Court Opinion

ID: 9839897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 16:08:51.429457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:56.932387
License: Public Domain

J-S25031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.R., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: E.R., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 943 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000059-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.A.R., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: E.R., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 944 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000060-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L.R., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: E.R., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 945 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000061-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.K.R., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-S25031-23

                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: E.R., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 946 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-AP-0000062-2022

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                        FILED SEPTEMBER 14, 2023

       E.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the March 15, 2023, decrees involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her children, sons, J.K.R., born in June

2018, and J.A.R., born in December 2010, and daughters, J.L.R., born in July

2013, and A.L.R., born in November 2016 (collectively, “the Children”),

pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1

For the reasons below, we affirm.

       We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows. The family

came to the attention of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services

(“DHS”) in 2019 due to reports related to Mother’s homelessness and

substance abuse. See N.T. Termination H’rg, 3/15/23, at 14. Additionally,

J.A.R., then 8 years old, was not enrolled in or regularly attending school.

____________________________________________

1 By separate decrees entered the same date, the trial court terminated the

parental rights of the Children’s putative father, I.M.A. (“Father”). Father did
not file appeals from those decrees, nor has he participated in the instant
appeals.

                                           -2-
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See id.    DHS obtained protective custody of J.A.R. on May 9, 2019, and

protective custody of the remaining three children the following day, May 10,

2019. See id. at 15-16. The Children have remained in DHS custody since

that time. See id. at 16.

       The court adjudicated the Children dependent on June 5, 2019, and

established permanency goals of reunification2 and ordered supervised

visitation for Mother. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 16; see also DHS Exhibit

4 (Dependency Dockets). In furtherance of reunification, DHS established a

single case plan with objectives focused on, inter alia, supervised visitation,

substance abuse, and mental health. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 17.

       Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted

permanency review hearings at regular intervals.      The court characterized

Mother’s compliance with the permanency plan as substantial in December

2019 and February 2020; moderate in October 2020 and April 2021; minimal

in September 2021; and moderate in March 2022.            See DHS Exhibit 4

(Dependency Dockets). Significantly, Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)

caseworker, Zeferino Albino, testified that Mother was inconsistent in her

compliance with the single case plan objectives and, as a result, not capable

of caring for the Children. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 27-28.

____________________________________________

2 The court established concurrent goals of adoption on March 4, 2022.    See
DHS Exhibit 4 (Dependency Dockets).

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       On January 27, 2022, DHS filed petitions for the termination of parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), with respect

to all four Children. Following numerous continuances, the trial court held a

hearing on the petitions on March 15, 2023.          Mother was present and

represented by counsel.3 The Children, then ages twelve, nine, six and four,

were represented by both a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel.4

DHS presented the testimony of the CUA Caseworker Albino.5, 6 Additionally,

Mother testified on her own behalf.

       By separate decrees dated and entered March 15, 2023, the trial court

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to
____________________________________________

3 We observe that Mother arrived late, after the proceeding had commenced.

See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 10, 32.

4 Both the GAL and legal counsel, also referred to as a child advocate, argued

in favor of termination of Mother’s parental rights. See N.T., Termination
H’rg, at 86-90. While the GAL submitted a brief to this Court, legal counsel
submitted a letter noting her agreement with the trial court and advising that
she would not be filing a separate brief. See Letter, 6/22/23.

5 During the subject proceeding the trial court incorporated unspecified court

orders and single case plans from the Children’s dependency records. See
N.T., Termination H’rg, at 9. It is important to note that DHS did not
introduce, and the trial court did not admit, the same as evidence. We remind
DHS counsel and the trial court that termination and dependency proceedings
are two separate, distinct proceedings “with their own docket numbers,
records, and divisions within the Court of Common Pleas.” See Interest of
S.S., 252 A.3d 681, 688 (Pa. Super. 2021).
6 DHS also marked DHS Exhibits 1 through 5, which were admitted without

objection. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 7, 9, 23. While not identified with
the markings indicated on the record, we note that copies are included with
the certified record.

                                           -4-
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Thereafter, Mother timely

filed notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 7            This Court

consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte on May 8, 2023.

       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Where Mother undertook her family plan objectives, visited the
       Children, the trial court erred in its finding that [DHS] presented
       clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights under
       23 Pa.C.S.[ ] Section 2511(a)(1).

       2. Where the Child[ren were] placed because of Mother’s alleged
       negligence, but Mother has taken steps to mediate those things,
       the trial court erred in finding that [DHS] presented clear and
       convincing evidence to terminate parental rights under [ ] Section
       2511(a)(2).

       3. Where Mother completed the counseling, parenting, anger
       management classes, [and] secured housing[ and] employment,
       the trial court erred in finding that [DHS] presented clear and
       convincing evidence to terminate parental rights under [ ] Section
       2511(a)(8).

       4. Where [DHS’s] witness testified to a bond between Mother and
       the Children, and the trial court instead focused on the Children’s
       bond with their foster parents, the trial court erred in finding a
       termination of Mother’s rights best serve the needs and welfare of
       the Children.

       5. Where Mother has been able to remedy the conditions that . . .
       led to the removal of the Children from her care and where there
       [has] been [a] failure of the services to adequately assist Mother

____________________________________________

7 On April 25, 2023, the trial court filed a Notice of Compliance with Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(a), in which it relied upon its reasoning placed on
the record at the termination hearing. See Trial Court’s Notice of Compliance
with Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), 4/25/23, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

                                           -5-
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      in the remedying the conditions, the trial court erred in a finding
      of termination of parental rights under [ ] Section 2511 (a)(5).

      6. The trial court erred in its findings of fact and they were not
      supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Mother’s Brief at 3-4.

      We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When

applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings

of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021).         “Where the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may

not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or

abuse of discretion.”     In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa.

2021).       An abuse of discretion in this context exists only upon “a

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-

will.” Id.

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.             See

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.       The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven

enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a). See In re Adoption of

J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 942 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Only if the

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court determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination

under Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under

Section 2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In

re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental

rights, the petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and

convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358

(citation & internal quotation marks omitted).

       In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On appeal, Mother

has challenged the court’s ruling under each subsection. See Mother’s Brief

at 3. However, we have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of

parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one

subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Instantly, we will analyze

the court’s termination decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which

provide as follows:8

____________________________________________

8 Thus, we need not address Mother’s first, third, and fourth claims which
concern the propriety of termination pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(1), (5),
and (8). See Mother’s Brief at 3, 8-11, 13, 16-17.

                                           -7-
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     (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

                                 *    *    *

        (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
        or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
        essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
        his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
        causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
        will not be remedied by the parent.

                                 *    *    *

     (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

     With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we have explained:

     In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] §
     2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
     repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
     such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
     be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
     necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
     causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
     not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). Section 2511(a)(2) “emphasizes the child’s present and future need

                                     -8-
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for essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical

or mental well-being,” especially “where disruption of the family has already

occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994

A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation & emphasis omitted).

      Furthermore:

      The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
      be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
      contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as
      incapacity to perform parental duties.

In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 327 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Rather,

“[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably

prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of Adoption of

M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As such,

“[a] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as

untimely or disingenuous.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118 (citation & quotation marks

omitted).

      On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding clear and

convincing evidence to support grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2). See Mother’s Brief at 11. She asserts her capability of caring for

the Children and implies that the court’s ruling was based on her “[p]ast

incapacity alone.”   Id. at 11-12.    Mother maintains the conditions which

“brought her children into care” have been resolved, and highlights her

participation in mental health treatment, as well as obtaining housing and

                                     -9-
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employment. See id. at 12. She further challenges the suggestion that she

is not capable of parenting the Children as speculative. She states: “Without

the [C]hildren returning to Mother’s care or her having unsupervised visits,

opinions about Mother’s inability to provide care are just suspicions based on

Mother’s prior history[.]” Id.

       Upon our review, we conclude the record supports grounds for

termination under Section 2511(a)(2).              As indicated supra, Caseworker

Albino testified that Mother was inconsistent in her compliance with her single

case plan objectives, which emphasized, inter alia, supervised visitation,

substance abuse, and mental health.9 See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 17, 27.

He confirmed that Mother was informed of these objectives, which remained

substantially the same since their inception. See id. at 18-19.

       Specifically, Caseworker Albino testified that Mother was inconsistent

with visitation. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 20. He noted that Mother had

a period of unsupervised visitation which reverted back to supervised

____________________________________________

9 Mother’s single case plan objectives additionally focused on housing and
employment. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 17-18. Caseworker Albino
acknowledged that Mother had provided a copy of her lease, and that he had
been inside of her home. See id. at 25, 60. His testimony regarding Mother’s
proof of employment, however, was unclear. Despite indicting that Mother
did not provide proof of employment, Caseworker Albino later agreed that he
“received copies of her paystubs” when she provided him with her lease. See
id. at 25, 60.

                                          - 10 -
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visitation prior to the filing of the termination petitions.10 See id. at 41-42.

However, he explained that, following an incident at the September 22, 2022,

visit, Mother did not visit with the Children for a period of more than four

months ─ from September 22, 2022, until February 3, 2023. See id. at 21-

23, 47. Caseworker Albino emphasized that the visits were not suspended by

CUA; rather, Mother stopped visiting with the Children “on her own.” Id. at

21. Moreover, he noted that prior to the March 15, 2023, termination hearing,

Mother had not visited with the Children since the last week of February. See

id. at 20-21.

       Further, despite some negative drug tests throughout the pendency of

the dependency matters,11 Mother tested positive for cocaine on May 12,

2022, and positive for both marijuana and cocaine on July 15, 2022. See

N.T., Termination H’rg, at 41, 60. Additionally, Mother failed to comply with

requests for random screens. Caseworker Albino testified that he requested

____________________________________________

10  While the notes of testimony reference an unspecified period of
unsupervised visitation in 2021, until Mother allegedly improperly kept J.K.R.
overnight, the dependency dockets reveal court permission for unsupervised
visitation from December 2019 until the court again ordered supervised
visitation in September 2021. See N.T., 3/15/23, at 41-42, 57; see also DHS
Exhibit 4 (Dependency Dockets).

11 Mother most recently tested negative for controlled substances in January

2023 following a court hearing. See DHS Exhibit 5 (Urine Drug Testing Report,
1/4/23).

                                          - 11 -
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Mother go to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”)12 for random screening twice

a month, but Mother did not go. See id. at 23-24, 40. He stated: “She would

not go. I would text her and inform her, can she provide a urine and she

would say yes. And when I called CEU, they said she did not go.” Id. at 24.

Mother acknowledged that Mr. Albino sent her for random screens on

“multiple” occasions, although she claimed she had missed “[j]ust” one

random drug test in February of 2023.              Id. at 68.    Furthermore,

notwithstanding the positive screens, she denied any substance abuse,

claiming, “I don’t get high at all, not even smoke cigarettes or drink.” Id. at

75. Caseworker Albino stated that Mother never successfully completed drug

and alcohol treatment and, therefore, he “wouldn’t know” if she was still

actively using drugs. Id. at 40-41.

       With regard to mental health treatment, Caseworker Albino testified that

Mother was discharged from therapy at The Wedge in July 2022 due to

noncompliance.       See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 24-26, 42, 59.   Likewise,

Mother failed to provide a mental health treatment plan to CUA as ordered.13

See id. at 25-26.        Mother’s current mental health status therefore also

remained unknown to DHS.

____________________________________________

12 It appears that this unit is now known as the Substance Analysis Unit.   See
id.

13 The court ordered Mother to provide an updated treatment plan and
progress to CUA on multiple occasions. See DHS Exhibit 4 (Dependency
Dockets); see also N.T., Termination H’rg, at 17-18.

                                          - 12 -
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      Lastly, Caseworker Albino opined that Mother is not capable of caring

for the Children. See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 27-28. He explained:

      She struggles ─ during the visit, [M]other struggles to control the
      kids. The [C]hildren would ─ they treat her as if she’s a friend,
      and she would interact and play with them in a playful manner,
      but when they begin to run around or try to leave the space where
      they’re at, she would scream and yell at them.

      It just illustrates that she does not have control of her children
      during her visits. . . .

Id.

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial

court in concluding that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) is

warranted. The record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated

and continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal has caused the Children to be

without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their physical

and mental well-being. See M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Mother

cannot or will not remedy this situation. See id. Mother’s failure to comply

with her objectives in furtherance of reunification related to visitation,

substance abuse, and mental health caused the Children to be without

essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their physical and

mental well-being. Critically, her lack of compliance left the current status of

her substance abuse and mental health conditions unknown to CUA. Further,

her testimony belies any suggestion of future compliance and progress. As

this Court has stated: “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a

parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting

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responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope

for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super.

2006).

      Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 267.   “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.            The

‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of

permanently severing the parental bond.”       Id. (citations omitted). As our

Supreme Court recently explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa.

2023):

      [A] court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and welfare
      analysis must consider more than proof of an adverse or
      detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond. We
      emphasize analysis of the parental bond is but one part of the
      overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a determination of
      whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e.,
      whether maintaining the bond serves the child's developmental,
      physical, and emotional needs and welfare.

Id. at 1113 (emphasis added).

      In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must

also include consideration of other important factors.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1118.

While not inventing an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained

                                     - 14 -
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that the inquiry must consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present

in the record, including, but not limited, “the child’s need for permanency

and the length of time in foster care . . .; whether the child is in a preadoptive

home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets

the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible

needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted);

see also id. at n.28.

      In concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves

the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court stated:

             The testimony reflects that Mother struggles to control the
      Children and that they treat her like a friend. She’s a visitation
      resource is my finding through the testimony. While they enjoy
      visits with Mother, they don’t look to her as a disciplinarian.

             I find that there may well be a bond that exists, but I don’t
      find that a termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
      beneficial relationship.

            It’s unfortunate that visits have not progressed from
      supervised at the agency. I believe that the Children may well
      look forward to seeing mom, but it’s as a friendly relationship as
      opposed to a parent/child.

            Children similarly or actually more than similarly have a
      bond with their foster parents. Three of the children are placed
      together, and the foster parents are meeting their needs.

                                     *    *    *

           I find the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if
      parental rights are terminated. The Children have expressed that
      they want to stay where they are.          These children need
      permanency.

N.T., Termination H’rg, at 94-96 (internal capitalization corrected).

                                     - 15 -
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      Mother, however, argues that the trial court dismissed and diminished

her bond with the Children and failed to consider the impact of termination,

as follows:

            Although the trial court references the needs and welfare of
      the [C]hildren, it failed to adequately consider the [C]hildren’s
      bond with their Mother. There was no testimony on the record of
      the fact that termination of Mother’s rights would have on the
      [C]hildren. The court first discusses the [C]hildren’s reported
      bond with their foster family, but not with Mother. The [t]rial
      [c]ourt then minimizes the strength of the [C]hildren’s bond with
      their Mother by stating that the [C]hildren called her by a
      nickname. In fact, the [C]hildren call her “M&M.” The fact that
      her [C]hildren call her a name other than mom or mother does
      not indicate[ ] that there isn’t a significant bond. To the contrary,
      the fact that the [C]hildren have a loving nickname for their
      Mother shows that there is a significant bond. Mother testified
      credibly that the [C]hildren want to return with her.

            The CUA worker criticized Mother’s ability to discipline the
      [C]hildren during the supervised visits and [c]ites this as an
      indicator that she does not have a parental bond with her
      [C]hildren. Mother applied an approach during visits that would
      minimize the emotional temperature of the visits. The idea that
      Mother did not spend the visits actively disciplining the [C]hildren,
      but rather chose to engage with them by other means is not an
      indicator that she does not have a significant bond with her
      [C]hildren.

            The trial court erred in finding that the [C]hildren did not
      have a significant bond with their [M]other as it was not based on
      clear and convincing evidence.

Mother’s Brief at 15-16.

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The record supports

the finding that the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs

and welfare favor termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).

See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

                                     - 16 -
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          As noted supra, while Mother’s visitation progressed to unsupervised

visits for a period of time, her visitation later reverted back to supervised

visits.     See N.T., Termination H’rg, at 41-42; see also DHS Exhibit 4

(Dependency Dockets). Moreover, Mother did not engage in any visitation

with the Children for a period of more than four months, from September 22,

2022, until February 3, 2023.14            N.T., Termination H’rg, at 21-23, 47.

Caseworker Albino testified that the Children had “issues at home” as a result

of Mother’s “stopping and beginning again” visitation, and that J.A.R., in

particular “was struggling with anxiety thinking that the caregiver was going

to leave him.” Id. at 47-48. Additionally, he reported that prior to the March

15, 2023, termination hearing, Mother had not visited with the Children since

the last week of February. See id. at 20-21. Therefore, although Caseworker

Albino testified that the Children “look forward” to and “enjoy” seeing Mother,

he characterized their relationship with her as more of a friend. See id. at

27-28, 32 (“The [C]hildren . . . treat her as if she’s a friend[.]”). Further, as

stated above, he expressed that Mother “struggles to control” the Children,

and they do not view her as a disciplinarian. Id. at 27-28.

          Caseworker Albino also confirmed that the Children are doing well in

their current foster care placements. He testified that they are bonded to their

____________________________________________

14 Caseworker Albino described a visit on September 22, 2022, where Mother

was “screaming and yelling” at the staff, which led to the visit being halted
and the Children being removed. N.T., Termination H’rg, at 22. He further
expressed that the Children were “scared and fearful with her behavior.” Id.

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respective foster parents who meet their needs and to whom they look for

“love, protection, and support.” N.T., Termination H’rg, at 33-36, 47. The

three oldest children, ages twelve, nine, and six at the time of the subject

hearing, have been placed together since October 2022.            See id. at 34.

Caseworker Albino attested that the placement is a pre-adoptive placement

for J.A.R., who has been in the home since his initial placement in May of

2019, and that the foster mother is considering adopting J.L.R. and A.K.R.,

who were placed with her in October of 2022. See id. at 34, 36 (“[The foster

mother] did say that she was open to adopting [J.A.R.] I mean the girls just

got there; so, she said she’s been thinking about it.”). The three were enrolled

in private school and receiving additional tutoring, as needed. See id. at 37-

38, 51. Caseworker Albino further testified that J.K.R., then age four, was

placed in a separate pre-adoptive home. See id. at 36. He confirmed that

J.K.R. was “bonded” with his foster mother, and the two had a “good

relationship[.]”    Id. at 36.     Caseworker Albino stated that J.K.R. refers to

Mother by her name15 and calls his foster mother mom. Id. at 46, 62. At the

time of the hearing, J.K.R. was in preschool and successfully discharged from

early intervention services. See id. at 39, 51.

       Caseworker Albino testified that the Children want to remain as placed.

See id. at 37, 43-45, 47-49, 61. As such, he opined that the Children will not

____________________________________________

15 Mr. Albino testified that J.K.R. refers to Mother by shortened versions of her

first name. See id. at 46, 62.

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suffer irreparable harm if parental rights are terminated. See id. at 36-37.

He further expressed that it is in the best interests of the Children to be freed

for adoption. See id. at 37. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that termination best serves the Children’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section

2511(b).

      While Mother may profess to love the Children, a parent’s own feelings

of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental

rights. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. The Children had been in placement

for 46 months at the time of the subject hearing and are entitled to

permanency and stability. As we have stated, “a child's life simply cannot be

put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the

responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super.

2008). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing

of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental

duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or

her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M.,

856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).          Accordingly, we

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

      In her final claim, Mother generally asserts the trial court failed to

consider the evidence presented “under the ‘clear and convincing’ standard[.]”

Mother’s Brief at 18.    She insists that Caseworker Albino’s testimony was

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“ambivalent, contradictory, and unreliable hearsay testimony.”          Id.   In

particular, she challenges his testimony regarding her discharge from mental

health treatment ─ which was based on his conversations with her therapist

and not her medical records ─ and his claim that she did not provide proof of

income, despite his later acknowledgment that she gave him her paystubs.

See id. at 18-19.

      Preliminarily, we note that Mother’s challenge to purported hearsay

testimony is waived. She did not include a hearsay claim in her Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement, and a challenge to hearsay testimony is not

a “subsidiary issue” of any of her other claims. See Mother’s Statement of

Matters Complained of on Appeal, 4/14/23, at 1-2(unpaginated). See also

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v) (“Each error identified in the Statement will be

deemed to include every subsidiary issue that was raised in the trial court[.]”),

(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance

with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).

      With regard to her assertion that the court’s findings of fact are not

supported by clear and convincing evidence, we could consider this claim to

be a subsidiary of the other issues presented in her concise statement. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v). In each issue, Mother asserted DHS did not prove it

met the statutory requirement for termination by “clear and convincing

evidence.” See Mother’s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal at 1-

2 (unpaginated). Regardless, we conclude she is entitled to no relief. Mother’s

argument simply asks this Court to reweigh the evidence and make our own

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credibility determinations, which we are not permitted to do. See S.K.L.R.,

256 A.3d at 1123. As our Supreme Court has explained, when considering a

trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights,

      appellate courts . . . should defer to the trial judges who see and
      hear the parties and can determine the credibility to be placed on
      each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the
      success of the current permanency plan[. Moreover, e]ven if an
      appellate court would have made a different conclusion based on
      the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence
      and the credibility determinations of the trial court.

Id. at 1124 (citation & quotation marks omitted). Thus, Mother’s final claim

also warrants no relief.

      Because we conclude the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion

when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2)

and (b), we affirm the termination decrees.

      Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/14/2023

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