Court Opinion

ID: 9680802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:38:53.563273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.440720
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, this- Court is limited to determining *817whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. banc 1993). In doing so, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept as true all logical inferences that support the jury’s finding. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 411 (Mo. banc 1993). The Court engages in such limited review out of deference for the role of the trier of fact, who is necessarily guided by inferences in its search for the truth. As long as these inferences are reasonable and are supported by the evidence, this Court must defer to the trier’s judgment and ignore all opposing inferences. O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d at 215-16.
It is this prohibited indulgence in contrary inferences that leads the majority to conclude that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt. However, the fact that the majority can articulate innocent explanations for defendant’s possession of the stolen gun does not justify a rejection of the entirely logical inferences drawn by the jury or render the jury’s conclusion either unreasonable or purely speculative. That was the import of State v. Grim, in which the Court specifically repudiated the notion that the state’s circumstantial evidence must be “inconsistent with any reasonable theory of [the defendant’s] innocence.” 854 S.W.2d at 406. In direct contravention of this rule, the majority’s opinion turns solely on purportedly reasonable theories of innocence, and not once is there an acknowledgement of the state’s theory of guilt.
The state’s theory is simply this: Defendant possessed the gun, having acquired it from his stepson one way or another (a permissible inference that the majority does not dispute), and believed that it was stolen because 1) his stepson could not have obtained the gun legally (at age 20, he was underage to have obtained a permit), and 2) there was no need to conceal the gun otherwise. These are indeed logical inferences that support the jury’s finding.
Having conceded that the evidence was “sufficient to allow the jury to infer Mr. Langdon’s possession of the gun,” and that “[t]he jury could even infer, from the gun’s presence in the drawer, that defendant knew it was present ...,” the only remaining issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Langdon knew or believed the gun was stolen. The knowledge or belief element may be established by proof of a defendant’s unexplained possession of recently stolen property coupled with the defendant’s suspicious or deceptive conduct. See State v. Priesmeyer, 719 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Mo.App.1986); State v. Taylor, 691 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo.App.1985). That is exactly what exists here: Defendant’s unexplained possession of a gun stolen just three months before and hidden in one of his dresser drawers. The majority, however, concludes that though the jury could reasonably deduce that defendant possessed the gun, the evidence does not establish that the possession is unexplained or that the gun was recently acquired and, consequently, the jury could not have inferred guilt from the circumstances surrounding the possession. I find this conclusion particularly suspect, for the majority itself demonstrates that defendant’s possession of the gun is indeed unexplained, by noting that “[t]here could be many ... explanations for how [the gun] came to be in the drawer.” It is precisely because the question of defendant’s possession invites, in the majority’s own words, “pure speculation,” that his possession can only be characterized as unexplained.
*818The majority’s rejection of the evidence that defendant possessed “recently stolen property” is no less mystifying. Recognizing that the concept of “recency” is inherently relative, both federal and state courts have uniformly declined to establish a bright-line test for determining what constitutes a recent theft, choosing instead to define its limits by reference to the unique facts and circumstances of each particular case. 89 A.L.R.3d sec. l[a] at 1206 (1979). As a result, “[w]hat may be considered ‘recent’ ... may vary from a few days to many months.” State v. Broum, 744 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Mo. banc 1988). Under this flexible standard, and given the facts surrounding defendant’s acquisition of the gun, three months is not such a prolonged interval between theft and possession to preclude an inference of guilt. See State v. Hubbard, 759 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Mo.App.1988) (finding that stolen automobile that was acquired six months after the theft qualified as “recently stolen property”).
In addition, there is ample evidence of defendant’s suspicious and deceptive conduct in connection with his unexplained possession of the recently stolen gun. First, testimony adduced at trial established that defendant’s stepson was only 20 — too young to get a permit, see sec. 571.090.1(1), RSMo (permit applicant must be at least twenty-one years of age), and as such, too young to legally obtain the gun, see sec. 571.080.1, RSMo (unlawful to receive or deliver a concealable firearm unless the transferee obtains and delivers to the transferer a valid permit authorizing the acquisition of the firearm). The obvious inference is that defendant knew that his stepson obtained the gun unlawfully. Second, and even more importantly, the evidence at trial also established that the gun was found in appellant’s bedroom, in his dresser drawer, hidden under his clothing. Tellingly, defendant’s many other guns — none of which were stolen — were placed elsewhere, in a plastic gun case kept in his bedroom closet. This concealment alone gives rise to a reasonable inference of guilty knowledge.
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and accepting all logical inferences derived therefrom, I cannot conclude that the jury’s finding was based on unreasonable inferences supported by “pure speculation.” The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant possessed the gun with the requisite knowledge. As such, I would uphold appellant’s conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.