Court Opinion

ID: 9554956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 16:00:39.905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:02.221728
License: Public Domain

FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                             AUG 10 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KEYRON LAMONTE BINNS,                            No.    21-16854

              Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No.
                                                 2:20-cv-01120-TLN-KJN
 v.

AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE AND                        MEMORANDUM*
ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,
AIG; CANDY JOHNSON, Analyst;
SHARITA DOUGLAS-LANE, Analyst;
ROSALIND BUSH, Analyst; ADRIENE
WHITFIELD-SWINTON, Senior Analyst;
BRIAN DUPERREAULT, President &
CEO; MARIA DAY, Senior Executive
Assistant,

              Defendants-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                     Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted August 10, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

      *
        This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiff Keyron Binns appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal of

his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We review the dismissal de novo.

Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

      Binns brought breach of contract and fraud claims, asserting 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. He did not allege his civil rights

were violated and never argued that he made § 1983 claims. Cf. Easton v.

Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). His

citation to § 1983 did not transform his state law claims into federal claims. See

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1343–44 (9th Cir. 1981). Because his claims

did not arise under the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States,

there was no federal question jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998); see also

Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. Gilder

v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1991).

      Binns failed to establish diversity jurisdiction because it is legally certain

that his claims could not reach the requisite amount in controversy ($75,000). See

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d

362, 363–64 (9th Cir. 1986); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,

                                           2                                     21-16854
303 U.S. 283, 288–89, 58 S. Ct. 586, 590, 82 L. Ed. 845 (1938). The maximum

insurance benefit of $1,000 was clear on the face of the documents that Binns

attached to his complaint, and his assertions to the contrary are plainly frivolous.

Because the insurance policy limited recovery, dismissal on amount in controversy

grounds was appropriate. See Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015);

Pachinger, 802 F.2d at 364. Because there was no federal subject matter

jurisdiction, the district court did not retain supplemental jurisdiction over Binns’s

breach of contract and fraud claims. See Scott, 306 F.3d at 664.

      AFFIRMED. All pending motions are DENIED.

                                           3                                    21-16854