Court Opinion

ID: 9687052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:14:59.741784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:23.951934
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority that because the insurance commissioner has been given licensing and regulatory authority over a bail bondsman does not mean that a judge setting bail must accept the surety of a particular licensed bondsman.
I do not agree with, and respectfully dissent from, the majority view that a judicial circuit can disregard the clear mandate of the statute that plaintiff, as one "engaged in the business of becom*419ing surety upon bonds,” be included in the annually compiled list of such persons. MCL 750.167b(4); MSA 28.364(2)(4).
i
As pointed out by the majority, the judges of each circuit have been given the administrative task of listing and posting in designated places the names of those writing bonds in the county. It is understandable that the defendants, in their efforts to correct the irregularities and violations allegedly perpetrated by the plaintiff, would seek to remove him from the list and thus disconnect him from exposure to his clients, rather than rely on their own abilities to refuse to honor his bonds in their respective courtrooms.
Efficiency, however, is not reason enough to ignore the clear mandate of the statute. Nor, in my view, is it satisfactory to base a decision whether or not to observe the statute on the fact, as set forth by the majority, that "[i]n removing Calvert’s name from the list, the judges did not, however, contravene the purpose ... of the Insurance Code . . . [or] frustrate or impede the effectiveness of . . . either the Penal Code or the Insurance Code . . . .” Ante at 416. It is unseemly and without authority on the subject of legislative interpretation1 for this Court to suggest that a statute need only be complied with if doing so *420fulfills its perceived purpose. We too are subject to the law.
ii
The defendant judges call upon us to recognize their "inherent supervisory authority” as a basis for disregarding the mandate of MCL 750.167b(4); MSA 28.364(2)(4).
The judges assert:
To deny a court the jurisdiction and authority to review the moral fitness and/or financial responsibility of bail bondsmen, as well as compliance with the laws of the State of Michigan, would be to violate the very principles and beliefs which formulated the separation of powers doctrine; and the inherent supervisory authority a court has over all persons appearing before it.
There can be no doubt but that the judges’ task would be made easier if they could address their plight under a doctrine of "inherent supervisory authority.” I believe, however, that the plight and their view of the availability of inherent power is exaggerated.
First, the judges are not as helpless as they seem to believe. While it would make more sense to be able to remove a bondsman from a list promulgated by the judges, in fact they have indicated their intention to disapprove of his bonds and sureties case by case. I do not think, however, that the better sense approach justifies reliance on the inherent power doctrine. The court is clearly not helpless, as evidenced by the fact that forfeitures against the plaintiff in nine different cases from the defendants’ circuit were approved on *421appeal. See Calvert v Lapeer Circuit Judges, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided November 28, 1992 (Docket No. 125191).
Secondly, while the defendants state, "The Court of Appeals would have Michigan trial courts close their eyes to such misconduct and simply turn the matter over to the Commissioner of Insurance,” there is no evidence that the circuit court, either on its own or through the State Court Administrator’s office, has brought its concerns to the commissioner of insurance. It would be entirely too cynical to suggest that it is better to enroll yet another class of citizens as officers of the court2 and declare yet another inherent authority, than to rely on a legislatively created regulatory scheme that must be adhered to and relied on by the public at large with similar concerns.
In support of their position, defendants cite and quote an opinion of Federal District Judge Newblatt in which he dismissed a civil rights action filed by the plaintiff against the defendants:
"[T]he Court finds that supervisory control of the conduct of licensed bail bondspersons acting as bail bondspersons is within the judicial power of the court(s) in which the bail bondsperson provides bond including the right to approve or reject the bonds proffered by the bondsperson. The authority under Michigan law of the Insurance Commissioner to license bondspersons and to review and revoke such licenses does not negate the power of a court to control the conduct of such bonds-persons in that court. MCL 550.103, 550.104, [500].1242(2) [MSA 24.243, 24.244, 24.11242(2)]. Moreover, the statute relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Calvert v Lapeer Circuit *422Judges, 187 Mich App 431 [468 NW2d 253] (1991), to hold that judges do not have authority to review the moral fitness or fiscal responsibility of bail bondspersons only refers to posting of a list in a conspicuous place and does not in any way negate the power of the court to control the conduct of such licensees. MCL 750.167[b](4) [MSA 28.364(2X4)] ....
"Accordingly, I hold that as to the matters alleged in Count i, the defendant state judges were acting in an area in which they have jurisdiction and were acting in their judicial and not their administrative capacity. Thus, they are absolutely immune.” [Calvert v Connolly, unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, decided June 30, 1992 (Docket No. 91-CV-40304-FL). Emphasis in the original.]
I, and. I am sure the majority, agree with Judge Newblatt, but it does not support the defendants’ claim that they can disregard the mandate of the state statute. A careful reading of this quotation makes it clear that Judge Newblatt is referring to the ability of a judge to supervise his dealings with a bail bondsman who is acting on behalf of a defendant in a given case. He also supports the position taken by the majority, with which I agree, that the licensing authority of the insurance commissioner does not interfere with judges’ ability to refuse to accept bonds written by plaintiff or a similarly situated surety. Id. The federal district judge then goes on to say that the statute denying the judges’ "authority to review the moral fitness or fiscal responsibility of bail bondspersons only refers to posting of a list in a conspicuous place and does not in any way negate the power of the court to control the conduct of such licensees.” Id.
*423Ill
I agree with Judge Newblatt and would find that, while the circuit judges have certainly done their best to keep the bail bond practices of their court above reproach, they have nonetheless unnecessarily exceeded their authority in having the plaintiff deleted from the list of those licensed to represent sureties in that county.
Riley, J., concurred with Brickley, J.

 The majority cites American Druggists Ins Co v Bogart, 707 F2d 1229, 1233 (CA 11, 1983) (placing a surety on a disqualification list for failing to pay a bond forfeiture violates the basic due process rights of the surety), In re Johnson, 26 NC App 745, 748-749; 217 SE2d 85 (1975) (suspending a bondsman for one year was a disciplinary proceeding regarding the violation of a court order, not the revocation of his license), and Summit Fidelity & Surety Co of Akron, Ohio v Nimtz, 158 Neb 762; 64 NW2d 803 (1954) (issuing a writ of mandamus requiring the judges to refrain from enforcing a court rule regulating bondsmen where questions of fact remain was an abuse of discretion), in support of the rule announced, but those cases do not stand for the *420proposition that the court can ignore a specific legislative mandate requiring a listing of bondsmen in the county.

 Defendant’s agree with the dissent in the Court of Appeals that bondsmen are akin to bailiffs or lawyers and should be considered officers of the court.