Court Opinion

ID: 9890181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 17:04:53.589003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:50.471034
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/12/23 P. v. Liva CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B325320

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. NA007529)
                   v.

JOSEPH LIVA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.

     Richard A. Levy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and William H. Shin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
       Defendant and appellant Joseph Liva participated in the
armed robbery of a bar during which his accomplice fatally shot
one bar patron and injured two others. Defendant pled no
contest to one count of first degree murder and was sentenced to
25 years to life. After the passage of Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.), defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant
to Penal Code section 1170.95. Former section 1170.95 was
subsequently renumbered and recodified as section 1172.6 with
no change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we
refer to former section 1170.95 only by its new designation
(section 1172.6).
       Defendant appeals from the denial of his resentencing
petition, contending there is no substantial evidence supporting
his guilt for murder as an accomplice under the law as amended
by Senate Bill 1437; the court failed to consider that he was 17 at
the time of the murder; the court erred in admitting his
testimony before the Board of Parole Hearings; and cumulative
error.
       Finding no error, we affirm.
          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       In 1991, defendant pled no contest to first degree murder.
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Defendant was sentenced to
25 years to life in prison. The court awarded defendant 450 days
of presentence custody credits and dismissed the remaining
charges.
       In 2019, defendant filed, in propria persona, a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 alleging he could not
now be convicted of felony murder under the law as amended by
Senate Bill 1437. The court appointed counsel for defendant and
ordered the People to file a response.

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      After the filing of initial briefs by counsel, a hearing was
held on January 5, 2021. Defense counsel told the court
defendant was 17 years old at the time of the 1991 murder and
requested a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261. The court granted defense counsel’s request to be
appointed to represent defendant at a Franklin hearing in
addition to handling defendant’s resentencing petition.
      Thereafter, the People conceded defendant had made a
prima facie showing under section 1172.6 and was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. The parties filed supplemental briefing.
The People submitted exhibits, including copies of the police
reports from the 1991 investigation, a copy of the 1991 probation
report, and the transcript of defendant’s May 21, 2015 hearing
before the Board of Parole Hearings. The court scheduled the
evidentiary hearing to take place on April 14, 2021, with the
Franklin hearing to follow.
      After several continuances, the hearing was held on
April 25, 2022. Defendant was represented by counsel and
waived his right to be present.
      The prosecution presented two witnesses: Sheri Ann
Roberts, a bar patron who witnessed the robbery, and William C.
MacLyman, a retired homicide detective with the Long Beach
Police Department who investigated the robbery.
      Ms. Roberts testified that on the evening of February 12,
1991, she got off work and went to the U.S.S. Someplace Bar in
Long Beach. She took a seat at the bar and ordered dinner.
Another patron, Shayne Shields, was seated about two feet away
from her. From her seat at the corner of the bar, she could see
the rear entrance clearly, without any obstructions. She saw
defendant and another man come in through the rear door. She

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recognized them both from the neighborhood and remembered
they had both been in the bar before, asking for change. The man
with defendant had something wrapped around his head like a
turban and he was holding a handgun. Defendant also had
something in his hand but Ms. Roberts could not say whether it
was a gun.
       The man with the turban fired a shot into the air. Both he
and defendant started yelling at everyone to get down on the
floor. Defendant grabbed a pool cue, “slammed” it on one of the
pool tables and on the bar counter and continued yelling at
everyone. The man with the turban “ripped” one patron off a bar
stool, threw him to the ground and headed toward the cash
register.
       Ms. Roberts said defendant “was yelling at people the
entire time.” Defendant “kind of coordinated all the activity that
was going on” while his accomplice collected money from the cash
register. Ms. Roberts heard a woman trying to tell defendant
that another male patron was trying to get down on the floor and
that he did not need to hit him so hard. She heard defendant
continue to hit people with the pool cue, with some of them
“making sounds of being hurt.”
       During the commotion, Mr. Shields, the patron who had
been sitting near Ms. Roberts, told her to try to move toward the
bathroom to hide. Mr. Shields was not completely down on the
floor at that point, and the man with the turban turned toward
him. After yelling at him again to get down, the man with the
turban shot Mr. Shields in the back of the head. The gunman
saw that Ms. Roberts was looking at him and pointed the gun at
her. She feared he was going to shoot her too, as she crouched
further down and put her hands over her head. She heard

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several more shots. Defendant yelled at the man with the turban
to hurry up, telling him it was time to go. Both men continued
yelling as they fled out the back door. The whole incident took
“just a few minutes.”
       Mr. Shields died from the gunshot wound to his head. Two
other bar patrons received nonfatal gunshot wounds.
       About a week after the shooting, Detective MacLyman
interviewed defendant while he was in custody at a juvenile
facility on an unrelated charge. Defendant was 17 years old at
the time. Detective MacLyman advised defendant of his rights.
Defendant signed a waiver form acknowledging his rights and
agreed to speak with the detective.
       Defendant told Detective MacLyman he had been at a
party in Long Beach and met up with a friend who he knew by
the moniker “Cap.” Cap’s real name was Faafatai Lulu. Cap
asked defendant if he was “down” with pulling a robbery, and
defendant said he was. Defendant said “being down with it”
meant agreeing to do it. Defendant also told Detective
MacLyman that he and Cap had committed a robbery the day
before.
       Defendant said he and Cap walked a few blocks to the
U.S.S. Someplace Bar and entered through the back door. Cap
had a shirt wrapped around his head and a handgun, which he
fired into the air when they got inside and yelled at everyone to
get down. Defendant grabbed a pool cue and hit a patron with it
because he did not get down fast enough. Cap fired several more
shots. Cap went to the register and collected money, while
defendant went through three people’s wallets looking for money
but did not find anything. Defendant said he and Cap then fled
out the back door.

                                5
       The prosecution offered two exhibits: a diagram of the
interior of the bar and the transcript of the 2015 hearing before
the Board of Parole Hearings. Defendant objected to the
admission of the transcript. Defendant did not present any
evidence.
       The hearing was resumed on August 31, 2022. After
entertaining argument, the court denied defendant’s petition,
finding there was substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt as a
major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless
disregard for human life.
       This appeal followed. We granted defendant’s motion to
augment the record with a copy of his resentencing petition.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Standard of Review
       We review for substantial evidence a trial court’s factual
findings at an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). (People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003,
1017; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591, review
den. Oct. 12, 2022, S276189 (Mitchell); People v. Ramirez (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 970, 985.) In conducting this review, “we
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence, whether direct
or circumstantial.” (Mitchell, at p. 591; accord, People v. Brooks
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)
2.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
       Factual Findings.
        Under current law, felony murder liability may be imposed
only if one of the following is proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
“(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,

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counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Pen.
Code, § 189, subd. (e); see also People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842.)
       The court here determined defendant remained guilty
under current law because he was a major participant in the
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Determining whether a defendant is a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life is a fact-intensive
inquiry. Courts are guided in their analysis by the Supreme
Court decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). “Banks
elucidated what it means to be a major participant and, to a
lesser extent, what it means to act with reckless indifference to
human life, while Clark further refined the reckless indifference
inquiry.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706–707.)
       Relevant considerations for assessing major participant
status are: (1) the defendant’s role in planning the crime(s),
including whether the defendant supplied or used a lethal
weapon; (2) the defendant’s awareness of the dangers the crime
posed or past experience or violent nature of accomplices;
(3) presence at the scene, including being in a position to
facilitate or prevent the murder or render aid; and (4) the
defendant’s conduct after the murder. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 803.) “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is
any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining the ultimate question.” (Ibid.)

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        The considerations relevant to determining reckless
indifference to human life are: (1) the defendant’s knowledge of
weapons, and use and number of weapons; (2) physical presence
at the crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid
the victim; (3) duration of the felony; (4) the defendant’s
knowledge of accomplice’s likelihood of killing; and (5) the
defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the violence during
the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–622.) As with
the major participant considerations, no one factor is necessary or
dispositive. The court must make an individualized, fact-
intensive inquiry and assess the totality of circumstances. (In re
Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 683.)
        Clark explained there was significant “overlap” in the
factors relevant to determining both elements because “ ‘the
greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the
more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615, italics added.)
         In denying defendant’s petition, the court said it found
defendant was a principal in the robbery and a “very direct
participant.” The court acknowledged its consideration of the
Banks and Clark factors and said the “most significant factor” to
the court “was the fact that at the entry to the establishment
gunshots were fired. It happens quickly. However, at that point
this defendant, Mr. Liva, knew that there were guns and knew
that they were being fired.” The court said defendant
nevertheless chose to continue to actively engage in the robbery
and assist his accomplice. The court noted defendant could have
said “no” to the use of guns, could have fled at that point, or could
have sought some form of assistance, but he chose instead “to
continue his participation in the takeover robbery.”

                                 8
       The court went on to explain that defendant, knowing his
accomplice was armed and firing his gun, continued “to direct”
the robbery in the words of Ms. Roberts, made no effort to deter
his accomplice from shooting multiple patrons, and then fled the
scene with him.
       Defendant says the court gave undue weight to the firing of
shots by his accomplice as they entered the bar and minimized or
failed to take into account how quickly everything happened, that
defendant did not plan the robbery, or personally use or supply
the gun, and that he was not in a position to prevent his
accomplice from shooting multiple patrons, which happened
suddenly and in rapid succession.
       It is not our role to reweigh the evidence considered by the
trial court. Our job is to determine whether substantial, credible
evidence supports the court’s findings, indulging all reasonable
inferences in the court’s favor. (Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 591, review den.)
       The record here shows that, after having committed a
robbery together the day before, defendant and his accomplice
met up at a party and decided to commit another robbery. They
then walked several blocks to a neighborhood bar, where,
according to the testimony of Ms. Roberts, they engaged in
coordinated behavior that appeared to be largely directed by
defendant. While defendant’s accomplice went to the register,
defendant yelled and terrorized the bar patrons by hitting them
with a pool cue with such force that Ms. Roberts could hear it and
the victims’ pained responses from her spot crouched in the
corner. Once his accomplice started shooting patrons, defendant
did not intercede but continued yelling and rifling through

                                 9
several patrons’ wallets before yelling to his accomplice to hurry
up. They then fled the scene together.
       Defendant’s violent participation in the robbery,
threatening and hitting patrons with a pool cue while his
accomplice collected cash from the register, heightened the risk of
violence as it escalated the possibility that someone might panic,
resist or attempt to flee. Defendant continued to pursue the
objects of the robbery, rummaging through patrons’ wallets even
after his accomplice started shooting, rather than try to
deescalate the situation or render aid. The court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
       Defendant contends the court made a material
misstatement of fact that undercuts the validity of its findings.
Defendant says the court referenced “guns” being fired when the
evidence showed that only one gun was used by defendant’s
accomplice. The court may have believed there was a possibility
more than one gun was used during the robbery based on the
testimony of Ms. Roberts who said that defendant “had
something in his hand. I couldn’t say if it was a gun or not when
he came in.” Whether or not the court believed defendant may
have also wielded a gun, the court did not rest its decision on a
finding that defendant personally used a gun.
       Defendant further argues the court’s finding of reckless
indifference is flawed because the court failed to consider that he
was only 17 at the time of the shooting. Defendant’s contention
that the court failed to consider his age is based solely on the
court having not expressly mentioned his age in reciting its
findings. Defendant concedes that we ordinarily do not presume
error, even from a silent record. (In re Julian R. (2009)
47 Cal.4th 487, 499 [discussing general rule “ ‘ “that a trial court

                                 10
is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable
law” ’ ”]; People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092 [“In
the usual case, the fact that a court did not specifically mention
certain evidence does not mean that the court ‘ignored’ that
evidence.”].)
       Defendant says however that the law regarding whether a
court must consider age as a factor when determining reckless
indifference was not well established at the time of the
evidentiary hearing and we should not presume the court took
his age into consideration. Defendant argues remand for a new
hearing is warranted to allow the court the opportunity to
expressly consider his age and how it impacts the reckless
indifference inquiry.
       The court received defendant’s extensive package of
material for the Franklin hearing and stated on the record it had
read all of the parties’ submissions. The court acknowledged on
the record that defendant was 17 at the time of the shooting.
Nothing obliged the court to explain further how it weighed
defendant’s age in its decision. There is no basis in this record
for us to find the court did not consider that defendant was 17 at
the time of the crimes.
3.     Defendant’s Testimony Before the Board of Parole
       Hearings Was Admissible.
       Defendant says the court prejudicially erred in admitting,
over his objection, the 2015 transcript of his hearing before the
Board of Parole Hearings.
       Numerous courts have concluded that a defendant’s prior
statements at a parole board hearing are admissible at an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). (See, e.g., People v. Duran (2022)

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84 Cal.App.5th 920, 924, 927-932, review denied Jan. 11, 2023,
S277507; Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 588–590, review
den.; People v. Anderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 81, 89–93, review
den. July 27, 2022, S274826; People v. Myles (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 688, 699, 704–706, review den. Dec. 15, 2021,
S271528.)
       We see no reason to depart from these well-reasoned
decisions or to revisit this court’s decision in Mitchell. “[I]t is fair
and indeed sensible to say a convicted person’s own words are
pertinent when that person petitions for the benefit of
resentencing.” (Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590, review
den.) We find no error in the court’s consideration of defendant’s
testimony before the Board of Parole Hearings.
        Finally, because defendant has not shown any error, we
reject defendant’s claim of cumulative error.
                           DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant and appellant Joseph Liva’s
petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                          GRIMES, Acting P. J.

      WE CONCUR:

                          WILEY, J.

                          VIRAMONTES, J.

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