Court Opinion

ID: 9707968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:26:12.316878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.603403
License: Public Domain

R. B. Burns, P. J.
(dissenting). Defendant was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery pursuant to MCLA § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.797). This appeal is taken from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Defendant claims the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The wife of the owner of the store which defendant and three other men were accused of robbing, positively identified defendant as one of the armed bandits. The store cashier, Perona Mitchell, also thought defendant was one of the robbers, although she was not positive. Defendant claims that the eyewitness testimony was unbelievable since he was wearing a moustache and a beard on the night of the robbery and the eyewitness did not recall seeing this excess facial hair. Defendant’s alibi witness, a woman with whom defendant had been cohabiting for several years, corroborated defendant’s claim of excess facial hair and further testified that defendant was with her at the time the alleged robbery took place.
It was the jury’s prerogative to disbelieve defendant and his alibi witness. People v. Jenkins (1968), 10 Mich App 257.
*201It cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant’s conviction was unjustified due to insufficient evidence. The eyewitness testimony of the store owner’s wife and of the store cashier was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Arither Thomas (1967), 7 Mich App 103.
On authority of People v. Jones (1935), 273 Mich 430 and People v. Lemmons (1970), 384 Mich 1, defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction which affirmatively excluded consideration of lesser included offenses from the jury. The pertinent part of the court’s instructions reads:
“Now, I don’t have to give you, members of the jury, in this case any instruction on automatic included offenses, which we have in so many cases. Why? Because in this case, due to the fact that the defense attorney is conceding and has conceded that there was a robbery armed — although he claims the defendant was not a participant — and in view of the nature of his defense, that he was not there— and in view of all the undisputed evidence we have heard regarding the incident that happened at the Simmons Grocery that night, it is either a case of robbery armed, or nothing. There are no included offenses because of the circumstances in this case.”
In the Lemmons case, supra, pp 2, 3, the Court stated:
“The complaining witness identified defendant as one of two men who robbed him at gunpoint. * * *
“Defendant made no request at trial that the lesser included offenses be included in the charg’e.
“The court instructed the jury that:
“ ‘There are only two possible verdicts as to each defendant. You may find the defendant, naming *202them individually, guilty of robbery armed or not guilty. There are no included offenses.’ * * *
“In Jones this Court went on to say:
“ ‘However, the rule does not excuse improper instructions. Here the court did more than fail to charge upon the included offenses. It affirmatively excluded them from the consideration of the jury. This was error because, under 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 17325, the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense * * * .’ (The statutory section now is CL 1948, § 768.32 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1055]).
“The court’s instruction in the instant case that the jury might find defendant either guilty of robbery armed or not guilty but that there were no included offenses comes directly within the interdiction of Jones and requires reversal with new trial.” (Emphasis in original.)
It is true that the defense tried this case on the theory that the defendant was not present at the scene of the crime. Defendant’s attorney did state to the court that a statement covering any lesser included offenses would not be consistent with the defense in this case. However, it is my interpretation of the Jones and Lemmons cases that a trial judge cannot affirmatively exclude the jury from considering lesser included offenses.
I would reverse and remand the case for a new trial.