Court Opinion

ID: 9409416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 12:06:40.783658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.019311
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA22-522

                                 Filed 18 July 2023

Pitt County, Nos. 21 JA 192–94

IN THE MATTER OF: A.J., J.C., J.C.

      Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 22 March 2022 by Judge Lee

Teague in Pitt County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 July 2023.

      The Graham Nuckolls Conner Law Firm, PLLC, by Jon G. Nuckolls, for
      petitioner-appellee Pitt County Department of Social Services.

      North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, by GAL Appellate Counsel
      Matthew D. Wunsche and Brittany T. McKinney, for guardian ad litem.

      Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo, by Assistant Parent Defender Jacky L.
      Brammer, for respondent-appellant mother.

      TYSON, Judge.

      Respondent is the mother of four-year-old A.J. (“Amanda”), thirteen-year-old

J.C. (“Jade”), and fifteen-year-old J.C. (“Juliet”). See N.C. R. App. P. 42 (pseudonyms

are used throughout the opinion to protect the identity of the juveniles). She appeals

from an order entered 22 March 2022, adjudicating Amanda as a neglected juvenile,

and Jade and Juliet as neglected and dependent juveniles, and placing the children

into the custody of the Pitt County Department of Social Services (“DSS”).

Respondent argues, and we agree, the inadmissible evidence and the trial court’s

findings thereon are insufficient to support its conclusions and adjudications. We
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                                    Opinion of the Court

reverse and remand.

                               I.      Background

      In June 2021, DSS received a report alleging neglect and improper discipline

based on an incident between Respondent and Jade. DSS created a safety plan with

Respondent, in which she agreed to refrain from physical discipline and to begin to

receive mental health services for herself and the children. Respondent also agreed

to allow Jade and Juliet to continue residing with their maternal great aunt, with

whom they had resided since 2018.

      In November 2021, the Washington County Department of Social Services

(”WCDSS”) sent DSS a report of another altercation between Respondent and Jade.

On 21 December 2021, WCDSS responded to a report alleging Respondent had locked

Jade out of the house. WCDSS, DSS, and Respondent were unable to identify a

temporary safety placement for Jade.

      On 22 December 2021, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging Amanda was a

neglected juvenile and alleging Jade and Juliet were neglected and dependent

juveniles, based upon these three reported incidents. DSS also obtained nonsecure

custody of Jade, and she was placed into the care of her maternal great aunt. Juliet

remained in the voluntary care of her maternal great aunt, and Amanda, the

youngest daughter, has remained in Respondent’s care.

      On 8 February 2022, DSS filed a notice it intended to present hearsay

statements at the adjudication hearing purportedly made by Jade and Juliet. DSS

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                                     Opinion of the Court

asserted their statements, made to DSS and WCDSS social workers, fell under the

residual hearsay exception of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(24) (2021).

      The petitions were heard on 17 February 2022. During the adjudicatory phase,

DSS presented testimony from a DSS social worker and a WCDSS social worker, each

of whom testified to statements purportedly made to them by Jade. Respondent’s

counsel objected before, during, and after the social workers introduced the hearsay

statements, but the court overruled the objections each time and allowed the

statements to be admitted into evidence.

      On 22 March 2022, the trial court entered an order adjudicating all three

children as neglected juveniles and adjudicating both Jade and Juliet as dependent

juveniles. The court later determined the children’s best interests demanded for them

to be placed into DSS’ custody. Respondent timely appealed.

                               II.      Jurisdiction

      Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(3)

(2021).

                                     III.   Issues

      Respondent argues the trial court erred by: (1) admitting hearsay statements

purportedly made by Jade, (2) adjudicating all three children as neglected, (3)

adjudicating Jade and Juliet to be dependent, and (4) concluding the children’s best

interests demanded for all of them to be removed from their parent and family and

placed into DSS custody.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

                           IV.    Standard of Review

      This Court reviews an adjudication “to determine whether the trial court’s

findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing competent evidence and

whether the court’s findings, in turn, support its conclusions of law.” In re J.R., 243

N.C. App. 309, 312, 778 S.E.2d 441, 443 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). “When reviewing findings of fact in a juvenile order, the reviewing court

‘simply disregards information contained in findings of fact that lack sufficient

evidentiary support’ and examines whether the remaining findings support the trial

court’s determination.” In re A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. 45, 52, 884 S.E.2d 687, 693 (2023)

(quoting In re A.C., 378 N.C. 377, 394, 861 S.E.2d 858 (2021)). The trial court’s

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

                                  V.     Analysis

                                 A. Findings of Fact

      The trial court’s order contains eighteen adjudicatory findings of fact, eight of

which Respondent challenges in whole or in part:

             5. The Department received a report relating to the
             Juveniles beginning on June 6, 2021, alleging neglect and
             improper discipline on the part of the Respondent Mother.
             The specific allegations were that the Juvenile, [Jade], was
             observed limping by another family member and later
             disclosed once Respondent Mother was gone that she had
             been in a physical altercation with the Respondent Mother.
             The Juvenile did not want to get out of the car and the
             Respondent Mother began twisting her leg trying to
             remove her from the car. The Juvenile locked herself in the
             car to get away from the Respondent Mother. The

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                    Opinion of the Court

Respondent Mother then took a shovel and broke the
window. Thereafter, the Respondent Mother beat the
Juvenile with a belt buckle in the head and all over her
body. She also choked and threatened to kill the Juvenile.
The Respondent Mother admitted to the Department
Social Worker that the altercation occurred.         The
Respondent Mother admitted she broke (sic) the car
window in today’s testimony.

...

7. Another report was received on November 16, 2021 that
the Respondent Mother had choke slammed the Juvenile,
[Jade], and threw her out of the car. This incident was
reportedly witnessed by a family member over a video call.
During the hearing . . . Respondent Mother yelled out, “I
did it.” when the choke slam was testified to.

8. On December 21, 2021, the Juvenile, [Jade], had agreed
to go with Respondent Mother thinking she would be able
to get her Christmas gifts and return to her [great] aunt’s
home, where she had been living for several years. Instead,
the Juvenile discovered that Respondent Mother planned
to enroll her in school in Washington County, which upset
the Juvenile.

9. On December 21, 2021, there was another report made
that the Respondent Mother locked the Juvenile outside in
the cold weather because she refused to babysit her two-
year-old sister. When [the WCDSS social worker] arrived
at the home, he discovered that law enforcement had to
handcuff Respondent Mother just to get her to calm down.
[He] observed Respondent Mother was “cussing and
fussing” and demanding that the child, [Jade] come inside.
[The social worker] confirmed that [Amanda], the 2-year-
old child, was present and witnessed Respondent Mother’s
outbursts and being handcuffed. This was upsetting to the
2-year-old. Respondent Mother’s behavior was unstable.

10. Neighbors, who witnessed the child’s distress had let
the Juvenile, [Jade], in their home to wait for assistance,
as they were concerned about her.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

             11. The Juvenile, [Jade], is very afraid of Respondent
             Mother and does not want to be in her care. The Juvenile
             has refused to get out of the Social Worker’s car, fearful
             that the Respondent Mother would kill her. The Juvenile,
             [Jade], confirmed there had been prior physical
             altercations with Respondent Mother.

             12. The Respondent Mother suffers from mental and
             psychological illnesses as a result of traumatic experiences
             throughout her life, including witnessing the murder of the
             Juveniles’ father. In 2016, Respondent Mother was the
             driver of a vehicle involved in an accident where two others
             were killed. The Respondent Mother suffered injuries that
             required hospitalization. The Respondent Mother has
             denied mental health diagnosis. The Respondent Mother
             has presented as extremely hostile and aggressive
             throughout the hearing of this matter as evidenced by
             numerous outbursts in the Courtroom and aggressive
             comments directed toward other participants in this
             proceeding.

             13. The Respondent Mother also has a history of drug use,
             specifically marijuana.

      Respondent argues the trial court, over multiple objections, erroneously

admitted hearsay statements purportedly made by Jade. We agree.

      DSS’s notice of its intent to offer hearsay statements specifically indicated the

proffered statements purportedly fell under the residual exception of N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 8C-1, Rule 803(24)(2021). However, at the hearing, DSS changed its position from

that basis asserted in the notice and appeared to argue Jade’s statements were

admissible because the social worker had

             direct knowledge. He had this conversation with the
             juvenile and he, as he testified, had a conversation with the
             Respondent-Mother, both of which are parties to the case,

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                                  Opinion of the Court

             and anything that the mom said, I would argue, is an
             admission of the Respondent-Mother and the juvenile as
             well. Her statement should be allowed in, as she is a party
             to the case as well.

Over objections, the trial court ruled the statements were admissible because “the

juvenile is a party to the action with the admission by the party as well.”

      The trial court’s determination and ruling were erroneous under either of the

possible hearsay exceptions noticed or presented by DSS at the hearing. In order to

admit hearsay under the residual exception, the trial court must

             determine whether (1) proper notice has been given; (2) the
             hearsay statement is not specifically covered elsewhere; (3)
             the statement possesses circumstantial guarantees of
             trustworthiness; (4) the statement is material; (5) the
             statement is more probative than any other evidence which
             the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
             (6) the interest of justice will be best served by admission.

In re W.H., 261 N.C. App. 24, 27, 819 S.E.2d 617, 620 (2018) (citation omitted).

      Such “careful consideration” must be reflected in the trial court’s findings. In

re F.S., 268 N.C. App. 34, 41, 835 S.E.2d 465, 470 (2019). As no such findings were

made, either during the hearing or in the order, Jade’s purported hearsay statements

were not properly admitted under this exception and should have been excluded upon

objection. Id. at 42, 835 S.E.2d at 470.

      A statement made by a party opponent is

             admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is
             offered against a party and it is (A) his own statement, in
             either his individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a
             statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
             him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a
             statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
             within the scope of his agency or employment, made during
             the existence of the relationship or (E) a statement by a
             coconspirator of such party during the course and in
             furtherance of the conspiracy.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(d) (2021).

      In abuse, neglect, and dependency actions, the parents are party opponents to

the petitioner-complainant. In re J.M., 255 N.C. App. 483, 489, 804 S.E.2d 830, 834

(2017). The trial court erred in concluding Jade, a juvenile, was a “party to the case,”

and, as her statements do not fall under any of the exceptions outlined in Rule 801(d),

her purported statements were not admissible. Respondent’s objections should have

been sustained.

      Neither DSS nor the guardian ad litem contest or argue Respondent’s assertion

of Jade’s purported statements constituted inadmissible hearsay.         Instead, they

contend Respondent failed to establish the inadmissible hearsay statements were

prejudicial and argue the findings were supported by other properly admitted clear

and convincing evidence. Respondent counters and contends the prejudice to her is

“readily apparent,” as the trial court’s conclusions are unsupported by a factual basis,

absent the inadmissible hearsay evidence. In re F.S., 268 N.C. App. at 41, 835 S.E.2d

at 470. We agree.

      At the hearing, the DSS social worker acknowledged DSS was still

investigating the allegations in all three reports, and the majority of the evidence to

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                                   Opinion of the Court

support the unsubstantiated allegations was based upon Jade’s purported

statements. We disregard the challenged findings, or portions thereof, which rely

upon Jade’s inadmissible hearsay statements or those which are otherwise

unsupported. In re A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. at 52, 884 S.E.2d at 693. This includes the

entirety of Finding of Fact 13, as it relies solely upon inadmissible hearsay, and the

entirety of Finding of Fact 7, as the only portion not solely based on Jade’s

inadmissible hearsay statements was apparently a misapprehension by the court.

      The order identifies 16 November 2021 as the date the report “was received,”

by DSS, which tracks the language of the petitions.        The testimony at hearing

indicates WCDSS received the report 9 November 2021. Respondent asserts this

discrepancy supports her assertion and argument that the trial court’s findings were

merely improper recitations of allegations in the petitions and do not reflect an

adjudication of the evidence and findings of facts. However, it appears: (1) the report

was first received by WCDSS, which then forwarded the report to DSS; and, (2) only

one event allegedly occurred in November 2021.

      Moreover, no properly admitted evidence supports any allegations from

November 2021. When the court sought clarification on what the allegation of “choke-

slammed” meant, Respondent objected and the transcript shows she stated she

“didn’t do it[,]” and not that she did. The properly admitted evidence, including

Respondent’s testimony and the social worker’s testimony concerning their

knowledge of the reports, supports portions of Findings of Fact 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

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                                 Opinion of the Court

      Finding of Fact 5 has sufficient evidence to support an argument had occurred

between Jade and Respondent on or about 6 June 2021. Jade purportedly refused to

her mother’s instruction to get out of the car, Respondent allegedly slapped and hit

Jade with a belt, Jade locked herself in the car, and Respondent broke the vent

window to unlock the car and to gain access. The remainder of Finding of Fact 5 is

unsupported by properly admitted evidence.

      The alleged 21 December 2021 incident, as described in Findings of Fact 8, 9,

10, and 11, finding another argument occurred between Jade and Respondent is

supported by sufficient evidence. Jade was allegedly upset by Respondent’s intention

to enroll her in a school located in Washington County. Neighbors allegedly saw Jade

standing outside and invited her to come into and wait inside their house.

      Police officers allegedly told a WCDSS social worker they had handcuffed

Respondent prior to his arrival. Respondent began “arguing and cussing” when the

social worker called the child’s maternal great aunt. The social worker allegedly

believed Jade was “afraid” because, as had occurred with Respondent earlier, Jade

remained inside the DSS vehicle, recalcitrant and disobeying instructions, and had

refused Respondent’s instructions for her to exit the DSS vehicle and go inside of

Respondent’s home. Amanda was two years old and was allegedly present during the

incident. The remainder of these findings are unsupported by properly admitted

evidence.

      Sufficient evidence supports portions of Finding of Fact 12, finding Respondent

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                                  Opinion of the Court

had experienced several severe traumatic events in her life, had denied diagnoses of

mental illness, and had outbursts during the hearing.        However, no clear and

convincing evidence and no expert medical testimony were presented to show or prove

Respondent “suffers from mental and psychological illnesses as a result of traumatic

experiences[.]”

      “Without the improperly admitted hearsay evidence, [and with the lack of any

other clear and convincing evidence,] the record does not support the trial court’s

conclusion[s].” In re F.S., 268 N.C. App. at 41, 835 S.E.2d at 470. Respondent has

established she was prejudiced by the trial court’s erroneous admission of hearsay

and other unsupported testimony. Id.

                                     B. Neglect

      The trial court concluded all three children were neglected juveniles as defined

in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15), as they did “not receive proper care, supervision or

discipline from [their] parent, guardian, custodian or caretaker and [they] live[d] in

an environment injurious to their welfare.” “In determining whether a juvenile is a

neglected juvenile, it is relevant whether that juvenile . . . lives in a home where

another juvenile has been subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly

lives in the home.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2021) (emphasis supplied).

      The unsupported findings of fact, as discussed above, are insufficient to

support an adjudication that Jade was neglected. An argument between a parent

and child or use of corporal punishment, with no evidence of any resulting marks,

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                                  Opinion of the Court

bruising, or other injury, does not constitute neglect. In re Thompson, 64 N.C. App.

95, 98-99, 306 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1983) (concluding that a child who is repeatedly

“disciplined so severely that bruises and internal abrasions [can be] a ‘neglected’

juvenile”); See State v. Varner, 252 N.C. App. 226, 228, 796 S.E.2d 834, 836 (2017)

(“[O]ur Supreme Court has recognized that, as a general rule, a parent . . . is not

criminally liable for inflicting physical injury on a child in the course of lawful

administering corporal punishment.” (citation omitted)); In re C.B., 180 N.C. App.

221, 224, 636 S.E.2d 336, 338 (2006) (holding the respondent’s punishment by

“spanking [or] whipping that resulted in a bruise” and not “serious injury” did not

constitute abuse under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1)).

      Similarly, the supported findings regarding the June and December 2021

incidents are insufficient to establish Respondent’s improper care or supervision of

her children. Respondent testified that she felt it was necessary to break the car vent

window after Jade had locked herself inside the vehicle and refused Respondent’s

instructions to open the door or exit the vehicle. Respondent testified she only used

“light force” to break a vent window only to unlock the car.

      Respondent’s intention to enroll Jade in school located in Washington County,

where Respondent lived, allegedly precipitated the December incident. The place of

the family’s residence and choice of their children’s school is a parent’s prerogative

under parental care, custody, and control.         Testimony at the hearing shows

Respondent believed a school transfer was necessary, due to Jade’s aggressive

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                                  Opinion of the Court

behavior at her current Greene County school. No record evidence supports a finding

Respondent had locked Jade out of the home.                Instead, a recalcitrant and

undisciplined pattern of behavior is shown by Jade locking herself inside of and

refusing to leave a car when she does not get her way, or disagrees and argues with

Respondent.

      Moreover, the evidence establishes that during all relevant periods and with

Respondent’s permission, Jade had been residing with her grandmother and later

with her maternal great aunt. Where a child is residing in a voluntary kinship

arrangement prior to any DSS involvement, and no evidence or adjudicatory findings

support a conclusion the child has been subjected to harm in the parent’s primary

care, custody, and control, “the findings and evidence do not support a conclusion” of

the child “living in an environment injurious to her welfare and not receiving proper

care and supervision.” In re B.P., 257 N.C. App. 424, 434, 809 S.E.2d 914, 920 (2018).

A child or DSS personnel disagreeing with or preferring a different path to a parent’s

prerogatives and decisions for their child is not neglect. With no supporting evidence,

the trial court erred in adjudicating Jade as a neglected juvenile. Id. at 434, 809

S.E.2d at 920.

      The trial court’s evidentiary findings center around the incidents between Jade

and Respondent. The court made no evidentiary findings whatsoever concerning

Juliet, who lived with her great aunt, and only one relevant finding concerning two-

year-old Amanda. Though Amanda’s presence while Respondent was “arguing and

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                                  Opinion of the Court

cussing” speaks “to the quality of [her] home environment[,]” that single finding does

not support a conclusion and adjudication Amanda was neglected. In re J.C.M.J.C.,

268 N.C. App. 47, 58, 834 S.E.2d 670, 678 (2019).

      As the evidence fails to establish Jade was a neglected juvenile, the trial court

also erred in, ipso facto, adjudicating Juliet, who was living at her maternal great

aunt’s home, and two-year-old Amanda as neglected juveniles. Cf. In re G.C., 384

N.C. 62, 68, 884 S.E.2d 658, 662 (2023) (evidentiary findings establishing neglect of

one child residing in the home may support an ultimate finding another child was

neglected).

      The trial court also made a finding regarding Amanda’s “agitation” during the

hearing and Respondent’s unwillingness to remove Amanda from the proceedings.

The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine only “the existence or

nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged in a petition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-802

(2021). The trial court failed to make findings to show this interaction was relevant

or admissible in any manner as adjudicatory evidence concerning the allegations in

the petition. In re V.B., 239 N.C. App. 340, 344, 768 S.E.2d 867, 870 (2015) (providing

that post-petition evidence may be considered where it is relevant to “a fixed and

ongoing circumstance” as alleged in the petition).

                                  C. Dependency

      The trial court concluded Jade and Juliet were “dependent” juveniles as their

“parent, guardian or custodian is unable to provide for [their] care or supervision and

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                                   Opinion of the Court

lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9)

(2021).

      “In determining whether a juvenile is dependent, ‘the trial court must address

both (1) the parent’s ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability to

the parent of alternative child care arrangements.’” In re B.M., 183 N.C. App. 84, 90,

643 S.E.2d 644, 648 (2007) (quoting In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d

403, 406 (2005)). “Findings of fact addressing both prongs must be made before a

juvenile may be adjudicated as dependent, and the court’s failure to make these

findings will result in reversal of the court.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

      The trial court failed to make any evidentiary findings or conclusions regarding

Respondent’s ability to care for or to supervise Jade and Juliet. The supported

findings, as detailed above, address Respondent’s arguments with Jade; no findings

or conclusions show Respondent’s behavior rendered her “wholly unable to parent”

Jade or Juliet. In re H.L., 256 N.C. App. 450, 458, 807 S.E.2d 685, 690 (2017).

      While the trial court referenced Respondent’s purported mental state, as

concluded above, no evidence supports a finding that Respondent suffered from

“mental and psychological illnesses,” let alone “serious psychological problems” that

impaired her ability to care for and supervise her children. See In re T.B., 203 N.C.

App. 497, 503, 692 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2010) (concluding that the mother’s “suicidal

ideation and tendencies,” “chronic state of stimulus overload,” and diagnoses of

“Chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Major Personality Disorder, Major

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Depressive Disorder, and Dependent Personality Disorder” impaired her ability to

parent her children).

      We also reject DSS’ and the guardian ad litem’s assertion Respondent is unable

to care for Jade and Juliet without constant assistance. The trial court failed to make

any findings, other than her witnessing the murder of her older girl’s father and being

hospitalized from an automobile accident, regarding Respondent’s reasons and

permissions for Jade’s and Juliet’s voluntary placement with their grandmother and

later their maternal great aunt for several years prior to the juvenile petitions.

      The evidence also does not support a finding such a placement was necessary

due to Respondent’s unwillingness or inability to parent. Testimony shows Jade and

Juliet originally went to live with their grandmother while Respondent recovered

from injuries suffered from her car accident. After their grandmother’s death and

with Respondent’s permissions, Jade and Juliet voluntarily went to live with their

grandmother’s sister: their maternal great aunt.           Respondent testified she was

willing and able to care for Jade and Juliet and to continue to parent Amanda. No

evidence was presented to the contrary.

      As the trial court failed to make sufficient findings, we conclude the trial court

erred in adjudicating Jade and Juliet as dependent juveniles. See In re J.A.G., 172

N.C. App. 708, 716, 617 S.E.2d 325, 332 (2005). That adjudication is reversed.

                                VI.    Conclusion

      The trial court erred in admitting the objected-to hearsay statements

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                                   Opinion of the Court

purportedly made by Jade to WCDSS and DSS social workers. Respondent was

prejudiced by the court’s error.     The findings of fact, unsupported by properly

admitted evidence, are insufficient to support the trial court’s adjudications either

that Jade, Juliet, and Amanda were neglected, or that Jade and Juliet were

dependent. The 22 March 2022 order is reversed and this cause is remanded for

dismissal. See In re F.S., 268 N.C. App. at 47, 835 S.E.2d at 473. In light of our

holding, we need not address Respondent’s arguments concerning disposition. It is

so ordered.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Judges Flood and Riggs concur.

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