Court Opinion

ID: 9848353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:17:48.59277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:15.335654
License: Public Domain

Zenoff, J.,
dissenting:
From the very beginning of Nevada’s judicial time this court directed that the case would have to be “extreme” before the court would reverse an order setting aside a default. Howe v. *290Coldren, 4 Nev. 171, 175-176 (1868). The recapitulation in Hotel Last Frontier Corp. v. Frontier Properties, Inc., 79 Nev. 150, 380 P.2d 293 (1963), confirms steady adherence to that principle. Whenever the fact pattern included nonattorney neglect, a reasonable explanation by the layman-litigant of why he did not respond to a complaint, and prompt action plus a meritorious defense, the exercise of discretion by the trial court to allow the litigant his day in court was upheld. “If,” the court said, “there is a refusal to set aside a default, a ruinous judgment may be sustained against a party who, upon hearing might have interposed a perfectly good defense. By sustaining the default, he would forever be debarred the right of a hearing. If, then, a nisi prius court refuses to set aside a default when a party shows with reasonable certainty that he has a good defense, and he has only been guilty of carelessness and inattention to his business, but no willful or fraudulent delay, it would be highly proper even for an appellate court to come to his relief if the lower court refused it. But when the default has been set aside the case is far different. In such case, if the plaintiff has a good cause of action and clear proof of his demand he could generally try his case in the court below and obtain another judgment in less time, and with far less expense, than he could bring his case to this court. In fine, if the plaintiff has a good case there is no necessity of appealing. If he has a bad one, this court ought not to be very anxious to help him keep an advantage he has obtained, not through the justice or strength of his cause, but by the accidental blunder of his opponent.
“It appears to us it would have to be an extreme case, when this court would reverse an order setting aside a default.” Howe, supra.
The record shows understandable neglect on the part of David. Having sold his business, any lawsuits were the concern of the new owners so far as he understood. When the complaint was served on him David notified the owners and they, in turn, notified the insurance carrier sending copy of the correspondence to David. Then he heard nothing more about the matter for over a year. He was not notified of the taking of the default nor the proceedings to prove the judgment. He was not served with notice that the judgment was taken. Only when an escrow of the sale of his property was opened 14 months later did he become aware of the consequences of his misplaced reliance upon the purchasers of his business. Before that, he could justifiably believe that proper care had been given to the lawsuit.
*291The foregoing capsule of the facts is typical of a lay person who has no understanding of the law’s procedural requirements. We hold lawyers to a stricter degree of responsibility because it is their business to know and respect legal procedures, but it is not to be expected of a person whose experience is limited to the sale of food products.
I prefer that the discretion of the trial court once exercised under these circumstances in favor of setting aside a default not be disturbed.
Thompson, C. J., concurs in the dissent.