Court Opinion

ID: 9927992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 17:05:02.954505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:23.136649
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                            Jan 30 2024, 11:21 am

                                                                 CLERK
                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                  and Tax Court

                           IN THE

   Indiana Supreme Court
             Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-232

                      Tailar L. Spells,
                   Appellant (Defendant below)

                               –v–

                      State of Indiana,
                     Appellee (Plaintiff below)

      Argued: September 28, 2023 | Decided: January 30, 2024

              Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                     No. 49D33-2111-F6-36202
             The Honorable Clayton A. Graham, Judge

     On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                         No. 22A-CR-1889

                     Opinion by Justice Goff
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
Goff, Justice.

   Indiana’s criminal code authorizes trial courts to impose a multitude of
fines, court costs, and fees on defendants. By statute, a trial court may
order payment of nearly all these expenses only after considering the
defendant’s ability to pay. Conversely, our criminal code also authorizes
trial courts, with a defendant’s consent, to retain cash bail to pay fines,
costs, fees, and public-defender expenses. Today, we explore whether trial
courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay before retaining cash bail
under such an agreement. Ultimately, we reach three principal
conclusions: the statutory agreement permits application of cash bail to
the whole of a defendant’s public-defender costs; a court may retain cash
bail to pay most other fines, costs, and fees only after considering the
defendant’s ability to pay; and, applying a recently enacted statute, the
indigency determination in this case was incomplete, thus warranting
partial remand to the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History
    One late night in November 2021, as officers from the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department were trying to break up an altercation
outside Tiki Bob’s, a downtown bar, Tailar Spells approached the scene
and spat on Officer Lynnford Parker. After a struggle, Officer Parker
subdued and arrested Spells, whom the State then charged with Level 6
felony battery by bodily waste and Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement. 1 The trial court set a $250 cash bond, which a third party,
Diane Rolle, deposited in full. “Pursuant to Indiana Code 35-33-8-3.2,”
both Spells and Rolle signed a cash-bond agreement, permitting the court,
upon full satisfaction of all bond conditions, to “retain all or a part of the
cash to pay publicly paid costs of representation and fines, costs, fees, and
restitution that the court may order the defendant to pay if the defendant
is convicted.” App. Vol. II, p. 24.

1   See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(2), (e)(2) (2020); I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2021).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                          Page 2 of 19
   At a pretrial hearing, the court appointed a public defender and
imposed a $100 supplemental public-defender fee. 2 After a bench trial,
Spells was convicted on the battery charge but acquitted of resisting law
enforcement. The court then held a sentencing hearing and imposed 365
days in the county jail, of which 363 days were suspended to probation,
and 40 hours of community service. The court also imposed a $20 fine and
$185 in various fees and court costs, but found Spells indigent as to
probation fees. Probation was to terminate upon completion of
community service and payment of the fine and all costs. A few weeks
later, the court granted the probation department’s request to apply $245
from Spells’s cash bond to her fine, costs, and fees. 3 That left $60 still
owed, which the chronological case summary indicates has since been
paid. Spells completed her community service and the court reduced her
conviction to a misdemeanor. 4

   Spells then appealed, arguing that the trial court had failed to
adequately inquire into her ability to pay her fine, costs, and fees. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision, relying on Wright
v. State in holding that cash bail may be applied, under a cash-bail
agreement, to fines, costs, and fees without making an indigency
determination. Spells v. State, No. 22A-CR-1889, 2023 WL 3144084, at *1–2
(Ind. Ct. App. April 28, 2023) (citing 949 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).
The panel also ruled that Spells’s payment of the last $60 mooted her
appeal as to that money. Id. at *2–3.

2   See I.C. § 35-33-7-6(c)(1) (2020).
3 We presume the remaining $5 of the cash bail was reserved for the fee collected by the clerk
from each bail deposit. See I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(d)(1) (2023).
4   See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(c) (2019).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                      Page 3 of 19
   Spells sought transfer to this Court, which we granted, thus vacating
the Court of Appeals’ decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 5

Standards of Review
   An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a trial court’s
sentencing decisions and to the imposition of costs and fees. Holder v.
State, 119 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). This standard allows
reversal only when a decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted
the law.” Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1083 (Ind. 2022) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). But a “statute’s meaning and scope are
legal questions we review de novo.” Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1094
(Ind. 2018) (citation omitted).

Discussion and Decision
   Our analysis commences with the agreement Spells made under
Indiana Code section 35-33-8-3.2(a) (the cash-bail statute), which we hold
permits the retention of public-defender costs—but not most other fines,
costs, or fees—without an indigency determination. We then proceed to
interpret the requirements of the recently enacted indigency statute and
review whether the trial court complied with those requirements when
ordering Spells to pay a fine, costs, and fees. We conclude that a partial
remand is necessary for the trial court to inquire more thoroughly into
Spells’s ability to pay these expenses.

5We note that Spells did not raise her appeal issues before the trial court. No objection was
required to preserve a challenge to her fine, because a fine, like restitution, is part of the
sentence. See Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 962 (Ind. 2016). But costs (which include most fees)
are not part of the sentence, I.C. § 33-37-2-2(a), and so Spells’s challenge to these could
arguably be waived. However, as the State addressed the issues head-on without arguing for
waiver, we exercise our discretion to excuse any such default. See Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d
155, 165 n.6 (Ind. 2017).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                       Page 4 of 19
I. Spells’s agreement permitted retention of her cash
   bail to defray public-defender costs, but retention
   of most other costs and fees required an indigency
   hearing.
   Trial courts may release criminal defendants before trial on reasonable
bail conditions calculated to “assure the defendant’s appearance at future
proceedings” and “‘the public’s physical safety.’” DeWees v. State, 180
N.E.3d 261, 267 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a)). Indiana’s
statutory scheme provides for “considerable judicial flexibility in the
execution of bail.” Id. at 268. Indeed, trial courts have several options in
deciding on the form of bail. Bonds backed by “sufficient solvent sureties”
are one option. I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a)(1)(A) (2023). Another is cash or
securities, either “in an amount equal to the bail” or “in an amount not
less than ten percent (10%) of the bail” along with execution of a “bail
bond.” I.C. §§ 35-33-8-3.2(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A).

   When, as here, a trial court “requires the defendant to deposit cash or
cash and another form of security” equal to the bail amount, the court
may require both the defendant and the person depositing bail to sign an
agreement authorizing the court to retain the cash “to pay publicly paid
costs of representation and fines, costs, fees, and restitution that the court
may order the defendant to pay if the defendant is convicted.” I.C. § 35-
33-8-3.2(a)(1). 6 When a trial court requires this kind of agreement, “the
defendant or person who makes the deposit on behalf of the defendant
shall be advised” of the stated conditions before the agreement’s
execution. Id. This provision, added in 2022, mandates explicit prior notice

6 The statute effectively codifies State ex rel. Williams v. Ryan, in which we approved a trial
court’s requirement that “the bond be available for payment of costs, fine, restitution and
necessary attorney fees.” 490 N.E.2d 1113, 1113 (Ind. 1986). Our approval was abrogated as to
fines, costs, most fees, and restitution by a former bail statute which has itself been repealed.
See I.C. §§ 35-33-8-3.1(a)(2), (b), (d) (1990) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 107-1998, § 6, 1998 Ind.
Acts 1360, 1366); Bennett v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                        Page 5 of 19
that the defendant’s deposit may be lost. See Pub. L. No. 147-2022, § 6,
2022 Ind. Acts 1854, 1861–62.

   Here, Spells signed an agreement containing the necessary advisement.
And this agreement, the State insists, authorized the trial court to retain
her cash bail to pay her public-defender costs, fine, court costs, and other
fees without making an indigency determination at all. Spells disagrees.
Without arguing that she lacked adequate notice, Spells contends that the
statute anticipates an indigency determination preceding the assessment
of all her expenses and their retention from cash bail.

   These arguments require us to interpret the cash-bail statute. In doing
so, we begin with the statutory language itself. Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d
256, 265 (Ind. 2020). We read the “words in their plain and ordinary
meaning, taking into account the structure of the statute as a whole.” Town
of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). We presume the General Assembly “intended for the
statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the
statute’s underlying policy and goals.” Id. (internal quotation and citation
omitted). We are mindful “of what the statute says and what it doesn’t
say” and “avoid interpretations that depend on selective reading of
individual words that lead to irrational and disharmonizing results.” Id.
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Our ultimate goal is to “to
determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id. (internal
quotation and citation omitted).

    A. A court need not determine a defendant’s ability to pay
       before retaining their representation costs.
   We first address the statute’s treatment of “publicly paid costs of
representation.” Spells argues that this term does not include her $100
supplemental public-defender fee because that fee is a “flat fee”
unreflective of actual costs. Oral Argument at 06:22–06:55. And she reads
the statute as permitting retention only of representation costs that the
trial court may order after an indigency determination. We disagree on
both counts and hold that the court had authority to retain the $100 fee
from Spells’s cash bail.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024     Page 6 of 19
   The term “publicly paid costs of representation” refers to “the portion
of all attorney’s fees, expenses, or wages incurred by the county” that are
“directly attributable to the defendant’s defense.” I.C. § 35-33-8-1.5(1)
(1987). The phrase “all attorney’s fees, expenses, or wages” is an expansive
one, indicating the entire incremental cost of the defendant’s own defense
and excluding only “overhead expenditures made in connection with the
maintenance or operation of a governmental agency.” I.C. § 35-33-8-1.5(2).
We must ask, therefore, whether Spells’s supplemental public-defender
fee represents part of this incremental cost and, thus, whether it falls
within the “publicly paid costs of representation.”

    Our reading of the public-defender statutes informs us that the
supplemental public-defender fee is indeed intended to defray part of the
costs “directly attributable to the defendant’s defense.” A criminal
defendant who “requests assigned counsel” is entitled to a determination
of indigency under Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6.5. I.C. § 35-33-7-6(a)
(2020). The court must consider the defendant’s “assets,” “income,” and
“necessary expenses” in determining their ability to pay for
representation. I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(a) (2020). If the defendant is “found to be
indigent,” counsel must be assigned. I.C. § 35-33-7-6(a). If, however, the
court finds that the defendant “is able to pay part of the cost of
representation by the assigned counsel,” the court “shall order” a
supplemental public-defender fee of $100 in a felony case and $50 in a
misdemeanor case. I.C. § 35-33-7-6(c) (emphasis added). 7 This language
tells us that the supplemental fee is intended as a contribution toward the
actual cost of representing the defendant, leading us to conclude that the
“publicly paid costs of representation” include the supplemental public-
defender fee.

   Spells’s second line of defense is, in effect, to read the cash-bail statute
as permitting retention only of those “publicly paid costs of representation
… that the court may order the defendant to pay if the defendant is

7We note in passing that the supplemental public-defender fee need not be assessed at the
initial hearing, but can be left for the sentencing hearing.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                   Page 7 of 19
convicted.” To reiterate, the statute permits a trial court to “retain all or a
part of the cash to pay publicly paid costs of representation and fines,
costs, fees, and restitution that the court may order the defendant to pay if
the defendant is convicted.” I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a)(1). Under Spells’s
interpretation, the relative clause (“that the court may order”) modifies
both the “publicly paid costs of representation” and “fines, costs, fees, and
restitution.” We find this reading of the statute unpersuasive for three
reasons.

   First, in the adjacent code section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(2), governing the
retention of ten-percent cash bail, the phrase “publicly paid costs of
representation” is found in a paragraph separate from the “fines, costs,
fees, and restitution that the court may order the defendant to pay if the
defendant is convicted.” This indicates two distinct concepts.

   Second, a useful rule of thumb is that “a limiting clause or phrase” is
ordinarily “read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately
follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (citing 2A N. Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.33, p. 369 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). This
“rule of the last antecedent” suggests that only the phrase “fines, costs,
fees, and restitution” is modified by the relative clause “that the court may
order.” See id.

   Lastly, representation costs are not, in most cases, costs “that the court
may order the defendant to pay if the defendant is convicted.” Rather,
they may be imposed under two code provisions whether the defendant is
convicted or not. See I.C. § 35-33-7-6(c) (the supplemental public-defender
fee); I.C. § 33-40-3-6(a) (2023) (requiring reasonable attorney’s fees to be
imposed on a defendant found able to pay “at any stage of a
prosecution”); but see I.C. § 33-37-2-3(e) (2019) (requiring “part of the costs
of representation” to be imposed on a “convicted person” who is able to
pay them). The “publicly paid costs of representation” referred to in
Spells’s cash-bail agreement are not, therefore, likely to be only those the
trial court could impose after her conviction.

   From this textual and structural analysis, we hold that a trial court may
retain the whole of a defendant’s incremental representation costs without
making the indigency determination that is otherwise required for

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024       Page 8 of 19
assessment of a supplemental public-defender fee. In this respect, we
follow the results reached in Wright v. State, 949 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011), and Obregon v. State, 703 N.E.2d 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), each of
which concerned cash-bail language similar to that involved here.

   Our interpretation of the statute also meshes with the General
Assembly’s presumed goal of ensuring that defendants who can access
bail money contribute financially toward their defense. This policy reflects
certain realities. The ninety-two counties of Indiana face serious
challenges in funding public defense. According to 2020 figures, Indiana
ranks forty-second out of the fifty states for the number of attorneys per
capita. American Bar Ass’n, Profile of the Legal Profession 25 (2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2021
/0721/polp.pdf [https://perma.cc/N59Q-DA66]. Over forty percent of our
counties have fewer than one attorney for every thousand inhabitants.
Katie Stancombe, Stretched to Serve in ‘Legal Deserts’, Indiana Lawyer, Sep.
2, 2020, https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/stretched-to-serve-in-
legal-deserts. For public defenders in particular, funding is “a constant
concern” at the county level, the lack of which has led to “staffing
shortages” and “excessive caseloads.” Indiana Task Force on Public
Defense, Findings and Recommendations to the Indiana Public Defender
Commission 54 (2018), https://www.in.gov/publicdefender/files/Indiana-
Task-Force-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8ZB-MD29]. Indeed, more than
half of the attorneys responding to one survey “indicated they did not
have enough resources to do their jobs to the level they aspire.” Id. at 28.
Another reality is that in some cases, as former Chief Justice Shepard
observed, a “defendant who manages to come up with cash to get sprung”
from pre-trial confinement “soon re-emerges as the indigent without
means to make restitution to the victims of his crime.” State ex rel. Williams
v. Ryan, 490 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ind. 1986) (Shepard, J., dissenting). The
same goes, perhaps, for the cost of hiring counsel.

   There will, of course, be cases involving genuine hardship on
defendants and worthy potential uses for bail money other than paying
public defenders. We therefore emphasize that the language of code
section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(1) is permissive. The statutory agreement “allows”
the court to retain cash for representation costs, and the defendant and

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024      Page 9 of 19
depositor are notified that the court “may” do so. 8 In view of alternative
uses for a defendant’s cash bail, such as restitution to victims or paying for
the needs of defendants and their dependents, it may not always be
desirable to retain the entire allowable representation costs.

    Here, the trial court was required to make an indigency determination
under Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6.5 before imposing Spells’s
supplemental public-defender fee. However, the trial court was also
authorized by the cash-bail agreement to apply $100 from Spells’s cash
bail to the cost of her defense without inquiring into her ability to pay. It
is, therefore, a moot question in this case whether the trial court made an
adequate indigency determination respecting the supplemental fee.

    B. An indigency hearing is necessary before retaining cash
       bail to pay most other fines, costs, and fees.
   We turn next to the fines, costs, and fees “that the court may order the
defendant to pay if the defendant is convicted.” See I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a)(1).
The issue is whether the trial court could retain Spells’s cash bail to pay
her fine, costs, and fees (other than her representation costs) without
inquiring into her ability to pay. We first examine whether the fine, costs,
and fees imposed on Spells would require an indigency hearing absent a
cash-bail agreement, concluding that they virtually all would. We then
consider whether Spells’s cash-bail agreement supplanted the hearing
requirement and hold that it did not.

8The same is not necessarily true for ten-percent cash-bail agreements under code section 35-
33-8-3.2(a)(2), which provides that the “clerk shall also retain from the deposit under this
subdivision fines, costs, fees, and restitution as ordered by the court” and “publicly paid costs
of representation.”

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                      Page 10 of 19
      1. Fines, costs, and fees generally require an indigency
         hearing when there is no cash-bail agreement.
   To start with, we observe that the imposition of a fine usually requires
an indigency hearing. By statute, “whenever the court imposes a fine, it
shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is
indigent” and it may order the payment of a fine only “[i]f the person is
not indigent.” I.C. § 35-38-1-18(a) (2007). When costs are imposed, too, the
court “shall conduct a hearing” into the person’s indigency and order the
costs paid only “[i]f the person is not indigent.” I.C. § 33-37-2-3(a). Spells’s
fine and costs would, therefore, usually be subject to a requirement for an
indigency hearing.

  The requirements for imposing fees are a little trickier to trace. Under
code section 33-37-2-5, “costs” include the “fees prescribed by IC 33-37-4-
1,” which “may be collected from a defendant against whom a conviction
is entered.” 9 And costs, as we’ve noted, usually cannot be imposed
without an indigency hearing. I.C. § 33-37-2-3(a).

   We have examined the fees assessed against Spells by the trial court
according to its sentencing order. Almost all of them (e.g., the automated
record-keeping fee) are prescribed by code section 33-37-4-1, making them
“costs” and thus subject to an indigency hearing. One $4 item listed as
“Indianapolis Metropolitan Police” we presume to be the “law
enforcement continuing education program fee,” which requires an
indigency determination pursuant to code section 33-37-2-5. See I.C. § 33-
37-4-1(b)(4) (2023); I.C. § 33-37-5-8(c) (2015). However, the $2 jury fee
authorized by code section 33-37-5-19 is not part of the “costs” for which a
convicted defendant is liable, because it is not prescribed by code section

9We note that code section 33-37-1-3(b) states in broad terms that costs “include fees.” We rely
here instead on code section 33-37-2-5, which defines as costs only a subset of the fees
assessed against convicted persons. The latter, more specific statute concerns costs in criminal
cases and controls over the former, more general statute. See State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152,
155 (Ind. 2022) (citations omitted) (“general statutes yield to more specific statutes”).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                     Page 11 of 19
33-37-4-1. 10 No indigency hearing appears, therefore, to be necessary for
the jury fee.

   To sum up, imposition of Spells’s fine, costs, and every fee except her
jury fee would usually necessitate an indigency hearing. We must
consider, then, whether her cash-bail agreement supplanted that
requirement.

          2. A cash-bail agreement does not supplant the
             requirement for an indigency hearing.
   Code section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(1) allows the court, by agreement, to retain
cash bail to pay “fines, costs, fees, and restitution that the court may order
the defendant to pay if the defendant is convicted.” The parties dispute
whether this language anticipates the trial court holding the usual
indigency hearing or whether it dispenses with it.

   In Wright, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the absence of
language requiring an indigency hearing” in the cash-bail statute meant
that no such hearings were required when cash bail was retained to pay
fines, costs, and fees. 949 N.E.2d at 416 (citing parallel language in code
section 35-33-8-3.2(a)(2)). To impose such a hearing, the Wright panel
reasoned, “would render the bail bond agreement meaningless.” Id. We
disagree. The cash-bail statute can be read in harmony with the fines,
costs, and fees statutes in a way that gives effect to them all.

   The key phrase in the cash-bail statute refers to the expenses “that the
court may order the defendant to pay” if convicted. See I.C. 35-33-8-
3.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). “May” could refer here to what the court is
permitted or authorized to do, or to what it might possibly do. If “may” is
intended in its permissive sense here, it arguably provides the trial court
an independent source of authority to order payment of fines, costs, and
fees without an indigency hearing. Equally, though, “may” could simply
refer to the possibility of the court ordering payments in the usual course

10   Amended last year to $6. Pub. L. No. 237-2023, § 2, 2023 Ind. Acts 3940, 3941.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                        Page 12 of 19
after indigency hearings. We find the latter reading the more natural of
the two: the defendant agrees to retention of whatever fines, costs, and
fees the trial court might possibly order—under its authority granted
elsewhere. In short, this is a statute dealing with the disposition of cash-
bail, not one authorizing the imposition of fines, costs, and fees without
hearings.

   Furthermore, when two statutes concern the same subject matter, we
prefer to read them together “to harmonize and give effect to each.”
Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 989 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). Thus, the payment of fines, costs, and fees may be
ordered as usual after indigency hearings, but the amounts so ordered
may be retained from cash bail. This interpretation of the statutory scheme
creates a measure of harmony. A reading of the cash-bail statute as
authorizing the court to order payments without indigency hearings, by
contrast, would render ineffective the indigency requirements in the fines,
costs, and fees statutes as far as cash bail is concerned.

   We conclude that the required procedure is for a trial court first to hold
an indigency hearing and only then, under the terms of any applicable
agreement, to retain from cash bail any fine, costs, or fees that the
defendant is able to pay. Just as an indigent defendant may not be ordered
to pay unaffordable fines, costs, or fees, neither may a court order their
cash bail to be applied as a form of payment.

   The cash-bail statute does not, therefore, provide trial courts as much
authority to retain money for fines, costs, or fees as it does for publicly
paid costs of representation. Still, we think the statute helps meet the need
to “facilitate meaningful imposition of fines, costs and restitution.” See
Bennett v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Where the
cash-bail agreement is in place, a judgment for these expenses need not be
“a hollow attempt to impose justice.” See id.

   Anticipating that an indigency hearing might indeed have been
required, the State argues that the trial court could have held one at any
time before Spells completed her sentence. Had the trial court suspended
Spells’s fine and costs, this would be correct. See I.C. § 35-38-1-18(b), I.C. §
33-37-2-3(b). Indeed, this Court has recommended such a procedure.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024        Page 13 of 19
Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002). But nothing in the
record here suggests that the fine or costs were suspended or even that a
future hearing was anticipated. See Holder, 119 N.E.3d at 624. Rather, the
trial court conditioned the end of Spells’s probation on “payment of court
costs and [the] fine” and deducted partial payment without holding a
fresh indigency hearing. App. Vol. II, p. 16. We therefore reject the State’s
argument.

  We hold that the retention from Spells’s cash bail of $143 in fine, fees,
and costs could not properly be ordered until an adequate indigency
hearing and determination took place as to these items. 11 In Part II, we
turn to the question of whether an adequate indigency determination was
in fact made.

II. The trial court’s inquiry was insufficiently
    thorough under the recently enacted indigency-
    determination statute.
   As we have explained, the trial court could not retain $143 of Spells’s
cash bail without an indigency hearing. The same goes for the $60 that
Spells voluntarily paid. We begin this part of the opinion by holding that
Spells’s appeal as to that $60 is not moot. We then set out the proper
standard for indigency determinations under the recently enacted code
section 35-33-7-6.5. Finally, we apply the new standard to the record in
this case.

     A. Spells’s claim to the $60 she paid is not moot.

  The Court of Appeals held that Spells mooted her appeal as to the last
$60 she owed by paying it off. Spells, No. 22A-CR-1889, at *2–3. A case

11The trial court allowed a $245 deduction from Spells’s cash bail. Subtracting $100 in
representation costs and the $2 jury fee leaves $143 applied to the fine and other costs and
fees.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                     Page 14 of 19
becomes moot “when the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or
otherwise disposed of so that the court can give the parties no effective
relief.” E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind.
2022) (citation omitted). Here, reimbursement of Spells’s $60 would be
effective relief, so her appeal remains justiciable as to the $60 balance
payment. See De La Cruz v. State, 80 N.E.3d 210, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)
(holding that an appeal of already-paid probation fees was not moot);
Long Manor Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Alungbe, 292 A.3d 85, 88 n.5 (Conn. Ct.
App. 2023) (citation omitted) (holding that payment of a judgment did not
moot the case as “restitution” of the money could still be ordered).

   The remainder of Part II applies to this $60 as well as $143 of the money
retained from Spells’s cash bail.

    B. Code section 35-33-7-6.5 replaces the inconsistent
       standards under appellate caselaw for indigency
       determinations.
   In 2020, the General Assembly enacted a new statute governing
indigency determinations in a criminal case. When making such a
determination, a trial court “shall” consider a defendant’s “assets,”
“income,” and “necessary expenses.” Pub. L. No. 140-2020, § 2, 2020 Ind.
Acts 1284, 1285 (codified at I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(a)). The court “may consider”
a defendant’s eligibility for SNAP, TANF, or “another need based public
assistance program” as sufficient evidence of indigency. I.C. § 35-33-7-
6.5(b). The court may make an “initial indigency determination” pending
receipt of evidence. I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(c). And, lastly, the court may
“prorate” fines, fees, and costs to what a defendant “can reasonably
afford.” I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(d). We note that a defendant may be deemed
unable to pay one cost, yet able to pay another. See Meeker v. State, 182 Ind.
App. 292, 302, 395 N.E.2d 301, 307 n.5 (1979).

   Before the new statute, appellate caselaw governed Indiana’s standards
for indigency determinations, albeit somewhat inconsistently. In Moore v.
State, this Court addressed the indigency inquiry necessary for assignment
of counsel. 273 Ind. 3, 7–8, 401 N.E.2d 676, 679 (1980). Our opinion

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024       Page 15 of 19
required a trial court to conduct “as thorough an examination of the
defendant’s total financial picture as is practical,” including “a balancing
of assets against liabilities and a consideration of the amount of the
defendant’s disposable income or other resources reasonably available to
him after the payment of his fixed or certain obligations.” Id. at 7, 401
N.E.2d at 679 (citations omitted). In contrast to this fairly rigorous
standard, we held in Bell v. State only that trial courts must “engage in
some inquiry of the defendant” in deciding their ability to pay restitution
and suggested some factors that courts “may consider.” 59 N.E.3d 959,
963–64 (Ind. 2016). A leading recent case on probation fees, Burnett v. State,
likewise set forth a broad standard under which a trial court must ask
questions about a defendant’s “actual ability to pay,” and suggested some
relevant factors. 74 N.E.3d 1221, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

   The General Assembly has now firmed up the requirements for
determining indigency as to representation, I.C. § 35-33-7-6(a), and as to
fines, costs, and fees, I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(d). Courts must consider three
distinct items—assets, income, and necessary expenses—that the
legislature deems essential in calculating a defendant’s ability to pay. I.C.
§ 35-33-7-6.5(a). We reiterate that it is incumbent on trial courts to consider
these factors. This means that if the parties fail to provide the information,
courts themselves must make inquiries calculated to bring out the
necessary evidence. Bell, 59 N.E.3d at 964. As to the burden of proof, “once
a defendant presents or the court elicits from [the] defendant information
demonstrating an inability to pay,” then the burden “shifts to the State to
rebut the evidence.” Id.

  Of course, trial courts will be aware of a defendant’s cash bail as an
“amount set aside which can be used for payment.” Spells, No. 22A-CR-
1889, at *2. This money will sometimes figure into the ability-to-pay
equation as an asset belonging to the defendant themselves. Garner, 93
N.E.3d at 1098. 12 Nothing prevents a trial court from considering the

12Sometimes does not mean always. Since 2022, the balance of cash bail is to be remitted to the
depositor, who is not necessarily the defendant. Pub. L. No. 147-2022, § 6, 2022 Ind. Acts 1854,
1863 (codified at I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(b)).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                     Page 16 of 19
amount of cash bail, proportioning the aggregate of all costs and fees to it,
and checking with the defendant that the total is affordable in light of
their means and expenses.

   As for appellate review, we will defer to the sound discretion of a trial
court when the record discloses a reasonable inquiry into the mandatory
factors as they pertain to the defendant’s ability to pay. Other relevant
factors may also need to be examined in an individual case, once brought
to the court’s attention, such as the defendant’s living situation,
employment history, potential earnings, social security benefits, state of
health, and dependents. See Bell, 59 N.E.3d at 963 (discussing some of
these factors). The record must reflect evidence of the defendant’s ability
to pay the expenses imposed. Id. at 966. If one of the mandatory factors,
especially either the defendant’s income or necessary expenses, is passed
over, or if the inquiry is unreasonably superficial, it may be appropriate to
vacate and remand for another hearing. We next apply this newly clarified
standard to Spells’s case.

    C. Spells’s indigency determination was incomplete.
   The trial court first questioned Spells about her means at a pretrial
hearing in December 2021. At that time, Spells was working thirty to forty
hours a week in daycare, earning $800 gross biweekly, living with her
sister, and had no children. We note that the court did not inquire further
into Spells’s necessary expenses or request dollar amounts for them. The
court nonetheless appointed counsel, implicitly finding Spells indigent,
and imposed the $100 supplemental public-defender fee.

   The trial court next heard evidence of Spells’s circumstances at the
sentencing hearing in July 2022. Responding to questions from defense
counsel, Spells explained that she was employed in full-time elder care.
However, she was now living alone and expecting a child for whom she
would be the primary financial provider. It was apparent that Spells’s
circumstances had changed since the pretrial hearing. Yet, no further
evidence of her assets, income, or necessary expenses emerged at
sentencing. The court found Spells indigent as to probation fees but
imposed a fine, costs, and other fees.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024     Page 17 of 19
   We find it a close question whether the trial court’s inquiries were
adequate under the standard we set out today. Certainly, the court made
some inquiries into Spells’s income and circumstances. On the other hand,
the court entered its order without knowing for sure the amount of
Spells’s income or of any necessary expenses like rent or prenatal
healthcare. This omission seems especially important given that Spells
was living alone and had a child on the way. We note, too, that the cash
bail was deposited by a third party, not by Spells herself. This could have
been a gift, or it could have been only a loan. We think that the trial court,
having found Spells indigent as to representation and probation fees,
should have investigated more deeply just what Spells could afford to pay
in fines, costs, and other fees. On these facts and under the standard
announced in this opinion, we conclude that the trial court did not
undertake a sufficient indigency inquiry.

Conclusion
   We hold that execution of a cash-bail agreement under code section 35-
33-8-3.2(a)(1) entitles the trial court to retain all or part of the cash bail to
cover the cost of a defendant’s public defender. Cash bail may not,
however, be retained to pay fines or most fees and costs unless an
indigency determination is made following a hearing. Under the new
statutory standard, the record of an indigency determination must
disclose evidence of the defendant’s assets, income, and necessary
expenses, insofar as they bear on ability to pay. Under this standard,
Spells’s indigency determination was incomplete.

  We affirm the retention of Spells’s cash bail to cover her $100
supplemental public-defender fee and $2 jury fee. The $20 fine and $183 in

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024         Page 18 of 19
other costs and fees are vacated. We remand the case to the trial court for
proceedings on the fine, costs, and fees consistent with this opinion. 13

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Valerie K. Boots
Megan E. Shipley
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Kelly A. Loy
Robert M. Yoke
Office of the Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

13In Bell, this Court split over whether it was appropriate to vacate and remand the restitution
order alone or the entire sentence. 59 N.E.3d at 966 (majority opinion), 967 (Slaughter, J.,
concurring in part). Here, it could serve no purpose to vacate Spells’s whole sentence along
with her fine because she has already completed probation successfully.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-232 | January 30, 2024                     Page 19 of 19