Court Opinion

ID: 9732570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:26:25.849127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.360084
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I believe, after fulfilling my statutory obligation of independent review,1 that the record discloses arguable ineffectiveness by appellant’s trial counsel during the penalty phase of the trial proceedings. Consequently, this Court properly raised the effective assistance issue, sua sponte, during oral argument. I am, however, unable to resolve the issue of whether that arguable ineffectiveness was prejudicial to appellant in the face of appellate counsel’s unquestionable ineffectiveness in failing to raise any issues concerning the penalty phase during either the original argument or reargument. In short, I can see an argument; but in the absence of advocacy, I am unable and unwilling to resolve its effect. The court appointed post-tri*477al and appellate counsel admitted at argument that he raised only those ineffectiveness issues appellant himself pointed out and trial counsel included in post-trial motions, that he had not read the United States Supreme Court’s cases on capital punishment in preparation for this case and had never tried a homicide. This coupled with the lack of any argument by anyone regarding the penalty phase, convinces me that we have here the rare case where defendant was effectively denied basic due process because of the absence of even minimally competent appellate advocacy. Accordingly, I would remand to Common Pleas for appointment of new counsel and a hearing on ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase of the trial.
It is well-settled that a criminal defendant is entitled, under the due process clause, to effective assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing as well as during the trial itself. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 125 n. 12, 377 A.2d 140, 145 n. 12 (1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 1205, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion, Stevens, J.). Of course, ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of a capital case may be quite literally a matter of life and death. Moreover, since the Pennsylvania death penalty statute requires our independent review of the matter we must be especially careful in considering this issue.
At appellant’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel cited two mitigating circumstances: that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal conduct and that he was operating under an extreme emotional disturbance when he killed Shelby Jean Storm. The assistant district attorney stipulated to the first mitigating circumstance but not to the second. However, defense counsel offered no testimony, lay or expert, for his client, on the mitigation issue at the penalty hearing.2 Therefore, the jury was left only with *478defense counsel’s bald statement concerning the existence of mitigating circumstances. This is arguable ineffectiveness.3
In addition, the Commonwealth made the following statement during the hearing with respect to aggravating circumstances in the Storm killing:
*479We would ask that the testimony of Maria Martin, the witness the jurors heard on Thursday of last week, be admitted and stipulated to as if she were recalled at this hearing. It is the Commonwealth’s position that if she were recalled, since she was subjected to both direct and cross-examination, that her testimony would be the same, and that as such, were we to call her now we would do nothing more than elicit the same testimony from her that she has previously given in this Court. We would feel that her testimony would give one of the set forth aggravating circumstances under the Crimes Code, that circumstance being that in the commission of the offense, the offense being the killing of Shelby Jean Storm, that the defendant, Richard Stoyko, knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person, the other person being Maria Martin, in addition to the victim, Shelby Storm, of the offense.
N.T. at 288 (February 2, 1981). Appellant’s trial counsel stated that he did not object to that stipulation. The jury could have arguably and fairly construed this as an admission of the aggravating circumstance.
Moreover, I cannot agree with the majority that any mistaken belief on the jury’s part that defense counsel admitted the proffered aggravating circumstance was dispelled by counsel’s closing argument. That argument was lackluster at best. Defense counsel did not argue against the aggravating circumstance which the jury might reasonably have concluded he admitted by stipulation. He merely told the jury that it must decide whether Ms. Martin was in danger. He thus focused the jury on the element of risk to Ms. Martin rather than on whether appellant knowingly created it. The obvious inference which counsel might have asked the jury to draw is that because of appellant’s emotional state, he was fixated on Ms. Storm and unaware that his actions endangered Ms. Martin. Furthermore, he never even mentioned appellant’s intoxication in discussing appellant’s emotional state. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 308 which provides:
*480Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such conditions be introduced to negative the element of intent of the offense, except that evidence of such intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder.
1972, Dec. 6, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, as amended, 1976, April 7, P.L. 72, No. 32, § 1.
Trial counsel’s failure to submit any evidence at the penalty stage coupled with his stipulation to the only aggravating circumstance presented by the Commonwealth is disturbing. I am particularly concerned with trial counsel’s arguable stipulation to the aggravating circumstance because our statute says “the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.” See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(iv) (emphasis added).
Again, I cannot state that counsel’s failure to present mitigating testimony was necessarily ineffective assistance under our standards. Moreover, I do not wish to encourage defense counsel to conjure mitigating circumstances from nothing in capital cases. I am also not convinced that stipulation to an aggravating circumstance never has a reasonable basis. Nevertheless, given the lack of proper appellate advocacy in this case I cannot determine the reasonableness, or effect on the jury, of either counsel’s stipulation or the absence of mitigating testimony without the record of an adversarial evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
At the first argument this Court was troubled by the failure of either trial counsel or newly appointed appellate counsel to raise any issues regarding the penalty phase of *481the trial.4 Upon consideration of this case after that first oral argument it became apparent to the Court that the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness warranted further inquiry. We therefore ordered reargument. Unfortunately, appellate counsel failed to address the quality of trial counsel’s representation during the penalty stage and, thus, reargument did not serve to significantly advance our inquiry into the matter.5 Appellate counsel’s seemingly inexplicable failure to raise the ineffectiveness issue at reargument, in turn, shifts the focus of the Court’s inquiry to the quality of his own advocacy.
The defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel throughout the appellate process. Commonwealth v. Murray, 452 Pa. 282, 305 A.2d 33 (1973). See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). There is, of course, a presumption that counsel is competent and an ineffectiveness claim will succeed only if sustained by the record or other credible evidence. Commonwealth v. Murray, supra. In evaluating such a claim “the issue is whether the accused’s rights have been adequately protected.” Id. See Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, supra. The hearing court measures the quality of both appellate and trial advocacy by the same standard, that is, it must determine if the strategy chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his *482client’s interests. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 142, 371 A.2d 468, 474 (1977). Counsel is not required to advance a baseless claim on appeal. Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 299, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (1980). Therefore, appellate counsel is ineffective only if he fails to raise an issue which is arguably meritorious. Id.
I believe the record in this case shows that Stoyko’s trial counsel was arguably, if not in fact, ineffective. Therefore appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue unless his failure to do so was reasonably calculated to promote Stoyko’s best interests. In evaluating appellate counsel’s representation, I am mindful that:
The artistry of the advocate is difficult to judge retrospectively because the elements influencing judgment usually cannot be captured on the record. The kaleidoscopic range of possibilities often seem [sic] limitless, and it is proverbial that the finest ideas emerge on the way back from the courthouse. The advocate’s work, therefore, is not readily capable of later audit like a bookeeper’s [sic]. Of course, not all the activity of the advocate has this highly subjective quality. It is possible to examine the sufficiency of his preparation and the adequacy of his knowledge of the relevant law.
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736-737 (3d Cir.1970) (en banc). Therefore, while a reviewing court may often find it difficult, using hindsight, to judge the wisdom of counsel’s tactics and overall strategy,6 it can, and should, *483determine counsel’s minimal, basic professional competence which can be measured according to objective criteria.7
Here, the counsel appointed to argue ineffectiveness told this Court on reargument that he reviewed the record and did not find any additional grounds on which to challenge either the conviction or the death sentence beyond those raised by appellant pro se. He further informed this Court, by my recollection, that in preparing to represent appellant he did not familiarize himself with the case law dealing with the death penalty. Finally, neither he nor trial counsel raised any issue concerning the penalty phase of this capital case. I cannot countenance this obvious lack of preparation and diligence. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 282, 372 A.2d 687, 698 (1977), (“‘sloth or lack of awareness of the available alternatives’ may constitute ineffectiveness” [citation omitted]). Moreover, appellate counsel’s incompetent performance at oral argument was not the “representation in the role of an advocate” which we require. Commonwealth v. Stone, 437 Pa. 496, 497, 264 A.2d 406 (1970) (quoting Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675, 78 S.Ct. 974, 975, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060 [1958]).
Under our adversarial system, the choice of strategy and tactics is within counsel’s discretion and, ordinarily, the reviewing court will not second guess counsel’s judgment. However, in exercising forebearance, the court operates under the presumption that counsel has made informed tactical decisions. We demand competence of criminal defense counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. There*484fore, we require that counsel be fully informed of all defenses which could be interposed on his client’s behalf.
Criminal defense attorneys have a “ ‘duty to investigate carefully all defenses of fact and of law that may be available to the defendant____’” ... If counsel’s failure to perform these obligations results in the withdrawal of a crucial or potentially meritorious defense “ ‘the defendant has not had the assistance to which he is entitled.’ ”
People v. Pope, 28 Cal.3d 412, 425, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 739, 590 P.2d 859, 866 (1979) (citations omitted).
In the case before us, the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness at the penalty phase of the trial proceedings has arguable merit. Appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue, or any other objection to the penalty hearing, at oral argument is attributable to his incompetence in neglecting to educate himself with respect to the pertinent law. Accordingly, his “decision” not to raise any objections to the penalty phase was based on ignorance, not reason. That there may exist a reasonable basis to justify the course of action taken by counsel is irrelevant. The court cannot supply a rationale to support counsel’s decisions. The appellant was entitled to an informed advocate during appellate proceedings. I would remand the case in order to provide appellant with representation of the caliber required to adequately protect his rights and interests.

. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h) provides:
(h) Review of death sentence.—
(1) A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules.
(2) In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate the sentence of death and remand for the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence.
(3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
(i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;
(ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d); or
(iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant.

. In Commonwealth v. Walzack, we noted that this Court has long recognized the propriety of psychiatric evidence at the penalty stage:
"It is, of course, true that the jury is entitled to be informed of all the circumstances and conditions properly to be regarded as relevant to the determination of the penalty; therefore it has been held *478that testimony concerning the mental incapacity of a defendant charged with murder, even though short of insanity, is admissible for that purpose: Commonwealth v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa. 231, 169 A. 439; Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 421, 422, 196 A. 5, 7, 355 Pa. at 359, 50 A.2d at 329.”
468 Pa. 210, 220 n. 15, 360 A.2d 914, 919 n. 15 (1976) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 559, 50 A.2d 328, 329 [1947] ). See also Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 499 Pa. 106, 451 A.2d 1344 (1982).

. In People v. Frierson, 25 Cal.3d 142, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587 (1979), defendant’s sole defense at trial was diminished capacity. The defense argued that because defendant had ingested drugs on the day he committed homicide and, allegedly, robbery, he could not form the specific intent to commit either first degree murder or robbery. However, trial counsel failed to properly develop his client's only defense and, therefore, the California Supreme Court ruled that the evidence of diminished capacity presented at trial was too insubstantial to-require submission of the defense to the jury. 599 P.2d at 596. The Court determined that counsel’s lack of diligence constituted ineffective representation without speculating as to the likely prejudicial impact of counsel’s omissions.
Here, it is uncontradicted that although counsel knew that his client assertedly had used drugs, including angel dust, during the day of the crimes in question, yet he failed to seek or secure either a psychiatric examination or other expert evaluation on the probable effect of that drug upon defendant's mental condition at the time of the offenses. In a capital case a reasonably diligent preliminary investigation of this type is necessary to provide the factual framework within which to make a competent, informed tactical decision regarding the most effective presentation of a diminished capacity defense. (See, e.g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Crim. Justice, Stds. Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function (Approved Draft 1971) std. 4.1 and com. at p. 227.)
599 P.2d at 599.
Unlike the California court I am unwilling to infer prejudice from the simple failure to meet required standards of legal competence. However, where one counsel’s failure to meet those standards leaves a defendant, sentenced to death, without advocacy of any issues concerning ineffectiveness at the penalty phase and where the arguable merit of such issues is apparent to me from my statutorily mandated independent review, I am compelled to seek a remand for appointment of new counsel so that we may determine the ineffectiveness issues on a record developed by true adversaries.

. Stoyko’s Motion for New Trial and in Arrest of Judgment raised . only the issues of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in not moving for a change of venue and in failing to move to suppress several inculpatory statements by Stoyko. Stoyko’s appellate brief raises the following issues: whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and against the law, whether the court erred in consolidating the cases for trial and whether the court erred in admitting certain Commonwealth exhibits into evidence. I agree with the majority that none of these have merit.

. At the reargument trial counsel stated merely that he entered a stipulation generally to avoid repetition of Ms. Martin’s damaging trial testimony. However, he acknowledged that he did not consider the possibility that the particular stipulation entered could appear to the jury as an admission that Ms. Storm’s testimony did, in fact, establish the aggravating circumstance of knowingly creating a grave risk of death to another person.

. In part because of the difficulty of evaluating strategical and tactical decisions objectively, appellate courts are reluctant to adjudge counsel incompetent on the basis of strategic or tactical errors. See Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 Colum.J.L. & Soc.Probs. 1:1, 19 (1977). However, in some cases an overall fairness or totality of the circumstances approach may be necessary in evaluating counsel’s competence. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has reached the following conclusion:
We do not find that any one of the specified actions or omissions in the conduct of the trial would in itself constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Many of them might well be justified as proper trial tactics. But the totality of the omissions and errors, and particularly the futile closing argument, clearly reflect a pro *483forma defense and a lack of adequate representation in the preparation and trial of the case. Appellant has sustained his burden of establishing his claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597, 604 (D.C.Cir.1970).

. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that:
if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).