Court Opinion

ID: 9426701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:18:42.478925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:02.519252
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Powell joins, concurring in the judgment.
The question presented for decision in this case is whether New York’s use of racial criteria in redistricting Kings County violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. The petitioners’ contention is essentially that racial awareness in legislative reapportionment is unconstitutional per se. Acceptance of their position would mark an egregious departure from the way this Court has in the past analyzed the constitutionality of claimed discrimination in dealing with the elective franchise on the basis of race.
The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. They have made no showing that the redistricting scheme was employed as part of a “contrivance to segregate”; to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons to participate in the political process. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52, 58; White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755; Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145; Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is whether the reapportionment plan represents purposeful discrimination against white voters. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229. Disproportionate impact may afford some evidence that an invidious purpose was present. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266. But the record here does not support a finding that the redistricting plan undervalued the political power of white vot*180ers relative to their numbers in Kings County. Cf. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358. That the legislature was aware of race when it drew the district lines might also suggest a discriminatory purpose. Such awareness is not, however, the equivalent of discriminatory intent. The clear purpose with which the New York Legislature acted—in response to the position of the United States Department of Justice under the Voting Rights Act—forecloses any finding that it acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters.*
Having failed to show that the legislative reapportionment plan had either the purpose or the effect of discriminating against them on the basis of their race, the petitioners have offered no basis for affording them the constitutional relief they seek. Accordingly, I join the judgment of the Court.

It is unnecessary to consider whether the position of the Department of Justice in this case was required or even authorized by the Voting Rights Act. It is enough to note that the Voting Rights Act and the procedures used to implement it are constitutionally valid, see, e. g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544; Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, and that the procedures followed in this case were consistent with the Act. Congress has established an exclusive forum—the District Court for the District of Columbia—and provided exclusive standing in the State or political subdivision to raise the issue of substantive compliance with the Act. 42 U. S. C. § 1973l (b) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). That procedure was not invoked by New York here, and the issue of statutory compliance is consequently not properly before us.