Court Opinion

ID: 9667476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:46:53.025581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:38.306581
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

We issued our original opinion on July 27, 2000,1 in which we affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. We find it necessary to address one of the arguments raised by the City in its motion for rehearing.
In its second ground for rehearing, the City challenges our rejection of its argument that the Sullivans’ pleadings do not state a premises defect claim by alleging that the school zone sign failed to activate the school zone at 7 a.m. or thirty minutes in advance of zero hour classes. The City also argues that we exceeded the scope of our review by examining the evidence attached to the Sullivans’ response.
On original submission, the City contended that the portion of the Sullivans’ pleadings alleging a failure of the school zone to be operative thirty minutes prior to the beginning of the “zero hour” classes does not demonstrate a waiver of immunity because the pleadings describe non-actionable legislative and discretionary actions. In support of its argument, the City attached to its brief a copy of Midland City Ordinance 7150 which establishes the boundaries, hours, and applicable speed limits of all school zones within the Midland city limits, and more specifically, sets the hours of the Midland High school zone at 7:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. with a speed limit of 20 miles per hour. The City had not attached the ordinance to its plea to the jurisdiction filed in the trial court, nor did it ask that court to take judicial notice of the ordinance. In fact, the City did not make this argument in its plea to the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the City, citing Bellnoa v. City of Austin, 894 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.App. — Austin 1995, no writ), argued in this Court that when a sign accurately reflects a legislative enactment, such as the operative time period for the school zone, and it operates as intended by the governing body, then the complaint does not involve a “condition” of the sign. City of Midland, at 12 . In their written response to the plea to the jurisdiction, the Sullivans argued that the City’s policy of starting all school zones thirty minutes in advance of classes is not discretionary, and in support of this assertion, they attached a copy of Gary Saunders’ testimony.
Distinguishing Bellnoa, we originally held that while the school zone signs may have been consistent with Municipal City Ordinance 7150, the ordinance itself is erroneous because it is not in compliance with the City’s policy of beginning all school zones thirty minutes in advance of classes. City of Midland, at 12. Thus, the school zone signs were not functioning as intended. Id. The City complains vociferously about our reference to Saunders’ *17testimony in our original opinion, alleging that it is improper to look outside of the pleadings in passing upon a plea to the jurisdiction. The City, however, fails to address how it is possible for this Court to restrict our review to the face of the Sulli-vans’ pleadings, yet at the same time, consider Municipal Ordinance 7150 in passing on its plea to the jurisdiction. If it is proper for this Court to take the ordinance into account, then ordinary notions of fair play suggest that the Sullivans should be permitted to respond by including relevant evidence in their response. Even if we must exclude the responsive evidence from our review of this issue, the Sullivans’ pleadings specifically allege that the City had a non-discretionary policy of starting all school zones thirty minutes in advance of classes. As set forth in our original opinion, the Sullivans alleged that Midland High had zero hour classes starting at 7:30 a.m., but the school zone was not operating at the time Adam crossed the street on his way to class. Id. at 10. We also set forth the following portion of the pleadings in a different section of the opinion, but they are applicable as well to this issue:
Plaintiffs allege that the City owed a duty to correct the condition of the school zone and the school zone sign pursuant to Texas Tort Claims Act Section 101 et seq. The City had a non-discretionary policy and practice of starting all school zones at least thirty minutes prior to the start of classes. The City knew that the school zone on ‘A’ street was in violation of this policy. Despite such knowledge, the City failed to properly activate the school zone at the scene of the accident pursuant to the City policy and failed to properly mark and maintain the school zone and signage to reflect changes in school start times so as to give accurate and sufficient warning to drivers of possible student-pedestrian traffic and, as a result, failed to protect Adam Sullivan while he was in the school zone. The defective condition created by the City’s failure to activate the school zone and school zone sign in accordance with established City policy created an unreasonable risk of harm to Adam Sullivan. [Emphasis added].
Id. at 12.
Taking these pleadings as true, as we must, we adhere to our holding that while the school zone signs may have been consistent with Municipal City Ordinance 7150, the school zone signs were not functioning as intended because the signs, like the ordinance, were erroneous and not in compliance with the City’s policy of beginning all school zones thirty minutes in advance of classes. The City’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

. See City of Midland v. Sullivan, 33 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App. — El Paso, 2000, no pet. h.).