Court Opinion

ID: 9825103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 12:05:02.967457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:30.490659
License: Public Domain

Petition for rehearing denied February 18, 1947
ON PETITION FOE REHEARING
(177P. (2d) 422)
The petition for a rehearing asserts:
“1. That the Court erred in not confining its decision to the error of the lower court in its finding that waiting time was picking up and delivering, but, instead thereof, based its conclusion upon the theory that the waiting, time was transportation, which point appellant has had no chance to argue before this Court;
“2. That the Court erred in not giving strict construction to a taxing statute but broadened the definition of the statute by including in ‘transportation’ all accessorial services in connection therewith.”
The brief filed in support of the above contentions begins thus:
“Appellant brought this case to the Supreme Court in the belief that it was appealing from a judgment in a law action and not an equity decree. This belief was founded upon the fact that the proceedings below were filed and tried pursuant to statutory law (Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act — Sec. 6-601, O. C. L. A., ét seq.). Under such *452circumstances we assumed that the appeal would not be a trial de novo. * * * We believe that this Court (if this is properly a law action) is empowered only to review the decision below and has no original jurisdiction to try issues not appealed to it. ’ ’
Our Declaratory Judgments Act (§6-601 to and including § 6-616, O. C. L. Á.) is the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act which was written by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The act repeatedly uses in alternative form the words ‘ ‘ judgment ’ ’ and ‘ ‘ decree ’ ’. The former is appropriate to a proceeding in a court of law; the latter is normally used only in-equity courts.
The final order of the circuit court from which the appellant appealed was entitled by the circuit court a decree. The complaint which instituted the proceeding commenced thus: “Plaintiff, for cause of suit against the defendant * * *.” Its brief, referring to the circuit court proceedings, stated: “Consolidated thereupon brought suit for a declaratory judgment * * *. From a decree of the court below * * * this appeal was taken. ” The last words of the brief follow: “Wherefore, plaintiff-appellant prays that the decision and decree of the lower court be reversed. ’ ’
Section 6-615, O. C. L. A., being section 15 of the Uniform Act, says:
“This act-shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the.law of those states which enact it, and to harmonize, so far as possible,' with Federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees.”
The section of the Uniform Act which invokes uniformity. qf judicial interpretation is frequently over*453looked. Nothing is gained through uniformity of legislation unless it is followed by uniformity of judicial interpretation.
From Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, (2d) 238, we now quote:
“As already observed, the power granted by the declaratory judgment statutes is more strictly a direction to use an existing power than an authorization of new power. As Bankes, L. J., remarked in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co., ‘I cannot doubt that had the Court of Chancery of those days (before 1852) thought it expedient to make mere declaratory judgments they would have claimed and exercised the right to do so.’ Again, it is both historically and traditionally a power exercised primarily by courts of equity, and even where exercised by law courts it is largely equitable in nature. It is so treated by several courts, which have reserved the fullest liberty in moulding decrees to the necessities of the occasion, regardless of the prayer, although only occasionally do they impose conditions, as in the case of pure equitable decrees. In truth, the source of the power ought not to be considered as of any other than historical importance, for in principle declaratory relief is sui generis and is as much legal as equitable. It is, for example, not subject to the restrictions of equity that irreparable injury or inadequacy of the legal remedy be alleged or proved, although equitable defenses, such as laches and unclean hands, may induce a court in the exercise of its discretion not to issue a declaration. Since it is not purely an equitable action, it escapes some of the technicalities of equitable procedure. For example, were it purely equitable, the action of an alleged infringer against a patentee for a declaration of invalidity of the patent and non-infringement would have required the joining as a defendant of an exclusive licensee who, living *454in another district, would have been impossible to serve and compel; but as a declaratory action, such joinder was deemed unnecessary. Where for some reason the petition for a declaration is regarded as a pure request for an equitable remedy in a case where other considerations persuade the court that a pending action at law gives full opportunity for equitable defenses and full relief, the declaration may be declined. More doubtful is the propriety of a dismissal rather than transfer on the calendar where the action at law, though considered more appropriate, has not yet been brought.
“In granting declarations construing contracts, wills or other written instruments, courts often consider themselves endowed with the inherent powers of a court of equity. Relief is sometimes granted and procedure made flexible in a way beyond the powers of a court of equity. It is roughly true to suggest, asp did the Supreme Court of Ohio, that the declaratory judgment was adopted at least in part to fill the gap between law and equity. In addition, however, it was adopted to simplify procedure so far as possible and to give relief both in cases where coercive remedies were also available and beyond, where equity failed or had not perceived the need of or opportunity for judicial relief. But since history is often a reliable guide to interpretation and policy, the equitable characteristics of the relief warrant special attention. Doubts in matters of pleading and practice, including parties, should be resolved in favor of analogies from equitable proceedings.”
From Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, § 56, the following is taken:
“When the history of a declaratory judgment action is looked to and taken into consideration, under whatever name it existed, whether it was one of the writs at ancient common law, or quia *455timet in equity, this matter becomes rather easy of solution; and it is submitted that such actions may not be placed strictly in one category or the other.
“However, decisions are not wanting which broadly announce the rule that declaratory actions are equitable and governed by equitable principles, and occasionally a sporadic adjudication is to be •encountered, which declares outright, they are simply and exclusively equitable actions and legal rights of actions may not trespass upon the domain occupied by them as such; and that when a legal defense is interposed in a declaratory judgment action, it is so purely equitable that the relief will not be granted; but these decisions proceed without taking into account the ancient character of declaratory actions and the fact that they existed at common law before the advent of the equitable system of jurisprudence.
* # * %
“There is another line of cases that, while not holding declaratory judgment actions to be strictly equitable, still hold them to be in the nature of equitable proceedings, or as partaking of some of the characteristics thereof. On the other hand, it is held that declaratory actions are properly classified as actions at law. To add to these various classifications, there are other adjudications holding that they are neither legal nor equitable, but are sui generis.
“It would seem that all of these positions are unsound, and that none of them can be sustained upon sound principles. It is not so much a matter of classification of the declaratory judgment action that is of importance, as it is. the right and duty of the courts to grant the declaratory relief in any action where it ought to be granted.
“The only sound position that can be taken with respect to such classification is that it partakes of the properties of both legal actions and suits in *456equity, and that the court will apply the rules with respect thereto as the nature of the case seems to demand; that at times a declaratory judgment action may properly be classified as legal, carrying with it the attendant right to a jury trial; and that at other times, it may correctly be designated as a suit in equity, warranting the issuance of an injunction, and authorizing the granting of extraordinary relief generally.
“When the history and development of the granting of declaratory rights is considered, beginning at the earliest times when the common-law writs were used for that purpose, and then later, when these writs were supplanted by the action of quia timet in equity, on down to the enactment of the present day statutes, it is clear that the. declaratory judgment action, is both legal and equitable; and this position finds support in the modern adjudicated cases. ’ ’
The New Jersey courts construe the Uniform Act as applicable only to equitable rights and deem proceedings under it as purely equitable in character. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 2d ed., page 241, and Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, page 158. But other courts which have analyzed the nature of the proceedings authorized by the Uniform Act announced views similar to those set forth in the excerpts which preceding paragraphs of this opinion took from Borchard and Anderson; see Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206; Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 266 N. W. 921; Lamb v. Wills, 72 Ohio App. 496, 53 N. E. (2d) 530; Strype v. Lewis, 352 Mo. 1004, 180 S. W. (2d) 688, 155 A. L. R. 99; Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. (2d) 251, 155 A. L. R. 495; and Manchester v. Townshend, 110 Vt. 136, 2 Atl. (2d) 207; Id., 109 Vt. 65, 192 Atl. 22, 110 A. L. R. 811. Pacific Indemnity Co. *457v. McDonald, 107 Fed. (2d) 446, 31 A. L. R. 208, (9th Circuit), says:
“The nature of an action for declaratory relief is correctly stated in the appellee’s brief. It ‘is neither legal nor equitable, but sui generis.’ In Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, p. 120, it is stated: ‘Declaratory relief is neither strictly equitable nor legal, although, as will presently be observed, its historical sources are almost exclusively equitable’.”
The opinions just cited reflect a conception that declaratory judgment proceedings are sui generis, but subject in the main to the rules which govern causes in the equity courts. The fact that such proceedings have not been permitted to become shackled by outmoded and inappropriate procedure is due to the enlightened view which both the bench and the bar today take of procedural reforms intended to render the courts more useful.
Precedents such as the above, which construe statutes that are intended to create uniformity of law, are entitled to great weight. To refuse to follow them because of some minor difference of opinion would defeat one of the important purposes of such acts; that is, to gain uniformity of law.
We believe that the practice of this state has constantly deemed declaratory judgment proceedings as sui generis, but controlled largely by equity practice. See, for example, Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove, 170 Or. 256, 130 P. (2d) 1013, 144 A.L.R. 286; Central Oregon Irrigation District v. Deschutes Co., 168 Or. 493, 124 P. (2d) 518; and New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Hyde, 148 Or. 229, 34 P. (2d) 930, 35 P. (2d) 980. Section 13-715, O. C. L. A., says:
“When jurisdiction is, by the organic law of this *458state, or by this code or any other statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer, all the means to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code. ’ ’
The close affinity of declaratory judgment proceedings with equity suits, due possibly to the fact that the inspiration to write declaratory judgment statutes came from ancient powers possessed by the chancellor, is shown by the fact that, in this state at least, it has become common to accompany the petition for a declaration with a prayer for relief of a purely equitable character, such as an injunction. In fact, the supplementary equitable relief which is sometimes sought seems to engross the primary purpose of the proceeding. See generally the annotation, 155 A. L. R. 501.
Without setting forth further analysis, we express our conclusion that declaratory judgment proceedings, although sui generis, are governed largely by equity practice. Such being our belief, it follows that, upon appeal from a declaratory decree, this court is not bound by the findings of fact entered in the circuit court. In the present instance, no findings of fact were entered by the circuit court. The language which we quoted from the petition for a rehearing has reference, not to findings, but to a memorandum opinion which the trial judge filed.
The petition for a rehearing and its accompanying brief have received careful attention. We remain satisfied with the opinion we announced in this case.
The petition for a rehearing is denied.