Court Opinion

ID: 9527356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:29:50.75597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:44.709603
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s substantive disposition of the issues. I write separately because I cannot join the majority’s unjustified expansion of the waiver rule. The issue in contention is whether issues raised in an untimely post-trial motion are waived on appeal if the trial court, in its discretion, adjudicated the merits of the motion. In a somewhat convoluted analysis, the majority apparently agrees with the State and holds that defendant waived the issues raised in his cross-appeal because his post-trial motion was filed two days beyond the 30-day deadline. The majority concedes, however, that the trial court adjudicated the merits of the motion despite the motion’s untimeliness. In my opinion, because the trial court adjudicated the merits of the motion, the issues raised therein are not waived. For some reason, the majority purports to avoid this issue but then decides it. The majority claims that “[i]t could be argued that an untimely filing operates as a procedural default.” (Emphasis added.) 189 Ill. 2d at 243. After almost sounding like it is not going to decide the issue, the majority claims that it will relax the waiver rule. If the court is. relaxing the waiver rule, then it must be holding that the issues are waived. If the issues are not waived, there is no need to relax the waiver rule. There is no reason to purport to avoid this issue. On at least two occasions, this court has suggested that issues raised in an untimely post-trial motion are waived on appeal. See People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 83 (1993); People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 528 (1992). However, the timeliness of the post-trial motions was not at issue in those cases. This case, unlike Robinson and Scott, directly presents the issue and gives this court the opportunity not to perpetuate an unsound rule. In Robinson, this court stated that, to preserve issues for appeal, “the defendant must both contemporaneously object and present the issue in a timely post-trial motion.” (Emphasis added.) Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 83. However, Robinson cited People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988), which nowhere contains that statement. In Enoch, this court held that the failure to raise an issue in a written motion for a new trial results in waiver of the issue on appeal, not that the failure to raise the issue in a timely motion for a new trial results in waiver. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. Further, the timeliness of the post-trial motion was not an issue in Robinson. In Scott, the defendant argued that statements he made during court-ordered psychiatric examinations should have been suppressed. This court disposed of this argument by stating, “Because defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court, or include it in a timely filed post-trial motion, it is not clear from the record which statements were made by defendant during each particular interview. Therefore, defendant has waived appellate review of this issue.” Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 528. No citation to authority follows this statement. Further, it seems clear that Scott was basing its waiver conclusion on the fact that defendant’s argument was not made in the trial court. Neither Robinson nor Scott addressed the issue presented in this case, and in both cases the use of the word “timely” was unnecessary and unsupported by proper citations. By suggesting that the timely filing of a post-trial motion is necessary to preserve issues for review, this confused two different concepts. First, written motions for a new trial must be filed “within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a verdict.” 725 ILCS 5/116 — 1(b) (West 1998). Second, issues must be raised first in a post-trial motion if a defendant wishes to argue those issues on appeal. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. The majority seems to infer a relationship between these two propositions that simply does not exist. The majority cites no authority holding that issues raised in an untimely motion are waived on appeal if the trial court chooses, in its discretion, to adjudicate the merits of the motion. Defendant had not yet been sentenced when the court considered and denied his motion. Consequently, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the action. As the appellate court noted in People v. Talach, 114 Ill. App. 3d 813, 818 (1983), the 30-day limitation applies to the defendant rather than to the court, and there is no jurisdictional bar to a court considering a late motion for a new trial when the court still has jurisdiction over the case. The irony in the majority opinion is that the majority’s purported reason for relaxing waiver is to “maintain a sound body of precedent.” What sound body of precedent holds that issues raised in the trial court, presented in a written post-trial motion, adjudicated by the trial court, and properly argued on appeal are waived? This court stated the purposes of the waiver rule in People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31-32 (1984): “Failure to raise issues in the trial court denies that court the opportunity to grant a new trial, if warranted. This casts a needless burden of preparing and processing appeals upon appellate counsel for the defense, the prosecution, and upon the court of review. Without a post-trial motion limiting the consideration to errors considered significant, the appeal is open-ended.” The appellate court has also recognized that “[t]he underlying purpose of waiver is to preserve finite judicial resources by creating an incentive for litigants to bring to trial courts’ attention alleged errors, thereby giving trial courts an opportunity to correct their mistakes.” People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108, 111 (1996). Here, the purposes of the waiver rule are not served by holding that these issues are waived. Defendant raised the issues in a post-trial motion that was filed two days late. The trial court exercised its discretion to consider the motion despite its untimeliness. The trial court was given a chance to correct any errors. The issues were ruled on by the trial court before they were presented to this court, and the scope of this appeal was properly limited to issues that defendant raised in the trial court. I see no justification for this court now holding that these issues are waived. The majority ultimately resolves the merits of defendant’s cross-appeal issues by relaxing the waiver rule and considering whether defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney filed the post-trial motion two days late. I agree with the majority’s resolution of the merits of these issues, but would reach the issues by holding that they are not waived.