Court Opinion

ID: 9853718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:53:01.04839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:02.687856
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(specially concurring):
The majority characterizes the United States Supreme Court opinion in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), as having held that in that case, “the acts which the accused admitted did not support the intent element of the crime.” A more complete summary of the Supreme Court’s view of the facts of that case is that while a jury would almost inevitably have inferred the required intent element of second degree murder from the objective evidence of multiple stabbings presented in the case, a jury would not have been required to draw that inference, in part because of the defendant’s extraordinarily low intelligence. The Court then held that “[tjhere is nothing in this record that can serve as a substitute for either a finding after trial, or a voluntary admission, that respondent had the requisite intent. * * * [H]e made no factual statement or admission necessarily implying that he had such intent.” Henderson v. Morgan, 96 S.Ct. at 2258.
I agree with the majority that this case departs from Henderson in several significant respects. The extended record includes reports concerning appellant by two examining psychological experts, as well as a presentence report prepared by the adult probation department. These evaluations indicate that appellant has been very cooperative with the authorities throughout the investigation. He has freely admitted in some detail the acts alleged.1 He defined “child molestation” for Dr. Bendheim as “a form of sex on an individual under the age of consent.” His statements about his feelings immediately after the act indicate that he was thoroughly disgusted with what he had done and that he recognizes that this type of sex act is deranged. Appellant is aware that the crime he committed was “serious” in nature, that he requires psychiatric care, and feels that with extended care he can be rehabilitated.
I agree with the Henderson Court that in many cases in which a defendant is charged with second degree murder a jury is not required to draw the inference of a “design to effect death.” However, the specific intent element of the crime of child molestation seems to be so inextricably intertwined with the physical act of penetration of a child that I find it difficult to imagine a jury placing an innocent construction on the acts admitted by appellant. Furthermore, appellant’s numerous statements and admissions, when considered in their entirety, especially those that recognize the depravity of his act, do “necessarily imply” that the *23act was committed by appellant with an unnatural or abnormal sexual intent with respect to his child. Thus, the requirement in Henderson that there be some substitute in the record for an admission of specific intent is satisfied here.

. Dr. Francis A. Enos’ report quotes appellant as having stated “I dropped my pants and rubbed my penis between her legs and almost immediately had an orgasm and with my finger pushed the end of my penis in her.”