Court Opinion

ID: 8754214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 11:39:03.362693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:08.746761
License: Public Domain

SANBORN, Circuit Judge
(concurring). I concur in the result, and in the opinion in this case, with this exception: The opinion contains the statement that it is the general rule in the federal courts relative to the examination of all witnesses, except when the rule is relaxed, as it sometimes is, on grounds of convenience or necessity, that the cross-examination must be limited to the matters testified to upon the direct examination of the witness. I concede the general rule, but I do not understand that it is discretionary with the federal courts to relax the rule, on the ground of convenience or necessity, so far as to permit a cross-examiner to cross-examine a witness, produced by his opponent, *697upon subjects not germane to those upon which he was examined in chief. Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co. (C. C. A.) 129 Fed. 668; Houghton v. Jones, 1 Wall. 702, 706,17 L. Ed. 503; Montgomery v. Ætna Rife Ins. Co., 97 Fed. 913, 916, 38 C. C. A. 553, 557; Safter v. U. S., 87 Fed. 329, 330, 31 C. C. A. 1, 2; Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Parke & Lacy Co., 107 Fed. 881, 884, 47 C. C. A. 34, 36; 1 Greenleaf, Ev. § 445; Hopkinson v. Leeds, 78 Pa. 396; Fulton v. Bank, 92 Pa. 112, 115. A rule which may be relaxed-by the court when in its opinion it is necessary or is convenient to relax it is no rule at all. Such an exception is the abrogation of the rule, because it leaves its controlling force and effect in every case to the discretion of the trial court. In my opinion the rule has not been so abrogated by the federal courts, and it ought not to be so destroyed. This rule rests upon a sound reason, which varies not, at the discretion of the court, by reason of- convenience or necessity. It exists because a witness during his cross-examination is the witness of the party who calls him, and not the witness of the party who cross-examines. Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich. 452, 458; Campau v. Dewey, 9 Mich. 381. The cross-examiner has the right to bind his opponent by the testimony of the witness upon cross-examination relative to every subject concerning which his opponent examined him in the direct examination. But he has no right to bind his opponent by the testimony of the witness during the cross-examination upon subjects relative to which his opponent did not examine him. If he. would examine the witness upon such subjects, he may and he must make him his own witness, and stand sponsor for the truth of his testimony. It is discretionary with the court to permit the cross-examiner to do this at the time he is conducting the cross-examination, because the time and the manner of the trial are within the discretion of the court. It is discretionary with the trial court to permit leading questions to be put to a hostile witness upon his direct examination. But in the federal courts the line of demarkation which limits a rightful cross-examination is clear and well-defined. It is the line between subjects relative to which the.witness was examined upon the direct examination and those concerning which he was not required to testify. It exists because within that line the party who calls the witness stands sponsor for the truth of his testimony, while without that line he does not. It does not vary with any convenience or necessity of court or counsel, because ho convenience or necessity can be conceived of which would not enable the cross-examiner to make the witness his own and take the chance of his testimony. For these reasons I adhere to the general rule upon this subject, but am unable to concede the correctness of the exception thereto stated in the- opinion.