Court Opinion

ID: 9551431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:53:23.688169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:47.265750
License: Public Domain

HERNANDEZ, Judge (concurring in the result). I agree with much of the analysis in the opinion of the court. However, there are two things with which I cannot agree and two where further explanation is necessary. Although it is implicit in the opinion that the doctrine of economic compulsion should be classified as a tort action, I believe that it should be made explicit to avoid confusion as to what procedural rules should apply, etc. I would define “duty” as the obligation to reasonably exercise superior economic power or advantage in a bargain situation. 53 Iowa L.Rev., supra. The opinion in the discussion on damages states: “However, the consequential damages must be' damages that were or should have been reasonably contemplated by the parties.” I agree that the “foreseeability” rule prevails in this state. However, it is also the rule that one who willfully commits a tort is liable for all injury resulting from such wrongful act, even though such resulting injury could not have reasonably been foreseen. Valdez v. Gonzales, supra. The actions of Duke City were willful. Many courts do deny recovery under economic compulsion because the victim had an adequate legal remedy on the principle of maintaining the stability of contracts. In my opinion the position of the victim of economic compulsion and the victim who has been induced by fraudulent means to enter into a contract are analogous. The law gives the fraud victim an election of' remedies. “Although relief may be obtained by a defrauded party to a contract in a variety of ways, such relief is always based on any of three general remedies which are open to the defrauded party: l.A right to damages for being led into the transaction. * * * 2. Recision of the fraudulent transaction * * * 3. Enforcement against the fraudulent person of the kind of bargain which he represented that he was making * * * ” 12 Williston, Contracts, § 1523, at 606-607 (3d ed. 1970). I believe that the victim of economic compulsion should also be given an election of remedies. The security of contracts has not been endangered by recognizing the demands of good faith and fair dealing in situations of fraud. Neither will the security be endangered by responding to the elementary fair dealing demands of the victims of economic compulsion. A New Jersey court faced with the argument that the victim had the legal remedy of recission had this to say: “An attempt has been made to justify the rule stated, upon the ground that the person exerting the. duress has relied on the payment made to him by the victim, and having relied, he should be protected. [Citation omitted] But why should the law have such a tender regard for a wrongdoer? Relief by way of restitution puts no undue burden upon him; he is not subjected to damages for his wrong, but merely called upon to give back that which he forced from his victim.” S. P. Dunham Company v. Kudra, 44 N.J. Super. 565, 131 A.2d 306 (1957). OPINION ON MOTION TO REMAND HENDLEY, Judge.  Pending the appeal of this cause defendants filed a motion requesting “ * * * an Order remanding this cause to the Trial Court, for the purpose of allowing Duke City to file, in the Trial Court, a motion pursuant to N.M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), to grant relief from the operation of the Judgment herein insofar as it awards damages for an alleged loss of the sawmill and planing mill belonging to Plaintiff, William E. Terrel, d/b/a Little Tree Lumber Company (hereinafter referred to as “Terrel”), for the reason that Terrel has not lost his sawmill and planing mill. * * * ” Attached to defendants’ motion is an Affidavit of the Executive Vice President of Duke City Lumber Company and a certified copy of a financing statement showing plaintiff as debtor after the date of judgment awarded by the Trial Court.  Since Rule 60(b)(6) applies to the district courts, the first question that presented itself was whether this court should entertain such a motion or whether the matter should have been presented directly to the Trial Court. It is our opinion that the Trial Court could not have considered the motion having lost jurisdiction by reason of the appeal. Therefore if we would not consider the motion the defendants would in effect be foreclosed from seeking relief under this rule. We believe that no party should be deprived of the benefits of this relief because a case is on áppeal. Therefore it is our determination that the filing of the motion in this court was proper.  We are mindful that the rule may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances, (Battersby v. Bell Aircraft Corporation, 65 N.M. 114, 332 P.2d 1028 (1958)) and that we should only remand in those cases where it is reasonably apparent that the Trial Court would be disposed to grant such a motion. Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 172 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1949).  After having read the briefs and other information furnished and heard the arguments of counsel we were not prepared to rule without further information. This then presented the question of whether this court should hear testimony, receive evidence, etc., which we are not adequately staffed to do or remand the entire case even though it was not reasonably apparent to us that the trial court would grant the motion. We decided instead to seek an expression of opinion from the trial court. See Switzer v. Marzall, 95 F.Supp. 721 (D.C.D.Cir.1951). Our reasoning being that in this case the trial court, having heard the original trial and motions, was more familiar with the facts of the case and was the appropriate court to determine the question of relief under Rule 60(b)(6). We issued an order which states in part: “IT IS ORDERED That the Court is reserving a ruling on movant’s motion to remand and directs the movant to file a motion with the trial court requesting an expression of opinion as to whether the trial court would entertain a motion under Rule 60(B)(6). After hearing before the trial court, movant is directed to file the trial court’s expression of opinion with the Court of Appeals.” Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing and issued an “Expression of Opinion” which stated: “Assuming jurisdiction for this purpose, the court would not entertain a Motion under Rule 60(B)(6).” Explicit in the Trial Court’s “Expression of Opinion” is that defendants’ motion, attached exhibits and arguments of counsel presented no basis for relief from the operation of the judgment. In view of the foregoing, defendants’ ' Motion to Remand is denied. It is so ordered. HERNANDEZ, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., dissents.