Court Opinion

ID: 9548309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:01:22.973447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:47.251383
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
I cannot agree that it is proper to approve the giving to the jury, prior to the time the case is tried, a mass of instructions such as those contained in the appendix to the majority opinion. It is virtually impossible in the time available, to examine and arrive at an intelligent conclusion as to the correctness of the long and detailed sheaf of instructions here involved. There may be many situations and conditions that would arise in various cases which cannot now be foreseen that would render some of the instructions highly improper. To arrive at a fair appraisal of all those instructions would require a lengthy study of the particular wording of the instructions and the cases to which they might be applicable. There may well flow from these instructions, implications which are contrary to law by reason of the failure to mention certain qualifying factors which may exist in some eases. In the time available I do point out the following questionable features in the instructions which were submitted to the jury in this case.
(1) On page 678, supra, in the appendix to the majority opinion it is said that “Criminal cases include all cases where a law has been violated. ’ ’ That clearly gives the impression that if the case is a criminal one a law has been violated, the very issue to be determined at the trial, or to state it another way, that the mere charge of a criminal law violation imports that one has occurred.
*686(2) On the same page of the appendix it is said: “Civil eases are begun and prosecuted by the private party who feels that he has been wronged. In criminal cases it is the theory of the law that the commission of the crime is a wrong against the state and therefore a criminal case is prosecuted in the name of the People of the State of California against the defendant. The person injured by the crime is not a party to the prosecution and his sole connection with the case is that of a witness.” That clearly implies that the complaining witness in a criminal case has not been wronged and therefore he is a wholly impartial and disinterested witness —the same as any witness who has no ax to grind. Such is plainly not true. No place will a person find more biased and vindictive attitudes than are displayed by a complaining witness in a criminal trial.
(3) Further on page 678, great stress is laid upon the finding by a grand jury or a magistrate at a preliminary hearing as showing that they believed defendant had committed the crime. While it is said at the bottom of page 678 that that is no proof of guilt, yet the jury is definitely given the impression that either a magistrate or a grand jury has in effect found guilt. From that the jury naturally infers, contrary to the presumption of innocence, that defendant is presumably guilty. That is especially dangerous when we recognize the well known tendency to assume that merely because someone has been charged with a crime there must be some merit in the charge—that where there is smoke there is fire. . How the ease got to the stage where it is ready for trial is wholly immaterial.
(4) On page 679, in the appendix, in giving an example of when challenges of jurors for cause is proper, the only mention is of a ease where the prosecution may make the challenge.
(5) On page 680 it is said: “In other words, it is less likely that a number of witnesses could get together and each falsify or by mistake tell a story which makes a consistent entirety than for one alleged eyewitness to tell a story that would appear to be true. ’ ’, which in effect states that circumstantial evidence carries more weight than direct evidence. That is not the law. (10 Cal.Jur. 1157-8; 8 Cal.Jur. 191.)
(6) It is stated on page 680 that an eyewitness to an accident rarely sees more than 10 per cent of that which is observable. Where is the scientific or statistical data to support that statement ? It might well lead the jury to discount an eye*687witness’ account by 90 per cent, resulting in very little consideration being given to Ms testimony.
(7) In discussing “impeachment” of a witness on pages 680 and 681, it fails to include all the methods of impeachment although on its face it purports to be comprehensive. TMs may lead the juror to reject other forms of impeachment.
(8) It is said also on page 681, that the law permits proof of statements of the defendant made out of court as evidence against him. The jurors might infer that statements purportedly made by defendant and reported in a newspaper could be used. The “outside of court” feature would loom as the important factor in his mind.
(9) It is said on page 681 that statements made by attorneys are not part of the case. Certainly such statements are a part of the ease when made in argument to the jury.
(10) In discussing the subject of “Deliberating on the Verdict” (p. 682), stress is laid on the necessity of arriving at a verdict to save the state money. The whole tenor of the discussion would impel jurors to compromise their convictions and go with the majority. Moreover telling the jury how they shall conduct themselves while deliberating (pp. 682 and 683) (how they shall present their views and the like of their fellow jurors) is wholly improper. It would tend to make them act in an unnatural manner and destroy the traditionally lay aspects of a true jury trial. Their deliberations are secret and how they are conducted is their own business.
To the foregoing observations undoubtedly many more could be added upon a closer scrutiny. Suffice it to say it is not the province of this court to pass upon, in advance of any controversy, the validity of a whole series of jury instructions in a criminal case.
Finally it should be observed that the instructions are not, as appears from the foregoing discussion, and a reading thereof, mere general advice to jurors. They go into detail on many questions of the value of various kinds of evidence and the like.
It should be remembered that the instructions here involved are given jurors in pamphlet form by an attache of the court, and that a conscientious juror would undoubtedly read and study the same with the view of attaining the qualifications which he deems essential to the performance of jury duty in a manner acceptable to the court in wMch he is serving. Because these instructions are placed in the possession of *688jurors so that they have access to them while they are not actually performing jury duty, they have an opportunity to become more conversant with them than with the specific instructions read by the court to the jury at the conclusion of the trial. It may be assumed, therefore, that the instructions contained in the appendix of the majority opinion will have greater influence upon the average juror than any other instructions read by the court to the jury during the trial. Such being the case, if the so-called pamphlet instructions are misleading and would tend to give the juror an erroneous concept of the law, they are more apt to have a prejudicial effect than the instructions read by the court to the jury during the trial.
In my opinion it was error to permit the jury in the case at bar to have access to the instructions contained in the appendix to the majority opinion, and for this error I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 28, 1948. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.