Court Opinion

ID: 9955112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 18:02:30.63943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.364762
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/24 P. v. Camper CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B325430

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. TA154235)
         v.

JERRY LOUIS CAMPER,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.

      Paul Kleven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Michael C. Keller,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Jerry Louis Camper (defendant)
appeals from his second degree murder conviction. He contends
the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution
to elicit the underlying facts of a prior conviction, which was
admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision
(b).1 Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment.

                         BACKGROUND
      Defendant was charged with murder in violation of Penal
Code section 187, subdivision (a), with the allegation that in the
commission of the crime he personally used a firearm. The
information further alleged defendant had previously been
convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of
Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(j), and 1170.12.
      A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and
found true the allegation he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense. After defendant waived a jury trial on
the prior conviction allegation, the trial court found the allegation
true, but struck it pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. On October 13, 2022, the trial court
sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life in prison for the
murder, with a consecutive term of 10 years for the firearm
enhancement.
      Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment.

1    All further unattributed code sections are to the Evidence
Code unless otherwise stated.

                                 2
Prosecution evidence
       On April 10, 2021, police responded to a shooting report at
Nickerson Gardens and found Delin Austin lying in an alcove
between units, bleeding from a head wound. Austin sustained a
total of six gunshot wounds including four fatal wounds to the
head. Stippling found near Austin’s eyes established the gun was
less than three feet away from Austin’s head when it was fired.
       Four shell casings and video footage from multiple
surveillance cameras located in the area were recovered at the
scene. The surveillance video was shown to the jury and the
action was described by Detective Manuel Armenta. The video
recorded shortly after 10:00 p.m. showed Austin in the covered
alcove in conversation with a man later identified as defendant.
Austin’s legs are seen hanging out of the alcove before he drops to
the ground. Defendant takes two steps back, then two steps
forward into the alcove, picks up something from the ground and
walks away as Austin’s body shakes violently before going limp.
The recovered shell casings were found in or near the alcove.
       Investigators obtained cellular subscriber information that
showed defendant’s cell phone was in the vicinity of the shooting
when it occurred. The phone was located on a freeway shoulder
near the City of Upland two days later.
Defendant’s testimony
       In his testimony defendant admitted he was the person in
the video on April 10, 2021, who shot Austin in the alcove, but
claimed he did not know how many shots were fired as he did not
remember firing the gun or even the kind of gun. Defendant
remembered, however, the events leading up to the shooting,
except a fist fight with Austin that seems to be shown on the
surveillance video. Defendant remembered he feared for his life.

                                 3
        Defendant also testified he had known Austin since they
were teenagers, nearly 30 years, and they were good friends until
2018 when defendant’s pit bull broke loose and attacked Austin.
The dog pulled out some of Austin’s hair and caused him to cut
his arm, which required stitches. Defendant claimed Austin
would often verbally and physically abuse the dog.
        Thereafter Austin repeatedly brought up the 2018 incident
and asked defendant to get rid of the dog. Defendant refused.
Defendant described an occasion in March 2021 when Austin
aggressively told defendant he would get rid of the dog if
defendant did not, and if defendant had a problem with that
Austin would get rid of defendant. Defendant interpreted this as
Austin expressing a willingness to kill both defendant and the
dog.
        A few days later defendant was talking to mutual friends at
a gas station, with his dog in the back seat, when Austin
approached defendant’s car. The dog barked “crazy” and tried to
get to Austin through the window. Austin jumped back and said,
“You better get that mother fucker before I shoot him.”
Defendant did not feel “directly” threatened at that time.
        About 6:00 p.m. on the night of the shooting, defendant
went to a friend’s house to drink and smoke, unaccompanied by
his dog. Austin was there with a few other friends. Austin
seemed cordial and did not mention the dog. Defendant saw
Austin approach the driver of a car that pulled up. He then saw
Austin take a gun from the driver and put it in his car. The
smoking and drinking continued until defendant left to attend a
vigil for a deceased friend. Later, after Austin arrived at the
vigil, the two men talked for some time without issues or
problems, and even shared a drink from the same bottle.

                                4
      About 10:00 p.m., when defendant attempted to retrieve his
bottle, Austin’s attitude changed. Austin told defendant to take
the bottle, that he was “crying like a little bitch.” Later, Austin
made a comment about defendant’s dog, and the two men argued.
Austin became aggressive and hostile, saying, “I don’t know who
you think you are. You think you’re tough. You know who I am.”
Austin told defendant he would “fuck” him up.
      They were near the alcove around 10:00 p.m. when
defendant heard Austin say, “I don’t give a fuck. I do blood right
now.” Defendant thought this meant Austin intended to kill him.
Defendant took two steps forward and got on the porch close
enough to touch Austin in order to prevent him from taking
defendant from behind. Defendant felt it was either fight or flee,
and he was not going to expose his back. Defendant was
concerned as there were gang members in the area, and both he
and Austin were associated with the Bounty Hunter Blood gang.
Defendant explained he feared for his life based on the
arguments and Austin’s comments about defendant’s dog, and
because he considered Austin a violent person, having seen him
in the past beat up people. Though defendant had previously
seen Austin with firearms multiple times, defendant testified he
had no idea whether Austin had a gun in the alcove.
      Defendant claimed not to remember firing the gun,
shooting Austin or throwing away his phone. He said he
“blanked out.” Defendant acknowledged, however, the video
showed Austin on the ground not presenting an actual threat at
the time some of the shots could have been fired. Defendant
further acknowledged the video showed him pick up something
from the ground before walking away from Austin.

                                5
       Defendant recounted events in his life that he thought
could have affected his mental state. Specifically, he grew up in a
household where his mother shot his father, who had abused both
him and his mother, mentally and physically, and having seen
gang violence, such as shootings, and beatings while living at
Nickerson Gardens.
       Defendant was arrested two days after the shooting in the
City of Adelanto. Defendant claimed he left Los Angeles because
he was afraid of retaliation after having been threatened by other
gang members on social media. Defendant claimed no
recollection of having thrown his cell phone away on the freeway
after the shooting, though later in his testimony he acknowledged
he had previously told police he had thrown the phone out the
window. Defendant said he threw the gun away because he was
angry that someone had shot up his grandmother’s house after
the shooting. Also, he received a threatening video from a fellow
gang member, saying defendant had killed someone who was
willing to do anything for “the set” and that Austin had
previously murdered people.2
       Clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Rahn Minagawa
testified that, based on defendant’s description of his multiple
exposures to trauma, defendant’s exposure to trauma was quite
severe, beginning in childhood and involving his family and the
neighborhood where he grew up. In psychological testing,
defendant scored high (90th percentile) for symptoms associated
with posttraumatic stress disorder, indicating defendant’s
exposure to trauma was extreme.

2     It does not appear the video was offered or entered into
evidence.

                                6
       Dr. Minagawa explained that exposure to violence and
physical abuse can cause physiological changes in the brain,
making the person hypervigilant and hypersensitive to threats in
order to survive, much like soldiers who have served in combat.
He explained automatic behavioral reactions can vary among
such individuals who perceive themselves to be in a life
threatening situation. Reactions may be quicker and may
include, for example, freezing, fighting, or fleeing, depending
upon a past exposure to multiple traumas over time. He added it
is not uncommon for people who experience a traumatic event to
be unable to recall certain aspects of the event. Although
Dr. Minagawa thought defendant was being truthful and some of
his test questions were designed to detect malingering, he could
not rule out the possibility defendant was lying about how much
he remembered of the shooting.

                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of his 2006 felony conviction without
sanitizing it, that is, without naming the felony or revealing the
underlying facts of the offense.
       A trial court’s “discretion must not be disturbed on appeal
except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Jordan (1986) 42
Cal.3d 308, 316.) It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate the
trial court’s decision was irrational, arbitrary, or not “‘grounded
in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies
appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’” (People v.
Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)

                                 7
      When the prosecution rested its case, defense counsel
requested a section 402 hearing regarding defendant’s prior
convictions the prosecution intended to use for impeachment
should defendant testify. The prosecution identified defendant’s
2015 felony conviction for violation of Vehicle Code section 10851
and his 2006 conviction for assault with a firearm pursuant to
Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(2). A motion to exclude
the 2006 conviction as remote was made by defendant. The trial
court declined, noting defendant spent time in custody following a
2012 misdemeanor, between the two identified felonies. In 2009
defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana for sale (for
which he served 44 months in prison), and for the 2015 Vehicle
Code section 10851 conviction he served 32 months in prison.
      Defense counsel then asked that the two felony convictions
be sanitized and argued that otherwise the conviction of assault
with a firearm would be more prejudicial then probative under
section 352. The court ruled it would be sanitized for the time
being, and the prosecution could request another section 402
hearing after defendant’s testimony, when the court would better
know the defense. On direct examination defendant admitted he
had been convicted of a felony in 2006 and another in 2015.
      After another section 402 hearing, the trial court ruled the
prosecutor could ask defendant about the 2016 conviction,
including the facts of the case, based upon section 1103,
subdivision (b).3 Section 1103, subdivision (b) provides that once

3     Section 1103, subdivision (b) reads: “In a criminal action,
evidence of the defendant’s character for violence or trait of
character for violence (in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) is not

                                 8
defendant offers evidence to show that the victim was a violent
person, thus “inviting the jury to infer that the victim acted
violently during the events in question, then the prosecution is
permitted to introduce evidence demonstrating that . . .
defendant was a violent person, from which the jury might infer
it was the defendant who acted violently.” (People v. Fuiava
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 696 (Fuiava).) The trial court noted
defendant had attacked the character of the victim, testifying he
had known the victim for many years, that the victim was a gang
member, known to be violent, to fight, and to carry guns.4
      In the ensuing cross-examination the prosecutor asked
three questions, eliciting defendant’s admission that in March

made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is offered by
the prosecution to prove conduct of the defendant in conformity
with the character or trait of character and is offered after
evidence that the victim had a character for violence or a trait of
character tending to show violence has been adduced by the
defendant under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).”
      Section 1101, subdivision (a), which provides that with
exceptions “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her
character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct)
is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.”
4     The trial court also overruled defendant’s objection based
upon section 352, which provides, “[t]he court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.”

                                 9
2005, he fired six bullets at Deshon Jones, one of which struck
him in the thigh, for which defendant was convicted of a felony.
       Defendant’s claim is the trial court abused its discretion
because his prior conviction was too remote for the underlying
facts to have any probative value, as there were 16 years between
the commission of the 2005 crime and the current crime with no
evidence of an intervening violent crime.
       In support of that argument, defendant quotes a passage in
People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 447: “As
Wigmore astutely observed, the time of character evidence ‘. . . as
a question of Relevancy, is simple enough . . . . Character at an
earlier or later time than that of the deed in question is relevant
only on the assumption that it was substantially unchanged in
the meantime, i.e. the offer is really of character at one period to
prove character at another, and the real question is of relevancy
of this evidence to prove character, not of the character to prove
the act.’” Defendant then relies on People v. Gonzales (1967) 66
Cal.2d 482, a third party reputation case. There, the defense
proffered the testimony of the former probation officer of an
injured companion of the murder victim to the effect the
companion had a reputation for violence seven years earlier. The
court ruled the reputation of one other than the murder victim
seven years earlier was too remote to have present probative
value. (Id. at p. 500; accord, People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1055, 1070 [“evidence of a third party’s reputation for violence
may be particularly susceptible to exclusion”]; see Fuiava, supra,
53 Cal.4th at p. 665.) Neither of these authorities supports
defendant’s arguments under the facts of this case.
       The People rely on People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230,
1245, in which the California Supreme Court acknowledged

                                10
evidence of other crimes is inherently prejudicial and held that
when (as here) there is no rule or policy requiring exclusion of the
evidence, exclusion due to remoteness is a matter of discretion,
and the trial court should weigh its probative value against any
prejudicial effect. In Steele, the court found that, although 17
years had passed between a prior crime and the charged crime,
exclusion was not compelled and prejudice was attenuated, given
their similarities, the fact that defendant was convicted of the
earlier crime, and considering defendant had little or no
opportunity to commit a similar crime because he was
incarcerated a substantial part of the intervening time. (Ibid.)
Here, similar factors demonstrate probative value and attenuated
prejudice. Defendant shot at the victims six times in both the
2005 assault with a firearm case and the current case, and he
was convicted in the 2005 case and incarcerated for several years
after that conviction. Defendant served three prison terms after
that: 44 months for a 2009 felony conviction, 180 days for the
2012 misdemeanor and 32 months for 2015 felony conviction.
Thus during the 16 years between the crime in 2005 and the
current crime, defendant was incarcerated about half that time,
with less opportunity to commit a similar crime. We thus reject
defendant’s claim of remoteness based on the 16-year period with
no intervening violent crime. We also reject defendant’s claim
the prior conviction was irrelevant or had no probative value.
       Relevant evidence is to be excluded only when its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability of undue
prejudice. (§ 352.) Defendant argues the evidence here was
unduly prejudicial due the similarity between his prior and
current crimes. We disagree, as this is one of the factors
mentioned in People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 1245, and

                                11
when considered with the other enumerated factors reduces the
probability of prejudice.
       Moreover, defendant’s undue prejudice argument appears
primarily to be that it was unnecessary to admit the evidence as
impeachment under section 788 or section 1103, subdivision (b)
without it being sanitized. Citing People v. Beagle (1972) 6
Cal.3d 441, 453, defendant argues that given the number of years
with no intervening violent crime, the prior conviction should
have been sanitized to prevent giving defendant a “false aura” of
nonviolence. Rather, the California Supreme Court
recommended courts sparingly admit identical prior crimes for
impeachment, but cautioned that it did “not propose to encourage
or countenance a form of blackmail by defendants. No witness
including a defendant who elects to testify in his own behalf is
entitled to a false aura of veracity.” (Ibid., abrogated on a
different point in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.)
       “‘“[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or
damaging to the defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, the
more it is ‘prejudicial.’”’” (People v. Walker (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 782, 806.) In the context of section 352, evidence is
not unduly prejudicial “‘“merely because it undermines the
opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent. The
ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant. . . .
‘[P]rejudicial’ is not synonymous with ‘damaging.’”’” (People v.
Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 490-491, citations omitted.)
Considering all the circumstances here, the evidence of
defendant’s prior conviction of assault with a firearm was
prejudicial only in the sense it gave the jury an accurate view of
the dynamics between Austin and defendant. Section 1103,

                                 12
subdivision (b) very clearly allows evidence of defendant’s prior
conviction under the circumstances presented here.
       We conclude the trial court carefully considered the
circumstances and appropriately weighed the probative value of
the evidence against its probable prejudice. Defendant has failed
to meet his burden to demonstrate the trial court’s decision was
irrational, arbitrary, or not “‘grounded in reasoned judgment and
guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the
particular matter at issue.’” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez),
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977.)
       Defendant has failed to show an abuse of discretion, and
assuming he had, he has not demonstrated that admission of the
evidence resulted in a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People
v. Jordan, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 316.) Defendant argues he has
satisfied the test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have
obtained a better result absent the unsanitized evidence.
Defendant asserts the prosecutor would not have been able to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-
defense or honestly believe in the need to do so, because the
prosecutor would not have been able to tell the jury during
closing argument that defendant had “shot at a person six times,
and that person was hit in the thigh or the leg and had to go to
the emergency room”; or remind the jury that “[t]he only person
that has been proven with a conviction for shooting at someone is
the defendant.”
       In addition, defendant recaps his testimony and the
testimony of Dr. Minagawa suggesting that if a single juror had
believed defendant’s testimony and had given more weight to
Dr. Minagawa’s opinion, he would have achieved a better result.

                                13
In essence, defendant argues that if he had been accorded a “false
aura” of nonviolence, a juror might have believed his testimony
and that he had spoken truthfully to Dr. Minagawa.
       Defendant was convicted of second degree implied malice
murder. To do so the jury must find that defendant deliberately
performed an act, the natural consequences of which were
dangerous to life, that he knew his conduct endangered the life of
an another and acted with conscious disregard for that life.
(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.)
       The jury here was instructed with the elements of implied
malice and that the required mental state may be proven with
circumstantial evidence, so long as the jury drew only reasonable
inferences from the facts. “‘It is settled that the necessary
element of malice may be inferred from the circumstances of the
homicide . . . .’” (People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 349.)
Defendant claimed to have no memory of shooting Austin, fleeing
the scene, or discarding his phone, because he “blanked out.”
Despite that, we find the circumstantial evidence of defendant’s
state of mind compelling.
       The surveillance video shows that about 10:00 p.m.
defendant and Austin engaged in a verbal and perhaps a physical
altercation. Defendant remembered hearing Austin tell someone,
“I don’t give a fuck. I do blood right now,” and that he feared for
his life. Defendant remembered stepping into the alcove,
although he claimed he did it as a defensive measure. The
surveillance video shows defendant stepping into the alcove
about 10:10 p.m., and then about one minute later Austin’s legs
are seen hanging out of the alcove and he drops to the ground.
The video then shows defendant taking two steps back, then two
steps forward into the alcove and picking up something before

                                14
walking away as Austin’s body shook violently before going limp.
The shell casings found at the scene were in or near the alcove.
       Defendant shot Austin six times and several of the shots
were fired while Austin was on the ground, presenting no threat
to defendant. The medical examiner testified that Austin
sustained four fatal wounds to the head from a gun that was less
than three feet away from his body. Firing multiple gunshots at
close range provides circumstantial evidence of an intent to kill
(People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 637) or at least conscious
disregard for human life (People v. Dixon (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
1547, 1557-1558). Defendant then fled to another city, getting rid
of evidence by throwing his phone to the side of a freeway. From
these facts the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was
conscious of his guilt. (See People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542,
596.)
       Considering all these circumstances we discern no
reasonable probability that defendant would have achieved a
more favorable result if his prior conviction had been sanitized.
       Defendant’s final contention is that the admission of
evidence of the facts underlying his conviction of assault with a
firearm resulted in a miscarriage of justice so highly prejudicial
that it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, depriving him of
due process. We need not address this contention as defendant
has not demonstrated a miscarriage of justice. Defendant
acknowledges this court is bound by the California Supreme
Court holding in Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th 622,5 and has raised
the issue solely to preserve it for review.

5    The California Supreme Court held that the section 1101,
subdivision (b) and section 1103, subdivision (b) are not

                                15
                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                    ___________________________
                                    CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

_______________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

fundamentally unfair, and the use of propensity evidence to prove
a defendant’s conduct after the defendant has elicited evidence of
the victim’s violent propensity does not offend the Constitution.
(Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 696-700.) Defendant also
acknowledges that United States Supreme Court has not decided
whether the admission of propensity evidence violates due
process or equal protection.

                               16