Court Opinion

ID: 9882814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:20:25.953225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:01.829201
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Ivery, 2023-Ohio-3495.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,             :
                                                                    No. 23AP-92
v.                                                :             (C.P.C. No. 22CR-1293)

Jerry L. Ivery,                                   :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellee.              :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on September 28, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula M.
                 Sawyers for appellant.

                 On brief: Kimberlyn L. Seccuro for appellee.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellee, Jerry L. Ivery, was seated in an idle vehicle near a
suspected drug house when a police cruiser parked directly behind him. Before the police
officer reached the driver’s window of the vehicle, Mr. Ivery exited the vehicle and walked
away. Even though the officer recognized he did not have a lawful basis to detain or arrest
Mr. Ivery and could tell Mr. Ivery did not want to speak with him, the officer nonetheless
followed Mr. Ivery and attempted to investigate him by lodging questions at Mr. Ivery
during the pursuit. While continuing to walk away, Mr. Ivery answered some of those
questions. Once additional officers arrived on the scene, Mr. Ivery began to run. The
pursuing officer caught up to Mr. Ivery, physically restrained him, and searched his person.
He found a firearm in the pocket of Mr. Ivery’s jacket, which formed the basis for the two
felony gun charges brought in Mr. Ivery’s accompanying case.
No. 23AP-92                                                                               2

       {¶ 2} After concluding the investigative stop was unlawful, the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas issued an order suppressing all evidence—namely, the firearm—
which followed the stop. Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, now appeals from that
February 6, 2023 judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
       {¶ 3} On March 28, 2022, Mr. Ivery was indicted by a Franklin County grand jury
with carrying a concealed weapon, in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a felony of the fourth
degree, and having weapons while under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a felony of
the third degree. These charges were based on evidence—a loaded firearm—recovered from
the warrantless search of Mr. Ivery’s person by Columbus Police Department (“CPD”)
Officer Dayne Linhart on January 3, 2022.
       {¶ 4} Mr. Ivery moved to suppress the firearm, arguing it was obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Ohio Constitution. (Sept. 26, 2022 Mot.) In his motion, Mr. Ivery contended that Officer
Linhart did not have probable cause to arrest him or reasonable, articulable suspicion to
stop him under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
       {¶ 5} In its written response, the state argued the encounter between Mr. Ivery and
Officer Linhart was consensual and did not rise “to the level of a seizure or detainment.”
(Oct. 10, 2022 Memo Contra at 3-4.) The state further contended that, during this
consensual encounter, Officer Linhart “gained reasonable suspicion that [Mr. Ivery] was
engaged in criminal activity,” thus premising the lawfulness of Mr. Ivery’s prolonged
detention and the officer’s warrantless search of Mr. Ivery’s person on Terry. (Memo
Contra at 4-6.) And, in the alternative, the state posited that even if the evidence was
improperly obtained, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should nonetheless
apply. (Memo Contra at 6-8.) Mr. Ivery filed no written response to the state’s arguments
opposing his suppression motion.
       {¶ 6} At the January 31, 2023 suppression hearing, the state presented testimony
from Officer Linhart about the stop, prolonged detention, and search of Mr. Ivery’s person.
The prosecutor played a recording from Officer Linhart’s body-worn camera, which
depicted his interaction with Mr. Ivery and showed his pat-down search of Mr. Ivery’s
person. (See Jan. 31, 2023 Tr. at 21. See also State’s Ex. A.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                                             3

        {¶ 7} During her cross-examination of Officer Linhart, Mr. Ivery’s trial counsel
replayed the body camera recording and questioned Officer Linhart about the footage. (Tr.
at 49-53, 57-59.) The defense also produced Officer Linhart’s written report relating to this
incident, questioned him about its contents, and compared his report’s description of the
encounter with Mr. Ivery to the events depicted on his body-worm camera footage. (Tr. at
46-54. See Def.’s Ex. A.)

        A. Evidence and Testimony Presented at the Suppression Hearing
        {¶ 8} At the suppression hearing, Officer Linhart testified that his involvement in
this matter began on January 3, 2022 when Detective J. Tabor—a plain-clothes narcotics
detective—asked him and other on-duty patrol officers during their pre-shift rollcall table
meeting1 to “check up on” a purportedly suspicious vehicle in the Hilltop area. (Tr. at 13-
15, 27.) Ultimately, Officer Linhart was charged with this task. (See Tr. at 15-16.)
        {¶ 9} At the meeting, Detective Tabor and other narcotics officers described seeing
a Dodge Challenger parked just north of Sullivant Avenue on Wrexham Avenue while
surveilling a suspected drug house. (See Tr. at 13, 31.) Officer Linhart acknowledged being
told the narcotics detectives were “really interested in all the activity” in this area because
they had observed a significant volume of foot traffic going into and around that alleged
drug house. (See Tr. at 13-14. Compare Tr. at 31-32.) Detective Tabor told the officers he
believed the parked Dodge Challenger “was suspicious” because an individual had been
sitting in it “for approximately 30 minutes” near “a known narcotics house” and would
“duck down, kind of hide himself from sight” “any time a police cruiser drove by[.]” (See
Tr. at 13-14. See also Tr. at 54, 62-63.) But, on cross-examination, Officer Linhart
acknowledged the narcotics detectives who allegedly witnessed the Challenger’s occupant
engage in this purported ducking behavior would have been driving unmarked vehicles, not
cruisers, at the time such observations were made. (Tr. at 35.)
        {¶ 10} After the rollcall meeting concluded, Officer Linhart activated his body-worn
camera and drove his cruiser from the substation to the area where Detective Tabor
described the suspicious vehicle was parked. (Tr. at 15-16.) At the hearing, Officer Linhart

1 Officer Linhart explained these pre-shift meetings with detectives were typical because CPD’s detectives

“watch something prior to [patrol officers] starting [their] shift[s],” which ensures the officers “have
something set up” to do when their shift begins. (Tr. at 13.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                                  4

conceded he went to this location for the purposes of conducting a “48A stop,” which he
explained is CPD’s ten-code for a suspicious person in a vehicle. (Tr. at 28-29. See also
Tr. at 58-59.) Officer Linhart also acknowledged that Detective Tabor had given him the
license plate number for the vehicle the detectives wanted him to investigate. (Tr. at 29-31;
Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 2.) Although Officer Linhart did not recall running the Challenger’s license
plate number in his cruiser’s computer system before he interacted with Mr. Ivery that day,
he conceded that “[i]f [he] was given the tag[,] [he] probably” ran it. (Tr. at 29-30.) And,
Officer Linhart agreed that if he did, in fact, run the Challenger’s license plate number in
his cruiser’s system, nothing of significance resulted. (See Tr. at 29-31.)
       {¶ 11} Officer Linhart arrived at the described location at 3:26 p.m. and observed
the described vehicle legally parked on the residential street “right where [Detective Tabor]
said, just north of Sullivant Avenue on Wrexham[,]” in the Hilltop neighborhood. (Tr. at
15-16, 27. See also Tr. at 34, 36-37; State’s Ex. A.) At the hearing, Officer Linhart testified
he considered this to be a “high-crime area.” (Tr. at 17, 27, 62-63.)
       {¶ 12} Without activating his overhead lights or siren, Officer Linhart pulled his
cruiser behind the parked Challenger. (See Tr. at 16, 36-37, 60.) At the hearing, Officer
Linhart agreed on cross-examination he did not personally witness the occupant of the
Challenger engage in the “ducking” behavior the narcotics detectives described. (See Tr. at
31, 35-36.) Nor did he observe a high volume of foot traffic inside or around the home the
Challenger was parked in front of, or “any drugs change hands” (i.e., sold) outside of the
home. (See Tr. at 31-33.) And, Officer Linhart admitted he never saw Mr. Ivery enter or
exit the suspected drug house. (See Tr. at 33.) Indeed, he conceded that when he arrived
at the scene, he had not received any information to suggest Mr. Ivery had committed, was
committing, or was about to commit any crime. (See Tr. at 33-38. See also Tr. at 60-61.)
       {¶ 13} After the cruiser parked, Mr. Ivery immediately exited the Challenger and
began walking away from the vehicles. (Tr. at 16, 35.) At the hearing, Officer Linhart
conceded he had no lawful basis to stop Mr. Ivery when he exited the Challenger and began
walking away. (Tr. at 37-38.)
       {¶ 14} In furtherance of his intention to investigate Mr. Ivery that day, Officer
Linhart exited his cruiser and attempted to engage Mr. Ivery while Mr. Ivery was walking
away. (See State’s Ex. A; Tr. at 16, 35-38.) The body camera recording shows that, while
No. 23AP-92                                                                                   5

attempting to catch up to Mr. Ivery, Officer Linhart yelled out to Mr. Ivery, “How ya doin’
man? My name’s Officer Linhart.” (See State’s Ex. A. See also Tr. at 39.) As Officer Linhart
got closer to him, Mr. Ivery turned around and began walking backwards away from the
officer (described by Officer Linhart as “blading his body”) while answering the officer’s
perfunctory questions—how he was doing (“alright”), what he was working on that day
(“about to go home”), where he lives (“right here,” while pointing at an apartment complex),
and what his address is (“[a]partment 15”). (State’s Ex. A. See also Tr. at 18, 39-46, 24.)
       {¶ 15} Officer Linhart acknowledged it was obvious that Mr. Ivery did not want to
talk to him and repeatedly tried to walk away. (See Tr. at 18, 40-41, 67-68.) Officer Linhart
admitted he nonetheless continued to follow and attempt to engage Mr. Ivery for the
purpose of investigating him. (See Tr. at 40-41, 45-46, 67-68.) Notably, Officer Linhart
conceded he still did not have a lawful basis to detain or arrest Mr. Ivery at this point during
the encounter. (See Tr. at 42-44.)
       {¶ 16} After Mr. Ivery briefly stopped and pulled down his face mask, Officer Linhart
asked if he had an identification card on him. (See State’s Ex. A; Tr. at 45.) Mr. Ivery stated
he did not, turned into an alley, and walked away from the officer towards the building he
identified as his residence. (See id.) As depicted in his body-worn camera footage, Officer
Linhart continued to follow and attempt to engage him. (State’s Ex. A. See also Tr. at 45-
46.) He asked Mr. Ivery if he owned the vehicle parked on the street. (See id.) In response,
Mr. Ivery turned slightly towards Officer Linhart—e.g., bladed his body towards the
officer—stated he did not, turned completely around again, and continued walking down
the alley away from the officer. (See id.) Officer Linhart agreed he still had no lawful basis
to arrest or detain Mr. Ivery at this point. (See Tr. at 44-46.) Nevertheless, Officer Linhart
continued following and attempting to question Mr. Ivery. (See State’s Ex. A; Tr. at 46.)
And although Mr. Ivery did not turn around, did not respond, and continued walking away
from the officer, Officer Linhart continued pursuing Mr. Ivery anyway. (See id.)
       {¶ 17} The body camera footage shows it is at this point during the encounter that
Mr. Ivery started to run, which prompted Officer Linhart to chase after him. (See State’s
Ex. A. See also Tr. at 61-62.) Although not visible in his body camera recording, Officer
Linhart testified that Mr. Ivery began to run down the alley when he saw another cruiser
arrive at the scene. (Tr. at 18. See also Def.’s Ex. A. at ¶ 3.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                                                     6

        {¶ 18} Officer Linhart initially testified that Mr. Ivery “kept his right hand in his
jacket [pocket] pretty much the entire time[]” during the encounter. (Tr. at 19, 48.) That
account is echoed in his report. (See Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 4.) Both are belied, however, by his
body camera footage. (See State’s Ex. A. See also Tr. at 48-52, 65.) Indeed, Officer Linhart’s
body camera recording shows—and notwithstanding the cold January temperature—both
of Mr. Ivery’s hands are visible outside of his jacket pockets the entire time preceding the
chase. (See State’s Ex. A. See also Tr. at 48-52.) During most of their conversation, Mr.
Ivery can be seen on the body camera footage holding his cell phone in his right hand and
using his left hand to point, gesture, and adjust his face mask. (State’s Ex. A. See also Tr.
at 50.) And, on cross-examination, Officer Linhart admitted his prior testimony and report
statement claiming Mr. Ivery’s right hand was in his jacket pocket before Mr. Ivery began
running could not be reconciled with his body-worn camera footage. (See Tr. at 48-52.) In
any event, Officer Linhart agreed he did not have a lawful basis to arrest or detain Mr. Ivery
prior to his flight. (See Tr. at 38-46, 53-54, 64-65.)
        {¶ 19} Officer Linhart also described Mr. Ivery keeping “his [right] hand in his
pocket” while the two men were running, which appeared to the officer as though
“something heavy was in there, just the way that it was pulling harder on the right side of
his jacket than his left side.” (Tr. at 19. See also Tr. at 52-53; Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 4.) Officer
Linhart recounted thinking “it was weird that [Mr. Ivery] was running with a hand in his
pocket because nobody usually does that.” (Tr. at 19.) Officer Linhart’s body-worn camera
footage is unclear and inconclusive as to whether Mr. Ivery’s right hand was, in fact, in his
jacket pocket while he was running.2 (See State’s Ex. A. See also Tr. at 52-53.) We note,
however, the footage does not clearly show the right side of Mr. Ivery’s jacket being heavily
weighed down, as compared to the left side. (See State’s Ex. A.) Also notable is Officer
Linhart’s concession that he did not see a gun—or, for that matter, any contraband—in Mr.
Ivery’s possession at any point prior to or while the two men were running. (Tr. at 56.)
        {¶ 20} After the two men ran out of the alley, Officer Linhart testified that Mr. Ivery
“slowed [down] his speed and either slipped on ice [or] [the officer] slipped on ice and [the
two men] ended up running into each other[.]” (Tr. at 20. See also Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 4.) The

2 Even if it was, we note that because keys, wallets, cell phones, and other personal effects are often carried in

jacket pockets, he could have been holding any number of these lawful items while he was running.
No. 23AP-92                                                                                  7

body-worn camera footage is again unclear and inconclusive as to whether Mr. Ivery was
tackled or fell to the ground by virtue of one or both men slipping on ice, losing balance, or
otherwise. (See State’s Ex. A.) No patches of ice or snow are visible on the roadway; rather,
there are several puddles suggestive instead of melting. (See id.)
       {¶ 21} In his report, Officer Linhart described “grabb[ing] Mr. Ivery’s feet prior to
hitting the ground.” (Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 4.) At the hearing, Officer Linhart testified that he
“ended up on top of [Mr. Ivery] [while] controlling his hands[,]” which, at that point, were
not in either of Mr. Ivery’s jacket pockets. (Tr. at 20.) These events are not reflected on
Officer Linhart’s body-worn camera footage, however, because it “flew off” of him when he
was in the process of detaining Mr. Ivery. (See Tr. at 20-21; State’s Ex. A.)
       {¶ 22} Officer Linhart testified he detained Mr. Ivery “for fleeing.” (Tr. at 53-54.)
More specifically, Officer Linhart opined that he had reasonable, articulable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory detention because Mr. Ivery was “[o]utside [of] a known narcotics
drug house,” ran away “upon the sight of more police officers,” and had “blad[ed] his body”
when speaking to Officer Linhart before the flight occurred. (See Tr. at 53-54. See also Tr.
at 18, 39, 63-66.) Officer Linhart also emphasized the “high crime” he associated with the
area. (See Tr. at 17, 27, 62-63.)
       {¶ 23} Moments after Officer Linhart detained Mr. Ivery, additional officers arrived
and searched Mr. Ivery’s person. (See Tr. at 20; Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 4.) On cross-examination,
Officer Linhart testified he performed this search incident to Mr. Ivery’s arrest. (Tr. at 56.)
But, on re-direct examination, Officer Linhart testified—mostly by answering the trial
prosecutor’s leading questions—that his search of Mr. Ivery’s person was actually a safety
pat-down (or Terry frisk). (Tr. at 65-66.) He explained that he conducted this type of pat-
down search “[f]or weapons and especially in narcotics activity.” (Tr. at 65.) Officer
Linhart’s body-worn camera did not capture the search and his report does not shed any
light on what justification the officer relied on for the warrantless search. Of note, Officer
Linhart did not testify or state in his report he believed Mr. Ivery was armed and presently
dangerous before he conducted the warrantless search. Compare State v. Oliver, 10th Dist.
No. 21AP-449, 2023-Ohio-1550, ¶ 84-85, 90-95.
       {¶ 24} During the warrantless search of Mr. Ivery’s person, a gun containing 14
rounds of ammunition in the magazine and 1 round in the chamber was recovered from the
No. 23AP-92                                                                                                       8

right pocket of Mr. Ivery’s jacket. (Tr. at 20, 56; Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 4.) Officer Linhart
acknowledged he had not seen this firearm at any point before he detained and searched
Mr. Ivery. (Tr. at 56-58.) At the scene, Mr. Ivery was arrested for felony gun charges and
outstanding traffic warrants. (Def.’s Ex. A at ¶ 4.)

        B. The Arguments Below and the Trial Court’s Decision
        {¶ 25} Following the presentation of all evidence and testimony at the suppression
hearing, Mr. Ivery’s counsel argued that although Officer Linhart claimed Mr. Ivery was
free to terminate the purportedly consensual encounter3 prior to his flight, the evidence and
testimony established that was not true. (Tr. at 70-71.) His trial counsel submitted that no
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter under the facts and
circumstances of this case. (Tr. at 70-71.) And, Mr. Ivery’s counsel emphasized that, before
he ran away, Mr. Ivery tried to disengage numerous times and told the officer he was going
home, but Officer Linhart nonetheless continued pursuing and attempting to engage Mr.
Ivery. (See Tr. at 70-71.) Mr. Ivery’s trial counsel argued that, in so doing, Officer Linhart
turned “what should have been a consensual encounter into an investigatory detention” for
which Officer Linhart admittedly lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct. (Tr.
at 71. See Tr. at 34-45, 66.)
        {¶ 26} Through his re-direct examination of Officer Linhart, the trial prosecutor
conveyed the state’s position was the investigatory Terry stop did not begin until after Mr.
Ivery’s unprovoked flight. (Tr. at 60-65.)                  In closing, however, the trial prosecutor
presented no arguments on the issue of whether, assuming the initial encounter was
consensual, it became an investigatory stop before Mr. Ivery began to run away from the
officer. (See Tr. at 71-75.) Instead, the focus of the state’s closing arguments centered on
the issue of whether Officer Linhart had reasonable, articulable suspicion (or probable
cause) to conduct an investigatory stop of Mr. Ivery after Mr. Ivery’s unprovoked flight.
(See Tr. at 71-75.) In support, the trial prosecutor cited two cases from this court—State v.
Banks, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1087, 2010-Ohio-5714 and State v. Moyer, 10th Dist. No.
09AP-434, 2009-Ohio-6777—and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois v.

3 Mr. Ivery’s trial counsel did not refute the consensual nature of Officer Linhart’s initial approach of Mr. Ivery,

but instead argued the consensual nature of their encounter ended before Mr. Ivery began running away. (See
Tr. at 70-71; Sept. 26, 2022 Mot.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                                                      9

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) for the proposition that a person’s unprovoked flight during
a consensual encounter in a high-crime area justifies the warrantless detention of that
person. (See Tr. at 71-75.) Presuming the entire encounter preceding the flight to be
consensual, the trial prosecutor cited several circumstances—in addition to Mr. Ivery’s
unprovoked flight and “high-crime” area—as supporting Officer Linhart’s warrantless
detention of Mr. Ivery in this case.4 (Tr. at 74-75.)
        {¶ 27} On February 6, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment granting Mr. Ivery’s
motion to suppress. In so holding, the trial court found that “even though Officer Linhart’s
interaction with [Mr. Ivery] may have begun as a consensual encounter, it is clear from
Officer Linhart’s body cam video and testimony that the consensual nature of the encounter
ended when [Mr. Ivery] began to walk away and clearly did not want to answer Officer
Linhart’s questions or interact with him.” (Emphasis added.) (Feb. 6, 2023 Decision and
Entry at 7.) The trial court determined that when Mr. Ivery began to walk away, the officer
“should have terminated the encounter” such that “any further pursuit or chase of [Mr.
Ivery] by Officer Linhart constituted an unlawful detention and seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.” (Decision and Entry at 7.) And, the trial court noted there was
no dispute that, at least before the flight, Officer Linhart did not have a lawful basis to detain
or stop Mr. Ivery. (See Decision and Entry at 7.) Accordingly, it ordered all evidence
obtained from the warrantless search of his person—namely, the loaded firearm—to “be

4 However, many are not persuasive. The state referenced Mr. Ivery being “outside of a drug house” (Tr. at

74), but the body camera footage showed his vehicle was merely parked on a street in a residential area. Officer
Linhart confirmed he did not see Mr. Ivery go inside of the suspected drug house or, for that matter, any foot
traffic in connection with the home near Mr. Ivery’s parked car. (See Tr. at 31-34.) The trial prosecutor also
pointed to Mr. Ivery being seated in an idle vehicle “for an extended period of time” while purportedly
“watching the traffic intently” and “ducking officers” as factual support for the officer’s reasonable suspicion
(or probable cause) to detain him after the flight. (Tr. at 74.) But, Officer Linhart did not witness such conduct.
(Tr. at 35.) Even if he did, the officer agreed it would be lawful. (Tr. at 29, 33-34.) And we note that, given the
reported duration (approximately 30 minutes), time of year (January), and type of vehicles the plain-clothes
narcotics detectives who observed his behavior were driving (unmarked), such actions are not indicative of
criminal conduct. While agreeing Mr. Ivery was not obligated to speak with Officer Linhart upon his arrival,
the state cited Mr. Ivery’s immediate departure from the vehicle as another circumstance supporting the
warrantless detention. (Tr. at 74.) However, there are plenty of lawful reasons a person would not want to
interact with the police, and exercising the precise “freedom to leave” that is often exploited to justify police
conduct falls within the bounds of such reasons. The trial prosecutor also contended that sitting in a vehicle
he did not own and not having identification on his person somehow, too, were contributing circumstances to
the officer’s reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) to detain Mr. Ivery (Tr. at 74), even though neither are
unlawful. Finally, the state suggested Mr. Ivery “may have been operating the car up to that point,” but such
notion is clearly speculative. (Tr. at 74-75.) Neither the narcotics detectives surveilling the drug house nor
Officer Linhart claimed to have witnessed Mr. Ivery operating the vehicle at any point that day. In fact, its lack
of operation was cited as a primary reason for the narcotics detectives’ suspicion about it. (See Tr. at 13-14.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                                  10

suppressed and excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” (Decision and Entry at 7, quoting
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).)
       {¶ 28} The state timely appealed from the February 6, 2023 judgment, as a matter
of right, pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A), Crim.R. 12(K), and App.R. 4(B)(4). (Feb. 8, 2023
Notice of Appeal.) It asserts the following assignment of error for our review:

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [MR. IVERY’S]
              MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

II. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 29} In its sole assignment of error, the state contends the trial court erred in
finding Officer Linhart’s warrantless detention and stop of Mr. Ivery violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, the state argues the trial court’s order
suppressing the firearm and all evidence obtained as fruit of the illegal search of Mr. Ivery’s
person should be reversed by this court. We disagree.

       A. Standard of Review
       {¶ 30} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of law and fact. State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 14,
citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. Thus, an appellate
court’s standard of review of a trial court’s decision denying a motion to suppress is two-
fold. See, e.g., State v. Pilgrim, 184 Ohio App.3d 675, 2009-Ohio-5357, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.),
citing State v. Reedy, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-501, 2006-Ohio-1212, ¶ 5, citing State v. Lloyd,
126 Ohio App.3d 95, 100-01 (7th Dist.1998).
       {¶ 31} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court first assumes the role of trier
of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 12, citing Burnside
at ¶ 8, State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, on appeal, we must “accept the
trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id.,
quoting Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982).
       {¶ 32} With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our standard of
review is de novo. See, e.g., Banks-Harvey at ¶ 14, citing Burnside at ¶ 8; State v. Turner,
163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773, ¶ 14. See also Pilgrim at ¶ 13. We are tasked with
independently determining whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. See id.
No. 23AP-92                                                                                                   11

        {¶ 33} Upon a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant, the state
carries the burden of showing, by at least a preponderance of the evidence, that the search
and/or seizure fits within one of the defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. See,
e.g., Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (1988), citing State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d
204, 207 (1978); Columbus v. Ellyson, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-573, 2006-Ohio-2075, ¶ 5,
citing Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 (1974); State v. Brandenburg, 12th Dist. No.
CA2020-09-055, 2021-Ohio-2875, ¶ 13.

        B. Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
           Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution
        {¶ 34} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects people against unreasonable searches
and seizures. See, e.g., Banks-Harvey at ¶ 17, citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
825 (1982). It is a restraint on the government and, more narrowly here, law enforcement.
See id. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that in felony cases, Article I, Section 14 of the
Ohio Constitution provides the same protection as the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.5 Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483,
¶ 12.
        {¶ 35} “For a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it
must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant.” State v. Moore,
90 Ohio St.3d 47, 49 (2000). “A search is unreasonable when police lack a valid warrant
and no exception to the warrant requirement applies.” State v. Jackson, ___ Ohio St.3d
___, 2022-Ohio-4365, ¶ 10, citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).

5 Although the protections afforded by Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution have historically been

construed as coextensive with the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it
is well-established that states may “rely on their own constitutions to provide broader protection for individual
rights, independent of protections afforded by the United States Constitution.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio
St.3d 234, 238 (1997), citing Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35 (1993). And, in certain circumstances, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has construed Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution as providing Ohio citizens
with greater protections than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v.
Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, ¶ 23 (holding that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against searches
and seizures made by members of law enforcement who lack authority to make an arrest); State v. Brown, 99
Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, ¶ 22 (holding that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provides
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against warrantless arrests
for minor misdemeanors). See also State v. Dibble, 159 Ohio St.3d 322, 2020-Ohio-546, ¶ 60, fn. 3 (Donnelly,
J., dissenting). See also id. at ¶ 14, fn. 1 (DeWine, J., writing for the majority).
No. 23AP-92                                                                               12

“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Footnote omitted.) Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). When a defendant moves to suppress evidence
recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search
fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Wolf at 241.
       {¶ 36} To safeguard the rights protected in the Fourth Amendment, the United
States Supreme Court has created the exclusionary rule, which precludes the use in a
criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Davis v.
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011), citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960). Evidence obtained as the result of an unconstitutional stop, arrest, and/or search
must be excluded at trial as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963); State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255,
¶ 49; Banks-Harvey at ¶ 25.

       C. The Stop
       {¶ 37} At the outset, we note that Officer Linhart conceded he did not have probable
cause to arrest or reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Ivery when he first parked his cruiser
behind Mr. Ivery’s idle car or at any point before Mr. Ivery ran away. (See, e.g., Tr. at 34-
35, 38-46, 60-67.) And, the parties agreed that Officer Linhart’s initial contact with Mr.
Ivery began as a consensual encounter. (Tr. at 5, 6, 23.) At issue is whether the challenged
seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.          Two distinct periods during the
encounter are relevant to our analysis: (1) after Mr. Ivery began walking away from Officer
Linhart but before he began to run; and (2) after Mr. Ivery began running away from Officer
Linhart.
       {¶ 38} The state argues the trial court erred in determining that the continued
approach by Officer Linhart after Mr. Ivery “began to walk away and clearly did not want
to answer Officer Linhart’s questions or interact with him”—but before Mr. Ivery’s flight—
represented a warrantless seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (See Decision and Entry at 7.) Thus, the state contends that no seizure
occurred before Mr. Ivery began running away from the officer. (Appellant’s Brief at 11-19.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                                  13

Accordingly, we must determine whether the facts in this case support the trial court’s
finding that Officer Linhart’s continued pursuit and questioning of Mr. Ivery before he ran
away from the officer constituted an unlawful investigative seizure.

       1. Legal Standards
       {¶ 39} Consent is a long-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. It is well-established that “law enforcement officers
do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by
approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to
them if they are willing to listen.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002). “A
consensual encounter remains consensual even if police officers ask questions, ask to see
the person’s identification, or ask to search the person’s belongings, provided ‘the police do
not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.’ ” State v. Jones, 188
Ohio App.3d 628, 2010-Ohio-2854, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 434-35 (1991), and citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1984) and I.N.S. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). In this regard, “the crucial test is whether, taking into
account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business.’ ” Bostick at 437, quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486
U.S. 567, 569 (1988).
       {¶ 40} A consensual encounter becomes a seizure, however, when “in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality
opinion). In Mendenhall, the United States Supreme Court set forth several factors which,
if present, indicate that a seizure has occurred even if the citizen does not attempt to leave.
See id. at 554-55. Such factors include the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. See id. at 554. “[W]hat
constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’
will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in
which the conduct occurs.” Chesternut at 573. Under this objective test, we consider not
whether the individual believed he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether
No. 23AP-92                                                                               14

the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person. Columbus
v. Body, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-609, 2012-Ohio-379, ¶ 14.
       {¶ 41} We note the Supreme Court of Ohio “has said little on [this] issue in the last
two decades despite changes in police training and public attitudes and increased social
tensions, not to mention continued divided opinions on the issue in Ohio’s appellate
courts.” State v. Kirk, 158 Ohio St.3d 1527, 2020-Ohio-3017, ¶ 1 (Stewart, J., dissenting
from majority’s decision not to accept jurisdictional appeal for review), citing State v.
Wertz, 2d Dist. No. 27376, 2017-Ohio-8766, appeal not accepted, 152 Ohio St.3d 1464,
2018-Ohio-1795, and State v. Scarberry, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-775, 2016-Ohio-7065, appeal
not accepted, 149 Ohio St.3d 1419, 2017-Ohio-4038. Thus, Ohio law is not entirely clear
“regarding under what circumstances * * * a citizen’s consensual encounter with a police
officer (during which the citizen is free to leave) become[s] an investigative detention
(during which the citizen is not free to leave).” Id.
       {¶ 42} In contrast to a consensual encounter, a warrantless seizure of a person may
be justified as a product of a brief investigatory stop under Terry. To justify a Terry stop,
a law enforcement officer must point to specific, articulable facts which gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that the suspect was engaged in criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at
21. See also State v. Tidwell, 165 Ohio St.3d 57, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 19-21.
       {¶ 43} A reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the
circumstances, a police officer has a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-
18 (1981). The officer “must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” (Internal quotations omitted.) United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of
objective justification, ‘that is, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or “hunch,” but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.’ ”
Jones, 2010-Ohio-2854 at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-57 (2d
Dist.1990). “In evaluating reasonable suspicion to support the propriety of a stop, a
reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop as
‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must
react to events as they unfold.’ ” State v. McCandlish, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-913, 2012-Ohio-
No. 23AP-92                                                                                               15

3765, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991). See also Terry at 21-
22.
        2. Analysis
        {¶ 44} Upon our review of the record and assuming the encounter began as
consensual,6 we conclude the trial court’s finding that the consensual nature ended before
Mr. Ivery began to run away from Officer Linhart is supported by competent, credible
evidence. (Decision and Entry at 7.)
        {¶ 45} While it is true that Mr. Ivery’s vehicle was not blocked by the cruiser, it is
clear from the conduct of the officer that Mr. Ivery was not free to leave the area. After
Officer Linhart parked his cruiser behind Mr. Ivery’s lawfully parked car, Mr. Ivery
immediately exited his vehicle and began walking away from the officer. At the suppression
hearing, Officer Linhart acknowledged that, during this encounter and before Mr. Ivery
began to run, he understood Mr. Ivery “obviously [did not] want to talk to [the officer]”
even though Mr. Ivery was answering Officer Linhart’s questions while he was in the
process of walking away. (Tr. at 18. See also Tr. at 67-68.) More pointedly, Officer Linhart
testified that “[i]t didn’t appear like [Mr. Ivery] wanted to talk to me because he was walking
away from me.” (Tr. at 40. See also Tr. at 67-68.) Nonetheless, despite Mr. Ivery clearly
conveying he did not want to engage with the officer and continuing to walk away from him,
Officer Linhart followed Mr. Ivery and repeatedly attempted to investigate him anyway.
(See State’s Ex. A; Tr. at 40-41, 67-68.)
        {¶ 46} At the hearing, Officer Linhart admitted he did not have a lawful basis to
conduct an investigatory seizure of Mr. Ivery at any point before Mr. Ivery began to run.
(See Tr. at 40-46, 60-61.) And, Officer Linhart conceded that, by continuing to follow and
ask Mr. Ivery questions while Mr. Ivery was walking away, he was investigating Mr. Ivery.
(See Tr. at 40-46.)
        {¶ 47} It is true that Mr. Ivery stopped and answered many of Officer Linhart’s
questions while he was in the midst of walking away. But that fact alone does not mean the
entire pre-flight encounter was consensual. On appeal, the state challenges the trial court’s
factual findings by contending that Mr. Ivery’s “actions, up until the point he took off

6 We note that because Mr. Ivery’s trial defense counsel agreed the encounter between Officer Linhart and Mr.

Ivery began as consensual, the trial court presumed this to be true and did not make any findings of fact or
legal determinations on this matter. (See Decision and Entry at 7.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                              16

running, in no way show that he does not wish to interact with Officer Linhart.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 16.) But, that claim is belied by Officer Linhart’s hearing testimony
that, prior to Mr. Ivery’s flight, it was obvious to the officer that Mr. Ivery did not want
to talk to him. (Tr. at 18, 40-41, 67-68.) As explained above, we defer to the trial court’s
findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. See, e.g., Burnside,
2003-Ohio-5372 at ¶ 8.
       {¶ 48} Although not required to establish Mr. Ivery’s consent to the encounter, we
note that Officer Linhart did not ask Mr. Ivery if he would be willing to answer some
questions—the assent to which would be clear evidence of choice—upon the officer’s initial
approach. Compare State v. Weisgarber, 2d Dist. No. 27525, 2017-Ohio-8764, ¶ 21;
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983). Officer Linhart also did not explain the
reasons he sought to question Mr. Ivery. Compare State v. Thompson, 2d Dist. No. 26130,
2014-Ohio-4244, ¶ 6-7. Nor did he inform Mr. Ivery at any point during the questioning
that he was free to leave. Compare Scarberry, 2016-Ohio-7065 at ¶ 46-47 (Sadler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, Officer Linhart—after parking his
cruiser behind the vehicle in which Mr. Ivery was lawfully seated and immediately exiting
his cruiser—began following and shouting out questions to Mr. Ivery. Officer Linhart
admitted he did this because he was trying to investigate Mr. Ivery despite having no
reasonable, articulable basis to suspect Mr. Ivery had committed, was in the process of
committing, or was about to commit any crime. (See Tr. at 31-46, 60-67.) Thus, at this
point, Mr. Ivery was well-within his rights to ignore the officer’s questions and walk away.
And, that is precisely what Mr. Ivery attempted to do.
       {¶ 49} In the absence of any context for such questioning, and based on the
testimony and evidence presented at the suppression hearing, we conclude that Officer
Linhart’s tone and compulsory language reasonably suggested the officer expected Mr.
Ivery to stop and answer his questions. This is particularly true when combined with the
officer’s continued pursuit and repeated attempts to question Mr. Ivery even after Mr. Ivery
disengaged and walked away at least three times before his flight. And, we agree with the
trial court’s assessment of the body camera footage as “clearly [showing Mr. Ivery] did not
want to answer Officer Linhart’s questions or interact with him.” (Decision and Entry at 7.)
No. 23AP-92                                                                               17

       {¶ 50} In the face of Mr. Ivery’s repeated efforts to terminate the encounter, then,
the intention behind Officer Linhart’s continued pursuit and questioning of Mr. Ivery is
transparent. His repeated engagement efforts and continued pursuit of Mr. Ivery even after
Mr. Ivery had clearly and repeatedly conveyed his intention to terminate the encounter
were a means to effectuate an investigatory seizure not supported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion. To be sure, Officer Linhart testified that had Mr. Ivery continued walking—
rather than running—away, he would have continued to follow and ask Mr. Ivery questions
but would not “have pursued him all the way into his apartment.” (See Tr. at 54-56. See
also Tr. at 67-68.)
       {¶ 51} The actions of Officer Linhart thus strongly communicated the message that
Mr. Ivery would not be free to leave until Officer Linhart’s curiosity was satisfied. Any act
of agreement or consent by Mr. Ivery upon Officer Linhart’s successive engagements was
not voluntarily and freely given, but rather, constituted an acquiescence to a showing of
police authority. Mr. Ivery was repeatedly prevented from exercising his right to walk away
because, each time he did, Officer Linhart followed and attempted to reengage him. The
cumulative, coercive effect of Officer Linhart’s conduct vitiated any consent to the
encounter that Mr. Ivery could have given, meaning that Mr. Ivery’s pre-flight interactions
with Officer Linhart’s merely served as “ ‘an expression of futility in resistance to [such]
authority.’ ” United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir.2011), quoting United
States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir.1999).
       {¶ 52} Affording due deference to the trial court’s factual findings and applying an
objective test in determining whether the encounter constituted a seizure for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment, we therefore conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of
this case, a reasonable person would not feel free to “disregard the police and go about his
business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628
(1991). The record thus supports the trial court’s finding that the consensual nature of the
encounter (during which a citizen is free to leave) between Mr. Ivery and Officer Linhart
terminated and became an investigative detention (during which a citizen is not free to
leave) before Mr. Ivery began to run away from the officer. The record also supports the
trial court’s determination that Officer Linhart did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion for an investigatory Terry stop before Mr. Ivery began running away from the
No. 23AP-92                                                                                 18

officer. (See Decision and Entry at 7.) Indeed, Officer Linhart admitted as much at the
suppression hearing (see Tr. at 32-46, 60-66), and his body-worn camera supported that
concession (see State’s Ex. A).
       {¶ 53} For these reasons, we find the trial court did not err in concluding that “an
unlawful detention and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment[]” occurred
before Mr. Ivery ran away. (Decision and Entry at 7.)

       D. Good Faith Exception
       {¶ 54} Having found the trial court did not err in holding the state failed to establish
the warrantless detention or stop of Mr. Ivery’s person was constitutionally reasonable, we
turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in suppressing evidence borne out by the
subsequent warrantless search as fruit of the poisonous tree.
       {¶ 55} “The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence secured by an
unconstitutional search and seizure.” Leak, 2016-Ohio-154 at ¶ 34, citing State v. Johnson,
141 Ohio St.3d 136, 2014-Ohio-5021, ¶ 40, citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394
(1914) (announcing the exclusionary rule), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(extending the exclusionary rule to the states).
       {¶ 56} The exclusionary rule is applied to evidence found as a result of an
unconstitutional search or seizure when its application will result in appreciable deterrence
of Fourth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Leak at ¶ 34; State v. Schubert, ___Ohio St.3d
___, 2022-Ohio-4604, ¶ 8. Under this doctrine, despite the unlawful seizure of evidence,
when “an officer acts with an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that his or her
conduct is lawful, the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule loses force,” and thus
does not support the exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence. Banks-Harvey, 2018-
Ohio-201 at ¶ 33. See also Leak at ¶ 35, citing Johnson at ¶ 50.
       {¶ 57} The good-faith exception may apply when an officer conducts an unlawful
search or seizure laboring under a mistake of law. See, e.g., State v. Stadelmann, 1st Dist.
No. C-130138, 2013-Ohio-5035, ¶ 10 (holding that because the officer had a good faith belief
that the defendant’s turn violated the relevant traffic law, the court properly denied his
motion to suppress despite the officer’s mistake of law); State v. Gunzenhauser, 5th Dist.
No. 09-CA-21, 2010-Ohio-761, ¶ 16 (“Under limited circumstances, courts have held that
the exclusionary rule may be avoided with respect to evidence obtained in a stop based on
No. 23AP-92                                                                                 19

conduct that a police officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believes is a violation of the law”);
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 67-68 (2014) (denial of defendant’s motion to
suppress was proper because officer’s mistaken belief that the law required two operating
headlights, instead of one, was objectively reasonable based on the circumstances).
       {¶ 58} However, the good-faith exception is limited. “ ‘Because courts must be
cautious in overlooking a police officer’s mistakes of law, the mistake must be objectively
reasonable.’ ” State v. Reedy, 5th Dist. No. 12-CA-1, 2012-Ohio-4899, ¶ 18, quoting
Gunzenhauser at ¶ 16. See also Heien at 61, citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949).
       {¶ 59} In this case, Officer Linhart acknowledged it was readily apparent that Mr.
Ivery did not want to engage with him. He also agreed that, before the flight, he did not
have a lawful basis to detain Mr. Ivery or otherwise restrict his movements. And, although
Officer Linhart testified Mr. Ivery was free to leave before the flight, his body-worn camera
footage and testimony belied that claim. Officer Linhart admitted Mr. Ivery attempted to
walk away from him multiple times, but he continued to pursue and question him anyway.
Officer Linhart agreed he did this because he was investigating Mr. Ivery even though the
officer conceded he had no reason to believe Mr. Ivery was involved in any criminal activity
at that time.
       {¶ 60} For these reasons, we find Officer Linhart’s belief that he was authorized to
continue to follow, question, and investigate Mr. Ivery when it was obvious to him that Mr.
Ivery did not consent to such encounter is not sufficiently reasonable to trigger the
protection of the good-faith exception. Accordingly, we conclude the warrantless search of
Mr. Ivery’s person was unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Because the
firearm was a fruit of that unconstitutional search, the trial court properly suppressed it.
See Xenia, 37 Ohio St.3d at 219; Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88.
       {¶ 61} Accordingly, we overrule the state’s sole assignment of error.
No. 23AP-92                                                                            20

III. CONCLUSION
      {¶ 62} Having overruled the state’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

                                                                     Judgment affirmed.
                          JAMISON and BOGGS, JJ., concur.