Court Opinion

ID: 9384870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 14:07:56.03265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.955258
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00062-CR

         KENDALL RASHID DIXON, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

         On Appeal from the 188th District Court
                 Gregg County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 51,880-A

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

            After a traffic stop, a drug dog alerted on a vehicle driven by Kendall Rashid Dixon.

Officers searched Dixon’s vehicle and found drugs, including cocaine. As a result, a Gregg

County jury convicted Dixon of possession with intent to deliver one or more, but less than four,

grams of cocaine and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. In his points of error on

appeal, Dixon argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his suppression motion, which

sought to suppress the physical and video evidence obtained from the traffic stop and Dixon’s

statement that he was responsible for the contents of the vehicle.

            Except for Dixon’s statement, we find that the trial court properly overruled Dixon’s

motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop because the State met its burden to

show that Dixon’s traffic stop was legal and not excessive in intensity or scope. We also find

that Dixon was not harmed by the admission of his statement accepting responsibility for the

contents of the vehicle. Even so, we modify the judgment to reflect the proper description of

Dixon’s offense. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.          The Trial Court Properly Overruled Dixon’s Motion to Suppress Evidence
            Obtained from the Traffic Stop1

            Brant Smith, a trooper with the Texas Highway Patrol, conducted a traffic stop of a

vehicle driven by Dixon. After a K-9 unit alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle, Smith

conducted a search of the vehicle, found cocaine, and placed Dixon under arrest. Dixon filed a

motion to suppress evidence obtained because of the traffic stop and argued that the trial court

erred by failing to grant it. We disagree.

1
    We omit Dixon’s complained-of statement from this analysis and address it separately in the following section.
                                                            2
         A.       Evidence at the Suppression Hearing

         Smith testified that there was “an uptick in shootings and drug dealing” at Angie B’s

nightclub in Longview, Texas. Although he had not observed Dixon at Angie B’s, Smith was

informed by another law enforcement officer that Dixon had left the nightclub’s parking lot in a

white Lincoln Town Car. Other officers told Smith that the car was seen in a nearby hospital

parking lot.

         Smith testified that he spotted the Lincoln Town Car after it left the hospital and that he

began following it. Smith ran the car’s Oklahoma tag, but “it did not come back to any return,”

indicating that the car may not have been properly registered.2 Smith then witnessed three traffic

violations. According to Smith, Dixon (1) “[f]ailed to stop at [a] designat[ed] stopping point, at

a stop sign, designated white line,” (2) “failed to signal at least 100 feet” before turning on a

public roadway, and (3) failed to signal at all as he turned “into the McDonald’s parking lot.”

Smith’s dash-camera video recording, which was played for the trial court, did not reveal the

first traffic violation and was not so clear as to be conclusive of the second traffic offense, but

corroborated the third traffic offense.

         Smith pulled Dixon over in the parking lot and approached him. In describing Dixon’s

demeanor, Smith said, “[Dixon] did not want to make eye contact, and he . . . became

argumentative right off the start as soon as I made contact with him.” When Smith asked Dixon

to identify himself, Dixon admitted that he did not have a driver’s license. Instead, Dixon

handed Smith his identification card and told Smith that he had “a warrant out for [his] arrest.”

2
 Smith testified that “[s]ubjects that are involved in drug trade . . . don’t have anything tied to their name” to prevent
a civil forfeiture.
                                                            3
Smith entered Dixon’s information into his patrol unit’s database, realized that Dixon did not

have any outstanding warrant, but noted that he had prior arrests for theft offenses and

possession of drugs.

       According to Smith, Dixon claimed that he was coming from his girlfriend’s house

instead of from Angie B’s and was untruthful about his criminal history. Initially, Dixon

emphatically told Smith that he had “never” been arrested on any drug charge. When Smith said

that the patrol unit’s database showed Dixon had been arrested for drug possession, Dixon said

he might have been arrested for marihuana as a child, prompting Smith to say that the prior drug

charge was “not so far back in the past.”

       When Smith asked Dixon for consent to search the vehicle, Dixon denied Smith’s

request. A drug dog that was already at the scene was brought to Dixon’s car and alerted when it

walked around the vehicle. After the dog alerted, Smith said Dixon was not free to leave. He

then searched the car, found drugs, and handcuffed Dixon.

       Smith testified that he was suspicious of Dixon because he “was coming from a targeted

area . . . currently under investigation due to the ongoing problems of drug transactions,

shootings, fights and other problems.” According to Smith, that fact, coupled with the traffic

violations and Dixon’s criminal history, justified the canine search. Smith testified that he had

not completed the traffic stop at the time of the search, still had the option of giving Dixon a

warning or a ticket for the traffic violations, and eventually decided to issue Dixon warnings for

the traffic violations “[a]nd maybe a no-driver’s-license citation.”

                                                 4
       B.      Applicable Law and Standard of Review

       “Any peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation of

[the Rules of the Road] subtitle [of the Texas Transportation Code].” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 543.001; see State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting TEX.

TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001). “The fact that the officer may have had another subjective

motive for seizing [a driver]” does not invalidate “an objectively reasonable seizure.” Gray, 158

S.W.3d at 469–70 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). A peace officer who

undisputedly witnesses a traffic violation has “probable cause to believe [a driver has] committed

an offense under the Rules of the Road statutes.” Id. at 469.

       Here, pointing to the dash-camera recording, Dixon argues that Smith did not clearly

witness any traffic offense. Even so, “[a]n officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if the

‘reasonable suspicion’ standard is satisfied.” State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018) (quoting Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)).

“Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has ‘specific articulable facts that, when combined

with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular

person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaged in criminal activity.’” Jaganathan v. State,

479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).

       “We review a reasonable suspicion determination by considering the totality of the

circumstances.” Cortez, 543 S.W.3d at 204 (citing Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001)). “When a police officer stops a defendant without a warrant, the State has the

                                                5
burden of proving the reasonableness of the stop at a suppression hearing.” Id. (citing Russell v.

State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), disapproved of on other grounds by Handy v.

State, 189 S.W.3d 296, 299 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Because Dixon was arrested without a

warrant, the State had the burden to prove that the initial traffic stop was legal. See id.; Ford,

158 S.W.3d at 492.

          “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on appeal for abuse of

discretion.” Id. at 203 (quoting Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). The

trial court’s decision will be sustained if it is correct under any applicable theory of law. Id. We

will reverse the trial court’s ruling “only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or ‘outside the zone of

reasonable disagreement.’” Id. (quoting State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014)).

          We determine whether a law enforcement officer’s “reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity” is supported by the totality of the circumstances using a bifurcated standard of review:

“[f]irst, we ‘give “almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts

that the record supports,” and second, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law

to facts, which do not turn on credibility and demeanor.’” Id. at 203–04 (quoting Abney v. State,

394 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009))). Also, “we review de novo whether the totality of circumstances is

sufficient to support an officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at 204 (quoting

Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49).

                                                 6
       “When the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, as in the case before us, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the trial court

made implicit findings of fact supported by the record.” Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Robino

v. State, 548 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.). “If the trial court’s

decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will affirm the decision.”

Robino, 548 S.W.3d at 113 (citing Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56; Maysonet v. State, 91 S.W.3d

365, 369 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d)).

       C.      The State Met Its Burden to Show the Initial Traffic Stop Was Legal

       “If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting that a person has committed a traffic

offense, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. The officer also may detain a person who

commits a traffic violation.” Zervos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000,

pet. ref’d) (citing Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). “The standard

requires only ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for the stop.” Hamal v. State, 390

S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010)).

       The Texas Transportation Code requires “[a]n operator intending to turn a vehicle right

or left” to “signal continuously for not less than the last 100 feet of movement of the vehicle

before the turn.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.104(b). The dash-camera recording showed

Smith’s patrol car approaching Dixon’s vehicle in the dark when Dixon stopped at an

intersection. As the patrol car neared Dixon’s car, Dixon used his turn signal when stopped at

                                                 7
the intersection. Because of the distance between Smith and Dixon, the recording does not show

exactly when Dixon began using his turn signal. As a result, Dixon argues that “the videos . . .

suggest that Smith could not have seen” the traffic violation. However, Smith testified that he

could see Dixon’s vehicle despite the distance and that “[Dixon] did not turn [his signal] on

within 100 feet.” As the fact-finder, the trial court was free to find Smith’s testimony credible,

and its determination of that historical fact is entitled to total deference.

        Also, Smith testified that Dixon failed to signal at all while turning into a McDonald’s

parking lot, a fact corroborated by the dash-camera recording. The Texas Transportation Code

requires an operator to use a signal “to indicate an intention to turn.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 545.104(a).

        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we find that

the trial court properly concluded that Smith had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.

        D.      The Stop Was Not Excessive in Intensity or Scope

        “An investigative stop that is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth

Amendment because of excessive intensity or scope.” Fisher v. State, 481 S.W.3d 403, 407

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Young v. State, 420 S.W.3d 139, 142 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.)). This is because “[a] traffic stop made for the purpose of

investigating a traffic violation must be reasonably related to that purpose and may not be

prolonged beyond the time to complete the tasks associated with the traffic stop.” Lerma, 543

S.W.3d at 190. “During a traffic stop the officer may request certain information from a driver,

such as the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance, and run a computer

                                                   8
check on that information.” Id. “An officer is also permitted to ask drivers . . . about matters

unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long as the questioning does not measurably extend the

duration of the stop.” Id.

       Immediately after Smith initially approached Dixon, Dixon admitted that he did not have

a driver’s license. The Texas Transportation Code requires a person to possess a valid driver’s

license when operating a motor vehicle on a public highway.             TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 521.021; Marzett v. McCraw, 511 S.W.3d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied). As

a result of Dixon’s admission, Smith’s continued investigation was justified. See TEX. TRANSP.

CODE ANN. § 543.001; see also Gray, 158 S.W.3d at 469.

       As for the information gathered during the continued investigation, we note that “the

officer does not need to develop reasonable suspicion that a particular crime has been or is about

to be committed; rather, the facts need only suggest ‘that something illegal was afoot.’” Fisher,

481 S.W.3d at 408 (quoting United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing

United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 509 (5th Cir. 2004))). “If such facts exist, ‘the police

[are] entitled, as long as they [act] with reasonable diligence, to pursue several plausible theories

in attempting to resolve the suspicion that reasonably had been created . . . .’” Id. (alterations in

original) (quoting Pack, 612 F.3d at 355).

       During the investigation of the initial traffic stop and Dixon’s lack of a driver’s license,

Dixon lied about coming from Angie B’s, a nightclub known for high crime and drug

                                                 9
trafficking.3 “If a false answer to a particular question would suggest a suspect’s involvement in

criminal activity, then a possibly false answer can help to establish reasonable suspicion.”

Hamal, 390 S.W.3d at 307. Smith also testified that Dixon (1) did not want to make eye contact,

(2) was argumentative, (3) believed there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest, (4) had an

arrest for a prior drug offense, (5) was driving a vehicle that was not registered to him, and

(6) lied about his criminal history. See id. at 308 (“a prior criminal record” and “[d]eception

regarding one’s own criminal record [have] also been recognized as . . . factor[s] that can

contribute to reasonable suspicion”).

        Because less factors than the ones present here have been used to uphold a canine open-

air sniff, we find that deployment of the drug dog here was justified by reasonable suspicion.

See id. at 304–05.4 Also, because the drug dog was already on the scene when Dixon was

stopped, the time between the stop and the open-air sniff was less than ten minutes and did not

unduly prolong the traffic stop. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

overruling Dixon’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.

3
 Dixon argues that Smith did not see him leaving Angie B’s. Even so, under the “‘collective knowledge’ doctrine,
when several officers are cooperating, their cumulative information may be considered in assessing reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.” State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing State v.
Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 569 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
4
 In Hamal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the following factors sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion, when viewed in combination:

        1.       Appellant was travelling late at night.
        2.       She had exceeded the speed limit.
        3.       She was nervous, with hands shaking.
        4.       She had a prior criminal record.
        5.       This record included arrests for drug offenses.
        6.       One of the drug arrests was recent, approximately seven months before the stop.
        7.       She responded, “No,” when asked whether she had ever been in trouble before.

Hamal, 390 S.W.3d at 308.
                                                       10
II.        Dixon Was Not Harmed By the Failure to Suppress His Statement

           After the drug dog alerted, Smith asked Dixon if he was responsible for the contents of

the vehicle, and Dixon responded that he was. At trial, Dixon sought to suppress “one statement

that [Dixon made] about . . . whether or not [what was] in his car . . . was all under his control.”

The State argued that, because Dixon was not handcuffed, he was not in custody when he made

the statement, and the trial court impliedly agreed. On appeal, Dixon argues that the trial court’s

implied ruling was erroneous and, in the absence of Miranda5 or Article 38.22 warnings by

Smith, the statement should have been suppressed.

           The warnings required by Miranda and Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure are triggered when a person undergoes custodial interrogation or, in other words, the

“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444;

Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.22, § 3. “A person is in ‘custody’ . . . if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would

believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal

arrest.” Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Smith testified that

Dixon was not free to leave after the drug dog alerted on his vehicle, and the dash-cam recording

shows that a reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave. As a result, Dixon’s

statement should have been suppressed.

5
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                 11
           Even so, we turn to the question of whether Dixon was harmed by the admission of his

statement. Our harm analysis is governed by Rule 44.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure, which requires us to reverse unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error did not contribute to Dixon’s conviction or punishment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see

Crayton v. State, 485 S.W.3d 488, 505 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.). Our inquiry is

whether “there was a reasonable possibility that the error . . . moved the jury from a state of

nonpersuasion to one of persuasion” on the relevant issue. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103,

119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

(We are to “calculate, as nearly as possible, the probable impact of the error on the jury in light

of the other evidence.”).       “[T]he burden is on the State to prove that the error made no

contribution to the defendant’s conviction or punishment.” Lamb v. State, 603 S.W.3d 152, 162

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (quoting Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 194 n.9 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997)).

           In making our determination, we view the entire record and consider the following

factors:

           “(1) the importance of the [complained-of] evidence to the State’s case;
           (2) whether the . . . evidence was cumulative of other evidence; (3) the presence
           or absence of other evidence corroborating or contradicting the [complained-of]
           evidence, . . . ; (4) the overall strength of the State’s case”; and (5) any other
           factor in the record that affects the probable impact of the error.

Crayton, 485 S.W.3d at 505 (quoting Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007)).

                                                  12
       Here, Dixon’s statement was unimportant to the State given the other, overwhelming

evidence of his guilt. Dixon was the only person in the vehicle when it was stopped. When

Smith initially approached him, Dixon indicated that the car was his and that he had insurance on

the car, suggesting that the car was under his control. The trial court properly admitted evidence

showing that the drug dog alerted on Dixon’s car, and there was ample testimony about the

drugs, including cocaine, found inside of the car. At trial, likely because of the strength of the

State’s case, Dixon never claimed that the drugs were not his. Instead, his defensive strategy

was to argue that the drugs were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights because “there

was no real basis for [Smith] to pull [Dixon] over” and that nothing showed Dixon had intent to

distribute the drugs.   The State did not emphasize Dixon’s statement during its opening

statement, Smith’s questioning at trial, or at closing argument. In light of those facts, Dixon’s

statement that he was responsible for the items inside the vehicle was insignificant.

       We find that the admission of Dixon’s statement of responsibility was not determinative

of his guilt. In light of the factors discussed above, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

that the admission of the statement did not contribute to Dixon’s conviction. As a result, we find

that Dixon was not harmed by the admission of his statement and overrule this point of error.

III.   We Modify the Judgment to Reflect the Proper Description of Dixon’s Offense

       Even though we have overruled Dixon’s points of error, we must modify the trial court’s

judgment to reflect the proper description of Dixon’s offense. “This Court has the power to

correct and modify the judgment of the trial court for accuracy when the necessary data and

information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State, 531 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—

                                                13
Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet.

ref’d)). “The authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect judgments is not dependent upon

the request of any party, nor does it turn on the question of whether a party has or has not

objected in the trial court.” Id. (quoting Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529–30).

            Dixon was indicted and convicted under Section 481.112 of the Texas Health and Safety

Code, which reads, “[A] person commits an offense if the person knowingly . . . possesses with

intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE ANN. § 481.112(a).6 Even though Section 481.112 is titled “Manufacture or Delivery of

Substances in Penalty Group 1,” the trial court’s judgment mistakenly states that Dixon was

convicted of possession of a controlled substance, which is a separate offense under Section

481.115 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. Compare TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 481.112 with § 481.115 (Supp.). As a result, we must modify the trial court’s judgment.

6
    The trial court’s judgment correctly identifies the statute of offense as Section 481.112.
                                                             14
IV.    Conclusion

       We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Dixon was convicted of

“Manufacture or Delivery of Substances in Penalty Group 1” in an amount of one or more but

less than four grams. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            Charles van Cleef
                                            Justice

Date Submitted:       March 30, 2023
Date Decided:         April 5, 2023

Do Not Publish

                                               15