Court Opinion

ID: 9838569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 20:06:52.373827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:52.880170
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211452-U

                                             No. 1-21-1452

                                     Order filed September 6, 2023
                                                                              THIRD DIVISION

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
     the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                           IN THE
                                 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                       FIRST DISTRICT

                                                      )
     In re MARRIAGE OF PERLA OTERO,                   )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                      )      of Cook County.
            Petitioner-Appellant,                     )
                                                      )      No. 2015 D 937
            and                                       )
                                                      )      The Honorable
     LUIS A. OTERO,                                   )      David Haracz,
                                                      )      Judge Presiding.
            Respondent-Appellee.                      )

            JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1     Held: We reverse the trial court’s order with regard to modification of maintenance, indirect
       civil contempt, and attorney fees. We remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the motion
       to modify maintenance with retirement payments treated as assets rather than income, as well
       as for a finding of contempt with a purge amount and to determine the amount of past due
       maintenance and section 508(b) attorney fees to be paid to the former wife.

¶2         Petitioner-Appellant Perla Otero (Perla) and Respondent-Appellee Luis Otero (Luis) were

       married in 1986 and that marriage continued for over 30 years. Perla stayed home and out of

       the job market to care for their three children for 16 of those years. In 2015, Perla filed for
     No. 1-21-1452

        dissolution of marriage. The two entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was

        incorporated into the dissolution order entered by the trial court and that required Luis to pay

        monthly maintenance to Perla. Luis subsequently retired and moved to modify maintenance

        due to the change in circumstances resulting from his retirement. While the motion to modify

        was pending and after he and Perla each began to receive payments from his retirement

        benefits, Luis ceased paying maintenance. Perla filed a motion for a finding of indirect civil

        contempt to compel Luis to pay maintenance until such time as the trial court ruled on the

        motion to modify. Perla also submitted a petition for costs and fees incurred in the process of

        attempting to enforce Luis’ maintenance obligation, as well as for costs and fees based on her

        inability to pay. The trial court granted Luis’ motion and modified the maintenance award to

        $0. The court denied Perla’s motions. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further

        proceedings.

¶3                                          BACKGROUND

¶4         On February 2, 2015, Perla filed for dissolution of marriage. On April 3, 2019, after 9 days

        of trial, a judgment for dissolution was entered that incorporated an MSA. The MSA provided,

        among other things, that 1) Luis would pay Perla “modifiable and terminable permanent

        guideline maintenance” of $1,598 per month beginning May 1, 2019; and 2) Luis and Perla

        would each receive 50 percent of the payment from Luis’ Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund

        Pension Plan with the City of Chicago. The MSA specified:

               “The Wife’s maintenance is permanent maintenance but which is otherwise modifiable

               as to amount but not duration, upon the filing of a Motion for Modification and upon a

               material and substantial change in circumstances. The maintenance is also terminable

               upon the first of the following termination events shall [sic] occur namely, upon the

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     No. 1-21-1452

               death of either party, Wife’s cohabitation upon a resident and/or continuous conjugal

               basis with a person of the opposite sex, or upon Wife’s remarriage or until terminated

               by order of the court, whichever shall first occur.”

¶5         On February 14, 2020, at the age of 57, Luis retired from his job with the Chicago Police

        Department and on February 25, 2020, he filed a “Motion to Modify Maintenance and

        Commence Retirement Benefits.” In the motion, Luis laid out his change in income due to his

        retirement, as well as his and Perla’s imminent receipt of his retirement benefits. Luis

        continued paying maintenance until May 2020, when pension payments began, and thereafter

        he ceased payment without being granted leave of court to do so.

¶6         On July 2, 2020, Perla filed a petition for indirect civil contempt seeking, among other

        things, to have Luis held in indirect civil contempt until such time as he paid his overdue

        maintenance for May, June, and July 2020 with interest. On July 30, 2020, Luis filed his

        response to the contempt petition. In it, he asserted that if his motion to modify maintenance

        had been heard in a timely fashion, he would only be responsible for paying half of his pension

        benefit to Perla, but, in addition to that, he was “unable to cover his own personal and

        household expenses while paying both pension and maintenance since he is now retired.” Luis’

        assertion of inability to pay cited no specific numbers, but merely stated generally that he could

        not afford to pay.

¶7         On January 20, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion for

        modification of maintenance and the contempt petition. In that hearing, Luis testified that his

        sole source of income was half of his pension benefit because the other half went to Perla in

        the dissolution decree. That half of the pension benefit came to $3,433.21 per month. Luis’

        mortgage was $1,555 per month. Luis stated that the pension benefit covered his monthly bills

                                                      3
     No. 1-21-1452

        and “[left him] $300 to $400 a month for [himself].” At an unspecified time after the

        dissolution decree, Luis received “a little bit over” $20,000 from the sale of a condo he and

        Perla owned in Florida. In or around April or May 2020, he received a partial refund from his

        pension amounting to $25,450 that was placed in his deferred compensation account. When

        asked if his “Compushare trust account” contained $108,141 worth of stocks as of July 30,

        2020, Luis confirmed that that was “probably correct.” He had not made any withdrawals since

        April 2020, but he was unsure of the balance of that account in July 2020 or at the time of the

        hearing. Luis stated that he owed approximately $27,000 on his mortgage, $15,000 in credit

        card debt, and had taken out a loan from his deferred compensation account for an unspecified

        dollar amount in January 2020 to cover his expenses until his pension payments began in April

        2020 and paid retroactive to his February 2020 retirement date. Luis testified that he had not

        paid off that loan because he was required to pay it in full if he was going to pay it off and he

        had not had the funds available to do so. Luis testified that he had intended to put the money

        from the Florida condo toward paying down his debts, but had put it aside for attorney fees

        “and everything else.”

¶8         On February 4, 2021, Perla filed a petition for attorney fees seeking fees under 750 ILCS

        5/503(j), 5/508(a), and 5/508(b).

¶9         On March 2, 2021, the trial court entered the order from which this appeal is taken, which

        held in pertinent part:

               “G. Respondent testified as to various injuries and medical issues that prevent him from

               working further. However, he offered no medical documentation or evidence beyond

               his testimony;

               ***

                                                     4
No. 1-21-1452

         K. Respondent’s retirement was voluntary. He had the capacity and ability to continue

         his employment with the Chicago Police Department.

         L. Respondent’s monthly gross decreased from approximately $9,333/month to

         $3,433.21/month. Because this was a voluntary retirement, this substantial change in

         income would in and of itself not be a basis for the modification of his maintenance.

         Reductions in the payor’s ability to pay maintenance that are not fortuitous cannot be

         used to modify maintenance obligations. [citations omitted]

         M. However, Petitioner’s income has substantially increased with her receipt of the

         pension benefits. Therein, there is a finding of substantial change in circumstances that

         triggers a modification of maintenance pursuant to the statute;

         N. With the addition of the pension income, Petitioner grosses approximately $78,500

         per year. Pursuant to the statutory guidelines, even if the Court used the Respondent’s

         $116,000 income from the time of his retirement, Respondent would not have an

         obligation to pay maintenance;

         O. Respondent was not willful or contumacious in his failure to pay maintenance after

         his retirement and upon the parties’ receipt of retirement benefits;

         ***

         WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

         1. Respondent’s Motion to Modify Maintenance and Commence Retirement Benefits

                is granted;

         2. Respondent’s maintenance obligation is modified to $0 effective May 1, 2020;

         ***

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       No. 1-21-1452

                 4. Petitioner’s Petition for Indirect Civil Contempt of Court for Failure to Pay

                 Maintenance and for Proof of Life Insurance, for Attorney Fees and Other Relief is

                 denied as to Respondent’s maintenance obligation. * * *

                 6. Petitioner’s request for 508(a) and 503(j) fees is denied;”

¶ 10         Several additional postjudgment motions followed. On March 29, 2021, Luis filed a motion

          for reconsideration of the March 2, 2021 order. Though the exact date is unclear because the

          motion is missing from the record, Perla filed a motion for sanctions against Luis sometime

          between March 2, 2021 and June 2, 2021. On June 2, 2021, Luis filed a motion for sanctions

          against Perla. On June 4, 2021, Perla’s motion for sanctions against Luis and Luis’ motion for

          reconsideration were both denied. On September 9, 2021, Perla filed another motion for

          sanctions against Luis. On October 13, 2021, a final order was entered that included the agreed

          withdrawal of both parties’ motions for sanctions against the other. On November 8, 2021, a

          notice of appeal was timely filed and this appeal follows.

¶ 11                                              ANALYSIS

¶ 12         Perla specifically appeals those holdings of the March 2, 2021 order contained under

          subsections 1, 2, 4, and 6. She also asserts that she is appealing subsections M, N, and O, but

          those are factual findings underlying the orders that we will review, and are not separately

          appealable. Her primary argument is that the trial court erred in several ways in granting Luis’

          motion to modify maintenance. In the alternative, Perla argues that even if modification was

          warranted, modification to $0 was inappropriate because Luis is still able to pay. Perla argues,

          without any specificity, that the trial court erred when it declined to find Luis to be in indirect

          civil contempt for his failure to pay maintenance. Perla also argues that the trial court erred by

          denying her petition for fees and costs associated with her efforts to enforce the maintenance

                                                        6
       No. 1-21-1452

          award via an indirect civil contempt finding. Perla suggests that we award her fees and costs

          associated with this appeal, and that we impose sanctions against Luis. Luis recommends we

          impose sanctions against Perla as well. Further, Luis asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction,

          both because this appeal is not timely and because the order being appealed was not a final

          order. We will examine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the arguments on the merits.

¶ 13                                            I. Jurisdiction

¶ 14         Luis raises two arguments regarding our jurisdiction. First, he contends that the appeal was

          untimely filed. Second, he argues that the order being appealed was not a final order. We reject

          both arguments and find that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

¶ 15                                            A. Timeliness

¶ 16         Luis and Perla disagree as to whether this appeal was timely filed and therefore whether

          the court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303:

                  “The notice of appeal must be filed *** within 30 days after the entry of the final

                 judgment appealed from, or, if a timely posttrial motion directed against the judgment

                 is filed, whether in a jury or nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order

                 disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against that judgment or

                 order. A judgment or order is not final and appealable while a Rule 137 claim remains

                 pending unless the court enters a finding pursuant to Rule 304(a).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303

                 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 17         Perla argues that this court has jurisdiction because the trial court’s final order was entered

          October 13, 2021 and her notice of appeal was filed 26 days later, on November 8, 2021, and

          was therefore timely. Luis argues that the March 2, 2021 order constituted a final judgment

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       No. 1-21-1452

           and that his March 29, 2021 motion for reconsideration did not extend the window for appeal

           because it was a request for reconsideration of a ruling on a postjudgment motion.

¶ 18          Even assuming we accept that a post-decree petition such as this qualifies as a

           postjudgment motion under Rule 303, Luis’ argument does not account for Illinois Supreme

           Court Rule 274. Rule 274 establishes that where a final judgment order is modified pursuant

           to a postjudgment motion, the order modifying the final judgment order becomes the new final

           judgment and postjudgment motions against that new final order toll the window in which a

           party can timely appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019). The trial court’s March 2, 2021

           order modified the maintenance terms of the underlying dissolution judgment. Accordingly,

           the March 29, 2021 motion for reconsideration extended the time in which Perla could appeal

           the decision. That motion was disposed of in an order entered on June 4, 2021 which also

           disposed of a pending motion for sanctions against Luis. 1 The motion for reconsideration alone

           extended the window for timely appeal to July 6, 2021. 2 However, when July 6, 2021 arrived,

           a motion for sanctions against Perla, filed June 2, 2021, was still pending.

¶ 19          Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan 1, 2018) provides the requirement that every

           document of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by that attorney. In doing so,

           that attorney certifies that he or she has read the document and “that, to the best of his

           knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact

           and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or

       1
               While the record on appeal does not contain Perla’s motion for sanctions against Luis, it
       appears based on a notice of filing contained in the record that it was filed on April 9, 2021. As
       the specific content of Perla’s motion is not relevant to this appeal, its omission from the record
       has no impact on the outcome of this appeal.
       2
               This date reflects a period of 32 days rather than the 30 provided by the rule, as the 30th
       day would have fallen on a weekend and the 31st on a court holiday.
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       No. 1-21-1452

          reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose.” Id. The rule

          provides that proceedings alleging violations of this rule constitute a separate claim within the

          same civil action and must be brought “within 30 days of the entry of final judgment, or if a

          timely post-judgment motion is filed, within 30 days of the ruling on the post-judgment

          motion.” Id. In the case at bar, both Rule 137 motions were filed after Luis’ motion for

          reconsideration and before the ruling on that motion for reconsideration, so both were timely

          and pending as of the June 4 ruling on the motion for reconsideration.

¶ 20         While an appeal may be filed in instances where a judgment dispenses with some, but not

          all, claims in a case, such an appeal may only be pursued where the court has made an explicit

          finding that “there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.” Illinois

          Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. March 8, 2016). Our court has found explicitly that this

          restriction applies when a Rule 137 motion for sanctions is pending. F.H. Prince & Co. v.

          Towers Financial Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 977 (1994). The trial court did not provide Rule

          304(a) language at any time, so its rulings were not final and appealable until such time as the

          Rule 137 claims were resolved. Perla’s motion for sanctions against Luis was denied in the

          June 4, 2021 order, but Luis’ motion for sanctions against Perla remained pending. Perla then

          filed another motion for sanctions, including a Rule 137 allegation, against Luis on September

          9, 2021. The October 13, 2021 order notes that as part of that order, both parties withdrew their

          motions for sanctions against one another. The October 13, 2021 order thereby resolved the

          final claims in the underlying case and tolled the period for appeal following final judgment,

          through November 12, 2021. The instant appeal was filed November 8, 2021 and was therefore

          timely.

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       No. 1-21-1452

¶ 21                                               B. Finality

¶ 22          Luis argues that this court lacks jurisdiction, because the order being appealed is not a final

          order since a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) is still pending in the court below,

          and the appeal was not filed as an interlocutory appeal. Luis also argues that the underlying

          order is not final, because Perla has not signed a quitclaim deed for the marital residence, as

          contemplated in the judgment for dissolution. However, he cites no legal precedent to support

          this argument, nor does he develop it further than a conclusory statement, so that argument is

          waived. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (argument in appellate brief must be

          supported by citation); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005); In re Marriage of Bates,

          212 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (2004) (“A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with

          relevant authority cited”); Rosier v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 559, 568 (2006)

          (holding that, by failing to offer any supporting legal authority or reasoning, plaintiffs waived

          consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants); Ferguson v.

          Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 61, 78 (1998) (“it is not necessary to decide this

          question since the defendant has waived the issue” by failing to offer case citation or other

          support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires).

¶ 23          “An order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the

          merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate part

          thereof.” In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 151 (2008). Luis cites to In re Marriage

          of Petraitis, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1022 (1993), for the proposition that the order being appealed is

          non-final because not all rights had been determined at the time of the order being appealed.

          In Petraitis, this court was examining whether the circuit court had retained jurisdiction to

          modify a QDRO. Id. at 1037-38. While this court laid out several possible arguments in favor

                                                        10
       No. 1-21-1452

          of jurisdiction, the primary basis for finding jurisdiction articulated in Petraitis was that

          because the QDRO had not been entered, the issue of the division of those assets had not been

          finally determined and so the lower court’s order was never final. Id. at 1038.

¶ 24         Perla argues that a subsequent case, In re Marriage of Platt, 2015 IL App (2d) 141174,

          explicitly overruled Petraitis and, therefore, it is inapplicable. While it is true that Platt holds

          that Petraitis was incorrect, Id. at ¶ 17, one order of this appellate court cannot overrule

          another. Gillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 215 Ill. 2d 381, 392 n.2 (2005). However,

          unlike the federal court system, our appellate court is unitary, so a contradictory decision in

          another district of this court does not represent a split, as it might in the federal judiciary, but

          merely an unsettled issue in this court as yet unaddressed by our supreme court. People v.

          Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 372 (1996). In Platt, this court reasoned that “the entry of a QDRO

          is part of the execution of an existing judgment” and therefore is not a bar to the finality of that

          existing judgment.

¶ 25         In the case at bar, the QDROs regarding the division of Perla’s retirement benefits with

          Sprint and Comcast had yet, at the time of appeal, to be signed and entered, but the division of

          those retirement benefits had been determined and clearly recorded in the MSA that was

          incorporated into the judgment of dissolution of marriage. These facts are similar enough to

          both Petraitis and Platt to make neither case more clearly applicable. However, as the division

          of the retirement assets has already been determined, we conclude that the Platt approach is

          more sensible in the case at bar, and the order being appealed is in fact a final order. Were it

          the case that the language anticipating a QDRO/QILDRO had been so vague as to say that the

          benefits would be split between the parties in respective percentages to be determined in a

          future QDRO/QILDRO to come, the parties’ rights regarding those assets would be as yet

                                                        11
       No. 1-21-1452

          undetermined and the order would be non-final. Here, though, the MSA fully determined the

          division of the assets and all that remained was having the QDROs drawn up and entered. The

          order being appealed is a final order, and accordingly, this court possesses the necessary

          jurisdiction to review the issues on appeal.

¶ 26                                    II. Modification of Maintenance

¶ 27          Perla argues that the trial court erred when determining whether a modification to the

          existing maintenance award was warranted 1) by treating Perla’s receipt of her share of Luis’

          pension benefit as income in determining that a substantial change in circumstances had

          occurred; 2) by failing to conduct a proper analysis of the necessary factors under Sections 750

          ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2020) and 750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2020); 3) by modifying the

          maintenance award based on circumstances not specifically established in the dissolution

          agreement; 4) by failing to impute Luis’ former income to him despite allegedly concluding

          that his retirement was in bad faith; and 5) by concluding that the parties’ relative financial

          circumstances warranted a modification of the maintenance award to $0. Perla argues in the

          alternative that, even if a substantial change occurred, Luis should still have to pay because he

          is capable of doing so and did not meet his burden to prove otherwise. As we reverse and

          remand based on Perla’s first argument, we need not examine the others.

¶ 28          “A trial court’s determination regarding whether a substantial change in circumstances has

          occurred is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” In re Marriage of Bostrom, 2022

          IL App (1st) 200967, ¶ 39. “[T]he decision to modify a maintenance award is within the trial

          court’s discretion.” Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion when the ruling is arbitrary, fanciful,

          unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view the trial court adopted.” Id.

          The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence

                                                         12
       No. 1-21-1452

          standard. Id. “A finding is considered against the manifest weight of the evidence where the

          opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the court’s findings are unreliable, arbitrary, and not

          based on the evidence.” Id.

¶ 29         Section 510 has been amended since the order underlying this appeal was entered, but the

          new version is irrelevant to this appeal. Per 750 ILCS 5/801:

                 “In any action or proceeding in which an appeal was pending or a new trial was ordered

                 prior to the effective date of this Act, the law in effect at the time of the order sustaining

                 the appeal or the new trial governs the appeal, the new trial, or any subsequent appeal

                 or trial.”

¶ 30         Without any language accompanying the May 13, 2022 amendment in question to indicate

          which amendment or portion of the statute that particular amendment should apply to, the

          Section 801 language applicable to the entire act applies to the 2022 amendment as well. The

          version of section 510 that was in effect on November 8, 2021, when this appeal was filed,

          established that:

                 “An order for maintenance may be modified or terminated only upon a showing of a

                 substantial change in circumstances.

                 ***

                 In all such proceedings, as well as in proceedings in which maintenance is being

                 reviewed, the court shall consider the applicable factors set forth in subsection (a) of

                 Section 504 and the following factors:

                 (1) any change in the employment status of either party and whether the change has

                 been made in good faith;

                                                        13
       No. 1-21-1452

                (2) the efforts, if any, made by the party receiving maintenance to become self-

                supporting, and the reasonableness of the efforts where they are appropriate;

                (3) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of either party;

                (4) the tax consequences of the maintenance payments upon the respective economic

                circumstances of the parties;

                (5) the duration of the maintenance payments previously paid (and remaining to be

                paid) relative to the length of the marriage;

                (6) the property, including retirement benefits, awarded to each party under the

                judgment of dissolution of marriage, judgment of legal separation, or judgment of

                declaration of invalidity of marriage and the present status of the property;

                (7) the increase or decrease in each party's income since the prior judgment or order

                from which a review, modification, or termination is being sought;

                (8) the property acquired and currently owned by each party after the entry of the

                judgment of dissolution of marriage, judgment of legal separation, or judgment of

                declaration of invalidity of marriage; and

                (9) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” 750 ILCS

                5/510(a-5).

¶ 31         The factors enumerated in Section 504 are as follows:

                “(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and

                non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance as well as all financial

                obligations imposed on the parties as a result of the dissolution of marriage;

                (2) the needs of each party;

                (3) the realistic present and future earning capacity of each party;

                                                     14
No. 1-21-1452

         (4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking

         maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or

         delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage;

         (5) any impairment of the realistic present or future earning capacity of the party against

         whom maintenance is sought;

         (6) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate

         education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself

         or herself through appropriate employment;

         (6.1) the effect of any parental responsibility arrangements and its effect on a party's

         ability to seek or maintain employment;

         (7) the standard of living established during the marriage;

         (8) the duration of the marriage;

         (9) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational

         skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and the needs of each of the parties;

         (10) all sources of public and private income including, without limitation, disability

         and retirement income;

         (11) the tax consequences to each party;

         (12) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education,

         training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;

         (13) any valid agreement of the parties; and

         (14) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” 750 ILCS

         5/504(a) (West 2020).

                                                15
       No. 1-21-1452

¶ 32             Perla argues that the trial court inappropriately considered Luis’ pension payments to

          be income to her for the purposes of determining that a substantial change in circumstances

          had occurred. Perla cites to a number of cases that concern child support awards rather than

          maintenance awards. As the statutory guidelines for the two overlap in some part, but not in

          full, we are reluctant to look to such cases for guidance where more pertinent precedent exists.

          Bostrom, which was recently decided, examined issues very similar to those in this case.

          Bostrom, 2022 IL App (1st) 200967. Because Bostrom was recently decided, that the trial court

          did not have the benefit of its guidance when it ruled on the motion for modification. In

          Bostrom, as in the case at bar, a retirement contemplated in the MSA occurred and pension

          payments began on a pension that was divided as property in the MSA. Id. The spouse paying

          maintenance filed a motion to modify maintenance based on those pension payments and an

          increase in income on the part of the spouse receiving maintenance. Id. The question arose

          whether it was appropriate to treat the receipt of those pension benefits as a change in income.

          Bostrom, 2022 IL App (1st) 200967, ¶ 47.

¶ 33                                    A. Luis’ Retirement Benefits

¶ 34         Perla argues that Luis’ retirement was contemplated at the time of the MSA and therefore

          his retirement and the consequent receipt of her share of his retirement benefits cannot

          constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Luis argues that under Section 510(a)(1) of

          the Act, whether an event was contemplated cannot be considered when determining whether

          a substantial change in circumstances has occurred. As we have established, this new version

          of the Act does not apply to this proceeding. The version that does apply did not contain the

          cited language. Under the analysis pertinent to the earlier versions of the statute, it was

          “axiomatic” that a substantial change in circumstances will not be found where the change in

                                                      16
       No. 1-21-1452

          financial circumstances was contemplated at the time of the MSA. In re Marriage of Bernay,

          2017 IL App (2d) 160583, ¶ 18; In re Marriage of Virdi, 2014 IL App (3d) 130561, ¶ 30; In

          re Marriage of Reynard, 378 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1005 (2008).

¶ 35         Bostrom notes that the retirement at hand in that case was directly at issue in the MSA and

          cites to Bernay, emphasizing that in that case, the payor of the maintenance was 55 years old

          at the time of the divorce, so retirement was a “not-too-distant” one and directly at issue.

          Bostrom, 2022 IL App (1st) 200967, ¶ 48 (citing In re Marriage of Bernay, 2017 IL App (1st)

          160583, ¶ 18). Luis was similarly situated, as he was 57 at the time of his retirement less than

          a year after the MSA was signed. Bostrom further notes the division of retirement benefits as

          an indicator that the retirement was contemplated at the time of the MSA. Id. The only relevant

          factual distinction on this point between Bostrom and the case at bar is that in Bostrom the

          payor’s obligation to maintain a life insurance policy would terminate upon retirement or the

          termination of maintenance, whereas in the case at bar, Luis’ obligation to maintain life

          insurance continues as long as his maintenance obligation continues. Id. It could be argued that

          this explicit mention of an occurrence at the moment of retirement distinguishes Bostrom, but

          it is a distinction without a difference. If we were to treat the splitting of pension benefits as

          income and that change in income as an event that could be contemplated by the parties, the

          decision to split those benefits inherently contemplates the occurrence of that event.

          Accordingly, in the case at bar, the MSA contemplated Luis’ retirement and so that event

          cannot be considered a substantial change in circumstances.

¶ 36         The holding in Bostrom did not rely on contemplation alone, but also held that because the

          MSA effectuated the distribution of the parties’ marital property, explicitly “including

          ‘retirement and other accounts,’ ” the trial court “should not have included * * * receipt of the

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          agreed upon distribution from [the pension fund] in her income” when determining whether a

          substantial change had occurred. Id. ¶ 49. In the case at bar, the MSA similarly devotes a

          section to the distribution of retirement accounts within the “Division of Assets and Privacy

          Clause” article. Though the relevant QDROs/QILDROs may not have yet been entered for all

          of them, all of the parties’ retirement accounts were distributed as marital property by the MSA.

          Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by treating receipt of that property as a change

          in Perla’s income, and we reverse for reconsideration of Luis’ motion to modify, with

          retirement benefits treated as assets rather than income in the substantial change analysis.

¶ 37                                      B. Luis’ Change in Income

¶ 38         The fact remains that Luis’ income was reduced by his retirement. Whether retirement

          constitutes a substantial change in circumstances depends on the facts of the particular case. In

          re Marriage of Schrimpf, 293 Ill. App. 3d 246, 251-52 (1997). The factors to be considered

          “include his age, health, motives and timing of retirement, ability to pay maintenance after

          retirement, and the former spouse’s ability to provide for herself.” In re Marriage of Waller,

          253 Ill. App. 3d 360, 365 (1993).

¶ 39         Luis contends that his reduction in income resulting from his retirement rendered him

          unable to pay and thereby constituted a substantial change in circumstances. While the trial

          court did not go so far as to say Luis’ retirement was in bad faith, it did find in its order that

          Luis’ retirement was voluntary. Although Luis asserted that his early retirement was for

          medical reasons, he presented no medical evidence to support that assertion.

¶ 40         During the January 20, 2021 evidentiary hearing, Luis testified at length about all of the

          factors listed in Waller except Perla’s ability to provide for herself. Perla testified as to that

          factor. The trial court found that Luis’ early retirement was voluntary and that Luis had the

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          “capacity and ability to continue his employment with the Chicago Police Department.” We

          do not find any of these factual findings to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. As

          Luis retired early, shortly after the MSA was entered, and provided no medical evidence or

          even testimony to any recent injury that prompted his retirement, we also cannot find that the

          trial court abused its discretion in holding that Luis’ voluntary retirement was not a basis for

          the modification of maintenance.

¶ 41          We need not reach Perla’s other claims of error or her argument in the alternative, as we

          reverse on the basis articulated in ¶ 35.

¶ 42                                      III. Indirect Civil Contempt

¶ 43          Perla contends that the trial court erred when it refused to find Luis in indirect civil

          contempt when he ceased paying maintenance upon his retirement. We agree.

¶ 44          “Generally, civil contempt occurs when a party fails to do something ordered by the trial

          court, resulting in the loss of a benefit or advantage to the opposing party.” Cetera v. DiFilippo,

          404 Ill. App. 3d 20, 41 (2010). “Contempt that occurs outside the presence of the trial court is

          classified as indirect contempt.” Id. “The power to enforce an order to pay money through

          contempt is limited to cases of willful refusal to obey the court’s order.” In re Marriage of

          Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 285 (1984). “The noncompliance with an order to pay maintenance

          constitutes prima facie evidence of contempt.” Id. “Therefore, once the prima facie showing

          is made, the burden shifts to the defendant, who may then defend by showing that he is unable

          to pay.” Id. “To prove this defense, a defendant must show that he neither has money now with

          which he can pay, nor has disposed wrongfully of money or assets with which he might have

          paid.” Id. “He who seeks to establish the fact that his failure to pay is the result of lack of funds

          must show with reasonable certainty the amount of money he has received.” Id. at 286. “He

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          must then show that that money has been disbursed in paying obligations and expenses which,

          under the law, he should pay before he makes any payment on the decree for alimony.” Id. “It

          is proper that he first pay his bare living expenses, but whenever he has any money in his

          possession that belongs to him and which is not absolutely needed by him for the purpose of

          obtaining the mere necessaries of life, it is his duty to make a payment on this decree.” Id.

¶ 45          Whether a party is guilty of contempt is a question of fact for the trial court and is not to

          be overturned “unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or the record reflects an

          abuse of discretion.” Id. at 286-87; In re Marriage of Knoll and Coyne, 2016 IL App (1st)

          152494, ¶ 50. “The burden initially falls on the petitioner to establish, by a preponderance of

          evidence, that the alleged contemnor has violated a court order.” Id. “Once that burden is

          satisfied, the burden shifts to the contemnor, who has the burden of showing that the violation

          was not willful and contumacious and that he or she had a valid excuse for failing to follow

          the order.” Id. “Contumacious conduct consists of conduct calculated to embarrass, hinder, or

          obstruct a court in its administration of justice or lessening the authority and dignity of the

          court.” Id.

¶ 46          “The question whether failure to comply with a judgment was willful is one of fact, and

          the trial court’s finding thereon will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight

          of the evidence.” (internal citations omitted) In re Marriage of Ramos, 126 Ill. App. 3d 391,

          398 (1984). “A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite

          conclusion is clearly evident or where the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not

          based on any of the evidence.” In re Marriage of Knoll and Coyne, 2016 IL App (1st) 152494,

          ¶50.

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       No. 1-21-1452

¶ 47         It is undisputed that there was a court order in place obligating Luis to pay maintenance

          and that he stopped paying. As such, the burden was on Luis to show that the violation was not

          willful and contumacious. Luis’ first argument in his response to Perla’s petition for indirect

          civil contempt was that had his motion to modify maintenance been heard in a timely fashion,

          no maintenance would have accrued and his only obligation to Perla would have been half of

          his pension benefit, which was being distributed to her. This argument was presented without

          citation to legal authority and is unsupported by the law. Luis made the conscious and measured

          decision to stop payment, so the behavior was willful. His alleged reason was that the court

          would agree that he could cease doing so. Choosing to engage in unilateral self-help and cease

          payment on a court-ordered maintenance obligation because you are confident that the court

          will find in your favor is both willful and contumacious. In re Marriage of Michaelson, 359

          Ill. App. 3d 706 (affirming a finding of contempt where contemnor ceased payment of

          maintenance before and during pendency of a petition to terminate or modify his maintenance

          obligation).

¶ 48         Luis’ second argument in his response was that he could not continue to pay his

          maintenance obligation and still cover his own expenses. This argument is not borne out by

          the evidence. Even if the court credited all of Luis’ claims regarding his finances, that

          testimony did not paint a picture of someone lacking the resources to pay a $1,598 per month

          maintenance obligation. Luis claimed that paying his own expenses left him $300 to $400 per

          month but never presented any financial obligation that prevented use of the approximately

          $108,141 in stocks in his Compushare trust account to pay his maintenance obligation. The

          question before the court with regard to the question of indirect civil contempt was not whether

          paying his maintenance would leave Luis with a negative monthly balance, it was whether Luis

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       No. 1-21-1452

          possessed the necessary resources to pay and was nonetheless refusing to do so. Logston, 103

          Ill. 2d at 285 (defendant must show he lacks money with which he can pay). Since Luis made

          no assertion that he could not use these funds to pay, his failure to do so was willful and

          contumacious. Accordingly, the trial court’s refusal to find Luis in indirect civil contempt was

          against the manifest weight of the evidence. We reverse that portion of the order and remand

          for a finding of indirect civil contempt and to set a purge amount.

¶ 49                                          IV. Attorney Fees

¶ 50                                            A. 508(b) Fees

¶ 51          Perla argues that the trial court erred in denying Perla’s petition for fees under 750 ILCS

          5/508(b) (West 2020) in connection with Luis’ violation of his obligation to pay maintenance

          following his retirement. Under Section 5/508:

                  “In every proceeding for the enforcement of an order or judgment when the court finds

                  that the failure to comply with the order or judgment was without compelling cause or

                  justification, the court shall order the party against whom the proceeding is brought to

                  pay promptly the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing party.” Id.

¶ 52          “Under section 508(b), a court has no discretion as to whether to award attorneys’ fees,

          only whether the failure to pay was without cause or justification.” In re Marriage of

          Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 706, 715 (2005). “A court may deny attorneys’ fees and costs

          where the failure to pay was justified, or the failure was not willful and wanton.” Id. “An award

          of attorneys’ fees will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion by the

          trial court.” Id.

¶ 53          Perla asserts that “[b]ecause the trial court found that Luis voluntarily resigned and

          unilaterally stopped paying maintenance in May 2020,” his refusal to pay “was necessarily

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       No. 1-21-1452

          without cause or justification.” Our analysis on this point goes hand in hand with our contempt

          analysis above. The attorney fee standard uses the less well defined language of “compelling

          cause or justification.” 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2020). The only justifications Luis offered

          were based in unilateral self-help and a baseless claim of inability to pay. No reasonable person

          would call those justifications compelling. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by

          refusing to award Perla attorney fees under section 508(b), and we reverse and remand to the

          circuit court to determine the amount of fees to be awarded under section 508(b).

¶ 54                                          B. 508(a)(3.1) Fees

¶ 55             Perla asserts that if she prevails on a material or central issue in this appeal, which she

          has, she should be awarded fees for those fees and costs associated with the instant appeal

          under 750 ILCS 508(a)(3.1) (West 2020). While it could be possible to infer what argument

          Perla might make in favor of awarding fees based on the content of the rest of the brief, no

          argument is made beyond the bald statement that fees should be awarded. Even if we were to

          accept the simple request for fees, our supreme court has established that “a party seeking

          contribution must establish that he or she is unable to pay his or her attorney fees and that the

          other party is able to do so.” In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 30. Perla makes no

          such assertion of inability to pay, so we cannot say she has established as much. Accordingly,

          we decline to award Perla fees or costs associated with this appeal.

¶ 56                                             V. Sanctions

¶ 57         In his response brief, Luis argues that sanctions should be imposed against Perla under

          Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375 (eff.

          Feb. 1, 1994). In her reply brief, Perla requests permission to file a petition for sanctions under

          Rule 375.

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       No. 1-21-1452

¶ 58         Luis’ proposed Rule 137 sanctions are improper at this stage, as “Rule 137 * * * governs

          the proceedings in the trial court.” Sacramento Crushing Corp. v. Correct/All Sewer, Inc., 318

          Ill. App. 3d 571, 580 (2000). However, “[a] motion for sanctions that is improperly brought in

          the appellate court pursuant to Rule 137 may be treated as properly brought under Rule 375

          and considered on its merits.” Id.

¶ 59         Luis argues that sanctions are merited because Perla’s appeal is vexatious, harassing, and

          frivolous because it was filed despite allegedly being untimely under Ill. S. Ct. R. 303. Luis

          does not assert that the appeal is frivolous beyond the fact that it was allegedly filed late, which

          it was not. Luis makes the additional assertion that Perla has failed to comply with some of the

          provisions of the MSA, notably failing to provide a quitclaim deed, failing to provide

          QILDROs regarding her own pension benefits, and “otherwise ignore [sic] those portions of

          the Judgment that would benefit Luis.” Luis argues that these failures represent a “continual

          pattern and practice of harassment.” As all of the matters cited as indicative of this pattern are

          still before the trial court and are not the subject of this appeal, we decline to impose Rule 375

          sanctions against Perla.

¶ 60         Perla argues, in favor of granting her leave to file a petition for Rule 375 sanctions, that

          Luis’ attorney may have violated his ethical obligation to cite controlling authority, even when

          it is harmful to the party’s position, because Luis’ response brief did not cite to Bostrom. Perla

          further argues that Luis’ argument that the underlying judgment is not final because of pending

          QDROs is meritless and a waste of valuable judicial resources. We deny Perla’s request for

          leave to file a petition for sanctions as the petition is unnecessary, since Perla has presented

          her argument for sanctions in the reply brief itself, and we find it unavailing.

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       No. 1-21-1452

¶ 61          The sanctions that Perla argues for would be under Rule 375(b), which concerns appeals

          that are frivolous or not taken in good faith. Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b). “Imposition of sanctions under

          Rule 375(b) is left strictly to our discretion.” Gakuba v. Kurtz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140252, ¶ 26.

          Luis’ counsel’s failure to cite to Bostrom was certainly an oversight, as that case was instructive

          and meaningfully informed our analysis. That said, this very order is the first order to cite to

          Bostrom in any way, so we do not find that it was a sanctionable offense to overlook it. With

          regard to Luis’ argument regarding the finality of the underlying order, we find that an arguable

          legal basis did exist, as is demonstrated in our above analysis of that issue. Accordingly, we

          decline to impose sanctions.

¶ 62                                            CONCLUSION

¶ 63          For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand to the trial court

          to reevaluate Luis’ motion to modify maintenance with pension income treated as a marital

          asset rather than income, to determine the amount of past due maintenance, for a finding of

          contempt with a purge amount, and to determine the amount of section 508(b) attorney fees to

          be paid to Perla.

¶ 64          Reversed and remanded with directions.

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