Court Opinion

ID: 9797937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:32:47.914071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:52.679199
License: Public Domain

MORENO, J.
I dissent. Second degree murder, of which petitioner John E. Dannenberg stands convicted, is by its very nature a serious crime. But as explained below, the relevant statute mandates that people convicted of second degree murder be considered for and normally granted parole. At the very least, the statute mandates that the Board of Prison Terms (Board) not deny parole solely because the prisoner has committed the murder. Yet the majority’s decision today would permit the Board to do precisely that. And though the majority does so in the name of public safety and individualized parole decisions, the majority opinion in fact advances neither goal. Rather, the position the majority adopts requires the judicial rubber stamping of the Board’s decisions, no matter how unfounded or unjust they might be.
There is, as the majority notes, a tension between Penal Code section 3041, subdivisions (a) and (b)1 (hereinafter section 3041(a) and section 3041(b)). But “the function of the court in construing a statute ‘is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)” (Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997) 16 Cal.4th 483, 492 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 304, 940 P.2d 891].) The majority fails to perform this basic function, reaching its result by ignoring or discounting much of section 3041(a).
Specifically, the majority concludes that section 3041(a)’s statement that the Board “shall normally set a parole release date ... in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in *1101respect to their threat to the public” (italics added) has no real meaning, and is nothing more than a “legislative assumption, or hope, that uniform release dates would be a typical or common result.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1087.) The majority accordingly holds, in effect, that “normally” can mean “almost never” and the Board can disregard the statutory mandate that parole dates be set proportionally in relation to the magnitude of the offense. Instead, the majority advances the position that the Board is governed by section 3041(b) to the exclusion of section 3041(a). Section 3041(b) provides, in pertinent part: “The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” What the majority does not and cannot explain is why the Legislature should go through the trouble of describing extensively a method of granting parole that the Board “shall” carry out if this statute expresses—very uncharacteristically for a Legislature—nothing more than a “hope.”
In addition to section 3041’s mandate to set uniform, proportional parole release dates, the Legislature has established minimum terms before parole may be granted, generally 15 years in the case of second degree murder and 25 years in the case of noncapital first degree murder. (§ 190, subd. (a).) In so doing, the Legislature has implicitly made the judgment that parole for the least serious second degree murders should be set at that minimum term, and that parole for more aggravated second degree murders should be set accordingly. But under the majority’s position of following section 3041(b) without any reference to 3041(a), the Board need not concern itself with the relative gravity of the underlying offense. Thus, the Board appears free to erase the fundamental legislative distinction between first and second degree murder, and to routinely compel the person convicted of the latter to serve as much time as one convicted of the former.
The Court of Appeal’s opinion below, and the opinion in In re Ramirez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 549 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 381] (Ramirez), set forth the most sensible way to interpret the statutory scheme that gives effect, as we must, to the entire statute. Because section 3041(a) requires the Board to “normally” set parole dates for life prisoners, and to establish a uniform, proportional scheme for parole setting that is protective of public safety, section 3041(b) must be understood as providing an exception to section 3041(a) in the “abnormal” circumstance when the gravity of the offense is so aggravated that a parole date cannot be set pursuant to section 3041(a). (Ramirez, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 569-570.)
One thing that makes the majority’s opinion particularly perplexing is that we recently endorsed this very position, which the majority now repudiates, *1102in In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174] (Rosenkrantz). As the Chief Justice, writing for the court, stated: “In some circumstances, a denial of parole based upon the nature of the offense alone might rise to the level of a due process violation—for example where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense. Denial of parole under these circumstances would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement that a parole date normally shall be set ‘in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public. . . .’ (Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (a).) ‘The Board’s authority to make an exception [to the requirement of setting a parole date] based on the gravity of a life term inmate’s current or past offenses should not operate so as to swallow the rule that parole is “normally” to be granted. Otherwise, the Board’s case-by-case rulings would destroy the proportionality contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a), and also by the murder statutes, which provide distinct terms of life without possibility of parole, 25 years to life, and 15 years to life for various degrees and kinds of murder. (Pen. Code, § 190 et seq.) [(J[] Therefore, a life term offense or any other offenses underlying an indeterminate sentence must be particularly egregious to justify the denial of a parole date.’ (In re Ramirez, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 570.)” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683.)
The majority attempts to minimize the significance of Rosenkrantz. It states: “Our discussion, including our use of the phrase ‘particularly egregious,’ conveyed only that the violence or viciousness of the inmate’s crime must be more than minimally necessary to convict him of the offense for which he is confined.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1095.) But we said more than that. As indicated above, we stated: “ ‘The Board’s authority to make an exception [to the requirement of setting a parole date] based on the gravity of a life term inmate’s current or past offenses should not operate so as to swallow the rule that parole is “normally” to be granted. Otherwise, the Board’s case-by-case rulings would destroy the proportionality contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a) . . . .’ ” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683, italics added.)2
The majority’s standard is not only inconsistent with the pertinent statute and with Rosenkrantz, it does not articulate a workable standard of judicial review. This deficit is brought home by the way in which it deals with the case before us. Having concluded that “particularly egregious” means “the *1103violence or viciousness of the inmate’s crime must be more than minimally necessary to convict him of the offense for which he is confined,” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1095.) the majority proceeds to review the facts of the case. “As the Board noted, Dannenberg reacted with extreme and sustained violence to a domestic argument. He struck multiple blows to his wife’s head with a pipe wrench. Bleeding profusely, she then ‘fell or was pushed’ into a bathtub full of water, where she drowned. Though he vehemently denied it, the evidence permitted an inference that, while the victim was helpless from her injuries, Dannenberg placed her head in the water, or at least left it there without assisting her until she was dead.....” (Maj. opn., ante, at p 1095.) The majority then states, conclusorily: “Thus, there clearly was ‘some evidence’ (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, 658) to support the Board’s determination that Dannenberg’s crime was ‘especially callous and cruel,’ showed ‘an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,’ and was disproportionate to the ‘trivial’ provocation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1095.)
This unexplained conclusion raises more questions than it provides answers. What is it about these facts that make this second degree murder particularly egregious? How is the Board to determine what facts constitute a particularly egregious murder? How is a court to review that determination? The majority gives us no clue, because the concept of a crime being “more than minimally necessary to convict [a prisoner] of the offense for which he is confined” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1095) is essentially meaningless. Second degree murder is an abstraction that consists of certain legal elements. Particular second degree murders have facts that fit within these elements. These facts are never “necessary” or “minimally necessary”3 to convict someone of a second degree murder, because we can always imagine other facts that would also lead to a second degree murder conviction. Furthermore, these facts, because they are facts about a second degree murder, will almost invariably involve the defendant acting violently, cruelly, and, if acting out of provocation, greatly out of proportion to the provocation (otherwise the defendant would have been convicted of manslaughter or exonerated through self-defense). If the Board labels a second degree murder “especially callous and cruel” and exhibiting “an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” then recites the *1104facts of the case, is there any way for a court to review that finding and, on occasion, to find it untrue? The majority provides no explicit answer. Its implicit answer appears to be “no.”
The majority’s implicit abolition of judicial review whenever the Board bases its parole denial decision on the commitment offense contravenes the limited but significant due process rights of parole applicants required by the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) As the court has explained, an applicant has the right, “ ‘to have his application for [parole] “duly considered” based upon an individualized consideration of all relevant factors.’ ” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 655, quoting In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 646 [102 Cal.Rptr. 749, 498 P.2d 997].) In other words, the parole application must be given “something more than mere pro forma consideration.” (In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268 [113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97] (Sturm).) As we have stated: “Under time-honored principles of the common law, ... the parole applicant’s right to ‘due consideration’ cannot exist in any practical sense unless there also exists a remedy against their abrogation. (See Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 161-163 [2 L.Ed. 60].) Hence, our prior recognition of a right to due consideration of parole applications necessarily gives rise to a concomitant right to an available remedy.” (Sturm, supra, at pp. 268-269.) It was the recognition of a parole applicant’s due process rights and the need for an effective remedy for their violation that led this court to recently reaffirm that a parole denial decision could not be sustained unless supported by “some evidence.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 655-658.)
Under the majority’s approach, if the Board gives the parole applicant mere pro forma consideration—reciting the facts of the case and then labeling the applicant’s actions “especially callous and cruel”—a court will nonetheless be obliged to uphold the Board’s decision. The banishment of judicial review from the parole process under these circumstances means the judiciary will be disabled from enforcing even the most rudimentary due process rights of parole applicants.
The possibility that the Board may not be giving individualized, due consideration to parole applicants is more than hypothetical. In 1999, for example, no life prisoners were released on parole, partly because the Board granted parole to an estimated 18 prisoners (Legis. Analyst’s analysis of 2000-2001 Budget Bill, p. D-59) out of about 2,000 parole suitability hearings (<http://www.bpt.ca.gov/caseload_stats.asp> [as of Jan. 24, 2005]), less than 1 percent of those eligible, and partly because of the then Governor’s even more stringent parole policy.
The Board’s reluctance to grant parole is understandable, but troubling. Denial of parole may incur the wrath of the prisoner and his immediate *1105supporters. But granting parole to a prisoner who reoffends will incur the disapproval of society at large. (See Simerman, Convicts Pin Hope on New Governor, Contra Costa Times (Aug. 22, 2004) [discussing the political risks of granting parole].) The Board’s commissioners therefore have little to gain and potentially much to lose by granting parole, and accordingly, the incentive to give only pro forma consideration to the parole decision is strong. This incentive makes meaningful judicial review all the more essential.
The majority primarily justifies its holding by means of section 3041’s overriding concern with public safety. But using public safety to excuse the Board’s failure to comply with its statutory mandate under section 3041(a) misses the mark for at least two reasons. First, section 3041(a) itself makes public safety concerns central, dictating that the “uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude” be calibrated “in respect to their threat to the public.” In other words, the Legislature has determined that for those convicted of second degree murder and first degree murder without special circumstances, the proportional, uniform setting of parole dates can and should be accomplished in a manner consistent with public safety. Although there are other individualized considerations pertaining to a prisoner’s suitability for parole and his threat to public safety, such as his behavior in prison, his plans after prison, and his age (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402), it is clear from section 3041(a) that the commission of a second degree murder that is not exceptional with respect to other second degree murders does not by itself provide a basis for failing to set a parole date.
In other words, no one is challenging the validity of the Board’s regulation that “regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (a).) But when a prisoner is denied a parole date solely as a result of the seriousness of the commitment offense, and all the postcommitment evidence points to the fact that he is no longer a danger to society, section 3041(a) and (b) dictates that the commitment offense be particularly egregious in comparison to other offenses of the same class. Despite the majority’s profession to the contrary, there is no indication that proceeding in this manner will compromise public safety in the least, nor any indication that the Legislature believed it would.
Second, although public safety is paramount, the Legislature had other concerns, which the majority suggests in its discussion of the legislative history of the determinate sentencing law of which section 3041 is a part. There was the concern that the indeterminate sentence “gave inmates no advance hope of a fixed date for release, thus actually promoting disciplinary *1106problems within the prisons.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1088, citing Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 6-13.) There was also no doubt a concern with expending large sums of taxpayer money to keep in prison someone who has served his sentence and poses little risk to the public, as well as humanitarian concerns. The legislative scheme of normally and uniformly granting parole dates to those convicted of second degree murder reflects this legislative balancing of various concerns, which the majority, following the Board, ignores.
It is perhaps possible that the majority endorses the Board’s way of conducting parole release because it seeks to avoid the undesirable result of the mass release of convicted murderers. I do not believe such mass release or anything like it will occur for several reasons. First, the approach of the Court of Appeal below and in Ramirez, quite properly, is to remand to the Board to require it to proceed in a correct manner, not necessarily to set a parole release date, as the trial court in this case would have done.
Second, and more fundamentally, the Board is still given a great deal of power under the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the statute. Its power comes from two sources. First, section 3041(a) gives it broad rulemaking authority for setting uniform, proportional parole release dates. The Board has established a matrix that appears to comply with the mandate, although it does not use that matrix for parole suitability determinations. The Ramirez court and the Court of Appeal below used the matrix because it reflects the Board’s own effort at establishing a uniform, proportional parole release date scheme consistent with the intent of section 3041(a). But the Board is free to amend the current matrix if it reasonably believes that the sentences given therein, ranging from 15 to 21 years for second degree murderers, are too brief to protect the public. Second, the Board has the authority to interpret and apply its regulations. Here again, it is afforded great discretion, subject only to a “some evidence” standard, as well as to the constraint that it not proceed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. (See Ramirez, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 563-564.) Third, as noted, there are and will be numerous instances in which the Board’s parole suitability decision will be legitimately based in whole or part on matters other than the commitment offense, such as misconduct in prison and lack of realistic parole plans. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402.)
It should be emphasized that ranking the gravity of the commitment offense is no extraordinary task. In fact, the Board already applies its own *1107matrix to determine the seriousness of the offense when it sets a parole date. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2403.) Under the Board’s matrix, for example, a second degree murder resulting from an indirect cause like a heart attack, and in which the victim was an accomplice, would rank among the least serious crimes, while a murder “calculated to induce terror in the victim” that was committed by someone with no personal relationship to the victim, would rank among the most serious. (Ibid.) Moreover, this kind of ranking of an offense based on aggravating and mitigating factors is what trial judges routinely are asked to do in making sentencing decisions. (See § 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Ct., Rules for Criminal Cases in the Superior Court, rule 4.413 [factors for determining base terms in determinate sentences]; id., rules 4.420-4.423 [factors for determining eligibility for probation].) There is no reason to believe the Board would be unable to fulfill its statutory obligation.
The majority argues that the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in this case and in Ramirez would require “intercase comparisons in every parole matter” that “would contribute significantly to backlogs .... Such a process seems likely to convert each proceeding into a comparative review of every proceeding.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1093-1094.) I disagree. Intercase comparisons are not required by section 3041, nor are they inherent in the principle of judicial review of parole suitability decisions. (Cf. former § 1170, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 1977, ch. 165, § 15, p. 649 [requiring comparative review of determinate sentences].) All that is mandated is for the Board to follow its own regulations ranking the relative gravity of the crime committed, according to aggravating and mitigating circumstances that the Board itself has defined. Of course, under any interpretation of section 3041, a prisoner is free to argue that he or she should be granted parole based on parole granted in comparable cases. But as long as there is some evidence that the Board has complied with its own reasonable regulations, its decision denying a parole date should be upheld.
Several additional arguments made by the majority merit brief mention. First, the majority argues legislative acquiescence, particularly with regard to the 2001 amendments to section 3041 that adopted certain procedural changes to deal with the large backlog in the parole hearing system. Legislative acquiescence is the proverbial “weak reed,” except when it is clear, or can be implied, that a particular administrative construction of a statute has come to the Legislature’s attention. (See Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 226, 235 fn. 7 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 825 P.2d 767].) In Robinson, for example, the Legislature was presumed to be aware of certain *1108precedential, published decisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. (Ibid.) The precise issue raised by this case—whether a prisoner could be denied the setting of a parole date in accordance with section 3041(a) based on a commitment offense that was not particularly egregious when compared to other offenses of the same class—was not the subject of any administrative or judicial decision until Ramirez discussed it at the end of 2001, after the enactment of the 2001 amendments. It is significant that Ramirez disapproved of no other Court of Appeal decision, no formal administrative decision, and no administrative rule. Rather, it disapproved of an administrative practice implicated in the case before it. There is no particular reason to believe the Legislature was focusing on that practice when it enacted the 2001 amendments or prior amendments to section 3041.
Second, the majority argues deference to administrative interpretation. The short response to this argument is that administrative practice or regulation inconsistent with its authorizing statute cannot stand, and courts must exercise their independent judgment to determine whether the administrative agency’s practice or regulation complies with statute. (California Assn, of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 11 [270 Cal.Rptr. 796, 793 P.2d 2].) Moreover, deference is particularly owing when the statutory interpretation implicates administrative agency expertise. (See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12-13 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031].) There is no indication that the Board exhibits particular expertise regarding which prisoners constitute a threat to public safety or are otherwise suitable for parole. In this case, in fact, the record shows the Board disregarded the un contradicted findings of the experts who had evaluated Mr. Dannenberg.
Third, the majority discusses several statutes requiring notification to various parties of a parole hearing and providing them opportunity for input on parole decisions. The majority concludes that “these laws emphasize that the first responsibility of the parole authorities is to evaluate the suitability of an individual inmate for safe release . . . .” (Maj. opn, ante, at p. 1086.) But there is nothing incompatible about on the one hand requiring the Board to follow its own regulations defining when a commitment offense is particularly egregious, and on the other hand allowing the Board to consider information provided by the public relevant to a parole suitability determination. Nor is there anything incompatible about the Board following section 3041(a) and gubernatorial review of the Board’s parole decision. Indeed, as Rosenkrantz makes clear, the Governor, like the Board, may not deny parole based solely on a commitment offense that is not “particularly egregious.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683.)
*1109Turning to the present case, I agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeal that the Board’s determination of Dannenberg’s unsuitability for parole cannot be sustained. As the Court of Appeal below stated: “The Board makes no attempt to justify its decision with reference to the gravity of Dannenberg’s crime as compared with other second degree murders, or the proportionality of the term he has served. Thus, the denial of a parole release date for Dannenberg was arbitrary in the sense that the Board failed to apply the controlling legal principles to the facts before it. [Citations.] (Ramirez, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 571.)”
Moreover, Dannenberg’s present record is not only unblemished in terms of disciplinary infractions, but also showed many positive signs of contribution to the prison community in which he lived—including being a helpful resource to other prisoners and prison staff, fixing the electrical wiring in San Quentin Prison, and volunteering with an inmate education advisory committee and a Jewish religious group for prisoners. His advanced education in electrical engineering, advanced years (61 at the time the trial court considered his habeas corpus petition, 64 now), realistic parole plans, and consistently favorable psychological evaluations, all weigh in his favor.
In light of these facts, it is understandable that the Board sought some reason other than the commitment offense to justify the denial of a parole release date. It found this in the boilerplate declaration that Dannenberg needed more therapy “to face, discuss, understand and cope with stress in a nondestructive manner.” As the trial court concluded, this finding is “entirely without foundation in the record. Indeed, all the evidence is to the contrary.” This gaping hole in the Board’s explanation of its decision does not, as the Court of Appeal below remarked, “inspire judicial confidence that the Board has given the parole application ‘something more than mere pro forma consideration.’ ”
In sum, the Legislature has established a system for prisoners to obtain parole according to a uniform, proportional system designed by the Board. This court has recognized a parole applicant’s constitutional right to due consideration. The Board has failed to comply with that statutory mandate, and perhaps the constitutional one as well. The majority places this court’s imprimatur on that failure. Because of the nature of the parole process, there is more than a little risk that the Board’s power to deny parole will at times be exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Failure to grant parole where parole is due wastes human lives, not to mention considerable tax dollars, concerns that, along with public safety, unquestionably motivated the Legislature when it enacted section 3041. This court should not abdicate its responsibility to ensure that the Board lives up to its statutory and constitutional obligations.
*1110I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 23, 2005. Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., and Moemo, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

 In Rosenkrantz, we found that certain circumstances of the offense, per se, constituted egregious conduct in comparison to other second degree murders, i.e., there was considerable evidence that the crime was committed with premeditation and deliberation sufficient for a finding of first degree murder. (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 678-679.)

 It is true that the majority plucks the phrase “minimally necessary” from Rosenkrantz. But, as quoted above, that phrase appears in Rosenkrantz in a passage that recognizes the Board’s obligation to normally, uniformly and proportionally set parole dates. (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683.) The unmistakable meaning of the Rosenkrantz court in that context was that a second degree murder commitment offense cannot by itself be the basis for the denial of parole unless it is “particularly egregious” for a second degree murder, so that “the Board’s case-by-case rulings [would not] destroy the proportionality contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a) . . . .” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 683, quoting Ramirez, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 570.) In other words, the phrase “minimally necessary” makes sense in the context in which it is used in Rosenkrantz, but not when it is taken out of context by the majority.