Court Opinion

ID: 2650422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-01-22 01:04:06.222052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:40.732243
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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STEVEN W. HYDE and SANDRA D.                                                    _«.•
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BROOKE, husband and wife,                        No. 69668-8-1
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                                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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                                                                                         -27 Wn. App. 261, 267, 616
P.2d 1257 (1980).
2 Meadowdale, 27 Wn. App. at 264.
3 Davidheiser v. Pierce Cntv.. ^2 Wn. App. 146, 152-55, 960 P.2d 998 (1998),
rev, denied. 137 Wn.2d 1016 (1999) (rejecting plaintiffs' estoppel argument that
they relied on a government employee's direction to serve the wrong person).
No. 69668-8-1 / 5

director was not authorized to accept service for the City.       While Hyde did

eventually serve the city clerk on September 4, 2012 and the mayor on

September 24, 2012, this was beyond the statute of limitations period, which, as

the trial court correctly concluded, began to run from the date of injury on June

11, 2009 and expired on August 10, 2012.4

       Hyde contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until

September 30, 2009, when he first learned that his injury was caused by the

training officer's negligence.5 Thus, he contends, it did not expire until November
29, 2012, after he served the dty clerk.6 Hyde invokes the "discovery rule,"
which applies "[i]n certain torts [when] injured parties do not, or cannot, know

they have been injured; in these cases, a cause of action accrues at the time the

plaintiff knew or should have known all of the essential elements of the cause of

action."7 The rule has been apblied in products liability cases when a claimant

cannot readily ascertain the factual causal relationship between a defective

product and harm at the time the harm actually occurred.8
       Hyde relies on North Coast Air Services v. Grumman Corp., where the

court addressed the applicability of the rule to RCW 7.72.060(3), which provides

4 RCW 4.16.080(2) (an action fdr any "injury to the person" shall be commenced
within three years); RCW 4.96.020(4) (providing an additional 60-day claim
period for tort claims against local government entities); Matter of Estates of
Hibbard, 118 Wn.2d 737, 744, 826 P.2d 690 (1992) ("The general rule in ordinary
personal injury actions is that a cause of action accrues at the time the act or
omission occurs.").
5 September 30, 2009, was the^ date on which Hyde received the e-mail from
Taser International stating that shoulder and foot exposures were not
recommended during taser training.
6BriefofAppellantat37.
7 White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wn.2d 344, 348, 693 P.2d 687 (1985).
8 North Coast Air Servs.. Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 111 Wn.2d 315, 319, 759 P.2d
405(1988).
No. 69668-8-1 / 6

that the statute of limitations for products liability claims begins to run "from the

time the claimant discovered oij in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered the harm and its cause."9 There, a pilot died in a plane crash and the

initial investigation attributed the fcause to pilot error and concluded there were no
                                   10
mechanical defects in the plane         The pilot's father learned 11 years later that

the crash was a result of a defect in the plane only after he heard of later

incidents involving this same aircraft where the defect resulted in similar

crashes.11

       The court interpreted RCyV 7.72.060(3) to require that "the claimant in a

product liability case must have discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence

should have discovered, a factual causal relationship of the product to the harm,"

in order for the statutory limitation period to start running.12 Accordingly, the
court held:

       [l]n this case the action did not accrue at the time claimant knew of
       the harm (death) and knew that the apparent and immediate cause
       was the crash. .     [W]e hold that the claimant must know or should
       with due diligence know that the cause in fact was an alleged
       defect.1131

       But here, there is no products liability claim. Thus, the rule in North Coast

does not apply. And while the discovery rule has been applied in other contexts,

our courts have been careful to limit its application

       to claims in which the plaintiffs could not have immediately known
       of their injuries due to professional malpractice, occupational
       diseases, self-reporting or concealment of information by the
       defendant. Application o the rule is extended to claims in which

9 North Coast, 111 Wn.2d at 317.
10 North Coast, 111 Wn.2d at 317.
11 North Coast, 111 Wn.2d at 317-18.
12 North Coast. 111 Wn.2d at 31 &
13 North Coast, 111 Wn.2d at 319.
No. 69668-8-1 / 7

      plaintiffs could not imrrjediately know of the cause of their
      injuries.[14]
      Hyde alleges no such claims. Rather, Hyde's complaint simply alleges

negligence that caused an injury sustained on June 11, 2009 from the tasing:

      6. On or about June 11] 2009 Plaintiff Steven W. Hyde in the
      course of his employ by Defendant was tased. As a result of said
      tasing Plaintiffs suffered injury.
      7. The injury described above was directly and proximately caused
      by the negligence of Defendant City of Lake Stevens.
      8. The tasing described above was an inherently and abnormally
      dangerous activity rendering Defendant liable for any resulting
       harm to Plaintiffs.
      9. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and inherently
      dangerous activity described above, Plaintiffs have suffered, and
      will in the future suffer, medical costs and expenses, financial loss,
      physical injury, pain ami suffering, emotional distress, mental
      anguish, loss of consortium and other damages to be identified and
       proved at the time of trial.

      While Hyde did not in fact discover at the time of the injury that a possible

cause of the injury was misuse of the taser, he fails to show that he could not

have made that inquiry at the time. Accordingly, as an ordinary personal injury

claim, the general rule is that a cause of action accrues at the time the act or

omission occurs.15 In this case , this was when the tasing and resulting injury

occurred, on June 11, 2009.

       Hyde also asserts that he brought a claim of negligent misrepresentation

based on his later discovery that being tased was not a requirement to become a

police officer. He alleges that this was not what he was told at the time of the
taser training and did not learn tpis until June 20, 2011. Thus, he contends that
the statute of limitations for the claim did not expire before he served the city

14 Hibbard, 118 Wn.2d at 749-50,
15 Hibbard, 118 Wn.2d at 744 (refusing to apply discovery rule in wrongful death,
rape, and negligence case).
No. 69668-8-1 / 8

clerk. But as the City correctly points out, Hyde did not plead any claim of

negligent misrepresentation.     As noted above, his complaint simply alleged

negligence resulting in an injury from the tasing on June 11, 2009 and he points

to no amended complaint in the record that reflects the addition of this claim.

The only mention of such a claim was raised in Hyde's motion for

reconsideration, which was rejected by the trial court and to which he has not

assigned error.16 Thus, this argument is without basis.
       Finally, Hyde contends that even if the statute of limitations had expired

before he made proper service, the trial court should have found that the City

waived   the   affirmative   defensive   of   defective   service   because   it   had

impermissibly "lied in wait," and then asserted insufficient process only after the

limitation period had run, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to cure the

service defect. Hyde relies on Lvbbert v. Grant County, where the court held that

the county waived its right to assert insufficiency of service when it sought
dismissal based on Lybbert's failure to properly serve the county within the

statute of limitations.17 The court explained that such a waiver can occur "if the

defendant's assertion of the defense is inconsistent with the defendant's previous

behavior," or "if the defendant's counsel has been dilatory in asserting the

defense."18 The court held that the county waived the defense because it had

initially represented that it was preparing an answer shortly after the complaint

16 While Hyde included the order on reconsideration in his notice of appeal, he
has waived review of it by failing to assign it as error and argue it in his opening
brief. State v. Sims, 171 Wn.2d 436, 441, 256 P.3d 285 (2011) ("an appellant is
deemed to have waived any issues that are not raised as assignments of error
and argued by brief.").
17 141 Wn.2d 29, 32, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000).
18 Lvbbert, 141 Wn.2dat39.
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No. 69668-8-1 / 9

was filed, but in fact did not file an answer or assert defective process until after

the statute of limitations expired and up until that point had acted as though it

was preparing to litigate the merits without any mention ofdefective process.19
       Hyde argues that similarly here, the City waived its defenses of insufficient

process and statute of limitations by filing a notice of appearance after the initial

service on Edin, continuing to engage in discovery until the statute of limitations

expired, and then moving for summary judgment after it expired based on

insufficient process.   But unlike in Lvbbert, Hyde fails to show that the City's

assertion of insufficient service was inconsistent with its previous behavior or that

its counsel was dilatory in asserting the defense.20 Rather, the record shows that
the City asserted insufficient service of process more than once and did so well

before the statute of limitations expired. On January 19, 2011, the City filed an

answer, asserting insufficient process. On April 19, 2011, the City again denied

proper service in response to Hyde's request for admissions.         In response to

requests for production, on April 21, 2011, the City submitted a copy of the

process server's declaration showing that the HR director was served. Thus,

Hyde had over a year to cure the defect before the statute of limitations expired,

unlike the plaintiff in Lvbbert who was unfairly surprised with the defense only

after the limitation period expired.

       The trial court did not err by concluding that the statute of limitations

began to run from the date of the tasing injury and expired before proper service

19 Lvbbert, 141 Wn.2dat33
20 See Lvbbert. 141 Wn.2d at 41 (recognizing that "the mere act of engaging in
discovery 'is not always tantamount to conduct inconsistent with a later assertion
of the defense of insufficient process'") (quoting Romiue v. Fairchild. 60 Wn. App.
278, 281, 803 P.2d 57 (1991)).
                                          9
No. 69668-8-1/10

was made on the City. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed the lawsuit on this

basis alone.    Accordingly, we need not reach the remaining arguments

addressing the substance of the claims.

      We affirm.

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WE CONCUR:

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