Court Opinion

ID: 9770624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:13:23.809759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:19.078300
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
concurring.
Although I agree with the majority that Appellee is not entitled to RCr 11.42 relief in this case, I write separately to explain my views with respect to the instructions given diming the penalty phase of the trial.
Neither Commonwealth v. Hayes, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 467 (1987) nor Davis v. Manis, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 505, 506 (1991) hold that the sentencing jury must reach two separate verdicts in their deliberations during the combined truth-in-sentencing/persistent felony offender penalty phase mandated by KRS 532.055(8). Those cases hold only that if the jury imposes a fine for the underlying offense, there can be no PFO enhancement. Here, the trial judge instructed the jury to impose a sentence of not less than ten nor more than twenty years if they found Appel-lee guilty of PFO, and, if not, to impose a sentence for the underlying offense of not less than one nor more than five years, or a fine of not less than $3,000 nor more than $5,000, or both.
Absent the alternative penalty of a fine authorized by former KRS 218A.990(16) (repealed 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 441, § 30), there would have been no error in these instructions. Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 721 (1991). KRS 532.080(1) specifically states that the jury shall impose the PFO sentence “in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment assessed under KRS 532.060_” It seems incongruous to require the jury to reach two separate verdicts in one deliberation when the statute clearly contemplates only one verdict depending upon whether the defendant is found guilty or not guilty of PFO. However, I agree that such was required here, where a fine was authorized as an alternative sentence to imprisonment. Since virtually all felony penalty statutes have now been amended to conform to the penal code, this issue is unlikely to arise again.