Court Opinion

ID: 9769698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:59:04.101797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:07.022996
License: Public Domain

DORSEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s holding appears to be that Mendoza was a trespasser in the municipal reservoir, but even if he were a licensee, still he would be unable to recover because there was no evidence of the city’s knowledge of the hazard at the place of injury.
Before analyzing the deceased’s status at the place of injury, it should be kept in mind that the court below and the parties tried the action based upon Mr. Mendoza being a licensee and not a trespasser. Ap-pellee City of Corpus Christi did not seek issues based on the decedent's status as a trespasser, although it objected to issues based on a licensee theory.
In order to analyze Mr. Mendoza’s status, it is essential to recognize that his status must be determined in relation to the City and its lake; not the deceased’s status vis a vis Mr. Lanphier, who was dismissed from the action prior to verdict, nor to Mr. Lanphier’s pier from which Mr. Mendoza dove.
The lake into which Mr. Mendoza dove is a municipal reservoir owned and operated by' the City of Corpus Christi and used by members of the public for recreational purposes. Unlike Rowland v. City of Corpus Christi, 620 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi-1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.), there were neither signs nor ordinances prohibiting diving and swimming where the incident occurred. I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Mr. Mendoza as a trespasser in a publicly owned and operated lake under - the circumstances. See Trinity River Authority v. Williams, 689 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.1985).
To sustain a judgment non obstante vere-dicto, the appellate court must find that there is no evidence to support of the jury’s verdict, the judgment non obstante veredic-*657to must be reversed. Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982); Meyer v. Mack Sales, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In the instant case, I believe there was some evidence to support the jury’s findings. The City had a representative at the lake who took readings twice daily of the lake level. Those readings reflected that the lake had fallen 1.5 feet in the 60 days prior to the accident; that the City’s agent would routinely drive or boat around the lake to check the piers located, as was Lanphier’s, around the perimeter of the lake, and that at the time of the accident one half of Lanphier’s pier (40 feet) was over dry land, whereas prior to the lake level falling, the entire 80 feet was over water. I do not think it necessary that there be direct evidence that prior to the accident the City knew the precise depth of the water off Lanphier's pier and that as such it constituted a dangerous condition in order for the jury to affirmatively answer the question of the City’s actual knowledge. It is not necessary for a citizen to abandon his common sense and reasoning when he takes the oath as a juror. The jury could well have reasoned that because the City knew that, as the level of the lake fell, the water receded from the shoreline, and the water under piers attached to the shoreline became shallower all around the lake, then the City would know that water underneath Lanphier’s pier was shallow also, and as such constituted a dangerous condition.
In Lower Neches Valley Authority v. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.1976), the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary for the injured person or the owner-occupier to have knowledge of the location of the particular hump of clay that the diver struck; rather, it was sufficient that they know that humps of clay are generally located throughout the canal. Likewise, the jury may find actual knowledge by the City of the dangerous condition in the vicinity of Lanphier’s pier by the evidence of the City’s actual knowledge of the shallow water all around the lake’s perimeter, including that area immediately off Lanphier’s pier.
For these reasons, I would REVERSE the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the verdict of the jury.