Court Opinion

ID: 9782438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:33:00.72362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:35.809786
License: Public Domain

Justice BURDICK,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion based upon a plain reading of the statutory language as well as the legislative history of I.C. § 12-120. In interpreting a statute, this Court looks first to the plain meaning of the language to see if there is an ambiguity. Jen-Rath Co. Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 48 P.3d 659 (2002). If there is no ambiguity, the Court analyzes the plain meaning of the words to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Id. Additionally, if the statute can be interpreted in two reasonable fashions, then the statute is ambiguous, id., and further information can be used to glean the legislative intent. See Kootenai Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432, 435, 901 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1995) (examining factors such as the statute’s language, the reasonableness of a proposed interpretation, and the policy underlying the statute).
The language in I.C. § 12-120(4) specifically states “an action for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand ($25,000), there shall be taxed and allowed to the claimant ... attorneys fees.” (Emphasis added.) Subsection 4 of Idaho Code 12-120 further states that a plaintiff in order to be awarded attorney fees, must make written demand for payment of the underlying claim and must furnish a statement of the underlying claim sixty days pri- or to filing to the defendant’s insurer or the defendant if the insurer is not known. The only mention of claim in I.C. § 12-120(4) is as to the plaintiffs prerequisite action to allowing an attorney fee award. How can “claimant” be interpreted to be anything other than plaintiff?
Significantly, the last paragraph of subsection 4 provides that a claimant who wishes to ask for attorney fees under this code section must give up valuable rights under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) concerning the amendment of his cause of action. The statute states specifically, “If the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to commence the action, or in evidence offered at trial, a different alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have waived any entitlement to attorney fees under this section.” This was new language adopted when the new subsection (4) was enacted in 1996.1 It is plain to see from the 1996 addition to I.C. § 12-120 that the plaintiffs gave up significant rights in order to allow them to recover attorney fees in this subsection. The time period for the defendants to respond to a demand was extended from ten to sixty days. The defendants were given the additional safeguard that a claimant could not change his alleged injury or any significant new item of damage once demand had been made. This shows a spe*270cific intent by the 1996 legislature in the enactment of subsection (4) to allow a cause of action to be framed very quickly by the plaintiff and to give a reasonable period of time of sixty days for insurance companies (who are specifically mentioned in the subsection) the claimants, and their attorneys to then settle these matters on an expedited basis.
I believe it very important also to note the title of the bill enacted in 1996. The title of that bill is as follows:
AN ACT RELATING TO ATTORNEY FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS: AMENDING SECTION 12-120, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE A DIFFERENT PROCESS FOR THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION.
1996 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 383, § 1, p. 1305. It is plain that the technical correction was the changing in I.C. § 12-120(1) from “per cent” to “percent.” The title meant there was a wholly “different process for award of attorney fees in actions for personal injury” not a “different process for award of attorney fees to plaintiffs in actions for personal injuries.”
It is important to note the original I.C. § 12-120 was passed in 19702 and initially, that code section applied to “... any action for damages for an injury or wrong to the person or property, or both, of another ...” Although the statute was amended four times prior to the 1996 amendment, the legislature had never divided the personal property actions from the personal injury actions, until 1996. Again this shows the legislative intent that subsection (4) should stand alone. I would point to the language in I.C. § 12-120(1) which says, “[ejxcept as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section ...” for the proposition that I.C. § 12-120(4) must stand alone and independent of I.C. § 12-120(1).
Throughout the history of I.C. § 12-120, there has always been a delineation between which actions a plaintiff must take and which actions a defendant who pleads a counterclaim in that regard must take in order to be allowed attorney fees. It is significant that in the 1996 amendment which took personal injury cases out of subsection (1), there is absolutely no comment concerning a defendant’s counterclaim or what a defendant should do to be awarded attorney fees under subsection (4). It is obvious from this exclusion of the defendants, that the legislature knew that it was excluding the defendants from the operation of subsection (4). Certainly, with twenty-plus years of delineating in subsections (1) and (2) what the plaintiffs and what the defendants were required to do to prevail under this code section, the lack of any mention of “the defendant” in subsection (4) is no mistake.
I would also point to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a), which states a civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint and the party filing the same shall be designated as the plaintiff. This section goes on to indicate “no claim, controversy or dispute may be submitted to any court in the state for determination or judgment without filing a complaint ...” It is very plain that only the plaintiff pursuant to I.R.C.P. 3(a) may bring a claim against a defendant in a complaint.
Therefore, the plain language of I.C. § 12-120 necessitates a finding that the district court could only apply I.C. § 12-120(4) to a personal injury action for under $25,000; and by the clear legislative intent, only the plaintiff may recover attorney fees if he is awarded a recovery. This Court should reverse the district court and remand with an order to enter an attorney fee award in favor of the plaintiff, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e).

. 1996 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 383, § 1, p. 1305.

. 1970 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 44, § 1, p. 91.