Court Opinion

ID: 9919405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:05:49.88902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.655889
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2193-21

USBANKCUST/PROCAP8/
PROCAPMGTII,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BLOCK 268, LOT 7 38
BRENWAL AVE.,
TOWNSHIP OF EWING,
STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, ASSESSED TO:
188TH BRENWAL AVENUE
DEVELOPMENT LLC,

     Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

                   Submitted October 3, 2023 – Decided January 18, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Mercer County, Docket No.
                   F-006684-20.

                   The Kelly Firm, PC, attorneys for appellant (Andrew J.
                   Kelly, of counsel and on the briefs; Nicholas D. Norcia,
                   on the briefs).
            Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, PA,
            attorneys for respondent (Bruce S. Luckman, on the
            brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant, 188th Brenwal Avenue Development, LLC appeals from the

January 8, 2021, Chancery Division order denying its motion to vacate a tax sale

foreclosure judgment in favor of plaintiff, PC8REO, LLC, pursuant to Rule

4:50-1. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

                                            I.

      The property at issue is located at 38 Brenwal Avenue in Ewing Township,

and is described on the tax map as Block 268, Lot 7. On November 9, 2018,

defendant, a New Jersey real estate investment limited liability company,

purchased the property for $97,900.         On December 30, 2019, the Ewing

Township tax collector issued a tax sale certificate on the property in the amount

of $6,569.66 for unpaid tax and sewer charges, which certificate was purchased

by USBANKCUST/PROCAP8/PROCAPMGTII (Procap).

      On June 18, 2020, Procap filed an in rem tax sale foreclosure complaint

alleging that the property was abandoned in accordance with the Abandoned

Properties Rehabilitation Act (APRA), N.J.S.A. 55:19-78 to -107. By way of

background, the holder of a tax sale certificate has no right to foreclose sooner

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than two years from the certificate's acquisition unless the property is abandoned

within the meaning of APRA, in which case the foreclosure action may be

commenced "any time" after the certificate's acquisition. See N.J.S.A. 54:5-

86(b) (authorizing "[a]ny person holding a tax sale certificate on a property" that

meets the statutory definition of abandoned property "either at the time of the

tax sale or thereafter," to "at any time file an action with the Superior Court in

the county wherein said municipality is situate, demanding that the right of

redemption on such property be barred . . . .").

      A tax sale certificate holder may show abandonment in two general ways.

First, the holder may file with the complaint "a certification by the public officer

or the tax collector that the property is abandoned." N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(b). The

second path allows a court to make such a finding by considering both the

plaintiff's "evidence that the property is abandoned, accompanied by a report

and sworn statement by an individual holding appropriate licensure or

professional qualifications," ibid., and, of course, any opposing evidential

material.

      On August 3, 2020, Procap pursued the second path and filed a motion

seeking a declaration from the court that the property was abandoned.              In

support, Procap submitted a certification dated April 4, 2020, prepared by Dino

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                                         3
Cavalieri, a licensed construction official. Cavalieri's certification consisted of

a preprinted form listing the statutory abandonment factors, with Cavalieri's

corresponding affirmative notations.

      Specifically, in the certification, Cavalieri averred that he "personally

inspected the exterior of the property" on April 4, 2020. He certified that the

property was abandoned pursuant to N.J.S.A. 55:19-81 because it "ha[d] not

been legally occupied for at least six . . . months preceding the date of th[e

c]ertification;" "[was] in need of rehabilitation and no rehabilitation ha[d] taken

place during the last six months[;]" "[a]t least one installment of property tax[es]

remain[ed] unpaid[;]" and the condition of the property rendered it "unfit for

human habitation, occupancy or use" because, among other things, the "electric

meter [was] not operating" and the "steps [were] not secure." See N.J.S.A.

55:19-81 (delineating criteria for a determination of abandonment, including

that "[t]he property is in need of rehabilitation . . . and no rehabilitation has

taken place during [a] six-month period[,]" "[a]t least one installment of

property tax remains unpaid and delinquent on th[e] property[,]" and "[t]he

property has been determined to be a nuisance by the public officer" in

accordance with N.J.S.A. 55:19-82); see also N.J.S.A. 55:19-82(a) (defining

nuisance as the property being "unfit for human habitation, occupancy or use").

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                                         4
        The motion was served on defendant's registered agent at a Neptune

address and on defendant's managing agent at the property address. On August

28, 2020, the trial court granted Procap's unopposed motion and entered an

abandonment order. The August 28, 2020, abandonment order was served on

defendant's registered agent at a Neptune address and on defendant's managing

agent at the property address.

        On October 21, 2020, Procap assigned its rights in the tax sale certificate

to plaintiff, PC8REO, LLC, and subsequently moved to substitute plaintiff in all

pleadings, which the court granted. On November 17, 2020, the court entered

an uncontested order in plaintiff's favor for final judgment on the foreclosure

complaint, vesting title in the property to plaintiff and barring any right of

redemption. The final judgment was mailed to defendant on November 24,

2020.

        On December 3, 2020, defendant moved to vacate the November 17, 2020,

final judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. In support of the motion, defendant

submitted the certification of Santi Rodriquez, defendant's property manager.

Rodriquez certified that "the property was never abandoned but waiting for

construction permit approvals." According to Rodriquez, "[p]ermits were filed

with the City of Ewing on [August 20, 2019]," and between August 20, 2019,

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                                         5
and March 25, 2020, "[t]he City of Ewing was in the process . . . of doing a plan

review." As a result, "[n]o work could be done during that period of time."

      Rodriquez averred that once "the building department issue[d] the permit"

on March 25, 2020, "work began." However, he explained that "[they] had to

shut down" during April 2020 when Cavalieri's inspection occurred "due to

COVID 19" and Governor Murphy's "[E]xecutive [O]rder 122 to cease all non-

essential construction projects." Rodriquez stated that once the ban was lifted,

work "resumed." As a result, they "had an [i]nspection for [f]ire [and e]lectrical

on May 26, 2020," "an inspection for [p]lumbing on May 27[], 2020," "a

building inspection" on May 29, 2020, "a [f]ire [i]nspection" on June 12, 2020,

and "a [m]echanical inspection" on June 17, 2020.

      According to Rodriquez, they ultimately "passed all inspections," "have

been working on the property," and anticipated completing the work "sometime

in December 2020." Rodriguez added that had plaintiff's inspector "checked

with the building department he would have seen this information," and they

were unaware of the litigation because "[they] were never served with

notification of the motion for [a]bandonment or [f]inal foreclosure action."

Supporting documents were submitted with Rodriguez' certification, which

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included a PSE&G bill for the property with a due date of May 21, 2020, and

showing current gas and electricity charges for the property.

      Plaintiff opposed the motion and submitted a certification of counsel

pointing out that on October 26, 2018, and July 9, 2019, Ewing Township issued

violation notices citing defendant for over twenty violations at the property,

including a violation for failure to obtain required inspections and working

without a permit.1 Further, according to counsel, "on June 23, 2020, a Stop

Construction Order was issued for the [p]roperty for [d]efendant's failure to

correct[] violations and failure to obtain permits," and on June 25, 2020, "a

Notice of Violation and Order to Terminate was issued for the [p]roperty."

      Additionally, counsel averred that

            [o]n May 8, 2020, [p]laintiff served [d]efendant with
            pre-foreclosure notices by way of certified mail to the
            [p]roperty and to 1301 Corlies Ave. Suite 6E, Neptune,
            New Jersey 07753, which is the address for
            [d]efendant's registered agent, the address on file with
            the Ewing Township tax collector where tax bills for
            the [p]roperty are mailed to [d]efendant, and the
            address for [d]efendant on its deed to the [p]roperty.
            The certified mail sent to the [p]roperty was returned
            marked, "moved left no address" and that certified mail
            sent to 1301 Corlies Ave. Suite 6E, Neptune, New
            Jersey 07753 was returned marked "unclaimed."

1
   The July 9, 2019, notice indicated that when the construction official arrived
at the property at approximately 2:45 p.m. on July 9, 2019, he observed ongoing
work in "all construction disciplines."
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      Further, counsel certified that on August 3, 2020, plaintiff served

defendant with its motion to declare the property abandoned "at the [p]roperty,"

as well as at "its registered agent['s office]," its "tax bill address," and "its deed

[address]" on Corlies Avenue in Neptune. Counsel stated the abandonment

order was served on defendant "on September 1, 2020[,] at the [p]roperty and

its registered agent's office." According to counsel, plaintiff also "caused to be

published in the Trenton Times, . . . a notice of [i]n [r]em [f]oreclosure, pursuant

to [Rule] 4:64-7(b)."

      Counsel continued:

             In addition, on September 1, 2020, in accordance with
             the provisions of [Rule ]4:64-7(c), [p]laintiff caused to
             be mailed notice of the within [i]n rem [f]oreclosure
             action, in sealed envelopes, with postage prepaid,
             simultaneously by first class and certified mail, return
             receipt requested, addressed to [d]efendant. Such
             service was sent to [d]efendant at the [p]roperty, its tax
             bill/registered agent address/deed address at 1301
             Corlies Ave. Suite 6E, Neptune, New Jersey 07753 and
             to 27 Marbourne Dr., Mamaroneck, NY 10543, which
             is an additional address listed on [d]efendant's
             registered agent report. The certified mail sent to the
             [p]roperty was returned marked "vacant" further
             bolstering the status of the [p]roperty as abandoned.
             The [d]efendant signed the return receipt for the service
             sent to 1301 Corlies Ave., Ste. 6E[,] Neptune, [New
             Jersey] 07753 two times. Defendant additionally
             signed the return receipt for the certified mail sent to 27
             Marbourne Dr., Mamaroneck, NY 10543. . . .

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                                          8
            . . . Further, [p]laintiff posted a true copy of the
            published Notice of In Rem Tax Foreclosure in a
            conspicuous location at the [p]roperty in accordance
            with [Rule] 4:64-7(d) on September 8, 2020. . . .

            . . . On September 23, 2020, La'Toya Wilkinson,
            assistant to Santi Rodriguez, the principal of the
            property owner, who maintains [d]efendant's address at
            1301 Corlies Ave., Ste. 6[E], Neptune[,] [New Jersey]
            07753 sent the Ewing Township Tax Collector
            correspondence indicating [d]efendant's desire to
            redeem the [t]ax [l]ien on October 14, 2020.
            Defendant's subsequent correspondence to the Ewing
            Township Tax Collector dated October 28, 2020[,] and
            November 24, 2020[,] stated that [d]efendant spoke
            with Amy, who is a paralegal at the office for
            [p]laintiff's counsel, and advised that [d]efendant
            intended to redeem the [t]ax [l]ien, further confirming
            [d]efendant's knowledge of the [t]ax [l]ien and
            foreclosure proceedings. . . .

      On January 8, 2021, following oral argument, the court entered an order

denying defendant's Rule 4:50-1 motion. In an accompanying written opinion,

the court rejected each of defendant's arguments ad seriatum. First, regarding

inadequate service, the court stated:

            Plaintiff   overwhelmingly      refutes     [d]efendant's
            assertion of inadequate service. Plaintiff demonstrates
            that they published the notice of In Rem Foreclosure
            pursuant to Rule 4:64-7(b) and served such notice upon
            [d]efendant per Rule 4:64-7(c) on September 1, 2020[,]
            by way of first class and certified mail, return receipt
            requested at its registered agent/tax bill/deed address,
            1301 Corlies Ave., Ste. 6E, Neptune, New Jersey
            07753, the very address that appears on [d]efendant's

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                                        9
            signature line on the correspondence from [d]efendant
            to the Ewing Township tax collector in September
            2020, shortly after [d]efendant received service.
            Additionally, [d]efendant signed the return receipt for
            such service two times and [d]efendant signed the
            return receipt for service sent to the other address on its
            registered agent report, 27 Marbourne Dr.,
            Mamaroneck, NY 10543. Plaintiff also observes that
            the certified mail sent to the [p]roperty was returned to
            [p]laintiff marked "vacant," buttressing its argument
            (and the [c]ourt's finding) that the property was
            abandoned.

      Next, rejecting defendant's defense that the property was not abandoned,

the court stated:

                   Defendant maintains that its defense to the
            foreclosure action derives from the fact that the
            property is not truly abandoned. However, neither this
            application nor any other mounts [d]efendant's
            challenge to the order entered declaring the property
            abandoned, and nothing in Rule 4:50-1 enables it to
            serve as a vehicle for a collateral attack on a wholly
            separate order. Moreover, in support of its application,
            [p]laintiff submitted the certification of a qualified
            individual certifying that the property was abandoned;
            in this application, an unqualified representative of
            [d]efendant attacks that conclusion but does not dispute
            that the property was unoccupied for a period of six
            months or more and that property taxes remained
            unpaid. Nothing in N.J.S.A. 55:19-81 requires the
            inspector to check with the municipality's building
            department to evaluate whether any permits were
            approved and pending on the date of inspection.

      The court concluded:

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                                       10
            Plaintiff has demonstrated by far more than a
            preponderance of the evidence that it[ ha]s effectuated
            service upon [d]efendant and [d]efendant had every
            opportunity to seek reconsideration of the order
            declaring the property as abandoned or to seek leave to
            appeal that interlocutory order. Defendant took no such
            steps. Nothing in [d]efendant's submission asserts
            mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect
            and none is apparent to the [c]ourt on this record.
            Finally, as [p]laintiff points out, [d]efendant does not
            assert or even suggest that it is prepared to make
            [p]laintiff whole for the fees and costs incurred on this
            property or to actually fulfill its obligation to pay
            property taxes to the Township.

This appeal from the January 8, 2021, order followed.2

      On appeal, defendant argues "the court committed several errors" in

denying its Rule 4:50-1 motion to vacate the final judgment. Among the errors,

defendant asserts "the court accepted as 'overwhelming[]' [p]laintiff's proofs of

service" when plaintiff "fell short of its obligations under Rule 4:64-7(c)."3

2
   Defendant filed a bankruptcy petition on February 12, 2021, that resulted in
an automatic stay of all proceedings. After the bankruptcy court granted
defendant's motion to allow defendant to pursue an appeal from the final
judgment in the State court, defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 23,
2022, seeking to appeal the August 28, 2020, November 17, 2020, and January
8, 2021 orders. On November 3, 2022, we entered an order determining that
only the appeal of the January 8, 2021, order was timely and "the August 28 and
November 17, 2020 orders [were] not properly before the court."
3
   Rule 4:64-7(c) delineates service requirements for in rem tax foreclosure
proceedings.
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                                      11
According to defendant, because "[a] judgment flowing out of a proceeding

against a litigant not duly served 'is void,'" the judgment should be set aside.

Defendant further argues the court erred in ruling that defendant was precluded

from challenging the underlying abandonment order while moving to vacate the

final judgment of foreclosure because the abandonment order was the foundation

for the foreclosure order. Defendant asserts that because the abandonment order

was predicated on insufficient evidence that the property was abandoned,

evidence defendant disputed with credible evidence of ongoing construction and

current energy usage at the property, the foreclosure judgment should be

vacated.

      At the very least, defendant contends "the court misapplied its discretion"

by "failing to resolve doubt in [d]efendant's favor . . . where there were disputed

issues of fact," and "fail[ing] to weigh the excusable neglect issue in

[d]efendant's favor, particularly with respect to issues far beyond [d]efendant's

control such as the City of Ewing's permitting process and the ongoing global

pandemic." We reject defendant's contentions regarding defective service and

determine they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We agree, however, with defendant's assertion

that the abandonment order, upon which the final judgment of foreclosure was

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                                       12
premised, was predicated upon disputed facts regarding whether the property

met the statutory definition of abandonment. In light of the contested record,

we vacate the final judgment of foreclosure and remand for an evidentiary

hearing to determine whether the property was properly ruled abandoned in

accordance with APRA, a determination pivotal to whether plaintiff was entitled

to seek foreclosure when it did.

                                           II.

      Under Rule 4:50-1, a party may move for relief from a judgment or order

for the following reasons:

            (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
            neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would
            probably alter the judgment or order and which by due
            diligence could not have been discovered in time to
            move for a new trial under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud
            (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
            misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
            party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the
            judgment or order has been satisfied, released or
            discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it
            is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
            no longer equitable that the judgment or order should
            have prospective application; or (f) any other reason
            justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or
            order.

      "Rule 4:50-1 does not accord tax sale foreclosure judgments greater

respect than judgments obtained under other laws that are supported by equally

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                                      13
strong public policy." BV001 REO Blocker, LLC v. 53 W. Somerset St. Props.,

LLC, 467 N.J. Super. 117, 129 (App. Div. 2021). Nonetheless, Rule 4:50-1

"[was] designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and

judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have authority to

avoid an unjust result in any given case." Id. at 123 (quoting Manning Eng'g,

Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113, 120 (1977)). As such, a motion

for relief under Rule 4:50-1 should be granted "'sparingly [and only] in

exceptional situations . . . in which, were it not applied, a grave injustice would

occur.'" Badalamenti by Badalamenti v. Simpkiss, 422 N.J. Super. 86, 103

(App. Div. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown

v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 289 (1994)).

      A motion to vacate based on one of the six enumerated grounds in Rule

4:50-1 "is a determination left to the sound discretion of the trial court, guided

by principles of equity." F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003). That said,

the "[trial] court's judgment will be left undisturbed 'unless it represents a clear

abuse of discretion.'" Ibid. (quoting Little, 135 N.J. at 283). A court abuses its

discretion "'when a decision is "made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible

basis."'" Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super.

                                                                              A-2193-21
                                        14
378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J.

561, 571 (2002)). Because principles of equity guide a judge's consideration of

a Rule 4:50-1 motion, a request to vacate a default judgment must "be viewed

with great liberality," with "every reasonable ground for indulgence . . . tolerated

to the end that a just result is reached." Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J.

Super. 313, 319 (App. Div. 1964). Still, under the rule, the movant bears the

burden of demonstrating his or her entitlement to relief. See Jameson v. Great

Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425-26 (App. Div. 2003).

      Although defendant did not specify in the trial court, on appeal, defendant

primarily relies on subsections (a), (b), and (f) of the Rule. Rule 4:50-1(a)

"requir[es] a showing of excusable neglect and a meritorious defense." US Bank

Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 468 (2012). "'Excusable neglect' may

be found when the default was 'attributable to an honest mistake that is

compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence.'" Ibid. (quoting Mancini

v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 335

(1993)). Rule 4:50-1(f), the so-called catch-all, "affords relief only when 'truly

exceptional circumstances are present.'" Ibid. (quoting Little, 135 N.J. at 286).

      Indeed, "[n]o categorization can be made of the situations which would

warrant redress under subsection (f). . . . [T]he very essence of (f) is its capacity

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                                        15
for relief in exceptional situations. And in such exceptional cases its boundaries

are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice." DEG, LLC v. Twp.

of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 269-70 (2009) (second and third alteration in original)

(quoting Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966)). To that end, we

have considered additional factors in deciding whether relief under subsection

(f) is warranted, including "(1) the extent of the delay in making the application;

(2) the underlying reason or cause; (3) the fault or blamelessness of the litigant;

and (4) the prejudice that would accrue to the other party." Parker v. Marcus,

281 N.J. Super. 589, 593 (App. Div. 1995).

      We acknowledge that "[f]oreclosure is a harsh remedy and equity abhors

a forfeiture. A court of equity may invoke its inherent equitable powers to avoid

a forfeiture and deny the remedy of foreclosure." Sovereign Bank, FSB, v.

Kuelzow, 297 N.J. Super. 187, 198 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Brinkley v. W.

World, Inc., 275 N.J. Super. 605, 610 (Ch. Div. 1994), aff'd o.b., and modified

on other grounds, 292 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 1996)). Nonetheless, APRA

is intended to provide a tool for local governments to rehabilitate abandoned

properties and avoid blight and declining property values. See N.J.S.A. 55:19-

79. As such, properties designated as abandoned are eligible for special tax

sales. See N.J.S.A. 55:19-101.

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                                       16
     Under APRA,

           any property that has not been legally occupied for a
           period of six months and which meets any one of the
           following additional criteria may be deemed to be
           abandoned property upon a determination by the public
           officer that:

                 a. The property is in need of rehabilitation
                 in the reasonable judgment of the public
                 officer, and no rehabilitation has taken
                 place during that six-month period;

                 b. Construction was initiated on the
                 property and was discontinued prior to
                 completion,      leaving    the     building
                 unsuitable for occupancy, and no
                 construction has taken place for at least six
                 months as of the date of a determination by
                 the public officer pursuant to this section;

                 c. At least one installment of property tax
                 remains unpaid and delinquent on that
                 property in accordance with [N.J.S.A.
                 54:4-1 to -136] as of the date of a
                 determination by the public officer
                 pursuant to this section; or

                 d. The property has been determined to be
                 a nuisance by the public officer in
                 accordance with [N.J.S.A. 55:19-82].

           [N.J.S.A. 55:19-81(a) to (d).]

     Once an abandoned designation has been made, the purchaser of the tax

sale certificate may commence a foreclosure proceeding, but the abandoned

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                                     17
property owner may redeem his rights at any time, subject to court order.

N.J.S.A. 55:19-58(c) ("After the foreclosure action is instituted, the right to

redeem shall exist and continue to exist until barred by the judgment of the

Superior Court[.]"). A tax sale certificate "creates only a lien on the premises"

and is "not an outright conveyance;" it "conveys the lien interest of the taxing

authority." Town of Phillipsburg v. Block 1508, Lot 12, 380 N.J. Super. 159,

163 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Savage v. Weissman, 335 N.J. Super. 429, 436

(App. Div. 2002)). Additionally, the "interest of the holder of the tax sale

certificate is entirely subordinate to the statutory right of redemption of the

property owner." Ibid. (quoting Savage, 335 N.J. Super. at 436).

      Here, because the final foreclosure judgment was based on the

abandonment designation, the propriety of the abandonment designation

necessarily informed whether vacating the foreclosure judgment was

appropriate under Rule 4:50-1. While defendant's failure to pay taxes on the

property was undisputed, the remaining facts supporting the abandonment

designation were not. Critically, the threshold requirement for an abandonment

designation, that the property had not been legally occupied for six months, a

fact attested to by Cavalieri, was disputed by the certification of Rodriquez,

defendant's property manager, who attested that the property was undergoing

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                                      18
rehabilitation construction that had been delayed by the permit approval process

and the pandemic.     If accepted, Rodriquez' certification demonstrated that

defendant had by no means abandoned the property.

      Significantly, other than his April 4, 2020, inspection, Cavalieri's

certification, which consisted of a preprinted form listing the statutory

abandonment factors and Cavalieri's confirmatory notations, did not explain the

basis for his conclusion that the property had not been occupied for at least six

months. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford, 418 N.J. Super. 592, 599 (App.

Div. 2011) ("A certification will support the grant of summary judgment only if

the material facts alleged therein are based, as required by Rule 1:6-6, on

'personal knowledge.'" (quoting Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472,

489 (App. Div. 2003))). In contrast, Rodriquez' certification showed that in the

six months preceding Cavalieri declaring that the property had been abandoned

for six months, defendant had applied to the City of Ewing for construction

permits and obtained approval after the third attempt. In addition, within that

six-month period, Governor Murphy had declared a public health state of

emergency. See Exec. Order No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 549(a) (Apr. 6,

2020). Once the ban was lifted and the permits secured, Rodriquez averred that

construction resumed with its concomitant inspections.

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                                      19
      We, of course, draw no conclusions on the abandonment issue except to

observe the presence of genuine factual disputes in the parties' competing

certifications that should be examined at an evidentiary hearing. Because the

abandonment determination was pivotal to whether plaintiff was entitled to seek

foreclosure when it did, all that followed must be vacated. We therefore reverse

the decision denying the motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure,

remand for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion, and vacate the

final judgment of foreclosure, effective immediately, without prejudice to the

outcome of the remanded proceedings.

      Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.         We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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                                      20