Court Opinion

ID: 9900231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:02:24.150733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:02.565870
License: Public Domain

Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 751 (BIA 2023)                                Interim Decision #4067

       Matter of Aldwin Junior BRATHWAITE, Respondent
                             Decided October 23, 2023

                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

  Because an appeal accepted under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure
Law is classified as a direct appeal, a respondent with a pending appeal under this section
does not have a final conviction for immigration purposes. Brathwaite v. Garland, 3 F.4th
542 (2d Cir. 2021), followed.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: John H. Peng, Esquire, Albany, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Amanda Ayers, Associate
Legal Advisor
BEFORE: Board Panel: GREER and SAENZ, Appellate Immigration Judges; PEPPER,
Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
GREER, Appellate Immigration Judge:

    The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded this
case to the Board to address the finality of the respondent’s criminal
convictions under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2018), and to reassess whether he
is removable as charged. Brathwaite v. Garland, 3 F.4th 542 (2d Cir. 2021).
The respondent filed a motion to terminate his removal proceedings. The
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) opposes the motion. The motion
will be granted.

             I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   The respondent is a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago and a
lawful permanent resident of the United States. DHS served the respondent
with a notice to appear alleging that on January 31, 2018, he was convicted
of multiple offenses including identity theft, larceny, and possession of stolen
property in violation of New York law. DHS charged the respondent with
removability under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii) (2018), for having been convicted of
two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and an aggravated felony,
respectively.

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    The respondent filed a motion to terminate, arguing that his convictions
were not final for immigration purposes under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), because a New York court had granted his
motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal under section 460.30 of the
New York Criminal Procedure Law. The Immigration Judge determined that
because DHS established the respondent had been convicted of the alleged
offenses and the initial time for filing a direct appeal had passed, a
presumption arose that the convictions were final for immigration purposes
under Matter of J. M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. 420, 432 (BIA 2018). She also
determined that the respondent did not carry his burden of rebutting the
presumption by producing evidence that he had filed a timely appeal that
relates to his guilt or innocence or concerns a substantive defect in the
criminal proceedings. See Matter of J. M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. at 432. We
dismissed the respondent’s appeal from this decision, concluding that the
Immigration Judge properly applied Matter of J. M. Acosta.
    The Second Circuit granted the ensuing petition for review and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 555. On remand, the
respondent filed a motion to terminate, asserting in both his motion and
appellate brief that his criminal appeal remains outstanding under New York
criminal appellate process. How to evaluate the finality of a criminal
conviction in the wake of Brathwaite is a legal issue that we address de novo.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2023).

                    II. SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION

    In its decision remanding this case, the Second Circuit concluded that
section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), is ambiguous
about whether finality is required to support a charge of removability.
Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 548–52. Applying Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984), the court
concluded that our interpretation of “conviction” in Matter of J. M. Acosta,
27 I&N Dec. at 431–32, was reasonable, in that a conviction does not support
removability until the right to direct appellate review has been waived or
exhausted. Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 552–53.
    However, the court concluded that our burden-shifting regime and
evidentiary requirements were unreasonable in the context of the appellate
process for criminal convictions under New York law. Id. at 553–55. The
court explained that a New York defendant “may file a written notice of
appeal with the clerk of the criminal court within 30 days of the judgment
from which an appeal is sought.” Id. at 554 (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 450.10 (McKinney 2021)). Alternatively, if “that initial time period
expire[s], a defendant may seek the permission of an intermediate appellate

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court to file a late notice of appeal” within 1 year of the initial deadline. Id.
(citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.30(1) (McKinney 2021)). Thus, in
practice, a “motion for a late notice of appeal may be filed within [1] year
and [30] days of the criminal judgment.” Id. The Second Circuit described
such late filings as “a matter of course in New York” and stated that “New
York courts treat appeals taken by written notice of appeal and those taken
by a granted [section] 460.30 motion as identical.” Id.
    In rejecting the burden-shifting regime and evidentiary requirements in
Matter of J. M. Acosta, the Second Circuit explained that requiring a
respondent to show that the appeal challenges the conviction on the merits at
the initial stage of filing a motion under section 460.30 of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law created “significant practical problems” that made
it “frequently impossible” for a respondent to comply. Id. at 554.
Specifically, the court observed that once a New York court accepts a motion
to file a late notice of appeal, an indigent criminal defendant will be provided
appellate counsel, who will be afforded time to review and analyze the trial
record. Id. Both the appointment of counsel and the production of the
criminal court record “can take considerable time.” Id. 1

                                  III. ANALYSIS
    Pursuant to the Board’s interpretation of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), as affirmed by the Second Circuit, a
conviction does not support removability until it is final, meaning that the
right to direct appellate review has been waived or exhausted. See
Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 552–53 (affirming the Board’s conclusion in Matter
of J. M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. at 431, that in enacting section 101(a)(48)(A),
Congress intended to incorporate the finality rule of Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N
Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (BIA 1988)). Determining whether direct appellate review
has been waived or exhausted requires analysis under the criminal procedure
laws of the convicting State.
    Despite reversing the rule in Matter of J. M. Acosta, the Second Circuit
did not reach whether other limits on finality relating to a request for a
late-filed appeal under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal Procedure
Law might be imposed. See Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 553–54. DHS therefore

1
   The court emphasized that these delays are inherent to New York criminal process,
because “the criminal appeals process in New York proceeds at a different pace than federal
removal proceedings.” Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 554. Unlike New York, the late-filed appeal
procedures in other States generally have shorter deadlines and may be classified as
discretionary in nature. See Matter of J. M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. at 432 n.12. A significant
number of jurisdictions provide for an automatic waiver of the direct appeal upon failing
to meet the filing deadline. Id.

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proposes that we adopt a rule requiring a respondent either show that the
accepted, direct appeal is merits-based upon completion of adjudication or
have demonstrated diligence in filing and pursuing it. The respondent asserts
that the proposed rule would engender many of the same problems stemming
from the “realities of appellate practice” in New York that the Second Circuit
identified when invalidating the rule in Matter of J. M. Acosta. Id. at 554.
    We recognize DHS’ concerns about delays in the New York criminal
process and differing outcomes nationally depending on the criminal
procedure statutes in different States. However, DHS’ proposal is at odds
with the court’s explanation of New York’s appellate process set forth in
Brathwaite. The Second Circuit clearly stated that a motion to file a late
notice of appeal under section 460.30, once accepted by the New York court,
is deemed the equivalent of a timely-filed direct appeal. Id. We find no
authority supporting a qualification on the characteristics of a direct appeal
as of right.
    Further, a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal “must be made
with due diligence after the time for the taking of such appeal has expired.”
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.30(1) (McKinney 2019). A New York court
that has granted such a motion has therefore necessarily concluded that the
defendant proceeded with due diligence, even if the motion was filed the
maximum 1 year and 30 days after the conviction. We cannot substitute our
judgment in that regard.
    In removal proceedings, DHS has the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that a respondent who has been admitted to the United
States is deportable. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2018);
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (2023); accord Matter of Thomas and Thompson,
27 I&N Dec. 674, 690 (A.G. 2019). Multiple grounds of removability under
section 237 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227, require DHS to show that a
respondent has been convicted of a criminal offense. The definition of
“conviction” under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(48)(A), requires that the respondent’s conviction be final, meaning
that the right to direct appellate review has been waived or exhausted.
Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 553; Matter of J. M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. at 431–32.
Thus, because an appeal accepted under section 460.30 of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law is classified as a direct appeal, a respondent with a
pending appeal under this section does not have a final conviction for
immigration purposes.
    Our analysis applies only to section 460.30 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law based on its classification as a direct appeal of right under
controlling precedent. This appeal is distinct from discretionary appeals
beyond the first appeal of right in New York. See generally N.Y. Crim. Proc.
Law §§ 450.90, 460.10(5), 460.20 (McKinney 2023) (discussing the

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availability and procedure for appeals by permission to the New York Court
of Appeals). Our holding also does not extend to other States’ criminal
procedure laws. For example, in Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894, 895,
897 (BIA 1994), we considered whether Polanco’s conviction was final for
immigration purposes where he sought permission to file a late appeal
pursuant to a discretionary process through which a New Jersey appellate
court may accept an appeal nunc pro tunc after the expiration of the statutory
period for filing a direct appeal as of right.
    Matter of Polanco held that a respondent who has either waived or
exhausted the right to a direct appeal of conviction is subject to removal, and
the potential for discretionary review “will not prevent the conviction from
being considered final for immigration purposes . . . [because] it would be
unreasonable to delay the proceedings on the basis of the availability of
post-conviction review that is not limited by any time constraints.” Id. at
896. Our holding that a conviction lacks finality for immigration purposes
during the pendency of an appeal accepted under section 460.30 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law is distinguishable from the scenario analyzed
in Matter of Polanco in which finality was not disturbed after the initial direct
appeal period had expired.
    A direct appeal as of right under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law is likewise distinct from deferred adjudications or
post-conviction relief, including vacaturs and expungements. Cf. Matter of
Dingus, 28 I&N Dec. 529, 534–36 (BIA 2022) (following Matter of
Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), and holding that post-conviction
vacaturs are valid for immigration purposes if based on a substantive or
procedural defect in the underlying proceedings); Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N
Dec. 512, 521–23 (BIA 1999) (addressing post-conviction measures for
rehabilitative purposes). A motion for post-conviction relief challenges a
conviction that is already final. See, e.g., St. John v. Garland, 82 F.4th 42,
47 (1st Cir. 2023) (affirming the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen an
order of removal based on final criminal convictions where the convictions
were undergoing post-conviction attacks in State courts). A conviction thus
remains final for immigration purposes throughout any post-conviction
challenges. Id.
    This decision does not preclude the removal of respondents whose
appeals of criminal convictions remain pending but who are removable on
alternative grounds, such as overstaying an immigrant visa. Immigration
Judges may also consider evidence regarding convictions that remain on
appeal in determining eligibility for discretionary relief from removal. See
Matter of Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20, 23–24 (BIA 1995) (holding that evidence
of unfavorable conduct that has not culminated in a final conviction under

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the INA may be considered in determining whether an applicant merits
discretionary relief).

                                 III. CONCLUSION

    The respondent timely exercised his right to file a motion for leave to file
a late notice of appeal under section 460.30 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law. The motion was accepted by the New York appellate court.
Once the court granted his motion, he stood in the same position as a New
York defendant who filed a direct appeal within 30 days of a criminal
judgment. See Brathwaite, 3 F.4th at 554. Therefore, the respondent’s
criminal convictions are not final. We will grant the respondent’s motion to
terminate these removal proceedings without prejudice. 2 Should DHS obtain
evidence that the respondent’s convictions have become final, it may initiate
removal proceedings against him with charges based on those convictions. 3
    ORDER: The motion to terminate is granted and removal proceedings
are terminated without prejudice.

2
    We emphasize that a respondent who missed the initial appeal deadline and has not yet
filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal under section 460.30 remains subject
to a final conviction. Similarly, if the motion has been filed but not accepted, the
respondent’s conviction is final at that stage for purposes of removal proceedings.
3
    DHS asserts that it may be unable to obtain information about pending appeals due to
privacy protections or prohibitions on disclosures, as it is not a party to a respondent’s
criminal proceedings. However, once adjudication of the appeal is completed, the
information is available to DHS. See, e.g., Matter of F-R-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 460, 466 n.5
(BIA 2022) (recognizing that DHS provided evidence that the respondent’s criminal appeal
had been dismissed).

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