Court Opinion

ID: 9562499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:30:22.323958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:22.829200
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part: I concur with the majority opinion except as it relates to upholding the validity of the expungement statute (K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 21-4619). From that portion of the majority opinion I respectfully dissent.
I believe K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 21-4619 is an unreasonable restriction on public access to criminal court records. In our modern society the public relies increasingly on the press to keep it *695informed on what is transpiring in the courts. In Sedgwick County there are twenty-two judges of the district court. The press obviously cannot be in all court divisions at the same time checking on the administration of justice. The records of judicial proceedings under such circumstances take on even greater significance in the news-gathering process. Open court not only benefits particular parties to particular litigation, but it also helps to keep the administration of justice “honest.” As was stated in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-60, 49 L.Ed. 2d 683, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976), the United States Supreme Court, citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600, 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966), observed:
“ ‘A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.’ ”
The majority states “[t]he records are closed by expungement only after the file has become as newsworthy as cold mashed potatoes.” I do not agree. An electorate must be informed on the performance of its elected officials in order to vote intelligently. Let us suppose an incumbent judge is challenged on his granting of expungements. The allegation is made that many of his ex-pungements were improvidently granted or a charge of graft in their procurement is made. The public has a definite legitimate interest in the judge’s “track record.” Under the statute herein there is no procedure by which the press can check the facts — the press can scrutinize subsequent expungement proceedings but the records as to previous expungements are closed. Additionally, closure of the records precludes any meaningful study or analysis of how expungement is being utilized, and its effects.
Although arising from factually distinguishable circumstances, the following statement from Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 957 (1966), is significant:
“Fairness in the administration of justice is not a one-way street to be approached only through an entrance limited to the accused. His cause cannot be submitted to automated jurors existing in complete sterility. And prominence of position deserves no special consideration. To the contrary, the administration of justice requires that the personal and professional conduct of any judge be a subject for public concern and knowledge, continued scrutiny, and, in proper *696instances, authoritative action. News media not only have a right to report upon the subject, Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541, 85 S.Ct. 1628,14 L.Ed. 2d 543, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 875, 86 S.Ct. 18, 15 L.Ed. 2d 118, but have a professional duty to do so that extends beyond the term newsworthy.” p. 291.
There is an old adage that “doctors bury their mistakes, but judges publish theirs.” Under this statute, judges may bury some of their mistakes. No matter how much recidivism a judge may have among his “expungees,” his past errors in judgment are buried from the public except as such may be gleaned from human recall, old news stories, and other unofficial and frequently inaccurate sources.
In my opinion the public’s right to be informed on the operation of its courts of criminal justice is being unreasonably restricted by K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 21-4619.