Court Opinion

ID: 9391717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 00:01:05.980704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.051896
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60383        Document: 00516735561             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/02/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                     May 2, 2023
                                      No. 22-60383                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Clara Denois Frazier-Barnes,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Denis McDonough, Secretary, U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 3:20-CV-158
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Douglas, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Clara Denois Frazier-Barnes (“Frazier-Barnes”), proceeding pro se,
   appeals the district court’s grant of the Department of Veterans Affairs’
   (“VA”) motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
   and motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. For the following reasons,
   we AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60383      Document: 00516735561          Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/02/2023

                                    No. 22-60383

                                         I.
          Frazier-Barnes is an African American woman born in 1959. Frazier-
   Barnes began working as a Nurse Coordinator at the G.V. (Sonny)
   Montgomery Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in July
   2017. She was hired as a Nurse II, Step 7 salary, and was subject to a two-
   year probationary period. Frazier-Barnes’ direct supervisor was Nurse
   Manager Peggy King, an African American woman born in 1955 and classified
   as a Nurse III salary.
          In the first few months of Frazier-Barnes’ employment, King
   identified issues with Frazier-Barnes’ performance and extended her
   “orientation phase” to give her additional time to complete the orientation.
   During the next few months, Frazier-Barnes had interactions with three
   other Nurse Managers in the presence of King. According to Frazier-Barnes,
   the interactions involved “threatening language” and “aggressive behavior”
   by the other Nurse Managers, without any intervention by King.
          In November 2017, Frazier-Barnes developed migraines and multiple
   orthopedic ankle and foot conditions. According to the VA, Frazier-Barnes
   requested “sick leave” on December 4, 2017, and then was absent from work
   without medical documentation from December 4, 2017, to March 29, 2018.
   Frazier-Barnes claims that she was injured at work on or about December 1,
   2017, because of excessive walking, and that she started “disabled veteran
   leave” on December 4, 2017, but she does not cite to any evidence in the
   record that supports these assertions. While Frazier-Barnes’ appellate brief
   states that she requested “45-days continuation of pay” on December 12 and
   a reasonable accommodation on either December 12 or 13, she likewise does
   not cite to evidence in the record.
          At some point, Frazier-Barnes made a formal request for an
   accommodation, asking to be re-assigned to a sedentary clerical job and put

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   on a limited work schedule. King denied this request on January 26, 2018.
   As reasons for the denial, King wrote that the requested accommodation
   “would not be effective” given that the responsibilities of the Nurse
   Coordinator position required walking and standing. King instead offered to
   have Frazier-Barnes make rounds on specific units, but Frazier-Barnes did
   not agree to that accommodation. In February, August, and September of
   2018, Frazier-Barnes had numerous requests for leave denied due to lack of
   documentation.
          On March 29, 2018, King requested a Nurse Professional Standards
   Board (“NPSB”) summary review of Frazier-Barnes’ performance. King’s
   request for a board review cited Frazier-Barnes’ issues during orientation,
   her delinquencies in completing mandatory training, and her failure to
   provide “appropriate medical documentation for her absence from
   December 4, 2017 to March 29, 2018.” King also prepared a proficiency
   report that marked Frazier-Barnes as “unsatisfactory” or “low satisfactory”
   in different performance categories and recounted various issues. Frazier-
   Barnes was notified of the NPSB review and her right to respond. She did
   not appear at the hearing but submitted a response in writing. On July 16,
   2018, the NPSB sustained most of the charges against Frazier-Barnes and
   recommended her termination.         Based on the NPSB recommendation,
   Medical Center Director Dr. David Walker terminated Frazier-Barnes’
   employment effective September 7, 2018.
          Frazier-Barnes contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity
   (“EEO”) counselor with the VA’s Office of Resolution Management
   (“ORM”) on September 24, 2018, alleging that she was terminated,
   discriminated against in compensation, denied a reasonable accommodation,
   had her leave requests denied, and was subject to a hostile work environment
   because of her disability and as retaliation for her prior EEO activity. Frazier-
   Barnes had filed at least two prior formal EEO complaints—one in November

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   2015, when she had a different job at the VA, and a second in May 2018—
   that had both been dismissed as untimely.
          Frazier-Barnes filed her third formal EEO complaint—which forms
   the basis of this lawsuit—on November 13, 2018. The EEO complaint
   included the same claims she had presented to the EEO counselor and added
   the claim that she had also been subject to a hostile work environment
   because of her race and age. After administrative proceedings, a final order
   was issued in the VA’s favor on November 18, 2020. In the interim, Frazier-
   Barnes filed this lawsuit in March 2020 and amended her complaint in March
   2021. The district court granted the VA’s motion to dismiss and motion for
   summary judgment in June 2022, and Frazier-Barnes appealed.
                                           II.
          “We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based on
   failure to state a claim de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts in the
   complaint as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Raj
   v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Bass v.
   Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir.2012)). “To survive a motion to
   dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
   to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
   U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citation and quotation omitted). “A claim has facial
   plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
   draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
   alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).
          “This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary
   judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.” Austin v. Kroger
   Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Summary
   judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

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   matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact
   exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
   for the non-moving party.” Austin, 864 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted). “All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
   the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in that party’s
   favor.” Id. at 328–29 (citation omitted).
           However, “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
   disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of
   materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish
   the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
   party opposing summary judgment “must go beyond the pleadings and
   designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little
   v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
   “[C]onclusory allegations” and “unsubstantiated assertions” will not
   suffice. Id. (citations omitted). “We resolve factual controversies in favor of
   the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is,
   when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Id.
                                             III.
           On appeal, Frazier-Barnes challenges the district court’s resolution of
   seven of her claims. 1 We consider each in turn.

           _____________________
           1
             “Where a claim is not briefed on appeal, it is abandoned.” McDowell v. Home
   Depot USA, Inc., 126 F. App’x 168, 170 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d
   921, 921 (5th Cir. 1999)). Frazier-Barnes’ brief does not address the Whistleblower
   Protection Act, Prohibited Personnel Practices, and Title VII race discrimination claims
   that she raised in the district court. Thus, those claims are abandoned.

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                                                 A.
           Frazier-Barnes first asserts that she was entitled to medical leave as a
   disabled veteran pursuant to Executive Order (“EO”) No. 5396 (July 17,
   1930). 2 The district court dismissed this claim under Rule 12(b)(6). On de
   novo review, we AFFIRM. EO 5396, signed in 1930 by President Herbert
   Hoover, states:
           With respect to medical treatment of disabled veterans who are
           employed in the executive civil service of the United States, it
           is hereby ordered that, upon the presentation of an official
           statement from duly constituted medical authority that
           medical treatment is required, such annual or sick leave as may
           be permitted by law and such leave without pay as may be
           necessary shall be granted by the proper supervisory officer to
           a disabled veteran in order that the veteran may receive such
           treatment, all without penalty in his efficiency rating. The
           granting of such leave is contingent upon the veteran’s giving
           prior notice of definite days and hours of absence required for
           medical treatment in order that arrangements may be made for
           carrying on the work during his absence.
   Executive Order 5396 (July 17, 1930).
           While there is no Fifth Circuit caselaw applying EO 5396, other
   circuits have noted that the order by its own terms makes the granting of leave
   “contingent upon the veteran’s giving prior notice of definite days and hours
   of absence required for medical treatment.” Cassie v. U.S. Postal Serv., 129
   F. App’x 620, 622 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Bankston v. Henderson, 213 F.3d
   630 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (explaining that EO 5396 does not apply
           _____________________
           2
               Frazier-Barnes also asserts that her claim arises under “the Back Pay Act, 5
   U.S.C. § 5596,” and claims that she was constructively suspended. She did not make these
   arguments in the district court, however, and this court will not consider claims raised for
   the first time on appeal. See Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctrs., Inc.,
   200 F.3d 307, 316–17 (5th Cir. 2000).

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   unless the employee “follow[s] the proper procedures for requesting leave to
   obtain medical care”). The order also requires “the presentation of an
   official statement from duly constituted medical authority that medical
   treatment is required.” Frazier-Barnes did not include any allegations in her
   amended complaint showing that she complied with EO 5396 in either
   respect, nor does she cite to evidence in the record that shows a genuine
   dispute of material fact on this issue. While she asserts in her brief that she
   gave prior notice and that King confirmed receipt by email, her citations to
   unspecified exhibits do not support her assertion. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
   (explaining that “conclusory allegations” and “unsubstantiated assertions”
   do not satisfy nonmovant’s summary judgment burden).
                                                B.
           Next, Frazier-Barnes asserts that the district court erred in dismissing
   her Fair Pay Act claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 3 On de novo review, we
   AFFIRM. First, Frazier-Barnes’ claims of compensation discrimination
   occurring from March 2014 to September 2015 were already dismissed as
   untimely in a prior EEOC decision. Second, as for her timely claims, Frazier-
   Barnes has not alleged that any compensation differences occurring from July
   2017 to May 2018 were because of unlawful discrimination. While Frazier-
   Barnes alleged that she was paid less than other employees performing
   similar work, she did not allege that any compensation differences were due
   to her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” as required to state a
   Title VII claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

           _____________________
           3
            For the first time on appeal, Frazier-Barnes also asserts that she has a claim under
   the Equal Pay Act and Paycheck Fairness Act. Again, these arguments will not be
   considered. See Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc., 200 F.3d at 316–17.

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                                         C.
          Next, Frazier-Barnes brought a claim for Title VII retaliation. The
   district court granted summary judgment to the VA on this claim. We
   AFFIRM. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [Frazier-Barnes]
   must show that: (1) she participated in an activity protected by Title VII;
   (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a
   causal connection exists between the protected activity and the materially
   adverse action.” Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th
   Cir. 2008). If she establishes a prima facie case, “the burden then shifts to
   the employer to articulate a legitimate . . . non-retaliatory reason for its
   employment action. If the employer meets this burden of production,
   [Frazier-Barnes] then bears the burden of proving that the employer’s reason
   is a pretext for the actual retaliatory reason.” Id. (cleaned up).
          While there is no dispute that Frazier-Barnes engaged in protected
   activity and was later terminated, the district court ruled that she had failed
   to show a prima facie causal connection between the two events. Frazier-
   Barnes contends that the “temporal proximity” between her second EEO
   complaint and her termination is enough to infer a causal connection. Our
   precedents hold that “temporal proximity” is “sometimes enough to
   establish causation at the prima facie stage” so long as the protected activity
   and the adverse action are “very close in time.” Gosby v. Apache Indus. Servs.,
   Inc., 30 F.4th 523, 527 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Porter v. Houma Terrebonne
   Hous. Auth. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 810 F.3d 940, 948–49 (5th Cir. 2015)) (cleaned
   up). We have held “that a six-and-a-half-week timeframe is sufficiently
   close, but that a five month lapse is not close enough, without other evidence
   of retaliation, to establish the ‘causal connection’ element.” Lyons v. Katy
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Here,
   Frazier-Barnes submitted “report of contact” forms detailing her conflicts
   with King and other Nurse Managers in December 2017, contacted an EEO

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   counselor in January 2018, filed her second EEO complaint in May, and was
   fired in September. The process that began her termination, however, began
   in late March 2018 with King’s request for an NPSB review, followed by the
   NPSB report in July recommending termination. Thus, there is some
   temporal proximity between Frazier-Barnes’ protected activities and the
   process leading to her termination.
          More importantly, however, even assuming that Frazier-Barnes
   established a prima facie case, her claim would ultimately fail at the
   subsequent pretext stage because our cases hold that temporal proximity
   evidence alone is insufficient to show that the employer’s given reason was
   pretextual and that the plaintiff was actually terminated for a retaliatory
   reason. Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir.
   2007) (summarizing circuit precedent and discussing additional types of
   pretext evidence, including employee’s length of employment and
   disciplinary record—or lack thereof—prior to engaging in protected activity;
   whether    employer’s     non-retaliatory   reason    for    termination   was
   substantiated; and whether employer commented disparagingly on
   employee’s protected activity); Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647,
   656 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Without more than timing allegations . . . summary
   judgment in favor of [the employer] was proper.”).
                                         D.
          Next, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment
   to the VA on Frazier-Barnes’ age discrimination claim because she has not
   shown a prima facie causal connection between her age and her termination.
   The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) applies to workers
   who are at least 40 years old. 29 U.S.C. § 631. To establish a prima facie case
   of age discrimination, Frazier-Barnes must show: (1) she is within the
   protected class; (2) is qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse

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   employment decision; and (4) was replaced by someone younger or treated
   less favorably than similarly situated younger employees. Smith v. City of
   Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 2003). There is no dispute that
   Frazier-Barnes is at least 40 years old and was terminated from her position.
   The VA maintains that she was not “qualified.” Assuming Frazier-Barnes
   was qualified, however, her claim still fails because she has put forth no
   evidence that she was replaced with someone younger or otherwise
   discharged because of her age. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Frazier-Barnes also
   argues that she applied for a “Utilization Review RN” position and that
   someone younger was hired instead. But, again, she points to no evidence
   that she was qualified for the position or that someone younger was hired
   instead of her, and “unsubstantial assertions” are not sufficient to carry her
   summary-judgment burden. Id.
                                         E.
          Frazier-Barnes next brought a claim of a hostile work environment due
   to disability. “[T]o succeed on a claim of disability-based harassment, the
   plaintiff must prove: (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she
   was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment
   complained of was based on her disability or disabilities; (4) that the
   harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of
   employment; and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the
   harassment and failed to take prompt, remedial action.” Soledad v. U.S.
   Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flowers v. S.
   Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235–36 (5th Cir. 2001)).
          Frazier-Barnes asserts that she was harassed and retaliated against
   when King denied her requests for leave and accommodation and when she
   was threatened and harassed by other Nurse Managers. Like with her ADEA
   claim, however, Frazier-Barnes points to no summary judgment evidence

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   showing that any harassment was motivated by her disability. Her subjective
   belief alone does not give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See
   Lawrence v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 313 (5th
   Cir. 1999). Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment to the VA on this claim as well.
                                          F.
          Frazier-Barnes brought two claims under the Rehabilitation Act
   (“RA”), a law similar to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) but
   applicable to the federal government. See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513,
   517 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies to federal
   government departments and agencies. By contrast, the ADA, enacted in
   1990, explicitly excludes the federal government from coverage.”) (footnotes
   omitted); Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
   “[t]he RA and the ADA are judged under the same legal standards”). To
   prevail on her RA disability discrimination claim, Frazier-Barnes must show
   that “(1) [s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) [s]he is
   qualified and able to perform the essential functions of [her] job, and (3) [her]
   employer fired [her] because of [her] disability.” Kemp, 610 F.3d at 235. “To
   succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) [s]he
   is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its
   consequential limitations were known by the covered entity; and (3) the
   entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d
   584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
          An individual with a disability is “qualified” if he or she “with or
   without reasonable accommodations can perform the essential functions of
   the employment position.” Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090,
   1092 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). The VA does not dispute
   that Frazier-Barnes is disabled but asserts that she was not qualified to

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   perform the Nurse Coordinator job, with or without an accommodation. For
   evidentiary support, the VA cites King’s March 2018 proficiency report and
   various “assignment sheets” documenting deficiencies in Frazier-Barnes’
   performance.        The VA also points to evidence that her requested
   accommodation of “[a] sit down job doing clerical work” with “[n]o
   continuous standing or walking” on a limited schedule “would not be
   effective” for the Nurse Coordinator job because that job is a
   “supervisory/administrative” position that requires “long periods of
   continuing walking” and “standing,” not a sedentary “clerical” position.
           Rather than focusing on whether she was qualified for the Nurse
   Coordinator job, with or without an accommodation, on appeal Frazier-
   Barnes appears to claim that the VA violated the Rehabilitation Act by not
   giving her a different job when it “failed to hire and offer her work that met
   her requirements.”         Frazier-Barnes asserts that there were “available
   positions that she was qualified for at the time of her request” and refers
   again to the “Utilization Review RN” position. But, as discussed above,
   Frazier-Barnes points to no summary judgment evidence that she was
   qualified for the Utilization Review RN position or that a position was
   available at the time, and “unsubstantial assertions” are not sufficient to
   defeat summary judgment. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. 4
           Because Frazier-Barnes has failed to point to evidence that she was
   “qualified” for either position, with or without a reasonable accommodation,
   we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the VA on
   her RA claims.

           _____________________
           4
              Frazier-Barnes’ additional contention that the VA failed to engage in the
   interactive process likewise lacks evidentiary support—and, in fact, is contradicted by the
   undisputed summary judgment evidence showing that Frazier-Barnes and King did discuss
   an accommodation, albeit without reaching an agreement.

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                                         G.
          Last, Frazier-Barnes asserted various claims under the Notification
   and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination Act of 2002 (“No FEAR Act”).
   The Act “requires that federal agencies repay any discrimination or
   whistleblower damage awards out of agency funds rather than the General
   Fund of the Treasury.” Glaude v. United States, 248 F. App’x 175, 177 (Fed.
   Cir. 2007). “The Act also requires agencies to discipline employees who are
   responsible management officials in cases in which there has been a finding
   of discrimination.” Baney v. Mukasey, No. 3:06-CV-2064, 2008 WL 706917,
   at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2008). The district court dismissed these claims
   because Frazier-Barnes failed to support them with any factual allegations in
   her amended complaint, and, alternatively, because the No FEAR Act does
   not provide for a private right of action. We AFFIRM. While our court has
   not yet addressed the question, the Federal Circuit and numerous district
   courts have held that the No FEAR Act does not provide a private right of
   action. See, e.g. Glaude, 248 F. App’x at 177; Baney, 2008 WL 706917 at *6–
   7 (collecting cases). But even assuming it did, Frazier-Barnes’ No FEAR Act
   claims fail for the same reason as her other claims, as she has not pleaded
   sufficient allegations of unlawful discrimination on account of race, gender,
   disability, age, or as retaliation for engaging in protected activities, nor
   pointed to summary judgment evidence showing the presence of a genuine
   dispute of material fact as to any claim.
                                         IV.
          For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
   granting the VA’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.

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