Court Opinion

ID: 9394364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-14 08:12:27.314132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:59.199884
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Rendered, March 9, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Judgment
Withdrawn, and Memorandum Opinion filed May 8, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-21-00322-CV

                    THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant
                                       V.

             JAMES CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 151st District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 2019-19256

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In two issues, appellant, City of Houston, challenges the trial court’s
interlocutory order which denied both its motion for summary judgment and its
plea to the jurisdiction. We dismiss its challenge to the summary-judgment denial
for lack of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise reverse and dismiss the case for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.     We withdraw our previously issued
memorandum opinion and replace it with this opinion.
                    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The City of Houston’s Bush Intercontinental Airport needed extensive
repairs of some of the taxiways. In 2016, the City of Houston (“Houston” or “the
City”) signed three Contracts (the “Contracts”) with James Construction Group,
LLC (“JCG”) to perform the work for a total of $64,445,036.30.

     Project         PN460C               PN797                 PN675
     Contract #      4600014415           4600014362            4600014266
     Project         Airfield Pavement    Taxiway RA            Reconstruction
     Description     Repairs              Emergency             of
                                          Pavement Repairs      Taxiway NA
     Contract        $7,651,135.88        $776,013.00           $56,017,887.42
     Price

      The projects suffered a variety of setbacks. According to JCG, while some
of the project-altering events such as Hurricane Harvey were unanticipated, others
were directly attributable to the City’s gross mismanagement. From JCG’s
perspective, the City’s acceleration determinations, the City’s misapplication of the
inspection criteria for cement-treated base, and the City’s replacement of its project
management team all hindered the project.

      From the City’s perspective, after the project was underway it became
evident that JCG’s workers did not have experience paving airport taxiways.
According to the City, JCG used inadequate and, in some cases, the wrong paving
materials, mixed the materials improperly, failed to abide by proper curing times
and procedures for the materials, and began to skip contractually mandated quality
control measures.

      In light of the delays, key provisions found in the General Conditions of
their contracts were set in motion, including provisions describing procedures for
JCG to submit potential change orders, for the City to terminate the contract for

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convenience, and for JCG to make a claim following the City’s termination notice.
One unique feature in the General Conditions, bearing significant implications to
the aforementioned procedures, was that despite the City Engineer’s role as an
authorized representative of the City, the parties agreed the City Engineer would
also serve a central role in making final decisions with respect to many of these
procedures.1

                   The potential change order and early termination

       On March 9, 2018, JCG submitted potential change order 003 (“PCO 003”).
PCO 003 was related to the City’s misapplication of the criteria for cement treated
base, creation of gross productivity losses, and improper imposition of acceleration
costs. JCG requested a contractual adjustment of $2,207,512 for PCO 003, which
reflected the amount owed as compensation for the increased cost to perform the
work as a direct result of City-caused delays or acceleration.

       Subsequently, the City Engineer formally notified JCG that the City was
terminating the Contracts solely for the City’s convenience under article 14.2 of
the General Conditions to the Contracts. The City Engineer issued two letters on
April 10, 2018, for Projects PN460C and PN797, becoming effective a week later,
and effectuating an October 17, 2018 notice-of-termination-claim deadline for
those projects. The City Engineer also issued a letter on May 4, 2018, becoming
effective a week later, for Project PN675, and effectuating a November 11, 2018,
notice-of-termination-claim deadline for that project.

       Following the City’s termination notice, JCG submitted a written demand to
the City seeking payment for services rendered, as allowed by article 14.2.3 of the

       1
         The City repetitiously alleges the parties agreed the City Engineer would perform the
role of an “arbitrator” in resolving claims and disputes, but the Contract contains no such
reference to an arbitrator or arbitration between the Contractor and the City.

                                              3
General Conditions to the Contracts. JCG’s termination-for-convenience claim
(“PCO 007”) was for payment of specific sums for work performed, as well as its
not inconsiderable costs to demobilize and remove materials and equipment from
the jobsite. The Contracts provide that upon termination for convenience by the
City, JCG is entitled to the “Contract Price for all work performed in accordance
with the Contract up to date of termination determined in the manner provided in
Article 9[.]” Additionally, JCG is entitled to “[r]easonable termination expenses,
including costs for settling and paying Subcontractor and Supplier claims arising
out of termination of the Work, reasonable cost of preservation and protection of
the City’s property after termination, if required, and the cost of Claim
preparation.” By July 2018, JCG detailed these costs in PCO 007 and in
subsequent amendments required by the City. JCG contends that it repeatedly
provided substantial documentation to the City to support these claims.

      With respect to the contract adjustment claims for project PN675 (PCO
003), the City Engineer issued an award and the City paid JCG $1,048,374.23. The
City Engineer also issued awards to JCG on its termination claims (for Project
PN460C and PN797) on November 21, 2018, and (for Project PN675) on
December 13, 2018. The City ultimately paid JCG $1,032,991.40 for the three
Termination claims.

      In the months leading up to the City Engineer’s determination, JCG
attempted to work with the City Engineer to supplement its supporting
documentation. In that time the following events transpired:

      On October 15, 2018, the City engineer wrote JCG a letter stating that
      “on November 12, 2018, the City Engineer will promptly review and
      make a final decision regarding all claims submitted by [JCG] within
      six months of [the City’s] notice of termination for convenience.”
      On October 18, 2018, JCG responded that it was “anticipating

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      resubmittal of the Termination for Convenience Claim Proposal in the
      early part of November, 2018,” and that the claim “will be
      resubmitted prior to the expiration of the six month submittal period.”
      In a letter dated November 9, 2018, two days before the expiration of
      six months, JCG stated that “it has become necessary to involve a
      consulting firm and request additional time to allow for an accurate
      and reasonable claim to be assembled.”
      The City engineer received this letter by email on November 11,
      2018, the last day of the six-month termination period.
      On November 26, 2018, the City Engineer responded to JCG’s letter
      by restating the terms of the Contracts, namely that “November 12,
      2018 was the deadline for [JCG] to submit its claim.” The City
      Engineer further added that no extension was granted and that the
      amount due to JCG would be determined “based on the current claim
      documents, pursuant to Sections 14.2.3 ad 14.2.4 of the Contract.”
      JCG protested that the City’s “final determination” of the termination claims
was “inconsistent with the terms of the contract.”

      JCG brought this lawsuit, seeking an additional $13,416,633.00. The City
first moved for summary judgment on res judicata grounds, to which JCG filed a
response. In its reply to that response, the City filed its plea to the jurisdiction
asserting that JCG had failed to establish the City’s waiver of immunity. The trial
court denied both motions.

                             II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

      The City’s lead issue challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for
summary judgment. We lack jurisdiction to hear this challenge.

      The City’s summary-judgment motion, exclusively based on its assertion of
res judicata following the City Engineer’s decision, raised no ground based on
immunity, and cannot reasonably be construed as a plea to the jurisdiction or any
other jurisdictional challenge.      See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
51.014(a)(8)(providing jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the denial of
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a plea to the jurisdiction filed by a governmental entity). The Court’s order
denying summary judgment is neither a final judgment nor an order that falls
within the scope of an interlocutory appeal statute. We lack jurisdiction to review
the denial of a summary judgment. See Clark v. Clark, 638 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.); Alexander Dubose Jefferson &
Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P., 540 S.W.3d 577, 587 (Tex.
2018).

                            III. PLEA TO JURISDICTION

      In its second issue, the City argues that the trial court erred in denying its
plea to the jurisdiction.

                               Standard of Review

      A plea to the jurisdiction questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction raises a
question of law that we review de novo. City of Houston v. Collins, 515 S.W.3d
467, 471 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The standard of review
for a plea to the jurisdiction “generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).” Id. citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).

      The jurisdictional question in this case relates to governmental immunity;
governmental immunity from suit defeats a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). We
review de novo whether the City’s governmental immunity deprives the trial court
of jurisdiction.

      Appellate review of subject-matter jurisdiction generally begins with review
of the pleadings, and we will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it would be proper
based on our independent review of JCG’s petition. See City of Houston v. Rhule,

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417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (explaining that all courts bear the affirmative
obligation to review issues of subject matter jurisdiction even if not raised by the
parties).

       A plea to the jurisdiction “may challenge the pleadings, the existence of
jurisdictional facts, or both.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d
755, 770 (Tex. 2018). If a plea “challenges the pleadings, we determine if the
pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to
hear the cause.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. In determining whether the plaintiff
has met that burden, “we liberally construe the pleadings, taking all factual
assertions as true and looking to [the plaintiff’s] intent.” City of Ingleside v. City of
Corpus Christi, 469 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. 2015).

       But when a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional
facts, we look beyond the pleadings and consider evidence submitted by the parties
“when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised,” even if the evidence
implicates both the court’s jurisdiction and the merits of a claim. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 227. For a plea that challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, our
standard of review generally mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment: a
plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to
the trial court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 221, 228. In determining whether the plaintiff
has met that burden, “we take as true all evidence favorable to” the plaintiff and
“indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the [plaintiff’s]
favor.” Id. at 228. If the evidence and allegations create a fact question regarding
jurisdiction, then a court cannot grant a plea to the jurisdiction, and the factfinder
must resolve the fact issue. Id. at 227–28. But “if the relevant evidence is
undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue,” a court rules
“on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. at 228.

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                           Sovereign Immunity Analysis

      Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state is immune
from suit, which means that it cannot be sued without its consent. See City of
Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011). When performing
governmental functions, political subdivisions derive governmental immunity from
the state’s sovereign immunity. See City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466,
469 (Tex. 2007). The City, a municipality, is a local governmental entity and thus
cannot be sued absent a waiver of its governmental immunity. City of Houston v.
Williams, 353 S.W.3d at 134.

      One such waiver can be found in the Local Government Contract Claims
Act, codified in Section 271.152 of the Texas Local Government Code, which
provides that a local governmental entity that “enters into a contract subject to this
subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a
claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of the
subchapter.” The subchapter limits the damages for which a party can sue the
government, but allows for “the balance due and owed by the local governmental
entity under the contract” and “the amount owed for change orders or additional
work the contractor is directed to perform by a local governmental entity in
connection with the contract.” § 271.153.

      For section 271.152’s waiver of immunity to apply, three elements must be
established: (1) the party against whom the waiver is asserted must be a “local
governmental entity” as defined by section 271.151(3), (2) the entity must be
authorized by statute or the Constitution to enter into contracts, and (3) the entity
must in fact have entered into a contract that is “subject to this subchapter,” as
defined by section 271.151(2). Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 271.151–.152; City of
Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134–35 (Tex. 2011). A “contract subject to

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this subchapter” is defined as “a written contract stating the essential terms of the
agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is
properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t
Code § 271.151(2). The Williams court reduced this third requirement to five
components, and explained:

       Section 271.151(2) effectively states five elements a contract must
       meet in order for it to be a contract subject to section 271.152’s
       waiver of immunity: (1) the contract must be in writing, (2) state the
       essential terms of the agreement, (3) provide for goods or services, (4)
       to the local governmental entity, and (5) be executed on behalf of the
       local governmental entity.
City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Tex. 2011); Tex. Loc. Gov’t
Code §271.151(2). The City has not disputed that any of the above statutory
elements or components precluded application of the waiver. Upon review of the
record, JCG’s pleadings provide allegations that sufficiently satisfy these elements.
The City does not challenge JCG’s allegation that Houston is a municipality which
constitutes a “local government entity” under the Local Government Contract
Claims Act or JCG’s allegation that the City and its various named agents were
authorized to enter any of the contracts. 2        This is not a case that presents an area
of dispute with respect to any of the above elements or components.

       Instead, in its second issue, the City has argued only that JCG failed to assert
a valid and viable breach of contract claim; namely, that in light of the contracts’
provisions calling for resolution by the City Engineer, which limit the scope of
review, JCG has failed to plead and prove its claim. We have previously observed
that “[t]he City’s governmental immunity is waived only to the extent the
[plaintiff] has pleaded a viable or valid constitutional claim.” Houston

       2
          We take judicial notice that for purposes of this statute these first two elements were
satisfied for the City in City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d at 135.

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Firefighters’ Relief & Ret. Fund v. City of Houston, 579 S.W.3d 792, 800 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (emphasis added).

      The unique nature of the contracts in this case drive the relevant standard.
Each of JCG’s breach of contract claims, both its contractual adjustment claims
and its termination claims, are based the same facts as the Claims directed to the
City Engineer for final determination.

      Undisputed are the facts that the parties contractually designated the City
Engineer to resolve claims, that JCG submitted claims for resolution by the City
Engineer, and that the City Engineer issued determinations.

      A contract may require performance by one party to be subject to the
satisfaction of the other party, or a designated third party such as an architect or
engineer. Tribble & Stephens Co. v. RGM Constructors, L.P., 154 S.W.3d 639,
652–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied), opinion
supplemented on overruling of reh’g (Feb. 10, 2005). In regard to such provisions,
the Texas Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen parties to a building contract agree
to submit questions which may arise thereunder to the decision of the engineer, his
decision is final and conclusive; unless in making it he is guilty of fraud,
misconduct, or such gross mistake as would imply bad faith or failure to exercise
an honest judgment.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones Bros. Dirt & Paving
Contractors, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 477, 481–82 (Tex. 2002) citing McKenzie, 150
S.W.2d at 996. Because the contract provisions at issue in this case called for the
City Engineer to resolve claims – provisions the parties clearly implemented– we
consider the facts under the applicable standard.

      The claims asserted in this case follow from the City Engineer’s decision-
making with respect to claims JCG referred to him under the terms of the contracts.
Thus, in the context of each of the contracts at issue, in evaluating the pleadings
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and evidence for the purpose of the jurisdictional challenge, we consider whether
JCG alleged and provided a fact issue showing the City Engineer was guilty of
fraud, misconduct, or such gross mistake as would imply bad faith or failure to
exercise an honest judgment.

      Contractual Adjustment Claims

      The record before us shows that JCG submitted a contractual adjustment of
$2,207,512, reflecting the amount owed as compensation for the increased cost to
perform the work as a direct result of owner-caused delays or acceleration, as well
as the amount owed for change orders or additional work JGG was directed to
perform by the City in connection with the Contracts.           These claims were
submitted prior to the City’s termination. The provisions within Article 4 of the
General Conditions operate to facilitate the submission and negotiation of such
claims, but ultimately authorize the City Engineer to review such claims for final
resolution, and provides that the “City Engineer’s decision is final and binding.”
The City provided an affidavit from the City Engineer in which he stated that he
made a final determination with respect to these claims on August 2, 2018. The
record also includes the City Engineer’s letter memorializing the status of prior
negotiations: The City Engineer reported that the City had received JCG’s third
revision of PCO 003 on June 18, 2018, that a meeting was held to discuss
components of the claim, that the City had made an offer rejecting part of the
claim, accepting other parts of the claim and offered to pay JCG $1,048,374.23 for
PCO 003. The report details the reasoning for the differences of JCG’s claim and
the City’s offer.

      On December 13, the City Engineer sent a letter entitled “Closeout Letter”
reporting that it was closing out the contract and notifying that the City of Houston
would process payment on various items including the amount offered for PCO

                                         11
003. JCG did not allege or present evidence to the trial court showing how the
City Engineer acted with “partiality, fraud, misconduct, and/or gross error” with
respect to the City Engineer’s resolution of the contractual adjustment.

       In the absence of a valid and viable claim following the City Engineer’s
determination, such as a claim for gross misconduct or bad faith, the City’s
governmental immunity is not waived as to JCG’s claims based on misconduct by
the City Engineer because JCG has not pleaded or proven a viable or valid claim
based on gross misconduct or bad faith. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones Bros.
Dirt & Paving Contractors, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 477, 481–82 (Tex. 2002). We thus
sustain the City’s second issue with respect to the contractual adjustment claims.

       Termination Claims

       The record shows that JCG timely submitted notice of its termination claims
for payment of specific sums for work performed on the three respective projects,
as well as costs to demobilize and remove materials and/or equipment from the
jobsite.

       The central governing contractual provision relating to JCG’s termination
claim, was stated in Section 14.2.3 of the General Conditions:

       14.2.3 After receipt of the Notice of Termination, Contractor shall
       submit to the City its termination Claim, in forms required by City
       Engineer. The Claim will be submitted to the City promptly, but no
       later than six months from the effective date of termination, unless
       one or more extensions are granted by City Engineer in writing. If
       Contractor fails to submit its termination Claim within the time
       allowed, in accordance with Paragraph 14.2.4, City Engineer will
       determine, on the basis of available information, the amount, if any,
       due to Contractor because of termination, and City Engineer’s
       determination is final and binding on the Parties. The City will then
       pay to Contractor the amount so determined.
       Though the record shows that JCG submitted a transmittal letter on July 6,

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2018 containing roughly 385 pages in support of its termination claims, JCG
argues that it was entitled to have additional documentation considered that was
submitted on December 14, 2018 that it contends the City Engineer arbitrarily
refused to consider.

      In support of its argument that the City Engineer committed a gross mistake
or was guilty of misconduct by not considering JCG’s December 14 submission of
substantiating documents, JCG relies on its reading of 14.2.3 with the definition of
the term “Claim” provided in the General Conditions which means a “[w]ritten
demand or written assertion by one Party seeking adjustment of the Contract,
payment of money, extension of time, or other relief under the Contract . . .” JCG
insists that under 14.2.3, it was only required to file a written demand giving notice
of the claim within six months; that it was not required to provide substantiating
material within this timeframe. JCG contends that City Engineer was contractually
obligated to “determine, on the basis of information available to City Engineer, the
amount due, if any, to Contractor for the termination [of convenience]” and failed
to do so by not considering the materials submitted on December 14, 2018.
Without significant explanation JCG argues in the alternative, “at worst, the
Contracts would be ambiguous, thus constituting a material fact dispute regarding
the City’s proposed jurisdictional issue.” Because the parties dispute whether the
contract permitted JCG to submit supporting materials more than six months
following the City’s notice of Termination, we consider whether the contract so
provided or whether it is ambiguous.

      When interpreting a contract, our primary concern is to ascertain and give
effect to the written expression of the parties’ intent. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd.
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011) (citing J.M.
Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003)). By this approach,

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we “strive to honor the parties’ agreement and not remake their contract by reading
additional provisions into it.” Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 126 (Tex. 2010). “[I]t is objective, not subjective, intent
that controls.” Burwell, 189 S.W.3d at 740. We give words and phrases their
ordinary and generally accepted meaning, reading them in context and in light of
the rules of grammar and common usage. See Gilbert Tex. Constr., 327 S.W.3d at
126; Dynegy Midstream Servs., Ltd. P’ship. v. Apache Corp., 294 S.W.3d 164, 168
(Tex. 2009). We examine the writing as a whole to harmonize and give effect to all
of the contract’s provisions so that none is rendered meaningless or surplusage.
J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 229; Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132,
134 (Tex. 1994) (“long-established rule” is that “[n]o one phrase, sentence, or
section [of a contract] should be isolated from its setting and considered apart from
the other provisions”); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393–94 (Tex. 1983). We
also bear in mind the particular business activity to be served, and when possible
and proper, we avoid a construction that is unreasonable, inequitable, and
oppressive. Frost Nat’l. Bank v. L & F. Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex.
2005) (per curiam).

      In reviewing the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract, we find the
deadline to submit substantiated termination claims is unambiguous.              The
provision plainly states that the deadline to submit a termination claim is “no later
than six months from the effective date of the termination” unless the City
Engineer grants an extension. In this context, the word “Claim” means more than
as independently defined in section 1.1.9. “Claim” is further characterized under
section 14.2.3 by the modifying phrase “in forms required by the City Engineer”.
The phrase can only reasonably be interpreted as defining 14.2.3 Claims
(termination claims) as types of claims submitted in a particular manner;

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essentially, in a manner that informs the City Engineer as he or she requests,
whether it be by specifically filling-in entries in a form provided by the city, or
more generally providing responsive substantive materials in the manner, or form,
prescribed by the City Engineer. Though the word “form” can mean many things,3
in context, the phrase denotes forms to be sets of required information,
descriptions, or explanations called for by the City Engineer. Thus, a Claim, when
made in forms requested, is substantiated. Moreover, the broad word “form”, as
coupled with the phrase “required by the City Engineer,” leads to the reasonable
expectation that completing submission of a termination Claim under 14.2.3 would
require communication with the City Engineer as to the proper form and could be a
process, or a dialogue, rather than a single effort.

       The contract plainly states that “[i]f Contractor fails to submit its termination
Claim within the time allowed, in accordance with Paragraph 14.2.4, City Engineer
will determine, on the basis of available information, the amount, if any, due to
Contractor because of termination, and City Engineer’s determination is final and
binding on the Parties.”         The City Engineer was authorized to make a final
determination after six months “on the basis of available information.” Indeed,
that’s what happened here; the City Engineer made the final determination based
on available information prior to December 14, 2018 when JCG submitted
additional claim-supporting documentation.

       Finally, the extension clause, which provides an exception to the six-month

3
  Relevant to the context “form” includes such meanings as “1a : the shape and structure of
something as distinguished from its material”; “4 : a printed or typed document with blank
spaces for insertion of required or requested information”; “5c manner or style of performing or
accomplishing according to recognized standards of technique”; “10a(1) : orderly method of
arrangement (as in the presentation of ideas) : manner of coordinating elements (as of an artistic
production or course of reasoning)” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at
http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forms (last visited January 18, 2023).

                                               15
deadline “unless one or more extensions are granted by City Engineer in writing”,
authorizes only the City Engineer the power to extend the deadline and specifically
in writing.   The provision stands without further modification, and can only
reasonably be construed as a matter of the City Engineer’s discretion.

      The contract cannot reasonably be construed as JCG suggests, to provide for
the unlimited submission of substantiating documents beyond the six-month claim
period without having obtained an extension granted by the City Engineer.
Importantly, the contract does not refer to an additional deadline for substantiating
materials, but instead emphasizes expedience and finality.

      Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the contract we find that the phrase
“Claims, in forms required by the City,” means substantiated claims, required to be
submitted within six months from the termination notice or later with an extension
granted at the City Engineers discretion.        Despite JCG’s contentions, this
construction of section 14.2.3 is consistent with JCG’s own reflections on the
contract’s terms in October 2018, when it acknowledged the six-month deadline to
submit its claims and requested additional time, a request that was denied.

      Under this construction, we cannot find support for the trial court’s implicit
conclusion that JCG provided any allegations or evidence that the City Engineer
was guilty of fraud, misconduct, or such gross mistake as would imply bad faith or
failure to exercise an honest judgment. The record shows that the City Engineer
acted within his discretion in refusing to grant the extension requested in
November, in making a determination based on the termination claims as
substantiated within the six-month deadlines, and in making a final determination
on December 13, 2018 without considering or reconsidering the claims after JCG’s
belated submission on December 14, 2018.

      The City’s governmental immunity is not waived as to JCG’s termination
                                         16
claims based on misconduct by the City Engineer because JCG has not pleaded or
proven a viable or valid claim based on gross misconduct or bad faith. See
Houston Firefighters’ Relief & Ret. Fund v. City of Houston, 579 S.W.3d 792, 808
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). We thus sustain the City’s
second issue as it pertains to JCG’s termination claims.

                                 III. CONCLUSION

      The City’s appeal of the trial court’s interlocutory summary judgment,
unrelated to its assertion of immunity, lacks appellate jurisdiction. As discussed
above, the City’s governmental immunity is not waived as to JCG’s breach of
contract claims. We reverse and render dismissal for lack of jurisdiction with
respect to the trial court’s order denying the plea to the jurisdiction, and we
otherwise dismiss the remainder of City’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

                                       /s/    Randy Wilson
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Poissant, and Wilson

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