Court Opinion

ID: 9636441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:29:01.525552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:46.002206
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop, the United States Supreme Court has counseled that “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). *408The degree of force that a police officer employs to effectuate "the stop must be proportional to the circumstances confronting the officer. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Again, however, a court’s evaluation must be realistic, viewed from the perspective of the officer on the scene rather than from the serenity of a judge’s chambers. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). Echoing these concerns, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned:
A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.....A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But “[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable.” ... The question is not simply whether some alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686-87 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)).
The Court here concludes that the investigating officer employed excessive force, thereby escalating an investigative stop into a de facto arrest lacking in probable cause. With respect, I believe the Court has indulged in precisely the sort of “second guessing” that the United States Supreme Court has cautioned against. The result, I fear, is to impose on our law enforcement officers the sort of “Hobson’s Choice” condemned by the court in United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1981), forcing the officer to choose between approaching a suspect with gun holstered, thereby increasing the risk of being attacked, or drawing one’s weapon and increasing the risk that a court “will set the criminal free by construing his action as an illegal arrest.” Like the court in Jackson, I am loath to create such a dangerous dilemma for our law enforcement personnel. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The record evidence summarized in the Court’s decision amply supports the trial court’s finding that the investigating officer acted reasonably in tracking a set of footprints from an abandoned car on *409Route 7 north toward a small complex of stores. The Court does not dispute this finding, nor indeed would any legal basis, exist to challenge it. Under the so-called “community caretaking function,” any reasonable officer would be justified, if not indeed compelled, to attempt to locate the missing driver of an abandoned vehicle parked some four feet off the highway. See State v. Marcello, 157 Vt. 657, 658, 599 A.2d 357, 358 (1991) (mem.) (police officers may intrude on person’s privacy without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity “to carry out ‘community caretaking’ functions to enhance public safety”) (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 441)).
After following a circuitous set of footprints to the rear of the stores, which included a gift shop closed for the evening, the officer observed a person lean forward and peek out from behind a darkened comer of the building. At this point, the trial court found that
the nature of the Officer’s investigation changed. What had begun as the investigation of a disabled vehicle was transformed into the investigation of suspicious activity: it was night time, and fresh tracks were found leading to an isolated area behind commercial buildings. Although the Officer did not articulate his response to the circumstances in these terms, he was investigating the possibility of criminal activity — a possible burglary — in progress. The Officer’s suspicions were enhanced when he found the Defendant peeking out from a darkened nook behind the stores.
Here again, the trial court’s conclusion was sound. As noted earlier, the reasonableness of an investigative detention must be judged from the perspective of the officer on the scene in light of the totality of the circumstances. The officer here obviously did not know the intentions of the individual in question, but given that he appeared to be hiding and behaving furtively, that the hour was late, and that the building housed a gift shop it was not unreasonable to suspect that something was amiss, including a possible burglary or even assault. Wdien asked why he unholstered his revolver, the officer responded that he was acting according to his training, and indicated that it was “for my safety and his.”* Although the officer did not testify that he also *410suspected a burglary, this is not controlling. The question is whether the circumstances objectively suggested a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 415, 765 A.2d 862, 872 (2000). Viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, I believe they clearly did.
The same standard of reasonableness for determining the justification of the detention applies to the officer’s show of force. As the court in United States v. Alexander, 907 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1990), observed: “There are no hard and fast rules for evaluating the conduct of law enforcement agents conducting investigative stops----A law enforcement agent, faced with the possibility of danger, has a right to take reasonable steps to protect himself____‘The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Id. at 272 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). When the officer here observed an unidentified individual in the shadows behind a closed shop lean forward and peek out, it was not unreasonable to unholster his revolver, command the individual to come out with his hands showing, and conduct a quick pat-down search. There was simply no way for the officer to know — in that instant — whether the person was hiding from the officer or lying-in-wait; whether he was alone or had a compatriot; whether he was armed, intoxicated, or otherwise unstable. The uncertainty and potential danger was compounded, moreover, by the fact that it was late at night, dark, and the officer was alone and isolated.
In these circumstances, it appears to me self-evident that the officer exercised precisely that amount of force reasonably necessary to ensure his safety by swiftly exerting control over defendant and ascertaining his intentions. Although he unholstered his weapon, there was no evidence that the officer held defendant at gunpoint, or restricted his physical movement with handcuffs or any other physical *411force for any length of time. On the contrary, the officer testified without contradiction that his weapon was holstered almost immediately, and that he proceeded to conduct a quick pat-down search of defendant and to question him about his reasons for being there. “Without exceeding Terry guidelines, the police may do what is necessary to command the suspect’s attention and bring him to a stop, ... and to protect themselves and the public from unnecessary exposure to risk of injury.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgibbons, 502 N.E.2d 142, 145-46 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). That describes precisely the nature of the officer’s actions here. Accordingly, I find no basis in the record to support a conclusion that the officer utilized such excessive force that it transformed the nature of the seizure from an investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause.
I would affirm the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court denying defendant’s motion to suppress. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Amestoy joins in this dissent.

 The ful text of the question and answer in this regard is as folows:
Q. Officer Roy, there’s been a lot of questions about your weapon. Why did you pul your weapon out that night?
*410A. Certainly my training is such that if you’re following an individual in a situation like I was, come around a comer and have someone surprised from a darkened area, which clearly is a place that that individual chose to put himself, I think for my safety and his —
Q. The area was not well lit?
Mr. Stetler: Objection form of the question.
A. Relatively dark back there.
THE COURT: Overruled.