Court Opinion

ID: 9776895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:48:09.597276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:44.603229
License: Public Domain

HILL, Judge
(dissenting).
I am not so much disturbed by the immediate result of this decision as I am by the establishment of a constitutional principle which is both contrary to logic and legal precedent and destructive to six sections (258-263) of the present Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
The authors of our Constitution outlined in section 258 definite and specific steps for its revision. This is the one and only mode of revision contained therein. Had the authors intended any other mode of revision, they would have said so. Had they intended its revision in “any manner as they (the people) may deem proper,” as is urged by appellees, section 258 would have been an indulgence in idle curiosity and speculation. I believe there is no rea*723sonable-minded person in this Commonwealth who doubts that it was the intention of the authors of the Constitution to provide an exclusive plan for revision.
It appears to me that the only justification for the majority opinion is expediency. The net result of the opinion recognizes the right of the legislature to repeal the Constitution either in toto or by piecemeal. Nowhere in the Constitution is the legislature given the authority to formulate or submit to the people a new constitution. Here we are testing a legislative act and not a process of revision of the Constitution. The legislature either has or does not have the authority to legislate on this important question.
The only source of power which appellees are able to invoke is section 4 of the Constitution. This section provides as follows:
“All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness and the protection of property. For the advancement of these ends, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may deem proper.” (Emphasis added.)
On its face, this section is an expression of political philosophy.; It is a cocky boast of a sovereign people revelling in the enjoyment of new-won freedom and sovereignty. It is said this philosophy came from the pen of Jefferson. Appellant argues it only has historic value. I would not degrade it on that theory but would recognize that it may well leave in “the people” a residual power to accomplish ends not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. It should be recognized, however, that the practical application of this section is almost impossible. It provides no plan of implementation. Who are “the people?” Certainly, they are not the legislature. Under this section how do “they” (the people) act ? I point out these difficulties in section 4 simply to emphasize the general, broad, and vague nature of the reservation,of power contained therein and to further emphasize the utter dependence of section 4 upon section 258 for its implementation.
Without explaining just why section 4 empowers the legislature to pass the Act before us, the appellees rely upon section 26 of the Constitution. In doing so, they remove the trapdoor of their own scaffold. Section 26 is as follows:
“To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, We Declare that everything in this Bill of Rights is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and all laws contrary thereto, or contrary to this Constitution shall be void.” (Emphasis added.)
Appellees cite this section to bolster their argument that section 4 of the Bill of Rights takes precedence over other sections. Ignoring the fact that this is contrary to settled principles of constitutional construction and contract law, the majority decision seems to overlook exactly what section 26 provides. Insofar as we are concerned in this case, it provides in effect that the power granted by section 4 “is excepted out of the general powers of government.” In other words, the power exercisable by the people cannot be exercised by the government.
It cannot be successfully argued that the legislature in passing the Act before us was not exercising the general powers of government. The legislature has undertaken to preempt the right of the people which is reserved to them by section 4. This is exactly what section 26 says the government, acting through its legislature, cannot do. The case for appellees completely falls. Section 4 gives the legislature no authority to do anything. The argument might well stop here.
The proponents of the Act apparently contend that the legislature is “the people.” I consider this argument untenable. But if the proponents are correct in this contention *724and the legislature is vested with the unrestricted power ostensibly bestowed by section 4, then the provisions of the Constitution pertaining to revision are completely meaningless and useless. On this theory, the legislature could from time to time alter or reform the Constitution in any manner it saw fit to suit the varying and unpredictable winds of political philosophy. What becomes of the sections on revision ? Has this court been usurping the power of the legislature for generations by declaring legislative acts unconstitutional?
The truth is, “the people” spoke when they enacted and adopted the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Until “they” speak again, the legislature exercising the general powers of government must conform to the plain mandates of that document.
Section 258 of the Constitution clearly recognizes that the legislature is not “the people.” It specifically provides for taking “the sense of the people” with respect to revising the Constitution. To accept the theory that the legislature is “the people” (with plenary power reserved by section 4) would lead to the most frightening results. If section 258, relating to revision, is not binding on the legislature, then certainly section 256, relating to amendments, is not. Section 256 is no more exclusive than section 258.
If the legislature is “the people,” then, of course, there is no necessity for having the vote of “the people” on any particular proposition. Those defending the Act seem to sense that somewhere, somehow the people should have a right to vote specifically on a constitutional revision or amendment, but their basic argument makes unnecessary any such vote. Nothing in section 4 requires any such vote. If the legislature had the authority to enact this law under section 4, then the vote of the people is mere surplusage.
In the argument, those defending this Act were forced to frankly concede that if a new Constitution could be adopted in this manner then the legislature itself could write the document. This is obviously true, and the majority of the court must accept this fact. This being so, the present safeguards for the revision or amendment of the Constitution are now obviously discarded and' obsolete.
Be it remembered for all time to come that the new Constitution contains specific provisions for the revision and amendment of that document (Article XIV). Under the majority decision these provisions are nothing more than suggested methods of accomplishing those ends. They can be ignored by the legislature. I wonder if “the people” who will vote on the new Constitution will realize that the solemn methods of revision and amendment therein contained are little more than camouflage and that the legislature is in no way bound by them.
There are other reasons why the majority decision violates principles of constitutional construction as well as contract law, such as the well-settled rule that specific will take precedence over general. It is said in 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, section 26, p. 198, that:
“ * * * the rule is that the constitutional mode of making amendments is mandatory and exclusive, and must be substantially followed, and that an amendment does not become effective as such unless it has been duly adopted in accordance with the provisions of the existing constitution. It follows that whatever power a constitution has conferred on the legislature in reference to proposing amendments, as well as to calling a convention, must be strictly pursued.”

“Any attempt to revise a constitution or adopt a new one in any manner other than that provided in the existing instrument is almost invariably treated as ex-traconstitutional and revolutionary. Thus, even if the vote of the people should be overwhelming in adopting a constitution formulated by a convention not legally *725called, it would be the duty of the executive and judiciary and all officers sworn to support the old constitution to resist to the utmost the installation of government under the new revolutionary constitution.”
On the question of rules of construction of constitutional language, this court in Grantz v. Grauman, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 364, 366 (1957), stated:
“A cardinal rule is that where the language of the Constitution leaves no doubt of the intended meaning of the section under consideration, courts may not employ rules of construction. * * * Another important rule is that in construing one section of a Constitution a court should not isolate it from other sections, but all the sections bearing on any particular subject should be brought into consideration and be so interpreted as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution.”
Also in the early case of Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 600, 6 S.W. 457, 459 (1888), in the same vein it is written:
“Wherever the language gives a direction as to the manner of exercising a power, it was intended that the power should be exercised in the manner directed and in no other manner. It is an instrument of words granting powers, restraining powers, and reserving rights. These words are fundamental words, meaning the thing itself; they breathe no spirit except the spirit to be found in them. To say that these words are directory merely, is to license a violation of the instrument every day and every hour. To preserve the instrument inviolate we must regard its words, except when expressly permissive, as mandatory, as breathing the spirit of command.”
Perhaps the most celebrated and quoted case on the constitutional question involved here is Miller v. Johnson, 92 Ky. 596, 18 S.W. 522 (1892). I quote from Miller:
“If a set of men, not selected by the people according to the forms of law, were to formulate an instrument and declare it the constitution, it would undoubtedly be the duty of the courts to declare its work a nullity. This would be revolution, and this the courts of the existing government must resist until they are overturned by power, and a new government established.”
* * * * * *
“If it provides how it is to be done, then, unless the manner be followed, the judiciary, as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid.”
Not only is the rule herein discussed firmly established in this jurisdiction, but in others, such as Indiana. See Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1. In Ellingham, supra, the factual situation, as well as the constitutional provisions, was peculiarly similar to our own. In that case, the Legislature of Indiana passed a bill termed “proposed new Constitution.” The Supreme Court of Indiana declared the bill unconstitutional, and the United States Supreme Court dismissed a writ of error. I am mindful of the Georgia case which furnishes strong support for appellees, but I consider the Georgia case, like the present one, a case of expediency.
The Constitutional rules of construction pertaining to this Act may not be understood by the layman. However, they are readily apparent to the trained legal mind. Those ardent supporters of a new constitution, and there is need for improvement, may become impatient and demand a short cut to a new constitution. But the Constitution of this Commonwealth should not be circumvented or a section or syllable masticated in the interest of expediency.
However unpopular my position, and irrespective of the loneliness of my dissent, I consider it my duty to speak out in support of the sacred and solemn Constitution of this Commonwealth and in support of the rights of “the people” who to this good hour have had no opportunity to be heard.