Court Opinion

ID: 9698022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:39:44.189917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:37.710833
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part)..I agree with the majority's holding that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise Scott that he could pursue enforcement of the original plea agreement and that Scott was prejudiced by such failure.
However, I disagree with the majority's remand directive that the remedy is "a new sentencing hearing requiring the State to adhere to the terms of the plea agreement as it existed on April 3, 1997." (Majority at 665.) I contend that the proper remand is for Scott to first make application to the trial court for enforcement of the original plea agreement. If that request is granted, then the resentencing proceeding envisioned by the majority would be appropriate.
When a trial or appellate court determines that an attorney has failed to provide effective assistance of trial counsel and that such failure is prejudicial, the proper remedy is to return the case to the posture it was in before counsel performed deficiently. See State v. Lentowski, 212 Wis. 2d 849, 857-58, 569 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Ct. App. 1997). Here, when the State withdrew from the April 3, 1997 plea agreement, counsel was *666ineffective by failing to advise Scott that he could seek enforcement of that agreement. If counsel had performed effectively, he would have advised Scott of this option and Scott could have then brought a motion to enforce the plea agreement. To correct counsel's failing, we should return the case to that posture and allow Scott to make such application to the trial court if he so chooses. Instead, the majority's directive for a new sentencing "leapfrogs" this process.
Under the facts of this case, the trial court should first determine whether enforcement of the plea agreement is proper. While that might seem a foregone conclusion in this case, orderly procedure calls for the trial court to first make this determination before any new sentencing occurs. That is the way the matter would have played out in the trial court if counsel had performed properly. There is no reason to depart from that procedure when an appellate or trial court holds that counsel has not performed properly.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's remand directive.