Court Opinion

ID: 9700027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:07:04.617089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:03.066174
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
{dissenting). The question at issue in this case is whether the injury for which Douglas Crilly, herein referred to as the plaintiff, seeks compensation arose out of and in the course of his 'employment. On July 9, 1953, plaintiff and Arthur Wozniak were employed by defendant Ballou, who was a subcontractor on a roofing and siding job in East Detroit. At the time Douglas was nearly 17 years of age, and Arthur was somewhat younger. Apparently they had been acquainted for some time. On the occasion in question they were inside the building on which 'they were working, cutting shingles for use by their employer who was working on the outside. While so engaged they began throwing pieces of asbestos shingles, and possibly other missiles, at one another. They had previously engaged in such conduct and had been warned by their employer not to do so.
Apparently no one other than the 2 boys was in the building at the time, or in position to see what was occurring. According to the testimony of Arthur on the hearing before the referee, the conduct referred to continued for some time, but less *329than a half hour. Finally Douglas was struck in the eye and in consequence suffered the loss of industrial vision therein. Following* the event both boys concealed for some time the manner in which the injury had been sustained.
The hearing referee concluded from the testimony before him that the injury suffered by plaintiff did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Accordingly an order was made denying compensation. The appeal board sustained the decision of the referee, specifically finding that plaintiff and his companion were engaged in horseplay which resulted in the injury, and that such conduct had not been condoned by their employer who had warned and instructed them against it. The board concluded that “Douglas Crilly did not receive a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.”
On leave granted plaintiff has appealed to this Court, claiming in effect that notwithstanding the factual findings of the appeal board he is entitled to compensation. Whether such claim is well founded depends on the interpretation given to provisions of the compensation act.* The mere fact that one suffers an injury on the premises where he is employed is not sufficient to establish his right to compensation. Presumably it was with such thought in mind that the legislature specifically provided for the payment of compensation in instances where the injury was one “arising out of and in the course of his employment.” CL 1948, § 412.1 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.151). The nest section of the act expressly denies compensation to an employee “injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct” (CL 1948, § 412.2 [Stat Ann 1950 Rey § 17.152]). The statute was enacted for the protec*330tion of employees and in the interest of the general welfare, but its application may not be enlarged beyond the limitations expressed by the legislature. We have the compensation law because of the action of the law-maldng department of the State government. This Court is limited to the duty of construing the expression of the legislative will in accord with the specific language used and applying it accordingly.
In prior decisions this Court has declined to construe the Michigan act as authorizing the payment of compensation to one who is injured as a result of “horseplay,” even though the one so injured was not a participant. Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich 275 (LRA1918E, 507); Steffes v. Ford Motor Co., 239 Mich 501; Jones v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 284 Mich 358. Counsel for plaintiff calls attention to Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., 225 Mich 693 (36 ALR 1464), in which an award of compensation was upheld to a victim of a joke played on him by his fellow employees. It was said in the course of the discussion that (p 694):
“It is well settled in this State that to justify an award under our act the accident must have arisen, not only in the course of employment, but out of the employment.”
It appeared in the above case that Grlenn was employed as a sweeper, using his wheelbarrow in the collection of refuse. Two men, who were subsequently convicted of manslaughter, attached electric wires to the handles of the wheelbarrow, as a result of which Grlenn received a shock causing his death. A “straw boss” was aware of the horseplay going on among the employees, and at times participated in jokes that were played. Pie had authority to stop such conduct but did not do so. This Court concluded that because of the unusual facts the innocent
*331victim of the horseplay was subjected to a hazard unknown to him but of which his employer was charged with notice, and that, in consequence, there was such a causal connection between the conditions under which his work was performed and the fatal injury received as justified the award made by the compensation commission.
The facts in the ease at bar are not analogous to those in Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., supra. Here the plaintiff was a willing participant in the course of conduct that resulted in his injury, which conduct had been continued for several minutes at least prior to his being struck in the eye. These boys were not children. They were of sufficient age and understanding as to be capable of doing the work for which they were hired. They had been warned by their employer to refrain from throwing missiles at one another, but while the employer was working where he could not constantly observe them they disobeyed the instructions given. They were of sufficient age and understanding to realize that serious injury might result from their acts. Nonetheless, in a spirit of apparent recklessness, they continued to throw missiles at one another.
Significant in this connection is the provision of the statute, above noted, denying compensation to an employee injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct. The acts of these young-men were deliberate and intentional. In view of the warning that they had received and the knowledge of the danger inherent in their conduct, the conclusion is fully justified that they acted wilfully. In Waldbauer v. Michigan Bean Co., 278 Mich 249, an award of compensation was vacated by this Court, the established facts showing that the employee had deliberately risked death by gas poisoning and in disregard of regulations concerning the use of said gas imposed by the employer. The statute was
*332deemed a bar to compensation although obviously Waldbauer was at the time acting in the course of his employment.
In the instant - case plaintiff and his companion, in engaging in the course of conduct that resulted in serious injury to plaintiff, were not engaged in performing their duties as employees or otherwise serving the interests of the employer. On the contrary, they were doing what they had been forbidden to do. The specific provision of the Michigan statute providing for compensation for injuries received in the course of and arising out of the employment may not be construed as applicable under the facts in the instant case. While plaintiff and his companion were throwing missiles at one another they were not in the course of their employment, nor may it reasonably be said that such conduct arose therefrom. No claim is made that the throwing of missiles at one another by employees engaged in the kind of work in which these young men were employed is customary. In other words, such conduct may not be considered as incidental to employment of the character in question.
The case of Lauscher v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc., 327 Mich 358, involved the question whether the injury sustained by an employee arose out of and in the course of his employment. Said employee was directed to remove a drum containing an antifreeze mixture to the defendant’s warehouse. Such removal was the extent of his duty. However, he proceeded to empty the drum in an alley, and to set fire to the liquid. He had been given express instructions not to light fires but, as in the case at bar, violated such instructions. The injury, which proved fatal, resulted from an explosion of the inflammable liquid. An award of compensation to the widow and minor child of the employee was *333set aside on the ground that, under the provisions of the statute, compensation was not payable.
In the instant case the factual findings of the appeal board, on the basis of which compensation was denied, were fully supported by the proofs taken before the referee. By such findings this Court is bound. CL 1948, § 413.12 (Stat Ann 1950 Bev § 17.186). The situation presented is somewhat unusual. The question is whether an employee who deliberately and intentionally participates in a course of conduct that may result in injury, in violation of the specific instructions of his employer, is entitled to compensation under our statute. Attention has been called to decisions from other States in which nonparticipants in so-called horseplay have been held, under the particular circumstances involved, and pertinent statutory provisions, entitled to such compensation. Among such decisions is Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 NY 470 (128 NE 711, 13 ALR 522), frequently cited by text writers and courts. There the claimant for compensation was struck in the eye by an apple thrown by one fellow employee at another. Claimant took no part in the so-called horseplay, and had no knowledge of it until he was struck by the apple. An award was sustained on the theory that the injury arose because of (p 472) “associations and conditions inseparable from factory life.” It is significant to note that the court differentiated the case from prior decisions in which the claimants who had joined in the horseplay were considered to have departed from their employment. For obvious reasons the New York holding may not be regarded as authority for a reversal of the decision of the appeal board in the present proceeding.
Plaintiff here was a participant in the conduct that led to his injury. While so engaged he was not in the course of his employment nor did his injury re-*334suit therefrom. He and his companion were not working under conditions that may perhaps obtain in some factories where large numbers of men and boys are employed. Neither are we concerned here with a single sportive act indulged in on the spur of the moment by a careless employee. Bather, we have a series of acts extending over an appreciable interval with no one taking part therein except the plaintiff and his fellow workman.
Notwithstanding the general humanitarian purposes of the workmen’s compensation act of this State, the legislature has not thereby authorized the payment of compensation for an injury sustained under the circumstances found by the appeal board. Under the facts the order entered by said board was correct and should be affirmed, with costs to defendants.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.

 PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948 § 411.1 et scq., as amended [Stat Ann 1950 Eev §'17.141 et seq., as amended]).