Court Opinion

ID: 9671097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:30:54.03316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.158753
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(dissenting). The majority holds that when a landlord is on notice that his or her tenant is keeping a dangerous dog on the rented premises in violation of the lease, the landlord is not responsible if that dog attacks and injures someone within the foreseeable zone of danger even though the parents of an earlier victim had warned the landlord before the latest attack that the dog was dangerous and asked the landlord to make his tenants get rid of the dog.1 I respectfully dissent.
Under the facts as alleged in this case, I believe that Joseph Fons, the landlord here, had a duty to enforce the "no pets" clause in the lease after he learned that his tenants were harboring a dangerous dog. "A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone." A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484, 214 N.W.2d 764, 766 (1974). This is true "even though the *771nature of that harm and the identity of the harmed person or harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act." Id., 62 Wis. 2d at 483, 214 N.W.2d at 766. Here, although the ultimate victim was unknown, the nature of the harm was patent.
Under Wisconsin law, a tortfeasor is liable to an injured plaintiff "if there is an unbroken chain of causation from the negligent act to the injury sustained and if the negligence is a substantial factor," unless public-policy considerations intervene. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 515, 523a-523b, 219 N.W.2d 576, 577 (1974) (per curiam, on reconsideration). There was such an unbroken chain here. The crux of the public-policy analysis is whether the imposition of liability would "shock the conscience of society." Rolph v. EBI Companies, 159 Wis. 2d 518, 534, 464 N.W.2d 667, 672-673 (1991). Imposition of liability here is well within the ambit of the doctrine announced by A.E. Investment Corp., and, in my view, is not barred by public-policy considerations.
The majority, as did the trial court, reads Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 227 N.W.2d 907 (1975), as barring the plaintiffs' action. Accepting for the sake of this discussion the majority's conclusion that the portion of Gonzales upon which it relies is a "holding" and not dictum, I do not agree that Gonzales is dispositive under the facts of this case that we must accept as true.
As the majority recognizes, Gonzales was an attractive-nuisance case. Id., 68 Wis. 2d at 155-156, 227 N.W.2d at 909. In Gonzales's passing reference to the landlord's common-law negligence, it noted, without even discussing the broad principle it had so recently set out in A.E. Investment, that the landlord had no "dominion over the dog," and that any liability under a common-law negligence theory rested merely *772on "the ownership and control of the premises," which, by themselves, did not create a duty to the plaintiffs. Id., 68 Wis. 2d at 158, 227 N.W.2d at 910. Here, in contrast, the dog should not have been on the premises. The dog would not have been on the premises if Fons had enforced the lease and heeded the warning given to him by the parents of the earlier victim. Unlike the situation in Gonzales, the plaintiffs here are not seeking to hold Fons liable as "an insurer for the acts of his tenant," ibid., but, rather, for refusing to enforce the lease provision under circumstances when it was "foreseeable" that his refusal "may cause harm to someone," A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 484, 214 N.W.2d at 766 ("A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone.").
Although I agree with the majority that Fons is not liable under § 174.02(1), STATS., or under the plaintiffs' third-party-beneficiary theory, I would reverse and remand for trial on the common-law negligence claim.

 The plaintiffs contend that the assertions of fact in this sentence are true. Although the defendants argue that they are not, this case was dismissed on summary judgment. We must, as did the trial court, accept the assertions of fact as correct in determining whether the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.