Court Opinion

ID: 9819524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:27:01.525091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.050592
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KUEHN, dissenting: The use of abandonment, or a reasonable, but erroneous, belief in abandonment, to justify this search is misplaced. The defendant did not abandon her privacy interests in the farmhouse by lying to police officers when confronted about whether she was living amidst a newly erected methamphetamine lab. This was a consensual search of a lessee’s home, based upon an invalid consent obtained from the property owner. None of the circumstances warranted a belief, reasonable or otherwise, that the premises constituted abandoned property. People were moving into the farmhouse, not moving out of it. The refrigerator was freshly stocked, and in use. The utilities were turned on. The farmhouse was furnished. And, quite obviously, the house’s occupants had set up a methamphetamine lab. Presumably, they intended to use it at some imminent future time. It would have been decidedly improper for officers to treat the farmhouse as abandoned property and search it for that reason. Neither Mark Hills’ flight nor the defendant’s denials about residency allowed for it. Someone clearly lived in the farmhouse, even if Hills and the defendant did not. Someone clearly had constitutionally protected privacy interests in the farmhouse and its contents. The officers recognized as much. I turn to my colleagues’ validation of the consensual search. They deem the request for a consent to search reasonable. This is why. Virginia Ernst (Virginia) originated the officers’ presence with a request for them to remove strangers from her property. According to those officers, Virginia disavowed her grandson’s authority to lease the premises. Mark Hills (Hills) ran from the house and initially denied living there. Then, the defendant twice denied living there, contradicting Hills’ belated admission about a recently entered-into lease. Ergo, the officers could reasonably believe that Virginia had the authority to consent to a search of someone else’s recently acquired home. Chuck Hayden (Hayden) rented the farmhouse to Hills and to the defendant. This is beyond question. Hayden testified that he rented the house to them and that the defendant paid him a $100 rental deposit. Virginia testified that Hayden had more than apparent authority to rent the house. According to Virginia, he had actual authority. And both Hills and the defendant confirm, in their motions to suppress, that they rented the farmhouse from Hayden. There is even a written receipt that memorializes the rental transaction and corroborates everyone’s position. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing to contradict the tenancy’s existence. We should begin by clearly acknowledging that the defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in her newly acquired home and that she was entitled to the fourth amendment’s promise of protection against unreasonable searches. The only question presented is whether circumstances warranted a reasonable belief that Virginia had the authority to allow a search, when officers asked her for permission to search the farmhouse. Here is why the Constitution permits certain erroneous consensual searches to stand. “ ‘Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 159-60, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1891, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949). “[I]n order to satisfy the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government *** is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 159, 110 S. Ct. at 2800. Did the officers in this case mistake Virginia’s authority to consent, while acting on facts that led sensibly to a conclusion that her consent could authorize a constitutional search of the farmhouse? In light of Hills’ belated claim of tenancy, the person with whom he claimed to have dealt, the circumstances that existed at the farmhouse, a friend who confirmed the rental transaction, and a written receipt that memorialized details of Hills’ claim, officers confronted a real possibility that Hills and the defendant were tenants with protected privacy interests in the premises. The officers confronted an uncertainty that could not lead them to sensibly conclude that Virginia, as opposed to Hills, could authorize a constitutional search by giving her permission. Simply put, the officers confronted an ambiguous situation that they chose to resolve with a guess that proved wrong. The obvious factual ambiguities that led to a consultation with a State’s Attorney also led sensibly to an entirely different course of action that reasonable law enforcement officers would have taken. With the potential that a leasehold estate existed, reasonable law enforcement officials would have pursued a less convenient, more labor-intensive course of action that would have ensured constitutional compliance. On the distinct possibility that Hayden, acting with apparent authority from his grandmother, and unbeknownst to her, rented the farmhouse to Hills and the defendant, reasonable officers of the law would have simply pursed the constitutionally favored authorization for the search of an American’s home. They would have procured a search warrant. Observations made during the protective sweep clearly provided probable cause to obtain one. Taking a handy, constitutionally uncertain path to search someone’s home, instead of using a search warrant, is not official decisionmaking that I would term “reasonable.” The erroneous reliance upon an invalid consent to search this farmhouse, given the conflicting circumstances and the obvious opportunity to procure a search warrant, does not constitute the kind of mistake that we should be willing to tolerate. Law enforcement should not be excused from making it. The fourth amendment promise deserves a little more reasonableness. What facts did the officers confront when they decided to forego a search warrant and ask for Virginia’s permission to search someone else’s residence? First of all, they had Hills’ statement that he, and the defendant, rented the farmhouse the day before from a man named Chuck Hayden and that the defendant paid Hayden $100 for a part of the first month’s rent. Hills detailed how he came into possession of the premises with knowledge of the protective sweep and its revelations. This was far more than an idle assertion. This was an admission, made with full knowledge that it spelled adverse consequence. Next, the officers had confirmation of the lease from Hills’ friend, Larry White (White). The officers had no reason to consider this a White he. Hills’ admission was also corroborated by the circumstances. It was consistent with Hills’ and the defendant’s obvious access to the farmhouse. It was consistent with the freshly stocked refrigerator. A very recent rental agreement was consistent with a truck full of furniture. And one circumstance uniquely credited Hills’ admission. The protective sweep allowed officers to know that Hills felt secure enough in his right to exclusively possess the farmhouse to erect a methamphetamine lab inside it. When the officers asked Virginia if she knew anyone named Chuck Hayden, Virginia told them that he was none other than her grandson. It would have seemed sensible to conclude at that point that Hills was being truthful about a lease transaction. Regardless of Virginia’s position about Hayden’s authority to lease, the officers could not ignore a real possibility that her grandson, clothed with the apparent authority to do so, took rent from the defendant. Virginia’s testimony conflicted with the testimony of two officers, evidence that sharply diverged over whether Virginia reported her grandson’s past rentals of the farmhouse and his authority to rent it anew. My view of this search does not depend upon who testified truthfully. However, since it is undisputed that Hayden indeed had rented out the farmhouse in the past, and since history included this simple truth about Hayden and farmhouse rental, Virginia had no reason to he about it to police officers. The majority’s view implicitly concludes that Virginia, contrary to her sworn testimony, lied to police officers about her grandson’s authority to rent the farmhouse. Next, the officers could see that the farmhouse was not run down or in a state of disrepair. The house and its grounds were maintained. The house did not have a dilapidated, unattended appearance. No one would think that it could be used without permission to run an undetected illegal drug laboratory. Hills’ physical possession of a farmhouse in this farmhouse’s condition could not lead sensibly to a conclusion that Hills was a complete interloper. The idea that Hills simply moved into the farmhouse and erected his lab there was not only belied by the condition of the house itself but by Hills’ admission about the lease, White’s corroboration of it, Hills’ claim that he dealt with Virginia’s grandson, and the surrounding circumstances consistent with a leasehold. Notwithstanding, the officers had to conclude that Hills was an interloper in order to conclude that Virginia could legally permit a search. My colleagues credit the defendant’s denials about the leasehold and residency in weighing how reasonably the officers acted. In fact, the officers always treated the denials for what they were — lies in an attempt to avoid being charged because of the methamphetamine lab. The defendant was not released from custody when she denied living there or paying any rent to Hayden. She was always treated like she was in possession of the farmhouse and its illegal drug lab. To the extent that the defendant’s custodial denials raised doubts about Hills’ admission of a leasehold, those doubts should have been quieted when the officers discovered a receipt that bore witness to Hills’ earlier claims about the details of the rental transaction. The officers found a document that acknowledged Hayden’s receipt of $100 from the defendant. Hills had earlier admitted that he rented the farmhouse from Hayden, the property owner’s grandson, and that the defendant had paid partial rent in the amount of $100. This was told to the officers before they discovered the written receipt that evidenced the details of the admitted rental transaction. Thus, Hills was further corroborated by documentary proof, before the officers decided to forego a search warrant and ask for Virginia’s consent to search. With the existence of these circumstances, the officers simply could not reasonably foreclose a possibility that Hills and the defendant possessed legitimate expectations of privacy in the farmhouse. Even if Virginia had defied history and lied about Hayden’s actual authority to rent the farmhouse, that misinformation did not end the need for further inquiry. Indeed, the officers tried to contact Hayden, presumably to ask whether he rented the farmhouse without Virginia’s permission. Even if Virginia had lied to officers about Hayden’s authority to rent the farmhouse, there remained a reasonable possibility that Hills and the defendant had engaged in the claimed transaction with Hayden. They could obtain legitimate expectations of privacy in the premises if Hayden held himself out as an agent and Hills reasonably believed that Hayden had the authority to rent the farmhouse. In light of Hills’ admission about the tenancy, White’s corroboration of it, the circumstances at the farmhouse consistent with it, the physical condition of the house itself, and the written receipt that evidenced not only the leasehold’s general existence but details about the claimed rental transaction — in light of the totality of the circumstances, asking for Virginia’s permission to search resulted in a mistake that reasonable men would not have made. The facts did not lead sensibly to their conclusion of probability that Virginia could validly consent. Reasonable law enforcement officers would have obtained a search warrant. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.