Court Opinion

ID: 9394738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:12:46.89749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.405032
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Ortiz, Chaney and Senior Judge Haley
              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              DWAYNE OTTIS DALTON
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0154-22-2                                   JUDGE JAMES W. HALEY, JR.
                                                                                   MAY 16, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY
                                              Kimberley S. White, Judge1

                              Rick Boyer (Integrity Law Firm, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.

                              William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Dwayne Ottis Dalton appeals his convictions, following a bench trial, for possession of a

              Schedule I or II controlled substance, possession of ten or more forged bank notes with intent to

              utter or employ as true, and forgery of bank notes, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-250, 18.2-173, and

              18.2-170.2 Dalton asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because it is

              “incredible.” For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm the convictions.

                                                        BACKGROUND

                     On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the

              prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
                     1
                     The Honorable Kimberley S. White presided over the proceedings below. Now a
              member of this Court, Judge White took no part in this decision.
                     2
                      Dalton pleaded guilty to driving on a suspended license in violation of Code § 46.2-301
              and does not contest this conviction on appeal.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard the

evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

       So viewed, on February 7, 2020, Halifax County Sheriff’s Deputy Giles Jones was

driving on Highway 58 when he witnessed a Jeep swerve and almost hit another vehicle. Deputy

Jones activated his lights and siren and initiated a traffic stop. The Jeep, driven by Dalton, pulled

into a motel parking lot. When Deputy Jones asked for Dalton’s license, Dalton stated he was

unable to find his wallet. When asked to provide his name and social security number, Dalton

misspelled his own name and provided an incorrect social security number.

       After running Dalton’s information and failing to find him in the Virginia database,

Deputy Jones re-approached the vehicle. Dalton then gave Deputy Jones the correct spelling of

his name and his accurate social security number. With this information, Deputy Jones learned

that Dalton’s license was suspended. Because Dalton appeared nervous and provided inaccurate

information, Deputy Jones requested backup units. South Boston Police Officer Trevor

Richardson and another officer responded.

       Upon backup arrival, Deputy Jones deployed his K-9 around the vehicle. The K-9 alerted

at the Jeep’s back passenger door. Dalton and his girlfriend were removed from the vehicle and

patted down. While patting Dalton down, Deputy Jones found a lighter and a baggie of what

appeared to be methamphetamine in Dalton’s right front pocket. Testing confirmed that the

baggie contained 0.4333 gram of methamphetamine. Deputy Jones also found what appeared to

be a sex toy in Dalton’s front left pocket.

       Deputy Jones and the South Boston officers began to search Dalton’s vehicle, while

Dalton smoked cigarettes. Deputy Jones found Dalton’s wallet in the center console. Dalton’s

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license and what was later determined to be a counterfeit five-dollar bill were found within the

wallet. On the back seat, Officer Richardson found a box of linen paper and paper cutting

instruments. Within the box, officers found some of the linen paper with U.S. currency printed

on it in several different denominations. Other pieces of linen paper within the box had

“printouts that had already been cut out.”

       U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Matthew Miranda reviewed all the paper currency

collected. Special Agent Miranda determined that all the currency found in the box of linen

paper was non-genuine because the bills did not contain any security features found in U.S.

currency. Additionally, Special Agent Miranda determined that one of the five-dollar bills in

Dalton’s wallet was non-genuine. The five-dollar bill contained no security features and had the

same serial number as the bills found in the box. Special Agent Miranda noted that you “would

never see two identical serial numbers within the same machine” at the Federal Reserve.

       In the trunk of the vehicle officers found two luggage bags. One of the luggage bags

contained women’s clothing, and Dalton’s girlfriend claimed ownership of it. The second

luggage bag contained men’s clothing, several thumb drives, and a cut straw with residue.

Deputy Jones testified that in his training and experience as a K-9 officer a cut straw with residue

is indicative of narcotics use. The thumb drives contained images of Dalton.

       When asked about the methamphetamine found in his front pocket, Dalton stated that the

sweatpants were not his and that he was unaware of the methamphetamine’s presence. The

police arrested Dalton. Before transporting him to the magistrate’s office, Deputy Jones asked

Dalton when he last used narcotics and if he needed medical attention. Deputy Jones noted that

Dalton was sweating profusely even though it was cold outside, and he was concerned for Dalton’s

safety. Dalton denied that he used illicit narcotics. While at the magistrate’s office, Dalton stated

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that if he had known about the methamphetamine, he would have eaten it. When asked about the

counterfeit currency, Dalton stated that “he rather not talk about that.”

        Dalton testified in his own defense. He admitted that he was a convicted felon and that he

had been convicted of perjury. He stated that after work on February 7 he drove to Halifax to help

his girlfriend move items. After moving items, he took a shower at his girlfriend’s mother’s home

where he borrowed a pair of sweatpants. He and his girlfriend then drove to a motel where she had

made reservations. Just before arriving at the motel, Deputy Jones pulled him over. He denied

knowledge of the methamphetamine in his pocket and of the counterfeit currency in the back seat of

the Jeep or in his wallet. He also asserted that the luggage in the trunk stayed in the Jeep all the time

and he was not aware that there were any clothes in the bag.

        He testified that his Jeep “wasn’t [his] everyday thing” and he “mainly [drives his] Ford

truck.” He asserted that in 2019 he loaned his Jeep to a friend, Phillip Hedgepath. During that

period the Jeep was impounded, and Dalton took Hedgepath to the impound lot to recover the

vehicle. Months after loaning Hedgepath the Jeep, Dalton learned that Hedgepath had been

convicted of uttering a false note. Additionally, Hedgepath had worked for Dalton’s construction

and antique restoration business. Consequently, Dalton often paid Hedgepath in cash. Dalton

would also loan Hedgepath money, and Hedgepath would repay Dalton in cash. Dalton stated that

he was unaware the box of linen paper was on the back seat of the Jeep.

        On cross-examination, Dalton admitted that there was clothing in the luggage in the

Jeep’s trunk. When asked why he wore someone else’s pants when he had his own clothing in

his luggage, Dalton stated that he did not “even remember what all – if [the luggage] had

clothing in it or not.” When asked if he was carrying a sex toy in his pocket, Dalton stated he

“guessed that’s what it was.” He admitted while at the magistrate’s office he complained about the

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officers tearing up his Jeep and he stated that it was “all [he’s] got.” Dalton, however, could not

remember what he meant by that statement.

        Dalton called Ronnie Shelton who testified that about two years prior he had seen

Hedgepath driving Dalton’s Jeep. Originally, Shelton thought it was Dalton driving because he saw

Dalton in that Jeep “[a]ll of the time . . . [and] was with him when he got it.” In rebuttal, the

Commonwealth recalled Deputy Jones and played Deputy Jones’s body worn camera from the

magistrate’s office for the court.3

        The trial court convicted Dalton of all the charges and sentenced him to twelve months and

thirty days of active incarceration. Dalton appeals.

                                                ANALYSIS

        Dalton asserts that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. He argues that the Commonwealth’s case was inherently incredible.

Furthermore, he asserts that the trial court arbitrarily disregarded his unimpeached testimony. He

testified that after moving items for his girlfriend, he borrowed sweatpants to wear and did not know

the pants contained methamphetamine. Additionally, Dalton testified that he loaned his Jeep to

Philip Hedgepeth, who had previously been convicted of uttering forged notes, and that his primary

vehicle was his work truck. Consequently, he was unaware of the box of counterfeit currency and

production materials in the back seat of the Jeep. Furthermore, he frequently received U.S. paper

currency from Hedgepeth and believed that during one of these exchanges he unknowingly received

a counterfeit bill from Hedgepeth. Finally, he argues, the Commonwealth failed to present evidence

that he attempted to pass a counterfeit bill.

        3
         The body worn camera footage was never entered into evidence as an exhibit. The
transcript does not provide any details concerning what the footage shows beyond that the video
was played and the trial court’s findings of fact.
                                                -5-
                  I. Reasonable Hypothesis of Innocence and Witness Credibility

       “Under the governing standard, ‘we review factfinding with the highest degree of

appellate deference.’” Commonwealth v. Barney, __ Va. __, __ (Mar. 16, 2023) (quoting

Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 496 (2015)). “[T]he credibility of a witness, the

weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters

solely for the fact finder’s determination.” Meade v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796, 805-06

(2022) (quoting Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375 (1999)). Moreover, “[t]he

conclusions of the fact finder on issues of witness credibility may be disturbed on appeal only

when we find that the witness’ testimony was ‘inherently incredible, or so contrary to human

experience as to render it unworthy of belief.’” Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548

(2000) (quoting Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 299 (1984)). “Such deference stems, in

part, from the trial court’s ‘opportunity to observe the testimony and the demeanor of the

witnesses.’” Meade, 74 Va. App. at 805 (quoting Lopez v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 70, 81

(2021)).

       “This deferential principle applies not only to ‘matters of witness credibility’ but also to

the factfinder’s ‘interpretation of all of the evidence, including video evidence’ presented at

trial.” Barney, __ Va. at __ (quoting Meade, 74 Va. App. at 806). “The factfinder ‘views video

and other evidence to determine what it believes happened; we, on appellate review, view video

evidence not to determine what we think happened, but for the limited purpose of determining

whether any rational factfinder could have viewed it as the [factfinder] did.’” Id. at __ (alteration

in original) (quoting Meade, 74 Va. App. at 806).

       “[M]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the

Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence

has not been excluded. What weight should be given evidence is a matter for the [factfinder] to

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decide.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 301 (2017) (second and third alterations

in original) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)). “By finding [a]

defendant guilty, therefore, the factfinder ‘has found by a process of elimination that the

evidence does not contain a reasonable theory of innocence.’” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 9). “While a factfinder may not arbitrarily disregard a

reasonable doubt, whether ‘the hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is itself a “question of

fact,” subject to deferential appellate review.’” Burton v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 274,

285-86 (2011) (quoting Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 572-73 (2009) (en banc)).

        Here, the record establishes that the trial court considered but rejected Dalton’s

hypothesis of innocence. The trial court specifically found that Dalton was incredible. Dalton was

initially evasive. He told Deputy Jones he could not find his wallet, even though the police easily

found it in the center console, a place, the trial court observed, people normally keep a wallet.

Further, Dalton misspelled his name and gave a close but incorrect social security number to Deputy

Jones. It was only when confronted with his lie that Dalton provided his true identifying

information.

        Although it was a cold February evening, Dalton was sweating so profusely that Deputy

Jones was concerned for Dalton’s health and safety, suspecting Dalton was under the influence of

drugs, despite Dalton’s denials. The pat-down search revealed that Dalton possessed

methamphetamine in his pocket along with a lighter. The court found that these items—the

methamphetamine and the lighter—were “fairly bulky, something that certainly one would know

was in their pocket.” Additionally, Dalton was a smoker, who was smoking cigarettes during the

search. Although Dalton claimed that the sweatpants were not his and that he was unaware of the

methamphetamine in them, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Dalton was aware of what

was in his pocket with his lighter. A reasonable fact finder may also conclude that Dalton likely did

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not borrow sweatpants when he had a suitcase of his own clothes readily available. Under either

theory, it is reasonable for the fact finder to reject Dalton’s theory.

        Officers found a box of linen paper and cutting instruments in the back seat of the vehicle in

plain view. The box contained linen paper with U.S. currency printed on it in several different

denominations. Several pieces of linen paper within the box had denominations that had been

cut out. In the trunk of the vehicle officers found a luggage bag containing men’s clothing and a

thumb drive with images of Dalton. Within the luggage, officers found a cut straw with residue

indicative of illicit narcotics ingestion. Although Dalton denied using drugs, he told Deputy Jones

at the magistrate’s office that if he had known about the drugs in his pocket, he would have

consumed it.

        Finally, the trial court found that Dalton’s credibility was undermined by his own witness’s

testimony. Dalton testified that he had loaned his Jeep to Hedgepath in 2019. Defense witness

Shelton affirmed that he saw Hedgepath with Dalton’s Jeep in 2019. When asked why Shelton

believed it was Dalton’s Jeep, Shelton stated he thought it was Dalton because Dalton drove that

Jeep “all the time” and Shelton had, in fact, been with Dalton when he bought the Jeep.

        The court reasoned that even if Dalton had loaned the Jeep to Hedgepath in 2019, the box

and paper cutting implements were in plain view for several months and would have been noticed

by Dalton. The court found it incredible that Dalton was not aware of the box or the cutting

implements in a vehicle that, according to his witness, he used all the time. Further one of the

five-dollar bills in Dalton’s wallet had the same serial number as one of the bills in the box. Special

Agent Miranda testified that identical serial numbers are not within the same machine at the Federal

Reserve. The court determined that Shelton’s testimony affected the credibility of all of Dalton’s

testimony and found Dalton to be incredible.

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       “The rejection of a hypothesis of innocence ‘is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.’”

Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 519 (2011) (en banc) (quoting Archer v.

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 13 (1997)). Considering the totality of the evidence, the trial

court did not err in rejecting Dalton’s hypothesis of innocence. We will not reverse the trial

court’s decision on appeal.

                                  II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

       When conducting a sufficiency review on appeal, we do not “distinguish between direct

and circumstantial evidence” because the fact finder “is entitled to consider all of the evidence,

without distinction, in reaching its determination.” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 463

(2017) (citation omitted). “Indeed, in some cases circumstantial evidence may be the only type

of evidence which can possibly be produced.” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)

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(quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 272 (1979)). “A circumstantial fact is

admitted on the basis of an inference when the inference is a probable explanation of another fact

and a more probable and natural one than other explanations, if any.” Barney, __ Va. at __

(quoting Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 780 (1949)). “Circumstantial evidence must

prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but not ‘beyond all doubt.’” Id. at __.

                                A. Possession of Methamphetamine

       “It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled

substance.” Code § 18.2-250. “In order to convict a person of illegal drug possession, the

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was aware of the

presence and character of the drug and that the accused consciously possessed it.” Yerling v.

Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 527, 532 (2020) (citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 572,

574 (1994)). Possession of contraband “may be actual or constructive.” Hall v. Commonwealth,

69 Va. App. 437, 448 (2018).

       Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, establishes

that Dalton had 0.4333 gram of methamphetamine in his pocket. The trial court determined that

the items found in the pocket—the bag of methamphetamine and a lighter—were “fairly bulky”

and thus were “something that certainly one would know was in their pocket.” Furthermore, the

trial court noted that Dalton was a smoker, who was smoking during the search of the Jeep, and

the police found the lighter in the same pocket as the illicit narcotics. Additionally, the police

found a cut straw in Dalton’s luggage. In Deputy Jones’s experience, a cut straw is used to

consume illicit narcotics. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that Dalton was aware of the

presence and character of the methamphetamine found in his pocket. We will not disturb the

trial court’s findings on appeal.

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                      B. Forgery of Bank Notes and Uttering Forged Notes

                       If any person forge any coin, note or bill current by law or
               usage in this Commonwealth . . . or utter, or attempt to employ as
               true, or sell, exchange, or deliver, or offer to sell, exchange, or
               deliver, or receive on sale, exchange, or delivery, with intent to
               utter or employ, or to have the same uttered or employed as true,
               any such false, forged, or base coin, note or bill, knowing it to be
               so, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.

Code § 18.2-170.

                        If any person have in his possession forged bank notes . . .
               knowing the same to be forged or base, with the intent to utter or
               employ the same as true, or to sell, exchange, or deliver them, so
               as to enable any other person to utter or employ them as true, he
               shall, if the number of such notes or coins in his possession at the
               same time, be ten or more, be guilty of a Class 6 felony.

Code § 18.2-173.

       Here, the evidence established that a box and paper cutting instruments were in plain

view on the back seat. The box contained linen paper with printed counterfeit bills and linen

paper where counterfeit currency had been cut out. Deputy Jones found a counterfeit five-dollar

bill with the same serial number as bills in the box of linen paper in Dalton’s wallet. A

reasonable fact finder could conclude that Dalton printed counterfeit currency onto the linen

paper and excised that currency with the intent to utter it as genuine U.S. currency. Because

there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual findings, we will not

reverse them on appeal.

                                           CONCLUSION

       In sum, the Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently incredible, and

was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dalton was guilty of possession of

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methamphetamine, employing a forged note, and forging a note. Accordingly, we affirm the trial

court’s decision.

                                                                                    Affirmed.

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