Court Opinion

ID: 9686344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:43:11.061659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:18.065624
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 34.] I respectfully dissent. In doing so, I take at face value the description in Dean’s own brief of his occupational endeavors from 1982 to 1987:
In 1982, Dean and Joanita M. Kant Fisher decided to move to Watertown, South Dakota. Dean sold his machinery and cattle and rented the real estate that is the subject of the Contract for Deed and Supplemental Agreement concerning Contract for Deed. The tillable land was rented to Dalton Docter and the pastureland was rented to Hubert Dinger for approximately six years, during 1982 through 1987.
Thereafter, as the majority opinion acknowledges, Donald hired Peter Bremmon to farm the Joanita Quarter in 1999 and 2000 and the Landreths apparently controlled the balance of the land that Brem-mon also custom farmed. Thus, a history is clearly established as to Dean’s lack of direct contact with the farm after 1982.
[¶ 35.] In 1974, two years prior to the signing of the contract for deed, the Legislature enacted a statutory definition of “farming.” See 1974 SD Sess.L. ch. 294, § 3(4). Although the provision deals with corporate farming, it establishes a clear legislative determination that farming and ownership of farmland are not synonymous. SDCL 47-9A-2(4) defines “farming” in relevant part to be: “the cultivation of land for the production of agricultural crops; livestock or livestock products; poultry or poultry products; milk or dairy products; or fruit or other horticultural products.” See also SDCL 47-9A-3 (distinguishing between farming and the ownership of farmland).
[¶ 36.] This statutory definition is in line with prior case law that defines farm*850ing as the tillage of soil or the cultivation of land. Sohner v. Mason, 136 Cal.App.2d 449, 288 P.2d 616, 617 (1955). “[T]he dominant and distinguishing characteristic of [farming] in both the popular and the legal sense of the term, is the cultivation of the soil for the production of crops therefrom.” Chudnov v. Bd. of Appeals of Town of Bloomfield, 113 Conn. 49, 154 A. 161, 162 (1931).
[¶ 37.] The overly expansive definition of farming from Black’s Law Dictionary, relied upon by the majority, is at odds with the above authority. Under that definition, anyone other than Dean who owned the property from 1982 to 1987 and rented it out to the same tenants would have been classified as a “farmer.” This Black’s definition converting landowners into farmers has been specifically rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See In re Easton, 883 F.2d 630, 634 (8thCir.l989) (stating “we reject the proposition ... that the renting out of land simpliciter constitutes ‘farming[.]’ ”).
[¶ 38.] Definitions aside, the language of the contract for deed itself provides ample support for the view that, to fulfill its terms, Dean was required to personally farm the property. “In determining the proper interpretation of a contract, a court is to seek to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties.” Kimball Inv. Land, Ltd. v. Chmela, 2000 SD 6, ¶ 14, 604 N.W.2d 289, 293. In that endeavor, a court, “ ‘must consider the entire contract.’” Hayes v. N. Hills Gen. Hosp., 1999 SD 28, ¶ 62, 590 N.W.2d 243, 254 (quoting S & S Trucking v. Whitewood Motors, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 297, 299 (S.D. 1984)). “A contract is to be examined and read in its entirety with all provisions being read together to construe its meaning.” Friesz ex rel Friesz v. Farm & City Ins., 2000 SD 152, ¶ 10, 619 N.W.2d 677, 680. Here, in the very same sentence, of the contract stating its purpose was for Dean to farm the property, was a clause providing that if he became incapacitated to a degree “he” (i.e., Dean) could not farm the land, then Donald would have the first chance to buy it. The obvious intention of these two clauses when read together was that Dean would personally farm the property. Were the intention that Dean could fulfill the contract by renting or leasing the property, there would be no need for a clause addressing his incapacity, because an incapacitated person can rent or lease property just as easily as a healthy person. Clearly the provision 'was not intended to deal with Dean’s mental incapacity, as there is a separate clause addressing that eventuality.
[¶ 39.] In conclusion, I would hold that Dean quit farming in 1982. There is no provision in the contract that permitted Dean to “unring the bell” and cut off Donald’s rights by restarting farming thereafter. The intention of the contract was to keep the farm in the family as a family farm, not as an investment for an absentee landlord in Watertown. There is no basis in the contract from which we can conclude that Donald’s rights should indefinitely be put on hold as long as Dean retains ownership of the land and mulls over his future options, which may or may not ever include personally farming the land.
[¶ 40.] I respectfully dissent and further join the dissent of Justice SABERS.