Court Opinion

ID: 9559438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:29:07.517843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:59.727522
License: Public Domain

Wertz, J.
(dissenting): I am unable to agree with the majority opinion that the answers to the special questions in this case were contrary to the general verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
In considering this matter we must bear in mind the often-repeated rule of this court that a general verdict imports a finding in favor of the prevailing party upon all issues in the case not inconsistent with the special findings, and nothing will be presumed in favor of the special findings. They shall be given such a construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony with the general verdict. (Kitchen v. Lasley Co., 186 Kan. 24, 29, 348 P. 2d 588; Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 736, 324 P. 2d 142; King v. Vets Cab, Inc., 179 Kan. 379, 384, 295 P. 2d 605, 56 A. L. R. 2d 1249; Cain v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P. 2d 909; Hubbard v. Allen, 168 Kan. 695, 701, 215 P. 2d 647.) In considering answers of the jury to the special questions, the court is not permitted to isolate one answer and ignore others, but all are to be considered together, and if one interpretation leads to inconsistency and another to harmony with the general verdict, the latter is to be adopted. In order to sustain a motion for judgment on the findings it is not sufficient that there be some inconsistency among the findings; they must be so contrary to the general verdict as to clearly compel the court to overthrow the verdict and render a contrary verdict as a matter of law. (Creten v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rld. Co., 184 Kan. 387, 400, 337 P. 2d 1003; Sparks v. Guaranty State *289Bank, 182 Kan. 165, 168, 318 P. 2d 1062; Snyder v. City of Concordia, 182 Kan. 268, 320 P. 2d 820; Dick’s Transfer Co. v. Miller, 154 Kan. 574, 119 P. 2d 454; Lee v. Gas Service Company, 166 Kan. 285, 288, 201 P. 2d 1023.) It is another well-established rule in this state that a general finding in the nature of a conclusion, if contradicted by special or detailed findings, cannot prevail but are controlled by, and must yield to, such detailed findings of ultimate facts. (Harrison v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., 156 Kan. 492,134 P. 2d 681.)
An analysis of this case, under the foregoing rules, will show that the answers given to the special questions asked are in harmony with the general verdict. Defendants motion for judgment on the answers to the special questions notwithstanding the general verdict concedes, for that purpose, that the answers are supported by the evidence. (Cain v. Steely, supra.)
As can be seen by the answer to question No. 1, the jury found that the defendant company was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. In response to question No. 2, the jury found that the specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant were the putting of the power lines over private property and the failure to post warning signs. In response to question No. 3, the jury found the plaintiff negligent, and in its answer to question No. 4, found that plaintiff’s negligence was the failure to use ordinary care for his own safety.
In the case of Hultberg v. Phillippi, 169 Kan. 610, 220 P. 2d 208, this court was confronted with a similar situation as here presented. In that case one of the questions to the jury and the answer thereto was as follows:
“7. Did Mrs. Hultberg [plaintiff], by her negligence, contribute to her injury?
“Answer: Yes.”
In that case the defendant contended that the answer definitely settled the question of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence and barred recovery. This court said:
“We cannot agree. In the first place, the question calls for a conclusion of the jury as a matter of law rather than a finding on a specific question of fact. It is definitely general in character and is purely in the nature of a conclusion. Such general finding or conclusion, if contradicted by detailed findings, cannot prevail, but is controlled by and must yield to the special or *290detailed findings of ultimate facts. (Citing Harrison v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., supra.)”
The answer given to question No. 3 in the instant case is the same as that answer given in the Hultberg case.
The ordinary definition of negligence is lack of due diligence or care, and a legal definition is that it is failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand. The negligence found must have been the proximate or legal cause of the injury to bar recovery. (Rowell v. City of Wichita, 162 Kan. 294, 300,176 P. 2d 590.) The answer given by the jury in the instant case in response to question No. 4 was nothing more than a definition of negligence, and under these circumstances it must be considered a conclusion of law. No specific acts of the plaintiff that would constitute contributory negligence were given by the jury. No question was asked whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, and the general verdict for the plaintiff imports a finding such negligence was not a proximate cause of the injury.
Early in the history of Kansas this court recognized that the plaintiff’s fault must also proximately contribute to his injury in order to constitute any grounds of defense. (Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466, 472; K. P. Rly. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37, 38.) Even though the plaintiff was negligent, if the negligence of the defendant was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff would be allowed to recover. (Pacific Rid. Co. v. Houts, 12 Kan. 328.) This principle has been recognized and approved by text writers. In 3 Cooley on Torts, § 486, p. 413, (4th ed.) it is stated:
“The negligence that will defeat a recovery must be such as proximately contributed to the injury. The remote cause will no more be noticed as a ground of defense than as a ground of recovery.” (Emphasis supplied.)
(See also, 1 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence, §61, p. 153, [6th ed. 1913].)
Cases in this jurisdiction are replete with the general rule that in order to bar the plaintiff’s recovery it is necessary that his negligence contribute to and be a proximate cause of his injury. In the case of Losey v. Railway Co., 84 Kan. 224, 231, 114 Pac. 198, it is stated:
“In order to constitute contributory negligence it must be the proximate cause of the injury . . .; that is, one without which the injury would not have occurred. (Citing authorities.) ” (Emphasis supplied.)
*291Hutchens v. McClure, 176 Kan. 43, 47, 269 P. 2d 473, states:
“Negligence to bar the plaintiff from recovery must contribute to and be the proximate cause of the injury complained of.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Scott v. Bennett, 181 Kan. 410, 415, 312 P. 2d 224, this court stated:
“The jury simply found that the plaintiff was guilty of not checking traffic, thoroughly but that such fact did not contribute to the accident as a proximate cause. One may be guilty of negligence and still not be barred from recovery, under such circumstances.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The latest approval by this court of the general rule that the negligence of the plaintiff will not bar his recovery unless it is the proximate cause of his injury was expressed in the case of Jefferson v. Clark, 190 Kan. 520, 523, 376 P. 2d 923. There two instructions in that case were under consideration by the court. Those instructions and the comments made by this court in regard to them are set out as follows:
“ ‘Instruction No. 24.
“ ‘By “contributory negligence” is meant the failure on the part of one who sustains injuries to use ordinary care for his own safety and by reason of which he helped to cause or bring about the injuries complained of, but for which contributory negligence at the time and place complained of the injuries would not have occurred. The burden of proving such contributory negligence is upon the person urging that claim. Contributory negligence is never presumed.
“ ‘Instruction No. 25.
“ ‘One seeking to recover damages from another upon the grounds of negligence is barred from such recovery when his own negligence contributes directly and proximately to his injuries. If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the plaintiff was the direct and proximate cause of the collision, your verdict should be for the defendant.’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“The two instructions cover much the same ground and actually are somewhat inconsistent. This inconsistency goes to the matter of defining proximate cause and under what circumstances contributory negligence is the proximate cause. We believe that instruction No. 24 is inaccurate and contrary to instruction No. 25 which seems to be the rule applied in this state.”
The rule that the negligence of the plaintiff in order to bar his recovery must be the proximate cause of his injury is based on justice and logic. Application of the rules of negligence and proximate cause should be consistent. In the case of Concannon, Administrator v. Taylor, 190 Kan. 687, 378 P. 2d 82, this court affirmed a verdict for the defendant. In that case the jury found the de*292fendant was negligent but his negligence was not the proximate cause of the deceased’s- injury and therefore was not liable in damages. If a defendant is negligent but such negligence is not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury and defendant is therefore not liable for damages it would then follow that where a plaintiff is negligent but such negligence is not found to be the proximate cause of his injury he should not be barred from recovery.
Proximate cause has been defined many times in this jurisdiction. In the case of Rowell v. City of Wichita, 162 Kan. 294, 301, 176 P. 2d 590, it is stated:
“In the multitude of decisions there are many definitions of the term ‘proximate cause’ but one of the most widely quoted is that the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. The proximate cause is an essential element of liability for negligence. Negligence, no matter of what it may consist, cannot create a cause of action, unless it is the proximate cause of the injury of which the complaint is made. (Citing cases.)” (Emphasis supplied.)
We may justifiably add, nor can negligence bar recovery unless such negligence is the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
An examination of the answers to questions No. 1 and No. 2 shows the jury found the defendant company was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the injuries of the plaintiff and that the defendant’s negligence consisted of the specific acts of putting its lines over private property and not posting signs. In response to questions No. 3 and No. 4 the jury found the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence was the failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. We again repeat that there were no specific acts of negligence on the part of the plaintiff given by the jury. When considered in the light of the general verdict, it is inherent that the jury felt that although the plaintiff was negligent, his negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries-, and that the negligence of the defendant alone was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. When the answers to the questions are given this construction, they are in harmony with the general verdict. I find nothing in the answers to the special questions that compels the overthrowing of the general verdict, and the general verdict should control. Moreover, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor for $5,000. Under our former opinion (Henderson v. Kansas *293Power & Light Co,, 188 Kan. 283, 362 P. 2d 60) the trial court should have granted a new trial because of the failure of the verdict to fairly compensate the plaintiff for his grevious personal injuries sustained.
I am of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Robb, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.