Court Opinion

ID: 9553418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:29:18.076624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:04.848369
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In the majority view the case before us is “controlled” by two decisions, Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 [37 L.Ed.2d 757, 93 S.Ct. 2796] and Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal.2d 981 [59 Cal.Rptr. 872, 429 P.2d 192]. Both of these cases expressly, although in somewhat different phrasing, confirm that police officers may seize, without a warrant, movie films which they reasonably suspect are obscene if “exigent circumstances” exist which indicate that the films may be “lost, destroyed, or spirited away.” (66 Cal.2d at p. 991, fn. 10; see, 413 U.S. at p. 505 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 765].) The record discloses that the officers in question had reasonable cause to believe that the films ultimately seized were obscene, and that exigent circumstances justified the seizure.
*92At the preliminary examination Deputy Sheriff Young testified regarding his initial telephonic contact with defendant Freeman and his visit by prearrangement with defendants at their office, “Hollywood House of Films.” After Young’s arrival and in his presence defendants Freeman and Home engaged in a brief conversation after which Horne left. When Young announced that the purpose of his visit was to acquire some “hard-core” pornographic movie films, Freeman advised Young that he had some “good action” films. The majority describes Freeman’s further graphic characterization of the films. Freeman then handed to Young, and asked him to examine, an album containing still color photographs of a variety of sexual activities. The album contained pieces of paper including one designated “Rental Films.” While Young was examining the album, Home returned to the office with a cart containing boxes of film, one of which was installed in a reel-to-reel viewer for Young’s benefit. Before the film was viewed, Home told Freeman “that he thought there was some cops downstairs—or hanging around downstairs.” Freeman then inquired if Horne was sure, and when Horne nodded affirmatively, Freeman told Home to “take the stuff back” at which time Home left “carrying some of the films together with the handcart.” The film which Young then viewed depicted various forms of very explicit sexual activity. During the office visit, Freeman, in Home’s absence, told Young that “he kept the films at another place; should the police come with a search warrant, they wouldn’t find anything there.”
While Freeman and Young were in defendant’s office defendant Home came finder the surveillance of Deputy Sheriff McFee outside the building and was observed to move assorted film boxes from a 1969 Cadillac placing them in a handtmck and returning to the building which housed defendant’s office. Five or ten minutes later Horne exited the same building with the same handcart and with “most of the film in boxes that were on there when he took them out of the Cadillac.” Horne was seen to push the cart to a parked 1962 Chrysler, open the trunk put some of the “silver cans” in the trank and the boxes into the back seat. Then, according to McFee, “[h]e jumped in the car and left hurriedly.” Home then for ten to fifteen minutes drove the Chrysler, making “several circles around several blocks,” and returning to park approximately one-half block from where the car had been parked originally. Home then returned to the office followed by McFee.
McFee was then told by Young that when Young first arrived at the office Horne came in with some items and that while he was there the other defendant told him to “get this stuff out of here.” Young also told McFee that he had placed both Freeman and Home under arrest. McFee then searched the Chrysler automobile with the use of keys given *93to him by Home and found approximately eight cardboard boxes in the rear seat. In the trunk McFee found three or four silver 16 mm. film cannisters and the handtruck. Before the seizure of the film, none of the officers had seen the film. However, it was stipulated for purposes of the hearing that the 50 reels of 8 mm. film which were introduced into evidence although of different subjects and taken at different times and places, were “similar in content and subject matter” to the 16 mm. film exhibited to Young and to the magistrate.
From the foregoing rather extended factual recitation appearing in the record, I reach the following conclusions. First, Officer Young reasonably believed the films in question, containing as they did graphic illicit sexual activities, were obscene, both those which he viewed and those which were unviewed. Freeman’s own characterization of them was clear and explicit. The sample album (Exhibit 1) furnished Young by Freeman, presumably as illustrative of defendant’s inventory, confirms their general nature. The single film (Exhibit 2) which Young viewed amply reinforced his impressions. In the record the film’s character both at the time of the meeting in defendant’s office and subsequently, was established clearly and unmistakably.
Second, exigent circumstances existed which amply justified the officers in seizing the film in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. During his preliminary discussions with Young, Freeman told him that “he kept the films at another place; should the police come with a search warrant, they wouldn’t find anything there.” Shortly thereafter, when Horne alerted Freeman to the suspicion that he “thought there was some cops downstairs—or hanging around downstairs,” Freeman immediately instructed Horne to “take the stuff back.” Home then forthwith took the handcart containing all but one of the films selected for Young and left the room. He was then observed by McFee returning the film and placing them in a trank of an automobile which he immediately drove" away in a manner described by McFee as “hurried.” Horne’s route in the car was a random and erratic one and it extended over several blocks. Upon his return he parked the car in a different area. Given Freeman’s original declaration as to his arrangements to store the film elsewhere so that searching officers armed with a warrant would be frustrated, Freeman’s direction to Home to remove the material immediately when alerted that officers were near, and Home’s immediate disappearance with the film, the conclusion seems reasonable to me that “exigent” circumstances existed which indicated that the film was in imminent danger of being “lost, destroyed, or spirited away.” (Flack v. Municipal Court, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 991, fn. 10.)
*94The majority find significance in the fact that “Freeman’s operation , was ... a continuing enterprise replete with office, secretary, reception room, and all the trappings of a permanent business arrangement.” Such an appraisal, in all deference, misses the mark. We are concerned with movie film. The film, either singly or together, did not constitute office fixtures. It could be easily moved and readily carried by hand. The majority’s analogy to a film shown at a theatre is not apt. This was not a situation in which the film was being shown over an extended period at predictable and ascertainable hours to a public admitted regularly on payment of a charge. This was a different case. The setting here was surreptitious. The conditions were clandestine. Defendants transported the film to the premises in one automobile and returned the film in another, and that within a very short time span. In between the use of the automobiles, a small handcart was utilized. The fact that the films were exhibited in a well established office complete with secretary detracts not one xyhit from the fact that the film which is the subject of our inquiry, was readily movable. The Roaden court itself took judicial notice of this fact and also noted the importance of the circumstances surrounding the exhibition of the film. (413 U.S. at p. 505, fn; 6 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 765].) Both from.what he heard and saw Deputy Young had very clear signals from defendants that their precise intentions were to remove and “spirit” the film away and speedily so. They had the capacity to match their intentions and this capacity had just been graphically demonstrated. A secretary was present. The officers presumably did not know how many other employees were available to aid defendants in their design.
While First Amendment protections affecting freedom of expression have been extended to motion picture films, Roaden and Flack nonetheless veiy expressly recognize the exception permitting seizure without warrant even of objects presumptively afforded First Amendment protection. The majority describe the exception as “narrow” or “extremely limited.” Regardless, however, of its characterization the exception contains only two essential ingredients—first, probable cause to believe the seized material was obscene, and second, exigent circumstances prompting a reasonable belief that the property seized is about to be moved beyond the reach of the officers. I suggest that on the record the. magistrate was fully justified in concluding that probable cause existed to believe that the material being seized was obscene and that a “legitimate emergency” existed involving, in the language of Flack, a “high probability that evidence may be lost, destroyed, or spirited away.” (66 Cal.2d at p. 991, fn. 10.)
I would go further. Even if we accepted the majority’s assumption that the officers lacked probable cause to believe the film viewed by Young *95would be “spirited away,” they certainly had such cause with respect to the film removed by Home. This film was brought by Horne to the office in one car, transported by him to and from the office by handcart and then deposited in the back seat and trunk of another car, after which it was then taken in a random odyssey. As we recently explained in People v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871, 884 [109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208], an automobile may be subject to a warrantless search whenever “(1) exigent circumstances rendered the obtaining of a warrant an impossible or impractical alternative, and (2) probable cause existed for the search.” As hereinabove indicated, in my view, the first element was fully satisfied. In Dumas we stated that “[p]robable cause for a search exists where an officer is aware of facts that would lead a man of ordinary caution or pmdence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion that the object of the search is in the particular place to be searched.” (Id. at p. 885.) The second condition was abundantly satisfied.
I would grant a peremptory writ of mandate to annul the order suppressing the evidence.
McComb, J., and Clark, J., concurred.