Court Opinion

ID: 9620419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:42:08.906476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.209484
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
WAKATSUKI, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The admission of evidence regarding Heather Klafta’s physical condition, specifically the maggot infestation of her vaginal *126area, was needlessly cumulative and highly prejudicial, thereby denying Sharon Klafta a fair trial. Further, the trial court erroneously excluded testimony of Sharon Klafta’s psychiatrist, Dr. Cooper, regarding whether or not she possessed the intent to kill at the time of abandonment.
Under Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 403, “although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, ... or a needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” (Emphasis added.)
The State made its case against Sharon Klafta by presenting evidence, which in the majority’s own words was “revolting to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” While evidence of Heather’s physical condition, resulting from the environment in which she was abandoned, may have been relevant to show whether or not her mother intended to kill her by leaving her subject to such an environment, any probative value of the cumulativeness of the same evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The graphic evidence of maggot infestation consisted of not just one color photograph, but several, depicting Heather’s naked body eaten by the maggots. State’s exhibit 91 displayed baby Heather Klafta lying on her back with her legs spread open to reveal the vaginal and inner buttock area filled with open red sores created by the maggots that burrowed into her flesh. State’s exhibit 10 again showed baby Heather Klafta lying on her back with her lower vaginal area exposed to reveal the red craters in her flesh eaten by the maggots. State’s exhibit 16 also shows the upper portion of baby Heather’s vaginal area while she was lying down and partly turned on her side.
The State continued to offer evidence in this horrific manner with a slide show on the life cycle of a fly, presented by one of its *127experts. Projected onto a large screen before the jurors were color magnifications of the stages of the fly from a worm-like larva appearance to that of a fully mature fly. These slides also showed up-close the incisor like cutting edges in the mouth of the larva which it uses to burrow. Further, accompanying the slide show, the State introduced two vials of maggots and two slides containing maggots which were recovered from baby Heather Klafta.
In addition, the State’s evidence regarding the maggot infestation included the detailed and largely repetitive accounts of the maggots in Heather’s flesh by the two doctors, Dr. Craig Thomas and Dr. Frederick Burkle, Jr., who treated Heather. Further, each time one of these doctors testified the photographs of Heather’s maggot eaten vaginal area were passed to the jury.
The unnecessary cumulativeness of this evidence also substantially prejudiced Sharon Klafta’s right to a fair trial. The majority seems to rationalize that if the testimony by “even one witness as to Heather’s condition, when found” is “revolting,” then the effect of additional similar testimony combined with the graphic color photographs and enlarged pictures from the slide show, could not have heightened prejudice. However, upon repetition the very nature of this evidence increases, rather than decreases, the sensitivities of the jurors. Obviously, this kind of presentation, could have easily led the jurors to bypass the inquiry of whether or not Sharon Klafta intended to kill her child at the time of abandonment by improperly focusing instead on what actually happened to the child as evidence of Sharon’s intent to kill.
The majority also holds that the trial court did not err in excluding part of the testimony of Sharon Klafta’s psychiatrist, Dr. Cooper. The majority insists that such testimony regarding whether or not she possessed the requisite intent is only admissible under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 704-404 when the defendant has alleged that a “physical or emotional disease, disorder or *128defect,.. . [has made her] incapable of forming the intent to murder.”
The majority further rejects this testimony on the basis that it falls into a “category of mitigation” known as “diminished capacity” which is not recognized in HRS Chapter 704. The majority relies on State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw. App. 173, 715 P.2d 822 (1986), for the proposition that the Model Penal Code, on which HRS Chapter 704 is based, does not describe diminished capacity as a “distinct category of mitigation.” Yet, Dumlao also states:
by placing more emphasis than does the common law on the actor’s subjective mental state, [the Model Penal Code] also may allow inquiry into areas which have traditionally been treated as part of the law of diminished responsibility or the insanity defense.
Id. at 181, 715 P.2d at 828.
In addition, the analogy drawn by the majority between our HRS Chapter 704 and the Model Penal Code to support their analysis is not significant where the language of our own statutes is clear. As the majority admits Sharon Klafta “expressly was not raising such a defense” pursuant to HRS § 704 — 404. Rather, HRS §704-401 is applicable. Under HRS § 704-401, Dr. Cooper should have been able to testify that Sharon Klafta did not intend to kill her child. HRS § 704 — 101 provides “[e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is required to establish an element of the offense.” The commentary to HRS § 704 — 401 states:
This section accords to evidence of physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect its full evidentiary significance. It assures “admissibility [of such evidence] co-extensive with its relevancy to prove or disprove a material state of mind.” . . . Any evidence relevant to *129prove or disprove the requisite state of mind ought to be admissible. (Emphasis added.)
According to the majority, Sharon Klafta had no real “complaint” because Dr. Cooper did testify regarding her extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that, in any event, testimony regarding her intent would not be admissible as part of an expert opinion because it would be essentially “testimony on her credibility” due to the fact that it would be based on interviews. Although, Dr. Cooper may have explained the mental or emotional disturbance that Sharon Klafta suffered, this would have carried less weight in the minds of the jurors than the kind of expert opinion he offered to render on the crucial issue of her lack of intent to kill. Hawaii Rules of Evidence Rule 704 states “[testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
I would reverse the trial court’s rulings and remand for a new trial.

 The defendant also objected to State’s exhibit 9 though the majority has not included this exhibit in its discussion.