Court Opinion

ID: 9406269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 16:04:46.066568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:28.380049
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MARIE REED,                           )
KAREN CHEESEMAN,                      )
SIMEON HAHN, JEFFREY                  )
RICHARDSON, and MUJAHID               )
NYAHUMA,                              )
                                      )
              Appellants,             )
                                      )
        v.                            ) C.A. No. N22A-11-006 SKR
                                      )
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF                )
NATURAL RESOURCES AND                 )
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL,                )
                                      )
              Appellee.               )

                      Submitted: March 10, 2023
                       Decided: June 28, 2023

                              ORDER

Upon Consideration of the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and
             Environmental Control’s Motion to Dismiss:
                               DENIED

1. This dispute stems from the Secretary of the Delaware Department of

  Natural Resources and Environmental Control’s (“DNREC”) Order No.

  2021-W/CCE-00026 (the “Secretary’s Order”), which authorized a

  subaqueous lands permit associated with the construction of a new

  container port on the Delaware River at the Diamond State Port
       Corporation’s Edgemoor property.1 DNREC published the Secretary’s

       Order on September 30, 2021.2

                            PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
    2. The procedural history of this action, while sprawling, bears mention.

       Shortly after DNREC published the Secretary’s Order, five individuals –

       Marie Reed, Karen Cheeseman, Simeon Hahn, Jeffrey Richardson, and

       Mujahid Nyahuma (collectively, the “Individual Appellants”) – and the

       Delaware Community Benefits Agreement Coalition (“DCBAC”) each

       filed separate pro se appeals of the Secretary’s Order to the Environmental

       Appeals Board (the “Board”).3

    3. Two days after the Individual Appellants filed their appeal, Greenwich

       Terminals LLC, GMT Realty and Glouster Terminals LLC, the Port of

       Philadelphia, and Walter Curran (collectively, the “Port Operators”) filed

       three other appeals of the Secretary’s Order.      The Board ultimately

       consolidated the Port Operator appeals with the Individual Appellants’

       appeals (the “Consolidated Appeal”).

1
  D.I. 7 (DNREC’s Mot. to Dismiss) at 1-2.
2
  Id.
3
  D.I. 4 (App.’s Op. Br.) at 1.
                                          2
    4. On April 28, 2022, the Board issued an order dismissing DCBAC for

       failure to secure legal counsel and mandating that the Individual

       Appellants file amended notices of appeal (which they did) and affidavits

       supporting their individual standing (which they did not).4

    5. DNREC, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the Individual Appellants from

       the Consolidated Appeal for lack of standing.5 The Board held a hearing

       on the motion in July 2022.6 While the Individual Appellants made

       statements about their standing at the July 2022 hearing, the Board did not

       swear in witnesses or receive exhibits.7 After argument, the Board found

       that the Individual Appellants lacked standing to appeal the Secretary’s

       Order and dismissed them from the Consolidated Appeal in a decision (the

       “Decision”) dated October 24, 2022.8

    6. This appeal challenges the Decision.9 The Individual Appellants claim

       now, as they did before the Board, that they have standing to appeal the

       Secretary’s Order.10     Because the Board dismissed the Individual

       Appellants from the Consolidated Appeal before they presented an attack

4
  Id. at 1-2.
5
  Id.
6
  Id. at 2.
7
  Id.
8
  See EAB Appeal No. 2021-07.
9
  See generally D.I. 1 (Notice of Appeal).
10
   D.I. 10 (App.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss) at 1.
                                          3
        on the merits of the Secretary’s Order, the scope of this appeal is limited.11

        The Individual Appellants do not request – nor could they – a ruling on the

        merits of their underlying appeal, as the Court has no record upon which

        to make such a ruling.12 Instead, they merely seek remand to the Board so

        they can be afforded a “public hearing” on the merits of their standing

        claim.13

     7. DNREC, on the other hand, moves for dismissal of the appeal on two

        procedural grounds: (1) the Individual Appellants’ failure to name one or

        more “indispensable” parties (the Port Operators) to the review proceeding

        before this Court, in violation of Superior Court Civil Rule 19; and (2) the

        Individual Appellants’ failure to “perfect” their appeal to this Court, in

        violation of Rule 72.14

                                      DISCUSSION
        A. The Port Operators Are Not Necessary or Indispensable to this
           Limited Appeal.

     8. In the exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory administrative power,

        administrative hearings, like judicial proceedings, are governed by

11
   Id.
12
   Id. at 5.
13
   Id. at 2.
14
   See generally D.I. 7.
                                            4
        fundamental requirements of fairness.15        These requirements are the

        essence of due process.16 As it relates to the requisite characteristics of the

        proceedings, due process entails providing the parties to the proceeding

        with the opportunity to be heard, by presenting testimony or otherwise, and

        the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the

        question of right in the matter.17 “[A]ll parties to the litigation who would

        be directly affected by a ruling on the merits of an appeal should be made

        party to the appellate proceedings.”18

     9. Superior Court Civil Rule 19(a) makes clear that a person is “directly

        affected by a ruling on the merits” if:

                     (1) In the person’s absence complete relief
                         cannot be accorded among those already
                         parties, or (2) the person claims an interest
                         relating to the subject of the action and is
                         so situated that the disposition of the
                         action in the person’s absence may (i) as a
                         practical matter impair or impede the
                         person’s ability to protect that interest or
                         (ii) leave any of the persons already
                         parties subject to a substantial risk of
                         incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

15
   Carousel Studio v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1990 WL 91108, at *1 (Del.
Super. June 26, 1990).
16
   Id.
17
   Id. at *2-4.
18
   CCS Investors LLC v. Brown, 977 A.2d 301, 322 (Del. 2009) (emphasis added).
This holding “is reflected in Superior Court Rule 19(a).” Id.
                                             5
                        inconsistent obligations by reason of the
                        claimed interest.19

        The initial burden is on the moving party to show that the absent parties

        are “needed for a just adjudication.”20

     10.As mentioned, the appeal before the Court is limited to the issue of whether

        the Individual Appellants have standing to challenge the Secretary’s Order

        before the Board. It is not a dispute over substance. So, to the extent the

        Port Operators have an aligned interest with the Individual Appellants in

        challenging the Secretary’s Order, that simple shared goal does not render

        the Port Operators indispensable for anything and everything the

        Individual Appellants do. Insofar as the Port Operators are concerned, the

        Court’s ruling here will have little (if any) bearing on their interest.

        Remand simply means that the Board must consider whether the Individual

        Appellants have standing in a proper evidentiary hearing.

     11.This appeal is not “on the merits.”       Functionally, it is a procedural

        challenge. And because the Port Operators are not indispensable parties to

        the appeal, it is a challenge DNREC must lose.

19
  Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19(a).
20
  Martinez v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., Inc., 82 A.3d 1, 20 (Del. Super.
2012).
                                           6
        B. The Individual Appellants Complied With Rule 72’s Notice and
           Service Requirements.

     12.The power of an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction rests upon the

        perfecting of an appeal within the time period fixed by statute.21 Title 7

        Del. C. 6009(a) provides that “[a]ny [EAB] appeal shall be perfected

        within 30 days of the receipt of the written opinion of the Board.”22 While

        the statute does not define what “perfected” means, the Delaware Supreme

        Court has stated that generally, “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal within

        the prescribed period . . . confers jurisdiction on the appellate court, which

        will not dismiss the appeal for a defect that does not result in substantial

        prejudice to a party in interest.”23 “In other words, as long as the notice of

21
   PNC Bank, Del. v. Hudson, 687 A.2d 915, 916 (Del. 1997).
22
   DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6009(a) (2022).
23
   Preston v. Bd. of Adjustment of New Castle Cty., 772 A.2d 787, 791 (Del. 2001)
(citing State Personnel Comm’n v. Howard, 420 A.2d 135, 138 (Del. 1980)). The
statute at issue in Preston contains the phrase “presented within 30 days.” Id. at 789
n.2 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 1314(a)). The statute at issue here reads
“perfected within 30 days.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6009(a) (2022). No matter. The
Preston Court ascribed the same statutory meaning to the words “present” and
“perfect” when it found a technical violation will not deprive a court of jurisdiction
so long as notice of an appeal had been timely filed. Preston, 772 A.2d at 791
(“Generally, if a party fails to perfect an appeal within the statutorily mandated
period, a jurisdictional defect results, thereby preventing the appellate court from
exercising jurisdiction. The filing of a notice of appeal within the prescribed period,
however, confers jurisdiction on the appellate court, which will not dismiss the
                                            7
      appeal is timely filed in a matter, any technical deficiency with the

      accompanying documents will not strip this Court of jurisdiction to hear

      it.”24

   13.DNREC claims that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter because

      the Individual Appellants failed to “perfect” their appeal under Superior

      Court Civil Rule 72 by: (1) not sending DNREC’s counsel of record a copy

      of the notice of appeal, and (2) not filing a certificate of mailing.25

   14.During the pendency of this action, this Court issued its decision in

      Diamond Town Tire Pros & Auto Care, LLC, et al. v. DNREC.26 As

      DNREC has acknowledged through its motion, Diamond Town squarely

      addresses the Rule 72 jurisdictional question at play here.27

   15.The Diamond Town Court held that an appellant’s failure to perfect a

      notice of appeal does not per se deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction

      to hear the matter, so long as the appellant docketed the appeal within the

      30-day window prescribed by statute.28 If the appellant’s failures are

appeal for a defect that does not result in substantial prejudice to a party in interest.”
(citations omitted)).
24
   Diamond Town Tire Pros & Auto Care, LLC v. Delaware Dept. of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control, 2023 WL 2985256, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr.
17, 2023).
25
   D.I. 7 ¶ 4.
26
   2023 WL 2985256.
27
   D.I. 7 ¶ 2 n.3.
28
   Diamond Town, 2023 WL 2985256, at *3.
                                            8
       severe enough, however, the Court has the power to dismiss the action

       under Rule 72(i).29 “In deciding whether dismissal [under Rule 72(i)] is

       appropriate, the Court [considers] whether ‘the level of egregiousness’ of

       [the violation] is so high that it overcomes the interest of justice in deciding

       the matter on its merits.”30 Permissive dismissal was not warranted in

       Diamond Town because any prejudice caused by the appellant’s service

       failures were, at best, minimal.31

     16.So too here. Although the Individual Appellants’ flawed service on

       DNREC risked a grant of permissive dismissal, they did docket the notice

       of appeal within the required 30-day statutory window. For present

       purposes, that is all the Court is concerned with. Clearly, the Individual

       Appellants satisfied the notice requirements as enunciated in Diamond

       Town.32 The Court, therefore, will retain jurisdiction over the appeal.

     17.For the reasons stated above, DNREC’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                       _____________________
                                                       Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge

29
   Id.
30
   Id. (citations omitted).
31
   Id.
32
   Id.
                                            9