Court Opinion

ID: 9789378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:35:43.371447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:59.070718
License: Public Domain

Alexander, J.
(dissenting) — I concur in the result reached by the majority, insofar as it finds that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of Pederson's prior conviction. However, I respectfully dissent from its holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of the polygrapher, Dr. Stanley Abrams. On retrial of the case, I strongly believe that the polygraph evidence should be excluded.
The majority has recognized that the requirements for admission of polygraph results set forth in State v. Renfro, 96 Wn.2d 902, 639 P.2d 737, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982) have not been complied with strictly. Nevertheless, it holds that substantial compliance with those standards occurred and that this compliance was sufficient. I disagree, because in my view, anything less than strict compliance with the Renfro standards should preclude admission of polygraph results at trial. Furthermore, I do not believe there has been substantial compliance with the Renfro requirements in this case, even if that degree of compliance is legally sufficient to support admission of the polygraph results.
The majority acknowledges that the courts of this state, along with courts of other jurisdictions, have long taken a rather jaundiced view of the polygraph. It was not until 1972 that polygraph results were deemed admissible in courts of this state. State v. Ross, 7 Wn. App. 62, 69, 497 P.2d 1343, 53 A.L.R.3d 997, review denied, 81 Wn.2d 1003 (1972). Courts have expressed reluctance to admit polygraph results under any conditions because they have had concerns about the reliability of the test and the capacity of such evidence to cause extreme prejudice. See Annot., Admissibility of Lie Detector Test Taken Upon Stipulation That the Result Will Be Admissible in Evidence, 53 *398A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973). Even in State v. Renfro, supra, the majority conceded that the evidence was insufficient for the court to conclude "that the polygraph has risen to the level where it can be said that it is reliable enough to be consistent with the standard of guilt required in criminal cases." Renfro, 96 Wn.2d at 905. No Washington case exists since Renfro that has expressed any more favorable view about the reliability of the polygraph machine and the results produced by it.
In light of the criticisms that courts of this state and others have leveled at the polygraph, I find it difficult to believe that substantial compliance with the explicit Renfro standards is sufficient to justify admission of this evidence.
In State v. Renfro, the court stated that "[m]ore than a stipulation by the parties is needed, however. There must be further safeguards before polygraph evidence may be admitted." (Italics mine.) Renfro, 96 Wn.2d at 906. The court proceeded to set forth the requirements for admission, including the requirement that the "[prosecuting] attorney, defendant and his counsel all sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's submission to the test and for the subsequent admission at trial of the graphs and the examiner's opinion thereon ..." (Italics mine.) Renfro, 96 Wn.2d at 906.
The majority concedes that Pederson's defense counsel did not sign the written stipulation. In fact, the stipulation did not contain a block for counsel's signature. Furthermore, the stipulation did not contain all of the language dictated by Renfro, relating to the admission at trial of the graphs. Additionally, the written stipulation signed by Pederson was for a test to be administered by Michael Davidson, a person other than the person who actually performed the test and then testified at trial. Finally, the stipulation was equivocal in that it was made "subject to evidentiary objections." The stipulation, thus, fails in numerous respects to measure up to the strict standards required by Renfro.
Even assuming that substantial compliance with Renfro's *399requirements would justify admission of polygraph results, I do not believe that such compliance is present here. Defense counsel, as I have noted, did not sign the stipulation, and he objected vehemently at trial to the admission of the polygraph testimony. The majority explains this away by pointing out that Pederson's counsel negotiated, prepared, and discussed the stipulation with his client. It further notes that counsel did nothing before trial to obstruct his client's desire to undergo the polygraph examination.
The record reflects, however, that defense counsel did not acquiesce in his client's decision to take the test. The attorney was only acting to carry out his client's wishes, notwithstanding his advice to his client to decline to take the test. An attorney whose advice is not accepted is in a difficult position, and we should be slow to read the attorney's advocacy of his client's position as evidence of the attorney's own views.
The majority points to the attorney's statement that his failure to sign the stipulation was "inadvertent." That statement, however, must be viewed against the backdrop of counsel's admitted lack of knowledge of all of the elements of the Renfro standards. The attorney apparently did not know until after the test was administered that he, in effect, had a veto right over his client's ability to stipulate to the admissibility of the polygraph results. Therefore, any support for a finding of substantial compliance with Renfro that can be taken from the attorney's statement is diminished by his lack of awareness of the significant role he was to play in the decision to stipulate to the admission of test results. In light of his expressed opposition to the test, I find it inconceivable that the attorney would have stipulated to the admissibility of the test results if he had been fully aware of his role under Renfro.
I must acknowledge that I possess a somewhat critical view of the polygraph in general. Much has been written through the years about its inherent unreliability. I am, frankly, more in tune with the views expressed by the dis*400senting Justices, Dore and Rosellini, in State v. Renfro, 96 Wn.2d 910-14. Even the majority in Renfro observed that "mere stipulation by the parties will not increase the reliability of a polygraph test." Renfro, 96 Wn.2d at 905. The majority in Renfro believed, as apparently the majority does in this case, that the stipulating parties in effect "gamble that the test will prove favorable to them." Renfro, 96 Wn.2d at 906. According to this view, the gamblers may not be heard to complain if the numbers on the dice do not come up as they had hoped. I am not comfortable with this analysis because a trial is not a game; rather, it is a search for the truth. Evidence that is generally recognized to be unreliable should not go before a trier of fact on issues of guilt or innocence if it is objected to at trial.
In our state and nation, juries determine credibility of witnesses. This system has served us well, and the province of juries should not be invaded by mindless machines until these machines are perfected further, if ever they can be. I recognize that this view was rejected somewhat when in State v. Ross, supra, and State v. Renfro, supra, our courts indicated that polygraph results could come into evidence on stipulation of the parties and attorneys. In this case, however, no such stipulation was made, and the polygraph evidence should not be admitted at the retrial of this case.
Review denied by Supreme Court October 7, 1986.