Court Opinion

ID: 9743806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:43:54.849385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.674938
License: Public Domain

Nolan, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court today holds that a judge may not accept a defendant’s plea over the Commonwealth’s objection without stating the reasons for so doing. I agree that, in the absence of an explicit explanation, such an action creates the appearance, and even the strong possibility, that the judge has impermissibly interfered with the prosecutorial function in violation of art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In such a case, it is not unreasonable to presume that there was such a violation and to reverse the ruling in order to safeguard the line between the judiciary and the executive branch.
However, I write separately to emphasize that nothing in the court’s opinion would prevent the judge from accepting the plea for reasons which do not encroach on the executive power, provided he fully explained these reasons. See Commonwealth v. Brandano, 359 Mass. 332 (1971). Such an action would, of course, be subject to review by this court. Provided the judge was utilizing the judicial rather than the executive power, there would be no conflict. An example of a potentially valid judicial reason for accepting a plea over the objection of the prosecutor would be the case where the judge determined that the sole reason for the pursuit of the more severe offense was a personal animosity between the prosecutor and the defendant, and that the sole purpose of *505the trial was to harass the defendant. On the present record, there is not even a suggestion of such animosity in this case.
I also write separately to express my reservation over the court’s gratuitous statement that “[n] either court congestion ' nor judicial economy justifies a judge in taking a plea . . . over the Commonwealth’s objection.” Ante at 503. There is not even a whisper on the record that court congestion or judicial economy played any part in the decision which we review today. Moreover, I think it unwise to determine on the basis of art. 30, if that is the basis for the court’s statement, that the judiciary may not manage an overcrowded and underfunded court system by accepting reasonable guilty pleas, even over the objection of the prosecutor. We ought not foreclose that possibility with such a passing phrase unsupported by the record.
I dissent to the extent that I would direct the judge of the Superior Court to set forth his reasons for accepting the plea.