Court Opinion

ID: 9740177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:29:27.071795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.332492
License: Public Domain

Opinion Concurring in Result
DeBruler, J.
Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 88 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, requires that a person in *599police custody be apprised prior to interrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel which the Constitution grants him. In Green v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 244, 274 N.E.2d 267, in conformity with this requirement, we set out the five categories of information which must be imparted to such persons in order to adequately apprise them of the extent of those rights in the interrogation context. Those five categories are quoted in the majority opinion from Green v. State, supra, and I shall not repeat them here. The advisement of rights given appellant here is as follows:
“1) You have a right to remain silent.
2) Anything which you say can be used against you in court.
3) You have a right to have a lawyer present now.
4) If you do not have the money to retain a lawyer, you have the right to have one appointed for you by the court.”
This advisement is constitutionally deficient, in that it does not inform the person about to be interrogated that, if he chooses to answer questions without counsel present, he has a right at any time during interrogation to invoke the right to remain silent and to answer no further questions. It is also deficient in that it does not inform the person that, if he submits to the interrogation without counsel, he has a right at any time during interrogation to stop answering until he talks to a lawyer.
I would hope that prosecutors throughout the State, who have not already done so, would insist that law enforcement officials within their jurisdiction include in their advisement of rights some statement comparable to this:
“If you want to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.” United States v. Poole, 495 F.2d 115, 117 n. 2 (D.C.Cir. 1974) ; accord, United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 659 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1972).
However, under the circumstances of this case, the erroneous admission of appellant’s statement given in the inter*600rogation which followed this deficient advisement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; Harrington v. California, (1969) 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284. According to the testimony of the interrogating officer, this statement consisted of the answers to two questions. The officer testified in relation to them as follows:
“I again asked him how long it took him to get the beer and he stated approximately five minutes, at which time I stated that there’s no way that he could get to Tenth Street and back in five minutes if he ran, at which time he stated well, that’s how long it took him.”
Appellant gave no other information on this occasion.
Prior to giving this testimony, the same officer had testified that appellant was at the scene when the police arrived and accompanied them about the house and talked with them during their investigation at the scene. The victim at this time was alive and being administered medical treatment. During this initial investigation, appellant told the officer that he had been in the same house as the victim on the night of the attack, that he left the house for five minutes to get some beer, returned to the house, went to sleep in the basement, was awakened by the victim calling to him from the first floor through a register in the floor, went upstairs, turned on the light and discovered the injured victim, went outside to a neighbor’s house and called the police and an ambulance. The admissibility of the officer’s testimony describing what appellant said during this period of investigation is not an issue in this appeal. The information given by appellant in his two responses following the deficient advisement of rights at the police station was minimally and circumstantially inculpatory and was repetitive of this unchallenged statement given at the scene.
And further, when the victim died a month later, a warrant was issued for appellant’s arrest on a murder charge. He surrendered in the company of his lawyer, and, with *601his lawyer present, he gave a confession, in which he admitted for the first time that he had struck the victim. This statement was admitted without objection.
Note. — Reported at 335 N.E.2d 206.