Court Opinion

ID: 9691580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:41:38.865557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:23.034200
License: Public Domain

JOHNSTONE, Justice,
Dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s holding that this case should be reversed for the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony to explain Appellant’s lack of emotional response to the fire and death of his family. The trial judge ruled that evidence of the Appellant’s demeanor soon after the death of his wife and stepchildren was relevant to his intent and knowledge about the offense. However, in ruling that Appellant could not offer expert testimony to explain his lack of expression, the trial judge stated:
No witness, lay or expert, may given (sic) an opinion on how the Defendant felt after the death of his family and destruction of his house. Witnesses may describe their observations of the Defendant, however the extent to which they may do so is a matter to be resolved when the evidence is presented and the Court is able to assess that evidence and any objections thereto. A jury of adult citizens is fully capable of fairly considering the admissible evidence and, in conjunction with the other proof in the case, assigning appropriate weight to such testimony to determine what, if anything, the Defendant’s demeanor indicates about his guilt or innocence. It was widely noted, that at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy, Jacqueline Kennedy revealed publicly no outward sign of emotion. Similarly, it is well known that Susan Smith, the South Carolina mother convicted of murdering her infant children, gave a dramatic emotional response to the reported loss of her children. It is within the realm of human experience to assess the significance of such expression or lack of expression, and juries are capable of making that assessment without the opinion of psychological experts.
In my opinion, the statements complained of were neither lay opinion testimony nor ultimate issue evidence. Rather, the testimony concerning the Appellant’s emotional reaction on the day in question consisted of observations of witnesses. However, assuming for the sake of argument that such testimony could be lay opinion evidence, it is clear that the decision to allow, or disallow, opinion testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial courts. A review of the above-quoted ruling reveals that the trial judge carefully considered the proffered expert testimony and thoughtfully explained his rationale. I believe he admirably discharged his responsibility to exercise his discretion with great care. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins this dissenting opinion.