Court Opinion

ID: 9654583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:27:38.108008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:11.056324
License: Public Domain

Sam Bird, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to show that appellant, Charles Rogers, was in actual physical control of his vehicle within the meaning of our DWI statute. I believe that the evidence was sufficient, and I would affirm Rogers’s conviction for fourth-offense DWI. The majority relies on Dowell v. State, 283 Ark. 161, 671 S.W.2d 740 (1984), in which our supreme court held that where the intoxicated occupant of an automobile was found to be asleep or passed out behind the steering wheel of an automobile without the key in the automobile’s ignition and with the motor not running, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he was in the actual physical control of the automobile within the DWI statute. The majority also cites Stephenson v. City of Fort Smith, 71 Ark. App. 190, 36 S.W.3d 754 (2000), which contains a similar holding by this court. However, in neither Dowell, supra, nor Stephenson, supra, was there evidence that the automobiles involved were susceptible of being started except by inserting and turning a traditional key in the automobile’s ignition switches. I do not disagree with the holdings of the Dowell and Stephenson cases. I simply question their applicability in the case at bar, where the evidence is undisputed that: (1) at the time of his arrest, Rogers’s automobile was equipped with an “auto-start” device that eliminated the need for a traditional key to start or stop the engine, or to operate the accessories of his automobile; (2) Rogers admittedly started the engine of his automobile with the use of the auto-start device; (3) the engine of the automobile was running and the headlights, taillights, and heater were on as the police officers approached his automobile; (4) Rogers was sitting intoxicated in the driver’s seat of his automobile; and (5) when Rogers was awakened by an officer, he used the auto-start device to turn off the motor of his automobile. Our case law clearly recognizes that evidence that an intoxicated person is asleep or passed out in the front seat of a vehicle with the lights on and the motor running is sufficient to show that the person is in control of a vehicle. See Diehl v. State, 63 Ark. App. 190, 975 S.W.2d 878 (1998) (affirming DWI conviction where appellant was slumped over on the driver’s side with the key in the ignition and the engine running); Hodge v. State, 27 Ark. App. 93, 766 S.W.2d 619 (1989) (affirming DWI conviction where appellant was lying on the front seat with the key in the ignition and the motor running); Blakemore v. State, 25 Ark. App. 335, 758 S.W.2d 425 (1988) (affirming DWI conviction where appellant was asleep in the front seat with the key in the ignition and the motor running). Although I agree that there was evidence in these cases that the keys to the automobiles were in the ignitions at the time of the arrests, the location of the keys was merely incidental to the fact that the cars were running. There was no evidence that any of the automobiles was equipped with an auto-start device that eliminated the need for a traditional key to start the automobile’s engine. In other words, unlike the case at bar, for the engines to have been running in Diehl, supra, Hodge, supra, and Blakemore, supra, the keys had to have been in the ignitions. Thus, the import of those cases is not that the keys were in the ignitions, but that the engines of the automobiles were running. In Wiyott v. State, 284 Ark. 399, 402, 683 S.W.2d 220, 222 (1985), our supreme court, in discussing the degree of “control” necessary to bring an automobile’s occupant within the gamut of the DWI statute, quoted with approval from the Oklahoma case of Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), wherein the Oklahoma court said, “[T]he control contemplated meant more than the ‘ability to stop an automobile,’ but meant the ‘ability to keep from starting,’ ‘to hold in subjection,’ ‘to exercise directing influence over,’ and ‘the authority to manage.’ ” In Wiyott our supreme court then went on to say, “[T]he evidence would support the finding that the appellant was exercising direct influence over his vehicle and had the authority to manage it. At any moment he could have awakened and started his vehicle.” 284 Ark. at 402, 683 S.W.2d at 222. Thus, the Wiyott decision did not turn on whether the key was in the automobile’s ignition but, rather, whether Wiyott had the authority to exercise directing influence over the management of his automobile. Likewise, in Hodge, supra, this court said that “[t]he object of [DWI] legislation is to prevent intoxicated persons from not only driving on the highways, but also from having such control over a motor vehicle that they may become a menace to the public at any moment by driving it.” 27 Ark. App. at 96, 766 S.W.2d at 620. The technician who installed the auto-start device in Rogers’s car testified that when started with auto-start, the automobile’s radio and heater become “active” and, thus, susceptible to the normal control of the driver. He also testified that when the automobile’s engine is ignited with auto-start, the car could be driven away by turning the key to the “on” position, pressing the brake, and putting the transmission in gear. Rogers himself testified that his purpose in using the auto-start was to warm up his automobile so he could sit in it until he was sober enough to drive home. In my opinion, a person who has the power to start and stop his automobile’s engine by the pushing of a remote button, and the power to operate his automobile’s heater, radio, and other accessories is a person who is exercising direct influence over the operation and management of his vehicle. As the supreme court said in Wiyott, supra, “control” within the meaning of our DWI law means more than simply the ability to stop and start one’s automobile. The majority concludes that in Dowell, “the supreme court has set out a bright-line rule that actual physical control begins when the keys are located in the ignition.”1 This might have been true in 1982 when Dowell was arrested, because in 1982 an automobile was started by placing the key in its ignition at the “off’ position, twisting the key past the “on” position to the “start” position, and holding the key in the “start” position long enough for the automobile’s engine to ignite. The 1982 driver could then press the brake pedal, place the automobile in gear, and drive away. However, in 2004, when Rogers was arrested, the engine in his Cadillac Escalade could have been ignited with the simple press of a remotely-located button. At that point, Rogers could have inserted his key in the ignition at its “off’ position, turned the key to the “on” position, pressed the brake pedal, put the automobile in gear, and driven away. Having already started his engine with auto-start, Rogers could have skipped the twisting of the key to the “start” position because the automobile’s engine was already running. Comparing these two automobile-starting techniques, it is clear to me that it would be just as easy, if not easier, for a drunken person to wake up and drive off in an automobile that is already running as it would be to wake up and start a non-running automobile that has its key in the ignition. This is especially true if the drunken person with auto-start knows where his automobile key is located, as was the evidence in this case2. I do not believe that it is the public policy of Arkansas, expressed through Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-103(a) (Repl. 1997), to simply discourage intoxicated persons from placing their keys in the ignition switches of their automobiles. Rather, I believe that it is the public policy of Arkansas to discourage intoxicated persons from placing themselves behind the steering wheels of automobiles under circumstances that permit them to exercise directing influence and management authority over their automobiles. See Wiy-ott, supra, and Hodge, supra. In this regard, I see no distinction between the degree of control over the operation of an automobile that is exercised by a drunken person who merely inserts his traditional key in a non-running automobile’s ignition switch and the degree of control exercised by a drunken person who has in his pocket, or otherwise readily accessible to him, a device that allows him to start or stop his automobile’s engine without a key in its ignition switch. The only difference is that the traditional key must be manually inserted in the ignition, whereas with auto-start, the “key” is “inserted” electronically with the push of a remote button. Either way, the automobile, with a drunk driver at the wheel, becomes a potentially lethal weapon with the twist of a key. I do not mean to suggest by this dissenting opinion that potentially drunk drivers should be discouraged from getting into their automobiles and “sleeping it off,” rather than attempting to drive after they have been drinking. Under Dowell, supra, they are still free to do this, remaining immune from prosecution for DWI, by simply leaving the engine off and the key out of the ignition, even if their automobile is equipped with auto-start. I respectfully dissent, and I am authorized to state that Judge Griffen joins in this dissent.   One logical extension of the majority’s analysis would be that if a drunken person lost his car keys and “hot-wired” his automobile’s ignition so as to enable him to drive the car, he would not be guilty of DWI because there was no key in the ignition. Of course, the same could be said of a drunken thief who hot-wired a stolen car because he had no key.    The auto-start technician testified that Rogers’s automobile key was attached to his auto-start “fob” by a chain.