Court Opinion

ID: 9595918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:44:19.392071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:53.659234
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that EAB did not err when it concluded that claimant was not discharged for “misconduct connected with work.” ORS 657.176(2)(a).1 That holding is based, in part, on its conclusion that the phrase “connected with work” is a delegative statutory term and that EAB properly ignored the return-to-work agreement between employer and claimant as evidence of “misconduct connected with work.” Because I would conclude that “connected with work” is an inexact statutory term and that EAB erred when it failed to consider the return-to-work agreement when it determined whether claimant’s conduct was work-connected, I dissent.
Statutory terms may be exact, inexact or delegative. See Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 223-28, 621 P2d 547 (1980). Exact terms are terms of precise meaning, requiring only fact-finding by an agency and judicial review for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). Inexact terms are “complete expressions of legislative meaning” that require agency interpretation. Springfield Education Assn. v. *209School Dist, supra, 290 Or at 224. We review those interpretations under ORS 183.482(8)(a) to determine “whether a particular interpretation or application is consistent with or tends to advance a more generally expressed legislative policy.” 290 Or at 228. In contrast, delegative terms give an agency the authority to “complet[e] a value judgment that the legislature itself has only indicated[.]” McPherson v. Employment Division, 285 Or 541, 550, 591 P2d 1381 (1979). We review agency interpretation of those terms to determine whether the agency has transgressed the limits of its discretionary authority or other administrative, statutory or constitutional provisions. ORS 183.482(8) (b).
The majority reads the phrase “misconduct connected with work” as a whole and concludes that it is a delegative term subject to administrative definition. I agree that “misconduct” is a delegative term because it involves a value judgment and, accordingly, that Division has properly adopted OAR 471-30-038(3)2 to assist in making that judgment. Examples of similar delegative terms that require value judgments include: “good cause,” “fair,” “unfair,” “undue,” “unreasonable,” “public convenience and necessity,” and “unprofessional conduct.” Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist, supra, 290 Or at 228; Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 293, 605 P2d 273 (1980). The same cannot be said of the phrase “connected with work.”
Whether a particular term is characterized as exact, inexact or delegative “depend[s] upon what the user intended to communicate or accomplish by the use of the word.” Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., supra, 290 Or at 224. We said in Giese v. Employment Div., 27 Or App 929, 933 n 2, 557 P2d 1354 (1976), rev den (1977):
“So far as we can determine, the term ‘misconduct connected with his work’ was inserted into our unemployment compensation law in 1937. Oregon Laws 1937, ch 398, § 4. When first enacted in 1935, our employment compensation statute simply provided that a claimant could be disqualified *210for ‘proven misconduct.’ Oregon Laws 1935 (Spec Sess), ch 70, § 4(b)(2).”
When the legislature added the words “connected with work” to ORS 657.176(2)(a), it intended to limit the denial of unemployment compensation benefits for misconduct to those actions which are reasonably related to a claimant’s workplace. See Giese v. Employment Div., supra, 27 Or App at 934. Determining whether conduct is “connected with work” does not involve any value judgment by the agency, but only requires fact-finding about what constitutes work-connectedness. See Market Transport v. Maudlin, 301 Or 727, 736, 725 P2d 914 (1986). Because that phrase represents a complete legislative expression of policy that does not require further expansion by rules of a legislative nature, see, e.g., Salem Firefighters Local 314 v. PERB, 300 Or 663, 666-68, 717 P2d 126 (1986), it is an inexact statutory term. Consequently, the next question is whether the interpretation of that phrase is consistent with the general policy of ORS 675.176(2)(a).
EAB based its decision on the rule in In the Matter of Lyle E. Zufelt, Jr., Opinion and Order 87-S-1587-E (1987) (Zufelt). In Zufelt, Division set forth its policy regarding payment or denial of unemployment compensation benefits when a claimant quits work or is discharged for drug use or other drug-related activities. Zufelt says, in part:
“At present, drug tests cannot determine whether an individual is under the influence of drugs. The test can only establish whether drugs are present in the individual’s body. Consequently, before benefits are denied for failing a drug test, it should be shown that: (1) Proper testing and confirmation procedures have been followed; and, (2) There is clear objective evidence of impairment (e.g., bizarre behavior, substantial loss of productivity, etc.).
“DISCHARGE. If an employe is discharged for failing a drug test and there is clear objective evidence that the employe was drug impaired, it is a discharge for misconduct.
«* * * * 4c
“NOTE: In cases involving significant threats to the safety of the general public benefits shall be denied where an employe fails a drug test even though there is no evidence of impairment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We enunciated a similar standard in Glide Lumber Prod. Co. v. *211Emp. Div. (Smith), 86 Or App 669, 674, 741 P2d 907 (1987) (Glide), when we said that
“off-the-job drug use can be disqualifying only if it does in fact or is reasonably likely in a specific case to have actual on-the-job effects.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Both Zufelt and Glide are inconsistent with the general policy of ORS 675.176(2) (a). On its face, the phrase “misconduct connected with work” is broader than Zufelt’s requirement of “objective evidence of impairment.” For example, an airline company would have a right to expect that pilots not fly with illegal substances in their systems, because of the potential effect on their ability to function safely. Thus, it could be “misconduct connected with work” for a pilot to ingest a controlled substance and to fly while it was still in his body. That the substance did not actually affect his ability to function does not make his misconduct any less work-connected. The misconduct becomes work-connected because, while he had those substances in his body, he flew his employer’s airplane.
Because ORS 657.176(2) (a) is intended to prevent individuals who engage in misconduct which reasonably relates to their work from receiving unemployment compensation benefits, it follows that off-duty employee drug use may be disqualifying misconduct if it has some rational connection to the employee’s work. To decide that issue, EAB is required to consider all facts that bear on whether a claimant’s drug use is work-connected. Zufelt and Glide prevent EAB from doing that. Zufelt limits EAB’s consideration to those facts that show that a claimant suffered actual on-the-job drug-induced impairment, unless the claimant’s job involved a “significant threatf] to the safety of the general public[.]” Glide is somewhat broader, because it allows EAB to consider whether a claimant suffered, or was “reasonably likely” to suffer, actual on-the-job effects. Both fail to recognize that off-duty drug use may be inherently “connected with” certain kinds of work, even in the absence of actual or likely on-the-job impairment or any threat to the safety of the general public. Nothing in the text of ORS 657.176(2) (a) or its context or legislative history warrants such a narrow reading. Therefore, Zufelt should be invalidated. See U. of O. Cooperative v. Dept. of Revenue, 273 Or 539, 550, 542 P2d 900 (1975). Further, to the extent that *212Glide holds that off-the-job drug use can be disqualifying only if it does in fact, have actual or likely on-the-job effects, it should be overruled.3
The majority holds that for EAB to consider evidence of the agreement is tantamount to allowing the employer to determine claimant’s eligibility for benefits. I agree that an employer cannot alter, by agreement or in-house rule, the legislature’s determination of a claimant’s eligibility for benefits. However, I do not agree that a last chance agreement may not be a basis for making a finding of fact that a claimant’s conduct is connected with his work. As we said in Glide, although employer’s in-house rule “cannot give rise to different substantive tests for work-connectedness than the ones expressed in the statutes, the administrative rule and the cases construing them,” it nonetheless “may be relevant to the proof of facts bearing on whether off-duty conduct is connected with work.” 86 Or App at 674. Here, an inference exists that employer deemed it important enough that claimant’s systems be free of controlled substances when he worked as a chipper operator to make it a requirement for continued employment. That is a fact that should have been considered by EAB.
Surely, the legislature did not intend, by enacting ORS 657.176(2)(a), to create a policy that rewards employees with unemployment benefits for wilfully violating agreements that were intended to enhance production or to prevent injury. Neither this court, Division nor EAB is free to restrict the legislature’s policy about what constitutes work-connectedness by adding a requirement that there be an actual or likely on-the-job effect. Because the majority does just that, I dissent.
Joseph, C. J., and Warren, J., join in this dissent.

 ORS 657.176(2) (a) provides:
“An individual shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits * * *, if the authorized representative designated by the assistant director finds that the individual:
“(a) Has been discharged for misconduct connected with work[.]”

 OAR 471-30-038(3) provides, in part:
“Under the provisions of ORS 657.176(2) (a) and (b), misconduct is a wilful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employe. An act that amounts to a wilful disregard of an employer’s interest * ** * is misconduct.”

 The majority’s reliance on Oliver v. Employment Division, 40 Or App 487, 595 P2d 1252 (1979), is misplaced. There, we said in a dictum that, as used in ORS 657.176, “misconduct” and “suitable work” are delegative statutory terms. The phrase “connected with work” was not involved in Oliver.