Court Opinion

ID: 9965545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 18:09:20.430484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:11.220036
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Fips, 2024-Ohio-1692.]
                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                            No. 113061
                 v.                              :

QUENTIN FIPS,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 2, 2024

           Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
                              Case No. CR-22-667110-A

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Andrew Boyko, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

        {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Quentin Fips (“Fips”), appeals his convictions

and sentences. We affirm.
      {¶2} Fips was convicted of trafficking cocaine, a first-degree felony, in

violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); and drug possession, a first-degree felony, in

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). The trial court sentenced Fips to four years in prison

to be served consecutively to another prison term imposed from a previous case.

I.    Facts and Procedural History

      {¶3} On August 15, 2021, Detective James Allender (“Det. Allender”)

received a complaint about drug activity at a home. Det. Allender received this

complaint because he is a member of the Cleveland Division of Police’s

Neighborhood Impact Community Engagement Unit (“NICE”), which targets

specific neighborhoods to reduce criminal activity, focusing on fugitives, gun

suppression, and tracking narcotics.      Det. Allender began investigating and

conducted surveillance on the home in question.

      {¶4} On January 19, 2022, during the aforementioned surveillance,

Det. Allender observed a white Chevy Suburban (“Suburban”) parked in the

driveway. Det. Allender immediately noticed the vehicle because it was the first

time in five months that he had observed a vehicle parked at the home, blocking

the sidewalk. During a 45-minute period, Det. Allender observed over six vehicles

briefly park in the street. One of the passengers of the Suburban would exit the

vehicle and briefly engage with occupants of the other vehicles. Other times the

passengers of the other vehicles would exit their vehicle and engage with the

occupants of the Suburban. From what Det. Allender observed, he believed the
interactions were hand-to-hand drug transactions. As the vehicles involved with

the Suburban left the scene, Det. Allender informed other NICE team members

about the vehicles’ descriptions so that they could perform investigatory traffic

stops. The other officers conducted three or four stops, and during one of the stops,

Officer Michael Schade (“Ofc. Schade”) spoke to a woman driver who spit out

cocaine rocks onto the bed of her truck.

      {¶5} Ofc. Schade informed Det. Allender, who then directed his team to

approach the Suburban. Detective Taylor Bohen (“Det. Bohen”) observed several

occupants in the Suburban and approached the driver’s side. He ordered the driver

to place his hands outside of the window. The driver of the vehicle was Fips, and

he complied with Det. Bohen’s demands and was detained.              The other two

occupants, Hector Martinez (“Martinez”) and Robert Fips (“Robert”), were also

detained and searched. Det. Bohen observed a marijuana blunt in the center

console of the vehicle.

      {¶6} Other detectives searched the Suburban and found two digital scales

with cocaine residue. In various locations within the Suburban, they also found a

large amount of cash, two loaded firearms, and a nylon bag. The firearms had a

bullet in the chamber, and the nylon bag contained Fentanyl, Tramadol, and crack

cocaine. Detectives also found two small bags of cocaine and marijuana on

Martinez. Martinez told the detectives that he was responsible for all of the items

in the front passenger seat. However, when asked what they were, Martinez was
unable to tell what items were there. All three passengers were placed in police

custody.

      {¶7} On March 30, 2022, Fips, Martinez, and Robert were charged in an

11-count indictment. Specifically, Fips was charged with six counts and found

guilty of just two counts. The trial court merged the two counts and sentenced Fips

to four years in prison, to be served consecutive to a prison term imposed in

another case. Fips also received credit for 148 days in jail.

      {¶8} At sentencing, the trial court stated:

      All right. Mr. Fips, you elected to have your case tried before a jury,
      so understanding you maintain your innocence, the jury has now
      found you guilty on Count 7 and 8 of this indictment.

      You know, I’ll note a couple of things for the record. One, I
      understand I gave a minimum sentence to Mr. Martinez. Of course,
      Mr. Martinez accepted responsibility for his involvement in the
      matter. And that was taken into consideration, along with his prior
      history. And so that’s really where a minimum sentence came in with
      him.

      But when looking at this case and whether, you know, the sentence
      between three and eleven years, it to be handed down in this case,
      when you look at the case, a couple of things come out. One is
      obviously his prior criminal history. Some of that was brought up
      during the examination when he took the stand.

      And so just noting that he has the prior case that he was found guilty
      on by the court where he’s serving five years.

      He had an attempted domestic violence where he served time. He had
      a former charge of domestic violence, misdemeanor, back in 2012,
      pled guilty in Judge Deena Calabrese’s room to a misdemeanor.
Judge Joan Synenberg sentenced him to six months after he pled
guilty to a trafficking offense with schoolyard specifications.

Judge Michael Donnelly found him guilty and sentenced him on the
attempted receiving stolen property, as well as his drug possession
charge.

So he has criminal convictions. But more than anything for this court,
the case that I found him guilty on, the date of that offense was
December 10th of 2018. And while that case was pending, he picked
up this case in January of 2022. Knowing that he had an open case,
out on bond, he picked up this case, as well. And those factors weigh
against him.

It’s a mandatory term of incarceration the court will sentence on. But
I do want to at least before I decide whether discretionary consecutive
sentence, the law says, Mr. Fips, that if you are going to — if the court’s
going to impose a consecutive sentence, I have to find some things for
the record.

Consecutive is necessary to protect the public from any future crimes
and necessary to punish you. I clearly find that for the record.

Consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness.
And again, the danger that you, Mr. Fips, pose to the public as you
continue to drug traffic in the community. And I find that as well.
And then finally the third notion would be one of three things. I think
a few of them apply to you. The offender committed this offense while
awaiting trial or sentencing or was under community control, under
post release control, for a prior conviction. And so awaiting trial on
the other case while you picked up this case, that factor meets the
factor for the law. And then these offenses were committed as part of
a course of conduct, is also satisfied. And then, again, the third one,
the history of the criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences should be handed down.

I find that all three of those findings that I have to look at all apply to
you in this case and find that, even though it’s discretionary, the court
is going to impose a consecutive sentence on this case with respect to
your case you’re serving currently. That case number for the record is
case 636185.
      Is that correct, bailiff? Yes. So 636185.

      So with respect to this case and looking at the purposes and principles
      of sentencing, it being a Reagan Tokes notation, as well, Mr. Fips, I’m
      going to sentence you on Count 7, and note that Count 7 and 8 are
      merged for purposes of sentencing, to four years at Lorain
      Correctional Institution.

Tr. 607 - 611.

      {¶9} Fips filed this appeal and assigned two errors for our review:

      1.      Appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the
              evidence; and

      2.      The record does not clearly and convincingly support the
              imposition of a consecutive sentence.

II.   Manifest Weight of the Evidence

      A.      Standard of Review

      {¶10} “‘[A] manifest weight challenge questions whether the state met its

burden of persuasion.’” State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110693, 2022-Ohio-

823, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-

3598, ¶ 13.

      “The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
      reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
      determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [fact-
      finder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
      justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
      The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only
      in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against
      the conviction.”
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 215, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

      B.     Law and Analysis

      {¶11} In Fips’s first assignment of error he argues that his convictions were

against the manifest weight of the evidence because they rest solely on

Det. Allender’s observations. Fips contends that Det. Allender did not actually

observe him selling drugs or partaking in any illegal drug activity. Fips also argues

that there were no drugs found on his person. We determine that Fips’s arguments

are misplaced. Det. Allender observed Fips in a Suburban where the occupants

would leave the vehicle and conduct hand-to-hand transactions with other

vehicles. Other times the passenger of the other vehicles would engage in the same

behavior as the occupants of the Suburban. Det. Allender suspected that the

occupants of the Suburban were selling drugs, so he radioed the other members of

his team and instructed them to conduct traffic stops on the vehicles leaving the

scene. During one such stop, Det. Schade obtained crack cocaine from one of the

drivers that left the scene after engaging in the hand-to-hand transaction with the

Suburban.

      {¶12} This observed activity, along with the stop and discovery by

Det. Schade, gave Det. Allender a reason to believe that the occupants of the

Suburban were engaging in drug trafficking. “[A] police officer must be able to

point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences
derived from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual has

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Kent, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109118, 2022-Ohio-834, ¶ 23, citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d

58, 60, 554 N.E.2d 108 (1990). “The propriety of an investigative stop by a police

officer must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id., citing State

v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), paragraph one of the

syllabus.

      {¶13} Given the fact that Det. Allender had a reasonable suspicion that the

occupants of the Suburban were trafficking drugs, and after Det. Bohen

approached the Suburban and observed a marijuana blunt in the center console of

the vehicle, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle.

      Under the ‘automobile exception,’ police may search an automobile
      without a warrant, as long as they have probable cause to believe the
      vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity. The rationale behind the
      automobile exception is two-fold: (1) vehicles are mobile, and (2) there
      exists a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle.

State v. Kumuhone, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112272, 2023-Ohio-2586, ¶ 23, citing

California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).

Additionally, “‘[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle,

it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal

the object of the search.’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting In re $75,000.00 United States

Currency (Katz), 2017-Ohio-9158, 101 N.E.3d 1209, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.). Once the
detectives searched the vehicle, they found a nylon bag containing Fentanyl,

Tramadol, and crack cocaine.

      {¶14} Fips argues that Det. Allender referred to him as the wrong name,

“Mr. Henderson” when he arrived at the scene and the only evidence against him

was Det. Allender’s testimony. “[I]n a manifest-weight review, the weight to be

given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the finder

of fact.” Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110693, 2022-Ohio-823, at ¶ 13, citing State

v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the

syllabus. “The trier of fact has the authority to ‘believe or disbelieve any witness or

accept part of what a witness says and reject the rest.’” Id., quoting State v. Antill,

176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). “Thus, in reviewing criminal manifest-

weight-of-the-evidence challenges, appellate courts must be mindful of the

presumption in favor of the finder-of-fact and defer to the factfinder’s resolution

of conflicting testimony if the greater amount of credible evidence supports the

verdict.” Id., citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865

N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25.     Thus, the factfinder was able to resolve any conflicting

testimony regarding Det. Allender’s reference to Fips as Mr. Henderson.

      {¶15} Finally, Fips argues that the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict

when it found him guilty of trafficking and drug possession but not guilty of the

counts involving the guns and other drugs. “‘Consistency in the verdict is not

necessary.’” State v. Amey, 2018-Ohio-4207, 120 N.E.3d 503, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.),
quoting State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995,

¶ 81-82.

       When a claim on appeal is made that a defendant was subject to
       inconsistent verdicts, we have determined that we will not disturb a
       conviction where we find the conviction is based on sufficient
       evidence, noting “defendants receive adequate protection against jury
       irrationality or error by a sufficiency of the evidence review at the trial
       and appellate levels.”

State v. Bradley, 2021-Ohio-2687, 176 N.E.3d 1173 ¶ 23, (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96901, 2012-Ohio-920, ¶ 10.

       {¶16} Given the testimonies of the detectives and the evidence found in the

Suburban, we find Fips’s convictions were based on sufficient evidence and his

argument regarding the consistency of the verdict is irrelevant.

       {¶17} Therefore, after a thorough review of the record, we find that Fips’s

convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fips’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

III.   Consecutive Sentences

       A.     Standard of Review

       {¶18} “We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. Hervey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110775, 2022-Ohio-

1498, ¶ 16, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d

1231, ¶ 21.

       Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce or
       otherwise modify a sentence or vacate a sentence and remand for
      resentencing if it “clearly and convincingly finds” that (1) the record
      does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C.
      2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) or 2929.20(I) or (2) the
      sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” “‘Clear and convincing
      evidence is that measure or degree of proof * * * which will produce in
      the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts
      sought to be established.’” State v. Franklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
      107482, 2019-Ohio-3760, ¶ 29 quoting, Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St.
      469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). Paragraph three of the syllabus.

Id.

      {¶19} “It is ‘an extremely deferential standard of review.’” Id., quoting State

v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 N.E.2d 453, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).

      B.     Law and Analysis

      {¶20} In Fips’s second assignment of error, he argues that the record does

not clearly and convincingly support the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Under Ohio law, “sentences are presumed to run concurrently unless the trial court

makes the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” State v. Reindl, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 109806, 109807, and 109808, 2021-Ohio-2586, ¶ 14; State v.

Gohagan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107948, 2019-Ohio-4070, ¶ 28. To impose

consecutive sentences, the trial court must find that (1) consecutive sentences are

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender,

(2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the

offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) at

least one of the following applies:
      (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
      while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
      sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of
      the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior
      offense.

      (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
      one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
      of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
      single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
      the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
      offender’s conduct.

      (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
      crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

      {¶21} A defendant can challenge consecutive sentences on appeal in two

ways. First, the defendant can argue that consecutive sentences are contrary to law

because the court failed to make the necessary findings required by

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b); Reindl at ¶ 13; State v. Nia, 2014-

Ohio-2527, 15 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Second, the defendant can argue that

the record ‘clearly and convincingly’ does not support the court’s findings made

pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a); Reindl at ¶ 13.

      {¶22} Fips concedes that the trial court made the necessary findings.

However, he argues that the record does not support the trial court’s findings.

Specifically, Fips contends that because the trial court did not sentence him to the

maximum term he could serve but rather sentenced him to only one year more
than the minimum sentence, the record does not support that he should serve

consecutive sentences. Fips’s argument is misplaced. “‘A proportionality analysis

considers both the defendant’s current conduct and the risk of the defendant being

a danger in the future.’” State v. Hayes, 2023-Ohio-4119, 229 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 50

(8th Dist.), quoting State v. Glover, 2023-Ohio-1153, 212 N.E.3d 984, ¶ 26, citing

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). “‘To make that determination, the analysis focuses upon the

defendant’s current conduct and whether this conduct, in conjunction with the

defendant’s past conduct, allows a finding that consecutive service is not

disproportionate.’” Id., quoting Glover at ¶ 87.

      {¶23} The trial court analyzed in great detail Fips’s current and past

conduct stating:

      And so just noting that he has the prior case that he was found guilty
      on by the court where he’s serving five years.

      He had an attempted domestic violence where he served time. He had
      a former charge of domestic violence, misdemeanor, back in 2012,
      pled guilty in Judge Deena Calabrese’s room to a misdemeanor.

      Judge Joan Synenberg sentenced him to six months after he pled
      guilty to a trafficking offense with schoolyard specifications.
      Judge Michael Donnelly found him guilty or sentenced him on the
      attempted receiving stolen property, as well as his drug possession
      charge.

      So he has criminal convictions. But more than anything for this court,
      the case that I found him guilty on, the date of that offense was
      December 10th of 2018. And while that case was pending he picked
      up this case in January of 2022. So knowing that he had an open case,
      out on bond, he picked up this case, as well. And those factors weigh
      against him.
Tr. 608 - 609.

      {¶24} The analysis for consecutive sentences does not include whether the

trial court sentenced the appellant to a maximum term in its proportionality

analysis. The record is sufficient to support the imposition of consecutive

sentences.

      {¶25} Therefore, Fips’s second assignment of error is overruled.

      {¶26} Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., CONCURS;
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY