Court Opinion

ID: 9407198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 00:00:41.169153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:35.843785
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10473        Document: 00516809732             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 23-10473
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                                     July 5, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Mark DeWayne Hallcy,                                                               Clerk

                                                                   Petitioner—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                               Respondent—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 5:23-CV-42
                     ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Jones, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Mark DeWayne Hallcy, Texas prisoner # 2149848, has filed this
   interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of his motions for
   appointment of counsel, expansion of the record, and release on bail pending
   the disposition of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We construe Hallcy’s notice

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10473       Document: 00516809732          Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/05/2023

                                     No. 23-10473

   of appeal as a motion seeking release on bail pending the conclusion of this
   appeal.
            As an initial matter, because the district court’s order denying the
   motions for appointment of counsel and for expansion of the record was
   neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order, we
   lack jurisdiction to consider Hallcy’s appeal from the denial of those motions.
   See Brinar v. Williamson, 245 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 2001); Thomas v. Scott,
   47 F.3d 713, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1995). However, we exercise jurisdiction over
   the instant appeal from the denial of Hallcy’s motion for release pending
   review of his habeas petition. See Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th
   Cir. 1974).
            To obtain release on bail pending review of a habeas petition, or
   pending an appeal in a § 2254 case, the petitioner must (1) raise a substantial
   constitutional claim with a high probability of success and (2) demonstrate
   that “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” exist that require his
   release from prison “to make the habeas remedy effective.” Id. Hallcy
   claims violations of the Ex Post Facto and Due Process clauses, essentially
   arguing that he has a constitutional right to have his earned good-time credits
   applied to his eight-year sentence, which would result in his immediate
   release.
            Because the grant of parole is discretionary, we have repeatedly held
   that Texas law does not create a liberty interest in parole that is protected by
   the Due Process Clause. See Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 769, 774 (5th
   Cir. 2007). Further, to the extent Hallcy challenges any good-time credits
   that were forfeited, “there is no protected liberty interest in the restoration
   of good time credits.” Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1079-80 (5th Cir.
   1997).     To the extent Hallcy claims he should have been released on
   mandatory supervision, his arguments do not implicate due process concerns

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Case: 23-10473     Document: 00516809732           Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/05/2023

                                    No. 23-10473

   because Texas law provides that mandatory supervision is unavailable to
   offenders who were convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
   See Teague, 482 F.3d at 777; Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2), (b) (2009);
   Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149(a)(7) (2017).
          Further, retroactive changes in parole laws may violate the Ex Post
   Facto Clause, see Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249-50 (2000), but
   “speculative, attenuated and conjectural effects are insufficient” to
   demonstrate an ex post facto violation, Hallmark, 118 F.3d at 1078 (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted). Hallcy has not shown that there has
   been any change in state law since the time of his conviction that is being
   applied retroactively and, thus, has not shown an ex post facto violation. See
   Garner, 529 U.S. at 249-50. To the extent that Hallcy argues that the denial
   of his state habeas application without a hearing or written reasons
   constitutes a substantial constitution claim, a challenge to infirmities in a
   state habeas proceeding is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Rudd v.
   Johnson, 256 F.3d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Because the district court did not base its decision on an error of law
   or an erroneous assessment of the evidence, it did not abuse its discretion by
   denying Hallcy’s motion for release on bail pending disposition of his habeas
   petition. See United States v. Olis, 450 F.3d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 2006); United
   States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, to the extent
   that Hallcy requests release on bail while this appeal is pending, he has also
   failed to make the requisite showing. See Calley, 496 F.2d at 702.
          Given the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED in part, the appeal is DISMISSED in part for lack of
   jurisdiction, and Hallcy’s motion for release on bail pending appeal is
   DENIED.

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