Court Opinion

ID: 2963907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:14.603852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:04.017662
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          January 11, 1996      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1333

                                PATRICIA A. STANISLAS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                    CIGNA and INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                 ____________________

            Timothy J.  Ryan  with whom  Bradford  R.  Martin, Jr.  and  Ryan,
            ________________             _________________________       _____
        Martin,  Costello,  Leiter, Steiger  & Cass,  P.C.  were on  brief for
        ______   _________________________________________
        appellant.
            Michael A. Davis for appellees.
            ________________

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.  In this diversity case, plaintiff-appellant
                 __________

            Patricia A. Stanislas appeals from the district court's grant

            of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellees CIGNA and

            its  wholly  owned  subsidiary  Insurance  Company  of  North

            America  ("ICNA") on  a sexual  harassment claim  under Mass.

            Gen.  L. ch. 151B.   The district court  found that Stanislas

            failed to comply with the statute of limitations contained in

            Mass. Gen.  L. ch. 151B,    5.   Our review  of the  grant of

            summary  judgment is plenary, and  we read the  record in the

            light  most favorable  to  the party  contesting the  summary

            judgment.  See,  e.g., Cambridge Plating Co. v.  Napco, Inc.,
                       ___   ____  _____________________     ___________

            991 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1993).

                 Stanislas alleged that her immediate supervisor, John A.

            Cvejanovich, engaged  in repeated  acts of  sexual harassment

            towards  her  beginning in  November  1990.   Stanislas,  the

            office  administrator  of ICNA's  Springfield, Massachusetts,

            field  litigation  office,  and  Cvejanovich,   the  managing

            attorney, last  worked together on April 26, 1991, the Friday

            before Cvejanovich departed on a one-week  vacation.  On that

            day, according to Stanislas' affidavit,  Cvejanovich demanded

            that Stanislas sleep with him or find someone else who would.

                 On  April  30,  1991,  Stanislas  reported Cvejanovich's

            conduct to  another  attorney  in  the office,  who  in  turn

            notified  ICNA's area supervisor, John  Gilfoyle.  On May 2nd

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            and  3rd,  two ICNA  attorneys,  Gilfoyle  and Rob  Gilbride,

            investigated  Stanislas' claims.   Gilfoyle instructed all of

            the office employees  to stay home on  May 6th, Cvejanovich's

            first day back  at work; when  Cvejanovich reported to  work,

            Gilfoyle  confronted  him  with  Stanislas'  allegations  and

            offered  him the  choice  of resigning  or being  terminated.

            Cvejanovich resigned.  

                 When the office employees, including Stanislas, reported

            to work, Gilfoyle and Gilbride told them that Cvejanovich was

            no  longer employed by ICNA.  The employees were also advised

            to  keep the matter  confidential, and they  were warned that

            the legal consequences of discussing the incident would be on

            the employees' heads.  

                  Stanislas  filed  a  complaint  with  the Massachusetts

            Commission  Against Discrimination  ("MCAD")  on October  30,

            1991,  and  on June  22, 1992,  brought  the instant  suit in

            federal  district court.    This appeal  concerns  Stanislas'

            claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B,   4(16A), which makes  it

            unlawful for  any employer "to sexually  harass" an employee.

            On that  claim, the  district court granted  summary judgment

            for  defendants because  Stanislas filed  her MCAD  complaint

            more than 6 months after the last incident of harassment.

                 Before initiating a court action alleging a violation of

            section 151B,  a plaintiff must  file a  complaint with  MCAD

            within six  months after  the alleged act  of discrimination.

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            See Christo v.  Edward G. Boyle  Insurance Agency, Inc.,  525
            ___ _______     _______________________________________

            N.E.2d 643, 645 (Mass. 1988);  Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B,     5,

            9.  "In the absence of  a timely complaint to the MCAD, there

            may be  no resort to the courts."   Sereni v. Star Sportswear
                                                ______    _______________

            Manufacturing Corp., 509 N.E.2d 1203, 1204 (Mass. 1987).  The
            ___________________

            last  alleged incident  of harassment  occurred on  April 26,

            1991, but Stanislas'  complaint with MCAD was not filed until

            October 30, 1991, four days after the six-month cut-off date.

                 Stanislas challenges  this conclusion on  three grounds.

            First, she  argues that  the district court  misconstrued the

            nature of her claim.  M.G.L. ch. 151B,   1(18) defines sexual

            harassment as:

                 Sexual  advances, requests  for sexual  favors, and
                 other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
                 when  (a)  submission  to   or  rejection  of  such
                 advances,   requests  or  conduct  is  made  either
                 explicitly  or  implicitly a  term or  condition of
                 employment or  as a basis for employment decisions;
                 (b) such  advances,  requests or  conduct have  the
                 purpose or effect  of unreasonably interfering with
                 an individual's  work  performance by  creating  an
                 intimidating,  hostile,   humiliating  or  sexually
                 offensive work environment. . . .

            Stanislas argues that  while the last  incident of "quid  pro

            quo"  harassment (as defined in clause (a)) occurred on April

            26,  the  "hostile  environment" harassment  (as  defined  in

            clause (b)) continued until Stanislas knew that the threat of

            further harassment was removed, that is, until May 6, 1991.

                 This  argument  is  unavailing.    Sexual  harassment is

            defined  as "[s]exual  advances, requests for  sexual favors,

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            and  other  verbal or  physical conduct  of a  sexual nature"

            having the  effect of  (inter alia) creating  a hostile  work
                                    __________

            environment.  It is the acts having the specified effect that
                                    ____

            constitute the harassment.  There is no indication here  that

            there was any delay between the  last act and its effect,  so

            the act  was ripe for  a complaint.   The last act  of sexual
                                                           ___

            harassment alleged  by Stanislas occurred on  April 26, 1991,

            and  the six month  limitations period  runs from  that date.

            Cf. Ching v. MITRE Corp., 921 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1990).
            ___ _____    ___________

                 Second,  Stanislas argues  that  her claim  is protected

            under  804 C.M.R.    1.03(2),  which  provides that  "the six

            month  requirement  shall not  be a  bar  to filing  in those

            instances  where facts  are alleged  which indicate  that the

            unlawful conduct  complained of  is of a  continuing nature."

            Conduct may be continuing if it involves an ongoing policy or

            practice  of  the  employer  which,  if  prolonged  into  the

            limitations period, permits the suit.   Jensen v. Frank,  912
                                                    ______    _____

            F.2d 517,  523 (1st Cir. 1990).   But there is  no claim here

            that Cvejanovich's conduct was part of any policy or practice

            of the defendants.

                 Alternatively, a serial violation  may occur where there

            are "a number of discriminatory acts emanating from the  same

            discriminatory animus," Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters
                                    ______    ___________________________

            and  Joiners, 921  F.2d  396, 400  (1st  Cir. 1990)  (quoting
            ____________

            Jensen, 912 F.2d at  522), but "[i]n order for  the violation
            ______

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            to be  actionable, at least  one act in the  series must fall
                                         ______________________

            within  the limitations  period."   Sabree,  921 F.2d  at 400
                                                ______

            (emphasis  added).   In the  instant case,  the final  act of

            harassment alleged occurred on April 26, 1991; in fact, there

            was no professional contact between Cvejanovich and Stanislas

            after that date.

                 Third,  Stanislas  argues  that  the  warning  given  by

            Gilfoyle and  Gilbride that she keep  the matter confidential

            constitutes justification  for equitable modification  of the

            statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations under ch.

            151B,    5,  is  subject  to  equitable  modification.    See
                                                                      ___

            Christo, 525  N.E.2d at 645.   The basis  urged here  is that
            _______

            defendants unfairly discouraged Stanislas from exercising her

            rights.   Cf. Felty  v. Graves-Humphreys  Co., 785  F.2d 516,
                      ___ _____     _____________________

            519-20 (4th Cir. 1986).

                 Because this issue  was first raised  in a motion  under

            Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) for reconsideration  of the district

            court's  grant of  summary judgment,  we review  the district

            judge's  determination only  for  abuse of  discretion.   See
                                                                      ___

            Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988).
            ________    _____________

            There  is  no  evidence  that the  warning  by  Gilfoyle  and

            Gilbride was  inappropriate in  light of the  risks presented

            (e.g., defamation) or that it  was intended to discourage the
             ____

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            filing  of a  complaint  with MCAD.1   We  think that  it was

            within  the sound discretion of the trial court to decline to

            reopen the case to entertain  this belated equitable claim of

            very doubtful merit.

                 Affirmed.
                 ________

                                
            ____________________

                 1Nor is it clear  that the warning had any  such effect.
            As  a matter of fact, Stanislas consulted with an attorney at
            least several days prior to the expiration of the limitations
            period.

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