Court Opinion

ID: 9459970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:36:43.527337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:24.856393
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge
(sitting by designation) (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. While I agree that the “balancing test” set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) must be applied in this ease, I believe the majority has seriously misapplied that test to the facts presented by this case.
The first of the four factors to be weighed under the Barker v. Wingo approach to determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied a speedy trial is the length of the delay. I fully agree with the majority that a twenty-eight month delay is sufficient to “trigger” a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. See e. g., United States v. Holt, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 448 F.2d 1108 cert, denied, 404 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 292, 30 L.Ed.2d 257 (1971).
The second factor to be weighed is the reason for the delay given by government. The majority here conclude that because the government has offered no explanation for the twenty-eight month hiatus between the arrest of the appellants and their indictment, “[t]his factor must be weighed in favor of appellants.” I am not persuaded that such a conclusion is warranted without a specific finding in the district court as to *755the reason for the delay. While the majority are no doubt correct that appellants’ motions to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial “invited the Government to explain or justify the delay, [and] the Government apparently did not do so,” it should be kept in mind that all such motions were heard and the trial below was completed before the Supreme Court released its opinion in Barker. The government may have believed at the time the question of delay was raised in this case that it did not have to divulge its reasons, if any. While I agree that Barker should apply here, I favor giving the government a post-Barker opportunity to establish the reason for this delay, and would thus remand this case to the district court. See United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Scafo, 470 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Valot, 473 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1973).
The third factor to be considered under the Barker v. Wingo approach is whether a defendant seeking to establish denial of a speedy trial has made a demand, for a speedy trial. In Barker the Court advised:
We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.
Neither of the appellants in this ease ever demanded a speedy trial. Both appellants did move to have their indictments dismissed for lack of a speedy trial, but after that motion was denied in November, 1970, neither party opposed the further delays that postponed trial until June, 1972.
The majority state that we should not expect defendants to demand a speedy trial before they have been indicted, since “a person who has been arrested but not charged will always nourish the hope that the Government will decide not to prosecute.” There is no support in Barker or in logic for making the indictment process such a critical watershed in this area of constitutional law.
Appellants’ silence here is easily explained by the well-known (and perfectly legitimate) interest of many criminal defendants in seeking to delay trial as long as possible. The Barker opinion itself refers to this:
More important than the absence of serious prejudice, is the fact that Barker did not want a speedy trial. * * * [T]he record strongly suggests that while he hoped to take advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, he definitely did not want to be tried.
407 U.S. at 534-535, 92 S.Ct. at 2194.
Appellants have demonstrated no interest in seeking an expeditious trial; their only motion was to dismiss the complaint after the delay between arrest and indictment. The majority here permit the appellants to have it both ways. Appellants are exempted from the important requirement imposed by Barker that they should assert their right to a speedy trial and are then permitted to acquiesce in successive further delays which postponed their trial for nineteen additional months.
Turning to the fourth and final factor to be considered in evaluating a denial of a speedy trial claim-prejudice to defendants, the majority here find the delay “extraordinary” and “extreme” and “prejudice manifest.” I, to the contrary, find prejudice minimal or, more likely, nonexistent, and the delay simply unexplained. In its consideration of prejudice in Barker, the Court identified three interests to be protected: (1) preventing “oppressive pretrial incarceration,” (2) minimizing “anxiety and concern of the accused,” and (3) limiting “the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.
While there is no claim of oppressive incarceration, the majority state that they have found both remaining types of prejudice in this case. There is no disputing that the anxiety and concern of *756the accused is an important interest protected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). It seems quite obvious, however, that the prejudice described here is tied in closely with the demand for a speedy trial which Barker also envisions. If their “anxiety and concern” were truly important to them, appellants were free to demand an expeditious trial. In referring to a defendant’s “responsibility to assert his right” to a speedy trial, the Court in Barker noted that “[t]he strength of [a defendant’s] efforts [to assert this right] will be affected * * * most particularly by the personal prejudice * * * that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.” 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192.
If, however, delaying their trial as much as possible was a countervailing consideration, and this may be surmised from the absence of any indication of interest on the part of appellants in an early trial, then it appears to me that little weight should be given to their anxiety and concern.
As to the prejudice to defendants because the lack of a speedy trial impaired their defense efforts, the majority find two instances of this prejudice here. Before trial was had in this case, one of the co-defendants died. Although it is not certain that this defendant would have testified and thus possibly helped appellants’ cases, death of a potential witness is an event which prejudices a party seeking to establish denial of a speedy trial under Barker, 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S.Ct. 2182. It is not clear, however, that this co-defendant died during the twenty-eight month period here complained of. Appellants were indicted in August and September of 1970; the death of the co-defendant was not suggested to the Court until March, 1971. Certainly the death of a co-defendant during a time when appellants are not opposing continuances should not weigh heavily (if at all) in the “balancing” of factors prescribed by Barker. And can there be any doubt that if appellants had been making the demand for speedy trial envisioned by Barker from the time of their arrest in August of 1968 that their case would have come to trial long before the death of their co-defendant was brought to the attention of the court?
The majority also note that there is positive evidence in this record that the memories of witnesses faded in the long hiatus between arrest and trial.
This, it is said, prejudiced the appellants’ ability to defend themselves. The evidence referred to by the majority is, of course, a reference by the government to its own witness’s fading memory. This is not prejudice to the appellants. Faded memories of prosecution witnesses are without doubt precisely what appellants had been hoping for since their arrest almost four years earlier.
In balancing the factors relevant to a determination whether there has been a denial of a speedy trial, I am not inclined to weigh in favor of appellants the apparent failure of the government to explain the twenty-eight month delay in this case. Since, the Barker approach was announced after proceedings in the district court had been completed, I favor remanding this case for a hearing to determine the reasons for the delay encountered here.
If an acceptable explanation is proffered, this should then be weighed against the slight prejudice which may have been suffered by these defendants as a result of their apparent acquiescence in the delay of four years which occurred here between arrest and trial.
I would vote to remand.