Court Opinion

ID: 9953313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 20:04:01.180681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:57.682125
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221419-U

                                                                            FOURTH DIVISION
                                                                      Order filed: March 21, 2024

                                          No. 1-22-1419

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                              IN THE

                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                        FIRST DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )   Appeal from the
                                                              )   Circuit Court of
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   Cook County.
                                                              )
 v.                                                           )   No. 12 CR 21663
                                                              )
 DERRICK ANTHONY BALDWIN,                                     )   Honorable
                                                              )   Stanley J. Sacks,
        Defendant-Appellant.                                  )   Judge, presiding.

        JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
        Justices Martin and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: Issue raised in the defendant’s petition for relief from judgment filed under section
             2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022))
             was barred by res judicata when the same issue had been decided in a previous
             appeal.

¶2     The defendant, Derrick Anthony Baldwin, acting pro se, appeals the dismissal of his

petition for relief from judgment filed under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)

(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022)). In the petition, the defendant argued that his convictions for

aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, and residential burglary were unlawful because
No. 1-22-1419

those charges had already been used as evidence of dangerousness in a separate proceeding in

which the State sought to have him declared a sexually dangerous person under section 3 of the

Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA) (725 ILCS 205/3 (West 2012)). Because this court has

previously decided this issue in a prior appeal from the defendant’s convictions, it is barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of the defendant’s petition.

¶3     The factual and procedural history of this case has been recited in detail in the defendant’s

prior appeals (see People v. Baldwin, 2020 IL App (1st) 160496 (Baldwin I), People v. Baldwin,

2021 IL App (1st) 190363-U (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Baldwin II)) and

need not be repeated in full here. Relevant to this appeal, in 2012, in case no. 12 CR 21663, the

defendant was charged with, among others, two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and

one count each of home invasion and residential burglary based on allegations that he entered a

woman’s home while she was sleeping and sexually assaulted her. Baldwin II, 2021 IL App (1st)

190363-U, ¶ 3. Following a jury trial in 2014, the defendant was convicted on all charges and

sentenced to twenty-nine years in prison. The defendant appealed. Id.

¶4     While his appeal from that case was pending, the defendant was facing similar charges of

home invasion, residential burglary, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and unauthorized video

recording in a separate case, case no. 13 CR 2690. Id. ¶ 4. In that proceeding, the State opted to

file a petition pursuant section 3 of the SDPA seeking to have the defendant declared a sexually

dangerous person based on his alleged conduct in that case. At the trial on the petition, the State

presented expert testimony regarding the defendant’s mental disorders, his propensity to commit

sexual offenses, and the risk of him committing sexual offenses in the future. Id. The State also

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No. 1-22-1419

introduced a certified copy of the defendant’s conviction in case no. 12 CR 21663. The court found

the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, and the defendant appealed. Id.

¶5     Meanwhile, in the earlier appeal from case no. 12 CR 21663, the State confessed error in

the denial of the defendant's motion for a substitution of judge, and this court reversed the

defendant’s convictions on that basis. Id. ¶ 5. In light of that reversal of the convictions in case no.

12 CR 21663, the SDPA adjudication was ultimately vacated in the defendant’s separate appeal

from case no. 13 CR 2690 because the now-reversed convictions from case no. 12 CR 21663 had

been admitted as evidence of dangerousness in the SDPA proceeding. See Baldwin I, 2020 IL App

(1st) 160496, ¶ 27.

¶6     On retrial in case no. 12 CR 21663, the defendant was again convicted on all charges.

Baldwin II, 2021 IL App (1st) 190363-U, ¶ 17. He then filed a post-trial motion to dismiss the case

on the grounds that “the State could not pursue criminal charges against him because he had been

found sexually dangerous under the SDPA.” Id. In response, the State acknowledged that a

defendant cannot be convicted of an offense and found to be sexually dangerous based on the same

offense, but it argued that the offenses at issue in case no. 12 CR 21663 were not the underlying

offenses for the SDPA proceeding in case no. 13 CR 2690. Id. The circuit court agreed with the

State and denied the defendant’s motion. Id. The defendant raised a similar argument in a separate

post-trial motion for new trial, and that motion was likewise denied. Id. ¶ 18.

¶7      Following the convictions on retrial, the defendant was again sentenced to twenty-nine

years in prison, plus an additional six-month sentence for contempt of court. Id. ¶ 19. The

defendant appealed.

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No. 1-22-1419

¶8     In that appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that “his convictions and sentence

should be vacated because criminally prosecuting him after he had already been adjudicated a

sexually dangerous person in case no. 13 CR 2690 violated the purpose of the SDPA.” Id. ¶ 21.

This court rejected the defendant’s argument and affirmed his convictions, specifically finding that

“the defendant's criminal convictions were not based on the same underlying charges that formed

the basis of his civil commitment under the SDPA, and therefore, his prosecution does not run

afoul of section 9 of the SDPA.” Id. ¶ 28.

¶9     In 2022, the defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the

Code, which is the subject of the present appeal. In the petition, the defendant sought to have his

convictions in case no. 12 CR 21663 vacated on the grounds that, under People v. Galba, 273 Ill.

App. 3d 95 (1995), “a defendant cannot be committed as a Sexually Dangerous Person and

simultaneously criminally punished for the same underlying acts giving rise to the finding of

dangerousness.” According to the defendant, because the SDPA adjudication in case no. 13 CR

2690 was vacated following the reversal of the convictions in case no. 12 CR 21663, it is clear that

the charges in case no. 12 CR 21663 were in fact the underlying charges for the SDPA proceeding,

in violation of Galba. The State moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the finding that the

defendant was a sexually dangerous person had been vacated, effectively mooting the defendant’s

argument. Following a hearing on the State’s motion, the circuit court granted the motion and

dismissed the petition. This appeal follows.

¶ 10   On appeal, the State asserts that the doctrine of res judicata bars the defendant’s argument

that his convictions in case no. 12 CR 21663 were barred by the SDPA adjudication in case no. 13

CR 2690. See, e.g., In re B.G., 407 Ill. App. 3d 682, 687 (2011) (holding that substantive arguments

                                                -4-
No. 1-22-1419

raised in a section 2-1401 petition were barred by res judicata when they had been decided earlier

in the same proceeding). The State contends that the argument that the defendant raises in this

section 2-1401 petition is identical to the argument that this court addressed on appeal of his

convictions following retrial in case no. 12 CR 21663 (Baldwin II). In his reply brief, the defendant

argues that in Baldwin II it was the State, and not him, that brought up the Galba issue that is at

issue in the section 2-1401 petition and that his argument in that appeal was that he could not be

prosecuted in case no. 12 CR 21663 after having been found to have a mental illness.

¶ 11    We are unpersuaded by the defendant’s arguments and agree with the State that the issue

presented in the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition, namely that he was illegally convicted of the

same charges that allegedly served as the basis for the SDPA adjudication, has already been finally

decided in this case and is, therefore, res judicata. “Three requirements must be satisfied for res

judicata to apply: (1) a final judgment on the merits has been rendered by a court of competent

jurisdiction; (2) an identity of cause of action exists; and (3) the parties or their privies are identical

in both actions.” Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008) (citing Downing v.

Chicago Transit Authority, 162 Ill. 2d 70, 73–74 (1994)). All three elements are present here. The

parties are identical, and the final judgment affirming the defendant’s convictions following retrial

in case no. 12 CR 21663 addressed and disposed of the exact same issue that the defendant raises

in this section 2-1401 petition. Indeed, in that prior order this court expressly stated that “the

defendant's criminal convictions were not based on the same underlying charges that formed the

basis of his civil commitment under the SDPA, and therefore, his prosecution does not run afoul

of section 9 of the SDPA.” Baldwin, 2021 IL App (1st) 190363-U, ¶ 28. We further explained:

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No. 1-22-1419

       “Simply put, in October 2012, the defendant committed multiple criminal acts on two

       separate nights and against two separate victims and was charged under two separate

       indictments. The SDPA mandates that, for each indictment, the State must elect whether

       to prosecute the defendant in a criminal proceeding or file a petition under the SDPA. In

       the instant case, the State elected to prosecute the defendant criminally, and in case no. 13

       CR 2690, it elected to file a petition under the SDPA. In both instances, the State comported

       with the provisions of the SDPA.” Id.

¶ 12   Thus, it has been established that the two matters are distinct and that the charges in case

no. 12 CR 21663 did not form the basis for the defendant’s SDPA adjudication, even though the

convictions from case no. 12 CR 21663 were admitted as evidence in the SDPA proceeding. The

issue has been settled, and the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition raising this issue is barred by

res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the defendant’s petition.

¶ 13   Affirmed.

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