Court Opinion

ID: 9514641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:53.25687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.651320
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 28.] The legislature established the requirements that must be met before a court may issue an order to forcibly medicate a patient. The legislature did so by statute. SDCL 27A-12-3.13. The majority opinion states that “[w]ords and phrases in [the] statute must be given their plain *429meaning and effect.” See ¶ 8 (citing Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539 (citations omitted)). However, the majority opinion fails to do so.
[¶ 29.] The statute provides that the administrator or facility director or attending psychiatrist “and” the person’s treating physician must agree that psychotropic medication will be medically beneficial to the person. The plain meaning and effect of the word “and” is that two things are required. In other words, the testimony of at least two people. The majority opinion claims that the statute does not set forth a testimonial requirement. However, the majority opinion does not cite any case from any jurisdiction to support the deletion of the word “and” based on the ruse of “no” testimonial requirement. How else would one establish that all of the requirements of the statute are met other than by presenting testimony from the administrator or facility director or attending physician “and ” the individual’s treating physician?
[¶ 30.] I agree that the language of SDCL 27A-12-3.13 is dear, certain and unambiguous. It clearly means exactly the opposite of what the majority opinion claims it means. The decision to forcibly medicate an individual is not one to be made lightly. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty. The purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes. While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1041, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). Before an individual is forcibly medicated, it is imperative that the individual’s due process rights be protected. SDCL 27A-12-3.13 requires that the administrator or facility director or attending psychiatrist “and” the individual’s treating physician agree that psychotropic medication will be medically beneficial and is necessary. Not only must two people concur in the need for medication, but they must both testify at the hearing in order to fully protect the individual’s rights and ensure that the statutory requirements are met. Before an individual is forcibly medicated and involuntarily subjected to the potentially dangerous side effects of anti-psychotic drugs, he should be allowed to cross-examine those advocating for the administration of medication. Those seeking to forcibly medicate carry the burden of proving that the statutory requirements have been met and should be held to a strict construction of the statute.
[¶ 31.] In addition, I disagree with the majority opinion’s claim that the 1999 legislative amendment eliminated “any possible confusion.” First, the amendment simply changes the words “in the opinion of’ to “believe,” which is basically the same standard. Secondly, the amendment adds a new requirement that the person’s treating physician AND the medical director or attending physician MUST personally examine the involuntarily committed patient before stating their belief. The plain meaning and effect is, once again, the exact opposite claimed by the majority opinion.8
[¶32.] We should reverse and remand and make the State meet the legislatively established statutory requirements before *430they can forcibly medicate an involuntarily committed patient. Therefore, I dissent.

. To my knowledge, none of the criminal statutes in South Dakota contain the language "this is a testimonial requirement." Under the precedent of this case, the majority could eliminate the necessity of proving the key elements of any crime simply by stating that those key elements were not testimonial requirements.
If that happens, GOOD-BYE CONSTITUTION, HELLO HITLER.