Court Opinion

ID: 9381202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 13:07:14.075824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.699729
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Tillery Holdings, L.L.C. v. Judge Holdings, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-870.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                      NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN                  )

TILLERY HOLDINGS, LLC                                       C.A. No.           22CA011861

        Appellee

        v.                                                  APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                            ENTERED IN THE
JUDGE HOLDINGS, LLC                                         COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                            COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
        Appellant                                           CASE No.   19-CV-197701

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 20, 2023

        SUTTON, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant, Judge Holdings, LLC (“Buyer”), appeals from the judgment

of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, awarding summary judgment to Tillery Holdings,

LLC (“Seller”). This Court reverses.

                                                       I.

        {¶2}     Seller and Buyer executed an agreement wherein Buyer agreed to purchase certain

real property from Seller for $824,000. Buyer promised to transfer $25,000 in earnest money to

an escrow agent within five days of both parties signing the agreement. The agreement specified

time was of the essence and named a closing date of May 31, 2018, but also gave Buyer the option

to extend the closing date. Specifically, Buyer could obtain a one-month extension of the closing

date by transferring an additional $10,000 to the escrow agent and notifying Seller of the extension

in writing. The agreement allowed Buyer to exercise the foregoing option twice in back-to-back

months without incurring any penalty. If Buyer defaulted on the agreement in any manner, Seller
                                                 2

would be required to give Buyer written notice of the alleged default and Buyer would have thirty

days to cure. The agreement provided that, if Buyer failed to cure the default in thirty days, the

agreement would terminate and any funds in possession of the escrow agent would be transferred

to Seller as liquidated damages.

       {¶3}    Buyer ultimately deposited $35,000 with Newman Title Agency, LTD (“Newman

Title”), the escrow agent the parties selected. That sum represented the initial deposit of $25,000

in earnest money and an additional $10,000 deposit to secure a one-month extension of the closing

date (i.e., until June 29, 2018). Thereafter, Buyer never deposited any additional funds with

Newman Title, and the closing did not occur as scheduled.

       {¶4}    Seller issued Buyer a written notice of default on September 4, 2018, advising

Buyer it had thirty days to cure its default. On the twenty-ninth day of that period, Buyer emailed

Seller and Newman Title indicating it was “in a position to close on this transaction at the earliest

possible date that is acceptable to [Newman Title] and [Seller], including but not limited to,

tomorrow, October 4, 2018.” Buyer asked Newman Title to provide the escrow number for the

transaction and to prepare a closing statement for its review and approval.

       {¶5}    The following morning (i.e., the final day of the cure period), a representative from

Newman Title emailed Buyer and Seller to provide them with contact information for the closing

agent who had been selected to assist them. Within thirty minutes of that email being sent, Seller

emailed the closing agent and wrote that the parties had been “out of contract since June 30, 2018,”

Buyer was “trying to pull a fast one[,]” and Seller had “no intention to close at this point.” Seller

did not copy Buyer on that email. Nor did Buyer receive the response the closing agent sent Seller

fifteen minutes later, indicating Newman Title was awaiting instructions and asking Seller whether

the agency should continue to hold the file open. Buyer only received an email from the closing
                                                 3

agent later that same morning, indicating Newman Title would schedule a closing “[o]nce there

[was] a signed extension” of the parties’ agreement. Buyer replied to that email, indicating it had

a right to proceed with the closing under the current agreement, it had the ability to close

immediately, and it was circulating all remaining closing documents for review and signature.

Buyer once again asked Newman Title to provide the information Buyer had requested the

previous day (i.e., the escrow number for the transaction and a closing statement for its review and

approval), but Newman Title never did so. The closing agent emailed Buyer the following day,

indicating the closing was “on hold as the contract expired June 30, 2018.” The closing agent

offered to schedule the closing once there was a contract extension and both parties were in

agreement.

       {¶6}    When Seller sought to obtain the funds held in escrow by Newman Title, Buyer

refused to sanction the release of those funds. Seller then filed a complaint against Buyer, seeking

a declaratory judgment that Seller was entitled to an immediate release of the escrow funds. Buyer

answered the complaint and counterclaimed Seller for breach of contract, breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory judgment in Buyer’s favor. The trial court

later dismissed Buyer’s second counterclaim, finding a claim for breach of contract subsumed any

claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

       {¶7}    A lengthy period of discovery ensued, complicated by the onset of the global

pandemic. Each party repeatedly accused the other of refusing to engage in discovery, and a litany

of motions to compel were filed. Relevant to this appeal, Buyer repeatedly failed in its efforts to

depose Seller, Seller’s managing member, or his wife, as their family temporarily relocated to

another country to try to reduce their exposure to Covid-19. Buyer filed several motions to compel

Seller and Seller’s family to appear for deposition and be held in contempt for failing to do so.
                                                 4

Buyer’s motions in that regard were still pending when Seller filed for summary judgment on its

complaint against Buyer and Buyer’s counterclaims against it.

       {¶8}    After Seller filed its motion for summary judgment, Buyer filed another motion to

compel the depositions of Seller, its managing member, and his wife. Buyer also filed a Civ.R.

56(F) motion, requesting an extension of time to oppose Seller’s motion for summary judgment

given that Seller and Seller’s family had not complied with its discovery requests and subpoenas

for deposition. Buyer asked the trial court to extend its motion filing deadline until at least three

weeks after the conclusion of discovery.

       {¶9}    The day after Buyer filed its Civ.R. 56(F) motion, the trial court conducted an in-

person status conference and issued an order. The order provided, in relevant part:

       By agreement of the parties, counsel shall file stipulations of fact no later than
       February 11, 2022. Counsel shall [also] provide the Court with proposed
       resolutions to the pending discovery motions no later than February 11, 2022.
       [Buyer] is granted leave to file a Brief in Opposition to [Seller’s] Motion for
       Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment no later than
       February 25, 2022. [Seller] is granted leave until March 4, 2022 to file any Brief
       in Opposition to [Buyer’s] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Court to rule
       thereafter.

The trial court’s order did not expressly address Buyer’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion.

       {¶10} Subsequently, Buyer filed a brief in opposition to Seller’s motion for summary

judgment as well as its own motion for summary judgment. Seller responded in opposition to

Buyer’s motion for summary judgment, and both parties filed replies. Buyer included as one of

its arguments that Seller should not be permitted to move for summary judgment given Seller’s

refusal to participate in discovery and be deposed. Buyer asked the trial court to either disregard

Seller’s summary judgment evidence or grant Buyer’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion. The parties also filed

stipulations with the court regarding their pending discovery motions. The parties agreed several
                                                  5

motions were still pending with the court, including Buyer’s motions to compel Seller’s family to

appear for deposition and to hold them in contempt for not responding to their subpoenas.

       {¶11} Upon review of the summary judgment filings, the trial court awarded summary

judgment to Seller. The trial court ordered any escrow funds held by Newman Title to be released

to Seller. Additionally, the court ordered Buyer to pay any escrow and title company charges

pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

       {¶12} Buyer now appeals from the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of

Seller and raises two assignments of error for this Court’s review.

                                                  II.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
       [SELLER] WHILE (a) FAILING TO RULE ON [BUYER’S] DISCOVERY
       MOTIONS, (b) FAILING TO RULE ON [BUYER’S] CIV.R. 56(F) MOTION,
       AND (c) FAILING TO ALLOW [BUYER] TO FULLY CONDUCT
       DISCOVERY.

       {¶13} In its first assignment of error, Buyer argues the trial court erred when it awarded

summary judgment to Seller without ruling on its discovery motions, ruling on its Civ.R. 56(F)

motion, and ensuring it was able to fully conduct discovery. For the following reasons, we sustain

Buyer’s assignment of error.

       {¶14} A party who opposes summary judgment may move for relief under Civ.R. 56(F)

if the party “cannot * * * present by affidavit facts essential to the party’s opposition * * *.” Akron

Firefighters Assn. IAFF Loc. 330, AFL-CIO v. Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27923, 2016-Ohio-

7092, ¶ 10. The rule allows a party to ask the trial court to “refuse the application for judgment or

[] order a continuance to permit * * * discovery to be had or [] make such other order as is just.”

Civ.R. 56(F). “A party seeking a Civ.R. 56(F) continuance has the burden of stating a factual basis
                                                  6

and reasons why the party cannot present sufficient documentary evidence without a continuance.”

Thomas v. Bauschlinger, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27240, 2015-Ohio-281, ¶ 10, quoting McPherson

v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21499, 2003-Ohio-7190, ¶ 15. “The

application of Civ.R. 56(F) is discretionary; therefore, a trial court’s denial of such a motion shall

not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Wayne County Nat. Bank v. CFP Leasing Ltd.

Partnership, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 02CA0058, 2003-Ohio-2028, ¶ 8.

       {¶15} The trial court found Buyer had until June 29, 2018, to close on the parties’

agreement. The original closing date was extended by thirty days after Buyer deposited an

additional $10,000 with Newman Title. When Buyer failed to complete the closing by June 29th,

the trial court found, Buyer defaulted on the agreement.            That default triggered Seller’s

responsibility to send written notice to Buyer, informing Buyer of the default and providing Buyer

a thirty-day period to cure the default. The trial court found Seller sent written notice of default to

Buyer on September 4, 2018, meaning Buyer had until October 4, 2018, to cure its default.

       {¶16} The trial court found that, to cure its default, Buyer had to deposit the balance of

the purchase price due under the parties’ agreement with Newman Title. Because Buyer only

expressed a willingness to proceed with closing and never actually deposited the funds it owed,

the trial court found Buyer failed to cure its default. Consequently, the trial court entered summary

judgment in favor of Seller.

       {¶17} The trial court never expressly ruled on Buyer’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion or pending

discovery motions, so this Court presumes those motions were denied. Weaver v. Ohio Farmers

Ins. Co., 9th Dist. Medina No. 22CA0004-M, 2022-Ohio-2716, ¶ 34, quoting Rhododendron

Holdings, LLC v. Harris, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28814, 2021-Ohio-147, ¶ 16 (“‘When a trial

court enters summary judgment without expressly determining a pending motion, the motion
                                                 7

impliedly is denied.’”) The question is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

those motions. See Wayne County Nat. Bank, 2003-Ohio-2028, at ¶ 8. In general, a trial court

“improperly grants a motion for summary judgment when it fails to consider and rule upon [a]

non-moving party’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion.”             Gumpl v. Wilkinson, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

92CA005407, 1993 WL 107857, *1 (Apr. 14, 1993). The trial court’s error is reversible if the

non-moving party set forth “‘sufficient reasons’ to justify a continuance.” Id., quoting Hartwell v.

Volunteers of America, 2 Ohio App.3d 37, 38 (10th Dist.1981).

       {¶18} In moving for summary judgment, Seller primarily relied upon the affidavit of its

managing member.        That affidavit consisted of seventy-seven separate paragraphs and

incorporated by reference many individual attachments. In Buyer’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion and its

summary judgment filings, Buyer sought a continuance because it had been unable to depose

Seller, its managing member, or his wife. Buyer argued it was manifestly unfair for Seller to assert

facts in its managing member’s affidavit that Buyer was unable to challenge by way of deposition

because the managing member had refused to be deposed. It was Buyer’s position that Seller,

through its managing member, had prevented it from curing its default. Buyer pointed to emails

the parties exchanged with the closing agent. Buyer noted that, after it asked the closing agent to

send information Buyer needed to proceed with closing, Seller independently emailed the closing

agent to write that the parties had been “out of contract since June 30, 2018,” Buyer was “trying

to pull a fast one[,]” and Seller had “no intention to close at this point.” Buyer further noted that

the closing agent chose to respond to Seller’s email and ask for instructions. Buyer argued any

“discussion or correspondence [that may have taken] place between the [closing] agent and [the

managing member or his wife] after that [was] unknown, as they refused to be deposed.” It was

Buyer’s position that the closing agent, at Seller’s instruction, refused to prepare the closing
                                                 8

statement Buyer needed. Buyer argued that, without that statement, Buyer did not know the exact

amount it had to deposit to proceed with closing.

       {¶19} Having reviewed the record, we must conclude Buyer demonstrated sufficient

reason to justify a continuance under Civ.R. 56(F). See Gumpl at *1, quoting Hartwell at 28.

Buyer repeatedly filed motions to compel Seller, Seller’s managing member, and his wife to appear

for deposition and to hold those individuals in contempt for not responding to its subpoenas. Buyer

also sought relief pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F), but the trial court never expressly ruled on any of

Buyer’s motions. See Gumpl at *1 (awarding summary judgment without ruling on a pending

Civ.R. 56(F) motion is generally improper). Undoubtedly, the global pandemic complicated the

discovery process in this matter, particularly because Seller’s managing member, his wife, and

their children relocated to another country. The record reflects the parties could not agree whether

Seller’s family was obligated to appear for their depositions in person or whether they could be

deposed remotely by electronic means. The trial court never ruled on that issue. Instead, it allowed

the case to proceed to summary judgment without addressing Buyer’s argument that Buyer had

been denied the opportunity to question Seller and Seller’s family.

       {¶20} Given that Buyer was specifically alleging misconduct on the part of Seller in

defending against Seller’s complaint and in bringing its own counterclaim for breach of contract,

we cannot say Buyer’s inability to cross-examine Seller via Seller’s managing member amounted

to harmless error. Compare State ex rel. Sawyer v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children and Family

Servs., 110 Ohio St.3d 343, 2006-Ohio-4574, ¶ 10; Linnen Co., L.P.A. v. Roubic, 9th Dist. Summit

No. 26494, 2013-Ohio-1022, ¶ 30. Seller relied almost exclusively on its managing member’s

affidavit in seeking an award of summary judgment. To be able to produce rebuttal evidence,

Buyer must have been afforded an opportunity to discover that evidence. See Tucker v. Webb
                                                9

Corp., 4 Ohio St.3d 121, 123 (1983); Hattie v. Sherman, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 97CA006809, 1998

WL 318464, *4-6 (June 17, 1998). The record does not support the trial court’s decision to award

Seller summary judgment without addressing Buyer’s motions and continuing the matter pursuant

to Civ.R. 56(F). Accordingly, Buyer’s first assignment of error is sustained.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [SELLER’S] MOTION FOR
       SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DENYING [BUYER’S] CROSS-MOTION
       FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

       {¶21} In its second assignment of error, Buyer argues the trial court erred when it granted

Seller’s motion for summary judgment and denied Buyer’s motion for summary judgment.

Considering our resolution of Buyer’s first assignment of error, we must conclude Buyer’s second

assignment of error is moot. As such, we decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

                                               III.

       {¶22} Buyer’s first assignment of error is sustained, and its second assignment of error is

moot. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the cause is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.

                                                                                 Judgment reversed,
                                                                                and cause remanded.
                                                10

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellee.

                                                     BETTY SUTTON
                                                     FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

STEPHEN D. DODD, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

HOWARD T. LANE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.