Court Opinion

ID: 9563751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:46:13.943308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:03.686931
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTIN
dissenting.
The majority opinion grants this defendant a new trial based upon the following: (1) N.C.G.S. 15A-1233(a) requires the trial judge to exercise his discretion in deciding whether to grant a juror’s request pursuant to this statute, in this case the trial judge failed to exercise his discretion, and this failure was prejudicial error; (2) N.C.G.S. 15A-1233(a) expressly mandates that the trial judge summon all jurors into the courtroom before hearing and passing upon a jury request pursuant to this statute.
*41I.
It is unquestioned that the defendant in this case failed to object to the action of the trial judge with respect to the request by the jury foreman. As the majority states, as a general rule a defendant’s failure to object to alleged errors precludes raising the error on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a); State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E. 2d 532 (1982) (Exum, J.). The majority reasons that the trial court in this instance was acting contrary to a statutory mandate and therefore the defendant can raise the issue on appeal notwithstanding his failure to object at trial. The majority argues that where the trial judge is by statute expressly required to do or not to do a certain thing and violates the statute, this error can be reviewed, even though the defendant did not object at trial. I have no quarrel with this statement of the law. This principle is properly applied in a case such as State v. Bryant, 189 N.C. 112, 126 S.E. 107 (1925), cited by the majority. In that case the trial judge violated the statute which prohibits the trial judge from expressing an opinion as to whether a fact had been proven. The statute is now N.C.G.S. 15A-1232. It was formerly N.C.G.S. 1-180. This statute clearly says that “[the trial judge] must not express an opinion whether a fact has been proved.”
Where is the statutory mandate in N.C.G.S. 15A-1233(a)? Contrary to the majority opinion, the statute does not expressly require the trial judge to conduct the jury to the courtroom. The statute simply says that “the jurors must be conducted to the courtroom.” Of course, the judge is in charge of the proceedings during the trial and it can be argued that it was the ultimate responsibility of the trial judge to see that the jury was brought into the courtroom. However, that is a far cry from an express mandate such as that contained in N.C.G.S. 15A-1232. The remainder of 15A-1233(a) is not couched in mandatory language, but says that the judge “may” allow the testimony to be read and the judge “may” have additional evidence read to the jury. No direct mandate is made to the judge at any point in the statute. For this reason, I do not find that a transgression of this statute comes within the holding in Bryant, 189 N.C. 112, 126 S.E. 107.
It is to be noted that N.C.G.S. 15A-1446(d) does not list this type of error as grounds which may be asserted on appeal without objection having been made in the trial court. Clearly the de*42fendant in this case had ample opportunity to object to the action of the trial court, and he cannot, and evidently does not, argue that he should be allowed to urge this alleged error on appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. 15A-1446(d)(12).
For these reasons, I think that the majority is wrong in holding that this Court should consider the alleged error of the trial judge in this case notwithstanding the fact that no objection was made by the defendant during the trial. Had such an objection been lodged, the trial court would have had an opportunity to correct any possible error.
II.
I agree that N.C.G.S. 15A-1233(a) requires the trial judge to exercise his discretion in determining whether to allow the jury to review a portion of the testimony. I also agree that under State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 272 S.E. 2d 123 (1980), the trial judge failed to exercise that discretion. Having done so, it is then necessary to determine whether such error was prejudicial. State v. Ford, 297 N.C. 28, 252 S.E. 2d 717 (1979). I disagree with the majority in its holding that such failure constituted prejudicial or reversible error. In finding that the failure of the judge to exercise his discretion constituted prejudicial error, the majority relies, again, upon Lang. In Lang the defendant had produced evidence through Ms. Rena James, a waitress at a restaurant, that he was at the restaurant between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. and, therefore, he could not have been the man who kidnapped the victim between 9:20 and 9:30 p.m. After the jury had deliberated for some time, it returned to the courtroom and requested that the transcript of the testimony of the witness Rena James be read to the jury. The trial judge denied the request, and this Court held that he did so without exercising his discretion. Upon reviewing the case to determine if the error was prejudicial, this Court found that the requested evidence would have established an alibi for the defendant if believed by the jury; further, that the evidence was in direct conflict with the state’s evidence; and that the question of whether the jury fully understood Ms. James’s testimony was material to a determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence and that the jury had requested this specific evidence. Therefore, this Court held that the failure of the trial court to exercise its discretion was prejudicial.
*43Contrary to Lang, in this case, as the majority points out, we do not know what motivated the foreman of the jury to request “we want to review portions of the testimony.” The writer of the majority opinion finds that the defendant relied upon alibi, as the defendant did in Lang, and therefore concludes that the foreman must have wanted to hear the testimony concerning the defendant’s alibi. This conclusion is sheer speculation. There is nothing in the record in this case which indicates in any fashion what testimony the jury wanted to review. Simply because alibi was one of the factors in the case is no reason to presume that the jury wanted to review that portion of the testimony. The principal witness against the defendant was Ted Killian, who testified for the state pursuant to a plea arrangement. The jury, just as logically, could have wanted to review the testimony of Killian, because his testimony was indeed suspect. The statute under which he testified requires the jury to scan and scrutinize his testimony with care before they accept it. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1052(c) (1983). The witnesses Robert Bryson and Kathy Gunter had made statements implicating three other persons, including Killian, in the murder of Odom, but had not implicated the defendant. Therefore, the state’s entire case turned on the evidence of Killian insofar as implicating the defendant as one of the perpetrators. Also, the jurors might well have wanted to review the testimony of Bryson and Gunter concerning their statements implicating all of the persons except this defendant as being the perpetrators of the murder. So, it appears to me that although the majority strains mightily to support its quantum leap that the jury wanted to hear the alibi testimony, it has failed to do so.
As there is no reasonable way to conclude what part of the transcript the jury wanted to review, there is no reasonable manner in which it can be determined that the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s denial of the request without exercising its discretion. It must be remembered that the alleged error is not the court’s denial of the jury’s request but is, rather, that the court denied the request without exercising its discretion. See State v. Dover, 308 N.C. 372, 302 S.E. 2d 232 (1983). There has been no showing made in a reasonable manner that by the court’s failure to exercise its discretion in denying the request a different result would have been reached at the trial. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (1983). Stated differently, can this Court say as a *44matter of law that had the judge denied the request in the exercise of his discretion, a reasonable possibility exists that a different result would have been reached at the trial? I think not.
Furthermore, the majority overlooks the statutory rules for determining prejudice as expressed in N.C.G.S. 15A-1443(a):
(a) A defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising other than under the Constitution of the United States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under this subsection is upon the defendant. Prejudice also exists in any instance in which it is deemed to exist as a matter of law or error is deemed reversible per se.
15A-1443(a) establishes the test for determining prejudice arising from all errors (including state constitutional errors) except errors under the Constitution of the United States, which are governed by N.C.G.S. 15A-1443(b). Under this test defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.
Defendant received a fair trial, without prejudicial error.
Chief Justice BRANCH joins in this dissenting opinion.