Court Opinion

ID: 9542702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:37:30.874141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:42.008211
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARTMAN, dissenting: Respectfully, I am compelled to dissent. I agree that the phrase “reasonably should know *** [an injury] was wrongfully caused” may be restated as “possessed of sufficient information concerning [the] injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.” (Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416, 430 N.E.2d 976; Moore v. A.H. Robins Co. (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 19, 23, 520 N.E.2d 1007.) The result reached by the majority, however, neglects this principle and suggests instead that the statute of limitations is not triggered until plaintiff gains actual knowledge of an actionable wrong or negligent conduct. Furthermore, the majority may not intend that such an inference be drawn; nevertheless, the discussion of Martinez v. Rozenweig (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 155, 387 N.E.2d 1263, Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146, 421 N.E.2d 869, Wigginton v. Reiehold Chemicals, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 776, 274 N.E.2d 118, and Moore will lead readers of this opinion to believe that independent confirmation of plaintiff’s existing suspicions, be it by the media or third persons, is somehow necessary to activate the limitations period. I do not believe that such requirement exists in the case law. It is enough, rather, that plaintiff alone possess sufficient facts to place a reasonable person on inquiry. In the case sub judice, plaintiff’s deposition testimony demonstrated she suffered incapacitating pain, bloating and constipation within 20 months of insertion of the first CU-7 device in April 1976. This episode was followed immediately by surgery to remove a “giant mass,” part of an ovary and one fallopian tube. Four months after insertion of a second CU-7 in December 1977, plaintiff consented to removal of the device after again experiencing “very bad cramping” and “lower abdominal pain,” although admittedly not of the same severity as occurred in 1977. Significantly, Dr. Klein informed plaintiff in March 1978 that plaintiff’s body was “rejecting” the IUD and that it “couldn’t take another IUD.” Plaintiff herself “knew” in 1978 she could not physically withstand the insertion of another IUD, stating at her deposition, “I could figure that out for myself,” and “[A] foreign substance was causing me pain at this time. I was able to determine that another foreign substance might do the same.” Although the events of 1977 might not alone have actuated the statute of limitations, plaintiff had by March 1978 endured two incidents of similar symptoms associated with the insertion of the CU-7. Her statements regarding her inability to tolerate another IUD demonstrate without doubt that she already had acquired sufficient facts of a possible link between the CU-7 and her alleged injury, reasonably placing upon her the burden to inquire further. Moreover, the majority minimizes the significance of Dr. Klein’s statement that plaintiff’s body “rejected” the IUD as evidence of an “idiosyncratic reaction, with which even laymen are familiar in varying degrees.” (182 Ill. App. 3d at 54.) This contention, however, assumes a legal result not yet proved and is, in any event, irrelevant: the motion for summary judgment at bar inquires only whether facts existed to reasonably require investigation by plaintiff, not whether those facts ultimately demonstrate a physical reaction unique to plaintiff alone. If Moore v. A.H. Robins Co. is “wide of the mark in this case,” as the majority suggests (182 Ill. App. 3d at 56), it is only because the facts in the present case more strongly favor defendant. Admittedly no “contradictory statements” from the defendant physician were made here, as they were in Moore, but Dr. Klein clearly and directly advised plaintiff in 1978 that her body was “rejecting” the IUD and that her body “couldn’t take another.” Based upon the preceding episodes in 1977 and early 1978 involving the IUD, a reasonable person should have begun to inquire in 1978, following the doctor’s comments to her, as to why she was sustaining these substantial symptoms and injuries and was caused to undergo the operation. Recently, we have decided McIntyre v. Christ Hospital (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 76, in which we held that summary judgment was improperly entered against a plaintiff who possessed undescended testicles apparently from birth, but attributed the absence of testicles to a hernia operation performed on him by the defendant surgeon at age six. After age six, he underwent a series of physical examinations and was constantly assured by his family physician performing those examinations that “everything [was] fine.” Although he noticed the absence of a mass in his testicular region, he never was told that anything was wrong by his family physician or his employer’s physician who administered employment examinations for several years. The first intimation he received of possible wrongdoing came after surgical removal of a kidney stone at age 20, when that surgeon advised him that surgery for the purpose of lowering his testicles should have been performed at the time of his hernia operation when he was age six. We held there that summary judgment in favor of defendant hernia surgeon under those facts was erroneous and remanded the cause for a determination by the fact finder as to whether McIntyre possessed sufficient information to put a reasonable person on inquiry as to wrongdoing. These facts, in my opinion, are in stark contrast to the facts of the instant case which demonstrate that Mrs. Ravin herself “knew” in 1978 that she was unable to withstand physically the insertion of another IUD and “could figure that out” for herself. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the circuit court in this case.