Court Opinion

ID: 9549696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:23:30.945947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:46.447601
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I have concluded that under the particular facts of this case, Ladd’s motion to suppress should have been granted by the superior court. For, in my view, Ladd was denied the right to the assistance of counsel under both the United States and Alaska Constitutions1 and was further denied the protections afforded an accused in custody by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Central to analysis of the record in the instant case are the following events: At the time he was first arrested on December 15, 1973, at Cordova, Alaska, for a federal offense, Alaska State Trooper Cole advised Ladd of his right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel at any questioning. Ladd then requested to have an attorney to represent him before answering any questions concerning Rich. After Ladd unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the services of an attorney, he advised Trooper Cole of this fact and specifically informed the officer that he did not want to make any statement until he had consulted with an attorney. Of controlling significance is the fact that despite the foregoing, Trooper Cole then informed Ladd that there were some questions he wished to ask him.
Thus, I cannot agree with the majority that Trooper Cole’s conduct at this initial interrogation is not in issue. Here the record shows that from Ladd’s first encounter with Trooper Cole until the February 4th correction by Ladd of the transcript of his *973taped statement of February 1, 1977, Ladd never received the benefit of the assistance of counsel with respect to the Rich homicide.
Not only was Ladd questioned by Trooper Cole after he had advised the officer that he desired to speak to counsel before answering Cole’s question but the same pattern emerges in the December 16 and 20 meetings between Ladd and Trooper Va-den. Here, although Ladd again makes reference to his desire to consult with an attorney before questioning, he is in fact questioned by Trooper Vaden after being given a complete Miranda warning by Vaden.
Given the totality of the factual circumstances of Ladd’s incarceration and interrogations, I conclude that the suppression motion should have been granted because the statements in question were obtained in violation of Ladd’s right to counsel as provided in the Constitutions of the United States and Alaska. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Additionally, in the factual context of the case at bar, I cannot find that Ladd had waived his right to the assistance of counsel. As the United States Supreme Court said in Michigan v. Mosley,2
[w]e therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’
Here the record fails to demonstrate that Ladd’s request to terminate questioning was “scrupulously honored,” and thus a valid waiver by Ladd of his Miranda rights cannot be found. See United States v. Jeffery, 473 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1970). Contrary to the majority’s view, the facts here indicate a situation where defendant requested counsel, asserted his right to remain silent, but nonetheless confessed after he was faced with renewed interrogations.3

. In the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, it is provided:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
In article I, section 11, of the Alaska Constitution, it is provided:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right , . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

. 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 321 (1975). The Supreme Court found the statements admissible in Mosley. However that case differs from the case at bar, in that Ladd made an initial request for counsel followed by allusions at subsequent interrogations to the fact that he was not represented. After each of these occurrences, the troopers continued the questioning. In Mosley, “[w]hen Mosley stated that he did not want to discuss the robberies, Detective Cowie immediately ceased the interrogation and did not try either to resume the questioning or in any way to persuade Mosley to reconsider his position.” 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326, 46 L.Ed.2d at 322.

. It should be noted that Ladd was in continuous custody from the time of the earliest statements to the last; much of this time he was in solitary confinement. Given these facts, there was an insufficient break to justify a holding that the taint from the original deprivations of Ladd’s right to counsel was dissipated. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972).