Court Opinion

ID: 9393266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 19:00:38.638955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:52.296236
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10632        Document: 16-1      Date Filed: 05/09/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                       [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                        In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eleventh Circuit

                              ____________________

                                      No. 22-10632
                              Non-Argument Calendar
                              ____________________

       WASEEM DAKER,
                                                          Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       TIMOTHY WARD,
       BRIAN OWENS,
       former Commissioner,
       HOMER BRYSON,
       former Commissioner,
       GREGORY DOZIER,
       former Commissioner,
       JACK KOON,
       Facilities Director, et al.,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10632

                                                    Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-00365-MTT-CHW
                           ____________________

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWSOM and ANDERSON,
       Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Waseem Daker, a Georgia prisoner, appeals pro se the dis-
       missal of his amended complaint without prejudice for misjoinder
       and failing to comply with a court order and the denial of his mo-
       tion to vacate the judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). We affirm.
              In September 2019, Daker filed a 130-page complaint against
       more than 130 defendants. He separated the defendants into five
       groups—Georgia Department of Corrections Central Office, Geor-
       gia Diagnostic & Classification Prison, Georgia State Prison, Ma-
       con State Prison, and Valdosta State Prison—and asserted that all
       defendants were properly joined because they maintained, exe-
       cuted, or enforced the same Georgia Department of Corrections
       policies and customs that violated his rights. He grouped his claims,
       which were based on events occurring between 2014 and 2019, into
       11 sets of issues—414 counts of obstruction of open records re-
       quests, 10 counts of denial of due process in property and court
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       22-10632                Opinion of the Court                          3

       access, 20 counts of denial of due process in property related to sei-
       zure of inmates’ property, denial of law library access, denial of
       photocopier access, denial of access to stored legal materials, denial
       of access to electronically-stored legal materials, an inadequate
       mail policy, an inadequate grievance procedure, obstruction of the
       grievance-filing procedure, and retaliation for filing grievances.
                The district court ruled that Daker’s complaint improperly
       joined dozens of individuals or entities as defendants based on
       events that took place in several institutions over several years. The
       district court explained the legal standard for joining parties and
       claims, Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2), and the “logical relationship”
       test. It stated that the “complaint fail[ed] to allege facts showing all
       defendants engaged in a common custom or policy.” For example,
       it stated, Daker made no allegations against several defendants
       identified in the caption, and although Daker alleged that “all” de-
       fendants were involved in the 11 sets of claims, he failed to plead
       that each defendant adopted or maintained at least one of the poli-
       cies. Regarding Daker’s open records claims, the district court ex-
       plained that he alleged that “all defendants” were responsible but
       alleged facts involving only 19 of them, and many of those defend-
       ants were not mentioned in his other claims even though he al-
       leged in his other claims that “all defendants” were responsible.
       The district court stated that, apart from asserting that all the cus-
       toms and policies violated his rights, Daker failed to identify any
       common question of law or fact that applied to each of the more
       than 130 defendants.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10632

               The district court ordered Daker to “recast” his complaint.
       It stated that, although it could attempt to add or drop parties or
       claims to remedy the misjoinder, Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, it was “not
       incumbent upon the Court to effectively re-write [Daker’s] Com-
       plaint so that it complies with” the rules. The district court ordered
       that the amended complaint “state only related claims” because
       “unrelated claims should be raised and filed in separate com-
       plaints.” It also directed him to state clearly “(1) who [Daker] seeks
       to sue; (2) what each Defendant did (or did not do) to violate his
       constitutional rights; (3) when and where each action occurred; and
       (4) how [Daker] was injured as a result of each Defendant’s actions.”
       It warned Daker that “[f]ailure to fully and timely comply with this
       Order may result in the dismissal of [his] Complaint.”
              Daker amended his complaint. His 105-page amended com-
       plaint named 113 defendants, separated into the same five groups
       as before, and alleged seven of the 11 sets of claims. He asserted
       that all defendants were properly joined because they maintained,
       executed, or enforced the same department policies and customs
       that violated his right of access to the courts.
              The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
       that the amended complaint be dismissed without prejudice. The
       magistrate judge considered Daker’s abusive litigation history and
       stated that because Daker had accrued three strikes, 28 U.S.C.
       § 1915(g), his refusal to comply with the joinder rules had enabled
       him to pay fewer filing fees. The magistrate judge recommended
       dismissing Daker’s complaint for failure to comply with the joinder
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       22-10632               Opinion of the Court                        5

       rules. The magistrate judge also stated that because the district
       court explained the joinder rules and warned Daker that failing to
       follow the rules could result in dismissal, Daker’s failure to make
       any effort to meaningfully comply with the order was an independ-
       ent ground for dismissal.
              Daker objected that his amended complaint was not materi-
       ally identical with the original complaint because he dropped 16
       defendants, 25 pages, and 118 paragraphs, which evidenced his
       good faith compliance. He conceded that not all defendants’ ac-
       tions arose from the same transaction or occurrence but argued
       that their actions raised a common question of law or fact regard-
       ing his access to the courts. He also argued that the district court
       should sever any improper claims because dismissal would effec-
       tively be with prejudice because of the expiration of the statute of
       limitations.
              The district court overruled Daker’s objections, adopted the
       magistrate judge’s recommendation, and dismissed Daker’s
       amended complaint without prejudice. The district court ruled
       that the defendants were misjoined because Daker failed to state at
       least one claim against each defendant that arose from the same
       transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,
       and he failed to identify a specific question of law or fact that was
       common to all defendants. It stated that it had warned Daker that
       a conclusory statement that the parties were properly joined would
       be insufficient.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10632

              Daker moved to vacate the judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e),
       and to amend his complaint again. He argued that the district court
       erred by not severing sua sponte any improperly joined defendants
       or claims and by not providing him notice or an opportunity to re-
       spond. He attached a proposed complaint that was 109 pages,
       named 30 defendants, and raised nearly identical claims.
               The district court denied the motions. The district court
       stated that Daker was provided notice, adequate reasoning, and an
       opportunity to respond, as evidenced by his objections to those rea-
       sons before dismissal. It stated that it had warned Daker that failing
       to file a compliant complaint could result in dismissal, and it had
       found that he “failed to make any effort meaningfully to comply
       with the Court’s instructions” so he could “frustrate the [Prison Lit-
       igation Reform Act’s] purpose of curtailing abusive litigation.”
               We review the dismissal of Daker’s amended complaint for
       abuse of discretion. See Betty K Agencies v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d
       1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). Under that standard, we will reverse
       only if the district court made a clear error of judgment or applied
       the wrong legal standard. Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583
       F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009). We also construe pleadings filed
       by pro se parties liberally, Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th
       Cir. 2008), but this leniency “does not give a court license to serve
       as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
       pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,
       760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
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       22-10632                Opinion of the Court                          7

               Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20, a plaintiff may
       join defendants in a single action only if “any right to relief is as-
       serted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with re-
       spect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
       of transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact
       common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
       20(a)(2)(A)–(B). A district court may drop a party “on its own initi-
       ative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.” Lamp-
       liter Dinner Theater, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 1036, 1045
       (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21).
             Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion by
       ordering him to amend his complaint and to raise unrelated claims
       in separate complaints because he was forced to choose which
       claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. For the same
       reason, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by dis-
       missing his amended complaint because the dismissal operated as
       a dismissal with prejudice as to some of his claims because of the
       expired statute of limitations.
              To be sure, where a dismissal effectively precludes a litigant
       from refiling a claim for relief because the statute of limitations has
       expired, the dismissal is “tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice,”
       which is a “drastic remedy to be used only in those situations where
       a lesser sanction would not better serve the interests of justice.”
       Mickles v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2018).
       Although dismissal of a complaint with prejudice is a sanction of
       last resort, Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983),
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10632

       dismissal for failure to comply with a court order ordinarily does
       not rise to an abuse of discretion, even where less severe sanctions
       are available, see Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.
       1989); Phillips v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 633 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. Unit
       B 1981). And we have recognized the authority of a district court
       to manage its own docket and to dismiss a complaint for failure to
       abide by its orders. Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662, 664 (11th Cir.
       1998).
               The district court did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to
       enforce the joinder rules after providing Daker notice and an op-
       portunity to comply with them also curbed Daker’s abusive litiga-
       tion by insisting that he pay separate filing fees for separate law-
       suits. The magistrate judge and district court gave reasoned analy-
       sis to the joinder issues in Daker’s original complaint, explained in
       detail the relevant rules with which Daker’s amended complaint
       must comply, and warned Daker that failing to file a compliant
       complaint “may result in the dismissal of [his] complaint.”
               Daker’s amended complaint did not comply with the order.
       Although he dropped 16 defendants and four out of 11 broad sets
       of claims, he still failed to name at least one claim against each de-
       fendant that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence or se-
       ries of transactions or occurrences. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In-
       deed, his amended complaint still raised claims against individuals
       at over five institutions over the course of more than five years.
             The district court was not required to expend judicial re-
       sources culling through Daker’s amended complaint and deciding
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       22-10632               Opinion of the Court                         9

       for him which claims against more than 100 defendants should re-
       main. See Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168–69. It was entitled to order
       Daker to make those decisions himself and to bring his complaint
       into compliance with the rules. When he failed to do so and filed a
       materially identical complaint, it was within the discretion of the
       district court to manage its docket by dismissing the amended com-
       plaint for failing to comply with its order. Magluta, 162 F.3d at 664.
             Daker also has identified no manifest legal error that would
       merit vacating the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). In the light of
       Daker’s noncompliance after having received notice of the joinder
       requirements and a dismissal warning, the district court did not
       abuse its discretion by denying him leave to file another amended
       complaint. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
             We AFFIRM the dismissal of Daker’s amended complaint
       and the denial of his motion to vacate.