Court Opinion

ID: 9642024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:46:07.281916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:25:43.376627
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the circumstantial evidence in this case is insufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that appellant committed the charged offense. I would also rely on the additional rule, expressed in Waldon v. State, 579 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Cr.App.), and quoted in Routon v. State, 589 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Cr.App.):
“Where circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution is somewhat weak and where the record on appeal affirmatively shows not only that other testimony which would have cast additional light on the facts was available to the prosecution, but also that the prosecution did not introduce such other evidence or satisfactorily account for its failure to do so, the appellate court will treat the case as one *913showing reasonable doubt of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.” (Citations omitted).
According to appellant the two girls were already in the yard when he came looking for them and saw one of them cutting the window screen. DeLoach was the only witness who testified to seeing appellant and his two companions in Johnson’s back yard where the screen was cut. He did not see appellant or the others enter the yard. De-Loach was alerted to their presence by his son, who had apparently observed them from a platform in DeLoach’s backyard. DeLoach’s son was not called to testify about what he saw in Johnson’s backyard before he called his father. His testimony could have “cast additional light on the facts.” The State did not call the son nor account for its failure to do so. For this additional reason, I concur in the judgment.
Before the court en banc.