Court Opinion

ID: 9624149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:52:38.294294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:03.461190
License: Public Domain

Bell, Judge:
*439This is a statutory proceeding for worker’s compensation. James L. Spoone filed a claim for benefits against his employer, Newsome Chevrolet Buick, Inc. The single commissioner awarded compensation and the full commission affirmed. Newsome appealed to the circuit court. The court reversed the award on the ground that the claim was barred by Section 42-9-60, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, which prohibits compensation if the injury was occasioned by the intoxication of the employee. Spoone appeals. We affirm.
The facts of the case are stipulated. Newsome employed Spoone as a car salesman in Columbia, South Carolina. During December, 1985, Newsome’s management promoted a month long sales contest between two teams of employees. The winning team would receive a steak dinner party. This party was one of a series of social events which were regularly held by Newsome to promote sales. Spoone’s team won the contest.
The party was held on January 8, 1986. In addition to the dinner, Newsome provided a serve yourself “open bar” with liquor and beer. Spoone left the party highly intoxicated to drive home in a “demonstrator” car Newsome furnished for his personal use. He sustained serious injuries when he “flipped” the car on the highway. At the time of the accident he was legally intoxicated. The parties agree that the accident was caused by his intoxication. For purposes of this appeal, Newsome has abandoned any argument that Spoone was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
The single commissioner concluded Spoone suffered compensable injuries. He reasoned that since the employer provided an “open bar” to its employees with the knowledge they would be drinking and driving, it should be equitably estopped from raising Section 42-9-60 as a defense. The circuit court held that equitable estoppel could not be invoked to nullify the prohibition of a mandatory statute.
The narrow issue presented for our decision is whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be used to overcome the bar of Section 42-9-60. This is a question of first impression in South Carolina.
As a general rule, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may not be invoked to nullify a mandatory statutory restriction. Freeman v. Fisher, 288 S.C. 192, 341 S.E. *440(2d) 136 (1986). The rule rests on the principle that equity will not prevail over a positive enactment of the legislature. Town of Zebulon v. Dawson, 216 N.C. 520, 5 S.E. (2d) 535 (1939). There is a sound reason for this principle. An important function of legislation is to consider and to balance the competing interests and equities arising from the conduct of human affairs. Worker’s compensation laws are a classic example of this legislative balancing of the equities. See Cook v. Mack’s Transfer & Storage, 291 S.C. 84, 352 S.E. (2d) 296 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 292 S.C. 230, 355 S.E. (2d) 861 (1987) (statute embodies legislative balancing of advantages between employer and employee to afford widest practical coverage for work related injuries). When the legislature has struck a balance by enacting a statutory rule, the courts have no prerogative to annul the legislative choice by applying “chancellor’s foot” notions of equity in its place. Stated differently, “[I]t is not the province of this Court to perform legislative functions.” Henderson v. Evans, 268 S.C. 127, 130, 232 S.E. (2d) 331, 333 (1977). The function of equity is to supplement the law, not to displace it. See Town of Zebulon v. Dawson, supra.
In this case, the language of the statute is plain and unqualified. It lists no exceptions. We cannot, under the guise of doing equity, allow what the General Assembly has expressly prohibited.
Affirmed.
Shaw, J., concurs.
Gardner, J., dissents with separate opinion.