Court Opinion

ID: 9723922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:38:06.330286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.380813
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I generally concur on the issue concerning attorney Ireland’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Beuning.
I dissent on Issue 2. First, reference is made to three sentences in the majority writing: “The presiding circuit judge was unable to hear the motion due to a family medical emergency, and it was assigned to Judge John Fitzgerald, who refused to hear the motion on the basis that he had no jurisdiction as a circuit court judge to remove another circuit court judge from a case. Thus, the motion has not been heard at the trial level, nor is there any signed order on this motion from which to take an appeal. As a result, this motion is before us without statutory authority.” I agree that there is no order to review on appeal; however, the senior judge of the circuit had jurisdiction to remove Judge Grosshans or to at least rule on the motion. Otherwise, why does SDCL ch. 15-12, particularly § 15-12-32 exist? It expressly authorizes the senior judge of the circuit to act:
The presiding judge of the circuit court or in his absence or disqualification as the judge sought to be changed, the senior judge of the circuit shall review the affidavit and certification, if any, and it is determined that the affidavit is timely and that the right to file the affidavit has not been waived or is not otherwise legally defective, shall assign some other circuit judge or magistrate of that circuit as is appropriate to preside in such action, by filing an order of such appointment with the clerk of the court of the county wherein said action is pending. From the filing of such order the judge or magistrate herein designated shall have full power, authority and jurisdiction to proceed in the matter.
Despite the majority writing’s authorities to the contrary, in my opinion, it would be in the best interests of justice for these parties to have a new judge preside over this case, a case that has now continued over four years and involved two separate trials and two appeals before this Court. In the first appeal, Judge Grosshans was reversed. He has now been reversed again. There has been a great deal of high emotions and conflict between this trial judge and counsel in this case. As we previously specified, the trial judge left the court room while attorney Ireland was continuing to make a record. Attorney Kappelman personally pleaded before this Court that the trial judge be removed because of the bias and prejudice of the trial judge. “He threatened to put me in jail simply because I took a [legal] position.” Attorney Kappelman is fearful of appearing before this trial judge again. Without benefit of reciting other language in our previous *868opinion concerning remarks of the trial judge, it becomes evident that the trial judge has not remained aloft from the fray. In Tesch v. Tesch, 399 N.W.2d 880 (S.D.1987), this special writer, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed a decision by this same trial judge but cautioned him concerning his obligation to remain neutral:
Finally, we shall mention the numerous gratuitous questions asked by the trial court. Such a practice should be avoided. A trial judge must not be in the arena of questioning — nay—he must preside over it that he may neutrally rule.
Tesch, 399 N.W.2d at 885.
Reference is made to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 A(4): “A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity ...” For authority, I refer to State v. Kaiser, 504 N.W.2d 96, 100 (S.D.1993). Therein, we declared, “It goes without saying that the actions and words of the trial judge have a definite impact on the jury.” I also rely on the case of Blomquist v. Clague, 290 N.W.2d 235 (N.D.1980), where the Supreme Court of North Dakota found it to be in the best interests of the integrity and fairness of the judicial process to remove a circuit court judge. It is to be remembered that this Court previously expressed that this trial judge should no longer inject his personal frustrations and biases into the proceedings. As I have said, it would be in the best interests of justice for this trial judge to remove himself from this case and I refer to the same Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E. Failing to remove himself, this Court should enter an order to remove him from the case so that the best interests of justice will be sought on an even playing field. Several attorneys in this case, representing different parties, have filed briefs requesting that this trial judge be removed. They are Officers of the Court. As such, their representations and supplications are entitled to recognition under these facts.
Remand instructions were not followed. This Court has the inherent power — and the duty — to see that the administration of justice is fair. And it also has inherent power to superintend its internal management and carry out its constitutionally-mandated duties. For is it not true that the highest court of any state, such as a Supreme Court of this state, and particularly where there is a Unified Judicial System as we constitutionally have in South Dakota, has the inherent power to see that a court within its system protect its dignity, independence and integrity so as to make its lawful actions effective, fair and just for the citizens over whom it bears a responsibility and to see that they are treated fair?
The term “inherent power of the judiciary” means that which is essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court.
In re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Ass’n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 267 (1937).
Failing to recuse himself, I vote to remove him. Thus, I would employ the inherent powers doctrine as a protective device on behalf of the populace as it is basic to the concept of any court and it is implicit in the provisions of our State Constitution which created a judicial branch. See In re Great-house, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933).