Court Opinion

ID: 9945365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 19:01:45.496473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.547387
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-5055     Document: 010111006083      Date Filed: 02/27/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 27, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 23-5055
                                                  (D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00545-GKF-1)
  RODRIGO JAVIER DIAZ-DE LA CRUZ,                            (N.D. Okla.)
  a/k/a Jose T. Gonzalez,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Rodrigo Javier Diaz-De la Cruz pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the

 United States after having been previously removed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1326. His

 Pre-Sentence Investigation Report assessed an offense level of 15 and a criminal

 history category of II, yielding a guideline sentencing range of 21-27 months in

 prison. De la Cruz moved for both a downward departure and a downward variance.

 The district court denied a departure, granted a two-level downward variance, and

       *
         After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-5055    Document: 010111006083       Date Filed: 02/27/2024    Page: 2

 sentenced De la Cruz to 18 months in prison. De la Cruz appealed, indicating he

 intended to challenge the procedural and/or substantive reasonableness of his

 sentence. His counsel, however, filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

 738 (1967), contending there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal and seeking

 permission to withdraw. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.

                                            I

       Anders permits “counsel to request permission to withdraw where counsel

 conscientiously examines a case and determines that any appeal would be wholly

 frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005).

       [C]ounsel must submit a brief to the client and the appellate court
       indicating any potential appealable issues based on the record. The
       client may then choose to submit arguments to the court. The [c]ourt
       must then conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether
       defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous. If the court concludes after
       such an examination that the appeal is frivolous, it may grant counsel’s
       motion to withdraw and may dismiss the appeal.

 Id. (citations omitted). De la Cruz’s counsel filed an Anders brief and served it on

 both the government and De la Cruz. We notified De la Cruz of his opportunity to

 file a pro se response, but neither he nor the government responded. Based on our

 review, we agree with counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.

                                           II

       Counsel identifies two potential issues relating to the procedural and

 substantive reasonableness of De la Cruz’s sentence. “[W]e review all sentences—

 whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a

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Appellate Case: 23-5055     Document: 010111006083         Date Filed: 02/27/2024     Page: 3

 deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298,

 1301 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Our appellate review for

 reasonableness includes both a procedural component, encompassing the method by

 which a sentence was calculated, as well as a substantive component, which relates to

 the length of the resulting sentence.” United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 803

 (10th Cir. 2008). “While a case involving a departure (and thus the question of

 guidelines application) opens the door to a procedural reasonableness challenge, we

 review a variance for substantive reasonableness.” United States v. Kaspereit,

 994 F.3d 1202, 1214 (10th Cir. 2021).

        Counsel first correctly points out that any procedural challenge to the

 discretionary denial of a downward departure would fall outside the scope of our

 jurisdiction. See United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 (10th Cir. 2005)

 (“This court has no jurisdiction . . . to review a district court’s discretionary decision

 to deny a motion for downward departure on the ground that a defendant’s

 circumstances do not warrant the departure.”).

        “The only [jurisdictional] exception is if the denial [of a departure] is based on

 the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines as depriving it of the legal

 authority to grant the departure.” United States v. Dawson, 90 F.4th 1286, 1292-93

 (10th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). That exception does not apply

 here. De la Cruz sought a departure under United States Sentencing Guidelines

 Manual § 2L1.2, cmt., appl. n.7 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n), which permits a

 departure based on time served in state custody. “Such a departure should be

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 considered only in cases where the departure is not likely to increase the risk to the

 public from further crimes of the defendant.” Id. Among other things, “the court

 should consider . . . whether the defendant engaged in additional criminal activity

 after illegally reentering the United States [and] the seriousness of any such

 additional criminal activity.” Id. The district court considered these factors and

 determined that a departure was inappropriate because it was likely to increase the

 risk to the public from further crimes of De la Cruz. Further, the district court

 pointed out that, after illegally reentering the United States, De la Cruz committed a

 serious state offense—trafficking in heroin. Under these circumstances, the district

 court did not misunderstand its authority to grant or deny a departure.

       Second, counsel correctly contends there are no nonfrivolous issues regarding

 the district court’s substantive decision to grant a downward variance. De la Cruz

 conceded that the applicable guidelines range was 21-27 months in prison, but he

 requested a downward variance to time served because he had been in federal custody

 for over five months and in state custody for 26 months. He claimed a variance

 would avoid any sentencing disparity caused by his federal prosecution being delayed

 until after his state sentence was imposed, which he asserted deprived him of the

 opportunity to seek concurrent state and federal sentences. He also urged the district

 court to grant a variance on the grounds that he reentered the United States for

 economic reasons and the guidelines overrepresented his criminal history.

       The district court agreed De la Cruz’s circumstances warranted a slight

 downward variance, particularly because the guidelines overrepresented his criminal

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 history. The district court considered the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C.

 § 3553(a) and reduced the applicable offense level by two, which yielded a guideline

 range of 15-21 months. The district court then sentenced De la Cruz to 18 months in

 prison. This is not an unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d

 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A] . . . sentence is substantively unreasonable only if

 it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.”). The district

 court carefully weighed the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature of De la Cruz’s

 unlawful-reentry offense, his criminal history, and his personal characteristics. The

 district court also explained that it sought to impose a sentence to provide adequate

 deterrence, promote respect for the law, provide a just punishment, and protect the

 public, mindful of sentencing disparities. Affording due deference to the district

 court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors warranted the variance, any challenge to

 the substantive reasonableness of De la Cruz’s sentence would have been frivolous.

                                            III

       Based on our review of the record, we find no other arguably meritorious

 claims. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss this appeal.

                                                       Entered for the Court

                                                       Nancy L. Moritz
                                                       Circuit Judge

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