Court Opinion

ID: 9819251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:21:03.207862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.683370
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: The majority decision is contrary to the supreme court’s recent decision in Novak. I respectfully dissent and would reverse for a new trial so that the jury could be instructed on theft as a lesser included offense of residential burglary. The majority correctly notes that in Dace, the supreme court found that the trial court should have given a tendered instruction on theft where (1) the information charged the specific intent to commit theft, and (2) the offense of theft was proved by the evidence adduced at trial. Dace, 104 Ill. 2d at 102-03, 470 N.E.2d at 996. The majority then suggests that Dace was wrongly decided because it impermissibly "fused the two steps” of the "charging instrument” approach adopted by Novak. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 860. I disagree. Although Dace did not refer to the "charging instrument” approach by name, it nevertheless applied the same two-step analysis of the "charging instrument” approach. That Dace applied the "charging instrument” approach is not surprising; Novak stated that the "charging instrument” approach was a rule whose lineage could be traced back to Earll v. People, 73 Ill. 329, 332-33 (1874). Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 112, 643 N.E.2d at 772. Subsequent to Dace, but prior to Novak, the supreme court declared that theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary. Schmidt, 126 Ill. 2d at 184, 533 N.E.2d at 900. The Schmidt court provided no rationale for its departure from Dace. Indeed, the court suggested that there was no inconsistency between the two decisions. The Schmidt court wrote: "In concluding that where an accused is charged with a single offense he cannot be found guilty of an offense not charged unless it is a lesser included offense, we are not unaware of [Dace], We would observe that in Dace the fundamental question just stated was not presented to or considered by the court.” Schmidt, 126 Ill. 2d at 184-85, 533 N.E.2d at 901. Recognizing, however, that Dace and Schmidt are fundamentally incompatible, this court held that Schmidt implicitly overruled Dace. People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320-21, 564 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1990). Likewise, in People v. Buress, 259 Ill. App. 3d 217, 630 N.E.2d 1143 (1994) (Buress I), the first district concluded that Dace was no longer good law after Schmidt. Accordingly, the Buress I court concluded that a defendant charged with burglary is not entitled to a theft instruction. Buress I, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 228-29, 630 N.E.2d at 1150. As noted above, the Schmidt court provided no analysis of the relationship between burglary and theft. The court merely cited People v. Baker, 57 Ill. App. 3d 401, 372 N.E.2d 438 (1978), for the proposition that theft was not a lesser included offense. Schmidt, 126 Ill. 2d at 183-84, 533 N.E.2d at 900. Baker reasoned that theft was not an included offense of burglary because "each offense has elements not included in the other offense,” i.e., burglary requires an entry into a building and theft requires the taking of property. Baker, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 405, 372 N.E.2d at 441. Baker applied the "abstract elements approach,” which "requires only a textual comparison of criminal statutes” to determine whether one offense is included in another. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 110-11, 643 N.E.2d at 771. Novak expressly rejected the harsh and mechanical "abstract element” approach for the more flexible "charging element” approach. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 111-12, 643 N.E.2d at 772. Schmidt therefore belongs to a lineage that was disavowed by Novak. The supreme court ordered the first district to reconsider Buress I in light of Novak. People v. Buress, 158 Ill. 2d 555, 643 N.E.2d 839 (1994) (supervisory order). On remand, the first district applied the "charging instrument” approach to conclude that theft was a lesser included offense of burglary where the information alleged that the defendant had the specific intent to commit theft, and the State’s evidence established that defendant committed theft. Buress, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 167, 653 N.E.2d at 843 (Buress II). I would follow Buress II. Here, as in Buress, the charging instrument alleges that defendant entered a dwelling "with the intent to commit therein a theft.” Theft is named in the indictment. The majority concludes that the indictment does not set forth the "main outline” or "broad foundation” of theft because a statutory element of theft is not described, i.e., the indictment does not allege that defendant knowingly obtained control over the property of another. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 859. The majority thus focuses on the abstract statutory elements. However, the mere fact that the indictment fails to allege that defendant obtained control over another’s property (a necessary element of theft) is not determinative. "The charging instrument approach does not require the lesser crime to be a theoretically or practically 'necessary’ part of the greater crime.” Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107, 643 N.E.2d at 769-70. By alleging that defendant had the intent to commit a theft, the indictment necessarily alleges that defendant intended to deprive another of property, and this intent may ordinarily be inferred only through an actual taking of property. Thus, the charging instrument contains the "broad outline” of theft. In the garden-variety burglary case, e.g., where defendant forms the intent to enter a house and steal a television set, and does so, theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary. That is because, in that situation, a jury could not rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense and acquit him of the greater offense. If he is guilty of one, he is guilty of both. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107, 643 N.E.2d at 770; Buress II, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 166, 653 N.E.2d at 842. The present case is different. The evidence adduced at trial supports the giving of a theft instruction. A jury could conclude that defendant came to the Williams’ dwelling to collect a debt, knocked on the door, was allowed inside by a six-year-old child, and while he was waiting for an adult, saw a purse and decided to take it. As is often the case in burglary trials, the State presented no direct evidence that defendant possessed the intent to commit a theft at the moment of entry. Instead, the State presented circumstantial evidence of the requisite intent by establishing that defendant committed a theft once inside. Where there is overwhelming evidence that a defendant committed a theft, but there exists a real question whether the defendant committed burglary (whether the defendant entered with the requisite intent), the failure to give a tendered theft instruction may seriously prejudice the defendant. The jury, faced with the dilemma of letting a thief go free or convicting him of a questionable burglary, may choose to convict. I also disagree with the majority’s finding of waiver. The State never raised the issue of waiver, at trial or on appeal. The issue of waiver itself can be waived. See, e.g., People v. Banks, 243 Ill. App. 3d 525, 530, 611 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (1993). Defendant raised the issue whether theft was a lesser included offense, both during the instruction conference and in a post-trial motion, albeit with little argument. Defendant can hardly be faulted for failing to cite authority in opposition to Schmidt. The most pertinent cases supporting defendant’s position (Novak, Buress II, and Landwer) were all decided after defendant’s trial.