Court Opinion

ID: 9531679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:13:50.41756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:33.913955
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
Recently in Snider v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1037, this court dealt with a claim which had not been made at trial or in a first and direct appeal, and held that it could be raised in a collateral attack in a first post-conviction petition through (1) a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) fundamental error, or (8) a justification of the prior default in not raising it. The subsequent Bailey v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 1260, regulates the manner of raising issues through the second category, but leaves the other two categories unaffected. In raising the alleged violation of due process through cross-examination of the defendant by the prosecutor on the subject of his post Miranda advisement silence, the public defender utilizes two of the categories, fundamental error and justification. n
Appellant first raised the claim in his post-conviction petition that the prosecution had used his post-Miranda advisement silence during cross-examination of him for impeachment in violation of due process. The trial court concluded that on the merits the claim could not be sustained and that the claim had been waived by failure to raise it upon direct appeal.
At appellant's trial the prosecutor repeatedly questioned Tope, during cross-examination, about his failure to explain his story to the police or prosecutor. That period of silence was preceeded by Miranda warnings. The defense attorney objected but was overruled, the court ruling that the questioning was within the scope of cross-examination. This questioning was like that considered by this court in Jones v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 447, 355 N.E.2d 402, wherein relying upon the holding in Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, we reversed because of the resulting violation of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth *877Amendment. Based upon Jones and Doyle, 1 find that appellant's post-convietion claim based upon Doyle that a violation of his due process rights occurred at his trial, is clearly sustained, and shoilld result in the grant of a new trial, unless the violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or was previously waived as found by the trial court.
Appellant's motion to correct errors addressed to his initial trial and conviction was filed on September 12, 1975. It contained no reference to any error in permitting the use of post-advisement silence during cross-examination. Doyle was decided the following year on June 17, 1976. Appellant's brief was filed on June 18, 1976. It contained no reference to the improper use of post-advisement silence. Doyle has been treated as fully retroactive. Williams v. Zahradnick (4th Cir.1980), 632 F.2d 353, and cases cited therein. Doyle declared for the first time that the federal proscription against the use of post-advisement silence was applicable to the states. Doyle, in relation to the courts of this state, constitutes a significant change in the law, occurring for our purposes here on June 17, 1976, and is fully retroactive. This change justifies appellant's failure to raise this issue in his motion to correct errors and in his brief on appeal, and demonstrates the error of the post-conviction court's judgment that the Doyle issue was waived on direct appeal.
I would therefore reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, and to address the question of harmless constitutional error.