Court Opinion

ID: 9889632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 20:19:15.478623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:25.878311
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Ames v. Geauga Cty. Republican Cent. Commt., 2023-Ohio-3689.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                GEAUGA COUNTY

BRIAN M. AMES,                                       CASE NO. 2022-G-0038

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                     Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                       Court of Common Pleas

GEAUGA COUNTY
REPUBLICAN CENTRAL                                   Trial Court No. 2022 M 000323
COMMITTEE, et al.,

                 Defendants-Appellees.

                                            OPINION

                                    Decided: October 10, 2023
                                       Judgment: Affirmed

Brian M. Ames, pro se, 2632 Ranfield Road, Mogadore, OH 44260 (Plaintiff-Appellant).

Nancy C. Schuster, Schuster & Simmons Co., LPA, The Bevelin House, 2913 Clinton
Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendants-Appellees).

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

        {¶1}     Plaintiff-appellant, Brian M. Ames (“Mr. Ames”), appeals the judgment of the

Geauga County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint against defendants-

appellees, Geauga County Republican Central Committee (“the committee”) and Nancy

B. McArthur in her official capacity as chairman (“Ms. McArthur”), for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

        {¶2}     Mr. Ames’ amended complaint alleged the committee and Ms. McArthur

(collectively, “the appellees”) violated R.C. 121.22, i.e., the Open Meetings Act (the
“OMA”), during the committee’s June 2022 organizational meeting held pursuant to R.C.

3517.04.

         {¶3}   Mr. Ames asserts one assignment of error, contending the trial court erred

by granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss. After a careful review of the record and

pertinent law, we agree with the trial court that Mr. Ames can prove no set of facts entitling

him to relief. Based on binding legal precedent, the committee’s election of officers

pursuant to R.C. 3517.04 involved the internal affairs of the political party. Therefore, the

committee’s meeting was not subject to the OMA.

         {¶4}   Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common

Pleas.

                                         Procedural History

         {¶5}   On June 9, 2022, Mr. Ames filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and

injunctive relief against the appellees,1 alleging violations of the OMA. The appellees filed

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The next day, Mr. Ames filed an

amended complaint.

         {¶6}   Mr. Ames alleged the committee held a meeting on June 8, 2022, pursuant

to R.C. 3517.04 during which it elected officers. According to Mr. Ames, the meeting was

“conducted by a statutorily created public body for the purpose of performing a statutory

function,” and the OMA applied. Mr. Ames alleged the appellees violated the OMA

because no vote was taken on a member-elect’s motion to conduct the elections of

officers by roll call vote; the elections of officers were conducted by secret ballot; and the

1. The committee refers to itself as the Geauga County Republican Party Central Committee. While it
appears Mr. Ames’ omission of the word “party” is intentional, this dispute is not relevant to the issues on
appeal.
                                                     2

Case No. 2022-G-0038
ballots were collected from members instead of members placing them in a ballot box.

Mr. Ames sought a declaratory judgment finding the appellees violated the OMA and the

election results are invalid; an injunction ordering the committee and its members to

comply with the OMA; a civil forfeiture of $500; and an award of costs and reasonable

attorney fees.

       {¶7}   The appellees filed an amended motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R.

12(B)(6), contending the committee is not a “public body” under the OMA and was not

exercising a “sovereign governmental function” when it elected its officers pursuant to

R.C. 3517.04.     Mr. Ames filed a brief in opposition, arguing the “conduct” of the

committee’s organizational meeting under R.C. 3517.04 constitutes a “governmental

function.” The committee filed a reply.

       {¶8}   In September 2022, the trial court filed a judgment entry dismissing Mr.

Ames’ complaint with prejudice. The trial court found it was “beyond doubt” Mr. Ames

can prove no set of facts that would warrant the requested relief, stating, “The Court

agrees with [the appellees] that merely because the Committee was conducting an

organizational meeting pursuant to statute, the Committee was not thereby conducting a

sovereign governmental function as might require the Committee to comply with certain

statutory obligations under dicta set forth in Jones v. Geauga Cnty. Republican Party

Central Committee, 82 N.E.3d 16 (11th Dist., Geauga).” The trial court subsequently filed

a nunc pro tunc entry to correct a scrivener’s error.

       {¶9}   Mr. Ames appealed and raises the following assignment of error:

       {¶10} “The trial court erred by granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.”

                                             3

Case No. 2022-G-0038
                                   Standard of Review

       {¶11} An order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to de novo

review. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d

44, ¶ 5. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is procedural and tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65

Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). In resolving a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, courts

are confined to the allegations in the complaint and cannot consider outside materials.

State ex rel. Baran v. Fuerst, 55 Ohio St.3d 94, 97, 563 N.E.2d 713 (1990). In construing

the complaint, a court must presume all factual allegations are true and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40

Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). However, a court should not accept as true

any unsupported legal conclusions in the complaint. See id. at 193.

       {¶12} A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it

appears beyond doubt from the complaint the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling

him to recovery. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. PUCO, 76 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 668

N.E.2d 889 (1996). If, after considering the complaint accordingly, there is no set of facts

consistent with the appellant’s allegations that would permit recovery, the judgment of

dismissal will be affirmed. Grybosky v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.

2010-A-0047, 2011-Ohio-6843, ¶ 15.

                                    Legal Principles

       {¶13} The determinative issue in this case is a legal one—whether the committee

was acting as a “public body” that was subject to the OMA when it conducted an

organizational meeting pursuant to R.C. 3517.04.

                                             4

Case No. 2022-G-0038
       {¶14} The OMA provides “[a]ll meetings of any public body are declared to be

public meetings open to the public at all times.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 121.22(C). The

meaning of the term “public body” includes “[a]ny board, commission, committee, council,

or similar decision-making body of a state agency, institution, or authority, and any

legislative authority or board, commission, committee, council, agency, authority, or

similar decision-making body of any county, township, municipal corporation, school

district, or other political subdivision or local public institution,” as well as “[a]ny committee

or subcommittee of a body described” above. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(a)

and (b).

       {¶15} The term “meeting” means “any prearranged discussion of the public

business of the public body by a majority of its members.” (Emphasis added.) R.C.

121.22(B)(2).

       {¶16} The term “public business” is not statutorily defined. The Supreme Court of

Ohio has defined it as “the business of the government,” “matters within the purview of a

public body’s duties, functions and jurisdiction,” and “those matters over which the public

governmental body has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power.” (Citations

omitted.) White v. King, 147 Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-2770, 60 N.E.3d 1234, ¶ 21.

       {¶17} R.C. 3517.03 governs the committees of major political parties. It provides,

in relevant part, “[t]he controlling committees of each major political party or organization

shall be [1] a state central committee * * *; [2] a county central committee * * *; and [3]

such district, city, township, or other committees as the rules of the party provide.” It

further provides “[e]ach major party controlling committee shall elect an executive

committee * * *.”

                                                5

Case No. 2022-G-0038
       {¶18} R.C. 3517.04 governs the organization of central committees. It provides:

       {¶19} “The members-elect of each major political party state central committee

shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, meet following the declaration of the

results by the boards of elections of the election of members of the state central

committees, at a suitable place and time to be designated by the retiring chairman of the

committee in accordance with party rules. In the case of a county central committee, the

meeting shall be held not earlier than six nor later than fifteen days following the

declaration of the results by the board of elections of the election of members of county

central committees in that county. Notice of any meeting held pursuant to this section,

giving the place and time, shall be sent to each member-elect by the retiring secretary of

the committee by mail and a copy of the notice shall be posted in the office of the secretary

of state or board of elections, as the case may be, at least five days prior to any such

meeting. The meeting shall be called to order by the retiring chairman or secretary or if

there is no such officer, or if such officer is absent, then by a member of such committee

designated by the secretary of state in the case of the state committees, and by a member

of the board of elections of the same political party, designated by the board, in the case

of county committees. A temporary chairman and secretary shall be chosen and the

committee shall proceed to organize by the election of a chairman, vice-chairman,

treasurer, secretary, and such other officers as the rules provide.”

       {¶20} As we recently explained in State ex rel. Ames v. Geauga Cty. Republican

Cent. & Executive Commts., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2021-G-0004, 2021-Ohio-2888,

appeal not accepted, 165 Ohio St.3d 1457, 2021-Ohio-4033, 176 N.E.3d 769:

                                             6

Case No. 2022-G-0038
       {¶21} “Courts have determined that political parties are not governmental entities.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has characterized political parties as ‘basically voluntary

associations of persons who act together principally for party and community purposes.’

State ex rel. Cain v. Kay, 38 Ohio St.2d 15, 18, 309 N.E.2d 860 (1974). As the Eighth

District Court of Appeals has aptly explained, ‘[a]lthough political parties have certain

public responsibilities, they are basically voluntary associations made up of persons who

act together for various community and party purposes and who are governed in most

respects by their own rules and usages.’ State ex rel. McCurdy v. DeMaioribus, 9 Ohio

App.2d 280, 281, 224 N.E.2d 353 (8th Dist.1967).

       {¶22} “Since a political party is not a governmental entity, members of a political

party’s county central and executive committees are generally not considered public

officials. See McCurdy at 281-282 (‘[I]t is the general rule in the United States that party

committeemen do not hold a ‘public office’-although the Legislature may, by statute,

regulate the election and conduct of political committees’); 2002 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No.

2002-038, *2 (‘[A]s a general rule, the members of these committees are not considered

officers or employees of a governmental entity, but rather officers of the political party that

elects or appoints them’).” Id. at ¶ 36-37.

       {¶23} In State ex rel. Hayes v. Jennings, 173 Ohio St. 370, 182 N.E.2d 546 (1962),

the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized a limited exception to this general rule, holding:

       {¶24} “The provisions of [R.C. 305.02] * * *, which authorize the members of the

central committee of a political party to fill vacancies occurring, inter alia, in the office of

clerk of courts of a county, confer official power upon the members of the central

committee, and this annexation of power to this position makes it a public office and is a

                                               7

Case No. 2022-G-0038
constitutional grant of power by the General Assembly.” Id. at paragraph one of the

syllabus.

         {¶25} In Cain, supra, the court clarified its holding in Hayes, stating “it was the

delegation by statute of one of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised for

the public benefit, to the county central committeemen that outweighed the traditional

reluctance of the court to interfere in the internal affairs of political parties. * * * [I]t is only

where party officers assume duties affecting activities beyond the sphere of the internal

affairs of the party and exercise official powers that are part of the sovereign functions of

the state, properly exercisable for the public benefit, that the courts will intercede.” Id. at

18-19.

         {¶26} This court has twice considered whether the OMA applied to meetings of

political party committees. In Jones v. Geauga Cty. Republican Party Cent. Commt.,

2017-Ohio-2930, 82 N.E.3d 16 (11th Dist.), we considered whether the OMA applied to

a meeting at which the central committee voted to amend its internal bylaws and appoint

new members. See id. at ¶ 3. We recognized that under the circumstances presented

in Hayes, “R.C. 305.02 transmutes the members of a county central committee of a

political party to ‘public officers.’” Id. at ¶ 26. However, we determined “a central

committee of a local political party is only comprised of ‘public officers’ when the

committee is actually undertaking its limited, governmental duties.” Id. at ¶ 28. We

concluded “although members of a central committee of a political party are public officers

upon acting under the authority granted in R.C. 305.02 in filling vacanc[ies] in county

offices, these same committee members do not constitute public officials engaged in

public meetings when they are addressing the internal affairs of the political party.” Id. at

                                                 8

Case No. 2022-G-0038
¶ 35; see also 1980 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 80-083, paragraph five of the syllabus (“The

convening of the county central committee for the purpose of conducting purely internal

party affairs, unrelated to the committee’s duties of making appointments to vacant public

offices, is not a ‘meeting’ as defined by R.C. 121.22(B)(2)”).

       {¶27} Most recently, in Ames I, supra, we considered whether the OMA applied

to the executive committee’s meeting held pursuant to R.C. 3501.07 for the purpose of

making and filing with the Ohio Secretary of State a recommendation for a Republican

member of the county board of elections. See id. at ¶ 2. We determined, “[w]hile R.C.

3501.07 certainly gives the county executive committee an opportunity to provide

meaningful input, the ‘sovereign function of government,’ i.e., the power of appointment,

expressly lies with the secretary of state. Accordingly, R.C. 3501.07 does not make a

county executive committee a ‘public body’ that is subject to the OMA.” Id. at ¶ 73.

                                         Analysis

       {¶28} Mr. Ames first contends the trial court erred by misapplying the Civ.R.

12(B)(6) standard, which required the court to presume the truth of all factual allegations

in his amended complaint. He asserts the appellees’ “conduct of the organizational

meeting was required by R.C. 3517.04 and was therefore public business.”

       {¶29} Mr. Ames did not allege in his amended complaint that the committee was

conducting “public business.” In any event, “public business” is a legal term defined by

the Supreme Court of Ohio. “[A] court should not accept as true any unsupported legal

conclusions in the complaint.” Jones, supra, at ¶ 12. Thus, the trial court did not misapply

the applicable legal standard.

                                             9

Case No. 2022-G-0038
       {¶30} Mr. Ames next contends the trial court erred by relying on “dicta” in Jones.

He contends this court in Jones did not find the central committee was not a “public body”;

rather, we only found the committee was not “conducting official business at that

meeting.”

       {¶31} Mr. Ames does not accurately characterize Jones. As stated, we concluded

“although members of a central committee of a political party are public officers upon

acting under the authority granted in R.C. 305.02 in filling vacanc[ies] in county offices,

these same committee members do not constitute public officials engaged in public

meetings when they are addressing the internal affairs of the political party.” (Emphasis

added.) Id. at ¶ 35. Stated differently, the central committee is only a public body when

its members are acting pursuant to R.C. 305.02.

       {¶32} Mr. Ames further contends the trial court’s use of the phrase “sovereign

governmental function” is “vague” and “unsuited” for this court’s review. Mr. Ames used

this exact phrase in his amended complaint and brief in opposition to the appellees’

motion to dismiss. Further, the above precedent from the Supreme Court of Ohio and

this court use and apply the nearly identical phrase “sovereign functions of government.”

Thus, the trial court’s intended meaning is abundantly clear.

       {¶33} In his opposition to the appellees’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Ames argued the

committee’s organizational meeting held pursuant to R.C. 3517.04 must necessarily

precede the performance of its appointment power under R.C. 305.02. Therefore, he

argued, the committee’s “organizational meeting” under R.C. 3517.04 is “essential to and

inseparable from” its appointment power under R.C. 305.02.

                                            10

Case No. 2022-G-0038
       {¶34} Mr. Ames cited no authority in support of this argument, and it is inconsistent

with the existing binding legal precedent. Based on the authority of Hayes and Jones,

the committee’s election of officers pursuant to R.C. 3517.04 involved the internal affairs

of the political party. Therefore, the committee’s meeting was not subject to the OMA.

       {¶35} Based on our de novo review of the allegations in Mr. Ames’ complaint and

the applicable law, we agree with the trial court that Mr. Ames can prove no set of facts

entitling him to relief. Therefore, the trial court properly granted the appellees’ motion to

dismiss.

       {¶36} Mr. Ames’ sole assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶37} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Geauga County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

                                             11

Case No. 2022-G-0038