Court Opinion

ID: 9770291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:57:42.738153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.402304
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
When a prosecutrix’s evidence “is of a contradictory nature or, when applied to the admitted facts in the case, her testimony is not convincing and leaves the mind of the court clouded with doubts, [then] she must be corroborated or a judgment cannot be sustained.” State v. Baldwin, 571 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Mo.1978). See also State v. Phillips, 585 S.W.2d 517 (Mo.App.1979); State v. Burton, 355 Mo. 467, 196 S.W.2d 621 (1946); State v. Guye, 299 Mo. 348, 252 S.W. 955 (1923); State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9 (1908).
The prosecutrix’s testimony is replete with contradictions. To give a few notable examples: First, after defendant had entered the house and told prosecutrix, “I want some”, and after he had put his hands on her and been told “in a nice way to stop, prosecutrix left defendant, went into the kitchen, and telephoned a friend, Lou-rine Amos. During the conversation, Lou-rine told prosecutrix that defendant would rape her. Prosecutrix denied that he would and Lourine reiterated her opinion. Prose-cutrix concluded their lengthy conversation by saying she was going to put her daughters to bed and wash her hair. These are not the concerns of a woman who is afraid a man is about to rape her.
Second, prosecutrix admitted at trial that she had told defense counsel prior to trial that no man could take her body unless she wanted him to, that she could fight and protect herself against a man. She also admitted she told defense counsel that defendant had not threatened her in any way and that she had offered no resistance.
Third, prosecutrix testified that defendant pulled her away from the phone until “it popped it loose”, until “[i]t came apart.” After the alleged rape, when she told him that he “done tore up [her] phone”, defendant replied “ ‘Naw, I can put it back together’, and that’s what he did.” This hardly sounds like the conversation one would expect between the alleged victim and the man who has raped her and caused her to fear for the lives of herself and her children, nor does it seem reasonable that a rapist would so readily provide the means for the victim to call the police.
Fourth, prosecutrix told defendant’s sister, “I raped Leroy [defendant] and he’s gonna take the blame.” This statement was made one day after the alleged rape. This was before she claimed to have rejoined the church whose philosophy it was to “suffer the wrong.” Neither had she then talked to defense counsel’s investigator. With regard to the statement that prosecutrix raped defendant, it was not prosecutrix’s explanation that she was probably not “talking sense.” This is what someone else said.
*358Fifth, prosecutrix admitted that she had been told that if she did not testify she would go to jail. She admitted further that she was also told that if she did not testify, her children might be taken away. Prose-cutrix admitted she told defense counsel prior to trial that she would say anything she had to, to keep from going to jail.
No man should have to serve a penitentiary sentence for rape based on the unsupported testimony of a witness who vacillated the way this witness did. The prosecu-trix, generally in response to leading and suggestive questions put to her by the prosecutor, attempted various rationalizations of her contradictory statements and behavior. But she cannot corroborate herself. With no outside corroboration, it is difficult to say what happened. One’s mind is truly “clouded with doubts.” The uncertainty affects both critical issues: lack of consent and forcible compulsion. A case like this shows the wisdom of the requirement of corroboration, a doctrine which has been the law of Missouri at least as far back as 1908, State v. Goodale, supra. Corroboration is completely lacking here and for that reason the rape charge should never have been submitted to the jury.
Further, I would disagree with the principal opinion’s finding that sexual abuse in the third degree is not a lesser-included offense of rape. “In rape,” the principal opinion concludes, “purposes and motive are irrelevant.” What the principal opinion is saying is that the element of sexual contact (defined in § 566.010.1(3), RSMo 1978)1 is not included within the element of sexual intercourse (defined in § 566.010.1(1)) because the legislature found no need to require, as it did for sexual contact, that sexual intercourse be “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.” It is, however, understandable that the legislature did not expressly so require. It was entirely unnecessary. The “purpose and motive” of sexual desire are already there. It is not that sexual desire or arousal are “irrelevant” to the crime of rape; they are an inescapable part of rape, whereas in the ease of a “touching” (§ 566.010.1(3)) which is not sexual intercourse, it is possible that such “purpose and motive” are not present.
To say that the sexual intercourse required for rape does not carry with it the element of being “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire” of the man ignores what every normal man knows accompanies the anatomical prerequisite for penetration. The arousal or gratification of sexual desire is a part of sexual intercourse just as food is part of a meal. Sexual contact accompanies sexual intercourse. Thus, the act of rape necessarily includes “sexual contact” as a part of “sexual intercourse” and hence the instruction on sexual abuse in the third degree should have been given. The latter crime is established by proof of sexual intercourse (which certainly is sexual contact) without the consent of prosecutrix. These elements are part of the proof required for rape and, under § 556.046.1(1), would make sexual abuse in the third degree an included offense of rape. There was evidence to support the foregoing and, under the then in force Rule 20.02, now found in Rule 28.02(a), and § 546.-070(4), RSMo 1978, the court was required to give the instruction. It was reversible error not to do so. State v. Smith, 592 S.W.2d 165 (Mo.banc 1979).
BARDGETT, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent and concur in the dissent of Seiler, J., except for that part of the dissent which states that sexual abuse in the third degree should have been submitted as a lesser included offense of rape.

. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to RSMo 1978.