Court Opinion

ID: 9905554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 18:01:48.611683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:42.913397
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 29 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NGUYEN CHAN NGUYEN; et al.,                     No.    22-56068

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No.
                                                2:21-cv-01893-FLA-PLA
 v.

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND                   MEMORANDUM*
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, an agency
within the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
               Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted November 13, 2023
                              Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

      Nguyen Chan Nguyen’s petition for an EB-5 immigrant visa was denied by

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) because he failed to

show that his qualifying investment, derived from a third-party currency swap, came

from a lawful source. Nguyen and three similarly situated plaintiffs (collectively,

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
“Nguyen”) sued, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. The

district court granted summary judgment to USCIS. Exercising jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

      The EB-5 statute provides:

      Visas shall be made available . . . to qualified immigrants seeking to
      enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in a new commercial
      enterprise . . . in which such alien has invested . . . or, is actively in the
      process of investing, capital in an amount not less than the amount
      specified.

8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(i) (2018) (amended 2022).1 USCIS regulations define

“capital” as excluding “[a]ssets acquired, directly or indirectly, by unlawful means.”

8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). They also require that “[t]o show that the petitioner has

invested, or is actively in the process of investing, capital obtained through lawful

means, the petition must be accompanied, as applicable, by: [evidentiary

requirements].” Id. § 204.6(j)(3).

      1.     Nguyen contends that the regulation requiring EB-5 petitioners to prove

that their invested capital comes from a lawful source is ultra vires. We disagree.

Employing settled canons of statutory construction, we find that the regulation

comports with the statute. First, Congress’s repeated re-enactment of the EB-5

1
       In 2022, Congress significantly amended the statutory scheme. EB-5 Reform
and Integrity Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 102, 136 Stat. 1070, 1070–75
(2022). The parties agree that this case is governed by the EB-5 statute in force at
the time of Nguyen’s application.

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program without disturbing the agency’s interpretation of the statute suggests that it

has endorsed it. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). Second, reading

the statute to allow illegal funds to qualify a petitioner for an EB-5 visa would allow

noncitizens to obtain EB-5 visas with investment capital garnered through criminal

activity. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989). Third, the

legislative history makes plain that Congress intended for illegal funds to disqualify

a petitioner from obtaining an EB-5 visa. See S. Rep. No. 101-55, 101st Cong., 1st

Sess. 21 (1989).

      Nguyen’s reliance on the presumption of consistent usage does not compel a

different result. Although Congress uses the term “lawful” in 8 U.S.C. § 1153, it

appears only in the context of lawful permanent residence—a term of art—and

lawful authorization to work. Congress did not attach “lawful” to “new commercial

enterprise,” but it seems entirely unlikely that Congress intended an EB-5 visa to

become available through investment in an illegal enterprise.            8 U.S.C. §

1153(b)(5)(A), (B).

      2.     We are also unpersuaded by Nguyen’s argument that USCIS’s practice

of inquiring into the legality of currency swaps is a new legislative rule requiring

notice and comment. USCIS regulations allow an inquiry into the legality of an

investor’s source and path of funds. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(3); see R.L. Inv. Ltd.

Partners v. INS (RLILP), 86 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1025 (D. Haw. 2000), aff’d and

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adopted in full, 273 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001). Inquiring into the path of funds not

only ensures their legality but also confirms that they belong to the petitioner. See

Matter of Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169, 195 (BIA 1998). Moreover, USCIS’s

practice is not new; the agency has a history of scrutinizing currency swaps. See,

e.g., Matter of [Redacted], 2009 WL 1742398, at *15–16 (AAO Mar. 6, 2009). And,

even if there were a rule change, it would be interpretive and hence exempt from

notice and comment. See RLILP, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 1024–26.

      3.     Nguyen argues that denying his EB-5 petition was arbitrary and

capricious because USCIS scrutinizes currency swaps more closely than investments

made through friends and family. But he does not identify any agency policy

imposing different evidentiary requirements on the two groups. Nguyen also alleges

that USCIS made adjudicative errors in denying his petition. But the agency

ultimately denied Nguyen’s petition based on multiple inconsistencies in the record

raising doubt about Nguyen’s currency swap partner. Since he never addressed

those inconsistencies, he does not demonstrate that the record would “compel a

reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result.” Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d

1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

      AFFIRMED.2

2
      Nguyen’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

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