Court Opinion

ID: 9907456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:04:59.925065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:23.273473
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-2881
                  _____________________________

EARNEST CARL DAUGTHREY,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County.
Ana Maria Garcia, Judge.

                         December 6, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Appellant was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a
law enforcement officer. Following a trial, the jury found him
guilty of reckless driving, a lesser included offense. At sentencing,
the State requested a six-month probation term and Appellant did
not object. The written judgment and sentence included an
assessment of $50 for prosecution costs.

     The trial court filed a written order of probation ninety-seven
days after imposing the judgment and sentence. The written order
included additional probation conditions not orally pronounced.
Appellant filed a motion to correct the sentencing error and it was
denied. This appeal followed.
    Appellant’s first claim is that his six-month probationary
sentence impermissibly exceeded the maximum lawful sentence.
This is incorrect. Section 948.15(1) provides the legal basis for his
sentence. We affirm on this claim.

     Appellant’s second claim is that the trial court erred in
imposing additional probation conditions in a written order filed
more than sixty days after sentencing. Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(c) “allows the trial court to reduce or modify a
sentence to include the conditions mandated by chapter 948.
However, the rule specifically requires that this must be
accomplished within sixty days after imposition of the original
legal sentence.” Kirizes v. State, 798 So. 2d 789, 794 (Fla. 5th DCA
2001). We have adopted the rationale in Kiriazes. See Schutte v.
State, 824 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Beal v. State, 978 So. 2d
825 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

     While the State is correct that the contested conditions did not
require oral pronouncement, they did need to be timely imposed.
“General conditions of probation not orally pronounced at
sentencing may validly be imposed by subsequent timely written
order of probation.” Hicks v. State, 1 So. 3d 1233, 1234 (1st DCA
2009) (citing State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1998)).
Since the written order was filed outside of the sixty-day window,
the additional probation conditions were improper. We reverse on
this claim and remand for the trial court to enter a corrected order
consistent with this opinion.

    Appellant’s third claim is that the trial court erred in
imposing a prosecution fee of $50. He argues that the State must
request the prosecution fee at sentencing. We affirm on this claim.
See Parks v. State, No. 1D22-1566, 2023 WL 4924857 (1st DCA
2023).

    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

RAY, BILBREY, and LONG, JJ., concur.

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                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Tyler Kemper Payne,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kristie Regan, Assistant
State Attorney, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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