Court Opinion

ID: 9427862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:07.463247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.106646
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I join the judgment of the Court and much of its opinion. I write separately primarily to state my understanding of the effect, or what should be the effect, of the Court’s holding on general double jeopardy principles.
(1) I agree with the Court that it would be inappropriate in this case to accord complete deference to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ construction of the local legislation at issue. In addition to the reasons offered in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 688-689, I would point out that the conclusions of the Court of Appeals concerning the intent of Congress in enacting the felony-murder statute were unsupported by appropriate references to the legislative history. Moreover, that court ignored the effect of § 23-112 of the District of Columbia Code, which I have concluded is disposi-tive of this case. I view the case, therefore, as one falling within the class of “ 'exceptional situations where egregious error has been committed.’ ” Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363, 369 (1974), quoting from Griffin v. United States, 336 U. S. 704, 718 (1949), and Fisher v. United States, 328 U. S. 463, 476 (1946). Where such an error has been com*697mitted, this Court is barred neither by Art. Ill nor past practice from overruling the courts of the District of Columbia on a question of local law. Pernell, 416 U. S., at 365-369.
(2) I agree with the Court that “the question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defendant’s conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized.” Ante, at 688. I read the opinions cited by the Court in support of that proposition, however, as pronouncing a broader and more significant principle of double jeopardy law. The only function the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch intended. It serves, in my considered view, nothing more. “Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 165 (1977).1
Dicta in recent opinions of this Court at least have suggested, and I now think wrongly, that the Double Jeopardy Clause may prevent the imposition of cumulative punishments in situations in which the Legislative Branch clearly intended that multiple penalties be imposed for a single criminal transaction. See Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. *6986, 11-13 (1978); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, 155 (1977) (plurality opinion). I believe that the Court should take the opportunity presented by this case to repudiate those dicta squarely, and to hold clearly that the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. I must concede that the dicta that seemingly support a contrary view have caused confusion among state courts that have attempted to decipher our pronouncements concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause’s role in the area of multiple punishments.2
(3) Finally, I agree with the Court that § 23-112 expresses Congress’ intent not to authorize the imposition of consecutive sentences in cases in which the two offenses involved do not each require proof of a fact that the other does not. Ante, at 690-693. The question then remains whether the crimes of rape and felony murder based upon that rape each require proof of a fact that the other does not. I would agree that they do not, and for the reasons stated by the Court, ante, at 693-694. I hasten to observe, however, that this result turns on a determination of Congress’ intent. The Court’s holding today surely does not require that the same result automatically be reached in a State where the legislature enacts criminal sanctions clearly authorizing cumulative sentences for a defendant convicted on charges of felony murder and the underlying predicate felony. Nor does this Court’s per curiam opinion in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977), *699holding that successive prosecutions for felony murder and the underlying predicate felony are constitutionally impermissible, require the States to reach an analogous result in a multiple punishments case. Unfortunately, the rather obvious holding in Harris and the dictum in Simpson have combined to spawn disorder among state appellate courts reviewing challenges similar to the one presented here.3 I would hope that today’s holding will remedy, rather than exacerbate, the existing confusion.

 The Court in Brown cited the following decisions in support of its observations concerning the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in multiple punishment cases: Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 (1955); and Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874). See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 460, n. 14 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); M. Friedland, Double Jeopardy 205, 212 (1969); Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 S. Ct. Rev. 81, 112-113, 158-159; Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 302-313 (1965).

 See People v. Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674, 272 N. W. 2d 567 (1978); id., at 683-687, 272 N. W. 2d, at 569-571 (Bronson, J., concurring); id., at 687-696, 272 N. W. 2d, at 571-575 (Walsh,.J., dissenting); Ennis v. State, 364 So. 2d 497 (Fla. App. 1978); id., at 500 (Grimes, C. J., concurring) ; and State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 393 A. 2d 1372 (1978); id., at 725-726, 393 A. 2d, at 1380-1381 (Murphy, C. J., concurring). In each of these state cases, the panels divided on the meaning of this Court’s pronouncements respecting the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against multiple punishments. See also cases cited in n. 3, infra.

 Compare People v. Anderson, 62 Mich. App. 475, 233 N. W. 2d 620 (1975) (a case in which a state court concluded, based on relevant indicia of legislative intent, that cumulative punishments for armed robbery and a felony murder based upon that robbery were not intended), with State v. Pinder, 375 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1979); State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 393 A. 2d 1372 (1978); State v. Innis, — R. I. —, 391 A. 2d 1158 (1978), cert. granted, 440 U. S. 934 (1979); Mitchell v. State, 270 Ind. —, 382 N. E. 2d 932 (1978); Briggs v. State, 573 S. W. 2d 157 (Tenn. 1978) (the latter decisions, erroneously I believe, gave controlling effect to Harris in challenges to cumulative punishments for felony murder and the underlying felony).