Court Opinion

ID: 9524761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:56:55.738643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:51.164107
License: Public Domain

R.S. Smith, J.
(concurring). I join the Court’s unanimous opinion, but add a brief explanation.
As the Court says, we have no “clear legislative directive” (majority op at 614). The situation of prison inmates whom the State seeks to confine upon the expiration of their terms is not specifically addressed by any statute, and neither Correction Law § 402 nor article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law fits the situation perfectly. I think the Court is correct in choosing section 402, in part because that statute provides for a hearing before *615confinement. The Mental Hygiene Law does not, and if applied to this case it would raise serious constitutional problems.
We upheld the Mental Hygiene Law’s provisions for involuntary admission of certain mental patients against a constitutional challenge in Fhagen v Miller (29 NY2d 348 [1972]). In doing so, we rejected the argument that the statutes were invalid because they permitted the State to confine a person first, and give him a hearing afterward. We explained:
“Due process does, ordinarily, demand reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard in advance of confinement or restraint. However, as we declared in Matter of Coates (9 N Y 2d 242, 249), ‘where immediate action is necessary for the protection of society and for the welfare of the allegedly mentally ill person, [it] does not require notice or hearing as a condition precedent to valid temporary confinement.’ ” (Id. at 353.)
It is hard to see how this reasoning can apply to a case like the present one. Petitioners had all been in prison for years before the State sought to commit them civilly. No sudden, unforeseen emergency required their confinement in a mental hospital. Since it cannot be said in this case that “immediate action [was] necessary for the protection of society,” a strong argument can be made that petitioners were constitutionally entitled to a hearing before being deprived of the liberty that they would otherwise have obtained upon the completion of their prison terms. Because Correction Law § 402 provides for such a predeprivation hearing, I agree with the Court in holding it to be the applicable statute.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Rosenblatt, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur with Judge Ciparick; Judge Smith concurs in a separate opinion.
Order reversed, etc.