Court Opinion

ID: 9364952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 19:00:45.337023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.556153
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 19-13197     Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 01/20/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 19-13197
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        JUSTIN B. LANE,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00044-MCR-1
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 19-13197

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Justin Lane pleaded guilty to mailing threatening communi-
        cations and threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. On
        appeal, Lane challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court
        erred in classifying him as a career offender under the sentencing
        guidelines. We affirm.
            FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                While serving a sentence in state prison, Lane sent two let-
        ters to a state attorney’s office. In the first, he wrote: “[W]hy don’t
        you inhale this powder and die . . . maybe it is anthrax who
        knows—f-ck you die pig.” In the second, he wrote: “F-ck you die,
        die, die, ha, ha, ha, anthrax, goodbye.” Each letter contained a
        white powdery substance and triggered biothreat protocols at the
        state attorney’s office when a secretary opened them. The letters
        later tested negative for anthrax.
               A grand jury indicted Lane on four counts: two counts of
        mailing threatening communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec-
        tion 876(c), and two counts of threatening to use a weapon of mass
        destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2332a. Lane pleaded
        guilty to all counts. After he pleaded guilty, the probation office
        prepared a presentence investigation report.
              The report classified Lane as a career offender under section
        4B1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. It reasoned that Lane “was at
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        19-13197               Opinion of the Court                        3

        least [eighteen] years old at the time of the instant offense”; “the
        instant offense of conviction [was] a felony that [was] . . . a crime
        of violence”; and Lane “ha[d] at least two prior felony convictions
        [that were] crime[s] of violence.” “[T]herefore, [Lane was] a career
        offender.”
                While the career offender enhancement required only two
        prior crimes of violence, the presentence investigation report iden-
        tified three. The first was for robbery, under Florida Statutes sec-
        tion 812.13, where Lane robbed a convenience store at gunpoint.
        The second was for aggravated battery, under Florida Statutes sec-
        tion 784.045, where Lane stabbed two victims multiple times with
        a screwdriver. The third was for mailing threatening letters, under
        18 U.S.C. section 876(c), where Lane sent another letter to a differ-
        ent state attorney’s office threatening anthrax.
                Lane objected to the presentence investigation report, argu-
        ing that he had committed only one prior crime of violence and so
        the career offender enhancement didn’t apply. He acknowledged
        that his robbery conviction was a crime of violence, but he argued
        that his convictions for aggravated battery and mailing threatening
        letters weren’t. As to aggravated battery, Lane conceded that, in
        Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, 709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2013),
        abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.
        591 (2015), this court held that a Florida aggravated battery convic-
        tion categorically qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Ca-
        reer Criminal Act. But, he argued, Turner (1) was “wrongly de-
        cided,” (2) never considered his “specific argument,” and (3) was
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 19-13197

        decided under a different statute. As to mailing threatening letters,
        Lane argued that the crime couldn’t qualify as a crime of violence
        because it required only recklessness, while crimes of violence
        must be intentional.
                The district court overruled Lane’s objection to the career
        offender enhancement. As to Lane’s aggravated battery convic-
        tion, the district court concluded the offense was a crime of vio-
        lence and that Lane’s argument to the contrary was “squarely fore-
        closed by Eleventh Circuit precedent.” It noted that this court had
        “repeatedly held that a conviction for aggravated battery under
        [section] 784.045 categorically qualifies as a violent felony” under a
        provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act that is “virtually iden-
        tical” to the career offender guidelines. As to Lane’s conviction for
        mailing threatening letters, the district court followed what it said
        was the majority rule across the federal circuits: that the offense
        qualifies as a crime of violence. As a result, the district court con-
        cluded that he had committed three crimes of violence—one more
        than necessary to apply the enhancement.
              At sentencing, the district court applied the career offender
        enhancement and calculated Lane’s advisory guidelines range.
        Lane’s total offense level was thirty-four. Lane’s criminal history
        category was VI. With a total offense level of thirty-four and a
        criminal history category of VI, Lane’s advisory guidelines range
        was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.
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        19-13197               Opinion of the Court                         5

               The district court varied downward and sentenced Lane to
        120 months’ imprisonment to be followed by five years of super-
        vised release. Lane timely appealed.
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
               “We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction
        qualifies as a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.”
        United States v. Matthews, 3 F.4th 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Estrada, 777 F.3d 1318, 1321
        (11th Cir. 2015)).
                                   DISCUSSION
              A defendant qualifies as a “career offender” under the sen-
        tencing guidelines if:
              (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the
              time the defendant committed the instant offense of
              conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a
              felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
              substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least
              two prior felony convictions of either a crime of vio-
              lence or a controlled substance offense.

        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The parties agree that Lane satisfies the first two
        elements because (1) he was at least eighteen years old when he
        committed the present crimes and (2) one of his instant offenses
        (threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction) is a crime of
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        6                            Opinion of the Court                       19-13197

        violence. 1 But they disagree on the third element—whether Lane
        has been convicted of at least two prior crimes of violence. We
        conclude that Lane committed two prior crimes of violence, and
        so the district court properly applied the career offender enhance-
        ment.
                A “crime of violence” is defined to include (among other
        things) a felony offense that “has as an element the use, attempted
        use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of an-
        other.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Courts call this the elements clause.
        “The Supreme Court has defined physical force as ‘violent force—
        that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
        person.’” United States v. Gandy, 917 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir.
        2019) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)).
                In this case, Lane had at least two prior crimes-of-violence
        convictions. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (providing that a defendant must
        have “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of vio-
        lence or a controlled substance offense” to qualify for the career
        offender enhancement). First, in Lane’s words, there’s no “dispute
        that a Florida robbery is a qualifying offense.” And for good reason:
        this court has already held that a “Florida robbery conviction was

        1
            Cf. United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332, 1342 n.9 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting,
        in applying a similar sentencing enhancement, that “threatening to use a
        weapon of mass destruction against a person . . . qualifie[s] as a ‘serious violent
        felony’”).
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        19-13197                  Opinion of the Court                              7

        . . . a crime of violence.” United States v. Martinez, 964 F.3d 1329,
        1333 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
               Second, Lane’s aggravated battery conviction under Florida
        Statutes section 784.045 (for stabbing two victims multiple times
        with a screwdriver) is also a crime of violence. In Turner, we held
        that Florida’s aggravated battery statute was a “violent felony” un-
        der the Armed Career Criminal Act. 709 F.3d at 1341. The Act
        defines a “violent felony” (for our purposes) in the exact same way
        that the sentencing guidelines define crimes of violence: as any
        crime that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
        use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. §
        924(e)(2)(B)(i). We reviewed Florida’s aggravated battery statute,
        which provides:
               A person commits aggravated battery who, in com-
               mitting battery:

               1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily
               harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigure-
               ment; or

               2. Uses a deadly weapon.

        Fla. Stat. § 784.045. 2 And we held that both of these prongs were
        crimes of violence: the first prong “involves the intentional or

        2
         Florida’s aggravated battery statute also provides that a “person commits ag-
        gravated battery if the person who was the victim of the battery was pregnant
        at the time of the offense and the offender knew or should have known that
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                      19-13197

        knowing causation of great bodily harm, and the other [prong] in-
        volves the use of a deadly weapon.” Turner, 709 F.3d at 1341. “Ei-
        ther way,” we said, “the crime has as an element the use, attempted
        use, or threatened use of physical force, indeed, violent force.” Id.
        (cleaned up). We could “therefore say without compunction that
        [a] conviction for aggravated battery qualifies as a violent felony
        for purposes of the [Armed Career Criminal Act].” Id.
                We have repeatedly reaffirmed this holding. See, e.g.,
        United States v. Vereen, 920 F.3d 1300, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (“We’ve held that a Florida aggravated battery conviction qualifies
        as a violent felony under the elements clause under either of the
        first two alternatives in [section] 784.045.”); In re Rogers, 825 F.3d
        1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We previously have held that a con-
        viction under Florida’s aggravated assault statute categorically
        qualifies as a violent felony under the [Armed Career Criminal
        Act’s] still-valid elements clause.”); Lukaj v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 953
        F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the petitioner’s “ar-
        gument that [Florida] aggravated battery does not involve physical
        force is foreclosed by Turner and Vereen”).
                These decisions—Turner, Vereen, Rogers, and Lukaj—
        compel our result here. While this case hinges on whether aggra-
        vated battery is a “crime of violence” under the sentencing guide-
        lines, not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act,

        the victim was pregnant.” Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(b). Neither side suggests that
        this third possible aggravated battery offense is relevant here.
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        19-13197               Opinion of the Court                         9

        the definitions are “virtually identical,” and so “decisions about one
        apply to the other.” Turner, 709 F.3d at 1335 n.4 (cleaned up); see
        also United States v. Dixon, 874 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2017) (“In
        determining whether a conviction is a ‘crime of violence’ under
        [the guidelines] we rely on cases interpreting the definition of ‘vio-
        lent felony’ under the Armed Career Criminal Act . . . because the
        definitions are substantially the same.”). And so Florida aggravated
        battery is a crime of violence under section 4B1.1 of the guidelines.
                Lane “acknowledges [that] this [c]ourt [has] previously held
        an aggravated battery offense is categorically a crime of violence,”
        but nonetheless urges reversal for two reasons. First, Lane argues
        that Turner’s holding—that Florida aggravated battery is a violent
        felony—has been “severely undermined” and therefore “abro-
        gat[ed]” by Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). But
        Borden simply held that “[o]ffenses with a mens rea of recklessness
        do not qualify as violent felonies under” the Armed Career Crimi-
        nal Act. Id. at 1834. The Florida aggravated battery statute pun-
        ishes only “intentional[]” crimes, so Borden (which said that reck-
        less crimes are not violent felonies) cannot help. See Fla. Stat. §§
        784.03, 784.045; see also United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255
        (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “[w]e may disregard the holding of
        a prior opinion only where that holding is overruled” by a decision
        of the Supreme Court or our en banc court that is “clearly on point”
        (cleaned up)).
              Second, Lane argues that “Turner’s analysis . . . was flawed.”
        The problem is that, “[e]ven if we thought [Turner was] wrong,
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                19-13197

        the prior panel precedent rule is not dependent upon a subsequent
        panel’s appraisal of the initial decision’s correctness.” Smith v.
        GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Co-
        hen v. Off. Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000)); see
        also United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1998)
        (en banc) (“Under our prior precedent rule, a panel cannot overrule
        a prior one’s holding even though convinced it is wrong.”). This
        argument won’t work either.
                                   *     *      *
               In sum, Lane’s prior convictions for robbery and aggravated
        battery were crimes of violence. And so the district court properly
        applied the career offender enhancement.
              AFFIRMED.