Court Opinion

ID: 9892201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 21:05:55.289449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:46.618317
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                   2023 IL App (4th) 230455-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                     FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is      NOS. 4-23-0455, 4-23-0457 cons.                 October 20, 2023
not precedent except in the                                                         Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                   4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   IN THE APPELLATE COURT                             Court, IL

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

  In re K.B. and D.T., Minors                                 )      Appeal from the
                                                              )      Circuit Court of
  (The People of the State of Illinois,                       )      Stephenson County
                Petitioner-Appellee,                          )      Nos. 21JA1
                v.                                            )           21JA2
  Darlene B.,                                                 )
                Respondent-Appellant).                        )      Honorable
                                                              )      Peter J. McClanathan,
                                                              )      Judge Presiding.

                  JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
                  Justices Cavanagh and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

 ¶1      Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court’s unfitness finding was not
               against the manifest weight of the evidence.

 ¶2               In December 2022, the State filed an amended petition to terminate the parental

 rights of respondent, Darlene B., as to her minor children, K.B. (born in August 2012) and D.T.

 (born in October 2013). Neither K.B.’s legal father nor the children’s biological father are parties

 to this appeal. However, K.B.’s legal father separately appealed the termination of his parental

 rights in appellate court case No. 4-23-0456. In January 2023, the trial court granted the State’s

 amended petition and terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing the

 court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

 ¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND
¶4             In January 2021, the State filed petitions seeking to adjudicate K.B. and D.T.

neglected under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The

State alleged the minors were neglected because of the uninhabitable living conditions in the

residences of both K.B’s legal father and their biological parents. In April 2021, the trial court

adjudicated both minors neglected due to being in environments injurious to their welfare (705

ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). In May 2021, in a separate dispositional order, the court found

respondent unfit to care for the minors for reasons other than financial circumstances alone,

made the minors wards of the court, and placed their custody and guardianship with the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶5             Several permanency reviews were held to monitor respondent’s progress and case

direction.

¶6             In December 2022, the State filed an amended petition to terminate respondent’s

parental rights as to both minors. The State alleged three bases on which respondent was unfit.

First, respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis

for the removal of the minors from their home or to make reasonable progress toward their return

within nine months after their adjudication as neglected minors, the period in question being

from April 2021 to January 2022 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii) (West 2022)). Second,

respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the

removal of the minors from their home or to make reasonable progress toward their return in the

subsequent nine-month period of January 2022 to August 2022 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii)

(West 2022)). Third, respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or

responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)).

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¶7             At the December 6, 2022, fitness hearing, the trial court, without objection, took

judicial notice of the January 2021 neglect petitions, the April 2021 adjudication order, and

permanency review hearing orders from November 2021 and July 2022. The court then heard

testimony from one witness, Vanessa Langer, a DCFS case manager.

¶8             Langer testified that while she was not the currently assigned caseworker, she had

previously been involved with the case for approximately one year. Respondent had substance

abuse issues which were not being appropriately addressed in services since the beginning of the

case. Respondent underwent a substance abuse assessment in December 2021 and was

recommended for intensive outpatient treatment. Respondent had not followed through with that

recommendation even though Rosecrance was “for sure *** ready to go for services” in

December 2021. (Indeed, there had been an occasion prior to December 2021 where respondent

was discharged from services at Rosecrance.) Langer acknowledged respondent completing the

recommended parenting classes over a year before. But respondent was still on a waiting list to

engage in mental health services through Rosecrance as of the date of the hearing. Langer

clarified substance abuse and mental health services were recommended for respondent

consistently throughout all the service plans. Langer acknowledged respondent loves her

children, but emphasized having her children returned to her is “all based on services and

following through, not just love.” The State rested and no additional evidence was presented.

¶9             During its closing argument, the State asserted respondent had made “no

significant progress” in the nearly two years since the commencement of the case. Respondent

did not follow through on the recommendation for intensive outpatient services even though her

substance abuse had been “the main concern.” Instead, respondent had done “the bare minimum

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of showing up and getting assessed.” Respondent “knows that the issue really is for her

substance abuse treatment and she is just not doing it.”

¶ 10           Counsel for DCFS argued that “we’re really not anywhere further to getting the

kids back *** since day one.” Respondent had undertaken assessments, which was “probably

one of the easiest things you can do.” However, respondent had not done the “hard work” of

following up with recommended treatment.

¶ 11           Respondent’s counsel argued the trial court should find respondent fit or,

alternatively, reserve its ruling and set the matter over for a later date to receive additional

evidence. Respondent’s counsel proposed that “[p]erhaps, [respondent] by then will be in

treatment and this case could take a different direction.” The guardian ad litem argued

respondent’s “inaction speaks volumes” in terms of her not having even begun treatment and

asked, “[h]ow long do we let this case stagnate?”

¶ 12           The trial court found respondent unfit as to the first ground alleged in the State’s

amended petition. While acknowledging respondent’s engagement in some services, the court

found:

               “[O]n the significant issues that needed to be addressed to achieve the

               return home goal, namely underlying substance abuse issues and the

               mental health and substance abuse treatment designed to address those

               issues, she made at best a minimal effort in that she would obtain

               evaluations, then fail to follow through on the recommended treatment.”

¶ 13           The trial court found the State did not prove the second count of its petition. The

court found the January 2022 to August 2022 period “was only an alleged eight-month period,

and the statutory requirement is a nine-month period.” The court also found the State did not

                                                 -4-
prove the third count of its petition. According to the court, “the testimony established that the

mother, outside of placement disruptions, was consistent in her weekly supervised visits *** and

the caseworker testified that [respondent] clearly seemed to love her children, even if she wasn’t

taking the appropriate steps to achieve the return home goal.”

¶ 14           This appeal followed.

¶ 15                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16           Respondent argues the trial court’s finding her unfit was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Specifically, respondent contends Langer “had no personal firsthand

knowledge of what had been ordered or performed more than a year earlier.” Respondent

maintains the court’s unfitness determination “had no evidentiary basis except for what had been

detailed in the service plan(s), which were not before the court, and Langer’s surmise of what

they contained.”

¶ 17           Parental rights may not be terminated without the parent’s consent unless the trial

court first determines, by clear and convincing evidence, the parent is unfit as defined in section

1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340,

354 (2005). A parent may be found unfit if she fails to “make reasonable progress toward the

return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of

neglected *** minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). Whether reasonable progress has

been made can be determined by assessing “the parent’s compliance with the service plans and

the court’s directives in light of the conditions that gave rise to the removal of the child and in

light of other conditions that later became known and would prevent the court from returning

custody of the child to the parent.” In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1051 (2003). This

court has described “reasonable progress” as

                                                 -5-
               “an objective standard which exists when the court, based on the evidence

               before it, can conclude that the progress being made by a parent to comply

               with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently

               demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will

               be able to order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be

               able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future

               because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the

               directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody of the

               child.” (Emphases omitted.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991).

¶ 18           We will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. “A finding is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only if the evidence clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation], such

that no reasonable person could arrive at the circuit court’s finding on the basis of the evidence

in the record [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150,

¶ 68. “This court pays great deference to a trial court’s fitness finding because of [that court’s]

superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re O.B., 2022 IL App (4th) 220419, ¶ 29.

¶ 19           Here, the record shows the trial court’s unfitness determination was not against

the manifest weight of the evidence. Langer testified substance abuse and mental health services

were recommended for respondent consistently throughout all her service plans. After having

been discharged from Rosecrance, respondent underwent a substance abuse assessment in

December 2021. Respondent was recommended for intensive outpatient treatment. However,

respondent did not follow through with this recommended treatment even though Rosecrance

                                                -6-
was ready to begin treating her then. Respondent was still on the waiting list for mental health

services as of the date of the hearing. In short, respondent had been assessed and recommended

for services, but she did not follow up with them. The facts clearly demonstrate respondent had

not made progress sufficiently demonstrable for the court to return the minors to her in the near

future. See L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461. The facts do not clearly demonstrate the court should

have reached the opposite result in finding respondent unfit. Accordingly, the court’s

determination that respondent was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 20                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 22           Affirmed.

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