Court Opinion

ID: 9894035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 15:00:42.55696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:02.013503
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11495    Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 10/31/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11495
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       RICHARD DANIEL,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:02-cr-20676-CMA-2
                          ____________________
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       2                        Opinion of the Court                    23-11495

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges
       PER CURIAM:
               Richard Daniel appeals the district court’s order denying his
       motion to reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act
       of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (“First Step Act”), as to his
       convictions for conspiracy to deal in ﬁrearms, distribution of mari-
       juana, and possession of a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a drug traﬃck-
       ing crime. The government moved for summary aﬃrmance, argu-
       ing that the court properly denied the motion as to those oﬀenses
       because they were not covered oﬀenses and any argument that the
       district court had discretion to reduce his sentence on non-covered
       oﬀenses is foreclosed by United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080 (11th
       Cir. 2020), and United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920 (11th Cir. 2023), pet.
       for cert. ﬁled, No. 22-1239 (U.S. June 26, 2023).
              Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
       the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
       sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
       or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a
       matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the
       outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the
       appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
       1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
            The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on August 3, 2010,
       amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) to reduce the sentencing disparity
       between crack and powder cocaine. Fair Sentencing Act; see Dorsey
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       23-11495                Opinion of the Court                           3

       v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268-69 (2012) (detailing the history that
       led to the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act, including the Sen-
       tencing Commission’s criticisms that the disparity between crack
       and powder cocaine oﬀenses was disproportional and reﬂected
       race-based diﬀerences). Speciﬁcally, § 2(a)(1) raised the quantity of
       crack cocaine necessary to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum
       sentence from 50 to 280 grams, and § 2(a)(2) raised the quantity
       threshold to trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to
       28 grams.          Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)–(2); 21 U.S.C.
       § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). These amendments were not made ret-
       roactive to defendants who were sentenced before the enactment
       of the Fair Sentencing Act. United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377
       (11th Cir. 2012).
              In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made
       retroactive for “covered oﬀenses” the statutory penalties enacted
       under the Fair Sentencing Act. See First Step Act § 404. Under
       § 404(b) of the First Step Act, “[a] court that imposed a sentence
       for a covered oﬀense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sec-
       tions 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in eﬀect at the
       time the covered oﬀense was committed.” Id. § 404(b). The statute
       deﬁnes “covered oﬀense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal stat-
       ute, the statutory penalties for which were modiﬁed by section 2 or
       3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . that was committed before August
       3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a). The First Step Act adds that “[n]o court shall
       entertain a motion” under § 404 for a sentence that “was previously
       imposed or previously reduced in accordance with” sections 2 and
       3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, or “if a previous motion made under
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11495

       this section . . . was . . . denied after a complete review of the mo-
       tion on the merits.” Id. § 404(c).
               In Denson, we concluded, as our main holding, “that the First
       Step Act does not require district courts to hold a hearing with the
       defendant present before ruling on a defendant’s motion for a re-
       duced sentence under the Act.” 963 F.3d at 1082. As an alternate
       and independent holding, we concluded that a sentencing modiﬁ-
       cation under the First Step Act is not a critical stage in the proceed-
       ings under the two-part test in United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1231
       (11th Cir. 2018), contrary to Denson’s arguments on appeal. Id. at
       1088–89. We concluded that the First Step Act does not authorize
       a plenary resentencing and instead “is a limited remedy.” Id. at
       1089. In so concluding, we reasoned that a district court may “re-
       duce a defendant’s sentence only on a covered oﬀense and only as
       if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in eﬀect when
       he committed the covered oﬀense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
       We also reasoned that a district court is not free to: (1) recalculate
       the defendant’s original Guidelines calculations unaﬀected by sec-
       tions 2 and 3; (2) reduce the defendant’s sentence on the covered
       oﬀense based on other changes in the law; or (3) reduce the defend-
       ant’s sentences on non-covered oﬀenses. Id. We also referenced
       the idea that a § 404(b) motion was a § 3582(c)(1)(B) proceeding.
       Id. at 1088.
              The Supreme Court held in Concepcion v. United States that
       sentencing courts may consider intervening changes of law or fact
       in adjudicating a First Step Act motion. 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2396 (2022).
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       23-11495               Opinion of the Court                         5

       The Supreme Court stated that, while courts must consider these
       arguments when raised by the parties, whether to reduce the de-
       fendant’s sentence remains within their sound discretion. Id. The
       Court explained that sentencing courts have historically had wide
       latitude to consider any information relevant to understanding a
       defendant’s individual circumstances, and “[n]othing in the text and
       structure of the First Step Act expressly, or even implicitly, over-
       comes the established tradition of district court’s sentencing discre-
       tion.” Id. at 2401. In so holding, the Supreme Court overruled our
       prior holding in Denson that a court cannot reduce a defendant’s
       sentence based on changes in the law beyond those mandated by
       the Fair Sentencing Act. Id. at 2398 n.2 (citing Denson, 963 F.3d at
       1089).
              In Files, we recently explained that Concepcion abrogated as-
       pects of Denson regarding whether a court adjudicating a First Step
       Act motion could consider changes in law unrelated to those spec-
       iﬁed in the Fair Sentencing Act but that Concepcion did not abrogate
       Denson’s holding that a court could not reduce defendants’ sen-
       tences for non-covered oﬀenses. 63 F.4th at 930–31. We also ex-
       plained that the Supreme Court’s discussion in Concepcion per-
       tained to the absence of limitations by Congress on how a district
       court exercises its discretion in reducing a defendant’s sentence, not
       its authority to do so in the ﬁrst place. Id. at 931. We conﬁrmed
       that a district court can consistently apply “Denson’s holding limit-
       ing the categories of sentences that can be reduced and Concepcion’s
       holding empowering courts to exercise broad discretion in impos-
       ing reduced sentences for those qualifying oﬀenses.” Id.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11495

              Under the prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s hold-
       ing is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is over-
       ruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme
       Court or this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th
       1249, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).
               We thus conclude that summary aﬃrmance is warranted
       here because the government’s position is correct as a matter of
       law. Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. Notably, Daniel does not
       dispute that the oﬀenses are non-covered oﬀenses. As such, Dan-
       iel’s arguments are foreclosed by this Court’s prior precedent in
       Denson and Files. Denson, 963 F.3d at 1088–89; Files, 63 F.4th at 930–
       31; Dudley, 5 F.4th at 1265. Further, any argument that Concepcion
       abrogated Denson is foreclosed by Files. Files, 63 F.4th at 930–31.
       Other than Concepcion, Daniel does not point to any case from this
       Court or the Supreme Court that abrogated Denson and Files. Dud-
       ley, 5 F.4th at 1265.
              Because the government’s position is correct as a matter of
       law, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary aﬃrmance
       and aﬃrm the district’s order denying Daniel’s motion to reduce
       his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. Groendyke Transp.,
       406 F.2d at 1162.
              AFFIRMED.