Court Opinion

ID: 9544837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:02:21.000056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:42.350202
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The gravamen of defendant’s appeal is that the failure of the People to record and preserve the conversations with the informant resulted in the loss of exculpatory evidence and a denial of due process. Defendant is not challenging the search and seizure aspects of the eavesdrop under the Fourth Amendment or Colo. Const. Art. II, sec. 7, but rather invokes the Fourteenth Amendment and Colo. Const. Art. II, sec. 25. Therefore, People v. Velasquez, Colo., 641 P.2d 943 (1982) relied upon by the People is not dispositive.
Defendant concedes that although a court order to eavesdrop pursuant to § 16-15-101, et seq., C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), is not required when one party to the conversation consents thereto, nevertheless, the other protections built into the article must be complied with to achieve due process. Section 16 — 15-102(8)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) contains the following language:
*1096“The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by this section shall, if possible, be recorded on tape, wire, or other comparable device.”
Defendant then analogizes the failure to record the critical conversation with the informant to the failure of the People to collect and preserve a breath sample, as was the case in Garcia v. District Court, 197 Colo. 38, 589 P.2d 924 (1979).
The sound monitor used by the police officers was equipped with a recording device. It is undisputed that recording the conversations would have been simple and inexpensive. Here, the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the crimes for which he was convicted in depends, in substantial degree, upon the conversations. The evidence needed to determine whether defendant was the agent of the seller or of the buyer was contained in the intercepted conversation with the informant. Fundamental fairness, and thus due process required that the conversations be recorded and preserved.
As the court said in Garcia:
“The trial of a criminal case is not a game of fox and hounds in which the state attempts to outwit and trap a quarry. It is, instead, a sober search for truth, in which not only the resources of the defendant, but those readily available to the state must be put to work in aid of that search.” (citations omitted)
Thus, I would find that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of the eavesdropping officers. Their testimony to the conversations tended to enhance the informant’s version, even though the officers admitted that they had not preserved the contents therein by use of an immediate report or recording.
Based on the record before us, devoid of the eavesdroppers’ testimony, it cannot be said that the evidence establishes defendant’s guilt of sale of narcotic drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Germany v. People, 198 Colo. 337, 599 P.2d 904 (1979). I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial excluding the testimony of the police officers regarding the conversation.