Court Opinion

ID: 9404972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 20:04:06.868478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.137130
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/26/23 In re Jessie M. CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                        CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

 In re JESSIE M., a Person                                                   B321807
 Coming Under the Juvenile
 Court Law.
                                                                           (Los Angeles County
 THE PEOPLE,                                                                Super. Ct. No. FJ57508)

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

             v.

 JESSIE M.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Miguel Espinoza, Judge. Affirmed.
     Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Chung L.
Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
         _______________________________________

      Jessie M. appeals from an order declaring him a ward
of the juvenile court and committing him to a secure youth
treatment facility (SYTF) for committing assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(4)). Appellant contends the juvenile court
improperly construed Welfare and Institutions Code section
875 when setting a baseline term of three years
confinement.1 Notwithstanding the fact that the petition
specifically pled that appellant committed the assault
against a peace officer, appellant contends his rights to due
process and fair notice were violated when juvenile court set
his baseline term of confinement based in part on the fact
that the victim was a peace officer.
      We conclude that the juvenile court properly construed
section 875 in setting a baseline term of confinement, and in
so doing, did not violate appellant’s rights to due process.
We affirm.

1     Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

                                  2
                       BACKGROUND
      Deputy Probation Officer P. Shackelford supervised
appellant and other juveniles at a secured facility for
troubled minors.2 On February 12, 2022, Officer Shackelford
sustained various injuries after appellant physically
assaulted him. In April 2022, a one-count section 602
petition was filed against appellant, alleging that on
February 12, 2022, “the crime of assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of Penal
Code 245(a)(4), a Felony, was committed by said minor, who
committed an assault on the person of DPO P[.] Shackelford
by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.”
Following a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile
court found the count true beyond a reasonable doubt. The
court sustained the petition and declared the offense a
felony. At a continued disposition hearing, the court
imposed a baseline term of three years confinement and
maximum term of four years confinement in a SYTF.
Appellant timely appealed.

                        DISCUSSION
A.    The Juvenile Court Laws
      If a minor is adjudged a ward under section 602, “the
court may make any reasonable orders for the care,
supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of

2     The prosecution identified Officer Shackelford using his last
name at the adjudication hearing. For consistency, we adopt the same
designation.

                                 3
the minor. . . .” (§ 727, subd. (a)(1).) Courts have the
discretion to place wards on probation, order commitment to
a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp, or for
particular criminal offenses, order confinement to a county
juvenile hall or a SYTF. (§§ 727, subds. (a)(2)-(3), 730,
subd. (a), 875, subd. (a).)
      When considering the appropriate disposition in any
section 602 case, “the court shall consider, in addition to
other relevant and material evidence, (1) the age of the
minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the offense
committed by the minor, and (3) the minor’s previous
delinquent history.” (§ 725.5.) Courts should also consider
“the safety and protection of the public, the importance of
redressing injuries to victims, and the best interests of the
minor in all deliberations.” (§ 202, subd. (d).) This scheme
“is designed to give the court ‘maximum flexibility to craft
suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward
before it.’ [Citation.] Flexibility is the hallmark of juvenile
court law, in both delinquency and dependency
interventions.” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 411
(Greg F.); accord, In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507;
§ 202, subd. (a).)
      Courts must consider these principles when
“‘interpreting and administering the juvenile court
law, . . . .’” (In re Scott H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 515, 523.)
“[I]nsofar as they are substantially the same as existing
statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter,”
amended provisions appearing in the Juvenile Court Law

                               4
“shall be construed as restatements and continuations
thereof, and not as new enactments.” (§ 201; accord,
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.501(c)(1), (c)(2).)

B.    Amendments to Juvenile Court Laws: Section
      875
      As of July 1, 2021, juvenile courts had the discretion to
commit wards to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (D.J.J.) for
serious criminal violations. (§ 731, subd. (a).) Prior to D.J.J.
commitment, the juvenile court was required to set a
maximum term of confinement “based upon the facts and
circumstances of the matter . . . and as deemed appropriate
to achieve rehabilitation.” (§ 731, subd. (b).) Despite
imposition of a maximum term of confinement, wards
committed to the D.J.J. were subject to discharge
proceedings by the Board of Juvenile Hearings under the
jurisdiction of the D.J.J. (Ibid.; see §§ 1703, subd. (d), 1719,
subd. (a), 1725, subds. (a)-(b).)
      In 2020, the Legislature found it “necessary to close the
[D.J.J.] and move the jurisdiction of [wards] to local county
jurisdiction” to ensure “justice-involved youth[s] are closer to
their families and communities and receive age-appropriate
treatment.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(b); accord, § 736.5,
subds. (a)-(e).) In May 2021, the Governor signed into law
Senate Bill No. 92, which announced the closure of the D.J.J.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12.) This development in juvenile
justice realignment also added section 875 et seq., which

                               5
governs commitment to local “secure youth treatment
facilities” (SYTF) in lieu of D.J.J. commitment. (See §§ 875,
subd. (c)(1).)
       Section 875, subdivision (a) provides, “commencing
July 1, 2021, the [juvenile] court may order that a ward who
is 14 years of age or older be committed to a [SYTF] for a
period of confinement” under certain criteria not relevant
here. As to the court’s duty to impose an appropriate
disposition, subdivision (b) of section 875 provides:
       “In making its order of commitment for a ward,
       the court shall set a baseline term of confinement
       for the ward that is based on the most serious
       recent offense for which the ward has been
       adjudicated. The baseline term of confinement
       shall represent the time in custody necessary to
       meet the developmental and treatment needs of
       the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge to
       a period of probation supervision in the
       community. The baseline term of confinement for
       the ward shall be determined according to
       offense-based classifications that are approved by
       the Judicial Council, as described in subdivision
       (h).[3] Pending the development and adoption of

3      Section 875, subdivision (h)(1) provides: “By July 1, 2023, the
Judicial Council shall develop and adopt a matrix of offense-based
classifications to be applied by the juvenile courts in all counties in
setting the baseline confinement terms described in subdivision (b).
Each classification level or category shall specify a set of offenses
within the level or category that is linked to a standard baseline term
of years to be assigned to youth, based on their most serious recent
adjudicated offense, who are committed to a [SYTF] as provided in this
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

                                       6
      offense-based classifications by the Judicial
      Council, the court shall set a baseline term of
      confinement for the ward utilizing the discharge
      consideration date guidelines applied by the
      [D.J.J.] prior to its closure and as set forth in
      Sections 30807 to 30813, inclusive, of Title 9 of
      the California Code of Regulations. These
      guidelines shall be used only to determine a
      baseline confinement time for the ward and shall
      not be used or relied on to modify the ward’s
      confinement time in any manner other than as
      provided in this section. The court may, pending
      the adoption of Judicial Council guidelines,
      modify the initial baseline term with a deviation
      of plus or minus six months.” (§ 875, subd. (b).)

       Sections 30807 through 30813 of title 9 of the
California Code of Regulations, appearing under division 6 of
the D.J.J. regulations, set forth “Offense Categories and
Classification” to be used by the Board of Juvenile Hearings
or the juvenile court to “establish a parole consideration date
category” for D.J.J. commitments, and as relevant here, a
baseline term of confinement to a SYTF. (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 9, § 30805.) Sections 30807 through 30813 enumerate
each category offense and any “ward behavior” when
committing an offense. (Ibid.) The “ward behavior”

section. The individual baseline term . . . in each case may be derived
from a standard range of years for each offense level or category as
designated by the Judicial Council.”

                                   7
described in sections 30807 through 30812 “may be
determined by the court or the board.” (Ibid.)
       At issue in this case are two categories of offenses and
their respective baseline terms of confinement. As provided
in section 30811, category 5 offenses carry a baseline term of
18 months confinement. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 30811.)
Among the enumerated category 5 offenses is “Assault
with . . . Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (245(a)
Penal Code).” (Id., § 30811, subd. (a)(1).) Section 30809
classifies category 3 offenses for which baseline terms of
confinement are three years. One offense listed as a
category 3 offense is “Assault with . . . Force Likely to
Produce Great Bodily Injury upon a peace officer,
firefighter, . . . or school personnel (245(a), (b), 245.2 and
245.3 Penal Code).” (Id., § 30809, subd. (a)(9).)

C.    Relevant Background
      At the continued disposition hearing in this case, the
juvenile court informed the parties that its findings would be
based on the adjudicated offense “and also the history of
[appellant’s] conduct” as set forth in the probation reports.
The court then questioned counsel about the appropriate
disposition. Assuming SYTF commitment, appellant’s trial
counsel argued that the court was limited to imposing a
baseline term of 18 months confinement as based on the
adjudicated offense under Penal Code section 245,
subdivision (a)(5). (See Cal. Code Reg., tit. 9, § 30811, subd.
(a)(1)). The prosecution disagreed, arguing for a baseline

                               8
term of three years confinement based on appellant
committing aggravated assault against a peace officer. (See
id., § 30809, subd. (a)(9)).4 The court declared appellant a
ward of the court, found less restrictive alternative
dispositions unsuitable, and committed appellant to a SYTF.
The court initially set a baseline term of three years
confinement but continued the matter to permit
supplemental briefing by the parties.
       In his supplemental brief, appellant argued that under
section 875, the prosecution was required to file formal
charges with what appellant refers to as “the enhancing
element” that he committed an assault upon a peace officer.
In the event section 875 was ambiguous, the rule of lenity
required the court to interpret section 875 in his favor. In its
brief, the prosecution argued that the trial court could
properly consider the circumstances of appellant’s offense
when setting the baseline term of confinement. The
prosecution also argued that classification of appellant’s
offense as a category 3 offense did not enhance his sentence,
as the three-year baseline term fell within the permissible
disposition range without any enhancement. (See §§ 875,
subd. (c)(1)(B) [confinement term shall not exceed middle
term of imprisonment that can be imposed upon an adult
convicted of same offense], 726, subd. (d)(1) [same];
Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) [providing sentencing triad of

4     Appellant’s trial counsel conceded the adjudication hearing
testimony had confirmed that Officer Shackelford “was a deputy
probation officer working at [a secured youth facility].”

                                  9
two, three, and four years for the offense of assault upon the
person of another by any means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury].)
      At the continued disposition hearing, the court
identified “a clear challenge . . . that the Legislature has
asked the court and the parties to rely upon a section of the
code of regulations that was not adopted with SYTF or
[section] 875 in mind.” To “earnestly harmonize the D.J.J.
matrix with the letter and spirit of [section] 875,” the court
ordered a baseline term of three years confinement as a
category 3 offense for committing an aggravated assault
against a peace officer under title 9, section 30809,
subdivision (a) of the California Code of Regulations. The
court then imposed a maximum term of four years
confinement.

D.    Analysis
      Appellant contends the juvenile court improperly
construed section 875 and the D.J.J. guidelines when setting
his baseline term of confinement. In so arguing, appellant
also contends that the juvenile court violated his
constitutional right to fair notice by setting the baseline
term for the “unadjudicated offense” of committing an
aggravated assault on a peace officer. We disagree with both
contentions.

                              10
     1.      The Juvenile Court Properly Construed Section
             875
       We independently construe section 875 and the
relevant regulations to determine if the juvenile court
properly set appellant’s baseline term of confinement. (See
In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866; see also
Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702,
1710 [“the same rules governing the construction and
interpretation of statutes apply to the construction and
interpretation of administrative regulations”].)
       “‘Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the
intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of
the law. [Citation.] Because the statut[e’s] language is
generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look
first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and
ordinary meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider
the statutory language in isolation, but rather examine the
entire substance of the statute in order to determine the
scope and purpose of the provision, construing its words in
context and harmonizing its various parts. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (People v. Castillolopez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 322,
329; see Hoffmann v. Young (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1257, 1266
[courts must consider “the provision at issue in the context of
the whole statutory scheme”].) “‘Ultimately we choose the
construction that comports most closely with the apparent
intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather
than defeating the general purpose of the statute.’

                              11
[Citation.]” (Mays v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th
313, 321.)
      With these principles in mind, we now consider the
language of section 875, subdivision (b), which requires
setting a baseline term of confinement based on “the most
serious recent offense for which the ward has been
adjudicated. . . . Pending the development and adoption of
offense-based classifications by the Judicial Council, the
court shall set a baseline term of confinement for the ward
utilizing the discharge consideration date guidelines applied
by the [D.J.J.] prior to its closure and as set forth in Section
30807 to 30813, inclusive, of Title 9 of the California Code of
Regulations.”
      Relying solely on the first sentence in section 875,
subdivision (b), appellant contends the juvenile court was
limited to setting his baseline term of confinement based
only on the elements of his adjudicated offense. In other
words, appellant contends the juvenile court was prohibited
from considering any circumstance attending his offense.
Under this interpretation, appellant contends his baseline
term of confinement is 18 months. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit.
9, § 30811, subd. (a)(1).)
      We disagree with appellant’s interpretation. To begin
with, section 875 instructs courts to “utiliz[e] the discharge
consideration date guidelines applied by the [D.J.J.],” and
those guidelines permit consideration of facts beyond the
particular elements of an adjudicated offense. As appellant
himself recognizes, to correctly utilize the category offenses

                               12
listed in sections 30807 to 30813 of title 9 of the California
Code of Regulations, section 30805 directs the Board of
Juvenile Parole Hearings and the court to consider “ward
behavior” described in each category offense when
establishing a “parole consideration date category [or as
here, a baseline term of confinement,] in accordance with
such determination.” If adopted, appellant’s interpretation
would impliedly repeal a significant portion of the D.J.J.
guidelines on which section 875 relies.5
      From this D.J.J. guideline, we discern no ambiguity in
section 875, subdivision (b). To adequately discharge its
duty to determine a baseline term of confinement from the
category offenses listed in section 30807 through 30813, the
juvenile court must consider the “ward behavior” identified
in those sections. Here, it is undisputed that appellant
committed an aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.
(a)(4)), and that he did so against Officer Shackleford, a
peace officer as a matter of law. (See § 283 [“[e]very . . .
deputy probation officer shall have the powers and authority
conferred by law upon peace officers”].) Appellant’s offense

5      Many of the category 2, 3, and 4 offenses listed in sections 30807
through 30813 contemplate ward behavior in connection with an
adjudicated offense (i.e., infliction of substantial injury, use of a deadly
weapon, and committing the offense against a particular victim). (See,
e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 30808, subd. (a)(2); 30809, subds. (a)(6).)
Other category offenses contemplate recidivism. (See id., § 30810,
subd. (a)(21).) These category offenses, each reflecting circumstances
beyond the elements of an adjudicated offense, would be rendered
meaningless under appellant’s interpretation of section 875.

                                     13
qualifies as a category 3 offense. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9,
§ 30809, subd. (a)(9).)
      Appellant’s interpretation isolates portions of section
875, and in doing so, ignores express language in the statute
designed to ensure flexibility in crafting suitable disposition
orders. (See § 875, subd. (b) [any baseline term imposed
must “represent the time in custody necessary to meet the
developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to
prepare the ward for discharge . . . in the community].”) To
give meaning and effect to these considerations, section 875
should be construed as vesting juvenile courts with
discretion to utilize the D.J.J. guidelines in a manner that
meets the goal of preparing the ward for discharge into the
community. (Ibid.)
      Beyond the plain language and purpose of section 875,
appellant’s restrictive interpretation of section 875 also
conflicts with the general flexibility inherent in the juvenile
court sentencing scheme (§ 725.5). As this interpretation
significantly curtails a juvenile court’s broad discretion when
imposing an appropriate disposition, we decline to adopt it.
(Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 410 [“[i]n interpreting a
statute, courts are obligated to ‘adopt a common sense
construction over one leading to mischief or absurdity’”];
Hopkins v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1275, 128
[courts must harmonize two codes as blending into each
other, and when possible, must be read together to give
effect to all provisions therein].)

                              14
      To the extent appellant contends the rule of lenity
applies in this case, requiring his interpretation to be given
preference over other reasonable interpretations, we
disagree. “The rule of lenity does not apply every time there
are two or more reasonable interpretations of a penal
statute. [Citation.] Rather, the rule applies ‘“only if the
court can do no more than guess what the legislative body
intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and
uncertainty to justify invoking the rule.”’ [Citation.] In
other words, ‘the rule of lenity is a tie-breaking principle, of
relevance when “‘two reasonable interpretations of the same
provision stand in relative equipoise. . . .’”’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 889.) As discussed
ante, we perceive no degree of uncertainty in section 875,
and therefore find the rule of lenity inapplicable in this case.
      In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court properly
construed section 875 and all relevant regulations when
setting appellant’s baseline term of three years confinement.

      2.    No Violation of Due Process
      Anticipating our result above, appellant alternatively
contends that the juvenile court violated his due process
rights to fair notice by setting a baseline term of confinement
on an “unadjudicated offense” of assault against a peace
officer. We disagree.
      “‘[D]ue process requires that a minor, like an adult,
have adequate notice of the charge so that he may
intelligently prepare his defense. [Citation.]’ [Citation]

                               15
Compliance with this requirement has been held by the
Supreme Court to mandate that the minor ‘be notified, in
writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be
considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be
given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event
sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation.’
[Citation.]” (In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437, 442.)
      It is unclear whether these principles apply to a
juvenile delinquency disposition hearing. (See In re Gary B.
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 844, 851 [rejecting due process
argument for fitness determination under former section
707, subdivision (b)]; see also Alfredo A. v. Superior Court
(1994) 6 Cal.4th 1212, 1215 [“in the words of the Supreme
Court, juvenile proceedings are ‘fundamentally different’
from adult criminal proceedings, requiring that a ‘balance’
be struck between the ‘informality’ and ‘flexibility’ that must
of necessity inhere in juvenile proceedings”].) We need not
decide this question, for we discern no violation of due
process in this case.
      The petition in this case provided appellant fair notice
of the specific charge (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and the
circumstances underlying that charge, including the
allegation that appellant assaulted a peace officer. From the
date of filing the petition, appellant understood these
allegations as serving the basis for adjudication and
disposition. No due process violation occurred. (See People
v. Jimenez (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [“[t]o avoid due
process violations, the facts giving rise to a sentence

                              16
enhancement must be alleged in the accusatory pleading”];
People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 630-631
[allegation that the defendant inflicted great bodily harm
“allege[d] the same facts necessary for” a sentence
enhancement].)
      People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735 (Mancebo), on
which appellant exclusively relies, is inapposite. In that
case, the defendant was convicted of various sex offenses for
which he was subject to sentencing under the One Strike law
(Pen. Code, § 667.61). (Id. at p. 738.) The One Strike law
“sets forth an alternative, harsher sentencing scheme for
certain forcible sex crimes” under specified circumstances.
(Ibid.) Using the One Strike law, the trial court sentenced
the defendant to two indeterminate 25-year-to-life terms for
committing forcible rape against one victim under specified
circumstances (gun use and kidnapping), and forcible
sodomy against another victim under specified
circumstances (gun use and tying or binding). (Ibid.; see
Pen. Code, § 667.61, subds. (a), (e).) The trial court then
sentenced the defendant to two additional 10-year terms for
separate gun-use enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd.
(a)) against each victim. (Mancebo, supra, at p. 738.) When
imposing sentence, the trial court conceded it had both
imposed One Strike sentences and additional enhancements
for gun use. (Ibid.) To avoid imposing multiple aggravated
sentences on the same circumstance, the trial court found
that “it had the authority to substitute [an unpled multiple-
victim] circumstance” under the One Strike law to replace

                             17
the gun use circumstance under the One Strike law. (Id. at
pp. 738-739.)
       Our Supreme Court considered “whether the
circumstance of gun use was available to support [both gun
enhancements under Penal Code] section 12022.5(a) . . .
when gun use had already been properly pled and proved as
a basis for invoking One Strike sentencing.” (Mancebo,
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 738.) To answer this question, the
court looked to the express pleading and proof requirements
under the One Strike law, which “requires that ‘[f]or the
penalties provided in this section to apply, the existence of
any fact required under subdivision (d) or (e) shall be alleged
in the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the
defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of
fact.’” (Id. at p. 743.) The Court held that the trial court
violated the pleading provisions in the One Strike law and
due process by using the multiple-victim circumstance that
was never alleged or found true by the trier of fact. (Ibid.;
see id. at p. 745 [“[i]n other words, no factual allegation in
the information or pleading in the statutory language
informed defendant that if he was convicted of the
underlying charged offenses, the court would consider his
[convictions against multiple victims] as a basis for One
Strike sentencing”].)
       Relying on this analysis in Mancebo, appellant
contends the juvenile court could not impose a term of
confinement based on a factual circumstance properly
pleaded in an accusatory pleading but untethered to a

                              18
particular criminal offense or sentencing factor. Appellant
construes Mancebo too broadly. The Court in Mancebo
cautioned that its holding was “limited to a construction of
the language of [Penal Code] section 667.61, subdivisions (f)
and (i), read together, as controlling here.” It added, “We
have no occasion in this case to interpret other statutory
provisions not directly before us . . . .” (Mancebo, supra, 27
Cal.4th at p. 745, fn. 5.) The Court did not purport to
announce a pleading requirement for any aggravating
circumstance that a criminal or juvenile court can consider
when imposing sentence or disposition. On the contrary, the
Court has clarified both before and after Mancebo that due
process does not require “rigid code pleading or the
incantation of words.” (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th
946, 957; People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 826.)
Absent any reasoned argument by appellant requiring this
type of pleading,6 we decline to require it in this case.
Omission of the circumstance in aggravation, as provided in
the relevant D.J.J. guidelines, did not violate appellants’
right to due process and fair notice.

6      The Determinate Sentencing law currently prohibits imposition
of any sentence above the middle term of a sentencing triad that is
based on an aggravating circumstance neither stipulated to by the
criminal defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the
trier of fact. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2), as amended by Stats.
2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)

                                 19
                       DISPOSITION
      The disposition order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                            MORI, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

ZUKIN, J. *

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.

                                   20