Court Opinion

ID: 9846137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:35:34.385696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.941798
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Reconsideration.
The State has moved for reconsideration, arguing that this Court erred in reversing that portion of Pless’s sentence that required Pless to reimburse the county $ 1,226 in attorney fees. As set forth above, we reasoned that because the governing statute was struck prior to trial, and because its replacement did not contain any provisions authorizing a trial court to order a defendant to reimburse his court-appointed attorney fees (see former OCGA§ 17-12-10 (c); Ga. L. 2003, *805p. 191, § 1), the trial court lacked the authority to impose this as a condition of probation. We deny the State’s motion for the reasons set forth below.
1. The State first argues that Pless waived this defect in his sentence when he acknowledged to the trial court that he had sufficient funds to pay the attorney fees and when he further failed to object to the imposition of the attorney fees below. However, “[a] sentence or portion thereof that is unauthorized by law is a nullity and void.” Harrison v. State 25 Thus, where no law authorizes the imposition of restitution ordered in a sentence (Washington v. State26), or where a condition of probation in a sentence is unauthorized (Brady v. State27), that portion of the sentence is void. A void sentence “ ‘may be so held in any court where it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it,’ ” regardless of a lack of objection in the trial court. Kinney v. State.28
Here, we held that the portion of the sentence requiring Pless to reimburse the county for the fees of his court-appointed counsel was without authorization. As such, that portion of the sentence was void and a nullity. Pless’s acquiescence to his illegal sentence “cannot render an otherwise illegal sentence valid through waiver.” Sanders v. State of Ga.29 Thus, the issue was properly before this Court, despite the lack of an objection below.
2. The State advances three arguments to show that the trial court had the authority to impose the reimbursement of the attorney fees as a condition of the probationary sentence. All three arguments lack merit.
(a) The court could impose the attorney fees as a part of the costs. The State first argues that the court could impose the attorney fees on Pless under its authority to assess costs against convicted defendants. See OCGA§ 17-11-1 (“[i]f convicted, judgment maybe entered against the defendant for all costs accruing in the committing and trial courts and by any officer pending the prosecution”). This argument fails.
Because costs in criminal cases were unknown at common law, no liability for costs exists in the absence of express statutory authorization. Walton County v. Dean 30 “All officers charging costs, and *806exacting its payment from the pocket of the citizen, must always show the authority of the law to do so.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. See Holloway v. State.31
Under Georgia law, generally “ ‘[c]osts’ does not include attorney fees.” Lawhorne v. Soltis.32 As explained in Bearden v. City of Austell:33
The term “costs,” as applied to proceedings in a Court of Justice, has, in the acceptation of the profession, and by the practice of all Courts in Georgia, a well understood meaning. It includes all charges, fixed by statute, as compensation for services rendered by officers of the Court in the progress of the cause. It does not embrace fees, to which counsel prosecuting or defending may be entitled. The courts in Georgia have consistently held that attorney fees are not recoverable unless specifically provided for by statute or contract.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Thus, we hold that the “costs” authorized by OCGA § 17-11-1 do not include attorney fees.
(b) The court could impose the attorney fees under restitution statutes. The State next argues that statutes authorizing restitution empowered the court to impose the attorney fees. We disagree.
OCGA § 17-14-3 (b) authorizes a trial court to order an offender to make full restitution to any victim as a condition of probation. Under the definition set forth in OCGA§ 17-14-2 (2), such restitution can only be for damages “which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action . . . based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced, except punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, or loss of consortium.” In civil actions, attorney fees are not generally recoverable as a part of the damages. Lawhorne, supra, 259 Ga. at 504 (3). The exception to this rule, where the defendant has acted in bad faith, or has been stubbornly litigious or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, clearly does not apply in this particular criminal action involving strict liability. See OCGA § 13-6-11.
Nor does OCGA§ 42-8-35 (a) (7), which concerns restitution that may be imposed as a condition of probation, authorize attorney fees here. This statute empowers a court to require a probationer to “[m]ake reparation or restitution to any aggrieved person for the *807damage or loss caused by the probationer’s offense, in an amount to be determined by the court.” “Damage or loss” does not normally include the expenses of litigation or attorney fees, and we decline to read that meaning into the statute here.
For these reasons and for the reasons also set forth in subdivision (c) below, the restitution statutes do not authorize the trial court to impose attorney fees for court-appointed counsel as a part of the sentence.
(c) The court could impose the attorney fees under its general power to impose reasonable conditions on probationers. Finally, the State claims that the general power of the trial court to impose reasonable conditions on probationers authorized the imposition of attorney fees here. Once again, we disagree.
OCGA§ 42-8-35 sets forth the terms and conditions a court may impose as a condition of probation. Nowhere in this Code section is there any authority to impose the fees of court-appointed attorneys. “This Code section, however, is not exclusive in its provisions but the court has authority to impose restrictions not specifically listed therein.” (Punctuation omitted.) Kellam v. State 34 Indeed, “[i]n the absence of express authority to the contrary, we see no logical reason why any reasonable condition imposed for probation or suspension of a sentence by a trial court should not be approved.” State v. Collett.35
Here, we are dealing with attorney fees, which “are not recoverable unless specifically provided for by statute or contract.” Bearden, supra, 212 Ga. App. at 400 (4). Former OCGA § 17-12-10 (c) (2003) expressly authorized the trial court to require certain defendants to reimburse the county for the attorney fees of their court-appointed counsel. We interpreted the statute strictly so as to require the court to first make a factual determination in the record that the defendant was able to pay for the employment of an attorney, which could include findings regarding the amount of the defendant’s assets, expenses, income, or outstanding obligations. See Burns v. State;36 Hall v. State;37 Fowler v. State.38
This detailed procedure (authorized by statute and delineated by case law), which protected the rights of the defendant by requiring certain findings before he was required to reimburse attorney fees and which appeared to occupy the field, was abolished by the General Assembly when it enacted the Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003. Ga. L. 2003, p. 191, § 1. The new statute repealed former OCGA *808§ 17-12-10 in its entirety and substituted in no provision authorizing such reimbursement. Where the legislature has enacted a specific procedure authorizing the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney fees by defendants under certain circumstances, the express repeal of that statute would clearly indicate the legislature’s intent to revoke the authority to impose such fees as a part of the sentence, regardless of the fact that such reimbursement may be implicitly authorized by the general powers of the court to impose reasonable conditions on probationers (or, speaking hypothetically, by general restitution powers authorized by other statutes). Such general powers existed before the enactment of the specific statute governing reimbursement, but the legislature found it necessary to expressly authorize the courts to order reimbursement in a statute specifically addressing the matter. The subsequent repeal of that statute would mean that the legislature intended that the authority was now revoked.
This analysis is supported by at least two cases. In Cawthon v. Douglas County,39 the Supreme Court of Georgia noted that in enacting the 1933 Code, the General Assembly repealed a statute that expressly authorized juries to determine questions of fact in equity cases. Even though another unrepealed statute indicated that the courts may still have had the authority to have juries decide fact questions in equity cases, Cawthon held that the repeal of the express statute showed the legislature’s intent to revoke this authority, and the Court declined to read that authority into the remaining statute by implication. Id. at 763-764 (1).
In Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady 40 the Supreme Court of Georgia considered OCGA§§ 5-3-2 and 5-3-3, which generally govern appeals from probate court to superior court, and OCGA § 37-3-150, which governs appeals in civil commitment proceedings. OCGA §§ 5-3-2 and 5-3-5 generally allow either party to appeal any probate court decision to the superior court. OCGA § 37-3-150, whose predecessor statute (now repealed) specifically authorized applicants for commitment (such as mental health facilities) to appeal adverse decisions, omitted that language in its subsequent version and instead specified that a mental health patient shall have the right to appeal any decision of the probate court; it did not specify whether a mental health facility that has filed an application for commitment of a patient has a right of appeal. Brady concluded that “the General Assembly must have intended § 37-3-150 to exclusively control the parties who have a right to appeal from a commitment decision and *809for mental health facilities not to have that right.” Brady, supra, 263 Ga. at 594 (2) (c). Because the legislature intended the specific statute to occupy the whole law on its subject, Brady held that the subsequent repeal of the specific statute meant that the general statutes (OCGA §§ 5-3-2 and 5-3-3) no longer guaranteed the right even though they could have been interpreted as doing so by their literal terms. Id.
Decided May 10, 2006
Reconsideration denied June 15, 2006
E. Suzanne Whitaker, for appellant.
Charles A. Spahos, Solicitor-General, Leonard M. Geldon, Gilbert A. Crosby, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellee.
This case, like Cawthon and Brady, presents a situation involving the same authority expressly granted by the specific language of one statute (former OCGA§ 17-12-10 (c)) andinferentially granted by the general language of another (OCGA § 42-8-35). As in Cawthon and Brady, the subsequent repeal of the specific statute revoked the authority, even though the authority could have been interpreted as being available under the general statute and associated court decisions. See also E-Lane Pine Hills v. Ferdinand.41 Accordingly, in light of the repeal of former OCGA§ 17-12-10 (c), the general probationary powers of a court do not authorize a trial court to require a defendant to reimburse the attorney fees of court-appointed counsel.

Motion for reconsideration denied.

 Harrison v. State, 201 Ga. App. 577, 583 (5) (411 SE2d 738) (1991).

 Washington v. State, 251 Ga. App. 206, 211-212 (3) (553 SE2d 855) (2001).

 Brady v. State, 246 Ga. App. 412, 413 (541 SE2d 396) (2000), superseded by statute, Beaton v. State, 255 Ga. App. 901, 905 (6) (567 SE2d 113) (2002).

 Kinney v. State, 234 Ga. App. 5, 8 (2) (505 SE2d 553) (1998).

 Sanders v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. App. 422, 423 (1) (577 SE2d 94) (2003).

 Walton County v. Dean, 23 Ga. App. 97, 99 (97 SE 561) (1918).

 Holloway v. State, 178 Ga. App. 141, 142-143 (3) (342 SE2d 363) (1986).

 Lawhorne v. Soltis, 259 Ga. 502, 504 (3) (384 SE2d 662) (1989).

 Bearden v. City of Austell, 212 Ga. App. 398, 400 (4) (441 SE2d 782) (1994).

 Kellam v. State, 271 Ga. App. 125, 126 (608 SE2d 729) (2004).

 State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 670 (208 SE2d 472) (1974).

 Burns v. State, 251 Ga. App. 889, 891-892 (2) (555 SE2d 209) (2001).

 Hall v. State, 189 Ga. App. 824, 825 (2) (377 SE2d 907) (1989).

 Fowler v. State, 184 Ga. App. 177, 178 (360 SE2d 918) (1987).

 Cawthon v. Douglas County, 248 Ga. 760, 762-763 (1) (286 SE2d 30) (1982).

 Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 594 (2) (c) (436 SE2d 219) (1993).

 E-Lane Pine Hills v. Ferdinand, 277 Ga. App. 566, 568-570 (627 SE2d 44) (2006).