Court Opinion

ID: 9947666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:11:39.939823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:29.638097
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Dillon v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-744.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                           SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-744
    THE STATE EX REL . DILLON, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
                               OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.

  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
                may be cited as State ex rel. Dillon v. Indus. Comm.,
                           Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-744.]
Workers’        compensation—Total-temporary-disability                 compensation—R.C.
        4123.511(K) requires Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to recoup
        overpayment of total-temporary-disability compensation paid to an injured
        worker between time injured worker reached maximum medical
        improvement and date of termination of total-temporary-disability
        compensation—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus
        affirmed—State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm. overruled.
     (No. 2023-0152—Submitted August 22, 2023—Decided March 5, 2024.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
                             No. 20AP-600, 2022-Ohio-4773.
                                   __________________
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       KENNEDY, C.J.
       {¶ 1} An order awarding appellant, Loretta Dillon, temporary-total-
disability (“TTD”) compensation was reversed on appeal by appellee Industrial
Commission of Ohio because the commission determined that she had reached
maximum medical improvement and was no longer temporarily disabled. R.C.
4123.511(K) then required the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to recoup the
overpayment of compensation that Dillon had received after she had reached
maximum medical improvement. Dillon filed an action in the Tenth District Court
of Appeals, requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate the
order that declared an overpayment of TTD compensation and to issue a new order
dissolving the overpayment. Based on the plain language of R.C. 4123.511(K), the
Tenth District correctly denied Dillon a writ of mandamus. We therefore affirm its
judgment.
                 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       {¶ 2} On April 2, 2019, Dillon suffered a work-related back injury, and the
bureau allowed her claim for “strain muscle, fascia, tendon lumbar.” On appeal, a
district hearing officer allowed her claim for lumbar sprain and strain and awarded
TTD compensation for those conditions to continue with Dillon’s submission of
supporting medical proof of her disability. Dillon appealed the disallowance of her
additional conditions, and her employer obtained an independent medical
examination. The reviewing physician opined that Dillon had reached maximum
medical improvement. Following a hearing on October 28, 2019, a staff hearing
officer affirmed the disallowance of Dillon’s additional conditions, agreed that she
had attained maximum medical improvement, and terminated her TTD
compensation as of August 8, 2019. However, by the time of the staff hearing
officer’s determination, Dillon had received TTD compensation after August 8, and
the bureau therefore issued an order seeking to recoup the $5,549.40 that it had
overpaid to her. Dillon appealed this determination. A district hearing officer and

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three staff hearing officers found that recoupment was appropriate, and the
commission denied further review.
       {¶ 3} Dillon then sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court
of Appeals to compel the commission to vacate the order that declared an
overpayment of TTD compensation and to issue a new order dissolving the
overpayment. The court of appeals denied the writ.
                              A. Standard of Review
       {¶ 4} Dillon is entitled to a writ of mandamus if she shows by clear and
convincing evidence that she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, that the
commission has a clear legal duty to provide it, and that there is no adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Indus.
Comm., 166 Ohio St.3d 216, 2021-Ohio-3669, 184 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 10. A writ of
mandamus may lie when there is a legal basis to compel the commission to perform
its duties under the law or when the commission has abused its discretion in
carrying out its duties. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio
St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 9. “Where a commission order is
adequately explained and based on some evidence, even evidence that may be
persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, the order will not be
disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus.
Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 579, 584, 679 N.E.2d 300 (1997). But “[a] mandatory writ
may issue against the Industrial Commission if the commission has incorrectly
interpreted Ohio law.” State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64,
65, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975).
       {¶ 5} Our consideration of the court of appeals’ decision involves a
question of statutory interpretation, so our review is de novo. See Ceccarelli v.
Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8. “The question
is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that
which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902),

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paragraph two of the syllabus.       “When the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the
General Assembly has said,” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio
St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, and apply the statute as written,
Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522,
¶ 18.
                             B. TTD Compensation
        {¶ 6} TTD compensation “compensates for the loss of earnings a claimant
sustains while his or her injury heals.” State ex rel. Am. Std., Inc. v. Boehler, 99
Ohio St.3d 39, 2003-Ohio-2457, 788 N.E.2d 1053, ¶ 22. It “is payable only to those
with temporary disabilities.”    Id. at ¶ 28.    Maximum medical improvement
“describes a condition that has become permanent, i.e., one that will, ‘ “with
reasonable probability, continue for an indefinite period of time without any present
indication of recovery therefrom.” ’ ” Id., quoting Vulcan Materials Co. v. Indus.
Comm., 25 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 494 N.E.2d 1125 (1986), quoting Logsdon v. Indus.
Comm., 143 Ohio St. 508, 57 N.E.2d 75 (1944), paragraph two of the syllabus.
After maximum medical improvement has been attained, TTD compensation is no
longer available—the condition is no longer temporary. See State ex rel. Advantage
Tank Lines v. Indus. Comm., 107 Ohio St.3d 16, 2005-Ohio-5829, 836 N.E.2d 550,
¶ 8. That does not leave the claimant without recourse; rather, he or she can then
seek compensation for permanent disability, such as permanent-total-disability
compensation. See R.C. 4123.58; State ex rel. Matlack, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 73
Ohio App.3d 648, 655, 598 N.E.2d 121 (10th Dist.1991).
           C. Recoupment of Overpayments of TTD Compensation
        {¶ 7} R.C. 4123.511(K) addresses when the bureau or a self-insuring
employer must recoup compensation payments made in accordance with an order
that is subsequently reversed on appeal. Its language is unambiguous and provides:

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                                January Term, 2024

               Upon the final administrative or judicial determination under
        this section or section 4123.512 of the Revised Code of an appeal of
        an order to pay compensation, if a claimant is found to have received
        compensation pursuant to a prior order which is reversed upon
        subsequent appeal, the claimant’s employer, if a self-insuring
        employer, or the bureau, shall withhold from any amount to which
        the claimant becomes entitled pursuant to any claim, past, present,
        or future, under Chapter 4121., 4123., 4127., or 4131. of the Revised
        Code, the amount of previously paid compensation to the claimant
        which, due to reversal upon appeal, the claimant is not entitled * * *.

        {¶ 8} Here, Dillon “received compensation pursuant to a prior order which
[was] reversed upon subsequent appeal.”             The bureau “previously paid
compensation to [Dillon] which, due to reversal upon appeal, [Dillon] is not
entitled.”   Because the order was reversed, she was not entitled to TTD
compensation after August 8, 2019. Nor was she allowed to retain what she had
previously been paid under the reversed order; R.C. 4123.511(K) required the
bureau to “withhold from any amount to which the claimant becomes entitled
pursuant to any claim * * * the amount of previously paid compensation to the
claimant.” Under the plain language of the statute, then, the bureau correctly
recouped the “previously paid” TTD compensation that Dillon received after she
reached maximum medical improvement from any future benefits she might
receive, such as an award of permanent-total-disability compensation.
                         D. R.C. 4123.56(A) and Russell
        {¶ 9} In support of her argument that recoupment is not warranted in this
case, Dillon relies on State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 516, 696
N.E.2d 1069 (1998), in which this court construed a prior version of R.C.
4123.56(A) and the predecessor to R.C. 4123.511(K), former R.C. 4123.511(J).

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(This opinion will refer to both former R.C. 4123.511(J) and R.C. 4123.511(K) as
R.C. 4123.511(K).)
       {¶ 10} According to Russell, “R.C. 4123.511[K] simply provides for
withholding future payments to recoup an overpayment when a claimant is found
to have received compensation to which [the claimant] was not entitled.” Russell
at 521. This court stated that “[t]he question of [a] claimant’s entitlement to receive
ongoing TTD compensation until a hearing officer rules otherwise is governed by
R.C. 4123.56, not [R.C.] 4123.511[K].” Russell at 521.
       {¶ 11} R.C. 4123.56(A) states:

       In the case of a self-insuring employer, payments shall be for a
       duration based upon the medical reports of the attending physician.
       If the employer disputes the attending physician’s report, payments
       may be terminated only upon application and hearing by a district
       hearing officer pursuant to division (C) of section 4123.511 of the
       Revised Code. Payments shall continue pending the determination
       of the matter, however payment shall not be made for the
       period * * * when the employee has reached the maximum medical
       improvement.

       {¶ 12} Based on the prior version of this provision and prior precedent, the
court in Russell explained:

       (1) that continuing TTD compensation may not be terminated prior
       to a hearing before a commission hearing officer so long as [the]
       claimant’s attending physician continues to certify TTD, (2) that the
       hearing officer may not terminate the claimant’s TTD retroactive to
       a date prior to the date of the hearing, (3) that [the] claimant is

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                                January Term, 2024

       entitled to all compensation paid to the date of the hearing, and (4)
       that any eventual discounting of the attending physician’s reports
       certifying TTD does not transform those payments into a recoupable
       overpayment.

Russell, 82 Ohio St.3d at 519, 696 N.E.2d 1069. Relying on R.C. 4123.56(A), the
court in Russell concluded that “the appropriate date on which to terminate disputed
TTD compensation on the basis of maximum medical improvement is the date of
the termination hearing, and the commission may not declare an overpayment for
payments received by the claimant before that date.” Id.
       {¶ 13} Initially, by its terms, the relevant part of R.C. 4123.56(A) is limited
to “the case of a self-insuring employer.” Dillon’s case does not involve a self-
insuring employer. But in Russell, we relied on former R.C. 4121.31(C) for the
proposition that “uniformity of application [between state fund and self-insuring
employers] is required” to explain that R.C. 4123.56(A) also applies to payments
made by the bureau. Russell at 520, fn. 1. The version of R.C. 4121.31(C) in effect
at the time that the court decided Russell, now recodified as R.C. 4121.31(A)(3),
directed the administrator of workers’ compensation and the Industrial Commission
to “adopt rules covering the following general topics with respect to [R.C. Chapters
4121 and 4123]: * * * All claims, whether of a state fund or self-insuring employer,
be processed in an orderly, uniform, and timely fashion.” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107,
145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3077. A requirement to adopt rules to process claims
in a uniform fashion is a far cry from a statutory requirement to treat the bureau and
self-insuring employers the same for all purposes in workers’ compensation law.
       {¶ 14} But even if this court in Russell correctly determined that the
relevant statutory language applies to payments made by the bureau, R.C.
4123.56(A) does not permit a claimant to receive TTD compensation after reaching
maximum medical improvement.            If the employer disputes the attending

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physician’s report, TTD compensation is paid to the claimant until payments are
terminated following a hearing before the district hearing officer. Although R.C.
4123.56(A) requires payments to continue “during the determination of the matter,”
the provision contains an exception: TTD compensation may not be paid for the
period after the employee has reached maximum medical improvement. This
means that Dillon was not entitled to receive TTD compensation once she reached
maximum medical improvement and her condition became permanent.
       {¶ 15} This court reasoned in Russell that a claimant who has received an
award of TTD compensation remains “entitled” to receive payments for purposes
of R.C. 4123.511(K) until TTD compensation is formally terminated after a
hearing. Russell, 82 Ohio St.3d at 519-523, 696 N.E.2d 1069. And because the
claimant was entitled to receive TTD compensation during that time, the court
explained, the bureau was not permitted to recoup payments made after the claimant
reached maximum medical improvement but before TTD compensation was
terminated. Id. But that conclusion cannot be squared with R.C. 4123.56(A)’s
prohibition on a claimant’s receiving payments after attaining maximum medical
improvement. If TTD payments may not be made after the claimant reaches
maximum medical improvement, then the claimant is not entitled to them. And if
the claimant is not entitled to those payments, then R.C. 4123.511(K) requires the
bureau to withhold the amount previously paid from compensation that the claimant
may receive in the future.
       {¶ 16} Moreover, this court in Russell ignored language in R.C.
4123.511(K) when it held that the statute does not permit recoupment of payments
made under an order before its reversal, Russell at 521. The statute provides criteria
under which payments will be recouped, stating that “[t]he administrator and self-
insuring employers, as appropriate, are subject to the repayment schedule of this
division only with respect to an order to pay compensation that was properly paid
under a previous order, but which is subsequently reversed upon an administrative

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                               January Term, 2024

or judicial appeal” (emphasis added), R.C. 4123.511(K). This language clarifies
that payments “properly paid” to the claimant before the order was reversed on
appeal may nonetheless be recouped. Even under Russell’s reasoning that an
injured worker is entitled to receive TTD compensation until it is formally
terminated, recoupment is required.
       {¶ 17} As this analysis shows, this court’s reasoning in Russell runs counter
to the plain language of R.C. 4123.511(K) and R.C. 4123.56(A). Because Russell
was wrongly decided, we overrule it and its progeny today. By applying the plain
language of R.C. 4123.511(K), the bureau correctly ordered the recoupment of TTD
compensation payments that Dillon received after she reached maximum medical
improvement from any future benefits she might receive.
                              III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 18} After the Industrial Commission reversed on appeal the order
awarding Dillon TTD compensation, R.C. 4123.511(K) required the bureau to
recoup the overpayment of compensation that she received between the time she
reached maximum medical improvement and the time her TTD compensation was
terminated. The Tenth District Court of Appeals therefore correctly denied Dillon’s
request for a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate the order that
declared an overpayment of TTD compensation and to issue an order dissolving the
overpayment. For this reason, we affirm its judgment.
                                                               Judgment affirmed.
       FISCHER, DEWINE, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
       BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY and STEWART,
JJ.
                              __________________

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       BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
       {¶ 19} Today the majority eliminates more than 25 years of precedent that
allowed an injured worker to continue receiving temporary-total-disability
compensation under R.C. 4123.56 while a dispute regarding whether the injured
worker has reached maximum medical improvement is pending before the
Industrial Commission of Ohio. The majority, on its own initiative, has summarily
concluded that State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 516, 696 N.E.2d
1069 (1998), “and its progeny” were wrongly decided. Majority opinion, ¶ 17.
This decision to overrule our long-standing precedent is unnecessary and
unwarranted.
       {¶ 20} No party in this case has directly or implicitly asked this court to
overrule Russell. We did not receive any written argument or hear any oral
argument from the parties requesting that we gratuitously reshape a quarter of a
century’s worth of jurisprudence in workers’ compensation law. The majority
opines, unbidden, that Russell was wrongly decided—a decision that will have a
grave impact on injured workers. Today’s decision defies practical workability,
does not demonstrate why Russell was wrongly decided at the time it was decided,
and clearly creates a hardship for appellant, Loretta Dillon, and other injured
workers who rely on it. We have generally adhered to the principal of stare decisis
unless, after careful consideration, we find that the following factors have been met:

       (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in
       circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision,
       (2) the decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the
       precedent would not create an undue hardship for those who have
       relied upon it.

Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d

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                                   January Term, 2024

1256, ¶ 48. Overruling Russell without considering those factors is an attack on the
rule of law, and doing so damages one of the essential principles of stare decisis—
predictability. The Tenth District Court of Appeals recently eloquently explained
the importance of stare decisis:

               Under the legal doctrine of stare decisis, courts follow
       controlling precedent, thereby creating stability and predictability in
       our legal system. Courts adhere to stare decisis as a means of
       thwarting the arbitrary administration of justice as well as providing
       a clear rule of law by which the citizenry can organize their
       affairs. The doctrine is of fundamental importance to the rule of
       law. This court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and must
       follow our own court’s precedent. We will not depart from the
       doctrine of stare decisis without special justification.

(Internal citations omitted.) Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Three-C Body Shop, Inc., 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-775, 2020-Ohio-2694, ¶ 13. This court too is bound by
stare decisis and should only depart from it when special justification exists.
       {¶ 21} In this case, Dillon argues that our holding in Russell should be
applied here and that it supports her right to relief in mandamus. In response,
appellee Industrial Commission argues that our analysis in Russell can be
distinguished and does not control the overpayment issue presented in this case.
Therefore, this court is presented with only one question: whether our holding in
Russell should be applied to this case or distinguished from it. None of the parties
argue that our holding in Russell is no longer good law. And the majority can—in
fact, the majority does—reach its decision to deny Dillon’s request for a writ of
mandamus without even looking to Russell. See majority opinion at ¶ 1, 14. This
makes the majority’s overruling of Russell even more dubious.

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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

        {¶ 22} I acknowledge that circumstances arise that invoke our duty to
reexamine this court’s precedents, such as when a prior decision of this court
becomes irreconcilable with the circumstances presented in a case, see
Galatis at ¶ 43, and in those instances, we are called on to review and, if necessary,
overrule those precedents. But that duty has not shown its face here. And we
should be even more cautious in reversing precedent involving our interpretation
of statutes, especially when those statutes remain unchanged by their creators, the
legislature. See Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 39, 143 S.Ct. 1487, 216 L.Ed.2d 60
(2023) (“Congress is undoubtedly aware of our construing [the Voting Rights Act]
to apply to districting challenges. It can change that if it likes. But until and unless
it does, statutory stare decisis counsels our staying the course”).
        {¶ 23} It is fair to say that the General Assembly has been aware of our
interpretation and application of R.C. 4123.56 for more than 25 years, and the
Industrial Commission has incorporated our holding in Russell into its adjudicatory
policies and procedures. The commission instructs its hearing officers that “[w]hen
terminating ongoing temporary total disability compensation due to a finding of
maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability compensation shall be
paid through the date of the hearing at which the compensation is being
terminated,” and it specifically references this court’s decision in Russell.
Adjudications Before the Ohio Industrial Commission (updated July 2022), at 14,
available      at       https://www.ic.ohio.gov/about-ic/resource-library/resource-
pdfs/adjudications-before-oic.pdf (accessed Jan. 25, 2024).
        {¶ 24} Seeing as how the General Assembly has not taken action to modify
R.C. 4123.56 since this court’s interpretation of that statute in Russell, we have no
basis for now concluding that our interpretation of the statute was unjust or
inappropriate when we decided Russell. The law calls for applying our holding in
Russell here, and we are bound to stay the course.
        {¶ 25} The majority, before turning to any analysis of Russell, looks to R.C.

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4123.511(K) to find authority for the overpayment assessed against Dillon. But
R.C. 4123.511(K) does not apply here. That statutory division provides that “if a
claimant is found to have received compensation pursuant to a prior order which is
reversed upon subsequent appeal,” the Bureau of Worker’s Compensation must
withhold “from any amount to which the claimant becomes entitled * * * the
amount of previously paid compensation to the claimant which, due to reversal
upon appeal, the claimant is not entitled [to].”        (Emphasis added.)       R.C.
4123.511(K). The order under which Dillon was receiving compensation has never
been reversed.
       {¶ 26} In a decision issued June 18, 2019, a district hearing officer allowed
Dillon’s claim for lumbar sprain and strain, awarding her temporary-total-disability
compensation from April 9, 2019, through May 9, 2019, and allowing
compensation “to continue with the submission of supporting medical proof.”
Dillon appealed the district hearing officer’s disallowance of her other claims. The
employer took no action to challenge the district hearing officer’s order.
       {¶ 27} Dillon’s appeal was heard by a staff hearing officer on October 28,
2019. The staff hearing officer affirmed the decision issued by the district hearing
officer allowing Dillon’s claim for lumbar sprain and strain and disallowing her
other claims. The staff hearing officer then made new findings, based on evidence
that had been submitted after the hearing before the district hearing officer. The
staff hearing officer determined that based on a physician’s report dated August 21,
2019, Dillon was no longer eligible for continuing compensation, because she had
reached maximum medical improvement on August 8, 2019.                       But this
determination affected only ongoing compensation that was paid to Dillon after the
district-level hearing in June—compensation that would have eventually
terminated at some future date. The staff hearing officer’s determination did not
reverse any prior decision of the commission.
       {¶ 28} Thus, the legal question raised in Dillon’s mandamus action is not

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within the purview of R.C. 4123.511(K)—Dillon did not receive any benefits she
was not entitled to “due to reversal upon appeal.” The commission does not argue
that R.C. 4123.511(K) controls the issue of Dillon’s overpayment.                R.C.
4123.511(K) is not even mentioned in the commission’s merit brief—because it
simply does not apply here.
       {¶ 29} Dillon instead relies on Russell and our interpretation of the
language in R.C. 4123.56(A), which provides that “payments shall continue
pending the determination of the matter.” In Russell, a dispute arose regarding the
attending physician’s report, and we determined that the injured worker could not
be assessed an overpayment for compensation received prior to the date of the
hearing terminating the compensation. Russell, 82 Ohio St.3d 516, 696 N.E.2d
1069, at syllabus. The same result should follow here. Until the General Assembly
legislates otherwise or we are presented with a case that cannot be reconciled with
our prior interpretation of R.C. 4123.56(A), we are bound to apply our holding in
Russell and find that Dillon has a clear legal right to receive compensation until the
date of the hearing that resulted in the decision to terminate her temporary-total-
disability compensation.
       {¶ 30} Even if Dillon’s case can or should be distinguished from Russell in
the manner argued by the commission, nothing compels us to overrule Russell. The
General Assembly holds the power to change the law when it disagrees with our
decisions interpreting a statute. To remain neutral arbiters, we must be careful to
not judge “the wisdom of the legislature’s policy choices,” Erickson v. Morrison,
165 Ohio St.3d 76, 2021-Ohio-746, 176 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 34. Here, we must respect that
the General Assembly has not spoken for 25 years since we interpreted the statute’s
application in Russell.
       {¶ 31} The majority commits grave damage to the rule of law in
gratuitously overruling Russell. Dillon’s petition for a writ of mandamus should be
granted because, based on the law as it has existed for the past 25 years under this

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court’s holding in Russell, she has a clear right to the relief she has requested and
the commission has a clear legal duty to provide that relief. Today, a majority of
this court despoils a settled area of the law that Ohio’s injured workers have relied
on for more than a quarter of a century. The majority’s decision today is nothing
more than raw judicial activism, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
       DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
                              __________________
       Knisley Law Offices, and Kurt A. Knisley, for appellant.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Natalie J. Tackett, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.
       Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Diane C. Reichwein, for
appellee Jefferson Industries Corporation.
                            ______________________

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