Court Opinion

ID: 9528589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:42:13.625538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:03.867168
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there is clear and convincing evidence that mother’s present unfitness is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. That conclusion is based largely on evidence of circumstances that existed more than one year before trial and ignores more recent evidence of mother’s progress toward becoming an adequate parent. Although I do not suggest that daughter should be returned immediately to mother’s custody, mother is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show that her progress will continue and become permanent. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Pennington, 104 Or App 194, 201, 799 P2d 694 (1990), rev den 311 Or 166 (1991); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Wyatt, 34 Or App 793, 798, 579 P2d 889, rev den 283 Or 503 (1978).
The majority places great weight on the testimony of the state’s witness, Dr. Sweet, and disparages the conclusions of mother’s witness, Dr. Dragovich. However, my review of the evidence does not show that Sweet is in any better position to predict mother’s future behavior than is Dragovich. In fact, Sweet had substantially less opportunity than Dragovich to view and comment on mother’s current circumstances. Sweet’s testimony was based on a single meeting with mother, nearly two years before trial. Although he *434testified at trial that mother suffers from a dependent personality disorder, a diagnosable mental illness, that diagnosis was not included in his initial report of July 27,1988, in which he stated that the personality inventory test (MMPI) showed “no significant mood, thought or personality disorder” and that other tests showed mother had low self-esteem, was frustrated and indecisive, and was experiencing a great deal of depression.
Dragovich met with mother twice, on January 25, 1990, and February 1, 1990, approximately 18 months after Sweet’s examination and just a few months before trial. Like Sweet, Dragovich reported that her tests showed “no signs of personality disorder, thought disorder or significant psychopathology.” She disagreed with his opinion that mother was very dependent and lacked the skills to change her situation. She also disagreed with Sweet’s testimony that mother has dependent personality disorder and testified that she saw “something nearly opposite to that configuration:” Dragovich thought that mother could benefit from “modeling, direct instruction, and repetitious learning — she clearly has done just that from her continued Al-Anon participation. ’ ’ On cross-examination, Sweet acknowledged that it was possible for mother to improve through more practical, hands-on types of counseling.
The majority discounts Dragovich’s conclusions, because she was not aware of every incident related to mother’s past associations with sex offenders and alcoholics; however, she was generally well-informed about the situation and knew that mother’s ability to avoid inappropriate relationships was the primary concern, in this case. The majority’s statement that Dragovich “agreed that mother is likely to continue to engage in inappropriate relationships” is incomplete. 108 Or App at 432. Dragovich only agreed with that conclusion “to some extent” and only “if things stay as they are.”
The majority virtually ignores the deposition testimony of the CSD parent trainer, who testified that mother has attended weekly parenting classes regularly for the past two years, continuing to attend even after CSD officially withdrew its services in September, 1989. The parent trainer explained that mother lacked the specific skill of “how to *435protect” herself and her child and did not know how to set boundaries with inappropriate people. Although she believed that mother was not yet able to protect daughter adequately, she had seen “some improvement” and testified that mother would eventually gain the skill. She also testified that, if she could work with mother and daughter together, the process would be much faster than working with mother alone.
The testimony of both psychologists and the parent trainer suggests that, with appropriate counseling and training, mother’s ability to protect daughter will improve. Although the state argues that the type of services that might help mother are not available and that it can do nothing more to help her, the evidence shows that parent training has provided some of the hands-on help that mother requires and that the effectiveness of the training would be enhanced if the' trainer worked with mother and daughter together. The evidence also shows that mother has been able to receive some help from her diligent participation in Al-Anon and an off-shoot of Al-Anon called Women Who Love Too Much.
The majority states that, at the time of trial, mother had not changed her lifestyle and implies that mother continues to associate with sex offenders and alcoholics. There is no evidence that mother associated with sex offenders after the spring of 1989, and no reliable evidence that she associated with alcoholics after February, 1990. The majority states that mother’s employer’s son is a convicted sex offender but does not mention that he lives out of state and is estranged from mother’s employer. There is no evidence that mother associated with him. The majority also states that mother visits in the home of a witness who employs an individual suspected of sexually abusing her daughter, but there is no evidence that mother associates with that individual. Reports received by the CSD caseworker that mother still associates with an alcoholic are unconvincing. The sources are identified only as “concerned citizens” and do not indicate when the alleged associations had occurred. The individual who testified while under the influence of alcohol, identified by the majority as “one of mother’s friends,” 108 Or App at 433, had not associated with mother since September, 1989.
On de novo review, I would conclude that the state has failed to meet its burden of proof. The evidence is not *436clear and convincing that mother cannot change or lacks motivation to change. Mother has cooperated with CSD and has made substantial efforts to change during the past two years. She did not cease her efforts when CSD withdrew its services, but continued with parent training and actively sought other sources of help, including Al-Anon and Women Who Love Too Much. The evidence is not clear and convincing that she will not be able to protect daughter adequately from harm in the foreseeable future. Rather, the evidence suggests that, with adequate resources and appropriate training, mother’s progress may continue and become permanent. Mother maintains a close and loving relationship with daughter, and I would not end that relationship on the basis of the less than clear and convincing evidence presented.1
I would reverse the termination of parental rights and the permanent commitment of the daughter to the custody of CSD.

 The record shows that mother visits daughter on a regular basis and that they have a close and loving mother-daughter relationship. Daughter expresses concern and love for mother and enjoys her visits. The record of the supervised visits shows that mother’s behavior was appropriate and caring.