Court Opinion

ID: 9927278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 18:00:37.419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.483811
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _____________

                                      No. 22-2297
                                     _____________

                     UNITED RENTALS NORTH AMERICA INC

                                             v.

                 LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                  Appellant
                              ______________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                              For the District of New Jersey
                                (D.C. No. 2-19-cv-17169)
                      District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
                                    ______________

                    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on
                                 December 6, 2023

               Before: SHWARTZ, CHUNG, and McKEE, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: January 26, 2024)
                               ______________________

                                       OPINION
                                ______________________

McKEE, Circuit Judge


  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
       Defendant appeals an order granting partial summary judgment on its declaratory

judgment claim. The District Court declared that Defendant “is obliged to defend”

Plaintiff in another proceeding and “must reimburse” Plaintiff for any costs Plaintiff has

already incurred in defending that proceeding pursuant to the terms of an insurance

policy.1

       The order did not dispose of all the claims in the case. Moreover, the District

Court did not certify the order as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

Accordingly, we do not have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Defendant

attempts to pirouette around this bar by arguing that the District Court’s order effectively

grants injunctive relief and, therefore, comes within our appellate jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We disagree.

                                             I.2
       Defendant is correct that an order can be injunctive even when it does not appear

to be on its face.3 But to be injunctive, an order must satisfy certain requirements.4 An

1
  App. 18.
2
  “We always have jurisdiction to consider our own jurisdiction, and our review is
plenary.” Zenith Ins. Co. v. Newell, 78 F.4th 603, 606 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
3
  See Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 669 (3d Cir. 2016) (“In a
determination of whether an order is injunctive, . . . what counts is what the court actually
did, not what it said it did.”).
4
  Zurn Indus., LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F.4th 321, 326–27 (3d Cir. 2023) (“Under a
functionalist approach, an order is an injunction if it is directed to a party, enforceable by
contempt, and designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought
by a complaint in more than a temporary fashion.”) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.,
867 F.2d 1455, 1465 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc)).

                                              2
order that merely “defines an insurer’s contractual obligations” is not injunctive.5 As we

recently reiterated, an order declaring the meaning of a contract is injunctive only if it

either “explicitly provides” that it is “enforceable by contempt” or “mandates, in the text

of the order, that some action be taken to effectuate the declaratory relief.”6

       Here, the District Court’s order does neither. The order states that Defendant

“must reimburse” Plaintiff for previously incurred defense costs.7 But this mandate—

which merely “compels the payment of money that is past due or compels specific

performance of a past due monetary obligation”—reflects a legal remedy, not an

injunctive remedy.8 The remainder of the order states that Defendant “is obliged to

defend” Plaintiff.9 The District Court’s use of passive voice makes it difficult to read this

portion of the order as a mandate.

       Indeed, the District Court’s order is indistinguishable from the orders in American

Motorists Insurance Co. v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc.,10 Zurn Industries, LLC v. Allstate

Insurance Co.,11 and Zenith Insurance Co. v. Newell.12 In each of those cases, we

5
  Newell, 78 F.4th at 608.
6
  Id. at 609.
7
  App. 18.
8
  Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Pell v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Inc., 539 F.3d 292, 307 (3d Cir. 2008)).
9
  App. 18.
10
   879 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1989) (order reciting that “the motion for partial
summary judgment brought by [the defendant] with respect to the issue of the obligation
[of the plaintiff] to provide a defense is granted”).
11
   75 F.4th at 325 (ordering that a motion for partial summary judgment be granted
“insofar as [the plaintiff] seeks a declaration that [the defendant] must pay defense
costs”).
12
   78 F.4th at 606 (ordering that the plaintiff “has a duty to defend” the defendant).

                                              3
determined that an interlocutory declaratory judgment order could not be construed as

injunctive.

       On the other hand, the District Court’s order is unlike the orders in Aleynikov v.

Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.13 and Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Insurance Co.,14 which are

the two Third Circuit precedents Defendant cites in support of its argument.15 In

Aleynikov, the order not only defined one party’s obligation to defend the other but also

appointed a magistrate judge to supervise the first party’s payments of the second party’s

defense costs on an ongoing basis.16 And in Ramara, the appealed order was not an order

entering declaratory relief at all, but a subsequent order effectuating a previously issued

declaratory judgment.17 Accordingly, as in American Motorist, Zurn, and Newell, we lack

appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s interlocutory order.18

                                             II.

       For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal.

13
   765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
14
   814 F.3d 660 (3d Cir. 2016).
15
   Defendant also cites our nonprecedential opinion in Nautilus Insurance Co. v. 200
Christian Street Partners, LLC, 819 F. App’x 87 (3d Cir. 2020), as well as a number of
cases from other courts of appeal. But as we explained in Newell, whatever persuasive
value Nautilus could have had is nullified by our prior contrary and precedential decision
in American Motorists. See Newell, 78 F.4th at 609 n.7. And we see no need to resort to
the precedents of other courts when our own precedents clearly and comprehensively
address the issue at hand.
16
   765 F.3d at 356 n.1.
17
   814 F.3d at 668.
18
   We lack appellate jurisdiction for a second reason. Because the underlying actions
have been resolved, and thus the need for prospective relief no longer exists, the order
addressing the duty to defend is not immediately appealable. Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Westfield Ins. Co., 73 F.4th 239, 242-44 (4th Cir. 2023).

                                              4