Court Opinion

ID: 9734127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:25:59.275216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.874578
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I cannot agree that reversible error occurred here. This is not a case wherein the defendant was improperly limited in his cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, as in People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 429 N.E.2d 526, People v. Lenard (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 398 N.E.2d 1054, People v. Hobson (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 22, 396 N.E.2d 53, and People v. Barr (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 50, 280 N.E.2d 708. Instead, what we are here obligated to determine is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing the testimony of an additional defense witness, Wilda Decker. The evidence of witness Decker was offered in an attempt to show that the complaining witness had a motive for lying, i.e., to cause her mother and stepfather to separate or divorce. The incident to which Decker would have testified, as disclosed by the offer of proof, happened IV2 years prior to the crimes charged here. It is axiomatic that it is within the discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence offered by the defense in a criminal case without infringing upon the accused’s constitutional right to present a defense when the relevancy of the evidence is so speculative as to give the evidence little probative value. (People v. Mikel (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 21, 391 N.E.2d 550.) Judge Wilhelm denied the defense motion to permit Decker’s testimony ruling that it was totally remote in time and place and irrelevant. Given all the circumstances of this case, including that the alleged activity of a former day was not here charged, including the length of time that had passed and the fact that Decker admitted she was now the defendant’s girlfriend, I would not say the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Decker’s testimony. Further, there was nothing to indicate that the complaining witness continued to want the separation of her mother and stepfather up to the time of these incidents. (Cf. People v. Moretti (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 494, 522, 129 N.E.2d 709, 725.) It should also be noted that Decker’s evidence would have been cumulative at best. The mother of the complaining witness had already testified to the earlier incident, and the complaining witness admitted that she wanted out of the house and was glad that she was no longer living in the same house with her stepfather, and that she in fact hated him. Furthermore, the complaining witness was thoroughly cross-examined, and her testimony was convincing and unwaivering. Her disclosures were supported by the immediate reporting to the police by her and her mother and the results of an immediate examination by Dr. Dowlut who found abrasions and scratches on her right shoulder, redness in the vaginal area and torn underclothing. Her testimony was corroborated by her brother Jeff and the defendant’s own admissions regarding contemporaneous occurrences. I would find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, that the defendant got a fair trial and that he was properly found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.