Court Opinion

ID: 9647006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:20:40.734598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:44.754908
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. Like the majority, I agree that our cases recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and that the exception extends (and should extend) to cases where employees are terminated because they have filed a workers’ compensation claim. This policy has been codified by the General Assembly and is clear. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 (1987). The public policy exception, however, should not extend to the facts of this case, where no intent or motive by the employer to violate that public policy was shown. Under such facts the trial court was remiss in not directing a verdict for the appellant. All that was presented by Linda Payne in the way of proof was that she was ignored by the cashier, Brenda Davis, and the manager, J.B. Broadway, when she returned to work after her operation and that she was not rehired. There was also vague testimony from an employee who had been fired by Brenda Davis that she heard Davis and Broadway say that Payne “was going to cause the company grief.” On the other hand Davis and Broadway testified that Payne had been back at work for almost a year since hurting her knee when she scheduled her operation. The operation was scheduled immediately after she returned from vacation and was in conflict with Davis’s own vacation which had to be cancelled. Davis and Broadway admitted that they were angry at Payne for doing this. They denied that filing the worker’s compensation claim itself had anything to do with the refusal to rehire. Admittedly, proving motive and intent in these cases is difficult. Yet, something more must be shown in the way of circumstantial evidence beyond the mere filing of a worker’s compensation claim and a subsequent refusal to rehire. Nonetheless, that is really all that was shown by Payne in this case. Here, Broadway had valid reasons for not taking Payne back: interference with Davis’s vacation, prolonged telephone conversations, and customer complaints. On the other hand, the evidence at trial that filing the worker’s compensation claim was the real reason for not rehiring was highly speculative. The majority cites proof that Payne was ignored by Davis and Broadway. Both individuals conceded that they were angry at Payne for other reasons. Rude treatment and vague statements to a fired employee are not sufficient in my judgment to find a public policy violation. Reversing a jury verdict should be done with caution, and I espouse such a course reluctantly. But for us to uphold a jury verdict, the evidence must be substantial. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Kelton, 305 Ark. 173, 806 S.W.2d 373 (1991). In this case, the evidence presented was far from substantial but was sufficient only to raise suspicion and conjecture. I have no other choice but to dissent. Hays, J., joins.