Court Opinion

ID: 9671209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:32:51.399137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.744565
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. First, Taco Bell, as I understand the record, argued that, if Glenn Norwood was Interested Underwriter’s agent, a fact issue existed whereby the jury could find (and did) that Norwood (and thereby Interest Underwriters) consented to Taco Bell’s voluntary payment for the second sign. Thus, I fail to see how this court can reverse based upon Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-607(1) (Repl. 1991). In other words, if Taco Bell’s second sign is a repair, not an original good, the Uniform Commercial Code (§ 4-2-607) does not apply, and the trial court’s ruling was correct that the common-law voluntary-payment rule bars Taco Bell’s recovery. While the majority attempts to recharacterize Taco Bell’s sign replacement as resulting from Little Rock Sign’s sale to Taco Bell of a new sign or original good governed by Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-607(1), the evidence decidedly supports the view that the second sign resulted from repair work. In fact, the trial court, without objection as I read the record, instructed the jury that to assess Taco Bell’s damages, it must fix the amount of money which would reasonably and fairly compensate Taco Bell for the reasonable expense of necessary repairs to the area surrounding the fallen sign and expenses for necessary repairs to the second sign. In addition, by interrogatory number one, the jury was asked to determine if Norwood acted within the scope of his authority for Interested Underwriters and if Interested Underwriters consented to the payment of $25,086.85 for the second sign. The jury answered yes.1 Examples of the evidence supporting the jury’s decision are as follows: • Láveme Lovette, Little Rock Sign’s officer manager, averred that, on March 18, 1992, the sign and support post broke and fell. She said Taco Bell requested Little Rock Sign repair the broken sign, and, as a result, Little Rock Sign repaired the sign and post. She further averred that Little Rock Sign sent a bill in the amount of $26,085.85 for the repair work it had performed. • Glenn Norwood, General Adjuster, testified he saw Little Rock Sign’s itemization for what the sign replacement would be and determined the cost was in line for what a sign replacement should be. Norwood said he was advised that a sign had been put back in place, and he knew that Little Rock Sign was the one that put it back in place. He further said that he told Little Rock Sign the person they needed to bill was the person who had hired them to do the repairs. Norwood identified a proof of loss statement that the full cost of repair or replacement was $25,086.85. • Darrell Glover, owner of Little Rock Sign, testified and identified the invoice for reinstallation of the damaged sign and said that immediately after the sign was damaged, “ We started repairing and building a new sign.” He further stated he replaced the parts that needed replaced and the amount of the bill was for all the work done in removing the damaged parts. • Mark Turner, General Manager of Edmondson Management, said, “We told Glover that the sign fell and we wanted him to put the sign back up for us,” and he did that. According to Turner’s notes, the re-erection of the sign was completed on May 1, 1992. Turner later expressed that he had done enough for Glover by paying him twice for a sign that never was put up right. (Emphasis added.) While other like repair evidence is dispersed throughout the record, the foregoing is sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling (and jury’s decision) that Taco Bell’s second sign was the result of repairs performed by Little Rock Sign, making the voluntary-payment rule, not the UCC, applicable to the facts of this case. That being so, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court’s holding that the voluntary-payment rule applied. In sum, because the jury in considering interrogatory number one found that (1) Norwood was Interested Underwriters’ agent, and (2) Norwood acted within the scope of such authority when he consented to Taco Bell’s voluntary payment to Little Rock Sign for the repair of the second sign, this court, on review, is obliged to affirm those decisions. Newbern, J., joins this dissent.   In a pretrial motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court ruled the Uniform Commercial Code provisions did not apply to the facts of this case, and as the trial developed, evidence was introduced without objection to support the trial court’s and later the jury’s decisions.