Court Opinion

ID: 9595083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:35:32.125746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:34:35.597441
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J., Dissenting.
I dissent.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the contract which is the basis of the present litigation insured the life of Frank L. Whipple “for the term of ten years”. The insurance was not to “take effect until the first premium” had been paid. (The first premium was actually paid between November 2 and 6, 192'6.)
The contract also provided that, “in the event of the death of insured prior to the 12th day of September, 1936”, the insurer would pay the face value of the policy to the named beneficiary.
Frank L. Whipple died October 1, 1936, which was within ten years from the date of the payment of the first premium and the issuance of the policy, but, of course, subsequent to September 12, 1936.
The majority opinion indicates that the policy was not ambiguous upon its face. This position is based upon the *119fact that both plaintiff and defendant have contended that the policy was unambiguous. The fallacy in this argument is:
First: In assuming that, since the parties do not concede the contract to be ambiguous but contend for differing constructions, the result is that the contract is unambiguous. It is similar to a situation where three men are in a room, one of them is blind, the other two look out of a window, and one man says, “I see a white horse on the street.” The second man says, ‘‘It isn’t a white horse; it is a black horse.” As far as the blind man is concerned, it is entirely ambiguous to him whether it is a white horse or a black horse, in spite of the fact that the other occupants of the room state in the most positive terms their views of the horse’s color.
Second: The majority of the court, by applying certain rules of construction, have arrived at what they believe to be a correct interpretation of the policy. Therefore, they reason that it follows as a matter of course that the policy was unambiguous.
Such reasoning is similar to a case where (taking the example above of three men in a room) a fourth man enters the room and at the request of the blind man looks out of the window and informs him that the horse is in fact white, for the blind man to then say that there never was any doubt in his mind as to the color of the horse, because he now knows its color.
The mere fact that it has become necessary for the majority of the court to resort to rules of construction to determine the meaning of the contract is convincing to me that the contract is in fact ambiguous.
Assuming, as I do, that the contract is ambiguous, the majority opinion disregards two long established rules of appellate procedure in this state:
First: On an appeal from an order granting a motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment, an appellate court, assuming that there is a substantial conflict in the evidence, will not set aside the order of the trial court granting the motion for a new trial.
Second: It is for the trial court in the first instance to construe ambiguous terms in a contract and, until so construed and the accuracy of the determination of the trial court is questioned directly on appeal, an appellate court *120will not in the first instance undertake to construe the ambiguous provisions in the contract.
In Barlow v. Frink, 171 Cal. 165 [152 Pac. 290], the rule is thus stated by our Supreme Court at page 172:
“ . . . Whether a contract is in any of its terms or provisions ambiguous or uncertain is a matter of determination in the first instance by the trial court. If it is found so to be, it is primarily the duty of the trial court to construe it after a full opportunity afforded all the parties in the ease to produce evidence of the facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding its execution and the conduct of the parties relative thereto. Until it is so construed by the trial court with this opportunity afforded to the parties and the accuracy of the determination of the trial court is directly questioned on appeal here, we do not think we should in the first instance undertake to construe it and have our determination of the matter operate as the law of the case on a new trial. ’ ’
It is likewise settled that, where a writing is uncertain and either of two constructions may be sustained, it is not within the functions of a court of review to declare that the interpretation given by the trial court should be supplanted by another construction of which the instrument is susceptible.
In Kautz v. Zurich Gen. A. & L. Ins. Co., 212 Cal. 576, 582 [300 Pac. 34], Mr. Justice Curtis thus states the rule:
“ . . . The construction given the instrument by the trial court appears to be consistent with the true intent of the parties and where that is the case the appellate court will not substitute another interpretation though it seem equally tenable. ’ ’
Again in McNeny v. Touchstone, 7 Cal. (2d) 429, the same learned justice at page 435 [60 Pac. (2d) 986] says:
“This construction appears to be consistent with the in tent of the parties, and where the construction given an instrument by the trial court appears to be consistent with the true intent of the parties, the appellate court will not substitute another construction although it seem equally tenable. (Kautz v. Zurich etc. Ins. Co., Ltd., 212 Cal. 576 [300 Pac. 34]; Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Bailie, 138 Cal. App. 143, 149 [32 Pac. (2d) 157] ; Slama Tire Protector Co. v. Ritchie, 31 Cal. App. 555 [161 Pac. 25] ; Manley v. Pacific Mill & Timber Co., 79 Cal. App. 641, 648 *121[250 Pac. 710].) In the last-mentioned case the court elaborates upon the above rule in the following manner: ‘ On the other hand, if the contract is ambiguous, so that there might be two possible constructions, then we agree with the respondent that the law as set forth in 6 California Jurisprudence, 327, and also in the case of Slama Tire Protector Co. v. Ritchie, 31 Cal. App. 555 [161 Pac. 25], applies. Hence, if the construction given by the trial court is one which is tenable, and one which appears to us consistent with the true intent and meaning of the parties, it would not lie within the province of an appellate court to set aside the judgment of the trial court and substitute its own interpretation, simply because another interpretation thereof is also possible. ’ ”
To the same effect, see, also, Whepley Oil Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 6 Cal. App. (2d) 94, 101 [44 Pac. (2d) 670] ; Hale v. Harbor Petroleum Corp., 139 Cal. App. 455, 462 [33 Pac. (2d) 1039] ; Manley v. Pacific Mill & Timber Co., 79 Cal. App. 641, 648 [250 Pac. 710] ; Slama Tire Protector Co. v. Ritchie, 31 Cal. App. 555, 563 [161 Pac. 25],
In the present case it is clear to me that the instrument is ambiguous and the trial court has not as yet placed any construction thereon. Therefore, this court should not undertake, in view of the above authorities, in the first instance to construe the meaning of the ambiguous provisions in the document.
In my opinion the order appealed from should be affirmed.