Court Opinion

ID: 9535337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:48:15.966465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:13.477099
License: Public Domain

*645Dissenting Opinion
Jackson, C. J.
— This is an appeal from the judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court sentencing the appellant to the Indiana State Prison and also an appeal from the ruling of the Shelby Circuit Court granting a petition for an entry nunc pro tunc in proceedings had after the cause had been transferred to the Shelby Superior Court.
Appellant and one Allen R. Dixon were jointly charged in a two count affidavit with the crimes of Second Degree Burglary and Automobile Banditry in the Shelby Circuit Court. On motion of the defendant Dixon, the cause was continued as to him, and was submitted as to the appellant only, to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury on June 23, 1961. At the conclusion of all the evidence, on June 23, 1961, appellant was found guilty of the crime of second degree burglary as charged in count one of the affidavit and not guilty of the crime of automobile banditry as charged in count two of the affidavit. Judgment was entered that appellant be imprisoned in the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than two years nor more than five years; that he be disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for a period of two years; that he stand committed until the costs in this action are paid or replevied, and the commitment is now ordered.
In view of the issues before this court we set out the commitment herein. Such commitment reads as follows:
“STATE OF INDIANA COMMITMENT
SS: The Shelby County Circuit Court
SHELBY COUNTY
April Term, 1961 June 23,1961
*646“TO THE SHERIFF OF SHELBY COUNTY, GREETING:
“BE IT REMEMBERED, that heretofore, to wit: At a term of the Shelby Circuit Court of Shelby County, in the State of Indiana, begun, holden and continued at the Court House in the City of Shelbyville, on the 23rd day of June, 1961, the same being the 65th judicial day of the April Term, A. D., 1961, of the said Circuit Court of Shelby County, before the Honorable Harold G. Barger, sole Judge thereof, the following proceedings were had in the cause of “THE STATE OF INDIANA
YS NO. 6945
JAMES G. WARE CRIME
SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY
“Comes now the State of Indiana, by Robert L. Sheaffer, Prosecuting Attorney; comes also the defendant, in person, and by Sam Blum, and the Court finds that the defendant James G. Ware, is — of age, and that said defendant is guilty of the crime charged, namely: Second Degree' Burglary:
“It is by the Court, therefore ordered and adjudged that the said defendant for the offense by him committed, to make him fine to the State of Indiana in the penal sum of — Dollars, that He be committed to the custody of the Board of Trustees of the Indiana Reformatory, to be confined by them according to law imprisoned in the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than 2 years nor more than 5 years, and be disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for a term of 2 years, and that He pay and satisfy the costs and charges herein, taxed as $ — .
“The Court further finds that by reason of the character of said defendant, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of said crime, the interest of society does not demand or require that the defendant shall suffer the penalty imposed by law, if he shall hereafter behave well. It is therefore ordered by the Court that the execution of the sentence herein im*647posed be suspended during defendant’s good behavior, and that he be permitted to go at liberty on probation so long as he behaves well.
“The Sheriff of said Shelby County is hereby charged with the due execution of the foregoing judgment.
“Harold G. Barger Judge
“STATE OF INDIANA
SS:
SHELBY COUNTY
“I, Herrin H. Brown, Clerk of the Shelby Circuit Court of Shelby County, in the State of Indiana, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the judgment of said Court in the above entitled cause, on the day and year first aforesaid, as appears on record in my office.
“IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe my name, and affix the seal of said Circuit Court of Shelby County, at my office in the City of Shelbyville, this 2Srd day of June, 1961.
“(SEAL) Herrin H. Brown, Clerk Circuit Court of Shelby County by Dorothy McNeely, Deputy”
At this point we deem it advisable to call attention to the fact that the legislature by Acts 1961, ch. 95, §1, p. 182, being §4-4401, Burns’ 1962 Cum. Supp., created the Shelby Superior Court. Said Act was in force July 1, 1961. Said act [Acts 1961, ch. 95, §7, p. 182, being §4-4407, Burns’ 1962 Cum. Supp.] granted to the Shelby Superior Court “. . . original exclusive jurisdiction within the county of all crimes and misdemeanors committed therein, . . . .” It provides further, “. . . lajnd all sueh matters, together with all books and records thereof, pending in the Shelby Circuit Court shall be transferred to the Shelby Superior Court. Such superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all- divorce, separation from bed and board, and annulment matters and causes of *648action originating in Shelby County, and all further proceedings of every nature commenced or had after a final judgment or decree in any of such causes heretofore made and entered by the Shelby Circuit Court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant filed his motion for a new trial on July 22, 1961, in the Shelby Circuit Court. On November 10, 1961, appellant’s motion for a new trial was overruled by both the Shelby Superior and Circuit Courts, and appellant was granted 90 days to file a Bill of Exceptions.
Appellant’s assignment of errors, including his additional assignment, contains ten specifications, the original assignment being:
“1. The court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial.
“2. The court erred in overruling the motion of appellant for discharge made at the close of the case of appellee.
“3. The court erred in overruling the motion of appellant for discharge made at the close of all of the evidence.
“4. The court erred in sentencing the appellant and committing him to the Sheriff for the execution of the judgment herein, without first complying with the laws of the State of Indiana concerning precommitment investigations.
“5. The court erred in not complying with the Precommitment Investigation Procedure of the 1959 Acts Chapter 264 sec. 2 Page 632.
“6. The court erred in committing the appellant without first having had written precommitment investigation report prepared by a probation officer.
“7. The finding of the court is contrary to law.”
Appellant’s additional assignment of errors is as follows:
*649“8. The court erred in sustaining appellee’s motion to amend and correct the record nunc pro tunc.
“9. The court erred in amending the record by nunc pro tunc proceedings.
“10. The court erred in changing the record and amending the record nunc pro tunc.”
For the purpose of this dissent it is not necessary to consider all the specifications assigned, and for that reason we will confine our discussion to those numbered 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10.
Under specification one we will consider appellant’s contention that the evidence was not sufficient as to the identification of the appellant.
There was only one witness who identified the appellant or testified as to his being any where in the vicinity of the alleged crime. That witness was Grace Darlene Robins, the daughter-in-law of the owner of the store alleged to have been burglarized by appellant and another. She testified that on August 19, 1960, she was at the home of her father-in-law, adjacent to, and on the east side of the store, about 9:30 in the evening. She left to go to her home, and as she passed the store she saw someone in the big plate glass window. She crossed the drive, took a second look, and saw it wasn’t her husband. She testified that there was a big night light in the store and that the intruder was standing directly beneath it, reaching to get a transistor radio, and that he had white gloves on. She noticed the color of the apparel the man had on at that time, but did not remember what the color of the suit was now. He had a jacket on, a windbreaker jacket, but she did not remember the color of the jacket. The man was standing up when she first saw him, he did not have glasses on, was *650rather tall, about 5'11", had long wavy, light brown hair. She did not remember the color of the trousers he had on, but testified she described the man and his clothes at that time; that she had two good looks at him at the store, it wasn’t probably over a half a minute. Some two and a half or three hours later she was taken to the police station, but no one else was pointed out to her for identification. Mr. Ware was the only one in the room at police headquarters. She further testified she saw the person through the door at police headquarters, and that the door was open when she saw him. There was an officer standing beside her, but she did not remember now who he was. She was at police headquarters about one to three minutes on August 10, 1960. She further testified that she had not seen him since August 1960, but was sure it was the same man. She was told that Ware and his counsel would be in court and that she would have to identify him.
This conviction can only be sustained by holding the testimony of Grace Darlene Robins, uncorroborated in any way, contradicted by the appellant and by the facts in the case, was sufficient to. prove the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances here delineated, without weighing the evidence, it seems that the State has failed to here meet the criteria laid down in Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 138 N. E. 2d 641.
Under specifications five and six appellant asserts that the court committed error in sentencing appellant and committing him to the sheriff, for the execution of the judgment, without first complying with Acts 1959, eh. 264, §2, p. 632, being §9-2252, Bums’ 1962 Cum. Supp. The statute provides:
*651“No defendant convicted of a felony shall be committed by any criminal court of record before a written precommitment investigation report, prepared by a probation officer, is presented to and considered by the sentencing court. Whenever precommitment investigation is required, the probation officer making the investigation shall inquire into the circumstances of the offense and shall make such investigation as is prescribed by the state probation director of the department of correction. All local and state police agencies shall be required to furnish to the probation officer such records as the probation officer may request. Where in the opinion of the sentencing court, or the investigating authority, it is desirable, the precommitment investigation may include a physical and mental examination of the defendant. If a defendant is thereafter committed to any penal and correctional institution the investigating agency shall send a written report of its precommitment investigation to the penal institution at the time of commitment.”
I agree with the majority opinion that the above statute is mandatory, if the defendant is in fact committed to a penal and correctional institution. In the instant case the appellant, by the terms of the original judgment, was placed on probation, and the failure to comply with the above statute at most constituted harmless error. When the. judge of the Shelby Circuit Court, on February 15, 1962, entered a nunc pro tunc entry attempting to strike from the original judgment, the provision which suspended the order of commitment, even had such nunc pro tunc entry been proper, the failure to comply with the statute [§9-2252, Burns’ 1962 Cum. Supp., supra] became prejudicial to the appellant and would constitute reversible error.
Specifications eight, nine and ten may be considered together for the purpose of this dissent. The record discloses that appellant was charged with the com*652mission of the crimes enumerated in the forepart hereof by affidavit filed August 25, 1960; on December 17, 1960, he pleaded not guilty to the charges; trial was had June 23, 1961, to the court and appellant was found guilty of second degree burglary, and sentenced the same day without the court having complied with §9-2252, Burns’ 1962 Cum. Supp., supra. On July 1, 1961, the new Superior Court with exclusive criminal jurisdiction for Shelby County, Indiana, came into being, and all cases within its jurisdiction were transferred from the Shelby Circuit Court. On July 22, 1961, appellant filed a motion for a new trial in the Shelby Superior Court; on November TO, 1961, appellant’s motion for a new trial was overruled by both the Shelby Circuit Court and the Shelby Superior Court. On December 1, 1961, appellant filed praecipe for transcript to appeal to this court; January 15, 1962, the State filed a written dismissal of affidavit against appellant’s co-defendant, Allen R. Dixon; January 31, 1962, appellant filed his Bill of Exceptions No. 1, and the same was on the same day signed and approved by the Judge and certified to the clerk as a part of the record in this cause. February 2, 1962, the State of Indiana filed its petition for nunc pro tunc entry in said cause No. 6945 in the Shelby Superior Court; notice of filing of said motion and request for hearing thereon to be heard on February 9, 1962, was mailed to appellant’s attorney on February 2, 1962. Appellant’s transcript and assignment of errors were filed in the Supreme Court on February 5, 1962;. February 15, 1962, the petition and motion' of the State of Indiana for nunc pro tunc entry was heard and determined in the absence of appellant, over the objection of appellant’s counsel, and the Shelby Circuit Court ordered the “Clerk of the Shelby Circuit *653Court to amend the committment (sic) entered on 23rd day of June, 1961, to conform to the order book entry set out in this petition and as set out in. civil Order Book 6-0, Page 64, by deleting from said Committment (sic) heretofore entered in this cause on the 23rd day of June, 1961, the following language: ‘The Court further finds that by reason of the character of said defendant, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of said crime, the interest of society does not demand or require that the defendant shall suffer the penalty imposed by law, if he shall hereafter behave well. It is therefore ordered by the Court that the execution of the sentence HEREin imposed be suspended during defendant’s good behavior, and that he be permitted to go at liberty on probation so long as he behaves well.’ ” On February 23, 1962, appellant filed his motion to complete the record to include entries nunc pro tunc and the Bill of Exceptions containing evidence in such proceedings as they were made after February 5, 1962, and are not included in said transcript.
It appears that the Shelby Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain or act on the petition for entry nunc pro tunc, as final judgment had been rendered in this cause originally on June 23, 1961, and .thereafter on July 1, 1961, all criminal jurisdiction in said county had vested in the Shelby Superior Court, including “proceedings of every nature commenced or had after a final judgment or decree in any such causes heretofore made and entered by the Shelby Circuit Court.” [§4-4407, Burns’ 1962 Cum. Supp., supra.]
' Appellant was not in court February 15, 1962, the cause was heard in, his absence, over the objection of counsel, and this being a felony case, appellant was *654entitled to be present at the trial. Acts 1905, ch. 169, §222, p. 584, being §9-1801, Burns’ 1956 Replacement; Miles v. State (1944), 222 Ind. 312, 53 N. E. 2d 779.
The evidence heard by the Shelby Circuit Court did not justify a nunc pro tune entry setting aside the suspended sentence as there was no memorial therefor. Cook v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 234, 236, 37 N. E. 2d 63; O’Malia v. State (1934), 207 Ind. 308, 311, 192 N. E. 435.
The cause should be reversed and remanded with instructions to sustain appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Note. — Reported in 189 N. E. 2d 704.