Court Opinion

ID: 9699472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:26:39.396815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:51.038393
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
TAMILIA, J.:
¶ 1 The majority would vacate the judgment of the trial court in favor of Ford and against the Stechers and remand for a new trial. I dissent.
¶ 2 Sharon and Joseph Stecher (appellants/cross-appellees) and Ford Motor Company (appellee/cross-appellant) appeal the judgment entered in favor of Ford and against the Stechers.14
¶ 3 On February 13, 1992, Sharon Stecher was involved in a motor vehicle accident while operating her 1983 Ford LTD. The evidence indicates that inclement weather and resulting road conditions caused Sharon Stecher to lose control of the LTD. Thereafter, the vehicle was hit near-side by an oncoming 1992 GMC pickup truck. The evidence established that the front grill of the truck hit the driver’s side of the LTD. As a result of the accident, Sharon Stecher sustained serious head injuries. Thereafter, the Stechers initiated a product liability action alleging the “B” pillar welds of the LTD were defectively manufactured, causing the “B” pillar to detach from the floor of the vehicle in the course of the accident and to strike Sharon Stecher in the head.15
¶ 4 Following an April 1999 trial, a jury found the vehicle’s “B” pillar welds were *499defective but not a substantial factor in bringing about Sharon Stecher’s injuries. These cross-appeals followed.
¶ 5 The Stechers present the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that [the Stech-ers] were required to prove an enhanced injury attributable to the manufacturing defect?
2. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on concurring causes based on the rationale that this case is a products liability action rather than a negligence action?
3. Whether the trial court erred by permitting [Ford’s] experts to testify about the statistical analysis and accident frequency/severity studies where [Ford’s] own experts acknowledge such information had no relevance to the specific issues in this case?
4. Whether the trial court erred in precluding [the Stechers’] expert’s testimony without an evidentiary hearing?
(Stechers’ corrected brief at 3.)
¶ 6 In its cross-appeal, Ford presents these challenges:
1. Plaintiffs in a crashworthiness case must present evidence that Plaintiff suffered enhanced injuries, above and beyond those plaintiff would have sustained absent a defect. [The Stechers] failed to present evidence that Mrs. Stecher suffered any enhanced injuries above and beyond those she would have sustained as a result of the initial collision. In light of [the Stechers’] failure to present required evidence, did the Trial Court properly deny Ford’s motions for compulsory nonsuit and directed verdict?
2. In automobile collision cases, demonstrative evidence involving circumstances different from the accident is admissible if proffered to illustrate general principles of science, and not as an accident reconstruction. Here, Ford sought to introduce into evidence crash tests performed and analyzed by its expert to demonstrate general principles of how vehicles behave in nearside impact crashes. Because Ford sought to introduce the crash tests solely to demonstrate general principles, did the Trial Court properly preclude Ford from introducing such evidence?
(Ford’s brief at 7.)
¶ 7 I begin by addressing those challenges presented by the Stechers. The Stechers argue this case presents an issue of first impression, that being, “whether a plaintiff in a ‘crashworthiness’ case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries resulting from the defect or whether plaintiff need only prove the defect increased the harm.” (Appellant’s corrected brief at 13.)
¶ 8 In 1968, the doctrine of “crashwor-thiness” was first addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968). In 1994, this Court addressed the issue of whether the doctrine of “crashworthiness” or “second collision”, is a valid theory of recovery in a product liability action under Pennsylvania law in Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 435 Pa.Super. 16, 644 A.2d 1213 (1994), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 693, 653 A.2d 1232 (1994).
¶ 9 “The term crashworthiness means the protection that a motor vehicle affords its passenger against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle acci*500dent.” Id. at 1218, citing Barris v. Bob’s Drag Chutes & Safety Equipment, Inc., 685 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.1982). “The principle behind the ‘second collision’ concept is that, because of the way the vehicle has been, manufactured, a person’s injuries have been aggravated unnecessarily.” Id., citing Jeng v. Witters, 452 F.Supp. 1349 (M.D.Pa.1978).
¶ 10 In Kupetz, this Court determined the crashworthiness/second "collision doctrine has been a viable theory of liability since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975). In McCown, the Supreme Court held contributory negligence is not a defense in a product liability case. Without describing it as such, however, the Court was reviewing this issue in a product liability case predicated upon the crashworthiness/sec-ond collision doctrine. Accordingly, in Ku-petz, this Court concluded the crashworthiness/second collision doctrine, as a subset of a cause of action for product liability under Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts Second, is a viable product liability theory in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1219.
¶ 11 The Stechers’ argument focuses upon the fact that there is no Pennsylvania case law establishing the level and burden of proof to be applied under the crashwor-thiness/second collision doctrine. Ford disagrees, citing Schroeder v. DOT, 551 Pa. 243, 710 A.2d 23 (1998). In Schroeder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issues of spoliation of evidence in a product liability case. In discussing the extent to which the defendants were prejudiced by the spoliation of evidence in the case, the Court footnoted the following:
Specifically, [the plaintiff] alleges that the truck was not crashworthy. Under this theory, she must prove (1) that the design of the vehicle was defective and that when the design was made, an alternative, safer, practicable design existed; (2) what injuries, if any, the plaintiff would have received had the alternative safer design been used; and (3) what injuries were attributable to the defective design. Kupetz v. Deere & Co., Inc., 435 Pa.Super. 16, 27, 644 A.2d 1213, 1218 (1994).
Schroeder, supra at 252 n. 8, 710 A.2d at 28 n. 8 (emphasis added).
¶ 12 As the Court in Schroeder cited Kupetz for its standard, we must look to the history behind the standard as set forth in Kupetz. In Kupetz, where neither causation nor damages were at issue on appeal,16 this Court cited the standard enunciated by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dorsett v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D.Pa.1992), and Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Pa.1990), which both adopted the approach set forth in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976).
¶ 13 I agree with the Stechers’ position that the issue of whether a plaintiff in a crashworthiness/second collision case must quantify the extent of enhanced injuries resulting from the defect or whether a plaintiff need only prove the defect increased the harm, has not been specifically addressed by the courts of this Commonwealth.
¶ 14 Similarly, in 1999, the United States District Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found there was no controlling *501state law precedent on this issue and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the issue to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88 (1st Cir.1999). In so doing, the First Circuit provided the following thorough analysis of the two recognized approaches to this issue:
The minority view, ..., places the burden on the plaintiff to prove the nature and extent of his enhanced injuries. This so-called Huddell/Caiazzo approach, derived from Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir.1976) (New Jersey law), and Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir.1981) (New York law), requires a plaintiff to prove three things: (1) that an alternative, safer design would have been practicable under the circumstances; (2) the injuries, if any, that would have resulted if the alternative design had been used; (3) the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design. See, e.g., Huddell, 537 F.2d at 737-38. The latter two elements are, of course, corollaries, both in essence requiring the plaintiff to sort out which injuries would not have occurred, and which injuries (including additional ones) would have occurred, had there been no defect.
See Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 251.12
The more widely used Fox-Mitchell approach, derived from Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787-88 (10th Cir.1978) (Wyoming law), and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1206-1208 (8th Cir.1982) (Minnesota law), requires a plaintiff to prove only that the design defect was a “substantial factor in producing damages over and above those which were probably caused as a result of the original impact or collision,” see Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1206. Once the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show which injuries were attributable to the initial collision and which to the defect. Under this line of cases, a manufacturer who fails to make such an allocation is held hable for all of the plaintiff’s injury. Thus, in cases where the injury is “indivisible” — such as, for example, certain instances of paraplegia or death — manufacturers are treated as joint tortfeasors for all injuries. See id.13
*502Trull, supra at 101-102 (1st Cir.1999).
¶ 15 Upon careful examination and evaluation of these approaches, I find the trial court properly applied the Huddell/Caiazzo approach, which places the burden on the plaintiff to prove the nature and extent of the enhanced injuries, for this approach most accurately reflects the jurisprudence in Pennsylvania with respect to liability and damages. As stated in Huddell, supra, “the plaintiff must offer some method of establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design [or manufacturing].” Id. at 737.
[The plaintiff has the] duty to establish by evidence such facts as would furnish a basis for the legal assessment of damages according to some definite and legal rule. Our law requires not merely conjecture, but rather sufficient data from which damages can be assessed with reasonable certainty. While we do not require mathematical exactness, we cannot award damages by guess or speculation. There must be before us a reasonably fair basis for calculation.
Cronan v. Castle Gas Co., 354 Pa.Super. 381, 512 A.2d 1, 5 (1986), citing Gordon v. Trovato, 234 Pa.Super. 279, 338 A.2d 653 (1975); Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Company, 264 Pa. 384, 107 A. 750 (1919); Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982); and Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980).
¶ 16 Furthermore, review of the case law makes clear that, for purposes of causation and damages, there is no difference between the burden and standard of proof in design defect and manufacturing defect cases. Liability for manufacturing defects involves discrepancies between the nature and quality of a product intended by the manufacturer and the product as produced, where liabihty for design defects involves discrepancies between the design of a product causing injury and an alternative specification that would have avoided the injury. See Leeds v. Cincinnati, Inc., 732 F.2d 1194, 1197 (3d Cir.1984). There is no distinction, however, between the elements of causation and damages in a design defect case as opposed to those in a manufacturing defect case.
¶ 17 The majority, in adopting the more prevalent Fox/Mitchell view, rather than that which has clearly been adopted in Pennsylvania, would alter the concept of an even playing field and shift to the defendant the duty of disproving unsubstantiated allegations, the proof of a negative, and in fading to do so, assess full liability on the defendant. In other words, the Fox/Mitchell approach shifts the burden of proof to the defendants to establish which injuries were attributable to the defect once the plaintiff proves the defect was a substantial factor in producing the injuries. In this case, however, Ford established to the satisfaction of a jury and the court that the manufacturer defect, if any, occurred at the floor of the LTD and not the roof, and the concept of enhanced injury as presented by the Stechers did not occur. As expressed in this Dissenting Opinion, this became a question which properly was resolved by the jury. The jury found the defect in the “B” pillar was not a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries to Mrs. Stecher. The jury’s verdict merely reflects its determination that the Stechers failed to make out a prima facie case of a manufacturing defect.
¶ 18 Even under the majority’s view, the Stechers cannot prevail because no evidence was presented that the manufacturer defect, that is the separation at the floor, in any way produced the alleged enhanced injury which was totally dependent upon separation at the roof. It is not any manufacturer’s defect which can call *503into play, even under the most liberal approach, the Fox/Mitchell analysis. As acknowledged by the majority, the plaintiff in such an action need prove “only that defect which was a substantial factor in producing damages over and above those which were probably caused as a result of the original impact or collision.” (Majority Opinion at 495.) The majority is introducing a change in the law of Pennsylvania based on concepts which are not applicable to this case and upon facts which are contrary to those established at trial and as found by the jury. The majority ignores the ancient and time-honored dictum that allegations must be followed by proof.17
¶ 19 The Stechers also argue the trial court should have instructed the jury on concurring causes in accordance with Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instruction § 6.80 Concurring Causes, and Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., 408 Pa.Super. 83, 596 A.2d 203 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 644, 607 A.2d 254 (1992). In Lilley, this Court stated:
When negligent conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently to an occurrence or incident, each of these persons is fully responsible for the harm suffered by the plaintiff regardless of the relative extent to which each contributed to the harm. A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the moment of the incident, and acted with another cause as a substantial contributive factor in bringing about the harm.
Pa. SSJI Civ. 3.26 Concurring Causes (Subcommittee Draft 1978). While this section applies to the negligent conduct of two or more persons, its reasoning applies just as forcibly to the defective products of two or more manufacturers.
Id. at 215-216.
¶20 This instruction, according to the Stechers, would have enabled the jury to conclude the defective “B” pillar and the force or size of the truck were both substantial causes in producing Sharon Stecher’s injuries.
We review a challenge to a jury instruction to determine if the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. We will not grant a new trial because of an erroneous jury instruction unless the jury charge in its entirety was unclear, inadequate, or tended to mislead or confuse the jury. Even if a trial court has refused to give a proposed instruction that contained a correct statement of the law, we will not grant a new trial on the basis thereof if the substance of that instruction was covered by the trial court’s charge as a whole.
Fragale v. Brigham, 741 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied 563 Pa. 629, 758 A.2d 662 (2000), quoting Southard v. Temple University Hospital, 731 A.2d 603, 616 (Pa.Super.1999). I agree with the trial court’s determination that the Stech-ers’ proposed instruction (an edited version of Pa. SSJI Civ. § 6.30) would have been inappropriate under the facts of this crashworthiness case.
[Ford] is liable for the injuries which resulted from the impact with the B Pillar. However, it is not liable for the injuries which resulted from the initial impact with the truck.18 Therefore, there can be only one cause of the enhanced injuries, which is the defect in the product, and a concur*504ring cause instruction is inconsistent with the enhanced injury concept. Accordingly, we believe that a concurring cause instruction would have confused the jury....
(Trial Court Opinion, Georgelis, J., 9/20/99, at 10; emphasis added.)
¶ 21 The Stechers also argue the trial court erred by permitting Ford’s experts to testify about the statistical analysis and accident frequency/severity studies. The Stechers claim Ford introduced negligence concepts to the jury which are not relevant to a products liability action.
A trial judge has broad powers concerning the conduct of trial, particularly with regal’d to the admission or exclusion of evidence. The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and may be reversed only where there was a clear abuse of discretion. The fundamental consideration in reviewing the trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence is its relevance. Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable.
Santarlas v. Leaseway Motorcar Transp. Co., 456 Pa.Super. 34, 689 A.2d 311, 313-14 (1997) (citations omitted).
¶22 In this case, Ford’s experts, Drs. Roberts and Vogler, testified about the statistical frequency/severity studies, which demonstrated the range of injuries likely to be suffered by any driver in a near-side impact collision, regardless of a defect in the welding of the automobile. Based on their analysis, the experts revealed the severe and life-threatening injuries Sharon Stecher would have suffered from the collision in the absence of the alleged defective welding.
¶ 23 In its Opinion, the trial court stated:
The defense at trial, in part, was that, regardless of any defect in the B Pillar, Mrs. Stecher would have been severely injured. Evidence based upon prior near side collisions was the only way for the Defendant to introduce this defense. Therefore, this evidence had a tendency to make the existence of a material fact more probable than it would be without it.
(Trial Court Opinion at 11-12.)
¶24 I agree with the trial court and conclude the expert testimony was offered to explain the injuries attributable to a near-side collision and, thus, was relevant to the doctrine of enhanced injury. I find this evidence was crucial to the jury’s determination of whether the Stechers proved the nature and extent of the enhanced injuries. As previously discussed, the Stechers were required to prove what injuries were attributable to the alleged defective welding fabrication of the “B” pillar. Ford introduced the expert testimony to demonstrate that the alleged defective welding did not enhance Sharon Stecher’s injuries. The testimony revealed which injuries would have occurred had there been no defect. In light of the record, therefore, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of Ford’s experts.
¶ 25 The Stechers also contend the trial court erred by precluding the testimony of their expert, Dr. Kenneth Saczalski, without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Ford objected to the introduction of Dr. Saczalski’s testimony concerning a computer simulation program, known as Dyna-man, which depicted Sharon Stecher’s movement within her vehicle at the time of the accident. The trial court determined the simulation was inadmissible and granted Ford’s motion in limine without a hearing. The Stechers claim the court was required to conduct a hearing pursuant to *505Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), to determine whether the evidence was scientifically reliable.
¶ 26 In its Opinion, the trial court found the Stechers’ argument waived for their failure to object or to make an offer of proof prior to trial and in response to Ford’s motion in limine to preclude evidence of the simulation program. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1, Post-Trial Relief, (b) provides:
Post Trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,
(1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method at trial; and
(2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings or at trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless leave is granted upon cause shown to specify additional grounds.
Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b).
¶ 27 In light of the record, I believe it is clear the Stechers did not preserve this issue for our review due to their failure to make a timely objection to the court’s exclusion of the evidence concerning the Dy-naman simulation. See Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 Explanatory Comment — 1983. See also Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974) (ground for new trial must be raised timely in pre-trial proceeding or during trial to afford the court the opportunity to correct the error). In response to Ford’s motion in limine to preclude evidence of the Dynaman simulations, the Stechers merely asserted that Dr. Saczalski’s analysis and use of the simulation would be based on well recognized scientific principles relied upon by automotive engineers and biomechanics. The Stechers failed to make an offer of proof or an additional attempt to demonstrate what the scientific testimony established. After the trial court granted Ford’s motion, the Stechers did not request reconsideration of the court’s ruling and made no further objection to the preclusion of the evidence. Following the trial, the Stechers filed a motion for modification of the record, which the trial court granted and, thus, Dr. Saczalski’s report and computer simulation is included in the certified record to this Court. Because the Stechers did not comply with the mandates of Rule 227.1, the trial court did not have the opportunity to correct the alleged error and, thus, I would find the issue is waived for purposes of review.
¶ 28 Even if the Stechers’ issue was not waived pursuant to Rule 227.1, their argument is without merit. Our law is well established that the trial court has broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence. Blum by Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa.Super.1997). Before scientifically adduced evidence may be considered admissible, however, the Blum court determined the evidence must first meet the standard established in Frye, supra.
The Frye test represents an attempt to measure the quality of scientific evidence prior to admission, so that jurors are not misled by unreliable evidence. Our courts have considered this to be necessary whenever science enters the courtroom, because there is the danger that the trial judge or jury will ascribe a degree of certainty to the testimony of the expert ... which may not be deserved. Therefore, because scientific testimony should aid jurors rather than mislead them, admissibility of scientific evidence depends upon the general acceptance of its validity by those scien*506tists active in the field to which the evidence belongs.
Blum, 705 A.2d at 1317 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court, acting as the gatekeeper, must determine whether the science is good enough to serve as the basis for the jury’s findings of fact, or is dressed up to look good enough, but is so untrustworthy that no finding of fact can properly be based upon it. Id. at 1322.
¶ 29 In this case, I would conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Ford’s motion to preclude the evidence without conducting a hearing. The court reviewed the Dynaman simulation, the expert reports and the briefs submitted by the parties before considering the admissibility of the proffered evidence. In its Opinion, the court found the parties submitted the necessary information from which it could determine whether the evidence met the standard for admissibility set forth in Frye. As such, the court was not required to conduct an evi-dentiary hearing. The court indicated the Stechers did not lay an adequate foundation from which the Dynaman simulation could be admitted under Frye. The Stech-ers, however, were not prohibited from questioning Dr. Saczalski at trial regarding the movement of Sharon Stecher in her vehicle. I would find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in excluding the Dynaman simulation evidence without a hearing.
¶ 30 Turning to those issues presented by Ford in its cross-appeal, initially, Ford argues that, in light of the fact the Stech-ers failed to present evidence that Sharon Stecher suffered any enhanced injuries above and beyond those she would have sustained as a result of the initial collision, Ford’s motions for compulsory nonsuit and directed verdict should have been granted.
A compulsory nonsuit can only be granted in cases where it is clear that a cause of action has not been established and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable evidence along with all reasonable inferences of fact arising from that evidence, resolving any conflict in favor of the plaintiff.
Matthews v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 748 A.2d 219, 221 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, — Pa. -, — A.2d -, 2000 WL 1157947, 2000 Pa. LEXIS 1961 (Pa. Aug. 11, 2000), quoting Joyce v. Boulevard Physical Therapy & Rehabilitation Ctr., P.C., 694 A.2d 648, 652-53 (Pa.Super.1997).
A motion for a directed verdict admits as true all facts and proper inferences from testimony which tend to support the opposing party’s case, and rejects all testimony and inferences to the contrary. Such a motion can properly be granted by a court only if the facts are clear and free from doubt. On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is being made. It is not within the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence when ruling upon a motion for directed verdict as credibility is a jury question.
Lonasco v. A-Best Prods. Co., 757 A.2d 367, 374 (Pa.Super.2000); (internal quotation and citation omitted).
¶ 31 Upon careful and independent review of the trial transcripts, I find no abuse of discretion with respect to the denial of these motions. The theory the Stechers presented to the jury is summarized in their brief as follows:
If the “B” pillar remains attached to the car, the force impacting the occupant’s head is significantly less than if the “B” pillar swings freely into the car. An easy way to appreciate this law of physics is to consider a baseball hitting a *507bat. If the bat is held stationary in front of the ball for a bunt, the ball drops to the ground in front of home plate. If the bat is swung with force, the ball is driven into the field. The higher the velocity of the pitched ball and swung bat, the greater the distance the ball travels. Similarly, if the welds had held, the “B” pillar would not have swung into Sharon’s head with increasing velocity. Accordingly, had the welds not been defective, the contact between the “B” pillar and Sharon’s head would have been more like a bunt than a home run.
Sharon suffered an AIS Grade 5 (AIS Scale runs from 1 to 6, with 6 being unsurvivable) brain injury, which is specifically known as diffuse axonal injury (“DAI”). DAI means that the axons throughout the brain have been torn apart by angular acceleration. Angular acceleration is best exemplified by use of a water-filled “snow globe.” When the snow globe is struck on the side without any angle, the material inside will not float around. If, however, the globe is angulated and then impacted, the snowy material will swirl around. Similarly, the greater the angular acceleration, the greater the brain damage. As the angular acceleration decreases, the level of AIS level [sic] decreases. Accordingly, if the “B” pillar had not swung freely like a baseball bat into Sharon’s head, her brain damage would not be as severe.
(Appellants corrected brief at 7-8; internal footnotes omitted.)
¶ 32 In support of this theory, the Stech-ers presented the testimony of a variety of lay and expert witnesses. In particular, and with specific reference to the cause of the accident, the Stechers presented the expert testimony of Dr. Herbert Hill, who explained to the jury that this was not a high impact collision. Additionally, Dr. Campbell Laird testified specifically as to how a “B” pillar, functioning as appellants theorize that it did, would enhance the injuries of an occupant. Tina Hauck, a member of the rescue response team, testified as to her observations of the physical condition of the LTD in comparison with the severity of Sharon Stecher’s injuries. The Stechers also presented the testimony of Dr. Ayub Ommaya, who testified that the severity of Sharon Stecher’s brain injuries is the result of the speed at which the “B” pillar struck her head. It was Dr. Ommaya’s opinion that the injuries would have been less severe had the “B” pillar struck Sharon Stecher at a lesser speed (T.T., Vol. 6, at 923-924).
¶ 33 Ford proposed a different yet equally viable theory of the accident based upon the fact that the “B” pillar was not detached at the top, but rather at the bottom weld. Ford presented evidence that the pillar did not follow the path of impact of a baseball bat hitting a ball, as appellants allege, and, in fact, never struck appellant. Rather, it was Ford’s position at trial that there was no “second collision” and that Sharon Stecher’s injury was the result of the initial collision occasioned by her head striking the broad flat sheet metal of the truck’s hood as it penetrated the window area during the initial collision.
¶ 34 It is well settled that the ultimate determination as to credibility and weight of the evidence lies with the fact finder. “Questions of credibility and conflicts in evidence are for the fact-finder to resolve.” Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 705 (Pa.Super.2000). Moreover, in reviewing a motion for nonsuit, “[t]he trial court must not consider issues of credibility and weight of the evidence.” Ravin, Inc. v. First City Co., 692 A.2d 577, 581 (Pa.Super.1997).
¶35 Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, I find ample areas which *508required a fact finder’s determination as to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It is clear, therefore, the trial court acted appropriately in denying Ford’s motions and in allowing the case to proceed to the jury.
¶ 36 Finally, Ford argues the trial court erred in precluding the demonstrative evidence of near-side impact crashes. Specifically, Ford claims the videotape crash tests were offered merely to illustrate general principles of science, and not to reconstruct the circumstances of the accident in which Sharon Stecher was involved.
¶ 37 “Generally, demonstrative evidence is admissible if its probative value outweighs the likelihood of improperly influencing the jury.” Pascale v. Hechinger Co., 426 Pa.Super. 426, 627 A.2d 750, 755 (1993) (citations omitted). The conditions of the demonstration must be sufficiently close to those involved in the accident to make the probative value outweigh the likely prejudicial effect. Id. In this case, Ford attempted to introduce videotape demonstrations of crash tests in which near-side impact collisions were recreated to indicate how vehicles function under such conditions. Ford cites Jackson v. Spagnola, 349 Pa.Super. 471, 503 A.2d 944 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132 (1987), to support its contention that the videotapes were admissible because they were not introduced as recreations of Sharon Stecher’s accident. In Jackson, the plaintiff was injured in a mul-ti-vehicle accident. A products liability action was initiated against Volkswagen, wherein the plaintiff claimed the faulty design of the seats caused her injuries. At trial, Volkswagen was permitted to introduce crash test films in which the operation of automobile seat belts was tested during rear end collisions. The jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff and, on appeal, the plaintiff claimed the trial court erred in admitting the crash test films. Based upon the trial court’s analysis of the films, this Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that the films were properly admitted.
¶ 38 It is clear Jackson differs from the case at hand. In this case, the trial court found the videotapes inadmissible because the likelihood of improperly influencing the jury outweighed the probative value of the crash tests.19
The tapes simply could not re-create the conditions of the accident. In the tapes, there were a number of dissimilarities from the actual crash. Steve Syson, [an appellants’] expert, detailed 33 instances where the tapes were dissimilar to the actual accident. Ultimately, the Trial Court decided that, if the jury were to view the tapes, even with a limiting instruction, it was likely that the jury would decide the case based solely upon the tapes, which is an improper basis for making a decision. We conclude the tapes’ prejudicial value outweighed their probative value....
(Trial Court Opinion at 17-18.)
¶ 39 I agree and would find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in precluding *509the admission of the videotape crash tests. In this case, the prejudicial and cumulative effect of the dissimilarities between the videotapes and the accident outweighed the probative value of the crash tests. Furthermore, Ford produced expert testimony, through Dr. John Habberstad, addressing the performance of vehicles in near-side impact collisions and, thus, the exclusion of the videotapes was not harmful to the defense. Accordingly, I do not believe Ford is entitled to relief on this claim.
¶ 40 I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. It does not appear as if appellee, Reed Inc., is a party to the instant appeal.

. It was Ford’s position that Sharon Stecher's head did not hit the "B” pillar but rather hit the hood of the GMC pickup truck during the collision.

. In Kupetz v. Deere & Co., 435 Pa.Super. 16, 644 A.2d 1213 (1994), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 693, 653 A.2d 1232 (1994), this Court addressed the following issues: (1) whether the doctrine of crashworthiness/second collision is a valid theory of recovery in a product liability action under Pennsylvania law; and (2) whether assumption of the risk is a complete defense in such an action.

. The Caiazzo court explained its rule as follows:
We realize that a plaintiffs burden of offering evidence of what injuries would have resulted absent the alleged defect will be heavy in some instances and perhaps impossible in others. Where it is impossible, however, the plaintiff has merely failed to establish his prima facie case, i.e., that it is more probable than not that the alleged defect aggravated or enhanced the injuries resulting from the initial collision. Moreover, in those instances in which the plaintiff cannot offer any evidence as to what would have occurred but for the alleged defect, the plaintiff has not established the fact of enhancement at all.
647 F.2d at 251.

. Under this approach, the court initially decides whether an injury is indivisible. If the court finds that it is, the jury is instructed to determine only whether the negligent design of the manufacturer was a substantial factor in producing that injury. If the jury makes such a finding, the manufacturer is held jointly and severally liable for the damages. See Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1209-1210 (8th Cir.1982). If the court finds that the injury is divisible, the *502jury must apportion the damages appropriately.

. The majority declines to address the remaining issues due to the fact they are remanding for a new trial.

. The trial court is referring to the 1992 GMC pickup truck, which collided with the LTD.

. Having reviewed the two crash tests tapes submitted by Ford, the first created December 8, 1998, the second January 13, 1999, and the accompanying documentation, I agree the trial court properly denied their admission after viewing the tapes and data as they purport to establish near side crashes in the few seconds of the collision between the GMC vehicle and the LTD Ford. I agree with the trial court that, at best, this was a thinly veiled attempt to admit Ford’s theory of the actual collision under the disguise of an illustration of general principles of science. As such, the Ford tapes had no greater validity as objective evidence than the Dynaman simulation proposed by Stecher. I agree with the trial court the impact of the tapes would be such as to influence the jury to decide on the basis of the tapes despite limiting instructions by the court.