Court Opinion

ID: 9915331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 06:05:03.675743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:58.731011
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

JAMES STEFANSKI,                                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      January 4, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                     No. 364851
                                                                      Saginaw Circuit Court
SAGINAW COUNTY 911 COMMUNICATIONS                                     LC No. 22-046428-NZ
CENTER AUTHORITY,

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MURRAY and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

MURRAY, J. (concurring).

        I fully concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to briefly explain why I
respectfully disagree with my concurring colleague. As detailed below, the plain meaning of the
controlling words within MCL 15.362 does not include common law principles.

        MCL 15.362 is part of the Whistleblower’s Protection Act (WPA) and provides a cause of
action for a person who “reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a
political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body . . . .” In Nyman v Thomson
Reuters Holdings, Inc, 329 Mich App 539, 544; 942 NW2d 696 (2019), this Court highlighted the
means by which we determine the meaning of a statute:

               This issue requires us to engage in statutory interpretation. “When
       construing a statute, this Court's primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the
       Legislature. We begin by construing the language of the statute itself. When the
       language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain meaning and apply the
       statute as written.” [Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 202; 731
       NW2d 41 (2007)] (citation omitted). “We must examine the statute as a whole,
       reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative
       scheme.” Ally Fin Inc v State Treasurer, 502 Mich 484, 493; 918 NW2d 662 (2018)
       (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In doing so, we consider the entire text,
       in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.”

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       Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Proper statutory interpretation requires:
       (1) reading the statute as a whole, (2) reading its words and phrases in the context
       of the entire legislative scheme, (3) while considering both the plain meaning of the
       critical words and phrases along with their placement and purpose within the
       statutory scheme, and (4) interpreting the statutory provisions in harmony with the
       entire statutory scheme. Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 167; 772 NW2d 272
       (2009). “If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute
       reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted.” Deruiter
       v Byron Twp, 325 Mich App 275, 283; 926 NW2d 268 (2018), [rev’d on other
       grounds 505 Mich 130 (2020)] (citation omitted). “[W]e must give effect to every
       word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of
       the statute surplusage or nugatory.” South Dearborn Environmental Improvement
       Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 502 Mich 349, 361; 917 NW2d 603
       (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The underlying purpose of the WPA is protection of the public. Dolan v Continental
Airlines/Continental Express, 454 Mich 373, 378; 563 NW2d 23 (1997). The statute “meets this
objective by protecting the whistleblowing employee and by removing barriers that may interdict
employee efforts to report violations or suspected violations of the law.” Id. at 378-379. The
WPA is a remedial statute and must be liberally construed to favor the persons that the Legislature
intended to benefit. Chandler v Dowell Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395, 406; 572 NW2d 210
(1998).

        Plaintiff argues, and the concurrence agrees, that “law” as used in MCL 15.362 includes
the common law as developed by the courts. The argument is primarily anchored in dictionary
definitions of “law” and “promulgate.” However, in my view the Legislature has provided some
guidance on the meaning of “law,” and it only includes statutes passed by the Legislature, laws
initiated by the people, and executive orders issued pursuant to Const 1963, art 5, § 2; MCL 8.8.
That statute, MCL 8.8, is a part of chapter 8, which contains sections setting forth definitions, rules
of statutory construction, and other provisions regarding the general application of statutes. See
MCL 8.1. Although MCL 8.8 is not within the definitional section of MCL 8.3, it is within chapter
8 regarding statutes, and contains a definition of “law” that is to be used in conjunction with
applying the Michigan Compiled Laws.

        Additionally, to read “law” within MCL 15.362 in the manner defined in MCL 8.8 is
consistent with the words and purposes of the WPA. As we have recognized, that purpose is “to
protect the integrity of the law by removing barriers to employee efforts to report violations of the
law. Inherent in the WPA is a purpose to protect the public by protecting employees who report
violations of laws and regulations.” Terzano v Wayne Co, 216 Mich App 522, 530-531; 549 NW2d
606 (1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Because the words of the statute and its
purpose are centered on reporting violations of “laws” or “rules and regulations,” WPA claims
typically “involve[] the violation of laws more closely connected with the employment setting,
such as Health Code and safety violations, or illegal labor practices[.]” Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid,
Inc, 443 Mich 68, 75; 503 NW2d 645 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Brown v Mayor
of Detroit, 478 Mich 589; 734 NW2d 514 (2007) (citations omitted). Though “there is no
limitation in the statute to these types of activities,” id. (which involved violation of the criminal
code), the plain words of the statute are tied to laws that are enacted by the legislature or

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promulgated by the executive—whether at the local, state or federal level of government. Each
law, rule or regulation is readily identifiable and compiled in an official government source—the
Michigan Compiled Laws, the state administrative code, local ordinances, the United States Code,
or the Code of Federal Regulations. It is in those sources that the policy-making bodies have set
out the rules that employers must follow, and it is a violation of those rules—whether in statute,
rule or regulation—that the Michigan Legislature wanted enforced by providing protection to
employees willing to report violations.

          The concurrence opines that common-law decisions fall within the term “law” because
“judicial decisions, which put the common-law into force or effect, are laws promulgated under
the laws of this state by a political subdivision of this state, i.e., the judiciary.” There are a couple
of flaws in this statement. For one, our Supreme Court—the court entrusted to determine the extent
of Michigan’s common law, see Roberts v Salmi, 308 Mich App 605, 631; 866 NW2d 460
(2014)—is not a political subdivision of the state, it is part of a separate branch of government.
See Const 1963, art 3, § 2 (the judiciary is one of three branches of state government) and People
v Ayers, 182 Mich 241, 247; 148 NW 383 (1914) (recognizing “counties, townships, cities, and
villages” as political subdivisions).1 Nor do the courts “promulgate” their decisions “pursuant to
the law of this state.” In legal circles—and particularly when the Legislature uses the term—
“promulgate” is in reference to administrative agencies issuing rules and regulations pursuant to
statutory authority. See, e.g., MCL 24.233 and Clonlara Inc v State Board of Educ, 442 Mich 230,
239; 501 NW2d 88 (1993) (“Rules adopted by an agency in accordance with the APA have the
force and effect of law. They must be promulgated in accordance with the procedures set forth in
the APA, and are not valid if those procedures are not followed.”). In this same vein, when our
Supreme Court acts pursuant to its administrative rule-making authority under the constitution, art
6, § 5, it is referred to as the Court’s ability “to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.” People
v Reichenbach, 224 Mich App 186, 192; 568 NW2d 383 (1997). See also Maple Hill Apartment
Co v Stine, 131 Mich App 371, 375; 346 NW2d 555 (1984), vacated and remanded on other
grounds 422 Mich 863 (1985) (“We acknowledge the Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate
rules regulating practice and procedure (as opposed to substantive rules) in the courts, Const 1963,
art 6, § 5.”). Thus, when acting in a legislative fashion adopting or amending court rules, the Court
is promulgating rules. But no court has held that to develop the common law on a case-by-case
basis is to “promulgate” the “law” “pursuant to the law of this state.”2

1
  Thirty-Sixth District Court v Owen, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No.
359059); slip op at 4, recently held that a local district court with limited geographic jurisdiction
is a political subdivision for purposes of the Headlee Amendment, art 11, § 3 of our state
constitution. But that provision is unique to itself, and even under Thirty-Sixth District Court, the
Supreme Court would not fit the test for a political subdivision.
2
  Interestingly, Minnesota’s version of the WPA contained language “very similar” to that
contained in MCL 15.362, Pace v Edel-Harrelson, 499 Mich 1, 8 n 15; 878 NW2d 784 (2016),
but in 2013 the Minnesota Legislature amended the statute to include the protection of reports of
violations of the common law, Moore v City of New Brighton, 932 NW2d 317, 324 (Minn App,

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        Finally, to read “law” to mean statutory law (whether originating with the legislature,
people or through the governor) is not only consistent with the words and purpose of the WPA,
but including the common-law principles espoused by the courts would be inconsistent with those
words and purposes.3 As one panel previously concluded,

       Plaintiff cited no authority to support the proposition that a lawsuit alleging
       exclusively common-law claims like defamation, fraud, or invasion of privacy
       constitutes report of a violation of law. Further, were we to read the WPA so
       broadly, protected activity would include any dispute between an employer and an
       employee that resulted in a lawsuit. The WPA would then apply to breach of
       contract suits and other common-law claims that have no public dimension. [Meier
       v Detroit Diesel Corp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
       issued July 27, 2006 (Docket No. 268009), p 2.]

       For these additional reasons, I concur in the decision to affirm the trial court’s order
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

                                                             /s/ Christopher M. Murray

2019). If MCL 15.362 should be expanded to include all areas of the common law, it should be
done by the Legislature, not the courts.
3
 As the concurrence notes, Vagts v Perry Drug Stores, Inc, 204 Mich App 481, 485; 516 NW2d
102 (1994), which involved a non-WPA public policy claim, did equate “law” in part with the
common law. But even so, our Court subsequently held that general negligence type claims do
not fall within that definition of “law.”
       The “standard of care” in the medical profession is not based on an objective legal
       source, but must be established through expert testimony on a case-by-case basis.
       See Gonzalez v St. John Hosp & Medical Ctr (On Reconsideration), 275 Mich App
       290, 294; [739] NW2d 392 (2007). Its subjectivity does not provide most
       individuals a clear and explicit delineation or understanding of the “law.” See id.
       Therefore, it cannot be said that a violation of the physician’s standard of care is a
       violation of objective “law,” and one’s refusal to violate the standard of care does
       not meet the requirements to prove wrongful termination in violation of public
       policy. [McIntire v Michigan Institute of Urology, unpublished per curiam opinion
       of the Court of Appeals, issued January 23, 2014 (Docket No. 311599), p 7.]

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