Court Opinion

ID: 9672197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:50:43.093603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.729459
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with Justice O’Hara’s conclusion that the common-law rule “ ‘that an infant under seven years of age is incapable of contributory negligence,’ ” “was and is * * * the rule in Michigan.” (Emphasis ours.)
I agree with my Brother’s disposition of appellant’s claimed error number one referring to the court’s refusal to direct a verdict' and appellant’s *506claimed error number two referring to the instruction in re emergency doctrine.
Appellant’s third and last “Statement of Questions Involved” does not refer to the court’s refusal to instruct that plaintiff, being a minor child of six years, could not be charged with contributory negligence, but, rather, complains about the court’s instruction in regard to the “possible violation by plaintiff of the ‘rules of the road.’ ”
Under this third assignment, plaintiff calls attention to the court’s instruction that:
“I should point out to you that if either driver has been guilty of violating any of these statutes, that that would be negligence per se, or negligence in and of itself. It is thereafter necessary for you to determine from the facts whether or not the violation of the statute was a proximate cause of any of the injuries or damages which later resulted. And then I must limit that further by—in Billy’s case, determining—having you determine whether or not the violation of that statute was the proximate cause of any contributory negligence on his part. But further, whether or not a person of the age, ability, discretion, judgment and so forth of Billy would have violated such a statute under the same or similar conditions.”
In regard to this instruction, plaintiff contends:
“The trial court committed reversible error in his instructions upon the significance of possible violation by plaintiff of the ‘rules of the road.’
“Michigan has long followed the rule that violation of one of the statutes generically referred to as ‘rules of the road’ is negligence per se.
“We have likewise long recognized that in negligence cases involving children, the standard of care to be required of the child is that degree ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, intelligence, and experience.
*507“When a child is charged with negligence because of violation of one of the rules of the road, these two principles collide and must be reconciled.
“Although we find no Michigan case recognizing the conflict and dealing with its reconciliation, the weight of authority throughout the country is that the first principle must yield to the second. The generally applied measure of whether the child is guilty of contributory negligence prevails: Has he exercised that degree of care normally to be observed in children of the same age, experience and intelligence ? The statute allegedly violated is merely evidence of negligence, and the' function of the jury is to determine whether children of the same class as the child before the court normally have the capacity to know of, understand and obey the statute. * * *
“The jury was thus instructed in the first instance ■that the statutes which had been read to the jury by the trial judge established a standard of care which both ‘drivers’ were required to measure up to, and that either was guilty of negligence per se if he had violated one of these statutes. The balance of the court’s instruction must certainly have left the jury with the impression that the only way in which the harshness of the rule could be tempered for this plaintiff, of age 6 years, 10-1/2 .months, was by some unexplained manipulation of the proximate canse rule.”
The above quotation of appellant discloses that he understood and is not challenging our holding in Tyler v. Weed, 285 Mich 460, and, in-fact, appellant does not cite or refer to the Tyler Case in his brief.
I cannot agree with my Brother’s conclusion that since Tyler v. Weed, supra, confusion has existed with both bench and bar as to whether a plaintiff six years of age or over can be guilty of contributory negligence.
Syllabus 1 in Tyler v. Weed could not more clearly spell out the rule that has existed, without' one appeal *508to this Court asking for clarification, in the 25 years since that 1938 decision. Said syllabus reads:
“In minor’s action against motorist to recover for injuries he sustained when six years and eight months of age while crossing a street on his way home from school, instruction leaving question of his contributory negligence for jury which was also instructed to consider his age, ability, intelligence and experience in determining whether he conducted himself as a child of his age, ability and understanding would reasonably have been expected to, under like circumstances, held, not reversible error.”
The first three paragraphs of Chief Justice Wiest’s majority opinion discloses that after considering Justice McAllister’s 29-page opinion analyzing and discussing all previous cases (including Easton v. Medema, 246 Mich 130, and Mollica v. Michigan Central R. Co., 170 Mich 96 [LRA 1917F, 118]) the majority of this Court rejected the common-law rule advocated by Justice McAllister’s minority opinion. Those three paragraphs of Chief Justice Wiest’s opinion are as follows (p 490):
“I cannot join in the holding that a boy, six years and seven months of age, cannot, under any circumstances, be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of fact, nor can I subscribe to the statement that:
“ ‘In Michigan, the common-law rule is reaffirmed, and children under the age of seven years are conclusively presumed to be incapable of [contributory] negligence.’
“The common-law rule with reference to nonre-sponsibility of children under seven years of age, related to criminal acts and ought not, by analogy, because wholly lacking in similarity, be applied to negligence.”
*509The trial court in the instant case did not err in following the majority opinion. The judgment should b.e affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Dethmers, J., concurred with Kelly, J.