Court Opinion

ID: 9913487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 22:09:31.573961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:49.445354
License: Public Domain

12/27/2023
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT KNOXVILLE
                               Assigned on Briefs October 2, 2023

                                 IN RE WILLIAM W. 1 ET AL.

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cumberland County
                      No. 22CV6876        Caroline E. Knight, Judge
                        ___________________________________

                                 No. E2023-00565-COA-R3-PT
                            ___________________________________

Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their three children.
The trial court found, relying on the doctrine of res judicata, that the ground of severe child
abuse supported termination and concluded that termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Mother and Father challenge the trial
court’s determination that the best interest factors support termination. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

    Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JEFFREY USMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY and
CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

Jeffrey A. Vires, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, William W.

Cynthia F. Davis, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Cleopatra W.

Sherrill A. Rhea, Crossville, Tennessee, Guardian ad Litem for the minor children, William
W., Warren W., and Willina W.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; and Mara L. Cunningham, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

1
 “In cases involving the termination of parental rights, it is this Court’s policy to remove the full names of
children and other parties, to protect their identities.” In re Chayson D., No. E2022-00718-COA-R3-PT,
2023 WL 3451538, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2023).
                                            OPINION

       William W. (Father) and Cleopatra W. (Mother) are the biological parents of three
children: William W., Warren W., and Willina W. (collectively, “the Children”). As of the
date of trial, the Children were six, four, and two years old respectively. This appeal
concerns the May 2022 petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the
Children on the ground of severe child abuse filed by the Tennessee Department of
Children’s Services (DCS). The Cumberland County Circuit Court terminated Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights on April 11, 2023. On appeal, Mother and Father contend that
the termination of their parental rights was not in the Children’s best interest.

        DCS first became involved with the family on August 23, 2020, which is the date
that Mother gave birth to Willina. A drug test at the hospital confirmed that Mother was
under the influence of THC, opiates, and oxycodone, and a subsequent screen revealed that
Willina was born with these drugs in her system. Though Father tested negative for any
controlled substances at the hospital, he later admitted that he had been smoking marijuana
as recently as a month prior to Willina’s birth. After receiving Mother’s and Willina’s test
results, DCS requested that both parents participate in programming offered by Multi-
Agency Collaboration (MAC) Services. Specifically, representatives from DCS and Child
Protective Services directed the parents to Volunteer Behavioral Health for drug and
alcohol testing and intensive outpatient treatment (IOP). They also advised Mother to
complete programming through the Tennessee Early Intervention System (TEIS) with
Willina.

        At this point, Mother and Father resided with the Children at an apartment complex
in Crossville, Tennessee. After a few months living at this complex,2 the family moved
into a home located in Crossville, Tennessee, which Father inherited from his uncle. The
parties disagree about the habitability of the house. According to DCS, this house lacks
electricity and running water. Father disagrees. He maintains that the home has working
utilities, but Father acknowledges it suffers from other problems, such as broken windows.
DCS did not offer the family assistance in terms of repairing this house. Courtney Wicks-
Pelfrey, the DCS caseworker who testified in favor of termination at the final hearing,
explained that the Department could not help unless at least one of the parents showed they
were earning income through some type of employment. In fact, Ms. Wicks-Pelfrey
testified that she personally “encouraged them to get employment, so that way they could
maintain any efforts [DCS] made into putting into that home.”

      DCS filed a petition in Cumberland County Juvenile Court on December 28, 2020,
seeking to have the Children declared dependent and neglected. While that petition was

2
  Father acknowledged that these apartments had “subsequently been condemned,” but also noted that the
family had vacated prior to the condemnation.

                                                -2-
pending, the parents took some, but not all, of the actions recommended by DCS. For
example, while Mother attended seven of twelve scheduled visits at Volunteer Behavioral
Health, she did not return a single call from TEIS about entering the program with Willina.
Father, meanwhile, failed to appear at the appointment he set up with Volunteer Behavioral
Health. According to DCS’s dependency and neglect petition, which was entered as a trial
exhibit without objection, “[t]he parents [were] sporadic in keeping their appointments
with the MAC case manager” during this time.

       Both parents also participated in drug screens while the dependency and neglect
petition was pending. On April 9, 2021, Father tested positive for methamphetamine,
amphetamine, and THC. Four days later on April 13, 2021, Mother tested positive for all
three of the same drugs. Based on the results of these drug screens, DCS sought custody
of the Children and the trial court granted DCS’s request. After the trial court placed the
Children in DCS custody on April 14, 2021, each child tested positive for
methamphetamine, and Willina also tested positive for THC.

       Mother and Father created a permanency plan for the Children in cooperation with
DCS on April 28, 2021, which was later updated on November 1, 2021, and April 19, 2022,
and that plan was ratified by the juvenile court. Among other things, this plan obligated
Mother to refrain from using illegal drugs, attend mental health provider services as well
as outpatient treatment, and “provide a home free of emotional and psychological stressors
for the children.” Father had the same obligations placed upon him, but also assumed a
duty to “obtain and/or maintain a legal means of support to meet the family[‘s] needs by
applying for employment” to be proved by “provid[ing] a list of efforts to DCS worker
weekly until employment or benefits are obtained.”

        DCS placed the Children with a foster family on June 1, 2021. As part of this
arrangement, the Children live with another foster sibling and an adopted child as well.
The Children’s foster father testified at the final hearing in this case that the Children
entered his care with unaddressed speech impediments. However, each child has
reportedly improved during the time they have spent with the foster family, overcoming
their respective speech impediments. The Juvenile Court’s dependency and neglect order
indicates that, after entering the foster home, DCS involved TEIS in the Children’s lives to
provide support in their development. According to the foster father’s testimony, the
Children “call me Little Daddy, and they call [my partner] Big Daddy.” He also testified
that the Children would act out and exhibit aggressive behaviors after each visit with
Mother and Father. On cross examination, the foster father noted that the Children still
call Mother “Mommy” and Father “Daddy,” and acknowledged Father’s concerns that
discussing adoption could make reunification difficult.

        On July 20, 2021, the Cumberland County Juvenile Court entered three child
support orders that affect the Children. These three orders, which DCS admitted as exhibits
at trial without objection, obligated Father to pay exactly $33.33 a month per child in the
                                            -3-
form of wage garnishments. Father testified that, during the pendency of the case, he held
jobs at “CoLinx,” McDonald’s, and THK Rhythm, the latter of which was still ongoing at
the time of trial.

       The Cumberland County Juvenile Court adjudicated each child dependent and
neglected on July 28, 2021. The trial court concluded that DCS presented clear and
convincing evidence to support its petition and proved that “[r]easonable efforts have been
made to assist the parents in remedying the conditions that necessitate foster care.” The
order additionally noted that, while Mother was attending IOP classes at Bradford, “[b]oth
parents were drug screened on 6/8/2021 and mom was positive for buprenorphine and
THC, and the father for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC.” It appears that the
Juvenile Court also tested both parents on the day of the dependency and neglect hearing,
noting “both parents were positive for THC & buprenorphine. Mother reports that she is
prescribed buprenorphine, but Father is not.” The Juvenile Court concluded that DCS
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Children were “victims of severe child
abuse” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(27).

       Sparse evidence is included in the record to demonstrate what occurred between the
dependency and neglect adjudication and the filing of the petition to terminate the parents’
parental rights. Father tried to attend treatment through “Health Connect” as well as a
detox through “the New Leaf,” a rehabilitation center. Father concedes, however, that he
did not fully complete the New Leaf program; he “only completed detox,” not full
rehabilitation.

       DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the
Children on May 5, 2022. DCS emphasized that the Children had already been deemed to
be victims of severe child abuse. Accordingly, DCS raised severe child abuse as a ground
for termination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4). DCS also
argued that the best interests of the Children support terminating Mother and Father’s
parental rights. Both parents received service of process on June 3, 2022, and Mother
subsequently filed an answer to the department’s petition. In it, Mother admitted that the
Children were adjudicated dependent and neglected on July 28, 2021, but not that the
Children were deemed victims of severe child abuse.

        Between the time of filing the petition and the termination hearing, according to
Father’s testimony, he began working at McDonald’s for several months before October
2022. In October, Father contends that he transitioned to working for THK Rhythm. It
also appears that both Mother and Father moved in with Father’s family “at the end of . . .
October” 2022. Father testified that this new home is a furnished dwelling with working
utilities.

       The trial court held a hearing on DCS’s termination petition on May 10, 2023. In
addition to introducing numerous exhibits, DCS elicited testimony from Ms. Wicks-
                                          -4-
Pelfrey, the DCS case worker assigned to Mother and Father’s case. Among other things,
Ms. Wicks-Pelfrey recounted the events that formed the basis for the Juvenile Court’s
decision to adjudicate the Children as victims of severe child abuse, and DCS entered the
corresponding order into evidence. She also discussed how, despite the parents trying to
engage in some drug treatment, Mother and Father continuously relapsed throughout the
case. Ms. Wicks-Pelfrey noted that Mother was arrested on March 9, 2023, for heroin
possession. She also discussed the status of the Children in the foster home, noting that
during her visits she observed that the Children were, in her opinion, bonded with both
foster parents. On cross examination, Ms. Wicks-Pelfrey conceded that Father informed
her of his employment with THK Rhythm, but also noted that Father has not provided DCS
with a single paystub from that job to confirm his current employment. She acknowledged
that the Children also show attachment to Mother and Father, evidenced by calling Mother
and Father affectionate names. She also identified three or four visits during the span of
DCS’s custodial episode that Mother and Father failed to attend.

         Though Mother did not take the stand, Father testified. Father discussed the
family’s housing situation, noting that they intended to live with his father temporarily until
they could fix the home he had inherited from his uncle. He also discussed his employment
with THK Rhythm and claimed that his wages were being garnished to provide child
support to the Children, though he admitted on cross examination that he provided no
evidence of these TKH Rhythm paystubs to DCS prior to the hearing as contemplated by
the permanency plans.3 Father admitted that he failed drugs screens and “[m]ost definitely”
suffers from a substance abuse problem. He nonetheless emphasized the love he has for
the Children and his desire to be reunited with them. On cross examination, DCS probed
Father’s inability to provide paystubs from his previous jobs. Father conceded that he did
not work diligently to procure those paystubs and send them to DCS, blaming his substance
abuse. Though Father emphasized that he passed a drug screen in December of 2022, DCS
noted that he failed a drug screen within a month of trial, testing positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamine, hydrocodone, fentanyl, and marijuana. Additionally,
due to his repeated statements that he misunderstood questions during cross examination,
the trial court admonished Father for what it considered purposeful avoidance. During the
GAL’s cross examination, Father claimed that he was unaware of Mother’s drug use during
her pregnancy with Willina and blamed an unnamed babysitter for the Children’s exposure
to illicit substances.

        On April 11, 2023, the trial court granted DCS’s petition to terminate Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to the Children. In its final order, the trial court stated that it found
“all of the State’s witnesses to be credible” but “did not find [Father] to be credible.” Citing

3
  Father had previously provided one or two paystubs from his time at McDonald’s. When Father’s counsel
tried to introduce a copy of what purported to be one of Father’s paystubs into evidence, DCS objected on
the grounds of hearsay. The trial court sustained DCS’s objection, though it permitted Father to discuss
“his knowledge about his own pay, child support, and any amount.”
                                                  -5-
the Juvenile Court’s dependency and neglect order that specifically labeled the Children as
victims of severe child abuse, the trial court deemed the ground of severe child abuse
proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. Finding
that DCS provided clear and convincing evidence to support at least one ground for
termination, the trial court then moved to the best interest analysis. After discussing facts
that supported its conclusions on each factor listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-1-113(i), the trial court ordered Mother’s and Father’s parental rights terminated and
gave DCS “the right to place said children for adoption and to consent to said adoption in
loco parentis.”

        Both parents appeal to this Court, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding
that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Both the GAL and DCS support the
trial court’s final order on the merits.

                                              II.

       Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their
own children. In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). This
fundamental interest is “far more precious than any property right.” In re Carrington H.,
483 S.W.3d 507, 522 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59
(1982)). “[P]ublic policy strongly favors allowing parents to raise their biological or legal
children as they see fit, free from unwarranted governmental interference.” In re Bernard
T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 597 (Tenn. 2010). However, a parent’s rights are not absolute and
may be terminated on clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination
exist and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
113(c)(1)-(2); In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tenn. 2013).

        In a termination of parental rights case, we review a trial court’s findings of fact de
novo on the record with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates
otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). “In light of
the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court
must make its own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court
or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing
evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” In re Carrington H., 483
S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97). The grounds for
termination and the determination that termination is in the child’s best interest must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, that is, evidence that “enables the fact-finder
to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts” and that “eliminates any
serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re Bernard
T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). “The trial court’s ruling that
the evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law,
which appellate courts review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” In re
Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)).
                                              -6-
                                                III.

        The trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children on
the ground of severe child abuse, finding severe child abuse to have been conclusively
established pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. Neither parent contests this decision
on appeal. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon this court to address each ground for
termination pursuant to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s directive to this court to “review
the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is
in the child’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on
appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525-26.

       A parent’s rights to his or her child may be terminated on the basis of severe child
abuse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) (effective July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2022); see
also In re J.S., No. M2022-00142-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 139424, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 10, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 4, 2023) (“This court applies the versions of
the parental termination statutes in effect on the date the petition was filed.”). Severe child
abuse exists when a parent “[k]nowingly or with gross negligence allow[s] a child under
eight (8) years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that results in
the child testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally prescribed.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 37-1-102(b)(27)(E) (effective July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2022). Here, the trial court
observed that the Cumberland County Juvenile Court, in its order adjudicating the Children
to be dependent and neglected, specifically found that “these children are victims of severe
child abuse” under section 102(b)(27)(E).

       As this Court has previously explained, res judicata is a doctrine that treats “an
existing final judgment rendered upon the merits . . . by a court of competent jurisdiction,
[as] conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties . . . in all other actions
in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.” In re Heaven L.F.,
311 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Galbreath v. Harris, 811 S.W.2d 88,
90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)). In the context of severe child abuse, res judicata permits a trial
court to treat a prior finding of severe child abuse in a dependency and neglect proceeding
as conclusive evidence establishing the ground of severe child abuse during a subsequent
termination of parental rights hearing. Id. All of the parties in this case agree that they
were the same parties included in the Cumberland County Juvenile Court’s dependency
and neglect adjudication, the issue of severe child abuse was plainly litigated during that
proceeding, and neither parent appealed that finding of severe child abuse. See id.
(concluding res judicata applied where all parties were identical and “the issue of whether
Mother committed severe child abuse was fully litigated”). Accordingly, the trial court
properly determined that the ground of severe child abuse was conclusively established via
the Juvenile Court’s prior dependency and neglect order.

                                               IV.
                                               -7-
       If a statutory ground for termination of parental rights has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence, the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey
S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The Tennessee Supreme Court has
summarized the law regarding the best interest analysis as follows:

               Facts considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a
       preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.”
       “After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should then
       consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they
       amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s
       best interests.” When considering these statutory factors, courts must
       remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s,
       rather than the parent’s, perspective.” Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective
       of the child is the common theme” evident in all of the statutory factors.
       “[W]hen the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in conflict,
       such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the best interests
       of the child . . . .”

               Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote
       examination” of the statutory factors. And the best interests analysis consists
       of more than tallying the number of statutory factors weighing in favor of or
       against termination. Rather, the facts and circumstances of each unique case
       dictate how weighty and relevant each statutory factor is in the context of the
       case. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a factually
       intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives
       individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are
       terminated.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017) (citations omitted).

      The nonexclusive factors relevant to the best interest analysis are laid out in
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i)(1):

       (A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical
       need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s
       minority;

       (B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
       have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;

       (C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting
       the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;
                                            -8-
(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with
the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive
relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household
trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic
symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another
person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons
other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and
the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and
the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the
child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there
is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol,
controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render
the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable
manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services,
or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent
in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of
the department;

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing
paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the
circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe
and not in the child’s best interest;
                                      -9-
       (N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the
       home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or
       psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;

       (O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child
       or any other child;

       (P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and
       specific needs required for the child to thrive;

       (Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
       creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific
       needs and in which the child can thrive;

       (R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and
       safe for the child;

       (S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial
       support for the child; and

       (T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
       detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
       effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (effective July 1, 2021 to June 30, 2022). The trial court
concluded that seventeen of these twenty factors support terminating Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights. However, due to a lack of proof, the trial court concluded that factors (F),
(G), and (R) were inapplicable to the facts of this case. DCS does not challenge this
determination with respect to factors (F) and (G). DCS does challenge the trial court’s
decision to ascribe no weight to factor (R), which concerns the health and safety of the
parent’s current home, and which factor DCS argues supports termination. The trial court
indicated that the evidence presented was insufficient regarding the “physical
environment” of the parent’s home. The trial court’s need for greater clarity in evidence
presented to make findings on this ground does not appear to be in error.

       In a thorough examination, the trial court made detailed findings addressing the best
interest factors. Because many of the factors touch on similar factual predicates and
involve similar issues, we group our discussion of the best interest factors “based on the
overarching themes within the list of twenty factors” under the circumstances of the case.
In re Chayson D., 2023 WL 3451538, at *14. We consider first the Children’s emotional
needs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A) (concerning the need for stability), (B)
(concerning how changes in caretakers affect child well-being), (D) (concerning parent-
                                            - 10 -
child attachment), (E) (concerning visitation), (H) (concerning attachment to others), (I)
(concerning relationships with others), (T) (concerning the parent’s fitness and its
corresponding impacts). Though competing evidence and testimony exists on several of
these factors, we nonetheless conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the
balance of these factors support the termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights.

        It is true that the Children still call Father and Mother “Daddy” and “Mommy,” that
Mother and Father have participated in the majority of their visits, and that the Children
still share a bond with Mother and Father. However, the relationship with Mother and
Father is one that produces poor behavior from the Children, and the trial court observed
that attachment was not a secure and healthy one. Alternatively, the Children are, however,
“extremely bonded” with their foster parents in a healthy and secure relationship.
Describing the relationship with the foster parents, the trial court noted that “the Children
run to them if something is wrong. They hug them.” Foster father testified that the
Children also use affectionate names to refer to himself and his partner. Moreover, the
Children appear to have exhibited negative reactions to visits with Mother and Father,
showcasing poor attitudes and aggressive behaviors at the conclusion of several visits.
DCS provided evidence showing that the Children’s well-being and development has
improved since leaving the parents’ custody. The foster parents are providing stability and
continuity that Mother and Father cannot.

       All three children also appear to have overcome significant speech impediments due
in no small part to the support they receive from DCS, TEIS, and the foster family. Under
Mother and Father’s care, by contrast, the Children received no such assistance. Ms.
Wicks-Pelfrey confirmed that Mother never reached out to TEIS, despite being urged to do
so, after Willina was born with drugs in her system. We agree with the trial court that
removing the Children from their foster home, where they are currently thriving, and
returning them to Mother and Father’s custody would negatively impact their stability and
overall well-being. The trial court found, and the record supports, that Mother and Father
“cannot provide for the basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs of the
children.” While Mother and Father contend that the Children’s young ages make
separation from the foster family less impactful than it would be at an older age, the trial
court found this argument unconvincing. Additionally, the Children have significant
positive relationship with their “foster parents’ adopted son and their foster sibling.”
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined these factors weigh in favor of
termination.

        We turn next to considerations of the Children’s physical environment and well-
being. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(N) (involving any abuse or neglect present
in the parent’s home), (O) (involving the parent’s prior provision of safe and stable care to
any child), (Q) (involving the parent’s commitment to having a home that meets the child’s
needs). The trial court properly determined that these factors support the termination of
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Willina tested positive for multiple harmful illegal
                                           - 11 -
drugs upon birth. Mother and Father continued to relapse—exposing all three Children to
methamphetamine, THC, and other drugs in the process. Furthermore, DCS administered
drug screens to each child after the Children were removed from Mother and Father’s
custody, and each of the Children tested positive. Though Father contended, without
evidence, that an unnamed babysitter was to blame for the Children being exposed to drugs,
the trial court found Father’s testimony not credible. The evidence presented indicated that
Mother and Father continued to abuse drugs. Placing the Children with Mother and Father
would be returning them to an environment in which Mother and Father continue to abuse
drugs without any foreseeable end to their drug abuse, when these same conditions
previously resulted in the Children testing positive for drugs. The trial court did not err in
determining these factors favored termination.

        Next, we consider Mother’s, Father’s, and DCS’s efforts. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
36-1-113(i)(1)(C) (involving the parent’s continuity in meeting the child’s needs), (J)
(involving the parent’s lasting adjustment of circumstances), (K) (involving the parent’s
use of available resources), (L) (involving DCS’s reasonable efforts), (M) (involving
parent’s sense of urgency in addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made
an award of custody unsafe and not in the child’s best interest). Concerning Mother and
Father, the trial court found that their efforts were insufficient. Though it is true that
Mother and Father attended some sessions at Volunteer Behavioral Health and Father
participated in a detox, the trial court heard credible testimony, unrebutted by both parents,
that relapses occurred despite repeated attempts by DCS to assist them. Furthermore, the
trial court concluded, and the record supports, that Mother and Father exhibited a lack of a
sense of urgency in addressing the problems that gave rise to the Children being placed in
foster care or even getting the Children back from foster care.

        Additionally, Father conceded at trial that he did not provide DCS with paystubs
aside from one or two during his temporary employment with McDonald’s. Concerning
his current position at THK Rhythm, Father admitted that he did not send the department
a single paystub. Parents failed to complete required paperwork that would enable DCS to
take further action with regard to various forms of assistance including, for example, water
bills and housing. Additionally, both parents declined to accept other forms of assistance
from DCS. For example, immediately upon intervening in this case, DCS recommended
that Mother engage TEIS in order to benefit from programming that would aid herself and
Willina. Mother did not participate in this TEIS programming. It was only after the
Juvenile Court granted DCS custody over the Children that Willina first received TEIS
assistance. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that “neither parent has taken advantage
of available programs, services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting
adjustment to their circumstances or conditions.” The trial court concluded that DCS made
reasonable efforts and has done more for the parents than they have done for themselves.
The trial court did not err in determining these factors favored termination.

       Finally, with regard to support and knowledge of the Children’s needs, the trial court
                                            - 12 -
also found that these factors support termination. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(S)
(addressing parent providing more than token support); (P) (addressing parent’s
understanding of the child’s needs). Relying in part on the facts recited above, the trial
court concluded that neither Mother nor Father have a clear understanding of the Children’s
needs. The record supports this conclusion as to Mother and Father’s lack of understanding
of the Children’s needs.

        The record is more muddled on the issue of support. Father testified that that he
held multiple jobs during the pendency of this case and that his wages were regularly
garnished to provide child support to the Children. The trial court, however, found Father
not to be a credible witness. The trial court stated that Father’s employment was “new”
and that this factor weighed against him because it is limited to “very recent proof, . . .
perhaps only one paystub.”4 Based on the state of the record regarding the support issue
as to Father and the basis of the trial court’s conclusion, there is uncertainty as to whether
factor (S) supports termination. Mother also points out in her briefing that “[t]he trial court
appears to make no findings regarding” her support to the Children specifically. We agree.
Accordingly, the trial court has not made findings as to factor (S) that support terminating
Mother’s parental rights.

       “While determination of the child’s best interest may not be reduced to a simple
tallying of the factors for and against termination, . . . especially considering the similarities
between the factors, we cannot help but acknowledge the overwhelming sense that the
[Children’s lives] will not be improved by a reintroduction to Mother [and Father].” In re
Chayson D., 2023 WL 3451538, at *15 (citation omitted). With the exception of factor
(S) as to which there is uncertainty, the record strongly supports the trial court’s
determinations as to the factors. Furthermore, clear and convincing evidence supports the
conclusion that the best interests of the Children favor terminating the parents’ parental
rights. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights.

                                                    VI.

        In considering the arguments advanced on appeal and for the reasons discussed
above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The costs of the appeal are taxed to the
appellants, William W. and Cleopatra W., for which execution may issue if necessary. The
case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this
opinion.

4
 The trial court sustained objections made by DCS when Father’s counsel attempted to enter other paystubs
into evidence at trial. Sustaining a hearsay objection, the trial court stated that it would permit Father to
“testify as to his knowledge” but not to “the paystub itself.” With the paystubs having been excluded, the
failure to enter into evidence additional paystubs to reflect paid child support payments becomes
questionable ground upon which to rest the trial court’s conclusion on this point.
                                                   - 13 -
         _________________________________
         JEFFREY USMAN, JUDGE

- 14 -