Court Opinion

ID: 9957296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 07:17:50.69724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:14.406121
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                         EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                              EL PASO, TEXAS

    ESTEBAN MANZASNARAS-WENCES,                                §                  No. 08-23-00108-CR

                                        Appellant,             §                      Appeal from the

    v.                                                         §              216th Judicial District Court

    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                        §               of Gillespie County, Texas

                                        Appellee.              §                      (TC# DC8126)

                                                       OPINION

           On March 8, 2023, a jury found appellant Esteban Manzasnaras-Wences guilty of the first-

degree felony offense of murder with a deadly weapon, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1),

ultimately recommending a sentence of life in prison and the imposition of a $10,000 fine. The

trial court rendered a final judgment of conviction consistent with that recommendation.

           Appellant was convicted of murdering Jesus Herrera Resendez. On appeal, his sole

contention is that the trial court abused its discretion during the guilt phase of trial by admitting

evidence that a ten-year-old girl (the Girl) also sustained a gunshot wound during the commission

of the offense. 1 Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.

1
    To protect the identity of the minor, we used generic descriptors for some of the participants.
                           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         The homicide that resulted in this prosecution and appeal arose from an altercation

following a family visit to the Pedernales River on Memorial Day weekend in 2021. 2 At the time,

Appellant was an ex-boyfriend of the Girl’s mother (Mother), and Mother was driving back from

the river. Also in the vehicle were Resensdez, the Girl, the Girl’s younger brother, and Mother’s

sister. Appellant was not in the vehicle but, according to multiple witnesses, he approached the

vehicle when Mother pulled into the driveway before anyone had exited that vehicle. It is

undisputed that Appellant fired multiple rounds into the vehicle, striking and killing the Resendez

immediately and striking the Girl in her hip.

         As the altercation unfolded at the vehicle, 911 dispatchers began receiving calls regarding

the incident. The content of those calls was admitted into evidence through exhibits and testimony.

Callers described a chaotic, confusing, and rapidly changing scene. One caller reported that a male

adult was “beating the shit” out of someone. Multiple callers reported gunfire. Another caller

reported that at least one adult or child had been shot. Two callers reported that the shooter—later

identified as Appellant—had fled the scene in a gray sedan with a firearm in hand. When law

enforcement asked a dispatcher for clarification as to the number of victims, the dispatcher twice

responded that she was having difficulty ascertaining that information because the callers were

distraught and “hysterical.” The 911 dispatcher that answered the calls testified at trial and verified

substance and timing of those calls.

2
  Pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas, see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001,
this appeal was transferred to our Court from Fourth Court of Appeals, and we apply its precedent to the extent any
of its precedent conflicts with our own, see TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. The background facts are taken from undisputed
aspects of the record unless otherwise noted, see id. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B), and include only facts and rulings
necessary to dispose of the sole issue on appeal, see TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                                          2
       The Girl, 12 years old at the time of trial, testified that she made what was possibly the first

911 call from the back seat of the car when she saw Appellant open the car door with a gun. She

explained, however, that she was unable to complete her report because she dropped the phone

when she “passed out” after sustaining the gunshot injury. She testified that she heard multiple

shots fired before she passed out, that Appellant was the only one with a gun, that she “woke up”

briefly, saw her brother performing CPR, and “woke up again to find [her]self in [her] mother’s

hands.” She did not describe her mother’s state of distress, the nature of her injuries, or the pain

she suffered.

       Fredericksburg patrol officer Luke Smith testified that when the 911 calls began coming

in, he realized he was the officer nearest to the scene and proceeded to respond. He explained that

while in transit, he recognized a car that matched the suspect’s, pulled him over with the assistance

of a deputy sheriff, and conducted a “felony take down.” He then left the deputy to complete the

arrest and proceeded to the scene of the crime. Smith testified that he was “the first officer on the

scene.” He confirmed that a video saved to a thumb drive was his bodycam video from the scene

as he approached. Although the defense objected to any use of the bodycam video, the Court

overruled the objection and allowed the State to show the jury the first three and a half minutes of

that video, which reveal Smith approaching the scene to find three women in extreme distress near

a vehicle and a child on a ground. While the woman with the Girl moved away to allow Smith to

see the injury, the two other women were cradling Resendez and preventing Smith from seeing or

examining him. Smith repeatedly asked the women to describe the injuries, but they continued

crying and blocking his view. When he finally coaxed the women away from the vehicle, he saw

Resendez, radioed dispatch, and requested two ambulances after reporting Resendez’s gunshot

                                                  3
wound to the head and describing him as unresponsive. Defense then suspended play of the video;

the jury did not see the remainder of the video until the sentencing phase of trial.

       The remaining evidence of the Girl’s injury, as admitted during the guilt-innocence phase

of trial, corroborated the evidence already described. One neighbor described observing “a bunch

of, like, fighting going on” before calling 911, to make her report. She did not mention the Girl’s

injury in her testimony. Another neighbor testified that she heard several “pops” before realizing

shots had been fired and calling 911. She did not mention the Girl’s injury in her testimony. A

nearby fireworks vendor testified that he called 911 after watching “a man and a woman arguing

and physically tussling behind a vehicle” and realizing that what he had mistaken for fireworks

was in fact gunfire. He did not refer to the Girl’s injury, as he said he was too “far away” to see

exactly what was happening.

       The Girl’s mother testified that she “ran to [her] daughter” after trying to prevent Appellant

from fleeing the scene; only then did she realize the Girl had been injured. She then explained that

her daughter was transported to a hospital before “very long,” while she and the other adults were

escorted to a police station. The Girl’s aunt testified—with respect to the Girl’s injury—that she

knew only that the Girl had sustained injury but knew no more than that because she was holding

the victim “the whole time.”

       A Fredericksburg police officer testified that he recovered the firearm used in the

commission of the crime when searching Appellant’s vehicle. Later in the trial, an expert witness

testified that the bullets removed from Resendez had been fired by that weapon.

       Fredericksburg fireman Harvey Lansford testified as to his arrival of the scene and

explained that there were two individuals that had sustained injury. He testified only as to the

                                                  4
injury to Resendez, explaining that the Girl was already being removed or had just been transported

from the scene when he arrived.

       A grand jury indicted the Appellant with murder with a deadly weapon, the case was then

tried to jury. Before, during, and after trial, defense repeatedly objected to “any reference” to the

Girl’s injuries and recovery. Counsel argued that any reference to the injury would violate Rules

402, 403, and 404 of the Rules of Evidence. The jury returned a verdict of guilty before

recommending a punishment of life in prison and the maximum fine. The court overruled all of

Appellant’s objections, denied a motion for new trial, and rendered a final judgment of conviction.

                      STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

       We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.

Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727,

736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the

“zone of reasonable disagreement.” Martinez, 327 S.W.3d at 736. Even so, because discretionary

abuses in a trial court’s evidentiary rulings are not of a constitutional dimension, any abuse “that

does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Taylor v. State,

268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under this standard, we will overturn the conviction

only if we determine the evidentiary decision had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict; we will not overturn a conviction “if we have fair assurance from

an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury, or had but slight

effect.” Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 592 & n.106.

                                                  5
                                                   DISCUSSION

         Appellant contends that any evidence of the Girl’s injury was inadmissible under Rules of

Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404. 3 In general, evidence is admissible only if relevant unless

otherwise deemed inadmissible by constitution, statute, or rule. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402.

Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be

without the evidence” and “is of consequence in determining the action.” See id. TEX. R. EVID.

401. That said, the trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of” “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue

delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” See id. TEX. R. EVID. 403. Evidence of

extraneous crimes, wrongs, or other acts are “not admissible to prove a person’s character in order

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” see id.

TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1); however, that evidence may be admissible to prove “motive opportunity,

intent preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident., see id.

TEX. R. EVID. (b)(2).

         A. Rules 401 and 402

         The trial court admitted limited evidence of the Girl’s injury during the guilt-innocence

phase, and that evidence is relevant. The State bore the burden to prove, beyond all reasonable

doubt, that Appellant committed this offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.01. That requires

proving that he—with intent to cause bodily injury—committed an acted clearly dangerous to

human life, resulting in the death of the victim. Id. § 19.02(b)(2); Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d

3
  At trial and again before this Court, Appellant does not consistently refer to the rules by name; however, it is clear
from the language used that he was objecting under Rules 401–404 and renews his challenge on appeal under those
same rules. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9.

                                                           6
377, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In this case, the State also bore the burden of proving that

Appellant used a deadly weapon in the commission of that offense.

       The Girl was the only witness to testify at trial that was not directly involved in the

confrontation in and around the occupied vehicle and that was able to see and hear everything that

led up to the shooting. She testified that she saw Appellant approach the vehicle with the deadly

weapon, recognized his intent, and called 911 for help. The jury, as the “ultimate arbiter” of the

evidence, see Woodfox v. State, 742 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc), was free

to reject the Girl’s testimony as to Appellant’s unprovoked approach and his intent, but that does

not make the evidence any less probative of the element of the offense. And while the State

certainly could have stopped the direct examination before asking the Girl about what happened

next—that she also sustained an injury—the jury would likely have been left wondering why the

State did not facilitate the rest of the Girl’s testimony or narrative. Cf. Inthalangsy v. State, 634

S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“A juror would naturally wonder what happened to

[witness] . . . and why she did not testify about what happened to her.”). The high court has

disapproved of these kinds of omissions. See id.

       The video that includes a brief image of the Girl lying on the ground is equally relevant.

The fact that she suffered severe abdominal injury from the gunshot wound is probative of whether

Appellant acted in a manner clearly dangerous to human life. Appellant, in his brief to this Court,

complains that the video depicts the Girl “writhing” on the ground in pain. That characterization

is not true to the three-and-a-half-minute excerpt shown to the jury. That excerpt reveals the Girl

lying still on the ground—her injury barely visible—before her mom picks her up and cradles her.

       Because the limited evidence of the Girl’s injury speaks to multiple elements of the offense,

we find Appellant’s arguments regarding relevance unpersuasive.

                                                   7
       B. Rules 403 and 404

       As we explained in a recent opinion, “Rule 403 does not allow the exclusion of evidence

just because it is prejudicial to the defendant; all evidence that a defendant is guilty is prejudicial

in this sense.” See Trevino v. State, No. 08-23-00111-CR, 2024 WL 339117, at *4 (Tex. App.—

El Paso Jan. 29, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “To fall within the scope

of Rule 403, the risk must be of unfair prejudice.” Id. (citing Maldonado v. State, 452 S.W.3d 898,

904 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)). “[U]nfair prejudice . . . speaks to the capacity of some

concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from

proof specific to the offense charged.” Id. (quoting Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2003), and citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)). “[T]he general

Rule 403 balancing test consider[s]: (1) the degree of probative value; (2) the potential for the

evidence to affect the jury in some irrational, indelible way; (3) the time the proponent needs to

develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Proo v. State, 587 S.W.3d

789, 817 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. ref’d) (quoting and citing Shuffield v. State, 189

S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “In evaluating whether the probative value of

photographs or video is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, [the court] may

considers several factors, including: the number of exhibits offered, their gruesomeness, their

detail, their size, whether they are black and white or color, whether they are close-up, and whether

the body depicted is naked or clothed.” Jackson v. State, No. 04-13-00911-CR, 2015 WL 505103,

at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 4, 2015, aff’d as modified) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (quoting Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). The trial court

may also consider any “other circumstances unique to the individual case.” Williams v. State, 301

S.W.3d 675, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

                                                  8
       With respect to the videos and the Girl’s testimony regarding her injury, these factors, taken

together, weigh in favor of admissibility. We have already discussed the probative value of that

evidence. Appellant argues that the State used evidence of the Girl’s injury to portray him as a

“scorned and hated man” and to inflame the jury. Yet Appellant provides no examples or legal

authority to support that argument, and in fact the record indicates that the State exercised every

means possible to limit the jury’s exposure to the Girl’s injury and any effect that exposure might

have. Conclusory statements like Appellant’s argument are not sufficient to demonstrate that the

disputed evidence affected the jury in some irrational or indelible manner. See, e.g., Williams v.

State, No. 12-22-00107-CR, 2023 WL 3914277, at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 8, 2023, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting argument regarding undue prejudice after

explaining that Appellant “d[id] not make any additional argument or cite any authorities in

support of his contention that crime scene photographs depicting a tearful person are categorically

more prejudicial than probative, and [the court] ha[d] found none”). The State needed little time

to develop and present the evidence: the entire trial spanned only a day and a half. Finally, with

multiple eyewitnesses to the offense, the State might not, strictly speaking, have needed the

evidence of the Girl’s injury to prove its case. That said, the court’s decision to admit the evidence

lies within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” Martinez, 327 S.W.3d at 736, and therefore

does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

       C. Harm

       Finally, because our review of the record reviews no abuse of discretion or error in the trial

court’s admission of the limited evidence of the Girl’s injury, and because Appellant has not

briefed this Court on harm, we need not address any harm that might have resulted from such an

abuse. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (outlining appellant’s briefing requirements), 44.2(b) (requiring

                                                  9
opinions to be as brief as practicable); Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008) (describing appellant’s burden of demonstrating harm when abuse or error is of non-

constitutional dimension); Guajardo v. Hitt, 562 S.W.3d 768, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (explaining briefing waiver).

                                            CONCLUSION

       Having reviewed the record and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission

of the contested evidence, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

                                              JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

March 28, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

                                                 10