Court Opinion

ID: 9669610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:01:30.327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:58.592318
License: Public Domain

NEUMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
Because I do not share the majority’s view that the reasoning of Wilson is “demonstrably flawed” or “inadequate for a case of first impression,” I respectfully dissent.
The court’s decision in Wilson rested on a well-settled legal principle: Before a court may tax attorney fees as costs, “the case must come clearly within the terms of the statute.” Wilson, 239 Iowa at 919, 32 N.W.2d at 798. Guided by that rule, the court looked at section 6B.33 and failed to find within its terms any support for an award of attorney fees beyond that statutorily permitted on appeal from the condemnation commission to the district court. Id. at 920, 32 N.W.2d at 799. The majority now faults Wilson’s holding as “conclusory,” but it was, in my view, a decision compelled by the language of the statute.
Read in isolation, section 6B.33 superficially supports the majority’s new interpretation. The statute obviously speaks to recovery of the costs of “appeal,” specifically including attorney fees.
A statute, however, must be read as a whole. Telegraph Herald, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 297 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Iowa 1980). *530Reference in the statute to the “trial” of the appeal and the “damages ... awarded” fully justifies Wilson ⅛ holding. The district court, not an appellate court, tries cases and awards damages. When considered in harmony with other sections in this statutory scheme, the only logical construction of section 6B.33 is that “appeal” means the appeal from the compensation commission to the district court. See Iowa Code §§ 6B.17 (“damages returned by the commissioners shall be final unless appealed from”); .18 (“appeal to the district court”); .21 (“appeal shall be tried as in an action by ordinary proceedings”); .22 (discussing necessary “pleadings” on appeal); .24 (amount of damages awarded by commissioners decreased on “trial of the appeal”); .25 (“[u]pon appeal from the commissioners’ award of damages the district court may direct ... ”); .30 (“trial of the appeal”) (emphasis added).
The majority nevertheless opines that the legislature could not have intended to make so arbitrary a distinction between trial and appellate attorney fees. I respectfully disagree. It seems equally plausible the legislature intended to limit the successful challenger to one expense-paid appeal (from the commission to district court). As in nearly all other litigation, further appeal would be on the challenger’s own nickel. By thus discouraging — but not outlawing' — further appeals, the legislation serves to preserve scarce judicial resources while at the same time saving taxpayers’ dollars.
One may persuasively argue the fairness of compensating a landowner for all costs incurred as a result of a condemnation action, but “such compensation is a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional command.” United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204, 99 S.Ct. 1066, 1067, 59 L.Ed.2d 257, 260 (1979). Given the legislature’s tacit acceptance of our long-standing interpretation of this statute, I would defer to its wisdom and refrain from enlarging the recovery permitted by its terms.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS and TERNUS, JJ., join this dissent.