Court Opinion

ID: 9949480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 19:04:52.052984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:29.529580
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 230019-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                       NOTICE
 Decision filed 03/11/24. The
                                                                            This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-23-0019
                                                                            Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                               not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                       limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                  under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Clay County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 03-CF-1
                                                )
WADE A. LOGAN,                                  )     Honorable
                                                )     Douglas C. Gruenke,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: There is no nonfrivolous argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing
               defendant’s postconviction petition raising a claim under Miller v. Alabama where,
               while petition was pending, the supreme court held that a petitioner who, like
               defendant, was sentenced pursuant to a fully negotiated guilty plea, could not raise
               such a claim. Thus, we grant defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to
               withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶2       Defendant, Wade A. Logan, appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing his postconviction

petition. His appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has

concluded that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that reversible error occurred.

Accordingly, it has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel along with a supporting memorandum.

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). OSAD has notified defendant of its motion, and

this court has provided him with ample opportunity to respond, but he has not done so. After

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considering the record on appeal and OSAD’s motion supporting brief, we agree that this appeal

presents no reasonably meritorious issues. Thus, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the

circuit court’s judgment.

¶3                                      BACKGROUND

¶4        In 2003, defendant was charged with 11 counts as a result of the beating death of James

Freeman and the aggravated battery of his wife, Freida. Defendant entered a fully negotiated plea

by which he would be sentenced to 50 years in prison for first degree murder and a consecutive

3½-year term for aggravated battery. He did not move to withdraw the plea or pursue a direct

appeal.

¶5        In 2014, defendant filed a postconviction petition seeking resentencing under Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny, alleging that the court did not consider his youth

and attendant characteristics when sentencing him. The circuit court summarily dismissed the

petition. The court reasoned that the 53½-year aggregate sentence was not a de facto life sentence.

¶6        On appeal, this court reversed. We held that, given the low threshold necessary to survive

first-stage dismissal, defendant had alleged the gist of a claim that his sentence was effectively a

life sentence and that he could challenge his sentence even though it was part of a negotiated guilty

plea. People v. Logan, 2018 IL App (5th) 150098-U.

¶7        Following remand, the circuit court appointed counsel for the defendant, and counsel filed

an amended petition contending that defendant’s sentence was a de facto life term and that the

court had imposed the sentence without considering defendant’s youth and its attendant

characteristics.

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¶8      On November 20, 2019, the State conceded that, under existing law, defendant was

“entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the first degree murder charge.” There followed numerous

delays for a variety of reasons including the COVID-19 pandemic.

¶9      On February 14, 2022, the parties appeared in court. At that time, the prosecutor informed

the court that new caselaw from the United States and Illinois supreme courts meant that “the State

is going to be filing some amended post-conviction pleadings.”

¶ 10    Subsequently, with leave of court, the State filed an amended response to defendant’s

petition. Defendant did not object to the State withdrawing its concession and filing a motion to

dismiss. The State argued that, pursuant to People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, defendant could not

avail himself of Miller’s protections because his sentence was imposed pursuant to a fully

negotiated guilty plea. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the petition. Defendant timely

appealed.

¶ 11                                     ANALYSIS

¶ 12    OSAD concludes that Jones clearly bars defendant from seeking relief under Miller. Thus,

it can formulate no good-faith argument that the circuit court erred by dismissing defendant’s

petition.

¶ 13    In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of a

mandatory life sentence on a juvenile offender. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).

Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a sentence of more than 40 years constitutes

de facto life for a juvenile offender. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41.

¶ 14    When defendant filed his petition, no clear precedent existed regarding whether a defendant

who had entered a fully negotiated plea could avail himself of Miller. Logan, 2018 IL App (5th)

150098-U, ¶ 11. After the State filed its concession, but before a sentencing hearing could be held,

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the supreme court decided Jones. There, the court held that a defendant who had agreed to accept

a specific sentence as part of a plea agreement could not raise a Miller claim. Jones, 2021 IL

126432, ¶¶ 26-28. The court recited the familiar rule that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional

error. Id. ¶ 20. More fundamentally, the court observed that “plea agreements are contracts, and

principles of waiver apply equally to them. Id. ¶ 21 (citing People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 87

(2011)). Entering into a contract is generally “ ‘a bet on the future.’ ” Id. (quoting Dingle v.

Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2016)). Thus, a typical guilty plea allows a defendant to

gain a present benefit “ ‘in return for the risk that he may have to [forgo] future favorable legal

developments.’ ” Id. (quoting Dingle, 840 F.3d at 175).

¶ 15   Here, defendant agreed to accept a 50-year sentence for first degree murder in exchange

for the State’s agreement not to seek a longer term and to dismiss numerous other charges. Thus,

Jones clearly bars defendant from seeking resentencing under Miller.

¶ 16   OSAD further concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the State

was bound by its original concession. It notes that the concession was based solely on the then

existing law. However, Jones unquestionably changed the law and barred defendant’s claim.

¶ 17   The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) provides

a mechanism by which a criminal defendant may assert that his conviction resulted from a

substantial denial of his constitutional rights. Id. § 122-1(a); People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 253

(2008). To withstand a motion to dismiss and merit a hearing under the Act, a petition must make

a substantial showing that the petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated. People v. Davis, 119

Ill. 2d 61, 64 (1987).

¶ 18   After Jones was issued, the court allowed the State to withdraw its concession and file a

new pleading. Defendant did not object. The State then filed a motion to dismiss in reliance on

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Jones. When the supreme court pronounces a rule controlling the parties’ rights while a case is

pending, the court deciding the issue is bound to apply the law that exists at the time of its ruling.

People ex rel. Carey v. Forberg, 33 Ill. App. 3d 161, 167 (1975). By the time the court ruled on

the State’s motion to dismiss, defendant’s contention that he could seek resentencing under Miller

despite his fully negotiated plea was contrary to Jones and thus did not make a substantial showing

that defendant’s rights were violated. Thus, the court would have been required to dismiss the

petition in any event.

¶ 19   Finally, OSAD concludes that there is no meritorious argument whether postconviction

counsel complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). That rule requires

that the record show that an attorney representing a defendant in connection with a postconviction

petition has consulted with petitioner to ascertain his or her contentions, examined the record of

the proceedings, and has made any amendments to the pro se petition necessary to adequately

present the petitioner’s contentions. Id. The showing may be made by an attorney certificate. Id.

¶ 20   Here, the public defender appointed to represent defendant after remand filed such a

certificate. He filed an amended petition presenting defendant’s Miller claim and obtained the

State’s concession of that claim. The State revoked its concession only after the issuance of Jones,

a development over which counsel had no control.

¶ 21                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 22   As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 23   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

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