Court Opinion

ID: 9964366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 19:12:01.407916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:20.559867
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                        In The Court of Appeals

            Khalil Abbas-Ghaleb, Appellant-Respondent,

            v.

            Anna Ghaleb, Respondent-Appellant.

            Appellate Case No. 2022-000505

                          Appeal From Aiken County
                     Vicki J. Snelgrove, Family Court Judge

                               Opinion No. 6057
                  Heard October 10, 2023 – Filed April 29, 2024

             AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
                           REMANDED

            Matthew B. Robins, of Strom Law Firm, LLC, of
            Columbia, and Gary Hudson Smith, III, of Smith,
            Massey, Brodie, Guynn & Mayes, LLC, of Aiken, both
            for Appellant-Respondent.

            Gregory S. Forman, of Gregory S. Forman, P.C., of
            Charleston, for Respondent-Appellant.

MCDONALD, J.: In this contentious marital litigation, Khalil Abbas Ghaleb
(Husband) appeals the family court's final orders, arguing the court erred in (1)
awarding Anna Ghaleb (Wife) primary custody of the parties' young daughter; (2)
granting Wife decision-making authority, other than as to medical decisions; (3)
allowing Wife to claim Daughter as a dependent for tax purposes; (4) equitably
apportioning the marital estate; (5) precluding Husband from taking Daughter to
Lebanon; and (6) ordering Husband to pay $40,000 of Wife's attorney's fees. In
her cross-appeal, Wife challenges: (1) the equitable distribution; (2) the visitation
and medical decision-making authority awards; and (3) the denial of her request
for post-trial attorney's fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the
family court to revalue and reapportion certain financial accounts.

Factual and Procedural Background

Husband and Wife met in October 2013 while Wife was stationed at Fort Gordon
in Georgia; they married on June 25, 2017. Throughout the majority of their brief
marriage, the parties lived separately. 1 Husband lived in Aiken and worked as an
advisory scientist designing nuclear processes for the Savannah River Site MOX
Project; Wife lived in the Washington, D.C. area where she worked for the United
States Air Force at Fort Belvoir as a linguist and translator with top secret security
clearance. While living apart, the parties did not merge their funds or accounts.

According to Wife, the parties' marital disputes began on their wedding night and
Husband "talked about divorce for the first time" on their honeymoon. Despite
this, Wife became pregnant, left the military, and moved to Aiken to live with
Husband and stay home with the baby. 2 Shortly thereafter, Husband learned he
might lose his job due to the termination of the MOX Project and told Wife he was
considering a position in Washington state. Wife recalled Charlotte, Tennessee,
and Cape Canaveral were also options.

Husband helped Wife pack and move to Aiken; however, when Wife arrived, she
became upset because Husband put most of her belongings in the attic and would
not let her sleep in his bedroom. Wife then left and went to stay with her mother
(Grandmother) in Florida without telling Husband. On August 30, 2018, Husband
sent Wife the following WhatsApp message:

             1. First option: You are to come live as my wife with me.
             I provide and protect you and I work like I do now from
             morning to evening to provide [for] you and the child and

1
 Although Wife sponsored Husband's 2018 green card, the parties lived together
for only seven months while married.
2
 Husband suggested Wife should remain in D.C. and continue working for the Air
Force. He claims the parties' problems began "immediately upon cohabitation."
               you on the other hand follow my rules. My rules are a
               guide for you and the children on the right path. Having
               order in our life, eat on time, have a clean house, talk
               respectfully to older people etc[. are] the examples and
               the teaching that I want to give to my children. If my
               children don't learn this from me and see me and their
               mom follow these rules and they don't follow these rules
               they are not my children and I don't want them. [If my
               wife and children don't live with me, I am not to provide
               for them. If my sister gets married she is to live with her
               husband and it's the case of your sister and any woman.
               Jesus and St Paul asked men to not divorce their women
               because they know that the women will suffer by
               themselves. But if the women wants to leave that's her
               fault.][3]

               2. Second option: You continue living with your mom. I
               don't provide anything to you nor the baby. You go find
               a job and work to raise him, and don't ask me for
               anything. I might not even be in the US to even ask me.
               I will have nothing to do with you.[4]

Wife returned to Aiken two weeks later, but the parties kept separate bedrooms.
Husband later invited Grandmother to stay and help with the baby; he also paid for
her plane ticket. The parties' marital problems escalated following Grandmother's
arrival and Daughter's birth in November 2018.

Although Wife's water broke between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. on the day Daughter was
born, she declined to go to the hospital immediately. Husband testified he "begged
her for three hours to go to the hospital" before ultimately threatening to call the
police. Wife eventually agreed to go, and Daughter was born at the hospital that
evening. Before the baby's hospital discharge, however, the parties disagreed over
whether she should receive the recommended Vitamin K shot and neonatal
prophylactic eye treatment—Wife ultimately refused both. The parties agreed to

3
    Husband included the third set of brackets in the message.
4
 The family court order references this communication as the "Prebirth Message."
Husband offered no testimony addressing the message at the final hearing.
delay the recommended Hepatitis B vaccine because Daughter "was at low risk for
acquiring this disease."

Once Daughter came home from the hospital, the parties had a litany of
disagreements regarding her health and wellbeing, including: how Wife should
breastfeed; whether Husband should use video monitors to watch the bassinet and
crib while he was away; when and how to bathe the baby; baby's proper bath
temperature; the proper temperature of the home; the frequency of diaper changes;
the tightness of swaddles; whether Wife could leave the house with the baby while
Husband was at work; whether and where Wife was permitted to travel with the
baby; what type of clothing the baby should wear; whether the baby could use
certain comfort items, including but not limited to how much pacifier time she was
allotted; whether to keep a clock in the nursery; whether the baby should be given
probiotics, Tylenol, or other medication; whether the baby should receive
treatment from chiropractor Chris Walker; 5 how and where she would be
baptized; 6 and how to address the baby's struggle to gain weight.

The parties further disagreed about which vaccinations Daughter should receive (as
well as when she should receive them). Husband wanted Daughter to receive the
vaccinations recommended by pediatrician Paula Luther, but Wife again refused to
consent. Wife explained she initially objected for religious reasons based on her
belief that some vaccines contained fetal cell tissue. Although Wife later
acknowledged this misgiving was misguided, she still sought to have Daughter
receive certain vaccines on a delayed schedule. Husband took Daughter to the
pediatrician for her first vaccinations without Wife's knowledge on March 8, 2019.

5
  When Wife ultimately took Daughter to chiropractor Walker while Husband was
at work, he called the police. Husband threatened various medical providers with
law enforcement and litigation on more than one occasion.
6
  Wife is a devout member of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Husband is a
Maronite Catholic. Before they married, the couple signed a document indicating
their children would be baptized in the Maronite Catholic Church in exchange for
the couple's marrying in the Russian Orthodox Church. Husband testified he did
not attend church at all between Daughter's birth and the time the parties separated.
After the separation, Wife expressed her preference to baptize Daughter in the
Russian Orthodox Church, however, Husband had the child baptized in the
Maronite Catholic Church without Wife's knowledge or consent.
As early as November 2018, Dr. Luther noted Daughter was having issues gaining
weight. 7 Thus, she referred the family to a speech therapist to determine whether a
problem with the baby's mouth was affecting her ability to breastfeed; Dr. Luther
further recommended supplementing the baby's diet with formula. According to
Husband, Wife refused to supplement with formula and insisted upon "my milk or
no milk." Wife supplemented Daughter with bottled breastmilk and testified
Daughter's weight struggles were related to her latching problems. Daughter was
seen by a lactation consultant; 8 speech therapist; ear, nose, and throat specialist
William Wells; and pediatric dentist Adam Hahn. At a December 19 visit, Dr.
Wells found the baby had an enlarged superior labial frenulum and lip-tie and
noted he "[s]pent the majority of the visit discussing treatment options to include a
frenectomy." Although Wife wanted Daughter to have the frenectomy, Husband
preferred to wait and see if the baby would gain weight on her own before
subjecting her to the procedure. The parties ultimately agreed to wait.

Nevertheless, in March 2019 while Husband was on a business trip in Salt Lake
City, Wife took Daughter by Uber to Dr. Hahn's Columbia office for an evaluation.
Dr. Hahn diagnosed Daughter with a Grade 4 lip and tongue-tie, and Wife
consented to a frenectomy. 9 When Husband discovered where they were, likely
from the automated Uber receipt, he called Dr. Hahn's office and threatened a
lawsuit. Husband later called Wife and asked to see the baby through FaceTime;
Wife refused. After Wife also refused Husband's request to fix the baby monitor
over Daughter's crib, Husband sought to return home early from his business trip.

During a phone call later that day, Husband told Wife, "You can't understand how
happy I am to be free from you. . . . And you take care of [Daughter] because I
cannot take care of her. You know. So, I am so glad. And again, I hope you are
not expecting any financial [inaudible], right?" Wife responded that Husband still
needed to repay her the $25,000 she loaned him to purchase his Jaguar—less
$5,000 he paid for Wife to get her master's degree—so she could properly care for
Daughter; however, Husband told her that he no longer owed her anything because

7
  In the four months following her birth, Daughter's weight percentile dropped
from sixty-fifth to three.
8
 The lactation consultant's notes from a December 3, 2018 visit indicate "a high
narrow palate and difficulty with the top lip clanging out during feeding."
9
 Daughter's weight improved slightly following the frenectomy. Between March
and July 2019, her weight percentile went from three to nineteen percent.
she had harmed Daughter by taking her to get the frenectomy. 10 Husband also
texted Grandmother and told her he wanted her to leave his house. Wife texted
Husband inquiring, "Just so I understood you right when we talked earlier you
want me, my mom and [Daughter] to leave." Husband responded, "It's not true.
Your text is suggesting that I want [Daughter] to leave. [Daughter] is in my [heart]
whatever you do. It's not true that I want her to leave." Wife noted she could not
go anywhere without Daughter and told Husband they were leaving for
Grandmother's house. Husband recommended Wife "start looking for a job in
Florida" because he intended to close their shared bank account.

Upon his return around midnight on March 16, Husband found Wife and
Grandmother packing to leave for Florida. Husband blocked Wife's car in the
driveway, locked Daughter's car seat in his car, removed Daughter from her crib,
and locked her in his bedroom. As the parties argued, Husband accused Wife of
being an inattentive mother and noted he had vaccinated Daughter, replaced her
probiotics, and secretly supplemented her diet. When Wife expressed her concern
that Husband had been feeding the four-month-old solid food, Husband responded,
"You know what I'm worried about? Is that a man can be with you and can rape
her without you knowing. That's how a mother doesn't know anything." Husband
repeated this comment later when Wife referenced the cameras he had placed in
the home. Wife eventually called the police, who directed Husband to allow Wife
to leave with the baby. Although Husband was initially noncompliant, he
eventually allowed the officers to retrieve the car keys from his safe and unblock
Wife's vehicle. The officers explained Wife could temporarily take Daughter to
Florida but would have to return for a judge to consider custody.

At daybreak, Wife and Grandmother took Daughter to a hotel in Augusta.
Following multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact Wife, Husband was able to
track her because the parties shared location data. He then drove to the Augusta
hotel and called the police, reporting he wanted to speak to Wife and see Daughter.
Wife declined, and law enforcement instructed Husband to leave.

10
  At trial, Husband testified Wife did not loan him the money to buy the Jaguar
and claimed she gave it to him. On cross-examination, Husband refused to agree
that "car loan" was on the memo line of the check and alleged someone must have
added the notation after the fact. When asked whether he paid Wife back for "any
of this loan," Husband responded, "I paid for her tuition at the University."
While Wife and Daughter were staying with Grandmother in Florida, Husband
contacted Wife through email, WhatsApp messaging, and video calls. Wife
testified many such communications pertained to finances and taxes but noted she
participated in two video calls per week to allow Husband to see and interact with
the baby. However, Husband claimed Wife refused to allow him to communicate
with Daughter and often responded to his messages with financial demands or the
occasional picture or video. Husband claims he was precluded from seeing
Daughter between March 16 and April 21, 2019, when the record contains proof
that the parties began video visitation.

Wife subsequently invited Husband to her May 2019 graduation in Washington
D.C., where she allowed him two hours of supervised visitation per day. While
there, Husband gave Wife a note indicating he wanted to see Daughter in person at
least once a month and have at least two thirty-minute video visits each week.
Husband claims Wife denied him in-person visitation with Daughter, allowed him
only three-and-a-half hours of video visitation between Easter and mid-July, and
insisted Husband's mother not participate in the video contacts.

After returning to Florida, Daughter fell from her stroller onto Grandmother's brick
driveway and suffered a minor head injury. Wife did not inform Husband of this
and when he emailed the following day to ask about Daughter, Wife told him she
was fine. Husband did not learn of the accident until three weeks later when he
received an explanation of insurance benefits. When Husband asked about the
accident, Wife claimed Daughter had fallen from a bed onto something soft and the
injury was not significant. Husband testified that when he again asked how
Daughter was injured and why Wife lied about how she fell, Wife responded,
"Why don't you call CPS and find out." On June 7, Husband made a report to the
Florida Department of Children and Families because Wife would not allow him to
see Daughter and he wanted someone to check on the baby.

On June 18, Husband asked to visit Daughter in Florida; Wife declined because
she had friends coming to town to celebrate Wife's birthday. On June 20, Husband
filed a complaint seeking custody and Daughter's return to Aiken; 11 Wife filed her

11
   Despite his knowledge that Wife has been a United States citizen since before
they were married, Husband's complaint stated Wife "is a Russian Citizen and
owns a home in Russia and [Husband] is concerned that she might flee the United
States with their Daughter." When questioned about this during his deposition,
Husband testified he was in a hurry to bring Daughter back to South Carolina and
filing an inaccurate complaint is "not a big deal."
own complaint seeking custody and child support the next day. Following an
expedited hearing, the family court consolidated the two actions, granted
temporary joint custody, ordered the parties to follow the recommendations of
Daughter's pediatrician, precluded Daughter's removal from South Carolina
without the other parent's written consent, awarded Husband physical custody
immediately following the July 9 hearing through August 2, and appointed a
guardian ad litem (GAL). 12

The parties continued to disagree about vaccinations, and this dispute came to a
head at the baby's July 19 pediatrician appointment. Dr. Luther recommended
standard vaccinations but refused to administer them without both parents' written
consent. Husband consented to all three recommended vaccines but after two
hours, Wife would consent to only one. 13 The following day, Husband filed a rule
to show cause over Wife's failure to comply with the pediatrician recommendation
provision in the first temporary order, and Wife was ordered to appear for a
September hearing. In the interim, the court issued a second temporary order
requiring that Daughter be vaccinated in accordance with Dr. Luther's
recommendations; the parties subsequently entered a consent order holding
Husband's rule to show cause in abeyance conditioned upon Wife's compliance.

By consent order, licensed psychologist Marc Harari was selected to serve as
custodial evaluator. In her interviews with both Dr. Harari and GAL Jessica
Brilhante, Wife raised concerns about Husband's family and noted Husband's
comments regarding Wife's lack of knowledge about what might happen while
Daughter was in Husband's bedroom. Although Wife recognized she had
insinuated Husband was sexually inappropriate, she later admitted she did not
believe Husband molested Daughter or behaved inappropriately with his mother or
sister. Still, she was disturbed by Husband's inferences and earlier statements
suggesting Daughter could be raped without Wife's knowledge.

In the ensuing months, the parties continued to disagree about visitation, traveling,
childcare, and healthcare. Following a February 10, 2021 hearing, the family court
addressed several issues by February 26 order. The order set a week-to-week
parenting schedule with the parties to exchange Daughter on Fridays at 4:00 p.m.;

12
  At this point, Daughter's weight had fallen to the ninth percentile, she was
behind on vaccinations, and she had a slight delay in gross motor development.

 The parties dispute what actually happened at the appointment, but Dr. Luther's
13

medical record notes, "Immunization not carried out because of caregiver refusal."
provided for daily contact during the other party's parenting time; and gave each
parent the right of first refusal regarding childcare during the workday. The family
court further permitted Wife to take Daughter to Florida during her parenting time,
required the parties to follow the CDC's Covid-19 guidelines, and found Wife had
not met her burden of proof with respect to her request for a rule to show cause
addressing Husband's alleged failure to inform Wife of a doctor's appointment.

The parties' final hearing was held in late September 2021. Wife asserted the
frenectomy caused the breakdown of the marriage and noted Husband's constant
monitoring of Wife and Daughter as one of the reasons she left the marital home. 14
Wife discussed her plan to remain in the North Augusta or Aiken County area,
noted she had enrolled Daughter in extracurricular activities in Augusta, and
requested physical custody and a traditional visitation schedule for Husband. Wife
also testified she preferred to remove Daughter from Husband's private insurance
and put her on Medicaid so Husband's insurance payments would not be
considered in the child support calculation.

Husband alleged finances caused the breakdown of the marriage. He admitted he
violated the February order by enrolling Daughter in daycare without providing
Wife the right of first refusal; he further failed to list Wife's legal name or contact
information on the daycare paperwork. Husband requested physical custody and
50/50 parenting time.

Neutral observers—Dr. Harari, the GAL, and retired family court judge and
co-parenting counselor Donna Strom—testified both parents love Daughter, but
their inability to co-parent remains problematic. According to the GAL, the
parties' issues include "how they communicate, how they respect each other as a
parent, how they respect each other's opinions and beliefs." Judge Strom testified
Husband was unwilling to compromise, angry, and controlling, while Wife was
"firm and willing to compromise." 15 The family court judge concluded the hearing

14
  In addition to the video monitoring, there is evidence in the record that around
the time of their March 2019 separation, Wife discovered Husband had been
signed into her Gmail account since April 4, 2015.
15
  Wife's doula, Ashley Brio; sister, Dr. Yekaterina Lyon; Grandmother; Dr.
Luther; Dr. Harari; and Husband's friend Soren McMillian all described Husband
as "controlling" or "exhibiting controlling tendencies." According to Brio, "[w]hile
[Husband] was hands-off with respect to [Daughter], he was highly controlling of
[Wife] and how she should parent and behave." Although Brio personally
by describing the Prebirth Message as a most "unbelievable piece of evidence" and
noted its concern with the number of firearms Husband had in the house.

Following the final hearing, Wife moved with Daughter to Augusta and the parties
again had a dispute over the child's medical well-being. Husband sent Wife an Our
Family Wizard (OFW) message on December 6, asking if Daughter still had a
cough and runny nose. After confirming Daughter was still symptomatic, he sent
Wife an OFW message informing her of Daughter's December 8 appointment with
Dr. Luther. When Wife cancelled the appointment, Husband sent her another
OFW message indicating he had rescheduled the appointment because Daughter
had been sick for two weeks. Although Dr. Luther diagnosed Daughter with a
bilateral ear infection and prescribed antibiotics, Wife declined to fill the
prescription. Husband was understandably concerned, and Dr. Luther reluctantly
suggested the parties could wait two to three days to see if the infection would
clear naturally before revisiting the need for antibiotics. The parties had yet
another disagreement over whether to wait, the infection did not clear, and
Daughter ultimately started the necessary antibiotics.

The family court granted the parties a divorce on December 28, 2021. In its
January 25, 2022 final order, the family court explained the division of assets was
atypical because the parties only cohabitated briefly and had generally been
responsible for their own expenses. Consistent with its statements at the end of the
final hearing, the family court concluded Husband's words in the Prebirth Message
showed "complete inflexibility and a total lack of an emotional connection with
[Daughter]." The court referenced the custody award as "joint custody," 16 with
Wife to have primary custody and "final decision making authority except as to
medical decisions" and Husband to have medical decision making authority. 17 The

disagreed with some of Wife's choices regarding vaccinations, she "did not observe
[Wife] to engage in any neglectful or problematic parenting practices. Instead, it
was evident that both parents had major disagreements which appeared to
contribute to their conflict."
16
  Specifically, the court stated, "The parties shall have joint custody of the minor
child to the point of telling and informing each other of decisions regarding
[Daughter], but not to the point of a discussion that must reach an agreement. The
requirement is to inform, not discuss."

 Regarding visitation, the family court ordered that during the school year,
17

Husband "will have the child every other weekend from Thursday at 6:00 pm until
family court also warned Husband "of the consequences of abusing this authority"
in light of his history of "demanding control even to the point of using it solely to
get at the mother." Additionally, the court precluded the parties from taking
Daughter to Lebanon, found Wife could claim her as a tax dependent, ordered
Husband to return or replace Wife's engagement ring, apportioned other assets,
ordered Husband to pay $40,000 of Wife's attorney's fees, and emphasized the
parties' obligations to inform each other of decisions involving Daughter. Both
parties filed motions to reconsider, which the family court denied.

Standard of Review

"Appellate courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of
evidentiary and procedural rulings." Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833
S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019). However, this broad scope of review does not require the
appellate court to disregard the fact that the family court saw and heard the
witnesses and was in a better position to evaluate their credibility. Lewis v. Lewis,
392 S.C. 381, 385-86, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (2011). "Moreover, consistent with
our constitutional authority for de novo review, an appellant is not relieved of his
burden to demonstrate error in the family court's findings of fact." Id. at 392, 709
S.E.2d at 655.

 I.   Custody, Visitation, and Decision-Making Authority

Husband argues the family court erred in granting Wife primary custody and
general decision-making authority, while Wife argues the court erred in setting
Husband's visitation and in awarding him medical decision-making authority. We
find no error, and we affirm the family court's awards of custody, visitation, and
assigned categories of parental decision making.

the following Monday when he takes [her] to school or daycare at 9:00 (or when
the school day requires as she ages)" and "[e]very other Monday night from 6:00
until return to school or daycare the next morning no later than 9:00 (certainly
earlier if his job requires it). This Monday is to be on the Monday following
mom's full weekend." The court granted alternating weeks during summers (with
each party to have a two-week summer increment), provided specifics for various
holiday periods, and specified the number and length of phone calls and video
chats each party is entitled to have when Daughter is with the other parent.
The family court has exclusive jurisdiction "to order joint or divided custody where
the court finds it is in the best interests of the child." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530
(A)(42) (2010). Section 63-15-230 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2023)
mandates the following regarding a final custody determination:

             (A) The court shall make the final custody determination
             in the best interest of the child based upon the evidence
             presented.

             (B) The court may award joint custody to both parents or
             sole custody to either parent.

             (C) If custody is contested or if either parent seeks an
             award of joint custody, the court shall consider all
             custody options, including, but not limited to, joint
             custody, and, in its final order, the court shall state its
             determination as to custody and shall state its reasoning
             for that decision.

             (D) Notwithstanding the custody determination, the court
             may allocate parenting time in the best interest of the
             child.

"In a child custody case, the welfare of the child and what is in the child's best
interest is the primary, paramount, and controlling consideration of the court."
Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 80, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting
McComb v. Conard, 394 S.C. 416, 422, 715 S.E.2d 662, 665 (Ct. App. 2011)). "In
determining a child's best interest in a custody dispute, the family court should
consider several factors, including: who has been the primary caretaker; the
conduct, attributes, and fitness of the parents; the opinions of third parties,
including the guardian ad litem, expert witnesses, and the children; and the age,
health, and gender of the children." Simcox-Adams v. Adams, 408 S.C. 252, 260,
758 S.E.2d 206, 210 (Ct. App. 2014); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-240(B)
(Supp. 2023) (providing a non-exhaustive list of factors a family court order
"issuing or modifying" custody may include). "While numerous prior decisions set
forth criteria that are helpful in such a determination, there exist no hard and fast
rules and the totality of circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only
scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed." Clark v. Clark, 423 S.C.
596, 605, 815 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Davenport v. Davenport,
265 S.C. 524, 527, 220 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1975)).
Here, we agree with the family court that the parties "are not compatible enough to
be in a marriage, much less rear a child together," and that "[t]he record is replete
with arguments, conversations, communications between these parties wherein
[Daughter] is the trophy to be won and the war is a 'take no hostages' battle." We
further understand the family court's belief that "[i]n [Husband's] words, he shows
complete inflexibility and a total lack of emotional connection with [Daughter]."
But our review of the record leads us to believe Husband's words were—and are—
generally designed to hurt Wife. While he may have lacked the referenced
emotional connection with the baby at the time of the Prebirth Message, both Wife
and Grandmother acknowledged at the final hearing that Husband indeed has an
emotional connection with Daughter. We do, however, agree with the family
court's concern that Husband "was enmeshed to the point of obsession regarding
the day-in day-out routine habits of [Daughter]'s care while he was working." We
also agree that a "disturbing trend of these parents is the obtaining of medical
treatment without agreement and knowledge of the other. They could have
endangered this child's life by not telling the other of procedures or vaccinations."
And, the record supports the family court's impression that while Wife acts out of
"fear and control," Husband acts out of "extremely poor insight as to how his
behavior will affect his relationship with [Daughter]."

In his custody evaluation report, Dr. Harari stated:

             Looking to the future, [Husband]'s rigidity and anxious
             tendencies could create conflict in the father-daughter
             relationship, especially as [Daughter] becomes an
             adolescent and develops a need for autonomy.
             Specifically, such tendencies may contribute to an
             authoritarian parenting style, in which a parent maintains
             high expectations and lacks warmth. (Baumrind, 1991).
             It is well established in the literature that an authoritarian
             parenting style is associated with concurrent and future
             psychological distress for children (Gould and
             Martindale, 2007). While [Husband] exhibited
             appropriate parental warmth with [Daughter] during the
             course of this evaluation, she is young and fully
             compliant with her father's directives. He can be
             perceived as argumentative and angry when individuals
             disagree with him. Therefore, [Husband]'s warmth may
             be conditional upon him obtaining his way. As his
             Daughter becomes an adolescent, she will naturally seek
             independence and disagree with or disobey him at times.

Although Dr. Harari's report "solely addressed abuse and neglect of the child rather
than the domestic violence history described by each parent," he recognized the
evidence of Husband's controlling behavior toward Wife. While Dr. Harari agreed
Husband's various behaviors were a form of coercive control, he declined to label
Husband as a "coercive controlling violent person" or a "physical batterer."

Dr. Harari's report also offered options regarding custody, and he testified in his
deposition that "this is a case where probably one parent has to have final
decision-making [authority]." Dr. Harari noted Husband considers Wife
"essentially incompetent and unfit to parent" and this attitude affects the
co-parenting relationship. 18 He further observed that although Wife respects
Husband's role as a father, she nevertheless "maintains vast mistrust of [his] future
motives." As for Wife's behavior while in Florida, Dr. Harari agreed some of her
gatekeeping could be described as protective rather than restrictive. He further
opined Wife had not engaged in such gatekeeping behavior since returning to
South Carolina.

We find the parties' toxic relationship presents a potential, if not imminent, risk of
harm to Daughter's mental health. We further find the family court, which was in a
better position to evaluate the witnesses' credibility and assign comparative weight
to their testimonies, properly awarded Wife primary custody. While the family
court did not specifically address all factors applicable to its custody decision, our
review of the record and consideration of the pertinent statutory factors supports
the family court's custody award. Although we decline to rehash all facts
pertaining to every factor supporting the family court's custody determination, we
note the following circumstances support the award: Wife moved to Aiken with
Husband to become a stay-at-home mom and has been Daughter's primary
caretaker; despite their atrocious conduct toward one another, Wife—although
misguided regarding medical care and treatment—generally sought to act in
Daughter's best interests while Husband did not always act in her best interests; Dr.
Harari's opinions regarding Husband's parenting style and psychological
functioning are concerning; and other neutral observers opined that while both
parents love Daughter, they are unable to effectively co-parent. Although there is
no definitive evidence of domestic abuse, Husband's controlling behavior and his

18
  Despite his impression of Wife's parenting abilities, Husband testified the best
physical custody arrangement would be to continue the 50/50 split.
"my way or no way" tendency—acknowledged by his friends and colleagues and
specifically noted by at least one of the law enforcement witnesses—is of great
concern to this court from a custody standpoint. Accordingly, we find the family
court properly awarded Wife primary custody.

Regarding visitation, this court presumed Husband and Wife had been rotating
Daughter's placement according to the January 2022 final order without further
involvement from the family court or law enforcement. However, we learned at
oral argument that the parties have had additional visitation issues since the final
hearing. Still, despite Wife's domestic violence insinuations, Grandmother's
testimony regarding threats, and testimony from numerous witnesses that Husband
is controlling, there is no evidence of physical abuse in the record. Although Dr.
Harari acknowledged "coercive control is a form of domestic violence," he
declined to label Husband as a "coercive controlling violent person" or a "physical
batterer." Thus, we find the family court did not err in setting Husband's visitation.

Although Husband and Wife both love Daughter, throughout this case they have
created conflict over even the smallest decisions. Dr. Harari, the GAL, Judge
Strom, and Dr. Luther all agreed these parties are unable to effectively co-parent.
In light of the neutral observers' opinions, the parties' inability to agree on almost
anything, and the history of one parent unilaterally making medical and major life
decisions for Daughter without consulting (or even informing) the other, the family
court's delineation of categories of responsibility for decisions affecting Daughter's
life and care was critical here. See, e.g., Greene v. Greene, 439 S.C. 427, 444, 887
S.E.2d 157, 166-67 (Ct. App. 2023) (noting to the extent mother and father
disagreed when making decisions for their child, "the record support[ed] the family
court's assignment of the decision-making categories for Child's parenting.").

As for medical decisions, although it concerns us that Husband was reluctant to
even consider the frenectomy recommendation in light of the baby's difficulties
breastfeeding and maintaining a healthy weight, there is greater problematic
evidence regarding Wife's approach to Daughter's medical care. Wife's "history of
withholding care that is recommended by [Daughter's] physicians" includes failing
to supplement her diet, refusing to vaccinate her despite medical recommendations
and at least one court order requiring her to do so, and declining to fill a
prescription for antibiotics after the baby suffered several days of fever and illness.
These are just a few of the examples in the record supporting the family court's
award of medical decision-making authority to Husband.
The family court's well-reasoned order granting Wife all remaining
decision-making authority is not only the best way to relieve some of the conflict
between these parties while serving Daughter's best interests, it is the logical
choice in this unfortunate situation. We applaud the efforts of the family court to
sort through this voluminous record and effectively address a difficult custody
situation.

 II.   Dependent Tax Deduction

Husband argues the family court erred in allowing Wife to claim Daughter as a tax
dependent because Wife was unemployed at the time of the final hearing and
Husband is responsible for a greater share of child support. Our review of the
record reveals that at trial, Husband did not make this argument or request the
dependent tax deduction should Wife be awarded primary physical custody.
Instead, he first raised this argument in his motion to reconsider, and the family
court appropriately declined to consider it. See Gartside v. Gartside, 383 S.C. 35,
43, 677 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[A] party cannot use a Rule 59(e)
motion to present to the family court an issue the party could have raised prior to
judgment but did not."). Under such circumstances, this question is unpreserved
for our review. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694
(2003) (reiterating that "[a] party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate
ground on appeal").

III.   Equitable Distribution

Husband and Wife argue the family court erred in its equitable distribution of the
marital estate. We agree in part.

"The term 'marital property' as used in this article means all real and personal
property which has been acquired by the parties during the marriage and which is
owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation." S.C. Code
Ann. § 20-3-630 (2014). "However, '[p]roperty acquired prior to the marriage is
generally considered nonmarital.'" Pittman v. Pittman, 407 S.C. 141, 148, 754
S.E.2d 501, 505 (2014) (quoting Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258, 269, 631 S.E.2d 279,
285 (Ct. App. 2006)). "Nevertheless, '[p]roperty that is nonmarital when acquired
may be transmuted into marital property if it becomes so commingled with marital
property that it is no longer traceable, is titled jointly, or is used by the parties in
support of the marriage or in some other way that establishes the parties' intent to
make it marital property.'" Id. at 148, 754 S.E.2d at 505 (alteration in original)
(quoting Wilburn v. Wilburn, 403 S.C. 372, 384, 743 S.E.2d 734, 740 (2013)).
Although "marital property subject to equitable distribution is generally valued at
the divorce filing date[,] . . . . the parties may be entitled to share in any
appreciation or depreciation in marital assets occurring after a separation but
before divorce." Burch v. Burch, 395 S.C. 318, 325, 717 S.E.2d 757, 761 (2011);
see also Fuller v. Fuller, 370 S.C. 538, 546, 636 S.E.2d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 2006)
(finding no error when the family court valued IRA and its passive increase at date
of final hearing rather than divorce filing date); Bowman v. Bowman, 357 S.C. 146,
159, 591 S.E.2d 654, 660 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding when the husband actively and
intentionally depleted his retirement account, the account should be valued as of
the filing date); Dixon v. Dixon, 334 S.C. 222, 233-34, 512 S.E.2d 539, 544-45 (Ct.
App. 1999) (finding proper valuation date for business was filing date where the
husband actively set out to destroy the business during the marital litigation);
Mallett v. Mallett, 323 S.C. 141, 151, 473 S.E.2d 804, 810 (Ct. App. 1996)
(holding when the husband's insurance business decreased passively due to market
forces, "it would be grossly unfair to value this asset" at date of filing); McDavid v.
McDavid, 333 S.C. 490, 496-97, 511 S.E.2d 365, 368-69 (1999) (finding that
because increase in marital home equity from time of filing to time of trial
stemmed from mortgage payments made solely by the wife, the husband was not
entitled to share in the increased equity and valuation date should be date of filing).

"Although statutory factors provide guidance, there is no formulaic approach for
determining an equitable apportionment of marital property." Lewis, 392 S.C. at
391, 709 S.E.2d at 655; see also S.C. Code § 20-3-620 (B) (2014) (setting out
fifteen statutory factors for the family court to consider in apportioning marital
property). "In the absence of contrary evidence, the court should accept the value
the parties assign to a marital asset." Pirri, 369 S.C. at 264, 631 S.E.2d at 283
(quoting Noll v. Noll, 297 S.C. 190, 194, 375 S.E.2d 338, 340-41 (Ct. App. 1988)).
"A family court may accept the valuation of one party over another, and the court's
valuation of marital property will be affirmed if it is within the range of evidence
presented." Pirri, 369 S.C. at 264, 631 S.E.2d at 283.

      A. Engagement Ring

Husband argues the family court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering him to return
or replace Wife's engagement ring. Husband further asserts Wife was not a
credible witness. We disagree.

Although we recognize unpublished opinions lack precedential weight, we are
persuaded by this court's analysis addressing engagement rings in Moring v.
Moring, Op. No. 2004-UP-605 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Dec. 3, 2004). There, the court
disagreed with the husband's argument that the family court erred in ordering him
to transfer the engagement ring in his possession back to the wife because it was
properly considered nonmarital property. Id. at *7. While acknowledging the
husband was correct in asserting the family court lacked jurisdiction to apportion
nonmarital property, the court reiterated that the family court indeed had
jurisdiction to determine what was and was not marital. Id. at *8. Thus, "the
[family] court did not 'apportion' the non-marital property, but merely determined
it was in fact non-marital and belonged to [the wife]." Accordingly, "the family
court properly determined Wife was entitled to possession and ownership of the
[engagement] ring." Id.; see also Frank v. Frank, 311 S.C. 454, 457, 429 S.E.2d
823, 825 (Ct. App. 1993) ("An antenuptial gift of an engagement ring is the
recipient's separate property.").

At the final hearing here, Wife testified Husband kept all of her rings in a locked
safe in his own bedroom and that when she vacated the marital home, she did not
take her heart-shaped diamond engagement ring. When Husband was asked to
identify all nonmarital property in Wife's possession, he did not list the
engagement ring despite listing other jewelry. On August 14, 2019, Husband had
Wife sign a list of the items she was taking from the marital home, and the
engagement ring is not on that list. In fact, Wife made a handwritten note on the
list indicating she "[d]id not take valuable Jewelry + rings." And, Husband created
two documents that support Wife's contention that she did not have the ring. Given
the evidence in the record, we find the family court properly ordered Husband to
either return the ring, a premarital gift, or pay Wife $5,000 to replace it. 19

         B. Accounts

In its final order, the family court noted Husband and Wife were married for just
twenty-one months before they separated and twenty-four months before Husband
filed his complaint. The court further found the parties lived together for only
seven months. Due to this brief period of cohabitation, the family court
substantially deviated from a 50/50 split of marital assets.

In dividing the marital assets, the family court considered several individual
accounts belonging to Husband and Wife, only some of which are at issue on
appeal. It equally divided Husband's Vanguard account, setting the value at
$28,076, and valued one of Husband's Areva accounts of €18,596 at $21,570,

19
     Wife's presented evidence that the ring had previously been appraised at $5,400.
finding Wife was entitled to ten percent of this Areva account's value ($2,157) "as
some marital funds were deposited into this account, but minimal as to [the] total
account." The family court valued Husband's other Areva account of €6,998 at
$8,117 and found Wife was entitled to ten percent ($812). Husband's Bank of
America (BOA) account ending in 6752 was valued at $34,101, and the family
court found Wife was entitled to twenty percent ($6,820) of this.

Additionally, the family court valued Wife's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account at
$115,743, and awarded Husband twenty percent ($23,148) "as some marital funds
were deposited into this account, but minimal as to [the] total account." The court
noted Wife's financial declaration reflected she deposited funds into this account
during the marriage and there was growth in these funds. Finally, the family court
valued Wife's Edward Jones account at $42,938, and determined Husband was
entitled to ten percent of the value of this account ($4,294) because Wife deposited
$5,500 into the account during the marriage. The court concluded Husband owed
Wife $9,789 from his accounts and Wife owed Husband $27,452 20 from her
accounts—a net of $17,663 due to Husband. Combined with the initial equitable
distribution, the family court found Husband owed Wife $11,528.00.

             1. Husband's Vanguard Account

Wife argues the family court erred in failing to account for post-filing growth and a
pendente lite withdrawal Husband took from his Vanguard account. We agree.

During his deposition, Husband testified he and his employer deposited funds into
the Vanguard account during the parties' marriage. He acknowledged the funds
deposited into this account were marital funds, and he presented no evidence that
he opened this account prior to the marriage. At the final hearing, Husband
recognized his equitable distribution valuations used date-of-filing values while his
financial declaration used current values. And, although Husband's September 20,
2021 financial declaration set the value of his 401k at $27,080.31, this valuation
failed to account for a $21,985.18 withdrawal Husband took during the second
quarter of 2020.

While the family court valued Husband's Vanguard account at $28,076 and divided
it equally, our review of the record reveals this value came from Husband's June

20
  This includes Husband's award of $10 from Wife's State Employees Federal
Credit Union (SEFCU) account, which is not at issue.
30, 2019 valuation and failed to account for two years of passive increase. Cf.
Fuller, 370 S.C. at 546, 636 S.E.2d at 640 (finding no error when the family court
valued IRA with passive increase at date of final hearing rather than divorce filing
date). We further find the family court erred in failing to include Husband's sizable
post-filing withdrawal in its valuation and apportionment. See Bowman, 357 S.C.
at 159, 591 S.E.2d at 660 (finding when husband actively and intentionally
depleted his retirement account, the account should be valued at the filing date).
Because we can find no evidence in this record as to the value of the Vanguard
account as of the date of the final hearing, we reverse and remand this question to
the family court with instructions to review the statements and other necessary
documentation for the Vanguard account, add the withdrawn $21,985.18 to the
account value, and revalue the Vanguard account as of the date of the final hearing
in order to fairly compensate Wife. The family court should equally divide the
Vanguard account between the parties once this valuation is made.

             2. Husband's Areva Amundi and Credit Mutuel Accounts

Husband argues the family court erred in dividing his "Areva account" twice, while
Wife argues the family court erred in both the valuation and distribution of
Husband's first Areva account. 21 Initially, we note Husband's Areva Amundi and
Areva Credit Mutual statements are in French. While both parties speak French,
we can only speculate about some of the account statements' information as we
admittedly do not speak French well enough to feel comfortable declaring their
contents. We also note neither party offered any testimony regarding Husband's
Amundi account at the final hearing.

At his deposition, Husband confirmed that between June and December 2017,
Areva deposited a total of €21,494.44 into one of his French accounts, although he
did not specify which one. He also testified that in January 2018, Areva deposited
€20,898.61 into his Credit Mutual account to compensate him for unused vacation
days under his French contract when he moved to the American contract.
However, we see no documentation relating to the alleged compensation for
unused vacation days and the only Credit Mutual statement in the record, dated
July 8, 2019, shows a checking account ending in 1401 with a balance of
€6,993.91 and a savings account ending in 1405 with a balance of €22,667.45.
Although Husband admitted to depositing at least some portion of his salary into
his Credit Mutuel accounts during his deposition, he declined to answer whether

21
  After obtaining his post-doctorate degree, Husband was hired as an advisory
scientist for Orano (formerly Areva) in Paris; he was transferred to Aiken in 2012.
any money from these accounts was used in support of the marriage. At the final
hearing, Husband acknowledged he had two separate accounts with Credit Mutuel
into which Areva deposited funds during the marriage, but he failed to provide the
family court with necessary documentation as to those account values.

It appears from the documents Husband did provide that he had a least three
French accounts into which Areva was depositing funds: one with Amundi and two
with Credit Mutuel. Although the family court's order discusses two "Areva
accounts," it is logical to conclude that the court was referring to Husband's two
accounts with Credit Mutuel. Because there is some evidence in the record that
both Credit Mutuel accounts were marital or transmuted, we find the family court
did not err in dividing them between the parties. However, given the amount of
money Husband deposited into the Credit Mutuel accounts after the parties'
marriage, we disagree with the family court's finding that "minimal" contributions
were made into these accounts during the marriage. Because this court is unable to
ascertain the value of either Husband's Amundi account or his Credit Mutuel
accounts as of the date of the final hearing, we reverse and remand these questions
to the family court. The court should review the bank statements or other
necessary documentation for all of Husband's Areva (Amundi, Credit Mutuel, or
otherwise) accounts held during the marriage and revalue and reapportion them.
Husband shall pay for a translator should one be necessary to aid the family court's
review because his evasive testimony and movement of funds among the various
accounts (along with his steadfast refusal to candidly acknowledge the marital
nature of certain transferred funds or even admit the existence of certain accounts)
has caused much of the confusion here.

            3. Husband's BOA Accounts

Wife argues the family court erred in awarding her only twenty percent of the
value of Husband's BOA account ending in 6752 and in finding "some marital
funds were deposited into this account, but [such funds were] minimal as to [the]
total account." We agree.

Husband deposited a $25,000 check from Wife's premarital savings into another
BOA account ending in 1855 on January 2, 2018, so that he could purchase a
Jaguar from account 6752. The following day, Husband transferred $24,500 from
account 1855 into account 6752. Then, Husband transferred $43,000 from account
6752 to pay for the Jaguar. Before the parties separated, Wife told Husband he
needed to repay her the $25,000 she loaned him to purchase the vehicle—less
some $5,000 Husband paid for Wife to obtain her master's degree—to take care of
Daughter, but Husband told her he no longer owed her anything because she had
harmed Daughter by taking her to get the (medically necessary) frenectomy. At
the final hearing, Husband testified Wife did not loan him the money for the
Jaguar—he claimed she gave it to him. He then refused to agree that "car loan"
appeared on the check's memo line and testified he did not remember seeing it
there. When asked whether he paid Wife back any of this loan," Husband
responded, "I paid for her tuition at the University." Additionally, Husband
testified his salary was deposited into this account, and there is evidence of
transfers between BOA accounts 1855 and 6752. In light of Husband's testimony
that his salary was deposited into account 1855, the commingling of funds in BOA
accounts 1855 and 6752, and the fact that the funds Wife loaned Husband to buy
the Jaguar traversed both BOA accounts, we reverse the family court's
apportionment of the BOA account ending in 6752 and reapportion it equally
between the parties. Thus, we find Wife is entitled $17,060.50, or fifty percent of
the value of BOA account 6752.

            4. Wife's TSP Account

Husband argues the family court erred in awarding him only twenty percent of
Wife's TSP account. Conversely, Wife argues the family court erred in awarding
Husband twenty percent of the value of her TSP account because only $28,227 of
the $115,743 date of trial value resulted from marital contributions or growth
during the marriage. The value of Wife's TSP account as of the date of filing was
$76,593.08. Wife's financial declaration lists $28,227 as the "Marital portion
growth" of the account. She testified that approximately $18,000 of this amount
consisted of contributions she made during the marriage and approximately
$10,000 was attributable to growth from premarital contributions. Although Wife
offered to provide the family court with account statements supporting her
position, the court indicated it did not need this information.

The family court then valued Wife's TSP account at $115,743, awarded Husband
twenty percent of the total account value ($23,148), and again noted "some marital
funds were deposited into this account, but minimal as to [the] total account."
Although the family court correctly valued Wife's TSP account at the time of the
final hearing, it erred in disregarding Wife's testimony that approximately $10,000
of this growth resulted from her own premarital contributions. Thus, we reverse
and remand for the family court to revalue and reapportion the marital portion of
Wife's TSP account. See Clark v. Clark, 430 S.C. 167, 183, 843 S.E.2d 498, 507
(2020) (reversing in part due to improper valuation of husband's business).
Wife shall provide the statements offered at the hearing to assist the family court
with this valuation, and Husband may offer any other relevant documentation
pertaining to this account in response to the documentation Wife provides.

             5. Wife's Edward Jones Account

Finally, Husband argues the family court erred in awarding him only ten percent
($4,294) of Wife's Edward Jones individual retirement account (IRA) ending in
9716. Conversely, Wife argues that because she only deposited $5,500 into the
Edward Jones IRA during the marriage, the family court erred in awarding
Husband ten percent ($4,294) of the full account value in the equitable distribution.

Wife's Edward Jones Portfolio shows two separate accounts—an IRA ending in
9716 with a balance of $10,576.12 and a Single Account (SA) ending in 6616 with
a balance of $32,362.53 as of the date of filing. Although Wife acknowledged she
opened the Edward Jones Portfolio during the marriage and the $5,500 she
contributed to her Edward Jones IRA is marital, she testified at the final hearing
that some of the cash to fund the portfolio came from premarital funds. However,
she listed the "Value of Publicly Held Stocks, Bonds, Securities, Mutual Funds" as
"approximately $37,000" under marital property on her July 8, 2019 financial
declaration and again listed $37,000 on her October 17, 2020 financial declaration.
Thereafter, Wife listed the "Value of Voluntary Retirement Accounts" at $33,727
under marital property and the Edward Jones IRA ending in 9716 with a $5,500
marital contribution under "Voluntary Retirement Accounts and Pension
Accounts" on her September 21, 2021 financial declaration. Husband's equitable
apportionment worksheet shows Wife's SEFCU account had a balance of
$49,529.57 as of the date of the marriage. 22 Additionally, Husband testified at the
final hearing that Defendant's Exhibit 38 shows Wife transferred $25,464 from her
SEFCU account to her Edward Jones portfolio on September 10, 2018.

In its final order, the family court found, "[Wife]'s Edward Jones account is valued
at $42,938. [Husband] is entitled to 10% of the value of this account as $5,500
went into this account during the marriage. [Husband] is entitled to $4,294 to
effectuate equitable distribution." In her Rule 59(e) motion, Wife argued the
family court failed to distinguish the two Edward Jones accounts. At the hearing

22
  Although we assume Wife transferred the funds from her Edward Jones SA
ending in 6616 into her Edwards Jones IRA ending in 9716, we have been unable
to find conclusive documentation of such in the record.
on the motions to reconsider, the following exchange took place between the
family court and Wife's counsel:

             [Court]: Okay. It looks like on page 281 on that Edward
             Jones account, and we had a conversation, the
             attorneys—it's 28—grouped by 28,277 of which 18,000
             was growth on the money that she put in during the
             marriage as Mr. Forman—me saying her paycheck
             deposited. Mr. Forman, the remainder of the growth is
             the growth that occurred over years.

             [Court]: It's 10,000 growth on the plan and $18,000
             contribution, which makes up the 28, is that right?

             [Wife]: Yes.

             ....

             [Wife]: As, as I understand, they're actually two Edward
             Jones accounts on that one statement. There's a[n]
             investment account and IRA—retirement account and
             just nod your head yes if I'm correct on that. Just—okay.
             So, I think part of it is the Court sort of thought there was
             just one account when there were actually two and she
             deposited funds into one of those accounts during the
             marriage but not the other.

             [Court]: Okay. Well, I'm denying the motion.

Although there is evidence in the record that the majority of Wife's Edward Jones
portfolio was funded with nonmarital property, without more documentation than
has been provided for our review, it is difficult to determine the degree to which
these funds may have been transmuted. See Pittman, 407 S.C. at 148-49, 754
S.E.2d at 505 (noting nonmarital property "may be transmuted into marital
property if it becomes so commingled with marital property that it is no longer
traceable, is titled jointly, or is used by the parties in support of the marriage or in
some other way that establishes the parties' intent to make it marital property"
(quoting Wilburn, 403 S.C. at 384, 743 S.E.2d at 740)). We thus reverse and
remand the valuation and apportionment of the Edward Jones IRA with
instructions that the family court consider Wife's Edward Jones Portfolio in
conjunction with other account documentation in the record as may be necessary to
calculate marital versus nonmarital percentages. The family court should then
equitably apportion only the funds (and fund growth) the court deems marital.

IV.   Travel to Lebanon

Husband argues the family court erred in precluding the parties from taking
Daughter to Lebanon. We disagree.

At the time of the final hearing, Husband was a citizen and passport holder of both
Lebanon and France. He described himself as "a mix of western and very
westernized eastern person, because, obviously, Lebanon is very European, but I
have lived in the west. I'm very westernized." In her answer and counterclaim,
Wife stated her belief that Husband is "capable and emotionally able" to take
Daughter out of the country. And, there is evidence in the record that both parties
discussed such travel with Judge Strom. When Wife sought to take Daughter to
see her grandfather in New York, Husband refused to allow Daughter to go unless
Wife allowed the child to travel with him to Lebanon. He then took it upon
himself to cancel the plane tickets Wife purchased for the New York trip. Wife
testified she had no problem with Daughter traveling with Husband to France but
was concerned because Lebanon is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Wife further referenced the State
Department's travel advisory for Lebanon.

In his amended Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, Husband argued:

             Paragraph 27: No travel to Lebanon: The court followed
             the request of [Wife] and prevented travel to Lebanon.
             The court did not take into account the looming war
             between Russia, Ukraine and possibly the NATO alliance
             including the USA. Lebanon is in no conflict with the
             USA. [Husband] believes that for the protection of the
             minor child, the court order should include Russia,
             Ukraine and all other countries that are not members of
             the Hague Convention in the "no travel ban", taking into
             consideration the current political and controversial
             situations in those countries.

Husband makes a different argument on appeal than he made to the family court in
that he now asserts "this provision of the order is punitive and only has the effect
of intimating to Daughter that she should be ashamed of [Husband]'s home country
and her heritage." See Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 694 ("A party may
not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal."). We disagree
that this is a punitive provision and find the family court's travel restriction to be
well-reasoned and in Daughter's best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the order of
the family court with respect to Daughter's travel and find it properly precluded the
parties from taking her to Lebanon.

V.    Attorney's Fees

Both parties challenge the fee award. Husband argues the family court erred in
awarding Wife $40,000 in attorney's fees because Wife has the resources to pay
her fees, was uncooperative, and spent money on materials not used to present her
case. Wife contends the family court should have awarded her fees related to the
defense of Husband's motions to reconsider.

When determining whether to award attorney's fees, the family court considers
four factors: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) [the]
beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial
conditions; [and] (4) [the] effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of
living." E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992). In
determining the amount of fees to be awarded, the family court considers "(1) the
nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the
case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5)
beneficial results obtained; [and] (6) customary legal fees for similar services."
Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991). It is
appropriate for the family court to "consider a litigant's uncooperative and evasive
behavior when determining the reasonableness of the fees." Daily v. Daily, 432
S.C. 608, 630-31, 854 S.E.2d 856, 868 (Ct. App. 2021).

In awarding a portion of the fees Wife requested, the family court noted most of
the findings in the final order "explain the reason for the attorney fee award." The
court stated it "did consider the factors in EDM v. TAM and Glasscock" and "also
considered the settlement offers from the Plaintiff to the Defendant." And, the
court specifically referenced "the parties' respective financial conditions,"
including the assets detailed in the equitable distribution analysis and the parties'
monthly incomes. We find the family court's award of $40,000—less than half of
the total fees Wife requested—was reasonable and appropriate given the
circumstances of this case, specifically the complexity of the issues, the parties'
respective abilities to pay, the time properly devoted to this contentious case, and
the professional standing of counsel. And, we agree with the family court's
recognition that "both parties were being represented by excellent attorneys and
both attorneys [did] a very competent job representing their clients in this action."
We thus affirm the initial award of $40,000 to Wife and note the behavior of the
parties and beneficial results Wife obtained further support the award.

However, we reverse the family court's summary denial of Wife's request for a
portion of the attorney's fees she incurred in defending Husband's post-trial
motions. Although Husband timely filed his initial post-trial motion seeking
reconsideration of eleven issues, he then filed an amended motion two-and-a-half
weeks later. Some of the new matters raised in the amended motion were untimely
under Rule 59(e); others sought redress as to issues not raised at trial. Wife
conceded one post-trial matter and successfully defended the others. Accordingly,
we find it appropriate to grant Wife the attorney's fees she incurred following
Husband's amended filing and award her $4,480.00 of the requested $10,185.00 in
fees related to defending Husband's post-trial motions.

Conclusion

We affirm the orders of the family court as to custody, visitation, primary and
medical decision-making, the dependent tax deduction, and Wife's engagement
ring. We further affirm the family court's initial award to Wife of $40,000 in
attorney's fees; however, we reverse the denial of post-trial motion fees and award
Wife $4,480.00 in additional fees. We reverse and remand the valuation and
apportionment of certain accounts as detailed in Section III.B.

We again commend the family court for its patience and consideration in this
difficult case. We urge these parties to prioritize the best interests of their daughter
as their paramount concern in seeking to more courteously co-parent her.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

VINSON, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.