Court Opinion

ID: 9826066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:18:41.089277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:49.884877
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chiee Justice Gary
dissents. I dissent from the opinion of Mr. Justice Fraser, in so- far as- it sustains the first exception.
As we construe his ruling in sustaining this- exception, it is bas-ed, upon the proposition, that the right of the defendant, to cross-examine the witness in reply, ivas n-ot dependent upon the discretion- of his Honor, the presiding Judge. The presiding Ju-dge did not deny the defendant, the right to cross-examination generally, but only ruled that the-testi*145mony, which the defendant’s -attorney proposed' to -elicit from the witness, was not in reply. If the presiding Judge hád refused the defendant, the right to cross-examine the witness generally, this would have 'been error; but the limit to which thie cross-examination' may be conducted, is to be determined by the presiding Judge, in the exercise of a sound, discretion. The r-ule is 'thus stated in 8 Bnc. of PI. & Pr. 109-110: “The opportunity of examining the opposing party’s witness, is a matter of right, but the latitude allowed in cross-examination, is v-ery- largely within the discretion of the trial Court, and an appellate Court w-ill not interfere, unless that discretion is oppressively abused.”
Ini 8 Bnc. of PI. & Pr. 131, under the head of “rebuttal and surrebuttal,” it is said: “The ordinary course of pro>ceeding requires-, that the party who hold's the affirmative of the issue shall introduce all the evidence in support of his case, before he rests. The other party should then introduce the evidence, upon which he relies-, after which the party who opened, may introduce evidence in rebuttal of the case, made 'by the opposing party.”
In the sarnie volume, on pages 133 and 134, 'under the head of “evidence.im surrebuttal,” it is also said: “The case at first made out by the plaintiff, should apprise the defendant, -of the ground"up6h which the cause of action, is finally to rest. Accordingly, if the ’plaintiff in reply, -puts new matter in evidence, or makes a new case, different from that at first made out, it becomes the right of the defendant, to call witnesses • in surrebuttal. And it isi within' the discretion of’the-Court; to permit the- introduction of evidence in ■surrebuttal, where the plaintiff in reply has not -transgressed the proper bounds' of -evidence in rebuttal, though ifl 'that case,’ the'privilege can not be claimed, as a matter of right.”
The record discloses-the’-fact that'the plaintiff in reply, did hot “transgress -the proper bounds of evidence' in rebuttal,”' nór was- such" an 'objection interposed by the appellant’s *146attorney. Therefore, even under the principle just stated, the right of the defendant, in the present case, to introduce evidence in surrebuttal depended upon the discretion of the presiding Judge. The Court, however, decided in the case of the State v. Summer, 55 S. C. 32, that even when the plaintiff in reply puts new matter in evidence, the right of the defendant, to introduce evidence in surrebuttal, was addressed to' the discretion of the presiding Judge.
In the case just mentioned, Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Pope, wrote the opinion of the Court, in which he announced the proposition, that the defendant had the right to introduce evidence in surrebuttal, when the plaintiff in the reply, puts new matter in evidence, and relied upon the doctrine announced in 8 Ene. of PI. and Pr. 133-4, which we have just quoted. Mr. Chief Justice Mclver took issue with him on this proposition, and quoted the following language from State v. Clyburn, 16 S. C. 375: “The- conduct of a case in the Circuit Court, so far as1 it relates1 to the time When testimony- may be introduced, must be left to the discretion of the Circuit Judge, to be governed by the particular circumstances of each case.”
The two -other members of the Court concurred- in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice M-cIver.
It was not necessary for the presiding Judge, in sustaining the objection interposed by 'the plaintiff’s attorney to state that he was exercising 'his discretionary powers.
In the case of State v. Summer, 55 S. C. 32, 32 S. E. 771, Mr. Justice Pope was of the opinion, that the Circuit Judge erred, “especially as- his exclusion of the testimony was not based- upon the exercise by him of discretion1, but on the contrary, the -exclusion seemed to be made by the Circuit Judge, upon the absence of power in- him to admit it;” but this view did not prevail with the majority of the Court.
Having reached the conclusion that the right of the defendant, 'to cross-examine the, witness rested, upon the di-s*147cretionary powers of the presiding Judge, it is only necessary to refer to the record, to show that 'his1 discretion- was not erroneously exercised.
For these reasons I think the judgment should be affirmed.