Court Opinion

ID: 9961749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 18:00:52.012981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:46.550098
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60479      Document: 76-1      Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/19/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                            ____________                           FILED
                                                               April 19, 2024
                             No. 22-60479                     Lyle W. Cayce
                            ____________                           Clerk

Sandra Beatriz Bustamante-Leiva; Jayco David Jovel-
Bustamante; Jean Carlos Jovel-Bustamante; Jonathan
Josue Jovel-Bustamante,

                                                                  Petitioners,

                                  versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                Respondent.
               ______________________________

                  Petition for Review of an Order of the
                      Board of Immigration Appeals
                        Agency Nos. A208 173 147,
                       A208 173 149, A208 173 150,
                               A208 173 151
               ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
      Sandra Beatriz Bustamante-Leiva, and her three children (Jean Carlos
Jovel-Bustamante, Jayco David Jovel-Bustamante, and Jonathan Josue Jovel-
Bustamante) petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial
of their applications for asylum, statutory withholding of removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and protection of removal under the Convention
Against Torture. We DENY their petitions.
Case: 22-60479       Document: 76-1       Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/19/2024

                                 No. 22-60479

                                      I
       Bustamante-Leiva and her three children are natives and citizens of
Honduras. Each was served a notice to appear after entering the United
States illegally near Hildalgo, Texas. Petitioners were then charged with
removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because they did not possess
valid documentation at the time of entry. Petitioners conceded removability
as charged. Bustamante-Leiva then applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and
humanitarian asylum, with the children as riders to her application.
       Petitioners based their claims for relief on claims of persecution on
account of religion, political opinion, and membership in a particular social
group. In doing so, Petitioners proposed five particular social groups: (1)
“unprotected Honduran [w]omen who are viewed as property and
subordinate to the male dominated gangs”; (2) “unprotected Honduran
[w]omen who are unable to protect themselves or [t]heir children from
Honduran gangs”; (3) “Honduran [w]omen, who are involved in religious
activities and a church that strives to proselytize and convert teenagers from
joining gangs, and who are unable to protect themselves or their children
from Honduran gangs”; (4) “a [f]amily that is headed by an unprotected
Honduran [w]oman who is unable to protect herself and her family, including
children, from the Honduran [g]angs itself and the children from Honduran
gangs”; and (5) “Honduran witnesses to witness Honduran gang violence
and threats.”    The application was supported by Bustamante-Leiva’s
testimony and written declaration. It was also supported by the testimony of
her son, Jean Carlos; testimony from experts Arlee Pugh and Dr. Thomas
Boerman; and documentary evidence.
       Bustamante-Leiva based her claims for relief on the following facts:
Beginning around 2012, gang members used an empty lot adjacent to the back

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of Bustamante-Leiva’s home to torture, kill, and bury gang victims.
Bustamante-Leiva stated that the screaming from gang victims was audible
in her home and that smells from the events carried through the walls.
Because the family felt unsafe in this neighborhood but lacked the financial
resources to leave, Bustamante-Leiva’s husband left the family to earn
money in the United States. He made this decision with the goal of earning
enough money for the family to move.
       At the end of 2012, Bustamante-Leiva heard that the gang would begin
recruiting children as young as twelve. Having sons within this age range,
Bustamante-Leiva fled to a city about an hour away with her sons and mother.
Shortly thereafter, Bustamante’s oldest son, Jorge, told his mother that he
was going to go to the United States to help his father earn money.
Unfortunately, however, Jorge was killed during his travels in a train accident
in Mexico. Bustamante-Leiva’s next oldest son, Jean Carlos, later informed
Bustamante-Leiva that the true reason Jorge left for the United States was
because gang members were trying to recruit him.
       Bustamante-Leiva and her remaining children lived in the new city
without issue until April 2015, when a gang member called her and demanded
money. The gang member told Bustamante-Leiva that the gang was watching
her, knew that she lived with only her children and mother, knew when and
where her son Jean Carlos went to school, and knew that her husband was in
the United States. The gang member demanded that she give the gang a sum
of money, which would increase each day that she did not comply. The gang
member then threatened to “chop up [her son] into little pieces” and kill the
rest of the family if she refused to pay.
       In response to the threats, Bustamante-Leiva consulted her pastor,
and the pastor and two of his family members went to Bustamante-Leiva’s
house, where they all prayed together. Bustamante-Leiva stated that she

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received another call from the gang as the group was praying, and she left the
phone on so that the caller could hear their audible prayers. She continued
to get threatening text messages from the gang, and the pastor advised her to
disable her phone and flee.
       After receiving the pastor’s advice, Bustamante-Leiva left with her
children and mother for a family member’s house in another city. Petitioners
stayed with the family member for one week, until the family member began
to fear for her own safety and asked Bustamante-Leiva to leave. At that point,
Bustamante-Leiva and her children left for the United States. Bustamante-
Leiva reported that another family member helped her, the children, and her
mother travel until they reached Mexico. After entering the United States,
Bustamante-Leiva learned that the family member who had helped her was
killed near his house by gang members for helping the family flee Honduras.
       Pugh, a licensed professional counselor, was accepted as an expert on
mental health diagnoses and testified that Bustamante-Leiva suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder and adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety
and depression. The Petitioners offered Dr. Boerman as an expert on gangs
in Honduras, and he testified on that topic.
                                       II
       The immigration judge denied all requested relief and ordered that
Petitioners be removed to Honduras.
       On appeal, the BIA upheld the immigration judge’s findings that
Petitioners did not show harm rising to the level of persecution, did not show
a nexus between the harm and a protected ground, and did not establish a
cognizable particular social group. Regarding their failure to establish a
cognizable particular social group, the BIA determined that the Petitioners
failed to establish the requisite social distinction with respect to their first
four proposed particular social groups and that the final proposed particular

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                                  No. 22-60479

social group, Honduran witnesses to gang violence and threats, was not
cognizable because it lacked the requisite particularity. In addition, the order
rejected due process arguments made by Petitioners and denied their request
for a three-member panel as moot. Petitioners then filed a timely petition for
review in this court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
                                      III
       We review factual findings under the substantial evidence standard
and its legal conclusions de novo. Bertrand v. Garland, 36 F.4th 627, 631 (5th
Cir. 2022). Where the immigration judge’s decision impacted the BIA—as
is the case here—we consider the immigration judge’s decision to the extent
it influenced the BIA. Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 199, 204 (5th
Cir. 2017).
                                      IV
       Petitioners contend that the BIA erred in denying their relief because:
(1) substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s determination that
Petitioners failed to show membership in a cognizable particular social group;
(2) substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s determination that
Petitioners failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus between their harm and
religion; (3) the BIA violated Petitioners’ constitutional rights when it
allowed a single BIA member to render its decision, without referral to a
three-member panel; and (4) the BIA adjudicator failed to act as an impartial
adjudicator in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1).
                                       A
       We begin by considering whether the BIA erred when it determined
that Petitioners failed to show membership in a cognizable particular social
group. We hold that it did not.

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                                 No. 22-60479

       To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show, among other things,
that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). To be cognizable, a particular social
group must be comprised of persons who share an immutable characteristic
that is particularly defined and socially distinct within the society at issue.
See Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2019). A group’s
“immutable characteristics must make the group sufficiently particularized
and socially distinct without reference to the very persecution from which its
members flee.” Jaco v. Garland, 24 F.4th 395, 407 (5th Cir. 2021). Social
distinction “is determined by ‘the extent to which members of a society
perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social
group.’” Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 784, 786 (5th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d 511, 519–20 (5th Cir. 2012)). While
Petitioners identified five proposed particular social groups before the
immigration judge, they only raise two on appeal:            (1) “unprotected
Honduran [w]omen who are unable to protect themselves or [t]heir children
from Honduran gangs;” and (2) “a [f]amily that is headed by an unprotected
Honduran [w]oman who is unable to protect herself and her family, including
children, from the Honduran [g]angs itself and the children from Honduran
gangs.”
       The law of this circuit squarely supports the BIA’s conclusion that the
two proposed particular social groups on appeal are not cognizable due to lack
of social distinction.   In Suate-Orellana v. Barr, this Court held that
“Honduran women who have been targeted for and resisted gang
recruitment after the murder of a gang-associated partner” lacked the
necessary social distinction to qualify as a particular social group. 979 F.3d
1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 2020). Similarly, in Jaco, the Court held that “Honduran
women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships” did not make

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up a particular social group because the proposed group also lacked an
independent social distinction in the community. Jaco, 24 F.4th at 402, 407.
Just as the proposed particular social groups in those cases lacked the
independent social distinction necessary to form cognizable particular social
groups, Petitioners’ proposed particular social groups fall short.
       Indeed, testimony by Petitioners’ own expert witness supports this
holding. While Petitioners allege that Dr. Boerman’s testimony before the
immigration judge adequately supports their position that the proposed
particular social groups described a socially distinct group in Honduras, Dr.
Boerman’s testimony indicated that violence by gangs against women in
Honduras was generally subsumed by the larger phenomenon of gang
violence. Specifically, Dr. Boerman stated that gang violence against women
was “treated essentially as an invisible phenomenon” and that there were
“no specialized programs of any sort to protect women at risk, and it’s just
kind of lost in the shuffle of the larger phenomenon of violence.” In other
words, Dr. Boerman’s testimony goes to show that the proposed particular
social groups are not perceived as socially distinct in the community. It
follows that nothing in the record compels the conclusion that the members
of Petitioners’ two proposed particular social groups are perceived
substantially differently in Honduras from the general Honduran population
who are targeted or harmed by gang members. See Suate-Orellana, 979 F.3d
at 1061.
   To the extent that Petitioners attempt to rely on a broader variation of
their proposed particular social groups than what they raised before the
immigration judge, we reject that attempt.        Petitioners assert that the
operative language in the definitions of their two proposed particular social
groups is: (1) “unprotected Honduran women [and] children;” and (2) “a
family that is headed by an unprotected Honduran woman [who has]
children.” Petitioners then contend that a mother and her children are a self-

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                                 No. 22-60479

evident group whose social distinction is recognized by society almost
universally.   According to Petitioners, the remaining language of their
proposed particular social groups is harmless surplusage that merely repeats
the persecutory conduct that must be proven.
   However, the “operative language” that Petitioners seek to rely on when
making this argument is similar to the language used in the reformulated
particular social groups definitions that Petitioners proposed to the BIA and
that the BIA refused to consider. In deciding to reject the Petitioners’
reformulated particular social groups, the BIA stated that Petitioners’ newly
articulated particular social groups would not be addressed because they were
not advanced before the immigration judge. Id. This decision by the BIA is
consistent with our precedent. The BIA need not consider a claim or issue
raised for the first time on appeal, including a reformulated particular social
group. See Jaco, 24 F.4th at 402; Cantarero-Lagos v. Barr, 924 F.3d 145, 150-
54 (5th Cir. 2019). Thus, because a particular social group consisting simply
of “unprotected Honduran women with children” was not raised before the
immigration judge, the BIA was permitted to decline to address it. See Jaco,
24 F.4th at 402; Cantarero-Lagos, 924 F.3d at 150–54. Given the BIA’s
refusal to address Petitioners’ refined particular social groups, this court’s
consideration of the proposed particular social group here would be
improper.
                                      B
       Second, we consider whether the BIA erred when it determined that
Petitioners failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of religion. We hold that it did not, as the evidence
presented to the BIA does not compel the conclusion that religion was a
central reason for the gang’s purported persecution of Petitioners.

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   In arguing that they are eligible for asylum because they came to the
United States to flee religious persecution, Petitioners rely on Bustamante-
Leiva’s testimony that she was heavily involved in her church and made
efforts to convert young people in order to deter them from joining gangs.
Petitioners further rely on Bustamante-Leiva’s testimony that she left the
phone on so that the gang could hear her praying with others when the gang
first called and threatened her family, and on Dr. Boerman’s testimony that
gangs tend to target church members for being outspoken opponents of
gangs. However, this evidence does not compel the conclusion that religion
was a central reason for the harm by the gang. See Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d
861, 864 (5th Cir. 2009). As we have recognized, “a statutorily protected
ground need not be the only reason for harm, [but] it cannot be incidental,
tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm” for a
petitioner to obtain asylum on the basis of religious persecution. Id. (quoting
Matter of J-B-N & S-M-, 24 I.&N. Dec. 208, 212 (BIA 2007)).
   To the extent religion played any role in the harm to Petitioners, it was at
most incidental to the gang’s goal of economic extortion. See Shaikh, 588
F.3d at 864. This is evident from the fact that the praying that the gang might
have heard through the phone occurred after the gang already initiated its
extortion demands and death threats. In addition, Bustamante-Leiva’s
testimony indicated that she did not have any issues with gangs directly
related to her church involvement. In light of these facts, and because
substantial evidence only requires “that the BIA’s decision be supported by
record evidence and be substantially reasonable,” we hold that substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners failed to show
past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on religion.
Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2002).
                                      C

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        Next, we consider Petitioners’ argument that the BIA violated their
due process rights when it allowed a single BIA member to render its
decision, without referral to a three-member panel. Petitioners’ due process
arguments are identical to those made by another petitioner in a recently
decided case, Mejia-Alvarenga v. Garland, 95 F.4th 319, 326–27 (5th Cir.
2024). Just as we did in that case, we reject Petitioners’ claim.
        Specifically, Petitioners argue that the regulation governing decisions
by a single BIA member, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e), is unconstitutional because it
precludes reversal of immigration judges’ removal orders even when
meritorious issues are raised. While Petitioners correctly assert that single-
member BIA panels do not have the authority to reverse an immigration
judge’s decision unless reversal is plainly consistent with and required by an
intervening change in law, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), (e)(6)(vi), this feature
of the BIA’s case management system does not violate due process. Mejia-
Alvarenga, 95 F.4th at 326.1
                                           D
        Finally, we consider whether the BIA violated its regulatory obligation
to be impartial under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d). Petitioners contend that the BIA
failed to act as an impartial appellate body when the BIA adjudicator did not
require DHS to file briefing and instead “sua sponte decide[d]” issues “on
DHS’s behalf.” However, there is no authority requiring either party to file
briefing before the BIA, and Petitioners’ argument is otherwise legally
insufficient to prove bias.

        _____________________
        1
          To the extent that Petitioners argue that the BIA also committed an abuse of
discretion by not referring her case to a three-member BIA panel pursuant to
§ 1003.1(e)(6), we do not have jurisdiction over that claim for the reasons articulated in
Mejia-Alvarenga. 95 F.4th at 327.

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                                 No. 22-60479

       Petitioners ground their claims concerning the BIA’s failure to act as
an impartial appellate body in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), which requires the
BIA to function as such. However, this argument is unavailing. As we
recently held in Mejia-Alvarenga, the decision not to require the government
to file briefing is consistent with the regulations governing appeals before the
BIA. 95 F.4th at 325. Under the regulations, “[b]riefs may be filed by both
parties.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(f).      Thus, the regulations allow even the
appealing party to forgo filing a brief before the BIA, so long as the party
identifies the reasons for the appeal when filing the notice of appeal. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.3(b). It follows that the single BIA member’s decision not to
require the government to file a brief complies with the regulations.
       Further, even if we were to construe Petitioners’ argument as a due
process concern—instead of one grounded in the Attorney General’s
regulations—Petitioners have still failed to present evidence in support of
their position that the BIA member demonstrated partiality by not requiring
the government to file a brief. Mejia-Alvarenga, 95 F.4th at 326 (citing Wang
v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 2009)).
                                       V
       For these reasons, we DENY the petition.

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