Court Opinion

ID: 9927239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:06:37.466308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:11.215235
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                    COURT OF APPEAL

                                      FIRST CIRCUIT

 Coo
                                      2023 CA 0321

                               LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS
                          IN THE MATTER OF MICHELLE BARNETf

                                                       Judgment Rendered:     JAN 2 6 70A

                                      On Appeal from
                                the Ethics Adjudicatory Board
                     State of Louisiana, Division of Administrative Law
                                   Docket No. 2015- 0652

                  Gregory McDonald, Presiding Administrative Law Judge

        David A. Lowe                             Counsel for Respondent/ Appellant
        Baton Rouge, Louisiana                    Michelle Barnett

        Tracy M. Barker                           Counsel for Appellee
        David M. Bordelon                         Louisiana Board of Ethics
        Mallory A. Guillot
        Agency Attorneys
        Baton Rouge, Louisiana

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                 BEFORE:       McCLENDON, NESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.
McCLEN DON, J.

         Michelle Barnett appeals from an Ethics Adjudicatory Board ( EAB) decision that

found she violated a provision of the Louisiana Code of Governmental Ethics, LSA- R. S.

42: 1101,     et seq. ( Ethics Code)       and imposed penalties and fines accordingly. After a

thorough review of the record, we affirm.

                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY'

         On January 15, 2015, the Louisiana Board of Ethics ( BOE)                         charged Michelle

Barnett, an employee of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals ( DHH), 2 office

of Behavioral Health ( OBH),           with receipt of a thing of economic value from Magellan

Health Services ( Magellan) at a time when her agency had a contractual or other business

or financial relationship with Magellan, in violation of LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d).                  An

adjudicatory hearing was held on October 13 and 14, 2022. After the hearing, the EAB

issued a decision finding Mrs. Barnett violated LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) "' by receiving

one- half of her husband Thomas Barnett's salary for services he provided to Magellan

Health Services, Inc. during the period of March 1, 2013, through October 15, 2013, from

a prohibited source."        For this violation, the EAB fined Mrs. Barnett $ 1, 000. 00 under LSA-

R. S. 42: 1153( B),       and    assessed penalties against Mrs.            Barnett   in    the   amount of

 22, 053. 74 under LSA- R. S. 42: 1115( A). Mrs. Barnett filed a " Request and/ or Motion for

Rehearing and/ or Reconsideration" pursuant to LSA- R. S. 49: 977. 1, 3 which the EAB

denied. Pursuant to LSA- R. S. 42: 1142( A)( 1),         Mrs. Barnett appealed directly to this court.4

1 We borrow portions of this opinion from this court's previous opinions in Barnett v. Louisiana Board
of Ethics, 2018- 1106 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 20/ 19), 280 So. 3d 632 ( Barnett I), and Louisiana Board of
Ethics In the Matter of Michelle Barnett, 2021- 0459 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 7/ 22) 2022 WL 1074623
 unpublished) ( Barnett II).

         In Barnett I, this court affirmed the EAB' s denial of Mrs. Barnett' s exception raising the objection
of prematurity. Prematurity is determined by the facts existing at the time the suit is filed. Barnett, 280
So. 3d at 638.

         In Barnett II, this court concluded that the EAB did not abuse its great discretion in denying Mrs.
Barnett's motion in limine seeking to preclude the BOE from asserting, alleging, calling any witness to
testify, or offering any evidence into the record asserting her agency "was anything other than DHH/ OBH[.]"
Barnett i1, 2022 WL 1074623 at * 1.

2 After the events at issue, Act 300 of the 2016 Legislative Session amended and reenacted LSA- R. S. 36: 251
to change the name of DHH to the Louisiana Department of Health ( LDH).            For ease of reference and

continuity, we refer to DHH throughout.
3 Louisiana Revised Statutes 49: 959 was redesignated as LSA- R. S. 49: 977. 1 by Acts 2022, No. 663, § 1.

4 Any person aggrieved by any action of the EAB may appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeal. LSA- R. S.
42: 1142( A)( 1);   Board of Ethics v. Morrow, 2022-0245 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 8/ 23), 369 So. 3d 54, 56.

                                                        2
                                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

        The Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act ( APA) governs the judicial review of

an EAB decision. Louisiana Board of Ethics in re Great Southern Dredging, Inc.,

2015- 0870 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 27/ 16), 195 So. 3d 631, 634, writ denied sub nam. Louisiana

Board of Ethics in the Matter of Great Southern Dredging, Inc., 2016- 1208 ( La.

10/ 17/ 16), 207 So -3d 1063. Judicial review is confined to the record, and, pursuant to

LSA- R. S.   49: 978. 1( G) (    formerly LSA- R. S. 49: 964( G)), s the EAB's decision may be

reversed or modified only if substantial rights of the appellant are prejudiced because the

findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: ( 1)             in violation of constitutional or

statutory provisions; ( 2)        in excess of the agency' s statutory authority; ( 3) made upon

unlawful procedure; (        4) affected by other error of law; ( 5) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or ( 6) not supported and

sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court. Great

Southern Dredging, Inc., 195 So. 3d at 634.

        As noted above, Mrs. Barnett appealed the decision of the EAB directly to this court

pursuant to LSA- R. S. 42: 1142( A)( 1). This court considered the direct appeal of a decision

of the Board of Ethics in Schmitt v. Louisiana Board of Ethics, 2000- 0341 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 3/ 28/ 01), 808 So. 2d 524, before concluding:

        Pursuant      to [      LSA-] R. S.   49: 964( G)( 6),   we   have    made     our    own

        determinations of fact and conclude the evidence supports a finding that
        Mr. Schmitt violated [ LSA-] R. S. 42: 1112( 6)( 1). In conducting this review,
        we have given due regard to the Board' s determination of credibility issues.
        The findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the Board' s .. .
        written reasons for judgment are correct.

Schmitt, 808 So. 2d at 525. Consistent with Schmitt, subsequent jurisprudence in which

a party appealed a decision of the Board of Ethics directly to this court reflects that this

court has made its own determinations of fact in such situations. See In re Ferrara Fire

Apparatus, Inc., 2003- 0446 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 31/ 03), 868 So. 2d 762, 764 (" Pursuant

to our standard of review, we have made our own determinations of fact and conclude

the evidence supports a finding that FFA violated LSA- R. S. 42: 1117" j; In re Jefferson

Alliance, Inc., 2002- 0335 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 14/ 03), 841 So. 2d 15, 17, writ denied, 2003-

5 Louisiana Revised Statutes 49; 964 was redesignated as LSA- R. S. 49: 978. 1 by Acts 2022, No. 663, § 1.

                                                        3
1136 ( La. 6/ 20/ 03), 847 So. 2d 1233 (" Employing this standard of review, we conclude

that the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the Board' s written reasons

for judgment        are   correct").     Thus,    as    the   reviewing       court,   we    make     our     own

determinations and conclusions of fact by a preponderance of evidence based upon our

own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety, though due regard must be given

to the agency' s determination of credibility issues. On legal issues, we give no special

weight to the findings of the administrative tribunal, but conduct a de novo review of

questions of law and render judgment on the record. See Schmitt v. Louisiana Board

of Ethics, 2000- 0341 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 28/ 01), 808 So. 2d 524, 525. 6

                                                       LAW

        The Ethics Code was enacted to establish ethical standards for the conduct of

elected officials and state employees to protect against conflicts of interest between their

private interests and the duties of their positions. LSA- R. S. 42: 1101( B); Great Southern

Dredging, Inc., 195 So. 3d at 634. A conflict of interest is a situation that would require

an official to serve two masters, presenting a potential,                     rather than an actuality, of

wrongdoing .7      In re Ferrara Fire Apparatus, Inc., 2003- 0446 ( La. App.                              1   Cir.

12/ 31/ 03), 868 So. 2d 762, 765. The Ethics Code prohibits not only actual conflicts of

interest, but also the appearance of impropriety by preventing situations that create the

perception of conflicts of interest. The BOE is responsible for investigating and issuing

charges for violations of the Ethics Code. See LSA- R. S. 42: 1141( C). The EAB then

conducts a hearing to determine whether any violations have occurred. See LSA- R.S.

42: 1141( C);    Louisiana Board of Ethics, 2017- 0313 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 16/ 17), 236

So. 3d 593, 598, writ denied sub nom., Louisiana Board of Ethics in Matter of

Dumas, 2018- 0132 ( La. 3/ 9/ 18), 238 So. 3d 457. Any public servant or other person who

is to be the subject of a hearing shall be given written notification of the pending charges

6 As noted in the Louisiana Practice Series, Louisiana Civil Appellate Procedure, §         10: 155, courts have
conflicting interpretations of LSA-R. S. 49: 964( G)( 6), now designated as LSA- R.S. 49: 978. 1( G)( 6), regarding
the deference owed by the appellate court to the factual findings of the trial court. However, given the
procedural posture of this matter, we need not consider that issue.

  Because violations of the Ethics Code can result in the assessment of fines and/ or penalties, they are
penal in nature and, therefore, must be strictly construed. Additionally, any doubt in the construction of a
penal statute must be resolved with lenity and in favor of the person subject to the fine or penalty.
Louisiana Board of Ethics v. Randolph, 2013- 1509 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 21/ 14), 2014 WL 4198343, * 3
 unpublished),   writ denied, 2014- 1987 ( La. 11/ 21/ 14), 160 So. 3d 974.

                                                        2
and of the time and place such hearing is to be held, not less than sixty days prior to the

date set for the hearing. See LSA- R. S. 42: 1141. 4( A)( 1).

        In     this   matter,    the    BOE    charged     Mrs.    Barnett    with      violating   LSA- R. S.

42: 1111( C)( 2)( d). 8 Louisiana Revised Statutes 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) provides, in pertinent

part:

         2) No public servant and no legal entity in which the public servant
        exercises control or owns an interest in excess of twenty-five percent, shall
        receive any thing of economic value for or in consideration of services
        rendered, or to be rendered, to or for any person during his public service
        unless such services are:

               d) Neither performed for nor compensated by any person from whom
              such public servant would be prohibited by R. S. 42: 1115( A)( 1) or ( 8)
              from receiving a gift.

This provision of the Ethics Code prohibits a public servant from receiving anything of

economic value for services rendered to a person from whom he would be prohibited

from receiving a gift pursuant to LSA -RS. 42: 1115(A)( 1)                 or ( B) (   for ease of reading

hereinafter, the " prohibited gift statute"). g See In re Scbneckenburger, 518 So. 2d 497,

499 ( La. 1988). A person from whom a public servant is prohibited from receiving a gift

under the terms of the prohibited gift statute is sometimes referred to as a " prohibited

source."      See Dumas, 236 So. 3d at 598. Thus, the elements of a violation of the

8 The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent persons seeking to obtain or having governmental contracts
or having interests substantially affected by the performance of certain governmental employees from
attempting, through payments of something of economic value, to curry favor, gain preferential treatment,
or be excused from substandard performance by reason of prohibited payment. See Great Southern
Dredging, Inc., 195 So. 3d at 634- 35, citing IT Corp. v. Commission on Ethics for Public Employees,
453 So. 2d 251, 258 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1984), armed, 464 So. 2d 284 ( La. 1985) ( interpreting LSA- R. S.
42: 1118, the predecessor to LSA -RS. 42: 1111).

9 Louisiana Revised Statutes 42: 1115 provides:

        A. No public servant shall solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any thing of economic
        value as a gift or gratuity from any person or from any officer, director, agent, or employee
        of such person, if such public servant knows or reasonably should know that such person:

               1) Has or is seeking to obtain contractual or other business or financial relationships
              with the public servant' s agency, or

               2) Is seeking, for compensation, to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by
              the public servant' s agency.
        B. No public employee shall solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, anything of economic
        value as a gift or gratuity from any person or from any officer, director, agent, or employee
        of such person, if such public employee knows or reasonably should know that such
        person:

               1) Conducts operations or activities which are regulated by the public employee's
              agency.

               2) Has substantial economic interests which may be substantially affected by the
               performance or nonperformance of the public employee' s official duty.
prohibited gift statute are ( 1) a public servant, ( 2) accepting, directly or indirectly, a thing

of economic value, ( 3)   from persons considered a " prohibited source." See Dumas, 236

So. 3d at 598.

       Thus, in order to find Mrs. Barnett violated LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d),    we must

find, based on the record before us, that ( 1) Mrs. Barnett was a public servant, ( 2) Mrs.

Barnett received a thing of economic value, and ( 3) Mrs. Barnett's receipt of a thing of

economic value was for or in consideration of services rendered to a person considered

a prohibited source as defined in the prohibited gift statute. In the context of the Ethics

Code, " Person" is defined as " an individual or legal      entity other than a governmental

entity, or an agency thereof." LSA- R. S. 42: 1102( 16). " Service" means " the performance

of work, duties, or responsibilities, or the leasing, rental, or sale of movable or immovable

property." LSA- R.S. 42. 1102( 20. 1).   While the prohibited gift statute provides several

definitions of a prohibited source, the definition which is pertinent to this matter is any

person that the " public servant knows or reasonably should know... [         h] as or is seeking

to obtain contractual or other business or financial relationships with the public servant' s

agency." LSA- R. S. 42: 1115( A)( 1); See Dumas, 236 So. 3d at 601.

                                         THE CHARGES

       In sum, the charges alleged that Mrs. Barnett began working for DHH in April

2011; that Mrs. Barnett was promoted to a Program Manager 2 position within DHH- OBH

in September 2011, specifically as manager of the Electronic Behavioral Health Record

System ( EBHRS); that Mrs. Barnett's responsibilities as manager of the EBHRS included

managing an effective and ongoing data exchange with the Statewide Management
Organization ( SMO); that the SMO managed behavioral health services for Medicaid and

Non -Medicaid eligible populations served by OBH; that Magellan Health Services

 Magellan) was selected as the SMO in November 2011; that Mrs. Barnett's husband,

Thomas Barnett, was hired by Magellan in July 2012 as a Senior Network Business

Analyst; that Mr. Barnett' s job duties included analysis and production of reports in

support of the Magellan provider network for OBH, which reports were prepared and

issued to DHH- OBH; that Mrs. Barnett's job duties were reclassified in February of 2013

to provide that she would be responsible for managing the effective data exchange with

                                                0
the SMO in order to manage and evaluate the SMO, and that she would work with a team

that included SMO staff to create reports and summaries based on data submitted by

Magellan to measure the performance of the SMO; that in October 2013, Mrs. Barnett

was asked to work on a Request for Proposal for the SMO, and in connection therewith,

disclosed that her husband worked for Magellan; and that, following Mrs. Barnett' s

disclosure, DHH moved Mrs. Barnett laterally to another Program Manager 2 position not

involved with the Magellan contract. The charges concluded:

               Based on the foregoing facts, Michelle Barnett violated [ LSA- R. S.
       42: 1111( C)( 2)( d)]
                           by virtue of her receipt of a thing of economic value[,]
       for services provided to Magellan, by her husband, Tom Barnett, at a time
       when she was employed with the DHH/ OBH, and at a time Magellan had a
       contractual or other business or financial relationship with the DHH/ OBH.

                                          THE HEARING

       During the adjudicatory hearing, witness testimony was taken from Karen

Stubbs, 10 then the Assistant Secretary of OBH, and Mr. and Mrs. Barnett. The BOE offered

numerous exhibits into evidence, which the EAB admitted over Mrs. Barnett' s objections.

The BOE' s exhibits included excerpts of Mrs. Barnett's DHH personnel file; Mr. and Mrs.

Barnett's marriage license; excerpts of Mr. Barnett's Magellan personnel file, including his

employment history, an Employee Statement of Confidentiality and Conflict of Interest

form, and Financial Disclosure Statements; excerpts from DHH' s July 8, 2011 Request for

Proposal seeking bids to serve as SMO for the Louisiana Behavioral Health Partnership;

the contract between DHH- OBH and Magellan; the amendment to the DHH- OBH and

Magellan contract; the December 10, 2013 letter from the DHH Bureau of Legal Services

to the BOE reporting Mrs. Barnett's " Possible Non -Compliance" with the Code; and Mrs.

Barnett' s Conflict of Interest Statement. Mrs. Barnett also offered numerous exhibits into

evidence, including the BOE's charges filed against her; position descriptions and related

charts; DHH- OBH' s offer of employment to Mrs. Barnett, dated February 29, 2012; and

documents reflecting Mr. Barnett's salary and his W- 2 forms from the relevant time

period.

10 Karen Stubbs Church is referred to as Karen Stubbs, her name at the time of the events herein.

                                                    7
Mrs. Barnett' s employment with DHH- OBH

       Ms. Stubbs testified she was Mrs. Barnett's supervisor in 2013.           Ms. Stubbs

reviewed the job descriptions and organizational charts the BOE offered as evidence and

testified that the documents reflected Mrs. Barnett' s duties for OBH involved the SMO.

Ms. Stubbs recalled hearing Mrs. Barnett say that Mr. Barnett worked for Magellan prior

to her formal disclosure, but as a newer employee at that time, she assumed the situation

had already been " vetted[.]"   Ms. Stubbs further testified that after Mrs. Barnett's formal

disclosure, she was transferred out of OBH in October or November 2013, based on the

conflict of interest.

       During Mrs. Barnett's testimony, she adamantly denied the accuracy of the BOE' s

charges against her. For example, while the BOE' s charges alleged Mrs. Barnett began

working for DHH- Medicaid as a Program Manager 1 in April 2011, Mrs. Barnett testified

that she began working for DHH- Medicaid as a Program Manager 2 in April 2011. Mrs.

Barnett's testimony on this point was corroborated by one of the BOE' s exhibits. Similarly,

the BOE' s charges alleged Mrs.     Barnett began working for DHH- OBH as a Program

Manager 2 in September 2011, but Mrs. Barnett also testified that she began working for

DHH- OBH as a Program Manager 2 on March 1, 2012. Mrs. Barnett's testimony on this

issue was corroborated by DHH- 013H' s February 29, 2012 offer of employment to Mrs.

Barnett.

       Mrs. Barnett also testified that the job descriptions and organizational charts

offered by the BOE and reviewed by Ms. Stubbs were so inaccurate they " floored" her.

In particular, the excerpts of Mrs. Barnett' s DHH personnel file included two " Position

Description" forms with attached " Duties and Responsibilities"      documents containing

 Occupational Summary"      sections.   The first " Position Description"   form showed an

effective date of September 22, 2011. The accompanying " Occupational             Summary"

stated, in pertinent part, " OBH   is the lead agency of the Louisiana Behavioral Health

Partnership, a new behavioral health managed coordinated system of care ( CSOC)

involving five state agencies, contracted through a Statewide Management Organization

 SMD)."    The Occupational Summary further provided that, as the           manager of the

Electronic Behavioral Health Record System ( EBHRS), Mrs. Barnett's responsibilities would

                                               N.
include managing an effective and ongoing data exchange with the SMO. Mrs. Barnett

pointed out that she did not sign the first Position Description form and disputed the

accuracy of the Occupational Summary.

      The second Position Description form showed an effective date of February 23,

2013, and contained a note that read " Business Reorg[.]"   The second Position Description

was marked to indicate that an organizational chart and a " Duties and Responsibilities"

document were attached, and the revised Occupational Summary provided that Mrs.

Barnett would serve as the " Clinical Services Quality/ Performance Accountability Branch

Program Manager[.]"    The Occupational Summary stated that Mrs. Barnett would be

 responsible for the development, implementation[,]      and ongoing management of the

OBH Data Mart/ Business Intelligence ( DM/ BI) system for clinical services data, analyses

of these data, and reporting of quality and performance metrics derived from the data."

The Occupational Summary further specified that the " DM/ BI is a critical        resource"

created from varying data sources, including the SMO, and " used by the OBH Business

Intelligence section to manage and evaluate the SMO and to monitor and evaluate the

statewide network of behavioral health services and providers." Mrs. Barnett conceded

she signed the second Position Description on October 31, 2012, but contested the

contents of the Occupational Summary.

       In disputing the BOE' s allegations that she worked with the SMO, Mrs. Barnett

asserted that she worked in the Analytics unit of the Business Intelligence section, which

was a section of the Health Plan Management section of OBH. According to Mrs. Barnett,

the Analytics branch of the Business Intelligence section involved the " traditional" role of

OBH in dealing with local governmental entities, while the other branch dealt with the
SMO. Mrs. Barnett offered a June 12, 2012 Memorandum and attached organizational

charts in support of her testimony. Mrs. Barnett also offered a personnel evaluation that

listed Mrs. Barnett's job duties and did not contain any reference to the SMO.

Mr. Barnett' s employment with Magellan

       Mr. Barnett was the second witness called at the hearing. Mr. Barnett testified Mrs.

Barnett knew he was applying to work for Magellan. He testified, and his employment
records confirmed, that he began working for Magellan in July of 201211 as a " Senior

Network Business Analyst[.]"           Regarding his duties while employed by Magellan, Mr.

Barnett described receiving data regarding provider information, such as location and

credentials, and "    produc[ ing] reports for the provider network," which included " mental

health professionals, social workers, psychologists, [ and]               psychiatrists[.]"    Mr. Barnett

testified he placed his reports in a directory, but denied being aware whether the reports

were transmitted to Mrs. Barnett's agency.

         Mr. Barnett identified the Financial Disclosure Statements he completed for the

years 2012, 2013, and 2014, all three of which were executed on May 10, 2015. On the

Financial Disclosure Statements, Mr. Barnett indicated he was the spouse of a public

servant, specifically Michelle Barnett, who worked at " DHH/ OBH[.]"               Mr. Barnett identified

Transactions Involving [ the] Public Servant's Agency" as " Produc[ ing]                   reports on the

provider network, showing provider locations, levels of care, specialties, ethnicity, access,

etc."   and identified the " Name of Business" as " Magellan Health Services[.]"

         The job description from Mr. Barnett' s personnel file provided:

         Provides analysis and produces reports in support of Magellan provider
         network     for   the    Louisiana     Behavioral Partnership ( LBHP).
                                                                Health
         Contracting and credentialing reports, GEO Access reports monitoring
         provider network adequacy, CSOC reports, prescriber sufficiency reports,
         ad hoc reports for presentation to DHH/ OBH, and contractually -required
         quarterly reports. Work with people in other department members ( sic) to
         solve problems and meet goals.

Mr. Barnett's employment records also contained an undated " Employee Statement of

Confidentiality and Conflict of Interest" that began, " I understand that as an employee of

Magellan Health Services or any of its affiliates ..."

         Mr. Barnett testified that, when reviewing his W- 2 forms several months prior to

the hearing, he realized they were issued by " Magellan, HRSC, Inc." ( Magellan HRSQ,

Mr. Barnett testified that seeing his W- 2 forms were issued by Magellan HRSC " made a

lot of things clear to [ him]      that were confusing before[,]" explaining that he knew he

11 The portion of Mr. Barnett' s employment records referenced is a form titled " work Experience[.]"    The

Work Experience form identifies Mr. Barnett's work history prior to beginning employment at Magellan, as
well as his employment with Magellan, under the titles " Other Employer[,]" " Other Function[,]"          and

 Achievements[.]"   The final entry on the work Experience form is explicitly marked as Mr. Barnett's "Current
Job" and identifies Mr. Barnett' s " Other Employer" as " Magellan Health Services" beginning in July 2012.
Accordingly, it is plain from reviewing the form in its entirety that this entry refers to the employment at
issue, regardless of the use of the title " Other Employer."

                                                      10
worked for a company named " Magellan," but had been told he " didn' t work for the SMO."

He stated that at the time he identified Magellan Health Services as his employer on the

Financial Disclosure Statements, he " didn' t know the distinction."

         Regarding Mr. Barnett's employment with Magellan,           Mrs.   Barnett stated she

sought advice from her supervisors and was told there were no issues with him applying

for that position. However, Mrs. Barnett did not seek an advisory opinion on the issue.

She stated she was not required to take ethics training until Mr. Barnett was already

working for Magellan, and when she did take ethics training, the term " agency" was

defined as the smallest identifiable group or unit within which an employee worked, which

she believed for her would have been the Analytics branch of the Business Intelligence

unit. Thus, Mrs. Barnett did not believe there was any problem. Mrs. Barnett further

speculated that the BOE' s charges were brought against her in retaliation for a civil suit

she filed after being passed over for a promotion in favor of a candidate with much less

experience.

                                       DISCUSSION

         Having conducted a thorough review of the record in its entirety, formed our own

conclusions of fact, and considered all legal issues de novo, we find that the EAB correctly

determined Mrs. Barnett violated LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) "    by receiving one- half of

her husband Thomas Barnett's salary for services he provided to Magellan Health

Services, Inc. during the period of March 1, 2013, through October 15, 2013, from a

prohibited source[,]"   for the reasons that follow.

Public Servant

         Pursuant to LSA -RS. 42: 1102( 19), " Public servant" means a public employee or

an elected official. It is undisputed that as an employee of DHH, Mrs. Barnett was a

 public servant" for purposes of the Ethics Code.

Receipt of       Thing of Economic Value

         Louisiana Revised Statutes 42: 1102( 22)( a) defines a "[ t]hing of economic value"

as "   money or any other thing having economic value." In this matter, the BOE alleged,

and the EAB found, that Mrs. Barnett received a thing of economic value because she

                                              11
received one- half of Mr. Barnett's salary by virtue of the community property regime

created by Mr. and Mrs. Barnett's marriage. We agree.

      This court considered a similar situation in Great Southern Dredging, Inc., 195

So. 3d at 634. In Great Southern Dredging, Inc., the spouses were subject to a

community property regime, and the public servant's spouse owned 51% of a company

that subcontracted with the public servant' s agency. Great Southern Dredging, Inc.

explained that under LSA-C. C. art. 2338, property acquired during the existence of the

legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse is community property.

Further, under LSA- C. C. art. 2336, "[ e] ach spouse owns a present undivided one- half

interest in the community property" during the existence of the community property

regime. See Great Southern Dredging, Inc., 195 So. 3d at 636- 37. Thus, by virtue of

the community property regime, the public servant in Great Southern Dredging, Inc.

owned an undivided one- half interest in 51 of the 100 shares of the subcontracted

company. As that exceeded 25% of the ownership interest, this court affirmed the EAB's

determination that the public servant violated LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d). See Great

Southern Dredging, Inc., 195 So. 3d at 638- 39.

       In this matter, it is undisputed that at all relevant times, Mrs. Barnett was married

to Mr. Barnett, and the two were subject to a community property regime. Thus, pursuant

to LSA- C. C. arts. 2336 and 2338 and Great Southern Dredging, Inc., 195 So. 3d at

634, 638- 39, Mr. and Mrs. Barnett each own an undivided one- half interest in Mr.

Barnett' s compensation during the existence of their marriage. Accordingly, the EAB

correctly determined that Mrs. Barnett received a thing of economic value, i.e., one- half

of Mr. Barnett' s salary, by virtue of the community property regime.

       We note Mrs. Barnett's third assignment of error argues there was no violation of

LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) because no legal entity received a thing of economic value,

and that the EAB' s finding of a violation of LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) was based on an

erroneous conclusion that her marriage to Tom Barnett was a " legal entity"             under

Louisiana law. However, these arguments conflict with the plain language of LSA- R. S.

42: 1111( C)( 2), which explicitly provides that "[ n] o public servant and no legal entity in

which the public servant exercises control or owns an interest in excess of twenty-five

                                              12
percent" (   emphasis added) shall receive any thing of economic value from a prohibited

source. This language prohibits both the receipt of payments by a public servant, and the

receipt of payments by entities in which a public servant exercises control or has the

requisite ownership interest. See Great Southern Dredging, Inc,, 195 So. 3d at 635.

Stated differently, the prohibition applies to public servants in their individual capacity

regardless of whether a legal entity is involved. This assignment of error lacks merit.

For or In Consideration of Services Rendered to a Prohibited Source

        Having found that Mrs. Barnett was a public servant who received a thing of

economic value, we next determine whether her receipt of a thing of economic value was

for or in consideration of services rendered to a prohibited source. As stated above, LSA-

R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d)   prohibits public servants from receiving any thing of economic

value for services rendered to a person from whom he would be prohibited from receiving

a gift under LSA- R.S. 42: 1115( A)( 1) or ( B). See In re Schneckenburger, 518 So. 2d at

499. It is undisputed that Magellan had a contractual relationship with OBH, and that Mr.

and Mrs. Barnett were aware of same. Thus, it appears to be clear that Magellan was a

prohibited source pursuant to LSA- R. S. 42: 1115( A). See Dumas, 236 So. 3d at 601.

However, in various assignments of error, Mrs. Barnett challenges the EAB' s findings that

OBH was her agency and that Mr. Barnett's salary was paid for or in consideration of

services rendered to a prohibited source.

        We first address the identity of Mrs. Barnett's agency. For purposes of the Ethics

Code, LSA- R. S. 42: 1102( 2)( a) provides the following definition of "[ ajgency":

         A] department, office, division, agency, commission, board, committee, or
        other organizational unit of a governmental entity. For purposes of this
        Chapter, " agency of the public servant" and " his agency" when used in
        reference to the agency of a public servant shall mean:

              i)   For public servants in the twenty principal departments of the
             executive branch of state government, the office in which such
             public servant carries out his primary responsibilities, except
             that in the case of the secretary, deputy secretary, or undersecretary of
             any such department and officials carrying out the responsibilities of
             such department officers it shall mean the department in which he
             serves; and except that in the case of public servants who are members
             or employees of a board or commission or who provide staff assistance
             to a board or commission, it shall mean the board or commission.

 Emphasis added).

                                                13
Pursuant to LSA- R. S. 36: 4( A)( 5), DHH is one of the principal departments of the executive

branch of state government. 12 Louisiana Revised Statutes 36: 251( 6) provides, in part,

that DHH, " through its offices and officers, shall be responsible for the development

and providing of health and medical services for the prevention of disease for the citizens

of Louisiana." ( Emphasis added).             Louisiana Revised Statutes 36: 251( C)( 1) 13 further

provides, in pertinent part, that DHH:

        jS] hall be composed of the executive office of the secretary, the office of
        management and finance, the office of public health,                         the office of
        behavioral health, the office for citizens with developmental disabilities,
        the office of aging and adult services, the office on women's health and
        community health, and such other offices as shall be created by law.
 Emphasis added).

        As a public servant employed by DHH, Mrs. Barnett's agency was " the office in

which such public servant carries out his primary responsibilities" pursuant to LSA- R. S.

42: 1102( 2)( a)( i).   Further, LSA- R. S. 36: 251( C)( 1)    explicitly identifies OBH as an office of

DHH.    Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in pari materia, or in

reference to each other. See LSA- C. C. art. 13; Acurio v. Acurio, 2016- 1395 ( La. 5/ 3/ 17),

224 So. 3d 935, 938. Considering the plain language of these statutes in pari materia, it

is plain that Mrs. Barnett's agency was OBH. While we note that Mrs. Barnett's seventh

assignment of error contends the Business Intelligence Section should be considered her

agency, because the BOE' s training materials define a public servant's agency as the "the

smallest unit" of the governmental entity to which the public servant belonged, such a

finding would directly contradict the plain language of LSA- R.S. 42: 1102( 2)( a), LSA- R. S.
36: 4(A)( 5), and 36: 251( 6) and ( C). Thus, this assignment of error lacks merit, and the

                                                                                14
EAB correctly determined that OBH was Mrs. Barnett's agency.

12 Louisiana Constitution of 1974, article II, § 1 provides that "(T) he powers of government of the state [ of
Louisiana] are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial." LSA -Const. of
1974, art. IV provides for the executive branch of state government and provides, in pertinent part, in
Section 1( B) that " all offices, agencies, and other instrumentalities of the executive branch... shall be
allocated according to function within not more than twenty departments". This constitutional mandate is
satisfied in LSA- R. S. 36: 4. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 2000-
2809 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 15/ 02), 812 So. 2d 746, 747, writ denied, 2002- 1230 ( La. 8/ 30/ 02), 823 So. 2d 953.
DHH is listed as LSA- R. S. 36: 4(A)( 5) in the listing of the executive branch departments.
13 Louisiana Revised Statutes 36: 251( C)( 1) was amended pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 676 of the 2022
Legislative session to provide for the creation of the office on women' s health and community health.
14 We note that Mrs. Barnett cites several EAB advisory opinions in support of this argument. However,
advisory opinions are explicitly lased solely on the facts as set forth therein, and the facts in this matter
are distinguishable from the facts presented in the advisory opinions Mrs. Barnett relies on. Further, while
the advisory opinions of a board or commission have been recognized as persuasive authority, like attorney

                                                       14
          We next consider whether Mr. Barnett's salary was paid for or in consideration of

services rendered to a prohibited source. In Mrs. Barnett"s second assignment of error,

she contends the EAB erred in finding that Mr. Barnett was employed by a prohibited

source, because he was not actually employed by the Magellan entity that served as the

SMO. Rather, Mrs. Barnett argues her husband' s W- 2 forms and certain other documents

show he was employed by " Magellan, HRSC, Inc." ( Magellan HRSC), which she contends

is a legal entity entirely distinct from Magellan SMD. In support of her position that

Magellan HRSC is a distinct legal entity, Mrs. Barnett argues the BOE failed to put forth

affirmative evidence establishing that Magellan HRSC is an affiliate of SMO Magellan. Mrs.

Barnett also relies on her husband' s testimony that Magellan HRSC and the Magellan

entity that served as the SMO had different employer identification numbers, different

tax identification numbers, different boards of directors, and were domiciled in different

states.

          As set forth above, in the context of the Ethics Code, " Service"                  means "   the

performance of work, duties, or responsibilities." LSA- R. S. 42: 1102( 20. 1).            Mr. and Mrs.

Barnett both believed Mr. Barnett worked directly for Magellan, in its capacity as the SMO,

until several months before the hearing, when Mr. Barnett noticed the name " Magellan,

HRSC, Inc." on his W- 2 forms. Mr. Barnett's description of the reports he produced for

Magellan were consistent with the stated purpose of the SMO, and his job description

explicitly referenced the Louisiana Behavioral Health Partnership and OBH. Further, Mr.

Barnett' s   2012,    2013,   and   2014 Financial        Disclosure Forms repeatedly identified

 Magellan Health Services" as his employer, identified " DHH/ OBH" as Mrs. Barnett' s

employer,     and    reflected that Mr.     Barnett's "   Transactions Involving"         Mrs.    Barnett"s

 Agency" included the "[ production of] reports on the provider network[.]"                      Moreover,

and most significantly, even though Mr. and Mrs. Barnett testified that at the time of the

hearing, they believed he worked for Magellan HRSC based on the W -2s, at no point did

Mr. or Mrs. Barnett deny that they understood the work Mr. Barnett performed while

general opinions, see oupiantis v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 2000- 1750 ( La. 3/ 23101), 782 So. 2d 582,
590, n. 7, and Louisiana Board of Ethics v. Holden, 2012- 1127 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 25/ 13), 121 So. 3d 113,
117, n. 7, such opinions are "are merely advisory and not binding." See City of New Orleans v. Board of
Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98- 1170 ( La. 3/ 2/ 99), 739 So. 2d 748, 753, n. 11.

                                                    15
employed at Magellan was to benefit Magellan in service to its contract to serve as the

SMO to OBH.

        Based on the record before us, it is clear that, notwithstanding any legal distinction

that may exist between Magellan SMO and Magellan HRSC, an actual relationship existed

between the two entities, and Mr. Barnett provided services in furtherance of Magellan' s

contract with OBH. Consequently, regardless of whether Mr. Barnett' s services and/ or

salary passed through another entity, his salary was paid for or in consideration of

services rendered to Magellan,         in its capacity as the SMO. The provisions of LSA- R. S.

42: 1111( C)( 2)( d)   prohibit the receipt of something of economic value " for or in

consideration of services rendered" to a prohibited source, not "from" a prohibited source,

and the services in question were clearly rendered " for or in consideration of services

rendered" to a prohibited source. Moreover, we note that, under the plain language of

LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d), there is no requirement that the public servant have any

supervisory authority, or any interaction at all, with the prohibited source. Thus, whether

Mrs. Barnett' s job duties involved the SMO is immaterial to this analysis.                           Having

thoroughly reviewed the record before us and considering the same in light of the

applicable law, we find the EAB properly determined that Mrs. Barnett's receipt of one-

half of Mr. Barnett's salary was for or in consideration of services rendered to a prohibited

source.

        Finally, we address the EAB' s finding that Mrs. Barnett was in violation of ISA- R.S.

42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) during the period of March 1, 2013, through October 15, 2013, from a

prohibited source. As the EAB correctly found, it was not necessary for the BOE to prove

Mrs.   Barnett directly managed Magellan or worked on the SMO in order to prove a

violation of LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d). Thus, it would appear that Mrs. Barnett was in

violation from the beginning of Mr. Barnett's employment with Magellan, on July 1, 2012,

through October 15, 2013. However, the EAB' s discussion of the fines and penalties

imposed on Mrs. Barnett under LSA- R. S. 42: 1153( 6) and LSA- R. S. 42: 1155( A) 15 makes

15 Louisiana Revised Statutes 42: 1153( 8) provides:

        Upon a determination that any public employee or other person has violated any provision
        of any law within the jurisdiction of the Board of Ethics except violations of the Campaign
        Finance Disclosure Act which shall be governed by Chapter 11 of Title 18 of the Louisiana

                                                       16
clear that the adjustment to the date the violation began was made in consideration of

the evidence reflecting that the violation was unintentional. Specifically,                     the EAB' s

discussion states, in pertinent part:

                In considering the amount of a fine to impose [ under LSA- R. S.
       42: 1153( 6),] the EAB considered that [ Mrs. Barnett] recommended that her
       husband apply to work for Magellan. [ Mrs. Barnett] also sought clearance
       for working in OBH before her husband was hired by Magellan from at least
       two higher level DHH authorities... [          Mrs. Barnett] told her new supervisor,
       Karen Stubbs, about her husband' s employment with Magellan before DHH
       asked its employees to complete a Conflict of InterestForrrr, [Mrs. Barnett]
       disclosed her husband' s employment with Magellan on the form; and [ Mrs,
       Barnett] did not contest her transfer out of OBH after DHH reviewed the
       disclosure she       made on       the form.       Further, [ LSA- R. S.]     42: 1170   was
       amended to require an hour of ethics training for department heads,
       specifically on contract ethics ( in addition to the hour of ethics training
       required for all public employees annually), beginning January 1, 2014, after
       the facts that led to this case...

                While these facts do not excuse [ Mrs. Barnett's] conduct, the EAB
       considers them important in determining penalties to be imposed.

               Taking these factors into account, the EAB imposes a $ 1, 000 fine
       against [ Mrs. Barnett] for the violation of [ LSA- R. S.] 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d),          as

       authorized by [ LSA- R. S.] 42: 1153( 6).

       Thomas Barnett's salary for the entirety of 2013 was $ 70, 571. 32. The BOE
       did not prove the exact date in February, 2013, when [ Mrs.] Barnett
       transitioned to her new position and, accordingly, the EAB will consider the
        period for economic advantage to be from March 1, 2013, through October
        15, 2013. On a pro rata basis, the economic advantage of [ Mrs. Barnett's]
        portion of the Thomas Barnett ( sic) salary during the relevant time period
       was $ 22, 053. 74.

                The EAB orders as a penalty under [ LSA- R. S.] 42: 1155( A) that [ Mrs.
        Barnett]  pay the economic advantage of $ 22, 053. 74. While the EAB has
        discretionary authority to award up to one- half of the amount of the
        economic advantage as an additional penalty under [ LSA- R. S.] 42: 1155( A),
       for the reasons set out under the analysis of fines under [ LSA- R. S.]
       42: 1153( B), the EAB declines to do so.

As set forth above, the EAB could have imposed significantly higher fines and penalties

on Mrs. Barnett. However, the EAB chose to limit the fine to $ 1, 000. 00 and to limit the

        Revised Statutes of 1950, the Ethics Adjudicatory Board may remove, suspend, or order a
        reduction in pay, or demotion of the public employee or other person, or impose a fine of
        not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 42: 1155( A) provides:

        If an investigation conducted pursuant to this Part reveals that any public servant or other
        person has violated any law within the jurisdiction of the Board of Ethics to his economic
        advantage, and after an adjudicatory hearing on the matter, the Ethics Adjudicatory Board
        may order the payment of penalties. Recovery may include, in addition to an amount equal
        to such economic advantage, penalties not to exceed one half of the amount of the
        economic advantage. Any appeal of such final decision by the Ethics Adjudicatory Board
        shall be to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, pursuant to R.S. 42: 1142.

                                                     17
penalties to one- half of Mr. Barnett's salary paid only beginning on March 1, 2013, which

was an adjusted start date for Mrs. Barnett' s job duties as set forth in the second Position

Description, which she signed. Finding this to be a fair and reasonable outcome, we

affirm.

          Finally, we address the remaining assignments of error raised by Mrs. Barnett. In

her first assignment of error, Mrs. Barnett contends that the evidence established that

the allegations contained in the BOE' s charges were false. While the BOE' s charges did

contain errors, such as the date Mrs. Barnett began working at OBH, the errors did not

prejudice Mrs. Barnett or prevent her from preparing an adequate defense. Additionally,

as discussed in detail herein, the allegations which were pertinent to whether a violation

of LSA- R.S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) occurred were satisfactorily proven. This assignment of

error lacks merit.

          In her fourth assignment of error, Mrs.        Barnett contends the EAB erroneously

admitted      into    evidence "    inadmissible,    unauthenticated,       unverified,     unidentified

documents       which    were      completely    contradicted    by   authenticated,      verified,   and

authenticated        documents"     over   her   objections.     However,    pursuant      to   LSA- R. S.

49: 975. 1( 1) and La. Admin. Code tit. 52, pt. 1, §            1008, the EAB may admit and give

probative effect to evidence that possesses probative value commonly accepted by

reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. Further, under LSA- R. S.

49: 975. 1( 2) and La. Admin. Code tit. 52, pt. 1, §      1008( F),   all evidence, including records

and documents in the possession of the BOE of which it desires to avail itself, shall be

offered and made a park of the record. In this matter, the BOE introduced the affidavit of

the executive secretary of the BOE, who attested that she was the custodian of all

records, reports, and files of the BOE, and that the exhibits offered were true and correct

copies of the BOE' s records. Thus, the EAB properly admitted the BOE' s exhibits under

LSA- R.S. 49: 975. 1, and this assignment of error lacks merit. Moreover, we note that the

testamentary evidence given by Mr. and Mrs. Barnett alone is sufficient to uphold the

EAB' s finding in this matter, such that even were we to completely discount the exhibits

Mrs. Barnett complains of, we would reach the conclusion that Mrs. Barnett violated LSA-

R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d).
       Mrs. Barnett's fifth assignment of error argues the EAB improperly weighted Ms.

Stubbs' testimony. Having conducted our own review of the record and the EAB' s decision

and reaching the same conclusion as the EAB, we find no support for this argument. This

assignment of error lacks merit.

       Mrs. Barnett's sixth assignment of error is that the EAB " erred in allowing the BOE

to ignore the First Circuit's 82- 02D Exception or any other exceptions and the precedent

cases comparable to this case[.]"     Mrs. Barnett contends the Board of Ethics for Elected

Officials' Advisory Opinion No.     82- 02D ( 82- 02D),   dated May 17,   1982, provides an

exception to LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d) that should have been applied in this matter. In

opposition, the BOE contends that it has stopped applying 82- 02D, because Act 272 of

the 2022 Regular Legislative Session enacted LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 5). Review of Ethics

Document No. 82- 02D and LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 5) establishes that Mrs. Barnett is not

entitled to the benefit of the exception, regardless of which version would properly apply.

The opinion in 82- 02D created an exception for a public servant to continue his

employment with an entity that was seeking a contractual or other business or Financia

relationship with the public servant's agency, and LSA- R. S. 42: 1111( C)( 5)   permits the

spouse of a public servant to continue employment with a person who has or is seeking

a contractual or other business or financial relationship with the public servant' s agency.

As Mr. Barnett's employment with the prohibited source did not pre -date the relationship

between Magellan and DHH, neither exception would apply. Accordingly, this assignment

of error lacks merit.

       In Mrs. Barnett's seventh assignment of error, she argues the EAB erred in allowing

the BOE to refer to Mrs. Barnett"s agency by more than one name or acronym, which she

maintains prejudiced her ability to defend herself against the charges. The inconsistencies

Mrs. Barnett complains of did not in any way prevent her from preparing her defense.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

       Finally, in Mrs. Barnett's eighth assignment of error, she argues the EAB ignored

mitigating factors, rules of lenity, and numerous precedents that directly compare to her

case. However, the EAB`s opinion directly contradicts these arguments. The EAB notes in

its opinion that Mrs. Barnett sought her supervisors' opinions regarding whether Mr.

                                               19
Barnett could apply to work at Magellan, that Mrs. Barnett was open with her colleagues

about her husband' s employment with Magellan, and that Mrs. Barnett properly disclosed

her husband' s employment with Magellan. Taking these factors into consideration, the

EAB imposed a fine of only $ 1, 000. 00, even though LSA- R. S. 42: 1153 authorized a fine

of up to $ 10, 000. 00, and imposed a penalty of $ 22, 053. 74, which was based on an

adjusted period of economic advantage. Further, the precedents Mrs. Barnett relies on

are all significantly distinguishable from this matter. This assignment of error lacks merit.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the January b, 2023 decision of the Ethics Adjudicatory

Board is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Michelle Barnett.

       AFFIRMED.

                                             20
STATE OF LOUISIANA                                     LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS

COURT OF APPEAL                                        IN THE MATTER OF

FIRST CIRCUIT                                          MICHELLE BARNETT

DOCKET NUMBER                                          2023 CA 0321

MILLER, J., dissenting.

        I write separately to first address the majority' s statement that the reviewing

court makes its own determinations and conclusions of fact in this EAB appeal. I

believe this legal rule has no application here and should not play a part in our

analysis.

         The majority opinion indicates that Mrs. Barnett appealed to this court

pursuant to the authority set forth in La. R.S. 42: 1142, which provides in part:

         A. ( 1)Whenever action is taken against any public servant ... by a
         final decision of the Ethics Adjudicatory Board ... or whenever
        any public servant is aggrieved by any action taken by the ... Ethics
        Adjudicatory Board, he may appeal to the Court of Appeal, First
         Circuit.

 Emphasis added.)

         In addressing the        standard    of   review,
                                                             the majority explains that the

Administrative Procedure Act ( APA) governs judicial review of an EAB decision,

with specific reference to La. R.S. 49: 978. 1.        Then, the majority relies on Schmitt v.

Louisiana Board of Ethics, 2000- 0341 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 28/ 01) 808 So. 2d 524,

525, for the proposition that the reviewing court makes its own determinations and

conclusions of fact.        I believe that if we apply La. R. S. 49: 978. 1,         in its current

iteration, the appellate court must consider the findings of a district court under the

manifest error standard of review.'

          The jurisprudence reflects conflicting interpretations of La. R.S. 49: 964( 0)(6) ( now La.
R. S. 49: 978. 1( G)( 6))
                       regarding the deference owed by the appellate court to the factual findings
of the district court in the judicial review of adjudication of administrative proceedings. See
Louisiana Practice Series, Civil Appellate Procedure §        10: 155, " Standard of review for
administrative determinations."    In Schmitt, this court expressed the view that the appellate court
        Even so, when we discuss the deference afforded the district court, we must

recognize that La. R.S. 42: 1142, unlike La. R.S. 49: 978. 1, does not provide for

review by the district court. Under La. R. S. 42: 1142, a final decision of the EAB is

appealed directly to the First Circuit Court of Appeal as was done here. In fact, this

court has already distinguished the district court' s " judicial review of adjudication"

pursuant to La. R.S. 49: 964 from an appeal of a decision of the EAB. In Board of

Ethics in Matter of Savoie, 2017- 0077 ( La. App. lir Cir. 8/ 7/ 17), 224 So. 3d 1246,

1251,     this   court   explained    that   a"   Judicial    review    of   an   adjudication"      in

administrative proceedings pursuant to La. R. S. 49: 964 is commenced and heard in

the district court with no direct recourse to the court of appeal. The instant appeal is

brought pursuant to La. R.S. 42: 1142( A)( 1),         where the district court level of review

is not implicated.2 Under this direct appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, I

believe the manifest error standard of review is the proper standard to apply to

decisions reviewable pursuant to La. R.S. 42: 1142( A)( 1).

        Secondly, while it is clear to me that Mrs. Barnett improperly received

something of economic value (salary received by her community from the prohibited

source)    I am not convinced that sufficient proof was presented to show that the

receipt of this thing was due to services rendered by the public servant. Certainly,

the EAB has made no such finding.

owes no deference to " the findings of the administrative tribunal," see Schmitt, 808 So. 2d at 525,
while in Universal Placement International Inc. v. Louisiana Workforce Commission, 2011- 1353
 La. App. I" Cir. 7/ 26/ 12), 97 So. 3d 1154, 1158, writ denied, 2012- 1974 ( La. 11/ 9/ 12), 100 So.
3d 845, this court " defer[ red] to the district court' s factual determinations" and applied a manifest
error standard of review. In Multi -Care, Inc. v. State, Department of Health & Hospitals, 2000-
2001 ( La. App. I" Cir. 11/ 9/ 01), 804 So. 2d 673, 675, this court noted that, pursuant to paragraph
 G)( 6), the district court is a fact finder that weighs the evidence and makes its awn conclusions
of fact by preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, while this court does not defer to the
district court' s legal conclusions, we do defer to the district court' s factual determinations and use
a manifest error standard of review. See Multi -Care Inc., 804 So. 2d at 675.

        2For example, La. R.S. 49: 978. 1( F) provides that the review will be conducted without a
jury. This would go without saying if the matter was to be heard in the court of appeal.

                                                   2
        Louisiana Revised Statute 42: 1111( C) provides that:

         2)No public servant and no legal entity in which the public servant
        exercises control or owns an interest in excess of twenty- five percent,
        shall receive any thing of economic value for or in consideration of
        services rendered, or to be rendered, to or for any person during his
        public service unless such services are:

         d) Neither performed for nor compensated by any person from whom
        such public servant would be prohibited by R.S. 42: 1115( A)( 1)              or (B)
        from receiving a gift.[']

 Emphasis added.)

        Here, the services to the prohibited source were rendered by Mr. Barnett. The

statute does not define a " public servant" broadly to include family members. See
La. R. S. 42: 1102( 19). 4    Moreover, while the Louisiana Supreme Court long ago

expanded the definition of a " public servant" under La. R.S. 42: 1111( C)( d)( 2) to

include a corporation controlled by the public servant, it has yet to declare any such

         Louisiana Revised Statute 42: 1115 provides that:

        A. No public servant shall solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any thing of
        economic value as a gift or gratuity from any person or from any officer, director,
        agent, or employee of such person, if such public servant knows or reasonably
        should know that such person:
         1)   Has or is seeking to obtain contractual or other business or financial
        relationships with the public servant' s agency, or
         2) Is seeking, for compensation, to influence the passage or defeat of legislation
        by the public servant' s agency.

        B. No public employee shall solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, anything of
        economic value as a gift or gratuity from any person or from any officer, director,
        agent, or employee of such person, if such public employee knows or reasonably
        should know that such person:
         1) Conducts operations or activities which are regulated by the public employee' s
        agency.
         2) Has substantial economic interests which may be substantially affected by the
        performance or nonperformance of the public employee' s official duty.

        Although a discussion of La. R.S. 42: 1115 is implicated by La. R.S. 42: 1111( C)( 2)( d), we
note that, in the instant matter, Mrs. Barnett was not charged with violating La. R.S. 42: 1115.

        4" Public servant" is defined as a public employee or an elected official.         La. R.S.
42: 1102( 19).

                                                  3
expansion to include the spouse of a public servant. See Glazer v. Commission on

                                                                         5
Ethics for Public Employees, 431 So. 2d 752, 758 ( La. 1983).

       This court has held the provisions of the Ethics Code must be strictly
construed.     Ellis v. Louisiana Board of Ethics, 2014- 0112 ( La.                App.   1'   Cir.

12130114), 168 So. 3d 714, 724, writ denied, 2015- 0208 ( La. 4/ 17/ 15), 168 So. 3d

400.   Under the rule of lenity, where there is any doubt as to the interpretation of a

criminal or civil penal statute, including the penalties imposed by those statutes,

 any doubt in the construction of a penal statute must be resolved with lenity

and in favor of the person subject to the fine or penalty."                  Ellis, 168 So. 3d at

724. ( Emphasis added.)       Had the work performed by Mrs. Barnett been performed

by a different public servant, we would be unable to characterize the work as being

performed for the prohibited source. I likewise conclude that Mrs. Barnett has not

been shown to have performed work for the prohibited source.                       See La. R.S.

42: 1111( C)( 2).

       5I Glazer, the Court noted that recognition of a separate identity between the public
servant and a company owned by him would thwart the policy of the legislature embodied in the
Code of Ethics, impair public confidence in the integrity of government, unfairly penalize persons
who resigned from public service because of similar conflicts, and have a corruptive influence on
officials who forgo personally profitable activities inconsonant with their public duties. Glazer,
431 So. 2d at 758.   The more expansive view was incorporated into the statute by La. Acts 1983,
No. 697, § 1 ( in subparagraph ( C)( 2) the words " and no legal entity in which the public servant

exercises control or owns an interest in excess of twenty-five pereent" were inserted following
 No public servant").

                                                 4