Court Opinion

ID: 9864765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:10:15.489232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:40.654921
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
It is my opinion that the petition for a writ of prohibition is premature in this case. The distinction between a proceeding' for an insanity inquisition under section 3, chapter 105, ’35, O. S. A., and a proceeding’ under section 7, chapter 48, ’35, O. S. A., should have been kept clearly in mind to avoid the error made in granting the writ, as the order follows the majority opinion herein. I am not contending that the county court of Fremont county has jurisdiction, through a lunacy proceeding, without direction from the district court to determine the question of sanity, to the end that it, the county court, could, by *342an order entered on a finding before it, stay the present and existing order of execution heretofore entered by the district court and in effect affirmed by this court. I do contend, however, that upon the filing of a proper petition under section 3, chapter 105, supra, it is mandatory upon the county judge to proceed with the inquisition. The benefits of this statute are available to any person found within the county. The results of the inquisition or any attempt to make it effective in this or any other case is not within our anticipation. For such a purpose, the jurisdiction of the county court was properly invoked and there could be no interference with the statutory direction to proceed thereon. If the county court had pursued its authority and a duly appointed commission had found defendant insane, for aught we know the matter might have ended there. Had an attempt been made upon such finding to rely upon an order based thereon, to interfere with or stop the existing order of execution of the district court, I think grounds for a writ of prohibition would then have been afforded.
Section 15, chapter 105, ’35, O. S. A., reading as follows, “Persons charged with crime.—No inquest shall be had as to the lunacy of any person charged with a criminal offense until such criminal offense shall have been tried or dismissed, unless the judge of the district court, wherein such criminal offense is pending shall order such inquest.” seems to have been relied upon in the majority opinion as making the defendant such a ward of the court as to deny him any rights provided by the lunacy statutes above cited. It is clear that the section just quoted has to do solely with a pending criminal charge. A desirable effect of this statute is that the defense of insanity in a criminal case cannot be built up in another forum and successfully invoked in the court having jurisdiction of the criminal charge. When insanity is suggested in the trial court, it either proceeds towards a determination of that question or directs the forum where that matter is to be tried. All of this relates to *343the prosecution and defenses in a criminal proceeding. In the case at bar, the question of defendant’s guilt or innocence is not to be determined. It is said by the majority opinion that the petition in the county court of Fremont county does not allege that defendant has become insane between the dates of the sentence imposed and that of its execution. That allegation would be necessary in a petition to be presented to the trial court, that is, to the district court of Pueblo county. Such a petition in the trial court should allege facts that could, in the discretion of the trial court, invoke the operation of the statute. The majority opinion states that a person claiming to have become insane during his confinement awaiting execution of the death sentence, “ does not have an absolute right to a trial to determine his present mental condition, unless it is expressly conferred by statute, since the recognition of such right in unqualified form would be tantamount to granting a convict the privilege of thwarting the administration of criminal justice for an indefinite term.” Our statute as construed in the case of Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 Pac. 800, confers the absolute right to have the question of sanity determined. It may be determined by the court, if the court is- not in doubt, otherwise an inquisition must be ordered.
Assuming that a stay of execution of the death sentence can not be entered except by the trial court, and then only after a finding before it, or under its direction, that the person has become insane after sentence, are we to say that a finding* of present insanity by a commission duly appointed by the county court of Fremont county, would not be admissible in evidence on a hearing on that question before the trial court? Zealous counsel might well want to be armed with something more than a mere suggestion of present insanity, when applying to a court for this humanitarian relief, located in what could easily be an inflamed and prejudiced community. Are we then to further say that a right to obtain legitimate evidence is to be denied? If so, then there are instances when *344justice is insecure. I will not lend myself to such denial, particularly where, as here, counsel and others, prompted only, as it clearly appears, by feelings and inclinations most creditable to man, are making* a fair and legitimate effort to prevent the cold and tragic taking, by the people, of the life of an admitted mental incompetent, an imbecile since birth, now friendless and penniless, and without conception of what is about to occur. What manner of man is he, who can be a party to an event that brings shame upon the fair name of the law? My feelings are of no lesser degree than if this unfortunate creature was of my procreation, or one of my race and kind. I do not want such a specter as a future intrusive visitor.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck concur in this dissenting opinion.