Court Opinion

ID: 9395156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 14:00:44.245081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.033098
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1157   Document: 21     Page: 1   Filed: 05/17/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                    SUSAN L. GELB,
                       Petitioner

                            v.

      DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
                   Respondent
             ______________________

                       2023-1157
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. SF-1221-21-0267-W-1.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: May 17, 2023
                 ______________________

    SUSAN L. GELB, Alameda, CA, pro se.

     MARIANA TERESA ACEVEDO, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, CORINNE
 ANNE NIOSI.
                  ______________________

      Before LOURIE, DYK, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21     Page: 2    Filed: 05/17/2023

 2                                               GELB   v. DVA

 PER CURIAM.
     Susan L. Gelb appeals the final decision of the Merit
 Systems Protection Board denying her request for correc-
 tive action under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).
 Specifically, Ms. Gelb challenges the Administrative
 Judge’s decision finding that Ms. Gelb had not established
 good cause for her absence at the scheduled hearing and
 thus waived her right to a hearing. We hold that the ad-
 ministrative judge (AJ) abused his discretion in denying
 Ms. Gelb a hearing because, although she was absent, her
 representative was present at the hearing. However, be-
 cause Ms. Gelb has not met her burden of showing harmful
 error, we affirm the Board’s final decision.
                        BACKGROUND
     Ms. Gelb filed a complaint with the Office of Special
 Counsel (OSC), alleging retaliation under the WPA. After
 the OSC closed its investigation, Ms. Gelb appealed to the
 Board seeking corrective action. An AJ determined that
 Ms. Gelb had exhausted her claims and made nonfrivolous
 allegations of Board jurisdiction such that the appeal could
 proceed.
     Subsequently, on April 22, 2021, the AJ held a tele-
 phonic status conference. He indicated that a hearing
 would take place using the Zoom for Government (ZfG) vid-
 eoconferencing platform. Ms. Gelb’s representative “ex-
 pressed concern[s] regarding the appellant’s ability to
 access the necessary electronic equipment and internet
 connection to participate using ZfG.” SAppx. 52. 1 Her rep-
 resentative asked whether an in-person appearance was
 possible, and the AJ explained that then-current COVID-
 19 protocols precluded such appearances. The AJ ordered
 the “appellant . . . to determine whether she is able to

     1   Citations to “SAppx.” refer to the appendix at-
 tached to the appellee’s brief.
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21     Page: 3    Filed: 05/17/2023

 GELB   v. DVA                                             3

 successfully utilize the ZfG platform with equipment cur-
 rently available to her.” Id. If Ms. Gelb was unable to uti-
 lize the ZfG platform, the AJ ordered that “she must notify
 the Board in writing by May 14, 2021, and set forth the
 specific reasons she [was] unable to use ZfG and any efforts
 she has made to overcome those issues.” Id. (emphasis in
 original). The AJ then issued an order setting a hearing
 for June 21, 2021 and stating that “[i]f the appellant fails
 to appear without good cause, the appeal will be decided
 without a hearing.” SAppx. 55.
      Ms. Gelb did not make a submission to the Board by
 the May 14, 2021 deadline. Instead, she asked—after the
 deadline, on four separate occasions—that the AJ allow her
 to appear via audio-only or in-person. See SAppx. 59
 (May 24, 2021); ECF No. 9 at 49–52 2 (June 7, 2021);
 SAppx. 69, 72 (June 17, 2021); ECF No. 9 at 74–79
 (June 19, 2021). Ms. Gelb explained that “she does not
 have the necessary personal hardware/equipment and
 wherewithal (to include a stable internet connection) to fa-
 cilitate a videoconference.” ECF No. 9 at 76; see also id.
 at 51–52.
     The AJ repeatedly denied Ms. Gelb’s requests. See
 SAppx. 59–60 (June 1, 2021); SAppx. 66–67 (June 8, 2021);
 SAppx. 69, 72 (June 17, 2021). He explained that appel-
 lant had failed to make the requested submission by the
 May 14, 2021 deadline and thus found that “appellant has
 not shown good cause to participate in the hearing in per-
 son or by audio only.” SAppx. 60.
     The AJ continued to order “appellant to appear by
 video” and warned that failure to do so may result in sanc-
 tions under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43. Id. Under 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.43(a), a judge may sanction a party for failure to

    2  Citations to “ECF No. 9” refer to the PDF page
 numbers on the appellant’s brief and attached appendix.
Case: 23-1157     Document: 21      Page: 4    Filed: 05/17/2023

 4                                                  GELB   v. DVA

 comply with an order. Under subsection (e), a judge may
 cancel a scheduled hearing “for contumacious conduct or
 conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Here,
 the AJ specified in his order that “an appropriate sanction
 for the appellant’s failure to appear by video would be to
 bar her from testifying.” SAppx. 72.
      The morning of June 21, 2021—the day of the hear-
 ing—the AJ told Ms. Gelb’s representative that Ms. Gelb
 may use audio-only means to join the hearing. Hearing Au-
 dio Recording at 6:45–7:02 (“Now the administrative judge
 tells us [to] just have [Ms. Gelb] call in, when she’s already
 been advised she can’t do that. . . . That could have and
 should have actually been articulated by the administra-
 tive judge way before now.”). In other words, the AJ finally
 permitted Ms. Gelb to appear in the manner she had re-
 peatedly requested.
     Ms. Gelb did not appear at the hearing through video
 or audio. She had made other plans for the day; specifi-
 cally, Ms. Gelb’s representative noted that, believing she
 would be unable to attend the hearing, Ms. Gelb decided
 not to take the day off work. Hearing Audio Recording
 at 6:00–6:49. Importantly, Ms. Gelb’s representative said:
     I just want the record to just be really clear too that
     we are not waiving our right to a hearing and ask-
     ing for a decision on the written record whatsoever
     in any way, shape, or form. The appellant is pre-
     pared to move forward today . . . [and] we just
     wanted to be real clear that we are prepared to
     move forward. She has a right to a hearing. . . . She
     does not waive her right to a hearing, and she is not
     asking for a decision on the written record at all
     and is prepared today to move forward without her.
 Hearing Audio Recording at 16:09–17:01. Ms. Gelb’s rep-
 resentative also asked that the hearing be rescheduled.
 SAppx. 42 n.2; Hearing Audio Recording at 13:40–14:48.
 The AJ decided that Ms. Gelb failed to show good cause for
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21     Page: 5    Filed: 05/17/2023

 GELB   v. DVA                                             5

 her absence, canceled the hearing, and notified parties that
 the record would close on July 6, 2021. See Hearing Audio
 Recording at 18:48–18:53 (“We will not be proceeding with
 the hearing absent the appellant’s presence.”).
      On July 5, 2021, Ms. Gelb, through her representative,
 filed an Initial Response to AJ Close of Record. She argued
 that the AJ arbitrarily and capriciously canceled her hear-
 ing because she was present at the hearing through her
 representative. Separately, she stated that “there is not a
 genuine dispute as to any material fact in appellant’s re-
 ported      disclosure(s)    and     contributing     factor
 knowledge/timing test under WPA law.” ECF No. 9 at 85.
 Also, the response stated that since appellant was “denied
 her requested hearing, [her] representative will further
 elaborate on some evidence of current record, which would
 have only, essentially, required oral argument at [the]
 hearing, and [about] which appellant may not have called
 any witnesses.” ECF No. 9 at 87. Yet, Ms. Gelb also ar-
 gued that by cancelling the hearing, she “was improperly
 denied the ability to have [her former supervisor]’s credi-
 bility assessed by the AJ at [the] hearing, [which] was
 harmful error.” ECF No. 9 at 92 n.10.
      On September 24, 2021, the AJ issued his Initial Deci-
 sion denying Ms. Gelb’s request for relief. Gelb v. Dep’t of
 Veterans Affs., No. SF-1221-21-0267-W-1, 2021 WL
 4439338 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 24, 2021) (Initial Decision), aff’d,
 2022 WL 4241205, at *1 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 14, 2022) (Final
 Decision). The AJ stated that “appellant’s representative
 failed to show good cause for the appellant’s nonappear-
 ance.” Initial Decision, 2021 WL 4439338. He addressed
 Ms. Gelb’s arguments in her close of record submission as
 “unavailing and decline[d] to reconsider [his] prior rul-
 ings.” Id. n.3. Also, he noted that “appellant states in her
 closing submission that the record is complete, that a hear-
 ing would have only required oral argument, and that she
 submits no new evidence or argument with her close of rec-
 ord submission.” Id.
Case: 23-1157     Document: 21     Page: 6    Filed: 05/17/2023

 6                                                 GELB   v. DVA

     Ms. Gelb appealed. She argued that she had not
 waived her right to a hearing because, in part, nothing in
 the statute or law requires an appellant to personally at-
 tend a hearing if represented. She also explained that she
 required a hearing, among other reasons, for the “oppor-
 tunity to develop testimonial evidence and record oral ar-
 gument, at the very least, of . . . conflicting material facts
 of her protected disclosures to agency official(s),” including
 to her supervisor. ECF No. 9 at 14–15.
     The Board denied Ms. Gelb’s petition for review and af-
 firmed the initial decision. Final Decision, 2022 WL
 4241205, at *1. The panel explained that Ms. Gelb was not
 improperly deprived of her right to a hearing because an
 appellant may forfeit such right by inexcusably failing to
 attend. Id. (citing Callahan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 748 F.2d
 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). As for representation, the
 Board explained that Sparks v. United States Postal Ser-
 vice, 32 M.S.P.R. 422, 425 (1987), a case in which an appel-
 lant’s attorney proceeded without the client, was
 distinguishable because Ms. Gelb’s representative asked to
 reschedule the hearing. Id. at *2 n.2. Also, the Board rea-
 soned that the AJ gave specific instructions for the appel-
 lant herself to appear by video and advised that failure to
 do so could result in sanctions under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.[43]3,
 which “may include cancellation of a hearing.” Id.
     In the alternative, the Board decided that even if the
 AJ erred in canceling the hearing, that is of “no legal con-
 sequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a
 party’s substantive rights.” Id. at *2 (citing Karapinka
 v. Dep’t of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981)). The Board
 explained that “appellant explicitly conceded that no

     3  Although the Board cites to § 1201.54, we believe
 the Board meant to cite to § 1201.43. See, e.g., SAppx. 60
 (the AJ referencing § 1201.43); Final Decision, 2022 WL
 4241205, at *2, ¶ 4 (citing to § 1201.43).
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21      Page: 7    Filed: 05/17/2023

 GELB   v. DVA                                              7

 material facts were in dispute and that she would have pre-
 sented only oral argument had the hearing taken place.
 Hence, the appellant has not shown that the cancellation
 of the hearing affected her substantive rights.” Id. (citing
 ECF No. 9 at 87).
    Ms. Gelb appeals.         We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                           DISCUSSION
      We may only set aside the Board’s decision if it is
 “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
 wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
 cedures required by law, rule, or regulations having been
 followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the failure to provide a hear-
 ing for an abuse of discretion. Spezzaferro v. F.A.A.,
 807 F.2d 169, 174 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
      On appeal, Ms. Gelb argues that the AJ arbitrarily de-
 nied her statutory right to a hearing, representation, and a
 hearing transcript. See Appellant’s Br. 7–9. She argues
 that the AJ’s actions violated her due process rights. See
 id. at 9.
     We begin by addressing the issue of the right to a hear-
 ing, which in this case relates to the right to representa-
 tion. In essence, Ms. Gelb argues that because her
 representative was present at the hearing, the representa-
 tive should have been able to stand in her stead. Appel-
 lant’s Br. 6; Reply Br. 5–6. We agree.
     Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a), an appellant has the right to
 a hearing and the right to be represented. An appellant
 can forfeit these rights. For example, in Callahan v. De-
 partment of Navy, 748 F.2d 1556, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984), we
 held that “when an employee is absent from a Board hear-
 ing without justification, the proper procedure is for the
 Board to consider the case on the agency’s investigatory
 record alone.” But there, the employee was unrepresented.
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21      Page: 8    Filed: 05/17/2023

 8                                                GELB   v. DVA

 See id. at 1556 n.1. In other words, the appellant indisput-
 ably failed to appear. That is not the case here.
     Instead, this case is like Atilano v. McDonough,
 12 F.4th 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021), where the appellant was
 present at a hearing before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
 through his representative. In Atilano, the applicable stat-
 utory provision stated that an “appellant” is afforded “an
 opportunity for a hearing.” Id. at 1380 (quoting 38 U.S.C.
 § 7107(b)). Mr. Atilano failed to attend his hearing due to
 severe disabilities. Id. at 1377. His representative was
 present, but the Veterans Law Judge refused to hear ex-
 pert testimony because of Mr. Atilano’s absence. Id. We
 reversed and held that the statute did not require the vet-
 eran to be present at the hearing when represented. Id.
 at 1381–82. Relevant here, we explained that while the op-
 portunity for a hearing is “afforded to the appellant,” noth-
 ing in the statutory language requires the appellant’s
 presence when he is represented. Id. at 1380. Simply put,
 Atilano recognized that “appellant”—as understood in the
 relevant statute—could mean the appellant’s representa-
 tive. While we recognize that Atilano involves a different
 statute, we find its analysis instructive.
     Title 5 U.S.C. § 7701 similarly states that an “appel-
 lant shall have the right . . . to a hearing.” Although this
 is an opportunity afforded to the “employee,” nothing in the
 statute requires an appellant’s presence when she is repre-
 sented. As in Atilano, we understand “appellant” in this
 context to include an appellant’s representative, rather
 than constraining it to mean solely the employee herself,
 regardless of representation.
     MSPB caselaw supports such a reading. For example,
 in Sparks, the appellant’s representative was present at
 the hearing and the employee was not. 32 M.S.P.R. at 424.
 The AJ in Sparks informed the appellant’s representative
 that he could proceed with the hearing or request that a
 decision be made on the written record; the appellant’s
Case: 23-1157     Document: 21      Page: 9     Filed: 05/17/2023

 GELB    v. DVA                                                9

 representative chose to proceed with the hearing. Id. After
 the AJ’s initial decision, the employee petitioned for re-
 view, arguing that “the initial decision was unjust because
 he was hospitalized at the time of the hearing and could
 not be present.” Id. The Board disagreed, explaining that
 it is “well-established . . . that generally an appellant is re-
 sponsible for the actions, or inactions, of his designated
 representative.” Id. at 425 (quotation omitted). The record
 there showed that the representative “was authorized to
 act as the appellant’s representative and that [the repre-
 sentative], therefore, had the legal authority to act in the
 appellant’s behalf.” Id.
      So too here. At the June 21, 2021, hearing, Ms. Gelb’s
 representative explained that the “appellant is prepared to
 move forward today,” without Ms. Gelb’s presence. Hear-
 ing Audio Recording at 16:09–16:33. The representative
 was authorized to act on her behalf. See ECF No. 9 at 83.
 Thus, the “appellant” was present at the hearing through
 the presence of her representative. The Board’s rationale
 for concluding otherwise is unavailing. 4
     First, the Board tried to distinguish Sparks because
 here, “the appellant’s representative requested that the
 hearing be rescheduled.” See Final Decision, 2022 WL
 4241205, at *2 n.2. We are unpersuaded. The Board’s
 analysis is difficult to reconcile with the facts. An audio
 recording of the hearing shows that Ms. Gelb’s representa-
 tive repeatedly said that appellant was ready to proceed

     4   The Government incorrectly contends that
 Ms. Gelb waived the issue of her right to representation by
 not raising it before the Board. Appellee’s Br. 18. But
 Ms. Gelb did raise the issue. See ECF No. 9 at 82–87 (rais-
 ing the issue before the AJ); ECF No. 9 at 14–17 (raising
 the issue before the Board); see also Final Decision,
 2022 WL 4241205, at *2 n.2 (addressing Ms. Gelb’s argu-
 ment).
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21     Page: 10    Filed: 05/17/2023

 10                                               GELB   v. DVA

 with the hearing. Hearing Audio Recording at 16:09–
 16:33. That is what happened in Sparks. That Ms. Gelb’s
 representative was flexible and willing to alternatively re-
 schedule the hearing should not vitiate Ms. Gelb’s right to
 a hearing and to representation.
     Second, the Board argued that the AJ “had explicitly
 ordered appellant herself to appear by video and advised
 her that failure to comply with the order could result in
 sanctions under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.[43] (which may include
 cancellation of a hearing).” Final Decision, 2022 WL
 4241205, at *2 n.2.
      Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43, a “judge may impose sanc-
 tions upon the parties as necessary to serve the ends of jus-
 tice.” For example, under subsection (a), a judge may
 impose sanctions on a party who fails to comply with an
 order. And under subsection (e), a judge “may cancel a
 scheduled hearing . . . for contumacious conduct or conduct
 prejudicial to the administration of justice.” See Jones
 v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 703 F. App’x 977, 981
 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (non-precedential) (affirming the Board’s
 determination that appellant’s “rude and disrespectful con-
 duct which regularly escalate[d] from advocacy to contuma-
 ciousness” warranted cancellation of a hearing). We have
 also recognized that a “right to a hearing should not be de-
 nied as a sanction absent extraordinary circumstances.”
 See Habtemariam v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 180 F. App’x. 968,
 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (non-precedential) (citing various
 MSPB cases showing that a single failure to comply with
 an order, or the failure to participate in two teleconfer-
 ences, does not warrant the extreme sanction of a denial of
 a hearing).
     There are no extraordinary circumstances warranting
 a denial of a hearing here. Ms. Gelb missed one deadline
 before the hearing. And while the AJ specified that
 Ms. Gelb could face sanctions—specifically, that she would
 be unable to testify if she did not appear via ZfG
Case: 23-1157     Document: 21     Page: 11    Filed: 05/17/2023

 GELB    v. DVA                                             11

 videoconference—we decline to reach the conclusion that
 the AJ’s orders were directed to “Ms. Gelb” as opposed to
 “appellant.” Said otherwise, we do not read the AJ’s or-
 der—that “[i]f the appellant fails to appear without good
 cause, the appeal will be decided without a hearing,”
 SAppx. 55—as describing a narrower interpretation of “ap-
 pellant” that would exclude an appellant’s representative.
 Here, Ms. Gelb complied with the order to appear at the
 hearing because her representative was present. To find
 that her behavior rose to the level of “contumacious conduct
 or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” is an
 abuse of discretion. Similarly, a finding that justice is
 served by forbidding Ms. Gelb’s representative from repre-
 senting Ms. Gelb at a hearing is an abuse of discretion.
     In sum, we hold that the Board abused its discretion in
 denying Ms. Gelb a hearing. An appellant’s representative
 can attend a hearing on an appellant’s behalf. 5
     Our analysis does not end here. We must decide
 whether the AJ’s denial of Ms. Gelb’s hearing was a due
 process violation—as Ms. Gelb argues, thus requiring an
 automatic remand—or a procedural error—as the Board’s
 analysis indicates, requiring a harmless error analysis.
 See Ward v. U.S. Postal Serv., 634 F.3d 1274, 1280–81
 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining how procedural due process vi-
 olations require constitutionally correct removal proce-
 dures, whereas procedural errors require a harmless error
 analysis for deciding whether to reverse a decision).

     5   We do not address the issue of whether Ms. Gelb’s
 representative should have faced sanctions for attending
 the hearing using audio instead of videoconferencing. See
 Hearing Audio Recording at 0:45–0:50; ECF No. 9 at 17.
 This issue was not raised, and it was not the expressed rea-
 son for cancelling the hearing.
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21      Page: 12    Filed: 05/17/2023

 12                                                GELB   v. DVA

      Due process requires notice and an opportunity to re-
 spond. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
 546 (1985). The Supreme Court has explained that the “op-
 portunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing,
 [for] why proposed action should not be taken is a funda-
 mental due process requirement.” Id. Under 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.43(e), if a judge cancels a hearing, “the judge must
 set a reasonable time during which the record will be kept
 open for receipt of written submissions.” The AJ here set a
 reasonable time during which the record would remain
 open, and Ms. Gelb provided a written submission. In
 other words, there was notice and an opportunity to re-
 spond. The AJ’s denial of Ms. Gelb’s hearing is therefore a
 procedural error, not a due process violation.
     Consequently, we apply the rule of harmless error. See
 28 U.S.C. § 2111. The party appealing an administrative
 decision bears the burden of establishing harmful error.
 See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409–10 (2009). The
 focus is whether the agency is likely to have reached a dif-
 ferent conclusion in the absence of the procedural error.
 Ward, 634 F.3d at 1282; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1). Said
 otherwise, we must decide whether Ms. Gelb has estab-
 lished that the outcome of her case would likely have been
 different if the AJ had conducted the hearing. We hold that
 she has not met her burden.
      On appeal, Ms. Gelb argues that she was provided “NO
 opportunity, by hearing, to assess credibility of any wit-
 ness(es).” Appellant’s Br. 8. She expands in her reply brief
 that her representative “could have and would have proven
 all of the material facts presented in [her] Board Prehear-
 ing Submission.” Reply Br. 2–3. Additionally, she argues
 that the government “does not dispute or refute the factual
 circumstances of [the] court record . . . that it was my [Vet-
 erans Affairs] supervisor (Spangler) that prepared my res-
 ignation form letter, and I signed under duress, all of which
 could have and would have been proven at [the] hearing by
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21      Page: 13    Filed: 05/17/2023

 GELB   v. DVA                                              13

 my representative who appeared on my behalf.” Reply Br. 7
 (emphasis added). We address each argument in turn.
      First, Ms. Gelb has not explained how any specific wit-
 ness testimony could have affected the outcome of her case.
 See Handy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 754 F.2d 335, 338 (Fed. Cir.
 1985) (“Having failed to show that in some way an oral re-
 ply would have possibly affected the agency’s decision, pe-
 titioner is not entitled to prevail.”); Diaz v. Dep’t of Air
 Force, 63 F.3d 1107, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (no harmful er-
 ror where petitioner “did not argue or submit any evidence
 that showed that the agency’s procedural violation affected
 the outcome of the agency’s decision or was in any way
 harmful”). Also, Ms. Gelb previously stated that “appellant
 may not have called any witnesses” at the hearing. ECF
 No. 9 at 87.
     Second, and similarly, Ms. Gelb has not met her bur-
 den of explaining how proving “all of the material facts”
 would likely affect the outcome of her case. See Handy,
 754 F.2d at 338; Diaz, 63 F.3d at 1109. Specifically,
 Ms. Gelb has not identified which “material facts” would
 likely have changed the outcome of her case and how a
 hearing would have brought these facts in.
     Third, whether Ms. Gelb signed a resignation form let-
 ter under duress goes to the issue of whether her resigna-
 tion was involuntary and thus constituted an adverse
 action. Initial Decision, 2021 WL 4439338. The Board ex-
 amines involuntary action using an objective test consider-
 ing the totality of circumstances. Id. In the Initial
 Response to the AJ’s order setting a date on which the rec-
 ord would be closed, Ms. Gelb explained that her belief that
 she had no choice but to resign or to be fired could be ob-
 served from her “exit interview e-mail of record . . . in
 which Spangler [her then-supervisor] went on to describe
 resignation circumstances that reasonably could be inter-
 preted by the fact-finder as under duress (i.e., Gelb was cry-
 ing and saying it was Spangler’s fault, etc., etc.).” ECF
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21     Page: 14    Filed: 05/17/2023

 14                                               GELB   v. DVA

 No. 9 at 93. The AJ relied on the evidence of record (which
 included the “exit interview e-mail of record”) and
 Ms. Gelb’s deposition testimony and was unable to find
 that Ms. Gelb’s resignation stemmed from improper
 agency acts or that she had no realistic alternative but to
 resign. Id.
     In sum, Ms. Gelb has not identified arguments, evi-
 dence, or witnesses that would have been presented at the
 hearing and would likely have altered the outcome of her
 case. We thus find that Ms. Gelb has not carried her bur-
 den of showing harmful error. As a result, the AJ’s abuse
 of discretion is not a reversible procedural error.
      Lastly, we turn to Ms. Gelb’s argument that she was
 improperly denied an opportunity to access the hearing’s
 transcript and audio file. Appellant’s Br. 3 n.3, 6, 8–9.
 Ms. Gelb did not raise these arguments before the Board.
 Indeed, Ms. Gelb’s representative cited the hearing audio
 file in the appeal to the Board. ECF No. 9 at 14. “A party
 in an MSPB proceeding must raise an issue before the ad-
 ministrative judge if the issue is to be preserved for review
 in this court.” Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665,
 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Because Ms. Gelb has not previously
 raised this issue, she has therefore waived it on appeal.
    We have considered Ms. Gelb’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. 6

      6  For example, Ms. Gelb stated that “MSPB Factual
 Findings Were Incorrect,” but failed to specify which fac-
 tual findings by the Board were erroneous. Appellant’s
 Br. 4–8. Similarly, she raised an issue about the “proper
 relief and burdens of proof standard,” without explaining
 the allegedly erroneous relief or burden of proof used by the
 AJ or the Board. See Appellant’s Br. 9. For this court to
 reach the merits of an issue, the issue must be adequately
Case: 23-1157    Document: 21     Page: 15    Filed: 05/17/2023

 GELB   v. DVA                                             15

                        CONCLUSION
      For the above reasons, we affirm the Board’s final de-
 cision denying Ms. Gelb’s request for corrective action un-
 der the WPA.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.

 developed. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341
 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Undeveloped arguments are waived. Id.
 And while “pro se filings must be read liberally,” Harris
 v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 946, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2013), such filings
 must still be clear enough to enable effective review, Groves
 v. Shinseki, 541 F. App’x 981, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (non-
 precedential). Ms. Gelb’s arguments about factual errors
 and proper relief and burdens of proof are insufficiently de-
 veloped for our review and therefore waived.
     To the extent Ms. Gelb sought to incorporate argu-
 ments solely by reference to the appendix, those arguments
 are also waived. See Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Med.
 Prods., Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Under
 the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, arguments may
 not be properly raised by incorporating them by reference
 from the appendix rather than discussing them in the
 brief.”); Monsanto, 459 F.3d at 1335 (explaining that such
 arguments are waived).