Court Opinion

ID: 9672187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:50:29.919126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.826537
License: Public Domain

The following opinion was filed March 2, 1965.
Per Curiam
(on motion for rehearing). One new point has been raised by appellants-defendants in their brief on rehearing which we deem merits consideration. This is the contention that the town zoning ordinance enacted March 28, 1962, is void on the ground that the legislature has prohibited the restriction therein imposed upon use of property for a rendering plant. In appellants’ original brief they took the position that it was unnecessary to consider the validity of this ordinance because it was claimed only the town and not private individuals could maintain an action to enforce the ordinance.
Appellants’ contention that the ordinance is void is grounded upon secs. 66.052 and 95.72, Stats.
Sec. 66.052, Stats., provides in part as follows:
“Any city council or village board may direct the location, management and construction of, and license (annually or otherwise), regulate or prohibit any industry, thing or place *122bwhere any nauseous, offensive or unwholesome business may be carried on, within the city or village or within 4 miles of the boundaries, . . . Any town board as to the area within the town not now or hereafter licensed, regulated or prohibited by any city or village pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall have the same powers as provided in this section for cities and villages. . . . The provisions of s. 95.72 shall not be construed as any limitation upon the powers granted by this section to cities or villages but powers granted to towns by this section shall be limited by the provisions of s. 95.72 and any orders, rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.” (Italics supplied.)
Sec. 95.72, Stats., provides for the licensing of rendering plants by the state department of agriculture and imposes certain requirements and restrictions with respect to their location and operation.
The court has encountered some difficulty in construing the provision in sec. 66.052, Stats., that sec. 95.72 is not to be construed as any limitation on the power of cities or villages under sec. 66.052 but that the power granted to towns thereunder is limited by the provisions of sec. 95.72 and any orders, rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. It is clear that the legislature intended to confer, some power upon towns to regulate rendering plants in addition to the regulations imposed by sec. 95.72, but that such power is more restricted than that of cities and villages. The interpretation that seems most reasonable is that cities, villages, and towns may impose stricter regulation of rendering plants than imposed by sec. 95.72, but, although cities and villages may prohibit rendering plants entirely within their limits, towns cannot do so.1 We adopt such construction.
*122cThe entire town zoning ordinance of March 28, 1962, is not before us but only the following portions thereof set forth in the complaint:

“Section VIII Industrial District

“Use. In the Industrial District buildings and land may be used for any purpose except the following:
“2. Uses contrary to laws of the State of Wisconsin of ordinances adopted by the County Board of Brown County or the Town Board of the Town of BeUevue, Brown County, Wisconsin.
“3. Any of the following uses unless the location thereof shall have been approved in writing by the board of appeals, following a public hearing, and such approval shall be consistent with the general purpose and intent of this ordinance and shall be based upon such evidence as may be presented at such public hearing, tending to show the desirability or undesirability of specific proposed locations for a specific proposed use from the standpoint of the public interest, because of such factors as (without limitation because of enumeration) smoke, dust, noxious or toxic gases and odors, noise, glare, vibration, heavy vehicular traffic and increased traffic on the public streets; . . .
“(e) Bone distillation, fat rendering or any other form of dead animal reduction. . . .
“(k) Slaughterhouse, stockyard, meat processing. . .
Prior to adopting this ordinance the town had voted itself village powers by adoption of a resolution to that effect as authorized by sec. 60.18 (12), Stats. The zoning ordinance of March 28, 1962, does not purport to have been grounded on sec. 66.052, but upon sec. 62.23. Sec. 61.35 expressly makes the provisions of sec. 62.23 applicable to villages. Nevertheless we determine sec. 66.052 is controlling to the extent that a town having village powers cannot wholly exclude a rendering plant from its entire area. However, the above-quoted provisions of the ordinance of March 28, 1962, do not purport to do this. Instead it requires written approval by the board of zoning appeals of any application for *122duse of property in an industrial district as a rendering plant, and sets forth specific standards to be followed by the board in passing on such an application.
We conclude that the ordinance does not violate sec. 66.052, Stats., nor is it in conflict with sec. 95.72.
The motion for rehearing is denied without costs.

 In Park Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 78, 91, 100 N. W. (2d) 571, we held there was no conflict between certain safety orders of the industrial commission and building code ordinance of the city of Milwaukee because it was possible for the property owner to comply with both.