Court Opinion

ID: 9631239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:32:28.952348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:50.819878
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
with whom COMPTON, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s holding that AS 36.10.160 and implementing regulations contravene the equal protection clause of article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution.1 In my opinion the laws in question serve, not disserve, the art. I, § 1 promise of equality under law.
Second, as a matter of constitutional construction, I disagree with the court’s con-*640elusion that “the equal rights, opportunities and protection clause of art. I § 1 affords at least as much protection intrastate to fundamental rights that the privileges and immunities clause affords interstate.” Federal privileges and immunities doctrine is not an appropriate analogue to state equal protection. Neither in my opinion does this forced analogy point to any constitutional deficiency in the regional preference laws as enacted or as applied in the case at bar.
ALASKA STATUTE 36.10.160.
Enserch’s contract with the state required Enserch to “comply with all applicable laws and regulations regarding the hiring of Alaska residents,” including AS 36.-10.160, the focal point of this appeal. AS 36.10.160(b) provides that:
The commissioner [of the Department of Labor] shall determine that an economically distressed zone exists if the commissioner finds that
(1)the per capita income of residents of the zone is less than 90 percent of the per capita income of the United States as a whole, or the unemployment rate in the zone exceeds the national rate of unemployment by at least five percentage points;
(2) the lack of employment opportunities in the zone has substantially contributed to serious social or economic problems in the zone; and
(3) employment of workers who are not residents is a peculiar source of unemployment of residents of the zone.
Following a determination by the commissioner that an economically distressed zone exists, and for the next two fiscal years after such a determination, section (b) provides that:
... qualified residents of the zone who are eligible under AS 36.10.140 shall be given preference in hiring for at least 50 percent of employment on each project under AS 36.10.180 that is wholly or partially sited within the zone. The preference applies on a craft-by-craft or occupational basis.2
For purposes of summary judgment, En-serch conceded that the commissioner made the necessary findings and complied with *641the requirements of AS 36.10.160 in his designation of the Northwest Arctic Borough as an economically distressed zone. Relying upon this concession, and upon evidence of the legislative purpose in the record, the superior court did not require the benefit of a full evidentiary record to show how this law affected job seekers from within and without the assisted zone; neither did the superior court derive the benefit a full evidentiary presentation would confer in illuminating the purpose, means, and closeness of the fit of the legislation in question.
EQUAL PROTECTION.
Turning now to an analysis of the equal protection issues under article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution, I agree with the court that the right to pursue a livelihood is an important right.3 Thus on Alaska’s sliding equal protection scale any infringement caused by implementation of AS 36.10.160 is “deserving of close scrutiny.” Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988).
Concerning the purposes of AS 36.10.160, again I agree with the court’s assessment that a number of important goals are sought to be furthered by this legislation, amongst which are: the preservation of the social structures in economically distressed zones, the reduction of unemployment in the economically distressed zones, the alleviation of social harms flowing from chronic unemployment, and assistance of economically disadvantaged residents of economically distressed zones.
My fundamental disagreement with the court centers on its conclusion that these legislative goals are illegitimate because Ag 36.10.160, and regulations implementing this statute, accord disparate treatment to unemployed workers in one region of Alaska in order to confer an economic benefit on similarly situated workers in another region of Alaska. I cannot agree that such geographic discrimination must always run afoul of article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. Unlike Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 710 (Alaska 1975), upon which the court relies, “residence” for purposes of AS 36.10.160 is a personal not political attribute. Article I, section 1 should not bar discrimination in favor of a “class” most in need of aid. I would not denigrate such geographically oriented assistance without an inquiry into the statute’s operation and effect — an inquiry obviated, but not answered, by the court’s holding of illegitimacy. In my opinion, the court’s semantic discourse on the relation between communities and individuals is no substitute for ascertaining whether individual needs bear some relation to geography — if such a relation were in doubt. I believe that equality under law in Alaska cannot be realized on an individual basis without legislative consideration of the particular and peculiar characteristics of the diverse regions and communities in which Alaskan’s reside.
Neither, in my opinion, is the ends/means fit here insufficiently close to satisfy Alaskas equal protection test. I cannot characterize the relation of the ends to means articulated in AS 36.10.160, and the applicable regulations, as “not close,” “seriously over and under inclusive” and thus fatal.4 It is clear from the text of AS *64236.10.160 and the regulations set out in note 2, that no employment preferences are granted on public projects unless particularly severe conditions require the granting of such preferences. The employment preferences in question are limited to a particular region, or regions, and to a limited percentage of the available jobs in certain designated crafts on public projects within a designated zone. Statistical evidence is employed to establish the need for any preferences, the relationship between unemployment and public assistance payments, domestic violence, sexual abuse, alcoholism, drug use, and suicide. My reading of AS 36.10.160 and 8 AAC 30.065, 8 AAC 30.068 and 8 AAC 30.069 persuades me that the legislature carefully fashioned a close fit between the objectives of this legislation and the means selected to achieve the legislation’s important legitimate goals.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
As noted at the outset I cannot agree with the court’s incorporation of the privileges and immunities clause, and its protections, into the equal rights, opportunities and protection clause of art. I, § 1 of the Alaska Constitution.5 Historically the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the Federal Constitution was intended to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent sovereign states. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 1161-62, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948). As we noted in Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 263 (Alaska 1986):
The privileges and immunities clause does not protect non-residents against all forms of discrimination. Its reach is limited to “fundamental rights” — rights involving “basic and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the foundation of the union.” Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371, 387, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 1862, 56 L.Ed.2d 354, 367-68 (1978).
Examination of the records of Alaska’s constitutional convention fails to disclose any intent on the framers’ part to incorporate the entire corpus of federal privileges and immunities doctrine into Alaska’s equal protection provisions. Nor is the court’s reliance upon Robison and Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975), dispositive of the question.6 Both Lynden and Robison involved explicit chal*643lenges under the privileges and immunities clause. In contrast, nothing in the instant record presents a unilateral action by a political subdivision to the detriment of a greater union.7 Simply, zones are not competing political sovereigns; rather, like corporations, they exist at the discretion of the state. In my opinion, equal individual rights, opportunities and protection under law requires rather than forbids Alaska’s legislators to perceive their constituents as members of the diverse communities in which they live.
Finally, even if privileges and immunities rightly inhered in Alaska’s equal protections provisions, I would conclude that the regional preference laws are valid. Regional economic distress, and the statute's limited application to 50% of designated state funded jobs, likens this case more to Camden8 than to Robison.9 I note my concurrence in Justice Compton’s dissent to this facet of the court’s opinion.
In summary, even assuming the appropriateness of a privileges and immunities analysis, I would conclude that the regional preference legislation is constitutional. The purposes served by the legislation are significant and legitimate, and the means employed to meet these purposes reflect a sufficiently close relationship to the legisla-five goals to withstand heightened scrutiny.

. I join in the court’s disposition of the intervention, standing and waiver issues.

. 8 AAC 30.065, .068 and .069 articulate criteria to implement AS 36.10.160. In this regard 8 AAC 30.065 provides:
Hiring Preference for Residents of Economically Distressed Zone, (a) For purposes of AS 36.10.160, the commissioner will determine that an area is an economically distressed zone if
(1) for the most recent 12-month period for which figures are available,
(A) the per capita income of residents of the area is less than 90 per cent of the per capita income of the United States as a whole, or
(B) the average unemployment rate in the area exceeds the average national unemployment rate by at least 5 percentage points; for example, if the average national unemployment rate is 5 percent, the average unemployment rate of the area must be at least 10 percent for the area to meet the criteria of this subparagraph;
(2) the lack of employment opportunities has substantially contributed to serious social or economic problems in the area, as determined under 8 AAC 30.068; and
(3) the employment of nonresidents is a peculiar source of unemployment of residents of the area, as determined under 8 AAC 30.-069.
(b) For a public-funded project, the minimum percentage of positions which must be reserved under AS 36.10.160 for eligible residents in a craft or occupation subject to a hiring preference, is 50 percent.
8 AAC 30.068 provides:
Determination That Lack of Employment Opportunities Has Substantially Contributed to Serious Social or Economic Problems. For purposes of AS 36.10.150 — 36.10.175 and this chapter, the lack of employment opportunities has substantially contributed to serious social or economic problems if changes in indicators of social and economic problems are linked to changes in the number of people who want to work and are unable to obtain work. The commissioner will use correlation analysis, testimony, professional studies, or other evidence to establish the relationship between unemployment and social or economic problems.
8 AAC 30.069 provides:
Determination of Peculiar Source of Unemployment. For purposes of AS 36.10.150 — 36.-10.175, and 8 AAC 30.064 — 8 AAC 30.067, the commissioner will determine that employment of nonresidents is a peculiar source of unemployment if more than 10 percent of the residents of an area who are trained or experienced in a craft or occupation are unemployed and more than 10 percent of the total number of workers employed in that area in that craft or occupation are not residents of that area.

. In my view Enserch has no right which is entitled to equal protection in the context of this case. Although I have noted my agreement with the court’s conclusion that the individual plaintiffs have important rights protected by art. I, § 1, these individual plaintiffs can qualify for 50% of the available craft openings in question.

. In Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Alaska 1980) we observed that:
The legislature in its wisdom could conceivably have better provided for such instances. But equal protection, even under Alaska's stricter standard, does not demand perfection in classification. If it did, there would be few laws establishing classifications that would sustain an equal protection challenge.
(Footnote omitted.)
See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-02 (1970):
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.... [I]t does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." Lindsley v. Natural Carbon*642ic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377 [(1911)]. "The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730, 734 [(1913)].

. The court misreads United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 79 L.Ed.2d 249 (1984) to subject AS 36.10.160 to federal privileges and immunities scrutiny even in the absence of a challenge by an out-of-state resident. To the contrary, the Supreme Court held the Camden ordinance subject to article IV privileges and immunities scrutiny "at the behest of” and in “a particular instance of discrimination against” out-of-state residents. Id. at 218, 104 S.Ct. at 1027. While Camden presented such a claim, id. at 212 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 1024 n. 4, the record before us today does not.

. That privileges and immunities analysis is similar to equal protection analysis does not compel today’s holding that "the equal rights, opportunities, and protection clause of art. I, § 1 affords the same protection intrastate to fundamental rights that the privileges and immunities clause affords interstate.” Indeed Robison, 713 P.2d at 264 n. 5, expressly notes several distinctions between the privileges and immunities clause and the equal protection clause:
The coverage of the two clauses is overlapping but not identical. The privileges and immunities clause does not apply to corporations, or to aliens, while the equal protection clause does, and the equal protection clause applies to many classifications, while the privileges and immunities clause applies only to those based on residence. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-33 at 411-12. Alien-age classifications involving non-U.S. citizens are subject to at least an intermediate level of review under federal equal protection doctrine. Tribe, supra § 16-31 at 1089-90; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. [2842] 2847, 37 L.Ed.2d 853, 860 (1973). The removal of the "disabilities of alienage” in the sense of discrimination based on residency in another state of the United States is central to the privileges and immunities clause. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180, 19 L.Ed. 357, 360 (1868).

. The record presents no attack on either the statutory definition or its implementation in defining the Northwest Arctic Borough as a zone. While the preferred zone in this case tracks political boundaries, I note this is not necessarily the case: AS 36.10.990 defines zone to include “a census area in the state, an economic region of the state, and the state as a whole.” The identity of an individual and her community is particularly evident where a zone maps an economic region.

. United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 79 L.Ed.2d 249 (1984).

. As we stated in Robison, 713 P.2d at 269:
Furthermore, the differences between the local hire act here and the ordinance in Camden are noteworthy. As the findings of the trial court indicate, the Alaskan economy is a dynamic and growing one, property values are increasing, and Alaska’s population is expanding rapidly. In contrast, in Camden the city claimed that it was in a condition of decay, with property values eroding, population sharply declining, and unemployment "spiralling.” Id. [465 U.S.] at 222, 104 S.Ct. at 1030, 79 L.Ed.2d at 261. While Alaska’s unemployment is chronically high due in large part to unique conditions in rural areas, the economy of the state does not seem remotely comparable to the picture of “grave economic and social ills” suggested in Camden. In addition, it appears that the discrimination effected by the Alaska statute is greater than that in Camden. Public works account for the majority of commercial construction activity in Alaska. While the opinion does not indicate whether the same is true in Camden, the exclusion mandated by our state — 90% to 100% resident workers required — is far more absolute than that in the Camden ordinance. As presented to the Court, the ordinance contained only a goal, not a requirement, that 40% of workers on public works construction projects be residents. For these reasons, unlike the Wyoming Supreme Court in [State v.] Antonich [694 P.2d 60 (Wyo.1985)] we do not regard Camden as precedent supporting approval of our local hire law.