Court Opinion

ID: 9828098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:06:01.850261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:05.108939
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/1/23 P. v. Barraza CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B314798

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. TA144705)
                   v.

VINCENT BARRAZA,

    Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

      Jerome J. Haig, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
       In November 2017, defendant and appellant Vincent
Barraza brandished a semiautomatic handgun from the front
yard of his home, fired it at a nearby elementary school, at two of
his neighbors, and at four deputy sheriffs who arrived on the
scene. (People v. Barraza (Jan. 10, 2020; B291988) [nonpub.
opn.].) Defendant then fled back inside his home and a standoff
ensued that resulted in the elementary school being placed on
lockdown. After deputies fired flash bang devices into the home,
defendant surrendered. (Ibid.)
       A jury convicted defendant of four counts of assault with a
firearm on a police officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (d)(1)),
two counts of assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b)), two counts of shooting at an occupied dwelling (§ 246),
and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and
the jury found true various firearm enhancements pursuant to
section 12022.53. (People v. Barraza, supra, B291988.) In a
bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that in 1997, he
suffered a felony conviction for attempted robbery which qualified
as a strike. Before sentencing defendant, the court denied his
motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497 to strike the 1997 conviction, finding defendant
had a “nonstop life of lawlessness” and did not fall outside the
spirit of the Three Strikes law. The court sentenced defendant to
53 years in prison. (People v. Barraza, supra, B291988.)
       While defendant’s direct appeal was pending, Senate
Bill 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) went into effect, giving trial
courts discretion to strike a five-year enhancement for a prior
felony conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 667,
subdivision (a)—a previously mandatory sentencing
enhancement. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, § 1.)

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       In January 2020, a panel of this court affirmed defendant’s
conviction, remanding for the limited purpose of having the
superior court correct two typographical errors in the abstract of
judgment and, in light of the passage of Senate Bill 1393, to allow
the trial court the opportunity to exercise its newly granted
discretion to strike the five-year prior felony enhancement.
(People v. Barraza, supra, B291988.) The remittitur issued
March 20, 2020.
       The postremand hearing took place on July 29, 2020.
Defendant was present with counsel. The court acknowledged
receipt of documentation submitted by defendant regarding work
performed and classes completed during his incarceration and
said it had taken those into consideration. The court then
declined to strike the five-year prior felony enhancement,
incorporating the same reasons previously outlined by the court
in denying defendant’s Romero motion and in imposing the
firearm use enhancements. The court ordered an amended
abstract of judgment to be prepared to correct the typographical
errors.
       Defendant filed in propria persona a petition for writ of
habeas corpus regarding the court’s failure to strike his prior
felony conviction. The court denied the petition.
       By order dated September 14, 2021, we granted defendant’s
application for relief from default for having failed to file a timely
notice of appeal from the July 29, 2020 postremand hearing.
Defendant subsequently filed his notice of appeal indicating the
order appealed from was the “Senate Bill 1393 Re-Sentencing
Hearing.”
       We appointed appellate counsel to represent defendant.
Defendant’s appointed counsel, Jerome J. Haig, filed a brief

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pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) in
which no issues were raised. The Wende brief included a
declaration from Mr. Haig in which he explains that he advised
defendant he would be filing a Wende brief, forwarded the brief
and the record to defendant, and advised him of his rights to file
a supplemental brief and to discharge him as his attorney.
Mr. Haig also stated his availability to brief, upon request, any
issues we may have following our independent review of the case.
       Defendant filed a supplemental brief raising seven issues:
(1) the trial court failed to consider and give proper weight to all
mitigating factors as required by the law as amended by Senate
Bill 1393; (2) the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to
strike the firearm enhancements and the five-year prior felony
enhancement; (3) remand is appropriate to allow the trial court
the opportunity to consider other newly passed legislation,
including Assembly Bill 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (amendments
to Pen. Code, § 654) and Senate Bill 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(amendments to § 1385); (4) ineffective assistance of counsel
during postremand hearing; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel
during trial; (6) this court should reconsider defendant’s sentence
in light of the passage of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020
(Assembly Bill 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.); newly enacted
§ 745); and (7) this court should consider whether defendant
lacked the requisite intent for assault due to voluntary
intoxication.
                            DISCUSSION
       In 2020, we affirmed defendant’s conviction without any
finding of legal error and without vacating any part of the
judgment. We remanded for further proceedings only because of
the passage of Senate Bill 1393 during the pendency of the

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appeal, and to allow for two typographical errors in the abstract
of judgment to be corrected. Our limited remand did not
implicate the full resentencing rule. (See, e.g., People v.
Cervantes (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 326, 330–332.) The trial court
on remand had jurisdiction only to carry out our directions as set
forth in the opinion and remittitur. (People v. Ramirez (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64; accord, Cervantes, at p. 332.)
       At the July 29, 2020 postremand hearing, the trial court
acknowledged the narrow scope of the proceedings and after
hearing argument from counsel, chose not to strike the five-year
felony prior and did not resentence defendant. Defendant
continues to serve his original sentence as pronounced in 2018.
(Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1255 [“if,
after a limited remand involving the sentence, ‘the trial court
decide[s] not to exercise its discretion to modify the original
sentence, that sentence would remain in effect, and the defendant
need not be resentenced but should be remanded to continue
serving the term previously imposed’ ”]; see also People v. Walker
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 204–205.)
       In his supplemental brief, defendant first contends the trial
court erred by failing to consider all mitigating factors before
declining to strike the five-year prior felony enhancement.
Nothing in the record supports this contention. Judge Coen was
the judge who presided over the trial and original sentencing in
2018. At the start of the postremand hearing, Judge Coen stated
he had read the record, the appellate opinion in defendant’s
direct appeal and the packet of information submitted by
defendant regarding his work history and classes completed
while incarcerated. The court heard argument from counsel and
then declined to strike the five-year felony enhancement based on

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the factors previously discussed and relied upon by the court in
denying defendant’s Romero motion and in imposing
enhancements—factors which the court still found relevant and
compelling. Defendant has not shown the court failed to consider
any mitigating factors.
      Defendant’s second and seventh issues do not relate to the
court’s decision at the postremand hearing and are therefore
outside the scope of this appeal. The issues could only have been
raised on direct appeal. In fact, defendant did challenge the
court’s imposition of the enhancements on direct appeal and we
rejected his arguments. (People v. Barraza, supra, B291988.)
      Defendant’s fourth and fifth issues concern the alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel, both during trial and during the
postremand hearing in 2020. Defendant’s claims are
inadequately presented and stated in a conclusory fashion. Any
such claim should be raised, if at all, by way of a petition for writ
of habeas corpus. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264,
266–267.)
      Defendant’s third and sixth issues concern new legislation
that has been passed since the postremand hearing occurred,
including Senate Bill 81 and Assembly Bills 518 and 2542.
      Senate Bill 81 amended Penal Code section 1385, adding,
as relevant here, a new subdivision (c). (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)
However, the statutory language expressly states that “[t]his
subdivision shall apply to all sentencings occurring after
January 1, 2022.” (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(7), italics added.)
Defendant’s sentencing predated the enactment of the statute
and does not provide defendant a basis for any relief.
      Assembly Bill 518 amended Penal Code section 654,
removing the requirement for a sentencing court to impose the

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longest term. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) Courts have concluded
the new statutory language applies retroactively to all
convictions not yet final on appeal. (See e.g., People v. Sek (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673.) However, defendant’s conviction is
final as it was affirmed on appeal in 2020 and defendant did not
seek further review. On remand, the trial court did not
resentence defendant and his original sentence remains intact.
(Peracchi v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1255.)
         Assembly Bill 2542, otherwise called the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020, prohibits state criminal prosecutions and
sentences based on race, ethnicity or national origin.
(Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5; Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a).)
Defendant asks this court to reconsider his sentence in the first
instance based on the new law. Whether defendant has any
claim under the Racial Justice Act is not properly before us.
Penal Code section 745, subdivision (b) plainly states that where,
as here, judgment has already been imposed, a defendant “may
file . . . in the trial court . . . a petition for writ of habeas corpus”
and seek to make a prima facie showing that his sentence is
improperly based on race, ethnicity or national original as
contemplated by the statutory scheme.
                               DISPOSITION
         The trial court’s order of July 29, 2020 is affirmed.

                          GRIMES, Acting P. J.
      WE CONCUR:

                          WILEY, J.           VIRAMONTES, J.

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