Court Opinion

ID: 9677884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:03:54.882136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:59.507907
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(concurring).
I have concluded to concur in result but on a basis which, although briefed, is not relied upon in the principal opinion in deciding the case. I would reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff because respondent church, a corporation, is incapable of holding property in joint tenancy with a natural person.
There are no Missouri cases on this subject, but the question has been considered elsewhere and by textwriters and they seem to be unanimous in stating that a corporation may not be a joint tenant.
In Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich.Eq. 235, 24 S.C.Eq. 235, 1. c. 242, the opinion states: “The Bible Society of New York is a corporate body. It is clear that, by the principles of common law, none but natural persons can take in joint tenancy. A corporation cannot take this estate, either jointly with another corporation, or with a natural person,”
In Moore Lumber Co. v. Behrman, 144 Misc. 291, 259 N.Y.S. 248, 1. c. 250, the court holds that “a corporation cannot hold as a joint tenant, either with an individual or another corporation.” This opinion, incidentally, is discussed in 17 Minn.Law Review 339, which also recognizes the common law on this subject.
In De Witt v. San Francisco, 2 Cal. 289, the court held that the County of San Francisco and the City of San Francisco, both of which were corporations, could not hold lands as joint tenants, saying 1. c. 297: “Two corporations cannot hold as joint tenants, because two of the essential unities are wanting, namely, of the same capacity and title; 1 Cruise, 362, sec. 39. Nor can they hold as joint tenants, for another reason; being each perpetual, there can be no survivorship between them; and this, as we have just seen, is the distinguishing incident of this estate. Nor can a corporation hold lands as joint tenant with a natural person, for there is no reciprocity of survivorship between them. Angel and Ames on Corporations, 150. 1 Kyd on Corp. 72.”
Angell & Ames on Corporations, 11th Ed., § 185, p. 166, states: “A corporation aggregate cannot hold lands in joint tenancy with a natural person, because, as the corporation never dies, the natural person would be subject to, without being able to take advantage of, the incident of survivor-ship; nor with another corporation, since both are perpetual, or one or both of fixed limited duration.”
The American Law of Property, § 12.76, p. 342, states: “A corporation is a legal entity and is thus qualified, except as restricted by statute or its articles of incorporation, to acquire and hold title to real property. But in the nature of things it cannot hold title in joint tenancy.” The same work, § 6.3, note 4, p. 13, says : “Since a corporation cannot hold as a joint tenant because of the absence of survivability, a corporate trustee must necessarily hold as a tenant in common.”
In 4 Thompson on Corporations, § 2457, p. 46, it is stated: “But in the nature of things a corporation can not take and hold land in joint tenancy.”
In 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3a, p. 914, it is stated: “Any person mentally competent to deal with the subject before him with full understanding of his rights is competent to create a joint tenancy, and as a general rule all natural persons are *699capable of being joint tenants; but bodies politic or corporations, as discussed in Corporations § 1088c, cannot be joint tenants either among themselves or with natural persons.” In 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1088 c, p. 630, it is stated: “From the nature of a corporation it is incapable of taking and holding lands in joint tenancy, either with another corporation or with a natural person. There is nothing, however, to prevent a corporation from taking and holding land as tenant in common with another, since for this estate only unity of possession is necessary. A corporation cannot take personal property as joint tenant, but may take as tenant in common.”
At common law, joint tenancies were favored, but even so corporations could not be joint tenants. Later, as the principal opinion recognizes, the tendency has been to treat estates given to a plurality of persons as tenancies in common rather than joint tenancies, unless expressly stated otherwise. 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3d, p. 917.1 That being true, it seems to me that, absent express statutory authorization to the contrary, we should hold as at common law that a corporation may not be a joint tenant.
I prefer to decide this case on the basis indicated rather than that relied upon in the principal opinion, because while I believe the principal opinion correctly follows the rule as announced in earlier cases, I am disturbed by two things incident to that rule.
In the first place, I see absolutely no logical basis for holding that specific acts will create a joint tenancy where there is a family relationship between donor and donee but that such acts are insufficient to show delivery and create a joint tenancy when such relationship does not exist. I realize the cases say that, but I do not believe the rule is sound. If what is done is sufficient to create a joint tenancy as between relatives, it should be effective irrespective of the relationship between the persons involved.
Secondly, I am disturbed by the fact that the General Assembly has provided in § 369.150, V.A.M.S., that when an account is established as specified in that section, a joint tenancy shall be created, and yet under the rule announced in the principal opinion, and in other cases on which it relies, compliance with that statute does not necessarily result in the creation of a joint tenancy. This is true even though the statute is not held unconstitutional or invalid. Surely, this statute, and other similar ones, if permitted to remain as valid statutes, should be so am,ended that when complied with, the result will be what the statute says will occur and what undoubtedly the parties think will occur when they comply with that statute.

. This philosophy appears in § 442.450, V.A.M.S., for example, which provides that conveyances of real estate to two or more persons, not executors, trustees, or husband and wife, shall be tenancies in common, unless expressly declared to be joint tenancies.