Court Opinion

ID: 9786960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:06:39.048198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:50.612491
License: Public Domain

Luckert, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s analysis that the issue which Moody raises is one of due process, not jurisdiction. However, I would not reach the issue of whether there was a due process violation. Instead, I would conclude that Moody abandoned this issue when seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Moreover, if the issue of due process is to be analyzed, I would adopt a different analysis than used by the majority.
In her petition for review, Moody asked this court to review the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court’s sentencing of her as a fourth-time DUI offender raised a due process rather than a jurisdictional question. Consequently, the only issue fully pre*199sented for this court’s review is the question of whether the failure to allege the number of underlying convictions which would enhance the penalty deprived the court of jurisdiction. Moody’s one-sentence reference to tire question of whether the process accorded was the process which was due, with no citation to authority or expansion of the issue, is insufficient to preserve the issue for our review. An issue not adequately briefed by the appellant is deemed abandoned. State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 622, 102 P.3d 406 (2004).
Furthermore, since the majority chose to address the question, I would suggest that the more appropriate rationale for their decision, in light of the holding that there was no jurisdictional defect, would be to conclude that Moody’s plea waived any defect in the complaint. See K.S.A. 22-3208(4) (“A plea of guilty or a consent to trial upon a complaint, information, or indictment shall constitute a waiver of defense and objection based upon the institution of the prosecution or defects in the complaint . . . other than it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge a crime.”).
Additionally, I respectfully suggest that much of the majority’s analysis is irrelevant to the question before us. Moody does not raise an issue about whether her plea complied with K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 22-3210 or with constitutional due process requirements. Therefore, the issue of whether postrelease supervision is a direct consequence of a plea, the issue to which much of the majority’s analysis relates, is not raised in this case.
The more appropriate analysis would have been whether there was a defect in tire complaint against Moody because the complaint did not alert her to the possibility of postrelease supervision. For such an analysis under the United States Constitution see United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are bound by existing precedent to hold that the Almendarez-Torres[v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998),] exception to the rule announced in Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000),] and extended to the Guidelines in [United States v.] Booker, [543 U.S. 220, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),] remains good law. . . . We therefore conclude that the government need not charge *200the 'fact’ of a prior conviction in an indictment and submit it to a jury.”).
An analysis under the Kansas Constitution would also be required, raising the question of whether K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 22-3201(c) creates a due process requirement in Kansas by requiring a complaint, indictment, or information to “allege facts sufficient to constitute a crime or specific crime subcategoiy in the crime seriousness scale.” The majority does not address this question directly. Rather, the holding in this case muddies the question of how to interpret K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 22-3201(c) and seems to conflict with the holding in State v. Masterson, 261 Kan. 158, 164, 929 P.2d 127 (1996), which stated that “a defendant is entitled under due process to notice in the information or complaint of the severity level of the DUI offense being charged.” 261 Kan. at 163.
With regard to tire question of the court order for reimbursement of the State Board of Indigents’ Defense Services fee, I dissent on the same basis as I did in State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 548, 132 P.3d 934 (2006).