Court Opinion

ID: 9957856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 15:05:19.515529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:54.219096
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 121,770

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                         STATE OF KANSAS,
                                             Appellee,

                                                   v.

                                     DANIEL ROMAN MUNOZ,
                                           Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Shawnee District Court; C. WILLIAM OSSMANN, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion on remand filed April 5, 2024. Affirmed.

       Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

       Michael J. Duenes, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before HURST, P.J., GARDNER and MALONE, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: Daniel Roman Munoz appealed his convictions and sentences for
second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, criminal possession of a
firearm, and theft for crimes committed in June 2018. A panel of this court, in State v.
Munoz, No. 121,770, 2022 WL 129005 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion),
addressed Munoz' multiple claims of error about his convictions and his sentences.
Among those issues was Munoz' claim that the district court erred by failing to get a jury
trial waiver from him when he stipulated to one element of the firearm offense—that he
had been convicted of a felony within five years of the charged offense.

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       The State argued that no jury trial waiver was necessary for this elemental
stipulation, as State v. Johnson, 310 Kan. 909, 918, 453 P.3d 281 (2019), was wrongly
decided. Still, it also responded that even if Munoz were correct, then any error was
harmless. Munoz made no reply to that argument. The panel, bound by Johnson, held that
the district court's accepting the elemental stipulation without a jury trial waiver was
reversible error because it violated the defendant's right to jury trial. Munoz, 2022 WL
129005, at *12.

       Both the State and Munoz petitioned for review, raising different issues. The
Supreme Court recently denied Munoz' petition for review, granted the State's petition for
review, and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration based on State v. Bentley,
317 Kan. 222, 526 P.3d 1060 (2023). As we explain below, the remand asks us to resolve
only one issue: whether the district court's error in failing to get a jury trial waiver from
Munoz when he stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony within five years of the
charged offense is harmless. For the reasons set forth below, we find that this Johnson
error is harmless.

Bentley's holding and effect

       In Bentley, the State asked the Supreme Court to overturn Johnson's holding that a
district court errs by accepting a defendant's stipulation to one element of a crime without
first getting defendant's separate jury trial waiver on the record. But the Supreme Court
found the State had waived that issue:

       "When the State failed to brief the first requirement of overturning precedent, it
       abandoned its claim that we overrule Johnson. See State v. Funk, 301 Kan. 925, 933, 349
       P.3d 1230 (2015) (issue not adequately briefed is deemed abandoned). Consequently,
       Johnson stands, and a district court must obtain a constitutionally sufficient jury trial
       waiver before a defendant stipulates to an element of a charged crime." 317 Kan. at 231-
       32.

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It thus left any overruling of Johnson to another day.

         Still, the Supreme Court agreed that a district court's failure to get a jury trial
waiver before accepting a defendant's elemental stipulation was not structural error. It
instead found that error "akin to a court's failure to submit an element of the charged
crime to the jury." Bentley, 317 Kan. at 233; see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8,
119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999). In Neder, the Court concluded the error was
harmless because "the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming
evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error." 527 U.S.
at 17.

         The Kansas Supreme Court in Bentley thus extended Neder's reasoning to cases in
which a district court fails to obtain a constitutionally sufficient jury trial waiver before a
defendant stipulates to one or some elements of a charged crime, as here. 317 Kan. at
233-34.

         "In such cases, the error should be reviewed under the constitutional harmless error
         standard.
                 "A constitutional error is harmless only if the party benefitting from the error
         demonstrates 'beyond a reasonable doubt the error will not or did not affect the trial's
         outcome in light of the entire record, i.e., when there is no reasonable possibility the error
         contributed to the verdict.' State v. Corey, 304 Kan. 721, 731-32, 374 P.3d 654 (2016)."
         317 Kan. at 234.

         Because Bentley's stipulation effectively decided the stipulated-to elements for the
jury, "thereby paving the way for a guilty verdict," the Supreme Court found it "logical to
consider whether the error here led to the stipulation. In other words, we will review
whether there is a reasonable possibility the failure to inform Bentley of his right to jury
trial led to his decision to enter the stipulation." 317 Kan. at 234. Our Supreme Court
found several factors relevant, as advised by the United States Supreme Court in United

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States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 159 L. Ed. 2d 157 (2004)
(examining analogous issue whether defendant would still have pleaded guilty absent
Rule 11 error under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). Those factors are: (1) any
representations the defendant or counsel made regarding the topic; (2) the overall strength
of the case against the defendant; and (3) any possible defenses. Bentley, 317 Kan. at 235
(citing Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 85).

       Our Supreme Court then reviewed the record and found that Bentley would have
made the stipulation even had the court advised him of his right to jury trial. It so
concluded because the facts Bentley had stipulated to were easily provable elements,
Bentley would have had no defense to those elements had the State offered evidence to
establish them, and there was no suggestion Bentley meant to defend his case based on
those elements. 317 Kan. at 235. It thus concluded:

       "Bentley would have elected to stipulate to this element of the crimes even if he had been
       informed of his right to submit them to a jury on the State's evidence. We conclude
       beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect Bentley's decision to enter the
       stipulation and, consequently, the error did not affect the trial's outcome. We affirm
       Bentley's convictions for possession of a firearm." 317 Kan. at 236.

Munoz' analysis

       The sole issue for this court is thus whether the district court's Johnson error—
failing to get a jury trial waiver from Munoz when he stipulated to the element that he
had been convicted of a felony within five years of the charged offense—is harmless. We
apply the Bentley analysis above, asking whether we find a reasonable possibility that the
district court's failure to inform Munoz of his right to jury trial led to his decision to enter
his stipulation. See 317 Kan. at 234.

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       First, we examine the stipulation that Munoz made. During trial, Munoz and the
State jointly stipulated to one element of the crime of criminal possession of a firearm, as
provided in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304. That stipulation stated:

       "'The following facts have been agreed to by the parties and are to be considered by you
       as true:
                  "1. That within five years proceeding on or about the 9th day of June, 2018, the
       defendant, Daniel Munoz, had been convicted of a felony other than those specified in
       subsection (a)(3)(A) of K.S.A. 21-6304, to wit: Shawnee County Case 13CR995.
       Defendant further stipulates he was not found to be in possession of a firearm in case
       number 13CR995.'" Munoz, 2022 WL 129005, at *11.

As Munoz acknowledged on appeal, his stipulation was to one element of the crime of
criminal possession of a firearm under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304—that he had been
convicted of a felony within five years of the charged firearm offense. This stipulation
was substantially similar to the stipulation made by Bentley and many other defendants
who wish to avoid having the State share details about their criminal history with the jury.

       Second, we apply these factors: (1) any representations the defendant or counsel
made regarding the topic; (2) the overall strength of the case against the defendant; and
(3) any possible defenses. Bentley, 317 Kan. at 235.

       The record contains few representations Munoz and his counsel made about the
stipulation. During voir dire, defense counsel explained to the potential jurors that the
parties were stipulating to the fact that Munoz had a prior conviction, thus satisfying that
element of the criminal possession of a firearm charge. Defense counsel asked the jury
pool if they would be unable to give Munoz a fair trial knowing that he has a prior
conviction on his record, and no jurors conveyed they would be unable to do so. During a
break, the State explained to the court that it would be adding a certified copy of Munoz'

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prior conviction to the record and that the parties would "do a stipulation on the record"
as to that.

       After selecting the jury and dismissing them for the day, the court revisited the
stipulation. Defense counsel stated the prosecutor was "working on a stipulation to
actually have us sign and present, but yes, we agree." The prosecutor responded that they
would prepare a written stipulation and have it read into the record to the jury. After the
trial court dismissed the jury at the end of the first day of the trial, the prosecutor said he
would provide a draft of the stipulation for defense counsel to review the next day. The
next day, the State presented the stipulation to the court as State's Exhibit 96, and a copy
of the complaint and journal entry for the prior conviction as State's Exhibit 93. The State
never offered Exhibit 93, however, and the parties admitted only State's Exhibit 96—the
stipulation. The court read the stipulation to the jury, so the jury never saw or heard
details about the complaint or the journal entry of Munoz' prior conviction.

       Relatedly, when the parties had submitted their proposed jury instructions pretrial,
Munoz proposed the following limiting instruction:

               "Evidence has been admitted tending to prove that [Munoz] committed a crime
       other than the present crimes charged. This evidence may be considered solely for the
       purpose of deciding whether the State has met its burden of proof in claims 2 and 3 of
       Count 3."

But at the jury instruction conference, defense counsel withdrew the proposed instruction,
agreeing that "with the stipulation," the limiting instruction they had proposed before trial
would be "unnecessary."

       The representations that Munoz and his counsel made about the stipulation thus
show that they desired to enter the stipulation, and that the stipulation benefitted Munoz

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by keeping prejudicial information from the jury about the type and nature of Munoz'
prior crime.

       That is typical in this kind of case. A defendant's stipulation to a prior crime in a
felon-in-possession case is encouraged by law. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.
172, 189-90, 117 S. Ct. 644, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1997) (If a criminal defendant offers to
stipulate to his or her felon status, the State and the district court must accept that
stipulation, contrary to the general rule that the State may prove its case against the
defendant "free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away."). This is
because this kind of stipulation is for the defendant's benefit. See State v. Lee, 266 Kan.
804, 814-15, 977 P.2d 263 (1999) (adopting the reasoning of Old Chief, United States v.
Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472-73 [10th Cir 1995], Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 882, 886
[Fla. 1998], and State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 571 N.W.2d 662 [1997], and
finding "[u]nless there is a dispute over the status of the prior conviction . . . the
admission of the type and nature of the prior crime can only prejudice the jury").

       Third, we examine the overall strength of the case against Munoz. He was found
guilty of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, criminal possession of
a firearm, and theft. Criminal possession of a weapon by a felon under K.S.A. 21-
6304(a)(2) is possession of any weapon by a person convicted of a person felony under
certain statutes. This crime has only two elements. "To convict under this section, the
State must prove the offender possessed a weapon and must also prove the prior felony
conviction . . . had occurred within five years." State v. Johnson, No. 124,256, 2022 WL
17409883 at *2 (Kan. App. 2022), rev. denied 317 Kan. 848 (2023). Munoz' stipulation
established his status for purposes of the charge of criminal possession of a firearm under
K.S.A. 21-6304(a)(2) and had no relation to the other charges.

       The record shows that the State had ample evidence to prove the only other
element of the firearm crime not stipulated to—that Munoz possessed a weapon on the

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date charged. Although we find it unnecessary to summarize all the evidence here, it is
detailed in the panel's decision in Munoz' direct appeal. See 2022 WL 129005, at *2-10.
The evidence included statements by Munoz' father to police soon after the shooting,
which identified Munoz as the shooter, and jailhouse recordings of conversations in
which Munoz urged his mother to persuade his father to retract his incriminating
testimony. As the panel found:

       "The statements clearly showed that Munoz was aware that his father identified him as
       the shooter to the police, and these statements, unless retracted, would result in Munoz'
       convictions in the shootings. The statements also showed that Munoz conjured up a false
       scenario in which he was merely with a group of people at the shooting scene, innocently
       obtained the firearm, and unknowingly possessed the stolen car in which the murder
       weapon was found." Munoz, 2022 WL 129005 at *10.

The evidence against Munoz on this firearm count was strong and weighty.

       Lastly, we review any possible defenses. Yet we find none. Had Munoz not chosen
to stipulate to his prior person felony conviction, the State was prepared to prove it. And
the facts Munoz stipulated to were easily provable elements. Munoz would have had no
defense to those elements had the State offered evidence to establish them, and there was
no suggestion that Munoz meant to defend his case based on those elements.

       Considering all the facts, we conclude that Munoz would have elected to stipulate
to this element of the crime even had he been informed of his right to submit it to a jury
on the State's evidence. We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
affect Munoz' decision to enter the stipulation and so the error did not affect the trial's
outcome. We thus affirm Munoz' conviction for criminal possession of a firearm under
K.S.A. 21-6304.

       Affirmed.

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