Court Opinion

ID: 9897870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:32.120835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:36.254340
License: Public Domain

FILE                                                                      THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                                     FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
                                                                                        SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
       IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
      SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
                                                                                        ERIN L. LENNON
                                                                                     SUPREME COURT CLERK

            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

         STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                               Petitioner,                           No. 101691-3
                     v.                                    Court of Appeals No. 55774-6-II
         JOHN MCWHORTER,                                               EN BANC
                               Respondent.
                                                               Filed: September 28, 2023

               PER CURIAM—John McWhorter pleaded guilty in adult court to crimes he
        committed when he was a juvenile. He later moved for resentencing to enable the trial
        court to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth. The superior court granted the
        motion for a resentencing hearing, and the State appealed this order to Division Two of
        the Court of Appeals.
               The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the superior court’s order was not
        appealable by the State, so it dismissed the appeal. The State filed a petition for review
        in this court. We grant the petition, and for reasons discussed below, we reverse the
        Court of Appeals and remand to that court to consider the State’s appeal.
                                                FACTS
               In 1997, McWhorter pleaded guilty in Kitsap County Superior Court to first and
        second degree rape and first degree robbery, all committed while armed with a firearm.
NO. 101691-3                                                                         PAGE 2

McWhorter committed these crimes when he was 17 years old. He ultimately received
a term of incarceration of 376 months.
       In 2016, McWhorter moved in superior court for resentencing, arguing that the
trial court at his original sentencing erred in failing to consider the mitigating qualities
of his youth. He asked that court to reverse his sentence and hold a new sentencing
hearing with consideration of his youth.
       The superior court first transferred the motion to the Court of Appeals for
treatment as a personal restraint petition pursuant to CrR 7.8(c)(2), finding the motion
untimely. But in 2020, after staying the matter pending other decisions, the Court of
Appeals remanded the matter back to the superior court for further consideration of
whether the motion was time barred.
       Back in superior court, the State conceded the timeliness of the motion but
moved to transfer the matter back to the Court of Appeals on the basis McWhorter
demonstrated no prejudice from any error related to the consideration of his youth and
therefore failed to make a substantial showing of entitlement to relief. See CrR 7.8(c)(2)
(postconviction motion in superior court must be transferred to Court of Appeals for
treatment as personal restraint petition if petitioner fails to make a substantial showing
of entitlement to relief). The superior court denied the State’s motion and ordered that
“[a] resentencing hearing shall be scheduled at the earliest convenient date.” Sealed
Clerk’s Papers at 170.
       The State appealed this order to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals
held that the superior court’s order was not appealable by the State. It therefore
dismissed the appeal in an unpublished opinion without addressing the merits. The State
now seeks this court’s review.
NO. 101691-3                                                                          PAGE 3

                                       ANALYSIS
       The State may appeal a limited number of decisions in a criminal prosecution,
including “[a]n order arresting or vacating a judgment.” RAP 2.2(b)(3). The State
argues that the superior court’s order scheduling a resentencing hearing “vacated” the
original judgment and sentence, making the order appealable under that RAP.
       The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It reasoned that when the superior
court ordered resentencing, it did not necessarily “arrest or vacate” the judgment against
McWhorter—because McWhorter did not ask the superior court to vacate the judgment
and sentence, and because nothing in the trial court’s order stated that it was vacating
the judgment and sentence.
       The Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with State v. Waller, 197 Wn.2d 218,
481 P.3d 515 (2021). In Waller, the defendant filed a motion in superior court seeking
resentencing to consider his relative youth in mitigation and asking the court to vacate
his judgment and set a resentencing hearing. The court scheduled a resentencing hearing
and directed the parties to brief the proper scope of resentencing, but it did not explicitly
vacate the judgment and sentence. The State appealed, but the Court of Appeals held
that the State had no right to appeal under RAP 2.2(b)(3) because the superior court’s
resentencing order did not vacate the judgment and sentence.
       We reversed. We held that the superior court’s order had the effect of vacating
the sentence, and hence the judgment, thus making the order appealable under
RAP 2.2(b)(3). Id. at 227.
       This case is identical in relevant respects to Waller. It is certainly true that
McWhorter did not expressly ask the superior court to vacate the judgment and sentence
(although he did ask the court to “reverse” the sentence) and that the superior court did
not expressly state that the judgment and sentence was vacated. But our decision in
Waller was not based on whether or not the defendant expressly asked to vacate his
NO. 101691-3                                                                         PAGE 4

judgment and sentence and our decision in Waller was not based on whether or not the
superior court expressly ordered that the judgment and sentence be vacated. Instead,
our decision in Waller was based on the fact that the superior court ordered a complete
resentencing hearing. Id. By the act of ordering a complete resentencing hearing at
which the superior court would exercise its sentencing discretion anew, the court
effectively vacated the original judgment and sentence. Id. at 228. In other words,
‘“[u]ntil the trial court exercised its independent judgment by imposing a new judgment
and sentence,’” there is ‘“no sentence,’” and thus the resentencing order ‘“effectively
vacat[ed] the judgment.’” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kilgore, 167
Wn.2d 28, 36 n.5, 216 P.3d 393 (2009)); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Skylstad, 160
Wn.2d 944, 954, 162 P.3d 413 (2007).
       The same thing happened in McWhorter’s case. The superior court ordered a
complete resentencing to consider the mitigating qualities of McWhorter’s youth, and
until that resentencing occurs, there is “no sentence.” Thus, in this case, as in the Waller
case, the original judgment was “vacated” within the meaning of RAP 2.2(b)(3).
                                     CONCLUSION
       The superior court’s order setting a resentencing hearing to consider the
mitigating qualities of McWhorter’s youth was an “order arresting or vacating a
judgment” under RAP 2.2(b)(3), appealable by the State. The State’s petition for review
is granted, the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the matter is remanded to that court for
further proceedings.