Court Opinion

ID: 9926558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 22:02:12.461399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:19.646694
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/24 P. v. Lepe-Puentes CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098142

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 99F00620)

           v.

 JUAN GABRIEL LEPE-PUENTES,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         On October 25, 1998, 12-year-old V.L. disclosed to her brother that defendant
Juan Gabriel Lepe-Puentes, her 24-year-old first cousin, had sexually assaulted her that
day. She subsequently gave a statement to law enforcement. In January 1999, a
complaint was filed charging defendant with five counts of forcible lewd and lascivious

                                                             1
conduct (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)), and an arrest warrant was issued.1 However,
defendant had moved to Mexico soon after he was informed of V.L.’s allegation.
       In July 2022, defendant was detained on the arrest warrant in Texas after crossing
the border from Mexico into the United States, and he was transported to California for
prosecution. V.L. was reinterviewed by law enforcement following defendant’s arrest,
and she disclosed for the first time that defendant had sexually abused her on multiple
occasions between 1996 and 1998, in addition to the abuse she had previously disclosed.
The People filed a second complaint charging defendant with five counts of forcible lewd
and lascivious conduct. The two complaints were later combined in a consolidated
information charging defendant with 10 counts.
       A jury found defendant guilty of all 10 counts. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial
court found true four factors in aggravation. The court noted two factors in mitigation,
but it concluded the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors
such that imposition of either the lower or middle terms would be contrary to the interest
of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) It sentenced defendant to consecutive upper terms of
eight years on each count, for a total of 80 years in prison.
       On appeal, defendant claims: (1) his federal and state constitutional rights to a
speedy trial were violated due to the delay between the filing of the original complaint in
1999 and the commencement of trial in 2022; (2) the charges against him related to
V.L.’s July 2022 disclosure were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and the
trial court erred by not instructing the jury about the statute of limitations; and (3) the
court improperly found factors in aggravation to be true, failed to consider relevant
factors in mitigation, and imposed a sentence constituting cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the federal and California Constitutions. We affirm the judgment.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                               2
                             FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
       Factual Background
       V.L. often went to her cousin Vanessa’s house to play. On October 25, 1998, 12-
year-old V.L. and her 17-year-old brother, Arturo, were playing in a parking lot near the
apartment complex where Vanessa and defendant, Vanessa’s 24-year-old brother, lived.
V.L. went into defendant’s apartment by herself to use the bathroom; she did not think
anyone was home. Defendant was there and grabbed V.L. by the arm, pulled her into his
parents’ bedroom, kissed her, touched her breasts and genitals, removed her clothes, and
had oral and vaginal sex with her. Defendant was startled by a noise, and he pulled up
his pants and left the apartment.
       V.L. ran to the front door of the apartment and got dressed; she saw defendant run
away from the apartment. She went back out to the parking lot to play with Arturo and
Vanessa; they each testified that V.L. had been in the apartment for approximately 15
minutes.
       V.L., Arturo, and Vanessa walked to a nearby store. Vanessa testified at trial that
V.L. appeared “[s]erious” and “[q]uiet” when she came out of the apartment, or as if she
was “thinking of something.” She did not recall that V.L. appeared nervous, although she
acknowledged that she told a police officer at the time of the incident that V.L. appeared
nervous and that she “wonder[ed] about something being a little bit off” when V.L. came
out of the apartment.
       Arturo noticed that V.L., who was characteristically happy and joyful before going
into the apartment, had become quiet and unhappy and “seemed like squashed inside.”
While Vanessa was in the store, Arturo asked V.L. what was wrong. V.L. burst into tears
and immediately said that defendant had raped her. V.L. testified that she was scared to
speak up, but she disclosed defendant’s assault to Arturo because she “couldn’t hold it
anymore.” When Vanessa came out of the market, Arturo explained to her what had
happened. Vanessa recalled that V.L. also told Vanessa that defendant tried to rape her.

                                             3
        According to V.L., Arturo went to their aunt’s house to find someone to pick her
up from the store, and her aunt picked V.L. up and brought her to her aunt’s house.
Arturo recalled that he brought V.L. to their aunt’s apartment, where he told the family
what happened and called the police.
        Vanessa went looking for defendant and found him at a park. She told him that
V.L. had accused him of rape and that law enforcement had been contacted, and she
advised him to run away because the family “wanted to kill [him].” She testified that
defendant told her he had been in his parents’ bedroom and that V.L. had come into the
room, but nothing happened.
        V.L. gave a statement to a police officer that same day. The officer taking V.L.’s
statement noticed that she appeared to be upset, her voice quivered as she spoke, and she
sometimes cried. V.L. did not disclose any other instances of abuse at that time. Law
enforcement searched for defendant but did not find him.
        On January 8, 1999, V.L. participated in an interview at a multi-disciplinary
interview center (MDIC).2 A report prepared by a detective who observed the interview
reflected that V.L. “became visibly upset, was crying, and spoke very rapidly” as she
described defendant’s assault.
        On January 25, 1999, the People filed a complaint charging defendant with five
counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts (§ 288, subd. (b)) against V.L in case No.
99F00620,3 and an arrest warrant was issued.

2 “The MDIC is a facility specially designed and staffed for interviewing children
suspected of being victims of abuse.” (People v. Sisavath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1396,
1400.)
3 The complaint alleged that the offenses occurred between October 1 and November 30,
1998.

                                             4
       Defendant’s Arrest, New Allegations, and Consolidated Information
       More than 23 years later, on July 12, 2022, defendant was taken into custody on
the warrant by Customs and Border Patrol after crossing into the United States from
Mexico. On July 19, two detectives from the Sacramento Police Department traveled to
Texas to collect defendant.
       In July 2022, following defendant’s arrest, V.L. was reinterviewed by law
enforcement. For the first time, she disclosed that defendant had sexually abused her on
multiple occasions from 1996 to 1998. At trial, V.L. testified that when she went to
Vanessa’s house to play, defendant would summon her out of Vanessa’s bedroom into
the hallway, put his hands between her legs, and rub her vagina over and underneath her
clothing. This occurred more than 10 times between 1996 and 1998.
       On August 3, defendant was arraigned on the complaint in case No. 99F00620,
and pleaded not guilty to all charges. On August 16, following a preliminary hearing, he
was held to answer on the charges, and the case was certified to superior court.4 He was
arraigned on September 1.
       On August 22, and based on V.L.’s July 2022 disclosure of defendant’s abuse, the
People filed a complaint in case No. 22FE013949, which charged defendant with five
counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts against V.L. between January 1, 1996, and
October 25, 1998. (§ 288, subd. (b)(1).) On September 9, following a preliminary
hearing, defendant was held to answer on the charges.
       At the preliminary hearing in case No. 22FE013949, the court granted the
prosecution’s request to consolidate the two cases, and a consolidated information was

4 A police officer testifying at the hearing confirmed that the assault was reported on
October 25, 1998, the same day it occurred. Based on that testimony, the trial court
amended the information to allege that the offenses occurred between October 1 and
November 30, 1998.

                                             5
filed. Counts one through five of the consolidated information charged defendant as he
was previously charged in case No. 99F00620. Counts one through five in case No.
22FE013949 were renumbered as counts six through ten in the consolidated information.
       The consolidated information alleged four factors in aggravation: the crimes
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1))5; the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); the manner in
which the crimes were carried out indicates planning, sophistication, or professionalism
(rule 4.421(a)(8)); and defendant took advantage of a position of trust (rule 4.421(a)(11)).
Defendant was arraigned on the consolidated information and pleaded not guilty to all the
charges and allegations.
       Defendant’s Trial Testimony
       Jury trial commenced on November 18, 2022. Testifying in his defense, defendant
denied touching V.L. or any other young girls inappropriately. He characterized V.L. as
“loose,” which he defined as “already having relations with other men,” and asserted that
she was sexually active with men in her family, although he testified that V.L. had never
acted flirtatiously or “loose” with him. He acknowledged he was home alone after work
on the day of the alleged sexual assault, and he had been alone with V.L. in the
apartment. He claimed that V.L. jumped on him or sat on his lap and tried to kiss him
and hug him in a sexual way, but that he rejected her and removed her from his lap. He
testified that this conduct was something other than “flirtatious” or “loose” behavior.
       Defendant also testified that after Vanessa informed him of V.L.’s allegation, he
responded that she should go to the doctor to substantiate her allegation and that he
would answer for the charges if there was proof he had assaulted her. Vanessa told him

5 Further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                             6
to leave because the family wanted to beat him up, and he did. He also asserted that he
had planned to leave for Mexico to prepare to get married before he learned of V.L.’s
allegations, although he was not yet engaged, had not discussed proposing with his
family, and did not marry until 2000. He stayed at his aunt’s house for a week before
leaving for Mexico; although he did not plan on ever returning to the United States, he
did not tell his family he was leaving. He attributed that decision to his fear that his
family would beat him up, his distaste for goodbyes on the basis that he and his mother
would become too emotional, and the fact that he was not very close to his brothers.
       Verdict and Sentence
       The jury found defendant guilty as charged in counts one through ten. Defendant
waived his right to a jury trial on the factors in aggravation, and the trial court found the
alleged aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence
adduced at trial.
       At sentencing, the trial court noted the factors in mitigation that defendant had an
insignificant criminal record outside of the current case (rule 4.423(b)(1)) and that he was
under the age of 26 at the time of the charged offenses (rule 4.423(b)(6)), although it
observed there was no evidence that defendant’s age contributed to the commission of the
offenses. The court concluded that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the
mitigating factors such that imposition of either the lower or middle terms would be
contrary to the interest of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) It sentenced defendant to
consecutive upper terms of eight years on each count.
       Defendant timely appealed. The case was assigned to the current panel in late
October 2023.6

6 The case was assigned to the panel following defendant’s failure to timely file a reply
brief. Appellate counsel subsequently requested an extension of time to file the reply

                                              7
                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                         Speedy Trial
       Defendant contends the lengthy delay between the filing of the initial complaint in
1999 and trial thereon violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
We disagree. With respect to the federal claim, the right attached upon defendant’s arrest
in July 2022--not upon the filing of the complaint in 1999, as defendant claims--and
therefore the delay between defendant’s arrest and the beginning of trial in November
2022 was not presumptively prejudicial. As for the state claim, it is forfeited because
defendant failed to object and file a motion to dismiss in the trial court, and he fails to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
       A. Legal Background
       Both the federal and California constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the
right to a speedy trial (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, cl. 1), and both
guarantees operate in state criminal prosecutions (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th
750, 754 (Martinez)).7 However, the federal and state constitutional rights differ in when
they attach, the showing required to obtain dismissal for violation of the right, and
whether the right can be waived.
       “Under the state Constitution, the filing of a felony complaint is sufficient to
trigger the protection of the speedy trial right. [Citations.] Under the federal
Constitution, however, the filing of a felony complaint is by itself insufficient to trigger

brief on the basis that he had not received the respondent’s brief; we granted that request.
Counsel filed the reply brief on November 30, 2023.
7 Additionally, “[t]he statutory speedy trial provisions, . . . sections 1381 to 1389.8, are
‘supplementary to and a construction of’ the state constitutional speedy trial guarantee.”
(Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 766.) Defendant does not contend that there was any
statutory delay that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice here.√

                                               8
speedy trial protection. [Citation.] The United States Supreme Court has defined the
point at which the federal speedy trial right begins to operate: ‘[I]t is either a formal
indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to
answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial
provision of the Sixth Amendment.’ ” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 754-755.)
       To obtain dismissal under the federal speedy trial right, the high court has
articulated a balancing test requiring the court to evaluate four factors: “whether delay
before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is
more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” (Doggett v. United
States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 651, citing Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530.) The
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under this four-
factor test. (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 233.)
       To demonstrate an “uncommonly long” delay before trial, a defendant must allege
that the interval between the attachment of the right and trial “has crossed the threshold
dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay, [citation], since, by definition,
he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact,
prosecuted his case with customary promptness. If the accused makes this showing, the
court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay
stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.”
(Doggett v. United States, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 652-653.) Courts have refused to
quantify the right into a specified number of days or months, recognizing that the speedy
trial right is “ ‘ “amorphous,” “slippery,” and “necessarily relative.” ’ ” (People v.
Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233.) However, the high court has noted that courts
have generally found delays approaching one year to be “ ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ ”
(Doggett, at p. 652, fn. 1.) Because an uncommonly long delay triggers a presumption of

                                              9
prejudice, a defendant can establish a federal speedy trial right claim without an
affirmative showing of prejudice. (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755.)
       Conversely, under the state speedy trial right, “no presumption of prejudice arises
from delay after the filing of a complaint and before arrest or formal accusation by
indictment or information.” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755.) Instead, a defendant
seeking dismissal under the state speedy trial right “must affirmatively demonstrate
prejudice.” (Ibid., citing Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 249.) If the
defendant demonstrates prejudice, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify the delay,
and the trial court will then weigh the prejudice against the justification to determine
whether the defendant’s ability to defend has been impaired and the right to a speedy trial
violated. (People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 942, citing Serna, at p. 249.)
       Finally, “state speedy trial rights ‘will be deemed waived unless the defendant
both objects to the date set [for trial] and thereafter files a timely motion to dismiss.’
[Citation.] The same is not true of the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial.’ ”
“ ‘[A] defendant’s mere silence in the face of a continuance does not waive the [federal]
constitutional right to speedy trial.’ ” (People v. Bradley (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 32, 39,
disapproved of on other grounds in Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354,
392, fn. 8.) However, with respect to the federal right, the United States Supreme Court
has clarified that while the courts and prosecutors have the “primary burden” to assure
that cases are brought to trial, “[w]e hardly need add that if delay is attributable to the
defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine.” (Barker
v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 529.)
       B. Federal Claim
       Defendant claims that the lengthy delay between the filing of “an information” in
1999 and the beginning of trial in 2022 violated his federal speedy trial right. He asserts
that “[t]he filing of a felony complaint, to wit, an information, triggers the protection of
speedy trial rights.” But as we have discussed, the distinction between a felony complaint

                                              10
and an information is an important one. A defendant’s federal speedy trial right is
triggered by a “formal accusation in the court with jurisdiction over the prosecution of the
charge” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 763), or “arrest with continuing restraint” on
such charge. (Id. at p. 765; accord, People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 891.) The
filing of a felony complaint in state court does not trigger the federal speedy trial right
because it is not a document upon which a defendant may be subjected to trial.
(Martinez, at pp. 761, 763.) Instead, a felony complaint “invokes the authority of a
magistrate, not that of a trial court,” and “functions to bring the defendant before a
magistrate for an examination into whether probable cause exists to formally charge him
with a felony.” (Id. at p. 763.) “Only if probable cause exists may an information
invoking the trial jurisdiction of the superior court be filed.” (Ibid.) Thus, a pleading
only constitutes a formal accusation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment when “a
defendant may be brought to trial in the court with jurisdiction over prosecution of the
offenses alleged”; i.e., an information or indictment. (Id. at p. 76.) Further, the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right does not attach upon the filing of an arrest warrant after the
filing of a felony complaint. (Id. at pp. 764, 765.)
       Here, a felony complaint was filed on January 25, 1999, and an arrest warrant
issued on that same day. However, defendant’s federal speedy trial right did not attach
until he was arrested on the warrant on July 12, 2022. Thus, there was a delay of
approximately four months--not 23 years, as defendant claims--between the attachment
of the federal speedy trial right in case No. 99F00620 and the start of his trial on
November 18, 2022. Defendant does not argue that a four-month delay was
presumptively prejudicial. Because he does not allege a prejudicial delay between the
attachment of the right and commencement of his trial, his federal speedy trial claim fails.
       C. State Claim
       Defendant claims a violation of his state constitutional speedy trial right. But he
did not object to the date set for trial or file a motion to dismiss in the trial court, and

                                               11
therefore we agree with the Attorney General that defendant waived his state speedy trial
right. (People v. Bradley, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.)
       Relying on People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, defendant contends that his
claim may be raised for the first time on appeal. In Tully, the court concluded that
constitutional claims raised for the first time on appeal are not subject to forfeiture when
“ ‘the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial
court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court’s act or omission,
insofar as wrong for the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal
consequence of violating the Constitution.’ ” (Id. at pp. 979-980.) Tully is inapt because
defendant’s claim on appeal clearly invokes facts and legal standards different from those
the trial court was asked to apply. Specifically, the trial court was not asked to conduct a
fact-intensive inquiry into whether defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated, and it
was not asked to balance the prejudice to defendant caused by the delay against the
prosecution’s justification therefor.
       Anticipating our conclusion, defendant contends his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective because he “should have considered a Serna motion,” or a
motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial and on due process grounds.
(See Serna v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 238.)
       To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that
(1) trial counsel’s representation was deficient because it fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficiency resulted in
prejudice to defendant. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389.) Prejudice is
shown where there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a
reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a
presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. It

                                              12
is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective assistance. On
direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record
affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are
more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.)
       At the outset, defendant argues only that trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to consider filing a motion to dismiss. There is nothing in the
record to suggest that trial counsel did not consider filing such a motion, and defendant’s
claim fails on that basis alone.
       Further, the record sheds no light on why counsel failed to file a motion to
dismiss, and we see satisfactory explanations for not filing one. For example, counsel
could have determined that delay in prosecution was likely justified by defendant’s flight
to avoid prosecution. (See People v. Perez (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 [“a
defendant who flees the jurisdiction of a court for the purpose of avoiding prosecution
waives the right to a speedy trial”]; People v. Garcia (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1178
[quoting Perez].) Or counsel could have determined that defendant was not prejudiced
by the delay because his ability to defend against the charge had not been impaired. (See
People v. Lowe, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 945 [defendant asserting violation of state speedy
trial right must show that delay has impaired the ability to defend against the charged
crime].) We cannot conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient where he was not
asked to explain why he did not file a motion to dismiss, and where the record reveals
potential satisfactory explanations for his conduct.

                                             13
                                               II
                                     Statute of Limitations
        Defendant contends prosecution for counts six through ten was time-barred.8 The
parties agree that the statute of limitations set forth in section 801.1 expired before
prosecution as to those counts commenced. Thus, the issue before us is whether counts
six through ten fell within the tolling provision contained in section 803, subdivision (f),
which allows the filing of a complaint within one year of the date of a person’s report to
law enforcement that the person was the victim of a specified sex offense while under 18
years of age. The dispute between the parties centers on section 803, subdivision (f)’s
requirement that independent evidence corroborate the allegation. As we will explain,
the record demonstrates that the requirements of section 803, subdivision (f) are satisfied
here.
        Relatedly, defendant claims that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that
counts six through ten were required to be corroborated by independent evidence.
Alternatively, he claims trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request
such an instruction. As we next explain, we reject these claims as well.
        A. Standard of Review
        Defendant did not raise the statute of limitations at trial. Nevertheless, “when the
charging document indicates on its face that the action is time-barred, a person convicted
of a charged offense may raise the statute of limitations at any time,” including on appeal,
absent an express waiver. (People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 341; id. at p. 338

8 While defendant does not expressly limit this claim to counts six through ten, he does
not argue that prosecution for counts one through five was time-barred. Because a
complaint was filed and an arrest warrant issued on January 25, 1999, it was not. (See
§ 804, subd. (d) [prosecution commences upon issuance of arrest warrant naming
defendant with particularity];√ People v. Simmons (2019) 210 Cal.App.4th 778, 789
[statute of limitations begins to run from earliest date the offense could have potentially
been committed].)√

                                               14
[the defendant can raise statute of limitations argument at any time absent express
waiver].) Where the statute of limitations is raised for the first time on appeal, we review
the record to determine whether it establishes that the action is not time-barred. (Id. at p.
341.) If the record establishes that the action is not time-barred, the conviction may stand
despite the prosecution’s error in filing an information that appeared to be time-barred.
(Ibid.) On the other hand, if we cannot determine from the record whether the action is
barred, we will remand for a hearing. (Ibid.; see People v. Smith (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
1182, 1193 (Smith I) [if statute of limitations is raised for the first time on appeal, we
review the record or, if necessary, remand to the trial court for factual findings].) In
determining whether there are facts to show a prosecution is timely, we may review facts
presented at the preliminary hearing or trial. (Smith I, at p. 1191.)
       B. Section 803, Subdivision (f)
       Pursuant to section 800, the statute of limitations applicable to each charged
offense at the time it was committed was six years. (See former § 288, subd. (b); Stats.
1995, ch. 890, § 1 [violation of § 288, subd. (b) punishable by up to eight years].) The
complaint alleged that counts six through ten occurred as early as January 1, 1996, and
therefore prosecution was required to commence on or before January 1, 2002.
(People v. Simmons, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 789 [statute of limitations begins to run
from earliest date the offense could have potentially been committed].) Before the
limitations period expired (see Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, 632 [state may
extend statute of limitations for prosecutions not yet time barred]), a series of legislative
changes extended the limitations period to allow prosecution for violations of section 288
against victims younger than 18 years old to commence any time before the victim’s 28th
birthday.9 But while those legislative changes extended the limitations period in this case

9 Effective January 1, 2001, the Legislature added subdivision (h)(1) of former section
803, which extended the statute of limitations applicable to the charged offenses to 10

                                              15
to V.L.’s 28th birthday in December 2013, the information was not filed, and defendant
was not arraigned on the information, until September 2022. (§ 804 [prosecution
commences when information is filed, or defendant is arraigned].) Accordingly, the
parties agree, as do we, that the statute of limitations under section 801.1 had long
expired at the time prosecution of counts six through ten commenced.
       Section 803, subdivision (f) extends the statute of limitations to allow the filing of
a criminal complaint within one year of a person’s report to law enforcement that they
were the victim of a violation of section 288 while under 18 years of age. For section
803, subdivision (f) to apply, the following conditions must also be met: (1) the
limitation period has expired; (2) the crime involved “substantial sexual conduct”; and
(3) if the victim was 21 years old or older at the time of the report, there is independent
evidence “clearly and convincingly” corroborating the victim’s allegation.10 (§ 803,
subd. (f)(2).)
       Here, defendant contends only that section 803, subdivision (f)’s independent
evidence requirement was not satisfied.11

years. (Former § 803, subd. (h)(1); Stats. 2000, ch. 235, § 1; former § 290, subd.
(a)(2)(A); Stats. 2000, ch. 649, § 2.5.) Effective January 1, 2005, the 10-year statute of
limitations was moved to former section 801.1. (Stats. 2004, ch. 368, § 1.) Before the
10-year statute of limitations expired on January 1, 2006, section 801.1, subdivision (a)
was amended to allow prosecutions under section 288 to commence any time before the
victim turns 28 years old. (Stats. 2005, ch. 479, § 2.) In 2019, section 801.1 was
amended to extend the statute of limitations to allow prosecutions to commence before
the victim turns 40 years old (stats. 2018, ch. 1494, § 78), but the statute of limitations
had already expired by the time of that amendment.√
10 The corroborating evidence must be otherwise admissible, and the evidence cannot be
the opinion of a mental health professional. (§ 803, subd. (f)(3).)√
11 Section 803, subdivision (f)’s other requirements are clearly satisfied. V.L. was
younger than 18 years old when the crimes were alleged to have occurred; the complaint
was filed well within one year from the date of V.L.’s report to law enforcement; the face
of the complaint indicated that it was filed after V.L.’s 28th birthday and therefore was

                                             16
       At the outset, we observe that the “allegation” that must be clearly and
convincingly corroborated by independent evidence is the allegation made by the victim
to a law enforcement agency that formed the basis for the counts otherwise barred by the
statute of limitations. (§ 803, subd. (f)(1); People v. Mabini (2011) 92 Cal.App.4th 654,
657.) In other words, the evidence clearly and convincingly corroborating a victim’s
allegation must be independent only of the victim’s report to a law enforcement agency;
it does not need to be independent of, for example, any previous allegation the victim
may have made about the defendant regarding other conduct, or testimony from other
witnesses about the victim’s statements and conduct.
       Additionally, the independent evidence does not need to corroborate each
allegation in a criminal pleading, only the “victim’s allegation,” and it “does not have to
be sufficient to support a conviction.’ ” (People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415,
427-428 (Smith II); see People v. Ruiloba (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 674, 683 [each specific
act alleged against a defendant need not be corroborated].) Instead, the corroborating
evidence need only connect the defendant to the commission of the crimes charged.
(Ruiloba, at p. 682.) Thus, independent evidence corroborated a victim’s allegation
where evidence obtained in a pretext call led to an inference that there were any sexual
acts with the victim, demonstrating the defendant’s lewd disposition toward the victim.
(Id. at pp. 687-688.) And evidence of an uncharged act showing a defendant’s propensity
to commit sexual offenses against a child can corroborate all of the charged offenses,
even if it does not particularly corroborate any specific offense. (Id. at p. 683, People v.
Mabini, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 657-659; People v. Yovanov, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th

time-barred (§ 801.1); and V.L.’s allegation involved substantial sexual conduct (see
§ 1203.66, subd. (b) [“masturbation of either the victim or the offender” is “substantial
sexual conduct”]; People v. Dunn (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1098, fn. 8
[“Masturbation encompasses any touching or contact, however slight, of the genitals of
the victim or the offender done with the intent to arouse the sexual desires of the victim
or the offender”]).

                                             17
at p. 404-405.) Where other acts evidence is used to corroborate an allegation, “the
precise probative value to be accorded this evidence will depend on various
considerations, such as the frequency of the uncharged acts and their similarity and
temporal proximity to the charged acts.” (Yovanov, at p. 404.)
       C. Analysis
       Defendant contends no independent evidence corroborated V.L.’s July 2022
allegation that he sexually abused her on multiple occasions between 1996 and 1998, as
charged in counts six through ten. In making this claim, he contrasts the absence of
independent evidence corroborating V.L.’s July 2022 allegation with what he
acknowledges is independent evidence clearly and convincingly corroborating V.L.’s
allegation that he sexually assaulted her on October 25, 1998.12 However, as we have
just discussed, evidence leading to an inference that there was any sexual contact between
defendant and V.L. can corroborate her allegation of other instances of abuse. (People v.
Ruiloba, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 687-688 [evidence leading to an inference that
there were any sexual acts with the victim corroborates victim’s allegation].) More
generally, the independent evidence corroborating an allegation needs only to connect the
defendant to the commission of the alleged crimes; it does not need to corroborate each
specific act alleged. (Id. at pp. 682, 683.) Thus, independent evidence leading to an
inference that defendant sexually assaulted V.L. on one occasion can corroborate her
allegation that he abused her on other occasions. And here the independent evidence

12 We understand defendant’s argument to be an effort to draw a contrast between the
state of the corroborating evidence, not an argument that independent evidence was
required to support the assault allegation charged in counts one through five. No
independent evidence was required to corroborate V.L.’s allegation as to that assault
because the complaint related to that allegation was filed within the six-year statute of
limitations set forth in section 800.

                                             18
showed that defendant’s October 25, 1998, assault occurred in the same location and
close in time to the other assaults alleged.
       As defendant implicitly acknowledges, abundant independent evidence leads to
the inference that he sexually assaulted V.L. on October 25, 1998. Vanessa and Arturo
each testified that V.L. was in the apartment at the time of the alleged assault for
approximately 15 minutes. Vanessa observed that V.L. appeared “[s]erious” and
“[q]uiet” when she came out of the apartment, and she told a police officer at the time of
the incident that V.L. appeared nervous and that she wondered about something “being a
little bit off” when V.L. left the apartment. For his part, Arturo noticed that V.L.’s
demeanor had changed when she returned from the apartment; she had previously been
happy and joyful but had become unusually quiet and unhappy. When he asked her what
happened, V.L. began to cry and disclosed that defendant had raped her. Vanessa also
recalled that V.L. had told her that defendant tried to rape her. Arturo reported
defendant’s assault to law enforcement.
       Soon after her initial disclosure to Arturo, V.L. gave a statement to a police officer
in which she recounted the assault; the officer noted that V.L. appeared to be upset, her
voice quivered as she spoke, and she cried. In January 1999, V.L. again recounted the
assault during an MDIC interview; a report of the interview reflected that V.L. was
visibly upset, crying, and speaking very rapidly.
       Additionally, after Vanessa informed defendant of V.L.’s allegation, he did not
return to the apartment where the assault occurred, but rather left abruptly for Mexico,
where he lived for the next 23 years. Although he testified that he left the United States
because he was afraid that his family would beat him up due to V.L.’s allegations, he
also testified that he, by pure coincidence, had preexisting plans to move to Mexico to
propose to his girlfriend and get married. He acknowledged that he did not tell anyone in
his family about his plans to move to Mexico.

                                               19
       The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 372 as follows: “If the defendant
fled immediately after the crime was committed or after he was accused of committing
the crime, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the
defendant fled, it is up to you decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.
However, evidence that the defense fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.” In
the related context of corroboration of accomplice testimony, “ ‘[f]light tends to connect
an accused with the commission of an offense and may indicate that an accomplice’s
testimony is truthful. [Citations.] As such, the flight of one who knows he is suspected
of committing a crime may be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice.’ ” (See People v. Felton (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 260, 272.) Our Supreme
Court has recognized: “[E]vidence of defendant’s flight after the crimes were committed
supports an inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission,
which may properly be considered as corroborative of the accomplice testimony.”
(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 679.)
       We recognize that there was no express finding that defendant fled to Mexico to
avoid prosecution, and thus we cannot conclude that evidence of defendant’s sudden
move to Mexico constitutes clear and convincing evidence, on its own, that defendant
assaulted V.L. However, we note that a reasonable jury could have found unconvincing
defendant’s claim that he coincidentally had preexisting plans to move to Mexico on the
same day that he was accused of sexually assaulting his young cousin, especially given
the fact that he did not tell anyone in his family about his impending move.
       Finally, we recognize that defendant denied sexually assaulting V.L. However, he
acknowledged that he had been alone with V.L. in the apartment on the date the assault
was alleged to have occurred and testified that V.L. had initiated sexual contact with him
by jumping into his lap, hugging him, and trying to kiss him on the face and mouth.
Thus, although defendant denied initiating sexual contact with V.L., his testimony

                                            20
corroborated V.L.’s claim that she had been alone with him and that some sexual contact
had occurred between them.
       Combined, evidence of V.L.’s behavior on the date of the assault, her disclosures
to Arturo, Vanessa, and law enforcement, her MDIC interview, evidence of defendant’s
flight, and the corroborative aspects of defendant’s testimony led to an inference that
defendant had a lewd disposition toward V.L. and sexually assaulted her in the same
location and around the same time as the acts alleged in V.L.’s July 2022 disclosure.
Independent evidence showing that defendant committed a similar sexual crime against
the same victim, in the same location, and around the same time as the alleged acts
clearly and convincingly corroborates V.L.’s allegation of other instances of abuse.
       Because independent evidence clearly and convincingly corroborated V.L.’s
allegation of abuse occurring between 1996 and 1998, the statute of limitations was
extended under section 803, subdivision (f), and the prosecution was not time-barred.
       D. Instructional Error Claim
       On appeal, defendant claims for the first time that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury about the independent corroboration requirement, and instead instructing
the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1190 that “[c]onviction of a sexual assault crime may
be based on the testimony of a complaining witness alone.”13 But “[a]s a general rule,
the trial court need only instruct on the statute of limitations when it is placed at issue by
the defense as a factual matter in the trial. [Citations.] To hold otherwise would render
moot the discussion in [People v. Williams, supra, 21 Cal.4th 335] as to whether the
defendant may raise a statute of limitations claim for the first time on appeal. If the trial

13 The trial court also instructed with CALCRIM No. 301 as follows: “The testimony of
only one witness can prove any fact. Before you conclude that the testimony of one
witness proves a fact, you should carefully review all the evidence.” Defendant does not
claim on appeal that the court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 301.

                                              21
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the statute of limitations, even if factually not
placed at issue by the defendant at trial, there would never have been an issue as to
forfeiture of the right to raise the statute of limitations for the first time on appeal; the
claim always would be preserved under the rubric of instructional error for failure to give
a required instruction sua sponte. As the court clarified in Williams, when an appellate
court is reviewing a statute of limitations question after a conviction for the charged
offenses, the proper question is whether the record demonstrates that the crime charged
actually fell within the applicable statute of limitations.” (Smith I, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1192-1193.) Accordingly, “because defendant did not request jury instructions on
the statute of limitations issues, he cannot argue on appeal that jury instructions should
have been given.” (Smith II, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 425.) “The proper challenge
for defendant to make now is not that the court failed to instruct but, rather, that he has
the right to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, pursuant to Williams, which we
have addressed above.” (Smith I, at p. 1193.)
       In the alternative, defendant contends that trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the statute of limitations. But there is
no reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if he had
requested such an instruction because, as we have concluded, independent evidence
clearly and convincingly corroborated V.L.’s allegation. (See People v. Mesa (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 1000, 1010-1011 [ineffective assistance claim rejected because defendant
failed to establish prejudice].)
                                               III
                                           Sentencing
       Defendant contends insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings
regarding factors in aggravation, and the court impermissibly failed to consider certain
mitigating factors. He also argues for the first time on appeal that his sentence

                                               22
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.
       A. Legal Background
       Under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), a trial court may not impose an
upper term sentence unless the aggravating circumstances justify doing so, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true
beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Section 1170 also requires the
court to impose the lower term of imprisonment if it determines that childhood trauma
was a contributing factor in the commission of the charged offenses, “unless the court
finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (Id., subd.
(b)(6).) The court must set forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the
sentence imposed. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5).)
       We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion,
determining whether the trial court exercised its discretion “in a manner that is not
arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law, and that is
based upon an ‘individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public
interest.’ ” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) It is an abuse of discretion
if the trial court “relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to the decision or that
otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision.” (Ibid.)
       B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
       Defendant claims that he “should have been acquitted” as to counts six through ten
because the trial court, in finding the allegations of factors in aggravation true beyond a
reasonable doubt, did not consider that counts six through ten required independent
evidence to support V.L.’s allegations. Defendant does not explain why a conclusion that
the court impermissibly found true certain aggravating factors would require us to reverse
his convictions, rather than conduct a harmless error analysis and potentially remand for

                                               23
resentencing. (See, e.g., People v. Butler (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 960-962.) In any
event, defendant’s claim fails because section 803, subdivision (f) provides only the
applicable statute of limitations, not an element of an offense or facts establishing
punishment. (See People v. Riskin (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 234, 241 [right to maintain
action is essential part of the power to pronounce judgment, but that right “ ‘constitutes
no part of the crime itself,’ ” and facts at issue in extension of statute of limitations “are
neither elements of the crime nor facts that establish punishment”].) The court was not
required to consider whether independent evidence corroborated V.L.’s allegation in the
context of making findings about factors in aggravation.
        Defendant also contends the trial court failed to consider three mitigating factors
when imposing the sentence: (1) his sentence, with the application of an enhancement,
could be more than 20 years (rule 4.423(b)(10)), (2) multiple enhancements were alleged
in a single case (rule 4.423(b)(11)), and (3) he suffered physical abuse as a child (rule
4.423(b)(3)). But no enhancements were alleged, and defendant presents no evidence
suggesting that physical trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of his
crimes. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) In any event, defendant forfeited this claim by
failing to raise it at sentencing, and we decline to discuss it further. (People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [“claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or
articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” are forfeited on appeal if not raised in the
trial court].)
        C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
        Defendant also forfeited his cruel and unusual punishment claim by failing to raise
it in the trial court. (People v. Brewer (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 199, 212; People v. Baker
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720; People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)
With the exception of a bald assertion in a heading of his reply brief, defendant does not
argue to the contrary, and we decline to consider this forfeited claim.

                                              24
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 /s/
                                           Duarte, J.

We concur:

     /s/
Robie, Acting P. J.

     /s/
Boulware Eurie, J.

                                      25