Court Opinion

ID: 9551875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:01:27.263682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:53.104040
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, J.,
dissenting: Limitations on time preclude full expression of my views in this case. A single claim was advanced at trial and is involved in this appeal. It was claimed that General Motors was negligent in the design of the TS-24 scraper because the machine was not reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was intended.
What was claimed and what was proved by the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was that the scraper was defective in the sense its design created an unreasonable risk of injury to operators and others working in its vicinity, and that under some environmental circumstances it could neither be turned nor stopped quickly. The plaintiffs’ claim the steering system was defectively designed was amply supported by General Motors’ own witness, Mr. Cadou, who testified he related in his written report in 1957, to Mr. Schindler, then in charge of hydraulic systems for General Motors, that “[t]he steering effort or torque is not great enough in some situations”; that “[t]he steering system is erratic,” and that “[m]uch of the criticism, insofar as turning torque is concerned, comes as a result of low pump pressure due to . . . low engine speed . . .” Cadou’s report concluded that, “some consideration could be given the refinement and improvement of the steering control system to provide better response characteristics.”
The recommendation was ignored and the steering response was not corrected, but remained essentially the same in the present *24scraper. Moreover, and with respect to the braking system, the plaintiffs’ evidence was that an adequate braking system is designed for military vehicles, but General Motors’ evidence was that such a system could not be so designed for commercial scrapers. It is obvious the jury did not accept General Motors’ evidence.
It is a rule of long standing that this court will not overturn findings of fact where the evidence is such that reasonable minds might differ. Likewise, with respect to the sufficiency of evidence, this court may not weigh the evidence or pass upon the credibility of any witness, but is required to- consider all of the plaintiff’s evidence as true, giving it the most favorable inference, disregarding that which is unfavorable, and may not weigh any difference between the direct and cross-examination. The court’s holding today violates these fundamental principles in that it unduly relies on testimony which was contradictory to, or inconsistent with, the testimony favorable to the plaintiffs, and which was rejected by the trier of the facts.
The district court permitted the plaintiffs’ witness Professor Sevart, to qualify and testify as an expert witness. His testimony was based upon facts which afforded a reasonable, accurate basis for the conclusions reached, and, thereafter, his credibility was strictly jury work.
In Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 Kan. 538, 431 P. 2d 518, the court considered the circumstances under which the opinion of an expert witness should go to the jury, and it was said:
“. . . The test of competency of an expert witness is whether he discloses sufficient knowledge of his subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury. (K. S. A. 60-419, 60-456.) Where an expert witness had disclosed a sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the question of degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence than to admissibility . . .” (l. c. 548, 549.)
In Grohusky v. Atlas Assurance Co., 195 Kan. 626, 408 P. 2d 697, this court considered the function of a district court regarding an expert witness, and said:
“. . . Fundamentally, the expert must be qualified to impart to the jury knowledge within the scope of his special skill and experience that is otherwise unavailable to the jury from other sources. The district court has the primary function to determine whether or not a witness is an expert. (2 Wigmore, 3rd Ed., Evidence, Sec. 561, [1940].) . . (l. c. 630.)
Grohusky was followed and approved in McElhaney v. Rouse, 197 Kan. 136, 144, 415 P. 2d 241. See, also, Temple v. Continental *25Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 320 P. 2d 1039, where this court stated the rule with respect to the admission of expert testimony and the weight and conclusiveness to be given thereto. It was held that the admission of expert testimony was for the court, and its weight was for the trier of the facts. See K. S. A. 60-456, and the case annotations.
Time does not permit a detailing of Professor Sevart’s testimony. In my judgment, it was sufficient to show the scraper was defective in the sense the design of the braking system and the steering system created an unreasonable risk, making the machine unsafe for the purpose for which it was intended, including any emergency use which could be reasonably anticipated. The jury accepted the plaintiffs’ evidence as true, and this court may not weigh conflicting evidence. Findings of a jury determined on conflicting evidence are conclusive. See Winn v. Sampson Construction Co., 194 Kan. 136, 398 P. 2d 272.
I would affirm the judgment.
Fontron, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.