Court Opinion

ID: 9445398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:28:02.651248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:15.096629
License: Public Domain

*447BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The jury decided for the appellee because it found that the appellant had negligently failed to make an adequate number of inspections of the vestibule doors and that, as a result of such negligence, decedent had fallen to her death through an open door. My colleagues hold that there was no evidence from which the jury could have found (1) that appellant’s ticket collector had any opportunity to make any additional inspections, or (2) that, even if there had been such opportunity, the failure to inspect was proximately related to the accident.
Whether there was opportunity for additional inspection and, thus, whether appellant was negligent depends upon what other duties the ticket collector had during the five to nine minute period in question. The collector testified that his duties were “to lift fares and lift tickets and see to the safety of [the] passengers, and keep [the] equipment in the best shape possible to> [his] knowledge, and see that passengers are received and discharged properly.” The evidence was, further, that the collection of fares and tickets and the receipt of passengers had already been completed prior to the time here in question and that the discharge of passengers would not occur until arrival at Union Station. Hence, the only duties to be executed by the collector in the crucial period were those which the jury apparently found he had negligently failed to execute, namely, to keep the equipment in the best possible condition (e. g., the doors closed) and see to the safety of his passengers (e. g., prevent the decedent from falling off the train). I think the jury could fairly have inferred, as apparently it did, from the collector’s testimony as to what his duties were, that he had an idle period during which he could have made another inspection of the doors. If some undescribed other duty had to be or was performed during that interval, the appellant should have introduced some evidence of it.
I cannot agree with the majority that, merely because inferences in conflict with the jury’s inferences are possible, the jury should not be allowed to decide the facts. “It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to-take the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences.” Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 1944, 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 412. I would follow Schulz v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1956, 350 U.S. 523, 76 S.Ct. 608, and Lavender v. Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740.
In Schulz, a tugboat fireman whose duty called for him to work on four tugboats moored side by side, stepping from one to another, was found drowned in the harbor. There was no evidence as to how he fell into the water, but there was evidence that he was a capable and experienced workman, that three of the’ tugs were unlighted and the fourth partially lighted, and that there was some ice on the tugs. 350 U.S. at pages 524-525, 76 S.Ct. at page 609. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, reasoning as do my colleagues in the instant case, affirmed, saying:
“The evidence of such alleged negligence was slight, and perhaps at most only doubtfully sufficient to present a jury question as to defendant’s breach of duty. But beyond this, there was no showing whatsoever that the alleged conditions were causally related to the accident. Plaintiff never contended that the ice completely covered the barges or that the pier or the barges were entirely shrouded in darkness. We have no way of knowing how or where the accident occurred, and cannot say that it was proximately caused by any default on the part of the defendant.” 1955, 222 F.2d 540, 541.
The Supreme Court reversed because the: evidence was sufficient to require sub*448mission of the case to the jury. The ■Court said:
“But the courts below took this case from the jury because of a possibility that Schulz might have fallen on a particular spot where there happened to be no ice, or that he might have fallen from the one boat that was partially illuminated by shore lights. Doubtless the jury ■could have so found (had the court allowed it to perform its function) but it would not have been compelled to draw such inferences.” 350 U.S. at page 526, 76 S.Ct. at page 610.
In Lavender v. Kum, a railroad :switeh-tender was found dead in the switchyard with a wound in his head. 'The plaintiff’s theory was that the blow came from a negligently maintained mail hook hanging on the outside of a passing mail car. The evidence indicated that the hook “might pivot” and its end “could thus be swung out to a point 3 to 31/2 feet from the rail and about 73 inches above the top of the rail.” 327 U.S. at page 649, 66 S.Ct. at page 742.1 Decedent was too short to be struck by the end of the hook unless he was on an elevation of some kind. There was such an elevation — an “uneven” mound of cinders some parts of which were high enough. Ibid. There was no evidence that decedent had in fact been standing on the mound. But, “If he had been standing on the mound about a foot from the side of the mail car he could have been hit by the end of the mail hook * * *. His wound was * * * well within the possible range of the :mail hook end.” Ibid. The defendant’s theory was a simpler one- — that deeedent had been murdered by a blow with a pipe. There were facts in the record '“from which it might reasonably be inferred” that the murder theory was correct. Id., 327 U.S. at page 652, 66 S. >Ct. at page 744. Indeed, there was even '“evidence tending to show” that plaintiff’s theory was “physically and mathematically impossible.” Ibid. The jury’s verdict for the plaintiff was upset by the Missouri Supreme Court on the ground that, although decedent “ ‘could have been struck by the mail hook knob if2 he were standing on the south side of the mound and the mail hook extended out as far as 12 or 14 inches * * * all reasonable minds would agree that it would be mere speculation and conjecture to say that [he] was struck by the mail hook’ and that ‘plaintiff failed to make a submissible case on that question.’ ” Id., 327 U.S. at page 651, 66 S.Ct. at page 743.
Like the Supreme Court of Missouri in Lavender, the majority here holds that the jury’s verdict was based not on rational inferences, but on speculation and conjecture. The evidence, in its view, as easily supports an inference that there was not an opportunity to inspect the doors again as that there was, and an inference that the accident was not caused by the failure to inspect the doors again as that it was. I think what the Supreme Court of the United States said in reversing the Supreme Court of Missouri in Lavender applies equally well to the majority view here:
“It is no answer to say that the jury’s verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And *449the appellate court’s function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.” Id., 327 U.S. at page 653, 66 S.Ct. at page 744.3
If the evidence in Lavender v. Kurn satisfied the Supreme Court that a jury could infer that the injury resulted from the defendant’s action or inaction, I do not see how the evidence here can fail to satisfy us. Indeed, in my judgment, this is a stronger case than Lavender v. Kurn. If the jury could reasonably infer, as from the evidence here it clearly could, that the appellee was negligent in not checking the doors more frequently, I think it is a highly probable inference that proper care would have avoided the accident. I concede the physical possibility that some stranger could have followed appellee’s agent about and opened the door right after it had been checked. In the circumstances, I think the judgment of comparative probability was well left to the jury.
That Lavender and Schulz arose under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, is not a reason, so far as I am concerned, for limiting in any way the effect of those decisions in non-F.E.L.A. cases.4 The line of cases of which Lavender and Schulz are representative reversed a trend toward appellate domination of juries which had deprived “jury trial in current civil cases * * * [of] most of its significance.” Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 Yale L. J. 482 (1956). I would not restrict this salutary development to F.E.L.A. cases. The suggestion that it should be so restricted because “under that act, the jury’s power to draw infer-enees is greater than in common-law actions,” 5 has been criticized as unjustified and merely reflecting “how far the courts have gone in other areas of litigation in restricting, if not denying, the jury’s orthodox common-law function to draw inferences.” Id. at 490, n. 17. The language of the Court in Lavender and Schulz which I quote in this opinion is not related to the “in whole or in part” provision of the statute. Nor do I find in those cases anything else that makes them inapplicable to cases like the instant one which arise under the common law. I do find that the appellate interference with juries which the Supreme Court condemned in the F.E.L.A. cases was based upon the same ground as the majority’s decision in the instant case. Id. at 489.

. Emphasis here and hereinafter supplied, unless otherwise indicated.

. Emphasis in original

. See also Schulz v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 850 U.S. at pages 525-526, 76 S.Ct. 608.

. I see no reason to distinguish between a case where a passenger mysteriously falls from a train and one where an employee mysteriously falls from a barge. If the threshold of proof is low enough to be reached by the unexplained cir-cumstauces of the one case, it seems to me it is also reached iu the other.

. Cahill v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R.( 2 Cir., 1955, 224 F.2d 637, 640 (dissent), reversed 1955, 350 U.S. 898, 76 S.Ct. 180, amended 1956, 351 U.S. 183, 76 S.Ct. 758.