Court Opinion

ID: 9552746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:15:56.667917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:47.573579
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I dissent from Part II of the majority opinion and would therefore affirm the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals.
I am of the opinion that consultation of a dictionary by a juror to look up the meaning of a common English word is not per se jury misconduct sufficient to warrant reversal of a jury verdict without a showing by the defendant of prejudice.
Once the per se rule has been determined not to be applicable, as it has in this case, the burden should be on the defendant to establish that juror misconduct denied him a fair trial and thus deprived him of substantial rights. I do not agree that the defendant here has sustained that burden.
The only evidence offered to support the defendant’s claim of prejudice was the affi*1134davits of two jurors. The first juror’s affidavit stated:
“Mr. Lacklen [State Public Defender and trial counsel] contacted me and asked me to make a statement on my guilty verdict concerning the trial against Pedro Alvarez.
I had a very difficult time reaching a verdict for several reasons. First of all because of the facts and/or lack of facts and because of the way the facts were presented to the jury.
The main reason was a doubt I had about the testimony given by Ms. Gonzales. Not that I believed she didn’t tell the truth, for she had no reason to lie, but could she have been mistaken in what she saw? She couldn’t have had but a minute or two and it had to be very confusing moments. She saw her friend lying on the ground, hurt very badly, maybe dead, people standing around and feet kicking. Was it possible she thought the defendant was kicking her friend, when he might have been trying to stop Mr. Martinez?
I had to decide whether my doubt was a reasonable doubt or if it was an imaginary or vague doubt. I couldn’t sleep that night so I looked up the words vague, imaginary, doubt, and reasonable. I discussed the definitions when we met the next morning with the other jurors. The definition for vague: not sharp, clear, certain, etc. in thought or expression, helped me make up my mind. I decided my doubt was a vague doubt and not a reasonable doubt. Ms. Gonzales had been able to give a very detailed report of what she saw and had seemed very sure of her testimony.”
The second juror’s affidavit stated:
“I ... had voted not guilty at the beginning of Deliberation. I stayed with this decision through the 4V2 hour period. At this time, I considered my doubts to be vague after hearing facts from other Jurors. At that time we adjourned until the following morning. My vote at this time was guilty. The next morning in Deliberation, one Juror had looked up some words in the dictionary; words such as vague and speculate. I then debated as to whether I should have changed my vote the night before. After another 2 hours of Deliberation, the other Juror and myself decided our, doubts to be vague. I still have these same doubts.”
As is clear from the first juror’s affidavit, she had not determined whether the doubt in her mind was a “reasonable doubt” or whether it was an “imaginary or vague doubt” when the jury recessed for the evening. She consulted a dictionary, not in an attempt to redefine a term of art like “reasonable doubt,” but to confirm or gain an understanding of the words used by the court in defining the term “reasonable doubt.”
We have not hesitated to consult dictionaries in an attempt to determine the common meaning of words. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 652 P.2d 575 (Colo.1982); People v. Gallegos, 193 Colo. 108, 563 P.2d 937 (1977); People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975). The same practice governs the interpretation of contractual language. See Lorenzen v. Mustard’s Last Stand, Inc., 196 Colo. 265, 586 P.2d 12 (1978).
The courts have often recognized that dictionary definitions are taken as matters of common knowledge which members of a jury are supposed to possess when the court’s instructions are read to them. In Re Estate of Cory, 169 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1969); Dulaney v. Burns, 218 Ala. 493, 119 So. 21 (1928). If this were not so, every word in every instruction would have to be defined for the jury.
I disagree with the court’s conclusion that the affidavit of the first juror establishes prejudice in fact because the dictionary definition of “vague” helped her to make up her mind that her doubt was not reasonable. To the same extent, I do not agree that the defendant was prejudiced by the action of the second juror who, prior to the evening adjournment had voted “guilty” and who, after discussing the meaning of “vague” with the first juror, reaffirmed her vote of guilty. The dictionary definition of “vague” and “speculate” did not in fact cause her to change her mind to the defendant’s prejudice. The court’s conclusion that the defendant was prejudiced is not sup*1135ported by the only evidence tendered by the defendant.
The court by its decision today is in effect drawing an artificial line and permitting a jury verdict to be overturned because a juror sought to clarify in her own mind the meaning of ordinary words.
If a juror should by happenstance have in mind the dictionary meaning of a word such as “vague” at the time deliberations commenced and informed the other jurors of his knowledge, would this constitute juror misconduct? I would think not, but the rationale of the majority opinion leads to that conclusion. The most that can be said is that the act of the juror in looking in the dictionary to determine the meaning of common words, not legal terms, is harmless error. U.S. v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 2189, 53 L.Ed.2d 232 (1977). See also Wilson v. State, 495 S.W.2d 927 (Texas Cr.App.1973).
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice HODGES and Justice LEE join in this dissent and concurrence.