Court Opinion

ID: 9827670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:45:27.253684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:33.133997
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We were in error in saying that the value of the four tracts of land, and that Albert Krenz was a party to his father’s scheme to defraud Mrs. Krenz was alleged in appel-lees’ answer. But these errors are immaterial, in that they did not influence our decision. If a scheme to defraud his wife out of her interest in the community estate was concocted by Chris Krenz, in pursuance of which he caused the land to be deeded to Albert, and Albert paid no consideration therefor, it would not matter that he did not know of such fraudulent intent.
[4] Appellants assigned error in submitting this issue, for the reason that it was not pleaded. Where a general charge is given it is error to submit an issue not raised by the pleadings, upon which the jury might have based their verdict, for the reason that it cannot be known that they did not do so. But where a case is submitted on special issues, it does not' matter that an issue is submitted which is not raised by the pleadings, as the court will base its judgment on the findings of the jury on the material issues. The court might have submitted to the jury the issue as to whether or not George Washington cut the cherry tree, and they might have found that he did not, but this would not have been a ground for setting aside the judgment if it followed the verdict as to the material issues raised by the pleadings. This is one of the many reasons why cases should be submitted on special issues.
As to alleging the value of the land, if such land was deeded to Albert by way of advancement, with the knowledge and consent of his mother, and it had been brought into hotchpotch, it would have been necessary to ascertain its value, in order to determine whether or not he was entitled to any additional portion of the community estate, and if so, how much. But if the finding of the jury that this property was deeded to Albert for the purpose of defrauding Mrs. Krenz out of her community interest therein was correct, such lands were community property, and in partition of the same their value would be determined by the commissioners, without regard to the finding by the jury as to such value.
[5] On March 10, 1915, we granted appellants’ motion, for rehearing herein on the *182ground, bf a conflict in tile findings of the Jury on the issues of fraud and of advancements. Upon further consideration, we have concluded that there is no conflict in such findings in the sense that the jury meant them, viz.: That the deeds were executed to Albert without the knowledge or consent of Oharlotte Krenz, and with the intent to defraud her of her community interest in the lands, but that as to Ohris Krenz, he intended them as an advancement and not as a gift to Albert. The jury made a finding that Ohris Krenz intended that certain property received by the daughter Lena should be an advancement to her, and had the questions as to Albert been framed as in the case of Lena, we doubt not that the finding would have been equally as specific. Looking to all of the questions, it is apparent that the court meant the issue of gift or advancements to Albert to apply to the intention of Chris Krenz only, and that the jury so understood. It is the duty of the court to reconcile the answers of the jury, if it can reasonably be done. Jordan v. Morgan, 15 S. W. 599. Chris Krenz being the owner of a half interest in the lands, had the right to have them transferred to Albert to the extent of his interest therein, and if there is a sufficient amount of the community estate remaining, Albert’s title to the four tracts of land will not be disturbed, but in the partition they will be charged up to him at their present value, as determined by the court on the report of the commissioners of partition.
The motion of appellees for a rehearing is granted, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with instructions to proceed with the partition of the community estate of Chris and Charlotte Krenz in accordance with the judgment of said court and our opinion herein.
Motion granted and judgment affirmed.
On Motion for Rehearing by Appellants.
Appellants insist that the rule that hearsay declarations against interest are admissible in evidence is not applicable to this case, and in support of such contention cite Ryle v. Davidson, 102 Tex. page 234, 115 S. W. 30. In that case Mr. Justice Williams, speaking for the court, said:
“The rule of evidence relied on (that hearsay against interest is admissible) is well sustained by the authorities, but no instance of such application of it as is here contended for has been cited or found by us.”
In that case the owner of a tract of land had executed two conveyances to it, one in 1835, and one in '1846. The prior deed was not recorded until 1847. The issue was whether the grantee in the last deed was a purchaser for value, and the question certified was whether the recital in said deed of a cash consideration of $500 was admissible to prove such payment. It was held that it was not. The purchaser under a prior unrecorded deed obtains title to the land subsequently conveyed, but, by force of the registration statute he is estopped from asserting the same against a subsequent purchaser for value without notice. The grantor having parted with his title, the recital of the payment of the purchase money is, as to those not parties or privies to such deed, purely hearsay, and is within the ban of the general rule excluding such testimony.
In the instant case, however, Ohris Krenz had not, from the standpoint of equity, parted with title when he made the declarations given in evidence. While the husband is the active manager of the community estate, and, in the absence of fraud, may dispose of the same as he sees fit, he is in fact but the trustee for such estate and cannot dispose of it in fraud of the rights of his wife, the co-owner thereof. In this case the community funds are clearly traced into the four tracts of land in controversy. This constitutes them community property. The deeds are in the name of Albert, but he paid no consideration therefor, and consequently can urge no defense against the claims of Ohar-lotte Krenz, or of her heirs, that could not have been successfully urged by Ohris Krenz. The declarations proven were against his interest in that the effect of them was to diminish his interest in the unsold portion of the community estate to the value of said four tracts of land.
[6] Appellants insist that inasmuch as Ohris Krenz was the owner of one-half of the community estate, the deeds to Albert conveyed title to one-half of the lands, and therefore, as to such half Albert should be charged, if at all, only the value of such half at the time of the conveyance, and not such value at the time of the trial. Our view is that the deeds to Albert conveyed no equitable title to any portion of the land as against Mrs. Krenz, but that the same became and remained community property, and that before Albert will be allowed to participate in the partition of the remainder of the community estate, he must account for the present value of the four tracts of land of which he becomes the equitable as well as the legal owner by virtue of the partition of said estate.
Eor the reasons stated in our former opinions herein, as well as those stated in this opinion, appellants’ motion for a rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.