Court Opinion

ID: 9734748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:44:57.31657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:50.990782
License: Public Domain

*741Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that trying defendant on the supplemental charge before a new jury would violate his right against twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.
Assuming arguendo that the Court in People v Thomas Johnson, 94 Mich App 551; 288 NW2d 456 (1980), correctly held that jeopardy attaches for purposes of the recidivist charge at the time the jury is sworn on the underlying charge,1 it does not follow that where defendant succeeds in getting the charges dismissed on procedural grounds, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents him from being charged anew.
In the case at bar, the supplemental information was filed sufficiently in advance of trial to afford defendant notice of the time, place, and nature of the prior convictions so that he could prepare a defense. The record indicates that through an oversight on behalf of the prosecutor, defendant was never arraigned on the supplemental information. Defense counsel, well aware of the oversight, did not request an arraignment but, as part of his trial strategy, waited until the jury had convicted defendant on the underlying charge to object to the failure to arraign him on the supplemental information.
While it is true that defendant does not have the duty to request an arraignment, it is also true that such proceeding may be waived. By thus waiting to object to the defect until trial and objecting to the prosecutor’s request to try the defendant on the supplemental charge before the jury already empaneled, defendant, in essence, *742consented to dismissal of the jury. Trying defendant on the charge in the supplemental information does not constitute a repeated attempt at conviction of a defendant who has been factually acquitted of the charge. Rather, as stated in United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 96; 98 S Ct 2187; 57 L Ed 2d 65 (1978), "[i]t is instead a picture of a defendant who chooses to avoid conviction and imprisonment, not because of his assertion that the Government has failed to make out a case against him, but because of a legal claim that the Government’s case against him must fail even though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”. In the case at bar, there was no ruling consisting of a resolution in defendant’s favor of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. Id., 97. Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not present a bar to arraignment and trial on the supplemental information. See also People v Anderson, 409 Mich 474; 295 NW2d 482 (1980). I would reverse the order of the trial court quashing the supplemental information and remand for arraignment on the charge stated therein.

This rule would not cover the situation where the habitual offender information was not filed until after defendant’s conviction under the exception in People v Hendrick, 398 Mich 410; 247 NW2d 840 (1976). MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085.