Court Opinion

ID: 9764948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:45:09.40328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:02.460990
License: Public Domain

GUNN, Presiding Judge.
Respondent, St. Francois County R-III Board of Education (School Board), terminated appellant’s indefinite contract of employment as a tenured teacher. The circuit court affirmed the School Board’s action and denied her petition for review. Appellant has appealed the circuit court’s judgment, raising five points of alleged error: (1) that there was no substantial or competent evidence to support the School Board’s decision terminating her employment because there was not sufficient proof that appellant’s job performance was deficient; (2) that she had not been given proper notice of the charges against her; (3) that inasmuch as she had filed sex discrimination charges against the School Board and against its members individually in federal district court, appellant was denied due process and a fair hearing, because the School Board had a personal interest in discharging her from employment; (4) that the appellant should have been given the opportunity to present evidence to the circuit court that the School Board was improperly influenced by its attorney; and, (5) that the hearing on the charges against appellant was conducted more than 30 days after the notice of hearing, contrary to § 168.116.3 RSMo 1969.1 We affirm.
Among the charges that served as a basis for the School Board’s ruling that appellant’s employment as a teacher should be terminated was that her teaching performance was incompetent; that she failed to maintain proper classroom order and disciplinary procedures; and that she failed to properly teach music fundamentals to her students — all in violation of School Board regulations. Without detailing all the evidence, we find that the School Board’s ruling was supported by competent and substantial evidence, not contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence, and that ap*285pellant was given proper notice under § 168.116.2 of the charges against her. Consequently, we are compelled to affirm the School Board’s ruling. Bd. of Ed., Mt. Vernon Schools v. Shank, 542 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. banc 1976); Moore v. Bd. of Ed. of Sp. Sch. Dist., 547 S.W.2d 188 (Mo.App.1977); Aubuchon v. Gasconade Cty. R-1 Sch. Dist, 541 S.W.2d 322 (Mo.App.1977). While there was conflict in the evidence, such conflicts are to be resolved by the hearing tribunal. Moore v. Bd. of Ed. of Sp. Sch. Dist., supra. We thus rule against appellant on her first two points.
Appellant had filed sex discrimination charges in federal district court seeking money damages from the School Board and the superintendent of schools. At the time of the hearing against appellant, the sex discrimination charges were pending. Appellant contends that by reason of the case in federal court she could not receive fair and unbiased treatment from the School Board. She urges that the standards for due process forbade the School Board from participation in adjudication of the charges brought against her. We find insufficient basis to change the trial court’s ruling in this regard. Sections 168.114-168.118 provide the procedures for hearing on termination of a tenured teacher’s indefinite contract of employment. Those procedures were followed here. As stated in Duke v. Meissner, 417 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Mo.App.1967), regarding the validity of a hearing before an administrative body having the jurisdiction, as here, to conduct disciplinary procedures:
“They constitute the sole body before whom an appeal may be heard. We must assume they will honestly and efficiently perform the duties imposed on them by law and accord an impartial hearing on such appeals.”
Using Duke v. Meissner, supra, as a guide, we find that the record fails to disclose that appellant was deprived of a fair and impartial hearing by the School Board. We find that appellant was given a fair hearing in accordance with the statutory procedures. The fact that the School Board, which initiated the charges against appellant, conducted the hearing does not vitiate the proceedings. Rose v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, 397 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.1965); Aubuchon v. Gasconade Cty. R-1 Sch. Dist., supra; Harrisburg R-VIII Sch. Dist. v. O’Brian, 540 S.W.2d 945 (Mo.App.1976). See also Duke v. Meissner, supra. The School Board followed the proper statutory procedures, and we find no basis for holding that the appellant’s hearing was other than fair and impartial despite the fact of the pending sex discrimination case filed by her against the School Board.
Appellant urges us to pay heed to Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Assoc., 426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), noting that in Hortonville, it was said that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment permits a court to strip” a school board of power given to it by the state legislature if the board’s involvement with teachers proscribes actions consistent with due process. Id. at 494, 96 S.Ct. at 2315. But appellant overlooks the holding in Hortonville which recognizes and upholds the intrinsic power given to the school board by the state legislature to terminate a teacher’s employment without violating the teacher’s due process rights:
“A showing that the Board was ‘involved’ in the events preceding this decision, in light of the important interest in leaving with the Board the power given by the state legislature, is not enough to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with decisionmak-ing power. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at [35], 47. . . . Accordingly, we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee respondents that the decision to terminate their employment would be made or received by a body other than the School Board.” 426 U.S. at 497, 96 S.Ct. at 2316.
There is no evidence here of actual bias or prejudice by the School Board against appellant. The mere filing of the sex discrimination action by appellant against the School Board does not justify the finding *286that a prejudice existed against appellant any more than a bias existed in Hortonville, where the school board—vested by the state legislature with teacher termination powers—terminated the employment of striking teachers after failing to negotiate a settlement. Here, the Missouri Legislature invested the School Board with powers to hear and terminate employment of tenured teachers. We see no reason to strip the School Board of those’ powers, particularly as we note that no other procedure for hearing teacher termination proceedings has been provided. Nor do we find justification for imposing some other procedure here.
Appellant contends that the School Board’s attorney improperly participated in the decision for terminating her employment and that the trial court erred in not permitting her to present evidence of the attorney’s participation in the proceeding, thus denying her fair trial. The School Board’s attorney did take active part in the proceedings, examining and cross examining witnesses. He also prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law for the trial court’s consideration and gave advice on how the hearing should be conducted, He also represented all but one of the School Board members in the appellant’s sex discrimination case. But these factors did not deny appellant a fair trial, nor was there evidence of unfairness in the School Board attorney’s actions. The fact that the School Board’s attorney actively participated in the hearing did not render the hearing unfair. Harrisburg R—VIII Sch. Dist. v. O’Brian, supra. We cannot assume that the School Board was improperly influenced by its attorney. Moore v. Bd. of Ed. of Sp. Sch. Dist., supra.
Appellant adverts to § 536.140.4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, providing in pertinent part as follows:
“ . . . the court may in any case hear and consider evidence of alleged irregularities in procedure or of unfairness by the agency, not shown in the record.”
(emphasis added)
Appellant contends that by reason of the foregoing language of the Act, it was error for the trial court not to have received further evidence of the School Board attorney’s involvement in the case. We find no error. Clearly, the language of § 536.140.4 does not mandate the trial court to consider further evidence; it is permissive only. Bloom v. Missouri Board for Architects P. E. & L. S., 474 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.App.1971). And we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in refusing to delve further in the matter. The School Board attorney’s involvement in the case was not denied, and his conduct did not deprive appellant of a fair hearing.
Finally, appellant importunes us to find that inasmuch as a portion of the hearing took place more than 30 days after notice of the hearing, it was invalid. Section 168.116.3 provides that the hearing “shall take place not less than twenty nor more than thirty days after notice of hearing has been furnished the permanent teacher.” The hearing commenced on June 21, 1976, the 25th day after the notice, and went to the midnight hour, at which time appellant’s attorney asked for a prorogation of the proceedings. The hearing was continued without objection2 to June 29, 33 days after the first notice of hearing. Appellant’s suggestion that she was not afforded the statutory right of hearing within 30 days of notice of hearing is destitute of merit. The hearing did commence within the 30 day period prescribed by § 168.116.3. After a full evening’s hearing, and at the behest of appellant’s attorney, it was continued to a date set by the School Board, 8 days later. We find that the statutory interdiction calling for a full hearing within a 30 day period from notice of hearing—if indeed any statutory violation did occur in this instance—was specifically waived by appellant. See § 536.060. Here, there was prompt continuance of hearing initially *287commenced within the statutory period, albeit the continued hearing was held 3 days beyond the 30 day period. Our waiver ruling is not dissonant with the purpose of the hearing as stated by appellant, “to give the teacher enough time for preparation for the hearing, and not so much time that there is no early certainty of the decision.” There was absolutely no prejudice to appellant resulting from the date of the continued hearing, and her interpretation and reasoning that a statutory time violation nullified the proceedings is too insular.
Judgment affirmed.
McMILLIAN, J., concurs.
KELLY, J., dissents.

. Statutory references are to RSMo 1969.

. It was at appellant’s counsel’s initiative that the hearing was continued, and it may be implied from the record that he approved the date to which the hearing was continued. Clearly, no objection was made at the time the continued hearing date was set.