Court Opinion

ID: 9675157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:43:38.099489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:24.192573
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith,
dissenting.
The court cites the case of Robinson v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, Texas Civ. App. (1953), 261 S.W. 2d 217, wr. ref., as its principal authority supporting its holding that the Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that there was no evidence supporting the finding of the jury answer to Special Issue Number 13.1
The finding of “no evidence” as to this issue has led to the further conclusion that since Griffin unequivocally testified that he knew of one man who had worked, such testimony constitutes a judicial admission precluding a recovery under Article 8309, section 1, Subdivision 3, Vernon’s Annotated Statutes of Texas. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, and this court has affirmed such action. This phase of the case will be hereinafter discussed.
My reasons for holding with petitioner, Griffin, will now be stated:
The action of the trial court in permitting a recovery under Subdivision 3 of Article 8309, supra, is in harmony with the provisions of said Article. The evidence when considered in the light of the statutes supports an implied finding of the trial court that it was impracticable to compute the average weekly wages under Subdivisions 1 and 2 of the Article. Subdivision 3 reads as follows:
*208“When by reason of the shortness of the time of the employment of the employee, or other employees engaged in the same class of work in the manner and for the length of time specified in the above Subsections 1 and 2, or other good and sufficient reasons it is impracticable to compute the average weekly wages as above defined, it shall be computed by the Board in any manner which may seem just and fair to both parties.”
The judgment of the trial court recites that it was based upon the “findings of the jury and the stipulations of the parties entered of record in this cause and the implied findings of the Court. * * *” (Emphasis added.)
It is important to ascertain if the evidence supports an implied finding that good and sufficient reasons were shown that would render it impracticable to compute the average weekly wages under Subdivision 2, Article 8309, supra. Webster’s New International Dictionary defines the word “impracticable” as meaning: “Incapable of being used or availed of; as impracticable road; an impracticable method.”
It is true that Griffin testified that he had found one man who had worked 12 months and that he requested the man to appear and testify in the trial of this case. It is also undisputed that the testimony of this man was unavailable because of illness. Griffin testified without objection that the man was ill and under the care of a doctor. He further testified that he had made a search for others in Lamesa, Tahoka, O’Donnell, Woodrow, and other places in the area and that no other worker could be found who had worked the whole of the year next preceding the date of injury. After this proof was made, Griffin testified:
“Q. All right, now then * * * in other words, for the purpose of clarifying the record, you did not work a full 12 months yourself?
“A. No sir.
“Q. And, you cannot find another man, after making a diligent search, that did work in the same or similar type of work that you were doing at the time you were injured, is that correct?
“A. That’s right.”
*209The attorneys for petitioner in the present case were also attorneys for petitioner, Robinson, in the case of Robinson v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n., supra. In the trial of the present case, they had before them the Robinson case wherein Robinson’s application had been refused by this court. This court, in refusing the application for writ of error adopted the following portion of the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion as its own:
“Although there was no evidence concerning the average weekly wage earned by such employees, there toas no showing that such wages could not have been ascertained or why for any reason it would have been impracticable to compute plaintiffs wage rate on the basis of the wages earned by one or more of such employees.” (Emphasis added.)
That Griffin discharged his burden of establishing a reason for the absence of proof as to Subdivision 2 is undisputed. No issue was requested and no objection to the charge was made to the failure to submit such issue. In the Robinson case, supra, the trial court found that Robinson had failed to establish that it was impracticable to compute his average weekly wage under Subdivision 2 of the statute and was, therefore, not entitled to have his wage rate computed under Subdivision 3, and that the jury’s finding under Subdivision 3 should be disregarded. The specific finding of the trial court was “that the plaintiff failed to establish by legal and competent evidence that it was impracticable to compute his average weekly wage under Subsection 2 of Article 8309.” The Court of Civil Appeals stated that “this finding is the basis of the court’s judgment non obstante veredicto and in our opinion is not subject to the complaint urged by appellant.”
It is well settled that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed in favor of the injured employee. Clearly, the Legislature meant to excuse a plaintiff from malting proof under Subdivision 2 if a valid reason should be given as to why the testimony could not be produced thereby rendering it impracticable to compute the average weekly wage rate under Subdivision 2. This reasoning gives effect to all provisions of Subdivision 3, Article 8309, supra. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed unless it is necessary to return the case to the Court of Civil Appeals to decide the point that the answer to Issue No. 13 was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. I take the position that such action is not necessary. Under my view, it can be admitted that one man worked substantially the whole of the year, but still petitioner *210was entitled to have his wage rate computed under the provisions of Subdivision 3, Article 8309.
Opinion delivered June 15,1960.
Rehearing overruled October 12,1960.

. — “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there was one or more employees of the same class as plaintiff working substantially the whole of the year immediately preceding the date of plaintiff’s injury, if any, for the same or another employer, in the same or a similar employment in the same or a neighboring place?
“ANSWER: Another employee had not worked.”