Court Opinion

ID: 9759127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:06:31.544002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:59.588027
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result, but do not agree with the rationale of the majority. As noted in the majority’s opinion, the trial court granted an initial partial summary judgment on the basis that the defamation causes of action were barred by the one-year statute of limitation. Appellees’ second motion for summary judgment was based on the premise that the second amended petition was barred because the filing of the original petition did not toll the statute of limitations. This is the correct basis, in my opinion, for the summary judgment and the affirmance.
TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5539(b), now TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. sec. 16.068 (Vernon 1986), allows an amended petition, asserting a cause of action barred by limitations, to avoid the plea when the original cause of action was not subject to any limitations bar. Since the original cause of action was barred, the statute was not tolled by the filing of the suit. As a result, the tortious interference claim must have been timely filed independent of the original petition. In this case, the amended petition which alleged the tor-tious interference with business relation was filed on November 18, 1984. The alleged acts would have to have occurred after November 18, 1982, to be within the two-year limitations period. TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. sec. 16.003 (Vernon 1986). There were no allegations of any tortious acts within the two-year period. The trial court was correct in granting the summary judgments in both instances.