Court Opinion

ID: 9716608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:45:58.997452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.184372
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by the majority: defendant is entitled to discharge on speedy-trial grounds. I write separately because I do not agree with my colleagues’ interpretation of People v. Tamborski, 415 Ill. 466 (1953), and People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606 (1966). In my view, those cases mean precisely what they say: delays attendant to the filing and disposition of a motion for discharge on speedy-trial grounds are not attributable to the defendant. See Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d at 611. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that this rule should be subject to exceptions. Speedy-trial rights are not self-executing. In order to avail himself of the protection of our state’s speedy-trial statute, a defendant must make application for discharge. People v. Shields, 58 Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1974). Because the filing of a discharge motion is necessary to assert speedy-trial rights, it is anomalous to hold that the prosecution of such a motion creates delay for which the defendant is responsible. Defendants bring discharge motions because they want to terminate the proceedings, not protract them. Tamborski, 415 Ill. at 473. The majority worries that a defendant might attempt to subvert the system by filing a discharge motion prematurely, then deliberately delay resolution of the matter so that the speedy-trial clock will run out while the discharge motion is still pending. Such a concern, however, seems more theoretical than real. Motions to discharge do not require elaborate evidentiary hearings. They can and should be resolved promptly by the court. In a normal case, the trial court should have no need to grant the defendant anything more than the briefest of continuances. That being so, it is difficult to see where the opportunities for abuse lie. Of course, there is always the possibility that the trial court may be dilatory in resolving the matter once it is presented. That, however, is the fault of the court, not of the defendant. In any event, there is certainly no evidence that the defendant was attempting to manipulate the speedy-trial law in this case, and the majority has cited no other instances in which such abuse has occurred or is alleged to have occurred. If a defendant does in fact, attempt such abuse one day, that is when we should take the matter up. Sound jurisprudential considerations counsel against attempting to resolve a problem before we are certain that the problem really exists.