Court Opinion

ID: 9739903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:23:18.718053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.617101
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that because Axsom did not exercise diligence in seeking his remedy, as a matter of law he could not return Griffin to the status quo. Such reasoning is not available to us as a basis for reversal. Whether the delay by Axsom in indicating his disaffirmance of the contract is termed “waiver” or “laches” is of no moment. Both theories constitute affirmative defenses which must be pleaded pursuant to Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 8(C). Griffin did not present either of such defenses in his answer or in any other manner prior to trial. The defense or defenses were, therefore, waived by Griffin. Highland v. Williams (1975) 1st Dist., 166 Ind.App. 492, 336 N.E.2d 846.
It may well be that as a factual matter, the delay prevented Griffin from being returned to the status quo or it may be that as a factual matter Griffin was not restored to the status quo by the trial court’s judgment. That, however, is not the basis of the majority opinion. In any event the trial court in granting rescission assessed the evidence and concluded reasonably, as it was entitled to do under that evidence, that such remedy was appropriate under applicable law. I am not persuaded that we are at liberty to overturn that determination.