Court Opinion

ID: 9385829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 08:08:59.240997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.470586
License: Public Domain

In the
          Court of Appeals
  Second Appellate District of Texas
           at Fort Worth
        ___________________________
             No. 02-22-00241-CV
        ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.H. AND V.H., CHILDREN

     On Appeal from the 481st District Court
            Denton County, Texas
         Trial Court No. 22-3497-481

     Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
     Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                    I. Introduction

       This is an appeal from an order granting a family-violence protective order,

which was sought by Appellee (Father) to protect himself and his two children from

their mother Appellant (Mother). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 81.001, 85.001. In two

issues, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support

the trial court’s findings that (1) she had committed family violence in the past and

(2) there is a likelihood that she will commit family violence in the future. Based on

the standards of review that we are required to apply, we hold that legally and factually

sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                    II. Background

       In May 2022, Father filed an application for a family-violence protective order

against Mother to protect himself and the parties’ two children. Father alleged that

Mother had engaged in family violence. Father asked the trial court to issue a

temporary ex parte protective order pending a final hearing and to issue a final

protective order after the final hearing.

       To his application, Father attached his affidavit in which he recounted Mother’s

actions toward him:

       • Father averred that in early March 2022, Mother and her significant other

          (whom he recognized by their voices and movements despite their being

          clothed in face masks and hoodies) had attacked him. He was hit in the

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          head with a baseball bat and a chain, “nearly knocking [him] unconscious.”

          During the encounter, Mother had stated, “I told you I was going to f[--]k

          you up.” Father averred that he was in fear for his life and for the life of his

          children.

      • Father also averred that in December 2020, Mother’s significant other had

          attended a visit with Mother and had pulled a gun and had threatened him.

          Father learned that his son had seen the gun and was frightened.

      • Father further averred that Mother had called his phone from an

          anonymous number numerous times, at all hours of the day and night,

          “sometimes making threats, [and] other times just remaining silent and

          hanging up after calling repeatedly.”

      The trial court granted Father’s request for an ex parte protective order and

subsequently held a final hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court found that

family violence had occurred, that it is likely to occur in the future, that Mother had

committed an act constituting a felony offense involving family violence against

Father, and that such act had caused serious bodily injury to Father. The trial court

granted Father’s application for protective order for a period of five years. The trial

court determined that there would be only supervised visitation by law enforcement

going forward and that Mother would be required to pay the cost of having law

enforcement supervise the visits. Mother then perfected this appeal.

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        III. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Family-Violence Findings

      In her two issues, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence to support the trial court’s findings that she had committed family violence

in the past and that there is a likelihood that she will commit family violence in the

future. Applying the applicable standards of review, we conclude that legally and

factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s family-violence findings.

      A.      Standards of Review

      When the trial court acts as factfinder, we review its findings under the legal-

and factual-sufficiency standards. Huskins v. Garcia, No. 02-21-00328-CV, 2022 WL

3905083, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (first

citing In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000); then citing Watts v. Adviento, No. 02-

17-00424-CV, 2019 WL 1388534, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2019,

no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (stating that legal- and factual-sufficiency standards

of review are proper in appeals from protective orders); and then citing Jakobe v.

Jakobe, No. 2-04-068-CV, 2005 WL 503124, at *1 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 3,

2005, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (measuring the sufficiency of the evidence in

protective order appeals by legal- and factual-sufficiency contentions)).

             1.     Legal Sufficiency

      We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence

challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of

law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to

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prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn

v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient

evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the

finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence

unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228

S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).

We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of

the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529

S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).

      Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support a

finding. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727–28 (Tex. 2003). More than a

scintilla exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-

minded people to differ in their conclusions. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658. On the other

hand, no more than a scintilla exists when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is

so weak that it creates no more than a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence.

McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Lopez, 576 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. 2019); Kindred v. Con/Chem,

Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983).

             2.     Factual Sufficiency

      When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to

support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all

                                            5
the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the

finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that

the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715

S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.

1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

      Findings of fact are the exclusive province of the factfinder.              Bellefonte

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1986). The factfinder is the

sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony.

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).

      B.     Applicable Law

      The Family Code provides that a trial court must render a protective order if it

finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future. Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. §§ 81.001, 85.001, .022. “Family violence” means an act by a member of a

family or household against another member of the family or household that is

intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a

threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily

injury, assault, or sexual assault but does not include defensive measures to protect

oneself. Id. § 71.004(1). “Member of a household” includes a person who previously

lived in a household. Id. § 71.006.

                                            6
         C.    Relevant Evidence

         Father testified at the protective-order hearing that Mother has only supervised

visitation with their two children. Father described his strained relationship with

Mother, as well as several incidents that had occurred.

         Father testified that since 2015, he had received either a threatening email or a

threatening voicemail from Mother “a thousand times.”1 He said that he had received

numerous threats from Mother since 2015 and that one of the reasons that Mother

was allowed only supervised visits was because she had threatened to harm Father or

the children; she had said, “I’m going to hurt you. And, as I told you, I’m going to

take these kids to the Philippines.” 2

         In the April to June 2020 time frame, Mother’s significant other James Dean3

showed up “high, drunk” to a visit, and Father told Mother, “[T]his can’t happen. If

this guy is coming like this, either you got to tell him to leave, or I will terminate the

visit peacefully.” Father told Mother that if she wanted to bring Dean to future visits,

she needed to get his consent for Father to run a background search on him. Mother

      Father testified that he had tried to report Mother for harassment, but that was
         1

unsuccessful.

        Father testified that Mother had previously kidnapped the children. In 2012,
         2

Mother took the children to South Carolina. Father testified that he had hired a
private investigator to locate Mother, and when he had found her, Mother demanded
that she be paid $5,000 before she would return the children. Father paid Mother the
money and recovered his children.
         Out of an abundance of caution, we use a pseudonym for Mother’s significant
         3

other.

                                             7
sent Father an email stating, “‘F’ you. I’m not going to do it. I do what I want to do.

I hope you die.”

        At the December 2020 scheduled visit that took place at a park in Carrollton,

Mother and Dean arrived two hours late. When Dean approached the children,

Father reminded Mother that Dean was not allowed to be present at the visit because

he had not undergone a background check. Mother said, “‘F’ you. I’ll bring anybody

I want.” Dean said, “Oh, MF, you can’t say that. You can’t do that.” Father

announced that the visit was terminated and grabbed his children’s hands to leave;

Dean pulled a gun, which the children saw. Mother got mad at Dean and told him

something, and he ran to his truck, to the river, to the ladies’ room, to the men’s

room, to a building, and back to his truck. While Dean was running around, Father

went to his truck but saw that he was blocked in. He called the police. The police

came but did not find a gun. After that incident, Father’s daughter said that she did

not want to go to that park anymore and that she was scared “for eight months to go

. . . there.”

        Father testified that on March 1, 2022,4 he ran errands after work. Prior to

picking up his children, his truck made a strange noise, so he pulled over. As soon as

he got out of his truck, someone hit him with a baseball bat. He saw that there were

        Initially, Father testified that the event had occurred in early March around
        4

March 1 through March 3. On cross-examination, he explained that the event had
happened anytime from March 1 to March 8. On redirect, he refreshed his
recollection by looking at his notes and testified that the event had occurred on
March 1.

                                          8
two people wearing face masks, sunglasses, and hoodies, despite that it was a warm

day. One of the individuals was a woman and the other was a man. The man had a

chain that he was using to hit Father, causing Father to fall. Father explained that as

the woman hit him with the baseball bat, she “used a word that [Mother and Dean]

use all the time towards [him].”      Although Father did not see their faces, he

recognized the attackers as Mother and Dean based on their voices, wording, and

body language.    Father screamed, “I know who you are,” and went toward his

attackers. Mother tried to hit him again with the baseball bat, but Father grabbed her

hand with one of his hands and used his other hand to try to dial 911. As he was

trying to dial, he was hit in the back with “a rock or [a] heavy punch” and let go of

Mother’s wrist. Mother and Dean ran toward Father’s truck and looked in, but Father

said, “My babies are not here.” Mother and Dean then ran and left the scene. Father

fell down three or four times before he was able to get into his truck. He stopped at a

shopping center to clean up the blood on himself. Father reported this incident to the

police and went to the doctor and the eye doctor. Father admitted into evidence

photographs of his injured face and head that were taken a couple of days after the

incident.

      Shortly after the ex parte temporary protective order was served on Mother,

she called Father twice, but he did not answer. He then received a call from a private

number; a lady whose voice was unknown to Father said, “We’re going to fight this

out.” He hung up without replying. These communications were made despite that

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the temporary ex parte protective order stated that there was to be no

communication.

      Father testified that he had been physically attacked by Mother and that he

feared that he would be attacked by her in the future. In addition to fearing for his

future safety, he also feared for his children’s safety because there was also a threat of

kidnapping or violence against his children by Mother.

      During her cross-examination of Father, Mother (who represented herself

pro se in the trial court) made much of the fact that Father did not introduce his

medical records or police reports from the gun incident at the park or the assault.

During her case in chief, she called Dean to testify. With regard to the December

2020 incident at the park, Dean said that as soon as Father called 911 and said that

Dean had a gun, Dean started recording the incident, which he said Mother was also

recording.5 Dean said that “the cops showed up. They searched for the gun. No

gun. No gun anywhere [in the] park, no gun on [him], no gun in [his] truck.” As to

the March 1, 2022 incident, Dean said that he and Mother had come to Texas that day

for a consultation with their family-law advocate and had driven back to Oklahoma

City the same day; he testified that he and Mother were at their residence in

Oklahoma from March 2 through March 7. The trial court asked Dean if Father

knew that they “were coming into town to see the family[-law] advocate,” and Dean

said, “Not that I know of.”

      5
       No such recordings were admitted in evidence.

                                           10
      D.     Analysis

      Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of past

family violence because Father could not visually identify his attackers during the

March 2022 incident, because the attack happened between March 1 and March 8 at a

time when Mother and Dean were in Oklahoma, and because no gun was found

during the December 2020 visit at the park.6 The record reflects that on redirect,

Father narrowed the date of the assault from “early March” to March 1, and Dean

testified that he and Mother were in the area that day to meet with a family-law

advocate. Even if the trial court did not believe Father’s testimony about the incident

with Dean and the gun at the park in December 2020, the testimony from Father and

Dean regarding the March 1, 2022 incident is legally and factually sufficient to support

a finding of past family violence. See Watts, 2019 WL 1388534, at *6; Finley v. Finley,

No. 02-11-00045-CV, 2015 WL 294012, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 22, 2015,

no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding evidence legally sufficient to support the

trial court’s granting of application for protective order because uncontroverted

testimony showed that father had broken into home where mother and son were

      6
        Mother also argues that Father’s claimed harassment from her via voicemail
messages was insufficient because the two voicemail messages that he played for the
trial court did not show a threat of harm and were only “requesting to speak with and
to have pictures of her children and expressing her exasperation with Father.” We
agree that the two voicemail messages did not reflect threats and therefore do not
focus on them in our analysis of past family violence.

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staying and tried to take son and then punched mother in the face). We overrule

Mother’s first issue.7

       As for the trial court’s finding that Mother was likely to commit family violence

in the future, evidence of past family violence can constitute sufficient evidence that

future family violence is likely. See Watts, 2019 WL 1388534, at *6; Maki v. Anderson,

No. 02-12-00513-CV, 2013 WL 4121229, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 15,

2013, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see also In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 544

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (“Oftentimes, past is prologue; therefore, past

violent conduct can be competent evidence which is legally and factually sufficient to

sustain the award of a protective order.”).       Given Father’s testimony and the

photographs of the injuries to his face and head, the trial court could have inferred

that Mother would continue to act the same way in the future. Further, the trial court

could have believed Father’s testimony that he was concerned for the future safety of

his children because Mother had threatened to take them out of the country.

       Mother argues that she “lives three hours away in a different state than [Father]

and works two jobs, which would most likely hinder her availability to commit acts of

       7
        Towards the end of the discussion of her first issue, Mother’s brief states that
“a finding of past family violence should actually be assigned to [Father].” As we
have stated in a prior opinion, “Our task is not to determine whether some evidence
in the record supports a finding contrary to the one the trial court made, as
[appellant’s] argument would require us to do.” Watts, 2019 WL 1388534, at *6.
Moreover, a court of appeals cannot make original findings of fact; it can only
“unfind” facts. Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1986).
Accordingly, we decline Mother’s implicit request to make a finding of past family
violence as to Father.

                                          12
future family violence.” Despite that distance and Mother’s two jobs, the record

demonstrates that Mother was able to come to Texas on March 1, 2022, and commit

an assault causing serious bodily injury to Father.

      Mother also cites to two cases from this court in arguing that “where no threats

of future violence were made, the court found that future family violence was unlikely

to occur despite there being a child in the situation.” See Huskins, 2022 WL 3905083,

at *3; Scott v. Wooley, No. 02-19-00318-CV, 2020 WL 7063292, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Both of the cases cited by Mother are

appeals from orders denying applications for protective orders. See Huskins, 2022 WL

3905083, at *1; Scott, 2020 WL 7063292, at *1. And in both cases, we stated that we

were deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations. See Huskins, 2022 WL

3905083, at *4; Scott, 2020 WL 7063292, at *5. We also defer to the trial court’s

credibility determinations here, and the record is clear that the trial court believed

Father’s testimony was credible.

      Applying the applicable standards of review, we hold that the evidence is legally

and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Mother is likely to

commit family violence in the future. See Watts, 2019 WL 1388534, at *6; Finley, 2015

WL 294012, at *4 (holding evidence factually sufficient to support protective order

based on prior assault).

      Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support both the trial

court’s finding that Mother had committed an act of family violence against Father in

                                           13
the past and its finding that Mother is likely to do so again in the future, we hold that

the trial court’s protective order is supported by legally and factually sufficient

evidence. See Watts, 2019 WL 1388534, at *6. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s two

issues.

                                    IV. Conclusion

          Having overruled Mother’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s protective

order.

                                                      /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                      Dabney Bassel
                                                      Justice

Delivered: April 6, 2023

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