Court Opinion

ID: 9623962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:47:24.041679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:15.879316
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
KEETON, Justice.
Appellant, Poynter, has filed a petition for rehearing in which he asserts: “that the Court committed an error in holding that the city ordinance involved herein was valid, as the great weight of authority is against the validity of any city ordinance upon a subject the entire field of which has been covered by State law;” and further asserts: “it will be observed in reading the State statute that for the first offense the punishment is not less than thirty days nor more than six months in jail, or fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than $300.00 * * * and upon the second conviction the convicted party shall undergo imprisonment in the State penitentiary * * * for not less than two nor more than five years; * * * Further, “ * * * a municipal ordinance *444cannot provide for the punishment of felonies under State law;”, claiming among other things that the decision overrules State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977.
The appellant admits that there is a conflict of authority on the question presented and asks this Court not to follow what he designates the minority rule.
Conceding that there is some conflict in the authorities, the rule announced in the decision follows precedents long established in Idaho, and is not a case of first impression here.
In the early case of State v. Preston, 4 Idaho 215, 38 P. 694, 695, the defendant was charged with the crime of vagrancy in violation of a city ordinance. The defendant contended: “that towns and villages cannot punish for vagrancy, for the reason that the crime is punishable under the Penal Code * *
To support this contention, he cited In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 P. 405. This Court speaking by Judge Sullivan refused to follow the California reasoning, and said: “This decision [In re Sic, supra] has been reaffirmed in several subsequent decisions of the supreme court of that state. Those decisions seem to proceed upon the theory that to permit towns and villages to punish for offenses that are punishable under the penal statutes of the state would be contrary to that provision of the constitution which provides that no one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, and hold such ordinances void fo: that reason, or as in conflict with the statutes providing punishment for the same offense. In the case last above cited the court says: ‘The decisions on this question are so very conflicting that they present no obstacle to our considering it as a new one,’ etc., and proceeds to consider it as a new one, and hold such ordinances void. After carefully considering the authorities on both sides of this question, I find that the clear weight of authority and reason is against the rule adopted by the supreme court of California, and conclude that said ordinance is valid, and should be sustained, and cite in support thereof a few of the authorities which sustain our position:” (citing numerous authorities).
In the case of State v. Quong, 8 Idaho 191, 67 P. 491, 492, defendant was charged with battery, and contended: “that inasmuch as battery is a crime under the general criminal statutes of this state, the municipality cannot enact an ordinance making it a crime * * *, as the ordinance conflicts with the general law of the state.”
This Court, speaking through Chief Justice Quarles, 8 Idaho at page 194, 67 P. at page 492, said: “The ordinance is not in conflict, but in harmony, with the general law. The authority of the city to enact police regulations, and to enforce them, where they do not contravene any general law of the state, is, under the provisions of our constitution, beyond question. The *445municipal government may not take from the citizen any constitutional right, — has no power to do so, — yet by the express provisions of section 2, art. 12, the power to make and enforce sanitary and police regulations is expressly given to cities and towns. The object of the provision is apparent, its necessity urgent. * * * This question was settled, so far as judicial action is concerned, in the case of State v. Preston, 4 Idaho 215, 38 P. 694, 695, where the same question here urged was raised, and decided adversely to appellant’s contention.”
In the case of State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199, 201, this Court speaking through an opinion written by Justice Budge, held as follows: “Under the above constitutional provision [Section 2, Article 12 of the Constitution] counties, cities and towns have full power in affairs of local government notwithstanding general laws of the state defining and punishing the same offense.”
An ordinance of the city of Boise prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons was held to be within the police power of the municipality and constitution, even though the general laws of the state, Sec. 17-3102, I.C.A., now Sec. 18-3302, I.C., had covered the same subject matter. State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217, 157 P.2d 72.
In the case of Clark v. Alloway, 67 Idaho 32, 170 P.2d 425, an ordinance of the city of Boise defining vagrancy was upheld even though the state had by general law legislated on the subject matter.
The rule adhered to is stated in 19 Ruling Case Law, page 804, Sec. 111. After recognizing a conflict in the authorities and citations supporting the same, the author said: “In other states it is held that under a general delegation of power a municipal corporation may impose penalties for acts which by the statutes of the state are declared to be crimes. An ordinance enacted in pursuance of express authority to legislate upon a particular subject is generally held to be valid, though there are statutes covering the same subject; * * *
In Re Henry, 15 Idaho 755, at page 759, 99 P. 1054, at page 1055, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 207, this Court, speaking through Justice Ailshie, recognizing the rule that cities and villages might legislate on a subject matter covered by general statute said: “The state of facts on which the conviction was had in the police court and in the justice’s court was the same, and the two prosecutions involved the same transaction. The first prosecution, however, in the police court, was for the violation of a city ordinance. The second prosecution had in the justice’s court was for violation of the state statute defining petit larceny and providing a punishment therefor. * * * A conviction for violation of a city ordinance, although covering the same state of facts, is not a defense to a prosecution under the *446state statute.” and cited with approval State v. Preston, supra, and State v. Quong, supra.
The case of State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977, is not in conflict with the view above expressed. In the latter case, the city attempted to legislate on a subject matter not coming within the jurisdiction of justice, probate or police courts, and this Court held: “A municipality has no power to confer upon police judges jurisdiction to summarily hear and determine acts denominated by the general law of the state as ‘indictable misdemeanors’ by the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting such acts and prescribing a punishment therefor.”
The decision in the case before us does not overrule or set aside that holding.
Appellant further contends that a municipal ordinance cannot provide for the punishment of felonies under state law. With this contention we agree. The appellant, Poynter, was not charged with a felony or an indictable misdemeanor under state law, or a “second offense” prescribed by Sec. 49-561, I.C., and as pointed out in the original opinion, the crime with which he was charged was cognizable in justice, probate and police courts.
Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, it has long been the rule in Idaho that the fact that an ordinance covers the same offense as the state law does not make it inconsistent or in conflict therewith, or invalid for that reason.
In upholding the validity of the ordinance challenged here, this Court is not establishing a new precedent, or deciding a matter of first impression, but is simply following a long line of prior decisions by this Court.
Petition for rehearing is denied.
HOLDEN, C. J., and GIVENS, PORTER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.