Court Opinion

ID: 9943676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-24 01:09:42.044749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:43.402635
License: Public Domain

02/23/2024
       IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT JACKSON
                         Assigned on Briefs January 3, 2024

                 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRIS M. JONES

                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                      No. 08-05720       Chris Craft, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                          No. W2023-00591-CCA-R3-CD
                      ___________________________________

The petitioner, Chris M. Jones, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition filed
pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, wherein he sought DNA
testing of evidence related to his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted
second-degree murder. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MATTHEW J. WILSON, J.
joined. JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., not participating.

Chris M. Jones, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                       OPINION

                            Procedural and Factual History

      The petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree
murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, using a firearm during the commission of a
dangerous felony, and possession of a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served for
which he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department
of Correction. See State v. Jones, No. W2009-01698-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 856375, at
*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011). This Court
affirmed the petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal, and the Tennessee
Supreme Court denied his application for permission to appeal. Id. The facts giving rise
to the petitioner’s convictions were summarized by this Court on direct appeal as follows:

             This case arises from a parking dispute which ultimately resulted in
      the death of Donald Munsey at the Windjammer karaoke bar in the early
      morning hours of March 14, 2008.

      ....

              Justin Smith testified that he was sitting in his truck when the
      [petitioner’s] truck “[j]ust came flying in around the corner . . . [and] almost
      hit [his] truck in parking.” Mr. Smith further testified that he felt he would
      not be able to get his truck out of the parking spot because of the way the
      [petitioner] had parked his truck. However, Mr. Smith waited until the
      [petitioner] had gone inside the bar to speak to him about his truck. Once
      inside, the [petitioner] sat down with Ms. Lampley and Mary at a table near
      the front door and ordered a beer. Mr. Smith then approached the [petitioner]
      to discuss how the two trucks were parked. The testimony at trial presented
      several conflicting versions of exactly what was said during this
      conversation.

              Kimberly Guest, the waitress working at Windjammer that night,
      testified that Mr. Smith asked the [petitioner] if it was his truck outside and
      “if he could possibly move it because . . . the trucks were close and [he] didn’t
      want to hit his truck.” Ms. Guest testified that “there was no indication that
      there was any kind of problem,” there was no physical contact between the
      two men, and she did not hear any “threatening language.” Stephanie
      Ravinuthala, a patron at the bar that night, testified that Mr. Smith asked the
      [petitioner] if he drove a gray truck and told the [petitioner] that he was
      “parked like three inches from [Mr. Smith’s] bumper and [Mr. Smith could
      not] get out.” Ms. Ravinuthala also testified that Mr. Smith did not appear
      to be belligerent and that she did not recall Mr. Smith cursing at the
      [petitioner].

              Mr. Smith testified that when he asked the [petitioner] to move his
      truck, the [petitioner] responded by saying “f**k you . . . I’m not moving it.”
      On cross-examination, Mr. Smith repeatedly denied threatening or being
      aggressive with the [petitioner] but admitted that after the [petitioner] told
      him “f**k you,” he was “rude” toward the [petitioner]. However, Ms.
      Lampley testified that Mr. Smith approached the [petitioner] intoxicated,
                                            -2-
“very loud, very arrogant” before asking the [petitioner] “if that was his
f***ing truck outside.” Ms. Lampley testified that the [petitioner] was very
calm during this exchange and told Mr. Smith he would move his truck when
Mr. Smith was ready to leave.

        At some point after their conversation, both Mr. Smith and the
[petitioner] went outside. Gary Miller was working at the front door,
checking IDs, that night and testified that he overheard the two men
“discussing the way the [trucks] were parked.” Mr. Miller also testified that
at some point two or three other men joined the conversation. According to
Mr. Miller, the [petitioner] asked the men “did they not realize that he was a
police officer by the tag that was on the truck.” Mr. Miller further testified
that there was no physical contact between the [petitioner] and any of the
three or four people with him. Mr. Smith testified that he went outside with
the [petitioner] because the [petitioner] “wanted to show me his license
plate.” The [petitioner] told Mr. Smith that “he was a cop and he had the tag
on his truck.” Mr. Smith testified that after their conversation outside, he did
not speak to the [petitioner] again that evening.

       Mr. Smith’s friend, William Bobbitt, testified that he was near the
front door when Mr. Smith and the [petitioner] went to look at the trucks. On
their way back to the front door, Mr. Bobbitt overheard the [petitioner] say
that he was not going to move his truck and that Mr. Smith should look at his
license plate. Someone asked the [petitioner] what he meant by this, and he
replied that he was a police officer. Mr. Bobbitt testified that the [petitioner]
spoke with an aggressive tone but that there was no physical contact between
the [petitioner] and anyone outside. Mr. Bobbitt further testified that
everyone went back inside after Mr. Munsey stepped outside and told them
to come in.

         Ms. Lampley testified that before the [petitioner] and Mr. Smith went
outside, Mr. Smith made a phone call and a short time later “[a]bout [ten]
guys around the age of 21 to 25 showed up” and were looking at the
[petitioner]. Ms. Lampley testified that the [petitioner] looked scared when
he came back inside. Ms. Lampley testified that she felt threatened because
this group of men continued to stare at the [petitioner] and her. However, on
cross[-]examination Ms. Lampley admitted that she was “making some jump
here . . . that Mr. Smith called people and that as a result of those calls, people
arrived.”

....
                                       -3-
       After the [petitioner] reentered the bar, David Eagan approached him
to discuss the parking situation . . . . Mr. Eagan testified that he “asked [the
petitioner] to move his truck and . . . just to calm down and everything was
going to be okay . . . .”

        Several witnesses saw the confrontation between the [petitioner] and
Mr. Eagan inside the bar. Ms. Ravinuthala testified that she saw Mr. Eagan
“lean[ ] down into [the petitioner’s] face” when he spoke to him and that the
petitioner responded by standing up and getting in Mr. Eagan’s face. Joe
Reynolds was working at the bar that night and testified that he saw the
[petitioner] and Mr. Eagan “talking about the parking place or something.”
Mr. Reynolds testified that the [petitioner] had an ink pen in his hand and
was “gripping [it] so tight that his knuckles were white.” Mr. Reynolds
decided to get Mr. Eagan to move away from the [petitioner] . . . .

....

        Mr. Reynolds approached the [petitioner] and had a second
conversation with him as the [petitioner] stared at Mr. Eagan and Mr. Smith.
Mr. Reynolds asked the [petitioner] if he was okay, and the [petitioner]
pointed at Mr. Eagan and said, “I’m going to kill that motherf***er right
there.” Then the [petitioner] pointed at Mr. Smith and said, “I’m fixing to
kill his punk ass buddy and if any of his buddies over there even approach
me, I’m going to kill all of them motherf***ers.” Mr. Reynolds told the
[petitioner] to calm down, and the [petitioner] responded by saying, “I’ve
lost my wife and I’ve lost my family and I’ve lost my home and I got nothing
else to lose.” Ms. Flynn and Ms. Ravinuthala both overheard the [petitioner]
threaten to kill Mr. Smith and Mr. Eagan. Mr. Flynn overheard the
[petitioner] say he had nothing left to lose. Ms. Flynn testified that the
[petitioner] was clenching and unclenching his fists as he spoke with Mr.
Reynolds. Mr. Flynn also testified that the [petitioner] seemed very upset as
he spoke with Mr. Reynolds. Mr. Reynolds again told the [petitioner] to calm
down but was called away to the office to answer a telephone call.

....

      After Mr. Reynolds left the [petitioner], Mr. Eagan paid his bar tab
and began to walk toward the door. The [petitioner] pulled out a gun, ran
toward Mr. Eagan, grabbed Mr. Eagan by his shirt collar, and put a gun to

                                     -4-
       his head. Mr. Eagan testified that the [petitioner] said, “I’m going to kill you.
       I have nothing to lose.”

              The testimony at trial presented conflicting accounts of what
       happened next. Mr. Flynn testified that the bar was crowded that night and
       there were lots of people standing near the [petitioner] and Mr. Eagan. Ms.
       Guest testified that she was near the [petitioner] and overheard him say,
       “who’s the tough guy now, motherf***er . . . the tough guy’s got the gun.”
       Ms. Guest further testified that she asked the [petitioner] “please don’t do
       this” when Mr. Munsey grabbed the [petitioner] from behind. According to
       Ms. Guest, Mr. Eagan then fainted, knocking down the [petitioner], Mr.
       Munsey, and Ms. Guest as he fell to the floor. Ms. Guest then heard two or
       three gunshots and saw that Mr. Munsey had been shot in the neck.

                Mr. Bobbitt testified that he and Mr. Munsey were in the kitchen when
       they saw the [petitioner] grab Mr. Eagan. Mr. Bobbitt also testified that he
       did not see a gun from where they were standing. Mr. Bobbitt and Mr.
       Munsey then charged toward the [petitioner] and tackled him. All four men
       fell to the ground; however, Mr. Bobbitt testified that while the men were on
       the ground, no one hit the [petitioner]. Mr. Bobbitt also testified that Ms.
       Guest was not involved at all. Mr. Bobbitt then heard two gunshots and ran
       out of the building. Mr. Smith similarly testified that Mr. Bobbitt and Mr.
       Munsey tackled the [petitioner]. After hearing the first gunshot, Mr. Smith
       ran out the front door, and out of the corner of his eye, he saw the [petitioner]
       aiming the gun at him. Mr. Smith was then shot in the buttock. Mr. Eagan
       testified that he did not remember anything after he fell to the ground.

               Mr. Flynn and Ms. Ravinuthala both testified that they saw Mr.
       Munsey tackle the [petitioner] and that both men and Mr. Eagan fell to the
       floor. Ms. Ravinuthala testified that she saw the [petitioner] and Mr. Munsey
       “wrestle” on the ground for a minute. The [petitioner] then pulled himself
       up, aimed his gun at Mr. Munsey’s head, and fired it. Next, the [petitioner]
       turned and aimed his gun at Mr. Smith before firing a second time. Mr.
       Miller had left the bar earlier to run an errand, and when he returned, he
       discovered Mr. Munsey’s body lying on the floor with Ms. Guest kneeling
       next to him. Mr. Miller saw the [petitioner] seated by the front door. He told
       the [petitioner] to remove the magazine from his gun and to lay them on a
       table, and the [petitioner] complied.

Id. at *1-5.

                                             -5-
        In May 2013, the petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief.
After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner
feigned mental illness and that the petition was, therefore, untimely. Jones v. State, No.
W2017-00405-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 3157013, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 27, 2018),
no perm app. filed. On appeal, this Court affirmed the ruling of the post-conviction court.
Id. at *1.

       In February 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based
on “actual innocence” and “newly discovered evidence.” Jones v. State, No. W2017-
00706-CCA-R3-ECN, 2018 WL 2264088 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 17, 2018), no perm. app.
filed. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that it had been filed outside the statute
of limitations and that the petitioner failed to present new evidence. On appeal, this Court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Id. at *6.

       In March 2023, the petitioner filed the instant petition requesting DNA analysis of
the shell casings collected at the crime scene under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis
Act. The petitioner claimed that the casings were not originally subjected to DNA analysis
and that touch DNA analysis, which was not available at the time of his trial, would have
prevented his prosecution and conviction as it would have established his actual innocence.
On April 1, 2023, the post-conviction court entered a written order summarily dismissing
the petition. In support of its ruling, the post-conviction court held,

       Even if those shell casings still existed more than 14 years after his
       conviction, and DNA were found on those casings that did not belong to the
       [petitioner], that would in no way prove the [petitioner]’s innocence. It
       would at most prove that someone else may have touched those casings,
       either when loading them into a gun clip he used or in collecting or storing
       them during the years that have passed from the shooting in 2008, 15 years
       after the killing of the victim. Again, this 2007 shooting was observed by
       many persons during the struggle that occurred prior to the shooting, and at
       trial several witnesses at the bar testified that they saw the shooting, and there
       was no testimony that any other gun was fired by anyone else on the scene
       when the victim fell, shot in the neck, by the [petitioner]. This court, pursuant
       to Tenn. Code Ann. §40-30-304 (1), finds that a reasonable probability does
       not exist that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if
       other DNA would be found on these casings through DNA analysis, because
       several eye witnesses observed the shooting committed by [the petitioner]
       and any test results would not be exculpatory. This court also finds, pursuant
       to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-305(1), that a reasonable probability does not
       exist that if DNA were found that does not belong to the [petitioner] on those
       shell casings, that those results would have rendered the petitioner’s verdict
                                              -6-
       or sentence more favorable if the results had been available at his trial. This
       motion should therefore be dismissed without the appointment of an attorney.

       This timely appeal followed.

                                         Analysis

        On appeal, the petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred in summarily
dismissing his claim and in doing so without the appointment of counsel. The State insists
the record supports the post-conviction court’s determination that the petitioner failed to
make a prima facie case for DNA analysis, and, therefore, the court did not err in dismissing
the instant petition without the appointment of counsel. Upon our review of the record and
the applicable law, we agree with the State and affirm the ruling of the post-conviction
court.

       The Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“the Act”) provides that a
petitioner convicted of specific offenses, including first-degree murder,

       may at any time, file a petition requesting the forensic DNA analysis of any
       evidence that is in the possession or control of the prosecution, law
       enforcement, laboratory, or court, and that is related to the investigation or
       prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction and that may contain
       biological evidence.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-303. “[T]here is no statutory time limit on requests for testing
and ‘the right to DNA analysis under the Act may not be waived by implication.’” Powers
v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 48 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Griffin v. State, 182 S.W.3d 795, 799
(Tenn. 2006)); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-303 (providing that a petitioner “may at any
time” file a petition for DNA analysis) (emphasis added).

       A post-conviction court is given considerable discretion in determining whether to
grant the petitioner relief under the Act. Haddox v. State, No. M2003-00514-CCA-R3-PC,
2004 WL 2544668, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2004) (citing Shuttle v. State, No.
E2003-00131-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 199826, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2004)).
Consequently, this Court will not reverse a post-conviction court’s judgment unless it is
not supported by substantial evidence. Id. (first citing State v. Hollingsworth, 647 S.W.2d
937, 938 (Tenn. 1983); and then citing Ensley v. State, No. M2002-01609-CCA-R3-PC,
2003 WL 1868647, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2003)).

                                            -7-
       Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-304 is mandatory, providing that once the
State has been notified and given the opportunity to respond, the court shall order DNA
analysis pursuant to the Act if it finds that:

              (1) A reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have
       been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained
       through DNA analysis;
              (2) The evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that DNA
       analysis may be conducted;
              (3) The evidence was never previously subjected to DNA analysis or
       was not subjected to the analysis that is now requested which could resolve
       an issue not resolved by previous analysis; and
              (4) The application for analysis is made for the purpose of
       demonstrating innocence and not to unreasonably delay the execution of
       sentence or administration of justice.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-304. The Act also has a discretionary section, which states that
after the State has been notified and given the opportunity to respond, the post-conviction
court may order DNA analysis if it finds that “[a] reasonable probability exists that analysis
of the evidence will produce DNA results that would have rendered the petitioner’s verdict
or sentence more favorable if the results had been available at the proceeding leading to
the judgment of conviction,” and the petitioner has satisfied the other three requirements.
Id. § 40-30-305. Under either the mandatory or discretionary sections, all four
requirements must be met before DNA analysis will be ordered by the court. Powers, 343
S.W.3d at 48.

        Here, the post-conviction court based its summary dismissal on both sections 40-
30-304 and 40-30-305. Therefore, we must determine whether the criteria of this
mandatory section were established by the petitioner. While all four criteria must be
satisfied before DNA testing is required under section 40-30-304, the most important
criterion in this case is the first, namely whether “[a] reasonable probability exists that the
petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been
obtained through DNA analysis[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-304(1). A reasonable
probability is “‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Powers,
343 S.W.3d at 54 (quoting Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009)).
Consequently, before a mandatory order of testing is given, the petitioner must establish
“‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence’ in the decision to prosecute or in the
conviction had the State or the jury known of exculpatory DNA testing results.” Id. at 55.

      When considering whether section 40-30-304(1) has been established, we must
“begin with the proposition that DNA analysis will prove to be exculpatory.” Id. (footnote
                                             -8-
omitted) (first citing Payne v. State, W2007-01096-CCA-R3-PD, 2007 WL 4258178, at
*10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2007); and then citing Shuttle, 2004 WL 199826, at *5).
“While courts must also consider the evidence that was presented against the petitioner at
trial, the evidence must be viewed in light of the effect that exculpatory DNA evidence
would have had on the fact-finder or the State.” Id. (citing Haddox, 2004 WL 2544668, at
*5).

        This Court has recognized that the facts of the offense are “paramount” to this
Court’s review of an issue under the Act. Greenleaf, Jr. v. State, No. M2009-01975-CCA-
R3-CD, 2010 WL 2244099, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2010). However, “the post-
conviction court is not required by the Act to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to decide
whether testing should be granted . . . .” Powers, 343 S.W.3d at 56. When considering the
effect that exculpatory DNA evidence would have had on the fact-finder or the State, the
post-conviction court must consider all available evidence, including the proof presented
at trial and any stipulations of fact made by either party. Id. at 55-56; Shuttle, 2004 WL
199826, at *4; Mitchell v. State, No. M2002-01500-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 1868649, at *4
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2003). “The recitation of the facts contained in prior appellate
opinions may be helpful in determining what facts and evidence were presented at trial.”
Powers, 343 S.W.3d at 56. However, “[t]he ‘reasonable probability’ inquiry under section
40-30-304(1) of the Act requires courts to look at the effect the exculpatory DNA evidence
would have had on the evidence at the time of trial or at the time the decision to prosecute
was made, not on the evidence as construed by an appellate court in the light most favorable
to the State.” Id. at 57 (footnote omitted).

       Here, the identity of the petitioner as the shooter was not in question. Several
eyewitnesses testified to hearing the petitioner threaten Mr. Eagan. They then witnessed
the petitioner grab Mr. Eagan, point his gun at Mr. Eagan, again threaten to kill Mr. Eagan,
and then shoot Mr. Eagan. The witnesses then saw the petitioner point his gun at Mr.
Smith, who was fleeing the bar, and shoot him. Based on the proof, even if the petitioner’s
requested DNA testing produced the DNA of someone other than the petitioner, this
evidence would not be exculpatory because it simply shows that someone else touched the
shell casings at some time. As noted by the trial court, any DNA could have come from
someone other than the petitioner loading the weapon or from someone handling the
casings when or after they were collected at the crime scene. Accordingly, no reasonable
probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if this
evidence had been obtained through DNA analysis. Therefore, the post-conviction court
properly exercised its discretion in summarily dismissing the petition in this case.

      Additionally, the petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in failing to
appoint him counsel. The Act, however, does not entitle the petitioner to the appointment
of counsel. Rather, the appointment of counsel is discretionary under the Act. See id. §
                                            -9-
40-30-307 (providing that the court “may” appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner).
Moreover, it is well established that the Act’s procedures do not violate due process. See
Estate of Alley v. State, 648 S.W.3d 201, 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2021) (recognizing that
the state-imposed requirements for obtaining DNA analysis under the Act do not create
any unconstitutional deprivation of due process rights). Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in summarily dismissing the petition without the appointment of counsel.

                                        Conclusion

       Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the dismissal of the
petition.

                                              ____________________________________
                                              J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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