduct and that recurrence of misconduct is unlikely.
Maj. op. at 1364. Again, I disagree with the majority’s justification for the sanction. As noted above, interim rehabilitation is no longer listed by the ABA Standards as a mitigating factor. Moreover, while I agree with the majority that “[w]e [canjnot excuse respondent’s conduct,” id., I am aware of no lawyer discipline case, and the majority cites none, in which this court has stated that sanctions should be affected by the fact of interim rehabilitation or that the respondent’s conduct has not been repeated. Neither of these factors are considered mitigating factors in our prior case law or in the ABA Standards and we should not open the door to such considerations here.
III.
The stipulation entered into by the respondent and the deputy disciplinary counsel limits the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to a maximum 180-day suspension. In my view, by accepting the stipulation and recommendation, the majority approves of a lower baseline for sanctions that may be imposed for such conduct in the future. Having expressed my dissent today, I will of course apply the standard in future cases. Until then, however, because I do not agree that this new baseline is appropriate in light of respondent’s conduct, and would therefore reject the stipulation and the recommended 180-day suspension, I respectfully dissent.

. On February 4, 1992, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted amendments to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. During that session, subsection (j) — “interim rehabilitation” — was deleted from section 9.32, which lists the factors that may be considered in mitigation. See ABA Standards, Standard 9.3.