Court Opinion

ID: 9721426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:59:03.436867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.772933
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(for affirmance in part and reversal in part). This appeal was argued first on June 24 last. The presentations that day apprised the Court fully that the main issue on review was of such statewide concern as to call for representation of the people by the Attorney General under MCLA 14.28 and 14.101; MSA 3.182 and 3.211. Accordingly, an order entered directing reargument of the appeal during the instant September session with request that the Attorney General brief the posed questions and participate in resubmission of the case. That has been done. The briefs and arguments of the plaintiffs, the defendants and those of the Attorney General, and the briefs of volunteering counsel amicus, have been most helpful in reaching one clear conclusion of uniform agreement. It is that an insidious^ “sleeper” has rested and now rests comfortably in the finance and taxation article of the Constitution of 1963. What if anything can be done about it is, of course, something else. That we perceive by conflicting quotations, post, of the respective briefs.
It is fair to say that one of the ten most notable opinions recorded in American jurisprudence was contributed by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197, 400-411; 24 S Ct 436; 48 L Ed 679 (1904). With argument and reargument as noted, this appeal like Northern Securities has grown to the status of a *50great case as well as a hard case. Hopefully, it will not make bad law on account of desperate or implausible effort to save that which, sadly, no longer is.1
Justice Holmes opened his review of Northern Securities with these oft quoted and ultimately prophetic words:
“Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend. What we have to do in this case is to find the meaning of some not very difficult words. We must try, I have tried, to do it with the same freedom of natural and spontaneous interpretation that one would be sure of if the same question arose upon an indictment for a similar act which excited no public attention, and was of importance only to a prisoner before the court.”
The Court in Northern Securities was concerned with the interpretation and application of a congressional act.; whereas our main question calls for the interpretation and application of a constitutional provision. The principle in today’s instance is nonetheless the same. It consists of judicial duty “to read English intelligently” (Holmes, J. in Northern Securities at 401); English written with clever clarity into the giving first paragraph and the taking second paragraph of section 6 of the finance and taxation article (Const 1963, art 9).
*51Section 6 in the constitution proper is headed “Limits on ad valorem taxes”. In Callaghan’s Michigan Statutes Annotated and in West’s Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated the first paragraph of the section is headed “15-mill limitation” and “15-mill limitations” respectively, and the second pararaph (in both) is headed “Nonapplication of Limitation”. There is no such “Nonapplication” notice in the constitution. The two paragraphs, pertinent here, read as follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the total amount of general ad valorem taxes imposed upon real and tangible personal property for all purposes in any one year shall not exceed 15 mills on each dollar of the assessed valuation of property as finally equalized. Under procedures provided by law, which shall guarantee the right of initiative, separate tax limitations for any county and for the townships and for school districts therein, the aggregate of which shall not exceed 18 mills on each dollar of such valuation, may be adopted and' thereafter altered by the vote of a majority of the qualified electors of such county voting thereon, in lieu of the limitation hereinbefore established. These limitations may be increased to an aggregate of not to exceed 50 mills on each dollar of valuation, for a period of not to exceed 20 years at any one time, if approved by a majority of the electors, qualified under Section 6 of Article II of this constitution, voting on the question.
“The foregoing limitations shall not apply to taxes imposed for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued, which taxes may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount; or to taxes imposed for any other purpose by any city, village, charter county, charter town*52ship, charter authority or other authority, the tax limitations of which are provided by charter or by general law.”
First: Section 6 of article 9 considered, may the defendant township levy ad valorem taxes — without limit as to rate or amount — that are required to pay an assessment imposed upon the township by a drainage district board under chapter 20 of the drain code, there being no approving vote of the electorate?
This question with another to be considered was brought here for review of Butcher v Grosse lie Twp, 24 Mich App 389 (1970). If upheld by the Court my reluctantly inevitable answer is bound to startle and then pain grievously thousands and thousands of property taxpayers of Michigan. It is that they no longer have any of that former 1933-1963 elective control over the fact, extent, or amount of monetary obligations their local public officers may incur on strength of property taxes to be collected, and that all such “taxes may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount”. This is plain constitutional talk. The prodigal sky is now the constitutional limit and the only restraint left is that which the legislature may choose to impose upon local public debts — whether they are authenticated by bonds or by “other evidences of indebtedness”— when those debts are contractually made payable out of to-be-levied property taxation.
The exhaustive briefs submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants’ counsel, and those submitted by the Attorney General and counsel amicus, favor us with an abundance of necessarily complex reviews of statutes, decisions, official opinions, and interpretations of past and present statutory and constitutional provisions. All this however is mostly irrel*53evant. "We are exclusively and presently interested in what the people chose to adopt when they voted in April of 1963. That brings us to the conflicting interpretive positions counsel take when, in the difficult ultimate, each has faced the stark question posed by our clerk’s letter, this page (footnote).
Plaintiffs’ counsel says:
“It seems to Plaintiffs that the only thing that the Constitutional Convention did and the only thing that the Convention attempted to do in drafting the nonapplication provisions of Section 6 of Article IX relating to bonds, etc., was to provide that money borrowed in anticipation of the collection of ad valorem taxes on the strength of a vote of the qualified electors could be certainly repaid regardless of whether the proceeds from the specific millage authorized by the electors for that purpose were sufficient to retire the indebtedness.” (Brief filed March 4, 1971.)
The defendants join in telling us:
“The concise answer to this question2 arrived at by a consideration of the specific provisions of Section 6 is that the taxes which remain subject to the limitation are those which are not specifically excepted from such limitation by the provisions of the second (or nonapplication) paragraph of said Section 6. As to any increases in the limitation to provide additional taxing power for purposes not specifically excluded by said second paragraph, such increases remain in the direct control of the qualified electorate. For example, general purpose taxes necessary for the operation of school districts, counties and unchartered townships, under existing law, remain subject to the limitation and the allocation *54of taxes thereunder, and any increase in said limitation for such purposes still remains in the direct control of the qualified electorate the same as it was under the provisions of the 1908 Constitution (Section 21, Article X).
“The changes made by the 1963 Constitution are two, as follows:
“A. All public corporations with taxing powers are now on the same basis as far as the levy of taxes to pay debt service on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness is concerned.
“B. The meaning of chartered ‘municipal corporation’ is specifically defined so as clearly to include charter townships, counties and authorities.” (July 16 letter to clerk, responding to Court’s inquiry of all counsel.)
“The lower courts have supported our contention that where bonds have been duly issued in anticipation of the payment of an at large assessment, the second, or ‘non-application’ provision of Article IX, Section 6 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, is clearly applicable. It follows that the 15-mill limitation in the first paragraph of this constitutional provision does not apply; and that taxes to meet the assessment needed for payment of the bonds are fully authorized by the specific language of that second paragraph, and ‘may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount.’ The lower courts have also sustained our contention that the proceedings taken are in complete and exact compliance with the Constitution of 1963 and the Drain Code. We expect to demonstrate in far less than 57 pages that these holdings are, indeed, fully in accord with both law and precedent.” (Brief filed May 4, 1971.)
“In other words, since January 1, 1964, bonds issued by all public corporations or agencies in the statej pursuant to legislative authorization, which are basically secured by a pledge of ad valorem taxes, are now all on the same basis and not subject *55to constitutional tax limitations as to rate or amount, the only tax limitation being the amount necessary to provide for payment of the principal and interest thereof as they become due.” (Brief filed September 9,1971.)
The Attorney General says:
“What, then, is the meaning of the language of the second paragraph of Article IX, Section 6? The Attorney General submits that the answer is neither obscure nor cryptic but very clear indeed: The second paragraph of Article IX, Section 6 gives necessary recognition to the fact, thoroughly imbedded in municipal bond and constitutional law, that ‘special fund’ obligations are not to be affected by the 15-mill limitation, since they do not constitute general obligations of the bond issuing municipality, being financed otherwise than by general property taxes. # # #
“Summarizing the position of the Attorney General:
“1. The 15-mill limitation established by Article IX, Section 6 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 applies to all general obligation bonds supported by ad valorem property taxes unless an increase in the tax limitation has been voted by referendum, and except in a temporary emergency where necessary to honor the constitutional obligation of the contract with holders of outstanding bonds. The second paragraph of Article IX, Section 6 is a limitation, not a grant. It confers no authority to tax. Bond issuing municipalities may not plan in advance to burden their taxpayers by deliberately going into debt in order to create an obligation which will come within the exception to Article IX, Section 6, and then levying all or any portion of debt service over and above the 15-mill limitation. It is urgently in the public interest for this Court so to hold.” (Brief filed September 8, 1971.)
*56“It is the position of the Attorney General that in the absence of permission of the electorate the governing tax limitation may be exceeded only where the normal tax levying and collecting procedures fail to yield sufficient to meet debt service, and then only on a temporary advance basis.
“Otherwise, the tax limitation has ceased to exist.” (Brief of Attorney General filed September 30, 1971.)
Amicus State Association of County Drain Commissioners insists:
“In apparent recognition of these problems, Article IX, Section 6, as finally adopted, unequivocally provides that taxes, levied for the purpose of paying principal and interest on bonds or to pay contract obligations or assessment in anticipation of which bonds are issued, are not subject to the 15-mill limitation. That portion of this section which permits taxation without limitation does not distinguish between cities, villages and school districts, on the one hand, and townships, counties and other public bodies, on the other hand, and on its face applies to all local taxing public bodies. It is, therefore, clear that all such taxing public bodies are authorized, by Section 6 of Article IX and obligated by the heretofore quoted sections of the Municipal Finance Act, Chapter 20, Act No. 185 and Act 342 or other similar acts, to levy a tax for these purposes, without limitation as to rate or amount, but in an amount not greater than the amount needed for these pur41. 4fc 41. poses. * * *
“It is respectfully submitted that, under the Michigan Constitution of 1963, and under the applicable statutes of the State of Michigan, taxes levied by a city, village, township, county or school district and any other public body having power to levy ad valorem taxes, for the purpose of paying principal and interest on bonds or of paying contract *57obligations or assessments in anticipation of which bonds are issued, are to be levied, without limitation as to rate or amount, on all taxable property in the public body.” (Brief filed August 27, 1971.)
“Fourth,, the name of the game in reasonable public financing is unlimited tax support for public debt. Tax support voted by electors, as an increase in millage, is not unlimited tax support. Under the provisions of the Municipal Finance Act, the Legislature has authorized (in fact made mandatory) the levy of unlimited taxes to pay bonds issued by any public body with the power to tax. The same is provided in Chapter 20 with respect to taxes to pay at large drain assessments against any such public body.” (Brief filed October 13, 1971.) (Emphasis by counsel.)
Amicus Michigan Townships Association insists:
“We believe that the language of the 1963 Constitution is clear and explicit: The tax rate limitations in the first paragraph of Article IX, Section 6, ‘shall not apply to taxes imposed * * # for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued, which taxes may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount * * * (Brief filed June 9, 1971.)
The quoted respective contentions are of course those of able adversaries. No one agrees with another, save only that the defendant public units and officers, united with their companions amicus, find themselves uniformly in favor of unlimited property taxation, with all alleging frightening consequences should such without-a-vote-of-the-people taxation be restrained. Yet no counsel has been willing to come right out and say what the second paragraph of § 6 plainly manifests; that there now is no constitutional bar against borrowing by local units on strength of taxes to be collected, whether that is done (a) by the *58issuance and sale of bonds, or (b) by the negotiation of “other evidences of indebtedness”, or (c) for the “payment of assessments or contract obligations”.
Whether the money borrowed is or is not to be used for operating expenses, “taxes imposed” to retire all such borrowing may be levied without limit as to rate or amount, subject only to legislative restriction, if any. I hold then, though loath, that Division 1 was right when it concluded (24 Mich App at 395, 396) :
“We find that although plaintiffs’ contentions as regards the 15-mill tax limitation would be correct if we were still acting under Const 1908, art 10, § 21 (See Township of Southfield v Drainage Board for Twelve Towns Relief Drains [1959], 357 Mich 59), under the present constitutional provision, Const 1963, art 9, § 6, however, the limitation does not apply to taxes levied to discharge bonded indebtedness.”
There is more that should be said.
If an actual or constructive fraud in the submission of a constitution or portion thereof could be made legally or equitably remedial, a meritorious case might — I say “might” — be made out of the affirmative repsesentations and the partially true representations that appear in that part of the “Preface” and the “Address to the People” which the constitutional convention appended with respect to § 6.
Hear first the “Preface to the Address to the People” Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 3357, 3361:

“Tax Limits, Exemptions

“The 15-mill tax limit for property taxes is retained. However, local government bonds will have unlimited tax support, thus permitting lower cost borrowing. A county, its school districts and town*59ships may establish separate and fixed tax limita-1, tions on a connty-wide basis if the total does not' exceed 18 mills and the arrangement is approved by, a majority of the voters. Exercise of this local option would eliminate the county tax allocation board.”
Then the “Address” starts out, pertinently:
“This is a revision of Sec. 21, Article X, of the present constitution which continues in substance the 15-mill limit on property taxes.” (Same record, p 3399).
Comment: Does it so continue, “in substance” or otherwise? “Substance” to me means the same as “essence”, that is to say, the most important element; the characteristic component or components; the main identifiable part of the subject in scrutiny. There is a visibly crafty conflict between the neatly adroit precision of § 6 and this bland assurance of continuity — “in substance”.
The “Address” proceeds (same record, p 3399):
“The section continues present provisions which permit the electors of any taxing district to vote additional millage, subject to the present 20-year limit and overall 50-mill limit.”
Comment: Yes, it does purport to so continue, and it does declare what always was for a separate constitutional reason; that all bonds, once they are validly issued and sold, shall have unlimited tax support. But it does not say, anywhere, that limited or unlimited borrowing by the issuance of bonds or other evidence of indebtedness may be accomplished without opportunity of the taxpayers to vote for or against such borrowing, or for or against the increased taxes that are required to retire such bor-¡ rowing. ~r
*60The next to final paragraph of the pertinent part of the “Address” begins (same record, p 3399):
“All electors may vote on millage increases np to and including 5 years for general purposes, but only property owners and their spouses may vote on property tax increase proposals which extend for more than 5 years.”
Comment: This must have led the about-to-vote elector to believe that new § 6 “continues in substance the 15-mill limit on property taxes” and also continues his right to “vote on millage increases up to and including 5 years for general purposes”. But still there is no word in the “Address” about the nonapplication, effected by the second paragraph of § 6, of all of “The foregoing limitations” when borrowing is effected by action of the local board or commission upon assurance to the lender that the obligation or obligations will be retired via the levy of taxes “imposed without limitation as to rate or amount”.
Bluntly stated truth in the “Address”, exposing fairly the actual purpose of § 6, probably would have defeated the narrowly surviving Constitution of 1963. Yes, the property taxpayers of Michigan were yensed3 in 1963, by § 6.
It is obiter of course to say that there may be a judicial remedy for this unfolded situation. The people doubtless are bound by the plainly written language of § 6, for it was the constitution itself, distinguished from the subsequently prepared4 “Address,” which the people approved in 1963. Behold *61the dismal end of that great effort of a beset and embittered people who, in the property tax crisis of 1932, rose np and successfully initiated the since battered and now extinct § 21 of the tenth article of the former constitution. To one who lived through that crisis and the property tax moratorium effected by 1934 PA (Ex Sess) 11, and through the tragic sales of property which finally took place pursuant to the land board act of 1937 (No 155), it is not difficult to predict that, sooner doubtless than later, the people will have to repeat their initiatory action of 1932 lest they endure again what this Court — unaided at the time by legislation — had to stop on March 1, 1933, that is, the annual sale for unpaid/" taxes of more than half the taxable property of Michigan. See Thompson v Auditor General, 261 Mich 624 (1933), particularly the reporter’s footnote at 628.
Second: May the defendant township require that property be connected to an available public sanitary sewer, without a specific finding that an existing private sewage system is a health hazard?5
The parties plaintiff and defendant agree generally upon the question but not upon the answer. For an affirmative answer defendants rely upon 1961 PA 151, as amended by 1970 PA 191. They say:
“It is absolutely immaterial whether or not appellants’ present private system is adequate. They must connect to the available sewer. This is compelled by health department regulation, by local ordinance and by the statute.”
If the defendants are right, their answer must hinge upon valid applicability of the cited act of 1961, as amended.
*62Excepting for presently impertinent deletion in 1970 of the restrictive phrase “containing more than 75,000 inhabitants”, which phrase appeared after “counties” in the title of the act of 1961, the title of both enactments read as now does the 1970 amended title. The latter reads:
“An act to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people in counties by requiring properties from which sanitary sewage emanates to be connected to available public sanitary sewage collection facilities; to define properties affected by the act; to establish remedies and to fix penalties for the violation thereof.”
The act of 1970 amends the title and sections 2 and 3 of the act of 1961. Section 1 of the act of 1961 remains intact. It says:
“Sec. 1. As used in this act: # # *
“(c) ‘Property from which sanitary sewage emanates’ means each parcel of land, as described in the last recorded deed of conveyance pertaining thereto, on which is located a structure or structures in which water is used or is available for use for household, commercial, industrial or other purposes. Industrial structures with a sanitary sewage disposal system approved by the state department of health shall be exempt from the provisions of this act.”
When the instant case was originally submitted our decision of Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151 (1971), affirming Maki v East Tawas, 18 Mich App 109 (1969), had not been decided. There we held unconstitutional a section of the involved statute (1964 PA 170; MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996 [107]) which in its scope exceeded the permitted ambit of the title under which it appeared. I think the same conclu*63sion is due here, only more so, applying directly the reasoning of the same authorities as was supplied by Judge Danhof for Division 3 in Maki and by Justice T. G. Kavanagh upon affirmance of Maki.
By § l.(c) the legislature undertook to enlarge beyond all constitutionally permitted doubt (Const 1963, art 4, § 24) the hedged-in margin of the quoted specific title, referring here to property “from which sanitary sewage emanates”, so as to include every parcel of land whereon is located a structure “in which water is used or is available for use for household, commercial, industrial or other purposes”; the structure being within the 200-foot limit. Section l.(o) is, therefore, unconstitutional; severable though it is under MCLA 8.5; MSA 2.216.
The gratuitous assumption of the definition seems to be that wherever on a section 1(b), “particular property” water is used or is available for use, “sanitary sewage” is bound to “emanate” therefrom. “Emanate” as employed by Act 151 means “sanitary sewage” emerging or outflowing from property in such a way as to threaten the public health or create a nuisance, and there is no suggestion in the briefs or record that the property of plaintiffs Butcher “emanates” anything, much less “sanitary sewage”.
Whether by the act of 1961 as it stood when this action was instituted in 1967, or by the act of 1961 as amended by the act of 1970, our response to the stated question must be the same. It not being claimed that sanitary sewage flows or emerges from plaintiffs’ property contrary to any public or private interest, plaintiffs cannot under the statute be forced to connect and pay. Maki makes the constitutional principle plain for instant application. I so hold. This renders unnecessary consideration of the question of invidious discrimination, effected — if it *64was — by the concluding sentence of quoted § 1(c). Too, it leaves for another case another obvious question; whether what may be a perfectly lawful and wholly inoffensive underground septic disposal system is a property right which may be condemned and destroyed without payment of just compensation.
I would vacate that part of the judgment below which determines affirmatively the second stated question (24 Mich App at 397-398), and order remand for further proceedings and entry of a judgment consistent with foregoing view of section 1(c). The remainder of the Court of Appeals’ judgment I would affirm.
The nature of the case is such that no costs can be awarded. One can only extend to plaintiffs’ counsel his respects for having unearthed and brought to this Court vital questions of public law which, long since, should have been exposed for knowledge if not betterment of the public weal. The protection of hitherto known property tax limitation, effected by constitutional provision, is no more.
T. E. Brennan, and T. Gr. Kavanagh, and Swain-son, JJ., concurred with Black, J.
Adams, J.
Our task in this case is to construe the language of the Constitution of 1963, art 9, § 6. We must construe and reconcile insofar as possible all of the language of § 6. I agree with Justice Black that the language of the second paragraph of § 6 in large measure cuts away the limitations the first paragraph appears to create. The first paragraph sets forth various limitations — 15 mills, 18 mills, 50 mills, and 20 years. Paragraph 2 opens with the broad language, “the foregoing limitations shall not apply”, — and then, in separate clauses, two broad *65categories or classifications are stated as to which the foregoing limitations do not apply. The first clause is the one that concerns us here.
Before turning to it, it may be helpful to examine the language of the second clause which is:
“The foregoing limitations shall not apply * * * to taxes imposed for any other purpose by any city, village, charter county, charter township, charter authority or other authority, the tax limitations of which are provided by charter or by general law.”
Because of this provision, the only tax limitations upon cities, villages, charter counties, charter townships, charter authorities, or other authorities, are limitations contained in the charter of the governmental unit or in the general law of the State of Michigan enacted by the legislature. There is no constitutional limitation.
Turning to the first clause of the second paragraph, it reads:
“The foregoing limitations shall not apply to taxes imposed for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued, which taxes may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount * * # .”
The striking part of this language is that the opening portion of the clause states that the limitations foregoing do not apply and the closing words are a further reinforcement of this proposition — “taxes may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount.”
While the last clause of the second paragraph specifically lists certain units of government — cities, *66villages, charter counties, charter townships, charter authorities or other authorities — and specifically omits from such listing counties, townships and school districts, there is no such enumeration of various forms of governmental units in the first clause. Consequently, it must be concluded that the first clause of the second paragraph applies across the board to all forms of governmental instrumentalities or units and that as to any and all such units of government the limitations of the first paragraph are not applicable as “to taxes imposed for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued”.
I agree with Justice Black that what purports to be a 15-mill general ad valorem tax limitation upon real and tangible personal property in the first paragraph of § 6 is, if not illusory, certainly a much more miniscule limitation than was depicted to the people in the Address to the People accompanying the proposed 1963 Constitution. The limitations of the firstparagraph do apply to counties, townships and school districts, and all of the operations of such governmental units, except for authorized operations of such units involving bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds were issued.
I agree with Justice Black’s holding as to the public sanitary sewer question and agree that, public questions being involved, no costs should be allowed.

 Division 1 said it all in one terse sentence (Butcher v Grosse Ile Twp, 24 Mich App 389, 396 [1970]):
“Thus, what was prohibited under the old constitution is clearly allowed under the new.”

 “What in your view will be left of section 6, within the direct control of the qualified electorate, should the Court approve that eonstruetion and application of section 6 for which the defendants stand?” (Question posed by clerk’s letter to all counsel.)

 An upper Peninsula colloquialism meaning deluded and duped, or conned and cozened, or beguiled and bilked; sometimes in a ribald or suggestive sense.

 2 Official Becord, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3357 (footnote) .

 This is plaintiffs’ Stated Question VIII, recast for nonargumentative brevity.