Court Opinion

ID: 9700307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:19:30.573831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:06.922816
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
In this case, the Court holds that a consumer, who has purchased a product, cannot rely on a common-law cause of action sounding in strict-products liability and negligence to recover damages solely for the economic loss resulting from a defect that *644destroys the worth of the product. Instead, the majority determines that the consumer’s exclusive remedy consists of the express warranties contained in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”). I am not troubled with that disposition because I am convinced that in a case such as this, the consumer is not at a genuine commercial disadvantage and is the kind of consumer who falls within the ambit of the U.C.C. The consumer here is a purchaser of an expensive luxury boat whose bargaining power is substantially equivalent to that of the seller. Furthermore, because the majority has not foreclosed tort recovery for purely economic loss in instances where the parties may be economic captives with unequal bargaining power, I am able to join in the result. See Ante at 638-639, 695 A.2d at 272-273 (“[W]e do not reach the issue of the preclusion of a strict-liability claim when the parties of unequal bargaining power, the product is a necessity, no alternative source for the product is readily available, and the purchaser cannot reasonably insure against consequential damages.”).
In Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 596-97, 489 A.2d 660 (1985) (Handler, J., concurring), I expressed the view that the U.C.C. did not foreclose a tort remedy for economic loss incurred by a non-commercial consumer. That category of consumer, as I viewed it, encompassed a class of purchasers who frequently would not have equal bargaining power. I believed that comparative bargaining power was the most critical factor in determining whether the U.C.C. was the exclusive remedy and that the U.C.C. did not bar other avenues of relief to consumers with substantial bargaining disadvantages. Under the U.C.C., recovery is restricted to limited claimants who meet the stringent requirements of the U.C.C. warranty provisions. Moreover, warranty disclaimers often bar recovery altogether.1 Such a *645result is acceptable only where the parties to the contract have equivalent bargaining power and meaningful alternatives. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.Cir.1965) (“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent ... was ever given to all the terms.”)
Comparative bargaining power cannot be determined merely by labeling a consumer either “commercial” or “non-commercial.” As the facts of this case reveal, some non-commercial purchasers will enjoy equal bargaining power. Similarly, some commercial purchasers in no sense enjoy equal bargaining power or the opportunity to secure adequate protections in the bargaining process. See Spring Motors, supra, 98 N.J. at 592, 489 A.2d 660 (Handler, J., concurring) (“It would not be correct to consider the U.C.C. remedy to be exclusively applicable to a purchaser’s claim simply because the transaction can be viewed as ‘commercial’ ... or because the ultimate purchaser is in business____ [T]he ultimate purchaser of a vehicle could be a travelling salesperson or a small-scale trucker, or a carpenter, plumber, electrician, or landscape gardener.”) Whether the U.C.C. should be the exclusive remedy for economic loss in a particular case can be determined only by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases, a gross inequality of bargaining power will supplant the exclusivity of the U.C.C. remedy.
In sum, I am confident that the Court’s decision does not preclude tort remedies for economic loss in such circumstances. I thus concur in its judgment.
Justice STEIN joins in this opinion.
*646HANDLER and STEIN, JJ., concur in result.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
For affirmance — None.

 The majority is satisfied with the limited U.C.C. remedy because “[ajlthough a manufacturer may be in a better position to absorb the risk of loss from physical injury or property damage, a purchaser may be better situated to absorb the ‘risk of economic loss caused by the purchase of a defective product.' " Ante *645at 628, 695 A.2d at 268 (citations omitted). That is not always the case. One can imagine myriad instances where the purchaser of an expensive necessity, such as a refrigerator or an oven, could be devastated by the product's defectiveness.