Court Opinion

ID: 9704059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:20:32.395309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:17.222028
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: The majority opines that this case is troublesome. Indeed it is. Here we are confronted with a defendant who was obviously up to no good. He was seen hiding in the weeds in a vacant lot some 25 feet behind the Owens gas station. He had a gun. He had a black stocking in his pocket. He ran from the police. His name is Michael Terrell. Under such circumstances, reasonable men might reasonably conclude that Michael Terrell was surely guilty of some offense. The troublesome part of this case is that “being up to no good” is not an offense under the law. The police and prosecutor believed, however, that a person in this situation must be guilty of something. Accordingly, Michael Terrell was charged with attempted armed robbery and unlawful use of weapons. After trial, a judgment of conviction was entered on the attempted armed robbery charge. No judgment of convictions was entered on the charge of unlawful use of weapons. He was sentenced to two years probation. He appeals. The majority would affirm. I dissent. In order to sustain a conviction for attempted armed robbery, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that defendant intended to commit the specific offense of armed robbery and (2) that defendant performed an act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense. The majority acknowledge that such is the state of the law. They believe that the facts in this case bring the defendant within such law. I do not. What Michael Terrell did has been cited in support of his conviction. It is not enough. It gives rise to nothing more than mere suspicion or supposition. It does not even come close to approaching the settled certainty that the defendant was guilty of the specific offense of attempted armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. A person cannot, for instance, be held guilty of murder in the abstract. It must be murder in the concrete. That is to say, murder of a specific person. So it is with armed robbery or attempted armed robbery. It cannot be armed robbery in the abstract. It must be armed robbery of a specific person at a specific place at a specific time. The defendant was convicted here of attempted armed robbery of the Owens gas station. Yet, the question must be asked: what did the defendant do with reference to the Owens gas station or with reference to any person on the premises thereof? The answer is nothing. What the defendant did not do in this case is more instructive than what he did do. He did not approach the Owens gas station. He did not speak to any person on or about its premises. He did not brandish his weapon. He did not remove the stocking from his pocket and pull it over his face. Although seen hiding in the weeds in an empty lot behind the station, his only observed movement was away from the station. With reference to the gun, he discarded it. Once again we are confronted with the troublesome aspect of this case. The police, the prosecutor, the trial judge and the majority of this court recognize that the defendant was up to no good. They desire that he should be convicted of something. They have settled on attempted armed robbery. They have done so in the absence of connective and convincing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the defendant’s burden to prove that he did not attempt to commit armed robbery of the Owens gas station. He does not have to prove that he was hiding in the weeds hoping to bag a rabbit or a pheasant. He does not have to prove that he was waiting there for a tryst. He does not have to prove that he was intending to rob one of the other businesses in the neighborhood. Indeed, he does not have to prove anything. Is any principle more settled than that in American constitutional law? It is clear, however, that the prosecution had the burden of proving that the defendant was guilty of attempt armed robbery of the Owens gas station beyond a reasonable doubt. They never came close. Whatever we may think of this defendant, whatever we may surmise as to his improper motivation and intentions, respect for the rule of law demands that this case be reversed. Accordingly, I dissent.