Court Opinion

ID: 9846340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:39:36.14221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:28.203247
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that Restina v. Crawford, 205 Ga. App. 887 (424 SE2d 79) (1992), was correctly decided and controls the issue of the amount to be used in determining whether the Clarks are entitled to prejudgment interest under the Unliquidated Damages Interest Act, and that postjudgment interest was improperly calculated from August 6, 1996, I must respectfully dissent.

Prejudgment Interest

The majority bases the affirmance of the award of prejudgment interest on resurrection of the June 1996 order awarding attorney fees to the Clarks. This is the mechanism by which the amount due the Clarks after set-offs of amounts paid by other defendants reaches the amount of their $4,000,000 demand made on Security Life before trial under OCGA § 51-12-14. “These provisions of OCGA § 51-12-14, setting forth the manner in which a plaintiff can recover prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages in a tort suit, are in derogation of common law, [cits.], and therefore must be strictly construed.” Resnik v. Pittman, 203 Ga. App. 835-836 (418 SE2d 116) (1992).
In Restina v. Crawford, the issue was whether the verdict or the judgment entered on it controlled entitlement to prejudgment interest. The defendant argued that the legislature intended for the judgment to be the operative amount and that the word “verdict” should be construed to mean “corrected verdict” or the judgment which is entered after the appropriate set-offs. This Court held that:
“It is elementary that ‘(i)n all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the (legislature).’ OCGA § 1-3-1.” Roman v. Terrell, 195 Ga. App. 219, 221 (3) (393 SE2d 83) (1990). The legislative intent is determined from a consideration of the entire statute. “ ‘The construction of language and words used in one part of the stat*531ute must be in the light of the legislative intent as found in the statute as a whole. . . . Where there is an apparent conflict between different sections of the same statute, the duty of a court is to reconcile them, if possible, so as to make them consistent and harmonious with one another. ... If they cannot be so reconciled the one which best conforms to the legislative intent must stand. . . .’ (Cit.)” Board of Trustees v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 554 (1) (272 SE2d 288) (1980). “The Unliquidated Damages (Interest) Act makes available to an injured party a coercive tool to offset injury and financial loss by encouraging a tortfeasor to make amends for his injurious conduct by making immediate payment short of litigation. If the tortfeasor does not take advantage of the opportunity to make his victim whole, the statute imposes a penalty, in effect, by authorizing the victim of the tort to collect damages in the form of interest from the time of the injury until the time the unliquidated damages become certain by verdict of the jury. As we view the intent of the statute, that award of interest from the time of injury to the date of judgment fulfills the purpose of the statute.” Williams v. Bunion, 173 Ga. App. 54, 60 (5) (325 SE2d 441) (1984). Based on legislative intent, we conclude that where a judgment is less than the verdict due to setoffs for payments already received by victims from tortfeasors, OCGA § 51-12-14 should be construed to entitle a plaintiff to interest only if the amount of the post-setoff judgment is equal to or exceeds the amount of the settlement demand. Although we have found no cases directly on point, this conclusion is supported by Bullman v. Tenneco Oil Co., 197 Ga. App. 408 (398 SE2d 311) (1990).
Id. at 888-889. The majority cites no authority for its conclusion that Restina was wrongly decided and does not resolve the apparent conflict between OCGA § 51-12-14 (a) and (d), as does Restina. It should also be noted that, following Restina, decided in 1992, the legislature amended OCGA § 51-12-14, without addressing this conflict. Ga. L. 2000, pp. 1589, 1608, § 3 (290). The legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of existing law and with reference to it. Dept. of Transp. v. American Ins. Co., 268 Ga. 505, 507 (1), n. 10 (491 SE2d 328) (1997); Abend v. Klaudt, 243 Ga. App. 271, 275 (531 SE2d 722) (2000). Although aware of this Court’s interpretation of OCGA § 51-12-14 in Restina, the legislature did not opt to make any changes in the statute to do what the majority has done here.
Apparently aware of the issue posed by Restina, the trial court, in its judgment on remand at issue here, used the June 1996 order to *532boost the amount of the judgment to the amount of the Clarks’ demand.
That June 1996 order awarded $306,290.98 as
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees for opposing Security’s original second defense and counterclaim, . . . subject to the following set-off. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs have settled with Security’s co-defendants Samuel C. Corey, Jr. and the Brokerage Resource, Inc. for the sum of $160,000. Security points out that an award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is a money judgment, for which it is entitled to take a credit for any sums previously received by the plaintiffs in settlement. Therefore, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses herein is reduced by $160,000, the amount of the settlement reached between the plaintiffs and the co-defendants Corey and Brokerage Resource. It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the plaintiffs have and recover against Security the sum of $146,290.98.
The final judgment entered by the trial court on the Clarks’ RICO claim on August 6, 1996, however, stated that, because the jury awarded $792,902.08 as attorney fees and expenses, and
[i]n view of the Plaintiffs’ election to take judgment on their RICO claims, they are entitled to recover all their reasonable expenses of investigation and litigation, including attorney’s fees, in both the trial and appellate courts. The specific amount [($146,290.98)] previously awarded by this court as litigation expenses and attorney’s fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 is completely subsumed in the amount awarded in this final judgment as the Plaintiffs’ overall expenses of investigation and litigation, including attorney’s fees. The court concludes, and the Plaintiffs agree, that they are not entitled to multiple recoveries of litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. Therefore, the ancillary award of litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees, entered on June 13, 1996, exists coincident with and not in addition to, the amount of litigation expenses and attorney’s fees awarded in this final judgment.
(Emphasis in original.)
That RICO judgment was reversed by this Court in Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 229 Ga. App. 593 (494 SE2d 388) (1997) (Security I). As reemphasized in Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 273 Ga. 44 (535 *533SE2d 234) (2000) (Security IV), the RICO claim was fatally flawed and “the Court of Appeals’ ruling in Security III [(Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 239 Ga. App. 690 (521 SE2d 434) (1999)] reinstating the trial court’s judgment on the Clarks’ RICO claim is reversed.” Security IV, supra at 48. St. Paul Fire &c. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14 (566 SE2d 2) (2002) (Security VI), further stated that “[a]ll agree that after that judgment’s appellate journey, the Clarks clearly lost their RICO judgment and the directed verdict holding that Security wrongfully interfered with their property rights by wrongfully rescinding their insurance coverage.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 16. Following remand of Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 249 Ga. App. 18 (547 SE2d 691) (2001) (Security V), on July 5, 2001, the trial court entered the Modified Judgment on the fraud portion of the verdict form, which was, as to compensatory damages, affirmed in Security VI (St. Paul v. Clark), supra at 16 (1). That Modified Judgment included compensatory damages of $4,073,000; attorney fees and expenses of $792,902.08; prejudgment interest of $374,792.10; and punitive damages of $1,500,000. The subtotal of these ($6,740,694.18) was then reduced by the previously paid settlements of $410,000 (Corey/Brokerage Resource, $160,000 and Insurers Administrative Corporation, $250,000).
Security VI (St. Paul v. Clark), while concluding that liability for litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 need not be relitigated, further held that “the Clarks were entitled only to attorney fees attributable to the claim on which they prevailed, i.e., the fraud claim. [David C. Joel, Attorney at Law, P.C. v. Chastain, 254 Ga. App. 592, 597-598 (4) (562 SE2d 746) (2002)]; [cits.]” Security VI (St. Paul v. Clark), supra at 24 (5) (a). As a result, the Clarks have the burden of proving the amount of attorney fees and expenses attributable solely to the fraud claim on which they prevailed and Security’s defense of that claim, including the counterclaim that was the subject of the June 1996 order. Premier Cabinets v. Bulat, 261 Ga. App. 578 (583 SE2d 235) (2003); David C. Joel, Attorney at Law, P.C. v. Chastain, supra.
Considering only the compensatory damages of $4,073,000 awarded by the Modified Judgment, which survived Security VI (St. Paul v. Clark), and even considering the $306,290.98 granted in the June 1996 order, after deducting the $410,000 paid by co-defendants, the Clarks’ recovery is still only $3,969,290.98, or less than their demand. Therefore, I do not believe they were entitled to recover prejudgment interest. Restina v. Crawford, supra; see also Wolf Camera v. Royter, 253 Ga. App. 254, 261-262 (558 SE2d 797) (2002) (citing Bullman v. Tenneco Oil Co., supra); Ga. Tile Distrib. v. Zumpano Enterprises, 205 Ga. App. 487, 489 (2) (422 SE2d 906) (1992); Corr v. *534Aaron Rents, 136 Ga. App. 643, 644 (222 SE2d 150) (1975). As stated in Restina,
this conclusion is supported by Bullman v. Tenneco Oil Co., [supra]. In Bullman, the jury’s verdict of $400,000 was offset by a $7,000 settlement with one of the defendants prior to trial, and a judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for $393,000. This court, in determining whether plaintiff was entitled to interest because the amount of the judgment exceeded her individual settlement demands against the various defendants, considered the amount of the judgment rather than the pre-setoff verdict to be the operative amount. This case illustrates that this court has considered the amount of the judgment to be the operative amount in determining whether interest should be allowed. Consequently, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling that appellant was not entitled to interest pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-14.
Restina v. Crawford, supra at 889.

Postjudgment Interest

(1) The trial court awarded postjudgment interest of $112,110.99 on the June 1996 sanctions order, adding this amount to the fraud compensatory damages before determining whether prejudgment interest was available under the Unliquidated Damages Interest Act. Absent this amount, the judgment would not bear prejudgment interest. This was improper for two reasons.
First, the order of June 1996, standing alone, is not a “judgment” to which the provisions of OCGA § 7-4-12 apply. OCGA § 9-11-54 (a) defines the term “judgment” as including “a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.” OCGA § 7-4-12 provides for interest on all “judgments.” The June 1996 order is not one that is appealable absent a certificate of immediate review, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) and (b). Nor was it a “judgment” until subsumed in the August 6, 1996 RICO judgment. See Crolley v. Haygood Contracting, 207 Ga. App. 434, 436 (2) (429 SE2d 93) (1993).
Second, imposing interest on interest is not allowed in Georgia. Here, the trial court included the postjudgment interest on the June 1996 order to the compensatory damages before calculating the amount subject to prejudgment interest, resulting in interest on interest.
Under OCGA § 9-12-10, “(i)n all cases where judgment is obtained, the judgment shall be entered for the principal *535sum due, with interest, provided the claim upon which it was obtained draws interest. No part of the judgment shall bear interest except the principal which is due on the original debt.” “(T)his . . . statute forbids post-judgment interest except on the principal or original debt and expressly excludes pre-judgment interest, where authorized, to be included in the amount used to compute post-judgment interest.” Dept. of Transp. v. Consolidated Equities Corp., 181 Ga. App. 672, 677 (353 SE2d 603) (1987).
Groover v. Commercial Bancorp, 220 Ga. App. 13, 16 (1) (b) (467 SE2d 355) (1996). See also Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga. App. 51, 55 (3) (572 SE2d 664) (2002); Barbush v. Oiler, 158 Ga. App. 625, 627 (281 SE2d 359) (1981).
(2) The trial court also awarded postjudgment interest to the compensatory fraud damages computed from the date of the entry of the RICO judgment on August 6, 1996, instead of from the entry on July 5, 2001, of the Modified Judgment on fraud, as I believe is required.
In CRS Sirrine v. Dravo Corp., 219 Ga. App. 301 (464 SE2d 897) (1995), this Court looked to analogous federal statutes and case law to determine that
where more than one judgment has been entered in a case, the decision of whether postjudgment interest should run from entry of the original or second judgment “turns on the degree to which the original judgment was upheld or invalidated on appeal.” [Cits.] “In general, where a first judgment lacks an evidentiary or legal basis, post-judgment interest accrues from the date of the second judgment; where the original judgment is basically sound but is modified on remand, post-judgment interest accrues from the date of the first judgment.” [Cit.]
Id. at 304 (2).
Application of this standard is fact specific and cases may fall between two extremes — the first where the original judgment is reinstated in its entirety by the appellate court, with postjudgment interest clearly accruing from the date of the original judgment, and the other where the original judgment is reversed completely and postjudgment interest does not accrue until entry of the second judgment.
Here, the original RICO judgment was found to lack a legal basis in the Clarks’ situation; judgment was entered on remand on the separate fraud cause of action included in the verdict form on July 5, *5362001; compensatory damages were reduced by two-thirds; and liability for and the amount of punitive damages, along with the amount of attorney fees and expenses attributable to the fraud claim, must be retried. This situation more closely aligns with the second extreme. Cf. Crolley v. Haygood Contracting, supra. There, Haygood sued both Cherokee Falls Investments, Inc. and William Crolley for money owed pursuant to a construction contract and partial summary judgment was granted against both defendants. While Crolley’s right to partial summary judgment was affirmed by Crolley v. Haygood Contracting, 201 Ga. App. 700 (411 SE2d 907) (1991), on remand, Crolley was required to select one of the two defendants against whom judgment was entered and postjudgment interest ran only from this second judgment.
Decided October 3, 2003
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, William D. Barwick, Teresa W. Roseborough, Carla W. McMillian, for appellant.
Porter, Orrison & Dosier, J. Alexander Porter, King & Spalding, Byron Attridge, Benjamin F. Easterlin IV, S. Stewart Haskins II, for appellee.
Here, also, I believe that postjudgment interest runs only from the second judgment, on the fraud claim, entered in 2001.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.