Court Opinion

ID: 9905035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 18:03:31.921448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:19.095314
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 In re C.G. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re C.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                              F085494

             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Super. Ct. No. 21JL-00088B)

                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
    C.G.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
            APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Jennifer O.
Trimble, Judge.
            Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
            Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Dina
Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*           Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Meehan, J.
                                          -ooOoo-
       Minor C.G. (minor) contends on appeal that the juvenile court’s attempted
criminal threat finding against him must be reversed because there is insufficient
evidence on the record that the threat caused the victim sustained fear. The People
disagree. We affirm.
                              PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       On June 9, 2022, an original juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to
Welfare & Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that minor made a
criminal threat against Ryan A.1 (Pen. Code, § 422;2 count 1).
       On June 29, 2022, there was a detention hearing and minor was not detained. At
the time the petition was filed, minor was on active deferred entry of judgment for an
allegation of infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a dating
partner or parent of child (§ 273.5).
       On October 26, 2022, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction hearing. After
presenting evidence, the People moved to amend the juvenile wardship petition to add
two counts: criminal threat against Rosalinda (§ 422) and disturbing the peace (§ 415).
Defense counsel submitted on the count of disturbing the peace but objected to the count
of a criminal threat against Rosalinda. The court granted the People’s request to add
disturbing the peace (§ 415; count 2).
       The same day, the juvenile court found minor guilty on count 1 of the lesser
included offense of attempted criminal threat (§§ 422, 664) and on count 2 of disturbing
the peace.3

1       Victim Ryan has the same initials as his sister, Rosalinda, so we refer to them by
their first names to prevent confusion.
2      All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
3       The court also granted probation’s request that deferred entry of judgment be lifted
in the prior matter and sustained the petition in that matter.

                                              2.
       On December 21, 2022, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing. The court
declared minor a ward of the court and placed him on electronic monitoring through a
home commitment program and ordered other various terms and conditions of probation.
       On December 27, 2022, minor filed a notice of appeal.
                                   FACTUAL SUMMARY
       On February 11, 2022, Rosalinda was outside her family’s house with her mother,
father, and younger brother, Ryan, when minor drove down the street past their house and
“[threw] up gang signs towards [Ryan].” Minor was Ryan and Rosalinda’s neighbor who
lived across the street. Rosalinda testified that minor was the passenger in the vehicle
and that she did not see who was driving. She stated that as minor drove past, he said,
“It’s a 12th Street Gang.”
       After driving past Rosalinda’s house, the vehicle circled back towards them and
minor and Ryan cursed at each other. The vehicle then parked across the street from
Rosalinda’s family’s house, and minor exited the vehicle and continued to yell at Ryan
from across the street.
       Minor “challenge[d]” Ryan to a fight. Rosalinda testified that minor was “trying
to get [Ryan] to go across the street to where [minor] was, and [Ryan] kept asking him,
‘Well, why do I need to come over there if you’re the one with the issue?’ ” Rosalinda
stated that minor then said to Ryan, “I’m going to shoot you,” and lifted up his shirt and
revealed a metal object tucked in the front waistband of his pants.
       Rosalinda testified that she believed the metal object was a silver gun handle
based on its shape and color. She stated that, upon seeing the gun, she became afraid for
herself and her parents “because you never know where a bullet can go.” She believed
minor would carry out the threat and she thought she and her parents would be in the line
of fire if minor began shooting.

                                             3.
       Minor’s girlfriend attempted to keep him on his side of the street, but he pushed
her away and kept arguing with Ryan. Rosalinda did not see if Ryan took cover or hid in
any way. Rosalinda called the police and the incident ended when they arrived.
       Merced Police Officer Jesus Lopez was second to arrive on the scene, and spoke
to minor initially, but did not take a statement from him.
       Defense Case
       Minor testified that he was driving down his street with his six-year-old brother in
the car when Ryan threw up his hands like he was challenging minor to fight. Minor
stated he and Ryan then argued back and forth from their respective front yards,
approximately 40 feet across from each other. He testified that Ryan was throwing his
hands up, gesturing that he wanted to have a physical fight. Minor said he raised his
shorts up, a gesture which he stated was a challenge to fight, while Ryan removed his
sweater.
       Minor testified he did not have anything in his waistband and denied owning a gun
or being affiliated with a gang. Minor claimed he had “problems” with Ryan in the past
involving “bickering” back and forth, but that he had never challenged him to fight.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Minor contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish
the “sustained fear” element of the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat.
The People disagree. We agree with the People.
       A.     Law
       We review minor’s contentions using the same standard of review that applies in
adult criminal cases. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) “Specifically, we
determine whether substantial evidence—‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value’—supports the juvenile court’s findings. [Citation.] We view the evidence
‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the [findings]
the existence of every fact the [court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’

                                             4.
[Citation.] We ‘accept [all] logical inferences that the [court] might have drawn from the
… evidence’ [citation], but reject inferences ‘ “based on suspicion alone, or on
imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work” ’ [citations].
We will reverse only if ‘ “it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the [court’s findings].’ ” (In re I.A. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 767, 778.)
       We do not resolve credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts in resolving a claim
of insufficient evidence. (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87; People v.
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181; People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 293.) It is
not our job to reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. (People v.
Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 785 (Perry).)
       We must also rely on the evidence that was actually presented at trial instead of
what we find lacking in the prosecution case. (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913,
921; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 12.)
       To make a criminal threat, the prosecution must show, “(1) that the defendant
‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury
to another person,’ (2) that the defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the
statement … is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it
out,’ (3) that the threat … was ‘on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was]
made, … so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the
person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the
threat,’ (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for
his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the
threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the circumstances.” (People v. Toledo
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–228 (Toledo); § 422.) To determine whether a
communication constitutes a threat, the court considers the communication on its face

                                              5.
and in the context of its surrounding circumstances. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th
297, 339–340.)
       The lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat requires that: (1) minor
specifically intended to commit a criminal threat; (2) minor committed an act that goes
beyond mere preparation in committing the threat; and (3) under the circumstances, the
intended threat was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.
(People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 525; Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 230–
231; § 21a.) “An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific intent to
commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.” (§ 21a.)
       The intent required for an attempted criminal threat is a specific intent “ ‘to
threaten to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury with the further intent
that the threat be taken as a threat, under circumstances sufficient to convey to the person
threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution so as to
reasonably cause the person to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or
her family’s safety.’ ” (People v. Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 516; Toledo, supra,
26 Cal.4th at pp. 230–231.)
       The crime of attempted criminal threat encompasses situations where a minor
intends to commit a criminal threat “but is thwarted from completing the crime by some
fortuity or unanticipated event.” (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 232.)
       B.     Analysis
       Here, the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that minor
committed the offense of attempted criminal threat, as the record shows he had the
specific intent to make a threat, and did so by pulling up his shirt to show a gun in his
waistband while saying, “I’m going to shoot you,” which was sufficient to cause a
reasonable person to be in sustained fear.
       Minor first contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s finding that he made an attempted criminal threat because the record does not

                                             6.
contain evidence showing his threat caused Ryan sustained fear. He argues that because
Ryan did not testify, “we have no way of knowing or evaluating whether Ryan was afraid
for himself or his family, or if the alleged threat did not actually cause him to be in
sustained fear.” He contends that, “[w]here the victim/listener has not testified to the
effect of the alleged threat, this court should not guess and make a determination based
on a hypothetical reasonable person.”
       However, “absence of proof of that element [of sustained fear] does not defeat a
conviction for attempted criminal threat.” (In re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th
601, 607 (Sylvester C.).) “[A]ffirmative evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt
whether [the defendant] succeeded or failed [to cause sustained fear] appears unnecessary
and its absence no reason for acquitting [the defendant] of the crime of attempted
criminal threat.” (Id. at p. 611.)
       In Toledo, the victim heard the threat, but testified that the threat did not cause her
sustained fear. The court found that her lack of fear was a “fortuity or unanticipated
event” that thwarted the defendant’s efforts to commit a criminal threat. (Toledo, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 232.) Here, as in Toledo, all elements of the crime of criminal threat
were established, except whether the victim, Ryan, experienced sustained fear.4
However, unlike Toledo, the victim here, Ryan, did not testify. The witness, Rosalinda,
only testified as to her own fear caused by the threat. She did not testify about whether
Ryan heard the threat or whether the threat caused him sustained fear.
       However, in Sylvester C., the victim, like Ryan, also did not testify. (Sylvester C.,
supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 604.) There, the court found that the “ ‘unintended
fortuity,’ ” thwarting the completion of the criminal threat was that the victim did not

4       The court was entitled to find credible Rosalinda’s testimony about minor pulling
his shirt up to reveal a gun in his waistband and yelling, “I’m going to shoot you,” as it is
not our job to reweigh the evidence. (See Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 785.)

                                              7.
testify and there was no evidence on the record as to whether the threat caused the victim
to suffer sustained fear. (Sylvester C., at p. 607.) It explained:

                  “the ‘unintended fortuity,’ was not proof the victim experienced no
          fear [as in Toledo] but a failure of proof whether he did or did not. This
          failure of proof resulted largely from the absence of that victim from the
          trial and thus the absence of evidence from him about his state of mind
          upon hearing [the minor] utter his threat. Nor did the prosecution produce
          sufficient evidence from any other source regarding [the victim’s] actual
          state of mind on that occasion.” (Sylvester C., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at
          p. 607.)
          The Sylvester C. court concluded that “the failure to prove the defendant
succeeded is capable of supporting an attempted criminal threat conviction just as would
affirmative evidence he failed to do so.” (Sylvester C., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 608.)
It explained that, while the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant’s threat was ineffectual in arousing sustained fear in the victim or that the
defendant failed to complete or was prevented from completing the crime of criminal
threat,

                   “[o]bviously, the prosecutor was not trying to prove [the
          defendant]’s failure but rather his success in instilling fear in the [victim] he
          was threatening. So all the prosecution did in this instance was fail to
          prove [the defendant] succeeded in completing this intended crime rather
          than affirmatively proving he was frustrated in his attempt to do so. [¶]
          We conclude … it would be anomalous and contrary to the Legislature’s
          obvious intent in punishing attempted crimes to completely absolve a
          defendant if the evidence falls just a bit short of proving he succeeded in
          completing his intended crime, while at the same time punishing other
          defendants when the evidence demonstrates they failed miserably. One
          who gets close and may or even probably (but not beyond a reasonable
          doubt) did succeed in achieving his criminal goal is at least as dangerous
          and worthy of punishment as one who is a demonstrable failure. [¶] It
          would be absurd to construe the attempt statutes to produce such absurd
          results. And we refuse to do so. Rather we take a commonsense approach.
          In practical terms, there is no difference whether the failure element of an
          attempt crime is satisfied because the prosecution proves failure or because
          it fails to prove success in committing the completed crime. In this context,
          at least, it is a zero sum game—success and failure are opposites—success

                                                 8.
       and nonsuccess. Whether the evidence proves the defendant failed or fails
       to prove his success, one element of the completed crime is missing. Yet,
       as they are in this case, the intent to commit that crime and all the acts
       necessary to constitute an attempt may be present.” (Sylvester C., supra,
       137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 608–609.)
       Here, as in Sylvester C., “affirmative evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt
whether” minor’s threat succeeded or failed to cause Ryan sustained fear “appears
unnecessary and its absence no reason for acquitting [the defendant] of the crime of
attempted criminal threat.” (See Sylvester C., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.)
       Minor next contends that there is insufficient evidence of attempted criminal threat
because the record does not show whether Ryan personally heard the threat. However,
the reasoning of Sylvester C. also extends to the lack of evidence as to whether Ryan
personally heard minor’s threat. The lack of evidence about whether Ryan personally
heard minor’s threat is another unintended fortuity that prevented minor from being
prosecuted for committing a completed criminal threat, but, as discussed above, its
absence is “no reason for acquitting [the defendant] of the crime of attempted criminal
threat.” (See Sylvester C., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.)
       Minor further contends there is insufficient evidence that his threat was
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific enough to convey gravity and a sense
of purpose and immediate prospect of execution because there is not evidence Ryan
heard the threat. He argues, “[t]his court has no way of knowing what Ryan saw and
cannot guess whether Ryan saw, or thought he saw, a gun in minor’s waistband, or
whether Ryan just thought minor was hiking his pants up to fight.”
       The People first contend minor waived this argument because minor failed to give
it its own subheading in his opening brief.
       Minor argues that it is only an extension of his argument that there is insufficient
evidence that Ryan personally heard his threat, because if he did not hear it, it did not

                                              9.
convey an immediate prospect of execution, and thus, this argument was not required to
have its own heading.
       We may disregard arguments not properly presented under appropriate headings.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204 (a)(1) [“Each brief must: [¶] … [¶] (B) State each
point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each
point by argument”]; Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 248,
fn. 6 [“Arguments not raised by a separate heading in an opening brief will be deemed
waived.”]; Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 46, 59 [“We may
disregard arguments not properly presented under appropriate headings.”]; Opdyk v.
California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4 [“The failure to
head an argument … constitutes a waiver.”].)
       Regardless, we conclude there is sufficient evidence that minor’s threat was
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific enough to convey gravity and a sense
of purpose and immediate prospect of execution, even without evidence that Ryan
personally heard it. As discussed above, the lack of evidence as to whether Ryan heard
the threat and saw a gun, or just thought minor was hiking up his pants, is an “unintended
fortuity” that is unnecessary, and “no reason for acquitting [the defendant] of the crime of
attempted criminal threat.” (See Sylvester C., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) Further,
the juvenile court was entitled to credit Rosalinda’s testimony that minor raised his shirt,
showing a gun in his waistband and yelled to Ryan that he would shoot him, causing her
to fear for herself and her family who were in the same front yard as Ryan. (See Perry,
supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 785.) Based on that testimony, the court could make the reasonable
inference that minor attempted to make a threat that was specific enough to convey an
immediate prospect of execution.
       Minor further argues that Rosalinda’s testimony was not corroborated by other
evidence. However, “[t]he uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently

                                             10.
improbable,” and it is not our job to reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of
witnesses. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296; see People v. Panah (2005) 35
Cal.4th 395, 489; see also Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 785.) Here, Rosalinda’s testimony
was neither physically impossible, nor inherently improbable. Accordingly, there is
sufficient evidence that minor attempted to make a threat that was “unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate and specific enough to convey gravity and a sense of purpose
and immediate prospect of execution,” regardless of whether Ryan personally heard the
threat.
          Because we find all the other elements of an attempted criminal threat fully
satisfied and conclude the absence of proof minor succeeded to make a criminal threat is
sufficient to satisfy the failure element, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding of
attempted criminal threat.
                                        DISPOSITION
          The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

                                               11.