Court Opinion

ID: 9637516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:08:40.945497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:56.992973
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, President Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
The principal issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that the defense of entrapment is available only to a defendant who admits to all of the elements of the offense charged. I agree with the majority that the trial court did err, and I therefore concur in its order granting a new trial. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant must “admit to at least some of the elements [of the offense] charged.” Majority op. at 1151. I believe the defense of entrapment *338should be available even if the defendant admits to none of the elements of the offense charged.
I agree with the majority that in 18 Pa.C.S. § 313, our legislature adopted the objective test for entrapment, and that this test, which focuses entirely upon the conduct of the police, makes evidence of a particular defendant’s “predisposition” to criminality irrelevant. See Majority op. at 1149; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384, 78 S.Ct. 819, 826, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958) (FRANKFURTER, J., concurring) (objective test “shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the police.”)
In providing that entrapment is a defense, however, the legislature imposed no requirement that the defendant admit to any element of the offense charged. Thus, any such requirement must be imposed by us, and must be justified as being consistent with the legislature’s purpose in enacting § 313. See State v. McBride, 287 Or. 315, 599 P.2d 449, 452 (1979) (court refuses to impose admission requirement where “statutory codification of the entrapment defense, contains nothing that would require the defendant to admit doing the proscribed act before being allowed the benefit of the defense, ... ”) In fact, an admission requirement is in consistent with the legislature’s purpose in enacting § 313. As Justice TRAYNOR explained in People v. Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 775, 44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 330, 401 P.2d 934, 938 (1965): “Entrapment is recognized as a defense ... to deter ... unlawful [police] conduct [and such a rule] cannot properly be restricted by compelling a defendant to incriminate himself as a condition to invoking the rule.” See also People v. D’Angelo, 401 Mich. 167, 178, 257 N.W.2d 655, 660 (1977) (“[s]ince our [objective] test for entrapment does not look to the defendant’s so-called predisposition to commit the crime charged but focuses instead upon the challenged governmental activity, the defendant will not be required to admit the criminal act in order to raise the entrapment issue.”)
The reasoning in support of an admission requirement is that it is supposedly illogical to allow a defendant to deny *339having committed an offense while at the same time claiming he was entrapped into committing it. See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 482 F.2d 508, 515 (5th Cir.1973); State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Iowa 1973). This reasoning, however, is not persuasive.
In the first place, for all crimes containing an element of scienter, the defendant may admit doing the act, but, with no inconsistency, claim that he did not do so knowingly. See, e.g., United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 182-83 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied 439 U.S. 860, 99 S.Ct. 178, 58 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), (where physician denies he knowingly misprescribed controlled substances and claims he was entrapped, court finds no impermissible inconsistency); State v. Branam, 161 N.J.Super. 53, 390 A.2d 1186, 1191, aff'd 79 N.J. 301, 399 A.2d 299 (1979) (“we fail to find any real inconsistency where, as here, defendant contends that she intended to commit no crime and that the acts which might give rise to an inference of intent were induced by an agent of the State.”)
In addition, where a defendant presents two mutually exclusive theories, the jury may believe that the evidence supports one, but not the other. In such a case, there is no inconsistency but simply alternative interpretations of the evidence; an inconsistency would occur only if the jury chose to adopt both alternatives. See Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219-20 (D.C.Cir.1962) (where defendant denies knowingly selling heroin and also claims entrapment, court holds “the defenses were alternative but not inconsistent. It was consistent with defendant’s denial of the transaction to urge that if the jury believed it did occur, the government’s evidence as to how it occurred indicated entrapment.”)
Moreover, even if there is a necessary inconsistency, that is not a reason to preclude the defense of entrapment. Obviously, the defendant will greatly damage his own credibility by following such a strategy, see State v. Stone, 629 P.2d 442, 446 (Utah 1981) (by urging “inconsistent factual contentions, a defendant’s credibility would suffer immense*340ly”), but entrapment should not be an exception to the well-established rule that a defendant may assert inconsistent defenses. See, e.g., United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 n. 6 (9th Cir.1975) (collecting cases); Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat— Denial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense, 1973 U.Ill. L.F. 254, 259 n. 27 (collecting cases). As the Ninth Circuit has said, “The rule in favor of inconsistent defenses reflects the belief of modern criminal jurisprudence that a criminal defendant should be accorded every reasonable protection in defending himself against governmental prosecution.” United States v. Demma, supra at 985. See also State v. McBride, supra, 287 Or. at 321, 599 P.2d at 452 (“[s]ince inconsistent defenses are allowed in criminal cases generally, there is no justification for prohibiting them in cases involving entrapment.”)
And finally, there are serious problems of fairness, which may approach constitutional dimension, with a rule that relieves the government of its burden of proving each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Demma, supra at 986; Groot, supra at 269-75. As Justice TRAYNOR wrote in People v. Perez, supra 62 Cal.2d at 775, 44 Cal.Rptr. at 330, 401 P.2d at 938, “To compel a defendant to admit guilt as a condition to invoking the defense of entrapment would compel him to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at the risk of not being able to meet his burden of proving entrapment.”
For all these reasons, I favor the adoption of the rule stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. McBride, supra 287 Or. at 317, 599 P.2d at 450: “A criminal defendant is entitled to the defense of entrapment without being required to concede that she committed the crime or any of the elements of the crime.”
Despite its reliance on People v. Perez, supra, and State v. McBride, supra, both of which adopt the “no elements” rule that I favor, the majority adopts the rule enunciated by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Martinez v. State, 91 N.M. 747, 580 P.2d 968 (1978), “that where the defendant *341has admitted some elements of an offense, although not all, and where the denial of all other elements is factually not repugnant to the defense of entrapment, the trial court must issue an instruction on entrapment.” Id. at 750, 580 P.2d at 971. However, the court in Martinez advanced no reasons to explain its choice of rule; I can think of none; and the majority suggests none.
It seems evident that in a state, like Pennsylvania, that follows the objective test, a requirement that the defendant make an admission is irrelevant. In addition, the requirement must prove inefficient. One of the advantages of the objective test is that it provides a fixed standard for evaluating police conduct, in contrast to the subjective test, which delves into the particular defendant’s “predisposition” to criminality. Under Martinez, however, the court must determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the defendant’s denial is “factually ... repugnant to the defense of entrapment.” This appears to me to be an open invitation to litigation in support of no discernible policy objective.1

. Because I believe that appellant's first argument, that he was improperly denied his requested point for charge on entrapment, requires a new trial, I should not reach either his second argument, that the trial judge unduly interfered with the presentation of his defense, or his third, that his sentence was illegal.