Court Opinion

ID: 9885673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:09:54.278975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:30.790676
License: Public Domain

McNally, J.
(dissenting). I dissent and vote to affirm the order.
In this action by plaintiff wife to enjoin the prosecution of a divorce action in France by the defendant husband, the appeal is from an order granting a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from prosecuting the divorce action pending this action and denying defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency.
The parties were married in France on February 15, 1933. They resided in France from 1933 to 1940. During September, 1940, the parties took up residence in the County and State of New York until April 8, 1954, when they separated. Between 1946 and 1954 the parties spent Spring and Summer of each year in Paris and returned to New York in the Fall. Defendant is one of the principal stockholders of Van Cleef & Arpéis, Inc., which owns and operates jewelry shops in the United States and has its principal place of business in the County of New York, and a member of a partnership so engaged in France.
On April 29, 1954, plaintiff commenced an action for separation against defendant in the Supreme Court, New York County. In said action the plaintiff alleged the residence of both parties in the State of New York. Defendant appeared in said action, filed an answer and admitted the allegation of residence. During 1954 and since 1933 the defendant owned a house in France. On this record it also appears that the defendant dwelled for substantially the same periods in New York and France at the time this action was instituted as he had prior to and during the pendency of the separation action. In the separation action of 1954, this defendant admitted the residence of the parties in New York County. On this application the defendant asserts his residence in France and the alienage of both parties. Defendant’s opposing affidavit does not deny his or plaintiff’s residence in New York. However, in the pending French divorce action, the defendant apparently alleges his French domicile.
*343Pending the separation action a separation agreement was made between the parties. The judgment of separation was entered November 1, 1954. The separation agreement, dated June 1, 1954, recites the residence of the parties in the County of New York and provides for the payment of $18,000 annually to the plaintiff for her maintenance and support until the death of either party or the remarriage of the plaintiff. The provision for support is subject to the defendant’s right to apply for a reduction in*the event his annual compensation is less than $40,000 under circumstances specified in the agreement. The stated circumstances being present, at the option of defendant the application for said reduction may be made to the Supreme Court, New York County, or the court in which a final judgment of divorce has been entered. Provision is also made therein for the maintenance by the defendant of a $10,000 insurance policy on his life for plaintiff’s benefit, subject to the condition that no judgment be rendered against the plaintiff in an action for divorce based on New York statutory grounds. The defendant’s acknowledgment of the execution of the separation agreement recites his residence in New York County and that he “ sojourns temporarily at 61 Rue Chauveau, Neuilly-sur-Seine (France) ”.
The defendant was born in France and at all times has been and still is a citizen of France. The plaintiff was born in Monte Carlo, Monaco, and is apparently subject to French law. On October 14, 1958, plaintiff was temporarily in Paris, France. During her then stay in Paris process in the French action for divorce was served on her by delivery to plaintiff’s maid. The effect of this service under French law is not clear and can be best determined at a trial. (Martens v. Martens, 284 N. Y. 363.)
The grounds alleged for the French divorce action are:
“ 1. Mrs. Arpéis gradually ceased to have any affection for her husband.
“ 2. Mrs. Arpéis is maintaining and continues to maintain adulterous relations with a Mr. X.
“ 3. That these facts constitute the serious insults and the adultery contemplated by the law, constituting a serious violation of the duties and obligations resulting from marriage and make the maintenance of the conjugal bond intolerable.”
The defendant alleges that he owns substantial business interests in France and in the United States; that he maintains a permanent place of residence in France and a place of dwelling-in New York; that he pays personal income taxes to France as well as the United States and the State of New York. Defend*344ant asserts that the French court has jurisdiction of the action for divorce.
In Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum (309 N. Y. 371) an injunction to restrain prosecution of a Mexican divorce action was denied. There, the undenied allegations of the complaint were that the defendant was at all times a resident of New York State and never established residence in Mexico and that service of process in the Mexican action was attempted by publication. The court held that the divorce action was concededly invalid and therefore could not result in a decree entitled to recognition by the courts of this State. However, the court there reaffirmed the propriety of an injunction against the prosecution of a sister State divorce action on the basis that the judgment of that State would be entitled to the presumption of validity under the full faith and credit provision of the Federal Constitution (art. IV, § 1). In such ease the constitutionally created presumption imposes on the defendant spouse the obligation to disprove jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree thereby supplying the basis for the granting of an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the action in the sister State.
The burden imposed on the defendant spouse to disprove the validity of the decree rendered by the sister State is the basis for equitable relief. This premise is fortified by the court’s reference in the Rosenbaum case to Hammer v. Hammer (303 N. Y. 481, affg. 278 App. Div. 396) and Garvin v. Garvin (302 N. Y. 96). In adverting to Hammer and Garvin, the Court of Appeals stated that the defendants there had relied on facts supporting the jurisdiction of the foreign courts. Rosenbaum stands for the proposition that an injunction will not issue where the absence of jurisdiction on the part of the foreign court is clear and undisputed. This record establishes, at the very least, disputed issues as to the domiciles of the parties. Where, as here, the defendant strenuously argues and factually supports the jurisdiction of the foreign court, then equity may restrain him from prosecuting the foreign action upon a showing of hardship on the part of the plaintiff in defending on jurisdictional grounds a French action for divorce. The rule of comity as to French judgments (see Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14) serves to emphasize that the policy of this State is not offended by and requires the recognition of divorce judgments of that Country and completes the analogy with sister State divorce judgments. I do not believe that the policy of this State is affected by the alienage of a party, especially when, as here, plaintiff alleges and the record factually supports her domicile in this State. (Cf. Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240.)
*345Plaintiff’s right to support, under the terms of the separation agreement, at defendant’s option, may be subject to modification by the French court if defendant in the action there pending is awarded a divorce. If said divorce is grounded on adultery, plaintiff may forfeit her right to the insurance for her benefit provided for in the separation agreement. The hardship and expense incident to the defense of an action in France by a New York resident is patent. Moreover, here there is personal jurisdiction of the defendant and so far as appears he will not be subjected to any undue burden or expense in meeting the issues as to domicile in this jurisdiction. As was aptly stated by this court in Hammer v. Hammer (supra, p. 399): “ We no more than hold that the showing so far made entitles plaintiff to a trial of the issue before the Florida action is prosecuted.”
Here, too, the record shows that plaintiff is entitled to test the jurisdiction of the French court insofar as it is grounded on domicile in the courts of this State before the defendant continues with the prosecution of his action in France.
Rabin, J: P., Valente and Stevens, JJ., concur with Bergan, J.; McNally, J., dissents and votes to affirm in opinion.
Order reversed on the law and on the facts, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant, the motion for temporary injunction denied and defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint granted, with $10 costs, and judgment is directed to ,be entered in favor of the defendant dismissing the complaint, with costs.