Court Opinion

ID: 9567326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:52:17.319128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:32.713959
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the majority’s pro forma construction of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) renders its provisions meaningless. Subsection (b) excuses the contemporaneous filing requirement when “the period of limitation will expire within ten days of the date of filing and, because of such time constraints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared.” After a hearing, the trial court made undisputed factual findings that (1) plaintiffs’ lawyers obtained the medical records in this case 14 months before the statute of limitation expired; (2) plaintiffs’ expert executed his affidavit on June 9, 1994, the day before the complaint was filed; and (3) the affidavit could have been filed with the complaint had it been returned by overnight mail or facsimile or had counsel waited until June 13 to file the complaint.1 The court therefore concluded that *583plaintiffs’ alleged inability to obtain the affidavit in time to file it with the complaint was not caused by a time constraint due to the impending expiration of the statute of limitation.
Decided December 5, 1995
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1995.
Hallman & Stewart, Ronald W. Hallman, Berrien L. Sutton, C. Edwin Rozier, for appellants.
Tillman, McTier, Coleman, Talley, Newbern & Kurrie, Wade H. Coleman, Edward F. Preston, Dillard, Bower & East, Terry A. Dillard, Fendig, McLemore, Taylor, Whitworth & Durham, Philip R. Taylor, Brennan & Wasden, Wiley A. Wasden III, James V. Painter, W. Grady Pedrick, for appellees.
Although OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) mandates a 45-day extension to file the affidavit when the statutory requisites are met, I reject the premise that those requisites may be satisfied through deceit. The record clearly shows that time constraints did not prevent the affidavit from being filed with the complaint. Counsels’ statement to the contrary violates their duty as attorneys practicing in this State to employ “such means only as are consistent with truth.” OCGA § 15-19-4 (2). I decline to join the majority in condoning this unethical breach of duty by officers of the court. Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 137 (3) (199 SE2d 260) (1973).
This is simply another example of this Court’s refusal to apply OCGA § 9-11-9.1 as framed by our legislature. See Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 165 (456 SE2d 718) (1995) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Johnson join in this dissent.

 The trial court’s factual findings are undisputed. It is also undisputed that the statute of limitation did not technically expire until Monday, June 13 because Paul Worth expired on June 11, 1992 and June 11, 1994, two years from that date, fell on a Saturday. OCGA *583§§ 9-3-71; 9-11-6 (a); Sanders v. Allstate Ins. Co., 207 Ga. App. 461 (1) (428 SE2d 575) (1993).