Court Opinion

ID: 9862028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:58:19.186316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:56.551648
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully specially concur in part and dissent in part. I would affirm the trial court in full. I note initially that the majority states, “[ejmployer agrees with the circuit court’s calculations and submits section 19(n) interest was properly awarded on the main award and section 2 — 1303 interest was properly awarded on the weekly PTD award and the remaining monthly amounts.” 367 Ill. App. 3d at 777. However, employer’s brief is confusing. Employer appears to argue section 19(n) interest applies to the main award of TTD, PTD, and caregiver’s expenses from the date of the award, September 17, 2002, through the date of payment, January 3, 2003, and section 19(g) 9% interest also accrues on the weekly PTD for that time period as well as on the caregiver’s expenses through payment in May 2003. However, at one point in the brief, employer argues somewhat contradictorily that section 19(g) interest cannot accrue on PTD payments because there never was a late payment, which I agree with. Employer also points out, yet apparently concedes this issue, that the method of calculating interest on the total amount owed is incorrect. Interest should be calculated on each individual payment as it becomes due and owing, not on the total amount owed. I do agree with the majority that, here, no appeal was taken, so the statutory compensation rate applies pursuant to section 19(n) from the date of the award. I, however, disagree with the majority that section 2 — 1303 interest accrues in a workers’ compensation case after a judgment has been entered in circuit court pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act for the time period from the date of entry of judgment back to the date of the arbitrator’s award. Instead, section 19(n) interest should accrue prior to entry of judgment in the circuit court because no judgment has been entered until the circuit court enters it. “Faced with an employer’s failure or refusal to pay a final award from which no further appeal is taken, section 19(g) of the Act provides a statutory remedy for a claimant to reduce the award to an enforceable judgment in the circuit court. Blacke v. Industrial Comm’n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26, 28, [644 N.E.2d 23, 24] (1994). The award itself is not a judgment. Blacke, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 28, [644 N.E.2d at 24 (opinion of McCullough, J., joined by Rakowski and Slater, JJ.; Rarick, J., dissenting, joined by Woodward, J.)].” (Emphasis added.) Aurora East School District v. Dover, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054-55, 846 N.E.2d 623, 629 (2006). Therefore, because a workers’ compensation award is not a judgment, only after the workers’ compensation judgment has been entered of record in the circuit court does section 2 — 1303 interest apply. Workers’ compensation is a purely statutory remedy governed by its own legislative rules, the Act. Further, “[p]ost[ judgment interest did not exist at common law and is solely a matter of legislative grace.” B. Miller, Statutory Post-Judgment Interest: The Effect of Legislative Changes After Judgment & Suggestions for Construction, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 601, 601. Moreover, the majority’s author has repeatedly and recently again acknowledged the general inapplicability of the Code and supreme court rules to the purely statutory workers’ compensation arena, recognizing the Code and supreme court rules do not apply where the Act regulates the area or topic. Clearly, here, the Act sets forth the rate of interest to be applied to awards, not the rate set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure. “The Act is a purely statutory remedy. See Elles v. Industrial Comm’n, 375 Ill. 107, 113, 30 N.E.2d 615, 618 (1940). The Code and supreme court rules do not apply to workers’ compensation proceedings where the Act or the Commission’s rules regulate the area or topic. Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute v. Industrial Comm’n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 149, 154, 731 N.E.2d 795, 800 (2000). However, they may be relied on for guidance without finding that they are applicable to workers’ compensation proceedings. Mora v. Industrial Comm’n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 266, 274, 726 N.E.2d 650, 656 (2000) (discussing amendment of an application for adjustment of claim).” Preston v. Industrial Comm’n, 332 Ill. App. 3d 708, 712, 773 N.E.2d 1183, 1188 (2002). The majority’s author has further recognized that a workers’ compensation award is not a judgment. “Faced with an employer’s failure or refusal to pay a final award determined by an arbitrator or affirmed by a decision of the Commission from which no further appeal is taken, section 19(g) of the Act provides a statutory remedy for a claimant to reduce the award to an enforceable judgment in the circuit court. The award itself is not a judgment. A judgment is ‘the final consideration and determination of a court upon matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding *** [and] is the judicial act of the court.’ (Blakeslee’s Storage Warehouses, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1938), 369 Ill. 480, 482-83, 17 N.E.2d 1, 3.)” (Emphasis added.) Blacke v. Industrial Comm’n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26, 28, 644 N.E.2d 23, 24 (1994). Since the award is not a judgment until recognized in the circuit court, section 19(n) interest should apply until the date of entry of judgment in circuit court and only then does section 2 — 1303 interest begin to accrue. The majority author may have recognized the error in applying section 2 — 1303 interest where the Act provides for section 19(n) interest. “Other cases have adopted sections of the Code deemed pertinent in areas where the Act has been silent. Courts have allowed the statutory interest provided for under section 2 — 1303 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1303 (West 1992)) to be imposed against judgments for unpaid compensation awards where the Act omitted reference to the accrual of interest on an unpaid arbitrator’s award. See Proctor Community Hospital v. Industrial Comm’n (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 7, 9, 276 N.E.2d 342, 343; Bray v. Industrial Comm’n (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 87, 93, 513 N.E.2d 1045, 1049; Ballard v. Industrial Comm’n (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 41, 45, 526 N.E.2d 675, 678.” Blacks, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 28-29, 644 N.E.2d at 24-25. So apparently prior to 1975 and passage of the section 19(n) interest provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, section 2 — 1303 interest was applied to a workers’ compensation award from the date of the entry of judgment back to the date of the arbitrator’s award. However, the Act was clearly amended to provide for section 19(n) interest in 1975 to set forth a specific judgment rate of 6% from the date of arbitration on Industrial Commission awards confirming or increasing an award. “(n) All decisions of the Industrial Commission confirming or increasing an award entered by an arbitrator of the Commission shall bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the arbitrator’s award on all compensation accrued. However, the employer or his insurance carrier may tender the payments due under the award to stop the further accrual of interest on such award notwithstanding the prosecution by either party of review, certiorari, appeal to the [s]upreme [c]ourt or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the award.” Pub. Act 79 — 79, §1, eff. July 1, 1975 (1975 Ill. Laws 224, 273) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19). This section was later amended in 1983, effective 1984, to set a floating rate of interest, clarifying interest does not accrue on awards where the claimant appeals and does not succeed (no change in award or decrease) but permitting interest from the date of arbitration on all payments accrued prior to payment. “(n) After June 30, 1984, decisions of the Industrial Commission reviewing an award of an arbitrator of the Commission shall draw interest at a rate equal to the yield on indebtedness issued by the United States Government with a 26-week maturity next previously auctioned on the day on which the decision is filed. Said rate of interest shall be set forth in the [a]rbitrator’s [d]ecision. Interest shall be drawn from the date of the arbitrator’s award on all accrued compensation due the employee through the day prior to the date of payments. However, when an employee appeals an award of an [arbitrator or the Commission, and the appeal results in no change or a decrease in the award, interest shall not further accrue from the date of such appeal.” Pub. Act 83 — 1125, §1, eff. June 30, 1984 (1984 Ill. Laws 212, 256) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.19 (formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19)). The majority and I agree the plain language “[ijnterest shall be drawn from the date of the arbitrator’s award on all accrued compensation due the employee through the day prior to the date of payments” (Pub. Act 83 — 1125, §1, eff. June 30, 1984 (1984 Ill. Laws 212, 250)) indicates that the floating interest rate shall be applied to “all accrued compensation due the employee through the day prior to the date of payment” (Pub. Act 83 — 1125, §1, eff. June 30, 1984 (1984 Ill. Laws 212, 250)). However, the majority would apply section 2 — 1303 interest retroactive to the date of the workers’ compensation award from the date the circuit court enters judgment. I believe the legislative history supports the statutory priority of section 19(n) interest to an award prior to entry in the circuit court. While, certainly, the Act recognizes in section 19(g) the applicability of section 2 — 1303 interest. Unfortunately, no legislative history exists for the statutory amendment setting the 6% interest rate. However, the legislative history available on the floating-interest-rate provision indicates the legislature’s intent to secure the current floating interest rate on awards to discourage frivolous appeals. “What the [ajmendment does is provide for expedited hearing and the one percent above prime rate involved in workers’ *** compensation claims. *** The second thing that it does is that it allows the interest rates to float. The insurance companies now for the last three years have had it very good. They know that they are going to lose a case, they can simply appeal the decision and invest the money at anywhere from twelve to eighteen percent interest over the last three years. It’s a lot more profitable for them to invest the money at fifteen percent or at twelve percent or, today, at nine percent than it is to pay the penalty under current law, which is six percent.” 83rd Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 16, 1983, at 27-29 (statements of Representative Tuerk and Representative McPike, respectively). “Senate Bill 1070 would also increase the interest rate on workers’ compensation awards from the current six[-]percent rate to a rate one percent above the prime rate. The low six[-]percent rate is an incentive for insurance companies to appeal the arbitrator’s awards. And when the Commission then orders payments, as I said many times a year or so later, the insurance company has made substantially more than the six percent on the money reserved for the award and profits from the difference. The interest rate provided in Senate Bill 1070 will instead provide an incentive to pay awards promptly rather than file frivolous appeals.” 83rd Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 27, 1983, at 179-80 (statement of Representative Matijevich). While this floating rate was passed in the shadows of 20-plus % interest rates versus the Act’s prior 6% rate, the legislative debates nonetheless recognize the fact that the floating rate may actually result in lower interest rates than the earlier 6%: “you may actually be lowering the interest rate on Industrial Commission awards.” 83rd Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 27, 1983, at 183 (statement of Representative Vinson). The legislature wanted to fairly compensate the claimant for his losses and discourage frivolous appeals but not grossly penalize the employer. That is what subsections (k), (1), and (m) provide penalties for: unreasonable or vexatious delays resulting in additional compensation of 50%, failure to pay without good and just cause resulting in $10-per-day fines up to $2,500, and wilful violation of the Health and Safety Act (820 ILCS 225/.01 through 23 (West 2002)) resulting in an additional compensation of 25%. 820 ILCS 305/19(k), (1), (m) (West 2002). The majority cites only section 2 — 1303 as authority for its proposition that section 2 — 1303 interest applies from the date of the arbitrator’s award to the date of judgment. However, as the employer recognizes here, the cases construing interest in this area are confusing. I agree with the majority that Ponthieux, Ballard, and Folks and their progeny are wrongly decided, yet they are the original authority for awarding section 2 — 1303 interest on amounts accruing from the date of the arbitrator’s decision; moreover, these cases are distinguishable. Edward Electric Co. v. Automation, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 89, 593 N.E.2d 833 (1992), has been cited for the proposition that section 2 — 1303 interest is properly allowed on arbitration awards. However, Edwards is governed by the Uniform Arbitration Act, which does not have the specific statutory scheme as the Workers’ Compensation Act, as previously set forth and which preempts section 2 — 1303 of the Code. Ballard is cited for the proposition that claimant is not entitled to section 19(n) interest on any benefits that accrue after the date of the arbitrator’s award, perpetuating the misinterpretation of the language of the Act from Folks, 93 Ill. App. 3d 19, 416 N.E.2d 745. “[C]laimant is not entitled to interest under section 19(n) on any benefits which accrue after the date of the arbitrator’s award. Necessarily, weekly total permanent disability benefits which come due after November 21, 1981, cannot have accrued prior to that date. Therefore, section 19(n) does not apply.” Ballard, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 44-45, 526 N.E.2d at 678. As previously noted, the plain language of the Act and the legislative history indicate the legislature clearly intended interest accrue from the date of the arbitrator’s award on all accrued compensation due the claimant through the day prior to the day of payments — so long as there is no losing appeal by claimant as here. Claimant also erroneously relies on Ponthieux in arguing for awarding interest under section 2 — 1303 of the Code. However, in that case, the defendant did not dispute that section 19(n) interest was not payable because the plaintiffs award was a wage-loss differential and there was a prearbitration credit, e.g., section 19(n) did not apply because there was no amount of the arbitrator’s award remaining unpaid as of the date of the award to which interest could apply (Ponthieux, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 112, 662 N.E.2d at 174), and that cause of action had clearly been filed under section 19(g) and the claimant had obtained the judgment in circuit court to obtain section 2 — 1303 interest. In sum, for these reasons, the floating interest rate should be applied through the date of payment unless claimant appeals and loses, which is not the case here since claimant filed no appeal of the underlying decision, or to the date judgment is entered in the circuit court, as here. Section 2 — 1303 interest should apply only from the date the judgment was entered in the circuit court, April 30, 2003. A workers’ compensation award, as previously stated, is not a “judgment recovered in any court” but is an award subject to section 19(n) interest until judgment is entered in circuit court. Even the majority recognizes “a claimant may file a petition pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act to reduce the award to an enforceable judgment in the circuit court” (367 Ill. App. 3d at 778, citing 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2004)). The award is not a judgment until the trial court renders it such. None of the cases, nor the majority, addresses how the section 2 — 1303 interest provision, which applies to a final judgment, can be used to calculate interest on an award before it is given judgment status. Moreover, contrary to the majority’s holding, the section 2 — 1303 rate continues to apply until paid, not just from entry of the award to entry of judgment in circuit court, but from entry of judgment in circuit court until paid. “Interest shall be computed and charged only on the unsatisfied portion of the judgment as it exists from time to time.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1303 (West 2002). I also disagree that section 2 — 1303 interest should accrue on prospective payments. A section 19(g) judgment can only be rendered on amounts due and owing — not future payments. The only exception to this rule deals with periodic payments on past-due child support. In re Marriage of Thompson, 357 Ill. App. 3d 854, 829 N.E.2d 419 (2005) (Second District) (judgment entered for $36,940.20 arrearage with monthly installments ordered of $170). Thompson also sets forth the unique status of child-support arrearages created by legislative actions, amendment of the Code, and the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 through 802 (West 2002)). “When construing a statute, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. [Citation.) The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute. [Citation.] The history of section 12 — 109 of the Code and section 505(d) of the Dissolution Act demonstrates their applicability to current child[-]support obligations only, and not to payments on an arrearage as in the present case. As discussed above, sections 12 — 109 of the Code and 505 of the Dissolution Act were amended by Public Act 85 — 2. The 1987 amendment to section 12 — 109 provided that if a judgment arises by operation of law from a child[-]support order, interest will be assessed as provided in section 2 — 1303 of the Code, commencing 30 days from the effective date of each such judgment. [Citation.] The simultaneous amendment to section 505 of the Dissolution Act provided that any new or existing support order shall be deemed to be a series of judgments against the person obligated to pay support thereunder, each such judgment to be in the amount of each payment or installment of support. [Citation.] These amendments indicate that the legislature intended that a past-due child[-]support payment does not have to be reduced to a court-ordered money judgment in order to accrue interest under section 2 — 1303 of the Code. The 1987 amendment to section 505 indicates that each payment or installment of support is to be considered a series of judgments, arising by operation of law, against the obligor. The amended section 12 — 109 then indicates that interest automatically accrues on each payment or installment after 30 days from the date the support payment was owed. As such, under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutes at issue, the legislature clearly intended that any interest to be awarded on missed support payments should accrue 30 days after the missed payment’s original due date. It does not matter if the support obligation is later set forth in a different form through an arrearage judgment.” Thompson, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 860-61, 829 N.E.2d at 424-25. No such legislative intent exists to permit this court to treat prospective workers’ compensation payments as child-support payments are treated — as a judgment. In fact, the legislative intent evident in section 19(n) indicates section 19(n) interest, not section 2 — 1303 interest, applies to prospective payments. “Interest shall be drawn from the date of the arbitrator’s award on all accrued compensation due the employee through the day prior to the date of payments.” 820 ILCS 305/19(n) (West 2002). Finally, I also believe it is important to note section 19(n) interest and section 2 — 1303 interest do in fact affect an employer who has raised a good-faith dispute as to amounts owed, not just employers who wilfully refuse to pay. I also believe claimant has raised a good-faith dispute as to the interest, fees, and cost amounts owed. However, I do incidentally concur with the majority that the trial court is not mandated to award 20% fees but has discretion to award reasonable costs and fees and those may be awarded for the refusal to pay home health care and continue until May 28, 2003. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court in full.