Court Opinion

ID: 9930763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:05:55.227744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:58.003278
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 23-0028
                               Filed February 7, 2024

DAVID DESHAWN BRADFORD,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.

Lekar, Judge.

       The applicant appeals the dismissal of his third application for

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

       Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,

for appellant.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

       This appeal concerns David Bradford’s third application for postconviction

relief (PCR) following his 2005 conviction for possession of a controlled substance

with intent to deliver, second offense, as a habitual offender, in violation of Iowa

Code sections 124.401(1)(a), 124.411, 902.8, and 902.9 (2004), a class “C”

felony.1 See State v. Bradford (Bradford I), No. 05-0778, 2006 WL 1229930, at

*1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2006) (affirming the conviction and sentence on direct

appeal but preserving Bradford’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for PCR

proceedings); Bradford v. State (Bradford II), No. 15-0811, 2016 WL 7403701, at

*1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016) (addressing the ineffective-assistance-of-

counsel claims and affirming the denial of Bradford’s first PCR application);

Bradford v. State (Bradford III), No. 20-1010, 2021 WL 4889232, at *1 (Iowa Ct.

App. Oct. 20, 2021) (affirming the dismissal of Bradford’s second PCR application

as untimely). Procedendo issued following our opinion in Bradford’s direct appeal

in May 2006.

       Bradford filed this third PCR application in April 2022. Nearly two decades

after his conviction, Bradford returns to the claim from his first PCR application that

his trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations.2 Bradford II, 2016 WL

7403701, at *2 (not considering Bradford’s claim concerning the plea offer, as it

1 Bradford was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of forty-five years.
2 Bradford also raised a claim that the prosecutor committed perjury in the trial of

the first PCR case by arguing Bradford was never offered a plea bargain. We note
this exact argument was made in the second PCR case. And although Bradford
argued this again before the third PCR court, there was no ruling on that issue and
Bradford did not file a motion to enlarge the findings. Thus, the issue is not
preserved for our review. See Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa
2022).
                                           3

was not addressed by the PCR court). The State moved to dismiss the application

in June 2022.      After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application in

November 2022.        In doing so, it wrote “that the issue concerning ineffective

assistance of counsel during plea negotiations was adequately raised as a ground

for relief in a prior proceeding . . . . [A]sserting the allegation of error in this case

as a newly discovered ground for relief is simply a rebranding . . . .”

         We review PCR proceedings for correction of errors at law. Thongvanh v.

State, 938 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Iowa 2020). “[W]e will affirm if the [PCR] court’s findings

of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the law was correctly applied.”

Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003). We review ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa

2001).

         Returning to a claim advanced in the first PCR application, Bradford asserts

“his trial counsel failed to accurately advise him about the plea offer and on his

maximum sentence.” He contends that his claims trial counsel and previous PCR

counsel provided ineffective assistance were never decided and, as such, this

claim involves “newly discovered evidence” and should be considered a “free-

standing claim.” Bradford agrees that the statute of limitations for seeking PCR

expired in May 2009—three years after procedendo issued following his direct

appeal—but argues his claim was not discovered until 2016 when our court ruled

his claim was not decided by the district court.3 See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2022)

(“[A]pplications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or

3 Bradford actually argued the date was 2015; we choose to use the correct date

but understand what his argument is.
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decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo

is issued.”). This three-year statute of limitations applies to subsequent PCR

actions, including those alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.           Id. (“An

allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in a prior case under this chapter

shall not toll or extend the limitation periods in this section nor shall such claim

relate back to a prior filing to avoid the application of the limitation periods.”); see

also Sandoval, 975 N.W.2d at 437 (finding that a fourth PCR application alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel filed after the 2019 amendment to section 822.3

was outside the three-year statute of limitations and thus was time-barred). But

the State drew the PCR court’s attention to the last ruling by a panel of our court

and urged that Bradford’s opportunity to address his plea negotiation complaint is

over as there is “nothing further that hasn’t been already litigated or presented to

the court in this case.” See Bradford III, 2021 WL 4889232, at *1.

       However, Bradford claims that because he raised the issue of ineffective

assistance of counsel in his first, timely PCR action and because he now raises a

claim against his PCR counsel for failing to advance his freestanding argument,

the current PCR application is not time-barred. But, in Bradford II, we explicitly

found that because the first PCR court did not address the ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claim related to plea negotiations, the claim was not preserved for our

review. 2016 WL 7403701, at *2 (citing Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537

(Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must

ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide

them on appeal.”)). And Bradford did not file an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904
                                          5

motion to enlarge the findings from the first PCR ruling to seek a ruling on the plea

negotiation claim.

       Finally, after addressing the failure to provide effective counsel over the plea

negotiation issue in the second PCR claim, a panel of our court shut the door on

Bradford’s attempt to circumvent the three-year time bar. See Bradford III, 2021

WL 4889232, at *1 (finding second PCR application, filed sixteen months after

procedendo issued in the first PCR action, was not filed “promptly” and was time-

barred). Without any showing of a new ground of fact not previously known to

extend the statute of limitations in this third PCR filing, Bradford’s claim cannot

survive the procedural hurdle of overcoming the statute of limitations. See Iowa

Code § 822.3 (stating that “this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law

that could not have been raised within the applicable time period”). The burden is

on Bradford to demonstrate that he could not have discovered the ground of fact

or law earlier in the exercise of due diligence. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778,

799 (Iowa 2018). And here, Bradford raised these same allegations in his earlier

PCR actions or would have known of his claims related to ineffective assistance of

trial counsel at the time of the first PCR hearing, and certainly at the time of the

second PCR filing would have known about any ineffective assistance by both trial

and PCR counsel. See Iowa Code § 822.8; Wycoff v. State, No. 21-0302, 2022

WL 2160448, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2022) (relying on the fact that Wycoff

had brought the same claims in previous proceedings to find “claims do not present

a ground of fact or law that could not have been presented within section 822.3’s

three-year period”); see also Clark v. State, 955 N.W.2d 459, 464 (Iowa 2021)
                                         6

(noting the doctrine of “[i]ssue preclusion prevents parties from relitigating issues

already raised and resolved in a prior action”).

       Thus, finding no exception to the application of the statute of limitations in

section 822.3 applicable here, we conclude Bradford’s claims are time-barred. We

affirm the PCR court’s dismissal of this third PCR application.

       AFFIRMED.