Court Opinion

ID: 9728415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:07:22.226858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:48.478198
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Judge,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In this case, pursuant to Rule 7:4-2(b) of the New Jersey Rules of Court 1, Licensee entered a plea of guilty with civil reservation to a violation of Section 39:4-50(a) of *882the New Jersey Statutes.2 Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I agree with Licensee’s assertion that the use of this plea to support a license suspension under the provisions of the Driver’s License Compact, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581, viplates the Full Faith and Credit Clause ^f the United States Constitution.3
This Court has consistently recognized that we are required by the Federal Constitution to give full faith and credit to a judgment or judicial decree of a sister state. See, e.g., Walker v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 729 A.2d 634 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); Department of Transportation v. Adcock, 103 Pa.Cmwlth. 298, 520 A.2d 118 (1987); Department of Transportation v. Granito, 70 Pa.Cmwlth. 123, 452 A.2d 889 (1982); Department of Transportation v. Rodgers, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 393, 341 A.2d 917 (1975). In support of its conclusion that the use of Licensee’s guilty plea with civil reservation is proper, the majority relies on Hession v. Department of Transportation, 767 A.2d 1135 (2001). In turn, the opinion in Hession relies on Bourdeev v. Department of Transportation, 755 A.2d 59 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). In interpreting the application of Rule 7:4-2(b) in Bourdeev, this Court stated the following, in pertinent part:
On appeal, DOT asserts that the civil reservation attached to Licensee’s guilty plea does not prevent it from relying upon the conviction as a basis to suspend Licensee’s driving privileges under the Driver’s License Compact of 1961 (Compact). We agree.
While the New Jersey Rule of Court which allows a civil reservation with guilty pleas prohibits the use of the plea itself in any civil proceeding, it does not bar the introduction of evidence of the conviction that resulted from the guilty plea. Clearly, in this case it is the conviction, not the guilty plea, that triggered New Jersey’s report to DOT.
Id., 755 A.2d at 61 (footnotes omitted and emphasis in original).
To the contrary, the New Jersey Supreme Court long ago recognized that the provisions of Rule 7:4-2(b) preclude the use of either the guilty plea or the resultant conviction in a subsequent civil proceeding. See Gallo Asphalt Co. v. Sagner, 71 N.J. 405, 412, 365 A.2d 932, 935 (1976) (“[T]he terms and the spirit of the agreement entered into by the State and appellants precluded any evidential use of the pleas and convictions in subsequent civil proceedings. Thus, this case is not strictly analogous to other instances in which prior pleas of nolo contendere have been considered in disciplinary proceedings... ”) (citations omitted). Thus, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires this Court to give the same effect to the plea entered pursuant to Rule 7:4-2(b) as would be afforded in the New Jersey courts. See Farmland Dairies v. Barber, 65 N.Y.2d 51, 55-56, 478 N.E.2d 1314, 1317, 489 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715-716 (1985) (“[T]he doctrine establishes a rule of evidence, however, which requires *883recognition of the foreign judgment as proof of the prior out-of-State litigation and give it res judicata effect, thus avoiding relitigation of issues in one State which have already been decided in another. The rule is not absolute; the judgment of one court is conclusive and binding in another State only if the first court had jurisdiction to render it, but if the foreign court had jurisdiction, as New Jersey did here, the courts of every other State must give it the same credit, validity and effect as it has in the State which rendered it and this is so even though suit could not have been maintained on the cause of action in the forum State or the judgment is based upon a mistake of law. Whatever could have been pleaded in opposition to it in the foreign state may be pleaded in opposition to it in the forum State, but the judgment can be given no less force or effect than it has in the State rendering it.”) (citations omitted).
Likewise, in Bourdeev, this Court equated a plea under Rule 7:4-2(b) to be equivalent to a plea of nolo contendere, and then determined that such a plea is a “conviction” under the provisions of the Compact. See Bourdeev, 755 A.2d at 61-62. However, as noted above, in Gallo the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly differentiated between a plea of nolo contendere and one entered pursuant to Rule 7:4 — 2(b). See Gallo, 71 N.J. at 412, 365 A.2d at 935. Thus, the analysis employed in Bourdeev, Hession and the majority opinion in this case is fatally flawed.
If the Department is acting to suspend a licensee’s operating privilege based on an out-of-state judgment under the provisions of the Compact, I firmly believe that all aspects of the judgment entered must be given the effect as they would in the foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., Walker, 729 A.2d at 634 (Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this Court must respect the Maryland authorities’ concurrent sentencing on the crimes committed by a parolee even though such sentencing is not permitted in this Commonwealth.); Adcock, 520 A.2d at 120 (Full faith and credit demands that this Court recognize the judgment of our sister states and give them at least the same effect and validity as they enjoy in the rendering state.). In this case, I would comply with that portion of the New Jersey judgment which precludes its use in this collateral civil proceeding. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States demands no less. Walker; Adcock; Farmland Dairies. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court dismissing Licensee’s appeal from the one-year suspension imposed by the Department pursuant to the provisions of the Compact.

. The provisions of the former Rule 7:4 — 2(b) are now contained in Rule 7:6-2(a)(l) which states, in pertinent part:
(a) Pleas allowed, Guilty Plea.
(1) Generally. A defendant may plead not guilty or guilty, but the court may, in its discretion, refuse to accept a guilty plea. The court shall not, however, accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining by inquiry of the defendant and, in the court’s discretion, of others, that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea and that there is a factual basis for the plea. Upon the request of the defendant, the court may, at the time of the acceptance of a guilty plea, order that the plea shall not be evidential in any civil proceeding...
N.J. R. Mum. Ct. R. 7:6-2(a)(l).

. Section 39:4-50(a) prohibits, in pertinent part, the operation of a motor vehicle "[wjhile under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or ... with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the ... blood...”

. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states, in pertinent part, that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Act, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State..." U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ("[Sjuch Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.’’).