Court Opinion

ID: 9542472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:44.036456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:01.299421
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I believe the trial court missed the mark by failing to direct a verdict in favor of defendant, Target Stores, (Target), on the claim of plaintiff, Susan Hoyt, for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, I disagree with Part II of the majority’s *195opinion. Henee, I would reverse the judgment in its entirety.
My review of our appellate decisions leads me to conclude that a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may not be predicated upon the self-help actions of an employee, even if the employee’s actions are' intended to vindicate her rights under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, §8 — 4— 101, et seq., C.R.S.1998.
The majority holds that Hoyt established a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy by showing that Target prohibited her from performing a public duty or exercising an important job-related right or privilege — enforcing her rights under the Wage Claim Act. In my view, however, Hoyt failed to establish a prima facie ease of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy on this or any other basis enunciated by our courts for such a claim.
In Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 552 (Colo.1997), the supreme court stated:
The public policy exception is grounded in the notion that an employer should be prohibited from discharging an employee with impunity for reasons that contravene widely accepted and substantial public policies. Although public policy wrongful discharge is not subject to precise definition, it has been variously described as an action that involves a matter that affects society at large rather than a purely personal or proprietary interest of the plaintiff or employer, ... leads to an outrageous result clearly inconsistent with the stated public policy ... or strikes at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties and responsibilities.
The Crawford court characterized prior decisions as recognizing claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in two categories: (1) terminating an employee for refusing to engage in unlawful or unethical conduct and (2) terminating an employee for exercising a job-related right.
Here, I agree with the majority that vindicating claims under the Colorado Wage Claim Act involves a matter that affects society at large rather than a purely personal or proprietary interest. See Morris v. Towers Financial Corp., 916 P.2d 678 (Colo.App.1996) (Wage Claim Act provides clear, comprehensive statutory scheme designed to require employers to pay wages earned by their employees in a timely manner); Porter v. Castle Rock Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 895 P.2d 1146 (Colo.App.1995) (plaintiff who prevails on Wage Claim Act claim is entitled to recover attorney fees to vindicate purpose of Act, even if defendant employer prevails on negligence counterclaim). Cf. Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Weissman, supra (interest in assuring rest breaks as provided under Colorado Wage Claim Act is largely personal, rather than a matter that affects society at large).
However, I dissent because I believe a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy must be based upon an employee’s complaint to a governmental agency or a complaint to the employee’s supervisor concerning the employer’s challenged conduct. Here, Hoyt did neither.
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hoyt, I do not believe the circumstances here satisfy the requirement for an employee exercising a job-related right.
In Crawford Rehabilitation Services, supra, the supreme court cited Lathrop v. Entenmann’s, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo.App.1989) for the proposition that a wrongful discharge public policy claim may be based upon an employee’s termination for exercising a job-related right. In Lathrop, a division of this court held that an employee stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when he alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
Here, in contrast, Hoyt did not file any claim with the Division of Labor or any other governmental agency. She did even less than the plaintiff in Crawford Rehabilitation Services, supra, who did complain to the Division of Labor about lack of rest breaks, but whose complaint did not result in the initiation of an investigation or proceeding by the Director of the Division of Labor.
*196Rather, here, Hoyt altered timecards without supervisor approval. She was not discharged in retaliation for complaining to any governmental agency about the procedures which Target required her to follow for completing timecards for travel between stores.
We ought not to establish a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy which rewards an employee for engaging in self-help. See Dyson v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 566 A.2d 1065 (D.C.App.1989) (worker’s unauthorized act of self-help in stopping work in order to take medication was not a claim for compensation under District’s workers’ compensation act); cf. People v. Pittam, 194 Colo. 104, 572 P.2d 135 (1977) (in attorney disciplinary proceeding, respondent’s taking money as self-help measure because he felt he had been unfairly dealt with by his partners did not excuse his professional misconduct but was properly considered as a mitigating circumstance).
Further, the majority’s reliance on Dyson is misplaced. The Dyson court did state that the formal filing of a claim with a governmental agency may not be the only way an employee may acquire the protection of a retaliatory discharge provision under the District of Columbia’s workers’ compensation statute. However, the court then cited as a supporting example another ease in which an employee had instituted a claim under the Texas workers’ compensation statute by reporting his injury to the employer. Here, of course, Hoyt neither filed a claim with a governmental agency nor complained to her employer about Target’s travel reimbursement policy.
By recognizing a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in these circumstances, the majority pursues a course of action that will operate to reward employees who choose to take employment disputes into their own hands, rather than pursue established avenues of relief, such as complaints to relevant governmental agencies or company supervisors.
As noted above, Hoyt’s circumstances do not fit within any of the other circumstances in which our appellate courts have recognized a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. She was not terminated for refusing to perform an act directed by her employer. See Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Service v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo.1996). Nor was she directed to perform an illegal act as part of her work-related duties.
Further, Hoyt’s actions are distinguishable from the circumstances in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo.1992), where a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim was found to exist under circumstances in which the plaintiff had refused to engage in acts of deception and misrepresentation concerning the quality of materials used by his employer in designing equipment for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Unlike in Lorenz, Hoyt did not express her concerns to her superiors, but simply exercised self-help and altered time records based upon her belief as to the correctness of her interpretation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act.
I would further hold that, even if Hoyt had a reasonable belief that Target was violating the provisions of the Wage Claim Act, she was required to express her concerns to her superiors or file a complaint with a governmental agency, and that she may not predicate a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy on actions which may fairly be characterized as self-help.
I conclude with the cautionary statement of the supreme court in Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Weissman, supra, 938 P.2d at 553:
Not all potential sources of public policy are of sufficient gravity to outweigh the precepts of at-will employment. We must develop the common law in this area with care.
Accordingly, I dissent as to Part II of the majority’s opinion, and, for that reason, would not reach the issue addressed in Part III. Otherwise, I concur with Parts I and IV of the majority opinion. Hence, I would reverse the judgment in its entirety.