Court Opinion

ID: 9522948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:34:03.432543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:22.525150
License: Public Domain

CRAVEN, P. J., dissenting. My colleagues hold that a prior conviction that is pending on appeal is admissible to impeach the defendant-witness. Concurrently it is suggested that if the prior conviction used for impeachment is ultimately reversed or reversed and remanded on appeal, then the “conviction” would be affected as to use for impeachment. This, to me, invites the use of the prior conviction with the possible consequence of having reversible error in two cases rather than one. The statistics issued by the court administrator indicates that in the year 1965 approximately one-third of the criminal cases on appeal in the Appellate Court in Illinois resulted in judgments of reversal or reversal and remandment. Another consequence of the majority holding is to isolate the judgment of conviction by the trial court from the appeal process. This is contrary to the theory of a unified court system wherein an appeal is but a continuation of the proceeding. Indeed, this is expressly so provided by Rule 301 of the new Supreme Court Rules as they relate to civil appeals although not specifically provided in the Rules as applicable to criminal appeals. The ultimate affirmance by the Appellate Court for the Fifth District of the case here used for impeachment does not alter the question presented. We must review the record as it was made in the Circuit Court of Macon County and determine the issues from that record. At the time of the use of the prior conviction, it was pending and unresolved on appeal. The Hoffa case referred to in the majority opinion and the Empire Packing Co. case by the same Court are contrary to a result reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Campbell v. United States, 176 F2d 45. The Court there held that the use of a conviction being appealed to impeach a defendant-witness was improper. The Court stated: “But it seems to us wholly illogical and unfair to permit a defendant to be interrogated about a previous conviction from which an appeal is pending. If the judgment of conviction is later reversed, the defendant has suffered unjustly and irreparably, the prejudice, if any, caused by the disclosure of the former conviction. We therefore hold that the pendency of an appeal prevents the prosecution from proving a previous conviction for impeachment purposes; and that the District Court erred in admitting evidence concerning Campbell’s conviction when his appeal therefrom had not been determined.” By count, the majority of the State decisions appear to hold as does the majority opinion and as was held by the Appellate Court, First District, in the Webb case. This problem is discussed and the cases thereon are collected in a comment found in 6 De Paul L Rev 257. At the time of that article, no Illinois case had decided the point in issue. The author did speculate on the position that Illinois would ultimately take. He stated: “In Illinois, though there are no cases in point, there are strong indications that when the question does arise, it will be decided in accordance with the minority viewpoint. “Illinois is among the strictest states in the matter of the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions to impeach a defendant who takes the stand in Ms own behalf. In addition, Illinois is one of the few states in which a distinction is drawn between a defendant as a witness and a non-party witness. Where this degree of definition is attempted, it is not too highly speculative to allow that the courts will be wary of submitting the rights of a defendant-witness (if not a non-party witness, or the party for whom he appears) to the prejudice which might result from admitting in evidence an appealed conviction.” (Footnotes omitted.) I recognize that there is a substantial difference between a prior conviction on appeal and a prior conviction that has been determined to be void by subsequent habeas corpus proceedings, as was the case in People v. Shook, 35 Ill2d 597, 221 NE2d 290 (1966). In the Shook case this Court had held that the use of a prior conviction that had previously been set aside by a writ of habeas corpus was error. In view of the record, however, we concluded that the error was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal and remandment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admission was prejudicial and reversible. The United States Supreme Court, in Spencer v. Texas, Bell v. Texas and Reed v. Beto, 385 US 554, 17 L Ed2d 606, recently discussed the admissibility into evidence of prior convictions in connection with recidivist statutes in the State of Texas. The discussion in that case, although bottomed on an admittedly different factual situation, is relevant as it relates to the use of prior convictions. The minority opinion by the Chief Justice is critical of the use of evidence of prior convictions. In the dissent, it is pointed out that when the jury learns of prior convictions it might punish an accused without regard to his guilt of the crime currently charged. In the course of the opinion he states: “Of course it flouts human nature to suppose that a jury would not consider a defendant’s previous trouble with the law in deciding whether he has committed the crime currently charged against him. See also Comment, 70 Yale LJ 763 (1961), where the use of prior convictions to impeach a defendant’s credibility is criticized. No Illinois Supreme Court decision has specifically determined that a conviction pending on appeal may be used to impeach a defendant-witness. Many cases may be cited as authority that prior convictions not on appeal may be shown for impeachment. In the absence of judicial compulsion, this Court should not expand the use of prior convictions to permit the use of a conviction pending and unresolved on appeal.