Court Opinion

ID: 9643027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:15:45.203746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:56.685081
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
White, Justice.
A petition to rehear has been filed in this case by counsel for contestee, Ben Billings. We will attempt to clarify one point which was considered and determined in our original opinion and deal at some length with the contestee’s third ground, which is based upon our recent decision in the case of Hilliard v. Park, 212 Tenn. 588, 370 S.W.2d 829 (1963).
Contestee’s first ground of contention is that the contestant’s petition does not specifically point out enough illegal votes to change the results of the election and that this is a fatal defect when challenged by a demurrer to that effect.
In support of this contention contestee cites the cases of Jared v. Fitzgerald, 183 Tenn. 682, 195 S.W.2d 1 (1946), and Shoaf v. Bringle, 192 Tenn. 695, 241 S.W.2d 832 (1951). Contestee contends that our holding in the instant ease overrules these cases. We do not agree.
*291A close reading of the cases cited by contestee and those to which this Court makes reference in the original opinion will show that where the relief sought is a-declaration that the election is invalid and void it is not necessarily fatal, upon demurrer, that the petition does not specifically point out enough illegal votes to change the result of the election or enough to make the result uncertain. This is merely one way a contestant may show that “the election was so permeated with fraud that it did not afford an opportunity for the free and equal expression of the will of the people as to who they desired elected. ’ ’ In the case of Shoaf v. Bringle, supra, cited by the contestee, at page 703 of 192 Tenn., at page 835 of 241 S.W.2d the Court makes this clear:
“Such allegations in the bill as ‘many legal votes’ and ‘many votes’ and such general statements are entirely too general under the ground that the election was valid. * * * But when we come to consider the ground that the election was void because of. the fraudulent and illegal acts of those holding the election such general allegations if supported by any specifically stated facts may be taken into consideration. The allegations of fraud must be supported by some specific allegation of fact.” (Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, just as in State ex rel. Davis v. Kivett, 180 Tenn. 598, 177 S.W.2d 551 (1944), the contestant alleged that in each of a number of precincts the election officials, etc., committed illegal and fraudulent acts and so conducted the election that the election in such precincts did not afford an opportunity for the free and equal expression of the will of the people, and that if all the votes in any one of a number of such precincts were counted for the contestant it would make the results *292of the whole election “incurably uncertain”. In the instant case the contestant has made sufficient specific allegations of illegality and fraud to support the general allegations just as did the contestant in Davis v. Kivett, supra. Thus, just as in that case, the contestant has stated a cause of action sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
As stated in our original opinion, we are not passing on the merits of the contest. It may well be that on remand the contestant will fail to prove that the election was so permeated with fraud and illegality as to keep it from being a free and equal expression of the will of the people.
This brings us to contestee’s third ground which has caused this Court considerable concern. Counsel for contestee contends that under our decision in the recent case of Hilliard v. Park, 212 Tenn. 588, 370 S.W.2d 829 (1963), the questions in this case and the relief sought by the contestant are moot. He points out that the only relief sought by the contestant is that the election be declared void and that a special election be held as required by law. He maintains that under our holding in Hilliard, supra, even if, on remand, the contestant is able to substantiate his allegations and have the election declared void, such declaration would be of no use to him because under that case the contestee, Ben Billings, would be entitled to hold over in office until his successor was elected and qualified at the next biennial election. This is what would happen if the election was not declared void. Either way the contestee would remain in office until the end of his regular term.
Hilliard v. Park, supra, involved six election contests turning basically upon the same question in each case. *293The offices involved were sheriff, circuit court clerk, registrar of deeds, county court clerk, and two constables. The sheriff was re-elected and the other five were elected for the first time in the election in question. This Court affirmed the circuit court in holding the election void for uncertainty due to a number of ineligible absentee votes.
A petition to rehear was filed in that case, questioning the validity of a statement made in the original opinion at page 832 of 370 S.W.2d:
“Of course, holding thus simply means that the incumbents in these offices at the time this election was held void will hold over until their successors are elected and qualified by law. Conger v. Roy, 151 Tenn. 30, 267 S.W. 122.”
We held that the sheriff was a de jure incumbent because prior to the election he had been sheriff and was holding office at the time of the election and that the remainder of the officers were de facto incumbents since they had been in possession of the offices at the time the election was declared void. At page 839 of 370 S.W.2d we said:
‘‘Counsel in this petition to rehear relies upon Section 2-1924, T.C.A., as authority for his contention that there is a vacancy in the office. This Court in the Conger case considered and quoted in full this same statute, which was then Section 1332, Shannon’s Code, and said this:
“We think this section applies only where there is a vacancy; in other words, where there is no one to hold the office. It does not and cannot apply where there is an incumbent who may hold over until his *294successor is elected and qualified, as provided by the Constitution. The constitutional provision must control.’ ”
We then held that when an election has been held void and the office is occupied by either a de jure officer or a de facto officer the courts have no power to call a special election; and, therefore, the “incumbents” at the time the election was held void would hold over until their successors were elected and qualified by law at the next regular biennial election.
It is to- be noted that the decision in Hilliard v. Park, 212 Tenn. 588, 370 S.W.2d 829 (1963), was based upon an interpretation of T.C.A. 2-1924. Certain other sections of the Code, which were not brought to our attention, however, govern the matters in question and leave little room for interpretation:
T.C.A. “8-2801. Causes of vacancies. — Any office in this state is vacated:
* # * * # #
“(4) By the decision of a competent tribunal, declaring the election or appointment void or the office vacant. ’ ’
T.C.A. “2-1902. Circuit court- — Jurisdiction over what contests. — The circuit court hears and determines all contests of the election of sheriffs, clerks of the circuit, criminal, or other court whose clerks are elected by the people, except clerks of the county court. ’ ’
T.C.A. “8-2806. Certification of judgment of vacancy. —Whenever there is a final judgment of a competent tribunal, declaring any election or appointment void, or any office vacated, such judgment shall promptly be *295certified by the clerk to the appointing power or power whose duty it is to take steps to fill the vacancy.”
T.C.A. “5-513. Filling of vacancies in office. — Vacancies in said offices and in the following offices are filled by election or appointment of the county court: Sheriffs, trustees, registers, public administrators and guardians, constables, county court clerks, county tax assessors, or any other county officer, not otherwise provided for.”
T.C.A. “8-806. Temporary appointment by county ■court. — In such cases, and in all cases of vacancy in the office of sheriff, the county court may fill the-vacancy by temporary appointment, the person so appointed giving bond and qualifying as sheriff, and continuing to act until the office is filled by the people. ’ ’
T.C.A. “8-807. Temporary appointment by judge or chairman.- — When there is a vacancy in the office of sheriff, and no coroner, the judge or chairman of the county court may make an appointment of one to serve until a successor is elected by the county court. ’ ’
T.C.A. “8-808. Coroner acting as sheriff. — When the office of sheriff is vacant, or the sheriff is incompetent to act, the coroner of the county shall perform all the duties of sheriff, under the same penalties and liabilities imposed by law on sheriffs; and when both offices -are vacant, or' both officers are incompetent, or where one office is vacant and the person holding the other is incompetent, a constable may execute any process.”
These sections clearly do not contemplate that the person declared “elected” in the void election should continue in office for my period of time after the circuit court declares his election void, and that decision be*296comes final or is upheld on appeal. This was made clear in Shumate v. Claiborne County, 183 Tenn. 182, at page 185, 191 S.W.2d 441, at page 442 (1946), where this Court held:
“If and when, as in the instant case, the election of the person who has succeeded to the office and occupied it pending a contest, is adjudged void, this occupant’s tenure of office expires and a vacancy results.” (Emphasis supplied).
We must concede that counsel for contestee, Ben Billings, is correct in stating that under our decision in Hilliard v. Park, supra, there would be no point in anyone contesting an election. This is amply demonstrated by a consideration of the instant case. If, on remand, the allegations of the contestant, Ben Southall, were proved and the election declared void, the ruling in Hilliard v. Park would allow the contestee, Ben Billings, to hold office as sheriff until the next biennial election; thus, the election contest could have no purpose.
For the reasons set out in this opinion, we must overrule our decision in Hilliard v. Park to the extent that it is inconsistent with the aforesaid sections of the Code and Shumate v. Claiborne County, supra. For the same reasons the petition to rehear in the instant case is denied.
Burnett, Chiee Justice, Dyer and Holmes, Justices, and Clement, Special Justice, concur.