Court Opinion

ID: 9389381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 16:08:10.559997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:26.816874
License: Public Domain

J-S43044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 HERIBERTO DIAZ                            :
                                           :
                     Appellant             :   No. 1587 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-48-CR-0003459-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED APRIL 25, 2023

      Appellant Heriberto Diaz appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of attempted arson, recklessly endangering

another person (REAP), possession of heroin with intent to deliver (PWID),

possession    of   heroin   (simple   possession),   and   possession   of   drug

paraphernalia. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting certain evidence, and he challenges the weight of the evidence and

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the

judgment of sentence in part, and vacate in part as to the sentence of simple

possession.

      On May 4, 2019, the Bethlehem Police Department responded to a

report regarding a possible fire in Room 7 of a hotel located at 716 East Fifth

Street.   Appellant was the sole occupant of the room when police arrived.

Appellant told police that he had used crushed paper and lighters to burn the
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wall and doorframe of the room, and that the fire had spread to the ceiling.

Police officers escorted Appellant out of his hotel room and into the common

area, where Appellant sat in a chair while the police called for an ambulance.

When the ambulance arrived, Appellant stood up from his seat, and a used

syringe needle filled with blood fell from his person and onto the ground. After

Officer Robert Taylor saw the syringe, he conducted a pat-down search of

Appellant for officer safety.

       During the search, Officer Taylor felt a bulge in Appellant’s leg area, at

which point Appellant stated that he was an “addict” and that the bulge was a

pouch filled with heroin.          Ultimately, Officer Taylor recovered $544 in

currency, three loose packets of heroin, and 21 bundles of heroin which

contained an additional 210 packets.

       On December 3, 2019, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with

criminal attempt to commit arson, REAP, PWID, simple possession, and

possession of drug paraphernalia.1 The criminal information stated that the

drug-related charges were based on the evidence that Appellant had

possessed 213 packets of heroin. Criminal Information, 12/3/19, at 1-4.

       During discovery, the Commonwealth provided Appellant with a lab

report reflecting the weight and contents of two heroin packets that had been

recovered from Appellant during the search. The report stated that the gross

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 3301(a)(1)(ii); 2705; 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30);
(a)(16); and (a)(32), respectively.

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weight of both items was 0.43 grams, and that the net weight of the powder

inside of the two packets was 0.015 grams. Lab Report, 8/29/19, at 1. The

day before trial, the Commonwealth provided an additional lab report to

Appellant which reflected a total weight of 5.5 grams for the heroin recovered

from Appellant.      Lab Report, 4/11/22, at 1.      After hearing argument from

Appellant and the Commonwealth, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth

to admit the additional lab report “based on the fact that the information itself

references the number of packets” that formed the basis of Appellant’s PWID

charge. N.T. Trial, 4/12/22, at 17-18.

       The matter proceeded to a jury trial on April 12, 2022.2       Ultimately,

Appellant was convicted of all charges.          On May 18, 2022, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of seven years and eleven months

to twenty-five years’ incarceration.3 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence

motion seeking reconsideration of his sentence in which he argued that the

trial court erred by failing to consider his “severe mental problems” at

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant initially entered a negotiated guilty plea to PWID and
attempt to commit arson in July of 2020. At that time, Appellant admitted
that he had attempted to start a fire in his hotel room and that he had
possessed 213 packets of heroin. N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/6/20, at 22-24.
However, Appellant later withdrew his guilty plea and proceeded to trial.

3 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms of 60
to 180 months’ incarceration for attempted arson and 35 to 120 months’
incarceration for PWID. The trial court also imposed concurrent terms of 12
to 24 months’ incarceration for REAP, 6 to 12 months’ incarceration for simple
possession, and 3 to 12 months’ incarceration for possession of drug
paraphernalia. See Sentencing Order, 5/18/22, at 1-3.

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sentencing.     Post-Sentence Mot., 5/23/22, at 1.        The trial court denied

Appellant’s motion on May 27, 2022.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial

court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review, which we

have reordered as follows:

       1. Did the trial court err in allowing the Commonwealth to present
          evidence of a “new” lab report generated the night prior to trial
          and providing the same to defense on the morning of trial?

       2. Did the jury fail to consider the lack of intent to cause damage
          to property or harm to persons as required under the charge of
          attempt to commit arson?

       3. Was the verdict of the jury . . . against the weight of the
          evidence and law?

       4. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion for
          reconsideration of sentence?

       5. Did the trial court err in failing to consider [Appellant’s] mental
          health condition in determining the sentence imposed?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (formatting altered).4

____________________________________________

4 Appellant presented one additional issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement that
he does not include in his brief. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/27/22.
Specifically, Appellant claimed that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. See id. at 1. Because Appellant
did not address this issue in his brief, he abandoned this issue on appeal, and
it is therefore waived.       See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); see also
Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding
waiver where the appellant abandoned claim on appeal).

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                                  Lab Report

      In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing

the Commonwealth to admit a second lab report that was provided to

Appellant the day before trial. Appellant’s Brief at 8. In support, Appellant

notes that during discovery, the Commonwealth disclosed an initial lab report

which stated that the substance recovered from Appellant weighed 0.43

grams. Id. However, the second report listed the weight as more than 5.5

grams. Id. Appellant argues that the admission of the second report was

highly prejudicial, as his entire “defense was that the amount of drugs [from

the first lab report was] consistent with mere [simple] possession and not

[PWID].” Id. at 8-9. Appellant concludes that the trial court erred by allowing

the Commonwealth to introduce the second lab report into evidence which

unfairly prejudiced Appellant. Id. at 10.

      “Decisions involving discovery matters are within the sound discretion

of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error

of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the

exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”       Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

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      The purpose of the discovery rules is to prevent a trial by ambush that

violates a defendant’s right to due process. Commonwealth v. Ulen, 650

A.2d 416, 419 (Pa. 1994).

      Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the

Commonwealth is required to disclose “any results or reports of scientific tests

. . . that are within the possession or control of the attorney for the

Commonwealth.”         Pa.R.Crim.P.   573(B)(1)(e).     Additionally,   both the

Commonwealth and the defense have a duty to promptly notify the opposing

party of additional evidence upon discovery prior to or during trial.          See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(D).

      Further, Rule 573(E) provides:

      (E) Remedy. If at any time during the course of the proceedings
      it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
      comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit
      discovery or inspection, may grant a continuance, or may prohibit
      such party from introducing evidence not disclosed, other than
      testimony of the defendant, or it may enter such other order as it
      deems just under the circumstances.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E).

      However, this Court has explained:

      A defendant seeking relief from a discovery violation must
      demonstrate prejudice.        A violation of discovery does not
      automatically entitle appellant to a new trial. Rather, an appellant
      must demonstrate how a more timely disclosure would have
      affected his trial strategy or how he was otherwise prejudiced by
      the alleged late disclosure.

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Commonwealth v. Causey, 833 A.2d 165, 171 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

     Here, shortly before trial began on April 12, 2022, the trial conducted a

hearing to address any remaining pre-trial matters. N.T. Trial, 4/12/22, at 5-

18. At that time, the Commonwealth moved to admit an additional lab report

that had been completed by the crime lab on April 11, 2022. Id. at 7. The

Commonwealth explained that although an initial lab report had been

completed on August 29, 2019, it had been performed by a now-retired

analyst who was unavailable to testify at trial. Id. The Commonwealth stated

that, in order to correct this issue, it had “requested [that] the drugs be

retested by a new analyst who will be available to testify.” Id. at 8. The

Commonwealth noted that although the crime lab completed a re-test on April

5, 2022, the report only contained results for one packet. Id. Therefore, the

Commonwealth asked the lab to conduct a second re-test to include a finding

as to the remaining packets that were recovered from Appellant. Id. The

Commonwealth stated that after the test was completed on April 11, 2022, it

had promptly provided the report to Appellant. Id.

     Appellant objected to the admission of the April 11, 2022 lab report and

argued that he had based his defense strategy on the 0.43 grams reflected in

the initial report, which was an amount more consistent with simple

possession than PWID.      Id. at 9-10.     Specifically, although Appellant

acknowledged that he had been charged with possessing 213 packets of

heroin, he argued that the Commonwealth’s expert would be unable to

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conclude that the heroin was “meant for anything other than personal use”

based on the original weight of 0.43 grams. Id. at 10.

      In response, the Commonwealth argued that, based on the weight of

the sample size reflected in the August 29, 2019 lab report, the

Commonwealth’s expert “could extrapolate, based on the weight of that bag,”

the total weight of the remaining packets that Appellant had in his possession

at the time of the search.    Id. at 10-11.    Therefore, the Commonwealth

asserted that, regardless of which lab report was being used, the expert could

have testified that the total weight of the heroin was 5.5 grams based on the

fact that police recovered a total of 213 packets. Id. at 11.

      Finally, the Commonwealth noted that the April 11, 2022 lab report was

“not exculpatory information,” because “[a]t all times we knew there was 213

[packets] of heroin. It does not change the grading of the offense as part of

the [criminal i]nformation. It does not change anything.”        Id. at 11-12.

Additionally, the Commonwealth reiterated that Appellant had already

admitted that the 213 packets were heroin, and that “he packaged the [other

packets of] heroin similarly so that he wouldn’t overdose.” Id. at 11.

      Ultimately, the trial court stated that it had “reviewed the record and[,]

simply based on the fact that the information itself references the number of

packets that were charged,” the Commonwealth’s April 11, 2022 lab report

was admissible. Id. at 17-18.

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      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained:

      As noted by the Commonwealth on the record, the heroin was
      originally tested in 2019, but prior to trial in April 2022, the
      Commonwealth determined that the original analyst had retired
      and would not be available to testify. On April 5, 2022, the
      Commonwealth received a second lab report analyzing a single
      packet of heroin. On April 11, 2022, the Commonwealth received
      a third lab report, provided to [Appellant] prior to jury selection
      on the morning of April 12, 2022, which included the total weight
      of the heroin contained in the 213 packets seized from
      [Appellant’s] pocket and underwear. The [c]ourt determined that
      because the criminal information, filed on December 3, 2019,
      originally charged [Appellant] with possession of 213 packets of
      heroin, [Appellant] was not unduly prejudiced by the introduction
      of the lab report providing the total weight of heroin within those
      packets. [N.T. Trial, 4/12/22, at 18]. Based on the foregoing, the
      Commonwealth disclosed the updated lab report as soon as it was
      received, and there is no basis for [Appellant] to contend that he
      was surprised by the Commonwealth’s attempt to prove the
      weight of heroin possessed by [Appellant].

Trial Ct. Op., 8/18/22, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court.   See Santos, 176 A.3d at 882.       As noted, Appellant was

charged with PWID based on allegations that he possessed 213 packets of

heroin at the time of his arrest. See Criminal Information at 1-4. Since that

time, Appellant has been aware that the Commonwealth intended to prove

PWID based on the quantity of heroin recovered from Appellant during the

search and the manner in which the heroin had been packaged, rather than

the weight reflected in the lab report. See e.g., N.T. Plea Hr’g, 7/6/20, at 23

(reflecting the Commonwealth’s summary of the factual basis for the PWID

charge).

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       Indeed, at trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Detective

Anthony Arredondo, who was qualified as an expert in the field of narcotics

investigation, sales, and trafficking.            See N.T. Trial, 4/13/22, at 115.

Detective Arredondo opined that the heroin recovered from Appellant was

“without a doubt possession with intent to deliver.” Id. at 119. Specifically,

Detective Arredondo explained: “The quantity alone is enough . . . a typical

purchase would be a bundle.[5] You have 213 bags here in this case. So

you’re talking over $2,000 worth of [h]eroin . . . [t]o have this much is typical

for a drug dealer, not a user.” Id.            Under these circumstances, even if the

Commonwealth violated Rule 573 by failing to provide the updated lab report

to Appellant at an earlier time, we conclude that Appellant has failed to

demonstrate that he suffered prejudice.6 See Causey, 833 A.2d at 171; see

____________________________________________

5The Commonwealth’s expert also explained that a “bundle” consisted of ten
bags. See N.T. Trial, 4/13/22, at 118.

6 We note that the August 29, 2019 lab report did not provide a total weight
for the heroin contained in the 213 packets recovered from Appellant during
the initial search. Instead, the report indicated that the gross weight of “two
blue glassine bags taped together containing tan powder” recovered from
Appellant was 0.43 grams, and the net weight of the heroin powder in one
bag from that sample was 0.015 grams. See Lab Report, 8/29/19, at 1. At
trial, the Commonwealth presented expert testimony from Erin Luck, who
explained that the lab does not test every packet of heroin, and instead uses
“a statistical formula to come up with a sample size large enough to infer
about the population” of the remaining packets. See N.T. Trial, 4/12/22, at
134. Therefore, even without the adjusted weight from the April 11, 2022 lab
report, Appellant had notice that the total weight of the heroin would exceed
0.43 grams.

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also Lopez, 57 A.3d at 82-83. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief

on this claim.

                              Weight of the Evidence

       In his next two claims,7 Appellant argues that the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence because the jury failed to consider “the lack of

intent to cause properly damage or to harm others” in finding him guilty for

arson. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. In support, Appellant notes that at trial, he

“emphatically told the jurors that he felt there were people trying to get to

him” and that he had started the fire in order to “get the police to his room.”

Id. at 10-11 (citing N.T. Trial, 4/13/22, at 143-45). Therefore, Appellant

concludes that the evidence demonstrates that he lacked the requisite intent

to sustain a charge of attempt to commit arson. Id. at 11.

       Before reaching the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine

whether he has preserved these issues for review.        Pennsylvania Rule of

Criminal Procedure 607(A) provides that a challenge to the weight of the

evidence must be raised in a motion for a new trial that is presented orally,

on the record, before sentencing, by written motion before sentencing, or in

a post-sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); Commonwealth v. Priest,

18 A.3d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2011). The failure to properly preserve a

weight of the evidence claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court
____________________________________________

7 We note that although Appellant raises these claims as two separate issues
in his statement of questions, he has combined them in his brief. See
Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. Therefore, we will address both issues together.

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addresses the issue in its opinion. Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d

483, 494 (Pa. 2009).

        Instantly, the record reflects that Appellant did not move for a new trial

at sentencing, nor did he raise this claim in his post-sentence motion.

Therefore,    Appellant’s     weight-of-the-evidence   claim   is   waived.   See

Sherwood, 982 A.2d at 494; Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A).8

                       Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

        Appellant’s remaining issues relate to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. First, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider his

mental health issues when imposing Appellant’s sentence. Appellant’s Brief

at 6.

____________________________________________

8 In any event, even if Appellant had properly preserved a weight-of-the-
evidence claim before the trial court, we would conclude that Appellant failed
to properly develop this claim for appellate review. Although Appellant
challenges the weight of the evidence in his brief, he has failed to support his
claim with any citations to case law or statutory authority. “[I]t is an
appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our
review.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924
(Pa. 2009) (holding that “where an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.”) (citations omitted). Further, to the extent that Appellant argues
that the jury should have credited his own testimony, we will not revisit the
jury’s credibility determinations or substitute our judgment for that of the trier
of fact. See Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super.
2018).

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      It is well settled that

      challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle
      an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging the
      discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s
      jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

      We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
      and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
      sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
      Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
      that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
      Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some

citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved his sentencing claims

in his post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included a

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. Therefore, we must consider whether

Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review.

      “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”             Id.

(citation omitted).

      Here, in his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that although

there was evidence demonstrating that he suffered from mental health issues,

the trial court “failed to take Appellant’s condition into account” when imposing

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its sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 5. However, this Court has held that “a

claim of inadequate consideration of [factors including mental health issues]

does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v.

Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 807 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v.

Cannon, 954 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2008)).             Therefore, because

Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question for review, his sentencing

claim fails.9 See Proctor, 156 A.3d at 273. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                         Merger

       Finally, we must address whether Appellant’s sentences for simple

possession and PWID should have merged for sentencing purposes. Although

Appellant did not raise this issue on appeal, we may address this issue sua

sponte. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 941 (Pa. Super.

2020) (holding that questions concerning merger implicate the legality of a

sentence, and this Court may address such issues sua sponte); see also

____________________________________________

9 In any event, although Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider
his mental health condition, that claim is belied by the record. The record
reflects that the trial court reviewed a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report
and a mental health evaluation prior to sentencing. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g,
5/18/22, at 7. Where a sentencing court is informed by a PSI report, “it is
presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and
considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion
should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135
(Pa. Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 616
(Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that the weight to be afforded the various
sentencing factors is a discretionary matter for the sentencing court and its
determination will not be disturbed simply because the defendant would have
preferred that different weight be given to any particular factor). Therefore,
Appellant’s claim is meritless.

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Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 960 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating

that “[a]n illegal sentence must be vacated” (citation omitted)).

      When reviewing the legality of a sentence, “our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tighe, 184

A.3d 560, 584 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).

      Section 9765 of the Sentencing Code provides as follows:

      No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
      arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements
      of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
      offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court
      may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.

      This Court has explained, “[t]he statute’s mandate is clear. It prohibits

merger unless two distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single

criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are

included in the statutory elements of the other.”        Commonwealth v.

Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

      The crimes of simple possession and PWID are defined as follows:

      (a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
      Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:

                                  *     *      *

         (16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or
         counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act,
         or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate
         State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from,
         or pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a
         practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized by this act.

                                  *     *      *

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          (30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture,
          delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a
          controlled substance by a person not registered under this act,
          or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate
          State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing
          with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.

35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30).

      It is well settled that charges of simple possession and PWID “should

[merge] for sentencing purposes” when “both charges [stem] from the same

act of possession.” Commonwealth v. Johnston, 501 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Pa.

Super. 1985) (citing Commonwealth v. Edwards, 449 A.2d 38 (Pa. Super.

1982)).

      Instantly, Appellant was charged with simple possession and PWID

based on the same act, namely, Appellant’s possession of the 213 bags of

heroin. See Criminal Information at 1-4. Therefore, Appellant’s convictions

for simple possession and PWID should have merged for sentencing purposes.

See Johnston, 501 A.2d at 1123; see also Martinez, 153 A.3d at 1030.

Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the sentence imposed for simple

possession. See, e.g., Tucker, 143 A.3d at 968 (affirming the defendant’s

convictions but vacating an illegal sentence). Further, we note that because

the trial court imposed a concurrent sentence for the simple possession

conviction, our disposition does not upset the trial court’s overall sentencing

scheme. Therefore, it is not necessary to remand this matter for resentencing.

See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569-70 (Pa. Super. 2006).

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      For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s convictions, vacate the

sentence imposed for simple possession, and affirm the judgment of sentence

in all other respects.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, and vacated in part as to the

sentence imposed for simple possession. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/25/2023

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