Court Opinion

ID: 9628745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:30:52.948205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:10.791889
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CASTLES,
specially concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion with respect to the Potter Basin real estate. It is well established that in an equity case this court can review all questions of law and fact. Hart v. Barron, 122 Mont. 350, 204 P.2d 797; Barrett v. Zenisek, 132 Mont. 229, 315 P.2d 1001. We are therefore not absolutely bound to accept the findings of fact of the district court. This is particularly true when the type of evidence in question can be as readily evaluated by this court as it can by the court be*42low. I feel that the deposition of Anne Bodine is of little or no probative value. It reveals a total lack of ability to remember those events which are here in controversy. Through persistent examination, Anne Bodine would admit that almost any state of facts did or could have existed. For this reason I feel that this deposition cannot be relied upon as a source of evidence.
The majority says, “Viewing the evidence set forth we find that it does preponderate against the court’s findings.” Rather than balance the evidence presented in this fashion, I believe that there is simply a lack of evidence supporting the finding of the district court as to the real property, particularly in view of the rule announced in Barrett v. Zenisek, supra, that proof of a resulting or constructive trust must be clear, satisfactory and practically free from doubt. The fact that Richard Bodine continued to give his mother rental payments after she deeded over the land has little significance of itself. Surely this is no indication that Richard Bodine promised to “support” his mother in consideration of receiving the property.
The conclusion of the majority also appears to rest on the fact that the district court made no formal finding of fraud or violation of a trust, and therefore failed to support a constructive trust under section 86-210, R.C.M.1947. I believe that a finding of fraud or violation of trust is implicit in the ruling below. We have said that where no findings of fact were either made or requested, every finding necessary to support the judgment of the lower court would be implied. Farmers Union Trading Co. of Sheridan v. Wiggins, 127 Mont. 481, 267 P.2d 117. For this reason I think the rationale of the majority is not well-founded.
The clear and uncontradicted intent of Alban and Anne Bodine was to give the Potter Basin property to Richard Bodine. Because there is a complete lack of evidence to the contrary, the ruling of the district court should be reversed, and I concur.
*43I must also agree, though with some reluctance, that there is insufficient evidence to show a valid gift of the stock certificates. It is the necessary element of delivery which is not clearly established by the record. Both of the certificates were held by Anne Bodine as trustee for Richard Bodine. However, by the terms of the trust instrument, Anne Bodine retained complete control over disposition of the stock. She could sell or otherwise dispose of the shares, whereupon the trust would automatically terminate. She also was entitled to receive dividends on the stock. The trust arrangement was primarily a testamentary device because the beneficiary, Richard Bodine, would receive a real interest in the stock only if he survived Anne Bodine.
The case of Marans v. Newland, 141 Mont. 32, 374 P.2d 721, cited by the majority, is distinguishable from the case at hand. In the Marans case two types of share certificates were involved. One group was issued in the name of Marans and his children as joint tenants, while others were issued in the name of the children only as tenants in common or sole owners. All of these stocks were left in a safe deposit box held in joint tenancy by Marans and the children. When Marans died, the ownership of the shares was placed in issue. We held that Marans estate had no interest in any of the shares. The stock issued to the children as tenants in common and individually constituted a valid gift when they were purchased. Ownership of stock issued in joint tenancy to Marans and his children passed entirely to the surviving joint tenants on the death of Marans. If the share certificates purchased by Anne Bodine were held in joint tenancy by her and Richard, we could easily follow the holding of the Marans case and find a completed gift when the stocks were purchased. However, the fact that Richard was only named as beneficiary of a revocable trust does not permit us to follow the Marans’ holding. He had no present interest in the stocks and there was no delivery to him when the stocks were purchased.
*44The fact that Anne Bodine had not endorsed the certificates as required under section 15-628, R.C.M.1947, is significant because it is further evidence that no delivery occurred. I do not believe that such endorsement is absolutely necessary to a valid gift of stock certificates. There is a great deal of authority holding that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (embodied by section 15-628) was enacted for the benefit and protection of corporations, and does not affect the right of individuals to make gifts of stock certificates among themselves. Collins v. Alexander, 37 Tenn.App. 129, 260 S.W.2d 414; In re Maijgren’s Estate, 193 Misc. 814, 84 N.Y.S.2d 664; In re Estates of Antkowski, 286 Ill.App. 184, 3 N.E.2d 132; Hausfelder v. Security-First National Bank, 77 Cal.App.2d 478, 176 P.2d 84. So while endorsement might not be necessary to a valid gift, the lack of endorsement by Anne Bodine is further indication that there was no delivery.
Although Anne Bodine consented to Richard taking possession of the certificates, along with other documents, I do not think it would be wise to hold that mere possession establishes a valid delivery, or indicates an intent to make a gift. Even though Anne Bodine intended Richard to acquire the stocks upon her death, the evidence is inadequate to show a valid inter vivos gift, and for the reasons set out above I would affirm that part of the judgment of the district court.