Court Opinion

ID: 9728968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:20:45.072695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:53.626034
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Me. Justice Jones,
On May 15, 1963, Kenneth C. Brown (appellant) was injured in the course of his employment with the Reynolds Metals Company. Reynolds’ workmen’s compensation insurance carrier, The Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers), accepted appellant’s claim for compensation under the provisions of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §1 et seq.) and made payments to appellant pursuant to the schedule established by the Act.
Appellant then brought an action in trespass against Travelers, alleging that Travelers’ negligence in inspecting or failing to inspect Reynolds’ work places and equipment caused his injuries. After appellant had filed an amended complaint, Travelers filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to the amended complaint. The Court of Common Pleas No. 4 of Philadelphia County (per Spaeth, J.) sustained Travelers’ preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises two issues: first, whether, as a matter of law, Travelers had a duty to see that the area where appellant worked and the manner in which the work was done were safe; second, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, whether an employer’s insurance carrier is subject to suit under The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. We need not consider the first issue, for we hold that an employer’s insurance carrier enjoys the same immunity from liability under the Act as does the employer.
Travelers’ position is that, under §303 of the Act (77 P.S. §481), the insurance carrier is entitled to the *511same freedom from common law liability as is the employer. Section 303 provides: “Snch agreement shall constitute an acceptance of all the provisions of article three of this act, and shall operate as a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any form or amount of compensation or damages. . . . Such agreement shall bind the employer and his personal representatives, and the employe . . . .” (Emphasis added) Travelers claims that the insurance carrier is included within the term “employer,” relying on the definition of “employer” found in §401 of the Act (77 P.S. §701) : “The term ‘Employer,’ when used in this article, shall mean the employer as defined in article one of this act ... or his insurer if such insurer has assumed the employer’s liability . . . .”
Appellant counters by arguing that this definition applies only to Article IV of the Act, that the employer’s immunity from liability is established in Article III and that, therefore, the general definition of “employer” set forth in Article I is controlling. Section 103 defines “employer” as “synonymous with master, and to include natural persons, partnerships, joint-stock companies, corporations for profit, corporations not for profit, municipal corporations, the Commonwealth, and all governmental agencies created by it.” (77 P.S. §21). No reference is made to the employer’s insurance carrier.
The courts in this Commonwealth which have considered this question have disagreed as to which definition should apply. The leading case in support of the appellant’s position is Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F. 2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963), in which the court (per Staley, J.) held that the Article I definition was to be applied to the immunity section in Article III. We are not persuaded by this opinion. The Mays opinion was carefully analyzed and criticized in an ex*512haustive and able opinion written by Judges Barbieri and Ullman — both of whom had extensive experience in workmen’s compensation prior to their elevation to the bench. Brown v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 37 Pa. D. & C. 2d 111 (Phila. C. P. 1965). Since we feel that Judges Barbieri and Ullman more than adequately set forth the reasons why the more restricted definition of “employer” should not apply to the immunity section, we quote at length from their opinion: “As is observed, Judge Staley’s conclusion is arrived at by his view that the language of section 103 is to be given superior force to that of section 401, for he refers to the former as the ‘principal definition’. One may ask, why so? We have noted previously herein that article I (including section 103) and article IV (including section 401), are neither of them substantive. We have termed them ‘external’ articles, as compared with the legislatively designated substantive articles II and III. In short, the first and fourth articles are ancillary, descriptive, unsubstantive and are both basically procedural in significance. It would have been inappropriate for the legislature to have included the workmen’s compensation insurance carrier as synonymous with employer in section 103 of article I of the act, because that section was delineating the status of employer and employe for the limited purposes of their status as parties to the statutory agreement to accept the compensation system which was set up in article III .... Chronologically speaking, it would be pointless and fruitless to discuss the insurance carrier in article I of the act, because the need for insuring could not arise until article III had become operative. It is the ‘master’ alone (who, before he accepts the act, has no need for a compensation insurance carrier), who is concerned with the substantive provisions of articles II and III. The employer not only has the *513right to reject the act, but frequently has done so. See Rich Hill Coal Company v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449 (1939). Article IV sets up all of the provisions for every form of process and remedy available to a claimant and the manner in which liability of the employer to him is to be met, satisfied, settled, concluded and released; so that even under Judge Staley's conception of article IV, and section 401, the insurance carrier shares every one of the obligations, prerequisites, benefits and release rights of the employer. Thus, we find the legislature stating in section 401 that the employer, who had to be defined in section 103 solely as the ‘master’ for articles II and III purposes, would, for all remedial or procedural purposes, be taken to be a complex entity, including within its scope the compensation insurer (be it a private company or the State Workmen’s Insurance Fund), and the agent of such ‘master’.” (37 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 119, 120)
If we were to accept the appellant’s argument that the Article I definition applies to Article III, then we would have difficulty interpreting §319, which states, “Where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the act or omission of a third party, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employe . . . .” (Emphasis added) (77 P.S. §671). The appellant could hardly argue that if the employer has an insurance carrier, that carrier has no subrogation rights because the word “employer” as used in the subrogation section does not include the insurance carrier. Travelers argues quite convincingly that the legislature clearly intended the word “employer” as used in §319 to include the insurance carrier. Therefore, since §319 is part of Article III, this destroys the appellant’s argument that the Article I definition of “employer” applies throughout Article III. Instead, we are convinced that the legislature intended that the *514broader definition which clearly applies in §319 should also apply in §303 establishing the employer’s immunity.
While we conclude that Judges Barbieri and Ullman correctly interpreted the Act, we must admit in all candor that the question is not free from doubt on the face of the statute. However, the relevant policy considerations reinforce our conclusion that the legislature intended that the insurance carrier would share in the employer’s immunity.
First, if the appellant’s position were adopted, then a regrettable discrimination would result between employers who are insured by the State Workmen’s Insurance Fund or are self-insuring employers and those employers who carry private insurance. The statute setting up the State Workmen’s Insurance Fund specifically gives the Fund the same defenses which are available to the employer,1 and, therefore, it is impossible to bring a suit such as the instant action against the Fund or a self-insuring employer. Such discrimination would be inequitable and unjust both to the employers who utilize private insurance and to their employees: first, these employers would be placed at a competitive disadvantage since private insurance carriers would necessarily have to raise their rates to offset the increased liability placed upon them by the result urged by the appellant; second, the employees-would be disadvantaged because, in the wake of such a result, private insurance carriers would probably abandon all safety programs since these programs, instead of cutting costs by reducing accidents, would merely increase the orbit of the carrier’s liability. We cannot and do not believe that the legislature ever intended the Workmen’s Compensation Act to produce such discrimination.
*515Second, we do not think that the legislature intended to place insurance carriers in such a position that they would be forced to abandon these safety programs. Today many insurance carriers undertake such safety programs in the factories and business places of employers whom they insure. Admittedly, these programs are not motivated by an altruistic feeling toward workers, since it is to the financial advantage of the insurance carrier to reduce accidents and safety programs reduce accidents. Nevertheless, although the insurance carriers are attempting to save money, the safety programs they institute directly benefit the workers. Under the appellant’s position, if an insurance carrier is negligent in instituting a safety program, it is liable to an employee who is injured as a result. Since the insurance carrier is not required by law to carry on these safety programs, the end result of the appellant’s argument seems assured — insurance carriers will specifically absolve themselves from undertaking such safety programs. Again, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended this result.
Third, the weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports Travelers’ position. This question has been much litigated across the country. In 1960 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a negligent insurance carrier was subject to suit by the injured employee.2 Three years later the Supreme Court of Iowa followed suit.3 However, the legislatures in both these states quickly amended their workmen’s compensation statutes to reverse the results reached in these cases.4 Courts in at least fifteen other states *516have considered this question and twelve of these courts rejected the position advocated by the appellant.5 Furthermore, at least seven states — including Pennsylvania — have amended their workmen’s compensation acts specifically to bar recovery by the employee against the insurance carrier.6 These statistics indicate that *517the position advanced by the appellant has generally met with disfavor and represents a minority view. The legislatures of at least nine states have come to the conclusion that permitting an employee to bring an action against the insurance carrier produces serious consequences for the entire structure of workmen’s compensation.
In conclusion, we hold that the insurance carrier is included within the term “employer” as that word is used in §303 and, therefore, shares the employer’s immunity from common law liability.
Order affirmed.
Mr. Justice Cohen concurs in the result.

 Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 762, §21, 77 P.S. §362.

 Smith v. American Employers’ Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A. 2d 564 (1960).

 Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W. 2d 361 (1963).

 2-B N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., §281:12; 6 Iowa Code Ann., §88A.14.

 Those courts reaching a result contrary to the appellant’s position include: Horne v. Security Mut. Cas. Co., 265 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Ark. 1967); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Bartolotta v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1967); Gerace v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 95 (D.C.D.C. 1966); Donohue v. Maryland Cas. Co., 363 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. [Maryland] 1966); Matthews v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E. 2d 348 (1968); West v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 697 (E.D. Mo. 1966); Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 387 F. 2d 631 (1st Cir. [Rhode Island] 1967); Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F. 2d 799 (4th Cir. [Virginia] 1966); Schulz v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Wash, [interpreting Idaho statute] 1954); Kerner v. Employers’ Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391, 151 N.W. 2d 72 (1967). The three courts which have reached the result advocated by the appellant include: Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E. 2d 769 (1964) (4-3 opinion interpreting a Florida statute. A federal district court in Florida refused to follow the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Hill v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 272 F. Supp. 569 (M.D. Fla. 1967)); Ray v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 55, 158 N.W. 2d 786 (1968) (the Michigan federal courts reached a contrary result in Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd, 372 F. 2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967)); Mager v. United Hospitals, 88 N. J. Super. 421, 212 A. 2d 664 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A. 2d 325 (1966) (this case can be distinguished on its facts, however, for the employee was injured as a result of improper medical attention in a hospital run by the employer’s insurance carrier).

 8 Ind. Stat. Ann., §40-1205; 3A Neb. Rev. Stat., §48-111; 9 N.M. Stat. Ann., §59-10-4F.; 5 Ore. Rev. Stat., §656.018(3); 22 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 8306, §3; 16 Wis. Stat. Ann., §102.03(2). The Pennsylvania statute — Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1552, §1, 77 P.S. §501 (pp) — was not in effect when this cause of action arose.