Court Opinion

ID: 9598351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:08:06.321155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:09.976487
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice:
Defendant appeals from his conviction, after a trial by jury in the District Court of Salt Lake County, of distribution of a controlled substance for value, in violation of § 58-37-8(l)(a). (All statutory references are to Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.)
On September 28, 1976, Donald Bird, a University of Utah Police Officer and Special Deputy for the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s office, was working undercover in the Fourth Quarter Lounge in Salt Lake City under the direction of the Narcotics Division of the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s of*766fice. Officer Bird testified that he shared a table with three persons he described as “Big Jim, another black individual and one female black,” and that he was acquainted with Big Jim but did not know the other two. Bird had with him two watches, and he described the events involving the watches as follows:
I asked him [Big Jim] if he would be interested in buying or trading the watches for some money or for narcotics. . I showed them to Big Jim, and then I showed them to the other black individual. He asked to see them. . The other black individual said he would have to go out and talk with Bill Bailey. He then gave me [returned to me] the watches and went outside.
When asked if the individual, who left, returned with anyone else, Bird responded affirmatively, described the defendant, and said, “I know him as Bill Bailey. . I was introduced to him several weeks previously by Big Jim.” In describing Bailey’s actions, Bird said, “Mr. Bailey asked to see the watches. I then showed him the watches, and he looked at both watches and set the one watch down.” With regard to the other watch, “He then examined it . and asked me how much I wanted for it. I told him I would take fifty dollars for it. . He said, ‘Well I don’t want that watch,’ and he went to set it down. ... I then said I would take a bag for it. . He then told the other black individual who he came back in the bar with, that had left previously, he told him to pay me. . . Mr. Bailey put the watch on his arm and then left. . The black individual then slid in beside me on the bench and reached into his pants pocket and took out a blue balloon, handed it to me and asked me if that’s what I wanted. ... I said, ‘Yeah, that’s what I wanted.’ ” Bird took the balloon, and the other person “got up and walked out of the bar.” The contents of the balloon on analysis proved to be heroin.
Defendant was arrested on January 26, 1977, and held without bail until trial. At the trial, the only witness to testify concerning the events at the bar was Officer Bird, although he admitted there were approximately fifteen other people in the bar at the time of the alleged sale.
During voir dire of the jury panel, prospective jurors were asked by the Court: “Are there any of you who believe you would be inclined to give the testimony of a Peace Officer greater weight than you would the testimony of someone who was not a Peace Officer? Would you be inclined to believe a Peace Officer’s testimony more?” A Mr. Bushnell answered in the affirmative, but when he could not commu-nicató&reason for this answer, the Court did not investigate further. Mr. Reimann, whom defendant claims is a Special Deputy for Salt Lake County, answered, “only on the basis that a Peace Officer is generally a very reliable observer. They are trained to be as such and they are not likely to jump to conclusions.” Mr. Bushnell concurred in this. A Mr. Brown responded, “In my experience I have found with the deals with the Peace Officers in connection with my job that you can rely upon their testimony and their background to the utmost,” and continued, “I would want to stand behind them a hundred percent.” The Court’s only reaction to this was to ask, “But you would take into account I assume their experience and their background and things of that nature?” Mr. Brown’s answer to this was yes. Despite these statements, only Mr. Reimann was removed by the Court for cause; Mr. Brown and Mr. Bushnell were removed by use of two of defendant’s four peremptory challenges. (Defendant used all four peremptory challenges available to him in a criminal case.)
During the closing arguments the prosecutor referred to defendant as a “criminal brought before the Bar of Justice,” which reference was deleted by the Court after objection thereto. The prosecutor then indicated that the defense had the opportunity to call witnesses but did not do so. The Court warned the prosecutor that such comments were improper, telling the jury to disregard the statement. Later, when the prosecutor stated that the defendant “has the right to call witnesses in his own be*767half,” the Court again indicated that this was not proper argument, but did not instruct the jury to disregard the statement. On the basis of these comments, counsel for defendant made a motion for arrest of judgment, or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict. (No motion for a mistrial was made.) This motion was denied; the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years.
Defendant seeks a new trial, and we shall discuss one issue, viz.: the District Court’s failure to remove the two challenged jurors, Bushnell and Brown, for cause, which is dispositive. We do not discuss other issues raised by defendant, including prosecutorial misconduct, as the issue we do address is, as noted, dispositive and the other ones are substantially without merit in this case.
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12, guarantees the defendant in a criminal case the right to a trial by an impartial jury. Accordingly, various challenges to jurors are allowed as one vital feature to ensure an impartial jury. At issue here are challenges to prevent a juror from serving in the particular case at hand. Sec. 77-30-18 defines two categories of challenges for particular cause:
(1) For such bias as, when the existence of the facts is ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror, and which is known in this Code as implied bias.
(2) For the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror which leads to a just inference in reference to the case that he will not act with entire impartiality which is known in this Code as actual bias.
Section 77-30-19 lists the bases for which a juror may be disqualified for implied bias. As none of the challenged jurors falls within any of the specified bases for implied bias, they must all be considered with reference to § 77-30-18(2) dealing with actual bias.
Impartiality has been defined by this Court as a “mental attitude of appropriate indifference.” State v. Brooks, Utah, 563 P.2d 799, 802 (1977). The Court went on to say that a juror who had a relationship of “affection, respect, or esteem” with a witness or a party could not be “disinterested, indifferent, impartial.” Id. at 802. Brooks involved two jurors who were friends of potential witnesses; although they testified that they could set aside those relationships and decide the case on its merits, in light of their relationships to the witnesses the Court inferred that they could not act with impartiality. Thus, it was held an abuse of discretion in that case to deny the challenge for cause.
The United States Supreme Court, considering this subject in Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878), stated that “The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.” Id. at 155. Chief Justice Marshall, presiding over the trial of Aaron Burr in 1807, defined an impartial jury as one composed of persons who “will fairly hear the testimony which may be offered to them, and bring in their verdict, according to that testimony, and according to the law arising on it.” Burr’s Trial, p. 415. Marshall’s test for impartiality, quoted with approval in Reynolds, is:
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered; which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions which will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them; which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him. Id. at 416.
In the case at hand, the District Court asked “Are there any of you who believe you would be inclined to give the testimony of a Peace Officer greater weight than you would the testimony of someone who was not a Peace Officer?” Mr. Bushnell answered, “I think I probably would,” but could not elaborate on his response. When asked by the Court if this would *768interfere with his ability to return an impartial verdict, Mr. Bushnell made no definite answer; however, the Court failed to question him further. In response to the Court’s question, Mr. Reimann said “a Peace Officer is generally a very reliable observer. They are trained to be as such and they are not likely to jump to hasty conclusions.” Mr. Bushnell concurred in this. Despite these comments which facially raised a question of bias, the Court failed to further probe this matter. The Court did, however, remove Mr. Reimann for cause, on grounds not specified in the record, but refused to remove Mr. Bushnell although he had agreed with Mr. Reimann’s comments, and had never said that he would be impartial in weighing the testimony of a peace officer. In those circumstances, the District Court had a duty to remove Mr. Bushnell for bias, or investigate further until the inference of bias was rebutted by showing that this was mérély a “light impression,” not one which would “close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition.” Failure to do either constituted an abuse of discretion.
In the case of Mr. Brown, the inference of bias was even stronger, for he said with reference to peace officers “. you can rely upon their testimony and their background to the utmost ... I would want to stand behind them a hundred percent.” The District Court’s reaction to this response, which, without more, clearly shows bias, was to ask, “But you would take into account I assume their experience and their background and things of that nature?” to which Mr. Brown replied, “yes.” As with Mr. Bushnell, the Court should have removed Mr. Brown or questioned him further to rebut the inference of bias. The Court’s one question was not sufficient to rebut this inference, and in fact none of the challenged jurors testified that they could weigh Officer Bird’s testimony impartially. Hence, the Court had insufficient evidence on which to base a conclusion that there was no bias and abused its discretion in failing to remove for cause all three jurors in whom an inference of bias was raised and not rebutted.
When the District Court failed to excuse Mr. Brown and Mr. Bushnell for cause, they were removed by the use of two of defendant’s peremptory challenges. It was prejudicial error for the District Court to force defendant to remove by peremptory challenges two jurors whose voir dire testimony raised an unrebutted inference of actual bias. “A party is entitled to exercise his three peremptory challenges upon impartial prospective jurors, and he should not be compelled to waste one in order to accomplish that which the trial judge should have done.”1 In State v. Moore, Utah, 562 P.2d 629 (1977), failure to excuse the challenged juror for cause was prejudicial and “in effect it deprived defendant of one of his statutory peremptory challenges in that he was required to exercise one of the peremptory challenges to have Rock [the challenged juror] excused from serving on the jury.” Id. at 631.
The State claims that the defendant has not proved he was prejudiced when he used his peremptory challenges to remove the challenged jurors. However, defendant cannot prove this empirically, and he is not required to do so. In Crawford, a civil case where six of eight jurors could return a verdict, a similar error was held not harmless although there was a unanimous verdict, because the juror who remained when the appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges “may have been a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will upon them.” At 542 P.2d 1093. The defendant was deprived in effect of two peremptory challenges, and in light of Crawford and Moore, the error in this case cannot be considered harmless.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
MAUGHAN and STEWART, JJ., concur.

. Crawford v. Manning, Utah, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1975). Note that Crawford was a civil case, hence the parties had only three peremptory challenges.