Court Opinion

ID: 9891221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 20:05:04.850257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:39.617895
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/17/23
                             CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                        E079991

 v.                                                      (Super. Ct. No. RIF1700495)

 DANNY MANZO,                                            OPINION

         Defendant and Respondent.

        APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey Prevost, Judge.

Reversed.

        Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Gary S. Rogh, and Kristen J. Allison, Deputy

District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

        Elisa A. Brandes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Respondent.

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                                             I.

                                    INTRODUCTION

       Plaintiff and appellant, The Riverside County District Attorney appeals the trial

court’s dismissal of three felony charges against defendant and respondent Danny Manzo

due to evidence lost during the prosecution’s five-year delay in prosecuting the case after

filing charges against defendant. Because there is no evidence that the loss of evidence

prejudiced defendant, we reverse the order dismissing the complaint.

                                            II.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On January 1, 2017, defendant was pulled over for using his cell phone while

driving. After learning that defendant was driving with a suspended license, the officer

ordered him out of the car. According to the officer, defendant admitted there was a gun

in the car. The officer searched the car and found a gun and a methamphetamine pipe

with drug residue. The officer then learned that defendant was a convicted felon and

arrested him.

       While defendant was out on bail, he was arrested a few weeks later in San

Bernardino County for armed robbery and booked into San Bernardino County jail,

where he remained until May 2017, when he was sentenced to eight years in prison for

the robbery.

       In February 2017, however, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a

complaint charging defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,

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§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a); count 2),

and possessing a loaded firearm while under the influence of a controlled substance

(Health & Safety Code, § 11550, subd. (e); count 3). Defendant did not appear at his

arraignment on February 15, 2017, so his bail was forfeited, and a warrant for his arrest

issued.

          Five years later, after defendant completed his sentence in the San Bernardino

robbery case, he was arrested and arraigned on the outstanding charges in Riverside

County in April 2022. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the

delay in prosecuting him violated his due process rights under article I, section 15 of the

California Constitution. Defendant claimed that the delay between the filing of charges

against him and his arraignment prejudiced him for several reasons, including that video

footage of his arrest from the officer’s dashcam was no longer available. In opposition,

the District Attorney’s only argument was that defendant suffered no actual prejudice

from the delay.

          The trial court found that the missing dashcam footage caused defendant

prejudice. The court reasoned: “The existence of the dashcam is problematic. I tend to

agree with the prosecution that the loss of any dashcam footage can be prejudicial to

prosecution of the case just as much as it might be prejudicial to defense. But I think that

that doesn’t obviate the fact that there is some prejudice that ensued to the defense from

the unavailability of such evidence, which could possibly substantiate defense claims that

the circumstances of the arrest were not as claimed by the law enforcement agency

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performing the arrest. I think to some extent that that does constitute prejudice.” The

court therefore granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The District

Attorney timely appealed.

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       The District Attorney argues the trial court erred in dismissing the case because

defendant suffered no prejudice from the delay. We agree.

       Under article I, section 15 California constitution, an unreasonable post-complaint

delay constitutes a denial of the right to a speedy trial. (Jones v. Superior Court (1970) 3

Cal.3d 734, 739-740.) To warrant dismissal on such grounds, the defendant must first

show actual prejudice resulting from the delay. (Id. at p. 740.) The showing of actual

prejudice must be made on competent evidence and “must be supported by particular

facts and not . . . by bare conclusionary statements.” (Crockett v. Superior Court (1975)

14 Cal.3d 433, 442.) Speculative arguments are inadequate to establish actual prejudice.

(See, e.g., People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 923; People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th

891, 909; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 875-876 (Alexander).) Instead, the

defendant must affirmatively demonstrate having suffered actual prejudice as a result of

the delay, not just the possibility of prejudice. (People v. Abel, supra, at p. 909.)

       If—and only if—the defendant shows actual prejudice from a delayed prosecution,

“the prosecution must show justification for the delay. If the prosecution does that, the

trial court must balance the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay against the

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prosecution’s justification for the delay. [Citation.]” (People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th

937, 942.) “[T]he more reasonable the delay, the more prejudice the defense would have

to show to require dismissal.” (Ibarra v. Municipal Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 853,

858.) But if the defendant fails to satisfy the initial burden of showing actual prejudice,

“there is no need to determine whether the delay was justified.” (People v. Jones, supra,

57 Cal.4th at 921.)

       We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial delay for an

abuse of discretion and defer to any underlying factual findings if supported by

substantial evidence. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431.) Whether a delay is

prejudicial is a factual question that we review for substantial evidence. (Alexander,

supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 874.)

       There is no evidence that the missing dashcam footage prejudiced defendant in

any way. He offered only unsupported speculation that the footage had exculpatory value

in that it might have contradicted the arresting officer’s version of events. But “‘[t]he

showing of prejudice requires some evidence and cannot be presumed.’” (People v.

Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 37, italics added.) Speculation is not enough. (People v.

Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 909.)

       For instance, in People v. Lewis (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 203, the defendant argued

“that he was prejudiced by the loss of the child welfare agency, police, prosecution, and

court records.” He claimed that “the lost records might have contained information he

could have used to impeach” the victim. (Id. at p. 212.) The Lewis court rejected the

                                              5
defendant’s argument that the loss of the records prejudiced him because it was “wholly

speculative.” Like defendant here, the defendant in Lewis failed to make any showing

that the lost records had exculpatory value, so it was “entirely speculative” that he was

prejudiced by their disappearance. (Id. at p. 213.)

       Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th 846 is also instructive. There, the defendant claimed

that he was prejudiced by the loss of witness interview audio tapes. He argued that the

tapes “may have included statements not contained in, or that contradicted, the

investigators’ reports or witnesses’ testimony.” (Id. at p. 875.) Our Supreme Court

rejected the defendant’s argument that the loss of the tapes prejudiced him because it was

“based on speculation, not proof of actual prejudice.” (Ibid.)

       So too here. As the trial court acknowledged, the missing dashcam footage might

help defendant’s case, but it is entirely possible that it could help the prosecution’s case.

Although the footage could have contradicted the officer’s version of events, it also could

have confirmed it. As it stands, nothing in the record suggests that the footage had any

exculpatory value. Defendant’s claim of prejudice is therefore based wholly “on

speculation, not proof of actual prejudice.” (Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 875.)

       Defendant argues otherwise, relying on People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th

1313 (Mirenda), and People v. Cave (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 957 (Cave), but both cases are

distinguishable. In Mirenda, the defendant was actually prejudiced by the 26-year delay

between the filing of charges and the actual prosecution of the case, the death of a key

witness, and “the irreparable fading of memory,” all of which resulted in “the complete

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inability to mount a defense.” (Mirenda, supra, at p. 1333.) The defendant in Cave was

also actually prejudiced by the prosecution’s “‘purposeful’” delay, which resulted in the

disappearance of a “material witness”—an informant who was the only witness to an

undercover operation where the defendant sold heroin to an undercover officer. (Cave,

supra, at p. 965; see also People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 430 [“Prejudice may

be shown by [the] ‘“loss of material witnesses”’ . . .”].) But here the only lost evidence is

the dashcam footage, which could be immaterial or even harmful to defendant’s case.

Because nothing in the record shows that the loss of this evidence hurts defendant’s case,

defendant failed to meet his burden of showing its disappearance actually prejudiced him.

       In short, there is no substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that

defendant was prejudiced by the delay in prosecuting him and the resultant loss of the

dashcam footage. We therefore reverse the order dismissing the complaint.

                                             IV.

                                       DISPOSITION

       The trial court’s order dismissing the complaint is reversed.

       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                                                 CODRINGTON
                                                                                              J.
We concur:

RAMIREZ
                        P. J.

McKINSTER
                           J.

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