Court Opinion

ID: 9532552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:22:24.324036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.066956
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
This court has many times stated that there are no duties connected with the offices enumerated in Article V, Section 9, of the Constitution of Arizona except those provided by legislative Act. In our leading case of Shute v. Frohmiller, 53 Ariz. 483, 90 P.2d 998, 1003, we said:
*166“Notwithstanding the holding in these cases, we are clearly of the view that the mere naming of the attorney general in the constitution of this state does not amount to an implied restriction on the authority of the legislature in prescribing his duties. * * *
“As just stated, the provision that the attorney general’s powers and duties ‘shall be as prescribed by law’ is as much a part of the constitution as that portion of it creating the office itself and fully as binding, but it is a useless provision if it be true that the mere naming of the office in that instrument limits the legislature in prescribing the functions the person filling it must perform. Naturally the framers of the constitution intended, when they created the office of attorney general and made it elective, that its duties would be discharged by the person elected to it, but in view of the fact that they provided also at the same time and in the same instrument that his powers and duties should be ‘as prescribed by law,’ meaning by legislative act, the intention was thht he would perform the duties assigned him by the legislature. * * *" (Italics mine.)
This decision was followed by many others approving and citing it as the law of this jurisdiction and culminated in unequivocal language used in Lockwood v. Jordan, 72 Ariz. 77, 83, 231 P.2d 428, 432:
“ * * * The powers and duties of the auditor under the provisions of section 9 of article 5 shall be such as are ‘prescribed by law’. No express restrictions are imposed upon the legislature by the constitution with respect to the powers and duties which shall be exercised by the state auditor. We have so often held that in the absence of such restrictions the legislature possesses plenary powers to enact .such laws as its judgment may dictate that it is unnecessary to cite authorities to sustain it.” (Italics mine.)
Since the only duties of the office of state auditor are those “prescribed by law,” it is only necessary to determine what the law has prescribed in this case. By the provisions of Section 41-141, A.R.S.1956, quoted in the court’s decision, the state auditor is required to “audit, adjust and settle the amount of claims against the state * * This would require the audit of the claims of members of the state legislature were it not for the subsequent Act of the twenty-second legislature, Section 41-1103, subd. E providing that “All payments * * * (for reimbursements of expenses of members of the legislature) shall be paid upon approval of the president of the senate or the speaker of the house of representatives * * *167By this latter Act the legislature has eliminated from the duties of the state auditor the obligation of auditing legislative claims for reimbursement of expenses.
We are not here concerned with the wisdom of the legislative action. That is wholly within its discretion.
“Finally, even if the law were one without safeguards and the threat of abuse seemed imminent, this Court has neither the power nor the authority to decide upon the desirability of the measure. We are confined solely to the question of its constitutionality.” Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 178 P.2d 436, 439.
What has been said fully disposes of the contentions of the respondent and would be sufficient to conclude this matter were it not for the position adopted by the court in its decision.
The court rests its decision on the assumption that it is the duty of the executive department to audit claims against the state in this language and this language only “ * * * but it was clearly contemplated by the creation of the constitutional office of auditor that someone should audit claims against the state, * * This assumption about the Constitution of this state is made without the support of any reasons or authority. It is, of course, insupportable being diametrically opposed to the construction of the Constitution as expressed in the foregoing quoted holdings of Lockwood v. Jordan and Shute v. Frohmiller and the many former decisions of this court. This court cannot have it both ways. Either it was contemplated by the framers of the" Constitution that the duties of the offices enumerated in Article V, Section 9, were to be prescribed by the legislature or it was contemplated that the duties of these offices would be construed into the Constitution by the interpretations of the members of this court. I choose the former. If it is the latter, then the plain, simple language of the Constitution, that the powers and duties “shall be as prescribed by law”, does not mean what it says.
It seems to me that the former decisions of this court are deserving of better treatment. There is some virtue in consistency. Without it the people- of the state are compelled to wander through a maze of conflicting constructions dependent upon no certain rules for guidance save only that which may be deemed expedient for the moment. The alternative writ of mandamus heretofore issued should be made permanent.