Court Opinion

ID: 9579054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:06.292072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:14.955746
License: Public Domain

Quillian, Judge,
concurring specially. I agree with the reversal on the special grounds. However, I am of the opinion that the defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted.
In passing upon the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict several principles of the law of negligence must be considered. The Supreme Court and this court have held: “One who knowingly and voluntarily takes a risk of injury to his person and property, the danger of which is so obvious that the act of taking such risk, in and of itself, amounts to a failure to exercise ordinary care and diligence for his own safety and that of his property, cannot hold another liable for damages from injuries thus occasioned.” Southern Ry. Co. v. Hogan, 131 Ga. 157 (62 S. E. 64).
Another pronouncement of our Supreme. Court is: “Failure to exercise ordinary care on the part of the person injured, before the negligence complained of is apparent, or should have been reasonably apprehended, will not preclude a recovery, but will authorize the jury to diminish the damages in proportion to the fault attributable to the person injured.” Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708 (2) (39 S. E. 306, 54 L.R.A. 802).
There is apparent conflict in the rules enunciated in the cases referred to, but analysis reveals that they are compatible. Each may be applied in a situation to which it is appropriate without offense to the other.
It is not, as held in Western & Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, supra, failure to exercise ordinary care on the part of the person injured before the negligence complained of is apparent or should be reasonably apprehended that will preclude recovery, but as held in the case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Hogan, 131 Ga. 157, supra, it is the assumption of the risk involved in *13knowingly and voluntarily placing one’s self or property in a situation of obvious danger from which proximately emanates the injury to his person or damage to property that debars recovery. A case similar to the one at bar is Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665 (88 S. E. 2d 6).
The latter rule is applicable when as in the present case a person during the hours of darkness voluntarily and intentionally drives a motor vehicle not equipped with lights along the wrong-side of a public highway, and in consequence of assuming such position of imminent danger is injured.
There can be no doubt that the plaintiff’s conduct above referred to did proximately cause his injury, because obviously the collision between the defendant’s automobile and the tractor and trailer could not have occurred if he had not placed those unlighted vehicles on the highway at point of contact.