Court Opinion

ID: 9477764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:30:30.753286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:01.987744
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Petitioner, a convicted murderer, has failed to convince me that Alabama — in revoking petitioner’s parole — violated the federal constitution so as to justify a federal court’s interference.1
Today’s opinion stresses that the record is silent2 about much that occurred at the state hearing on the revocation of petitioner’s parole. I regard that silence as no basis for habeas corpus relief and decline to give petitioner any benefit of assumptions based on silence. To warrant habeas relief, petitioner must show that the state violated his federal rights;3 it is not (and ought not to be) enough that the state had the opportunity to violate his rights and that the record is silent about what happened.
As early as September 14, 1984, petitioner was notified that an effort would be made to revoke his parole because he had violated a law: criminal mischief. Then on October 2, 1984, prior to Gholston’s parole revocation hearing, petitioner was given a “Notice of Parole Violation Charges” stat*1162ing that he breached Condition Seven of his parole agreement: “not to violate any law.” This document showed that Ghol-ston had been arrested for second-degree criminal mischief but that the charge had been dismissed. On the same form, Ghol-ston expressly waived his right to seven days notice, to have an attorney represent him, and to call witnesses to testify on his behalf.
After signing the form, a revocation hearing was held during which Gholston plead not guilty to the underlying charge of second-degree criminal mischief. During this hearing, according to Gholston, the Board told him that his “parole supervisor had sent the Board a letter stating that in [the supervisor’s] opinion [Gholston] was guilty of the charge.” This report was based upon a personal conversation with Gholston immediately after his arrest during which Gholston admitted committing the crime. The record is silent about when at the hearing Gholston was told of or shown his parole supervisor’s report. The record is also silent about whether Ghol-ston ever objected to anything, claimed surprise, or requested the parole supervisor’s appearance, requested access to the letter alluded to by the Board or testified on his own behalf at the hearing; but Gholston has never contended that he did these things.4
In view of these facts, I believe that Gholston’s right to confrontation was un-breached. He appears to have received everything to which he was entitled. As Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), instructs, a revocation hearing must be provided, “if it is desired by the parolee, prior to the final decision on revocation by the parole authority.” Id. at 487, 92 S.Ct. at 2603 (emphasis added). This hearing is to “lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation.” Id. at 488, 92 S.Ct. at 2603. But the point is that the revocation hearing discussed in Morris-sey is mandated by the constitution only to the extent that the parolee requests a hearing.
The conditional nature of a parole revocation hearing strongly suggests that unless a parolee requests an opportunity to confront an adverse witness, the confrontation requirements of Morrissey are not implicated.5 Put differently, Alabama was under no constitutional obligation to produce the parole officer upon whose report the Board’s decision to revoke Gholston’s parole was based absent some request by Gholston to do so or, at least, an objection to the officer’s absence.6 Because Ghol-ston does not contend that he ever requested an opportunity to dispute his parole *1163supervisor’s report and that such a request was denied, today’s holding is an unwarranted extension of the protections established by Morrissey. More important, today’s opinion contradicts Morrissey’s warning that parole revocation procedures should be simple, flexible, and informal. Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604; see also United States v. Miller, 514 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1975) (parole revocation hearing is not to be “equated with a criminal prosecution”).
In determining that Gholston’s due process rights were violated, today’s court concludes that the significance of the supervisor’s report should be discounted because the report was “unsworn” and “unverified” and because it discussed Ghol-ston’s mental condition.
I do not believe that the supervisor’s report is as infirm as today’s court suggests. Although Morrissey states that the “finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts,” id. 408 U.S. at 484, 92 S.Ct. at 2602, the opinion goes on to say that a parole board may “consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604. Therefore, when the Supreme Court said a parole should be revoked on the basis of “verified” facts, I think “verified” was used in its ordinary sense, that is to say, facts confirmed or established by a hearing, and not in the more technical sense in which the word connotes statements made under oath. See Miller, 514 F.2d at 43 (admission of hearsay statement from probation officer and of unauthenticated copies of state court criminal records did not deny due process). A parolee’s due process rights are satisfied where unsworn evidence, such as this supervisor’s report, is considered by a parole board so long as the proffered evidence bears substantial evidence of reliability. See generally Egerstaffer v. Israel, 726 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (7th Cir.1984); Prellwitz v. Berg, 578 F.2d 190 (7th Cir.1978).
The supervisor’s report is reliable for at least two reasons. First, the report contains an admission by Gholston that he violated the terms of his parole. Although evidence allowed at revocation hearings is unlimited by the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is significant that those Rules allow admissions into evidence at trials. See Fed.Rule Evid. 801(d)(2). Second, the report was submitted in compliance with a statutory obligation pursuant to Ala.Code sec. 15-22-73 (1975) (“Each parole officer shall make such reports as the board may require_”). See generally McCormick on Evidence sec. 315 (3d ed. 1984) (exception for public records and reports); United States v. Pattman, 535 F.2d 1062, 1063-64 (8th Cir.1976) (because there was evidence of the report’s reliability, hearsay police report was properly admitted during probation revocation hearing even though arresting officer was not called to testify). These features provide the necessary guarantee of trustworthiness to permit consideration of the report.
I share the concern that the supervisor’s report discussed Gholston’s mental condition when nothing in the record indicates that the supervisor was qualified to do so. Still, merely because evidence irrelevant to whether Gholston violated the conditions of the parole was considered together with other evidence that Gholston did violate his parole, I am unwilling to say that revocation of Gholston’s parole violated due process. See generally Frick v. Quinlin, 631 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1980) (affirming parole revocation decision even though evidence that had been expunged from parolee’s record was considered, where other evidence supported revocation). The final notice to Gholston from the parole commission notifying him formally that his parole was revoked relied upon a single ground for the revocation: his violation of a state law.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. The burden is on [the petitioner] ‘to allege and provide primary facts, not inferences, that show, notwithstanding the strong presumption of constitutional regularity in state judicial proceedings, that in his prosecution the state so departed from constitutional requirements as to justify a federal court’s intervention to protect the rights of the accused.’
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 218, 70 S.Ct. 587, 597, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963).
In this habeas corpus proceeding, [the petitioner] must prove his right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. It is not the state’s responsibility to provide that [petitioner] received the proper warnings; it is [the petitioner’s] responsibility to prove that he did not.
Alvord v. Wainwright, 731 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

. That the absence of a transcript or recording of the revocation hearing violated due process has not been argued to us.

.See United States v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462, 76 S.Ct. 965, 970, 100 L.Ed. 1331 (1956) (“While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality") (emphasis added); Henson v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. March, Unit A 1981) ("State court convictions regular in form and valid on their face may not be so lightly set aside. The burden on the state habeas applicant is that his factual applications shall have appropriate evidentiary support. Convicts in state prisons, incarcerated under a state court conviction, valid on its face, may not be set free on assumptions") (emphasis added); see also Dais v. State ex rel. Davis, 420 So.2d 278 (Ala.Civ. App.1982) (“We cannot assume error; the burden is on the appellant to show error in the record, [cite] An appellate court cannot presume the existence of facts as to which the record is silent and make it the grounds for reversal.’’).

.In the absence of either a request or an objection, the officer conducting the hearing was unwarned of potential defects in the hearing. Generally, I oppose policies that allow a person to be silent in a state proceeding and then to make a federal case out of state conduct that might well have been different if the presiding officer in the state hearing had simply been told there was a potential problem. I recognize that Gholston was acting pro se at the revocation hearing, but it is undisputed that he waived counsel. Also, he has never contended that, when the Board mentioned the letter, he then requested a lawyer or requested more time to prepare a response to the letter.
Gholston had no right to be informed, in advance of the hearing, of the evidence against him. See Baker v. Wainwright, 527 F.2d 372, 378 n. 23 (5th Cir.1976) ("Morrissey does not require disclosure to the parolee in writing of the evidence to be used against him.’’); see also Stidham v. Wyrick, 567 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1977) (no requirement to provide parolee with copies of evidence to be against him prior to hearing); Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 251 Pa. Super. 428, 380 A.2d 854 (1977) (same); State v. Turnbull, 114 Ariz. 289, 560 P.2d 807 (Ct.App. 1977) (same).

. Baker v. Wainwright, 527 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1976), is, in my view, not a case in which a parolee attempted to waive cross-examination. Instead, the parolee was told “there will be no point in [his] questioning” the witness: cross-examination was unpermitted.

. Even had Gholston requested and then been denied the opportunity to confront his parole supervisor, it is unclear that such a denial would violate due process. See Stidham v. Wyrick, 567 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir.1977) (no due process violation where parolee’s request to call parole officers who prepared his parole violation report that was considered in revocation proceeding was denied). Because Gholston made no such request, it is unnecessary to address this question.