Court Opinion

ID: 9840776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 06:08:08.657979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:12.974827
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed September 14, 2023

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-01364-CV

       GEORGIA VERHALEN AND CINDY VERHALEN, Appellants
                            V.
         ADRIANA AKHTAR AND EVAN JOHNSTON, Appellees

                On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-00476

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      Georgia Verhalen and her mother Cindy Verhalen appeal the trial court’s

summary judgment awarding take-nothing judgments in favor of appellees Adriana

Akhtar and Evan Johnston on the Verhalens’ claims against them. In their sole issue

on appeal, the Verhalens argue the trial court abused its discretion by denying them

leave to file a late summary-judgment response. We affirm. Because all dispositive

issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.2(a), 47.4.
                                             BACKGROUND
         In January 2021, the Verhalens filed suit against Akhtar, asserting claims of

negligence and gross negligence for alleged actions and omissions that took place

during a trip to a resort in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico, to celebrate Akhtar’s daughter’s

birthday.1 Those joining Akhtar and her daughter on the trip included Akhtar’s adult

sister Angelina Lawton, Georgia Verhalen, Evan Johnston, and G.L., the then 15-

year-old daughter of Lawton. According to the petition, during that trip, Georgia

Verhalen was riding on a golf cart driven by then 17-year-old Johnston or G.L.

Georgia fell off of the golf cart and onto her head. Georgia was treated by

paramedics on duty at the resort and later at an emergency room “where she suffered

from concussion like symptoms, specifically confusion, nausea, loss of appetite, and

headaches.” Akthar demanded Georgia fly home “because she believed Georgia

was ruining her daughter’s birthday experience.”

         The Verhalens’ suit alleged Akhtar failed to adequately supervise the children

in her care, provided alcohol to minors who were not her children, allowed minor

children to drive golf carts in violation of the resort’s rules, allowed unsupervised

children to use the golf carts under the influence of alcohol, instructed Georgia to

travel “hours after suffering a traumatic brain injury,” and other actions and

omissions that the Verhalens allege proximately caused or made worse Georgia’s

alleged injuries and damages. They later added Johnston as a defendant for her

   1
       The following background facts are taken from the allegations in the petition.
                                                    –2–
alleged negligence related to her driving the golf cart Georgia was riding in,

including that she did so while under the influence of alcohol. The Verhalens also

added Lawton, individually and as next friend of her daughter G.L., as defendants,

but later nonsuited the claims against them with prejudice.

        On September 8, 2022, Johnston filed a no-evidence motion for summary

judgment, seeking a take-nothing judgment on all of the Verhalens’ claims against

her. Johnston filed a notice initially setting the hearing on her motion for October

5. On September 16, Akhtar filed a combined traditional and no-evidence motion

for summary judgment, also seeking a take-nothing judgment on all the Verhalens’

claims against her. Akhtar filed a notice that her motion was set for hearing on

October 13. On September 28, both Johnston and Akhtar filed amended notices that

their respective motions were going to be heard on October 12.

        On October 7, the Verhalens filed a motion for leave to file late responses to

the summary-judgment motions, acknowledging the due date of the responses of

October 5 and explaining the delay in filing the responses as due to a “calendaring

issue when the hearings were rescheduled in the case management software used by

Plaintiffs’ counsel.”2 At the October 12 hearing on the summary-judgment motions,

the trial court heard the motion for leave to file late responses and denied that motion

before hearing the parties’ arguments on the summary-judgment motions. That same

    2
     The Verhalens also requested leave from the trial court to file appendices exceeding the trial court’s
25-page limit.
                                                   –3–
day, the trial court signed an order granting Johnston’s motion for summary

judgment. On October 13, the trial court signed an order granting Akhtar’s motion.

Both orders awarded take-nothing judgments against the Verhalens.

        The Verhalens filed a motion for new trial, in which they argued the trial court

abused its discretion by denying their motion for leave to file late responses. 3 Both

Johnston and Akhtar filed motions in opposition to the motion for new trial, arguing

the Verhalens’ explanation for their delay was insufficient and that the delay would

cause them undue delay and injury. The motion for new trial was denied by

operation of law. This appeal followed.

                                             DISCUSSION
        In their sole issue on appeal, the Verhalens argue the trial court abused its

discretion by denying them leave to file late summary-judgment responses.

        We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for leave to file a late response

to motion for summary judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. Brown v.

Melissa 121/5 Partners, Ltd., No. 05-13-01189-CV, 2014 WL 3811120, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Aug. 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Carpenter v. Cimarron

    3
      Included as exhibits to the motion for new trial were affidavits from the Verhalens’ counsel, in which
she asserted that in the late evening of October 6, she attempted to file the motion for leave to file late
responses to the summary-judgment motions, along with supporting evidentiary exhibits. She also attested
that her paralegal filed and served the motion for leave and its exhibits “including the proposed responses
and summary judgment evidence.” In a separate affidavit, the paralegal attested that the morning of October
7, she received a “filing returned” efiling notification and “learned that only the Motion for Leave was
necessary, and that the Responses should not be submitted until such time as the Motion for Leave was
granted.”
                                                   –4–
Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686–87 (Tex. 2002)). The trial court abuses

its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.

      In a summary-judgment proceeding, the nonmoving party may file and serve

opposing affidavits or other written responses no later than seven days prior to the

scheduled date of the hearing. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). The nonmoving party must

obtain leave to file evidence after the deadline. Id. A motion for leave to file a late

summary-judgment response should be granted when the nonmovant establishes

good cause by showing that the failure to timely respond (1) was not intentional or

the result of conscious indifference but the result of accident or mistake and (2)

allowing the late response will not cause any undue delay or otherwise injure the

party seeking summary judgment.         Brown, 2014 WL 3811120, at *1 (citing

Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686).

      The Verhalens argue they established the first element of good cause by

explaining—with a supporting affidavit from their counsel—that the delay in

responding was not out of conscious indifference, but rather the result of a mistake

in calendaring. In her supporting affidavit, the counsel stated, “Due to an inadvertent

calendaring error, the deadline for Plaintiffs to respond to the Motions for Summary

Judgment filed by Defendants Adriana Akhtar and Evan Johnston did not appear on

the firm’s company calendar. . . . As soon as this oversight became known, I

immediately prepared the responses as well as a Motion for leave of the Court to file

late responses . . . .” At the hearing, counsel stated that when the summary-judgment

                                         –5–
hearings were rescheduled from October 5 and 13 to October 12, “unfortunately our

calendaring system did not pick that up, and it was a mere mistake on [our] part.”

      In Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., the supreme court addressed

whether a party had established good cause for failing to timely respond to a

summary-judgment motion when the counsel only argued at the hearing on the

motion that he had not timely responded “because of a calendaring error.” See 98

S.W.3d at 688.      The Verhalens argue that this case is distinguishable from

Carpentar, noting that in that case counsel “offered no explanation of the error from

which the trial court might determine that an accident or mistake had occurred.” See

id. They also argue that the supreme court later held in the context of whether a trial

court erred by denying a motion to set aside a default judgment that “conscious

indifference amounts to more than mere negligence.” See Levine v. Shackelford,

Melton & McKinley, L.L.P., 248 S.W.3d 166, 169 (Tex. 2008). The Verhalens also

rely on decisions from this Court in which we held that “even a slight excuse will

suffice” to satisfy “good cause” in the context of reviewing trial court’s rulings on

setting aside deemed admissions. See Spiecker v. Petroff, 971 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1997, no pet.); Emps. Ins. of Wausau v. Halton, 792 S.W.2d 462, 466

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied); see also Torres v. Lee, No. 05-18-00631-

CV, 2020 WL 38832, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

And, as previously held by the supreme court, the standards for withdrawing deemed

admissions and for allowing a late summary-judgment response are the same. See

                                         –6–
Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Carpenter,

98 S.W.3d at 687–88).

      We agree that the “slight excuse” standard applies, but the excuse offered here

is only that the deadline to file responses did not appear in counsel’s calendar.

Therefore, trial court could not conclude from that explanation that failure to prepare

responses was an accident or mistake. See, e.g., Se. Tex. Env’l, L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., No. 01-10-00076-CV, 2011 WL 3556966, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Southeast Texas Environmental’s

explanation for its failure to attach evidence to its original response is that a

calendaring error occurred and that the mistake was not the result of conscious

indifference, but it did not offer specific facts in support of this general assertion.”);

see also Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 688. For example, nothing in the affidavit

indicated that the hearings themselves did not appear in the counsel’s calendar such

that counsel would be aware that responses would be due the week prior. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see also Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 444 (noting that application of

rule 166a “turns on an actor’s state of mind” and that “application may require a

different result when the actor is not a lawyer,” thus indicating “what any lawyer

would [know]” is relevant to determining whether a litigant established “good

cause” for failure to respond to deemed admissions). Thus, the Verhalens’ failed to

establish even a slight excuse to explain their delay in filing responses.

                                          –7–
      Even assuming the foregoing were sufficient to establish a slight excuse, as

part of the “good cause” requirement, the Verhalens were required to show the late

response would not cause any undue delay or otherwise injure Akhtar and Johnston.

In their sworn motion for leave, the Verhalens argued that (1) “the Court still has

adequate time to review the evidence presented prior to the hearings on October 12”;

(2) “the filing of Plaintiffs’ responses will not change the date of the hearings”; and

(3) “the evidence presented has long since been produced in discovery—much of it

produced by Defendants—or is based on sworn testimony in depositions which were

attended by Defense counsel.”

      While the Verhalens’ October 7 motion for leave was filed several days before

the summary judgments were set to be heard on October 12, the Verhalens did not

request any continuance until the date of the hearing, at which point only an oral

request to continue was made. “The law is well settled that a motion for continuance

must be in writing, state the specific facts supporting the motion, and be verified or

supported by affidavit.” See In re A.A., No. 05-07-01698-CV, 2008 WL 2514346,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P.

251; Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986); Serrano v. Ryan’s

Crossing Apartments, 241 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.); In

re E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)).

Further, although the motion for leave to file late responses also requested leave to

file appendices greater than 25 pages long, the motion contained no attached

                                         –8–
responses or evidence.4 Cf. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443 (no undue prejudice where

responses were received by opposing counsel two days late but six months before

summary-judgment motion heard). Therefore, the trial judge could have concluded

that the hearing on the motions for summary judgment would have been the first

opportunity for Akhtar and Johnston to review the responses and to know what

evidence already produced in discovery that the Verhalens relied upon to support

their responses.

        Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying the Verhalens’ motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment

response. We overrule their sole issue.

                                             CONCLUSION
        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        /Nancy E. Kennedy/
221364f.p05                                             NANCY KENNEDY
                                                        JUSTICE

    4
      The Verhalens assert that their counsel served the responses with supporting evidence on opposing
counsel six days prior to the hearing. To support this assertion, they rely on the affidavits of their counsel
and paralegal filed in support of their motion for new trial. However, those affidavits were not included in
support of the motion for leave to file late responses, and the Verhalens do not appeal the trial court’s
decision to deny their motion for new trial.
                                                    –9–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

GEORGIA VERHALEN AND                           On Appeal from the 14th Judicial
CINDY VERHALEN, Appellants                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-00476.
No. 05-22-01364-CV           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                               Kennedy. Justices Carlyle and Smith
ADRIANA AKHTAR AND EVAN                        participating.
JOHNSTON, Appellees

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

    It is ORDERED that appellees ADRIANA AKHTAR AND EVAN
JOHNSTON recover their costs of this appeal from appellants GEORGIA
VERHALEN AND CINDY VERHALEN.

Judgment entered this 14th day of September 2023.

                                        –10–