Court Opinion

ID: 9791982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:34.281909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.967837
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
There are two aspects of the majority opinion that are troublesome: (1) The opinion’s acceptance of the jury instructions as adequate for purposes of informing each of the jury members that he/she could decide to be a hung juror rather than part of the crowd and (2) the opinion’s explanation of why the testimony concerning Smith’s other alleged bad acts was admissible.
I concur wherein the opinion holds that “the failure to object to an instruction at trial in a criminal case does not constitute a waiver of any objection to the instruction on appeal.” At 231, 786 P.2d at 1131 (1990). However, the majority’s treatment of the “hung jury” issue is unsatisfactory.
Smith’s attorney moved for a new trial because one of the jurors was in a state of dismay because she had not been given to understand that the jury was not obliged to reach a unanimous verdict or that it was permissible to become a “hung jury.” In response, the majority opinion asserts that “the affidavit and transcribed interview of the juror are irrelevant to our consideration. If the instructions were ad*233equate it does not matter whether the juror misunderstood them or not.” At 230, 786 P.2d at 1130. Further on, when deciding whether the instructions were indeed adequate, the majority says “[rjeading and construing these two instructions together leads us to the conclusion that the jury should have understood that in order to reach a verdict they all had to agree, but that they were not required to reach a verdict, if they could not do so unanimously.” At 231, 786 P.2d at 1131 (emphasis added).
If the standard for determining the adequacy of jury instructions is whether “the jury should have understood ” the instructions, then there is no better evidence of any inadequacy than a statement from a juror that in fact he/she did not perceive that there was latitude to not agree.
Far better, I suggest we follow the course of the Ninth Circuit. Jury instructions which clearly inform jurors of all their alternatives, including the option of deadlocking and not returning a verdict at all are to be preferred.
The majority’s approval of testimony from Smith’s daughter that he had touched her at times other than those for which he had been charged is also unfortunate. At the first trial, the prosecution was allowed to elicit this testimony on rebuttal, but only because Smith’s counsel had opened the issue by attempting to impeach the daughter’s testimony with prior inconsistent statements. At the second trial the defense asked that this evidentiary ruling be renewed. The trial court did renew its ruling, holding that the other acts testimony would be allowed only on rebuttal, and presumably only if the defense opened the door to such questions. Yet at trial, over defense objection, the testimony was admitted on direct examination. A major problem is my present inability to understand why a ruling made at a first trial (mistrial) somehow is a fortiori sufficient reason for utilizing the same rule at a second trial.
The majority dismisses this objection by stating that, since the defense went ahead on cross examination and questioned the daughter about her prior inconsistent statements, no harm was done by allowing the prosecution to jump the gun. This reasoning is based on a number of erroneous assumptions. It assumes that the defense would be conducted in the same way at the second trial as it was at the first trial; it assumes that the defense would not opt to take advantage of the evidentiary ruling by declining to introduce the prior inconsistent testimony; and it assumes that the testimony would have the same impact on the jury whether it was introduced on direct examination or on the rebuttal. Long experience would indicate that these assumptions are unsound. The prosecution was allowed to put the cart before the horse when neither the defense nor the court even knew there would be a horse. As a result, Smith was required to defend himself, not only against the occurrences with which he was charged, but against an untold number of other “touches.”
The majority also fails to recognize that, even when offered in rebuttal, evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.— ... (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts involves a two-tiered analysis. See State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 712 P.2d 674 (Ct.App.1985). First, as with all evidence, the proof must be relevant. Here, for the testimony to be relevant it must pertain to one of the elements listed in I.R.E. 404(b): motive, opportunity, preparation, intent, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake, identity, or accident.
*234Secondly, having made the threshold determination of relevancy, it is then ascertained whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by unfair prejudice to the defendant. This balancing is left to the discretion of the trial judge and will be disturbed only if his discretion is abused. Roach, 109 Idaho at 974, 712 P.2d at 675.
In order for testimony concerning other “touches” to have been properly admitted, it should have been shown that the testimony was relevant for purposes other than to show Smith’s propensity for such conduct. Such relevance is not evident from the record, and the State forwards no argument that the disputed testimony falls within the purview of I.R.E. 404(b). Rather, it is asserted that the trial court’s decision that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect to Smith should not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion. It appears that the trial court side-stepped the first tier of the two tier analysis which supposedly governs the admission of such evidence.
Discretion is properly exercised only when a rule of evidence calls for it. State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671, 674, 701 P.2d 291, 294 (Ct.App.1985) (Burnett, J. specially concurring). If, but only if, evidence of uncharged crimes is relevant to a permissible purpose, such as establishing motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity or a common scheme or plan, may the trial judge then exercise discretion in balancing the probative value against the likelihood of unfair prejudice. Maylett, 108 Idaho at 674, 701 P.2d at 294.
Here the need for the trial court to balance the probative value of the evidence against the prejudice to defendant need not have been addressed, because the relevance of the testimony had not been shown to fall within the purview of I.R.E. 404(b). Therefore, evidence of Smith’s uncharged prior acts should have been ruled inadmissible in the trial court.