Court Opinion

ID: 9715245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:58:32.077159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:32.884234
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STAMOS, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s denial of the petition in the case at bar. However, I find, in some respects, the majority fails to squarely face the issues presented in this case. I therefore write separately. Supreme Court Rule 708 provides that an applicant “who has availed himself of his full hearing rights before the Committee on Character and Fitness and who deems himself aggrieved by the determination of the committee may *** petition the Supreme Court for relief.” (107 Ill. 2d R. 708(d).) Generally, an exercise of discretion by the Committee on Character and Fitness (Committee) in its consideration of an applicant’s fitness for admission to the bar will not be reversed by this court unless certification has been arbitrarily refused. (In re Ascher (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 485, 498.) The Committee’s determinations are advisory only, and neither bind this court nor limit our authority to take action. In re Loss (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 186,192. The Committee’s report and the majority opinion focus almost exclusively on the incident of March 27, 1984. Because of the outrageous nature of this incident, the Committee was forced to focus most of its efforts on petitioner’s past in connection with both the particular incident in question and petitioner’s history of alcoholism. After examining the Committee’s report, I have determined that petitioner’s testimony before the Committee about this incident, in light of the events and results of his trial for the criminal acts he allegedly committed that evening, raises some questions regarding petitioner’s veracity. I will explain this later. However, even though I agree with the majority that the Committee reached its alleged “findings” regarding the expert testimony relating to alcohol-related blackouts without arbitrarily disregarding petitioner’s expert testimony, I believe the majority failed to recognize how unimportant this issue is in relation to the evidence of petitioner’s lack of moral character. There is nothing arbitrary about denying this petition. There is ample evidence in the Committee report, unconnected to the incident of March 27, 1984, or petitioner’s alcohol problems, which impugns petitioner’s veracity in such a way that I conclude he lacks the requisite moral character for bar admission. Petitioner falsified an application for employment by listing prior jobs he had in fact never occupied while omitting certain jobs and entirely omitting his arrest record. He admitted to the Committee that these falsifications were intentional, stating, “I didn’t think I would get the jobs if I had been accurate on the application.” Further, petitioner lied on his application to law school. He failed to list a previous job and listed one prior position which he had not occupied. Again, petitioner testified that he falsified this information in order to “be seen in a better light.” There is nothing in the record that shows petitioner’s deceitful nature has any connection to his alcoholism. Rather, the record, particularly petitioner’s own testimony, reveals a pattern of using fraud and deceit to further career objectives. The majority opinion fails to clearly articulate this point. Petitioner had argued that the Committee’s decision to deny certification was based solely on petitioner’s alcohol-inspired violent tendencies. However, the Committee report clearly shows that while much of the focus was on petitioner’s alcoholism and alcohol-induced violent behavior, it also considered petitioner’s general background and employment history, which revealed petitioner’s history of prevarication. Therefore, based solely on petitioner’s deceitful tendencies, I would deny certification. The majority correctly mentions petitioner’s rehabilitation from alcoholism. (139 Ill. 2d at 249.) Rehabilitation is indeed important. (Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 196.) Petitioner argues that his case is “markedly different” from the Loss case in that the petitioner in Loss had a more egregious criminal record and history of dishonesty. However, the same misgivings regarding the Loss petitioner are equally applicable to the petitioner in the case at bar. Should we “permit a person to perpetrate a fraud on a law school in order to be admitted, and then later, when applying for admission to the bar, to admit that he had been a liar and be forgiven. To me, being truthful in answering the [Committee] questionnaire is not a manifestation of the reform of a deceitful person.” (Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 214-15 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).) There is nothing in the evidence to show that the Committee found these specific incidents of petitioner’s deceitfulness to be connected with or influenced by his drinking. Even if we were to hypothesize that petitioner’s lying on the employment and law school applications were attempts at concealing conduct which alcoholism caused to transpire, there is nothing in the record to support this. Petitioner admitted the lies were to put himself in the best possible light. I am not concerned with petitioner’s past alcohol abuse, or the violent acts which ensued as a result. Petitioner has apparently overcome this problem; I commend him for his courage and tenacity. I am also not concerned with his criminal record. I am, however, concerned about his propensity for lying. (See Loss, 119 Ill. 2d at 213-14 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).) Therefore, even if the incident of March 27, 1984, had never occurred, the record supports denying this petition. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion regarding how the incident of March 27, 1984, and its legal resolution casts some doubt on petitioner’s veracity. Before I explain this, however, I must discuss the ambiguity caused by the majority’s failure to exactly define the terms “alcohol-related blackout” (see 139 Ill. 2d at 244) or “complete blackout” (see 139 Ill. 2d at 246). To a lay person, a “blackout” could mean a temporary memory loss or a loss of consciousness. (American Heritage Dictionary 185 (2d College ed. 1985).) The majority never explains this. The Committee report contains summaries of the expert witnesses’ testimony, but is also unclear as to what a person experiences when he or she is “blacked out” due to alcohol consumption. Is it that a “blackout” victim possesses the ability to reason and make willful decisions, and simply cannot remember what he has done? Or does “blackout” mean a complete loss of control, where the ability to reason, make rational or volitional decisions, and remember are all suspended? This lack of clarity could explain why some members of the hearing panel expressed misgivings about the expert testimony. Indeed, in his arguments before the court, petitioner made much of the hearing panel’s “finding” that alcohol-related blackouts cannot occur. While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to show that the panel arbitrarily rejected petitioner’s expert testimony, to go no further leaves several questions unanswered. First, petitioner argues the hearing panel concluded that no blackout had occurred. The majority opinion fails to address this argument. I find that the panel made no such “finding” of fact. The Committee report merely stated that “[c]ertain members of the hearing panel experienced doubts” regarding the factual existence of “blackouts” stemming from the overconsumption of alcohol. The report contains no evidence to connect this statement to the vote taken by the hearing panel. In fact, the Committee report noted that the hearing panel had reviewed all the evidence, including petitioner’s police record, transcripts of his hearings before the police board and the trial court, and his general background. The majority opinion merely states that some of the Committee members “expressed interest” in the blackout theory. (139 Ill. 2d at 251.) This begs the question. The majority should have focused on the totality of the hearing panel’s investigation and given more emphasis to the critical issue in this cause — petitioner’s credibility. I also find that the majority’s discussion of the March 27, 1984, incident and petitioner’s conviction following that event does not clearly explain why these circumstances reflect poorly on petitioner’s moral character. “An opinion of an expert is to be accorded such weight [as], in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, reasonably attaches to it.” (Emphasis added.) (People v. Harvey (1919), 286 Ill. 593, 604.) While all the testimony regarding the possibility of alcohol-related blackouts went uncontradicted, the other facts and circumstances relating to petitioner’s alleged blackout on March 27, 1984, leads me to conclude that the majority’s conclusion that these events cast a pall on petitioner’s veracity needs bolstering. While not conclusive in and of themselves, there are several reasons why petitioner’s credibility in connection with his testimony regarding the March 27, 1984, incident is at least somewhat doubtful; the majority touched on most of these. First, petitioner, while testifying before the hearing panel, stated he did not take drugs on the night of March 27; he stated that his blackout was solely alcohol induced. Yet, petitioner’s defense at trial was predicated on “drug intoxication,” and one of petitioner’s witnesses testified that petitioner was under the influence of drugs when the witness saw petitioner the morning of March 28. The record is unclear as to what petitioner’s attorney meant by pleading “drug intoxication,” and we cannot determine the credibility of the witness’ testimony. While certainly not conclusive, this evidence adds to my impression that petitioner has habitually relied on falsehood to avoid the consequences of his past behavior. The next two reasons relate to assessing whether petitioner’s testimony regarding his suffering the blackout is actually an issue on which our determination of petitioner’s character and fitness should rest. When the trial judge acquitted petitioner of most of the charges related to the March 27 incident, the judge stated that petitioner had been acting under the impression that he was performing his police duties. The record is unclear as to whether this holding was based on petitioner’s testimony, or simply upon the trial judge’s observation or the testimony of others. Also, the trial judge did convict petitioner of misdemeanor theft. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(b)(1).) Through all this, petitioner maintains he has no memory of the events of the evening of March 27, 1984. These two determinations of the trial court could be seen as being at odds with what petitioner characterizes as a “complete blackout.” Theft was, at common law, a specific-intent crime. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 16, Committee Comments, at 18 (Smith-Hurd 1977).) Under the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code), a theft must be committed “knowingly.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(a).) The Code states that persons act knowingly when they are consciously aware that their conduct or the attendant circumstances of their conduct will lead to one of the Code’s defined crimes, or when they are practically certain such a result will occur. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 4 — 5.) For petitioner’s intoxication to have negated his criminal responsibility on March 27, 1984, it must have been so extreme as to nullify the existence of a mental state which is an element of the crime. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 6 — 3(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 6 — 3(a) (1988 amendment states that criminal responsibility is negated if intoxication “[i]s so extreme as to suspend the power of reason and render him incapable of forming a specific intent which is an element of the offense”).) Thus, petitioner’s intoxication defense could only have been effective if the prosecution was unable to prove that petitioner possessed the mental state required for several of the offenses he had been charged with. See O’Neill, Illinois’ Latest Version of the Defense of Voluntary Intoxication: Is it Wise? Is it Constitutional?, 39 De Paul L. Rev. 15,19 (1989). Petitioner was convicted of a crime which requires “conscious awareness” of his behavior, or at least “practical certainty” that his behavior will achieve a particular result. I find this logically inconsistent with the concept of a “complete blackout.” How could petitioner be “consciously aware” of his behavior on March 27, 1984, and perform the acts which consisted of the other elements of the crime of which he was eventually convicted, without being “consciously aware” of his behavior, as Dr. Ar-bit, one of petitioner’s expert witnesses, testified before the hearing panel? Of course, as a court of review, we cannot determine whether this inconsistency is the product of petitioner’s dishonesty or was caused by a strategy which petitioner’s attorney used at trial. Thus, this problem, on its own, could not be a determining factor in our review of petitioner’s character. However, I believe this inconsistency can only weigh against petitioner, in light of the other more obvious examples of petitioner’s untruthfulness. I find that the trial court’s determination that petitioner thought he was acting in the line of duty is similarly inconsistent with the “blackout” testimony before the hearing panel. (See 139 Ill. 2d at 245-46.) A person who has a sincere belief — even if totally fanciful — and who acts intentionally under that belief cannot be said to be' without conscious awareness of his actions. Yet, Dr. Arbit testified that petitioner was not consciously aware of what he was doing. Again, this logical inconsistency alone would not lead me to conclude that petitioner lacks the character required for bar admission, because we have no way of determining whether the trial judge’s conclusion was based directly on petitioner’s view of the events in question. However, in my estimation this evidence, if it can be construed as significant at all, merely adds to the more egregious evidence of petitioner’s lack of veracity.