Court Opinion

ID: 9709045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:38:55.241355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.565885
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants Robert and Norma Lambert (Lamberts) appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants-appellees Dennis Stark and John Kes-ler II, d/b/a Kesler & Stark (Kesler & Stark).
We affirm.
In the fall of 1979, the Lamberts sought legal advice concerning their financial difficulties. Kesler & Stark, attorneys, advised the Lamberts to dispose of certain property. Additionally, Kesler & Stark filed a petition in bankruptcy on behalf of the Lamberts.
On March 10, 1980, a secured creditor filed a complaint objecting to the Lamberts' discharge in bankruptey. The complaint alleged that the Lamberts had transferred property with the intent to defraud the creditor of its security interest. Kesler & Stark informed the Lamberts that a complaint had been filed and continued to represent the Lamberts in the matter.
A hearing was held before the bankruptcy court judge, who found that the Lam-berts intended to defraud creditors by transferring property for less than adequate consideration within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Lamberts were denied their discharge on March 19, 1982.
Nearly two years later, on February 27, 1984, the Lamberts filed a malpractice complaint against Kesler & Stark. Kesler & Stark responded with a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Lamberts' claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Lamberts countered with the argument that the statute of limitations had been tolled by fraudulent concealment. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment.
One issue is raised on appeal: whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations period had expired.
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Criss v. Bitzegaio, (1981) Ind., 420 N.E.2d 1221, 1223. The plead ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits and testimony, if any, are construed in favor of the opponent of summary judgment. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is resolved against the proponent of the motion. Pike County v. State ex rel. Hardin, (1984) Ind.App., 469 N.E.2d 1188, 1195.
In their motion for summary judgment, Kesler & Stark correctly contended *632that the Lamberts' cause of action was governed by IND. CODE § 34-1-2-2 (1982):
The following actions shall be com-meneed within the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action has accrued, and not afterwards: (1) For injuries to person or character, for injuries to personal property, and for a forfeiture of penalty given by statute, within two (2) years....
Most acts of attorney malpractice involve negligence or injury to a chose in action; thus attorney malpractice complaints fall under the two year statute. Shideler v. Dwyer, (1981) 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281; Apple v. Hall, (1980) Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 114.
The Lamberts claim that the two year limitation period was tolled by fraudulent concealment. IND. CODE § 34-1-2-9 (1982) provides:
If any person liable to an action shall conceal the fact from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced at any time within the period of limitation after the discovery of the cause of action.1
Generally, the concealment contemplated by LC. § 34-1-2-9 must be active and intentional. Forth v. Forth, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 641; Dotlich v. Dotlich, (1985) Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 331. However, when the defrauder has a duty to disclose material information to individuals with whom he has a fiduciary or confidential relationship, the requirements of active and intentional conduct do not apply. Dotlichk, supra, at $41. The failure to speak when there is a duty to disclose will toll the running of the statute of limitations. Forth, supra, at 645. The Lamberts emphasize the fiduciary character of the attorney-client relationship, and they submit that Kesler & Stark had a duty to disclose the legal effect of the property transfers made by the Lamberts prior to their filing of a petition in bankruptcy.
To avoid the bar of limitations by claiming fraudulent concealment, the Lam-berts also had to show that they used due diligence to detect the fraud. Keystone Distribution Park v. Kennerk, et al., (1984) Ind.App., 461 N.E.2d 749; Whitehouse v. Quinn, (1982) Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 882, vacated and reversed on other grounds (1985) Ind., 477 N.E.2d 270. The evidence on this issue consists of the Lam-berts' statement in their affidavits that they first became aware that the legal advice was incorrect and possibly actionable in January, 1984. The record is devoid of evidence regarding why the Lamberts ought not to have discovered the erroneous nature of the advice earlier than they did.
Although this court must construe the evidence in favor of the opponent of a summary judgment motion, the burden of avoiding a statute of limitations ruling was on the Lamberts. See Keystone Distribution Park, supra, at 751. Part of that burden was to show that the Lamberts used reasonable care and diligence to detect the alleged fraud. Id. The Lamberts failed to meet their burden, as the only evidence produced on this point was the assertion that they did not discover that the legal advice was incorrect until January, 1984. See Whitehouse v. Quinn, supra, 443 N.E.2d at 339. Such an allegation standing alone is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding reasonable diligence. Id.
Judgment affirmed.
NEAL, J., concurs.
RATLIFF, P.J., dissents with separate opinion. .

. The parties to this appeal do not cite the concealment statute, but rely instead upon the medical malpractice case, Guy v. Schuldt, (1956) 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d 891, and its progeny. In Guy, the Indiana Supreme Court announced that the concealment statute did not constitute an exception to the statute of limitations governing medical malpractice cases [now IND.CODE § 34-4-19-1 (1982)]. The court then introduced the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 236 Ind. at 107, 138 N.E.2d at 895. Reliance upon the equitable defense established in Guy is unnecessary in the instant case. The concealment statute does create an exception to IND. CODE § 34-1-2-2.