Court Opinion

ID: 9695733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:28:19.198319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.855247
License: Public Domain

V. L. Washington, J.
(dissenting). I dissent.
Because of an instructional error, and because rulings on the exclusion of evidence and the exclusion of witnesses erroneously deprived plaintiff of a full opportunity to persuade the jury, I would reverse.
I agree with plaintiff that prejudicial error requiring reversal occurred because the trial court refused to give an applicable, requested Standard Jury Instruction on plaintiff’s burden of proof, and used instead defendant’s proposed instruction which deviated from the SJI and misstated the law.
Prior to the jury’s instruction, plaintiff’s counsel requested the trial court to use SJI 105.04 in instructing the jury regarding plaintiff’s burden of proof. When the trial court stated it would not give the applicable SJI and, instead, would give the instruction defendant proposed, plaintiff objected. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the instruction as proposed by defendant would unduly confuse the jury as to the issues.
SJI 105.04 provides:
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that:
a. defendant [discharged/failed to hire/failed to promote/failed to train/harassed/ _] the plaintiff, and
b. [religion/race/color/national origin/age/sex/ height/weight/marital status] was one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining to [discharge/fail to hire/fail to promote/fail to train/harass _] the plaintiff.
*589Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if you find that defendant [discharged/failed to hire/failed to promote/failed to train/harassed/ -] the plaintiff, and that [religion/race/color/national origin/age/ sex/height/ weight/marital status] was one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining to [discharge/fail to hire/fail to promote/fail to train/harass/_] the plaintiff.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if you find that the defendant did not [discharge/fail to hire/ fail to promote/fail to train/harass/ -] the plaintiff. Your verdict will also be for the defendant if you find that defendant did [discharge/fail to hire/fail to promote/fail to train/harass/_] the plaintiff, but that [religion/race/color/national origin/age/ sex/height/weight/marital status] was not one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining to [discharge/fail to hire/fail to promote/fail to train/harass/_] the plaintiff. other
In reviewing SJI 105.04, the trial court stated that the only word that was standard was "defendant.” The rest was to be filled in by the parties according to the parties’ claims, the trial court stated, adding that the instruction defendant proposed more fairly stated plaintiff’s claims.
The requested instruction which the trial court failed to give provided:
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that: (a) defendant failed to promote and/or failed to train the plaintiff and
*590(b) race/color and/or sex was one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining to fail to promote and/or failing to train.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if you find that defendant failed to promote and/or failed to train the plaintiff and that race, color and/or sex was one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining to fail to promote and/or train the plaintiff.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if you find that defendant did not fail to promote and/or fail to train the plaintiff. Your verdict will also be for the defendant if you find that defendant did fail to promote and/or fail to train the plaintiff, but that race, color and/or sex was not one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining to fail to promote and/or fail to train the plaintiff.
The court’s charge to the jury on plaintiffs burden of proof was:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that similarly situated white or male employees were promoted or cross-trained or treated differently during the period plaintiff sought promotions and cross-training, and that plaintiff’s race, color or sex was one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining not to promote or cross-train the plaintiff, or in her treatment by the defendant.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff, Rosa Jernigan, if you find that similarly situated white or male employees were promoted or cross-trained or treated differently during the period plaintiff sought promotions and cross-training and that plaintiff’s race, color or sex was one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining not to promote or cross-train her or in her treatment by the defendant.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if you find that similarly situated white or male employees were not promoted or cross-trained during the *591period plaintiff sought promotions and cross-training, or treated differently, or that plaintiff’s race, color or her sex did not make a difference in determining whether or not to promote or cross-train the plaintiff or in her treatment by the defendant.
The burden of proof in employment discrimination cases brought under the Civil Rights Act is the same as for cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq. In Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 252-253; 101 S Ct 1089; 67 L Ed 2d 207 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated plaintiffs burden of proof thusly:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” . . . Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.
In a race discrimination case, plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that plaintiff was a member of the class entitled to protection under the act, and (2) that, for the same or similar conduct, plaintiff was treated differently than one who was a member of a different race. Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785; 369 NW2d 223 (1985); Sisson v Bd of Regents of the University of Michigan, 174 Mich App 742; 436 NW2d 747 (1989).
*592Similarly, plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing (1) that plaintiff was a member of a class entitled to protection under the act, and (2) that, for the same or similar conduct, plaintiff was treated differently than a man. Pomranky v Zack Co, 159 Mich App 338, 343; 405 NW2d 881 (1987). Whether an employee is similarly situated is a question of fact for the jury.
I find that the trial court erred in failing to give SJI 105.04. Although the standard jury instruction did require the trial court to tailor it to the specific facts of this case, MCR 2.516 required the trial court to follow the format of the standard jury instruction. Instead, the trial court gave an instruction which defendant proposed, which did not follow the format of the standard jury instruction. In addition, the jury may have been confused by the instruction. The instruction suggested that, if defendant had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to promote or to cross-train whites or males due to economic reasons, then defendant’s decision regarding plaintiff’s nonpromotion was made for the identical reason. In addition, the time frame stated in the instruction, limiting the jury’s consideration of evidence of discrimination to the period plaintiff sought promotion or cross-training, was erroneous. No such time frame is provided in SJI 105.04. In employment discrimination cases, evidence of discrimination is rarely direct, and plaintiffs often rely on circumstantial evidence to prove their claims. In Riordan v Kempiners, 831 F2d 690, 698-699 (CA 7, 1987), the court noted that, given the importance of circumstantial evidence in proving (and, equally, disproving) employment discrimination, a blanket exclusion of evidence of events that occurred before or after the alleged discrimination is *593arbitrary. Similarly, limiting the jury’s review of that evidence would be arbitrary. Therefore, I would find that plaintiff has demonstrated that affirmance of the jury’s verdict would be "inconsistent with substantial justice,” and plaintiff should be granted a new trial.
As to the issue regarding the circuit court’s grant of defendant’s pretrial motion to preclude six of plaintiff’s witnesses from testifying at trial, it should be noted that the pretrial order which defendant claims plaintiff violated required the parties to amend their witness lists after discovery was completed and provided that failure to do so "may result in that witness not being allowed not to testify.” Five of plaintiff’s additional witnesses were employees of defendant and plaintiff withdrew the name of another nonemployee witness. Since several of the proposed witnesses were employees of defendant, it was not shown how defendant would be prejudiced if the witness list was amended. Since no separate record was made, I am unable to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in precluding these witnesses from testifying. Since I would reverse in this case, I would order that, on remand, the trial court reconsider the blanket preclusion of plaintiff’s witnesses and determine which of the five witnesses, if any, should testify upon retrial.
Additionally, the trial court excluded from evidence a letter sent to plaintiff from Richard O’Brien, General Motors’ Director of Worldwide Personnel Administration, in November, 1982, about three months after plaintiff’s resignation.
Plaintiff argues that the letter was a party admission under MRE 801(d)(2)(D). Defendant counters that the letter was properly excluded under MRE 407 as a subsequent remedial measure. I agree with plaintiff. MRE 801(d)(2)(D) pro*594vides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.” The statements contained in O’Brien’s letter were made by O’Brien as an employee of defendant, they concerned a matter within the scope of his agency or employment and the statements were made during the existence of that relationship. Moody v Pulte Homes, Inc, 423 Mich 150, 173-175; 378 NW2d 319 (1985); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp v Illinois C G R Co, 615 F2d 470, 476 (CA 8, 1980), cert den 449 US 890; 101 S Ct 249; 66 L Ed 2d 116 (1980); 4 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 801(d)(2)(D)[01], pp 801-221 to 801-224. I conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the letter from evidence.
Finally, I would find that the attorney fees were inappropriate as assessed. "In making a final award of attorney fees, the trial court should determine a reasonable fee based on the particular facts of the case and community legal practice.” Petterman v Haverhill Farms, Inc, 125 Mich App 30, 33; 335 NW2d 710 (1983). In Johnston v Detroit Hoist & Crane Co, 142 Mich App 597, 601; 370 NW2d 1 (1985), this Court approved the trial court’s approach which consisted of assessing a reasonable attorney fee for that locale under the circumstances. The trial court in the instant case should have considered these factors in making its determination.
I would reverse.