Court Opinion

ID: 9479878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:31:26.08426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:20.306250
License: Public Domain

ALTIMARI, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s well-reasoned opinion as it relates to defendant Thomas. However, I respectfully dissent from the opinion as it relates to defendant MacDonald.
At the conclusion of a hearing, the district court denied MacDonald’s motion to suppress certain items of physical evidence, including large quantities of drugs, several loaded firearms, stacks of money and assorted drug paraphernalia, seized from a one-room efficiency apartment in Manhattan used by MacDonald and his associates as a narcotics exchange. The district court found that exigent circumstances justified an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirement. I agree. See United States v. Zabare, 871 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 316, 102 L.Ed.2d 335 (1988). In order to find that an exception is justified/the district court must determine that the law enforcement agents had probable cause to enter the apartment and a reasonable belief that exigent circumstances existed. United States v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1008 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1695, 68 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981).
The plain facts of this case fully support the district court’s findings. As the proof proffered at the hearing demonstrated, the law enforcement agents had probable cause to believe that the defendants had committed a narcotics trafficking offense and that contraband would be found in the apartment. Both the observations made by the surveillance officers immediately prior to the undercover purchase and those made by Agent Agee while he was inside the apartment gave rise to the law enforcement agents’ belief. The majority’s apparent position that the agents could easily have obtained a search warrant implies that probable cause existed. In any event, the defendant does not argue a lack of probable cause, and the issue seems to me to be beyond dispute.
*492The real issue here is whether the district court erred when it determined that exigent circumstances justified the war-rantless entry. We have held that “[t]he determination of exigent circumstances turns upon whether in light of all the facts of a particular case ... an ‘urgent need’ ” sanctioned the warrantless entry. United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391 (D.C.Cir.1970) (en banc)). On numerous occasions, we have pointed to a list of “various factors that may be used to determine whether ‘exigent circumstances’ are present.” United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 283, 58 L.Ed.2d 259 (1978) (quoting Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392-93); see also, Cattouse, 846 F.2d at 146; United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1471, 99 L.Ed.2d 700 (1988); Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 100; United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir.1978). Although the majority opinion acknowledges the factors, it concludes that “the district court’s finding that the agents ‘had urgent need to make a warrantless entry in order to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence as well as to prevent the flight of the suspects’ is clearly erroneous.” In so doing, the majority conclusion puts an entirely new gloss on the exigent circumstances exception.
Consistent with the well-settled law of this circuit, the district court properly assessed the several illustrative factors in light of all the facts of the case. The district court first pointed to the gravity of the offenses involved and concluded that the “[pjresence of the narcotics and the weapons under the circumstances suggested that the defendants were engaged in ongoing criminal activities and were in a position to use the weapons thereby creating an emergency situation justifying immediate entry.” When Agent Agee entered the apartment, he was confronted by Paul Thomas who held a cocked nine millimeter pistol four feet from his head. One of four other men in the apartment, Errol MacDonald, was counting a large stack of money with a loaded .357 magnum revolver next to him. Agee observed large quantities of cocaine and marijuana packaged and ready for sale. He smelled marijuana in the smoke-filled room as he purchased five dollars worth of marijuana with a pre-re-corded bill. The highly volatile mix of loaded weapons and drug abuse created an emergency situation that could explode at any moment. It was ten o’clock at night, and would have taken a minimum of two or three hours to obtain the warrant. Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents “certainly could not assure stability while they sought a warrant.” Cattouse, at 148. Indeed, “the greater the delay in arresting [the suspects], the greater the danger to the arresting agents and the community.” Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 101; accord United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Farra, 725 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir.1984); Campbell, 581 F.2d at 26. On the basis of these particular facts, I fail to comprehend how the district court’s finding that an urgent need justified the warrantless entry was clearly erroneous.
Moreover, the district court found that the law enforcement agents had an urgent need to make a warrantless entry to prevent the loss of evidence. The agents had been informed that the suspects controlled at least one other apartment in the building. Given the ease with which the suspects could have moved the contraband from one apartment to another, the agents had reason to secure the apartment in question immediately. The district court also noted that the suspects would have had no difficulty disposing of the cocaine by flushing it down the toilet. The district court reasoned that obtaining a warrant at ten o’clock in the evening “would have taken a matter of hours, thereby increasing the risk that evidence would be lost or destroyed.” Once the agents had knocked on the door and identified themselves, any delay in entering would have rendered the risk of evidence destruction all but definite. See Farra, 725 F.2d at 199; Martinez-*493Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 101; Gomez, 633 F.2d at 1006.
In addition, the district court found that the law enforcement agents “had an urgent need to make a warrantless entry in order to prevent ... the flight of the suspects.” Requiring the agents to wait several hours while a warrant was obtained would have allowed the possibility that the suspects might escape them. After knocking at the apartment door and identifying themselves, the agents heard sounds of fast movement from inside. At that moment, they were notified by radio from other agents waiting in the street that the suspects were attempting to escape through the apartment windows. Upon receiving this transmission, the agents used a battering ram and forcibly entered the apartment. Once the agents had announced themselves in good faith, the fleeing defendants presented them with all the more urgent need to enter the apartment without a warrant. As the actual attempted flight of the suspects demonstrates, any delay by law enforcement agents after knocking may well have rendered the escape successful. Cf. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 391 (hot pursuit illustrates the kind of exigent circumstances that justifies a war-rantless entry); Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 102 (same).
In light of all the facts of this case, I am compelled to disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s determination of exigent circumstances was clearly erroneous. See Zabare, 871 F.2d at 290 (finding of exigent circumstances must be made in examination of the “totality of the circumstances”).
The majority, however, believes that the law enforcement agents impermissibly manufactured the exigent circumstances by knocking on the apartment door and announcing themselves. We have previously reasoned that agents did not intentionally design exigent circumstances by using (1) an all-white surveillance team in a predominantly black neighborhood, and thus exposing the agents to a great risk of detection, Cattouse, 846 F.2d at 147, 148; (2) marked buy money in a controlled drug deal, and thus compelling the agents to act immediately lest the money be dissipated, Id.; (3) counterfeit tickets marked void, and thus endangering the lives of agents and occasioning the possibility of destruction of the evidence when the suspect unwrapped the package and discovered the markings, Zabare, 871 F.2d at 290. It follows that agents here did not create exigent circumstances simply as a pretext to violate the fourth amendment.
The majority observes that the agents arrived at the apartment with a battering ram and their guns drawn, and on this basis suggests that the agents acted in bad faith. The agents had every reason for expeditiously defusing the ongoing illegal sale of narcotics in a potentially explosive situation. If they had not done so, they would have been derelict in their duty. Although law enforcement agents are required to be innocent, they are not required to be naive.
Today’s majority decision reflects dissatisfaction with the exigent circumstance exception itself rather than its correct application to the facts of this case. For the reasons given above, I would affirm the convictions of both appellants Thomas and MacDonald.