Court Opinion

ID: 9473473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:30:50.629321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:33.054314
License: Public Domain

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
My disagreement with the majority concerns whether summary judgment was proper on Gans’ claim that his lawyers (collectively referred to as Mundy) were negligent in failing to join SEPTA as a defendant in Gans’ suit.
Gans’ claim on the merits was not complex. He was a passenger of an Amtrak bus that collided with a SEPTA bus on October 20,1977. Since Gans was patently not responsible for any part of his injuries, either Amtrak or SEPTA or both were responsible. Mundy, his lawyer at the time, proceeded on the theory that Amtrak was liable, and indeed there was ample basis for that belief. However, during discovery on August 27, 1979, the Amtrak bus driver testified that the SEPTA bus had no brake lights at all, that the SEPTA driver had indicated to him that he knew his brake lights did not work, and that the turning signal lights of the SEPTA bus were not functioning prior to the chain of events that led to the accident. This testimony, according to Gans, should have alerted his lawyers that there was a potential claim against SEPTA, and should have led them to join SEPTA as an additional defendant while there was still an opportunity to do so.
As all experienced trial lawyers know, the basis for proceeding against all possible defendants is to prevent a situation where the factfinder attributes liability to a defendant that is not before it. That is apparently what happened in this case. When the case against Amtrak was tried by Mundy’s successor, the jury found against plaintiff and for Amtrak on liability. Gans filed a motion for a new trial contending that the jury verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence. In denying that motion, the district court referred to a number of facts that would have permitted the jury to find that Amtrak was not negligent, including “more importantly, whether the rear lights on the SEPTA bus were operating properly, prior to the accident.” Since SEPTA had not been named as a defendant, the jury was not able to assess liability against it on that basis, and we will never know whether the district court would have permitted a verdict to stand that found neither Amtrak nor SEPTA liable.
The issue before us, and that was before the district court, was whether Gans’ claim that Mundy was negligent for failing to sue SEPTA should have been permitted to go to the jury. I submit that it should have.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Mundy filed only his own self-serving affidavit in which he alleged that “[djefendants affirmatively decided not to bring any action against SEPTA because, to the best of defendant’s knowledge, information, and belief, based upon the facts related to defendants by the injured employees, there was no good ground to support any such action against SEPTA.” In Gans’ affidavit in opposition. Gans averred, “I am without information as to any reason why defendants did not bring an action against SEPTA. At some point in the proceedings, it was learned that the SEPTA vehicle was operating without proper lights and, therefore, there would be a basis for a claim that SEPTA was at least, in part, responsible for the accident.” Thereafter, an associate of Mundy, Alan M. Feldman, filed an affidavit setting forth the reasons why he did not join SEPTA, primarily the clear liability of Amtrak and the complications and delay in trial that would have ensued had SEPTA been joined. While Mundy and Feldman might have convinced a jury that their actions were not negligent, it was error for the district court to draw this conclusion on summary judgment.
In the first place, defendants’ affidavits are factually deficient in that they fail even to allege that their decision not to join SEPTA conformed to the standard of care in the community. In Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.1979), we stated that the determination *346of legal malpractice, like determinations of malpractice in other professions, requires not only an evaluation of professional skill and judgment, but also of a standard of care which is related to common professional practice. We stated that ordinarily an expert witness is “necessary to establish the specific standard of care and to assist the jury in its determination of defendants’ conformity to the relevant standard.” Id. at 480.
The majority concludes that because the plaintiff would have the burden to prove malpractice at trial, plaintiff had the burden of producing expert evidence to counter the motion for summary judgment. This conclusion simply does not follow, and confuses the relevant law as to the propriety of summary judgment with the plaintiff’s burden to prove his case at trial.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the moving party must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that s/he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, since Mundy was the moving party, he bore the burden to establish that he was entitled to judgment. The opposing party need only bring forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of the defendant’s crucial allegations in order to defeat the motion. Where the moving party does not allege facts sufficient to support entitlement to judgment, the motion cannot be granted even if the opposing party offers no response at all. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153-60, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1606-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Maldonado v. Ramirez, 757 F.2d 48, 50 (3d Cir.1985); Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 790 (3d Cir.1978).
Although the majority gives lip service to the proper burdens to be placed on the parties when a motion for summary judgment has been filed, the majority fails to apply them properly in this case. The majority relies on defendants’ affidavits alleging that the decision not to sue SEPTA was a tactical decision based on the attorneys’ informed decision. However, even “informed decisions” may not be up to the relevant professional level, and on this record we do not know what that level was. Underlying the majority's decision is its inference that the allegedly “informed decision”, self-characterized by the lawyers themselves, satisfied the relevant standard of care. Such an inference is unsupportable on this record, particularly in the context of summary judgment. See, e.g., Continental Insurance Co. v. Bodie, 682 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir.1982). Ordinarily therefore, the issue is one for trial.
In the second place, I see nothing in this court’s recent decision in Zimmer Paper Products, Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86 (3d Cir., 1985), on which the majority relies, to support the grant of summary judgment here. In Zimmer, the allegation of negligence made by a class member against class counsel was that counsel failed to give adequate notice of a settlement. After substantial discovery, the district court granted summary judgment. On appeal, we noted that “Zimmer has not adduced any evidence to suggest that class counsel’s hiring of three professional firms to print, prepare and mail the notice was itself below the legal profession’s standard of care with regard to class notice.” At 94. Thus, we affirmed, agreeing that “the evidence of negligence is too speculative to establish any material issue of fact.” Id. Significantly, however, in that case, it was apparent from the record that the procedure for notice employed by counsel “was customary and court-approved.” Id. at 93.
The facts in the case before us are far different from those in Zimmer. Here, the decision not to join SEPTA as a potential defendant was made notwithstanding a plausible basis for finding SEPTA was indeed negligent. It is simply not “speculative” to think that the failure to join a party who may be negligent and to permit the statute of limitations as to the party to run might be a basis for a finding of legal malpractice. Since the record is devoid of any evidence to show whether such a decision conforms to the standard of care in the community, and Mundy failed to pro*347duce such evidence, he was not entitled to summary judgment.
Finally, I am distressed that the majority has chosen to include, out of context, the statement in Mazer v. Security Insurance Group, 368 F.Supp. 418, 422 (E.D.Pa.1973), aff'd 507 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.1975), that “an attorney is presumed to have discharged the duties of his representation until the opposite has been made to appear.” In Mazer, the issue of legal malpractice was tried before the judge as factfinder, and the statement was made immediately after the court found that plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof. There was expert evidence at the trial introduced by defendants supporting a judgment for defendant. The court did not apply any “presumption” to support a motion for summary judgment on the basis of defendant’s own affidavits. Attorneys are no different than any other professionals and have a duty to conform to the accepted standard of professional practice. I know of no basis for establishing a presumption that they have done so.
I believe that the majority’s result is contrary to Lentino, distinguishable from Zimmer, and in violation of the basic principles governing summary judgment motions. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.