Court Opinion

ID: 9648372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:16:34.972944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:59.420630
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge McGINLEY.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that “employer’s contest was reasonable and the Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s denial of an award of attorney’s fees.” (footnote omitted). Opinion at 165.
In the present controversy, the record reveals that Employer committed two violations of the Act. First, Employer issued its first payment to Claimant approximately one week beyond the twenty-one day period following Claimant’s injury. Section 406.1(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 717.1(a), provides that “[t]he first installment of compensation shall be paid not later than the twenty-first day after the employer has notice or knowledge of the employe’s disability.” Second, after the second monthly payment, Employer sent compensation payments every two weeks, which differed from Claimant’s weekly pay schedule. Pursuant to Section 308 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 601, “all compensation payable under this article shall be payable in periodic installments, as the wages of the employe were payable before the injury.” Claimant only challenges the WCJ’s determination that the “contest of the matter *166was reasonable.”1
Section 440(a) of the Act, ' 77 P.S. § 996(a) provides:
In any contested case where the insurer has contested liability in whole or in part, including contested cases involving petitions to terminate, reinstate, increase, reduce or otherwise modify compensation awards, agreements or other payment arrangements or to set aside final receipts, the employe ... in whose favor the matter at issue has been finally determined in whole or in part shall be awarded, in addition to the award for compensation, a reasonable sum for costs incurred for attorney’s fees, ... Provided, That cost for attorney fees may be excluded when a reasonable basis for the contest has been established by the employer or the insurer, (emphasis added).
The employer shoulders the burden of proving reasonable contest. Ricks v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Parkway Corporation), 704 A.2d 716 (Pa. Cmwlth.1997). The existence of a reasonable contest is a question of law reviewable by this Court. Pruitt v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Lighthouse Rehabilitation), 730 A.2d 1025 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999). Finally, case law establishes that an employer’s violation of the Act give rise to an unreasonable contest as a matter of law. Varkey v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Cardone Industries & Fireman Fund), 827 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Cmwlth.2003).
In Varkey,2 this Court addressed the issue of unreasonable contest counsel fees:
The WCAB reversed the legal fee award. Although the WCAB agreed that some penalty was appropriate for Employer’s [Cardone’s] delay in payment of Paragraph 10(g) benefits, the WCAB was not satisfied that WCJ Liebau properly concluded that Employer unreasonably contested the penalty petition .... However, the situation in this case can be compared to other eases involving a violation of the Act, wherein we held that the employer’s contest was not reasonable and an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate. See e.g., Hoover [v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (ABF Freight Systems), 820 A.2d 843] (Pa. Cmwlth.2003)[3] (holding that where an employer violated the Act by failing to timely re-commence payment of the *167claimant’s compensation benefits, the employer’s contest was unreasonable and warranted an award of attorney’s fees); Department of Public Welfare v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Overton), 783 A.2d 358 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001) (holding that an employer’s refusal to abide by a stipulation approved by the WCJ constituted a violation of the Act that precluded a finding of a reasonable contest, thereby rendering an award of penalties proper); Body Shop v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Schanz), 720 A.2d 795 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1998) (holding that where an employer violated the Act by refusing to pay the claimant’s medical expense related to his work injury, there could be no reasonable contest and the award of counsel fees was proper).
Here, WCJ Liebau determined, and the WCAB agreed, that Employer [Car-done] had violated the Act by delaying payment of Paragraph 10(g) benefits [partial disability benefits] and failing to make quarterly reviews. In addition, we now have determined that Employer [Cardone] also violated the Act by failing to commence payment of Paragraph 10(a)-(f) benefits [past due compensation] in a timely manner. Such violations render Employer’s [Cardone’s] contest in this matter unreasonable, making the award of attorney’s fees proper. Hoover; Department of Public Welfare; Body Shop. Accordingly, we reverse the WCAB to the extent that it denied WCJ Liebau’s award of such fees to Claimant [Varkey]. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1276.
Here, as in Varkey, Employer’s untimely payment of benefits triggered violations of the Act which rendered Employer’s contest unreasonable, and Claimant is entitled to counsel fees. I believe the WCJ erred when he deemed Employer’s contest reasonable. As a result, I would reverse and remand to the Board to remand to the WCJ for a determination of unreasonable contest counsel fees.
Judge SMITH-RIBNER and Judge FRIEDMAN join in this dissent.

. Here, the WCJ ordered a penalty of twenty percent, not Claimant’s requested fifty percent. However, Claimant did not challenge the imposition of penalties. Pursuant to Section 435(d)(i) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 991 (d)(i):
(d)(i) Employers and insurers may be penalized a sum not exceeding ten per centum of the amount awarded and interest accrued and payable: Provided, however, That such penalty may be increased to fifty per centum in cases of unreasonable or excessive delays.

. In Varkey, the attorney for Cardone Industries’ (Cardone) stipulated that partial disability benefits had not been paid to Geer-arughese Varkey (Varkey) and that Varkey’s earnings were not reviewed in a timely manner. The WCJ determined that Cardone violated the Act and concluded that Cardone’s contest of the penalty petition was unreasonable. The WCJ order Cardone to pay counsel fees. The Board reversed the award and this Court reversed the Board on appeal.

.Hoover has been overruled (on other grounds). In Snizaski v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Rox Coal Co.), 847 A.2d 139 (Pa.Cmwlth.), allocatur granted, 580 Pa. 549, 862 A.2d 582 (2004), this Court, in an en banc panel, noted that ”[b]ecause the Board's own regulations provided that Employer’s obligation to pay was in effect, stayed, it was an abuse of discretion for the WCJ to award penalties for the period during which the su-persedeas was being processed.” Id. at 143. The issue of the counsel fee was not addressed by this Court in Snizaski because the reversal of the penalty award in Hoover validated the reasonableness of the contest.