Court Opinion

ID: 9895761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 17:06:41.292869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:02.767475
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 22-2024
                               Filed November 8, 2023

RODERICK E. WARD, Jr.,
    Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David F. Staudt,

Judge.

      An applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his request for

postconviction relief concerning his conviction for second-degree murder.

AFFIRMED.

      Nathan A. Olson of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

        Roderick Ward appeals the district court’s denial of his request for

postconviction relief (PCR) concerning his conviction for second-degree murder.

Ward alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his decision

not to testify at trial.

    I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

        In 2014, Ward was charged with first-degree murder. After a jury trial in

2015, Ward was found guilty of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to a

fifty-year term of incarceration with a mandatory minimum of seventy percent. This

court affirmed Ward’s conviction. State v. Ward, No. 16-0027, 2017 WL 1278288,

at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2017). Our court summarized the facts:

                On August 1, 2014, Ward and his girlfriend, Katelyn Randall,
        invited people to their home for a gathering. The decedent, Gary
        Wilson; Ward’s uncle, Reggie Taylor; and Taylor’s wife were in
        attendance along with a number of other individuals. Wilson arrived
        at Ward’s home in the afternoon, and Ward and Wilson were drinking
        alcoholic beverages throughout the day. The gathering continued
        through the evening and night. Ward and Wilson continued drinking.
        Wilson began acting obnoxious and aggressive, attempting to pick
        fights. Wilson did not get physical with anyone but his behavior
        began to anger Ward.
                After most of the people had gone—only Ward, Wilson,
        Randall, Taylor, and Taylor’s wife remained—Wilson’s behavior
        continued and Ward became more angry. Ward raised his voice at
        Wilson and told him to leave. Ward held a shotgun as Ward and
        Wilson continued exchanging words.
                Randall testified she saw Wilson in the street in front of the
        house and Ward holding the shotgun and moving toward Wilson.
        Randall stated she turned to go inside because she “didn’t want to
        see it if something were to happen.” As Randall reached the front
        door, she heard gunshots. Randall turned to see Wilson and Ward
        both lying in the street. She believed Ward had fallen down.
                Taylor was also outside at the time. Taylor testified he was
        searching for a cigarette inside his truck when he heard the gunshots
        and ducked for cover. When he looked up, Taylor saw Wilson lying
        in the street. Taylor also saw Ward running from the scene.
                                           3

                Randall stated after she heard the gunshots she went inside
        to check on her children. Randall testified she saw Ward come into
        the house, retrieve a Denver Broncos blanket from the living room,
        leave the house, and retreat down the street.
                Police and paramedics arrived on the scene and made
        lifesaving efforts, but Wilson did not survive his injuries. Police
        located five empty 12-gauge shotgun shells and a cell phone in the
        street near Wilson. The medical examiner testified Wilson sustained
        three gunshot wounds—one to the left forearm and two to the
        abdomen. The medical examiner stated the wounds were caused
        by a shotgun that was likely fired at fairly close range.
                Ward was not at the house when police arrived, but later
        approached the line of police tape securing the scene. Officers
        detained Ward for questioning. The cell phone discovered in the
        street rang when officers called the number Ward provided during
        the interview. Bloodstains found on the pants Ward was wearing at
        the time he was detained matched Wilson’s DNA.
                The next morning a man walking along the street near Ward’s
        house found a 12-gauge pump-action shotgun wrapped in a Denver
        Broncos blanket hidden in some bushes and alerted police. DNA
        testing confirmed several spots of blood on the shotgun matched
        Wilson.

Id. at *1.

        In 2017, Ward filed an application for PCR, his first, arguing his trial counsel

in his criminal case provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an

evidentiary hearing, in which both Ward and his defense counsel testified, the court

denied his application. This timely appeal follows.

    II. Standard of Review

        We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Clay,

824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012).

    III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        Ward argues he is entitled to relief based on ineffective assistance of

counsel. Ward’s sole argument on appeal is that he was misinformed by counsel

in making his decision not to testify, leading to his decision not being knowing,
                                           4

voluntary, and intelligent. Ward states that his testimony was “critical to show

unintentional recklessness rather than deliberate and intentional murder,” and to

support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter rather than second-degree

murder. Ward also argues he did not wish to testify because he feared it would

assist the State, and his trial counsel never discussed that fear or explained the

benefits of testimony. He alleges that because of counsel’s failure to explore his

hesitancy to testify, “he was unaware of the benefits of testifying.”

       The Strickland standard requires establishment of its two-prong test to

demonstrate the ineffectiveness of counsel: (1) counsel failed to perform an

essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted from this failure.            Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Failure to prove either prong is fatal

to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805,

809 (Iowa 2003).

       Under the first prong, we presume the attorney competently performed his

or her duties. State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Iowa 2014). An applicant must

rebut the presumption of competence by showing by a preponderance of the

evidence that “trial counsel’s ‘representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.’” State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Iowa 2006) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). “Counsel breaches an essential duty when counsel

makes such serious errors that counsel is not functioning as the advocate the Sixth

Amendment guarantees.” Ross, 845 N.W.2d at 698. This is more than a showing

that a trial strategy backfired or that another attorney would try the case differently.

Id.
                                           5

       To establish prejudice under the second prong, an applicant “must show a

reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.” State

v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Iowa 2015). “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Ondayog, 722

N.W.2d at 784 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

       A defendant has a constitutional right to testify at their criminal trial, and it

is the duty of counsel to “advise the defendant about the consequences of

testifying so that an informed decision can be made.” State v. Ledezma, 626

N.W.2d 134, 146–47 (Iowa 2001). “Generally, the advice provided by counsel is

a matter of trial strategy and will not support a claim of ineffective assistance

absent exceptional circumstances.        However, when a defendant follows the

misinformed advice of counsel concerning the consequences of testifying,

ineffective assistance of counsel may occur.”              Id.at 147.     Additionally,

“[m]iscalculated trial strategies and mere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise

to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 143.

       We are able to resolve Ward’s appeal on the breach-of-essential-duty

prong. Although Ward contends that he and his counsel failed to have substantive

discussions on whether he should testify, the record belies this contention. Ward

acknowledged that he had discussed testifying with his counsel and that their

strategy was to “present our case and leave it in the jury’s hands to make the

decision.” His counsel testified that as a public defender she followed the same

procedure with each client and that included having conversations regarding

testifying. Ward’s defense counsel testified that she would have had ongoing
                                           6

discussions with Ward over the course of the case on whether he would testify,

and the trial record supports that.

       Ward’s counsel also discussed the strategy behind Ward not testifying. She

stated that she believed Ward’s testimony could have been detrimental to their

theory of the case. Defense counsel argued Ward was intoxicated at the time of

the shooting, but counsel worried Ward might appear to remember too much on

the stand and “it would make him seem less intoxicated.” And as noted by the

district court, had Ward elected to testify he would be cross-examined about his

statements to the police that he was not present when the shooting took place, the

fact that five shots were fired, and the fact that he hid the shotgun.

       The trial court record also supports Ward’s defense counsel’s testimony:

                 THE COURT: Off the record we had also discussed . . . the
       issue of whether or not the defendant had opted to testify or more
       importantly whether he opted not to testify. And is it safe to say, [trial
       counsel], that you and the defendant have had ample opportunity to
       discuss this issue in anticipation of the trial, throughout the course of
       this trial, and . . . at the point where we discussed it off the record,
       on the eve of the [S]tate resting, and a decision was made that he
       was not going to testify?
                 DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s correct, Your Honor. It’s
       been an ongoing conversation I’ve had with Mr. Ward leading up to
       the actual commencement of trial as well as points during the trial
       I’ve checked in with him to see, I mean, explained to him that it’s his
       right to testify and only he is the person who can make that choice.
       It’s not anything that [co- counsel] or I can do.
                 THE COURT: And so, Mr. Ward, just to confirm on the record,
       is it, in fact, your decision to not testify here today?
                 WARD: Yes.
                 THE COURT: And do you concur with the statements that were
       made by me, and more importantly by [defense counsel], that that’s
       been an ongoing discussion between the two of you, and you feel, as
       you sit here now, that you have a knowing, intelligent, essentially a
       history and discussion of that, that you can make a knowing
       and intelligent decision?
                 WARD: Yes.
                 ....
                                        7

            THE COURT: And so as we sit here now, and with that
      understanding that if you wanted to testify we’d make that
      accommodation,      it’s your      decision,  based       on you[r]
      conversations with counsel, that you do not want to testify.
            WARD: Yes.

      The record demonstrates that Ward and his trial counsel engaged in

ongoing discussions about whether he should testify, and ultimately, Ward elected

not to do so. We find no breach of an essential duty by Ward’s trial counsel. See

Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143–47. We therefore do not address the prejudice

prong of the Strickland test. We affirm the denial of Ward’s PCR application.

      AFFIRMED.