Court Opinion

ID: 9672170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:50:14.467543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:14.802291
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent — not because of the rules of law pronounced in the majority *411opinion, but because of the manner in which such rules have been applied to the facts of this particular case.
From the multitude of cases pertaining to railroad crossing accidents, Mo.Dig., Railroads, Vols. 24 and 24A, it is well established:
(1) That blocking of an ordinary public road crossing by the railroad, standing alone, is not an act of negligence, and there is no duty to warn the traveling public other than the mere presence of the train.
(2) That special circumstances may exist which create additional changes that make the crossing peculiarly hazardous, and in such instances there is a resulting duty to warn the traveling public by such warnings as flagging or mechanical signals.
(3) That a peculiarly hazardous crossing may flow from special circumstances that are temporary in nature as well as from those that are fixed and permanent.
(4) That where such special circumstances are permanent, knowledge of their existence by the railroad is generally presumed; but where such special circumstances are temporary or created suddenly by the particular use being made of the crossing, it is incumbent there be proof that the railroad had knowledge, or should have had, that a peculiarly hazardous crossing existed at that moment.
(5) That after it is determined that a crossing is peculiarly hazardous, whether permanent or temporary, there remains only one question — did the railroad use ordinary care to provide a sufficient warning to the traveling public?
In determining whether the crossing was or was not peculiarly hazardous on the night of this accident, the majority opinion, as it states, limited its consideration to only one fact, i. e., “whether the severe angle at which the railroad track intersected the highway rendered the crossing peculiarly hazardous.” In fairness to the evidence, as reflected in the record, the following significant facts should have been considered:
(a) The severe angle at which the tracks crossed the highway required the train to travel 96 feet to cross the 22 foot roadway. At this angle, the rear of the train was practically traveling along plaintiff’s lane of travel as any truck or motor vehicle might. This fact denies the logic of the contention that “mere presence of the train,” standing alone, was a sufficient warning, as that reasoning is only justified where one had a view of what, in fact, looked like a train.
(b) There were no lights on the rear of the train.
(c) It was an unscheduled train.
(d) The speed of the train was only 4 or 5 miles per hour; a fact made important, only because of the extreme angle of the crossing and the absence of lights.
(e) The appreciation by the train crew that the prior wreck, uncoupling and coupling the train, had created, at least temporarily, a peculiarly hazardous crossing calling for additional warnings. This fact is brushed aside in the majority opinion by virtue of there being no evidence plaintiff had relied on this additional warning. With this statement there can be no argument, however, that same evidence was available on the vital and controlling issue in the case as to whether or not a peculiarly hazardous crossing existed. The experienced employees of the railroad undoubtedly thought it did.
*412(f) The crew had stopped cars approaching from the east. It would not he unreasonable to charge it with knowing that as soon as this lane of travel was clear, such cars would proceed west and temporarily blind plaintiff from seeing the unlighted rear of the train as it slowly traveled along plaintiffs lane of travel.
(g) The usual cross-buck signs were missing.
(h) One flagman had been on the west side (the side from which plaintiff approached) and one was flagging on the east side. At a time prior to departure, the flagman on the west went to the east side, regardless of the fact the crew saw cars approaching from the west and which a jury could reasonably find included plaintiff’s car. Even though the abandonment of this assumed task might not be relevant to the original question as to the proper classification of the crossing, it is highly significant on whether or not the warning as given met the demands of due care.
Obviously, the evidence could sustain a finding defendant knew of the existing conditions and that its abortive effort to warn was indicative of a failure to use ordinary care under the existing circumstances. On the contested issue, reasonable minds could differ as to whether this crossing, perhaps ordinarily not extra dangerous or peculiarly hazardous, was made so by defendant’s use of it under the conditions there existing. Clearly a jury issue was created and it has been resolved by its verdict for plaintiff.
This dissent has not been extended by quotations or citations of authority as each summarized version of the existing law on the subject is consistent with the precedents cited in the majority opinion.
I would hold that plaintiff made a sub-missible case on the issue of defendant’s negligence.