Court Opinion

ID: 9370051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 18:01:54.162958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.073974
License: Public Domain

REL: February 10, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                             CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695
                                _________________________

                                                    T.W.

                                                      v.

            Calhoun County Department of Human Resources

                       Appeals from Calhoun Juvenile Court
                         (JU-19-972.02 and JU-19-973.02)

MOORE, Judge.

        In appeal number CL-2022-0694, T.W. ("the mother") appeals from

a judgment entered by the Calhoun Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")

terminating her parental rights to S.H.W., who was born on September

4, 2012. In appeal number CL-2022-0695, the mother appeals from a
CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

separate judgment entered by the juvenile court terminating her

parental rights to H.T., who was born on February 2, 2017. We reverse

the juvenile court's judgments.

                          Procedural History

     On August 24, 2021, the Calhoun County Department of Human

Resources ("DHR") commenced an action by filing a petition to terminate

the parental rights of the mother and of J.T. ("the father") to S.H.W.

That same date, DHR commenced a separate action by filing a petition

to terminate the parental rights of the mother and of the father to H.T.

The juvenile court consolidated the actions for the purposes of trial,

which commenced on November 19, 2021, and was concluded on April 26,

2022. On April 26, 2022, the juvenile court entered a separate judgment

in each action terminating the parental rights of the mother and the

father to S.H.W. and J.T. ("the children"). 1     The mother filed a

postjudgment motion in each action on May 4, 2022; the juvenile court

entered orders denying those motions on May 11, 2022. The mother filed

     1The   father has not appealed the judgments terminating his
parental rights.
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a timely notice of appeal in each action on May 25, 2022. This court

consolidated the mother's appeals ex mero motu.

                                  Facts

     The facts pertinent to the disposition of these appeals are as follows.

The children were residing with the mother and, apparently, at times,

the father, in a mobile home in Calhoun County until October 2019, when

DHR removed the children from the mother's custody. While the children

were in her custody, the mother, who was disabled and unemployed,

financially provided for the children through benefits received from

governmental-assistance programs. S.H.W., who was six years old when

she was removed from the mother's custody, had been diagnosed with a

"speech impairment" and a learning disability. S.H.W. was receiving

speech therapy and attending special-education classes to address her

special needs. The mother testified that she was taking online college

courses to learn more about how to address S.H.W.'s special needs. H.T.,

who was three years old when she was removed from the mother's

custody, had been diagnosed with various dental problems for which she

was regularly receiving treatment, according to the mother.

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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

     In September 2019, DHR received a report that substance abuse

was occurring in the family's home. At that time, the father tested

positive for methamphetamine. DHR entered into a safety plan with the

mother, who had received a negative drug-test result, pursuant to which

she was allowed to retain custody of the children, provided that the father

was not allowed to reside in the home; the mother was also required to

supervise the father's visitations with the children. According to the

safety plan, the mother showed "great aptitude toward protecting her

children as evidenced by her motivation to create a safe environment for

her children." The mother was also "fully willing to cooperate" with DHR.

     In October 2019, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine.

Based on that positive drug-test result, DHR terminated the safety plan,

removed the children from the mother's home, and placed the children

into foster care, where they have since remained. DHR subsequently

completed a child-abuse-and-neglect investigation and determined that

the children were at risk of harm from the mother as a result of her

positive drug-test result. The mother denied that she had ever used

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illegal drugs and testified that she could not explain the positive drug-

test result.

      DHR immediately instituted a plan requiring the mother to submit

to a substance-abuse assessment, drug testing, and substance-abuse

counseling. The mother cooperated with that plan. The mother testified

that she had learned a great deal about substance abuse during her

counseling sessions, which she had completed in the summer of 2020.

Between November 2019 and August 2021, the mother submitted to

numerous drug tests and did not produce a single positive result for

methamphetamine use after January 2020.           At trial, the mother

continued to maintain that she had never used illegal drugs and that she

had never had a substance-abuse problem. A DHR social worker testified

that she had no concerns that the mother was using illegal drugs.

      As the case progressed, DHR shifted its focus from the mother's

suspected drug abuse to concerns regarding the mother's home

environment. The mother had agreed, as part of a family-reunification

plan with DHR, that she would maintain stable, clean, and appropriate

housing with working utilities for the children. The mobile home in

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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

which the mother was residing at the time the children were removed

from her care was described by the children's Court Appointed Special

Advocates ("CASA") worker as hazardous, unsanitary, and flea infested.

DHR provided the mother with intensive in-home services through

programs from ECA FOCUS ("FOCUS") designed to teach her better

housekeeping skills.     Although the mother testified that she had

benefited from those services, the CASA worker testified that she had

seen no improvement in the condition of the mobile home throughout

2021 and that any efforts that the mother had made to better her

housekeeping skills had proven unsuccessful. The CASA worker and a

DHR social worker testified that the mother, who, despite having a

learning   disability,   had   obtained    an   associate's   degree   in

"childcare/preschool" and was, at the time of the last trial date, working

toward a bachelor's degree in child psychology, did not seem to

understand the severity of the conditions of her residence and did not

consistently apply what she had been taught to address those conditions.

     In the fall of 2021, the mother moved into a newer and larger mobile

home, which the mother described as being clean and in good repair with

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working utilities.   However, a DHR witness who had inspected that

mobile home described it as being in the same or even worse condition

than the original mobile home, such that DHR could not approve of the

children's visiting there. According to DHR's witnesses, it seemed that

the mother was permanently incapable of maintaining a safe and

sanitary home, and DHR cited that problem as the main factor

supporting its petition to terminate the mother's parental rights. The

mother disputed that testimony and testified that, by the time of the last

day of trial, the second mobile home had been renovated, repaired, and

cleaned so that it was safe and suitable for the children.

     While working with DHR to improve her housekeeping skills, the

mother maintained regular visits with the children. At first, she visited

the children for two hours every two weeks under supervision. The

mother began having unsupervised visits with the children in December

2020, and, eventually, in 2021, the mother began keeping the children

overnight every two weeks. The mother testified that the children were

excited to visit with her and enjoyed their visits. During the visits, the

mother would give the children food, clothes, and other presents, and, on

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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

at least one occasion, money, and the mother would play games with the

children to entertain them.    A social worker employed by Alabama

Baptist Children's Home ("ABCH") testified that the mother appeared to

have benefited from the parental counseling that she had received, that

the mother had been consistent with her visitations with the children,

that she was attentive and had acted appropriately toward the children

during visitations, and that the children "absolutely" love the mother and

"[y]ou can definitely tell there is an attachment there." The children's

CASA worker also testified that the mother had displayed a proper

general protective capacity over the children when the CASA worker had

observed them visiting at the mother's residence and that the children

appeared to be happy and bonded with the mother.

     Some evidence, however, indicates that the mother sometimes

communicated improperly with S.H.W. during visits, that the mother

appeared to have failed to give S.H.W. medication during one overnight

visit, and that, on another occasion, had provided the children with food

that was past its expiration date. Also, after visits, the children would

often smell of cigarettes or other foul odors and would appear unclean

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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

and afflicted by flea bites as a result of the condition of the mother's

residence.

     On June 10, 2021, the mother became involved in a domestic

dispute involving a neighbor of the children's aunt. The mother testified

that she was visiting the aunt when, she said, the neighbor became

verbally abusive and began acting aggressively toward the aunt and the

mother. The aunt called the police, which, the mother said, had ended

with the neighbor, not the mother, being arrested. The mother testified

that she considered herself to have been a victim in that domestic

dispute. Nevertheless, DHR ceased allowing the mother to exercise

unsupervised visits with the children or to communicate with them over

the telephone, and DHR changed its permanency goal 2 from returning

the children to the custody of the mother to adoption over the objection

of the mother. All family-reunification services, except for drug testing

and in-person visitations, ended at that point. The mother testified that

     2As  discussed infra, the term permanency, in this context, refers to
a safe, stable, and nurturing custodial arrangement lasting throughout
the child's minority.
                                    9
CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

it was her understanding that the June 10, 2021, domestic dispute had

caused DHR to take the abrupt change in its course of action.

     At trial, several DHR witnesses testified that, based on their visits

to the mother's residence, they had developed concerns that the mother

was maintaining a relationship with the father, who, they said, had

consistently tested positive for illegal drugs, had refused to participate in

any services offered by DHR, and had completely abandoned the children

after June 2020.      The mother testified that she had ended her

relationship with the father in September 2019 and that, at the time of

the first trial date, she had not seen him in over one year. However, the

juvenile court heard evidence, although disputed by the mother,

indicating that the mother had kept men's clothes and shoes in her

residence, that she had corresponded with the father through social-

media platforms, that she and the father had together attended

supervised visits with the children in 2019 and 2020, that the father had

received service of legal process at the mother's residence, and that the

father had been seen mowing the mother's lawn on one occasion, all

indicating that the mother and the father had remained together.

                                     10
CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

Additionally, the mother resided in an area owned or controlled by the

father's relatives, which, according to the DHR witnesses, made her

living situation unstable.

     The CASA worker, the ABCH worker, and a DHR social worker all

testified that the children needed a suitable permanent home apart from

the mother.    DHR's witnesses acknowledged that the mother had

cooperated with the family-reunification process but stated that the

mother had not shown sufficient and consistent improvement to the point

that DHR could recommend that the children be returned to her custody.

Testimony indicated that the foster parent with whom the children had

primarily resided since October 2019 had provided the children with a

suitable home. During their time in foster care, the children's physical,

mental, dental, and educational health had significantly improved,

although H.T. had been diagnosed with a speech problem for which she

was receiving speech therapy. The foster parent would not agree to adopt

the children, however. The DHR social worker assigned to the case at

the time of the last trial date asserted that adoption would be the only

option to provide the children with permanency. Upon the conclusion of

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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

the trial, the children's guardian ad litem also recommended that the

juvenile court terminate the mother's parental rights so that the children

could achieve permanency through adoption.            Although DHR had

changed the permanency plan to adoption in June 2021, by the last day

of trial on April 26, 2022, DHR had not identified an adoptive resource

for the children.

                            Standard of Review

     A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear

and convincing evidence, which is " ' "[e]vidence that, when weighed

against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact

a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high

probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." ' " C.O. v. Jefferson

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)

(quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting

in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)).

           " '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate
           affirmance of a judgment based on a factual
           finding in the context of a case in which the
           ultimate standard for a factual decision by the
           trial court is clear and convincing evidence is
           evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to
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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

           clearly and convincingly … establish the fact
           sought to be proved.'

     "KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish,] 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ.
     App. 2006)].

           "… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a
     clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the
     judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of
     the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty
     Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986)];; thus, the appellate
     court must also look through a prism to determine whether
     there was substantial evidence before the trial court to
     support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's
     weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of
     the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the
     claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the
     conclusion.' "

Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not

reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact

made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile

court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971

So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence,

this court presumes their correctness.        Id.   We review the legal

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of

correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

                                    13
CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

                                  Issue

     The mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court's conclusions

in its judgments that the mother was unwilling or unable to discharge

her parental responsibilities to the children and that DHR had made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her are not supported by clear and

convincing evidence; that there was insufficient evidence of the mother's

current conditions to warrant the termination of her parental rights; that

DHR failed to establish that there were no viable relative resources; and

that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because

maintenance of the status quo was a viable alternative to termination.

We find the mother's last argument dispositive of these appeals.

                                 Analysis

     Section 12-15-319, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Juvenile

Justice Act ("the AJJA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-101 et seq., provides

that a juvenile court may terminate the parental rights of a parent when

clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent cannot or will not

discharge the duty of providing his or her children with a safe, clean, and

suitable home. See generally H.B. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,

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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

236 So. 3d 875, 882 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (holding that a juvenile court

may terminate parental rights when a parent, due to an uncorrectable,

permanent inability or unwillingness, cannot or will not provide a home

free from "chronic, recurring unsanitary conditions" that "endanger the

health of the child"); L.M. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 86 So. 3d

377, 387 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (recognizing that the rights of a parent

may be terminated when that parent fails or refuses to protect his or her

children from threat of harm presented by the other unfit, abusive, or

neglectful parent by allowing the other parent access to family home).

However, because a parent has a fundamental right to the custody of his

or her natural children, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102

(1982), due process demands that a juvenile court terminate a parent's

parental rights only when some other, less-drastic measure would be

unavailing, Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976), or, as

Alabama appellate courts have stated more commonly, a juvenile court

may terminate a parent's parental rights only when clear and convincing

evidence shows that no other viable alternative to termination exists. Ex

parte Ogle, 516 So. 2d 243, 243 (Ala. 1987).

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CL-2022-0694 and CL-2022-0695

     Termination of parental rights is the most extreme measure the

state can undertake to redress parental unfitness, abuse, or neglect.

See Santosky, supra; M.H. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 158 So.

3d 471, 482 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). Termination of parental rights involves

the complete, permanent, and irreversible extinguishment of a parent's

right to custody, control, and even association with his or her children.

Id. Through termination of parental rights, a juvenile court assures that

a parent has no legal means of accessing the child to expose the child to

the threat of harm arising from the unhealthy parent-child relationship.

See S.M.M. v. R.S.M., 83 So. 3d 572, 573 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) ("The

purpose of the statute authorizing termination of parental rights is to

protect children from harm emanating from an adverse parental

relationship."). But the state has other means of adequately protecting

a child from the threat of parental harm, including placing the child out

of the family home and in the sheltered environment of foster care with

contact between the parent and the child being monitored and any

personal visits being supervised. See, e.g., Ex parte T.V., supra. If that

alternative is available, it would serve as a less-drastic means of securing

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the safety and welfare of the child, militating against termination of

parental rights. Id.

     However, foster care is intended primarily to secure to a child a safe

and nurturing home temporarily during the period in which the child's

custodial parent works toward rehabilitation to the point when the

family can be safely reunited. K.W. v. J.G., 856 So. 2d 859, 873 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2003). The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("the ASFA"),

42 U.S.C. §§ 671 and 675, was enacted to prevent a child from

languishing in foster care after it has been determined that the goal of

family reunification cannot be accomplished.             See Robert M.

Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the

Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 637, 642 (1999).

The ASFA rests on the premise that all children need "permanency" to

thrive and to mature properly into responsible adults and citizens. Id.

In this context, the term "permanency" refers to a safe, stable, and

nurturing custodial arrangement lasting throughout the child's minority.

See generally B.W.C. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 582 So. 2d 579, 580

(Ala. Civ. App. 1991); In re Interest of Sarah K., 258 Neb. 52, 57, 601

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N.W.2d 780, 784 (1999) (applying federal guidelines for applying the

ASFA). To obtain this goal, the ASFA requires states that receive federal

funding for their foster-care programs, like Alabama, to use reasonable

efforts to expeditiously move children out of foster care and into

permanent homes, preferably through termination of parental rights

with adoption. Ramesh Kasarabada, Fostering the Human Rights of

Youth in Foster Care: Defining Reasonable Efforts to Improve

Consequences of Aging Out, 17 CUNY L. Rev. 145, 157 (2013). Because

long-term foster care does not provide children with the permanency

contemplated by the ASFA, "generally speaking, maintaining a child in

indefinite foster care is not a viable alternative to termination of parental

rights." T.L.S. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 119 So. 3d 431,

439 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).

     Our legislature has enacted various statutes to comply with the

ASFA, including Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-315, which is based on 42 U.S.C.

§ 675(5) (defining "case review system"). Section 12-15-315(a) requires

juvenile courts to conduct a "permanency hearing" for the purpose of

determining the "permanency plan" for a dependent foster child within

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12 months of the placement of the child in foster care and at least

annually thereafter.       Section 12-15-315 lists various custodial

arrangements a juvenile court may approve as the permanency plan for

a foster child, including: adoption, relative placement, kinship

guardianship, and "[a]nother planned permanent living arrangement,"

meaning long-term foster care. See Ex parte Bodie, [Ms. 1210248, Oct.

14, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring

specially) (citing Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C.

Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 1, 9 n.3 (2015)). Consistent with the intention

behind the ASFA to move children out of foster care, § 12-15-315(b)

provides that a juvenile court shall determine that the permanency plan

for a foster child shall be placement in another planned permanent living

arrangement only when a "compelling reason" shows that it is not in the

best interests of the child to return to his or her home or to be placed for

adoption, placed with a relative, or placed in a kinship guardianship.

     Section 12-15-315(b) does not set forth the compelling reasons that

may justify a juvenile court leaving a child in long-term foster care rather

than terminating parental rights and placing a child for adoption.

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However, the caselaw from this court recognizes that, when a foster child

shares a beneficial emotional bond with a parent, continued visitation

with the parent serves the best interests of the child, and the prospects

for the child to be adopted or placed in some permanent custodial

arrangement is indefinite, speculative, or unlikely, the court should not

terminate parental rights under those circumstances, but, instead, it

should maintain the status quo by leaving the child in long-term foster

care. See C.M. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 81 So. 3d 391

(Ala. Civ. App. 2011); B.A.M. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 150

So. 3d 782, 784-86 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014); T.N. v. Covington Cnty. Dep't of

Hum. Res., 297 So. 3d 1200 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019); D.S.R. v. Lee Cnty.

Dep't of Hum. Res., 348 So. 3d 1104 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).

     Recently, in his special concurrence in Ex parte Bodie, supra, Chief

Justice Parker explained the primary basis for this line of cases. Because

of the fundamental rights of parents to a relationship with their children,

the state may not terminate parental rights except when no other less

restrictive means are available to achieve its dual objectives of protecting

children from parental abuse and neglect and meeting the needs of the

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child for permanency. As Chief Justice Parker put it, when a child is

secured from the threat of parental abuse or neglect through placement

in foster care, but adoption is not a viable option, "termination is not only

not the least restrictive means, it is not a means at all," ___ So. 3d at ___

(Parker, C.J., concurring specially), for providing a child with

permanency. "Accordingly, to meet the no-viable-alternative element, at

a minimum DHR must prove by clear and convincing evidence that

adoption is a viable option ...." Id. If the state fails to carry that burden,

the juvenile court cannot terminate parental rights.

     The party seeking to terminate a parent's rights bears the burden

of proving that the termination of those rights is the appropriate remedy.

K.W. v. J.G., 856 So. 2d 859, 874 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). In this case, DHR,

as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving that termination of the

mother's parental rights was the only avenue available to advance the

government's compelling interest in protecting the children and meeting

their need for permanency. The evidence presented by DHR showed that,

at the time of trial, the children were residing with the foster parent,

subject to the supervised visitation of the mother outside of her home,

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and, thus, were adequately protected from the identified threats to their

health, safety, and welfare from the mother's home environment or her

continuing association with the father. DHR's witnesses testified that

the children needed permanency and that the mother could not provide

that permanency, which, according to DHR, could be achieved only

through termination of parental rights with adoption. However, DHR

did not present any evidence to prove that adoption was presently a

viable option for the children.

     The undisputed evidence in the record shows that the foster parent

did not agree to adopt the children and that DHR did not identify any

other adoptive resource for the children. The record does not disclose

whether DHR searched for a suitable adoptive home for the children, but

the record does indicate that DHR changed the permanency plan to

adoption in June 2021, and the AJJA specifically states that "reasonable

efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance

with the permanency plan ... and to complete whatever steps are

necessary to finalize a permanent plan for the child." Ala. Code 1975, §

12-15-312(b). Furthermore, DHR regulations explicitly allow DHR to

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place children in a pre-adoptive foster home pending legal proceedings to

terminate parental rights. See Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r.

660-5-22-.03(2). Thus, we can infer that DHR had made some efforts to

place the children for adoption but that those efforts had not succeeded

in identifying a readily available, suitable adoptive placement for the

children in the 10 months since the permanency plan had been changed

to adoption.

     Additionally, the evidence in the record reveals that H.T. and,

possibly, S.H.W., continue to have special needs that may affect their

prospects for adoption. See Talladega Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. J.J.,

187 So. 3d 705, 713-714 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (requiring juvenile courts

to consider special needs of child that may impede permanency).

Furthermore, under the ASFA, the state must develop a plan to use

reasonable efforts to place the children together in the same adoptive

home unless doing so would be contrary to their safety or welfare, see 42

U.S.C. § 671(a)(31)(A), which does not seem to be the case here. Those

circumstances may adversely affect the ability of DHR to find a suitable

adoptive home for the children, but no DHR witness testified about those

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potential impediments to adoption or how DHR had addressed or even

planned to address those issues. The children, now ages 10 and 6 years

old, may well be adoptable despite those circumstances, but DHR did not

present any evidence to prove their adoptability, and the juvenile court

could not assume that fact, which was not proven by clear and convincing

evidence.

     In the final judgments, the juvenile court simply awarded DHR

permanent custody of the children with "discretion in planning and

placement." The judgments may have freed the children for adoption,

but they do not actually achieve the goal of the ASFA to provide the

children with permanency. The entire purpose of the ASFA is to remove

dependent children from "foster care limbo." Kasarabada, supra, at 157.

However, the judgments leave the children in foster care indefinitely,

without any proven prospect for acquiring a substitute parent or parents

through adoption or any other means, and, now, facing the added stressor

of the permanent loss of their relationship with the mother.

     Section 12-15-35, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes a juvenile court to

terminate parental rights even when DHR has not identified an adoptive

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resource. In R.B. v. State Department of Human Resources, 669 So. 2d

187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), this court held that a juvenile court may

terminate parental rights even though the child may not be immediately

adopted. In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned that, even if an

adoptive resource has not materialized, a juvenile court should be

allowed to terminate parental rights in "egregious" circumstances. Id. In

R.B., this court did not specify what "egregious" circumstances would

warrant the entry of a judgment terminating parental rights that leaves

a child an orphan with no definite prospect of adoption or other

permanent custodial arrangement, but the cases applying R.B. have

since clarified that that drastic remedy is appropriate when maintaining

any relationship with the parent would only subject the child to

continuing emotional or physical harm.       For example, in T.L.S. v.

Lauderdale County Department of Human Resources, 119 So. 3d 431

(Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (authored by Moore, J., with Pittman, J.,

concurring, and Thompson, P.J., and Thomas, J., concurring in the

result), this court affirmed a judgment terminating the parental rights of

T.L.S. to her two children despite the lack of an identified adoptive

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resource.   The evidence in that case showed that T.L.S. had been

convicted of abusing one of the children, who had since come to fear

T.L.S., that the other child had resented that T.L.S. had not believed that

she had been sexually abused while in the custody of T.L.S., that both

children suffered from severe emotional and behavioral problems

stemming from their abuse, and that the children would regress

behaviorally after visiting with the mother. In cases like T.L.S., although

termination of parental rights does not achieve permanency, it is justified

as being the least restrictive means of accomplishing the compelling

governmental interest of securing the child from parental abuse or

neglect that emanates from the mere continuing existence of the parent-

child relationship.

     On the other hand, in Talladega County Department of Human

Resources v. J.J., 187 So. 3d 705 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), this court affirmed

a judgment in which the Talladega Juvenile Court declined to terminate

the parental rights of the parents of an autistic child, who had special

educational and caregiving needs, due to the lack of an identified

adoptive resource and the " 'strong possibility of [the child at issue] being

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a legal orphan for her life' " if parental rights were terminated. 187 So.

3d at 709. The undisputed evidence in J.J. showed that the child had

been placed in a therapeutic foster home and that any adoptive resource

would have to cater to the special needs of the child, including providing

the child with constant supervision. The state had not identified an

adoptive resource and intended only to place the child on the state

adoption registry upon termination of parental rights. A witness for the

state testified that the child would remain in long-term foster care if no

adoptive resource was located. In addressing whether the lack of an

identified adoptive resource alone was a sufficient basis for denying the

petition to terminate parental rights, this court acknowledged the

holding in R.B. but concluded that the Talladega Juvenile Court had not

erred in considering the lack of an adoptive resource when concluding

that maintaining the status quo would be a viable alternative to

termination of the parents' parental rights. This court reasoned that,

when the likelihood of adoption has not been proven, the state has failed

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental

rights will provide the child with permanency. This court held that, in

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such cases, the juvenile court may properly consider the fact that the

termination of parental rights may not achieve " 'the desire for

permanency,' " 187 So. 3d at 713-14 (quoting C.M., 81 So. 3d at 398), and

can leave the child in long-term foster care, if that option is available, in

order to preserve a relationship between the parent and the child that

will not harm the child.

     As the foregoing cases illustrate, when the state fails to prove that

termination of parental rights will meet its goal of providing a child with

permanency, the state may justify terminating parental rights only when

no other available custodial alternative will satisfactorily protect the

child from parental harm.       Termination of parental rights with no

identified adoptive resource or other definitive prospect for permanency

would be an overly broad measure when termination is unnecessary for

the protection of the child. See B.A.M, 150 So. 3d at 786. In such cases,

if the evidence shows that, in fact, long-term foster care is a viable

alternative that accomplishes the goal of protecting the child from

parental harm, a juvenile court must employ that option instead of

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terminating parental rights to protect the constitutional rights of the

parent to a relationship with his or her child.

     In this case, the record shows that the juvenile court could have

maintained the status quo. Although the foster parent would not agree

to adopt the children, DHR did not present any evidence indicating that

the foster parent would not continue to provide the same level of care to

the children in which they have been thriving since October 2019. The

current long-term foster-care arrangement satisfies the children's basic

health and safety needs while protecting them from the identified threats

to their welfare posed by the mother. The record does not disclose the

availability of any other permanent custodial arrangement for the

children. A judgment terminating parental rights must be based on

current circumstances. See A.P. v. Covington Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,

293 So. 3d 892 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019). Unless and until the circumstances

proven by the evidence change, long-term foster care appears to be the

only current available option to advance the government's interest in the

welfare of the children.

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     We conclude that DHR did not prove through clear and convincing

evidence that termination of parental rights was the least restrictive

means to protect the children from the mother or that termination of the

mother's parental rights would provide permanency for the children

through adoption. Because maintenance of the status quo is a viable

alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights to the children

in this case, as we concluded in C.M. and other similar cases, we reverse

the juvenile court's judgments and remand the cases to the juvenile court

for the entry of judgments consistent with this opinion.

     CL-2022-0694 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     CL-2022-0695 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

     Thompson, P.J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

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THOMPSON, Presiding Judge, concurring in the result.

     I agree that the termination of parental rights should occur only in

extreme circumstances in which it is demonstrated that a parent cannot

or will not be successfully reunited with his or her child. I concur in the

result reached by the main opinion that, under the unique circumstances

of this case, leaving these children in foster care with continued contact

with the mother was a viable alternative to the termination of the

mother's parental rights and was in the children's best interests. D.M.P.

v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 871 So. 2d 77, 97 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003); C.M.

v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 81 So. 3d 391, 398 (Ala. Civ. App.

2011) ("[W]e conclude that, in this exceptional case, termination of the

mother's parental rights was not in the best interests of the children

because of the beneficial relationship between the mother and the

children."). In this case, the evidence supports the determination that

allowing the children to continue to visit the mother is a viable

alternative that would be beneficial to the children.

     I disagree with that part of the analysis in which the main opinion,

without an argument on the issue having been made by the appellant,

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attempts to broaden the law concerning viable alternatives to

termination. In this case, DHR failed to present any evidence regarding

whether the children at issue are considered to be adoptable, i.e., whether

they might be adopted in the future. I agree that, in the absence of such

evidence, when the record demonstrates that, as here, the child and the

parent share a strong emotional bond such that it would be beneficial to

the child at issue to maintain a relationship with the parent, the parent's

parental rights should not be terminated. In my opinion, however, the

main opinion errs in attempting to expand the law to hold that where a

strong emotional bond exists between a parent and a child, but no

adoptive resource is identified at the time of the termination-of-parental-

rights hearing, the juvenile court may terminate parental rights only in

the most extreme or egregious cases in an attempt to achieve permanency

for the child.

      Each termination-of-parental-rights action concerning a child must

be resolved on its own specific facts, and the broad holding of the main

opinion precludes such a case-specific determination. See L.M. v. D.D.F.,

840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) ("Due to the serious nature of

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the action of terminating a parent's parental rights, this court must

carefully review the unique set of facts established in each case in

determining whether clear and convincing evidence was presented to

support the termination of those rights."). Not all prospective adopters

are willing to come forward and expose themselves to the uncertainties

inherent in the judicial process concerning the termination of a parent's

parental rights to a prospective adoptee. In a case like this one involving

the termination of parental rights where a strong bond between the

parent and the child has been established, DHR should present evidence

regarding whether adoption is a viable alternative for achieving

permanency for the child. However, I see no reason, when a juvenile court

is addressing whether the termination of parental rights will provide the

child with permanency, to impose an additional requirement that

mandates that, except in the most extreme and egregious cases, an

adoptive resource must be identified at the time of the termination-of-

parental-rights hearing.

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