Court Opinion

ID: 9372757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:15.687162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.196498
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                      2022 MSPB 42
                            Docket No. SF-1221-15-0660-W-1

                                  Anthony G. Salazar,
                                        Appellant,
                                             v.
                           Department of Veterans Affairs,
                                         Agency.
                                    December 13, 2022

           Anthony G. Salazar, Pico Rivera, California, pro se.

           Steven R. Snortland, Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

           Wonjun Lee, Esquire, Oakland, California, for amicus curiae, the Office of
            Special Counsel.

           Noah J. Fortinsky, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae, the
             Office of Special Counsel.

                                         BEFORE

                              Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                               Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                 OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision denying
     his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA) appeal.
     For the following reasons, we GRANT the petition for review. We AFFIRM the
     initial decision IN PART, to the extent it determined the appellant proved the
     agency took personnel actions against him and his disclosures were a contributing
                                                                                           2

     factor under the knowledge/timing test. However, we otherwise VACATE the
     initial decision and REMAND the appeal for further adjudication.

                                         BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a Motor Vehicle Operator Supervi sor in the agency’s
     Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System.             Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6
     at 27-28. Between November 2012, when his former first-level supervisor left
     her position as Chief of Transportation, and July 2014, when she was replaced,
     the appellant assumed the duties of the Chief of Transportation positi on. Hearing
     Transcript (HT) at 10, 13-16, 43-44 (testimony of the appellant). Both the Motor
     Vehicle Operator Supervisor and Chief of Transportation were required to
     oversee the vehicle fleet and fleet cards. 1 IAF, Tab 6 at 27-28, Tab 15 at 11; HT
     at 66-68 (testimony of the appellant).
¶3         On October 10, 2013, the appellant sent his supervisor an email reporting
     that an employee for the Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System’s Community
     Care Program had stored the keys and fleet cards for the vehicles assig ned to the
     Program in an unsecured location. IAF, Tab 5 at 62; HT at 16-19 (testimony of
     the appellant). On October 24, 2013, the appellant emailed his supervisor, as well
     as his second-level supervisor.       IAF, Tab 5 at 63.      In this email, he reported
     further details related to the failure of the Community Care Program to secure
     vehicle keys and cards, including that vehicles were missing and that there may
     have been fraudulent card use.        Id.; HT at 19-20 (testimony of the appellant).
     Although these vehicles and cards were assigned to the Program, the appellant
     was responsible for overseeing their security.             HT at 67-68 (testimony of
     the appellant).

     1
       A fleet card is a credit card for gasoline that goes with an individual fleet vehicle. HT
     at 67 (testimony of the appellant).
                                                                                            3

¶4         In January 2014, the agency convened an Administrative Investigation
     Board (AIB) to look into the theft of fleet vehicles, including those assigned to
     the Community Care Program. IAF, Tab 8 at 4. The AIB submitted its report
     2 months later, which included findings that the appellant’s supervisor failed to
     adequately oversee fleet vehicles and cards.                 Id. at 14-20.         It made
     recommendations, including that “disciplinary or other administrative action
     should be taken with respect to” the issues identified in its report. Id. at 23. As a
     result, the supervisor received a letter of counseling, for which he held t he
     appellant   partially responsible.       HT     at 230-32,   245     (testimony of         the
     appellant’s supervisor).
¶5         In March 2014, the appellant requested training in fleet management, which
     was to occur in May 2014. IAF, Tab 5 at 72-73. His supervisor responded that
     he “wanted to hold off a while . . . [because they] need[ed] to do a number of
     things before then in order to take full advantage of the training.” Id. at 72; HT
     at 251-52 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). He permitted the appellant to
     receive the training in September 2014.            HT at 249-50 (testimony of the
     appellant’s supervisor).     In June 2014, the supervisor changed the appellant’s
     performance standards.       IAF, Tab 5 at 26-30, 49-52.           After observing his
     performance on the new standards for 3 months, the supervisor issued the
     appellant   an   unacceptable     performance      notification    and     a   performance
     improvement plan (PIP).        Id. at 103-09.    The appellant was on the PIP for
     3 months    when   his     supervisor   proposed     his   removal       for   unacceptable
     performance. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-15. Following the appellant’s response, the agency
     removed him effective February 4, 2015. IAF, Tab 5 at 16.
¶6         The appellant asserted in this IRA appeal that the actions beginning with
     the delay of his training in May 2014, and ending with his removal in
     February 2015, were in reprisal for his two disclosures in October 2013. IAF,
     Tab 14 at 7-8, Tab 15 at 3-5, Tab 17 at 5-6. The administrative judge found that
     the Board had jurisdiction over the appeal and held a hearing.                 IAF, Tab 28,
                                                                                    4

     Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2, 14 n.7. He then issued an initial decision in which he
     found that the appellant made his disclosures in the normal course of his duties.
     ID at 19-26.   The administrative judge determined that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(f)(2) (2016), such disclosures are protected only if the employee proves
     by preponderant evidence that the agency took a given perso nnel action with an
     improper retaliatory motive. ID at 18-19, 29.
¶7        Upon finding no direct evidence of retaliatory motive, the administrative
     judge held that circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of an actual
     purpose to reprise could encompass the following factors: (1) whether the agency
     officials responsible for the personnel actions knew of the appellant’s disclosures
     and the timing of those actions; (2) the strength or weakness of the agency’s
     reasons for the actions; (3) whether the disclosures were directed personally at the
     agency officials responsible for the actions; (4) any desire or motive to retaliate
     against the appellant; and (5) whether the agency took similar personnel actions
     against similarly situated employees who had not made disclosures.        ID at 30.
     After looking at the totality of the evidence, the administrative judge concluded
     that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that the agency took
     the personnel actions with the actual purpose of retaliating agains t him. ID at 19,
     26-52. Thus, he found that the appellant did not prove that his disclosures were
     protected and denied corrective action. ID at 52-53.
¶8        The appellant has filed a petition for review, disagreeing with the standard
     articulated by the administrative judge. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
     at 8-10. He also has challenged the administrative judge’s factual findings, as
     well as his determination that he could not consider the appellant’s due process
     and harmful error defenses. Id. at 9-32. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
     has filed an amicus curiae brief.    PFR File, Tab 5; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.34(e)
     (setting forth the procedures for amicus curiae). The agency h as not responded to
     the petition for review, and neither party has responded to OSC.
                                                                                    5

                                        ANALYSIS
      The administrative judge erred by applying 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) because the
      appellant’s principal job function was not to regularly investigate and
      disclose wrongdoing.
¶9         The administrative judge applied 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) (2016) to find that
      the appellant’s disclosures were not protected. For the reasons that follow, we
      find that the appellant’s disclosures should have been analyzed under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8) and not subjected to the slightly higher burden of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2).

            The enactment of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) as part of the Whistleblower
            Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) clarified the scope of
            5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
¶10        Under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), which was in place before
      the WPEA, agencies generally were prohibited from engaging in reprisal for “any
      disclosure” that an employee reasonably believed evidenced certain categories of
      wrongdoing. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2011). A Senate report accompanying the
      bill that was enacted as the WPEA indicated that judicial and Board
      interpretations of the WPA had “narrow[ed] the scope of protected disclosures” in
      a manner that “undermine[d] the WPA’s intended meaning.”                S. Rep.
      No. 112-155, at 4-6 (2012), as reprinted in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 592-94.
      Most relevant to our discussion here, the report stated disagreement with the
      conclusion of the decision in Willis v. Department of Agriculture, 141 F.3d 1139,
      1140-41 & n.1, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1998), that disclosures made by a Government
      inspector concerning private parties’ noncompliance with Federal Government
      approved conservation plans were not protected under the WPA because he made
      them as part of his regular job duties.    S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 5-6 & n.13.
      Accordingly, the WPEA added the following provision:
            If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an
            employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection
            [5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)] if [the agency takes a personnel action] with
            respect to that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.
                                                                                     6

      WPEA, Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 101(b)(2)(C), 126 Stat. 1465, 1466 (codified at
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) (2012)).
¶11         In adopting this language, the Senate report stated that it was overturning
      prior case law, including Willis, and clarifying that a whistleblower is not
      deprived of protection just because the disclosure was made in the normal cour se
      of an employee’s duties. S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 5. However, the Senate report
      also explained that an appellant making a disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2)
      was required to show that “actual reprisal occurred,” i.e., that “the agency took
      the action with an improper, retaliatory motive.” Id. Thus, the report observed
      that the language of section 2302(f)(2) imposed an “extra proof requirement” or
      “slightly higher burden” for proving the disclosure was protected.         S. Rep.
      No. 112-155, at 5-6. In explaining the reason for this higher burden, the report
      identified the concern of “facilitat[ing] adequate supervision of employees, such
      as auditors and investigators, whose job is to regularly report wrongdoing”:
            Personnel actions affecting auditors, for example, would ordinarily
            be based on the auditor’s track-record with respect to disclosure of
            wrongdoing; and therefore a provision forbidding any personnel
            action taken because of a disclosure of wrongdoing would sweep too
            broadly. However, it is important to preserve protection for such
            disclosures, for example where an auditor can show that she was
            retaliated against for refusing to water down a report.
      Id.
¶12         In Day v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 18
      (2013), the Board observed that the WPA’s definition of disclosure contained in
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) was ambiguous as to whether disclosures made in the
      normal course of an employee’s duties were protected.          It found the new
      provision at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2), which was enacted as part of the WPEA,
      clarified this ambiguity to provide that these types of disclosures were covered
      under the WPA.     Day, 119 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶¶ 18-26.      The version of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2) enacted as part of the WPEA was the version in place when the
                                                                                     7

      events in this case occurred and when the administrative judge issued his
      May 2016 initial decision.

            The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (2018 NDAA)
            explicitly clarified the intent of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2).
¶13         In   May 2017,   the   Senate   Committee     on   Homeland   Security   and
      Governmental Affairs recommended passage of a bill titled the Office of Special
      Counsel Reauthorization Act of 2017. S. Rep. No. 115-74, at 1 (2017). The bill
      proposed to add language to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) providing that, “[i]f a
      disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the
      principal job function of whom is to regularly investigate and disclose
      wrongdoing, . . . the disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection [5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8)] if . . . [the agency takes a personnel action] with respect to the
      disclosing employee in reprisal for the disclosure.” S. Rep. No. 115-74, at 21-22
      (emphasis added). In recommending this modification, the Committee stated that
      it “clarifies that an employee with a principal job function of investigating and
      disclosing wrongdoing will not be excluded from whistleblower protection law s”
      if he can prove that actual reprisal occurred. Id. at 8; see S. Rep. No. 112-155,
      at 5 (containing the “actual reprisal” language).
¶14         An amended version of the bill passed the Senate on August 1, 2017, and
      was referred to the House of Representatives 3 days later, still containing the
      proposed change to section 2302(f)(2).      An Act to Reauthorize the Office of
      Special Counsel, and for other purposes, S. 582, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017);
      Communication from the Clerk of the House, 163 Cong. Rec. H6587 (Aug. 4,
      2017). The language of the bill, as passed by the Senate, later appeared, with
      relatively few changes, in the 2018 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097, 131 Stat.
      1283, 1615-23 (2017),        under the heading “Office of       Special   Counsel
      Reauthorization.”   In particular, the 2018 NDAA contained an amendment to
                                                                                      8

      5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) that was identical to the version in the Senate bill, save for
      one non-substantive change that is not relevant to our discussion here. 2 Compare
      Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(B)(ii), 131 Stat. at 1618, with S. 582, 115th
      Cong. § 4 (reflecting that the phrase “referred to” was moved from the middle to
      the beginning of a parenthetical).         Accordingly, we find that 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2) now expressly applies only to employees whose principal job
      functions are to regularly investigate and disclose wrongdoing.
¶15        Although not raised by the parties, we must address whether this amended
      language applies to this appeal, given that the actions at issue here took place
      before the 2018 NDAA was enacted. We find that it does. 3
¶16        The proper analytical framework for determining whether a new statute
      should be given retroactive effect was set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in
      Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994):
            When a case implicates a [F]ederal statute enacted after the events in
            suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has
            expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done
            so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules.
            When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the
            court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive
            effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he
            acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new
            duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statut e
            would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that

      2
        Apart from the Senate report on S. 582, discussed above, the legislative history is
      silent as to the purpose of the 2018 NDAA’s amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). For
      example, although it appears that the Senate and House agreed in November 2017 to
      add the Senate’s proposed version of section 2302(f)(2) to the 2018 NDAA, the
      accompanying report provides no explanation. H.R. Rep. No. 115-404, at 338-39
      (2017) (Conf. Rep.).
      3
        Given our determination that the 2018 NDAA’s amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) is
      retroactive, it is unnecessary to consider OSC’s motion seeking leave to file an
      additional pleading about the 2018 NDAA as it relates to this appeal. PFR File, Tab 9
      at 3.
                                                                                       9

            it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such
            a result.
      E.g., Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 31 (identifying Landgraf
      as providing the proper analytical framework for determining whether a new
      statute should be given retroactive effect); Day, 119 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 7 (same).
      The first step under Landgraf is to determine if Congress expressly defined the
      temporal reach of the statute. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280; Day, 119 M.S.P.R. 589,
      ¶¶ 7-8. If so, that command is controlling. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. Here, the
      2018 NDAA amending 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) is silent regarding retroactivity.
      Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(B)(ii), 131 Stat. at 1618; see Edwards,
      2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 29, 32 (so finding as to the 2018 NDAA’s amendment of
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C)).
¶17         We must therefore determine whether the amended provision impairs the
      parties’ respective rights, increases a party’s liability for past conduct, or imposes
      new duties with respect to past transactions. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. For the
      reasons that follow, we find that the 2018 NDAA’s modification of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2) does not have an impermissible retroactive effect under Langraf
      because it does not alter the parties’ respective rights or liabilities, and does not
      impose new duties to past transactions when compared to the earlier version of
      the statute initially contemplated by Congress as part of the WPEA.
¶18         When legislation clarifies existing law, its application to preenactment
      conduct does not raise concerns of retroactivity.     Day, 119 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 10.
      In determining whether a new law clarifies existing law, “[t]here is no bright-line
      test.” Id., ¶ 11 (quoting Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 506 (3d Cir.
      2008) (citation omitted)). However, “[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the intent
      of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight. ”        Id. (quoting Red Lion
      Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81
      (1969)). Other factors relevant in determining whether a legislative enactment
      clarifies, rather than effects a substantive change in, existing law are the presence
                                                                                    10

      of ambiguity in the preceding statute and the extent to which the new law resolves
      the ambiguity and comports with both the prior statute and any prior
      administrative interpretation.   Id. (citing Levy, 544 F.3d at 507 (finding these
      factors “particularly important” for “determining whether a new regulation
      merely ‘clarifies’ existing law”) (citations omitted)).
¶19         The first of these factors, expressions of legislative intent, weighs in favor
      of finding that the amended language of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) merely clarified its
      predecessor. In making this determination, we look to the legislative history of
      S. 582. When legislative history relates to prior drafts of a statute that did not
      change before passage, the Board may rely on that history in interpreting the
      enacted statute. See Ganski v. Department of the Interior, 86 M.S.P.R. 32, ¶ 12 &
      n.2 (2000) (relying on legislative history for a bill with the same language as the
      WPA that was pocket vetoed to interpret the enacted WPA); Special Counsel v.
      Santella, 65 M.S.P.R. 452, 462 & n.9 (1994) (considering the legislative history
      for a bill that never became law in interpreting a similar chan ge eventually
      effectuated as part of the WPA). Here, the legislative history of the 2018 NDAA
      does not explain the purpose of the modification to the WPEA’s version of
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). However, S. 582 included the same clause at issue here,
      later enacted as part of the 2018 NDAA, limiting the scope of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2) to disclosures made during the normal course of duties of an
      employee whose “principal job function . . . is to regularly investigate and
      disclose wrongdoing.” Further, the 2018 NDAA was enacted in December 2017,
      less than 5 months after the Senate passed S. 582 in August of the same year.
      Therefore, we find it appropriate to rely on the statement of the Senate Committee
      on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that S. 582 was intended to
      clarify in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) that employees whose principal job functions are
      to investigate and disclose wrongdoing are not excluded from whistleblower
      protections. S. Rep. No. 115-74, at 8. Accordingly, we conclude that the intent
                                                                                         11

      of Congress in adopting the relevant language at issue here was to clarify
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2). 4
¶20         We next turn to the question of whether the prior version of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2) was ambiguous and, if so, whether that ambiguity is resolved by the
      2018 NDAA in a manner that comports with the prior statute and administrative
      interpretation.   We find that the WPEA’s version of section 2302(f)(2) was
      ambiguous regarding what types of employees that provision was meant to cov er,
      and that the 2018 NDAA resolved that ambiguity. The administrative judge in
      Acha v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-13-0197-W-2,
      applied the heightened standard to a Forest Service purchasing agent. After the
      case was appealed, OSC filed an amicus brief arguing that Congress did not
      intend for the new heightened standard of section 2302(f)(2) to apply to a Federal
      employee whose core job functions did not require investigating and reporting
      wrongdoing. See Brief on Behalf of the United States Office of Special Counsel
      as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellant and in Favor of Reversal
      at 10-11, Acha v. Department of Agriculture, 841 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2016).
¶21         Because of the confusion over this issue, OSC requested of Congress a
      clarifying amendment, which was then included in the OSC reauthorization bill
      along with other legislative requests from OSC. 5          The clarifying amendment
      resolved this ambiguity and, as discussed above, comports with how Congress

      4
        In Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 29-33, we found that the expansion of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C) to include additional protected activities did not apply retroactively. In
      doing so, we observed that nothing in the 2018 NDAA, S. 582, or the latter’s bill report
      indicated that it was intended to clarify an existing law. Id., ¶ 33 n.11. Because bill
      report S. Rep. No. 115-74 contains such a statement as it concerns the change to
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2), we find the situation distinguishable from Edwards, and we
      do not apply the same analysis. See S. Rep. No. 115-74, at 8.
      5
        OSC’s amicus brief was submitted over a month after the House Committee on
      Oversight and Government Reform had already voted to the floor its v ersion of an OSC
      reauthorization bill, H.R. 4639, which is why the issue was not addressed in the
      House bill.
                                                                                        12

      described its purposes for the original language in the WPEA. Thus, we find that
      the 2018 NDAA’s version of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) may be applied retroactively
      in this case.

             The appellant’s principal job function was not to regularly investigate and
             disclose wrongdoing.
¶22         Turning back to the facts of this appeal, the appellant made his disclosures
      as part of his normal duties as a Motor Vehicle Supervisor. HT at 62 (testimony
      of the appellant).    Nonetheless, it is apparent that 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2), as
      recently clarified in the 2018 NDAA, does not apply to him. Section 2302(f)(2)
      includes only employees whose principal job functions are regularly investigating
      and disclosing wrongdoing.       The appellant’s principal job functions included
      supervising, scheduling, and monitoring staff, and ensuring good relationships
      with customers. 6 IAF, Tab 5 at 49-51, Tab 15 at 11-15. Although his position
      description indicated that he conducted “audits as directed,” this potential
      assignment was listed among a number of “General Administration and
      Operational Duties,” and there is no evidence that the agency routinely requested
      that he conduct audits or that conducting audits was the reason his position
      existed. IAF, Tab 15 at 12. Therefore, the appellant’s disclosures fall under the
      generally applicable 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), rather than 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2).

      The appellant established a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation.
¶23         To establish a prima facie case of reprisal for a disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8), an appellant must prove, by preponderant evidence, that: (1) he

      6
        We have considered the appellant’s principal duties in his assigned position of Motor
      Vehicle Supervisor at the time he made his disclosures. Although the appellant was
      performing the duties of the Chief of Transportation, he was not officially assigned to
      this position, but rather was “fill[ing] in” as required by his position description. HT
      at 15 (testimony of the appellant); IAF, Tab 15 at 14. There is no indication that the
      Chief of Transportation was principally tasked with investigating and
      disclosing wrongdoing.
                                                                                       13

      made a disclosure that a reasonable person in his position would believe
      evidenced any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement,
      a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
      to public health or safety; and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined b y 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a).      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); Webb v. Department of the Interior,
      122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6 (2015). Because the administrative judge found that the
      appellant did not make protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2), he
      did not make findings as to whether the appellant met his burden to prove that his
      October 2013 disclosures were protected under section 2302(b)(8). The appellant
      has not specifically addressed the elements of his prima facie case on review,
      although he generally asserts that he disclosed gross mismanagement and fraud.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 8, 14. We find the appellant has met his burden to prove his
      prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal.

            The appellant proved that he reasonably believed that his disclosures
            regarding fleet vehicles and fleet cards evidenced gross mismanagement.
¶24        The proper test for determining whether an employee had a reasonable
      belief that his disclosures were protected is whether a disinterested observer with
      knowledge of the essential facts known to, and readily ascertainable by, the
      employee      could   reasonably   conclude   that   the   actions   evidenced   gross
      mismanagement or one of the other categories of wrongdoing set forth in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8). See Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 5
      (2013).      “Gross mismanagement” is more than de minimis wrongdoing or
      negligence; it means a management action or inaction that creates a substantial
      risk of significant adverse impact on the agency’s ability to accomplish its
      mission. Swanson v. General Services Administration, 110 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 11
      (2008).
¶25        The agency’s mission “is to fulfill President Lincoln’s promise, ‘To care for
      him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan’ by
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      serving and honoring the men and women who are America’s Veterans.” IAF,
      Tab 5 at 96. Pursuant to an agency directive, “[i]t is [agency] policy to manage
      its vehicle fleet in an effective, efficient, and fiscally sound manner in order to
      support the [agency’s] mission.”        Id.    The appellant testified, without
      contradiction, that the agency’s Community Care Program used their fleet of
      88 vehicles to reach out to the veteran community, including in the effort “to end
      homelessness.” HT at 11 (testimony of the appellant).
¶26        The substance of the appellant’s October 10 and October 24, 2013
      disclosures was what he viewed as a “vehicle and credit card issue in the
      Homeless program [which] is in an alarming state of disarray and must be dealt
      with immediately.”    IAF, Tab 5 at 62.    Specifically, he stated that, based on
      reports he received from employees assigned to dispatch vehicles assigned to the
      Community Care Program, the fleet vehicle keys and cards were “stored in a
      room . . . , [to which] nearly everyone could gain access,” vehicle cards were
      missing, and “[i]t now is apparent that there was a lack of control of these cards
      and vehicles.” IAF, Tab 5 at 62, Tab 8 at 6, 11; HT at 16-19 (testimony of the
      appellant), 71-75 (testimony of a former Community Care Management Analyst).
      He further reported that “personnel from [the Program] stated that thirty of the
      eighty-eight vehicles were unaccounted for, with no idea who had possession of
      them,” and he was “aware of ten separate credit cards that [were] suspected of
      fraud.” IAF, Tab 5 at 63. The appellant’s supervisor testified that he viewed the
      appellant’s October 24, 2013 email as a report of gross mismanagement and that
      he agreed “obviously, something was amiss.” HT at 229-30 (testimony of the
      appellant’s supervisor). We find that the appellant reasonably believed that the
      agency’s mismanagement of fleet vehicles created a substantial risk of significant
      adverse impact on the agency’s ability to provide services to care for veterans,
                                                                                       15

      and in particular homeless veterans. 7 Because providing such services is part of
      the agency’s mission, we find the appellant’s disclosures were protected.

            The administrative judge properly determined that the appellant proved
            that the agency took personnel actions against him.
¶27         The administrative judge implicitly found that the appellant’s (1) delayed
      training, (2) changed performance standards, (3) placement on a PIP, and
      (4) removal were personnel actions as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).              IAF,
      Tab 17 at 6; ID at 14 n.7, 15. We agree. The appellant’s placement on a PIP and
      removal are personnel actions. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii), (viii) (defining
      “personnel action” to include disciplinary action s and performance evaluations);
      Gonzales v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 64 M.S.P.R. 314, 319
      (1994) (finding that placement on a PIP is, by definition, a threatened personnel
      action, such as a reduction in grade or removal).
¶28         Concerning his delayed training, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix) provides that
      “a decision concerning . . . training” is a personnel action “if the . . . training may
      reasonably be expected to lead to . . . [a] performance evaluation or other
      [personnel] action” described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). There must be, at a
      minimum, a moderate probability that the training would have resulted in , or
      avoided, some type of personnel action. Simone v. Department of the Treasury,
      105 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 9 (2007); Shivaee v. Department of the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R.
      383, 387 (1997). Here, that standard is met.
¶29         In March 2014, a Fleet Management Analyst from the agency’s Veterans
      Affairs Central Office offered to provide 2-day on-site training to the appellant
      and others in May 2014. IAF, Tab 5 at 72-73. The training would have given
      “assistance and oversight of Fleet Management responsibilities, mandates, and
      ensure policies/procedures are met.”        Id. at 73.    The appellant wanted to

      7
        The agency did not dispute below that, under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the appellant’s
      disclosures were protected. IAF, Tab 24 at 24.
                                                                                      16

      participate because he believed the training would assist the department in
      meeting fleet management goals and provide him with an opportunity to me et his
      standards. IAF, Tab 5 at 72; HT at 25-27, 53-54 (testimony of the appellant).
      The appellant’s supervisor denied his request for the training at that time. IAF,
      Tab 5 at 72. The appellant did eventually receive the training in September 2014,
      the same month that the agency placed him on a PIP for unacceptable
      performance pertaining to fleet management, which ultimately led to his removal.
      HT at 28 (testimony of the appellant), 249-53 (testimony of the appellant’s
      supervisor); IAF, Tab 5 at 16, 103, Tab 6 at 4-15.       The appellant’s first-level
      supervisor testified that the appellant “continued to be unsuccessful” after taking
      the training in September 2014.       Nonetheless, we find that at the time the
      appellant requested the training, it was possible that the training could have
      improved his performance, which may have made the PIP unnecessary. We find
      the delay of training in March 2014 was, therefore, a personnel action.
¶30         Regarding the June 2014 change in the appellant’s performance standards,
      “any . . . , significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions” is
      a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). We recently explained
      that, to amount to a “significant change” under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), an
      agency action must have a significant impact on the overall nature or quality of
      an employee’s working conditions, responsibilities, or duties.             Skarada v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 15.
¶31         Here, the appellant’s prior performance standards included just one critical
      element, “Program Administration,” which generally required that the appellant
      monitor resources for proper utilization, ensure satisfactory performance by staff,
      identify and fulfill staff training needs, and develop appropriate performance
      standards for staff.   IAF, Tab 5 at 78.     By contrast, the appellant’s updated
      performance standards included two critical elements, “Motor Vehicle Inventory
      Control” and “Motor Vehicle Maintenance and Reporting.” IAF, Tab 6 at 16-23.
      The new standards contained more extensive, focused, and specific requirements
                                                                                       17

      pertaining to vehicles, many of which included express deadlines. Id. at 20-22;
      HT at 191-93 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). In comparing his old and
      new performance standards, we find that the appellant was subjected to a
      significant change in duties and responsibilities because the new standards
      effectively changed his duties from supervising subordinate employees to
      tracking the location, and ensuring the maintenance, of vehicles.

               The administrative judge properly determined that the appellant proved
               contributing factor under the knowledge/timing test.
¶32        One of the ways to prove that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a
      personnel action is the knowledge/timing test, in which the appellant may
      demonstrate that the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure,
      and that the personnel action occurred within 1 to 2 years of the disclosure.
      Wilson v.    Department   of   Veterans   Affairs,    2022 MSPB     7,   ¶ 41.    The
      administrative judge found that the appellant met this test . ID at 30-31. The
      agency conceded below that the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test
      was satisfied for each of the alleged personnel actions.         IAF, Tab 24 at 24.
      We agree.
¶33        The appellant made his disclosures in October 2013 directly to his
      first-level supervisor, who, over the subsequent 15 months, delayed the
      appellant’s training, changed his performance standards, placed him on a PIP, and
      proposed his removal. IAF, Tab 5 at 16-18, 62-63, 72-73, 103-09, Tab 6 at 4-23;
      HT at 199 (testimony of appellant’s supervisor). The deciding official also had
      actual knowledge of the appellant’s disclosures. The appellant raised his belief
      that he was the victim of retaliation in his response to the proposed removal, as
      well as referring to and attaching his October 2013 emails. IAF, Tab 5 at 23-36,
      62-63.     The deciding official reviewed this response and was aware of the
      appellant’s allegation that the actions leading up to and including his proposed
      removal were in reprisal for his disclosures.        HT at 338-41 (testimony of the
      deciding official). The agency removed the appellant effective February 4, 2015,
                                                                                         18

      less than 2 years after he made his disclosures.        IAF, Tab 5 at 16.     Thus, the
      appellant has proven contributing factor.

      On remand, the administrative judge must address whether the agency proved by
      clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel actions
      absent the appellant’s protected disclosures.
¶34         When, as in this case, an appellant shows by preponderant evidence that he
      made protected disclosures and that those disclosures were a contribu ting factor
      in the decision to take personnel actions, the burden shifts to the agency to prove
      by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action s
      in the absence of the whistleblowing.           Smith v. Department of the Army,
      2022 MSPB 4, ¶¶ 13, 23.        Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or
      degree of proof that produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the
      allegations sought to be established. Id., ¶ 13 n.8; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e). It is an
      intentionally high standard of proof and is higher than the “preponderance of the
      evidence” standard. Chambers v. Department of the Interior, 116 M.S.P.R. 17,
      ¶ 28 (2011) (citations omitted); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e).
¶35         In determining whether an agency has met this burden, the Board generally
      considers the following (“Carr factors”):          (1) the strength of the agency’s
      evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to
      retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision;
      and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who
      are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.                 Soto v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see also Carr v. Social
      Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 8                    The

      8
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
      the All Circuit Review Act (Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510), appellants may file
      petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any
      circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
                                                                                      19

      administrative judge previously considered some of these factor s when analyzing
      whether the appellant’s disclosures were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2).
      ID at 32-52.    However, in doing so, he placed the burden of proof on the
      appellant. ID at 17-18, 26. Because 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) is inapplicable to this
      matter and this is a different stage of the proceedings with different burdens of
      proof, the administrative judge’s prior analysis must be reevaluated. We find it
      appropriate to remand this case because the administrative judge, as the hearing
      officer, is in the best position to make factual findings and detailed credibility
      assessments on the Carr factors.         See Mastrullo v. Department of Labor,
      123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 27 (2015) (citing this consideration in remanding an IRA
      appeal for an administrative judge to make a determination as to whether the
      agency subjected the appellant to a personnel action and, if so, to evaluate the
      remaining elements of the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal claim).
¶36         On remand, the administrative judge should reassess each of the Carr
      factors in light of the findings herein, giving weight to the appellant’s first-level
      supervisor’s motive to retaliate, as he testified that “it didn’t make [his] day” that
      he received the letter of counseling for mismanagement of vehicles, and
      responded in the affirmative to the question of whether he held the appellant
      partially responsible for the letter.    Id. at 245 (testimony of the appellant’s
      supervisor). Further, on remand, the administrative judge should consider that
      the appellant’s disclosures also reflected poorly on the appellant’s first-level
      supervisor and the deciding official as representatives of the general institutional
      interests of the agency, which is sufficient to establish retaliatory motive.
      Wilson, 2022 MSPB 7, ¶ 65; Smith, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶¶ 28-29.

      Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
      review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
                                                                      20

                                          ORDER
¶37        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case for further
      adjudication in accordance with this Opinion and Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:

      /s/
      Jennifer Everling
      Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.