Court Opinion

ID: 9635982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:11:34.207272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:39.751931
License: Public Domain

VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judge
(concurring). I concur in the disposition of the case directed in the foregoing opinion. If the action be viewed as one on implied contract to refund money paid through mistake, the court below was without jurisdiction. If, as I think, it is for the recovery of carriers’ charges, it is barred by limitation.
From the correspondence between the parties and their representatives set out in the record, it appears that plaintiff in error on June 30, 1922, made claim for overcharge in the sum of $130.84. July 25, 1922, defendant in error acknowledged a claim for $75.92. October 26, 1922, the railroad asked the lumber company to reduce the claim to $85.48. February 15, 1923, it advised plaintiff in error that “if you will amend yourx claim to $101.08,. we will be pleased to place in line for payment.” Amendment and payment followed. August 13, 1924, the accounting department of the railroad notified the lumber company that in this refund there had been an overpayment of $4.46. The lumber company remitted that amount to the railroad. June 17, 1925, the accounting department again revised its figures and made demand for an additional sum of $55.75 because of alleged overpayment in its refund of $101.08.
.Upon refusal to meet this demand this action was filed February 17, 1926. In the stipulation of facts it is agreed: “That the balance of the overpayment by the plaintiff to the defendant still unpaid is fifty-five dollars seventy-five cents ($55.75).”
Paragraph 3 of section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended June 7, 1924, provides that: “The cause of action in respect of a shipment of property shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to accrue upon delivery or tender of delivery thereof by the carrier, and not after.” 49 USCA § 16 (3), (e); Comp. St. § 8584 (3), (e).
This action is in effect one for the recovery of a part of the carrier’s charge; other*617wise, the ultimate result of the transaction is a rebate of $55.75 to this shipper. But the delivery was made May 16, 1922; consequently, by the unambiguous terms of the statute, this action is barred. Without reflection upon the parties to this controversy, it is obvious that such vacillating methods of accounting may be made the means of granting rebates and concessions under specious forms of procedure. The remedy, however, lies with Congress. The courts must administer the law as it is written.