Court Opinion

ID: 9549788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:24:43.947051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:54.870769
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. I believe we should affirm the trial court because Kimberly Kay Coss has not raised a privacy issue under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, and has neither automatic standing, nor standing based upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. Further, because she does not have standing, we need not address the impoundment issue, but because the majority has a different view, I also disagree with their analysis and conclusion that the impoundment was improper. I would affirm.

ADDITIONAL FACTS

At the suppression hearing Ms. Coss did not respond to *901the State’s briefing and argument asserting she lacked standing to object to the evidence seized from Mary Laposa’s car, as well as controlled substances discovered on her person at the scene and during the booking process. The trial court declined to decide the automatic standing issue, but did find Ms. Coss lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy as a passenger.
I do not know what the trial court meant by saying the issue was inadequately briefed and was not pivotal to its decision. I assume these remarks refer to the court’s decision to find the impoundment proper under former RCW 46.20.435(1), and therefore, the standing issue made no difference to the outcome.

ISSUES

Automatic standing is the threshold issue in this case. The State adequately briefed and gave notice of this issue both at the trial and appellate levels.
The other issues presented are: (1) whether Ms. Coss has standing based upon a legitimate expectation of privacy as a passenger in Ms. Laposa’s car; and (2) whether the trial court erred in approving the inventory incidental to the impoundment.

ANALYSIS

Automatic standing. The automatic standing rule developed as an exception to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights. State v. Goucher, 124 Wn.2d 778, 787, 881 P.2d 210 (1994). For example, Ms. Laposa had personal rights under the general rule because her car was impounded and she could claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, but Ms. Coss, a passenger, could not. Automatic standing evolved to protect persons such as Ms. Coss from the horns of the constitutional dilemma of having to choose between preserving her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or invoking her Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Carter, 74 Wn. App. 320, 326, 875 P.2d 1 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 836, 904 *902P.2d 290 (1995). Another view is that the rule "was intended to prevent the government from arguing at a suppression hearing that a defendant did not possess the substance and thus had no Fourth Amendment protected interests, and then contrarily asserting at trial that the defendant was guilty of possessing the substance.” Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 843.
The automatic standing exception requires that: (1) possession be an essential element of the charged offense, and (2) the accused be in possession of the item seized or the place it was found. Goucher, 124 Wn.2d at 787. The instant case presents both elements of the automatic standing exception, as possession is an essential element of the offense charged, and the accused admitted possession of the contraband after its discovery following the inventory and its seizure. This situation differs from the problem described in Goucher, 124 Wn.2d at 788 n.1, and favors resolution of the automatic standing issue now.
The State asks us to reconsider State v. Gonzalez, 77 Wn. App. 479, 891 P.2d 743 (1995), review denied, 128 Wn.2d 1008 (1996), discard the automatic standing rule, follow Divisions One and Two of this court,4 and also align ourselves with the current federal approach. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980). In Gonzalez, this division adhered to automatic standing based, in part, on the plurality in State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980), and also to be consistent with our decision in State v. Belieu, 50 Wn. App. 834, 838, 751 P.2d 321 (1988), rev’d on other grounds, 112 Wn.2d 587, 773 P.2d 46 (1989).
Although Division One and Division Two have abandoned automatic standing, the Washington Supreme Court has not yet by a majority decided the continued vitality of the automatic standing rule. Goucher, 124 Wn.2d at 788 n.1. The majority infers that Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 850-51, *903supports the proposition that the automatic standing rule is resolved and good law in this State. I do not agree.
In Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 836, the Supreme Court determined Ms. Carter had no legitimate expectation of privacy and that exigent circumstances provided exceptional reasons justifying the search, no matter whether she had automatic standing. The court carefully avoided resolving the automatic standing issue, even though at one point appearing to conclude that Ms. Carter did have automatic standing to object, because the court recognized that under the facts this was a distinction without a difference because exigent circumstances required affirmance. The court flatly said: "[T]his is not the case for resolving the (automatic standing) question.” Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 849.
The Carter Supreme Court majority, instead, thoroughly rejected Ms. Carter’s argument that abrogating the automatic standing rule would prevent defendants from asserting their privacy interest because of the possibility that statements made at the suppression hearing would late be used to incriminate them through impeachment. Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 846. The Supreme Court also unequivocally rejected the notion that the automatic standing rule was necessary to deter illegal police behavior by concluding: "The trial court can determine whether a due process violation exists on a case-by-case basis in motions to suppress evidence under CrR 3.6.” Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 847 (citations omitted). Indeed, in Carter the Supreme Court rejected each of Ms. Carter’s contentions in its critical analysis of automatic standing at page 846 and at page 849 was merely "assuming” she had standing in order to emphasize that standing made no difference because exigent circumstances justified the search of the motel room without a warrant.
As this court observed in Gonzalez, "[plurality opinions have only limited precedential weight and we are not bound by Simpson." 77 Wn. App. at 486 (citing Zueger v. Public Hosp. Dist. 2, 57 Wn. App. 584, 591, 789 P.2d 326 (1990)). The narrowest construction of a plurality holding *904should be given. Where there are dissimilar or peculiar facts, the principles of stare decisis do not require a broad application of a plurality rule.
Our desire in Gonzalez for consistency with our decision in Belieu, in view of the limited precedential value of Simpson, is outweighed by the logic that automatic standing is no longer necessary to protect a defendants’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that the Washington constitution provides no broader protection than the federal constitution. State v. Carter, 74 Wn. App. at 328-29. Furthermore, there is a need for consistent and uniform treatment of automatic standing issues in our courts. It is proper to reverse existing case law when it is incorrect or harmful. State v. Ray, 130 Wn.2d 673, 679, 926 P.2d 904 (1996). We should now reject automatic standing as articulated in Belieu and Gonzalez. Accordingly, Ms. Coss should not be accorded automatic standing. The doctrine should now be abandoned in favor of a legitimate expectation of privacy test.
A defendant does not have to risk self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment or article I, section 9 of the Washington State Constitution by the substantive use of his or her statements made at pretrial CrR 3.5 and CrR 3.6 hearings. A defendant does not, however, have the unlimited right to lie under oath at a trial and avoid the use of suppressed evidence or statements made during pretrial hearings for impeachment purposes under the provisions of either the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Carter, 127 Wn.2d at 846; State v. Greve, 67 Wn. App. 166, 171-75, 834 P.2d 656 (1992), review denied, 121 Wn.2d 1005 (1993). The trial courts have the means to safeguard against any abuse of these principles by properly drafted limiting instructions. State v. Lavaris, 106 Wn.2d 340, 343-44, 721 P.2d 515 (1986). Abandoning automatic standing does not mean a defendant is foreclosed, however, from having any standing to raise Fourth Amendment suppression issues. There still may be a legitimate expectation of privacy.
*905Standing based upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. If the automatic standing exception is eliminated, Ms. Coss can still challenge the search of Ms. Laposa’s vehicle under the Fourth Amendment if she has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place where the evidence was seized, i.e., the vehicle. State v. Boot, 81 Wn. App. 546, 550, 915 P.2d 592 (1996). An accused must establish more than a legitimate presence. Under the Fourth Amendment, there must be both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy to be reasonable. Carter, 74 Wn. App. at 329-30. Ms. Coss has not established such an interest in the car driven by Ms. Laposa, and, therefore, does not have standing to challenge the search. The trial court’s decision that Ms. Coss lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle was proper and should be affirmed.5
Because the majority concludes that Ms. Coss has standing, I will also assume standing to make clear that when there are independent state grounds for exception to state constitutional requirements that are coextensive with Fourth Amendment requirements or even provide greater protection under our constitution, the results would be the same.
Impoundment and inventory. When confronted with a warrantless search, we must first analyze an alleged violation under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, then under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 69-71, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.6 Id. An inventory pursuant to a lawful impoundment is a recognized exception to the general rule requiring a warrant. Id.
*906The trial court concluded Officer Griffen properly exercised his discretion under former RCW 46.20.435(1) to impound and inventory Ms. Laposa’s car. Inherent in this conclusion is the determination that the stop and inventory were without pretext. I agree. The statute provided: "Upon determining that a person is operating a motor vehicle. . . with a suspended or revoked license in violation of RCW 46.20.342 or 46.20.420, a law enforcement officer may immediately impound the vehicle that the person is operating.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court had the benefit of observing the fact-witnesses on the need to impound the vehicle pursuant to former RCW 46.20.435(1). It resolved factual differences and determined witness credibility. This question is one of mixed law and fact. We are not in a position to reject the findings of the trial court that turning the car over to someone else when the defendant remained with the vehicle was the same as returning the car to Ms. Laposa once the officers were out of the way. See finding of fact IV. I would not disturb the trial court’s findings on this fact issue when reviewing the reasonableness of the officer’s decision to impound. State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App 113, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985).
Even if Ms. Coss had viable automatic standing or a legitimate expectation of privacy under the federal or state constitutions, or a claim of disturbance of her private affairs under article I, section 7, of the Washington State Constitution, there is an independent state ground to support the trial court’s decision. Police under these circumstances have lawful discretion to conduct an inventory pursuant to the statutorily permitted impoundment. Former RCW 46.20.435(1). This police discretion was properly reviewed by the trial court. This process and result is consistent with State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); State v. Carter, 74 Wn. App. 320, 875 P.2d 1 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 836, 904 P.2d 290 (1995); and Reynoso, 41 Wn. App 113.

CONCLUSION

With due respect to the majority, the doctrine of *907automatic standing has limited precedential value in light of the plurality decision in Simpson. The doctrine has been criticized or abandoned by most of the courts which have examined the doctrine since its abandonment by the federal system which first gave it life. When a doctrine of law is incorrect or is no longer supported by the reasons which gave it life in the first place, or the doctrine promotes a harmful result, it should be discarded. Ray, 130 Wn.2d at 679. Thus, it is time for us to overrule Gonzalez and Belieu. It is time to confront and settle this court-created legal fiction of automatic standing. The issue of automatic standing is ready to be resolved as the problem noted in Goucher is satisfied by the facts of this case.
In my view, Ms. Coss has neither automatic standing, nor standing based upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. Additionally, the trial court correctly, but unnecessarily, held the inventory following impoundment was a proper exercise of police discretion under the independent state grounds of former RCW 46.20.435(1). However, the trial court and the majority should have held Ms. Coss did not have standing in the first place. I would affirm.
Review denied at 134 Wn.2d 1028 (1998).

State v. Carter, 74 Wn. App. 320, 329, 875 P.2d 1 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 836, 904 P.2d 290 (1995); State v. Zakel, 61 Wn. App. 805, 812 P.2d 512 (1991), aff’d, 119 Wn.2d 563, 834 P.2d 1046 (1992).

Even Ms. Laposa has less expectation of privacy in her automobile than in her home or office. State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). Inferentially, Ms. Coss has less legitimate expectation of privacy in the car than Ms. Laposa, as Ms. Coss has established no personal right in the car.

Disturbing a person’s private affairs without authority of law is contrary to article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The State constitution is at least coextensive with the federal constitution, so any warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment also implicates article I, section 7 of our Constitution.