Court Opinion

ID: 9833578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:50:36.196831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:04.476722
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant, in her motion for rehearing, cites a number of eases, some of which we will notice. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153, 21 Ann. Cas. 921, involved a suit by the wife against the husband for a tort, alleged to have been committed by the husband upon his wife. The suit originated in the District of Columbia. In that case the Supreme Court, by a divided court, decided that under the District of Columbia Code no such suit could be maintained. Prom the conclusion of the majority three of the judges, to,wit, Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Hughes, dissent. But in Texas our courts have decided that a wife may not maintain a suit against her husband for a tort committed by him on her. At least the majority of us think that Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281, as well as Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S. W. 529, by this court, settles the question in this state.
Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624, 9 A. L. R. 1064, by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, involved the right of the husband to maintain an injunction against his wife, to restrain her from talking about him, abusing him, and “nagging” him. The court decided that a husband could not maintain this character of a suit against his wife, under the Minnesota statutes. We do not think the Minnesota decision is in conflict with our holding in this case.
The case of Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 A. 83, 8 L. R. A. 833, 17 Am. St. Rep. 499, held that an action by a married woman for debauching and carnally knowing-her husband, and for alienating his affections, cannot be maintained against another woman. To the same effect is Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N. W. 522, 8 L. R. A. 420, 20 Am. St. *213Rep. 79. But Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 A. 1027, 6 L. R. A. 829, 18 Am. St. Rep. 258; Seaver v. Adams, 66 N. H. 142, 19 A. 776, 49 Am. St. Rep. 597; Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605, 6 Ann. Cas. 658; Sims v. Sims, 79 N. J. Law, 577, 76 A. 1063, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842; Weber v. Weber, 113 Art. 471, 169 S. W. 318, L. R. A. 1915A, 67, and Ann. Cas. 1916C, 743—and in fact a large majority of the several state jurisdictions, especially the modern authority, are to the contrary of the case of Doe v. Roe, supra.
The case of Snedaker v. King (Ohio) 145 N. E. 15, is relied on by appellant to sustain her contention. Four of the seven members of the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, quoting from the syllabus, “in alienation suit, decree restraining defendant from associating. with plaintiff’s husband, going near, or communicating with him,” was an unwarranted extension of equity jurisdiction. One of the concurring justices, Judge Allen, explained her concurrence, in part, in the following words:
“The order passes all bounds in its lack of limitation. Under this order, what is Miss Sne-dekar to do if she passes King upon the street? Must she cross the street in order not to go ‘near him * * * at * * * any * ■ *. * place where said Homer King may be,’ or may she stay upon the same side of the street and pass him? Under such circumstances, may she say ‘Good morning’ to him, or in so doing will she be violating the order that she is not to communicate with King, ‘by word’?”
Chief Justice Marshall and Associate Justice Day each wrote quite lengthy dissenting opinions, in which they discussed at length the condition of the authorities involved, and each was of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Each cited Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 50 S. W. 933, 76 Am. St. Rep. 724, cited in the original opinion herein, and showed that in a large number of the states, including Ohio itself, the decisions had upheld the injunctive relief of the character therein shown. • Justice Conn, of the court, did not sit.
Perhaps in a majority of the cases affecting this question, the statutory law of the individual state is involved and the statutes construed. We believe that our statutes, construed under the light of advanced civilization and the increasing regard for the legal rights of our married women, do not preclude the maintenance of this character of a suit by a married woman alone, where her husband refuses to join as plaintiff, and in fact is incapacitated by reason of his own wrongdoing to maintain the suit as plaintff.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.