Court Opinion

ID: 9372750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:09.560134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.069116
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                         2023 MSPB 3
                              Docket No. DE-531D-18-0028-I-1

                                       Karl Brookins,
                                          Appellant,
                                               v.
                                Department of the Interior,
                                           Agency.
                                       January 10, 2023

           Karl Brookins, Fort Collins, Colorado, pro se.

           Deborah E. Yim, Esquire, Lakewood, Colorado, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                 Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                  Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                             Member Limon recused himself and
                     did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                   OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial deci sion, which
     dismissed his appeal of his within-grade increase (WIGI) denial for lack of
     jurisdiction.   For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the
     Denver Field Office for further adjudication.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a Fishery Biologist for the agency. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1 at 8. On September 3, 2017, he became eligible for a WIGI from a
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     GS-12 step 5 to a step 6. Id. On September 15, 2017, the agency informed him
     that it was denying his WIGI because he received a “minimally successful” rating
     for the rating period of October 1, 2015, through September 30, 2016, and
     completed a performance improvement plan that resulted in his performance
     rating being raised from “unsatisfactory” to “minimally successful” on one of his
     critical elements. 1 Id. at 8-9, 11-12. In the notice of his WIGI denial, the agency
     informed him that he could request reconsideration of its determination, which he
     did on September 30, 2017. IAF, Tab 1 at 9, Tab 4 at 28-38. On October 10,
     2017, the agency denied his request for reconsideration. IAF, Tab 1 at 13.
¶3         On October 22, 2017, the appellant timely filed an initial appeal with the
     Board, alleging that, in denying his WIGI and request for reconsideration, the
     agency committed prohibited personnel practices (PPPs) under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(2) and (b)(12).      Id. at 5.   The administrative judge conducted a
     preliminary status conference and subsequently issued a summary and order
     questioning the Board’s jurisdiction over the appellant’s WIGI denial b ecause the
     appellant was a bargaining unit employee, WIGI denials were subject to the
     negotiated grievance procedures of the applicable collective bargaining agreement
     (CBA), and the appellant had not alleged discrimination after a final decision, as
     required to elect a Board appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d). IAF, Tab 8 at 1-3.
     The administrative judge ordered the appellant to submit evidence and argument
     to establish that the Board had jurisdiction over the agency’s denial of his WIGI.
     Id. at 3. The appellant responded to the administrative judge’s order , arguing
     among other things that 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) allows for an appeal directly to the
     Board   when    the   aggrieved    employee    alleges   a   violation   of   5 U.S.C.

     1
       The memorandum denying the appellant’s WIGI referenced “Critical Element 5,” but
     the appellant only had four critical elements, the fourth of which was rated “minimally
     successful.” IAF, Tab 1 at 8, 11.
                                                                                       3

     § 2302(b)(2)-(14) in connection with an action covered under negotiated
     grievance procedures. IAF, Tab 9 at 4-5.
¶4         On December 19, 2017, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. IAF, Tab 12,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 1. The administrative judge found that the appellant was
     a bargaining unit employee who was subject to the grievance procedures set forth
     in the CBA. ID at 4. He additionally found that the denial of a WIGI is not
     identified on the list of matters excluded from the grievance process , and thus the
     CBA allowed for grievances of such denials. Id. Under these circumstances, the
     administrative judge found that, if “the [CBA] provides for review of WIGI
     denials under the grievance procedure, then that procedure is exclusive.” ID at 3
     (citing 5 C.F.R. § 531.410(d)).    The administrative judge stated that the only
     exception to this rule is when the employee alleges discrimination under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(1). ID at 3-4 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d)). Even in the presence of a
     claim of discrimination, the administrative judge continued, the employee must
     first pursue the matter through the negotiated grievance procedures and receive a
     final decision on the matter in order to then pursue the matter before the Board.
     ID at 4.     The administrative judge found that, absent an allegation of
     discrimination, the appellant’s only avenue of recourse was through the
     negotiated grievance procedure, and thus the Board lack s jurisdiction to hear the
     matter, regardless of his claim of PPPs under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) and (b)(12).
     ID at 4-6.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing among other things
     that the grievance procedures are not his exclusive remedy because he has alleged
     PPPs under 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2) and (12), and therefore, he may elect a direct
                                                                                          4

     Board appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g). 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.
     The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

                                         ANALYSIS
¶6        An employee occupying a permanent position under the General Schedule
     earns a periodic increase in pay, or WIGI, as long as his performance is at an
     acceptable level of competence. 5 U.S.C. § 5335(a). An agency’s decision to
     deny a WIGI is appealable to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 5335(c), provided that
     the employee first requests reconsideration from the agency and the agency
     affirms the denial. Priselac v. Department of the Navy, 77 M.S.P.R. 332, 335
     (1998).   Nevertheless, if a WIGI denial is also grievable under a negotiated
     grievance procedure, then it will be subject to the election of remedies provisions
     of 5 U.S.C. § 7121. Generally, if an employee is covered by a CBA that includes
     WIGI denials in its negotiated grievance procedures, then those pr ocedures are
     the exclusive procedures for appealing the denial. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1). Under
     the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 as originally enacted, the only exception to
     this general rule was found in 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), for cases in which the
     employee alleges that he has been affected by a PPP under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(1). 3 Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 7121, 92 Stat. 1111. It is undisputed that
     this exception does not apply to the instant appeal because the appellant has not
     alleged that the agency subjected him to a PPP under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1). PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 6.   However, in 1994, Congress amended 5 U.S.C. § 7121 by
     adding a new subsection (g) and providing another exception for cases in which
     employees allege that they have been affected by a PPP other than under 5 U.S.C.

     2
       The appellant’s petition for review raises numerous other arguments in support of
     jurisdiction; however, because we find that his argument concerning the application of
     5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) warrants remand, we decline to reach those arguments at this time.
     3
       Another exception exists for removals and other adverse actions that are otherwise
     appealable under 5 U.S.C. chapters 43 or 75. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1), (e).
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     § 2302(b)(1). Pub. L. No.103–424, § 9, 108 Stat. 4361. That is the exception
     that applies to the instant appeal.
¶7         Although this statute was amended in 1994, the Board has not yet issued a
     precedential decision addressing the section 7121(g) exception as applied to
     appeals of WIGI denials under 5 U.S.C. § 5335(c). 4            In finding that the
     appellant’s only avenue to the Board was through 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), the
     administrative judge considered the Board’s nonprecedential decision in
     Silveria v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. SF-531D-16-0042-
     I-1, Final Order (Jan. 6, 2017). 5 ID at 4. However, the facts in Silveria, which
     included allegations of PPPs under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1), indicated that 5 U.S.C.
     § 7121(d) was the applicable exception in that case. Silveria, Final Order, ¶¶ 5,
     9, 12-13, 18. The Board did not cite or discuss 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) because that
     exception was not implicated by the facts of that particular case—not because that
     exception is unavailable as a general matter.
¶8         Nevertheless, in reaching its decision, the Board in Silveria cited to Hunt v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 88 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 6 (2001), in which the Board
     held in relevant part as follows:
           If an employee is covered by a CBA containing a grievance
           procedure that does not exclude WIGI withholdings from its
           coverage, and if the employee does not allege prohibited
           discrimination, she cannot appeal an agency’s decision to withhold a

     4
       The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has issued one nonprecedential
     decision that provides some helpful guidance. Weslowski v. Department of the Army,
     217 F.3d 854, *3 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Table) (holding that 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) is an
     exception to the general rule set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) that the negotiated
     grievance procedure is the exclusive administrative procedure for resolving disputes
     that fall within a CBA’s coverage). Although Weslowski is not binding on the Board,
     we have considered it for its persuasive value. See Jennings v. Social Security
     Administration, 123 M.S.P.R. 577, ¶ 25 n.2 (2016).
     5
      The administrative judge recognized that Silveria was not a binding decision, but he
     considered it for its persuasive value. ID at 4 n.3; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c)(2).
                                                                                          6

           WIGI; instead, the negotiated grievance procedure is the exclusive
           means for resolving the dispute.
     This holding seems to suggest that, for a WIGI denial covered under a negotiated
     grievance procedure, the only avenue of Board review is through 5 U.S.C.
     § 7121(d), to the exclusion of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g). To the extent that it does,
     Hunt is overruled. 6    We also overrule other Board cases issued after the
     enactment of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g), such as Caracciolo v. Department of the
     Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 663, ¶ 8 (2007), to the extent those cases state that WIGI
     denials, if covered by a CBA, are not appealable to the Board even when an
     aggrieved employee has alleged a PPP other than a PPP under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(1).
¶9         The Board in Silveria also cited to the Office of Personnel Management’s
     regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 531.410(d), which states as follows:
           When a negative [WIGI] determination is sustained after
           reconsideration, an employee shall be informed in writing of the
           reasons for the decision and of his or her right to appeal the decision
           to the Merit Systems Protection Board. However, for an employee
           covered by a collective bargaining agreement a reconsideration
           decision that sustains a negative determination is only reviewable in
           accordance with the terms of the agreement.
     This regulation accurately sets forth the general rule of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1), but
     it does not account for either of the exceptions to that rule that allow for a direct
     Board appeal where a PPP has been alleged, i.e. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d) and (g). To
     the extent that this regulation is inconsistent with the statute, the statute controls.
     See Johnson v. Department of Justice, 71 M.S.P.R. 59, 67 (1996) (finding that the
     provisions of a statute will prevail in any case in which there is a conflict
     between a statute and a regulation).

     6
      In support of this holding, the Board in Hunt relied on Espenschied v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 804 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, Espenschied
     was issued prior to the enactment of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) in 1994.
                                                                                             7

¶10         Turning to the facts of this case, the appellant is a bargaining unit employee
      covered by a CBA with a negotiated grievance procedure that includes WIGI
      denials. IAF, Tab 4 at 13. Prior to filing an appeal with the Board, he requested
      reconsideration of the agency’s denial and the agency upheld the denial.              Id.
      at 26-38. The appellant then timely filed an appeal with the Board, alleging that
      the WIGI denial constituted a PPP under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) and (b)(12). IAF,
      Tab 1 at 5. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the appellant previously
      filed a grievance through the CBA or a complaint with the Office of Special
      Counsel regarding this WIGI denial. 7 Therefore, it appears that the appellant may
      have made a valid election under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) to file an appeal directly
      with the Board, and we find that the appeal must be remanded for further
      adjudication of the issue.
¶11         We note that, to this point, the appellant has made only bare assertions of
      PPPs under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) and (b)(12). IAF, Tab 1 at 5. Neither party
      has briefed whether the appellant is required to do anything more to establish th e

      7
        On his initial appeal form, the appellant checked “Yes” next to the question of
      whether, “[w]ith respect to the agency personnel action or decision you are appeal ing,
      have you, or has anyone on your behalf, filed a grievance under a negotiated grievance
      procedure provided by a [CBA]?” IAF, Tab 1 at 4. However, in response to the
      following question, he stated that he filed said grievance on December 15, 2016, which
      was nearly 9 months before the WIGI denial at issue here. Id. Moreover, in the
      agency’s “declaration of collective bargaining agreement,” the agency stated in no
      unclear terms that “[t]he Appellant has not grieved this action.” IAF, Tab 4 at 13.
      Although it is not material to the outcome of this appeal, we note our disagreement with
      the administrative judge that an election to proceed before the Board under 5 U.S.C.
      § 7121(d) requires that the employee first obtain a final decision on a grievance. ID
      at 4. If the employee first elects to proceed with a grievance, the statute does not
      preclude Board review of the final decision under 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a), but the actual
      initial election under subsection (d) is between a negotiated procedure and any available
      statutory procedure, including an appeal directly to the Board. See Avila v. Defense
      Logistics Agency, 21 M.S.P.R. 91, 92-93 (1984).
                                                                                            8

      Board’s jurisdiction over his appeal. 8 Regardless, the appellant was not afforded
      notice that he needed to do anything further regarding his PPP allegations to
      establish jurisdiction. See Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d
      641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that an appellant must receive explicit
      information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue).
      In the absence of briefing by the parties and adequate Burgess notice for the
      appellant, we will not decide this issue on the current record. The administrative
      judge and the parties can address these issues on remand as necessary.
¶12         The administrative judge should also rule on the appellant’s three
      objections to the Order and Summary of Telephonic Status Conference.              IAF,
      Tab 11 at 4-5. Because they are not material to our holding here, we decline to
      rule on them at this time.       The appellant’s Request for Order to Preserve
      Computer Files is denied because he has not alleged or shown that the computer
      files contain information relevant to the issues in this appeal. PFR File, Tab 4
      at 4; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.72(a). However, in light of the clarified jurisdictional

      8
        The Board has held that, to elect its procedure under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), which
      requires an allegation of discrimination under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1), the discrimination
      allegation need not be nonfrivolous. See Farooq v. Corporation for National &
      Community Service, 109 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 9 (2008); Cooper v. Department of Defense,
      98 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶¶ 9-11 (2005); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s) (defining “nonfrivolous
      allegation”). Moreover, the Board has held on occasion that, absent express instruction
      from Congress, the exceptions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), (e), and (g) should be
      treated the same. Agoranos v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 16 (2013).
      However, it is potentially significant that appeals under section 7121(d) are brought
      under 5 U.S.C. § 7702, whereas appeals under section 7121(g) are brought under
      5 U.S.C. § 7701.      Cooper, 98 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 10.         Section 7702(a)(1), unlike
      section 7701, specifically states that the Board “shall . . . decide both the issue of
      discrimination and the appealable action,” and section 7702 does not differentiate
      between frivolous and nonfrivolous discrimination claims. 5 U.S.C. § 7702; Bennett v.
      National Gallery of Art, 79 M.S.P.R. 285, 289 (1998).
                                                                                              9

      issue, the administrative judge should afford the parties another opportunity to
      initiate discovery. 9

                                              ORDER
¶13         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Denver Field
      Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Opinion and Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:

      /s/
      Jennifer Everling
      Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      9
        The administrative judge previously stayed discovery pending a jurisdictional ruling.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 3. If the administrative judge deems it appropriate, he may initially limit
      discovery to the jurisdictional issue.