Court Opinion

ID: 9747035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:53:37.850222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.502771
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J., which GREENE, J. joins.
It is well settled that a defendant may waive the right, personal to, and exercisable only by, him or her, Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379-81, 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003), Howell v. State, 87 Md.App. 57, 77, 589 A.2d 90, 100 (1991), to trial by jury, but that any such waiver is effective and valid only if made on the record in open court and found by the court to have been made “knowingly and voluntarily.” Maryland Rule 4—246(b);1 Smith, 375 Md. at 378-81, 825 A.2d at 1063-1064; State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 724-25, 720 A.2d 311, 319 (1998); Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 90, 570 A.2d 1229, 1233-34 (1990); Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 131-35, 522 A.2d 950, 953-56 (1987); Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32, 590 A.2d 550, 551-552 (1991). This determination is fact and circumstance specific, Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551, citing State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182, 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990); Stewart, 319 *364Md. at 90, 570 A.2d at 1233-34; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955, and dual-faceted, requiring that the waiver be both “knowing” and “voluntary.”
For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, it must have been, for the possessor of the right, “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 (1970), the Supreme Court elucidated: “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” (Footnote omitted). Thus, while it is true that no fixed litany need be followed in complying with Maryland Rule 4-246, “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry, either from his lawyer or the court, that he understood that he has a right to a jury trial, that he knows ‘what a jury trial is,’ and waives that right ‘freely and voluntarily.’ ” Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32, 590 A.2d at 551. On the contrary, our case law is clear:
“[T]he trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion, and further that the defendant has some knowledge of the jury trial right before being allowed to waive it.”
Id. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551, citing Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83, 582 A.2d at 509. See Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955, in which this Court instructed:
“In determining whether the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial, the questioner need not recite any fixed incantation. Whether there is an intelligent, competent waiver must depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.... However, the court must be concerned that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion.... Adams [v. United States ex rel. McCann], 317 U.S. [269,] 275, 280, 63 S.Ct. [236,] 240, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268[, 272, 275, (1942) ].... Furthermore, a defen*365dant must have some knowledge of the jury trial right before he is allowed to waive it. See Dortch [v. State], 290 Md. [229,] 232, 428 A.2d [1220,] 1222[ (1981) ]; Harris v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339 n. 1, 455 A.2d 979, 984 n. 1 (1983); Adams, 317 U.S. at 280, 63 S.Ct. at 242, 87 L.Ed. 268.”
(Footnotes and some citations omitted). See Bell, 351 Md. at 725, 720 A.2d at 319.
Although questioned concerning his right to a jury trial, the nature of that right, including the composition of the jury and the burden of proof, and the effect of a waiver of a jury trial for the guilt or innocence stage of the trial on the right to jury sentencing, the petitioner was not questioned with respect to the voluntariness of the election; he was not asked if the decision was freely and voluntarily made or was the product of promises, intimidation or coercion. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that, “considering the totality of the circumstances,” 391 Md. 289, 320, 893 A.2d 1018, 1036 (2006), from that record, the trial court could have found, as it did, that the petitioner’s waiver of trial by jury was knowing and voluntary. Id. In addition to emphasizing the number of times that the petitioner was asked about his jury trial right and the jury trial process, id. at 320, 893 A.2d at 1036, it relies on Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 428 A.2d 1220 (1981), and State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 582 A.2d 507, in both of which the Court repeated that there is no fixed litany for jury trial waivers and, on a totality of the circumstances review, excused the trial court’s failure to inquire as to whether the defendants in those cases had been subjected to physical or mental duress or coercion, Dortch, 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224; Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 510, or been made promises, which induced the waiver, Dortch, 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224. Id. at 318, 893 A.2d at 1034-35. The majority is also persuaded by the facts that “Appellant was represent by counsel, who, prior to the 16 August 2004 hearing, had discussed with appellant the decision whether to elect a court or a jury trial,” id. at 320, 893 A.2d at 1036, that “Appellant affirmed that he wanted a court trial,” id., and that “[n]o facts from the record demonstrate that the court had reason to ask Appellant *366whether he had been coerced or threatened to waive his right to a jury trial or whether anyone, including defense counsel or the prosecutor, promised Appellant anything in exchange for his waiver.” Id.
In both Hall and Dortch, the defendant was undeniably informed of the nature of the jury trial right and, so, there was no issue as to his having met the “knowledge” prong of the test. Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509, Dortch, 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224. Neither defendant was questioned concerning whether he had been coerced or whether he had been made promises which prompted his waiver. Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509, Dortch, 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224. To be sure, the argument was made in each of those cases, as I am doing here, that the failure of the court or counsel to inquire specifically with respect to the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver of jury trial prevented it from being able to determine, as the rule requires, that the waiver was not only knowing, but voluntary, as well.
In rejecting the argument, the Dortch Court appears to have conflated the two prongs of the waiver test. After noting that the predecessor to Rule 4—246(b), Rule 735 d, did not require a specific inquiiy into voluntariness and did not contemplate a fixed litany or specific ritual, it concluded that “the failure of the trial judge to specifically inquire as to whether the jury trial waivers were induced by promises or by physical or mental coercion did not constitute error.” 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224. The Court explained:
“The record in the Dortch case[2] indicates that the defendant made a written election witnessed by counsel, stating that his election for a court rather than a jury trial was ‘knowingly and voluntarily’ made. The voluntary character of the election was fortified by the colloquy between the *367trial judge and Dortch at the commencement of the trial. We think the trial judge fairly determined that Dortch, having been fully advised with respect to the nature of a jury trial, voluntarily relinquished that right when he elected a court trial.”
Id. at 235, 428 A.2d at 1224. It is far from clear how full advise with respect to the nature of a jury trial, which satisfies the knowledge prong, permits a court to infer that the light also was voluntarily relinquished, but that is precisely what, and all that, the Court said.
Hall is to like effect. There, the Court opined:
“Considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case, see Dortch v. State, supra, 290 Md. at 235, 428 A.2d 1220, we think that the trial judge could fairly find that Hall intentionally relinquished his known right to a jury trial by his voluntary act in waiving that right. When Hall appeared for trial before the court, in the presence of his attorney and the prosecutor, the court advised him of his right to a jury trial ‘where twelve people would hear the evidence,’ all of whom would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt before he could be found guilty. The court advised Hall that if he waived his right to a jury trial, the court would hear the evidence and have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt before he could be found guilty. At the end of this colloquy, the trial judge asked Hall whether he wanted to be tiled by jury or by the court, to which Hall answered: ‘Tried by the Court.’
“While the court did not specifically ask Hall whether he understood what he had been told, or whether his election of a court trial was the result of any physical or mental duress or coercion, we think that the record before us demonstrates that the court could fairly be satisfied that Hall had the requisite knowledge of the jury trial right, that the waiver was voluntary, and that the requirements of the rule were satisfied. Moreover, the court was not required to advise Hall, as he contends, as to the details of the jury selection process.
*368“We conclude, therefore, that constitutional due process requirements were not transgressed in this case. Fortifying this determination is the fact that on two prior occasions, the first in writing, and the second during in-court plea negotiations, Hall also waived his right to a jury trial; on each occasion, he was also represented by counsel.”
Hall, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d at 509-510.
These cases stand in stark contrast to a later case, Tibbs, 323 Md. 28, 590 A.2d 550, penned by the author of both Hall and Dortch. In that case, the defendant’s proffered waiver of jury trial was accepted by the trial court as knowingly and voluntarily made, on the basis of a colloquy between the defendant and his counsel, occurring after the defendant responded, “Yes, I do,” to counsel’s inquiry concerning his knowledge of his right to have a trial by a jury:
“ ‘MR. STILLRICH [Defense Counsel]: And do you understand what a jury trial is?
“ ‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
“ ‘MR. STILLRICH: And you indicated to me when I spoke with you at the detention center the other evening that you desired to have the case tried before this Court alone, is that correct?
“ ‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
“ ‘MR. STILLRICH: And you do specifically waive your right to have the matter tried before a jury?
“ ‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
“ ‘MR. STILLRICH: Has anyone forced you or threatened you to have you give up your right to a jury trial?
“ ‘DEFENDANT: No, they haven’t. “ ‘MR. STILLRICH: Have you given up your right to a jury trial freely and voluntarily?
“ ‘DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.
*369“ ‘MR. STILLRICH: Your Honor, I would proffer to the Court that a waiver of a jury trial is freely and voluntarily tendered.
“ ‘THE COURT: All right.
“ ‘MR. STILLRICH: And we’re ready to proceed, Your Honor.
“ ‘THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Tibbs enters a plea of not guilty to the four counts, is that right?
“ ‘MR. STILLRICH: That’s correct.
“ ‘THE COURT: Waives his right to a jury trial?
“ ‘MR. STILLRICH: Yes, Your Honor.’ ”
Id. at 30, 590 A.2d at 551.
In reversing the Court of Special Appeals’ affirmance of the defendant’s conviction, on a totality of the circumstances review, acknowledging that the validity of a jury trial waiver does not depend on a fixed litany, id. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551, the Court held:
“[T]he record is woefully deficient to establish that Tibbs knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his right to a jury trial. The record fails to disclose that Tibbs received any information at all concerning the nature of a jury trial, as required by our cases. See Hall, supra, 321 Md. at 183, 582 A.2d 507; Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 522 A.2d 950 (1987). It is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry, either from his lawyer or the court, that he understood that he has a right to a jury trial, that he knows ‘what a jury trial is,’ and waives that right ‘freely and voluntarily.’ ”
Id. at 31-32, 590 A.2d at 551. We added that speculation, based on past criminal justice system involvement, could not supply the “knowledge” requirement: “[ajccordingly, notwithstanding that Tibbs may have had some prior unspecified experience with the criminal justice system, the trial judge could not fairly be satisfied on this record that Tibbs had the requisite knowledge of the nature of the jury trial right, that *370his waiver of the right was knowing and voluntary, and that the requirements of the rule were thus met.” Id. at 32, 590 A.2d at 551-52.
The majority, in responding to the contrary result reached by the Tibbs court, merely states that the trial court in that case “should have inquired further.” 391 Md. at 318, 893 A.2d at 1035, n. 13. I agree, it should have and the fact that it did not was fatal. Moreover, that is exactly what I believe should have happened here. If Tibbs stands for the proposition that knowledge of the right to jury trial cannot be inferred when the litany focuses exclusively on voluntariness factors, how, I ask, can the majority infer no coercion or inducements when the litany focuses exclusively on knowledge factors?
The circumstances in Tibbs mirror this case. At no time was the petitioner asked about anything that would impact the voluntariness of his waiver, except, of course, the nature of the jury trial right and the effect of waiver in the context of a death penalty proceeding. That a defendant is aware of, has some knowledge of, the jury trial right, while it may be necessary to a finding of voluntariness, it simply does not address directly the motivation issue and it certainly does not inform the court as to it. Whether a person has been coerced or induced to act, whether physically, mentally, by promise or otherwise, ordinarily is not readily, and may not be at all, observable.3 As in Tibbs, there is in this case nothing whatso*371ever on which the trial court could have relied to determine, as it must have done, that the petitioner’s jury trial waiver was not the product of duress or coercion. The majority’s reliance on the absence of facts in the record demonstrating that the court had a reason to ask questions going to the voluntariness of the waiver is, therefore, quite curious. Nor can the fact that the petitioner was represented by counsel provide the necessary basis for the voluntariness determination.
We can not forget that coercion and improper inducements may have many sources. Indeed, it is not unheard of that a defendant’s attorney may be the source of an improper inducement. To be sure, we can speculate that counsel properly advised the petitioner about his jury trial right and satisfied himself that the defendant’s decision was not the result of coercion, duress or promises. Moreover, we may also surmise that counsel did not himself do anything to coerce or improperly induce the waiver. As with the knowledge prong, see Tibbs, that is not sufficient. Nor is it uncommon that disclosure of such inducements is made, if at all, only upon direct inquiry, perhaps because of the nature of the proceedings— the defendant is responding to questions and likely does not know that he should, or is expected to, volunteer information. Expecting the defendant to volunteer the information or, at least signal that there may be matters that may call into question the voluntariness of the defendant’s announced decision, without explicitly advising him of the consequences of not doing so, therefore, is, I submit, most unrealistic. In any event, it is the court’s burden to satisfy itself that the waiver is voluntary, not the defendant’s. The absence of evidence hardly seems an appropriate or adequate basis on which to meet that burden.
I join the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the record is insufficient to establish that the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to jury sentencing. I dissent, however, from the conclusion that he knowingly and voluntari*372ly waived Ms right to jury trial at the guilt or innocence stage. I would remand and order a new trial.
Nevertheless, I feel compelled to mention one curiosity regarding the basis for the majority’s holding that the petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to jury sentencing—the failure of the trial judge to make an inquiry concerning the voluntariness of the petitioner’s jury sentencing decision. Noting that the trial court knew that the petitioner had been prescribed psychiatric medication while in custody, the majority is troubled, and rightly so, by the trial judge’s failure to ascertain whether, when he was required to decide whether to waive jury sentencing, he was still taking the medication and, if so, whether any side effects of such medication might have affected the petitioner’s ability to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. Not having made this inquiry, directly implicating the voluntariness of the petitioner’s waiver decision, the trial judge erred, the majority concludes, in finding the waiver to have been knowing and voluntary. Interestingly, the petitioner did not volunteer any information on the subject of his medication, or the effect of not taking it, at the sentencing waiver hearing.
It is interesting that the petitioner was not questioned on this subject, just as he did not volunteer such information, during the initial jury trial waiver either. The majority states that such an inquiry was unnecessary at that earlier stage, reasoning “[t]he effect of the failure to make a specific inquiry on this point in the jury sentencing waiver is distinguishable from the absence of a similar inquiry during the jury trial waiver process because, in the latter, the court heard contemporaneous expert medical testimony regarding Appellant’s competency to stand trial, which included the prescription of [psychiatric medication] ...” 391 Md. at 349-50, 893 A.2d 1053.
This difference is curious. The issue of whether the petitioner’s voluntariness was compromised by the petitioner’s failure to take his prescribed medication was as much an issue at the jury trial waiver at the guilt or innocence stage as it was at the jury sentencing stage. I do not agree that whether *373an inquiry on that subject is appropriate depends on the timing of a competency hearing. Unless the issue of the timing of the last taking of the medication literally had been explicitly addressed immediately before the waiver proceeding, there really is little difference between the two scenarios.
In any event, the focus of a hearing on a defendant’s competency to stand trial is on whether that defendant has the capacity to make a voluntary waiver, whether he or she understands the proceedings, appreciates their significance, and is able to assist counsel in mounting a defense. What is encompassed in the concept of voluntariness as it relates to waiver is much more; it involves determining whether, in fact, that defendant voluntarily waived his or her right to a jury trial or sentencing, as appropriate. That determination, in turn, may be informed, and often is, by more than a defendant’s capacity to waive due to lack of medication and its effect; also relevant to the determination is the presence or absence of coercion, inducements or promises affecting the waiver decision. The temporal proximity between a competency hearing and the waiver of jury trial hearing, accordingly, is not dispositive, even if relevant.
Judge GREENE joins in the views expressed herein.

. Maryland Rule 4-246(b) provides:
"Procedure for Acceptance of Waiver. A defendant may waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial. The court may not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.”

. There were two cases addressed in the one opinion. In the other case, Cohen v. State, the Court stated, simply, "the trial judge specifically determined on the record from his dialogue with Cohen prior to trial that he voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.” Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 235, 428 A.2d 1220, 1224 (1981). This explanation can only be described as conclusory.

. The Court was not unaware of the tenuousness of relying on a record that was not developed fully as to all aspects of the waiver construct. In Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 428 A.2d 1220 (1981), taking note of the fact that many trial judges inquired specifically into the motivation of defendants who waived jury trials, the Court pronounced that to be the preferable practice and "encouragefdj trial judges to engage persons electing court trials in a dialogue as detailed as time, resources and circumstances permit so as to insulate jury trial waivers from successful direct or collateral attack.” Id. at 236, 428 A.2d at 1224, quoting Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 118, 361 A.2d 113, 121 (1976). We reiterated that encouragement in Hall, in light of our recognition "that the cold record before us does not reflect a defendant’s demeanor, tone, facial expressions, gestures, or other indicia which, to a trial judge, may *371be indicative of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right.” Id. at 183-84, 582 A.2d at 510.