Court Opinion

ID: 9664453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:19:10.301635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:06.444832
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Although I agree to affirm this conviction and upon the basis of “judicial estop-pel,” I disagree with the rationale in footnote three of the majority opinion.
This appeal can also be decided in favor of the State on the doctrine of comity. In State v. Daly, 454 N.W.2d at 345, Justice Sabers (present author of this opinion) dissented. I still recognize Daly as good law and not eroded by footnote three of this opinion.
In Daly, this Court recognized that the doctrine of comity can apply to a federal judgment. Therefore, it can apply here and I believe that it should. This Court recognized certain “conditions precedent” to the application of this doctrine by the following criteria:
The Court recognized as “conditions precedent” to the application of the doctrine of comity the following:
1. The foreign court actually had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties;
2. The decree was not obtained fraudulently;
3. The decree was rendered by a system of law reasonably assuring the requisites of an impartial administration of justice — due notice and a hearing; and
4. The judgment did not contravene the public policy of the jurisdiction in which it is relied upon.
Justice Sabers’ conceptual difference is to a case this Court handed down approximately seven months ago. He now employs a footnote, in effect, to disregard our recent opinion and to elevate his dissent. Here, the author’s opinion, in said footnote, apparently is: We cannot say, in the case before us, that “The foreign court actually had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, i.e., criteria one above.”
*183With his conclusion, I disagree.
First, the federal court’s decision on matters within its jurisdiction should not be deemed “questionable” by our judicial fiat. The federal judge had jurisdiction to determine that the federal court had jurisdiction. In the federal court, the federal judge had to “go to the merits of the question.” He had to legally explore the merits of the jurisdictional claim. He had the right to determine if St. Cloud was not an Indian within the meaning of the federal Major Crimes Act. For the members of this Court to independently review the federal judge’s decision on said issue is wrong. And that is precisely what the author would have us, theoretically, do in the future. The federal courts would never permit us to “independently review” their jurisdiction, as Justice Sabers would hold that we do. The United States has a federal system of courts and a state system of courts. The courts — the state courts as well as the federal courts — play an important role in maintaining federalism. Federalism remains strong, not only as an ideál but also as a constitutional principle.
Second, the federal order was not fraudulently obtained.
Third, the procedures employed by the federal court reasonably assure the requisites of the impartial administration of justice.
Fourth, the decision of the federal court did not contravene the public policy of the jurisdiction upon which it relied.
Therefore, my conclusion is that comity applies here — not as a matter of right — but rather as a continuation of the criteria we recently espoused.
MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, J., join this special concurrence.