Court Opinion

ID: 9786828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:03:28.123076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:49.146435
License: Public Domain

Abbott, J.,
dissenting: I would affirm the conviction under the harmless error rule.
Here, the defendant has the burden of showing reversible error. He does not suggest that he was prejudiced. He does not point to any part of the closing argument and contend that he might have given his lawyer information that would have been helpful in his defense. He squarely stands on his constitutional right to be pres*257ent at all crucial stages of his trial. I have no quarrel with that black letter law.
However, an error of constitutional magnitude may be held to be harmless error if we declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To so hold, we must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. State v. Coyote, 268 Kan. 726, 732, 1 P.3d 836 (2000).
I am not persuaded that, under the facts of the case, the presence of a translator for the defendant would have been of any benefit. It is hard to imagine what benefit a jury would have watching a defendant hearing a translation in a language the jury does not understand with some delay between what the jury hears in English and what the defendant later hears in a foreign language.
I would follow the reasoning in Luu v. Colorado, 841 P.2d 271, 275 (Colo. 1992), where the Colorado Supreme Court said:
“There is no evidence that the absence of an interpreter interfered with Luu’s ability to cross-examine witnesses. Nor is there any indication in the record that tlie absence of an interpreter during closing arguments and the giving of jury instructions compromised the basic fairness of the trial. ... In light of the entire record, we conclude under these facts that any error suffered by Luu was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
It went on to hold:
“In [Arizona v.]Fulminante [499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)], the Supreme Court segregated those cases in which harmless error analysis does not apply from tire cases in which harmless error analysis is appropriate. [Citation omitted.] Harmless error analysis does not apply when there is a ‘structural defect in the constitution of the trial mechanism.’ [Citation omitted.] The Fulminante Court cited examples of structural defects as total deprivations of the right to counsel and partial or biased trial judges. [Citation omitted.] Conversely, die Fulminante Court emphasized that harmless error analysis applies where a trial error — such as deprivation of the right to be present — occurs. [Citation omitted.]
“Under Fulminante, federal law is clear: harmless error analysis applies to allegations of error regarding denial of the federal constitutional right to be present at trial. Accordingly, die court of appeals did not err in determining that the harmless error doctrine should govern Luu’s allegations of constitutional error.” 841 P.2d at 274-75.
*258The majority, in essence, determines that the harmless error doctrine cannot apply in this case. In the absence of the defendant making some effort to explain how he was prejudiced, I would hold the error was harmless and affirm the conviction.
McFarland, C.J., joins in the foregoing dissent.