Court Opinion

ID: 9529543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:51:51.364283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:50.512278
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, specially concurring: While I concur in the disposition and the reasoning of my colleagues in this case, I am concurring specially only on the issue that the majority in its discretion decided not to address: the question of whether this damages award was excessive and not supported by the evidence. While I completely agree that the damages award in this case must be reversed and the cause remanded for a retrial, the parties legitimately raised and argued the issue of whether the damages awarded by the circuit court were excessive. An award for damages will be deemed excessive if it falls outside the range of fair and reasonable compensation or results from passion or prejudice, or if it is so large that it shocks the judicial conscience. See Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill. 2d 98, 113, 676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (1997); Richter v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 177 Ill. App. 3d 247, 257, 532 N.E.2d 269, 275-76 (1988). Defendant argues that because the trial court made separate awards for pain and suffering and loss of normal life, the total damages are duplicative and excessive. While we hold that pain and suffering and loss of normal life should be included in one award of damages under the Jones Act, this does not necessarily mean that the total of damages awarded in this particular case was excessive. After a review of the entire record, I would hold that the total amount of damages was not excessive as it fell within the range of fair and reasonable compensation, did not result from passion or prejudice, and was not so large that it shocked the judicial conscience. I completely concur in the majority’s position: “[W]e trust that the trial judge will consider the proper elements of damages in light of the evidence and will assess damages in a manner consistent with this opinion” (314 Ill. App. 3d at 810). So as to deal with this last issue raised by the parties in the hope that resolving it would be of some guidance to the trial court on remand, and noting that the trial court is not required to award the same amount of damages, I specially concur.