Court Opinion

ID: 9663339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:35:34.147714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:48.039715
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
Although I concur in the result of this opinion, I am dismayed at the dearth of facts recited. Although I concede that brevity is a legal virtue, rarely exhibited, this opinion does not delineate the factual scenario sufficiently to apprise the reader of the background in this case. Example being that Appellants were to place bred female Tarentaise cattle in Ness’ care, on his ranch, and that Ness was to receive calves born to these bred females which were placed in his care, for providing care and feed.
We have a State Legislature in South Dakota. Convening once a year, it passes many laws. Not one citation to a state statute appears in the majority opinion, other than SDCL 57A-9-203(l). The United States of America in its brief cites eight *605(8) specific statutes; Ness cites eight (8) specific statutes; Appellants cite the same statute set forth in the majority opinion. These statutes, at least part of them, have applicability to the total factual scenario, which has not been set forth. Furthermore, the two cited South Dakota cases, one decided in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1985 and the Feeney case cited cry out for academic distinguishment.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that this case Appellant (Tomsheck’s claims against Ness) were tried to the court and a jury. We have no procedural history recited in this opinion which would further tell us that a jury awarded money damages to Tomsheck and issued an advisory verdict on the existence of a “death loss” provision in the agreement between Tomsheck and Ness. Determinations were made by the trial court on the existence and enforceability regarding the “death loss.” The trial court found there were two agreements between Tomsheck and Ness, determining that there was no death loss provision in the first agreement but did find that Tom-sheck was entitled to 25 replacement animals in the second agreement. Procedurally, all the parties agreed that on the issue of a theoretical attachment of the FmHA’s security interest, same was to be determined by the court. Essentially, the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that the FmHA’s security interest, indeed, had attached, and that it was superior to Tom-sheck’s ownership interest.
Does the Uniform Commercial Code apply in this? If so, we should say so. To what extent does it apply? We should specify. Are we skirting the holding in Feeney? Or are we modifying it? The Bar deserves to know. There are six (6) Findings of Fact and six (6) Conclusions of Law, consisting of four (4) typewritten pages which are the trial court’s work product. Are we finding them not clearly erroneous under In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1970)? Regarding the Conclusions of Law, are we holding that they are not mistakes of law under Permann v. South Dakota Dept. of Labor, Unemployment Ins. Div., 411 N.W.2d 113 (S.D.1987)?
This decision deals justly with the litigants and therefore I join in its result. Truly, this case is typically appellate justice which will excite little public concern. My concern is that the facts are so few that it is extremely difficult to adopt a coherent analysis and appraisal of the principal issue created under the briefs. This case, because of our previous Feeney holding, has a substantive consequence to the settled law of this State. Fearing legal uncertainty arising from our decision herein, I am constrained to concur in result only.