Court Opinion

ID: 9474691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:05:59.585281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:16.424018
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring
While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I write separately because of a different perception of the current state of the controlling law, particularly as applied to the present circumstances, and of the scope of section 2680(h), the intentional torts proviso of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
I do not believe that the “planning/operational” distinction employed by the majority expresses the present state of the test for the application of the discretionary function exception. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984), “has reduced some of the uncertainty generated by the numerous courts of appeals’ decisions that have wrestled with the vague contours of the discretionary exception.” General Public Utilities Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.1984). In Varig Airlines, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953), which had often been called into question in recent years. It noted that it is “impossible ... to define with precision every contour of the exception,” Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. at 2764, and quoted Dalehite’s maxim that “ ‘where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.’ ” 104 S.Ct. at 2764, quoting 346 U.S. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968. The Court went on:
[fjirst, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the ... exception applies in a given case. As the Court pointed out in Dalehite, the exception covers ‘[n]ot only agencies of the government ... but all employees exercising discretion. 346 U.S. at 33 [73 S.Ct. at 966]. Thus, the basic inquiry concerning the application of the ... exception is whether the challenged acts of the Government employee — whatever his or her rank— are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from liability.
104 S.Ct. at 2764.
I believe that the Varig Airlines test is the one that must be applied to Kimmel’s actions to determine whether the discretionary function exception applies. This is particularly important in the case of the alleged intentional torts involved in Kimmel’s decision to seek prosecution of the subjects of his investigation, because in that context the planning/operational distinction is not easily applied.
The discretionary function exception has historically been applied to “prosecutorial decisions as to whether, when and against whom to initiate prosecution [because such decisions] are quintessential examples of governmental discretion in enforcing the criminal law.” Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 513 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). See also, Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir.1983); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841, 88 S.Ct. 76, 19 L.Ed.2d 106 (1967).
The cited cases, however, involve prosecutorial decisions made by prosecuting authorities, not decisions by law enforcement agents to seek prosecution based on the results of an investigation. Our task under Varig Airlines, then, is to determine whether, Kimmel’s decision to bring charges against Pooler and Bradley were “of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from liability.” 104 S.Ct. at 2764.
In doing so, it is necessary to parse the activities of Kimmel the head of an investigation from those of Kimmel the planner or operative so that the inquiry focuses on the precise activity complained of. Viewed in this context, it is clear that the process of assessing the results of a protracted investigation and deciding whether those *874results warrant presentation to prosecuting authorities is closely analogous to a prosecutor’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and similar policy considerations are present. Since Varig Airlines directs us to analyze the “nature and quality” of the activity “rather than the status of the actor,” id., I would conclude that the discretionary function exception applies to Kimmel’s decision to bring charges. Plaintiffs’ claims are therefore barred by that exception “whether or not the discretion [was] abused,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), unless, as plaintiffs claim, the intentional tort proviso can be read to override the discretionary function exception.
There are few eases interpreting the scope of section 2680(h) and even fewer addressing the interrelationship between that section and the discretionary function exception. The intentional tort proviso was enacted by Congress in 1974. Several'incidents in which federal agents engaged in “abusive, illegal and unconstitutional ‘no-knock’ raids,” Sen.Rep. 93-588, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong.. & Admin.News 2789, 2790,' motivated Congress .to amend the FTCA to prevent “future abuses.” Id. The amendment was generally intended to be coextensive with actions brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and thus to provide a cause of action against the government whenever Bivens would provide one against the individual federal employee. Sen.Rep. 93-588, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2791. See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-72, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1979).
However, the proviso was not, as the majority holds, intended to be limited in scope to the types of behavior that provided the initial motivation for its passage:
This whole matter was brought to the attention of the Committee in the context of the Collinsville raids, where the law enforcement abuses involved Fourth Amendment constitutional torts. Therefore, the Committee amendment would submit the Government to liability whenever its agents act under color of law so as to injure the public through search and seizures that are conducted without warrants or with warrants issued without probable cause. However, the Committee’s amendments should not be viewed as limited to constitutional tort situations but would apply to any case in which a Federal law enforcment agent committed the tort while acting within the scope of his employment or under color of Federal law.
Sen.Rep. 93-588, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2791.
Because Congress intended section 2680(h) to encompass activities outside the arrest, search, and seizure context, see e.g., Carlson v. Green, supra (§ 2680(h) allows action for death of prisoner due to intentional indifference of federal prison officials motivated by racial prejudice), this case forces us to confront the interface between sections 2680(a) and 2680(h).
Congress gave no guidance in the legislative history of the intentional tort proviso respecting a line of demarcation between that proviso and the discretionary function exception. Other courts that have faced the situation where an intentional tort has allegedly been committed by a federal law enforcement officer who was arguably exercising a discretionary function have expressed concern that the provisions should not “be read to eviscerate each other.” Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1234 (2d Cir.1982). In Caban, the court declined to classify “as discretionary the basically mechanical duty to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimal standards for entry into this country [because to do so would] jeopardize a primary purpose for enacting § 2680(h).” Id.
In the case before us, however, where the alleged intentional tort took place in a context that involved the performance of a discretionary function, I would “reject the contention that intentional tort claims based on the acts of ‘investigative or law enforcement officers]’ may never come within the purview of the discretionary *875function exception.” Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). Gray recognized that some challenged conduct, including claims of malicious prosecution, might involve the exercise of a discretionary function and thus be barred by section 2680(a). The court held nevertheless that since statutes waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States must be “ ‘construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,’ ” 712 F.2d at 508, quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27, 72 S.Ct. 17, 19, 96 L.Ed. 26 (1951), claimants must clear the discretionary function hurdle and satisfy the requirements of the intentional tort proviso in order to bring such claims under the FTCA.
I stress that the activity giving rise to the alleged malicious prosecution in this case involved the evaluation of the results of a wideranging and protracted investigation. We are not called upon to decide whether every decision by a law enforcement officer to seek prosecution of an individual per se involves a discretionary function and is therefore barred by section 2680(a) despite the potential applicability of section 2680(h). The essence of the Varig Airlines test is that each situation must be analyzed independently. I would hold, however, that where the discretionary function exception applies, it precludes a suit that otherwise might satisfy the intentional tort proviso. Since Kimmel’s decision to seek prosecution involved the exercise of a discretionary function, it follows that the claims asserted under the intentional tort proviso are barred.