Court Opinion

ID: 9534658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:41:47.820947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:56.389592
License: Public Domain

Allegrucci, J.,
dissenting: The majority has no difficulty in finding that a rational basis exists for eliminating the automobile brokerage business. In my opinion, S.B. 486 (L. 1990, ch. 52) does not withstand a rational basis scrutiny and thus denies the *925plaintiffs equal protection of the law. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that the rational basis test is the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied. The rational basis test requires that statutory classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The majority, however, applies the test absent the words “rational” and “legitimate.” I agree that this is a deferential standard of review, but it “ ‘is not a toothless one.’ ” Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389, 97 S. Ct. 431 (1976) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651, 96 S. Ct. 2755 [1976]).
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), Justice White, speaking for the Court, said:
“Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthermore, some objectives — such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’ id., at 534 — are not legitimate state interests. See also Zobel, supra, at 63. Beyond that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by the law.”
The majority correctly notes that S.B. 486 was introduced at the “behest” of the Kansas Motor Car Dealers Association for the purpose of eliminating automobile brokers, which obviously would keep the brokers from competing with the car dealers. The majority does not find this objective to be a legitimate state interest, nor did the district court:
"The Defendants ask this Court to conclude that banning automobile brokers advances the legislative purposes. No evidence or argument has been offered to support this bald conclusion. Defendants have presented no explanation as to how the government interests are directly advanced by prohibiting brokers from advising credit union members of admittedly permissible offers. Defendants have offered no explanation as to how the *926government interests are advanced by prohibiting brokers from informing willing consumers of the ‘deals’ available through licensed dealer's.
“Senate Bill No. 486 forbids the individual Plaintiffs from bringing a buyer and seller together, even though that seller holds a license under the act. It prohibits the individual Plaintiffs from advertising new motor vehicles, even though the advertised transaction is effectuated and completed by a licensed salesperson and licensed new vehicle dealer. It prohibits the individual Plaintiffs from referring a buyer to a seller regularly or actively, even though that seller is a licensed salesperson.
“The State offers no argument or evidence that these prohibitions on individual Plaintiffs’ speech advance any government interest. Nor is it apparent that these prohibitions on individual Plaintiffs’ speech promote fair dealing and honesty in the industry; protect consumers against irresponsible vendors and dishonest or fraudulent sales practices; promote a reliable system for titling vehicles and tracking the flow of vehicles and parts; or preserve supporting services for Kansas new car purchasers.”
Instead, the majority attempts to justify S.B. 486 based on the stated purpose for passing the original act. The majority speaks of the heavy burden placed on car dealers in being required to have a franchise from a manufacturer; to maintain an inventory of vehicles, a showroom, a parts department, and a repair facility; and to meet a payroll. And the final coup de grace is evidence that “such merchandising giants as Sears Roebuck, Wal-Mart, and Amway were poised to enter the brokering business in Kansas.” These are not legitimate state interests which justify discriminating against automobile brokers. S.B. 486 is not rationally related to the purpose for passing the Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Act. The majority indirectly concedes that the legislative history of S.B. 486 does not evidence a rational basis for adopting it: “We do not know all of the concerns the legislature had relative to brokering. . . . [T]he court is not limited to evidence shown to have been before the legislature in determining the ‘evils’ the legislation was aimed at correcting.” Clearly, however, the legislature could not have reasonably conceived to be true any of the purported facts which the majority now finds rational in justifying the adoption of S.B. 486.
In this regard, the district court found:
“33. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that automobile brokers present any threat to the interests set forth in K.S.A. 8-2402 that would require any measure more extreme than the enforcement of the licensing requirements and procedures which pre-dated Senate Bill No. 486. Nor have Defendants offered any competent evidence that abolishing automobile brokers would enhance enforcement of the existing licensing re*927quirements and prohibitions as they apply to others involved in the automobile distribution business.
“34. The Defendants’ arguments concerning the police power objectives of Senate Bill No. 486 are not persuasive.
“First, they argue that Plaintiffs do not appear in the chain of title. The significance of this argument becomes apparent when one recognizes that the licensed automobile salesmen (and the publishers who may advertise what brokers now may not communicate under Senate Bill No. 486) do not appear in the chain of title. There is simply no support in the record for Defendants’ assertion Senate Bill No. 486 would result in ‘anyone having to do with the sale or transfer of a vehicle’ appearing in the chain of title.
“At the risk of being simplistic, it must be emphasized that every car begins at the same place: the manufacturer. Every new car that enters Kansas must go from a manufacturer to a licensed dealer who enjoys a franchise from that manufacturer. Finally, every new car purchased with the assistance of Plaintiffs came to the consumer from a licensed dealer who completed the manufacturer’s statement of origin, the odometer statement, the warranty information, and the sales tax receipt.
“The record does not contain any competent evidence to warrant the conclusion that the abolition of brokers’ activities is reasonably necessary to preserve the Kansas system for titling or tracing automobiles.
“The Defendants’ complaints about the ‘fly-by-night’ nature of some automobile brokers can all be answered by the provisions which pre-existed Senate Bill No. 486. As the Attorney General noted in Opinion No. 90-22 (March 2, 1990), brokers must maintain an established place of business; must supply information at the Director’s request to obtain a new or renewed license, such information relating to the broker’s solvency or ‘other pertinent matter commensurate with the safeguarding of the public interest’; and must maintain a bond of $15,000.00.
“The real complaint about the effect of automobile brokers seems to be that their activities permit some licensed dealers to sell too many automobiles, and that the consumer may look to another licensed franchise dealer to perform the less-profitable warranty work. This complaint arises, not because of the automobile brokers, but because some dealers have been willing to offer $100.00 over factory invoice to credit union members, while others have not been willing to do so. This risk to automobile dealers will continue so long as licensed • dealers can make such special offers, those offers are communicated to the public — even by those in the business of ‘advertising for others in their own name’; consumers find those offers attractive; and, as the Attorney General noted, manufacturers require their franchisees to do warranty work without regard to where the vehicle was purchased.”
The majority acknowledges that
“plaintiffs had not been shown to have operated in a manner that was injurious to their customers. The plaintiff brokers did not receive payments from customers in their own names; they had the dealers prepare all nec*928essary title and warranty instruments; they dealt only with licensed Kansas dealers; and all vehicle deliveries were directly from the dealer to the customer.”
The majority, however, is concerned about “brokering in general and what evils occur or may occur therein” and “perceived threats” to the system. Unsubstantiated evils and “perceived threats” do not rationally justify the elimination of automobile brokers. Nor can I accept, as the majority does, that S.B. 486 was adopted to forestall a “consumer disaster” which would render warranties meaningless, hopelessly skew sales taxes and titles, and allow fraud to run rampant. S.B. 486 could not rationally have been intended to prevent any one of these abuses.
I agree with the district court that by any standard of scrutiny, S.B. 486 violates plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the law. I would affirm the district court.
Abbott and Davis, JJ., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.