Court Opinion

ID: 9374022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:13:40.696667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:44.206226
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 22, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-2117
                        Lower Tribunal No. 20-8291
                           ________________

                             AFP 103 Corp.,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

              Common Wealth Trust Services, LLC,
                                  Appellee.

    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R.
Manno Schurr, Judge.

      Carlton Fields, P.A., Christopher W. Smart (Tampa), Dean A. Morande
(West Palm Beach), Jose A. Loredo, Rachel A. Oostendorp and Michael G.
Zilber, for appellant.

     Silver Law, P.A., and Scott A. Silver; Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., and
Paulo R. Lima, for appellee.

     Mrachek Fitzgerald Rose Konopka Thomas & Weiss, P.A., and Manuel
Farach (West Palm Beach), for Florida Land Title Association, Inc., as
amicus curiae.

    Ausley McMullen, and Benjamin B. Bush (Tallahassee), for Florida
Home Builders Association, as amicus curiae.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

      FERNANDEZ, C.J.

      Defendant AFP 103 Corporation (“AFP”) appeals the trial court’s

“Order Granting Third-Party Plaintiff Common Wealth Trust’s Motion for Final

Summary Judgment,” as well as the trial court’s Order denying AFP’s Motion

for Rehearing or Reconsideration. For the following reasons, we affirm the

order granting Common Wealth Trust’s motion for final summary judgment.

as   well   as   the   trial   court’s   order   denying   AFP’s   motion    for

rehearing/reconsideration.1

                  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In 1981, Miami-Dade County approved the site plan for the property in

the underlying case. In 2004, South Florida Hotel, Inc., (“South Florida

Hotel”) a Florida corporation, was the fee simple title owner to all the land in

question in the underlying action. On March 29, 2004, South Florida Hotel

executed and recorded a “Declaration of Restrictive Covenants in Lieu of

Unity of Title.” The Declaration stated that the parcels would be subdivided

1
   AFP made no arguments in its Initial Brief or Reply Brief concerning the
trial court’s order denying AFP’s motion for rehearing or reconsideration with
regard to MIMM. Thus, we do not address it.

                                         2
into two separate lots: the “Non-Condominium Lot” and the “Mart

Condominium Lot.” It further stated that South Florida Hotel intended to

develop the Mart Condominium Lot “as a condominium and sell individuals

units therein.” The Declaration indicated that title to the Non-Condominium

Lot and the Mart Condominium Lot “will not remain in single ownership and

[South Florida Hotel] is therefore executing this instrument in order to assure

the County that the development of the Property with future multiple

ownership will not violate the Zoning Code of Miami-Dade County.” This

Declaration of Restrictive Covenants in Lieu of Unity of Title further stated,

in part:

      In the event of multiple ownership subsequent to site plan or
      amended site plan approval, each of the subsequent owners …
      shall be bound by the terms, provisions, and conditions of this
      instrument. Owner further agrees that it will not convey portions
      of the Property to such other parties unless said portions of the
      Property are bound by, and subject to, the Master Covenants,
      which for purposes hereof Article Four of the Master Covenants
      shall be deemed to be the “Easement and Operating Agreement”
      required by Section 33-257 of the Code of Miami-Dade County.
      ..

      Thereafter, on April 30, 2004, South Florida Hotel recorded the

“Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, Easements and

Operating Agreement for Miami International Merchandise Mart, Hotel,

Plaza and Convention Center” (“Declaration of Covenants”). In that

document, South Florida Hotel stated:

                                      3
     South Florida Hotel intends on selling individual Condominium
     Units . . . located within the Mart Condominium Lot to multiple
     purchasers. Further, [South Florida Hotel] may decide to further
     subdivide the Non-Condominium Lot in the future. Consequently,
     the Non-Condominium Lot and the Mart Condominium Lot will be
     under separate ownership. Accordingly, [South Florida Hotel]
     desires to grant and crate, on the terms and conditions
     hereinafter set forth, the cross easements and covenants
     hereinafter set forth in favor of and appurtenant to the Mart
     Condominium Lot and the Non-Condominium Lot, all as more
     particularly provided for herein.

Paragraph F of the Declaration of Covenants also referred to Miami-Dade

County Ordinance section 33-257, where it stated:

     [South Florida Hotel] entered into that certain Declaration of
     Restrictive Covenants in Lieu of Unity of Title recorded March 29,
     2004… Paragraph 3 of such Covenant in Lieu and Miami-Dade
     County Code Section 33-257 requires [South Florida Hotel] to
     create an “Easement and Operating Agreement” as a condition
     to multiple ownership of The Properties . . . Article Four hereof
     shall serve as the required “Easement and Operating
     Agreement.”

     In addition, Article 4.2 of the Declaration of Covenants provided:

     4.2 Parking within the Shared Essential Components. All of
     the parking areas that are intended to be used by Condominium
     Unit Owners and their guests, tenants, employees, licensees and
     invitees, are located within the Shared Essential Components
     which are part of the Non-Condominium Lot. Declarant, as the
     initial NCL Owner [Non-Condominium Lot Owner], shall have,
     and hereby reserves unto the NCL Owner, the exclusive right at
     any time, to grant to specific Condominium Unit Owners or other
     Owners or occupants of The Properties or to the Master
     Association or to any Condominium Association the exclusive
     right to use one or more of such parking spaces….NCL Owner
     shall accommodate, within the Shared Essential Components,
     the reasonable parking needs of the Mart Condominium Lot

                                     4
      which may be met by designation, assignment, valet parking or
      otherwise. . .

Furthermore, Article 4.3 stated, in part:

      4.3 Easements for Vehicular and Pedestrian Ingress/Egress
      over portions of the Shared Essential Components and Shared
      Facilities. …Declarant for itself and as the initial NCL Owner,
      hereby reserves and covenants for itself and for all future Owners
      of Lots within The Properties…and for all Condominium Unit
      Owners…, that the Declarant, all Owners and all Condominium
      Unit Owners…, shall have (a) a non-exclusive easement for
      vehicular ingress and egress over all private streets and
      roadways located from time to time within the Shared Essential
      Components…, and (b) a non-exclusive easement for pedestrian
      access over all lobbies, paths, walkways and stairwells located
      from time to time within the Shared Essential Components or the
      Shared Facilities which serve or are intended for the use of the
      Mart Condominium Lot, the Condominium Unit Owners or the
      general public….

Also, Article 4 provided that according to Miami-Dade County Code of

Ordinance section 33-257, South Florida Hotel “shall obtain the written

approval of the Office of the County Attorney prior to recording any

Supplemental Declaration in the Public Records of the County which amends

or modifies the provisions of this Article 4.” South Florida Hotel is the only

entity that signed the Declaration of Covenants.

      On October 3, 2005, South Florida Hotel executed a Warranty Deed

and recorded it on October 12, 2005. With this Warranty Deed, South Florida

Hotel conveyed all of the Mart Condominium and a portion of the Non-

Condominium Lot. The Non-Condominium Lot was divided into the

                                       5
Undeveloped Lot and the Convention Lot. The buyer/grantee of the

Condominium Lot and the Convention Lot was a corporation known as SF

Hotels, Inc. Along with the land, the Warranty Deed alleged to convey South

Florida Hotel’s “rights pursuant to that Declaration of Covenants, Conditions,

Restrictions, Easements and Operating Agreement for Miami International

Merchandise Mart, Hotel, Plaza and Convention Center, dated April 29, 2004

… as modified by the Supplemental Declaration of Covenants and

Conditions, dated September 30, 2005, to be recorded in the Public Records

of Miami-Dade County, Florida prior to or concurrently with this deed.”

      On November 1, 2005, South Florida Hotel recorded a Supplemental

Declaration to the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions,

Easements and Operating Agreement for Miami International Merchandise

Mart, Hotel, Plaza and Convention Center.” The first paragraph of the

Supplemental Declaration states that it “is made as of the ___ day of

September, 2005, by SOUTH FLORIDA HOTEL INC., a Florida

corporation….” All three signature pages state, “The foregoing instrument

was acknowledged before me this ___ day of September, 2005, ….” It was

signed only by South Florida Hotel. It was also signed, on pages labeled

“Consents,” by two entities associated with the Condominium Lot: “MIMM

Master Association, Inc.” and “MIMM Condominium Association, Inc.” The

                                      6
Supplemental Declaration was not signed by SF Hotels, Inc., who was the

grantee of the Condominium Lot and the Convention Lot. Furthermore, no

subsequent property owner signed the Supplemental Declaration.

      The Supplemental Declaration further stated: “Declarant desires to

supplement, modify and amend the Declaration…(b) to allocate certain

rights and obligations between the owners of [the Convention and

Undeveloped] Lots, (c) to provide for all of the rights of the Declarant and the

NCL owner to remain with the Owner of the [Convention] Lot, and (d) as

otherwise set forth herein.” The Supplemental Declaration alleged to modify

portions of Article 4 of the Declaration of Covenants, which is the “Easement

and Operating Agreement” (amending Articles 4.1(a) and 4.2). In addition,

with respect to parking, the Supplemental Declaration tried to amend the

Declaration of Covenants. The Supplemental Declaration required the

Undeveloped Lot owner to maintain a minimum number of parking spaces

for the other parcels to use. This condition was not present in the original

April 30, 2004 Declaration of Covenants. The undated Supplemental

Declaration was recorded on November 1, 2005.

      On August 11, 2009, AFP acquired the Convention Lot from SF Hotels,

Inc. Almost ten years later, on June 27, 2019, Common Wealth acquired the

Undeveloped Lot from South Florida Hotel after foreclosure. Thus, when the

                                       7
proceedings below began, Common Wealth owned the Undeveloped Lot,

and AFP owned the Convention Lot. The Condominium Lot was owned by

multiple individual condominium unit owners, who are represented by the

MIMM Condominium Association (“MIMM”).

     In February 2020, Common Wealth put a fence around the

Undeveloped Lot. MIMM’s counsel mailed a letter to Common Wealth’s

counsel alleging that condominium owners were allowed to park on the

Undeveloped Lot and demanded that they be granted access. Common

Wealth’s counsel responded in March 2020 that the easement claimed by

MIMM was invalid.

     Thereafter, in a related proceeding between MIMM and Common

Wealth, MIMM sued Common Wealth in April 2020 for damages, declaratory

and equitable relief. MIMM sued, in part, for a declaratory judgment that

Common Wealth had a duty “to maintain the Undeveloped Lot for [MIMM’s]

use as a parking lot of no less than 583 spaces” and requested that Common

Wealth be required to remove all barriers surrounding the lot. Common

Wealth moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, which the

trial court granted without prejudice for MIMM to file an amended complaint.

MIMM filed an amended complaint in October 2020. On December 22, 2020,

MIMM’s counsel moved to withdraw as counsel due to irreconcilable

                                     8
differences. While the motion to withdraw was pending, Common Wealth

filed a Counterclaim on December 29, 2020. The Counterclaim alleged one

claim to quiet title and sought as relief, in part, to “quiet and remove any and

all clouds on title with respect to MIMM’s purported easement rights in the

Undeveloped Lot.” Common Wealth also moved for a summary judgment on

January 7, 2021.

      On January 29, 2021, while MIMM’s counsel’s motion to withdraw was

still pending, MIMM filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Common

Wealth’s counterclaim. In February 2020, the trial court granted the motion

to withdraw and gave MIMM twenty days to hire new counsel. The record on

appeal does not show whether MIMM hired new counsel or not. On March

23, 2021, after the deadline for MIMM to secure new counsel passed, the

trial court held a hearing on Common Wealth’s motion for summary

judgment. The trial court entered final summary judgment for Common

Wealth on MIMM’s direct claim against Common Wealth, as well as on

Common Wealth’s counterclaim against MIMM. MIMM did not appeal this

judgment.

      Thereafter, on April 21, 2021, Common Wealth filed a Third-Party

Complaint against AFP to clear up any alleged easement rights that AFP

might claim in Common Wealth’s Undeveloped Lot. The Third-Party

                                       9
Complaint requested that the court enter judgment against AFP to remove

any clouds on title regarding AFP’s purported easement rights in the

Undeveloped Lot. Common Wealth also filed a motion for summary

judgment against AFP contending it was entitled to judgment because there

were no genuine issues of material fact regarding 1) the invalid easement

documents that AFP might rely upon in support of its claim; and 2) South

Florida Hotel’s failure to comply with the necessary conditions precedent that

were required by the easement documents to convey easement rights.

      Next, AFP filed its Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim on

June 21, 2021. In its counterclaim, AFP sought a declaration that AFP had

the right of access to the Undeveloped Lot for ingress and egress, as well as

for parking. It further sought a declaration that Common Wealth was required

to maintain the Undeveloped Lot for AFP to use as a parking lot of at least

583 spaces.

      On August 5, 2021, AFP filed its opposition to Common Wealth’s

motion for summary judgment. Also on August 5, 2022, AFP filed a Motion

for Rehearing and Reconsideration requesting that the trial court reconsider

its April 7, 2021 order entering final summary judgment against MIMM, which

MIMM never appealed. After holding a hearing in August 2021, the trial court

denied AFP’s rehearing motion due to procedural issues with timing and

                                     10
AFP’s standing to file such a motion. The trial court entered its written order

on August 25, 2021. 2

      On August 25, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Common

Wealth’s motion for summary judgment. After hearing counsels’ arguments,

the trial court granted Common Wealth’s motion. The court entered its written

order on September 30, 2021, granting final summary judgment to Common

Wealth on its complaint against AFP, as well as on AFP’s counterclaim

against Common Wealth. The trial court stated:

      [T]here are no disputed issues of material fact on Common
      Wealth Trust’s Third-Party Complaint or on AFP’s Counterclaim
      because: (1) AFP did not establish or ever prove that it had
      easement rights due to the invalidity of the Easement
      Documents; and (2) the original grantor’s failure to comply with
      necessary conditions precedent required by the Easement
      Documents to properly create or convey easement rights.

AFP did not move for rehearing, but then filed this appeal. AFP also appeals

the trial court’s October 6, 2021, order denying AFP’s motion for

reconsideration and rehearing, which dealt with the summary judgment the

trial court entered against MIMM.

                                 ANALYSIS

2
 AFP sought reconsideration of this order, which the trial court denied on
October 6, 2021.

                                      11
      Because this is an appeal from a final judgment based on an order

granting summary judgment, this Court applies a de novo standard of review.

Volusia Cty., v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla.

2000).

      AFP first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

to Common Wealth because the easement documents and deeds are valid

and enforceable. However, the rule in Florida is that one cannot, while being

owner of both a dominant and servient estate, grant an easement to oneself

in one’s own property. One Harbor Fin. Ltd. Co. v. Hynes Properties, LLC,

884 So. 2d 1039 (5th DCA 2004); Hensel v. Aurilio, 417 So. 2d 1035, 1038

(Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Morris v. Garcia, 224 So. 2d 268 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA

2017).

      In One Harbor, Hoffenberg, a property owner, built a 75,000 square-

foot building on one of two adjacent parcels of land that he owned. The parcel

of land with the building was now owned by One Harbor Financial Limited

Company (“One Harbor”), the defendant. One Harbor, 884 So. 2d at 1041.

Hoffenberg needed to comply with zoning regulations that required thirteen

additional parking spots for his new building, so he executed an “easement

agreement” that alleged to create a parking easement on the adjacent parcel

of land that he owned. Id. Hoffenberg is the only party that signed the

                                     12
“easement agreement.” Id. He then sold the parcel with the alleged parking

easement (the servient parcel) without referencing the easement and

recorded the “easement agreement” eight days after he sold the parcel. Id.

The trial court found that at the time the agreement was recorded,

Hoffenberg owned both parcels of land, thus Hoffenberg’s attempt to create

an easement over his own property was void ab initio. Id. at 1042-43. One

Harbor appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The

appellate court held, “Hoffenberg, as fee simple owner of both parcels, did

not possess the legal right to grant an easement over his own property.” Id.

at 1044. Similarly, here, because South Florida Hotel was the fee simple

owner of all the parcels, it did not possess the legal right to grant an

easement over its own property to itself.

      In addition, Miami-Dade County Code of Ordinance section 33-257

provides the specific procedures that landowners or developers must follow

to describe future easements over their land in multi-parcel developments,

“where multiple buildings are proposed for a single site.” Section 33-257,

titled “Unity of title; covenant in lieu thereof” provides that a developer or

landowner shall provide a “declaration of restrictive covenants” and the

declaration “shall contain the following necessary elements ….” § 33.257(2).

One of the necessary elements is contained in subsection (c) which states:

                                     13
      (c) That in the event of multiple ownerships subsequent to site
      plan approval, that each of the subsequent owners shall be
      bound by the terms, provisions and conditions of the declaration
      of restrictive covenants. The owner shall further agree that he or
      she will not convey portions of the subject property to such other
      parties unless and until the owner and such other party (parties)
      shall have executed and mutually delivered, in recordable form,
      an instrument to be known as an “easement and operating
      agreement” . . .

§ 22-257(2)(c), Miami Dade County, Fla., Code of Ordinances. That section

further provides, “These provisions of the easement and operating

agreement shall not be amended without prior written approval of the Office

of the County Attorney.” § 33-257(2)(c). In addition, in Persaud Properties

FL Investments, LLC v. Town of Fort Myers Beach, 310 So. 3d 493, 496 (Fla.

2d DCA 2020), the Second District Court of Appeal stated:

      Moreover, zoning ordinances, like statutes that are in derogation
      of the common law, “will not be interpreted to displace the
      common law further than is clearly necessary. Rather, the courts
      will infer that such a statute [or ordinance] was not intended to
      make any alteration other than was specified and plainly
      pronounced.”…“[T]he presumption is that no change in the
      common law is intended unless the statute is explicit in this
      regard.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). We agree with Common Wealth’s contention

that section 33-257 clarifies the common law rule set out in One Harbor; thus,

it must be narrowly construed. Accordingly, the rule in Florida that a property

owner cannot create an easement over his own property is not superseded

by section 33-257.

                                      14
      Importantly, here, the evidence does not support that the requirements

of section 33-257 were followed; thus, the alleged easement was void ab

initio. South Florida Hotel, the property owner that executed the declarations,

did not include the language from section 33.257(2)(c) that South Florida

Hotel “will not convey portions of the subject property to such other parties

unless and until the owner and such other party (parties) shall have executed

and mutually delivered, in recordable form, an instrument to be known as the

‘easement and operating agreement’ . . . .” Also, there is no evidence in the

record that the subsequent owners of the subject parcels executed and

delivered the Easement and Operating Agreement. To meet the

requirements of section 33-257, SF Hotels had to execute and record the

“Easement and Operating Agreement” when South Florida Hotel, the original

owner and developer, conveyed the Condominium Lot and Convention Lot

in October 2005 through the Warranty Deed. It did not. In fact, SF Hotels did

not execute any of the documents that AFP now claims created an easement

in its favor. As previously noted, the Declaration of Covenants contains the

signatures of MIMM Master Association, Inc. and MIMM Condominium

Association, Inc. Those were the two corporations related to the

Condominium Lot. In addition, the copy of the October 2005 Warranty Deed,

is signed only by South Florida Hotel, the original grantor. It is not signed by

                                      15
SF Hotels, which is the corporation to which South Florida Hotel conveyed

the Convention Lot.

     Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that AFP executed an

“Easement and Operating Agreement” when it acquired the Convention Lot

in August 2009. Nor is there evidence in the record that Common Wealth

executed an “Easement and Operating Agreement” when it acquired the

Undeveloped Lot in June 2019. As previously stated, the only party that

executed the “Easement and Operating Agreement” is the original grantor,

South Florida Hotel. In the Declaration of Covenants, which South Florida

Hotel executed on April 29, 2004, Paragraph F of this document stated that

Article 4 of this Declaration “shall serve as the required ‘Easement and

Operating Agreement’”, as required by section 33-257 of the Miami-Dade

County Code. Accordingly, it is clear from the record that neither AFP nor

Common Wealth executed the “Easement and Operating Agreement.”

     AFP contends that the Supplemental Declaration supports its position

that an easement was created. It alleges that the Warranty Deed conveyed

the Convention Lot from South Florida Hotel to SF Hotels. The Warranty

Deed states that the conveyance is made “pursuant to [the Declaration of

Covenants]…as modified by the Supplemental Declaration.” AFP contends

that the Supplemental Declaration “confers a parking easement requiring the

                                    16
Undeveloped Lot Owner to maintain 583 parking spaces for use by the

owners of the Convention Lot and Condominium Lot.”

     However, Common Wealth is correct that the Supplemental

Declaration was null and void. Consequently, AFP cannot use the

Supplemental Declaration to support an easement. First, if South Florida

wanted to create an easement with the Supplemental Declaration, it failed

because the Supplemental Declaration was not signed by SF Hotel when it

acquired the Convention Lot and the Condominium Lot in 2005. Section 33-

257 of the Miami-Dade County Code required SF Hotels to sign the

Supplemental Declaration.

     Second, section 33-257 states the that the provisions of the easement

and operating agreement “shall not be amended without prior written

approval of the Office of the County Attorney.” § 33-257(2)(c). Accordingly,

to modify or create another easement, SF Hotel needed the written approval

from the County Attorney’s Office to amend the original “Easement and

Operating Agreement,” something SF Hotel did not do. AFP argues that prior

written approval from the Office of the County Attorney was not required

because the Supplemental Declaration did not modify or amend the

easements. However, in the third “WHEREAS” paragraph on the first page

of the Supplemental Declaration, it states: “Declarant desires to supplement,

                                     17
modify and amend the Declaration.” Further, in the first paragraph on the

second    page   of    the Supplemental     Declaration,   it   states:   “NOW

THEREFORE, … Declarant hereby supplements, modifies and amends the

Declaration as follows: . . . .” Accordingly, AFP’s argument on this point is

not supported by the record.

      Moreover, the October 5, 2005 Warranty Deed did not convey any

easement in the Undeveloped Lot because at the time the Warranty Deed

was executed, the Supplemental Declaration was not in effect. The Warranty

Deed states that the Convention and Condominium Lot parcels were being

conveyed “pursuant to that certain Declaration of Covenants, Conditions,

Restrictions, Easements and Operating Agreement . . . as modified by the

Supplemental Declaration of Covenants and Conditions dated September

30, 2005, to be recorded in the Public Records of Miami-Dade County,

Florida, prior to or concurrently with this deed.” However, as Common

Wealth correctly contends, there is no document in the record on appeal with

that date of September 30, 2005. The Supplemental Declaration in the

record on appeal does not have a date on it in the first paragraph on the first

page of the document. The date is left blank. The day is also left blank on

the signature pages.

                                      18
      The Supplemental Declaration was recorded on November 1, 2005,

while the Warranty Deed was signed on October 3, 2005 and then recorded

on October 12, 2005. Accordingly, we agree with Common Wealth that the

Warranty Deed did not incorporate any easement from the Supplemental

Declaration because, as Common Wealth contends, a document cannot

incorporate by reference the terms of another document that has not yet

come into existence. 2000 Presidential Way, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,

326 So. 3d 64, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“[T]he doctrine of incorporation by

reference is generally limited to documents that actually exist at the time of

the incorporation. . . . ‘Incorporation by reference pulls existing material into

the new, incorporation contract; it does not push material terms into

nonexistent,     as-yet-unassented-to       future    contracts.’”).Thus,    the

Supplemental Declaration was not effective prior to its recordation.

      With respect to AFP’s argument that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in Common Wealth’s favor despite AFP’s affirmative

defenses of estoppel, laches and waivers, and unclean hands, the trial court

properly entered summary judgment on these affirmative defenses. All three

equitable defenses fail under the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s opinion in

One Harbor. One Harbor was the defendant trying to enforce the alleged

easement. It raised various affirmative defenses, including equitable

                                       19
estoppel. Id. at 1042. The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that the alleged

easement was void ab initio. The One Harbor Court stated:

      One Harbor urges this court to employ its equitable powers to
      give effect to the intent of the parties in view of fifteen years of
      uncontested use of the property, and to declare the easement
      valid, but such remedy is beyond this court’s power. Courts of
      equity simply have no power to issue rulings which they consider
      to be in the best interest of justice without regard to established
      law.

Id. at 1045. Similarly, here, the trial court found that the alleged parking

easement was void ab initio, and thus, correctly ruled that summary

judgment was proper on AFP’s affirmative defenses which were equitable in

nature.

      Finally, turning to AFP’s contention that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in Common Wealth’s favor on AFP’s implied easement

counterclaim, AFP is not entitled to an implied easement as a matter of law.

First, AFP argues that the trial court granted the summary judgment on

AFP’s counterclaim without notice. At the end of the summary judgment

hearing on August 25, 2021, the trial court stated it was granting summary

judgment in Common Wealth’s favor. AFP’s counsel did not argue to the trial

court that the summary judgment should not be limited to Common Wealth’s

direct claim. Thus, the trial court’s “Order Granting Third-Party Plaintiff

Common Wealth Trust’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment” stated that

                                       20
summary judgment was entered in favor of Common Wealth and against

AFP on Common Wealth’s Third-Party Complaint, “and on AFP’s

Counterclaim.” AFP did not move for rehearing to allow the trial court to

correct any error AFP was contending the trial court made, which AFP was

required to do. “If the error is one that first appears in the final order, the

aggrieved party must bring it to the judge’s attention by filing a motion for

rehearing.” Hamilton v. R.L. Best Intl., 996 So. 2d 233, 234 (Fla. 1st DCA

2008). Thus, because the issue was not raised below, AFP cannot raise the

issue now for the first time on appeal. Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. V. Radio Station

WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999); see also Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc.

v. City of N. Bay Village, 911 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“The

purpose for requiring a contemporaneous objection is to put the trial judge

on notice of a possible error, to afford an opportunity to correct the error early

in the proceedings, and to prevent a litigant from not challenging an error so

that he or she may later use it for tactical advantage.”).

      Second, AFP cites to Faussner v. Wever, 432 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA

1983), in support of its contention that the trial court did not give AFP notice

that it was going to address AFP’s counterclaim. However, Faussner is

distinguishable. In Faussner, the plaintiff was a buyer in a real estate contract

who sued the seller for specific performance. Id. at 101. The seller

                                       21
counterclaimed for liquidated damages. Id. The seller moved for summary

judgment on the plaintiff’s specific performance claim but not on the seller’s

counterclaim for liquidated damages. The trial court granted summary

judgment in the defendant seller’s favor on the plaintiff’s specific

performance claim, as well as on the defendant’s counterclaim for liquidated

damages. The plaintiff appealed. Id.

      The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment

on the counterclaim based on lack of notice, concluding that the plaintiff had

no indication the liquidated damages counterclaim would be addressed at

the hearing. The appellate court noted that “the counterclaim was not

addressed by any motion . . . .” Id. at 102. Here, AFP was asserting the

counterclaim, and AFP made the trial court aware of AFP’s counterclaim

before the trial court held the hearing on Common Wealth’s motion for

summary judgment. AFP argued in its response to Common Wealth’s motion

for summary judgment that summary judgment should not be entered in

Common Wealth’s favor because AFP had asserted counterclaims for

prescriptive easement and implied easement. Accordingly, unlike the plaintiff

in Faussner, AFP cannot claim to not have notice when Common Wealth

raised the issue at the summary judgment hearing. Thus, the trial court did

not err in granting summary judgment on AFP’s counterclaim.

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     For these foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s “Order Granting

Third-Party Plaintiff Common Wealth Trust’s Motion for Final Summary

Judgment.” AFP is not entitled to an easement by virtue of the Declaration

of Covenants because that document is invalid as a matter of law. In

addition, the Supplemental Declaration also fails for the reasons previously

discussed. We also affirm the trial court’s order denying AFP’s motion for

rehearing or reconsideration.

     Affirmed.

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