Court Opinion

ID: 9731878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:00:39.396866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:21.693662
License: Public Domain

Shangraw, J.
dissenting. The court below was confronted with the libelant’s libel for divorce and the libelee’s cross-libel. The grounds alleged were the same.
The opinion in part states:
The libelant testified that so far as he knew they were on good terms when he left to go to his daughter’s home. He had thought for some time that she was discontented over his being sick and said “that’s about as far as I know about it.” He also testified she became rather cold towards him in the latter years when he was- sick and that he didn’t know of anything he had done which gave his wife a reason for wanting to leave him.
From the foregoing, it is my belief that the trial court could have reasonably and properly concluded, as it did, that the separation of the parties was occasioned through no fault on the part of the libelant.
The opinion refers to evidence introduced on the part of the libelee indicating fault on the part of the libelant and lack of fault on her part. Notwithstanding this evidence the court declined to grant the libelee’s cross-libel, and instead granted a divorce to the libelant. It apparently placed no credence on the evidence of the libelee and believed the libelant.
Triers of fact have the function of determining the credibility of witnesses, weighing evidence, and drawing justifiable inferences from proven facts. It is also well established that factual determination below will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. The persuasive effect of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses was for the trial court to determine. Pacquin v. Pacquin, 125 Vt. 243, 246, 214 A.2d 90; Crossman v. Crossman, 124 Vt. 127, 129, 197 A.2d 818.
*452No findings of fact were made by the court below. The case of each party hinged on the credibility of the witnesses. The weight of their testimony was properly reserved unto the trial court. On this issue, I do not believe this Court’s judgment can be substituted for that of the trial court which had the advantage of viewing the witnesses and parties on the stand. Here, only the transcript is before us. In the absence of a clearly erroneous judgment it should not be disturbed.
The parties broke about even as to the personal property. The opinion takes issue with the propriety of the decree awarding the libelant the homestead. •
At the time of trial the libelant was 71 years of age and had been sick for a few years and under the doctor’s care. No doubt he had passed the earning age. The libelee, age 50, has a good position. The libelant needs a home, or possibly the proceeds thereof to live on. In considering these factors it is likely that the court had in mind its wide judicial latitude under 15 V.S.A. section 751 which permitted the court to consider the condition in which the parties would be left by the divorce. Raymond v. Raymond, 120 Vt. 87, 96, 132 A.2d 427; Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 115 Vt. 331, 335, 58 A.2d 814. The libelee flew the coop, — not the libelant.
It is my judgment that the trial court arrived at a fair and realistic result which is supported by adequate evidence.
I would affirm the decree.
Attention might well be called to the fact that since this case was heard and disposed of below, the policy of the State with regard to the cause of a divorce under 15 V.S.A. Section 551, sub-section 7 was changed by the adjourned session of the 1969 Legislature. By Act No. 264 the above statute was amended, effective April 8, 1970, by striking out the very clause which is in contention here. Henceforth, the element and proof that a libelant on his or her part is without fault for a separation is no longer required.