Court Opinion

ID: 9698682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:57:33.11176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:00.587671
License: Public Domain

Riley, C.J.
(concurring). I write separately because, while I am in accord with the result reached by the majority, I do not believe that it adequately addresses the certified conflict that it is meant to resolve.1_
*762My concern is that it is difficult to extract a workable rule from the opinion. I gather that the rule is that if the primary complaint alleges active negligence, then the third-party plaintiff is precluded from indemnity because it (third-party plaintiff) is not free from active negligence. I disagree with this rule — if, in fact, this is what the opinion means to say.
The workers’ compensation statute prevents an injured worker from suing his employer for a work-related injury. Thus, the injured employee must allege active negligence against a machine manufacturer, in a products liability action, in order to avoid being summarily dismissed. The logical conclusion is that the primary complaint will always plead active negligence — a breach of a direct duty owed to another which is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury. For this reason, I find it inequitable to preclude a third-party plaintiff from an indemnity action only upon the basis of the primary complaint. I believe the rule should allow a review of the third-party complaint, as well as the primary complaint. This allows the third-party plaintiff the chance to prove its freedom from active fault, a prerequisite to an indemnity action.
I would adopt a rule similar to the approach taken in Cutter v Massey-Ferguson, Inc, 114 Mich App 28, 35; 318 NW2d 554 (1982). In order to ascertain whether the party seeking implied contractual indemnity has pled freedom from active negligence, the court should look to both the primary and third-party complaint to determine if there has been: (1) a specific undertaking by the employer to perform some act or service for the manufacturer, and (2) an attempt by the employee to hold the manufacturer liable for the failure to *763perform the act which the employer had obligated itself to do.
Applying this rule to the present case, we find no specific undertaking by Ford to perform some act or service for Litton regarding the storage retrieval system. Consequently, the allegations made in the primary complaint did not involve any act that Ford had obligated itself to perform. Thus, Litton has not pled its freedom from active negligence and may not maintain an indemnity action against Ford.
The third-party complaint states that the accident was a result of the failure of Ford to either provide the decedent with a safe place to work or to properly train him. However, we agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the complaint merely alleges a complete defense to the original action, rather than a basis for implied contractual indemnity. "Where there are no allegations of vicarious liability and a primary defendant seeks to disprove his own active negligence, he should do so against the primary plaintiff who brought the claim.” Williams v Litton Systems, Inc, 164 Mich App 195, 202; 416 NW2d 704 (1987).
I do not think it is correct to say that "Litton cannot obtain contribution from Ford because the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation act has been held to relieve the injured worker’s employer from liability to make contribution.” Ante, p 760. It is not correct because, if a third party could prove it was free from active negligence and the employer did not perform an assumed obligation to the third-party plaintiff, the employer could be held liable for indemnity notwithstanding the workers’ compensation statute.
Turning to the cases of Hill v Sullivan Equipment Co, 86 Mich App 693; 273 NW2d 527 (1978), and Kirin v Riise Engineering Co, 148 Mich App *764278; 384 NW2d 149 (1986), the facts in Kirin and in Hill involve an employer who purchased equipment from a manufacturer. In both instances, the employer specifically rejected significant safety features that were ordinarily attached by the manufacturer. The employer assured the manufacturer that it (the employer) would add the required safety features and that the equipment would not be accessible to the employees. In both cases, the employers’ failure to fulfill their assurances resulted in injury to the plaintiffs. Each plaintiff was successful in a products liability action against the manufacturer who, in turn, sought indemnification from the employer.
Applying my proposed rule to the facts of Kirin and Hill would yield the same results as those of the Court of Appeals. Each employer made a specific undertaking to add the missing safety features, and each plaintiff successfully held the respective manufacturer liable for the failure of the employer’s obligation. Therefore, an action for indemnification did exist. While I believe that Kirin and Hill are distinguishable from the instant action, the conflict between the Court of Appeals panels can be resolved by the application of the above proposed rule.
Another concern raised by the majority is that Kirin and Hill are cited for the proposition that "freedom from active negligence is not a prerequisite to maintaining the action.” Ante, p 758. I believe that their concern is misplaced. While it is true that panels of the Court of Appeals "have construed Hill as standing for the proposition that freedom from active fault is not a precondition to an implied contractual indemnity claim,” Kirin at 283, the remainder of the cited paragraph continues to say:
*765However, as noted in Reed v St Clair Rubber Co, 118 Mich App 1, 10; 324 NW2d 512 (1982), and Clark Equipment Co v Jones & Lamson [144 Mich App 91, 99; 373 NW2d 249 (1955)], Hill was unique in that the allegations of the third-party complaint, if proven, would establish that the sole cause of plaintiff’s injury was the third-party defendant’s negligence. Thus, in permitting the case to go to trial, the Hill majority did not conclude that freedom from active fault was not a precondition to recovery under an implied contractual indemnity theory. Rather, the majority held only that the third-party plaintiff should be given an opportunity to prove that it was in fact completely free of any active fault in bringing about the injury. [Id. at 284. Emphasis added.]
Therefore, while I believe that the majority is correct in stating that Litton argues for the proposition that freedom from active negligence should not be a prerequisite to maintaining an indemnity action is correct, I believe that Kirin and Hill are cited incorrectly.
I believe that the third-party complaint should be reviewed with the primary complaint in determining whether an indemnity action exists. However, I do concur with the majority that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

 The Court of Appeals certified its decision in this matter as being in conflict with its decisions in Hill v Sullivan Equipment Co, 86 Mich App 693; 273 NW2d 527 (1978), and Kirin v Riise Engineering Co, 148 Mich App 278; 384 NW2d 149 (1986).