Court Opinion

ID: 9829495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:21:16.574683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:01.688064
License: Public Domain

On Behearing.
We think it evident'that counsel for appellant misunderstand the opinion filed in this case, We did not hold, as contended, that the preference right to appointment as administrator under subdivision 5 of article 3857 of the 'Statutes was not a legal right, but merely one that the count may determine according to his discretion; o’n the contrary, we held that such was a legal right, and that under the undisputed facts appellee was entitled to be preferred to appellant. In the discussion, referring to the applications of Mrs. Isbell and J. A. Pearson, each bearing the identical blood relationship to intestate, and equally entitled to letters, we gave the effect of the statute applicable to such a situation, being article 3358, which provides that: “When applicants are equally entitled, letters shall be granted to the applicant who, in the judgment of the court, is most likely to administer the estate advantageously, or they «may be granted to any two or three of such applicants.”
Nor did we find or hold, as contended, that A. 'G. Gillespie and J. A. Pearson had a common ancestor; the common ancestor referred to was one common to Pearson, the applicant, and Ann H. Gillespie, the intestate. Nor did we hold, as contended, that the “applicants are equally entitled to letters and *748qualified to act.” In harmony with the findings of the trial court, we stated, not that these applicants — that is, appellant, appel-lee, and Mrs. Isbell — were equally entitled to letters, but that neither was disqualified, under the law, to act as administrator.
Appellant contends further that we misconceived the facts and erred in finding that “Mrs. Isbell and J. A. Pearson bore the identical blood relationship to intestate, and that in the order of descent were nearer the intestate than A. O. Gillespie,” because the court below made no such findings, and that this court was not justified in so finding, contrary to the undisputed facts. We do not think it can be correctly said that the portion of the opinion quoted in appellant’s motion is out of harmony with the findings of the trial court, or that the same is contrary to the undisputed facts. What we there said was based precisely upon the findings of the court below, !fco the effect that appellant’s relationship to the intestate was that of a second cousin of the whole blood, while the relationship of each Mrs. Isbell and J. A. Pearson was that of first cousin of the half blood; therefore we think it follows that Mrs. Isbell and J. A. Pearson each bore the identical relationship to intestate, and, being first cousins, were nearer intestate in the order of descent than was appellant, a second cousin.
Embodied in appellant’s motion for rehearing is a request for additional conclusions of fact. After due consideration, we fail to see the necessity for additional conclusions, as the facts set out in the original opinion embrace all that are essential'to a decision; any others would be of an evidentiary nature, and in fact immaterial.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing and for additional findings is overruled.
Overruled.