Court Opinion

ID: 9701792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:38:32.279657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:29.769477
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Associate Judge,
with whom GALLAGHER and MACK, Associate Judges, join, dissenting:
The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the con*297viction.1 The majority is of the opinion that it was, and therefore affirms. I disagree.
Specifically, appellant contends that the testimony of the arresting police officer concerning the street encounter establishes as a matter of law that the solicitation,' if any, was not made by appellant. The majority explains in considerable detail that since D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2701, uses neither the word “solicit” nor the word “soliciting”, so much of appellant’s argument as focuses on the definitional limits and innuendoes of the word “solicitation” is irrelevant to the instant case. However, in Riley v. United States, D.C.App., 298 A.2d 228, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840, 94 S.Ct. 96, 38 L.Ed.2d 77 (1973), Judge Nebeker, writing for this court, made it clear in a due process void for vagueness context that the statute would be evaluated by the established principles governing solicitations generally at common law:
Thus, it is appropriate to determine if similarity exists between the common-law and contemporary usage of the words used in § 22-2701. Historically, “urging, inciting, requesting, or advising another person to commit a crime” was in itself punishable as the crime of solicitation. However, only the solicitations of felonies and certain misdemeanors were punishable.
In light of the nature of the offense of solicitation as found at common law, § 22-2701 must necessarily be construed as limited to solicitations of acts which if accomplished would be punishable as a crime. . . . [298 A.2d at 230-31; citations omitted.]
The crime of solicitation is now universally recognized in the United States as a part of Anglo-American common law.2 In Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (7th ed.1967), its characteristics are well set out at 219— 23:
Solicitation is a distinct common-law misdemeanor in which the act forbidden consists of the accused person’s parol or written efforts to activate another to commit a criminal offense.
The gist of this offense is incitement. In brief, the gravamen of this common-law misdemeanor lay in counselling, enticing, or inducing another to commit a crime. .
In addition, Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed. 1969) at 582 states:
The word “solicitation” in the sense of “criminal solicitation,” is employed in the law as a general label to cover any use of words or other device by which a person is requested, urged, advised, counseled, tempted, commanded, or otherwise enticed or incited to commit a crime.
It is clear that the words “solicit”, “entice”, “persuade”, and “invite” are constantly used interchangeably by courts and scholars in discussing solicitation. Hence, the majority’s attempt to distinguish these terms is tenuous at best. The legislative history of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2701, as well as the plain meaning of the words, clearly indicates that the statute under which appellant was charged prohibits soliciting prostitution.3
*298In order to convict appellant of the charged offense, it is my opinion that it must be affirmatively demonstrated that she invited, enticed, persuaded, or addressed for the purpose of inviting, enticing, or persuading any person over 16 years of age for purposes of prostitution. D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2701. Prostitution per se has neither been defined by statute or judicial decision in the District of Columbia, nor does there exist a common-law definition for the term. See Bailey v. United States, 69 App.D.C. 25, 98 F.2d 306 (1938); 73 C.J.S. Prostitution § 1 at p. 224 (1951). However, several solicitation cases in the District have indicated that the transaction must be of a commercial nature. Garrett v. United States, D.C.App., 339 A.2d 372, 373 (1975); Hall v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 631, 632 (1943). This court has further described solicitation for prostitution as an “invitation to commercial sexual intercourse.” United States v. Moses, D.C.App., 339 A.2d 46, 52 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920, 96 S.Ct. 2624, 49 L.Ed.2d 373 (1976). Accordingly, in order to convict a person of soliciting for purposes of prostitution, it must be shown that the one doing the soliciting actively seeks to engage in a sex act in exchange for something of value.
In my opinion, appellant did not “invite, entice, or persuade” the officer to engage in prostitution. The question is: Did appellant address the officer “for the purpose of inviting, enticing, or persuading” him for the purpose of prostitution? On the record before us, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the undisputed facts is that the officer addressed the appellant for the purpose of prostitution. Officer Thomas made the first approach. He was the first to make suggestive inquiries and to indicate his interest in engaging in some activity. Further, he initiated the discussion of the commercial nature of the transaction. The only obvious purpose of the officer in addressing the appellant was to determine if she was a prostitute. After he made the judgment that she was a prostitute, she was arrested. This court has commented in a similar case that “[i]f the officer had broached the terms of an agreement between herself as a supposed prostitute and appellant as an unwitting customer, then she, rather than appellant, would have done the soliciting. If that had occurred, appellant would not be guilty . . . because he had not committed the offense at all. . . .” Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 342 A.2d 367, 369 (1975).
In light of Williams, supra, I cannot agree with the position taken by the majority that the question of who makes the first overture is not crucial to the issue of guilt. My feelings on this matter are firm, notwithstanding the absence of an entrapment issue in the instant case. The majority today expressly allows covert police officers to approach unwary suspects and initiate conversation regarding acts of prostitution. Law enforcement officers play a debased role when they become the instigators of the crime, or partners in its commission, or the creative brain behind the illegal scheme. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). By condoning such conduct, the majority invites a virtual flood of litigation regarding entrapment.
Accordingly, for the above reasons, I dissent.

. One is hard put to explain why such an issue deserves en banc consideration.

. See Wechsler, Jones and Korn, Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation and Conspiracy, 61 Colum.L.Rev. 957 (1961); Hitchler, Solicitations, 41 Dick.L.Rev. 225 (1937); Curran, Solicitation: A Substantive Crime, 17 Minn.L.Rev. 499 (1933); Blackburn, Solicitation to Crimes, 40 W.Va.L.Q. 135 (1934).

. The first statutory control over prostitution in the District of Columbia came on July 29, 1892, when Congress passed “an act for the preservation of the public peace and the protection of property within the District of Columbia.” Act of July 29, 1892, ch. 320, 27 Stat. 322. Section 7 of that Act (27 Stat. 323) made it unlawful for “any prostitute or lewd woman to invite, entice, persuade, or to address for the purpose of inviting, enticing, or persuading any person or persons . . . for the purpose of prostitution . . . Section 7 of the 1892 Act was specifically repealed on August 15, 1935, when Congress passed “an act for the suppression of prostitution in the District of Columbia.” Act of August 15, 1935, ch. 546, 49 Stat. 651, 652. *298This new Act (Section 1) broadened the scope of the offense set forth in Sec. 7 of the 1S92 Act in several areas: the persons covered shifted from “any prostitute or lewd woman” to “any person”; the offense was extended to cover not only solicitation for the purpose of prostitution, but also “any immoral or lewd purpose”; the maximum penalty was increased; and provisions were added for suspension of sentences and rehabilitation. See D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2703. Section 1 of the 1935 Act has been amended twice. Act of June 9, 1948, ch. 428, tit. I, Sec. 102, 62 Stat. 346; Act of June 29, 1953, ch. 159, Sec. 202(b), 67 Stat. 93. The changes brought about by these amendments relate primarily to limiting the age (to persons sixteen years of age or over) of solicitation and increasing the maximum penalty for solicitation.