Court Opinion

ID: 9401262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 16:00:49.810685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.562514
License: Public Domain

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                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-14468
                         ____________________

        CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        MARCUS BROWN,
        SARITA BROWN,
        TASHA PRATCHER,
        GLOBAL PAYMENTS, INC.,
        FRONTLINE PROCESSING CORP.,

                                                Defendants-Appellees,

        CHECK & CREDIT RECOVERY, LLC,
        UNIVERSAL DEBT SOLUTIONS, LLC,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court              21-14468

        WNY SOLUTIONS GROUP, LLC,
        WNY ACCOUNT SOLUTIONS, LLC,
        CHECK & CREDIT RECOVERY, LLC,
        CREDIT POWER, LLC,
        S PAYMENT PROCESSING & SOLUTIONS, LLC,
        MOHAN BAGGA,
        VARINDERJIT BAGGA,
        SUMANT KHAN,

                                           Defendants-Cross Defendants-
                                                             Appellees,

        GLOBAL CONNECT, LLC,
        FRANCIS DAVID CORP,
        d.b.a. Electronic Merchant Systems, Inc.,

                                             Defendants-Cross Claimants-
                                                              Appellees,

        PATHFINDER PAYMENT SOLUTIONS, INC., et al.,

                                                             Defendants.

                            ____________________
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        21-14468                  Opinion of the Court                             3

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Georgia
                         D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00859-RWS
                               ____________________

        Before BRANCH and GRANT, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,∗
        District Judge.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is not
        exempt from the rules of discovery. Nonetheless, the CFPB tried
        to bring a wide-ranging civil lawsuit against 18 defendants without
        ever being deposed. When the district court ordered the CFPB to
        sit for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, the CFPB doubled down by
        engaging in dramatic abuse of the discovery process. The district
        court imposed sanctions for this misconduct.
              On appeal, the CFPB maintains that it behaved properly.
        We conclude, however, that violating the district court’s clear
        orders and derailing multiple depositions is nowhere near proper
        conduct. Thus, after careful review and with the benefit of oral
        argument, we affirm the district court’s sanctions order.
                                   I.      Background
               A.       The Underlying Lawsuit

        ∗ Honorable   Harvey Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                21-14468

               The CFPB brought this action under the Consumer
        Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”) and the Fair Debt Collection
        Practices Act (“FDCPA”) against 18 defendants for engaging in or
        substantially assisting a fraudulent debt collection scheme.
        Essentially, the CFPB alleged that several individuals “created
        limited liability companies in Georgia and New York” to
        “perpetrate a debt-collection scheme targeting millions of
        consumers.” Thirteen of the defendants were individuals, and
        their respective companies, who directly participated in the
        scheme.
               The other five defendants—the appellees here—were not
        direct operators of the scheme; rather, they simply provided
        services to the individuals who were. One appellee, Global
        Connect, LLC (“Global Connect”), allegedly provided the
        telephone broadcast services that the individual debt collectors
        used to “broadcast millions of threatening and false statements to
        consumers.” The other four appellees—Global Payments, Inc.
        (“Global Payments”), Pathfinder Payment Solutions, Inc.
        (“Pathfinder”), Frontline Processing Corp. (“Frontline”), and
        Electronic Merchant Systems (“EMS”)—allegedly provided the
        processing services that were used to “withdraw funds from the
        consumers’ accounts.”
              The CFPB alleged that these service-providing entities
        “provided substantial assistance” to the debt collectors’ “unlawful
        conduct” and engaged in “unfair acts or practices” in violation of
        the CFPA. In other words, these service-providing entities knew
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        21-14468                   Opinion of the Court                               5

        or should have known that their platforms were advancing the debt
        collectors’ unlawful conduct.
               B.      The CFPB’s Conduct During Discovery
                The CFPB’s problematic conduct began during discovery.
        At first, the CFPB objected on the following grounds when it was
        served with deposition notices pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 30(b)(6): 1 (1) it had “already . . . provided [the
        information] to [d]efendants . . . in responses to written
        interrogatories,” (2) “[d]efendants inquire[d] into topics within the
        law enforcement and deliberative process privilege,” and (3) “the
        depositions [were] an improper attempt to question [CFPB]
        counsel as to counsel’s mental impressions and analyses.” The
        district court overruled the objections, reasoning that Rule 30(b)(6)
        applies with equal force to government agencies and “factual
        matters are subject to inquiry even if those matters have been
        disclosed in interrogatory responses.”

        1Rule 30(b)(6) is the principal mechanism for deposing entities, including
        government agencies. The rule allows the entity to designate a representative
        who testifies on the agency’s behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (“The named
        organization must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing
        agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf . . . .
        The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably
        available to the organization.”). In the instant case, the service-providing
        entities sought to use 30(b)(6) depositions to uncover the factual bases for the
        CFPB’s claims against them.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                      21-14468

               Dissatisfied, the CFPB tried again to avoid providing a
        30(b)(6) representative. This time it moved for protective orders
        to reduce the scope of defendants’ questioning, relying on the same
        arguments the district court had already rejected. The court
        granted in part and denied in part the CFPB’s motions, striking the
        balance that facts—including “exculpatory facts”—were fair game
        while questioning that “would delve into Plaintiff’s trial strategy”
        was off limits.
                       1.      The First Deposition
               During the first 30(b)(6) deposition, 2 counsel for Global
        Payments met heavy resistance from the CFPB. The 359-page
        transcript reveals that the CFPB avoided answering questions
        through a number of impermissible tactics.
               First, the CFPB lodged more than 70 work product
        objections—even objecting to fact-based questions that the district
        court had instructed it to answer. For example, the CFPB objected
        to the question “[a]re you aware of any facts that Global Payments
        knew that the debt collector defendants . . . were collecting
        phantom debt?” And it objected to the yes-or-no question “[a]re
        you aware of any facts that [a pertinent document] was sent to
        Global [Payments]?” As a final and particularly egregious

        2 The CFPB designated Michael Godard, a supervisory investigator at the
        CFPB, as its 30(b)(6) representative for each deposition covered in this appeal.
        Godard spent “a little over 300 hours” preparing for the depositions by
        reviewing documents and meeting with counsel.
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        21-14468                 Opinion of the Court                          7

        example, 3 to a question asking if the deponent spoke to any
        witnesses in the case, the CFPB objected and argued that “[t]he
        identity of witnesses is work product.” These objections were
        often accompanied by an instruction for the CFPB’s witness “not
        to answer.”
                Second, the CFPB equipped its witness with so-called
        “memory aids” 4 from which the witness read verbatim for
        extended periods of time. In response to one question, for
        example, the witness read from his memory aid for more than 40
        minutes and then, after a break, continued reading for 18 minutes
        before the parties stipulated that he would have read another 93
        pages. This filibuster-style reading occurred repeatedly. And when
        Global Payments’s attorneys objected, the CFPB’s counsel would
        insist that the witness needed to finish his answer: “Let him finish
        the answer, maybe it will be [responsive].”
               Third, in response to the district court’s instruction that
        exculpatory facts were fair game, the CFPB took the position that
        it had not “identified any exculpatory facts” in the entire record.
        One illustrative back-and-forth follows:
                  [Deposing counsel]: The judge in his ruling said that
                  the [CFPB] was to provide a witness who would

        3 There are many, many more examples in the record, but we do not include
        them all in the interest of conciseness.
        4The “memory aids” were essentially lawyer-prepared scripts that were
        hundreds of pages in length.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court               21-14468

              testify as to all facts the plaintiff could reasonably
              identify as exculpatory. Are you familiar with that
              part of the judge’s ruling in your testimony here
              today?
              [CFPB’s witness]: Yes.
              [Deposing counsel]: What, if anything, did you do to
              identify exculpatory facts?
              [CFPB’s witness]: I didn’t identify any.
              [Deposing counsel]: So in the 300 hours that you
              spent preparing for this, you didn’t identify a single
              fact that was exculpatory as to Global Payments?
              ...
              [CFPB’s witness]: That’s correct.
                     2.    Telephonic Hearing with the District Court
                Because Global Payments felt it was denied the opportunity
        to conduct a meaningful deposition—and Frontline and Pathfinder
        had noticed depositions for later that week—defendants alerted the
        district court to the CFPB’s behavior. Specifically, defendants
        expressed concern with the CFPB’s repeated work-product
        objections and its witness’s complete reliance on memory aids. In
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        21-14468                     Opinion of the Court                                9

        light of these concerns, the district court conducted a telephonic
        hearing with the parties. 5
              During the hearing, the district court reiterated its guidance
        from previous orders that the CFPB’s witness must answer fact-
        based questions:
                  I think what you do is when the question is asked, you
                  look at what it goes to, and if it goes to an element of
                  the claim, then that is a fair question. If it’s asking the
                  witness to analyze it beyond offering the facts[,] then
                  you’re getting out of bounds and you’re arguably
                  getting over into work product or you’re getting into
                  questions that the witness is not qualified to answer
                  and that are subject to legitimate objections. But so
                  long as the inquiries are into facts that are within the
                  knowledge of the [CFPB] and that are within the
                  scope of the notice, then I think they’ve got to be
                  answered.
              It also reemphasized that defendants were entitled to
        question the CFPB about exculpatory facts. 6 The district court also

        5 We  appreciate that the district court did not yet have a transcript of the first
        deposition at the time of the hearing, so it had only the parties’ finger-pointing
        as evidence and was unable to analyze independently the extent of the CFPB’s
        obstructive conduct.
        6   Regarding exculpatory evidence, the district court stated:
                  I believe I have ruled the defendants are entitled to question
                  and it’s exculpatory information, and I know I’m using
                  criminal terms and we just talked about this being a civil case,
                  but evidence that would be in the possession of the [CFPB]
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                        21-14468

        indicated that memory aids were acceptable due to the voluminous
        record but regurgitating pre-written information would be
        insufficient in many cases. 7

               that would show that the defendants had not violated these
               provisions.
        7The district court described the extent to which it would permit the CFPB’s
        witness to use memory aids and when it would expect testimony with a
        “human touch”:
               [N]umber one, it’s okay for a witness to have these kinds of
               things with him or her at the time the deposition is given. It
               seems to me that this is a good faith effort on the part of CFPB
               to give what I said they had to give in denying many parts of
               the protective order and the rulings on the protective order,
               trying to make it clear that there had to be specific information
               given. It seems that these exhibits are, at least on their face, a
               good faith effort to accomplish that. At the same time, I think
               the witness needs to be prepared and versed, and Mr. Engel
               has represented in his e-mail that he does intend to have a
               witness who has been prepared to address these topics that
               require a more generalized response or a response that’s more
               of a human touch than some listing that might be contained in
               the exhibits.
        It continued: “[M]y expectation is that the [CFPB’s] witness would answer
        those questions and, for lack of a better term, the human touch questions, but
        would be prepared to answer those and to represent the position of the CFPB.”
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        21-14468                   Opinion of the Court                                11

                         3.     Subsequent 30(b)(6) Depositions
                Despite having received additional instructions from the
        district court, the CFPB continued its obstructionist conduct
        during the next four depositions. 8
               To start, the CFPB continued to object on work product
        grounds and instruct its witness not to answer even simple fact-
        based, yes-or-no, and follow-up questions. A few examples are
        instructive. 9 The CFPB raised a work product objection to the
        question “does the CFPB rely on any facts to demonstrate that
        Frontline’s practices were unfair?” The CFPB also lodged the same
        objection to the question “did you review any fact that leads you
        to the conclusion that Global Connect authored [an e-mail
        exhibit]?” And, after being shown an exhibit that arguably
        contradicted the script its witness read, the CFPB objected on work
        product grounds to the question “do you still believe [your
        testimony] was correct?” This pattern persisted throughout all four
        depositions.
               The CFPB’s witness continued to rely exclusively on
        memory aids, but the amount of time he spent reading was
        reduced because defendants’ counsel resorted to incorporating into
        the record the portions that the witness would have otherwise read

        8 In the second deposition after the hearing with the district court, Pathfinder’s

        counsel notified the CFPB that it “reserve[d] its rights to move for sanctions
        and other remedies available.”
        9   Again, we reproduce only a few of many, many examples.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                21-14468

        aloud. One example is sufficient to show the extent of the witness’s
        reliance on the memory aids and why incorporation was necessary:
              [Deposing counsel]: [I]f you and your counsel don’t
              mind, would you be willing to tell us what pages in
              [the underwriting document] you plan to read in
              providing a response to the question . . . .
              ...
              [CFPB’s witness]: So again in the underwriting
              document, I would start at Page 32 at the bottom, 33,
              34, 35, 36, and towards the end of 37. And then as far
              as the memory aid, I would not include the
              monitoring section, which starts at Page 78. Starting
              with the memory aid at Page 5. I would go 5 to 78.
              [Deposing counsel]:     Pages 5 through 78 of the
              memory aid?
              [CFPB’s witness]: Correct.
              [Deposing counsel]: So that I’m clear, do all of the
              facts at Pages 5 through 78 of the memory aid
              [address the question]?
              ...
              [CFPB’s witness]: I don’t think I can say that every
              fact within – on each page. I’d have to look through
              every fact to determine that. But I believe those pages
              would be generally responsive to your question, that
              they contain facts that would answer your question.
              [Deposing counsel]: Other than reading Pages 5
              through 78 of [the memory aid] and Pages 32 through
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        21-14468                Opinion of the Court                        13

               37 of [the underwriting document] into the record,
               are you prepared to testify about facts [pertinent to
               the question]?
               ...
               [CFPB’s witness]: Other than these documents, no.
               [Deposing counsel]: And other than reviewing the
               tracts – the tract of [the underwriting document] and
               all of [the memory aid] less monitoring provisions,
               are you prepared to testify today about any facts
               [pertinent to the question]?
               ...
               [CFPB’s witness]: My preparation to testify to those
               questions would be contained in the memory aid or
               in the underwriting summary.
               All in all, in each 30(b)(6) deposition, whether the CFPB’s
        tactic was to object at every turn, instruct its witness not to answer,
        refuse to acknowledge any exculpatory facts, or have its witness
        read extended and nonresponsive answers, the CFPB tried to game
        the system so that nothing was accomplished.
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                      21-14468

               C.      The District Court’s Sanctions Order
                Because of the CFPB’s contumacious conduct, defendants
        moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, 10 requesting that the
        district court strike the CFPB’s claims against them. 11
               The district court granted defendants’ motions, beginning
        its analysis with the rules and what conduct they covered—i.e.,
        Rule 37(b) is applicable when a party fails to “obey an order to
        provide or permit discovery” and Rule 37(d) is applicable when a
        “person designated under Rule 30(b)(6)” fails to appear for that
        person’s deposition. Under both rules, potential sanctions included
        “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

        10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits a district court to impose
        sanctions for a party’s “failure to make disclosures or to cooperate in
        discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Specifically, under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), a district
        court may issue sanctions “[i]f a party or a party’s officer, director, or
        managing agent—or a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) . . .—fails to
        obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . .” Id. at 37(b)(2)(A). And,
        under Rule 37(d), sanctions are appropriate if “a party or a party’s officer,
        director, or managing agent—or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) . . .
        —fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear for that person’s
        deposition . . . .” Id. at 37(d)(1)(A)(i).
        11  Defendants technically brought three different motions which all sought
        sanctions in the form of striking the claims against them. Considered together,
        these motions are the subject of this appeal. Pathfinder also moved for Rule
        11 sanctions against the CFPB and its counsel (seeking an award of costs and
        attorneys’ fees as well), alleging that the CFPB’s claim amounted to
        government overreach and was frivolous. The court denied this motion, and
        it is not part of this appeal.
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        21-14468                    Opinion of the Court                          15

        37(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also id. at (d)(3) (“Sanctions may include any of
        the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi).”).
                In its Rule 37(b) analysis (failure to obey a court order to
        provide or permit discovery), the court found that, despite its
        instructions that defendants were entitled to question the CFPB
        about the factual underpinnings of its claims, the CFPB “put up as
        much opposition as possible at every turn” through a two-pronged
        strategy of (1) reading from the memory aids to “bury the
        [d]efendants in so much information that it [could not] possibly
        identify, with any reasonable particularity, what support[ed] the
        CFPB’s claims,” and (2) “assert[ing] privilege objections to
        questions that the [c]ourt ha[d] repeatedly ordered to be
        answered.” Because “neither form [of opposition was] proper,” the
        district court sanctioned the CFPB under Rule 37(b), finding that
        the CFPB “demonstrate[d] a willful disregard [for] the [c]ourt’s
        instructions.”
                The district court also found that the CFPB’s witness “failed
        to appear” pursuant to Rule 37(d) because, even though he was
        physically present, he was effectively unavailable due to his
        inability to answer questions without memory aids and refusal to
        address exculpatory evidence.
              Finally, because the CFPB’s conduct was egregious, 12 and
        “the Court [was] not optimistic that reopening the depositions

        12 In addition to the
                          bad faith usage of objections and memory aids, the district
        court also found that the CFPB’s repeated insistence that there were no
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        16                            Opinion of the Court                 21-14468

        would be fruitful,” the district court granted defendants’ motions
        for Rule 37 sanctions, struck all claims against the five service-
        providing defendants, and dismissed them from the case.
                                II.      Standard of Review
               “The standard of review for a Rule 37(b) dismissal is not
        whether the reviewing court would, as an original matter, have
        dismissed the action; it is whether the district court abused its
        discretion in dismissing the action.” Aztec Steel Co. v. Fl. Steel
        Corp., 691 F.2d 480, 481 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Marshall v.
        Segona, 621 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The bandwidth of the
        District Court’s power to impose Rule 37 sanctions is broad indeed.
        We will not interfere unless . . . there has been an abuse of
        discretion.”). 13 When reviewing discovery motions, “wide
        discretion” is proper because “[a] judge’s decision as to whether a
        party or lawyer’s actions merit imposition of sanctions is heavily
        dependent on the court’s firsthand knowledge, experience, and
        observation.” Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 506 (11th Cir. 1996).
               If the district court applies an incorrect legal standard, fails
        to follow the appropriate procedures when making the relevant
        determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous,

        exculpatory facts in the voluminous record was a “bad faith attempt to
        frustrate the purpose of the [d]efendants’ depositions.”
        13 In Bonner v. City
                          of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
        this Court adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
        handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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        21-14468                  Opinion of the Court                              17

        it abuses its discretion. Lugo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 750 F.3d
        1198, 1207 (11th Cir. 2014). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous
        when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
        on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
        that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Robertson,
        493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
                                     III.    Discussion
                The district court dismissed the service-providing
        defendants after finding that the CFPB violated both Rule 37(b)—
        for failure to obey a court order to provide or permit discovery—
        and Rule 37(d)—for the witness’s failure to appear at a Rule 30(b)(6)
        deposition. We affirm because we conclude that sanctions were
        clearly permitted under Rule 37(b) and the CFPB’s discovery
        abuses were sufficiently egregious to merit dismissal; thus, the
        district court did not abuse its discretion. 14 See Aztec Steel, 691
        F.2d at 481.
               A.      Rule 37(b) Sanctions Generally
               The CFPB argues that the district court abused its discretion
        in sanctioning the CFPB under Rule 37(b) because the CFPB “made
        all reasonable efforts” to comply with the court’s unclear
        instructions. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in imposing Rule 37(b) sanctions against the CFPB

        14 We do not reach the question of whether a 30(b)(6) witness who is physically

        present but refuses to offer meaningful testimony has “failed to appear”
        pursuant to Rule 37(d).
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                      21-14468

        because it repeatedly disobeyed the district court’s instructions and
        orders regarding the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. See Aztec Steel, 691
        F.2d at 481.
               Rule 37(b) provides: “If a party or a party’s officer, director,
        or managing agent—or a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or
        31(a)(4)—fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . .
        the court where the action is pending may issue further just
        orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). “This rule gives district judges broad
        discretion to fashion appropriate sanctions for violation of
        discovery orders[.]” Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d
        1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993). “Sanctions . . . for violation of an order
        are only appropriate if ‘the order stated in specific and clear terms
        what acts were required or prohibited.’” In re Se. Banking Corp.,
        204 F.3d 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Gen.
        Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d 113, 116 (5th Cir. 1993)). But “Rule 37,
        on its face, does not require that a court formally issue an order
        compelling discovery before sanctions are authorized.” United
        States v. Certain Real Prop. Located at Route 1, Bryant, Ala., 126
        F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1997).
               Contrary to the CFPB’s argument, the district court’s
        instructions and orders were clear. 15 See In re Se. Banking Corp.,

        15As a starting principle, district courts are not required to hold a litigant’s
        hand and guide him through the basics of discovery. By repeatedly telling the
        CFPB what was expected during a deposition, the district court was already
        going out of its way to provide extra instruction to an off-track party.
        Unfortunately, the CFPB was not an unsophisticated litigant that merely
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        21-14468                   Opinion of the Court                               19

        204 F.3d at 1332 (affirming sanctions that were issued after the
        defendant violated multiple clear discovery orders). Before the
        CFPB sat for the first Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the district court
        considered the CFPB’s initial objections and reconsidered those
        same arguments when it moved for protective orders. The district
        court emphasized on multiple occasions that “factual matters are
        subject to inquiry . . . .” For example, in ruling on one motion for
        a protective order, the district court narrowed a potential topic to
        “all facts relevant to Plaintiff’s claims against Global Payments,
        including all facts that Plaintiff could reasonably identify as
        exculpatory.” 16 The clear upshot was that the CFPB had to sit for
        depositions during which defendants were “entitled to question the
        CFPB about the factual underpinnings of its allegations against
        them.” The CFPB did not misunderstand—it disagreed.
              If these instructions were not enough—and they should
        have been—the district court reasserted these points during the
        telephonic hearing after the first deposition. During the hearing,

        misunderstood the rules, but rather an arm of the federal government that
        sought to overrun them.
        16 The CFPB argues that the district court overreached in issuing this
        instruction. In its words, “it was improper for the district court to order
        [CFPB] to specifically identify evidence that it considered exculpatory,” so it
        was assuredly improper to sanction the CFPB for failing to do so. The CFPB
        overstates its case. The district court’s instruction did not ask the CFPB to
        hand over the keys to its case; rather, it merely reiterated that facts—including
        those that were exculpatory—were fair game and could not be hidden from
        the service-providing defendants during 30(b)(6) depositions.
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        20                        Opinion of the Court                    21-14468

        the district court stressed that work product objections should be
        limited to work product concerns—“so long as the inquiries are
        into facts that are within the knowledge of the [CFPB] . . . they’ve
        got to be answered”—and that the CFPB’s witness must do more
        than just read verbatim from a lawyer-prepared script—“the
        witness needs to be prepared and versed . . . to address these topics
        that require . . . a response that’s more of a human touch . . . .”
               Nevertheless, the CFPB again ignored these directions in
        subsequent depositions. The CFPB’s witness continued to read—
        or stipulate that he would have read—canned answers from
        memory aids rather than offering organic answers with a “human
        touch.” This continued refusal undermined the very purpose of a
        Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and rendered the practice nothing more
        than a glorified document production—an entirely different
        discovery tool with a different purpose. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. The
        CFPB does not have the power to decide which discovery rules it
        will abide by and which it will ignore. 17
               Similarly, the CFPB continued to lodge work-product
        objections to simple, fact-based questions. During the four
        depositions after the telephonic hearing (when the CFPB was given

        17The CFPB asks us to credit it for preparing its witness for a significant
        amount of time. We are unaware of any rule or case law that recognizes
        preparation time as a metric of measuring compliance with the Federal Rules
        of Civil Procedure and it is not clear why preparation time—rather than level
        of preparedness exhibited during the deposition, for example—should be
        considered at all.
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        21-14468                   Opinion of the Court                              21

        at least its third set of instructions), there were a shocking number
        of improper objections and instructions for its witness not to
        answer. 18 To top it off, the CFPB continued to take the incredible
        position that exculpatory facts did not exist as to any defendant in
        the case.
               In light of the CFPB’s repeated failure to obey the district
        court’s orders, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in imposing Rule 37(b) sanctions. See Aztec Steel, 691
        F.2d at 481; Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1542.
                B.      Dismissal as an Appropriate Sanction
               At this point, the question shifts from “should the district
        court have issued sanctions?” to “should the district court have
        issued that sanction?” 19 The CFPB argues that the district court
        abused its discretion by imposing a sanction that was too severe.
              “[D]ismissal is a severe sanction . . . .” United States v.
        $239,500 in U.S. Currency, 764 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1985).
        Nonetheless, “the district court retains the discretion to dismiss a
        complaint where the party’s conduct amounts to flagrant disregard

        18In its brief, the CFPB calls our attention to the few times that it lodged a
        proper work product objection and/or allowed its witness to answer a fact-
        based question without objecting. We think it obvious that a splash of proper
        conduct amidst an expansive sea of impropriety is insufficient to save the
        CFPB from sanctions.
        19Again, one of the potential sanctions for a Rule 37(b) violation was “striking
        pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14468

        and willful disobedience of the court’s discovery orders.” Hashemi
        v. Campaigner Publ’ns Inc., 737 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984)
        (quotation omitted). Although the district court is always required
        to assess whether lesser sanctions would suffice, it is not required
        to explicitly say as much when the rest of its analysis makes that
        finding obvious. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA,
        432 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] dismissal with
        prejudice, . . . is an extreme sanction that may be properly imposed
        only when . . . the district court specifically finds that lesser
        sanctions would not suffice.” (emphasis in original)); Phipps v.
        Blakeney, 8 F.3d 788, 791 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ome cases speak for
        themselves and are clear enough without the district court adding
        a section to its opinion to explain why lesser sanctions were not
        used.”). Finally, the Supreme Court has warned against viewing
        dismissal as too extreme when reviewed on appeal with the benefit
        of hindsight. Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc.,
        427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (“There is a natural tendency on the part
        of reviewing courts . . . to be heavily influenced by the severity of
        outright dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with a
        discovery order. . . . But here, as in other areas of the law, the most
        severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule
        must be available to the district court in appropriate cases . . . .”).
              Whether dismissal was an appropriate sanction does not
        require much additional analysis. The district court dismissed the
        claims against defendants only after determining that “in light of
        the [CFPB’s] pattern of conduct in this case, [it was] not optimistic
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        21-14468               Opinion of the Court                       23

        that reopening the depositions would be fruitful.” That is, the
        district court offered its rationale for why the severe sanction of
        dismissal was necessary.
                We are reviewing under the abuse of discretion standard.
        There was no such abuse, and we decline to second-guess the
        district court’s conclusion that reopening discovery would not be
        fruitful in this case that it was intimately familiar with. Hashemi,
        737 F.2d at 1539; Nat’l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 642. Finally,
        while the CFPB argues that dismissal was improper because the
        service-providing defendants were not prejudiced by its conduct,
        we staunchly disagree and believe the record (as reiterated
        throughout this opinion) speaks for itself in refuting this
        contention.
                                 IV.   Conclusion
                The CFPB was determined to avoid 30(b)(6) depositions. To
        realize its goal, the CFPB employed tactics that the district court
        repeatedly forbade. As such, the CFPB clearly violated Rule 37(b)
        and severe sanctions were warranted. We therefore hold that the
        district court’s sanctions order dismissing the CFPB’s claims against
        the five appellees was not an abuse of discretion.
              AFFIRMED.