Court Opinion

ID: 9735985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:38:35.379488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.043266
License: Public Domain

Opinion On Rehearing
Landis, J.
Appellant has filed petition for rehearing contending our opinion handed down on Decem*496ber 18, 1961,1 did not pass on the refusal of the trial court to permit other members of the annexed territory to add their names to the remonstrance upon the permitted withdrawal of others who had remonstrated.
Although there is serious question whether such matter was properly raised in appellant’s original brief, we will discuss it as we prefer to dispose of questions on the merits whenever possible.
Burns’ §48-702 (1961 Supp.),2 cited in our earlier opinion as to the procedure for remonstrating against annexation ordinances, is in part as follows:
“ ... an appeal may be taken from such annexation by either a majority of the owners of land in the territory ... by filing their remonstrances in writing against such annexation . . . in the circuit or superior courts . . . within thirty [30] days after the last publication . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
This statute providing for the judicial review of annexation proceedings also is in effect a statute of limitations as to the filing of remonstrances to annexation proceedings. The attempt to add additional names to the remonstrance in the case before us occurred long after the expiration of the thirty [30] day period specified by the above statute for filing remonstrances.
Our earlier opinion adequately discussed the right of petitioners to withdraw their names from a petition or petitions before the tribunal created to receive and consider them had acted thereon. This was predicated on the general dismissal statute (Burns’ §2-901, 1946 *497Repl.),3 which permits a dismissal “. . . when the trial is by the Court, at any time before the finding of the Court is announced.”
However, we are unable to perceive the basis for appellant’s argument that new petitioners (remonstrators) after the expiration of the thirty [30] day period, should be permitted to appear as new proponents of the remonstrances upon the withdrawal or dismissal of other remonstrators. No plausible reason has been advanced why this should be true. A statute of limitations is not automatically extended by the dismissal of a previous lawsuit, so long as the dismissal stands. No valid contention has been advanced here showing the dismissal or withdrawal of names to have been improper and we must conclude therefore that the court below properly refused to allow new persons to appear as remonstrators after the expiration of the thirty [30] day statutory period. To hold otherwise would nullify the statutory provision requiring persons to file their remonstrances within thirty [30] days.
The remaining- matters alleged in the petition for rehearing are not meritorious and the petition is therefore overruled.
Achor, C. J., and Arterburn, Jackson and Bobbitt, JJ., concur.
Note. — Reported in 178 N. E. 2d 746. Rehearing denied 179 N. E. 2d 866.

. Petercheff et al. v. City of Indianapolis (1961), 242 Ind. 490, 178 N. E. 2d 746.

. Acts of 1955, ch. 269, §3, p. 720, 723.

. Acts of 1881 (Spec. Sess.), eh. 38, §433, p. 240, 322.