Court Opinion

ID: 9766363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:43:17.399705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:21.723921
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion upholding the denial of the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. We part company, however, with respect to the Court’s finding that the numerous and long continuances of the trial of this case, well beyond the maximum time period provided by the Interstate Agreement on De-tainers Act, G.L.1956 chapter 13 of title 13 (IADA), were for “good cause shown,” a mandatory requirement for an extension of the trial date beyond the statutory 120-day deadline. I dissent primarily because there has been no showing of good cause by the prosecution and certainly no finding of good cause by the hearing justice who granted the state’s request for a continuance. I would remand this case for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
*1281The record in this case demonstrates that Tremayne Clifton arrived in the state of Rhode Island on December 12, 1997, pursuant to the state’s request for temporary custody of the out-of-state prisoner for purposes of trial on an indictment that had been pending for more than one and one-half years. He was arraigned on the indictment on December 16, 1997. According to the disclosures made by the state at oral argument, the original prosecutor assigned to this case departed the Attorney General’s Office on December 17, 1997, a mere five days after the defendant arrived in Rhode Island and the day after his arraignment. There is no indication in the record when this resignation was announced and it appears that it may have occurred before defendant arrived in Rhode Island. The defendant did not receive the assistance of counsel until January 13, 1998, after thirty-two days had elapsed; certainly this is not the fault of defendant. There is no evidence in-the record indicating when the next prosecutor was appointed, although this prosecutor was clearly on board before February 2, 1998, the fifty-second day, because he filed the state’s first answer to defendant’s request for discovery and inspection on that date. On February 26, 1998, the seventy-sixth day, the pretrial conference was inexplicably continued until March 3, 1998, the eighty-second day, at which point the case was not only passed for trial but was assigned a date certain for trial on May 18, 1998, the 168th day, well beyond the 120 day period permitted by § 13-13-2, Article IV(c). There is no transcript of the proceedings on that day and no indication why the hearing justice scheduled the trial to start thirty-eight days beyond the statutory maximum of 120 days. Further, the record discloses that as of March 1998, the state had not fulfilled its discovery obligation and still was updating its Super.R.Crim.P. 16 response.
Significantly, the state’s motion for a continuance of the trial date was not filed until March 6, 1998, after the continuance to May 18 had been granted, and was not argued until March 13, 1998, the ninety-second day. Further, the reasons given by the prosecutor for the need for a continuance are questionable at best. The transcript provides as follows:
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Clifton was brought back involuntarily from North Carolina. That is where he is serving a sentence currently. He is also currently charged with murder in the State of Rhode Island. His transfer date back to North Carolina is April 10th. At this point he was brought back involuntarily so the State only has four months[,] unless the Court grants an extension[,] in which to try him. I have moved for an extension of time. My motion indicates ninety days I’m requesting. If I could give the Court some background in the case. Mr. Livingston initially represented the State in this matter. And while Mr. Livingston was still in the office he was prepared to try the case and had asked that Mr. Clifton be brought back from North Carolina for that purpose. However, Mr. Livingston unexpectedly left the office. An order had already been granted to bring Mr. Clifton back. When he was brought back I was assigned the case, and for that reason I was not prepared to try it immediately. It’s taken me awhile to try to get up to speed in the case. There has been discovery that’s continually being furnished to the defense. Defense has not provided me with discovery.
“[THE COURT]: When will it be ready to be tried?
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: We already have a date certain for May 18th. And I expect — -I also have an out-of-state wit*1282ness. If I have the out-of-state witness subpoenaed for that date and we can find our other witnesses it will definitely go on May 18th.” (Emphases added.)
Thus, three months after the defendant arrived in Rhode Island, discovery was outstanding; the state was not prepared for trial and had not located its witnesses. Defense counsel objected to the continuance and reminded the court that defendant was in this state involuntarily and that the state had 120 days to try this case. Defense counsel also argued that he recently had received discovery on two different occasions in the past week and, although he was having difficulty preparing the case as a result of the state’s dilatory discovery compliance, defendant was prepared to proceed to trial and did not agree to any continuance. The court summarily granted the state’s request for a ninety-day continuance, having made no findings or placed any reasons on the record. Trial commenced on the 172nd day.
On May 7, 1998, the 147th day, defendant’s motion to dismiss was heard and summarily denied. In objecting to the motion to dismiss the prosecutor stated:
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: * * * When [defendant] was brought into the state the state had a hundred twenty days. That period ended on 4-28-98. On 3-18-98, however, you granted a ninety day extension in which the State had to try Mr. Clifton. That would have allowed us to July 28, 1998. We have a date certain in this case of May 18th, and the State expects it will go on that date. At this time[,] because there is a date certain on May 18th I haven’t filed a formal written motion, but [defense counsel] indicated earlier there may be discovery that he will provide in this case. I would just ask it be provided, you know, as quickly as possible before the trial date.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: To my knowledge at this date I don’t have any discovery to provide. I will put that in writing.
“[THE COURT]: Motion to dismiss is denied.”
In my opinion, there has been no showing of good cause and certainly no finding of good cause by the hearing justice relative to the need or the appropriateness of such a long continuance other than the convenience of the prosecutor. Indeed, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the prosecutor was mistaken about when the 120-day period expired; it was April 10, 1998, and not April 28, 1998. This suggests to me a rather casual approach to the state’s obligations under the IADA. There was no real showing of why the state needed such a long continuance, other than it was “tak[ing the state] awhile to try to get up to speed.”
“The purpose of the [IADA] is to encourage the speedy disposition of untried criminal accusations against persons already incarcerated in other [states].” State v. Williams, 917 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex.App.1996). It is a compact among the signatory jurisdictions, including the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and is designed to reduce the adverse effects of transfers upon the rehabilitation of prisoners who suffer the loss of beneficial programs when sent to other jurisdictions. Id. Thus, the receiving state, in this case Rhode Island, is obliged to begin the trial within 120 days or dismiss the charges against the out-of-state prisoner. By the agreement, the state does not enjoy the luxury of a continuance to “get up to speed.” I know of no case in which failure to comply with the 120 day period has been excused because of the failure of the prosecution to be ready for trial. See Dennett v. State, 19 Md.App. 376, 311 A.2d 437, 442 (1973) (IADA re*1283quires that the state be ready for trial within the time period, and its excuse for not trying the case must amount to more than lack of preparation). Nor am I convinced that the grant of a continuance beyond the statutory 120-day limit rests solely within the sound discretion of the hearing justice. The exercise of that discretion is controlled by the statute, particularly when the showing by the state was neither necessary nor reasonable, but rather was for the convenience of the prosecutor. The defense in this case did not ask for a continuance and indeed, indicated that notwithstanding the piecemeal compliance by the state of its discovery obligations, the defense was prepared to go to trial. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 445 Pa. 49, 282 A.2d 241, 244 (1971) (defense counsel request for a continuance constituted good cause to extend trial date beyond the statutory period). Further, I do not agree with the majority that this was a complex crime; the trial lasted five days and was comprised of eight witnesses. This was a straightforward murder with several eyewitnesses, one of whom was present in the car when the shots were fired, and a second, unbiased bystander who actually witnessed the murder and recognized the defendant from the neighborhood. The out-of-state witness that the state was so concerned about merely testified to admissions made by defendant after he fled the state. Certainly this testimony was probative of defendant’s guilt, but not critical, particularly when, as of the ninety-second day when it requested a continuance, the prosecutor was not sure the state had located its witnesses.
Finally, I note the mandate that the statute “shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes” — that is to effectuate the trial of cases involving out-of-state prisoners within 120 days of their arrival in Rhode Island absent a showing of good cause. Section 13-13-2, Article IX and Article IV(c); see also Hoss v. Maryland, 266 Md. 136, 292 A.2d 48 (1972) (lack of prejudice to the prisoner by noncompliance with the statutory deadline is irrelevant to the objectives of the LADA because the sanction was regarded as essential to produce compliance with the statutory mandate). There may have been good cause for the delay in bringing this case to trial, but, in my opinion, it is not shown on this record. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.