Court Opinion

ID: 9397167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 18:04:26.111449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.016745
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/24/23 In re Jonathan N. CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 In re JONATHAN N. et al.,                                    B319063
 Persons Coming Under the                                     (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                          Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                              19CCJP05125,
                                                              19CCJP05125A,
                                                              19CCJP05125B)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

     v.
 DIANA O., et al.,

      Defendants and
 Respondents.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Affirmed.
      Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Diana O.
      Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal for Defendant and Appellant Jonathan N.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                         INTRODUCTION
       Children J., age two, and N., eight months, were detained
from mother Diana O. (mother) and father Jonathan N.1 (father)
in August 2019 and placed with their maternal grandmother.
Mother and father failed to reunify with the children, and
reunification services were terminated in September 2021. In
March 2022, under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26,2 the juvenile court terminated parental rights over the
parents’ objection that the parental-benefit exception applies.
The parents appealed.
       We affirm. Although mother’s visitation with the children
was consistent and pleasant, she did not offer evidence showing
that continuation of the relationship would benefit the children
or that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental
to the children. Father forfeited his claims by failing to argue
below that the parental benefit exception applies to him, and he
also failed to present sufficient evidence to support the parental-
benefit exception.

1     Father’s name is also spelled “Jonathon” in parts of the
record on appeal.
2     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Initial proceedings
      The children came to the attention of the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in
June 2019, when J. was two years old and N. was seven months
old.3 DCFS received a report that on June 9, father “was
frustrated with child [J.] crying and punched the child once on
the leg.” The report stated that father had been “physically
aggressive” with mother, and mother suspected father was using
drugs.
      On June 20, 2019, a children’s social worker (CSW) met
with mother and the children at their home while father was out.
Mother reported that father had punched J. on the leg because he
was crying, but said it did not leave a bruise and father did not
intend to cause harm. Mother said it was an isolated incident,
and father had never spanked J. Mother also said that a couple
of weeks earlier, father pulled on mother’s arm during an
argument. Mother called law enforcement, who removed father
from the home so he could cool off. Mother said father had been
under stress lately, and when he was not stressed, everything
was fine. Mother denied ongoing domestic violence. The children
had no visible marks or bruises, and appeared happy and
comfortable in mother’s presence.
      The CSW met with father at the DCFS office the same day.
Father denied that he punched J., saying instead that he
“spanked” him while he was having a tantrum; the open-handed
slap landed on J.’s ankle. Father denied any domestic violence
with mother. He stated that in a recent incident, he and mother

3     There had been one previous referral for the family in May
2018, which was deemed unfounded.

                                3
were arguing. Mother blocked the door and refused to let him
leave, so he moved mother by grabbing her arm and leg. Father
stated that long hours from his previous job had caused
relationship problems with mother; he had recently quit his job
and he was unemployed. Father said that the children’s
maternal grandmother (MGM) interfered a lot with the children.
Father was on parole; his parole agent said father had been doing
well on his parole until about two months earlier, when he tested
positive for methamphetamine and he and mother began having
relationship problems. Father’s drug test dated June 27 was
positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana
metabolites. DCFS found the family to be at high risk of future
abuse or neglect, and stated that it was seeking court oversight to
monitor the safety of the children.
       On August 12, 2019, DCFS filed a petition under section
300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j). Counts a-1, b-1, and j-1
alleged that father physically abused J. by striking his leg, which
was excessive, and that the physical abuse created an
environment that endangered the safety of both children. Counts
a-2 and b-2 alleged that father and mother engaged in a violent
physical altercation in which father pulled mother’s arm, and the
violent conduct by father endangered the children’s physical
health and safety. Count b-3 alleged that father had a history of
substance abuse and was a current user of amphetamine,
methamphetamine, and marijuana, which interfered with
father’s ability to care for the children. Count b-3 further alleged
that mother knew of father’s substance abuse and failed to
protect the children.
       A last-minute information filed August 13 stated that on
August 11, mother and father were involved in another domestic

                                 4
violence incident in the presence of the children in which mother
hit father. Mother had been arrested and she was in jail. DCFS
recommended that the children be detained from both mother
and father. The court ordered the children detained on August
13, 2019 and ordered reunification services for the family.
B.     Adjudication
       A jurisdiction/disposition report filed August 30, 2019
stated that the children had been placed with MGM. The parents
had not made themselves available to DCFS. Neither mother nor
father had contacted DCFS to set up visitation with the children.
       MGM reported that the family lived with her before the
case began. MGM said that several times a week she heard
father verbally abuse and possibly hit mother while they were in
their bedroom; MGM tried to intervene but at times she was
unable to enter the bedroom. MGM said that when she was able
to, she would remove the children from the bedroom so they
would not witness the domestic violence. MGM said she also
heard father yell at and possibly spank J. MGM reported that
she was able to care for the children, but J. cried at night because
he wanted mother.
       A last-minute information filed September 16, 2019 stated
that DCFS had been able to contact mother. Mother denied the
allegation that father hit J.’s leg, stating that father was
attempting to spank J., but J. moved. Mother admitted that she
and father “fight like cats and dogs,” including pushing and
pulling each other. Mother said she believed police had been
called seven times, and she had been arrested once because she
left marks on father. Mother’s criminal case for spousal battery
was pending. Mother said she was participating in parenting
classes, and she had inquired about individual therapy. Mother

                                 5
said she was willing to comply with court orders and cooperate
with DCFS. Mother said she suspected father was using drugs,
but father denied it when she asked.
       A last-minute information filed October 8, 2019 stated that
parents had both attended a team meeting on September 26 and
were seen walking together afterward, even though there was a
criminal protective order requiring mother to stay away from
father and the CSW had spoken to both parents about the
importance of complying with that order. Father still had not
agreed to be interviewed about the allegations. The last-minute
information did not describe any visits between the parents and
children. Father had not provided information about the person
he requested to monitor the visits. When the CSW offered to
have visits monitored by MGM, father declined.
       A last-minute information filed December 9, 2019 stated
that father had not submitted to drug testing. Five drug test
results from September 27 to November 26 stated that father was
a no-show each time. Father had not visited the children, stating
that his work schedule prevented visits. Father still had not
spoken with the CSW about the allegations. Father had
completed nine sessions of a parenting class.
       Mother had completed 10 sessions of a parenting class, and
she had started attending domestic violence classes. Mother had
been visiting the children, and the visits were going well. Mother
said she wanted to work on her relationship with father, but
because the criminal protective order was still in place, they were
not living together.
       At the adjudication hearing December 9, 2019, the juvenile
court sustained the petition as amended by interlineation; the
amended petition is not in the record on appeal. The court’s

                                6
minute order states that counts b-2 and b-3 were sustained as
amended regarding mother and father; counts a-1, b-2, and j-1
were dismissed. The court declared the children dependents of
the court under section 300, subdivision (b). The court ordered
reunification services for the parents, and stated that mother’s
visitation with the children could be unmonitored within MGM’s
home, and monitored outside the home. Father’s visits were to
remain monitored.
C.     Reunification period
       A status review report filed May 12, 2020 stated that the
children remained living with MGM and were doing well. J. had
developmental delays and was receiving therapy.
       A new incident had been reported to the child protection
hotline on March 25, 2020. The reporter stated that father and
mother lived together in paternal grandmother’s (PGM’s) home.
On March 24, 2020 father slapped mother and punched PGM on
the eye; father was arrested. When the CSW relayed this
allegation to father, he initially denied it, but later said that
following an argument with mother he was arrested for being
under the influence of a controlled substance. Mother also denied
the allegation, but the CSW stated that a “pertinent collateral”
confirmed that the information in the report was accurate.
Father’s parole officer confirmed that father had been arrested in
March.
       Both parents maintained consistent visitation with the
children; their visits were monitored by MGM, who reported no
concerns. Mother had attended some medical and therapy visits
for J. Mother had also completed parenting classes and was
attending domestic violence classes, but she had not started
individual counseling. Father was discharged from a substance

                                7
abuse program in March 2020 without completing it. Father had
been arrested in March 2020 for being under the influence of a
controlled substance. Father’s drug test results from December
9, 2019 to April 29, 2020 had one negative test and nine no-
shows.
       An interim review report filed August 31, 2020 stated that
MGM reported that the children continued having consistent
visitation with their parents; MGM had no concerns. Mother
continued to attend medical and therapy appointments for J.
Mother maintained regular contact with the CSW, she had
completed eight of ten domestic violence classes, and she had
enrolled in individual counseling. Mother had monitored and
unmonitored visits with the children, and no issues were
reported. Father had “limited to no contact with [the] CSW.”
Father was not enrolled in a substance abuse program, he was
not completing drug tests, he had been discharged from his
domestic violence program for missing sessions, and he was about
to be discharged from an anger management program for failing
to participate.
       The interim review report stated that father had the
criminal protective order lifted, and mother and father now
resided together. DCFS determined that the family was still at
high risk for future abuse or neglect, and recommended ongoing
reunification services. At the review hearing on September 9,
2020, the juvenile court ordered continuing reunification services,
and set a date for a permanency planning hearing. (§ 366.21,
subd. (f).)
       A status review report filed February 17, 2021 stated that
the children remained living with MGM and were doing well.
Mother was consistent with her monitored and unmonitored

                                8
visitation, and she “interacts well with both children as she plays
with them with their toys.” Father was “semi-consistent” with
visitation, and was “appropriate” during visitation. However,
MGM reported that when mother and father visited the children
together on December 29, 2020, they asked MGM what she does
with the funding she receives from caring for the children. MGM
replied that she had discussed the issue with the CSW and did
not need to answer to them. Father “raised his voice and said he
was going to do everything possible to have the children
removed.” The CSW informed mother and father that they could
no longer visit together, and the visits would no longer occur at
MGM’s home. The court had ordered three visits per week for
father; in January 2021, father had visited on the 8th, 15th, and
17th. Specific dates of other visits are not included in the report.
       At the hearing on March 10, 2021, the court continued
reunification services for the parents, and ordered an
unmonitored 29-day visit for mother if DCFS confirmed that
father had moved out. Father’s visits were to remain monitored
and separate from mother’s visits. The court set an 18-month
review hearing for September 9, 2021.
       The extended visit with mother never occurred. Although
it appeared that father had moved his belongings out of the room
he and mother shared, the CSW was unsure he had actually
vacated the apartment, and the CSW was unable to verify the
names and dates of birth of mother’s roommates. Mother said
she was not willing to live with MGM.
       A status review report filed August 16, 2021 stated that J.,
now age 4, and N., now age 2, remained living with MGM; they
were healthy and thriving. J. was developmentally on track and
no longer receiving therapy services. Mother and father were

                                 9
“consistent” with visitation and MGM reported no concerns about
the visits. During mother’s visits, she played with the children,
fed them, and watched television with them. During father’s
visits, he took them to a park or got food with them, and he
“redirects them in an appropriate manner.”
       Father had been arrested on July 24, 2021 for cohabitant
battery, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of
unlawful paraphernalia. The status review report stated, “Per
police report, the incident occurred at PGM’s home with PGM,
MGM, mother, father, [J.] and [N.] present. Father slapped
mother on the right ear using his left hand while mother was
sitting on the toilet due to their ‘ongoing troubled relationship.’”
Father was arrested, and police found a methamphetamine pipe
and baggies containing what appeared to be methamphetamine.
MGM confirmed the incident, stating that several family
members were celebrating a birthday when father showed up and
would not leave. MGM said the children were present, but they
did not witness the incident. Mother told the CSW it was “a big
misunderstanding” and “not a big deal.” Mother said she lied to
police about father hitting her, and she believed that father was
sober. Father told the CSW that PGM forced mother to lie to
police about the hitting incident, but he admitted the
methamphetamine was his and that he continued to struggle
with substance abuse.
       Mother had been evicted from the room she was renting
and she and father were living together in a hotel. DCFS
recommended that the court terminate reunification services and
set a section 366.26 hearing.
       At the review hearing on September 9, 2021, the court
terminated family reunification services, noting that the case was

                                10
more than two years old, and mother and father had not
addressed the issues that led to jurisdiction. The court noted
that with mother and father living together and the recent
domestic violence incident, “we are at square one on everything,
and cannot be at square one under California law two years
later.” The court set a section 366.26 hearing for January 11,
2022.
D.     Termination of parental rights
       The section 366.26 report filed December 17, 2021 stated
that the children were living with MGM and doing well. J. was
in kindergarten; his teacher noted that he was learning quickly
and was well-behaved in class. MGM told the CSW that “since
turning 5 years of age, [J.] has been asking why he is not going
home to his mother. [MGM] states that it has become instinct to
tell him that ‘soon you will be,’ but added, ‘I don’t know what to
say to him.’” MGM also said that sometimes J. cries, and he is
“questioning [his] life and his environment, such as why he is not
going home with his mother.” The CSW advised MGM to be
honest with J. N. was developing well and had no issues.
       MGM was the prospective adoptive parent and was “very
motivated and committed [to] adopting the children.” MGM was
a stay-at-home parent in a clean and safe home; she had a
“strong and positive attachment” to the children. MGM provided
the children “all of the essential necessities in a nurturing and
loving home environment.” The children “wish to remain under
the care and supervision” of MGM. DCFS found that it would be
in the best interests of the children to be adopted by MGM, and
recommended that the court terminate parental rights and
proceed with adoption.

                                11
       Mother continued to visit the children on her previous
visitation schedule: Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays for six
hours per day. The children were happy to see mother and would
cry when she left. MGM reported that father had not visited the
children for four months, but said he planned to resume
visitation soon. MGM said she would no longer monitor father’s
visits, because father had yelled at her and been disrespectful. A
paternal uncle was planning to monitor father’s next visit.
       At the section 366.26 hearing on January 11, 2022, mother
testified that she visits the children three days per week, six
hours per visit. Mother said the visits were “really good,” and “I
get to do a lot of things with the kids.” Toward the end of the
visits, “it depends on the mood. It’s usually when they want to go
home or they actually don’t want to. They keep asking why they
have to go back to my mom’s house.” Mother testified that the
children are bonded to her, and she had attempted to attend
some medical appointments, but during the Covid-19 pandemic
additional people were not allowed at visits. Mother said she
wanted to be more involved in the children’s medical or dental
care, but MGM “would shut me out.” No additional evidence was
submitted.
       In argument, DCFS’s counsel noted, “I assume mother will
argue that the beneficial relationship exception should apply.”
DCFS’s counsel stated that mother had not met the burden to
support the exception. Counsel conceded that mother met the
first prong—regular contact with the children—but asserted that
mother had not shown a beneficial relationship that would
outweigh the benefits of permanency for the children.
       Counsel for the children joined in DCFS’s argument, and
also asserted the parental benefit exception did not apply to

                               12
father, who had not visited the children for four months. The
children’s counsel agreed that mother had not submitted any
evidence to show that terminating parental rights would be
detrimental to the children.
       Mother’s counsel asked the court “to find that the child-
parent bond exists, and order that the permanent plan be legal
guardianship instead of the termination of parental rights and
adoption.” She noted that the children are happy to see mother
and cry when she leaves. She further asserted that the children
have a “significant and positive attachment” to mother. Father’s
counsel stated only, “I join with mother’s counsel. I would ask
the court to order a plan of legal guardianship. Submitted.”
       The court asked the children’s counsel whether legal
guardianship would be a better option, “if we assume that
terminating mother’s parental rights may in some ways
discourage continued contact.” The children’s counsel responded
that the children are young, three and five years old, and “[i]t’s
always best to go with a permanent plan, which is adoption.” The
children’s counsel also noted that none of the evidence suggested
the relationship between mother and the children would change,
“quite the contrary. . . . [MGM] is more than willing to facilitate
contact with mother.” He also stated that there was no benefit to
guardianship over adoption. “The only benefit with legal
guardianship would be to open the door for mother to file a
[section] 388 [petition]. But . . . she’s had ample time to do
everything she needs to do” to reunify with the children. The
children’s counsel further noted that the children were well-
bonded to MGM. Counsel for DCFS joined the children’s
arguments “in their entirety.”

                                13
       The court took the matter under submission, and ordered
the parties to return on January 18, 2022. The Court of Appeal
ordered a stay upon mother’s request, so the hearing was
continued to March 10, 2022. The stay was lifted on February 17,
2022 after mother did not file a writ petition.
       A last-minute information filed February 16, 2022 stated
that MGM remained adoption-ready, and adoption continued to
be the permanent plan for the children. A status review report
filed the same day stated that J. was doing well in school, he had
“a strong connection to MGM,” and he “enjoys having visits with
mother and father.” N. was having some behavior issues and had
started attending school from 11:45 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. five days
per week. The report did not mention N.’s visits with mother or
father. Overall, the children were “happy, active, playful
children who are completely bonded with their caretaker.
Likewise, [MGM] already see[s] and treat[s] [J.] and [N.] as her
children.” DCFS stated, “Adoption with [MGM] remains as the
best and most appropriate permanent plan for” the children.
       Mother continued visiting three days per week, four hours
per visit. Mother would take the children to a park, eat dinner
with them, and watch television with them. On October 21, 2021,
a school night, mother brought the children home at 1:28 a.m.
Father was visiting with the children on Saturdays and Sundays,
monitored by other family members after father threatened
MGM.
       Father filed a section 388 petition seeking to change the
court’s order terminating reunification services, stating that he
was enrolled in various programs that were ordered during the
reunification period.

                               14
       At the hearing on March 10, 2022, the court noted father’s
section 388 petition, and allowed father to make an offer or proof.
Father’s counsel argued that father’s participation in services
constituted a change in circumstances, and father’s visits with
the children have been “high quality.” The court asked the
children’s counsel for his position on father’s petition, noting that
typically at a section 366.26 hearing, “the court does not look at a
parent’s progress at this stage.” The children’s counsel argued
that the petition should be denied, noting that father was
requesting additional reunification services 30 months into the
case.
       Counsel for DCFS objected to the petition as untimely,
given that the court already had the section 366.26 hearing and
the parties were returning only for the court’s ruling. DCFS also
argued that father made no showing that the change would be in
the children’s best interests. The court denied father’s section
388 petition “for procedural reasons, given that I have heard the
[366.26] previously,” and “also because the court finds it is not in
the best interests of the children.”
       Turning to the section 366.26 ruling, the court stated that
it had reviewed the case record, and the parents were never able
to resolve their issues. The court stated, “I do believe that
California law requires me to terminate parental rights today. I
don’t find that an exception applies.” The court found the
children were adoptable; it had “considered the various parental
exceptions and find they are not applicable.” The court found it
would be detrimental to return the children to the parents, and
“no other exception to adoption applies in this case.” The court
therefore terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights, and
designated MGM as the prospective adoptive parent. The court

                                 15
acknowledged to the parents, “I know that this decision is not one
that you wanted to hear. . . . I also want you to understand that
this process is also traumatic for the children, and there has to be
an end to it. They do deserve permanency and so that is why the
law does balance those interests.”
       When the court asked if the parties had anything else to
add, mother’s counsel said, “Mother objects to the termination of
her parental rights. She requests a stay. She also wants to know
[sic] the maternal grandmother says she preferred legal
guardianship over adoption.” The court moved on to father’s
counsel, who stated that father objected “to the termination of
parental rights on the basis that there is, first of all, prima facie
evidence for our 388, as well as on the grounds of a parent/child
bond.” The court stated, “[L]et the record be clear that I did
consider that parental benefit exception and found that it does
not apply on the various prongs that are laid out. The parents
haven’t played a sufficient parental role and they do not meet the
standard laid out in the cases on the parental benefit exception.”
       Mother and father timely appealed the termination of
parental rights.
                          DISCUSSION
       Mother and father both contend the juvenile court erred in
finding that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply to
their relationship with the children. DCFS asserts that mother
has not shown that the beneficial relationship exception applies
to her, and no one below contended the beneficial relationship
exception should apply to father.
A.     Legal principles
       Children have “compelling rights . . . to have a placement
that is stable, permanent, and that which allows the caretaker to

                                 16
make a full emotional commitment to the child.” (In re Marilyn
H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.) “The objective of the dependency
scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at
substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes
if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed
period of time.” (Id. at p. 307.) “[W]here possible, adoption is the
first choice. ‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it
gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment
from a responsible caretaker.” [Citation.] ‘Guardianship, while a
more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and
thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the
Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.’” (In re Celine
R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 (Celine R.).)
       Thus, at a section 366.26 hearing, the court is required to
terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption
unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
“The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.” (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a
compelling reason for determining that termination would be
detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” ((§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) “[T]he exception applies in situations where a child
cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s
relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the
benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child.”
(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).)

                                17
       There are “three elements the parent must prove to
establish the [parental-benefit] exception: (1) regular visitation
and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 631.) In other words, “the parent asserting the
parental benefit exception must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, three things. The parent must show regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of
visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent must show that the
child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent — the kind of attachment implying that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship. And the parent must
show that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to
the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit
of a new, adoptive home. When the parent has met that burden,
the parental-benefit exception applies such that it would not be
in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and
the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.”
(Id. at pp. 636-637.)
       We review the court’s determination on the first two
elements for substantial evidence; the third element “is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) However, where, as
here, a parent contends the court erred in finding she did not
meet her burden of proof, we must determine whether “the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a

                                18
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.W . (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517,
1528, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 4, 1010, fn. 7.)
       We consider the three elements below, addressing mother’s
contentions first.
B.     Mother’s appeal
       Mother argues the juvenile court erred by finding that she
failed to meet her burden regarding the Caden C. elements. She
also contends the juvenile court relied on improper factors when
it stated that mother did not take a parental role with the
children, and by suggesting that mother’s relationship with the
children likely would not be completely severed. DCFS asserts
that the court’s rulings were correct, and that mother forfeited
any contention that the court relied on improper factors by failing
to assert any specific objections below. We find no error.
       1.     Regular visitation and contact
       “The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) This element is
not in dispute with respect to mother. By all accounts, mother
maintained regular and consistent visitation with the children
throughout the pendency of the case.
       2.     A relationship, the continuation of which would
              benefit the children
       The second element considers “whether ‘the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship’” with the parent.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) A beneficial relationship is one that “promotes the

                                19
well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-
being the child would gain in a permanent home with new,
adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567,
575.) Thus, “the parent must show that the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
636.) The focus is on the child, and the relationship may be
shaped by “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632.)
       Mother has not demonstrated that the court was compelled
to find in her favor on this element. N. was about seven months
old when the case began in June 2019, about eight months old
when she was detained from parents in August 2019, and three
years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing in March 2022.
J. was two years old when the case began, nearly three years old
at the time of detention, and five and a half at the time of the
section 366.26 hearing. Thus, N. had spent only eight months of
her life in mother’s care, and J. had spent about his first three
years in mother’s care. The children had been in MGM’s care
continuously for about two and a half years.
       Mother spent several hours each week with the children.
Mother points out that she fed the children, played with them,
and they sometimes cried at the end of their visits. However,
“the beneficial relationship exception demands something more
than the incidental benefit a child gains from any amount of
positive contact with her natural parent.” (In re Katherine J.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 318.) “A positive attachment between

                               20
parent and child . . . is nurturing and provides the child with a
sense of security and stability. . . . [A]n emotional attachment is
one where the child views the parent as more than a mere friend
or playmate and [whose] interactions with the parent were not
ambivalent, detached, or indifferent.” (In re B.D. (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) Here, although mother’s visits with the
children were consistent and pleasant, there was no evidence
that the children derived a sense of security from those visits, or
that the children saw mother as more than a trusted friend.
       Mother argues DCFS “was derelict in not gathering” more
information about how the children felt about visiting with her,
stating that J. was not “interviewed in any depth about his
feelings about” mother, and N., age three, was “certainly old
enough to have been questioned.” However, the burden of
proving the parental-benefit exception fell on mother—not DCFS.
(See Caden C. supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636 [“the parent asserting
the parental benefit exception must show, by a preponderance of
the evidence,” the three elements].)
       Mother focuses on some of her own actions, such as her
attendance at the children’s medical appointments or J.’s therapy
sessions, as proof that her visits were beneficial to the children.
But this was only true in the first part of the case. Toward the
end of the case, J. was no longer receiving therapy, and mother
testified that although she wanted to be more involved with the
children’s medical care, MGM “would shut me out.” Mother also
does not suggest how her involvement in the children’s medical
care—as opposed to MGM’s involvement alone, which was by all
accounts entirely effective—benefited the children.

                                21
        Mother further contends the court erred in stating that the
parents had not “played a sufficient parental role.”4 We find no
error. Many cases before Caden C. held that it was appropriate
to consider whether parents play a “parental role” when
determining the parental benefit exception, distinguishing the
parent’s role in the children’s life from that of a friend or non-
parent family member. In In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549,
555, for example, the court stated, “A parent must show more
than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. . . . The
parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s
life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment
between child and parent.” Similar language has been used in
many cases addressing the parental-benefit exception. (See, e.g.,
In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 [“No matter how
loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the
existence of an ‘emotional bond’ with the child, ‘the parents must
show that they occupy “a parental role” in the child's life’”]; In re
A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 995; In re B.D. (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
212, 229.)

4      DCFS contends mother has forfeited this argument,
because she did not object to the court’s statement below. Mother
asserts that because she raised the parental-benefit objection
below, all objections involving any “legal standard” have been
preserved. DCFS is correct that in order to preserve issues for
review, an objection must be specific and “state the ground or
grounds upon which the objection is based.” (In re E.A. (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293 [parties should “bring errors to the attention of the
trial court, so that they may be corrected”].) We nevertheless
exercise our discretion to address mother’s contention.

                                 22
       Caden C. did not discuss a “parental role,” but it also did
not disapprove cases that used the phrase. As our colleagues in
the Fourth District, Division Two, have noted, “[T]he words
‘parental role,’ standing alone, can have several different
meanings,” and because of this ambiguity, it may be “better not
to use the words ‘parental role’ at all.” (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 197, 210, 211; see also In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 319 [“problems arise when juvenile courts use
the phrase ‘parental role’ without explaining which meaning(s)
they impart to it”].) Even so, in order for the parental-benefit
exception to apply, “the emotional attachment between the child
and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of
being a friendly visitor or friendly non-parent relative, such as an
aunt” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468), keeping in
mind that “rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an
entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
632.) Here, nothing in the record suggests the court relied so
heavily on an inappropriate definition of a “parental role” that it
failed to appropriately consider the Caden C. elements. To the
contrary, when the court made the “parental role” statement, it
said in the same sentence that the parental-benefit exception
elements had not been met.
       In short, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that although mother’s visits with the children were pleasant and
enjoyable, mother did not establish a benefit from continuing the
relationship. Mother has not demonstrated that the court was
compelled by law to find in her favor on this element. Even
assuming this element had been met, however, the court’s ruling
as to the third and final element was not an abuse of discretion.

                                23
      3.     Whether termination of parental rights would be
             detrimental to the children
       For the third element, “the court must decide whether it
would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and
choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “[I]n
assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial
court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s
relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of
placement in a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632.)
       Mother asserts this element was also met, pointing to only
two pieces of evidence: her “interactions with the children were
observed to be uniformly positive,” and J.’s questions to MGM
about whether he would be returned to mother’s home. This
evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
Regarding her visits with the children, “pleasant and cordial
[parental] visits are, by themselves, insufficient to mandate a
permanent plan other than adoption.” (In re Brian R. (1991) 2
Cal.App.4th 904, 924.) Notably, mother points to no other
evidence suggesting that terminating her relationship with N.
would be detrimental to N.
       Regarding J. asking about living with mother, mother
contends that J., “more than two-and-a-half years after being
detained, continued to ask why he was not going home to mother,
and continued to cry for mother, ‘questioning his life and
environment.’” This does not accurately reflect the evidence.
MGM reported that after J. turned five—more than two years
after detention, and after he had started kindergarten—he began
asking why he did not live with mother. In response, MGM
repeatedly told J. that he would be going to live with mother
“soon,” because she did not know what else to say.

                                24
       This evidence does not favor finding that termination of
mother’s rights would be detrimental to the children. To the
contrary, it highlights the importance of permanency and
stability in a child’s life. It is not surprising that J. was
“questioning life and his environment” after being told multiple
times that his home with MGM was not permanent and would
soon change. The relevant question for the court is “whether
losing the relationship with the parent would harm the child to
an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new,
adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) The
evidence does not show that the benefit of continuing J.’s
pleasant relationship with mother outweighed his expressed need
for a stable, permanent home. (See In re Angel B. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [“if mother’s parental rights were not
terminated, the [children] would be denied a permanent, stable
adoptive family, [which is by statute] more desirable than legal
guardianship”].)
       Mother argues the court erred by making an “assumption
that the children’s relationship with mother would continue after
termination of parental rights.” She points to the section 366.26
hearing, in which the court asked the children’s counsel, “[I]f we
assume that terminating mother’s parental rights may in some
ways discourage continued contact, why wouldn’t legal
guardianship be better for the children?” The children’s counsel
responded that it is “always best to go with the permanent plan,
which is adoption,” and added that because MGM and mother
have an ongoing relationship, “I don’t think that terminating
parental rights will discourage communication with mom.”
Mother argues that from this exchange, “[t]he juvenile court here
seems to have been misled into believing that it could terminate

                               25
parental rights with the assurance that maternal grandmother
would allow mother ongoing visits.”5
       This conclusion is not supported by the record. The court
correctly acknowledged that adoption, rather than legal
guardianship, requires a court to consider that the parental
relationship may be severed completely. (See Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633 [“Because terminating parental rights
eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the
relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental
rights terminates the relationship”].) Nothing in the record
suggests the court was misled or changed its position due to
counsel’s suggestion that visitation might continue even if the
court terminated mother’s parental rights.
       In short, mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in finding that the parental-benefit
exception did not apply. We therefore turn to father’s appeal.
C.     Father’s appeal
       Father argues that he also met the three Caden C.
elements, and therefore the parental-benefit exception applies to
him as well. DCFS correctly points out that father never
suggested in the juvenile court that he was entitled to the
parental-benefit exception, and he presented no evidence on the
issue. The sole issue father asserted at the January 11, 2022
hearing involved his section 388 petition seeking to reinstate
reunification services, which the court denied. During the
portion of the same hearing addressing the section 366.26 issues,
after mother testified and her counsel argued that the parental-
benefit exception applied to mother, father’s counsel stated, in

5     DCFS correctly points out that neither mother’s nor
father’s counsel objected to any part of this exchange.

                               26
full, “Your honor, I join with mother’s counsel. I would ask the
court to order a plan of legal guardianship. Submitted.” When
the parties returned on March 10, 2022 for the court’s ruling,
after the court stated its ruling terminating parental rights,
father’s counsel objected “to the termination of parental rights on
the basis that there is . . . prima facie evidence for our 388, as
well as on the grounds of a parent/child bond.”
       Thus, father presented no evidence or argument suggesting
to the juvenile court that he was asserting that the parental-
benefit exception applied to him. The issue has therefore been
forfeited. (See, e.g. In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [a
reviewing court ordinarily will not consider an issue not raised
below]; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222
[forfeiture “applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is
intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the
conclusion of the proceedings”].)
       Even if we were to consider the merits of father’s
contention on appeal, however, he has not demonstrated error.
He does not meet the first Caden C. element: he did not maintain
consistent visitation with the children. Father argues in his
appellate brief that he “maintained consistent visitation with [the
children] throughout the two-and-a-half-years of dependency
proceedings.” However, father did not visit the children for
months when the case began, father admits he missed five visits
in January 2021, and the December 17, 2021 section 366.26
report stated that father had not visited the children for four
months. Missing visits for months at a time, when the court
allowed three visits per week, does not constitute “regular
visitation and contact.”

                                27
       The record also does not support a finding that father met
the second element: “a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
Father contends he met this element because the “interactions
between the minors and father were positive and . . . the visits
went well.” As discussed above, however, a parent must show
more than pleasant visits with the children to satisfy the second
element of the Caden C. analysis.
       Father does not point to any evidence supporting the third
Caden C. element, whether termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the children. Instead, he argues the juvenile
court “relied on impermissible factors, such as whether the
parents had resolved the problems that led to the minors’
dependency and whether the parents occupied a parental role in
the children’s lives.” Father argues that remand is required so
the court can follow Caden C. more closely.
       We disagree. Although the juvenile court did not expressly
discuss each of the three Caden C. elements, it did state that the
elements had not been met. Moreover, the court’s references to
what father contends are “impermissible factors” do not
demonstrate error. For example, father argues the court “focused
on the parents’ lack of progress in addressing the reasons that
the minors were detained,” but in the portion of the reporter’s
transcript father cites, the court was stating its reasons for
denying father’s section 388 petition. Father argues the court
impermissibly considered “whether the parents had resolved the
problems that led to the minors’ dependency,” but on the cited
page the court was simply making a statement that continued
jurisdiction under section 300 was necessary—it was not stating
its reasons for terminating parental rights. We also find no error

                               28
in the court’s comment about the “parental role,” as we discussed
in relation to mother’s appeal above. And because father has
cited no evidence that could support a different conclusion as to
the third Caden C. element, he has not demonstrated the juvenile
court abused its discretion.
       In short, even if he had not forfeited his claim to the
parental-benefit exception, father has not demonstrated
reversible error.
                           DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s March 10, 2022 order is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                          COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, ACTING, P.J.

STONE, J.

     
       Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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