Court Opinion

ID: 9582875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:14.877632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:40.817101
License: Public Domain

*488BISTLINE, J.,
concurring specially.
Justice Johnson’s dissenting views are entitled to a response, hence the following. In Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858, 862, 712 P.2d 559, 562 (1985), the Court stated: “With few exceptions this Court will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Baldner v. Bennett’s, Inc., 103 Idaho 458, 460, 649 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1982); Webster v. Potlatch Forests, 68 Idaho 1, 16, 187 P.2d 527, 536 (1947).” Nycum in turn relied on this language from the Webster case:
We direct attention to Marysville Mercantile Co., Ltd. v. Home Insurance Co., 21 Idaho 377, 395, 121 P. 1026, 1033, where we held: ‘This court has so often held that it will not consider or review a question presented to this court for the first time, unless it be a question of jurisdiction, or that the pleading does not state a cause of action, that it seems almost unnecessary to cite the decisions, but the principle is well recognized in the following authorities’ (citing cases).
Webster, 68 Idaho at 16-17,187 P.2d at 536 (emphasis supplied). The earlier Marysville case, quoted in Webster, relied in part on Aram v. Edwards, 9 Idaho 333, 337, 74 P. 961, 962 (1903), wherein it was stated “[ojbjection to the jurisdiction of the court is never waived.” The Marysville court wrote:
This court has so often held that it will not consider or review a question presented to this court for the first time, unless it is a question of jurisdiction, or that the pleading does not state a cause of action, that it seems almost unnecessary to cite the decisions, but the principle is well recognized in the following authorities: Smith v. Sterling, 1 Ida. 126; Aram v. Edwards, 9 Ida. 333, 74 P. 961; Watson v. Molden, 10 Ida. 570, 79 P. 503; Miller v. Donovan, 11 Ida. 545, 83 P. 608; Medbury v. Maloney, 12 Ida. 634, 88 P. 81; Steve v. Bonners Ferry Lumber Co., 13 Ida. [384] 392, 92 P. 363.
Marysville Mercantile Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 21 Idaho 377, 395, 121 P. 1026, 1033 (1912) (emphasis added).
In the earlier case of Miller v. Pine Mining Co., which was relied upon in the Aram case, the Court ruled:
There is no allegation in the complaint that the defendant is a corporation, nor is there any statement of facts equivalent thereto. The complaint is entirely silent upon the subject. The words ‘a corporation,’ annexed to the name of the defendant in the title of the cause, is not an allegation that defendant is a corporation, but is a mere description of the person of the defendant. (See White v. Mullins, ante [3 Idaho], p. 434, 31 Pac. 801, decided at the present term of this court.) In all cases where suit is brought against a private corporation, it is necessary to allege its corporate character, and the complaint is fatally defective in this respect. (Bliss on Code Pleading, secs. 246, 247; Loup v. [California Southern ] Railroad Co., 63 Cal. 99; People v. [Central Pac.] Railroad Co., 83 Cal. 393, 23 Pac. 303.) This objection to the complaint is never waived. (Greathouse v. Heed, 1 Idaho 482; Idaho Rev.Stats., sec. 4178.)
Miller v. Pine Mining Co., 3 Idaho 493, 495, 31 P. 803, 803 (1892). In Greathouse v. Heed, 1 Idaho 482 (1873), the Court wrote and ruled:
Speaking of complaints, the forty-fifth section of the Civil Practice Act provides that ‘if no objection be taken either by demurrer or answer, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the same, excepting only the objection to the jurisdiction of the court, and the objection that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’
... This court is of the opinion that the facts which, by the law referred to, are made requisite, are not stated in the complaint; for this cause the district court erred in overruling the demurrer. We are of the opinion that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that this cause should be reversed.
Greathouse, 1 Idaho at 484.
Justice Bakes, in authoring State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 582, 570 P.2d 259, 260 (1976), wrote for the Court:
*489We hold that the complaint in the case was defective because it did not charge and describe an offense, and that prosecution under the complaint was a violation of Lopez’[s] due process rights under Art. 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution. Lopez’[s] conviction must be reversed for those reasons. Thus, we find it unnecessary to consider whether I.C. § 18-5613 is unconstitutionally vague and express no opinion on that question.
Following the grant of a rehearing, Justice Bakes remained of the same view:
I concur in the decision of the Court reversing this conviction. In my view, the complaint does not charge an offense, see State v. Doolittle, 58 Idaho 1, 68 P.2d 904 (1937), and State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 404 P.2d 347 (1965), and therefore under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure, when that defect is noticed ‘at any time during the pendency of the proceedings’ the complaint must be dismissed. The judgment of the district court should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint for failure of the complaint to charge an offense.
Lopez, 98 Idaho at 590, 570 P.2d at 268.
In Nab v. Hills, 92 Idaho 877, 882, 452 P.2d 981, 986 (1969), the Court was unanimous that:
[t]his court undoubtedly has the power to raise the questions of illegality and public policy sua sponte. See Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833 (1952). Nevertheless our resolution of the issues on appeal, infra, make it unnecessary to determine the legality of a chain referral sales contract.
Steams stated:
It is further urged that the trial judge arrived at a decision on the erroneous theory that Mr. Stearns was a public officer or employee, and a theory which is entirely different than the theory upon which the defendants tried the case; the court did find and conclude that there was no misrepresentation of any material fact, or any fraud or overreaching in the procurement of the contract, but concluded that Stearns was a public employee and that specific performance of the contract was denied on the grounds of sound public policy.
A party to a contract, void as against public policy, cannot waive its illegality by failure to specially plead the defense or otherwise, but whenever the same is made to appear at any state of the case, it becomes the duty of a court to refuse to enforce it, Reed v. Johnson, 27 Wash. 42, 67 P. 381, 57 L.R.A. 404; again, a court of equity will not knowingly aid in the furtherance of an illegal transaction; in harmony with this principle, it does not concern itself as to the manner in which the illegality of a matter before it is brought to its attention, Wright v. Corbin, 190 Wash. 260, 67 P.2d 868. Furthermore, the court itself will raise the question of the invalidity of a contract which offends public policy and, as stated before, the parties cannot waive it, Noonan v. Gilbert, 63 App.D.C. 30, 68 F.2d 775; McCowen v. Pew, 153 Cal. 735, 96 P. 893, 21 L.R.A., N.S., 800. The court, having once acquired jurisdiction to make equitable disposition of the case, retains such jurisdiction to do equity, even though its disposition of the case will be grounded upon some theory not set forth in the pleadings, nor urged to the court, but which is supported by evidence.
Stearns, 12, Idaho at 289-90, 240 P.2d at 842.
This Court in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Durtschi, sitting pro tern, in Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 586 P.2d 1068 (1978), concluded:
Furthermore, because of the serious ramifications and consequences which could follow from a court acting without jurisdiction over the subject matter, we recognized that it is important to keep that concept clearly defined. For example, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is never waived (I.R.C.P. 12(h)); purported judgments entered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter are void and as such are subject to collateral attack, and are *490not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (Restatement of Judgments, § 7 (1942)). In addition, judges who act without jurisdiction over the subject matter may be liable for damages in civil actions. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). For these reasons, it may work considerable mischief to confuse lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter with questions of venue, other aspects of jurisdiction, or defenses which may bar relief or render it improper or inappropriate for a court to proceed with a case even though it has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Sierra, 99 Idaho at 626-27, 586 P.2d at 1071-72.
Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 215 P.2d 286 (1950), which Sierra relied upon, elaborated on the definition of jurisdiction:
Such jurisdiction the court acquires by the act of its creation, and possesses inherently by its constitution; and it is not dependent upon the sufficiency of the bill or complaint, the validity of the demand set forth in the complaint, or plaintiff’s right to the relief demanded, the regularity of the proceedings, or the correctness of the decision rendered.
70 Idaho at 249, 215 P.2d at 289.
Sierra, 99 Idaho at 629, 586 P.2d at 1073.