Court Opinion

ID: 9911738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 19:02:22.435902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:16.026871
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/20/23 Yavapai-Apache Nation v. La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 YAVAPAI-APACHE NATION,                                                                        C098204

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-
                                                                                   00238711-CU-MC-GDS)
           v.

 LA POSTA BAND OF DIEGUENO MISSION
 INDIANS,

                    Defendant and Appellant,

 CALIFORNIA GAMBLING CONTROL
 COMMISSION,

                    Defendant and Respondent.

         This appeal concerns a party’s attempt to obtain an antisuit injunction. Yavapai-
Apache Nation (YAN) has pursued parallel litigation against La Posta Band of Diegueno
Mission Indians (La Posta) in both state court and tribal court. Seeking to pause the tribal
court proceedings, La Posta asked the state trial court to enjoin YAN from pursuing its
claims in tribal court. But the trial court declined to do so. We affirm.

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                                     BACKGROUND
       We recently covered most of this case’s long history in Yavapai-Apache Nation v.
La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians (Apr. 6, 2022, C091801) [nonpub. opn.]—a
decision we will call, like the parties, La Posta II. We provide a brief summary of this
history here.
                                              I
                           YAN’s Three Suits Against La Posta
       Over a decade ago, YAN and La Posta entered into an agreement that required La
Posta to repay a loan used to finance a casino. (La Posta II, supra, C091801.) Under the
terms of the agreement, if La Posta failed to pay its debt, YAN’s sole recourse in most
circumstances would be to seize La Posta’s casino revenues, casino equipment, and other
casino-related assets. But the agreement also authorized YAN to pursue La Posta’s other
assets if a court made a “final determination” that La Posta committed any act of fraud in
connection with the parties’ agreement. (Ibid.)
       After La Posta failed to repay the loan, YAN sued La Posta in three different
courts. In the first suit, YAN sued La Posta in San Diego County Superior Court,
alleging that La Posta breached the parties’ agreement. (La Posta II, supra, C091801.)
YAN also alleged that La Posta committed an act of fraud in connection with the parties’
agreement, reasoning that La Posta intentionally misrepresented a material fact about its
planned operation of the casino. Following a bench trial for the contract claim, the trial
court agreed that La Posta breached the contract and awarded YAN nearly $49 million on
that claim. But after a jury trial for the fraud claim, the jury rejected YAN’s claim of
intentional misrepresentation, finding in a special verdict that La Posta did not make any
false representation to YAN. (Ibid.)
       In the second suit, YAN sued La Posta in YAN Tribal Court. (La Posta II, supra,
C091801.) As in the San Diego action, YAN sought to show that La Posta committed an
act of fraud in connection with the parties’ agreement. But in this case, YAN alleged,

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among other things, that La Posta negligently, not intentionally, misrepresented a
material fact—a claim it based on largely the same set of facts as its earlier intentional
misrepresentation claim. In a 2018 decision, the tribal court agreed La Posta committed
an act of negligent misrepresentation and awarded YAN damages on that claim. But it
did not resolve all claims that YAN had brought against La Posta, reserving one of
YAN’s claims—a claim for declaratory relief—for another day. (Ibid.)
       In the third and final suit, YAN sued La Posta and the California Gambling
Control Commission (the Gambling Commission) in Sacramento County Superior Court.
(La Posta II, supra, C091801.) YAN asked the court to declare that the Gambling
Commission—which collects revenue from tribes with large gambling operations and
distributes it to other tribes, like La Posta, with small or no gambling operations—must
pay to YAN all the money that it otherwise would have distributed to La Posta until La
Posta’s debt is repaid. YAN based its argument on the terms of the parties’ agreement
and the tribal court’s decision. According to YAN, although the agreement generally
bars YAN from reaching these assets, it allows YAN to recover the amount it is owed
from these assets if a court makes a “final determination” that La Posta committed an act
of fraud in connection with the agreement. YAN then asserted that the YAN Tribal Court
made such a final determination when it found that La Posta committed an act of
negligent misrepresentation. After YAN moved for summary judgment, the trial court
agreed with YAN’s claim and entered judgment in its favor. (Ibid.)
                                              II
                           Our 2022 Decision and Its Aftermath
       La Posta appealed the last of these decisions to this court. It argued that the trial
court’s decision was flawed for several reasons, including because the tribal court’s
decision—which resolved some but not all of YAN’s claims—was not a final judgment
under the tribal court’s own rules and so not a “final determination” within the meaning
of the parties’ agreement. (La Posta II, supra, C091801.) In a narrow decision, we

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agreed reversal was appropriate. “Although we stop[ped] short of accepting La Posta’s
reading of tribal law, we agree[d] that uncertainties concerning the status of the tribal
court’s decision preclude[d] a judgment in YAN’s favor.” We reasoned that “YAN failed
to meet its burden to show that the tribal court’s decision was a ‘final determination’
within the meaning of the parties’ agreement . . . .” (Ibid.)
         Following our decision, YAN and La Posta filed competing motions in different
courts. YAN moved in tribal court for a final judgment on all its causes of action,
including its request for declaratory relief that the tribal court had not yet addressed. La
Posta, in turn, asked the trial court to enjoin YAN from pursuing its claims in tribal court.
It also asked the trial court to grant it summary judgment on various grounds, including
on the ground that YAN had not shown, and would never be able to show, that the tribal
court’s decision was a “final determination” under the parties’ agreement.
         Before the trial court acted on La Posta’s request for an injunction, the YAN
Tribal Court ruled on YAN’s motion. In a 2023 decision labeled as a final judgment, the
tribal court agreed YAN was entitled to the declaratory relief it sought, which concerned
YAN’s entitlement to the revenues that the Gambling Commission distributes to La
Posta. The court also, consistent with its earlier decision in 2018, found that La Posta
committed an act of negligent misrepresentation and awarded YAN damages on that
claim.
         The trial court afterward denied La Posta’s motion for an injunction. To start, the
court found La Posta’s motion “appears moot” because “the very event which La Posta
sought to have this Court enjoin . . . has now occurred.” It then found La Posta’s motion
failed for two independent reasons. First, it found La Posta failed to meet its burden to
show that an antisuit injunction was appropriate, because it had not articulated the
requisite “exceptional circumstances” for an antisuit injunction. Second, it found La
Posta also failed to meet its burden to show an injunction was appropriate under the

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traditional standards for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that it had not shown it
would suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction.
       La Posta timely appealed the trial court’s decision.1
                                       DISCUSSION
       La Posta raises four general claims on appeal, none of which we find persuasive.
       First, La Posta contends the trial court misapplied the standard for injunctive
relief. The trial court described a two-step process for considering a preliminary
injunction motion: First, the moving party must make a threshold showing of irreparable
injury, and second, if this showing is made, the court must then consider two interrelated
factors—(1) the likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits, and (2) the
relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or non-issuance of the injunction.
Ultimately, the trial court denied La Posta’s requested relief in part because it believed La
Posta had not satisfied the first step of showing irreparable harm. In La Posta’s view,
however, the actual standard for an injunction is different: While courts must consider
the two interrelated factors the trial court described, they do not require a threshold
showing of irreparable injury. La Posta adds that under the proper standard, the trial
court should have granted the requested injunction.
       La Posta, however, neglects to mention that the trial court denied its requested
relief for two distinct reasons. One of the reasons is the one La Posta mentions—the trial
court faulted La Posta for failing to make a threshold showing of irreparable injury. But
the court also relied on another ground—La Posta failed to show that exceptional

1 La Posta asks us to take judicial notice of several documents from the tribal court,
including three briefs, a scheduling order for briefing, and an order scheduling oral
argument. We deny the request. To obtain judicial notice from a reviewing court, a party
must file a motion stating, among other things, why the matters to be noticed are relevant
to the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).) Because La Posta has not explained
the relevance of the materials here, it has not shown that judicial notice is appropriate.

                                              5
circumstances favored granting the injunction. The court reasoned that La Posta had to
make this showing because of the unusual relief it sought—an order enjoining YAN from
litigating its claims in another jurisdiction. And the court was right on that point. As our
Supreme Court has explained in discussing antisuit injunctions, enjoining proceedings in
another sovereign’s courts “requires an exceptional circumstance that outweighs the
threat to judicial restraint and comity principles.” (Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic,
Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 697, 707-708.)
       We find La Posta’s failure to challenge this independent ground for the trial
court’s decision is fatal to its claim on appeal. La Posta has the burden as the appellant to
show that the trial court got it wrong. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564 [“ ‘[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct” and “ ‘error must
be affirmatively shown’ ”].) It cannot meet this burden by attacking only one of several
independent grounds for the trial court’s decision. As another court has said, and as
YAN notes in its brief, “[w]hen a trial court states multiple grounds for its ruling and
appellant addresses only some of them, we need not address appellant’s arguments
because ‘one good reason is sufficient to sustain the order from which the appeal was
taken.’ ” (People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.)
       Resisting this conclusion, La Posta claims it sought two alternative types of relief
from the trial court—an antisuit injunction and, in the alternative, a preliminary
injunction. It then argues that it is not challenging the trial court’s ruling denying
injunctive relief under antisuit injunction principles; it is instead only challenging the trial
court’s ruling denying injunctive relief under preliminary injunction principles. But in its
notice of motion and motion in the trial court, La Posta sought only one type of relief—
an antisuit injunction (which it characterized as a type of preliminary injunction) that
would “(1) enjoin YAN from litigating in YAN Court and (2) require YAN to litigate its
claims in this forum on remand.” While La Posta discussed in its motion both the
traditional standards for a preliminary injunction and the “heightened” standards for an

                                               6
antisuit injunction, it evidently did so because it believed it needed to satisfy both
standards to obtain the injunction it sought, not because it sought two distinct types of
injunctions.
       We acknowledge, however, that La Posta expanded the type of relief it sought in
its reply in the trial court, including by requesting, as “[a]lternative[]” relief, an order
enjoining YAN from submitting any post-2018 materials from the tribal court. But La
Posta only mentioned this alternative relief in the conclusion to its reply brief and
supplied no supportive argument. The trial court did not consider, and had no obligation
to consider, this belatedly raised and unsupported request. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules
3.1110(a) [“A notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the
order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order”], 3.1113(b) [party filing a
motion must submit a memorandum containing the “arguments relied on”]; Grappo v.
McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1009 [trial courts have discretion whether to “accept
arguments or evidence made for the first time in reply”].)
       Second, La Posta contends the trial court misinterpreted “La Posta II to mean that
this Court advised YAN to return to its own court and resume the YAN Court Action to
obtain a ‘final’ judgment.” It further asserts that YAN admitted at oral argument in La
Posta II “that the YAN Action was abandoned” and so “it is highly unlikely that this
Court anticipated that YAN would return to its own court and resume its seven year old
lawsuit to obtain a new YAN Court judgment, then return to Sacramento to restart its
lawsuit.” La Posta, however, misunderstands both the trial court’s ruling and YAN’s
statements at oral argument.
       Starting with the trial court’s ruling, the court never said our prior decision
“advised” YAN to return to its own court to obtain a final judgment. The court instead
quoted part of our decision that left open the possibility of YAN obtaining additional
records on remand. In our decision, we found that YAN had failed to meet its burden to
show that the tribal court’s decision was a “final determination” within the meaning of

                                               7
the parties’ agreement. But, as the trial court explained, we left open the possibility that
YAN could obtain tribal court records to make this showing in the future. (La Posta II,
supra, C091801.) The trial court quoted our statement on this topic and observed that,
after our decision, YAN logically returned to the tribal court and moved for a final
judgment. We find nothing improper in the court’s saying so.
       Turning to YAN’s statements at oral argument, YAN never said it abandoned the
tribal court action. It instead only said it abandoned a single claim in that action—
namely, its claim for declaratory relief that the tribal court had, at that time, not yet
resolved. We agree, however, that YAN has not acted fully consistent with this
statement. At oral argument in La Posta II, YAN said: “[T]he declaration issue, you
know, was not resolved at the time [the tribal court issued its initial decision in 2018].
Now, your honor, this has been more than four years ago. . . . So, I think that claim has
been abandoned. No party has made any effort to address that claim. You can’t just let a
claim sit there forever.” But shortly after our decision in La Posta II, YAN “revers[ed]
course,” as YAN acknowledges in its briefing here. It asked for (and then received) a
ruling in its favor on this allegedly abandoned claim. Although YAN changed course, La
Posta has not shown that any of this is legally material. It comments, again, that “it is
highly unlikely that this Court anticipated” YAN’s conduct on remand. But that
comment, offered without any supportive legal authority, is not enough to warrant
reversal. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142,
153 [courts may “ ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent
legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the
conclusions he wants us to adopt’ ”].)
       Third, La Posta asserts the trial court’s decision was flawed to the extent it relied
on the YAN Tribal Court’s 2023 decision. It reasons that the trial court, before relying
on the tribal court’s decision, first needed to apply either principles of comity or the
procedures in the Tribal Civil Court Money Judgment Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1730 et

                                               8
seq.). But the trial court did not, as La Posta believes, rely on the tribal court’s decision.
The trial court, to be sure, noted the decision’s existence and said this matter “appears
moot” because the tribal court already issued the decision that La Posta sought to avoid.
But it stopped short of saying the matter was moot and ultimately rejected La Posta’s
motion for reasons unrelated to the tribal court’s 2023 decision.
       Fourth, La Posta contends the trial court relied on an inapplicable provision when
it granted judicial notice of the tribal court’s 2023 decision. La Posta asserts that YAN
sought judicial notice of the decision on two grounds: first, because it is a record of
either “(1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any
state of the United States” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)); and second, because it is a fact
that is “not reasonably subject to dispute and [is] capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy” (id., subd. (h)).
La Posta then suggests that the trial court wrongly took judicial notice of the decision
under the latter provision, Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). But La Posta fails
to provide record citations to support this claim. At the one citation it provides, the trial
court stated: “La Posta’s objections to YAN’s requests for judicial notice of various
Court and Tribal Court orders are overruled.” But nothing in this one sentence,
considered alone, shows that the trial court granted judicial notice under Evidence Code
section 452, subdivision (h).
       Apart from addressing La Posta’s arguments, we acknowledge that after this
appeal was deemed submitted, La Posta informed this court that the Court of Appeals of
the Yavapai-Apache Nation had vacated the tribal court’s decision and dismissed YAN’s
complaint with prejudice. The parties can address the significance of this decision on
remand.

                                               9
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying La Posta’s motion for an injunction is affirmed. YAN is
entitled to recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

                                                      /s/
                                                  BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

    /s/
EARL, P. J.

   /s/
MAURO, J.

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