Court Opinion

ID: 9896176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 17:10:17.103838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:13.023120
License: Public Domain

J-S39005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  ARMEL J. BAXTER                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TIMES LEADER, TIMES LEADER                   :   No. 158 MDA 2023
  MEDIA GROUP, A CIVITAS MEDIA                 :
  LLC CO., AND EDWARD LEWIS                    :

            Appeal from the Order Entered December 12, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
                              2018-10857

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                       FILED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023

       Appellant, Armel J. Baxter, appeals pro se from the December 12, 2022

Order entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas granting the

motion for summary judgment filed by Appellees, Times Leader, Times Leader

Media Group, A Civitas Media LLC Co. (“Civitas”), and Edward Lewis

(“Appellees”) and entering judgment in Appellees’ favor in this Defamation

action.1 After careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.2 On January

25, 2019, Appellant filed an Amended Complaint against Appellees raising
____________________________________________

1 This order also denied Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion for

Sanctions, and Request for Amendment of Pleadings.

2 By way of further background, Appellant is currently serving a life sentence

imposed following his February 5, 2009 jury conviction of First-Degree Murder,
Criminal Conspiracy, and Possession of an Instrument of Crime.
J-S39005-23

claims of Defamation and Malice, and seeking declaratory judgment,

compensatory damages, and punitive damages.3            In particular, Appellant

asserted that on September 8, 2017, Cassandra Blauch visited him at SCI Coal

Township and informed him that, on July 12, 2007, Appellee Edward Lewis

wrote, and Appellee Civitas published, a news article that Appellant

characterized as defamatory because it “insinuated [that Appellant] was

connected to an alleged rape investigation.”4

       Appellees filed Preliminary Objections to the Amended Complaint, which

the trial court overruled in part and sustained in part. Ultimately, the only

claim that survived preliminary objections was Count I—Defamation.

       On May 31, 2022, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

asserting that Appellant’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of

limitations.5 Appellees also moved for summary judgment on the grounds

that: (1) Appellant had failed to allege facts to establish a necessary element

of the claim, i.e., the defamatory character of the communication, and (2)

that the statements in the article are protected by the fair report privilege. 6
____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s initial pro se Complaint was docketed by the lower court clerk on

September 19, 2018.

4 Amended Complaint, 1/25/19, at ¶ 19.

5 42 Pa.C.S. § 5523.

6 The fair report privilege protects the press from liability for the publication

of defamatory material if the published material reports on an official action
or proceeding. Sciandra v. Lynett, 187 A.2d 586, 588-89 (Pa. 1963). Our
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant filed an Answer in which he conceded the one-year statute of

limitations for Defamation claims, but argued that, because he did not become

aware of the allegedly defamatory article until after he had been incarcerated,

he should be able to avail himself of the discovery rule which would operate

to toll the running of the statute of limitations. He claimed that because he

has not had internet access since his arrest on July 10, 2007, he was neither

aware nor reasonably should have been aware of the article’s existence until

Ms. Blauch’s visit to SCI Coal Township in September 2017.               Thus, he

concluded that his Defamation claim was not barred by the statute of

limitations. Appellant also disputed Appellees’ assertions that he had failed to

plead sufficient facts to prove the defamatory nature of the article and that

the fair report privilege applied to protect Appellees from liability.

       Following a hearing, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment. The court determined that the discovery rule did not

apply to toll the one-year statute of limitations and that, therefore, Appellant’s

Defamation claim, brought more than 10 years after publication of the

allegedly defamatory article was time-barred. The court also determined that

Appellant’s Defamation claim failed as a matter of law because the article was

not defamatory.

____________________________________________

Supreme Court explained that no liability attaches so long as the account of
the official action or proceeding is “fair, accurate[,] and complete, and not
published “solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed[.]”
Id. at 589.

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       This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with the court’s order

to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Statement.7

       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

       A. Did [the] trial court err by concluding, as a matter of law, [that]
          the contents of the article are not defamatory and granted
          [Appellees’ Motion for] Summary Judgment?

       B. Did [the] trial court err by concluding, as a matter of law, [that
          Appellees] are protected by the fair reporting privilege?

       C. Did [the] trial court err by concluding, as a matter of law, [that]
          Appellant is not able to avail himself of [the] discovery rule
          because he did not exercise reasonable diligence?

       D. Was Appellant entitled to the same application, regard, and
          consideration, pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the
          United States, as pro se litigants held in Commonwealth v.
          Small, 278 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 2020), that determined pro se
          litigants’ access to public information is distinctly compromised
          and does not have access to information otherwise readily
          available to the public, and indeed, is no longer a member of
          the public?

       E. Did [Appellees] establish their burden of proving the privileged
          character of the occasion on which the article was published?

Appellant’s Brief at ii (reordered for ease of disposition, some capitalization

omitted).

                                               A.

       Appellant challenges the trial court’s Order granting summary judgment

in favor of Appellees.        Our Supreme Court has clarified our role as the

appellate court as follows:

____________________________________________

7 On March 2, 2023, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) Opinion in which it

directed this Court to its December 12, 2022 Opinion addressing the reasons
for its ruling.

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      [A]n appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if
      there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion. But[,]
      the issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any
      material fact presents a question of law, and therefore, on that
      question our standard of review is de novo. This means we need
      not defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals. To
      the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law, we shall
      review the grant of summary judgment in the context of the entire
      record.

Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (citation

omitted).

      A trial court may grant summary judgment “only in those cases where

the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1). “When considering a motion

for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of record and

reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.”   Summers, 997 A.2d at 1159.       “In so doing, the trial court must

resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

against the moving party, and, thus, may only grant summary judgment

where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.”         Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      “[O]ur responsibility as an appellate court is to determine whether the

record either establishes that the material facts are undisputed or contains

insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such

that there is no issue to be decided by the fact-finder.” Jones v. Levin, 940

A.2d 451, 453 (Pa. Super. 2007). If the record contains “evidence that would

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allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party,” we

must reverse the order granting summary judgment. Id. at 453-54. Because

our “inquiry involves solely questions of law, our review is de novo.” Id. at

453 (citation omitted).

                                       B.

      In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in finding

that his Defamation claim failed as a matter of law because the article was not

defamatory. Appellant’s Brief at 14-20.

      The July 12, 2007 article states as follows:

      Shooting suspect nabbed in W-B: Man wanted in
      Philadelphia death is discovered in area motel during a
      rape investigation.

      Wilkes-Barre - Police investigating a reported rape at a Kidder
      Street motel on Tuesday ended up capturing a man connected to
      a deadly shooting in Philadelphia and discovering more than 100
      packaged bags of heroin and crack cocaine inside the motel room.

      Armel Baxter, 22, of Philadelphia, was identified by a Live Scan
      fingerprint analysis that showed he was wanted by Philadelphia
      police for shooting a man back on April 22.

      Sgt. Joseph Novak said Baxter was expected to be picked up by
      Philadelphia authorities on Wednesday.

      Details about the deadly shooting couldn’t be obtained from
      Philadelphia police.

      According to local police:

      Officers John Majikes and Charles Casey responded to the Garden
      Inn on Kidder Street just before 6 a.m. on Tuesday for a reported
      rape.

      An investigation determined that the man, identified as Baxter,
      was involved in a dispute with a woman.

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      Police said packaged bags of heroin and crack were found inside
      Baxter’s motel room.

      Baxter refused to give police any identification then gave police
      fake names.

      Police took Baxter to the Kingston Police Department, where a Live
      Scan fingerprint analysis showed his true name and arrest warrant
      for the homicide in Philadelphia.

      Baxter is the fourth person since January who was wanted for
      homicide in other areas and was captured here. . . .

Edward Lewis, Shooting Suspect Nabbed in W-B, Times Leader, July 12, 2007,
https://www.timesleader.com/archive/1117771/shooting-suspect-nabbed-
in-w-b.

      In an action for defamation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving

numerous elements, including, relevantly, the defamatory nature of the

communication. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8343(a). “A statement is defamatory if it tends

to harm an individual’s reputation so as to lower him in the estimation of the

community or deter third persons from dealing with him.” Kryeski v. Schott

Glass Tech., Inc., 626 A.2d 595, 600-01 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation

omitted).   “Whether the challenged statements are capable of having a

defamatory meaning is a question of law for the court to determine in the first

instance.” Id.

      In Weber v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., et al., 878 A.2d 63 (Pa.

Super. 2005), this Court explained the test used to determine whether a

communication has “defamatory character:”

      In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
      ... the defamatory character of the communication. It is the
      function of the court to determine whether the challenged
      publication is capable of a defamatory meaning. If the court
      determines that the challenged publication is not capable of a

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      defamatory meaning, there is no basis for the matter to proceed
      to trial.

      To determine whether a statement is capable of a defamatory
      meaning, we consider whether the statement tends so to harm
      the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
      community or to deter third parties from associating or dealing
      with him. Libel is the malicious publication of printed or written
      matter which tends to blacken a person’s reputation and expose
      him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. The court must view
      the statements in context.

      Words which standing alone may reasonably be understood as
      defamatory may be so explained or qualified by their context as
      to make such an interpretation unreasonable. Thus, we must
      consider the full context of the article to determine the
      effect the article is fairly calculated to produce, the
      impression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the
      average persons among whom it is intended to circulate.

      It is not enough that the victim of the statements ... be
      embarrassed or annoyed, he must have suffered the kind of harm
      which has grievously fractured his standing in the community of
      respectable society.

Weber, 878 A.2d at 78, quoting Tucker v. Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d

113, 123–124 (Pa. 2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted,

emphasis added).

      In support of his claim, Appellant argues that the trial court evaluated

the facts under the wrong standard when it concluded that the article was not

defamatory because “the article does not state [Appellant] is a rapist or

committed rape.” Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing Trial Ct. Op., 12/12/22, at

23). He contends that “what the article does not state is immaterial to the

determination of the court as a matter of law. What is of merit, is what the

article does state and the impression it would naturally engender in the minds

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of the average person[,]” i.e., that Appellant had been reported for and police

were investigating him for raping someone. Id. at 15-17.

       Here, after considering the full context of the article, the trial court

concluded that it was not capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.

Following our de novo review, we agree. Our review of the article indicates

that it never states that Appellant raped anyone or even that he was being

investigated for raping someone.           Rather, the article indicates that police

responded to a motel to investigate a rape allegation. Upon arrival, police

found Appellant, who had had a dispute with a woman, in a room that

contained 100 bags of heroin and crack cocaine. When Appellant failed to

identify himself to the police officers, they took him to the police station where

they discovered that he was a suspect in a Philadelphia murder investigation.

The obvious conclusion after reading the article is that Appellant was involved

in a shooting in Philadelphia, not that he was involved in a rape at the motel.

       Because the article was not capable of a defamatory meaning as a

matter of law, the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellant did not

plead a prima facie cause of action for Defamation, such that there is no issue

to be decided by the fact-finder. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted

summary judgment in favor of Appellees.8

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

8 In light of our disposition of Appellant’s first claim, we need not address his

remaining issues.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/09/2023

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