Court Opinion

ID: 9537275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:15:15.225105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:21.595644
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Chief Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
While I agree that under Alaska Supreme 'Court Rule 6 this court has appellate jurisdiction, I disagree with the majority’s disposition of the case. In my view the record fails to establish the existence of an actual controversy. I would therefore vacate the superior court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.
In 1969, the Borough instituted an action seeking to resolve a dispute involving the right to regulate certain electrical power-line construction activity along its Aero Avenue right of way. On December 8, 1969, the parties stipulated to a settlement of the Aero Avenue dispute. This stipulation also attempted to reserve for judicial decision the question of whether “the Borough has the power to regulate construction along its road rights of way.” In my opinion this stipulation mooted the 1969 action, since the parties agreed to abide by the settlement “regardless of the outcome” of the reserved question.
In June 1971, the parties filed with the superior court a document entitled “Stipulation to Clarify An Issue Submitted to Court.” Apparently referring to the question “reserved” in 1969, this stipulation sought to raise the issue of “whether the [Borough] has the authority to regulate the use of rights of way outside the city limits, including construction in those rights of way . . . .” I agree with the majority that we may construe this 1971 stipulation as an attempt to commence an action for declaratory relief under Alaska Civil Rule 51(a) and AS 22.10.-020(b). On the other hand, in Jefferson v. Asplund,1 we noted that Alaska’s Declaratory Judgment Act requires a case of actual controversy as a prerequisite to the grant of declaratory relief.2 There we approved Chief Justice Hughes’ definition of justiciable controversy which provided in part that
‘A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. . The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. ... It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of of facts.’ 3
Though the 1971 stipulation can be construed as an attempt to commence a declaratory judgment action, the parties are not relieved from Jefferson’s requirement of
a simple statement of facts demonstrating that the superior court has jurisdiction and that an actual justiciable case or controversy is presented. (Footnote omitted.) 4
In the case at bar the parties have made no effort to show that they are currently involved in a disagreement over power-line *1038construction work within Borough rights of way. Nor have they shown the frequency with which such disputes have occurred in the past, or the likelihood that their recurrence is imminent. The only fact the parties have clearly established is that they are not now engaged in any such road right of way construction controversy. Since the record before us does not demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy, I would dismiss the declaratory relief action.5

. 458 P.2d 995 (Alaska 1989).

. Id. at 998.

. Id. at 998-999, quoting from Aetna Life Ins. Oo. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241, 57 S.Ot. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617, 621 (1937).

. 458 P.2d at 999.

. We have noted that Alaska’s Declaratory Judgment Act is patterned on the federal act. Jefferson v. Asplund, 458 P.2d 995-996. The United States Supreme Court has dismissed declaratory judgment actions under the federal act when the ree-ord did not demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy, without first remanding to the trial court for further proceedings. B. g., International Longshoremen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954).