Court Opinion

ID: 9781418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:36:59.034906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:26.275142
License: Public Domain

NORRIS, Judge,
concurring.
¶ 11 On the facts presented here, the trial court determined that Appellant’s prison sentence warranted termination of his parental rights because the sentence was of such length that the children would be deprived of a normal home for a period of years. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). I join with the majority in affirming the juvenile court’s order terminating Appellant’s parental rights.
¶ 12 Our decision today also holds that where termination of a parent’s rights is appropriate because of the length of the prison sentence, the state need not provide reunification services because such services are futile. I write separately to emphasize the length of the parent’s prison sentence by itself is not dispositive of whether termination is appropriate.
¶ 13 Section 8-533(B)(4) sets out no “ ‘bright line’ definition of when a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years____” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 29, 995 P.2d at 687 (2000). Indeed, a “20-year sentence might not provide sufficient basis for severing an incarcerated parent’s rights, while in another case a 3-year sentence could provide the needed basis.” Id. Thus, the “better approach” is to consider each case on its particular facts. Id.
¶ 14 The length of the parent’s sentence is just one of the many “particular facts” the court must consider in making the complex decision to sever a parent’s rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). As our Supreme Court held in Michael J.:
The trial court, in making its decision [to sever an incarcerated parent’s rights], should consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between that child’s age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.
Id. at 252, ¶ 29, 995 P.2d at 688. Only after the juvenile court considers these, as well as any other relevant factors, can the court determine whether the sentence is of such a *4length as to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years. Id.
¶ 15 Nothing in our opinion today should be read as excusing a court from having to make this multifactor determination when severing an incarcerated parent’s rights. Nor should our opinion be viewed as countermanding our Supreme Court’s directive that a juvenile court must consider the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured in spite of the parent’s incarceration.