Court Opinion

ID: 9420095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:52:57.297346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:32.159290
License: Public Domain

Separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Black,
in which
Mr. Justice Rutledge concurs.
August 9, 1943, the referee in bankruptcy found that petitioner had possession of certain merchandise belonging to a bankrupt corporation and ordered him to turn it or the proceeds over to the bankruptcy trustee. In these contempt proceedings (April 18, 1945) the District Court found that petitioner had failed to prove he no longer had possession of the property, and ordered him to be held in jail until he delivered the property or its proceeds to the trustee.
Had the petitioner been charged with embezzling this same property after the 1943 turnover order, doubtless no one would even argue that a doctrine of res judicata barred him from introducing evidence to show that the turnover findings of possession were wrong, and that in truth he did not have possession of the property or its proceeds either on, before, or after August 9, 1943, or April 18, 1945. One basic reason why the findings of fact in a turnover proceeding would not be res judicata in an embezzlement proceeding is that the burden of proof is different in the two types of proceedings. In the first, a turnover proceeding, “clear and convincing proof” is enough; in the second, embezzlement, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is required. The burden of proof is *79heavier in the embezzlement case because a judgment of conviction may embody a crimiñal punishment, while a turnover judgment does not — it is merely an order for the surrender of property, similar to an order of delivery in a replevin suit.
There is no such reason for different measurements of proof in contempt and embezzlement cases; consequentially, the two are almost identical. Fine, imprisonment, or both can result from a conviction of either. Here if this contempt judgment is carried out against the petitioner, he might, be compelled to remain in prison longer than he would had he been convicted and sentenced on a charge of embezzlement. It is true that, if the court was correct in finding that petitioner had possession of the property or its proceeds (and if he still has it), he carries the keys of the jail in his pocket, because he can turn the property or proceeds over to the trustee at any time and thus get his freedom. The crucial question to petitioner in this contempt proceeding was whether he had possession of the property or its proceeds June 5, 1945. And that crucial question was decided against petitioner by the trial court without holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner still had possession of the property.
I am unwilling to agree to application of a doctrine of res judicata that results in sending people to jail for contempt of court upon a measure of proof substantially the same as that which would support the rendition of a civil judgment for the plaintiff on a promissory note, an open account, or some other debt. All court proceedings, whether designated as civil or criminal contempt of court or given some other name, which may result in fine, prison sentences, or both, should in my judgment require the same measure of proof, and that measure should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gompers v. United *80States, 233 U. S. 604, 610-611; Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 66-67; Pendergast v. United States, 317 U. S. 412, 417-418.
The foregoing is written on the assumption that the turnover-contempt procedure is legal, an assumption which I do not accept. I share the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals that this procedure is unauthorized by statute and that it should not be permitted to take the place of criminal prosecutions for fraud as apparently was done here.1 This whole procedure savors too much of the old discredited practice of imprisonment for debts— debts which people are unable to pay. For here, if petitioner did wrongfully dispose of the property, whether or not he was guilty of a crime, he was probably liable in some sort of civil action, basically similar to, if not actually, one for debt. Had a judgment been obtained against him in such a civil case, I doubt if it would be thought at this period that the bankruptcy court could have thrown petitioner in jail for his failure to obey what would have been in effect a court order to pay the debt embodied in the judgment.
Furthermore, the finding of possession of the merchandise as of 1943 may rest on an evidential foundation firm enough to support a civil turnover order but it is too shaky to support a sentence to prison. Accepting that *81finding, however, the presumption of present or 1945 possession from the possible 1941 or 1943 possession achieves a procedural result which runs counter to basic practices in our system of laws. For as the District Court said, it gave the prosecution the advantage of a “presumption” which, of itself, was held to relieve it from offering further proof of petitioner’s guilt in a case where forfeiture of his personal liberty and property was sought; it threw upon the petitioner the burden of proving his innocence.2
For the foregoing reasons, among others, I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, with directions that the petitioner be released and that no further contempt proceedings be instituted against him based on his refusal to obey the turnover order.

 “We would hold that a turnover proceeding may not, via a fiction, be substituted for a criminal prosecution so as to deprive a man of a bade constitutional right, the right of trial by jury. We would note, too, that one consequence of the fiction is that the respondent may be twice punished for the same offense, since, if he is later indicted for violation of 11 U. S. C. A. § 52 (b), his imprisonment for contempt will not serve as a defense. We would add that nowhere in the Bankruptcy Act has Congress even intimated an intention to authorize such results, and that they stem solely from a judge-made gloss on the statute.” In re Luma Camera Service, 157 F. 2d 951, 953-954.

 In holding petitioner in contempt, the District Court said: “Respondent has not sustained his burden of satisfactorily accounting for the disposition of the assets by his mere denial of possession under oath.” It then made the following finding of fact: “4. The respondent, Joseph F. Maggio, has wholly failed to comply with said turnover order, and he has failed to explain to the satisfaction of this court his failure to comply.”