Court Opinion

ID: 9391374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 06:00:09.005674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.562962
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     PROMOD CHANDHOK,                                DOCKET NUMBERS
                 Appellant,                          DC-0432-17-0812-I-9
                                                     DC-513D-17-0813-I-9
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF
       TRANSPORTATION,                               DATE: May 1, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Peter Broida, Esquire, Arlington, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Paul Sanchez, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chair
                                 Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
     which affirmed the denial of the appellant’s within-grade increase (WIGI) and
     his removal from service.     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, DISMISS the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     appellant’s appeal of his denied WIGI for lack of jurisdiction, and REMAND the
     appellant’s appeal of his removal to the regional office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2           In September 2017, the appellant filed a Board appeal challenging two
     distinct actions—the December 2015 denial of his WIGI and his November 2016
     removal from service.       The matters were docketed separately.        Chandhok v.
     Department of Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-17-0812-I-1, Initial
     Appeal File (0812 IAF), Tab 1 at 6-7; Chandhok v. Department of
     Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DC-531D-17-0813-I-1, Initial Appeal File
     (0813 IAF), Tab 1 at 6-7. However, they were joined for adjudication. 0812 IAF,
     Tab 6; 0813 IAF, Tab 6.
¶3           During the lengthy period that followed the appellant’s initial filing, his
     appeals were repeatedly dismissed without prejudice to accommodate the parties’
     mediation efforts, settlement efforts, discovery, and other delays . E.g., Chandhok
     v. Department of Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-17-0812-I-5,
     Appeal File (0812 AF-5), Tab 104; Chandhok v. Department of Transportation,
     MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-17-0812-I-9, Appeal File (0812 AF-9), Tab 1. Then,
     in July 2020, the administrative judge held a 5-day hearing. E.g., 0812 AF-9,
     Hearing Transcripts (HT1-HT5). Finally, the administrative judge issued a single
     initial decision that affirmed both of the agency’s actions—the appellant’s
     removal and the prior denial of his WIGI. 0812 AF-9, Tab 70, Initial Decision
     (ID).
¶4           The following facts, as further detailed in that initial decision, appear to be
     undisputed. The appellant most recently held a GS-14 Mathematical Statistician
     position within the agency’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). ID at 2.
     In July 2015, the agency determined that the appellant’s performance was
     unacceptable in one critical element, “Business Results,” causing his overall
                                                                                            3

     performance rating to be unacceptable. Id.; 0812 AF-9, Tab 17 at 4-9. Therefore,
     the agency placed the appellant on a performance improvement plan (PIP) and
     later withheld his scheduled WIGI. ID at 2; 0812 AF-5, Tab 90 at 4-8, Tab 93
     at 11-14.
¶5        At     the   conclusion   of   his   PIP,   which      had   been   extended   until
     February 3, 2016, the agency determined that the appellant’s performance
     remained unacceptable in the critical element of “Business Results.” ID at 3;
     0812 AF-5, Tab 41 at 4-10. The agency proposed his performance-based removal
     for the same in June 2016.        ID at 3; 0812 AF-5, Tab 40 at 4-11.           After the
     appellant      responded,   the     deciding     official    sustained    the    removal
     in November 2016. ID at 3; 0812 AF-5, Tab 12 at 4-9. The appellant then retired
     in lieu of his removal. 0812 AF-5, Tab 13 at 4.
¶6        The appellant first challenged his denied WIGI and removal through the
     equal employment opportunity (EEO) process. 0812 AF -5, Tabs 7-10. He then
     filed the instant appeals and raised claims of discrimination, EEO reprisal, and
     harmful procedural errors. ID at 3-4.
¶7        The administrative judge found that the agency met its burden regarding
     both the denied WIGI and the removal action. ID at 4 -39. She further found that
     the appellant failed to meet his burden regarding any affirmative defense.
     ID at 39-48.      Accordingly, the administrative judge sustained the agency’s
     actions. ID at 48-49.
¶8        The appellant has filed a petition for review. E.g., Chandhok v. Department
     of Transportation, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-17-0812-I-9, Petition for Review
     (0812 PFR) File, Tab 3. The agency has filed a response, and the appellant has
     replied. 0812 PFR File, Tabs 5-6.

     We must remand the appellant’s removal claim for further adjudication in light of
     Santos.
¶9        At the time the initial decision was issued, the Board’s case law stated that,
     to prevail in an appeal of a performance-based removal under chapter 43, the
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      agency must establish the following by substantial evidence: (1) the Office of
      Personnel Management (OPM) approved its performance appraisal system and
      any significant changes thereto; (2) the agency communicated to the appellant the
      performance standards and critical elements of his position; (3) the appellant’s
      performance standards were valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1); (4) the agency
      warned the appellant of the inadequacies of his performance during the appraisal
      period and gave him a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable
      performance; and (5) the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable in one
      or more of the critical elements for which he was provided an opportunity to
      demonstrate acceptable performance. 2 Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency,
      115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5 (2010). Substantial evidence is the degree of relevant
      evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, might
      accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even though other reasonable persons
      might disagree. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p). The administrative judge found that the
      agency met this burden and proved each of these elements. ID at 6 -28, 30-39. As
      further detailed below, we find no basis for disturbing t hese findings, but we must
      remand for the parties to address one additional element, as described in Santos v.
      National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

            OPM approved the agency’s performance appraisal system and
            communicated to the appellant the performance standards and critical
            elements of his position.
¶10        The agency submitted evidence regarding element 1 —that OPM approved
      of its performance appraisal system.     0812 AF-5, Tab 100 at 21.        Plus, the
      appellant indicated that he did not contest that element. 0812 AF -9, Tab 45 at 4.

      2
        Although Lee provides that performance standards must be valid under 5 U.S.C.
      § 4302(b)(1), the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 redesignated
      subsection 4302(b) as subsection 4302(c). Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(d)(1)(A),
      131 Stat. 1283, 1619 (2017). Accordingly, 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1) now sets forth the
      statutory requirements for a valid performance standard.
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¶11         Regarding element 2—that the agency communicated to the appellant the
      performance standards and critical elements of his position—there also appears to
      be no dispute.        Among other things, the record includes the appellant’s
      performance plan for the period between June 2014 and May 2015, signed by the
      appellant in December 2014 as part of his mid-year review and containing a
      notation that he had refused to sign the same at the start of the performance year.
      E.g., 0812 AF-9, Tab 17 at 4-9. Although we found no explicit indication that the
      appellant was conceding this element, he did not present any substantive
      argument about the matter in his final brief below, 0812 AF-9, Tab 63, or in
      his petition for review, 0812 PFR File, Tab 3.
¶12         For these reasons, we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that
      the agency met its burden regarding elements 1 and 2. ID at 6-8, 16-17.

             The appellant’s performance standards were valid.
¶13         One of the appellant’s primary arguments on review concerns element 3,
      the validity of the agency’s performance standards.          0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at
      6-13. In summary, the appellant has alleged that the performance standards at
      issue in this appeal were impermissibly absolute and impermissibly subjective.
      Id. at 8-13.
¶14         An absolute standard is one where a single incident of p oor performance
      will result in an unsatisfactory rating on a critical element.            Henderson v.
      National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 116 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶ 12 n.2
      (2011). The statutory scheme for performance-based actions does not preclude
      the use of absolute performance standards, so long as those standards are
      objective and tailored to the specific requirements of the positio n. Id.; Jackson v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 97 M.S.P.R. 13, ¶¶ 13, 15 (2004).
¶15         The      appellant   argues   that,   although   the   statutory   scheme   for   a
      performance-based removal does not prohibit absolute performance standards, the
      agency’s policies did. 0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 8-12. In particular, agency policy
      about performance standards indicates that performance should be measured in
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      terms of timeliness, but the timeliness standard “must not be absolute,” 0812
      AF-9, Tab 12 at 70, while the agency’s collective bargaining agreement provides
      that performance management systems “will not apply absolute performance
      standards except where they are crucial to the mission,” 0812 AF -9, Tab 7 at 7-8.
¶16        The appellant suggests that the performance standards from his performance
      plan and PIP violate those policies, the agency was not permitted to cure the
      alleged violations through subsequent communications, and we should not subject
      these alleged violations to a harmful error analysis.      0812 PFR File, Tab 3
      at 6-12. In other words, the appellant argues that we should exclusively look to
      the performance plan and PIP to determine whether the agency violated internal
      policy and, if we find that it did, we should reverse his removal, regardless of
      whether he can prove that the violation was harmful.
¶17        We disagree with the appellant’s argument regarding what we should
      review while considering the validity of his performance standards. Although
      he suggests that we should not look past the four corners of his performance plan
      and PIP, the appellant has not directed us to anything requiring the same. Nor has
      he squared that argument with Board precedent to the contrary. The Board has
      routinely recognized that an agency may cure otherwise fatal defects in the
      development and communication of performance standards by communicating
      sufficient information about the performance requirements at the beginning of,
      and even during, the PIP.       Henderson, 116 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶ 18; see Town,
      120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 23 (finding that an agency can and did cure any improper
      vagueness in its performance standards through additional oral or written
      communications); Thompson v. Department of the Navy, 89 M.S.P.R. 188,
      ¶¶ 18-19 (2001) (finding that even if an employee’s unmodified performance
      standards were invalid, the agency cured them before the start of his PIP).
¶18        We also disagree with the appellant’s argument regarding the proper
      analytical framework for considering any violation of agency policy.           The
      appellant directs us to Cross v. Department of the Air Force, 25 M.S.P.R. 353,
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      358-59 (1984), aff’d, 785 F.2d 320 (Fed. Cir. 1985), to assert that the harmful
      error test does not apply to the agency’s alleged violation of its own policies
      regarding absolute standards. 0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 8-11. But Cross merely
      recognized that certain statutory requirements described in chapter 43 are not
      subject to the harmful error test; it cannot be reasonably interpreted as reaching
      the same conclusion about an agency’s internal policies regarding absolute
      performance standards. Cross, 25 M.S.P.R. at 356-59. Therefore, we find the
      harmful error test appropriate. See Doe v. Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R.
      90, ¶ 7 (2015) (recognizing that the Board will not sustain an agency decision if
      the appellant proves a harmful error, i.e., a procedural error that was likely to
      have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have
      reached in the absence or cure of the error).
¶19         Regarding the performance standards at issue in this appeal, t he appellant’s
      performance plan describes the relevant critical element as follows:        “Business
      Results . . . Under the direction of BTS project manager(s), successfully update
      key   DOT    documentation     for   statistical   standards    and   guidelines   and
      confidentiality procedures.” 0812 AF-5, Tab 96 at 7. It then identifies the three
      documents to be updated—two agency manuals and one agency guide—while
      providing several dated milestones for doing so, such as an initial review for
      recommended updates, initial draft, second draft with edits incorporated, and
      completion of the documents, edited to omit errors and inconsistencies. Id. The
      performance plan acknowledged that the appellant’s performance could be rated
      as unacceptable, achieved results, exceeded expectations, or outstanding. Id.
¶20         Subsequent    communications     and      documentation    provided   additi onal
      context. For example, when the agency completed the appellant’s performance
      appraisal for the period ending May 2015 and found his performance
      unacceptable in this critical element, it included a lengthy narrative statement
      devoted to the same. Id. at 12-17. Among other things, this narrative describes
      how the agency held periodic meetings with the appellant to provide “clear
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      expectations for each deliverable and due date,” along with a senior statistician
      “to provide oversite and consultation” to the appellant.       Id. at 12.   It also
      describes how the agency reviewed “deadlines and deliverables” with the
      appellant and “reminded [him] that these defined the standard for an ‘achieved
      results’ rating.” Id. Then, the agency provided specific instances of the appellant
      submitting work and other agency officials responding with explanations for why
      that work was deficient. Id. at 12-17.
¶21         The PIP, itself, is another example of the agency providing additional
      context to the relevant performance standards. 0812 AF-5, Tab 90 at 4-8. The
      PIP tasked the appellant with completing that which he failed to finish during the
      performance year—updates to the three documents listed for the Business Results
      critical element.   Id.   Among other things, the PIP included the following
      explanation of that which was required to attain the necessary “achieved results”
      rating:
            Successfully finalize the revisions of the 3 documents listed in [the
            critical element] within 111 days of the effective date of this PIP.
            The final versions must incorporate all comments received to date.
            These deliverables should also be generally free of grammatical
            errors and style inconsistencies. If comments are not addressed, a
            written, well-reasoned explanation must be timely provided and
            agreed to by your supervisor.
      Id. at 5.   The PIP then provided a roadmap with new, dated milestones to
      elaborate and explain the agency’s expectations in terms of factors such as
      content, quality, and timeliness.   Id. at 5-7.   Plus, as detailed in the initial
      decision and throughout the record, the appellant’s supervisor regularly met with
      the appellant to discuss her specific expectations and what more the appellant
      needed to do to meet them. E.g., ID at 9-12; 0812 AF-9, Tab 15 at 34-36, 74-76.
¶22         Although the appellant argues that his performance standards were absolute
      and left no margin for error, we are not persuaded.        None of the evidence
      described above explicitly or implicitly requires perfection to reach the necessary
      “achieved results” performance rating. The appellant’s strained interpretation to
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      the contrary is not one we adopt. As further described in the initial decision, it is
      also not one shared by those measuring his performance.               ID at 13 -15; HT3
      at 83-89 (testimony of the proposing official).
¶23         We further find that, even if the agency had a policy prohibiting absolute
      standards, and even if the agency violated that policy, the appellant failed to
      prove that the error was harmful. As detailed in the initial decision and discussed
      below, the agency did not find the appellant’s performance unacceptable because
      of any single mistake or single instance of untimeliness. It found his performance
      unacceptable because of many mistakes and many missed deadlines. E.g., 0812
      AF-5, Tab 41 at 7-10.
¶24         Turning to the appellant’s other set of arguments, that his performance
      standards were impermissibly subjective, we first note that an agency is not
      required to include in each performance standard specific indicators of quantity,
      quality,     and   timeliness   that   are   used   to   evaluate   work.   Henderson,
      116 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶ 23. Further, the fact that the performance standard may call
      for a certain amount of subjective judgment on the part of the employee’s
      supervisor does not automatically invalidate the standard.           Id. The Board has
      held that performance standards must be sufficiently precise and specific as to
      invoke a general consensus as to their meaning and content and provide firm
      benchmarks toward which the employee may aim his performance.                 Id.   And
      again, as previously mentioned, the Board has also recognized that an agency may
      cure otherwise fatal defects in the development and communicati on of
      performance standards by communicating sufficient information regarding
      performance requirements at the beginning of, and even during, the PIP.
      Id., ¶ 18.
¶25         The appellant’s arguments on this point are also unavailing. It seems as if
      the appellant is suggesting that the agency’s performance standards were
      impermissibly subjective because they did not adequately define the number or
      types of errors and delays that would be allowed under the “achieved results”
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      performance rating.    0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 12-13.           We disagree.   The
      appellant’s performance plan and the PIP that followed tasked the appellant with
      successfully updating three specific documents. E.g., 0812 AF-5, Tab 90 at 4-8.
      The agency repeatedly provided detailed descriptions of what was required to
      attain the necessary “achieved results” rating for doing so, along with dated
      milestones. Id. at 5-6; supra ¶¶ 20-22. The fact that these performance standards
      call for a certain amount of subjective judgement on the part of the appellant’s
      supervisor, such as her judgement as to whether the documents were “generally
      free of grammatical errors,” is acceptable under the circumstances.        This is
      especially so because of the nature of the appellant’s position and work, as well
      as the agency’s extensive feedback throughout the performance year and PIP. See
      Diprizio v. Department of Transportation, 88 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 10 (2001)
      (recognizing that the degree of objectivity and specificity required in performance
      standards depends on the job involved and with greater discretion and
      independence on the part of an employee comes less objectivity and specificity in
      their performance standards); see also Salmon v. Social Security Administration ,
      663 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding performance standards were not
      impermissibly subjective because, inter alia, the employee’s supervisor “gave
      direct, precise feedback on the deficiencies in [the employee’s] work and clear
      instructions on how to remedy them”).
¶26        For all these reasons, we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion
      that the agency proved element 3, the validity of its performance standards.
      The appellant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.

            The agency warned the appellant of the inadequacies of his performance
            and gave him a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable
            performance.
¶27        Regarding element 4—proof that the agency warned the appellant of the
      inadequacies of his performance during the appraisal period and gave him
      a reasonable   opportunity    to   demonstrate     acceptable     performance —the
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      administrative judge found that the agency met its burden. ID at 17 -28. Among
      other things, she determined that the agency provided close supervision and
      extensive help to the appellant, throughout the relevant period, to no avail. Id.
      The administrative judge also considered but rejected the appellant’s allegations
      that his assignments were improper and his training was inadequate. Id.
¶28         On review, the appellant presents arguments that implicate this element and
      associated claims of a harmful error.      0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-25.    First,
      he argues that the assignments underlying his unacceptable performance —to
      update three documents—violated the applicable union contract because they
      were not tied to his position.      Id. at 13-14.   The administrative judge found
      otherwise. ID at 20-25. Second, the appellant argues that the agency failed to
      provide training in project management and technical writing that was requi red by
      the union contract and performance management systems, 0812 PFR File, Tab 3
      at 14-19, as well as assistance that was promised during the PIP, id. at 19-24.
      But again, the administrative judge found otherwise. ID at 25 -26, 28.
¶29         Regarding the allegation that his assignments were not tied to his position,
      the appellant has failed to specifically identify any evidence in the voluminous
      record for support. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(2) (providing that a petitioner
      who alleges that the judge made erroneous findings of fact must explain why the
      challenged factual determination is incorrect and identify specific evidence in the
      record that demonstrates the error).        Instead, he merely rea sserts that the
      assignments      underlying   his    unacceptable    performance —updating    three
      documents—were atypical for him and better suited for someone with a different
      set of skills.   0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-14.      We are not persuaded by this
      argument, particularly in light of the administrative judge’s extensive analysis of
      the same that included a discussion of the appellant’s position description, his
      education, his prior authoring of a book, his experience within the agency, and his
      experience as an adjunct professor. ID at 20-25, 27.
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¶30        Regarding the allegation that the agency failed to provide training that was
      either required by contract or otherwise promised, the appellant’s arguments are
      similarly unavailing.   As to required training, the appellant has di rected us to
      several resources, including statutes, regulations, Board precedent, Board reports,
      agency policies, and union contract provisions. 0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 14-19.
      We have reviewed each but find that none required that the agency provide the
      appellant with formal training before acting on his unacceptable performance.
      For example, although the appellant has referenced 5 U.S.C. § 4302(a), that
      statute merely describes what performance appraisals should be used for, e.g.,
      training but also decisions to remove an employee.       In another example, the
      appellant has recounted agency policies and union contract provisions regarding
      performance, but each provides that training “may” be provided. 0812 PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 15-17. These and each of the other sources the appellant relies upon do
      discuss training, but none mandates it under the circumstances. Plus, we note that
      the appellant has now, in retrospect, identified his need for certain for mal
      training, but he has not identified any instance of him doing the same prior to his
      removal, when the agency repeatedly invited him to notify the agency if
      he believed any particular training would be beneficial as he worked to improve
      his performance. E.g., 0812 AF-5, Tab 90 at 4, 7, Tab 93 at 11, 13.
¶31        Turning to the appellant’s allegation of promised training, it is true that
      an agency’s promise of assistance during the PIP and then failure to provide the
      same may prevent the agency from meeting its burden in certain circumstances.
      Corbett v. Department of the Air Force, 59 M.S.P.R. 288, 290 (1993). But again,
      the appellant’s arguments on this point are not persuasive. The administrative
      judge found that the agency provided the appellant with extensive assistance from
      his supervisor and others during the relevant period, e.g., ID at 26, and the
      appellant does not appear to argue otherwise. Instead, he seems to argue that
      because the projects underlying his unacceptable performance were originally
      planned to be group projects, he should have received assistance from the original
                                                                                      13

      group members.     0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 19-24.       However, what may have
      originally been planned as a group project became the appellant’s own project by
      late 2014, id. at 20-21, which was well before his 2015 rating of unacceptable, his
      subsequent PIP, and his 2016 removal.      Therefore, even if he did not receive
      assistance from the individuals that may have been contemplated years earlier,
      that is of no apparent consequence to the period and performance at issue in this
      appeal.

            The appellant’s performance remained unacceptable.
¶32        Regarding element 5—proof that the appellant’s performance remained
      unacceptable in one or more of the critical elements for which he was provided
      an opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance—the administrative judge
      also found that the agency met its burden.          ID at 30-39.     In doing so,
      she discussed and relied on extensive testimony of multiple witnesses, as well as
      extensive documentary evidence, all reflecting how the appellant’s work for each
      of the three documents the agency had tasked him with updating was deficient in
      terms of substance, consistency, and overall quality. Id.
¶33        On review, the appellant seems to implicate this element of the agency’s
      burden by asserting that the agency misconstrued his drafts with final products.
      0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 24-25. But this is another instance of the appellant
      suggesting that the agency was holding him to an impossible and absolute
      standard, where he could not make even a single grammatical or stylistic error.
      Id. For the reasons previously discussed, we find the argument unavailing and
      unsupported by the evidence of record. Supra ¶ 23.
¶34        The appellant also argues that the administrative judge’s factual analysis
      was materially incomplete.    0812 PFR File, Tab 3 at 26 -27.      He refers us to
      “many hours of testimony” about various pieces of documentary evidence, as well
      as his post-hearing brief, asserting that the administrative judge referred to
      neither in the initial decision. Id. However, an administrative judge’s failure to
      mention all of the evidence of record does not mean that she did not consider it in
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      reaching her decision.    E.g., Marques v. Department of Health and Human
      Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
      (Table). Plus, despite the suggestion to the contrary, the administrativ e judge did
      cite to and discuss at least some of the appellant’s testimony and closing brief for
      this element and others. E.g., ID at 30, 31 n.8, 37 (referencing 0812 AF-9, Tab
      63; HT5 at 35 (testimony of the appellant)). More broadly, the appellant has not
      shown that the administrative judge erred in finding the agency’s evidence
      persuasive and sufficient for purposes of its evidentiary burden in this appeal.

            On remand, the agency must prove one additional element regarding the
            appellant’s removal.
¶35        Although the appellant has identified no basis for us to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings regarding the agency proving the elements
      described above, we must remand this appeal for the agency to prove
      an additional element of its charge for its removal action. During the pendency of
      the petition for review in this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
      Circuit held in Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61, 1363, that in addition to the five
      elements of the agency’s case set forth above, the agency mu st also “justify the
      institution of a PIP” by proving by “substantial evidence that the employee’s
      performance was unacceptable . . . before the PIP.”
¶36        The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to all pending cases,
      including this one, regardless of when the events took place. Lee v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16. Accordingly, we remand the appeal to
      give the parties the opportunity to present argument and additional evidence on
      whether the appellant’s performance during the period leading up to the PIP was
      unacceptable in one or more critical elements. See id., ¶¶ 15-17. On remand, the
      administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence on this issue and shall
      hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate. Id., ¶ 17.
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      On remand, the administrative judge must also make new findings about the
      appellant’s EEO reprisal claim and one additional harmful error c laim, as
      appropriate.
¶37         The administrative judge rejected the appellant’s numerous affirmative
      defenses, which included claims of discrimination based on national origin, sex,
      and age, reprisal for engaging in protected EEO activity, and harmful error.
      ID at 39-48.    Except for the harmful error claims we discussed above, in
      connection with the elements required for a performance -based action such as
      this, the appellant has not reasserted his affirmative defenses on review.
      His petition makes no substantive argument of discrimination or reprisal.
      Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we find that the administrative judge
      must reconsider the appellant’s EEO reprisal claim, using the proper legal
      standards. We also find that the administrative judge should consider one new
      harmful error claim, if the appellant pursues it during the remand proceedings.

            EEO Reprisal
¶38         The administrative judge found that the appellant’s claims of discrimination
      based on national origin, sex, or age failed because the appel lant did not prove
      that his national origin, sex, or age were a motivating factor in the denied WIGI
      or removal.       ID at 39-45 (citing Savage v. Department of the Army,
      122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 42 (2015)). 3       We find no basis for reaching a different
      conclusion.
¶39         For his EEO reprisal claim, the administrative judge referenced the same
      motivating factor standard in both an affirmative defense order and a portion of
      the initial decision. ID at 40; Chandhok v. Department of Transportation, MSPB
      Docket No. DC-0432-17-0812-I-4, Appeal File, Tab 5 at 2.               However, as she
      discussed the underlying allegations and facts, the initial decision cites a

      3
        Because the appellant here failed to prove his initial burden that national origin, sex,
      or age played any part in the agency’s decision, we do not reach the question of
      “but-for” causation. Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31.
                                                                                      16

      “genuine nexus” requirement. ID at 45-48. That was not the correct standard to
      apply. See, e.g., Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492,
      ¶ 8 (2016) (describing one of the limited circumstances in which the genuine
      nexus standard still applies).     The correct standard for the appellant’s EEO
      reprisal claim depends on the nature of the appellant’s EEO activit y, which is not
      explicitly discussed in the initial decision.   See, e.g., Haas v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 31(recognizing the differing standards for
      Title VII-based reprisal claims and disability-based reprisal claims).
¶40        Although the appellant has not reasserted his EEO reprisal claim on review ,
      the administrative judge on remand should determine the nature of the activity
      underlying the appellant’s EEO reprisal claim to decide the appropriate burden of
      proof. She should then apprise the parties of the same and issue new findings
      under the appropriate standards.

            Harmful Error
¶41        Though not raised by either party, we recognize that when the deciding
      official sustained the appellant’s proposed removal, he indicated that the
      allegations described in the proposal were “supported by substantial evidence.”
      0812 AF-5, Tab 12 at 7.       It is not apparent, however, whether this was a
      purposeful reference to the legal standard the Board applies when reviewing a
      performance-based action under chapter 43. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1) (providing
      that appeals of a chapter 43 performance-based action are subject to the
      “substantial evidence” standard, while all other cases must be supported by
      preponderant evidence).    We have not come across anything in the record to
      suggest, for example, that the deciding official was instructed by agency policy to
      apply the “substantial evidence” legal standard while consider ing the appellant’s
      proposed removal.
¶42        During the period since the administrative judge issued the initial decision,
      the Federal Circuit considered a somewhat comparable situation in an appeal
      governed by 38 U.S.C. § 714.        Rodriguez v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
                                                                                       17

      8 F.4th 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2021). In that case, the deciding official seemed to apply
      the “substantial evidence” to an employee’s proposed removal , and agency policy
      seemed to dictate the same.    Id. at 1297 n.3. The court, however, found that
      preponderant evidence was the proper standard for the agency as it made its
      determination on a proposed removal, and the underlying statutory scheme’s
      reference to “substantial evidence” merely dictated the standard of review that the
      Board would apply when reviewing the matter on appeal. Id. at 1296-1301. In a
      subsequent but similar case that was also governed by 38 U.S.C. § 714, the Board
      determined that such an error should be analyzed as a harmful error affirmative
      defense. Semenov v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶¶ 22-25.
¶43        Because Rodriquez and Semenov were issued after the initial decision and
      petition for review in the instant appeal, the administrative judge should entertain
      new arguments the appellant presents about the same during the remand
      proceedings, if the appellant chooses to present any.

      The administrative judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding a witness.
¶44        Below, the appellant requested several witnesses to testify.      0812 AF -9,
      Tab 37 at 14-15. The appellant described one as being able to testify about how
      he used to supervise both the appellant and the appellant’s immediate supervisor.
      Id. at 15. According to the appellant, this individual would further testify about
      how the appellant’s immediate supervisor was disinclined to work with the
      appellant back then, when she was not his supervisor but was a colleague. Id.
¶45        Although the administrative judge approved the others, she denied the
      appellant’s request to call this witness. 0812 AF-9, Tab 45 at 4-6. The appellant
      objected and asked that the administrative judge reconsider, 0812 AF -9, Tab 47
      at 4-5, but she denied that request as well, 0812 AF-9, Tab 53 at 1-2.          The
      administrative judge reasoned that this proposed witness retired from the agency
      approximately 14 years prior to the hearing and the information the appellant
      wished to elicit from him was not relevant or material. Id.
                                                                                        18

¶46         An administrative judge has wide discretion under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(8)
      and (10) to exclude witnesses where it has not been shown that their testimony
      would be relevant, material, and nonrepetitious. Franco v. U.S. Postal Service,
      27 M.S.P.R. 322, 325 (1985). On review, the appellant challenges the exclusion
      of this proposed witness, reiterating arguments he made below. 0812 PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 27-29. He once again suggests that this proposed witness could have
      provided testimony about the appellant’s performance and about possible animus
      from the appellant’s supervisor.      Id.   But we remain unpersuaded that the
      administrative judge abused her wide discretion.       As the administrative judge
      recognized, this individual’s testimony about the appellant’s performance or the
      parties’ working relationships 14 years earlier does not seem particularly relevant
      to the issues at hand.

      The Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s denied WIGI.
¶47         All of the above analysis has concerned the appellant’s removal action,
      which is within the Board’s jurisdiction. However, the administrative judge also
      adjudicated a denied WIGI.        For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
      administrative judge’s findings on that claim and instead find t hat the appellant
      failed to prove that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter.
¶48         An employee earns a WIGI upon completion of the applicable waiting
      period so long as, inter alia, he or she is performing at an acceptable level of
      competence. 5 U.S.C. § 5335(a). If an agency determines that an employee is not
      performing at an acceptable level of competence and withholds a WIGI, the
      employee is entitled to “an opportunity for reconsideration . . . within his [or her]
      agency under uniform procedures prescribed by the Office of Personnel
      Management.” 5 U.S.C. § 5335(c). “If the determination [to withhold the WIGI]
      is affirmed on reconsideration, the employee is entitled to appeal to the Merit
      Systems Protection Board.” Id. Thus, the Board can exercise jurisdiction over an
      appeal from the withholding of a WIGI only if the agency has affirmed its initial
      determination upon reconsideration or has unreasonably refused to act on a
                                                                                                 19

      request       for   reconsideration.        Priselac   v.   Department    of    the     Navy,
      77 M.S.P.R. 332, 335 (1998).
¶49         In this case, the agency denied the appellant’s WIGI in December 2015.
      0812 AF-5, Tab 93 at 11-14.             The letter advising of the same notified the
      appellant of his rights and procedures. It explained that the appellant had 15 days
      to request reconsideration. Id. at 13.
¶50         At the time of his denied WIGI, the appellant already had a pending EEO
      complaint regarding other matters. 0812 AF-5, Tab 8 at 6-7. The record shows
      that he added the denied WIGI to this EEO complaint by late February 2016.
      Id. at 11-12. In August 2017, the agency issued a Final Agency Decision (FAD)
      about the denied WIGI. 0812 AF-5, Tab 10. Among other things, the FAD called
      into question whether the appellant had requested reconsideration of the denied
      WIGI and whether, as a result, the matter would be within the Board’s
      jurisdiction. Id. at 6.
¶51         Within 30 days of that FAD, the appellant filed his Board appeals,
      challenging his removal and the denied WIGI.                0812 IAF, Tab 1; 0813 IAF,
      Tab 1.    The administrative judge adjudicated both, and the initial decision
      indicated that both were within the Board’s jurisdiction.            ID at 1.        However,
      the initial     decision   contains    no    substantive    discussion   of    the    Board’s
      jurisdictional limitations, including the requirement that the appellant first
      requested reconsideration of his denied WIGI with the agency.
¶52         Given these facts, the Office of the Clerk of the Board sent the parties an
      order, requesting arguments and evidence about the matter. 0812 PFR File, Tab
      7. Both parties responded. The agency presented argument and evidence that it
      searched but found no indication that the appellant requested reconsideration of
      the agency’s decision to deny his WIGI. 0812 PFR File, Tab 9. The appellant
      presented no argument or evidence to the contrary.               0812 PFR File, Tab 8.
      Instead, the appellant has essentially argued that the Board should waive its
                                                                                         20

      jurisdictional limitations due to the time, energy, and costs associated with
      pursuing the matter up to this point. Id. at 4-6. That argument is unavailing.
¶53        Under these circumstances, we must vacate the administrative judge’s
      analysis of the appellant’s denied WIGI.        The appellant failed to meet his
      jurisdictional burden for that claim.         See Winns v. U.S. Postal Service,
      124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 7 (2017) (recognizing that the Board’s jurisdiction is limited
      to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or
      regulation, and that an appellant bears the burden of proving jurisdiction by
      preponderant evidence), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

      Conclusion
¶54        In conclusion, the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that the
      Board has jurisdiction over the agency’s decision to deny him a WIGI.            The
      appellant also failed to present any persuasive arguments on review regarding his
      removal.     Nevertheless, we must remand for further adjudication of certain
      matters associated with his removal appeal.
¶55        On remand, the administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence on
      the additional element described in Santos, and she shall hold a supplemental
      hearing if appropriate. Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 17. The administrative judge shall
      then issue a new initial decision.   See id. If the agency makes the additional
      showing required under Santos on remand, the administrative judge may
      incorporate her prior findings on the other elements of the agency’s case.
      See id.; supra ¶¶ 10-34.
¶56        In her remand initial decision, the administrative judge may also
      incorporate her prior findings as to the appellant’s affirmative defenses, except
      those about the appellant’s EEO reprisal claim, which must be revisited to apply
      the appropriate standard. Supra ¶¶ 39-40. The administrative judge must also
      address any new arguments the appellant may present about Rodriquez, Semenov,
      and the deciding official’s reference to “substantial evidence.” Supra ¶¶ 41-43.
                                                                                          21

¶57         Regardless of whether the agency meets its burden for the additional
      element required under Santos, if the argument or evidence on remand regarding
      the appellant’s pre-PIP performance affects the administrative judge’s analysis of
      the appellant’s affirmative defenses, she should address such argument or
      evidence in the remand initial decision.      See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must
      identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve
      issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law
      and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).

                                            ORDER
¶58         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 4

      FOR THE BOARD:                             /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      4
        As explained above, we find that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appeal of the
      WIGI denial at issue in MSPB Docket No. DC-531D-17-0813-I-9. However, in order to
      efficiently process these appeals, we remand both. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(a)(5). The
      administrative judge should incorporate our jurisdictional findings concerning the WIGI
      denial into the remand initial decision and provide review rights for both appeals.