Court Opinion

ID: 9738942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:05:48.600531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.350324
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring in the result). It is *559clear that plaintiffs’ claims before this Court rest solely on an express oral contract theory, not on a legitimate-expectations theory arising from defendant’s policy manuals. I therefore believe that Justice Riley’s discussion of the legitimate-expectations issue in part ii(a) of her opinion is unnecessary dicta.1 For reasons noted by Justice Riley in part ii(a), however, see ante, p 529, n 3, I agree that there is simply no basis in this case for the Group a plaintiffs’ express oral contract theory.
With regard to the Group b and Group c plaintiffs, and with regard to the issue of unjust enrichment, I agree with the result reached by the majority. I disagree with those aspects of Justice Riley’s and Justice Boyle’s analyses which draw upon Justice Riley’s analysis in Rowe v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 627; 473 NW2d 268 (1991), for reasons stated in my and Justice Levin’s dissenting opinions in Rowe, see id. at 676-722. In this case, however, unlike Rowe, the Group b and Group c plaintiffs do not allege the existence of any express oral contractual term regarding the duration of the seven percent commission system, other than the vague and precatory promise that it would last "forever.” This is a far cry from the express just-cause language alleged in Rowe and in Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). For reasons noted by Justice Boyle on pp 555-556 of her *560concurring opinion, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs in this case would require too great an inferential leap from the precatory "forever” term. On the record presented here, I agree that summary disposition was properly granted.
Because it is evident that no single opinion in this case will command a majority of the Court, and in view of the inordinate verbiage which this case has already produced, it appears that little purpose would be served by elaborating my views at any greater length.
I concur in the result.

 Plaintiffs have expressly abandoned before this Court any claim based on legitimate expectations. In their brief, plaintiffs explicitly state: “This cause of action rests on the 'just cause’ portion of the Toussaint decision, not on the 'policy manual’ portion.” See Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). Furthermore, former Justice Archer asked plaintiffs’ counsel at oral argument how they could address the holding of In re Certified Question, Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co, 432 Mich 438; 443 NW2d 112 (1989), that employers may, with adequate notice, unilaterally modify the expectations arising from policy manuals, and counsel responded that this case involves express contracts and express promises.