Court Opinion

ID: 9555972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:11:57.767558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:55.757046
License: Public Domain

J-A16039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  RESPONSE INDUSTRIAL, INC.                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :
  PENN STATE HEALTH LANCASTER                  :
  MEDICAL CENTER                               :   No. 1388 MDA 2022
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: ENVIRONMENTAL AIR                 :
  SYSTEMS, LLC.                                :

              Appeal from the Order Entered September 2, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at
                            No(s): CI-22-00418

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                   FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

       Environmental Air Systems, LLC (EAS) appeals from the order entered

September 2, 2022, in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas. The

trial court granted a motion for reconsideration, filed by Response Industrial,

Inc. (RII), of its prior order striking a mechanics’ lien claim, and reinstated

the mechanics’ lien.1 EAS presents three issues for our review: (1) whether

this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal; (2) whether the trial court erred

when it reconsidered its prior order more than 30 days after it was entered;

and (3) whether the trial court properly struck the mechanics’ lien claim when
____________________________________________

1 As will be discussed infra, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Penn State

Health Lancaster Medical Center (Penn State Health) did not participate in
these proceedings and is not a party to this appeal.
J-A16039-23

RII failed to file an affidavit of service as required by the Mechanics’ Lien Law.2

Because we conclude the trial court had no authority to reconsider its prior,

final order after the appeal period expired, we are constrained to vacate the

order on appeal, and remand for reinstatement of the court’s July 18, 2022,

order.

       We discern the following relevant facts and procedural history from the

certified record. Penn State Health is the owner of a property located at 2148

State Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, where it is constructing a Central

Utility Plant (the Project). See RII’s Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim, 1/24/22, at ¶¶

2, 4; EAS’s Brief at 4; RII’s Brief at 1. EAS, a subcontractor for the Project,

entered into a subcontract with RII to provide “engineering work and

contracting services, including central utility plant modular connections” for

the Project.     RII’s Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim at ¶ 4.     RII maintains that it

completed the work requested on September 22, 2021, but that it was still

due $190,479.07 for labor and materials. See id. at ¶¶ 5-8. Thus, on January

24, 2022, RII filed the underlying mechanics’ lien claim against Penn State

Health in the amount of $190,479.07. Relevant herein, on February 24, 2022,

a signed Sheriff’s Return of Service was docketed, which stated that the

mechanics’ lien claim was served on Penn State Health the day before,

February 23rd.

____________________________________________

2 See Mechanics Lien Law of 1963, 49 P.S. §§ 1101-1902.

                                           -2-
J-A16039-23

       Meanwhile, on February 23, 2022, EAS filed a motion requesting

permission to file a bond to discharge and release the mechanics’ lien on Penn

State Health’s property.         See EAS’s Motion to File Bond to Discharge

Mechanics’ Lien, 2/23/22, at 1-2. EAS asserted, inter alia, “as the entity that

allegedly failed to pay RII, EAS [was] a ‘party in interest’” pursuant to the

Mechanics’ Lien Law. Id. at 2. On March 23, 2023, the trial court granted

the motion and ordered EAS to “enter and post with the court a lien bond in

the amount of $380,958.14[,]” double the lien amount.3 Order, 3/23/23. The

court further stated, “[w]hen the bond is posted, the lien shall discharge as to

[Penn State Health’s] property and attach to [EAS’s] bond.”        Id. (footnote

omitted). Thereafter, on April 1, 2022, EAS posted the requisite lien bond.

       On April 8, 2022, RII filed a civil complaint against EAS, seeking

damages for breach of contract and quantum meruit in the same amount as

the mechanics’ lien claim. EAS filed preliminary objections asserting, inter

alia, that RII was prohibited from “filing a breach of contract claim in the same

action as a mechanics’ lien claim[,]” and, in any event, the parties’ subcontract

included both an arbitration clause and a forum selection clause, which

required any civil action be brought in Guilford County, North Carolina.4 EAS’s

Preliminary Objections to RII’s Complaint, 6/3/22, at 2-4, 6-7.         RII filed
____________________________________________

3 See 49 P.S. § 1510(d) (providing security “may be entered . . . double the

amount of the required deposit” to have lien discharged).

4 EAS is a limited liability company with a registered business address in High

Point, North Carolina. See RII’s Complaint, 4/8/22, at ¶ 2.

                                           -3-
J-A16039-23

preliminary objections to EAS’s preliminary objections, arguing that EAS’s

objections were untimely filed and the forum selection clause is unenforceable.

See RII’s Preliminary Objections to EAS’s Preliminary Objections to RII’s

Complaint, 6/17/22, at 3-5 (unpaginated).

       While the competing preliminary objections to the civil action were

pending, on July 1, 2022, EAS filed a motion to strike the mechanics’ lien. It

argued that RII failed to file an affidavit of service within 20 days of the service

of the lien as required by Section 1502(a)(2) of the Mechanics Lien Law.5 See

EAS’s Motion to Strike Mechanics’ Lien Claim, 7/1/22, at 2. Further, because

a mechanics’ lien must be filed within six months after work is completed6 ─

which RII acknowledged was in September of 2021 ─ EAS asserted the

mechanics’ lien action “should be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 4.

       RII filed a response and supporting brief, averring that the sheriff’s

return of service, docketed on February 23, 2022, satisfied the requirements

of Section 1502. See RII’s Brief in Support of Response in Opposition to EAS’s

Motion to Strike Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim, 7/8/22, at 3.         EAS filed a reply,

disputing RII’s assertion. Thereafter, on July 18, 2022, the trial court entered

an order which: (1) granted EAS’s motion to strike the mechanics’ lien claim
____________________________________________

5 See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(2) (requiring mechanics’ lien claimant to, inter alia,

file “affidavit of service of notice, or the acceptance of service, . . . within
twenty (20) days after service [of lien claim] setting forth the date and manner
of service”).

6 See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(1) (mechanics’ lien claim must be filed “within six (6)

months after the completion of [the] work”).

                                           -4-
J-A16039-23

due to RII’s failure to file an affidavit of service; (2) sustained EAS’s

preliminary objection to RII’s civil complaint based upon the misjoinder of

actions; (3) dismissed as moot EAS’s remaining preliminary objections; and

(4) overruled RII’s preliminary objections to EAS’s preliminary objections.

See Order, 7/18/22, at 1-2. We note that an order striking a mechanics’ lien

claim is final and appealable. See Caldwell v. Carter, 23 A. 575 (Pa. 1892).

Therefore, RII could have filed an appeal from the July 18th order within 30

days, that is, no later than August 17, 2022.

       However, on August 15, 2022 ─ two days before the appeal period

expired ─ RII instead filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s

July 18th order. See RII’s Motion for Reconsideration of [Trial] Court’s July

[18], 2022 Order Striking its Mechanics’ Lien Claim & Seeking Reinstatement

of Said Claim, 8/15/22, 2-3 (unpaginated).            Notably, RII did not file a

supporting brief “concurrently” with the motion, as required by local Lancaster

County Rule of Civil Procedure 208.3(b)(A).7 Further, although the motion

was properly docketed, the trial court maintains that it did not receive notice

of the filing at that time. See Trial Ct. Op. at 2.

       Thereafter, on August 25, 2022, a week after the appeal deadline, EAS

filed a praecipe to deem RII’s motion for reconsideration withdrawn pursuant

to local Rule 208. See Lancaster Cty R.C.P. 208.3(b)(A) (“If a brief is not filed
____________________________________________

7 See Lancaster Cty R.C.P. 208.3(b)(A) (“The moving party shall file a
motion, proposed order and supporting brief concurrently.”) (emphasis
added).

                                           -5-
J-A16039-23

with the motion, the motion shall be deemed withdrawn, without prejudice,

upon praecipe of an opposing party.”) (emphasis added). That same day, RII

filed a second, identical motion for reconsideration ─ this time, however, RII

concurrently filed a supporting brief. See RII’s Motion for Reconsideration of

[Trial] Court’s July [18], 2022 Order Striking its Mechanics’ Lien Claim &

Seeking Reinstatement of Said Claim, 8/25/22; RII’s Brief in Support of Motion

for Reconsideration of [Trial] Court’s July [18], 2022 Order Striking its

Mechanics’ Lien Claim & Seeking Reinstatement of Said Claim, 8/25/22.

      On September 2, 2022, the trial court entered the order on appeal,

which:   (1) granted RII’s motion for reconsideration; (2) reinstated RII’s

mechanics’ lien claim; and (3) denied EAS’s motion to strike the lien claim.

See Order, 9/2/22. In a footnote, the court explained that the sheriff’s return

of service, which was docketed within 20 days of service of the lien claim,

satisfied the requirements of Section 1502. See id. at n.1. EAS filed this

timely appeal on September 26, 2022, and complied with the trial court’s

directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal.

      On December 6, 2022, this Court directed EAS to show cause as to: (1)

whether the order on appeal, granting a motion for reconsideration, was final

and appealable; (2) whether EAS had standing since it did not appear to be a

party to the mechanics’ lien claim; and (3) whether the appeal should be

transferred to the Commonwealth Court because the Commonwealth of

                                     -6-
J-A16039-23

Pennsylvania was a named party. Order, 12/6/22. After EAS filed a timely

response, we discharged the rule on February 7, 2023. Order, 2/7/23.

       EAS presents the following three issues for our review:8

       A. Whether the Superior Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction
          over this appeal?

       B. Whether the trial court erred in vacating its initial decision to
          strike the mechanics’ lien claim, when it issued its order
          granting reconsideration more than thirty (30) days after
          initially granting EAS’[s] motion to strike the mechanics’ lien
          claim, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505?

       C. Whether the trial court erred in reinstating the mechanics’ lien
          claim, where the Mechanics’ Lien Law and controlling case
          authorities conclusively require a claimant to file an affidavit of
          service within 20 days of service of the mechanics’ lien claim?

EAS’s Brief at 3-4 (some capitalization omitted).

       EAS first addresses the concerns raised by this Court in the rule to show

cause, and “incorporates by reference the arguments contained in its

[r]esponse[.]” EAS’s Brief at 28-29. This Court’s show cause order raised

three questions concerning our jurisdiction over this appeal: (1) whether EAS,

who is not a named party in the action, has standing to appeal; (2) whether

the appeal should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court since Penn State

Health is a named party; and (3) whether the order on appeal ─ granting

reconsideration of a prior order ─ is final and appealable. See Order, 12/6/22.

       Preliminarily, we agree that EAS is an “aggrieved” party which has

standing to appeal the order at issue, and that the matter should not be
____________________________________________

8 We have reordered EAS’s claims for purposes of disposition.

                                           -7-
J-A16039-23

transferred to the Commonwealth Court.9 By way of background, we reiterate

that Penn State Health is the captioned defendant in this matter because it is

the owner of the property, and project, at issue. However, EAS is the entity

that contracted with RII and allegedly failed to pay RII. Therefore, EAS posted

bond to remove the mechanics’ lien from Penn State Health’s property.

Moreover, EAS is the named defendant in RII’s breach of contract civil action.

       Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 501 provides that “any party

who is aggrieved by an appealable order . . . may appeal therefrom.”

Pa.R.A.P. 501. Further, the Judicial Code defines a “party” as “[a] person who

commences or against whom relief is sought in a matter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 102.

Here, EAS is clearly the entity “aggrieved” by the trial court’s order reinstating

the mechanics’ lien claim ─ the lien is attached to the bond EAS posted.

Indeed, EAS is the entity that will be required to pay RII if, in fact, the action

is resolved in RII’s favor.         Because EAS has “a substantial, direct and

immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation[,]” we conclude it has

standing to appeal the court’s order. See Johnson v. Am. Standard, 8 A.3d

318, 329 (Pa. 2010).

       Further, because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, while a named

defendant, is not an aggrieved party, we agree that we are not required to

transfer this matter to the Commonwealth Court. Pursuant to Section 762 of

____________________________________________

9 RII agrees with EAS’s position on both of these issues.      See RII’s Brief at
22.

                                           -8-
J-A16039-23

the Judicial Code, the Commonwealth Court has “exclusive jurisdiction of

appeals from final orders” in “Commonwealth civil cases.”            42 Pa.C.S. §

762(a)(1). However, as explained supra, although Penn State Health is the

owner of the property and project at issue, EAS entered into a subcontract

with RII and posted bond to discharge the mechanics’ lien from the property

─ thus, EAS is the entity that will be liable for any judgment. For this reason,

we agree that the appeal was properly filed in this Court.

      The final jurisdictional issue concerns the appealability of the trial court’s

September 2, 2022, order, which purported to grant reconsideration of a

final order more than 30 days after it was entered. Preliminarily, we reiterate

that an order striking a mechanics’ lien is final and appealable. See Caldwell,

23 A. at 575.    However, an order refusing to strike a mechanics’ lien is

“interlocutory and unappealable.” H.P. Starr & Sons, Inc. v. Stepp, 211

A.2d 78, 79 (Pa. Super. 1965). We recognize that the trial court’s September

2, 2022, order effectively refused to strike the mechanics’ lien claim ─ the

court granted RII’s motion for reconsideration, reinstated RII’s mechanics’ lien

claim, and denied EAS’s motion to strike the lien claim. See Order, 9/2/22.

      Nevertheless, the primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court had

jurisdiction on September 2nd to grant reconsideration of the final, appealable

order it had entered more than 30 days prior on July 18th. See 42 Pa.C.S. §

5505 (if no appeal is taken, court may modify or rescind any order within 30

days of entry); Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology,

SC, 108 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A court lacks the authority to grant

                                       -9-
J-A16039-23

reconsideration of a final order more than 30 days after its entry.”); Valley

Forge Ctr. Assocs. v. Rib-it/K.P., Inc., 693 A.2d 242, 245 (Pa. Super.

1997) (motion for reconsideration tolls 30-day appeal period only when court

enters order “expressly granting” reconsideration before expiration of 30-day

period) (citation omitted).

       This Court considered a similar issue in Gardner v. Consolidated Rail

Corp., 100 A.3d 280 (Pa. Super. 2014). In that case, on February 20, 2013,

the trial court entered a final, appealable order granting the defendants’

motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens. Id. at 282. The

next day, the plaintiff filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but not a notice

of appeal. Id. On April 10, 2013, more than 30 days after the entry of its

order, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and vacated

the February 20th order.10 See id. The defendants then appealed to this

Court. We exercised appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court

lacked the jurisdictional authority to grant a motion for reconsideration more

than 30 days after the order at issue was entered. See id. at 282-83. In that

case, we concluded the trial court had no authority to grant the motion for

reconsideration, so that its April 10th order was invalid. See id. at 283. Thus,
____________________________________________

10 Similar to an order refusing to strike a mechanics’ lien, an order denying a

motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens is not final or
appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c); Ritchey v. Rutter’s Inc., 286 A.3d 248,
253 (Pa. Super. 2022) (interlocutory order denying motion to transfer venue
appealable upon this Court’s grant of petition for review pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1311).

                                          - 10 -
J-A16039-23

based upon our exercise of jurisdiction in Gardner, we likewise conclude that

we may consider the appeal before us.

      Accordingly, having disposed of the jurisdictional prerequisites, we now

consider EAS’s second issue on appeal, which directly challenges the trial

court’s authority to grant RII’s motion for reconsideration of a final, appealable

order more than 30 days after the order was entered. See EAS’s Brief at 12.

EAS argues that while Section 5505 of the Judicial Code permits a trial court

to modify or rescind any final order, it must act within 30 days of the entry of

the order, or it loses jurisdiction to do so. See id. Here, EAS maintains that

RII should have filed both a notice of appeal and a motion for reconsideration

in order to preserve its rights, since a motion for reconsideration does not toll

the 30-day period for filing an appeal unless the trial court expressly grants

reconsideration during that time period. See id. at 13-14. Because RII failed

to do so, and the trial court did not expressly grant reconsideration until after

the expiration of the 30-day appeal period, EAS insists the trial court’s

September 2, 2022, order is a nullity. See id. at 18.

      EAS correctly cites the law concerning reconsideration of a final order.

Section 5505 of the Judicial Code authorizes a trial court to “modify or rescind

any order within 30 days after its entry, . . . if no appeal from such order has

been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. However, even after a party has

filed an appeal from a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 1701 authorizes a trial court to

grant reconsideration of a final order if: (1) an application for reconsideration

is filed within the 30-day appeal period; and (2) the court expressly grants

                                     - 11 -
J-A16039-23

reconsideration before the expiration of the appeal period.             Pa.R.A.P.

1701(b)(3)(i)-(ii).   “A timely order granting reconsideration under [Rule

1703(b)(3)] render[s] inoperative any such notice of appeal . . . filed or

docketed with respect to the prior order.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3).

      As this Court has explained:

      Under section 5505, the trial court has broad discretion to modify
      or rescind an order, and this power may be exercised sua sponte
      or invoked pursuant to a party’s motion for reconsideration. [T]he
      trial court may consider a motion for reconsideration only if the
      motion for reconsideration is filed within thirty days of the entry
      of the disputed order.          The mere filing of a motion for
      reconsideration, however, is insufficient to toll the appeal period.
      If the trial court fails to grant reconsideration expressly within the
      prescribed 30 days, it loses the power to act upon both the
      [motion] and the original order.

PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, 929 A.2d 219, 226 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citations & quotation marks omitted). See also Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs.,

693 A.2d at 245 (“[A]lthough a party may petition the court for

reconsideration, the simultaneous filing of a notice of appeal is necessary to

preserve appellate rights in the event that either the trial court fails to grant

the petition expressly within 30 days, or it denies the petition.”).

      Turning to the present matter, on July 18, 2022, the trial court entered

an order granting EAS’s motion to strike RII’s mechanics’ lien claim.          On

August 15th, RII filed a motion for reconsideration ─ two days before the

expiration of the appeal period on August 17th. RII did not simultaneously

file a notice of appeal. Thus, the trial court facially exceeded its authority

pursuant to Section 5505 and Rule 1701, when it granted reconsideration of

                                     - 12 -
J-A16039-23

its July 18th order on September 2, 2022, 16 days after the appeal period

expired.

      Nevertheless, in its opinion, the trial court maintains that despite the

jurisdictional time restrictions cited above, all courts retain the authority to

open or vacate a final judgment after the 30-day appeal period when there is

“extraordinary cause” requiring the court’s intervention.        Trial Ct. Op.

11/4/22, at 3. Here, the court opined:

             “Extraordinary cause” exists when some action or oversight
      by the court deprives a litigant of its appella[te] rights. See
      Jackson ex rel. Sanders v. Hendrick, 746 A.2d 574, 576 (Pa.
      2000) (plurality opinion) (extraordinary cause where trial court’s
      failure to memorialize and file oral order would force litigant to
      forfeit appellate rights); Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co.[,] 108 A.3d [at]
      921 [ ] (extraordinary cause where court error prevented litigant
      from receiving notice of final order). But see Luckenbaugh v.
      Shearer, 523 A.2d 399, 401 (Pa. Super. 1987) (extraordinary
      cause “generally” where error in judicial process prevents losing
      party from receiving notice). While extraordinary cause generally
      revolves around the litigant’s notice of a final order, the Superior
      Court has historically accounted for other court errors in its
      reasoning. See Great Am. Credit Corp. v. Thomas Mini
      Markets, Inc., 326 A.2d 517 (Pa. Super. 1974) (analysis
      including court misplacing appellant’s motion to detriment of
      appellate rights).

             Here, [RII] filed their motion for reconsideration on August
      15, 2022, within Section 5505’s thirty-day window. The trial court
      agrees that had it merely failed to act upon [RII’s] timely motion
      for reconsideration, extraordinary cause would not exist. See
      Simpson v. Allstate, 504 A.2d [335, 337-38] (Pa. Super. 1986).
      However, the court was unaware of the filing — or any subsequent
      filings by the parties — until August 30, 2022, when the
      Prothonotary’s Office delivered the file. It is unclear exactly why
      fifteen days passed from the date of filing to the date this court
      received the motion for reconsideration, but the Prothonotary’s
      Office is generally known to be chronically understaffed and
      backlogged. The delay prevented the court from knowing of the

                                     - 13 -
J-A16039-23

      time-sensitive issue and from making a timely decision, thus
      forcing [RII] to forfeit their appellate rights. This failure of the
      judicial process constitutes an “extraordinary cause” worthy of the
      court’s intervention.

            The trial court did not err in granting [RII’s] motion for
      reconsideration nor in vacating its initial order, notwithstanding
      the fact that Section 5505’s window for appeal had run, because
      there was an extraordinary cause to justify intervention.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.

      Although we recognize that “extraordinary cause” can justify a trial

court’s decision to reconsider or vacate a final order more than 30 days after

its entry, we conclude the trial court erred when it determined that such

“extraordinary cause” was present in this case.

      As this Court explained in Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., supra:

      Our cases have referred to several circumstances under which a
      trial court may modify a final order after more than 30 days have
      passed: “extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
      matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some
      other evidence of ‘extraordinary cause justifying intervention by
      the court.’” ISN Bank v. Rajaratnam, 83 A.3d 170, 172 (Pa.
      Super. 2013).

            A court may open at any time a judgment procured by fraud.
      For example, in First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 744
      A.2d 327, 334–35 (Pa. Super. 1999), we held that a trial court
      had the authority to modify a final in rem judgment five years
      after its entry. Because of the defendant’s use of aliases and
      corporate alter egos, fraudulent court filings, frivolous bankruptcy
      and removal petitions, and dilatory tactics, the original judgment
      amount no longer reflected what he owed to the plaintiffs. Id.

            “Extraordinary cause” refers to “an oversight or
      action on the part of the court or the judicial process which
      operates to deny the losing party knowledge of the entry
      of final judgment so that the commencement of the running
      of the appeal time is not known to the losing party.” Orie
      v. Stone, 601 A.2d 1268, 1271 ([Pa. Super.] 1992) (quotation
      omitted)    (emphasis   removed),    appeal    dismissed   as

                                     - 14 -
J-A16039-23

      improvidently granted, 622 A.2d 286 ([Pa.] 1993).                For
      example, in Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Center of Beaver
      County, Inc., 409 A.2d 343, 344–45 (Pa. 1979), unbeknownst to
      the plaintiff, her attorney had been suspended from the practice
      of law when the defendants successfully argued for dismissal of
      the case on their preliminary objections. Our Supreme Court held
      the trial court could reopen the otherwise final judgment, because
      “it would be harsh, indeed, to hold that [the plaintiff’s] possible
      cause of action be lost forever because of the conduct of an
      attorney this court has deemed unfit for the practice of law in this
      Commonwealth.” Id. at 345.

Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919 (emphasis added).

      Nevertheless, we have emphasized that “extraordinary cause” justifying

a trial court’s decision to modify a final order more than 30 days after its entry

is “limited in nature.”    Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919; see

Simpson, 504 A.2d at 337 (stating “the discretionary power of the court over

[final] judgments is very limited.”). Notably, we have held that “mistakes or

ordinary neglect by counsel do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.”

Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919. But see Estate of Gasbarini,

409 A.2d at 344-45 (plaintiff attorney’s suspension from practice of law at the

time trial court sustained preliminary objections and dismissed complaint ─

unbeknownst to plaintiff ─ constituted extraordinary cause justifying court’s

order opening judgment).          Furthermore, “[w]e have also held that

extraordinary cause does not exist where a party has notice of the entry of

a final order.” Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919 (emphasis added).

      In the present case, RII does not dispute it had notice of the trial court’s

July 18th final order striking the mechanics’ lien claim; indeed, it filed a motion

for reconsideration within the 30-day appeal period. Rather, the error here

                                      - 15 -
J-A16039-23

was of its own making ─ RII failed to file a notice of appeal concomitant with

its motion for reconsideration in order to preserve its appellate rights pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3). See Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs., 693 A.2d at 245.

      Recognizing this Court’s disinclination to find extraordinary cause when

a litigant received timely notice of the entry of a final order, the trial court

cites our decision in Great Am. Credit Corp., supra, for the proposition that

“the Superior Court has historically accounted for other court errors” in

affirming a trial court’s decision to vacate a judgment after the expiration of

the appeal period. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4 (emphasis added). However, the

court’s reliance on Great Am. Credit Corp. to justify its actions herein is

misplaced.

      First, Great Am. Credit Corp. was decided prior to the enactment of

both Section 5505, which authorizes a trial court to modify or rescind an order

within 30 days after its entry, and Pa.R.A.P. 1701. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505

(eff. Jun. 27, 1978); Pa.R.A.P. 1701 (eff. Jul. 1, 1976).

      Second, the relevant facts in that case are distinguishable. In Great

Am. Credit Corp., the guarantor of an installment note moved for summary

judgment in an action to recover the balance due. Great Am. Credit Corp.,

326 A.2d at 518. The court granted it as uncontested when the appellee failed

to file a timely answer. Id. However, the court later learned that the appellee

had requested an extension of time, but it was “inadvertently mislaid in

transmission through court processes.” Id. (record citation omitted). After

the appeal period expired, the court vacated the order granting summary

                                     - 16 -
J-A16039-23

judgment and dismissed the motion; the guarantor then filed a timely appeal.

Id.

      In affirming the trial court’s grant of relief to the appellee, a panel of

this Court highlighted “the inherent power of the courts of this Commonwealth

to act where equity so demands[,]” and noted that the trial court recognized

it had “improvidently” granted summary judgment “because of its own error.”

See Great Am. Credit Corp., 326 A.2d at 519. The panel agreed with the

trial court’s decision not to “penalize” the appellee for the “court’s oversight”

particularly when the appellee assumed his extension request had been

granted and had filed an answer within the extended time period. See id. In

a footnote, the panel further explained:

      [T]he appellee avers that he received a telephone call stating that
      his requested extension had been granted and that a copy of
      appellee’s letter to the court requesting an extension was sent to
      [guarantor’s] counsel. Moreover, the delay between the entering
      of the first Order and the second was, in part, occasioned by the
      fact that appellee never received notice that the motion for
      summary judgment had been granted. He had filed an answer
      and was apparently under the impression that the court was
      considering the case on the merits as presented in the motion and
      answer.

Id. at 520 n.5 (emphasis added)

      Thus, while at first glance, Great Am. Credit Corp. appears to lend

support to the trial court’s decision, the trial court overlooks the fact that the

aggrieved party in that case ─ unlike here ─ did not receive timely notice of

the entry of the final order. Indeed, in subsequent decisions, this Court has

distinguished Great Am. Credit Corp. on that fact. See Mfrs & Traders Tr.

                                     - 17 -
J-A16039-23

Co., 108 A.3d at 921 (explaining that in Great Am. Credit Corp., “the trial

court’s oversight deprived the defendant of notice that it had entered a final

order, triggering the appeal period[,]” but that the aggrieved party in present

case “never alleged it was unaware” the trial court entered final, appealable

order); Luckenbaugh, 523 A.2d at 402 (stating that decision affirming trial

court’s actions in Great Am. Credit Corp. was “for two main reasons[:]” (1)

court or staff misplaced appellee’s extension request; and (2) appellee “never

received notice” of entry of final order) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we

conclude the trial court erred when it found the existence of “extraordinary

cause” justifying its decision to vacate its July 18th final order more than 30

days after it was entered.

      Because we agree the trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate its final

order striking RII’s mechanics’ lien claim more than 30 days after the order

was entered, we are constrained to vacate the court’s September 2, 2022,

order. Further, we direct the trial court to reinstate its July 18, 2022, order

striking RII’s mechanics’ lien claim.

      Our disposition of this issue renders EAS’s final claim ─ which challenges

the substantive merit of the court’s September 2nd order ─ moot. As this

Court has explained, a trial court’s “inherent authority to correct mistakes or

errors . . . does not allow a court to make substantive changes after more

                                        - 18 -
J-A16039-23

than 30 days have passed.” Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.2d at 921. Thus,

the propriety of the court’s July 18th order is not before us.11

       Order vacated.         Case remanded with instructions.        Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

____________________________________________

11 Nevertheless, despite the fact that our proverbial hands are tied as a result

of RII’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal, we agree that the trial court’s
July 18th order was erroneous. As the trial court subsequently recognized,
this Court has held that a sheriff’s return of service satisfies the “affidavit of
service” requirement of Section 1502(a)(2) of the Mechanics’ Lien Law. See
Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.4, citing J.H. Hommer Lumber Co., Inc. v. Dively, 584
A.2d 985, 987 (Pa. Super. 1990). Moreover, EAS’s assertion that “the holding
in J.H. Hommer was overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its
2021 decision,” Terra Firma, Bldrs, LLC v. King, 249 A.3d 976 (Pa. 2021),
is simply incorrect. See EAS’s Brief at 26 n.5. The Terra Firma Court made
no mention of the J.H. Hommer decision, nor did the Court address the
propriety of a sheriff’s return of service as a substitute for an affidavit of
service ─ in fact, in that case, the aggrieved party “concede[d] it never filed
an affidavit of service” for the mechanics’ lien claim. See Terra Firma, Bldrs,
LLC, 249 A.3d at 981.

                                          - 19 -
J-A16039-23

              - 20 -