Court Opinion

ID: 9724332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:53:05.319402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:59.344062
License: Public Domain

DONIELSON, Judge
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent to that part of the majority opinion which vacates Lois Bean’s plea of guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree. A knowing and voluntary plea of guilty waives all defenses or objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself. State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982). While it is true a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court can be raised at any time, Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989), the majority correctly points out that Lois is not challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. Nor has appellant challenged the district court’s authority to hear the particular case before it. I do not find a “jurisdictional” challenge presented; the majority’s reasoning on this issue is strained.
Rather, I find Lois Bean’s challenge to the district court’s power to enter judgment on her guilty plea to be governed by the doctrine of invited error, i.e., a litigant cannot complain of error which she has invited or to which she has assented. See McCracken v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 445 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa App.1989). In other words, I believe Lois Bean waived any challenge to the court’s authority to enter judgment under these circumstances when she entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.
Furthermore, I do not believe Lois’ challenge raises a question of ex post facto application of penal laws. The constitution prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held the principle applies to judicial construction of penal statutes as well. Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. at 352-55, 84 S.Ct. at 1701-03, 12 L.Ed.2d at 899-900. However, nothing I have found prohibits a criminal defendant from pleading guilty to a crime in order to avoid the greater penalty accompanying the crime with which defendant is charged (and which was inarguably in existence at the time the offense was committed). Here, more than ten years from the date of the crime, Lois pleads guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree and, not liking the result, wants another “go at it.” I would not give in to such manipulations of the legal system. Lois pleaded guilty to a lesser offense than the one with which she was charged. Lois received a lesser penalty than she would have received upon conviction of the crime charged. In other words, defendant has already received a better “deal” than she was entitled to. Therefore, the entry of judgment on the guilty plea did not substantially affect her rights, Iowa R.App.P. 1(b), and this contention is without merit.