Court Opinion

ID: 9410095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 15:01:12.793844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:55.380765
License: Public Domain

20-3154
     Alam-Bhuyan v. Garland
                                                                                       BIA
                                                                                 Wright, IJ
                                                                               A206 025 881
                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
 3   City of New York, on the 20th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6              JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 7              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
 8              SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
 9                    Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   MD ANWARUL ALAM-BHUYAN,
13                 Petitioner,
14
15                    v.                                             20-3154
16                                                                   NAC
17   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
18   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
19                    Respondent.
20   _____________________________________
21
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq., New York,
 2                                       NY.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 5                                       General; Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant Director;
 6                                       Jaclyn G. Hagner, Attorney, Office of
 7                                       Immigration    Litigation,   United    States
 8                                       Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

11   AND DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED and the case is

12   REMANDED to the BIA.

13         Petitioner MD Anwarul Alam-Bhuyan, a native and citizen of Bangladesh,

14   seeks review of an August 31, 2020 decision of the BIA denying his motion to

15   remand and affirming a May 29, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

16   denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

17   the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re MD Anwarul Alam-Bhuyan, No.

18   A206 025 881 (B.I.A. Aug. 31, 2020), aff’g No. A206 025 881 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. May

19   29, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

20   procedural history.

21         In his brief, Alam-Bhuyan challenges the IJ’s adverse-credibility finding,

22   which was the IJ’s sole basis for denying his claims for relief. We defer to an IJ’s

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 1   adverse-credibility determination “unless, from the totality of the circumstances,

 2   it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

 3   ruling.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

 4   marks omitted). On review, we ask “whether the agency has provided ‘specific,

 5   cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding and whether those reasons bear

 6   a legitimate nexus to the finding.’” Id. at 77 (quoting Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534

 7   F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2008)). An adverse-credibility determination may be based

 8   on, among other factors, inconsistencies between “the applicant’s or witness’s

 9   written and oral statements” and “other evidence of record,” as well as “any

10   inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an

11   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim,

12   or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The agency must

13   consider an inconsistency “in light of the totality of the circumstances” and

14   “discrepancies . . . must be weighed in light of their significance to the total context

15   of [the petitioner’s] claim of persecution.” Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 79 (internal

16   quotation marks omitted).

17         The IJ believed that there was a “significant discrepancy” between

18   Alam-Bhuyan’s testimony and a letter from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party

19   (the “BNP”) and relied on that asserted discrepancy to find Alam-Bhuyan not
                                           3
 1   credible. Certified Admin. Record at 67. At his hearing, Alam-Bhuyan testified

 2   that he was attacked twice by members of a rival political party – once on

 3   November 4, 2012, resulting in “two to three hours” of medical treatment at his

 4   family’s pharmacy, id. at 110–12, and once on November 26, 2012, resulting in a

 5   three-day stay at a local hospital, id. at 113–14. The BNP’s letter, meanwhile, stated

 6   that Alam-Bhuyan was “attacked . . . severely once.” Id. at 490. Based on a belief

 7   that the BNP’s letter contradicted Alam-Bhuyan’s testimony that he was attacked

 8   on two occasions, the IJ refused to credit Alam-Bhuyan’s account and denied his

 9   claims for relief.

10         The IJ’s finding rested on a misreading of the BNP’s letter. In making the

11   adverse-credibility finding, the IJ characterized the letter as stating that

12   Alam-Bhuyan “was attacked once.” Id. at 67. The letter, however, asserts that

13   Alam-Bhuyan was “attacked . . . severely once,” id. at 490 (emphasis added) – an

14   assertion that is consistent with Alam-Bhuyan’s testimony regarding his course of

15   treatment following each attack. To be sure, the letter is silent as to the first attack.

16   But that omission does not amount to a contradiction of Alam-Bhuyan’s testimony,

17   which the IJ acknowledged was independently corroborated by medical records.

18   Indeed, we have cautioned against relying on third-party omissions that do not

19   create an inconsistency. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 81 (holding that “where a
                                            4
 1   third party’s omission creates no inconsistency with an applicant’s own

 2   statements,” the “applicant’s failure to explain [the omission] is less probative of

 3   [his] credibility” (emphasis omitted)).       Accordingly, the IJ’s reliance on the

 4   purported discrepancy between Alam-Bhuyan’s testimony and the BNP’s letter

 5   does not support the adverse-credibility determination.

 6         Nor was the adverse-credibility determination bolstered by the IJ’s finding

 7   that Alam-Bhuyan could not explain the “discrepancy.” Certified Admin. Record

 8   at 67. We have hesitated to fault a petitioner for being unable to explain why

 9   information may have been omitted by a third party, where, as here, the petitioner

10   “was not in a position to know” why the third party omitted the information.

11   Singh v. Garland, 6 F.4th 418, 429 (2d Cir. 2021). Therefore, while Alam-Bhuyan

12   was asked to speculate about why the BNP’s letter mentioned only one of the two

13   attacks, his failure provide a satisfactory answer does not undermine his

14   credibility, particularly in light of corroborating medical records that the IJ appears

15   to have credited. Without more, we cannot say that the agency “provided specific,

16   cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding . . . [that] bear a legitimate nexus

17   to the finding.” Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                               5
1          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED, the BIA’s

2   decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings. All

3   pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 1

4                                                FOR THE COURT:
5                                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

    1Because we grant Alam-Bhuyan’s petition for review, we need not reach the BIA’s ruling on the
    motion to remand. See I.N.S. v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts . . .
    are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results
    they reach.”).
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