Court Opinion

ID: 9860594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:26:41.502554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:16:36.037901
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE DEMPSEY dissenting: I agree that the first part of the contempt order finding the contemnor guilty of “Disorderly, contemptuous and insolent behavior” is too general to support summary punishment for contempt. I disagree, however, that the second part of the order charging the contemnor with “falsely accusing the said judge of acting in collusion with one Herbert A. Glieberman, an attorney, in improper handling of the above-entitled cause” is too conclusory to sustain a guilty finding for direct contempt of court. The second part of the order is specific and as complete a recitation of the facts as the circumstances permitted. It was specific: the contemnor made a direct and contemptuous accusation in open court; he charged the trial judge with acting in collusion with his adversary in improperly handling the cause then on hearing. CoHusion is an agreement for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose — a secret agreement to defraud a person of his rights. (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1967.) He named the party with whom the judge conspired and he stated the purpose of the collusion. Improper handling is doing something that should not be done, doing something wrong. The precise conduct of the contemnor was thus described. The only conclusional finding was the declaration that the accusation was false. This declaration was necessarily subjective and conclusional for the falsity of the accusation was within the court’s knowledge. The finding was as complete as the circumstances permitted; no court reporter transcribed the proceedings. Since a verbatim account of the coHoquy was not at hand, it was necessary to reconstruct the contemnor’s language or relate the substance of what he said. The latter was done. Stating the essential facts of his accusation was aU that could be done and is aU that is required. The declaration in the order that the contemnor accused the trial judge of coHusion was an allegation of ultimate fact; it was the equivalent of quoting him as saying, “I accuse you of coHusion” or “I charge that you and Attorney Glieberman have plotted together.” The declaration that the contemnor charged the purpose of the coHusion was the improper handling of the cause on trial, is equivalent to quoting him as saying, “Judge, you have been conniving to defraud my client” or “you and GMeberman have a secret agreement to deprive my client of his rights.” We must accept the facts set out in the contempt order as true. These facts constitute a flagrant act of contempt — an insulting reflection on the integrity of the judge made in open court before attorneys, court personnel and spectators. The order should be affirmed.