Court Opinion

ID: 9519190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:11:05.613579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:53.857417
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
Today's opinion holds that so long as the attending physician, in the exercise of his or *112her "clinical judgment," finds that an abortion is indicated by any non-temporary health condition more severe than the "lesser and regular conditions normally associated with pregnancy," the physician may dispense with the informed consent provisions of the Indiana abortion control act and "perform the abortion without delay." A Woman's Choice v. Newman, op. at 109 (Ind.1996). And this applies to all bodily functions-mechanical, chemical, emotional or psychological. Id. at 111. As such, the majority answers the federal district court's first and third questions in the affirmative.
My reading of the statute and the legislative history leads me to a more restrictive interpretation of the statute. The plain language of the "medical emergency" definition allows for abortions only when a pregnant woman's medical condition is so complicated that either () "immediate termination of her pregnancy" is necessitated to "avert her death" or (i) delay in termination of her pregnancy "would create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function." Ind.Code § 16-18-2-223.5 (1995 Supp.). It is true that the determination is to be made according to "the attending physician's good faith clinical judgment." Id. But the grammatical construction of this provision simply will not lend itself to including within the definition of "medical emergency" such serious threats to the health of a pregnant woman as (1) substantial but reversible impairments of major bodily functions and (H) irreversible impairments of minor bodily functions. For this reason, I would answer the first question in the negative.
I think the legislative history shows that the legislature intended this very restrictive abortion control system. I agree that "we do not impute the opinions of one legislator, even the bill's sponsor, to the entire legislature unless those views find statutory expression," Op. at 110, quoting O'Laughlin v. Barton, 582 N.E.2d 817, 821 (Ind.1992). But here Representative Young's views did find statutory expression: his remarks quoted in the majority opinion today were made during consideration of an amendment proposed by him, an amendment which was adopted and became law. The bill had been amended in committee in a way that, according to Representative Young, "open[ed] it up to every abortion you can think of whether it's an emergency or not." Representative Young told the House that the committee language was the "[clomplete opposite" of what the supporters of the bill favored because "instead of talking about preventing [a woman's] death, this language will talk about her physical health instead of her imminent death because of not having an abortion." Representative Young asked his colleagues to adopt his amendment to restore the bill to its original purpose, creating an exception from the informed consent requirements only "if the woman's life is in danger."1 The House adopted the Young amendment and it became law, thereby giving Representative Young's views "Statutory expression."
I agree that the district court's second question should be answered in the negative.
As to the third question, I agree that, under Indiana law, emotional or psychological harms are impairments of bodily functions. Wayne Twp. Bd. of Sch. Comm. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (Ind.*113Ct.App.1995), transfer denied (holding emotional damage to be "bodily injury" under liability insurance policy). However, under the abortion control act, a woman threatened with severe psychological harm which is either temporary or otherwise reversible is still required to comply with the informed consent requirements. For this reason, I would also answer the third question in the negative.

. - In seeking approval for his amendment, Representative Young told the House:
My [amendment] deletes some language that was added in the committee.... The reason we need to change this back quite frankly is this opens it up to every abortion you can think of whether it's an emergency or not. Complete opposite of the supporters of this bill is what they do not want here. Quite frankly, an opinion we have from the language instead of talking about preventing her death, this language will talk about her physical health instead of her imminent death because of not having an abortion.
Also, by having the word "health" at the end of those two sentences instead of the words that I propose, impairment of major bodily function, those words could mean anything that affects a woman's well being from including physical, sociological or family problems. So, if she has a disagreement with her husband it now becomes an emergency and they can perform an abortion without an informed consent or the items that go along with it, that's the danger of those words. If you believe in this bill, we need to take those words out and go back to the purpose of this bill, especially for a medical emergency, if the woman's life is in danger which we all can agree with. I would ask your support of this amendment.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38, Apr. 10, 1995 House Floor Debate on S.B. 311 on Second Reading (First Time), pp. 1-2.