Court Opinion

ID: 9948373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 21:04:53.796254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:30.215219
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                                    Electronically Filed
                                                    Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                                    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                    06-MAR-2024
                                                    09:55 AM
                                                    Dkt. 63 SO

                           NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

                 IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

                         OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                   WILLIAM FORESMAN, a single man,
            Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee, v.
                     JOHN FORESMAN, a single man,
             Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff-Appellant.

         APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                      (CASE NO. 1CC16-1-000705)

                      SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
 (By:    Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Nakasone and McCullen, JJ.)

            Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff-Appellant John

Foresman (Uncle) appeals from the Circuit Court of the First

Circuit's November 28, 2018 Final Judgment awarding

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee William Foresman

(Nephew) $50,000.00 in general damages and $200,000.00 in

punitive damages, in accordance with a jury verdict. 1

     1   The Honorable Keith K. Hiraoka presided.
   NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

             Nephew sued Uncle for civil damages under Hawaiʻi

Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-1.8 (2016), 2 asserting Uncle

sexually molested him between 1975 and 1976, when Nephew was

approximately 7 and 8 years old, and Uncle was approximately 15

and 16 years old.

             The gravamen of Uncle's appeal challenges HRS § 657-

1.8 as unconstitutional for imposing punishment for acts

committed in 1975 and 1976, despite those acts not constituting

criminal offenses at the time. 3         See Peugh v. United States, 569

      2  HRS § 657-1.8 allows for "[a] civil cause of action for the sexual
abuse of a minor . . . based upon sexual acts that constituted or would have
constituted a criminal offense under part V or VI of [HRS] chapter 707."

      3   Uncle raises five points of error on appeal:

          (1) HRS § 657-1.8 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law under
              article I, section 10, clause I of the United States
              Constitution;

          (2) HRS § 657-1.8 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law under the
              Hawaiʻi Constitution;

          (3) HRS § 657-1.8 is unconstitutional as it deprives persons of life,
              liberty, or property without due process of law as required under
              the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

          (4) HRS § 657-1.8 is unconstitutional as it deprives persons of life,
              liberty, or property without due process of law as required under
              article I, section 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution; and

          (5) the circuit court erred in instructing the jury to determine
              civil sexual abuse claims based on the elements of subsequently
              enacted crimes.

      All these points turn on whether HRS § 657-1.8 violates the United
States Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws.

      Uncle contends HRS § 657-1.8 violates due process under the United
States and Hawaiʻi Constitutions solely because it violates the prohibition

                                                              (continued . . .)

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U.S. 530, 532–33 (2013) ("The Constitution forbids the passage

of ex post facto laws, a category [including] '[e]very law that

changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than

the law annexed to the crime, when committed.'") (quoting Calder

v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)).         Nephew argues, inter alia,

Uncle failed to raise an ex post facto challenge below and

failed to submit instructions he claims to have been entitled.

            Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the issues raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we

affirm.

            (1) We first address Nephew's waiver arguments.

Nephew argues Uncle waived his constitutional challenge by

failing to expressly argue to the circuit court that HRS § 657-

1.8 violates the ex post facto clause.         However, Uncle objected

to the approved jury instructions on the basis that his

liability would turn on elements of crimes which did not exist

(. . . continued)

against ex post facto laws. Moreover, the Hawaiʻi Constitution does not
contain its own ex post facto clause; it bars ex post facto measures by
virtue of its prohibition against "legislation not inconsistent with . . .
the Constitution of the United States." Hawaiʻi Const. art. III, § 1; State
v. Guidry, 105 Hawaiʻi 222, 236, 239, 96 P.3d 242, 256, 259 (2004). Lastly,
Uncle provided no discernable argument on Point 5; thus, we deem it waived,
or at a minimum, subsumed within the ex post facto argument. See Hawaiʻi
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(7); Hawaii Ventures, LLC v. Otaka,
Inc., 114 Hawaiʻi 438, 472 n.17, 164 P.3d 696, 730 n.17 (2007).

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at the time of the incident, violating "fundamental fairness"

under "the Constitution."   The United States Supreme Court has

observed the ex post facto clause "safeguards 'a fundamental

fairness interest . . . in having the government abide by the

rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under

which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life.'"

Peugh, 569 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added) (quoting Carmell v.

Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000)).     Thus, Uncle's objection

sufficiently preserved the ex post facto issue.

          Nephew also argues Uncle invited the error by not

supplying the circuit court with a form of special jury

instructions containing elements of sexual abuse crimes in

effect at the time of the incidents.     However, after the circuit

court indicated it would submit Nephew's proposed instructions

to the jury, Uncle objected, stating the crimes referenced in

the jury instructions "should be the ones that are defined as of

the date of the alleged incident."     Thus, Uncle did not agree to

the portion of the instructions now being contested, nor did he

leave his objection unspoken.    See Moyle v. Y & Y Hyup Shin

Corp., 116 Hawaiʻi 388, 397, 173 P.3d 535, 544 (App. 2007),

vacated on other grounds, 118 Hawaiʻi 385, 191 P.3d 1062 (2008).

          (2) Next, Uncle contends HRS § 657-1.8 violates the ex

post facto clause because it imposes a punishment for acts

committed in 1975 and 1976, even though they did not constitute

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criminal offenses at that time.    He argues:   (1) sexual assault

was not a crime in 1975 and 1976, and the similar crimes of

first and second degree rape under HRS §§ 707-730 (1976) and

707-731 (1976) required that a male engage in sexual intercourse

or sexual contact with a female; (2) indecent exposure was a

crime in 1975 and 1976, but the then-existing version under HRS

§ 707-738 (1976) required additional proof of "intent to gratify

sexual desire"; (3) continuous sexual assault of a minor was not

a crime in 1975 and 1976, and the similar crime of first degree

sexual abuse under HRS § 707-736 (1976) required proof of

"intent to gratify sexual desire"; and (4) Nephew is not a

female, and the jury was not instructed on "intent to gratify

sexual desire."

          Uncle further contends liability is a form of

punishment under United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398

(1888), and that "[c]reating liability for a past act that did

not impose liability at the time of it's [sic] alleged

commission inflicts greater punishment then when committed."

Citing DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), he argues the

determining factor is whether the "legislative aim was to

punish" an individual for past activity, rather than as a

restriction incident to regulation of a present situation.

          The ex post facto clause pertains to statutes with a

punitive intent, whether classified as criminal or civil.       See

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Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95 (2003).     "If the intention of the

legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.

If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that

is civil and nonpunitive," then the court determines whether the

statute's punitive effect overcomes any nonpunitive intent.

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.

           HRS § 657-1.8 is not part of Hawaii's penal code, and

the legislature has expressly indicated its purpose is "to

provide victims of sexual abuse a fair chance to bring a civil

action against an individual or entity."     S. Stand. Comm. Rep.

No. 2473, in 2012 Senate Journal, at 1033,

https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/journal/senate/2012/Senate_Journa

l_2012_Committee_Reports.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD49-EDBM].

Thus, legislative intent was not punitive.

           As to whether the statute's punitive effect overcomes

any nonpunitive intent, we apply the seven factors set out in

Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and conclude:

     (1)   creating a civil cause of action for victims of

           sexual abuse of a minor does not involve an

           affirmative disability or restraint;

     (2)   allowing for or extending the time for a civil

           cause of action has not been historically

           regarded as a punishment;

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     (3)   because claims against persons turn on whether

           the acts committed would have constituted

           criminal offenses, it appears that scienter is a

           requirement;

     (4)   permitting a cause of action for damages for

           criminal behavior arguably promotes traditional

           aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence;

     (5)   the behavior to which it applies is already a

           crime;

     (6)   the alternative purpose of providing opportunity

           for compensation for a victim is clearly

           assignable; and

     (7)   providing a cause of action—which may not

           ultimately result in an award—does not appear

           excessive in relation to the purpose of providing

           an opportunity for a sex abuse victim to obtain

           compensation.

See 372 U.S. at 168-69; State v. Guidry, 105 Hawaiʻi 222, 235-36,

96 P.3d 242, 255-56 (2004).

           Factors (3), (4) and (5) weigh in favor of an ex post

facto violation, and the remaining four factors weigh against.

Therefore, "it cannot be said that [Uncle] has provided the

'clearest proof' that the statutory scheme is so punitive it has

negated the State's remedial purpose."     Guidry, 105 Hawaiʻi at

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236, 96 P.3d at 256.      Consequently, Uncle fails to show that the

statute violates the federal ex post facto clause. 4

            Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's

November 28, 2018 Final Judgment.

            DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai‘i, March 6, 2024.

On the briefs:                            /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
                                          Acting Chief Judge
Scot Stuart Brower,
for Defendant/Counterclaim                /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Plaintiff-Appellant.                      Associate Judge

Brandee J.K. Faria,                       /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Sidney S. Royer,                          Associate Judge
for Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant-Appellee.

      4  In accordance with principles of judicial restraint, Rees v.
Carlisle, 113 Hawaiʻi 446, 456, 153 P.3d 1131, 1141 (2007), this summary
disposition order shall not be construed as affirmatively determining that
HRS § 657-1.8 does not violate the ex post facto clause, but only that Uncle
has failed to demonstrate otherwise in this appeal.

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