Court Opinion

ID: 9891017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 13:06:41.099343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:40.765673
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                       STATE V. RUDLOFF

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                                STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
                                                V.

                                SHAWN S. RUDLOFF, APPELLANT.

                            Filed October 17, 2023.    No. A-23-178.

        Appeal from the District Court for Sioux County: TRAVIS P. O’GORMAN, Judge, on appeal
thereto from the County Court for Sioux County: RUSSELL W. HARFORD, Judge. Judgment of
District Court affirmed.
       Bell Island, of Island Law Office, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
       Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and P. Christian Adamski for appellee.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and ARTERBURN, Judges.
       PIRTLE, Chief Judge.
                                       INTRODUCTION
       Shawn S. Rudloff appeals the decision of the district court for Sioux County to affirm the
order of the county court for Sioux County which denied his motion for absolute discharge on
speedy trial grounds. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
                                        BACKGROUND
       On September 21, 2021, the State filed a complaint against Rudloff charging him with one
count of driving under the influence of alcohol; second offense. After arraignment, Rudloff filed
a motion to quash and a motion to suppress on January 7, 2022. The court denied the motion to
quash on the same day but did not rule on the motion to suppress until March 21. On May 3,

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Rudloff filed a motion to modify conditions of bond. The court issued its order on that motion on
May 4.
        On April 11, 2022, the State requested a trial date of May 23, 24, or 31. The court set trial
for May 31 in Sioux County, Nebraska. However, following the trial date being set, the State
informed the court that one of its key witnesses would not be available on that date. This witness,
Erienne TeSelle, was the forensic scientist who conducted Rudloff’s blood alcohol test.
        On April 19, 2022, the State filed a motion to continue the May 31 trial date. A hearing
was held on May 6. At this hearing, the State offered three affidavits into evidence. Two of these
affidavits were from TeSelle where she indicated that she was unavailable to testify on May 31.
She stated she was observing the Memorial Day holiday at a family event in St. Louis, Missouri,
and would be unable to travel to Sioux County, Nebraska, the following day. She went on to state
that she would be available to testify on June 28. The third affidavit came from the prosecuting
attorney. He stated that TeSelle was a material witness because she was responsible for testing
Rudloff’s blood sample for its alcohol content. He continued to state that he had used due diligence
in making TeSelle available to testify and succeeded in making her available on June 28. On the
same day of the hearing, May 6, the court granted the State’s motion to continue over Rudloff’s
objections. A new trial date was set for June 28.
        On June 17, 2022, Rudloff filed a motion for absolute discharge asserting the speedy trial
clock had run. The county court denied the motion and calculated the excludable time for Rudloff’s
speedy trial clock. It found that absent any excludable time, the clock would have run on March
21, 2022; 180 days after his complaint was filed. However, there were 73 days between Rudloff
filing his motion to suppress and the court ruling on it. This pushed the expiration date for his
speedy trial clock back to June 2, 2022. Although the court’s order did not decide whether
Rudloff’s motion to modify bond conditions tolled the clock, it indicated that it was
inconsequential. Because the original trial date had been set for May 31, 2022, it did not matter
whether the motion to modify bond conditions pushed the expiration date back one day to June 3.
        The court went on to state that if TeSelle had been available on May 31, that trial would
have been within Rudloff’s speedy trial time frame. Because the State showed “good cause as to
both the materiality and unavailability of [TeSelle],” the time between either June 2 or June 3 until
the rescheduled trial date of June 28 would be excluded.
        Rudloff appealed this decision to the district court. In affirming the county court’s decision,
the district court calculated the number of excludable periods. It first agreed that the period related
to Rudloff’s motion to suppress, January 7 until March 21, tolled the clock for 73 days. It then
concluded Rudloff’s motion to modify bond conditions tolled the clock for an additional day. It
also found the State’s motion to continue was properly granted and the period from May 31, when
the original trial was set to occur, until June 17, when the motion to discharge was filed, was
properly excluded.
        Finally, after indicating there was no dispute as to the materiality of TeSelle’s testimony
for the State’s case, the district court agreed the State showed due diligence in obtaining her
testimony. It stated:
        The State immediately moved to continue on April 19, 2022[,] after learning that the
        material witness would not be available on that date. The hearing on the motion to continue
        was heard on May 6, 2022. The motion to continue was properly granted and the trial was

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        set for June 28, 2022[,] when all parties, the witnesses and the Court were available. Due
        diligence was exercised.

                                    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
       Rudloff assigns that the district court erred in affirming the denial of his motion for absolute
discharge.
                                     STANDARD OF REVIEW
       Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on
speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous. State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616, 961 N.W.2d 539 (2021).
                                             ANALYSIS
         Rudloff contends that he was entitled to discharge because the State violated his statutory
right to a speedy trial. The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207
and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016). State v. Billingsley, supra. Under § 29-1207(1), “[e]very person
indicted or informed against for any offense shall be brought to trial within six months.” State v.
Billingsley, supra. Section 29-1207(2) generally provides that the six-month period shall
commence to run from the date the indictment is returned or the information filed. State v.
Billingsley, supra.
         However, certain periods of delay are excluded from the speedy trial calculation. Section
29-1207(4)(a) excludes all time between the time of the filing of a defendant’s pretrial motions
and their final disposition. State v. Billingsley, supra. In addition, § 29-1207(4)(c) excludes certain
periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney.
State v. Billingsley, supra. Pursuant to that section, a period of delay due to the unavailability of
material evidence is excludable provided that the prosecuting attorney demonstrates they
“exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence” and that “there are reasonable grounds to believe
that such evidence will be available at the later date.” § 29-1207(4)(c)(i).
         To calculate the time for statutory speedy trial purposes, “a court must exclude the day the
complaint was filed, count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under
§ 29-1207(4) to determine the last day the defendant can be tried.” State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb.
at 621, 961 N.W.2d at 543. The State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under § 29-1207(4). State v.
Billingsley, supra. As provided in § 29-1208, if a defendant is not brought to trial before the
running of the time for trial as provided for in § 29-1207, as extended by excluded periods, he or
she shall be entitled to his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged. State v. Billingsley,
supra.
         As his sole assignment of error, Rudloff argues the district court erred in affirming the
county court’s denial of his motion for absolute discharge. Rudloff does not dispute that TeSelle’s
testimony was material to the State’s case. Instead, he argues the period from when the trial was
originally set on May 31, 2022, until the rescheduled date of June 28, 2022, should not have been

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excluded because the State failed to exercise due diligence in making sure its witness was available
before setting a trial date.
        We begin by determining the expiration date of Rudloff’s speedy trial clock while factoring
in excludable periods. The complaint was filed on September 21, 2021. Excluding the date the
complaint was filed, counting forward 6 months and backing up one day leaves March 21, 2022,
as the expiration date if there were no excludable periods. However, there were two excludable
periods prior to the State’s motion to continue. Section 29-1207(4)(a) clearly states that periods of
delay resulting from a defendant’s filing of pretrial motions are excludable. The statute lists both
motions to suppress and motions to quash as examples of applicable pretrial motions.
§ 29-1207(4)(a). For delays due to a defendant’s pretrial motion, the excludable period commences
on the day immediately after the filing of the pretrial motion and ends on the date the motion is
granted or denied. State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (2009). Rudloff filed motions
to suppress and quash on January 7. While the motion to quash was decided on the same day, the
motion to suppress was not ruled on until March 21, 2022. This leaves a 73-day excludable period.
Excluding the 73-day delay, the new expiration date for Rudloff’s speedy trial clock became June
2, 2022.
        Rudloff then filed a motion to modify conditions of bond on May 3, 2022. The court ruled
on this motion the next day, May 4. While a motion to modify conditions of bond is not explicitly
listed within § 29-1207(4)(a)’s list of pretrial motions that toll the speedy trial clock, “Nebraska
appellate courts have held in numerous cases that pretrial motions not specifically enumerated in
§ 29-1207(4)(a) still constitute excludable time.” State v. Webb, 311 Neb. 694, 702, 974 N.W.2d
317, 323 (2022). In Webb, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that several pretrial motions
initiated excludable periods. These motions included a motion to disclose intent to use evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, a motion to disclose intent to use evidence of prior convictions
for impeachment, a motion to allow the defendant to wear civilian clothing when in the presence
of the jury and a motion to remove the defendant’s restraints when in the presence of the jury. Id.
We see no reason why a motion to modify conditions of bond should be treated differently.
Therefore, the one-day period between Rudloff filing his motion and the county court ruling on it
constitutes an excludable period. This pushed the expiration of his speedy trial clock to June 3,
2022.
        With that determination, we now decide whether Rudloff’s motion for absolute discharge
was properly denied. We agree that it was. As stated, § 29-1207(4)(c) excludes:
        The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting
        attorney, if:
                 (i) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to
        the state's case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such
        evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will be available
        at the later date. . . .

       We agree that the affidavits offered by the State satisfy the requirements of
§ 29-1207(4)(c). The affidavits of TeSelle and the prosecutor demonstrated the need for a
continuance due to the unavailability of TeSelle, a material witness. They explain that TeSelle was

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the individual who conducted the testing of Rudloff’s blood sample. In a criminal action for driving
under the influence, the witness that conducted such testing is clearly a material witness.
         Further, the affidavits demonstrate the prosecution exercised due diligence in securing
TeSelle as a witness as well as reasonable grounds to believe that her testimony would be available
at a later date. The State discovered that TeSelle was not going to be available 7 weeks before the
scheduled trial date and sought to change the date somewhere around a week after it was set.
TeSelle’s affidavit specified her absence was due to her being out of the state the day prior to the
trial and having insufficient time to travel to Sioux County, Nebraska. Further, the prosecutor’s
affidavit indicated that the increased time before trial was not only due to TeSelle’s busy schedule,
but also the other witnesses’ schedules, his schedule, and the defense counsel’s schedule. As the
problem was identified well in advance of the original trial date and measures were promptly taken
to secure the availability of TeSelle’s testimony, we find the State exercised due diligence. Further,
TeSelle’s affidavit provided that she would be available to provide testimony on June 28, 2022.
This sufficiently established reasonable grounds to believe that her testimony would be available
at that later date. With these findings, the period of delay related to the State’s motion to continue
was properly excluded and Rudloff’s motion for absolute discharge was properly denied.
         While we agree with the district court that the motion for absolute discharge was properly
denied, we disagree with the district court’s calculation of excludable time. The district court
articulated the excludable period related to the State’s motion to continue began on May 31, 2022,
the original trial date, and extended until June 17, when Rudloff filed his motion for absolute
discharge. This is incorrect. The calculation of excludable time for a continuance begins the day
after the continuance is granted and includes the day on which the continuance ends. State v.
Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019). Therefore, the excludable period related to the
continuance began on May 7, the day after it was granted, and would have ended upon the start of
the trial on June 28. But Rudloff’s motion for absolute discharge, filed on June 17, was an
independent tolling action that tolled the clock past the June 28 trial date. Therefore, the excludable
period began on May 7 and extended past the timely trial date set for June 28.
         However, this calculation error is inconsequential because Rudloff waived his right to a
speedy trial. In State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (2014), the Supreme Court
found that the defendant waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by filing a motion and an appeal
that resulted in any future trial date being set beyond the statutory six-month speedy trial period.
Rudloff filed his motion for absolute discharge on June 17, 2022. This motion and its subsequent
appeal resulted in the proceedings extending beyond the statutory six-month trial period. Because
Rudloff’s motion resulted in the continuance of a timely trial date outside the statutory 6-month
period, he has waived his statutory right to a speedy trial. Once a defendant has waived his statutory
right to a speedy trial, “an exact calculation of days remaining on the speedy trial clock is no longer
required.” Id. at 684, 844 N.W.2d at 684. Considering Rudloff’s waiver, it is not necessary to
calculate the amount of time remaining to bring him to trial under § 29-1207.
                                          CONCLUSION
       We affirm the judgment of the district court affirming the county court’s denial of
Rudloff’s motion for absolute discharge.
                                                                                AFFIRMED.

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