Court Opinion

ID: 9459054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:09:06.630769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:59.906831
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge,
concurring
in the result only of Part I, concurring in the Court’s opinion in Parts II — III, and dissenting from Part IV:
For the reasons stated in my separate opinion in United States v. Alexander & Murdock, 152 U.S.App.D.C. -, 471 F.2d 923 No. 23,190 (April 21, 1972), I dissent from Part IV of the Court’s opinion. I would hold that the question of “diminished responsibility” is now open to decision, and that the question should be resolved in favor of appellant’s position. See slip opinion in Alexander & Murdock at 948-952.
After presenting evidence that he “was suffering from a sociopathic or antisocial personality with paranoid features at the time of the incident * * * and that Defendant had little control over himself and that his impulses completely took over at the time of the killings,” Brief for Appellant at 39, appellant requested the following jury instruction:
If the members of the jury are not satisfied from the evidence that the defendant, at the time he committed the acts, was so mentally unsound as to render him not guilty by reason of insanity; yet if the jury find[s] from the evidence that there was such a degree of mental unsoundness existing at the time of the homicide as to render the defendant incapable of premeditation and of forming such an intent as the jury believe[s] the circumstances of this case would reasonably impute to a man of sound mind, they *1047may consider such degree of mental unsoundness in determining the question whether the act was first degree murder or second degree murder.
The trial judge declined to offer this instruction and this Court affirms on the strength of our en banc decision in Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 275 F.2d 617 (1960), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961). There, as I pointed out in Alexander & Murdock, at 951, the defendant requested an instruction that evidence of “diminished intellect” could reduce the offense from murder in the first degree to second-degree murder. Judge Burger’s opinion for the Court, affirming the trial court’s denial of the proposed instruction, makes clear that “[i]n the view of the majority the evidence in question was adapted not so much to rebut the specific charge of premeditation, but rather to mitigate in general the gravity of the offense.” Slip opinion in Alexander & Murdock at 951. Where a defendant, as in Bryant or Alexander & Murdock seeks to introduce relevant psychiatric evidence to negate the state of mind for a particular crime, Stewart does not bar the introduction of that evidence or the granting of an appropriate instruction.
Since Bryant was convicted at a unitary trial, the jury at least had an opportunity to hear the psychiatric evidence before deciding whether the acts were committed with premeditation and deliberation: Only the proposed jury instruction is now at issue. In Alexander & Murdock, on the other hand, the issue of responsibility and the psychiatric testimony pertaining to it were not introduced until the jury had already decided that the defendant committed the acts in question with the requisite intent. As a result, unless the trial judge granted an instruction at the end of the responsibility hearing to the effect that the jury could reconsider the issue of intent in light of the relevant testimony, the jury would not be able to consider any psychiatric evidence on the issue of intent.
Plainly, the failure to give the proposed instruction in Alexander & Murdock was more prejudicial to the defense than the counterpart refusal in Bryant. Nevertheless, while the pertinent evidence was at least before the jury in Bryant, the defendant was still entitled, in my view, to an instruction explicitly setting forth the relevance of that testimony to the issue of intent. I would reverse the conviction because of the failure to offer such an instruction.
ON APPELLANTS’ PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
On consideration of appellant’s petition for rehearing in No. 23,746, United States v. Bryant, it is
Ordered by the Court that appellant’s aforesaid petition is denied.
BAZELON, Chief Judge, would grant the petition for rehearing for the reasons indicated in the accompanying statement.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, McGOWAN, Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL E. SMITH,* Chief District Judge for the District of Montana.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
On consideration of appellant’s petition for rehearing in No. 23,783, United States v. Murdock, it is
Ordered by the Court that appellant’s aforesaid petition is denied.
*1048BAZELON, Chief Judge, would grant the petition for rehearing for the reasons indicated in the accompanying statement.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT, McGOWAN, TAMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKINNON, ROBB, and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
On consideration of appellants’ suggestions for rehearing en banc, it is Ordered by the Court en banc that the aforesaid suggestions are denied.
Statement of BAZELON, Chief Judge, as to why he would grant appellants’ suggestions for rehearing en banc.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
These two cases raise fundamental questions concerning our procedure for deciding which litigants should obtain the benefit of the overruling of prior case law. In each of these cases the trial judge denied a proposed instruction to the jury that they could consider psychiatric testimony offered in relation to the insanity defense as relevant to the question of specific intent. Two separate panels of this Court affirmed the convictions on the grounds that the doctrine of “diminished responsibility,” invoked by appellants, was precluded by prior decisions of this Court.1 Subsequently, this Court overruled en banc those prior decisions, and appellants now assert that their convictions should be reversed and their cases remanded for new trial under the new standard. For the reasons set forth below, I would grant the suggestion for rehearing en banc in both cases.
In No. 23,746, appellant Bryant was convicted of first-degree murder. At the conclusion of his trial, which included a defense of insanity, he requested an instruction that
if the jury find[s] from the evidence that there was such a degree of mental unsoundness existing at the time of the homicide as to render the defendant incapable of premeditation and forming such an intent as the jury believe[s] the circumstances of this case would reasonably impute to a man of sound mind, they may consider such degree of mental unsoundness in determining the question whether the act was first degree murder or second degree murder.
In No. 23,783, appellant Murdock, who also offered a responsibility defense, was convicted of murder in the second degree. He proposed to tell the jury that
mental unsoundness, though insufficient to entitle the accused to an acquittal under the legal test of responsibility, may nevertheless be sufficient to prevent the accused from forming malice aforethought, and thus diminish the defendant’s responsibility or reduce the grade of the offense. * * * If you find that the accused’s mental condition resulted in a failure to formulate malice aforethought, you must find the accused guilty of only manslaughter.
Appellants Bryant and Murdock both argued on appeal that reversal was required because of the trial court’s failure to offer the requested instruction. But in each case a majority of the panel affirmed the conviction on the grounds that “any proposed change in the court’s position on this doctrine should be addressed to the court en banc,” slip opinion in Bryant at - of 153 U.S.App.D.C., at 1046 of 471 F.2d, and that “[i]f the law is to be changed so as to make evidence tendered in support of an insanity defense also relevant to the intent elements in the alleged crime itself inde*1049pendently of insanity, that must be done by the court sitting en banc,” in Murdock at - of 152 U.S.App.D.C., at 967 of 471 F.2d. In both cases I argued in dissent that appellants’ position was not foreclosed by our prior decisions and that the question was now open for decision by a panel. Since my view was rejected in both cases, I called for rehearing en banc.
While the petitions for rehearing were pending, this Court announced its decision in United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S.App.D.C. -, 471 F.2d 969 (1972) (en banc), wherein we abandoned the Durham formulation of criminal responsibility and adopted a test derived from the American Law Institute’s formulation. As a “corollary” to that decision, the Court — unanimously on this point— deemed it appropriate to overturn the prior decisions of this Court which had been thought to preclude the defense of diminished responsibility. The question now before us is whether Bryant or Murdock will obtain any benefit from that ruling.
. Brawner, who fired five shots through the closed door of an apartment, was brought to trial on a charge of first-degree murder for killing one of the occupants of the apartment. Before the case was submitted to the jury, the trial judge acquitted Brawner of murder in the first degree, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder. Yet the Court’s discussion of the diminished responsibility doctrine in Brawner explicitly stops short of deciding its applicability to a defendant charged with second-degree murder. “Whether [the doctrine] may be applicable in a case where malice [an element of second-degree murder] is established on a subjective standard, so as to reduce the offense to manslaughter, is,” according to the Court, “a matter that requires further analysis and reflection.” In Brawner at - of 153 U.S.App.D.C., at 1002 of 471 F.2d n. 75. In other words, the Court refused to decide the only aspect of the question which could conceivably be relevant to the case then before us.
The Court’s decision in Brawner that psychiatric evidence can be introduced to reduce first-degree murder to second is gratuitous in another sense. Brawner did not offer the trial court a proposed instruction on diminished responsibility. Nor did he request such an instruction. The question did not arise on appeal until raised by one of the many amicus curiae briefs submitted in that case. Yet the Court chose Brawner as the vehicle for en banc reconsideration of the issue, and announced a new rule which— as limited by the Court — was entirely without significance for the case then before us.
Whether or not the resolution of this question in Brawner was an appropriate exercise of our judicial function is not now the issue. On balance, I am persuaded that the announcement of the new rule in Brawner, as an adjunct to the adoption of a new standard of criminal responsibility, was justified. But it is clear to me in any case that our choice of Brawner as a vehicle cannot be used to justify denying the benefit of the ruling to appellants Bryant and Murdock. The contrast between Brawner and these two cases is very striking. Both Bryant and Murdock raised the question in timely fashion before the trial court. Both offered a proposed instruction. Both argued the question persistently and effectively on appeal. It seems to me intolerable for us to bypass Bryant and Murdock, who have been litigating the question continuously since their trials in the fall of 1969, and to announce the new rule in a case where the question was never properly raised. This Court has so often penalized defendants for various missteps in the presentation of novel questions, see, e. g., Watson v. United States, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 439 F.2d 442 (1970) (en banc), that it is utterly beyond explanation for us now to turn our backs on Bryant and Murdock while choosing another case for the unveiling of our new rule.
*1050Moreover, there is another sense in which Bryant, and not Brawner, is the case where the question is properly raised. Of the three cases, Bryant is the only one which involves a conviction of first-degree murder. Thus, Bryant is the only case which precisely fits the Court’s decision in Brawner, and the only case where application of the new rule would unquestionably mandate a different result.
The Court obviously intended the announcement of the new rule in Brawner to have only prospective force. But to appreciate properly the true impact of the Court’s picking and choosing among these three cases, it is important to consider another aspect of the Brawner decision which sheds light on the Court’s understanding of the prospectivity doctrine. The adoption of a new formulation of the responsibility test was also made prospective. But the Court points out, 153 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 471 F.2d at 1005, that “under established doctrines of the judicial function . . . the benefit of the rule cannot wholly be withheld from the defendant in whose case it was established.” By application of those same “established doctrines” to the issue of diminished responsibility, it seems clear that Brawner would have derived some benefit from the adoption of the new rule except for the fact that the Court decided only as much of the question as had no possible relevance to Brawner’s case. Yet if the Court had announced that same limited conclusion in Bryant I presume that reversal of Bryant’s conviction would be required. Thus, the net effect of using Brawner as our vehicle is to undermine precisely those “established doctrines” — and the interests they serve — which the Court now finds it inconvenient to apply.
Perhaps the explanation for our choosing Brawner and ignoring Bryant is that the Court does not consider the new doctrine sufficiently important to warrant reversal of a conviction. I do not share that view. Most defendants, it seems to me, have mixed feelings about an acquittal by reason of insanity. Conditions at St. Elizabeths are not necessarily preferable to those at a penitentiary; and the stigma a judicial determination of mental illness may, sadly, be more oppressive than the stigma a judicial determination of guilt. On the other hand, I have no doubt that every defendant who cannot obtain an outright acquittal has a very lively interest in insuring that he is convicted on the lowest possible count. And the Court now concedes that psychiatric evidence may have a fundamental impact on the jury’s determination of the degree of the offense. But even if the Court is convinced that no conviction should be overturned on the strength of this doctrine, I could respect that view if it were brought into the open and clearly articulated. I am deeply troubled by the Court’s effort to bury Bryant so that the question does not even seem to arise.
In my view, the new doctrine should be applied to all cases now at trial or on appeal, as well as all cases that will be brought to trial subsequent to our decision in Brawner. There is ample precedent for that approach. See, e. g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966). And the burden of granting this relief would surely be extremely small. Compare opinion in Brawner at - of 153 U.S.App.D.C., at 1005 of 471 F.2d n. 70. Of course, there may be some irrationality in permitting the availability of relief to turn on the position which a case has reached in progressing through the criminal process. See Schaefer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 631, 644-46 (1967). But that irration.ality seems to me far less troublesome than the irrationality of withholding relief from litigants who have vigorously and properly pursued it.
I take it there is no dispute that it is the function of courts to decide concrete questions in the context of an appropriate case, and not to expound generally on abstract principles of law. The wis*1051dom of that ancient principle is strikingly illustrated by the Court’s refusal to heed it here. In Brawner we adopted a new and admirable rule on diminished responsibility, but we have pretended not to notice that the new rule is critical to the fair resolution of cases that are now before us. What explanation can we offer to appellants Bryant and Murdock for refusing to consider a question that they have properly raised? Can we reasonably expect them to respect the fairness and integrity of our judgment when we bypass their cases and resolve the question in a case where it can have no impact on the result? I would grant the petitions for rehearing en banc in both cases. The conviction in Bryant should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial by means of a one sentence order and a citation to our opinion in Brawner. In Murdock we should consider the question left open in Brawner —the application of the new rule to reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter. Our refusal to take this action imperils the fairness and integrity of our decisionmaking process.

 Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(c) (1970).

. Fisher v. United States, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 96, 149 F.2d 28 (1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 463, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946) ; Stewart v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 166, 275 F.2d 617, 624 (1960) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961).