Court Opinion

ID: 9381597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 15:05:42.957931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:33.453210
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                               TO BE PUBLISHED

           Supreme Court of Kentucky
                         2022-SC-0048-TG
                         2022-SC-0095-TG

LEIF HALVORSEN                                       APPELLANT

             ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
V.          HONORABLE JULIE MUTH GOODMAN, JUDGE
                      NO. 83-CR-00152-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                              APPELLEE

                              AND

                         2022-SC-0039-MR

JOHNATHAN WAYNE GOFORTH                              APPELLANT

             ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
V.          HONORABLE JULIE MUTH GOODMAN, JUDGE
                      NO. 99-CR-00146-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                              APPELLEE

                              AND

                         2022-SC-0040-MR

VIRGINIA SUSAN CAUDILL                               APPELLANT

             ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
V.          HONORABLE JULIE MUTH GOODMAN, JUDGE
                      NO. 99-CR-00146-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

            OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER

                                      AFFIRMING

      This case came before the Fayette Circuit Court upon the filing of three

post-conviction collateral attack motions seeking to vacate the murder

convictions of Virginia Caudill, Johnathan Goforth and Leif Halvorsen

(collectively, “Appellants”) pursuant to RCr1 11.42(10), CR2 60.02, and CR

60.03. Appellants requested post-conviction relief on grounds that the

“combination” jury instructions rendered their verdicts non-unanimous, in

violation of their constitutional right to a unanimous jury and ran afoul of the

unanimity requirement recently announced in in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.

Ct. 1390 (2020). Concluding that Ramos does not apply retroactively to these

cases and further, that Appellants’ claims were time-barred, the trial court

denied them relief. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

                     I.    Factual and Procedural Background

      Caudill and Goforth were tried together in 2000 and were both convicted

of murder, robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, arson in the

second degree, and tampering with physical evidence. Caudill v.

Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003). Each received a death sentence

      1   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
      2   Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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for the murder conviction and the maximum authorized penalties for the other

four convictions. Id. In a separate case, years before Caudill and Goforth’s

convictions, Halvorson was found guilty of three counts of murder and

sentenced to death on two counts, and life imprisonment on the third count.

Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1986).3 Each of the

Appellants was convicted under a combination jury instruction, which

permitted the jury to convict if it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that

he or she was guilty of either murder or complicity to murder, but was unable

to ascertain from the evidence whether each committed the crime as the

principal or as an accomplice.

      Appellants challenged their convictions on direct appeal as non-

unanimous verdicts under the principal-accomplice combination instruction.

This Court rejected that claim across the board, noting that the unanimity

requirement was not violated because both the principal and accomplice

theories were supported by the evidence. Caudill, 120 S.W.3d at 648;

Halvorsen, 730 S.W.2d at 925. Following our affirmance of their convictions on

direct appeal, each Appellant received additional state and federal collateral

review of their case, none of which bore any fruit.

      In 2020, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in

Ramos, which addressed the issue of juror unanimity – unanimity in numerical

count. 140 S. Ct. at 1393. Specifically, the Court examined the criminal

      3 In December 2019, then Governor Bevin commuted Halvorsen’s death

sentences to sentences of life with the possibility of parole.

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justice systems of Oregon and Louisiana, both of which allowed a defendant to

be convicted of a serious crime based on a jury verdict in which at least 10 of

12 jurors found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The

Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury

implicitly included the right to a unanimous verdict in criminal trials, as

applied equally to federal and state criminal trials (via the Fourteenth

Amendment). Id. In addressing concerns that its decision would spawn a

“tsunami” of litigation, the Ramos majority emphasized that “prior convictions

in only two States [Oregon and Louisiana] are potentially affected by our

judgment.” Id. at 1406.

      Thereafter, Appellants each filed a motion for post-conviction relief,

which the trial court consolidated. While their motions were being litigated,

the United States Supreme Court decided Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547

(2021), which clarified that Ramos was not to be retroactively applied in federal

collateral attacks, pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

Resultingly, prisoners who were convicted by non-unanimous juries and whose

cases were final in state court before rendition of Ramos cannot rely on Ramos

as support for federal collateral relief.

      Based on the holding of Edwards and application of the Teague

standard, adopted by this Court with regard to state collateral attacks in

Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009), the trial court held that

the Ramos did not apply retroactively to Appellants’ claims. The trial court

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further observed that the underlying basis for Appellants’ motions - a lack of

unanimity - had been previously rejected by this Court on direct appeal.

      The trial court determined that even if this Court were to now decide that

the combination jury instruction did not satisfy the requirement of unanimity,

absent a finding of retroactivity, the cases at bar are final and the post-

conviction motions untimely. The trial court noted that Halvorsen’s murder

convictions were final 33 years before, and Goforth and Caudill’s convictions

were final 16 years ago. Moreover, Appellants’ RCr 11.42 motions had been

denied and affirmed on appeal. Caudill v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-

000457-MR, 2009 WL 1110398 (Ky. Apr. 23, 2009); Halvorsen v.

Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2007). Thus, the trial court concluded that

Appellants’ RCr 11.42 motions were untimely and must be dismissed. The trial

court likewise dismissed the motions under CR 60.02 and CR 60.03, noting

that those rules do not allow a defendant to circumvent the time limitations of

a RCr 11.42 motion. This appeal followed.

                                   II.   Analysis

      In Kentucky, the structure for attacking the final judgment of a trial

court in a criminal case “is not haphazard and overlapping but is organized

and complete.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). The

structure “is set out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42,

and thereafter in CR 60.02. . . . [which] is for relief that is not available by

direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42.” Id. In an RCr 11.42

proceeding, the movant must establish that he was deprived of some

                                          5
substantial right that would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the

post-conviction proceeding. Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118

(Ky.1968).

      Likewise, CR 60.02 is an extraordinary remedy and “[t]o justify relief, the

movant must specifically present facts which render the original trial

tantamount to none at all.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Ky.

2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted). To warrant reversal of a lower

court’s ruling on a CR 60.02 motion, the appellant must demonstrate some

“flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 886 (quoting Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858).

As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,

“[t]he presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest in

collateral attacks on that judgment.” 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). With

retroactivity being an issue that is purely a matter of law, we review the trial

court’s ruling de novo. See Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard, 37 S.W.3d 717, 719

(Ky. 2000) (applying de novo standard of review to matters of law in cases in

which no facts are in dispute).

      The relevant portion of RCr 11.42(10) provides that a motion must be

filed within three years after the judgment is final unless it presents new facts,

or the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the

three-year period and has been held to apply retroactively. Appellants argue

that Ramos announced a new constitutional right and urges us to apply its

holding retroactively. Alternatively, they request relief under CR 60.02 on

equitable grounds.

                                         6
      In Leonard, Kentucky adopted Teague’s proscription against applying

new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure retroactively once a

judgment is final on direct review. 279 S.W.3d at 160. The Leonard court

reasoned, “Teague’s proscription against applying new rules retroactively once

a judgment has become final on direct review makes sense, given the interest

in finality of judgments.” Id. The Court noted this was especially so in cases

that have been final for a significant amount of time. Id. Thus, “[u]nder

Teague, once a conviction becomes final, that is, it has gone through the direct

appeal process and been affirmed, the new rule is not applicable, even if the

collateral attack is pending when, or has begun after, the new decision is

rendered.” Id. at 159. See also Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“A

state conviction and sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity

analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been

exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed

or a timely filed petition has been finally denied[]”). The Teague doctrine has

been consistently and repeatedly applied in Kentucky jurisprudence. See, e.g.,

Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 300-01 (Ky. 2018); Commonwealth v.

Lawson, 454 S.W.3d 843, 846 (Ky. 2014); Hallum v. Commonwealth, 347

S.W.3d 55, 57 (Ky. 2011).

      In Edwards, the Supreme Court expressly held that the rule announced

in Ramos could not be applied retroactively to overturn final convictions on

federal habeas corpus review. 141 S. Ct. at 1551. Citing Teague, the Edwards

Court noted that “a decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure

                                         7
ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.” Id. The

Edwards court specified that the Ramos case “directly affected Louisiana and

Oregon, which were the only two States that still allowed non-unanimous

verdicts[,]” thereby solidifying that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not

apply to any situation that does not involve the number of jurors required for a

unanimous verdict. 141 S. Ct. at 1554.

      Nonetheless, Appellants ask that we abandon state precedent relying on

the federal habeas non-retroactivity doctrine because of the fundamental right

at stake. They maintain that their constitutional right to a unanimous verdict

was violated when they were convicted by a jury that was not unanimous as to

the actus reus. In this vein, Appellants assert that sufficiency of the evidence

and unanimity are independent constitutional rights.

      However, unlike the Oregon and Louisiana unanimity issues presented in

Ramos, “Kentucky has long required criminal convictions by a unanimous jury

verdict.” Capstraw v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 148, 158 (Ky. 2022).

Indeed, over four decades ago, this Court held that “Section 7 of the Kentucky

Constitution requires a unanimous verdict reached by a jury of twelve persons

in all criminal cases.” Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky.

1978). See also KRS 29A.280(3) (“A unanimous verdict is required in all

criminal trials by jury”); RCr 9.82(1) (“The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall

be returned by the jury in open court[]”).

      Furthermore, Kentucky law is clear that “jurors may reach a unanimous

verdict even though they may not all agree upon the means or method by

                                        8
which a defendant has committed the criminal act.” King v. Commonwealth,

554 S.W.3d 343, 352 (Ky. 2018). Juror unanimity in this context “means that

jurors must agree upon the specific instances of criminal behavior committed

by the defendant but they need not agree upon his means or method of

committing the act or causing the prohibited result.” Id.

      In Capstraw, this Court considered whether to apply Ramos retroactively

to a claim of unanimity violation (combination murder instruction – wanton or

intentional) and was “unconvinced that Ramos requires us to revisit our long-

standing precedent.” 641 S.W.3d at 158. The Capstraw court upheld the

combination instruction and found no unanimous verdict issue “as long as the

evidence was sufficient to support a combination instruction.” Id. The

rationale in Capstraw echoes the reasoning of this Court’s ruling on the

unanimity issue raised in Appellants’ direct appeal and is consistent with

Kentucky precedent. See, e.g., Futrell v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 258, 277

(Ky. 2015) (finding a combination principal-accomplice wanton murder

instruction appropriate because the evidence supported both alternatives); St.

Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 559 (Ky. 2004) (holding that murder

instructions combining principal and accomplice liability was proper).

      Here, noting its obligation to follow Edwards and Leonard’s adoption of

Teague’s retroactivity principles, the trial court correctly denied relief under

RCr 11.42(10). As for relief under CR 60.02, that rule “is not a separate

avenue of appeal to be pursued in addition to other remedies but is available

only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other proceedings.” McQueen v.

                                         9
Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997); see also Gross, 648 S.W.2d at

857 (holding the language of RCr 11.42 forecloses the defendant from raising

any questions under CR 60.02 which are “issues that could reasonably have

been presented” by RCr 11.42 proceedings). “A change in the law simply is not

grounds for CR 60.02 relief except in aggravated cases where there are strong

equities.” Leonard, 279 S.W.3d at 161–62 (citation omitted).

      To justify CR 60.02 relief, a movant bears the burden to “affirmatively

allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege

special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.” McQueen, 948 S.W.2d at

416. Appellants’ CR 60.02 motions are not only procedurally deficient, as they

raise the same claim in their request for RCr 11.42 relief, but they have further

failed to persuade us that the equities weigh in favor of using CR 60.02 to

apply Ramos’s holding to their cases. Thus, the trial court properly denied

relief under this rule.

      Lastly, as to CR 60.03, the trial court’s order summarily denied relief

under that rule as well. Notably, Appellants have not briefed this issue on

appeal and therefore we consider it abandoned. That said, for purposes of

clarity, any claim for relief under that rule would likewise be barred. CR 60.03

“is intended as an equitable form of relief when no other avenue exists.” Meece

v. Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 295 (Ky. 2017). The plain language of that

rule requires “an independent action” to be brought, with relief unavailable “if

the ground of relief sought has been denied in a proceeding by motion under

Rule 60.02[.]” CR 60.03; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 640 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky.

                                        10
App. 2022). Since Appellants did not bring an independent action seeking CR

60.03 relief, and we affirm the denial of CR 60.02 relief, they are prohibited

from seeking CR 60.03 relief on this basis in the future.

       In summary, Appellants’ cases have received direct and collateral review

at the state and federal levels, with the unanimity/combination instruction

issue squarely addressed. Appellants’ current attempt to vacate their

convictions by arguing for retroactive application of Ramos is distorted, as the

holding of Ramos simply does not apply to their claims. Moreover, Appellants

have failed to persuade us that their cases warrant abandoning long-standing

precedent concerning unanimity and combination instructions or justify

renouncing this state’s continued adherence to the Teague bar. We conclude

that the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ post-conviction motions was correct

as a matter of law and therefore affirm.

                                 III.   Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court is

affirmed.

       All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Lambert and Nickell, JJ.,

concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion in which

Bisig, J., joins.

       THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING: While I agree with the majority opinion

affirming the Fayette Circuit Court’s denial of the appellants’ postconviction

motions, I write separately to clarify what I believe to be the appropriate focus

for resolving these appeals. Two points are key: (1) Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.

                                        11
Ct. 1390 (2020), does not apply to invalidate verdicts in which twelve jurors

concluded the defendant was guilty of murder; and (2) there is no unanimity

problem when a jury finds a defendant guilty of murder under an appropriate

principal-accomplice combination instruction.

         The appellants argue their jury verdicts were not unanimous because it

is unknown whether each of the twelve jurors convicted them of murder as

principals or accomplices. Their jury instructions were as follows:

         If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
         the Defendant, [defendant’s name], is guilty of either Murder under
         Instruction No. 2 or Complicity to Murder under Instruction No. 3,
         but are unable to determine from the evidence whether the
         Defendant committed this crime as Principal under Instruction No.
         2 or Accomplice under Instruction No. 3, then you will find
         [defendant’s name] guilty of Murder, Principal or Accomplice,
         under this Instruction and so state in your verdict.[4]

         Ramos invalidates state convictions reached by ten jurors out of twelve

on the basis that such does not constitute a unanimous jury verdict. 140 S.

Ct. at 1397. While the opinion addresses unanimity generally, it does not

reach the type of problem raised by the appellants. Therefore, there is no need

to discuss whether Ramos applies retroactively or not, as it simply does not

apply.

         In Kentucky, “a general jury verdict based on an instruction

including two or more separate instances of a criminal offense, whether

explicitly stated in the instruction or based on the proof—violates the

      4 This was the exact wording for the instructions concerning Caudill and

GoForth, and very close to the wording for the instructions regarding Halvorsen.

                                         12
requirement of a unanimous verdict.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d

439, 449 (Ky. 2013) (emphasis added). However, such a situation is not to be

confused with one instance of a criminal offense which may have been

committed directly, through being the actor who physically did it, or indirectly

as an accomplice.

      As explained in as explained in King v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343,

352 (Ky. 2018):

      This court recognizes and has consistently maintained that the
      jurors may reach a unanimous verdict even though they may not
      all agree upon the means or method by which a defendant has
      committed the criminal act. Conrad v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d
      779, 784 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d
      566, 574 (Ky. 2002) ) (A “conviction of the same offense under
      either of two alternative theories does not deprive a defendant of
      his right to a unanimous verdict if there is evidence to support a
      conviction under either theory.”). Nor is the jury required to agree
      upon the defendant's mental state in cases where alternative
      mental states authorize conviction for the same criminal act. Wells
      v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1978) (“We hold that a
      verdict cannot be successfully attacked upon the ground that the
      jurors could have believed either of two theories of the case where
      both interpretations are supported by the evidence and the proof of
      either beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes the same offense.”).
      Neither Harp, Johnson, nor their progeny changes that.

      However, we have also held consistently with virtually every other
      American jurisdiction to address the matter, that juror unanimity
      means that jurors must agree upon the specific instance of
      criminal behavior committed by the defendant but they need not
      agree upon his means or method of committing the act or causing
      the prohibited result.

      The fact that either Caudill or GoForth may have bludgeoned the victim

to death, with each of them “accus[ing] the other of murdering and robbing the

victim and of setting fire to the automobile[,]” Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120

S.W.3d 635, 648 (Ky. 2003), does not mean that they are not each guilty of
                                       13
murder under KRS 507.020, whether as a principal or as an accomplice

pursuant to KRS 502.020, for this single act. Similarly, where the evidence

indicated that Halvorson and his co-defendant both shot the victims, rendering

lethal wounds and “it was impossible to determine that either appellant was

only a principal or only an accomplice[,]” the Court correctly determined, citing

Wells, that “[a] verdict cannot be attacked as being non-unanimous where both

theories are supported by sufficient evidence.” Halvorsen v. Commonwealth,

730 S.W.2d 921, 925 (Ky. 1986). Accordingly, there is no unanimity problem

and affirmance of the denial of the appellants’ postconviction actions was

appropriate.

      Bisig, J., joins.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS,
LEIF HALVORSEN AND
JOHNATHAN WAYNE GOFORTH:

David Michael Barron
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT.
VIRGINA SUSAN CAUDILL:

J. Robert Linneman
Santen & Hughes

Dennis James Burke
Assistant Public Advocate

Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General

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