Court Opinion

ID: 9649748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:08:09.770516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:21.495866
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. I would find that under 18 Pa.C.S. § 312, appellant’s conduct amounted to no more *328than a de minimis infraction and I would, accordingly, reverse the judgment of sentence and discharge appellant.
In this case, the majority holds that appellant’s eight seconds on a public street warrants the condemnation and stigma of a criminal conviction. In so holding, the majority reasons that since this Court upheld a shoplifting prosecution for $1.59 in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 273 Pa.Super. 407, 417 A.2d 712 (1980),1 we must uphold appellant’s conviction. However, to compare different offenses and different circumstances to determine whether an infraction is de minimis is, to use a cliche, to compare apples to oranges. The application of § 312 must inherently turn on the offense involved in and the circumstances of each particular case. b Other cases are of little value in resolving a § 312 question. The fact that this Court held that § 312 did not apply to a shoplifting prosecution for $1.59 presents no greater reason for affirming appellant’s conviction than the fact that we held that § 312 applied to a harassment prosecution for calling an acquaintance “morally rotten”2 presents for reversing appellant’s conviction. Thus, a question of whether an infraction is de minimis must be essentially resolved by reference to the provisions of § 312 and the circumstances surrounding the infraction.
In the instant case, I would find that § 312(a)(2) applies to appellant’s conduct. This section provides the following:
(a) General rule. — The court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the conduct of the defendant:
(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense *329or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction;
(emphasis added).
While I have no quarrel with the majority’s conclusion that, under Commonwealth v. Predmore, 347 Pa.Super. 195, 500 A.2d 474 (1985),3 appellant’s conduct was of the type the legislature has sought to prevent in order to protect the public safety, an inquiry under § 312(a)(2) cannot end with this conclusion. The question that remains to be answered is whether appellant threatened the public safety “only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.” I am firmly convinced that the eight seconds appellant spent on a public highway was indeed too trivial a threat to the public safety to warrant the stigma of a criminal conviction. If appellant’s conduct did not constitute a de minimis infraction, I would be hard-pressed to conceive of conduct that would be encompassed by § 312.
Certainly, in recent years our criminal justice system has been criticized for failing to convict those whose conduct deserves such condemnation. However, the prosecution of those whose actions do not warrant conviction leaves the system open to more, not less, of such criticism. Appellant’s actions do not warrant the condemnation of conviction, and, accordingly, I dissent.

. I note that in Campbell the entire discussion of the de minimis issue consisted of the following: “Additionally appellant contends that she should be discharged because her violation of section 3929 [retail theft] was de minimis. We find no merit to this contention.”

. See Commonwealth v. Houck, 233 Pa.Super. 512, 335 A.2d 389 (1975).

. I note that in Predmore, the issue of whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a de minimis infraction was neither raised nor discussed.