Court Opinion

ID: 9789794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:41:22.626801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.464948
License: Public Domain

Judge METZGER
dissenting.
In my view, the majority has reached its result based on a flawed analysis of the substantive issues raised. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) dictates a" dismissal of the criminal charges against defendant. That case is factually and legally distinguishable from the situation here.
Grady v. Corbin involved two criminal prosecutions, each of which was brought by the state and prosecuted by the same district attorney’s office against the same defendant. Here, in sharp contrast, the contempt proceeding was brought by defendant’s ex-wife, as an ancillary proceeding to a civil dissolution of marriage action. It was argued by her private attorney before a county judge in a proceeding for contempt.
The purpose of the double jeopardy clause, as noted in Grady v. Corbin, is to prevent the state, “with all its resources and powers,” from making “repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,” and to further prevent the state from seizing the opportunity to “rehearse its presentation of proof.” However, these purposes are not served here where the state had no power to prevent the defendant’s ex-wife from proceeding against him for contempt in the civil case, and had absolutely no authority to and did not participate in the contempt proceedings.
Secondly, I believe the majority has misconstrued the record and the contempt order in reaching its result. The critical issue is whether the trial court relied on evidence of defendant’s violence in issuing its contempt order. Based on the totality of circumstances, I believe the answer is no.
In all proceedings for contempt committed out of the presence of the court, as here, the alleged contemnor must be given *102notice of the purpose of the hearing, including the nature of the acts of contempt he or she is alleged to have committed. People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970 (Colo.1985).
Here, during the contempt hearing, the only notice defendant received of the allegations sought to be proved was contained in the following colloquy:
Q And you are aware of a permanent restraining order being issued back in March of 1987?
A I am.
Q And you knew not to go to your residence up in Evergreen, is that correct?
A I’m aware of that.
[[Image here]]
Q Then on January 2nd, 1988, did you go to the residence in Evergreen?
A I’d have to take the fifth.
Defendant’s attorney had notified the court that defendant had been advised to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at this hearing. Thus, once defendant did so concerning his presence at the home, no further questions concerning the incident were asked of him.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court stated:
The question this morning is whether the testimony is sufficient for me to find [defendant] in contempt of my order. And the fact of the matter is that if [defendant] had knocked on [his wife’s] door on January 2, she’d opened it and he had tendered her a Christmas present, he would still have been in contempt of my order because my order is that he stay away from that house and that he have absolutely nothing to do with her. The evidence that I have heard is absolutely uncontroverted that he smashed through the door, that he threatened to kill her, that he terrified her, and that she had to flee from the residence, (emphasis added)
The trial court specifically found that the defendant’s presence alone at the wife’s house violated the order to “stay away from that house and have absolutely nothing to do with his ex-wife” and was sufficient to constitute contempt. The trial court was thus limited to the only issue of which defendant had notice: his presence at the home. People v. Razatos, supra. Accordingly, the order reflected that limitation.
The majority, however, relies heavily on the trial court’s last sentence concerning the defendant’s violent conduct and concludes that such conduct was the basis of the contempt holding. In my view, this is a mischaracterization of the court’s ruling.
The early portion of the court’s order constitutes the contempt finding. The latter portion, concerning defendant’s violence, is a gratuitous recitation of the facts the court heard, not a factual finding. Thus, the defendant's presence at his ex-wife’s door was the conduct underlying the contempt, and his violence was separate conduct. Therefore, the People were not precluded from prosecuting the criminal action against him based upon his separate violent conduct.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order because different entities brought and prosecuted the two proceedings, because the majority’s application of the Grady v. Corbin decision contravenes rather than furthers the purpose of the double jeopardy clause, and because different conduct constituted the basis of the two proceedings.