Court Opinion

ID: 9742615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:16:50.433284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:34.030460
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(concurring specially).
I agree with the result reached by the majority in Division III but am unable to accept the rationale or reasoning upon which it is foundationed.
In this regard the record reveals Officer Dolan was questioned, on direct examination, regarding his giving of so-called Miranda warnings to defendant Canada and other arrestees. These are the inquiries directed to Dolan and his answers:
“Q. Did they state whether or not they understood these rights? A. Yes, they did.
“Q. Did they want to say anything at that time? A. No, they didn’t.”
I. At the outset it appears to me the majority mistakenly equates defendant’s arrest-related “silence” with “conduct”.
As here applied “silence” denotes absence of oral communication. On the other hand “conduct” relates to personal behavior or mode of physical action. Thus the two are instantly distinct and severa-ble. See Black’s Law Dictionary, “Conduct”, n. at 367, and “Silence” at 1554 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, n. 37, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); Gilbert v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-267, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1178 (1967); Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-1833, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); 2 Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, §§ 372-373 (5th ed., Herrick).
II. I also submit, in light of the fact no apparent admission or confession was voiced by the accused at time of arrest, the above noted questioning of Dolan had only one purpose, i. e., to impermissibly impress upon the jury the fact that defendant had tacitly admitted his guilt by silence when accorded an opportunity to speak. See State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Iowa 1972).
In the same vein it is to me apparent the questions put to Dolan were intended and served, in essence, to penalize defendant for exercising his time-of-arrest silence privilege. See Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra; State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891, 898-901 (Iowa 1971), (Mason, J., dissenting) ; Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1068 (10th Cir. 1973); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969); *436People v. Severance, 43 Mich.App. 394, 204 N.W.2d 357, 358-360 (1972).
Noticeably, however, defense counsel voiced no objection to the last above stated question put to Dolan. Neither was a motion timely made to strike the answer thereto or for a mistrial order. This means error was not instantly preserved for appellate review and defendant cannot now be heard to complain. See State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 1973); State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687, 690-691 (Iowa 1973); State v. Schurman, 205 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1973); State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Iowa 1973). But see Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-451, 85 S.Ct. 564, 567-569, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965); State v. Means, 211 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa, opinion filed October 17, 1973).
I therefore concur in the result.
MASON and McCORMICK, JJ., join this special concurrence.