Court Opinion

ID: 9541703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:27:56.549803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:29.720112
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
I agree with the majority that the in-court identifications of appellant made by Bobert Crawford and Nathaniel Williams were properly allowed into evi*207deuce. 1 cannot agree, however, that Officer Brennan’s in-court identification was properly admitted1 or that its admission was harmless error.
While searching the area of the robbery, Officers Brennan and Smith drove past a small side street and *208noticed two men in the middle of the block. As the officers drove north on the street, the men darted ont of an alley. One carried a rifle and a television set; the other carried red boxes. At the sight of the patrol car, the two men went back into the alley and then reappeared without the packages. Milton Smith, appellant’s co-defendant, ran in a northerly direction and was soon apprehended by Officer Smith. The other suspect ran in front of the patrol car, across the street and into an alley. Officer Brennan pursued, but was unable to apprehend the man.
Nine months after the incident, and after indictment, Officer Brennan was interviewed by an assistant district attorney in the course of preparation for trial. To assure himself that Officer Brennan could make a competent identification, the district attorney presented Brennan with a photographic display2 from which the *209officer picked appellant’s photo. Because counsel was not present, the hearing judge suppressed this identification on the basis of Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A. 2d 738 (1970), but allowed the officer to make an in-court identification, finding an independent origin for it.
The most significant factor in determining whether an independent basis exists is the opportunity of the witness to observe the defendant at the time of the incident. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A. 2d 299 (1971); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 450 Pa. 296, 301 A. 2d 823 (1973). Officer Brennan had, at best, a fleeting glance of the suspect as he ran in front of the patrol car on a dark street. Officer Brennan’s partner had the same view of the suspect but was unable to make an identification. There are no other indicia of “independent origin” present in the instant case. Officer Brennan gave no description of the suspect: cf. Commonwealth v. Minifield, 225 Pa. Superior Ct. 149, 310 A. 2d 366 (1973); the officer had no prior contact with the appellant: cf. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 50, 311 A. 2d 709 (1973), and, ¿here was a significant lapse of time (9 months) between the incident and the photographic identification. Commonwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Superior Ct. 218, 220, 269 A. 2d 352 (1970). There is simply no objective evidence in this record to support a finding that the in-court identification had a basis independent of the photographic identification. I believe it was error for the court to allow this identification.
Nor can I conclude that the admission of this identification into evidence was harmless error. Before an error may be declared harmless, “the Commonwealth *210must now demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45, 49, 233 A. 2d 552 (1967); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 227 Pa, Superior Ct. 96, 102, 323 A. 2d 813 (1974). The fact that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction apart from the erroneously admitted evidence does not satisfy the harmless error test. Commonwealth v. Pearson, supra.
Clearly, the identification made by Williams and Crawford are sufficient to support the conviction. Crawford’s identification, however, was weakened by a previous failure to identify appellant at a preliminary hearing. Williams’ motives for incriminating appellant were challenged by defense witnesses who stated that Williams and Crawford harbored personal grudges against the appellant. There is a “reasonable possibility” that Officer Brennan’s identification served to strengthen the other witnesses’ identification, and that the corroboration supplied thereby contributed to the jury’s verdict. I would, therefore, conclude that the Commonwealth has not shown that the admission of the identification was harmless error.
The judgment of sentence should be reversed and appellant granted a new trial.

 The majority notes that the issue oí whether Commonwealth v, Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A. 2d 738, cert, den., 400 U.S. 919 (1970) is of continuing validity in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) is not before the court. (See note 2 of majority opinion.) However it should he noted that in Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167 (1974) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-affirmed the holding in Whiting that counsel is required at pre-indictment lineups despite a contrary holding by the United States Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Thus, it appears that our Supreme Court has taken a far more expansive view of the requirement of counsel at pretrial identification procedures. See especially the concurring opinions by Justices Eagen, Roberts and Pomeroy. In Whiting, the Court expressed its own conclusion that the considerations requiring counsel at corporal lineups are equally applicable to photographic identifications. 439 Pa. at 209. Although the Court cited a now overruled Third Circuit Court of Appeals holding that counsel is required at photographic identification procedures [United States v. Zeiler, 427 F. 2d 1305 (1970)], it did not rest its decision on the doctrine of Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117 (1965) that it was bound by the Third Circuit decision. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could, of course, reaffirm its view that the right to counsel applies to photographic identifications in Pennsylvania, thus affording a greater right than the United States Supreme Court lias done. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 218, n.l (1968) ; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1987). The Court could base its decision on the Pennsylvania Constitution’s provision guaranteeing the right to counsel; Pa. Const, art. I, §9; Commonwealth v. Jackson, 227 Pa. Superior Ct. 1 (1974) (concurring opinion by Spaeth, J.) ; or it could adopt a broader rule on the basis of its supervisory power. Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622 (1974) (addendum opinion). Although the ulrmate resolution of the issue is not clear, I believe that we yhouid not adopt the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Ash until oft Supreme Court chooses to declare it to be the law of the Commonwealth.

 Although the photographic display was preserved for use at the suppression hearing to allow a determination of the suggestiveness of the actual layout (which was found to be not suggestive), this procedure does not provide any “picture” of the occurrences at the actual layout. Thus, there is no method for guarding against the potential suggestive influences which exist apart from the physical layout. If counsel is provided at photographic identification procedures, and is satisfied that the layout is fair, retention of the display for trial would be unnecessary. Counsel would provide additional safeguards against suggestive influences not involved in the display itself (the manner of the layout, gestures, comments). Administratively requiring the photographs to be retained for trial may be a significant burden on police and prosecutors. Should records be lost, an in-court identification would be suppressed despite a perfectly fair out-of-court photographic identification. Requiring counsel at photographic identifications would not only provide greater safeguards against suggestive practices, but would obviate these administrative burdens. Although the issue has not been raised in the instant case, there is some question as to whether the photo layout preserved for trial is the same as that displayed to Officer Brennan. There is some confusion as to the number of photographs shown, and the number of duplicate photographs con-*209tamed in the layout. The majority does not reach the issue as to whether this satisfies the requirement of Commonwealth v. Jackson., 227 Pa. Superior Ct. 1 (1974) that the actual display be retained for trial as a matter of due process of law.