Court Opinion

ID: 9725763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:09:13.006931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:19.503714
License: Public Domain

DUNN, J.
I dissent.
The majority mentions that appropriate instructions on circumstantial evidence were given, but declares they should have been given twice, once with respect to the elements of robbery and once with respect to proof of the intent to inflict great bodily injury. As to the latter, the majority states that a failure to instruct, might have misled the jury. I do not agree that this is so. The giving of an instruction once is sufficient, since instructions, even if correct, should not be unduly emphasized by repetition. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Trial, §§ 209, 210, pp. 3027-3028.) The majority then launches into a discussion of the penalties imposed for first degree robbery, which discussion would be more appropriate to a discussion of cruel and unusual punishments and has nothing to do with points raised by defendant in this case.
The majority also states that the amended information was defective in failing to allege “intent” properly. I disagree with the majority that this is so. The amended information states, as to this: “With intent to inflict injury, the said Juan L. Salas inflicted great bodily injury on Guadalupe Garcia Escobar during the commission of the offense alleged herein.” Contrasted with this charge is the language of Penal Code, section 213 reading, so far as here pertinent: “. . . and in the course of commission of the robbery, with the intent to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily injury on the victim of the robbery, such fact shall be charged in the indictment or information ....”
I do not concede that the information should allege an intention to inflict great bodily injury and that the amended information is deficient in failing so to allege. The majority cites no authority for its statement and, indeed, there is none in the criminal field. However, in the civil field there is ample authority that an intent to inflict injury is sufficient. *477(Arenson v. Nat. Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 81 [286 P.2d 816]; People v. Cloward (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 669, 672 [16 Cal.Rptr. 772].)
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 1976. On the record in this case, the court feels that the People should not be foreclosed from amending the information if they so desire. Dunn, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted for the reasons set forth in his dissent. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 15, 1976. Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.