Court Opinion

ID: 9947474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 21:09:45.886344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:31.036204
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Litsinger v. Rootstown Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2024-Ohio-781.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                PORTAGE COUNTY

DONALD LITSINGER, et al.,                               CASE NO. 2023-P-0067

                 Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                                        Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                          Court of Common Pleas

THE ROOTSTOWN TOWNSHIP
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,                                      Trial Court No. 2022 CV 00352

                 Defendant-Appellee.

                                              OPINION

                                        Decided: March 4, 2024
                                         Judgment: Affirmed

Jaqueline Bollas Caldwell, John B. Schomer and Kyle W. Rea, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths
& Dougherty Co., LPA, 4775 Munson Street, N.W., P.O. Box 36963, Canton, OH 44735,
and Matthew W. Onest, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., LPA, 6715
Tippecanoe Road, 2C, Canfield, OH 44406 (For Plaintiffs-Appellants).

Chad E. Murdock, P.O. Box 334, Rootstown, OH 44272 (For Defendant-Appellee).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Plaintiffs-appellants, Donald and Cathy Litsinger, appeal the judgment of

the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of

defendant-appellee, the Rootstown Township Board of Trustees.                   For the following

reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

        {¶2}     On May 16, 2022, the Litsingers filed a Civil Complaint against Rootstown

and other defendants who are not parties to this appeal. On August 30, 2022, the

Litsingers filed a First Amended Complaint against Rootstown only. On April 3, 2023, the
Litsingers, by stipulation, limited their claims against Rootstown to the following: breach

of contract and, in the alternative, promissory estoppel; negligence; negligent

misrepresentation; right of contribution; declaratory judgment; and injunctive relief. On

April 11, 2023, Rootstown moved for summary judgment.

       {¶3}   On July 31, 2023, the trial court granted Rootstown’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. The court summarized the litigation as follows:

                    In this instant case, Plaintiff is seeking recovery from
              Defendant for dumping “ditch” dirt on Plaintiff’s real property. Plaintiff
              is seeking to have Defendant pay the cost to remediate the
              environmental violations for which Plaintiff has been cited. Plaintiff
              claims that Defendant, through its road supervisor, entered into a
              contract for disposal of dirt and other debris on Plaintiff’s property.

                     Conversely, Defendant claims that its road supervisor did not
              have agency authority to enter into any contracts and any
              discussions between the road supervisor and Plaintiff were personal.
              Defendant also claims that Plaintiff sought out the “ditch” dirt from
              Defendant and directed where the “ditch” dirt was to be placed.
              Defendant also provided free “ditch” dirt to any township resident
              who requested same. Defendant also argues that the “ditch” dirt is
              not an item for which Plaintiff has been cited.

                      In the instant matter, Plaintiff and the road supervisor had a
              personal relationship. They were friends and both were involved in
              forms of construction. During a personal visit to Plaintiff’s property,
              the road supervisor noted a large hole, which later became the
              dumping site for construction debris and “ditch” dirt. During this
              personal visit the road supervisor indicated that he could get “ditch”
              dirt to put into the big hole. Thereafter, both the road supervisor and
              the Plaintiff dumped construction debris in the hole. Both Plaintiff
              and the road supervisor were acting in their own personal best
              interest by avoiding construction disposal fees and inconvenience by
              dumping their personal business debris on Plaintiff’s property.

                      The “ditch” dirt was provided by Defendant at Plaintiff’s
              request. That “ditch” dirt was directed to a specific dumping area by
              Plaintiff and was later leveled by Plaintiff. Defendant would provide
              free “ditch” dirt to any township resident that asked for it. The “ditch”
              dirt provided by Defendant was used to cover some of the personal
              business construction debris of both Plaintiff and the road supervisor.
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Case No. 2023-P-0067
       {¶4}   On August 24, 2023, the Litsingers filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal,

they raise the following assignment of error: “The trial court erred in granting summary

judgment to the Appellee, the Rootstown Board of Trustees, on Appellant’s claims against

it for breach of contract, promissory estoppel in the alternative to breach of contract,

negligence, negligent representation, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.”

       {¶5}   Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and * * * the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” i.e.,

when “reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse

to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being

entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.”

Civ.R. 56(C). An appellate court’s “review of a summary-judgment ruling is de novo.”

Fradette v. Gold, 157 Ohio St.3d 13, 2019-Ohio-1959, 131 N.E.3d 12, ¶ 6.

       {¶6}   The first issue to be addressed is whether a genuine issue of material fact

exists as to whether a binding contract existed between the Litsingers and Rootstown.

“The elements of a contract include the following: an offer, an acceptance, contractual

capacity, consideration (the bargained-for legal benefit or detriment), a manifestation of

mutual assent, and legality of object and of consideration.” Lake Land Emp. Group of

Akron, LLC v. Columber, 101 Ohio St.3d 242, 2004-Ohio-786, 804 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 14.

       {¶7}   With respect to the formation of the contract at issue, Donald Litsinger

provided the following testimony by affidavit:

              3. In 2000 I spoke with Darrell Stephens, the Road Superintendent
              for the Township. Mr. Stephens, on behalf of the Township, offered
              to have the Township dump dirt on my Property in a hole that he
              pointed out. He offered to have the Township do that and
              guaranteed and promised me that it would be legal. In exchange I
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Case No. 2023-P-0067
             promised him the Township could dump on my Property and I would
             give the Township and its drivers access to my Property and they
             would dump in the area that Mr. Stephens had identified and
             promised would be legal for such purpose. I would thereby receive
             fill material to fill the identified hol[e] an[d] build up my Property, and
             the Township would benefit by and have a disposal site that would
             not cost them any money. I allowed them to dump without any
             charge or fee. Had Mr. Stephens not promised and guaranteed me
             that the Township’s dumping was and would be legal, I would never
             have allowed [t]he Township to dump on my [P]roperty. Nor would I
             have dumped on the Property, [n]or would I have allowed others to
             dump on the [P]roperty.

             4. Based upon the communications above and as I testified to in my
             deposition, Mr. Stephens and I shook hands and I accepted his offer
             to supply dirt and do so in a manner that was legal. There was never
             any money involved or discussed, because I was going to get a field
             leveled and th[e] Township would be able to dispose of dirt with[out]
             having to pay or be charged. I knew at that time that Mr. Stephens
             was the acting Township Road Superintendent and thought, based
             upon his statements and assurances that he had the authority and
             responsibility to bind the Township to the agreement identified above
             and in my deposition. I also thought that since he was the
             Township’s Road Superintendent, he would have the experience,
             expertise and could be relied upon to keep the promises he made
             and that he knew what was legal. Our agreement was performed,
             for over 19 years and the Township and all its drivers (including the
             later Road Superintendent – Bill Hahn) dumped Township dirt on my
             Property for over 19 years in the area Mr. Stephens had guaranteed
             was legal, most of what they dumped was not legal. The Township
             dumped significant amounts of material into the wetland over many
             years, with this dumping of fill activity continuing to occur by the
             Township as recently as 2019. The contract itself and my
             understanding of it were shown by what Mr. Stephens told me and
             what the Township did to perform the contract over a 19-year period
             until 2019. Some years the Township dumped more ditch dirt on the
             Property and other years the Township dumped less dirt, but the
             dumping was always in accord with the oral agreement.

      {¶8}   We agree with the trial court and Rootstown that the agreement described

by Litsinger does not constitute an enforceable contract although for different reasons.

Assuming, arguendo, that Stephens entered the agreement on behalf of Rootstown with

apparent authority to do so, the agreement is unsupported by valid consideration on the
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Case No. 2023-P-0067
part of Rootstown. The Supreme Court of Ohio “has long recognized the rule that a

contract is not binding unless supported by consideration.”           Lake Land at ¶ 16.

“Consideration may consist of either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the

promisor.” Id. “A benefit may consist of some right, interest, or profit accruing to the

promisor, while a detriment may consist of some forbearance, loss, or responsibility given,

suffered, or undertaken by the promisee.” Id.; Williams v. Ormsby, 131 Ohio St.3d 427,

2012-Ohio-690, 966 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17 (“whether there is consideration at all is a proper

question for a court”).

       {¶9}   In the present case, as noted by the trial court, it was the policy of Rootstown

to provide free “ditch” dirt to any township resident that asked for it. Thus, the Litsingers’

promise to provide Rootstown with a site to dump its dirt without fee or charge was an

illusory benefit to the township. The uncontradicted deposition testimony of Rootstown

road superintendent Hahn demonstrates that any agreement to allow Rootstown to dump

on their property was superfluous:

              [A]s a township, we have to go out along the roads if somebody is
              having water issues -- you know, the ditch is silt in with dirt and
              wheat. We go out, we take a -- at that time it was a backhoe, but
              now we have an excavator -- we simply scoop it out, place it in the
              back of the dump truck. We piled [it] in our yard, which is down at
              our salt shed, because we make numerous trips. And then after it
              sits there for a while, you know, any resident that would like dirt is
              more than welcome to the dirt, and we disperse it that way. * * * It
              is the Township’s practice. * * * Anyone living in the Township is
              allowed to have the ditch dirt, that’s the county practice, that was
              state-wide practice with ODOT. We just followed in line with them.

       {¶10} Hahn also described the purposes for which township residents would avail

themselves of the dirt. When residents would install culvert pipes in their ditches, ditch

dirt would be used to cover the pipes. Farmers, such as the Litsingers, and other

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
residents used the free dirt for leveling and “so they could fill in holes around their yards.”

Rootstown also used the ditch dirt for its own purposes, such as the construction of a

retaining wall. Thus, the agreement for Rootstown to provide dirt to the Litsingers in

exchange for a place to dump it was simply a description of what was already the

township’s practice with respect to any resident that wanted the dirt. It did not constitute

a bargained-for legal benefit or detriment.

       {¶11} The Litsingers assert that the Township Trustees were authorized by statute

to appoint Stephens as Road Superintendent with authority to enter into the purported

contract with them.     R.C. 5571.02(C) (“township trustees * * * may appoint some

competent person * * * to have charge and maintenance and repair of roads within the

township”). They further maintain that, “in addition to the duties specifically enumerated

in the statute [regulating townships], the Board [of township trustees] may also assign to

the administrator any ‘duties under its control.’”       Oberer Land Developers, Ltd. v.

Sugarcreek Twp., S.D.Ohio No. 3:19-cv-82, 2020 WL 1466184, *11, citing R.C. 505.032.

Such duties would include the disposition of dirt collected from drainage ditches. R.C.

505.10(A)(7) (“[i]f the board of township trustees determines that township personal

property is not needed for public use * * *, the board may discard of salvage that

property”). As interpreted by the Litsingers, these authorities demonstrate that, “where

authority is duly delegated to township officials by township trustees, those officials may,

in the scope of their position, contract on behalf of the Township.” Brief of Appellants at

20. We need not address these contentions inasmuch as, for the reasons stated above,

there was no enforceable contract between the Litsingers and the Township irrespective

of Stephens’ ability to contract on behalf of the Township.

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
          {¶12} The Litsingers argue in the alternative that, if no contract existed, they are

entitled to recover under a theory of promissory estoppel, specifically, “the Litsingers

presented evidence that the promise they relied on was Road Superintendent Stephens’

promise, as the Road Superintendent, that the Township’s dumping of dirt on [their]

Property was completely legal.” Brief of Appellants at 21. Donald described Stephens’

promise as follows in his deposition testimony:

                 [Stephens] confirmed to me that it was perfectly legal to fill a hole on
                 your property. So I mean, that was the guy who was in charge so I
                 * * *. [H]e told me that it was, you know, fine to fill a hole up and it
                 was perfectly legal. Because I did ask him, I don’t want to get in no
                 trouble. * * * But he did guarantee me we wouldn’t get in no trouble
                 so -- and it was perfectly legal.

          {¶13} Although the Litsingers argue for the application of promissory estoppel, the

proper legal doctrine applicable to this situation is equitable estoppel. As noted by the

Supreme Court of Ohio, “[p]romissory is distinct from equitable estoppel in that the

representation at issue is promissory rather than a representation of fact.” (Citation

omitted.) Hortman v. Miamisburg, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 2006-Ohio-4251, 852 N.E.2d 716,

¶ 24. Stephens’ statement that it was legal for the township to dump dirt on the Litsingers’

property was not a promise as commonly understood in contract law as a statement of

intent.    See 1 Williston on Contracts, Section 1:2 (4th Ed.2023) (“[a] ‘promise’ is a

manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in specified way”); 17 Corpus Juris

Secundum, Contracts, Section 2 (August 2023 Update) (“[a] promise is the declaration by

any person of his or her intention to do, or to forbear from anything at the request, or for

the use, of another”). The statement at issue herein was a representation of fact, i.e., it

was legal to dump dirt on the property, rather than promissory. As further illustrated by

the Supreme Court:
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Case No. 2023-P-0067
              In the typical equitable estoppel case, the defendant had
              represented an existing or past fact to the plaintiff, who reasonably
              and in ignorance of the truth relied upon the representation to his
              detriment. In a number of cases, however, the representation was
              not as to a fact but as to an intention; where the party making the
              representation asserted that he would do or refrain from doing
              something in the future he made a promise, though it might also be
              considered a representation of his intention. If the promise was
              gratuitous, not backed by consideration, the promisee would have no
              remedy. No equitable estoppel could exist since the promisee had
              not relied upon a statement of fact; no action for breach of contract
              could be brought since the promise was gratuitous.

(Citation omitted.) Hortman at ¶ 21.

       {¶14} “The purpose of equitable estoppel is to prevent actual or constructive fraud

and to promote the ends of justice.” Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 51 Ohio St.3d

143, 145, 555 N.E.2d 630 (1990). “It is available only in defense of a legal or equitable

right or claim made in good faith and should not be used to uphold crime, fraud, or

injustice.” Id. It has often been recognized that “‘equitable estoppel’ is not an independent

cause of action, but rather is a device by which courts bind parties to presentments made

upon which an opposing party relies to his * * * detriment for the formation of a contract.”

(Citation omitted.) Smith v. Safe Auto Ins. Co., 179 Ohio App.3d 240, 2008-Ohio-5806,

901 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.); Lopardo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 548 F.Supp.2d 450, 468

(N.D.Ohio 2008) (“the great majority of Ohio courts, including the Ohio Supreme Court,

have recognized that equitable estoppel is a defense and not an independent cause of

action”). “It does not furnish a basis for damages claims, but a defense against the claim

of the stopped party.” (Citation omitted.) Slone v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Ins. Co.,

S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv-5344, 2021 WL 38273, *4; Torrance v. Rom, 2020-Ohio-3971, 157

N.E.3d 172, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.) (“[t]he doctrine is a shield, not a sword”).

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
       {¶15} With the foregoing in mind, the Litsingers’ promissory estoppel claim fails

as a matter of law. As demonstrated above, it is not based on a promise properly

understood. Andersons, Inc. v. Consol, Inc., 185 F.Supp.2d 833, 840 (N.D.Ohio 2001)

(“[a] promise, for promissory estoppel purposes, must ‘involve[e] “commitment,” or

“manifestation of an intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way”’”) (citation

omitted). Construing the Litsingers’ claim as one for equitable estoppel does not avail

inasmuch as they did not raise that claim in their pleadings and such a claim does not

constitute an independent cause of action for damages. Lopardo at 468 (“[t]he First

Amended Complaint alleges misrepresentations about the past or current ‘status’ of

accounts, but does not allege any clear and unambiguous promise future behavior” and

“[s]uch allegations cannot support a claim of promissory estoppel”); Pappas v. Ippolito,

177 Ohio App.3d 625, 2008-Ohio-3976, 895 N.E.2d 610, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.) (“[b]ecause

appellants’ claim is not based upon an enforceable promise, but rather upon a

misrepresentation of an existing or past fact, it fails to satisfy the first element of

promissory estoppel, and appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law”); Ford

Motor Credit Co. v. Ryan, 189 Ohio App.3d 560, 2010-Ohio-4601, 939 N.E.2d 891, ¶ 95

(10th Dist.) (“[b]ecause equitable estoppel does not constitute a cause of action,

appellants cannot prevail on such a ‘claim’”).

       {¶16} The Litsingers next argue that the trial court erred by granting summary

judgment on their claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Rootstown

counters that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations.        We agree with

Rootstown.

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
       {¶17} “Tort actions against political subdivisions to recover damages must be

brought within two years after the cause of action accrued.” Barton v. Cty. of Cuyahoga,

2020-Ohio-6994, 166 N.E.3d 129, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.); R.C. 2744.04(A) (“[a]n action against

a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property

allegedly caused by any act or omission in connection with a governmental or proprietary

function * * * shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues”). “The

‘discovery rule’ generally provides that a cause of action accrues for purposes of the

governing statute of limitations at the time when the plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise

of reasonable care, should have discovered the complained of injury.” Investors REIT

One v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 179, 546 N.E.2d 206 (1989).

       {¶18} Assuming, arguendo, that the Litsingers are entitled to the benefit of the

discovery rule, their causes of action against Rootstown accrued in June 2019, when the

Portage County Combined General Health District sent a certified letter to them of

statutory and administrative violations consisting of the “[i]llegal disposal of a construction

and demolition debris (C&DD) and clean hard fill including, at a minimum, used shingles,

plywood type materials, plastic corrugated piping, pieces of metal piping, nails, used

bricks with motor-like compound attached, and concrete slabs that are placed onto the

surface of the ground and into surface water which is impeding and rerouting the flow of

waters of the State of Ohio.” As stated in Donald’s deposition, “[i]t was not until 2019 that

I learned that the Township and Mr. Stephens had breached the contract and his promise

and guarantee that the dumping was legal.” The original Civil Complaint was filed on May

16, 2022, more than two years after the accrual of the causes of action. Accordingly, the

tort claims are time barred.

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
       {¶19} The Litsingers argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

on their statutory claim for right of contribution. “[I]f one or more persons are jointly and

severally liable in tort for the same injury or loss to person or property or for the same

wrongful death, there may be a right of contribution even though judgment has not been

recovered against all or any of them.”        R.C. 2307.25(A).      Here, it has not been

demonstrated that the Litsingers and Rootstown are tortfeasors jointly and severally liable

for the same injury. “The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has

paid more than that tortfeasor’s proportionate share of the common liability, and that

tortfeasor’s total recovery is limited to the amount paid by that tortfeasor in excess of that

tortfeasor’s proportionate share.” Id. “Thus, the right of contribution is a legal concept

that applies only to joint tortfeasors.” Waverly City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Triad

Architects, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-329, 2008-Ohio-6917, ¶ 28. The Litsingers’

liability for violation of environmental regulations is not tort liability (and neither would

Rootstown’s liability be if such were established). Rootstown’s allegedly tortious conduct

(negligence and negligent representation) was directed toward the Litsingers and does

not establish a common liability between them. The right of contribution claim fails as a

matter of law.

       {¶20} The Litsingers argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

on their claim for declaratory judgment. “Because the Litsingers presented sufficient

evidence establishing that the Township improperly disposed [of] Township dirt on the

Property, and that this disposal resulted in the conditions cited by the Health District and

the Ohio EPA, they have sufficiently established their declaratory judgment claim.” Brief

of Appellants at 31.

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
       {¶21} “[D]eclaratory relief is available to a plaintiff who can show that (1) a real

controversy exists between the parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable, and (3) speedy

relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.” Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio

St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 49. The Litsingers essentially seek a

declaration that Rootstown, by dumping ditch dirt on their property, violated Ohio’s

environmental laws, specifically, R.C. 6111.04(A)(1) which provides: “No person shall

cause pollution or place or cause to be placed any sewage, sludge, sludge materials,

industrial waste, or other wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters of

the state.” Also R.C. 6111.01(I) (“‘[p]erson’ means * * * any other political subdivision of

the state”). We find that this is not a controversy that is properly justiciable through

declaratory judgment.

       {¶22} “Courts of appeals have uniformly held that actions for declaratory judgment

and injunction are inappropriate where special statutory proceedings would be bypassed.”

State ex rel. Albright v. Court of Common Pleas of Delaware Cty., 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 42,

572 N.E.2d 1387 (1991); Galion v. Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., Ohio Council

8, AFL-CIO, Local 2243, 71 Ohio St.3d 620, 623, 646 N.E.2d 813 (1995) (“[w]e have held

that if there is a special statutory procedure which a party must use, an action for

declaratory judgment is inappropriate”). “[S]ince it is always inappropriate for courts to

grant declaratory judgments and injunctions that attempt to resolve matters committed to

special statutory proceedings, their decisions should always be reversed on appeal,

except when they dismiss the actions.” Albright at 42.

       {¶23} Responsibility for investigating violations of and enforcing Ohio’s

environmental laws lies with the director of environmental protection and his or her duly

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
authorized representatives. R.C. 6111.03(G) (“[t]he director of environmental protection

may * * * [a]dopt, amend, and rescind rules in accordance with Chapter 119. of the

Revised Code governing the procedure for hearings, the filing of reports, the issuance of

permits, the issuance of industrial water pollution control certificates, and all other matters

relating to procedure”) and (H)(4) (“[i]ssue, modify, or revoke orders to prevent, control,

or abate water pollution by such means as * * * [r]equiring compliance with any standard

or rule adopted under sections 6111.01 to 6111.05 of the Revised Code or term or

condition of a permit”); R.C. 6111.05 (“[t]he director of environmental protection * * * may

investigate or make inquiries into any alleged act of pollution or failure to comply with this

chapter or any order, any rule, the terms and conditions of a permit, or any other

determination pursuant thereto”).       Likewise, the prosecution of violators of Ohio’s

environmental laws is undertaken at the initiative of the director of environmental

protection:

              The attorney general, upon the written request of the director, shall
              prosecute any person who violates, or who fails to perform any duty
              imposed by, sections 6111.01 to 6111.08 or division (B) of section
              6111.33 of the Revised Code or who violates any order, rule, or
              condition of a permit issued or adopted by the director pursuant to
              those sections. The attorney general, upon written request of the
              director, shall bring an action for an injunction against any person
              violating or threatening to violate this chapter or violating or
              threatening to violate any order, rule, or condition of a permit issued
              or adopted by the director pursuant to this chapter.

R.C. 6111.07(B).

       {¶24} Under the foregoing provisions, the determination of whether a prosecution

for the violation of R.C. 6111.04(A)(1) is merited is for the director of environmental

protection. These special statutory proceedings would be circumvented if we were to

allow private litigants such as the Litsingers to initiate and prosecute alleged violations
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Case No. 2023-P-0067
through an action for declaratory judgment.          Accordingly, the claim for declaratory

judgment was properly dismissed. Albright at 43 (declaratory judgment could not intrude

into the statutory process of annexation proceedings); Galion at paragraph two of the

syllabus (“[a]n action in declaratory judgment cannot be maintained to circumvent the

clear legislative intent of R.C. Chapter 2711 [providing the exclusive statutory remedy

which parties must use in appealing arbitration awards to the courts of common pleas]”);

Aust v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 136 Ohio App.3d 677, 683, 737 N.E.2d 605 (10th Dist.)

(“Appellant attempted to bypass these special statutory procedures [the Dental Practice

Act] by filing this declaratory judgment action”).

       {¶25} The Litsingers’ final claim was for injunctive relief. According to the First

Amended Complaint, the Litsingers sought injunctive relief “enjoining the Township, its

agents, or employees, from deposing Waste Materials, including, but not limited to, solid

Waste Materials on the Litsingers’ Property or otherwise conducting any action that

creates a nuisance on the Property and/or otherwise interferes with the Litsingers’ use

and enjoyment of their Property.” According to the Brief of Appellants, the Litsingers “are

entitled to the equitable remedy of requiring the Township to remove the Township dirt

and restore the Wetland [their property] to its original state.” Brief of Appellants at 32.

Neither iteration of the claim for injunctive relief states a valid claim.

       {¶26} “It is well-established that in order to obtain an injunction, the moving party

must show by clear and convincing evidence that immediate and irreparable injury, loss

or damage will result to the applicant and that no adequate remedy at law exists.”

(Citation omitted.) Redding v. United States Parachute Assn., Inc., 11th Dist. Geauga

No. 2022-G-0024, 2023-Ohio-884, ¶ 50. To the extent that the Litsingers seek to enjoin

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Case No. 2023-P-0067
Rootstown from depositing waste materials on their property, they have failed to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists that they are menaced by

immediate and irreparable injury.       Donald testified by deposition that the last time

Rootstown dumped material on his property was in 2019. Hahn testified that, as of 2021,

the township no longer has the policy of distributing ditch dirt to its residents upon request.

There is no evidence that such an occurrence is likely to occur in the immediate future.

       {¶27} With respect to the Litsingers’ claim that they are entitled to injunctive relief

mandating that Rootstown restore the wetlands to their original state based on the

violation of R.C. Chapter 6111, such a purpose is not justiciable for the same reasons set

forth above in connection with declaratory judgment. Albright, 60 Ohio St.3d at 42, 572

N.E.2d 1387 (“[c]ourts of appeals have uniformly held that actions for declaratory

judgment and injunction are inappropriate where special statutory proceedings would be

bypassed”).

       {¶28} The sole assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶29} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Court of

Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of Rootstown, is affirmed. Costs to

be taxed against the appellants.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

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