Court Opinion

ID: 9894324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 15:03:51.653545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:48.617289
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 484
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION II
                                      No. CV-22-266

 PERRY LINDER, JR., AND KATHY      Opinion Delivered November 1, 2023
 LINDER
                        APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE CLEBURNE
                                   COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                   [NO. 12CV-20-106]
 V.

                                HONORABLE HOLLY MEYER, JUDGE
 MICHAEL STEVEN GERTSCH AND
 LISA GERTSCH                   AFFIRMED
                      APPELLEES

                              RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

       This is a dispute over the title to a 1.63-acre parcel of real property (“Subject

Property”) situated on the Little Red River. Appellee Michael Gertsch has owned lot 1 of

Hidden Valley Estates since 1982. Gum Springs Creek is the dividing line between lot 1 and

the Subject Property. It is part of Hidden Valley Subdivision along the Little Red River in

Cleburne County. Record title to the Subject Property is vested in the Gertsches, but

appellants Kathy and Perry Linder claim ownership by adverse possession or boundary line

by acquiescence. The circuit court rejected the Linders’ claims and quieted title to the

Subject Property in the Gertsches. On appeal, the Linders maintain this court should reverse

the judgment and revised judgment and also reverse the denial of their motion for

reconsideration. We affirm.
       The Subject Property was conveyed by Robuc, Inc., to Fleda and William Shearer and

Etta Jane and J.C. Shearer in 1984 along with all other property within Hidden Valley Estates

Subdivision that had not already been sold to third parties. A year later, in 1985, Etta Jane

and J.C. Shearer relinquished their interest in all such property (including the Subject

Property) to Fleda and William Shearer. Lisa and Michael Gertsch purchased the Subject

Property on October 6, 2018, from the estate of Fleda Shearer. The Linders purchased their

farm adjoining the Subject Property in 1992 and understood that the property acquired

through that transaction did not include the Subject Property.

       Perry Linder testified that when he bought his farm, he received a survey at closing

identifying a triangle consisting of 12.68 acres that was not being conveyed, and the Subject

Property lies at the eastern end of that triangle. Perry believed he later acquired title to the

Subject Property through a quitclaim deed executed in 1999 from Ricky Whisnat. However,

the quitclaim deed was indefinite in that it did not identify what property it purported to

convey. Whisnat was not called to testify at trial, and there is no indication in the public

record that the Linders ever owned any interest in the Subject Property.

       Following the Gertsches’ purchase of the Subject Property in 2018, the Linders

discovered a deer stand that had been installed on it by the Gertsches, and this dispute arose.

The following months were marked with various acts of dominion over the Subject Property

that are not disputed—the Gertsches obtained a survey and installed a fence, the Linders cut

the fence to brush hog the Subject Property, the Linders painted blazes on the trees and

posted no-trespassing signs, and the Gertsches removed them.

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       Ultimately, the Linders filed their complaint seeking to quiet title to the Subject

Property through boundary line by acquiescence and adverse possession, and the Gertsches

counterclaimed. In support of his claims, Perry testified that at one point in time, a barbed-

wire fence existed along the east side of the Subject Property. The characteristics of the fence

and whether it even existed were disputed by the parties.

       A survey from 2000 depicted a fence as “partially down” and “meandering” and only

traversing a small portion of the Subject Property well inside its eastern boundary. Perry

testified that the fence represented the boundary between his property and the Shearers to

the east. In support of his contention, Perry introduced, and the court considered, testimony

that J.C. Shearer “recognized the fence was there and indicated that was the property line.

He had no issue with it, didn’t seem like it bothered him much one way or the other.” Perry

further testified that he had not maintained the fence since the 1970s when his father owned

his farm. Kathy Linder believed that she paid ad valorem taxes on the Subject Property but

did not know.

       Aneatha Hill was the title agent who closed the sale of the Subject Property from the

Shearer Estate to the Gertsches. Hill researched the status of title to the Subject Property in

connection with the issuance of a title insurance policy to the Gertsches. Nothing in the

public record indicated any interest of the Linders to the Subject Property. Hill determined

that the ad valorem taxes assessed against the Subject Property had been paid by the Shearers

and the Shearer Estate—not the Linders. There was no hint of any dispute between the parties

prior to the Gertsches’ purchase of the Subject Property. However, the contentions of the

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parties with respect to possession and occupancy of the Subject Property over the past several

decades are in stark contrast.

       Perry testified that he acquired a brush hog and kept the Subject Property clear of

brush beginning in 2015. Michael Gertsch testified that in forty years, he had never seen any

sign of maintenance or development on the Subject Property. Michael had never seen

anyone brush hog the Subject Property until after he had purchased and fenced it. He also

testified that he had only seen human activity on the Subject Property twice in forty years.

However, the Linders testified to hunting upon and otherwise using the Subject Property

recreationally, and Perry testified to posting the Subject Property with purple paint.

       The circuit court rejected the Linders’ claims and quieted title to the Subject Property

in the Gertsches. The court found that the Gertsches derived clear record title to the Subject

Property from the estate of Fleda Shearer. With respect to the claim of boundary line by

acquiescence, the circuit court held that the fence remnants were indefinite and uncertain,

that there was no credible evidence regarding the Shearers’ knowledge or opinions of

boundary lines, that the Linders claimed both to the location of the alleged fence and to the

creek itself, and that Fleda Shearer’s request for an easement to the Subject Property in 2015

indicated that she believed she still owned the Subject Property.

       After viewing the Subject Property and considering the evidence, the court found it

to be wild, unimproved, and unenclosed. With respect to the claim for adverse possession,

the court found that the continuous payment of taxes by the Gertsches and the Shearers

before them required that the Gertsches be deemed to be in possession of the Subject

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Property as a result of its wild and unenclosed state. Finally, at trial, the Linders requested

that the court reform the indefinite quitclaim deed from Whisnat to include reference to

the Subject Property. The circuit court held that the lack of any evidence that Whisnat owned

the Subject Property in the first place precluded a finding of mutual mistake and that

reformation would prejudice the Gertsches, who were bona fide purchasers. The Linders

filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied by the circuit court. This timely appeal is

now properly before our court.

       The circuit court’s judgment rejecting the claims of adverse possession, boundary line

by acquiescence, and reformation can be reversed only if the decision was clearly erroneous.

Robertson v. Lees, 87 Ark. App. 172, 181, 189 S.W.3d 463, 469 (2004). “A finding is clearly

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

Rigsby v. Rigsby, 356 Ark. 311, 316, 479 S.W.3d 318, 322 (2004).

       The Linders argue that the circuit court erred in its judgment and that they should

have been held to own the Subject Property as a result of boundary line by acquiescence. In

support of their claim, the Linders introduced a statement from J.C. Shearer (deceased)

regarding a fence that was alleged to have stood to the west of Gum Springs Creek. This

court has held that boundary line by acquiescence requires proof of three essential elements—

(1) a tacit agreement between the parties; (2) recognition of the boundary for a long period

of time; and (3) a fixed line that is definite and certain. Thurkill v. Wood, 2010 Ark. App. 319,

374 S.W.3d 790.

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       The primary basis for the circuit court’s rejection of Perry’s contentions regarding the

statement of J.C. Linder came down to credibility. The responsibility to judge the credibility

of witnesses lies solely with the trial court. See Bobo v. Jones, 364 Ark. 564, 567–68, 222

S.W.3d 197, 200 (2006). However, even if the court were to have accepted this testimony

and found it credible, the boundary-line claim fails for a far simpler reason: “Whenever

adjoining landowners tacitly accept a fence line and thus apparently consent to that as their

property line, it becomes the boundary by acquiescence.” Ward v. Adams, 66 Ark. App. 208,

212, 989 S.W.2d 550, 552 (1999). There was no evidence that J.C. Shearer and the Linders,

or their predecessors in interest, were ever neighboring property owners.

       Ultimately, the Linders’ boundary-line-by-acquiescence claim depended on a

statement from a deceased witness. The court did not find this credible. “A boundary line

by acquiescence is inferred from the landowners’ conduct over many years so as to imply the

existence of an agreement about the location of a boundary line.” Ward, 66 Ark. App. at

212, 989 S.W.2d at 552. Absolutely no evidence was introduced by the Linders that would

support the conclusion that the Shearers recognized a forfeiture of their property on the west

side of Gum Springs Creek. Considering the evidence in the record before us, we cannot say

the circuit court’s decision was clearly erroneous.

       The Linders also argue the circuit court erred in rejecting their claim of adverse

possession. We disagree and hold that the circuit court correctly held that the Linders failed

to meet their burden to prove ownership of the Subject Property by adverse possession.

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       In order to prevail on their claim for adverse possession, the Linders were required

to demonstrate actual possession for seven years. Thompson v. Fischer, 364 Ark. 380, 384, 220

S.W.3d 622, 625. “In addition, the possession must have been actual, open, notorious,

continuous, hostile and exclusive, and it must be accompanied with an intent to hold against

the true owner.” Id. The Linders’ burden in this case was heightened by the court’s finding

that the Subject Property was wild, unimproved and unenclosed.

       Arkansas Code Annotated section § 18-11-102 (Repl. 2015) provides that

“[u]nimproved and unenclosed land shall be deemed and held to be in possession of the

person who pays the taxes thereon if he or she has color of title thereto, but no person shall

be entitled to invoke the benefit of this section unless he or she, and those under whom he

or she claims, shall have paid the taxes for at least seven (7) years in succession.”

       “The statute applies only to ‘unimproved and unenclosed land;’ that is to say, land

that is wild and in a state of nature.” Jones v. Barger, 67 Ark. App. 337, 343, 1 S.W.3d 31, 36

(1999). The statute operates as an absolute bar to a claim of adverse possession by a party

that does not pay the taxes, and to that end, this court has held:

              Arkansas Code Annotated § 18-11-102 provides that unimproved and
       unenclosed land shall be deemed to be in the possession of the person who pays the
       taxes on it for at least seven years in succession, provided that he has color of title.
       The possession contemplated by this section has the same effect as if the person
       paying the taxes had been in actual, adverse possession of the land for the full seven-
       year period. Payment of taxes under color of title for more than seven years on
       unenclosed and unimproved property confers title by limitation. The payment of
       taxes under this section constitutes an eviction of all others who claim to be in
       constructive possession.

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Appollos v. Int’l Paper Co., 34 Ark. App. 205, 206–07, 808 S.W.2d 786, 787 (1991) (internal

citations omitted).

       Because of its unimproved and unenclosed state, as observed by the circuit court

during a site visit the morning of trial, the Subject Property cannot be adversely possessed.

These statutory presumptions were, in part, a codification of long-standing Arkansas case

law. “The use of wild, unenclosed and unimproved land is presumed to be permissive, until

the persons using the land of passage, by their open and notorious conduct, demonstrate to

the owner that they are claiming a right of passage.” Stahl v. Thompson, 6 Ark. App. 275, 277,

641 S.W.2d 721, 722 (1982). The presumption is rebutted where “hostility of conduct in

the usage of the land” is shown between the adverse possessor and true owner. Anita G, LLC

v. Centennial Bank, 2019 Ark. App. 217, at 11–12, 575 S.W.3d 561, 569. No such evidence

exists in this case. The Linders presented no evidence of any communications or interactions

with the Shearers other than a brief conversation with J.C. Shearer seven years removed from

when he owned a fractional interest in the Subject Property. Accordingly, we affirm the

circuit court’s finding.

       Finally, the circuit court properly declined to grant the motion to reconsider. The

Gertsches agree that abuse of discretion is the applicable standard. They did not present any

evidence to meet such a high burden; accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s decision to

deny the Linders’ motion to reconsider.

       Affirmed.

       KLAPPENBACH and THYER, JJ., agree.

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Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellants.

Kutak Rock LLP, by: Kyle T. Unser, for appellees.

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