Court Opinion

ID: 9770344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:59:15.963223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.589986
License: Public Domain

MAURICE E. AMIDEI, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant’s Point of Error Number 2 complains that the trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment, because the *563Columbian constitutional rights of the plaintiff fishermen to earn a livelihood from subsistence/artisanal fishing and due process prevail over the enforcement of the alleged “fishing ban” .regulation against plaintiffs.
Under Columbian constitutional law, the fishermen have a right to subsistence and artisanal fishing to protect their lives and their families. Any incompatibility between any other law or juridic norm with such rights to fish shall be resolved in favor of such rights.
The resolution in question raised as an absolute defense by appellee recognizes the constitutional right to subsistence and artisanal fishing. Appellee admits that the toxic spill area is not within the areas where artisanal and subsistence fishing is allowed by the resolution. There is no proof that appellants fished in the toxic spill area. The appellants’ only connection with the toxic spill area was that they were enlisted to help clean it up and were allegedly personally injured in doing so. In fact, appellants allege they were prevented from fishing in the area of the toxic spill because of the spill. Only industrial fishing is banned in the Bay of Barbacoas and within a zone set out in the resolution.
Not only do appellants have valid fishing licenses but also they were not banned by the resolution. The appellees’ claim that “all fishing” was banned is not well taken. Assuming arguendo the resolution applies to appellants, there , are further considerations.
We must construe a foreign law in harmony with the construction placed on a similar statute of Texas. State v. Grubstake Inv. Assn., 117 Tex. 53, 297 S.W. 202 (1927) (laws of Mexico should be given the same efficacy in reserving title to river beds as is given to Texas statutes); Powell v. Penny, 336 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1960), rev’d on other grounds, 162 Tex. 497, 347 S.W.2d 601 (1961) (it is a well established rule that each state may determine the nature of a foreign enactment by application of its own rules of construction); Mitchell v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 35 S.W.2d 140 (Comm. of Appeals 1931, holding approved); McKinney v. Minkler, 102 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1937, no writ) (where no decisions of a foreign state construing statutes of that state can be found directly in point on the question involved, such statute will be construed as if it were a local statute).
Generally, resolutions, even those promulgated by the legislature, are not laws. City of San Antonio v. Micklejohn, 89 Tex. 79,33 S.W. 735 (1895) (no law shall be passed, except by bill); Mosheim v. Rollins, 79 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1935, writ dism’d) (joint resolution that prohibited planting of permitting ber-muda grass to grow along state highways held not a law creating a cause of action against the highway commission from so planting or growing bermuda grass).
Further, since there are no sanctions for violating the resolution are provided therein, the resolution cannot be afforded validity as a law. Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence, MeN and Ideas of the Law (1953), § 2.33. It merely provides violators shall be sanctioned according to law and does not reference what law. We do not know whether the Columbian legislature or some administrative agency followed up on the resolution and passed a law or binding regulations applicable to this case.
Assuming the resolution has the effect of a law and it was applicable to the appellants, it would not operate as an absolute ban to their suit.
For the violation of the resolution or statute to be the basis of civil liability or a defense, in the absence of an express provision therefor, the appellee must be within the class for whose protection the resolution was passed, and the injury must be of the nature the resolution was intended to prevent. Brownstone Park Ltd. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 537 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin, 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor *564Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d 587 (1947); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Baker, 215 S.W. 556 (Tex. Comm’n App.1919, judgm’tadopted), 40 Tex. JuR.2d Negligence § 11-15 (1962); Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 286 (1965).
Appellee, a chemical company, was not expressly mentioned in the resolution and, considering the main purpose of the resolution being to clean up certain heavy metals in the bay, appellee was certainly not within the class for whose protection the resolution was passed, and the injury intended to be prevented by the resolution was “to avoid contingent alterations in human health.” Appellee cannot use an alleged violation of the resolution as a defense to their alleged pollution. The resolution was intended for the protection of public health, not to protect a chemical company accused of polluting the bay by a toxic spill. Continued fishing by appellants, if any, could only mitigate appellee’s liability to appellants, and could not be the proximate cause of any damage to ap-pellees. It cannot be reasonably held that the resolution was passed for the protection of appellee.
Furthermore, appellee cannot prove the injuries alleged by appellants were caused by appellants’ violation of the resolution. Rules of causation apply with equal force in a case of violation of a statute or an ordinance as in the ordinary case where negligence is a fact issue. Alpine Telephone Corp. v. McCall, 143 Tex. 335, 184 S.W.2d 830 (1944); J.S. Abercrombie Co. v. Delcomyn, 134 Tex. 490, 135 S.W.2d 978 (1940); Missouri P.R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1977). I would hold as a matter of law that any violation of the resolution by appellants was not a proximate cause of the injuries alleged by appellants.
Since appellants were not convicted of any crime and were not proved to have violated any resolution or regulation, they are entitled to have submitted issues of liability, causation, damages and comparative responsibility pursuant to the Texas Comparative Responsibility Act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.001 et seq.(Vernon 1986 & Supp.1999). Appellee would not be entitled to an illegality defense issue without proof Appellants were convicted of violating the resolution.
For the “illegality defense” to completely ban appellants’ cause of action, the appellants’ cause of action would require aid from an illegal transaction or must depend upon an illegal act to which they are a party. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 71 Tex. 619, 9 S.W. 602, 603 (Tex.1888). Appellants’ cause of action does not require aid from, or depend on, any illegal act. Appellants claim they were injured from the toxic spill caused by appellee, i.e., loss of income from fish catches. If appellants were guilty of illegal fishing, their cause of action is complete and distinct without reference to the amount of fish illegally caught. If anything, the number of fish illegally caught would mitigate ap-pellees’ damages. The alleged illegal fishing by appellants did not contribute to the injury to appellants as is required by Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry.Co. v. Johnson, 9 S.W. at 603 Johnson does not support appellees’ position in this case.
Likewise, the other cases cited by appel-lee do not support its position herein. Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Sneed, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 17, 132 S.W. 386 (1910, writ dism’d). This case involved a cold drink dealer’s suit against a supplier for fraud as to whether a drink was capable of producing intoxication. Id. at 387. The dealer had been convicted of violating the tax and license law for selling the drink without a license. Id. The Court held that the dealer cannot seek indemnity against the supplier for the dealer’s own illegal act. Id. The appellants in this case have not been convicted of anything, and they are not seeking indemnity against appellee for any illegal act. The appellee does not claim that appellants are seeking indemnity for fines or costs of prosecution they received in some criminal prosecution. The rules of evidence would prevent appel-*565lee from trying to prove appellants illegally fished unless appellee could show a final conviction. The alleged illegal fishing should not be allowed to be mentioned in this case in any respect, including in the summary judgment proceedings.
The appellee also cites Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, 880 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied) which only involves a suit by parties who were convicted of bank fraud against their attorneys who had helped them with the illegal loan. The case holds much like the Houston Ice & Brewing Co. case and disallows indemnity to a person convicted of a crime. The Saks case does make a pertinent point, that a summary judgment movant, in order to conclusively establish the requisite essential element or elements, must identify or address the cause of action or defense and its elements in the motion. Saks, 880 S.W.2d at 469. Appellees motion for summary judgment does not address whether appellants were guilty of illegal fishing, and if so, whether and how much such illegal fishing contributed to the appellants’ injuries. Appellee makes the erroneous assumption that if there is a fishing ban in the area of the toxic spill, then fish cannot be caught in other Columbian waters. It is an evidentiary matter for the parties to show how much the total fish population was diminished by the toxic spill and the corresponding reduction in fishermen’s income, if any. If a fisherman is convicted for fishing in the wrong place, he is fined by the state and while he cannot seek indemnity for the fine from appellee, the number of fish illegally caught has no relevance to his claim against appellee for killing a substantial number of the total fish population.
I would grant appellants’ Point of Error Number 2 and reverse and remand.