Court Opinion

ID: 9962118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 19:10:02.178292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:52.690879
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Rutter, 2024-Ohio-1528.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                       CASE NO. 2023-A-0056

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                     Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                       Court of Common Pleas

MATTHEW LEE RUTTER,
                                                     Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00337
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                              OPINION

                                         Decided: April 22, 2024
                                          Judgment: Affirmed

Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Christopher R. Fortunato,
Assistant Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).

Matthew C. Bangerter, The Bangerter Law Office, 4124 Erie Street, Willoughby, OH
44094 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Matthew Lee Rutter (“Mr. Rutter”), appeals the judgment of the

Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas that sentenced him to two concurrent, five-

year terms of imprisonment following his guilty pleas to two counts of gross sexual

imposition.

        {¶2}     Mr. Rutter raises one assignment of error on appeal, contending the trial

court’s maximum sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to consider the

R.C. 2929.12 seriousness/recidivism sentencing factors.
       {¶3}   After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find Mr. Rutter’s

assignment of error to be without merit.        The trial court explicitly reviewed the

seriousness/recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, including the mitigating

circumstances, at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing judgment entry. Further,

we are not permitted on appeal to independently reweigh the R.C. 2929.12 factors, and

there is nothing to suggest Mr. Rutter’s sentence is contrary to law.

       {¶4}   The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                            Substantive and Procedural History

       {¶5}   In June 2022, the Ashtabula County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Rutter on one

count of rape, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B), and

three counts of gross-sexual imposition, third-degree felonies, in violation of R.C.

2907.05(A)(4) and (C)(2). Mr. Rutter’s convictions arose from a series of sexual acts he

committed on two young children.

       {¶6}   In May 2023, Mr. Rutter pleaded guilty to two counts of gross sexual

imposition (counts two and four). The court dismissed the remaining counts of rape and

gross sexual imposition. The court set the matter for a presentence investigation (“PSI”)

and a sentencing hearing.

       {¶7}   In July 2023, the court postponed the sentencing hearing after Mr. Rutter

informed the court he was diagnosed with leukemia. The court requested he obtain

medical documentation from his treating physicians, including a detailed diagnosis, a

detailed prognosis, his current treatment regime, and how his treatment can be

maintained in the future.

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       {¶8}   At the end of August 2023, the sentencing hearing was held. Mr. Rutter’s

counsel spoke on his behalf, advocating for a sentence of community control sanctions

so Mr. Rutter could enter a clinical trial for his leukemia treatment. Mr. Rutter apologized

to the court for his actions.

       {¶9}   A court advocate read victim impact statements from one of the child victims

and the child’s mother. The child victim shared that because of Mr. Rutter’s crimes, she

cannot sleep, she must take medication, and she does not feel safe around males. In

addition, the memories of the incidents cause mental and physical stress/symptoms and

sometimes cause her to try to hurt herself. She asked the court to give Mr. Rutter the

maximum penalty to keep other little girls safe and so she can sleep at night.

       {¶10} The victim’s mother also requested the maximum penalty, noting the

devastating consequences of Mr. Rutter’s actions.

       {¶11} The state asked the court to especially consider, among the sentencing

factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B), that the physical and/or mental injuries suffered by

the victim were exacerbated by her young age. She was under the age of ten when the

incidents occurred.    She has post-traumatic stress syndrome, and she suffers from

flashbacks. The state further argued that no mitigating factors applied and pointed out

that while Mr. Rutter is suffering from a horrible disease, per his treating physician, he

can receive his treatment while incarcerated. The other victim did not submit a victim

impact statement and was not present at the hearing.

       {¶12} Upon the court’s questioning, the state confirmed that there were no

allegations of the incidents or harm caused to the other victim in the PSI.

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       {¶13} The court reviewed the seriousness and recidivism sentencing factors

pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, finding the victims were very young, Mr. Rutter was in a position

of trust since the victims had been staying overnight in a place where he lived, and he

never accepted responsibility for his actions. The court noted that Mr. Rutter has an

extensive juvenile record and a minimal adult record, including misdemeanors of theft,

obstructing official business, and criminal trespass and that the probation officer believes

a prison sentence is appropriate.

       {¶14} In mitigation, the court noted the state has very little information regarding

the second victim, Mr. Rutter has a minimal adult record, he has been compliant with pre-

trial supervision, and he has been in counseling, as set forth in the PSI.

       {¶15} Regarding Mr. Rutter’s leukemia, the court noted his prognosis is unclear,

the prison system can administer outpatient chemotherapy, and the clinical trial is a

promising treatment option.

       {¶16} The court concluded by outlining the purposes and principles of sentencing,

finding the state’s recommendation to be appropriate because Mr. Rutter needs to be

punished and the public must be protected. The court further found Mr. Rutter to be a

Tier II sexual offender, notifying him of his registration requirements.

       {¶17} The court sentenced Mr. Rutter to the maximum term of imprisonment of

five years on each count, to be served concurrently to one another, for a total term of

imprisonment of 60 months.

       {¶18} Mr. Rutter raises one assignment of error on appeal:

       {¶19} “The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant-appellant to a term of

imprisonment contrary to statute and where its findings were not supported by the record.”

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                     Sentencing Factors Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12

       {¶20} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Rutter contends his sentence is contrary

to law and unsupported by the record because the trial court failed to consider the

seriousness/recidivism sentencing factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶21} We apply the standard of review for felony sentences, which is governed by

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d

1231, ¶ 16. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2):

       {¶22} “The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section

shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification

given by the sentencing court.

       {¶23} “The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to

the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s standard of review is not

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any

action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

       {¶24} “(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or

division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

       {¶25} “(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.”

       {¶26} “‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is

more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty

as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

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established.’” Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d

118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶27} The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-

Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, recently clarified that contrary to the “dicta” in Marcum, R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(a) does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a

sentence based on the lack of support in the record for the trial court’s findings under

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Id. at ¶ 29; see Marcum at ¶ 23. See also State v. Patrick,

164 Ohio St.3d 309, 2020-Ohio-6803, 172 N.E.3d 952, ¶ 67, fn. 2 (Donnelly, J.,

concurring) (the failure to observe the statutory requirements of R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12 is not subject to appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08).               “Nothing in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the

record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that

best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 42.

       {¶28} We note that Mr. Rutter expresses some confusion in his assignment of

error as to “contrary to law” in his challenge of whether the trial court erred in failing to

consider the seriousness/recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12. The Jones majority clarified

that the term “otherwise contrary to law” under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not

encompass an appellate court’s conclusion that a sentence is not supported by the

record. Id. at ¶ 32. See also State v. Toles, 166 Ohio St.3d 397, 2021-Ohio-3531, 186

N.E.3d 784 (affirming on the authority of Jones where the appellant challenged whether

his sentence was supported by the record).

       {¶29} Thus, following precedent, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate

court to review whether the record supports the sentence under R.C. 2929.12.

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                                       R.C. 2929.12

       {¶30} R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 apply as a general judicial guide for every

sentencing. State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36.

       {¶31} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the sentencing judge discretion “‘to determine the

most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.’” Foster at

¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). “[I]n exercising that discretion, the court shall consider,

along with any other ‘relevant’ factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B)

and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Id., quoting

R.C. 2929.12(A). These statutory sections provide a nonexclusive list for the court to

consider. Id.

       {¶32} The trial court possesses broad discretion to determine the most effective

way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing within the statutory

guidelines. State v. Phifer, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0010, 2020-Ohio-4694, ¶ 52;

R.C. 2929.12(A).     The statutes do not mandate judicial fact-finding, and when a

sentencing court states that it has considered these factors, it fulfills its duty. State v.

DeLuca, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-089, 2021-Ohio-1007, ¶ 18. Even a silent record

raises the presumption that the sentencing court considered all relevant factors. Id.; State

v. Adams, 37 Ohio St.3d 295, 525 N.E.2d 1361 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶33} As our review reveals, the trial court was explicit at the sentencing hearing

and in the sentencing judgment entry that it considered the seriousness/recidivism factors

pursuant to R.C. 2929.12, including the mitigating circumstances.

       {¶34} Moreover, the court clearly considered the seriousness of Mr. Rutter’s

crimes, especially against such young child victims, as well as the seriousness of Mr.

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Rutter’s medical diagnosis, remarking that “[b]efore [the court] had all the information

regarding his medical condition, the Court’s feelings were somewhat different than they

are now in terms of what the appropriate sentence in this matter is.”

       {¶35} As we have observed, “the competing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12

are for the sentencing court to weigh, not the court of appeals.” State v. Stanley, 11th

Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0039, 2021-Ohio-549, ¶ 12.          Further, even if we could

independently review and weigh the evidence, it cannot be said that Mr. Rutter’s sentence

is not supported by the record, and there is nothing in the record to suggest his sentence

is contrary to law.

       {¶36} Mr. Rutter’s sole assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶37} The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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