Court Opinion

ID: 9626855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:25:41.602699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:34.646820
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that holds that aggravated sexual battery, as defined in K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-3518(l)(b), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-3504. The statutes are set forth in the majority opinion and need not be repeated here. We have defined “lesser included offense” on numerous occasions. In State v. Galloway, 238 Kan. 415, Syl. ¶ 2, 710 P.2d 1320 (1985), we held:
“An offense is considered a lesser included offense under K.S.A. 1984 Supp. *49121-3107(2)(d) when all elements necessary to prove the lesser offense are present and required to establish the elements of the greater offense charged.”
In discussing lesser included offenses under 21-3107(2) in State v. Arnold, 223 Kan. 715, 716, 576 P.2d 651 (1978), Chief Justice Schroeder, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
“Lesser included offenses fall into three categories under our statute. The first is the offense which is merely a lower degree of the offense charged or subparagraph (a) under the statute. The second category is the attempt as a lesser included offense or subparagraphs (h) and (c) under the statute. The third category is the offense which is necessarily committed by the defendant in perpetrating the crime charged or subparagraph (d) under the statute. Under this section it is impossible to commit the greater offense without first having committed the lesser offense. The offense must not require some additional element which is not needed to constitute the greater offense. In other words, there must be ‘identity of elements.’ (See Note, The Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses in Kansas, 15 Washburn L.J. 40, 41-45 [1976].)”
The majority in this case has chosen to totally ignore the test used repeatedly by this court and instead bases its determination on some new theory which looks to the intent of the legislature. The majority states:
“From a reading of these statutes, it is clear to ús that the legislature intended to establish certain sex offenses applicable where family relationships were not involved. The legislature also intended that when lewd acts for sexual gratification were directed by a parent against his own child, it constituted a more serious offense than when the acts were perpetrated by a defendant against a child with whom he had no family relationship.” p. 488.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s determination of the legislative intent behind the statutes. Where we part company is in adopting legislative intent as the test for a lesser included offense. A purely cursory reading of the statutes makes it abundantly clear that the offense of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, as it existed herein, cannot be proved without also proving all of the elements of the offense of aggravated sexual battery under K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-3518(l)(b). Hence, the latter crime is a lesser included offense of the crime charged and K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 21-3107(3) requires that the court so instruct the jury.
I cannot ignore our often-repeated definition of a lesser included offense purely for the sake of affirming a conviction which was probably otherwise justified. Considering the facts of this case, the jury may well have convicted the defendant of the lesser included offense, a class D felony, rather than the greater *492offense, a class B felony, if it had been properly instructed and given that opportunity. As a result, this father has been sentenced to a term of ten years to life as opposed to a maximum sentence of three to ten years for the lesser offense.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
Schroeder, C.J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.