Court Opinion

ID: 9630168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:03:33.889296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:32.942535
License: Public Domain

*458Francis, J.
(concurring). I concur in the affirmance of the order under review. But the effect of the majority opinion is that a distiller may select a certain number of wholesalers and deal with them to the exclusion of all others, and once having done so the only duty imposed by the statute is to refrain from arbitrary discrimination among them in the sale of his products. In my judgment, approval of the Director’s order should be reached on broader premises.
When language employed by the Legislature is clear and unambiguous, the interpretive function of the judicial branch of the government is simple and confined. The law should be applied as written. Under our tripartite system of government, we cannot concern ourselves with matters of legislative wisdom or policy. If the constitutional power exists to promulgate the particular fiat, it must be accepted even if personally we believe it to be a legislative mistake. Nor can the judiciary under the guise of interpretation read into an enactment a more limited policy than that which is clearly projected into action by the words of the lawmakers.
I think the statute in question, N. J. S. A. 33:1-1 et seq.j says that all wholesalers duly licensed by the Director of Alcoholic Beverage Control have an equal right to purchase the products of distillers operating in New Jersey, and that if they have the financial capacity to pay therefor, they cannot be refused arbitrarily. Prima facie all wholesalers must be treated on a parity, and prima facie the distillers cannot limit the number with whom they will deal. The impact of the statute under ordinary circumstances is that any reasonably competent and financially capable wholesaler is entitled to be served and cannot be discriminated against arbitrarily. The fact that it would be more convenient or more feasible or more efficient for the distiller to deal with a limited number would not of itself provide an escape from condemnation as arbitrary discrimination. Such is the burden imposed by N. J. S. A. 33:1-1 et seq. on this highly regulated industry. Any lessening of that burden must come from the source which imposed it.
*459Let us look at the statute closely. It was enacted in 1942. L. 1942, c. 264. It ordains that “[t]here shall be no discrimination in the sale of alcoholic liquors by distillers * * * to duly licensed wholesalers * * *.” Section 1. Here it should be noted that a wholesaler is defined as “[a]ny person who sells an alcoholic beverage for the purpose of resale either to a licensed wholesaler or to a licensed retailer, or both.” N. J. S. A. 33:1-1 subd. z; also that wholesale licenses are issued by the Director, N. J. S. A. 33 :1-11; 33 :1-18. No limitation on the number appears in the act. Such licensees are “entitled, subject to rules and regulations, to sell and distribute alcoholic beverages to [licensed] retailers and wholesalers.” N. J. S. A. 33:1-11. Whenever a distiller refuses to sell “to any individual wholesaler” "any” amount of alcoholic liquor, the Director, on complaint of the wholesaler, is required to determine if the refusal is arbitrary. L. 1942, supra, section 2. If it is found to be arbitrary and the Director is satisfied that the ability to pay is present, he “shall order” the sale completed. Section 3. In the event of failure to comply, the Director must forbid “every licensed wholesaler” from purchasing the distiller’s products. Section 4.
It is difficult to imagine more imperative language. The supervisory administrative machinery may be set in motion by refusal to sell to “any” wholesaler “any” amount of liquor. It is legislating rather than interpreting to read into this section the qualification that the refusal to sell must be to a wholesaler with whom the distiller has been dealing regularly.
Not only do the words used demonstrate the intent of the Legislature to make all licensed wholesalers prima facie entitled to purchase from the distillers, but the introducer’s statement emphasizes the fact. It says:
“The purpose of this act is to insure an equitable basis for competition between all licensed wholesalers of alcoholic beverages in New Jersey and to prevent any monopolistic freezing-out of one wholesaler by another by preventing the sale of certain products to him.”
*460It is a matter of common knowledge that in the past various brands of liquor were in shorter supply or greater demand than others. When such a situation exists, if those brands are localized in the hands of one or a few wholesalers, obviously retailers will be more anxious to deal with him or them in order to obtain a supply of the scarce commodity and therefore will be inclined to purchase their other related requirements of alcoholic beverages from him or them to the detriment of the not so favored wholesalers. The Legislature may well have believed that such a situation would produce practices known to be inimical to the public interest. And when it is recalled that in 1942 when the statute was adopted the country was at war and imported liquors were unusually scarce, it is not difficult to conjure up the reason for the legislative desire to secure an equitable basis for competition among all wholesalers. If the reason for the adoption of the regulation has disappeared, then the power of the Legislature to give recognition to the change is plenary.
If this is the proper view of the 1942 act, and to me it is inescapable, then the present case must be approached from that standpoint. It 'is conceded that the excluded wholesalers have sufficient financial capacity to pay for their purchases. There is no substantial evidence in the record to indicate that they are not reasonably competent to engage in the business as wholesalers or that they have not done so. There has been no suggestion of engagement in any improper or proscribed trade practices. Uo proof was offered of any disparagement of the distiller’s products or of unfair preferment in sales efforts for those of a competitor. In the face of the mandate of the statute and the proof adduced, the elimination of these wholesalers must be deemed arbitrarily discriminatory.
In the field of strictly private enterprise such a curtailment of the prerogatives of management might well be invalid. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 P. 46 (2 Cir. 1915). But the liquor business, attended as it is with dangers to the community, must *461bow to the heavy and pervasive hand of the police power— if the Legislature wills it. Butler Oak Tavern v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 20 N. J. 373, 384 (1956); Eskridge v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 30 N. J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1954).
It has been suggested that the views expressed herein are incompatible with the decision of this court in Hoffman v. Hock, 8 N. J. 397 (1952). I do not think so. There it was said that the act does not prevent a distiller from acting as the exclusive distributor or wholesaler of its own products. Accordingly, it would be lawful not to sell through or use wholesalers at all; “thus it is still open to the distiller to sell directly to retail dealers if licensed so to do.” The court then indicated that it was not violative of the statute for the distiller to divide the State into two areas, northern and southern Few Jersey, and sell directly to retailers in the northern area, without the use of any wholesalers at all there. But the plain tenor of the opinion is that if any wholesalers were utilized in the area, discrimination among them would be illegal. See 8 N. J. at page 409. In other words, if one wholesaler were appointed to act, all other such licensees operating in the area would be entitled prima facie to have their purchase orders filled.
To what extent the doctrine of the Hock case can be refined, that is, whether a distiller can establish a great many small districts in the State and sell directly in some and through wholesalers in others, is not an issue now and need not be discussed, except to say that the act cannot be circumvented and that presently the Hock case is confined to its own factual situation.