Court Opinion

ID: 9581943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:20:43.611541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:21.277697
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as I believe the warrant is supported by probable cause. Although the majority purports to apply the totality of circumstances analysis, it bases its decision solely on the fact that *850the unidentified third-party’s reliability is not established by the affidavit or otherwise. However, under the totality of circumstances analysis, the issuing magistrate is to make a practical, common-sense decision whether there is a fair probability contraband will be found in a particular place based on all the circumstances described in the affidavit before him, not just the veracity of persons supplying hearsay information. See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577 (422 SE2d 426) (1992). We have specifically stated that “although information regarding the reliability of the informant is highly relevant to the totality oi circumstances determination, the absence of significant informatior regarding reliability is not necessarily fatal to an affidavit.” Munsor v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80, 82 (438 SE2d 123) (1993). Indeed, we have said that a grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towarc warrants is inconsistent with the desire to encourage police officers tc use the warrant process and with the recognition that once a warran has been obtained, intrusion on the interests protected by the Fourtl Amendment is less severe. Mincey v. State, 180 Ga. App. 898, 900 (1) (350 SE2d 852) (1986). We have further said that preference shoulc be accorded to upholding warrants in doubtful or marginal cases. Id
While the majority purports to adhere to these standards, in nr view, its opinion represents a return to the two-pronged Aguilar Spinelli requirement of demonstration of the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge. However, we rejected this test ai “hypertechnical and divorced from the factual and practical consider ations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not le gal technicians, act” in order to allow magistrates, many of whom an not lawyers, to make a practical, common-sense decision as t< whether probable cause exists. See Munson, supra at 82.
Looking at the totality of circumstances and applying a practica common-sense analysis, I would find the warrant was supported b; probable cause. The affidavit stated that Source B had told Source i that he had been in Wood’s residence, described as 1616 Wax Roac and had seen a quantity of methamphetamine in Wood’s possessior Source A, who by all accounts was a reliable informant, had furthe told the affiant that he knew of no reason for Source B to lie and tha Source B did not know this information would be communicated t the police. Source A also told the affiant that Wood, who was appai ently known by both Sources A and B, had red hair and drove a whit Chevy Caprice. Police, by independent investigation, corroborate that Wood had red hair, drove a white Chevy Caprice, and lived s the address in question.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not find the informe tion provided by Source B to be completely unreliable. Rather tha detracting from the unwitting, third-party’s reliability, the fact .the the unwitting did not know the reliable informant would commun *851cate this information to police has been considered an indicator of reliability. See State v. Hockman, 171 Ga. App. 504, 505-506 (320 SE2d 241) (1984); see also Munson, supra at 82, n. 1. Furthermore, the independent investigation conducted by police corroborated that Wood lived at the house where Source B said he saw the contraband in Wood’s possession and that Wood and her car fit the description given by the reliable informant. In my view, the independent investigation conducted by the police was not insufficient since the police corroborated all the details of the information provided by both sources that they possibly could. Certainly, it cannot be argued that the police should have asked Source B if his information was true since it is likely that Source B, who did not know the information would be communicated to the police, would have alerted Wood to such an inquiry. Because I find there was some indication of the reliability of Source B and that the police did provide corroboration of the information obtained by both sources, I would hold that probable cause existed to believe contraband was located at Wood’s home and that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. See Mincey, supra at 900; Hockman, supra at 506.
Decided September 27, 1994
Reconsideration denied October 18, 1994 —
Lorie A. Moss, for appellant.
Stephen F. Lanier, District Attorney, Lisa W. Pettit, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.