Court Opinion

ID: 9807862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:18:16.007925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:53.993081
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
(concurring): As I concurred in the judgment of this Court, reported in 120 N. C., 551, I think it proper to say that, after a more careful consideration of the princples involved, I fully concur in the present opinion of the court, holding that there was no error in the trial below. As my opinion then was erroneous, I am glad to correct the error at the earliest possible moment, to prevent its becoming incorporated in the jurisprudence of our State. It is true that this Court will, on rehearing, reverse its deliberate judgment only for the gi’avest reasons, because it stands as a decided case ; but, when the petition appeals to the conscience of the Court,' while a rehearing is a matter of legal discretion, it is of moral right. As said by Judge Pearson, flos judicum, in his dissenting opinion in Gas-*998kill v. King, 34 N. C., 211, “Let a case be taken, as settling the law, prima facie; but if it is shown not to be supported by principle and the “reason of the thing, ’ let it be overruled — the sooner the better ; for, if the error is allowed to spread, it may insinuate itself into so many parts and become so much ramified as to make it impossible to eradicate it, without doing more harm than good. But it the seed has not spread too much, pull it up and throw it away.”
The two railway companies had taken possession of part of a public street, on which they had laid four tracks, not for the convenience of the public, but purely for their own benefit. The plaintiff was not a trespasser, nor even a licensee ; he was there by right, fully as much so as the defendant. If the defendant had increased the danger of travelling a public highway by its own act, it hau by that act imposed upon itself a greater degree of care. It cannot be heard to say that it has made the highway so dangerous as to impose upon the plaintiff so high a degree of care as practically to defeat his recovery no matter how great its own negligence. The plaintiff was between the tracks on the usual walk, and stepped upon the adjoining track to avoid the escaping steam of an engine, which of course drowned any ordinary sound. He testified that he saw the car that struck him, but did not think it was moving, as no bell was being rung and no light was on the car. The jury apparently believed him. Under these circumstances we must affirm the judgment below or overrule our own decisions in the cases of Hinkle, Lloyd, Stanley and Purnell. The charge of the court was full and presented the case to the jury fairly and intelligibly. The facts were found by them under proper instructions, and I now see no reason to disturb their verdict.