Court Opinion

ID: 9853444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:48:57.314598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:48.845959
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion. However, I dissent as to Division 2 and the judgment, and I would reverse and remand with direction.
The Court of Appeals left two issues that the parties raised unaddressed. This Court decided one of the issues when it held that the trial court’s authority to act on remand is limited. I disagree with this holding. I believe that when the trial court’s judgment was vacated by the Court of Appeals and the remittitur sent down to the trial court, there was no final judgment and the trial court could entertain the *286appellant’s motion to open the default. See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). The other unaddressed issue is the appellant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to open the default.
Decided December 3, 1985 —
Reconsideration denied December 19, 1985.
Dickey, Whelchel, Brown & Readdick, Richard A. Brown, Jr., John E. Bumgartner, for appellant.
Orion L. Douglass, for appellee.
Our Constitution provides that every person has a right to be heard in court. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII. The fact is that the appellant was denied this constitutional right when an agent or employee of ap-pellee’s insurance carrier placed the complaint against the appellant in his pocket until the case went into default. This is not fair, and justice was not served. The fact that the appellant might have insurance is not a factor in this case. The appellant is the defendant, and we are in no position to determine what effect this default judgment could have upon the appellant and her property.
Fundamental fairness is a cornerstone of our judicial system and fundamental fairness dictates that this default be reopened and this appellant be given her day in court. She has been denied her constitutional right to her day in court, and she is entitled to a hearing.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case for them to address the issue of whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in failing to open the default.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Marshall and Justice Weltner join in this dissent.