Court Opinion

ID: 9832637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:04:35.187615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:49.843750
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[4, 5] The appellee insists that, since that action is founded upon a tort, the entire damages accrued at the time the tort was committed; that is, his cause of action arose when the deception was consummate in the assumption by him of the outstanding indebtedness against his land. The right to recover damages for tortious conduct accrues when the injury occurs. In this case the appeUee can claim an injury in only one or the other of two respects: First, by being made liable for a debt in excess of what he agreed to pay as a part of the consideration for the land purchased; second, by having his land incumbered with a lien which he was under no just obligation to discharge. In order to establish an injury of the first kind, the appellee must show that he had paid the debt, or had become substituted for the appellant as payor in such a manner as to prevent any escape from liability. Thomas et al. v. Ellison, 102 Tex. 354, 116 S. W. 1141; Pitzer v. Decker (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 162. If, as is alleged in this instance, the appellant through fraud induced the appellee to assume a debt larger than the latter had agreed to pay, that fact would constitute a good defense against an effort on the part of the mortgage company to compel the appellee to pay the debt. The fact that the mortgage company may hereafter transfer the notes to an innocent holder and thereby remove that defense is not available until such a contingency has happened; until then, any payment made by the appellee will ,be voluntary. As the situation now stands, he may follow one of two courses: He may have his contract reformed so as to eliminate the interest he did not intend to assume, or he may pay off the entire debt *1039and then sue the appellant for reimbursement. Still a third course is open; he may-pay the excess interest as it accrues, which amounts to $42 a year, and sue the appellant for each successive payment.- On the other hand, the appellee is clearly not entitled to recover for any damages done to his title by reason of the incumbrance, which amounts in legal effect to a breach of warranty, until he has removed the incumbrance or has sustained some substantial injury in his right of possession. Walker v. Lawler’s Heirs, 45 Tex. 532; Richardson v. Harrison, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 661, 25 S. W. 438; McClelland v. Moore, 48 Tex. 355.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.