Court Opinion

ID: 9955832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 16:07:33.689493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:26.434085
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Tyree, 2024-Ohio-1186.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 2023-CA-20
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 007
                                                   :
 TANYA RAGENE TYREE                                :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
 aka EARLINE ANN ROYSTAN                           :   Court)
 aka TANYA REGENE WILSON                           :
                                                   :
       Appellant

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                       Rendered on March 29, 2024

                                              ...........

AMY E. BAILEY, Attorney for Appellant

SAMANTHA B. WHETHERHOLT, Attorney for Appellee
                            .............

WELBAUM, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Tanya Ragene Tyree, appeals from her conviction and

sentence on one count of possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. According to

Tyree, the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled her motion to suppress

evidence. A review of the record reveals that the trial court did not err in finding that

police officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Tyree’s vehicle and that
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seized contraband was properly obtained pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s inventory

search exception. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

                          I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

      {¶ 2} On January 3, 2023, an indictment was filed charging Tyree with possession

of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a). Tyree was initially scheduled for

arraignment on January 26, 2023, but the arraignment was rescheduled to February 7,

2023, at the request of Tyree’s attorney.        However, Tyree failed to appear for

arraignment on that date, and the court issued a capias for her arrest.            Tyree

subsequently appeared, pled not guilty, and was released on her own recognizance.

      {¶ 3} On March 3, 2023, Tyree filed a motion to suppress evidence, and the State

responded. When Tyree failed to appear for the March 23, 2023 scheduled suppression

hearing, the court continued the hearing, issued another capias for her arrest, and noted

various bond violations. On April 4, 2023, another indictment was filed in the case,

charging Tyree with failure to appear as required by recognizance in violation of R.C.

2937.29, 2937.99(A)(B), a fourth-degree felony. After Tyree appeared in court on April

11, 2023, the court revoked bond and set a suppression hearing for April 26, 2023. Tyree

also pled not guilty to the second charge. Ultimately, the suppression hearing was held

on May 9, 2023, at which time the court heard testimony from Lt. Robert McConnell and

Officer Leland Queen, both of whom were employed by the Mechanicsburg Police

Department. Tyree did not testify, nor did she offer any evidence.

      {¶ 4} The facts offered during the suppression hearing were as follows.        On
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December 12, 2022, Lt. McConnell and Officer Queen were traveling together in the same

vehicle, as McConnell was training and observing Queen.             Transcript of Motion to

Suppress Hearing (“Tr.”), 60-61.       At around 4:30 p.m., the officers were heading

eastbound on West Sandusky Street in the Village of Mechanicsburg and were

approaching the stoplight on Main Street, which is also designated as State Route 29.

Id. at 7, 56, and 61. Traffic was moderate at the time. Id. at 10. The officers observed

a white vehicle ahead of them travel past the stop bar painted on the roadway by

approximately half a car length before coming to a stop. Both front tires were over the

stop bar. Id. at 8. The vehicle did not stop at all nor did it inch up before stopping;

instead, it stopped well beyond the stop bar. Id. at 55 and 62.

       {¶ 5} According to Lt. McConnell, the stop bar was important at that intersection

because Mechanicsburg is a farm community. As a result, huge trucks come through

and have to be able to negotiate the turns. If cars fail to stop behind the bar, the path of

trucks will be blocked and they will not be able to navigate the turn. Id. at 8-9. The

driver of the white car (later identified as Tyree) had on her right turn signal, but McConnell

could not recall if the turn signal was on before or after Tyree stopped over the bar. Id.

at 9-11. Due to the violation, McConnell initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 11.

       {¶ 6} When Lt. McConnell approached the car, he was not certain whether he

would issue a citation or a warning. It depended on the following points: identifying the

driver; ascertaining if the driver had been previously warned; and identifying the driver’s

traffic history.   Id. at 11-12.   After obtaining Tyree’s license, the officers ran her

information through LEADS, which was on the computer in the cruiser.              During this
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process, they discovered that Tyree’s license had been suspended for financial

responsibility (FRA) non-compliance and that she had a 2022 conviction for driving

without a license. Id. at 13-14, 50, and 62. Another person was in the car, and that

person’s driver’s license was also suspended. Id. at 18, 50, and 63. The car was

registered to another person, Tony Tyree, who was not present. Id. at 17.

       {¶ 7} Lt. McConnell stated that the Mechanicsburg tow policy is fairly strict and

requires cars to be towed on a second offense if a person has a prior conviction for driving

under suspension or without a driver’s license. Under the tow policy, the car also would

have been towed based on the FRA noncompliance. Tr. at 14-17 and State’s Ex. 1 (the

tow policy). Thus, the car had to be impounded at that point. Id. at 52.

       {¶ 8} McConnell stated that he also had not been concerned about determining if

another lawful driver was present to drive the vehicle because he noticed that the vehicle’s

owner and Tyree lived at the same address. Therefore, a wrongful entrustment citation

applied and should have been issued when the registered owner came to pick up the

vehicle. Thus, the vehicle had to be towed for wrongful entrustment as well. Id. at 17-

18 and 50. In any event, no one was present who had a valid license. Id. at 17.

Regardless, the tow policy required the vehicle to be towed and inventoried. Id. at 18

and 22. When a vehicle is towed, the inventory search policy is that every possible

crevice and any possible container where there could be items of value must be searched

and inventoried. However, locked containers could not be searched. Id. at 22-23.

       {¶ 9} After learning that Tyree’s license had been suspended, Lt. McConnell

returned to Tyree’s vehicle and asked her to step out of the vehicle. He then explained
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the tow policy and that the car would be towed per the policy. Id. at 18-19, 50-51, and

57. At that point, Tyree was not free to leave the encounter, and no Miranda warnings

had been administered. Id. at 51. McConnell did not have any weapons or handcuffs

out, and Tyree was not handcuffed. Id. at 64.

       {¶ 10} After explaining the policy, Lt. McConnell asked Tyree if the vehicle

contained any contraband or weapons. Tyree responded that there was a “stem” in the

vehicle, which was slang for a cocaine pipe. Tr. at 19, 20, 21 and 57. McConnell stated

that he asks everyone about contraband and weapons, as it is not uncommon to find

things like chemicals that could harm him, and he is always concerned about weapons

for safety purposes. At this point, the other individual was still seated in the vehicle. Id.

at 20-21. Tyree also told McConnell that there was some cocaine in the vehicle. Id. at

19.

       {¶ 11} Lt. McConnell placed Tyree in his cruiser before he went to search the car.

Id. at 20. Before the car was searched, the passenger was removed from the car. The

passenger then stood with Officer Queen while McConnell searched. Id. at 58. He

found the cocaine pipe in the middle console but did not immediately find the cocaine.

Id. At that point, McConnell returned to the cruiser and administered Miranda warnings

to Tyree. Id. He asked Tyree again where the cocaine was, and she provided a better

description; he then located the cocaine in an open compartment on the driver’s side of

the car. Id. at 19-20 and 23. Even if Tyree had not made statements about the stem or

cocaine, the police would have searched the center console and the compartment next

to the driver’s side, based on the tow policy. Id. at 24-25.
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      {¶ 12} After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress in

part and granted it in part. See Journal Entry Denying in Part, and Granting in Part,

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (May 12, 2023) (“Supp. Dec.”). The court overruled the

motion with respect to the seizure of the drug stem pipe and cocaine, because the officers

had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and obtained these items

pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s inventory search exception. Id. at p. 1 and 6-8. In

addition, the court overruled the motion as it pertained to post-Miranda statements,

because Tyree had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her rights. Id. at p. 1-

2 and 13-15.

      {¶ 13} The court granted the motion to suppress with respect to the statements

that Tyree made prior to being Mirandized. The court concluded that a reasonable

person would have understood herself to be in custody after Lt. McConnell informed

Tyree that the vehicle was going to be towed and inventoried. At that time, Tyree knew

she was going to be charged with another traffic offense, knew she lived in an adjacent

county, and would have had no expectation that she would be able to freely walk home

from the encounter. Id. at p. 1 and 8-13.

      {¶ 14} As a final matter, the court concluded the evidence would inevitably have

been discovered under the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement. This was based on the standardized tow policy for impoundment

due to the FRA/noncompliance suspension and Tyree’s knowledge of her prior conviction

of driving under suspension. Id. at 15-18.

      {¶ 15} On May 16, 2023, Tyree agreed to plead no contest to possession of
                                                                                          -7-

cocaine; in exchange, the State agreed to ask the court to dismiss the second count (the

failure to appear charge). The parties also agreed to waive a presentence investigation

report and that the State would recommend community control at a residential drug or

alcohol treatment facility if Tyree had no further criminal record other than what was

already known. Transcript of Plea & Sentencing Hearing, 1-2.

      {¶ 16} During the hearing, the court conducted a Crim.R. 11(C) colloquy, accepted

the no-contest plea, found Tyree guilty as charged, and immediately proceeded to

sentencing. The court sentenced Tyree to 90 days of community control beginning on

May 16, 2023. In addition, the court sentenced Tyree to serve 90 days in jail, also

beginning on May 16, 2023, with a requirement of being subject to random drug screens.

The court then filed the written plea agreement and entry of finding of guilt. See Plea

Agreement of No Contest and Entry (May 16, 2023). The judgment entry, reflecting the

sentence imposed, was then filed on May 17, 2023. Tyree timely appealed.

                            II. Denial of Suppression Motion

      {¶ 17} Tyree’s sole assignment of error states that:

             The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When Denying Ms. Tyree’s

      Motion to Suppress in Its Entirety.

      {¶ 18} Under this assignment of error, Tyree contends that the trial erred in partially

denying the suppression motion because the police had no reasonable grounds to believe

she was engaging in criminal activity. According to Tyree, she was turning right and had

on her blinker, and it was reasonable for her to “inch over the stop bar to view oncoming
                                                                                         -8-

traffic.” Appellant’s Brief at p. 7. Tyree further contends that although she did not have

a valid license, she should have been allowed to call a licensed driver to pick up the

vehicle. Moreover, Tyree argues that when she was removed from the vehicle, the

police had no suspicion of a crime other than that she was driving without a license and

had no probable cause to search the car.

       {¶ 19} Tyree's brief, therefore, raises two primary issues: (1) whether the police

had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for stopping her car; and (2) whether the inventory

search was reasonable. We will consider these matters separately.

                             A. The Stop of the Automobile

       {¶ 20} As a preliminary point, “[a]ppellate review of a motion to suppress presents

a mixed question of law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court

assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual

questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”       (Citation omitted.)   State v.

Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “Consequently, an

appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence. * * * Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must

then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,

whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” (Citations omitted.) Id.

       {¶ 21} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, ‘The

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
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but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ Article I, Section 14 of the

Ohio Constitution contains almost identical language, and [has been interpreted] as

affording at least the same protection as the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Leak, 145

Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 13, citing State v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio

St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 11.

       {¶ 22} “[A] traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable and

articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to commit

a crime.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7,

citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

“Further, ‘[t]he propriety of an investigative stop by a police officer must be viewed in light

of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio

St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus. As a result, “if an

officer's decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, including a traffic violation, is

prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances,

then the stop is constitutionally valid.” Id.

       {¶ 23} Having reviewed the record and the totality of the circumstances, we agree

with the trial court that the stop was constitutionally valid.          As noted, Tyree was

attempting to turn right at a red light but failed to stop at or behind the stop bar. This was

a violation of R.C. 4511.13(C)(1)(a), which provides: “Vehicular traffic, streetcars, and

trackless trolleys facing a steady circular red signal indication, unless entering the

intersection to make another movement permitted by another signal indication, shall stop
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at a clearly marked stop line; but if there is no stop line, traffic shall stop before entering

the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection; or if there is no crosswalk, then before

entering the intersection; and shall remain stopped until a signal indication to proceed is

displayed * * *.”   There was no dispute here about the fact that a stop line existed.

       {¶ 24} Based on observing this violation, the police had a reasonable, articulable

suspicion for the stop. See Miracle v. Petit, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-50, 2020-Ohio-

1567, ¶ 13 (observation of defendant failing to comply with R.C. 4511.13(C)(1)(a)

constituted probable cause for a traffic stop); State v. Richards, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1410,

1997 WL 111751, *4 (Mar. 14, 1997) (“observed violations of the motor vehicle laws

provide, in themselves, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is taking place”); State

v. Britt, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26584, 2015-Ohio-3605, ¶ 11 (finding no potential merit

in claim of error in overruling motion to suppress; officer found defendant with vehicle

stopped all the way into crosswalk and clearly had a basis for the stop).

       {¶ 25} In Tyree’s case, the trial court found both officers’ testimony credible

concerning the fact that Tyree had “failed to stop at the ‘stop bar.’ ” Supp. Dec. at p. 6.

Furthermore, contrary to Tyree’s claim, there was no testimony that she was “inching over

the stop bar to view traffic.” Tyree did not testify, and both officers specifically said there

was no inching forward or stop before Tyree’s car crossed the stop bar. The car was also

over the bar by a considerable amount.          Accordingly, the trial court did not err in

concluding that the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for stopping the vehicle.

                              B. Inventory Search Exception
                                                                                        -11-

      {¶ 26} The second issue is whether the inventory search was reasonable.

“Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a search conducted

without prior approval of a judge or magistrate is per se unreasonable, subject to certain

well-established exceptions.” State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45

N.E.3d 127, ¶ 181, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19

L.Ed.2d 567 (1967).

      {¶ 27} “The inventory-search exception is a well-defined exception to the Fourth

Amendment's warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-

Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 20, citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643, 103 S.Ct.

2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983).        “An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth

Amendment's warrant requirement or a probable-cause review, because it is a search

that is made for administrative reasons and is unrelated to a criminal investigation.” Id.,

citing State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 109, 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999).                 “This

administrative search and inventory is intended to help guard against claims of theft or

careless handling and also protects the police from dangerous instruments.” Id., citing

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987).

      {¶ 28} “To satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle must be conducted in

good faith and in accordance with reasonable standardized procedure(s) or established

routine.” State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d 403, 604 N.E.2d 743 (1992), paragraph one

of the syllabus, following South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49

L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), Bertine, and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109
                                                                                          -12-

L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). In order “to establish a lawful inventory search based on standard

police practice, ‘ “the evidence presented must demonstrate that the police department

has a standardized, routine policy, demonstrate what that policy is, and show how the

officer's conduct conformed to that standardized policy.” ’ ” State v. Nixon, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 29606, 2023-Ohio-1160, ¶ 32, quoting State v. Myrick, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 21287, 2006-Ohio-580, ¶ 13.

       {¶ 29} Here, Lt. McConnell testified about the Mechanicsburg tow policy, and the

State submitted the policy as an exhibit during the suppression hearing. Under that

policy, “ ‘Officers may allow a legal licensed driver to take the vehicle except in the

following cases: * * * a. driver has prior knowledge they are suspended from prior DUS

conviction.’ ”   Tr. 15-16, quoting Ex. 1, p. 81, 6.01 (Driving Under Suspension and

Operating the Vehicle Under the Influence of OVI), section 7(A)a. Once Lt. McConnell

ascertained during the traffic stop that Tyree was illegally driving under an

FRA/noncompliance suspension and that she had a prior DUS suspension, he was

lawfully able (and required) to tow the vehicle.

       {¶ 30} Tyree failed to present any evidence that this the tow policy was not a

standardized tow policy; that it had no discernible criteria; that Lt. McConnell’s conduct

failed to comply with the policy; or that the vehicle was unlawfully towed. Instead, Tyree

argues that the police should have let her call a licensed driver to get the vehicle and that

the police had no probable cause to search the car.         In the context of an inventory

search, whether the police had probable cause to search is irrelevant, since that is not

the basis of the exception. Furthermore, the police were under no obligation to allow
                                                                                      -13-

Tyree to call someone. Neither occupant of the car was legally allowed to drive, and the

police were not required to do more than what they did. As an additional point, Lt.

McConnell had already decided to tow the car and had explained the tow policy to Tyree

before he asked her any questions about potential contraband or weapons.

Consequently, the trial court did not err in upholding the inventory search.

       {¶ 31} The trial court also commented that “the prosecution had proven by a

preponderance of the evidence that the drug evidence would have been inevitably

discovered during McConnell’s impoundment and subsequent inventory search of the

vehicle.” Supp. Dec. at p. 18. This is consistent with the law. The Supreme Court of

Ohio has held that “illegally obtained evidence is properly admitted in a trial court

proceeding once it is established that the evidence would have been ultimately or

inevitably discovered during the course of a lawful investigation. The prosecution will

have the burden to show within a reasonable probability that police officials would have

discovered the derivative evidence apart from the unlawful conduct.” State v. Perkins,

18 Ohio St.3d 193, 196, 480 N.E.2d 763 (1985), following Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,

104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

       {¶ 32} Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court. As noted,

even before Lt. McConnell asked Tyree the questions about contraband or weapons

(which the trial court found had violated Tyree’s rights), McConnell had decided to tow

the car. Thus, the evidence would inevitably have been discovered during an inventory

search. Accordingly, Tyree’s sole assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.
                                                                                       -14-

                                     III. Conclusion

       {¶ 33} Tyree’s assignment of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial

is affirmed.

                                     .............

EPLEY, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.