Court Opinion

ID: 9516967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:57:45.54053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:12.664977
License: Public Domain

KENNETH M. ROMINES, C.J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. This case is not moot, just inconvenient. Inconvenient because as Courts we are reluctant to reverse the action of elected officials.1
At issue is the meaning to be given Section 72.080 RSMo. That section reads
“... (1) Whenever a number of voters equal to fifteen percent of the registered voters in the area proposed to be incorporated shall present a petition to the governing body of the county in which such city, town, village or area is situated, such petition shall describe, by metes and bounds, the area to be incorporated and be accompanied by a plat thereof, shall state the approximate population and the assessed valuation of all real and *102personal property in the area and shall state facts showing that the proposed city, town, or village, if such village has at least one hundred inhabitants residing in it, shall have the ability to furnish normal municipal services within a reasonable time after its incorporation is to become effective and praying that the question be submitted to determine if it may be incorporated;
(2) The governing body shall submit the question to the voters if it is satisfied the number of voters signing such petition is equal to fifteen percent of the registered voters in the area proposed to be incorporated.”
This is a straight forward combination of words — neither oblique nor ambiguous. Likewise the record is clear — Mr. Ferguson complied with all the requirements of § 72.080, supra. I believe the majority believes this, though they avoid this issue with “mootness.” I also believe the majority would concede that the two members of the Franklin County Commission that comprised the majority — on the record— made clear that they were not going to comply with § 72.080, supra; “mootness”, again, avoids the issue.
Mr. Ferguson brings two issues for our consideration. One — should the Franklin County Commission be compelled to comply with § 72.080 by mandamus.2
Two — was the action of the Franklin County Commission arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable as a ruling of an administrative body.
I do not believe we need to reach Mr. Ferguson’s second point — though it is clear that the Commission’s action was indeed arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
As such, we have before us a mandamus case. Whether a writ of mandamus is required is a question of law, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. banc 2002). The party who seeks mandamus must prove an unequivocal, clear, specific right. State ex rel. Office of Public Counsel v. Public Service Com’n of State, 236 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. 2007). Mr. Ferguson has met this standard— again, I believe the majority would concede Mr. Ferguson’s compliance with every aspect of the statute.
Reluctant as Courts are to tell legislative bodies they have run afoul of the law with legislation — that reluctance disappears when the same body functions administratively. The standard is different because when acting administratively the legislative body is not exercising its police power, and is not making policy. Here, the Franklin County Commission is acting in its administrative capacity. As such the Commission is compelled to place the issue of the Incorporation of the Village of Stonewater on the ballot to be voted up or down.
The Circuit Court below found discretion in the Commission — discretion which does not appear in § 72.080. The Commission’s sole discretion is to decide at which election the ballot proposition will be submitted to the voters, as the statute does not set a specific election date.
The majority discusses the repeal of § 72.080 — simply, when Mr. Ferguson sought incorporation § 72.080 was the law. Mr. Ferguson had a due process right consistent with Art. I § 10 Constitution of Missouri as the Commission had the case before repeal, as indeed did the Circuit Court, as the repeal did not become effective until 28 August 2008.
Consistently as Courts we apply statutes in effect when a petition has been brought before a Court prior to the repeal of the statute — whether it be venue provisions, *103worker compensation, wrongful death, medical malpractice, or indeed criminal cases — a party receives the benefit of the statute under which the case is brought, thus avoiding an ex post facto inquiry.3
Unequivocally and clearly Mr. Ferguson has a right to place the Incorporation of the City of Stonewater on the ballot.
Mandamus should issue Ordering the County Commission of Franklin County, Missouri to place the Incorporation of the Village of Stonewater, Missouri on the ballot.4

. Courts are reluctant to the point of allowing legislation even if that legislation is obtained by bribe. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 366, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1346, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (U.S.S.C. 1991).

. The Circuit Court below denied mandamus and denied the administrative appeal.

. The repeal of § 72.080 did not apply the repeal retrospectively — indeed the legislative histoiy indicates an attempt at retrospective application was defeated.

. Additionally, I note that Respondent failed to file a brief with this court. While this does not violate any rules or statutes, "it is an imposition on the court that leaves us without the benefit of Claimant's research and insight.” Missouri Forge, Inc. v. Turner, 118 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Mo.App. S.D.2003). While we are required to decide the case regardless of whether Respondent prepares a brief, we are not to become an advocate for Respondent Rhodes v. Blair, 919 S.W.2d 561, 563, 565 (Mo.App. S.D.1996).