Court Opinion

ID: 9946266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 16:05:28.006922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:36.332491
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                            ____________

                          No. SC2022-0745
                            ____________

                       EVERETT G. MILLER,
                           Appellant,

                                 vs.

                       STATE OF FLORIDA,
                            Appellee.

                         February 29, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     Everett Glenn Miller appeals his convictions and death

sentences for the first-degree premeditated murders of Kissimmee

Police Officers Matthew Baxter and Richard “Sam” Howard, both of

whom were shot twice in the head from close range in 2017. We

have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons

we explain, we affirm Miller’s convictions and death sentences. 1

     1. Miller does not appeal his separate convictions and
sentences for one count of resisting a law enforcement officer
without violence, and one count of carrying a concealed firearm in
an establishment licensed to dispense alcohol.
                          I. BACKGROUND

     On August 18, 2017, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Miller pulled

his car over and angrily inserted himself into a conversation Officer

Baxter was having with three individuals who were loitering on a

street corner. At Miller’s request, Officer Baxter called his

supervisor to the scene. After the supervisor—Sergeant Howard—

arrived, Miller made certain comments that caused Sergeant

Howard to instruct the three loiterers to leave the area. Soon

thereafter, both Officers had been twice shot in the head. When

Miller was arrested in Roscoe’s, a local bar later that night, he was

carrying two firearms, including the murder weapon—a small .22

caliber revolver capable of being concealed in the palm.

     Before the murders, Miller, a former Marine, had been making

hateful anti-police and race-based social media posts, including this

post just hours earlier: “Am I the only one. Fuck a Cop . . . Racist

Fuckers.”

     At trial, Miller did not dispute that he killed both Officers. The

defense instead argued that premeditation was lacking, and that

Miller committed second-degree murder. The jury ultimately

convicted Miller of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder

                                 -2-
and later unanimously recommended death for each murder.

                             Guilt Phase

     The State presented the testimony of numerous witnesses,

including one of the three loiterers, various law enforcement

officials, a jailhouse informant, medical examiners, and employees

of Roscoe’s. The State also introduced, among other things,

forensic evidence, a video taken by one of the loiterers showing

some of Miller’s interaction with Officer Baxter, and Miller’s social

media posts expressing animus against the police. The evidence

established the following.

     On the night of the murders—at the location where the

murders were to occur—Officer Baxter approached Maribel

Gonzalez King, who had an open beer container, and her two

friends (nicknamed “Dash” and “Blaze”) who were all loitering on a

street corner in Kissimmee. King knew Officer Baxter (and Sergeant

Howard) from previous interactions. Officer Baxter was in full

police uniform, had a marked car, and was, according to King,

“calm and relaxed, like normal.”

     During Officer Baxter’s interaction with the three individuals,

Miller pulled up in his vehicle, stopped suddenly, got out, and

                                   -3-
walked toward Officer Baxter. After an obnoxiously loud Miller told

Officer Baxter to stop harassing people and requested that Officer

Baxter call his superior, Officer Baxter radioed his location and that

a black male wanted to speak to Sergeant Howard. Within minutes,

Sergeant Howard arrived in a marked car and full police uniform

and, according to King, “stayed calm the whole time.” Neither

Officer acted aggressively, threatened to use a weapon, or gave any

commands to Miller.

     Sergeant Howard’s demeanor changed after Miller commented

that he feared for his life and was eligible to carry a concealed

weapon. Upon hearing those words, Sergeant Howard instructed

King and her friends to move along. King, the last to walk away,

made it only halfway down the street when she heard two gunshots,

a pause, and two more gunshots. After hearing a car speed away,

King looked back and saw two officers on the ground.

     A woman who lived close to the murders also heard noises—

interrupted by a pause—that sounded like possible gunshots. She

looked outside her house and saw two police vehicles and a dark

vehicle. After seeing an individual speed away in the dark vehicle,

she saw two officers on the ground and called 911.

                                 -4-
     The first officers to arrive at the scene, Lieutenant Christopher

Paul Succi and Officer David Toro, noticed the bodies were

unusually situated. That is, Officer Baxter and Sergeant Howard—

each with a fully loaded pistol still securely holstered and an

undeployed taser—were “both on their backs, feet straight, arms to

the side,” and were “laying parallel next to each other, a few feet

apart.” In other words, their bodies had been positioned.

     Sergeant Howard had no defensive wounds, a “near contact”

gunshot wound on the left side of his head in the temporal region,

and a “near contact or intermediate” gunshot wound just above the

upper lip. Officer Baxter had some abrasions that were consistent

with a fight or altercation but also consistent with simply falling

and being scraped on the pavement. Officer Baxter also had two

gunshot wounds to the head—one through the lower lip, the other

to the back left side of the head—both of which were “contact

wounds.” The four bullets were ultimately recovered during the

Officers’ autopsies.

     Later the night of the shootings, the lead investigator, Corporal

Charles Hess, became aware that Dash had provided to law

enforcement a brief video he had taken of Officer Baxter’s

                                 -5-
interaction with the black male. After an investigator recognized

Miller in the video, a bulletin was put out, and the video was sent to

the field units.

     In the meantime, Miller abandoned his vehicle in a woman’s

yard and eventually made his way to Roscoe’s. Upon entering

Roscoe’s, Miller—an unfamiliar face—commented that “there was

some crazy stuff going on outside” and that he “was gonna stay and

have a drink.” Miller proceeded to the bar area, where he was calm

and coherent until a patron approached and asked if Miller had

shot two cops. Miller became agitated, denied shooting any officers,

and claimed he had been there at Roscoe’s. Another patron

overheard Miller say at one point that the Officers “got what they

deserved.”

     Miller’s behavior at Roscoe’s soon led to his arrest. After the

owner of Roscoe’s contacted law enforcement about an agitated

person and provided a description matching the individual in

Dash’s video, multiple deputies entered Roscoe’s and arrested

Miller, who was carrying a black 9mm Sig Sauer, a knife, and a

                                -6-
small .22 caliber “single action” revolver. 2 The .22 revolver—which

was found in Miller’s front pocket, holds five rounds, and does not

eject shell casings—had one live round and four that had been

fired. Firearms testing later confirmed that the four bullets

recovered during the Officers’ autopsies were fired from Miller’s

revolver.

     After Miller’s arrest, law enforcement located his dark blue Kia

Optima. Among other things, a latent print was discovered on the

trunk lid, and bloodstains were found on a rear tire. Fingerprint

analysis and DNA testing matched the print and blood to Sergeant

Howard. Other items sent for DNA testing—including physical

samples collected from Miller, and a hat and necklace recovered at

the crime scene—also tied Miller to the murders.

     Within days of the murders, Corporal Hess discovered Miller

had a YouTube channel for firearms instruction and review. One

video showed Miller using a single-action .22 caliber revolver to

rapidly fire successive bullets into a target’s head from

      2. As explained at trial, “single action” means that an
individual must perform two actions to fire the gun, namely pulling
back the hammer and then pulling the trigger.

                                 -7-
approximately ten yards.

     Corporal Hess also discovered Miller had been making anti-

law-enforcement posts on a Facebook page under the profile name

of Malik Mohammad Ali. For example, on August 12, 2017, Miller

posted comments including this one: “Punk AssBlack Cop. Here is

a real nigger! I would love to meet him.” That same day, Miller also

posted a picture of a law enforcement officer, with certain captions

including “There Are No ‘Good Cops.’ ” And as previously

mentioned, on August 18, 2017, hours before the murders, Miller

posted: “Am I the only one. Fuck a Cop . . . Racist Fuckers.”

     Lastly, Corporal Hess became aware that a jailhouse informant

came forward about conversations with Miller regarding the

murders. At trial, the informant testified that, among other things,

Miller used the Officers’ names as though he knew them, said he

“hated them” for always harassing people, and talked about what he

would have done if he had his AR-15.

     The defense called one witness, Miller’s half-sister, who

testified that Miller was loving and caring, and that before the

murders, he lost his job working for Sonoco, had a breakup with his

girlfriend, showered less, became jumpy, and started acting like

                                 -8-
somebody was watching him. She also testified that a few weeks

before Miller’s arrest, she drove him to the police station; he was

crying and chanting his military ID number.

     After hearing all the evidence, the jury unanimously convicted

Miller of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder.

                           Penalty Phase

     In the penalty phase, the State presented additional witnesses

and evidence, including additional Facebook posts by Miller.

     The State’s first witness, Julian Albright, who met Miller on

active duty and later worked with Miller for a military contractor

before Miller left that job in 2016, testified about a daytime meetup

he agreed to have with Miller at a 7-Eleven a month or two before

the murders. When Albright arrived at the 7-Eleven, he saw plainly

visible bags of marijuana in Miller’s backseat. Miller was

unconcerned about the drugs and at one point showed Albright a

very small .22-caliber-looking firearm while saying: “I’m not gonna

be another statistic. I’m not gonna be caught driving while black,

you know. . . . [I]f you’re gonna take me out, you know, I’ve got

this.” Miller also showed Albright a 9mm firearm and an AR-15.

     The State then called its anti-government extremism expert,

                                 -9-
J.J. MacNab, a research fellow at George Washington University’s

program on extremism. The State originally planned to call MacNab

during the guilt phase to opine that Miller had become a radicalized

Moorish sovereign and to explain how she reached that conclusion

based on the materials she examined. But after MacNab’s

testimony was proffered and a Daubert 3 hearing was held, the

parties called what the judge described as “an armistice on the

Moorish issue,” at least for the guilt phase. After the hearing, the

court issued an order qualifying MacNab as an expert to testify

about “the Moorish Sovereign Citizen Movement, including its

ideology and underlying customs, symbols and beliefs.” But the

court limited the scope of her testimony because of concerns about

“the danger of allowing her to testify to everything proffered.” And

the court limited her to “expository testimony only.”

     During MacNab’s limited penalty phase testimony, she

described the Moorish belief system, including that it is primarily a

Muslim group not recognized by standard Muslims, has an

alternative view of history, is non-violent, and is harmless at its

     3. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

                                 - 10 -
core. She then described how the white-supremacy-based

sovereign citizen movement influenced a pocket of Moorish

believers. She explained that Moorish sovereigns are “highly

distrustful of government,” tend to be “anti-white,” and do not have

a positive view of law enforcement. She also testified about an

uptick in Moorish sovereign violence after the 2014 events in

Ferguson, Missouri, and gave examples of Moorish sovereign

violence against law enforcement, mostly in 2016 and 2017.

     Following MacNab’s testimony, seven additional Facebook

posts by Miller were published to the jury. In the posts, all but one

of which were made on the day of or within days before the

murders, Miller expressed animus against white people, indicated

he identified as a Moor, or suggested an alternative view of history.

And in a post from a year before the murders, Miller shared a meme

of someone repeating themes and theories of sovereign citizens.

     The State then presented victim impact statements before

resting its case. The State also had victim impact videos but was

unable to play them before resting; the State needed time to edit the

videos in response to a last-minute defense objection and had been

granted permission by the court to play the videos during rebuttal.

                                - 11 -
     After the State rested, the defense called numerous witnesses,

including Albright. Several of the witnesses knew Miller from his

time as a Marine or his work for a military contractor. According to

those witnesses, Miller was a very good Marine and person, was an

imaging analyst before later becoming a targeteer, was involved in

targeting strikes into Afghanistan where innocent people were

occasionally killed, and had been deployed a few times, including to

Afghanistan in 2013. One witness testified Miller had problems

sleeping while in Afghanistan and, upon returning, occasionally had

nightmares. Another witness acknowledged Miller’s military

records included a court martial from 1992 in which one of the

charges was assault by waving a dangerous weapon. And one

witness testified that Miller’s decision to leave military contracting

was primarily a financial one.

     Some of Miller’s family members testified about his happy

childhood and how his demeanor changed after leaving the military.

Miller’s cousin, for example, testified that Miller became depressed

and remorseful, was in a downward spiral, tried to get help from

Veterans Affairs (VA), and was committed under the Baker Act due

to an incident in which he was running around town in his

                                 - 12 -
underwear. And Miller’s daughter testified he seemed to be

suffering and was more paranoid.

     Miller’s father testified to being a Jehovah’s Witness and

taking Miller to Kingdom Hall every week when Miller was growing

up, to having a brother who had post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD), and to divorcing Miller’s mother, marrying his current wife,

and being given custody of and raising Miller. Miller eventually

went to live with his mother, who was not a Jehovah’s Witness and

was more likely to allow him to play high school sports. Miller later

signed up for the Marines, married, had a daughter, divorced, and,

after leaving military contracting, worked with his father at Sonoco

before being laid off and living house to house.

     Dr. Steven Gold, a psychologist and professor, opined that

Miller met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and two statutory

mitigators, namely that Miller was under the influence of extreme

mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crimes, and that

Miller’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially

impaired. See § 921.141(7)(b), (f), Fla. Stat. Dr. Gold further

opined that something likely triggered Miller’s PTSD on the night of

                                - 13 -
the murders and that Miller was weighed down by stressful

circumstances, including that he had been subjected to fire while

deployed, and was involved in strikes that resulted in civilian

deaths. At one point, after being asked by defense counsel about

Miller’s Facebook posts, Dr. Gold noted that the posts expressed

hateful anger towards white people and that anger can be a

symptom of PTSD.

     Dr. Gold was not the only defense witness asked by defense

counsel about Miller’s anti-white posts or whether Miller was a

racist. Indeed, at one point during a sidebar, the trial judge

commented that the defense had “repeatedly brought up, through

every single witness, the racism issue.”

     When the defense’s final witness was temporarily unavailable,

the State began calling rebuttal witnesses, including two who

provided additional context regarding Miller’s Baker Act incident.

One testified that Miller described the incident as follows: Miller had

a disagreement with his uncle and stripped down to prove he was

unarmed; on Miller’s way back to his car, a man flashed a gun at

Miller, who then went to retrieve his AR-15; when Miller was told

the police were coming, he ditched the AR-15 in the woods and later

                                - 14 -
asked someone to retrieve and hide it in Miller’s trunk.

     After the State’s initial rebuttal witnesses, the court recessed

for a long weekend. When the proceedings resumed, the victim

impact videos were played first thing, with limiting instructions

given before and after the videos were played.

     The defense then called its final witness, Dr. Robert Cohen, a

behavioral health officer and neuropsychologist. Dr. Cohen opined

that Miller was likely suffering from PTSD at the time of the

murders, was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional

“disorder,” and had cumulative trauma stemming from deployments

and a hospital bombing.

     The State then called its remaining two rebuttal witnesses.

One testified regarding the incident that led to Miller’s court

martial. The other, Dr. Michael Gamache, a psychologist, rebutted

the defense experts’ conclusions that Miller suffered from PTSD.

Dr. Gamache also opined that the evidence was insufficient to

support “extreme mental disorder or extreme mental illness” at the

time of the crimes. According to Dr. Gamache, four factors affected

Miller’s conduct in the summer of 2017: alcohol, cannabis,

adjustment disorder (from stress), and ego (adjustment to post-

                                 - 15 -
military life).

      The jury unanimously recommended death sentences for each

murder, finding beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of all four

proposed aggravators, namely: (1) the victim was a law enforcement

officer engaged in the performance of his official duties; (2) the

defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a

felony involving the use or threat of violence to another person

(based on the contemporaneous murders of Officer Baxter and

Sergeant Howard); (3) the capital felony was a homicide and was

committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without

any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); and (4) the capital

felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any

governmental function or the enforcement of the laws. Each juror

also found that no mitigating circumstance was established.

                          Spencer 4 Hearing

      At the Spencer hearing, the State presented additional victim

impact testimony before the defense called a handful of witnesses.

      One defense witness testified regarding the events that led to

      4. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).

                                 - 16 -
Miller’s court martial, including that he was with Miller and never

saw Miller with a gun. And two witnesses testified Miller received

the least amount of punishment possible in a court martial

proceeding.

     Another witness, Adam Thomas, who was twice deployed to

Iraq with Miller, explained what imagery analysis entails and

testified regarding the lasting impact (upon Thomas) of the threats

of indirect fire attacks they received while deployed. After returning

from Iraq, Thomas noticed things about Miller that were out of

character, including Miller’s extreme Facebook posts.

     Dr. Elizabeth McAlister, who teaches Africana religions at

Wesleyan University, opined that Miller did not like participating as

a Jehovah’s Witness when growing up and was spiritual but not

religious. She also testified that in the summer of 2017, Miller

became interested in Moorish Science and tracing his heritage. She

acknowledged the increase in sovereign Moors but opined that

Miller was a normative Moor—as distinct from Moors influenced by

sovereign citizens—although she conceded there is racial animus

within the Moorish sovereign group and that Miller’s social media

posts were out of character for a normative Moor.

                                - 17 -
                             Sentencing

     The trial court agreed with the jury regarding the four

aggravators. The court merged them to three, as follows: (1) prior

capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence to

another person (based on the contemporaneous murders); (2A) the

capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful

exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of the

laws, merged with (2B) the victim was a law enforcement officer

engaged in the performance of his official duties; and (3) CCP. The

court assigned each aggravator very great weight.

     Regarding mitigation, the court explained that Miller “offered

three statutory . . . mitigating circumstances” as well as thirty-three

proposed other factors in Miller’s background that would mitigate

against imposition of the death penalty under section 921.141(7)(h),

Florida Statutes. The court found that one “statutory” mitigator

had been proven, namely no significant history of prior criminal

activity (moderate weight). 5 As to the remaining proposed

      5. The court concluded that Miller failed to establish two
other statutory mitigators, namely that he was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that his capacity

                                 - 18 -
mitigation, which Miller grouped into seven “categories,” the court

found that the mitigation was generally established and assigned it

varying weight. 6

     In the end, the court imposed a sentence of death for each

murder after concluding “that the aggravating factors far

outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances and support[ed] the

recommendations of the jury for a sentence of death as to [each

murder].” The court further found that “any of the considered

aggravating factors found in this case, standing alone, would be

sufficient to outweigh the mitigation in total.” This appeal followed.

                           II. ANALYSIS

     Miller raises seven issues in this appeal. We also

to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.

      6. Specifically, the court found as follows regarding the
remaining proposed mitigation: (1) Miller’s service to his
country/United States Marine Corps and contracting (considerable
weight); (2) Miller’s service-related traumatic experiences (little
weight); (3) Miller’s downward spiral into mania and madness (little
weight); (4) statutory mental health mitigators (previously
discussed); (5) Miller’s mental and physical health symptoms and
diagnosis (some weight); (6) Miller’s family life and relationships
(very little to no weight); and (7) good citizen; service to the
community (little weight).

                                - 19 -
independently review whether the evidence was sufficient to support

the murder convictions.

               Race, Religion, and Political Beliefs

     Miller first argues that, although evidence of his animus

against law enforcement was admissible, the State crossed the line

in the penalty phase by introducing his anti-white and pro-Moor

Facebook posts and the testimony of MacNab, the State’s expert

who provided expository testimony regarding Moorish sovereigns.

Miller asserts the State was erroneously permitted “to inject race,

politics and religion into th[e] case,” thereby denying him a fair

penalty phase. He argues the testimony and additional Facebook

posts were not relevant—in part because neither victim was white—

and in any event unfairly prejudicial. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat.

(“Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”).

     At the outset, we note that the arguments Miller presents are

not entirely consistent with those he presented (or failed to present)

below. As an example, Miller argues relevance and unfair prejudice

with respect to MacNab’s testimony and the additional posts, but

the defense below effectively conceded the relevance of the posts.

                                 - 20 -
That is, shortly before MacNab testified, the defense objected to the

posts on relevance grounds before conceding they “would become

relevant” if the State “put Ms. MacNab on first,” which is precisely

what the State did. The defense then stated its objection was on

prejudice grounds.

     To the extent Miller’s arguments have not been waived, we

review this issue for abuse of discretion. See Hudson v. State, 992

So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008) (“We review a trial court’s decision to

admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.”). We

recognize that evidence of religious or political beliefs or of racial

slurs can be unfairly prejudicial, particularly in a penalty phase.

But here, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

permitting the State to present MacNab’s testimony and the

additional posts, the probative value of which related to the State

attempting to establish an all-encompassing motive for the murders

and was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice.” § 90.403, Fla. Stat. Even assuming an error occurred,

we deem it harmless. 7

     7. Miller’s “politics” argument is undeveloped. To the extent
the beliefs he references are those of being “highly distrustful of

                                  - 21 -
     We have said that “[t]he CCP aggravator pertains specifically to

the state of mind, intent, and motivation of the defendant.” Hilton

v. State, 117 So. 3d 742, 753 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Wright v. State, 19

So. 3d 277, 298 (Fla. 2009)). Here, the trial court permitted the

State to introduce the items at issue for that purpose—i.e., to

explain the intent and motivation underlying bizarre murders

committed by an otherwise decorated Marine. The State’s plausible

theory was that Miller became radicalized online and adopted an

extremist anti-government and anti-law-enforcement belief system

under which he came to view—and abhor—all law enforcement as

the tyrannical arm of a racist and oppressive system. So much so

that police officers, no matter their skin color, represented a

constant threat to black people, including Miller. The evidence

contextualized the things going on in Miller’s mind, with his anti-

white posts being intimately tied up with his view of the police as

institutionally racist. Cf. United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518,

1528 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[E]vidence of [the defendant’s] racist views

government and having a dislike for law enforcement,” they clearly
had probative value, as explained below.

                                - 22 -
not only demonstrated the context, motive, and setup of the crime,

but was necessary to complete the story . . . .”). The items

presented could help show that Miller had anger and hatred that

could lead to the very violence in which he engaged, and against

precisely the victims he chose. Allowing the State to show that

Miller acted on the hatred of law enforcement fueled by that

mindset was not unfairly prejudicial.

     Even if the trial court erred in allowing some of the evidence,

any error was harmless. The State did not make religion a feature

of the penalty phase. 8 And Miller’s arguments regarding race are

undermined by the fact that the defense itself made Miller’s racism

or lack thereof a theme in the penalty phase. The defense’s

approach was to essentially establish that Miller had an untreated

mental illness, had never been racist, and that his extreme

Facebook posts (and other things) expressing hatred and anger

     8. We reject Miller’s suggestion that the State painted him as
a post-9/11 “Islamic extremist.” Moreover, this case was “not the
prosecution of a religion.” Beasley, 72 F.3d at 1526 n.7. Indeed,
MacNab made clear that the Moorish belief system is non-violent
and has core beliefs or ideals that are harmless, including the
promotion of entrepreneurialism and self-reliance.

                                - 23 -
were the product of that illness. In painting that picture, the

defense brought up the racism issue through numerous defense

witnesses, including Dr. Gold, who opined that Miller’s anti-white

posts supported a PTSD diagnosis. Another defense witness,

Martin Hamann, who worked with Miller for a military contractor

and became friends with Miller, even referenced anti-white posts

the State had not introduced. Namely, Hamann testified on direct

that he spoke with Miller after the August 2017 violent events that

occurred in Charlottesville, Virginia, and could not understand why

Miller would post things like “kill whitey.” Unsurprisingly, the State

used Hamann’s testimony to then introduce a post Miller made,

just days before the murders, about killing “all the whitety i see.”

     The defense made racism a theme to the point that the trial

judge at sidebar during Hamann’s testimony commented that

defense counsel “repeatedly brought up, through every single

witness, the racism issue.” The record reflects that the judge was

keenly aware and did not want the “anti-white sentiment” to

become a theme. But the defense largely made it one.

     The one case cited by Miller in his initial brief, McDuffie v.

State, 970 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007), does not support a new penalty

                                 - 24 -
phase. McDuffie—which had nothing to do with race, religion, or

politics, and which involved cumulative error in the guilt phase—

held that the trial court erroneously admitted, over objection,

unfairly prejudicial testimony of the “inflammatory contents of a

voice mail [the defendant left for someone who was not one of the

victims] depicting [the defendant] as a person with a vicious temper

who wishes on another individual a fate similar to that of the

victims of the Washington, D.C./Baltimore area snipers.” Id. at

326-28. According to McDuffie, the voice mail details “bore no

relationship to the crimes” and were not “probative of whether [the

defendant] committed robbery and murder.” Id. at 328. Here,

rather than bearing “no relationship to the crimes,” MacNab’s

testimony and the additional Facebook posts could help to

contextualize the crimes.

     The four additional cases cited in Miller’s reply brief are also

not on point. See Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1, 5-8 (Fla. 1988)

(vacating death sentence where prosecutor’s examination of

defense’s medical expert “was a deliberate attempt to insinuate that

[defendant] had a habit of preying on white women,” which “had no

bearing on any aggravating or mitigating factors”); Johnson v. State,

                                - 25 -
61 So. 2d 179, 179 (Fla. 1952) (affirming a conviction and death

sentence even though defendant’s confession presented to the jury

contained “expressions of [defendant’s] political beliefs” that “were

wholly immaterial and irrelevant”); Torres v. State, 124 So. 3d 439,

442 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (remanding for resentencing because

sentencing judge’s comments improperly suggested the judge’s

“condemnation of [defendant’s] behavior was based on the court’s

own religious beliefs”); Guerrero v. State, 125 So. 3d 811, 812, 816

(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (reversing conviction because prosecutor made

defendant’s alleged racial slurs “a feature,” even though the slurs—

unsurprisingly—“did not tend to prove any element of [battery or

trespass]”). Here, the items were relevant and not unfairly

prejudicial, and the defense made Miller’s racial prejudice “a feature

of” the penalty phase. We deny this claim.

             MacNab’s Expert Status and Testimony

     Related to the previous issue, Miller claims the trial court

erred in even qualifying MacNab as an expert witness. Miller

advances two undeveloped arguments in his initial brief, namely

that MacNab’s expository testimony during the penalty phase was

“not relevant” and was “pure opinion testimony,” and that she

                                - 26 -
lacked credentials and had “inherent bias.” 9

     The parties agree our standard of review is abuse of discretion.

See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997) (holding

that “abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard” that “an

appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision to

admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert”). We conclude

that to the extent this issue is adequately briefed—most of Miller’s

“argument” is merely a summary of MacNab’s proffer, defense

counsel’s arguments at the Daubert hearing, and MacNab’s penalty

phase testimony—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

qualifying MacNab as an expert to provide expository testimony.

     First, Miller asserts that MacNab’s expository testimony was

“not relevant” in that it “was not directly related to [Miller’s] actions

or beliefs,” and was “pure opinion testimony” that “is no longer

      9. In his reply brief, Miller asserts new arguments, including
assailing MacNab’s brand of “content analysis” and claiming that
“whether to hold that content analysis as used in this case has
sufficient scientific reliability is of first impression to this Court.”
But these “new arguments . . . were not raised in his initial brief”
and are therefore “waived.” Truehill v. State, 358 So. 3d 1167, 1186
n.12 (Fla. 2022). In any event, MacNab never discussed content
analysis or offered an opinion during her penalty phase testimony.

                                  - 27 -
admissible” in the wake of the Legislature’s “Daubert

amendment[s].” See ch. 2013-107, Laws of Fla. (“WHEREAS, by

amending s. 90.702, Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature

intends to prohibit in the courts of this state pure opinion

testimony as provided in Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla.

2007) . . . .”). But Miller fails to show that the defense objected on

these grounds. The most we find in the record is a general

objection of “I object to that as well” after the trial judge, shortly

before MacNab’s testimony, stated that MacNab was “[t]here for

expository testimony only, which is she has certain specialized

training and experience to describe a belief system.” This issue was

not preserved.

     Notwithstanding this waiver, Miller’s argument is without

merit. Although unclear, it appears he conflates “pure opinion

testimony” and “expository testimony.” But pure opinion testimony

requires, at a minimum, “an expert’s opinion.” Marsh v. Valyou, 977

So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Flanagan v.

State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993)), receded from by In re

Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d 551, 551-52 (Fla. 2019).

MacNab’s non-opinion expository testimony, by definition, was not

                                  - 28 -
pure opinion testimony.

     To the extent Miller suggests expository testimony is always

inadmissible in the wake of the Daubert amendments and this

Court’s adoption of “the Daubert standard . . . for expert testimony

found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702,” In re Amends. to Fla.

Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d at 551-52 (footnote omitted), we

disagree. Section 90.702, Florida Statutes, amended as part of the

Daubert amendments, expressly contemplates that an expert may

testify without offering an opinion. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2023)

(permitting an expert to testify “in the form of an opinion or

otherwise” if it “will assist the trier of fact” (emphasis added)).

Miller offers no authority to the contrary. See State v. Dobbs, 945

N.W.2d 609, 621, 624 (Wis. 2020) (concluding that state evidence

code, modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 702, “permit[s] an

expert witness to testify in the form of an opinion ‘or otherwise,’

including exposition testimony on general principles without

explicitly applying those principles to, or even having knowledge of,

the specific facts of the case” (quoting Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1)));

United States v. Galatis, 849 F.3d 455, 462 (1st Cir. 2017)

(concluding that expert testimony explaining the Medicare

                                  - 29 -
“regulatory framework” without “appl[ying] the regulations to the

facts of the case” or opining on the legality of the conduct at issue

“was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702”).

     Miller’s second argument is that MacNab “has no academic

credentials” and “no academic study” relating to “Moor beliefs or

sovereign citizen extremists,” and is purportedly “a pro-state zealot.”

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that MacNab had sufficient qualifications and in

determining that certain “deficiencies,” including her lack of any

“degrees in the subject of her proposed testimony,” would be “ripe

for cross examination” if she testified at trial, but were “not a basis

to exclude her testimony.”

     After an extensive proffer and Daubert hearing, the trial court

concluded that MacNab had “sufficient knowledge and experience”

regarding “the Moorish Sovereign Citizen Movement.” The trial

court reasoned in part as follows:

     The hearing transcript . . . sets forth years of work
     history, including research, lectures, consultations and
     training for organizations, on the subject of her proposed
     testimony. Although MacNab has no formal education or
     degrees in the subject of her proposed testimony, a lack
     of peer reviewed publications in the subject of her
     proposed testimony, and has never been qualified as an

                                 - 30 -
     expert in the subject of her proposed testimony, she has
     devoted nearly 20 years of her life to the subject. While
     these deficiencies are ripe for cross examination . . . , it is
     not a basis to exclude her testimony.

The court later explained that MacNab “has used [the knowledge

she gained over the years] in the past to present, lecture and

consult with various organizations, such as the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS),

Department of Justice (DOJ) and local law enforcement agencies.”

     We find no abuse of discretion. Section 90.702 permits a trial

court to qualify an expert witness based on “knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education.” (Emphasis added.) MacNab’s

extensive “knowledge” and “experience”—acquired over twenty

years—supports the trial court’s decision. See Jackson v.

Household Fin. Corp. III, 298 So. 3d 531, 536 n.3 (Fla. 2020) (“Even

with respect to expert testimony, oftentimes, the amount of training

or experience required is minimal.” (citing Bell v. State, 179 So. 3d

349, 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015))). To the extent Miller asks us to hold

that any expert—in anti-government extremism or otherwise—must

possess certain academic credentials or study, we decline to rewrite

section 90.702. We deny this claim.

                                 - 31 -
                                   CCP

       Miller next argues the trial judge erred in finding the CCP

aggravator. That aggravator requires proof of four elements, namely

that

       the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection
       and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a
       fit of rage (cold); that the defendant had a careful plan or
       prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal
       incident (calculated); that the defendant exhibited
       heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the
       defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.

Joseph v. State, 336 So. 3d 218, 239 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Franklin v.

State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007)). Miller claims the “calculated”

and “heightened premeditation” elements are lacking. See Campbell

v. State, 159 So. 3d 814, 831 (Fla. 2015) (“Evidence proving

heightened premeditation can sometimes overlap with evidence

proving the prearranged plan necessary to establish CCP.”). He

argues the murders were “unplanned” and that premeditation

formed only after he was alone with both Officers.

       Miller largely asks this Court to reweigh or reassess evidence,

something we do not do “[w]hen reviewing claims alleging error in

the finding of aggravating factors.” Id. at 830 (citing Franklin, 965

So. 2d at 98). “Rather, this Court’s role is to review the record to

                                  - 32 -
determine whether the trial court applied the correct rule of law . . .

and, if so, whether competent, substantial evidence exists to

support its findings.” Id. (citing Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98). Here,

the sentencing order thoroughly addresses each element of CCP

and how it was established by the evidence. Our review of the

record leaves undisturbed the finding of CCP.

     “A determination of whether CCP is present is properly based

on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.” Colley v.

State, 310 So. 3d 2, 13 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Gill v. State, 14 So. 3d

946, 962 (Fla. 2009)). We have said that “CCP can be indicated by

the circumstances showing such facts as advance procurement of a

weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of a

killing carried out as a matter of course.” Ballard v. State, 66 So.

3d 912, 919 (Fla. 2011) (citing Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270

(Fla. 1988)). Those are plainly “the circumstances” here, given the

execution-style killings committed without provocation or much if

any resistance, with a weapon Miller had shown Albright weeks

earlier while discussing a potential police encounter. In any event,

we address the two disputed elements.

                                - 33 -
     The “calculated” element of CCP requires “a careful plan or

prearranged design to commit murder.” Joseph, 336 So. 3d at 239

(quoting Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98). Here, competent, substantial

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Miller had a

“prearranged design to commit violence upon law enforcement

officers” and that he expressed that prearranged design “before and

after the murders in several different ways.” That evidence

includes: Miller’s Facebook posts; Miller showing Albright the small

firearm and claiming he was “not gonna be another statistic”;

Miller’s jailhouse comments; Miller’s comment in Roscoe’s that the

Officers “got what they deserved”; Miller summoning a second

officer to the scene; and the execution-nature of the killings using a

concealable firearm Miller was proficient in using to shoot bullets

into a target’s head. One can conclude from this body of evidence

that the killings were “calculated.” See Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d

178, 194 (Fla. 2011) (“[W]here a defendant arms himself in advance,

kills execution-style, and has time to coldly and calmly decide to

kill, the element of ‘calculated’ is supported.”).

     The “premeditated” element of CCP “is heightened

premeditation, defined as ‘deliberate ruthlessness.’ ” Ballard, 66

                                  - 34 -
So. 3d at 919 (quoting Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1008

(Fla. 1994)). Although “heightened premeditation” requires some

period of reflection, there is no “bright-line rule for how much

reflection suffices.” Colley, 310 So. 3d at 14. Miller certainly had

time to reflect, given that he requested the presence of a second

officer and then managed to shoot two armed officers with point-

blank shots to the head. The execution-style nature of the murders

supports this element, see Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087,

1107 (Fla. 2004) (“[W]holly unnecessary, execution-style murders

are prime examples of the ‘deliberate ruthlessness’ for which

application of the CCP aggravating factor is reserved.”), as does the

other evidence relied on by the trial court. The court quite sensibly

determined the most “reasonable sequence of events” was that

Miller shot each Officer to the back left side of the head (shooting

the larger Sergeant Howard first), and then positioned the bodies

before shooting each Officer directly in the face. Needless to say,

such “conduct . . . exhibited deliberate ruthlessness.” Bonifay v.

State, 680 So. 2d 413, 419 (Fla. 1996).

     Miller’s fact-based arguments are unavailing. For example,

his assertion that he “was always armed” is irrelevant, even more so

                                - 35 -
given that he showed Albright a similar weapon and made

comments indicating preparedness for a police encounter. Just as

irrelevant—even if true—is Miller’s claim he did not target these two

specific Officers. See Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 678 (Fla. 1997)

(“The focus of the CCP aggravator is the manner of the killing, not

the target.” (citing Sweet v. State, 624 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla.

1993))). In any event, at a minimum, Miller targeted “law

enforcement personnel” generally. See Howell v. State, 707 So. 2d

674, 682 (Fla. 1998) (upholding CCP where defendant “had

sufficient opportunity to formulate the intent that law enforcement

personnel would be the bomb’s intended victim”).

     Lastly, we have upheld CCP in certain cases in which the

defendant murdered a police officer not long after becoming

ensnared in a police inquiry. See Jackson v. State, 704 So. 2d 500,

501-02, 504-05 (Fla. 1997) (defendant self-vandalized her car and

then murdered officer who was preparing the police report and who

attempted to arrest defendant); Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 43, 48

(Fla. 1991) (defendant executed officer during traffic violation stop).

CCP is far more compelling here, where Miller, who had been

making hateful anti-law-enforcement posts, executed two officers

                                 - 36 -
after inserting himself into a situation having nothing to do with

him. We deny this claim.

                  Miller’s Mental Health “Defense”

     In Miller’s only guilt phase claim, he argues the trial judge

erroneously excluded what Miller describes as “heat of passion

evidence through the use of mental health experts.” Miller asserts

the trial judge “erroneously believed that [Miller] was attempting to

present a diminished mental capacity defense.” We conclude that

the trial court carefully and correctly ruled on the issue.

     During guilt phase opening, defense counsel conceded the

murders and argued it was “appropriate for a lesser included

offense to be considered by the jury,” on the ground that

premeditation was lacking. Defense counsel argued Miller’s life

leading up to the murders was “the perfect storm” in that Miller:

had worked in Kabul; began having nightmares and being jumpy

“around 2013”; “deteriorate[d] through 2016 after he return[ed]

to . . . Kissimmee”; had “difficulty adjusting to civilian life”; was

“laid off” in May 2017; was “drinking” and “smoking weed” to self-

medicate; “sought help from the VA”; had a breakup with his

girlfriend and “didn’t have any place to live”; “started posting crazy

                                  - 37 -
things on Facebook”; was committed under the Baker Act one

month before the murders; and “suffered from depression, anxiety,

nightmares.” And defense counsel stressed that “the why” was

important.

     The State responded by filing a motion arguing that evidence

of Miller’s drinking or marijuana use was prohibited by section

775.051, Florida Statutes, and that the defense was otherwise

presenting a “general, abnormal mental condition defense” long

deemed inadmissible by this Court. The trial court largely agreed,

concluding that: evidence Miller was self-medicating with drugs or

alcohol was inadmissible under section 775.051, which provides

that “[v]oluntary intoxication . . . is not a defense”; evidence

regarding Miller being committed or suffering from depression or

anxiety was inadmissible evidence of abnormal mental condition;

and all other items would only be excluded if the defense attempted

to relate them to a mental condition. The trial court did not err in

precluding Miller’s approach to negating premeditation.

     Premeditation, of course, “is the key element that separates

first-degree murder from second-degree murder.” Twilegar v. State,

42 So. 3d 177, 190 (Fla. 2010) (citing Randall v. State, 760 So. 2d

                                 - 38 -
892, 901 (Fla. 2000)). Although a defendant is free to argue that

premeditation is lacking, a defendant may not—as Miller attempted

to do—present “evidence of diminished mental capacity . . . to

negate the specific intent required to convict of first-degree

premeditated murder.” Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla.

1989); 10 see also Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 2006)

(“[D]iminished capacity is not a viable defense in Florida.”); Hodges

v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 352 n.8 (Fla. 2004) (“[E]vidence of an

abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity is

inadmissible to negate specific intent.”); Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d

922, 929 (Fla. 1987) (“[I]n the absence of a plea of not guilty by

reason of insanity, testimony concerning a defendant’s mental state

is inadmissible during the guilt phase of a trial.”), disapproved of on

other grounds by Owen v. State, 596 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1992); Zeigler

v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981) (“During the guilt phase of

the trial, testimony regarding the mental state of a defendant in a

criminal case is inadmissible in the absence of a plea of not guilty

     10. Chestnut recognized that such evidence might, however,
be “appropriate” in “mitigation.” 538 So. 2d at 825. Here, Miller
did present the evidence in mitigation.

                                 - 39 -
by reason of insanity.” (citing Tremain v. State, 336 So. 2d 705 (Fla.

4th DCA 1976))).

     The clear import from defense counsel’s opening statement is

that Miller was mentally unwell and thus did not—or could not—

form the specific intent to commit premeditated first-degree murder.

Indeed, Miller acknowledges his “theory of defense” was that “an

unspecified mental illness . . . should permit the jury to find a

verdict of second[-]degree murder.” Our caselaw does not permit

that type of “defense.”

     The cases Miller cites are easily distinguished, as they involve

evidence regarding seizures, e.g., Bunney v. State, 603 So. 2d 1270,

1273 & n.1 (Fla. 1992), or certain “state-of-mind evidence” to prove

self-defense, e.g., State v. Mizell, 773 So. 2d 618, 620-21 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2000). Miller’s case does not involve seizures or self-defense.

We deny this claim.

              Adequacy of Florida’s Capital Scheme

     Miller argues that “Florida’s capital scheme, as administered

in 2021, fails to adequately reduce the risk of arbitrary infliction of

death sentences.” Miller asserts that “multiple vital safeguards for

[Florida’s] system have either been eliminated or eroded” since

                                 - 40 -
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Miller’s “safeguards”

argument is based on these three developments in our law: (1)

Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), which eliminated

comparative proportionality review; (2) Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d

179 (Fla. 2020), which eliminated what Miller describes as “the

‘reasonable hypothesis of innocence’ motion for judgment of

acquittal”; and (3) “aggravator creep.” Miller’s argument fails under

our caselaw.

     Recently, this Court in Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005 (Fla.

2023), upheld a death sentence against a constitutional challenge

based on two of the three purported infirmities alleged by Miller,

namely “the sheer number of aggravating factors in the statute

combined with [this Court’s comparative proportionality] holding in

Lawrence.” Id. at 1015. Wells first noted that this Court, “even

with the statute in its current form,” had “repeatedly rejected the

argument that the death-penalty statute violates the Eighth

Amendment because it fails to sufficiently narrow the class of

murderers eligible for the death penalty.” Id. (citing cases). Wells

then explained that Lawrence “d[id] not alter our analysis.” Id. On

that point, Wells reasoned that “Lawrence recognized that

                                - 41 -
comparative proportionality review was not an integral component

of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citing Lawrence, 308 So. 3d at 548-

50, 552).

     Our decision in Bush similarly “does not alter our analysis.”

Id. Bush merely abandoned a “special appellate standard” that

“used a different standard to evaluate evidence on appeal in a

wholly circumstantial evidence case than in a case with some direct

evidence.” 295 So. 3d at 184. Bush discontinued the use of that

standard because it was “unwarranted, confusing, and out of sync

with both the jury instructions currently used in this state and the

approach to appellate review used by the vast majority of the courts

in this country.” Id. at 199. Miller fails to explain how eliminating

a confusing and unwarranted standard of review creates a

constitutional problem. We deny this claim.

                         Mercy Instruction

     Miller next argues the trial court committed “structural” error

by denying his request for an express jury instruction on mercy and

instead reading Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 7.11.

Miller’s “argument that he was entitled to a jury instruction on

mercy is . . . without merit.” Bush, 295 So. 3d at 210. Indeed,

                                - 42 -
Miller acknowledges this issue is foreclosed by our caselaw.

     In Woodbury v. State, 320 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 2021), for example,

the trial court rejected similar requested special jury instructions

on mercy and instead read Standard Jury Instruction 7.11, the

relevant portion of which provided: “Regardless of the results of

each juror’s individual weighing process . . . the law neither

compels nor requires you to determine that the defendant should be

sentenced to death.” Id. at 655-56. Woodbury affirmed, reasoning

that Standard Jury Instruction 7.11 “adequately informed the

jurors of the applicable legal standard” and was “not ambiguous

when it comes to addressing the jurors’ options.” Id. at 656.

Woodbury also noted that this Court has “referred to the relevant

provision of Standard Instruction 7.11 as the ‘mercy instruction.’ ”

Id. (quoting Reynolds v. State, 251 So. 3d 811, 816 n.5 (Fla. 2018)).

According to Woodbury, the trial court thus “did read an instruction

on mercy.” Id. Here, although Miller “might have preferred the

wording of his proposed instruction,” id., the trial court did not err

in reading Standard Jury Instruction 7.11. We deny this claim.

                      Victim Impact Evidence

     Miller next argues that introduction of the victim impact

                                 - 43 -
videos “in penalty phase rebuttal” rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair. The videos, played without music, span approximately eight

minutes and show photo montages of both Officers. Miller does not

take issue with any specific photos or the length of the videos, just

“the timing and placement of the evidence” that was purportedly

played “just before jury deliberations.”

     The parties agree our standard of review is abuse of discretion.

See Kalisz v. State, 124 So. 3d 185, 211 (Fla. 2013) (“A trial court’s

decision to admit victim impact testimony is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion.”). Under that deferential standard, we “will not find

an abuse of discretion unless the trial court makes a ruling which

no reasonable judge would agree with.” Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1013.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under

the circumstances. Even assuming an error occurred, it was not

“so unduly prejudicial that it render[ed] the trial fundamentally

unfair.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). In other

words, no fundamental error or due process violation occurred. See

Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 858 (Fla. 2012) (“The analysis to

determine if admission of victim impact evidence has violated a

defendant’s due process rights in the penalty phase of a capital trial

                                - 44 -
parallels the analysis for fundamental error.” (quoting Wheeler v.

State, 4 So. 3d 599, 607 (Fla. 2009))).

     The record establishes that two nights before the penalty

phase began, the defense objected to portions of the videos despite

being provided the videos “months in advance.” When the penalty

phase began on Tuesday, November 5, 2019, the prosecutor

informed the judge that edits to the videos would take time and

requested permission to play the videos during rebuttal. In

agreeing to that request, the court relied on “the lateness of the

objections,” juror inconvenience, the absence of constitutional

“limits on when [victim impact information] can be provided,” and

limiting instructions that would be given.

     By Friday, November 8, 2019, the State had presented its

case-in-chief and certain victim impact statements, and the defense

had called all but one witness, Dr. Cohen, who was unavailable.

So, the State called some rebuttal witnesses, and the court

adjourned for a long weekend. On Tuesday, November 12, 2019—

the day before closing arguments—the videos were played before the

remaining witnesses were called so that the videos were not the

final items of evidence introduced before closing argument. The

                                - 45 -
court explained to the jurors why the information had not “been

played earlier” with “the victim impact statements.” The court also

read a limiting instruction before and after the videos were played,

explaining the purpose for which the videos were presented and

instructing the jurors not to consider the information as evidence of

an aggravating factor. The defense then called Dr. Cohen, followed

by the State calling the remaining rebuttal witnesses.

     As recognized by the trial judge, there does not appear to be

any authority for the proposition that victim impact information

“can only be presented in the State’s case-in-chief.” The statute

governing the admission of victim impact evidence, section

921.141(8), Florida Statutes, does not squarely address the issue,

although the statute arguably suggests the information will

generally be presented during the State’s case-in-chief.

§ 921.141(8), Fla. Stat. (allowing the prosecution to introduce and

argue victim impact evidence after “the prosecution has provided

evidence of the existence of one or more aggravating factors”). Nor

has our caselaw addressed this issue. 11 Indeed, neither party cited

     11. The State cites Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 2017),
but the “additional victim impact testimony” there was presented

                                - 46 -
any case—from any jurisdiction—addressing victim impact evidence

presented during penalty phase rebuttal.

     Given the circumstances (caused by the defense), the

reasonable steps taken by the trial court (including the explanation

and unobjected-to limiting instructions given to the jury), the highly

deferential standard of review, and the absence of a per se bar to

ever presenting victim impact evidence during rebuttal, we deny

this claim.

                    Sufficiency of the Evidence

     Lastly, even though Miller does not challenge the sufficiency of

the evidence, this Court independently reviews the record in all

death penalty cases to determine whether competent, substantial

evidence supports the murder convictions. See Fla. R. App. P.

9.142(a)(5); Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 501 (Fla. 2011). In

conducting this review, we “view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State” and ask whether “a rational trier of fact

could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond

“[a]t the subsequent Spencer hearing,” not during penalty phase
rebuttal. Id. at 39 (footnote omitted).

                                - 47 -
a reasonable doubt.” Allen v. State, 322 So. 3d 589, 603 (Fla. 2021)

(quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).

     To prove first-degree premeditated murder, the State was

required to establish the following three elements: (1) the victim is

dead; (2) the death was caused by the criminal act of the defendant;

and (3) the victim’s death was premeditated. Id. (citing Glover v.

State, 226 So. 3d 795, 804 (Fla. 2017)). Here, sufficient evidence

supported the convictions.

     The State presented extensive evidence, including eyewitness

testimony, video evidence, forensic evidence, and the murder

weapon itself, that placed Miller at the scene and directly tied him

to the murders. Premeditation, which “may be inferred” from the

evidence, Glover, 226 So. 3d at 806 (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.

2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993)), was also sufficiently established, given

that, among other things, Miller had been making hateful anti-

police social media posts leading up to the murders, angrily

inserted himself into a situation having nothing to do with him,

requested the presence of a second officer and then shot both

Officers execution-style—using a single-action firearm requiring two

separate decisions for each bullet fired—while taking the time to

                                - 48 -
pose the bodies.

                         III. CONCLUSION

     For the reasons stated above, we affirm Miller’s convictions

and death sentences.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, J., concurring in result.

     I continue to adhere to my dissent in Lawrence v. State, 308

So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020), wherein this Court abandoned this Court’s

decades-long practice of comparative proportionality review in the

direct appeals of sentences of death. For this reason, I can only

concur in the result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County,
    Greg Allen Tynan, Judge
    Case No. 492017CF002906XXXAXX

Matthew Metz, Public Defender, George D.E. Burden, Assistant
Public Defender, and Kathryn R. Radtke, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,

     for Appellant

                               - 49 -
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick
Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

     for Appellee

                              - 50 -