Court Opinion

ID: 9371521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 16:04:52.679303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:28.092807
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2023
                                                         TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0411-DG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLANT

                    ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                          NO. 2019-CA-1549
                   TODD CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CR-00011

THOMAS MOORE                                                          APPELLEE

              OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE LAMBERT

       AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

      In accordance with his plea agreement, Appellee Thomas Moore was

convicted of two class D felonies and of being a persistent felony offender in the

second degree and sentenced to twenty years in prison. When Moore’s motion

to vacate, challenging the plea agreement and his conviction and sentence, was

unsuccessful, Moore sought relief through the Court of Appeals. The Court of

Appeals concluded that Moore’s sentence must be vacated because the circuit

court committed palpable error. While the Court of Appeals’ treatment of

Moore’s appeal as a direct appeal may be erroneous, the sentencing issue in

this case supports the Court of Appeals’ decision that relief is warranted.

However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Moore’s probation

revocation and we reverse that decision. Therefore, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the Court of Appeals’ decision, and we remand this case to the

Todd Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Following his indictment on various charges, Moore entered a guilty plea

to two class D felonies: (1) operating a motor vehicle under the influence of

alcohol/drugs (DUI), fourth offense or greater within ten years, aggravating

circumstances present;1 and (2) operating a motor vehicle while license is

suspended for driving under the influence and at the time of the offense,

operating the motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1).2,3 Moore also pled

guilty to the amended charge of being a persistent felony offender in the second

degree (PFO II).4 Moore did not waive his right to appeal.

      Moore memorialized his plea agreement with the Commonwealth on July

18, 2018. A separate order which details the Commonwealth’s sentencing

recommendation to the circuit court was contemporaneously entered into the

record. For each class D felony, the Commonwealth recommended that Moore

receive a prison sentence of three years enhanced to ten years due to being a

PFO II and that these two ten-year sentences run consecutively. For the PFO II

      1   Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 189A.010(1) and (5)(d).
      2   KRS 189A.090(1) and (2)(b).
      3 Moore also pled guilty to the following charges for which he received a fine:
careless driving, KRS189.290; no/expired registration plate, KRS 186.170; and failure
of owner to maintain required insurance, first offense, KRS 304.39-080.
       The possession of marijuana, KRS 218A.1422, and drug paraphernalia, KRS
218A.500, charges were dismissed.
      4   KRS 532.080(2).

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charge, the Commonwealth noted “[twenty] years concurrent.” On the same

day, the circuit court accepted Moore’s guilty plea and convicted Moore of the

two class D felonies and of being a PFO II. As recommended by the

Commonwealth, the circuit court fixed Moore’s punishment at twenty years in

prison and probated the sentence for five years. Days later, on July 27, 2018,

the Commonwealth’s Attorney filed a motion to revoke Moore’s probation.5

Moore’s probation was revoked on August 15, 2018, and the circuit court

entered its Final Judgment on Plea of Guilty and Sentence of Imprisonment

(Final Judgment), imposing a twenty-year sentence. According to the Final

Judgment, for each class D felony, the circuit court imposed a three-year

prison sentence enhanced to ten years by the PFO II charge, and for the PFO II

charge itself, the circuit court imposed twenty years. The Final Judgment

states that all sentences run concurrently for a total of twenty years in prison.6

      After the circuit court denied Moore’s shock probation motion, Moore

filed a pro se motion styled “Motion to Vacate Imposed Sentence and Request

for New Trial Pursuant to RCr 10.26 and CR 61.02 Substantial Error Rules.”7

      5  The grounds for the motion were that Moore failed to report to his Probation
Officer as directed. Moore failed to appear for the August 1, 2018 revocation hearing.
When Moore was arrested he tested positive for use of methamphetamine and
benzodiazepines.
      6The amended Final Judgment entered September 20, 2018 did not change the
sentence imposition.
      7  Because Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26 and Kentucky Rule
of Civil Procedure (CR) 61.02 are identical and interpreted the same, Nami Resources
Company, L.L.C. v. Asher Land and Mineral, Ltd., 554 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Ky. 2018), the
remainder of this Opinion cites the criminal rule, RCr 10.26, only when referencing
Moore’s arguments.

                                           3
Pertinently, Moore argued that it was palpable error and an abuse of discretion

for the circuit court in its Final Judgment to list the PFO II conviction as an

independent criminal offense, to sentence him to twenty years for that offense,

and then to order that twenty-year sentence on the PFO II charge to be served

concurrently to the two ten-year concurrent sentences. Moore requested the

circuit court to vacate its judgment and sentence and to set his case for a new

trial. The circuit court appointed counsel for Moore.

      Over the course of several hearings, the circuit court discussed the

merits of Moore’s motion with appointed counsel and the Commonwealth’s

Attorney. Early on, appointed counsel expressed his belief that there was merit

in Moore’s illegal sentence argument. At the March 6, 2019 hearing, appointed

counsel presented Moore’s argument raised in his filed motion. At the final

hearing on June 26, 2019, in addition to arguing that the twenty-year sentence

imposed based upon the PFO II charge was illegal, because the two ten-year

enhanced class D sentences could not run consecutively and that the Final

Judgment did not state that the ten-year sentences run consecutively,8

      8  At the final hearing on June 26, 2019, the primary discussion in regard to
Moore’s illegal sentence argument was whether Moore’s PFO II status could enhance
both class D felonies and if so, whether the enhanced ten-year sentences could run
consecutively. Without providing a citation to the circuit court, appointed counsel
described a case provided by the Commonwealth supportive of the conclusion that a
defendant with a PFO II status, being found guilty of two class D felonies, may have
the enhanced ten-year sentences run consecutively. Appointed counsel, however, also
advocated that because the Final Judgment did not state that the ten-year sentences
were to run consecutively, the ten-year sentences run concurrently. Responding to
the circuit court’s question, appointed counsel further stated that if both class D
felonies could be enhanced by the PFO II status, twenty years is the maximum
sentence Moore could receive, which would also be the maximum sentence if he pled
guilty to the PFO I charge.

                                         4
appointed counsel presented a probation sentencing argument on Moore’s

behalf. The circuit court denied Moore’s motions and entered a final and

appealable order.

      Moore acted pro se before the Court of Appeals.9 Rather than presenting

his preserved illegal plea agreement and illegal sentence arguments, Moore

presented both preserved and unpreserved arguments related to his probation

sentencing and its revocation.

      The Commonwealth did not address Moore’s briefed arguments. Instead,

the Commonwealth argued that Moore’s motion to vacate pursuant to RCr

10.26 was procedurally improper because RCr 10.26’s standard of review may

be utilized only on direct appeal and does not provide an avenue for a

defendant to collaterally attack his convictions. The Commonwealth argued

that because Moore failed to raise each of his issues in a prior proceeding, by

way of an RCr 11.42 motion or a CR 60.02 motion, the failures amounted to a

fatal procedural bar for consideration of his arguments and that the Todd

Circuit Court should be affirmed.

      The Court of Appeals first concluded that Moore was entitled to relief

from the circuit court’s imposition of a twenty-year sentence because that

sentence was solely and improperly based on Moore’s PFO II charge. The Court

       9 Although a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty plea typically waives

his right to appeal, it was determined in the course of Moore’s appeal to the Court of
Appeals that he did not waive that right. However, even if Moore had waived his right
to appeal, this Court has recognized some exceptions to the general rule, one of which
is the appealability of so-called sentencing issues, which applies to this case. Windsor
v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2008).

                                           5
of Appeals explained, citing Commonwealth v. Jones,10 that Moore is entitled to

relief under the RCr 10.26 palpable error standard. The Court of Appeals

concluded the imposition of the twenty-year sentence was a plain error under

existing law, particularly KRS 532.080; was more likely than ordinary error to

have affected the judgment because without the invalid separate sentence for

the PFO charge, Moore would have been sentenced to ten years in prison; and

the error seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings and is

“jurisprudentially intolerable.”

      The Court of Appeals also considered Moore’s probation revocation

arguments, finding merit particularly in an unpreserved argument. Finding

that the circuit court did not make specific written findings as to the essential

elements of KRS 439.3106 in its revocation order, and that it was unclear from

the record whether the circuit court properly considered KRS 439.3106’s

criteria when revoking Moore’s probation, the Court of Appeals reversed the

circuit court’s probation revocation order and remanded the case for further

revocation proceedings.

      Lastly, in a conclusory manner, the Court of Appeals addressed the

Commonwealth’s procedural argument. The Court of Appeals stated that

contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertions, Moore’s appeal serves as a direct

appeal and does not necessarily preclude a later, appropriate RCr 11.42

collateral attack.

      10   283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009).
                                             6
      The Commonwealth moved this Court for discretionary review, which we

granted. The Commonwealth complains that the Court of Appeals improperly

determined that Moore could collaterally attack his final judgment by filing a

motion under RCr 10.26 and that under this standard, the Court of Appeals

determined that the circuit court committed palpable error when it sentenced

Moore to twenty years in prison. Consistent with its motion for discretionary

review, the Commonwealth’s arguments to this Court do not seek to reverse on

the merits the Court of Appeals’ decision that the circuit court erred by

sentencing Moore to twenty years in prison on the PFO II conviction. In

addition to maintaining the RCr 10.26 procedural argument as a reason to

reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the circuit court, the Commonwealth

advances other arguments, including (1) because Moore waived his sentencing

claim by failing to brief it, the Court of Appeals improperly looked to RCr 10.26

as a basis to reverse the circuit court’s denial of Moore’s motion to vacate and

(2) the Court of Appeals improperly considered Moore’s KRS 439.3106 non-

compliance argument because Moore did not raise it before the circuit court.

                                   ANALYSIS

I.    Even if the Court of Appeals erred by treating Moore’s appeal from
      the denial of his motion to vacate as a direct appeal, the Court of
      Appeals’ conclusion that the circuit court committed reversible
      error is not erroneous.

      The Kentucky Constitution provides a convicted defendant a right to at

least one appeal or review of the trial court proceedings leading to his

conviction to determine whether the proceedings were carried out according to

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law.11 This “direct appeal,”12 is generally based upon the trial court record

alone.13 The review is designed for preserved issues, claimed errors brought to

the trial court’s attention upon which the trial court had the opportunity to

rule.14 However, as prescribed by RCr 10.26,15 an appellate court may review

and grant relief from certain unpreserved issues. For these unpreserved

issues, they “can only be reviewed as palpable error on appeal, which requires

a finding of manifest injustice to prevail.”16 Nevertheless, even if a defendant is

unsuccessful on the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, other civil

and criminal rules allow a criminal defendant to seek post-conviction relief

from judgment.17 In particular, a criminal defendant may seek post-conviction

relief through RCr 11.4218 and CR 60.02.19

      11   Ky. Const. § 115.
      12   See Howard v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ky. 1963).
      13   Id.
      14   See Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582 (Ky. 2011).
      15   RCr 10.26 states in full:
      A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on
appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice
has resulted from the error.
      16   Fischer, 348 S.W.3d at 589.
      17   See Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
      18   Pertinently, RCr 11.42(1) states:
       A prisoner in custody under sentence or a defendant on probation, parole
or conditional discharge who claims a right to be released on the ground that
the sentence is subject to collateral attack may at any time proceed directly by
motion in the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct it.
      19   CR 60.02 states in full:

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       The interplay of RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 with the direct appeal process

is well-settled.20 “The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final

judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping,

but is organized and complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to

direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02.”21 “RCr 11.42

provides a procedure for a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence for ‘a

prisoner in custody under sentence or a defendant on probation, parole or

conditional discharge.’ It provides a vehicle to attack an erroneous judgment

for reasons which are not accessible by direct appeal.”22 CR 60.02 “is for relief

that is not available by direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42. The

movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this special, extraordinary

relief.”23

        On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or
his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the
following grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (b)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or
falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or
falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature
justifying relief. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and on
grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this rule does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
       20See e.g., Howard, 364 S.W.2d at 810 (discussing direct appeal and CR
60.02); Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856 (discussing direct appeal, CR 60.02 and RCr. 11.42).
       21    Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
       22    Id.
       23    Id. at 853.

                                            9
      The Commonwealth relies primarily upon Gross, Parrish v.

Commonwealth,24 McQueen v. Commonwealth,25 and more recently decided

Commonwealth v. Dulin,26 to support its argument that Moore’s use of RCr

10.26 to collaterally attack his final conviction is procedurally barred. In Dulin,

we concluded that KRS 533.040(2) operated to extend Dulin’s term of probation

by tolling its expiration for at least six months beyond the original expiration

date and consequently the circuit court was not divested of jurisdiction to

revoke his probation.27 That conclusion disposed of the case, but we briefly

discussed the procedural arguments advanced by the Commonwealth for

reversing the Court of Appeals.

      Pertinently, Dulin did not appeal the revocation order.28 Instead, two

years after the revocation order was entered, relying upon CR 60.02 and RCr

10.26, Dulin moved to vacate his sentence of imprisonment arguing that the

circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation.29 While recognizing

that under certain circumstances CR 60.02 may afford relief to an incarcerated

former probationer, we stated that RCr 10.26 “is not intended as an

independent source under which an aggrieved party may bring a motion for

relief challenging an alleged error in a proceeding in which there has been a

      24   272 S.W.3d 161, 176 (Ky. 2008).
      25   948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997).
      26   427 S.W.3d 170, 178 (Ky. 2014).
      27   Id. at 172.
      28   Id. at 173.
      29   Id.

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final judgment entered.”30 The Commonwealth complains that the Court of

Appeals’ disregarded Dulin’s guidance and determined that Moore could

collaterally attack his final judgment under RCr 10.26.

      While it appears that the procedural question raised by the

Commonwealth is relatively straightforward, that the differences between a

challenge to a conviction and sentence by direct appeal to an appellate court

and a post-conviction challenge by motion to the trial court easily resolves that

Moore’s appeal from his motion to vacate is not what is traditionally thought of

as a direct appeal, and that Moore’s post-conviction motion which was not

brought pursuant to RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02 was not properly before the circuit

court, this case goes beyond the traditional analysis. Although not addressed

by the parties, this case involves a sentencing issue, an issue which alters the

procedural analysis.

      Specifically, a “sentencing issue” is a claim that a sentencing decision is

contrary to statute, such as when an imposed sentence is longer than allowed

by statute for the crime, or a claim that the decision was made without fully

considering the statutorily-allowed sentencing options.31 As we noted in Phon

v. Commonwealth,32 “this Court’s language in McClanahan [v. Commonwealth33]

implies that the mode of attack or time when the attack is brought are

      30   Id. at 178 (citing Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856).
      31   Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted).
      32   545 S.W.3d 284, 307 (Ky. 2018).
      33   308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010).

                                             11
immaterial when the issue is an illegal sentence. ‘[S]entences falling outside

the permissible sentencing range cannot stand uncorrected.’”34

      “Our review of unpreserved ‘sentencing issues’ is based on protection of

the defendant from being subjected to an illegal sentence, ‘since all defendants

have the right to be sentenced after due consideration of all applicable law.’”35

The appellate court will automatically treat an unpreserved sentencing issue as

though it was preserved for appellate review.36 Furthermore, because the trial

court and appellate court have inherent authority to correct an unlawful

sentence at any time,37 a defendant may raise a sentencing issue through any

of the following relief mechanisms: direct appeal, with the standard of review

being abuse of discretion even when the sentencing issue is not preserved;38

RCr 11. 42; CR 60.02; or a writ of habeas corpus.39

      Despite the Court of Appeals’ likely good intention of construing Moore’s

motion and appeal in a manner which would not keep him from seeking RCr

11.42 relief, because of the manner in which we think of a direct appeal – an

appeal directly from the final judgment and not an appeal from a post-

      34545 S.W.3d at 307 (quoting McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 700) (emphasis
added in Phon).
      Martin v. Commonwealth, 576 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Hughes v.
      35

Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. 1994)).
      36   Webster v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Ky. 2014).
       See, e.g., Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 308 (Ky. 2018), and Jones
      37

v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Ky. 2011).
      38   Jones, 382 S.W.3d at 27-28; McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 698.
      39Myers v. Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010).
                                         12
conviction motion attacking a final judgment through RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02,

we do not view Moore’s appeal as a direct appeal. Nevertheless, even if the

Court of Appeals’ treatment of Moore’s appeal was erroneous, the

Commonwealth’s procedural argument is not a basis to reverse the Court of

Appeals’ decision that Moore’s sentence must be vacated and to affirm the

circuit court. While Moore describes his case as an anomaly and likely it is so,

“[i]n Kentucky, a court speaks through the language of its orders and

judgments”40 and given the involvement of a sentencing issue, like the Court in

Howard v. Ingram,41 we decline to engage in “useless ‘circuity of motion,’”42,43

requiring Moore to file an additional post-conviction motion seeking relief when

this procedural issue was not raised before the circuit court and the

Commonwealth does not dispute the fact that the twenty-year sentence based

on the PFO II charge is erroneous. Whether the circuit court’s denial of

Moore’s motion to vacate his sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

      40 Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644,
648 (Ky. 2007).
      41   452 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1970).
      42   Id. at 411.
      43  In Ingram, although the defendant’s original judgment of conviction fixed his
sentence at one year in prison, upon his probation revocation, the trial court
sentenced him to two years. Id. After the defendant served more than thirteen
months, his petition for habeas corpus was sustained, and the defendant was released
from prison. Id. The state reformatory superintendent appealed, arguing that the
defendant should have brought an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate. Id. While the
appellate court agreed with the superintendent, it noted that it would be useless
‘circuity of motion’ to reverse the judgment, since it could only result in the necessity
of reincarcerating the defendant, thereby reestablishing his eligibility to proceed under
RCr 11.42. Id. at 411-12.

                                           13
standard44 or as considered by the Court of Appeals here, the palpable error

standard, Moore is entitled to relief.

      The Commonwealth also argues that the Court of Appeals erred by

considering Moore’s illegal sentence claim under RCr 10.26 because it was not

briefed by Moore. “Implicit in the concept of palpable error correction is that

the error is so obvious that the trial court was remiss in failing to act upon it

sua sponte.”45 Nevertheless, pertinent to the Commonwealth’s argument, this

Court has stated that “[a]bsent extreme circumstances amounting to a

substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not engage in

palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a request is made and

briefed by the appellant.”46

      An erroneous sentence is injurious to a defendant’s substantial rights.47

By applying the preceding standard, under which we conclude Moore’s case fits

easily within the exception, we simply may recognize that appellate briefing is

not required for a defendant to be granted relief from an illegal sentence.

      In sum, we cannot view the circumstances of this case as not warranting

relief.48 Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for Moore’s

resentencing. The illegal twenty-year sentence for the PFO II charge is vacated.

      44   McClanahan, 308 S.W.3d at 698.
      45   Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Ky. 2017).
      46   Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008).
      47   Peyton v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Ky. 2008).
      48 The Court of Appeals did not address Moore’s defective plea agreement claim.

Moore does not raise that issue before this Court.

                                            14
However, it is unclear from the record on appeal what sentence was imposed

upon Moore for the two class D felonies.49 In consideration of precedent

respecting final judgments, see e.g., Machniak v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.3d

648 (Ky. 2011), the circuit court is directed to resentence Moore on the two

class D felonies, pursuant to KRS 532.110 and KRS 532.080.

II.   The Court of Appeals erred by reversing the circuit court’s probation
      revocation order.

      Finally, the Commonwealth claims that the Court of Appeals erred by

improperly using RCr 10.26 to review the probation-revocation order because

Moore did not raise this claim before the circuit court.

      As noted previously, Moore’s appellate brief to the Court of Appeals

addressed preserved and unpreserved probation sentencing and probation

revocation arguments. The probation issue which the Court of Appeals relied

upon to reverse the circuit court’s revocation order – failure to comply with

KRS 439.3106 – was not an issue presented to the circuit court. Moore argued

before the Court of Appeals that the circuit court failed to make the mandatory

findings pursuant to KRS 439.3106(1) because the circuit court did not include

any findings on its calendar order other than the conclusive statements related

to the statutory criteria. Despite the issue being unpreserved and at most,

subject to palpable error review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the

circuit court abused its discretion by revoking Moore’s probation without

      49 Moore certified for appeal the motion to vacate hearings only and the
Commonwealth did not supplement the record to clarify Moore’s proper sentence on
the two class D felonies.

                                        15
making written findings in its orders about the statutory criteria under KRS

439.3106(1)(a), i.e., whether Moore posed a significant risk to prior victims or

the community at large and whether Moore could be appropriately managed in

the community.

      There are two documents in the record related to Moore’s probation

revocation: the revocation hearing docket sheet/calendar order and the

subsequent order revoking Moore’s probation. The circuit court wrote its

findings of fact and conclusion of law, including its conclusion that Moore was

not capable of supervision and was a danger to the community, on the docket

sheet. The order revoking Moore’s probation references the revocation hearing

proof generally and identifies that Moore violated the terms of his probation by

failing to report to Probation and Parole as ordered and by using

methamphetamine and benzodiazepines.

      Under RCr 10.26, if an unpreserved error is found to be palpable and if it

affects the substantial rights of the defendant, the appellate court may grant

appropriate relief if manifest injustice has resulted from the error. An error is

palpable when it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.”50

The error must be “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it

threatens the integrity of the judicial process.”51 Upon review of the record, we

find no palpable error in regard to the circuit court’s compliance with KRS

      50   Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).
      51   Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006).

                                          16
439.3106(1). We agree with the Commonwealth that the Court of Appeals

erred by reversing Moore’s probation revocation.52

                                  CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals’ decision is affirmed in

part and reversed in part. This case is remanded to the Todd Circuit Court for

proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Bryan Morrow
Assistant Attorneys General

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Jennifer Wade
Assistant Public Advocate

        52 As noted above, Moore raised other probation related arguments, but those

issues were not addressed by the Court of Appeals: (1) the circuit court abused its
discretion by placing Moore on probation before he served the 240 days in jail
mandated by KRS 189A.010(5)(d), or (2) the circuit court committed palpable error by
failing to consider lesser sanctions than revocation under KRS 439.3107. Moore does
not raise those issues before this Court.

                                         17