Court Opinion

ID: 9827301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:23:38.95554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:28.749165
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We have reached the conclusion that appellant’s assignment of error as to the refusal of the trial court to give the special charge hereinafter set out should be sustained, and, as this case is to be reversed on that account we announce the following propositions of law for the guidance of the court upon another trial hereof:
[3] 1. When a common carrier receives goods for shipment, it insures their delivery in accordance with the bill of lading,- unless the loss is occasioned by the act of God, or of a public enemy, or by reason of the inherent defect or vice of the good^ or animals, or on account of the fault of the consignee.
This proposition is too well established to require citation of authorities in its support.
[4] 2. When a plaintiff proves delivery of-goods to a common carrier, and the failure of the carrier to deliver the goods at the point of destination, he makes a prima facie case, and the burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove, if it can, that the loss occurred by reason of one of the foregoing exceptions.
[5] 3. If the defendant proves that the loss occurred by the act of God, as is alleged in the instant case (or by reason of either of the above-named exceptions), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that, notwithstanding such act of God, the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the loss. Ry. Co. v. Bergman, 64 S. W. 999; Elam v. Ry. Co., 117 Mo. App. 453, 93 S. W. 852; Express Co. v. Duncan, 193 S. W. 411; Davis v. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 340, 1 S. W. 327; Ry. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 189 (77 U. S.) 19 L. Ed. 909.
*777This is true for tlie reason that, if the loss does not occur by reason of one of the excepted causes, the carrier is an insurer, and negligence on its part is not an issue. But, by proving that the loss occurred by reason of an act of God, it takes itself out of the class of insurer, and the plaintiff must then, as in ordinary cases, prove that the loss occurred by reason of the negligence of the carrier.
The special charge above referred to is as follows:
“At the request of the plaintiff you are instructed that, if you believe from the evidence that defendant Southern Pacific Company received warnings of the approach of the 1915 storm in question in time to have removed [italics ours] the lost and damaged goods in question to a place of safety, and that it failed to do so, and that such failure was negligence on its part, and that said negligence was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff’s loss of the three cases of shoes in question, and damage of the. one case to such an extent as to he rendered worthless to it, you will find for plaintiff against said defendant for the amount of ¡f.250.67, and interest at 6 per cent, thereon from September 13, 1915.”
Appellant alleged that the Southern Pacific Railway Company was negligent in not removing the goods from a place of danger (its docks), after it had sufficient warning of the approach of the storm, and in not making an effort to save said goods from the consequences of such storm.
We have concluded that the evidence was such as to require this issue to be submitted to the jury. The only charge given by the court on this subject was in connection with the charge as to the act of God, wherein the court instructed the jury that if they found that the destruction of said goods by such storm, if any, was not the proximate result of any negligence on the part of the steamship company, its agents or employés, then they would find for the plaintiff.
[6] If after the storm had begun and the waters were rising in the docks, so that there was apparent danger that they would reach and injure the goods, and the appellant could by the use of reasonable diligence have re moved the goods to a place of safety, its failure to do so was negligence of such character as would render it liable for the damage occasioned by such waters continuing to rise until they reached the goods. Ry. Co. v. Madden, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 597, 103 S. W. 1195; Ry. Co. v. Bland, 34 S. W. 676. In the case last above cited it was said: “The fact that the flood was extraordinary and unprecedented would not relieve the appellant from liability, if, by the exercise of diligence, its effects could have been prevented.”
[7] The requested charge was an affirmative presentation of a material issue raised by the pleadings and the evidence, and it was reversible error to refuse the same. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 171 S. W. 1029; Bean v. Hall, 185 S. W. 1054; Bangle v. Ry. Co., 140 S. W. 375; Traction Co. v. Adams, 107 Tex. 612, 183 S. W. 155.
Appellant filed 17 assignments of error. We have not thought it necessary to discuss them separately.
For the reason stated the appellant’s motion for a rehearing is granted, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.