Court Opinion

ID: 9401033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 19:10:33.878627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.333303
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Kryling, 2023-Ohio-1921.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio                                            Court of Appeals No. WD-22-036

        Appellee                                         Trial Court No. 2021CR0221

v.

Christian Kryling                                        DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                        Decided: June 9, 2023

                                                   *****

        Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        David T. Harold, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Jeffrey P. Nunnari, for appellant.

                                                   *****

        ZMUDA, J.

                                              I.   Introduction

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Christian Kryling, appeals the April 29, 2022 judgment of the

Wood County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of aggravated trafficking in drugs.

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                               A. Procedural Background

       {¶ 2} On August 5, 2021, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated

trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(a), a fourth-degree

felony. The charge arose from an incident in which a detective from the Wood County,

Ohio Sheriff’s Department observed appellant selling methamphetamine to a confidential

informant through a controlled buy operation. Appellant was originally charged with

aggravated trafficking in drugs through the filing of a complaint in the Bowling Green,

Ohio, Municipal Court on April 9, 2021. He was arrested on April 14, 2021, and made

his initial appearance that same day. At that time, appellant requested a continuance to

consult with counsel. The court granted appellant’s request and he was ordered to be

held in the custody of the Wood County Sheriff’s Department prior to his preliminary

hearing. Appellant ultimately appeared before the municipal court on April 19, 2021,

where he waived his preliminary hearing. The court then ordered the matter bound over

to the Wood County Court of Common Pleas and ordered appellant released on a

personal recognizance bond.

       {¶ 3} Appellant was indicted by a grand jury on one count of aggravated

trafficking in drugs on August 5, 2021. He appeared for arraignment on August 17,

2021. At that time, he was determined to be indigent, was appointed counsel, and entered

a not guilty plea to the single count in the indictment.

2.
       {¶ 4} The parties appeared for trial on March 23, 2022. During its case-in-chief,

the state sought to introduce portions of phone calls recorded during appellant’s

confinement immediately following his arrest. Appellant objected arguing that the

entirety of the phone calls were inadmissible “other acts” evidence as described in

Evid.R. 404(B). The state argued that analysis under Evid.R. 404(B) was improper

because the statements were admissible as party admissions pursuant to Evid.R.

801(D)(2). The trial court concluded that the entirety of appellant’s statements made on

the recordings related to the specific sale of methamphetamine underlying his indictment.

As a result, the court found that they were admissible and the recordings were played for

the jury at trial. The jury found appellant guilty at the conclusion of the single-day trial.

On April 26, 2022, the trial court sentence appellant to an 18-month prison term.1 The

trial court’s judgment was memorialized on April 29, 2022.

                                 B. Assignment of Error

       {¶ 5} Appellant timely appealed and asserts the following error for our review:

       {¶ 6} The trial court erred to appellant’s prejudice by admitting statements

alluding to other acts of drug dealing.

1
 Appellant was also sentenced to an additional 588-day prison term for violating the
conditions of his post-release control previously imposed in Hancock County Court of
Common Pleas case No. 2015-CR-0239. Appellant does not assign error to the
imposition of that sentence.

3.
                 C. Trial Proceedings and Factual Background

       {¶ 7} The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible

error in admitting certain portions of the recorded phone calls at trial. Therefore, we

begin with a summary of the challenged evidence, the parties’ arguments regarding the

admissibility of that evidence, and the trial court’s ruling, before describing each

witnesses’ testimony at trial.2

                            Trial court’s Evid.R. 404(B) Ruling

       {¶ 8} The charge in this case arose from appellant’s sale of methamphetamine to a

confidential information (“the C.I.”) during a controlled buy operation. Wood County

Sheriff’s Department Detective-Sergeant Destinie Moore arranged the buy, which

occurred on January 27, 2021. Following appellant’s arrest, he was held in custody by

the Wood County Sheriff’s Department. During that time, appellant made two recorded

phone calls to non-party A.B. Prior to trial, the state indicated that it planned to use

portions of the recorded calls during its case-in-chief as exhibits to supplement Detective-

Sergeant Moore’s testimony. The portions of the recordings the state sought to introduce,

as transcribed by the state, consisted of the following:

                                      Recording No. 1

       APPELLANT: “Here’s the thing about that, baby, is through BG, right. BG

       has somebody they caught doing something wrong. Now this guy [the C.I.]

2
  Rulings and testimony described in this decision are not presented in the same order as
they occurred at trial.

4.
     is from BG. When he catches a case here, BG says we need your help

     catching people you can get. Now here I come because I slept with his

     girlfriend and shit. And he’s mad at me, so he says I can get him. I want to

     get this guy, right? However it happened, I came to BG and dealt with him

     at certain times or whatever, right. Now I’m saying what he said I gave

     him isn’t what I gave him. Now it’s up to the police to prove what’s

     happened. BG is not worried about anything else. They’re only worried

     about BG. That’s what makes me think I would never deal with anybody in

     Findlay for that reason. Watch what you say, man. I was kind of thinking

     the same thing but I don’t know where it would come from.

                                  Recording No. 2

     APPELLANT: Now I know what I’ve done in my life. I can remember the

     day that I’ve done shit. That’s why when they ask me, I do know who I’ve

     dealt with in Wood County. I can remember the day that it happened. I can

     remember the day that this charge right here happened. You know why?

     Because I can remember everything. I remember who I deal with. I

     remember what I dealt with. I remember visuals, I remember dates. I

     remember times. I remember who I talk to. I remember what I said. I

     remember what I said on this date right now. January 21st, when they got

5.
     me on this charge, I can tell you exactly where it was. I can tell you where

     I parked that day. I can tell you who I parked next to.

     ***

     APPELLANT: It was a silver M-F truck like a Suzuki. Remember those

     fucking cars. I parked next to that. I can tell you who I talked to and what

     I said. When I walked in, I can tell you exactly who was sitting where. I

     have a good fucking memory for this shit. See, you guys don’t take that

     into consideration. You guys don’t know what I walk into a place I see

     what I see and I visualize it.

     A.B.: You know that’s a good thing and that’s a bad thing.

     APPELLANT: It’s a blessing and a curse.

     A.B.: Yes, it is.

     APPELLANT: Absolutely. You’re absolutely right about that. But what

     I’m saying is for things like this, right here, it’s a blessing because I’m

     telling you right know I know who I’ve sold to. I can tell you exactly

     when I started selling and when I started running for [C.].

     A.B.: Right, right, right. That’s when I met you.

     APPELLANT: I can tell you who was running for who or where I went. I

     can tell you where I was way back when. I can tell you almost to the exact

     spot I parked. I can tell you what you were wearing that day. Can you tell

6.
       me what I was wearing that day, the day I met you? Yeah, I can tell you all

       that.

                                     Recording No. 3

       APPELLANT: So this is what I’ve got. There’s a guy named [the C.I.].

       His girlfriend is [R.T.]. Remember when I told you that me and her were in

       a hotel room and [D.] knew about it? This was the whole reason this

       happened. He’s trying to get back at me for doing that, which I thought

       they were broke up. Didn’t even say they were together. Regardless of all

       they’re trying to say, I sold him some illegal stuff or whatever. I already

       know everything that happened. The time that I think they’re talking about

       we were supposed to meet up at Burger King. I ended up peeping out of

       the place and there was somebody sitting in a burgundy truck, a female. I

       ended up leaving there and going to the trailer park. I don’t know what

       they have or what they think they have. I know one thing. Every time I met

       the dude he was using drugs. You can’t be using drugs and buying drugs

       for the police.

       {¶ 9} At trial, appellant argued that the entirety of these recordings were

inadmissible “other acts” evidence and were precluded from being admitted under

Evid.R. 404(B). The state, in turn, argued that Evid.R. 404(B) did not apply to these

recordings as they did not constitute the introduction of “other acts” evidence but instead

7.
constituted party admissions as defined in Evid.R. 801(D)(2) and were, therefore,

admissible. The trial court determined that all three recordings were admissible because

they all related to the underlying incident that gave rise to the indictment, implicitly

finding that they were not “other acts.” The trial court did not, however, offer any

specific analysis related to Evid.R. 404(B) or Evid.R. 801.

       {¶ 10} The state then proceeded with its case-in-chief, during which it elicited the

following testimony:

                     Testimony of Detective-Sergeant Destinie Moore

       {¶ 11} At the time of the trial, Detective-Sergeant Moore had been employed by

the Wood County Sheriff’s Department for six years. She spent two years in traffic

patrol before being promoted to the detective bureau in 2018. She served on special

assignment in narcotics interdiction which involved her performing her work as a plain-

clothes undercover officer.

       {¶ 12} Detective-Sergeant Moore testified that her investigations generally arose

from different places including an anonymous tip line, tips from confidential informants,

and tips from informants held in confinement. She noted that there are three categories of

informants—citizen informants not expecting anything in return, paid informants, and

those individuals seeking to have their own charges reduced or dismissed for providing a

tip. She noted that an informant can be both paid and granted reduced or dismissed

charges. She stated that most informants, other than citizens who happen to observe

8.
illegal activity, have knowledge where drugs are being sold because they themselves are

purchasing and using drugs. The Wood County Sheriff’s Department’s detective bureau

typically utilizes drug purchasers as its informants so that they can “move up the ladder”

to arrest the sellers.

        {¶ 13} Detective-Sergeant Moore testified that she had developed approximately

60 to 75 sources for information in furtherance of her investigations during her time as a

detective. Of those individuals, she has tasked approximately 40 to 65 to perform a

controlled buy. A controlled buy is the purchase of drugs by a confidential informant that

is observed by law enforcement.

        {¶ 14} Her investigation of appellant began approximately six to eight weeks prior

to the January 27, 2021 controlled buy when she was contacted by the C.I. The C.I. was

known to Detective-Sergeant Moore because he had previously provided her with

information in prior investigations. In light of this new tip, she decided to set up a

controlled buy between the C.I. and appellant.

        {¶ 15} Controlled buys are subject to specific procedural requirements. The

procedure involves both “pre-buy” and “post-buy” protocols to “protect the integrity of

the investigation.” Detective-Sergeant Moore described the general procedural

requirements in conjunction with her adherence to the proper protocol in the underlying

case.

9.
       {¶ 16} Detective-Sergeant Moore testified that all controlled buys are prepared

and observed by a team of three detectives. For the January 27, 2021 controlled buy

involving appellant, she was accompanied by Detective-Sergeant Mormile and Detective-

Sergeant Barta. Pursuant to the pre-buy protocol, all three detectives met with the

informant to determine the location of the buy. At that time, they performed a thorough

search of the C.I. including having him remove his shoes, searching all pockets, and

checking his belt buckle and hat. These searches are meant to prevent an informant from

taking any drugs or additional money to the sale. This allows the detectives to ensure

that only the money provided to an informant is used in the sale and that only drugs

purchased from the target of the buy are returned. She estimated that the search took

approximately 15 minutes to complete.

       {¶ 17} The C.I. was then provided with a “covert device” to record the buy. The

device both records the audio of the parties’ interaction as well as provides a live

broadcast of the audio to the observing detectives. The live broadcast allows the

detectives to determine that a buy took place in real time as well as determine if an

informant is in distress. The device was also capable of recording video. Detective-

Sergeant Moore testified that she does not ask informants to utilize the video feature until

they have experience with controlled buys as attempting to obtain video is more

conspicuous and risks detection. In this case, the informant was instructed to only record

audio of the transaction.

10.
       {¶ 18} After being provided the recording device, Detective-Sergeant Moore

prompted the informant to contact appellant through Facebook’s messaging service and

via cellphone to set up the buy. The C.I. and appellant agreed to meet at a Taco Bell

restaurant parking lot. The informant was then dropped off near the established site and

walked to the location where the buy was set to occur. Detective-Sergeants Moore and

Mormile parked in a nearby parking lot to listen to the audio of the sale. Detective-

Sergeant Barta was stationed near the location to visually observe the transaction.

       {¶ 19} Appellant did not arrive at the appointed time. The C.I. then called

appellant who accused the C.I. of setting him up. Appellant then contacted the C.I. a

second time and stated that he would “be there in ten minutes.” When appellant arrived,

he stated that he thought the occupant of another vehicle in the parking lot may have been

a police officer so the C.I. got into appellant’s vehicle and they drove to a nearby mobile

home park. In doing so, appellant drove past Detective-Sergeant Moore’s location. She

observed appellant as being the driver of the vehicle and identified him at trial. She also

noted the presence of an unidentified female passenger.

       {¶ 20} Detective-Sergeants Moore and Mormile followed appellant and the C.I.

into the mobile home park. Rather than follow appellant too closely and risk being

identified, Detective-Sergeants Moore and Mormile pulled into a parking space to

observe the audio of the buy. This resulted in the buy not being visually observed by any

member of the detective team.

11.
       {¶ 21} Approximately four minutes elapsed from the time the C.I. entered

appellant’s vehicle until he was observed walking away from the buy. Detective-

Sergeants Moore and Mormile picked up the C.I. and began searching him as part of the

post-buy protocol. During that search, Detective-Sergeant Moore recovered a green bag

containing a substance purchased from appellant as well as the cell phone with the

recording device.

       {¶ 22} The audio recovered from the recording device was played at trial. At its

conclusion, Detective-Sergeant Moore testified that the first voice heard on the recording

was the C.I. She testified, over appellant’s objection that the video spoke for itself, that

appellant could be heard describing the methamphetamine he was selling and that the C.I.

could “check it out[,] look at it, taste it, all that shit. It’s a big ass chunk.”

       {¶ 23} Detective-Sergeant Moore stated that after completing the post-buy

protocol, she and the detective team then returned to their office. There, they weighed

the substance the C.I. purchased and performed a presumptive drug test. That test

yielded a “positive presumptive result for methamphetamine.” It was then logged as

evidence to be sent to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) for testing. The

state then introduced a “BCI submission sheet” that accompanied the substance when it

was submitted for testing. Detective-Sergeant Moore confirmed that it was submitted for

testing on March 5, 2021.

12.
       {¶ 24} The state then directed Detective-Sergeant Moore to appellant’s recorded

phone calls. She noted that the calls were recorded while appellant was held in custody

awaiting his release on bond. The recorded conversations described above were played

for the jury over appellant’s renewed Evid.R. 404(B) objection.

       {¶ 25} Detective-Sergeant Moore then described a conversation she had with

appellant on September 20, 2021. She was informed that appellant wished to speak with

her and, after waiving his right to have counsel present, he informed Detective-Sergeant

Moore that his sale of drugs was the result of his need to have money to support his own

drug addiction. He then described his belief that the C.I. participated in the controlled

buy because appellant had previously been in a relationship with the C.I.’s then-

girlfriend. Appellant concluded his conversation with Detective-Sergeant Moore by

informing her that he limited his drug sales in Bowling Green, Ohio to the C.I. and the

C.I.’s girlfriend so that he could only “deal with limited people.”3

       {¶ 26} On cross-examination, Detective-Sergeant Moore confirmed that the

preparation for the controlled buy, as well as the post-buy protocol, was not recorded

3
  Appellant’s brief alleges that this conversation should have also been excluded under
Evid.R. 404(B). Review of the record shows that appellant objected to only the portion
of the conversation in which Detective-Sergeant Moore informed appellant the potential
prison term he was facing if he was convicted. This objection was granted and no
reference to that portion of the conversation was made at trial. As a result, appellant has
not identified any portion of the conversation that was improperly admitted at trial. See
Viox v. Weinberg, 169 Ohio App.3d 79, 2006-Ohio-5075, 861 N.E.2d 909, ¶ 36 (1st
Dist.), citing Bowden v. Annenberg, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040499, 2005-Ohio-6515
(holding that errors cannot be predicated on sustained objections).

13.
despite all three detectives having recording devices available to them. She attributed

this lack of recording to protecting the safety of the C.I. She also noted that shortly

before the buy, she learned that the C.I. was dating appellant’s ex-girlfriend. She testified

that she later learned from appellant that he believed the C.I.’s motivation for

participating in the controlled buy was that the C.I. suspected his girlfriend was cheating

on him with appellant. Detective-Sergeant Moore’s testimony concluded with her

redirect examination in which she confirmed that appellant did not deny selling

methamphetamine to the C.I. when she spoke with him on September 20, 2021.

                             Testimony of Shervonne Bufford

       {¶ 27} At the time of trial, Shervonne Bufford had served as a forensic scientist at

the BCI’s Richfield Laboratory for approximately 15 years. She was assigned to the

BCI’s drug chemistry section. She explained that the BCI is a component of the Ohio

Attorney General’s office that aids law enforcement in their investigations. Her

responsibilities as a forensic scientist included detecting the presence or absence of

controlled substances, as described by the applicable law, reporting her findings to the

“contributing agency,” and then appearing as a witness at trial to explain her findings. A

contributing agency is the group or individual that requests the analysis. Bufford

identified police departments and sheriff’s deputies as examples of contributing agencies.

       {¶ 28} The procedure for identifying a controlled substance submitted for analysis

is to first give the substance a unique BCI case number. The sample is then identified in

14.
the BCI’s computer system and a receipt with the identifying number is provided to the

contributing agency. The sample is then stored in a vault until it is randomly assigned to

an analyst. The analyst then retrieves the substance from the vault and performs their

analysis. The analyst then prepares their report and returns the substance to the vault.

This completes the analyst’s work related to that specific substance unless they are called

to testify in related proceedings.

       {¶ 29} Bufford was then presented with the documentation for BCI case number

21-20856. She identified the substance tested in that case number as having been

received from the Wood County Sheriff’s Department. The investigating officer was

identified as Detective-Sergeant Moore. The evidence was received at the BCI lab on

March 5, 2021 at its Bowling Green, Ohio office. It was then transferred to the Richfield

Laboratory on July 19, 2021.

       {¶ 30} Bufford retrieved the evidence from the vault on July 20, 2021. She then

opened the sample, noted its appearance for her report, and weighed it. After obtaining a

small sample for testing, she performed two “presumptive” tests as part of her initial

analysis. Each of these tests were positive for a “phenylamine class” substance that is

consistent with the presence of methamphetamine. She then further tested the sample

utilizing a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer. This device allows her to identify the

chemical make-up of the compound. She then compared it to a known sample of

methamphetamine and confirmed that the sample received from Detective-Sergeant

15.
Moore was indeed methamphetamine. Her report confirming these findings was admitted

into evidence without objection.

       {¶ 31} On cross-examination, Bufford confirmed that there was no request to

perform DNA or fingerprint testing on the sample. She stated that these tests are

performed by another analyst and would only be performed at the request of the

submitting agency.

            Closing arguments, Jury Deliberations, Verdict, and Sentencing

       {¶ 32} The state presented no additional evidence or witness testimony and rested

its case-in-chief. Appellant then made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Appellant

offered no specific argument and the trial court denied his motion. Appellant then rested

his case-in-chief without presenting any testimony or evidence.

       {¶ 33} Following closing arguments, the trial court provided the jury with its final

instructions and dismissed it to begin its deliberations. The jury returned a guilty verdict

finding appellant guilty of aggravated trafficking in drugs. Appellant now asks this court

to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that portions of the recordings of his

phone calls were admissible at trial.

                                 II.    Law and Analysis

           A. Appellant’s narrowing of his trial court objection on appeal.

       {¶ 34} As a preliminary matter, we note that appellant sought to exclude the

entirety of the recorded phone calls as inadmissible “other acts” evidence at trial. Now,

16.
on appeal, appellant directs us to specific statements within those recordings that he

argues constituted inadmissible “other acts” evidence as described in Evid.R. 404(B). In

light of our analysis below, we find that it is important to recognize this narrowing of the

issues on appeal as it is not only proper under the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, but

it also helps to properly frame our review of “other acts” evidence in this appeal.

       {¶ 35} App.R. 16(A)(2) requires appellants to include “reference to the place in

the record where each error is reflected” in their brief. “If reference is made to evidence,

the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the

transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.”

App.R. 16(D). If a party fails to make specific reference to the location of the assigned

error in the record, App.R. 12(A)(2) authorizes appellate courts to “disregard” that

assignment of error. When trial counsel’s objection at trial is broadly stated, appellate

counsel may not merely identify general or “overwhelming” errors in the record. See

State v. Jurek, 52 Ohio App.3d 30, 556 N.E.2d 1191 (8th Dist.1989). The failure to

“specifically direct [the court’s] attention to [the evidence] which [appellant] contends

are objectionable” warrants overruling the assigned error on that basis alone. Id. at 34

(holding that appellant’s identification of “‘overwhelming amount’ of irrelevant,

inadmissible, incompetent, or unfairly prejudicial evidence” on a recorded conversation,

without citation to the specific portions of the tape that were objectionable, warranted

disregarding the assigned error under App.R. 12(A)(2) due to lack of specificity).

17.
       {¶ 36} Here, appellant has identified the specific portions of the recorded calls that

he argues constitute inadmissible “other acts” evidence while conceding that other

portions of the recording relate directly to the underlying sale and were admissible. In

doing so, appellant has avoided the potential that this court would disregard his assigned

error pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2). He has also clarified a threshold issue that we must

address prior to reaching the merits of his argument—that is, whether the admission of

these challenged statements are subject to review under Evid.R. 404(B) or 801(D)(2)?

       A. The recorded statements appellant challenges on appeal are subject to
          Evid.R. 404(B) analysis.

       {¶ 37} The general subject of each of the recordings is appellant’s knowledge of

the specific sale that resulted in the charges against him and his suspicion as to the C.I.’s

identity. In expressing his suspicion, appellant made explicit references to the underlying

sale. For example, in recording No. 3, appellant stated that he recalled the sale because

he was originally scheduled to meet at a fast-food restaurant but ultimately made the sale

in a mobile home park. Detective-Sergeant Moore described this same series of events as

they relate to the underlying sale—albeit referencing a different fast-food restaurant than

appellant described in the recording. Despite his broad objection at trial, appellant now

concedes that the recorded statements directly referencing his sale of methamphetamine

to the C.I. are not “other acts” as contemplated by Evid.R. 404(B) as they are direct

evidence related to the underlying offense.

18.
       {¶ 38} Despite his concession as to some of the recorded statements, appellant

nevertheless maintains that the recorded statements referencing “other acts” were

inadmissible at trial under Evid.R. 404(B). For example, appellant notes that in recording

number 2, he discussed remembering dates and time of his previous drug sales as well as

the name of his supplier. It is these types of statements regarding conduct unrelated to

the underlying offense, that appellant argues the trial court improperly admitted at trial.

       {¶ 39} Having reviewed the record, we find that appellant correctly identifies

portions of the recordings as “other acts” evidence. Appellant was charged with a single

offense of aggravated drug trafficking for the sale of methamphetamine on January 27,

2021. In the recordings, appellant references his alleged participation in, or at least

knowledge of, the illegal sales of drugs other than on the occasion for which he was

charged. These statements constitute “other acts” evidence as defined by Evid.R. 404(B)

as they are wholly unrelated to the underlying offense. This finding would normally lead

directly into our analysis regarding these statements’ admissibility under that rule.

However, the state argues that this court should analyze the admissibility of this “other

acts” evidence under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) instead. For the following reasons, we find the

state’s argument is without merit.

       {¶ 40} Both at trial and in this appeal, the state asks us to ignore the clear

implication of Evid.R. 404(B) and to instead analyze the admissibility of appellant’s

statements solely under Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Specifically, the state argues that because the

19.
statements appellant alleges were improperly admitted were statements appellant himself

made, including those statements referencing drug sales unrelated to the underlying

offense, that the trial court’s admission of those statements should be reviewed under

Evid.R. 801(D) as party admissions. As a result, the state argues, our review of the trial

court’s admission of the recordings should be limited to determining whether all of the

recordings constitute party admissions under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) and, if so, we must find

that those statements were properly admitted at trial.

       {¶ 41} In support of its argument, the state cites State v. Cody, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 07AP-142, 2007-Ohio-6776. In Cody, the defendant was charged with two counts of

arson after attempting to set his former-girlfriend’s apartment on fire. Id. at ¶ 2-10.

Cody had previously left threatening voicemails on his ex-girlfriend’s phone. Id. As part

of his investigation, a member of the Columbus Fire Department’s investigation unit

recovered the threatening messages. Id. The messages were played at trial over Cody’s

objection. Id. He was later convicted of both offenses. Id.

       {¶ 42} On appeal, Cody argued that the state did not explicitly seek admission of

the recordings as a non-hearsay party admission under Evid.R. 801(D) and, therefore, the

trial court should have treated the recordings as hearsay and conducted the required

hearsay analysis prior to their admission at trial. Id. at ¶ 12. In the alternative, Cody

argued that the recorded statements did not meet any of the Evid.R. 404(B) exceptions to

the prohibition of admitting “other acts” evidence. Id.

20.
       {¶ 43} The Tenth District Court of Appeals found no error in the admission of the

recordings, finding that while the state did not specifically mention Evid.R. 801(D) when

seeking admission of the statements, it clearly argued that the statements were admissible

as party admissions. The appellate court found that “[a]s the statements at issue were

those of [the defendant], and offered against him at trial, such statements were not

hearsay and were properly admissible.” Id. at ¶ 15. The statements were relevant to the

underlying offense as they showed “appellant was upset over the breakup of the

relationship and that he engaged in an on-going pattern of controlling and harassing

behavior toward [the victim] and her family, both before and after the incident.” Id. at ¶

17. The court further held that “because the messages met the requirements of Evid.R.

801(D)(2), their admission was not dependent upon one of the exceptions under Evid.R.

404(B).” Id. at ¶ 15. Finally, the court held that “to the extent appellant argues the

statements are precluded under Evid.R. 404(B), such evidence was relevant and

admissible as it tended to prove identity.” Id.

       {¶ 44} Here, the state argues that this holding shows that “where Evid.R.

801(D)(2) is involved, appellate courts have uniformly held that that rule trumps any

Evid.R. 404(B) argument that a defendant may make.” Through this declaration, the

state requests that this court simply determine whether the challenged statements

constitute party admissions as defined under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) and that the recordings

21.
were admissible solely on those grounds. This argument improperly expands the holding

in Cody and its application in other cases.

       {¶ 45} In Cody, the defendant argued that because his admission was not

submitted at trial under Evid.R. 801(D) that the state could only have introduced that

evidence by showing that it met one of the Evid.R. 404(B) exceptions. Further, since

Cody argued that his admission did not meet any exception under Evid.R. 404(B), it was

improperly admitted. Put simply, Cody’s argument regarding Evid.R. 404(B) was

contingent upon the appellate court finding that the admission of evidence as a party

admission under Evid.R. 801(D) was improper. By affirming that the evidence was

indeed a party admission under Evid.R. 801(D), despite the state’s failure to explicitly

cite the rule, and that the evidence was directly related to the state’s prosecution of the

underlying offense (therefore, not “other acts” evidence), the appellate court did not need

to address Cody’s contingent argument that the state was obligated to submit that

evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). In other words, the court analyzed the disputed

statement under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) because it was a party admission and that was the

applicable rule. Analysis under Evid.R. 404(B) was simply unnecessary. This limited

holding is far from the state’s suggestion that Ohio appellate courts have “uniformly

held” our analysis under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) “trumps” any analysis under Evid.R. 404(B).

22.
Indeed, we were unable to identify any authority supporting such a definitive

proposition.4

       {¶ 46} Moreover, we note that uniform application of the state’s argument

regarding Cody would essentially carve out an implicit exception to the intended

protections established under Evid.R. 404(B) by permitting the admission of any

statement made by a defendant without regard to its content. Evid.R. 404(B) is intended

to support convictions for acts committed and not based on “the defendant’s disposition

to commit certain acts.” State v. Kamer, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-084, 2022-Ohio-

2070, ¶ 129, citing State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d

651, ¶ 22. Unrestricted admission of any statement made by a defendant, particularly an

arguable confession to uncharged offenses similar to appellant’s reference to other drug

sales here, would certainly endanger Evid.R. 404(B)’s protection against disposition-

based convictions.

4
  The state also references additional authority it argues supports the uniform application
of its interpretation of the holding in Cody. This additional authority is readily
distinguishable. In State v. Hare, 108 N.E.3d 172, 2018-Ohio-765 (2d Dist.), the Second
District Court of Appeals held that the defendant incorrectly argued that his statements
should be analyzed under Evid.R. 404(B) when they were submitted as party admissions
related to the charged offense under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) at trial, not “other acts” evidence.
In State v. Scarton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108474, 2020-Ohio-2952, the 8th District
Court of Appeals held that it was not ineffective assistance for the defendant’s trial
counsel not to object to the admission of his statement under Evid.R. 404(B) when that
statement referred to the charged offense and was admissible as a party admission under
Evid.R. 801(D)(2).

23.
       {¶ 47} Finally, even if the Evid.R. 801(D) analysis the state requests was

applicable here, the state’s argument that a party admission is admissible as a matter of

law is incorrect. While the admission of a party-opponent is not hearsay under Evid.R.

801(D)(2), this does not equate to admissibility at trial. Bromall v. Select Specialty

Hospital – Akron, LLC, 2022-Ohio-2496, 193 N.E.3d 609, ¶ 52 (8th Dist.). “Admissions

of party-opponents, although not hearsay, are still subject to the general rules of

admissibility, including Evid.R. 401 and 403.” Id., citing Mowery v. Columbus, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-266, 2006-Ohio-1153, ¶ 62. Evid.R. 401 provides that the

evidence sought to be introduced must be “relevant” while Evid.R. 403 provides for the

mandatory or discretionary exclusion of such evidence based on the weight of its

probative value as balanced against other considerations. The state’s argument that

appellant’s statements are admissible solely because they are admissions under Evid.R.

801(D)(2) ignores the relevance of those statements or the weight of their probative value

against other considerations prior to their admission. As a result, our acceptance of the

state’s faulty expansion of the holding in Cody to resolve this appeal would deny

appellant the opportunity to ensure the recordings were admitted only after they were

subject to proper analysis under Evid.R. 401 and 403.

       {¶ 48} For these reasons, we reject the state’s argument that appellant’s assigned

error should be reviewed under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) alone. As appellant correctly notes,

the recordings reflect statements that discuss his sale of drugs to others in various

24.
geographic locations unrelated to the underlying controlled buy—that is, “other acts.”

Therefore, we review appellant’s assignment of error to determine whether his statements

were improperly admitted in violation of Evid.R. 404(B).

       B. The trial court erred in admitting appellant’s statements as prohibited
          under Evid.R. 404(B).

       {¶ 49} Evid.R. 404(B) states “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity therewith.”

“Other acts” evidence, however, may be admissible for other limited purposes including

“proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence

of mistake or accident.” Id. “The key is that the evidence must prove something other

than the defendant’s disposition to commit certain acts.” Kamer at ¶ 129.

       {¶ 50} Determining whether “other acts” evidence is admissible requires a specific

procedural analysis. First, to be admissible the evidence must meet a two-pronged

relevance threshold. That is, the evidence must be relevant to “the particular purpose for

which it is offered—i.e., a non-character-based purpose, as allowed by Evid.R. 404(B)”

and to “an issue that is actually in dispute—i.e., an issue that is material to the case as

required by Evid.R. 401.” Id., citing State v. Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353, 2020-Ohio-

4441, 165 N.E.3d 1123, ¶ 37-38. If the evidence meets this relevancy threshold, its

admissibility is determined under Evid.R. 403(A), which states relevant evidence “is not

admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Id.

25.
       {¶ 51} Whether the trial court erred in determining that the “other acts” evidence

was admissible under Evid.R. 404(B) is a question of law that we review de novo.

Kamer at ¶ 132, citing State v. Worley, 164 Ohio St.3d 589, 2021-Ohio-2207,174 N.E.3d

754, ¶ 117. The trial court’s weighing of the probative value of admissible evidence

against the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary judgment. Id. Therefore, we

review this step in the analysis for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Id., citing

Hartman at ¶ 30. While this analysis remains necessary to resolve any Evid.R. 404(B)

issue properly raised before the trial court, we need not complete this analysis here for a

simple reason—the state did not comport with the perquisites of Evid.R. 404(B) to even

allow the trial court to entertain the admission of the disputed evidence.

       {¶ 52} When a party seeks to admit “other acts” evidence pursuant to Evid.R.

404(B), the rule explicitly requires that party to “provide reasonably notice of any such

evidence the proponent intends to introduce at trial so that an opposing party may have a

fair opportunity to meet it” and “articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which

the proponent intends to offer the evidence, and the reasoning that supports the purpose.”

Evid.R. 404(B)(2)(a) and (b).5

       {¶ 53} Clearly, it was incumbent on the state to identify which of the excepted

purposes identified in Evid.R. 404(B)(2) it intended to rely on to introduce the otherwise

5
  Evid.R. 404(B)(2)(c) also requires that the notice be in writing. The record does not
reflect whether the state provided the required written notice. However, appellant does
not allege deficient notice and it is not relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

26.
inadmissible “other acts” evidence. The record plainly demonstrates that the state’s only

argument for admission of the “other acts” evidence is that they constitute party

admissions under Evid.R 801(D)(2), a reason that is clearly not identified as an exception

in Evid.R. 404(B). At no point, either at trial or in this appeal, did the state indicate that

it sought to introduce the statements for one of the purposes identified in Evid.R.

404(B)(2). This failure to comply with the rule necessitates a finding by this court that

the trial court erred in admitting the “other acts” evidence. See State v. Kelley, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-16-1098, 2017-Ohio-4475, ¶ 45-48, citing State v. Nuzum, 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-15-1122, 2016-Ohio-2744, ¶ 21 (holding that the state’s failure to comply with

Evid.R. 404(B)(2) constitutes error). For this reason, we find that the trial court erred in

admitting appellant’s record statements referencing “other acts” into evidence at trial.

       C. The trial court’s improper admission of “other acts” evidence was
          harmless error.

       {¶ 54} Having determined that the trial court erred in admitting appellant’s

recorded statements referencing drug sales other than the controlled buy, we must

determine whether that error was harmless. State v. Moore, 2021-Ohio-765, 168 N.E.3d

921, ¶ 37 (6th Dist.). Harmless error is “any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which

does not affect substantial rights.” Kamer at ¶ 154; Crim.R. 52(B). “The state bears the

burden of proving that the error did not affect a defendant’s substantial rights.” Id., citing

Moore at ¶ 33. “When determining whether a trial court’s improper admission of other

acts evidence affected the substantial rights of a defendant, an appellate court must (1)

27.
determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant (i.e., the error affected the verdict),

(2) declare a belief that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3)

excise the improper evidence from the record, look to the remaining evidence, and

determine whether there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.

Kamer at ¶ 155, citing State v. Harris, 142 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015-Ohio-166, 28 N.E.3d

1256, ¶ 27. “In other words, ‘an appellate court must consider both the impact of the

offending evidence on the verdict and the strength of the remaining evidence.’” Id. In its

brief, the state argues that the remaining evidence supported appellant’s conviction,

rendering the erroneous admission of evidence harmless. Following our review of the

record, we agree.

       {¶ 55} At the outset, we recognize that the similar nature of the improperly

admitted “other acts” evidence to the charged offense weighs in favor of finding that the

error was not harmless. Id. at ¶ 156, citing State v. Sargent, 2015-Ohio-704, 29 N.E.3d

331, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.) (“Other acts evidence admitted in violation of Evid.R. 404(B) is

particularly likely to result in prejudice—that is, to affect the verdict—when ‘the other

acts are very similar to the charged offense[.]’”). However, when excising the

improperly admitted evidence and looking at the remaining evidence, we find that there is

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of appellant’s guilt.

       {¶ 56} The remaining evidence at trial showed that the controlled buy comported

with the pre-buy and post-buy protocols described by Detective-Sergeant Moore. The

28.
buy was recorded on a covert device carried by the C.I. The audio of the buy was played

at trial. Detective-Sergeant Moore confirmed from her notes that the audio reflected

appellant’s sale of methamphetamine to the C.I., a fact confirmed through chemical

testing by Bufford, a forensic analyst with the BCI. Detective-Sergeant Moore also

positively identified appellant as a participant in the controlled buy based on her having

observed appellant driving past her with the C.I. in the vehicle. Further, the unchallenged

portion of appellant’s recorded statements included appellant’s admission that he sold

“something” to the C.I. on the recorded calls. Appellant also stated on the recordings that

he knew which sale resulted in his arrest because he had identified the C.I. and knew the

details of the sale. During his in-person conversation with Detective-Sergeant Moore,

appellant discussed his sale of drugs to the C.I. stating “I understand I did what I did.”

He then explained to Detective-Sergeant Moore that he was selling drugs because he

himself was an addict. He stated “I sold to make sure I had [drugs] myself.”

       {¶ 57} Appellant, in turn, asked the jury to find reasonable doubt of his guilt due

to the lack of recording of the pre-buy and post-buy protocols or any interviews

conducted with the C.I., and because of the Detective-Sergeants’ lack of visual

observation of the sale. This argument ignores appellant’s admission on the recorded

calls that he sold “something” to the C.I. and his statement to Detective-Sergeant Moore

that he sold drugs to the C.I. as a result of his need to continue procuring drugs for

himself.

29.
       {¶ 58} In sum, after excising the improperly admitted evidence, the remaining

evidence overwhelmingly shows that appellant was guilty of the charged offense. In this

scenario, it is appropriate to find that the improper admission of “other acts” evidence

was harmless error. Kamer at ¶ 159, citing State v. Rahman, 23 Ohio St.3d 146, 151, 492

N.E.2d 401 (1986) (“Cases where imposition of harmless error is appropriate must

involve * * * overwhelming evidence of guilt[.]”). For these reasons, we find that the

trial court’s error in improperly admitting the “other acts” evidence in violation of

Evid.R. 404(B) at trial was harmless and does not warrant reversal of appellant’s

conviction. Therefore, we find appellant’s assignment of error not well-taken.

                                     III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 59} We find that the trial court erred in admitting “other acts” evidence at trial.

However, because the error was harmless, we find appellant’s assignment of error not

well-taken. Therefore, we affirm the April 29, 2022 judgment of the Wood County Court

of Common Pleas. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to

App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

30.
                                                                            State of Ohio
                                                                     v. Christian Kryling
                                                                             WD-22-036

Christine E. Mayle, J.                        ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                              ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                 JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                              ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

31.