Court Opinion

ID: 9551852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:00:49.914913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:51.824405
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(specially concurring).
Here, the evidence, aside from appellant’s confession, reflects that appellant made a statement to two insurance representatives describing how an accident had occurred; that the injured party brought suit to recover for his alleged injuries; that such suit was later settled for $25,000; that the injured party was not as severely injured as he had claimed. Later appellant, by a voluntary written confession admitted that a hoax was committed to defraud the insurance company and that in fact no accident had occurred at all.
The majority opinion states that there is sufficient corroborating evidence so that the conviction based upon appellant’s extrajudicial confession may be sustained. I disagree. There was no evidence whatsoever (other than appellant’s confession) to prove that appellant’s representations were false. The medical testimony only showed that the alleged injury was not as severe as Fraley claimed and failed to establish the fact that the alleged accident had been faked. However, I concur in the affirmance because I do not believe the rule requiring corroboration of an extrajudicial confession should be applied in this case.
The general proposition is that an extrajudicial confession, standing alone, is not sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of some corroborating evidence. State v. Hall, 88 Idaho 117, 397 P.2d 261 (1964); State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 65 P.2d 736 (1937); State v. Wilson, 51 Idaho 659, 9 P.2d 497 (1932); State v. Downing, 23 Idaho 540, 130 P. 461 (1913); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 P. 1051 (1902); 45 A.L.R.2d 1317, at 1318 (1956); 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2071, at 396 (3d ed. 1940). The corroborating evidence must relate to and tend to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. State v. Van Vlack, supra; State v. Wilson, supra; State v. Downing, supra; State v. Keller, supra; 45 A.L.R.2d 1317, at 1327 (1956); 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2071, at 397 (3d ed.1940).
A crime consists of three elements; the fact of the injury, the criminality causing that injury, and the identity of the perpetrator. 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2072, at 401 (3d ed.1940). The corpus delicti of any crime consists of the first two elements. State v. Darrah, 60 Idaho 479, 92 P.2d 143 (1939); 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2072, at 402 (3d ed.1940); Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant’s Confession, 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 638 (1955).
Analysis of the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses leads to the conclusion that the loss of the money is the injury, and the falsity of the representation is the criminality. Thus, it has been held that where an extrajudicial confession is the only proof of the falsity of the representation, the conviction can not be sustained. Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 1, 37 So. 937 (1904); People v. Simonsen, 107 Cal. 345, 40 P. 440 (1895); Button v. State, 207 Miss. 582, 42 So.2d 773 (1949); Owen v. State, 159 Miss. 588, 132 So. 753 (1931). See Gulotta v. United States, 113 F.2d 683 (8th Cir.1940); City of St. Louis v. Watters, 289 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App.1956).
The rule concerning extrajudicial confessions developed in England in response to cases in which alleged homicide victims were found to be alive after the accused, on *76the basis of his confession, had been convicted and executed. Note, 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 638 (1955). The rule originally was applied only to homicide cases and was later extended to bigamy cases. Id. at 640. In the United States, it has been expanded to cover most serious crimes. Id. at 641. The indiscriminate application of this rule has been criticized. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2070 (3d ed.1940); Note, 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 638 (1955); 13 Vand.L.Rev. 561 (1960).
The reasons given today for the application of the rule have been listed as: that there is a danger of misreporting what the accused said; that it is a safeguard against coerced confessions; that an accused may himself be mistaken about whether a crime was in fact committed; that it helps to prevent false confessions from mentally deranged persons; and that it forces the prosecution to use its best evidence. However, the rule as it stands does not fulfill these purposes, as it does not apply to judicial confessions and does not require independent proof of the third element of a crime, namely, the identity of the perpetrator. See generally Note, 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 638 (1955).
An analysis of these purposes in relation to the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses leads me to the conclusion that there need be no corroborative evidence of the falsity of the representation. The confession was written and thus the danger of misreporting an oral statement is absent. The rule is no longer needed as a safeguard against coerced confessions as recent developments in our criminal law amply protect an accused. In this crime, it was impossible that the defendant could he mistaken as to whether the crime was committed. This aspect of the purposes for the rule would be more applicable in a case where a defendant confesses to pushing a man overboard and the victim may not in fact have drowned. It does not appear that the appellant was mentally deranged; moreover, this purpose for the rule would only be logical if the rule also applied to judicial confessions. That a confession is not the best evidence of a crime may generally he true, but in the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, a confession by one of the participants will often be the only evidence available.
Therefore, I concur in the decision that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. This judgment should not be affirmed on the basis of “slight” corroborating evidence of the confession. It should simply be stated that in the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, when the representations have been proven in accord with I.C. § 19-2116, and the defendant has confessed that the representations were false, the judgment may be upheld even though there is no evidence other than the extrajudicial confession to prove that the statement was false. Hence, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment.