Court Opinion

ID: 9796367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:56:18.800092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:10.522586
License: Public Domain

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
¶ 60 I respectfully dissent as to parts I and II.B of Chief Justice Durham’s lead opinion. In part I, Chief Justice Durham would adopt a rule eliminating the trial court’s discretion by requiring that expert witness testimony be admitted in eases where eyewitness identification is at issue. In my view, this rule is both unjustified and overly broad. In part II.B, she would create a new rule of criminal procedure that requires the suppression of all allocution statements made by defendants, including confessions. I believe that the lead opinion fails to offer adequate justification for such a new rule.
ANALYSIS
I. MAESTAS’S MOTION TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
1161 I disagree with Chief Justice Durham’s conclusion that Maestas’s expert on witness identification “must be allowed to testify at trial.” I consider this new rule an unjustified extension of our ease law and inconsistent with rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. After reviewing our previous holding in this case, State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 376 (Maestas I), the lead opinion reviews three prior decisions that addressed the issue of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. See State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 44 P.3d 794; State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). However, neither these cases nor rule 702 mandates, as Chief Justice Durham suggests, a new rule removing judicial discretion and requiring admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification.

A. Our Prior Case Law Does Not Mandate a New Rule Requiring the Admission of Expert Testimony

¶ 62 Contrary to the view expressed in the lead opinion, other cases that have recently addressed the admission of eyewitness expert testimony do not support the conclusion that trial courts must allow expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Chief Justice Durham concludes that these cases, read in light of our holding in Maestas I, support a determination that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Maestas’s expert to testify. However, a close examination of our case law provides no such support for this position.
¶ 63 Concerns about expert testimony on eyewitness identification were central to our holding in Maestas I, where we noted that our prior cases “have summarized the empirical studies questioning the reliability of eyewitness identification.” 1999 UT 32 at ¶ 25, 984 P.2d 376 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-92 (Utah 1986)). Although we held that Maestas’s counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to educate the jury about the limitations of eyewitness identifications, we did not state that expert testimony was necessary for Maestas to receive a fair trial on remand. Maestas I, 1999 UT 32 at ¶ 30, 984 P.2d 376. Rather, we held that, in the absence of a legitimate tactical basis for refusing to do so, effective assistance requires, at a minimum, that defense counsel request a cautionary instruction. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 37. Although expert testimony is one method of educating the jury about the *635pitfalls of eyewitness identifications, our comment in Maestas 1 should not be interpreted as depriving the trial court of its traditional discretion in this area.
¶ 64 Similarly, none of the cases relied on by Chief Justice Durham support the rule that expert testimony must be admitted in this case. In fact, our recent case law contradicts her conclusion by consistently upholding the trial court’s discretion.
¶ 65 The lead opinion would create a rule entitling defendants “to the information experts on human memory can provide about its operation,” relying on “our holdings in Hollen, Butterfield and Long.” However, Long only addressed whether giving a jury instruction on eyewitness identification was appropriate. 721 P.2d at 487-92. Long did not address the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. While we concluded in Long “that, at a minimum,” problems with eyewitness identifications warranted a special jury instruction, id. at 492, Chief Justice Durham now concludes that even more is mandated. However, our holding in Long recognizing the necessity of educating juries about the fallibility of eyewitness testimony does not justify the further conclusion that courts must admit expert testimony to provide that education.
¶ 66 Nor does Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133, support the creation of this new rule. In Butterfield, the trial court excluded the defendant’s eyewitness identification expert’s testimony for several reasons. In affirming that exclusion, we noted that the expert’s testimony “did not deal with the specific facts from this case.” Id. at ¶44. The lead opinion in the case at bar focuses on this language, reasoning that because the expert would deal with the specific facts a different conclusion is warranted. However, in Butteifield we also found that the trial court appropriately exercised discretion by excluding the expert because his testimony “ ‘would [amount to] a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the evidence,’ ” id. at ¶43 (quoting State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981)), and because the evidence “could cause confusion of the issues and could cause undue delay or waste of time during the trial.” Id. at ¶44. Finally, we upheld the trial court’s exercise of discretion because “Butterfield ... made no showing that the proffered testimony would have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict.” Id.; see also State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982). Our holding “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding ... proposed expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification,” Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at ¶ 44, 27 P.3d 1133, does not support Chief Justice Durham’s conclusion that defendants are entitled to expert testimony.
¶ 67 Chief Justice Durham also finds support for this rule requiring the admission of expert testimony by distinguishing our holding in Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 44 P.3d 794, from the circumstances in this case. In Hollen, the trial court allowed the defendant’s eyewitness identification expert to give “extensive testimony on factors that affect the reliability of identifications” but prohibited the expert from testifying on the “overall reliability of the process of identification.” Id. at ¶ 67. On review, this court concluded that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion because the excluded testimony would not have been “helpful to the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 69 (citations omitted). Chief Justice Durham finds that the case at bar differs from Hollen because the trial court “did not allow an expert on eyewitness testimony to testify at all.” Based on the fact that this court affirmed the trial court’s allowance of expert testimony in Hollen, Chief Justice Durham finds support for this new rule that expert testimony must be admitted in eases where eyewitness identification is central to the prosecution’s case. Such a conclusion is unjustified. Our affirmation of a trial court’s exercise of discretion to permit, with a limitation, an eyewitness expert’s testimony does not justify, as Chief Justice Durham argues, a conclusion mandating the admission of expert testimony.
¶ 68 Even more recently, we have reviewed the exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification and upheld the trial court’s exercise of discretion. See State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953. In Hubbard, “the trial court gave a cautionary Long instruction instead of permitting expert testi*636mony regarding eyewitness identification.” Id. at ¶ 19. Reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we noted the following:
We have not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. Instead, we recognize that whether to allow proffered expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification testimony is a matter best left to the trial court’s discretion because of the trial court’s superior position to judge the advisability of allowing such testimony.
Id. at ¶ 14. This recent decision emphasizes our determination to avoid the creation of a per se rule and to permit trial courts to exercise discretion when asked to admit expert testimony.
¶ 69 In sum, Chief Justice Durham’s reliance on our case law to justify a new rule mandating the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification is unjustified. The cases cited in the lead opinion do not support the conclusion that trial courts must admit expert testimony. Rather, our case law validates the opposite conclusion — that trial courts may appropriately exercise discretion to exclude expert testimony.

B. The Proper Application of Rule 702 Does Not Require the Admission of Expert Testimony

¶ 70 In concluding that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is required, Chief Justice Durham also misconstrues rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which specifically governs the admissibility of expert testimony. According to rule 702, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training -or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
¶ 71 Interpreting rule 702, this court has established a three-part test to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 640-41 (Utah 1996); State v. Rimmasch, 776 P.2d 388, 398-403 (Utah 1989). The test requires the trial court to (1) “determine whether the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert’s testimony are inherently reliable,” (2) “determin[e whether] the scientific principles or techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by sufficiently qualified experts,” and (3) “determine whether the proffered scientific evidence will be more probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.” Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641.
¶ 72 With respect to a trial court’s denial of a party’s motion to present expert testimony under rule 702, we have held that “[t]he trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). Explaining further, we recently held that “ ‘the exercise of discretion ... necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if ... no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at ¶ 28, 27 P.3d 1133 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). In this case, the trial court’s refusal to allow Maestas’s expert to testify can be overturned only if no reasonable person would make the same decision. If, however, the trial court reasonably determined to exclude expert testimony after considering elements of the Rimmasch test, it did not abuse its discretion.
¶ 73 In the case at bar, the only question with respect to the Rimmasch standard is whether the trial court appropriately found that the proposed eyewitness expert testimony did not meet the third prong of the Rim-masch test.1 Explaining the third prong, this court elaborated that the court should consider “whether, on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact.” Rim-masch, 775 P.2d at 398 n. 8. Here, Maestas claimed the trial court erred in refusing to *637allow expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications. After a Ramirez hearing2 to examine the reliability of the eyewitnesses’ testimony, the court held that four of the seven eyewitnesses to the robberies would be permitted to testify that Maestas was the person who committed the robberies. As to the other eyewitnesses, the court held that they would not be allowed to identify Maes-tas as the perpetrator, but would be allowed to relate other details of the robberies that they observed.
¶ 74 The trial court also determined that the expert testimony Maestas sought to present “would have significant tendency to cause the jury to abdicate its role as a fact finder.” The risk that the jury will fail to perform its duty as an independent arbiter of the facts is a legitimate countervailing concern that must be balanced against the probative value of the proffered expert testimony. See Hubbani, 2002 UT 45 at ¶ 15, 48 P.3d 953. In regard to this balance, the trial court held that Maestas could adequately present the scientific bases concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identifications by means of “thorough instructions on the concerns about and factors ... set forth in the Long case.” Such instructions give Maestas the opportunity to “educate the jury with respect to the factors set forth in Long, ... [and to] argue how each of those factors could have affected particular eyewitnesses.” Maestas I, 1999 UT 32 at ¶ 30, 984 P.2d 376. Thus, the trial court’s ruling was reasonable and does not preclude Maestas from presenting the basic information that he desired to relate to the jury via his expert witness.
¶ 75 Moreover, the trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of proffered testimony against the risk of intrusion upon the fact-finding functions of the jury. Hence, we should accord it broad discretion in admitting or excluding expert testimony such as that in issue here. I would affirm the trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion because I cannot conclude that “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.”
¶ 76 In my view, it is clear, in light of both our case law and rule 702, that Chief Justice Durham’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion is incorrect. Neither our case law nor rule 702 justifies the creation of a rule mandating the admission of expert testimony. Instead, both plainly support leaving the determination of whether to admit expert testimony up to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the expert identification testimony.
II. RULE 24(d) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE ADMISSION OF MAESTAS’S ALLOCUTION STATEMENT
¶ 77 I also disagree with Chief Justice Durham’s proposal in part II.B to craft a new rule governing retrials resulting from appeals. Recognizing that rule 24(d) does not apply to new trials arising from appeals, Chief Justice Durham would create a rule, using this court’s inherent supervisory power, which adopts rule 24(d)’s “same position” language and requires the exclusion of Maes-tas’s entire allocution statement.
¶78 For two reasons, I dissent on this point. First, I disagree with Chief Justice Durham’s proposed use of this court’s supervisory authority to promulgate a new rule of criminal procedure mirroring rule 24(d). Second, I disagree with the lead opinion’s analysis of what rule 24(d) provides. I believe the plain language of rule 24(d) and related rules, together with pertinent case law and rules of statutory construction, strongly indicate that the drafters of rule 24(d)3 did not intend that the “same posi*638tion” language operate to exclude evidence obtained since the original trial.
¶ 79 Because I conclude that rule 24(d) does not bar the admission of Maestas’s allo-cution statement, I hereafter review whether constitutional considerations would block its admission. From this review, I conclude that constitutional considerations do not bar the admission of Maestas’s allocution statement. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling to admit Maestas’s allocution statement.

A. The Court’s Inherent Supervisory Power Should Not Be Used to Create a New Rule of Criminal Procedure

¶ 80 Concluding that rule 24(d) does not apply to this situation, Chief Justice Durham, nevertheless, relies on the inherent supervisory powers of the court to fashion a new rule mirroring rule 24(d) to govern new trials following appeals. I disagree with this approach. By adopting this new rule, the lead opinion would, in effect, amend current rules of criminal procedure. However, the appropriate procedure for making such amendments is governed by rule 11-101(1)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Because Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 24 and 28 speak for themselves, they ought not be modified without following the appropriate procedure.
¶ 81 Our inherent supervisory power stems from our authority “to adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state.” Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4. We have further explained that “[tjhe courts’ inherent supervisory power is that which is necessary to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch, and it may not be wholly delegated to a nonjudicial officer. This power enables a court to ensure that the judicial process is not abused.” In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). We have elected, however, to regulate the exercise of our rule-making authority, establishing a rulemaking process “for the adoption, repeal, and amendment of rules of procedure and evidence.” Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 11-101(1)(A). Through this process, advisory committees propose changes to the rules, which are then made available for public comment prior to adoption. See id. The process even provides an opportunity for this court, in our discretion, to “adopt rules of procedure or evidence ... upon [our] own initiative and without proposals by the committees.” Id. 11-101(4)(C). Such rules, however, still must “be published for a 45-day public comment period.” Id. There is no provision in this rulemaking process, though, supporting Chief Justice Durham’s proposal to use our inherent supervisory power to make an immediate change to the rules.
¶ 82 While we have relied on our inherent supervisory power to formulate new rules in the past, we only did so to explain or interpret existing case law, rules, or statutory requirements. See State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, ¶ 13, 999 P.2d 1 (Durham, J., concurring) (listing several Utah cases). This new rule does not explain or interpret existing case law, rules, or statutory requirements, however. It is a completely new rule regulating trials following appeal that has the effect of amending rule 28 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which regulates dispositions following appeal. The appropriate method for amending rule 28 is to follow the process outlined in rule 11-101.
¶ 83 By resorting to our inherent supervisory power, the lead opinion undermines our established rulemaking process, and implies that we can ignore our own process and procedures to achieve what is considered to be the appropriate decision. Any attempt to circumvent the procedures outlined in rule 11-101(1)(A) or 11 — 101(4)(C) weakens the process we have established to amend the rules of procedure and evidence. I believe that we should not use our inherent supervisory power to supplant our established rule-making process.

B. The Intended Meaning of Rule 21

¶ 84 Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation of rule 24(d), requiring reversal of the trial court’s decision to admit Maestas’s allocution statement, is flawed in several respects. First, the plain language of rule 24 and rule 28 shows that the drafters of those rules intended that new trials following a motion be treated differently from new trials follow*639ing an appeal. Second, Chief Justice Durham incorrectly interprets the “same position” language found in rule 24. Third, her interpretation of rule 24 is incompatible with modern interpretations involving evidence. Finally, her interpretation of rule 24 conflicts with our case law on newly discovered evidence. Because the lead opinion uses a flawed analysis of rule 24, it incorrectly concludes that Maestas’s sentencing statement must be excluded. I believe that under a correct interpretation of the rule, Maestas’s statement should be admitted.
1. The Plain Language of Rule 24 and Rule 28 Demonstrates the Inappropriateness of Forging a New Rule Regarding New Trials Awarded By Appellate Courts
¶ 85 The plain language of rule 24 limits its scope to new trials that result from a trial court granting a motion for a new trial. Utah R.Crim. P. 24(a)-(c) (describing procedures for moving for a new trial at the trial court level). Here, however, we are concerned with a new trial following a reversal by an appellate court. This situation is specifically addressed by another rule of criminal procedure — rule 28. Utah R.Crim. P. 28 (“Disposition after appeal”). In contrast to rule 24, rule 28 does not specify that an accused who is awarded a new trial by an appellate court be placed in the “same position” as before the original trial. This difference clearly indicates that the drafters of the rules of criminal procedure did not intend the “same position” language to apply to a new trial following a reversal.
¶ 86 The inclusion of the “same position” language in rule 24 and the omission of this language from rule 28 conforms with widely recognized differences between a new trial obtained as a result of a motion to a trial court and a new trial following an appellate court’s reversal. When a trial court grants a motion for a new trial, as a general rule, “the trial of the case proceeds de novo” and the trial court hearing the new trial is not bound by the rulings of the court in the previous trial. 58 Am.Jur.2d. New Trial § 587 (1989). Thus, in many respects, an accused receiving a new trial upon motion to a trial court is returned to the same position as the accused was in before his or her first trial. See generally id. §§ 587-88.
¶ 87 In contrast, a new trial following appellate review is subject to the “law of the case” doctrine. See Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, ¶ 9, 31 P.3d 543; Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995); Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). “Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by [an appellate court] bind the trial court on remand.” Gildea, 2001 UT 75 at ¶ 9, 31 P.3d 543. Because an appellate court generally resolves certain issues when it awards a new trial, the accused does not begin the new trial in the same position as he or she was in at the start of the original trial, when all issues were unresolved.
¶ 88 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the drafters of the rules of criminal procedure intended rule 24’s “same position” language to apply to new trials following a reversed conviction. Moreover, even assuming ar-guendo, as the lead opinion does, that rule 24(d) applies by analogy to new trials following a reversal by an appellate court, I would conclude that its drafters did not intend that it place the parties in the same position in terms of evidence.
2. The History and Purpose of the “Same Position” Language
¶ 89 While Chief Justice Durham “de-clinéis] to decide whether rule 24(d) applies to new trials after appeal” and crafts a new rule instead, she finds the “same position” language of rule 24(d) to be “critical.” The lead opinion notes that to properly construe this term, one must pay “close attention to [its] exact language.” However, Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation of the “same position” language conflicts with its purpose and history.4
*640a. Purpose Behind the “Same Position” Language
¶ 90 Chief Justice Durham argues that the plain meaning of the “same position” language requires the restoration of both the defendant and the State to the same circumstances that existed prior to the faulty trial. After thus interpreting rule 24(d), however, she later states in a footnote, “If the defendant testifies at retrial, however, he may be impeached by the use of statements made at the allocution.” If the drafters of rule 24(d) indeed intended that the parties be returned to the circumstances that prevailed before the first trial, it would follow that the prosecution could not use the allocution statement for any purpose, since the statement did not exist before the first trial. Based on this qualification, however, it appears that Chief Justice Durham’s “same position” language is not as absolute as she suggests.
¶ 91 Additionally, although case law on the “same position” language extends back to the nineteenth century in numerous jurisdictions, the lead opinion cites no cases, nor are we aware of any, applying the “same position” language to return the parties to the same position in terms of evidence. Indeed, Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation is untenable in light of the purpose behind the “same position” language and the historical development of the rule containing it.
¶ 92 Contrary to Chief Justice Durham’s conclusion, it appears certain that the drafters of the “same position” language intended it to protect the interests of the State, not the accused. Under nineteenth century common law, it was widely held that an appeal of a conviction did not constitute a waiver of the accused’s double jeopardy rights. See, e.g., Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 530-31, 533-34, 26 S.Ct. 121, 50 L.Ed. 292 (1905). Under this common law rule, an accused who was granted a new trial could be retried only for the crime for which he or she was con-vieted. Id. at 531, 26 S.Ct. 121. The accused could not be retried for any other crimes for which he or she was placed in jeopardy, but not convicted, at the first trial. Id. In short, the common law placed the accused in a different position than he or she was in at the first trial in terns of double jeopardy.
¶ 93 To override this common law rule and permit the accused to be prosecuted for the same offenses as at the first trial, several states in the nineteenth century passed legislation that conditioned the awarding of a new trial on the accused being returned to the “same position” he or she was in prior to the first trial. Id. (noting that the “same position” language in state statutes was intended to act as a waiver of a defendant’s right to claim that a second prosecution following a reversal violates double jeopardy); see also United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 858 (2d Cir.1965) (noting that legislation containing the “same position” language had been passed in response to the common law rule and “authoriz[ed] reprose-cution on the greater degree charged if the conviction on the lesser degree is reversed”); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 83 Ky. 1, 3, 6 (1884) (holding that pursuant to the legislature’s prerogative to “prescribe ... the terms upon which” one who has been convicted of a lesser included offense may have a new trial, the legislature could authorize retrial on the greater offense by prescribing that the “ ‘granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had,’ ” quoting Ky.Crim.Code § 270, thereby allowing retrial of the accused on the greater offense for which the accused was acquitted).5
¶ 94 Because Utah codified the “same position” language contemporaneously with other states that codified the exact same language, its drafters very likely had the same purpose: to ensure the State had the same flexibility as it had at the first trial in terms of charging and prosecuting the accused. This purpose had nothing to do with the exclusion of *641evidence, as far as I can see.6 Indeed, evi-dentiary issues were specifically addressed by another clause, which provided that “ ‘all the testimony must be produced anew’ ” at the new trial. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 442, 7 S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887) (quoting 1878 Utah Laws § 317). Since evidentiary issues were specifically addressed by another clause, it is unlikely the drafters intended the “same position” language to also address evi-dentiary issues.
b. Legislative History
¶ 95 In addition to not analyzing the historical purpose of the “same position” language, Chief Justice Durham overlooks another critical indicator of legislative intent. Because a legislature presumably intends to “change existing legal rights” when it amends a statute, courts attempting to discern a legislature’s current intentions are careful to take into account the effect of statutory amendments. Olsen v. Samuel McIntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Significantly, Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation does not account for a pertinent amendment following the codification of the “same position” language in the original territorial regulation. Specifically, a comparison of the territorial regulation interpreted in Hopt to the current rule 24(d) reveals that, at some point, the drafters deleted the language requiring that “all the testimony must be produced anew.” Compare Hopt, 120 U.S. at 442, 7 S.Ct. 614, with Utah R.Crim. P. 24(d). This deletion further supports interpreting rule 24(d) as not excluding evidence from the first trial.
¶ 96 Case law from other jurisdictions directly supports this position. In Montana ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court, 2000 MT 266, 302 Mont. 39, 22 P.3d 166, for example, a trial court precluded the prosecution from using the defendant’s testimony from his first trial during its case in chief at the new trial. Id. at ¶ 2. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court reasoned that the prosecution’s use of defendant’s prior testimony would violate a Montana statute that provided “ ‘the granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if there had been no trial.’ ” Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-701).
¶ 97 On appeal, the State argued that a review of the historical changes in the statute “reveal[ed] that the Montana Legislature did not intend for the current version of [the statute] to preclude the use of prior testimony in a new trial.” Id. at ¶ 14. Agreeing with the State’s argument, the Montana Supreme Court noted that, in addition to the “same position” language, an 1895 version of the statute had also included language that provided that “[a]ll the testimony must be produced anew.” Id. at ¶ 15 (quoting Mont. Rev.Code § 2191 (1895)). This language, noted the court, had precluded the use of prior testimony on retrial. Id. However, the Montana Legislature “delet[ed] the language requiring that testimony be produced anew” from the later versions of the statute. Id. at ¶ 17. The Mazurek court interpreted this modification as being “intended to change the existing law and allow the use of testimony from a prior trial in a new trial.” Id. at ¶ 18. Accordingly, the court concluded that the current statute did not preclude the prosecu*642tion from using the defendant’s prior testimony during its case in chief on retrial, even though the current statute included a “same position” requirement.
¶ 98 The historical changes associated with rule 24(d)’s legislative history are nearly identical to those of the Montana statute interpreted in Mazurek. In removing the language requiring testimony to be produced anew, the drafters of rule 24(d) evidenced an intent not to preclude the admission of prior testimony. Chief Justice Durham has not accounted for this pertinent indicator of legislative intent.
3. Modern Interpretations Involving Evidence
¶ 99 In addition to conflicting with the original intent and legislative history associated with the “same position” language, Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation conflicts with modern cases dealing with the “same position” language in the context of evidentiary issues. These cases make clear that the “same position” language is not intended to place the parties in the “same position” in terms of what evidence they may use. Rather, cases applying the language clearly anticipate that parties on retrial will supplement the evidence from the first trial with additional evidence. For example, in Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, the United States Supreme Court held as follows:
[U]nder California law, the Gospel Army on the second trial to which it is entitled may amend its complaint and present new facts. Such a reversal remands the case for a new trial and places the parties in the same position as if the case had never been tried .... [On retrial, the] law must be applied by the trial court to the evidence presented [at] the second trial.
Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543, 547-48, 67 S.Ct. 1428, 91 L.Ed. 1662 (1947) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 100 Cases like Gospel Army indicate that if the “same position” language applies at all in the evidentiary context, it requires that the parties have the same flexibility to discover and present evidence as they did at the beginning of the first trial. See also United States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145,1148 (D.C.Cir.1983) (collecting cases demonstrating that “same position” and other similarly-worded requirements are intended to provide parties the same flexibility regarding evidence). Properly interpreted, rule 24(d) affirmatively permits the parties to take advantage of all the evidence available at the start of the trial. Due to the progression of time, of course, placing the parties in the same position in terms of their ability to gather evidence will permit them to rely upon evidence that may not have been available at the start of the original trial.
¶ 101 Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation places the parties in a different position in terms of their ability to discover and use evidence. More specifically, by preventing further discovery of evidence, Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation places the parties in a decidedly different position as compared to the start of the first trial, when the parties remained free to discover and rely upon new evidence.
4. Utah Case Law Concerning Newly Discovered Evidence
¶ 102 Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation is also fundamentally incompatible with Utah precedent providing for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) (holding that “to constitute grounds for a new trial,” newly discovered evidence must, among other things, “render a different result probable on the retrial of the case” (footnote and citation omitted)). Newly discovered evidence is, by definition, evidence that was not available at the start of the first trial. Id. By requiring that the parties be returned to the “circumstances that existed prior to” the first trial, Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation would, by its terms, preclude the admission of newly discovered evidence on retrial.
¶ 103 In contrast, no such conflict exists with an interpretation of the “same position” language that affords the parties the same flexibility they had at the first trial in terms of presenting evidence. As in the first trial, on retrial both parties would be able to pres*643ent all evidence currently available to them, including newly discovered evidence.
5. Summary
¶ 104 In summary, rule 24(d)’s “same position” language does not require suppression of Maestas’s allocution statement. The inclusion of the “same position” language in the rule governing new trials awarded by the trial court, together with its omission from the rule governing new trials awarded by an appellate court, clearly indicates that the drafters of the rules of criminal procedure did not intend the language to apply to the latter situation. This makes sense given that under the “law of the case” doctrine an appellate court’s rulings place the accused in a different position as compared to the first trial.
¶ 105 Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the “same position” applies to reversals by an appellate court, neither the original intent, legislative history, nor modern interpretations of the language suggest that it was intended to constrain the parties to use only the evidence that was available at the beginning of the first trial. Indeed, Chief Justice Durham’s interpretation cannot be reconciled with Utah case law under which a new trial may be awarded upon discovery of new evidence.
¶ 106 In contrast, an interpretation under which the parties are placed in the “same position” in terms of their ability to use all evidence available to them better comports with modern interpretations of the language and Utah precedent pertaining to newly discovered evidence. Under the correct interpretation of rule 24(d), then, the parties may avail themselves of all evidence available to them at the start of the new trial.7 The only restriction placed on them by rule 24(d) is that the State may not refer to the verdict in the first trial. Utah R.Crim. P. 24(d). In this regard, I note that references to the verdict may be readily redacted from Maes-tas’s statement.8

C. Admission of Maestas’s Statement in the Prosecution’s Case in Chief Does Not Violate the Federal or State Constitutions

¶ 107 Having concluded that rule 24(d) does not prohibit the parties from relying upon new evidence, I now examine in this section whether there is any constitutional bar to the admission of Maestas’s allocution statement. Since rule 24 provides inadequate justification for overturning the trial court’s decision, this question must be addressed to determine whether the lower court appropriately admitted Maestas’s sentencing statement. Because, in my view, neither the state nor the federal constitution would bar admission of Maestas’s statement, I would affirm the trial court’s determination to admit the statement at trial.
*6441. Right of Allocution Does Not Include the Right to Suppress Allocution Statement Under the Utah Constitution
¶ 108 Chief Justice Durham’s comments regarding allocution seem intended to establish that an accused has a right to present a statement in mitigation at sentencing. This is a red herring given that Maestas had an opportunity to allocute and did so. The real issue is whether an accused who has obtained the benefits presumptively associated with allocuting also has the right to the additional benefit of suppressing the allocution statement on retrial, notwithstanding the State’s and victims’ compelling interest in providing this highly probative evidence to the jury. As this section demonstrates, Maestas’s right of allocution does not include the right to suppress the statement at a new trial.
¶ 109 Chief Justice Durham notes that the Anderson court stated that “Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 implements the constitutional right [of allocution].” State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). Significantly, in implementing the right of allocution, rule 22 does not specify that an accused has a right to suppress his allocution statement at a new trial. See Utah R.Crim. P. 22.
¶ 110 It is also worth noting that the Utah Constitution does not expressly mention the right of allocution. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Rather, the Anderson court concluded that the right was implied by the constitution because the right to allocution “is an inseparable part of the right to be present,” Id. The right to suppress an allocution statement would be even further removed from the text of the Utah Constitution. Specifically, to conclude that the constitution provides this right would require an inference upon an inference: namely, that the right to suppress an allocution is implied by the right of allocution, which in turn is implied by the constitutional right to be present. Significantly, the right to suppress an accused’s trial testimony has not been inferred from the constitutional right to testify in one’s defense, even though the right to testify in one’s defense is at least as important as the right of allocution and more universally recognized. See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968) (acknowledging and “not questioning] the general evidentia-ry rule that a defendant’s testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings”); United States v. Girdner, 773 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument was “without merit” because he had not invoked the right at the previous trial); State v. Tellay, 100 Utah 25, 28, 110 P.2d 342, 343 (1941) (holding that because the “defendant voluntarily, of his own violation, and under the guidance of his counsel, went upon the witness stand and told his story” in a previous trial, he could not argue against the admission of his testimony in a subsequent trial); People v. Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 14, 457 N.Y.S.2d 757, 444 N.E.2d 7, 12 (1982) (holding that neither the constitution nor statute required the exclusion of the defendant’s pre-plea statements at retrial following appeal); 3 Charles E. Torcía, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, § 357 (13th ed. 1991 & Supp.2001) (stating a defendant who takes the stand “without asserting the privilege against self-incrimination ... waive[s] the privilege as to the testimony, and hence such testimony may be used against him at a subsequent criminal trial”) [hereinafter Tor-cía].
¶ 111 Accordingly, I do not believe that we can legitimately conclude that the drafters of the Utah Constitution intended to entitle an accused to suppress his allocution statement. We should require a much clearer expression of this intent in the constitutional text, especially when the State and victims have a compelling interest in admitting evidence of guilt. As it stands, we would be creating the exclusionary rule virtually out of thin air.
2. No Federal Constitutional Theories Bar Admission of Maestas’s Statement
¶ 112 None of Maestas’s other constitutional arguments for suppressing his allocution statement are persuasive. Maestas argues that admitting the statement would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, that the use of his statement in a subsequent retrial places an unconstitutional restriction on his right to allocute, and that the statement should be excluded as fruit of *645the poisonous tree. For the reasons given below I would reject these arguments.
a. Fifth Amendment Violation
¶ 113 Relying on eases such as Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999), Maestas contends that admission of his allocution statement violates his Fifth Amendment rights because (1) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his privilege against self-incrimination, and (2) he was compelled to allocute to obtain leniency in sentencing. I conclude that the Fifth Amendment does not bar admission of Maestas’s allocution statement.
i. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
¶ 114 Maestas contends that the Fifth Amendment imposes a duty on the sentencing court to engage in a colloquy or otherwise ensure a convicted person is knowingly waiving his Fifth Amendment rights by making a statement. Yet, it is widely recognized that the Fifth Amendment does not require a judge to warn a represented defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination prior to testifying. Torcía, § 350 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1937)). Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to directly apply this rule to statements at sentencing, the Court’s related jurisprudence strongly supports such an application. In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980), the Supreme Court placed the burden on the defendant or his counsel to recognize and claim the privilege against self-incrimination at sentencing. Id. at 559-61, 100 S.Ct. 1358. Since Roberts places no burden on the sentencing court to sua sponte advise the defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination, a fortiori, the sentencing court need not ensure knowledge of the privilege when it merely affords a defendant, in the presence of his counsel, the opportunity to make an open-ended statement pursuant to his right to allocute. Thus, a court has no duty to ensure, prior to an accused alloeuting, that the accused knows of the privilege against self-incrimination.
¶ 115 Moreover, a defendant who testifies in an earlier prosecution “without asserting the privilege against self-incrimination[ ] is deemed to have waived the privilege as to the testimony, and hence such testimony may be used against him at a subsequent criminal trial.” Torcia, § 357; see also Tellay, 110 P.2d at 343. In short, admission of an accused’s testimony from a proceeding in which the accused was represented by counsel does not violate the Fifth Amendment based on the fact that the judge presiding at the former proceeding did not inform the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination.
¶ 116 Accordingly, Maestas’s statement at his sentencing hearing is not rendered inadmissible at retrial because the sentencing court did not inform him of the privilege against self-incrimination.9
ii. Voluntariness of the Allocution Statement
¶ 117 I next address whether Maestas’s statement was compelled or involuntary. In contending that his statement at sentencing was involuntary, Maestas does not claim that the sentencing judge compelled him to attend, or participate in, the sentencing hearing. Nor does Maestas claim that the sentencing judge threatened him with a harsher penalty if he refused to admit to the robberies, or promised him leniency if he did. Instead, Maestas concedes in his brief that, after his conviction for the robberies, he allo-euted to obtain leniency.10 The pressure to *646obtain leniency, he argues, made his allocution statement involuntary and thus excluda-ble.
¶ 118 Although a sentencing judge has the discretion to consider numerous factors in imposing sentence, including a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, any inducement this creates does not compel an accused to make self-incriminating statements within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See Harvey v. Shillinger, 76 F.3d 1528, 1531, 1535 (10th Cir.1996) (ruling that the defendant’s allocution following conviction of various offenses was admissible at a later trial for conspiracy to commit the same offenses, even though the defendant had allocuted to obtain leniency). Applying the United States Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to the specific context of statements made at sentencing, the Harvey court concluded as follows:
[T]he privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not offended when a defendant yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment in the hope of leniency. A defendant’s choice to exercise the right to allocution, like the choice to exercise his right to testify, is entirely his own; he may speak to the court, but he is not required to do so.
Id. at 1535.
¶ 119 Chief Justice Durham argues that “[t]he right to allocution would be meaningless if a convicted person’s allocution statements could be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.” Chief Justice Durham fears that defendants will not allocute after being informed that their statements could be used against them at any retrial. All defendants have the right to testify in their own behalf and the right to refuse to testify against themselves. These two rights weigh against each other. Once a defendant has determined to testify, that defendant effectively waives the right to remain silent and the right to avoid the consequences of remaining silent. Torcía, § 357. By rendering Maestas’s allocution statement inadmissible in this case, however, the lead opinion would elevate the right to allocution above the right to testify in one’s own behalf, allowing a defendant to allocute without waiving the right to remain silent. Allocution statements would receive substantially more protection than statements made at trial. Such disparate treatment is not justified.
¶ 120 I agree with the reasoning of Harvey and reject Maestas’s claim that his allocution statement was compelled and thus inadmissible. In choosing to speak at sentencing, Maestas made a choice similar to those frequently made by criminal defendants: instead of remaining silent and avoiding self-incrimination, he tried to mitigate his sentence by admitting to the robberies. The fact that Maestas allocuted to obtain leniency does not make the statement compelled or involuntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent that Maestas felt pressure to speak due to his attorney’s earlier ineffective assistance at trial, it goes to the weight of the statement, not its constitutional admissibility. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-67, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (noting that a confession is not involuntary or inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even when it results from “outrageous behavior” of a non-state actor). Accordingly, I would hold that the tidal court correctly ruled that Maestas’s allo-cution statement was voluntary.
b. Unconstitutional Condition on Right to Allocute
¶ 121 Maestas further argues that admitting his allocution statement at his new trial creates an “intolerable” conflict between the Fifth Amendment and his right to allocute *647and appeal. That is, he contends that he was subject to an unconstitutional condition, namely, in order to exercise the right to allocute and get a fair sentence, he had to sacrifice his right not to incriminate himself, and with it, his prospects at his new trial.
¶ 122 For this proposition, Maestas relies on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), a case dealing with a conflict between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In holding that the inculpatory statements from a suppression hearing were inadmissible, the Simmons Court reasoned that it would be “intolerable” to condition the right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim on the waiver of a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 394, 88 S.Ct. 967.
¶ 123 The State correctly notes that United States Supreme Court decisions following Simmons have cast serious doubt on the continuing viability of its reasoning concerning conflicting constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court decision in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285-86, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998), epitomizes the Supreme Court’s decreased reliance on the “unconstitutional conditions” analysis in the Fifth Amendment context. Indeed, although the Woodard defendant alleged an unconstitutional conflict between his right to seek clemency and his right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court summarily rejected this argument in concluding the clemency interview did not violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1244.11 Having concluded that Maestas waived his privilege against self-incrimination and gave his statement voluntarily, I similarly reject Maestas’s “unconstitutional condition” argument. Accordingly, Maestas’s voluntary allocution statement is not rendered inadmissible because of any supposed conflict between his right to allocute and his privilege against self-incrimination.
c. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
¶ 124 Moreover, Maestas argues that his statement should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. Maestas does not, however, claim that his statement should be excluded because of police or prosecutorial misconduct. Rather he claims that his lawyer’s ineffective assistance indirectly prejudiced him by causing him to allocute to obtain leniency. In Maestas I, we reversed Maes-tas’s original conviction due to the direct prejudicial effect of his lawyer’s failure to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction. Maestas I, 1999 UT 32 at ¶¶ 32-37, 984 P.2d 376. Maestas contends his allocution was therefore the “fruit” of a “poisonous tree,” i.e., his lawyer’s ineffective assistance and the tainted verdict.
¶ 125 Although originally set forth in a Fourth Amendment context, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the poisonous tree doctrine has since been extended to exclude the fruits of a violation of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See United, States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-42, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1112-13 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Marshank, 777 F.Supp. 1507, 1519 (N.D.Cal. 1991). In these cases, however, exclusion of the “fruits” of the Sixth Amendment violation was consistent with the justification behind the “poisonous tree’s” exclusionary rule — deterrence of official misconduct. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485-86, 83 S.Ct. 407; cf. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300-01 (Utah 1992) (evaluating whether statements were “ ‘tainted’ by prior police misconduct ” (emphasis added)). In contrast, Maestas does not contend that police or prosecutorial misconduct played any part in his counsel’s failure to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction. As a result, exclusion of his allocution statement would not promote the deter*648rence rationale underlying the “poisonous tree” doctrine, and Maestas’s allocution statement is not excludable under that doctrine.
3. Even If the Right of Allocution Requires Suppression of an Allocution Statement in Some Circumstances, It Does Not Require Suppression Under the Specific Facts of this Case
¶ 126 Even if a method of constitutional interpretation existed under which we could recognize a constitutional right to suppress an allocution statement, at best it would be a limited right. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110-11 (rejecting an accused’s argument that the right of allocution is an absolute right). In my mind, this would mean that the determination of whether or not to suppress an allocution statement would turn on the circumstances of each case and would involve consideration of countervailing interests. The circumstances in this case indicate that the interests in favor of allocution and suppression are weak, while the State’s and victims’ interests in admitting Maestas’s highly probative statement are compelling. Accordingly, I would rule that the State may admit Maestas’s allocution statement, with the deletions I have noted in footnote 8, in its case in chief.
a. The Interests in Favor of Allocution and Suppression Are Weak in This Case
¶ 127 The right to alloeute was originally recognized in part because the accused was considered incompetent to testify at trial. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 370 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting) (detailing historical justifications for allocution). While an accused today may testify on his or her behalf, an accused may instead exercise his or her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during trial. When this occurs, the interests in favor of allocution are at their highest, because the accused has not yet addressed the court or given a statement in mitigation. Id. at 370-71 (arguing that although the original reasons for allowing an accused to alloeute no longer exist, modern courts now justify it on the ground that it permits an accused to present mitigating information).
¶ 128 Here, however, Maestas not only testified at trial, but in so doing gave the ultimate in mitigating statements — he denied his guilt. His allocution rights were thus vindicated when he testified at trial. His admission of the crime at sentencing was not the exercise of any legitimate right; taken together with his contradictory trial testimony, it was a transparent attempt to manipulate the system. To now suppress Maestas’s allo-cution statement would, in my mind, sanction and encourage such duplicity.
b. Society’s and the Crime Victims’ Interests in Admitting Evidence of a Crime Outweigh Maestas’s Interests in Excluding the Allocution Statement
¶ 129 Our system of criminal justice involves not only the rights of the accused, but also the interests of society and of crime victims. Maestas’s rights have been given due respect. He was permitted to deny his guilt at trial when this was beneficial to him; he was permitted to admit his guilt at sentencing when that suited him; and he was granted a new trial in the absence of any official misconduct. To now conclude that he also has the right to exclude his voluntary and public admission does not, in my mind, give due respect to the compelling interests of society and the victims of this violent crime to have this highly probative evidence available to the jury on retrial. I would rule that his statement is admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief.
CONCLUSION
¶ 130 Admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Because the trial court properly analyzed the issues under rule 702 and came to a reasonable conclusion, its decision should be affirmed.
¶ 131 In addition, I see no reason to ask society and the victims of this crime to turn a deaf ear to Maestas’s voluntary allocution statement. Evidence is excluded when officials violate a person’s constitutional rights to obtain it. The exclusion of the evidence, it is *649said, will remove an incentive to violate a person’s constitutional rights. Here, however, the evidence in question — an allocution statement — was obtained when officials permitted a person to exercise his rights. Under these circumstances, there is no persuasive reason to exclude Maestas’s statement. The right to testify in one’s behalf, by way of comparison, does not encompass the right to exclude the testimony on retrial.
¶ 132 Under Chief Justice Durham’s analysis, defendants who voluntarily and publicly admit to their crimes in a self-serving attempt to obtain leniency at sentencing may, on retrial, exclude their admissions and thereby potentially escape conviction. Excluding the admission from the courtroom would not, of course, erase the admission from the minds of the victims or their family members who may have been present during the sentencing hearing.12 In a society built on respect for the rule of law, I have great concerns about creating a new rule under which persons who have admitted their guilt in open court can escape all consequences of that admission. Neither rule 24(d) nor the right of allocution requires such a result.
¶ 133 Justice WILKINS concurs in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT’s dissenting and concurring opinion.

. The State did not challenge the admission of expert testimony under the first two prongs of Rimmasch.

. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). In Ramirez, this court held that a defendant is "entitled to a determination by the court of the evidence's constitutional admissibility.” Id. at 778. Once determined to be constitutionally admissible, the evidence may then be presented to the jury.

. Because the lead opinion uses rule 24(d) as a guide to create the new rule for retrials following appeal, the same arguments against expansion apply to both rules. Therefore, my discussion, while using the term "rule 24(d),” has application to the new rule created today.

. Prior to 1989, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure existed as statutory enactments subject to revision by the state legislature. In In re Rules of Procedure and Evidence to be Used in the Courts of This State, filed January 13, 1989, we "adopt[ed] all existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33 (1982 & Supp.1988).” Utah R.Crim. P. compiler’s notes. When interpreting these adopted rules, we look to the drafters’ *640intent. See State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 478 n. 3 (Utah Ct.App.1991).

. Under our present law, the double jeopardy clause "protects against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal.” Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998); see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-94, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). The examples in the above text, however, provide a historical context for the adoption of the "same position” language and underline the idea that the "same position” language was not intended to apply to evidence.

. The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Utah territorial regulation that originally enacted the "same position” language supports this view. Hopt v. Utah involved a retrial in which “the counsel for the prosecution alluded to the case as the most remarkable one ever tried in the territory, and to ‘the many times it had been brought before the tribunals.' ” 120 U.S. 430, 442, 7 S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887). In rejecting the defense's contention that the prosecutor's allusion violated a Utah territorial regulation predating rule 24, the United States Supreme Court limited its analysis to whether the prosecutor had referred to the verdict:
The counsel for the defendant now contends that this allusion was in contravention of that section of the act of the territory regulating proceedings in criminal cases, which declares that "the granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had,” and that "all the testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict cannot be used or referred to either in evidence or in argument.” [1878 Utah Laws § 317.] The object of this law was to prevent the accused from being prejudiced by reference to any former conviction on the same indictment. There was, in fact, no reference to any verdict on a previous trial, but merely a mention of the times the case had been before the courts, so as to magnify its importance.
Id. (emphasis added).

. Of course, as at the beginning of the first trial, the admissibility of evidence at a new trial is subject to the rules of evidence and the state and federal constitutions. Maestas has not argued that any rule of evidence renders his statement inadmissible. In this case, Maestas has not shown that either the federal or state constitution precludes the admission of the statement.

. Although Maestas did not mention the verdict in his allocution statement, he referred to the presentence report and the recommended sentence of fifty-six years contained therein, and asked for leniency in this regard. Since these portions of his statement necessarily confirm that Maestas had been convicted, they could be redacted from his statement as follows:
I know that I had admitted to the robberies that I done. I do have remorse for the victims, you know, and I regret doing what I did. I can be a changed person. I was ... I committed robbery before. I done time in prison. I got out, and I completed the programs and everything. I got caught up in drugs, which I have never had any offense for, and I got caught up in them, and I committed these robberies and my intents wasn't to hurt anybody. I wasn’t going to hurt anybody.... I can be changed. I have showed that before.
For the same reason, the prosecution is precluded from mentioning either that the statement was an allocution or that it originated at a sentencing hearing. This would not prevent Maestas from introducing this information, however, if he desires, for his own strategic purposes to do so. Cf. Hopt, 120 U.S. at 442, 7 S.Ct. 614 (noting that the object of similarly-worded Utah territorial statute "was to prevent the accused from being prejudiced by reference to any former conviction on the same indictment" (emphasis added) (construing 1878 Utah Laws § 317)). Nor would Maestas be prevented from arguing at trial that the Utah Rules of Evidence require exclusion of portions of the remainder, such as Maestas's reference to his earlier crimes.

. Relying on Mitchell, Maestas also claims that even if he waived his privilege at sentencing, his statement could only be used for sentencing purposes. Nothing in Mitchell, however, limits the scope of a waiver at sentencing so as to prevent admission of Maestas’s statement at his new trial. Unlike the situation in Mitchell, the government here does not seek to compel Maestas to give additional testimony at a later proceeding. Rather, the government seeks only to admit evidence (i.e., a transcript) of Maestas’s earlier statement at sentencing. This is not an unconstitutional broadening of the scope of Maestas's waiver. Cf. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 324, 119 S.Ct. 1307 (noting that "once the plea has been accepted, statements or admissions made during the preceding plea colloquy are later admissible against the defendant, as is the plea itself”).

. If Maestas allocuted to obtain leniency, his attorney may have had a legitimate tactical basis for permitting Maestas to speak at sentencing. *646In such a situation, a sentencing judge might interfere with a legitimate trial strategy by warning an accused that his statement at sentencing could be used at retrial. Such a colloquy, suggesting as it does the possibility of a successful appeal, might cause an accused to reject his attorney’s advice and waive his right to allocute, only to have the appeal later rejected. Cf. United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 11 (3d Cir. 1995) ("A colloquy on the right to testify [when the defense rests] not only would be awkward, ... but more importantly inadvertently might cause the defendant to think that the court believes the defense has been insufficient. This belief in turn might prompt the defendant to abandon an appropriate defense strategy without good reason.”).

. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically held that the
respondent has the ... choice of providing information to the Authority — at the risk of damaging his case for clemency or for postcon-viction relief — or of remaining silent. But this pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview compelled. We therefore hold that the Ohio clemency interview, even on assumptions most favorable to respondent’s claim, does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Id. at 287-88, 118 S.Ct. 1244.

. Crime victims have a constitutional right to attend important criminal justice hearings related to the crime. Utah Const, art. I, § 28(l)(b) (expressly recognizing a victim’s right "to be heard at important criminal justice hearings").