Court Opinion

ID: 9714014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:28:44.823213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.687625
License: Public Domain

BAILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the affirmation of a "judgment" based on a "stipulation" that does not exist in the record. Indiana Trial Rule 16(c)(8) provides that the parties may narrow the issues for trial by a stipulation in writing referencing all facts and issues not in genuine dispute. Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Ed.1988) defines "stipulate" as "arrange or settle definitely, as an agreement or covenant." Here, the parties were unable to settle any issue definitely prior to the October 22, 2003 proceedings.
In my view, nothing more than a settlement conference transpired on October 22, 2003, when the trial court heard argument of counsel as to what the parties would or would not be willing to stipulate to. When *905the negotiations went awry, the trial court entertained additional argument of counsel, accompanied by several unverified doe-uments.
From the argument of counsel, it appears that Father informally agreed to pay all M.B's uninsured medical expenses and college expenses, after financial aid, conditioned upon his not paying weekly child support. Father apparently ceased paying child support as of June 6, 2003, and advised Mother that he was "setting aside" that $150.00 per week toward M.B.'s college expenses. (Resp. Ex.4.) Mother, who apparently agreed that Father should pay all M.B.'s educational and medical expenses, did not also agree that Father should be relieved of his basic child support obligation and filed her petitions for modification and contempt.
At the hearing, Mother's counsel advised the trial court that the parties had certain stipulations to present to the court, but also had certain conflicts, and would address the remaining issues in a summary fashion. Mother's counsel entreated the trial court to consider Father's offer to pay 100% of the uninsured medical and college expenses binding, rather than contingent on Mother's agreement to waive Father's basic child support payments. Mother requested that the court determine Father's current income, child support arrearage, and future child support obligation. Father's counsel claimed that Father offered to pay an amount that would exceed the Guideline amount computed by adding together his income-based proportionate share of college and medical expenses and partial child support, taking into account M.B.'s residency on campus. Too, Father argued that if he paid basic child support as well as all medical and educational expenses, Mother would be contributing nothing toward the support of M.B. As argument developed, it became clear that the parties had reached no stipulation to be presented to the trial court. The trial court observed as much at the conclusion of the hearing:
I guess the thing that I'm toying with right now or troubling me a bit is that I'm not sure that [sic] dad's position- and I'm not sure it's unreasonable as I sit here hearing it for the first time-but I'm not sure it's something the court could impose on a parent, that kind of a deviation from the guidelines. But- and whether it's more or less than the obligation would be, you know, I guess I'm troubled and I've had this issue come up before. (Judge, we've got stipulations," and tell me what they are, and then as we get into it, they're really not stipulations at all, they're a framework for a good stipulation. But if you say, well, we're going to pay all the expenses, and there's no agreement as to what all the expenses are, then that's not really a stipulation.
(Tr. 34-35.) Despite the absence of stipulations, no sworn testimony was presented. The assertions of counsel constituted mere argument, not evidence. See generally Kuester v. Inman, 758 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (differentiating between evidence and argument of counsel).
Moreover, the exhibits pertaining to parental income and expenses-unaccompanied by stipulations of admissibility-were unsworn and unverified. Although the parties submitted several alternative child support obligation worksheets, neither parent signed any worksheet. Since 1989, the Indiana Child Support Guidelines have required, in all cases in which the court is requested to order support, that both parents complete and sign a child support worksheet to be filed with the court verifying the parents' incomes under penalty of perjury. (Glover v. Torrence, 723 N.E.2d 924, 941 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
*906In some circumstances, summary proceedings may be appropriate. For example, a separate panel of this Court affirmed a marital property division judgment entered after "the trial court swore the parties and [held] summary proceedings in which counsel summarized their client's testimony and the clients verified that the statements made by their respective attorneys were accurate." Trout v. Trout, 638 N.E.2d 1306, 1307 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Here, in contrast to the cireumstances of Trout, no witnesses were sworn and the trial court did not advise the parties at the outset of the hearing that evidence would be taken in a summary manner. Rather, counsel advised the trial court that the parties were prepared to present their joint stipulation on child support. This initial representation proved to be untrue. The end result of failed in-court negotiations and haphazard proffers of unverified exhibits is that the trial court's calculation of parental income and child support ar-rearage, and its modification of the existing child support order to include all educational expenses but exclude all regular child support are wholly without evidentia-ry support.
When it became apparent to the trial court that the parties had not, in fact, reached a stipulation as to the terms of a modified child support order, the trial court could have heard the testimony of witnesses under oath, pursuant to Indiana Evid. Rule 608. Alternatively, the trial court could have considered child support worksheets signed under penalty of perjury. It did not do so. Consequently, there is a total absence of sworn testimony or verified exhibits to support a judgment and the hearing was in essence a settlement conference. Thus, in my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering modification of support. Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion and I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.