Court Opinion

ID: 9418859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:41:31.062965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:00.903384
License: Public Domain

*83Me. Justice Roberts,
dissenting.
Although I do not disagree with the opinion of the Court respecting the meaning of the word “held” as found in § 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, I think we. should not decide the point in this case. The order of the District Judge dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction was right notwithstanding he may have been in error as to the necessity of actual possession of the property or its proceeds by the Government’s representatives at the date of suit.
The action is clearly one against the United States1 and consent to be sued evidenced by Act of Congress is essential to jurisdiction. The question is whether such consent has been given. Whatever view may be taken of the nature of the action as disclosed by petitioner’s pleading the answer must be in the negative.
The Government has consented to be sued as is evidenced by § 9 (a). It appears by petitioner’s own declaration, however, that it availed itself of the privilege of suit thus granted and recovered a judgment for the full amount of the proceeds of the stock which had been seized by the Alien Property Custodian. The present action is a second suit to recover another judgment for a portion of the same money embraced in the former judgment. I fail to find any indication in the Act that Congress intended to afford a claimant two suits and two judgments for the same moneys.
Entirely apart from the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, however, the District Court is without jurisdiction to permit a second action for a sum admittedly embraced in a judgment which is of record in that court.
*84Suit cannot be maintained under the Tucker Act as amended.2 The six year limitation on suits against the Government is not merely a defence to be pleaded or waived but is jurisdictional.3 The sale of the property by the Custodian and the recovery of the first judgment for the proceeds of the sale both occurred more than six years prior to the institution of this action. Moreover, the express provision of § 7 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, that the sole relief and remedy of any person having a claim under the Act shall be that afforded by the Act, precludes a suit for the property or the proceeds of it under the Tucker Act.4
The complaint asserts that the judgment recovered for the entire proceeds of the sale of plaintiff's stock has been formally released and satisfied. The satisfaction is said to have been obtained by duress. If the present proceeding be viewed as an action on the judgment the satisfaction is a bar to its maintenance; if treated as an appeal to the equity powers of the Court to set aside the release and satisfaction the Tucker Act is not a consent to the prosecution of such an action in the District Court.5
1 think it idle to remand the case to the District Court merely because of an erroneous reason assigned in support of the order of dismissal, since the suit will again have to be dismissed for the lack of jurisdiction. I should, therefore, affirm the order of the District Court.
Mr. Justice Sutherland concurs in this opinion.

 Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 591, 602; Von Bruning v. Sutherland, 58 App. D. C. 258; 29 F. (2d) 631; Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U. S. 298, 301.

 U. S. Code, Tit. 28, § 41 (20).

 Ford v. United States, 116 U. S. 213; Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227; United States v. Wardwell, 172 U. S. 48; Campagnie Generale v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 1053, 1056.

 Compare Johnson v. United States Shipping Board, 280 U. S. 320; Mara v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 397.

 United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1; compare Holmes v. United States, 78 Fed. 513; New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 650.