Court Opinion

ID: 9498963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:33:42.94595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:11.675149
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The government was obviously upset by our earlier opinion in this case, United States v. Ortuño-Higareda, 421 F.3d 917 (9th Cir.2005), and immediately began easting its net for a different and more plausible argument. The government’s brand new argument, advanced for the first time in its petition for rehearing, has now been accepted by a majority of this panel. I must respectfully dissent. I would not entertain the government’s argument, as it is both waived and without merit.
As the majority properly states, we normally do not consider contentions that went unmentioned during the full round of briefing and oral argument, and these arguments are deemed waived. See, e.g., Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 395 F.3d 1062, 1063 (9th Cir.2005) (rejecting argument “because it is made for the first time in the petition for rehearing”); Picazo v. Alameida, 366 F.3d 971, 971-72 (9th Cir.2004) (refusing to consider argument on petition for rehearing where issue had been raised “at no point in th[e] litigation”); Talk of the Town v. Dep’t of Finance and Business Servs., 353 F.3d 650, 650 (9th Cir.2003) (refusing to consider argument raised on petition for rehearing “for the first time ever”).
In Varney v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1397 (9th Cir.1988), we discussed a narrow exception to the general rule of waiver for cases involving “extraordinary circumstances,” where the issue involved is “sufficiently urgent.” Id. at 1398. The majority contends that we should jettison the important tenet of waiver because “our withdrawn panel opinion was in direct conflict with prior precedent.” The majority relies primarily on three cases: United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.1987); and United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.1977).
These three cases, however, do not conflict with our original opinion. None of the cases arose under the statutory regime that is now in place, and even if they had, none of them rule on the issue that we decided in our withdrawn Ortuño-Higare-da opinion. In Dane, the then-statute was in fact satisfied. The probation officer had provided a written form describing the conditions of probation, which Dane had signed. In addition, the probation officer explained the significance of the form to *414Dane at the time Dane left prison. 570 F.2d at 842-43. It is clear that the question of the statutory requirements was never raised and, indeed, had it been raised, the requirements would have been satisfied. The issue of whether the statute precluded any further analysis was simply not before the court.
Similarly, in Simmons, there is no indication that the statutory issue was raised. Thus, there can be no conflict with our withdrawn opinion.
Finally, our decision in Laughlin explicitly leaves open the very question that was decided in our withdrawn opinion. Laugh-lin “objected] that his probation officer failed to perform her or his duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3655 to remind him of these conditions. Section 3655, however, was repealed effective November 1, 1987 — more than two years before Laughlin’s probation commenced. We thus need not decide whether a violation of this statute’s provision could warrant a reinstatement of probation.” Laughlin, 933 F.2d at 790 (emphasis added). It is clear that our decision in Laughlin leaves open the very question that was decided in our withdrawn opinion.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s contention that our withdrawn opinion was in “direct conflict with our prior precedent,” the opposite is true. The issue was never raised except in Laughlin, where it was specifically left open, and was not addressed again as being dispositive to the outcome of an appeal until our withdrawn opinion.
This brings me to our more recent case of United States v. Ortega-Brito, 311 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.2002). There, we specifically criticized the failure to comply with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(f) and 3603(1). We pointed out that “the obligations of the district courts and probation officers under th[ese] statutes are specific....” Id. at 1139. However, in that case we held that the specific term for which supervised release was being challenged was in fact provided orally to the defendant. Thus, we excused on our own what is otherwise an absolute statutory mandate.
How does Ortegar-Brito differ from the case before us? As is clear from our withdrawn opinion, the specific term of supervised release that Ortuño-Higareda was accused of violating was not provided to him, orally or in writing, at any time or by anyone. This case is factually distinct from Ortegar-Brito and all of our prior cases, and presents this specific statutory claim for the first time. We answered the question in our withdrawn opinion.
It seems to me that not only was the government demonstrably tardy, but it was also wrong. While the majority has accepted its obviously flawed argument and rejected our ordinary waiver doctrines, I cannot. The government’s effort to demonstrate a conflict that does not exist and its renewed effort to win a point that it properly lost before will apparently carry the day. The government, apparently, will be allowed to continue its unfortunate practice of disregarding statutory mandates and putting its prosecution practices above the will of Congress.
For the reasons stated by the withdrawn majority opinion, I cannot join the present majority. The obligations imposed by the United States Congress in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3603 and 3583 are direct and specific. They are binding upon the probation officers, the district court, and certainly this court. That we have chosen to disregard them in some cases does not indicate that we should disregard them in all cases. Perhaps it is time for our court to look carefully at these cases and to conclude that these statutes actually mean what they say. We have, in my judgment, an obligation to enforce them as written, *415whether we agree that Congress has adopted a good policy or not.
Acceptance of ray position, of course, does not leave the government without the ability to enforce the law. The government contends that Ortuño-Higareda has violated the law. It need not attempt to squeeze this alleged crime into a violation of supervised release. The government is free to indict Ortuño-Higareda on the new crime and to present evidence of the violation. Because of its own failure to follow the statutory mandate, the government’s decision to shoehorn this alleged crime into a supervised release violation is unfortunate. That the majority allows the government to do so is even more regrettable.
For the reasons stated above, I would not withdraw our prior opinion. For the reasons stated in the prior majority opinion, see Ortuño-Higareda, 421 F.3d at 922-25, I dissent from the majority disposition.