Court Opinion

ID: 9931688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 18:01:28.606918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:18.389249
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1112    Document: 010110997699   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 1
                                                               FILED
                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     February 9, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                        Clerk of Court
     ROBERT-LAWRENCE PERRY,

           Plaintiff - Appellant,

     v.                                                No. 23-1112
                                              (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-02306-RM-
     CITY OF FORT COLLINS;                                KLM)
     CSU BOARD OF GOVERNORS;                            (D. Colo.)
     STEVEN VASCONCELLOS,

           Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
                _________________________________

          This appeal grew out of a clash between Colorado State University

 and an alumnus, Mr. Robert-Lawrence Perry. Mr. Perry is homeless, and

 the university allegedly excluded him from the campus. The exclusion

 *
      Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
 decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
 App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 2

 didn’t stop Mr. Perry, so the City of Fort Collins cited him for trespass

 when he returned.

       The exclusion from campus and resulting citations for trespass led

 Mr. Perry to sue. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of all the

 claims, and the district judge adopted the recommendations.

       Mr. Perry appeals. He reargues his underlying claims, but doesn’t

 address the district court’s reasons for dismissing the claims.

 1.    Identification of parties

       The district court decided that the only parties were the State of

 Colorado, the Board of Governors of Colorado State University, and

 Mr. Steven Vasconcellos. Mr. Perry complains that he also sued others.

       The court acknowledged that the caption had included many other

 individuals, but explained that the body of the complaint itself had limited

 the parties to the state, the board of governors, and Mr. Vasconcellos.

 Though Mr. Perry obtained this explanation, he didn’t inform the district

 court that he was intending to include others as defendants. So we reject

 his argument about the district court’s identification of the parties.

 2.    The Magistrate Judge’s authority to recommend rulings on
       dispositive matters

       The district judge referred the case to a magistrate judge. The

 referral encompassed issues that were both dispositive and non-dispositive.

                                        2
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699    Date Filed: 02/09/2024     Page: 3

 For dispositive issues, the magistrate judge could issue “proposed findings

 of fact and recommendations.” Doc. 9.

       The magistrate judge carried out this referral, submitting proposed

 findings of fact and recommendations on the defendants’ motions to

 dismiss. Mr. Perry argues that the magistrate judge exceeded her authority

 because the referred issues don’t involve trial management. But the referral

 also allowed the magistrate judge to recommend rulings on the motions to

 dismiss. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1).

       Mr. Perry argues that the magistrate judge lacks authority to decide a

 motion to dismiss. But the magistrate judge didn’t make rulings; she just

 recommended them. These recommendations fell not only within the

 district judge’s referral order but also within the scope of the magistrate

 judge’s statutory authority. Clark v. Poulton, 963 F.2d 1361, 1363 (10th

 Cir. 1992). So we reject Mr. Perry’s challenges to the magistrate judge’s

 authority.

 3.    Vagueness of the university’s policy on exclusionary orders

       Mr. Perry also claims that the university’s policy on exclusionary

 orders was too vague. The district court concluded that the Board of

 Governors enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity for the challenges to

 the university’s policy on exclusionary orders.

       Mr. Perry argues that an exception exists when a claimant seeks

 declaratory or injunctive relief against a state official. But the district

                                        3
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699    Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 4

 court explained that this exception doesn’t apply because Mr. Perry had

 asserted this claim against the university itself, rather than a state official.

 Mr. Perry doesn’t address this rationale. So we reject his challenge to the

 ruling.

 4.    Regulatory taking

       Mr. Perry also claims that the city took his personal property in

 violation of the Fifth Amendment. This claim apparently stems from the

 university’s restrictions on Mr. Perry’s use of his car while at Colorado

 State University. The district court dismissed this claim, reasoning that

       •      the pertinent property was Mr. Perry’s car and

       •      no one took the car away from him.

 Mr. Perry apparently disagrees, but he doesn’t address the district court’s

 reasoning. We thus reject Mr. Perry’s challenge to the ruling.

 5.    Prosecution, conviction, and sentence for trespass

       Mr. Perry alleges a constitutional violation from his prosecution,

 conviction, and imprisonment for trespass. But Mr. Perry said in district

 court that he was “not seeking damages” or “reversal of his trespass

 convictions.” Doc. 59 at 10. 1 So the district court didn’t err in dismissing

 1
       Mr. Perry was convicted in state court of trespass. The City of Fort
 Collins argued in federal district court that the civil rights claims on the
 trespass conviction were (1) premature until Mr. Perry separately obtained
 expungement or habeas relief and (2) barred under the Rooker-Feldman
 doctrine. The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Perry had directed the

                                         4
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 5

 Mr. Perry’s claims involving his prosecution, conviction, and sentence for

 trespass. So we reject his challenge to the ruling.

 6.    Trespass ordinances

       On appeal, Mr. Perry also challenges the constitutionality of the

 trespass ordinances. In district court, he asserted that the ordinances were

 unconstitutional because they had targeted the homeless. For these claims,

 Mr. Perry invoked the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment

 and the rights to equal protection and due process. The district court

 concluded that Mr. Perry had abandoned his claim involving cruel and

 unusual punishment, that he had failed to allege facts tying his prosecution

 for trespass to his homelessness, and that he had waited too long to claim a

 denial of due process.

       In response, Mr. Perry argues that the district court neglected to

 consider the continuing-violation doctrine. But the court declined to apply

 this doctrine because Mr. Perry had relied on continuation of his injury

 rather than the wrongdoing. He presents no reason to question that ruling. 2

 So we reject Mr. Perry’s appellate argument.

 claims about the trespass conviction to the state defendants rather than the
 city, and Mr. Perry doesn’t challenge this characterization.
 2
       In responding to the city’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Perry said that he
 intended to drop his claims involving “unlawful arrest, unlawful conviction
 and unlawful imprisonment.” Doc. 58 at 2. The magistrate judge thus
 concluded that Mr. Perry had withdrawn his claims involving the trespass

                                        5
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 6

 7.    Camping ordinance

       Mr. Perry claims that the city’s camping ordinance violates the

 Constitution (the protections against cruel and unusual punishment and

 regulatory takings and the rights to equal protection and due process). The

 district court rejected these claims. For the claim involving cruel and

 unusual punishment, the district court reasoned that Mr. Perry’s conviction

 hadn’t involved violation of the camping ordinance. For the claim

 involving a denial of equal protection, the court reasoned that the

 ordinance had no discriminatory purpose or effect. For the claim involving

 a denial of due process, the court reasoned that Mr. Perry had provided no

 details about the seven times that he was allegedly charged with violations.

 For the claim involving a regulatory taking, the court reasoned that the city

 hadn’t taken any of Mr. Perry’s property. Mr. Perry doesn’t say what he

 thinks is wrong with the district court’s reasoning. So we reject Mr.

 Perry’s challenges to these rulings.

 8.    University’s policy on exclusionary orders

       Mr. Perry claims that the university’s policy on exclusionary orders

 violates the Constitution. But the district court concluded that the

 ordinance. On appeal, Mr. Perry reasserts his trespass claims without
 addressing his statements that he was withdrawing these claims.

                                        6
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699     Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 7

 university enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state,

 and Mr. Perry doesn’t address that conclusion. So we reject this challenge.

 9.    Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

       In the complaint, Mr. Perry asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

 But he asserted these claims against only the state and the university, not

 the city. As discussed above, the district court dismissed the claims against

 the state and university based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and

 Mr. Perry doesn’t address that reasoning. So we reject his challenges on

 the claims invoking § 1981.

 10.   Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

       Mr. Perry claimed that the city had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

This section addresses conspiracies to deprive individuals of equal

protection or equal privileges and immunities. Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d

683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993). The district court dismissed this claim based on

a failure to allege facts reflecting a conspiracy.

       On appeal, Mr. Perry argues that § 1985(3) covers conspiracies that

are private as well as “official.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 18. But the

district court didn’t say otherwise. The court dismissed this claim based on

the failure to adequately allege a conspiracy—not the private nature of the

conspiracy. Mr. Perry’s appellate argument thus doesn’t address the district

court’s reasoning. So we reject his argument involving the claims under

§ 1985(3).

                                        7
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 8

 11.   Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986

       Mr. Perry also complains that the district court shouldn’t have

dismissed his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. But liability under § 1986

depends on liability under § 1985. Brown v. Richardson, 770 F.2d 896, 907

(10th Cir. 1985). And as noted above, the district court didn’t err in

dismissing the claims under § 1985(3). See Part 10, above. So we conclude

that the district court didn’t err in dismissing the claims under § 1986.

 12.   Timing of the district court’s ruling on the motion for
       appointment of counsel

       In district court, Mr. Perry moved for appointment of counsel. The

 magistrate judge denied the motion when she recommended dismissal of

 the remaining claims. Mr. Perry argues that the magistrate judge waited too

 long to rule on the motion for appointment of counsel.

       Courts ordinarily have discretion on when to rule on motions.

 Mr. Perry sought appointment of counsel only after the parties had finished

 briefing on the motions to dismiss. So the magistrate judge could

 reasonably defer consideration of the motion to appoint counsel until after

 the ruling on the motions to dismiss.

       In denying the motion to appoint counsel, the magistrate judge

 explained that she couldn’t force an attorney to take the case. See Rachel v.

 Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 396–97 (10th Cir. 2016). The magistrate judge could

 only ask an attorney to represent Mr. Perry. See id. If his claims had

                                         8
Appellate Case: 23-1112   Document: 010110997699   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 9

 survived the motions to dismiss, the magistrate judge might have

 appropriately considered counsel essential for further briefing or for trial.

 In these circumstances, the magistrate judge could reasonably defer

 consideration of the request for counsel until she could recommend a

 ruling on the motions to dismiss. So the court didn’t err in its timing.

       Affirmed.

                                        Entered for the Court

                                        Robert E. Bacharach
                                        Circuit Judge

                                        9