Court Opinion

ID: 9494502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:38:56.690352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:26.420551
License: Public Domain

ROSENBAUM, District Judge,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, but write separately to express my view that the law we are bound to apply is ill-considered in the context of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. I urge its reconsideration.
We hold, as we must, .that sovereign immunity bars monetary relief in this case. But our holding does nothing to deter the government’s flagrant violation of Rule 41 and nothing to constrain its bald abuse of power. Justice Stevens predicted this when dissenting from one of the decisions *944compelling our ruling. He wrote, “The injustice that the Court condones today demonstrates that it is time to reexamine the wisdom of the judge-made rules that drive its decision.” United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 39, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The facts of this case exemplify the injustice Justice Stevens foretold. The government seized Mr. Hall’s property under color of Rule 41, but thereafter disposed of it in derogation of its concomitant duty to return private property not needed for evidence. See United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). In doing so, the government carelessly deprived one of its citizens of his property. It did so after availing itself of the very Federal Rule it would later disregard. Unfortunately for Mr. Hall, however, the authors of Rule 41 did not anticipate that the government would flagrantly disregard the Rule’s mandate.
In the absence of any effective penalty for non-compliance with the dictates of Rule 41, the government more than once has disposed of private property to which its citizens held lawful title. As a result, several Circuit Courts of Appeals have invoked their inherent equitable powers and ordered the government to pay damages after it has lost, destroyed, or transferred seized private property. See Soviero v. United States, 967 F.2d 791, 792-93 (2d. Cir.1992); Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 161 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir.1987). In Martinson, the Ninth Circuit observed, “When a citizen has invoked the jurisdiction of a court by moving for return of his property, we do not think that the government should be able to destroy jurisdiction by its own conduct. The government should not at one stroke be able to deprive the citizen of a remedy and render powerless the court that could grant the remedy.” Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1368. With today’s holding, we allow the government to do precisely that.
The Supreme Court’s recent sovereign immunity precedents constrain us to deny recompense after the government has disregarded a Federal Rule, approved of by both the Supreme Court and Congress. See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (“Waivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be unequivocally expressed.” (internal quotations omitted)); Id. at 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (“[T]he Government’s consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.” (internal quotations omitted)); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (“A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text ... and will not be implied.”).
In the past three years, three of our sister Circuit Courts of Appeals have been obliged to rule the same way. See United States v. Jones, 225 F.3d 468, 470 n. 3 (4th Cir.2000) (“We are mindful of the concern expressed by the Ninth Circuit [in Martinson] that the government should not be able to defeat jurisdiction by the unilateral, act of destroying the property sought in a Rule 41(e) motion.... We are bound, however, to honor the government’s sovereign immunity from damages in a Rule 41(e) action.”); United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 413-15 (3d Cir.2000) (“While we respect this policy argument [of the Ninth Circuit in Martinson ], ... application of sovereign immunity, by its very nature, will leave a person wronged by Government conduct without recourse.”); Pena v. United States, 157 F.3d 984, 986 (5th Cir.1998) (“However compelling his case, Pena may not maintain a suit against the United States for monetary damages under Rule 41(e).”).
*945The reasoning supporting our holding today seems suspect, and the Executive Branch’s claim of sovereign immunity seems hollow. Consider: the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not simply spring forth like Athena from the forehead of Zeus. The Executive Branch— through the Department of Justice — has substantial input into the Rules drafting process. Proposed Rules are offered to the Supreme Court, which approves the proffered Rules and forwards them to Congress. Congress is, thereafter, afforded the statutory authority to accept, amend, or reject the proposed Rules. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74. Through this process Congress allowed Rule 41 to go into effect.
The Executive Branch is aware of the nature of sovereign immunity; the Judicial and Legislative Branches know it, too. Each assented to Rule 41’s dictate requiring the government to return seized property to which it has no claim. The instruction is explicit Under these circumstances, when all three Branches of our government assent to a Rule, it hardly seems an implicit waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity when the government must be forced to answer for its citizen’s losses after it flaunts the Rule.
Every legitimate assertion of sovereign immunity, by its nature, leaves a person wronged by government conduct without recourse. See Bein, 214 F.3d at 413. But when all Branches of government have had a hand in imposing an affirmative duty upon the government, a court-contrived version of sovereign immunity needlessly exacerbates this harsh rule. Cf. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 45-46, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s stubborn insistence on ‘clear statements’ burdens the Congress with unnecessary reenactment of provisions that were already plain enough when read literally. The cost to litigants, to the legislature, and to the public at large of this sort of judicial lawmaking is substantial and unfortunate. Its impact on individual citizens engaged in litigation against the sovereign is tragic.” (footnote omitted)).
Our opinion correctly notes that both the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act authorize money damages. Similarly, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that sovereign immunity bars monetary relief under Rule 41, it granted the property owner leave to amend his pleadings to include a Bivens claim against the federal agents directly to seek redress for his loss. See Pena, 157 F.3d at 987. The possibility of alternative relief to some extent ameliorates this case’s bitter outcome. But we sully, rather than protect, the nation’s sovereignty when we erect a constitutional shield guarding the government from its own wrongdoing.
So, as we must, we reverse the District Court. But this Judge respectfully suggests it is well past time to reconsider the law requiring us to do so.