Court Opinion

ID: 9383394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 16:00:42.410107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.213388
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6185        Document: 010110835309       Date Filed: 03/30/2023      Page: 1
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                                FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             March 30, 2023
                            _________________________________
                                                                              Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                  Clerk of Court
  JIMMY CALDWELL,

           Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 22-6185
                                                        (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00340-JD)
  JANET DOWLING, Warden,                                        (W.D. Okla.)

           Respondent - Appellee.
                          _________________________________

                ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                       _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Jimmy Caldwell, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a certificate of

 appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s order denying his habeas petition as

 untimely. For the reasons explained below, we deny his COA request and dismiss this

 matter.

        In 2004, Caldwell pleaded guilty to one count of child sexual abuse in Oklahoma

 state court. The state court imposed a 50-year sentence, and Caldwell did not appeal. In

 2020, Caldwell sought postconviction relief in state court, contending that the state court

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed.
 R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
        1
          Although we liberally construe Caldwell’s pro se filings, we do not act as his
 advocate or create arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1
 (10th Cir. 2008).
Appellate Case: 22-6185      Document: 010110835309          Date Filed: 03/30/2023      Page: 2

 lacked jurisdiction over him under McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), and the

 Major Crimes Act (MCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The state trial court denied relief, and

 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed.

        Caldwell then filed this habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, advancing the

 same lack-of-jurisdiction argument. The magistrate judge assigned to Caldwell’s case

 recommended dismissing the petition as untimely. Although Caldwell did not file formal

 objections to this recommendation, he twice filed notices of appeal and COA motions

 with this court. After Caldwell voluntarily dismissed his first attempted appeal and we

 sua sponte dismissed the second (given the absence of a final judgment from the district

 court), the district court liberally construed Caldwell’s attempted appellate filings as

 objections. The district court then overruled those objections, adopted the magistrate

 judge’s report and recommendation with minor modifications, and held that Caldwell’s

 petition was untimely. It therefore dismissed the petition with prejudice and declined to

 issue a COA.

        Caldwell now requests a COA from this court, seeking to challenge the dismissal

 of his habeas petition.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We will grant a COA if Caldwell

 can “show[], at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

 states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would

 find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.

        2
         We construe Caldwell’s combined opening brief and COA application as a notice
 of appeal. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1992) (holding that brief filed in
 appellate court was effective as notice of appeal); Martin v. Rios, 472 F.3d 1206, 1207
 (10th Cir. 2007) (treating COA application as notice of appeal).
                                               2
Appellate Case: 22-6185      Document: 010110835309         Date Filed: 03/30/2023         Page: 3

 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). If we conclude that reasonable jurists would not

 debate the district court’s procedural ruling, we need not address the constitutional

 question. Id. at 485.

        We begin with the procedural timeliness ruling. There is a one-year deadline for

 filing a federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Typically, this one-year

 period begins to run when the state-court judgment becomes final “by the conclusion of

 direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). But

 this start date can be delayed if (1) state action created an unlawful impediment to filing

 the petition, (2) the petitioner asserts a constitutional right newly recognized by the

 Supreme Court that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, or (3) the factual

 predicate for the claim could not previously have been discovered through due diligence.

 § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D).

        Here, the district court concluded that Caldwell’s deadline began running when his

 conviction became final in September 2004 and expired one year later, in September

 2005. See § 2244(d)(1)(A). In so ruling, the district court rejected Caldwell’s argument

 that, based on McGirt, § 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D) delayed the starting date for the one-year

 deadline. It also rejected Caldwell’s argument that the one-year deadline does not apply

 to him because his conviction, entered by a court lacking jurisdiction, never became final.

 And it noted that Caldwell did not argue for and was not entitled to any kind of tolling or

 equitable exception.

        Before this court, Caldwell reasserts that McGirt established a new and retroactive

 rule of constitutional law under § 2244(d)(1)(C), making his petition timely. But we

                                               3
Appellate Case: 22-6185       Document: 010110835309        Date Filed: 03/30/2023    Page: 4

 recently held otherwise, rejecting a § 2244(d)(1)(C) argument because “McGirt

 announced no new constitutional right.” Pacheco v. El Habti, 48 F.4th 1179, 1191 (10th

 Cir. 2022). There is accordingly no room for debate about whether McGirt triggers a later

 starting date for habeas petitions under § 2244(d)(1)(C), and we decline to issue a COA

 on this basis.

        The remainder of Caldwell’s brief merely reiterates his position that the state court

 lacked jurisdiction over him because he is an Indian who committed an MCA crime in

 Indian country. But this assertion does not help Caldwell escape the untimeliness of his

 habeas petition: “[A] habeas claim predicated on a convicting court’s lack of

 subject[-]matter jurisdiction ‘is subject to dismissal for untimeliness.’” Lamarr v. Nunn,

 No. 22-6063, 2022 WL 2678602, at *2 (10th Cir. July 12, 2022) (unpublished) (quoting

 Morales v. Jones, 417 F. App’x 746, 749 (10th Cir. 2011)).3 And reasonable jurists could

 not debate the district court’s procedural ruling that Caldwell’s petition was untimely. See

 Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. We therefore deny his COA request and dismiss this appeal.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Nancy L. Moritz
                                                Circuit Judge

        3
            We cite Lamarr for its persuasive value. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
                                                4