Court Opinion

ID: 9897344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:25.45032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:25.504847
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                    Jul 13 2023, 9:27 am

                                                                                        CLERK
                                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                                         and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke                                       Theodore E. Rokita
Brooklyn, Indiana                                           Indiana Attorney General

                                                            Daylon L. Welliver
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Heidi Marie Littlefield,                                    July 13, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-2895
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Hamilton
                                                            Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Michael A. Casati,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            29D01-2103-MR-1789

                            Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                    Judge Kenworthy and Senior Judge Robb concur.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023                         Page 1 of 15
[1]   Heidi Littlefield appeals her convictions for murder, Level 1 felony conspiracy

      to commit murder, and Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit murder, claiming

      that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for murder, and that

      the dual convictions for murder and Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit

      murder constitute double jeopardy. Littlefield further contends that the 115-

      year aggregate sentence is inappropriate when considering the nature of the

      offenses and her character.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts & Procedural History 1

[3]   Littlefield and Francis Kelley are the biological parents of B.K., born in early

      2019. The relationship between Littlefield and Kelley soured after B.K.’s birth.

      As a result, Littlefield did not want Kelley to have a relationship with B.K.; nor

      did she want her adult children to interact with Kelley.

[4]   In March 2020, Kelley filed a petition to establish custody, parenting time, and

      child support. At some point, Littlefield approached two of her adult daughters

      to assist in purchasing drugs to poison Kelley. After they refused, Littlefield

      asked another daughter, Logan Runyon, to help her obtain fentanyl and poison

      Kelley. Littlefield promised to give her some of the life insurance proceeds that

      B.K. would receive if they succeeded in killing Kelley.

      1
       We heard oral argument in this matter on June 22, 2023, at the Jewish Community Center in Indianapolis.
      We thank all at the Center for their hospitality, and we commend counsel for their able presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023                           Page 2 of 15
[5]   Runyon purchased the fentanyl, and in October 2020, Littlefield brought Kelley

      soup that she and Runyon had laced with the drug. Although Kelley consumed

      the soup and became ill, he did not die. Later that same month, Littlefield

      spoke with Robert Walker—Runyon’s boyfriend—about hiring a hitman to kill

      Kelley. Walker acknowledged that he “knew someone,” and Littlefield gave

      him $2500 as a down payment for contacting the prospective hitman. Transcript

      Vol. IV at 119-20. Runyon and Walker, however, spent the money on hotels

      and drugs.

[6]   On January 14, 2021, Runyon and Littlefield purchased more fentanyl. That

      same day, Runyon entered Kelley’s residence after Littlefield lured him away

      from the house to go shopping for B.K. Once inside, Runyon laced Kelley’s

      refrigerated oatmeal with the fentanyl. The next day, Kelley texted Littlefield

      and asked whether she had put something in his oatmeal because it tasted

      “funny,” and he felt “light-headed.” Id. at 145. Shortly thereafter, Runyon and

      Littlefield, along with B.K., drove to Kelley’s house. Runyon saw Kelley

      through a window lying on the kitchen floor. Runyon entered the residence

      through a window and opened the front door for Littlefield. Kelley was

      breathing abnormally and gasping for air. Littlefield grabbed one of Kelley’s

      neckties, tied it around his neck, lifted him “up, probably two to three feet”

      several times, and slammed his head to the floor each time. Id. at 148-49. After

      they left the residence, Littlefield tossed the necktie in a restaurant trash can.

[7]   On January 18, Kelley’s former girlfriend—and mother of their minor child—

      went to Kelley’s residence and saw him lying on a couch, deceased. She saw

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023           Page 3 of 15
      no signs of forced entry, and when emergency personnel arrived, they examined

      Kelley and determined that he was nonviable due to “prolonged signs of

      death,” including lividity and rigor mortis. Transcript Vol. III at 35. There was

      evidence of blunt force trauma to Kelley’s eye and head, and the cause of death

      was determined to be “asphyxia due to strangulation/neck compression” with

      “acute fentanyl intoxication” as a contributing cause. Id. at 168. The evidence

      showed that the fentanyl would have made Kelley “groggy” and unable to

      defend himself. Id. at 167, 170. Fentanyl can result in a “slow death,” and take

      up to twelve or more hours before a person dies after ingesting the drug. Id. at

      174. The fluid found in Kelley’s lungs indicated that he died “a slow death,”

      and the level of fentanyl in his system could have been considered as the cause

      of death, had that been the only finding in the autopsy. Id. at 174-75.

[8]   Following a police investigation, Littlefield was charged with murder (Count

      1), Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit murder (Count 2), and Level 2 felony

      conspiracy to commit murder (Count 3). The conspiracy counts alleged the

      following:

              Count 2: between on or about January 1, 2021 and on or about
              January 15, 2021, Littlefield agreed with Runyon to commit the
              crime of murder (which is to knowingly or intentionally kill
              another human being, to-wit: Francis A. Kelley) with the intent
              to commit that crime, and Littlefield or Runyon performed at
              least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement, to-wit:

                       a. acquiring fentanyl
                       b. transporting Runyon to Carmel
                       c. transporting fentanyl to Carmel

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023         Page 4 of 15
                       d. accompanying Kelley away from his home on January 14, 2021
                       e. adding fentanyl to Kelley’s food
                       f. entering Kelley’s home on January 15, 2021
                       g. battering and/or strangling Kelley.

              Count 3: between on or about October 1, 2020, and on or about
              October 31, 2020, Littlefield agreed with Robert James Walker to
              commit the crime of murder (which is to knowingly or
              intentionally kill another human being), to-wit: Kelley with the
              intent to commit that crime, and Littlefield performed at least
              one overt act in furtherance of the agreement, to-wit:

              a. paid money to Robert James Walker.

      Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 19.

[9]   Following a jury trial, Littlefield was found guilty as charged, and the trial court

      entered judgments of conviction on all counts. At the sentencing hearing on

      October 7, 2022, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances:

      a) Kelley’s vulnerability when Littlefield strangled him; b) the planning and

      premeditation of the offenses exceeded what was necessary to establish a

      conspiracy; c) Littlefield’s commission of the offenses deprived B.K. of her

      parents; d) her plans to kill Kelley resulted in prison sentences for Runyon and

      Walker; and e) Littlefield’s threats against Runyon to cooperate in the plan.

      The trial court identified Littlefield’s lack of criminal history as a mitigating

      factor, and after determining that the aggravators substantially outweighed the

      sole mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced Littlefield to sixty years

      on Count 1, thirty-five years on Count 2, and twenty years on Count 3.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023           Page 5 of 15
       Littlefield was ordered to serve the sentences consecutively, thus resulting in an

       aggregate 115-year executed sentence.

[10]   Littlefield now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision

       1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11]   Littlefield argues that her murder conviction must be reversed because the State

       failed to establish that she killed Kelley. Littlefield maintains that while the

       State presented sufficient evidence to show that “she attempted to kill Kelley,”

       the “State’s own evidence did not establish that she killed him.” Appellant’s Brief

       at 13 (emphasis added).

[12]   When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither

       reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Hall v. State,

       177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). Rather, we consider the evidence most

       favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn

       therefrom. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). Moreover, when

       faced with conflicting evidence, we consider only that which is favorable to the

       judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). If there exists

       substantial evidence of probative value to support the jury’s conclusion, the

       conviction will be affirmed. Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1066.

[13]   In accordance with Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1, the offense of murder is committed

       when a defendant “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.” In

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023          Page 6 of 15
       support of her sufficiency of the evidence claim, Littlefield notes that the

       primary cause of Kelley’s death was determined to be asphyxia due to

       strangulation rather than acute fentanyl intoxication. Although Runyon

       testified at trial that Littlefield strangled Kelley with a necktie and banged his

       head on the floor numerous times, Littlefield argues that Kelley was alive when

       she and Runyon left the residence. According to Littlefield, the evidence

       established that Kelley could not have died on the floor “because livor mortis

       would have settled on the front part of [Kelley’s] body.” Appellant’s Brief at 14.

       Littlefield also notes that the State’s evidence showed that Matthew Duncan—

       the father of one of Littlefield’s other children—had spoken with Runyon and

       Walker about killing Kelley and that Duncan’s cell phone was tracked in the

       vicinity of Kelley’s home on the afternoon of January 16. In light of this

       evidence, Littlefield claims that there was a “strong possibility that . . . Duncan

       visited the home . . . and strangled Kelley [to death] . . . .” Id. at 15. In short,

       Littlefield maintains that because “the State never presented any evidence to

       show that Littlefield in any way aided, induced, or caused Duncan to kill

       Kelley,” the murder conviction must be reversed. Id.

[14]   Notwithstanding Littlefield’s contentions, the evidence most favorable to the

       judgment established that Littlefield and Runyon purchased fentanyl to poison

       Kelley’s food with the intention of killing him. Littlefield developed the plan

       for Runyon to enter Kelley’s house while he was not there and poison his

       oatmeal. Littlefield set the plan in motion by luring Kelley from his house, and

       Runyon entered while he was away.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023           Page 7 of 15
[15]      The evidence further showed that when Kelley texted Littlefield asking if she

          put something in his oatmeal, Littlefield threatened Runyon and compelled her

          to continue to assist in the plan to kill Kelley. The two proceeded to Kelley’s

          house and once inside, Littlefield strangled Kelley with a necktie and slammed

          his head repeatedly on the ground, causing severe injury and blunt force

          trauma. Runyon then walked outside and waited in the car for approximately

          ten minutes until Littlefield exited the residence. The two then drove to a

          restaurant where Littlefield threw the necktie in the trash. The evidence

          established that Littlefield was the last known person to have seen Kelley alive.

[16]      Runyon’s testimony was corroborated by the autopsy, along with the forensic

          pathologist’s testimony who concluded that Kelley was strangled to death with

          fentanyl intoxication as a contributing cause. Moreover, Runyon’s testimony

          that Littlefield placed the necktie around Kelley’s neck, lifted him off the

          ground several times and banged his head on the floor, was corroborated by the

          evidence of injury to Kelley’s neck muscles, voice box, Adam’s apple, and

          tongue.

[17]      In sum, Littlefield is asking that we reweigh the evidence, which we decline to

          do. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Littlefield’s

          murder conviction.

       2. Double Jeopardy

[18]      Littlefield argues that dual convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit

          murder as alleged in Count 2 cannot stand because of the double jeopardy

          Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023         Page 8 of 15
       prohibition under Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. Littlefield

       maintains that the murder conviction must be set aside when applying the

       double jeopardy test announced in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 253 (Ind.

       2020).

[19]   Questions of substantive double jeopardy are resolved pursuant to the

       framework set forth in Wadle and Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020).

       The “Wadle test” applies “when a single criminal act or transaction violates

       multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims,”

       whereas the Powell test applies “when a single criminal act or transaction

       violates a single statute but harms multiple victims” or “results in multiple

       injuries.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247; Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 263. Under either

       test, “the dispositive question is one of statutory intent.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at

       247. Double jeopardy claims are reviewed de novo. Id. at 237.

[20]   The offenses in this case involve Littlefield’s convictions for a single criminal

       transaction that implicates both the murder and conspiracy statutes. See Garth v.

       State, 182 N.E.3d 905, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Thus, Littlefield’s

       claim triggers application of the Wadle test. See id. Under the Wadle analysis,

       we first examine whether the statutes permit multiple punishments, either by

       express statement or by unmistakable implication. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. If

       so, there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy and “the court’s inquiry

       comes to an end.” Id. If the statutes are unclear, we apply our included-offense

       statutes. Id. If either offense is included in the other, either inherently or as

       charged, we then consider whether the defendant’s actions are “so compressed
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023           Page 9 of 15
       in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to

       constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 249. If the facts show only a single

       crime, judgment may not be entered on the included offense. Id. at 256.

[21]   To obtain a murder conviction, the State must establish that the person

       knowingly or intentionally killed another person, or the defendant aided,

       induced, or caused someone else to kill the person. Ind. Code §§ 35-41-2-4, 35-

       42-1-1. A person conspires to commit a felony when, with intent to commit the

       felony, the person “agrees with another person to commit the felony.” I.C. §

       35-41-5-2(a). To obtain a conviction for conspiracy, the State must “allege and

       prove that either the person or the person with whom he or she agreed

       performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” I.C. § 35-41-5-2(b).

[22]   Littlefield asserts that neither the murder statute nor the conspiracy statute

       includes language that expressly states or implies that multiple punishments are

       permitted. She also notes that the General Assembly did not amend the

       “multiple convictions” statute 2 “to expressly permit punishment for both

       conspiracy to commit murder and murder.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. As a

       result, Littlefield asserts that all the double jeopardy tests set forth in Wadle

       2
          I.C. § 35-41-5-3 provides that “(a) A person may not be convicted of both a conspiracy and an attempt with
       respect to the same underlying crime. (b) A person may not be convicted of both a crime and an attempt to
       commit the same crime.” This statute immediately follows the attempt and conspiracy statutes.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023                              Page 10 of 15
       must be applied here, and it must be concluded that her dual convictions for

       murder and conspiracy to commit murder in Count 2 cannot stand.

[23]   Notwithstanding Littlefield’s argument, we note that Indiana treats the offense

       of conspiracy to commit an offense as a separate crime from the underlying

       offense because the “agreement itself constitutes the criminal act.” Coleman v.

       State, 952 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). For instance, in Garth, the

       defendant was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. In

       rejecting Garth’s argument on appeal that the dual convictions violated double

       jeopardy prohibitions, a panel of this court explained:

               [Ind. Code] Section 35-41-5-3 explicitly prohibits convictions for
               both a conspiracy and an attempt with respect to the same
               underlying crime. It also prohibits convictions for both a crime
               and an attempt to commit the same crime. Id. Notably,
               however, it does not prohibit convictions for both a crime and a
               conspiracy to commit the same crime. If the legislature wanted to
               prohibit convictions for both a crime and a conspiracy to commit that
               same crime, it surely would have included such language in Section 35-
               41-5-3. See N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind.
               2002) (“[I]t is just as important to recognize what the statute does
               not say as it is to recognize what it does say.”). We conclude that
               the murder and conspiracy statutes allow for multiple punishments, and
               consequently Garth’s convictions do not violate double
               jeopardy.

       182 N.E.3d at 920 (emphasis added).

[24]   As in Garth, we conclude that there is no double jeopardy violation as to

       Littlefield’s convictions for both murder and conspiracy to commit murder

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023           Page 11 of 15
       under Wadle. Thus, our double jeopardy inquiry ends here, and Littlefield’s

       convictions for both offenses may stand.

       3. Sentencing

[25]   Littlefield argues that the 115-year aggregate sentence was inappropriate when

       considering the nature of the offenses and her character in accordance with Ind.

       Appellate Rule 7(B). Although Littlefield acknowledges that her “repeated

       attempts to kill Kelley, the father of her young child, was particularly

       egregious,” she claims that her enhanced, consecutive sentence must be revised

       because of her habitual drinking and her difficult childhood. Appellant’s Brief at

       20.

[26]   Our standard of review regarding inappropriate sentence claims is well-settled:

               Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) gives us the authority to revise a
               sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
               and the character of the offender. Our review is deferential to the
               trial court’s decision, and our goal is to determine whether the
               appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other
               sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the
               aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any
               other factors appearing in the record.

       George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[27]   Whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on the culpability of the defendant,

       the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other

       factors that come to light in a given case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023          Page 12 of 15
       1224 (Ind. 2008). The defendant has the burden of persuading us that the

       sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

       More particularly, the defendant must show that her sentence is inappropriate

       with “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the

       offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the

       defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples

       of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[28]   The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an

       appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657

       (Ind. 2014). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, “we

       consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as

       committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense

       accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Madden v.

       State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[29]   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 sets forth a minimum sentence of forty-five years, a

       maximum of sixty-five years, and an advisory sentence of fifty-five years for the

       offense of murder. Here, the trial court sentenced Littlefield to sixty years for

       that offense. Under Count 2, Littlefield was convicted of conspiracy, a Level 1

       felony, which provides for a minimum sentence of twenty years, a maximum

       sentence of forty years, and an advisory sentence of thirty years. The trial court

       imposed a thirty-five-year sentence on that offense. Littlefield’s conviction for

       Count 3 conspiracy, a level 2 felony, carries a maximum sentence of thirty

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023        Page 13 of 15
       years, a minimum of ten years, and an advisory sentence of seventeen-and-one-

       half years. Littlefield was sentenced to twenty years for that offense.

[30]   When examining the nature of the offense, we look to the details and

       circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s participation therein. Madden,

       162 N.E.3d at 564. Notwithstanding Littlefield’s attempt to minimize the

       egregiousness of her offenses because of her difficult childhood 3 and her alcohol

       abuse, she has offered no compelling evidence of “restraint, regard, and lack of

       brutality,” in the commission of the offenses. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

       The horrendous circumstances of the crimes, along with Littlefield’s persistent

       pattern of trying to kill Kelley that ultimately deprived B.K. of a father, her

       continued manipulation of Runyon to participate in the murder plot, and the

       fact that she left her minor daughter in the car during the murder, do not

       warrant a revision of the sentence when examining the nature of the offenses.

[31]   Turning to Littlefield’s character, we note that “character is found in what we

       learn of the offender’s life and conduct.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2017). We conduct our review of a defendant’s character by engaging

       3
          The presentence investigation report (PSI) contradicts this assertion, in that Littlefield reported to the
       probation department that she was raised in a good home and had “no domestic issues” with her mother and
       stepfather. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 211. And even if there was evidence to support Littlefield’s claim of
       a difficult childhood, our Supreme Court has “consistently held that [such circumstances] warrant little, if
       any, mitigating weight.” See Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 725 (Ind. 2007).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023                                  Page 14 of 15
       in a broad consideration of her qualities. Madden, 162 N.E.3d at 564. A

       defendant’s life and conduct are illustrative of character. Id.

[32]   Although Littlefield insists that she is of good character because she has no

       prior criminal convictions and was gainfully employed at the time of the

       offenses, the evidence demonstrates that she tried to enlist the aid of her two

       other daughters before successfully recruiting Runyon. Littlefield and Runyon

       illegally purchased fentanyl on several occasions to facilitate her commission of

       the murder, and Littlefield assisted Runyon in illegally entering Kelley’s home.

       Indeed, a defendant’s lack of criminal history may be properly rejected as a

       mitigating circumstance where there is other evidence of criminal behavior.

       Bostick v. State, 804 N.E.2d 218, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Additionally,

       Littlefield’s anger toward Kelley, her desire to exclude Kelley from B.K.’s life,

       and her threats against her own daughter to keep her involved in the murder

       plot, “speak[s] volumes” about Littlefield’s poor character. Appellee’s Brief at 31.

[33]   In sum, neither the nature of the offenses nor Littlefield’s character renders

       Littlefield’s 115-year executed sentence inappropriate.

[34]   Judgment affirmed.

       Kenworthy, J., and Robb, Sr.J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2895 | July 13, 2023        Page 15 of 15