Court Opinion

ID: 9952989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 08:14:16.0447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:34.379924
License: Public Domain

In The
                               Court of Appeals
                      Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                      No. 07-23-00359-CR

                        NATHANIEL DAVID JONES, APPELLANT

                                                V.

                            THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                           On Appeal from the 33rd District Court
                                   Llano County, Texas
                Trial Court No. CR7845, Honorable J. Allan Garrett, Presiding

                                       March 20, 2024
                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

      In exchange for dismissal of four of five counts of possession of child pornography,

Appellant, Nathaniel David Jones, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of one count.1

Punishment was assessed at ten years’ confinement, suspended in favor of ten years’

community supervision, and a $1,000 fine.2 In addition to the usual terms and conditions

of supervision, Appellant was required to comply with supplemental terms and conditions

      1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(d).

      2 As part of the plea agreement, Counts II through V were abandoned by the State and dismissed.
applicable to sex offenders.            Less than a year after being placed on community

supervision, the State filed a motion to revoke, which was amended twice, alleging

Appellant failed to comply with numerous conditions of the usual and supplemental

conditions.3 At a hearing on the State’s allegations, Appellant pleaded “not true” and the

trial court heard evidence of violations of the usual and supplemental conditions, revoked

Appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement.

        By a sole issue, Appellant maintains his due process rights, specifically his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights, were violated by the trial court’s failure to hold a

preliminary and final revocation hearing before revoking his community supervision.4 The

State contends Appellant failed to preserve his complaint for review and even if

preserved, no violation of his due process rights occurred. We agree with the State.

                                              BACKGROUND

        According to expert testimony, Appellant is a high functioning autistic individual.5

His supervision officer testified she reviewed the usual and supplemental conditions of

community supervision with Appellant, and he acknowledged them. The officer testified

        3 The State points out the amended motions were erroneously entitled “Requests for Adjudication”

but are in fact motions to revoke.

        4 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should
a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, this
appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court . TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
        5 A psychologist, who is not licensed to practice in Texas, testified remotely that Appellant, although

high functioning, is unable to understand other people’s thoughts, feelings, or ideas. However, he explained
that through an educational approach such as “overlearning,” an autistic individual can be treated to
comprehend law and rules that must be followed.

       The supervision officer testified she has other clients who are on the spectrum and evaluates their
treatment based on the recommendations of a psychologist.
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Appellant committed multiple violations of the conditions thereof.         According to her

testimony, Appellant admitted to certain violations and self-reported others. The State

also presented evidence of other violations, including proof of violations of some of the

supplemental conditions imposed on Appellant as a sex offender.

                                         ANALYSIS

      Appellant’s sole complaint is that his due process rights were violated by the trial

court’s failure to hold a preliminary hearing before the revocation hearing. We disagree.

      Initially, we note that preservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-tier

appellate court is required to address. Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2020). A complaint of a due process violation requires preservation in the trial court

lest it be forfeited on appeal. Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009); Vanhoose v. State, Nos. 03-17-00259-CR, 03-17-00530-CR, 2019 Tex. App.

LEXIS 1418, at *6 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 27, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). Appellant did not object or otherwise complain during the

revocation hearing that his due process rights were being violated. See TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(1)(A).

      Although not preserved, Appellant’s due process argument can be succinctly

resolved. See Whisenant v. State, 557 S.W.2d 102, 104–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)

(recognizing that procedure for revocation in Texas is different than in Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 656 (1973), and holding due

process rights were not violated where probationer did not receive a preliminary hearing).

See also Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 41–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

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       While Appellant acknowledges the holding in Whisenant, he requests this Court

overrule or modify that decision. He presents what he calls a “good faith” argument that

Whisenant was wrongfully decided. He advocates, at a minimum, for a preliminary

hearing in cases where the defendant suffers from a classified mental disorder, i.e.,

autism or bipolar disorder, before holding a revocation hearing.

       Despite his argument that Whisenant was wrongfully decided, this Court has no

authority to disregard precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals and is bound to follow

such precedent. See Sierra v. State, 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004),

aff’d, 218 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Martinez v. State, No. 03-08-00611-CR,

2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6528, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 21, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication); Bolen v. State, 321 S.W.3d 819, 828 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2010, pet. ref’d). We decline to overrule or modify Whisenant and conclude the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s community supervision. See Garcia

v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding proof of a single violation is

sufficient to support revocation). Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

                                       CONCLUSION

       The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                        Alex Yarbrough
                                                            Justice

Do not publish.

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