Court Opinion

ID: 9926321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 16:05:05.862165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:35.330074
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DIVISION
                               MCFADDEN, P. J.,
                            BROWN and MARKLE, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                    January 24, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1428. WASHINGTON v. THE STATE.

      BROWN, Judge.

      Neko Washington appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her

guilty plea to theft by shoplifting less than $500 from a Kroger, for which the trial

court sentenced her to twelve months to serve thirty days, with credit for time served,

and the balance of the sentence suspended upon the conditions of her not again

violating the laws of the State of Georgia and not returning to the location of the theft.

Washington contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her

guilty plea, arguing that withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice

because the plea was not knowingly, freely, or voluntarily entered and was the result

of “an environment of coercion.” We affirm.
      The record shows that the prosecutor set forth the following factual basis for

Washington’s guilty plea. On October 6, 2019, Washington was observed at the Lake

City Kroger taking items off the shelf and eating the items without paying for them.

Washington told police that “someone else was going to cover the cost of [the]

items.” When that person never materialized, Washington was arrested and charged

with theft by shoplifting.

      The transcript of the guilty plea hearing shows that on June 12, 2020,

Washington entered a negotiated plea to the charge. The colloquy between

Washington and the trial court prior to entry of the plea shows that Washington

understood the charges against her and that she was represented by counsel who

explained her “rights and options” in the case and that she was satisfied with

counsel’s representation. Washington also acknowledged that she understood that she

had the right to plead guilty, not guilty, or nolo to the charge and that counsel

explained to her — and she “fully and completely” understood — the nature of the

charge, the statutory and constitutional rights applicable to her case, the potential

punishment range, and the consequence of pleading guilty, and affirmed that no one

had threatened or coerced her into entering the plea. Counsel also testified that he was

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satisfied that Washington “fully and completely” understood all matters applicable

to her case and that he did not know of any reason why the court should not accept the

plea.

        Before the trial court accepted the plea, the trial court asked why Washington

had been in custody since March 5, 2020. Washington’s counsel explained that she

had been incarcerated in Lake City on the instant charge on October 6, 2019, and

apparently bonded out, after which she ended up in Gwinnett County to deal with

another matter. According to Washington, she was supposed to be released by

Gwinnett County on December 24, 2019, and transferred to Lake City which had a

“hold” on her, but nobody came to pick her up until February 12, 2020. According

to the trial court, Washington subsequently “got hung up in the [Lake] City court”

waiting for them to bind her case over to State Court, but Washington could not

appear for her March court date in State Court because of the pandemic.

        After the discussion about why Washington had been “in custody so long,” the

trial court advised Washington about the terms of the negotiated plea and confirmed

that she would get credit for time served. When Washington asked if that meant she

would “get to go home today,” the trial court confirmed as follows: “That is my

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understanding. I don’t think that you have any holds.” The trial court then accepted

the plea and advised Washington of her appeal rights.

      Five days later, Washington filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, alleging

that her plea was not knowingly or freely entered because it was the result of duress

and coercion. According to Washington, after she was transported to the Clayton

County jail from Gwinnett County on February 12, 2020, she requested a jury trial,

but her case was not accused by the solicitor’s office until nearly four months later.

Washington entered the guilty plea because she feared that she would continue to get

lost in the system or lose her life due to unsafe conditions in the Clayton County jail.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, pointing out that the Order

Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency — which went into effect at the time

Washington was awaiting proceedings in Lake City — mandated that courts cease all

operations and that Zoom proceedings did not start until April 10, 2020, all of which

caused a tremendous backlog. The trial court concluded that Washington’s plea was

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered and that she acknowledged that

pleading guilty was her way to get out of jail instead of risk being lost in the system

again. The trial court found that Washington had “in fact” demonstrated a high level

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of intelligence by her “plan to get out of jail and subsequently challenge her plea.” As

to whether manifest injustice resulted from Washington’s prolonged incarceration,

the trial court found that Washington had a reasonable bond1 for the theft charge the

entire time she was incarcerated — which was entered when she returned to Clayton

County to answer a failure to appear bench warrant issued in the case — but failed to

request a bond reduction or a recognizance bond so she could be released from jail

while awaiting trial. The trial court also pointed out that when Washington’s case

came before the court, no jury trials were being scheduled because of the judicial

emergency; thus, Washington’s options were to plead guilty and accept a negotiated

sentence, plead guilty and accept a non-negotiated sentence, or plead not guilty and

request a bond reduction or recognizance until a trial could be scheduled. The trial

court concluded that Washington’s choice to enter a guilty plea and seek withdrawal

was not the appropriate way to address her concern of being “lost” in the system, and

that the alleged “environment of coercion” leading to Washington’s decision to plead

guilty failed to meet the definition of manifest injustice. During the hearing, the trial

      1
       When Washington appeared before the Municipal Court of Lake City on
March 5, 2020, and entered a plea of not guilty, that court bound the case over to the
State Court of Clayton County and set bond at $1,266.
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court noted that Washington’s decision to wait and voice her concerns confirmed for

the court that her plea was taken voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and raised

the suspicion “that there was some sort of plan . . . to conspire to take the plea and

then try to get out of it later when there . . . was no effort to even ask the [c]ourt for

a[n] [own recognizance] bond[.]”

      1. Washington contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to

withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest

injustice because she was neither informed of the consequences of pleading guilty nor

advised of the more stringent standards for withdrawal after sentencing or that she

could withdraw her plea on the record and before sentencing. Because Washington

failed to raise this claim below, she has waived it on appeal. See Humphrey v. State, 299

Ga. 197, 199 (2) (787 SE2d 169) (2016) (defendant waived for appeal claim that his

plea was not knowing and voluntary where claim was not raised below); Terrell v.

State, 272 Ga. App. 297, 298 (1) (612 SE2d 32) (2005), overruled on other grounds,

Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 378 (834 SE2d 769) (2019). Even if we were to consider

the claim, it is without merit. See Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 747 (2) (a), (b) (843

SE2d 571) (2020).

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      2. Washington contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to

withdraw her guilty plea because the plea was induced while she had been in custody

for an extended period of time and was “under an environment of coercion due to

being lost in the system.” “The standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea following

sentencing is ‘manifest injustice.’” (Citation omitted.) Shaheed v. State, 276 Ga. 291

(2) (578 SE2d 119) (2003). Manifest injustice

      exists if the plea was in fact entered involuntarily, without an
      understanding of the nature of the charges, or where a defendant is
      denied effective assistance of counsel. When a defendant challenges the
      validity of [her] guilty plea in this way, the State bears the burden of
      showing that the defendant entered [her] plea knowingly, intelligently,
      and voluntarily. The State may meet its burden by showing on the record
      of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights being
      waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic
      evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.
      In evaluating whether a defendant’s plea was valid, the trial court should
      consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea. The
      court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be
      disturbed absent an obvious abuse of discretion.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. State, 367 Ga. App. 298, 300 (885 SE2d

810) (2023). “Moreover, in ruling on the motion, the trial court is the final arbiter of

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all factual disputes raised by the evidence. If evidence supports the trial court’s

findings, we must affirm.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Montford v. State, 317

Ga. App. 417, 418 (731 SE2d 91) (2012). See also Ranger v. State, 330 Ga. App. 578

(768 SE2d 768) (2015). “[W]hether or not [Washington’s] situation coerced [her]

into pleading guilty was a question of fact for the trial court to resolve.” Taylor, 367

Ga. App. at 301. See also Frost v. State, 286 Ga. App. 694, 697 (1) (649 SE2d 878)

(2007) (“[d]uress is a question of fact for the trial court to resolve, whose decision we

will only reverse if it constitutes an abuse of discretion”) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

      Based on the record, we conclude that the trial court neither erred in

determining that Washington made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty

nor abused its discretion in finding insufficient evidence that her guilty plea was the

product of coercion based on her having been in custody for an extended period of

time and lost in the system. See Taylor, 367 Ga. App. at 301 (rejecting defendant’s

claim that his being placed in protective custody/isolation prior to the entry of his

guilty plea coerced him into pleading guilty). During the hearing on the motion to

withdraw her guilty plea, Washington testified about the circumstances that kept her

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incarcerated in Gwinnett County and then Clayton County until she pleaded guilty on

June 12, 2020. She also acknowledged that while in jail she learned that all court

operations had “pretty much” shut down because of the pandemic. Nonetheless,

when asked why she did not express her concerns about her situation to the trial court,

Washington testified that she had explained it to her attorney but “didn’t know if

[expressing her concerns to the court] would have helped at the time”2 and that she

“just wanted to hurry up and get out.” In light of Washington’s testimony at the

hearing on the motion to withdraw her plea and at the plea hearing, where she

participated intelligently but failed to raise her concerns to the court, the trial court

was authorized to resolve the question of whether Washington was under duress

because of an environment of coercion against her. See Shaheed, 276 Ga. at 291-292

(2); Frost, 286 Ga. App. at 697 (1). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order

denying Washington’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

      Judgment affirmed. McFadden, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.

      2
        In fact, during the plea hearing, Washington testified that her attorney had
taken the time and opportunity to advise her regarding her rights and options; that she
was satisfied with the advice and counsel provided by her attorney; and that she made
the decision to plead guilty after speaking to her attorney.
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