Court Opinion

ID: 9945737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:09:34.40733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.054210
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                 APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                 APPELLATE DIVISION
                                 DOCKET NO. A-3720-22

E.T.,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THE BOYS AND GIRLS CLUB
OF HUDSON COUNTY, f/k/a,
THE JERSEY CITY BOYS CLUB,

        Defendant-Respondent,

and                                         APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

                                                  February 28, 2024
BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
AMERICA,1                                       APPELLATE DIVISION

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

A.M.,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
HUDSON COUNTY,

        Defendant-Respondent,

1
  Appellant Boys and Girls Clubs of America was improperly pled below as
Boys and Girls Club of America, f/k/a Boys Clubs of America.
and

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
AMERICA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

A.R.,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
AMERICA,

        Defendant-Appellant,

and

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
HUDSON COUNTY f/k/a JERSEY
CITY BOYS' CLUB, and ARTHUR
FREUDENBERG,

     Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________

A.R.2,

        Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
AMERICA,

                                     A-3720-22
                                 2
      Defendant-Appellant,

and

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUB OF
HUDSON COUNTY f/k/a JERSEY
CITY BOYS CLUB, and ARTHUR
FREUDENBERG,

     Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________

E.R., and R.R.,

      Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

THE BOYS AND GIRLS CLUB OF
HUDSON COUNTY, f/k/a THE
JERSEY CITY BOYS CLUB,

      Defendant-Respondent,

and

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
AMERICA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

J.A., A.M., and G.M.,

      Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

                                     A-3720-22
                                 3
THE BOYS AND GIRLS CLUB OF
HUDSON COUNTY, f/k/a, THE
JERSEY CITY BOYS CLUB,

      Defendant-Respondent,

and

BOYS AND GIRLS CLUBS OF
AMERICA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

           Argued January 23, 2024 – Decided February 28, 2024

           Before Judges Sumners, Rose and Smith.

           On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
           Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County,
           Docket Nos. L-3355-20, L-1307-21, L-3892-21, L-
           4042-21, L-1442-22, and L-1908-22.

           Michael L. Eber (Caplan Cobb, LLC) of the Georgia
           bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
           appellant (Fishman McIntyre Levine Samansky, PC,
           and Michael L. Eber, attorneys; Mitchell B. Levine and
           Michael L. Eber, on the briefs).

           J. Silvio Mascolo argued the cause for respondents
           E.T., E.R., R.R., J.A., A.M., and G.M. (Rebenack,
           Aronow & Mascolo, LLP, attorneys; J. Silvio Mascolo,
           of counsel and on the briefs).

           Levy Kongisberg, LLP, attorneys for respondent A.M.,
           join in the brief of respondents E.T., E.R., R.R., J.A.,
           A.M., and G.M.

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                                      4
      The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUMNERS, JR., C.J.A.D.

      This appeal requires us to determine whether an out-of-state non-profit

national youth organization affiliated with a New Jersey non-profit youth

member organization is subject to the jurisdiction of our state courts in a lawsuit

pertaining to the alleged sexual abuse by a counselor of the New Jersey entity

occurring in our state. Based on jurisdictional discovery, the motion court held

our state courts had specific personal jurisdiction over the national organization

regarding plaintiffs' sexual abuse claims. We disagree and reverse.

      Jurisdictional discovery revealed the national organization had no

influence or control over the New Jersey entity's hiring, training, or supervision

of the alleged sexual abuser. We thus conclude the national organization did

not purposefully avail itself of benefits in or from New Jersey regarding the

alleged sexual abuser, and hence, our state has no specific personal jurisdiction

over the national organization in this matter.

                                        I.

      In six consolidated lawsuits, plaintiffs allege that Arthur Freudenberg,

while a part-time counselor for the Jersey City Boys Club, now known as the

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Boys & Girls Clubs of Hudson County (Hudson County BGC),2 sexually abused

them between approximately 1978 to 1982, when they were members of the

club.3 Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, plaintiffs sued the New

Jersey non-profit, Hudson County BGC and Boys & Girls Clubs of America

(BGCA), the affiliated national organization. 4

      After the parties were allowed discovery to determine whether our state

has jurisdiction over BGCA due to its involvement with its member

organization, Hudson County BGC, BGCA moved under Rule 4:6-2(b) to

dismiss the complaints for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. The

court ruled New Jersey does not have general jurisdiction over BGCA but found

specific personal jurisdiction because BGCA purposefully availed itself of New

Jersey through its relationship with Hudson County BGC.

2
  For convenience and to avoid confusion, we refer to the Jersey City Boys Club
organization as Hudson County BGC throughout the entirety of the period when
the alleged assaults occurred.
3
   Plaintiffs allege Freudenberg was charged with 493 counts of aggravated
sexual assault on boys ages eleven to thirteen but pled guilty to only five
charges.
4
  Two plaintiffs also sued Freudenberg. Claims against Freudenberg are not
involved in this appeal.

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                                        6
      On leave to appeal, BGCA contends the motion court erred in determining

New Jersey courts have specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA in these

lawsuits. Specifically, it argues the court's order rests on four incorrect factual

findings: (1) Hudson County BGC, where plaintiffs were allegedly abused, was

under BGCA's control; (2) the alleged abuser was a BGCA employee; (3)

BGCA "marketed" its program in New Jersey when allowing Hudson County

BGC to use BGCA's logo and branding in obtaining membership; and (4) BGCA

provided services to Hudson County BGC.

                                        II.

      The issue of whether New Jersey has specific personal jurisdiction over

BGCA due to Freudenberg's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiffs is a mixed

question of law and fact. Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 358 (App. Div.

2017).5 We therefore determine whether the motion court's factual findings "are

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record" and review de novo

its legal conclusions. Ibid. (citing Mastondrea v. Occidental Hotels Mgmt. S.A.,

391 N.J. Super. 261, 268 (App. Div. 2007)).

5
  We do not address whether New Jersey has general jurisdiction over BGCA
because there is no challenge to the motion court's ruling that New Jersey does
not have general justification over BGCA.

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                                        7
      Due process dictates that for a forum state to have specific personal

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the defendant must "have certain

minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not

offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.

457, 463 (1940)); see also Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 322

(1989). We have held "for a state court to exercise [specific] jurisdiction over

a non[-]resident defendant, the lawsuit 'must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the

defendant's contacts with the forum.'" Jardim v. Overley, 461 N.J. Super. 367,

376 (App. Div. 2019) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Daimler

AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)); accord Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral

Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 119 (1994), cert. denied sub nom. WMX Techs., Inc. v.

Canadian Gen. Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 1183 (1995).

      There must be a "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the

litigation" to establish minimum contacts. Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323 (quoting

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). A defendant's conduct must be

purposeful and not be caused by the plaintiff's unilateral actions. Ibid. (citing

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); see

also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The conduct in our state

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                                         8
should be "such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled"

into our courts. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. Moreover,

"[a] court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum

State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.

Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).

                                       III.

      Guided by the above principles, we examine the factual record regarding

the BGCA and Hudson County BGC, particularly the latter's employment of

Freudenberg.

      BGCA, a federally charted District of Columbia non-profit corporation

with its principal place of business in Georgia, was established as a Boys Club

of America in 1956 "to promote the health, social, educational, vocational and

character development of all boys throughout the United States." 6 Act of Aug.

6, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-988, 70 Stat. 1052 (current version at 36 U.S.C. §

6
  In 1990, after the Boys Club of America began accepting female members, the
organization's charter was amended to adopt its current name. For convenience
and to avoid confusion, we do not alter the boys-only reference in the BGCA's
charter and by-laws that existed when the alleged abuse occurred. Our Mission
& Story, Boys & Girls Clubs of America https://www.bgca.org/about-us/our-
mission%20story#:~:text=In%201956%2C%20Boys%20Clubs%20of,amended
%20and%20renewed%20our%20charter (last visited Feb. 12, 2024).

                                                                             A-3720-22
                                        9
31102(1)). The organization's activities are "not confined to the place where the

principal office is located but may be conducted throughout the States,

territories, and possessions of the United States." 36 U.S.C. § 31107. BGCA ,

in accordance with its constitution, provides "national leadership in the

development of the Boys' Clubs of America movement [through] activities

which will enable member organizations to render better service to their boy

members; and . . . assistance to communities in the establishment of new Boys'

Clubs."

      A "[m]ember [o]rganization" as defined under BGCA's constitution is "a

corporation, association, administrative committee or otherwise named

governing body which operates one or more Boys' Clubs in accordance with the

requirements herein, and which has been admitted to membership in Boys' Clubs

of America."    A "Boys' Club" is a club "which meets the requirements

established [under BGCA's Constitution]."        BGCA's constitution section ,

"Requirements for Membership," provides that "[a]ny corporation, association,

administrative committee or otherwise named governing body . . . which meets

the minimum requirements established here may be elected to membership

. . . ." Moreover, a member organization's "[f]ailure to comply with membership

requirements could result in an organization having their membership revoked

                                                                           A-3720-22
                                      10
or leaving membership in [BGCA] during that time, and at that time would not

be able to use the name, logo, or programs associated with BGCA." Member

organizations are required to pay annual dues to BGCA.

      BGCA's involvement with its member organizations is limited.            Its

constitution provides:

                   The local governing body shall have control of
            the Boys' Club buildings or designated Boys' Club
            rooms; shall have control of the expenditures of the
            Boys' Club within an established budget; shall have
            authority to determine policies and establish programs;
            shall have authority to appoint the executive and fix his
            compensation, prescribe his duties and the terms of his
            employment; shall have authority to fix the
            compensation of other employees; and shall have the
            authority, or delegate the authority to the executive, to
            hire and discharge employees and prescribe their
            duties.

The constitution also provides, the local governing body's executive director

shall "be acceptable to [BGCA], [and] be responsible directly . . . to the local

governing body," and "have executive and administrative control of activities

and personnel of the member organization in accordance with policies and

procedures established by the . . . local governing body."

      While BGCA supports its member organizations, it does not provide

services to the local organization's youth members. As for the services made

available to member organizations, John Miller, BGCA's National Vice

                                                                          A-3720-22
                                      11
President of Field Operations, deposed that "no member or organization is

required to use any of the services that they are provided as part of the[ir]

membership[,] and organizations can determine based on their needs and their

priorities which services they take advantage of." Miller confirmed member

organizations were required to employ workers who were "qualified in

personality, character, experience, education, and training for the leadership and

guidance of boys."

      However, according to Miller:

            [A]s part of the [BGCA] constitution . . . local
            organizations have the sole authority for the hiring,
            evaluation, training, conditioning of employees and
            [BGCA] has no authority there, so [the local
            organizations] would determine the suitability of
            someone for hiring within their organization.

                  ....

                   Each local organization would be looking at the
            type of personality, character, experience, education[,]
            and training that would –– they would need to carry out
            their program on the local level.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      During the time of Freudenberg's alleged sexual assaults, Hudson County

BGC was a New Jersey nonprofit corporation and a dues-paying local governing

body member of BGCA. Plaintiffs were members of the Hudson County BGC.

                                                                            A-3720-22
                                       12
There is nothing in the record indicating that BGCA had any input in Hudson

County BGC's hiring practices or gave direction to Hudson County BGC

regarding the training or supervision of the local governing body's employees.

Nor is there any indication that during the period of the alleged assaults or when

these suits were filed, BGCA owned any real property in New Jersey.

                                       IV.

                                       A.

      Plaintiffs' consolidated lawsuits essentially make the same allegations

regarding BGCA's liability for Freudenberg's alleged assaults. They allege

BGCA is liable for their injuries caused by Freudenberg's sexual abuse based on

violation of the Child Sex Abuse Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1, and theories of

negligence, and willful, wanton or grossly negligent conduct.        They claim

Freudenberg was an agent, servant, or employee of BGCA, and as such, BGCA

failed to use reasonable care in hiring and supervising him or in protecting them

from his abuse and is vicariously responsible for his conduct. They claim BGCA

failed to train Hudson County BGC to prevent the foreseeable acts of

Freudenberg's sexual abuse. Finally, plaintiffs allege Hudson County BGC was

under the supervision and control of BGCA, and, therefore responsible for

overseeing Hudson County BGC's staff.

                                                                            A-3720-22
                                       13
                                       B.

      The motion court ruled that under principles established in Lebel and

Baanyan Software Services, Inc. v. Kuncha, 433 N.J. Super. 466, 476 (App. Div.

2013), "BGCA purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey forum" which

"relates to the claims by [p]laintiffs." The court further relied on Ford Motor

Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022,

1028 (2021), where the United States Supreme Court concluded that Ford was

subject to personal jurisdiction in certain states where Ford systematically

marketed, sold, and serviced its vehicles, even though the Ford vehicles involved

in the accidents in the forum states were not sold in those states. The court

determined the situation here was like that in Ford, reasoning:

            BGCA provides to local clubs "marketing support,
            strategic planning support, leadership development and
            training, facility, consultations." . . . Moreover, the
            local clubs use the BGCA logo and branding.
            Significantly, the local clubs benefit from the "market
            value in terms of name recognition and public trust" of
            the BGCA. In return, BGCA collects dues from its
            member clubs. The alleged wrong—sexual abuse by a
            [Hudson County BGC] employee against [Hudson
            County BGC] members—relates directly to the
            BGCA's conduct in New Jersey. In other words, BGCA
            marketed its youth clubs in New Jersey, and an
            employee abused a patron. Accordingly, BGCA is
            subject to personal jurisdiction in these consolidated
            matters.

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                                      14
                                      C.

      We part company with the motion court's finding that there is specific

personal jurisdiction over BGCA. We agree the record reflects, as the court

recognized: BGCA had contacts with New Jersey through its relationship with

the Hudson County BGC; BGCA received membership dues from Hudson

County BGC to be a member of BGCA; BGCA provided support, including in-

person training, to Hudson County BGC pertaining to sports, fitness, recreation,

education, the arts, leadership, citizenship, and development to enhance Hudson

County BGC's recruitment and retention of members, like plaintiffs; and that

BGCA provided leadership and training to Hudson County BGC to ensure

stability of the local club. These connections, however, do not cause us to

conclude that BGCA availed itself to New Jersey with respect to specific

personal jurisdiction regarding plaintiffs' allegations of Freudenberg's sexual

abuse.

      The gravamen of plaintiffs' allegations against BGCA is that it is liable

for Freudenberg's misconduct because it was responsible for his hiring, training,

and supervising. The record does not reflect BGCA maintained control over the

hiring, training, supervising, or termination of any Hudson County BGC

employee. Instead, the record demonstrates, Freudenberg was not an agent,

                                                                           A-3720-22
                                      15
servant, or employee of BGCA––as plaintiffs pled in their respective

complaints––subject to BGCA's control or supervision.             Plaintiffs have

presented no credible evidence contradicting the deposition testimony of Miller

that local clubs, such as Hudson County BGC, solely hire, evaluate, and train

their employees without the oversight of BGCA. There is no evidence that

BGCA monitored or directed Hudson County BGC staff. See Waste Mgmt., 138

N.J. at 126 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984)).

      While Hudson County BGC's executive director must be "acceptable" to

BGCA, the record does not show BGCA compelled, or could compel, the

executive director or other local club staff to undergo any mandated training for

their roles or the supervision of staff. Hudson County BGC's executive director

managed the local club's operations and reported to the club's trustees, not to

BGCA. Significantly, there is no indication that BGCA had any knowledge

about Freudenberg's abusive propensities or should have known of them based

upon involvement with Hudson County BGC.

      Plaintiffs argue Hudson County BGC's affiliation with BGCA, use of the

BGCA brand to market its services to the local community, and access to

BGCA's programmatic and financial guidance establish contact with New Jersey

warranting our state court's jurisdiction over BGCA. This is unpersuasive.

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                                      16
Specific personal jurisdiction does not exist over BGCA merely because it

offered resources to local clubs and "might have predicted" a New Jersey club

would use those resources. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.

873, 882 (2011) ("The defendant's transmission of goods permits the exercise of

jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as

a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its

goods will reach the forum State.").         BGCA's support must relate to

Freudenberg's alleged sexual abuse for it to avail itself of New Jersey courts.

Since plaintiffs have not shown there are facts indicating minimum contacts in

New Jersey, for which BGCA would have reasonably expected to be a party in

our state, BGCA should not be a defendant in these matters. See Int'l Shoe Co.,

326 U.S. at 316-17 (1945).

      The facts here are unlike those in our recent published opinion in JA/GG

Doe 70 v. Diocese of Metuchen, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2023) (slip

op. at 15-16),7 where we concluded there was substantial credible evidence

showing New Jersey had specific personal jurisdiction over the Diocese of

7
  Because Metuchen was issued after the parties submitted their merits briefs,
the parties accepted our invitation to submit supplemental briefs regarding the
impact of that decision on this appeal.

                                                                           A-3720-22
                                      17
Richmond in Virginia arising from its connection with a Catholic priest who

sexually abused children in New Jersey while serving in the Diocese of

Metuchen. Judge Gilson, speaking for our court concluded:

            [T]he facts here establish that [the Diocese of]
            Richmond acted with intent to avail itself of a benefit
            in New Jersey by sending one of its troubled priests to
            New Jersey. The credible evidence in the record
            establishes that [the Diocese of] Richmond was not
            willing to suspend [the priest] from his priestly duties
            until 2002. In 1970, and again in 1982, [the Diocese
            of] Richmond purposefully availed itself of New Jersey
            by encouraging and allowing [the priest] to go and
            remain as an active priest in New Jersey.

            [Id. at 19.]

      The Diocese of Richmond was aware the priest sexually abused at least

three children when he served there. Id. at 13. The Diocese of Richmond, as

the priest's ordaining and incardinating 8 diocese, retained sole and ongoing

power to control and terminate the priest. Id. at 12-15.

      In contrast with the Diocese of Richmond's involvement with the sexual

abuser in Metuchen, BGCA had no such connection with Freudenberg's

8
   "[A]n ecclesiastical term indicating a priest's acceptance into a diocese."
Metuchen, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 3) (citation omitted). "A priest is subject
to the authority of the bishop of the diocese where he is incardinated . . . and
may only be incardinated in one diocese at a time." Ibid. (citation omitted).

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                                       18
employment at Hudson County BGC. The record does not indicate BGCA hired,

trained, supervised, or had the authority to discipline or terminate Freudenberg's

employment.

                                        V.

      Our Legislature has recognized the compelling need for sexual abuse

victims to seek relief in our state courts to address the insidious effects of their

ordeal. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b(a) (permitting individuals to bring otherwise

time-barred claims for sexual offenses committed against them as minors).

Nevertheless, we must be mindful that there are due process restrictions to

extend our courts' jurisdiction over individuals and entities that are allegedly

liable for sexual abuse.

      Here, there is no substantial, credible evidence in the record that supports

a finding of specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA. Because no facts indicate

BGCA purposely availed itself to an action related to Freudenberg's employment

with Hudson County BGC, there is no support for plaintiffs' argument that

BGCA would have reasonably expected to be a party to a New Jersey lawsuit

involving his sexual abuse conduct.           In parting with the trial court's

determination, we make no judgment regarding the merits of plaintiffs' claims

against BGCA beyond our jurisdiction. Our ruling, which is solely based on the

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                                        19
parties' jurisdictional discovery, is limited to whether New Jersey courts have

specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA given plaintiffs' allegations. We

conclude we do not.

      Reversed.

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