Court Opinion

ID: 9408412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 18:04:15.859098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.776257
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/12/23 P. v. Ward CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B321275

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. PA047853)
         v.

EUGENE H. WARD,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.
      Salley Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        ___________________
       Eugene H. Ward was convicted following a jury trial in
2006 on two counts of second degree murder and additional
crimes arising out of Ward’s operation of a vehicle while
intoxicated and sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of
33 years to life. We affirmed the judgment on appeal, specifically
rejecting Ward’s contention the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to prove he possessed the requisite mental state
(implied malice) for second degree murder. (People v. Ward
(Aug. 26, 2008, B193719) [nonpub. opn.].)
       Ward’s first petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)1 was summarily
denied in January 2019 on the ground Ward was convicted as the
direct perpetrator of the two murders, not as an aider and
abettor, and, therefore, was statutorily ineligible for relief. Ward
did not appeal that adverse ruling, seeking review only by writ
petition, which this court denied. Ward’s second petition for
resentencing was summarily denied in March 2022 based on the
collateral estoppel effect of the January 2019 order denying his
first petition.
       On appeal Ward contends several procedural errors by the
superior court when denying his first and second petitions
require reversal and a remand for an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). Because the record
of conviction indisputably established that Ward was convicted of
implied malice murder, none of the purported errors identified
was prejudicial. We affirm.

1    Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Ward’s Conviction for Second Degree Murder
      Ward was charged by information with two counts of
second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) (for victims
Kevin Whitteker and Wallace Tauch); two counts of gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5,
subd. (a)) (also for victims Whitteker and Tauch); one count of
driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injury (Veh.
Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) (for victim Ana Ayala); one count of
driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher and
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)) and one count of
leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury (Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (a)). The information specially alleged Ward had a
blood alcohol level of .20 percent or higher (Veh. Code, former
§ 23578) and had caused bodily injury to a fourth victim.
      The jury at Ward’s trial was instructed that before it could
find Ward guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated, the People had to prove “1. The defendant (drove
under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage), or drove while
having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher; [¶] 2. While (driving
that vehicle) either under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage)
or while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher the
defendant also committed (a) (misdemeanor/or infraction); [¶]
3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor/or infraction) with
gross negligence; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s grossly negligent
conduct caused the death of another person.”2

2     At the People’s request we have augmented the record to
include the jury instructions from Ward’s 2006 trial, as well as
Ward’s initial petition for resentencing filed in December 2018
and the superior court’s order denying that petition.

                                  3
       To find Ward committed second degree murder, the jury
was instructed the People had to prove “1. The defendant
committed an act that caused the death of (another person) [¶]
AND [¶] 2. When the defendant acted, he had a state of mind
called malice aforethought.” The court also instructed on the
definitions of express and implied malice, using CALCRIM
No. 520, which included in the elements of implied malice that
the defendant intentionally committed an act the natural
consequences of which were dangerous to human life.
       Ward’s primary defense at trial was that a significant
preexisting brain injury, combined with alcohol, negated the
mental state required to convict him of second degree murder.
He also challenged the special allegation his blood alcohol level at
the time of the offenses was .20 or greater, arguing the People’s
expert could not be certain the alcohol level from his blood
sample taken at the hospital at 5:12 a.m. was higher or lower
than his blood alcohol level at 4:30 a.m. when he collided head-on
with the vehicle driven by Whitteker (that is, whether his blood
alcohol level at 5:12 a.m. was rising or falling).
       The jury found Ward guilty on all counts. It also found true
the special allegation that Ward’s blood alcohol level at the time
the offenses were committed was .20 percent or higher. Ward
was sentenced to consecutive indeterminate 15-year-to-life terms
for second degree murder. The sentences for his convictions for
gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated involving the
same two victims were stayed pursuant to section 654.
       As discussed, on appeal we affirmed the judgment of
conviction, rejecting Ward’s contention the evidence was
insufficient to prove he possessed the requisite mental state for
second degree murder. (People v. Ward, supra, B193719.)

                                 4
       2. Ward’s Petitions for Rehearing
       On December 14, 2018 Ward, representing himself, filed a
four-page typewritten petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95, apparently contending he was entitled to relief
based on his convictions for gross vehicular manslaughter, which
required a finding he had acted with gross negligence, and the
language of the implied malice instruction, which included the
requirement that he had committed an act the natural
consequences of which were dangerous to human life. Ward did
not request appointment of counsel. The superior court on
January 3, 2019 summarily denied the petition after having
“reviewed the entire court file,” ruling “defendant was the
principal, the perpetrator of the crimes, and NOT an aider &
abettor as required by the bill. In addition, based on the charges
the defendant was convicted under the theory of ‘implied malice’
and NOT the ‘natural and probable cause [sic] doctrine.’”
       Ward did not appeal from the denial of his petition.
However, on February 25, 2019 he filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in this court, contending the superior court had
improperly denied his petition for resentencing. (In re Ward,
B295849.) We denied the petition. Then on January 30, 2020
Ward filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court, again
arguing the petition for resentencing had been improperly
denied. (Ward v. Superior Court, B303900.) We denied the
petition. Following a transfer from the Supreme Court, we
denied a further petition for writ of mandate on May 13, 2020.
(Ward v. Superior Court, B305795.)
       On March 22, 2022 Ward filed a second petition for
resentencing, this time using a printed form prepared for use
after the January 1, 2022 effective date of the amendments to

                                5
former section 1170.95 made by Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2). Ward checked boxes on the form to establish his
eligibility for resentencing relief, including the boxes stating he
had been convicted of murder following a trial and could not
presently be convicted of murder because of changes made to
sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
       The superior court on March 28, 2022 summarily denied
the petition, ruling it was barred by collateral estoppel because
Ward had “previously filed the same motion,” which had been
“litigated and denied.”3 Ward moved for reconsideration,
contending collateral estoppel could not bar his petition because
the law under which he was seeking relief “became effective on
January 1, 2022”—apparently referring to Senate Bill No. 775’s
amendments to former section 1170.95. The court denied
reconsideration, noting the recent changes to the law made by
Senate Bill No. 775 “have no bearing on Petitioner’s case or his
motion.”
       A notice of appeal from the superior court’s March 28, 2022
order denying the petition for resentencing was due by May 27,
2022. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a) [notice of appeal must be
filed within 60 days after the rendition of the order being
appealed].) On May 30, 2022 Ward apparently signed a notice of
appeal, which he mailed from Folsom State Prison (according to
the postage meter on the envelope) on June 2, 2022. The notice

3     In its order denying Ward’s petition the court also stated,
“The court is aware that whenever a petitioner provides the
information mandated by Penal Code § 1170.95, the court is to
appoint counsel and proceed with the litigation. However, in the
instant case, as a matter of law, Petitioner is not entitled to relief
due to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”

                                  6
was received and filed by the superior court on June 6, 2022. The
notice stated Ward was appealing from the order dated April 25,
2022 (the date of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration) but also stated he was appealing the “1170.95
motion.”
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Accomplice Liability for Murder and Section 1172.6
        Under the ameliorative changes to the law relating to
accomplice liability for murder effected by Senate Bill No. 1437
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice must be proved to convict a
principal of murder except under the narrowed felony-murder
rule set forth in section 189, subdivision (e), and may not be
imputed based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), thereby eliminating the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843; see
People v. Reyes (June 29, 2023, S270723) __ Cal.5th __, __
[2023 Cal. Lexis 3568, p. *2]). The amended felony-murder
provision requires the People to prove specific facts relating to
the defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant was the
actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer,
the defendant, with the intent to kill, assisted in the commission
of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major
participant in an underlying felony listed in section 189,
subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,” the felony-
murder special-circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)).
(See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)
        Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable

                                  7
consequences doctrine or any other theory under which malice is
imputed based solely on that person’s participation in a crime to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not now
be convicted of murder because of these changes to the law
relating to accomplice liability for murder. (See Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis); People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) As
amended by Senate Bill No. 775, Senate Bill No. 1437’s
ameliorative changes to the law now expressly apply to
attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
       If the petition contains all the required information,
including a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible
for relief (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)), the court must appoint
counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3)), and direct the prosecutor to file a response to the
petition, permit the petitioner to file a reply and determine if the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 962-963.)
       In determining whether the petitioner has carried the
burden of making the requisite prima facie showing, the superior
court properly examines the record of conviction, “allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; People
v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) However, “the
prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the
analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the
court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would

                                  8
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.
If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. . . . However,
if the record, including the court’s own documents, contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court
is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” (Lewis, at p. 971, internal quotation marks omitted.)
        At the evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to relief, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
court may consider evidence “previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,” including
witness testimony. The petitioner and the prosecutor may also
offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.)
        We review de novo whether the superior court conducted a
proper prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
(People v. Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1251; People v.
Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.) The superior court’s
decision to deny the petition after an evidentiary hearing, if the
court correctly understood the elements of the offense and the
proper standard and burden of proof were applied, is reviewed for
substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes, supra, __ Cal.5th at p. ___
[2023 Cal. Lexis 3568 at p. *10]; People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
970, 985; People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 113.)

                                  9
      2. Ward Was Convicted of Vehicular Homicide as an
         Intoxicated Driver Acting with Implied Malice and Is
         Ineligible for Resentencing Relief as a Matter of Law
       The parties present a variety of procedural, as well as
substantive, arguments for affirmance or reversal of the
March 28, 2022 order denying Ward’s second petition for
resentencing. The People contend Ward appealed only the
April 25, 2022 denial of his motion for reconsideration, which
they assert is a nonappealable order, and point out that the
June 6, 2022 notice of appeal would be untimely if we were to
construe it as an appeal from the March 28, 2022 order. The
People also argue the superior court properly denied Ward’s
March 22, 2022 petition as an impermissible successive
petition—one that raised the identical issues as his December 14,
2018 petition without any intervening change in law, explaining,
as the superior court found, that Senate Bill No. 775 did not
modify the law under which Ward was found guilty of implied
malice murder. Finally, they assert, any error in failing to
appoint counsel for Ward in the superior court was necessarily
harmless because counsel could not have avoided the application
of collateral estoppel to bar Ward’s second petition and, in any
event, the record of conviction demonstrated Ward was ineligible
for relief as a matter of law.
       For his part, Ward contends, if counsel had been appointed,
he would have filed a timely notice of appeal from the March 28,
2022 order denying the second petition and argues the second
petition should not have been denied as successive given the
significant evolution of the law from January 2019, when his
initial petition was denied, to March 2022, when he filed his
second petition, particularly the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision
in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, which held there was a very low

                                10
bar for making a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.
Ward additionally argues the jury’s guilty verdicts on the
two counts charging the murders of Whitteker and Tauch did not
necessarily determine he was the perpetrator, as opposed to an
aider and abettor, and the court’s denial of his first petition
required the weighing of evidence and impermissible factfinding
at the prima facie stage of the section 1172.6 process.
       As intriguing as some of the procedural issues might be, we
need not address any of them to reject Ward’s appeal. The jury’s
instructions and verdict—part of the record of conviction now
included in the record on appeal—unquestionably established
that Ward was neither tried nor convicted of second degree
murder on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice or accomplice
liability. There were no jury instructions concerning aider and
abettor (accomplice) liability, nor was the jury instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. To the contrary, the
jury’s guilty verdict on the two counts of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated required it to find that Ward was
the driver of the car that caused Whitteker’s and Tauch’s deaths.
And the guilty verdicts on the two counts of second degree
murder similarly required the jury to find Ward acted with
implied malice when he committed the act that caused their
deaths. (See People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1004
[“Malice may be implied when a person willfully drives under the
influence of alcohol. [Citation.] [¶] Roldan was therefore
convicted under a theory of actual implied malice, not malice
imputed under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
and thus failed to meet the threshold requirement of showing he
was convicted under a natural and probable consequences
theory”]; see also People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 139,

                                11
143 [People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 “stands for the
proposition that implied malice may be inferred from a
defendant’s conduct before, during, and after driving drunk—not
imputed from the bare fact of driving drunk”; Watson requires
that the defendant—the person who kills unintentionally while
driving drunk—act with implied malice”].)
       Contrary to Ward’s arguments, no improper reliance on
this court’s factual summary in People v. Ward, supra, B193719,
or impermissible factfinding at the prima facie stage was
required to conclude Ward was ineligible for resentencing relief
as a matter of law. Any procedural errors leading to the denial of
Ward’s first and second petitions were necessarily harmless.
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974 [“a petitioner ‘whose
petition is denied before an order to show cause issues has the
burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she]
had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would
not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary
hearing”’”].)
                         DISPOSITION
      The postjudgment orders denying Ward’s petition for
resentencing and motion for reconsideration are affirmed.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.                FEUER, J.

                                12