Court Opinion

ID: 9690960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:54:11.444658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:07.221797
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice CUNNINGHAM.
Resisting the urge to go along with my much admired brothers and sisters, I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority on the jurisdictional issue, but would affirm the Court of Appeals on the merits.1
Having been there and done that in dealing with difficult custody cases at the trial level, I extend deep respect and deference to the trial court in this case.
However, as diligent as the trial court appears to have been, I believe there was an abuse of discretion in finding there was substantial evidence to justify a change of *771custody in this case. The decision by this Court today will cause thirteen-year-old Kaitlyn and ten-year-old Nicholas to be removed from the primary custody of Ap-pellee with whom they have lived all of their lives and, who even Appellant admits, has been a good mother. There is a presumption in the law that a child’s present custody arrangement should continue and should not be modified unless absolutely necessary. Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173 (Ky.1978); Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky.1987).
According to the trial court’s own findings, the children are doing fine in their current environment. Said the trial court: “Kaitlyn is in the gifted program at school and is doing well; furthermore, she even has a band with several of her friends in Louisville. It is clear that the children are intelligent and have been able to cope, to some extent, with the struggles between the parties.” Not only has Appellee been an excellent parent to the children, to her great credit she has extended to her ex-husband and the father of these children a most liberal visitation arrangement, and has encouraged and assisted his relationship with them.
It was not until 2004, when Appellee married Dr. Thomas Rankin and announced her plans to move from Hardin County, that the current custody dispute arose. At that time, Appellant filed a petition in the Hardin Family Court to gain custody of the children. Appellee sought and was granted permission by the Family Court to relocate to Jefferson County with the children and Dr. Rankin.2
Therefore, the feud-raising issues in this custody dispute are Dr. Rankin and the relocation.
In the lengthy, seventeen-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decree and Order entered by the trial court, almost all of the fact-finding has to do with the previous instability of Dr. Rankin. Unquestionably, Dr. Rankin has suffered from mental depression and other emotional instability in the past. However, according to the trial court’s findings, Dr. Rankin has not suffered from any of these problems during his relationship with Appellee, nor has he experienced any such problems over the past five years.
The trial court then proceeded to speculate as to what might occur. Said the trial court: “[T]he Court is concerned for the emotional and mental health of the children who do realize, to some extent, the fragile nature of Dr. Rankin’s mental health. Although there was no testimony or evidence presented that whatever problems Dr. Rankin may be dealing with now or in the immediate past has substantially adversely affected the parties’ children, the Court is nevertheless concerned about the children’s current environment and the mental stability of Dr. Rankin and the constant stress they are experiencing as a result of being primarily in that environment.” This is hardly “substantial evidence” that the current environment is in any way negative to the children’s development.
As extensive as the findings were, they were centered primarily upon Dr. Rankin’s ancient past. And, as the Court of Appeals noted, “little of the testimony involved the children in more than a cursory manner.”
The trial court, undoubtedly with their best interests at heart, chose to take two well nurtured and emotionally healthy chil*772dren away from their mother based upon what is, in essence, speculation. Said the trial court: “Although there was substantial testimony that Dr. Rankin has gotten control of his past struggles with drug addiction and depression, the Court is concerned that subjecting the parties’ minor children to this constant worry and stress is not beneficial and would endanger seriously their emotional, mental, and psychological health.” To find that this evidence is sufficient to change custody away from a mother, who has had the children all of their fives, will set a precedent which will create justifiable apprehension for all custodial parents throughout this state, and will undermine the much needed stability for children of broken homes.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that KRS 403.270(2), subsections (a) through (i), provides factors to be considered by the trial court in determining custody in accordance with the best interests of the children. The primary factors present in this case include:
• “The wishes of the child as to his custodian[.]” See KRS 403.270(2)(b). Here, the children adamantly wish to stay with their mother.
• “The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests!.]” See KRS 403.270(2)(e). Here, the interaction and interrelationship of Kaitlyn and Nicholas with their mother has been excellent.
• “The child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community!.]” See KRS 403.270(2)(d). The evidence in this case is undisputed that the children have adjusted to their home, school, and community, and that they are doing exceptionally well in school.
• “The mental and physical health of all individuals involved!.]” See KRS 403.270(2)(e). As stated earlier, there is no evidence of record that the mental health of Dr. Rankin has in any way affected, nor is likely to affect, the welfare of the children.
KRS 403.270(3) has been totally ignored in this case. It states, in part, as follows: “The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his [or her] relationship to the child.” There is absolutely no evidence in this case that Appellee’s relationship with Dr. Rankin has affected her relationship with her children.
Hard work, good intentions, and exhaustive findings should not be the only requirements that a trial court meet when custody of adolescent and pre-adolescent children is being changed. The ages of Kaitlyn and Nicholas cry out for stability.
With all due respect, it appears to this writer that the opinion of this Court focuses only on the Court of Appeals’ erroneous use of the “serious endangerment” standard without adequate attention to whether there was “substantial evidence” to determine that the best interests of the children demanded a change in custody. The majority opinion devotes only one sentence to this very important issue: “A review of the Family Court’s decision and the record below shows that the trial judge explicitly applied the standards articulated in KRS 403.340 to the facts and circumstances of this case in reaching its conclusions of law.” See op. at 770.
These children, both at a most critical stage of their development, deserve to have more proof presented which would justify this monumental and unsettling change in their young fives. There is insufficient evidence to justify removing thirteen-year-old Kaitlyn and ten-year-old *773Nicholas from their mother’s primary care and custody.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
SCOTT and SCHRODER, JJ., join.

. The Court of Appeals erroneously found that the non-custodial parent must show that the change in circumstances endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child. The "serious endangerment” standard is not demanded for custody modifications occurring more than two years after rendition of the order which is sought to be modified. This case should have been determined on the “best interests of the child” standard utilizing the factors of KRS 403.270(2).

. It appears, although the evidence was not absolutely clear, that Appellee and Dr. Rankin have since separated and divorced.