Court Opinion

ID: 9793045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:41:15.767412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:09.128352
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
It seems to me that the trial court erred in instructing the jury.
He properly told the jury that the term “defective condition” meant a condition from which injury to those affected thereby might reasonably be anticipated. He thereby laid the foundation for a negligence concept. However, he completely abandoned any thought that negligence had anything to do with the case and refused to tell the jury that if the harm to plaintiff was occasioned by a vis major she could not recover.
In refusing to give any instruction requested by the defendant regarding the question of negligence on the part of the defendant, the trial court clearly indicated his belief that negligence was not a factor to be considered by the jury.
The facts of this case seem to justify a finding of negligence or the lack thereof on the part of the defendant. A road and parking lot were under construction. The grading had been completed, and gravel was being hauled prior to placing of the hard surfacing material on top. Adequate drains had been installed by competent engineers to carry off ordinary surface waters which might be expected to fall thereon. However, before the pavement could be applied, a downpour of 1.88 inches fell — most of it in less than one hour— washing gravel into the drains and thus causing the water to flow onto the lower land of the plaintiff. ’
Ordinarily the question of a vis major is for the jury to determine from the facts given in evidence. It would therefore seem that the question of whether or not the defendant should have foreseen a rainstorm of the proportions of the one which came and made temporary provision by screens or otherwise to prevent the washing of gravel into the drains would be a question to be determined by the jury (unless the defendant is to be held an insurer to prevent water from flowing onto plaintiff’s land).
The law seems to be contrary to the way the trial judge presented it to the jury. If there was a defective condition, to-wit: one from which harm might reasonably have been anticipated, then an instruction on negligence and on vis major should have been given.
The following cases are in point: City of Valparaiso v. Spaeth, 76 N.E. 514 (Ind. 1905). There, plaintiff sued for damages occasioned by flooding. The defendant city set forth the defense of an unprecedented rainstorm. The trial court sustained a de*294murrer to that defense, and the appellate court reversed, saying:
* * * What has been said above with respect to the duty of municipalities to provide means of escape for surface water in the improvement of its streets does not apply to unprecedented rainfalls; that is, to such downpours or ■ floods as may be known to have occurred, but are so. unusual and extraordinary as that prudent persons do not think of attempting to guard against them. Skillful construction of streets in this respect seems to mean that such side ditches, culverts, and outlets must be provided for surface water collected and diverted from natural ways as are sufficient to carry the waters that may, from experience and the previous history of the vicinity, be reasonably expected to fall, and which are not the result of a cloudburst or other rainstorm of extraordinary character. * *
In Smith v. Mayor, etc., of City of N. Y., 66 N.Y. 295 (1876), the plaintiff’s land was flooded when the sewer overflowed following an unusually heavy shower. The judgment was for the defendant, and the appellate court affirmed in these words:
* * * It is found upon sufficient evidence that the overflow was caused by a stoppage of the sewer with sand, dirt and refuse matter washed in from the street, and that at or just before the flooding of the plaintiff’s premises, there was an unusually heavy shower of rain. There is no proof of any obstruction before that time. There being no fault in the construction of the sewer, causing the overflow, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show a neglect by the defendants to remove the obstruction after notice of its existence, or some omission of duty on the part of the city officers in looking after it and seeing that no obstruction occurred. * * * The city does not insure the citizen against damage from works of its construction, but is only liable as other proprietors, for negligence or willful misconduct. * *
The case of City of Peoria v. Adams, 72 Ill.App. 662 (1897), was one wherein the city was sued for injuries caused by the collapse of a building due to weakening of its foundation by reason of flooding occasioned by failure of the city to provide for carrying off surface waters. The Court of Appeals stated the law in the following language:
* * * The rule is that the outlet must be of ample capacity to carry off all the water likely to be in it. But the rule is not applicable to an extraordinary and excessive rainfall, which is held to be vis major. Such infrequent and extraordinary occurrences cannot be foreseen and provided against, and for damages caused by them no one is responsible. [Citations omitted.]
*295To the same effect is the case of Allen et al. v. City of Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis. 430, 9 N.W. 284 (1881). Headnote 1 of that case reads:
A city, in grading its streets and constructing gutters thereon for carrying off surface water, is not hound to provide against extraordinary storms such as private persons of ordinary prudence do not usually anticipate and provide against.
Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 P. 375 (1894), was similar to the instant matter. Headnote 2 of that case states the law to be:
Where a city, under the superintendence of a competent engineer, builds a culvert sufficient to discharge the ordinary quantity of surface water flowing through a definite channel, it is not liable when, because of a flood caused by an unusually heavy rain, the culvert is unable to discharge the water, and lands are overflowed.
The instant matter is not a case of nuisance, nor is it one of diversion of surface waters. It is merely a case of flooding of plaintiff’s land due to the stoppage of a drain which was neither negligently constructed nor inadequate for carrying off of the foreseeable amount of precipitation which would fall. The only trouble was that in constructing the road and parking lot there had to he an interval of time between the laying of gravel and the placing of the paving material on top of it; and during this interval of time a rainfall of unprecedented proportions fell, causing the damage of which the plaintiff complains.
The law is stated in Sec. 833, Restatement of the Law of Torts, as follows:
* * * Where one person * * * builds roads, * * * upon it, [his land] he usually interferes with the flow of surface waters upon or across it, and such interference often causes harm to a neighbor in the use and enjoyment of his land. That harm may arise from the backing up of water on the neighbor’s land or from an increase in the flow thereon or from a change in its direction or velocity. It may be intentional or unintentional * * *. Where the invasion is not intentional, the liability of the person harmfully interfering with the flow of surface waters depends upon whether his conduct has been negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous, * * *. Where, however, the invasion is intentional, liability depends upon whether the invasion is unreasonable. * * *
The illustrations following the cited text make it clear that negligence is at the base of any cause of action.
No one could believe from the evidence in the instant case that the defendant intentionally directed the water onto the plaintiff’s land. The question of negligence therefore must be presented to the jury by proper instructions.
*296Even if I could assume that negligence was not to he a factor in deciding this case, I would still dissent from the majority holding. If there were a defect in the construction of the road and parking lot, it was latent in that until a rain came which was heavy enough to wash the gravel into the drain, there was no defect at all. It is difficult for me to see how one can foresee a rain of unprecedented proportions far enough in advance to require a delay in putting gravel on a road. It seems difficult enough for professional forecasters to foresee even an ordinary rain for any length of time in the future.
Since the defect, if one there was, was latent, immunity from suit was retained by the very wording of Sec. 63-30-9, as cited in the prevailing opinion.
I would reverse the case and direct the trial court to enter judgment for the defendant. The least that should be done would be to reverse and remand for a new trial.