Court Opinion

ID: 9831686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:17:21.834504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.042599
License: Public Domain

On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants have filed a rather lengthy motion for rehearing, and we will proceed to discuss certain grounds urged in said motion.
The Constitution (Const. art. 5, § 18) makes the commissioners’ court the governing body for the county business proper. Jernigan v. Finley, 90 Tex. 205, 38 S. W. 24, by the Supreme Court. The Legislature of Texas saw fit, relative to the delegation of power and authority to the commissioners’ courts, to use the following language:
“Each commissioners court shall * * * provide and keep in repair court houses, jails and all necessary public buildings * * * said court shall have all such other powers and jurisdiction, and shall perform all such other duties, as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law.” Article 2351, Rev. Civ. Statutes of 1925.
In the case of Stone v. City of Wylie (Tex. Com. App.) 34 S.W.(2d) 842, 843, it is said:
“It is announced by Corpus Juris, vol. 43, § 317, p. 306, as a settled rule that courts -will not interfere with the exercise of discretionary power upon the part of the governing body of a city except in a clear case of abuse, and that where a discretion is validly vested in a municipal body, or officials, it will be assumed that tho duties are properly and lawfully performed.”
It is the duty of commissioners’ courts to “provide” courthouses and other necessary public buildings, and in connection with this power and authority, and as a component part thereof, the right is given to levy taxes for courthouse purposes. Article 2352 provides that “said court shall have the power to levy * * * not to exceed twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollar valuation in any one year” for public building purposes; article 7048 provides that “each commissioners court shall have power to levy * * * for the erection of public buildings * * * not to exceed twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollar valuation in any one year.”
The Legislature did not provide that the commissioners’ court should know the exact amount of the debt before it could levy the tax; the only limitation being the amount of the tax for that particular purpose. The 25-cent tax referred to in the statute is authorized by section 9 of article 8 of the Constitution, and is a “limitation upon the power of the legislature to authorize counties to impose taxes for such purposes.” Mitchell County v. Bank, 91 Tex. 361, 43 S. W. 880, 883, by the Supreme Court.
Power and authority of the commissioners’ court in respect to making tax levies for courthouse purposes was recognized in Cresswell Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Roberts County, 27 S. W. 737, by Judge Stephens of this court. The tax order of December 8, 1930, was and is a component part of all other orders that had been entered, and were to be entered, in respect to the creation of the indebtedness which is to be evidenced by these interest-bearing warrants. We know no good reason, and appellants have cited us to none, to show that the commissioners’ court of Young county did not have authority .to pass the tax order of December 8, 1930. The tax levy was made on December 8th; the order of December 20th merely appropriated that levy. Each and every order was- necessary in order to complete the public record of the proceedings, which show the authorization and creation of a valid debt for courthouse purposes in Young county. The fact that in the instant case the issuance of bonds is not involved does not and cannot affect the validity of the tax. By article 2368, Rev. Civ. Statutes, the commissioners’ court is required, to award contracts upon competitive bids, and which was done in respect to the contract in*366volved in this suit, as shown by the testimony of appellees’ witnesses. The .commissioners’ court adopted the plans and specifications. After the plans and specifications were adopted, full four weeks’ notice of intention to award a contract, based upon those plans and specifications,- was given, as required by article 2368. As declared by Judge Brown, in Mitchell County v. Bank, supra, and ratified by the United States Supreme Court in Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S. 506, 19 S. Ct. 715, 43 L. Ed. 1060, and also by the Texas Supreme Court in City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 112 Tex. 399, 247 S. W. 818, 821, the legislature “has the power to make all such ‘provision’ for counties and cities, or it may leave it to the officers of such corporations to make it when the debt is created ; if made by either it [the debt] is sufficient.”
Appellants say in their motion for rehearing: “We cannot conceive how your Honors can hold that the power to tax in the creation of a debt can come into existence until the amounts of the debt, its maturity, etc., have been determined.”
The exact amount of a debt, including interest thereon and time of maturity, is rarely known at the time the debt is authorized. There is always an element of uncertainty as to the maintenance of subsisting taxable values throughout the life of either a bond or warrant debt. If values are increased, then a reduction in the tax rate is permissible and authorized, so long as it does not impair the obligation of a contract. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 112 Tex. 339, 348, 247 S. W. 818, in an able opinion by Justice Greenwood.
In the case of Bloodworth v. Rhea, 280 S. W. 1070, writ of error refused, opinion by Justice Dunklin, this court sustained the validity of certain school bonds, and one of the reasons advanced by appellants in that case was that the proposition for the issuance of the bonds did not distinctly specify the rate of interest, but merely stated that the bonds would bear interest not exceeding 6 per cent.
The order of December 8, 1930, by the commissioners’ court, levied a tax of 25 cents on the $100 valuation of all taxable property for the current year, but further provided that:
“During each year thereafter while any of said warrants are outstanding and unpaid, and at the time other county taxes are levied in each of said years, there shall be computed and ascertained what rate of tax based upon the latest approved tax rolls of said county will be necessary, requisite and sufficient to fully make, raise, and produce in each of said years the amount of principal necessary to be raised for that year, plus the interest maturing in said year upon the amount of this series of warrants outstanding and unpaid and to provide ten per cent, attorney’s fees in case of default,” etc.
We think this levy was sufficient to cover the life of these bonds.
Appellants again urge that the provision of the specifications, to the effect that “bids on the furniture and cabinet work” were limited, in that “persons or firms bidding on this work shall be actually engaged in the manufacture of this class of work, and shall have been for a period of not less than five years,” tends to stifle the bidder. If cannot be successfully contended that any offer to contract for a given service does not itself limit those who are available to perform the service. The statutes limit those who can, contract with the county by requiring a posting of a surety bond. The general contractor in the instant case was required to bid on all the material and make the job complete in every detail. The specifications did not recognize as a party to the contract any subcontractor whatsoever, but gave the general contractor the right to receive bids from subcontractors who could meet, with respect to cabinet work and furniture, the reasonable requirement of being manufacturers thereof for a period of five years. All that is required by law of the commissioners’ court is that the job be submitted to competition. A substantial compliance with the statutory requirement is all that is required. Haralson v. Dallas (Tex. Civ. App.) 14 S.W.(2d) 345, 347; Headlee v. Fryer (Tex. Civ. App.) 208 S. W. 213; article 2368, Rev. Civ. Statutes.
In Headlee v. Fryer, supra, dismissed by the Supreme Court by agreement, the court held that all that was required under articles 2268a and 2268b was that the commissioners’ couft “must take such steps as are reasonably and fairly calculated to 'carry out the act.” We think the undisputed evidence shows, as found by the trial court and by this court, that there was fair and proper competition as required by article 2368. There was sharp competitive bidding by seven responsible contractors, and the bid of the lowest bidder was accepted. It has always been the law that a substantial compliance with the terms of a contract enables the party performing to enforce the same. Linch v. Lumber & Grain Elevator Co., 80 Tex. 23, 15 S. W. 208, by the Supreme Court.
In Dupuy v. Schilling (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S.W(2d). 323, application for writ of error dismissed by the Supreme Court, it was held that a finding where cost of remedying defects and supplying omissions was $200 did not preclude the finding of substantial performance, where the contract price was $1,725.
In the instant case, the bid was approximately $300,000, and the cabinet work and furniture complained of by appellants was *367but relatively a very small part thereof^ and, even if the bidding on the cabinet work and furniture was stifled, which we do not believe was done, then the contract as to the other part of the erection of the courthouse should be approved. ' However, we do not believe that the provision in the contract complained of, as shown by the record, tended to stifle competition.
There are other grounds urged by appellants, but we do not find that any sufficient grounds are offered to disturb our former -opinion, which we think was correct. Therefore the motion for rehearing is overruled.