Court Opinion

ID: 9553429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:29:33.4746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:05.591906
License: Public Domain

Owsley, J.,
dissenting: I am unable to' agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that reasonable minds might not differ as to the issue of contributory negligence. I do not differ with the court’s conclusion that the case be returned for a new trial. Neither do I differ with the conclusion that defendant was guilty of negli*580gence as a matter of law. I agree the authorities cited in the opinion represent the law in this state, but I charge the majority with improperly applying that law to the facts in this case.
The majority of this court concludes the plaintiff was not contributorially negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiff testified she was driving south on Washington Street in Great Bend, Kansas, at about thirty miles per hour; that she was following another vehicle at a distance of one and one-half car lengths; that when the vehicle suddenly turned to the left in front of her without warning, she applied her brakes and came to a stop; and that defendant’s car, traveling behind her, struck her vehicle in its stopped position. The majority reasons plaintiff was not negligent in stopping to avoid striking a turning vehicle, and that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether plaintiff was negligent in following the car in front of her too closely.
K. S. A. 8-543 (a) of the Kansas Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, provides that a driver “shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” The majority opinion states that here the plaintiff was clearly in full compliance with this rule. I must disagree. The obvious purpose of 8-543 (a) is to prevent an accident when a leading vehicle stops or decreases its speed. A vehicle traveling at thirty miles per hour, as was plaintiffs car prior to the accident, requires approximately eighty-seven feet to come to a complete stop. (See, Kansas Driving Handbook, Prepared by Driver’s License Examining Division of the Motor Vehicle Department [1970].) Following another vehicle at a length and a half, or at about twenty-four feet, while traveling at thirty miles per hour, could reasonably be determined to fall below the standard of “reasonable and prudent” required by the statute. In addition, the safety recommendations included in the above-mentioned handbook suggest drat a following vehicle allow at least one car length for every ten miles per hour of speed. The same caution is contained in the Driver License Renewal Examination Handbook (1974), now being distributed to Kansas drivers. Accordingly, plaintiff should have been at least three car lengths from 'the leading vehicle. If she had been, this accident might never have occurred as the leading vehicle could possibly have cleared the highway before plaintiff reached the turning area, eliminating the necessity of bringing her vehicle to a stop in 'the street. Regardless of the weight attached *581to the drivers’ handbooks prepared by state agencies, the issue of following too closely should remain a jury question.
The majority reasons plaintiff was free of contributory negligence because she was required to stop her vehicle to avoid striking the turning vehicle in front of her. Applying this reasoning to the manner in which defendant was driving, it would follow that if defendant had been following plaintiffs vehicle as closely as plaintiff was following the vehicle in front of her, defendant could also be found free of negligence as a matter of law. The majority absolves a driver of negligence if she is following another vehicle closely enough to require a sudden stop to avoid striking a turning vehicle, and charges a driver with negligence when an ample distance is permitted to remain between her vehicle and the vehicle in front of her. The result is to penalize the driver for leaving ample distance between vehicles, and reward the driver who does not leave ample distance between vehicles. Unless logic is no longer a basis for the opinions of this court, the majority opinion is incorrect.
For many years this court has jealously guarded the right of a jury to determine questions relating to negligence. It is only when different minds can reasonably arrive at but one result that fact issues become questions of law justifying a court in substituting its judgment for the jury. (Johnston, Administratrix v. Ecord, 196 Kan. 521, 412 P. 2d 990.) This is not such a case.
Kaul, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.