Court Opinion

ID: 9665001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:36:00.98139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:12.021160
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. We cannot conclude as a matter of law that the trial court’s interpretation of its order was erroneous. The order covered motions filed by Mouttet on August 24, 1984, and thus on file when the order was issued, as well as those motions that were filed after the order. Since Mouttet had motions pending, he was required to appear at the hearing scheduled November 22, 1982.
The order specified (1) .. that all pretrial motions in this case shall be filed on or before the 15th day of November, 1982, ...” and (2) “... that any pretrial motions filed will be heard on the 22nd day of November, 1982_” (Emphasis added.) The language clearly states that any pretrial motions filed by November 15, 1982, would be heard on November 22, 1982. Mouttet was present at his August 24, 1982, hearing. He therefore knew that pre-trial motions were filed that day on his behalf. Further, these motions remained outstanding and undecided through the deadline date of November 15, 1982. Thus, Mouttet was required to appear at the November 22, 1982, hearing pursuant to the court’s order. A contrary interpretation would mean that the court intended either to ignore the pretrial motions filed on August 24, 1982, or alternatively, to schedule a separate pretrial hearing in regard to the August 24, 1982, motions. The record reveals nothing to indicate such an intention. Mouttet was playing games with the court. Consequently, the trial court’s decision should be affirmed because the order clearly compelled Mouttet’s appearance at the November 22, 1982, hearing.
Mouttet also contends that he was entitled to instructions on his “mistake of fact” defense and that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed instructions numbered 6 and 12 which embodied that defense. In response, the State argues that, in view of the strict liability aspect of SDCL 23A-43-31, the trial court properly refused the offered mistake of fact instructions. The majority opinion appears to avoid this issue.
In State v. Vogel, 315 N.W.2d 324 (S.D.1982), we held that Failure to Appear is a strict liability crime. The appellant’s state of mind is irrelevant.
This Court has previously upheld the Legislature’s prerogative to create strict liability crimes. State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911 (S.D.1979) (securities laws); State v. Martin, 85 S.D. 587, 187 N.W.2d 576 (1971) (securities laws); State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 160 N.W.2d 418 (1968) (statutory rape). The common thread that runs through these decisions is that the strict liability aspect to the crimes involved were enacted in accord with, and designed to maintain, the welfare of the public. We are convinced that the strict liability aspect of SDCL 23A-43-31 was enacted by the Legislature to insure that our judicial tribunals are capable of functioning in an orderly manner, that is, to promote public welfare by allowing for the effective and timely administration of justice. A toleration of missed court appearances would bring chaos to the courts. We note that the State of New York has upheld its strict liability bail-jumping laws. See People v. DeRigo, *12566 A.D.2d. 919, 410 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (1978).
Vogel, at 326 (emphasis added). It follows the court did not err in refusing Mouttet’s proposed instructions 6 and 12.
I am hereby authorized to' state that Justice Morgan joins in this dissent.