Court Opinion

ID: 9603610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:08:16.371693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:13.239500
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
PART I. CONCURRING
I concur with all that Justice Johnson has written other than his reversing and remanding language, and other than the reasoning which gets him to such a conclusion.
PART II. DISSENTING
On page 11 of Justice Johnson’s opinion the first paragraph of Part IV states:
In its memorandum decision on post-trial motions the trial court stated that Dr. Dick had not requested a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a) and that “this court is, therefore, without the authority to review the verdict of liability under that rule.” R. 104.
This particular opening sentence of Part IV is practically a restatement of the beginning of Dr. Dick defendant/appellant’s brief on this one issue:
The trial court held that because Defendant/Appellant did not request a new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), and Plaintiffs/Respondents requested a new trial on the issue of damages only, the trial court was without authority to review the verdict of liability.
Such was an inaccurate recitation of what the trial court wrote, and the Dr. Dick brief has obviously misguided the majority opinion. Entirely different is the language used by the district court:
It must be noted that the defense has not requested a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), and this court is, therefore, without authority to review the verdict of liability under that rule. Therefore, a new trial on damages is ordered unless the defendant accepts this court’s additur.
It is seen that the Dr. Dick brief was in error in saying that the trial court held itself without authority to review the verdict of liability [meaning to do so in considering a grant of a new trial on liability] only because defendant/appellant [Dr. Dick] had not so requested. The trial court was simply taking note that there was on file no defendant/appellant [Dr. Dick] motion for a new trial on liability, and that rule having not been invoked by the defendant/appellant, the court had no authority under that rule, i.e., 59(a).
Moreover, the trial court’s statement to that effect was not a statement hanging in open air, but rather the end of a paragraph where it can be said, without fear of contradiction, the district court demonstrates that it did consider the defendant/appellant’s argument that there should be a whole new trial:
This court has considered the defendant’s argument that if a new trial on damages is required under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), a new trial would also be required on the issue of liability. Defendant argues that the verdict was a compromise verdict, and that the finding of damages was so intertwined with the finding of liability, any prejudice found in the damage award would be inextricably linked to the jury’s verdict with respect to liability. A careful review of the record does not disclose, in any manner, how this verdict was a compromise verdict. It must be noted that the defense has not requested a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), and this court is, therefore, without the authority to review the verdict of liability under that rule. Therefore, a new trial on damages is ordered unless the defendant accepts this court’s additur.
The trial court understood very well the defendant/appellant’s argument that the verdict was a compromise verdict. Defendant/appellant in her brief (p. 16) filed in this court states, “Thus, even ignoring Rule 59, the trial court had the authority to review the verdict of liability, and to decide the question of whether the verdict for Plaintiff James Smallwood was a compromised verdict.” I humbly submit that the trial court did exactly that, did “decide the question of whether the verdict for plain*871tiff James Smallwood was a compromise verdict.” Finding that it was not, after a careful review of the record, the new trial was limited to the issue of damages.
An open and reasoning mind can draw no other conclusion from the trial court’s own language:
Defendant argues that the verdict was a compromise verdict, and that the finding of damages was so intertwined with the finding of liability, any prejudice found in the damage award would be inextricably linked to the jury’s verdict with respect to liability. A careful review of the record does not disclose, in any manner, how this verdict was a compromise verdict.
It cannot be said that the trial court considered itself without authority to consider defendant’s contention that the jury’s verdict was a compromise entitling it to a new trial on the issue of liability. It has to be conceded and said that the district court in fact did consider the issue, and did rule on it.
I mention also a problem with some language at p. 865, 761 P.2d at 1217 of the majority opinion, which, taken together with the erroneous conclusion that the trial court did not know of the independent authority to award new trials, seems to be the predicate which is thought to justify reversing the trial court:
We are unsure whether the statement by the trial court in its order of judgment that ‘the evidence at trial established the liability of [Dr. Dick] for the injuries suffered by the [Smallwoods] as a matter of law’ was intended to be a finding that liability was close in this case.
To adjust it to my own capabilities of reading comprehension, I have broken it down into two sentences:
The trial court stated that ‘the evidence at trial established the liability of [Dr. Dick] for the injuries suffered by the [Smallwoods] as a matter of law.’ We are unsure whether that statement was intended to be a finding that liability was a close issue.
First, it is noted that this appeared in an Order of Judgment which the trial court entered following and pursuant to the 20 page MEMORANDUM DECISION ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS, which was declared to constitute the court’s findings and conclusions on the issues presented. The order recited the court’s four main rulings:
That the verdict of the jury in the sum of $356,714.12 was inadequate and rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice and was not in accordance wit the evidence as presented at the trial.
******
That the evidence conclusively demonstrated that Plaintiffs suffered damages greatly in excess of the amount awarded by the jury, namely the sum of $1,033,-530.00.
******
That the evidence at trial established the liability of the Defendant for the injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs as a matter of law.
******
That the Defendant is entitled to an offset in the sum of $375,000 against the total damages for the purposes of determining an Additur.
The Memorandum Decision did not purport to be an order; it merely provided the court’s ratio decedeni in passing on the issues presented. An order was required; the order was entered.
The concern expressed in Justice Johnson’s opinion is the third ruling, i.e., does that ruling amount to a finding that liability was a close issue? Or, otherwise put, was the trial court intending to say that liability was a close issue?
One would surmise that if the trial court thought this to be a close issue, and intended to say so, the court was articulate enough to say so. If that were the case, the court would not have ruled that the defendant was liable to the plaintiffs as a matter of law. I can only express a great concern that the trial court’s plain language can be so misunderstood. “As a matter of law” constitutes words of art that have many applications, i.e., in passing on motions for summary judgment, in pass*872ing on motions for directed verdicts, and in passing on motions for judgment n.o.v. Attorneys may not know what “as a matter of law means” from this day forward, but they have known heretofore that it is equivalent to saying that on a given issue reasonable minds could not differ. In this particular case the trial court used that language in a ruling which had to do with the defendant’s argument for a new trial on the issue of liability, claiming that the jury had arrived at a compromise verdict.
The trial bar may be very disheartened to see appellate jurists having a problem with plainly written and well-recognized English language which is peculiar to the legal profession.
The result achieved by the majority is based solely upon the view that Judge Hurlbutt was under the incorrect impression that he could not independently order a new trial on liability. To be more explicit, at p. 866, 761 P.2d at 1218 of the opinion it is stated that the trial “court misperceived [failed to recognize] its authority under I.R.C.P. 59 to consider granting a new trial on both the issue of liability and the issue of damages.” In support of that statement paragraph (d) of Rule 59 is cited and quoted.
I doubt that any of our Idaho judges at any level are not aware of Rule 59(d), and also that most trial practitioners of more than three years experience are likewise aware. It is one thing to say, as did the trial court, that without the defendant having filed a 59(a) motion, it could not grant an unmade motion — but quite another thing to imply that the court did not know of its own power to do so — assuming that it perceived some compulsion for doing so. Why should the court feel any such compulsion when the defendant, full well knowing the state of the record, did not bother to make any such motion? A review of the record satisfied the mind of the trial court that the defendant was liable as a matter of law. This Court does not meet that issue, does not overrule the trial court’s considered ruling after review. How, now?
This case, more than any other is as close to being a case of res ipsa loquitur negligence as one might expect to encounter. This defendant doctor in the exercise of her specialty failed to observe the observable.
The trial court was clearly of the view that the defendant’s liability was not a close issue, and obviously would have granted the plaintiff a judgment n.o.v. on liability had the jury mis-fired on that issue. In that regard it is not necessary to speculate, but to merely rely upon the court’s statement that liability was established as a matter of law.
It is too stretching of credulity to assert that the trial court — in this case of all cases — did not know the provisions of Rule 59(d). There was no basis for the court to grant the defendant/appellant a liability second trial on her own motion, or even on a defendant/appellant’s motion, had one been made. The defendant/appellant only sought to argue a compromise verdict, did so, and the court correctly ruled against the contention. A trial court better than an appellate court knows the case over which it has presided for three weeks, and, ordinarily is said to be entitled to considerable deference when its findings are challenged.
This action was filed five years ago, and although like Judge Towles and Judge Oliver, I register “no objection” to Justice Johnson’s proposal to remand for the reconsideration of a motion the trial court has already ruled upon, I can see no reason for so doing, and until now did not realize that I could object. I simply disagree. To the defendant/appellant’s delight, I am certain, the effort to lead some members of this Court astray has succeeded. However, the trial judge will be seen as more learned and more acute.
West Publishing Company may have difficulty in writing the headnotes for this case. There are three votes which say that the trial court was not in error in ruling that the defendant/appellant was liable as a matter of law, which certainly does not indicate that the issue on liability was close. Far from it. And with three votes that should surface from West as a holding *873in the case, which so long as it stands is the law of the case.