Court Opinion

ID: 9789080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:27:40.583139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:19.411757
License: Public Domain

ESPINOSA, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 31 I respectfully dissent because the majority has interpreted the facts of this case in a less than realistic fashion to essentially conclude that an officer reasonably fearing for her safety during a lawful roadside vehicle stop may not ensure her own safety and that of others present by patting down a suspicious passenger for weapons. Although the majority attempts to disclaim responsibility for such a result by stating it does “not reach” that question, that is precisely the issue raised by the facts of this case. I believe the majority’s conclusion is not only contrary to settled law, but could have the unintended effect of unnecessarily increasing the already high level of risk faced by law enforcement officers during some vehicle stops.
¶ 32 In Ilono H., 210 Ariz. 473, ¶ 12, 113 P.3d at 700, this court stated “an officer’s right to conduct a pat-down search should be predicated on the officer’s right to initiate an investigatory stop in the first instance.”6 The majority concedes the stop in this ease was lawful. And this court has found the pat-down search of a passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle constitutional where an officer had a “reasonable concern for his safety.” State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, ¶ 16, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140 (App.1999) (pat-down search justified after passenger reached for waistband when asked if had weapon); see also State v. Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, ¶ 9, 996 P.2d 125, 128 (App.2000) (police officer may lawfully conduct pat-down search when officer justified in believing individual he or she is investigating at close range may be armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others). “ ‘The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.’” Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, ¶ 9, 996 P.2d at 128, quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
¶33 An officer need not have probable cause in order to conduct a Terry pat-down search. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. If an officer develops a safety concern during a legitimate vehicle stop, further reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is not necessary. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, ¶ 16, 992 P.2d at 1140. Accordingly, a protective search is justified when officers simply possess an articulable reason to fear for their safety. See Ilono H., 210 Ariz. 473, ¶ 10, 113 P.3d at 699. *66A number of cases lend support to this view. See e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir.2004) (“[E]ven outside the context of a lawful arrest supported by probable cause, officers are likewise authorized to conduct a warrantless protective pat-down of individuals they encounter in the field so long as their concerns are justified by reasonable suspicion of possible danger.”); United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir.2003) (protective pat-down search during valid traffic stop is constitutional when officer believes individual may be armed or constitute present threat).
¶ 34 The majority relies heavily on Ilono H., a case in which officers on foot approached a group of juveniles wearing baggy clothing in colors associated with gangs; the juveniles were simply sitting under a ramada marked with gang graffiti in a park where drug and gang activity were known to occur. 210 Ariz. 473, ¶¶ 2, 5, 113 P.3d at 697-98. Under these circumstances, this court found that the officers had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by “Ilono, or any other person in the group,” to justify protective searches of the juveniles. Id. ¶ 6. And we held the officers could not, during a consensual encounter, lawfully conduct a protective search based on safety concerns alone. Id. ¶ 11. The trial court here, however, correctly distinguished Ilono H. from this case, noting that unlike the random encounter and arbitrary pat-down search in Ilono H., see id. ¶ 2, Trevizo’s frisk was preceded by a lawful traffic stop based on founded suspicion. And Trevizo articulated her safety concerns not about the group in general but about Johnson in particular.
¶ 35 The majority acknowledges that Johnson was lawfully “seized” when the vehicle he was in was stopped, but reasons that “at some point during the encounter the passengers in the vehicle must be free to leave.” This is undoubtedly true, but that “point” had not yet occurred here. The record establishes the encounter with Johnson took place within minutes of the stop, and the officer’s request that he get out of the vehicle and her patting him down took place within mere moments of each other. As the majority correctly quotes from Wyman, an encounter is not consensual if “the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” 197 Ariz. 10, ¶ 7, 3 P.3d at 395, quoting Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569, 108 S.Ct. at 1977. Here, it is highly unrealistic to conclude that merely because the officer was courteous and Johnson cooperative, the ongoing and virtually simultaneous chain of events somehow “evolved into a consensual encounter” in the few short moments involved.
¶ 36 In fact, Johnson had been physically stopped and temporarily “seized” by the police, through no choice of his own and against his will, by virtue of the police stop of the vehicle in which he had been riding. See Brendlin v. California, — U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2406-07, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007); State v. Gomez, 198 Ariz. 61, ¶ 6, 6 P.3d 765, 766 (App.2000). After three officers approached the vehicle, all of the occupants were directed to display their hands and the driver to exit the vehicle. Johnson was in no position to “‘ignore the police presence and go about his business,’ ” notwithstanding Trevizo’s subjective notion to the contrary upon which the majority relies. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, ¶ 7, 3 P.3d at 395, quoting Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569, 108 S.Ct. at 1977. While Trevizo was addressing Johnson, her partner, Officer Machado, was investigating the driver of the car. The stop had not terminated and Johnson was still seized as part of the valid traffic stop. See Gomez, 198 Ariz. 61, ¶ 6, 6 P.3d at 766; Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, ¶ 16, 992 P.2d at 1140. Moreover, although Trevizo stated Johnson could have refused to get out of the car or be patted down, she testified she never told him he did not have to answer her questions or otherwise cooperate with her, and during cross examination did not disagree when counsel asked “in fact, you weren’t seeking [Johnson’s] permission?”
¶37 Under the circumstances, Johnson’s cooperation was not consensual as much as mere “acquiescence [which] signified not voluntary consent, but rather acceptance of an unavoidable course of conduct.” State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, *67586 (1985). Moreover, this court has relied on the United States Supreme Court’s statement that “ ‘passengers in automobiles have no Fourth Amendment right not to be ordered from their vehicle, once a proper stop is made.’” State v. Webster, 170 Ariz. 372, 374, 824 P.2d 768, 770 (App.1991), quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 155 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 421, 436 n. 4, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated police “may order out of a vehicle both the driver, and any passengers; [and] perform a ‘patdown’ of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118, 119 S.Ct. 484, 488, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (citations omitted).7 Because Trevizo had the authority to order Johnson from the car, did not inform or indicate to Johnson he was free to disregard her request, and the encounter developed far too quickly for any “evolution” into a consensual one, Johnson’s cooperation cannot reasonably be considered consensual.8
¶38 Trevizo also testified about multiple circumstances that had led her to believe a pat-down search of Johnson was appropriate, including Johnson’s atypical behavior at the initiation of the stop, his possession of the scanner, his admission to being a convicted felon, and his potentially being a gang member. The majority incorrectly states that only one indicator of gang involvement was present. On the contrary, Trevizo, who had received basic and advanced gang training and been assigned to the gang task force for two years when this encounter occurred, testified that she considered several factors, including Johnson’s age, the stop of the car occurring on the border of a known Crip neighborhood, Johnson’s wearing a blue bandanna, an indicator of Crip affiliation, his being from Eloy, a known Crips area, and his felon status, all indicia of possible gang association. The trial court cited all of these circumstances, as well as Johnson’s lack of identification, in determining “there was a reasonable basis to believe there was a danger, and [the] stop allowed them to go ahead and do the pat down.”
¶ 39 Viewing the evidence and totality of the circumstances realistically and in a light favorable to upholding the trial court’s determination, see May, 210 Ariz. 452, ¶ 4, 112 P.3d at 41, Trevizo was lawfully in Johnson’s presence, the encounter was nonconsensual, and the officer had a reasonable basis to consider him dangerous and therefore conduct a brief pat-down of his person. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of that encounter.

. In Ilono H., the encounter between the juvenile and law enforcement officers was a consensual encounter, not a traffic stop. 210 Ariz. 473, ¶¶ 2, 11, 113 P.3d at 697, 699.

. The majority discounts this language in Knowles as mere dicta, however, it is well established that dicta of the United States Supreme Court carries great weight and is generally authoritative. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n. 17 (9th Cir.2000); In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir.2000); see also Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 495 n. 41 (3d Cir.1992) (Supreme Court dicta should be respected because that court hears relatively few cases and uses dicta to provide guidance to lower courts).

. State v. Navarro, 201 Ariz. 292, 34 P.3d 971 (App.2001), cited by the majority, bears no resemblance to the situation here. The initial contact with Navarro was not a traffic stop but his arrival at the scene of a shooting during the investigation. Id. ¶ 5. Navarro willingly accompanied officers to the police station to investigate the shooting; during the trip, he was unhand-cuffed in the front seat of the patrol car and had only been visually searched for weapons; and at the station he was left unattended. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. Moreover, the events in Navarro took place over a lengthy period of time, rather than the first few minutes of an ongoing traffic stop as in this case.