Court Opinion

ID: 9669903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:10:40.763893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:01.028185
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice
(concurring specially).
I agree with the result reached by the majority, but disagree with the majority’s analysis for the reasons stated in my special concurrence in State v. Osborne. See State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 448-52 (Minn.2006) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially) (stating that “Blakely articulated a significant new rule of law, that it is still in its infancy, and ultimately, * * * it is the United States Supreme Court that is best suited to guide the continued development of this new rule.”); see also Washington v. Recuenco, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 2551, 2553, - L.Ed.2d- (2006) (holding that failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not structural error and that the objected-to Blakely error was subject to a harmless-error analysis, citing to Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)) for the proposition that “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”).
*656Unlike the majority, I would apply the plain error doctrine to the unobjected-to Blakely error in this case and conclude that there was error, it was plain because the aggravating factors were not admitted to a degree that the concerns raised in Blakely are satisfied, that the plain error affected Dettman’s substantial rights, and that the fairness and the integrity of Dett-man’s trial was affected to the extent that he is entitled to relief. Using this analytical framework, it is not necessary to reach the question of waiver.
I would affirm the court of appeals.