Court Opinion

ID: 9895644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 07:10:02.586081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.638839
License: Public Domain

Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 31, 2023

                                               In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                          Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      No. 05-23-00582-CV

       IN THE INTEREST OF C.D.M., J.L.M., AND H.N.P., CHILDREN

                  On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court
                               Dallas County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. DF-21-16421

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
                                Opinion by Justice Molberg
       Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights

to children C.D.M., J.L.M., and H.N.P.1 Father presents four issues in this appeal,

generally challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

order. The Department raises a cross-issue to correct a clerical error in the order of

termination. For the reasons explained below, we sustain the Department’s issue

and otherwise affirm the order of termination in this memorandum opinion. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

   1
     Although Mother’s parental rights to the children were also terminated, she did not appeal to this
Court.
                                         I.      Background

        This case involves the parent-child relationship between K.M. (Father) and

his children C.D.M. (C.), J.L.M. (J.), and H.N.P. (H.). At the time of the final

hearing in 2023, C. was seven, J. was five, and H. was two.

        On October 7, 2021, the Department filed an original petition for protection,

conservatorship, and termination. An affidavit accompanying the petition stated the

Department received a referral on September 16, 2021, stating that J. had severe

eczema that Mother had been aware of for a month yet failed to seek medical

intervention. J. had “big giant open sores all over his body from head to toe.”

Daycare workers confirmed they previously informed the parents that J. needed to

be seen by a doctor but he had not been seen. After unsuccessfully trying to meet

with Mother and Father, the Department caseworker was contacted by Children’s

Medical Center in Dallas and informed J. had been admitted to the hospital on

October 3. Among other things, the caseworker learned Mother told the hospital

doctor that J. had not been to the doctor because they did not have transportation.

The affidavit also included information about Mother and Father’s history with the

Department from 2020 for reported domestic violence and drug use.

        The trial court signed the ex parte order for emergency care and temporary

custody on October 7, 2021.2 Among other things, the court found there was a

    2
     Although proceedings regarding H. were initially separate from the case of J. and C., the two cases
were eventually consolidated on December 16, 2021, when Father’s paternity of H. was established.
Accordingly, we discuss C., J., and H. simultaneously for clarity.
                                                 –2–
continuing danger to the physical health or safety of C., J., and H. if returned to their

parents and appointed the Department as C., J., and H.’s temporary managing

conservator. The court extended the order on October 21, 2021, and November 4,

2021.

        On December 7, 2021, the trial court signed a temporary order requiring

Mother and Father to participate in parenting classes, submit to drug tests, and follow

through with recommendations made by any service provider. Supervised visitation

was allowed at Department offices for one hour per week. The court appointed the

Department temporary managing conservator of J., while C. and H. were returned to

Mother. On May 12, 2022, and again on July 14, 2022, the trial court entered

permanency hearing orders requiring Mother and Father to submit to further drug

testing. On September 29, 2022, the trial court extended the dismissal date until

April 8, 2023.

        The trial court entered an ex parte order for emergency care and temporary

custody of C. and H. on October 12, 2022; the Department was appointed temporary

managing conservator of C. and H. in addition to J. According to the Department’s

report to the court, the Department received a new referral when it was reported that

C., who reportedly had a black right eye, stated Mother struck him after he let H. fall

off the couch. A temporary order was entered and the parents were ordered to submit

to random drug testing, psychological evaluations, parenting classes, anger

                                          –3–
management, and individual counseling, and to follow through with any

recommendations made by any service providers.

      On February 9, 2023, the trial court entered a permanency hearing order

before final order in which the court, among other things, found Mother and Father

had not demonstrated adequate compliance with their service plans.

      Trial was conducted beginning April 6, 2023.          Dr. Kristen Reeder, an

attending physician at the Referral and Evaluation of At Risk Children Clinic

(REACH) at Children’s Medical Center in Dallas, testified about her evaluation of

J. Dr. Reeder’s education included a “three-year subspecialty fellowship training

specifically in child abuse and neglect pediatrics,” and without objection, the

Department tendered her as an expert in her field. Dr. Reeder evaluated J. on

October 6, 2021, after he had been admitted to the hospital for a blood infection and

severe eczema and then referred to REACH due to concerns of possible neglect. Dr.

Reeder stated J. had “Meticillin-sensitive Staphylococcus Aureus bacteria growing

in his bloodstream that was most likely the result of the open wounds that he had on

his body from his eczema,” which he had from “head to toe.” She said J. was

physically very small and appeared sickly and inactive. Dr. Reeder stated that blood

infections can be life threatening. She learned from Mother that Mother was J.’s

primary caregiver; Father did not live with them at the time but visited occasionally.

Dr. Reeder saw J. about two weeks later and found he was still exhibiting similar

symptoms but said “his eczema was already showing some improvement.”

                                         –4–
      Dr. Reeder reviewed Children’s records and learned that J. was first diagnosed

with eczema in the emergency room at Children’s in October 2017 when he was four

months old and he was eventually referred to the dermatology clinic at Children’s in

March 2018. The parents did not schedule J.’s first dermatology appointment until

June 10, 2019, but he was not brought in for the appointment and was instead seen

on June 14. Father and Mother were instructed to treat J. with Hydrocortisone, wrap

him in “wet wraps,” and Hydroxyzine, and they were to bring him back in for a

follow-up visit in six to eight weeks. Dr. Reeder said J. was not brought in again

until over a year later on August 19, 2020, and the parents either no-showed or

cancelled several appointments in the interim. At the August 2020 appointment, the

parents reported to the physician they had not been following J.’s prescribed

treatment and so they were again instructed to follow the same course and follow up

in six to eight weeks. They did not show up for J.’s next scheduled appointment on

November 11, 2020.

      Dr. Reeder stated J. was next brought into Children’s for eczema-related

problems when Mother brought him to the ER on December 8, 2020. Mother was

again found to not be following the prescribed treatments and J. was again referred

to dermatology. J. was brought to the emergency room for a “crushed finger” in

February 2021 and was found to be “in distress from itching.” He was not brought

in for a follow-up appointment for the finger injury, and again missed a follow-up

dermatology appointment in May 2021.

                                        –5–
      Dr. Reeder concluded Mother and Father failed to follow a minimum standard

of medical care for J. and this failure created a medical emergency for him. She

characterized their failure as “medical neglect,” which she said “may have resulted

in life threatening injuries or conditions.” Dr. Reeder stated her conclusion of

medical neglect was based upon J.’s clinical, physical state. She said it was “the

worst case of eczema” she had ever seen and required “significant, daily, chronic

care” that J. was not receiving; it was clear to her that the recommended treatments

were not followed and appointments were not kept. She said untreated eczema

caused J.’s blood infections and kept him from physically developing as a four-year-

old should. Dr. Reeder also described J.’s eczema as painful and itchy. She said if

J.’s blood infection continued to be untreated, it could have led to his death.

      Mother testified her son C. was seven years old, her son J. was five years old,

and her daughter H. was two years old. She stated Father was the biological father

of the three children. Mother said the Department became involved with her family

in September 2021. She said Kassandra Rodriguez from the Department tried to

contact her regarding J.’s health and wanted to meet with her, but Mother said she

did not meet with Rodriguez and regarded her communications as threats, so she

“never really picked up the phone.” Mother did not want J. to have to deal with the

Department because “everybody had something to say about his eczema.”

      Mother said she was living with her mother in Dallas in 2021 when the

Department was attempting to meet with her. Mother said she lived in Dallas with

                                         –6–
her mother from June 2017 until March 2021, at which point she said she moved to

Houston where she lived in an apartment provided by a friend she knew from high

school. Father lived with her and the three children in Houston. She said her mother

helped with J.’s medical care when they lived with her in Dallas. In Houston, Mother

said J. was treated by the pediatric practice MD Kids but she did not know the name

of any specific doctor who treated him. Mother said MD Kids was “a dermatology

clinic and a pediatric clinic.” She said she took him in “probably every four weeks”

but that it varied—she said J. “never missed a doctor’s or pediatric appointment.”

Mother testified she told Dr. Reeder about MD Kids, and she did not know why Dr.

Reeder would lie to the court in testifying that Mother did not provide this

information to her.

      Mother said they moved back to Dallas following a car accident. Without

their vehicle, they “had no choice but to come back to Dallas.”

      Mother stated she took J. to the emergency room in October 2021 after she

noticed “little bumps” with “puss coming out,” which she blamed on the changing

seasons. Mother met with the Department at the hospital, and the children were

taken into the care of the Department.

      Mother had possession of C. and H. between November 2021 and August

2022, at which point they were removed on suspicion of abuse when C. went to

school with a black eye. Mother was arrested for injury to a child, a first-degree

felony—she was alleged to have punched C. in the eye—and that case was pending

                                         –7–
at the time of trial. She denied ever punching C. and said she did not know how C.

developed a black eye. Mother said C. had been at her mother’s house the night

before he went to school with the black eye, and when questioned whether if, in a

previous hearing, she stated C. came from her own house, Mother invoked her Fifth

Amendment rights. Mother was released on bond and one of her bond conditions

prohibited her from having any contact with minor children.

      Mother said that if her rights were not terminated and the Department’s

involvement with her children ended, she was not certain where she wanted her

children to live. She was unaware of any relative or friend with whom the children

could be placed if the children were removed from the Department’s custody.

Mother testified she was aware a home study had been completed on her mother and

that it was denied.

      Mother stated previously prescribed treatments did not help J.’s eczema, so

she went to Children’s but was provided the same medicine again. She said that

before taking him to Children’s in October 2021, she had been taking J. to different

doctors and emergency rooms “every two or three weeks.” Mother said she went to

different doctors because she was seeking “a better solution for his skin.” Mother

said she did not believe J.’s condition was dangerous or life threatening, but she said

it was painful. Mother said J.’s daycare was not administering his medicine as they

should and that she removed him from that daycare as a result.

                                         –8–
      Appellant Father testified he was the biological father of J., C., and H. He

said he went to doctor appointments for J.’s eczema shortly after his birth, and he

took J. to the doctor when Mother was at work. He sometimes picked up J.’s

prescribed medicines, which he could not name, other than that one of them was

“Tramadol or something.” Father said they missed appointments at Children’s

because “we transferred to MD kids,” “because Children’s wasn’t really a big help.”

He believed Mother was giving J. his medicine, and he did not believe that J. was in

danger, though he stated he thought the blood infection was dangerous and said he

was concerned about the eczema. When questioned about what he did to make sure

the children were safe after he learned there were concerns about J.’s treatment,

Father said, “it was up to [Mother] and her mom to agree with it” and that he was

“not the type of person to argue with nobody.” Father testified he was caring for J.

when J.’s condition worsened in October 2021.

      Father testified he completed a court-ordered parenting class. He said since

J. was in foster care, he had not been to any medical appointments or medical training

sessions, though he had completed “about seven” training sessions at Children’s,

MD Kids, or Parkland before then. He said he had not been offered any additional

training after J. entered foster care but he would be willing to attend additional

sessions to better understand how to care for J.

      Between October 2021 and September 2022, Father said he missed just two

visits with J. But he admitted he told the Department caseworker that he was not

                                         –9–
going to visit the children because Mother was not allowed to visit the children after

her indictment resulting from the eye injury to C. He also said he could not visit

because he was in Houston.

      After C. and H. were placed in foster care, Father was court ordered to

complete classes again. He said he did not complete his parenting class or anger

management because he “was stabbed five times” and hospitalized. After November

2022, Father said he had not completed parenting classes, a psychological

evaluation, anger management, or individual counseling. He said he had missed

“probably four” random drug tests. He said he tested positive for marijuana because

he “was around it,” but that he had not used it since “this stuff that happened.” Father

also had not seen Mother use marijuana since having children.

      Father testified he worked as a waiter at IHOP and full-time as a trash

technician at a hospital. He said he had benefits and could make arrangements for

the children’s schooling and medical care. Father said he lived in Houston by

himself in an apartment and was planning for the children to move in with him.

Father stated he did not believe Mother hit C. in the eye because he believed she was

not “that type of person”—he believed Mother should be around their children

because she was “a good mom.”

        Department caseworker Tanisha McQueen testified she had been in her job

for a year and a half. She had been assigned to the case involving C., J., and H. since

September 2022. At that time, J. was in foster care and C. and H. were still living

                                         –10–
with Mother. She said the nature of the referral that prompted the removal of C. and

H. was suspected physical abuse against C. by Mother. Mother told McQueen that

her grandmother took C. to school on the day of the incident, but Father told

McQueen that C. was with him on the date of the incident.

      McQueen testified Mother completed parenting classes and a psychological

evaluation in March 2023. The evaluation yielded recommendations for Mother,

including a virtual psychiatric evaluation and virtual individual counseling. Mother

did not provide any documentation to McQueen that she completed the evaluation

or counseling. Mother was also asked to complete drug testing in October 2022 and

again in November, and she failed to submit to the testing. She was asked again in

December but did not submit to testing until January, which yielded a result positive

for marijuana. Mother again failed to complete drug testing in February and March

of 2023.

      McQueen testified Mother’s mother was put forth as a placement for J., but

the grandmother specifically declined to be considered a placement home for C. or

H. The Department determined she would not be a suitable placement given that the

children were living in her home when they were removed and she was unwilling to

care for all three children. Further, McQueen testified the grandmother did not seem

to appreciate the extent of J.’s medical needs or the danger of C. being assaulted.

McQueen said the grandmother had not visited with the children since their removal.

                                        –11–
      McQueen testified Father had not completed the services ordered by the court

in November 2022. She said he told her he did not complete his services because he

was working. The services, McQueen said, were virtual and could be scheduled at

his convenience. From September to December 2022, McQueen said Father visited

the children, but inconsistently: he would “visit once” and then “skip two or three

weeks, and then visit again.” McQueen said after January 2023, Father did not visit

the children. She said he was offered virtual visits, but he took advantage of just one

such visit. Father did not provide McQueen with any relative or friend placement

possibilities other than his sister, but he failed to provide her contact information and

later stated she would not be able to take in the children.

      McQueen also testified about the needs of the children. She said C. was seven

years old and in first grade; he received behavioral therapy, speech therapy, and play

therapy, and an ADHD/autism assessment was pending.                J. was five and in

kindergarten, and he received play therapy and behavioral therapy. He required

frequent dermatology and primary care visits. McQueen said since she had been

assigned the case, J. had not required any additional hospitalization and had not

visited the emergency room other than December 2022 when he needed to get a

medication refilled. She said he had not experienced any emergency circumstances

related to his eczema, and his skin was now “very clear” and he scratched himself

only when he was frustrated. McQueen said J.’s current treatment plan included

using sensitive detergent and soap, body oil, three different creams daily, and the

                                         –12–
drug Hydroxyzine for itching. McQueen said H. was two years old and had seasonal

allergies and required ear tube surgery after repeated ear infections.

      McQueen testified the children had all been together in one foster home since

April 10, 2023. Their foster placement had indicated a desire to adopt the children

if Mother’s and Father’s parental rights were terminated.

      Despite requesting a copy of Father’s lease, Father had not provided it to

McQueen because, he said, it was none of the Department’s business. McQueen

said Father told her on March 20, 2023, that Mother would be moving in with him

at his apartment in Houston. McQueen said Mother told her she was living with a

friend in Houston but that she would be moving in with Father. McQueen said if the

children were returned to Father, she was concerned Mother would be in the home.

Further, she said she had no way of knowing if Father was drug free given that he

had not taken drug tests he had been ordered to take. McQueen also questioned

whether Father and Mother could administer J.’s treatment plan given that they had

failed to do so previously, which they had never acknowledged. McQueen did not

believe Father had a “working understanding” of J.’s medical needs.

      Caseworker Amber Waters testified she had worked for the Department for

two years, was previously assigned to C.’s case in October 2021, and worked on the

case until September 2022. Apart from “attendance issues at school,” Waters did

not report any issues with C. and H. living with Mother. Waters spoke on the phone

and texted with Father and saw him “from time to time when he would attend the

                                        –13–
parent/child visits.” She said Mother and Father did not consistently visit J. in

November and December 2021; they told Waters they were unable to do so because

of transportation issues or work. Waters attempted to give them bus passes but it

was difficult “to track them down” to do so. She said Mother and Father either

missed or arrived late three times in January 2022, three times in February 2022, and

in March, Mother missed one visit and Father missed three. She said that in April,

Mother and Father missed one visit. In the period stretching from May through

August 2022, Waters said the parents’ visitation was “spotty,” at times going several

weeks with no visit. She said there were times when J. was brought to the

Department office and the parents did not show up, and on such occasions, J. would

be confused and frustrated. Waters said she tried to work around the parents’

schedules, but they continued to miss visits. Waters said Mother seemed to miss

drug tests because she questioned why she needed to be drug tested at all. She said

Father also failed to test consistently.

      Kassandra Rodriguez testified she was a child investigator with the

Department who had been assigned in September 2021 to investigate the reported

medical neglect of J. Rodriguez went to Mother’s address repeatedly over a two-

week period to make contact with her, but she was unsuccessful in reaching Mother.

Rodriguez eventually made contact with Mother over the phone and Mother told her

the other children were “out of town” but would not specify where. She eventually

made contact in person with Mother and J. at Children’s in Dallas

                                           –14–
      Deborah Mays testified she was appointed as a special advocate in this case

in 2021. Mays said she would be concerned if J. were returned to Mother because

she previously neglected to adequately address his medical needs and J. continued

to need “a lot of attention.” Mays said J. was doing well at the time of trial “in terms

of his eczema” but that he still needed to be taken to his appointments and still

required treatments. She said Mother’s inability to make it to visits when the

children were in foster care gave her further reason to doubt Mother would “be able

to do the things medically that are needed as well.” Mays stated she had the same

concerns about Father because he had failed a drug test and she believed he put

Mother’s needs ahead of the children’s. She said all three children continued to have

a lot of needs. Mays said the Department had done its due diligence when it came

to finding a relative or fictive kin placement.

      Mays testified C. stated Mother caused his black eye by striking him. By the

time Mays visited C. after this incident, his eye “had healed some, [but] not

completely.” She was concerned that Father and Mother’s mother did not seem to

believe or support C.

      The attorney ad litem for the children reported to the trial court that she was

surprised the case got to point of the Department seeking termination because,

“given the amount of support that the parents had, [she] thought we would be able

to reunify the children with family.” But she believed it was time for the children to

have stability, and the only way she could see for that to happen would be to

                                         –15–
“terminate the rights of the parents so that these children can be able to be adopted

and finally achieve some stability.”

      The Department admitted a family plan evaluation from November 2022 that

reflected that C. had a bond with his parents and loved them and had a very close

relationship with his siblings. C. also enjoyed living with his foster parents and was

“working on building a bond with” them. J. also reportedly “displayed a bond with

his parents when they visit him” and loved them, had a “very close relationship”

with his siblings, and built “a close relationship with his foster mother,” confided in

her, and “expressed a sense of safety and security within his foster family.” H.

reportedly had a bond with her parents and was “doing well in her placement” and

was “working on building a bond with her foster parents,” who supported her growth

and development.

      After hearing the above evidence, the trial court reserved its ruling and

ordered the parents to submit to drug testing by the next day. The court informed

the parties and attorneys that once she got the results back, she would notify them

and also send out her ruling in the case. Father’s nail drug test results filed with the

trial court were positive for cocaine and marijuana. Mother’s urine drug test result

filed with the court was positive for marijuana.

      Following a memorandum ruling, the trial court entered an order of

termination on April 6, 2023. The court found by clear and convincing evidence

that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in

                                         –16–
conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of

the children, engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who

engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the

children, and that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and

C., J., and H. was in the children’s best interest. Further, the court found by clear

and convicting evidence that Father knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the

children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or

emotional well-being of the children, engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the

children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or

emotional well-being of the children of the children, and that termination of the

parent-child relationship between C., J., and H. and Father was in the children’s best

interest. The Department was appointed permanent managing conservator of the

children with the right to consent to the children’s adoptions.

                                   II.    Discussion

      In four issues, Father contends the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the court’s findings under §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) and

161.001(b)(1)(E), that the termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best

interest of the children, and to support the appointment of the Department as

managing conservator of the children.

                                         –17–
      A. Standard of review

      “Because the fundamental liberty interest of a parent in the care, custody, and

control of his child is one of constitutional dimensions, involuntary parental

termination must be strictly scrutinized.” In re C.V. L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 748 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66

(2000)). While we acknowledge the constitutional dimensions of parental rights, we

also recognize the imperative that the “emotional and physical interests of the child

not be sacrificed merely to preserve” those rights. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26

(Tex. 2002). The evidence supporting termination must be clear and convincing

before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights. Holick v. Smith, 685

S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Clear and convincing evidence is the measure or degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the fact finder a “firm belief or conviction”

as to the truth of the allegations. TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.

      Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) a parent committed one or more of the enumerated statutory acts

in § 161.001(b)(1) of the family code, and (2) termination is in the best interest of

the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Because the standard of proof is “clear

and convincing evidence,” the supreme court has held that the usual legal and factual

standards of review are inadequate. In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 405–06 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (citing In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002)).

                                        –18–
      Instead, in conducting legal sufficiency review in a parental termination case,

we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding,

is such that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction

that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “[L]ooking at the evidence

in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume

that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable

factfinder could do so.” Id. We consider all the evidence—not just the evidence

favoring the verdict—and we assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor

of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d

452, 462–63 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). We also disregard all evidence a

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found incredible. In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266.

      In factual sufficiency review in a parental termination case, we consider the

entire record, including evidence both supporting and contradicting the finding, and

determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm conviction or

belief about the truth of the allegation. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25–26. We

“consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not

have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d

at 266. We give due deference to the decisions of the factfinder because the

factfinder is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of

witnesses and do not supplant the trial court’s judgment with our own. In re J.D.B.,

                                        –19–
435 S.W.3d at 463. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then

the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

      B. Subsections (D) and (E)

      In his first two issues, Father challenges the trial court’s findings under family

code §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) and 161.001(b)(1)(E). Because evidence relating to these

subsections is interrelated, we will consider these two issues together.

      Parental rights may be terminated under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) if clear and

convincing evidence supports a finding that the parent “knowingly placed or

knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger

the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”                TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D). Under § 161.001(b)(1)(E), parental rights may be terminated if

clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that the parent “engaged in conduct

or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which

endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

      Both subsections (D) and (E) require proof of endangerment. In re J.D.B.,

435 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). “‘Endanger’ means to

expose to loss or injury, or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health, but

it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually

suffer an injury.” Id.; see also Tex. Dep’t of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d

                                         –20–
531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re C.V. L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 750 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019,

pet. denied). Furthermore:

      Specific danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from the
      parent’s misconduct alone. A parent’s conduct that subjects a child to
      a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical and
      emotional well-being. The specific danger to the child’s well-being
      may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone.

In re C.V. L., 591 S.W.3d at 750 (internal citations omitted).

      The primary distinction between the two subsections is the source of the

physical or emotional endangerment to the child: “subsection (D) addresses the

child’s surroundings and environment while subsection (E) addresses parental

misconduct.” Id. While subsection (D) refers to “the acceptability of a child’s living

conditions[,]” subsection (E) refers “to the parent’s conduct, as evidenced not only

by the parent’s acts, but also by the parent’s omissions or failures to act.” In re S.K.,

198 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). However, parental

conduct is of course relevant to a determination under subsection (D) regarding the

child’s environment. In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d at 463.

      A voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is

required for termination under (E)—it “must be based on more than a single act or

omission.” In re C.V. L., 591 S.W.3d at 750.

      C. Analysis

      Father argues the evidence is insufficient to support the finding under

subsection (D) because evidence showed Mother sought appropriate treatment for

                                         –21–
J.’s medical problems and that the children were with Mother, whom he believed

was appropriately caring for the children. He also argues insufficient evidence

showed Mother injured C. Father generally argues the subsection (E) finding is

unsupported by the evidence because the evidence showed Father supported J.’s

well-being and did nothing to harm any of the children.

      As discussed above, the Department presented evidence that the children lived

in an environment in which Mother and Father failed to adequately address and treat

J.’s severe eczema to the point he had a blood infection that could have been life

threatening and required hospitalization. Mother and Father knew J.’s diagnosis

shortly after his birth in 2017 and thereafter repeatedly failed to follow and

consistently administer prescribed treatments and to show up for scheduled

appointments with J.’s doctors.      Evidence showing Father was aware of the

seriousness of J.’s condition includes testimony that Father lived with Mother and

the children in Houston for much of 2021, up until shortly before J.’s hospitalization

in October 2021, Father’s testimony he was caring for J. before he was hospitalized,

and Father’s testimony that he was aware the eczema was bad and that he was

concerned about it. Despite this, Father testified he left things up to Mother and her

mother.

      Evidence also showed C. had a black eye and that C. told others Mother

caused the black eye by striking him.       Mother, her mother, and Father gave

conflicting stories about who had possession of C. around the time of the incident

                                        –22–
and could not explain the injury. See In re I.S., No. 05-19-00709-CV, 2019 WL

6696037, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing

child’s unexplained injury as evidence supporting termination under (D) and (E)).

Mother was facing criminal charges and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights when

questioned about the alleged assault. Father did not believe C. because he believed

Mother to be a good mom.

      Father points to his testimony that although J. missed his appointments with

Children’s, he was taken to appointments at MD Kids and that they were

appropriately caring for J. Other evidence contradicted his testimony. Dr. Reeder

testified that the parents reported in 2020 that they were not following J.’s prescribed

treatments, and moreover, J.’s poor condition in 2021 was evidence in itself that the

parents were not taking proper care of J. The trial court was the sole arbiter of the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. See, e.g., In re

A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (appellate court must give “due deference to

the decisions of the factfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe witness

testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor

of witnesses”).

      Though most of the parents’ acts and omissions put forth by the Department

relate directly to J., this does not make the evidence insufficient as to Father’s parent-

child relationship with C. or H. because, as stated above, “it is not necessary that the

conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer an injury.” In re

                                          –23–
J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d at 463; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (endangering acts need not be

committed in child’s presence, be directed at child, or cause physical injury to child).

Violent acts directed toward one child can endanger other children who are not the

direct victims of the acts in question and support termination of parental rights as to

the other children. See Dir. of Dallas Cnty. Child Protective Servs. Unit of Tex.

Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Bowling, 833 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992,

no writ); In re T.L.E., 579 S.W.3d 616, 625 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019,

pet. denied). The courts of appeals have so held, “even if the other children were

not yet born at the time of the conduct.” See In re L.M.N., No. 01-18-00413-CV,

2018 WL 5831672, at *16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). This is true in cases of medical neglect, too. See In re A.A.H.,

No. 01-19-00612-CV, 2020 WL 1056941, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Mar. 5, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evidence of medical neglect of one child was

sufficient to show endangering environment and conduct as to another child because

“it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child that is the subject of the

suit or that that the child actually suffer injury”).

       Given all of this, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a

firm belief or conviction that Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of

the children, and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons

who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of

                                          –24–
the children. We also conclude the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could

not have credited in favor of the two findings under subsections (D) and (E) is not

so significant that a factfinder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or

conviction as to their truth. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s predicate act findings under

§ 161.001(b)(1).

      D. Best interest

      Father also challenges the trial court’s finding that terminating Father’s

parent-child relationship with the children was in the children’s best interest. Under

§ 161.001(b)(2), the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the

termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child. TEX.

FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Though a strong presumption exists that remaining

with a parent is in the child’s best interest, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.131(b), In re

R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam), the prompt and permanent

placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the child’s

best interest, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a), In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 115

(Tex. 2017).

      We look to certain non-exclusive factors enumerated by the supreme court in

Holley v. Adams in determining the child’s best interest. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72

(Tex. 1976). These include (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and

physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical

                                        –25–
danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals

seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote

the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the

agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the

acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child

relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the

parent. Id. at 372.

      Evidence is not required on all of these factors to support a best interest

finding, In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,

pet. denied), or to put it differently, the absence of evidence on some of these factors

does not preclude a best interest finding, “particularly if undisputed evidence shows

the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety,” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465,

477 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). Indeed, “evidence relating to one single

factor may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination

is in the best interests of the child.” In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2014, no pet.).

      A trial court may infer that past endangering conduct may recur if the child is

returned to the parent in making its best interest determination. See In re L.N.C.,

573 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

Evidence relevant to § 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds may also be relevant to

the question of the child’s best interest. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 753 (Tex.

                                          –26–
App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied). However, the question of a child’s best interest is

not equivalent to a finding of endangerment: “‘best interest’ is a term of art

encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is

accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013).

      E. Analysis

      The children did not testify at trial, and no one testified about their desires.

However, the family plan evaluation admitted into evidence reflected that J. and C.

loved their parents, all three children were bonded to their parents, and that all three

children were building bonds with their foster family, which was reportedly

providing safety and stability for them.

      Evidence showed J. had significant physical needs relating to continued

treatment for his eczema and that he was also going to behavioral and play therapy.

J. used multiple creams for his skin and took medicine to prevent itching. C. also

had significant needs, requiring various therapies and had a pending evaluation for

autism and ADHD.

      Evidence relating to the emotional and physical dangers to the children largely

overlaps with the evidence discussed above under subsections (D) and (E), and it is

also pertinent to Father’s parental abilities and whether any acts or omissions

indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one. When the children

were previously subject to Father’s care, J.’s eczema was not treated properly and

evidence showed C. reported that Mother assaulted him. J. and C. both required

                                           –27–
frequent transportation to therapy and other appointments, and evidence showed

Father did not always provide it.

      Additional evidence was presented on the parenting abilities and plans for the

children of those seeking custody of the children, as well as the stability of the

proposed placements. After the children were removed, Father inconsistently visited

them and visited them only twice in 2023. He did not complete court-ordered

services including parenting classes, psychological evaluation, anger management,

drugs tests, or individual counseling. Father’s plan was for the children to live with

him in his apartment in Houston, but evidence also showed he planned to live with

Mother despite concerns of physical abuse. The Department’s plan was for the

children’s foster family to adopt them, and evidence showed this was the foster

family’s intent if Mother’s and Father’s parental rights were terminated.

      Considering the above evidence in light of the Holley factors, we conclude a

reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination

of the parent-child relationship between Father and the children was in the children’s

best interest, and that any evidence contradicting that finding was not so significant

so as to preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a firm belief or conviction of

the finding. Although some evidence showed the children were bonded to their

parents, the factors of emotional and physical needs and dangers, parenting abilities,

the stability of the home, and acts or omissions of the parents indicating the parent-

child relationship is improper all weigh in favor of the trial court’s best interest

                                        –28–
finding.     Consequently, we conclude legally and factually sufficient evidence

supports the trial court’s finding, and we overrule Father’s third issue.3

        F. Managing conservator

        In his final issue, Father contends the evidence is insufficient to support the

appointment of the Department as managing conservator. We reject this argument

because we concluded above that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s

termination order. As we have explained previously,

        In the case before us, “we have overruled appellant’s challenge to the
        termination, and the trial court’s appointment of the Department as sole
        managing conservator may be considered a ‘consequence of the
        termination pursuant to Family Code section 161.207.’” Further,
        Mother “provides no authority for the proposition that she is a ‘suitable,
        competent adult’ as contemplated by section 161.207(a) or that the
        presumption in section 153.131(a) applies to a parent whose parental
        rights have been terminated under Chapter 161.” Accordingly,
        Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s appointment of the Department
        as sole managing conservator, rather than Mother, “is without merit.”

In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 481 (internal citations omitted); In re S.O., No. 05-22-

01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *17 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.)

(mem. op.).

        Moreover, Father lacks standing to challenge the trial court’s appointment of

the Department as managing conservator of the children. If the court terminates the

    3
     Father argues the drug tests ordered by the trial court at the end of the bench trial were not evidence
properly before the court and cannot support the order of termination. Although we find this argument
inadequately briefed, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), because we find the evidence to be sufficient without
considering the final drug tests, the resolution of this issue is unnecessary to the final disposition of the
appeal and we do not reach it. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
                                                   –29–
parent-child relationship with respect to both parents, “the court shall appoint a

suitable, competent adult, the Department of Family and Protective Services, or a

licensed child-placing agency as managing conservator of the child.” TEX. FAM.

CODE § 161.207(a). An order terminating the parent-child relationship divests the

parent of all legal rights and duties with respect to the child. Id. § 161.206(b).

Because we have overruled Father’s challenge to the termination of his parental

rights to the children, he has been divested of his rights and duties related to the

children. Therefore, we conclude Father does not have standing to challenge the

portion of the order appointing the Department as conservator of the children. See

In re R.B., No. 05-21-00043-CV, 2021 WL 2943927, at *15 (Tex. App.—Dallas

July 9, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re E.M., No. 05-18-01161-CV, 2019 WL

1449791, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 1, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.D.G.,

570 S.W.3d 839, 856 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). We

overrule Father’s final issue.

      G. Department’s cross-issue

      The Department urges us in a cross-issue to correct a typographical error in

the trial court’s order of termination. The order identifies H. as having a middle

name beginning with “D” rather than one beginning with “N.” The Department

points out that the record is clear that H.’s middle name begins with “N.” We agree.

When we have the necessary information to do so, we may correct clerical errors in

the judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); In re A.B., 458 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex.

                                       –30–
App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).       Accordingly, we delete H.’s middle name

“D*****” in the order of termination and replace it with the correct middle name

beginning with “N” as identified in the Department’s October 7, 2021, original

petition.

                               III.   Conclusion

      As modified, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental

rights to the children.

230582f.p05                              /Ken Molberg/
                                         KEN MOLBERG
                                         JUSTICE

                                       –31–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF C.D.M.,                    On Appeal from the 255th Judicial
J.L.M., AND H.N.P., CHILDREN                  District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. DF-21-16421.
No. 05-23-00582-CV                            Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Molberg. Justices Carlyle and Smith
                                              participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the May 22, 2023 order
of termination is MODIFIED as follows:

      H.N.P.’s listed middle name of “D*****” is replaced with H.N.P’s
      correct middle name, “N*****”, as reflected in the Department’s
      October 7, 2021 Original Petition for Protection of a Child.

It is ORDERED that, as modified, the trial court’s order of termination is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 31st day of October, 2023.

                                       –32–