Court Opinion

ID: 9562461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:29:42.977548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:21.843378
License: Public Domain

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
The Supreme Court has consistently considered two important questions in Free Speech Clause cases involving private speech: (1) whether the state’s regulation of speech is based on subject matter or viewpoint; and (2) whether the speech being regulated takes place in a public *102forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic forum. The majority does not discuss the first question. As for the second question, the majority summarily concludes that this classroom was a nonpublic forum. After doing so, the majority relies extensively on Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education, 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir.2003), in concluding that the School District appropriately barred Donna Busch from speaking. Because I do not believe Walz controls this appeal, I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that relates to Busch’s free speech claim.12
I.
Under the First Amendment, content-based regulations on speech are presumptively invalid. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). This presumption covers two types of content-based regulations: (1) prohibitions of public discussion of an entire topic or subject matter; and (2) restrictions on particular viewpoints. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). Accordingly, a content-neutral regulation “places no restrictions on ... either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000).
The distinction between subject-matter and viewpoint discrimination is not a bright one. Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir.2003). As a general matter, “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Therefore, governmental action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter “slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.” Id. at 99, 92 S.Ct. 2286. If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments must not be allowed to choose “which issues are worth discussing or debating.” Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 537-38, 100 S.Ct. 2326; Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 192-93 (3d Cir.2008). “To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth.” Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981).
By contrast, viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government targets not just subject matter, but also particular views taken by speakers on a subject. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). Viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form of content discrimination” and “the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.” Id. “To exclude a group simply because it is controversial or divisive is viewpoint discrimination. A group is controversial or divisive because some take issue with its viewpoint.” Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 527 (3d Cir.2004). As Justice Brennan explained in his dissent in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), “[viewpoint dis*103crimination is censorship in its purest form and government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the continued vitality of ‘free speech.’ ” Id. at 62, 103 S.Ct. 948.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that discrimination based on the religious character of speech is properly classified as viewpoint discrimination. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993), the Court held that a school district could not permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious perspective. Id. at 393, 113 S.Ct. 2141. Similarly, in Rosenberger, the Court held unconstitutional a university’s refusal to fund a student publication because it addressed issues from a religious perspective. 515 U.S. at 831, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Court explained, “Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.” Id. Finally, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001), the Court found viewpoint discrimination where a public school permitted nonreligious groups to meet on school property after school but prohibited a Christian club from doing so. Id. at 107-09, 121 S.Ct. 2093. The Court held that exclusion of a religious group amounted to impermissible viewpoint discrimination where the group sought only “to address a subject otherwise permitted under the [school district’s policy], the teaching of morals and character, from a religious standpoint.” Id. at 109, 121 S.Ct. 2093. Together, Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club stand for the proposition that if the government permits the discussion of a topic .from a secular perspective, “it may not shut out speech that discusses that same topic from a religious perspective.” Stafford, 386 F.3d at 528.
Comparing the facts of Walz and the present case, I find they fall on opposite sides of the subject-matter/viewpoint divide. In Walz, this Court considered whether a school’s refusal to allow a first-grade student to distribute pencils that included the phrase “Jesus [Loves] The Little Children” and candy canes with attached religious stories during a classroom holiday party violated the student’s constitutional rights. 342 F.3d at 274. The school maintained an unwritten policy forbidding religious, as well as political and commercial messages, but noted that religion may be acknowledged “if presented in an objective manner and as a traditional part of the culture and religious heritage of the particular holiday.” Id. at 273. As the district court in Walz determined, the regulation at issue was viewpoint neutral, although it limited some religious speech. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 187 F.Supp.2d 232, 239-40 (D.N.J. 2002). Citing Lamb’s Chapel, the student argued that because the restriction addressed religious speech specifically, it was not viewpoint neutral. The district court disagreed. The court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s warning that discrimination against religion in general may constitute viewpoint discrimination because it prevents discussion from a religious standpoint. However, the court found Lamb’s Chapel and its progeny inapplicable because the school had not opened a forum for the exchange of views about a subject by hosting a holiday party. Id. at 239. Rather, the school had only solicited generic gifts devoid of any message and had not created a forum to promote any viewpoint, religious or secular. Id. Therefore, the district court *104properly concluded that the regulation was viewpoint neutral, even if it discriminated on the basis of subject matter.
In contrast to the district court’s careful analysis of the distinction between subject matter and viewpoint discrimination in Walz, this Court declined to engage in such an inquiry on appeal, concluding that “in the context of an organized curricular activity, an elementary school may properly restrict student speech promoting a specific message.” Walz, 342 F.3d at 278. Without determining whether the discrimination was based on subject matter or viewpoint, we held that the school could bar the student from “promoting] a religious message through the channel of a benign classroom activity.” Id. at 280.
The regulation at issue in this appeal is different from that in Walz. As the District Court noted, this case involves viewpoint discrimination. Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist, No. 05-CV-2094, 2007 WL 1589507, at *7 (E.D.Pa. May 31, 2007). The teacher’s description of “All About Me” week left the subject matter of the assignment open-ended, stating: “Each child will have the opportunity to share information about themselves [sic] during their ‘All About Me’ week.” Furthermore, the description encouraged discussion of the “child’s family, hobbies, and interests,” and invited parents to “come to school to share a talent, short game, small craft, or story” during their child’s week. Accordingly, Donna Busch’s attempt to read Psalm 118 to her son’s class fell within the specified subject matter — i.e., something of interest to her son and important to his family — and the sole reason for excluding her speech was its religious character. Psalm 118 does not contain vulgar or lewd language, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986) (“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech ... would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”), nor does it praise illegal activities, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2629, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) (school was justified in restricting speech that could be “reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”), and there is no evidence that Busch’s reading would have caused any sort of classroom disruption, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969).
Instead, the challenged speech was responsive to the assignment but approached it from a religious perspective because religion is most important to the Busch family. As the Supreme Court has observed, particularly in the context of religious expression, it can be difficult to discern what amounts to a subject matter unto itself, and what, by contrast, is best characterized as a standpoint from which a subject matter is approached. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831, 115 S.Ct. 2510. However, I believe the school went too far in this case in limiting participation in “All About Me” week to nonreligious perspectives. As the District Court properly noted, Donna Busch was denied the opportunity to read the story her son chose because it expressed a religious viewpoint, rather than a secular one. This plainly constituted viewpoint, not subject matter, discrimination.13 As then-Judge Alito recognized *105in his dissent in C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc), such viewpoint discrimination is proscribed by the First Amendment unless the School District can show that allowing Busch’s speech on a nondiseriminatory basis would have “materially disrupted] classwork or involve[d] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of other [ ] [students].” Id. at 212 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, 89 S.Ct. 733). “When the government makes an avenue of communication available to the proponents of some views, the same opportunity must, absent exceptional circumstances, be afforded to others who wish to express their ideas in that manner, whether or not the governmental officials endorse or sanction the thoughts to be expressed.” Main Road v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080, 1087 (3d Cir.1975).
The viewpoint discrimination visited upon Busch differs from the treatment in Walz. Though we did not explicitly address the subject matter/viewpoint distinction in Walz, the district court’s thorough analysis in that case shows that the regulation was viewpoint neutral; the school did not open the forum to discuss any subjects. By contrast, here the School District solicited speech, but then discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by refusing to allow Donna Busch to express herself from a religious perspective. Having opened the proverbial Pandora’s box by inviting parents of kindergarten students to speak to the class about their children’s “family, hobbies, and interests,” the School District was required to respect the boundaries that it had set — however open-ended — provided that the speech remained germane to the subject matter and subject, of course, to the limitations set forth in Tinker, Fraser, and Morse. Because the basis of discrimination differs between the two cases, I do not find Walz controlling.14
*106II.
The majority’s adherence to Walz is, in my view, also flawed because of that case’s reliance on Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court upheld a principal’s deletion of student articles on teen pregnancy and divorce from a school-sponsored newspaper. The Court held that the school could “exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities as long as [its] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562.
Hazelwood is limited to situations in which the speech may be interpreted as coming from the school itself. As the Supreme Court acknowledged:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech ... is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.... Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of student expression.
Id. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562.
The Court reaffirmed this principle in Rosenberger, explaining:
[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.... It does not follow, however ... that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself speak ... but instead encourage[s] a diversity of views from private speakers. A holding that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.
515 U.S. at 833-34, 115 S.Ct. 2510. See also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1131-34, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) (noting distinction between government speech and private speech).
I find Hazelwood inapposite to this appeal because there is no risk that Busch’s speech would “bear the imprimatur of the school,” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562, nor will it be mistaken for “the [school’s] own speech.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Here, “All About Me” week was designed to help *107students “identify individual interests and learn about others.” The teacher explained to parents that “[e]ach child will have the opportunity to share information about themselves [sic] during their ‘All About Me’ week.” Students were invited to send in a poster with pictures of their favorite things, bring in special toys or snacks to share with the class, and parents were welcome to “come to school to share a talent, short game, small craft, or story.” Everything from the title of the exercise— “All About Me ” week — to the specific requests made by the teacher, indicated that the student (or, in reality, the parent) was speaking and not the school.15 This is distinguishable from the situation in Hazehuood, which contained numerous indicia of school-sponsorship, including: the newspaper was produced by students in a journalism class that was part of the school curriculum; the school financed the paper and it was the official school newspaper; the students’ work was reviewed and graded by a faculty member and the entire paper was subject to the review of the principal prior to publication. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268-69, 108 S.Ct. 562.
As Walz itself indicates, “[^Individual student expression that articulates a particular view but that comes in response to a class assignment would appear to be protected.” 342 F.3d at 279. “[N]othing in Hazehuood suggests that its standard applies when a student is called upon to express his or her personal views in class or in an assignment.” Oliva, 226 F.3d at 213 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Donna Busch’s speech came in response to the teacher’s broad invitation to share something about her child; once invited, the School District was obliged to “tolerate” her speech, not to “affirmatively promote” it. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562. “School-or government-sponsored speech occurs when a public school or other governmental entity aims ‘to convey its own message.’ ” Child Evangelism Fellowship, 386 F.3d at 524 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833, 115 S.Ct. 2510). By contrast, when the school solicits the expression of “a diversity of views from private speakers,” the expression that results is private. Id.
In Walz, this Court seemed concerned that young students would not be able to distinguish between school-sponsored speech and speech from private individuals, and “the school may wish to avoid the appearance of endorsing certain speech.” 342 F.3d at 277. Accordingly, we set forth a number of factors against which to measure the propriety of student expression in an elementary school setting, including: the type of speech; the age of the speaker and audience; the school’s control over the activity in which the expression occurs; and whether the school solicits individual views from students during the activity. Id. at 278.
The Walz factors strike me as highly manipulable and therefore may encompass speech — such as the expression at issue in this case — that will not be reasonably perceived as being school-sponsored. Even kindergarten students are capable of distinguishing between personal “show and tell” activities and school-sponsored instruction. As we observed in Walz:
The appropriateness of student speech must be viewed in its educational context. For a student in “show and tell” to pass around a Christmas ornament or a dreidel, and describe what the item means to him, may well be consistent with the activity’s educational goals; *108likewise, a lesson that includes a mock debate invites individual student expression on the relevant topic. In those scenarios, the student speaker is expressing himself in the context of a school assignment or activity where the school has sought students’ personal views.
342 F.3d at 278 (emphasis added).
The speech at issue in this appeal closely resembles a “show and tell” exercise. Accordingly, Donna Busch’s speech did not “bear the imprimatur of the school” and Hazelwood is inapposite.16
III.
Finally, I note that even if we were to find that Hazelwood should control this case because any speech to young children is likely to be perceived as being school-sponsored, this would not conclude our inquiry. In holding that a school may regulate school-sponsored expressive activities so long as the regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,” the Hazelwood Court justified the principal’s decision to discriminate on the basis of content; but that decision does not necessarily offer any justification for allowing educators to discriminate based on viewpoint absent a compelling government interest.
As the Supreme Court held in Hazel-wood, “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562 (emphasis added). The school officials in that case conceded that any restrictions on school-sponsored student speech must be viewpoint neutral. Id. at 287 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 562 (Brennan, J., concurring). More fundamentally, if schools could impose viewpoint-based restrictions on all student speech that might be perceived as school-sponsored, the promise of Tinker — that students “do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” — would mean very little. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733.
Because Hazelwood did not address the issue of viewpoint discrimination, the question of whether school-sponsored speech can discriminate on the basis of viewpoint remains open and our sister courts of appeals are split on this issue. Some circuits have found that Hazelwood requires that the school’s regulation only be reasonably related to pedagogical concerns. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 926-29 (10th Cir.2002); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir.1993); see also C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172-73 (3d Cir.1999), vacated and reh’g en banc (“Hazelwood clearly stands for the proposition that educators may impose non-viewpoint neutral restrictions on the content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as those restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”) (emphasis added). In es*109sence, these courts read Hazekvood as establishing a rational basis standard for speech in the public school setting. The District Court embraced this standard, holding that “schools may restrict speech even based on its viewpoint ‘so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’ ” Busch, 2007 WL 1589507, at *9 (emphasis added).
By contrast, other circuit courts of appeals have interpreted the Hazelwood standard to require that a school’s restriction be not only reasonable, but also viewpoint neutral. See Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626, 629-30 (2d Cir.2005); Planned Parenthood of S. Nevada, Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir.1991); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Oliva, 226 F.3d at 211 (Alito, J., dissenting). Citing these cases, Busch argues that when a public school opens a limited public forum, the general rule prohibiting viewpoint-based restrictions remains effective despite Hazelwood.
Without explicitly embracing either of these two perspectives vis-a-vis viewpoint discrimination, we concluded in Walz that “in the context of its classroom holiday parties, the school’s restrictions on this expression were designed to prevent proselytizing speech that, if permitted, would be at cross-purposes with its educational goal and could appear to bear the school’s seal of approval.” 342 F.3d at 280 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562). Given the school’s valid educational purposes, this Court reasoned, its actions were appropriate. Id. The Court did not explain its level of scrutiny, however. Likewise, in the present case, the majority makes sparse mention of Hazelwood and does not attempt to justify the school’s viewpoint discrimination under either rational basis review or strict scrutiny.17
If we wish to conclude that Hazelwood grants schools the power to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, I think we should do so explicitly. This Court’s approach in Walz and in this appeal, however pragmatic or commonsensical, lends itself to ad hoc jurisprudence. I recommend that we establish clear rules regarding viewpoint discrimination in the classroom. “The need for specificity is especially important where, as here, the regulation at issue is a ‘content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.’ ” Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 266 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997)); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (“When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’ ”) (citation omitted).
IV.
Clearly, “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159. It does not follow, however, that the state may regulate one’s viewpoint merely because speech occurs in a schoolhouse — especially when the facts of the case demonstrate that the speech is personal to the student and/or his parent rather than the school’s speech. The ma*110jority’s desire to protect young children from potentially influential speech in the classroom is understandable. But that goal, however admirable, does not allow the government to offer a student and his parents the opportunity to express something about themselves, except what is most important to them. With respect, I dissent.18

. I concur with the majority's holding in Part III of its opinion denying Busch relief on her Establishment Clause claim. However, I disagree with the majority’s implication in that Part that the School District’s desire to avoid an Establishment Clause violation was a valid concern. See infra note 5.

. As Busch argues, that this was viewpoint discrimination is made manifest by the fact that religious discussion had not been foreign to this classroom in the past. Apart from “All About Me” week activities, a different parent twice was invited to present to the class about Hanukkah and Passover. Therefore, in addition to having discriminated against the religious perspective generally — in contravention of Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good *105News — the School District may have improperly discriminated between religious perspectives. Either way, the School District does not vigorously challenge the District Court's conclusion that its restriction of Busch's speech was viewpoint-based.

. I also depart from the majority’s brief forum analysis in Part II.A of its opinion. As the Supreme Court noted in Perry, "[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue." 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948. Accordingly, the Supreme Court "has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property to the intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).
The District Court found that the teacher's invitation converted the classroom into at most a limited public forum, which is created when the state opens a public place for expressive activity. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. The District Court accurately noted that the School District "opened [the] classroom to specific people, the parents of [the] students, for a specific delineated purpose,” to participate in the discussion of their children via "All About Me" week. Busch, 2007 WL 1589507, at *6. While the First Amendment "does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government,” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981), when the state has opened a forum but limits the expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or the discussion of certain subjects — as the School District did here — "[t]he Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions ... even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. Although the School District surely was not required to invite parents into the classroom in the first place, once it did so, it could only apply reasonable time, place, and manner regulations; content-based prohibitions "must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.” Id. at 46, 103 S.Ct. 948.
The majority summarily concludes that the classroom is a nonpublic forum. Even as*106suming this to be the case, the government could not restrict speech on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint. Id. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439 ("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.") (emphasis added); Child Evangelism Fellowship, 386 F.3d at 524 ("[Ejven if the ... fora were not limited public fora but were closed, [the school] still could not engage in viewpoint discrimination.'').

. The likelihood that a kindergarten student would engage this assignment without parental influence and control is exceedingly remote. And the various approaches that a parent might take in this regard are as idiosyncratic as the number of parents.

. Because I find that the speech in question could not have borne the imprimatur of the School District, I also reject the District Court’s conclusion that the School District’s viewpoint discrimination was necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. "The Establishment Clause is not violated when the government treats religious speech and other speech equally and a reasonable observer would not view the government practice as endorsing religion." Oliva, 226 F.3d at 211 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-70, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (plurality)). Because the speech came from Busch and cannot be considered school-sponsored, it did not violate the Establishment Clause.

. Neither the Walz court nor the majority here would have had occasion to clarify whether Hazelwood disallowed viewpoint discrimination, because, as noted above, neither opinion addressed the question whether the discrimination was based on subject matter or viewpoint in the first place.

. I agree largely with the sentiments Judge Barry expresses in her concurrence. Like Justice Thomas’s recent concurring opinion in Morse, Judge Barry harkens back to a day when American schools were run by principals and teachers, acting in loco parentis, with little or no intrusion from lawyers, courts, and parents. See Morse, 127 S.Ct. at 2630-36 (Thomas, J., concurring). But this is not where we find ourselves today. As long as our schools continue to provide a forum for some parents and teachers to espouse their views in public schools, we must manage the speech of all parents and teachers within the guise of the First Amendment, lest we engage in the very sort of viewpoint discrimination that the Amendment was designed to protect against.
An "elementary school exception" or "kindergarten exception” to the First Amendment seems sensible to me. However, instead of establishing such an exception — which would delegate to schools the power to determine what is said and done in the classroom — the majority opinion merely allows this school to prohibit a viewpoint, germane to the assignment, that it disfavors. In addition, I question whether the creation of such an exception should be the exclusive province of the Supreme Court.