Court Opinion

ID: 9681227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:46:18.592318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.800953
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
DUNCAN, Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of injury to a child pursuant to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 22.04. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections and a fine of $2,000.00. We granted the appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine if the court of appeals was correct in its determination that appellant’s oral confession was not a product of “custodial interrogation” and consequently the prophylactic warnings enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), were unnecessary. See: Cates v. State, 748 S.W.2d 9 (Tex.App.—Dallas, 1987). We will vacate the judgment of the court of appeals.
The facts relevant to appellant’s sole ground for review reveal that after appellant had been arrested on February 27, 1986, for the instant offense, and while in the Dallas County Jail, Joanna Vatsis, an investigator with the Texas Department of Human Resources (hereinafter DHR), on March 4, 1986, interviewed the appellant and was able to obtain admissions from him which were introduced in the State’s case in chief. The record is clear that prior to the interview, which took place while appellant was incarcerated, no Miranda warnings were administered. The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress his statements and in affirming its action the court of appeals concluded that Vatsis was not a law enforcement officer within the definition of “custodial interrogation” as defined by the United States Supreme Court. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.1
Relying on Paez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 34 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), the court of appeals concluded that the dispositive issue in the case was whether Vatsis was acting as an agent of law enforcement pursuant to a police practice. In Paez, supra, which also involved an investigator with the DHR, this Court in following its case by case approach adopted the “custodial interrogation” analysis announced in McCrory v. State, 643 S.W.2d 725 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
*172It is obvious that employment by the DHR does not per se invest one with the status of a law enforcement officer or police agent. Rather, the record as a whole must clearly establish that the defendant’s statement “ ‘resulted from a calculated practice’ which all agents of the State present or involved knew was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from ...” McCrory, id., at 743. Simply put, the record must establish that when the appellant made the admissions, the DHR employee was utilizing her capacity so as to accomplish what the police could not have lawfully accomplished themselves. Moreover, in Paez, we also noted that in resolving this issue one must also consider whether the DHR employee was known to law enforcement personnel and whether it was reasonably likely that this individual would evoke or elicit an incriminating response within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). With this standard in mind, we concluded that the investigator in Paez was not an agent of law enforcement officers as she was not conducting a child abuse investigation, but had gone to the hospital to see the defendant who was a client, to determine the well-being of the defendant’s children. Paez, although charged with the murder of her husband, did not undergo “custodial interrogation” because the record indicated that the DHR employee was not an agent of law enforcement as we used that term in McCrory.
The court of appeals reached the same conclusion as we did in Paez: the record did not support a finding that Vatsis was acting as an agent of law enforcement. We disagree.
Central to the Paez decision was the fact that the DHR investigator was not functioning in her criminal investigative role as defined in the Texas Family Code.2 Accordingly, we concluded that she was not acting as one whose business was to ferret out criminal child abuse and then report it to the local law enforcement agency. Rather, she was attempting to locate a home for the defendant’s child, when during the course of that interview the defendant made incriminating statements. The conversation in Paez between the DHR investigator and the defendant was for the distinct purpose of a civil court proceeding involving the parent-child relationship.
Comparing the extant circumstances of Paez to the instant case the dichotomy is apparent. The record in Paez revealed the following:
(1) Vera, the DHR investigator, was not conducting an investigation of child abuse relative to the defendant’s children nor was she attempting to interview the defendant concerning the murder of her husband or a criminal offense which was the basis of the criminal charges and conviction in that case.
(2) Although the defendant was in custody (at a hospital) and charged with the *173murder of her husband, she was not accused, charged or suspected of child abuse.
(3) The interview conducted between the defendant and the DHR investigator was not interrogation initiated to extract or gather incriminating information from the defendant.
(4) The defendant in Paez was not the focus of a DHR investigation.
The facts of the case subjudice presents a significantly different situation for although Vatsis was not acting at the behest or as a surrogate for another more traditional police agency, in her capacity as a DHR investigator she was nevertheless operating as an agent of law enforcement in the State of Texas. The record is clear that appellant was the central figure in a criminal investigation concerning child abuse and indeed had been arrested for the present offense and was in the Dallas County Jail at the time of the interview. Appellant’s arrest had resulted from information provided by Vatsis as well as police interviews of the child and the examining medical doctor. Appellant had been in jail five days on child abuse charges at the time Vatsis spoke with him and the questions propounded to him were calculated to evoke incriminating responses relevant to the pending charges.
The State counters that the record both at the motion to suppress and at trial includes testimony of Vatsis wherein she unequivocally declared she was not a law enforcement officer and that in any event since she did not have the power to arrest she could not be a member of the law enforcement community. We find neither argument persuasive. As this Court observed in McCrory v. State, supra, “[t]he courts cannot be expected to decide cases solely on the basis of self-serving statements by the defendant or the interrogating officer.” Id., at 733. See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: what constitutes custodial interrogation?, 25 S.C.L.Rev. 699, 713 (1974). Thus Vatsis’s declarations are insufficient to provide us with a basis for a decision.
Whether a DHR investigator has the power to arrest is a factor which should be considered; however, an answer, positive or negative, certainly is not dispositive. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding. Dr. Grigson, the sua sponte, pretrial court ordered psychiatrist, certainly was not a traditional law enforcement officer possessed with the power of arrest under Texas law, yet it was concluded that a criminal defendant while in custody and faced with interrogation from the court ordered psychiatrist, the procedural safeguards of Miranda were essential.
The same is true with regards to Vatsis. Although she did not have the power to arrest, she was acting as an agent of law enforcement. Her function in pursuing a child abuser was for the enforcement of the Texas child abuse laws. Although it is not the responsibility of the DHR investigators to arrest the child abuse offender, it is their responsibility to discover child abuse and report it to the appropriate police agency. It is also the investigators’ obligation in cases such as this one to provide the documentation necessary to procure the arrest of the alleged offender. Here the evidence gathered by Vatsis prior to the jail interview of appellant was instrumental in appellant’s arrest.
Further, it is undisputed that appellant was in custody when interrogated by Vat-sis and the questions propounded to the appellant was done so in her official capacity as a DHR investigator. The fact that Vatsis lacked the authority to arrest appellant does not detract from the reality of the situation. Vatsis was paid by the State of Texas for the express purpose of discovering, and investigating allegations of child abuse, and turning her findings over to the proper authority responsible for the prosecution of the child abuse offender.
*174Essential to our conclusion is the fact that Vatsis was not simply conducting a routine interview to assist her in solving the abuse problem within the family unit. Rather, it is evident that she was conducting a criminal investigation and officially operating to assist those police agencies responsible for enforcing the State’s criminal laws. Vatsis was representing the State of Texas, the party in interest in a criminal prosecution. This is evident as the record indicates that after the interrogation of appellant she immediately reported his statements to law enforcement personnel.
As noted, the appellant was in custody for the offense of injury to a child, Vatsis as a DHR investigator was investigating the offense, and the statements elicited from appellant were in direct response to the questions propounded to him by Vat-sis. Prior to the interrogation, the appellant should have been afforded the procedural safeguard provided under Miranda. His statements were therefore inadmissible.
It must now be determined if the introduction of appellant’s statement was harmless. We will therefore remand this case to the court of appeals for a harm analysis pursuant to Tex.R.App.Pro. 81(b)(2). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to that court for further proceeding consistent with this opinion.

. In Miranda, the Court stated:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in &e pages which follow but briefly stated it it this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or incul-patory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. [Footnote omitted]

. As of the date of appellant’s trial Chapter 34 of the Family Code set out the pertinent duties of a child abuse investigator:
§ 34.02. Contents of Report: to Whom Made
(a)Nonaccusatory reports reflecting the re- . porter’s belief that a child has been or will be abused or neglected, or has died of abuse or neglect, has violated the compulsory school attendance laws on three or more occassions, or has, on three or more occasions, been voluntarily absent from his home without the consent of his parent or guardian for a substantial length of time or without the intent to return shall be made to any local or state law enforcement agency, and in addition shall be made to:
(1) The Texas Department of Human Services; or
(2) the agency designated by the court to be responsible for the protection of children.
(b) All reports must contain the name and address of the child, the name and address of the person responsible for the care of the child, if available, and any other pertinent information.
(c) All reports received by any local or state law enforcement agency shall be referred to the Texas Department of Human Services or to the agency designated by the court to be responsible for the protection of children. The department or designated agency immediately shall notify the appropriate state or local law enforcement agency of any report it receives, other than from a law enforcement agency, that concerns the suspected abuse or neglect of a child or death of a child from abuse or neglect.