Court Opinion

ID: 9663864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:53:53.08511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:35.318546
License: Public Domain

SHORT, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because a trial court’s decision under Minn.Stat. § 611.21 (Supp.1989) should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 668 (8th Cir.1982) (federal appellate courts review grants of funds to defendants to hire experts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) under abuse of discretion standard); cert. denied 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 456, 74 L.Ed.2d 608 (1982); United States v. Barger, 672 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir.1982) (grant of investigator fees under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) is discretionary); see also Peterson v. City of Elk River, 312 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1981) (decision to award reasonable expert witness fees in civil case under Minn.Stat. § 357.25 (1980) lies within the trial court’s discretion).
In scrutinizing the fee request, the trial court had available information on the experts’ credentials, their full-time salaries, and the time entries and hourly rate charged by Jobe’s attorney. The trial court concluded (1) hourly rates of $155 and $150 were unreasonable and ordered payment of $100 per hour, and (2) only ten of the forty-eight hours claimed by the consulting expert were compensable because the disallowed hours benefitted the attorney and not Jobe. The trial court’s reasons for reducing the requested fees were articulated in its memorandum and Minn.Stat. § 611.21, subd. (a) does not require a more detailed explanation.
Where the issues have been decided by the trial court, we are not required “to reverse simply because the trial court might have gone into more detail in the explanation of its findings.” See Peterson v. Johnston, 254 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Minn.1977). Under these circumstances, the reduction was not arbitrary and a remand on this issue is a waste of judicial time and taxpayers’ money-
I am troubled that despite counsel’s efforts to obtain prior approval of the expert fee expenditures, the trial court never indicated it found the experts’ hourly rates or the planned consultant hours unreasonable. If the trial court had established a maximum hourly rate or set a ceiling on fees initially, Jobe might have been able to avoid incurring the disallowed expenses. Nonetheless, the legislature specifically gave the trial court the responsibility to determine reasonable compensation for expert services. Minn.Stat. § 611.21, subd. (a) (Supp.1989). The trial court was in the best position to assess the value of the services rendered by each of Jobe’s experts and the assistance necessary to prepare his attorney for this case compared to future DNA cases. See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn.1988). Given its vantage point, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding only part of the expert witness fees claimed. I would affirm the trial court’s decision.