Court Opinion

ID: 9965467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 16:00:58.90123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:06.871916
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 23-2364
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                                 Hugo Escudero

                                   Defendant - Appellant
                                 ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                         for the District of Minnesota
                                ____________

                          Submitted: February 16, 2024
                              Filed: May 2, 2024
                                ____________

Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

       A jury convicted Hugo Escudero of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. He raises a number of challenges, including the legitimacy of a GPS-
tracking warrant, the admission of a message he sent a government witness, and the
sufficiency of evidence for his guilty verdict. We affirm the district court. 1

      1
        The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.
                                  I. Background

      In 2021, law enforcement officers investigated Escudero as a suspected
wholesale cocaine dealer. The investigation started in July 2021, when a confidential
informant told officers that Escudero and his brother, Joaquin Escudero, were selling
large amounts of cocaine. The informant provided details about Escudero and
Joaquin, including descriptions of their vehicles and residences. The informant said
Escudero lived close to the campus of University of Minnesota–St. Paul and kept a
“stash house” nearby. Escudero and Joaquin allegedly worked with a “runner,”
M.G., who delivered cocaine on their behalf.

      Detective Antonio Patsy was one of the officers who investigated Escudero.
To corroborate the informant’s statements, Det. Patsy found Escudero’s address in
the Vehicle Services database and ran surveillance outside Escudero’s residence
multiple times a week. He then obtained a tracking warrant for Escudero’s vehicle.
Based on the tracking data, he obtained additional search warrants for Escudero’s
apartment and music studio (which was the alleged “stash house”). 2

       In September 2021, officers used the informant to ask M.G. about buying a
kilogram of cocaine. When Escudero and M.G. arrived with a kilogram of cocaine,
officers arrested them. M.G. began cooperating with the government on the day of
his arrest.

       After Escudero was indicted, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the tracking and search warrants, each authorized by a Minnesota state
court judge. A federal magistrate judge held a motions hearing and recommended

      2
       The officers waited until after a controlled buy occurred before executing the
search warrants on Escudero’s apartment and music studio.

                                         -2-
denying Escudero’s motions to suppress.           The district court adopted this
recommendation.3

        Escudero’s trial began in December 2022. M.G., as a government witness,
testified how he and Escudero met more than a decade ago and how he eventually
agreed to sell cocaine for Escudero. M.G. also described the events leading up to
their arrests. After M.G. testified, Escudero posted a message on M.G.’s Facebook
page in Spanish. 4 It translated to English as, “nice to see you fool !!! greetings to
the family brother [sending you] a hug!!’ �”.

        The next morning, the government informed the district court of the Facebook
message. The district court then granted three of the government’s motions. First,
it admitted the Facebook message into evidence because it was “probative of the
consciousness of guilt” and not unfairly prejudicial. Second, it admitted Escudero’s
prior statements about obtaining the witness list to send to Mexico because “the
combination of [Escudero’s] statement pertaining to witness lists and [the] Facebook
message create the strong implication of witness intimidation.” Third, the district
court revoked Escudero’s pretrial release. When trial resumed, U.S. Marshals were
in the courtroom. M.G. testified that Escudero’s Facebook message made him feel
unsafe, and he took his family to a hotel the previous night due to the perceived
threat.

      3
       Escudero contested five tracking and search warrants: a tracking warrant for
Escudero’s car; a search warrant authorizing an examination of the seams of the door
and exterior doorknob of Escudero’s apartment for evidence of drug activity; a
search warrant for Escudero’s apartment for evidence of controlled substances; a
search warrant authorizing an examination of the seams of the door and exterior
doorknob of Escudero’s music studio for evidence of drug activity; and a search
warrant for Escudero’s music studio for evidence of controlled substances. Only the
tracking warrant for Escudero’s vehicle is relevant to this appeal.
      4
       The Facebook message said “gusto en verte foo !!! saludos a la family carnal
un abrazo!!’ �”.
                                         -3-
       After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Escudero guilty of
possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. The district
court sentenced Escudero to 216 months of imprisonment.

                                    II. Analysis

      On appeal, Escudero challenges the legitimacy of the tracking warrant for his
vehicle; the admission of his Facebook message to M.G. 5; and the sufficiency of
evidence for his guilty verdict. We address each issue in turn.

                               A. Tracking Warrant

      Escudero filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the GPS-tracking
warrant on his vehicle due to a lack of probable cause. For denial of a motion to
suppress, we “review[] the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo.” United States v. Norey, 31 F.4th 631, 635 (8th Cir. 2022).
The district court properly denied Escudero’s motion to suppress because the Leon
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984).

       The exclusionary rule generally prohibits admission of evidence seized during
an unlawful search, United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2014), such
as evidence obtained without probable cause. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 136 (2009). But “before reviewing the existence of probable cause, [courts]
may consider the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
as established in Leon.” United States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007).
If the Leon good-faith exception applies, then we need not address whether probable
cause exists. Norey, 31 F.4th at 635.

      5
        Escudero also challenges the resulting revocation of his pretrial release and
the resulting presence of U.S. Marshals in the courtroom.
                                         -4-
       Under the Leon good-faith exception, “evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant . . . that is later determined to be invalid, will not be suppressed if the
executing officer’s reliance upon the warrant was objectively reasonable.” Proell,
485 F.3d at 430. In other words, the good-faith inquiry asks “whether a reasonably
well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the [issuing
judge’s] authorization.” United States v. Puckett, 466 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23) (alteration in original). Leon identified
situations in which an officer’s reliance on a warrant would be unreasonable, such
as “when the affidavit in support of the warrant is ‘so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” Proell, 485
F.3d at 431 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).

       The circumstances here suggest Det. Patsy “had an objectively reasonable
belief in the existence of probable cause.” See Norey, 31 F.4th at 636. First, Det.
Patsy knew information that “reinforces the objective reasonableness of his belief in
probable cause.” See id. Specifically, a confidential informant told officers
Escudero sold cocaine throughout Minneapolis and St. Paul, so Det. Patsy could
logically infer Escudero would use his car to transport cocaine. See United States v.
Lopez-Zuniga, 909 F.3d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting it is reasonable for an
officer to think a defendant “might use his car to move about in furtherance of a drug
conspiracy”). Det. Patsy then independently corroborated the informant’s
statements through his own investigations by running surveillance outside
Escudero’s residence. Det. Patsy confirmed that a vehicle was registered to
Escudero by looking up the Vehicle Identification Number, then tested the driver’s
side door handle for drug residue using an ion swab pad. The ion swab tested
positive for the presence of cocaine, the very substance Escudero was suspected of
selling. Cumulatively, the information known to Det. Patsy showed the necessary
indicium of probable cause to make his reliance on the GPS-tracking warrant
reasonable.

                                          -5-
       Second, no evidence suggests Det. Patsy acted in bad faith: he followed
procedures and obtained incremental warrants to aid his investigation—such as by
obtaining a tracking warrant before a search warrant. Further, the issuing judge
thought Det. Patsy’s affidavit included sufficient detail for probable cause purposes,
which grants further credence to Det. Patsy’s reasonable reliance on the affidavit.
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (“[A] warrant issued by a magistrate [judge] normally
suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in
conducting the search.” (quotations omitted)). See also United States v. Martin, 833
F.2d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 1987) (“When judges can look at the same affidavit and come
to differing conclusions, a police officer’s reliance on that affidavit must, therefore,
be reasonable.”).

       In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances, Det. Patsy’s affidavit “was
not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable.” See United States v. Perry, 531 F.3d 662, 667 (8th Cir.
2008). And because it was objectively reasonable for Det. Patsy to rely in good faith
on the warrant, the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and
the district court properly denied Escudero’s motion to suppress.

                              B. Witness Intimidation

              i. Admission of Facebook message and prior statements

      The district court granted the government’s motion to admit Escudero’s
Facebook message into evidence because the message was “probative of the
consciousness of guilt” and not unfairly prejudicial. It also granted the government’s
motion to admit Escudero’s prior statements about obtaining the witness list because
“the combination of the defendant’s statement pertaining to witness lists and [the]
Facebook message create the strong implication of witness intimidation.” We
review a district court’s evidentiary decisions, including evidence of witness
intimidation, for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Zierke, 618 F.3d 755,

                                          -6-
759 (8th Cir. 2010). Based on our review, the district court did not abuse its
discretion.

       Threats against witnesses are “generally admissible against a criminal
defendant to show consciousness of guilt of the crime charged.” Id. In other words,
threats against witnesses are admissible intrinsic evidence because “it directly relates
to the charges that the defendant is facing.” United States v. Vaca, 38 F.4th 718, 722
(8th Cir. 2022).

       Escudero challenges the admissibility of his Facebook message to M.G.,
claiming “the statement was neither meant to be intimidating nor a threat.” Escudero
contends he meant the message to be a sincere expression of niceties between
friends. But prior interactions between Escudero and M.G. provided further context
for the message—Escudero had told M.G. that he wanted a copy of the government’s
trial witness list to send to unknown actors in Mexico, where many members of
M.G.’s family live. Hence, M.G. could reasonably believe Escudero intended to
harm his family members in Mexico. Given these circumstances, Escudero’s
Facebook message did not need to be directly threatening to constitute a threat. See
United States v. Maurstad, 35 F.4th 1139, 1146 (8th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he Guidelines
have a broad view of obstruction—it can vary in nature and seriousness, and does
not require a direct threat.”). Hence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Escudero’s Facebook message and witness list comment.

           ii. Revocation of pretrial release and U.S. Marshals’ presence

       As a result of Escudero’s Facebook message to M.G., the district court
revoked Escudero’s pretrial release and authorized U.S. Marshals to be present at
trial. Escudero challenges both actions. We find his arguments unpersuasive.

       First, Escudero’s pretrial release argument became moot upon his conviction.
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982). Second, “[t]he need for and extent of
security measures during trial are within the discretion of the trial court.” United

                                          -7-
States v. Lee, 886 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1989). Here, the district court properly
exercised its discretion in taking proper security measures because the U.S. Marshals
are expressly authorized to “provide for the personal protection of . . . witnesses, and
other threatened persons in the interests of justice where criminal intimidation
impedes on the functioning of the judicial process or any other official proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 566(e)(1)(A). There was no abuse of discretion.

                            C. Sufficiency of Evidence

      Escudero did not move for judgment of acquittal during his trial proceedings,
and the district court did not sua sponte grant a judgment of acquittal. Escudero now
argues he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the government did not
meet its burden of proof. We find this argument unpersuasive.

       This court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.
United States v. King, 898 F.3d 797, 808 (8th Cir. 2018). In reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, this court “view[s] evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict, resolv[es] conflicts in the government’s favor,
and accept[s] all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v.
Tillman, 765 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 2014). A guilty verdict may be overturned “only
if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Flax, 988 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting King,
898 F.3d at 808). But if the defendant “did not move for judgment of acquittal at the
close of the government’s case, at the close of all evidence, or after the jury’s
verdict,” then “we reverse only if the district court, in not sua sponte granting
judgment of acquittal, committed plain error.” United States v. Calhoun, 721 F.3d
596, 600 (8th Cir. 2013).

       Because Escudero did not move for judgment of acquittal, we can only reverse
if the district court committed a plain error in not acquitting Escudero sua sponte.
See id. No such error exists. Escudero argues the evidence was not sufficient to
convict him of possession because the government failed to prove he actually

                                          -8-
possessed cocaine, the first element of his charged offense. See United States v.
Williams, 39 F.4th 1034, 1044–45 (8th Cir. 2022) (stating elements of offense). But
during trial, the jury heard that Escudero was the sole tenant of the music studio
where the cocaine was found, and that he visited the studio “very frequent[ly].”
M.G.’s testimony further detailed how the cocaine belonged to Escudero. Hence, a
reasonable jury could have found Escudero guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the district court did not commit plain error for not sua sponte granting Escudero
judgment of acquittal.

                                 III. Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
                      ______________________________

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