Court Opinion

ID: 4129708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2017-02-18 00:55:26.394385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:33:26.111245
License: Public Domain

QMfice      of the Igttornep            QBeneral
                                              &ate of QCexae
DAN MORALES
 ATTORNEY
      CENERAL                                    April 13,1998

   The Honorable Steven D. Wolens                     Opinion No. DM-473
   Chair, Committee on State Affairs
   Texas House of Representatives                     Re:      Validity of Dallas City Council rule that
   P.O. Box 2910                                      requires request by five council members or majority
   Austin, Texas 78768-2910                           of a city council committee to place items on agenda
                                                      for council meeting (RQ-952)

   Dear Representative Wolens:

          You ask whether the following city council rule of procedure for the City of Dallas violates
   the Texas Gpen Meetings Act, Government Code chapter 55 1:

                   Presentations by Members of Council The mayor shall include on an
              agenda any item requested by five city council members or by a majority of
              a city council committee to be brought before the city council. The item must
              be placed on the tirst voting agenda scheduled at least 30 calendar days after
              receipt of request, unless the request is withdrawn by any of the five city
              council members or by a majority of the city council committee, whichever
              applies.’

  Five city council members constitute one-third of the till city council membership.2

          You further state:

                   As applied by the Dallas City Council, this rule has been utilized to
              prohibit placement of an item on the council’s agenda unless request for
              placement has been made by five city council members, or by a majority of
              a city council committee. This rule has been utilized to severely circumscribe
              and restrict what matters of public interest come before the council for
              consideration.

           ‘City of Dallas, Texas, City Council Rules of Procedure, Rule 6.2, as adopted 8/l l/93 and amended by
  Resolution Nos. 94-0297,94-2571,94-3328,94-3675,95-1545,95-2450,95-2451,95-2760,          954204, and 96-0713.

           ‘Letter from Sam Lindsay, City Attorney, City of Dallas, to The Honorable Dan Moraks, Office of Texas
  Attorney Ciencral (Oct. 1, 1997). See Texas State Directory 475 (38th cd. 1995); Ciq of Dallas,Mayorand City
  Council, (Sept. 6, 1997)83 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1935, no
writ), which Attorney General Gpinion DM-228 relied upon, can also be distinguished The wurt
held that a county judge, as presiding officer of the commissioners court, ‘has no discretion in
receiving motions offered in the regular discharge of the court’s business, and submitting said
motions to a vote of the members of the court for their decision.“” Thus, the county judge was
subject to a writ of mandamus where he refused to rewgnixe a motion duly proposed and seconded
at a commissioners court meeting. Hansbro indicates that a single member of the commissioners
court may raise a subject before the court by proposing a motion. That right can only be
implemented under present law if the individual member may place subjects on the agenda posted
as notice of a commissioners court meeting. Thus, the result in Hunsbro is consistent with our
wnclusions in Attorney General Opinions JM-63 and DM-228, that individual members of the
commissioners court may place items on the agenda. However, the rule of procedure stated in
Hansbro does not wntrol the city council of a home-rule city. If this case is based on statutes
applicable only to the commissioners court, it does not apply to the governing body of a city. If it
is based on a common-law rule of meeting procedure, a home-rule city may change the rule by
exercise of its legislative power. IJ Accordingly, Hansbro does not prevent the city council of a
home-rule city t?om adopting reasonable mles of procedure for its meetings.

        You state that the Dallas rule “has been utilii    to severely circumscribe and restrict what
mat&s of public interest wme before the wuncil for consideration,” but you do not identify any city
charter provision or wnstitutional provision that may limit the city council’s authority to adopt this
rule. In Attorney General Opinion H-188, this office determined that the Open Meetings Act does
not authorixe the public to choose the items to be discussed or to discuss subjects on the agenda The
opinion stated as follows:

               So long as the requirements of. . . [the Open Meetings Act] are met and
           the right of citizens to apply to their government for redress of grievance by

       “Hansbm v. Neiderhofw, 83 S.W.Zd 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1935, no writ).

       “See Attomey t3ene-d Opinion JM-1087 (1989) (h ome-rule city may ovcrcomc ccmmon-law do&k    of
inwmpatiiiIity for city offims by chatter provision).

                                                  p.     2675
 The Honorable Steven D. Wolens - Page 5                     @M-473)

              “petition, addms or remonstranw’*16is not abridged. . ., it is our opinion that
              a Commissioners Court need not provide a public forum for every citizen
              wishing to express an opinion on a matter.

Attorney General Opinion H-188 (1973) (footnote added).” We find no basis for concluding that
the city council rule in question is invalid for being inwnsistent with the wnstitution, general laws,
or city charter provisions.

        We cannot determine in the opinion process whether the rule you inquire about is a
reasonable exercise of the city council’s power to establish its rules of procedure. In addressing the
reasonableness of this rule, however, we believe it is appropriate to consider it together with other
procedures for placing items on the agenda of a meeting. The reasonableness of the city’s rules of
procedure is in the first instance a matter for the discretion of the city council, subject to judicial
review for abuse of discretion.

         ‘qex. Comt. art. I.5 27.

         “The legislature has stated in section 22.043 of the Local Gov-ent          Code, that “~]etitions and
remonstrancea may be pnsented to the governing body of the municipality and must be. in witing.” While section
22.043 expressly &ies to type A gcneml-law cities, other Local Gov anmeat Code provisions make it applicable to
tpe B and type C general-law cities. l%i.sprovision illwhwes a method other than inclu.sion on the agenda of a city
council meeting whereby matters of public interest may be presented to members of the city council.

                                                        p.    2676
The Honorable Steven D. Wolens - Page 6         (DM-473)

                                     SUMMARY

                A rule of Dallas City Council on preparing the agenda of a city council
            meeting requires five members (onethird) of the city council or a majority
            of a city council wmmittee to request the mayor to include an item on the
            agenda of a meeting. The City of Dallas, as a home-rule city, is author&d
            to adopt reasonable rulesof procedure for its meetings as long as they are
           not inconsistent with the wnstitution, statutes, or city charter provisions.
            We see no basis for tinding the rule invalid under the Open Meetings Act or
            inwnsistent with the wnstitution, general laws, or city charter provisions.
            Whether a particular rule is reasonable cannot be determined in the opinion
           process. It is a matter for the discretion of the city council, subject to
           judicial review for abuse of discretion.

                                            DAN MORALES
                                            Attorney General of Texas

JORGE VEGA
Fii Assistant Attorney General

SARAH J. SHIRLEY
Chair, Opiion Committee

Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
Assistant Attorney General

                                                p. 2677