Court Opinion

ID: 9864731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:04:33.284745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:10.163994
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 230154-U

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
      limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                                                                     FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                    September 25, 2023
                                       No. 1-23-0154
      ______________________________________________________________________________

                                          IN THE
                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                      FIRST DISTRICT
      ______________________________________________________________________________

      CHRISTINE WILLIAMS,                                 )
                                                          )               Appeal from the
                             Plaintiff-Appellant,         )               Circuit Court of
                                                          )               Cook County
           v.                                             )
                                                          )               No. 19 L 65083
      MICHAEL STUCKLY, VILLAGE OF TINLEY PARK,            )
      an Illinois municipal corporation, ANMARIE HUMENIK, )               The Honorable
      and MICHAEL W. GLOTZ,                               )               Thomas W. Murphy,
                                                          )               Judge Presiding.
                             Defendants-Appellees.        )

                 PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court.
                 Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment.
                 Justice Pucinski specially concurred.

                                                 ORDER

¶1   Held: Trial court’s dismissal of second amended complaint alleging intrusion upon seclusion,
           false light, and civil conspiracy is affirmed. Trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for
           pleading sanctions against defendant and defense counsel is affirmed.

¶2        The plaintiff, Christine Williams, appeals the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of her

     second amended complaint at law against the defendants, Michael Stuckly, the Village of Tinley

     Park, Anmarie Humenik, and Michael W. Glotz. She also appeals the trial court’s denial of her

     motion for pleading sanctions against defendant Stuckly and his counsel and its denial of her
     No. 1-23-0154

     request for an evidentiary hearing on that motion. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4        The plaintiff and defendant Stuckly are residents of the Village of Tinley Park (Village) with

     opposing political allegiances in local politics. Defendant Humenik is an employee of the Village’s

     police department and serves as a part-time clerk. Defendant Glotz is an elected trustee of the

     Village. Several of the attorneys representing the parties are likewise involved in the local politics

     and government of the Village.

¶5        The original complaint in this case was filed on October 11, 2019, against defendant Stuckly

     and Adrienne Jasiczek, who was later dismissed as a defendant. It also named Glotz as a respondent

     in discovery. Although the plaintiff filed it pro se, it bore all the hallmarks of having been drafted

     by an attorney. It sought damages under the tort theories of invasion of privacy, false light, public

     disclosure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress

     based on the defendants’ alleged involvement in two events.

¶6        The first event involved an allegation that, in “multiple publications on social media,”

     defendants Stuckly and Jasiczek “made false statements that Plaintiff was a drug addict, accused

     Plaintiff of other criminal acts such as theft and criminal damage to property[,] and published false

     statements intended to impugn the integrity of Plaintiff.” It included no further specificity about

     these statements and accusations. The second was an allegation that Jasiczek had, under false

     pretenses of needing them for a meeting with the state’s attorney, requested and obtained police

     reports about the plaintiff from the Village in which personal and medical information about the

     plaintiff had not been redacted. Jasiczek then shared these police reports with defendant Stuckly,

     who posted private medical information about the plaintiff on social media. Again, it included no

     specificity about the nature of the information in these police reports or social media posts. No

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     No. 1-23-0154

     exhibits were attached to the complaint.

¶7        An appearance was soon filed on the plaintiff’s behalf by attorney Stephen E. Eberhardt,

     followed by a first amended complaint. The first amended complaint named five defendants:

     Stuckly, Jasiczek, the Village, Humenik, and Glotz. As to the Village and Humenik, the first

     amended complaint pled theories of intrusion upon seclusion, release of private information, and

     intentional infliction of emotional distress. The factual predicate for the causes of action against

     these two defendants was an allegation that Humenik, who was a personal friend of Jasiczek, had

     produced for Jasiczek within 30 minutes of her request the police reports concerning the plaintiff,

     and she did so without redacting “personal, private and medical information” about the plaintiff.

     Humenik took these actions on behalf of the Village, as its response to a request by Jasiczek under

     the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020)). No greater specificity

     was pled about the nature of the information in these reports, and no exhibits were attached.

¶8        As to defendants Stuckly, Jasiczek, and Glotz, the first amended complaint pled causes of

     action under tort theories of false light, intrusion upon seclusion, release of private facts,

     defamation, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The causes of action were

     predicated in part on the same incident described above, by which Jasiczek allegedly submitted a

     FOIA request to the Village for police reports involving the plaintiff, which was fulfilled by

     Huminek without redacting “personal, private and medical information” about the plaintiff. It

     further alleged that Jasiczek had done this under the false pretense that the information was needed

     for a meeting with the state’s attorney, but her true intent was to share the police reports with

     defendant Stuckly to enable him to “publish and comment on the reports on social media.” Jasiczek

     had also shared and discussed the police reports with defendant Glotz, who suggested to and urged

     defendant Stuckly “to publish defamatory comments about Plaintiff.” It alleged that Glotz had

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       No. 1-23-0154

       animosity toward the plaintiff for her vocal comments criticizing his conduct and his fitness to

       serve as an elected official, and because of this animosity he urged defendant Stuckly to “publish

       information and private information as contained in the police reports on social media.”

¶9          Additionally, the first amended complaint alleged that defendant Stuckly had posted and

       published “certain videos, photographs and altered photographs[,] some containing images of

       Plaintiff” on social media, which had been given to him for this purpose by Glotz. Stuckly further

       posted “personal and private information of Plaintiff, including medical information, regarding

       Plaintiff on social media” at the request of Jasiczek and Glotz. It alleged that all three defendants

       then “commented on the various social media posts making false statements that Plaintiff was a

       drug addict, accusing Plaintiff of other criminal as theft and criminal damage to property and

       published false statements intended to impugn the integrity of Plaintiff.”

¶ 10        The claims against Jasiczek were thereafter dismissed pursuant to a settlement found to be in

       good faith. The Village, Huminek, and Glotz filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint.

       They argued in that motion that the factual allegations pled failed to support any of the causes of

       action against them. They also argued that they were provided with immunity for providing

       information in response to a FOIA request pursuant, respectively, to sections 2-107 and 2-210 of

       the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act)

       (745 ILCS 10/2-207, 2-210 (West 2020)).

¶ 11        Defendant Stuckly also filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. His motion

       argued that no cause of action could be stated against him for false light, defamation, or conspiracy

       for referring to the plaintiff as a “drug addict” on social media, due to the plaintiff’s own

       admissions on her Facebook account publicly discussing her struggle with addiction to pain

       medication. That motion was supported with an affidavit from defendant Stuckly, stating that in

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       No. 1-23-0154

       2018-2019, the plaintiff had maintained an account on Facebook which Stuckly had read. He stated

       in his affidavit that prior to the date on which she had filed this case against him, he had copied a

       screenshot of a post made by the plaintiff on her Facebook account, which was attached. That post

       included statements to the effect that “[a]ddiction does suck,” that “I had a problem with alcohol

       and other pills before my surgery and before this pain,” and that “I am sick and tired of having to

       live my life by being tied to a little pill every few hours.”

¶ 12        Following significant briefing and oral argument, the trial court ultimately entered an order

       dismissing all counts of the first amended complaint. The central factor of the trial court’s ruling

       was its finding that the plaintiff’s causes of action were all based upon the defendants’ alleged

       disclosure of the same information about the plaintiff’s struggles with drug addiction that she had

       posted on Facebook herself, thereby rendering that information non-private. It also dismissed the

       false light count without prejudice on the basis that the first amended complaint failed to state with

       specificity what private information defendant Stuckly or Glotz released, how it was released or

       distributed, in what manner the plaintiff was portrayed in a false light, or what information was

       fabricated or fraudulent. The plaintiff was granted leave to file a second amended complaint.

¶ 13        The second amended complaint, which is the operative pleading in this appeal, asserted three

       causes of action. Count I asserted a claim for intrusion upon seclusion against all four defendants.

       Count II alleged a theory of false light against defendants Stuckly and Glotz. Count III alleged a

       claim of conspiracy against all four defendants.

¶ 14        With minor alterations in verbiage, the same facts pled in the first amended complaint were

       included in the second amended complaint, along with several new allegations. In count I for

       intrusion upon seclusion against all defendants, the second amended complaint specified that the

       personal and private information that the defendants had allegedly published about the plaintiff

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       No. 1-23-0154

       “included, but was not limited to, publication of a medication being taken by Plaintiff. (Exhibit

       A).” Exhibit A purports to be an undated post from an unidentified social media site by Stuckly

       stating, “It’s a shame that they have visited many times at the residence. But as they say never a

       problem.” Another user then writes, “[W]ho calls the police if never a problem then?” to which

       Stuckly replies with a picture of what appears to be two yellow pills.

¶ 15        In count II for false light, the second amended complaint specified that the false and

       misleading statements published by defendants Stuckly and Glotz “included, but were not limited

       to, production and publication of numerous fabricated photos and videos of Plaintiff. (See e.g.

       Exhibit B).” Exhibit B then purports to be an undated post on Facebook by Stuckly to a group

       named “Tinley Taxpayers Unite” of a photograph with the caption, “We really need a drive in

       theater for Freaky Friday Night Movies.” The photograph appears to be crudely manipulated

       photograph of a person with horns and blood-splattered, discolored skin. The second amended

       complaint alleges that Exhibit B was produced by Village trustee Colleen Sullivan and given to

       Glotz, who provided it to Stuckly “to use to ‘slam’ and ‘trash’ Plaintiff.”

¶ 16        Finally, in count III for conspiracy against all defendants, the second amended complaint

       alleged that defendant Glotz engages in a pattern and practice of having his political supporters

       use social media to attack others who comment negatively on his qualifications and actions as a

       public official. It alleged that Jasiczek, Humenik, and Glotz discussed, agreed, and took concerted

       action whereby Humenik would release police reports pursuant to a FOIA request to the Village,

       and that Glotz and Stuckly discussed, agreed, and took concerted action to publish the plaintiff’s

       personal information on social media as described in the preceding counts. In support of its

       conspiracy claim, the second amended complaint attached Exhibit C, which purports to be two

       exchanges of text messages between Glotz and “Nancy Ohshaw” (which the plaintiff alleges is

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       No. 1-23-0154

       Nancy O’Connor, the Village clerk and a supporter of Glotz) and a third exchange between Glotz

       and an unidentified individual. In the first, Glotz purportedly writes, “Ok just report her and I’ll

       let Stuckles trash her.” In the second, he purportedly writes, “Can I give this to Stuckly to slam

       her[?]” And in the third, he purportedly writes, “Oh we are so posting those… Well, Stuckly will.”

¶ 17        Motions to dismiss the second amended complaint were filed on behalf of all defendants. The

       motion by defendants Humenik, Glotz, and the Village asserted that the second amended complaint

       failed to provide simple allegations necessary to support claims for intrusion upon seclusion or

       false light. They argued, for example, that it contained no factual detail about the exact nature of

       the private or false information released, how it was released, to whom it was released, or the date

       when the allegedly tortious acts occurred. They also argued that the second amended complaint

       failed to include factual allegations about how the information involved was private, given the

       plaintiff’s own Facebook posts about drug addiction that had led to the trial court’s dismissal of

       the first amended complaint. They argued that the second amended complaint failed to allege how

       the production of police reports pursuant to a FOIA request constituted an intrusion upon seclusion.

       They argued that the count for conspiracy must be dismissed also based upon the failure of the

       second amended complaint to sufficiently allege an independent tort. And they again argued that

       the claims against the Village and Huminek must be dismissed under sections 2-107 and 2-210 of

       the Tort Immunity Act. Id. §§ 2-107, 2-210.

¶ 18        Defendant Stuckly’s amended motion to dismiss the second amended complaint argued that

       the intrusion upon seclusion count against him was an improper repleading of a count that had

       previously been dismissed with prejudice. It argued that count II failed to state a claim for false

       light due to the court’s earlier finding that the plaintiff rendered this information non-private by

       posting about her addiction on Facebook. It argued that Stuckly had immunity for republishing

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       No. 1-23-0154

       statements made by others via an interactive computer service under section 230 of the

       Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018)). It argued that count III failed to

       state a claim for conspiracy because no underlying tort in furtherance of a conspiracy was alleged.

       And it argued that the second amended complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because its

       allegations were so vague that Stuckly was unable to determine what statements the plaintiff was

       accusing him of making.

¶ 19        The motions were briefed, and the trial court conducted oral argument on October 13, 2022.

       At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court granted both motions and dismissed all counts of

       the second amended complaint with prejudice. The trial court’s comments at the hearing, along

       with its explanation in its later order of January 12, 2023, indicate that it found that the factual

       allegations were lacking specificity and that the plaintiff had waived privacy in the issue of her

       drug addiction through her own post on her Facebook account acknowledging the matter.

¶ 20        Despite failing to prevail on the motions to dismiss, the plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for

       pleading sanctions against defendant Stuckly and his attorney. The plaintiff’s motion set forth eight

       actions which it asserted were sanctionable in totality: (1) when Stuckly’s counsel filed his

       additional appearance in the case, he failed to serve it on plaintiff’s counsel in accordance with

       supreme court rules; (2) he filed the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint prior to seeking

       leave to withdraw the answer that was filed by his co-counsel; (3) he failed to consult with his own

       co-counsel, specifically to determine whether an answer had already been filed in the case; (4) he

       drafted a pleading which was never filed but contained purposeful misrepresentations; (5) his

       motions to dismiss were procedurally improper, contained false, irrelevant, and misquoted

       statements, and included “ ‘derogatory’ and ‘disgusting’ comments” about plaintiff’s counsel

       which he took “childish revelry” in making; (6) he disregarded court-ordered deadlines and orders

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       No. 1-23-0154

       to serve pleadings; (7) he refused to forward copies of his motion to dismiss to delay a scheduled

       hearing in July 2022; and (8) he made purposefully misleading arguments intended to deceive the

       court and to harass plaintiff’s counsel. The plaintiff argued that these issues warranted the

       presentation of further evidence requiring an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 21        Defendant Stuckly and his counsel declined to brief the motion. The trial court denied the

       plaintiff’s request to conduct an evidentiary hearing, but it did hold an oral argument at which both

       attorneys made argument. On January 12, 2023, the trial court issued a written order denying the

       plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. The trial court stated in that order that after reviewing the parties’

       motions, it found that the defendant had not committed any violations of Supreme Court Rule 137

       (eff. Oct. 1, 2018). The court noted that it had made allowances for both parties to deviate from

       strict adherence to court procedures. The plaintiff thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 22                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23                              A. Dismissal of Second Amended Complaint

¶ 24        This appeal is before the appellate court following the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s

       second amended complaint pursuant to motions brought under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil

       Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022)). That statute allows for combined motions

       raising grounds for dismissal under both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code (id. §§ 2-615, 2-

       619). Section 2-615 allows for motions that test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, while section

       2-619 allows for motions that admit the legal sufficiency of the complaint but raise outside

       defenses that defeat the claim. Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148,

       ¶ 31. Relevant here, section 2-619(a)(9) permits involuntary dismissal where the claim is “barred

       by other affirmative matter.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022). In ruling on such a motion, the

       court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as well as any reasonable inferences that arise

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       No. 1-23-0154

       from them, but it cannot accept as true mere conclusions unsupported by specific facts. Patrick

       Engineering, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. The standard of review is de novo. Id. Under this standard,

       this court may affirm the trial court’s judgment on any basis that is supported by the record.

       American Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. K&K Iron Works, LLC, 2022 IL App (1st) 220181, ¶ 17.

¶ 25        The plaintiff’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting the

       defendants’ motions to dismiss and thereby dismissing all counts of her second amended complaint

       with prejudice. She argues that the trial court improperly resolved contested issues of fact,

       specifically about whether and when she made a post to her Facebook account discussing her

       struggles with drug addiction. She argues that all three counts of her second amended complaint

       contain sufficient allegations of fact to support the causes of action pled, and none of the defenses

       raised by the defendants are sufficient to defeat her claims at the pleading stage.

¶ 26        We disagree and hold that the trial court ruled properly when it dismissed the plaintiff’s

       second amended complaint with prejudice. As explained below, we find that the factual allegations

       pled in the second amended complaint fall far short of stating causes of action for intrusion upon

       seclusion, false light, or civil conspiracy.

¶ 27                                        1. Intrusion Upon Seclusion

¶ 28        Count I of the second amended complaint purports to state a cause of action against all four

       defendants under the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The elements required to prove

       intrusion upon seclusion are (1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclusion;

       (2) an intrusion that is highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) that the matter

       upon which the intrusion occurs is private; and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering.

       Jacobson v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 132480, ¶ 47. The third element of the

       tort, requiring allegations that the facts or matter intruded upon is private, is a predicate for the

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       No. 1-23-0154

       other three elements. Id.; Busse v. Motorola, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (2004).

¶ 29        Further, the basis of this tort is not publication or publicity; rather, it is the offensive prying

       into the private domain of another. Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill.

       2d 411, 417 (1989); accord Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d 976, 981 (1990). Examples

       of actionable conduct include invading an individual’s home, an illegal search of his or her

       shopping bag in a store, eavesdropping by wiretapping, peering into the windows of a private

       home, and persistent and unwanted telephone calls. Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 417 (citing W. Prosser

       & W. Keeton, Torts § 117, at 854-55 (5th ed. 1984)). It may also include investigation or

       examination into an individual’s private concerns, such as by opening personal mail, searching a

       wallet, examining a private bank account, or compelling a person by forged court order to permit

       inspection of personal documents. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530,

       ¶ 33 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b, at 378-79 (1977)); accord Borchers

       v. Franciscan Tertiary Province of Sacred Heart, Inc., 2011 IL App (2d) 101257, ¶ 29 (accessing

       and reading plaintiff’s personal e-mail account). The harm must result from an act of intrusion or

       prying analogous to the above examples, as opposed to resulting from an act of publication.

       Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 417.

¶ 30        The plaintiff argues that an unauthorized intrusion or prying into her seclusion is adequately

       alleged by the facts pled in count I. She cites the allegations that defendant Glotz unlawfully used

       his official status to view or receive information in the records of the Village that detailed police

       responses to the plaintiff’s home; that he directed Jasiczek to make a FOIA request to the Village

       for those police reports; and that defendant Humenik improperly produced materials beyond the

       scope of the FOIA request and did so without redacting “personal, private and medical

       information” contained in them. She further cites allegations that Jasiczek provided the police

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       No. 1-23-0154

       reports to Stuckly, who shared them with Glotz and published information on social media,

       including “publication of a medication being taken by Plaintiff.”

¶ 31        For their part, the defendants argue that the allegations in count I relate solely to publication

       and do not allege injury from an “intrusion.” We agree that certainly the gravamen of the plaintiff’s

       allegations involve publication, and count I contains no allegation that any anguish or suffering

       was caused by an act of intrusion (as opposed to a later publication). More significant, however,

       is that the facts pled in count I fail to show an “unauthorized” intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s

       private information. To the extent an intrusion is alleged, it is not an intrusion into private

       information in the possession of the plaintiff; instead, the allegation is that a Village officer (Glotz)

       and employee (Humenik) accessed official records belonging to the Village. Generally, an

       organization’s accessing of its own records is not an unauthorized intrusion for purposes of this

       tort. See e.g., Dwyer v. American Express Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 742, 746 (1995); Mucklow v. John

       Marshall Law School, 176 Ill. App. 3d 886, 894 (1988); In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy

       Litigation, 326 F. Supp. 2d 893, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2004). The conclusory allegation that Glotz accessed

       the police reports “unlawfully” is insufficient to overcome this rule.

¶ 32        Furthermore, the alleged intrusion here involved records subject to a FOIA request that were

       obtained in that context. Without attaching the police reports to the complaint or describing in

       detail the “personal, private, and medical information” contained in them, the court is unable to

       credit any assertion that they included information which the plaintiff had the right to expect would

       be kept private. The examination of a public record concerning a plaintiff is not an unauthorized

       intrusion upon seclusion. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c, at 379 (1977). Further,

       section 7(1)(c) of FOIA provides that a public body “may elect to redact” personal information

       contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute unwarranted invasion of

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       privacy. (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2022). The plaintiff has cited no authority

       supporting the argument that she had a reasonable expectation that information included within

       police reports concerning her would be kept private. For these reasons, we hold that count I of the

       second amended complaint fails to state a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion.

¶ 33                                              2. False Light

¶ 34        Count II of the second amended complaint purports to state a claim for the privacy tort of

       false light against defendants Stuckly and Glotz. This tort protects a person’s interest in being free

       from false publicity. Benton v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 190549, ¶ 83. A

       claim for false light requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that (1) the plaintiff was placed in a

       false light before the public as a result of the defendants’ actions; (2) the false light in which the

       plaintiff was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendants acted

       with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard

       for their truth or falsity. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 17-18 (1992); Benton,

       2020 IL App (1st) 190549, ¶ 83.

¶ 35        The plaintiff argues that count II of the second amended complaint properly pled an action

       for false light upon which relief could be granted. However, the argument on this point in her brief

       consists mostly of a cut-and-paste copy of the paragraphs of the second amended complaint of

       which count II is comprised (i.e., paragraphs 28-40 and 53-58). She asserts that the defendants’

       use of “phony/alias Facebook pages,” the ease with which they could block her from viewing posts

       made by them, and Stuckly’s refusal to comply with discovery orders should excuse her from

       pleading with precision those facts that are within the defendants’ knowledge and control.

¶ 36        We conclude that count II fails to plead facts stating a cause of action for false light. The

       paragraphs comprising count II are replete with allegations to the effect that Stuckly, at the urging

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       and for the political benefit of Glotz, made “multiple publications on social media” that placed the

       plaintiff in a false light. This included statements that she was a “drug addict,” statements accusing

       her of theft and criminal property damage, and “videos, photographs, altered photographs and

       manipulated false statements as well as personal information, including medical information”

       about the plaintiff. It further alleges that Stuckly and Glotz both added comments to these various

       social media posts, further placing the plaintiff in a false light.

¶ 37        However, with the exceptions addressed below, none of the “multiple” social media

       publications, posts, or comments are attached as exhibits to the second amended complaint or

       otherwise set forth with the actual words, photographs, or videos used in the context in which they

       were published. Without this information, it is impossible for the court or the defendants to

       understand and evaluate the plaintiff’s allegations that she was placed in a false light by specific

       words or conduct of the defendants. For example, the allegations imply that the plaintiff is alleging

       numerous instances of tortious conduct by the defendants, but it is impossible to know from the

       second amended complaint how many such instances are being alleged. They suggest that false

       statements were published by both defendants without specificity as to which defendant published

       what. They are silent as to the dates when any of the alleged publications were made. Even the

       allegation that things were published on “social media” is vague. “Social media” is a broad term.

       This is important because a false light claim requires the plaintiff be placed in a false light “before

       the public,” which means that the size and nature of the audience viewing the publication can

       matter. See Poulos v. Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 731, 739-40 (2000).

       Something may be actionable if published in a Facebook post visible to the world at large but

       nonactionable if it is shared only through a group text among a handful of people with whom the

       plaintiff had no relationship. The allegations of the second amended complaint are simply too

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       vague for the court to say that they are closer to the former category than to the latter.

¶ 38        The parties focus their arguments on the allegation of count II that the defendants placed the

       plaintiff in a false light by referring to her as a “drug addict” on social media. However, their

       arguments center on the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff waived the issue of privacy in this

       matter through her own post on Facebook in which she discussed this topic publicly. We find no

       reason to address this waiver argument, though, because we find that the allegations of the second

       amended complaint suffer from the more fundamental defect of being too vague and unclear as to

       what the plaintiff is alleging in this regard. Principally, it is not clear whether the plaintiff is

       alleging a direct quote or is characterizing other evidence. While the second amended complaint

       places quotation marks around the phrase “drug addict,” the original and first amended complaints

       contained identical allegations without using quotation marks. Also, the second amended

       complaint attaches exhibit A, which purports to be a post by Stuckly to an unidentified social

       media site of a photograph of two yellow pills. 1 It is not clear from the allegations whether this is

       the social media post to which the plaintiff is referring by her allegation that Stuckly called her a

       drug addict. The plaintiff was challenged on this point in Stuckly’s motion to dismiss the second

       amended complaint, and the plaintiff’s response did not refute this assertion or clarify the

       relationship, if any, between the “drug addict” allegations and the photograph attached as exhibit

       A. Additionally, paragraph 9 of the second amended complaint alleges that Stuckly falsely stated

       that the plaintiff was a “drug addict” in “multiple publications on social media,” whereas paragraph

       33 alleges that both Stuckly and Glotz “all commented on the various social media posts making

       false statements that Plaintiff was a ‘drug addict.’ ” In sum, the allegations that the defendants

               1
                Exhibit A is technically incorporated only into an allegation pled in support of count I for intrusion
       upon seclusion.

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       referred to the plaintiff as a “drug addict” are subject to the same deficiencies we identified in the

       preceding paragraph and are simply insufficient to support a claim for false light.

¶ 39        The only other allegation of count II that is somewhat specific is its attachment of exhibit B,

       which purports to be an undated Facebook post by Stuckly to a group named “Tinley Taxpayers

       Unite” of a photograph captioned, “We really need a drive in theater for Freaky Friday Night

       Movies.” As described above, the photograph is a crudely manipulated photograph of a person

       with what appear to be horns and blood-splattered, discolored skin. No further facts are alleged in

       the second amended complaint specific to exhibit B.

¶ 40        However, the plaintiff makes no argument in her appellate brief about exhibit B or how it

       purportedly places her in a false light. Her only reference to it occurs when she quotes paragraph

       56 of the second amended complaint, stating: “The false and misleading statements as made and

       published by Defendant Stuckly and Defendant Glotz included, but were not limited to, production

       and publication of numerous fabricated photos and videos of Plaintiff. (See e.g. Exhibit B.)” By

       failing to include any argument in her brief concerning this exhibit, this court could only speculate

       about how this exhibit could relate to the plaintiff or how its publication could place her in a false

       light. We decline to engage in this speculation and conclude that any argument by the plaintiff that

       exhibit B provides a sufficient basis to go forward on a claim for false light has been forfeited by

       the failure to argue this point. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued [in

       appellant’s opening brief] are forfeited”).

¶ 41                                           3. Civil Conspiracy

¶ 42        The plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing count III of the second

       amended complaint, which purports to state a claim against all four defendants for civil conspiracy

       predicated on the conduct alleged to be tortious in counts I and II. However, conspiracy is not an

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       independent tort. Thomas v. Fuerst, 345 Ill. App. 3d 929, 936 (2004). Where, as here, a plaintiff

       fails to state an independent cause of action underlying the conspiracy allegations, the claim for

       civil conspiracy fails also. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Jackson Towers Condominium Ass’n, Inc.,

       2018 IL App (1st) 170781, ¶ 35; Thomas, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 936.

¶ 43                                        4. Dismissal with Prejudice

¶ 44        Given that our holding is that the second amended complaint fails to state a cause of action,

       the final question is whether dismissal with prejudice is proper. We address this as a matter of

       completeness, even though the plaintiff makes no argument on this point. The general rule is that

       dismissal of a complaint should be with prejudice only where it clearly appears the plaintiff can

       prove no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to recovery. Mayle v. Urban Realty Works, LLC, 2022

       IL App (1st) 210470, ¶ 81.

¶ 45        Here, the second amended complaint was the plaintiff’s third opportunity to state viable

       claims based on allegations concerning the defendants’ posts about her on social media and the

       release of unredacted police reports through a FOIA request. The first amended complaint had

       been dismissed after the defendants filed motions pointing out specific ways in which that pleading

       was deficient in its alleging of basic facts to support the claims pled. The trial court’s written order

       dismissing the first amended complaint specifically stated that the intrusion upon seclusion count

       failed to allege conduct amounting to an unauthorized intrusion into the plaintiff’s privacy or

       seclusion, and its false light count failed to specify what private information that either defendant

       released, how it was released or distributed, in what manner the plaintiff was portrayed with false

       light, or what information was fabricated or fraudulent. Nevertheless, we find no real attempt in

       the second amended complaint to overcome the defects cited in the trial court’s order and the

       defendants’ motions to dismiss. Although it removed some counts and changed some verbiage, its

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       factual allegations were largely identical to those of the first amended complaint. Most of the

       allegations it added were conclusory legal allegations, not facts. It did attach three exhibits but

       made no effort to allege facts showing how these exhibits supported the claims pled.

¶ 46        In light of the above, along with the absence of any argument by the plaintiff that she could

       state any viable cause of action if allowed an additional chance to replead, we hold that dismissal

       of the action with prejudice is proper. See OnTap Premium Quality Waters, Inc. v. Bank of

       Northern Illinois, N.A., 262 Ill. App. 3d 254, 265 (1994) (dismissal with prejudice was proper

       where factual basis and counts pled in second amended complaint remained substantially

       unchanged from prior dismissed complaints); Schiller v. Mitchell, 357 Ill. App. 3d 435, 453 (2005)

       (dismissal of second amended complaint with prejudice affirmed). Here, the plaintiff was given

       three opportunities to allege an actionable wrong on the part of the defendants, and we find no

       indication in this case that the plaintiff could plead or prove any set of facts entitling her to recovery

       if given a fourth.

¶ 47                                           B. Denial of Sanctions

¶ 48        The plaintiff’s second principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying her

       motion for pleading sanctions against defendant Stuckly and his attorney and in refusing to hold

       an evidentiary hearing on that motion. The plaintiff’s motion sought to impose sanctions under

       Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), which authorizes a trial court to impose

       sanctions against attorneys or parties who sign and file frivolous pleadings, motions, or other

       documents that lack a basis in law or fact. The signature of an attorney or party on such document

       constitutes a certification “that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after

       reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith

       argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed

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       No. 1-23-0154

       for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in

       the cost of litigation.” Id. The determination of whether to impose sanctions under Rule 137 rests

       within the sound discretion of the trial court; its decision to impose or deny sanctions is entitled to

       great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Benson v. Stafford,

       407 Ill. App. 3d 902, 928-29 (2010).

¶ 49        After setting forth the relevant legal standards for sanctions under Rule 137, the entirety of

       the argument on this point in the plaintiff’s appellate brief is as follows:

                    “Plaintiff’s Motion and the incorporated Exhibits detailed a litany of improper actions

              taken by Mr. Walsh during his representation of Defendant Stuckly herein. Even without

              development of further facts, the pleadings and attached Exhibits made clear that sanctions

              were appropriate.

                    The Circuit Court erred in disregarding Mr. Walsh’s purposeful violation of the

              provisions of the Civil Practice Act, Supreme Court Rules and the Circuit Court’s own

              Orders and not sanctioning Mr. Walsh and Mr. Stuckly.”

¶ 50        Defendant Stuckly contends that this is an “inadequate and undeveloped argument” which

       we should deem forfeited. We agree that forfeiture would be appropriate here, as the incorporation

       by reference of a trial court brief does not satisfy the requirement that an appellant’s argument be

       set forth in his or her opening brief. See Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010) (citing

       People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 413-14 (1995)); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 51        However, even overlooking the forfeiture we can easily conclude that the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for pleading sanctions. The situation

       presented here was unusual, in which a plaintiff was seeking pleading sanctions against a defendant

       despite the dismissal of the plaintiff’s own action at the pleading stage. The eight “sanctionable

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       actions” set forth in the plaintiff’s motion largely involve procedural infractions, such as the failure

       to serve documents properly and the filing of motions that were not procedurally proper. They also

       include actions such as “name calling” and making alleged misrepresentations or misleading

       statements. The trial court, being familiar with this case after having presided over it for several

       years, was in a far better position than this court to evaluate whether the acts of defendant’s counsel

       were improper and to determine whether they were efforts at harassment, delay, or increasing the

       cost of litigation. Having reviewed the plaintiff’s motion, the attached exhibits, and the record in

       its entirety, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling that neither defendant Stuckly nor his counsel

       violated Rule 137 in this case.

¶ 52        We further reject the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an

       evidentiary hearing on the motion for sanctions. A trial court has the discretion to determine that

       an evidentiary hearing is not necessary for it to deny a motion for pleading sanctions. Shea, Rogal

       & Associates, Ltd. v. Leslie Volkswagen, Inc., 250 Ill. App. 3d 149, 154-55 (1993); accord Reverse

       Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Rahman, 2017 IL App (1st) 161035, ¶ 33. The plaintiff argues that an

       evidentiary hearing was necessary for the trial court to determine how defendant Stuckly’s counsel

       came to represent him after another attorney employed by Stuckly’s homeowner’s insurance

       carrier had already filed an appearance on his behalf. We disagree that an evidentiary hearing was

       necessary for this purpose, and we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in declining to hold

       an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 53                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 54        For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 55        Affirmed.

¶ 56        JUSTICE PUCINSKI, specially concurring:

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¶ 57        I reluctantly concur in the majority’s analysis and decision. Discourse in election campaigns

       has taken a decidedly ugly turn, and all courts should take seriously the damaging effect of social

       media, fake media, misuse of personal information, hijacked photographs and other campaign

       material which is designed simply to malign an opponent with half truths and untrue

       statements. To be sure, voters are entitled to know the good, the bad and the ugly about candidates

       for election and political activists. But things have gotten out of hand when police reports, which

       would not be evidence in a court, are purposefully used in a smear campaign. And, to morph

       addiction to pain killers into being a “drug addict” brings the normal connotation of addiction to

       illegal drugs, which is decidedly not correct in this case. I concur only because the second amended

       complaint did not provide the specificity necessary to properly bring the elements of plaintiff’s

       case to the attention of the trial court or to this panel of the appellate court.

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