Court Opinion

ID: 9643251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:23:51.388659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.842001
License: Public Domain

WITMER, District Judge.
I fully concur in the opinion expressed by Judge BUFFINGTON, but I am further of the opinion that the validity of the search warrant is not necessarily decisive of the matter in dispute, as was said in the following opinion of this court, filed-February 9, 1923:
“This case comes before the court upon an appeal from a final decree of the District Court, ordering the return to the petitioner, Albert H. Queek, executor of Harry P. Queek, deceased, of twenty-four (24) eases and ten quarts (10) of whisky, which were seized by' federal prohibition agents under a search warrant. The facts briefly, so far. as they are material, are as follows:
“Harry P. Queek, from whom the liquors were taken, was on July 17, 1920, in the hotel and saloon business at 705 Amity street, Homestead, Allegheny county, Pa. The premises were used, however, only in part for this purpose, the remainder being occupied by him as a residence. A search warrant was obtained upon affidavit of a federal prohibition agent to search the premises of Harry P. Queek, at 705 Amity street, and upon the search that followed under the warrant there was taken from his premises the liquor mentioned. Subsequently an information was filed against Queek to No. 243, November term, 1920, United States District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania. Before any proceedings were had thereon, however, Queek, died on April 9, 1921. Up to the time of his death no petition had been received in relation to the search warrant or the whisky seized thereunder. On June 7, 1921, the last will and testament of Harry P. Queek was probated, and Albert H- Queek qualified as executor. Nothing further appears to have been done until June 29, 1922, when, upon motion of the United States attorney, the court entered a nolle prosequi to the criminal information filed.
“On July' 29, 1922, over two years from the-date of the seizure, and over a year after the death of Queek, a petition was filed by the executor, praying that the search warrant and affidavit be declared void, and that an order be entered directing the return to the estate of the' liquor seized. • A rule was awarded, commanding Elmer G. *81Hawker, group head in charge of the Pittsburgh prohibition office, to show cause why the prayer of the 'petition should not be granted. The petition of the executor, among other things, alleges: ‘(3) That pri- or to national prohibition going into effect your petitioner’s decedent, Harry P. Queek, owned and had in his possession a number of cases of whisky which was undisposed of at the time when national prohibition went into effect on January 17, 1920, and has stored it away in his private storeroom and one of his bedroom presses in that part of the hotel building which he had formerly set aside as his private apartments ov private dwelling place for himself and family, and at the time of the grievances hereinafter complained of, and up to the time of the decedent’s death, April 9, 1921.’
“The respondent, Elmer Gr. Hawker, filed an answer, and among other things says, as to paragraph 2 of the petition: ‘Defendant has no information relative to the averments made in the third paragraph of the petition, and, if material, demands proof thereof. For further answer respondent avers that the liquor seized upon ihe premises of Harry P. Queek, deceased, was all nonbeverage whisky, that is, whisky withdrawn from bond after the National Prohibition Act became effective, and that said liquor could not lawfully be used for beverage purposes.’ And he says in paragraph 5 of his answer: ‘Respondent denies that said liquor was lawful personal property of Harry P. Queek, held by him for beverage purposes, as alleged, and avers that all of said liquor was withdrawn from bond after the National Prohibition Act became effective, aiid that said liquor could not be lawfully possessed for beverage purposes.’ He also defends the validity of the search warrant.
“The court below, in an opinion filed August 18, 1922, held that: ‘As the record does not show any finding of probable cause by the commissioner, we think the warrant fatally defective, and therefore the seizure thereunder illegal. Entertaining these views, the search warrant being invalid, the seizure was necessarily illegal, and the goods seized thereunder are directed to he returned in accordance with the prayer of ihe petition.’ An order was accordingly entered to which exception was taken.
“Whether the search warrant is valid or not is not the determining factor in the case. Since, in any event, we would be confronted with the same proposition, that of decedent’s title to the liquor, he having died before his guilt was determined on the charge of violation of the National Prohibition Act. If he legally'possessed sueh liquor when it was taken from him, his estate is entitled to its return, whatever the means of seizure may have been; if otherwise, having then no legal title to the same, the rule is to he dismissed.
“That a person may lawfully possess liquor, whore sueh was acquired lawfully pri- or to the effective date of the National Prohibition Act, is not doubted. Section 33, title 2 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 30338%t), Act of October 28, 1919, known as the National Prohibition Act;. State v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. et al., 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. 31, 65 L. Ed. 151, 10 A. L. R. 1548. On the other hand, it is equally clear that no property rights exist in intoxicating liquor fit for beverage purposes acquired subsequent to the effective date of such act. Section 25, tjtle 2, of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138%m); Rose v. United States (C. C. A.) 274 Fed. 245-252; United States v. Rykowski (D. C.) 267 Fed. 866; United States v. Kozman (D. C.) 267 Fed. 866.
“In section 25 it is provided that ‘it shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property designed for the manufacture, of liquor intended for use in violating this title or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such liquor or property.’ It is further provided in section 33, supra: ‘After February 3, 1920, the possession of liquors by any person not legally permitted under this title to possess liquor shall be prima facia evidence that such liquor is kept for the purpose of being sold, bartered, exchanged, given away, furnished, or otherwise disposed of in violation of the provisions of this title.’
“In the Rykoski and Kozman Cases the court held that, while the searches and seizures were not of such a nature as the law provided, under the Silverthorne Lumber Company Case, the government was not able to avail itself of the information derived from its agents’ unwarranted action. However, it was ordered that in neither of the cases should any of the illicit mash or liquors taken be returned, since the same were pronounced as contraband. In United States v. O’Dowd (D. C.) 273 Fed. 600, Judge Westenhaver puts the matter pointedly saying that the property seized in this case (being liquor illegally acquired) is ‘like stolen property. No title to or property in it can exist in the defendant.’
“Under the above provisions of the act no property right shall at present exist in *82liquors, unless tlie same were lawfully acquired and so used. No man can have any right of property in contraband liquor. As soon as it comes into existence it is forfeited. Elrod v. Moss (C. C. A.) 278 Fed. 123-129; United States v. Alexander (D. C.) 278 Fed. 308; Hall v. United States (C. C. A.) 267 Fed. 795. The appellee has laid stress upon the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654, as announcing the rule that intoxicating liquors seized upon an illegal search warrant or without such search warrant must be returned under any circumstances. In the instant case the liquor was seized without warrant of any kind, and a petition was presented for the return of the property; the petition alleging that the same was seized in the petitioner’s home by government agents without warrant of any kind. The petition was denied, and at the trial a motion to prevent such property and the testimony relating, thereto being given in evidence against the accused was also denied. There does not appear to have been any denial of the petitioner’s title, nor that the same was lawfully possessed by the accused. The question as to whether the liquor was contraband was not before the court, and the return of it does not appear to have been opposed by counsel for the government. The sole question upon which this opinion seems to be based was a consideration as to whether such property should have been permitted in use as evidence against the defendant. While the language itself may appear somewhat broad, we do not think that the Supreme Court intended to pass upon the further question of whether the petitioner would have been entitled to more than its exclusion from evidence. In this conclusion we share the opinion expressed in O’Connor v. Potter (D. C.) 276 Fed. 32-33; O’Connor v. United States (D. C.) 281 Fed. 396.
“In the matter before us, the executor of Harry P. Queck alleges in his petition that the decedent owned and had in his possession the liquor in question at the time national prohibition went into effect, on January 17, 1920, and had it stored away in his private storeroom, etc. The defendant in his answer denies this allegation, and alleges that the liquor seized was all nonbeverage whisky, which could not lawfully be possessed as alleged by the petitioner. No testimony was taken, the court ordering the return of the liquor on the ground that the search warrant was invalid. In view of the issue raised by the petition and answer, as to whether there was any property right in the petitioner’s decedent entitling his estate to a returú thereof, the order of the court below was in error, and is therefore reversed. The ease is therefore remanded to that court for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.”