Court Opinion

ID: 9645699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:33:09.893381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.603165
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
At issue in the instant case is the statutory interpretation of Tex.Code Crim. Proe. Ann. art. 12.05(a), which provides:
The time during which the accused is absent from the state shall not be computed in the period of limitation.1
I.
In Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we stated the “lawmaking” function is assigned to the Legislature and the “law interpreting” function is assigned to the judiciary. Tex. Const, art. II, § 1. In discharging this assignment, the judiciary “seek[s] to effectuate the ‘collective’ intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation.” Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. See also, Camacho v. State, 765 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). To determine legislative intent, we focus first on the literal text of the statute because this is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators intended when the statute was enacted into law. Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. If the statute is clear, the inquiry is over. However, if the statute is not clear, Hines v. State, 906 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex.Cr.App.1995), but rather is ambiguous, susceptible to multiple interpretations, Murdock v. State, 870 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), and Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), or would lead to an absurd result, Basden v. State, 897 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex.Cr.App.1995), then and only then should courts consider “extratextual factors” to determine legislative intent. These factors may include executive or administrative interpretations of a statute, Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 786, consequences of construction, State v. Mancuso, 919 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), practice commentaries, Hines, 906 S.W.2d at 521, legislative history, Basden, 897 S.W.2d at 322, and Murdock, 870 S.W.2d at 41, the rules of statutory interpretation, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311 et seq., and/or legislative floor debate, Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). If a statute is subject to two interpretations, one reasonable and the other unreasonable, we prefer the former interpretation. Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 244. *139Finally, when the Legislature meets, after a particular statute has been judicially construed, without changing the statute, we presume the Legislature intended the same construction should continue to be applied to the statute. Marin v. State, 891 S.W.2d 267, 271-272 (Tex.Cr.App.1994); Moore v. State, 868 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Watson v. State, 532 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); and State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1996)(Baird, J., concurring).
II.
A majority of the Court of Appeals interpreted art. 12.05(a) to require proof that the defendant was “formally accused” of committing a crime at the time she left the State. Ex parte Matthews, 892 S.W.2d 208, 210-211 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995). The dissent, however, would have interpreted “accused” to mean the person now accused. Id., 892 S.W.2d at 212 (Oliver-Parrott, C.J., dissenting). Thus, this case presents a classic example of a statute’s use of a term which is not plain but is susceptible to multiple interpretations. In these situations the judiciary is required to consider extratextual factors to determine the legislative intent when the statute was enacted. See I., supra.
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311 et seq., commonly referred to as the Code Construction Act, is intended to aid in statutory interpretation. Id. §§ 311.002 and 311.003. The Act instructs:
(a) Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
(b) Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.
Id. § 311.011. Therefore, under the Act the Court of Appeals was asked to consider the common usage of accused and determine if that term has acquired a technical or particular meaning.
To determine its common usage, the Court of Appeals considered the definitions of “accused” provided by Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary,2 The English Oxford Dictionary,3 and the Black’s Law Dictionary.4 Matthews, 892 S.W.2d at 210-211. The Court of Appeals next considered whether “accused” had acquired a “technical or particular meaning.”5 In Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), we adopted the definition of accused employed by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986):
[Ajfter a formal accusation has been made ... a person who had previously been just a “suspect” has become an “accused” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment....
Holloway, 780 S.W.2d at 793. See also, McCambridge v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); and, Nichols v. State, 754 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned that under either the “common” or “technical” definition, no person is “accused” unless and until there is a formal accusation of criminal wrongdoing. Applying the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, this definition, art. 12.05(a) reads as follows: “The time during which the *140[person who has been formally charged with a crime ] is absent from the state shall not be computed in the period of limitation.”
III.
The following graphic illustrates a “time line” of a hypothetical criminal prosecution:
[[Image here]]
As noted above, the statute of limitations is automatically tolled when a person is “formally” charged by an indictment, information or a complaint is filed. Art. 12.05(b)6. Therefore, if we held, as the Court of Appeals did, that a person does not become an “accused” until an indictment, information, or complaint is filed, art. 12.05(a) would be meaningless. I agree with the majority that the Legislature could not have intended such a construction. Childress v. State, 784 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); and, Sattiewhite v. State, 786 S.W.2d 271, 289-290 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Therefore, the Legislature could not have intended the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals. However, we still must determine when one becomes an “accused” under art. 12.05(a).
The majority correctly rejects the State’s contention that “accused” simply refers to one who is later charged with a criminal offense. Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 137. Under such a construction, the statute of limitations would be tolled every time a suspect leaves the state. And, if the suspect resided out of state, there would be no statute of limitations.7 As the Court of Appeals noted, the Legislature could not have intended “the State to delay prosecution until it discovered a crime.” Matthews, 892 S.W.2d at 211. Such a construction thwarts the very intent and purposes of a statute of limitations. Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 137 (“[T]hat prosecutorial authorities exercise all due diligence obtaining and presenting a formal accusation of an offense against a person.”).
I would hold that, for the purposes of art. 12.05(a) one becomes an “accused” at the time of arrest. Only at this point does one become aware that he/she is suspected and may be charged with an offense. The underlying purposes of the statute of limitations are protected and both parties have the ability to diligently investigate and prepare their respective cases. Therefore, I would hold that, under art. 12.05(a), the statute of limitations is tolled when one is absent from the state after having been arrested.8
IV.
Appellant allegedly perjured herself on June 12, 1981. On that date she was a resident of Arizona who came to Harris County to testify on behalf of the State. Appellant was not indicted until January of 1991, a date beyond the applicable limitation period. Moreover, appellant was not arrested within the statute of limitations. Therefore, applying the above analysis, the limitation period was not tolled by art. 12.05(a).
With these comments, I join only the judgment of the Court.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary 14 (1976) defines accused as "one charged with an offense, esp: the defendant in a criminal case

. The English Oxford Dictionary, p. 94 (2d ed.1989) defines accused as “[one] charged with a crime or fault.”

. Blacks Law Dictionary 23 (6th ed.1990) defines accused:
The generic name for the defendant in a criminal case. Person becomes "accused” within meaning of guarantee of speedy trial only at point at which either formal indictment or information has been returned against him, or when he becomes subject to actual restraints on his liberty imposed by arrest, which ever first occurs.

Id.

.The Court of Appeals also considered the 1925 Texas Penal Code's definition of accused:
[A]ny person who, in a legal manner, is held to answer for an offense, at any stage of the proceeding, or against whom complaint in a lawful manner is made charging an offense, including all proceedings from the order for arrest to the final execution of the law. The word "defendant” is used in the same sense.

. Tex.Code of Crim. Proc. 12.05(b) provides:
The time during the pendency of an indictment, information, or complaint shall not be computed in the period of limitation.

. Such a construction would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex parte Boetscher, 812 S.W.2d 600, 603-604 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).

.Here I must part company with the majority who would apparently allow the limitation period to be tolled by the mere issuance of an arrest warrant.