Court Opinion

ID: 2964143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:10.605353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:51.426547
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          May 13, 1996          [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2302

                                 PATRICIA L. LeFEVRE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                     JESSE BROWN,
                  SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                       [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Gregory P. Piccirilli with whom Sciacca  & Piccirilli was on brief
            _____________________           _____________________
        for appellant.
            Sheldon Whitehouse for the United States.
            __________________

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                 Per  Curiam.     After  exhausting  her   administrative
                 ___________

            remedies, Patricia  LeFevre filed suit in  the district court

            seeking damages  and injunctive relief  against her employer,

            the  United  States  Department  of  Veterans'  Affairs,  for

            alleged gender discrimination in violation  of Title VII.  42

            U.S.C.    2000e-16(c).  She  claimed that  she was  initially

            denied  relocation benefits  provided to  comparably situated

            male  employees,   and  that  when  she   complained  to  her

            supervisor she was assigned  to a lesser position at  another

            office.  An additional claim of age discrimination, 29 U.S.C.

              633a(c), was withdrawn at trial and is no longer at issue. 

             

                 LeFevre  presented her  claims of  gender discrimination

            and retaliation to a jury  in October 1995.  At the  close of

            LeFevre's evidence, the district judge in an opinion from the

            bench granted  judgment as  a matter of  law in favor  of the

            government  on  the  gender  discrimination  and  retaliation

            claims.  Fed.  R. Civ. P. 50(a).  This  appeal followed.  The

            only  issue on appeal is  whether the evidence,  taken in the

            light most  favorable to  LeFevre, would permit  a reasonable

            jury to decide in her favor,  and our review on that issue is

            de  novo.  Gibson v. City of  Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st
            ________   ______    _________________

            Cir. 1994).

                 To summarize  the evidence, LeFevre was  working for the

            Veterans' Administration in  Texas in early  1990.  In  March

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            1990, she applied for  an advertised management position with

            a VA office in  Providence, Rhode Island.  The  VA's internal

            form authorizing  the position specified  that no  relocation

            expenses  were  authorized;  but  this  restriction  was  not

            mentioned  in the  advertisement itself.   At  trial, LeFevre

            testified  that during  an  interview for  the  job with  the

            Providence Regional Manager Clyde  Waite, Waite told her that

            she would be  paid for  the expense of  moving her  household

            goods.   Waite testified he  told LeFevre that  no relocation

            benefits  were available but that  he later told  her that he

            might be able  to get reimbursement for moving  her household

            goods, which in fact he did.  

                 After LeFevre  began working in Providence,  she learned

            that two men hired for similar positions had received further

            benefits  such  as  reimbursement  for  lodging  and  mileage

            expenses,  a per diem allowance,  and a home equity purchase.

            LeFevre told  Waite  that she  believed she  was entitled  to

            these benefits, but Waite again said that no further benefits

            were available.   LeFevre  complained to her  congressman and

            thereafter  a VA official in Washington ruled that the denial

            of  benefits was  due  to a  misinterpretation of  government

            regulations   and   that  LeFevre   was   entitled   to  full

            reimbursement.  LeFevre eventually  was paid over $61,000 for

            expenses relating to her move.  

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                 Shortly after LeFevre told Waite that she was contacting

            her  congressman, LeFevre was  transferred from Providence to

            Cranston, R.I, to another VA position, apparently one with no

            management  responsibility.   LeFevre contended  that Waite's

            motive  was   to  retaliate   against  her  because   of  her

            complaints.   Waite testified that the  transfer stemmed from

            an   ongoing  appraisal   of  LeFevre's   position  and   job

            performance that had begun long  before she raised the  issue

            of relocation expenses. 

                 Against  this background,  we  agree with  the  district

            court  that LeFevre  did  not present  evidence permitting  a

            reasonable  jury  to conclude  that  gender  bias caused  the

            original  alleged disparity  in  treatment  as to  relocation

            expenses.  LeFevre's burden  was defined by McDonnell Douglas
                                                        _________________

            Corp. v.  Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).   There was no specific
            _____     _____

            evidence of  discriminatory intent, but to  establish a prima
                                                                    _____

            facie case it was enough  for LeFevre to show that she  was a
            _____

            woman and that men, apparently similarly situated, were given

            more favorable treatment.  Id. at 802.  This LeFevre did.  
                                       ___

                 But  it was  then  open to  the  defense to  respond  by

            showing a non-discriminatory reason for the action.  411 U.S.

            at  802-03.   The  government  did this  by  introducing into

            evidence the VA's "request  for personnel action"; this form,

            authorizing  the  advertising  of  the  position,  explicitly

            stated that  "no relocation expenses are  authorized."  Waite

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            testified that this document  was prepared before the  VA had

            any notion whether the successful applicant would be a man or

            woman.  On  its face, the document provides a  reason for the

            decision  to deny  relocation  benefits that  was not  gender

            based.         

                 We  are now told that because  LeFevre was relocated for

            the convenience  of the government, she  could not rightfully

            be denied relocation benefits.   But it does not  matter that

            the  government's original reason  for denying benefits (lack

            of  authorization) was  based  on a  misunderstanding of  the

            regulations; under Title VII  the employer has a right  to be

            wrong  so   long  as   the  decision   was  not   tainted  by

            discrimination.   Pollard  v. Rea Magnet  Wire Co.,  824 F.2d
                              _______     ____________________

            557, 559  (7th Cir.) ("reasons honestly  described but poorly

            founded" represent bad judgment, not  pretext), cert. denied,
                                                            ____________

            484 U.S. 977 (1987).

                 LeFevre  was   entitled  to  offer   evidence  that  the

            government's explanation was  pretext, for example,  that the

            explanation had been made up after the fact.  LeFevre did not

            object  at trial to the authenticity of the document, but she

            does  offer on  appeal a  host of  arguments to  suggest that

            neither  the  document nor  Waite's  testimony  about it  was

            reliable.   She  points  out, for  instance,  that while  the

            authorizing document purportedly denied  relocation benefits,

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            the   public  advertisement  said  nothing  about  relocation

            benefits one way or the other.

                 How  far  LeFevre  developed  these  arguments  in   the

            district court is not entirely clear, but it does not matter.

            Taking  them all  together, they  simply would  not permit  a

            reasonable jury  to conclude--as LeFevre now  urges--that the

            document was  altered  later  or is  in  some  other  respect

            inauthentic.  Thus, the public advertisement turns  out to be

            a  government  form in  which there  is  no separate  box for

            describing   relocation  benefits.     The   other  inference

            arguments  are  no  stronger,  whether  taken  separately  or

            together.

                 LeFevre's other main contention  is that the document is

            of no consequence because  Waite did not actually rely  on it

            in  denying the  relocation  benefits.   In support,  LeFevre

            argues  that  she was  initially  told  by  Waite  that  some
                                                                     ____

            relocation benefits would be provided, and that  subsequently

            the reason given for denying full benefits was that she was a

            "new hire."  We  agree that an employer  cannot automatically

            escape   liability   by   exploiting    a   nondiscriminatory

            justification on which it did not actually rely.  McKennon v.
                                                              ________

            Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995).  
            _________________________

                   But  any  apparent  inconsistency   between  LeFevre's

            version of events and the government's proffered reason--that

            the  benefits  were  not  authorized--fades  when  one  looks

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            carefully at the  testimony.   Waite testified  that he  told

            LeFevre in the initial  interview that no relocation benefits

            were  authorized, but  that in  a subsequent  conversation he

            said he "would  check with the  central office" to see  if he

            could get reimbursement for the  household goods.  He further

            testified  that he  contacted a  superior in  Washington, Dr.

            Blank, who authorized expenses for moving household goods.   

             

                 Waite's  detailed account  of  his effort  to secure  an

            exception  is consistent  with  his initial  reliance on  the

            personnel document  that said  no  expenses were  authorized.

            And  at the  district court  hearing on  the Rule  50 motion,

            LeFevre's counsel conceded that LeFevre initially was told no

            relocation  expenses  were  authorized.    LeFevre's  general

            assertion  at  trial--that  Waite  told  her  she  would  get

            relocation  expense for  household  goods--was  apparently  a

            compressed version of the account given by Waite. 

                 As  for the  "new hire"  justification for  denying full

            benefits, Waite conceded that  this was one of  reasons later

            given  to  LeFevre.    But  he  explained  that  this  reason

            originated  not with  him but  with a  VA personnel  officer.

            Waite testified  that he  had  no personal  knowledge of  the

            basis  for  the  "new  hire"  justification  and  was  simply

            deferring to the expertise of the personnel officer.   Again,

            this testimony was uncontradicted.  Title VII offers remedies

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            only  for discrimination  and not  for bureaucratic  error or

            confusion.     LeFevre's retaliation claim might or might not

            have more merit  than her gender discrimination  claim.  Even

            though  the original  denial of  relocation benefits  was not

            shown to be gender based, the statute independently prohibits

            an employer  from taking  adverse action against  an employee

            because of the fact that the employee is pursuing a Title VII

            claim.   42 U.S.C.   2000e-3.   In this case,  there is doubt

            whether  the  record would  permit  an  inference that  Waite

            engaged in retaliation, there being very little evidence that

            Waite  knew  at the  time of  the  transfer that  LeFevre was

            claiming gender discrimination.

                 But  we need not discuss the evidence at length, or rule

            upon the  issue, because on  appeal LeFevre makes  no serious

            attempt to  develop the retaliation charge  as an independent

            claim for the jury.  We normally do not address arguments not

            developed  on appeal.   Argencourt v. United  States, 78 F.3d
                                    __________    ______________

            14, 16  n.1  (1st Cir.  1996).   Given  the  thinness of  the

            evidence as to retaliation,  there is certainly no indication

            of plain error.

                 Affirmed.
                 ________

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