Court Opinion

ID: 9712555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:56:12.604876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.998878
License: Public Domain

Thornton, J.
I respectfully dissent.
I. In view of the prior treatment given section 70.6, Code of Iowa, 1958, and chapter 70, Code of Iowa, 1958, by this court. I feel if a change is to be made it is a legislative function.
Chapter 70, Soldiers Preference Law, confers special rights or privileges of employment on wartime veterans in governmental employment, section 70.1, and provides security of tenure except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing, upon due notice, upon stated charges, and with a right of review by certiorari. Section 70.6.
Thus a predetermined class is created with special privileges not enjoyed by others in the same work. Though this *1346legislation is special in nature it meets the test of being general because it relates to- the class. In Crawford, v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 739, 76 N.W.2d 187, 189, we apparently approved the distinction in 82 C. J. S., Statutes, section 163, page 277, as follows:
“ ‘A statute which relates to ■ persons or things, as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special.’ ” ■ .
This chapter permits or provides two ways of discharging employees in the governmental 'departments and political subdivisions to which it is applicable. One by hearing for wartime veterans and airy method chosen by the employer or head of the particular department for others.
Chapter 365, Code of Iowa, 1958, confers special rights or privileges upon all persons who qualify, sections 365.7,- .8, .9-, .10, .16, .17, for employment in cities as provided in section 365.6. In the positions to which it applies the employee is required to be qualified as provided. Sections 365.6, .7, .8, .9, .11. The tenure of the persons so-employed is made secure by seniority rights, sections 365.12 and 365.28, 'and they may only be removed, demoted, suspended or discharged as provided in sections 365.18 and .19. The purpose of -the legislation is to obtain competent qualified' people in the appointive positions ■designated in cities and to insure their tenure. A class of persons holding civil service rights is thus created. Sections 365.18 •and .19 meet -the test of being a general law, they relate to all members of the class created. But it gives special privileges to that class.
If there is an irreconcilable conflict between the removal statutes, section 70.6, Soldiers Preference, and sections 365.18 and .19, Civil Service, it is because, of the natural overlapping of the two classes. A -number of wartime veterans do- qualify and are -appointed under civil service, as the plaintiff here. Such veterans are preferred in appointment by section- 365,10. The question is, do they lose the privilege granted under -section 70.6 and come solely under section 365.18 et seq. 1 If the answer is negative, we have again two systems of removal and discharge. Section 365119, the later enacted statute, provides the person *1347having the appointing* power 'and the police and fire chiefs may peremptorily “* * * discharge any subordinate.”’ Reports are provided, the reportee may affirm or revoke. Appeal is provided and the civil service commission is set. up as a special tribunal to hear and determine it. Section 365.20 at seq. The term “any subordinate” includes the entire class including plaintiff unless he is protected by section 70.6.
In the past we have indicated there was no conflict between chapter 70 and chapter 365. In Geyer v. Triplett, 237 Iowa 664, 668, 22 N.W.2d 329, 332, after referring to Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 18 N.W.2d 599, with approval, we said:
“We think the above holdings are correct. We see no conflict between the Civil Service Law and the Soldiers Preference Law. We think the two acts are to he construed together with the purpose of giving each proper application and construction.
“The Civil Service Law, including section 5697, Code of 1939 [now section 365.10, Code of Iowa, 1958], neither modifies nor repeals any of the provisions of the Soldiers Preference Act. Jones v. City of Des Moines, 225 Iowa 1342, 283 N.W. 924.”
In the Geyer case sections 365.18 and .19 were not in issue. In the Ervin case, however, a demotion was. involved and though sections 365.18 and .19 were not separately referred to, it was held section 1163, Code of Iowa, 1939 (now section 70.6, Code of Iowa, 1958), should be given effect.
It might be noted in passing where in the Ervin case general and special statutes are referred to, section 5697, Code of Iowa, 1939 (now section 365.10, Code of Iowa, 1958), dealing with soldiers preference in civil service, is referred to as special and chapter 60, Code of Iowa, 1939 (now chapter 70, Code of Iowa, 1958), is referred to as general.
In the Jones ease -this court stated' it was a case of ouster and held what is now section 70.6 was applicable and not modified or repealed, citing Hahn v. Clayton County, 218 Iowa 543, 255 N.W. 695.
In the Hahn case, wherein under the then provisions Of section 4644-cl9, Code of Iowa, 1931 (now section 309.17, Code of 1958), the board of supervisors was given the power to- employ a -county engineer, the concluding sentence of th'e section *1348was, “The board shall fix their term of employment which shall not exceed three years, bnt the tenure of office may be terminated ait any time by the board.”, this court held what is now section 70.6, Code of Iowa, 1958, controlling and that the board could not discharge the engineer except pursuant to that section. Section 4644-cl9, Code of Iowa, 1931, was a later enacted statute and no reason appeal’s why it does not give power to discharge at least equal to that contained in sections 365.18 and .19, Code of Iowa, 1958.
The majority now changes position, and after the legislature has acquiesced in our former interpretation for 27 years says the legislature meant the opposite. It is preferable for changes of this type to be made by the legislature.
II. In Division II the majority holds a civil service appointee is not entitled to the protection or benefit of section 70.6, Code of Iowa, 1958, because he comes within the exceptions of section 70.8, Code of Iowa, 1958. If the first division of the majority opinion is sound the second division is entirely unnecessary to the decision.
Section 70.8 provides:
“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply to the position of private secretary or deputy of any official or department, or to any person holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer.”
The first two excepted positions are ones where there is a close relationship between the superior and subordinate in the matter of performance of duties. When the third is found in series with these a similar relationship undoubtedly was intended.
In the cases cited by the appellant and reaffirmed by the majority the appointing officer exercised unlimited freedom of choice in selecting the subordinate. In this case the appointing officer was limited to the names on the certified list. Here actually only one, but the list could contain up to ten. Certainly at that point there could be no confidence or trust placed in the subordinate by the superior. That the duties of an assistant chief of police as outlined in the ordinances are those of trust and confidence and require skill and judgment no one would *1349deny. But the trust and confidence are owed to the public, not the appointing officer. In Allen v. Wegman, 218 Iowa 801, 810, 254 N.W. 74, 79, and Brown v. State Printing Board, 230 Iowa 22, 24, 296 N.W. 719, 720 (I agree with the result reached in each), a definition of “confidential relation” was taken from Scott v. Brown, 90 Ind. App. 367, 378, 157 N.E. 64, 68, as follows:
“The term ‘confidential relation’ is a very broad one and is not at all confined to any specific association of the parties, but applies generally to all persons who are associated by any relation of trust and confidence.”
The next sentence at page 378 of 90 Ind. App., page 68 of 157 N.E. is, “It arises when a continuous trust is reposed by one pel's on in the skill or integrity of another.” See also 15 C. J. S., Confidential, page 822.
In this ease by the majority and in the. reaffirmed cases the word “strictly” has been overlooked and so have the words “to the appointing officer.”
In 12 C. J., Confidential Relation, page 421, note 67(b), the following is quoted:
“ ‘A “strictly confidential relation” means much more than the imposition of important duties, requiring the- exercise of intelligence or trained ability or integrity. It necessarily implies personal contact between the officer and his superior, where the officer occupying the position holds towards his superior a position of confidence -and trust; where the person occupying the position has the power, or in consequence of the relation that exists between himself and his superior, to impose upon the superior liabilities and obligations which the superior is bound by law to discharge. It must be shown that the officer holding the position- has the power of so performing his duties, in consequence of his relations to his superior and the business that the superior is bound to prosecute, or by a betrayal of the information acquired in consequence of the personal relations necessary because of the office which he holds, as to impose liability or obligations upon the superior which the superior will be compelled to meet.’ Peo. [ex rel. Flood] v. Gardiner, 33 App. Div. 204, 207, 53 NYS 451.”
*1350If that definition is applied here it is in harmony with the first two exceptions and gives meaning to all the words used in the third exception.
In Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 18 N.W.2d 599, this court held the record did not disclose any work that was confidential to the commissioner within the provisions of section 70.8. From this the majority opinion states the case is authority for the proposition that a detective does not occupy a position of trust and confidence. However, a' detective is higher classification than a patrolman and we find from the trial court’s opinion under section 39.5 of the Municipal Code the city manager can in the event of the absence or disability of the police chief designate any member of the department as1 chief.
Reliance is placed on the duties delegated by the city Code. These duties are a public trust and confidence, not to the appointing officer. An examination of the duties outlined in the majority opinion shows the- area of operation of an assistant chief placed on him by the Municipal Code, not by the city manager, and it also' discloses the assistant chief does not perform any duties of or for the manager. Certainly the manager is charged with running the city, but not with the duties of an 'assistant chief. Some importance is attached to the fact the assistant chief may act 'as chief in his absence or upon his disability. What the ordinance provides is., “A designated officer of this class may direct all activities of the department in the absence or disability of the police chief.” This is far from automatic, it is at the will of the manager. And as above noted any member of the department may be so designated, even a detective.- Apparently the cutoff for position of trust and confidence for the purposes of section 70.8 is somewhere between detective and assistant chief of police. The effect of the majority holding is.to except from Soldiers Preference any public office in which trust and confidence is owed to the public. This is other than a liberal interpretation and repeals chapter 70 for practical purposes.
The- other contentions • of the appellants are likewise without merit; ■ I would affirm.