Court Opinion

ID: 996220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:47:40.492001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:43.563051
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

FRANK MOORE,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
                                                                      No. 98-6453
DEAN R. WALKER, Superintendent;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH
CAROLINA,
Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.
Graham C. Mullen, District Judge.
(CA-97-133-1-MU)

Submitted: July 30, 1998

Decided: August 31, 1998

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Frank Moore, Appellant Pro Se.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief
on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.
1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion
and find no reversible error. Moore made several claims regarding
sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction for rape and non-
felonious breaking and entering. The standard of review of suffi-
ciency of the evidence on habeas corpus is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could find essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
The reviewing court must consider circumstantial as well as direct
evidence and allow the government the benefit of all reasonable infer-
ences. See United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.
1982). In addition, the factual determinations of a state court are pre-
sumed to be correct, unless the applicant for a writ of habeas corpus
rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). Moore has not presented
reliable evidence that his conviction was not supported by sufficient
evidence. Because two of Moore's claims, ineffective assistance by
trial counsel, and that the indictment was based upon false evidence
and impressions, are premised upon Moore's claim that his conviction
was not supported by sufficient evidence, these claims must also fail.

Moore also makes several claims regarding errors the district court
made during trial. Moore did not raise these claims in his state habeas
petition. The principles of comity which underlie the exhaustion
requirement dictate that a state be presented with the opportunity to
review federal constitutional challenges whether or not the state will
choose to avail itself of that opportunity. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973).

Finally, Moore alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective
because his attorney did not raise nine issues that he suggested on
appeal. Because the attorney believed that there was not a reasonable
chance of success on the issues, and Moore does not demonstrate that
counsel's judgment was unreasonable, we find that this claim is with-

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out merit. See Strickland v. Washington, 466, 687-94 U.S. 668 (1984);
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 752-54 (1983).

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the
appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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