Court Opinion

ID: 9474083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:47:47.89529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:53.916060
License: Public Domain

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write separately because I believe that this court may exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from section 7429 proceedings in which the district court terminates the proceedings on procedural grounds without reaching the reasonableness of the assessment at issue and the appropriateness of its amount. Exercising the jurisdiction that I believe we possess, I conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the proceedings below. Accordingly, I concur in the court’s judgment.
The right to judicial review is too important to be excluded on the basis of ambiguous evidence of legislative intent to preclude review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Thus, courts will presume that judicial review is available unless there is “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress intended to preclude review. Id. See also Lindahl v. *1490Office of Personnel Management, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 1627-28, 1627 n. 13, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985). There is no such evidence that Congress intended to preclude review of procedural orders entered in section 7429 proceedings that were disposed of other than by determinations on the merits.
Section 7429(f) provides that “[a]ny determination made by a district court under this section shall be final and conclusive and shall not be reviewed by any other court.” A threshold question presented in this appeal is whether section 7429(f) clearly manifests congressional intent that taxpayers will be precluded from seeking appellate review of all determinations made in the course of a proceeding to ascertain the reasonableness of a termination assessment and appropriateness of its amount. I think that the language of section 7429 supplies the answer to this question. Section 7429(b)(2) provides that “the district court shall determine” whether the assessment is reasonable and the amount of the assessment is appropriate. Section 7429 specifically provides for no other “determination.” Thus, I believe that the “determination” that we may not review is the determination of the reasonableness of the assessment and the appropriateness of its amount. This statutory language therefore does not bar review of a district court “determination” to dismiss the entire proceeding as a sanction against the taxpayer because of his or her failure to appear for a deposition.
No opinion of this court suggests that “determination” should include orders disposing of section 7429 proceedings on procedural grounds rather than on the merits. Only one opinion discusses the broad question of appellate jurisdiction in section 7429 cases, and that opinion does not decide the issue presented here. In Nichols v. United States, 633 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.1980), this court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from procedural orders and a ruling on the merits in a section 7429 proceeding, as well as a constitutional challenge to section 7429. Because the Nichols court had made determinations on the merits and procedural rulings, Nichols is not disposi-tive of the issue presented here. Nichols therefore does not preclude the court from reviewing orders entered in section 7429 proceedings in which the district court has not actually made a determination of the reasonableness and amount of the assessment.
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has recently held that it has jurisdiction over appeals from section 7429 proceedings if they are “based on procedural error — i.e., that the district court acted outside its authority, rather than acting erroneously within its authority.” Schuster v. United States, 765 F.2d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir.1985). In Schuster, the district court had dismissed the taxpayer’s section 7429 proceedings without ruling on the merits because the taxpayer was a fugitive from justice, pursuant to Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970). The court asserted jurisdiction over the appeal from the order of dismissal, relying on a line of Eleventh Circuit cases. The primary authority on which it relied is Meadows v. United States, 665 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir.1982).
In Meadows, the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court order determining the reasonableness of an assessment and the appropriateness of its amount. The district court had entered the order after the 20-day limit for section 7429 proceedings had .lapsed. The court relied on the analysis employed in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976), where the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) did not preclude judicial review of an order remanding to state court a case that had been removed to district court. The Court reasoned that statutory nonreviewability provisions permit appellate review when a district court has acted outside its authority, but preclude review when a court has merely exceeded its authority. Applying the Thermtron reasoning to the facts before it, the Meadows court determined that the district court’s entry of its decision more than 20 days after the petition was filed was in excess of, rather than outside, its authority. 665 F.2d at 1012. See also *1491United States v. Doyle, 660 F.2d 277, 280 (7th Cir.1981) (reaching same result in appeal from decision entered after 20 days on the basis of different reasoning; court held that taxpayer could not raise 20-day limit on appeal unless it had raised it in district court).
The Schuster court also cited other Eleventh Circuit cases in which the court had exercised jurisdiction over appeals from section 7429 proceedings. Williams v. United States, 704 F.2d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir.1983) (dismissal for improper venue); Fernandez v. United States, 704 F.2d 592, 593 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983) (dismissal as untimely filed). In addition, it cited a case in which the Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from the denial of attorney fees in a section 7429 proceeding. Randazzo v. United States, 751 F.2d 145, 145-46 (3d Cir.1984). There appears to be no case, however, in which a court of appeals has determined that it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from a procedural order entered in a section 7429 proceeding in which the district court did not rule on the merits, i.e., the reasonableness of the assessment and the appropriateness of the amount of the assessment.
Review of such procedural orders is entirely consistent with Congress’s intent. Congress’s primary reason for enacting section 7429 was to benefit taxpayers, who had previously been forced to endure lengthy delays before obtaining judicial review of termination assessments. H.Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 302-03 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3197-99. See also S.Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 3792-96. I find no indication that Congress intended to permit district courts to deprive taxpayers of a prompt post-deprivation remedy with impunity, by dismissing section 7429 proceedings on procedural grounds in unreviewable orders.
In short, I find no “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress intended to preclude review of such orders, in the ambiguous language of section 7429(f), in this circuit’s opinions, or in the legislative history. Moreover, I find support for our exercise of jurisdiction over such orders in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinions. Nonetheless, because the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this action for Zu-luaga’s failure to comply with discovery, I affirm the judgment of dismissal.