Court Opinion

ID: 9567678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:56:40.45674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:19.484880
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Reconsideration.
Defendants/Appellees seek reconsideration of our holding in Division 3 that the trial court erred by failing to give Brock’s requested jury charge on nominal damages. They cite, for the first time, the Supreme Court’s decision in Magnetic Resonance Plus v. Imaging Systems Inti.,25 in which the Court held that a party that failed to obtain any of the relief it sought on its breach of contract claim could not be the “prevailing party” for the purpose of a contractual fee-shifting provision.26 They argue that, under Magnetic Resonance Plus, the jury’s decision to award Brock no actual damages means that he was not the prevailing party under the contract and therefore was not contractually entitled to attorney fees. According to defendants, “[bjecause an award of nominal damages would not have converted [Brock] into the prevailing party, a specific charge on nominal damages was unnecessary.”
The plaintiff in Magnetic Resonance Plus did not seek nominal damages in the pretrial order or at trial.27 Thus, the Supreme Court did not consider whether an award of nominal damages could constitute sufficient relief to enable a party to claim “prevailing party” status under a contractual fee-shifting provision. Defendants argue that an award of nominal damages cannot confer “prevailing party” status, and they point to the common description of nominal damages as a “trivial” sum.
However, in Georgia, the term “nominal damages” is purely relative, and carries with it no suggestion of certainty as to amount. Instead of being restricted to a very small amount, the sum awarded as nominal damages may, according to circumstances, vary almost indefinitely. In some cases a *344very small amount might constitute the trivial sum contemplated by the term “nominal damages”; in others a much larger amount might measure down to the same standard of triviality.28
Decided March 10, 2006
Reconsideration denied May 12, 2006
Jones, Jensen & Harris, Taylor W. Jones, Jenny E. Jensen, Richard E. Harris, for appellant.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, John G. Parker, William K. Whitner, for appellees.
Thus, “nominal” does not necessarily mean “small.” Moreover, “[a] recovery may be classified as coming under the definition of nominal damages where the violation of a right is shown, substantial damages claimed, and some actual loss proved, and yet the damages are not susceptible of reasonable'certainty of proof as to their extent.”29 For these reasons, we reject defendants’ argument that a party who wins nominal damages cannot be considered a “prevailing party.”
In any event, even if an award of nominal damages would not have entitled Brock to attorney fees under the contract, Georgia law still provides for the recovery of nominal damages. And as explained in Division 3, the court’s charge failed to inform the jury that such damages were available. Accordingly, we deny defendants’ motion for reconsideration.

 2 73 Ga. 525 (543 SE2d 32) (2001).

 Id. at 527-529 (3).

 Imaging Systems Intl. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus, 227 Ga. App. 641, 646 (3) (490 SE2d 124) (1997).

 Wright v. Wilcox, 262 Ga. App. 659, 663 (2) (586 SE2d 364) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

 Duckworth v. Collier, 164 Ga. App. 139, 141 (296 SE2d 640) (1982) (citation and punctuation omitted).