Court Opinion

ID: 9962013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 15:00:49.558394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:39.928725
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8085     Document: 010111035603       Date Filed: 04/22/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            April 22, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 23-8085
                                                    (D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00198-NDF-1)
  MEGA LESTARI SETIYANINGSIH,                                   (D. Wyo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Mega Setiyaningsih, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district

 court’s order denying her motion to reconsider its previous denial of compassionate

 release.1 Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

 Setiyaningsih failed to proffer previously unavailable evidence, we affirm.

       *
          After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a);
 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
        1
          We liberally construe Setiyaningsih’s pro se filings. See United States v.
 Davis, 339 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2003).
Appellate Case: 23-8085     Document: 010111035603       Date Filed: 04/22/2024     Page: 2

                                      Background

       In June 2020, Setiyaningsih pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine

 with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. In

 accordance with the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Setiyaningsih to 180

 months in prison (120 months on the drug count and 60 months on the gun count, to

 be served consecutively) and five years of supervised release.

       In October 2021, Setiyaningsih filed her first pro se motion for compassionate

 release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing a wide range of preexisting medical

 conditions, inadequate medical care, and the threat posed by the COVID-19

 pandemic. The district court denied the motion after determining that the 18 U.S.C.

 § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against a sentence reduction, and we affirmed.

 United States v. Setiyaningsih, No. 21-8093, 2022 WL 2160001, at *2 (10th Cir. June

 15, 2022) (unpublished).

       In August 2023, Setiyaningsih filed a second pro se motion for compassionate

 release. This time, in addition to citing her various medical conditions and the

 prison’s allegedly inadequate medical care, Setiyaningsih asked to serve the rest of

 her sentence through home confinement so that she could be reunited with her three-

 year-old daughter, to whom she gave birth shortly after she was sentenced in 2020, as

 well as her 17-year-old son. Setiyaningsih also asked the court to consider her

 rehabilitative efforts, including her newfound religious faith, remorse for her crimes,

 and commitment to education.

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       Ruling on this second motion, the district court focused on whether

 Setiyaningsih had established extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a

 sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Regarding Setiyaningsih’s family

 circumstances, the district court concluded that her separation from her children was

 the “usual product of a parent’s incarceration” and that she had not shown her

 children’s current care was inadequate. R. vol. 1, 66. In addition, the district court

 determined that Setiyaningsih’s medical records did not support her allegations about

 her medical conditions and that her allegations of inadequate medical care were

 wholly unsupported. Accordingly, the district court denied Setiyaningsih’s second

 motion for compassionate release.

       Shortly thereafter, Setiyaningsih filed a motion for reconsideration that

 attached a letter she had received from her daughter’s caregiver. The caregiver wrote

 that because she had stopped working due to her health and age, she was behind on

 her mortgage and other bills and would be unable to continue caring for

 Setiyaningsih’s daughter. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the

 caregiver’s financial difficulties did not constitute new evidence warranting

 reconsideration because Setiyaningsih failed to “explain how this information was

 previously unavailable to her.” Id. at 81.

       Setiyaningsih appeals.

                                              3
Appellate Case: 23-8085    Document: 010111035603         Date Filed: 04/22/2024     Page: 4

                                         Analysis

       Setiyaningsih argues that the district court erred in denying her reconsideration

 motion.2 Our review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d

 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). “A district court abuses its discretion only where it

 (1) commits legal error, (2) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, or (3) where

 no rational basis exists in the evidence to support its ruling.” United States v. Alfred,

 982 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. A.S., 939 F.3d 1063,

 1070 (10th Cir. 2019)). On the other hand, “[a] district court does not abuse its

 discretion if its ruling ‘falls within the bounds of permissible choice in the

 circumstances and is not arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.’” United States v.

 Armajo, 38 F.4th 80, 84 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Gutierrez de

 Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 2014)).

       Setiyaningsih first contends, on a procedural note, that the district court erred

 by construing her reconsideration motion as a motion for relief from judgment under

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). But we have expressly “imported the standard

       2
          For two reasons, we limit our review in this appeal to the order denying
 reconsideration and do not reach the underlying order denying compassionate release.
 First, Setiyaningsih’s notice of appeal lists only the order denying reconsideration.
 See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (stating that notice of appeal must “designate the
 judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken”); Gonzalez v.
 Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (“Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdictional in nature.”
 (quoting Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992))). Second, despite mentioning the
 underlying order in passing, Setiyaningsih’s appellate brief raises arguments
 exclusively directed at the district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration.
 See SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 578 F.3d 1201, 1226 (10th Cir. 2009) (“An issue
 or argument insufficiently raised in a party’s opening brief is deemed waived.”).
                                             4
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 from [Rule 60(b)] to decide motions for reconsideration” in criminal cases, so the

 district court did not err on this point. United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917, 927

 (10th Cir. 2022). Setiyaningsih also inaccurately suggests that the district court erred

 by dismissing her motion as untimely. To be sure, the district court noted that she

 filed her motion outside the 28-day deadline for reconsideration motions in civil

 cases. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). But that conclusion was irrelevant for two reasons.

 First, the civil deadline does not apply in this criminal case; instead, reconsideration

 motions in criminal cases must be filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal.

 See Randall, 666 F.3d at 1242. Second, the district court drew no legal conclusions

 from this passing fact and did not deny Setiyaningsih’s reconsideration motion as

 untimely.

       Turning to the merits, a district court may grant reconsideration when it “has

 misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the law.” Id. (quoting United States

 v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 539 (10th Cir. 2014)). “The specific grounds” for “granting

 such motions include ‘(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new

 evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent

 manifest injustice.’” Id. (quoting Christy, 739 F.3d at 539).

       Setiyaningsih specifically contends that the district court failed to liberally

 construe her reconsideration motion when it concluded that the letter from her

 daughter’s caregiver did not constitute previously unavailable new evidence. She is

 correct that courts should liberally construe pro se filings, but “the party requesting

 [Rule 60(b)] relief . . . bears the burden of showing that relief is warranted.” Crow

                                             5
Appellate Case: 23-8085    Document: 010111035603        Date Filed: 04/22/2024     Page: 6

 Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 74 F.4th 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2023). Here, the district

 court concluded that Setiyaningsih failed to carry this burden because the caregiver’s

 “difficulties stemming from health and age in meeting financial obligations, such as

 being behind on mortgage payments, cannot be presumed to have instantaneously

 arisen in such a short time since last judgment.” R. vol. 1, 81. And the district court

 noted that although Setiyaningsih “state[d] that such information was previously

 unavailable,” she did “not explain how this information was previously unavailable

 to her.” Id. (emphases added).

        The district court is correct that Setiyaningsih’s reconsideration motion lacks

 any explanation as to why she was previously unaware of the caregiver’s financial

 difficulties. Moreover, Setiyaningsih appears to have offered the letter to rebut the

 district court’s statement in the underlying order that there was no indication

 Setiyaningsih’s children were receiving inadequate care. And “[a] motion to

 reconsider is not a second chance for the losing party to make its strongest case or to

 dress up arguments that previously failed.” Warren, 22 F.4th at 927 (alteration in

 original) (quoting United States v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2015)).

       Further, the letter contains repeated references to video calls between

 Setiyaningsih and the caregiver, and Setiyaningsih’s appellate brief states that the

 caregiver “repeatedly informed [her] that God would provide.” Aplt. Br. 4 n.2. This

 demonstrates that Setiyaningsih was either aware of the caregiver’s financial

 difficulties when she moved for compassionate release or could have ascertained

 such information using reasonable diligence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (providing

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 for relief from judgment based on “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable

 diligence, could not have been discovered” any earlier); Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632

 F.3d 658, 672 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) relief because

 movants “never adequately explained why they could not have discovered the

 [allegedly new] evidence . . . had they exercised due diligence”). Thus, the district

 court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Setiyaningsih’s newly proffered

 evidence of the caregiver’s financial hardship did not justify reconsideration because

 the evidence was not “previously unavailable.”3 Warren, 22 F.4th at 927 (quoting

 Christy, 739 F.3d at 539).

                                       Conclusion

       Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

 evidence of the caregiver’s financial hardship was not previously unavailable, we

 affirm the order denying reconsideration.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Nancy L. Moritz
                                              Circuit Judge

       3
          Having concluded that the district court was under no obligation to consider
 the caregiver’s letter, we likewise reject Setiyaningsih’s additional argument that the
 district court erred by failing to determine that the letter established an extraordinary
 and compelling reason for compassionate release.
                                             7