Court Opinion

ID: 9943276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 23:02:07.822359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:44.221244
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Sounatananh CA4/2
See Concurring Opinion

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E080757

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FVI22001158)

 NICK SOUNATANANH,                                                       OPINION

          Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Miriam Ivy

Morton, Judge. Affirmed.

         Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and Cary Epstein, Deputy District Attorney, for

Plaintiff and Appellant.

         David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Respondent.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Robert W. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General,

Myung J. Park, Carol A. Z. Boyd and Janelle M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, as

Amicus Curiae for State Water Resources Control Board.

                                                             1
                                     INTRODUCTION

       In this appeal, the People contend the trial court erred in granting defendant and

respondent Nick Sounatananh’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Penal Code section 995.

The People argue defendant’s failure to obtain a permit through the regional water board

is sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of Health and Safety Code section

11358, subdivision (d)(3)(B), marijuana cultivation with a concurrent violation of Water

Code section 13260. The People also argue the mere use of water in outdoor commercial

cannabis cultivation constitutes waste, and evidence of such use, by itself, is sufficient to

constitute a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358, subdivision (d)(3)(B).

We affirm.

                            PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On May 6, 2022, the People filed a felony complaint charging defendant with

marijuana cultivation in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358,

subdivision (d)(3). On September 27, 2022, a preliminary hearing was held. At the

conclusion of evidence and argument, the magistrate found sufficient cause to believe

defendant committed a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358, subdivision

(d)(3)(b). In discussing the evidence presented, the magistrate commented, “I don’t

suppose that marijuana plants that are being cultivated in this manner just subsist on

water.” The magistrate also opined, “I believe a large operation like this would require

all kinds of chemicals to keep these plants going that can contaminate the water.”

Defense counsel pointed out to the magistrate “[t]here’s no testimony of that. There’s no

                                              2
evidence of that.” The magistrate responded, “[w]ell, I think that . . . is why a permit is

required for such an operation . . . .” Prior to ruling, the magistrate concluded, “[a]gain,

the Court has to assume there’s going to be some contamination from this—the size of

this project, the type of project, how it’s being done, . . .”

       On October 13, 2022, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Penal Code

section 995. In his motion, defendant argued the absence of a permit is insufficient to

prove a violation of Water Code section 13260.1 Defendant also argued the People failed

to prove actual discharge of waste at the preliminary hearing. The People filed an

opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss and a supplemental opposition. In their two

oppositions, the People argued that the absence of a permit alone is sufficient to prove a

violation of section 13260. The People also argued use of water, in commercial

marijuana cultivation, by itself, constitutes waste and thus violates section 13260. On

January 27, 2023, defendant’s motion was heard and granted by a superior court judge.

The superior court judge reasoned, “There is no indication in this preliminary hearing

transcript that there’s anything other than water and some plants.” In evaluating the legal

issues, the superior court judge commented, “[a]nd we are all sitting here and agreeing

that there was no illegal discharge of waste. Now, perhaps they need a permit to cultivate

the marijuana, so their marijuana cultivation process needs to be shut down, but does it

rise to this concurrence with a violation of environmental law? It is not as you have it

written here.” In granting defendant’s motion, the superior court judge stated, “I have

       1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Water Code.

                                                3
reviewed Water Code section 13260. I don’t see anything in this preliminary hearing

[transcript] that rises to the level to hold to answer in violation of this code section.”

                                 STATEMENT OF FACTS2

       Deputy Griego had been a sworn deputy for approximately 15 years. In 2021,

Deputy Griego was assigned to the marijuana enforcement team where he received in-

house training regarding marijuana grows and cultivation of marijuana. During his year

on the marijuana enforcement team, Deputy Griego conducted approximately

70 investigations on his own and participated in several hundred investigations with other

members of his team. On March 3, 2022, Deputy Griego served a search warrant for a

suspected illegal marijuana cultivation in San Bernadino County, specifically in

Newberry Springs. Deputy Griego and his team scouted the area two days prior to

executing the search warrant and observed two marijuana grow houses on the property.

The grow houses were each approximately 40 feet long by 40 feet wide. Deputy Griego

likened the structure to the skeleton of a greenhouse. There were no permanent structures

on the property.

       Upon arriving at the location to execute the search warrant, Deputy Griego saw a

single trailer on the property. Deputy Griego and his team made announcements and

defendant exited the trailer. Defendant’s date of birth was established by his

identification card to be October 6, 1971. In speaking to defendant, Deputy Griego

noticed defendant’s hands were dirty, had soil or dirt on them, and were tinted green.

       2 The statement of facts contains only those facts presented at the preliminary
hearing.

                                               4
Deputy Griego found the appearance of defendant’s hands to be consistent with someone

handling marijuana plants. Deputy Griego also compared defendant’s shoes to shoe

impressions left around the property and found them to be a match. When interviewed,

defendant eventually admitted to being at the location to water and tend to the marijuana

plants.

          During a search of the property, 630 marijuana plants were located. Deputy

Griego also observed four water cubes, each containing approximately 275 gallons of

water. It appeared the water cubes were being used to water the marijuana plants. The

water cubes had hoses and irrigation running to the grow houses. The hoses were being

used to water the marijuana plants by hand. The soil around the plants was damp

indicating to Deputy Griego the plants had recently been watered. A marijuana plant

requires one to five gallons of water a day. The size of the water cubes located on the

property was consistent with the volume of water necessary to water the marijuana plants

found. A well was also located on the property. Deputy Griego did not investigate the

nature of the well or whether it was operational.

          A permit from the regional water board is required to cultivate marijuana. K.

Bindl is an environmental scientist who works for the water board. K. Bindl is in charge

of water code violations and has received training from attorneys at her office regarding

water waste violations and other water code violations. K. Bindl has also received

training on internal and commercial policies regarding water. K. Bindl’s agency issues

water discharge permits for marijuana cultivation. Water discharge permits are required

                                               5
for any legal water discharge from hemp grows and other marijuana cultivations. K.

Bindl reviewed the records for the property Deputy Greigo searched and found no water

discharge permit had been issued. K. Bindl opined that based on her training, education,

and experience, failure to have a discharge permit for a marijuana cultivation is a

violation of section 13260.

       Samples of the marijuana located on the property were taken and booked into

evidence. The marijuana samples were later tested by the supervisor of the lab used by

the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department (Sheriff’s Department). The lab supervisor,

having 25 years of laboratory experience and using scientifically accepted methods,

tested the marijuana provided by the Sheriff’s Department. Based on the results of the

testing, the lab supervisor opined that the substance provided by the Sheriff’s Department

was marijuana.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

       At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate’s role “is to determine whether there is

‘sufficient cause’ to believe [the] defendant guilty of the charged offense.” (People v.

Abelino (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 563, 573 (Abelino).) Sufficient cause is “ ‘ “generally

equivalent to ‘reasonable and probable cause.’ ” ’ ” (People v. San Nicholas (2004) 34

Cal.4th 614, 654, quoting People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 924).) Reasonable or

probable cause exists where “ ‘ “such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary

caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the

guilt of the accused.” ’ ” (San Nicholas, at p. 654.)

                                             6
       Under Penal Code Section 995, a defendant may move to dismiss an information

on the ground that the defendant “had been committed without reasonable or probable

cause.” (Pen. Code, § 995, subd. (a)(2)(B).) In reviewing a superior court’s ruling on a

motion to dismiss pursuant to Penal Code section 995, the reviewing court directly

reviews the magistrate’s ruling at the preliminary hearing. (People v. Superior Court

(Mendez) (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 268, 277).) The reviewing court “draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the information [citations] and decide[s] whether there is probable

cause to hold the defendant[] to answer, i.e., whether the evidence is such that ‘a

reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt’ [citations].”

(Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072.)

       “[A]n . . . information should be set aside only when there is a total absence of

evidence to support a necessary element of the offense [or special circumstance] charged.

[Citations.] [¶] ‘Although there must be some showing as to the existence of each

element . . . such a showing may be made by means of circumstantial evidence supportive

of reasonable inferences on the part of the magistrate.’ [Citation.] ‘Every legitimate

inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the

information.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th

1217, 1226.) However, the inferences must be reasonable. (Ibid.) “An inference is not

reasonable if it is based only on speculation. [Citation.]” (People v. Holt (1997) 15

Cal.4th 619, 669.)

                                             7
                                       DISCUSSION

A. Sufficient Evidence was Presented to Find Defendant Violated Health and Safety Code

Section 11358, Subdivision (c)

       Under Health and Safety Code section 11358, subdivision (c), it is a misdemeanor

for a person 18 years or older to cultivate more than six living cannabis plants, except as

provided by law. A violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358 becomes a felony

if the violation meets the additional requirement of resulting in a violation of certain

enumerated environmental laws, as in this case Water Code section 13260. (Health &

Saf. Code, § 11358, subd. (d).)

       Here, the People argue and defendant agrees, sufficient evidence was presented at

the preliminary hearing for defendant to be held to answer for a misdemeanor violation of

Health and Safety Code section 11358, subdivision (c). At the preliminary hearing,

Deputy Griego testified defendant was 51 years old at the time of the offense. Defendant

admitted to being at the location to water and tend to the marijuana plants. Defendant’s

shoe prints were located near the marijuana plants and his hands were tinted green with

remnants of dirt or soil. The grow houses contained a total of 630 suspected marijuana

plants. When tested, the samples taken from the grow houses, tested positive for

marijuana. This evidence, taken in its totality, constitutes “sufficient cause” to believe

defendant is guilty of a violation Health and Safety Code section 11358, subdivision (c).

(Abelino, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 573.)

                                              8
B. Insufficient Evidence was Presented to Find Defendant Violated Health and Safety

Code 11358, subdivision (d)(3)(B)

       In 2016, the Comprehensive Adult Use of Marijuana Act (Proposition 64)

amended Health and Safety Code section 11358 to narrow the circumstances when

cultivation of marijuana is punishable as a felony. (Proposition 64, pp. 60-61.) As

amended by Proposition 64, a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358 is

punishable as a felony when marijuana cultivation results in a violation of certain

enumerated environmental laws. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358, subd. (d).) In discussing

various concerns regarding marijuana cultivation, the authors of Proposition 64

expressed, “[c]urrently, illegal marijuana growers steal or divert millions of gallons of

water without any accountability. The Adult Use of Marijuana Act will create strict

environmental regulations to ensure that the marijuana is grown efficiently and legally, to

regulate the use of pesticides, to prevent wasting water, and to minimize water usage.

(Proposition 64, p. 2.)

       In an effort to achieve these goals, Proposition 64 requires each regional water

board to establish conditions addressing 12 separate concerns: (1) Site development and

maintenance, erosion control and drainage features; (2) stream crossing installation and

maintenance; (3) riparian and wetland protection and management; (4) soil disposal; (5)

water storage and use; (6) irrigation runoff; (7) fertilizers and soil; (8) pesticides and

herbicides; (9) petroleum products and other chemicals; (10) cultivation-related waste;

(11) refuse and human waste; (12) clean up, restoration, and mitigation. (Proposition 64,

                                               9
p. 46.) The environmental laws Proposition 64 added to Health and Safety Code

section 11358 are demonstrative of these concerns. For example, the amendment

included: Water Code section 1052 (unauthorized diversion of water); Water Code

section 13272 (prohibiting discharge of petroleum into state waters); Fish and Game

Code section 5652 (prohibiting disposal of litter, waste, etc. into state waters); Fish and

Game Code section 1602 (prohibiting substantial diversion or obstruction of natural

water flow); Penal Code section 374.8 (prohibiting hazardous substances to enter state

waters).

       Health and Safety Code section 11358 includes Water Code section 13260.

Section 13260, subdivision (a), provides, “Each of the following persons shall file with

the appropriate regional board a report of the discharge, containing the information that

may be required by the regional board: [¶] (1) A person discharging waste, or proposing

to discharge waste, within any region that could affect the quality of the waters of the

state, other than into a community sewer system.” (Wat. Code, § 13260, subd. (a)(1).)

“ ‘Waste’ includes sewage and any and all other waste substances, liquid, solid, gaseous,

or radioactive, associated with human habitation, or of human or animal origin, or from

any producing, manufacturing, or processing operation, including waste placed within

containers of whatever nature prior to, and for purposes of, disposal.” (Wat. Code,

§ 13050, subd. (d).) Evidence of harm can convert an otherwise innocuous substance

into waste, and a substance’s characterization as waste turns on “the harm it cause[s] to

the environment.” (Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2021) 61

                                             10
Cal.App.5th 1093, 1119 (Sweeney).) “ ‘Waters of the state’ ” is defined as “any surface

water or groundwater, including saline waters, within the boundaries of the state.” (Wat.

Code, § 13050, subd. (e).)

       Here, at the preliminary hearing, the People proceeded on the theory that

defendant violated section 13260. Thus, the threshold issue is whether defendant is a

person discharging or proposing to discharge waste. At the motion to dismiss hearing,

the People conceded no evidence was presented showing defendant actually discharged

waste, instead relying on the absence of a permit as sufficient grounds for a violation of

section 13260. However, the People now argue, use of water, alone, in marijuana

cultivation constitutes waste.

       There are two arguably broad categories of waste: (1) a substance that is

independently waste regardless of how it is used; (2) a substance that is generally

innocuous but can be converted into waste when it is used in a manner that harms the

environment. Here, the People’s argument that use of uncontaminated water in a

marijuana cultivation constitutes waste implicates the second category of waste. While

an innocuous substance, such as water, can constitute waste, the manner in which it is

used is paramount to such a conclusion. (See Lake Madrone Water Dist. v. State Water

Resources Control Bd. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 163, 170 (Lake Madrone) [release of dam

water resulting in flushing accumulated sediment into a creek constituted “waste” for

purposes of clean water statute]; see also Sweeney, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1117-

                                            11
1118 [use of non-contaminated fill material constituted waste when its use to repair an

exterior levy resulted in environmental harm to a tidal marsh].)

       While acknowledging that “affect[ing] . . . the waters of the state” is a separate

element of section 13260, the fact that the environmental impact of a substance’s use in a

particular manner can convert an otherwise innocuous substance into waste, we must

consider that impact in assessing whether a substance qualifies as waste. In Lake

Madrone, the opening of the dam and releasing water downstream was causing

concentrated sediment to clog a downstream creek. (Lake Madrone, supra, 209

Cal.App.3d at 170.) The court in Lake Madrone acknowledged that while the silt was

innocuous “in its unconcentrated form,” “by furnishing a man-made artificial location for

its concentration, . . . the innocuous substance [was changed] into one . . . deadly to

aquatic life.” (Lake Madrone, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 169-170.) In Sweeney, the

court concluded that uncontaminated fill material could convert into waste when the use

of that material converted the site “from tidal marsh to a largely dry island.” (Sweeney,

supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118.)

       The People failed to provide evidence of a functional equivalent at the marijuana

cultivation site. There was no evidence presented that the water used in the marijuana

cultivation was having a negative impact on the surrounding environment, including, but

not limited to the surrounding state waters. The holdings in Lake Madrone and Sweeney

suggest a negative environmental impact is necessary to convert an otherwise innocuous

substance, such as water, into “waste.” Further, there was no evidence presented that the

                                             12
water was mixing with any substances that would result in the water itself constituting

sewage or waste, independent of an environmental impact. Without such evidence, the

use of water itself does not constitute waste. No other evidence of actual discharge was

presented or argued. As such, the People failed to prove defendant was a person

discharging waste.

       Section 13260 is also violated if defendant is a person proposing to discharge

waste. (§ 13260, subd. (a)(1).) The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing

relevant to this inquiry involves the nature of the property and the nature and character of

the cultivation operation. All evidence presented was testimonial. There were no photos

or other exhibits presented at the preliminary hearing. Related to the nature of the

property, evidence was presented that the property did not have a specific address, but

was identified by parcel number. The property contained a travel trailer with a fence

surrounding it, two grow houses, and a well. The square footage of the grow houses was

a combined 3,200 square feet. All other physical characteristics about the property are

unknown. It is unknown whether the property is in a rural area, if the property was

attached to a community sewer system, or if there were nearby lakes, streams, or other

state waters.

       Related to the nature and character of the cultivation operation, evidence was

presented that the property contained two grow houses holding a total of 630 marijuana

plants. Four water cubes were located, each of which held 275 gallons of water. The

water containers had hoses and irrigation attached to them and it appeared the hoses were

                                             13
being used to water the marijuana plants by hand. The ground near the marijuana plants

was damp as if it had been watered recently. No evidence was presented related to waste

discharge, actual or potential. There was no evidence presented about whether there were

waste containers on the property, irrigation runoff visible, or any other method of waste

disposal. There was also no evidence presented about the use of chemicals or pesticides.

       In addition to a lack of evidence presented as to the nature and character of this

particular cultivation operation, the record also lacks generalized testimony about the

nature and character of cultivation operations of this size. While testifying, Deputy

Griego began to opine about the environmental impact of marijuana cultivation, however,

the magistrate sustained an objection and no further efforts to elaborate were made.

There was no evidence presented that marijuana cultivations of this size, by definition,

would result in waste that could impact the waters of the state. Nor was there any other

generalized testimony about the common practices of marijuana cultivation, such as the

use of pesticides or waste disposal procedures.

       Ultimately in ruling, the magistrate assumed facts that were not presented at the

preliminary hearing. The magistrate’s comment, “I don’t suppose that marijuana plants

that are being cultivated in this manner just subsist on water,” is not based on any

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and instead appears to be based on

speculation. The magistrate speculated further stating, “I believe a large operation like

this would require all kinds of chemicals to keep these plants going that can contaminate

the water.” After comments by defense counsel about the lack of evidence presented, the

                                             14
magistrate concluded, “[a]gain, the Court has to assume there’s going to be some

contamination from this⸺the size of the project, the type of project, how it’s being

done, . . .” While a magistrate is able to make reasonable inferences based on the

evidence presented, speculation of this nature and to this degree goes beyond the

requirement that the reviewing court draw “ ‘ “every legitimate inference . . . in favor of

the information.” ’ ” (Salazar v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 840, 842.) The

preliminary hearing transcript is devoid of any evidence showing defendant discharged or

proposed to discharge waste. Thus, the People did not provide sufficient cause to believe

defendant violated Water Code section 13260, and in turn, Health and Safety Code

section 11358, subdivision (d)(3)(B).

       In their reply brief, the People argue defendant’s failure to obtain a permit through

the regional water board is sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of Health and

Safety Code section 11358, subdivision (d)(3)(B). However, the plain language of the

statute does not support this conclusion. Water Code section 13260 imposes a reporting

requirement on individuals engaging in or proposing to engage in certain conduct. Not

having a valid discharge permit is not proof, by itself, that an individual is engaging in or

proposing to engage in discharge of waste that could affect the quality of the waters of

the state. Water Code section 13304, subdivision (a), affirms our interpretation,

providing in part, “A person . . . who has caused or . . . causes . . . any waste to be

discharged or deposited where it is, or probably will be, discharged into the waters of the

state and creates, or threatens to create, a condition of pollution or nuisance, shall, upon

                                              15
order of the regional board, clean up the waste or abate the effects of the waste, or, in the

case of threatened pollution or nuisance, take other necessary remedial action.”

       Section 13304 requires that an individual or entity clean up discharged waste or

abate the effects of the waste. (Wat. Code, § 13304 subd. (a).) In situations of threatened

pollution or nuisance, an individual or entity shall take other necessary remedial action.

(Wat. Code, § 13304, subd. (a).) The penalties enumerated in Water Code section 13304

presuppose actual damages or anticipated damages resulting from actual or proposed

discharge of waste. These penalties do not conform with the People’s interpretation of

Water Code section 13260 where absence of a permit, by itself, is a violation. Instead,

the language of Water Code section 13260 and its inclusion in Health and Safety Code

section 11358 comports with the intentions of the drafters of Proposition 64 to curb the

negative impacts of marijuana cultivation.

       The People also argue “[b]ased on the size and scope of the outdoor commercial

cannabis cultivation . . . a minimum of 630 gallons of liquid was being discharged on the

ground each day. Such discharge of waste could have resulted irrigation runoff,

tailwater, sediment or plant waste that could have entered the ground water affecting the

water quality of the state.” Again, no evidence presented at the preliminary hearing

supports such conclusions. The testimony presented indicates that marijuana plants

require one to five gallons of water a day and there is no evidence that the plants were

being over watered or that the land was structured in such a way to prevent effective

water absorption. Irrigation runoff, for example, suggests that the plants or land where

                                             16
the irrigation is occurring is unable to absorb the volume of water discharged, thus

resulting in water flowing to a different location. (Martinson v. Hughey (1988) 199

Cal.App.3d 318, 329 [discussing the rights of upper land owners to reasonably discharge

irrigation tail water onto a lower land owner’s property].) The watering of a large

number of plants does not result in de facto irrigation runoff and mere absorption of

water into the soil is not irrigation runoff. (Rancho Viego v. Tres Amigos Viejos (2002)

100 Cal.App.4th 550, 557 [describing irrigation runoff as “water cascading and seeping

from the cut slopes… causing damage to and destabilization of the slope” that could be

solved by reducing irrigation or installing water control systems].) No evidence

presented at the preliminary hearing suggests this was occurring.

       In their reply brief, the People outline the potential environmental harms

marijuana cultivation operations produce. The People cite an article detailing, among

other things, the risk of pesticides contaminating the water and the negative impact of

marijuana leaching of nutrients from the soil. While informative, including this

information in briefing does not ameliorate the absence of evidence at the preliminary

hearing.

       The People had the ability and opportunity to call a witness who could have

provided testimony about the environmental impact marijuana cultivation has on the

state’s water. Evidence Code section 801 allows experts to testify “[r]elated to a subject

that is sufficiently beyond common experience.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) The

environmental impact of marijuana cultivation is a subject sufficiently beyond common

                                            17
experience. (See generally People v. Guntert (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [both

prosecution and defense allowed to call experts where defendant on trial for depositing a

substance and material deleterious to fish and plant life into state waters].) It’s plausible

K. Bindl had the knowledge and expertise to provide this evidence if she’d been asked.

However, ultimately no evidence came before the magistrate related to these relevant

issues. This court cannot speculate what the evidence would have shown if it had been

presented.

       The question before this court is not whether defendant is a person discharging or

proposing to discharge waste in violation of section 13260, but instead, whether the

People provided enough evidence at the preliminary hearing for the magistrate to find

sufficient cause. A review of the record shows the People did not. This court cannot rely

on the recitation of the impact of marijuana cultivation on the environment the People

provide in their briefing when it was not presented to the magistrate as evidence. While

argument of the law is appropriate, providing substantive evidence through briefing is not

a substitute for presenting evidence at the preliminary hearing. To allow the People to

put forth substantive evidence through briefing would rob defendant of the opportunity to

object to its consideration. (People v. Banda (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 349, 360 [finding

trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a police report after the court ruled, depriving

the defendant both notice and the opportunity to object].) While this court does not

necessarily disagree that the marijuana cultivation at issue may have violated

                                              18
section 13260, insufficient evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing to warrant a

holding order.

                                     DISPOSITION

      The order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                              McKINSTER
                                                                              Acting P. J.
I concur:

CODRINGTON
                          J.

                                           19
[People v. Sounatananh, E080757]

       RAPHAEL, J., Concurring.

       I join the court in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the single felony charge

of cultivating cannabis plants in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11358,

subdivision (d)(3). This crime incorporates the elements of another statute defining a

civil regulation. I respectfully concur separately because the majority’s analysis does not

focus on statutory language and obscures the elements of the offense.

                                               I

       The charge against defendant Nick Sounatananh includes three elements. The first

is that he cultivated more than six living cannabis plants, and the second is that he did so

knowing it was cannabis. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358, subd. (d) (section 11358);

CALCRIM No. 2370.) The parties agree the preliminary hearing testimony covered

these elements, as Sounatananh was found at a cannabis operation with 630 live plants

and admitted tending to them.

       The third element makes the charge a felony if the cannabis cultivation offense

“resulted in” a “violation of” at least one of a list of 15 other statutory provisions, mostly

civil requirements from the Water Code or the Fish & Game Code. (§ 11358, subd.

(d)(3).) The People argue they showed the cannabis cultivation offense resulted in a

violation of Water Code section 13260 (section 13260) “relating to the discharge of

water.” (§ 11358, subd. (d)(3)(B).)

                                              1
       The disputed appellate issue, then, is whether the testimony at the preliminary

hearing provided some evidence that the cannabis cultivation offense violated all the

elements of section 13260. At this stage, the People simply need some non-speculative

showing as to each element of the section 13260 violation. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.) At

trial, they would need to prove this charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Because we analyze one criminal charge and only one of the theories that could

support that charge, the case does not implicate the broad legislative mandate provided to

the State Water Resources Control Board (Board) and its regional water quality control

boards to regulate the range of ways that cannabis cultivation may affect the state’s water

supply. (See Wat. Code, § 13276, subd. (b)(1) [requiring that the Board address a dozen

items relating to waste discharge from cannabis cultivation].)

       Accordingly, one of the People’s primary arguments is misdirected to this criminal

case. They argue the Board’s regulations require all commercial cannabis operations of a

certain size to seek a permit, so those regulations “make clear that failure to file [for] a

waste discharge permit prior to engaging” in an operation the size of the one in this case

violates section 13260. That is, they claim the “burden is placed on the cultivator to

comply with the regulations or suffer a violation of section 13260, subdivision (a).”

       While the People may be correct as to what Board regulations require, section

13260, charged as a felony through section 11358, places no such burden on the

cultivator. The language of the section does not (for instance) make criminal the failure

to file a for a permit “as required by Board regulations.” Rather, it makes criminal the

                                               2
failure to file for a permit if a cannabis operator is discharging “waste” that “could affect

the quality of the waters of the state, other than into a community sewer system.”

(§ 13260, subd. (a)(1).)1 By its terms, the criminal statute applies only when the

cultivation offense “results in” a violation of the Water Code provision. A cultivation

offense cannot result in the failure to file for a permit, but it could result in a discharge of

waste that affects the quality of the waters of the state.

       So understood, the language of sections 11358 and 13260 allows for trial defenses

that the operator was not discharging waste, that the waste did not affect the quality of

state waters, or that the waste was discharged into a community sewer system. It does

not provide for a felony if the operator failed to file for a permit for reasons that can be

known only by reading regulations. The language of the felony charged through sections

11358 and 13260 therefore does not incorporate cannabis regulations that the Board

adopts through a different statutory provision (such as Wat. Code, § 13149) granting it

authority to issue cannabis cultivation regulations. The statutory crime for failure to

furnish a report (or pay a fee) is Water Code section 13261 and defines a misdemeanor.2

       1 An illustrative contrast with this statute is the statute criminalizing the failure to
file tax returns, which applies to people who fail to file any “required” return. (Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 19701, subd. (a); see 26 U.S.C. § 7203 [including persons “required
by . . . regulations” to file a federal return].) This language means that whenever
regulations change the minimum income for which a tax return is required, the class of
persons subject to criminal liability for failure to file also changes. (See CALCRIM No.
2800 [first element].) If Water Code section 13260 similarly required filing for any
“required permit,” then the only proof needed would be the failure to file as required.

       2 Although a permit is not required by section 11358, a valid permit may be a
defense to a section 11358 charge. The crime excludes cannabis cultivators who are
                                                                    [footnote continued on next page]

                                               3
       The question for us, then, is whether the People at the preliminary hearing

provided some evidence that Sounatananh’s cannabis operation violated the elements of

section 13260 as the statute provides them. We must examine those elements.

                                             II

       Section 13260 requires certain people to file a report of a “discharge” with a

regional water board. The section contains two elements Sounatananh identifies as

unsupported by evidence. The people who must file reports are (a) discharging or

proposing to discharge “waste” that (b) “could affect the quality of the waters of the state,

other than into a community sewer system.” (§ 13260, subd. (a)(1).)

       As to the first of these elements, the preliminary hearing included sufficient

evidence to suggest that “waste” was being discharged from the cannabis operation.

       The preliminary hearing witness testified that the site included 630 live plants, and

each plant was maintained with one to five gallons of water per day. This was evidence

that the cannabis operation irrigated with at least 630, and perhaps about 3000, gallons of

water daily. The soil was damp around the plants. Under the low preliminary hearing

standard, this is sufficient evidence to establish that irrigation runoff was discharged from

the marijuana operation, at least into groundwater.

acting as “provided by law.” (§ 11358, subds. (a), (d).) California has a detailed
licensing process for cannabis cultivation. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 26060-26066.2;
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 4 §§ 15500-15507.) The model jury instructions contain instructions
on “lawful use” defenses to some cannabis offenses. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3412, 3413,
3415; see also CALCRIM No. 2370 [bench notes discussing lawful use defenses].) They
do not include permit authorization among the lawful use defenses, but such a defense
should be available.
                                             4
       Water that is irrigation runoff from a cannabis operation constitutes “waste.”

“Waste” is defined for regulatory purposes, beyond just cannabis operations, in the

division of the Water Code covering water quality. It is defined comprehensively to

include “liquid . . . from any producing, manufacturing, or processing operation.” (Wat.

Code, § 13050(d).)3 That definition includes any irrigation runoff from an operation. In

fact, for cannabis cultivation, the Board must establish “waste discharge requirements”

that include “irrigation runoff” as well as erosion control and drainage. (Wat. Code, §

13276, subds. (b)(1), (b)(6).) Those items do not depend on the water being mixed with

some other substance before traveling through soil, and they are listed separately from

fertilizers and pesticides. (See id., subds. (b)(7), (b)(8).) Consequently, for instance,

water discharged from a site can move or deposit “‘silt or sediment,’” which can be waste

affecting the state waters. (Santa Clara Valley Water District v. Cal. Regional Water

Quality Control Board (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 199, 210; see also State Water Resources

Control Board Order WQ 2019-0001-DWQ at p. 1 (General Order)

<https://perma.cc/W8GS-ETPW> [“Waste discharges from cultivation sites include

sediment”]; see also Wat. Code, § 13304, subd. (a) [waste discharge can constitute not

just “pollution” but also “nuisance”].) Whether the operation here discharged waste by

irrigation runoff perhaps could be contested at trial. But the People provided some

       3 The provision defines “waste” circularly to include any “waste substances,” and
the definition of those substances is all-inclusive. “‘Waste’ includes sewage and any and
all other waste substances, liquid, solid, gaseous, or radioactive, associated with human
habitation, or of human or animal origin, or from any producing, manufacturing, or
processing operation, including waste placed within containers of whatever nature prior
to, and for purposes of, disposal.” (Wat. Code, § 13050, subd. (d).)
                                              5
evidence of “waste” through preliminary hearing testimony of the large water volume

needed to maintain 630 cannabis plants.

       That said, evidence for the second contested element was entirely lacking.

       The People had to provide an indication that the irrigation runoff “could affect the

quality of the waters of the state, other than into a community sewer system.” (§ 13260,

subd. (a)(1).) Even though irrigation runoff (untainted by any fertilizer or pesticide)

could affect state waters, the People must offer some indication that the water at

Sounatananh’s site did so. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not needed until trial, but

some piece of evidence is. The statutory language must be read to have some meaning.

       To illustrate the difference between the elements of “waste” and “affecting the

quality of waters,” consider a backyard planter with a dozen marijuana plants, where the

grower uses fertilizer but discharges irrigation runoff into the community sewer system.

While the People could offer evidence of the discharge of waste, they could not offer

proof of a section 13260 violation, because the discharge is into the sewer. Likewise, if

such a small operation discharged not into the sewer but a small amount of water into the

ground, there might be no way to show that the waste affected the quality of state waters.

       In all, evidence of up to 3,000 gallons of daily water at a cannabis operation is

sufficient to show irrigation runoff. If that runoff is in fact harmless to the quality of

California’s waters, the People would be unable to show the charged criminal violation at

trial. In contrast, if the runoff affects state waters through erosion, silt, sediment, or some

other substance the water collects, the People might be able to show a crime. At the

                                               6
preliminary hearing, they needed some evidence of how the runoff affected state water

quality, as the statute requires. They offered none. This is why we should affirm.

                                             III

       Having laid out what the statutes say, I will outline briefly why I think the

majority opinion’s analysis is lacking. Although the majority cites the statutes, it does

not tie its reasoning to them. It thereby complicates and obfuscates what is needed for

this section 11358 charge at a preliminary hearing.

       The majority states there is “no evidence” of irrigation runoff. (Maj. opn., ante, at

pp. 16-17.) The preliminary hearing testimony, however, suggested the site irrigates with

up to 3,000 gallons of water a day. The majority recognizes that the “waters of the state”

include groundwater. (Id. at p. 10.) The majority also recognizes that because this case

is at the preliminary hearing stage, there must be a “total absence” of evidence on an

element to dismiss a case, with “circumstantial evidence” and “reasonable inferences”

permitted. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7 [citation omitted].) The large amount of water is

sufficient to support an inference of irrigation runoff. If the majority means what it says,

even with ample evidence of (for instance) bags of toxic fertilizers at the site, this charge

would have to be dismissed without better proof of runoff. To the contrary, the inference

of irrigation runoff is reasonable for a preliminary hearing.

       Apart from the discharge of runoff from the site is the showing that the discharge

is “waste.” Rather than apply the broad statutory definition of waste, the majority creates

“two arguably broad categories of waste” that includes substances that are

                                              7
“independently waste” and substances that can be “converted into waste.” (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 11.) This allows the majority to conclude that water discharge here is not

waste without evidence that “the manner in which it is used” causes harm. (Ibid.) But as

discussed, the statutory definition of waste includes all substances discharged by

industrial use. It includes sediment, which water picks up simply by running through

earth. The statutes themselves allow the Water Board to regulate “irrigation runoff”

among “waste discharge requirements.” (Wat. Code, § 13276, subds. (b), (b)(6).)

       For these reasons, the majority is not correct—under the preliminary hearing

standard—to conclude that “[n]o evidence was presented related to waste discharge,

actual or potential.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.) There was a reasonable inference of

discharge of water as irrigation runoff, which is the “potential” waste discharge that the

majority says there is no evidence of. (Id. at p. 14).

       The proper focus of the opinion should be on the section 13260, subdivision (a)(1)

element that makes the defendant guilty of the crime charged here if a waste discharge

from the cannabis operation “could affect the quality of waters of the state.” The

majority folds this element into a broader test for when a discharge constitutes waste: if it

has “a negative impact on the surrounding environment, including, but not limited to the

surrounding state waters.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12).

       Instead, our guidance for the People should be simple. Along with the extant

evidence of water use at the cannabis cultivation, they must offer some evidence the

water use would affect the quality of state waters. If the People can offer a reasonable

                                              8
inference of this, that would be sufficient for the preliminary hearing. With no evidence

supporting such an inference, the charge was properly dismissed.

                                            IV

       The preliminary hearing testimony was deficient. The People’s proffered theory

of the felony charge (§ 11358) is that the “discharge of water” from the cannabis

cultivation (§ 11358, subd. (d)(3)(B)) was waste that “could affect the quality of the

waters of the state” (§ 13260). Yet they offered no indication Sounatananh’s cannabis

operation could affect the quality of state waters. That warranted dismissal.

                                                               RAPHAEL
                                                                                            J.

                                             9