Court Opinion

ID: 9693915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:09:41.288919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:52.341692
License: Public Domain

Duncan, J.,
dissenting: I am of the opinion that upon the facts found the ruling “as a matter of law” that rescission should be denied was erroneous; and that the Court exceeded its discretionary powers in denying rescission, if the decree was entered in the Court’s discretion. 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed.) s. 1523; Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1. See also, 2 Lawrence, Equity Jurisprudence, ss. 755, 756, 760-762. To the extent that the plaintiffs cannot restore what they received from the defendant, compensation can be made upon an accounting. Beaudry v. Favreau, 99 N. H. 444; Newton v. Tolles, 66 N. H. 136, 139. Any change in the defendant’s position which occurred after the sale can furnish no basis for denial of the relief sought. Restatement of the Law, Restitution, s. 142 (3) and comment d. I find nothing in the record to justify discretionary denial of rescission (see Twardosky v. Company, 95 N. H. 279, 285; Manchester Dairy System v. Hayward, 82 N. H. 193, 206, 207; cf. Cotton v. Stevens, 82 N. H. 105, 109), and no recognized principle of equity which can properly be invoked to support it. I would therefore vacate the decree of the court below in its entirety.