Court Opinion

ID: 9850924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:16.726184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:45.652403
License: Public Domain

Rawlings, J.
I respectfully dissent.
I. Having in his possession a preliminary information only, but with no arrest warrant having been issued, a Fort Dodge police officer at about 9:00 p.m., went to defendant’s home located outside the city limits, and there arrested him. Sections 755.1, 755.2 and 755.7, Code, 1962; Hobbs v. Illinois Central R. Co., 182 Iowa 316, 339-342, 165 N.W. 912; Norton v. Mathers, 222 Iowa 1170, 1178, 271 N.W. 321; United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837, 840; Price v. United States, D. C., 119 A.2d 718, 719; and Swetnam v. F. W. Woolworth Company, 83 Ariz. 189, 318 P.2d 364, 366. The officer admits having then stated to defendant that he, the officer, had a warrant for arrest of defendant which representation was false.
No offense had been committed by defendant in the presence of this or any other officer.
Unquestionably defendant was a person of low mentality, having an I. Q. of 68, and was illiterate.
Without being first advised as to any of his fundamental rights, defendant was questioned at some length by the officer in the police car. At that time defendant denied guilt, was then taken to the Fort Dodge Police Station, and there again interrogated at length. He still denied guilt of the offense with which the officer accused him but, according to the officer, gave self-*794incriminatory statements as to prior familiarities with the child here concerned. More on this later.
No showing is made of any effort to take defendant before a magistrate, without unnecessary delay, and no reason appears for failing to do so. ,
Section 758.1, Code, 1962, provides as follows: “758.1 Disposition- of prisoner. When an arrest is made without a warrant, the person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay,- be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and the grounds on which the arrest was made shall be stated to the magistrate by affidavit, subscribed and sworn to by the person making the statement, in the same manner as upon a preliminary information, as nearly as may be.”
This is comparable to rule 5(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Then section 758.2, Code, 1962, provides: “758.2 Hearing before magistrate. If the magistrate believes from the statements in the affidavit that the offense charged is triable in the county in which the arrest was made, and there is sufficient ground for a trial or preliminary examination, as the case may require, and it will not be1 inconvenient for the witnesses on the part of the state that it should be had before him, he shall proceed as if the person arrested had been brought before him on arrest under a warrant, and, if the case be' one within his jurisdiction to try and determine, shall order an information to be filed against him.”
These Iowa laws have a wholesome and clear-cut purpose. As was said of rule 5(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 343, 344, 63 S. Ct. 608, 614, 87 L. Ed. 819, 825:
“The purpose of this impressively pervasive requirement of criminal procedure is plain. * * *' The' awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom .the criminal law relies for its vindication. Legislation such as this, requiring that the *795police must-with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons* constitutes an important safeguard— not only in assuring protection for the innocent.but also in securing conviction of the guilty'by methods that commend themselves' to a progressive and'self-confident society.' :For this procedural requirement cheeks resort to those reprehensible practices known' as the ‘third degree’ which, though universally rejected, as indefensible, still find their‘way .into'use; It aims, to-.avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons -accused of crime.” - ' ■ - - •
With due regard for any prior holdings of this court to the contrary, I honestly believe the case at hand demonstrates a need for strict compliance with sections 758.1 and 758.2 of. the Code. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449, 450-455, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1357-1359, 1 L. Ed.2d 1479; Morales v. United States (9 Cir.), 344 F.2d 846, 851; and Norton v. Mathers, 222 Iowa 1170, 1176, 271 N.W. 321.
II. But there is another factor in this , case which is even more disturbing. :
'As aforesaid defendant was questioned extensively in the: police car before being taken to the station: Clearly, any investigation had then focused on defendant.- -The proceedings had reached an accusatory stage. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 485, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1762, 12 L. Ed.2d 977. However, defendant was not at that time advised as to his right to remain silent, to have advice of counsel, or the effect of any statements he might make. In fact the record fails to disclose he was advised of any constitutional rights until after arrival at the station. Stated otherwise he was not timely advised.
During the critical period of interrogation in the police car, defendant denied guilt but a denial of guilt during interrogation before being advised as to rights, followed by confession or admissions after such advice, can be most damaging. Among other things, it serves to créate inconsistencies which'the prosecution may and usually does bring out on trial, with appropriate comments by the- prosecution. .
At the -station defendant was for the first timé told that what he might say could be used in court as evidence, and of his *796right to employ counsel. At that point defendant said nothing, and without waiting for or securing any answer the officer proceeded to question defendant at length. It is at best difficult to find an intelligent waiver by defendant of all fundamental rights, and particularly his right to remain silent. Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed.2d 106; Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 378 U. S. at 491, 84 S. Ct. at 1765, 12 L. Ed.2d at 986; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed.2d 653; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801; United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey (3 Cir.), 351 F.2d 429; and State v. Breaker, 178 Neb. 887, 136 N.W.2d 161. See also State v. Turner, Ore., 404 P.2d 187; People v. Schader, 62 Cal.2d 716, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361; and State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 395 P.2d 557, 398 P.2d 482.
The good faith of the arresting officer, the trial court, and the majority of this court is beyond question. However, the totality of the circumstances in this case leaves me no alternative but to express disapproval of the procedures adopted by the police officer, and the admission of defendant’s claimed confession.
It is my opinion defendant’s motion for a new trial should have been sustained.
Justices Thornton and Becker join in this dissent.