Court Opinion

ID: 9493227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:01:41.702421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:43.253766
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The district court granted the sheriffs deputies in this case qualified immunity after concluding that “[p]oliee have no dependable guidance [regarding] the constitutional limitations, if any, upon a mere threat or display of force to effect a seizure.” This court now reverses, finding that clearly established law put the officers on notice as to the potential illegality of their conduct. Because the majority finds “clearly established law” where none exists, I must respectfully dissent.
I
Before proceeding to the specific facts of this case, a few brief observations regarding qualified immunity are in order. For purposes of qualified immunity analysis, a right is clearly established if “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). We have previously described the scope of the doctrine in the following terms: *1039Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (quoting Malloy v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). Although the qualified immunity inquiry would appear to be fairly straightforward, our cases defining the scope of the defense are less than pellucid. This is in large part due to the difficulty of selecting the appropriate level of generality for purposes of qualified immunity analysis. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has recognized this difficulty and provided the following guidance:
*1038[T]he qualified immunity “defense” has been defined quite broadly: “[I]t provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.... [I]f officers of reasonable competence would disagree on th[e] issue [whether or not a specific action was constitutional], immunity should be recognized.”
*1039The operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant “legal rule” is to be identified. For example, the right to due process is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of “clearly established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. Harlow would be transformed from a guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading. Such an approach, in sum, would destroy [the balance struck by the doctrine of qualified immunity].
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034. Thus, in qualified immunity cases, the crucial inquiry should not be the somewhat academic question of “how do we define the right allegedly violated” (such as the rather general “right to be free from excessive force”). Rather, the key question is “did the challenged actions fall short of objective legal reasonableness,” such that “in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the official’s actions was] apparent.” Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034.
II
Here, the majority defines the right at issue — “the right to be free from excessive force” — at such a high level of generality that the resulting qualified immunity analysis “bear[s] no relationship to the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of Harlow.” Id. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034. The question here is not whether Robinson enjoys a “right to be free from excessive force,” which, of course, he does (doesn’t everyone?); rather, the issue is whether, “in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness [of the deputies’ specific actions was] apparent.” Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (emphasis added). Based on our cases, as well as those of our sister circuits, I must conclude that such unlawfulness — if any — was far from apparent.
Although the majority is correct in noting that it is not necessary for the very actions in question to have been held unlawful, the state of the law must be “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates [the law].” Id. I find the requisite clarity sorely lacking in this case. We have never squarely addressed the extent to which merely pointing a weapon at a suspect, unaccompanied by the use of physical force, can give rise to § 1983 liability for violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. The majority relies upon McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir.1984), for the proposition that pointing a service revolver at a suspect may constitute excessive force. The facts of McKenzie, however, are very different from those in the case at bar. The McKenzie panel reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers in a § 1983 action alleging the use of excessive force. In contrast to this case, where a weapon was pointed at Robinson but no physical force was used against him, the pointing of weapons in McKenzie was accompanied by significant force: Police officers “burst into the hotel room with weapons drawn, forced appellants against *1040the wall, handcuffed them, and threw them to the floor.” Id. at 1010 (emphases added). In light of the additional conduct of the officers in McKenzie that accompanied the pointing of weapons at the suspect, McKenzie does not establish — clearly or otherwise — that the actions of the officers in this case might be illegal.
Furthermore, persuasive authority from other circuits supports the proposition that merely pointing a weapon at a person does not give rise to § 1983 liability for violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive force. See, e.g., Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir.1997) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when officers required plaintiffs to lie face down in dirt, with guns at their heads); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir.1989) (“[T]he action of a police officer in pointing a gun at a person is not, in and of itself, actionable [under the Fourth Amendment].”); Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 1229-31 (5th Cir.1988) (overturning a jury verdict against an officer for constitutionally excessive use of force, stating that “we are unwilling to say that merely pointing the gun was grossly disproportionate to the need for action”). In light of these precedents, the district court was correct in reaching the following conclusion: “Police have no dependable guidance [regarding] the constitutional limitations, if any, upon a mere threat or display of force to effect a seizure, and accordingly defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.” This conclusion makes particular sense in a case like this one, where the suspect to be seized was known to be in possession of a deadly weapon that he had recently used (even if only against dogs).1
III
While the treatment of Robinson by the defendant officers is certainly regrettable, sympathy for an attractive plaintiff does not justify distorting the law of qualified immunity. It is difficult to imagine how police officers can be held liable for alleged failure to adhere to law that was so “clearly established” that not even our district courts can divine its contours.2 I respectfully dissent.

. This case is therefore quite distinguishable from McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.1992), where an officer pointed his gun at the head of a nine-year-old child who was not suspected of any crime or of being armed. It is also very different from Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir.1981), where an unidentified police officer “brandisbfed] his revolver” only eighteen inches away from the head of a man the officer had no cause to believe armed — with the man’s wife “in the precise line of fire” — and threatened to shoot.

. “If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999).