Court Opinion

ID: 9703713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:05:52.909309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:51.403376
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: The brief filed in this case by counsel for the defendant, who also represented the defendant at trial, differs markedly from those usually submitted in death penalty cases. Normally, such briefs raise numerous issues concerning the conviction, the sentence imposed, and the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute. The defendant in this case, however, brings only three questions to our attention. Only five cases are cited in the defendant’s main brief, and the argument portion of that brief comprises only 11 pages. Defense counsel has not raised a single issue relative to the death sentence, even though there is a serious question as to his effectiveness at the penalty phase of trial because he did not call any witnesses in mitigation. The failure to raise this oversight or constitutional objections to the Illinois death penalty statute may preclude the defendant from raising them on review in the Federal courts. In my opinion, a violation of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel is demonstrated on the face of the defendant’s brief. Rather than waiting for this issue to be raised on post-conviction review, I would order new counsel appointed and set the case for a new briefing and argument. On the merits, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. No physical evidence tying the defendant to the crime was produced; indeed, the fingerprints found at the crime scene were not Titone’s. Victim Infelise named Gacho as the one who committed the crimes, but not Titone. The court speculates that perhaps the severely injured Infelise did not know Titone’s name or thought Titone could be traced through Gacho, but an equally likely inference from Infelise’s declaration was that Titone was not involved. The only evidence against the defendant was the testimony of Kathy DeWulf. DeWulf admitted that Gacho told her as soon as he entered her car that they “were going to have to waste” Fratto and Infelise. She made no attempt to leave the car during the 10 minutes they sat outside Gacho’s house. Without compulsion, she followed the vehicle containing the other alleged participants and the victims. At Gacho’s request, she attempted to place his gun in her handbag during the drive, but found it would not fit. DeWulf may well have been an accomplice to the murders since she knowingly supplied the “backup” or getaway car. But whether she was technically accountable for the actions of Gacho, Titone and Sorrentino does not appear to me controlling. She was certainly deeply enough involved to cast significant doubt on a story which tended to place the blame, at least for personally shooting the victims, on Titone and Sorrentino instead of on herself and her boyfriend, Gacho. This is not a case in which the witness has voluntarily gone to the police in order to report her knowledge of and participation in a crime. Rather, some 16 hours after the event, the police came to her house. She was transported to the police station, fingerprinted, photographed, and given Miranda warnings. DeWulf reasonably could have believed that she was under suspicion in the case. I do not understand how, based solely on the testimony of such a witness, the defendant could properly be convicted of murder. In addition, the admission of DeWulfs prior consistent statement, given at the police station, constituted reversible error. As the majority recognizes, “such evidence is admissible to show that [the witness] told the same story before the motive [to testify falsely] came into existence or before the time of the alleged fabrication.” (Emphasis added.) (115 Ill. 2d at 423.) Rather than applying this principle to the evidence introduced here, the court merely accedes to the ruling of the circuit judge, who “apparently concluded that the motive for fabrication did not exist when the statement was made.” (115 Ill. 2d at 423.) I cannot conceive of any motive that DeWulf had to fabricate her trial testimony that did not also exist when she gave her original statement to the police, and the majority has identified none. The defense theory, and the thrust of its cross-examination, was that DeWulf implicated the defendant in order to avoid prosecution herself. Since this motive was present, if anything more forcefully, when she made her original statement to the police the night after the incident, the existence of that statement could not rebut the inference created by the defense that she was lying on the stand and served only to improperly bolster her testimony. Finally, the majority’s reasoning in sidestepping the Doyle issue is disturbing. The court holds that any error in permitting the prosecution to impeach the defendant with his failure to mention his alibi at the police station was of no consequence since in a bench trial the court is presumed to have considered only the properly admitted evidence. That presumption only makes sense, though, if the evidence has been admitted without objection. Here the defendant lodged an objection, and the trial judge overruled it. “If the rule is applied as announced in the majority opinion we would reach the odd conclusion that the trial court is presumed to have disregarded evidence which it specifically believed to be competent ***.” (People v. Clifton (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 112, 115 (Stouder, J., dissenting).) The majority’s approach in effect eliminates the rule of Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240, in bench trials.