Court Opinion

ID: 9885120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:30:46.484677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:44.081627
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Daily, dissenting: I cannot concur with the result of this case or with the manner in which it was reached. The opinion correctly states that the construction of the concealed weapons statute has been that there must be a concealment of the weapon on or about the person, and that it must be so situated that it may be-used without material change in the position of the person charged with concealing the weapon. In concluding that the gun here was not readily accessible to the defendant, this court has substituted its interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court and the Appellate Court, and has resorted to an extreme test of what constitutes a material change in position. It should also be noted that the majority result does not come from a sifting of conflicting evidence, for defendant did not defend on the ground that the gun was not accessible. In seeking to justify the finding that the defendant would have to materially change his position in order to secure the gun under the car seat, the majority has relied upon past decisions which, in my opinion, are not applicable on their facts. Commenting on People v. Niemoth, 322 Ill. 51, where the gun was on the floor of the back seat behind the driver, the opinion makes the unwarranted inference that the gun could be reached by the driver from where he sat. The result of that case clearly establishes that the driver could not reach the back floor from his sitting position. It is within common knowledge and experience that a driver must leave his sitting position at the wheel, and in most cases cease driving, in order to reach an object on the floor of the back seat. In the present case, the facts established by the arresting officer, when coupled with common knowledge, show that the defendant could have easily maintained his sitting position, kept one hand on the wheel, his eyes on the road and have secured the gun merely by leaning forward and reaching down with his other hand. The movement and time involved would have been negligible in preventing defendant’s speedy access to and use of the gun. Reaching for any concealed weapon will entail some change of position, and to limit that movement to the narrow confines set forth by the majority, is to render the statute nugatory as to weapons found “about” the person of an accused. People v. Lake, 332 Ill. 617, is apparently relied upon as stating that a weapon placed in the crevice between the seat cushion and the back of the seat immediately behind the driver is not readily accessible, thus not a concealed weapon. Such assumption can only come from a misinterpretation of the facts, for as I read the case the gun was in the crevice behind a passenger in the front seat, not in back of the driver who was the accused. The majority’s statement that a gun in the crevice back of the driver is not a concealed weapon would be notice to all future criminals who travel by auto to take their guns out of their pockets while proceeding to the scene of their intended crime. Alluding to the facts of the Lake case is further erroneous because the only matter there determined was that the information charging the crime must contain the allegation that the weapon is concealed “on or about the person” of the party accused. A judicial opinion must be read as applicable only to the facts involved and is authority only for what is actually determined. Likewise, the stress laid by the majority on the lack of proof that defendant owned the weapon, or the car in which it was found, finds no support either in the statute or past decisions. Ownership of the weapon is not made an element of the crime by the statute, nor is ownership of the place or object in which it is found. Possession and accessibility are the elements defined, and to require proof of ownership is to place a burden on the People not contemplated by the legislature, and which would render conviction under the statute a virtual impossibility. In the instant case the defendant had possession and control of the automobile in which a gun was found. It was about his person and where it could be readily used. His statements that he did not own the gun and that he had borrowed the car should not be allowed to overshadow his possession and control of both the car and the gun. As I view it, proof of ownership in another and the extent to which those factors would excuse defendant, were matters for affirmative defense and not proof by the People. Defendant did not tell the trial court either the name or the address of the owner, or give any other information which could be called a successful pursuit of such a defense. Again, I must remark that the case relied upon by the majority is not in point. Denial of ownership of the car and of the gun found in the car were advanced as reasons for reversing the judgment against the defendant in People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151, only because the accused was a passenger in the car which was being driven by its owner. Nor was it shown that he had any control over the car or possession of the pistol found in its glove compartment. The Henneman case on its facts is not applicable here where defendant was driving and had possession and control of the car in which the weapon was found. The observation that there is not an iota of evidence that defendant was a criminal, or had associated with criminals, has, in my estimation, no place in the determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence. There was, likewise, no evidence offered by either defendant or his companion as to what their present or past occupations were. Whatever his past conduct or associations, defendant has committed a criminal act by unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. To excuse one who carries a gun unlawfully by looking into his past ignores the future and constitutes a coddling of the unauthorized bearer which is realized too late when he finds occasion to use the gun for some other crime. Prevention of crime is, as I see it, a fundamental purpose of the act. That purpose should not be defeated by the strained constructions and extreme rules indulged in by the majority. Mr. Justice Wilson, also dissenting.