Court Opinion

ID: 9402828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-17 06:10:20.698917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.785318
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed June 15, 2023

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                              No. 11-22-00359-CV
                                  __________

        IN THE INTEREST OF M.M. AND P.M., CHILDREN

                      On Appeal from the 91st District Court
                            Eastland County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. CV2146213

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court, based upon the jury’s
verdict, terminated the parental rights of the father to the children, M.M. and P.M.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2022). Appellant, the father, filed this
appeal. In three issues, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
termination of his parental rights. We affirm the order of termination.
                         Termination Findings and Standards
      The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. FAM. §§ 161.001(b), 161.206(a), (a-1). To terminate one’s parental rights
under Section 161.001, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. In this case, the trial court
terminated Appellant’s parental rights in accordance with the jury’s verdict. After
being instructed pursuant to Sections 161.001(b) and 161.003(a), the jury answered
the questions posed in the trial court’s charge. The jury found that Appellant had
committed three of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in
subsections (D), (E), and (O). Specifically, the jury found that Appellant had
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or
surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. See
id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The jury also found that Appellant had engaged in conduct
or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that
endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.                  See id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). Finally, the jury found that Appellant failed to comply with the
provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions Appellant needed
to take to obtain the return of his children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
      In addition to the findings under Section 161.001(b)(1), the jury also found,
pursuant to Section 161.003, that Appellant has a mental or emotional illness or a
mental deficiency that renders him unable to provide for the physical, emotional,
and mental needs of the children; that Appellant’s illness or deficiency will, in all
reasonable probability, continue until the children’s eighteenth birthdays; that the
Department of Family and Protective Services has been the managing conservator
of the children for the six months preceding the termination hearing; and that the
Department had made reasonable efforts to return the children to the parents. See
id. § 161.003(a)(1)–(4).
      Finally, the jury found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would
be in the best interest of the children. See id. §§ 161.001(b)(2), 161.0003(a)(5).
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      To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination
case, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that its finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).
To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the
finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably
form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent.
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the jury is the sole arbiter
of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex.
2014) (citing In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)).
      With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not
limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now
and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the
child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship
is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best
interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.

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                       Procedural and Factual Background
      Immediately after P.M. was born, the Department quickly became concerned
about the welfare of both M.M. and P.M. The trial record revealed a long history of
allegations of abuse or neglect against the mother and Appellant as to other children.
Allegations of abuse and neglect dated back to 2016 for the mother and 2005 for
Appellant. All of the allegations of abuse or neglect to the parents’ older children
occurred outside of the State of Texas. There was also a prior allegation of neglect
of M.M. in California, and when she was three months old, M.M. was removed from
the parents’ care for approximately thirteen months beginning in October 2019.
M.M. was returned to her parents’ care on a monitored return in November 2020—
prior to the family moving to Texas.
      Both the mother and Appellant had been previously diagnosed with mental
illness and mental disorders. The mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. Appellant was diagnosed with narcissistic
traits, histrionic traits, and some compulsive traits. Appellant also described his
relationship with the mother as “like a drug to him”—when she was gone “it was the
worst experience he could fathom,” and when they were together, “he was in
heaven.” Appellant exhibited some codependent behaviors placing the mother’s
needs before the needs and safety of his children.
      Evidence of the mother’s lack of ability to care for the children was presented
in letters written by Appellant and his four eldest children in June 2017. The letters
detail neglectful, abusive, and manipulative behaviors by the mother, in an effort to
gain custody of one of the mother’s biological children who had been living with the
family. Despite these claims of neglect and abuse, at the time of trial Appellant was
still in a relationship with the mother and either denied or made excuses for the
mother’s detrimental behavior described in his 2017 letter.

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      According to testimony from an investigator with the Department, the first
service plan for the parents in Texas was created approximately two months before
M.M. was removed from her parents’ care. At that time, the service plan instructed
the parents that they could not live in their Cisco, Texas residence with M.M.
because there were hazards in the home, and that M.M. was to remain with family
in Lampasas, Texas. The Cisco residence was described as a “schoolhouse” that, as
of May 2021, had no windows, glass on the floor, piles of trash, a bottle of urine and
a bucket of feces on the floor, with standing water and raw sewage—all of which
were accessible to the child, M.M. One of the images admitted into evidence also
depicted a man and a child sitting between two tents in one of the rooms, with ladders
leaning against the wall. The investigator indicated that the family was living in
tents set up in the schoolhouse at that time. Another Department investigator
described the smell as “atrocious” and testified that she did not observe any toys,
appropriate bedding, clean bottles or cups, or adequate food during the visit.
Appellant testified that despite the bucket of feces and bottle of urine, the lack of air
conditioning, or the state of the Cisco residence, Appellant had blocked off certain
areas and believed it to be safe for children.
      In July 2021, law enforcement alerted the Department that immediate
response was needed at a restaurant. An investigator testified that M.M. was in a
vehicle in her car seat with her half-brother,1 and that the vehicle was turned off.
M.M. was described as dirty, wet, sweaty, and smelling of body odor, feces, and
urine. An investigator for the Department testified that, at that time, M.M.’s basic
needs were not being met. A new family plan was created following the removal of
M.M. The primary permanency goal was family reunification. During this time, the
mother was pregnant with P.M. After P.M. was born in December 2021, a new

      1
       M.M.’s 22-year-old half-brother, lives with Appellant and M.M.’s mother and is autistic.
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family plan was created for P.M., and the primary permanency goal at that time was
also family reunification.
      Cynthia Newton, a licensed clinical social worker, testified that she was
assigned to work with Appellant and the mother—both individually and as a couple.
Newton eventually stopped working with the mother after she voluntarily
relinquished her parental rights to both M.M. and P.M. prior to the termination
hearing. Newton established several objectives for the sessions with Appellant: to
identify triggers for angry outbursts and identify coping skills to manage his anger,
to identify protective parenting skills and how to apply those to the supervised
visitation with his children, and to identify past controlling behaviors in his
relationship and how to positively interact with his partner and have effective and
open communication in his relationship. However, Newton reported that none of
these objectives were completed.
      Regarding their ability and success in creating a safe and healthy home
environment, Newton testified to a lack of personal hygiene that Appellant and the
mother appeared to have. Instead of responding to questions about personal hygiene,
they would ignore or not answer direct questions about how recently they had
bathed. Newton testified that during the sessions with Appellant, he was often
disheveled, dirty, and smelled strongly of body odor. Appellant told Newton on
more than one occasion that he liked dirt because it made him feel as though he had
worked. These attitudes were reflected in the condition of the home and the care of
the children. Newton testified that the parents did not understand why the home
needed to be cleaned or why there was such a concern for the level of cleanliness in
the home. The mother indicated that when she did not feel well, she would simply
put trash on the floor for later—or it would be disposed of by Appellant or his autistic
son who lived with them. This conduct occurred in the bathroom as well as other
areas of the home. Appellant indicated in sessions with Newton that the mother’s
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refusal to help clean was very frustrating for him. Again, Newton expressed that, in
trying to address cleanliness and hygiene issues, the parents would often deflect and
look for someone else to blame.
        Three of Appellant’s adult children testified during the hearing. Two of those
children testified that they were removed as children from their parents’ care due to
lack of cleanliness in the home and of the children. One daughter testified that, when
she was a child, the family did not focus on sweeping or mopping all the time—or
taking showers—and that the family was “definitely not the most hygienic.” Even
after she no longer lived with her father and would return to visit, the home “was not
kept the best” and would usually smell like urine. She testified that the new home
the family was living in was vastly improved from what she had seen previously and
just needed “a really, really good wipe down.”
        Although, Newton testified—and Appellant affirmed in his own testimony—
that Appellant indicated that he would choose the children over his wife, Newton
also stated that Appellant later told her that he could not be forced to choose his
children over his wife. Notwithstanding the mother’s termination of parental rights,
at the time of trial, Appellant testified that he and the mother were still living together
because the children were not in the home at that time. Appellant also testified that
he believes that he must be patient with her and show her mercy because she is his
wife.
        Newton testified that the last two sessions she had with Appellant were hostile
and oppressive and led her to contact law enforcement during their final session.
She testified that Appellant used the Bible as a tool for veiled threats that were
directed to her and others who were working the case. Appellant explained that he
was preaching the Bible, and stated, “The Bible says you reap what you sow. If you
take away something from somebody else, then God will reckon with that.” The
court-appointed special advocate (CASA) for the case also testified that, although
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her communications with Appellant were appropriate at first, they became harassing
and threatening and text messages would arrive at all hours of the day or night. The
2INgage permanency case manager for the case also received harassing telephone
and electronic messages which threatened the case manager, the case manager’s
wife, and the case manager’s children. The 2INgage permanency case manager
explained: “When things do not go [Appellants] way, [Appellant] turns very hateful
and very -- very hostile. It immediately goes to -- it immediately goes to threats.”
      Appellant also showed Newton pictures taken on his phone of those
caseworkers and court personnel involved in investigating or monitoring the case—
pictures which included the children of those individuals. When asked about these
images at trial, Appellant testified that he was concerned about the qualifications of
“any of the case-workers or anybody in the investigation” and felt that because he
was being investigated, he should also be able to investigate people—and that he did
not think it would be a problem because the images were publicly available on
Facebook. Appellant stated that the biblical messages sent to caseworkers in this
case were similar to messages that Appellant had sent to prior caseworkers when
living in California.
      The case manager testified that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was
in the best interest of the children because Appellant failed to demonstrate the ability
to provide safe and stable housing, failed to acknowledge the reasons for the children
being removed, failed to acknowledge or address his own mental health issues, and
failed to address or acknowledge the volatile relationship with the mother, whose
rights to the children have been terminated, or Appellant’s codependency on the
mother, which relationship he prioritizes over that of the children. The case manager
and the foster mother both testified that—in the event Appellant’s parental rights
were terminated—the foster mother would like to adopt M.M. and P.M. The case
manager indicated that the placement with the foster family was a safe and stable
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home and environment for the children, and is the home that two of their older
brothers were adopted into.
                                      Analysis
      Endangering Conduct
      In Appellant’s first issue, he challenges the findings made by the trial court
under Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E) and (O). Due process mandates a heightened
standard of review when addressing a parent’s challenge to a trial court’s findings
under subsection (D) or (E) “because of the potential consequences [of those
findings] for parental rights to a different child.” See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230,
234–35 (Tex. 2019) (appellate court must provide a detailed analysis if affirming the
termination on either of these grounds).
      Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the
endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s conduct,
including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re D.O., 338 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.). Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must
be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and
conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625,
634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228
(Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.). The offending conduct need not be directed at
the child, nor does the child actually have to suffer an injury. In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding under subsection (E), “endangering conduct is not limited to
actions directed towards the child.” Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd,
727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). The endangering conduct may include the
parent’s actions before the child’s birth and may relate to the parent’s actions while
the parent had custody of other children. Id.; In re S.T., No. 11-19-00363-CV, 2020
WL 2610393, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 18, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
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(upholding the finding under subsection (E) based upon parent’s conduct with other
children).
      The record shows that M.M. and P.M., were endangered as a direct result of
Appellant’s conduct. While M.M. was in Appellant’s care, he failed to properly care
for her personal hygiene, left her unattended in a vehicle without air conditioning
circulating in the summer, and could not understand why his conduct and omissions
could be harmful to a child. Appellant also referred to “your cleanliness standards”
(versus his own lack of standards), rather than making changes to his own personal
hygiene habits or acknowledging the need to create better hygiene for his children.
Further, although P.M. was removed from the parents’ care before she experienced
the same circumstances as M.M., the extensive history of poor personal hygiene and
deficient care of the children in Appellant’s custody demonstrated danger to the
health and well-being of P.M. For instance, placing children in unsanitary habitats
and leaving children in closed vehicles during Texas summer months to eat lunch
with his wife are Appellant’s choices that directly endanger the well-being of the
children and indicate a lack of understanding of what is required to care for a child
and be a responsible parent. Moreover, Appellant continued to live with his wife,
whose parental rights were voluntarily relinquished, showing that Appellant
prioritized his marital relationship over the needs of his children. Appellants failure
to prioritize the children’s needs continued, even after he acknowledged that the
mother was an unfit parent and complained about her continued negative impact on
any efforts to improve household cleanliness.
      Based on the evidence presented, the trial court could have reasonably found
by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant had engaged in a course of conduct
that endangered the children. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. Therefore, we hold
that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding
under Subsection (E). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. Because
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only one statutory ground is necessary to support termination and because we have
upheld the jury’s finding as to Subsection (E), we need not address Appellant’s
allegations as to Subsections (D) and (O), or Appellant’s second issue. See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1); N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234–35; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
      Best Interest
      In Appellant’s third issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s findings that termination of his parental rights would be in
the best interest of M.M. and P.M.
      With respect to M.M. and P.M.’s best interest, the evidence set forth above
demonstrates that, despite years of previous efforts to assist Appellant to
appropriately parent and care for his children, Appellant has not made and may be
incapable of making the necessary changes to do so. Clear and convincing evidence
showed that placing M.M. and P.M. in a home with Appellant would create a risk of
danger to M.M. and P.M. Appellant continued—even at trial—to avoid addressing
his parental deficiencies, deflecting the severity of the harm because his older four
children “turned out good,” continually excusing the lack of cleanliness in the home
and, instead, claiming that others are against him. Regardless of how his older
children may have turned out, that is not justification for the inappropriate care to
which M.M. and P.M. were subjected. The testimony at trial was overwhelming as
to the lack of cleanliness in the home and the lack of care exhibited by both the
mother and Appellant. Even the testimony by his older children confirmed that
Appellant has always struggled with cleanliness and appropriate hygiene habits—
for himself and for the family. Importantly, Appellant was entrenched in his
questionable practices, became hostile and threatening towards those working on the
children’s case and was unable to show that he would consistently prioritize the
children’s health and safety. Furthermore, the permanency case manager, the current
foster parent for M.M. and P.M., and the CASA advocate for the children, all
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testified that it would be in the children’s best interest to terminate the parental rights
of Appellant.
      The jury saw the evidence and heard the testimony, observing the tone and
body language of each witness. The jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the
witnesses’ credibility. A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503. In light of the deference to be given
the jury in this regard, the evidence presented at trial, and the Holley factors, we
conclude that the jury could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that
termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in M.M. and P.M.’s best interest.
See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Upon considering the record as it relates to the
emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, the emotional
and physical danger to the children now and in the future, and the plans for the
children by the Department, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental
rights is in the best interest of M.M. and P.M. See id. We defer to the jury’s findings
as to the children’s best interest, see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27, and we cannot hold in
this case that the jury’s findings as to best interest are not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                 PER CURIAM

June 15, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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