Court Opinion

ID: 9966196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 14:07:12.208819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:44.655699
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1760-22

ELIZABETH R. SCHREIBER and
JUSTIN SCHREIBER, her husband,

          Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, KENNETH T. KEYWORTH
and NICOLAS A. VAZQUEZ,

     Defendants-Respondents,
_______________________________

NICOLAS A. VAZQUEZ,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KENNETH T. KEYWORTH and
ELIZABETH R. SCHREIBER,

     Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________

ERICA I. PORTAL,
      Plaintiff,

v.

KENNETH T. KEYWORTH,

      Defendant,

and

ELIZABETH R. SCHREIBER,

      Defendant/Third-Party
      Plaintiff,

v.

NICOLAS A. VAZQUEZ,

     Third-Party Defendant.
_______________________________

            Submitted March 12, 2024 – Decided May 6, 2024

            Before Judges Paganelli and Whipple.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Bergen County, Docket Nos. L-4764-19, L-
            3401-20 and L-3405-20.

            Chazen and Chazen, LLC, attorneys for appellant
            (David K. Chazen, on the briefs).

            Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
            respondents New Jersey Department of Treasury and
            Kenneth T. Keyworth (Sara M. Gregory, Assistant
            Attorney General, of counsel; Jae K. Shim, Deputy
            Attorney General, on the brief).

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                                     2
PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Nicolas A. Vazquez appeals from a January 17, 2023 order

granting defendants New Jersey Department of the Treasury, State of New

Jersey, and Kenneth T. Keyworth summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's

personal injury action under the New Jersey Tort Claim Act (TCA), N.J.S.A.

59:1-1 to :12-3. We affirm.

      We glean the facts and procedural history from the motion record.

Plaintiff alleges he sustained personal injuries when his vehicle was struck from

the rear by defendants' dump truck. He claims MRIs revealed cervical and

lumbar disc herniations and bulges. His pain management physician opined

these injuries "c[ould ]not be reversed and/or restored to a normal state of

function and anatomy" and while "[s]ymptoms may be alleviated by another pain

management intervention or surgical intervention . . . [it would] do nothing to

the underlying pathology and that area will not heal to function normally."

      The pain management physician further opined plaintiff's "pain and

pathology are [a] direct consequence" of the motor vehicle accident and "all

injuries are direct results of the current accident."

      As a result of the accident and claimed injuries, plaintiff contended he:

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            c[ould] no longer, by way of example but not by way of
            limitation, engage in: cycling, hiking, swimming,
            jogging, working out at gym, housecleaning, yard
            work, heavy lifting, motorcycle riding. . . . [Also] as a
            result of these injuries [he wa]s limited, by way of
            example but not by way of limitation, in engaging in:
            difficulty getting out of bed, getting dressed, walking,
            standing, sitting, driving, difficulty getting up from the
            floor, difficulty grocery shopping, difficulty studying
            and advancing career, constant pain and limitations
            affect all daily living activities, difficulty sleeping,
            sexual activity [wa]s less vigorous and frequent due to
            pain and physical limitations.

      Plaintiff testified he lived with his grandmother and "t[ook] care of

everything around the house for her." He explained "taking care of a [ninety]-

year-old can have all of its challenges"; he helped her a lot; and he was her

"primary care[giver]" doing the best he could. He also explained they shared

the cooking and cleaning duties.

      Plaintiff stated he was employed on the date of the accident. He "worked

different positions within the business from waiter to bartender" to "working in

the kitchen." Because of the accident, he missed two weeks of work. When he

returned to work, he "stopped [performing] the multi-role" and "stuck to being

a bartender." He explained being a bartender involved less movement; his co-

workers helped him with tasks; and he adapted by carrying plates using a very

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large tray. He noted while he "performed everything through pain," he "needed

to work."

      Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendants' negligence caused his

injuries and he sought damages. After the completion of discovery, defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiff's claims under

the TCA.

      In a written opinion, the judge considered whether plaintiff "sustained a

permanent, substantial loss of bodily function pursuant to the" TCA. The judge

reviewed plaintiff's: moving papers; expert's report; testimony; and answers to

interrogatories. Moreover, the judge gave plaintiff all reasonable inferences but

could "not find that [p]laintiff ha[d] demonstrated an objective permanent injury

and a permanent loss of bodily function."

      Instead, the judge noted plaintiff's assertion that he was

            unable to perform certain tasks and/or engage in certain
            activities without experiencing some level of pain. . . .
            such as running, hiking, swimming, exercising, and the
            like because of complaints of pain.           Plaintiff's
            impairments appear[ed] to be limited to participating in
            activities or performing tasks such as cleaning his
            home.

      The judge found:

            [p]laintiff's reduced ability or function when engaging
            in those activities d[id] not rise to the level of

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              permanent and substantial injury as [wa]s required by
              the TCA.         Plaintiff's subjective complaints of
              experiencing a sensation of pain when he engages in
              certain activities or performs certain tasks d[id] not rise
              to the level of a permanent loss of a bodily function.
              Th[e] [c]ourt note[d] that the record [wa]s clear with
              respect to what [p]laintiff ha[d] stated he can and
              cannot do, but there ha[d] been no demonstration of
              anything other than pain that [p]laintiff experiences
              when he engages in certain activities.

      Ultimately, the judge found "[p]laintiff[']s impairments [we]re limited to

an ability to participate in activities rather than a permanent loss of a bodily

function."

      On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge "erred in finding that [he] did not

sustain a permanent, substantial loss of bodily function pursuant to the [TCA]."

We disagree.

      We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

legal standards as the trial court. Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529

(2019).      Thus, we consider "whether the competent evidential materials

presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are

sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in

favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.

520, 540 (1995); see R. 4:6-2. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we

must then "decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law."

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DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super.

325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted). Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J.

463, 478 (2013).    "The factual findings of a trial court are reviewed with

substantial deference on appeal, and are not overturned if they are supported by

'adequate, substantial and credible evidence.'" Manahawkin Convalescent v.

O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 115 (2014) (quoting Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of

Warren, 169 N.J. 282, 293 (2001)).

      In adopting the TCA, the Legislature declared "the public policy of this

State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the

limitations of [the TCA]." N.J.S.A. 59:1-2. Therefore, "[a]pplication of the

summary judgment standard . . . must . . . account for the fact that under the

TCA, 'immunity [of public entities] from tort liability is the general rule and

liability is the exception.'" Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State Parkway,

249 N.J. 642, 655-56 (2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting Garrison v.

Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 286 (1998)).

      N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) provides "[n]o damages shall be awarded against a

public entity or public employee for pain and suffering resulting from any

injury; . . . [except] in cases of permanent loss of a bodily function, permanent

disfigurement or dismemberment." To satisfy N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) a plaintiff

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must show "(1) an objective permanent injury, and (2) a permanent loss of a

bodily function that is substantial." Gilhooley v. Cty. of Union, 164 N.J. 533,

540-41 (2000) (citing Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 402-03 (1997)). The

analysis is fact sensitive. Id. at 541. There is "no per se rule that would be

decisive in all cases." Knowles v. Mantua Twp. Soccer Ass'n, 176 N.J. 324, 331

(2003) (citation omitted). "[I]t is the nature or degree of the ongoing impairment

that determines whether a specific injury meets the threshold requirement under

the [TCA]." Ibid.

      Under the second prong of Gilhooley/Brooks1 "there must be a 'physical

manifestation of [a] claim that [an] injury . . . is permanent and substantial.'" Id.

at 332 (alterations in original) (quoting Ponte v. Overeem,171 N.J. 46, 54

(2002)).

      In Knowles, the Court illustrated two cases, Brooks and Ponte, where

plaintiffs failed to establish a permanent, substantial loss of a bodily function.

Id. at 333. Brooks and Ponte are substantially similar to the matter here. The

Court explained "the plaintiffs in Brooks and Ponte complained that their

1
   The judge's opinion did not address the first prong of the Gilhooley/Brooks
test—an objective permanent injury. The Department contends the judge
"properly determined that [plaintiff] failed to meet the second prong of the
Brooks test." Therefore, we offer no opinion on the first prong and focus our
attention, as the judge did, on the second prong.
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                                         8
injuries left them unable to perform certain tasks without pain, but the injuries

were not severe enough or verifiable enough to constitute a 'permanent loss of a

bodily function.'" Ibid. (citing Brooks, 150 N.J. at 406; Ponte, 171 N.J. at 54).

      "Brooks was decided in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff's daily

activities, although painful, were not substantially precluded by her injuries."

Ibid. (citing Brooks, 150 N.J. at 406). In "Ponte[,] plaintiff . . . was able to

return to his former athletic activities and yardwork, albeit with some

restrictions." Ibid. (citing Ponte, 171 N.J. at 50-51). Brooks and Ponte stand

for the proposition that "[a]n injury causing lingering pain, resulting in a

lessened ability to perform certain tasks because of the pain, will not suffice

because '[a] plaintiff may not recover under the [TCA] for mere 'subjective

feelings of discomfort.'" Id. at 332 (second alteration in original) (quoting

Brooks, 150 N.J. at 403).

      Applying these principles, we are satisfied the judge correctly found there

was no objective evidence that plaintiff's injuries were permanent and

substantial. As the judge concluded, plaintiff experienced a "limited ability to

participate in activities, rather than a permanent loss of function"; "reduced

ability or function"; and "sensation of pain [that] d[id] not rise to the level of

permanent loss." In his appellate brief, plaintiff acknowledges "his capacity to

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                                        9
perform the activity is limited and leaves [him] in pain" and "activities requiring

exertion are extremely limited and result in pain and discomfort." Under the

controlling TCA caselaw, these limitations are not a "permanent loss of

function" and are insufficient to maintain a cause of action under N.J.S.A. 59:9-

2(d).

        To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiffs' remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

        Affirmed.

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