Court Opinion

ID: 9847349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:58:08.584118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:07.772248
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the ruling in Division 2 of the opinion and the judgment of reversal. In my opinion, the liability of the defendant hospital authority was clearly a question for the jury to determine. Since the evidence disclosed that the plaintiff had succeeded in opening one of the security screens and that these screens could not be opened except by one "possessed of Gargantuan strength, or ingenious enough, using any materials at hand, to devise some means of unlocking a screen” the hospital was put on notice either that the plaintiff possessed the Gargantuan strength necessary or was ingenious enough using any materials at hand, to devise some means of unlocking a screen. The hospital attendants assumed the plaintiff had unlocked the screen with a bent ashtray. It was a jury question as to whether this assumption was arrived at in the exercise of ordinary care and whether a search of the plaintiff was required in the exercise of ordinary care. The majority reaches a conclusion that "no one had the slightest reason to believe that a BIC pen could be used as a substitute for the key designed to unlock the screens.” While this conclusion might very well be au*452thorized by the evidence, it is not demanded. This is a question for the jury only under all the facts and circumstances of the case. The jury was authorized to find that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the hospital should have known a BIC pen would fit the lock on the retaining screen. If "[a] continuous surveillance of the plaintiff’s activities was necessary” (and a jury could have so found), then the imposition of such duty does not make the hospital an insurer of the plaintiff’s safety. See in this connection Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643 (1) (171 SE 192); Lathan v. Murrah, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 554, 557 (174 SE2d 269). A jury may find a greater amount of care may be required under some circumstances to meet the legal standard of ordinary care than would be required if the circumstances were different. See in this connection, Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214 (8) (176 SE2d 715). In my opinion, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict rendered.
I am authorized to state that Judges Quillian, Whitman, and Evans, concur in this dissent.