Court Opinion

ID: 9705217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:05.363687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:08.966258
License: Public Domain

*561CIRILLO, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I write separately in order to address the majority’s decision which, in my opinion, adheres far too rigidly to elements of tenancy by the entireties, without regard for the unjust results in this case.
Initially, I will re-examine the facts, as it appears there are some inadvertent discrepancies in both the trial court and majority opinions. Appellee Alan Cohen (“husband”) owes appellant The Howard Savings Bank (“bank”) a total of $202,871.05 as the result of two loans. Both the bank and the Cohens have stipulated to this amount and judgment has been entered accordingly.
In order to finance a business venture, husband borrowed the necessary funds from the bank. Husband signed a promissory note on October 5, 1984. This contract allowed him to borrow up to $50,000.00 which would be advanced to him as needed. No one co-signed this promissory note. On the same day, however, Marilyn Cohen (“wife”), at the bank’s request, signed a separate instrument, a guaranty, which stated: “I guaranty the Borrower [husband] will punctually pay whatever he owes the Bank now or later.” (emphasis added). Husband did not co-sign this guaranty. Several months later when husband needed additional capital for his business, he requested that the bank increase his credit line. The bank agreed to lend him the additional funding if he would sign an additional promissory note. On May 23, 1985, husband signed a second promissory note. This contract allowed him to borrow up to $150,000.00 which again would be advanced to him as needed. No one co-signed this second promissory note. Both notes and the guaranty clearly stated that the contracts were to be governed by the laws of New Jersey.1 In 1987, husband *562stopped paying the interest on the loans2 and the bank requested that he renew the two promissory notes and that wife co-sign the notes. Husband and wife refused. Consequently, the bank made demand for repayment on the two notes, which was authorized under the contracts.
After a lengthy procedural delay, the bank and the Co-hens agreed that husband had defaulted on the loans and that he owed the bank $202,871.05. On January 29, 1990, the parties stipulated before the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County that judgment would be entered against husband and wife individually in the amount of $202,871.05, plus interest to accumulate at $49.51 per diem. The trial court so held.3 Subsequently, after the bank filed a praecipe, the trial court entered judgment. The parties also stipulated to a sixty day moratorium against enforcement to permit the trial court sufficient time to determine whether the bank could execute its judgment against property located in Pennsylvania and held by the Cohens as tenants by the entireties.
After considering the complexities of the situation, the trial court determined that the bank could not satisfy its judgment by executing against the Cohens’ Pennsylvania property. The court reasoned that since judgment was entered in the full amount against each spouse individually, the debt was not a joint debt. Therefore, the Pennsylvania *563property was not subject to levy, as only joint debts can be satisfied with property held in tenancy by the entireties. Sterrett v. Sterrett, 401 Pa. 583, 166 A.2d 1 (1960). Thereafter, the bank filed post-trial motions. The motions were denied and this appeal followed. The bank now requests this panel to consider whether it can enforce its judgment against the property held by the Cohens as tenants by the entireties.
On appeal the bank initially contends that the interpretation of and execution on this contract is governed by the laws of Pennsylvania. In support of its assertion the bank cites the fact that husband and wife are Pennsylvania residents, the contract was signed in Pennsylvania and the property they seek to levy against is in Pennsylvania. However, the bank is confusing two separate choice of law principles. Generally, absent a choice of law provision in the contract, a contract is governed by the law of the state in which the contract is signed. See Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws § 188.
The two promissory notes husband signed and the guaranty wife signed, however, state unequivocally that they are to be governed by the laws of New Jersey. In interpreting the intent of the parties in a written contract, when the words are clear and unambiguous, as in this case, the intent is to be determined only from the express language of the agreement. Scherer v. Nash, 405 Pa.Super. 37, 591 A.2d 1086 (1991); Warren v. Greenfield, 407 Pa.Super. 600, 595 A.2d 1308 (1991). To do otherwise would undermine the integrity of written contracts. See Gianni v. Russell, 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924). Conversely, if the language of the contract is ambiguous and unclear, a written agreement is to be construed against its drafter, which in this case is the bank. Warren, supra; Ormond Realty v. Ninnis, 341 Pa.Super. 101, 491 A.2d 169 (1985). Therefore, the laws of New Jersey, not Pennsylvania, govern the contracts and the debt incurred by the Cohens. The contracts are to be executed under New Jersey law and, consequently, questions or disputes concerning the contract or the debt, are to *564be resolved under New Jersey law. Indeed, a review of the record indicates that the loans were extended according to New Jersey law, husband’s default was stipulated to under New Jersey law, husband’s default was stipulated to under New Jersey law, and the loans were called in under New Jersey law. Moreover, the debt was reduced to judgment under New Jersey law. Now that the bank has a judgment to enforce, it seeks to levy against real estate located in Pennsylvania.
Although the laws of New Jersey govern the contracts and the debt, the laws of Pennsylvania govern execution of any judgment, against real estate located in this Commonwealth. It is well established that the courts of Pennsylvania have jurisdiction over the land situated within the Commonwealth, even if a person owning or claiming an interest in the land is not personally subject to the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5302; Alpern v. Coe, 352 Pa. 208, 42 A.2d 542 (1945). This case involves real estate located in Pennsylvania and owned by Pennsylvania residents as tenants by the entireties. Therefore, although New Jersey law governs the contracts and debt, it does not govern the execution of the judgment against real estate located outside the state of New Jersey. The issue of whether or not the bank can execute against property in Pennsylvania held by the Cohens as tenants by the entire-ties can only be determined under the laws of Pennsylvania.
To understand the dilemma posed by the parties on the facts of this case, one must first comprehend the nuances of tenancy by the entireties. Tenancy by the entireties is a “unique form of co-ownership grounded in the common law concept that husband and wife were but one legal entity.” Clingerman v. Sadowski, 513 Pa. 179, 519 A.2d 378 (1986). Essentially, a tenancy by the entireties is based on the uniqueness and unity of the marital relationship. Id. The distinguishing feature of this type of ownership is that a husband and wife individually own the entire or whole property, and not a one-half or a divisible portion. Id. *565Justice Musmanno offered an illustrative analogy for this type of ownership:
Husband and wife own an estate in entireties as if it were a living tree, whose fruits they share together. To split the tree in two would be to kill it and then it would not be what it was before when either could enjoy its shelter, shade and fruit as much as the other.
Sterrett, 401 Pa. at 585, 166 A.2d at 2.
Given such unity, neither spouse may deprive the other spouse of the use or enjoyment of the entireties property, and neither spouse may sever or encumber the estate without the consent of the other spouse. Schweitzer v. Evans, 360 Pa. 552, 63 A.2d 39 (1949). Neither spouse, alone, may convey the entireties property, Clingerman, supra, and an entireties estate may only be terminated by a joint act of the husband and wife. In re Gallagher’s Estate, 352 Pa. 476, 43 A.2d 132 (1945).
At common law, under the concept of coverture, husband and wife were considered one, but with the legal identity of the wife merging into that of her husband. DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975). Society presumed that it was the husband’s duty to provide his wife with a home and the requisite household goods. Id. Therefore, as married women were not legally capable of owning property in their own names until the nineteenth century,4 *566the husband owned the property, both real and personal. Id. To afford a woman, who had few property rights, some measure of protection from the possibility of losing her home due to a husband’s reckless actions, the concept of tenancy by the entireties was created. Id.; see also Wallaesa v. Wallaesa, 174 Pa.Super. 192, 100 A.2d 149 (1953). This type of ownership preserved the tenancy even if the husband incurred debts and his creditors attempted to seize the marital home in lieu of payment. See Amadon v. Amadon, 359 Pa. 434, 59 A.2d 135 (1948). Also, it protected entireties properties from being conveyed to a third party by one spouse without the other spouse’s consent. See Backus v. Backus, 464 Pa. 380, 346 A.2d 790 (1975); see also Fascione v. Fascione, 272 Pa.Super. 530, 416 A.2d 1023 (1979).
When the Married Women’s Property Acts were enacted in several states in the late nineteenth century, see footnote four, supra, there was a question as to the continued need for tenancy by the entireties. Wallaesa, supra. Women no longer required legal protection as they had achieved the same property rights as their husbands. Today, of course, husbands and wives are regardéd as two separate and distinct individuals in all but one area of the law. Pennsylvania chooses to retain the common law concept of tenancy by the entireties, which views a husband and wife as a single entity. DiFlorido, supra; see Madden v. Gosztonyi, 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624 (1938).
Here, I find the majority’s strict adherence to the traditional attributes of tenancy by the entireties unwarranted. In this case it only serves to enable husband and wife to avoid payment of a debt. Husband and wife are each individually responsible for the debt by virtue of the promissory notes and guaranty. The majority, however, denies the bank execution of judgment on the entireties property on the basis that the Cohens are not jointly obligated. Such an anomalous interpretation is misguided and undermines *567the very purpose for which tenancy by the entireties was created. Application of the common law principle in this case allows one spouse, or both spouses, individually, to protect their jointly held property. Tenancy by the entire-ties was never intended to work such an inequity, and I therefore register my disagreement with the majority’s analysis and result.

. The promissory notes and guaranty read in pertinent part as follows:
APPLICABLE LAW: This note will be governed by the law[s] of the State of New Jersey.

. Husband suffered a heart attack on December 6, 1987. He did not make any interest payments after the onset of his illness.

. The parties stipulated to the amount of money owed and the judgment was entered individually against husband and wife in Pennsylvania. However, this was done pursuant to the laws of New Jersey as the contracts were governed by those laws. The promissory notes provided for payment. Both promissory notes state, “If I do not pay any amount when due under this note or under any of my other debts to the Bank Bank may sell any of the collateral at any price the Bank believes best, for cash or on credit, to anyone including the Bank itself without any notice to me, and apply the proceeds of the sale to pay any or all of my debts to the Bank.” Therefore, the promissory notes were called in under their own terms which are governed under New Jersey law. Thus, this case has been brought before the courts of this Commonwealth in order to enforce the judgment against Pennsylvania property pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 4306.

. In Pennsylvania, married women's rights were advanced under the Married Women’s Property Acts. Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 170, and Act of June 8, 1893, P.L. 344 Sec. 1 (48 P.S. § 31). The Act of 1893 permitted married women to lease, sell, and own their real estate, but, also, stated that married women could not "execute or acknowledge a deed or other written instrument conveying or mortgaging her real property unless her husband joined in such mortgage or conveyance.” Act of June 8, 1893, P.L. 344, 48 P.S. § 32; Ladner on Conveyancing 59 (4th ed.). The Act of 1957 equalized a married woman’s rights with these rights of a married man: a married woman “shall have the same right and power as a married man to acquire, own, possess, control, use, convey, lease or mortgage any property of any kind, real, personal or mixed, either in possession or expectancy, or to make any contract in writing or otherwise, and may exercise the said right and power in the same manner and to the same extent as a married man.” A woman’s rights were further enhanced in 1971 with the Equal *566Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Pa.Const., art. I, § 28.