Court Opinion

ID: 9352076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:06:51.716352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.229269
License: Public Domain

J-A22035-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
    TOMA MARTIN                                 :
                                                :
                       Appellant                :   No. 1530 WDA 2021

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002196-2020

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                             FILED: JANUARY 04, 2023

        Toma Martin appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following

a non-jury trial wherein she was found guilty of possessing a controlled

substance, possessing/distributing a small amount of marijuana, and

possessing/using drug paraphernalia.1 For these offenses, Martin was

sentenced to an aggregate one-year probation term. On appeal, Martin dually

challenges whether the lower court erred by denying her suppression motion

and whether there was sufficient evidence to support her convictions. After a

thorough review of the record, we affirm.

        As cogently summarized by the lower court:

              [O]n    September      8th   of   2019[,]   Mt.   Lebanon   Police
____________________________________________

   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31); 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(32), respectively.
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     Department received an assistance call from Washington County
     regarding [a] theft and assault that occurred in Washington
     County, [that County] being a contiguous and neighboring county
     with Allegheny[.]

           In any event, Office[r] Daniel McBride of the Mt. Lebanon
     Police Department, who had experience [as] of the date of this
     offense, approximately ten years[‘] experience both in Ocean City,
     Maryland[,] and the last four with Mt. Lebanon[;] he has
     experience involving hundreds of drug citations and/or
     investigations including identification and investigation of heroin,
     marijuana, cocaine, [e]cstasy and MDMA.

           As he was working a shift on September 8, 2019[,] he
     received a call from his superiors and/or dispatch regarding
     assistance as to the alleged theft and assault in Washington
     County. He was contacted by [one] Lieutenant Sober regarding
     that assist[ance] request and information thereto. The report that
     he received [was] that there were two females who were involved
     in that theft and assault of a male in Washington County. One of
     them was [eventually identified as] the [d]efendant in this case,
     Toma Martin, and the belief was that … Martin was a resident of
     Mt. Lebanon.

            The request to follow up confirmed that … Martin was a
     resident of Mt. Lebanon living in Apartment 401 at 100 Academy
     Avenue. There was also information that the vehicle involved in
     this incident in Washington County was a red Jeep and the object
     or subject of the theft was clothing, a shoe article, Nike athletic
     shoes, as well as Suboxone strips [taken] from the victim.

            Officer McBride proceeded to 100 Academy Avenue where
     he was met by a fellow officer, Officer Rutowski. When they
     arrived at 100 Academy Avenue, which is an apartment building,
     the officers immediately noticed that there was a red Jeep parked
     in front of the apartment building and it was registered to a female
     named Jessica.

            The officers looked through the windows of the Jeep and
     they saw the described pair of black Nike sneakers in the vehicle.
     They did not notice at that juncture any Suboxone strips. The
     officers went up to Apartment 401 and knocked on the door in an
     attempt to contact ... Martin or Jessica, the owner of the red Jeep.
     The officers approached the door, and before they knocked on the

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     door, they could hear voices inside the apartment, at least one
     male and at least one female voice inside the apartment. They
     knocked on the door multiple times over the course of a couple
     minutes without response.

           There was a body cam[era] video introduced as
     Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 1 that substantially corroborated
     Police Officer McBride’s account of the events. [The officers] heard
     the voices and muffled sounds inside even after they were
     knocking. Eventually the door was opened by … Martin and
     immediately the officers noticed an overwhelming odor of burnt
     marijuana emanating from the apartment as soon as the door was
     open.

           The officers started to make inquiry of … Martin instructing
     her to leave the door open for their safety as well as the marijuana
     emanating from the apartment and also the evanescent nature of
     the Suboxone strips. … Martin was evasive and actually lied to the
     police officers about the number … of persons in the apartment
     indicating that the only other person in the apartment building …
     was a female. [Martin] was nervously looking over her shoulder
     during the course of this conversation.

           The officers wanted to have the door open to make sure that
     nothing else was going on at the time in the apartment. They
     wanted to speak to her about potentially giving her consent to
     search the apartment and also to make certain that no evidence
     was destroyed if, in fact, the door was closed as they stood in the
     hallway. The apartment building itself was a known source of
     complaints for drug activity over the years, which [was] also a
     concern for Officer McBride. [These events transpired at]
     approximately 1:18 in the morning . . . . [Martin] acknowledged
     during the course of [her] contact [with police officers] that she
     was not only the leaseholder but the sole occupant [of that specific
     apartment].

            At this juncture there was entry into the apartment and the
     officers found two individuals in the bedroom. [Therefore,] in
     addition to … Martin, there were three other persons[] present
     including Jessica, the owner of the red Jeep [who was also] a
     potential suspect from the events in Washington County.

           The officers removed everyone from the apartment during
     the course of their protective sweep. There was one bedroom, a

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     living room-kitchen combination and of course a bathroom and
     shower. During the protective sweep they noticed a cannister of
     marijuana in plain view near the mattress in the living room floor.
     It should be noted that the apartment was very sparsely
     furnished, and in addition to the bedroom, the mattress on the
     living room floor was basically the only other furniture.

           The protective sweep was completed and they waited for
     other officers to arrive. Officer McBride began speaking with
     Jessica, who acknowledged that she was the owner of the vehicle
     outside. Jessica did indicate that she knew the victim who had
     called in the complaint. She acknowledged that they could recover
     the shoes from the vehicle and they did. She also acknowledged
     that she didn’t know if the Suboxone was in there, but she did
     consent to a search of the vehicle … which was completed and the
     shoes were retrieved but no Suboxone.

           During this period of time … Martin was secured in the
     hallway outside the apartment with the officers again noting that
     after the protective sweep that … Martin and Jessica, as well as
     the two others, were removed from the apartment into the
     hallway.

            The apartment being secured, the quick conversation [with]
     Jessica and in search of the red Jeep being completed[,] the
     officer, that is Officer McBride, went on to address the issue of the
     Suboxone and the marijuana that were still outstanding. It was
     explained to [Martin] that they were going to get a search warrant
     for the apartment, but she did have the opportunity to consent.
     She initially refused to consent, but upon further reflection she
     decided that she would consent to the search of the apartment. A
     formal consent to search form was executed by [Martin] which
     was introduced into evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2.
     The execution included, of course, her signature and that was
     approximately at 2:00 a.m.

          [Ultimately, v]arious items, drug paraphernalia and drugs
     themselves as charged in the indictment were located in [Martin’s]
     apartment . . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/22, at 6-9 (quoting the findings of fact and

conclusions of law as determined by the suppression court) (most brackets

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added).

      After being charged, initially, with five drug-related crimes, Martin

challenged the bases by which police officers were able to gain access to and

search the at-issue apartment without a warrant. Through its subsequent

denial of Martin’s suppression motion, the court found that

      the court of conduct by the police responding to the request from
      authorities and Washington County was appropriate and that their
      conduct and investigation was reasonable and expected. The
      [c]ourt also [determined] that their conduct, once they were at
      the residence by knocking trying to secure further information to
      advance the investigation was appropriate and reasonable, and
      once the door would be open to the apartment, they were
      overwhelmed by the odor of burnt marijuana, that the intrusion in
      this incident for officers’ safety and the evanescent nature of both
      marijuana and unaccounted for Suboxone strips was reasonable
      [in] not letting … Martin shut the door and as events unfolded and
      eventually secured her consent during that relatively short period
      of time[.]

Id., at 9-10.

      After being found guilty of the three aforementioned offenses by way of

non-jury trial, Martin, following sentencing, filed a timely notice of appeal. The

relevant parties have complied with their obligations under Pennsylvania Rule

of Appellate Procedure 1925, and as such, this matter is ripe for review.

      On appeal, Martin challenges:

      1. Whether the lower court erred in denying her motion to
         suppress, as officers executed an illegal search of her resident
         without a warrant, exception, or probable cause.

      2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions,
         as contraband was accessible to other persons in the residence
         and constructive possession had not been proven.

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Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

      Martin’s first issue contests the court’s denial of her suppression motion.

In this domain, the standard we apply and scope of review we employ are

well-settled:

      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's
      denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are
      supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a
      suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the
      prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record.
      Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court,
      we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
      conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc) (citation omitted).

      Distilled down, Martin contends that, given that police officers had no

search warrant that would have allowed them access to the apartment, their

initial physical entry into the residence constituted an unconstitutional search

that was, too, unsupported by any exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement. As such, anything recovered following that discrete

event was illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible.

      In contrast, the Commonwealth asserts that a warrantless search was

justified because: (1) there were exigent circumstances associated with what

the police officers interpreted as an “imminent destruction of evidence” risk

posed by, inter alia, the Suboxone contraband, which, after observing the Nike

shoes located in the Jeep, were likely to be located on site; (2) officers were

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concerned with their safety as they had heard more people in the apartment

than Martin had indicated, and relatedly, Martin did not fully present herself

at the door to converse with them, acting nervous throughout the interaction;

and (3) there was an overwhelming smell of marijuana emanating from the

apartment. In addition, Martin signed a form consenting to a search of her

apartment. See Appellee’s Brief, at 20.

        The United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment establishes that

people have a right to not be the subject of unreasonable searches and

seizures. See U.S. Const. Amend. 4 Generally, a warrant predicated on

probable cause is necessary to effectuate such a search and/or seizure. See

id.; see also Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 8. While exceptions to the warrant

requirement exist, they are quite narrow in scope and applicability. As applied

here:

        [i]n a private home, searches and seizures without a warrant are
        presumptively unreasonable[.] Absent probable cause and exigent
        circumstances, the entry of a home without a warrant is prohibited
        under the Fourth Amendment. In determining whether exigent
        circumstances exist, a number of factors are to be considered[:]
        (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is
        reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is above and
        beyond a clear showing of probable cause, (4) whether there is
        strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises
        being entered, (5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect
        will escape if not swiftly apprehended, (6) whether the entry was
        made peaceably, and (7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it
        was made at night. These factors are to be balanced against one
        another in determining whether the warrantless intrusion was
        justified. Other factors may also be taken into account, such as
        whether there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, a likelihood that
        evidence will be destroyed if police take time to obtain a warrant,
        or danger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.

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      Nevertheless, police bear a heavy burden when attempting to
      demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless
      searches or arrests.

Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 557 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted) (bracket in original); see also Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d

25, 40 (Pa. 2021) (“[T]he police may conduct a warrantless search of a home

if they have probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in the home and exigent circumstances are present.”) (citation

omitted). Effectively, given the fact-specific nature of these types of inquiries,

a totality of the circumstances approach is necessary to demonstrate whether

an exigency, in fact, exists. See Commonwealth v. Trahey, 228 A.3d 520,

530 (Pa. 2020).

      Martin spends much of her brief discussing the enactment of the Medical

Marijuana Act (MMA), see 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110, which permits

the possession and use of marijuana under enumerated circumstances for

those who are certified and have received a valid identification card. Martin

then discusses the MMA’s impact on constitutionally permissible searches.

Specifically, in Barr, our Supreme Court determined, in the context of

automobile searches, that “the smell of marijuana may be a factor, but not a

stand-alone one, in determining whether the totality of the circumstances

established probable cause to permit a police officer to conduct a warrantless

search of a vehicle.” 266 A.3d at 28. As Martin concedes, Barr does not

“specifically address warrantless searches for marijuana as it pertains to a

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residence[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 17. However, Martin believes that pursuant

to Barr, officers, prior to conducting a warrantless search of a residence and

in the absence of exigent circumstances, should be required to ask a resident’s

occupants if “they are valid MMA patients immediately upon the smell of

marijuana.” Id. Such an interrogatory did not happen here.

      In addition to the MMA-based averments, Martin collates the order of

events to demonstrate that there was no exigency that would have allowed

the police officers to circumvent the warrant requirement. In particular, Martin

describes that: (1) officers arrived in the middle of the night with ambiguously

sourced information about crimes that occurred in another county on an

unspecified date; (2) officers encountered Martin despite limited facts

underpinning her actual involvement in those extra-jurisdictional crimes; (3)

despite finding the stolen shoes in a vehicle outside of the residence, no

warrant was sought to recover those pieces of clothing; (4) officers did not

announce themselves as police officers concurrent with knocking on the

apartment’s door; and (5) officers, themselves, created a hostile situation

when the one officer stuck his foot inside of the apartment’s door entrance

after Martin had indicated she did not wish to speak with them anymore. See

id., at 18-19.

      Preliminarily, we note that, to the extent Martin argues that marijuana

smell provided the sole reason for police officer’s warrantless entry into the

apartment, such a contention is refuted by the record. While the marijuana

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smell may have had some relevancy to the officers’ operations, the record

unambiguously reflects that the officers “believed that if [Martin] would shut

[the apartment’s] door, any evidence that would be in there could have been

destroyed by the time [they] came back with a search warrant.” Suppression

Hearing, 10/18/21, at 36. Moreover, the police officers “knew that there

[were] additional individuals in the apartment. [The police officers] knew that

one of them was a male based on hearing him. [They] knew [Martin] was lying

about the amount of people in the apartment.” Id.

      More importantly, however, despite highlighting the police officers’

actions that seemingly provide credence to her contention that a search

warrant was necessary, Martin fails to present any authority, either factually

similar or by analogy, establishing that the stolen Suboxone strips, which the

court explicitly determined to be “evanescent” and potentially destructible,

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/22, at 11, are incapable of establishing an exigency

situation. Reading between the lines, the concern was, by both police officers

at the time and the court when determining suppression, that these types of

strips, when considered in tandem with how events unfolded that evening,

were easily capable of being flushed down the toilet or destroyed in some

other way. Despite this oversight, Martin appears to ascribe no relevance to

those strips whatsoever, exclusively focusing on the other item stolen from

Washington County: shoes. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18 (“Although

[o]fficers[’] initial investigation concluded with their discovery of the vehicle

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described in the information received by them and located the essential items

(Nike shoes) claimed from the alleged victim . . . .”) (emphasis added).

      There were clearly two distinguishable items that underpinned why the

police were at the apartment that evening, and police officers knew, prior to

arriving, both Martin’s name and that a red Jeep was involved. When they

obtained Martin’s address and thereafter saw, via plain view, the shoes in that

red Jeep, but were unable to see whether there were Suboxone strips in that

same location, it would appear reasonable that police officers continued on in

their endeavor and attempt to glean, from Martin and/or the Jeep’s owner,

more information about the Washington County crimes. Upon making this

contact at the front door of the apartment, when the police officers attempted

to speak with Martin, she acted evasively and recurrently looked over her

shoulder. Easily, these types of body movements could have been construed

as signals to others in the apartment to destroy the illicitly obtained Suboxone

strips, forming the basis of an exigency, or that she was considering a quick

break from the interaction with police officers in order to facilitate the same.

      With police officers having probable cause to believe that the Suboxone

strips, either as contraband or evidence of a crime, would likely be contained

within the apartment, established through known police channels specifically

identifying Martin and corroborated by the presence of the stolen shoes/red

Jeep, and when coupled with both the easily disposed-of nature of those strips

and Martin’s anxious movements, a warrantless search, based on a totality of

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the   circumstances    analysis,   was   permissible    under   those   specific

circumstances. Furthermore, while Barr prohibits vehicular searches based

solely on the odor of marijuana, even if we were to apply the same holding to

residence searches, because marijuana “remains illegal to smoke,” 266 A.3d

at 41, the implication that Martin possessed smokable marijuana, at an

apartment leased in her name, when considered in the context of her furtive

movements and untruthfulness, well-exceeds an exclusive reliance on the

smell alone. Marijuana, too, was considered by the lower court to be easily

destructible, therefore, in this situation, requiring immediate action – an

exigency. Although police officers carry a heavy burden in establishing that no

warrant was needed to conduct a search of this nature, without any discussion

relevant to one of the principal reasons why the court denied suppression, i.e.,

the destructibility of contraband/evidence of a crime, there is simply no clear

reason to overturn the court’s ruling in this regard.

      Similarly, other than baldly claiming that no exigencies existed, Martin

provides no analytical discussion on anything that is relevant to the protective

sweep proffered by the Commonwealth as another exception to the warrant

requirement. That sweep stemmed, at least in part, from the additional, yet

unacknowledged, individuals heard in the apartment by the police officers,

which was juxtaposed against Martin lying to the police as to how many people

were there. We note, however, that Martin does not appear to have been

arrested at the time of the officers’ entrance into the apartment. See

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Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (defining a protective sweep as

“a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted

to protect the safety of police officers or others[]”) (emphasis added).

      Accordingly, primarily due to Martin’s lack of direct challenge to the

court’s explicit findings that: (1) both the Suboxone strips and marijuana were

easily capable of destruction; and (2) Martin’s affect/lying when coupled with

police officers hearing unaccounted-for people in the apartment, we see no

strong basis to reverse the suppression court’s finding that a warrant was not

necessary to enter the apartment. As such, the lower court did not err by

denying her motion to suppress.

      In Martin’s second issue, she avers that the evidence was insufficient to

find her guilty of the crimes in which she was convicted. Specifically, Martin

challenges whether she, in fact, “possessed” contraband. Despite conceding

that she was the leaseholder of the apartment, Martin identifies that she was

“not found in possession of any contraband” and “three other people were

located inside [of the apartment], two of whom, a male and female, were

found alone in the rear bedroom hiding underneath blankets where police

recovered the heroin, marijuana, and drug use paraphernalia.” Appellant’s

Brief, at 20. Moreover, one of the people in the apartment “admitted to being

a drug user.” Id.

      As with all sufficiency of evidence claims, we utilize a well-established

standard of review:

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      In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
      elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
      133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
      finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
      2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
      links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      Essentially, Martin’s challenge is limited to whether the Commonwealth

adequately demonstrated that she constructively possessed the items she was

ultimately found guilty of possessing, i.e., drugs and drug paraphernalia.

      Where possession is an element of the offense, the concept of
      constructive possession is a legal fiction used to prove the element
      although the individual was not in physical possession of the
      prohibited item. The evidence must show a nexus between the
      accused and the item sufficient to infer that the accused had the
      power and intent to exercise dominion and control over it.
      Dominion and control means the defendant had the ability to
      reduce the item to actual possession immediately or was
      otherwise able to govern its use or disposition as if in physical
      possession. Constructive possession can be established by
      inferences derived from the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Peters, 218 A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted).

      First, we note that the argument portion of this issue in Martin’s brief

spans approximately five sentences, and while she has briefly described what

constructive possession is, she has not provided any authority that reflects

any kind of analysis as to why, here, constructive possession has not been

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proven. Instead, it appears that Martin is implicitly trying to show that others

located in the apartment were the ultimate possessors of the illicit items that

were recovered.

      Second, we highlight the lower court’s determination on this issue:

      although other individuals were located in the residence upon the
      police arriving and conducting their protective sweep and that the
      items in question were not found on [Martin’s] person, the record
      clearly supported that given [Martin] was the leaseholder, her
      statements regarding being the only person staying in the
      residence, and her admission as to what would be found during
      the search all supported that there was sufficient evidence to show
      she had access and the ability to exercise dominion and control
      over the items recovered.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/22, at 15 (citation omitted).

      At the suppression hearing, one of the police officers stated that Martin

had “indicated that there would be some paraphernalia in the apartment.

Some needles. Hypodermic syringes.” Suppression Hearing, 10/18/21, at 25.

In addition, it is unrefuted that Martin was the exclusive leaseholder of the

apartment. See id., at 26. The items Martin was convicted of possessing were

“located in various areas [of the apartment]. Drug paraphernalia was in the

kitchen and the bathroom. And the majority of the items that were recovered

were from the rear bedroom of the apartment.” Id.

      Given that constructive possession may be inferentially determined

predicated on the totality of the circumstances, we see no reversable basis to

conclude that Martin, given her unfettered access to her own apartment and

the multiple locations the contraband were found, had anything other than the

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ability to exercise dominion and control over the items she was ultimately

found guilty of possessing. In addition, the fact that others were present in

the apartment does not, by itself, shield her from a constructive possession

determination. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078, 1094

(Pa. 2011) (establishing that multiple people may be in constructive

possession of the same contraband where that item is in an area that is jointly

controlled and equally accessible). Effectively, with contraband being found all

over her apartment, in places she inherently or logically accessed daily, there

was sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that she constructively

possessed the items that were recovered. Accordingly, Martin’s challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence necessarily fails.

      For the reasons outlined, we deny both of Martin’s claims and affirm her

judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      Judge Olson joins this memorandum.

      Judge Dubow concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/04/2023

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