Court Opinion

ID: 9498636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:23:22.534505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:57.976049
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s holding. The majority improperly holds that the plaintiffs, female corrections officers, who claim that their employer Belmont Correctional Institution discriminated against them, based on their sex, cannot bring a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) to collectively enforce the rights and remedies afforded for such violations under both the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 *652U.S.C. § 1981a, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Rejecting the majority’s analysis, I would affirm the district court and hold that it did not abuse its discretion by not engaging in a Falcon “rigorous analysis” under Rule 23(a). Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it applied the standard in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.2001) to certify Plaintiffs’ case as a Rule 23(b)(2) class. See Reeb v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab, and Corr., 221 F.R.D. 464, 480 (S.D.Oh.2004) (“Reeb III”).
I. RIGOROUS ANALYSIS UNDER RULE 23(a)
In Reeb II, this Court remanded with instructions for the district court to conduct a “rigorous analysis” necessary to show that the Plaintiffs had met all of Rule 23(a)’s requirements. Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t. of Rehab., 81 Fed.Appx. 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (“Reeb II ”). The Court directed the district court to follow the Supreme Court’s precedent in Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982).
The district court admittedly rejected the instructions on remand and properly distinguished Falcon. The district court distinguished this case from Falcon stating that “Falcon involved one plaintiff who has been subjected to one form of discrimination, yet he sought to represent a class — of which he was not a part that had been subjected to a completely different form of discrimination.” Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t. of Rehab., 221 F.R.D. 464, 475-76 (S.D.Oh. 2004) (“Reeb I ”).
Notably, the district court properly held the Plaintiffs were able to establish the commonality and typicality requirements. In regards to commonality, the district court stated that the Plaintiffs needed only to have one common question of law or fact for class certification. Reeb III at 474. The district court reasoned that the one common issue of fact was the named Plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendant maintained a policy of gender discrimination that manifested itself in various ways. Id. at 474-75 (citing Rule 23(a)(2) and Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir.1998) (stating that the requirements for Rule 23(a)(2) are low, requiring that there only be “one common issue the resolution of which will advance the litigation.”)). Here, the Plaintiffs assert that the discriminatory employment practices affected them as well as other members of the class. The district court properly noted that
many of the alleged practices — such as the general claims of different treatment and standards, the requirement that women more often perform the undesirable duties, and the inability to apply for promotions based on the use of temporary positions are likely to apply to all members of the class, including the named Plaintiffs. Other practices such as the denial of training opportunities and leave, the use of excessive discipline as compared to male employees, and the failure to promote — are more likely to have applied only to certain of the female corrections officers.
Id. at 475.
Further, the district court properly held that Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement is satisfied as long as each class member’s claim arises from the same course of events. Reeb III at 478 (citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir.1993)). The district court explained that “substantial identity between the operative facts of the named plaintiffs and the class in general is not necessary.... [w]hen an overarching policy of discrimination is adequately alleged, the fact that both the named Plaintiffs and the putative class *653members were equally subjected to that policy is more important than precise identity between the facts of how the policy impacted each class member.” Id.
The majority rejects the district court’s attempt to distinguish Falcon and finds that the district court did not obtain any new evidence to determine whether Plaintiffs met Rule 23(a) requirements. Based on the district court’s analysis, I would hold that the district court engaged in a rigorous analysis sufficient to certify the class under Rule 23(a). While Falcon requires an individual analysis of each plaintiff, this analysis is not necessary here where the members of the class have been subjected to a general policy or practice and the legality of that policy is the focus of the litigation. Reeb III.
II. CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23(b)(2)
The issue before this Court is one of first impression — namely, whether Title VII plaintiffs can bring a class action for injunctive or declaratory relief in the same action that seeks compensatory damages under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). The majority holds that “Title VII cases in which plaintiffs seek individual compensatory damages are not appropriately brought as class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) because such claims for money damages will always predominate over requested injunc-tive or declaratory relief.” Majority Op. at 641 (emphasis added).
The majority’s holding usurps the legislative discretionary power granted to the district court to certify class actions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c) and ignores the plain language of the Rule. The majority adopts a standard wherein class certification is automatically denied whenever plaintiffs request individual monetary and injunctive or declaratory relief in the same action.
A. Class Actions as a Tool for Fighting Systemic Workplace Discrimination
The majority’s holding disregards the widespread implications that this holding will have on Title VII plaintiffs ability to file a class action to address and remedy systemic discrimination in the workplace. By creating an irrebutable presumption in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions that whenever monetary and injunctive or declaratory relief is sought in the same action, monetary relief always predominate, the majority prevents plaintiffs who have valid claims for injunctive and monetary relief from filing a class action under 23(b)(2). This holding eliminates class actions’ power as a tool to address systemic workplace discrimination and turns the clock back on civil rights.
The Plaintiffs correctly argued against this approach asserting that it “places victims of discrimination in a quandary that Congress never intended: they must either abandon the claims for compensatory damages ... or they must forfeit the class treatment that may be the only hope for prevailing and for an injunction that will finally end discrimination.” (Appellee’s Br. at 20.)
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments “to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination ... and [expand] the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). “In the battle against institutional discrimination, in 1991 Congress amended the Civil Rights Act and provided for the availability of compensatory and punitive damages for individuals claiming intentional discrimination.” Lesley Frieder Wolf, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 *654Colum. L.Rev. 1847, 1848-49 (2000). The majority’s holding adversely affects this goal and decreases the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 432 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 64-65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-603 (stating “After the 1991 Civil Rights Act the thrust of Title VII action continues to be society’s interest in eliminating discrimination and the individual’s interest in being made whole.”)).
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(b)(2) specifically states that the primary cases that fall within this Rule are “various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes 1966, Note on Subdivision (b)(2) (citing pre-1991 amendment civil-rights cases Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.1963); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 666, 11 L.Ed.2d 609, (1964); Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 1, Clarendon Cty., S.C., 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir.1962), cert, denied, 373 U.S. 933, 83 S.Ct. 1538, 10 L.Ed.2d 690 (1963); Green v. Sch. Bd. of Roanoke, Va., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir.1962); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.1957), cert, denied, 354 U.S. 921, 77 S.Ct. 1380, 1 L.Ed.2d 1436 (1957); Mannings v. Bd. of Public Inst, of Hillsborough County, Fla., 277 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1960); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Memphis, 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.1962), cert, denied, 370 U.S. 944, 82 S.Ct. 1586, 8 L.Ed.2d 810 (1962); Frasier v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of N.C., 134 F.Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C.1955), (3 judge court), aff'd 350 U.S. 979, 76 S.Ct. 467, 100 L.Ed. 848 (1956)). These cases demonstrate that historically Rule 23(b)(2) has been used to enjoin invidious discriminatory policies and practices.
The majority suggests that the alternative to Title VII class actions that seek injunctive or declaratory and monetary relief in the same action is for each individual plaintiff to file separate claims or for the Plaintiffs to proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) for solely monetary damages or 23(b)(2) for only injunctive or declaratory relief. Majority Op. at 11. The majority asserts that Title VII plaintiffs will not be foreclosed from filing actions because of the fee shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a),(b), and (k) and asserts that there is no lack of Title VII plaintiffs lining up to file claims. Id.
This analysis ignores the overall purpose of class actions and the fact that filing a class action provides greater protections than filing an individual civil rights claim or case where both injunctive and compensatory damages are sought. “Class action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system [because] they permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be aggregated into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly caused harm.” Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(1) Note, Pub.L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
The inconsistent adjudication of claims on a ease by case basis will do absolutely nothing to remedy systemic workplace discrimination. This holding eliminates the power of class actions to address systemic discrimination on a broad scale that is unparalleled to filing individual suits. See W. Lyle Stamps, Notes and Comments: Getting Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison Behind for the Robinson Line, 17 BYU J. Pub.L. 411 (stating that under the Allison rule “potential defendants are almost relieved from the large monetary and public relations liabilities concomitant with class action litigation.”).
*655In addition, the majority’s holding “derogated from the class action goals of judicial economy and efficiency; affording aggrieved persons a remedy not otherwise economically feasible; enhancing access to the courts by spreading costs; and protecting defendants from inconsistent adjudications.” Allison, 151 F.3d at 428 (Dennis, J. dissenting). Judicial economy and efficiency are not facilitated by having each individual file separate claims. Id. Further, the adjudication of multiple suits will only adversely affect the defendant-employer who will have to comply with multiple inconsistent adjudications.
Ultimately, the majority’s holding disarms legitimate classes seeking injunctive and compensatory relief to enforce statutory rights under Title VII. Id.
B. Addressing Coleman and Allison
The majority relies on the Fifth Circuit case, Allison, and this Circuit’s case, Coleman, in support of its holding. The majority’s holding creates a rule with an ir-rebutable presumption where plaintiffs seeking individual monetary and injunc-tive or declaratory relief in the same action will always be denied certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Majority Op. at 640.
In Allison, the Fifth Circuit set the standard whereby Rule 23(b)(2) certification is only proper when injunctive relief “predominates” over monetary relief. 151 F.3d at 413. Even though Allison adopted a rule in which it would be nearly impossible to certify Title VII class' actions under Rule 23(b)(2), it left open the possibility that in some cases where monetary and injunctive relief are sought the class could be certified. Id. at 411. The Allison court stated “this circuit has chosen an intermediate approach, neither allowing certification without regard to the -monetary remedies being sought, nor restricting certification to classes seeking exclusively injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. at 411. See Majority Op. at 641.
The majority adopts a standard wherein Title VII plaintiffs must seek exclusively injunctive or declaratory relief to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Specifically, the majority holds that “Title VII cases in which plaintiffs seek individual compensatory damages are not appropriately brought as class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) because such claims for money damages will always predominate over requested injunctive or declaratory relief.” Majority Op. at 641 (emphasis added). See also, Majority Op. at 651 (holding that “because of the individualized nature of damage calculations for Title VII plaintiffs and the ability of those plaintiffs to bring individual actions, the claims for individual compensatory damages of members of a Title VII class necessarily predominate over requested declaratory or injunctive relief, and individual compensatory damages are not recoverable by a Rule 23(b)(2) class.”) (emphasis added).
Other circuits that have adopted the Allison standard, including this Circuit in Coleman, have not adopted an unduly restrictive standard like the majority does in the instant case. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir.1999); see also Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807 (11th Cir.2001); In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 416-17 (5th Cir.2004).
This Court in Coleman, relied on Allison, but did not adopt a standard where a request for monetary and injunctive or declaratory relief in a case would be fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim. In Coleman, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant credit company, discriminated against them on the basis of their race in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 — 1691f (“ECOA”). We applied Allison to assess whether the plaintiffs’ re*656quest for compensatory relief undermined the assumption of homogeneity in a Rule 23(b)(2) action. In making this determination, we examined (1) whether each individual had a stake in the outcome of the litigation that could be protected by the opportunity to opt out of the class; (2) whether the individualized determinations necessary to calculate the amount of damages to each class member would be entitled to eliminates the efficiencies created by adjudicating these claims on a classwide basis; and (3) whether the primary justification for class treatment of the claims is largely absent. Coleman, 296 F.3d at 449.
In Coleman, this Court did not adopt the irrebutable presumption that the majority adopts today. Instead, the Court stated that the district court must make a determination based on the facts whether the injunctive relief requested predominates over monetary damages, and noted that money damages may be recoverable under Rule 23(b)(2). Id
C. Plain Language of Rule 23(b)(2)
The majority exceeds the scope of Coleman and Allison and ignores the plain language of Rule 23(b)(2). The plain language of Rule 23(b)(2) gives the district court the power to certify a class when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
The plain language establishes only two requirements: (1) that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class and (2) the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. “When these two requirements have been met, certification should be granted because neither the text or its plain meaning establish any further criteria.” Stamps, 17 BYU J. Pub.L. at 426 (citing Chevron, U.S A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)).
Further, the Advisory Committee Notes support the plain language reading. The Notes indicate that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes 1966, Note on Subdivision (b)(2) (emphasis added). Neither the text of Rule (b)(2), nor the Advisory Committee Note expressly prohibit district courts from certifying class actions in which the class seeks both in-junctive relief and monetary damages. Thus, the majority’s holding does not comport with the plain language of Rule 23(b)(2) or the Advisory Note.
D. Majority Exceeds Judicial Power and Usurps the District Court’s Discretion
The majority exceeds its judicial power by adopting this rule. The Supreme Court has admonished that:
Federal Rules take effect after an extensive deliberative process involving many reviewers: a Rules Advisory Committee, public commenters, the Judicial Conference, this Court, the Congress. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2074. The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress ordered, a process properly tuned to the instruction that rules of procedure “shall not abridge ... any substantive right.” § 2072(b).
Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J. dissenting) (citing Amchem Prod, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997)).
Specifically, the majority’s holding usurps the discretion granted to district courts in Rule 23(c)(1). Rule 23(c)(1) *657states “when a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class, the court must— at an early practicable time — determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1). This Circuit and the majority opinion acknowledge that “the district court has broad discretion in determining whether to certify a class, within the dictates of Rule 23.” In re. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir.1996); Majority Op. at 644 (citing Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir.2000) (stating that “[t]he district court maintains substantial discretion in determining whether to certify a class, as it possesses the inherent power to manage and control its own pending litigation.”)). By adopting an irrebutable presumption rule, the majority improperly eviscerates the district court’s legislatively granted discretion to certify class actions under Rule 23(c)(1).
To give effect to all of the provisions of Rule 23, this Court must adopt a standard wherein the district court is given discretion “to consider all of the evidence and arguments of counsel before certifying a class.” Hoffman v. Honda of America Mfg., 191 F.R.D. 530, 535 (N.D.Oh.1999). See also, Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-950 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that decisions based on per se rules are not appropriate because they nullify the discretion vested in the district court through Rule 23). See also, Reeb I at 323 (properly noting that the court exceeds its judicial powers when it reads the Rules of Civil Procedure as eviscerating substantive rights granted by Congress). See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762 (6th Cir.2005) (stating that “a statute should be construed to accord meaning and effect to each of its provisions.”); Cafarelli v. Fancy, 226 F.3d 492 (6th Cir.2000) (same); Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755 (6th Cir.1998) (same); Fed. Express Corp. v. United States Postal Serv., 151 F.3d 536, 546 (6th Cir.1998) (same). In adopting a narrow rule, the majority exceeds its judicial power.
E. Individualized Treatment of Class Plaintiffs
The majority’s holding is based on the assertion that allowing Title VII class actions under 23(b)(2) will result in numerous individualized determinations for damages, which will undermine the homogeneity of a class action. Majority Op. at 649-651. The majority states that the damages available under Title VII, “in-clud[ing] future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses” will result in individualized determinations. Majority Op. at 651. Further, the majority claims that this case cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because “whether the discriminatory practice actually was responsible for the individual class member’s harm, the applicability of nondiscriminatory reasons for the action, showings of pretext, and any affirmative defense all must be analyzed on an individual basis.” Majority Op. at 651.
The majority’s rationale underlying its holding would make it impossible to certify a Title VII class action under any of the provisions in Rule 23(b)(2). Further, other courts have already addressed this issue by bifurcating the liability and damages phases of the trial. Allison, 151 F.3d at 433 (Dennis, J. dissenting) (noting “Title VII class actions for disparate treatment have traditionally been conducted in two stages.”). The Allison dissent, cites Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 443-44 (5th Cir.1974), to explain the bifurcation of Title VII class actions. The Baxter court stated that:
A Title VII class action presents a bifurcated burden of proof problem. Initial*658ly, it is incumbent on the class to establish that an employer’s employment practices have resulted in cognizable deprivations to it as a class. At that juncture of the litigation, it is unnecessarily complicating and cumbersome to compel any particular discriminatee to prove class coverage by showing personal monetary loss. What is necessary to establish liability is evidence that the class of black employees has suffered from the policies and practices of the particular employer. Assuming that the class does establish invidious treatment, the court should then properly proceed to resolve whether a particular employee is in fact a member of the covered class, has suffered financial loss, and thus entitled to back pay or other appropriate relief.
Allison, 151 F.3d at 443 (emphasis in original) (citing Baxter, 495 F.2d at 443-44; Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp., 424 U.S. 747, 772, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976)).
Bifurcated phases of Title VII class actions contemplate separate and distinct issues. Id. The first stage focuses exclusively on class-wide claims. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)) (stating that the focus in Stage I is not on individual hiring decision, but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking) (quotations and citations omitted). Once it has been shown that the employer maintained a policy or practice that unlawfully discriminates in the first stage, the second stage focuses on whether individual employment decisions were made pursuant to any such procedure or policy. Id.
Some courts have expressed concerns with the constitutionality of certifying a class action for monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2) under this procedure. The constitutional concern is that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is never appropriate because it binds all class members without the safeguards of notice and opportunity to be heard. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164. This concern arises from the Supreme Court cases Ticor v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 114 S.Ct. 1359, 128 L.Ed.2d 33 (1994) and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999). In Ticor, the Supreme Court stated that there is at least a substantial possibility that in actions seeking monetary damages, classes can be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits opt-out. 511 U.S. at 121, 114 S.Ct. 1359. In Ortiz, the Supreme Court suggested that a mandatory class seeking monetary damages should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because such a class compromises the due process rights of absent class members. See also, Coleman, 296 F.3d at 447.
The solution may be to bifurcate the liability and damages portion of the trial and grant the plaintiffs opt-out rights with regards to their claims for monetary damages. See Rule 23(c)(4)(A) (providing that “an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that the language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford the district court discretion to grant opt-out rights in Rule (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions). This would result in the certification of a hybrid class action under Rule(b)(2) and (b)(3). This may address the constitutional concerns that could arise when certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class that seeks monetary damages.
F. The Appropriate Standard
The district court did not abusé its discretion when it adopted the Robinson standard. Preliminarily, the Coleman case, on which the majority relies, can be *659distinguished from this case and is not applicable. Further, in Robinson, the Second Circuit adopted a standard that appropriately gives the district court discretion and is congruent with the purpose of both the Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) and the amendments 1991 to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. This Court should do the same.
The majority improperly states that Coleman’s reliance on Allison dictates the outcome of this case. Majority Op. at 11. First, this case is a Title VII case, which necessitates applying a different standard than the ECOA claim in Coleman. In Coleman, this Court specifically stated “it is unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether money damages are ever recoverable in a 23(b)(2) class action, however, because we hold that compensatory damages under the ECOA are not recoverable by a 23(b)(2) class.” 296 F.3d at 447. Thus, this Court in Coleman limited its holding to ECOA cases, and left open the possibility that monetary relief may be recoverable to some extent in other Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. The holding of Coleman does not affect this case since it was limited to the ECOA and did not extend to Title VII cases.
In addition, the district court properly distinguished Coleman on the basis of the individualized determinations required to calculate damages. Reeb III at 481. The district court stated that “the damages sought here, however, seem more akin to back pay than to the compensatory damages sought in Coleman. In Coleman, the court noted that ‘determining the damages of each class member in this case would involve investigation into the practices of multiple auto dealerships whereas a back pay claim typically involves the practices of a single employer.’ ” Reeb III at 481. The district court went on to note that individual damage assessment would be necessary, if the case proceeded to the liability phase, but stated that a damages’ determination would involve only the practices of a single employer and would be simple in comparison to the damage claims in Coleman. Id.
This Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s holding in Robinson. The Robinson court adopted an ad hoc balancing test where the “district court should at minimum, satisfy itself of the following: (1) even in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief sought; and (2) the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably necessary ' and appropriate were plaintiffs to succeed on the merits.” 267 F.3d at 164. In adopting this standard, the court intended “that when presented with a motion for (b)(2) class certification of a claim seeking both injunctive relief and non-incidental monetary damages, a district court must consider the evidence presented at a class certification hearing and the arguments of counsel, and then assess whether (b)(2) certification is appropriate in light of the relative importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.See also, Hoffman, 191 F.R.D. at 536; Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 92 (stating that Title VII and other civil rights class actions are frequently, certified .pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) noting that “although the defining characteristic of the (b)(2) class is that it seeks declaratory or injunctive relief application to the class as a whole, it is not uncommon in employment discrimination cases for the class also to seek monetary relief in the form of front or back pay.” (citations omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I affirm the district court’s decision. The majority improperly holds that Title VII plaintiffs will never be able to obtain certification under *660Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) to collectively enforce the rights and remedies under both the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. This holding eliminates class actions’ power as a tool to address systemic workplace discrimination and turns the clock back on civil rights. I cannot endorse this holding because it curtails the relief available to Title VII plaintiffs. This holding will obstruct employees’ ability to eradicate an employer’s discriminatory workplace policies and practices. I vigorously dissent. It is unfortunate that the majority has chosen this case to roll back the clock on years of workplace based civil rights legislation. Until Congress has definitively spoken on this issue, neither should we.