Court Opinion

ID: 9856249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:42:37.818859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:17.661509
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for the plaintiff in the motion for rehearing strenuously insists that the instant case is controlled by Independent Life &c. Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 80 Ga. App. 348, supra. Counsel states: “It should be recalled that the Hopkins case and the instant case are virtually identical in almost every respect. There are no material differences in the policy provisions and there are no differences in the facts material to the comparison of these two cases, other than the fact that a ‘hack cutter’ was used in the Hopkins case and a pistol was used in the instant case.” We agree with counsel that this seems to be the only material .difference; however, we direct attention to the language in the Hopkins case as follows: “There is nothing to indicate that it [hack cutter] is such a weapon as would normally be expected to cause death even when used in the manner in which the jury was authorized to find it was used in this case.” It could hardly be argued that a loaded pistol fired in the direction of the insured is not such a weapon as would normally be expected to cause death when used in the manner described. As lucidly stated in Gaynor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 12 Ga. App. 601, 605, supra, “It is rarely ever possible to prove an intent by direct evidence. Intent is something which exists in the human mind and can be manifested only by external acts from which an inference of intent will' arise. If one discharge a pistol, under circumstances which indicate that it was not accidental, there is a conclusive inference that he intended to fire it; and if he pointed at another and fired and hit him, there is a conclusive inference that he intended to hit him, in absence *294of something to rebut such an inference. Now if death does not result, there is ordinarily no such inference that death was intended; but if death does result, an inference of an intent to kill arises, and becomes conclusive, unless it is met and overcome by other circumstances showing the absence of such intent. Where a particular injury is inflicted, there is a conclusive inference that such injury was the probable consequence of the act which inflicted it, and there is, also, a conclusive inference that the person inflicting the injury intended the natural consequence of the act.”
Accordingly, the motion for rehearing is denied.