Court Opinion

ID: 9664831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:31:15.925005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.124578
License: Public Domain

DONIELSON, Presiding Judge
(specially concurring).
While I agree with the majority’s view, I think it makes little sense not to dispose of the primary issue raised by the petitioner, an issue which is sure to result in additional litigation. State v. Barbee, 370 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa Ct.App.1985), states quite clearly what the policy ought to be and that is: “Although defendant did not comply with the requirement in filing his motion, we would better conserve judicial resources by reaching the merits of [his] claim and rendering a final disposition.”
The glaring inconsistency of disposing of a prospective new lawsuit in one case and not disposing of another is a pointless waste of judicial resources. As many lawsuits should be disposed of in one action as possible and therefore I prefer to address the issues so raised.
Mary argues that a life sentence is disproportionate to her crime since she “neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.” In support of this argument, she relies heavily on language from Enmund. A careful reading of this case reveals that this reliance is misplaced.
In Enmund, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and the robbery of two elderly persons. 458 U.S. at 785, 102 S.Ct. at 3370, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1144. Based on these convictions, he was sentenced to death. Id. The factual basis for his convictions closely resembled the case at bar. While Enmund waited in a car, his two codefendants approached the residence of Thomas and Eunice Kersey. They demanded money from the Kerseys, subsequently killed them, and then fled with Enmund in the car.
The United States Supreme Court held that imposition of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment where the defendant neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life. 458 U.S. at 801, 102 S.Ct. at 3379, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1154. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
For purposes of imposing the death penalty [the defendant’s] criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt.
Id. (emphasis added).
As noted by the majority, there are some factual similarities between Enmund and the case at bar. Evidence reflects that Mary Ellis Cuevas was waiting in a car when George Weeks was killed; she did not participate in the actual murder. However, in asking this court to consider En-mund controlling, I believe the petitioner is reading the case much too broadly. An important distinction exists between sentences of imprisonment alone and sentences of death. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
*288It is true that the “penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.” [citation omitted] As a result, “our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment” in a noncapital case [citation omitted]. We agree therefore, that, “outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare.” [citation omitted]
Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90, 103 S.Ct. at 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649 (1983) (emphasis in original).
In accordance with this language, I would conclude that the principles set forth in Enmund should only be applied in cases where the death penalty is imposed. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, I do not believe that the Solem court intended to extend the principles in Enmund to apply to felony prison sentences as well as capital cases. It is evident from the language above that the Court intended quite to the contrary. In fact, in discussing Enmund, the Court specifically stated,
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund’s crime.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649 n. 15 (emphasis added). Likewise, in view of the similarities between Enmund and the case at bar, we believe that no sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Cuevas’ crime. This is not one of those “exceedingly rare” cases where the sentence should be considered disproportionate.