Court Opinion

ID: 9655776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:21:35.349466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:21.785426
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from that part of the court’s opinion which holds that the legal existence of the district and the legal status of its officers can be litigated in this proceeding.
*305It is to be remembered that this is an appeal in a special statutory proceeding under section 31-413, R. R. S. 1943. The question is not: Can the question of the legality of the organization of a drainage district be challenged collaterally? That, however, is the question which the court poses and answers: The court quotes the statute and thereafter pays no further attention to it. It being a statutory matter it is my thought that we should examine the statute to determine what jurisdiction the district court has been given in this proceeding. That is the question which this appeal presents.
An analysis of Chapter 31, article 4, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943, answers the question here presented.
The first sections of the article deal with the organization of a district. Section 31-411, R. R. S. 1943, provides for the apportionment of benefits. Section 31-412, R. R. S. 1943, provides for a hearing on objections before the directors of the district, a determination by them of apportionment, a filing of their report, and a publication of notice of the action taken. Section 31-413, R. R. S. 1943, then provides that a person “claiming to be aggrieved by such apportionment of the benefits may file complaint thereof.” The county clerk is then to make “a transcript of the objections and of the report of the apportionment of benefits.” That transcript is to be filed in the district court of the county where “all such objections” are to be heard and determined by the court “in a summary manner as in a case in equity, and shall increase or reduce the units of benefits on any tract where the same may be required in order to make the apportionment equitable.” Section 31-414, R. R. S. 1943, provides that the procedure of sections 31-411 to 31-413, R. R. S. 1943, shall apply if a change of plans or enlargement or extension of the work makes a different apportionment necessary. Section 31-449, R. R. S. 1943, provides for a reapportionment where a levy is invalid. It is quite apparent that these procedures *306go to the general matter of apportionment and reapportionment of benefits. The proceedings of section 31-413, R. R. S. 1943, are somewhat akin to an equalization proceeding. At no point in the sections mentioned is there any suggestion of a right or power to go beyond the particular scope of these proceedings and to convert them into an action to test either the legality of the district or the legal status of its officers. This procedure is not designed to accomplish that purpose.
As a general rule, where a statutory remedy is prescribed for a particular purpose, it cannot be used for other purposes. 1 C. J. S., Actions, § 5, p. 973; 1 C. J., Actions, § 100, p. 988.
The statute, section 31-413, R. R. S. 1943, limits the scope of the proceedings and the remedy to be had in the district court. It provides for no pleadings, process, or proceedings as in an ordinary action. It provides for a “complaint” by one “aggrieved by such apportionment of benefits.” It provides for a “transcript of the objections” to be filed in the district court. It provides that the district court “shall hear and determine all such objections in a summary manner as in a case in equity.” It provides that the district court “shall increase or reduce the units of benefit on any tract where the same may be required in order to make the apportionment equitable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously the “such objections” relates back to the claim that a party is aggrieved by the apportionment •of benefits, and limits the scope of the proceedings to ■objections dealing with that question.
The statute prescribes the order which the court may enter in clear and unmistakable language.
The words “summary manner,” as commonly employed in statutes, mean a short, concise, and immediate proceeding to determine issues within the narrow scope •of the statutory remedy. Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152,13 A. L. R. 524; McKown v. Powers, 86 Maine 291, 29 A. 1079; Matlon v. Matlon, *30792 Ind. App. 350, 175 N. E. 369; Goodwin v. Calumet Supply Co., 107 Ind. App. 487, 23 N. E. 2d 602.
We have held: “The board of equalization is simply what its name imports, a board for the equalization of values in certain cases. It possesses no powers save those conferred by statute, and its jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record of its proceedings.” State ex rel. Goff v. Dodge County, 20 Neb. 595, 31 N. W. 117. See, also, Brown v. Douglas County, 98 Neb. 299, 152 N. W. 545. “Upon the appeal of a landowner from the findings and order of assessment made by the drainage board, the question of the amount of benefits to his land can always be tried, * * *.” Drainage Dist. v. Bowker,. 89 Neb. 230, 131 N. W. 208. “It will be observed that section 5901, Comp. St. 1922, is wholly devoted to the subject of the equalization of assessments and procedure prescribed therefor, including provisions for review of the final determinations therein made. It would seem, in view of all the provisions referred to, that the concluding portion of section 5901, Comp. St. 1922, must be limited to proceedings contemplated and regulated by this section.” Elmen v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 120 Neb. 141, 231 N. W. 772.
Nebraska Telephone Co. v. Hall County, 75 Neb. 405, 106 N. W. 471, involved an appeal from the county equalization board to the district court. In the district court the taxpayer undertook to raise a new issue to the effect that it had erroneously reported its property and asked to raise that objection. The statute provided: “The court shall hear the appeal as in 'equity and without a jury, and determine anew all questions raised before the board which relate to the liability of the property to assessment, or the amount thereof, * * *.” Comp. St. 1905, c. 77, art. I, § 124, p. 1311; Ann. St. 1903,' § 10523. We held that the issues in the district court under that statute were limited to those questions raised before the board of equalization.
In Reimers v. Merrick County, 82 Neb. 639, 118 N. *308W. 113, which was an appeal from a decision of the board of equalization, the taxpayer undertook to raise in the district court the question of constitutionality of the act. We held, citing the Telephone case, that: “Whenever the legislature provides for an appeal to a court from a decision of a board of equalization, that court, no matter what may be its grade, is one of limited jurisdiction for said purpose, and must keep strictly within the letter of the statute defining its power. * * * The legislature, in the section of the revenue law referred to, has seen fit to restrict the district court on such appeal to a consideration of the questions raised before said board, and the court is without power to adjudicate any other issue in that proceeding.”
In Bute v. Hamilton County, 113 Neb. 230, 202 N. W. 616, there was an effort to raise questions here not presented to the board of equalization. We followed these two cases and held that that could not be done. See, also, Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. v. State Board, 154 Neb. 371, 48 N. W. 2d 81; In re Turrell, 63 Misc. Rep. 502, 117 N. Y. S. 764; Self v. Indian Creek Drainage Dist., 158 Miss. 7, 128 So. 339.
Consistent with these decisions I would hold that in the proceedings provided by section 31-413, R. R. S. 1943, a party claiming to be aggrieved by an apportionment of benefits by a drainage district cannot properly challenge the legality of the organization of the district nor the legal status of its officers.
The court ignores the above decisions of this court which point directly to the correct answer here and quotes from cases and texts dealing with collateral attack generally.
Township of Lake v. Millar, 257 Mich. 135, 241 N. W. 237, was an action in equity for an injunction; Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Village of Hershey, 139 Neb. 205, 296 N. W. 879, was a suit for judgment upon taxes assessed; State ex rel. Sheffer v. Fuller, 83 Neb. 784, 120 N. W. 495, was an action in quo warranto to dissolve a district *309and oust its acting directors; O’Neill v. Learner, 93 Neb. 786, 142 N. W. 112, affirmed in 239 U. S. 244, 36 S. Ct. 54, 60 L. Ed. 249, was an action to enjoin the construction of a ditch; Campbell v. Youngson, 80 Neb. 322, 114 N. W. 415, was an injunction action; Scottsbluff Drainage Dist. v. Scotts Bluff County, 113 Neb. 187, 202 N. W. 455, was a proceeding on a claim for assessments not paid; and Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Payne Creek Drainage Dist., 148 Neb. 139, 26 N. W. 2d 607, was an injunction action challenging the organization of the district.
Those cases do not deal with the construction or jurisdiction of a court in a special statutory proceeding.
The court quotes from certain of the standard texts. The first one is from 17 Am. Jur., Drains and Sewers, § 24, p. 793. The quote is correct. It is interesting to note, however, that the text cites no authority for the last sentence, which the court adopts in its syllabus point. Also, it should be noted that the court does not quote the next sentence which is: “The fact that the organizing tribunal acted without jurisdiction or that the proceedings were conducted under an unconstitutional statute may be brought up in a suit to recover an assessment or to enjoin a levy and may constitute a good defense or a good cause of action therein.” Obviously the actions there mentioned do not deal with one such as we have here.
The court quotes from 19 C. J., Drains, § 258, p. 742. It fails to quote a prior sentence in the same section which is: “The questions to be determined on appeal from a drainage assessment are generally confined to those bearing on the making and correctness of the assessment, and the regularity of the prior proceedings cannot be reviewed.” In this connection, see, also, 28 C. J. S., Drains, § 72, p. 441; 48 Am. Jur., Special or Local Assessments, § 184, p. 718.
The court quotes from 28 C. J. S., Drains, § 36, p. 333. The court does not quote this sentence appearing *310in the text: “The legality of the organization of the district cannot be questioned by a landowner in assessment proceedings, * * The court quotes from a subparagraph entitled “Jurisdictional defects” appearing in the above text on page 335. The court fails to quote-the-next following sentence which is: “In case of jurisdictional defects, the party entitled to complain may sue to set aside or enjoin the collection of assessments, or-to enjoin the construction of the drain, except where-there is a plain and adequate remedy at law.”
The above counterquotes are given to illustrate the-inherent dangers and weaknesses involved in following statements in texts, as is here done, particularly in matters of statutory construction.
It appears to me that such statements of law taken from such decisions and applicable to the nature of the action being tried and statements from texts are not particularly persuasive or in point in determining the issues that may be tried under a special statutory proceeding such as we have here.
' I have not overlooked the fact that the court quotes part of one sentence from Cordes v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Iowa 136, 196 N. W. 997, which in turn rests upon Lightner v. Greene County, 145 Iowa 95, 123 N. W.. 749, from which an extended quote is made. The court, however, fails to note that the Iowa statute cited in the opinion is not analyzed or discussed. The statute provides: “The appeal herein provided for shall be tried in the district court as an action in equity * * § 1989-al4, Code of Iowa, Supp. 1907. The broad language of the Iowa code when compared with the restricted language of our statutes, hereinbefore quoted, removes the-Iowa cases as persuasive authorities.
The court, by adopting general language from cases and texts, has effectively judicially amended our act, struck out the limiting clauses, and converted this special proceeding to “an action in equity.”
Particular reference should be made to the court’s use *311as an authority of Haecke v. Eastern Sarpy County Drainage Dist., 141 Neb. 628, 4 N. W. 2d 744. We there held that compliance with the provision of section 31-511, Comp. St. 1929, as to the making of detailed plans of public work to be done, was a condition precedent to the apportionment of benefits and that the question of compliance with this condition precedent could be presented to the district court on an appeal from an order of apportionment of benefits.
The court now holds that we concluded that such a step was a jurisdictional requirement and “As logically, the legal existence of the district, a jurisdictional requirement, could also be litigated.” I assume that it may be said that the legal existence of the district is a condition precedent to any subsequent act of the district including the apportionment of benefits, but from that it does not follow that in this special statutory proceeding that question can be raised.
The court overlooks the fact that this proceeding, by the very terms of the statute, deals with the equitable apportionment of benefits and nothing else. The Legislature presupposed the existence of a legally organized district, with legally qualified officers with power to act. It provided for a review of action taken by such a district and such officers. The court overlooks the fact that detailed plans were in fact, and made so by statute as demonstrated by the opinion, a condition precedent to the apportionment of benefits. That is a foundation element necessary to establish the correctness of the apportionment of benefits. The legal organization of the district is not such a foundation element. If it is, then proof of the legal organization of the district and the legal status of the officers becomes “a condition precedent” to proof of the correctness of the apportionment of benefits in all cases. I find no indication in the statute of such a requirement and the court cites none.
I would hold that the issue to be determined in this *312proceeding is that which the Legislature said was to be determined. I would leave the question of the legality of the district and the legal status of its officers to be determined by the remedies which the law clearly furnishes for that purpose.