Court Opinion

ID: 9777123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:59:02.190653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:25.421881
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff-buyer sued defendant-seller of a used aircraft for the cost of repair and loss of use during time of repair of the aircraft which crashed because of a defect in the engine. Neither plaintiff nor defendant knew of the defect. Defendant had done no work on the engine and neither plaintiff nor defendant knew or reasonably could have known of the defect. Plaintiff made its own investigation and assessment of the condition of the aircraft before purchase and had access to the same information as the defendant.
The aircraft in question was sold “as is”; thus, it was sold with an express disclaimer of any implied warranty of fitness. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 2.316(c) (1968).
The sole question is whether strict liability in tort, as delineated by § 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) and as adopted by our Supreme Court in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 *943(Tex.1967) should be extended to include damage to the defective product itself. I am of the opinion that it should not.
The doctrine of strict liability in tort evolved in response to the failure of the law governing commercial transactions, partly because of the requirement for privity, to provide an adequate remedy for physical injuries resulting from the consumption and use of unreasonably dangerous products. The loss occasioned by such injuries was often great and the rationale of the evolving doctrine was that the manufacturer was better able to assume the loss or to distribute the loss to the consuming public.
It does not follow that strict liability in tort should be extended to compensate a buyer for unfulfilled commercial expectations. Liability for loss or damage to the product sold, as well as other commercial losses, is not only adequately but better governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Those losses are properly the subject of negotiation and contract between the parties. This is particularly true because the Restatement rule of strict liability in tort makes no distinction between new and used products and between the liability of the manufacturer and that of the intermediate seller or retailer. I would not extend the doctrine of strict liability in tort, willy-nilly, where the compelling social policy reasons for the doctrine do not exist. See, Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga.App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (Ct.App.1975); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd., 383 P.Supp. 1114 (D.S.C.1974); and Sales and Purdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous.L. Rev. 1, 141-143, 144-148 (1977).
I would reverse that portion of the trial court judgment which grants recovery to plaintiff against Mid Continent Aircraft Corporation and here render judgment that plaintiff take nothing as to that defendant.