Court Opinion

ID: 9406363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 18:05:45.598262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:29.261557
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 210896-U

                                                                                 SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                                     June 30, 2023

                                          No. 1-21-0896

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         IN THE
                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

                                                                )
 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                               )      Appeal from the
                                                                )      Circuit Court of
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                                     )      Cook County.
                                                                )
 v.                                                             )      No. TN 798-786
                                                                )
 JARED STUBBLEFIELD,                                            )      Honorable
                                                                )      Athanasios S. Sianis,
        Defendant-Appellant.                                    )      Judge Presiding.
                                                                )

       PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices C.A. Walker and Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: Defendant’s convictions for disorderly conduct and illegal transportation of alcohol
             are affirmed where defendant failed to demonstrate that (1) he was prevented from
             filing a motion to suppress evidence at his trial, (2) the filing fees he was asked to
             pay violated his constitutional rights, (3) the court “forced him to testify,” or that
             (4) the trial court’s failure to properly admonish him as to his rights to file an appeal
             prejudiced him in such a way that remand is required.

¶2     Following a bench trial, where he represented himself pro se, defendant Jared Stubblefield

was found guilty of disorderly conduct and illegal transportation of alcohol. He was sentenced to
No. 1-21-0896

six months of supervision and ordered to pay a $250 fine and complete 25 hours of community

service. He appeals the convictions, arguing that the trial court did not allow him to file a motion

to suppress evidence and that his constitutional rights were violated when he was forced to pay a

$40 filing fee in the clerk’s office. He also argues that the trial court essentially “forced him to

testify” and that it “convict[ed] [him] without reading [him] his rights to appeal.” We affirm.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4                           A. Citations and Preliminary Proceedings

¶5     On February 28, 2019, at around 2:40 a.m., Mr. Stubblefield was cited for failure to keep

his vehicle within lane boundaries, failure to signal, driving while under the influence of alcohol

(DUI), and illegal transportation of alcohol.

¶6     At a hearing on June 14, 2019, Mr. Stubblefield notified the court that he was ready for

trial and that he wished to represent himself. The court asked Mr. Stubblefield questions about his

educational background and, upon learning that he lacked any formal legal education, admonished

Mr. Stubblefield in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984) regarding

his rights and the consequences of his decision to proceed pro se. Mr. Stubblefield confirmed that

he understood his rights and wished to proceed without a lawyer.

¶7     Mr. Stubblefield made an oral motion to dismiss, arguing that the charges against him

conflicted with his “constitutional right to try to travel freely.” The court denied the motion. The

State then attempted to tender a DVD containing video footage from the traffic stop to Mr.

Stubblefield, but he refused to receive it, apparently irritated that he was being told of the footage

on the date the matter was set for trial. The court then offered to continue the matter to give Mr.

Stubblefield more time to review the footage and prepare his defense, and Mr. Stubblefield

interrupted the court, stating, “what do you mean? I said I’m demanding a trial.” The court asked

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No. 1-21-0896

if Mr. Stubblefield was refusing to take discovery from the State, and he responded, “[a]m I

refusing to take what? You sound silly bro.” The court then attempted to explain the concept of

discovery to Mr. Stubblefield, who continued to interrupt, accusing the court of “trying to hang

[him]” and of “having evil intentions.” The court then passed the matter.

¶8     When the case was called back, Mr. Stubblefield continued to demand a trial and the court

once again attempted to get an answer from Mr. Stubblefield as to whether he was refusing to take

the State’s discovery. Every time the court asked if he was refusing discovery, Mr. Stubblefield

answered, “I’m demanding a trial.” After several attempts to get Mr. Stubblefield to answer the

question, the court stated for the record that Mr. Stubblefield was refusing to take discovery and

therefore “foregoing the opportunity to prepare his defense.” Upon hearing this, Mr. Stubblefield

accused the court of “treason.” The court once again passed the matter.

¶9     Upon recall, Mr. Stubblefield inquired about “the judge scratch[ing] out something [he]

wrote” on his “first demand of trial.” The court explained that it had crossed out the phrase

“suppression of evidence” because Mr. Stubblefield could not simultaneously demand a trial and

move to suppress evidence in the same document. Mr. Stubblefield then stated, “[w]ell, I was just

trying to suppress the evidence. I don’t want a trial today, I was just trying to suppress the

evidence.” The court then stated, “[w]ell, that takes us back to where you and I were before, right?”

The court explained to Mr. Stubblefield that the State “was trying to give you the evidence and

you can’t, you don’t know what you want to suppress unless you take the evidence, which was

what I was trying to get you to do but you were fighting with me about it. So let’s revisit that.”

¶ 10   The court then asked once again if Mr. Stubblefield accepted the evidence that the State

was tendering and explained that, “[a]s a defense attorney, or defendant, or whatever it is, it is

always wise to see what evidence they’re going to try to use against you so you can prepare to

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No. 1-21-0896

rebut it or fight the evidence they’re going to use, which is why I was trying to get you to take it.

It’s beneficial for you to know these things.” The court asked once again if Mr. Stubblefield was

prepared to accept the evidence and he responded, “I said suppress, I want to suppress it.”

¶ 11   The back and forth continued like this for several more minutes as Mr. Stubblefield

repeatedly refused to accept the State’s evidence, while reiterating his desire to suppress it. After

more unfruitful dialogue, the matter was continued so that Mr. Stubblefield could prepare an

argument for his motion to suppress. The record does not contain any report of proceedings on the

hearing on that motion. The next court date in the report of proceedings is the trial date, which was

June 21, 2021.

¶ 12                     B. Evidence Adduced at Mr. Stubblefield’s Trial

¶ 13   At trial, before the State began its case-in-chief, Mr. Stubblefield was again extensively

admonished about his decision to proceed pro se and he once again insisted on representing

himself, even after the trial judge briefly had him talk with an attorney present in the courtroom,

as a friend of the court. The attorney reported back to the court that Mr. Stubblefield was “adamant

on wanting to remain pro se.” Mr. Stubblefield opted for a bench trial and the State then called its

first and only witness, Officer William Sierzega of the Chicago Police Department.

¶ 14   Officer Sierzega testified that at around 3 am on February 28, 2019, he was on routine

patrol when he observed a vehicle driving erratically on 63rd Street. According to the officer’s

sworn report, the vehicle was making “abrupt movements,” failing to stay in its lane, and it came

to a stop about 30 feet before the white stop line. Officer Sierzega and his partner turned on their

emergency lights and pulled the car over. Mr. Stubblefield was the driver and nobody else was in

the car with him.

¶ 15   Officer Sierzega testified that when he walked to the driver’s side of Mr. Stubblefield’s car

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No. 1-21-0896

and asked him to roll down the window, Mr. Stubblefield called him a “b****” several times and

refused to roll the window down more than an inch, which “became a point of contention.” He

asked Mr. Stubblefield multiple times to roll down the window, without success. Through the

slightly cracked window, the officer observed Mr. Stubblefield eating food and “looking forward.”

Officer Sierzega testified that in his experience, “eating food is something that people who have

been consuming alcohol tend to do to mask their breath.” Mr. Stubblefield seemed “quite

confused” and was “irate and he wanted to engage in an argument.” Officer Sierzega then asked

Mr. Stubblefield to step out of the car and he refused, which caused Officer Sierzega to request

that a sergeant come to the scene pursuant to “Chicago Police Department general orders.”

Sometime later, the sergeant arrived on scene “and attempted to reason with Mr. Stubblefield to

no avail.”

¶ 16   The State asked Officer Sierzega if he was wearing a body camera that evening and he said

that he was. The State then sought leave to publish the video footage captured by Officer Sierzega

that night and played about six minutes of footage for the court. This footage is not part of the

record on appeal.

¶ 17   Officer Sierzega explained that he was forced to break Mr. Stubblefield’s window to get

him out of the car, at which point his sergeant quickly handcuffed and moved Mr. Stubblefield to

a squad car. Once Mr. Stubblefield was secured, Officer Sierzega searched the vehicle and found

a plastic cup with what he described as “alcoholic beverage residue” in it. He also found a bottle

of tequila behind the driver’s seat that was three-quarters empty.

¶ 18   Officer Sierzega testified that he detected a strong odor of alcohol on Mr. Stubblefield’s

breath, and he recalled that Mr. Stubblefield’s eyes were “bloodshot and glassy.” The officer said

Mr. Stubblefield also “spoke repetitively,” which Officer Sierzega described as an indicator of

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No. 1-21-0896

alcohol consumption. Mr. Stubblefield refused to submit to a Breathalyzer or field sobriety test

and was transported to the police station where he was read his Miranda rights.

¶ 19   On cross-examination, Mr. Stubblefield asked Officer Sierzega if he “dislike[d] black

people” and inquired about whether the officer experienced a “feeling of joy” when arresting him.

Mr. Stubblefield then became frustrated when he asked to see additional footage of the arrest that

was not in evidence. The court explained that if there was another video that Mr. Stubblefield

wanted to discuss beyond the video published by the State, then it was his responsibility to bring

that evidence forward. Mr. Stubblefield was confused and stated that he thought the courtroom

had “the evidence.” The court explained that “[w]e don’t have anything. You have to put on the

evidence, sir, it’s your case. It’s the state’s case and your case, so if the state puts on a video you

can talk about that video, but any other videos you have to put on if you want to talk about them.”

¶ 20   After brief closing arguments, the court found Mr. Stubblefield not guilty of driving under

the influence of alcohol, explaining that the State did not meet its burden where the only evidence

was an open container of tequila and an empty cup, but no admission of guilt or failed sobriety or

chemical test. The evidence did however, in the court’s view, support findings of guilt as to

disorderly conduct and illegal transportation of alcohol. On these two offenses, the court sentenced

Mr. Stubblefield to six months of supervision, 25 hours of community service, and a $250 fine and

court costs of $254. This appeal followed.

¶ 21                                     II. JURISDICTION

¶ 22   The circuit court entered its judgment finding Mr. Stubblefield guilty of disorderly conduct

and illegal transportation of alcohol on June 21, 2021. Mr. Stubblefield filed notice of appeal on

July 20, 2021. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under article VI, section 6, of the Illinois

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 603 (eff. Feb 6, 2013)

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No. 1-21-0896

and 606 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final judgments in criminal cases.

¶ 23                                       III. ANALYSIS

¶ 24    On appeal, Mr. Stubblefield argues that (1) the trial court erred by not allowing him to file

a motion to suppress, (2) the fees he was asked to pay in the clerk’s office violated his

constitutional rights, (3) the court improperly attempted to force him to testify, and (4) the court

failed to adequately explain his appeal rights after finding him guilty.

¶ 25    The State argues that we need not reach the merits of any of these claims because Mr.

Stubblefield forfeited them when he failed to object or raise the issues in a written posttrial motion.

The State is technically correct. Our supreme court has repeatedly held that to properly preserve

an issue for appeal, a defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a written posttrial motion.

People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15. Failure to do so “forfeits any review of the error.” Id.

The plain-error rule allows us to bypass these forfeiture principles and consider issues not properly

preserved (People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611 (2010)), but this is a narrow and limited

exception (People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010)).

¶ 26    As our supreme court explained in People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 489 (2009), the

plain-error doctrine allows us to remedy a “clear and obvious error,” regardless of the defendant’s

forfeiture, only in two situations: “(1) where the evidence in the case is so closely balanced that

the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence; or (2) where the

error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial.” In either

case, however, the first step of plain-error review is to determine whether any error occurred, and

the burden of persuasion rests with the defendant. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613.

¶ 27    As the State notes in its brief, Mr. Stubblefield makes no plain error argument in his brief.

Additionally, while he cites generally to the United States Constitution, and asserts that his “1st,

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No. 1-21-0896

4th, 5th, and 14th amendments was violated,” he does not cite any cases in support of any of his

claims, aside from a general reference to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Forfeiture

aside, however, Mr. Stubblefield’s claims are meritless.

¶ 28                                  A. Motion to Suppress

¶ 29   Mr. Stubblefield first argues that the trial court erroneously prevented him from moving to

suppress evidence. This notion, however, is contradicted by the transcript of his hearing on June

14, 2019. At that hearing, Mr. Stubblefield repeatedly stated that he wished to “suppress the

evidence,” but he never explained what specific evidence he wished to suppress and emphatically

refused to accept from the State the evidence it was attempting to tender him. The trial court

patiently explained to Mr. Stubblefield countless times why it would be beneficial for him to view

the evidence the State was trying to share with him, but Mr. Stubblefield repeatedly refused and

accused the court of trying to conspire against him.

¶ 30   Eventually, the court accepted Mr. Stubblefield’s oral motion to suppress, and asked Mr.

Stubblefield to argue it, at which point Mr. Stubblefield merely stated, “I suppress evidence.”

When the court tried to explain to Mr. Stubblefield that he needed to provide a reason why he

sought the suppression of evidence, Mr. Stubblefield demanded “an order from the clerk” and

accused the court of trying to “hang” him. The court then, once again, explained that he needed to

provide reasons “why [he] want[ed] to suppress this evidence.” Mr. Stubblefield responded, “I

don’t want to *** I don’t want whatever you’re talking about. I don’t want it.”

¶ 31   In sum, Mr. Stubblefield’s argument that the court prevented him from filing his motion to

suppress is meritless and completely disproven by the record. Not only did the court ultimately

permit Mr. Stubblefield to move to suppress evidence, but it offered to continue the case to give

him more time to prepare his motion and repeatedly explained to him, with astonishing patience,

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No. 1-21-0896

why it would be in his interest to accept the State’s evidence.

¶ 32                                      B. The Filing Fees

¶ 33    Mr. Stubblefield next argues that he was “not allowed to file on some days” and that the

“circuit court office” tried to make him “pay a filing fee anytime [he] file[d] anything on this case.”

He also asserts that the clerk’s office “said no” when he asked if he could turn in a fee waiver

form, and that they told him he needed to present that form before the court. He further argues that

the clerk’s office did “not allow [him] to petition against the summary suspension” of his driver’s

license. He claims that these experiences amounted to a violation of his first amendment rights.

¶ 34    Mr. Stubblefield fails to put forward any discernible argument as to why these fees—which

it is not clear he ever paid—were unconstitutional. Moreover, it remains unclear how Mr.

Stubblefield was prejudiced by these alleged errors when, as discussed above, he was not

prevented from filing his motion to suppress directly before the court, which the court apparently

accepted independent of any fee.

¶ 35    As to his specific complaint about not being able to challenge the summary suspension of

his license, the court did address this issue. Towards the end of the June 21, 2021, trial date, after

the court found Mr. Stubblefield not guilty on the DUI charge, Mr. Stubblefield asked, “[s]ince

I’m not guilty of the DUI, don’t that dismiss all the suspensions against me?” In response, the court

said that there are “two parts of the DUI. There is the criminal part, and there is also the civil part.”

The court further explained that its finding of not guilty on the DUI did not necessarily affect Mr.

Stubblefield’s summary suspension, which was a civil penalty. The court then advised Mr.

Stubblefield to consult with an attorney on that “different type[] of charge.”

¶ 36    The court was correct in its explanation. The summary suspension procedure that resulted

in Mr. Stubblefield’s driver’s license being suspended “is civil in nature and not part of the criminal

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No. 1-21-0896

prosecution for DUI.” People v. Ehley, 381 Ill. App. 3d 937, 945 (2008); see also People v. Moore,

138 Ill. 2d 162, 166 (1990) (explaining that the legislature enacted this separate civil procedure

“in recognition of the fact that it often takes a very long time for the State to prosecute impaired

drivers and remove their drivers’ licenses,” and that automatic summary suspension provides a

mechanism to “promptly remove impaired drivers from the road.”). The reason Mr. Stubblefield’s

license was automatically suspended was not because he was found guilty of a DUI in a criminal

trial, but because when he was arrested on the suspicion of a DUI, he refused to submit to a

chemical test to determine his blood alcohol levels. The consequence for refusing to submit to a

test was an automatic license suspension by the Illinois Secretary of State.

¶ 37   Pursuant to section 11-501.1(d) of the Vehicle Code, when a motorist suspected of driving

drunk refuses testing, or submits to testing and the test discloses that they were indeed driving over

the legal blood alcohol limit, the law enforcement officer “shall immediately submit a sworn report

to the circuit court of venue and the Secretary of State.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(d) (West 2022).

Upon receipt of that sworn report, the Secretary of State “shall enter the statutory summary

suspension.” Id. § 11-501.1(e). People whose licenses are suspended under these procedures have

the right to request a hearing challenging their suspension. See id. § 11-118.1. But such a

proceeding is a civil matter, separate and apart from their criminal case, and “the dismissal of a

criminal charge does not result in an automatic rescission of the suspension.” (Emphasis in

original.) People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250, 258 (1993). Indeed, at that civil proceeding, unlike

in the criminal case, the defendant bears the burden of proof and must establish a prima facie case

for recission of their suspension. People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 294 (1996).

¶ 38   Here, the trial court did not rule on Mr. Stubblefield’s objection to his summary suspension

because the issue was not properly before the court, as Mr. Stubblefield was in the wrong forum

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No. 1-21-0896

to challenge that issue. Additionally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Stubblefield

was prevented from challenging his summary suspension through the proper channels. We

therefore reject his argument that he was prevented from challenging his summary suspension.

¶ 39                                    C. Forced to Testify

¶ 40   Mr. Stubblefield next argues that the trial court “tried to force [him] to testify on behave

[sic] of [him]self. Which [he] refused to.” He also insinuates that the trial court was biased and

“trying to force [him] to say something wrong to incriminate [him]self.” As with his claim about

his motion to suppress, this argument is contradicted by the trial record.

¶ 41   When the State rested, the court told Mr. Stubblefield, “it is now your turn to tell us your

side of what happened. You may proceed whenever you’re ready.” With this statement, the court

was merely indicating to Mr. Stubblefield that it was his turn to put on his case-in-chief, it was not

“forcing him to testify.” Mr. Stubblefield, however, immediately began to discuss the traffic stop

from his perspective, which generated some confusion in the courtroom. The State thought Mr.

Stubblefield was making his closing argument, but the court told the State it could cross-examine

Mr. Stubblefield if it wished, which caused Mr. Stubblefield to state, “[y]ou’re saying like I’m on

the stand?” The court told Mr. Stubblefield that he was, because he had just provided testimonial

evidence. Mr. Stubblefield then stated that he did not “want to get on the stand.” The State then

asked one question: “Mr. Stubblefield, you said you were driving your aunt’s car.” Mr.

Stubblefield answered yes, but then stated, “Your Honor, no disrespect but I’m not trying to be

cross examined.” The court responded to Mr. Stubblefield, “so you’re not testifying today, so was

that your closing argument then?” And Mr. Stubblefield responded, “that was my closing.” The

State asked no further questions.

¶ 42   This exchange did not amount to the court forcing Mr. Stubblefield onto the stand. While

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No. 1-21-0896

there was briefly some confusion as to whether Mr. Stubblefield was testifying, the issue was

immediately rectified and did not prejudice him in any way. Even Mr. Stubblefield implicitly

acknowledges that he was not forced onto the stand when, in his brief, he states that he “refused”

to testify. Additionally, in its own closing argument, the State relied entirely on facts established

by Officer Sierzega’s testimony and made no mention of anything Mr. Stubblefield stated during

the brief period when it was unclear as to whether Mr. Stubblefield was testifying or giving his

closing argument.

¶ 43   We also reject Mr. Stubblefield’s assertion that the court was biased against him, as there

is nothing in the trial record to support this assertion. To the contrary, as the State writes in its

brief, “[t]he court went out of its way throughout the course of the proceedings to ensure that

defendant was well advised as to his rights, and the court showed patience and diligence in

responding to defendant’s inquiries and outbursts.” We agree and we commend the trial court for

going above and beyond in explaining to Mr. Stubblefield his rights and obligations throughout

what was clearly a frustrating process for all involved.

¶ 44                           D. Failure to Explain Appeal Rights

¶ 45   Mr. Stubblefield’s final argument is that the court failed to adequately explain to him his

right to file an appeal. We agree with Mr. Stubblefield that after finding him guilty on his two

remaining non-DUI charges, the court did not adequately admonish him as to his rights to file an

appeal. This was an error, as Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (eff. June 23, 1967) requires the

trial court to advise a defendant on, among other things, how and when to file an appeal after the

defendant has been found guilty and ordered to pay a fine.

¶ 46   The issue, however, is that Mr. Stubblefield makes no argument as to how the court’s

failure to properly admonish him prejudiced him in any way. As we explained in People v.

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Lambert, 364 Ill. App. 3d 488, 494 (2006), a defendant who receives incomplete Rule 605(a)

admonishments is not entitled to a remand unless he can demonstrate that he was prejudiced or

denied “ ‘real justice’ ” (quoting People v. Henderson, 217 Ill. 2d 449, 470 (2005)). Mr.

Stubblefield has not made that showing.

¶ 47   Here, as the State explains in its brief, even if the court failed to properly admonish him,

Mr. Stubblefield managed to timely file his notice of appeal and his opening brief, where he raised

several issues regarding the trial court’s conduct. While Mr. Stubblefield has identified an error in

the trial court’s failure to properly admonish him, he has not shown how that error prevented him

from raising additional arguments or compromised his claims in any way. As in Lambert, he “does

not suggest any additional issues that he would have raised had he received proper

admonishments.” Lambert, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 494. Accordingly, we agree with the State that there

is no need for remand on this issue.

¶ 48   Throughout this appeal, Mr. Stubblefield, still representing himself, has filed repeated

motions asking this court to rule, by motion, on the merits of his case. Most of those have been

denied but his motion filed May 18, 2022, to rescind his statutory summary suspension, was taken

with the case. That motion is hereby DENIED. For the reasons described above (supra ¶¶ 35-

38) his summary suspension is not part of this appeal.

¶ 49                                    IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 50    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 51   Affirmed.

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