Court Opinion

ID: 9375958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 15:15:01.433353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.144277
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 16

                  SUPREME COURT           OF     WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP1683

COMPLETE TITLE:        Citation Partners, LLC,
                                 Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
                                 Respondent-Appellant.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 260, 968 N.W.2d 734
                             PDC No: 2021 WI App 86 - Published

OPINION FILED:         March 1, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         October 17, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Dodge
   JUDGE:              Martin J. De Vries

JUSTICES:
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER,
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Frederic J. Brounder, J. Wesley Webendorfer, and DeWitt
LLP,        Madison.   There   was   an   oral   argument   by   J.   Wesley
Webendorfer.

       For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Anthony D. Russomanno, assistant attorney general, with whom on
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
oral   argument   by   Anthony   D.       Russomanno,   assistant   attorney
general.

                                      2
                                                                        2023 WI 16

                                                                NOTICE
                                                  This opinion is subject to further
                                                  editing and modification.   The final
                                                  version will appear in the bound
                                                  volume of the official reports.
No.    2020AP1683
(L.C. No.   2019CV612)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                            :             IN SUPREME COURT

Citation Partners, LLC,

            Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                     FILED
      v.                                                         MAR 1, 2023

Wisconsin Department of Revenue,                                   Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                Clerk of Supreme Court

            Respondent-Appellant.

DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER,
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                Affirmed.

      ¶1    REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.           Wisconsin imposes a five

percent tax on the sale or lease of tangible personal property,

including aircraft, as well as on select services.                         The tax

applies to the "sales price"——that is, "the total amount of

consideration"     paid   for   a   sale,   lease,     or    service,      with     no

deductions for the seller's or lessor's costs.                   See Wis. Stat.
                                                                                No.     2020AP1683

§§ 77.52(1)(a), 77.51(15b)(a) (2013-14).1                             The sale of aircraft

parts and maintenance, however, are exempt from sales tax.                                     See

Wis. Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10., 77.54(5)(a)3.

       ¶2     Citation          Partners,    LLC         owns    an     aircraft       which    it

leases to third parties, the Lessees.                                As part of the total

amount the Lessees pay to lease the aircraft, Citation Partners

charges per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and engine

maintenance.          Those       rates     correspond          to     the   amount     Citation

Partners      spends       on    aircraft     repairs           and    engine     maintenance.

Citation Partners argues that this portion of the lease payment

is    tax    exempt    because       it     is       a   sale     of    aircraft       parts    or

maintenance.          We    disagree.            The     per-flight-hour          charges      for

aircraft repairs and engine maintenance are taxable because they

are part of the total amount of consideration the Lessees pay to

lease      Citation    Partners'        aircraft.           We        therefore       affirm   the

court of appeals' decision.

                                                 I

       ¶3     Citation Partners owns an aircraft that it leases to

the Lessees.      The Lessees signed a contract called the Aircraft

Dry    Lease,    defining         the     responsibilities              they    and     Citation

Partners have with regard to the lease of the aircraft.                                  The Dry

Lease requires the Lessees to notify Citation Partners if the

aircraft needs repairs or maintenance.                          If so, Citation Partners

is responsible for scheduling and paying for all repairs or

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
       1

the 2013-14 version.

                                                 2
                                                                            No.      2020AP1683

maintenance.2           It   does    not   perform          any    of   the    repairs       or

maintenance itself.

     ¶4     In addition to the Dry Lease, the Lessees entered into

a Side Agreement with Citation Partners that sets forth the

financial       terms    for   the    lease      of    the        aircraft.       The     Side

Agreement includes costs-per-flight-hour that Citation Partners

charges the Lessees for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance.

Those charges are substantially similar to the amount Citation

Partners spends when it purchases aircraft repairs and engine

maintenance directly from vendors.

     ¶5     In    2013,      the    Legislature        passed       Wisconsin     Act     185,

which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the

sale of aircraft parts or maintenance.                       See 2013 Wis. Act 185.

After the Act took effect, Citation Partners stopped collecting

sales tax on the amounts it charged Lessees for aircraft repairs

and engine maintenance.              In 2017, the Wisconsin Department of

Revenue notified Citation Partners that unpaid sales taxes were

due on those amounts.
     ¶6     Citation Partners appealed, claiming that the Act 185

sales     tax    exemption     applied      to        the    Lessees'       payments       for

aircraft    repairs      and   engine      maintenance            because     they    were   a

dollar-for-dollar "reimbursement" to Citation Partners for those

costs.     The Tax Appeals Commission disagreed, concluding that

     2 The Lessees have limited authority to incur up to $5,000
of necessary maintenance and repair work for the aircraft
without the prior written approval from Citation Partners. The
Lessees will be reimbursed by Citation Partners upon receipt of
proof of payment.

                                            3
                                                                         No.   2020AP1683

the payments were not reimbursements and that Act 185 did not

apply to any portion of the payments Citation Partners received

from the Lessees.         The circuit court3 reversed the Commission's

decision    on    the   grounds   that     an       agency    relationship       existed

between Citation Partners and the Lessees.                         According to the

circuit court, this relationship meant that the payments for

aircraft repairs and engine maintenance were tax exempt, since

those payments would be tax-free if they were made directly by

the Lessees to the vendors.

       ¶7    The court of appeals reversed.                  Citation Partners, LLC

v. DOR, 2021 WI App 86, ¶35, 400 Wis. 2d 260, 968 N.W.2d 734.

In    its   view,   the    existence       of       an    agency   relationship       was

irrelevant.       Id., ¶32.     Instead, it held that the payments were

not   exempt     from   sales   tax   under         the    plain   language      of   the

statutes, which apply sales tax to "the total amount paid on an

aircraft lease," without "any deduction for the portions of a

lease attributed to aircraft maintenance or engine maintenance,

which are the costs and expenses of running an aircraft leasing
business."       Id., ¶24.

                                         II

       ¶8    We review the Commission's decision rather than the

circuit court's.          See Friendly Vill. Nursing & Rehab, LLC v.

DWD, 2022 WI 4, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d 277, 969 N.W.2d 245.                          In doing

so, we defer to the Commission's findings of fact so long as

       The Honorable Martin
       3                              J.       De    Vries    of   the   Dodge    County
Circuit Court presided.

                                           4
                                                                   No.    2020AP1683

they are supported by substantial evidence, but we review its

legal conclusions de novo.        Id.

                                      III

    ¶9      In order to determine whether the Lessees' cost-per-

flight-hour payments to Citation Partners for aircraft repairs

and engine maintenance are taxable, we analyze the tax statutes.

"When interpreting statutes, we start with the text, and if its

meaning is plain on its face, we stop there."                 Clean Wis., Inc.

v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, ¶10, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611.                        In

assessing the plain meaning of the text, "[w]e also consider the

broader    statutory   context,    interpreting         language    consistently

with how it is used in closely related statutes."                        Duncan v.

Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., 2022 WI 1, ¶9, 400 Wis. 2d 1,

968 N.W.2d 661.     After analyzing the relevant statutes, we then

consider what effect, if any, Citation Partners' arguments about

the law of agency has on our interpretation.

                                        A

    ¶10     Wisconsin imposes a five percent tax on the "sales

price" for tangible personal property like aircraft that is sold

or leased.     § 77.52(1)(a).      "[S]ales price" is defined broadly

as "the total amount of consideration, . . . for which tangible

personal     property . . . [is]        sold,     licensed,    [or]       leased."

§ 77.51(15b)(a).       The   "total      amount    of    consideration,"        and

therefore     the   "sales   price,"        is    calculated       "without     any
deduction for" "[t]he seller's cost of the property or items,

                                        5
                                                                     No.     2020AP1683

property, or goods . . . sold," or "[t]he cost of materials

used, labor or service cost, . . . and any other expense of the

seller."      Id. (a)1.-2.         Thus, §§ 77.52(1)(a) and § 77.51(15b)(a)

together state that the total amount of consideration paid for a

lease——the "sales price"——is taxable, with no deduction for the

lessor's costs.         See § 77.51(15b)(a)1.-2.

      ¶11     To calculate the total "sales price" that the Lessees

pay Citation Partners to lease the Aircraft, we simply multiply

the number of flight hours by the total of all the costs-per-

flight-hour.4          The Side Agreement breaks the total costs-per-

flight-hour down into different hourly rates, including a base

rate ($724.50/hour), Airplane Repairs ($488/hour), and Engine

TAP Costs ($292.26/hour).5              The Lessees have to pay all of these

costs in order to lease the aircraft.                   The sum of those costs——

including for aircraft repair and engine maintenance——is thus

"the total amount of consideration . . . for which [the aircraft

is]       .   .   .     leased"      and     is   therefore       taxable.          See

§ 77.51(15b)(a).             If    there   were   any    doubt    remaining    as   to
whether Citation Partners' costs for aircraft repairs and engine

maintenance           can     be     deducted     from      the     sales      price,

§ 77.51(15b)(a)             confirms       that    the     "total      amount       of

consideration" must be calculated "without any deduction" for

Citation Partners' costs.              Id. (emphasis added).

      4In addition, the Lessees also pay $1.00 per rental period
to lease the aircraft.
      5These hourly rates reflect those in the Side Agreement as
of January 1, 2015.

                                             6
                                                                            No.    2020AP1683

      ¶12      Citation    Partners       argues      that    the    payments          are    not

taxable because they are not consideration at all.                                     That is

because, in its view, Citation Partners simply hands the money

the Lessees pay for repairs and maintenance over to the vendors

that provide those services.                But consideration is "any act of

the plaintiff from which the defendant . . . derives a benefit

or advantage."          Consideration, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019); see also DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, Inc., 2007 WI

27,     ¶50,     299    Wis. 2d 561,       729      N.W.2d 396       (explaining             that

consideration "may arise when there is a benefit to the promisor

or a detriment to the promisee").                   And Citation Partners clearly

benefits from these payments by passing along to its Lessees the

costs    of     maintaining      its    aircraft.          For     that    reason,       these

payments are——by definition——consideration.                        See River City, 299

Wis. 2d 561, ¶50 (consideration includes "a change in financial

position").        Additionally, accepting Citation Partners' argument

that it receives no consideration from the Lessees' payments for

aircraft       repairs    and     engine   maintenance            simply    because          that
payment     corresponds      to      anticipated      repair       costs    would       render

part of § 77.51(15b)(a) meaningless.                   See State ex rel. Kalal v.

Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681

N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language is read where possible to give

reasonable        effect        to     every       word,     in     order         to     avoid

surplusage.").          After all, if Citation Partners is right, it is

not   clear      what    § 77.51(15b)(a)           means   when     it     says    that       the

"sales         price"——the       "total        amount        of     consideration"——is

                                               7
                                                                      No.    2020AP1683

calculated "without any deduction" for Citation Partners' costs.

§ 77.51(15b)(a)      (emphasis added).

      ¶13   Citation      Partners      claims      that   the   costs-per-flight-

hour that it receives for aircraft parts and engine maintenance

are   nevertheless       tax   exempt.         It    points      to   two   statutory

exemptions    related     to     aircraft:     Wis.    Stat.      §   77.54(5)(a)3.,

which   exempts    the    sale    of    "parts      used   to    modify     or   repair

aircraft," and Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10., which exempts the

sale of "repair, service, . . . and maintenance of any aircraft

or aircraft parts."            Citation Partners argues that since the

plain language of both exemptions covers the costs of aircraft

repairs and engine maintenance, then "the reimbursement payments

that Citation Partners receives from the Lessees are exempt from

sales tax."

      ¶14   We    disagree       because       neither     of     these     statutory

exemptions applies to the payments Citation Partners receives

from the Lessees.         Simply put, Citation Partners does not sell

its   Lessees    "parts    used    to    modify      or    repair     aircraft,"     or
"repair, service, . . . and maintenance of any aircraft."                           See

§§ 77.54(5)(a)3., 77.52(2)(a)10.               It leases its aircraft to the

Lessees.     And as explained previously, the statutes already make

clear that the total amount of consideration paid on an aircraft

lease is taxable without any deduction for the Lessor's costs.

See §§ 77.51(15b)(a), 77.52(1)(a).                  When Citation Partners (or

the Lessees for that matter) buy aircraft repairs or engine

maintenance directly, those transactions are tax-exempt.                            But
when Citation Partners passes those costs along to its customers
                                           8
                                                                                    No.     2020AP1683

as part of the total amount of consideration in a lease, that

transaction is taxable.

       ¶15       For example, if the plane's landing gear breaks and

Citation Partners purchases parts from a business in Wisconsin,

that       transaction       is    exempt        under       §    77.54(5)(a)3.             That   is

because       the    business           sold     Citation         Partners       "parts used to

modify or repair [the] aircraft."                               See id.       Thus, the seller

would      not    have    to      charge       the       usual    five    percent         sales   tax.

Likewise, when Citation Partners pays a maintenance company to

service the aircraft's engine, that transaction is exempt from

the    sales      tax    under      §    77.52(2)(a)10.                That    is    because       the

maintenance             company          sold            Citation         Partners          "repair,

service, . . . and             maintenance           of . . . an[]          aircraft        part[]."

See id.

       ¶16       Under    Act     185     then,          sales    of     aircraft        repairs   or

engine maintenance are tax-exempt.                              But when Citation Partners

turns around and leases its aircraft, it is not selling aircraft

repairs      or     engine      maintenance.               It    is    leasing      an     aircraft.6
Thus,      because       Citation       Partners'          activities       fall     outside       the

text of the exemptions, the total lease price is taxable.

       For this reason, the general rule in § 77.51(15b)(a) and
       6

the specific exemptions in §§ 77.54(5)(a)3. and 77.52(2)(a)10.
relate to different subject matters and are not in conflict. These
statutes simply apply to different types of transactions.      And
because there is no conflict, the general-specific canon is
inapposite. See Kramer v. City of Hayward, 57 Wis. 2d 302, 310-
11, 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973); see also Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC,
2021 WI 86, ¶39, 399 Wis. 2d 599, 967 N.W.2d 21 (Dallet, J.,
concurring) ("The general-specific canon applies only to
statutes that both address the same subject matter and conflict
with one another such that harmonizing them is impossible.").

                                                     9
                                                                              No.     2020AP1683

                                             B

      ¶17    Citation       Partners        tries       to     circumvent           the    plain

language of the statutes by arguing that it is the Lessees'

agent when it purchases aircraft repairs and engine maintenance.

And   for   that     reason,     the    per-flight-hour            reimbursements            for

aircraft repairs and engine maintenance are akin to the Lessees

purchasing those repairs and maintenance directly.

      ¶18    An agency relationship is a "fiduciary relation which

results     from    the    manifestation          of    consent       by   one      person    to

another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to

his control."        James W. Thomas Constr. Co. v. City of Madison,

79 Wis. 2d 345, 352, 255 N.W.2d 551 (1977).                        Thus, in order for

an    agency       relationship       to     exist,          Citation      Partners        must

demonstrate     that      (1)   the    Lessees         manifested       consent       to    have

Citation Partners act on their behalf with respect to aircraft

repairs and engine maintenance and (2) the Lessees had the right

to control Citation Partners' conduct in that regard.                               See id.

      ¶19    Citation      Partners        relies      on    the   lease      documents       as
"provid[ing] the framework for the agency relationship."                                      It

points out that the Dry Lease makes the Lessees responsible for

"inspect[ing] the Aircraft" and notifying Citation Partners if

"any repair or maintenance should be completed."                              Additionally,

the Dry Lease contains an indemnification provision under which

the   Lessees      are    "ultimately       responsible         for     all    obligations,

expenses and disbursements asserted against Citation Partners

arising out of the operation of the Aircraft."

                                             10
                                                                                    No.    2020AP1683

       ¶20    Rather than prove an agency relationship exists, the

lease documents reveal the opposite.                          The Dry Lease states that

Citation Partners——not the Lessees——"shall schedule and pay for

all    repairs          and       maintenance."             And   that       decision          is    not

"directed" by the Lessees just because they must notify Citation

Partners          of     necessary         maintenance        upon      inspection             of    the

aircraft.         Rather, the Lessees' inspection obligation is limited

to confirming that the aircraft is flightworthy before using it.

Likewise, under the Dry Lease, the Lessees have only limited

authority to purchase repairs and maintenance up to $5,000, and

are    reimbursed               by     Citation           Partners      if     they            do   so.

Additionally,            although        the     parties      entered        into    a     new      Side

Agreement in 2015 which states that the Lessees are "responsible

for    fixed           and        indirect       operating        expenses          and        charges

attributable to the operation and maintenance of the Aircraft,"

including "[s]cheduled and unscheduled maintenance," nothing in

that   Agreement             or    the     Dry   Lease      suggests        that     the       Lessees

control Citation Partners' aircraft-maintenance activities.
       ¶21    The        indemnification             provision       does     not     demonstrate

otherwise.             In that provision, the Lessees agree to indemnify

Citation          Partners         "from       and    against     any        and     all       claims,

liabilities, demands, obligations, losses, damages,                                   . . . which

may be imposed on, incurred by or asserted against [Citation

Partners], in any way relating to or arising out of this Lease,

and/or the operation of the Aircraft, . . . ."                                       But standing

alone,   standard             indemnification             language    like     this        does      not
create       an        agency        relationship.           To   reiterate,              an    agency
                                                     11
                                                                         No.     2020AP1683

relationship requires that one party have the right to control

the other's conduct.           See James W. Thomas Constr. Co., 79 Wis.

2d 345, at 352.           And nothing in this indemnification provision

grants    the       Lessees   the    right     to      control    Citation      Partners.

Instead, the Dry Lease and the Side Agreement demonstrate that

Citation Partners, the owner of the aircraft, is the one in

charge of repairs and engine maintenance, and that the Lessees

do      not     control       how     Citation          Partners       fulfills       that

responsibility.

                                             IV

     ¶22       Wisconsin imposes a five percent sales tax on the sale

or lease of tangible personal property like Citation Partners'

aircraft.           The tax applies to the total "sales price" of the

lease    unless       there   is    an   applicable           exemption.        Two   such

exemptions exist for the sale of aircraft parts and maintenance,

but neither apply to the Lessees' payments to Citation Partners

for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance.                           Accordingly, we
hold that the total amount of consideration the Lessees pay to

lease Citation Partners' aircraft is taxable, and affirm the

court of appeals' decision.

     By       the    Court.—The     decision      of    the    court   of      appeals   is

affirmed.

                                             12
                                                                               No.    2020AP1683.pdr

       ¶23    PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.                           (dissenting).         In 2013

Wis.      Act        185,     the         legislature             enacted            Wis.        Stat.

§ 77.52(2)(a)10.             to          exempt            the          "repair,            service,

alteration . . . of           any    aircraft         or    aircraft           parts"      and    Wis.

Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3. to exempt the "[p]arts used to modify or

repair aircraft" from state sales taxes.                               This case involves a

claimed      exemption        from        state       sales            taxes        for     aircraft

maintenance services and aircraft parts.                               The majority opinion

never     interprets         §§ 77.52(2)(a)10.               or        77.54(5)(a)3,             which

address aircraft repairs and aircraft parts.                               It skips over the

plain meaning of those two statutes, and instead, it interprets

Wis. Stat. §§ 77.51(15b)(a) and 77.52(1)(a), neither of which

contains the word, "aircraft," nor does either statute mention

aircraft parts or aircraft maintenance.

       ¶24    I      interpret          Wis.        Stat.         §§ 77.52(2)(a)10.                and

77.54(5)(a)3., the statutes relevant to Citation Partners, LLC's

claim.       The plain meaning of those statutes grants Citation
Partners the sales tax exemption it seeks.                              Because the majority

opinion      chooses    to    follow       the       error-strewn          path       of    the    Tax

Appeals Commission (TAC), which contravenes the clear statutory

direction       to   exempt       the     sales      price        of    aircraft          parts    and

aircraft      maintenance         from     state      sales       taxes,        I    respectfully

dissent.

                                     I.    BACKGROUND

       ¶25    Citation       Partners,         LLC    owns        a    Cessna        Citation     C12
aircraft      that    it     leases       to   parties           related       to    the    limited

                                                1
                                                                                       No.    2020AP1683.pdr

liability        company          and    to    one       unrelated             party.         The    parties

operate         under       two     documents:               the        Aircraft       Dry     Lease        and

individual Side Agreements that each lessee signs.

          ¶26   Section One of the Dry Lease describes the structure

of    a    "Rental         Period"       for       the       aircraft's         use     and        return    to

Citation        Partners.           It    sets       one          dollar       "and    other        good    and

valuable         consideration"               as    a         lessee's         initial        payment       to

Citation Partners.                 Section Two provides that the lease term is

one year, unless terminated earlier by either party with ten

days notice.               Section Four talks about scheduling use of the

aircraft and what is required to do so.                                       Section Five requires

Citation Partners to insure the aircraft.

          ¶27   Section       Six        places          certain           geographic          and     other

restrictions on aircraft use and creates obligations for the

lessees.         Section Nine requires lessees to inspect the aircraft

and   maintenance            records       prior             to    each       rental    period        and    to

notify Citation Partners and not to operate the aircraft until

all repairs and maintenance are completed.                                         Citation Partners
schedules         and        initially             pays           vendors        for         repairs        and

maintenance.               Section       Nineteen             requires          that     the       lease     be

interpreted           in    accordance             with           the    laws     of    the        State     of

Wisconsin.

          ¶28   The        Side         Agreements                 are        individual           memoranda

concerning        the       financial          commitments               of    lessees        to    Citation

Partners.          Each Side Agreement states the hourly charge for

flight time, the lessee's obligation to pay a stated amount for
aircraft repairs and for engine maintenance and a listing of

                                                         2
                                                                         No.     2020AP1683.pdr

expenses specific to flights that are allocated only to the

lessee       who    was     using     the    aircraft       when     the       charges     were

incurred.          Accordingly, Citation Partners charges each lessee

its    proportionate           share        of       aircraft     repairs        and     engine

maintenance that Citation Partners initially pays to vendors.

However, the Side Agreements contain more components than those

two charges.

       ¶29    Prior to 2015, Citation Partners charged state sales

taxes on all components of the Dry Lease and Side Agreements and

remitted       the        collections       to       Department     of     Revenue       (DOR).

Because the effective date of 2013 Wis. Act 185 was July 2014,

Citation Partners filed for a refund of taxes collected for

periods      of     time    after     the   effective       date    of     Act    185.      DOR

granted       the        refund.       Subsequently,            however,       DOR     demanded

repayment.

       ¶30    Citation Partners appealed DOR's decision to the TAC,

which agreed with DOR.                Citation Partners then sought review in

circuit court, which reversed the TAC.                      The TAC sought review in
the    court        of     appeals,     which         reversed     the     circuit       court.

Citation Partners petitioned for review here, which petition we

granted.

                                      II.    DISCUSSION

                               A.     Standard of Review

       ¶31    We review the TAC's decision, not that of the circuit

court or the court of appeals.                          MercyCare Ins. Co. v. Wis.

Comm'r of Ins., 2010 WI 87, ¶25, 328 Wis. 2d 110, 786 N.W.2d
785.

                                                 3
                                                                             No.    2020AP1683.pdr

      ¶32      This     dispute           requires    us       to    interpret          and     apply

statutes.          The      interpretation           and       application         of     statutes

present       questions        of    law     requiring         our     independent            review.

Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 86, ¶17,

383 Wis. 2d 247, 914 N.W.2d 597;                          Solowicz v. Forward Geneva

Nat'l, LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111.

However, as we do so, we benefit from the discussions of the

circuit court and court of appeals.                        Id.      We owe no deference to

TAC on questions of law.                    Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI

75, ¶84, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21; see also Patience Drake

Roggensack,          Elected         to     Decide:       Is     the      Decision-Avoidance

Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in This Court of

Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541 (2006).

                              B.    Statutory Interpretation

                1.      Principles of Statutory Interpretation

      ¶33      We begin statutory interpretation with examination of

the words the legislature chose to use in statutory enactments

that are under review here.                   When we do so, "statutory language
is   interpreted         in    the    context        in   which      it     is    used;       not    in

isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of

surrounding        or      closely-related           statutes;         and       reasonably,        to

avoid absurd or unreasonable results."                           Teigen v. Wis. Elections

Comm'n,     2022      WI      64,    ¶50,     403    Wis. 2d         607,    976     N.W.2d         519

(quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI

58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110); Antonin Scalia &

Bryan    A.    Garner,         Reading       Law:     The      Interpretation            of     Legal
Texts,    180,     183      (2012)        (explaining       that      the    general-specific

                                                4
                                                                  No.   2020AP1683.pdr

canon    applies   to     statutory        construction      "when       conflicting

provisions simply cannot be reconciled").

    ¶34     Statutory     history     is     central    to    a     plain      meaning

analysis.    As we have explained, a "review of statutory history

is part of a plain meaning analysis" because it is part of the

context in which we interpret statutory terms.                          Richards v.

Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749

N.W.2d 581; see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9 (citing

Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,

103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 430 (1989)).

    2.    Wisconsin Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3.

    ¶35     2013   Wis.   Act   185    enacted     two       statutes        that   are

relevant here:     Wis. Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3.

As enacted, § 77.52(2)(a)10. provides in relevant part:

    For the privilege of selling, licensing, performing or
    furnishing   the   services   described   under   par.
    (a) . . . .

         (a) The tax imposed                 herein     applies         to    the
    following types of services:

    . . . .

         10. Except for the repair, service, alteration,
    fitting,   cleaning,  painting,   coating,   towing,
    inspection, and maintenance of any aircraft or
    aircraft parts;
Section 77.52(2)(a)10. is broadly stated.                 The statute applies

to "any aircraft or aircraft parts."              (Emphasis added.)             There

is no statutory limitation on the statute's use that refers to

whether the "selling, licensing, performing or furnishing" of
aircraft parts or services are set out in a written agreement or

performed without a written agreement.                 There is no limitation
                                       5
                                                                      No.   2020AP1683.pdr

on whether the person responsible for that financial obligation

pays the vendor directly or pays another who has paid the vendor

on that person's behalf.

       ¶36    Wisconsin Stat. § 77.54 is not a newcomer to Wisconsin

statutes.         It sets out "General exemptions" from state sales

tax.     Section 77.54's exemptions are many and diverse, ranging

from tractors and machines, § 77.54(3)(a), to the sales price

for    tickets     to   elementary       and      secondary        school   activities,

§ 77.54(9),       to    the    sales    price       of    ballet     and    tap    shoes,

§ 77.54(67)(a)12.a.

       ¶37    2013 Wis. Act 185 added a relevant exemption to the

many-faceted exemptions of Wis. Stat. § 77.54 with the enactment

of     § 77.54(5)(a)3.          The     amended          statute     provides      a    new

exemption:

       The sales price from the sale of and the storage, use
       or other consumption of;

       . . . .

       3.    Parts used to modify or repair aircraft.
It exempts the "sales price" of aircraft parts from sales taxes,
just as § 77.54(67)(a)12.a. exempts the sales price of ballet

and tap shoes from sales taxes.                         Nothing in     § 77.54(5)(a)3.

limits its exemption when the obligation to pay for aircraft

parts is set out in written agreements.                    Once again, just as the

legislature       has   done   for     the   myriad       of   exemptions      contained

within § 77.54, the legislature granted a broad exemption for

the sales price of aircraft parts.
       ¶38    In the dispute before us, the plain meaning of the

words       the   legislature     chose          when     it   enacted      Wis.       Stat.
                                             6
                                                                       No.    2020AP1683.pdr

§§ 77.52(2)(a)10.        and       77.54(5)(a)3.            describe      both      specific

exemptions from sales taxes for the repair and maintenance of

aircraft and general exemptions from sales tax for the "sales

price" of aircraft parts used to modify or repair an aircraft.

     ¶39   Prior       to     the       above-described            statutory        changes,

aircraft parts and maintenance were not exempt from state sales

tax, unless the aircraft was used by "certified or licensed

carriers     of    persons        or    property       in    interstate       or    foreign

commerce,"    Wis.      Stat.      § 77.54(5)(a)1.,           or    the      aircraft      and

attachments       to   aircraft        were    "sold    to     persons       who    are    not

residents of this state and who will not use such aircraft in

this state," § 77.54(5)(a)2.1                 Clearly, the legislature knew how

to limit exemptions from sales tax for aircraft if it chose to

do   so.           However,        in     the      enactment         of      Wis.     Stat.

§§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3., the legislature chose to

provide the exemption for the "sales price" of "any aircraft or

aircraft parts."         (Emphasis added.)              Accordingly, applying the

plain meaning of the words the legislature chose, I conclude
§§ 77.52(2)(a)10.           and     77.54(5)(a)3.           grant      exemptions         that

Citation Partners seeks.

     1 2013 Wis. Act 185 repealed Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a) and
renumbered the statute as Wis. Stat. §§ 77.54(5)(a)1. and
77.54(5)(a)2. Act 185 did not change the quoted language.

                                              7
                                                                  No.   2020AP1683.pdr

                                3.    TAC Decision

     ¶40    As required, I review the TAC decision, beginning with

its factual statements.           In reviewing TAC findings of fact, we

apply the "'substantial evidence' standard."                      Hilton ex rel.

Pages Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶16, 293 Wis. 2d 1,

717 N.W.2d 166 (citations omitted).               Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(6)

requires us to set aside or remand an agency action "if the

agency's decision depends on any finding of fact not supported

by substantial evidence in the record."2              Id.

     ¶41    The   test     is   based   on    the   evidence      of    record,   and

whether reasonable minds would conclude that there are material

factual      findings      that       underlie      TAC's        erroneous      legal

conclusions.      Id.      In this matter, we are concerned about how

TAC's factual findings affected its decision not to apply Wis.

Stat.    §§ 77.52(2)(a)10.        and   77.54(5)(a)3.       to    the   transaction

under review here.          As explained below, I conclude that the

TAC's     material      factual      findings     that   underlie        its    legal

conclusion     are   not    supported        by   substantial       evidence,     and
therefore, TAC's decision must be set aside.

     2 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.57(6) provides: "The court shall,
however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the
agency if it finds that the agency's action depends on any
finding of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence in
the record."

     Wisconsin Stat. § 73.015(2) provides that "[a]ny adverse
determination of the tax appeals commission is subject to review
in the manner provided in [Wis. Stat.] ch. 227."

                                         8
                                                                     No.    2020AP1683.pdr

                                    a.    Factual Errors

       ¶42       TAC appears to misread the relevant Side Agreements

that are in the record.              In one of TAC's errors, it says:

            Below the hourly fee descriptions, the Side
       Agreement clarifies the parties' responsibilities for
       expenses.   The Lessor's list includes scheduled and
       unscheduled maintenance.   The Lessee's list does not
       include any maintenance related expenses.[3]
This TAC statement is completely incorrect.

       ¶43       The relevant Side Agreement, dated January 1, 2015,

says       the   opposite      of    what    TAC   finds.      The    Side       Agreement

actually provides:

       Lessee will be responsible for fixed and indirect
       operating expenses and charges attributable to the
       operation and maintenance of the Aircraft.        These
       expenses and costs include, but are not limited
       to: . . . Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.[4]
       ¶44       The   TAC's   factual       inaccuracy     leads    it    to    incorrect

legal       conclusions.            TAC     errs   when   it   ignores          the    plain

statements in the Side Agreement and says:

            The Dry Lease, with its Side Agreement, does not
       confer a responsibility for maintenance on the Lessee.
       To the contrary, it is the Lessor who is expressly
       responsible for the repairs and maintenance.   Because
       the Lessees are not obligated to maintain the
       aircraft, they are not reimbursing the Lessor for
       something paid on their behalf.[5]
As   the     quote     above    from      Record   6-35     shows,   under       the    Side

Agreement, the lessees are obligated to pay for repairs and

       3   TAC decision, R. 22-13 (emphasis added).
       4   R. 6-35 (P. App 0053) (emphasis added).
       5   R. 22-15.

                                               9
                                                                  No.   2020AP1683.pdr

maintenance of the aircraft.           Therefore, Citation Partners is

being reimbursed under the Side Agreement for obligations of the

lessees that it paid on their behalves.

     ¶45    In addition to its misreading of record exhibits, the

TAC ignores the Stipulation of Facts that the parties jointly

submitted.6    That stipulation in paragraph 3 states, "the Side

Agreements and invoices to lessees expressly provided for dollar

for dollar reimbursement by each of the lessees of the Aircraft

of both engine maintenance cost and Aircraft maintenance cost."7

Notwithstanding that factual stipulation the TAC says,

          That starting point, reimbursement, presupposes
     that each Lessee was obligated to pay for repair and
     maintenance such that the Lessor, in effect, paid the
     expenses on behalf of the Lessees.   That is not what
     happens under these Agreements.[8]
However,    reimbursement     from    the    lessees        for    expenses       that

Citation    Partners   paid   for    the    lessees    is    exactly       what    the

parties    represented   in    the    Factual     Stipulation            that     they

provided to TAC, as well as under other record exhibits.

     ¶46    Accordingly, TAC's material factual findings are not

supported by substantial evidence, and they must be set aside

based on documents in the record and the Stipulation of Facts

     6 The majority opinion also ignores the parties' Stipulation
of Facts that was submitted to and accepted by TAC and is part
of the record before us.       That Stipulation is critical to
understanding the facts that drive the matter that is now before
the court.
     7   R. 9-4 (P. App 0061).
     8   R. 22-14.

                                      10
                                                           No.   2020AP1683.pdr

that the parties provided to the TAC.             Pages Homeowners' Ass'n,

293 Wis. 2d 1, ¶16.

                            b.   Legal Conclusions

     ¶47       TAC's legal conclusions are grounded in its erroneous

factual findings.          As with the majority opinion, the TAC does

not interpret the statutes that are at issue here.                 Instead, it

interprets Wis. Stat. § 77.51(15b)(a), which does not mention

aircraft maintenance, aircraft parts or aircraft in any regard.9

Nevertheless, TAC concludes that "expenditures for those repairs

and maintenance parts and services are not separately exempt

when incorporated into the lease payments of a subsequent lease

of the entire Aircraft."10

     ¶48       Rather, it is Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3. that creates

an "exemption" for the "sales price" of "[p]arts used to modify

or repair aircraft," and Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10. that sets

sales     of    "repair,    service,    alteration,     fitting,     cleaning,

painting,      coating,    towing,   inspection   and   maintenance    of   any

aircraft or aircraft parts" outside the scope of state sales
taxes.     Nothing in either statute changes those exemptions when

an aircraft is leased.           Stated otherwise, there is nothing in

either statute that limits its use when obligations to pay for

aircraft maintenance and parts are incurred pursuant to written

documents rather than directly to the vendors.

     9 The word "aircraft" also does not appear in Wis. Stat.
§ 77.52(1)(a), which is relied on by the majority opinion.
Majority op., ¶10.
     10   TAC decision, R. 22-16 (P. App 0038).

                                       11
                                                                               No.     2020AP1683.pdr

       ¶49     In     addition,         a        plain      reading            of     Wis.           Stat.

§§ 77.52(2)(a)10.           and 77.54(5)(a)3.               cannot be reconciled with

the    TAC's        use    of    Wis.       Stat.        § 77.51(15b)(a).                      Sections

77.52(2)(a)10.            and   77.54(5)(a)3.            are       more       specific          to    the

dispute       before      the   court       than      are    § 77.51(15b)(a)'s                  general

terms.        Therefore,        §§ 77.54(5)(a)3.             and 77.52(2)(a)10., which

are more specific in addressing sales taxes on the sales price

of aircraft services and aircraft parts, control the outcome of

Citation Partners' claim for state sales tax exemption.                                          RadLAX

Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012)

(explaining "it is a commonplace of statutory construction that

the specific governs the general.").                         Furthermore, this canon is

most        frequently      applied         to     statutes         in        which       a     general

prohibition is contradicted by a specific permission, just as we

have here.          Id.; see also Scalia, Reading Law, at 183.                                       TAC's

legal conclusion is based on its interpretation of a broad sales

tax statute and is contrary to the plain meaning of Act 185's

amendments       to    sales     taxes       owed     on     the     sales          price      for     any
aircraft       parts      and   services         that       were    granted          by       Act    185.

Accordingly, TAC's decision must be set aside.11

       ¶50     Furthermore, although the plain meaning of the words

chosen by the legislature for Act 185's enactments clearly grant

the    exemption          Citation      Partners            seeks,        I     note          that    the

Legislative Council Act Memo describes comprehensive use of Act

185's provisions:

       The majority opinion does not review TAC's decision,
       11

either as to the facts TAC found or the reasoning underlying
TAC's legal conclusion.

                                                 12
                                                               No.   2020AP1683.pdr

    2013 Wisconsin Act 185 adds a comprehensive exemption
    for aircraft parts to the list of aviation-related
    sales and use tax exemptions under existing law,
    described above.    Under the Act, sales of aircraft
    parts are exempt from sales and use tax regardless of
    how the aircraft is used.      The Act also creates a
    sales and use tax exemption for the repair and
    maintenance of any aircraft and aircraft parts.
Although legislative history is not part of a plain meaning

statutory analysis, we have used it to confirm a plain meaning

interpretation, as I do here.            Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51.

                              III.       CONCLUSION
    ¶51       I   interpret       Wis.        Stat.   §§ 77.52(2)(a)10.         and

77.54(5)(a)3.,      the    statutes      relevant     to    Citation    Partners'

claim.        The plain meaning of those statutes grants Citation

Partners the sales tax exemption it seeks.                 Because the majority

opinion chooses to follow the error-strewn path of the TAC,

which contravenes clear statutory direction to exempt the sales

price    of    aircraft   parts   and     aircraft    maintenance      from   state

sales taxes, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶52       I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE

KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this

dissent.

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    No.   2020AP1683.pdr

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