Court Opinion

ID: 9641948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:44:00.452881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:40.316670
License: Public Domain

SCHREIBER, J.,
concurring.
The defendant contends that he cannot be sentenced for crimes of which he has been convicted because procedural changes in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice apply retroactively to cases pending on September 1, 1979. N.J.S.A. 2C:l-l(c). This contention assumes that the applicable modification in the New Jersey Code is procedural — a contention with which the majority agrees. Analysis of the modification and its application to this case demonstrates that the change in the Code is substantive, not procedural.
The Code altered the established rule that a conviction or acquittal of a federal offense did not bar prosecution for a state offense though the proscribed conduct arose out of the same episode. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959); State v. Cooper, 54 N.J. 330 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 593, 24 L.Ed.2d 514 (1970). While the double jeopardy provisions in the federal and state constitutions did not preclude such dual prosecution, the Legislature could and did change that rule of law. Thus, the Code of Criminal Justice provides that as of its effective date, with few exceptions, a state prosecution is barred by a former prosecution in the United States District Court based on the same conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:1 — 11. This amendment changed and modified the *61substantive law of this State. It is not a “procedural provision[ ] of the Code,” N.J.S.A. 2C:l-l(c)(l), which involves the conduct or mode of proceeding of the trial. See State v. Molnar, 81 N.J. 475, 488 (1980) (stating that in the context of the Code, “procedure” refers to the conduct of the trial for an offense).
It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973), commented upon the substantive nature of the double jeopardy prohibition. The Court stated that the “practical result [of the constitutional guarantee] is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial.” 409 U.S. at 509, 93 S.Ct. at 878, 35 L.Ed.2d at 33. The statutory bar to dual prosecutions embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-11 has an effect akin to that of the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition.
Not only does N.J.S.A. 2C:1-11 change the rule permitting state and federal prosecutions, but also its application in the instant matter would affect another area of substantive criminal law — sentencing. The defendant here had pleaded guilty in the state court in June 1979. All that remained was sentencing. The imposition of a sentence itself is an integral part of substantive criminal law. State v. Mandara, 183 N.J.Super. 299, 303 (App.Div.1982).
The contention that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-11, proscribing a state criminal prosecution after a federal trial, is procedural does not square with the functional reality that the defendant is serving a seven-to-ten-year period in the New Jersey State Prison.
The majority does not apply the Code to this case for other reasons, and I therefore concur in the result.