Court Opinion

ID: 9943135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:12:50.869423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:09.682191
License: Public Domain

J-S37015-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOSE BENITEZ                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2114 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 18, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0005816-2017

BEFORE:       BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2024

       Jose Benitez (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of possessing a controlled

substance with the intent to deliver (PWID), possession of a controlled

substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal conspiracy.1

We affirm.

       On August 25, 2017, the Commonwealth charged Appellant and Yasser

Almanzar (Almanzar) with the above crimes. Appellant and Almanzar each

filed pre-trial motions seeking to suppress evidence obtained from a

warrantless vehicle search. On April 29, 2019, the trial court conducted a

joint suppression hearing.

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (16), (32), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, respectively.
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                            Suppression Hearing

     Philadelphia Police Sergeant Brian Myers testified that on May 22, 2017,

he conducted surveillance of 3329 Bleigh Avenue in response to “numerous

complaints for that address of numerous Hispanic males coming in and out of

the property, carrying packages and different cars leaving the area.” N.T.,

4/29/19, at 28. Although Sergeant Myers confirmed the activity, he did not

see Appellant or Almanzar during the May 22, 2017 surveillance. Id. at 42.

     In a prior decision, this Court explained:

     On May 24, 2017, Sergeant Myers returned to 3329 Bleigh Avenue
     to conduct additional surveillance. Sergeant Myers received
     assistance from Officer Edward Slater, who was conducting
     surveillance of [a] white Jeep at 2204 Stanwood Street. Officer
     Slater observed [Appellant] exit the property and walk to the Jeep.
     At the same time, Mr. Almanzar arrived in a white Chevrolet
     Malibu, which he “backed up to the white Jeep, so the trunk of the
     Chevy was facing the trunk of the” Jeep. [Appellant] retrieved
     a large, green bag from the trunk of the Jeep and
     transferred it into the trunk of the Chevrolet. Mr. Almanzar
     drove off in the Chevrolet, and [Appellant] subsequently left in the
     Jeep.

     Officer Slater followed the Chevrolet, and Sergeant Myers joined
     the pursuit. Once the Chevrolet pulled over on the 3000 block of
     Gilford Street, Sergeant Myers decided to stop the vehicle for
     further investigation. A search of the trunk revealed 1,150
     bundles of heroin inside [a] green bag. Sergeant Myers contacted
     a back-up officer and ordered him to conduct a stop of [Appellant]
     in the Jeep. The back-up officer stopped the Jeep, but did not
     discover any drugs.

                                     ***

     Officer Slater testified that he had served as a police officer for
     twelve years with two-and-a-half years of narcotics work. Officer
     Slater had conducted approximately ten narcotics investigations
     in the neighborhood at issue, “usually pertaining to bag houses of
     heroin.” Although Officer Slater observed [Appellant] retrieve the

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       bag from the trunk of the Jeep and transfer it to the Chevrolet, he
       did not observe any drugs or the exchange of money.

       Mr. Almanzar also testified, stating he had received permission to
       drive the Chevrolet from a man named “Jose.” Although Jose was
       “not really a close friend,” Mr. Almanzar asked to borrow the
       Chevrolet after seeing Jose “one day at the barbershop.” Mr.
       Almanzar told Jose he “needed to pick up baby clothes,” and Jose
       agreed that he could use the car for the day.

Commonwealth v. Benitez, No. 1462 EDA 2019, unpublished memorandum

at 1-2 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 15, 2020) (emphasis added, citations to notes

of testimony omitted).

       At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court found “the

evidence to be insufficient to meet probable cause for stopping the vehicle.”

N.T., 4/29/19, at 119. Thus, the court granted Appellant’s motion to suppress

evidence obtained from the vehicle search. The Commonwealth appealed.2

       On appeal, we determined that Appellant “did not even occupy the

Chevrolet at the time of the search.             Absent more, [Appellant] had no

demonstrable, reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in a vehicle he did

not own and for which he could show no authority to occupy or operate.”

Benitez, supra at 4.         We concluded the trial court “should have denied

[Appellant’s] suppression motion concerning the contraband recovered from

____________________________________________

2  The trial court also granted Almanzar’s suppression motion.           The
Commonwealth appealed, and this Court affirmed the grant of suppression.
Commonwealth v. Almanzar, No. 1463 EDA 2019, unpublished
memorandum at 6 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 15, 2020) (agreeing “officers lacked
facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
[Almanzar] was committing a crime”).

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the Chevrolet.” Id. Accordingly, we reversed the order granting suppression

and remanded for further proceedings.

      Following remand, Appellant and the Commonwealth declined recusal of

the trial court judge. Therefore, the judge who presided at the suppression

hearing also presided at Appellant’s bench trial.

                                  Bench Trial

      The trial court held Appellant’s bench trial on December 8, 2021. The

parties stipulated to the admission of the transcript from the suppression

hearing, which the trial court admitted as Exhibit C-1. N.T., 12/8/21, at 11.

The parties also stipulated to the admission of Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-2

(“collectively being the property receipts”), and Exhibit C-3 (“being the seizure

analysis”). Id. at 11-13. The Commonwealth explained:

      [Exhibit] C-2 is property receipts that if Officer Myers were to
      testify, he would testify he made these recoveries from Property
      Receipts 3306701 through ending in 707. He filled these out and
      they correspond with [Exhibit] C-3, which is the seizure analysis
      that if George Daisy were to testify, he is a forensic scientist for
      the Philadelphia Police Chemistry Unit[, who] filled out a lab report
      indicating Property Receipt 3306701 contained 14,483 packets
      labeled “Westbrook” off-white powder.          These items were
      analyzed and tested positive for heroin.

Id. at 12-13. With the “stipulations on the record, and [exhibits] moved into

evidence,” the Commonwealth rested. Id. at 14.

      The defense presented testimony from Appellant’s wife, Jennifer

Martinez. Ms. Martinez testified that on May 24, 2017, she needed to use the

couple’s one car, so Appellant borrowed the white Jeep from “his friend[, who

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like Appellant, was] named Jose.” Id. at 18. Ms. Martinez stated, “I just

know him as Jose. I think it’s Santiago.” Id. She also testified to giving

police permission to search the couple’s home, where police recovered

approximately $5,000 in cash. Id. at 20-24. According to Ms. Martinez, she

and Appellant got the money from “selling a car 15 days prior.” Id. at 21.

       Appellant also testified. Like Ms. Martinez, Appellant testified that he

borrowed the Jeep from his friend, Jose Santiago. Id. at 26, 29.3 Appellant

stated that if he “had known” what was in the Jeep, he “wouldn’t have even

touched it.” Id. at 26. Appellant explained:

       I took [the Jeep] back home and I parked it there. I just parked
       it there because it was still about 30 minutes before I had to go
       pick up the kids. So what I did is I put the [J]eep in front of my
       house and[,] about 30 minutes later[,] Almanzar called me to do
       a favor for him and to open the [J]eep.

Id. at 26-27.

       Defense counsel asked Appellant:

       [COUNSEL:]           Where was Mr. Almanzar when you opened up
                            the [J]eep?

       A                    He was on the side behind the car and the
                            [J]eep.

       Q                    Was there a bag in the [J]eep?

       A                    Yes.

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth asked Appellant if he recalled Almanzar testifying at the

suppression hearing that “the same person let [Almanzar] borrow his car
where [Almanzar] was caught with the drugs?” N.T., 12/8/21, at 33.
Appellant responded: “No, I mean, I was paying attention about me. I don’t
know.” Id.

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       Q                    Who picked the bag up from the [J]eep?

       A                    He opened the trunk and he picked up the bag
                            and he put it in his car.

       Q                    So he picked up the bag from the [J]eep and put
                            it in the trunk of his car?

       A                    Yes.

       Q                    Did you have any idea or did you know what was
                            in that bag?

       A                    No, no.

Id. at 27-28.

       After Appellant testified, counsel made closing arguments, and the trial

court called a brief recess “to review the notes of testimony.” Id. at 48. When

the court returned, it announced that it found Appellant “guilty of all charges.”

Id. at 52.

       On March 18, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of five years’ probation for PWID and conspiracy, “concurrent with no

further penalty on the remaining charges.”          Trial Court Opinion (TCO),

12/15/22, at 1. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial

court denied on July 27, 2022. Appellant timely appealed. On September 16,

2022, Appellant filed a court-ordered concise statement.4

____________________________________________

4 The trial court ordered Appellant “to provide this [c]ourt with a Statement of

the Matters Complained of on Appeal within twenty (21) days of the date of
this Order.” Order, 8/18/22. Appellant’s counsel filed the concise statement
approximately one week late, on September 16, 2022. As the trial court did
not deem the statement untimely and addressed Appellant’s issue, we proceed
as if the statement was timely filed. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213 A.3d
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant presents one question for review:

       Was the testimony presented sufficient to sustain the conviction
       for [PWID]?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

       When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we determine

       whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable
       inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most
       favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the
       conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is sufficient
       evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the
       crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the
       sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

       The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
       possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
       part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the
       province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our
       judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden
       may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt
       about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder
       unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
       of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
       circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 302 A.3d 117, 120 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

       Appellant challenges his conviction of PWID, which is defined as:

       the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
       manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not
       registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or
       licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating,

____________________________________________

1004, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2019) (declining to find waiver or remand where the
“trial court did not comment on the untimely filing of [the a]ppellant’s Rule
1925(b) statement and, in fact, it addressed all of the issues raised therein”).

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      delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit
      controlled substance.

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

      To sustain a PWID conviction, “the Commonwealth must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled substance and

did so with the intent to deliver it.” Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882 A.2d

1008, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

      In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a
      PWID conviction, all facts and circumstances surrounding the
      possession are relevant, and the Commonwealth may establish
      the essential elements of the crime wholly by circumstantial
      evidence. Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849, 853-
      54 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). Factors to consider in
      determining whether the drugs were possessed with the intent to
      deliver include the particular method of packaging, the form of the
      drug, and the behavior of the defendant. Commonwealth v.
      Kirkland, 831 A.2d 607, 610 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
      omitted).

Id.

      Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient because the “quantum of

the evidence is [Appellant] moved a package from one vehicle to another.”

Appellant’s Brief at 14. He claims there was no evidence he knew “of the

contraband inside the package.     Further, there was no intent to exercise

conscious dominion of the contraband. Despite law enforcement having prior

information regarding criminal activity, it did not relate to Appellant.”   Id.

Appellant concludes that “[p]icking up a bag and moving it from one vehicle

to another, without opening it, contradicts any inference the Commonwealth

may be entitled to as the verdict winner.” Id. at 17.

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      The Commonwealth argues Appellant’s claim “is both inapposite and

meritless” because “the evidence in fact established that he actually possessed

the drugs.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 2. We agree that Appellant’s issue lacks

merit.

      Before announcing its verdict, the trial court stated:

      All parties have agreed that I can proceed as the fact finder in this
      waiver trial in spite of my prior findings. So I must view this case
      in consideration of the evidence now being allowed in the hearing.

      In reviewing the testimony that has been incorporated, the
      evidence is no longer suppressed and it stands in this case. So as
      the testimony pertaining to that evidence, I have carefully
      considered the arguments of both counsel.

N.T., 12/8/21, at 49.

      The trial court referenced Sergeant Myers’ suppression hearing

testimony in finding that Appellant conducted “an orchestrated delivery.” Id.

at 52. The court noted that both Sergeant Myers and Officer Slater “observed

Appellant transfer the bag (later found to contain heroin) from [the Jeep] to

Mr. Almanzar’s car.” TCO at 7. The court further found the heroin was “for

distribution and not personal use” based on “the weight/amount of drugs,

[and] individual packaging and labeling.” Id. Pertinently, the trial court “did

not find [Appellant’s] version of events convincing or credible.” Id.

      Our review reveals no error, as the evidence was sufficient to sustain

Appellant’s conviction.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 2/22/2024

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