Court Opinion

ID: 9494544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:39:52.764372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:27.690319
License: Public Domain

DYK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the PTO’s action in granting the certificate of correction is entitled to a presumption of validity that must be overcome with clear and convincing evidence. I also agree that the PTO is authorized, under 35 U.S.C. § 255, to issue certificates of correction for typographical or clerical mistakes that broaden the scope of the patent, for I share the majority’s hesitancy to interpret section 255 to prohibit broadening corrections “without express indication from the statute.” Ante at 1370. However, I part company with the majority when it reads into the statute a requirement that the error be apparent from the prosecution history, a requirement which is equally lacking an “express indication” in the statute. I accordingly dissent from the majority’s holding that the certificate of correction is invalid and from the majority’s decision affirming the grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.
As the majority admits, the text of section 255 does not require that the error be apparent from the prosecution history. It is not our task to read into the statute an “implicit, extra-textual requirement,” ante at 1372, because we believe that it represents good policy. As the Supreme Court noted in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 10, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000) *1379“[wjhatever merits these and other policy arguments may have, it is not the province of this Court to rewrite the statute to accommodate them.” See also Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 886, 398, 104 S.Ct. 766, 78 L.Ed.2d 549 (1984) (“Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement.”). Indeed, it is perfectly clear that Congress did not intend to require in section 255 that mistakes be evident from the prosecution history.
As the majority admits, Congress explicitly imposed such a requirement in section 254. Section 254 states that “[wjhenever a mistake in a patent, incurred through the fault of the Patent and Trademark Office, is clearly disclosed by the records of the Office, the Director may issue a certificate of correction-” 35 U.S.C. § 254 (Emphasis added.). Because such language is absent from section 255, the inference is inescapable that Congress did not intend to impose such a requirement in section 255. Section 255 was enacted in 1952 at the very same time section 254 was reenacted, and both sections appear in the Patent Act of 1952, Pub.L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.1 Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court has made clear that a section that omits language appearing in a companion section should not be construed to include the language. The Court concluded in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983), that “[wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” See also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2124-25, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001). There is nothing here to overcome that presumption, and the legislative history of the 1952 Act is silent on the reason for the textual difference in the two sections. S.Rep. No. 82-1979, at 27 (1952), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2420.
The majority states that reading into section 255 an extra-textual requirement that mistakes be evident from the prosecution history is consistent with the “overall statutory scheme,” articulated in §§ 251-256.I agree with the majority that when interpreting a statute we should “interpret the ivords in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 2482, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001), and that we should “consider not only the bare meaning of the word[s] but also [their] placement and purpose in the statutory scheme,” Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 721 (Fed.Cir.1998). However, Tyler and Fanning, Phillips & Molnar discuss how to interpret the meaning of an individual, ambiguous word that appears in the text of a statute. Those cases hardly suggest that we should read entirely new clauses into a statute because we think that that approach better fits the overall design.
Even under the majority’s interpretation, I fail to see why reading into section 255 a requirement that errors be “clearly disclosed in the records of the Office” serves the policies of the statute. Section 254 is designed to deal with PTO mistakes while section 255 is designed to deal with *1380mistakes by the applicant. It seems highly unlikely that Congress intended to require that the prosecution history disclose the applicant’s own mistakes. If a mistake were made by the applicant and went undetected by the PTO (as apparently occurred here), it would often not appear in the prosecution history.
The majority’s concern that the prosecution history must give notice of the mistake because “[t]he public is entitled to rely upon the public record of a patent in determining the scope of the patent’s claims,” ante at 1369 (quoting Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383, 49 USPQ2d 1144, 1148 (Fed.Cir.1998)), is misplaced. The majority expresses concern that section 255, unlike section 252, provides on its face no protection from infringement liability for intervening rights. However, we recently (and correctly) held that a certificate of correction is valid only for claims arising after the certificate issued, as the language of the statute makes clear. Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1294, 56 USPQ2d 1161, 1172 (Fed.Cir.2000).2 We offered the example of a patent issuing with a single claim that was clearly invalid due to a mistake, and stated that:
Until the PTO issues a certificate of correction ..., such a claim would appear invalid to the public, and reasonable competitors would be justified in conducting their affairs accordingly. In such a case, where the claim is invalid on its face without the certificate of correction, it strikes us as an illogical result to allow the patent holder, once the certificate of correction has issued, to sue an alleged infringer for activities that occurred before the issuance of the certificate of correction.
Id. at 1295-96. Thus, a certificate of correction is valid only for acts occurring after the certificate of correction issues. Because Southwest requires that the certificate of correction be treated as valid only for acts occurring after the certificate issues, the public’s reliance on the public record is protected, regardless of whether the mistake is evident in the original prosecution history.
The majority cites the two-year time bar for obtaining a broadening reissue under section 251 and notes that no similar time limit applies to broadening certificates under section 255. Ante at 1371-72. But this does not support imposing a requirement in section 255 that an applicant’s mistakes be evident from the prosecution history. In any event the certificate of correction here was issued on August 17, 1999, less than two years after the original patent issued October 21,1997.
Finally, in areas such as this, we should be reluctant to second guess the PTO. The PTO, not the district courts or this court, is in the best position to know whether a typographical or clerical error has occurred. The presumption of validity and the clear and convincing evidence standard were crafted, in part, because we recognized that we cannot know exactly what occurred during prosecution, and we appropriately assume that the PTO has done its job properly, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1569, 40 USPQ2d 1481, 1485 (Fed.Cir.1996) (“The presumption of validity is based on the presumption of administrative correctness of actions of the agency charged with examination of patentability.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230, 117 S.Ct. 1822, 137 L.Ed.2d *13811030 (1997). The same presumption applies to certificates of correction. As we recently said in Winbond Electronics Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 262 F.3d 1363, 1371, 60 USPQ2d 1029, 1034 (Fed.Cir.2001), “[t]he Patent Act accords each patent a presumption of validity.... A Certificate of Correction extends that presumption to the corrected document.” While the majority purports to apply this standard, in fact it pays little or no actual deference to the PTO’s determination that a qualifying clerical or typographical mistake occurred.
Even under the majority’s statutory interpretation, there is ample evidence in the patent and its prosecution history here to support the conclusion that such a mistake occurred, and certainly no clear and convincing evidence that it did not. In the course of prosecution, Superior submitted an amendment adding a claim that eventually matured into claim 1 of the '534 patent. It claimed a fireplace that included a housing and “a firebox within the housing comprising a top wall, rear ioall and side walls.... ” (Emphasis added.) On March 11, 1997, after a telephone interview between the examiner and Superior’s representative on March 6, 1997, in which prior art was discussed, “rear wall” was changed to “rear walls” in the claim by an examiner’s amendment. Accordingly, the patent originally issued on October 21, 1997, claiming a fireplace that included a housing and “a firebox within the housing comprising a top wall, rear walls and side walls .... ” '534 patent, col. 5, 11. 44-45 (Emphasis added.). The PTO issued a certificate of correction, pursuant to section 255, on August 17, 1999, changing “rear walls” to “rear wall.”
The patent itself strongly supports the validity of the certificate of correction. The written description stated: “[i]n the preferred form of the invention, the firebox rear wall 15-” (emphases added). '534 patent, col. 4, 11. 11-12. By using the definite article, the patentee clearly indicated that the preferred embodiment of invention included a firebox having a single rear wall. We have held that a claim construction that does not encompass the preferred embodiment is “rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1996). So too a claim which is written to exclude the preferred embodiment is likely to be an error.
The majority notes that the examiner’s amendment changed “rear wall” to “rear walls” after a telephonic interview between Superior’s representative and the examiner to discuss prior art. From this, the majority draws an inference that the amendment was made in a deliberate attempt by the applicant to overcome prior art and was not a clerical or typographical error. But the examiner’s amendment also added, at the same time, to the same claim, the claim limitation “a rear room air plenum between the rear toall of the firebox .... ” '534 patent, col. 6, 11. 3-4 (Emphasis added.). The majority hypothesizes that this language was an error. Ante at 1374. But there is simply no reason to believe that the “rear wall” reference was an error, as opposed to the “rear walls” reference. In any event, the existence of these inconsistencies sharply argues against the majority’s inference of a deliberate change. Thus, the prosecution history supports the view that the change from “rear wall” to “rear walls” was inadvertent and was a clerical or typographical mistake.3 Certainly, Majestic has not pre*1382sented clear and convincing evidence that this was not a mistake, much less clear and convincing evidence that the PTO made an error in issuing the certifícate of correction.
Finally, the court holds that the district court erred in summarily denying Masjestic’s motion for attorneys’ fees without further explanation. I disagree with the majority that the district court should be required to make findings and establish a record to allow our review of its denial of defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees. District courts already are overworked and we need not add to their burden. In Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1583, 27 USPQ2d 1836, 1845 (Fed.Cir.1993), although the “district court issued no factual findings as to whether [it] was an ‘exceptional case’,” we affirmed a district court’s denial of the accused infringer’s motion for attorneys’ fees because the record provided a sufficient basis for us to review the district court’s decision. The same is true here.
The issue on which the majority invalidates the certificate of correction is an issue of first impression, and is certainly a close one (even if one assumes that the majority is correct). Majestic has also made no claim, much less an evidentiary showing, that Superior filed the original infringement action in bad faith. In Cambridge Products, Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050-51, 22 USPQ2d 1577, 1580-81 (Fed.Cir.1992), we affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and explained that:
[i]n the case of awards to prevailing accused infringers ... ‘exceptional cases’ are normally those of bad faith litigation or those involving fraud or inequitable conduct by the patentee.... Thus, [the accused infringer] bears the burden of establishing that [the paten-tee] pursued this litigation in bad faith and that the district court clearly erred in failing to so find.
Superior may have been negligent in not carefully reviewing the patent before filing the action, but this negligence is a far cry from the gross failure involved in the single case cited by the majority in which sanctions were imposed under Fed. R.Civ.P. 11. See View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 982-84, 54 USPQ2d 1179, 1180-82 (Fed.Cir.2000) (affirming district court’s imposition of sanctions where patentee had filed an infringement counterclaim without having seen the accused infringer’s products, and where the patentee admitted “that it had no factual basis for its counterclaims”).
The majority states, “this is not a case in which the record ... compels a denial of attorney fees,” ante at 1377, but neither is this a case in which the record compels us to grant attorneys’ fees. In such circumstances, given the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review under which we review the district court’s finding regarding attorneys’ fees, a remand is quite unnecessary. On the record in this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that this was not an exceptional case and did not abuse its discretion in denying Majestic’s motion for attorneys’ fees.
I note that none of the cases on which the majority relies for its conclusion that judicial findings are compelled involved an attorneys’ fee award reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. As we have stated before, a remand for findings on the question of attorneys’ fees, “with its accompanying expenditure of additional judicial resources in a case thought to be completed, is a step not lightly taken and one that should be limited to cases in which further action must be taken by the *1383district court or in which the appellate court has no way open to it to affirm or reverse the district court’s action under review.” Carroll Touch, 15 F.3d at 1584, 27 USPQ2d at 1845. Here, we should defer to the discretion of the district court to deny the motion for attorneys’ fees.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Section 254 was first enacted by the Patent Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 535, 43 Stat. 1268 (1925), "to save time and money and also promote efficiency in the operation of the Patent Office” because, when errors are detected that "are clearly clerical errors ... the certificate obviates the necessity of reprinting the entire patent." 65 Cong. Rec. 6,842-43 (1924) (statement of Rep. Lanham). The statute “saves expense. It saves the reprinting of patents and allows the offering of these amended patents, with these certificates in them, in evidence rather than requiring a reprint of the entire patent.” Id. at 6,843.

. While Southwest involved certificates issued under section 254, its holding applies equally well to certificates issued under section 255.

. Because Majestic did not present clear and convincing evidence that the mistake was not clerical or typographical in nature, I would not reach the issue of whether the mistake was "of minor character” under section 255.