Court Opinion

ID: 9723266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:09:12.637035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:46.308581
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I would reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for trial.
Defendants’ position is that, assuming for purposes of argument that the events leading up to and resulting in the termination of plaintiff’s employment were based upon plaintiff’s nonunion status, their respective roles in such events constituted conduct prohibited by 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1) and (3) and (b)(1) and (2) and therefore clearly preempted from state court jurisdiction under the broad principles of preemption announced in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.
The most recent discussion of the preemption doctrine by the United States Supreme Court is found in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338, wherein the Court summarized the various exceptions to the Garmon doctrine. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842; Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396; Walles v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Iowa, 252 N.W.2d 701; Bebensee v. Ross Pierce Electric Corp., 400 Mich. 233, 253 N.W.2d 633; Cox, “Labor Law Preemption Revisited,” 85 Harv.L.Rev. *5051337 (1972); Bryson, “A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights,” 51 Tex.L.Rev. 1037 (1973).
We need not speculate whether in the absence of our right-to-work law plaintiffs claim would fall within the exception created by the decision in Farmer, supra, or one of the other exceptions discussed therein, for I conclude that under the exceptions to exclusive federal jurisdiction recognized by the United States Supreme Court as arising from a state’s interest in vindicating the provisions of its right-to-work law, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s suit.
In Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691, the Court acknowledged that § 14(b) was included within the Taft-Hartley Act to forestall the inference that federal policy regarding the regulation of union security agreements was intended to be exclusive. In reaching this conclusion the Court stated:
“It is argued, however, that the effect of this section [§ 14(b)] is to displace State law which ‘regulates’ but does not wholly ‘prohibit’ agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. But if there could be any doubt that the language of the section means that the Act shall not be construed to authorize any ‘application’ of a union-security contract, such as discharging an employee, which under the circumstances ‘is prohibited’ by the State, the legislative history of the section would dispel it.” 336 U.S. at 314, 69 S.Ct. at 591, 93 L.Ed. at 702.
Any doubt that the states retained jurisdiction to enforce their right-to-work laws was laid to rest by the two Schermerhorn decisions. In Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 83 S.Ct. 1461, 10 L.Ed.2d 678, the Court held that § 14(b) permits the states to prohibit agency shop agreements. After reargument on the preemption question, the Court held that state courts have jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of state right-to-work laws that prohibit agency shop agreements. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179. See also, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 96 S.Ct. 2140, 48 L.Ed.2d 736; Communications Workers v. Western Electric Co., Inc., Colo., 551 P.2d 1065; Ficek v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, N.D., 219 N.W.2d 860, and cases cited therein.
Defendants contend that because the agreement between the union and Swift Brothers provides for nothing more than a nondiscriminatory hiring hall arrangement of a type that has received sanction under federal law, Local 357 Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 81 S.Ct. 835, 6 L.Ed.2d 11, and because several federal courts have held that a nondiscriminatory hiring hall agreement may not be prohibited under the provisions of a state’s right-to-work law, see NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors, 5 Cir., 349 F.2d 449; Laborers’ International Local 107 v. Kunco, Inc., 8 Cir., 472 F.2d 456; NLRB v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 9 Cir., 353 F.2d 768, the agreement in question gives plaintiff no right of action cognizable by the courts of our state.
Although the Supreme Court held in Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 10 L.Ed.2d 638, that a claim by a union member against his union based upon the alleged refusal of the union to refer him for employment under a hiring hall agreement was within the jurisdiction of the NLRB and that the state court was without jurisdiction to consider the claim, the holding did not discuss the effect of the state’s right-to-work law on the question of jurisdiction. As the Court explained in the Farmer case, supra, concurrent state court jurisdiction over such a claim would have impaired significantly the functioning of the federal system because a state court determination that held hiring hall procedures unlawful would render meaningless the earlier approval of those same procedures by the NLRB. 430 U.S. at 298, 97 S.Ct. at 1063, 51 L.Ed.2d at 350, n. 9. Again, however, the Court had no occasion *506to consider whether a claim of unlawful discrimination in violation of a state right-to-work law would be preempted under federal law.
I conclude that under the principles expressed in the Schermerhorn and Farmer cases, supra, plaintiff’s claim is not preempted from state court jurisdiction. The conflict between state and federal law has been sanctioned by Congress, with the states having been given authority to bar the execution and enforcement of union security agreements. Once granted such authority, perforce a state has a substantial interest in protecting the rights its citizens have under the provisions of the state’s right-to-work law. The potential for interference with federal regulation is reduced, if not eliminated, for the vindication of the provisions of a state’s right-to-work law is not within the area of primary federal concern and is not part of the federal regulatory scheme.
Because this case was decided below on defendants' motions for summary judgment, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff. SDCL 15-6-56(a); Wilson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19.
“[A] party moving for summary judgment is not entitled to a judgment merely because the facts he offers appear more plausible than those tendered in opposition, or because it appears that the adversary is unlikely to prevail at trial.” 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725, p. 514.
Moreover, “[T]he evidence presented to the court always is construed in favor of the party opposing the motion and he is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from it.” Id. § 2727, p. 526.
It is possible to draw the inference from Adler’s deposition testimony that the project agreement would not have been signed had Swift Brothers not agreed to terminate plaintiff’s employment and refer him to the union for referral back to the job. In response to a question whether he would have signed the agreement in spite of plaintiff’s nonunion status, Adler testified that he would have been forced to take up the grievance procedure that was contained in the preexisting contract the union had with Swift Brothers. Accordingly, I cannot say that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, for under the evidence presented by the record genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to plaintiff’s allegation that his employment was terminated as a result of an agreement between Swift Brothers and the union to discharge him because of his nonunion status. I would therefore reverse the judgment entered in favor of defendants and remand the case to the circuit court for trial.