Court Opinion

ID: 9496981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:40:29.834557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:55.654575
License: Public Domain

*1297DYK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority but not the route by which it gets there. In my view, the language of the statute is ambiguous as to which two-year period is being referenced. It can be read as referring to either (1) any two-year period, as the majority holds, or (2) the two-year period immediately prior to death. The existence of ambiguity inherent in the language of the statute is evidenced by the fact that two of our earlier decisions in dictum read the language as meaning the two years immediately prior to death. See Richard v. West, 161 F.3d 719, 722 (Fed.Cir.1998); Haines v. West, 154 F.3d 1298, 1300 (Fed.Cir.1998).
Nonetheless, as the majority notes, the statutory language was changed in 1957 to delete a reference to “prior to death.” Ante at 1296. We assume that such changes have substantive significance. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93, 122 S.Ct. 528, 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001). In light of this history, I agree with the majority’s construction — that the two years referred to in the statute means any two-year period.