Court Opinion

ID: 9391021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 21:04:54.532876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.971510
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U
                                         No. 2-22-0137
                                    Order filed April 28, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

In re I.M.,                                       ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                  ) of Kane County.
                                                  )
                                                  ) No. 21-MH-34
                                                  )
                                                  ) Honorable
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) John A. Noverini,
Appellee, v. I.M., Respondent-Appellant).         ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Schostok and Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: Section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)),
             which establishes the procedures by which one can file a petition for a certificate
             of innocence, is inapplicable to respondent’s wrongful confinement claim because
             he was involuntarily admitted to a mental hospital and not convicted of a felony
             and imprisoned which is required by statute to seek a certificate of innocence;
             therefore, the trial court’s decision to strike respondent’s petition was proper.

¶2     The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to strike

the petition of respondent, I.M., for a certificate of innocence which was filed pursuant to section

2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)) as respondent’s

effort to pursue his claim of “wrongful confinement” in a mental institution. For the following

reasons, we affirm.
2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On March 4, 2021, respondent’s mother filed a petition seeking respondent’s involuntary

admission to a mental health facility in the circuit court of Lake County. See 405 ILCS 5/3-700

(West 2020) (involuntary inpatient admission by court order). The petition alleged that respondent

is a person with a mental illness who, (1) because of his mental illness is reasonably expected,

unless treated on an inpatient basis, to engage in conduct causing him or another physical harm or

placing him or another in reasonable expectation of physical harm; (2) because of his mental

illness, is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm

without the assistance of others unless treated on an inpatient basis; (3) refuses treatment or is not

adhering adequately to prescribed treatment, is unable to understand his need for treatment, and is

reasonably expected, based on his behavioral history, to suffer mental or emotional deterioration,

and after such deterioration, is reasonably expected to meet either of the first two criteria; and

(4) is in need of immediate hospitalization to prevent harm. On that day, the court entered an order

for respondent’s detention, examination, and diagnostic evaluation at the Elgin Mental Health

Center (EMHC). Respondent was taken to the emergency room at a hospital in Elgin for medical

clearance prior to being transported to the EMHC. Respondent was admitted to the EMHC on

March 5, 2021.

¶5     On March 8, 2021, a second petition for involuntary admission was filed. See 405 ILCS

5/3-600 (West 2020) (involuntary inpatient admission by certification). This petition was filed in

the circuit court of Kane County. It was prepared by Deb Prichard, a social worker who had

observed respondent at the hospital. The petition sought emergency inpatient admission of

respondent based on the same allegations as the petition filed in Lake County. This petition was

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

supported by a written statement from Prichard and inpatient certificates completed by two

psychiatrists who had examined respondent.

¶6     According to Prichard’s statement, respondent had been admitted to the EMHC on March

5, 2021. Respondent, a 30-year-old college graduate and former accountant, had been living in

the basement of his parents’ home in Round Lake Heights. His mother reported that he began

having mental health issues at the age of 22 and that his symptoms had worsened. Over several

months, respondent had become aggressive, including slamming doors and breaking furniture in

the home. He began turning off the furnace and water supply to the home. The petition described

the altercation between respondent and his mother that led to his admission; his mother told

respondent to stop destroying things and respondent threw a chair at her, hitting her leg. The police

were called, and they took respondent to the emergency room. Prichard attempted to talk with

respondent at the hospital, but he pulled the bed covers over his head and refused to speak. She

asked him what brought him into the hospital, if he felt he was a danger to himself or others, if he

had a place to live, and whether he wished to leave the hospital. Respondent replied by repeatedly

saying, “I decline to answer” and “I’m waiting for my CPAP.” Prichard stated that because of his

“guardedness” and refusal to answer questions, she recommended respondent remain hospitalized

for evaluation to assess whether he was a danger to himself or others or whether he was able to

care for his basic needs.

¶7     Dr. Christopher Sullivan and Dr. Eva Kurilo both stated in their inpatient certificates that

they examined respondent and it was their opinion that respondent was a person with a mental

illness who, (1) because of his mental illness was reasonably expected, unless treated on an

inpatient basis, to engage in conduct placing him or another in physical harm or in reasonable

expectation of physical harm; (2) because of his mental illness is unable to provide for his basic

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm without assistance, unless treated on an

inpatient basis; (3) refuses treatment or is not adhering adequately to prescribed treatment, is

unable to understand his need for treatment, and is reasonably expected based on his behavioral

history, to suffer mental or emotional deterioration and after such deterioration, is reasonably

expected to meet either of the first two criteria; and (4) is in need of immediate hospitalization to

prevent harm. Dr. Sullivan explained that respondent appeared “guarded” and demonstrated

“illogical and disorganized thought.” He stated that respondent’s presentation was consistent with

psychotic illness and being a danger to himself or others and that he was in need of hospitalization.

Dr. Kurilo stated respondent had “mood problems” with an onset of eight years ago. She indicated

that respondent had been physically aggressive towards his mother and described the interactions

between respondent and his mother that led to respondent’s admission.

¶8     The petition was set for hearing on March 12, 2021. The hearing was continued numerous

times, over respondent’s objections, and rescheduled for April 9, 2021.              Respondent was

subsequently discharged from the EMHC on April 7, 2021. Because respondent was discharged,

the petition was withdrawn on April 9, 2021.1

¶9     On January 27, 2022, respondent filed a pro se petition for a certificate of innocence

pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)). Respondent used a

standard legal form entitled “Petition for Certificate of Innocence” provided by the Clerk of the

Circuit Court of Cook County. However, respondent changed the language in the form in

       1
           There are no transcripts of any of the proceedings on the petition for involuntary admission

included in the record on appeal. The record does confirm that respondent was represented by a

public defender during those proceedings.

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

numerous ways. He changed the caption from “In the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois” to

“In the Circuit Court of Kane County, Illinois.” He struck out the standard language which stated,

“I was convicted of one or more felonies in the above captioned cause by the State of Illinois in

the County of Cook,” and typed in the following language directly above it, “I believe I was

wrongfully confined by Lake County Circuit Court Court Ordered Petition and Confined in Kane

County DHS Center.” He also added the following language to the petition by typing between

lines of standard language in the form: “I am requesting a Certificate of Innocence for my wrongful

confinement in a DHS Mental Health Institution;” “Wrongful confinement in a mental institution

should be similar to a prisoner wrongfully imprisoned in a State Institution;” and “Discharge in

Kane County to serve to Kane County State’s Attorney Office.”

¶ 10   In a six-page affidavit filed in support of his petition, respondent stated that he believed he

was wrongfully confined during his time as an involuntary patient at the EMHC. He stated that

he was innocent prior to being “arrested” in Lake County “with the Court Order provided by the

Illinois Lake County Circuit Court.” He claimed that the petition filed in Lake County was not a

“true medical emergency and did not have any appropriate medical certificates attached to hold

[him] against his will.” He stated that he was wrongfully confined for longer than 30 days to

“await trial for the requirement of medication and confinement but did not have any proper

evidence to actually convict or confine a person as to required medication or confine to a longer

stay that the discharge was allowed by the Kane County Judge and [he] should be viewed as

innocent.” He further contended that he:

               “successfully defended against the confinement in a mental institution and

       defended against the requirement of medication when I was discharged from the Circuit

       Court of Kane County on April 9th 2021 that I believe this confinement should be seen as

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

       wrongful confinement as similar to a prisoner’s innocence to be awarded a Certificate of

       Innocence to be recognized with the Illinois Court of Claims but for a mental health case.”

Pointing to the fact that he was assigned a public defender to represent him in the involuntary

admission proceedings, he asserted that this matter should be seen as a “quasi-criminal”

proceeding. Respondent stated that the public defender’s office and the EMHC do not have “a

proper review board as similar to a prisoner’s review board” and do not “recognize the need to

prove innocence for the defendant when the defendant defeats a petition for involuntary

confinement [by being] discharged from confinement.”           Citing section 2-702 of the Code,

respondent states that he is filing a petition for a certificate of innocence due to the “wrongful

confinement in a mental health institution although it does not match perfectly as to be imprisoned

in a [sic] Illinois prison institution that the wrongful confinement should be noted for being

wrongfully confined in a mental health institution for longer than 30 days due to the court ordered

arrest and confinement.”

¶ 11    On March 14, 2022, respondent filed a motion in support of his petition for a certificate of

innocence asking the trial court judge to hold a hearing to “recognize a need for a [sic] innocent

discharged subject to reclaim innocence after a wrongful confinement” so the court of claims can

“process the Circuit Court Judge approved Petition for a Certificate of Innocence as similar to a

prisoners [sic] innocence.” On March 21, 2022, respondent filed a 22-page document entitled

“Second Affidavit for – Petition for a Certificate of Innocence.” The document contains discussion

of and references to numerous amendments to the United States Constitution, case law from federal

and state jurisdictions, and numerous federal and Illinois statutes. The document states, inter alia,

that wrongful confinement in a mental health institution should be treated the same as a criminal

conviction for the purpose of seeking a certificate of innocence.

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

¶ 12   At a hearing held on April 1, 2022, the trial judge asked respondent for clarification as to

what he was seeking, asking respondent if he was “trying to get monetary damages for being

wrongfully detained” and commenting “which if you were, I can understand that, but I’m saying

maybe you ought to bring a civil suit.” Respondent stated that he wanted a certificate of innocence.

He stated further “I understand that this petition is not necessarily recognized, because – in a sense,

you know I am coming from the understanding that the petition for Certificate of Innocence is

understood for criminal cases, and I understand that this case is a quasi criminal, which is why I

was assigned a Public Defender [for the involuntary admission proceedings].”

¶ 13   The State argued that a petition for a certificate of innocence filed pursuant to section 2-

702 of the Code only applies to criminal cases and specifically to someone who has been convicted

of a felony and subsequently imprisoned for one year or more. The State noted that respondent

had struck out portions of the standard form petition referring to these requirements and added his

own language about applying the statute to a mental health case. The State argued that there may

be “different pathways” that respondent could pursue to seek redress in this case but that a

certificate of innocence is not one of them. After allowing extensive arguments from both sides,

the court ruled “I agree with the State. I don’t think this is the proper remedy, so the Petition for

Certificate of Innocence will be denied. The motion to Strike will be granted.” The trial court

ruled that it was a final and appealable order.

¶ 14   This appeal followed.

¶ 15                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16   Before we turn to the merits of this appeal, we must first address the State’s renewal of its

motion to strike respondent’s brief for his failure to comply with multiple provisions of our

supreme court rules. We note that respondent is self represented. However, it is well established

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

that “pro se litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures

and must comply with the same rules and procedures as would be required of litigants represented

by attorneys.” JB Morgan Chase Bank, National Associates v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 181909,

¶ 29; In re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2009).

¶ 17   Throughout the pendency of this appeal, respondent filed numerous motions, many of

which were related to the preparation of his brief (including motions for extensions of time to file

his opening brief, motions for leave to file an opening brief in excess of the page limitation, a

motion to file a supplemental brief, motions to stay the appeal to obtain additional time, a motion

to “relax” the rules regarding brief requirements, and a motion to file a reply brief in excess of the

page limitation). Notably, respondent also filed no less than five motions seeking the appointment

of counsel on appeal which this court denied because respondent has no right to appointed counsel

on a petition for a certificate of innocence. In several of these motions, respondent requested, in

the alternative, that the rules regarding briefs be “relaxed” for him if counsel were not appointed.

In these instances, we further admonished respondent that he, like any pro se litigant, must

substantially comply with the supreme court rules pertaining to briefs.

¶ 18   Once respondent’s brief was filed, the State filed a motion to strike his brief, to compel

him to file a brief in compliance with the supreme court rules, and to set a new briefing schedule.

The State pointed to respondent’s numerous violations of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff.

Oct. 1, 2020) regarding the form and content of briefs (misrepresentation of the length of his brief

due to misleading pagination and a substantial use of single spacing; omission of a “Points and

Authorities” section; lack of a proper issue statement or statement of jurisdiction; improper

“Statement of Facts” containing argument and no citations to the record; an argument section

comprised largely of discussion of issues not before the court and with no citations to the record

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

on appeal; and an argument section that is “basically incoherent, nonsensical and based on a flawed

supposition, that this appeal is from a mental health code matter.”). The State also argued that

respondent “ignore[d] multiple orders of this Court indicating that this appeal was solely from the

Kane County court’s denial of appellant’s Petition for a Certificate of Innocence and was not an

appeal from the dismissed Lake County mental health matter.”              The State explained “the

deficiencies in [respondent’s] brief make it difficult to respond to [his] confusing and often

nonsensical claims.” 2

¶ 19   In denying the State’s motion to strike respondent’s brief, we ruled that our denial was

subject to reconsideration, and we further clarified the matter by instructing the State to “file a

response brief addressing whether Kane County circuit court properly struck appellant’s petition

for a certificate of innocence as a vehicle for appellant’s ‘wrongful confinement’ claim.” In its

brief, the State renewed its objection and again asked this court to strike respondent’s brief.

¶ 20   We are mindful of the challenges respondent faces in representing himself on appeal.

Nevertheless, failure to comply with Rule 341 which governs the form and contents of briefs is

not an inconsequential matter. The rules of our supreme court “are not aspirational. They are not

       2
           Respondent also filed a 732-page Table of Contents/Appendix which is not in compliance

with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). His reply brief violates Supreme Court

Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) by failing to confine his argument strictly to replying to the State’s

brief, by exceeding the page limitation (although the reply brief is 20 pages in length, it contains a

significant amount of single spacing), and by including an unnecessary 23-page appendix mostly

comprised of orders issued by this court.

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

suggestions. They have the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed

and enforced as written.” Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995).

¶ 21   This court has the authority to strike a brief that lacks substantial conformity to our supreme

court rules. Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7. Still, striking a

brief is a harsh sanction that is only appropriate where violations of the procedural rules hinder our

review. Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 15. In this case, we have the benefit of a clear and

cogent brief submitted by the State. Based on the State’s brief and our own review of respondent’s

briefs, we have been provided with the facts necessary for an understanding of the case and can

discern, generally, respondent’s assignment of error. Thus, despite the egregious deficiencies and

violations in respondent’s brief and even though respondent was admonished numerous times that

substantial compliance with the rules was expected, we will address the merits of the trial court’s

decision to strike respondent’s petition for a certificate of innocence. This is the only issue

properly before the court in this appeal.3

       3
           Respondent filed an appeal of the trial court’s decision in the Lake County case involving

the first petition for involuntary admission (No. 2-22-0191) which was consolidated with the

appeal before us. However, that appeal was subsequently dismissed as untimely. Despite this

dismissal, respondent continued to seek, via numerous motions filed in this court, inclusion in this

appeal the record and issues from the Lake County case. Respondent has also included discussion

and argument regarding the Lake County case in his brief in this appeal. However, we will

disregard references to matters outside of the record and beyond the scope of the one issue properly

before the court in this appeal. See Keener v. City of Herrin, 235 Ill. 2d 338, 346 (2009) (holding

that a party may not rely on matters outside the record to support its position on appeal); Affiliated

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

¶ 22     We now turn to the merits. At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in

granting the State’s motion to strike respondent’s petition for a certificate of innocence filed

pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-702 (West 2020)).

¶ 23    Although not expressly designated as such, the State’s motion to strike respondent’s

petition for a certificate of innocence was argued and ruled upon as a motion with respect to the

pleadings under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)). A section 2-615

motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading by alleging defects on the face of

the pleading. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). A case “ ‘should not

be dismissed on the pleadings unless it appears that no set of facts can be proved which will entitle

the pleader to relief, and then only if it is apparent that even after amendment, if leave to amend is

sought, no cause of action can be stated.’ ” Cordts v. Chicago Tribune Co., 369 Ill. App. 3d 601,

613 (2006) (quoting Dinn Oil Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 87 Ill. App. 2d 206, 211-12 (1967)).

We review an order granting or denying a section 2-615 motion to strike de novo. Marshall, 222

Ill. 2d at 429.

¶ 24    Although respondent’s argument is difficult to follow, his objective is clear; he believes

his involuntary admission to the EMHC was wrongful and he wants to be declared “innocent.” He

contends that the trial court should have construed section 2-702 of the Code in a way to allow

him to obtain a certificate of innocence in the same way a person convicted of a felony can petition

to do so when he or she asserts that he or she was wrongfully convicted of a crime. However, his

argument is contrary to the plain language of the statute.

Health Group, Ltd. v. Devon Bank, 2016 IL App (1st) 152685, ¶ 27 (holding that a court of review

will only consider issues properly raised as to the judgments specified in the notice of appeal).

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

¶ 25   Section 2-702 of the Code provides a way for innocent people who have been wrongfully

convicted of crimes in Illinois and subsequently imprisoned to obtain relief against the State for

wrongful incarceration through the court of claims. 735 ILCS 5/2-702(a) (West 2020). To obtain

a certificate of innocence, the person wrongfully convicted must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that:

                 “(1) the petitioner was convicted of one or more felonies by the State of Illinois and

       subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the

       sentence;

                 (2)(A) the judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the indictment or

       information dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either the petitioner was found not

       guilty at the new trial or the petitioner was not retried and the indictment or information

       dismissed; or (B) the statute, or application thereof, on which the indictment or information

       was based violated the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois;

                 (3) the petitioner is innocent of the offenses charged in the indictment or

       information, or his or her acts or omissions charged in the indictment did not constitute a

       felony or misdemeanor against the State; and

                 (4) the petitioner did not by his or her own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about

       his or her conviction.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g) (West 2020).

¶ 26   The standard form “Petition for Certificate of Innocence” respondent used to file his claim

in this case contains all of the aforementioned statutory requirements. However, respondent struck

out a required element of a certificate-of-innocence claim, namely, the requirement that he “was

convicted of one or more felonies in the above captioned case by the State of Illinois.” He then

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

added new language stating, “I believe I was wrongfully confined by Lake County Circuit Court

Court Ordered Petition and Confined in Kane County DHC Center.” In many of his court filings,

respondent acknowledged that his situation did not fit within the required statutory framework.

On the face of the petition itself, respondent added the following language: “Wrongful

confinement in a mental institution should be similar to a prisoner wrongfully imprisoned in a

State Institution.” In his affidavit attached to the petition, respondent quoted the language of

section 2-702 of the Code and explained: “I believe this confinement should be seen as wrongful

confinement as similar to a prisoner’s innocence to be awarded a Certificate of Innocence to be

recognized with the Illinois Court of Claims but for a mental health case.” At the hearing on the

State’s motion to strike, respondent stated further:

                 “it should be viewed as a wrongful confinement kind of understanding for

       prisoners, not necessarily in a prison for the criminal division, like I said, but for mental

       health.

                 Like I said, the motion – this motion is not necessarily being understood by the

       Kane County State’s Attorney’s Office, ***

                 But this is correct, the standardized forms for the petition, what is available to pro se

       lit–pro se, you know, one who defends his own self at this point. So I think it’s correct

       that even though it’s more geared to the criminal division, that there should be some

       understanding of going into a process like a trial ***”

Later in the hearing, respondent acknowledged: “I do recognize that it’s [a petition for certificate

of innocence] not specifically defined in the law for mental health cases, which could be

understood that, you know, orally could be better recognized as a legal course of understanding to

be allowed to that kind of trial.”

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2023 IL App (2d) 220137-U

¶ 27    The plain language of the statute is clear; to petition for a certificate of innocence, a person

must be “convicted and subsequently imprisoned for one or more felonies by the State of Illinois

which he or she did not commit.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702 (b)(1) (West 2020). Respondent was not

convicted of a felony, and he was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. We acknowledge that

respondent believes he was wrongfully confined in the EMHC and is asking this court to extend

that statute to meet his needs. However, we have no authority to do so. See Accettura v.

Vacationland, Inc., 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11 (stating that courts will not depart from the plain

language of the statute by reading provisions into it). We find, as a matter of law, respondent is

not eligible to make a claim under section 2-702 of the Code. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s

decision to strike his petition.

¶ 28    Finally, while respondent has attempted to raise a multitude of other issues and arguments

in his briefs, our review is limited to only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the

notice of appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017); General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242

Ill. 2d 163, 176 (2011). In this case, the trial court’s decision on April 1, 2022, to strike

respondent’s petition for a certificate of innocence is the only judgment at issue. Therefore, we

lack jurisdiction to consider all other matters respondent has attempted to raise before this court.

¶ 29                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30    For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 31    Affirmed.

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