Court Opinion

ID: 9882494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:39.638091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:02.795406
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Worrell, 2023-Ohio-3110.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               AUGLAIZE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 2-23-03

        v.

MARK D. WORRELL,                                          OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                 Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. 2022-CR-0164

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                           Date of Decision: September 5, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Nick A. Catania for Appellant

        Benjamin R. Elder for Appellee
Case No. 2-23-03

WALDICK, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Mark Worrell (“Worrell”), appeals the judgment

of conviction and sentence entered in the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas

on January 13, 2023. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                       Procedural History and Relevant Facts

       {¶2} This case originated on December 15, 2022, when the Auglaize County

Grand Jury returned a three-count indictment against Worrell, charging him as

follows: Count 1 – Illegal Conveyance of Drugs of Abuse onto the Grounds of a

Specified Governmental Facility, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C.

2921.36(A)(2), alleged to have occurred on or about November 16, 2022; Count 2

– Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, a fifth-degree felony in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(11)(a), alleged to have occurred on or about November

17, 2022; and Count 3 – Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, a fifth-degree

felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(11)(a), alleged to have occurred on

or about November 16, 2022.

       {¶3} On December 20, 2022, an arraignment was held and Worrell entered a

plea of not guilty to all counts in the indictment.

       {¶4} On January 11, 2023, a change of plea hearing took place. At that time,

Worrell entered a negotiated plea of guilty to Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment, in

exchange for a dismissal of Count 1.

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Case No. 2-23-03

       {¶5} At the start of the change of plea hearing, as counsel for the State of

Ohio was setting forth the counts to which the defendant would be pleading guilty,

the trial court asked, “Do they merge?”, to which the prosecutor answered, “No,

Sir”, and then proceeded to detail the rest of the negotiated plea arrangement.

(1/11/23 Tr., 3-4). Following that, the trial court asked defense counsel, “Mr.

Catania, do you concur?”, to which defense counsel answered, “I do, Your Honor.”

(1/11/23 Tr., 4).

       {¶6} After a detailed Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, Worrell pled guilty to Count

2 of the indictment, acknowledging that the crime in Count 2 occurred on November

17, 2022, and pled guilty to Count 3 of the indictment, acknowledging that the crime

at issue in Count 3 occurred on November 16, 2022. (1/11/23 Tr., 4-12).

       {¶7} At the trial court’s request, the prosecutor then set forth the following

statement of facts:

       On November 16, 2022, the Defendant was brought to the Auglaize
       County Jail in Wapakoneta, Auglaize County, State of Ohio. He was
       brought over from the Mercer County Jail, had been dressed out in the
       Mercer County Jail uniform. He was changed out into an Auglaize
       uniform. On November 17, 2022, the Defendant overdosed while an
       inmate at the Auglaize County Jail and [sic] taken to the hospital.
       Once he was released from the hospital, he returned to Mercer County
       without returning to the Auglaize County Jail. Sergeant Keckler went
       through the Mercer County uniforms the Defendant had worn and
       found two (2) balled up items in the socks, which tested positive for
       fentanyl and was sent to BCI. The Defendant gave a statement
       advising that he found heroin, in a plastic cigarette wrapper, on the
       floor in intake while in the Auglaize County Jail, and that’s what he
       overdosed on. Reviews of the cameras showed the Defendant did not

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Case No. 2-23-03

       pick anything up off the floor. So his story didn’t pan out or was not
       corroborated by the video of the area. Essentially, the possession of
       fentanyl on November 17th is related in [sic] Count II involves, - or
       is for the use of fentanyl on the 17th. The Count III is possession on
       November 16th, which was the day he was brought into the Auglaize
       County Jail with the items in his socks, which were found in his
       uniform that he changed out of from Mercer county.

(1/11/23 Tr., 12-13).

       {¶8} At that point, the trial court asked if that meant the fentanyl used by

Worrell on the 17th was the same fentanyl possessed by Worrell on the 16th, to

which the prosecutor replied, “Not technically, because he didn’t have access to his

uniform after he was changed out, so there was [sic] items left in the socks on the

16th. He must have continued to have some, because he used some on the 17th,

which he overdosed on.” (1/11/23 Tr., 13-14). The trial court noted that Worrell

could have also obtained the fentanyl on which he overdosed from somebody else

in the jail, and the prosecutor acknowledged that was true. (1/11/23 Tr., 14).

       {¶9} The trial court then addressed Worrell directly on the issue of where he

obtained the drugs at issue. Worrell stated that, as to the drugs he overdosed on in

the Auglaize County Jail, he had taken those drugs into the jail dorm in his mouth,

after retrieving the substance from the Mercer County socks he had been wearing

when he first arrived at the jail in Auglaize County. (1/11/23 Tr., 14-15). Worrell

stated that he had found all of the drugs at issue when he was in the Mercer County

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Case No. 2-23-03

Jail intake cell on November 13th, and that he then brought those drugs with him to

the Auglaize County Jail from the Mercer County Jail. (1/11/23 Tr., 15-16).

       {¶10} Following the trial court’s acceptance of Worrell’s guilty plea to

Counts 2 and 3, the matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing on that same date. The

sentencing hearing transcript reflects that Worrell’s counsel made no express

motion or argument with regard to the issue of allied offenses and potential merger.

However, when presenting argument in mitigation of sentence, defense counsel

stated that, “When we’re talking about the two (2) Felony 5’s, we are talking about

use and possession of the same thing essentially, on two (2) separate days. So I

understand that the Court could find that those don’t merge, but we’re asking the

Court to at least run those concurrent * * *.” (1/11/23 Tr., 27). No additional

reference to merger was made during the sentencing hearing by counsel for either

party, or by the trial judge. The trial court then sentenced Worrell to a twelve-month

prison term on Count 2 and to a twelve-month prison term on Count 3. The trial

court ordered the two twelve-month sentences be served consecutively to each other

and consecutively to a prison term stemming from a prior felony case.

       {¶11} On February 7, 2023, Worrell filed the instant appeal.

                               Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred in not merging the two possession charges
       which was one action in which both charges had the same
       elements and the action was one continuous possession and use of
       drugs which did not have separate animus.

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Case No. 2-23-03

       {¶12} In the sole assignment of error, Worrell contends that the trial court

erred by not merging for sentencing the two convictions for Possession of a

Fentanyl-Related Compound as allied offenses of similar import. Worrell argues

that merger should have occurred because the two separate quantities of fentanyl at

issue were possessed by him while an inmate at the Auglaize County Jail, and

because the two possession offenses involved the same exact elements and were

committed with the same animus.

       {¶13} Pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, the

imposition of multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct is prohibited.

Specifically, R.C. 2941.25 provides:

       (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
       constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
       indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses,
       but the defendant may be convicted of only one.

       (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses
       of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
       offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
       separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain
       counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of
       all of them.

       {¶14} In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import

and should be merged for sentencing, courts are instructed to consider three separate

factors – the conduct, the animus, and the import. State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114,

2015–Ohio–995, paragraph one of the syllabus. Offenses do not merge and a

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Case No. 2-23-03

defendant may be convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses if any one of the

following is true: “(1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the

conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct

shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus.” Ruff, paragraph

three of the syllabus. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist “when the

defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm

that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.” Ruff, paragraph two of

the syllabus. The determination as to whether a defendant has been found guilty of

allied offenses of similar import “is dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C.

2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct,” Ruff, at ¶ 26, and “an offense may be

committed in a variety of ways * * *.” Ruff, at ¶ 30. “No bright-line rule can govern

every situation.” Id.

       {¶15} An appellate court applies a de novo standard of review in reviewing

a trial court’s merger determination. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012–

Ohio–5699, ¶ 28. However, “[a]n accused’s failure to raise the issue of allied

offenses of similar import in the trial court forfeits all but plain error, and a forfeited

error is not reversible error unless it affected the outcome of the proceeding and

reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Rogers,

143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 3. In Rogers, the Supreme Court of Ohio

further held that absent the defendant showing that there was a reasonable

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Case No. 2-23-03

probability that the convictions are in fact for allied offenses of similar import

committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus, “the accused

cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to inquire whether the convictions

merge for purposes of sentencing was plain error.” Id.

       {¶16} In the instant case, Worrell failed to raise an allied offense argument

or objection in the trial court and, in fact, the defense appeared to concede at the

time of the change of plea that the two possession offenses did not merge. (1/11/23

Tr., 4). As a result, Worrell has forfeited his right to raise an allied offense argument

on appeal and his assignment of error must be reviewed solely for plain

error. Rogers, supra, at ¶ 21-22.

       {¶17} As previously noted, to establish plain error here, it is Worrell who has

the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions at issue are

for allied offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and without

a separate animus. Worrell has failed to make such a showing in this case.

       {¶18} Because Worrell did not raise the issue of merger in the trial court, no

hearing was had on that issue at sentencing. However, to the extent that the record

demonstrates information relevant to the issue, the record tends to reflect that the

two counts of Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound of which Worrell was

convicted were committed separately and with a different animus.

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Case No. 2-23-03

       {¶19} To be guilty of possession pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A), the offender

must “knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance.”

       {¶20} In this case, as detailed above, there were representations made by

both the prosecution and the defense at the time of the change of plea as to the facts

upon which the two possession offenses were based. While the state’s statement of

facts differed from the representations made by the defendant, what was consistent

was that the fentanyl products were possessed by Worrell in two distinctly separate

locations within the jail, and on two different dates. Thus, the two offenses of

possession here are separate and identifiable. The offense of possessing fentanyl on

the 16th and the offense of possessing fentanyl on the 17th were not committed by

Worrell with the same conduct, and the offenses were committed at two separate

times. As reflected by the record, the offense in Count 2 was based on Worrell’s

use of fentanyl in the jail on November 17th, while the offense in Count 3 was based

on the fentanyl Worrell had in his constructive possession while stored in his Mercer

County uniform following his arrival at the Auglaize County Jail on November 16th.

The record also reflects that Worrell gave at least two conflicting explanations as to

where and how he obtained the fentanyl and, as the trial court accurately noted,

Worrell could have obtained the fentanyl on which he overdosed from somebody

else in the jail. (1/11/23 Tr., 14).

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Case No. 2-23-03

       {¶21} Worrell’s actual possession and use of fentanyl in the jail dorm on

November 17th can also reasonably be inferred to have been committed with a

separate animus or motivation from his November 16th constructive possession and

storage of the same type of drug in the Mercer County Jail clothing stored in the

Auglaize County Jail property system. The gap in time between the two possession

offenses, the different locations, and the fact that one quantity of fentanyl was

actually used while the separate quantity was constructively possessed and being

saved for later, all serve to establish that the two quantities of fentanyl were

possessed with a separate motivation as to each.

       {¶22} Finally, we have reviewed State v. Brown, 186 Ohio App.3d 437,

2010-Ohio-324 (12th Dist.), upon which Worrell relies, and Brown is factually

distinguishable from the instant case. Brown involved two crack cocaine possession

offenses that occurred on the same date, at a single location, and there was no

evidence in that case – unlike here – to indicate that the defendant intended to do

anything with all of the crack cocaine at issue other than use it on the night in

question. Id.

       {¶23} For all of those reasons, Worrell has not shown a reasonable

probability that the convictions at issue are allied offenses of similar import

committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus. As Worrell has

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Case No. 2-23-03

not demonstrated that the trial court’s failure to merge the two offenses constituted

plain error, the assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶24} Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant in the

particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Auglaize County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs.

/jlr

MILLER, P.J., concurring separately.

       {¶25} I concur with the judgment of the majority and agree that plain error

was not established in this case. However, I write separately as I would find that

any error with regard to the merger of offenses in this case was invited by the

defense.

       {¶26} Pursuant to the “invited error” doctrine, a party may not “‘take

advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.’ˮ State v. Campbell, 90

Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (2000), quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury,

Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 502 N.E.2d 590 (1986), paragraph one of

the syllabus.    However, simple acquiescence in the trial judge’s erroneous

conclusion will not support a finding of invited error. Campbell at 324. In order

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Case No. 2-23-03

for the doctrine to apply, a party must have been “‘actively responsible’ for the trial

court's error.” State v. McAlpin, 169 Ohio St.3d 279, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 220. In

my judgment, Worrell and his counsel were “actively responsible” and contributed

to the trial court’s decision not to merge the possession offenses.

       {¶27} As aptly recounted in the majority opinion, the record reflects the

prosecutor was setting forth the plea negotiations when the trial court inquired

whether the offenses to which Worrell was pleading merged. The prosecutor

advised the court the offenses did not merge then continued outlining the

negotiations.    Immediately thereafter, the court asked defense counsel if he

concurred with the prosecutor’s statements, to which counsel answered

affirmatively.   When reviewing the facts of the two offenses as part of the plea

colloquy, the court was led to consider that the offenses occurred on different dates

and may even have involved different sources for the fentanyl Worrell possessed.

This information came both from the prosecutor and Worrell’s responses to the

court’s inquiring about certain facts. When the matter came on for sentencing,

Worrell’s counsel advised the court the offenses did not merge. Counsel explained

his sentencing strategy and stated:

       In this situation, we understand, and Mr. Worrell understands, that at
       a certain point he has to pay the piper. We’re not asking for you not
       to send him to prison. We understand the Court very likely and
       probably should send Mr. Worrell to prison in this case. But we are
       asking the Court to keep it under sixty (60) months to give him the
       opportunity to put forward a good effort in prison to hopefully get his

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Case No. 2-23-03

         GED in there and do programs, and show this Court he is amenable to
         Judicial Release at a further date. When we’re talking about the two
         (2) Felony 5’s, we are talking about use and possession of the same
         thing essentially, on two (2) separate days. So I understand that the
         Court could find that those don’t merge, but we’re asking the Court
         to at least run those concurrent or give eleven (11) months on one (1),
         to keep the total sentence under [sixty (60)] months to provide Mr.
         Worrell that opportunity to show the Court hopefully, at a future date,
         he is amenable to Judicial Release. . . .

(Emphasis added.) (Jan. 11, 2023 Tr. at 26-27).

         {¶28} In reviewing the record, it is evident defense counsel employed a

sound strategy to minimize Worrell’s exposure to a potential lengthy prison term.

Counsel was successful in negotiating the dismissal of Count One – Illegal

Conveyance of Drugs of Abuse onto the Grounds of a Specified Governmental

Facility, a felony of the third degree and the most serious offense charged against

Worrell (and arguably the easiest for the State to prove). If successful, this strategy

would shorten the time Worrell had to serve before filing a motion for judicial

release. 1 Only after Worrell received consecutive sentences of 12 months for each

drug possession offense served consecutively to a 36-month sentence imposed for a

community control violation imposed for a prior offense, which totaled 60 months,

did counsel’s strategy switch to appealing the merger issue.

1
  A sentence totaling 60 months precluded Worrell from filing for judicial release until after he served four
years of the stated prison term. R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(c). If counsel’s strategy of obtaining a sentence of less
than 60 months had been successful, Worrell could have applied for judicial release after serving 180 days
in prison. R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(b).

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Case No. 2-23-03

       {¶29} While the invited error doctrine requires “more than mere

‘acquiescence in the trial judge’s [alleged] erroneous conclusion,’” I am of the

opinion defense counsel’s agreeing with the prosecutor’s statement at the change-

of-plea hearing and then advising the trial court at sentencing that the offenses did

not merge constitutes more than mere acquiescence. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d at

324, quoting Carrothers v. Hunter, 23 Ohio St.2d 99, 103, 262 N.E.2d 99 (1970).

See State v. Oehler, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-11-001, 2011-Ohio-6501

(counsel’s express agreement with the trial court’s assessment that two charges were

not allied offenses and that defendant was subject to two separate penalties

constituted invited error).

       {¶30} On the record of this case, I find defense counsel affirmatively

conceded the issue of merger at the time of the guilty plea and then confirmed that

position at the time of sentencing. In my judgment, these actions by counsel at least

induced, if not openly invited, the court to sentence Worrell on each offense.

Consequently, he cannot now take advantage of that claimed error.

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