Court Opinion

ID: 9825260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 12:24:42.96021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:37.760000
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing and on Petition for Certiorari.
It is insisted on application for rehearing and in the petition for certiorari considered together, that the decree from which the appeal w-as taken is void because the children of Mr. and Mrs. Mudd, one adult and two minors, did not sign the agreement by which Judge Howze undertook to hear and determine this cause, and no one signed for them. All the other beneficiaries under the will of Edward Wilkinson, Sr., did sign by counsel.
There was no assignment of error presenting that contention on the submission of this cause, nor in the briefs for those parties filed at the time of the submission, and the matter was not considered by the Court. But the urgency of the argument now made requires its consideration and discussion.
We are persuaded that the insistence is not well taken.
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, section 18, Article VI, which is section 160, Constitution of 1901, a court provided for by the Constitution was required to be presided over by a judge elected according to the Constitution, and the parties could not by agreement select such a judge though it were authorized by statute. Then it was that a person attempting to act as judge by agreement of parties could make no valid judgment in a court provided for by the Constitution, but it constituted a quasi arbitration. Ex parte Amos, 51 Ala. 57. But the Constitution of 1875 and that of 1901 made provision for the parties under certain circumstances by agreement to authorize a person who is practicing in that court and learned in the law to act as special judge in place of the presiding judge of that court. This provision of the Constitution has been adopted as a statute and is now section 124, Title 13, Code of 1940.
It does not require that the agreement or disability of the regular judge, or the qualification of the substitute judge, be shown by a writing or made to appear in the record. That legal status came on for consideration in Roberts v. State, 126 Ala. 74, 28 So. 741, 30 So. 554, in which it was held that if the record showed that a special judge was presiding, his acts were not void, though there was no evidence of an agreement shown by the record, since such a judge was authorized by the Constitution, and one so acting was at least a de facto judge, pro hac vice. The Court further held that to test the question of his authority, it must be done in the trial court, and if not there done it was waived, and the authority of the judge could not then be questioned on appeal.
This is a collateral attack, though there was a motion made and denied by Judge Howze to recuse himself, 'but the ruling on that motion has not been directly challenged, and is not assigned as error.
It is noted that the record does not affirmatively show that there was no agreement by or for the Mudd children that Judge Howze act as special judge. It does show that the agreement in the record was not so signed. But it does not show affirmatively that no verbal or implied agreement was made to that effect. An absence of all reference to such an agreement is not an affirmative showing that no such agreement was made.
The argument is also now made that Judge Howze was not qualified to act because the Constitution and statute require *242that the substitute judge shall be one who is practicing in the court in which he is thus to act.
We think there are two reasons why this contention is not well taken though we take judicial notice of the fact that at that time Judge Howze was probate judge of Jefferson County, and as such prohibited from engaging in the practice of law.
One reason is that such a contention cannot be made on collateral attack, and there was no direct attack made on that ground, the agreement providing that he was “lawfully admitted- to practice in this (that) court and learned in the law.”
 The other reason is that we do not think the Constitution and statute should be so strictly construed and applied as to disqualify one who has been duly licensed to practice law in that court, and which license is still in effect, though for the time being he cannot pursue the practice in that court because he holds some other official position. We take judicial notice of our records to the effect that Judge Howze has long been duly licensed to practice law in all the courts of Alabama, and that his license was then in full force and effect. It is apparent the parties so construed the law in drafting the agreement.
The petition for certiorari is denied; and the application for rehearing is overruled.
All the Justices concur.