Court Opinion

ID: 9538681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:39:35.167747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:04.677626
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, D. J.,
dissenting:
At defendant’s trial for murder it developed that during the jury deliberations one member of the jury stated he had personal knowledge respecting the facts in controversy which had not been submitted in open court during the trial and which information he presented to *232his fellow jurors during their deliberations. The trial court over defense counsel’s objection declared a mistrial.1
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel’s objection and demand to “voir dire” that juror was sufficient to place the trial court on notice of the procedure to be followed in cases of this instance, as outlined in NRS 175.310, did the trial court abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial? I think not.
The provisions of NRS 175.310 are at best vague and ambiguous. This is true to such an extent that the California Legislature has amended its counterpart to said statute, Penal Code Section 1120, in order to clarify it:
“If a juror has any personal knowledge respecting a fact in controversy in a cause, he must declare the same in open Court during the trial. If, during the retirement of the jury, a juror declares a fact which could be evidence in the cause, as of his own knowledge, the jury must return into Court. In either of these cases, the juror making the statement must be sworn as a witness and examined in the presence of the parties in order that the court may determine whether good cause exists for his discharge as a juror.” (Emphasis added.) Stats. 1965, ch. 299, Sec. 144, operative Jan. 1, 1967.
Before this amendment was adopted there was no method to determine how to apply the statute since it had never been interpreted by the Nevada courts and its counterpart has been cited only once by the California courts and therein without clarification, People v. Sarazzawski, 161 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1945), and alluded to twice by that State’s courts without citation, People v. Young, 69 P.2d 203 (Cal. 1937), and People v. Kobey, 234 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1951).
Before amendment the section did not make it clear whether the examination in the presence of the parties is for the purpose of determining if “good cause” exists for the juror’s discharge or whether this examination is for the purpose of obtaining the juror’s knowledge as evidence in the case. The amendment eliminates the *233ambiguity in its provisions and provides assurance that the juror’s examination is to be used solely to determine whether “good cause” exists for his discharge.
It was reasonable for the court to declare a mistrial in order that the trial could take place before another jury. If the court had done otherwise, it would have placed the juror-witness in an anomolous position. He manifestly cannot weigh his own testimony impartially. The party affected adversely by the juror’s testimony is placed in an embarrassing position. He cannot freely cross-examine or impeach the juror for fear of antagonizing the juror — and perhaps his fellow jurors as well. And if he does not attack the juror’s testimony, the other jurors may give his testimony undue weight.
Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and the defendant should be re-tried:
“Where, for reasons deemed compelling by the trial judge, who is best situated intelligently to make such a decision, the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be declared without the defendant’s consent and even over his objections, and he may be retried consistently with the fifth amendment.” Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961).
The Writ of Prohibition should be denied.
Because of the death of Badt, J., the Governor designated Honorable John Mowbray, of the Eighth Judicial District Court, to sit in his place.

 The acquittal vote of 11 to 1 was not known to the court nor counsel until after the trial and later became a part of this record at the time of oral argument pursuant to the stipulation of counsel.