Court Opinion

ID: 9831925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:29:00.302872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:39.465972
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is contended by counsel for Mrs. Mary Hoefling that this court has not thoroughly considered the cases of Moore v. Moore, 89 Tex. 29, 33 S. W. 217, Ashe v. Yungst, 65 Tex. 631, and Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604, 46 S. W. 787, 48 S. W. 571, 50 S. W. 931; hut those cases were carefully considered by this court, and not one word is found in either of them to sustain the proposition “that, upon the abandonment by Dorothea Hoefling of the property in controversy for the purposes of a home, it ceased to be a homestead and became subject to the general lien given by law upon the property of a decedent to creditors of such decedent to secure their claims in accordance with the statute law of this state,” as asserted by appellee Mary Hoefling in her motion for rehearing. In the case of Ashe v. Yungst the Supreme Court merely held that the duly qualified survivor has the power to sell the homestead to pay community debts, a very different question from the one involved in this suit. In the case of Moore v. Moore the only question involved as to a homestead was as to its being subject to partition. It has no application whatever to the facts of this ease. And in the case of Blinn v. McDonald the question of homestead is not adverted to in any manner, shape, or form.
It may he, as stated by appellees Mary Hoefling and Henry E. Vernor, that they do not claim that the lien given on the homestead by Mary Hoefling assumed vitality when the homestead was abandoned; but they are in no better position when they claim that a creditor’s lien, which had not attached to the homestead before, arose when the abandonment took place. That proposition is in the face of the holding by the Supreme Court that the setting aside of property as a homestead “has the effect of removing the property set apart to the surviving wife from the assets of the estate of the decedent, and by permanently protecting the property from the' claims of the creditors.” Lacy v. Lockett, 82 Tex. 190.† In the case of Stephenson v. Marsalis, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 33 S. W. 383, it was held: “Ordinarily the property of a party, at his death, descends to his heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of such decedent; but the homestead, which is exempt from the payment of debts, if a constituent of the family remains, descends and becomes vested absolutely in the heirs, and is not assets in the hands of the administrator subject to the payment of debts.”
The question of solvency or insolvency of the estate, under our view of the law, should have no consideration in the decision of this case, for; whether solvent or insolvent, at the death of William Hoefling the homestead descended to his widow and heirs absolutely and permanently free of any liens, equitable or otherwise, of creditors. But we still hold, however, that the evidence showed that the only assets of the estate consisted of a parcel of real estate on Avenue C, claimed by Kampmann, out of which about $1,600 was realized, and out of which sum $1,080 was paid to Mary Hoefling on her claim. The remainder of the $1,600 was paid to Dorothea Hoefling, as part of the widow’s allowance. Dorothea Hoefling, testified: “After my husband’s death I had to earn a living. There has nothing ever been paid to me out of the estate except what came out of the Avenue C property. It was paid to me as the widow’s allowance. The court granted me widow’s allowance. After my husband’s death, I had no other income except this property, and all I got out of the estate was the $600 allowance that was paid out of the Avenue O property. Prior to that I had received nothing out of the estate. Outside of the Avenue O property there was no other real estate belonging to the estate.” There were numerous debts, some of which Dorothea Hoefling paid out of insurance money which belonged to her separate estate. These facts were not controverted and clearly indicate' the insolvency of the estate.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.

 17 S. W. 916.