Court Opinion

ID: 9566143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:25.77065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:16.291578
License: Public Domain

ARABIAN, J.,
Concurring.—I concur in the determination that Government Code section 17556, subdivision (d)1 (section 17556(d)), does not offend article XIII B, section 6, of the California Constitution (article XIII B, section 6). In my estimation, however, the constitutional measure of the issue before us warrants fuller examination than the majority allow. A literalistic analysis begs the question of whether the Legislature had the authority to act statutorily upon a subject matter the electorate has spoken to constitutionally through the initiative process.
Article XIII B, section 6, unequivocally commands that “the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse . . . local government for the costs of [a new] program or increased level of service” except as specified therein. Article XIII B does not define this reference to “costs.” (See Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 8.) Rather, the Legislature assumed the task of explicating the related concept of “costs mandated by the state” when it created the Commission on State Mandates and enacted procedures intended to implement article XIII B, section 6, more effectively. (See § 17500 et seq.) As part of this statutory scheme, it exempted the state from its constitutionally imposed subvention obligation under certain enumerated circumstances. Some of these exemptions the electorate expressly contemplated in approving article XIII B, section 6 (§ 17556, subds. (a), (c), & (g); see § 17514), while others are strictly of legislative formulation and derive from *490former Revenue and Taxation Code section 2253.2. (§ 17556, subds. (b), (d), (e), & (f).)
The majority find section 17556 valid notwithstanding the mandatory language of article XIII B, section 6, based on the circular and conclusory rationale that “the Legislature effectively—and properly—construed the term ‘costs’ as excluding expenses that are recoverable from sources other than taxes. In a word, such expenses are outside of the scope of the [subvention] requirement. Therefore, they need not be explicitly excepted from its reach.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p.488.) In my view, excluding or otherwise removing something from the purview of a law is tantamount to creating an exception thereto. When an exclusionary implication is clear from the import or effect of the statutory language, use of the word “except” should not be necessary to construe the result for what it clearly is. In this circumstance, “I would invoke the folk wisdom that if an object looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is likely to be a duck.” (In re Deborah C. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 125, 141 [177 Cal.Rptr. 852, 635 P.2d 446] (cone. opn. by Mosk, J.).)
Of at least equal importance, section 17500 et seq. constitutes a legislative implementation of article XIII B, section 6. As such, the overall statutory scheme must comport with the express constitutional language it was designed to effectuate as well as the implicit electoral intent. Eschewing semantics, I would squarely and forthrightly address the fundamental and substantial question of whether the Legislature could lawfully enlarge upon the scope of article XIII B, section 6, to include exceptions not originally designated in the initiative.
I do not hereby seek to undermine the majority holding but rather to set it on a firmer constitutional footing. “[Statutes must be given a reasonable interpretation, one which will carry out the intent of the legislators and render them valid and operative rather than defeat them. In so doing, sections of the Constitution, as well as the codes, will be harmonized where reasonably possible, in order that all may stand.” (Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 723 [123 P.2d 505]; see also County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 58 [233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202].) To this end, it is a fundamental premise of our form of government that “the Constitution of this State is not to be considered as a grant of power, but rather as a restriction upon the powers of the Legislature; and . . . it is competent for the Legislature to exercise all powers not forbidden . . . .” (People v. Coleman (1854) 4 Cal. 46, 49.) “Two important consequences flow from this fact. First, the entire law-making authority of the state, except the people’s right of initiative and referendum, is vested in the *491Legislature, and that body may exercise any and all legislative powers which are not expressly or by necessary implication denied to it by the Constitution. [Citations.] In other words, ‘we do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is prohibited.’ [Citation.] [fl] Secondly, all intendments favor the exercise of the Legislature’s plenary authority: ‘If there is any doubt as to the Legislature’s power to act in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the Legislature’s action. Such restrictions and limitations [imposed by the Constitution] are to be construed strictly, and are not to be extended to include matters not covered by the language used.’ [Citations.]” (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 685, 691 [97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161], italics added.) “Specifically, the express enumeration of legislative powers is not an exclusion of others not named unless accompanied by negative terms. [Citations.]” (Dean v. Kuchel (1951) 37 Cal.2d 97, 100 [230 P.2d 811].)
As the majority opinion impliedly recognizes, neither the language nor the intent of article XIII B conflicts with the exercise of legislative prerogative we review today. Of paramount significance, neither section 6 nor any other provision of article XIII B prohibits statutory delineation of additional circumstances obviating reimbursement for state mandated programs. (See Dean v. Kuchel, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 101; Roth Drugs, Inc. v. Johnson (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 720, 729 [57 P.2d 1022]; see also Kehrlein v. City of Oakland (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 332, 338 [172 Cal.Rptr. 111].)
Furthermore, the initiative was “[b]illed as a flexible way to provide discipline in government spending” by creating appropriations limits to restrict the amount of such expenditures. (County of Placer v. Corin (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 443, 447 [170 Cal.Rptr. 232]; see Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 1.) By their nature, user fees do not affect the equation of local government spending: While they facilitate implementation of newly mandated state programs or increased levels of service, they are excluded from the “appropriations subject to limitations” calculation and its attendant budgetary constraints. (See Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 8; see also City Council v. South (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 320, 334 [194 Cal.Rptr. 110]; County of Placer v. Corin, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at pp. 448-449; Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 3, subd. (b); cf. Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 199 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1505 [246 Cal.Rptr. 21] [“ ‘fees not exceeding the reasonable cost of providing the service or regulatory activity for which the fee is charged and which are not levied for general revenue purposes, have been considered outside the realm of “special taxes” [limited by California Constitution, article XIII A]’ ”]; Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City *492and County of San Francisco (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 892, 906 [223 Cal.Rptr. 379] [same].)
This conclusion fully accommodates the intent of the voters in adopting article XIII B, as reflected in the ballot materials accompanying the proposition. (See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245-246 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) In general, these materials convey that “[t]he goals of article XIII B, of which section 6 is a part, were to protect residents from excessive taxation and government spending.” (County of Los Angeles v. State of California, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 61; Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin (1985) 38 Cal.3d 100, 109-110 [211 Cal.Rptr. 133, 695 P.2d 220].) To the extent user fees are not borne by the general public or applied to the general revenues, they do not bear upon this purpose. Moreover, by imputation, voter approval contemplated the continued imposition of reasonable user fees outside the scope of article XIII B. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Limitation of Government Appropriations, Special Statewide Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979), arguments in favor of and against Prop. 4, p. 18 [initiative “Will curb excessive user fees imposed by local government” but “will Not eliminate user fees . . .”]; see County of Placer v. Corin, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 452.)
“The concern which prompted the inclusion of section 6 in article XIII B was the perceived attempt by the state to enact legislation or adopt administrative orders creating programs to be administered by local agencies, thereby transferring to those agencies the fiscal responsibility for providing services which the state believed should be extended to the public.” (County of Los Angeles v. State of California, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 56; see City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 66 [266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522].) “Section 6 had the additional purpose of precluding a shift of financial responsibility for carrying out governmental functions from the state to local agencies which had had their taxing powers restricted by the enactment of article XIII A in the preceding year and were ill equipped to take responsibility for any new programs.” (County of Los Angeles v. State of California, supra, 43 Cal. 3d at p. 61.) An exemption from reimbursement for state mandated programs for which local governments are authorized to charge offsetting user fees does not frustrate or compromise these goals or otherwise disturb the balance of local government financing and expenditure.2 (See County of Placer v. Corin, supra, 113 *493Cal.App.3d at p. 452, fn. 7.) Article XIII B, section 8, subdivision (c), specifically includes regulatory licenses, user charges, and user fees in the appropriations limitation equation only “to the extent that those proceeds exceed the costs reasonably borne by [the governmental] entity in providing the regulation, product, or service . . .
The self-executing nature of article XIII B does not alter this analysis. “It has been uniformly held that the legislature has the power to enact statutes providing for reasonable regulation and control of rights granted under constitutional provisions. [Citations.]” (Chesney v. Byram (1940) 15 Cal.2d 460, 465 [101 P.2d 1106].) “ ‘ “Legislation may be desirable, by way of providing convenient remedies for the protection of the right secured, or of regulating the claim of the right so that its exact limits may be known and understood; but all such legislation must be subordinate to the constitutional provision, and in furtherance of its purpose, and must not in any particular attempt to narrow or embarrass it.” [Citations.]’ ” (Id., at pp. 463-464; see also County of Contra Costa v. State of California (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 62, 75 [222 Cal.Rptr. 750].) Section 17556(d) is not “merely [a] transparent attempt[] to do indirectly that which cannot lawfully be done directly.” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 541 [234 Cal.Rptr. 795].) On the contrary, it creates no conflict with the constitutional directive it subserves. Hence, rather than pursue an interpretive expedient, this court should expressly declare that it operates as a valid legislative implementation thereof.
“[Initiative] provisions of the Constitution and of charters and statutes should, as a general rule, be liberally construed in favor of the reserved power. [Citations.] As opposed to that principle, however, ‘in examining and ascertaining the intention of the people with respect to the scope and nature of those . . . powers, it is proper and important to consider what the consequences of applying it to a particular act of legislation would be, and if upon such consideration it be found that by so applying it the inevitable effect would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of some other governmental power, the practical application of which is essential and, perhaps, . . . indispensable, to the convenience, comfort, and well-being of the inhabitants of certain legally established districts or subdivisions of the state or of the whole state, then in such case the courts may and should assume that the people intended no such result to flow from the application of those powers and that they do not so apply.’ [Citation.]” (Hunt v. Mayor & Council of Riverside (1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 628-629 [191 P.2d 426].)
*494This court is not infrequently called upon to resolve the tension of apparent or actual conflicts in the express will of the people.3 Whether that expression emanates directly from the ballot or indirectly through legislative implementation, each deserves our fullest estimation and effectuation. Given the historical and abiding role of government by initiative, I decline to circumvent that responsibility and accept uncritically the Legislature’s self-validating statutory scheme as the basis for approving the exercise of its prerogative. It is not enough to say a broader constitutional analysis yields the same result and therefore is unnecessary. We provide a higher quality of justice harmonizing rather than ignoring the divers voices of the people, for such is the nature of our office.

Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Government Code.

 This conclusion also accords with the traditional and historical role of user fees in promoting the multifarious functions of local government by imposing on those receiving a service the cost of providing it. (Cf. County of Placer v. Corin, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 454 [“Special assessments, being levied only for improvements that benefit particular parcels of *493land, and not to raise general revenues, are simply not the type of exaction that can be used as a mechanism for circumventing these tax relief provisions. [Citation.]”].)

 See, e.g., Zumwalt v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 167 [260 Cal.Rptr. 545, 776 P.2d 247]; Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197 [182 Cal.Rptr. 324, 643 P.2d 941]; California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci (1978) 22 Cal.3d 171 [148 Cal.Rptr. 875, 583 P.2d 729]; California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575 [131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193]; Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Cal.2d 804 [270 P.2d 481]; Dean v. Kuchel, supra, 37 Cal.2d 97; Hunt v. Mayor & Council of Riverside, supra, 31 Cal.2d 619.