Court Opinion

ID: 9848422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:19:25.138958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:17.422806
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I disagree with the legal analysis in Division 2,1 dissent from this division.
The rule against double jeopardy is fundamental to our system of justice. It is a simple and concise rule, which “basically provides that no person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense.”14 Under this rule, if a defendant is tried for the greater offense, but convicted of a lesser included offense, retrial on the greater offense is generally barred.15 This rule has subsequently been refined such that “retrial on the greater offense [is] not barred unless two prerequisites [are] established: (1) an unambiguous conviction on the lesser included offense and (2) a full opportunity for the jury to consider the greater offense.”16
In this case, Collins contends that his retrial on the greater offense was barred by double jeopardy, and the State concedes Collins’ contention. Despite the State’s concession, the majority concludes that Collins’ failure to include the record from the first trial constitutes waiver. This “cult-like” adherence to waiver is unwarranted and illogical in the circumstances of this case.
It is true that, as a general rule, “[t]he burden is on him who asserts error to show it affirmatively by the record.”17 As a corollary to this rule, however, this Court has held that “where facts necessary for disposition are stated in a brief, and the State concedes such statement is substantially correct, we are permitted to reach a decision upon the agreed . . . facts.”18 In other words, if the parties *877agree on the facts, as stated, we accept such agreement. Here, by agreeing that Collins’ retrial on the greater offense was barred by double jeopardy, the State essentially concedes that the record from the prior trial supports his argument. Under existing precedent, I believe we must accept the State’s concession. Indeed, to hold otherwise seems fundamentally unfair; it permits the meaningless to trump the meaningful and the technical to trump the substantive.
Decided April 8, 2004.
Cook & Connelly, Rex B. Abernathy, for appellant.
Herbert E. Franklin, Jr., District Attorney, Michael J. Moeller, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The cases the majority cites to support its position that the State cannot concede error where none exists are inapposite. In the first case, the principle was enunciated in a special concurrence and did not factor into the majority analysis.19 In the other two cases, the lack of legal error was apparent from the record and thus this Court upheld the ruling of the trial court notwithstanding the State’s concession.20 None of those cases is analogous to the case at bar, in which we ignore the State’s concession only to conclude that the lack of evidence results in waiver. And I do not agree that we should read the cases cited by the majority as supporting such orchestrated waiver. For these reasons, I dissent as to Division 2, but I concur with the remaining divisions.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller joins in this special concurrence and dissent.

 Keener v. State, 238 Ga. 7, 8 (230 SE2d 846) (1976).

 See Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 327 (90 SC 1757, 26 LE2d 300) (1970); Potts v. State, 258 Ga. 430, 431 (1) (369 SE2d 746) (1988) (“jeopardy for an offense ends after a jury convicts a defendant of a lesser-included offense, if the court has given the jury a full opportunity to return a verdict on the greater offense and no extraordinary circumstances have prevented the jury from doing so”).

 State v. Heggs, 252 Ga. App. 865, 866 (558 SE2d 41) (2001).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Holzmeister v. State, 156 Ga. App. 94 (1) (274 SE2d 109) (1980).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 253 Ga. App. 10 (557 SE2d 473) (2001); see also *877Keith v. State, 218 Ga. App. 729 (1) (463 SE2d 51) (1995); Holzmeister, supra.

 See Brown v. State, 264 Ga. 803, 807 (450 SE2d 821) (1994).

 See Busbee v. State, 205 Ga. App. 533, 534 (423 SE2d 3) (1992) (although State conceded that trial court erred in failing to instruct jury, record demonstrated that defendant waived such error); Shaw v. State, 211 Ga. App. 647, 649 (440 SE2d 245) (1994) (this Court addressed ineffective assistance claim notwithstanding the fact that the State arguably conceded that trial counsel’s conduct was unprofessional).