Court Opinion

ID: 9709511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:49:16.158735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.588197
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 After a careful review, and in compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957 (2007), I would find the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion, and I would affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶2 The Supreme Court vacated this Court’s previous opinion and remanded for consideration in light of Walls. Specifically, in Walls, the Supreme Court stated the following recitation of the proper standard of appellate review of a sentencing court’s imposition of sentence:
The standard of review typically refers to the level of deference to be accorded a lower tribunal’s decision. Our Court has stated that the proper standard of review when considering whether to affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 543 Pa. 566, 673 A.2d 893, 895 (1996) (“Imposition of a sentence is vested in the discretion of the sentencing court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”). As stated in Smith, an abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion *1203unless “the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. In more expansive terms, our Court recently offered: “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 576 Pa. 546, 839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (2003).
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing court sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should not be lightly disturbed. Even with the advent of the sentencing guidelines, the power of sentencing is a function to be performed by the sentencing court. Thus, rather than cabin [sic] the exercise of a sentencing court’s discretion, the guidelines merely inform the sentencing decision.
As can be seen from the above, the abuse of discretion standard includes review of whether the judgment exercised was unreasonable. As more fully described below, the Sentencing Code sets forth a requirement of appellate review for whether a sentence outside of the guidelines is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9781(c). Thus, the statutory unreasonableness inquiry is a component of the jurisprudential standard of review for an abuse of discretion.
Thus, under the Sentencing Code an appellate court is to exercise its judgment in reviewing a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines to assess whether the sentencing court imposed a sentence that is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c), (d).
Yet, what makes a sentence “unreasonable” is not defined in the statute. Generally speaking, “unreasonable” commonly connotes a decision that is “irrational” or “not guided by sound judgment.” While a general understanding of unreasonableness is helpful, in this context, it is apparent that the General Assembly has intended the concept of unreasonableness to be a fluid one ... Indeed, ... it is clear that the General Assembly intended the concept of unreasonableness to be inherently a circumstance-dependent concept that is flexible in understanding and lacking precise definition.
Thus, given its nature, we decline to fashion any concrete rules as to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence that falls outside of applicable guidelines under Section 9781(c)(3). We are of the view, however, that the Legislature intended that considerations found in Section 9721 inform appellate review for reasonableness. That is, while a sentence may be found to be unreasonable after review of Section 9781(d)’s four statutory factors, in addition a sentence may also be unreasonable if the appellate court finds that the sentence was imposed without express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721, i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of the *1204offense in relation to the impact on the victim and the community; and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Moreover, even though the unreasonableness inquiry lacks precise boundaries, we are confident that rejection of a sentencing court’s imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds would occur infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges, especially when the unreasonableness inquiry is conducted using the proper standard of review.
Walls, 592 Pa. at 564-65, 568-569, 926 A.2d at 961-64 (citations, quotation marks, quotations and footnotes omitted).
¶ 3 Applying the Supreme Court’s clarification of the proper standard of review to the case sub judice, I conclude the Majority has impermissibly miseharacterized the sentencing court’s decision and has substituted its own policy reasons in place of the careful exercise of discretion by the sentencing court. For example, the Majority indicates the sentencing court had an unjustified agenda designed to keep Appellant in prison for life, and the Majority holds Appellant’s sentence is clearly unreasonable on the basis Appellant’s crimes were lacking in violence6 and resulted in the stealing of mostly costume jewelry. Under our standard of review, as clarified by Walls, I conclude the Majority has again erred in undertaking this analysis and ignores the dictates of our Supreme Court.
¶ 4 Specifically, here the sentencing court properly took into account the requirements in Subsection 9721(b) that the sentence must be “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Thus, Appellant’s sentence is appropriate in light of the nature and circumstances of- the offense and the history and characteristics of Appellant. Clearly, the sentencing court did not make a decision that is “irrational” or “not guided by sound ’judgment.” Walls, supra.
¶ 5 Despite acknowledging that the sentencing court specifically noted that Appellant has been a career criminal,7 that Appellant has not responded positively to rehabilitation, that Appellant has no regard for the victims or his family, that Appellant evaded the police, and that Appellant was captured while driving a stolen vehicle, the Majority inexplicably concludes Appellant’s sentence was “clearly unreasonable.”
¶ 6 To the contrary, I find the sentencing court made a sentencing decision which was individualized to Appellant, and the sentencing court relied upon permissible sentencing factors in so doing. The Majority is attempting to substitute its own policy considerations that somehow it is “clearly unreasonable” per se for a trial judge to impose a strict sentence on a *1205career criminal simply because the criminal commits crimes against property.
¶ 7 The fact Appellant’s crimes did not yield him a great financial gain and did not result in physical violence does not justify the legal conclusion that the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing its sentence. Indeed, the Majority has exceeded its appellate review in offering personal viewpoints about the appropriate lengths of sentences for certain crimes. In addition, the Majority has denigrated the seriousness of property offenses and ignores the fact Appellant received a lengthy sentence not because he committed property offenses but, rather, because Appellant made a career of committing such offenses without any showing he was amenable to rehabilitation.
¶ 8 Moreover, I disagree with the Majority’s repeated emphasis on the fact Appellant’s crimes had “limited financial impact” because the items stolen consisted largely of costume jewelry. First, there is no indication Appellant knew the items were “costume jewelry” and not monetarily valuable items when he stole them. Second, the Majority’s conclusions are dismissive toward the victims of the crimes. While the Majority summarily acknowledges the jewelry stolen by Appellant had sentimental value to the victims, I conclude the Majority has not taken into account the fact the sentencing court carefully considered the impact Appellant’s crimes had on the victims. For example, the sentencing court observed that “victim after victim took the stand and broke down because of the sentimental value of many of these things that were taken.” N.T. 2/19/02 at 28-84. That is, the sentencing court, who did not review a “cold record,” observed the “flesh-and-blood people” standing before it. This is precisely the advantage the sentencing court enjoys and which is discussed in Walls.
¶ 9 The Supreme Court concluded in Walls that “we are confident that rejection of a sentencing court’s imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds would occur infrequently_” Walls, 592 Pa. at 569, 926 A.2d at 964. I do not share that confidence if the Majority’s analysis becomes law.
¶ 10 As I find the Majority has again usurped the sentencing court’s discretion by reversing the decision of the sentencing court, I dissent.

. As I stated in my previous dissent to the Majority's previous Opinion:
While Appellant was not convicted of any crimes of violence, the Majority ignores the fact that among the stolen property received by Appellant were firearms. The traffic in illegal firearms, and the violence caused by those in possession of illegal firearms, is a serious problem in our society. Appellant’s role in that traffic and its facilitation of violence crimes should not be minimized.
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 859 A.2d 771, 785 n. 17 (Pa.Super.2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 594 Pa. 345, 935 A.2d 1290 (2007) (per curiam order).

. Appellant’s crimes for the charges at issue occurred over many months and encompassed two states, with several counties within Pennsylvania.