Court Opinion

ID: 9686090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:27:12.139359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:14.747886
License: Public Domain

KLAPHAKE, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Prior to construction of 1-394, appellants enjoyed ideal access to and from their property via Florida Avenue. What remains under these undisputed facts is hardly ideal. Direct access has been eliminated entirely. Motorists from the east must travel at least one-half mile farther once exiting the freeway, assuming they use the Louisiana exit. Motorists from the west must exit at Louisiana Avenue, at least one-half mile before Prestige comes into view. The next available exit for motorists missing the exit at Louisiana Avenue is at Xenia-Park Place. The trip back from the Xenia-Park Place exit to Prestige adds approximately four miles to the trip and takes motorists on a circuitous trip around a large industrial complex. The remaining access, coupled with the visual obstructions, makes appellants’ property almost invisible to passing eastbound motorists. Eastbound motorists cannot see the dealership from 1-394 until they are passing it, and are approximately one-half mile past the Louisiana Avenue exit. This leaves only the circuitous and highly inconvenient Xenia-Park Place exit as access to appellant’s property. When compared to what appellants had before the construction in terms of access and view, they have suffered a significant loss.
This court is not required to defer to the trial court’s conclusions regarding the reasonableness of remaining access. I see no difference between the change in access under these facts and the facts presented in Johnson Bros. Grocery, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 75, 76-77, 229 N.W.2d 504, 505 (1975), State v. Prow’s Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 2-3, 171 N.W.2d 83, 84-85 (1969), State v. Kohler, 268 Minn. 77, 128 N.W.2d 90 (1964), or Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964). In each of these eases, the property owner enjoyed direct access to their property from the abutting roadway, that access was significantly altered by changes to the roadway, and the supreme court concluded that the changes in access constituted a compensable taking.
Because I believe the facts here are indistinguishable from the facts in this line of eases, I would hold that a constitutional taking has occurred.