Court Opinion

ID: 9896753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 16:01:21.641446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.257728
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22-1266                                                  September Term, 2023
                                                             FILED ON: NOVEMBER 14, 2023

NEW YORK PAVING, INC.,
                   PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
                  RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 22-1289

                On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application for Enforcement
                      of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board

       Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, MILLETT and PAN, Circuit Judges.

                                       JUDGMENT

       This appeal was considered on the record from the National Labor Relations Board and on
the briefs of the parties. See D.C. Cir. R. 34(j). The Court has accorded the issues full
consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See D.C. Cir. R.
36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is:

       ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition for review be DENIED and the National
Labor Relations Board’s cross-application for enforcement be GRANTED.

                                           *    *   *

        Petitioner New York Paving, Inc. (“NY Paving”) seeks review of the National Labor
Relations Board’s (the “Board”) affirmance of a determination by an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) that NY Paving violated the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) by laying off thirty-
five of its fifty asphalt pavers. See New York Paving, Inc., 371 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (Sept. 26, 2022)
[hereinafter “Board Op.”]. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings that (1) the layoffs were
motivated by anti-union animus; and (2) NY Paving failed to provide the asphalt pavers’ union
with an opportunity to bargain about the effects of the layoffs. Because the Board’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, we deny NY Paving’s petition for review and grant the Board’s
cross-application for enforcement.

                                                 I.

        NY Paving performs concrete and asphalt paving services in New York City. Board Op. 1.
Local 175 is a union that represents the asphalt pavers employed by NY Paving. Id. On three
prior occasions, Local 175 successfully pursued grievances or unfair labor practice charges against
NY Paving — including one for using fewer asphalt pavers per job than was contractually required.
See id. at 1–2.

        On December 20, 2019, NY Paving announced that it was laying off thirty-five of its fifty
asphalt pavers. Board Op. 2–3. In doing so, the company distributed a notice to its employees
that blamed Local 175 for filing grievances that necessitated the layoffs. Id. Specifically, the
layoff notice claimed that “Local 175 forced New York Paving to make major changes to [its]
asphalt paving operations” by “fil[ing] many grievances and arbitrations against New York
Paving.” J.A. 613 (emphasis in original). The notice went on to state that NY Paving “repeatedly
warned Local 175 that its efforts . . . would cause temporary and permanent layoffs,” but “[i]t
appeared to New York Paving [that] Local 175 did not care.” Id. (emphasis in original). The
notice concluded by blaming the layoffs on “Local 175’s deliberate efforts to interfere with [NY
Paving’s] . . . asphalt paving operations.” Id. (emphasis in original).

        On January 17, 2020, Local 175 filed charges against NY Paving based on the layoffs, and
the General Counsel of the Board filed a Complaint on April 20, 2020. The General Counsel’s
Complaint alleged that NY Paving committed two violations of the Act. First, it alleged that NY
Paving violated Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act by terminating the thirty-five asphalt pavers
because of anti-union animus. Second, it alleged that NY Paving violated Sections 8(a)(5) and
8(a)(1) of the Act by failing to give Local 175 notice and an opportunity to bargain over the effects
of the layoffs.

        After a hearing, an ALJ agreed with the General Counsel and found that NY Paving
violated the Act as alleged. See J.A. 23–86. On September 26, 2022, the Board affirmed, largely
adopting the ALJ’s reasoning. See Board Op. NY Paving petitioned this court for review, and the
Board cross-applied for enforcement. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).

                                                 II.

        Our review of the Board’s decision is “narrow and highly deferential.” Inova Health Sys.
v. NLRB, 795 F.3d 68, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “We will uphold a decision of the Board
unless it relied upon findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, failed to apply the
proper legal standard, or departed from its precedent without providing a reasoned justification for
doing so.” Id. at 80 (cleaned up). Thus, the Board “is to be reversed only when the record is so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find to the contrary.” Id. (cleaned up).

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                                                   III.

       We uphold the Board’s conclusions that NY Paving violated the Act by (1) laying off its
asphalt pavers in retaliation for protected union activity, and (2) failing to engage in effects
bargaining. Both determinations are supported by substantial evidence.

                                                   A.

         Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that NY Paving laid off its asphalt
pavers in retaliation for protected union activity. See Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. NLRB, 833
F.3d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“An employer violates [S]ection 8(a)(3) by taking an adverse
employment action . . . to discourage union activity.” (cleaned up)); Fort Dearborn Co. v. NLRB,
827 F.3d 1067, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that a “violation of [Section] 8(a)(3) constitutes a
derivative violation of [Section] 8(a)(1)” (cleaned up)). Where, as here, an employer purports to
have relied on reasons unrelated to union activity, the Board applies the Wright Line test. Ozburn-
Hessey, 833 F.3d at 215, 218 (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)). Under that test, the
General Counsel must make a “prima facie showing” that (1) an employee engaged in protected
activity; (2) the employer knew of that protected activity; and (3) the employer had animus against
the protected activity. See id. at 218; DHSC, LLC v. NLRB, 944 F.3d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
If the General Counsel meets that burden, the employer still can avoid liability if it demonstrates
“that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the unlawful motive.” Ozburn-Hessey,
833 F.3d at 218 (cleaned up).

        Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the General Counsel met its
burden under Wright Line. The layoff notice itself demonstrates that NY Paving harbored animus
against Local 175 for filing grievances against the company. See Board Op. 4 (it is “not disputed”
that NY Paving knew about the prior grievances); id. (layoff notice “amount[ed] to direct evidence
of animus”). As the Board noted, “[i]n three separate portions of the layoff notice,” NY Paving
blamed Local 175 and its grievances for the layoffs, leaving “no doubt” that NY Paving undertook
the layoffs, at least in part, to retaliate against Local 175 for its protected activity. Id. That finding
was bolstered by NY Paving’s demonstrated animus against Local 175 in two prior Board cases,
as well as by NY Paving’s shifting justifications for the layoffs. Id. at 5.

         Because the General Counsel met its burden under Wright Line, the burden shifted to NY
Paving to demonstrate “that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the unlawful
motive.” Ozburn-Hessey, 833 F.3d at 218 (cleaned up). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s
conclusion that NY Paving did not meet that burden. First, although NY Paving pointed to the
retirement of one of its managers as evidence that it would have laid off the asphalt pavers in any
event, nothing connected that retirement of a single individual “to the need for such a large-scale
layoff.” Board Op. 5. Second, even though NY Paving argued that it always conducts layoffs in
preparation for a winter slowdown in paving work, “[i]n each of the [four] years prior to the 2019
layoffs, [NY Paving] had laid off only five to eight employees in the asphalt unit,” far fewer than
the thirty-five here. Id. at 6. Third, though NY Paving argued that Local 175’s crew-size grievance
economically necessitated the layoffs, it “failed to produce evidence corroborating its defense,

                                                    3
such as financial information demonstrating that the [grievance] created financial hardship
justifying the layoffs.” Id.

        NY Paving’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. NY Paving argues that the Board
erred in relying on NY Paving’s demonstrated animus towards Local 175 in prior cases because
those cases occurred too long ago. But the Board concluded that its precedents allow consideration
of prior cases as evidence of animus when they show a pattern of behavior. Board Op. 5. That
interpretation is reasonable and we “must give deference to [the Board’s] interpretations of its own
precedents.” Pac. Coast Supply, LLC v. NLRB, 801 F.3d 321, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
Most relevantly, the Board’s conclusion that NY Paving’s prior cases were not too remote was
reasonable on this record because, as the ALJ found, NY Paving had not fully implemented the
Board’s remedies from one of those prior cases by the time of the layoffs at issue in this case.
Board Op. 5 n.12, 29. So the prior violation remained close in time.

        Next, although NY Paving denies that its justifications for the layoffs were inconsistent
and insists that it would have laid off the asphalt pavers in any event, the Board reasonably
concluded that the record shows otherwise. The initial layoff notice primarily attributed the layoffs
to Local 175’s prior grievances and the retirement of one of NY Paving’s managers. Board Op. 5.
After Local 175 filed this case, NY Paving attributed the layoffs to a seasonal slowdown in paving
work and the manager’s retirement, suddenly falling silent about Local 175’s prior grievances. Id.
at 5, 31. Since we reverse the Board’s factual determinations only when “the record is so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find to the contrary,” Inova Health Sys., 795
F.3d at 80 (cleaned up), the fact that NY Paving offered different reasons for the layoffs at different
times, Board Op. 5, is itself sufficient to sustain the Board’s factual finding of animus.

          NY Paving’s other arguments were not raised before the Board, and therefore are
forfeited. 1 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (“No objection that has not been urged before the Board
. . . shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be
excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). That the Board considered some of those
issues does not obviate NY Paving’s obligation to raise objections; we are barred from reviewing
issues “not presented to the Board, even where the Board has discussed and decided” those issues.
HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 798 F.3d 1059, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original)
(cleaned up). We cannot reach NY Paving’s forfeited arguments, and we express no view on the
Board’s discussion of those arguments.

                                                   B.

       Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s determination that NY Paving violated the
Act by failing to engage in effects bargaining. See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666, 681 (1981) (“There is no dispute that the union must be given a significant opportunity to

1
     Those forfeited arguments are (1) that Local 175’s grievance activities were not protected by the Act
because the grievance was filed by the union, not by employees; and (2) that NY Paving’s layoff notice
was protected by Section 8(c) of the Act. NY Paving also failed to preserve the argument that its layoff
notice was protected by the First Amendment, but NY Paving does not attempt to raise that argument here.
                                                    4
bargain about . . . matters of job security as part of the ‘effects’ bargaining mandated by [Section]
8(a)(5).”); NLRB v. Ingredion Inc., 930 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1)). Here, NY Paving did not inform Local
175 of the layoffs until December 20, 2019, the day on which the layoffs began. The Board
reasonably concluded that the decision was a “fait accompli” at that point, and it was too late for
any “meaningful” bargaining. Board Op. 36. 2

        NY Paving’s challenges to the Board’s conclusion are unconvincing. First, it contends that
there was no bargaining requirement because its decision was economically motivated. But
employers must still bargain over the effects on employees in such situations. See First Nat’l
Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 681–82. Second, NY Paving argues that it notified Local 175 of the
layoffs at a mediation on October 25, 2019. But the referenced statements were vague, noting only
that layoffs “could” ensue. Board Op. 36–37. Third, NY Paving argues that it did not actually
implement the layoffs until January 1, 2020, which, in its view, gave Local 175 sufficient notice.
As the ALJ and the Board observed, however, the layoff notice itself suggested that the layoffs
were being implemented immediately. Id. at 36 n.60. And, in any event, the ALJ and the Board
reasonably determined that a ten-day period that included Christmas, Hanukkah, and New Year’s
Day was not sufficient to allow meaningful bargaining. Id.

                                                  IV.

         In summary, substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusions that NY Paving laid
off its asphalt pavers in retaliation for protected union activity, and that NY Paving failed to engage
in effects bargaining. We accordingly deny NY Paving’s petition and grant the Board’s cross-
application for enforcement.

                                              *   *     *

        Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition
for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41.

                                            Per Curiam

                                                               FOR THE COURT:
                                                               Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                        BY:    /s/
                                                               Daniel J. Reidy
                                                               Deputy Clerk

2
    The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings and conclusions on the effects-bargaining issue. See Board
Op. 1 n.2.
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