Court Opinion

ID: 9655616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:17:56.847437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:20.703618
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I cannot concur in that portion of the majority opinion which holds that upon retrial appellant’s statements must be suppressed because he was not advised that those statements could be used against him in the event that he should be tried as an adult.
I do not read the principal cases relied upon by the majority opinion as requiring the per se rule that the majority opinion adopts. In State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966), the Supreme Court of Oregon was careful to point out that:
The parens patriae relationship does not exist between police and child but between court and child. Police are in the business of solving transgressions against the welfare of society and the apprehension of those who are responsible therefor. They are not engaged in the rehabilitation of the child and the treatment of his emotional and family problems where the free exchange of information and a close relationship is so important. The *417use of information secured by police will not, in our opinion, tend to make more difficult the establishment of a close relationship between juvenile workers and the child.
244 Or. at 179, 416 P.2d at 314.
In following the Gullings decision, the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated:
We agree with the rule expressed by the Oregon court in State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966). A confession by a juvenile is admissible if he has been apprised of his constitutional rights and voluntarily and intelligently waives those rights in making a statement. However, we recognize that the nature of the juvenile system may work to encourage a confession by a juvenile which might otherwise be withheld. While all of the facts and circumstances should be examined in determining whether a juvenile has intelligently waived those rights, it is important that the juvenile is questioned in an adversary setting and not in the confidential atmosphere of the juvenile court process; otherwise he may not realize that criminal responsibility might result. Awareness of potential criminal responsibility may often be imputed to a juvenile when the police are conducting the interrogation. Of course, the safest method the interrogating authority can pursue is to specifically advise a juvenile that criminal prosecution as an adult could result whenever such prosecution is possible.
State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 449-450, 212 N.W.2d 671, 677 (1973).
Indeed, as the Minnesota Court stated, the “safest method” might well be for the interrogating officers to specifically advise a juvenile of the possibility of prosecution as an adult whenever such prosecution is possible. Such a mandatory rule, however, carries with it its own inherent difficulties. Strictly speaking, prosecution of a juvenile as an adult is theoretically possible in any case, following the transfer hearing mandated by SDCL 26-11-4. As a practical matter, of course, only those cases that meet the criteria set forth in that statute should be transferred to adult court, but the likelihood of such transfer becomes a matter of probability rather than possibility. In this regard, although as stated in the majority opinion the officers and the state’s attorney had decided early on to request that appellant be tried as an adult, that decision was a matter for the circuit court and not for the prosecuting authorities. Granted that that decisional process would be triggered in the first instance by a request from the state’s attorney’s office that appellant be proceeded against as an adult, the ultimate responsibility for making that decision was for the circuit court, and for the circuit court alone.
It is interesting to note the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the Loyd case:
The defendant in this case had an extensive juvenile delinquency record, was on parole from the state school at Red Wing, and was under the supervision of a probation officer. Although Officer Brown did not specifically inform defendant of possible adult prosecution, he was not attached to the juvenile court and defendant knew he was a policeman....

After considering all the evidence, we conclude that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that the inculpa-tory statements were not elicited in a context in which the defendant could reasonably believe that a protective and confidential relationship existed between him and the police.
State v. Loyd, 297 Minn, at 450-451, 212 N.W.2d at 677.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached a similar result, applying the Loyd rationale:
There is no question but that defendant’s confession in the instant case is admissible in adult criminal proceedings. He was placed in custody by regular policemen, questioned at the detective bureau, and warned that his statements could be used against him “in a court of law.” No evidence indicates defendant confessed expecting that his statements *418could only be used in juvenile proceedings.
Theriault v. State, 66 Wis.2d 33, 52, 223 N.W.2d 850, 859 (1974).
One of the findings entered by the circuit court following the suppression hearing in the instant case was that “the defendant did not believe he was protected by the juvenile justice system.” That finding is amply supported by the uncontroverted evidence that resulted in the following findings:
I.
That on November 13, 1980, and prior to the defendant being detained on the charges herein, the defendant was an escapee from the State Training School in Plankinton, South Dakota.
II.
That the defendant had an extensive juvenile history prior to the charges being brought herein, with considerable contact with the Court system during which he had been advised of his constitutional rights several times by Circuit Court Judges as well as by law enforcement officers and court services workers.
III.
That the defendant had served three separate terms of detainment at the South Dakota State Training School, escaping from the third such term.
Likewise supported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, which included the testimony of a number of teachers and counselors who had worked closely with appellant during his several terms of detainment at the State Training School, is the trial court’s finding that “the defendant’s age, mental ability and educational level are adequate such that he understood what was said to him, could comprehend the rights explained to him, and was aware of the proceedings in which he was involved.”
While it is unfortunate that there was a delay in the detention hearing, that delay resulted from the good faith, diligent efforts, ultimately unavailing, of the law enforcement officers to attempt to locate appellant’s relatives at the locations in Rapid City that he described to the officers. (Appellant’s mother was living somewhere in Minnesota, and his father had been killed in Viet Nam.) Had the officers not taken the time to conduct this search, they could have proceeded with the interrogation shortly after 8:00 a.m. on November 14. Unless we are to hold that law enforcement officers have absolutely no right to interrogate a juvenile before producing him at a detention hearing, a proposition that I do not understand the majority opinion to espouse, I believe that we must hold, however reluctantly, that in view of the totality of the circumstances the delay in taking appellant before the circuit court does not require suppression of appellant’s statements. Although I agree with the majority opinion’s rejection of the State’s argument that the State may hold a juvenile for interrogation for up to forty-eight hours without a hearing, to say this, however, is not to say that the police may never interrogate a juvenile before bringing him or her before a circuit court judge under the provisions of SDCL 26-8-23.1.
I would affirm the order denying appellant’s motion to suppress.