Court Opinion

ID: 9447952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:18:27.204185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:14.549370
License: Public Domain

HINCKS, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in affirming the conviction for violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 4704(a) and the conviction for violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 4705(a).
I dissent, however, from so much of the Court’s decision as affirms the convictions under 21 U.S.C.A. § 174. In my opinion there was no substantial evidence that this appellant had either knowledge of the importation or had physical possession, or control amounting to constructive possession, over the narcotics such as to bring into play the presumption created by § 174. The evidence on that issue fell considerably short of the standard required by our decisions in United States v. Panica, 2 Cir., 290 F.2d 97; United States v. Hernandez, 2 Cir., 290 F.2d 86; and United States v. Cox, 277 F.2d 302. The evidence on which my brothers rely seems to me to suggest no more than that the appellant facilitated the sale.
It follows that the convictions under § 174 can be sustained only on the theory that its presumption can be invoked against the appellant as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 even though he personally was without knowledge of the importation and without possession or control of the narcotics. With the Court evenly divided on this question, United States v. Santore, 2 Cir., 290 F.2d 61, I take it that it is my duty to make my own appraisal of the weight of the opposing arguments. On that basis I feel constrained to vote to reverse the § 174 convictions.