Court Opinion

ID: 9581055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:21.573609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:40.641546
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
1. Over Home Depot’s objection that the testimony was scientifically unreliable, the trial court allowed Tvrdeich to present expert opinion testimony that trauma she suffered in a fall at Home Depot and during subsequent surgery necessitated by the fall caused her to develop scleroderma. The majority holds that this testimony was not the type of scientific evidence subject to the reliability requirements set forth in Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (292 SE2d 389) (1982). I disagree and find that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing pursuant to Harper to exercise its discretion to determine whether or not the scientific principle or theory upon which the expert opinion testimony was based has reached a “scientific stage of verifiable certainty” required prior to admission under Harper. Id. at 524-527.
As the majority points out, Home Depot moved in limine to exclude this expert opinion testimony on the basis that the claimed causal connection between trauma and the onset of scleroderma is a novel scientific theory which is unreliable and inadmissible under Harper. The trial court denied the motion and admitted the expert testimony without evaluating its scientific reliability under the Harper test. In so doing, the trial court referred to our opinion in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 593 (452 SE2d 159) (1994), which held that Harper did not apply to Orkin’s claim that expert opinion testimony establishing a causal connection between exposure to a certain pesticide and the plaintiffs illness was scientifically unreliable. Orkin Exterminating held that Harper did not apply because Orkin “[did] not challenge a particular scientific test or technique employed by plaintiffs experts; [rather] Orkin challenge [d] the conclusions drawn by those experts from testimony and evidence in the record.” Orkin Exterminating, 215 Ga. App. at 593.
It is not clear whether Orkin Exterminating represents a narrow *587construction of Harper11 or simply a technical ruling in that case on the sufficiency of an evidentiary objection. What is clear is that Harper has been construed by the Supreme Court of Georgia to apply to a wide range of cases involving the admissibility of expert opinion testimony based on an analysis of data supporting various scientific principles or theories. Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 702-704 (482 SE2d 314) (1997) (citing to the “wide range” of cases involving “scientific test evidence” subject to Harper, all having in common “expert opinion based on an analysis of data”), overruled on other grounds, Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6,10 (515 SE2d 155) (1999); Pullin v. State, 272 Ga. 747, 748-749 (534 SE2d 69) (2000) (applying the Harper test to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony based on scientific principles showing that the geographic location of a cellular call can be reliably established). Moreover, this Court has not persisted in giving Harper the narrow construction apparently applied in Orkin Exterminating. See Cromer v. Mulkey Enterprises, 254 Ga. App. 388, 393 (562 SE2d 783) (2002) (applying the Harper test to the admissibility of expert testimony which relied on scientific principles to determine if a certain accident caused a certain injury).
The Harper test clearly applies not only in cases where the application of a particular scientific test or technique is at issue, but also where expert opinion testimony is offered which is based upon an analysis of data supporting a scientific principle or theory. It follows that the reliability test set forth in Harper applied to the admissibility of the expert opinion testimony in the present case, which relied upon an analysis of data to advance the scientific principle or theory that the trauma suffered by Tvrdeich caused her to develop scleroderma. To the extent Orkin Exterminating, 215 Ga. App. at 593 and J. B. Hunt Transport, 236 Ga. App. at 635 can be construed to hold that Harper has no application to the present case, they should he overruled.
Because the trial court erroneously failed to exercise its discretion to determine under Harper whether or not this expert opinion testimony was reliable and admissible, the judgment in this case should be affirmed on condition and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to apply the reliability test set forth in Harper. If the trial court finds under Harper that the testimony was reliable and admissible, then the judgment should stand affirmed, subject to Home Depot’s right to appeal that finding. If, however, the trial court finds under Harper that the testimony was unreliable and should have been excluded, then Home Depot should be granted a new trial.
*588Decided July 16, 2004
Hawkins & Parnell, Michael J. Goldman, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Frank M. Lowrey IV, Nicole G. Iannarone, Gray, Hedrick & Edenfield, Lloyd B. Hedrick, Jr., for appellant.
Evans & Evans, Larry K. Evans, Cramer & Peavy, James E. Peavy, for appellees.
2. Home Depot’s claim that there was a lack of evidence to support the award of attorney fees may be rendered moot if a new trial is required. Accordingly, I would reserve ruling on this issue and give Home Depot the right to raise it again in its appeal, if necessary, from the trial court’s findings on remand.

 J. B. Hunt Transport v. Brown, 236 Ga. App. 634,635 (512 SE2d 34) (1999), which relies on Orkin Exterminating, apparently takes this view.