Court Opinion

ID: 9830272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:03:10.078117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:17.478318
License: Public Domain

Ori. Motion for Rehearing.
[2] The theory on which this court held that the case was within the rule applied in Wright v. Davenport, 44 Tex. 164, was not sufficiently stated in the opinion disposing of the appeal. It should have been stated that the conclusion of the court was based on testimony of appellee as a witness in his own behalf which showed, the court thought, that appellant’s, liability (if any) was not for fraud practiced on him, but for breach of a contract of warranty. The court was of the opinion, and is still, that it conclusively appeared from said testimony that appel-lee did not rely upon the representations as statements by Boone of facts within his knowledge, but relied upon them as warranties that the automobile was as represented. The testimony of appellee referred to was as follows:
“Every day Mr. Boone would stop in and see me, and he would tell me that this car was built out of absolutely the best material in the world, and that it had the best workmanship that could be done on a car, and he went over their prospectus with me and showed me the stunts it would do in pulling sand and pulling mud, and he represented the car to be first-class in every particular, so I finally traded with him on those representations, provided he would give me his personal guaranty: that the factory guaranty only guaranteed to replace the parts; and Boone gave me his personal additional guaranty that I should be out no expense on the car for six months, and I traded with him on that basis. * * * I did not buy the car on the factory warranty. I bought it on the W. D. Sessums Motor Company’s warranty. Yes; I knew that the factory made this warranty, and that is just the reason I demanded from Mr. Boone an additional warranty. * * * I reckon the warranty set out in the petition is the warranty that went with this car. I will say that I knew it, but Boone told me that the factory would guarantee all the parts of the car, and I said, ‘Well, that don’t get you anything. I want a warranty from you that the car will be replaced, and be a first-class automobile.’ * * ⅜ He guaranteed it for six months. * * * That is the main thing I bought the car on, that he would make the car go for six months. * * ⅝ j bought the car upon his personal guaranty to me that he would guar*331antee it for six months. * * * I do not say that he guaranteed' to keep the ear good for six months. I said he guaranteed to give me a first-class automobile; he guaranteed the car to be first-class in every respect, and that he would make that good for six months. * * * Boone guaranteed it to be first-class in every respect, first-class workmanship, first-class material, and all, and that is the representation I bought the car on.”
The testimony set out plainly, and, as before stated, we think conclusively, shows that it was not reliance on Boone’s knowledge of the car and the truth of the statements he made about it that induced ap-pellee to buy it, but it was Boone’s warranty or guaranty that the car was as represented. In other words, appellee was in the attitude of saying to Boone:
“You may have knowedge of the car sufficient to justify you in making the statements you have made to me, and those statements may be true, but I don’t know that you have such knowledge nor that your statements are true, and am not willing to rely on them; therefore, before I will buy the car you must agree that, if it is not as you have represented it to be you will reimburse me for any loss I sustain because it is not.”
So construing the testimony, and giving effect to the finding of the trial court that the representations by Boone were made in good faith, there was no fraud in the transaction, and the case on its facts is clearly within the rule adopted in Wright v. Davenport; for there is no doubt when Mr. Sedg-wick said that “where there is no fraud and' no agreement to return the vendee cannot, at his own option, rescind the contract, but has only an action on the warranty,” he meant actual fraud. And we think there is as little reason to believe the Supreme Court meant anything else when they approved Mr. Sedgwick’s statement as correctly interpreting the law.
[3] If, in addition to the fact that the rep resentations made by Boone were false, as determined by the trial court, it appeared that appellee was induced by his reliance on the truth of same to buy the automobile, we think his right to relief on the ground of fraud would not be affected by the fact that Boone made the representations in goad faith. It is the fact, as appears from his testimony, that he did not rely on the truth of the representations that causes us to think he has no right to relief on that ground, but must look for relief to the warranty he exacted, which he did rely upon. Trans. Line v. Trans. Co., 129 Mich. 209, 88 N. W. 473, 56 L. R. A. 939, 24 R. C. L. 339. In the case cited the vendor, in negotiating the sale of a steamer, stated it would make 15 miles an hour, and the contract of sale warranted the boat to have such speed. It turned out the boat could not run so fast. The court held that the vendee, having insisted upon and relied on the warranty, was not entitled to relief because the representation was false, it not appearing it was fraudulently made. The court said:
“Whatever may have been the rights of the parties before the contract was entered into, we think it is clear that, having insisted upon and relied upon the warranty being embodied in the contract, the complainant’s reliance must be upon the written warranty.”
If, however, we thought the testimony warranted a finding that appellee was induced to buy the ear by reliance he placed on the truth of Boone’s representations, we would not think the appeal could properly be disposed of otherwise than it was; ‘ for we think' it appeared from testimony referred to in the opinion that, if appellee ever had a right to rescind the contract for fraud practiced on him, he waived it. Car Co. v. Brashear (Tex. Civ. App.) 158 S. W. 233.
The fact that the testimony showed and the trial court found that appellant had possession of the car after August —, 1920, and at the time of the trial, was not, as ap-pellee suggests it was, overlooked in determining that it appeared that he was not entitled to the rescission of the contract granted by the trial court. The testimony did not show and the trial court did not find that appellant’s possession was based on either a claim on its part of a right to rescind it or on agreement between it and appellee to rescind the contract. The finding of the trial court was that the car was “turned over” (presumably by appellee) to appellant August -, 1920, but for what purpose he did not say, except so far as it may be inferred from his finding that appellant “again had it worked over” and tendered it to ap-pellee. And it appeared from the testimony that appellant was entitled to the possession of the car by the terms of a mortgage given by appellee to secure the payment of his note due June 15, 1920, as stated in the opinion reversing the judgment.
The motion is overruled.