Court Opinion

ID: 9900362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:37.465396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.713044
License: Public Domain

No. 451            September 13, 2023                    1

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 JAMES SNODGRASS,
                  Petitioner-Appellant,
                            v.
                    Jamie MILLER,
                    Superintendent,
           Snake River Correctional Institution,
            and Oregon State Board of Parole,
                Defendants-Respondents.
               Polk County Circuit Court
                  20CV28914; A176748

  Rafael A. Caso, Judge.
  Submitted August 8, 2023.
   Margaret Huntington and O’Connor Weber LLC filed the
briefs for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondents.
   Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Kamins, Judge, and
Kistler, Senior Judge.
  LAGESEN, C. J.
  Affirmed.
2   Snodgrass v. Miller
Cite as 328 Or App 1 (2023)                                      3

        LAGESEN, C. J.
         In 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of 10
sex offenses. Eight of the verdicts were not unanimous.
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d
583 (2020), petitioner filed this post-conviction proceeding
seeking relief from his convictions resulting from nonunan-
imous verdicts. The post-conviction court granted summary
judgment to defendants, the Superintendent of the Snake
River Correctional Institution and the Oregon State Board
of Parole, on two alternative grounds: (1) that Ramos did
not apply retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings;
and (2) that, as part of a settlement of a federal habeas cor-
pus case, petitioner waived the right to file post-conviction
proceedings challenging his convictions. Reviewing for legal
error, Yann v. Bowser, 301 Or App 720, 722, 459 P3d 272
(2020), we affirm on the ground that petitioner’s waiver bars
him from pursuing this post-conviction relief.
         To start, in view of the Oregon Supreme Court’s
decision in Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or 604, 523 P3d 86 (2022),
decided after the post-conviction court rendered its decision
in this matter, the post-conviction court erred when it con-
cluded that Ramos did not apply retroactively in state post-
conviction proceedings.
         Given that error, the remaining question is whether
the post-conviction court was nonetheless correct in grant-
ing defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the alter-
native ground that petitioner had waived the right to seek
post-conviction relief from the convictions at issue. It was.
As part of a stipulated agreement to resolve two pending
federal habeas cases, petitioner unambiguously waived his
right to bring a further post-conviction challenge to the con-
victions at issue in this case. Specifically, petitioner stipu-
lated to the following:
      “In consideration for the above stipulations, petitioner
   knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives any fur-
   ther challenges to his convictions and sentences in State
   of Oregon v. James Lowell Snodgrass, Multnomah County
   Circuit Court Case 060835039 and State of Oregon v. James
   Lowell Snodgrass, Polk County Circuit Court Case No.
4                                               Snodgrass v. Miller

    96P-3054, including the filing of a petition in state court for
    post[-]conviction relief, a petition [in state or federal court]
    for a writ of habeas corpus, or any other form of collateral
    relief. * * * This waiver is intended to resolve any claims
    and prevent any future litigation based on or related to
    petitioner’s convictions and sentences in State of Oregon
    v. James Lowell Snodgrass, Multnomah County Circuit
    Court Case 060835039 and State of Oregon v. James Lowell
    Snodgrass, Polk County Circuit Court Case No. 96P-3054,
    and any collateral proceedings stemming from those con-
    victions and sentences.
        “Petitioner acknowledges, via declaration, that he
    has reviewed these stipulations with his attorney, Mark
    Weintraub, and that he (petitioner) knowingly, intelligently,
    and voluntarily agrees to all of the stipulations contained
    in this motion and the stipulated order.”
          Petitioner’s stipulation could not be clearer. He
unambiguously waived “any further challenges,” including
state post-conviction challenges, to the convictions that he
seeks to challenge in this proceeding. Petitioner neverthe-
less argues that the waiver should not be enforced against
him. He argues that the waiver was not “knowing” because,
at the time he waived his right to further challenge his
convictions, he did not know that, ultimately, the Supreme
Court would reach the conclusion it reached in Ramos.
Alternatively, he argues that a waiver should not apply any
time a person can demonstrate that a conviction or sentence
is “illegal.”
          We are not persuaded.
         Petitioner’s first argument is contrary to case law.
A waiver that is “intelligently made in the light of the then
applicable law does not become vulnerable because later
judicial decisions” indicate that it “rested on a faulty prem-
ise.” Brady v. United States, 397 US 742, 757, 90 S Ct 1463,
25 L Ed 2d 747 (1970); see Peeler v. Reyes, 328 Or App 110,
___ P3d ___ (2023).
        Petitioner’s second argument rests on a Ninth
Circuit decision, United States v. Torres, 828 F3d 1113 (9th
Cir 2016). We are not bound by Ninth Circuit precedent.
However, even if we adopted the reasoning in Torres, it
Cite as 328 Or App 1 (2023)                                  5

would not assist petitioner here. That case addressed the
scope of a direct appeal waiver of the ability to challenge
a sentence, and did not hold that knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waivers of collateral remedies cannot be enforced
to bar a constitutional challenge to a conviction. Id. at 1125.
As defendants point out, courts generally have concluded
that waivers of collateral remedies are enforceable. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lemaster, 403 F3d 216, 220 (4th Cir 2005)
(noting that “[e]very Circuit Court of Appeals to consider
the issue * * * has held that the right to attack a sentence
collaterally may be waived so long as the waiver is know-
ing and voluntary”). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit itself has
explained that its decision in Torres is limited. Specifically,
the court has held that its decision in Torres does not apply
to waivers of the right to challenge convictions. In partic-
ular, the decision in Torres does not stand for the proposi-
tion that a waiver of right to challenge a conviction becomes
unenforceable when a change in the law gives rise to a new
basis on which to challenge the legality of the conviction.
United States v. Goodall, 21 F4th 555, 562-64 (9th Cir 2021).
Rather, a person agreeing to such a waiver assumes the risk
that “the law could change in [their] favor,” when the person
knowingly and voluntarily agrees to a bargain that includes
a waiver of a subsequent challenge. Id. at 563-64. That is
what happened in this case.
         Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly
granted summary judgment to defendants on the ground
that petitioner had waived the right to challenge the convic-
tions at issue in this post-conviction proceeding.
        Affirmed.