Court Opinion

ID: 9690294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:03:32.316335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:55.045548
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 95. {concurring). I write separately to highlight my concerns with the majority opinion. Once again, the majority reaches out and needlessly addresses an issue that was neither raised by the parties nor briefed and argued. If the majority is going to go down this path, it is best that it get it right.
¶ 96. Here the majority reaches out and introduces a concept foreign to our jurisprudence: that judge-made common law plays a role in worker's compensation decisions. Neither of the parties advance the issue nor make the argument that the odd-lot doctrine explained in Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 (1977), is anything other than a judicial interpretation of the relevant provision in the worker's compensation act. Nevertheless, the majority tackles the issue.
¶ 97. I believe that the rule of law is generally best developed when issues are raised by the parties and then tested by the fire of adversarial briefs and oral *191arguments. Indeed, "[t]he fundamental premise of the adversary process is that these advocates will uncover and present more useful information and arguments to the decision maker than would he developed by a judicial officer acting on his own in an inquisitorial system." Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look At Sua Sponte Decisions By Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245, 247 (2002) (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
¶ 98. Additionally I am suspect of the majority's new concept. As aptly described in the concurrence above, worker's compensation is not an outgrowth of our judge-made common law. Rather it is a carefully crafted and uniquely balanced legislative act. All of our judicial decisions represent the court's application and interpretation of the act together with its attendant administrative regulations. There exists no common law in our worker's compensation jurisprudence.
¶ 99. For the above stated reasons, I respectfully concur.