Court Opinion

ID: 9672949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:03:10.191697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.420483
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the failure to credit a state jail felon with time served pursuant to a probation revocation warrant violates the Texas Constitution. We have held that denying credit for time served pending appeal violates due process. Ex parte Griffith, 457 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1970). And we have held that denying credit for time served pending a motion to revoke parole violates the Texas Constitution. Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Crim. App.1988). Analogies are drawn between the situation in this case and the situations in Griffith and Canada.1 In my opinion, there is a marked distinction between the appeal situation and the state jail probation revocation situation.
When credit for time served pending an appeal is optional, an inmate must choose between, on the one hand, forgoing the appeal and, on the other, risking spending virtually unlimited time in confinement without receiving credit for it. Such a defendant not only has no control over how long the appeal will take, he has no way of confidently approximating how long it will take, and thus he cannot competently weigh the advantages *579of the different courses of action. Pursuing an appeal in such a situation would be a risky proposition; one can easily imagine an inmate waiving his appeal in order to avoid the possibility of serving years of uncredited time in confinement.
When credit for time served pursuant to a state jail felony probation revocation warrant is optional, the defendant knows what he risks by not waiving the probation revocation hearing. He risks twenty days of uncredited confinement, at most. This is because Art. 42.12 Sec. 21(b),Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., requires the court to hold a hearing on the motion to revoke within twenty days of the filing of the motion.
If an inmate confined pursuant to a motion to revoke probation were subject to unlimited non-credited time, he would be in a situation comparable to that of the inmate wishing to appeal. But Art. 42.12 Sec. 21(b) and Art. 42.12 Sec. 15(h)(2), when considered together, avoid any constitutional problem because the inmate’s decision whether to avail himself of a hearing is not overly burdened by the fact that there is a possibility that he will not get credit for a relatively minimal amount of time served. His choice, unlike that of the inmate wishing to appeal, is between known options, and the risk of uncredited time is not great enough to tempt one who wants to litigate the motion to forgo his right to a hearing. By requiring a prompt hearing on the motion to revoke probation, the legislature has successfully avoided the constitutional problem in the appeal scenario. I would hold that Art. 42.12 Sec. 15(h)(2) does not violate the Texas Constitution, and that whether to award credit for time served by a state jail felon in a county jail pursuant to a motion to revoke probation is optional with the trial court.2
Nevertheless, by the combination of the two statutes, the legislature has shown an intent to limit the non-credit exposure of an inmate confined pursuant to a motion to revoke probation. In order to give effect to that intent, I would hold that if a hearing is not held within twenty days from the filing of the motion, an inmate is entitled to credit for time served beyond the statutory twenty days. In this case, applicant was confined pursuant to a motion to revoke probation from July 1, 1997, until October 28, 1997. I would hold that he is entitled to credit for the period from July 21, 1997, to October 28, 1997.
MeCORMICK, P.J., and HOLLAND, J., join.

. Because the holding in Canada was derived from the holding in Griffith, I will not at this point explain why Canada does not mandate the holding of the majority, other than to say this: I question whether the failure to give credit for time served pending a motion to revoke parole actually does violate the Texas Constitution, but even assuming that to be so, the statutes governing revocation of parole differ in ways I believe are significant from those pertinent to the issue in this case.

. In Canada, we noted that there is no federal constitutional right to credit for time served between arrest and sentence. 754 S.W.2d at 665. We also said in that case that it appears that there is no federal constitutional right to time credit for any period of confinement pending a parole revocation hearing. We quoted, "The State contends that if a parole revocation hearing is required, a parolee can endure a reasonable period of confinement awaiting determination of his delinquency without receiving credit for said period of confinement on his sentence. We agree. This action does not reach Constitutional proportions.” 754 S.W.2d at 666 fn. 5, citing Ivy v. State of Alabama, 381 F.Supp. 503 (S.D.Ala. 1974).