Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2024-03-08 16:02:09.579203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:27.737032
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USCA11 Case: 23-10989    Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 03/08/2024   Page: 1 of 17

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10989
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        THADDEUS RHODES,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00073-AT-LTW-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10989

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Thaddeus Rhodes appeals his convictions for nine counts of
        Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and five
        counts of carrying or using a firearm during or in relation to a crime
        of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (ii). On ap-
        peal, Rhodes argues that he should not have been convicted of any
        Hobbs Act robberies or § 924(c) counts because Hobbs Act robbery
        is not a predicate offense for a § 924(c) conviction following the Su-
        preme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845
        (2022). Additionally, Rhodes argues that because completed
        Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, the district court
        erred when it instructed the jury that Hobbs Act robbery could be
        completed through fear of economic harm. He further argues that
        there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions for his
        Hobbs Act robbery and § 924(c) convictions because the govern-
        ment’s case was based on circumstantial evidence and there was no
        evidence that the robber used a real gun during the robberies. For
        the following reasons, we affirm.
                                       I.
               Rhodes was charged in an indictment with several counts
        Hobbs Act robbery in violation of § 1951(a) (Counts One, Three,
        Five, Seven, Nine, Eleven, Thirteen, Fourteen, and Sixteen) and car-
        rying or using a ﬁrearm during or in relation to a crime of violence
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        23-10989               Opinion of the Court                         3

        in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A) and (ii) (Counts Two, Four, Six, Eight,
        Ten, Twelve, and Fifteen).
                Before trial, Rhodes moved to dismiss the § 924(c) counts on
        the basis that Hobbs Act robbery was not a predicate crime of vio-
        lence that can support a conviction under § 924(c) following United
        States v. Taylor. In relevant part, Rhodes argued that Taylor abro-
        gated this Court’s precedent as to whether completed Hobbs Act
        robbery was a crime of violence. Rhodes also argued that the
        standard Hobbs Act robbery instruction was overbroad because it
        can be committed by causing fear of purely economic harm to non-
        tangible property. Following a pretrial hearing on Rhodes’s mo-
        tion, the district court denied the motion, ﬁnding that there was a
        diﬀerence between completed and attempted Hobbs Act robbery.
               The case proceeded to trial. The government called
        Amanda Lawson, who worked in 2017 at a Dollar General store in
        Ellenwood, Georgia, who testiﬁed to the following. On October
        19, 2017, an individual who Lawson described as a black male with
        a tissue over his face entered the store with a gun and told Lawson
        to give him money. After the robbery, Lawson saw the individual
        get into a white Nissan Altima. Through Lawson’s testimony, the
        government entered video and images from the robbery.
               Francenia Brown, who worked at a Family Dollar store in
        Ellenwood in 2017, testiﬁed to the following. On November 27,
        2017, a black male with a black handgun came into the store and
        asked Brown for everything out of the store’s safe. During the rob-
        bery, the robber lifted up his sweater and showed her that he had a
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10989

        gun. Brown saw the robber leave in a silver compact car. The gov-
        ernment admitted video of the robbery and of the robber leaving
        the store through Brown’s testimony.
               Egypt Singh, who worked in a Metro PCS store during Jan-
        uary 2018, then testiﬁed to the following. Singh was working one
        day in January 2018 when the store was robbed. The robber was a
        black male with a napkin over his face and showed Singh a black
        gun, asking for money. The government entered video footage of
        the robbery through Singh’s testimony. Chelsea Crisp, another for-
        mer employee at that Metro PCS store, similarly testiﬁed about this
        robbery and testiﬁed that the robber had almond-shaped brown
        eyes.
               Debra Ledford, an employee at a Dollar General store in
        Stockbridge, Georgia, then testiﬁed to the following. On January
        10, 2018, Ledford was working when a black male came in wearing
        scrubs and a paper towel over his face and robbed the store. The
        robber pulled up his shirt and showed her that he had a black gun.
               Mashea Mays, who worked at a Little Caesars store in Janu-
        ary 2018, then testiﬁed to the following. On January 22, 2018, a
        black man with almond-shaped eyes wearing a Quick Trip napkin
        covering his face robbed the store. The robber, who was wearing
        a black hoodie, a red baseball cap, and black pants, lifted his shirt to
        show Mays he had a gun. Mays saw the man leave in a silver Nissan.
               Ashley Bennett, a former worker at a Sally Beauty Supply
        store in Kennesaw, Georgia, then testiﬁed to the following. On Feb-
        ruary 2, 2018, the Sally Beauty Supply store was robbed by a black
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        23-10989              Opinion of the Court                        5

        male who was wearing a napkin over his face and had a black gun
        tucked into his pants. Kayla Kohler, another Sally Beauty Supply
        store worker who was at the store on the day of the robbery, also
        testiﬁed about this robbery; through Kohler’s testimony, the gov-
        ernment entered a photo that Kohler took of the Nissan Altima
        that the robber got into after the robbery.
               Then, Valeria Rodriguez, who previously worked at a Food
        Depot store in Norcross, Georgia, testiﬁed to the following. On
        February 15, 2018, a black male with a paper towel covering most
        of his face came into the store. Rodriguez noticed that the male
        looked like he had a gun. The male walked down a store aisle with
        medicines and exaggerated being sick. The male also approached
        her and asked for money. Through Rodriguez’s testimony, the gov-
        ernment entered video footage of the man and photographs of the
        man in the car he drove away in.
               Veronica Gonzalez, a former worker at a Cricket Wireless
        store in Norcross, testiﬁed to the following. On June 28, 2018, Gon-
        zalez was working when a black male with his face covered robbed
        the store. The robber pointed at something in his pocket and then
        pointed at her, another worker, and a customer, telling them all to
        go to the back of the store. Gonzalez gave him all the cash in the
        register and wallets from the back. The item in the robber’s pocket
        was silver or black, but Gonzalez was not sure which color it was.
        Maria Fonseca then testiﬁed similarly about this robbery.
             The government next called Joshua Brown, a former Gwin-
        net County Police Department oﬃcer, who testiﬁed that he
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        6                     Opinion of the Court               23-10989

        responded to a car accident on August 3, 2018. The accident in-
        volved Rhodes, who was driving a silver Nissan Altima.
               Then, Glen Harbin, a Federal Bureau of Investigation
        (“FBI”) oﬃcer, testiﬁed to the following. On February 21, 2019,
        Harbin was collecting evidence and searched a home in Decatur,
        Georgia; this search was connected to a Hobbs Act robbery case.
        Harbin took photographs of cell phones he found in that home, of
        a piece of mail addressed to Rhodes with the same address as the
        searched home, and of a red hat.
                Bradley Rhoden, a special agent with the FBI in 2019, then
        testiﬁed as follows. On February 21, 2019, the FBI had an arrest
        and search warrant for Rhodes. Through Rhoden’s testimony, the
        government entered the following evidence (1) a photograph of a
        closet in an apartment Rhoden searched that had a Ruger handgun
        box; (2) a close-up photograph of the Ruger box; (3) a Ruger hand-
        gun that was found in the closet; and (4) photographs of that gun.
        Rhoden also found a BB pistol in the same closet and collected a
        black hooded sweatshirt during the search.
               The government also called George McGee, who testiﬁed
        that he had conducted the cell phone extraction of Rhodes’s phone.
        McGee later testiﬁed that he made a video of an extraction he did
        of one of the phones that were found. The name of the Gmail
        account found on the phone was “thaddeus.rhodes.” Through
        McGee’s testimony, the government introduced photographs that
        were stills from the video he took, chats and messages he found on
        the device, and a Google search for “man wanted for armed” found
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        23-10989               Opinion of the Court                        7

        on the device. The photographs included pictures of Rhodes wear-
        ing a black sweatshirt, pictures of him wearing red shorts, as well
        as pictures of a black Ruger gun and of the back and license plate
        of Rhodes’s Nissan Altima. The photographs also contained vari-
        ous pictures Rhodes took of himself on his phone.
               Then, James Berni, a special agent for the FBI, testiﬁed as
        follows. Berni made a report regarding two cell phones and a
        Gmail account that were attributed to Rhodes. Rhodes generally
        testiﬁed as to the cell phones and Gmail account being pinged near
        the stores on the days the robberies occurred at each store.
               Laquintus Perry, a forensic accountant with the FBI, re-
        viewed and analyzed Rhodes’s Wells Fargo bank statements.
        Perry testiﬁed as to amounts that Rhodes deposited into those ac-
        counts following the robberies.
               And the government ﬁnally called Paul Costa, a special agent
        with the FBI, who testiﬁed to the following. Costa investigated the
        nine armed robberies charged against Rhodes and noticed the mo-
        dus operandi was consistent among the robberies—i.e., the physi-
        cal description of a black male with a tissue or napkin over his face
        who wore hooded sweatshirts, the presence of a handgun, and the
        robber’s getaway car being a silver or white four-door sedan that
        was sometimes identiﬁed as a Nissan. Based on the getaway car’s
        description, he requested from the Georgia Bureau of Investiga-
        tion a spreadsheet of owners of silver Nissan Altimas. When re-
        viewing the records, Costa saw a photo of Rhodes and thought
        Rhodes, who had a silver Nissan Altima registered in his name, ﬁt
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10989

        the physical description of the robber. Costa also noticed that
        Rhodes’s car windows were tinted just like the Nissan Altima pic-
        tured at the Food Depot robbery on February 15, 2018. Costa
        noted that, during the search of Rhodes’s phone, pictures of a
        Ruger pistol and a Smith & Wesson gun were found. Costa also
        testiﬁed about messages on Rhodes’s phone to “Al UPS,” which in-
        dicated that he was not at work on days the robberies charged
        against Rhodes occurred.
               During the government’s case, the district court held a jury
        charging session. The district court stated that the issue was the
        relationship between the Hobbs Act charge and the § 924(c) charge.
        The district court explained that the Eleventh Circuit Judicial
        Council adopted the charge that it would give. The court then
        went through the jury instruction for deﬁning the oﬀenses charged.
        The government then objected to the § 924(c) charge instructions
        because the instruction did not include the entire deﬁnition of a
        ﬁrearm that was located in the pattern instruction and requested
        that the whole instruction be included. In response, Rhodes argued
        that a BB gun was not a ﬁrearm in the context of a § 924(c) charge.
        The government responded by pointing to United States v. Hunt, 187
        F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), arguing that, under Hunt, it was not re-
        quired to prove that the gun used was not a toy but that it was for
        the jury to weigh the evidence and determine if it was a gun. After
        additional argument, Rhodes again objected to the court not giving
        a BB gun instruction. The court stated that it took that under ad-
        visement. Rhodes, however, did not object to the Hobbs Act rob-
        bery instruction.
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        23-10989              Opinion of the Court                        9

               After the government rested, Rhodes moved for a judgment
        of acquittal on all counts, arguing that there was insuﬃcient evi-
        dence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any
        of the robberies at issue in the case. The district court denied
        Rhodes’s motion. Rhodes objected to the court’s ruling and then
        rested. Following closing arguments, Rhodes reminded the district
        court about his motion in limine seeking to dismiss the § 924(c)
        counts, which the district court denied.
               The district court then instructed the jury. As relevant to
        this appeal, the court instructed the jury that Hobbs Act robbery is
        deﬁned as:
              One, that the defendant knowingly acquired some-
              one else’s personal property; two, that the defendant
              took the property against the victim’s will by using
              actual or threatened force or violence or causing the
              victim to fear harm either immediately or in the fu-
              ture; and, three, that the defendant's actions ob-
              structed, delayed, or aﬀected interstate commerce.
        The instruction continued that “[f ]ear means a state of anxious
        concern, alarm, or anticipation of harm. It includes the fear of ﬁ-
        nancial loss as well as fear of physical violence.” The jury ulti-
        mately found Rhodes guilty on all counts.
              Following trial, the government moved to dismiss Counts
        Four and Eight. The district court granted the motion. Rhodes
        was then sentenced to 420 months and 1 day of imprisonment.
        This appeal ensued.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                23-10989

                                       II.
               Rhodes ﬁrst argues that he should not have been convicted
        because Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate oﬀense for a § 924(c)
        conviction following the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor.
        Whether an oﬀense is a crime of violence under § 924(c) is a ques-
        tion of law that we review de novo. United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th
        1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 2023).
               Section 924(c) prohibits the use, carrying, or possession of a
        ﬁrearm during and in relation to or in furtherance of “any crime
        of violence or drug traﬃcking crime” and provides for a manda-
        tory consecutive sentence for any defendant who uses a ﬁrearm
        during a crime of violence. Section 924(c)’s “elements clause” de-
        ﬁnes a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has as an element the
        use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
        person or property of another.” § 924(c)(3)(A).
               Here, Rhodes was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery in viola-
        tion of § 1951. Hobbs Act robbery criminalizes:
               the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property
               from the person or in the presence of another, against
               his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or vi-
               olence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his
               person or property, . . . , or the person or property
               of . . . anyone in his company at the time of the . . .
               obtaining.
        § 1951(a), (b)(1).
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        23-10989                Opinion of the Court                         11

                In In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), we con-
        cluded that Hobbs Act robbery “clearly” qualiﬁes as a crime of vi-
        olence under § 924(c)’s elements clause, noting that it “has as an
        element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
        against the person or property of another.” Id. at 1340–41 (quoting
        § 924(c)(3)(A)). Subsequently, in United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d
        335 (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by Taylor, 596 U.S.
        845, we held that, pursuant to § 924(c)’s elements clause in § 924(c)
        and Saint Fleur, Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence because
        “[a] conviction for Hobbs Act robbery by deﬁnition requires ‘actual
        or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or fu-
        ture, to person or property,’” noting that § 924(c)’s elements clause
        referred “to the ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
        force against person or property.’” Id. at 348 (alteration adopted)
        (emphasis removed) (ﬁrst quoting § 1951(b)(1); then quoting
        § 924(c)(3)(A)). In holding so, we reasoned that there was no “‘re-
        alistic probability’ that Hobbs Act robbery could encompass nonvi-
        olent conduct.” Id. at 350 (quoting United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135,
        140 (2d Cir. 2016)). We determined that there was no “plausible
        scenario” in which the Hobbs Act applied to a robbery “that did not
        involve, at a minimum, a threat to use physical force,” or a situation
        “in which a Hobbs Act robber could take property from the victim
        against his will and by putting the victim in fear of injury (to his
        person or property) without at least threatening to use physical
        force capable of causing such injury.” Id.
              The Supreme Court in Taylor held that, under the categorial
        approach, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10989

        predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause. 596
        U.S. at 851. The Court explained that, to prove attempted Hobbs
        Act robbery, the government must show that the defendant in-
        tended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of
        actual or threatened force and completed a “substantial step” to-
        ward that end. Id. But the Court noted that, to show a substantial
        step, the government need not show that the defendant actually
        used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force, as required
        by § 924(c). Id. Thus, the Court abrogated our holding in St. Hubert
        that attempted Hobbs Act robbery satisﬁed § 924(c)’s elements
        clause.
               However, following Taylor, we have found that “Taylor did
        not disturb our holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a
        crime of violence.” Wiley, 78 F.4th at 1365. Under the prior prece-
        dent rule, we must adhere to our past decisions unless a prior
        panel’s decision has been overruled or abrogated by the Supreme
        Court or by us sitting en banc. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347,
        1352 (11th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246,
        1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the intervening Supreme
        Court decision must be clearly on point and “actually abrogate or
        directly conﬂict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of
        the prior panel”).
               We are bound by the prior precedent rule to apply Wiley; as
        such, Rhodes’s argument is foreclosed by our precedent. There-
        fore, the district court did not err when it found that completed
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        23-10989                Opinion of the Court                         13

        Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. Accordingly, we aﬃrm
        as to this issue.
                                        III.
               Rhodes next argues that, in St. Hubert, we did not consider
        the argument that this Court’s Pattern Oﬀense Instruction 70.3
        conﬁrmed that Hobbs Act robbery did not require the use or
        threatened use of violent force against property. Thus, Rhodes
        says, because completed Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of vio-
        lence, the district court erred when it instructed the jury that
        Hobbs Act robbery could be completed through fear of economic
        harm.
                We normally review the legal accuracy of jury instructions
        de novo. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).
        But where the defendant makes no speciﬁc objection to the jury
        charge at trial, we review the claim for plain error. United States v.
        Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 (11th Cir. 1997). And, under the doctrine
        of invited error, we will not address, even for plain error, the merits
        of an error that the appellant invited or induced the district court
        to make. United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006).
        Where a party agrees with a court’s proposed jury instructions, in-
        vited error applies. See United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1240
        (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1337 (11th
        Cir. 2005).
               Here, Rhodes did not object to the jury instructions on the
        basis of this argument during the jury charging session. And, when
        prompted by the district court as to whether there were any
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10989

        objections to the jury instructions, Rhodes replied that his only ob-
        jection was to the intent to aﬀect interstate commerce section and
        that he had no other objections. Given Rhodes’s aﬃrmative ac-
        ceptance of the jury instructions, he invited any claimed error. See
        Silvestri, 409 F.3d at 1337. But even if we were to review for plain
        error, we would aﬃrm as to this issue. Indeed, our precedent holds
        that completed Hobbs Act robbery satisﬁes § 924(c)’s elements
        clause, see Wiley, 78 F.4th at 1365, and Rhodes’s argument that we
        may have overlooked a particular argument has no force under the
        prior precedent rule, see In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir.
        2015) (“We have held that ‘a prior panel precedent cannot be cir-
        cumvented or ignored on the basis of arguments not made to or
        considered by the prior panel.’” (quoting Tippitt v. Reliance Standard
        Life Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2006))). Further, Rhodes
        has not identiﬁed any precedent from this Court or the Supreme
        Court holding that this Court’s pattern jury instruction for Hobbs
        Act robbery is improper. See United States v. Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585,
        588 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, even reviewing for plain error, Rhodes’s
        argument fails.
               Accordingly, we aﬃrm as to this issue.
                                       IV.
              Finally, Rhodes argues that there was not suﬃcient evidence
        to support his convictions for his Hobbs Act robbery and § 924(c)
        convictions. In response, the government asserts that there is suf-
        ﬁcient evidence connecting Rhodes to each of the robberies for
        which he was convicted.
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        23-10989               Opinion of the Court                        15

                We review de novo whether there was suﬃcient evidence to
        support a conviction. United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284
        (11th Cir. 2009). In reviewing the suﬃciency of the evidence, we
        view the record in the light most favorable to the government, re-
        solving all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. Id. The
        evidence will be suﬃcient to support a conviction if “a reasonable
        trier of fact could ﬁnd that the evidence established guilt beyond a
        reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1284-85 (quoting United States v. Calhoon,
        97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996)).
               The test for suﬃciency is the same, regardless of whether
        the evidence is direct or circumstantial, but where the government
        relied on circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences must sup-
        port the conviction. United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 587 (11th
        Cir. 2015). We will assume that the jury resolved all questions of
        credibility in a manner supporting the verdict. Jiminez, 564 F.3d at
        1285. Additionally, the evidence need not exclude every reasonable
        hypothesis of innocence for a reasonable jury to ﬁnd guilt beyond
        a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1545
        (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Instead, the jury is free to choose among
        alternative, reasonable interpretations of the evidence. Id.
               For example, in United States v. Hunt, 187 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.
        1999), we held that a conviction for brandishing a gun during the
        commission of a crime under § 924(c) “may be sustained by lay wit-
        ness testimony that a defendant carried or used a gun.” Id. at 1270.
        The evidence in Hunt included witness testimony that Hunt pos-
        sessed a ﬁrearm during a bank robbery, including one witness’s
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                23-10989

        testimony that Hunt “cocked the gun” in her face. Id. We deter-
        mined that the government did not have to “show to a scientiﬁc
        certainty that a defendant is carrying a device that ﬁres projectiles
        by means of an explosive,” nor did it have to oﬀer the gun into ev-
        idence or present expert witness testimony identifying the object
        as a ﬁrearm. Id. Subsequently, in United States v. Woodruﬀ, 296 F.3d
        1041 (11th Cir. 2002), we applied Hunt in aﬃrming a defendant’s
        § 924(c) conviction, even though the ﬁrearm was not in evidence,
        based upon the witness testimony about the weapon. See id. at
        1049.
               Here, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
        government, we ﬁnd that there was suﬃcient evidence to support
        Rhodes’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and using a ﬁrearm
        during or in relation to a crime of violence. First, there was evi-
        dence showing that Rhodes owned a silver Nissan Altima, which
        matched the description of the car that the robber used to get away
        from the scene of the robberies. A search of Rhodes’s residence
        revealed that he had a black handgun in a closet, matching the
        handgun described by the witnesses to the robberies. Further,
        Rhodes was either late to, or called out of, work on all the days of
        the robberies, and his cell phone was pinged within the general vi-
        cinity of the robbery locations around the time of the robberies.
        And Rhodes made various cash deposits into his bank accounts cor-
        responding with the dates the robberies occurred. Second, there
        was suﬃcient evidence showing that Rhodes was carrying or using
        a ﬁrearm during the robberies. Indeed, the witnesses from the
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        23-10989             Opinion of the Court                     17

        diﬀerent robberies testiﬁed that the robber showed them what they
        perceived to be a gun.
              The jury could reasonably interpret the evidence described
        above to ﬁnd Rhodes guilty. Accordingly, there was suﬃcient evi-
        dence that the jury could have used to reasonably conclude that
        Rhodes committed all nine robberies. We thus aﬃrm as to this is-
        sue.
                                       V.
              For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Rhodes’s convictions.
              AFFIRMED.