Court Opinion

ID: 9762491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:25:28.513137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.029511
License: Public Domain

OPINION
KEYS, Justice.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine. Punishment was assessed at ten years in prison, probated for seven years, and a $2500.00 fine. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court.
Appellant was driving about sixty-five miles per hour in a sixty-five mile per hour speed zone down 1-37 towards Corpus Christi, Texas, at 12:30 a.m. He passed a black and white Department of Public Safety Mustang which was patrolling slowly in the right lane. Not knowing whether the speed limit was fifty-five or sixty-five miles per hour, appellant slowed to the speed of forty-five to fifty miles per hour upon overtaking the black and white Mustang. He maintained this speed without weaving or violating any traffic laws. Officers Lober-au and Kelley accelerated their Mustang and followed three to four car lengths behind appellant. They called in to determine whether appellant’s vehicle was stolen and discovered it was not. Nevertheless, they stopped appellant. Officer Loberau asked to see appellant’s drivers license and evidence of insurance. When he looked inside the vehicle, Loberau thought he saw a marijuana cigarette in the ash tray. He requested permission to search appellant’s vehicle, and searched it. They found cocaine, marijuana, and other illegal drugs. Appellant was arrested.
By his first two points of error, appellant contends that the investigatory stop was unjustified because the officers lacked sufficient specific articulable facts that appellant was involved in criminal conduct. He contends that evidence concerning the drugs found in the car should have been suppressed. We agree and reverse.
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S. -, -; 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). Stops by roving patrols are considered Fourth Amendment seizures. See e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). This stop was an intentional termination of freedom of movement by the State; thus, it was a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Our first inquiry is whether the seizure was reasonable. The constitutionality of a seizure for the purposes of investigation is measured by the reasonable suspicion test and not the probable cause standard set forth in the Constitution. Id. at 664, 99 S.Ct. at 1401; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
For a stop to be legal under the reasonable suspicion standard, there must be some indication or reasonable inference of criminal conduct. Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Simply stated, the facts known to the officers were that a car overtook them while they were driving slowly *460at night on an interstate highway. The vehicle slowed and maintained a speed comfortably within the limit. The car was not reported stolen. When followed closely the driver did not weave or violate any traffic laws.
When asked why appellant was pulled over, Loberau indicated that he was “real suspicious” and that “something was not right”. He stated that usually people slow down when they see a DPS unit, but then they speed up and drive the maximum speed limit. What made this encounter suspicious to the officers was that the driver slowed and did not subsequently accelerate. Loberau testified that they had initiated other “investigatory stops” based on the driving pattern found here. These encounters revealed some intoxicated drivers.
By slowing down when he spotted the DPS unit and thereafter driving well within the speed limit, appellant did not create a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in a crime. Without a reasonable suspicion that appellant is linked to a crime, the DPS officers had no authority to seize appellant. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
The Court of Criminal Appeals requires a greater quantum of specific articulable facts to initiate an investigatory stop than those present in the instant case. For example, in Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558-59, the police suspected that Albert Garza was “good for” several burglaries. The arresting officer was aware of Garza’s description and vehicle. Garza was allegedly a drug addict. The officer spotted Garza and stopped him. The Court of Criminal Appeals held there were insufficient articula-ble facts linking Garza to any crime. Thus, the stop was illegal and the evidence was suppressed.
Similarly, in Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), the police observed two men in a truck parked by a barbecue restaurant in a high crime area. The dome light was on. The men appeared interested in something in the seat between them. When the police drove into the parking lot, the truck pulled out. The police then initiated an investigatory stop. Since these facts were just as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, the Court held the seizure violated appellant’s rights.
In contrast, in Hoag, 728 S.W.2d at 380, the Court of Criminal Appeals held there were sufficient specific articulable facts to support an investigatory stop. The officers had good reason to believe Hoag was involved in a burglary two days before he was pulled over. Later, the police observed Hoag apparently attempting to break into several houses. Finally, the police observed Hoag enter an apartment complex, and return with a newspaper and a canned drink. The police checked the apartment complex and did not find a break in. They stopped Hoag anyway and searched his car. The Court of Criminal Appeals held the events leading up to the stop justified the officer’s suspicion that Hoag was committing or attempting to commit a crime.
Comer is like the instant case because there was no evidence that a crime was involved. The activity in both cases suggested that the subjects did not wish to speak with the police but did not indicate that any crime had been committed. At the best, the police officers possessed only an inarticulate hunch or speculative suspicion of wrongdoing. Glass v. State, 681 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The facts in this case are not sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of appellant’s wrongdoing.
The trial judge erred in not suppressing the evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Baldwin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 872, 874-75 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 1989). We sustain appellant’s first two points of error.
By appellant’s third point of error, he complains that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the drugs found in the car because the plain view doctrine does not apply. We agree. The plain view doctrine holds that no search occurs if a party has no subjective expectation of privacy in the product of the search, or if the *461expectation of privacy is unreasonable. When an object is exposed to plain view neither of these requirements are met. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring). A predicate to the plain view doctrine is that the officer be lawfully present. Our prior holding establishes that appellant’s investigatory stop was illegal; therefore, the plain view doctrine does not apply. Ebarb v. State, 598 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Appellant’s third point of error is sustained.
By appellant’s fourth point of error, he complains that the search was invalid because no consent was given, or consent was the product of the illegal stop. We sustain this point of error.
The general rule is that consent must be voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), the Court of Criminal Appeals identified factors in addition to voluntariness that the courts must apply to determine whether consent is valid following an illegal police encounter. See also Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). If consent is sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop it will be valid.
A number of the factors the Brick Court found important weigh heavily here against finding valid consent. Consent was obtained as a direct result of the illegal stop. Loberau requested consent to search; it was not freely offered by appel-lee. Loberau failed to notify appellant that-any evidence found would be used to convict him, or that he had the right to refuse the search. Brick 738 S.W.2d at 680-81. Under these circumstances, we hold that the taint of the illegal stop was not sufficiently attenuated to validate consent. The trial court therefore erred in failing to suppress the evidence.
Judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.