Court Opinion

ID: 9893532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 16:09:28.155258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:25.496023
License: Public Domain

J-S15040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES ROBERT SCHOLL                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1328 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001683-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                    FILED: OCTOBER 27, 2023

       James Robert Scholl (“Scholl”) appeals from the order dismissing his

petition seeking relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”) as

an untimely second petition. Scholl’s counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a petition

to withdraw from representation and a no-merit letter brief pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).           We affirm, grant

Counsel’s petition to withdraw and deny Scholl’s application for substitution of

counsel.

       This Court previously summarized the procedures leading to this appeal

as follows:

             In March 2014, a jury found Scholl guilty of three counts
       each of aggravated assault (attempt to cause serious bodily
       injury), aggravated assault (attempt to put official in fear of
____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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       serious bodily injury), terroristic threats, simple assault, . . .
       recklessly endangering another person, and one count each of
       resisting arrest and possession of firearm prohibited. The trial
       court found him guilty of harassment. The convictions stemmed
       from an incident in which Scholl pointed a gun at three police
       officers who had gone to his home in response to a report of a
       domestic disturbance. The officers had to wrestle with Scholl to
       disarm him. Scholl testified at trial, and his counsel called Scholl’s
       girlfriend as a trial witness, but [trial] counsel did not call any
       character witnesses.

             On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but
       remanded for re-sentencing because the trial court had
       improperly imposed a mandatory minimum sentence, and the
       Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in February 2016. The
       trial court re-sentenced Scholl to 16 to 32 years [of]
       imprisonment, on March 16, 2016.

              That same month, Scholl filed a pro se [first] PCRA petition.
       The court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition
       asserting that Scholl’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
       call character witnesses.

Commonwealth v. Scholl, 251 A.3d 1208, 2021 WL 798891 (Pa. Super.

2021) (unpublished memorandum at *1) (some capitalization and footnotes

omitted), appeal denied, 263 A.3d 1137 (Pa. 2021). The PCRA court denied

Scholl’s first PCRA petition following an evidentiary hearing. After additional

proceedings not relevant to this appeal, this Court affirmed the order denying

Scholl’s first PCRA petition, see id. (unpublished memorandum at *3), and

our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in September 2021.

       In November 2021, Scholl filed the instant, second PCRA petition pro se.

The PCRA court appointed Counsel,2 who filed an amended PCRA petition
____________________________________________

2 The PCRA court did not state its basis for appointing counsel for Scholl's
second PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(D), (E) and Comment (noting
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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asserting several constitutional violations, including a claim that trial counsel

had argued in favor of his conviction during closing arguments, and a possible

suppression issue. Counsel did not address the timeliness of Scholl’s second

PCRA petition. The Commonwealth answered and argued that the petition

was facially untimely, did not state a timeliness exception, and, in any event,

raised previously litigated claims. The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition as untimely.         Counsel did not

respond.    The PCRA court dismissed Scholl’s second petition on August 9,

2022, and Scholl timely appealed.              The PCRA court ordered a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement, and Counsel timely filed a statement of her intent to file

a Turner/Finley letter brief in the appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).

       Counsel filed in this Court a petition to withdraw from representation

and a Turner/Finley letter brief concluding that Scholl’s second PCRA petition

was time-barred.         This Court determined Counsel minimally met the

procedural requirements to seek withdrawal but directed Counsel to file a

corrected petition to withdraw, advise Scholl of his appellate rights, and

provide him a copy of her Turner/Finley letter brief. Commonwealth v.

Scholl, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 5014628 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished
____________________________________________

that Rule 904 “limits appointment of counsel on second or subsequent
petitions so that counsel should be appointed only if the judge determines
that an evidentiary hearing is required” or if the interests of justice require
the appointment of counsel (emphasis in original)). However, once appointed,
counsel has an obligation to represent her client through an appeal or seek
leave of the court to withdraw, even when the case involves a second PCRA
petition. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 965 A.2d 280, 284 (Pa. Super.
2009); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(F)(2).

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memorandum at *3). Following additional orders from this Court, Counsel

has complied. Scholl has filed a pro se response indicating that his underlying

PCRA claims have merit and requesting the appointment of new counsel. See

Answer to Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 9/5/23, at 1.3

       As discussed in our previous memorandum, Counsel’s filings satisfy the

technical requirements to withdraw as PCRA counsel. See Commonwealth

v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 510 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that “[p]rior to

addressing the merits of the appeal, we must review counsel’s compliance

with the procedural requirements for withdrawing as counsel”).          Counsel

seeking to withdraw from PCRA representation must:

       (1) detail the nature and extent of counsel’s review of the case;
       (2) list each issue the petitioner wishes to have reviewed; and (3)
       explain counsel’s reasoning for concluding that the petitioner's
       issues are meritless. Counsel must also send a copy of the
       brief to the petitioner, along with a copy of the petition to
       withdraw, and inform the petitioner of the right to proceed
       pro se or to retain new counsel. If the brief meets these
       requirements, we then conduct an independent review of the
       petitioner’s issues.

Commonwealth v. Knecht, 219 A.3d 689, 691 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal

citations omitted) (emphasis added).

       Counsel has minimally complied with the first three procedural

obligations for seeking withdrawal. With respect to the first Turner/Finley

requirement that Counsel detail her review of the case, Counsel states she
____________________________________________

3 Scholl has also filed a document that this Court docketed as an application

for substitution of appointed counsel. Scholl, in relevant part, requests a
prompt decision if this Court is unwilling to appoint another attorney to
represent him. See Scholl’s Application, 10/16/23, at 1.

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“reviewed the record” and, “[a]fter careful review of the claims[,]” concluded

that Scholl’s PCRA petition was without merit. Corrected Petition for Leave to

Withdraw, 8/823, at 1.      For the second Turner/Finley requirement that

Counsel list the issues Scholl wished to have reviewed, Counsel’s letter brief

describes the issues Scholl intended to raise as a “request [for] new trial based

on violations of his constitutional rights.” Turner/Finley Letter Brief at 4. As

to the third Turner/Finley requirement that Counsel explain her conclusion

that Scholl’s issues are meritless, Counsel properly identifies the timeliness of

Scholl’s second PCRA petition as a threshold issue. See id. at 5-6.

      As to the final procedural requirement that Counsel send Scholl a copy

of her Turner/Finley letter brief and advise him of his appellate rights,

Counsel has complied with this Court’s directives, and we are satisfied that

Scholl has notice of his appellate rights and a copy of Counsel’s Turner/Finley

letter brief asserting that Scholl’s second petition was time-barred under the

PCRA. Accordingly, we will proceed to an independent review. See Knecht,

219 A.3d at 691.

      Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

             We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
      the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
      This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
      evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
      is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
      Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
      record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
      factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
      findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we

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      afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
      petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
      novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

      Under the PCRA, any petition, including a second or subsequent petition,

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes

final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final

at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or   at   the   expiration   of   time   for   seeking   the   review.   See   42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional

in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the

PCRA petition was not timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994

A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

      Here, Scholl’s judgment of sentence became final on April 15, 2016,

thirty days after the trial court resentenced him on March 16, 2016, and Scholl

did not challenge or appeal from the new sentence.              See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903(a), (c)(3). Thus, Scholl had until April

17, 2017, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see

also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Scholl filed his second PCRA petition in November

2021, more than four years after his judgment of sentence became final.

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Therefore, the instant petition is facially untimely under the PCRA. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

      Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the

petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), which provides:

      (b) Time for filing petition.—

      (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

          (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
          interference by government officials with the presentation of
          the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
          Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
          States;

          (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
          to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
          exercise of due diligence; or

          (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
          recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
          Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
          in this section and has been held by that court to apply
          retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).       Any PCRA petition invoking one of these

exceptions “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If the petition is untimely and

the petitioner has not pleaded and proven a timeliness exception, the petition

must be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition. See Commonwealth v.

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Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      Our review of the record establishes Scholl filed a facially untimely

second PCRA petition in November 2021. Counsel filed an amended petition

that did not assert any exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements.

Therefore, the PCRA court properly dismissed Scholl’s second PCRA petition

as untimely. See id.

      Scholl’s pro se response to Counsel’s petition to withdraw warrants no

relief. The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional, and, as stated

above, a court may not consider the merits of the issues raised unless the

petitioner pleaded and proved a timeliness exception. See id. Moreover, a

PCRA petitioner has no right to counsel for a second PCRA petition or an appeal

from the dismissal of second PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Kubis,

808 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 2002). Here, Scholl’s pro se response states:

“There is no question that my arguments have merit. . . . If this Court grants

[Counsel’s] petition to withdraw as counsel then the [C]ourt should appoint

new counsel.” See Answer to Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 9/5/23, at 1

(internal citation omitted); see also Scholl’s Application, 10/16/23, at 1.

Scholl fails to identify any timeliness exception to consider the merits of his

underlying claims, and we agree with Counsel’s assessment that Scholl’s

second PCRA petition was time-barred. Thus, we discern no basis to consider

Scholl’s underlying claims.    See Taylor, 65 A.3d at 468.          Under the

circumstances of this appeal, we further conclude Scholl has no right to new

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counsel. Cf. Kubis, 808 A.2d at 200; Commonwealth v. Williams, 204

A.3d 489, 493 (Pa. Super. 2019) (noting that once a court grants counsel’s

petition to withdraw pursuant to Turner and Finley, new counsel shall not be

appointed).

      Order affirmed.    Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.    Scholl’s

application for substitution of counsel denied as moot.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/27/2023

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