Court Opinion

ID: 9585616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:02:15.018149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:42.811997
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J.
I concur in the judgment. Under Education Code section 35014,1 a local school district may only adopt rules which are “not inconsistent with law or with the rules prescribed by the State Board of Education.”  The local fees for extracurricular activities at issue here conflict with an administrative regulation—title 5, section 350 of the California
*920Administrative Code—prescribed by the State Board of Education. (See Cal. Dept. of Ed., Fees, Deposits and Charges in the Public Schools of California, Grades K-12 and Adult Schools (1979); Ops.Cal.Legis. Counsel, No. 18293 (Oct. 19, 1982) School Fees: Extracurricular Activities; Ops.Cal.Legis. Counsel, No. 17036 (Nov. 16, 1979) School Fees.) (5e), (2f) Because I believe that—under familiar standards (see, e.g., Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 172, 176 [70 Cal.Rptr. 407, 444 P.2d 79]; Credit Ins. Cen. Agents Assn. v. Payne (1976) 16 Cal.3d 651, 657 [128 Cal.Rptr. 881, 547 P.2d 993])—the state board had authority to promulgate the regulation in question (see § 33031; City and County of San Francisco v. Hyatt (1912) 163 Cal. 346, 352-354 [125 P. 751]), I agree with the lead opinion that the challenged fees cannot stand. In view of this conclusion, there is no need to reach the broad constitutional question discussed in part II of the lead opinion.
Furthermore, in this case there are weighty reasons for not embarking on the constitutional journey which the lead opinion undertakes. For judges, the “free school” guarantee is a rarely traveled route; we have few, if any, helpful precedential guides in the California cases. In this unmapped setting, it is difficult to predict the practical effect that a broad constitutional pronouncement may have in a great variety of situations. Well-intentioned judicial efforts to provide sweeping, “absolute” rules to protect the values underlying the “free school” provision may well prove, in practice, to have precisely the opposite effect by foreclosing reasonable legislative options.
If I understand the lead opinion correctly, it concludes that all “educational” activities offered by public schools—whether credit-bearing or extracurricular, whether taking place during the school day, before or after school hours—must, as a matter of constitutional mandate, be provided absolutely “free.”2 Although the lead opinion does not purport to pass on the matter, its proposed rule would apparently invalidate a number of statutory provisions which authorize the charging of fees in a variety of special settings. For example, section 35330 implicitly permits a school district to impose a charge for field trips or excursions, while at the same time specifying that no pupil shall be prevented from making the trip because of a lack of funds. (Cal. Dept. of Ed., Fees, Deposits, and Charges in the Public Schools of California, Grades K-12 and Adult Schools (1979) pp. 2-3.) Similarly, sections 32220 to 32224—after requiring districts to provide medical and accident insurance for each member of an athletic team—authorize a district to pass such cost on to the parents of each member who can afford to pay. And section 48909 permits a district to charge a parent when a pupil *921loses a loaned book. (See also §§ 39804 [permitting charges for transportation costs under certain circumstances]; 35335 [permitting charges for school camp programs].)
My point is not that all of these statutory provisions are necessarily valid, but simply that their existence points up the potential complexity of the school fee issue and the importance of considering the particular setting in which the fee is imposed. The Legislature and educational administrators have been involved with these issues for some years, and I believe that we would do well to proceed cautiously and limit ourselves to the question before us.
Since, as noted at the outset, there is a valid administrative regulation which clearly prohibits the local fees at issue, we should avoid a premature resolution of the constitutional mandate.

 The lead opinion would acknowledge that fees may be charged for “recreational,” as distinguished from “educational,” activities. (Ante, p. 911, fn. 14.)