Court Opinion

ID: 9739143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:09:27.751532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.246411
License: Public Domain

Taylor, J.
(dissenting). In concluding that the trial court’s finding that the informant was not a police agent was clearly erroneous on the facts of this case, the majority sounds the death knell for civilian-assisted arrests. Contrary to the majority’s analysis of this case, I would find that where an "informant acted with at least police encouragement and perhaps even with police assistance,” ante, p 540, a trial court’s conclusion that the informant is not an agent of police may be debatable, but it is not necessarily clearly erroneous. It is that standard of review that we must apply to such a ruling. As it now stands, however, the majority ensures that virtually every individual who previously has had some involvement with *543police, is aware of ongoing criminal activity, and telephones police for advice or assistance regarding that activity, is a police agent. This state of affairs will result, for example, in rendering useless to police the help of people interested in keeping their neighborhoods free of crime because of a justified police fear that the assistance of such people will constitute entrapment.
The majority asserts that our Supreme Court now holds that a lack of control over an informant "militates in favor of finding entrapment.” Ante, p 541. To the contrary, People v Juillet, 439 Mich 34; 475 NW2d 786 (1991), stands for the proposition that police may not hire and let loose an informant with a suspect track record, studiously ignore that informant’s extravagant and ill-advised behavior, and then expect that the informant’s gross conduct will not be attributed to them. This latter principled rule is a far cry from an all-encompassing rule that lack of control over an informant always militates toward a finding of entrapment. While the degree of control exerted over an informant may well be evidence of impermissible or reprehensible police conduct in many cases, People v Fabiano, 192 Mich App 523, 531-532; 482 NW2d 467 (1992), the quantum of control should not be used by this Court to establish a red-line test for police agency.
Because I would find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in sentencing defendant to no more than the mandatory minimum term, despite defendant’s habitual offender status, I would affirm.