Court Opinion

ID: 9964998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 15:03:58.89666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:52.063369
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                           LUV N CARE, LTD.,
                               Appellant,

                                     v.

                           LISA HAKIM, et al.,
                               Appellees.

                            No. 4D2023-1970

                              [May 1, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Jaimie R. Goodman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502022CA007553.

   Marissa D. Kelley of Kelley Legal, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

  Todd R. Friedman of Todd R. Friedman, P.A., Miami, for appellee Lisa
Hakim.

GERBER, J.

   The plaintiff in a pending Louisiana civil case commenced an action in
the Florida circuit court to enforce a domesticated Louisiana subpoena
duces tecum. The subpoena commanded a nonparty Florida resident (“the
witness”) to produce the Louisiana subpoena’s listed items. Upon the
witness’s failure to fully comply with the subpoena, the plaintiff filed two
motions to compel the witness’s full compliance with the subpoena. The
witness then filed a motion for protective order.

   The circuit court ultimately entered an order denying the plaintiff’s
second motion to compel, and granting the witness’s motion for protective
order. The circuit court pertinently reasoned:

         This Court is unable to determine whether the information
      requested in the subject subpoena duces tecum is reasonably
      calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in
      the underlying Louisiana litigation and is not overly broad or
      harassing.    The issue of discoverability pertains to the
      underlying litigation in Louisiana and is within the province
      of the presiding Judge in the underlying Louisiana litigation.
      The Court therefore will not compel a [further] response to the
      subpoena unless there is an order from the Louisiana court,
      that is presiding over the Louisiana litigation, determining
      that the information requested in the subject subpoena duces
      tecum is discoverable, is reasonably calculated to lead to the
      discovery of admissible evidence, and is not unduly invasive
      or harassing.

         If Plaintiff obtains such an order from the Louisiana Court,
      and prior to enforcement of the subpoena, this Court will then
      address whether the subpoena violates [the witness’s] rights
      as a Florida citizen in terms of privacy considerations. At this
      time[,] there is no Order from the Louisiana Court presiding
      over the litigation as to the discoverability of the information
      requested in the [s]ubpoena.         Accordingly, the case is
      DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE[.]

         The Clerk is directed to close this case. Should Plaintiff
      obtain the referenced order from the Louisiana Court, Plaintiff
      may file a motion to re-open this case and the Court will then
      address any issues and inquiries as to the privacy
      considerations of the [witness].

(paragraph numbering omitted).

   From that order, the plaintiff appeals, primarily arguing the circuit
court erred in deferring to the Louisiana court on whether the information
requested in the plaintiff’s subpoena is discoverable. We agree with the
plaintiff’s argument and reverse the circuit court’s order.

   Our conclusion is dictated by the Uniform Interstate Depositions and
Discovery Act (“UIDDA”), codified in section 92.251, Florida Statutes
(2022), which governs foreign, i.e., out-of-state, subpoenas. The UIDDA,
pertinently provides:

      (5) DEPOSITION, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION.—The
      laws and rules of this state govern and apply to all subpoenas
      issued under [this statute].

      (6) APPLICATION TO COURT.—An application to the court
      for a protective order or to enforce, quash, or modify a
      subpoena issued by a clerk of court under [this statute] must
      comply with the statutes and rules of this state and be

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      submitted to the court in the county in which discovery is to be
      conducted.

§ 92.251(5), (6), Fla. Stat. (2022) (emphases added). Accordingly, whether
to enforce a domesticated subpoena—or whether to issue a protective
order based upon a Florida witness’s objections—is a decision for the
discovery state’s court, here being Florida.

   Greenlight Financial Services, Inc. v. Union America Mortgage, Inc., 971
So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), on which the plaintiff relies, is instructive.
In Greenlight, a nonparty Florida resident witness served with an out-of-
state subpoena “filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings before the
[Florida circuit court] for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds, among other
things, that no Florida complaint or lawsuit had been filed pursuant to the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 985. The witness asserted that,
in the absence of a Florida lawsuit, the Florida circuit court “lacked
jurisdiction to resolve the pending discovery disputes.” Id. The Florida
circuit court adopted the witness’s position, granted the witness’s motion
to dismiss, and directed the out-of-state litigant “to the California court
that issued the commission for a resolution of their discovery issues.” Id.

   The Third District, interpreting the UIDDA’s predecessor statute
formerly known as the Uniform Foreign Depositions Law (“UFDL”),
reversed the Florida circuit court’s order, holding:

         The [Florida circuit court] … erred in its determination that
      it was without jurisdiction to entertain the discovery
      objections associated with the subject depositions in
      accordance with Florida law. The UFD[L][, the UIDDA’s
      predecessor,] proceeding before the court below is essentially
      a separate action, distinct from, although ancillary to, the
      underlying cause of action pending in California. Indeed, only
      [Florida circuit court] has jurisdiction to enforce the Florida
      subpoena duces tecum at issue against this Florida non-party
      witness. Accordingly, we reverse the [order] under review and
      remand for further proceedings.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

   Similarly, here, although the circuit court did not use the phrase that
it was “without jurisdiction” to consider the plaintiff’s second motion to
compel and the witness’s motion for protective order in accordance with
Florida law, the circuit court effectively determined it was “without
jurisdiction” to do so based the following phrases in its order:

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   •   “This Court is unable to determine whether the information
       requested in the subject subpoena duces tecum is reasonably
       calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in
       the underlying Louisiana litigation and is not overly broad or
       harassing.”

   •   “The issue of discoverability pertains to the underlying
       litigation in Louisiana and is within the province of the
       presiding Judge in the underlying Louisiana litigation.”

   •   “The Court therefore will not compel a [further] response to
       the subpoena unless there is an order from the Louisiana court,
       that is presiding over the Louisiana litigation, determining
       that the information requested in the subject subpoena duces
       tecum is discoverable, is reasonably calculated to lead to the
       discovery of admissible evidence, and is not unduly invasive
       or harassing.”

   •   If Plaintiff obtains such an order from the Louisiana Court, and
       prior to enforcement of the subpoena, this Court will then
       address whether the subpoena violates [the witness’s] rights
       as a Florida citizen in terms of privacy considerations.

   •   At this time[,] there is no Order from the Louisiana Court
       presiding over the litigation as to the discoverability of the
       information requested in the [s]ubpoena. Accordingly, the case
       is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE[.]

   •   The Clerk is directed to close this case. Should Plaintiff obtain
       the referenced order from the Louisiana Court, Plaintiff may file
       a motion to re-open this case and the Court will then address
       any issues and inquiries as to the privacy considerations of
       the [witness].

(emphases added).

   As the Third District and other sources suggest, the circuit court’s
findings here were error. Greenlight, 971 So. 2d at 985; see also Quinn v.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark, 410 P.3d 984, 988 (Nev. 2018)
(“Any motion practice associated with the discovery subpoena, such as a
motion to enforce or quash a subpoena, must take place in the discovery
state and is governed by the law of the discovery state.”); UIDDA § 6 cmt.

                                      4
(Unif. L. Comm’n 2007) (“[T]he discovery state has a significant interest in
protecting its residents who become non-party witnesses in an action
pending in a foreign jurisdiction from any unreasonable or unduly
burdensome discovery requests, and this is easily accomplished by
requiring that any discovery motions must be decided under the laws of
the discovery state.”).

    The witness’s answer brief primarily responds the plaintiff’s argument
is unpreserved because the plaintiff has failed to provide us with a hearing
transcript leading to the appealed order, which provided that the circuit
court’s rulings were further based on “the reasons set forth by the Court
at the hearing.”

    However, regardless of whether the circuit court’s orally pronounced
reasons for its rulings may have differed from the final order’s stated
reasons, “facially apparent errors from the record will result in reversal”
even without a hearing transcript. Evans v. Diaz, 365 So. 3d 1176, 1178
(Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v. Merrill, 312 So. 3d 986, 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
(“[Applegate] does not mean that absence of a transcript is always fatal to
an appeal. Instead, the issue is whether the appeal turns on dispositive
questions of fact that were, or could have been, established only in the
proceedings not transcribed.”).

   Here, as discussed above, the circuit court’s error in deferring to the
Louisiana court on whether the information requested in the plaintiff’s
subpoena is discoverable appears on the appealed order’s face. Thus, we
are compelled to reverse the appealed order in its entirety. We remand for
the circuit court to rehear the plaintiff’s second motion to compel and the
witness’s motion for protective order, and conduct its independent
determination of whether the information requested in the plaintiff’s
subpoena is discoverable.

   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

                           *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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