Court Opinion

ID: 9407713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-08 06:09:53.748872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.754721
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed July 7, 2023

                                     In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                  __________

                             No. 11-21-00262-CR

                                  __________

                  ROBERT OLIVER PARMER, Appellant
                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                      On Appeal from the 35th District Court
                              Brown County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. CR27831

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       The trial court convicted Robert Oliver Parmer of failure to comply with sex
offender registration requirements. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 62.102(a)
(West 2018). The trial court also found “true” a prior felony conviction alleged by
the State for enhancement purposes.          The trial court assessed Appellant’s
punishment at confinement for a term of thirty years in the Institutional Division of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
      In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction. He contends that the State failed to prove that
he intentionally or knowingly failed to comply with the requirement that he report
an anticipated change of address in person to the appropriate authority at least seven
days prior to said change. He requests that we reverse his conviction and render an
acquittal for insufficient evidence. We affirm.
                                          Background Facts
      Appellant was subject to the change of address requirements of Article 62.055,
and because of his two prior convictions for reportable sexually violent offenses,
Appellant was required to report on a quarterly basis to law enforcement. See CRIM.
PROC. arts. 62.055, 62.058(a) (West Supp. 2022). On August 11, 2020, Appellant
reported in person to Lori Davis, a records manager at the Brownwood Police
Department. During this report, Appellant confirmed that his residence remained
the same as was on file—a residence on Vine Street. During this appearance,
Appellant indicated his address may change. Davis instructed Appellant to inform
her “at that point when it would change.” Davis testifed that, after this report,
Appellant did not notify her of any change in his address until September 21.
      David Simpson, the owner of the registered residence on Vine Street, testified
that he instituted eviction proceedings against Appellant. On August 27, 2020, the
Justice Court, Precinct 2, of Brown County entered a final judgment against
Appellant and “all occupants” of the residence on Vine Street that granted possession
of the property to Simpson. 1 The judgment further provided that Simpson would be
entitled to a writ of possession “no sooner than the sixth day after the signing of the

      1
          The record does not reflect when Simpson filed the eviction suit.
                                                     2
Judgment,” or September 2. Seven days later, on September 3, 2020, the Justice
Court issued a writ of possession. Simpson testified that Appellant had vacated the
residence by the sixth day as required.
      An officer of the Brownwood Police Department conducted a check of the
registered residence on August 30, 2020, following a report by Appellant of an
unauthorized individual on the property. The officer testifed that the home appeared
vacant at that time, and that he did not observe Appellant there.
      Sandra Garcia, an administrative assistant for sex offender registration for the
Early Police Department testified that on August 31, 2020, Appellant appeared in
person at the direction of a local church. The church required Appellant to go to the
police department for a wanted persons check in order for him to receive the church’s
assistance to pay for lodging at the Royal Inn in Early. Appellant did not inquire
about registering an address in Early at that time. After verifying his information,
Garcia discovered that Appellant was a sex offender registered in Brownwood.
When questioned by Garcia, Appellant claimed that the Brownwood Police
Department knew of his presence in Early. Garcia instructed him to contact Davis.
Garcia later telephoned Davis to question her about her knowledge of Appellant’s
attempt to reside at the Royal Inn, and Davis informed her that she was not aware of
his stay in Early.
      On September 8, 2020, Officer Zane Taylor of the Brownwood Police
Department unsuccessfully attempted to locate Appellant at his registered address
on Vine Street. With information regarding his potential presence at the Royal Inn,
Officer Taylor visited the hotel at which time hotel staff informed him of Appellant’s
check-out three days prior on September 5.
      On September 15, 2020, Brownwood Police Department Investigator Brian
Rice discovered during a fraud investigation that Appellant was living with another
person at an RV Park. Appellant stated that he was in fact living there, and despite
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multiple excuses as to why he was unable to contact Davis to update his address, he
admitted to knowing he was required to do so. Appellant told Investigator Rice that
he had only been “out of the [Vine Street address] for about a week.” Appellant also
confirmed his stay at the Royal Inn and his ownership of a Jeep sufficient for
transportation during the time in question. On September 21, 2020, Appellant was
arrested on an active warrant after appearing at the Brownwood Police Department
to “let [Davis] know his address was changing.”
                                      Analysis
      In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction that he intentionally or knowingly failed to report an
intended change of address. Appellant asserts that, due to the narrow manner and
means charged in the indictment and an involuntary eviction, a factfinder could not
reasonably or rationally have inferred that Appellant intended to change his address
or had notice to report an anticipated new address.
      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the
witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be afforded. Brooks,
323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d
772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When the record supports conflicting inferences,
                                          4
we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer
to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      We measure sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily
increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was
tried.” Id.
      A person commits the offense of failure to comply with registration
requirements if the person “is required to register and fails to comply with any
requirement” of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See CRIM.
PROC. art. 62.102(a); Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(“Article 62.102 is a generalized ‘umbrella’ statute that criminalizes the failure to
comply with any of the registration requirements set out in Chapter 62.”).
      Under Article 62.055, a person with a reportable conviction must inform the
proper authority of any change of address. CRIM. PROC. art. 62.055.                The
statute provides alternative manners and means by which a person can
violate Article 62.055(a): (1) failure to report a change of address “not later than the
seventh day before the intended change” or (2) failure to report “not later than
the . . . seventh day after changing the address[.]” Id. art. 62.055(a) (emphasis
added); see Young, 341 S.W.3d at 427 (“Reporting a change of address ‘not later
than the seventh day before the intended change’ and ‘not later than the . . . seventh
day after changing the address’ are . . . alternative manners and means of committing
a single offense.”).
      The indictment alleges that Appellant failed to report an intended change of
address at least seven days before the anticipated change. By specifying a single
                                           5
manner and means, the State must prove that the offense was committed as charged
in the indictment. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(addressing Article 62.055). In this instance, the State had to prove that Appellant
failed to report an intended change of address at least seven days before the change
under Article 62.055(a).
        Appellant contends that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
because the State failed to show that he intended to change his address. He bases
this contention on his involuntary eviction from his residence, and because he did
not subsequently obtain a sustained residential address, he lacked an anticipated new
address. Appellant asserts that he did not acquire a new address until September 21
when he was arrested by the police. He essentially contends that he was never under
a duty to report a future change of address because he did not have a new address
prior to his arrest. In many respects, Appellant’s contention mirrors the position
advocated by the dissenting opinion in Thomas. 454 S.W.3d at 11–13 (Cochran, J.,
dissenting). Appellant asks us to “carve out an exception” to Thomas. For the
reasons set out below, we decline to do so.
        A review of the timeline of Appellant’s whereabouts during the relevant
period reveals conflicting information. Appellant stated, in a letter to the court, that
he “squatted” at the residence on Vine Street following his eviction until
September 16, and that he began residing at the RV Park on September 17.2
However, the body-cam video footage of Investigator Rice recorded on September
15 shows Appellant present and admitting to residing at the RV Park on that date.
In the same letter, Appellant alleges he that was not evicted from his residence on
Vine Street until September 6, and that he subsequently found a short term job at the
Royal Inn. Conversely, Simpson testifed that Appellant vacated the residence

        We note that the trial court took judicial notice of the contents of the clerk’s file that included
        2

Appellant’s letter.
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within six days, on September 2, as required by the eviction judgment. Additionally,
the testimonies of Officers Taylor and Garcia indicated that Appellant was at the
Royal Inn for a temporary stay and checked out on or about September 5. When, as
in this case, the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the
factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      We first note that the trial court, sitting as the factfinder, was not necessarily
bound by the specific date alleged in the indictment to convict Appellant because
the indictment used “on or about” language. See Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 9, 11. Here,
Appellant was present in justice court when it entered a judgment on August 27 that
required him to vacate the registered address on Vine Street. This order gave him
notice and a minimum of six days to vacate. However, the justice court did not issue
a writ of possession until the seventh day. In his letter to the trial court, Appellant
stated that he was not evicted until September 6, and that he squatted at the residence
afterwards.    Thus, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, he was not required to
immediately vacate the registered residence on Vine Street.
      Simpson testified that Appellant had vacated the registered residence by
September 2.    Upon that event, Appellant’s address changed from the registered
residence on Vine Street. Then, there is evidence that Appellant resided at the Royal
Inn in Early. According to his own admission, Appellant resided at the Peaches RV
Park on September 15, an address other than the registered address on Vine Street.
There is evidence that, from August 27 to September 21, Appellant did not notify
the Brownwood Police Department of an intended move away from the registered
residence on Vine Street.
      In Thomas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established an inference of
intent to change an address where there is evidence that a defendant no longer resides
at the registered residence and inhabits a different location. 444 S.W.3d at 10; see
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Gilder v. State, 469 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet.
ref’d) (explaining the effect of Thomas); see also Herrell v. State, No. 02-16-00432-
CR, 2018 WL 1865881, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 19, 2018, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). The decision in Gilder is
particularly instructive because it addressed its earlier decision in Green v. State, 350
S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) wherein the court
held that an unintended move would not trigger a failure to report an intended move.
Gilder, 469 S.W.3d at 639–40 (discussing Green, 350 S.W.3d at 630–34). In Gilder,
the court noted that the holding in Thomas abrogated the holding in Green.3 Id. at
640. As explained in Gilder:
       The high court [in Thomas] concluded that, because there was evidence
       that appellant was living at a new address as of June 25, 2012, the jury
       reasonably could have concluded that Thomas intended to change [his]
       address on June 25, 2012, and that he violated article 62.055(a) by
       failing to report this intended address change on or before June 18,
       2012.
Gilder, 469 S.W.3d at 640 (discussing Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 10–11).
       In Gilder, there was no direct evidence that the appellant was living in a new
address. Id. at 641. Instead, the evidence showed that he was not living at his
registered address. Id. Relying on Thomas, the court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence that the appellant was living in a new address because he was not
living in the registered residence on a particular date, and that he failed to give the
registering authority notice seven days prior to that date. Id. Similarly, in Herrell,
the appellant was told that he had to leave his registered residence on October 17,
2014. 2018 WL 1865881 at *1. He moved out the next day when he was dropped
off at a Dollar General to buy a tent in order to live “in a field.” Id. As was the case

       3
        The dissenting opinion in Thomas favorably cites the holding in Green. Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at
12–13 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
                                                 8
in Gilder, there was no direct evidence of the appellant’s new address. Id. at *3.
Relying on Thomas and Gilder, the court in Herrell held that the evidence was
sufficient to establish that the appellant failed to give notice of his intended move by
not giving notice of his new address seven days prior to the date he was no longer
living at the registered address. 4 Id.
        It was of no consequence that the State did not prove the appellants’ new
addresses in either Gilder or Herrell. See Gilder, 469 S.W.3d at 641; Herrell, 2018
WL 1865881 at *3. Thus, Appellant is incorrect in his assertion that the State was
required to produce evidence that he had a new address in order to establish that he
failed to give notice of an intended move. Instead, his absence from the registered
residence created an inference under Thomas and its progeny that he had a new
address. Furthermore, Appellant in fact had a new address on September 15 as
evidenced by his admission to Investigator Rice that he lived at the RV park.
Additionally, in his letter to the trial court, Appellant stated that he lived at the RV
park as of September 17. Appellant’s failure to give notice seven days prior to either
of these dates, together with the evidence that he no longer lived at the resigtered
residence on Vine Street, constituted sufficient evidence that he failed to provide
notice of his intended move under Article 62.055. See Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 10–
11; Gilder, 469 S.W.3d at 641; Herrell, 2018 WL 1865881 at *3. In this regard, the
record is replete with evidence that Appellant was aware of the requirements to
notify the registering authority of an intended move.
            Appellant’s contention that his lack of a sustained residential address
following the eviction would justify a failure to report is inconsistent with the

        4
          The court in Herrell also cited Burnett v. State for the proposition that circumstantial evidence
showing that the appellant had stopped living at his registered address as of a certain date “permitted an
inference that [he] intended to change his address as of that date.” Herrell, 2018 WL 1865881 at *3
(alteration in original) (quoting Burnett v. State, 506 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.]
2016, pet. ref’d)).
                                                    9
requirements under Chapter 62. See CRIM. PROC. art. 62.055. Appellant’s formal
eviction on August 27 was sufficient to provide notice of the impending change of
address, and even without a government issued address to report, his requirement to
report the impending change remained. Because Appellant had sufficient notice and
did not report the intended address change until September 21, a factfinder could
reasonably and rationally conclude that Appellant violated Article 62.055(a) by
failing to report at least seven days before the change.         See CRIM. PROC.
art. 62.055(a). We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                JOHN M. BAILEY
                                                CHIEF JUSTICE

July 7, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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