Court Opinion

ID: 9493086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:57:57.776501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:38.826568
License: Public Domain

*1027McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I too do not expect police officers “to be aware of all the idiosyncratic designs of vehicle seat-belt systems,” supra at 1025, I do expect police officers to be truthful in giving their reasons for making traffic stops. Here, Officer Leo testified under oath in state court that he and Officer Dickel stopped the plaintiffs’ vehicle for violating the state seat belt law, after observing the slack, unbuckled shoulder belts hanging down inside the automobile. A state court judge examined the automobile and found it impossible to see the shoulder belts hanging down as Officer Led described because the shoulder belts attach to the seats, not the roof area of the vehicle’s interior. See Joint Appendix at 158-59 (state court’s “Ruling on Defendants’ Appeal and Order Vacating Judgments”).2
The majority opinion states that the truthfulness of Officer Leo’s testimony is relevant “only to the extent that that testimony relates to the existence of a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity.” Supra at 1025-26. Obviously, if Officer Leo found it necessary to fabricate a reason for stopping the plaintiffs, then the officers likely had no particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity at the time they initiated the stop. Because the logical conclusion is that the officers conducted the traffic stop without having a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, I would hold that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under clearly established law, or it is at least a matter of genuine factual dispute under clearly established law, and thus summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was improperly granted. Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s summary judgment order and remand the case for further proceedings.
By contrast, the majority concludes that “the alleged falsity of Officer Leo’s testimony is of no consequence whatever.” Id. In my opinion, the majority reaches that conclusion, and the conclusion that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, through flawed reasoning. First, it is incorrect to assume, as the majority apparently does, that.the actual.knowledge and intent of the police officers at the time of the traffic stop becomes irrelevant so long as the court can rationalize, in hindsight, a lawful basis for the stop. See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 840 F.2d 567, 572 n. 2 (8th Cir.) (“[i]n considering whether sufficient reasonable suspicion existed to justify a seizure, we will evaluate the circumstances known to [the officer] at the earliest point at which a seizure could be said to have occurred”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941, 109 S.Ct. 364, 365, 102 L.Ed.2d 354 (1988). Second, even assuming for the sake argument that such bootstrap rationalizing were permissible, I disagree with the suggestion that the officers could have had a lawful basis for the traffic stop under the circumstances of this case.
The majority relies on the fact (readily admitted by the plaintiffs and confirmed by the state court’s findings) that, upon viewing the plaintiffs’ vehicle from behind, Officers Leo and Dickel “could not see shoulder harnesses pulled down and across the plaintiffs’ bodies.” Supra at 1025. The majority then declares that “[i]t is common knowledge that many, if not most, automobiles now have shoulder harnesses” and that “[i]t it likewise common knowledge that most shoulder harnesses are visible from behind when deployed.”3 Id. The majority next opines that, whenever a moving vehicle in Iowa is viewed from behind, “the absence of a visible shoulder harness pulled down and across a driver provides police in Iowa with a reasonable, *1028articulable suspicion that a crime is being committed.” Id. Thus, the majority concludes, “the stop in this case did not violate the plaintiffs’ fourth amendment rights” because Officers Leo and Dickel could not have seen the shoulder belts, whether buckled or unbuckled, from behind the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Id. I disagree.
As the majority clearly recognizes, in some automobiles there are no shoulder straps as part of the seat-belt system or, if shoulder straps exist, they are not visible from behind even when the seat belt is properly buckled. Thus, for those automobiles, the absence of a visible shoulder harness on the driver or a front-seat passenger, when the automobile is viewed from behind, is just as consistent with innocent behavior as it is with guilty behavior. I see no reason why those drivers and front-seat passengers must at all times be subject to random stops and investigations by the police simply because it is a matter of “common knowledge” that “most” cars (not theirs, of course) have shoulder belts that are visible from behind. I believe that police officers should, at a minimum, be expected to attempt to pull alongside the vehicle in question, to look for a shoulder strap extending across the person.4 Therefore, I would hold that a police officer’s inability to see a shoulder strap extending down and across the driver or front-seat passenger, upon viewing a moving vehicle strictly from behind, is not sufficient to support a reasonable, articula-ble suspicion that the seat belt is not being worn. For that reason, even if we assume (contrary to Officer Leo’s testimony) that the police officers stopped the plaintiffs solely because they could not see from behind any seat belts pulled down and across the plaintiffs’ shoulders, that, in my view, would not have been enough to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the plaintiffs were violating the Iowa seat belt law.5
Finally, I think it is essential to consider the policy implications of this case. Notwithstanding the fact that the police officers did find marijuana as a result of their traffic stop and investigation,6 the record in this case undeniably indicates that one of the officers gave false testimony under oath in explaining the basis for the traffic stop. See Joint Appendix at 158-59 (State court’s “Ruling on Defendants’ Appeal and Order Vacating Judgments”). When a law enforcement officer gives a false explanation for exercising his or her police power, the American public will justifiably perceive it as an abuse of power, and that perception will undermine the authority and credibility of law enforcement officers everywhere. More importantly, when a court of law appears to put its stamp of approval on such police conduct, the American public will rightfully lose faith in the courts, and that loss of confidence will undermine our entire system of justice. I therefore disavow the conclusion that “the alleged falsity of Officer Leo’s testimony is of no consequence whatever.” Supra at 1026. The end does not justify the means.

. The state court dismissed the seat belt charges against the plaintiffs with prejudice, see Joint Appendix at 158-59 (state court's “Ruling on Defendants’ Appeal and Order Vacating Judgments”), and no appeal was taken thérefrom.

. There is nothing in the record to indicate how many vehicles' on the roads of Iowa or nationwide do or do not feature shoulder belts that are visible from behind.

. During oral argument, counsel for the police officers conceded that the officers never attempted to pull the patrol car alongside the plaintiffs’ car to determine whether or not shoulder belts were in fact being used.

. If, however, those were the actual facts of the case, I would hold that the police officers were protected by qualified immunity because the law on this point was not clearly established at the time the traffic stop occurred.

.Counsel at oral argument informed the court that the marijuana charges against the plaintiffs were voluntarily dismissed following the dismissal of the seat belt charges. See also Joint Appendix at 184 (Affidavit of Joseph Leo) ("It is my understanding that following Judge Bergeson’s ruling with regard to the seatbelt charge ... the Polk County Attorney’s office dismissed the pending marijuana charges against [the plaintiffs].”).