Court Opinion

ID: 9643003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:14:58.707838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:56.233245
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer
STONE, Judge.
The burden of the Department’s motion for rehearing or to transfer is (1) that we “weighed the evidence, disregarded the findings made by the Director upon substantial evidence and determined independently which way the evidence preponderates,” thus erroneously reviewing the *592case under Article V, Section 22, Mo. Const, of 1945, 2 V.A.M.S., and (2) that we have read the words “any gainful work” out of Section 208.040(2) and have held “that a person had to be employable or able-bodied to be denied” ADC benefits.
As to the first complaint: We have been mindful that our review in this category of cases is not under Article V, Section 22, Mo.Const. of 1945 [Ellis v. State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, 365 Mo. 614, 618-620, 285 S.W.2d 634, 637-638(3)], and we stated in our opinion, precisely as the Department now urges, that: “ * * * [T]he issue is whether the decision was based upon substantial evidence. (Citing cases) If it was, it may not be disturbed * * *.” The Department’s first complaint manifestly stems from apparent misconceptions (a) as to what constitutes substantial evidence and (b) as to whether the testimony of Dr. Palenske supplied the substantial evidence essential to support the Director’s decision.
In the course of offering extended advice, no doubt well-intentioned even though self-serving, as to what an opinion in this character of case should contain, the Department’s counsel admonish : “The court should consider or quote in its decision the evidence that supports the decision and then determine whether the evidence is substantial in the sense that it is admissible and competent without regard to all the opposing or unfavorable evidence submitted.” (All emphasis herein is ours.) But substantiality is not synonymous with and limited to, but implies and requires something more than, mere admissibility and competency. As our Supreme Court, en banc, per Conkling, C. J., said in Collins v. Division of Welfare, 364 Mo. 1032, 1037, 270 S.W.2d 817, 820(6): “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i. e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it establishes them; it is evidence from which the trier or triers of the fact reasonably could find the issues in harmony therewith; it is evidence of a character sufficiently substantial to warrant the trier of facts in finding from it the facts, to establish which the evidence was introduced.” To the same effect, see Davis v. State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, Mo.App., 274 S.W.2d 615, 617(6); Burrows v. County Court of Carter County, Mo.App., 308 S.W.2d 299, 305; Carlisle v. State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, Mo.App., 341 S.W.2d 617, 624(4); Velghe v. State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, Mo.App., 362 S.W.2d 747, 750(3).
With assurances that the Director had not considered the inadmissible exhibits, the Department’s brief told us that the Director’s decision “clearly shows that it was based upon the competent and admissible medical testimony in the record, namely, the testimony of Dr. R. L. Palenske.” Thus directed to Dr. Palenske’s testimony as supplying the substantial evidence essential to support the Director’s decision (and indeed no other admissible evidence in the record could have supported it), we carefully considered and painstakingly analyzed the doctor’s testimony. Certain bits or fragments of that testimony (noted in our opinion), if isolated and accepted out of context (as we are urged to take them), might afford support for the Director’s decision. But, where the testimony of a witness is not self-contradictory, and Dr. Palenske’s testimony was not [contrast Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 332 Mo. 954, 59 S.W.2d 644, 647(6); Banty v. City of Sedalia, Mo.App., 120 S.W.2d 59, 61(1)], it should be considered as a whole.. Dimond v. Terminal R. R. Ass’n. of St. Louis, 346 Mo. 333, 353, 141 S.W.2d 789, 799(12); Haire v. Stagner, Mo.App., 356 S.W.2d 305, 310; Dugan v. Rippee, Mo.App., 278 S.W.2d 812, 816(7); 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 1031a, loc. cit. 1073. See also Batson v. Ormsbee, Mo.App., 304 S.W.2d 680, 682; Hoffman v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., Mo.App., 274 S.W.2d 591, 593. “For sometimes the meaning of the words or the thought attempted to be conveyed by the *593witness may be explained and clarified in the words he used or by what he previously [or thereafter] said in relation to the same subject.” Hampton v. Raines, Mo.App., 334 S.W.2d 372, 377(5).
When read as a whole, the clear and unmistakable gist and import of Dr. Palenske’s testimony was that, although Grady could do “light work” under ideal conditions, the doctor knew of nothing in that territorial area which would be within the physical capability of Grady, also limited as he was by only a sixth-grade education and no vocational training or experience; that “on any kind of exertion” his heart murmur was accentuated; that, if Grady undertook “any kind of hard work,” it would make his “chest condition” worse; and that, in short, he was not physically capable of working at hard manual labor, the only “kind of gainful employment” for which he otherwise was fitted. As Dr. Palenske put it, “I am sure maybe he would work 30 minutes, or could, but this hard labor would go ahead and cause a deterioration in his condition quicker, which is gradually getting worse anyway.” Certainly it could not be said that Grady was capable of doing hard work, if he thereby would run a substantial risk of increasing his disability or shortening his life. Wiener v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 352 Mo. 673, 680, 179 S.W.2d 39, 43(8); Robinson v. United States, 2 Cir., 87 F.2d 343, 345 (2, 3). We still believe and hold that Dr. Palenske’s testimony did not afford substantial evidence to support the Director’s decision affirming the order removing claimant from the ADC rolls.
As to the second complaint'. Arguing that “the word ‘any’ as used in the statute [Sec. 208.040(2)] is all comprehensive,” the Department contended in its brief (upon which this case was submitted and determined) for a literal, “according to the letter,” interpretation of the words “any gainful work” in the statutory requirement for physical or mental disability, namely, “a physical or mental defect, illness or disability * * * which prevents the parent from performing any gainful work.” Sec. 208.040(2). With respect to this matter of statutory construction [see Webster’s New International Dictionary (2nd Ed.), p. 572, for “the distinction between construction and interpretation * * * not well observed” in ordinary or legal usage], all that we needed to hold for proper disposition of this appeal, and all that we intended to hold in our opinion, was: (1) that nothing short of a literal, “according to the letter,” interpretation of "any gainful work” reasonably would have permitted the Director’s findings and order on the admissible evidence before him, (2) that we were unwilling to accord such literal, “according to the letter,” interpretation to those words, and (3) that, therefore, the order under review was not supported by competent substantial evidence and was arbitrary and unreasonable, thus requiring the remanding of the cause to the Director for redeter-mination of the issues.
In the course of our discussion, we did refer to several recognized rules of statutory construction, among them the principle that statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized, and we did point out that the literal construction of “any gainful work” for which the Department contended certainly would not harmonize with the language and intendment of Section 208.050. But we did not hold (as the Department charges) “that a person had to be employable or able-bodied to be denied ADC benefits,” and we did not undertake to interpret or define either “able-bodied” or “employable” as those terms are used in Section 208.050 but left undefined therein, excepting insofar as the legislative intent with respect to “employable” may be gathered from the second sentence in subsection (3) thereof.
In the suggestions in support of its motion for rehearing or to transfer, the Department now informs us that “ ‘any gainful work’ * * * has not received a literal interpretation as requiring a state of being bedfast or near-helplessness” but that *594“it has been construed as allowing the Division of Welfare to determine what kind of zvork is ‘gainful’ and encompassing the performance of services zmth reasonable regularity in some employment or self-employment.” Having already considered and ruled the case as it was briefed and presented to us, we eschew gratis dictum concerning the Department’s now-disclosed definition (if such it is intended to be) of “any gainful work.” But perhaps it may not be amiss to indicate our hearty approval of the Department’s present position that “any gainful work” should not receive a literal interpretation and its further suggestion that “each case must be considered on all its own facts.” For us to go further would be inappropriate and might be unwise.
The motion for rehearing or to transfer is overruled.
RUARK, P. J., and HOGAN, J., concur.