Court Opinion

ID: 9862162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:02:48.503408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:29.708827
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARTMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority. The majority holds, in effect, that a claim for reimbursement of support is a separate right of action not governed by the judgment of dissolution, relying upon People ex rel. Paredes v. Paredes (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 692, 502 N.E.2d 273, and People ex rel. Hartshorn v. Hartshorn (1959), 21 Ill. App. 2d 91, 157 N.E.2d 563. In Paredes, this court held that a father is liable for the support of his minor children even though a prior dissolution judgment is silent on the issue of support. (Paredes, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 694.) In Hartshorn, the appellate court was faced with similar facts and issues. The Hartshorn court stated: "Independent of the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, when the parents of a child are divorced and no mention is made in the decree for the care and custody of the minor child, under the law, the father is still bound to provide a reasonable and proper support for the minor.” (Emphasis added.) (Hartshorn, 21 Ill. App. 2d at 101.) In neither Hartshorn nor Paredes, however, did the dissolution judgments mention the issue of support. In contrast, here, the undisputed facts reveal that the dissolution judgment entered on March 18, 1987, specifically reserved child support and visitation, and expressly retained jurisdiction for purposes of any modification dictated by necessity. Section 510(a) of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 1992)) specifically provides that "the provisions of any judgment respecting máintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice by the moving party of the filing of a motion for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) Illinois cases interpret section 510(a) as controlling in nonURESA actions. (In re Marriage of Kraft (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 502, 504, 577 N.E.2d 522; Conner v. Watkins (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 759, 762, 511 N.E.2d 200. See Rimkus v. Rimkus (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 903, 906-07, 557 N.E.2d 638.) A dissolution judgment reserving support constitutes a final judgment as to child support which limits modification of the original judgment to child support accruing subsequent to filing a modification petition and thereby precludes the imposition of retroactive support. (Nerini v. Nerini (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 848, 488 N.E.2d 402.) There is no reason suggested as to why the rule should be ignored in URESA cases. In the present case the dissolution judgment which reserved support was a final judgment setting respondent’s support obligation at zero. Nothing in the URESA documents shows that petitioner was seeking "modification of [an] existing responding state order” or "collection of arrears,” although that is what she undertook to secure, without notice, and contrary to the dissolution judgment and Illinois law. Petitioner should have sought modification and thereby changed respondent’s future support obligations but did not. Her present appeal effectively is an attempt to impose the type of retroactive support specifically precluded in Illinois. Although a claim for reimbursement under URESA is not necessarily dependent upon a judgment of dissolution as its basis, a URESA claim for reimbursement has no independent basis for the imposition of a support order. (People ex rel. Oetjen v. Oetjen (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 699, 416 N.E.2d 402.) URESA creates no duty to support but simply provides a means to enforce a duty to support as it may exist under the law of the responding State. Oetjen, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 705. Under URESA, a State furnishing support to an individual obligee has the same, but no greater, right to collect as does the obligee. 750 ILCS 20/8 (West 1992) (formerly 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 1208). Here, petitioner has failed to show the existence of a retroactive right by the obligee to collect support for the period of March through July 1992. The dissolution judgment entered specifically reserved the issue of child support and thereby precluded the imposition of a retroactive support award and the requested reimbursement. Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the circuit court.