Court Opinion

ID: 9688135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:34:22.19614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:35.246829
License: Public Domain

GORDON W. SHUMAKER, Judge,
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and write separately to suggest the inappropriateness of the trial court’s resolution of the verdict issue and to note the uselessness of having juries answer damages questions after they have decided that defendants are not liable for damages.
I do not quarrel with the fact that the inartful wording of Question # 5 created a predictable, apparent inconsistency in the verdict because it seemed to reintroduce a causation issue after causation had been definitively decided in Question # 4.
But, in resolving the apparent inconsistency, the trial court lost sight of the fact that Question # 5 is not a causation question but rather is a damages question. There is no tenable basis for thinking the jury was answering liability causation questions twice or that it purposely contradicted itself. In Question #4, the jury said that the school district’s conduct was not a direct cause of “any injury” to Olson. Did the jury then, in the very next question, contradict itself and say that the school district nevertheless directly caused $15,000 in damages to Olson? I think that is a very skewed reading of the verdict.
The case ended when the jury clearly found in Question # 4 that the school district’s conduct did not directly cause any injury to Olson. The damages questions then became superfluous and no longer controlled the outcome of the case. The effect of the court’s interpretation of Question # 5 was to give the jury two opportunities to find causal liability'—one through the straightforward Question # 4 and one through a question that seemed to be asking about damages rather than liability. I know of no authority that provides a jury with more than one chance to answer liability questions on a special verdict. Thus, the court should not resolve this apparent *590inconsistency by ignoring the true liability question in favor of the “hidden” liability question. If the court cannot resolve the issue in favor of the school district, as I believe it should, then it ought to grant the parties a new trial.
My second concern is that there is neither authority nor good reason for requiring a jury to answer damages questions after it clearly finds that a party has no liability for damages. I am aware that the JIG special verdict form carries that directive. But the JIG verdict form is not the law; rather it is merely a guide, and I have been unable to locate either decisional authority or a rule requiring damages answers after a finding of no liability. Thus, I suggest the practice has become customary but is not at all required.
The likely purpose of having the jury answer damages questions after it has found no liability is the thought that, if there is an appeal and a reversal, the whole case will not have to be retried. Perhaps only the liability issue would have to be retried and the damages determination can stand. This is surely a good theory but is not plausible in practice. I suggest that when the jury knows that the damages answers do not count, it really does not invest the time and attention it should to reach a meaningful assessment of damages. Additionally, as this case illustrates, by having the jury answer a superfluous damages question, the trial court runs the risk of creating needless posttrial and appellate issues.
I would not let the result the trial court reached stand but would reverse and remand for a new trial.