Court Opinion

ID: 9902388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-26 23:02:12.091937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.873765
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 Ilaga v. The Permanente Medical Group CA1/5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 HENRY ILAGA,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                        A165273
 v.
 THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL                                                 (Alameda County
 GROUP, INC., et al.,                                                   Super. Ct. No. RG19009039)
           Defendants and Respondents.

         In this employment action, plaintiff and appellant Henry Ilaga
(plaintiff) appeals following the trial court’s grant of a motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants and respondents The Permanente Medical
Group, Inc. and Monica Azevedo (defendants). We reverse as to plaintiff’s
causes of action for age discrimination and for failure to prevent age
discrimination, both under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et. seq), as well as to plaintiff’s request for
punitive damages, but we otherwise affirm.

                                                               1
                              BACKGROUND1
      Plaintiff, born May 1958, worked for defendant The Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. (Permanente) for over 26 years, starting in 1991.
Permanente consists of 19 service areas throughout Northern
California, including the Central Valley Service Area (CVSA), which provides
healthcare services in Stockton, Modesto, Tracy, and Manteca. In 2011,
plaintiff was promoted to the position of Director of Strategic Business and
Development for the CVSA. In that position, he “managed space and
expansion projects, including their design, planning, and implementation,
and strategic development and planning of capital expansion initiatives.” As
Director, plaintiff reported to the Medical Group Administrator, who in turn
reported to the Physician-in-Chief, who was the top executive in the CVSA.
Starting in October 2015, the Physician-in-Chief in the CVSA was Sanjay
Marwaha, M.D. (Dr. Marwaha). Prior to June 2016, the Medical Group
Administrator was Linda Mann. In June 2016, Dr. Marwaha made
defendant Azevedo the Medical Group Administrator, and she remained in
that position until February 2019.
      In March 2016, plaintiff received a very positive performance
evaluation for 2015 from Ms. Mann, with an overall rating of “Excellent
Performance.” In or around March 2017, Ms. Azevedo gave plaintiff his
performance evaluation for 2016. Plaintiff averred, “It was the worst
performance evaluation of my career.” Among other things, in the category,

      1 “On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we

examine the record de novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of
the party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.” (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005)
36 Cal.4th 446, 460.) Our factual summary reflects that standard of review.
(San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. ex rel. Contreras v. First Student, Inc.
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 627, 632, fn. 4.)

                                      2
“Drives for Results,” Ms. Azevedo wrote, “[a]n area of opportunity for
[plaintiff] is to improve his deliverable timing understanding that Dr.
Marwaha and I require sufficient time to review materials, ask clarifying
questions and ensure alignment well in advance of deadlines.” In contrast,
Ms. Mann had written in his 2015 performance evaluation, “[Plaintiff] is
relentless in moving projects and ideas forward and achieving results. . . . I
would commend [plaintiff] for his diligence and persistence in moving our . . .
partners to outcomes and results.”
      In a declaration, plaintiff disputed Ms. Azevedo’s statements in the
2016 performance evaluation. He averred, “I was prepared for all meetings
during my career as Director of Strategic Business and Development for
[Permanente]. I consistently was able to provide additional information and
to answer follow up questions asked by regional leaders when attending
meetings with them.”2
      On or around October 31, 2017, plaintiff attended a meeting with Ms.
Azevedo in her office. To his surprise, a human resources consultant was also
present; Ms. Azevedo stated that the consultant was there to witness and
document the meeting. In a declaration, plaintiff described the meeting as
follows: “[Ms.] Azevedo proceeded to say that my work product required
extensive time for her to review. I told her that this was the first time I was
hearing of her concerns and that I would have expected her to reach out and
dialogue with me on her questions or need for clarity. In addition, I
expressed that the workload had increased with the growth and demand for
additional space, and because I had not received a replacement for my former

      2 Plaintiff’s declaration is further detailed in our discussion of the

merits.

                                        3
Project Manager, Mark Azevedo,[3] despite my request. Although I asked if
we could have a conversation about her concerns, [Ms.] Azevedo told me that
I was being moved to a different position. It was clear to me that this was a
demotion, because I was moved to a smaller office, I no longer directly
reported to [Ms.] Azevedo, I lost the staff that reported directly to me . . ., and
the salary band for the demoted position was about $20,000 less than that of
my Director position. It was also clear to me that I could not trust [Ms.]
Azevedo as she was demoting me based on fabricated reasons.”
      Ms. Azevedo changed the name of the “Strategic Business and
Development” team to the “Space and Capital Planning” team. The Space
and Capital Planning team had the same employees, objectives, and work as
the Strategic Business and Development team. In November 2017, Ms.
Azevedo informed plaintiff that he would be reporting to Ann Vales, an
employee whom plaintiff had trained and who was “significantly younger and
less experienced” than he. She was named Director of the team, and plaintiff
was given the new title, “Practice Specialist.” The new position had a lower
salary range and plaintiff was moved to a smaller office outside the executive
suite; previously his office had been next to Dr. Marwaha’s and Ms. Azevedo’s
offices, who were the two most senior executives in the CVSA.
      Plaintiff, who was 59 years old at the time, believed he had been
discriminated against in the demotion. He averred, “After approximately
twenty-six (26) years at [Permanente], I was shocked, confused, disoriented,
and dumbfounded by my sudden demotion and the promotion of a younger
and less experienced employee whom I had trained to take over my role and
become my supervisor. I was humiliated. After my demotion, I struggled in
the environment created by [Ms.] Azevedo. Based on my experience working

      3 Mark Azevedo is Ms. Azevedo’s husband.

                                         4
with [Ms.] Azevedo and observing the way she treated older people and
minorities with less respect than younger Caucasian people, I believe that my
demotion was related to my age and race.[4] I also believe that [Ms.] Vales’
promotion was related to her being younger than me and being Caucasian.
My demotion and [Ms.] Vales’ promotion were consistent with my
observations that [Ms.] Azevedo gave preferential treatment to younger
Caucasian people. Based on [Ms.] Azevedo’s treatment of other employees
who had been forced out, after her false accusations of my performance issues
and my illegitimate demotion, I believed I was being forced out.”
      Although plaintiff had intended to remain at Permanente until his
retirement, he instead resigned a few months after his demotion, in February
2018. He averred, “During the time that [Ms.] Azevedo was the [Medical
Group Administrator], [she] created an environment in which I eventually
realized I could not continue to work as my employment conditions became
intolerable.”
      In March 2019, plaintiff filed suit against defendants. The complaint
alleged ten causes of action: (1) race discrimination under the FEHA, (2) age
discrimination under the FEHA, (3) harassment because of race and age
under the FEHA, (4) race and age associational discrimination under the
FEHA, (5) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment under the
FEHA, (6) retaliation under the FEHA,5 (7) wrongful constructive
termination in violation of public policy, (8) intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED), (9) breach of express or implied contract, and (10) breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Among other things, the

      4 Plaintiff is Asian-American, of Filipino ethnicity.

      5 The retaliation claim was on behalf of a second named plaintiff who is

not involved in the present appeal.

                                        5
complaint requested injunctive relief, damages for economic harm and
emotional distress, and punitive damages.
      In July 2021, defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication. Defendants contended that plaintiff had
accepted a voluntary transfer during a corporate reorganization and then
voluntarily resigned. Ms. Azevedo averred in a declaration that, when she
became Medical Group Administrator, “it was [her] good faith belief
[plaintiff] was not providing sufficient leadership or delivering work product
necessary to accomplish space and capital projects for the service area.”
Defendants also submitted a declaration from Dr. Marwaha making similar
assertions about plaintiff’s preparedness.6
      Plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The opposition was supported by plaintiff’s declaration, which
disputed the assertions in Ms. Azevedo’s and Dr. Marwaha’s declarations.
Plaintiff’s opposition was also supported by declarations from a number of
former Permanente employees, and deposition testimony from a current
employee. Some of those persons contradicted defendants’ allegations about
plaintiff’s work performance and some averred they had observed Ms.
Azevedo engage in age discrimination.
      In November 2021, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. On the discrimination claim, the court concluded
plaintiff had not shown the existence of a triable issue as to whether he
suffered an adverse action; the court’s decision also stated, without
explanation, that plaintiff had not presented evidence creating a triable issue
as to whether the reasons for any adverse action were pretextual. On the

      6 Ms. Azevedo’s and Dr. Marwaha’s declarations are further detailed in

our discussion of the merits.

                                        6
harassment claim, the court concluded, among other things, that the
complained-of actions were personnel decisions that could not provide a basis
for the claim. The trial court also concluded plaintiff did not show there was
a triable issue as to whether the conditions were so intolerable as to
constitute constructive termination. The court granted defendants’ motion as
to plaintiff’s other causes of action because the claims were derivative or
duplicative of the discrimination or harassment claims, or because plaintiff
did not oppose the motion as to particular claims. Finally, the court stated it
was unnecessary to address defendants’ motion as to the request for punitive
damages because it was granting summary adjudication of all of plaintiff’s
claims.
      In February 2022, after reconsideration, the trial court reaffirmed its
order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The present
appeal followed.7
                                 DISCUSSION
I.    Standard of Review
      “ ‘ “A trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment only if
no issues of triable fact appear and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. [Citations.] The moving party bears the burden of
showing the court that the plaintiff ‘has not established, and cannot
reasonably expect to establish,’ ” the elements of his or her cause of action.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] We review the trial court’s decision de novo, liberally

      7 An order granting a defendant’s summary judgment motion is not an

appealable order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); Levy v. Skywalker
Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 753, 761, fn. 7.) In the present case, the
parties agree no judgment appears in the record. “In the interests of justice
and to avoid delay, we construe the order granting summary judgment as
incorporating an appealable judgment, and the notice of appeal as appealing
from such judgment.” (Levy, at p. 761, fn. 7.)

                                        7
construing the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment
and resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (State of
California v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1008, 1017–1018.)
II.   The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s
      Age Discrimination Claim
      A.     Legal Background
      The FEHA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against [a] person in
compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of
age. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) “ ‘California has adopted the three-stage
burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for
trying claims of discrimination. . . .’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘This so-called McDonnell
Douglas test reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional
discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved
circumstantially. Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the
test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable
likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ [Citation.] [¶] In the
first stage, the plaintiff bears the burden to establish a prima face case of
discrimination. [Citation.] The burden in this stage is ‘ “not onerous” ’
[citation], and the evidence necessary to satisfy it is minimal [citation]. . . . If
the plaintiff meets this burden, ‘ “ ‘the burden shifts to the defendant to
[articulate a] legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision. . . .’ . . .” ’ [Citation.] This likewise is not an onerous burden
[citation], and is generally met by presenting admissible evidence showing
the defendant’s reason for its employment decision [citation]. [¶] Finally, if
the defendant presents evidence showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff to establish the defendant
intentionally discriminated against him or her. [Citation.] The plaintiff may

                                         8
satisfy this burden by proving the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were false, creating an inference that those reasons served as a pretext for
discrimination.” (Wills v. Superior Ct. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 159–160
(Wills).)
      “A defendant’s summary judgment motion ‘ “slightly modifies the order
of these [McDonnell Douglas] showings.” ’ [Citation.] [The defendant has]
the initial burden to either (1) negate an essential element of [the plaintiff’s]
prima face case [citation] or (2) establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for [the challenged adverse action] [citation]. [¶] ‘[T]o avoid summary
judgment [once the employer makes the foregoing showing], an employee
claiming discrimination must offer substantial evidence that the employer’s
stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or
pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a
combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the
employer engaged in intentional discrimination.’ ” (Wills, supra,
195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160.)
      B.    Plaintiff Showed a Triable Issue as to Whether He Suffered an
            Adverse Action
      “In the context of the present case, a reasonable inference, that is, a
prima facie case, of age discrimination arises when the employee shows (1) at
the time of the adverse action he . . . was 40 years of age or older, (2) an
adverse employment action was taken against the employee, (3) at the time of
the adverse action the employee was satisfactorily performing his . . . job and
(4) the employee was replaced in his position by a significantly younger
person.” (Hersant v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003
(Hersant).) Of those elements, defendants only dispute that plaintiff has
shown he suffered an adverse employment action. That is, defendants do not

                                        9
dispute that plaintiff was over the age of 40, that there was evidence he was
satisfactorily performing his job sufficient to satisfy his initial burden, or that
his replacement Ms. Vales was significantly younger.8
      In Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1051
(Yanowitz), the California Supreme Court defined an adverse action as one
that “materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
Yanowitz emphasized that the FEHA “protects an employee against unlawful
discrimination with respect not only to so-called ultimate employment actions
such as termination or demotion, but also the entire spectrum of employment
actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an
employee’s job performance or opportunity for advancement in his or her
career. Although a mere offensive utterance or even a pattern of social
slights by either the employer or coemployees cannot properly be viewed as
materially affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . .,
the phrase . . . must be interpreted liberally and with a reasonable
appreciation of the realities of the workplace in order to afford employees the
appropriate and generous protection against employment discrimination that
the FEHA was intended to provide.” (Yanowitz, at pp. 1053–1054; accord,
Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
359, 373 [following Yanowitz in a discrimination case].)
      Plaintiff demonstrates a triable issue as to whether the change in his
employment position was an adverse action. At the outset, we observe that
defendants repeatedly assert that plaintiff “accepted a new position.”
However, plaintiff averred that, at the October 2017 meeting, “[Ms.] Azevedo
told me that I was being moved to a different position.” Ms. Azevedo averred
the position was “offered” to plaintiff and he “accepted.” But the human

      8 Ms. Vales is almost 12 years younger than plaintiff.

                                        10
resources representative who was at the meeting averred only that Ms.
Azevedo told plaintiff “a change could be occurring.” That language does not
imply choice on plaintiff’s part. Plaintiff’s view is further supported by the
circumstance that he soon started looking for a new job outside the company;
a reasonable trier of fact could infer he would not have done so if he
voluntarily accepted the new position. Plainly, there is a factual dispute as to
whether the change was voluntary.
      On the substance of the adverse action question, two organizational
charts attached to plaintiff’s declaration alone create a triable issue as to
whether plaintiff was demoted. The first chart, from before the change,
shows Dr. Marwaha at the top, then Ms. Azevedo at the next level, and then
plaintiff and nine others at the third level on the chart. The second chart,
after the change in position, shows Ms. Vales at the third level in the position
of Director, where plaintiff previously was, and it shows plaintiff at the next
level below her, listed without a title along with two others as a member of
the “Space and Planning Capital Team.”9 And evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that plaintiff was demoted is arguably
sufficient to show a triable issue as to whether plaintiff suffered an adverse
action. (See Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1054 [characterizing
“demotion” as an “ultimate employment action[]”]; Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (Guz) [plaintiff must show “he suffered an adverse
employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available
job”]; CACI No. 2509 [“Adverse employment actions are not limited to

      9 Ms. Vales, plaintiff’s supervisor after the change in position, testified

in her deposition that she viewed the change as a demotion of plaintiff. She
explained that, as an “independent contributor” rather than a “director,”
plaintiff no longer had staff reporting to him and instead he and the other
staff reported to her.

                                       11
ultimate actions such as termination or demotion”].)10 However, we need not
so decide, because plaintiff also showed his terms and conditions of
employment were materially affected by the demotion.
      In particular, the demotion moved plaintiff out of an executive and
managerial role, which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude materially
affected his “opportunity for advancement in his . . . career.” (Yanowitz,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1054.) For example, prior to the transfer, plaintiff’s
title was “Director, Strategic Business and Development” for the CVSA.
After the transfer, his title was changed to “Practice Specialist.” A
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that was a significantly less
prestigious title that could affect his opportunities both within and outside
the company. (Cf. McRae v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th
377, 393 [emphasizing that a “transfer” “did not involve a change in status or
a less distinguished title”].)
      Plaintiff also averred in his declaration that, “Prior to my demotion, my
office was located in the C Suites, which housed employees in executive
positions. My office was right next to the offices of the Physician in Chief, Dr.
Marwaha, and the [Medical Group Administrator], [Ms.] Azevedo. When I
was demoted, . . . [m]y office was tucked away, hidden, and not located close
to any of the leaders with whom I worked.” Defendants argue the office move
was merely “less desirable” to plaintiff. We do not conclude a change in office
location alone is sufficient to establish an adverse action. Nevertheless, given
“the realities of the workplace” (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1054), a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that plaintiff’s move out of the office

      10 Defendants do not argue to the contrary.  Instead, despite all the
evidence to the contrary, they suggest the change in position was merely a
lateral “transfer.” Indeed, defendants entirely ignore the organizational
charts showing that the change was a demotion.

                                        12
area for top management could affect how he was perceived and his
opportunities for further advancement. Thus, the office change tends to
support a conclusion that plaintiff suffered an adverse action in the totality of
the circumstances. (Id. at p. 1052, fn. 11 [“it is appropriate to consider
plaintiff’s allegations collectively under a totality-of-the circumstances
approach”].)
      Plaintiff also averred, “the salary band for the demoted position was
about $20,000 less than that of my Director position.” Defendants argue “he
cites no evidence for his claim.” But defendants cite no authority plaintiff
was incompetent to testify regarding the salary band applicable to his own
position, and defendants cite no evidence contrary to plaintiff’s averment,
despite the ready availability of that information to them. The evidence that
plaintiff’s salary prospects were worse after his transfer is further evidence
supporting a finding that the change in position was an adverse action.
      In sum, there is evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
infer that plaintiff was demoted into a position with less prestige and
potential for financial and professional advancement. That is sufficient to
show the change “materially affect[ed] the terms and conditions of
employment.” (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1036.) Accordingly, plaintiff
has shown there is a triable issue of fact as to whether he suffered an adverse
action.11

      11 Plaintiff also argues he was constructively discharged, which

constituted a second adverse action. We conclude later in this decision (post,
Part III) that plaintiff has not shown a triable issue as to constructive
discharge.

                                       13
      C.     Respondent Offered Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons for
             the Demotion
      “If, at trial, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption
of discrimination arises.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355.) “[T]he burden
shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible
evidence, sufficient to ‘raise [ ] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a
judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.” (Id. at pp. 355–356.) “ ‘[L]egitimate’ reasons
[citation] in this context are reasons that are facially unrelated to prohibited
bias.” (Id. at p. 358.)
      Here, defendants argue, “By October 2017, [Ms.] Azevedo concluded
that [plaintiff] could not properly manage his capital improvement projects
[citations], and Dr. Marwaha . . . came to a similar conclusion based on their
communications in which [plaintiff] appeared unprepared.” Defendants
continue, “[Ms.] Azevedo and Dr. Marwaha determined that it was best for
operational efficiency to reorganize the capital improvement resources and
staff and to create a new Space and Capital Planning Team. [Citation.] They
created and offered to [plaintiff] a new Practice Specialist position on that
new team.”
      Defendants’ argument is supported by declarations submitted below
from Ms. Azevedo and Dr. Marwaha stating concerns about plaintiff’s
preparedness. Ms. Azevedo averred, “I believed [plaintiff] was unprepared to
present progress and assessment reports to regional leaders to make the
business case for approval to move forward with projects; thus, capital
projects were delayed until such information was prepared and reported in
the next business approval cycle. The capital planning process requires
specific attention to details and is very paper-heavy; concerns existed

                                         14
regarding [plaintiff’s] ability to complete projections, to be thorough and
accurate in his analyses, and to be timely in submittal of paperwork.”
      Similarly, Dr. Marwaha averred, “I observed what I believed were
significant deficiencies with [plaintiff’s] handling his position. I had
numerous communications with [plaintiff] in which he did not appear
prepared to me or having a good handle on the capital improvement projects
and issues for which he was responsible. By October of 2017 I had reached
the conclusion [plaintiff] was not well suited to continue in the Director of
Strategic Business Development position. Ms. Azevedo shared similar
concerns to me about [plaintiff’s] performance. Ms. Azevedo recommended
restructuring the capital department and suggested that [plaintiff] be
assigned to a new role where he could succeed. I agreed with Ms. Azevedo’s
recommendation. As a result of this reorganization, [plaintiff] was asked to
transfer to a newly created Project Specialist position.”
      As noted previously, an employer’s burden of articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action is not “onerous” and “is
generally met by presenting admissible evidence showing the defendant’s
reason for its employment decision.” (Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
p. 160.) The averments in the Azevedo and Marwaha declarations are
sufficient to satisfy defendants’ burden; plaintiff does not argue to the
contrary.
      D.    Plaintiff Showed There is a Triable Issue as to Pretext
      “In demonstrating that an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory
reason is false or pretextual, ‘ “[an employee] cannot simply show that the
employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue
is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. . . . Rather, the [employee]

                                       15
must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
‘unworthy of credence,’ . . . and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for
the [asserted] nondiscriminatory reasons.’ ” ’ ” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 314 (Sandell).)
      As Dr. Marwaha admitted, the “new” department established under
Ms. Vales does “the same work as the Strategic Business and Development
Department for which [plaintiff] was the director.” Defendants do not
dispute the point on appeal, stating that plaintiff’s “new Team had the same
objectives and did the same work as his former Team” and “his new position
was not a change in subject matter and thus was comparable to his former
position.” The only evidence of change in plaintiff’s job duties is that he no
longer supervised two people who, after the demotion, were at the same level
as him on the organizational chart. But defendants did not identify any
issues with plaintiff’s supervisory skills as a reason for his demotion. That
defendants claim to have been concerned about plaintiff’s work but assigned
him substantially the same work after his demotion is evidence a reasonable
trier of fact could find tends to support an inference of pretext.
      Next, plaintiff points out that his 2015 evaluation under his prior
supervisor, Ms. Mann, does not reflect any of the concerns about
preparedness given as the reason for the demotion. In that evaluation, Ms.
Mann rated plaintiff’s overall performance as “excellent” and wrote,
“[Plaintiff’s] perseverance and ability to engage and collaborate brings many
teammates into the fold of the work he is accountable for. It has been such
an honor to have worked closely again with him this past year. He has
unlimited potential as a leader and serves a critical role in the senior

                                       16
leadership team!” Although plaintiff did not accomplish all of the 2015
project goals, Ms. Mann did not suggest plaintiff’s preparedness was a
problem, commenting only, “For 2016 I suggest keeping this goal and focus
area with specific and measurable actions you can drive.” Elsewhere, the
supervisor emphasized plaintiff’s ability to move projects forward, writing,
“[Plaintiff] is truly a driver. He is relentless in moving projects and ideas
forward and achieving results. . . One of his comments in his survey aptly
described [plaintiff] as a leader that doesn’t take no for an answer, but does
so with positive persistence.” Ms. Mann also commented, “[Plaintiff]
definitely assumes ownership and delivers as promised. He produces an
amazing amount of work and somehow consistently is able to meet
deliverables and deadlines. . . [Plaintiff’s] ability to engender trust, combined
with his integrity, creates a leadership strength that gets things done
through and with others.” The 2015 evaluation also contains additional
effusive comments about plaintiff.
      Plaintiff’s 2016 evaluation by Ms. Azevedo contrasts sharply, which
both offers some support for defendants’ reasons for the demotion but also
suggests a need for an explanation for the difference in the evaluations. Ms.
Azevedo’s overall rating was “successful” and she commented, “As a Director
and member of the Executive Administrative Leadership Team, the
expectation of [plaintiff] is that he become more proactive in his approach to
strategy and financial performance. It is critical to the future growth of the
Central Valley that he present well vetted proposals to meet the current
demands for space including the potential barriers as well as a forward
thinking strategy to promote the needs of the Central Valley to Regional
leaders. While I can appreciate [plaintiff’s] collaborative style, he will need to
exercise more independent judgment in advance of presenting proposals to

                                       17
leadership to be able to answer questions instead of seeking input. I would
encourage [plaintiff] to utilize his administrative support to help in the
organization of his work to meet deliverables and timeline expectations.”
Although the 2016 evaluation echoes some of the reasons given for plaintiff’s
demotion, defendants offer no explanation for the dramatic difference from
the prior year’s evaluation, which expressed none of the same concerns.12
Also, defendants cite to no documentary evidence (other than the 2016
evaluation) or other declarations supporting Ms. Azevedo’s and Dr.
Marwaha’s assertions. Finally, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the
2016 evaluation itself was tainted by Ms. Azevedo’s alleged age bias.
(Sandell, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 316 [“in light of the fact that [the
supervisor’s] complaints about [the plaintiff’s] performance were often
subjective, one could reasonably infer that these complaints, and the negative
performance evaluation, were themselves motivated by discriminatory
animus”].)
      As further evidence of pretext, plaintiff points to declarations and
testimony from three co-workers who express views contrary to defendants’
concerns. Leticia Piazza Hopp averred in a declaration that plaintiff was “a
high performer,” “very productive,” “insightful, competent, and . . . always

      12 As plaintiff points out, the wording of Ms. Azevedo’s declaration

suggests she “had already made up her mind against [plaintiff] from the time
she became manager.” She averred, “When I became MGA in 2016, [plaintiff]
had been a long-time employee but it was my good faith belief he was not
providing sufficient leadership or delivering work product necessary to
accomplish space and capital projects for the service area.” (Italics added.)
She also averred that “At the time I became the MGA . . . I believed [plaintiff]
was unprepared to present progress and assessment reports to regional
leaders . . .” (Italics added.) The declaration does not explain how Ms.
Azevedo came to that conclusion before she had an opportunity to actually
observe plaintiff’s work.

                                       18
prepared.” She was “shocked” when she found out plaintiff had been
“demoted” and replaced by Ms. Vales. Milana Lock averred that plaintiff
“was never unprepared when I worked with him in 2016. Rather, based on
my personal experience and observations working with [plaintiff], I believe
[plaintiff] was as prepared as possible while working within a capital
planning process that constantly changed and lacked clarity and direction
from Kaiser Permanente’s Organizational Leaders. My impression was that
everyone involved, including [plaintiff] and myself, struggled with the capital
planning process because of the constant changes, disorganization, and lack
of clarity and direction from the Kaiser Permanente Organizational Leaders.”
Finally, plaintiff’s former supervisee Lakiesha Timberlake testified in her
deposition that she never thought plaintiff was “unprepared.” Although
defendants point out those employees did not supervise plaintiff, they do not
deny those co-workers had direct knowledge of plaintiff’s work performance.
      Plaintiff’s own declaration also brings into question defendants’ reasons
for the demotion, and defendants point to nothing in the record contradicting
any of plaintiff’s assertions. For example, plaintiff averred, “The CVSA had
been expanding for years in terms of membership. Because of the expansion,
the needs of the CVSA were constantly increasing, although resources were
not growing commensurately. This included the resources that I had with
which to do my job. The capital expansion projects rely heavily upon
forecasts. During this time there was uncertainty, lack of clarity on strategic
direction, and difficulty for the organization to seek and receive approval for
. . . funding for these various critical projects. The lack of clarity and
uncertainty of forecasting the capital expansion needs based on membership
growth from a regional perspective often caused delays in funding approval
. . . .” Plaintiff’s observations are generally corroborated by the declaration of

                                        19
Ms. Lock, quoted in the previous paragraph. Plaintiff also averred that he
had not received a replacement for a project manager who had departed,
despite his request for a replacement and the increase in workload with
growth in demand for additional space. A reasonable trier of fact could
conclude plaintiff’s explanations are plausible in the totality of the evidence.
      Finally, plaintiff presented evidence, uncontradicted by defendants,
that plaintiff had substantially more experience than Ms. Vales. He testified
in his deposition that Ms. Vales had “zero financial experience, less
operational experience, less experience within the realm of space capacity
and planning, less collaboration with other leaders in the organization,
relationships were not developed.” Plaintiff averred that “[i]n or around
January 2017” he had trained Ms. Vales “on the following project categories:
Space Moves; Offices Expansions or Conversion; Furniture Renovation or
Purchase; Beautification; Capital Equipment; Plant Maintenance and
Renovation . . .; Medical Office Capacity and Expansion; and, Behavioral
Health Office Capacity and Expansion.” He testified Ms. Vales was “an
executive assistant or consultant” before being promoted to the director
position. Defendants may be able to convince a trier of fact they had good
reason to replace plaintiff with such a less-experienced employee, but a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude Ms. Vales’ relative inexperience tends
to show defendants demoted plaintiff for a reason other than his ability to do
his job.
      In summary, the only significant corroboration for the explanations
given for plaintiff’s demotion is the 2016 evaluation by Ms. Azevedo, but a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that evaluation was tainted by bias,
given the other circumstances referenced above. (Sandell, supra, 188
Cal.App.4th at p. 316.) A reasonable trier of fact could be skeptical of

                                       20
defendants’ conclusory assertions of plaintiff’s unpreparedness, given the
disparity between the 2015 and 2016 evaluations, the opinions of plaintiff’s
co-workers, and defendants’ failure to point to any evidence contradicting the
project obstacles identified by plaintiff and Ms. Lock in their declarations.
These circumstances alone are sufficient to establish a triable issue as to
pretext. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 356 [“In an appropriate case, evidence
of dishonest reasons, considered together with the elements of the prima facie
case, may permit a finding of prohibited bias.”]; Sandell, at p. 319 [“a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that [the defendant’s] proffered reasons
for terminating [the plaintiff’s] employment were unworthy of credence, and,
based on that conclusion, infer that those reasons are not the real reasons for
[the] termination”].)13
III.   The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Adjudication as to
       Plaintiff’s Constructive Discharge Claim
       Constructive discharge “occurs when the employer’s conduct effectively
forces an employee to resign. Although the employee may say, ‘I quit,’ the
employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer’s
acts, against the employee’s will. As a result, a constructive discharge is
legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.” (Colores v. Board of
Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1305.) “ ‘[O]ne of the essential
elements of any constructive discharge claim is that the adverse working

       13 Given that we conclude the evidence disputing defendants’ reasons is

alone sufficient to create a triable issue as to pretext, we need not and do not
address whether plaintiff’s showing of pretext finds additional support in
declarations from other former Permanente employees who averred that Ms.
Azevedo demonstrated age bias. The trial court can address the admissibility
of that evidence at trial. (See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn
(2008) 552 U.S. 379, 388; Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855,
871; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 92, 114.)

                                       21
conditions must be so intolerable that any reasonable employee would resign
rather than endure such conditions.’ ” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 1238, 1247 (Turner); accord, Atalla v. Rite Aid Corp. (2023)
89 Cal.App. 5th 294, 320.)
      Plaintiff has not shown a triable issue as to constructive discharge. As
we have explained, the evidence supports a finding the demotion materially
affected plaintiff’s career prospects. Plaintiff’s decision to leave Permanente
is understandable given the loss of prestige and advancement prospects, as
well as his frustration at being demoted based on allegations he believed
were false. But plaintiff fails to identify any specific ways in which his actual
work conditions were “intolerable.” The parties agree the substance of
plaintiff’s work did not substantially change after the demotion, other than
the loss of supervisory responsibilities. To find a triable issue as to
constructive discharge in the present case would essentially mean every
allegedly unlawful demotion must be treated as a constructive discharge, but
plaintiff cites no authority supporting that proposition.14
      Simers v. Los Angeles Times Commc’ns, LLC (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th
1248, is instructive. There, a newspaper demoted a sports columnist to a
reporter position after investigation of an alleged ethical breach. (Id. at pp.
1250–1251.) The columnist claimed constructive termination and sued. (Id.

      14 Plaintiff references declarations in which other employees averred

they left employment because they found working for Ms. Azevedo
intolerable, but he cites no authority he may base his constructive
termination claim on any discrimination or harassment suffered by others.
Furthermore, his declaration fails to specify what knowledge he had about
any such incidents before he resigned, and he avers only that he believed the
employment decisions were discriminatory. Plaintiff cites no authority that
such evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue as to constructive
termination.

                                       22
at p. 1251.) After trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the plaintiff’s constructive
termination claim, but the court denied the motion as to the plaintiff’s
discrimination claim. (Ibid.) The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning, “While
the evidence allowed the inference that age or disability discrimination was a
motivating factor in one or more of defendant’s actions, nothing in the
conveyance of the criticism, the performance of the investigation, or the
resulting demotion and performance plan reflected any ‘unusually
aggravated’ working conditions or the ‘continuous pattern of mistreatment’
necessary for a constructive discharge. It is the working conditions
themselves—not the plaintiff’s subjective reaction to them—that are the sine
qua non of a constructive discharge.” (Id. at p. 1274; see also Turner, supra, 7
Cal.4th at p. 1247 [“a poor performance rating or a demotion, even when
accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive
discharge”].)
      The same reasoning applies in the present case.
IV.   The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Adjudication as to
      Plaintiff’s Harassment Claim
      It is unlawful for an employer “because of . . . age . . . to harass an
employee.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).) Plaintiff contends he raised a
triable issue of age harassment based on his alleged demotion and his 2016
performance review.15 Defendants argue the evaluation and demotion cannot
be the basis for plaintiff’s harassment claim because they constituted
personnel management, citing Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640 (Reno).
We agree.

      15 Plaintiff does not argue the trial court erred in rejecting his claim of

harassment based on race.

                                        23
      In Reno, the California Supreme Court explained, “ ‘[T]he exercise of
personnel management authority properly delegated by an employer to a
supervisory employee might result in discrimination, but not in harassment.
[Citations.] Making a personnel decision is conduct of a type fundamentally
different from the type of conduct that constitutes harassment. Harassment
claims are based on a type of conduct that is avoidable and unnecessary to job
performance. No supervisory employee needs to use slurs or derogatory
drawings, to physically interfere with freedom of movement, to engage in
unwanted sexual advances, etc., in order to carry out the legitimate objectives
of personnel management. . . . We conclude, therefore, that the Legislature
intended that commonly necessary personnel management actions such as
hiring and firing, job or project assignments, office or work station
assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the provision
of support, the assignment or nonassignment of supervisory functions,
deciding who will and who will not attend meetings, deciding who will be laid
off, and the like, do not come within the meaning of harassment. . . . These
actions may retrospectively be found discriminatory if based on improper
motives, but in that event the remedies provided by the FEHA are those for
discrimination, not harassment.’ ” (Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 646–647;
accord, Serri v. Santa Clara Univ. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 869–870; see
also Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706 (Roby) [“harassment
focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace
becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or
visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee”].)
      Plaintiff argues his harassment claim nevertheless has merit, quoting
Roby for the proposition that, “in some cases the hostile message that
constitutes the harassment is conveyed through official employment actions,

                                       24
and therefore evidence that would otherwise be associated with a
discrimination claim can form the basis of a harassment claim.” (Roby,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 708, citing Miller v. Department of Corrections et al.
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460–466 (Miller).) Roby explained, “In Miller, we
considered whether evidence of widespread sexual favoritism in the
workplace could constitute sexual harassment against the nonfavored
employees. We concluded that it could, provided that the favoritism was so
severe or pervasive as to alter the working conditions. [Citation.]
Significantly, the favoritism at issue in Miller took the form of official
employment actions, including promotions and favorable job assignments
given to female employees involved in sexual relationships with a particular
male supervisor. [Citation.] The Miller plaintiffs, however, were not subject
to any demands for sexual favors. [Citation.] In concluding that the
plaintiffs had nevertheless stated a prima facie case of harassment in
violation of the FEHA, we stated that widespread sexual favoritism could
convey a ‘demeaning message . . . to female employees that they are viewed
by management as “sexual playthings” or that the way required for women to
get ahead in the workplace is to engage in sexual conduct with their
supervisors or the management.’ [Citations.] This demeaning message, we
held, could give rise to an actionable hostile work environment.” (Roby, at
pp. 707–708.)
      Plaintiff cites no authority he can assert a harassment claim based on
the hostile message conveyed by his own negative evaluation and demotion,
instead of employment actions suffered by others reflecting age bias. Such a
rule would swallow the distinction between discrimination and harassment
under the FEHA. And, although the evidence of discrimination allegedly
experienced by others may be admissible at trial on the issue of pretext (see

                                        25
ante, p. 21, fn. 13), the declarations lack sufficient details to support a finding
that any such discrimination created “severe” or “pervasive” harassment for
plaintiff. (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462.) Plaintiff asserts in his
declaration that Ms. Azevedo “demoted, forced out, or tried to force out”
various persons “because of our respective ages.” But the declaration fails to
detail pervasive or severe harassment actually observed by plaintiff. Instead,
his declaration asserts he believed that certain people that left or were not
promoted did not have performance problems, which is not sufficient to show
there is a triable issue. (Cf. Miller, at pp. 466–468 [plaintiffs were aware of
pervasive and severe sexual favoritism].)
      We conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment on
plaintiff’s harassment claim.
V.    Plaintiff’s Remaining Causes of Action
      The trial court properly granted summary adjudication of plaintiff’s
race discrimination claim (the first cause of action). Plaintiff’s opening brief
only makes passing reference to that claim and plaintiff’s reply fails to
address the arguments regarding the claim in defendants’ brief. Plaintiff has
failed to present evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
he was discriminated against on the basis of race.
      As to the age discrimination cause of action, defendants argue that this
court should affirm summary adjudication to the extent the claim is based on
an alleged constructive termination—because there is no triable issue that
such a termination occurred. Defendants argue it is proper to grant partial
summary adjudication, citing Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993)
12 Cal.App.4th 1848, at pages 1854 to 1855, for the proposition that “[A]
party may present a motion for summary adjudication challenging a separate
and distinct wrongful act even though combined with other wrongful acts

                                        26
alleged in the same cause of action.” Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary
in his reply brief. We will affirm summary adjudication of plaintiff’s
discrimination claim only to the extent it is based on an alleged constructive
termination.
      As to the fourth cause of action, for associational discrimination,
plaintiff did not oppose summary adjudication below and does not raise any
issue on appeal.
      As to the fifth cause of action, for failure to prevent discrimination and
harassment, we reverse because there is a triable issue as to plaintiff’s
discrimination claim. We will, however, affirm to the extent the claim is
based on alleged failure to prevent harassment.
      Plaintiff does not argue the trial court erred in granting summary
adjudication as to the retaliation claim (the sixth cause of action), which was
asserted only by the other named plaintiff.
      Plaintiff concedes his IIED claim (the eighth cause of action) is properly
dismissed if the harassment claim is dismissed. He does not dispute the trial
court’s conclusion that it is “duplicative of the harassment claim.”
      Plaintiff does not dispute that he dismissed the ninth and tenth causes
of action for breach of express or implied contract and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
      Finally, defendants argue that, even if this court reverses the grant of
summary judgment as to some of plaintiff’s claims, this court should affirm
summary adjudication of plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. In
particular, defendants argued in their brief on appeal that plaintiff’s request
fails because plaintiff “failed to raise a triable issue whether [Ms.] Azevedo
was an officer, director or managing agent” and because plaintiff “failed to
raise a triable issue whether [Ms.] Azevedo’s alleged acts rise to the level of

                                       27
oppression, fraud or malice.” Plaintiff failed to address defendant’s
arguments in his reply on appeal, but he did address the arguments in his
briefing below. Among other things, he pointed out that, according to Ms.
Azevedo’s curriculum vitae, while at Permanente she “Provide[d] executive
leadership for highly complex, fully integrated healthcare organization;
$400+ million budget oversight, 2,000+ employees, eight sites across a 70
mile radius in four distinct cities.” There is a triable issue whether Ms.
Azevedo “exercised substantial discretionary authority over decisions that
resulted in an ‘ad hoc formulation of policy.’ ” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 563, 571; see also id. at p. 577 [“zone manager . . . responsible for
managing eight stores, . . . and at least sixty-five employees” was a managing
agent].) There is also a triable issue whether Ms. Azevedo’s conduct
constituted “malice or oppression.” (Scott v. Phoenix Sch., Inc. (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 702, 717.) For example, although the alleged wrongful
demotion itself would not be sufficient to sustain such a finding, evidence
that Ms. Azevedo “engaged in a program of unwarranted criticism to justify”
the demotion could support such a finding. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we will
reverse summary adjudication of the request for punitive damages.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s judgment is reversed as to the second cause of action,
except to the extent it is based on an alleged constructive termination; the
fifth cause of action, except to the extent it is based on an alleged failure to
prevent harassment; and the request for punitive damages. The court’s
judgment is otherwise affirmed. The matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiff is awarded his costs on
appeal.

                                        28
                  SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.

BURNS, J.
CHOU, J.

(A165273)

             29