Court Opinion

ID: 9630412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:10:39.259337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:38.197059
License: Public Domain

ALMA WILSON, Justice,
dissenting in part II:
We are called upon to give meaning to the term “pro rata” within the context of Oklahoma’s contribution statute, 12 O.S. 1981 § 832. Our construction of this troublesome word will determine how contribution between multiple tortfeasors should be allocated.
Reference to various dictionaries and other persuasive authorities indicates that pro rata is synonymous with the term proportionate.1 Proportionate is commonly understood to mean a method of division according to one’s degree of interest or liability. Applying this definition each tort-feasor is liable in contribution for only his degree of fault. The proportionate method of dividing liability in contribution is coined as comparative contribution. Yet, within the context of the law of contribution the term pro rata has traditionally taken on a different meaning. Traditionally, pro rata means a division of liability in equal shares, that is, the allocation of liability in contribution cases is arrived at by dividing the damages by the number of tortfeasors without regard to their respective degrees of fault.2 Furthermore the term contribution as traditionally used refers to distribution in equal shares.3 Exhaustive research unveils the fact that the terms “pro rata” and “proportionate” as used within the context of the law of contribution are not synonymous. In fact, the two terms are used to apply different methods of calculation rendering different results.
To complicate matters, some jurisdictions adhere to the traditional method of dividing liability in equal shares. A modern trend is toward comparative contribution. Ironically the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (hereinafter the “Act”)4 provided for comparative contribution as an optional, not mandatory, legislation. Whereas the 1955 version of the Act specifically provides that the tort-feasor’s relative degrees of fault shall not be considered when determining the distribution of common liability.5 One stops to query why the Act was changed from the modern trend to the traditional method. The reasoning behind the modern trend is to attain fairness. Advocates of comparative contribution maintain that it is more inherently fair for tortfeasors to be liable only for their relative degrees of fault.6 Yet, the traditional method may well be more inherently fair as the drafters of the 1955 Act ably demonstrate in the comments to § 2 of the Act. For example, applying comparative contribution, is it fair for the tortfeasor who has settled the whole to bear the share of the insolvent tortfeasor?7 Of course not. Nor is it fair to require two tortfeasors to equally split their liability when one is 1% at fault and the other 99% at fault. Both methods of allocating common liability seek fairness, the guiding light of equity.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts 2d (1979) completely avoids the use of the terms pro rata and proportionate. Instead the Restatement § -886A(2) states that “[n]o tortfeasor can be required to make contribution beyond his own equitable *61share of liability.” In the comments to the Restatement, the drafters state at page 338 that “[contribution is a remedy that developed in equity” and that “when there are three tortfeasors and one of them is clearly insolvent or is beyond the jurisdiction, the amount of contribution fairly allowable between the other two may reasonably be affected and the court may be expected to do what is fair and equitable under the circumstances.” Id. at 339. The drafters, of the Restatement go on to note in the comments that there are two methods of assessing equitable shares (pro rata and comparative contribution). Under both methods, situations may call for some variation. Specifically the drafters state “[i]f the tortfeasor’s equitable share turns out to be uncollectible it should be spread proportionately among the other parties at fault.” Id. at 340-41.
The wisdom and fairness of both methods of allocation of common liability in contribution are sound. However, it is not the role of the judiciary to substitute its wisdom for that of the legislature. In spite of the apparent ambiguity of the use of the term pro rata, the diversity among jurisdictions and the wisdom and fairness claimed by advocates of both methods, I am compelled to construe Oklahoma’s contribution statute’s use of the term pro rata to mean the traditional and equal distribution of liability among tortfeasors regardless of degree of fault. I so .conclude because it would be difficult to fathom that our legislature was not enlightened as to the controversy between the use of the two terms and their respective differing methods of calculation and results. All authority researched has noted the controversy and I am therefore compelled to determine that our legislature was cognizant of the difference and chose the term pro rata. I cannot agree with the majority that pro rata and proportionate are snyonymous. Nor can I agree that our legislature meant proportionate when it legislated pro rata. I therefore dissent to Part II.

. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1098 (5th ed. 1979); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1820 (1961); Words and Phrases and cases cited therein.

. 1 S. Speiser, C. Krause, A. Gans, The American Law of Torts §§ 3:23, 3:24 (1985), 53 ALR3d 184.

. Prosser and Keeton on Torts §§ 50, 51 (5th ed. 1984).

. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 2(4) 12 U.L.A. 57 (1939).

. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 2 12 U.L.A. 87 (1955).

. See footnotes 2 and 3.

. The inequities of comparative negligence come to light only in prejudgment situations if the share of the insolvent tortfeasor is not distributed among the remaining solvent tort-feasors.