Court Opinion

ID: 9958578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 17:01:05.546325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.748476
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 9 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

C.D., by his guardian ad litem Michelle         No.    23-55563
Dougherty,
                                                D.C. No.
                Plaintiff-Appellant,            2:22-cv-05937-MCS-AGR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
ATASCADERO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted March 25, 2024
                              Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      C.D. appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against Atascadero

Unified School District (“Atascadero”). C.D. is a high school student with

disabilities who resided at relevant times in the district. In May 2022, Atascadero

removed C.D. from his Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) placement for

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
more than ten days because C.D. violated Atascadero’s student code of conduct

when he assaulted a teacher three times. Atascadero held a manifestation

determination meeting and concluded that C.D.’s conduct was not a manifestation

of his disabilities. Atascadero then expelled C.D. Fifteen days later, after the

teacher whom C.D. assaulted transferred to a different school, Atascadero

rescinded C.D.’s expulsion.

      C.D. requested a due process hearing, appealing the manifestation

determination. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) from the California Office of

Administrative Hearings heard the matter over the course of seven days and issued

a thirty-two-page decision in which she agreed with Atascadero that C.D.’s

conduct was not a manifestation of his disabilities. After independently reviewing

the record, the district court agreed that C.D.’s conduct was not a manifestation of

his disabilities and dismissed the case with prejudice. C.D. timely appealed. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      In cases arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(“IDEA”), we review the district court’s factual findings “for clear error, even

when they are based on the written record of administrative proceedings.” Van

Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887

(9th Cir. 2001)). We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. L.J. ex

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rel. Hudson v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2017).

Our review in IDEA cases “is far less deferential than judicial review of other

agency actions, but requires this court to refrain from substituting its own notions

of educational policy for those of the school authority it reviews.” Id. at 1002–03.

We accord administrative rulings in IDEA cases “due weight,” Bd. of Educ. v.

Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982), with particular deference where the ALJ’s

findings are “thorough and careful,” R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch.

Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith,

15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994)).

      1. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that C.D.’s conduct

was not a manifestation of his disabilities. When a student with an IEP violates a

student code of conduct, the school may remove the student from his placement for

more than ten days only if “the behavior that gave rise to the violation of the

school code is determined not to be a manifestation of the child’s disability.”

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C). In such circumstances, the school must hold a

manifestation determination meeting, with the parent and relevant IEP team

members, to “review all relevant information in the student’s file” and determine:

(1) “if the conduct in question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial

relationship to, the child’s disability; or” (2) “if the conduct in question was the

direct result of the [school]’s failure to implement the IEP.” Id. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i).

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In considering a manifestation determination, we do not attribute all of a student’s

conduct to his disabilities because doing so “would amount to asserting that all acts

of a [child with disabilities], both good and bad, are fairly attributable to his

[disabilities].” Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir.

1986), aff’d as modified sub nom. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). The district

court and ALJ both carefully considered the record and evidence before them and

reasonably concluded that C.D.’s conduct was not a manifestation of his

disabilities. While all IEP team members acknowledged that C.D.’s disabilities

sometimes manifest in difficulties with focus, attention, or compliance, Atascadero

team members distinguished the conduct at issue, which was particularly

inappropriate, violent, and targeted. Because the conduct that led to Atascadero’s

discipline of C.D. was exceptional, volitional, and attenuated from his disabilities,

the district court did not err.

       2. C.D. also alleges two procedural errors in Atascadero’s original

manifestation determination: (1) that in making its manifestation determination,

Atascadero did not consider all relevant information; and (2) that Atascadero did

not provide C.D.’s parent with written copies of staff statements recounting the

conduct in question before or during the manifestation determination meeting. It

appears that Atascadero complied with the relevant procedural safeguards:

Atascadero held a manifestation determination meeting, attended by C.D.’s parent

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and eight school staff members, within ten days of suspending C.D.; the team

considered the circumstances of the events at issue, C.D.’s evaluation and

diagnostic results, observations, health records, school disciplinary records, IEP,

services, placement, and additional analyses from the school psychologist and

principal; and the team, with the exception of C.D.’s parent, concluded that the

conduct in question was not a manifestation of C.D.’s disabilities. But even if we

assume that Atascadero committed the alleged procedural violations during the

manifestation determination meeting, those violations would now be harmless

because of the robust process before the ALJ, during which the ALJ considered

additional evidence and testimony over the course of seven days, and at which

point C.D., C.D.’s parent, and C.D.’s counsel all had access to the staff statements

recounting C.D.’s conduct. The ALJ’s thorough and careful decision in this case is

entitled to substantial deference. See R.B., 496 F.3d at 942.

       AFFIRMED.

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