Court Opinion

ID: 9657832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:39:04.0647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:48.741671
License: Public Domain

Mallett, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority regarding the search and seizure issues presented by defendantappellee, and agree that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 does contain a proportionality component. See People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1972). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the "most appropriate remedy” is "to ameliorate the no-parole feature of the penalty.” See ante, p 42.
I am in agreement with the Louisiana Supreme Court that "the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment will override a legislatively imposed mandatory minimum sentence if, as applied to a given defendant for [this] *44crime the punishment is constitutionally excessive.” State v Barberousse, 480 So 2d 273, 280 (La, 1985). While I agree with Justice Riley that in most cases, "the Legislature has the constitutional power to enact mandatory sentences requiring uniform application to all defendants convicted of certain crimes,” post, p 65, it is my belief that in each case where a defendant is convicted of possession of 650 grams of a controlled substance, potentially contained therein is a constitutional claim of cruel or unusual punishment for the imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. It is therefore my position that the constitutional infirmity of the statute1 rests not with the no-parole feature, but with the statute’s mandatory uniform and blanket application to all defendants.
A trial court’s inquiry into the constitutional imposition of this penalty should recognize the Legislature’s judgment that persons who are convicted for violating this statute have engaged in reprehensible activity that has ravaged communities across this state. With that in mind, a trial court should then afford defendants an opportunity to present substantial, compelling, objective and verifiable reasons that the penalty of non*45parolable mandatory life, as it is applied to them, is unconstitutionally disproportionate. I would not foreclose the possibility that such substantial, compelling, objective and verifiable reasons might convince a trial court to deviate from nonparolable mandatory life and impose a substantial term of years.2
The imposition by the Legislature of a mandatory life sentence without parole for this crime strips the judiciary of necessary discretion. The Legislature cannot foreclose the judiciary from exercising its responsibility to examine any and all constitutional claims, particularly those offered by defendants claiming cruel and/or unusual punishment violations.
Nevertheless, on the basis of the precise circumstances and facts of the cases currently before this Court, I am not convinced that the imposition of the mandatory life sentences without possibility of parole is in fact violative of Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Because neither I nor my colleagues are prepared to act as sentencing judges, these cases should be remanded to the trial court for sentencing hearings. This would afford both the prosecution and the defendants the opportunity to create a record that would establish the foundation or lack thereof for individual challenges to the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence of life without possibility of parole.

 MCL 333.7403; MSA 14.15(7403) provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person shall not knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance or an official prescription form or a prescription form unless the controlled substance, official prescription form, or prescription form was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of the practitioner’s professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this article.
(2) A person who violates this section as to:
(a) A controlled substance classified in schedule 1 or 2 which is either a narcotic drug or described in section 7214(a)(iv), and:
(i) Which is in an amount of 650 grams or more of any mixture containing that controlled substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for life.

 By striking down MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4) in so far as it denies prisoners parole if they have been sentenced for life or for a minimum term of years for a major controlled substance offense, the majority will create some confusion in that the mandatory minimum sentence for possession of 225 to 650 grams of a controlled substance is twenty years without the possibility of parole, unless "the court finds on the record that there are substantial and compelling reasons” to depart from the minimum. MCL 333.7403(3); MSA 14.15(7403)(3). A departure from the imposition of mandatory life without the possibility of parole to a term of years less than twenty diminishes the severity of the crime being punished.