Court Opinion

ID: 9625511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:43:08.1274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:09.872780
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting, with whom McCLINTOCK, Justice, joins.
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. In my view the legislature did create alternative methods for reviewing the decisions of the hearing examiner for the Department of Revenue, and this case properly was before the district court for a trial de novo. I would hold, however, that the district court erred in excluding from the evidence the material records of convictions. I then would remand this case to the district court for retrial in accordance with the views hereinafter set forth.
The majority view is that the only procedure for appeal in this instance is that provided by § 31-276.32, W.S.1957, as amended. That approach eschews the possibility that the legislature created alternative methods of review, and limits the procedure set forth in § 39-43.12, W.S.1957, as amended,1 so that matters relating to suspension of drivers’ licenses would not be included. This conclusion does violence, to some degree, to the clear language of this latter provision. I have not been able to perceive the ambiguity in these provisions upon which the majority opinion relies. Despite the illusion of certainty which rules of statutory construction can create, I see no need to invoke them here. In a different context, that of questioning the legality of a tax, we have recognized alternative remedies. Atlantic Richfield Company v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Sweetwater, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1267 (1977). Awkward as such a statutory situation may be, I would hold that the legislature in this instance did create two procedures for review, and that since the petition for review was timely under one of them the matter was properly before the district court pursuant to the provisions of §§ 39-43.11 and 39-43.12, W.S.1957, as amended. In light of the sequence of the statutory provisions and the failure of § 31-276.32, W.S.1957, as amended, to refer to the extension of a period of suspension as provided in § 31-276.34, W.S.1957, as amended, an argument well might lie to the effect that the method of review provided by §§ 39-43.11 and 39-43.12, W.S.1957, as amended, is the only one available when a period of suspension of a driver’s license is extended.
Turning then to the alternative disposition, I would remand the case to the district court for a rehearing. While it is somewhat difficult to be certain of the basis for the ruling by the district court that the “agency’s procedure herein has not been in conformity with the law,” it must be related to the manner of execution of the certification of the abstracts of the records of convictions of Irvine for driving while his license was suspended. Irvine’s sole objection to these two exhibits was directed to *1303the manner of execution which clearly appears to be a facsimile stamp.
It is my conclusion that unless such a practice is prohibited by statute (no such prohibition appears here from the briefs and none has been discovered independently) or unless the statute requires a signature in writing, a facsimile stamp signature of a judicial officer such as a justice of the peace is efficacious for all purposes. McGrady v. Munsey Trust Co., 32 A.2d 106 (D.C.Mun.App.1943); Costilla Estates Development Co. v. Mascarenas, 33 N.M. 356, 267 P. 74 (1928); Ex Parte Spencer, 171 Tex.Cr.App. 339, 349 S.W.2d 727 (1961); Stork v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.App. 398, 23 S.W.2d 733 (1929); Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967). See Shafsky v. City of Casper, Wyo., 487 P.2d 468 (1971) (disapproving practice of furnishing stamp to police officers but not challenging the facsimile stamp signature).
It would follow for me that the district court should have received these exhibits, which were material to the issues in the case, and considered them as evidence. The validity of these exhibits vitiates the basis for the conclusion of the district court that the agency’s procedure is not according to law, and their presence in evidence before the court invokes the language of § 31-276.-34(b), W.S.1957, as amended, which is mandatory as addressed to the driver’s license division. It also appears that in reaching that conclusion the district judge relied to some extent upon other documents evidencing convictions which were received in evidence, but which are immaterial to the issues in this case.
I would reverse this case and remand for a new trial de novo in accordance with the' views expressed above.

. As explained in the majority opinion, these statutes were revised in the 1977 Republished Edition of the Wyoming Statutes so extensively that any parallel reference to these provisions as they appear after 1977 is not possible. Therefore, citations in this dissenting opinion are to W.S.1957, as amended, only.