Court Opinion

ID: 9375000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 17:07:07.739983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.750737
License: Public Domain

J-S40004-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 BROOKS LITTLE                             :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 2497 EDA 2021

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 4, 2021
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004775-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                     FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2023

      Brooks Little appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after a jury

convicted him of the first-degree murder of Tyrone Armstrong and related

crimes. On appeal, Little challenges the sufficiency of the identification

evidence supporting his convictions, and argues the trial court erred in not

granting his pre-trial motions in limine. After careful review, we affirm.

      The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

      On March 6, 2019, at 10:27 p.m., approximately an hour and
      forty-five minutes before the murder, [Little’s co-defendant,
      Aaron Durham] called the decedent, Tyrone Armstrong, from his
      cell phone. At about 10:29 p.m., [Little and Durham] entered Penn
      Cafe Pizzeria together at 4909 Catherine Street in Philadelphia. As
      confirmed by video, [Little] was wearing a blue hoodie with a white
      Nike emblem, black gloves, tan pants, and blue shoes with thick
      white soles. [Durham] was wearing a black hoodie with a red shirt,
      black pants, and glasses. After about seven minutes, [Little] and
      [Durham] left together.
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     They walked past three storefronts and entered the Barn Bar at
     4901 Catherine Street. [Little] and [Durham] stayed at the bar
     together for about eleven minutes. They both left the bar after
     [Durham] received a call from the decedent. At 10:53 p.m., they
     stopped in the Peeking Inn, at 4905 Catherine Street, for about a
     minute, before they left the area.

     Over a half an hour period, [Armstrong and Durham] called each
     other multiple times. They last spoke at 12:02 a.m., about
     fourteen minutes before the murder. At 12:11 a.m., [Little,
     Durham, and [Armstrong], captured on video, are double parked
     in front of 4913 Catherine Street in the decedent's 2016 Dodge
     Ram. [Armstrong] was in the driver's seat with [Durham] in the
     front passenger seat. [Little] was by himself in the backseat.

     Five minutes later, video captured the sound of the gunshot as
     [Little] shoots [Armstrong]. [Little] then shoots [Armstrong] three
     more times, as [Durham] opens his door. At 12:18 p.m., video
     shows [Little] putting his gun in his waistband before both men
     leave the scene together, walking west on Catherine Street.

     [Little] and [Durham] are captured on video going back and forth
     to the crime scene multiple times. About thirty seconds after the
     shooting, [Durham] returns to the vehicle and takes a minute to
     wipe down the vehicle's surfaces. [Durham] leaves the vehicle and
     meets up with [Little] down the street. At 12:20 a.m., [Little] runs
     back to the vehicle and searches the back and front seat for about
     thirty seconds and walks off again. Approximately four minutes
     later, he returns to the vehicle and takes off his hoodie. He then
     turns his inner jacket inside out and wipes down the vehicle's
     surfaces again. Two minutes later, [Durham], now wearing a puffy
     jacket, joins [Little].

     The video picks up snippets of conversation between [Little] and
     [Durham] at the crime scene. One of the men is heard saying:
     "Where's my phone ... Get it. .. Call my phone. Call my phone ...
     Call it right now." After this conversation, at about 12:28 p.m.,
     [Little] puts his hoodie back on and leaves the scene with
     [Durham].

     While this is the last time [Little] is caught on video, at 2:04 a.m.,
     video captures [Durham] returning to the Barn bar. After about
     four minutes, [Durham] left the bar and went into a store down

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     the street for about three minutes, before leaving the scene for
     the last time at 2:11 a.m.

     After receiving a 911 call, around 3:00 a.m., Philadelphia Fire
     Department medics arrived on the scene and declared
     [Armstrong] dead.

     Philadelphia Police Department's Crime Scene Unit recovered one
     .45 caliber projectile, from the front passenger dash board, and
     four .45 caliber fired cartridge casings ("FCC"), three from the
     front passenger seat and one on the street outside of the front
     passenger side door from the scene. After the vehicle was
     transported to a police garage, the Crime Scene Unit recovered
     one .45 caliber projectile from the driver's side door panel. The
     Medical Examiner recovered one .45 caliber projectile from
     [Armstrong's] body. Officer Robert Scott, firearms identification
     expert from the Philadelphia Firearms Identification Unit,
     concluded that all of the FCCs were fired from the same .45 caliber
     firearm.

     Dr. Lindsay Simon, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, concluded
     that [Armstrong’s] cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds
     and that the manner of death was homicide. [Armstrong] was shot
     twice in his forehead and once each in his neck, torso, and arm.
     Individually, the wounds to his forehead and neck were fatal. Dr.
     Simon found stippling around the forehead wounds, indicating
     that the barrel of the gun was two to three feet away when
     [Armstrong] was shot.

     On March 13, 2019, Agent Jamie Linke, [Durham’s] parole agent,
     identified [Durham]t on the surveillance footage. On May 5, 2019,
     Agent Jon Lukens, [Little]’s parole agent, identified [Little] on the
     surveillance footage. Agent Lukens had been supervising [Little]
     for three years and had met him in person about thirty-one times.
     Agent Lukens identified [Little] at trial. Agent Lukens and [Agent]
     Linke's occupations as parole agents were not disclosed to the
     jury.

     On May 5, 2019, police executed a search warrant on [Little]’s
     home and recovered a pair of blue Nike sneakers with a white sole
     and tan pants, both items are consistent with the sneakers and
     pants worn by [Little] on the video. Tarah Helsel, a forensic
     scientist at RJ Lee Group, found two-component particles
     consistent with gunshot residue on the top of both of the sneakers.

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Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/2022, at 2-5 (citations omitted). Little was arrested

the same day the search warrant was executed, and charged with murder and

related offenses.

        Prior to trial, Little filed two motions in limine. The court partially granted

the first motion, in which Little requested to preclude Agent Lukens from

testifying that he knew Little from supervising Little’s parole. The court denied

the second motion, in which Little requested to preclude a detective from

narrating the surveillance video during trial.

        On November 4, 2021, a jury convicted Little of first-degree murder,

conspiracy to commit murder, possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”),

and violations of the Uniform Firearms Act1. The trial court sentenced Little

the same day to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole for

first-degree murder, along with concurrent sentences for the remaining

charges. This timely appeal followed.

        Little raises the following issues on appeal:

        1. Was the evidence of identification sufficient to convict [] Little?

        2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit reversible
        error when the court denied [] Little's motion in limine and
        permitted an expert witness to offer improper lay opinion
        testimony that intruded upon the jury's domain as factfinder?

        3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit reversible
        error when the court denied [] Little's motion in limine and

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6127.

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      permitted a parole agent to alert the jury that [] Little had a prior
      criminal offense?

Appellant’s Brief, at 8.

      In his first issue on appeal, Little challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions. Our standard of review for a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light

most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable

inferences therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each

element of the crimes charged is established beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

      “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need

not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). “As an

appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor do we assign weight to any

of the testimony of record.” Commonwealth v. Kinney, 863 A.2d 581, 584

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Therefore, we will not disturb the verdict

“unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Bruce,

916 A.2d at 661 (citation omitted). Furthermore, a mere conflict in the

testimony of the witnesses does not render the evidence insufficient because

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it is within the province of the fact finder to determine the weight to be given

to the testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Baskerville, 681 A.2d 195, 200 (Pa. Super. 1996).

      Here,   Little’s   claim   relates   solely   to   the   sufficiency   of   the

Commonwealth’s identification evidence. Accordingly, we limit our discussion

to the evidence for that element. See Commonwealth v. Cain, 906 A.2d

1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2006) (declining to address the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting every element of an offense where the appellant raises a

claim relating to one specific element); see also Commonwealth v.

Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“In addition to proving the

statutory elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the

Commonwealth must also establish the identity of the defendant as the

perpetrator of the crimes”).

      [E]vidence of identification need not be positive and certain to
      sustain a conviction. Although common items of clothing and
      general physical characteristics are usually insufficient to support
      a conviction, such evidence can be used as other circumstances
      to establish the identity of a perpetrator. Out-of-court
      identifications are relevant to our review of sufficiency of the
      evidence claims, particularly when they are given without
      hesitation shortly after the crime while memories were fresh.
      Given additional evidentiary circumstances, any indefiniteness
      and uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its weight.

Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Little compares the identification made in his situation to that found

insufficient in Commonwealth v. Crews, 260 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1970). In

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Crews, the defendant and his co-defendant had been convicted of robbing a

cab driver. A witness identified the defendant based on her general description

of a tall, light-complexioned black male wearing a gold-colored sweater. While

a gold sweater was found in the defendant’s home, the witness could not

positively identify it as the same sweater. The only additional evidence linking

the defendant to the crime was evidence that placed the defendant and the

co-defendant at a bar not far from the location of the crime, and other

witnesses’ testimony regarding the defendant's similar height and clothing.

      The Court held that where the Commonwealth's sole identification

evidence is based on similar height, coloring, and clothing, the evidence is not

enough to convict a defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. See Crews, 260

A.2d at 772. The court explained that it forced the jury to guess whether the

defendant was the perpetrator. See id.

      We find Crews to be distinguishable. Unlike in Crews, Little was not

convicted based solely on evidence of similar clothing items. On the contrary,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the

verdict winner, the certified record reveals the following evidence was

presented to prove Little perpetrated the crimes charged. First, the

Commonwealth presented Agent Lukens’s identification of Little. Prior to

Little’s arrest, Agent Lukens gave a statement to police, in which he

unequivocally   identified   Little   from   multiple   still   images   taken   from

surveillance footage. See id. at 129-32, 137-39. Further, after giving an in-

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court identification of Little, Agent Lukens again watched the surveillance

footage and unequivocally identified Little from the footage. See N.T., Trial

(Jury) Volume 2, 11/2/2021, at 134-35. Unlike in Crews, Agent Lukens

testified that he had known Little for three years, and had met with him face-

to-face on at least 31 occasions. See N.T., Trial (Jury) Volume 2, 11/2/2021,

at 128. Further, the jury, as fact-finder, also had the opportunity to view the

footage and was able to directly evaluate the credibility of Agent Luken’s

identification.

      In addition to Agent Luken’s strong identification evidence, the police

also recovered Little’s shoes, as seen in the surveillance footage, which tested

positive for gunshot residue. See id. at 188 (highlighting the perpetrator was

wearing white soled shoes); see also N.T., Trial (Jury) Volume 3, 11/3/2021,

at 116-117 (white soled shoes found in search of Little’s residence); N.T., Trial

(Jury) Volume 4, 11/4/2021, at 24 (gunshot particles found on the shoes from

Little’s residence).

      Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

winner, we find the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to allow the

jury to find that Little was the person who shot and killed Armstrong.

Accordingly, Little is entitled to no relief on this issue.

      Next, Little argues the trial court erred and abused in discretion in

denying Little’s motion in limine and permitting an expert witness to offer

improper lay opinion testimony that intruded upon the jury’s domain as

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factfinder. In a pretrial motion in limine, Little sought to preclude Detective

Lucke, an expert in video surveillance recovery and analysis, from narrating

the surveillance footage and giving his opinions about the images in the video.

Little takes issue with Detective Lucke’s narration of the video as he contends

Detective Lucke repeatedly gave his opinion and point of view, which was not

based on specialized knowledge, regarding the appearance of footwear shown

in the video. Little contends he was prejudiced by the narration because

Detective Lucke’s description of the shoes as “distinctive” essentially identified

Little as the perpetrator. See Appellant’s Brief, at 25.

      We review a challenge to the admissibility of evidence, including the

introduction of expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion:

      [o]n appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court,
      our standard of review is limited. A trial court’s decision will not
      be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion
      is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where the judgment
      is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or
      where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,
      prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted; brackets in original).

      After jury selection, but prior to the start of trial, the trial court heard

from both parties regarding Little’s motion in limine. The Commonwealth

explained that because of the use of numerous different types of cameras and

locations in creating the video compilation, an explanation of how color and

lighting were rendered by each camera was very important to understanding

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the video. Therefore, the ability of Detective Lucke to track different

individuals across the different cameras and locations was useful because the

view would be altered depending on the technology of the specific camera and

the lighting in that scene. The trial court concluded that the narration was

permitted under our caselaw, but that it would give a cautionary instruction

to the jury regarding its use of the narration.

      Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial

court in reaching its conclusion. Detective Lucke testified that depending on

the time of day of the video, and whether there was light from another source

(i.e. streetlights, car lights, etc.), the camera would not be able to focus as

much, causing it to switch to an infrared mode and lose color, making certain

articles of clothing and other items appear greyish in color. See N.T.,

11/2/2021, at 180-82. In order to track the two individuals shown in the

compilation from scene to scene, Detective Lucke continued to focus the jury’s

attention on certain articles of clothing and items in the scene that changed

color due to the lightning. See id. at 182-214.

      Little particularly takes issue with Detective Lucke describing a pair of

shoes shown in the video as “distinctive”. Detective Lucke described the white-

soled shoes repeatedly throughout the scenes, not to identify a particular

person as the perpetrator, but to focus the jury’s attention to the fact that the

same individual could be seen in different locations. As the lighting and

coloring of the different cameras and views changed, it was helpful for

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Detective Lucke to explain the changes in light and color in order to track the

individuals in question from scene to scene. See Commonwealth v. Cole,

135 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding a detective's video narration

“was relevant to the jury's understanding of the timing, the actors, and the

location of events depicted in the video.”).

      Detective Lucke’s narration did not identify anyone in particular as the

shooter. Accordingly, Detective Lucke did not intrude upon the jury’s domain

as fact-finder, but rather aided the jury in understanding the surveillance

compilation video in order for the jury to determine the identification of the

shooter. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 576 (Pa. Super.

2021).

      Further, the trial court nevertheless proceeded with extreme caution and

gave three cautionary instructions to the jury to clarify the jury’s role and the

purpose of Detective Lucke’s narration. The court instructed the jury that, as

the fact-finders, it was their own perception and conclusions of the facts that

controlled. Further, the court instructed the jury that while they could choose

to be guided by the narration if they agreed with Detective Lucke’s perception,

they could also completely disregard the narration. The trial court gave these

instructions prior to the narration, directly after the narration, and again at

the end of trial. See N.T., 11/2/2021, at 175-76, 216-17; N.T., 11/4/2021, at

124. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.

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      Finally, Little argues the trial court erred and abused its discretion in

denying Little’s motion in limine and permitting a parole agent to testify that

he, as an unspecified government agent, “supervised” Little. We begin by

noting that the trial court in fact partially granted Little’s motion in limine,

precluding the Commonwealth from identifying Agent Lukens as Little’s parole

agent. Further, there was no testimony given regarding any prior criminal

offenses.

      Nonetheless, we understand Little’s argument on appeal to be focused

on the trial court’s subsequent denial of defense counsel’s request that Agent

Lukens be permitted to testify only that he “managed” Little. Little contends

that allowing to Agent Lukens to use the word “supervised” was sufficient to

alert the jury to his status as a parolee.

      At a motions hearing held three weeks before trial, defense counsel

requested that Agent Lukens’s title as Little’s parole agent be “sanitized”, or

unknown to the jury, as well as the fact that Little was on parole. The

Commonwealth agreed and suggested that Agent Lukens instead be identified

not as Agent, but simply by his first and last name as someone employed by

a State Agency. See N.T., Motions Hearing, 10/7/2021, at 9-10. The trial court

granted the motion. See id. at 14 (“... I’m going to grant the motion.”).

      On November 1, 2021, after jury selection took place, defense counsel

requested clarification of how the relationship between Little and Agent Lukens

would be described, and subsequently requested that a different description

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of the relationship, other than “supervised”, be used. N.T., Trial (Jury) Volume

1, 11/1/2021, at 175-76. The court stated it would consider any alternatives

provided by the next day, while maintaining that it found “supervised” to be

appropriate. Id. at 176-78. The next day, outside the presence of the jury,

defense counsel proposed the word “managed.” N.T., Trial (Jury) Volume 2,

11/2/2021, at 98. The trial court rejected this alternative, as it would

improperly imply an employee relationship, and concluded the term

“supervised” would be used. Id. At trial, Agent Lukens testified as agreed

upon above. See id. at 127-28.

      We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Any accurate

term used by Agent Lukens to describe his relationship with Little would risk

allowing sharp jurors to infer his parole status. When faced with an array of

imperfect options, the trial court made a good faith effort to find a word that

was fair to both parties. The record does not support any finding that the

court’s ruling was based on bias, ill-will or irrationality. Accordingly, this claim

is without merit.

      As we find none of Little’s issues merit relief, we affirm the judgment of

sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/24/2023

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