Court Opinion

ID: 9587593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:03.780355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:03.705982
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that the trial court did not make the necessary findings of fact on all relevant factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207,1 respectfully dissent.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207, a court “may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances, and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(a) (2005). The statute further provides:
(b) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this State shall consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, *510the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(2) The length of time the child has resided outside this State;
(3) The distance between the court in this State and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
(7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.

Id.

First, I disagree with the majority that “[t]he factors listed in N.C.G.S. § 50A-207(b) are necessary when the current forum is inconvenient, not when the forum is convenient.” It is only after considering the relevant factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b) that a trial court is able to determine whether the current forum is inconvenient or convenient. Thus, the factors listed apply to all proceedings under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207, regardless of their outcome. The majority’s interpretation puts the cart before the horse.
Furthermore, while the majority correctly states that a trial “court is not required to make findings of fact on all the evidence presented,” In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 75, 623 S.E.2d 45, 51 (2005) (citation omitted), a trial court must make findings of fact on all material issues raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Rosenthal’s Bootery, Inc. v. Shavitz, 48 N.C. App. 170, 174-75, 268 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1980) (remanding to the Superior Court for the judge to “find the facts specially from the record evidence as to all the material issues *511raised by the evidence”). When determining whether “[a] court of this State ... is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(a), the statute mandates that the trial court consider, at a minimum, the factors enumerated in the statute. Accordingly, by virtue of the plain language of the statute, the enumerated factors are material to the trial court’s determination, and the trial court must make findings of fact on all factors about which evidence was submitted. See Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) (“When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute[.]”).
In this case, the trial court made findings of fact concerning the length of time the children had resided outside of North Carolina, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b)(2), and the parties’ agreement to jurisdiction in North Carolina contained in the 23 March 2006 Consent Order. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b)(5). Additionally, the trial court found that Plaintiff was a citizen of North Carolina and Defendant was a citizen of California, implicitly acknowledging the distance between North Carolina and California. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b)(3). However, even though Defendant submitted evidence regarding her financial circumstances, the trial court did not consider the relative financial circumstances of the parties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b)(4). Furthermore, although Defendant submitted affidavits from her mother, the children’s babysitter, the children’s daycare provider, and the children’s pediatrician, the trial court failed to consider “[t]he nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b)(6), or the ability of the courts in North Carolina and California “to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b)(7). Thus, although the trial court made findings regarding some relevant factors, I disagree with the majority that “the trial court’s findings are sufficient.” Because the trial court did not “consider all relevant factors,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-207(b), I am unable to discern whether the trial court’s decision to deny Defendant’s motion to transfer jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion. See Martin v. Martin, 167 N.C. App. 365, 604 S.E.2d 203 (2004) (stating that the standard of review for a child custody proceeding is abuse of discretion). Accordingly, I would remand to the trial court for additional findings of fact as warranted by the evidence, and for an order consistent with such findings.