Court Opinion

ID: 9882629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:17:41.353502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:37.694757
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Ranazzi v. Fire Recovery USA, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3281.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LUCAS COUNTY

Andrew Ranazzi                                            Court of Appeals No. L-23-1024

        Appellant                                         Trial Court No. CVE 2210031

v.

Fire Recovery USA, LLC                                    DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellee                                          Decided: September 15, 2023

                                                 *****

        Andrew Ranazzi, Pro se.

        Taylor R. Ward, for appellee.

                                                 *****

        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} This is an appeal of a January 30, 2023 judgment of the Sylvania Municipal

Court, Lucas County, Ohio, granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and

denying appellant’s motion to strike the summary judgment supporting affidavits.

Appellant filed no brief in opposition to appellee’s motion for summary judgment. For

the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.
       {¶ 2} This case arises from an October 5, 2021 motor vehicle accident between

appellant and another vehicle in Pittsfield Township, Michigan (“Pittsfield”). Following

the accident, State Farm, appellant’s insurer, received a $435 emergency services cost

recovery claim from Pittsfield for reimbursement of the costs of fire department services

incurred by Pittsfield as a result of the collision. State Farm allowed $250 of the $435

claim, and tendered payment in that amount. This appeal centers upon the $185 residual

balance following the insurance payment.

       {¶ 3} Pro se appellant, Andrew Ranazzi, sets forth the following three assignments

of error:

              I. The Trial Court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary

       judgment without allowing appellant to respond or file his opposition to it.

              II. The Trial Court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary

       judgment [given] Judge Bonfiglio’s prior decision [].

              III. The Trial Court erred in denying appellant’s motion to strike [].

       {¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On October 5,

2021, appellant backed his motor vehicle out of a driveway in Pittsfield and into the path

of oncoming traffic, resulting in an accident.

       {¶ 5} A Pittsfield fire department crew was dispatched to the accident scene to

secure it, evaluate and furnish any needed medical care, evaluate and furnish any needed

site cleanup, and conduct an investigation. The report generated by the fire department

2.
reflects that, upon arrival at the accident scene, they attempted to examine appellant for

medical injuries. Appellant refused to undergo a medical examination or treatment. In

response, a refusal form was provided to appellant and executed by him. In addition, the

fire department performed a site assessment to determine if any hazardous materials or

liquids had spilled during the collision that needed to be cleaned up. It was determined

that no such spillage occurred.

       {¶ 6} On October 14, 2021, in conformity with a Pittsfield ordinance, State Farm

received a $435 claim on behalf of Pittsfield. State Farm allowed the claim, and tendered

a payment of $250 to Pittsfield. Appellant later received a statement requesting payment

of the $185 remaining balance from appellee, Pittsfield’s third-party billing administrator.

       {¶ 7} The record reflects that appellant denied financial responsibility and refused

to tender payment. On April 13, 2022, appellee sent a demand letter to appellant. On

April 28, 2022, in response to the demand letter, appellant filed a complaint in Sylvania

Municipal Court, alleging that he sustained $6,000 in damages as a result of appellee’s

pursuit of the $185 balance.

       {¶ 8} In the complaint, appellant alleged that, “[N]o Pittsfield fire department

personnel appeared to be on the scene nor did they render assistance to anyone.”

However, the record irrefutably reflects that fire department personnel were dispatched to

the scene, secured the scene, offered medical assistance, obtained an executed refusal

form from appellant, and performed a site assessment regarding cleanup. The fire

3.
department crash report reflected that, “[Fire Department truck] T10-1 parked to protect

the scene and went to check for injuries and hazards * * * crew members obtained signed

refusal [from appellant] * * * T10-1 blocked traffic until released by Pittsfield Police,

returning to in-service at that time. At fault information, according to police:

[Appellant].”

       {¶ 9} Appellant alleged that as a result of appellee’s demand for payment of the

$185 balance he, “suffered damages in the form of having increased insurance costs, as

well as a threat to his credit rating.” The record is devoid of evidence demonstrative of

these claims.

       {¶ 10} On May 6, 2022, appellee’s CFO submitted correspondence to the trial

court requesting that the case be dismissed. Given that a motion to dismiss had not been

properly filed, as conceded by appellee, the case was not dismissed.

       {¶ 11} On November 14, 2022, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. In

support of the motion for summary judgment, appellee attached the supporting affidavits

of Lt. Yurkunas (“Yurkunas”), the fire department member who was dispatched to the

accident scene and offered assistance to appellant, and the affidavit of his superior, Fire

Chief Gleason (“Gleason”). Appellee emphasized in support of summary judgment that

appellant’s principal claim in the complaint, that the fire department did not respond to

the scene or provide services, was contrary to the record of evidence, including the crash

report, photographs, and supporting affidavits.

4.
        {¶ 12} Appellant did not file a brief in opposition to appellee’s motion for

summary judgment. Rather, appellant filed a motion for an extension of time,

accompanied by a motion to strike, setting forth unsupported claims that the two

affidavits submitted by the above-referenced fire department members were not based

upon their personal knowledge and were, therefore, improper. The trial court was not

persuaded.

        {¶ 13} On January 30, 2023, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to strike and

granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined in relevant

part,

        There is no credible evidence that * * * Pittsfield Fire Department did not

        appear at the scene of plaintiff’s accident to render aid. Plaintiff’s claim to

        that effect is totally without merit. Plaintiff presents no evidence * * * that

        the charge of $185 for services rendered is excessive. Plaintiff’s motion to

        strike the affidavits [of Lt. Yurkunas and Chief Gleason] is found not well

        taken * * * [D]efendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

This appeal ensued.

        {¶ 14} Appellant’s first two assignments of error are premised upon the position

that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, they will be considered simultaneously.

5.
       {¶ 15} It is well-established that an appellate court reviews a disputed trial court

summary judgment determination utilizing the same standard as that used by the trial

court. Summary judgment will be granted if the movant demonstrates that there is no

genuine issue of material fact, and when construing the evidence most strongly in favor

of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lorain Natl. Banl v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio

App3d. 127, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist. 1989). Civ.R. 56(C).

       {¶ 16} In support of the claim that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment to appellee, appellant alleges that, “Both affidavits * * * have impermissible

hearsay * * * neither is germane to the proceedings nor within the personal knowledge of

any of the affiants.” The record of evidence does not comport with appellant’s position.

       {¶ 17} Civ.R. 56(E) establishes that, “Affidavits shall be made on personal

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.”

In conjunction, the Ohio Supreme Court determined in Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake

Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 26, “The personal

knowledge standard requirement in Civ.R. 56(E) tracks the personal knowledge standard

of Evid.R. 602 covering lay witness testimony at trial.”

       {¶ 18} In applying the above-discussed legal parameters for proper summary

judgment supporting affidavits, this court held in Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Brunner,

6.
2013-Ohio-128, 986 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.), “The foundation for personal

knowledge may be furnished by the witness’s own testimony. Evid.R. 602. A mere

assertion of personal knowledge satisfies Civ.R. 56(E) if the nature of the facts in the

affidavit, combined with the identity of the affiant, creates a reasonable inference that the

affiant has personal knowledge of the facts.”

        {¶ 19} The affidavit of Yurkunas sets forth that the affiant, in his capacity as an

on-duty fire lieutenant with Pittsfield on the day and time of appellant’s accident, was

dispatched to the accident scene to secure it, assess it, and to provide medical and cleanup

services. He further attests to his direct observations upon arrival at the scene, and the

actions that he took in response to his observations. Lastly, he attests that he drafted the

crash report documenting the accident.

        {¶ 20} Next, the affidavit of Gleason sets forth that the affiant, in his capacity as

Pittsfield’s fire chief, reviewed the reports prepared by Yurkunas related to this case, and

based upon that review, he was familiar with the actions taken by the fire department in

response to the accident. In addition, as the Pittsfield fire chief, he further attests to his

personal knowledge of, and experience with, department policies and practices, including

the post-collision third-party administrative cost recovery billing process underlying this

case.

        {¶ 21} In accord with Civ.R. 56(E), Bonacorsi, and Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn., as

regards to appellant’s claim that the affidavits were not based upon personal knowledge

7.
and were improper, we find that the nature of the facts set forth in the affidavits,

combined with the identity of the affiants, creates a reasonable inference that the affiants

had personal knowledge of the facts. Accordingly, the affidavits were not improper.

       {¶ 22} Based upon our de novo review, we find that reasonable minds can only

conclude that appellee furnished credible, unrefuted evidence reflecting that Pittsfield fire

department personnel were dispatched to, and performed emergency services at,

appellant’s crash scene. Appellant furnished no evidence of impropriety in connection to

appellee’s emergency services cost recovery effort. The trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment to appellee. Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are

found not well-taken.

       {¶ 23} In appellant’s third assignment of error, appellant similarly contends that

the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to strike appellee’s summary judgment

supporting affidavits. We do not concur.

       {¶ 24} As this court held in Bliss v. Johns Manville, 172 N.E. 3d 1146, 2021-

Ohio-1673, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), “A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to strike will not

be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Hizer, 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-13-1035, 2013-Ohio-4621, ¶ 16, citing State ex. rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio

St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-1509, 824 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 10. Abuse of discretion means that the

trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Wilkinson at ¶ 10.”

8.
       {¶ 25} In support of the third assignment of error, appellant again asserts that,

“[T]hese affidavits both fail because neither of the affiants have any personal knowledge

of the accident.”

       {¶ 26} As discussed in detail above, the record reflects that the nature of the facts

set forth in the affidavits, in combination with the identity of the affiants, created a

reasonable inference that the affiants had personal knowledge of those facts, in

conformity with Civ.R. 56(E), Bonacorsi, and Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. Accordingly, no

basis for striking the affidavits was manifest. Appellant has not demonstrated that the

trial court’s denial of the motion to strike the affidavits was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Wherefore, we find appellant’s third assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 27} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Sylvania Municipal Court is

hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.

24.

                                                                           Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

9.
                                                                        Andrew Ranazzi
                                                             v. Fire Recovery USA, LLC
                                                                              L-23-1024

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                          ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
CONCUR.                                       ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J.                        ____________________________
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT                                   JUDGE
ONLY.

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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