Court Opinion

ID: 9723176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:05:08.151681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.292765
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOFFMAN, specially concurring: I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case and also with its well-reasoned analysis of each of the relevant issues, save one. I write separately to register my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred when it failed to include within its instruction based upon Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.06 — 3.07 (3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.06— 3.07) the phrase advising the jury that it was to determine whether the defendant had made the statement attributed to him. IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.06 — 3.07 reads as follows: “You have before you evidence that [(the) (a)] defendant made [a] statement^] relating to the offense[s] charged in the [(indictment) (information) (complaint)]. It is for you to determine [whether the defendant made the statementfs], and, if so,] what weight should be given to the statement^]. In determining the weight to be given to a statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made.” (Emphasis added.) As noted by the majority, the instruction given in this case omitted the italicized phrase. The committee note following the instruction states that the phrase is to be “deleted only when the defendant admits making all the material statements attributed to him.” IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.06 — 3.07, Committee Note. However, this court has consistently held that the instruction is sufficient without inclusion of the italicized phrase in circumstances where the defendant presents no evidence that he did not make the statement. See People v. Ramos, 318 Ill. App. 3d 181, 188, 742 N.E.2d 763 (2000); People v. Moore, 294 Ill. App. 3d 410, 417, 689 N.E.2d 1181 (1998); People v. Garner, 248 Ill. App. 3d 985, 992-93, 618 N.E.2d 753 (1993); People v. Lee, 151 Ill. App. 3d 510, 530, 502 N.E.2d 399 (1986); People v. Fleming, 103 Ill. App. 3d 194, 198, 431 N.E.2d 16 (1981). Although the majority acknowledges this court’s holdings in Ramos, Moore and Garner and the fact that the defendant in this case did not deny making the statement attributed to him, it nevertheless finds that the trial court erred, albeit harmlessly, in failing to include the underlined phrase it its instruction to the jury. In support of its finding in this regard, the majority references certain questions asked by defense counsel during his cross-examination of Rosenblum and Bradley and concludes that the jury might have inferred that all or part of the defendant’s statement was fabricated. I disagree. Defense counsel was able to get Rosenblum to acknowledge that the defendant’s statement was not videotaped, that the defendant was not offered the option of writing the statement himself, and that the statement was not recorded verbatim. Bradley acknowledged that only he and Rosenblum witnessed the statement. I fail to see, however, how these answers could support an inference that the defendant’s statement was fabricated. A jury is permitted to infer facts only if the inference is a rational one. Probability is the test of rationality. A jury is not permitted to engage in guess, speculation or conjecture. See Consolino v. Thompson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 31, 34, 468 N.E.2d 422 (1984), citing James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 Va. L. Rev. 218, 221-22 (1961). To conclude, based solely on the cross-examination of Rosenblum and Bradley, that the defendant’s statement was fabricated would be nothing more than speculation. Their testimony simply could not, standing alone, support a conclusion that it is probable that the statement was fabricated in whole or in part. I agree with the majority when it states that Ramos, Moore, and Gamer do not stand for the proposition that a defendant must take the stand and deny making the statement attributed to him before he is entitled to have the underlined portion of the instruction included in the court’s charge to the jury. I do not, however, subscribe to the proposition that innuendoes and insinuations, wholly unsupported by any evidence, are sufficient to entitle a defendant to an instruction containing the phrase at issue. In this case, the State’s evidence that the defendant made the statement was uncontradicted. The facts that it was not videotaped, not recorded verbatim, and not in the defendant’s own handwriting are certainly circumstances that the jury should consider in determining the weight to be given to the statement, but these facts, either individually or collectively, hardly constitute evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the statement was fabricated. For these reasons, I find no error in the instruction given by the trial court in this case.