Court Opinion

ID: 9840923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 17:04:11.614166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:57.700976
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 Marriage of Farrell CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re Marriage of TRAVIS and
 ASHLEY FARRELL.
                                                                 D080127
 TRAVIS FARRELL,

           Respondent,

                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 21FL007938C)
           v.

 ASHLEY FARRELL,

           Respondent;

 RICHARD FARRELL et al.,

           Appellants.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michelle Ialeggio, Judge. Affirmed.
         David A. Kay, for Appellants Richard Farrell and Fairfax Farrell.

                                                             1
      No Appearance for Respondent Travis Farrell.
      Dillon Miller Ahuja & Boss and Sunjina Ahuja; Law Offices of Michael
Jason Lee and Michael J. Lee for Respondent Ashley Farrell.
                              INTRODUCTION
      During their marriage, Travis and Ashley Farrell borrowed funds from
Travis’ parents, Richard and Fairfax Farrell (the Farrells), to purchase a
home in San Diego. Travis later filed for divorce, listed the home for sale,
and accepted an offer for its nearly $2 million purchase. While the home was
in escrow, the Farrells’ Deed of Trust and $736,000 payoff demand emerged.
Following unsuccessful negotiations with the Farrells, Ashley joined them to
the dissolution action in family court, which ordered the $736,000 in disputed
funds to be sequestered in a trust account. Travis, Ashley, and the Farrells
then signed an agreement regarding escrow.
      Six months later, the family court granted Ashley’s request for $40,000
in attorney fees against the Farrells to be paid from the trust account. The
Farrells appeal the order, contending that they were not properly joined to
the family court action, that attorney fees could not be awarded against them
as third parties because all issues relating to them would be addressed in
their separate civil action against Travis and Ashley, and that the family
court’s fee order violated the parties’ escrow agreement. Ashley responds
that the Farrells forfeited their joinder objections by generally appearing in
the family court, that issues relating to the Farrells remained in the family
court, and that the Farrells failed to raise any argument in the family court
about the fee award violating the escrow agreement. We agree with Ashley
and therefore affirm.

                                       2
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Ashley and Travis Farrell married in September 2000. In July 2021,
while Ashley Farrell and the couple’s four minor children were visiting
relatives in Michigan, Travis filed for divorce in San Diego Superior Court
(family court). Travis also listed the couple’s San Diego family home for sale,
which quickly sold for nearly two million dollars.
      During escrow, the home’s title report disclosed a Deed of Trust (Deed)
recorded in June 2020 by Travis’ parents, Richard and Fairfax Farrell. The
Deed stated that Travis and Ashley would repay the Farrells for their
$121,335 loan made in 2002—when Travis and Ashley purchased the home—
at zero percent interest or at interest of 50 percent of the home’s equity
obtained through its refinance or sale. In late July 2021, the Farrells
submitted a $736,000 payoff demand to the escrow company.
      Following unsuccessful negotiations between Ashley, Travis, and the
Farrells, Ashley moved ex parte to join the Farrells to the dissolution action
in family court and to obtain an order sequestering the $736,000 of disputed
funds in a trust account so that the home sale could close. In her declaration
supporting her motion, Ashley outlined facts “confirm[ing her] suspicions”
that Travis was colluding with the Farrells to deprive the marital estate of
this asset.
      On September 3, 2021, the family court joined the Farrells “on an
emergency basis, under [California Rules of Court,] Rule 5.151” and ordered
the house sale funds to be placed in Travis’ attorney’s client trust account
“pending further order of the court or agreement of all parties.” Five days
later, on September 8, 2021, Ashley, Travis, and the Farrells signed an
escrow agreement (Escrow Agreement) with a stated effective date of
September 1, 2021. The Escrow Agreement provided that the Deed would be

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reconveyed so that the home sale could close and said that the escrow agent
would not distribute the escrowed funds “unless and until there is signed
written agreement between the Parties (Ashley, Travis and Trustees [the
Farrells]) or a certified final Order from a Court of competent jurisdiction
over Ashley, Travis and Trustee and the Escrowed Funds directing the
disbursement of the Escrowed Funds.” As of the time the parties filed their
briefing in this appeal, the $736,000 remained escrowed in the trust account.
      In December 2021, Richard Farrell was personally served with the
Joinder Summons, Ex Parte Joinder Order, and other related family court

filings. The same month, the Farrells filed a civil lawsuit1 against Ashley
and Travis seeking repayment under the Deed and for five additional notes,
signed only by Travis and totaling over $350,000. The Farrells’ civil suit
seeks a joint and several judgment against Ashley and Travis and claims the
marital estate is liable for the five additional notes because Travis signed
them during the marriage.
      Approximately one month later, Ashley filed in the family court a
Request for Order requesting a bifurcated trial as to the “legitimacy and
property characterization” of the Deed and the five notes, and seeking
$40,000 in attorney fees from the Farrells.
      In support of her attorney fees request, Ashley stated that the Farrells
sought reimbursement for various loans totaling more than $1,000,000 from
the community or from Ashley, alone. She stated that she and Travis had
worked together to resolve many issues in the dissolution, including child
support, spousal support, and child custody. And she further contended that
most of the attorney fees she had incurred were caused by the Farrells and

1    Farrell v. Farrell, San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2021-
00051661-CU-BC-CTL.
                                       4
that she could no longer afford an attorney to defend against their ongoing
attacks. She outlined her financial difficulties, including that her part-time
income as a piano teacher had been interrupted by a recent resurgence in
COVID, that she had previously depended on Travis to manage the couple’s
finances, and that she was now managing her own finances and primarily
responsible for raising the couple’s four children.
      The following day, on January 21, 2022, the Farrells filed a Notice of
Related Case in both the family and civil matters. Ashley filed a response
agreeing that the cases were related and requesting that the family court
assign all matters related to the Deed and five notes to a single judge. She
contended the family court had priority jurisdiction to hear the matters and
to determine the characterization of the debt and marital assets.
      On February 8, 2022, the Farrells filed a “pocket brief” asking the
family court to stay its characterization determination until after the civil
court had decided the alleged liabilities’ “ ‘validity.’ ” In the alternative, the
Farrells asked the family court to limit its review to the characterization of
the alleged debts “(i.e., separate or community)” and not to determine their
validity, which was being litigated in their civil action. The Farrells
explained that they did not dispute the family court’s authority to
characterize the alleged debts, and “in fact, Claimants [the Farrells] welcome
characterization, so long as their evidence is properly and fully considered.”
      At a February 9, 2022 hearing, the family court—pursuant to the
parties’ agreement—continued the matter to March 4, 2022 to determine the
relatedness issues and whether the family or civil court should hear the case.
The Farrells filed a supplemental “pocket brief” reiterating the same position
as their February 8 pocket brief on February 23, 2022.

                                         5
      On March 2, 2022, the Farrells filed an objection to their joinder in the
family court action, contending that they were not currently joined and
should not be joined.
      On March 7, 2022, the Farrells filed a Request for Order regarding
their joinder objection, set to be heard on April 12, 2022.
      The family court began the March 4, 2022 hearing by asking the
parties to identify which issues were to be heard that day. Although the
parties and court appeared to agree that relatedness was one issue on
calendar, as the parties had previously agreed, the court disagreed with
Travis’ attorney’s belief that the Farrells’ contested joinder was also on
calendar. The court stated it was not ruling on the Farrells’ joinder objection
that day and that, as far as it was concerned, the Farrells were joined. The
court ultimately found that the family and civil actions were related. It
further found that characterization of the alleged debts owed to the Farrells
needed to be determined by the family court and that, although either the
civil or family court could determine the validity of those debts, validity
would be “best determined by the civil division.” The family court stated that
characterization needed to be determined before validity and noted the
possibility that the family court could find the debts to be Travis’ liability,
alone, which would prevent the entry of a joint and several judgment against
Ashley in the civil action.
      Three days later, Richard Farrell filed a responsive declaration in
opposition to Ashley’s request for attorney fees, contending that he and his
wife, Fairfax Farrell, were not properly joined and that Fairfax had never
been served in the family court action. Richard further alleged that he was
retired and did not have money to pay for Ashley’s attorney fees, and that
there was no litigation against them in the family court; rather, the Farrells’

                                         6
civil action covered “all claims and issues” between the Farrells, Ashley, and
Travis. Richard noted his belief that the pending litigation would confirm
that Ashley owed the Farrells “for all of the money she has forced us to sue
her for” and that the Farrells had been “unnecessarily dragged into” family
court for the purpose of obtaining attorney fees against them. Although
California Rules of Court, rule 5.427, subdivision (c)(2) requires a party
responding to a request for attorney fees to complete and file a current
Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-320), the Farrells did not file one.
      In Ashley’s reply brief, she alternatively requested that if the Farrells
claimed they could not afford the $40,000 in requested fees, that this amount
should be disbursed from the $736,000 held in Travis’ attorney’s trust
account. Ashley additionally requested $60,000 to cover her attorney fees in
the Farrells’ civil action.
      At a March 15, 2022 hearing, the family court addressed Ashley’s
request for attorney fees. When asked for their appearances, the Farrells’
attorneys stated that they were making a “special appearance” because of
contesting joinder, and they claimed that the Farrells had never made a
general appearance in the family court action. The family court identified
several previous appearances by the Farrells and proceeded to consider
Ashley’s request for attorney fees, stating that it would not be addressing the
joinder issue during the hearing.
      After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, the family court
ordered the Farrells to pay $40,000 in attorney fees to Ashley, and declined to
award the $60,000 in requested civil fees because Ashley made this request
in her reply papers. It reasoned that because Ashley’s ability to pay fees was
“very limited” and because it was unable to assess the Farrells’ ability to pay
due to their failure to file Income and Expense Declarations, the fees would

                                       7
be paid from the $736,000 held in the trust account. The court further
ordered the Farrells to file Income and Expense Declarations. The court and
parties then discussed the timing of the fees payment from the trust account,
and the court ordered that the $40,000 be paid by 5 p.m. that day. The
Farrells immediately petitioned for a writ of supersedeas, which we

summarily denied. The Farrells then appealed.2
                                DISCUSSION
      The Farrells contend the family court erred in several ways when it
ordered them to pay Ashley $40,000 in attorney fees from the trust account.
They argue that they were not properly joined to the family court action, the

family court could not award attorney fees against them under Family Code3
section 2030, subdivision (d), because there were no “issues relating to” them
in the family court, and the order violated the Escrow Agreement. Because

we find each argument without merit, we affirm.4
A.    The Farrells’ General Appearances Forfeited Their Joinder Arguments
      The Farrells contend that attorney fees could not be awarded against
them because they “were not properly joined” to the family court action.

2     In a May 27, 2022 letter to this court, the Farrells conceded that their
appeal of the portion of the March 15, 2022 order requiring them to submit
Income and Expense Declarations was moot and abandoned. Accordingly,
this appeal is limited to the family court’s award of $40,000 in attorney fees
from Travis’ attorney’s trust account.

3    All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise indicated.

4      We need not address the parties’ various arguments about the validity
of the alleged debts owed to the Farrells because this is not an issue on
appeal and, indeed, does not yet appear to have been resolved by the civil
court.
                                       8
Specifically, they allege that they did not have notice of the family court’s
September 2, 2021 emergency order joining them to the case, that their
initial joinder was only for the limited purpose of allowing the pending home
sale to close, and that they were not joined using the procedure required by
California Rules of Court, rule 5.24. Ashley responds that the Farrells’
joinder is not an appealable issue and is not before us on appeal. Regardless,
we agree with Ashley that by generally appearing in the family court action,
the Farrells forfeited their joinder objections. (See e.g., In re Marriage of
Williams (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 753, 759–760 [although respondent’s failure
to properly join pension fund contravened statute, pension fund waived
joinder objection by generally appearing at hearing]; see also In re Marriage
of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1 (Marriage of Obrecht) [“By generally
appearing, a defendant relinquishes all objections based on lack of personal
jurisdiction or defective process or service of process.”].)
      Indeed, through their filings in family court, the Farrells generally
appeared multiple times before the March 15, 2022 attorney fees order. (See
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 52 [“A general appearance
occurs when the defendant takes part in the action or in some manner
recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.”].) For example, on
January 21, 2022, the Farrells filed a Notice of Related Case in the family
court. Regarding their appearances, the filing indicated only that the
attorney represented both “Richard Farrell and Fairfax Farrell.” (Cf.
Marriage of Obrecht, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 8 [“A California defendant
can preserve objections to personal jurisdiction only by making a special
appearance, i.e., an appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court’s
jurisdiction.”].) Similarly, the Farrells’ February 8 and 23, 2022 “pocket
brief” filings fail to suggest any limitation on their appearances. On the

                                         9
contrary, these briefs argued the merits of the alleged debts’ validity and
conceded to the family court’s jurisdiction to determine characterization,
which the Farrells expressly “welcome[d] . . . so long as their evidence [wa]s
properly and fully considered.” Accordingly, we conclude the Farrells
forfeited their improper joinder objections in this appeal.
B.    The Family Court Action Involved “Issues Relating To” the Farrells
      The family court awarded Ashley the $40,000 in attorney fees against
the Farrells under section 2030. Section 2030, subdivision (a)(1) provides
that in dissolution proceedings, “the court shall ensure that each party has
access to legal representation, . . . by ordering, if necessary based on the
income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party, or to
the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for
attorney[] fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding
during the pendency of the proceeding.” When—as is the case here—the
“other party” is a third party rather than a spouse to the dissolution, any
award of attorney fees “shall be limited to an amount reasonably necessary to
maintain or defend the action on the issues relating to that party.” (Id.,
subd. (d), italics added.) “ ‘Related’ ” means “ ‘standing in relation; connected;
allied; akin.’ ” (In re Marriage of Jovel (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 575, 587; see
also id. at p. 584 [“An ‘issue’ is ‘[a] single, certain, and material point,
deduced by the allegations and pleadings of the parties, which is affirmed on
the one side and denied on the other.’ ”].)
      The Farrells contend the family court lacked authority to award
attorney fees against them, as third parties, because all issues concerning
validity of the alleged debts would be resolved in the civil court, not the

                                         10
family court.5 The more appropriate question, however, is whether any
issues “relating to” the Farrells would be decided in the family court. (§ 2030,
subd. (d).) We conclude the answer to that question is yes. It is undisputed
that the Farrells were asserting their right to property purportedly owed to
them by the marital estate. And the fact that the validity of those alleged
debts would be determined in the civil court did not extinguish their interest
in this property in the family court—the same court that ordered the
disputed funds to be sequestered in a trust account.
      Indeed, the record shows that the Farrells sought to weigh in on the
characterization in family court of the alleged marital debts. Their own
pocket brief filed in family court stated that they did not object to the family
court deciding characterization, “so long as their evidence [wa]s properly and
fully considered.” (Italics added.) Moreover, Ashley contended in the family
court proceeding that Travis and the Farrells were colluding to deprive the
marital estate of this property. Accordingly, we conclude that issues “relating
to” the Farrells remained in the family court, as required by section 2030,
subdivision (d). (See e.g., In re Marriage of Bendetti (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
863, 871 [affirming fee award against ex-husband’s new wife joined to
dissolution proceeding where “issues” related to the new wife—whether
husband invested in funds in which the ex-wife had a community property
interest and whether he fraudulently transferred his interest in those funds
to his second wife].)

5     The Farrells additionally contend that they were not “parties” within
the meaning of section 2030, subdivision (d) because they were not properly
joined to the family court action. Because, as discussed previously, we
conclude the Farrells forfeited their joinder objections, we reject this
argument for the same reasons.
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C.    The Farrells’ Remaining Arguments on Appeal Are Forfeited
      The Farrells additionally complain that because the family court’s
order required the attorney fees to be paid from Travis’ attorney’s trust
account, the order violated the parties’ Escrow Agreement. The crux of the
Farrells’ argument is that the Escrow Agreement supplanted the family
court’s prior order sequestering the disputed funds and that the Escrow
Agreement’s terms required all issues concerning the disputed funds,
including validity, to be resolved by “a certified final” court order or party
agreement before any funds could be disbursed.
      We need not consider these arguments, however, because the Farrells
failed to raise them in the family court. (See Rancho Mirage Country Club
Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 264 [“ ‘[A]s a
general rule, “issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” ’ ”]; Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 651, 670
[“ ‘It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on
appeal.’ ”].) Indeed, the Farrells did not make any argument concerning the
alleged violation of the Escrow Agreement’s terms in their briefing in the

family court or during the March 15, 2022 hearing.6 Their silence in the
family court on these issues is particularly glaring considering Ashley’s
alternative request—made both in her reply brief supporting her attorney

6      In their reply brief on appeal, the Farrells point to their March 7, 2022
lodgment of the Escrow Agreement, among other exhibits, in support of their
separate request for order regarding their objection to joinder. But merely
lodging this exhibit in support of a separate request for order does not equate
to raising the argument that awarding attorney fees from the trust account
would violate the terms of the Escrow Agreement and thus allowing the
family court an opportunity to address this new argument.

                                        12
fees request and specifically discussed by the family court at the hearing—to
have the attorney fees paid out of the trust account.
      Moreover, even if we considered these forfeited arguments, we would
reject them and conclude the family court’s award of fees from the trust
account was proper. (See e.g., § 2032, subd. (c), italics added [“The court may
order payment of an award of attorney[ ] fees and costs from any type of
property, whether community or separate, principal or income.”]; see also
§ 2010, subds. (e), (f) [family court has power to “render any judgment and
make orders that are appropriate concerning . . . [t]he settlement of the
property rights of the parties [and t]he award of attorney[ ] fees and costs”].)
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Ashley is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.

                                                                  CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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