Court Opinion

ID: 9703403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:54:43.115106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:48.617592
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 76. (dissenting). This case raises disturbing issues about attorney discipline proceedings in Wisconsin. For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 77. The court approves a referee's recommended discipline of Attorney Marvin E. Marks under Wisconsin SCR 20:8.4(c), for engaging in conduct that involved misrepresentation. The referee's Conclusions of Law state:
2. Respondent's lien claim was wrongful because the fee agreement [he had with the Koivisto family] was not in existence in November 1996 when he wrote the two insurance companies involved nor was it in existence in December 1996 or April 1997 when he asserted his lien claims in the Michigan [legal] action. McBride v. Wausau Insurance Companies, 176 Wis. 2d 382, 500 N.W2d 387 Ct. App. 1993).
4. Respondent was guilty of misrepresentation in stating he held a lien against the two insurance companies involved in this matter in his letters to them on November 14, 1996 and November 21, 1996.
*235. Respondent violated SCR 8.4(c) by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceipt [sic] or misrepresentation when he wrote letters to the two insurance companies in November 1996 stating that he held a lien against them and the Koivistos on any settlement proceeds the Koivistos might receive in settlement of their claims.
¶ 78. First, the court acknowledges that the McBride case does not support the referee's legal conclusion. Per curiam op., ¶ 54, n.2.
¶ 79. Second, and more important, the referee made no factual finding that Attorney Marks knew or should have known that he was not justified in asserting a lien claim on November 14 and November 21, 1996.
¶ 80. The court's per curiam opinion, ¶ 47, summarizes the situation: "Essentially, Marks contends that he may have been wrong about having such a lien, but that he did not intentionally deceive anyone because he believed he was legally justified in asserting the lien claims." The per curiam never responds to this contention by asserting that Attorney Marks knew or should have known that he did not have a lien. It dances around this predicament in ¶ 51.
¶ 81. The court's treatment of the problem leads to one of two unpalatable results: either this court has engaged in implicit fact-finding, contrary to our own statements and precedent, or we have concluded that it is not necessary for an attorney to know or have reason to know that something he represents is not correct, in order for us to find the attorney guilty of misrepresentation.
¶ 82. Attorney Marks' purported "misrepresentation" needs to be put in context. There is no dispute that Donald Koivisto entered into a Contingent Fee Agree*24ment with Attorney Marks in connection with Mrs. Koivisto's untimely and wrongful death. That agreement was signed on October 22, 1996. Koivisto's daughter, Nikki, entered into a similar agreement on October 24, 1996. Both agreements contained the following paragraph:
5. If for any reason, the Attorney-Client relationship was to be terminated prior to settlement, compromise, or judgment, etc., without good cause on client's behalf, the client hereby agrees to pay attorney for the value of legal services received by the client for attorney on an hourly rate schedule of $100.00 per hour plus expenses. Said fee will be immediately due and payable.
¶ 83. The referee based his conclusion about Marks' misrepresentation on the premise that "the fee agreement was not in existence in November 1996 when he wrote the two insurance companies." There is no dispute, however, that the hourly rate billed on October 31, 1996, had not been paid on November 14, 1996, when Marks wrote the first letter. On November 11 the Koivistos' new attorney had proposed paying Attorney Marks "after settlement of the Anna Koivisto wrongful death case."
¶ 84. The new attorney also indicated that before any final decision regarding payment of Marks' fees would be made, the attorney wished to see the file materials that had been generated by Marks. In other words, the attorney who acquired the Koivisto case from Marks reserved the right to delay payment of Marks' legal fees and to evaluate Marks' legal work before Marks was paid. These conditions were not part of the two Contingent Fee Agreements, and when Marks was not paid by November 15, he reasonably concluded that the agreements had been breached.
*25¶ 85. Rightly or wrongly, Marks thought the Koivistos' new attorney had tampered with his contract. He retained a lawyer to represent him in the matter. On November 11 Marks advised the Koivistos' new attorney that he would sue the attorney's firm for interference with contract. All this preceded the November 14 letter.
¶ 86. Prior to the November 21 letter, the new attorney advised Marks that Koivisto would pay Marks' legal bill ¿/Marks agreed to sign a release and drop any claimed lien. The per curiam opinion does not explain what effect this release would have had on Marks' tampering claim. Ultimately, Marks filed suit in Michigan alleging an interference with contract and claiming a "charging lien."
¶ 87. The sum of all this is that Attorney Marks could have believed that he had a lien when he wrote letters to the two insurance companies. Even now in this appeal, Marks' attorney maintains that Marks had a legitimate basis for claiming such a lien.
¶ 88. The per curiam opinion does not decimate this argument, nor does it assert that Marks knew or should have known that he did not have a lien at the time of the November letters, the critical period for this case. Consequently, I do not understand what rule of law on misrepresentation comes out of this case.
¶ 89. Over time Marks became obsessed with pursuing a lost cause. He went too far. I would have no problem issuing a public reprimand on an appropriate charge. But Marks' license to practice law is suspended for two months for conduct involving misrepresentation in November 1996, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), which is a charge that was not satisfactorily proved.
¶ 90. Beyond the suspension, this court imposes costs of $22,178.69. These costs are disproportionate to *26the seriousness of the offense. In part, they reflect OLR's obsession to appeal an issue that it lost before the referee. The issue of costs in attorney discipline cases requires prompt attention, for excessive costs will deter some attorneys from adequately defending themselves and may prevent others from ever returning to the practice of law.