Court Opinion

ID: 9670406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:19:57.909669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:30.165623
License: Public Domain

*39Judge Allen
dissented on the basis that he believed § 3145 did not apply to a suit between two insurers, one of which paid the policyholder under the mistaken belief that the injured party had no other insurance. Judge Allen was persuaded by the argument that such a suit was an action for indemnity rather than an action for personal injury protection benefits. Thus, the limitation period began to run either on the date the mistake was discovered or on the date the payment was made. The dissent stressed that the insurance company that paid benefits was not at fault for erroneously believing that its policyholder had no other insurance.
In Federal Kemper Ins Co v Western Ins Cos, 97 Mich App 204; 293 NW2d 765 (1980), a person was injured while he was a passenger in a vehicle insured by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant was also potentially liable because the defendant insured the injured person’s brother, with whom the injured person resided. Although the accident occurred in 1973, the plaintiff did not file suit against the defendant until 1976. Citing Home Ins Co, this Court held that the plaintiff’s claim for subrogation was barred by the one-year statute of limitations period contained in § 3145. This Court noted that the plaintiff knew all along that the defendant was denying liability, but waited almost three years to file suit. Such an action would have barred the injured person’s ability to recover. Since the subrogated insurer has no greater rights than its insured, the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Home Ins Co and Federal Kemper Ins Co were followed in Michigan Mutual Ins Co v Home Mutual Ins Co, 108 Mich App 274; 310 NW2d 362 (1981). As in both of those cases, the plaintiff in Michigan Mutual Ins Co knew of its potential *40claim against the defendant in April, 1978, but did not file suit until April, 1980. This Court held that the plaintiffs suit was barred by § 1345.
We find the conclusion and most of the reasoning in Judge Allen’s dissent in Keller to be persuasive although we disagree that the doctrine of indemnity as used in tort law was applicable. The cause of action brought by Wausau against Lake States was for recoupment of money paid by mistake. It should not be characterized as subrogation, nor should it be characterized as indemnity as used in tort law. It is indemnity in the sense of seeking a return of money paid by mistake. It is clear in our law that payments of money, although voluntarily made, if made under a mistake of a material fact, may be recovered, even if the mistake is due to a lack of investigation. Montgomery Ward & Co v Williams, 330 Mich 275; 47 NW2d 607 (1951).
Section 3145 applies only to actions to recover personal injury protection benefits and does not apply to an action for recovery of money paid by mistake. The recovery of money paid by mistake is a common law cause of action that was not abrogated by the no-fault act. Adams v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 154 Mich App 186, 195; 397 NW2d 262 (1986). Therefore, a suit to recover money paid by mistake is not governed by the one-year statute of limitations period contained in § 3145.
The next question is what statute of limitations governs in a case of a first insurer bringing an action against a second insurer for benefits that were mistakenly paid by the first insurer and which should have been paid by the second. As the Revised Judicature Act does not contain a specific statute of limitations to cover such a situation, the general six-year statute of limitations of MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813 governing actions not *41covered by specific statutes of limitation is applicable. Wausau commenced suit against Lake States well within the six-year period.
Equity dictates this result. The purpose of the no-fault statute is to establish a scheme whereby a person injured in a motor vehicle accident would promptly receive payments of his claim for economic losses from an insurer who received compensation, in the form of premiums, to assume the risk of having to pay the claim. Madden received payment of his claim to his satisfaction. The purpose of the no-fault statute will be fulfilled when an adjudication has been made that the insurance company that received the premiums in return for accepting the risks pays those benefits according to the priorities set forth in MCL 500.3114(1); MSA 24.13114(1) and MCL 500.3114(4); MSA 24.13114(4).
Wausau also argues that (1) the statute of limitations period contained in § 3145 was tolled and (2) the statute of limitations period in § 3145 did not begin to run until Wausau discovered or should have discovered the existence of its cause of action against Lake States. Since we hold that the § 3145 statute of limitations period does not apply to the present case, we will not address these issues.
The order of the circuit court dismissing Wausau’s third-party complaint against Lake States is reversed and this case is remanded for reinstatement of Wausau’s complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
G. R. McDonald J., concurred.