Court Opinion

ID: 9754430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:00:18.459151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:53.383652
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL,
Judge, dissenting.
We learn today that when the police have reasonable articulable suspicion to effect a Terry1 type stop and frisk, *529either an arrest is not an arrest or it is irrelevant whether there has been an arrest. By so holding the majority lays to rest the lamentation, heard more and more in recent years, that only lip service is paid to the “general rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to arrest.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Rather, the majority opinion makes patent that it is no longer necessary that even lip service be paid to this venerable concept. Although merely a small, lone voice crying out in the wilderness, I wish to make it clear beyond cavil that this lone voice, both loudly and vigorously, does protest its unjustified and untimely demise.
“... [N]ot all seizures of the person must be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime.” Florida v. Royer, supra at 498, 103 S.Ct. at 1324 (1983). If there is an articulable suspicion, but not probable cause, that a person has committed, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680-81, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), but see Anderson v. State, 282 Md. 701, 387 A.2d 281 (1978), is committing, or is about to commit a crime, and is dangerous and armed, a stop and frisk for weapons, is justified. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Alfred v. State, 61 Md.App. 647, 655, 487 A.2d 1228 (1985); Gibbs v. State, 18 Md.App. 230, 237-38, 306 A.2d 587 (1973). This applies to a stop and detention of a moving automobile when the occupants are reasonably suspected of being involved in criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The police may, in appropriate circumstances, i.e. when the occupants are reasonably believed to be dangerous, conduct a protective search of the person of the occupants and of the passenger compartment of the car. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480-81, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). *530The stop, as well as the “frisk”, must, of course, be based on specific and articulable facts which justify the actions. Id.; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra. The detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 1325.
On the other hand, “Terry and its progeny ... created only limited exceptions to the general rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to arrest.” Id., 460 U.S. at 499, 103 S.Ct. at 1325. Thus, when the police arrest a person, i.e., take him or her into custody for purposes of charging him or her with a crime, or effect a seizure of the person similar to arrest, regardless of how the seizure is characterized, probable cause must exist in order for the seizure to be valid. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2256, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at 499, 103 S.Ct. at 1324; Trusty v. State, 67 Md.App. 620, 623, 508 A.2d 1018 (1986).
Despite these principles, which it acknowledges, the majority concludes that the police action in the case sub judice did not vitiate an otherwise valid stop and frisk. In effect, the majority says that no arrest was effected and that the seizure made was reasonable under the circumstances. The majority relies upon United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1983); People v. Finlayson, 76 A.D.2d 670, 431 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1391, 67 L.Ed.2d 364 (1981); People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485, 409 N.E.2d 958 cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 582, 66 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); 3 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 9.2(d) (1978 & Supp.1986) and cases therein cited.
*531My disagreement with the majority could not be more basic. The seizure in this case was unquestionably an arrest, see Morton v. State, 284 Md. 526, 397 A.2d 1385 (1979); Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511, 350 A.2d 130 (1976), or a seizure of the person similar to arrest. Dunaway v. New York, supra. The surrounding circumstances and the police action itself provide the proof. Not only was appellant’s car surrounded so as to prevent its movement, but the police approached the car with drawn revolvers, pulled appellant from the car, and placed him face down on the ground. Furthermore, he was guarded by one officer while another searched the passenger compartment of the car. This seizure was not a limited one undertaken for the limited purpose of investigating police suspicion; rather, it was a complete seizure.
In Morton v. State, supra, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was arrested when the defendant was confronted by an officer in a recreational center, was told “to accompany him and to bring his possessions ... ”, and was placed in a patrol car with another officer while the first officer searched for the defendant’s “possessions”. The Court said:
an arrest is the taking, seizing or detaining of the person of another, inter alia, by any act that indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest. On the record before us, Rice’s manual seizure of the appellant and the subsequent restraint of his liberty plainly constituted an arrest ....
284 Md. at 530, 397 A.2d 1385. See also Royer, supra. The facts here are considerably more compelling. But see Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597, 420 A.2d 270 (1980).
The State argues that the police had an articulable suspicion that justified them stopping appellant. It then argues that they also had a reasonable suspicion that appellant was armed and dangerous, a bulge having previously been seen in his shirt; therefore, they continue, the method used to effect the arrest was reasonable under the circumstances. *532While I may agree that there was an articulable suspicion that appellant was armed, which justified a frisk, I cannot agree that the police action under the circumstances was reasonable. Adopting the State's argument is to allow the exception “ ...to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable cause”. Dunaway v. New York, supra, 442 U.S. at 213, 99 S.Ct. at 2257. Neither the Supreme Court nor our Court of Appeals has gone so far. In United States v. Hensley, supra, for example, the police officers approached the car, in which an occupant for whom a “wanted flyer” issued by another police department had been issued, with guns drawn and ordered that individual and another man out of the car; neither was physically removed from, or physically restrained, prior to the search. The “wanted flyer” advised that Hensley was to be considered armed and dangerous. Although the Court found the police actions in approaching the car were reasonable under the circumstances, it noted the briefness of the stop and the reasonableness of the reliance on the flyer as factors. In contrast, the seizure here was considerably more intrusive and the reliance on the observation of the bulge more tenuous. The Court of Appeals in Watkins, has found justification for the use of force in effecting a Terry stop. It did so, however, in a context where the stopping officer had “specific knowledge” that
a fellow police officer was pursuing two suspects reported to be armed; the suspects had eluded the foot patrolman just a few moments before Officer McEntee entered the city block in which they had last been seen; upon entering the block the officer heard the petitioner’s companion yell “run, police,” and observed Watkins run into an alley; and that in response to several calls to halt, the petitioner continued to attempt to evade the officer.
288 Md. at 604, 420 A.2d 270. But see Cole, J., dissenting at 610, 420 A.2d 270. Significantly, the Court recognized the quality and nature of the knowledge possessed by the *533officer may be significant in assessing the officer’s response:
‘There is a difference of significant degree between a report only that a person has a gun in his possession and another report that a person not only has a gun but that he has just used it for the commission of a crime.’ Of course, where the report indicates that the person has used the weapon to menace or threaten or will use the weapon if stopped for questioning ... then the personal and public safety may well mandate a more intensive police intrusion.
Id., at 608, 420 A.2d 270, quoting People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562, 573 (1976).
The cases cited in La Fave, and relied upon by the majority, have not gone so far either. In none of them did the police action rise to the level reached in the instant case. Recognizing the general rule that probable cause is necessary to effect an arrest, the cases stand for the proposition that the display of weapons and other police actions do not necessarily transform a legitimate Terry stop into an arrest, that determination being dependent upon the particular facts there existing, see United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed.2d 92 (1985); United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S.Ct. 1197, 84 L.Ed.2d 342 (1985); United States v. Nargi, 732 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Danielson, 728 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 919, 105 S.Ct. 300, 83 L.Ed.2d 235 (1984); United States v. Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1982); United States v. Harley, 682 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.1982), and the application of certain relevant factors, such as:
*534the number of officers and police cars involved, the nature of the crime and whether there is reason to believe the suspect might be armed, the strength of the officers’ articulable, objective suspicions, the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under observation, and the need for immediate action by the officers and lack of opportunity for them to have made the stop in less threatening circumstances.
Jones, supra, 759 F.2d at 639-40. See also Harley, supra, 682 F.2d at 402. (“The nature of the crime under investigation, the degree of suspicion, the location of the stop, the time of day, the reaction of the suspect to the approach of police are all facts which bear on the issue of reasonableness” of the police conduct.).
A few representative cases are illustrative. The Court in Jones, supra, found that the blocking of the accused’s car and the display of weapons during the course of the stop did not transform the stop into an arrest where the encounter involved only one police car and two officers, the accused had run from the front of an apartment building upon seeing the police officers with a suspected burglar, the accused was in his car with the motor running and the accused went for a gun during the course of the encounter.2 Id., 759 F.2d at 635, 640. Similarly, no arrest was found when weapons were displayed in the stop of an individual suspected of selling drugs, where the accused reached in the back seat of the car as the agents approached the car. Harley, supra, 682 F.2d at 400. Although the question was close, an accused, suspected of being wanted for murder and reported to be heavily armed, was not found to have been arrested even though the police drew and pointed shotguns at him. Merritt, supra, 695 F.2d at 1273.
*535The cases relied upon by the majority are susceptible to the same analysis.2a For example, in Taylor, the Court found the handcuffing and frisking of the defendant for weapons were justified because the police “had strong evidence of drug activity and valid reasons to fear for their safety [they had been informed that prior experience showed the defendant’s codefendant and anyone associated with him, to be dangerous]”, id., 716 F.2d at 709, and because
Twice Pressler had disobeyed an order
to raise his hands, and he made furtive movements inside the truck where his hands could not be seen. At this point Agent Dick found it wise to frisk Pressler for weapons. Because there were two suspects and only two or three officers on the scene, Agent Dick deemed it prudent to have Pressler lie down and be handcuffed during the frisk.
Id. In Finlayson, the lone officer’s conduct in detaining the two defendants at gunpoint until he received additional information was justified where the stop occurred at night, in a deserted industrial area shortly after a holdup at a gas station had been reported. Id. 431 N.Y.S.2d at 848. To like effect, see Chestnut, supra, in which the action of a lone officer, responding immediately to a report of an armed robbery in the vicinity, in stopping a man, who matched the description of the robber, and his two companions, with gun drawn, was found justified.
Other cases have reached a contrary result. In United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.1981), for example, the Court concluded that the blocking of a defendant’s car and the approach by officers with guns drawn constituted *536an arrest which in the absence of probable cause, was unlawful. A similar result was reached in United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.1974). There, police cars surrounded the accused’s automobile and the officers, with guns drawn, ordered the occupants to raise their hands. That conduct was determined to constitute an arrest, not merely an investigatory detention. Because there was no probable cause for the arrest, the accused’s conviction was reversed. See also State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293 (La. 1985).
Turning to the case sub judice, an application of the factors identified in Jones produces a clear result. A number of police officers and cars were utilized to effect the stop; the reason for believing appellant to be armed was somewhat tenuous; and there was no evidence that appellant made any suspicious movements prior to being stopped or removed from the car. Moreover, the timing and the place of the stop and the intensity of the police response militate against a finding that the actions of the police were reasonable. In my view, appellant was arrested and not simply detained for an investigative stop.
There was no probable cause to justify the arrest. The trial judge did not find probable cause. The most damaging observation made by the police was that the license tag on the vehicle was covered on the day before the stop. Appellant was not identified as the person who had been driving the car at that tifne and on the day of the stop, the license tag was not covered.
In the absence of the covered license tag, the police observations are not remarkable and, even considering it, insufficient to rise to the level of probable cause to believe that a conspiracy to rob was in progress. If these observations could be found to be sufficient to constitute probable cause, then the existence of the concept is, at best, illusory.
The trial judge justified the arrest on the basis that probable cause existed to arrest appellant for carrying a *537concealed dangerous and deadly weapon. The “weapon” was a half of a pool cue observed in the front seat of the car.
Art. 27, Sec. 36 (a), provides:
Every person who shall wear or carry any dirk knife, bowie knife, switchblade knife, sandclub, metal knuckles, razor, nunchaku, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever (penknives without switchblade and handguns excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such weapon, chemical mace or tear gas device openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor____
In order for the police to have had probable cause to arrest appellant for violating Art. 27, Sec. 36(a), the arresting officer would have had to have reason to believe: (1) that the pool cue was a dangerous or deadly weapon, and (2) that appellant was carrying or wearing it “concealed” or (3) that appellant was carrying it “openly with intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner.”
The trial judge’s ruling is flawed in two respects. First, assuming for the sake of argument, that it is a dangerous weapon, the pool cue was lying in open view on the front seat; thus, it was not concealed.3 Second, and just as important, neither the evidence nor circumstances support the conclusion that the pool cue was a weapon and, if a weapon, that it was being carried “with the intent or purpose of injuring any person”.
In Dunn v. State, 65 Md.App. 637, 642, 501 A.2d 881 (1985), we explained the meaning of the term “dangerous weapon” as used in § 36(a):
*538[w]hether an object that is not a weapon per se is used, carried or possessed as a weapon on a particular occasion depends upon the surrounding circumstances. If the object, although normally a tool, is closely akin to a weapon, as a knife or an axe, far less proof should be required to persuade one of its character as a weapon on a given occasion than if the object bears little or no resemblance to traditional weapons, as the fingernail file, pen, telephone cord, or piece of string mentioned in the colloquy between Judge Melbourne and defense counsel.
The half pool cue bears little resemblance to a traditional weapon and there was no evidence that appellant intended to use it as a weapon. Moreover, the circumstances did not give rise to any inference that it was intended to be used to injure anyone. In short, there was simply no evidence upon which the court could find probable cause based on appellant’s possession of the pool cue.
Since I conclude that there was, at the moment of arrest, no probable cause for appellant’s arrest, the handgun seized in the search was tainted and, thus, was inadmissible against him. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Trusty v. State, supra, 67 Md.App. at 623, 508 A.2d 1018; DiPasquale v. State, 43 Md.App. 574, 576, 406 A.2d 665 (1979). Similarly, and for the same, reasons, the ring, although seized later, was inadmissible. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence; therefore, the judgment should be reversed.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (A protective search for weapons in the absence of probable *529cause to arrest may be conducted when an officer possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous.)

. While in Jones, the accused was eventually shot by the police, that conduct occurred after the initial stop had been ongoing for some time. The entire encounter lasted between three to six minutes and it was towards the end of the three to six minute period that the accused was shot.

. Michigan v. Summers, supra, is inapposite. There, the Court held that "for Fourth Amendment purposes, ... a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of premises while a proper search is conducted." Id., 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595. No such situation existed here; nor does the State argue that it does. See Taylor, 716 F.2d at 707.

. The trial judge’s and the majority’s rationale for determining it to be concealed is not persuasive. Under their rationale, if one who has an object in his right hand is approached from the left side, from which the object cannot be seen, and if the object be determined to be a deadly weapon, that person has worn or carried a concealed deadly weapon.