Court Opinion

ID: 9796265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:53:14.930072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:25.047964
License: Public Domain

Rose, L,
dissenting:
I dissent because our intervention in the initiative petition process at this time is premature and not appropriate. But even if *179intervention were appropriate, I believe that the basic business tax proposal is severable from the provision that would require the Legislature to spend on education at least fifty percent of the state’s revenue.
Our case law instructs us that we should not intervene at this early stage of the initiative petition process unless the petition “would constitute a ‘plain and palpable’ violation of the . . . Constitution and would ‘inevitably be futile and nugatory and incapable of being made operative under any conditions or circumstances.1 The rationale behind the rule is simple: the initiative process should continue and not be derailed by judicial intervention unless the petition proposal is clearly and obviously unconstitutional.2 The business tax petition is certainly not that. It presents close legal issues with few helpful precedents to aid us.
In oral argument, Justice Cliff Young insightfully inquired: “Why should we get involved at all? Why shouldn’t we wait until the initiative petition process has run its course?” First impressions are almost always valid when buttressed by the law. Abstaining from action at this time is the legal and thoughtful thing to do and constitutes a preferred conservative approach to judicial involvement in the initiative petition process.
The majority believes that the petition’s requirement that the Legislature maintain educational spending at present levels runs afoul of article 19, section 6 of the Nevada Constitution. I doubt that it does. The proposal requires the Legislature to spend at least fifty percent of the state’s budget on education. The majority of funds for this expense are already raised by the state when the Legislature convenes every other year. At trial, the petition’s proponents introduced evidence that the petition’s tax would raise sufficient revenue to bring this funding to the fifty-percent level. Additionally, because the petition simply requires the Legislature to spend at least fifty percent of state revenues, funding is available; the revenues to comply with the mandatory minimum spending requirement are already on hand, and thus there is no need to identify a revenue source. It appears that the majority is objecting to the reduction of legislative discretion to spend money as it wishes, rather than to the lack of sufficient available revenues. *180While a legitimate concern, curbing legislative discretion does not violate this constitutional provision if sufficient revenues are available to comply, as they are in this case.
The initiative process is a power reserved by the people.3 Accordingly, liberal construction of a proposed initiative is called for, and any doubts should reasonably be resolved by the court in favor of this reserve power.
The exercise of initiative and referendum is one of the most precious rights of our democratic process. Since under our theory of government all the power of government resides in the people, the power of initiative is commonly referred to as a “reserve” power and it has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, our courts will preserve it.4
As I read the majority opinion, any initiative petition that requires the Legislature to fund any project without identifying an independent revenue source will be unconstitutional. This holding gives a strict construction to an initiative petition that should instead be liberally interpreted to preserve the will of the petitioners if at all possible.
I also note that the opponents to the petition did not challenge the constitutionality of the provision that requires a minimum mandatory percentage of the state budget to be spent on education until oral argument before this court. The argument was not made before the district court, and the district court judge was not given a chance to rule on the issue. The district court was faced solely with determining whether the proposed tax would bring the state’s prior education funding to the fifty-percent level. Further, the argument was not even made in the appellants’ briefs to this court. A legal argument not made in district court is deemed waived and cannot be raised on appeal.5 Therefore, the opponents to the petition should be precluded from relief on this issue if we follow our precedents regarding appellate review. This is yet another reason why we should not be entertaining this argument against the petition at this time.
But even if we are going to rule on the validity of the petition at this early date and conclude that the provision requiring mandatory spending on education is unconstitutional, the provision is *181clearly severable from the business tax proposition for the following reasons:
1. The petition itself requests that if any section is invalid, then the remaining valid portions be placed on the ballot. There can be little doubt of the individual signers’ intent when the signed petition requests severance of any invalid section.
2. The petition sponsors requested at oral argument that if the mandatory education spending proposal was ruled invalid, the business tax proposal alone be placed on the ballot. I do not see how the majority cannot discern the intent of the sponsors and petition signers when the drafters expressly request severance.
3. NRS 0.020(1) unequivocally states that the invalid portion of an initiative petition “shall not affect” the remaining provisions if the other valid provisions can be given effect. Nevada law thus directs that the valid portions of an initiative petition should survive and be placed on the ballot.
4. The business tax is the primary part of the initiative. The obvious intent of the petition is to supplement existing funding for education. This proposal can stand alone, just as it has in other states.
Many states have severed an invalid portion of an initiative petition after it was enacted into law.6 One state has severed the invalid portion of an initiative petition before it went to the voters.7 Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court has gone so far as to modify the language of an initiative petition to meet a constitutional challenge before it went to the voters.8 In another case, this court severed judges from other elected officials in the term limits proposal that was voted on in 1996.9 If the mandatory educational spending provision is invalid, this court has the power and *182obligation, pursuant to NRS 0.020(1), to declare the business tax proposal severable from the mandatory spending requirement and permit the business tax proposal to go forward in the initiative process.
The business tax proposal, standing alone, certainly appears to be constitutional. It will raise substantial sums if its hefty four-percent tax on business profits over $50,000 is ever levied. Therefore, the business tax proposal standing alone is not in violation of article 19, section 6 of the Nevada Constitution because it would merely mandate that any funds raised be allocated to Nevada’s public primary and secondary schools.
If we are true to the law, we should eschew ruling on the initiative petition’s validity at this early stage. These close legal issues will still be there if the petition proposal is enacted into law. For this reason, I dissent from the majority.

Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 831, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (1992) (quoting Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416, 425, 131 P.2d 516, 520 (1942)).

This court explained its wait-and-see policy in Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 106 Nev. 910, 917, 802 P.2d 1280, 1281-82 (1990): “First, a measure that initially appears unconstitutional may be implemented in a constitutional manner. Second, even if an initiative measure is unconstitutional, there is great political utility in allowing the people to vote on the measure. Such a vote communicates clearly to the representative branches of government the popular sentiment on a particular issue or issues.”

Nev. Const, art. 19, § 2.

Mervynne v. Acker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (Ct. App. 1961) (citations omitted).

See Dermody v. City of Reno, 113 Nev. 207, 210, 931 P.2d 1354, 1357, (1997); Powers v. Powers, 105 Nev. 514, 516, 779 P.2d 91, 92 (1989).

See, e.g., Citizens Clean Elections Commission v. Myers, 1 P.3d 706 (Ariz. 2000) (severing provision of electorate-adopted initiative that unconstitutionally expanded the scope of judicial appointments and violated doctrine of separation of powers); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994) (severing unconstitutional amendment as to federal legislative candidates); Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991) (severing unconstitutional portion of citizen-initiated term-limit legislation); Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1999) (severing portion of citizen-initiative legislation that attempted to impose term-limits on federal legislators); Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 944 P.2d 1372 (Idaho 1997) (severing citizen-initiative legislation that attempted to impose term limits on federal legislators); State v. Shumway, 607 P.2d 191 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (severing legislative amendment that established 25-year minimum incarceration period for persons convicted of murder).

See McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).

See Choose Life Campaign ‘90’ v. Del Papa, 106 Nev. 802, 804, 801 P.2d 1384, 1385 (1990).

See Nevada Judges Ass’n v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 60, 910 P.2d 898, 904 (1996).