Court Opinion

ID: 9772393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:16:43.94083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:44.024446
License: Public Domain

AKIN, Justice,
concurring.
After consideration of the State’s motion for rehearing, I remain convinced that a judgment of reversal correctly disposes of this case. However, I am not satisfied that our opinion clearly articulated what I now believe to be the correct rationale underly*93ing that judgment. Consequently, concurring in the overruling of the State’s motion, I write to express my views.
“It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.” TexJPenal Code Ann. § 8.02(a) (Vernon 1974). Appellant was indicted pursuant to section 31.03(b)(2) which provides that an unlawful appropriation of property occurs when the accused appropriates property “knowing it was stolen by another.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.1986). At trial appellant testified that he “[njever [had] a question in [his] mind” that the goods in question were legitimately acquired by the sellers. He explained that he believed that the sellers purchased the goods because they possessed a triple beam scale used in determining accurately the weights of precious metals and because the sellers reportedly dealt with several other businesses.
Regardless of the credibility of this testimony, I consider it to be some evidence tending to show that appellant entertained a mistaken belief as to the manner in which the sellers acquired their wares. As such, appellant was entitled to a charge on the mistake of fact defense recognized under section 8.02(a) because, if found to be true, this testimony would negate the existence of the culpable mental state required by section 31.03(b)(2). Paragraphs (c) and (d) of section 2.03 of the Penal Code and the accompanying commentary clearly mandate that, under this state of the evidence, the trial court must submit this statutory defense in its jury charge. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (held that the trial court erred in refusing to submit mistake of fact defense in its charge when raised by evidence in theft prosecution).
Indeed, the holding in Jackson disposes of the State’s contention that appellant was not entitled to such an instruction because it merely negated an element of the offense. In Jackson, the court of criminal appeals responded:
This [contention] ignores the rule that a defendant is entitled to submission of every defensive issue raised by the evidence. ... To hold as requested by the State would be to strike [the mistake of fact defense] from the Penal Code.
646 S.W.2d at 227 (citation omitted). The State’s reliance on the court’s opinion in Sanders v. State, 707 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), is misplaced. In Sanders, the accused was charged with having burglarized a pawn shop and having stolen a guitar. The accused denied committing the burglary and explained his possession of the guitar by testifying that he bought it from another. Although I question some of the broad statements in the Sanders opinion,1 the court properly upheld the trial court’s refusal to submit an instruction on the issue of good faith purchase because this testimony did not raise a defense or affirmative defense recognized by the Penal Code. Instead, it simply elaborated the basis for the appellant’s general contention of innocence.
Turning to Justice Vance’s opinion, I can only concur in the present judgment because the opinion fails to recognize that appellant’s testimony raises the defense of mistake of fact and then compounds this oversight by saying that good faith purchase is an “affirmative defense.” It is not. Mistake of fact is plainly labelled as a defense by section 8.02(a), not an “affirmative defense.” For these reasons, I cannot join in that portion of the opinion by Justice Vance disposing of appellant’s second ground of error. I concur, however, in the *94disposition of that ground for the foregoing reasons.

. For instance, the court states in Sanders that all of the defenses in the Penal Code are in the nature of a confession and avoidance and not mere negations of a single element. 707 S.W.2d at 81. To the extent that this statement embraces at least the defenses of insanity and mistake of fact, it is patently incorrect. The commentaries to both make plain that their sole function is to negate mental culpability. Thus, I believe that the court spoke too generally in saying that no charge is required if a defense merely negates an element of the offense. I further believe that correct rule to be that such defenses need not be submitted unless specifically recognized under the Penal Code.