Court Opinion

ID: 9928212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 01:00:37.841108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:18.476475
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60642        Document: 00517050008             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/30/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                 January 30, 2024
                                      No. 22-60642                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Jianrong Wong,

                                                                                Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                               Respondent.
                     ______________________________

                    Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
                              Agency No. A208 597 413
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Jianrong Wong, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of
   the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his applications for
   asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the convention against tor-
   ture (“CAT”). Because the BIA erred in applying Ninth Circuit precedent
   to Wong’s case, we VACATE the BIA’s denial of Wong’s applications and
   REMAND the case with instructions.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60642      Document: 00517050008           Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/30/2024

                                     No. 22-60642

                                           I.
          Wong entered the United States on September 25, 2015, in Southern
   California. Upon being apprehended, he immediately expressed fear of
   returning to China and was given a credible fear interview. The Department
   of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear alleging that
   Wong was subject to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as
   an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, was not in
   possession of a valid entry document. On November 25, 2015, Wong
   appeared, with counsel, at the Los Angeles Immigration Court, and admitted
   the allegations in the Notice. On December 3, 2015, Wong timely filed an I-
   589 asylum application. The asylum claim was based on Wong’s persecution
   for practicing his religion in China.
          The Immigration Judge held a removal hearing on February 1, 2016.
   Wong testified that he was Christian, started practicing his religion on March
   7, 2015, and attended registered church gatherings on five occasions while in
   China. He testified that, at the urge of his friend, he also attended an
   unregistered “house” church gathering on April 13, 2015. Wong claims that,
   while at the gathering, they were reading the Bible and praying when the
   police kicked in the door and stated that Wong and the others were engaging
   in illegal activities of an evil cult. Wong testified that he and the others were
   arrested and that he was detained, slapped, interrogated, had light shined in
   his eyes, and was locked in a small room where the temperature was turned
   very low. He was held overnight. The next day his parents had to pay 5,000
   RMBs for his release. He was warned by police that he would be sentenced
   to jail if he continued to attend unregistered religious gatherings. Wong
   testified that the cold temperatures in detention led him to become ill and
   that he sought medical treatment. Wong testified that, after reporting to the
   police for seven weeks, he was forced to flee to another area of China and
   eventually left China for the United States.

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                                       No. 22-60642

          The IJ denied Wong’s applications for asylum, withholding of
   removal, and relief under CAT on May 9, 2016. Wong timely appealed to the
   BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ for further consideration of Wong’s
   past persecution claim. The BIA also noted that the IJ did not make a
   credibility finding and Wong, therefore, has a rebuttable presumption of
   credibility on appeal. Following remand, the IJ granted Wong bond. Wong
   subsequently moved to Oklahoma and the DHS filed a motion to change
   venue from Los Angeles to Dallas, Texas.1 The IJ granted DHS’s motion to
   change venue.
          A master hearing was held at the Dallas Immigration Court on Octo-
   ber 11, 2017. Wong, through counsel, stated that he did not believe that fur-
   ther testimony was needed and that both pre- and post-remand evidence ex-
   isted in the record. The parties also discussed with the Dallas IJ transferring
   the case back to Los Angeles. The Dallas IJ agreed to speak with the court
   administrator about transferring the case.
          The case was never transferred back to Los Angeles and, on October
   11, 2018, the Dallas IJ denied Wong’s applications for asylum, withholding of
   removal, and CAT protection. The Dallas IJ dropped the following footnote
   in her opinion:

          Here, jurisdiction remains with the Ninth Circuit Court of
          Appeals, although venue was changed from the Los Angeles
          Immigration Court to the Dallas Immigration Court. “The
          petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals for
          the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed
          the proceedings.” INA § 242(b)(2). Although the BIA
          remanded the record and the Court, who is under jurisdiction

          _____________________
          1
           Where Wong lives in Oklahoma is under the administrative control of the Dallas
   Immigration Court.

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                                    No. 22-60642

          of the Fifth Circuit, has been assigned the case, an IJ in Los
          Angeles “completed the proceedings” in Los Angeles, California, by
          accepting evidence into the record, including [Wong’s]
          testimony, and rendering an oral decision on the merits of this
          case. Moreover, the parties agreed post-remand that no further
          hearing on the merits is necessary and that the Court may
          render its decision on the existing record, which includes post-
          remand evidence of updated country conditions. Thus, the
          Court finds that jurisdiction remains in the Ninth Circuit. See,
          e.g., Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 971-73 (9th Cir. 2016)
          (holding that, consistent with nine other federal circuits,
          including the Fifth Circuit, INA § 242(b)(2), requiring petition
          for review of orders of removal be filed with the court of
          appeals for the judicial circuit in which the IJ completed the
          proceedings, is a non-jurisdictional venue provision, and thus,
          the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction over the applicant’s claim
          even if venue was proper in the Eleventh Circuit). Accordingly,
          the Court will apply Ninth Circuit law in rendering its decision
          regarding [Wong’s] applications for relief.

   ROA.82 n.1 (emphasis added). As noted above, the Dallas IJ applied Ninth
   Circuit precedent to her opinion. The Dallas IJ denied Wong’s applications
   based on an adverse credibility determination and, in the alternative,
   presuming Wong was credible, on the merits.
          Wong appealed the decision to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal
   on November 18, 2022. The BIA applied Ninth Circuit precedent and noted
   that “precedent decisions within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit remain
   controlling this case.” ROA.7 n.2. The BIA did not make a ruling on Wong’s
   credibility, and assumed for the purpose of the decision he was credible. The
   BIA determined: (1) Wong’s harm that he suffered did not rise to the level of
   past persecution; (2) Wong was not singled out for persecution on account of
   any protected ground under the Immigration and Nationality Act upon
   return to China; (3) the evidence did not demonstrate that there was a pattern

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                                     No. 22-60642

   or practice in persecution of people similarly situated to Wong throughout
   the country of China; and (4) with regards to the claim for protection under
   CAT, Wong did not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will
   be tortured upon return to China. The BIA therefore dismissed Wong’s
   appeal. Wong now seeks review of that decision.
                                          II.
          On appeal to this court, and aside from the merits, Wong concedes
   venue is proper. He does claim, however, that the Dallas IJ and BIA
   concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent is controlling because the case was
   initiated and heard in Los Angeles, and the parties agreed that venue should
   remain in the Ninth Circuit. Wong thus applies Ninth Circuit precedent
   throughout his opening brief. Citing Adeeko v. Garland, 3 F.4th 741, 746 (5th
   Cir. 2021), DHS does not contest venue. DHS does argue, however, that the
   correct law is that of the Fifth Circuit. In reply, Wong claims that Adeeko is
   distinguishable since it involved a legal question rather than application of the
   evidentiary standard of review, but asserts that under either circuit, remand
   is warranted.
          The governing venue statute provides that judicial review of a final
   order of removal “shall be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial
   circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. §
   1252(b)(2) (emphasis added). This circuit and others interpret Section
   1252(b)(2) as a non-jurisdictional venue provision. Jama v. Gonzalez, 431
   F.3d 230, 233 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Yang You Lee v. Lynch, 791
   F.3d 1261, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2015); Thiam v. Holder, 677 F.3d 299, 302 (6th
   Cir. 2012); Sorcia v. Holder, 643 F.3d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 2011); Avila v. U.S.
   Att’y Gen., 560 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Khouzam v.
   Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2008); Moreno-Bravo v. Gonzalez, 463
   F.3d 253, 258-62 (2d Cir. 2006); Georcely v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.

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                                        No. 22-60642

   2004); Nwaokolo v. I.N.S., 314 F.3d 303, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
   Both the Dallas IJ and the BIA concluded that the Ninth Circuit was the
   proper venue—although they incorrectly referred to jurisdiction—and the
   BIA erroneously stated that venue had been transferred back to Los Angeles.
   The Dallas IJ reasoned that the “IJ in Los Angeles ‘completed the
   proceedings’ in Los Angeles, California.” ROA.82 n.1. The BIA mentioned
   that the “[p]roceedings in this case were initiated and the merits hearing was
   conducted in Los Angeles, California, within the jurisdiction of the [Ninth
   Circuit].” ROA.7 n.2. But whether venue is proper turns on where the
   proceedings were completed. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
           Reading the plain text of Section 1252(b)(2), “completed the
   proceedings” connotes where the final order was issued.2 In other words,
   here, the IJ “completed the proceedings” in Dallas. The Tenth Circuit’s
   decision of Yang You Lee is persuasive because the court there analyzed
   where the IJ held the final hearing (Dallas), where the petitioner and the
   government’s representation physically appeared for the final hearing
   (Dallas), and that the IJ issued his final order from the Dallas Immigration
   Court. 791 F.3d at 1264. While the case commenced in Los Angeles, see 8
   C.F.R. § 1003.14(a), the IJ transferred it to Dallas. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b).
   Thus, this case is properly before this court. This holding aligns with other
   circuits’ reasoning. See, e.g., Bazile v. Garland, 76 F.4th 5, 14 (1st Cir. 2023);
   Sarr v. Garland, 50 F.4th 326, 332 (2d Cir. 2022).
           Because venue is proper in this circuit, our precedent applies—not the
   Ninth Circuit’s precedent. Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 305 n.2 (5th Cir.
           _____________________
           2
                     Complete,    Merriam-Webster.com;              https://www.merriam-
   webster.com/dictionary/complete (last visited Dec. 11, 2023) (defined as “to bring to an
   end . . . to make whole”).

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                                     No. 22-60642

   2004) (“only this circuit’s precedents (and those of the Supreme Court) bind
   the BIA when considering an appeal from an immigration judge in the Fifth
   Circuit”). The BIA applied the wrong legal standard. In such cases, the
   Supreme Court instructs courts to remand the matter back to the agency that
   made the legal error in its opinion. Calcutt v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 598 U.S.
   623, 629 (2023) (per curiam) (“[I]f the grounds propounded by the agency
   for its decision ‘are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm
   the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more
   adequate or proper basis.’”) (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp.,
   332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
          The BIA’s denial of Wong’s applications is therefore VACATED
   and the case is REMANDED. The BIA is directed to apply Fifth Circuit
   precedent consistent with this opinion.

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