Court Opinion

ID: 9881747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 20:18:11.236462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:14:23.258177
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/3/23 In re W.J. CA2/4
           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
               SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                      DIVISION FOUR

 In re W.J., Person Coming                                   B315345; B317391;
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                               B318454

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                          Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF                                               Super. Ct. No.
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY                                         21CCJP00852
 SERVICES,

        Plaintiff and Respondent,

        v.

 K.J.,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Judge Pro Tempore.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
      Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Melania Vartanian, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

       In this consolidated appeal arising out of the dependency
case concerning 11-year-old W.J., K.J. (mother) challenges the
juvenile court’s July 2021 order temporarily suspending her
visitation with W.J.1 She also challenges the order entered at the
contested six-month review hearing held in January 2022, in
which the court declined to return W.J. to her care based on its
finding that doing so would place him at substantial risk of
detriment, and ordered mother to have monitored visitation in a
therapeutic setting when deemed appropriate by W.J.’s therapist.
       The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of the case, so we do not fully restate those details here.
Instead, in the Discussion, post, we discuss the facts as needed to
provide context for and resolve the issues presented on appeal. As
discussed below, we dismiss as moot the portions of the appeal
relating to mother’s visitation. We affirm the January 2022 order
declining to return W.J. to mother’s custody.2

1     On December 28, 2022, this court granted mother’s request
to consolidate case numbers B315345, B317391, and B318454 for
purposes of oral argument and decision. W.J.’s father is not a
party to this appeal.
2     At oral argument, mother, through counsel, asked that we
continue the matter so she could speak on her own behalf. The
request was denied as untimely because applications seeking to
extend time must be presented beforehand in written form (see
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.50(a) [“parties must serve and file all
applications in the reviewing court”]), and at no point before
argument did we receive a written application seeking the relief
sought.

                                 2
                           DISCUSSION

I.    Mother’s appeal from the visitation orders is moot.

       A.     Governing Principles
       “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’ [Citation.] A case becomes
moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of [the party seeking redress], to
grant him [or her] any effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to
be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the [party]
must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
[party] seeks. [Citation.] [¶] This rule applies in the dependency
context. [Citation.] A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-
case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency
matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect
the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
       “Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute. [Citation.]
As a rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion to review
a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence
of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material
question remains for the court’s determination.’” (D.P., supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 282.) Specific to the dependency context, our
Supreme Court has held that courts should consider the
following factors when deciding whether to review a moot appeal:

                                  3
(1) whether the challenged finding “‘could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other consequences for
[the appellant][ ]”’” (id. at p. 285); (2) whether the finding was
“based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct[ ]” (id.
at pp. 285-586); and (3) “why the appeal became moot[,]” bearing
in mind that “where . . . the case becomes moot due to prompt
compliance by parents with their case plan, discretionary review
may especially be appropriate.” (Id. at p. 286.) “The factors above
are not exhaustive, and no single factor is necessarily dispositive
of whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot
appeal.” (Ibid.)

      B.     Analysis
      As noted above, mother challenges two orders relating to
her visitation with W.J. Specifically, she seeks reversal of: (1) the
July 2021 order suspending her visits based on the juvenile
court’s finding that visits with mother would be detrimental to
W.J.’s mental and physical health; and (2) the January 2022
order permitting W.J. to have visits with mother in a therapeutic
setting when deemed appropriate by W.J.’s therapist. In June
2023, however, the juvenile court ordered mother to have
monitored visits with W.J. In so doing, the court effectively
vacated the July 2021 order suspending mother’s visits, along
with the detriment finding on which it was based, and rendered
irrelevant its January 2022 limitation on when visits were to
resume. Under these circumstances, we conclude reversal of the
disputed visitation orders will not “‘have a practical, tangible
impact on [mother’s] conduct or legal status.’” (D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 277.) Thus, mother’s challenges to those orders are
moot. (Ibid.)

                                  4
       Having concluded this appeal is moot to the extent it
concerns the prior visitation orders, we consider whether to
exercise discretionary review of those portions of the appeal. On
this point, mother appears to argue that we should review the
disputed visitation orders because the juvenile court may rely on
them to terminate her reunification services in the future.3
Therefore, she argues, the challenged visitation orders will cause
her “very real” prejudice. We reject mother’s contention because,
in future proceedings, mother can remind the juvenile court that
the July 2021 and January 2022 visitation orders have been
vacated.
       None of the other factors discussed in D.P. demonstrate
discretionary review is warranted. The challenged findings and
orders were largely based on mother’s repeated failure to follow
visitation guidelines and court orders, as well as her
inappropriate behavior with W.J. during visits. While these
behaviors are concerning, we do not consider them so egregious to
warrant review in this case. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.

3     The issue of mootness arose when, after the parties
submitted their appellate briefs, the Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) asked this court to take judicial
notice of the juvenile court’s minute order entered on June 9,
2023. Consequently, pursuant to Government Code section
68081, we asked the parties to file supplemental letter briefs
addressing: (1) whether the juvenile court’s June 2023 order
reinstating mother’s visits rendered her challenges to the July
2021 and January 2022 visitation orders moot; and (2) if the
appeal is moot with respect to those prior visitation orders,
whether this court should exercise its inherent discretion to
consider her challenges to those orders.

                                5
286.) In addition, this case did not become moot due to mother’s
prompt compliance with her case plan. (See ibid.)
       In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we dismiss as
moot the portions of mother’s appeal relating to the juvenile
court’s visitation orders entered in July 2021 and January 2022.

II.   Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
      finding that returning W.J. to mother’s care would
      place him at substantial risk of detriment.

       A.     Relevant Background
       At the adjudication and disposition hearing held in May
2021, the juvenile court sustained the following allegations
asserted in the petition filed on W.J.’s behalf under Welfare and
Institutions Code4 section 300: mother physically abused W.J. by
placing him in the closet without food and intimidating him with
a machete (counts a-1 and b-3); mother medically neglected W.J.,
a child with mental and emotional problems necessitating his
hospitalization on prior occasions, and has a limited ability to
provide appropriate care and supervision for him, as she failed to
ensure his consistent participation in mental health treatment,
failed to follow through on his medical appointments, and failed
to give him his medication, causing his self-harming and
aggressive behaviors to escalate (counts b-1, b-2, and c-1); mother
placed W.J. in a detrimental and endangering condition by
excluding him from his home and failing to make an appropriate
plan for his ongoing care and supervision (count b-4); and
mother’s mental and emotional problems and failure to obtain

4    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                 6
recommended mental health treatment render her unable to
provide regular care and supervision for W.J. (count b-5).
      The court then removed W.J. from his parents and granted
mother reunification services. Her court-ordered case plan
required her to participate in individual counseling, follow all
recommendations offered by the expert who conducted a
psychiatric evaluation of mother as ordered by the juvenile court
under Evidence Code section 730, attend therapy with a licensed
therapist, take all prescribed psychotropic medications, and
attend conjoint counseling with W.J. when deemed appropriate.
In addition, mother was ordered to complete six consecutive
random or on demand drug tests, and to complete a full drug
rehabilitation program if any test was missed or dirty. She was
also directed to complete a developmentally appropriate
parenting program, a program offered by the National Alliance
on Mental Illness (NAMI), and an anger management program.
      As noted above, at the six-month review hearing held in
January 2022, the juvenile court declined to return W.J. to
mother’s care, finding that doing so would place him at
substantial risk of detriment. In so doing, the court acknowledged
that although mother apparently participated in some programs
during the preceding review period, the Department could not
verify whether those programs assisted her in addressing the
issues requiring W.J.’s removal because she refused to sign the
necessary information release forms, in violation of a prior court
order. The court also questioned whether mother has benefited
from her participation in services, as she continued to behave
inappropriately during visits and disobey court orders.

                                7
       B.    Governing Principles and Standard of Review
       At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court must
return the child to his or her parent’s custody unless it finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that doing so “would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).) “A
substantial risk of detriment means that ‘returning a child to
parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical
or emotional well-being.’” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960,
965 (E.D.).) The Department bears the burden of proving
detriment. (Ibid.) “‘In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court
must consider the extent to which the parent participated in
reunification services. [Citations.] The court must also consider
the efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating
the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.’” (Id.
at p. 966.)
       “We review the juvenile court’s finding of substantial risk of
detriment for substantial evidence, which means evidence that is
‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value[.]’” (E.D., supra, 217
Cal.App.4th at p. 966.) The appellant “bear[s] the burden to show
there was no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to
support [the challenged] findings and orders. [Citation.] We draw
all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the juvenile court and review the record in
the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; we do not
reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but
merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the trial
court’s findings. [Citation.] Thus, we do not consider whether
there is evidence from which the juvenile court could have drawn
a different conclusion but whether there is substantial evidence

                                 8
to support the conclusion that the court did draw.” (In re M.R.
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101, 108.)

       C.    Analysis
       Mother argues the juvenile court erred by declining to
return W.J. to her care at the six-month review hearing.
Although not entirely clear, she appears to contend the record
lacks sufficient evidence to support a finding that returning W.J.
to her care would create a substantial risk of detriment to his
physical or emotional well-being. For the reasons discussed
below, we do not agree with her argument.
       In asserting reversible error, mother largely contends the
Department failed to ensure W.J. promptly received necessary
mental health services while in its care and insists “she was quite
capable, ready, willing, and able to provide for [W.J.’s] needs
exponentially better than what he had received under the care of
[the Department].” This argument misses the mark. In reviewing
findings entered under section 366.21, subdivision (e)(1), our role
is not to determine whether the Department made sufficient
efforts to ensure W.J. received mental health services in a timely
fashion. Instead, we must decide whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that
returning W.J. to mother would place him at substantial risk of
detriment. (E.D., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 966.) As discussed
below, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the
court’s detriment finding.5

5     We acknowledge that, in asserting the juvenile court’s
detriment finding is unsupported by substantial evidence, mother
also attempts to discredit the Department’s status review reports
and the Title XX records setting forth the Department’s contacts
with her. Her arguments are unavailing because they disregard

                                9
       The record reflects mother was partially compliant with her
court-ordered case plan. Specifically, it shows that during the
relevant review period, mother received certificates of completion
for a 12-week anger management program and two parenting
courses. Throughout the review period, however, mother refused
to speak to the Department about her participation in these
programs or other services. Therefore, the Department was
limited to the information available from mother’s service
providers to ascertain her progress in addressing the issues
giving rise to jurisdiction. With respect to her parenting classes,
the record shows that based on the limited information provided
by mother, the Department was unable to determine whether the
courses complied with its requirements and/or assisted her in
addressing the issues necessitating W.J.’s placement. With
respect to her anger management program, the Department
spoke to the program director in October 2021, who confirmed
mother’s completion of 12 sessions but did not provide detailed
information regarding her participation in the classes or her
progress in addressing case issues.
       In early January 2022, the Department spoke to mother’s
psychiatrist, who reported mother has been in her care for the
last six to seven years. The psychiatrist related that “mother
sought medication management to treat General Anxiety
Disorder, ADHD[,] and PTSD[,]” that “mother was taking Zoloft
and Adderall[,]” and that “mother was compliant with monthly

the applicable standard of review. As noted above, in reviewing
for substantial evidence, “we do not reweigh the evidence or
exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the trial court’s findings.” (In re M.R.,
supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 108.)

                                 10
sessions and [her] medication regimen.” Subsequently, however,
the psychiatrist acknowledged she “did not know the specifics[ ]”
of W.J.’s dependency case, and did not opine on mother’s progress
in addressing case issues.
       The record also contains three letters from mother’s
therapist, dated April 21, August 3, and October 6, 2021. These
letters demonstrate mother has been working with her therapist
since 2017, that the therapist has been treating mother for
ADHD, anxiety, and PTSD, that she attended therapy on a
weekly basis for most of 2021, and that mother was compliant
with her medication as of April and October 2021. The letters do
not, however, demonstrate that mother’s therapist was aware of
the issues giving rise to W.J.’s removal from mother’s care. Nor
do they elucidate what progress, if any, mother had made in
addressing those issues. Further, the evidence shows the
Department reached out to mother’s therapist twice to discuss
mother’s participation in services, but was unable to reach the
therapist.
       Mother’s participation in services is not dispositive of
whether reunification would be appropriate. (See In re Dustin R.
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1139-1140 [holding a parent’s
“compliance with the reunification plan need not be the sole
concern of the [juvenile] court, but it must be an indicium of
progress toward family preservation”]; see also id. at p. 1143
[reiterating that a parent’s compliance with the case plan is
relevant to, but not determinative of, reunification, and that
courts “must also consider the parents’ progress and their
capacity to meet the objectives of the plan[ ]”].) Despite her
participation in the services noted above, the record
demonstrates mother continued to engage in aggressive and

                               11
inappropriate behavior throughout the relevant reunification
period. It also shows that her actions have negatively impacted
W.J.’s well-being on several occasions.
       Specifically, the record demonstrates that while W.J. was
in his paternal grandparents’ care, he often became upset while
talking on the phone with mother because she repeatedly asked
him questions he did not want to answer. In response to mother’s
behavior, W.J. would appear stressed and uncomfortable and
begin fidgeting with the phone. He then either pushed the phone
away or disconnected the call himself, and appeared to exhibit a
sense of relief once calls ended.
       Similarly, W.J.’s prior caregiver stated she often had to
intervene in mother’s calls with W.J. because mother made
inappropriate statements about his caregivers, his grandparents,
and Department staff. Mother responded to the caregiver’s
redirection with verbal aggression or additional inappropriate
statements, which caused W.J. to appear fearful, angry, or
nervous. After calls were ended due to mother’s actions, W.J.
engaged in negative behavior, such as burrowing his head under
blankets, verbal aggression, isolating himself, crying, and self-
injurious behaviors.
       During an in-person visit with W.J. in July 2021, mother
refused to comply with the Department’s visitation guidelines
and used her phone to video conference with a third-party while
W.J. was present without the Department’s prior approval.
Mother refused to allow the Department social worker
monitoring the visit to speak to the third-party and declined to
explain why she required the third-party’s virtual presence at the
visit. When the social worker advised mother that the visit would
be terminated unless she disconnected the call, mother still

                               12
refused to disconnect the call. At that point, the social worker
ended the visit and asked W.J. to return to her car. W.J. initially
complied, but mother immediately became upset, stated she was
contacting law enforcement, and insisted that she was going to
accompany W.J. to the car. In response, W.J. began yelling and
crying, and pleaded with mother to disconnect the video call. He
refused to go with the social worker, as he wanted to remain at
the visit to spend time with his dog. At that point, mother agreed
to disconnect the call and contacted law enforcement. W.J. was
able to remain calm and continued with the visit.
       Subsequently, law enforcement arrived and spoke to
mother, who became argumentative. The officer also spoke to the
social worker. As the visit continued, the social worker noticed
mother had again initiated a video call with a third-party on her
phone. At that point, the social worker ended the visit because,
even though mother had been given a second chance, she still
failed to comply with the visitation guidelines. W.J. then had an
emotional breakdown, and began crying and yelling
uncontrollably for his dog. A law enforcement officer helped the
social worker bring W.J. to her car.
       Upon returning to the home of W.J.’s paternal
grandparents, W.J. refused to get out of the car and tantrummed
for approximately 45 minutes. During his meltdown, he
repeatedly and uncontrollably yelled for his dog, yelled at his
grandparents, punched the windows of the social worker’s car,
and threw items from the vehicle into the street. When his
paternal grandfather got into the backseat with W.J. in an
attempt to de-escalate his behavior, W.J. reclined the passenger
seat all the way back, trapping his grandfather in the car and
hurting him. As the social worker attempted to open the

                                13
passenger door to help W.J.’s grandfather exit the vehicle, W.J.
repeatedly hit and scratched the social worker’s hands and arms.
He then repeatedly hit his head on the vehicle’s seats and
rooftop, and also hit and scratched the vehicle’s seats and door
panels. Eventually, W.J. agreed to sit outside and calmed down.
The record reflects that, before his visit with mother, W.J.’s
behavioral issues had improved significantly. After the visit,
however, W.J. “demonstrated declined behaviors[.]”
       While mother’s visitation was suspended, the juvenile court
permitted her to have a monitored holiday visit with W.J., which
took place on December 29, 2021. At the beginning of the visit,
W.J. asked mother not to behave how she acted at their last visit
in July 2021, noting she had been difficult. Mother denied
engaging in inappropriate behavior during their last visit and
remarked “‘they’ must have told him to say that to her.” (Bolded
text omitted.) She then gave W.J. several gifts, including, among
other things, a journal, a cell phone, and a box she called a Love
Box.
       After the visit ended, W.J.’s caregiver informed the
Department that the cell phone given to W.J. had its tracking
notification turned on. The location of his placement, however,
was to be kept confidential. The caregiver also related that the
Love Box was a device that enabled mother to send messages to
W.J., that the journal had mother’s contact information inside of
it, and that mother had given W.J. capsules containing rolled up
pieces of paper with her contact information on them. Per the
Department’s instruction, the caregiver confiscated the devices
given to W.J., causing him to become angry. In the days following
his visit with mother, W.J.’s behavior worsened and resulted in
his hospitalization on December 31, 2022.

                               14
       At no point during the pertinent review period has mother
acknowledged or taken responsibility for her actions giving rise to
W.J.’s removal from her custody. Instead, mother has maintained
W.J.’s removal was illegal, that the Department violated her
rights, and that her son should return home because she can
provide him with proper care. Moreover, as noted above, she has
refused to speak to the Department about her participation in
services, to sign the requisite information release forms, even
though the juvenile court ordered her to do so in November 2021,
or to follow the Department’s visitation guidelines. She also
denied engaging in improper behavior during her July 2021 visit
with W.J. and has refused to accept that he has expressed
unwillingness to speak to her on the phone. Further, mother has
been aggressive with Department social workers when she has
spoken to them. For example, during an in-person meeting in
May 2021, she spoke to the Department social worker in a
demeaning and disrespectful manner, raised her voice at the
social worker, and hit the social worker on the arm when the
social worker ended the meeting due to mother’s behavior.
       Based on the evidence discussed above, the juvenile court
could reasonably conclude: (1) although mother may have
participated in some services, she has not made substantial
progress in addressing the issues requiring W.J.’s removal from
her care; and (2) returning W.J. to mother’s custody would create
a substantial risk of detriment to his physical and emotional
well-being. It therefore did not err by declining to return W.J. to
mother’s care at the six-month review hearing. (See § 366.21,
subd. (e)(1); see also In re Dustin R., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1133, 1139-1143 [affirming the juvenile court’s detriment finding
entered at 18-month review hearing where the evidence showed

                                15
the parents had not addressed the issues giving rise to
jurisdiction even though they complied with their case plans].)6

6       Although not entirely clear, in her appellate briefs, mother
appears to suggest the juvenile court erred by finding the
Department provided her with reasonable services during the
reunification period. On this point, mother has not presented any
arguments supported by citations to the record or legal authority.
We therefore conclude she has forfeited this contention and
decline to consider it on the merits. (See Benach v. County of Los
Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“An appellant must
provide an argument and legal authority to support his [or her]
contentions. This burden requires more than a mere assertion
that the [challenged order or] judgment is wrong. ‘Issues do not
have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported by
argument or citation to authority, [they are] . . . [forfeited]’”];
Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 [“‘The appellate
court is not required to search the record on its own seeking
error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument
with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will
be] deemed to have been [forfeited]”].)

                                16
                         DISPOSITION

      The portions of the appeal challenging the visitation orders
entered in July 2021 and January 2022 are dismissed as moot.
The order entered at the six-month review hearing is affirmed.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                   CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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