Court Opinion

ID: 9941208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 05:05:54.62918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:20.961980
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re M. M. HOLCOMB, Minor.                                          February 15, 2024

                                                                     No. 366476
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2021-000491-NA

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BORRELLO and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his
minor child, MMH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused sexual abuse and the court
finds likelihood that child may suffer from injury in the foreseeable future if placed in parent’s
home), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
(reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent), MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) (the parent abused
the child, the abuse included criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, and there is a
reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to care of the parent), and (k)(ix)
(the parent abused the child, the abuse included sexual abuse, and there is a reasonable likelihood
that the child will be harmed if returned to care of the parent). We affirm.

                                             I. FACTS

        The trial court acquired jurisdiction over MMH following the authorization of the
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services’s (DHHS) petition for permanent custody
alleging that respondent father sexually abused MMH. The mother of MMH was not a respondent
in this matter. MMH remained in her mother’s care during and after the termination proceedings
against respondent father.

        On December 6, 2022, a Children’s Protective Services (CPS) case worker filed a
permanent custody petition on behalf of petitioner in Wayne Circuit Court requesting that the trial
court take jurisdiction over MMH under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (failure to provide proper care and
custody due to neglect or abandonment), and (2) (unfit home environment due to neglect), remove
MMH from respondent’s care, and enter an order terminating respondent’s parental rights to MMH
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), and MCL
712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) and (k)(ix). The petition alleged that respondent sexually abused MMH on

                                                -1-
July 26, 2022, when respondent “put his finger in her vagina” to check to see if she was sexually
active. A complaint regarding the incident was received by CPS on September 6, 2022. The
complaint stated that respondent went to say goodnight to MMH and “found her masturbating
while on [F]ace[T]ime with an unknown person.” Respondent then pushed open MMH’s legs,
and put his finger in her vagina. The petition stated that MMH’s mother was informed of the
incident on September 5, 2022, by the mother of MMH’s boyfriend. The mother of MMH’s
boyfriend went to the home of MMH’s mother and told her that MMH had confided in her son that
she was “fingered” by respondent. MMH was taken to a hospital for a sexual abuse examination
on September 5, 2022, but the examination was unable to be conducted because of the lapse of
time since the incident. The abuse was reported to the Detroit Police Department on September 5,
2022. The petition further stated that on September 14, 2022, MMH participated in a forensic
interview. At the interview, MMH said that respondent put his finger in her vagina and then said
that “someone’s been there.” MMH then said respondent told her to hug him, which she did while
only wearing a t-shirt and bra, no underwear. The trial court authorized the petition and suspended
respondent’s parenting time.

         On March 6, 2023, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that MMH
came within the jurisdiction of the court under MCL 712A.2(b) as to respondent. The court
reasoned that respondent “has failed to provide necessary support and care for the child and
provided an unfit home. The child is at substantial risk of harm to her mental well-being….” The
court expressed to respondent’s counsel that proper care and support included not inappropriately
disciplining or sexually abusing a child, and that the court was not finding that respondent was
financially unable to care for MMH. MMH testified to the abuse as described in the petition, and
the trial court found her to be “enormously credible, 100 percent credible.”

        The court concluded that there was penetration of MMH’s vagina and whether it was for
sexual gratification or not, respondent “does not respect boundaries. He does not know how to
discipline a child or how to deal appropriately with children….” The court also concluded that
there was clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix) because of the sexual abuse MMH had
suffered from at the hands of respondent. Specifically, the court’s order of adjudication stated:

       There is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of the father’s
       rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). Under (b) the
       child has suffered sexual abuse by her father and there is a reasonable likelihood
       that the child will suffer abuse in the foreseeable future if placed with the father.
       He repeatedly denied the abuse and attempted to blame and embarrass the child to
       Ms. Hernandez. Under (g) the father failed to provide proper care and custody for
       [MMH] by abusing her and there is no reasonable expectation that the father will
       be able to provide proper care within a reasonable time. Under (j) there is a
       reasonable likelihood based upon the father’s sexual abuse of [MMH] that she will
       be harmed if returned to him. Under (k)(ii) and (ix) the father sexually abused
       [MMH] including penetration.

       On April 21, 2023, following a “best interest hearing,” the court terminated respondent’s
parental rights, finding termination was in MMH’s best interests by a preponderance of the
evidence. The court did not find respondent’s contention that MMH’s mother forced MMH to

                                               -2-
make these disclosures to be credible. Respondent felt that MMH’s mother was jealous of his new
partner, but the court noted that according to MMH’s testimony, her mother only raised the issue
once she learned about it from the mother of MMH’s boyfriend more than a month later. The court
reasoned that it would not make sense for MMH’s mother to be jealous of respondent and his new
partner after all this time when his oldest child with his new partner was already six years old.
Instead, the court found MMH to be “fully credible” and that “there was zero evidence that she
had been put up to making her disclosures.” The court agreed with the clinician assigned to the
case who determined that the sexual abuse allegations against respondent “present an ongoing
concern for [MMH’s] safety.” The court also agreed with the clinician’s finding that respondent’s
response to MMH’s behavior was extreme and raised concerns of his “judgement, decision
making, and impulsiveness.” While it was unclear whether respondent’s actions were done for
disciplinary reasons or for sexual gratification, the court found either would be “inappropriate”
and “bizarre.”

        On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that there
were statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights because petitioner failed to present clear
and convincing evidence to meet its burden under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and
(k)(ix). Respondent also argues that it is not in MMH’s best interests for his parental rights to be
terminated because he was not given the opportunity to complete a treatment plan, this is the first
time he has been accused of sexual abuse, MMH is still living with her mother and not being placed
for adoption, and he has a good relationship with MMH, despite the allegations. We disagree with
respondent’s arguments and conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix), and did not
clearly err when it determined that termination was in the best interests of MMH.

                                  II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

       Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that the DHHS
presented clear and convincing evidence to support termination of his parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). We disagree.

         “To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established.” In re Moss, 301
Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings and
ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination for clear error. In re White, 303
Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing
court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to
the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-
297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).

        The clear and convincing evidence standard is “the most demanding standard applied in
civil cases[.]” In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

       Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
       belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established,
       evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the factfinder to

                                                -3-
       come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in
       issue. [Id. (citation omitted).]

The trial court “may take into consideration any evidence that had been properly introduced and
admitted at the adjudication trial… along with any additional relevant and material evidence that
is received by the court at the termination hearing . . . .” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 316; 964
NW2d 881 (2020).

                                    A. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i)

        MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) provides for termination of parental rights under the following set
of circumstances:

       (b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or
       sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:

       (i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the
       court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury
       or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.

        Throughout the entirety of the proceedings, details of respondent’s alleged sexual abuse of
MMH remained consistent. Petitioner’s permanent custody petition described how MMH told
forensic interviewers that respondent stuck his finger inside of her vagina as his way of
determining whether she was sexually active. At trial, the court heard testimony from MMH and
she confirmed what she told the forensic interviewers. The trial court found MMH to be a credible
witness and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence to show that respondent had
sexually abused her. The trial court also heard testimony from CPS workers that believed
respondent created a risk of future harm to MMH.

        Respondent argues that the sexual abuse allegations are untrue, that he has not been
incarcerated for the allegations, and that he has a good relationship with MMH. The trial court,
however, found that that there was a reasonable likelihood that the child would suffer from injury
or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s home because his behavior was
extreme, bizarre, and inappropriate, no matter his reasons for acting in this way. It also determined
that respondent repeatedly tried to blame and embarrass MMH when speaking with CPS workers.

       We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding there was a statutory ground to
terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). The trial court properly
weighed the evidence and made the reasonable determination that MMH was sexually abused by
respondent, and that MMH would likely suffer abuse in the future if respondent was allowed to
maintain his parental rights. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and
convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i).

                                     B. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)

        To terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), DHHS must demonstrate that
“[t]he parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper
care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to

                                                 -4-
provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” MCL
712A.19b(3)(g).

        Respondent argues that clear and convincing evidence was not shown to prove he is unable
to provide proper care for MMH. However, petitioner presented evidence of respondent’s sexual
abuse through the testimony of MMH and CPS case workers. MMH testified that she had lived
off and on with respondent and that during the previous school year, she lived with him for a
portion of the year and then lived with him on weekends without issues. The trial court concluded
that respondent failed to provide proper care and custody for MMH when he sexually abused her
and there was no expectation that he would be able to provide proper care within a reasonable
time. The trial court made clear to respondent that it was not finding him to be financially unable
to support MMH, and instead was finding he was unable to support and care for her because of his
inappropriate and extreme behavior involving sexual abuse.

        The trial court did not err in concluding there were statutory grounds to terminate
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The trial court properly weighed the
evidence and made the reasonable determination that, despite respondent’s apparent ability to
financially support MMH, there were no indications that respondent would be able to provide
MMH proper care in the future after he sexually abused her. Therefore, the trial court did not
clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).

                                       C. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)

        A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity
of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.”
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Termination is proper pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if there is a
potential of physical or emotional harm to the children. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268;
817 NW2d 115 (2011).

        Respondent argues that he did not sexually abuse MMH, that he has always taken good
care of her, and that there have not been any other sexual abuse allegations in the past. Petitioner,
however, presented evidence at trial that showed the sexual abuse did in fact occur, and that MMH
needed trauma counseling because of the abuse. Additionally, MMH told CPS workers that she
did not want to see respondent.

        The trial court did not err in concluding there were statutory grounds to terminate
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). MMH’s testimony that respondent put
his finger in her vagina was clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood
that she would be harmed if returned to respondent’s home based on his prior conduct. Not only
would MMH be subject to potential physical harm, she would be subject to continued emotional
harm by being placed in a home with her abuser, for which she already receives counseling. If
respondent is allowed to retain his parental rights, it would risk further emotional harm to MMH.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to
terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Because we find that at least
one statutory ground for termination existed, we need not consider the additional grounds upon

                                                  -5-
which the trial court based its decision. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105
(2009). See also Moss, 301 Mich App at 80 (“To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find
by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has
been established.”).

                                      III. BEST INTERESTS

        Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that termination of
his parental rights was in the best interests of MMH under MCL 712A.19b(5). We disagree.

        “Even if the trial court finds that [DHHS] has established a ground for termination by clear
and convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children.” In re
Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). This Court reviews a trial
court’s best-interests determination for clear error. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276; 976
NW2d 44 (2021). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special
opportunity to observe the witnesses.” BZ, 264 Mich App at 296-297.

       “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). In making its determination, the trial court should weigh all of the
evidence available to it and may consider the following:

       [T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
       permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
       parent’s home. Other considerations include the length of time the child was in
       care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the
       foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan. [In re
       Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346-347; 990 NW2d 685 (2022) (quotation marks and
       citation omitted).]

Moreover, “[a] child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to
consider.” Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434. While placement with a relative weighs
against termination, it is not dispositive because a trial court “may terminate parental rights in lieu
of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

        Respondent argues that it is not in MMH’s best interests for his parental rights to be
terminated because he was not given the opportunity to complete a treatment plan, this is the first
time he has been accused of sexually abusing one of his children, MMH is still living with her
mother and not being placed for adoption, and he has a good relationship with MMH, despite the
allegations.

       The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in MMH’s best interests. The trial court carefully reviewed the evidence

                                                 -6-
presented by both parties and determined that it was in MMH’s best interests to terminate
respondent’s parental rights because he sexually abused her. The trial court concluded that
respondent’s actions were extreme and that they raised questions about his judgement. The court
took note of the testimony from CPS case workers that said MMH did not want to see respondent
and had no desire to be reunified with him. The court also took issue with respondent placing
blame for the incident on MMH’s mother. The trial court found that respondent would be a danger
to any child in his care. Thus, the trial court found that a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrated it was in MMH’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights,
notwithstanding MMH being in her mother’s custody. See Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at
434 (a trial court must consider a minor child’s placement with relatives).

       We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found terminating respondent’s
parental rights to be in MMH’s best interests.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                            /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                            /s/ Mark T. Boonstra

                                               -7-