Court Opinion

ID: 9763147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:37:41.259938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:39.720592
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Justice,
dissenting.
The question in this case is not whether a delivery had occurred, but whether the evidence supported a delivery by actual transfer. Under the Controlled Substance Act, delivery of a controlled substance is accomplished in three distinct ways: actual transfer, constructive transfer, and offer to sell. See Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Conaway v. State, 738 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); see also Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. Art. 4476-15, § 1.02(8)1. The Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled that these are mutually exclusive ways in which delivery of a controlled substance might occur. Conaway, 738 S.W.2d at 694. The majority ignores this distinction by merging constructive transfer with actual transfer.
Under the law of parties, the State offered proof that Valladares was guilty of delivery of marihuana by constructive transfer or offer to sell. Valladares was charged in a three paragraph indictment alleging all three types of delivery. The State, however, abandoned the paragraphs alleging constructive transfer and offer to sell and elected to go to trial on the actual delivery charge. Thus, actual delivery was the only portion of the indictment read to the jury, and the court’s charge to the jury contained only the actual transfer provi*278sion.2 The State was, therefore, bound to prove delivery of marihuana by actual transfer beyond a reasonable doubt. See Conaway, 738 S.W.2d at 694.
The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the elements of delivery of a controlled substance in Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). In this opinion, the Court quotes Black’s Law Dictionary 385-86 (5th ed. 1979), stating that “[a]ctual delivery consists in giving real possession to the vendee or his servants or special agents who are identified with him in law and represent him” (emphasis added). They further quote Black’s Law Dictionary to define constructive delivery as “a general term, comprehending all those acts which, although not truly conferring a real possession of the thing sold on the vendee, have been held, by construction of law, equivalent to acts of real delivery” (emphasis added). The Court in Daniels also quotes Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 329 (3rd ed. 1969) which defines delivery as:
a handing over; the surrender of possession to another
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For some purposes, a delivery is accomplished by nothing more than making a thing available to another, placing it within his reach, notwithstanding there is no actual handing of the thing from one person to another.
Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d at 220.
At first blush, the definition of delivery in Ballentine’s Law Dictionary suggests that an actual transfer did occur in the present case because the two bags of marihuana were within Anguiano’s reach. However, the portion of the definition setting out delivery to mean “placing it within his reach” begins with the words “[f]or some purposes.” These introductory words indicate that this is limited to certain types of delivery. As stated supra, delivery is first defined as “a handing over; the surrender of possession to another.” The Court in Daniels used the second part of the definition to determine constructive transfer, not actual transfer.
Actual transfer and constructive transfer were distinguished in Williams v. State, 783 S.W.2d 301 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.). The court in Williams stated that an actual-transfer occurs when “the person associated with the contraband has possession and control over it.” Constructive transfer occurs when “the person associated with the contraband does not have possession of the contraband; rather, the person only has control over the contraband.” Williams, at 302.
The majority holds that the essential fact of delivery was completed in the present case even though the recipient obtained possession after Valladares’ arrest. The majority relies on a Florida case, Newman v. State, 522 So.2d 71 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988). There has been no Texas case in which a court has allowed conduct occurring after the arrest to establish delivery. The taking of the contraband after the arrest is a police seizure and cannot be construed as the conduct of a purchaser or recipient of the contraband. This seizure by the police can be made without the consent or agreement of the transferor and cannot be construed as a completion of a voluntary act of the defendant.
Furthermore, in Newman v. State, 522 So.2d 71, the court is endeavoring to determine if there was an actual, constructive or attempted transfer of a controlled substance. The court concluded that at the very least, the facts in the case supported a constructive delivery. In Texas, we cannot take our choice out of the three methods. Instead, we must determine if the State proved the method with which the defendant was charged and on which he was tried.
*279The majority correctly states that the focus of the statute’s prohibition against delivery of a controlled substance is on the actor — the transferor — not the transferee. However, in order to determine the type of delivery that occurred, the focus must be on what acts of delivery were completed between the transferor and the transferee. The majority opinion provides that an actual delivery can occur even though the transferee does not have possession of the controlled substance. This contradicts the Court of Criminal Appeals which held that “actual transfer” consists of completely transferring the real possession and control of a controlled substance from one person to another person. Nevarez v. State, 767 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), quoting Conaway, 738 S.W.2d at 695.
The majority states that by requiring the transferee to obtain physical possession before an actual delivery has occurred confuses actual or constructive transfer with actual or constructive custody. The majority misinterprets the holding in Queen v. State, 662 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). In Queen, the Court of Criminal Appeals was deciding whether an indictment, which did not contain the words “actual transfer” or “constructive transfer,” was sufficient to put a defendant on notice as to the type of delivery the State was required to prove. The Court held that an indictment containing the words “actual custody” constitutes an allegation of delivery by actual transfer. Queen v. State, 662 S.W.2d at 341. The Court in Queen further stated that an indictment alleging that the defendant had transferred marihuana “into a motor vehicle within the care and control and custody” of the officer charged the defendant with delivery by constructive transfer. Queen, 662 S.W.2d at 341. The Court held that where there is no material difference between the language of the statute and the language of the indictment, an indictment which alleges all of the requisite elements of the particular offense is not deficient simply because it fails to “precisely track the language of the statute.” Queen, 662 S.W.2d at 341. The language quoted by the majority in the present case concerning the concept of constructive custody comes from the dissent in Queen.
The majority opinion provides that an actual delivery can occur by putting the collateral in the recipient’s legal custody or by making the contraband available to the recipient even though the recipient does not obtain physical possession of it. The majority fails to distinguish between constructive transfer and actual transfer. Constructive transfer is not limited to transactions through live intermediaries. See Davila v. State, 664 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim. App.1984). A constructive transfer may take several forms: the actor may constructively transfer narcotics to the intended recipient by entrusting the narcotics to an associate or the postal service for the delivery to the recipient, or the actor may place the contraband in a particular location and then advise the recipient of this location so that the recipient can retrieve the narcotics. Queen v. State, 662 S.W.2d at 340; Rasmussen v. State, 608 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980)
The recipient does not have to physically touch the contraband in order for the trans-feror to be charged with delivery by actual transfer as suggested in the majority opinion. When the transferee takes control and possession of the container, the requirements of actual transfer are satisfied. For example, in the case of Phillips v. State, 704 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1986, pet. ref’d), an actual delivery was accomplished by the recipient’s handling of garbage bags which contained the contraband.
The case of Flores v. State, 754 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.), is in point with the present case. In Flores, the defendant displayed the marihuana to the undercover officers, but the contraband at all times remained in the trunk of the brown car belonging to the defendant. The court held that since the officers never removed the marihuana, they never had real possession or control over it. Thus, there was no actual delivery.
Contrary to the majority’s opinion, delivery of keys to Anguiano did not constitute *280actual delivery.3 At most, possession of the keys might be construed as having control over the contraband, but this fulfills only the requirement of a constructive delivery, not an actual delivery. In the case of Queen v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed a fact situation dealing with the delivery of keys. In the Queen case, the defendant took the officer’s van key, drove the van to the home of a codefendant and loaded it with 100 pounds of marihuana. The defendant then drove the van back to the parking lot of the motel where the officer was staying, reentered the officer’s motel room, and handed the keys back to him. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that handing the keys to the officer was a constructive delivery. See also Pena v. State, 776 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd). In the present ease, delivery of keys accompanied by a viewing of controlled substance is not evidence that establishes an actual transfer.
Following the holdings of the Court of Criminal Appeals, the evidence in the present case is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Therefore, the judgment of the conviction should be reversed and reformed to show acquittal.

. This section is now found in Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(8) (Vernon 1990).

. The jury charge defined delivery as the "actual or constructive transfer from one person to another of marihuana, whether or not there is an agency relationship.” The portion of the jury charge which applied the law to the facts only authorized a conviction if the jury found "actual transfer" of marihuana. Expansive, preliminary definitions do not override the specificity of subsequent portions of the charge. Lacy v. State, 782 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.); Pulgarin v. State, 635 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.).

. In civil cases, the delivery of keys to personal property is construed as a constructive delivery of the object. See 38 C.J.S. Gifts § 22 (1943). For examples, see In re Estate of Stahl, 13 Ill. App.3d 680, 301 N.E.2d 82 (1973), and Banks v. Harvey, 98 Ga.App. 196, 105 S.E.2d 341 (1958).