Court Opinion

ID: 9696955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:02:13.045306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:28.002303
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, J.,
concurring.
VII fully agree with the majority Opinion. I write separately to point out that our decision today is consistent with case law concerning whether an utterance of the “F” word is an obscene statement for purposes of the crime of disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(3). With regard to the issue of whether Appellant’s usage of the “F” word amounts to lewd, lascivious, or indecent words for purposes of the crime of harassment by communication, I believe that the cases concerning the disorderly conduct statute are relevant and instructive. See Commonwealth v. Lobiondo, 501 Pa. 599, 462 A.2d 662, 664 (1978) (stating that sections of the Crimes Code are necessarily interrelated, and should be read and construed as an entirety). Indeed, the cases concerning whether usage of the “F” word amounts to disorderly conduct bolster our interpretation of the harassment by communication statute as to the usage of language relating to sex.
¶ 2 Sections 5503 and 5504 of the Crimes Code were both adopted by the Legislature on December 6, 1972 and became effective on June 6, 1973. In fact, both criminal statutes were part of Public Law 1482, No. 334, Section 1. Section 5504(a)(1), addressed by the majority Opinion, makes criminal the conduct of a person who, with the intent to harass another person, “addresses to or about such other person any lewd, lascivious or indecent words or language”.... 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5504(a)(1). Section 5504(a)(2) makes criminal the conduct of a person who, with the intent to harass another person, makes “repeated communications ... in offensively coarse language”. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5504(a)(2).
¶ 3 Section 5503 defines the offense of disorderly conduct, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior;
(3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture;
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503.
V 4 The majority Opinion astutely observes that the terms “lewd, lascivious, and indecent”, used in section 5504(a)(1), all connote or pertain to matters of a sexual and salacious nature. I would observe that, likewise, the term “obscene” used in section 5503(a)(3) has the common meaning of being designed to incite lust or depravity. See Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 802 (Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1993). Thus, the term “obscene” also pertains to matters that are of a sexual and salacious nature.
¶ 5 On several occasions in the past, this Court and our Supreme Court have considered whether language Js “obscene” so as to render a person guilty of having uttered obscene language for purposes of supporting a disorderly conduct conviction. The test that has evolved is one that is used for gauging whether language is “obscene” or protected as free speech for purposes of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
V 6 Significantly, in Commonwealth v. Pringle, 304 Pa.Super. 67, 450 A.2d 103 (1982), a panel of this Court addressed the question of whether the appellant therein, Paula Pringle, was guilty of committing disorderly conduct pursuant to section 5503(a)(3), regarding the use of obscene *870language. Pringle repeatedly shouted “goddamn fucking pigs” at officers in protest of a friend’s arrest as a large crowd gathered at the scene. Quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-2, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1034-35 (1942), we recognized that there is certain speech, including obscene language and fighting words, that is not accorded Constitutional protection under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
¶ 7 The Pringle Court examined the United States Supreme Court precedent on whether the use of the word “fuck” under certain instances was protected as free speech. Pringle, 450 A.2d at 106 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971)) (where the defendant was convicted for disturbance of the peace for wearing a jacket bearing the inscription, “Fuck the Draft”); and Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 94 S.Ct. 326, 38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973) (where the defendant was convicted for a disturbance because he stated, “We’ll take the fucking street later” during an antiwar demonstration). The Pringle Court rejected the Supreme Court cases as inapplicable to the situation before it, where the appellant had been making epithets at police officers. This Court held that, although in other contexts, the word “fuck” had to carry a sexual context in order to be obscene, in the circumstances of the case before the court, where Pringle had called the police officers “goddamn fucking pigs”, he had used “obscene” language within the context of section 5503(a)(3), without need for resort to the sexual content of the words. The Pringle Court further concluded that, even if the words were not obscene, they were “fighting words”, i.e., those words which by then-very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Therefore, the Pringle Court reasoned that the appellant, in shouting these words at police in a crowd as they carried out their duties, had created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, alarm, and the inciting of lawless behavior.
¶ 8 Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Bryner, 438 Pa.Super. 473, 652 A.2d 909 (1995), a panel of this Court attempted to refine the decision in Pringle so that a test could be devised for determining whether language is obscene for purposes of section 5503(a)(3) or is protected speech under the First Amendment. The Bryner Court considered whether an appellant who shouted, “Go to hell, Betsy”, was properly convicted of a disorderly conduct summary offense under section 5503(a)(3). In Bryner, the appellant therein, Brady L. Bryner, was standing near the rear of an auction building voicing his views about a teacher strike. Several hundred people were in attendance at the auction when Betsy Long, one of the owners of the auction budding, asked Bryner to leave the building. He then shouted the statement in question.
¶ 9 In determining whether Bryner’s utterance constituted obscene language under section 5503(a)(3), the Bryner Court adopted the test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), pertaining to whether materials are obscene or protected by the First Amendment. That test is:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Bryner, 652 A.2d at 912 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615). This Court determined that the language used by Bryner was not obscene under the Miller test. Departing from the decision in Pringle, once determining that the utterance was not obscene, the Bryner Court did not go on to examine whether the *871statement was “fighting words”, unprotected as free speech. The Bryner Court noted that there was no need to consider whether Bryner’s words were “fighting words”, since that type of language is not at issue under section 5503(a)(3). Bryner, 652 A.2d at 912, n. 4. This analysis seems to put an end to the analysis conducted in Pringle.
¶ 10 Following Bryner, the federal district court for the Middle District in Brockway v. Shepherd, 942 F.Supp. 1012, 1016 (M.D.Pa.1996), addressed the question of whether the appellant therein, Louis Brockway, violated section 5503(a)(3) by making an obscene gesture, the proverbial “middle finger”, after a vehicle stop.5 In ruling on this question, the court relied on Bryner and the Miller standard adopted in that case. The Brock-way Court observed that there are times when conduct using a base term for sex may be intended to express disrespect for someone and to offend that person, yet not amount to offensive communication that appeals to the prurient interest. The court stated: “It would be a rare person who would be ‘turned on’ by the display of a middle finger or the language it represents....” Brockway, 942 F.Supp. at 1015. In interpreting section 5503(a)(3), the court reasoned that the intent behind the crime of disorderly conduct was to prevent people from using gestures or language in a way that would engender public turmoil. The Brockway Court observed that language or a gesture might support a charge of disorderly conduct under section 5503(a)(1) or (4), depending on the context. Since Brockway was charged not with section 5503(a)(1) or (4) but section 5503(a)(3), the court ruled that he was improperly arrested for making the offensive gesture, as there was no showing that it was obscene for purposes of the First Amendment.
¶ 11 Later, in McDermott, 971 F.Supp. 939 (E.D.Pa.1997), the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied this Court’s decision in Bryner to its analysis of whether the appellant, Michael McDermott, had committed a violation of subsection 5503(a)(3) of the Crimes Code.6 McDermott, a First Class Petty Officer in the United States Navy, had been drinking one night, and, when rousted from his car by Naval Security Officers, uttered profanities describing the rousting as “bullshit”, and allegedly saying, “I’m not fucking going anywhere”. The Eastern District Court found the language uttered by McDermott, although obscene in everyday parlance, not obscene under the test adopted in Bryner. Furthermore, the court ruled that the language used by McDermott was not “fighting words”, in that there was no evidence that he sought to incite others to prevent his arrest. Therefore, the McDermott Court, finding the language distasteful but not criminal, reversed the judgment of conviction.
¶ 12 Subsequently, in Hock, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the question of whether a single profane remark directed at a police officer was sufficient to support a conviction of disorderly conduct. The appellant, Kelly Jo Hock, uttered, “Fuck you, asshole,” in a normal tone of voice after a police officer cited her for driving under a suspended license. The only persons present were the police officer, who was seated behind the wheel of his cruiser, and the appellant. The Hock court concluded that Hock’s utterance was not “fighting words”, since, under the circumstances, a trier of fact could not reasonably find that her comment risked an immediate breach of the peace. *872The Supreme Court found that the remark did not constitute disorderly conduct under section 5503(a)(1). The particular subsection of section 5503(a) with which Hock was charged is not clear from the opinion. However, Justice Castille noted in his dissent that the words uttered by Hock did not fit the definition of “obscene” under section 5503(a)(3) under the Miller test adopted in Bryner, and that the Court was analyzing the behavior strictly under section 5503(a)(1). Commonwealth v. Hock, 556 Pa. 409, 728 A.2d 943, 947 n. 1 (1999) (Castille, J., dissenting).
¶ 13 In the instant appeal, Appellant was charged not with a violation of section 5503 of the Crimes Code but a violation of section 5504(a). I would find it appropriate for this Court to apply the same test for whether a communication is “lewd, lascivious or indecent” under section 5504(a)(1) that has been applied in determining whether an utterance or gesture is “obscene” under section 5503(a)(3), ie., the Bryner test. Consistent with the case law discussed above, and applying the test articulated in Bryner, I would find that the statement allegedly uttered by Appellant to Mr. Leventry, regarding shooting off person’s “fucking heads”, while uncivil, is not sexual in nature and would not have aroused Mr. Leventry’s prurient interests. Thus, Appellant’s statement was protected speech. Although Appellant most likely intended to be disparaging with his use of the “F” word, his statement here was no different from Hock’s use of the word in the Hock case: the “F” word was privately uttered and was in no way sexually evocative.
¶ 14 I find Appellant’s attitude toward his legislator and the legislator’s staff, as reflected in Appellant’s communication to Mr. Leventry, alarming. I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that Appellant was guilty of making terroristic threats for his statement directed toward Mr. Leventry, Congressman Murtha and his aide, as well as toward the other people involved in repairing Appellant’s truck. Certainly, Appellant is not to be applauded for use of the “F” word in making these terroristic threats. While this Court is sensitive to the social affront to which Mr. Leventry was subjected, I must agree, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Appellant’s loathsome behavior amounted to harassment by communication under section 5504(a)(1).7 Thus, I concur in the majority’s Opinion.

. Although we are not bound by decisions of federal courts inferior to the United States Supreme Court, we may look to them for guidance in interpretation of federal case law. Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258, 710 A.2d 31, 39 (1998).

. This state offense was adopted for use in the federal case.

. Moreover, I agree with the majority's conclusion that Appellant's conduct was not a violation of section 5504(a)(2), as there were no repeated communications in offensively coarse language by him.