Court Opinion

ID: 9747966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:46:19.601818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:29.700781
License: Public Domain

*220ARONSON, J., Concurring.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion plaintiff properly invoked his statutory right to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit before the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. Because Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (b)(1) (section 581), provides that a party may dismiss “at any time before the actual commencement of trial,” plaintiff was entitled to file a dismissal without prejudice, even if the court had posted a tentative ruling announcing its intention to dismiss plaintiff’s case with prejudice.
I write separately to voice my concern that section 581’s clear definition of when trial commences has been obscured by a growing thicket of judicial decisions that rely more on the courts’ own sense of fairness than the Legislature’s express mandate. For example, Mary Morgan, Inc. v. Melzark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 765 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 4], relied upon “[l]ogic and fairness” and “the need to reconcile the competing interests” in denying the plaintiff the right to dismiss after the court continued the defendants’ summary judgment hearing to allow discovery. (Id. at p. 771.) Groth Bros. Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gallagher (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 60 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 405], invoked “policy concerns” to prohibit voluntary dismissal after a tentative ruling on a demurrer was posted, fearing a contrary result would undermine the superior court’s tentative ruling system. (Id. at p. 70.) In Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 562] (Hartbrodt), the court concluded the plaintiff could not dismiss before a hearing on the defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions, declaring the plaintiff’s reliance on section 581 a mere “tactic” designed to “defeat the trial court’s power to enforce its discovery orders.” (Hartbrodt, at pp. 175-176.)
We must presume, however, the policy issues determined in the foregoing cases were considered and rejected by the Legislature when it adopted section 581. Under this section, a party has an absolute right to dismiss an action if done “before the actual commencement of trial,” even if this places the other party at a disadvantage and gains the plaintiff a tactical respite. (§ 581.) What section 581 means by “commencement of trial” presents no mystery because it is defined in the statute.
My colleagues have deftly attempted to reconcile the leading cases, but even they concede their “mere formality test” fails to account for all the disparate rationales and results in the case law. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 204.) For example, niy colleagues reject Hartbrodt, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 168 because it does not fit within their formula. The problem is the mere formality test is not really a test one would apply to reach a legally correct conclusion, but a general description that attempts to reconcile appellate decisions, some of which have strayed too far from the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent interpreting section 581.
*221The source of the problem may stem from Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781 [176 Cal.Rptr. 104, 632 P.2d 217], where the Supreme Court interpreted the commencement of trial language in section 581 to include the trial of an issue of law, which occurs when a court rules on a demurrer or summary judgment motion. Courts have relied on Wells to stretch “commencement of trial” to encompass any procedure that is potentially dispositive, including demurrer or summary judgment tentative rulings, or a pending motion for terminating sanctions. The issue appears ripe for further guidance from the Supreme Court or the Legislature.
Respondents’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 13, 2007, S151732.