Court Opinion

ID: 9750383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:55:18.069985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:07.410994
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
concurring.
Laster’s contention is that Howard County was required to begin his trial within 120 days of his arrival in this State. He is wrong because he requested trial in Howard County1 *570and thus triggered the 180-day limitation of Article III. He was tried within 180 days of delivery of his demand to a prosecutor in this State, and his conviction is properly affirmed.
I write separately to explain my concern with the majority’s dictum regarding the effect of an Article IV request by a prosecutor. The majority states that when a prosecutor files a request for temporary custody, each jurisdiction in the receiving state that has lodged a detainer is bound to bring the prisoner to trial within the time specified by Article IV. 313 Md. at 559, 546 A.2d at 478. I have serious doubts about the accuracy of that dictum, and I believe it to be in direct conflict with our opinion in Boyd v. State, 294 Md. 103, 447 A.2d 871 (1982), adopting the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, Boyd v. State, 51 Md.App. 197, 441 A.2d 1133 (1982). In Boyd, detainers were filed by two Maryland counties with the custodial authority in Washington, D.C. The prosecutor in one of the counties filed an Article IV request for custody of the prisoner, tried him, and returned him to the District of Columbia. The second Maryland county then initiated an Article IV request and, over the objection of the prisoner that the “one-trip” requirement of Article IV (Art. 27, § 616E(e)) prevented his second transfer and trial, transported, tried, and convicted him. We held that subsection (e) did not apply because neither the prisoner nor the prosecutor in the second county had requested transfer to that county during the first transfer or trial. 51 Md.App. at 206, 441 A.2d 1133.
The majority opines that because the custodian of the prisoner is required to give notice of an Article IV request to all other prosecutors in the receiving state who have detainers pending, this operates as a request for final disposition and triggers the 120-day time limit for all such jurisdictions. This concept of automatic notice most as*571suredly operates in Article III proceedings, but it does so because of the express language of subsection (d) (Art. 27, § 616D(d)):
Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to subsection (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.
No similar language is found in Article IV.
In an appropriate case, where the issue is properly before us and has been fully briefed and argued, we should determine the effect of an Article IV request on other jurisdictions in the receiving state. I believe a strong argument may be made that the “one-trip” requirement of Article IV is entirely consistent with the notice requirement of that article, and where notice is properly given,2 the several jurisdictions within the receiving state may be required to complete all trials before returning the prisoner. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the 120-day time limit should apply to every jurisdiction in such cases, and that question should await its proper resolution on another day.
MURPHY, C.J., and RODOWSKY, J., join in this concurring opinion.

. The majority opinion suggests that Laster’s demand for disposition was made to Anne Arundel County in response to that County’s request for temporary custody. In fact, Laster’s request for disposition (Form 2) was specifically addressed to the State’s Attorney for Howard County (although it described the Circuit Court for Howard County as being in Annapolis, Md.) and was received by that State’s Attorney on November 6, 1985. A legal assistant in the office decided that Laster’s demand was intended for Anne Arundel County, and forwarded it. Whether we treat this as a direct demand to Howard *570County, or as a demand to Anne Arundel County that constituted a demand to Howard County by operation of law, the result is the same.

. Article 27, § 616Q, added by Maryland at the time of its adoption of the IAD, provides that certain notices are not effective until actually received.