Court Opinion

ID: 9598761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:11:36.443351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:25.398351
License: Public Domain

SLOAN, J.,
specially concurring.
The reasons expressed by the majority for distinguishing this case from our decision in State ex rel. O’Hara v. Appling, 1959, 215 Or 303, 334 P2d 482, are not compatible with my understanding of the decision in that case nor with my reasons for concurring with it. The majority say that the rule of implied resignation or withdrawal cannot “be applied to the present case without coming in conflict with our primary election law.” The implied resignation permitted in O’Hara v. Appling, supra, was in equal conflict with the laws involved in that ease.
The constitutional and statutory limitations and compulsions regarding a person who withdraws from *395the office of Secretary of State and assumes “any [other] office of trust * * *” (Article II, Section 10, Oregon Constitution) are equally, if not more, mandatory than the statutes considered in this case. The decisive reason why this court in O’Hara v. Appling, supra, along with other courts in similar cases, did not require enforcement of the requirements there involved was to accommodate the overriding policy of certainty and continuity of office. It was said that this rule of certainty was “indispensable for the protection of the public.” 215 Or at 310.
If, however, the doctrine of implied resignation were expanded to include implied withdrawal of a candidacy the obvious direct result would be uncertainty and confusion to all of the many persons and officials involved. This would entail detriment rather than benefit to the people that the law is intended to protect.
This difference in the compelling public policies is the only basis upon which I can distinguish this case from O’Hara v. Appling, supra. With that exception, I concur in the opinion.