Court Opinion

ID: 8786315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 13:35:52.118947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:03:05.658390
License: Public Domain

CARPENTER, District Judge
(after stating the- facts as above). [1] A personal name, such as “Borden,” is not susceptible of exclusive appropriation, and even its registration in the Patent Office cannot make it a valid trade-mark. Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, 198 U. S. 134, 25 Sup. Ct. 609, 49 L. Ed. 972; Elgin Natl. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665, 21 Sup. Ct. 270, 45 L. Ed. 365; Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169, 16 Sup. Ct. 1002, 41 L. Ed. 118; Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540, 11 Sup. Ct. 625, 35 L. Ed. 247.
There is. no charge made in the bill that the appellants are infringing, or propose to infringe, upon any technical trade-mark of the appellee, so we may dismiss any claim for relief upon that score.
[2] The only theory upon which the injunction in this case can be sustained is upon that known as unfair competition. Relief against unfair competition is granted solely upon the ground that one who has built up a good will and reputation for his goods or business is entitled to all of the resultant benefits. Good will or business popularity is property, and, like other property, will be protected against fraudulent invasion.
The question to be determined in every case of unfair competition is whether or not, as a matter of fact, the name used by the defendant had come previously to indicate and designate the complainant’s goods. Or, to put it in another way, whether the defendant, as a matter of fact, is, by his conduct, passing off his goods as the complainant’s goods, or his business as the complainant’s business.
[4] It has been said that the universal test question in cases of this class is whether the public is likely to be deceived as to the maker or seller of the goods. This, in our opinion, is not the fundamental question. The deception of the public naturally tends to injure the proprietor of a business by diverting his customers and depriving him of sales which otherwise he might have made. This, rather than the protection of the public against imposition, is the sound and true basis for the private remedy. That the public is deceived may be evidence of the fact that the original proprietor’s rights are being invaded. If, however, the rights of the original proprietor are in no wise interfered with, the deception of the public is no concern of a court of chancery. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281, 43 C. C. A. 233, 50 L. R. A. 609.
*514Doubtless it is morally wrong for a person to proclaim, or even intimate, that his goods are manufactured by some other and well-known concern; but this does not give rise to a private right of action, unless the property rights of that concern are interfered with. The use by the new company of the name “Borden” may have been with fraudulent intent; and, even assuming that it was, the trial court had no right to interfere, unless the property rights of the old company were jeopardized. Nothing else being shown, a court of equity cannot punish an unorthodox or immoral, or even dishonest, trader; it cannot enforce as such the police power of the state.
In the case now under our consideration the old company '(the appellee) never has manufactured what is known as commercial ice cream. The new company (the appellant) was incorporated for the sole purpose of manufacturing and putting on the market such an article.
Nonexclusive trade-names are public property in their primary sense, but they may in their secondary sense come to be understood as indicating the goods or business of a particular trader. Such trade-names are acquired by adoption and user, and belong to the one who first used them and gave them value in a specific line of business. It is true that the name of a person may become so associated with his goods or business that another person of the same or a similar name engaging in the same business will not be allowed to use even his own name, without affirmatively distinguishing his goods or business.
The secondary meaning of a name, however, has no legal significance, unless the two persons make or deal in the same kind of goods. Clearly the appellants here could make gloves, or plows, or cutlery, under the' name “Borden” without infringing upon any property right of the old company. If that is true, they can make anything under the name “Borden” which the appellee has not already made and offered to the public. George v. Smith (C. C.) 52 Fed. 830.
[3] The name “Borden,” until appellants came into the field, never had been associated with commercial ice cream. By making commercial ice cream the appellants do not come into competition with the appellee. In the absence of competition, the old company cannot assert the rights accruing from what has been-designated as the secondary meaning of the word “Borden.” The phrase “unfair competition” presupposes competition of some sort. In the absence of competition the doctrine cannot be invoked.
There being no competition between the appellants and appellee, we are confronted with the proposition that the appellee, in order to succeed on this appeal, has and can enforce a proprietary right to the name “Borden” in any kind of business, to the exclusion of all the world.
It is urged that appellee has power, under its charter, to make commercial ice cream, and that it intends some da.y to do so. If such intention can be protected at this time, it might well be that appellee, having enjoined appellants from making commercial ice cream, would rest content with selling its evaporated milk to ice cream dealers, and *515never itself manufacture the finished product. But, as was well stated by Judge Coxe, in George v. Smith, supra:
“It is the party who uses it first as a brand for his goods, and builds up a business under it, who is entitled to protection, and not the one who first thought of using it on similar goods, but did not use it. The law deals with acts and not intentions.”
Appellee also urges that it makes and sells large quantities of evaporated or condensed milk to manufacturers of ice cream, and that if the appellants are permitted to use the name “Borden” in the ice cream business dealers probably will believe that its ice cream is made by appellee, and will in consequence buy the finished product rather than the component parts, and that appellee’s sales of evaporated or condensed milk will fall off, to its manifest damage. Such result would be too speculative and remote to form the basis of an order restraining men from using in their business any personal name, especially their own.
Appellee is in this position: If it bases its right to an injunction upon the doctrine of unfair competition, no competition of any kind has been shown by the record. If it relies upon some supposed damage which may result from appellants’ use of the name “Borden” in connection with inferior goods, the action is premature, because the appellants, as yet, have neither sold nor made anything.
The order of the District Court must be reversed; and it is so ordered.