Court Opinion

ID: 9381330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 18:01:15.255801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.843134
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1241     Document: 010110830799      Date Filed: 03/22/2023   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        March 22, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  RYAN MARCK,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                        No. 22-1241
                                                (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00238-LTB-GPG)
  DAVID MILLER; DEPARTMENT OF                                (D. Colo.)
  HUMAN SERVICES, EL PASO
  COUNTY, COLORADO; LISA CRAIG;
  MERIDETH STEFFAN,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Plaintiff Ryan Marck appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

 pro se civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1241     Document: 010110830799       Date Filed: 03/22/2023    Page: 2

                                    BACKGROUND

        This action arises from state-court juvenile proceedings in El Paso County,

 Colorado, that resulted in Mr. Marck’s children being removed from his custody and

 placed in foster care. Mr. Marck filed a complaint in the United States District Court

 for the District of Colorado, in which he asserted that the defendants had conspired to

 violate his constitutional rights and that his children had been illegally kidnapped.

 He obtained leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs. See 28 U.S.C.

 § 1915(a). A magistrate judge screened his complaint, found it deficient in several

 respects, and ordered him to file an amended complaint.

        Mr. Marck then filed his operative amended complaint, naming as defendants

 David Miller, a state court judge; the El Paso County Department of Human Services

 (DHS); and two DHS employees. The complaint alleged that defendant Merideth

 Steffan, acting as an employee of DHS, kidnapped Mr. Marck’s children and that the

 other defendants “witnessed this conspiracy to deprive me of my constitutional rights

 and did nothing.” R. at 38. Mr. Marck explained that he sought “intervention in

 [the] juvenile court matter” and return of his daughter. Id. at 39. The complaint

 further alleged that defendant Lisa Craig withheld Mr. Marck’s daughter from him

 and his family, thus violating his constitutional rights. He requested that his children

 be “returned from foster care” and that he be granted “attorney fees, and whatever the

 court sees as just.” Id.

        Two weeks later, Mr. Marck filed a 33-page document purporting to further

 amend his complaint. The magistrate judge advised Mr. Marck he would not “sort

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 through multiple pleadings to ascertain his claims,” and ordered him to submit a

 single, completed complaint within 20 days if he wished to have any additional

 exhibits or documents considered in connection with his amended complaint. Id. at

 75. Mr. Marck did not respond to the magistrate judge’s order.

       The magistrate judge thereafter issued a recommendation that the amended

 complaint be summarily dismissed. He treated the amended complaint, without any

 further amendments, as the operative pleading. He reasoned that Mr. Marck’s claims

 for equitable relief should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

 because (a) the domestic relations exception stripped the court of jurisdiction; (b) the

 court was required to abstain from hearing the case under Younger v. Harris, 401

 U.S. 37 (1971); and (c) to the extent Mr. Merck sought to overturn final orders in

 state-court proceedings, his claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 To

 the extent the complaint sought monetary relief, the magistrate judge found that its

 official-capacity claims were brought against officers of the State of Colorado who

 were immune from liability pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Further,

 Defendant Miller was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Finally, the damages

 claims against defendants Steffan and Craig were subject to Younger abstention and,

 in any event, his conclusory allegations against them did not adequately satisfy the

 requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The magistrate judge recommended that all the

 claims be dismissed.

       1
         See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 482, 486 (1983); Rooker v.
 Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
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        The recommendation warned Mr. Marck that he had 14 days to serve and file

 any written objections to obtain review by a district court judge. It also warned him

 that if he failed to file timely objections, he would waive de novo review of the

 magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and that he might also be barred

 from appealing any findings and conclusions that were accepted or adopted by the

 district court. See R. at 76 n.2. Despite this warning, Mr. Marck did not file any

 objection to the recommendation. The district court therefore adopted the

 recommendation and dismissed all claims without prejudice except the individual

 damages claims against defendant Miller, which it dismissed with prejudice.

                                      DISCUSSION

        This court recognizes a firm-waiver rule, which provides that “[t]he failure to

 make timely objection to the magistrate [judge]’s findings or recommendations

 waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.” Johnson v. Reyna, 57

 F.4th 769, 778 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule applies

 to pro se litigants, “provided they were informed of the time period for objecting and

 the consequences of failing to object.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,

 the magistrate judge warned Mr. Marck about the time to object and the

 consequences of failing to file timely objections.

        This court issued Mr. Marck an order to show cause why he had not waived

 his right to appellate review of the district court’s dismissal order by failing to file

 timely objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. He filed a response in

 which he essentially asserted that the interests of justice weighed against applying the

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 rule. To determine whether to make an exception to the firm-waiver rule in the

 interests of justice, we consider three factors: (1) the “pro se litigant’s effort to

 comply,” (2) the “force and plausibility of the explanation for his failure to comply,”

 and (3) “the importance of the issues raised.” Id. We have characterized this

 exception as “similar to reviewing for plain error.” Id. (internal quotation marks

 omitted).2

        The first two of these factors do not weigh in Mr. Marck’s favor. He asserts

 he made efforts to comply with his obligation to object once he became aware of it,

 but the record does not support that assertion. On the day the recommendation was

 filed, and again two days later, Mr. Marck filed an exhibit list with accompanying

 documents that were apparently connected with his state-court juvenile proceedings.

 See R. at 91-140. A few weeks later, he filed in district court a purported Tenth

 Circuit “opening brief,” on this court’s pro se form, that did not address the

 magistrate judge’s analysis. As the district court correctly determined, none of these

 documents qualified as objections to the recommendation. These were the only

 documents Mr. Marck filed between the recommendation and the order adopting it.

 In addition, his conclusory assertion that by researching the issues and filing

 documents throughout the proceedings he clearly showed he objected to dismissal

 does not establish that he satisfied his obligation to file the required response.

        2
          Plain error may also operate as another, freestanding exception to the
 firm-waiver rule. Johnson, 57 F.4th at 778 n.7. But Mr. Marck has not argued that
 plain error applies or discussed the plain-error factors, so we need not consider that
 exception. See id.
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       Mr. Marck also asserts that he did not receive the recommendation by mail,

 unlike other court documents sent to him. Although he claims he only discovered the

 recommendation at some later unspecified date by searching PACER, a mailing

 receipt on the district court’s docket sheet shows it served the recommendation on

 him by mail at his address. Mr. Marck has given us no reason to doubt the accuracy

 of this entry or that could overcome the presumption that he received the

 recommendation. See Crude Oil Corp. of Am. v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 809, 810 (10th

 Cir. 1947) (“When mail matter is properly addressed and deposited in the United

 States mails, with postage duly prepaid thereon, there is a rebuttable presumption of

 fact that it was received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail.”).

        Finally, turning to the importance of the issues raised, this factor also weighs

 against Mr. Marck. His amended complaint states, “I am seeking intervention in [the

 state] juvenile court matter” to get “my daughter back” and “my children . . . returned

 from foster care.” R. at 39. The district court correctly determined that it lacked

 jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Marck’s attempts to obtain child custody through this

 federal-court action. See generally, e.g., Leathers v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729, 756

 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The domestic relations exception divests federal courts of the

 power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” (emphasis added)); see

 also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702-04 (1992) (stating the Supreme

 Court has “expanded the domestic relations exception to include decrees in child

 custody cases” and has also barred the use of a federal writ of habeas corpus “to

 restore a child to the custody of the father,” in part because state courts are better

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 positioned to “deploy[] . . . social workers to monitor compliance”). And to the

 extent the complaint’s cursory request for “whatever the court sees as just,” see R. at

 39, could be construed as a request for money damages, see Brown v. Buhman, 822

 F.3d 1151, 1169 n.19 (10th Cir. 2016) (casting doubt on whether request for “such

 other relief as the district court may deem just and proper” constitutes a claim for

 money damages (brackets omitted)), Mr. Marck also fails to show he has any viable

 damages claims. He has failed to mount an effective challenge to the district court’s

 conclusions that (1) his claims against defendant Miller are barred by judicial

 immunity; (2) the individual defendants are immune from damages in their official

 capacities; and (3) his complaint’s conclusory allegations relating to the individual

 defendants in their individual capacities fail to adequately allege a constitutional

 claim against these defendants.

       In sum, all three factors weigh against applying the interests-of-justice

 exception. We therefore conclude that Mr. Marck has waived his appellate

 challenges to the district court’s dismissal under the firm-waiver rule.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the district court’s judgment. Mr. Marck’s motion for judicial

 notice is denied.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                             Circuit Judge

                                             7