Court Opinion

ID: 9661596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:43:44.61524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:30.751744
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because I feel that the testimony of West relating to the damage to Kennedy’s house should have been stricken, and the action of the circuit judge did not eliminate the consideration of a noncompensable item of damages. West testified that Kennedy’s house had diminished in value to the extent of $4,950, and that this was a part of the total damage to the landowner. When asked to explain his reasons for arriving at that amount of damage, West said that they were (1) the steep driveway required after the taking, (2) the increased traffic and noise, and (3) changing the view of the city and the privacy. Appellant’s counsel first moved that the witness’ value testimony be stricken. The court correctly denied this motion. Appellant’s counsel then moved to strike that portion of West’s testimony relating to the damages to the house because of the inclusion of improper elements of damages. This motion was denied and the court then instructed the jury that the proper measure of damages was “before” and “after” values and that West’s testimony as to breakdowns and figures might be considered only as an aid in determining these values, but that the separate items should not be considered as constituting the measure of damages. West had testified that he arrived at his “after” value by subtracting from the “before” value the damages resulting from the taking. Thus the judge’s instruction to the jury did not have the effect of eliminating any improper element of damages included by West from the jury’s consideration. It was clearly held in Campbell v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, 183 Ark. 780, 38 S. W. 2d 753, that a landowner should not recover for noise, dust and matters of that sort, which, in varying form, are “incidents” to living upon a public highway and, as such, must be borne by all abutting property owners, even though he was entitled to recovery for interference with access. The owners’ allegation that the construction of a bridge and approaches on existing right-of-way caused annoyance by dust and dirt and sound caused by vehicles going over the bridge was admitted by demurrer. See also Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Kesner, 239 Ark. 270, 388 S. W. 2d 905.1  The inclusion of an improper element of damages should be reversible error, where, as here, we cannot say that there was manifestly no prejudice in the failure of the trial court to eliminate that element from consideration. Harris, C. J., and Jones, J., join in this dissent.  The soundness of this rule is questionable to say the least, but it has been the law in Arkansas for 39 years. It will remain so, until it is overruled.