Court Opinion

ID: 9647692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:47:21.231556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:52.110944
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING ■ OPINION
MORRISON, Judge.
Upon original submission, Judge Onion joined me in a concurring opinion. At the conclusion of argument for rehearing, we both agreed that the theory upon which we concurred originally was erroneous. We now withdraw such concurring opinion and face the issue squarely again. The only logical conclusion which we have been able to reach is that there is no different quantum of proof in a case where the charge is *397enticing for immoral purposes and a case of indecent exposure which follows such illegal enticement. They are both criminal cases, and the quantum is the same. Once that conclusion is reached, the solution of this case is simple.
As stated in the majority’s original opinion :
“The prosecution was permitted to present testimony from two other boys showing that appellant had at other times and while alone with them committed similar acts upon them.”
Extraneous offenses are not admissible in indecent exposure cases because of the rule stated in Young v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 164, 261 S.W.2d 836, and here restated:
“The general rule in all English speaking jurisdictions is that an accused is entitled to be tried on the accusation made in the State’s pleading and not on some collateral crime, or for being a criminal generally. The rule is now deemed axiomatic and is followed in all jurisdictions.”
None of the exceptions to the general rule stated above exists in this case, and certainly not the exception relied upon in the original opinion of the majority. It is abundantly clear from this record that at no time during the trial did appellant take issue with any State’s witness as to the truthfulness of his testimony. He offered no evidence in his own behalf nor did he vigorously cross examine the State’s witnesses. The motion for instructed verdict was made in the absence of the jury; therefore, no fact issue was raised before the jury as to J. E. C.’s being an accomplice. The court’s charge could not create an issue not raised by the facts.
Without a question of J. E. C.’s being an accomplice, his uncontradicted testimony as to the occurrence of the alleged acts would support a finding of the necessary intent and motive and would preclude the introduction of extraneous offenses for that purpose.
There is no question of appellant’s identity and malice does not appear in cases of this nature.
The majority in its original opinion states:
“The evidence indicates methods and types of unnatural sexual acts, all being of a similar nature to the offense on trial and recent in point of time, all logically and reasonably tending to show the accused’s intent and purpose, the condition of his mind, the unnatural attitude of the accused toward the victim of his lust, and the probability he would commit the act charged.
The evidence warrants the conclusion that the appellant followed a common pattern of similar acts and conduct, amounting to a common scheme or plan in committing the particular acts shown by the evidence. The appellant pursued the same method, in the same place, with similar acts committed upon three boys ages 10 and 11.”
However, the defendant in no way denied the alleged acts of misconduct, as by offering a defense such as alibi. As stated in Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 409 S.W.2d 409:
“ * * * proof of prior and subsequent acts are admissible if they explain and lend credence to the testimony concerning the conduct of the parties on the occasion charged in the indictment, which would not otherwise appear plausible where there was a denial of the act through testimony offered by appellant as to an alibi.”
See also Gephart v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 414, 249 S.W.2d 612.
Having re-analyzed the case in light of appellant’s motion for rehearing, and his argument in support thereof, Judge Onion joins me in dissenting to the overruling of appellant’s motion for rehearing.