Court Opinion

ID: 9672396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:53:59.57333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.795214
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s legal analyses in every respect; however, I evaluate the evidence differently and must therefore respectfully dissent.
*386While I agree that the record is far too sketchy to conclude that $8,000 of the applicant Viola Meier’s money disappeared in the 7 months preceding the application, there is no doubt that $3,000 is unaccounted for. Inasmuch as Meier has the burden of proving her entitlement to assistance, Dobrovolny v. Dunning, 221 Neb. 67, 375 N.W.2d 123 (1985), it was incumbent upon her to explain what she had done with that money; she did not.
Because the Department of Social Services is itself a party to this proceeding, I do not place much reliance on the fact that it chose not to believe Lillian Nelson’s denial of Dr. Ronald Cooper’s statement that he told Meier and Nelson that Meier suffered from an incurable dementia. I do, however, place great credence in that statement. Cooper had no interest in the outcome and had no reason to intentionally say he did something he did not in fact do. Moreover, Meier did not call him to testify that he was or might be mistaken in that regard. One would expect that if Cooper would have so testified, he would have been called as a witness. In re Estate of Schoch, 209 Neb. 812, 311 N.W.2d 903 (1981).
If the true purpose of conveying the real estate were to avoid probate, why was it not placed in trust for the use and benefit of Meier during her life with the power of sale in the event she required funds for her care, the remainder, if any, to be distributed to her children upon her death? If there in fact were no concern for Meier’s future condition, why was it thought that a conservatorship might be needed?
Irrespective of the past history of caring for relatives, the evidence convinces me that in this instance the applicant deprived herself of assets with the intention and for the purpose of qualifying for public assistance, to thereby enrich her children at the expense of the taxpayers.
Coming to that conclusion does not mean, however, that the decision of the department was entirely correct. Neb. Admin. Code tit. 469, ch. 2, § 2-009.10 (1985) provides in part:
The worker determines the period of ineligibility based upon the period of time the countable value of the resource disposed of might reasonably be expected to meet the need of the client. The worker may consider the actual need of the client at the time of disposal in determining the *387period of ineligibility. The period of ineligibility begins with the date of the resource disposal. In determining the period of ineligibility the worker shall consider any available income.
If the countable value disposed of is $12,000 or less, the period of ineligibility may not exceed 24 months. If the countable value disposed of exceeds $12,000, the period of ineligibility may be longer than 24 months. In either case, the period of ineligibility must bear a reasonable relationship to the amount disposed of and the client’s need.
The department should therefore have determined the period of Meier’s ineligibility. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the district court and direct that the cause be remanded to the department for determination of the period of Meier’s ineligibility in accordance with this dissenting opinion. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-917(6) (Cum. Supp. 1984).