Court Opinion

ID: 9609373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:38.420372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:10.828802
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. I disagree with the majority decision that the trial court committed error in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the habitual offender’s charge against him or in alternatively refusing to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of commercial burglary. The issue of whether the defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of commercial burglary on March 6, 1980 in reliance upon an undisclosed oral agreement between his own attorney and the prosecutor, that he would not be prosecuted as an habitual offender was a disputed factual issue tried to the trial court and which Judge Stowers decided adversely to the defendant. There was testimony from the defendant and his attorney that such promise was made; contradicting such testimony was the testimony of the Prosecutor, that no such promise was in fact made to defendant or his attorney. Where the evidence is clearly in conflict, the credibility of the witnesses and conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the trial court as fact finder and not by an appellate court on review. State v. Lampman, 95 N.M. 279, 620 P.2d 1304 (Ct.App.1980); State v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 795, 626 P.2d 1292 (Ct.App.1979); State v. Santillanes, 86 N.M. 627, 526 P.2d 424 (Ct.App.1974). There was substantial evidence to support the decision of the trial court. The court ruled that it was not convinced that any agreement was ever made regarding a promise not to pursue habitual criminal charges against the defendant. Because there was a conflict in the evidence as to the existence of any such alleged unkept promise, the trial court’s determination of the factual issue against defendant should be controlling. State v. Bloom, 90 N.M. 192, 561 P.2d 465 (1977); State v. Landlee, 85 N.M. 449, 513 P.2d 186 (Ct.App.1973); State v. McKay, 79 N.M. 797, 450 P.2d 435 (Ct.App.1969). In addition to hearing the conflicting testimony of the witnesses at the motion hearing, the trial court also had before it the transcript of the sentencing hearing of defendant on March 6,1980. As shown by the record the court inquired of defendant: The Court: You understand in making this plea that no one can make any promises to you as to what sentence the court will impose. Mr. Jaramillo: Yes. Mr. Lucero: Yes. The Court: Have any promises been made to induce you to plead guilty here today? Has anybody promised you ariything if you enter a plea? Mr. Jaramillo: No. Mr. Lucero: No. * ‡ s(c * * The Court: Are both of you entering this plea freely and voluntarily, without any promises of any kind having been made to you? Mr. Jaramillo: Yes. Mr. Lucero: Yes. The trial court expressly determined there was no undisclosed, unkept promise that was part of the plea agreement, and expressed such finding at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing. Although the existence of the alleged component of the plea bargain was determined adversely to Appellant, the failure to disclose the existence of the. alleged promise to the trial court at the time of the court’s inquiry concerning any promises should constitute hereunder, a waiver under the decision in State v. Lord, 91 N.M. 353, 573 P.2d 1208 (Ct.App., cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297, 1978). In State v. Lord, the rule was stated: “When plea bargaining occurs it ought to be spread on the record and publicly disclosed. Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970). Rule of Crim. Proc. 21 was designed to obtain disclosure. Defendant’s claim, of an unkept promise by the State, is based on his own failure to disclose the alleged promise. Not having made full disclosure to the trial court at the time that inquiry was made concerning the details of the plea bargain, defendant seeks to obtain advantage from his own omission. He may not do so. The nondisclosure waived the claim of an unkept promise by the State. See State v. Garcia, 80 N.M. 466, 457 P.2d 985 (1969); State v. Edwards, 54 N.M. 189, 217 P.2d 854 (1950); State v. Duran, 80 N.M. 406, 456 P.2d 880 (Ct.App.1969). Compare Baird v. State, 90 N.M. 667, 568 P.2d 193 (1977). Santobello v. New York, supra, [404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)]. Defendant did not raise as an issue before the trial court that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Such contention was raised for the first time in this court on appeal. Although ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute fundamental error where properly plead and litigated, State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340 (Ct.App.1979), under the facts of this case, this court should not reverse the trial court’s ruling on the basis of an issue not fully or properly litigated below, or upon an issue not invoked before the trial court, and which is contrary to an express determination by the trial judge who found that no unkept promise existed. To preserve a question for appellate review it must appear from the record that a ruling or decision by the trial court was fairly invoked, or a finding expressly requested. Cf. State v. Kenney, 81 N.M. 368, 467 P.2d 34 (Ct.App.1970); State v. Snow, 84 N.M. 399, 503 P.2d 1177 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 390, 503 P.2d 1168 (1972); see also N.M.R.Crim.App. 308, N.M.S.A., 1978. Because such issue was not properly presented or preserved as an appellate issue and because the trial court found no unkept promise was made, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling below. The judgment of the district judge should be affirmed.