Court Opinion

ID: 9753482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:15:22.521253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:29.103182
License: Public Domain

SAYLOR, Justice,
Concurring.
Concerning Appellant’s penalty phase claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to proffer an adequate case of mitigation, the .majority ultimately concludes that the strategy of limiting the presentation to a theory of residual doubt was reasonable given that counsel did not view Appellant as being an effective witness and the lack of other witnesses. Majority Op. at 320. But as this Court has recognized, and as is widely recognized in other jurisdictions, capital defense counsel is obliged to perform an adequate pre-trial investigation concerning potential mitigation evidence for use in a capital sentencing proceeding. See Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 289, 744 A.2d 717, 735 (2000); Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 248, 732 A.2d 1167, 1189 (1999); see also Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 595 (6th Cir.2000)(deeming defense attorneys’ performance deficient where they failed to investigate substantial avenues of mitigation, opting instead to rely solely on a theory of residual doubt); accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-97, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1514-15, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Here, trial counsel conceded at a post-conviction hearing that he failed to investigate basic areas of potential mitigation evidence. See, e.g., N.T., Jun. 28, 1998, at 82. Moreover, although certainly a residual doubt theory may, in an appropriate case, present an effective argument to a capital sentencing jury, see generally Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1769, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), its selection should not be regarded as excusing the obligation to investigation other potential avenues. See Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991)(finding trial counsel ineffective where “the ultimate decision that was reached not to call witnesses [for mitigation] was not a result of *369investigation and evaluation, but was instead primarily a result of counsels’ eagerness to latch onto defendant’s statements that he did not want any witnesses called”). In this regard, I would emphasize the impossibility of making an informed decision that a chosen mitigation strategy is superior to others without first exploring the availability and strength of other mitigation theories. Thus, I would find that the post-conviction record here presented supports a conclusion that there is arguable merit to Appellant’s contention that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to conduct an adequate investigation concerning mitigation evidence.
In my view, however, the primary weakness in this post-conviction claim lies in Appellant’s failure to establish prejudice. In contrast to .cases in which a PCRA court dismissed a post-conviction claim without a hearing in the face of pleadings and affidavits setting forth a substantial case in mitigation, see, e.g., Williams, 557 Pa. at 245-49, 732 A.2d at 1187-90, here, the PCRA court conducted a hearing and therefore provided Appellant the opportunity to develop a record of available strategies which could be compared and contrasted with the residual doubt tactic actually pursued. See Williams, 557 Pa. at 248, 732 A.2d at 1189 (“A finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.”). At the hearing, in addition to his own testimony concerning good work, school and prison records, Appellant offered solely the abbreviated testimony of a single character witness to establish that Appellant had been of significance in her life. This approach contrasts sharply with instances in which, for example, a post-conviction petitioner who can demonstrate a deficient investigation supplies a substantial history of mental health disorder and treatment and associated psychiatric evidence, see, e.g., Williams, 557 Pa. at 245-49, 732 A.2d at 1187-88; see also Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d at 590-600, which, if believed, would at least provide some form of explanation concerning how it is that the defendant came to his present circumstances to aid the sentencing *370tribunal in making its judgment concerning whether life imprisonment or death is the appropriate penalty for the capital crime involved. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. at 1515 (concluding that “the graphic description of Williams’ childhod, filled with abuse and privation, or the reality that he was ‘borderline mentally retarded,’ might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of his moral culpability”).
Here, by contrast, I would conclude Appellant’s evidence simply does not establish that alternative not chosen offered a potential for success greater than that which was pursued. Hence it is that I am able to join the majority’s disposition of this claim.