Court Opinion

ID: 9668584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:18:46.544354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.210968
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
(dissenting). The material facts involved in this proceeding are not in dispute. On the 14th of December, 1953, and for some time prior thereto, plaintiff was an employee of the defendant bank. Her work involved the handling of records kept in trays, which plaintiff in the course of her employment was required to lift from metal files in order to obtain proper access to the contents. Such trays weighed approximately 25 pounds each.
On the date mentioned plaintiff took hold of a tray for the purpose of lifting it. Her first attempt was unsuccessful and, as appears from her statements, *606she jerked it. Such action loosened the tray but, as plaintiff claimed, resulted in a disability to her back. She sought compensation under the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law.* The deputy commissioner before whom the hearing was held concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to an award and denied compensation. The appeal board reversed the action of the deputy, stating in substance that in its opinion plaintiff had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. An award was made accordingly and defendants, on leave granted, have appealed.
The record in the case does not contain testimony to support a finding that the occurrence in question was accidental. Plaintiff was proceeding in the ordinary course of her work and undertook to loosen the tray by an appropriate act. She was successful in doing so. The result that followed was not anticipated but such fact does not bring plaintiff’s disability within the purview of part 2 of the compensation act. The question at issue was considered and discussed in Wieda v. American Box Board Company, 343 Mich 182, and in the prevailing opinion, which was signed by 7 members of the Court, it was held that:
“An accidental injury, to be compensable under the workmen’s compensation act, must be more than merely an unusual and unanticipated result; the means must be accidental — involuntary and unintended, and there must be some proximate connection between accidental means and the injurious result (CL 1948, § 412.1 et seq., as amended).
“An unfortunate result may not be given the retroactive effect of making a particular event or happening accidental in nature which was not of such char*607acter when it took place and, thereby, impose liability under portion of workmen’s compensation act requiring that injury to be compensable must have been proximately caused by an accident (CL 1948, § 412.1 et seq., as amended).” (Syllabi 2 and 3.)
A repetition of the reasons on which the holding of the Court was based would serve no useful purpose. The question involved is primarily one of the interpretation of the workmen’s compensation law and the term “accidental injury” must be given its ordinary meaning.
A situation analogous to the case at bar was involved in Hooks v. City of Wyandotte, 278 Mich 232. There the plaintiff’s decedent was employed by defendant city in collecting refuse. While he and his fellow workman were lifting a drum of ashes he suffered a disability. Compensation was sought under part 2 of the act and an award in plaintiff’s favor was appealed to this Court. It appeared from the record that the drum in which the refuse was contained was frozen to the ground. In the process of jerking it loose, and raising it, Hooks suffered the disability in question. In reversing the award in plaintiff’s favor it was held that the testimony did not “indicate that the injury occurred otherwise than when the work was being done in the usual and ordinary way and without the intervention of any untoward or accidental happening. That no accident, within the meaning of the .compensation law, was shown is settled by repeated decisions. (Citing cases.)”
Of like nature was the decision of the Court in a unanimous opinion rendered in Nichols v. Central Crate & Box Company, 340 Mich 232. There the plaintiff in the course of his employment undertook to move a log into position for sawing. He sought to raise the log from the ground with a cant hook. His first attempt was unsuccessful whereupon he gave *608it a jerk, applying sufficient force to lift the log.. However, he suffered an injury in so doing which resulted, as it was claimed, in disability. He sought compensation under part 2 of the statute. The compensation commission determined the matter in favor of the plaintiff and on appeal it was contended that the award should be upheld on the theory that the result to him from the occurrence in question was unexpected and unusual even though the cause thereof was not of such character. The Court rejected the-contention and set aside the award. The reasons underlying the decision are applicable to the determination of the case at bar.
In writing for affirmance of the award in plaintiff’s favor, Justice Edwards takes the position that part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act does not require that the disability shall be the result of an accidental occurrence in order to be compensable. Reliance is placed on amendments to the statute made by PA 1943, No 245. No change was made by said act in the title in its then form, the reference to compensation for accidental injuries being retained therein. In Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, 313 Mich 608, it was held, after reference to the amendments made-to the statute by the cited act of 1943, that an accidental injury was essential in order to authorize an award for compensation under part 2. An examination of the case will disclose that full and careful consideration was given to the matter. The decision has been repeatedly cited and followed.
In arguing that compensation may be awarded under part 2 even though the injury is not accidental, Justice Edwards claims that this Court has in prior decisions so held. In support of his statement he cites the following cases: Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 313 Mich 630; Kasarewski v. Hupp Motor Car Corp., 315 Mich 225; Schinderle v. Ford Motor Co., 316 Mich 387; Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rub*609ber Co., 317 Mich 149; and Croff v. Lakey Foundry & Machine Company, 320 Mich 581. An examination of these decisions indicates that in none was there an unequivocal holding hy a majority of the Court that PA 1943, No 245, had eliminated the necessity for an accidental injury as a basis for compensation under part 2. In Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 2 members of the Court thought the award in plaintiff’s favor should be set aside, and 2 concurred with Justice North who in writing for affirmance pointed out that the plaintiff’s disability resulted from causes and conditions characteristic of the work in which he was engaged. On such ground the case was differentiated from Hagopian v. City of Highland Park. The basis of the holding was discussed in Arnold v. Ogle Construction Company, 333 Mich 652, 665.
In the Kasarewski Case it was held that compensation could not be recovered for aggravation of a pre-existing hernia not resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. In Schinderle v. Ford Motor Co., the testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that his disability was suffered as the result of slipping, causing an injury to his back. In Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 3 members of the Court concluded that the award in plaintiff’s favor should be sustained on the ground that he had suffered an occupational injury under part 7 of the statute. Three took the position that the award might be sustained under part 2, and the other 2 members of the Court came to the conclusion that the award could not be sustained under part 2 because his disability did not result from an accidental occurrence, and that the proceeding should be remanded to the department for consideration of the question as to the plaintiff’s right to compensation under part 7. In Croff v. Lakey Foundry & Machine Company the Court was evenly divided.*610These decisions indicate differences of opinion among the members of the Court as to the matter at issue, but it may not be said that the holding in Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, and in cases following it, was overruled by said decisions, or any of them.
The interpretation and application of part 2 of the compensation act came again before the Court in Arnold v. Ogle Construction Company, supra, where it was held that plaintiff’s injury was not accidental in character and that, in consequence, the award in his favor could not be sustained. Attention was directed to the proposition that under article 5, § 21, of the Constitution (1908), it is required that the title of an act shall express its object. In case of a vari-ande, the principle is too well settled to require citation of authority that provisions in the body of the act that are not in accord with the title, or embraced within its terms, are invalid. Part 7 of the act was added by PA 1937, No 61, the title being broadened at that time to permit compensation for occupational injuries and diseases. The reference in the title to accidental injuries was retained, thus indicating that the legislature did not at that time intend to change in any way the scope or application of part 2. As before noted, the title was not amended by PA 1943, No 245. The majority opinion in the Arnold Case speaks for itself, and further reference thereto is not required. It and other decisions of like import were cited and followed in May v. A. H. Powell Lumber Company, 335 Mich 420, in which the award in plaintiff’s favor, made under part 2, was not sustained because of an absence of testimony to support a finding of an accidental injury. In reaching this conclusion reference was made to Schlange v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 326 Mich 552, relied on by the appeal board in the instant proceeding, and it was pointed out that the testimony in that case indicated *611that Schlange had sustained an accident by being jerked or thrown against the equipment that he was operating.
In Nichols v. Central Crate & Box Company, supra, it was held that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation because his disability did not result from an accidental injury. It may be noted in passing that the decision was unanimous. In Wieda v. American Box Board Company, supra, the workmen’s compensation commission denied an award to plaintiff on the ground that his disability did not result from an accidental injury suffered in the course of and arising out of his employment, citing in support of the conclusion McGregor v. Conservation Department, 338 Mich 93. This Court affirmed the order on the ground that the plaintiff’s disability did not result from an occurrence accidental in nature. In his opinion Justice Edwards seems to criticize the quotations hereinbefore set forth from the syllabi in the Wieda Case. Apparently he disagrees with the conclusion there reached. However, 7 members of the Court joined in the prevailing opinion, and it may be noted in passing that the dissenting opinion of Justice Smith rested on the theory that the occurrence involved was as a matter of fact and of law accidental in nature because of the result.
Without citing other recent decisions we think that the foregoing clearly indicate the position that this Court has taken with reference to the scope of part 2 of the compensation act. We may not extend its application by judicial fiat. We may not, in other words, encroach on the functions of the legislature. As before stated, the proposition before us is primarily one of statutory construction. We are bound to apply the compensation law in accordance with the purpose for which it was enacted, and in such manner as to carry out the intent of the legislature as therein expressed. The general rule of interpre*612tation suggested in Smith v. Wilson Foundry & Machine Co., 296 Mich 484, is applicable here. It was there said (p 487):
“We have in mind that the workmen’s compensation law, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich 298 (6 NCCA 807, Ann Cas 1916D, 724). It must be construed and administered according to its terms, Wilcox v. Clarage Foundry & Manfg. Co., 199 Mich 79, and its scope may not be enlarged beyond the terms of its enactment. Gordon v. Smith Brothers, 284 Mich 456.”
The case should be reversed and remanded, with directions to the appeal board to set aside the award.
Sharpe, J., concurred with Caer, J.

 PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948, §411.1 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 17.1.41 et seg.]).