Court Opinion

ID: 9469638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:45:31.904186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:29.171903
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court, like the majority, decided this case under what I consider the erroneous view that C & R had the burden of persuasion on the *1134issue of whether the adrift condition of the barges was due to its negligence. This is contrary to the provision of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that presumptions do not effect a shifting of the burden of persuasion.
The fact that C & R’s barges were adrift gave rise to a presumption that this was due to C & R’s negligence. Under Rule 301, the effect of the presumption was to cast on C & R the burden of producing evidence that such condition did not result from its own negligence. I believe C & R met this burden by evidence that the barges were properly moored. However, this evidence was not conclusive. Nor does the production of such evidence operate to “burst the bubble” of a presumption. Accordingly, despite C & R’s evidence, there remained for consideration by the trier of fact what the majority accurately describes as “the logical deduction that a vessel found flpating loose was improperly moored.” In this posture of the case, the trial court, as fact finder, was free to find, in accordance with the presumption and on the basis of the referenced “logical deduction,” that C & R was negligent. But the trial court was not required to so find. And, such a finding should not have been made unless the trial court was affirmatively persuaded on consideration of the evidence as a whole, including both the “logical deduction” and C & R’s testimony, that C & R was in fact negligent. Since it is evident from the trial court’s memorandum opinion that it cast the ultimate burden of persuasion on C & R, and ruled against it because it had failed to convince the trial court it was free from negligence, I believe the case should be remanded for findings on this issue under the correct standard.
The language of Rule 301 reflects that it is to apply in all civil actions, except where otherwise specified by the Rules or an Act of Congress. Certainly this includes admiralty eases. See Rule 1101(b). It is true that for some purposes the burden of persuasion may be regarded as a substantive, rather than a procedural, matter. The significance of this is, I believe, implicitly recognized in Rule 302, which provides that state law will control the effect of presumptions concerning claims or defenses established by state law. Accordingly, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence appear to have contemplated that Rule 301 would govern in numerous other instances where the application of the burden of persuasion might properly be characterized as “substantive.” There is nothing in the language of Rule 301, or elsewhere in the Federal Rules of Evidence, to indicate that Rule 301 was intended to apply only to those specific presumptions expressly recognized or provided for in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rather, the intent seems to have been to create a uniform rule for civil cases respecting the effect, on the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, of all nonconclusive presumptions, except as otherwise might be provided in the Rules of Evidence themselves or in an Act of Congress. I do not reach the question of whether it was the intention of Congress to prevent the courts in civil cases from ever applying different judge-made rules regarding the shifting of the burden of persuasion, or the extent of Congress’ constitutional power in that regard. Simply as a matter of policy, and in the interests of uniformity, it seems to me to be preferable to follow the provisions of Rule 301, absent some most compelling reason to the contrary. Finding none such here, I believe Rule 301 should have been applied in the instant case. The decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court relied on by the majority which speak to the issue of the burden of persuasion were decided before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and hence are not controlling on this question.