Court Opinion

ID: 9529548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:51:56.269571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:50.548957
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge.
The State of Indiana, Indiana Department of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Division (Revenue Department) appeals from a judgment allowing Margaret Ellen DePoy (Mrs. DePoy) preferential status as a “Class A transferee” for inheritance tax purposes.
The facts are undisputed. Mrs. DePoy’s stepmother, Ora E. Carlile, died testate on October 13, 1976. Mrs. DePoy was named as a residuary legatee under the will. Mrs. DePoy claims that she is entitled to tax treatment as a Class A transferee since the decedent was in loco parentis with Mrs. DePoy. The decedent was the second wife of Andrew Dilts, Mrs. DePoy’s father. Mrs. DePoy was seven years old at the time of the second marriage and lived with her father and the decedent until she married thirteen years later.
The trial court recognized the in loco parentis relationship between the decedent and Mrs. DePoy and granted the Class A transferee status pursuant to I.C. 6-4.1-1-3 (Burns Code Ed.1976). The statute reads as follows:
“(a) ‘Class A transferee’ means a transferee who is a surviving spouse, lineal ancestor, or lineal descendant of the transferor.
(b) ‘Class B transferee’ means a transferee who is a:
(1) brother or sister of the transferor;
(2) descendant of a brother or sister of the transferor; or
*1009(3) spouse, widow, or widower of a child of the transferor.
(c) ‘Class C transferee’ means a transferee who is neither a Class A nor a Class B transferee.
(d) For purposes of this section, a legally adopted child is to be treated as if he were the natural child of his adopting parent. For purposes of this section, if a relationship of loco parentis has existed for at least ten (10) years and if the relationship began before the child’s fifteenth birthday, the child is to be considered the natural child of the loco par-entis parent.”
The Revenue Department does not challenge the trial court’s determination that the in loco parentis relationship existed. Rather, its sole contention is that Mrs. De-Poy is estopped from claiming Class Á transferee status since she previously claimed that status when her natura) moth- ■ er, Arvilla E. Eikelburner, died in 1972.
The Revenue Department argues that the trial court’s decision places Mrs. DePoy in a position superior to that of a natural or adopted child, both of whom are limited to inheritance as a Class A transferee from only one mother. It seeks to support this argument by citing Kerlin v. Kenny (1958) 129 Ind.App. 199, 153 N.E.2d 607, affirmed on transfer 155 N.E.2d 389, which held that for purposes of intestate succession, children adopted during minority could not inherit from either their natural parents or their natural grandparents. The Kerlin case is inapplicable to the instant case. Here, Mrs. DePoy was named as a legatee in the decedent’s will.
The Revenue Department inferentially contends that the language of I.C. 6-4.1-1-3(d) prohibits an adopted child from claiming Class A transferee status if the natural parent leaves a bequest.1 Accordingly, the Revenue Department argues, Mrs. DePoy has been placed in an unequal and úntena-ble inheritance tax exemption position as compared to natural and adopted children who, for purposes of inheritance, will have only one mother and one father. However, in the eyes of the law, adoption involves the complete severance of the relationship between the child and the natural parents. Mrs. DePoy’s natural mother did not sever the ties in this manner. Instead, Mrs. De-Poy had the good fortune to establish familial ties with her stepmother in addition to maintaining a relationship with her natural mother. .
The Revenue Department cites Hart v. Neeld (1956) 21 N.J. 479, 122 A.2d 611, as applicable to the instant case. In Hart, the appellant was the principal beneficiary of her aunt’s estate and sought to claim an inheritance tax exemption by virtue of a “mutually acknowledged parent-child relationship” between them, after having previously received an exemption based upon a parent-child relationship with her natural mother at her mother’s death. The New Jersey Court stated:.
“Indeed, appellant has already had one exemption from inheritance taxes, based upon a parent-child relationship, in her mother’s estate. It would seem quite obvious that one mother per child exhausts the exemptions provided for by statute, and it is difficult to conceive a legislative intention to surpass nature itself by endowing a child with more than one maternal parent.” 122 A.2d at 615.
This statement may be seen as mere sur-plusage since the court had earlier in its opinion upheld a finding of fact that no “mutually acknowledged” relationship of parent and child existed between the appellant and her aunt. In the instant case, we are faced with an unchallenged determination that the decedent stood in loco parentis to Mrs. DePoy. However, insofar as the New Jersey case can be cited in support of disallowing double exemptions, we decline to follow it as precedent.
We find the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Nebraska to be more persuasive. In In re Dowell’s Estate (1948) 149 Neb. *1010599, 31 N.W.2d 745, the court was presented with a situation similar to that in Hart v. Neeld, supra. The taxing authority argued that the legatee who had received an exemption in her natural mother’s estate was not entitled to claim an exemption in the estate of the aunt who had stood in loco parentis to her. The court responded:
“The appellant argues that an exemption from each of the two parents is all that was intended. No such meaning can be obtained from a reading of the act. If such a limitation is in the public interest, it is a matter for the legislature and not the courts.” 31 N.W.2d at 747.
Similarly,- in the instant case, no legislative intent to deny Mrs. DePoy Class A transferee status can be obtained from a reading of I.C. 6-4.1-1-3. There is no ambiguity in this tax exemption provision to be strictly construed against the party claiming the exemption. Words and phrases in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning. Pryor v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 408, 296 N.E.2d 125; State v. Turner (1979) Ind.App., 386 N.E.2d 208. In addition, it is a general principle that the Inheritance Tax Act is to be interpreted and construed in favor of the taxpayer. In re Estate of Cassner (2d Dist. 1975) 163 Ind.App. 588, 325 N.E.2d 487; State v. Weinstein’s Estate (1967) 141 Ind.App. 399, 229 N.E.2d 741. While it may seem capricious that Mrs. DePoy is being allowed two exemptions, the facts and circumstances of her relationship with the decedent fall within the plain meaning of the statute. We are unable to discern any legislative intent to proscribe Mrs. DePoy’s claims. If the Legislature deems it to be the policy of this State to limit an individual to one Class A exemption status for a parent of each gender, it may certainly do so by an amendatory statute.
Judgment affirmed.
SHIELDS, J., concurs.
BUCHANAN, C. J., dissents with separate opinion.

. “For purposes of this section, a legally adopted child is to be treated as<nif he were the natural child of his adopting parent.”