Court Opinion

ID: 9700267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:17:48.168516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:06.088381
License: Public Domain

Judge JOHNSON,
dissenting.
I believe the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay declaration of the emergency medical technician. I also conclude that the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad is not a “proper government authority” within the meaning of Section 1702 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) so as to render the striking vehicle uninsured. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
Out-of-court statements which are offered to prove the • declarant’s state of mind are not within the interdiction of the hearsay rule. Commonwealth v. Smith, 523 Pa. 577, 594, 568 A.2d 600, 609 (1989). Likewise, an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it is offered to explain a course of conduct. Spotts v. Reidell, 345 Pa.Super. 37, 42, 497 A.2d 630, 633 (1985). The waiver trial in this matter was brief. Counsel for Constitution State Service Company (CSSC) timely objected to any testimony regarding what the emergency medical technician said to Janine Gunter (the claimant) as hearsay. Waiver Trial Transcript, (W.T.T.), October 15, 1992, at 11, R.R. at 27a. The trial court reserved its ruling on the hearsay objection, wanting to first hear what was said. Id. at 12, R.R. at 28a.
*310The claimant’s counsel then asked the following question on direct examination:
Q. Why did you not go to the police department to file the police report?
A. When I talked—when the guy in the ambulance was talking to me, he took the report and he said he would take care of it.
MS. DICHTER [CSSC’s COUNSEL]: Same objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I’ll overrule it. I’ll hear it.
BY MR. SAGOT [CLAIMANT’S COUNSEL]:
Q. He told you he would take care of it?
A. Yes. He said he would take care of it.
MR. SAGOT: Thank you. I have no further questions of this witness.
Id. at 12-13, R.R. at 28a-29a.
Arguably, statements made to the claimant by the emergency medical technician would go to establish the claimant’s state of mind just prior to her being transported to the hospital by a Philadelphia Fire Rescue ambulance. As CSSC correctly points out to this Court on appeal, the claimant’s state of mind, on these facts and when reviewing this statute, is irrelevant.
Our supreme court instructs us that in seeking to invoke the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the proffered evidence must tend to make a material fact more or less probable, that is to say, the out-of-court statement must be relevant. Commonwealth v. Smith, supra 523 Pa. at 594, 568 A2d at 609. Compare Baker v. Morjon, 393 Pa.Super. 409, 415, 574 A.2d 676, 679 (1990) (state of mind of plaintiff upon learning of casket’s deteriorated condition from third persons irrelevant to suit against defendant where not causally related to defendant’s tortious acts). The only possible fact which would be illuminated by the hearsay evidence before us on this appeal is the reason why the claimant did not report her accident to the police. But an unidentified vehicle can qualify as an uninsured vehicle only if the accident involving the *311unidentified vehicle has been reported to the police or proper governmental authority. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702; Jackson v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan, 394 Pa.Super. 274, 575 A.2d 626 (1990). Therefore, the reasons for not reporting the accident to any particular governmental agency, including the police, cannot make the alleged reporting to another agency any more or less probable. I can only conclude that the out-of-court statements relating to what the emergency medical technician would do with the information given to him by the claimant are totally irrelevant.
The majority states that the claimant:
was preoccupied with establishing her state of mind at the time the conversation took place.... She believed the incident would be reported to the police because of the technician’s remarks to that effect.
Majority op. at 300. The majority goes on to conclude:
The linchpin to admissibility is that the remarks were made and not whether the EMT employee carried out his statements to notify the police____ Thus, we hold meritless the hearsay claim raised by the Appellant, concluding that the remarks testified to were both relevant (they increased the probability of the material fact at issue—whether the Appellee communicated to the EMT employee about the “hit and run”) and admissible.
Id. at 300.
The relevancy analysis may precede, but remains separate and apart from, the hearsay analysis. I cannot join my colleagues in believing that statements claimed to be made by the emergency room technician in response to the claimant’s statements, if any, increase the probability that the claimant made those statements. This does not advance a “state-of-mind” analysis. Moreover, the only evidence in the record certified to this Court on the issue of what the claimant said to the technician is her testimony quoted above:
A. When I talked—when the guy in the ambulance was talking to me, he took the report and he ,said he would take care of it.
*312At trial, the claimant identified Gerald Brown as “the guy in the ambulance.” Brown was not called as a witness, nor was his deposition taken or submitted to the trial court. The claimant did not testify as to what was included in “the report” which she claims to have given to Gerald Brown, and the claimant does not even contend that a written report was ever made by the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad. Thus, we are left with a request that we accept the hearsay statement of the technician as increasing the probability of material facts which are found nowhere in the record. The majority would admit the hearsay statements to buttress statements by the claimant which were never placed before the trier of fact. This writer is unable to join in such a conclusion. This argument—that the statement increased the probability of a material fact at issue—is an attempt to find admissibility based upon circumstantial evidence of a fact other than the matter asserted. This is not an argument based upon the “state-of-mind” exception. Where my colleagues advance two disparate arguments, without citation to authority, I am at a loss as to which is intended to support their conclusion that the out-of-court statements regarding a report to the Philadelphia police is both relevant and admissible. I find the statements to be both irrelevant and inadmissible, on the basis that the statements do not advance any material facts and are, consequently, irrelevant to any issue before the trier of fact.
The potential harm is apparent from the analysis of the trial court. The court concluded its Opinion of April 28, 1993, with this paragraph:
The evidence concerning what was said by the paramedic to Ms. Gunter [the claimant] was highly relevant, as it tended to negate the inference that because Ms. Gunter did not report the accident to the police her claim was not legitimate. Therefore, this Court’s ruling admitting the evidence concerning the paramedic’s conversation with Ms. Gunter was not error, as it was not inadmissible hearsay, but rather was admissible as relevant and material to Ms. Gunter’s claim.
*313Opinion, Glazer, J., April 28, 1993, at 5. The flaw in this analysis is that the trial court, and the majority on this appeal, both find that the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad is a “proper government authority” under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702. With this legal conclusion established, any attempt to report the same incident to another government authority, the Philadelphia Police Department, is rendered unnecessary and immaterial. On this basis alone, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Turning to the other issue raised on this appeal, I conclude that the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad is not a proper governmental authority for reporting accidents which involve unidentified motorists. It may be assumed, for purposes of this appeal, that the Fire Department of the City of Philadelphia, and its sub-departments including the Fire Rescue Squad, are part of a governmental entity. I have not found any analysis in the Opinion of my colleagues, however, on the narrow issue of whether either the Fire Department or its Fire Rescue Squad is an “authority” as that word is used in defining an uninsured motor vehicle in 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702. The majority finds that a fire rescue service maintained by a city is a unit of local government. I would not dispute this. This is not sufficient to justify the quantum leap then made by my colleagues in finding it “appropriate to hold that members of Philadelphia’s Fire Rescue Squad ... be considered an integral pari of a ‘governmental authority.’’ ” Majority op. at 239.
The MVFRL includes, as one of its definitions of an uninsured motor vehicle, the following:
§ 1702. Definitions
The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall have the meanings given to them in this section unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
"Uninsured motor vehicle.” Any of the following:
*314(3) An unidentified motor vehicle that causes an accident resulting in injury provided the accident is reported to the police or proper governmental authority and the claimant notifies his insurer within 30 days, or as soon as practicable thereafter ... (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that this matter was not reported to the police. Since the contested out-of-court statement by the emergency medical technician may not be used to establish the truth of what he asserted, there is no evidence that there was any attempt to report it to the police. Therefore, we must find that the accident was reported to the “proper governmental authority” to find an uninsured vehicle to support the claim advanced on this appeal.
It may be helpful to begin by establishing what the legislature could not have intended in using the term “proper governmental authority.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). It would be absurd to conclude that the legislature meant to place all bodies or boards authorized by law to enact ordinances or adopt resolutions for a particular municipality on a par with the police for purposes of implementing the MVFRL. See, for example, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102; 53 P.S. § 302. In determining the intention of the General Assembly, we are called upon to consider, among other matters, the mischief to be remedied by the statute and the object to be obtained, as well as the consequences of a particular interpretation. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(3), (4), and (6).
The purpose of the requirement that the accident be reported to either the police or proper governmental authority was to prevent fraud and the attempted recovery of benefits in cases where accidents were alleged to have been caused by “phantom” vehicles. Jackson v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan, supra 394 Pa.Super. at 276 n. 2, 575 A.2d at 628 n. 2; Ronca, Sloane and Mundy, Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Insurance: An Analysis of the Financial Responsibility Law (1986), § 6.5. A proper authority under this rubric would need to be an agency of government with the power to investigate accident claims and the resources to accomplish this task. Part of the purpose in *315requiring reporting is to allow for the possibility that the hit- and-run operator will be apprehended through effective police work. The inability of a victim of a hit-and-run to identify the assailant or the vehicle, in any particular case, does not militate against a statutory requirement that all alleged hit- and-run incidents be reported in order for the claimant to become eligible for benefits under the MVFRL.
In considering whether the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad should qualify as a “proper authority” for reporting purposes, there is much in the record on this appeal which the majority has elected to ignore. Edwin R. Boardman was the driver of the Rescue Squad vehicle which answered the emergency call involving the claimant. His deposition was taken and was included in the record at trial. W.T.T. at 18, R.R. at 34a. Boardman testified that emergency medical technicians do not receive any specific training regarding the investigation of accidents. Transcript of Deposition, Boardman, (T.D.B.), October 13, 1992 at 7, R.R. at 53a. He stated that the E.M.T. personnel do not investigate accidents. Id. Furthermore, he testified that, in the normal course of his duties, he does not take any information regarding the facts of an accident, in terms of who was involved, who may have been at fault, and what specifically might have happened. Id. at 9, R.R. at 55a. In those cases where they may have occasion to inquire as to how fast a vehicle may.have been traveling, that information is forwarded by the E.M.T. to the doctors in the emergency room, to assist in medical management. Id. Boardman testified that an E.M.T. does not ask any questions or take any record of the identity of the vehicles involved in any accident, such as license tag numbers or names of operators of the vehicles. Id.
There is no procedure within the Fire Rescue Squad administration established to report facts of either an injury or an accident to the police department. Id. at 10-11, R.R. at 56a-57a. The police are usually dispatched simultaneously with the fire rescue units. Id. Boardman reiterated that the only thing he ever relates to the police is the name of the patient who is transported to the hospital. Id. at 17, R.R. at 63a. *316Boardman testified that the job description of an E.M.T. does not include any requirement or expectation that anything is reported to the police. Id. at 18-21, R.R. at 64a-67a.
The Fire Rescue Service Report, a form utilized by the City of Philadelphia Fire Department through its Fire Rescue Squads, does not contain any places for recording information concerning facts surrounding an automotive accident or a hit- and-run. The form does contain blocks to permit the E.M.T. to record the location type where medical service was rendered and the route log (road and weather conditions). There is nothing on the form, not even an open remarks section, to provide for the recording of vehicular information.
The only evidence before the trier of fact negates any suggestion that an emergency medical technician is trained, equipped or authorized to explore the facts surrounding a motor vehicle collision or incident, beyond collecting those facts necessary to administer appropriate medical assistance. There is nothing on the record to suggest that information volunteered to a member of an Emergency Fire Rescue Squad would be transmitted to anybody or any entity not involved in the medical care and treatment of the patient. This being so, how then can the Emergency Fire Rescue Squad qualify as a “proper authority” for the receipt of information concerning a hit-and-run incident?
The cases cited by the majority to support its conclusion are inapposite. The New York cases are easily distinguished from the unique facts presented on this appeal. All of the New York cases involved the proper interpretation of Section 608(b) of the New York Insurance Law which requires a report of the motor vehicle accident to be made within 24 hours or as soon as reasonably possible to a “police, peace or judicial officer in the vicinity or to the commissioner.” Calabrese v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 43 A.D.2d 970, 352 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1974), merely held as a matter of law, without any analysis, that a parole officer is a peace officer within the meaning of § 608(b). Hanavan v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 33 A.D.2d 1100, 308 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1970), held that notifying the New *317York State Police that one has been struck by an unknown vehicle complies with the § 608(b) statutory requirement. To the same effect, Rodriguez v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, 54 Misc.2d 361, 282 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1967), held that a hospital special patrolman, who wore a shield and a blue uniform similar to that of a New York City policeman and who possessed the duty and right to arrest was a “peace officer” for the purpose of § 608(b), “particularly where the rights of a non-English speaking litigant are concerned.”
None of the New York cases went further than to consider whether a particular individual met the requirements of a “peace officer” or a “police officer” under the statute requiring reporting to a “police, peace or judicial officer.” None of the New York cases considered, or discussed, whether the employing authority or entity was a “proper.... authority” under New York law for reporting purposes. Each of the cases were devoid of any dispute that a hit-and-run was reported; the only issue was whether the individual receiving the report was a proper individual, under the act, to receive the report.
We need not subscribe to the argument advanced by CSSC that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation would be the only “proper governmental authority” other than the police to whom an accident could be reported. Rejection of that argument, however, provides no basis for declaring the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad as a “proper government authority” under the MVFRL. There is nothing inconsistent with espousing a liberal interpretation of the MVFRL while rejecting the suggestion that the Fire Rescue Squad is a contemplated reporting alternative to the Philadelphia Police Department on the facts here presented.
I am willing to examine the interpretation of the phrase “proper governmental authority” on a case-by-case basis. It is enough to conclude, on the record before us, that the Philadelphia Fire Rescue Squad falls far short of satisfying the threshold requirements for inclusion in that category. The purpose of the section we now review was to prevent fraud and the collection of benefits in cases where accidents *318were alleged to have been caused by “phantom” vehicles. The declaration of Fire Rescue Squads as proper authority for reporting hit-and-run accidents, where the squads have never deemed it to be within their responsibility or authority to either receive or report such information, does nothing to advance that legislative purpose.
Accordingly, I dissent. I would reverse the judgment and direct entry of judgment in favor of the Constitution State Service Company.