Court Opinion

ID: 9847213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:55:54.862362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:03.411959
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
While I have no quarrel with many of the generalities urged by the majority, I am unable to agree with their principal conclusion or the reasoning that leads to it. One can easily resonate to the abstract proposition that indigent prisoners should be afforded both counsel and full opportunity for a personal appearance at trial in the defense of civil suits filed against them. Yet the Legislature has not as yet seen fit to establish such procedures and in the absence of some constitutional compulsion applicable to civil actions the judicial function does not extend to this type of prison reform.
The practical difficulties presented by this case are far better resolved by action of the Legislature following that body’s traditional study and debate. For example, as the majority apparently concede, courts simply cannot mandate the Department of Corrections to release a prisoner for purposes of attendance at civil trials. Further, there is no basis upon which courts can compel the Legislature to appropriate and expend public monies for the defense of purely private litigation. Similarly, it is doubtful that courts can indefinitely abate civil actions pending the release of a prisoner-party. The foregoing illustrate but a few of the numerous problems which must be resolved before the achievement of *928that worthy goal of adequate participation in civil proceedings by all of our citizens.
The majority, relying upon the doubtful premise of a constitutional inadequacy, nonetheless, are emboldened to fashion a remedy which requires courts in civil actions either (1) to appoint counsel to serve “gratuitously” for an indigent prisoner or (2) to continue the cause for a reasonable period pending the prisoner’s release, thus assuring his presence at trial. Preliminarily, it may be noted that under the majority’s scheme the trial court even then does not fulfill its “constitutional” obligations solely by arranging with the Department of Corrections for the prisoner’s personal appearance since to meet the majority’s requirements even “. . . allowing a right of personal appearance is not an appropriate remedy for prisoners seeking to defend a civil action.” (Ante, p. 923.)
The majority’s main premise, however, that indigent prisoners possess a general “right of access” in the sense that they are entitled to free legal representation or their personal presence in civil courts, either or both, is incorrect under existing decisions of this state. Prisoners in California enjoy only a limited statutory degree of “access” to the courts. This conclusion is consistent with Penal Code section 2600 which provides that prisoners are deprived of only those rights “... necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution . . . and for the reasonable protection of the public.” The right to appear personally in court is, of course, one which necessarily involves considerations of both institutional security and of public safety. Until now it had been assumed that a prisoner possessed no such right in civil actions. ( Wood v. Superior Court (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 811, 813 [112 Cal.Rptr. 157], and cases cited.) With respect to the asserted right to appointed counsel for prisoners in civil cases it is not accurate to say that prisoners are “deprived” of such a right, for under existing law even nonprisoner indigents have no abstract “right” to appointed counsel in ordinary civil matters. (Hunt v. Hackett (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 134, 137-138 [111 Cal.Rptr. 456].)
The majority note the anomaly created by their requirement that indigent prisoners defending civil cases receive appointed counsel and/or a personal appearance while the indigent nonprisoner is assured of no such benefit. Thus, the prisoner is elevated above the law-abiding citizen. The Legislature has never seen fit to effect this startling result, and for good reason. In its reluctance, thus far, to assure prisoners a *929“right” to counsel and presence in civil actions the Legislature need not ignore the fact that the reason for the prisoner’s inability to attend trial is because of his intentional and wilful violation of the state’s criminal laws and his subsequent conviction and confinement. Similarly, other adverse consequences follow from the prisoner’s own conduct, self-induced. His constitutional right to travel, for example, is thereby inhibited. Part of the disparity between the remedies available to prisoner and nonprisoner indigents stems from the very nature of the criminal system, as expressed in Penal Code section 2600. The precise point was expressed recently by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963], “Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a ‘retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’ [Citation.]” (P. 555 [41 L.Ed.2d p. 950].)
The majority’s use of the term “right of access” to the courts, accordingly, must be understood in its proper perspective. Prisoners do have access to the courts. On the criminal side it is extensive. On the civil side it is much more limited.
The Legislature, however, has not entirely disregarded the rights of indigent prisoners in civil litigation. In 1975, enlarging upon the provisions of former section 2600 of the Penal Code, it established eight broad classes of civil rights of which the fourth is the right “to initiate civil actions.” (Pen. Code, § 2601, subd. (e).) Furthermore, it has specifically provided that in actions involving deprivation of parental rights under Civil Code section 232 upon affidavit of a prisoner or his counsel “indicating the prisoner’s desire to be present during the court’s proceedings” the court shall order his production and may do so in other actions involving his parental or marital rights. (Id., § 2625.) It is fair to conclude that the Legislature in its wisdom and for reasons satisfying to itself has declined, as yet, to go further in the matter of the prisoner’s appearance in civil proceedings, and no precedent California case has required that it do so.
The majority, however, insist that “. . . the United States Supreme Court has long recognized a constitutional right to access to the courts for all persons, including prisoners. [Citations.]” (Ante, p. 914.) The assertion is made with more confidence than is warranted. None of the cases relied upon by the majority to support the foregoing generalization establish any right of prisoners to resort to the courts, either in person or through *930appointed counsel in ordinary civil cases. Thus, close scrutiny discloses that Procunier v. Martinez (1974) 416 U.S. 396, 419 [40 L.Ed.2d 224, 243, 94 S.Ct. 1800], and Johnson v. Avery (1969) 393 U.S. 483 [21 L.Ed.2d 718, 89 S.Ct. 747], involved respectively prisoners’ rights of access to law student and inmate legal assistance in preparing habeas corpus petitions. In Cruz v. Beto (1972) 405 U.S. 319, 321 [31 L.Ed.2d 263, 267-268, 92 S.Ct. 1079], the issue concerned the right to assert complaints regarding prison conditions, and Price v. Johnston (1948) 334 U.S. 266 [92 L.Ed. 1356, 68 S.Ct. 1049], dealt with the right orally to argue a criminal appeal. The high court in Procunier explained that the right of a prisoner’s access to the courts is limited to proceedings “. . . to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.” (P. 419 [40 L.Ed.2d p. 243].) Even more recently, in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 539, the Supreme Court expressly observed that a prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process right of access to the courts “... has not been extended by this Court to apply further than protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a [habeas corpus] petition or complaint [regarding prison conditions].” (P. 576 [41 L.Ed.2d pp. 962-963].) It seems quite clear to me that, under any United States Supreme Court decisions, old or new, petitioner’s defense of a private tort action does not rise to a degree invoking Fourteenth Amendment protections.
The commendable goals of affording all of our citizens, whether entirely indigent or not, prisoners and nonprisoners alike, access to adequate counsel in civil cases are gaining the attention of legislative bodies, federal and state; thus the creation of Legal Services Corporation, federally funded to make more available and accessible competent legal assistance in the civil areas. But the much needed impetus toward affording more adequate and more widely distributed legal representation in civil litigation, comes from a growing awareness of a demonstrable social need and legislative and professional policy decisions implementing it, not from any Fourteenth Amendment compulsion.
The majority rely upon Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371 [28 L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780], as establishing a general right of free access to the civil courts in favor of all indigent persons including prisoners. Boddie, however, does not constitute authority for such a proposition. The Boddie court, on the contrary, implicitly limited the scope of its holding to actions brought to dissolve a marriage. (See, e.g., pp. 376-377, 380-381, fn. 8 [28 L.Ed.2d pp. 117-121].) The Supreme Court in the more *931recent cases of Ortwein v. Schwab (1973) 410 U.S. 656 [35 L.Ed.2d 572, 93 S.Ct. 1172] (no free access to appellate courts) and United States v. Kras (1973) 409 U.S. 434 [34 L.Ed.2d 626, 93 S.Ct. 631] (no free access to bankruptcy courts) carefully explained that Boddie involved a special situation. In doing so, it furnished a sufficient answer to the majority’s equal protection argument. Both Ortwein and Kras observed that in the area of “economics and social welfare” the compelling interest standard is inapplicable, and the state’s action is measured by the less stringent “rational basis” test. It seems obvious that if, as in Ortwein and Kras, an indigent may constitutionally be denied free access to the courts to challenge a welfare reduction on the one hand, or assert a bankruptcy on the other, a fortiori the state may decline to provide prisoners free, legal representation and physical presence in the defense of personal injury suits.
The majority next insist that “. . . a number of courts have granted prisoners protective and assertive rights in civil actions.” (Ante, p. 914.) The “number” consists, however, of two cited cases and neither is in point. In Merchant’s Adm’r. v. Shry, 116 Va. 437 [82 S.E. 106, 108], a 1914 Virginia case, the court enforced a special state statute which provided for the creation of a committee to represent prisoners sued in state courts. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, this committee was a legislative device and not simply an “equitable solution” judicially created to assure due process. The other case, Bagley v. Bagley (1968) 57 Misc.2d 388 [292 N.Y.S.2d 796], involved a divorce action brought against a prisoner. The Supreme Court in Boddie has stressed that divorce proceedings represent a special situation, as previously noted, in which indigent persons are guaranteed access to civil courts. As we have observed the California Legislature has heretofore recognized this unique situation by its adoption of section 2625 of the Penal Code.
No other authorities are cited in support of the majority’s proposal. The absence of any controlling or persuasive precedent, coupled with valid policy reasons, convinces me that we should leave in legislative hands the creation of new rights which are not of constitutional origin.
At present the average indigent must face civil litigation bereft of counsel. His recourse, in propria persona, is to seek help where he can find it. This is often difficult. Two principal sources are available to him. One is the membership of the organized bar which, pro bono publico, may respond free of charge or expense to the historic and compelling *932professional call enunciated in Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (h): “Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.” Far more frequently than is generally known or accepted the profession has favorably responded to this ethical mandate. The indigent civil litigant also has access to legal aid societies where help may be available. Indigent prisoners are physically more isolated than nonprisoner indigents, but they may by mail also seek legal assistance, request continuances, file pleadings, motions and other legal papers. Judging by the number of criminal petitions flowing with regularity into the California court system, I think it is reasonable to conclude that these inmate rights are fairly well known among those affected. They may “testify” at hearings through use of depositions (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (d); Pen. Code, § 2623). Most importantly, no default judgment may be taken in a tort action, here involved, until the court first has heard the plaintiff’s evidence and has determined that he should recover. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585, subd. 2; see also Wilson v. Goldman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 573, 576-577, fn. 1 [79 Cal.Rptr. 309]; Code Civ. Proc., § 117g [small claims court].)
Thus imprisonment does not totally deprive the indigent prisoner of all opportunity to reach the civil courts. Access is limited and does not achieve perfect equality with nonprisoners, which inequality is an incident of the prisoner’s lawful confinement.
Other interesting questions remain unresolved by the majority’s formulation, among them: What of the indigent plaintiff who, in propria persona, sues the indigent prisoner? Is he also entitled, because of due process and equal protection arguments, to court-appointed counsel to represent him free of charge in his civil action against the indigent prisoner who, under the majority’s proposal, now has counsel? Who is to bear the cost of this additional increment of legal expense? Suppose the legal representation for either indigent nonprisoner plaintiff, or prisoner defendant is wholly inadequate or ineffective without an expert witness or extensive discovery? Is this to be afforded pro bono publico?
I note briefly certain incidents of the majority holding which requires appointment of counsel for indigent prisoner defendants in civil cases where a trial court concludes that “the prisoner’s interests are actually at stake,” and where “an attorney would be helpful.” {Ante, p. 924.) As to the prisoner’s physical presence, the trial court is to determine whether *933his presence “is needed to protect the due process rights of the parties.” If the court makes such a determination, then it may attempt to “arrange” for his presence or, if unsuccessful, order a continuance, record his testimony, and if feasible try the case, or a portion thereof, in prison. (Ante, p. 924.)
The foregoing procedural rules, judicially pronounced, although perhaps very loose in definition, impose upon trial courts a mandatory duty either to grant a continuance or to appoint counsel to represent, on a gratuitous basis, indigent prisoners who are defendants in civil suits. If the trial court concludes the prisoner’s presence is “necessary” it should be “arranged” or the trial held in prison. It will be seen that two important professional and official responsibilities are invoked by the majority formulation: as to counsel—the organized bar and the practicing attorney; as to the prisoner’s personal presence—the law enforcement and security agencies of the Department of Corrections and the local courts including judges, sheriffs, police, and marshals.
I do not know, and neither apparently do the majority, whether the number of criminal indigent civil defendants who would be affected by the majority’s holding is large or small. The majority “doubt” that it would be large, noting the absence of any empirical evidence. They may be right or wrong, but this uncertainty alone, in my view, suggests the need for legislative inquiry first to trace the dimensions of the problem on the basis of facts not speculation, and then carefully to weigh the various alternatives. This is the procedure which has been successfully followed in analogous situations. Thus, in meeting the need for representation of criminal indigents, the Legislature adopted Penal Code sections 987.2, 987.3, 987.4, and 987.6, a carefully conceived plan for compensated representation. Similarly, when it became apparent that the appellate rights of the criminal indigents required consistent and adequate representation, again, the Legislature has very recently in the Government Code established the office of State Public Defender (Stats. 1975, ch. 1125) and carefully defined its duties and powers.
In the final analysis the majority will mandate the rendition of free legal service by the bar to convicted criminals in civil cases, which professional service we have not as yet required be extended to law-abiding citizens. The majority concede that we cannot compel appropriation of monies, legislative or otherwise, for these services. This *934means that a large measure of voluntary cooperation will be required from the bar as to counsel. Similarly, depending upon the magnitude of the problem, law enforcement agencies are necessarily involved in any pronouncement, legislative or judicial, which requires the prisoner’s personal presence. The cooperation of both affected groups is more likely to be achieved through their participation in legislative formulations in the traditional manner. A fair legislative solution of the problem of the indigent prisoner in civil actions doubtless will give appropriate consideration to the plight of the indigent nonprisoner and maintain a fair relationship between the two.
I make two final observations on the constitutional argument as to the requirement of counsel for indigent prisoñers in civil actions. For many years the California public, the bench and the bar have lived with a very important procedural institution, the small claims court (Code Civ. Proc., § 117 et seq.). From its inception the Legislature has specifically prohibited any áttorney from representing either party in civil litigation. (§ 117g.) The constitutionality of such procedures has long been accepted. (Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 379, 384 [173 P.2d 38, 167 A.L.R. 820].) Do different constitutional considerations suddenly arise when the civil claim exceeds the frequently changing jurisdictional limits of the small claims court? Further, when a civil litigant appears in propria persona at trial he may be asked by the court or counsel if he has an attorney, but to my knowledge he is rarely if ever asked to waive the services of counsel, which would surely be required if the litigant had a constitutional right to counsel in civil matters.
The majority of this court in In re Tucker (1971) 5 Cal.3d 171 [95 Cal.Rptr. 761, 486 P.2d 657], rejected a parolee’s due process contention that he was entitled to counsel at parole revocation proceedings. (Tucker preceded Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 [36 L.Ed.2d 656, 93 S.Ct. 1756], which provided a limited right to counsel in these proceedings.) Addressing a vigorous and extended dissent which argued that the presence of counsel was necessary to meet due process and equal protection requirements, the concurring opinion of this court gently chiding the dissent for “tripping over reality” (p. 180) soundly emphasized the logistical problems thereby imposed. It further identified a far larger goal circumscribed by very practical considerations in recognizing that “as an ideal a skilled member of the bar should either be available *935for hire or provided out of the public treasury for every adult and every juvenile with a civil or criminal problem that has the slightest potential of subjecting him to physical detention, monetary loss or moral humiliation. The day may come when there is an adequate lawyer population and sufficient public sophistication to achieve that ideal. I regret, perhaps more than my dissenting brethren who fail to consider the problem of logistics, that the day does not yet appear on the horizon. Nor will it be hastened by judicial fiat.” (P. 181, italics added.) The concurring opinion then stressed that of the possible solutions “[T]he third alternative, necessary for the present, is to avoid judicially extending the required presence of hired or appointed counsel beyond the areas compelled by the Constitution. At such time as the numerous practical problems appear ripe for solution, primarily the availability of attorneys in sufficient numbers, we can anticipate adoption of appropriate procedure by the Legislature.” (P. 184, italics added.)
I fully share in these practical expressions of caution and restraint and note that those wise observations, expressed in concurrence in the context of a criminal case, have even greater force when, as here, the criminal indigent faces not the heavy onus of criminal sanctions but the lesser burden of a civil judgment. In a similar vein they continue to remind us, notwithstanding the passage of five years, that while searching for commendable policy goals we will do well to pay frequent attention to the uneven ground over which we must pass in reaching them, relying always on the Legislature to play its appropriate part in the process.
I do not agree that the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a criminal indigent have been violated by denying him free counsel in, or attendance at, the defense of a civil action. I do agree, however, with the following principles, applicable to prisons and prisoners generally, recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S. 396: “Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no *936more than a healthy sense of realism.” (Pp. 404-405, fn. omitted [40 L.Ed.2d pp. 235-236].)
I would deny the writ.
McComb, J., and Clark, J., concurred.