Court Opinion

ID: 9793869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:54:35.480238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:15.381920
License: Public Domain

ALMA WILSON, Justice,
dissenting:
This cause was initiated to recover monetary damages for the fatal injury to a minor child caused by an automobile accident. The personal representative of the deceased minor child seeks recovery under the liability coverage in three motor vehicle liability insurance policies issued by the appellee, State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm): one policy was issued to the owner of the automo-*893Me and two policies were issued to the permissive operator, the father of the cMd. All three policies are identical and contain clauses excluding personal injury to household members from the liability coverage.
The legal issue is whether the household exclusion clause in each of the three policies is valid. -The parties have briefed the issue as if it were a certified question of law, concentrating on our decisional law. That is, the parties have not presented arguments of the legal issue under each of the policies separately. Accordingly, the trial Court’s summary judgment in favor of State Farm did not include findings as to the identity of the household defined in each policy for purposes of exclusion, nor the extent of the coverage issued in accordance with Oklahoma’s compulsory insurance law. As it had argued before the trial court, in this appeal State Farm contends that the household exclusion clause is valid; but State Farm further contends, which it did not argue in the trial court, that if the clause is invalid, the invalidity should be limited to the minimum compulsory insurance required by statute. This Court upholds the household exclusion as to any amount of the liability coverage which exceeds the minimum coverage mandated by our compulsory insurance law. For the reasons set out below, I must respectfully dissent to today’s ruling.
THE FACTS
The record reflects that Francis D. Morgan owned a 1979 Oldsmobile and resided at 5139 S. Utica in Tulsa, Oklahoma. J. Michael George and his wife and children resided at 4619 S. Vandalia in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Morgan loaned the Oldsmobile to George for a vacation trip to Wisconsin. On August 6, 1983, George and his family were returning from their trip to Wisconsin. At approximately 8:45 a.m., George was driving the Oldsmobile in the westbound outside lane on the Will Rogers Turnpike about 2.2 miles east of the Afton interchange in Ottawa County, Oklahoma, when he dozed or fell asleep and the Oldsmobile left the roadway, struck a guardrail and then impacted with an overpass support. George’s five year old son, Jeffrey George, was fatally injured in the accident. A judgment was entered against George for $130,060.00 damages for the fatal injury to Jeffrey George.
State Farm had issued an automobile insurance policy to Morgan which listed the Oldsmobile as the insured vehicle. Morgan’s liability coverage has a $100,000.00 limit for personal injury to an individual and uninsured motorist coverage has a $10,000.00 limit. State Farm had also issued two automobile insurance policies to George. Each of George’s policies provides liability coverage with a $25,000.00 limit for personal injury to an individual and uninsured motorist coverage with a $25,000.00 limit in one policy and $10,000.00 limit in the other policy. State Farm has paid $45,000.00, the maximum uninsured motorist coverage available, leaving $85,000.00 of the judgment unpaid, which the appellant seeks to collect under the liability provisions of the involved policies through garnishment.
THE POLICY PROVISIONS
In deciding the liability coverage and the validity of the household exclusion clauses herein, this Court should begin with the insurance policy provisions upon which the defense relies. Even though the policies are identical, a single reading is insufficient. Morgan’s policy must be read to determine the extent of the liability coverage provided for the wrongful injury caused by a permissive operator of the listed vehicle, while George’s policies must be read to determine the extent of the liability coverage provided for the wrongful injury caused by the use of a non-owned automobile. The readings of Morgan’s policy and George’s policies must be governed by established legal rules. The language used in the insurance policies must be assigned plain and ordinary meaning;1 the various provisions must be read together;2 and any ambiguity must be strictly *894construed against the insurer.3
Each of the three State Farm policies contain the following provisions relating to liability coverage, household exclusions and definitions:
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Agrees with the insured, named in the declarations made a part hereof, in consideration of the payment of the premium and in reliance upon the statements in the declarations and subject to all of the terms of this policy:
(Note: The words in bold face italic type are defined under definitions within each Section.)
SECTION I — LIABILITY AND MEDICAL PAYMENTS INSURING AGREEMENTS
COVERAGE A — BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
COVERAGE B — PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
(A) bodily injury sustained by other persons, and
(B) property damages,
caused by accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use, including loading or unloading, of the owned motor vehicle;' and to defend, with attorneys selected by and compensated by the company, any suit against the insured alleging such bodily injury or property damage and seeMng damages which are payable hereunder even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient....
USE OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE
... (1) Coverages A and B applies to the use of a non-owned automobile by:
(a) the first person named in the declarations or,
(b) if residents of the same household, his spouse or the relatives of either, and
(c) any other person or organization not owning or hiring such automobile, but only with respect to his or its liability for the use of such automobile by an insured as defined in subsections (a) and (b) above; ...
PROVIDED SUCH USE, OPERATION OR OCCUPANCY IS WITH THE PERMISSION OP THE OWNER OR PERSON IN LAWFUL POSSESSION OF SUCH AUTOMOBILE AND IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH PERMISSION. The definition of insured does not apply to Use of Non-Owned Automobiles.
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER:
... (h) COVERAGE A, TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF AN INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS THE INSURED; .... DEFINITIONS — SECTION 1
... Insured — the unqualified word “insured” includes
(1) the named insured, and
(2) if the named insured is a person or persons, also includes his or their spouse(s), if a resident of the same household, and
(3) if residents of the same household, the relatives of the first person named in the declarations, or of his spouse, and
*895(4) any other person while using the owned motor vehicle, PROVIDED THE OPERATION AND THE ACTUAL USE OF SUCH VEHICLE ARE WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE NAMED INSURED OR SUCH SPOUSE AND ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH PERMISSION, and
(5) under coverages A and B any other person or organization, but only with respect to his or its liability for the use of such owned motor vehicle by an insured as defined in the four subsections above.
... Resident or Reside — when used with reference to the named insured’s household, means bodily presence in such household and an intention to continue to dwell therein. However, the named insured’s unmarried and unemancipated children, while away from his household attending school, are deemed to be residents of his household.
6886 STATUTORY ENDORSEMENT— OKLAHOMA
... In consideration of the premium paid, it is agreed that, when the Declarations Page indicates that Coverages A and B are applicable to the policy, the following statement applies:
“Liability insurance is provided in this policy in accordance with the coverage required by the Compulsory Insurance Law of Oklahoma.”
I.
THE FATAL INJURY TO JEFFREY GEORGE, THE PASSENGER/MINOR CHILD OF THE PERMISSIVE OPERATOR OF MORGAN’S AUTOMOBILE WHO DID NOT RESIDE IN THE MORGAN’S HOUSEHOLD, IS NOT WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION IN MORGAN’S POLICY; AND, STATE FARM SHOULD BE LIABLE TO THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY GEORGE, DECEASED, FOR $100,000.00 UNDER MORGAN’S LIABILITY COVERAGE.
The comprehensive language insuring the operators of Morgan’s Oldsmobile clearly include the fatal injury to Jeffrey George up to the policy limit. The liability coverage to be paid under Morgan’s policy is set forth in all encompassing terms — State Farm agrees to pay damages for bodily injury to other persons caused by accident arising out of the wrongful use of the owned motor vehicle, Morgan’s Oldsmobile, by an insured. The definition of insured clearly includes a permissive operator, such as George, within the liability insuring agreement. State Farm’s endorsement providing that the liability coverage for which the premium has been paid is provided in accordance with Oklahoma’s compulsory insurance law is equally all encompassing — State Farm agrees that §§ 7-600, et seq., of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes control Coverage A for which the premium for a $100,000.00 limit per person coverage has been paid.
On the other hand, whether the fatal injury to Jeffrey George is excluded from the comprehensive liability coverage is not clear from the obscure language in the household exclusion clause. In view of the various articles used in the clause to modify the noun “insured,” the article the modifying “insured” in' the phrase “residing in the same household as the insured” could be read to mean “the named insured.” The terms “insured” and “residing” are printed in bold italic type in the clause and, according to the policy, are used within the confines of the definitions in the liability insurance section. The definitions of “insured” and “reside” both refer to the household of the named insured. In fact, the definition of “reside” expressly limits its application to the household of the named insured.
It is State Farm’s printed form that defines “reside” in terms of the household of the named insured and that requires the meaning of bold typed word “residing” in the household exclusion clause to be controlled by its definition of “reside.” A strict reading of the household exclusion together with the definitions in Morgan’s policy is that persons who are related to Morgan and reside in Morgan’s household are excluded from liability coverage. Under the facts and cireum-*896stances in this case,4 personal injury to Jeffrey George, the passenger/minor child of the permissive operator, is clearly included within Morgan’s liability coverage because of George’s wrongful use of Morgan’s Oldsmobile and it is not excluded by the household exclusion. Accordingly, I cannot join in today’s per curiam holding which implicitly extends the household exclusion clause in Morgan’s policy to the household of the permissive operator, George, contrary to the terms of the policy.
II.
BY STATE FARM’S DECLARATION, THE LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR $25,000.00 PER PERSON IN EACH OF GEORGE’S TWO POLICIES IS WRITTEN IN ACCORQANCE WITH THE COMPULSORY INSURANCE LAW; THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION CLAUSE IS CONTRARY TO THE COMPULSORY INSURANCE LAW; HENCE, THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION CLAUSE IS INVALID AS TO THE POLICY LIMITS OF LIABILITY COVERAGE; AND, STATE FARM IS LIABLE TO THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY GEORGE, DECEASED, FOR AN AMOUNT UP TO $50,000.00.
In George’s policies, the same comprehensive language insuring the operators of Morgan’s Oldsmobile insures George’s permissive use of a non-owned automobile and the same obscure language excludes household members from the liability coverage. Because the policies expressly provide that the definition of “insured” does not apply to the use of a non-owned automobile, it cannot be used to interpret the ambiguity. But as already said, the definition of “reside” refers to the household of the named insured, George’s household,5 so that under the terms of George’s policies, personal injury to Jeffrey George, the passenger/minor child of George, would be within the household exclusion.
Without expressing its legal rationale, today’s per curiam opinion holds that the household exclusion clause is contrary to §§ 7-600, et seq. of Title 47 and invalid as to the first $10,000.00 of liability coverage, the minimum coverage required by §§ 7-600, et seq. However, same as the endorsement attached to Morgan’s policy, State Farm’s endorsements attached to each of George’s policies expressly states that the liability coverage for which the premium has been paid is provided in accordance with OHahoma’s compulsory insurance law. That is, under the plain, ordinary and clear terms of the policies, State Farm agrees that Coverage A for which the premium has been paid for a $25,000.00 limit per person coverage in each of the two policies is governed by the compulsory insurance law.
Notwithstanding State Farm’s endorsement otherwise, the Court’s holding fictionalizes two liability policies for each of the policies involved, and every motor vehicle liability insurance ■ contract issued in Oklahoma in an amount of coverage greater than $10,000.00: 1) liability coverage for $10,-000.00, which is subject to the compulsory insurance law; and, 2) excess or additional liability coverage for any amount of the policy limits which exceed $10,000.00, which is not subject to the compulsory insurance law. This fiction is not supported by the compulsory insurance statutes.
Our compulsory insurance statutes were originally enacted in 1976.6 In 1982, § 7-600.1 was added to the compulsory insurance laws.7 It authorizes excess or additional liability coverage to be included in an insurance policy which provides compulsory insurance, as follows:
*897Section 2. Statement or endorsement to be included in policies — Excess or additional coverage — Binders.
A. The following statement or endorsement shall be included in owner’s policies and operator’s policies except certified policies issued pursuant to Section 7-324 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes: “Liability insurance is provided in this policy in accordance with coverage required by the Compulsory Insurance Law of Oklahoma.”
B. Excess or additional coverage. A policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess or in addition to the coverage specified for policies defined by Section 1 of this act [§ 7-600, Definitions] and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of the Compulsory Insurance Law.
C. Binders. Any binder issued pending the issuance of a policy shall be deemed to fulfill the requirements for such a policy.
Subsection B, without ambiguity, provides that an insured and insurer may agree to the inclusion of other liability coverage in the same contract that provides the compulsory liability insurance and that the other liability insurance will not be subject to compulsory insurance law. That is, excess or additional liability coverage, like medical payments and uninsured motorist coverage, may be included in an insurance policy providing compulsory insurance and the excess coverage will not be subject to the compulsory insurance statutes. Any other reading would render the phrase “may also grant” useless.8
The Court’s holding implicitly rewrites § 7-600.1 to say — A policy may provide coverage with limits in excess or in addition to the minimum coverage specified for policies defined by Section 1 of this act and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of the Compulsory Insurance Law. The Legislature could have provided that the compulsory insurance laws are not applicable to that part of the liability coverage which exceeds the minimum amount required. But it did not. The statute plainly says that excess or additional coverage may be granted which shall not be subject to the compulsory insurance law. Further, as to an owner’s policy and the liability coverage therein which follows the automobile, the Court’s holding confuses primary and excess liability coverage.9
As I read § 7-600.1, it would permit an insured to buy and an insurer to sell two separate liability coverages as perceived by the per curiam opinion, but that is not the agreement contained in the policies before the Court. As set out above, State Farm endorsed the liability coverages to be in accordance with the compulsory insurance law with the monetary limits for which the premiums were paid. Accordingly, I cannot join in today’s per curiam holding which invalidates the household exclusion clauses in the involved policies as to the minimum $10,-000.00 coverage mandated by our compulsory insurance law only.
III.
EXCLUSIONS FROM LIABILITY COVERAGE PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OKLAHOMA COMPULSORY INSURANCE LAW MUST BE EXECUTED BY THE INSURED AND THE INSURER IN A SEPARATE WRITTEN ENDORSEMENT.
The first impression issue presented herein is whether the household exclusion clause which the insurer inserted into the printed form of the insurance policy providing liability coverage is contrary to law and invalid. Without expressing its legal rationale, today’s per curiam opinion holds that the household exclusion clause is contrary to §§ 7-600, et seq. of Title 47. I agree with the Court’s conclusion, but I would also con-*898elude that the household exclusion clause is invalid as to the whole of the liability coverage.
At its inception, our financial responsibility law authorized a household exclusion from motor vehicle liability insurance.10 However some thirty years ago, the Legislature repealed the provisions allowing guest/passenger and household/family member exclusion from liability coverage required by the financial responsibility statutes.11 Research reveals no preserved legislative intent for the 1961 statutory changes other than the intent obvious from the face of the measure — to reject clauses in motor vehicle liability insurance policies which exclude guest/passengers and household family members of the named insured from coverage.12 The repealed household exclusion provision has not been reenacted. However, in 1980 the Legislature amended § 7-324 of the financial responsibility law,13 adding a provision that a liability insurance policy may exclude any person or persons designated by name from coverage. The 1980 amendment clearly requires that any exclusion of a person or persons must be agreed to by separate endorsement between any named insured and the insurer:
(b) Owner’s policy. Such owner’s policy of liability insurance: ...
(c) May by agreement in a separate written endorsement between any named insured and the insurer exclude as insured any person or persons designated by name from coverage under the policy....
In my view, for purposes of financial responsibility of motorists after the occurrence of an accident, the Legislature has expressed its intent that guest/passengers and household members may not be excluded from the liability coverage and that exclusions of a person or persons from liability coverage must be agreed to, in writing, by the insured and the insurer. In resolving the household exclusion clause issue herein, I would not ignore the public policy expressed by the Legislature in our financial responsibility statutes when it repealed the statutory household exclusion provisions and when it required a separate written endorsement to exclude a person or several persons from liability coverage.
Our compulsory automobile liability insurance law requires every owner of an automobile and every operator to maintain security, i.e. an insurance policy, as required by § 7-*899204 of Title 47.14 In 1982. the Legislature amended the compulsory insurance statutes,15 adding a definitions section. The definition of owner’s policy allows exclusions from coverage in accordance with existing law:16
As used in Article VI, Chapter 7 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes:
1. “Owner’s policy”. An owner’s policy of liability insurance: ...
c. may provide for exclusions from coverage in accordance with existing law, and....
The liability insurance required by our compulsory insurance law is a condition precedent to driving a motor vehicle upon the public streets, roads and highways, while the liability insurance required under the financial responsibility law is not triggered until the occurrence of an accident.17 These statutes have a common underlying public policy — financial protection for the public for damages wrongfully caused by motorists— and may be read with reference to each other.18 Only one conclusion favorable to State Farm can be reached herein if the 1980 amendment to § 7-324 which authorized exclusions of persons from coverage by separate endorsement and the 1982 enactment of § 7-600 which authorized exclusions from coverage in accordance with existing law are read in pari materia. That conclusion is that an enforceable household exclusion from liability coverage in an owner’s or operator’s motor vehicle liability policy must be agreed to by the insured and the insurer by separate written endorsement.19 Accordingly, I cannot join in today’s per curiam holding which enforces the household exclusion clauses unilaterally inserted into the involved printed policies by the insurer.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Resolution of the first impression issue herein — whether the injury to a passenger/ehild of a negligent driver may be excluded from coverage in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy by a household exclusion clause — will have widespread impact. The common law parent/child tort immunity has been abrogated.20 In Unah the parent/child *900tort immunity was abrogated to the full extent of the parent’s automobile liability insurance. Equity held that a geographical exclusion in a liability policy is invalid insofar as it limits the statutorily required minimum insurance, but the vehicles involved were a commercial tractor and trailer. The Equity limitation is contrary to our holding in Unah; it is contrary to State Farm’s endorsement of each of the policies herein; and, it was not urged in the trial court. I remain committed to the principles expressed in Unah — there is no parent/child immunity to the extent of the parent’s liability coverage. I would reverse the trial court’s summary judgment, finding and holding that the entire amount of the liability coverage in all three policies in the record on appeal has been endorsed as issued in accordance with the OHahoma compulsory insurance law; that the household exclusion clause in George’s policies is contrary to public policy expressed in our compulsory insurance statutes; and that Jeffrey George is not within the household exclusion in Morgan’s policy.

. Flitton v. Equity Fire and Casualty Co., 824 P.2d 1132 (Okla.1992).

. Words, phrases and clauses of an insurance policy should be read within the context of the whole policy, Dodson v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 812 P.2d 372 (Okla.1991), so that the plain, ordi*894nary, popular and generally accepted sense of the coverage is accomplished. Wiley v. Travelers Insurance Co., 534 P.2d 1293 (Okla.1974); Wilson v. Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co. of Oklahoma City, 159 Okla. 191, 14 P.2d 945, 84 A.L.R. 386 (1932).

. Since statehood, ambiguous provisions in insurance policies, like other adhesion contracts, have been construed strictly against the insurer. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132, 21 S.Ct. 326, 45 L.Ed. 460 (1901); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Hymes, 77 Okla. 20, 185 P. 1085, 8 A.L.R. 318 (1919); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beaty, 455 P.2d 684 (Okla.1969); Lusk v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 569 P.2d 985 (Okla.1977); Wilson v. Travelers Insurance Co, 605 P.2d 1327 (Okla.1980); Dodson v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 812 P.2d 372 (Okla.1991).

. The record reflects that Jeffrey George did not reside in the household with Francis Morgan and it does not reflect that Jeffrey George was related to Francis Morgan by affinity or consanguinity.

. The facts that Jeffrey George was related to J. Michael George and they resided in the same household are not disputed.

. 1976 Okla. Session Laws, ch. 176, codified at 47 O.S.Supp.1976, §§ 7-601, et seq.

. 1982 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 355, § 2, codified at 47 O.S.Supp.1982, § 7-600.1.

. It is presumed that every provision in a statute has a useful purpose. Hunt v. Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 381 P.2d 844 (Okla.1963).

. In Equity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, 747 P.2d 947, 954-955 (Okla.1987), we said: "Primary coverage is provided when, under the terms of the policy, the insurer is liable without regard to any other insurance coverage available. Excess coverage or secondary coverage is provided when, under the terms of the policy, the insurer is liable for a loss only after any primary coverage — other insurance — has been exhausted....”

. In 1949, the Legislature expressly provided that insurers may exclude bodily injury to or death of guest-passengers and family members of the household of the insured from the coverage afforded by a motor vehicle liability insurance policy. 1949 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 9b. Section 21 of ch. 9b, codified at 47 O.S.1951, § 521, the precursor to 47 O.S.1991, § 7-324, provided in part:
(e) Such motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability under any Workmen’s Compensation Law nor any liability on account of bodily injury to or death of a guest passenger or member of the family of the insured residing in the same household, other than domestic, of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, maintenance or repair of any such motor vehicle nor any liability for damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by the insured.
[Emphasis added.]

. 1961 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 10b, § 20-106. Authorization for the exclusions has not been reenacted by the Legislature. 47 O.S.1991, § 7-324.

. The intent of the 1961 repeal was considered in Hibdon v. Casualty Corporation of America, Inc., 504 P.2d 878 (Okla.App.1972), wherein the Court of Appeals concluded that a passenger exclusion clause is contrary to legislative intent. Hibdon was left standing in Looney v. Farmers Insurance Group, 616 P.2d 1138 (Okla.1980). Looney, distinguishing Hibdon on the facts, concluded that the appellant was more than a mere member of the family of the insured because her relationship with the defendant Looney (as his wife) surpassed mere household member status and placed her within the policy definition of named insured. In upholding the exclusion of Mrs. Looney as a named insured, the Looney opinion said § 7-324 is "the proper statute for determining exclusion validity.” Looney, 616 P.2d at 1141. This language was expressly disapproved in Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Okla.1987), but the remainder of Looney was left standing. Equity, 747 P.2d at 952-953 also left Hibdon standing, saying: "The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that a passenger exclusion in a liability policy issued in compliance with Articles II and III [Footnote omitted.] of the Financial Responsibility Act contravened the intent of the act and was therefore void.”

. 1980 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 235, § 5, adding a new subsection C. to § 7-324 of Title 47.

. Although the compulsory insurance law is separate from our financial responsibility law, it references § 7-204. Section 7-204 provides the minimum amount of liability insurance, exclusive of interest and costs, which an owner or operator must have had at the time of an accident to suspend the security requirements following the accident.

. 1982 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 355, § 1, codified at 47 O.S.Supp.1982, § 7-600.

. Existing law, 47 O.S.1981, § 7-324, required a separate written endorsement in order to exclude a person or persons from motor vehicle liability insurance coverage.

. Beavin v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 662 P.2d 299 (Okla.1983).

. Relevant provisions of statutes relating to the same subject matter should be considered together whenever possible to ascertain legislative intent. Haney v. State, 850 P.2d 1087 (Okla.1993); Naylor v. Petuskey, 834 P.2d 439 (Okla.1992).
In Equity Mutual Ins. Co., 747 P.2d at 952, we considered § 7-324, which requires liability coverage within the United States and Canada, in holding a 200-mile radius limitation clause contrary to legislative intent of § 7-600. Yet, in Beavin, 662 P.2d at 302, we refused to apply the exceptions to the suspension of drivers' license in § 7-203 as exceptions to the compulsory insurance law; and in Young, 743 P.2d at 1087, we refused to apply the provisions of § 7-324, permitting exclusions of persons from coverage by separate endorsement, to defeat the clear legislative intent of the compulsory insurance law that any vehicle operated on the highways of Oklahoma shall be secured against liability to innocent victims. But Beavin and Young refused to read the provisions in the financial responsibility statutes and the compulsory insurance law together because a conflict would have resulted, which is not the case here.

. Notwithstanding the freedom of contract principle, exclusions which render the vehicle uninsured, i.e., exclusion of drivers under the age of twenty-five years, are impermissible as violative of the intent of the compulsory insurance law because “the exclusionary clause in question has the effect of limiting the insurer's liability to an innocent victim who was not a party to the contract....” Young, 743 P.2d at 1088.

. Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla.1984). State Farm's arguments presented in the trial court to support the household exclusion clause which it inserted into its liability insurance policy form were rejected by this Court in Unah. When asked the reason for the household exclusion clause, the State Farm answered;
The household exclusion clause was inserted in State Farm’s policies as a result of a decision *900made by underwriting department. The most obvious reason for a household exclusion is to avoid fraudulent claims. The validity of the household exclusion has been recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the federal courts in Oklahoma. [Answer to INTERROGATORY NO. 23, R. at 48.]