Court Opinion

ID: 9364232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 19:02:04.716016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:28.167609
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 P. v. Bustillos CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B318022
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 2018038445)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)

v.

CHRISTOPHER JAMES
BUSTILLOS,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Christopher James Bustillos appeals an order denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the following felonies:
criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422) (two counts); obstructing a
peace officer (id., § 69); possession of drugs for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11378); transportation of a controlled substance (id.,
§ 11379, subd. (a)); and corporal injury on a partner (Pen. Code,
§ 273.5, subd. (a)). He also admitted the special allegations that
he used a deadly weapon in committing the criminal threat
counts and that he committed a felony after being released on
bail. (Id., §§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 122022.1, subd. (b).) The trial
court ultimately suspended imposition of sentence and placed
him on probation for 36 months. We conclude that Bustillos has
not shown that the court abused its discretion by denying his
motion. We affirm.
                                FACTS
       In multiple consolidated actions, Bustillos was charged
with six felony counts: criminal threats (two counts), possession
of drugs for sale, transportation of a controlled substance,
obstructing a peace officer, and corporal injury on a partner.
Bustillos initially pled not guilty.
       On March 6, 2020, Bustillos signed a felony disposition
statement to plead guilty to the six felony counts. In that
statement he said, “My attorney has explained to me the direct
and indirect consequences of this plea, including the maximum
possible sentence.” (Italics added.) He acknowledged that he
knew the “maximum possible sentence [was] 11 year(s) 8 months.”
(Italics added.) He stated that his attorney had explained the
rights he was giving up, and that he was entering the plea “freely
and voluntarily and not as the result of any force, pressure,
threats or coercion brought against [him].” (Italics added.)
       On the felony disposition form, Bustillos’s counsel stated, “I
have discussed with the defendant the facts of the case, the
elements of the charged offenses and allegations, and all possible
defenses. I have explained the direct and indirect consequences of
this plea to the defendant and am satisfied he understands them.
I am satisfied the defendant is voluntarily and of his own free will
seeking to enter this plea.” (Italics added.)
       At a March 6, 2020, change of plea hearing, the prosecutor
gave Bustillos advisements of his rights and asked him a series of
questions. In response to those questions, Bustillos told the trial

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court that 1) he signed the felony disposition statement; 2) he
went through the document with his attorney; 3) he understood
his rights and understood the consequences of his plea; 4) he
knew he faced a maximum potential sentence of 11 years 8
months; 5) nobody made any threats or promises to get him to
change his plea to guilty; and 6) it was his intention to withdraw
the not guilty plea and enter a guilty plea. Bustillos’s counsel
told the court that he also “join[ed] in the plea.”
       The trial court accepted Bustillos’s guilty plea and found:
1) Bustillos appeared with his counsel; 2) he understands the
charges and the consequences of his plea; 3) he “knowingly,
intelligently,” voluntarily, and “understandingly” waived his
rights. There was a factual basis for the plea.
       Bustillos changed counsel. In April, his new counsel
declared a doubt about his competence. After obtaining an
evaluation by Doctor Amber Ruddock, the trial court found
Bustillos was competent.
       On July 9, 2020, Bustillos filed a motion to withdraw pleas
of guilty and all admissions during plea. That motion included
Bustillos’s declaration, the declaration of Doctor Randy Wood,
and two other declarations.
       Wood declared that while incarcerated Bustillos was
prescribed “Prozac,” resulting in “manic episodes.” A diagnosis of
“Bipolar 1 Disorder, mixed type, most recent episode manic” was
added to his other diagnoses. Wood interviewed Bustillos on
June 22, 2020. Bustillos told him that at the plea hearing “he
was very anxious, felt exhausted from not sleeping well, and his
thinking was ‘all jumbled up’ and he felt confused and
overwhelmed and ‘shut down’ when in court.” Based on what
Bustillos told him about his “symptoms” at the time of the plea

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hearing, Wood concluded that “due to interference and
impairment from his symptoms,” he was “not capable of
adequately understanding, intelligently evaluating and
voluntarily accepting the proposed guilty plea offer on [March 6,
2020].”
       Bustillos declared, “[M]isleading by my attorney is why I
signed [the plea agreement].” His counsel “rushed [him] to
plead.” “I believe my change of plea took advantage of my severe
mental health issues, the fear instilled by my attorney that there
was no other real option, and this all took advantage of the severe
stress and confusion and manic episode I was mentally in.”
       Bustillos testified that he pled guilty solely because his
attorney told him to do so. He did not review the plea agreement
form. He had no memory of the prosecutor providing
advisements or asking him questions at that hearing. He did not
remember signing the plea form, but he identified his initials on
that form. He did not know the consequences of his plea.
       The trial court denied the motion. It found Bustillos was
not credible and was merely “looking for a better deal.” The court
said, “I’m just not persuaded that he made a mistake,” that “he
didn’t understand what was going on,” or that he had “any kind
of mental health concerns.” He was not misled. “[I]t’s a case of
buyer’s remorse.”
                             DISCUSSION
          Denying the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea
       Bustillos contends the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his plea.
       A trial court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea for good cause. (People v. Archer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
693, 702.) “ ‘To establish good cause . . . , the defendant must

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show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she was
operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor
overcoming the exercise of his or her free judgment, including
inadvertence, fraud, or duress.’ ” (Ibid.) “The defendant may not
withdraw a plea because the defendant has changed his or her
mind.” (Ibid.)
       “ ‘A decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
“ ‘rests in the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” and is final
unless the defendant can show a clear abuse of that discretion.’ ”
(People v. Archer, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.) “ ‘ “All
questions of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence are
addressed, in the first instance, to the trier of fact, in this case
the trial judge.” ’ ” (People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453,
1460, fn. 4.)
                 Bustillos’s Mental Health Condition
       Bustillos contends the trial court erred because his mental
illness prevented him from entering a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary plea. We disagree.
       “[T]he mere presence of a mental illness does not mean
appellant was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in
his own defense.” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492,
502.) The “defendant is presumed competent” unless sufficient
evidence supports a different conclusion. (Ibid.)
       Bustillos claims his testimony and the other evidence he
presented supports his claim he was not competent to enter his
plea.
       But the trial court did not find Bustillos’s testimony and
the evidence he presented to be credible. We do not weigh the
evidence. The trial court exclusively decides the weight to be
given to the evidence and witness credibility. (People v. Young

                                 5
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “[T]he trial court was not bound to
give full credence to the statements in defendant’s affidavit in
support of his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty even though
they are uncontradicted because of defendant’s obvious interest
in the outcome of the proceeding.” (People v. Beck (1961) 188
Cal.App.2d 549, 553.)
       The trial court may consider “the record made when
[Bustillos] entered into the negotiated disposition.” (People v.
Araujo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) It could reasonably find
Bustillos’s affirmative statements at the change of plea hearing
undermined the credibility of his testimony that he did not
understand the plea agreement and its consequences. Such
“[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption
of verity” and “constitute a formidable barrier” to his motion.
(Blackledge v. Allison (1977) 431 U.S. 63, 74.) Bustillos testified
that he had no memory about the portion of the plea hearing
where the prosecutor asked him questions before he entered his
guilty plea. The court could find if he had no memory of that
period, he could not credibly testify about his mental symptoms
while answering the prosecutor’s questions at that time.
       Bustillos notes Doctor Wood declared that because of
“impairment from his symptoms of mental illness,” Bustillos “was
not capable of adequately understanding . . . the proposed guilty
plea offer on [March 6, 2020].” But the credibility of a medical
opinion is exclusively decided by the trial court. (People v.
Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1463.) “ ‘ “[T]he law does
not accord to the expert’s opinion the same degree of credence or
integrity as it does the data underlying the opinion. Like a house
built on sand, the expert’s opinion is no better than the facts on
which it is based.” ’ ” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381,

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449; County of Sacramento v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(Brooks) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 785, 797.)
       Wood obtained the facts about Bustillo’s symptoms at the
plea hearing from Bustillos. The trial court found Bustillos was
not credible. It could reasonably infer that Wood’s opinion was
not reliable because it was based on facts Bustillos provided.
(People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 435; County of
Sacramento v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Brooks), supra, 215
Cal.App.4th at p. 797.) There are additional reasons why it could
reject this opinion. Wood was not a treating physician. (San Jose
Neurospine v. Aetna Health of California, Inc. (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 953, 960.) He met with Bustillos once at the request
of the defense, months after the plea hearing, and Wood did not
testify. Wood’s declaration was stated “on information and
belief.” Declarations stated on information and belief cannot “be
used as evidence.” (Lieppman v. Lieber (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d
914, 919; see also People v. Oppel (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1146,
1153; Burger v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1013, 1019;
Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d
201, 204.)
       Wood claimed he reviewed the relevant medical evidence.
But he did not mention a recent medical report, and the trial
court could find that undermined his opinion. (Milpitas Unified
School Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 808, 825.) In April 2020, Bustillos’s counsel declared
a doubt about Bustillos’s competency. The court appointed
Doctor Ruddock to evaluate him. Ruddock found Bustillos was
competent. Based on Ruddock’s report, the court found Bustillos
“is competent,” that he understands the proceedings, and he is
able to cooperate with counsel.

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       Wood claimed Bustillos would have “difficulty
concentrating.” But Bustillos included another report in his
motion from Nick Barneclo, Ph.D. He concluded Bustillos “was
oriented to place and time, was literate, had adequate knowledge
of basic information,” and had “performed adequately” on the
“mental status portion” of a “KSNAP” mental status screening;
that he “performed adequately” on the “Gestalt Closure subtest”;
that he showed “no signs of simultaneous processing or visual-
spatial processing concerns.” His “number recall” was “in the
average range,” showing “no evidence of working memory
deficits.”
       Wood mentions Bustillos’s “symptoms” at the day of the
hearing. But he did not conduct intellectual capacity testing to
make a finding on Bustillos’s mental capacity. That is a
significant omission because “ ‘[t]he focus of a competency inquiry
is the defendant’s mental capacity . . . .’ ” (People v. Welch (1999)
20 Cal.4th 701, 733, italics added.)
       Ruddock and Barneclo tested Bustillos and found he had
sufficient mental capacity. The trial court could give less weight
to Wood’s opinion (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 733;
Milpitas Unified School Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.,
supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 825), and resolve any conflict in the
medical evidence in the People’s favor. (People v. Hamlin, supra,
170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463.)
       Wood did not explain how he could determine from a single
interview that Bustillos was not making self-serving statements,
and Wood did not state that he had reviewed the plea hearing
transcript. That transcript was objective evidence showing
Bustillos made a voluntary and intelligent plea because: 1)
Bustillos “answered in the affirmative” to the questions; 2) “there

                                  8
is nothing in the record to suggest [he] did not understand the
questions asked”; 3) there was no uncertainty while answering;
and 4) the trial judge who accepted the plea found Bustillos made
“a knowing and intelligent” waiver of his rights. (People v.
Smith, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.)
       The trial judge who accepted the plea also decided the
motion to vacate. The judge said he “observed the plea being
taken.” The trial court could rely on its observations of Bustillos
when he made his plea to determine that he was not impaired or
confused. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254;
People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 918 [“It is entirely
within the trial court’s discretion to consider its own observations
of the defendant in ruling on such a motion”].) The court found
Bustillos was not confused and was not experiencing mental
health issues when he made his plea. These were “ ‘ “first hand
observations made in open court,” ’ which that court itself is best
positioned to interpret.” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250,
1267.)
                   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Bustillos contends the trial court erred by not vacating his
plea based on his counsel’s ineffective assistance in making the
plea bargain. We disagree.
       To show ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
must show that his attorney’s actions fell below the reasonable
objective standard of proper representation by counsel, and that
counsel’s errors were prejudicial to the defendant’s case.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694.)
“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded
but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” (Lee v. United States (2017) _

                                 9
U.S. _ [198 L.Ed.2d 476, 487].) “[C]ontemporaneous evidence”
may be considered to determine whether the defendant’s claims
are credible. (Ibid.) “An allegation that trial counsel failed to
properly advise a defendant is meaningless unless there is
objective corroborating evidence supporting appellant’s claimed
failures.” (People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 212, 223-
224.)
      Bustillos testified that his counsel pressured him to quickly
sign a plea agreement that he did not understand, review, or
voluntarily agree with. But the trial court found he was not
credible. Because his claims about ineffective assistance are
largely based on his testimony, that finding undermines his
claim. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) Bustillos’s
statements at the plea hearing also contradict his claims. In
pleading guilty, he said he knew the consequences of his plea, he
was not threatened or pressured to make it, and it was his
voluntary decision. The trial court may properly consider his
counsel’s certification on the plea agreement. (People v. Gandy
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1288, 1300.) That shows counsel discussed
the facts, the merits, the possible defenses, and the direct and
indirect consequences of the plea with Bustillos. That, along with
Bustillos’s statements in court at the time of the plea, support a
finding that the plea was knowledgeable and voluntary. (People
v. Araujo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 764; People v. Smith,
supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.)
      Moreover, the trial court found his trial counsel “did a
really competent job.” It rejected his suggestion that his lawyer
ignored his mental health conditions. Counsel was well aware of
them. The court found his attorney prepared well-documented
“paperwork” for a “mental health diversion” for Bustillos.

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Bustillos claimed that “misleading by [his] attorney is why [he]
signed the paperwork and entered the plea.” But the court found
counsel did not mislead him and Bustillos’s motion was simply “a
case of buyer’s remorse.”
      We have reviewed Bustillos’s remaining contentions, and
we conclude he has not shown grounds for reversal.
                          DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

     YEGAN, J.

     BALTODANO, J.

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                     Rocky J. Baio, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Christopher P. Welch for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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