Court Opinion

ID: 9462597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:44:53.90289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:40.074981
License: Public Domain

McENTEE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
While not discounting the persuasiveness of the majority’s opinion in this case I nonetheless must dissent. This case is a difficult one — in terms both of its human dimensions and of the problems of statutory construction which it involves. While I have striven to avoid permitting the sympathetic aspects of petitioner’s situation to control, I have been influenced in my approach to the statutory language by the consistent line of Supreme Court decisions which hold that in *791deciding whether a given statute requires the deportation1 of an alien, doubts as to the correct construction of the statute should be resolved in the alien’s favor. “[S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 376, 92 L.Ed. 433, 436 (1948). See also Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225, 87 S.Ct. 473, 480, 17 L.Ed.2d 318, 326 (1966); Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642, 74 S.Ct. 822, 825, 98 L.Ed. 1009, 1013 (1954). Cf. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.)
The statute we must construe here does not directly address the situation of state expunction laws. While Congress specifically closed off the avenues of pardon and judicial recommendation against deportation to drug offenders, it said nothing about the effect of expunctions under state law (or about federal expunction under the Youth Correction Act [YCA]). In Mestre Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972) we followed the rule of strict construction and held that if Congress had intended federal YCA expunction to be inoperative from barring deportation it would have expressly said so. I believe a similarly strict construction is mandated here. We also noted in Mestre Morera that Congress through the Youth Correction Act, had expressed a “concern, which we cannot say to be any less strong than its concern with narcotics, that juvenile offenders be afforded an opportunity to atone for their youthful indiscretions.”2 462 F.2d at 1032. The fact that Congress chose to intertwine the criminal justice systems of the states with deportation decisions in no way alters its clearly manifest concern with rehabilitation.
Furthermore, I do not share the majority’s concern over the possible non-uniformity which might result from giving effect to the rehabilitative purposes of state expunction laws. In this as in other areas Congress has frequently made federal laws dependent on state statutes, see, e. g., 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(c)(2); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(l)(i). Congress has clearly bargained for and manifested an acceptance of the variety that necessarily flows from making deportation dependent on state convictions. Since Congress knew of the existence of state expunction provisions and the fact of their diversity, it could hardly have been unaware that such statutes might have a different scope than comparable federal provisions. Hence, I think we should be reluctant to strain toward uniformity where Congress has clearly countenanced variety through a system which partially relies on state laws. Such a system necessarily must involve “sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and . . . the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, [should] always endeavor . to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, 676 (1971).

I dissent.

. The consequences of deportation are often very grave for the individual involved. Deportation may result in the loss “of all that makes life worth living.” Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938, 943 (1922) (Brandéis, J.). It can be the equivalent of banishment or exile. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391, 68 S.Ct. 10, 12, 92 L.Ed. 17, 19 (1947).

. As the majority correctly notes, had petitioner been convicted of a narcotics offense under federal law and dealt with under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (for which he would have been eligible, see 18 U.S.C. § 5006(e)) he would not be deported following expunction.