Court Opinion

ID: 9419128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:46:26.762767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:52.296666
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
concurring:
Mr. Justice Douglas and I concur in the judgment of affirmance but on the ground that the petitioners set up no justiciable controversy which the court had power to determine. The questions raised by the petitions involve relations between the United States and Germany, which we believe are constitutionally committed exclusively to the legislative and executive departments.
The sole ground upon which petitioners prayed relief in the District Court was that awards made by the Mixed Claims Commission Were “wholly null and void and without jurisdiction on the part of the alleged Commission.” A declaratory judgment was sought to have the awards declared null and void, and to enjoin the Secretary of State from certifying and the Secretary of the Treasury from paying such awards made by the Commission. ■ In addition petitioners asked a mandatory injunction to require the Secretary of the Treasury to pay petitioners without regard to other awards of the Commission certified by the Secretary of Sta,te.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury moved to dismiss on the grounds,' among others, that the complaint stated no cause of action; the court had no jurisdiction, to review the action of the Mixed Claims Commission; the court was without power,to pass-upon the jurisdiction of the Mixed Claims Commission; and the court had no jurisdiction to restrain the Secretary of State from certifying awards of the Commission or to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from paying the claims so certified. The District Court dismissed and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the actions of théQdixed Claims Commission .in making awards and the Secretary of State in certifying *491them were committed for determination to the political department of government and therefore the courts were without power to review their determination. We agree with their conclusion. And in this vie# we believe the certifications of the Secretary of State must be deemed final and conclusive in the courts, not because the con-' duct of the Secretary and the Commission preceding certification meets approval of the. courts, but because power to make final determination rests with the political departments of government alone. ■
The fundamental questions raised by the petitions as . presented to the District Court, were: Who can challenge the propriety of the Commission’s awards? Does the judicial branch of government, rather than the political,-possess the power finally to determine the propriety of the awards? And the fact that petitioners sought to challenge the Commission’s power by proceedings against the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, and not by direct suit against the Commission, is immaterial. If petitioners cannot directly attack the Commission in„ the courts, neither can they, in the absence of Congressional consent, assail the propriety of its awards through the expedient of suits against others charged with responsibility for executing the final determination of the Commission.
The Mixed Claims Commission was set up pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Germany. The agreement gave the Commission full power to hold hearings to determine “the amount to be paid by Germany in satisfaction of Germany’s financial obligations” under two treaties previously made between the two countries. The agreement further, provided that “the decisions of the Commission, and those of the Umpire (in case there may be any) shall be accepted as final and binding upon the two governments.” The Commission was set up with an Umpiré and all of the awards *492were reported to the Secretary of State by the Commission.
While petitioners contend that they have the right to challenge the certification of the Secretary of State, it is to >be remembered that their petitions ultimately rest solely upon the premise that it is his duty to refuse to carry out the Commission’s awards because of alleged impropriety of the proceedings of the Commission. They say that the Commission was without jurisdiction and power to make awards to certain claimants other than themselves; payment of these awards out of a fund that is limited in amount will result in diminishingj paypiepts>, to them below the full amount of their award with interest; since the Commission was without power— as tfhey charge — to make these other awards, the Secretly of State should not have certified them for payment; and for the samé reason the Treasury should not pay them. They assert a right through court procedure to challenge piayment to the other claimants by reason of an Act of Congress of 1928?
. But the 1928 Act provides that the Secretary shall from time to .time certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the awards of the Mixed Claims Commission of the United States,,, and that the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized anjd directed to pay “the principal of each award so certified, plus the interest thereon, in accordance with the'award, . . .” Nowhere in the Act is there any language which either expressly or by fair implication indicates! a purpose of Congress to permit some claimants to resort to the courts — as petitioners here have done — to determine the propriety of awards by the Mixed Claims <3ommission to other claimants.
The exact .challenge made by petitioners against the awards of the ¡Commission is the subject of a diplomatic *493controversy between the United States and Germany. Germany’s contention is the same as petitioners’. And the Secretary of State, in charge of our foreign affairs, has declined to accede to Germany’s contention that the particular awards here in controversy were improper and should not be certified or paid. The immediate subject matter of petitioners’ complaint, upon which rests the power of the Court to act, if it has any power, has therefore been repudiated by the political branch of our government. A contrary conclusion by the courts would bring about a square clash between the executive and judicial branches of government. And far more than this. Whoever is entrusted finally to determine what government must or must not do in. a dispute between nations is the ultimate .arbiter of momentous questions of public policies affecting this nation’s relations with the other countries of the world.
The controversy here bears all the' earmarks of that type of controversies which our Constitution has confided exclusively to the executive or political departihents of government, and concerning which this Court has many times repeated “that the action of the political branches of the government in a matter that belongs to them, is conclusive.” 2 Since this clearly appeared from the face of the pleadings at the very outset, the District Court properly stayed its hands and renounced power to proceed.

 Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420; United States ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U. S. 306, 320, 321, 322-6; Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U. S. 63. No good purpose would be served by setting out the numerous decisions of this Court to the same effect. For a collection of such cases see Digest of the U. S. Supreme Court Reports, vol. 4, Courts, §§ 49^63.