Court Opinion

ID: 9705081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:56:04.189799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.806870
License: Public Domain

*180POPOVICH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
According to the majority’s logic, a drunk driver who crashes into a school bus and kills several children can be sentenced for only one count of involuntary manslaughter,1 the sentence not to exceed five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine2. Does this punishment fit the crime? Routinely and perfunctorily reiterating an ancient legal cliche, the majority maintains that the defendant cannot be sentenced on the remaining counts because all of the deaths are the result of a “single unlawful act.”
Although the facts of the instant case are, fortunately, not as severe as the above hypothetical, the same rule is applicable in either situation. In the instant case, appellant, prior to engaging in a high speed chase with the police, “propelled his vehicle forward, through a crowd of people in the street waiting for a trolley. Several persons suffered injury.” The majority, in remanding so that sentence can be imposed on only one of the nine counts of recklessly endangering, is blindly adhering to the prior decisions of this Court which prohibit multiple sentences in automobile accident cases. When our Court has bothered to offer a reason for this rule, we invariably cite a line of cases which state that the single act theory has “long been the law of this Commonwealth.” Because no logical reason exists to support the continued viability of the single-act doctrine in cases such as this one, I must vehemently dissent.
The rule takes its roots from two cases having nothing to do with the legal issues presented in automobile injury cases. In Commonwealth v. Veley, 63 Pa.Super. 489 (1916), three people drowned when a dam broke. The president of the company which owned and constructed the dam was brought to trial on two counts of involuntary manslaughter. The Commonwealth alleged that the defendant’s negligence in the construction and maintenance of the dam caused the drownings. The defendant was acquitted *181by a jury. Two years later, another involuntary manslaughter charge was brought against the same defendant for the death of the third drowning victim. Finding that the defendant was to be tried for an offense arising out of the same set of circumstances of which he was acquitted, this Court stated:
“Where there is but one act of cause of injury, or death of a number of persons, there is but one injury to the Commonwealth, but where the acts or causes are separate, they are separate injuries to the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth.
The protection afforded by the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United State [sic], that a person shall not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, is not only to protect against the peril of a second punishment, but is well against being tried a second time for the same offense: Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 [24 S.Ct. 797] 49 L.Ed. 114.”
Veley, supra, 63 Pa.Superior Ct. at 496.
The first sentence of the above quote is preserved by the majority in the instant case in its quote from Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323, 362 A.2d 227 (1976). This single-injury-to-the-Commonwealth language was initially produced in Commonwealth v. Ernesto, 93 Pa.Super. 339 (1928), where five defendants were each charged with seven counts of involuntary manslaughter after a still they were operating, in violation of the liquor laws of the time, exploded and ignited a fire destroying the home of one of the defendants and killing his wife and six children. All of the defendants were found guilty and each received five consecutive two-year sentences of imprisonment and two concurrent sentences of two years imprisonment. This Court held that the trial court erred in sentencing each defendant to a total of ten years incarceration. We found that the only difference between Commonwealth v. Veley, supra, and the case at bar was that the deaths in Veley were alleged to have occurred from the doing of a lawful act in a negligent manner and that in Ernesto, the deaths occurred from the *182doing of an unlawful act. Ernesto, supra, 93 Pa.Superior Ct. at 347. The Ernesto court reasoned:
“The same unlawful act which caused the death of any one of the persons mentioned in the indictment caused the deaths of the others. There was but one injury to the Commonwealth involved in this prosecution and that [sic] neither a malicious nor an intentional one insofar as its unfortunate results are concerned.”
Id., 93 Pa.Superior Ct. at 348.
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the lower court for resentencing so that a sentence no more severe than that authorized for a single act could be imposed.
The first time a drunk driver benefited from the single-act theory was in Commonwealth v. McCord, 116 Pa.Super. 480, 176 A. 834 (1935). Defendant McCord was found guilty of assault and battery, aggravated assault and battery, operating a vehicle on the public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, violation of the Motor Code in failing to stop at the scene of an accident, and involuntary manslaughter. The facts indicated that an automobile, driven by either Mr. McCord or defendant Waggy, struck three young women, killing one, and injuring the other two. McCord was sentenced on all counts except simple assault and battery. This Court, relying on Commonwealth v. Veley, supra, and Commonwealth v. Ernesto, supra, ruled that the trial court had no power to impose sentence for both involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault and battery from the single act of running into three people. The sentence imposed on the latter count was reversed.
Over the years, it has been consistently held that the courts of this Commonwealth have no power to impose more than one sentence for a single unlawful act. This single-act theory has been used in ca.ses where multiple crimes are committed by a single act, Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323, 362 A.2d 227 (1976); Commonwealth v. Crocker, 280 Pa.Super. 470, 421 A.2d 818 (1980); Commonwealth v. Lezinsky, 264 Pa.Super. 476, 400 A.2d 184 *183(1979), and where multiple victims are the result of a single act, Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 256 Pa.Super. 259, 389 A.2d 1113 (1978); Commonwealth v. Speelman, 235 Pa.Super. 109, 341 A.2d 138 (1975); and Commonwealth ex rel. Brockway v. Keenan, 180 Pa.Super. 78, 118 A.2d 255 (1955). The latter group of cases, involving multiple victims, most commonly involve auto accidents caused by intoxicated or reckless drivers. As stated previously, the primary reason given for the rule in these cases, which invariably cite McCord, supra, is that such a rule has long been the law of Pennsylvania. However, in Commonwealth v. Reynolds, supra, in response to the Commonwealth’s argument that the enactment of the Crimes Code dictated a new result, it was held that, aside from the fact that Pennsylvania case law in this area is well settled, if the legislature had desired to change the law it would have specifically done so. Id. 256 Pa.Super. at 279-80, 389 A.2d at 1123 (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 469 Pa. 24, 364 A.2d 886 (1976)). This writer finds that the Reynolds court’s reliance on Miller, supra, was misplaced. In Miller, our Supreme Court held that the legislature, in adopting the Crimes Code, did not intend for the crime of criminal conspiracy to merge with the completed offense which was the object of the conspiracy. The Court reasoned that since the Crimes Code, which was based on the Model Penal Code, did not contain specific provisions mandating such a merger, our legislature did not intend to change the common law rule. Furthermore, the Miller court found that where the legislature intended to preclude multiple prosecutions and convictions, it manifested this intention clearly and precisely. Miller, supra 469 Pa. at 26-29, 364 A.2d at 887, 888.
The Reynolds court held that the legislature did not intend to change the common law single-act doctrine when enacting the Crimes Code because it remained silent on the subject. I find it totally illogical to premise such a decision on the Miller case, which holds that where the legislature has intended to preclude multiple prosecutions and convic*184tions, it has done so clearly and precisely.3 Nowhere in the Crimes Code has the legislature precluded multiple sentences for multiple violations of a criminal statute when a single act injures more than one person.
“Although a rule of law may have emerged from a case, that does not foreclose its subsequent scrutiny by the Courts in ascertaining whether it is still jurisprudentially sound. Since the law is a ‘living and developing legal system ... rather than ... a static set of rules,’ Estate of Grossman, 486 Pa. 460, 470, 406 A.2d 726, 729 (1979), the policy of stare decisis is not to be adhered to with such blind obedience that one’s constitutional rights, e.g., to a speedy trial, are impinged. The better practice would be to examine the continuing viability of our decisions where the need so.requires.” (emphasis supplied).
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 288 Pa.Super. 69, 76-77 n. *, 431 A.2d 291, 295 n. * (1981) (Popovich, J., dissenting).
The constitutional right protected by this Court in Veley, supra, was the clause of the Fifth Amendment which states, “[n]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ____” U.S. Const., Amend V. The Ernesto court erred in relying on Veley, supra, when it held that the explosion of an illegal still which leaves seven people dead gives rise to only one punishment. Veley stands only for the proposition that after an acquittal, one cannot be tried again on the same facts for the same offense. “[Tjhere is no constitutional prohibition against legislation which provides for multiple crimes arising from single acts against multiple victims. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958); People v. Golson, 32 Ill.2d 398, 207 *185N.E.2d 68 (1965).” State v. Miranda, 3 Ariz.App. 550, 416 P.2d 444, 451 (1966). This Court, in a case such as the present case, is no longer protecting a defendant’s constitutional right not to be tried twice for the same offense. Rather, we are protecting intoxicated and reckless drivers from the obvious consequences of their actions.
I would adopt the more logical approach taken by the State of Arizona, which allows consecutive sentences on multiple involuntary manslaughter charges arising from a single motor vehicle accident. In State v. Miranda, supra, the court interpreted the applicable Arizona statutes:
“The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted is in Ch. 2 of our Criminal Code (Title 13 A.R.S.) which is the chapter on homicide. A.R.S. § 13-156, sub-sec. A, in pertinent parts, reads as follows:
‘Manslaughter is of three kinds:
‘3. In the driving of a vehicle:
‘(a) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.’
This section is not intelligible unless the prior section is read also:
‘§ 13-455. Manslaughter defined.
‘Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.’
This language makes sufficiently clear, in the opinion of this court, that the legislature intended that the killing of each human being, under the circumstances described in the code, would constitute a separate offense. Respect for human dignity is of the essence of our way of life. Certainly it is in keeping with this spirit that the wrongful killing of each human being should be treated as a separate offense.”
*186State v. Miranda, supra 416 P.2d at 451, 452. A contrary result was reached by the Alaska Supreme Court in Thessen v. State of Alaska, 508 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1973), where the defendant was found guilty of 14 counts of manslaughter for one act of arson and only one sentence could be imposed. The Thessen court found that since the defendant did not intend for anyone to be killed in the fire he set, the focus of punishment “must be on the intent and conduct of the perpetrator rather than on fortuitous results.” Id. at 1197. The courts of this Commonwealth should not be persuaded by such reasoning in cases where a driver recklessly propels his car into a crowd of people or where an intoxicated driver crashes into a school bus. The results of these automobile “accidents” are not fortuitous.
The Pennsylvania statute which defines involuntary manslaughter provides:
“(a) General rule.—A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504.
This statute is invoked when one engages in the conduct proscribed and thereby “causes the death of another person.” Had the legislature intended the single-act theory to be included in the statute, the final phrase would read: “causes the death of one or more persons.” Rather, a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when his unlawful or negligent conduct causes the death of one person. The Pennsylvania involuntary manslaughter statute clearly focuses on the individual victim just as, in the instant case, the recklessly endangering section of the Crimes Code is written. This section provides:
“§ 2705. Recklessly endangering another person
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may *187place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
As was held in Commonwealth v. Miller, supra, where the legislature has intended to preclude multiple prosecutions and convictions, it has expressly done so. It is clear, in the opinion of this writer, that the above statute is written with regard to an individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that a separate offense is committed for each individual placed in such danger. If the legislature intended a different result, this statute would read: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place a person or persons in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” It does violence to the plain meaning of these laws to hold that the legislature, by failing explicitly to overrule a relatively obscure line of cases, intended to incorporate the single-act doctrine into the involuntary manslaughter and recklessly endangering statutes. The fact that our Supreme Court quoted the multiple death language of Veley, supra, in Commonwealth v. Walker, supra, is irrelevant since that case involved different crimes, rape and statutory rape, from a single act against a single victim. The case law which has developed where two or more persons are injured or killed by a single criminal act in the operation of a motor vehicle is not based on sound legal principles and, therefore, must be changed. Appellant’s sentence of nine consecutive one-year terms of probation should be affirmed.4
For the above-stated reasons, I dissent. I concur with the majority’s disposition of the first issue raised by this appeal.

. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504.

. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1101, 1104; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9726(b).

. On this point, the Miller decision cites 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, which provides: "A person may not be convicted of more than one offense defined by this chapter [inchoate crimes] for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime," and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502, which provides: “(d) Multiplé convictions.—A person may not be convicted both for burglary and for the offense which it was his intent to commit after the burglar’s entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the additional offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.”

. To the extent that concurrent sentences are not violative of the single act doctrine, see Commonwealth v. Carroll, 131 Pa.Super. 357, 200 A. 139 (1938). However, as the distinction between concurrent and consecutive sentences, with regard to the single act doctrine, is as unsound as a rule against consecutive sentences in these cases, I understand the total disregard of Carroll in Commonwealth v. Speelman, supra, and Commonwealth v. Crocker, supra.