Court Opinion

ID: 9724149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:47:00.936496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:56.836239
License: Public Domain

Kelly, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which would grant to the commissioner of human rights the power under Minn. St. c. 363 to bring class actions for persons who have not filed a charge of discrimination with the commissioner pursuant to the statute for the purpose of recovering compensatory or *100punitive damages on their behalf. The legislation itself does not specifically authorize such class suits.
This court has often observed that the jurisdiction of an administrative agency in this state is derived only from the legislation creating it.
“Jurisdiction of an administrative agency consists of the powers granted it by statute. Lack of statutory power betokens lack of jurisdiction. It is therefore well settled that a determination of an administrative agency is void and subject to collateral attack where it is made either without statutory power or in excess thereof.” State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 253, 259, 32 N. W. 2d 583, 586 (1948).
The jurisdiction of the Department of Human Rights therefore should be limited to the powers conferred upon it in Minn. St. c. 363. The duties and powers of the commissioner are enunciated in Minn. St. 363.05, of which subd. 1(9) empowers him to “issue complaints, receive and investigate charges alleging unfair discriminatory practices, and determine whether probable cause exists for hearing.” The procedure for the issuance of complaints regarding grievances is set forth in § 363.06, which provides in part:
“Subdivision 1. Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may file a verified charge with the commissioner or his designated agent * * *.
“Subd. 2. Whenever the commissioner has reason to believe that a person is engaging in an unfair discriminatory practice, the commissioner may issue a complaint.
“Subd. 3. A charge of an unfair discriminatory practice must be filed within six months after the occurrence of the practice.
“Subd. 4. When a charge has been filed, the commissioner shall * * * make a determination as to whether or not there is probable cause to credit the allegation of unfair discriminatory practices, and
* * * * *
*101“(2) If the commissioner shall determine after investigation that probable cause exists to credit the allegations of unfair discriminatory practices, the commissioner shall issue a complaint * * (Italics supplied.)
The statute therefore empowers the commissioner to initiate complaints against persons for alleged discriminatory practices in two instances: (1) After investigation shows that a charge of discrimination by a person is credible, and, (2) when the commissioner himself discovers such practices. The charge of Mrs. Samueison is properly being pursued under the first of these alternative methods. I cannot agree, however, that the statutory authorization to the commissioner to issue complaints on his own initiative enables him to seek adjudication of the rights of others with similar interests by means of a class action.
There is nothing in the statute which expressly or impliedly gives the commissioner of human rights the power to bring this type of class action. The purpose of allowing the commissioner to initiate a complaint regardless of the non-filing of a charge of discrimination is to eliminate such practices by cease and desist orders and not to seek redress for those affected by it. Apparently the legislature thought this type of class action would be effective in eliminating discriminatory practices. Thus, this objective can be accomplished without the use of a class suit to recover damages on behalf of non-charging persons. An aggrieved person who wishes redress for unfair discriminatory practices is required to bring his claim within 6 months of the practice. To overlook this requirement merely because the commissioner himself took the initiative in filing a complaint frustrates the purpose for the limitation provision. In addition, Minn. St. 363.071, subd. 2, authorizes compensatory and punitive damages to be paid only to a “charging party”1 who is defined with *102particularity. The awarding of compensatory or punitive damages to a “charging party” or even the prospect thereof should have a prophylactic effect upon all employers. This effect, along with the commissioner’s powers to issue complaints for discriminatory practices, should give the commissioner adequate weapons to enforce and carry out the policies of the statute without resorting to class actions on behalf of employees who are not “charging parties” to recover on their behalf compensatory and punitive damages.
Furthermore, to authorize the commissioner of human rights to maintain class actions based on the broad legislative policy of eliminating discrimination in the state is unwarranted. Chapter 363 contains no guidelines for the class action such as are spelled out in Rule 23, Rules of Civil Procedure. To allow the commissioner to derive authority to bring class actions because of the general policy statements contained in the statute may lead to the use of class actions by other administrative agencies when not expressly provided for by the statute. I cannot believe the legislature intended such a result by outlining the purpose of the act in Minn. St. 363.12.
Peterson, Justice (dissenting in part).
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Kelly.
Mr. Justice Yetka and Mr. Justice Scott, not having been members of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 Minn. St. 363.01, subd. 22, provides: “ ‘Charging party’ means a person filing a charge with the commissioner or his designated agent pursuant to section 363.06, subdivision 1.”