Court Opinion

ID: 9637928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:26:46.88139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:24.521542
License: Public Domain

HOLLAND, Justice,
dissenting, with whom BERGER, J., joins:
The interlocutory judgments of the Superi- or Court which determined that 2 Del.C. § 1329, rather than 18 Del.C. § 6511, applies to these proceedings and limits any recovery to $300,000 per occurrence should be reversed because § 1329 is unconstitutional. The operative statutes are 18 Del.C. § 6511 and 2 Del. C. § 1309(20). The General Assembly’s statutory authorization and funding of the commercial liability insurance policies, which are applicable to the claims in this case, constituted acts that waived the State’s sovereign immunity up to the combined $11 million limits of those policies. See Del. Const, art. I, § 9; 18 Del.C. § 6511; 2 Del.C. § 1309(20); Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990).

Enactment of Section 1329 Violates Delaware Constitution

The appellants contend that 2 Del.G. § 1329 is violative of the Delaware Constitution, inter alia, because it was enacted as Section 68 of the 1989 Bond and Capital Improvements Act (“1989 Bond Act”). 66 Del.Laws, Chapter 360. In support of that contention, the appellants assert that the title of the 1989 Bond Act gave no indication its *1382purpose was to alter the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that it was improper to include substantive legislation in an appropriation bill. The dispositive merit in this challenge to 2 Del.C. § 1329 is contained in three separate provisions that became a part of the Delaware Constitution simultaneously in 1897.
The first provision in the Delaware Constitution is Article II, § 16, which provides:
No bill or joint resolution, except bills appropriating money for public purposes, shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.
Del. Const, art. II, § 16 (emphasis added). This provision sets forth the general “single-subject” and title rules, but specifically excepts from its purview appropriation bills, which, by their nature, cover more than a single subject, ie., the designation of funds to multiple recipients. See Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 2, p. 817.
The second provision in the Delaware Constitution that is relevant to this analysis is Article III, § 18, which provides, in part, that:
The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items of appropriation disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills, over the Executive veto.
Del. Const, art. Ill, § 18 (emphasis added). This provision authorizes a line-item veto power for the Governor, but only as to appropriation bills.
The final applicable constitutional provision is Article VIII, § 4, which provides:
No appropriation of the public money shall be made to, nor the bonds of this State be issued or loaned to any county, municipality or corporation, nor shall the credit of the State, by the guarantee or the endorsement of the bonds or other undertakings of any county, municipality or corporation, be pledged otherwise than pursuant to an Act of the General Assembly, passed with the concurrence of three fourths of all the members elected to each House.
Del. Const, art. VIII, § 4 (emphasis added).

Historical Context The Single-Subject and Title Rules

The two general provisions in Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution, that a bill contain only one subject and that the title of the bill express its subject, are distinct requirements. See Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” Vol. XLII, Minn.L.Rev. 389, 391 (1958). Each has different historical origins. Id. Nevertheless, these two requirements are often combined in a single provision, such as Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution, to achieve a common purpose. Id. Before examining the exception for appropriation bills, it is important to understand the history and purpose of the two general requirements.
The potential problem caused by an omnibus bill, which includes unrelated provisions on heterogeneous matters, is an uninformed legislative vote. This was recognized by the Romans. In 98 B.C., the Lex Caecilia Didia was enacted to prohibit the adoption of laws which contained unrelated provisions — the lex satura. See Luce, Legislative Procedures 548-549 (1922). The omnibus bill continued to be a cause for concern in colonial America prior to the Revolutionary War. Id. Consequently, the constitution of nearly every state now contains a general requirement that legislation be limited to a single subject. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” at 390.
The other general requirement in Article II, § 16, that the subject matter of a bill be expressed in its title, originated with the Georgia Constitution of 1798. Id. In 1795, the Georgia legislature passed the Yazoo Act, which made grants to private persons that were not reflected in the statute’s title. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” at 390. The Georgia Constitution was amended in 1798. Id. The constitution of almost every state now requires that the title of a bill adequately express its subject matter. Id. These provisions are also intended to insure informed legislative *1383action, as the 1897 debates on the Delaware Constitution reflect:
Oftentimes bills have been introduced in the Legislature with very harmless titles, but amendments have been added to those bills and when they have passed both Houses, they are entirely different from what they were originally.
Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 1, p. 264.
Consistent with the foregoing historical background, this Court has recognized that the two general requirements of Article II, § 16 were included in the Delaware Constitution of 1897 in order to “prevent deception of the general public and the members of the General Assembly by titles to bills which give no adequate information of the subject matter of the bills.” Opinion of the Justices, 57 Del. 19, 194 A.2d 855, 856 (1968). The single-subject and title provisions in Article II, § 16 are intended to assure sufficient notice that “legislation, the content of which was inadequately brought to the public attention, or so-called sleeper legislation” does not slip through the General Assembly. Id. If a bill contains multiple subjects or the title of the bill is such that it would “trap the unwary into inaction,” it must be struck down as a violation of this section of the Delaware Constitution. In re the Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 366, 177 A.2d 205, 208 (1962).

Single-Subject and Title Rules Appropriation Bills as Limited Exception

Nevertheless, appropriation bills have traditionally been conditionally exempted from both of the general requirements, the single-subject and the title provisions, in state constitutions. Id. In view of the historical fear of omnibus legislation, which led to the constitutional proscriptions against bills with multiple subjects or nondescript titles, however, the exceptions for appropriation bills are always narrow. The condition for exemption is usually a limitation that the provisions in an appropriation bill relate only to appropriations. Id.
While appropriation bills must contain no other substantive provisions than appropriations matters, this does not mean that an appropriation bill must merely be a list of monetary appropriations and respective recipients. See Commonwealth v. Gregg, 161 Pa. 582, 29 A. 297 (1894). Rather, appropriation bills may contain substantive language which relates to the specific appropriations in the appropriation bill. Such language may be found to be “conditional” or “incidental” to an appropriation and, therefore, properly included in an appropriation bill. See Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 306 A.2d 720 (1973).9 Factors which indicate that language in an appropriation bill is not merely “conditional” or “incidental,” but rather is improperly substantive are: first, the provision is not germane to any appropriation in the appropriation bill; second, the provision amends or repeals an already existing law; and third, the provision is permanent in nature, extending beyond the life of the appropriation act.10 See Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” Vol. XLII, Minn.L.Rev. 389, 423-429 (1958); Brown v. Firestone, Fla.Supr., 382 So.2d 654, 664 (1980).
If an appropriation act contains substantive, non-financial legislation, it then becomes precisely the kind of omnibus bill the single-subject and title rules were meant to prohibit.11 See Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” Vol. XLII, Minn. L.Rev. 389 (1958). Accordingly, an appropriation act is an improper place for an enactment of matters unrelated to appropriations.12 Id. Otherwise, the purpose behind the single-subject and title rules would be meaningless, since they could be circumvented simply by putting a substantive change into legislation otherwise primarily devoted to appropriations. Id. Consequently, those *1384courts which have considered the issue all conclude:
While under the Constitution general appropriation bills are exempted from the general constitutional provision which requires that all bills must contain but one subject, which must be clearly expressed in the title, it does not follow that general laws may be amended, modified, or repealed by a general appropriation act under such a general title.
See, e.g., State v. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 P. 1071, 1072 (1908).
In Ruud’s authoritative analysis of the one-subject rule, he reaches that same conclusion rhetorically regarding the exemption in Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution:
Delaware, making what seems the broadest exception, excepts “bills appropriating money for public purposes.” A textual interpretation could lead to the conclusion that any act appropriating money, whether a general or special appropriations act, could contain any number of subjects. The question would be raised, though, whether acts containing more than appropriations and related- provisions remain “bills appropriating money for public purposes.” Doesn’t the exception impose a limitation on the bill that it only appropriate money? Remarkably, no Delaware case dealing with this question was found.
Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” at 434.
The foregoing conclusion by Ruud, that the exemption from the one-subject and title requirements in the Delaware Constitution for appropriation bills limits such legislation to appropriations, is compelled by an examination of the history and context in which Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution was adopted. During the debates on the 1897 Delaware Constitution, Edward G. Bradford proposed that appropriation bills be excluded from the constitutional provision which provided that no bill should embrace more than one subject expressed in its title (the single-subject and title rules):
Mr. Chairman, I would move that section eighteen as adopted be reconsidered. In making that motion may I explain the reason why I make it? I find that in the Constitutions of the other states, and also according to what I consider sound reason, there ought to be an exception in that section of general appropriation bills. For instance, “No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, but a bill or joint resolution in violation of this provision shall not be invalidated thereby, only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.” A general appropriation bill contains a great variety of items, which it would be impossible to fully set forth in any title. It seems to me, therefore, that, following the example in other states, it would be very well to except from that section general appropriation bills.
Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 2, p. 817 (emphasis added).
During the discussion on this proposal, the Pennsylvania Constitution was cited as one of its origins and as persuasive authority for its adoption. See Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 4, pp. 2641-43. In 1894, three years prior to the Delaware constitutional debates, two similar provisions in the Pennsylvania Constitution,13 along with a provision giving the governor line-item veto power over appropriations,14 were interpret*1385ed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to have the same purpose, i.e., to prevent the passage of extraneous matters in appropriation bills. Commonwealth v. Gregg, 161 Pa. 582, 29 A. 297 (1894).15 With the benefit of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of its constitutional provisions regarding: appropriation bills; the single-subject rule; and the line-item veto, the drafters of the Delaware Constitution understood that excluding appropriation bills from the single-subject rule meant that such bills would not contain substantive provisions other than appropriations matters.16

Line-Item, Veto Consistent Limited Exception

The narrow exemption for appropriation bills in Article II, § 16 is similar to the limited authorization for the gubernatorial line-item veto in Article III, § 18. In construing the latter provision, this Court has recognized the distinction between bills which have the fundamental purpose of appropriating money for public purposes, and bills which are fundamentally substantive in nature, but which also include an appropriation relating to the substantive issues. See Perry v. Decker, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 357, 360-61 (1983); Opinion of the Justices, 58 Del. 475, 210 A.2d 852, 853-54 (1965). As to the former type of bill, the Governor has line-item veto power, but as to the latter, the Governor may only approve or veto the bill in its entirety. Perry v. Decker, 457 A.2d at 361-62; Opinion of the Justices, 210 A.2d at 854-55. The debates on the 1897 Delaware Constitution make this clear:
The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bill, making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved, shall be the law, and the item or items of appropriation disapproved shall be void unless repassed according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the Executive veto.
Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 1, p. 282 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court has interpreted the Governor’s line-item veto power, as set forth in Article III, § 18 of the Delaware Constitution, to extend “only to a bill containing more than one appropriation and ‘embracing distinct items,’ ” and not to “bills which contain only a single item of appropriation” among other substantive provisions. Perry v. Decker, 457 A.2d at 360.

Limited Appropriation Exceptions Article II, § 16 and Article III, § 18

The provisions in Article II, § 16 and Article III, § 18 of the Delaware Constitution, *1386when viewed in historical context and read in para materia, reflect that to be an appropriation bill the provisions in the legislation must all relate to appropriations. See Perry v. Decker, Del.Supr., 467 A.2d 357, 360-62 (1983). The purpose of exempting appropriation bills from the single-subject and title rules of Article II, § 16 was to allow appropriation bills to designate money for more than one purpose without running afoul of the constitutional mandate that a bill embrace only the one subject expressed in its title. See Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897; Vol. 2, pp. 817-820, 2475-76; Vol. 4, pp. 2641-43, 2871. The exception for appropriation bills in Article II, § 16 was not intended to allow substantive provisions other than money appropriations to be included in appropriation bills.
Similarly, the constitutional authority for a line-item veto in Article III, § 18 was limited to appropriation bills only, not legislation that related to substantive subjects and also included appropriations. See Perry v. Decker, 457 A.2d at 360-61. This Court has explained:
The legislative process for the enactment of law established by our Constitution contemplates the formulating of proposed laws by the Houses of the General Assembly, and the submission of a proposed law to the Governor for his approval or disapproval. In effect, the Governor and the Houses of the General Assembly are a legislative team, but each has separate and distinct functions in the enactment of laws. It is the function of the Senate and House to agree upon the form and substance of a law, and, generally speaking, it is the function of the Governor to act as a check upon the final enactment of that law. In doing so, he must approve or disapprove it as a whole for he has no constitutional power to alter the content of a proposed law submitted to him, except as to appropriations of money.
Opinion of the Justices, 58 Del. 475, 210 A.2d 852, 855 (1965) (emphasis added). There was no veto power at all in the 1831 Delaware Constitution. Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 1, p. 233. The limited exception for a line-item veto in' an appropriation bill in the 1897 Delaware Constitution permitted continued funding for other State operations, even in the absence of an agreement between the Governor and the General Assembly on the propriety of funding certain projects. See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, “The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,” 65 Tex.L.Rev. 872, 922 (1987).

1989 Bond Act An Appropriations Bill

The central question thus becomes: was the 1989 Bond Act an appropriation bill? In a similar context, this Court has answered such a question affirmatively. An “[a]ct authorizing the State of Delaware to borrow money by issuing bonds and appropriating the moneys so borrowed to various agencies of the State” is an appropriation bill. Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 306 A.2d 720, 721 (1973).
The 1989 Bond Act, in addition to authorizing the issuance of certain bonds, also was denominated by the General Assembly as “a supplemental appropriation of and in addition to the monies appropriated by the Fiscal Year 1989 Budget Act.” 66 Del.Laws c. 360, § 5. Thus, the 1989 Bond Act, which included Section 68, was passed under the authority of Article VIII, § 4 of the Delaware Constitution. Accordingly, it was an appropriation bill. See Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d at 721; 66 Del.Laws c. 360.

Section 68 of1989 Bond Act Violates Appropriation Exception

Although Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution specifically excludes appropriation bills from its purview, Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act does riot fall within that exclusion. The Constitutional Debates of 1897 reflect that the purpose of excluding appropriation bills from this section was to allow the legislature to make appropriations for many different purposes at once. Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 2, pp. 817-820; Vol. 4, pp. 2475-76, 2641^3 and 2871. Those debates also reflect the drafters of Article II, § 16 did not intend to permit the passage of “sleeper” legislation by including substantive non-monetary enactments in an appropriation bill. Id.
*1387Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act, through which 2 DelC. § 1829 was enacted, is the type of legislation that was intended to be prevented by Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution. Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act amends Title 2 of the Delaware Code to waive the State’s sovereign immunity for DART operations that are covered by commercial insurance and to impose a liability cap of $300,000. This is a substantive enactment of a permanent nature, which is improper in a bill otherwise completely devoted to “appropriating money for public purposes.” Del. Const, art. II, § 16. There is also no indication in the title of the 1989 Bond Act that any change was to be made in the substantive law relating to sovereign immunity. Consequently, as a substantive change to the law of sovereign immunity, which was part of an appropriation bill, Section 68 violated Article II, § 16 of the Delaware Constitution.

Section 68 Unconstitutional Severability Saves 1989 Bond Act

What are the ramifications of concluding that Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act is unconstitutional? The other sections of the 1989 Bond Act are unaffected because of the severability provision in Section 73:
Section 73. Severability. If any section, part, phrase, or provision of this Act or the application thereof be held invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such judgment shall be confined in its operation to the section, part, phrase, provision, or application directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered and shall not affect or impair the validity of the remainder of this Act or the application thereof.
Therefore, although Section 68 is unconstitutional, it does not invalidate the remaining provisions of the 1989 Bond Act. See 66 Del.Laws e. 360, § 73.
The conclusion that § 1329 is unconstitutional will come as no surprise to the State. The statutory $300,000 damage cap in Section 68 of the 1989 Bond Act became effective on July 12, 1988. 2 Del.C. § 1329. Nevertheless, the State has been concerned about the constitutionality of § 1329 since its enactment,' as deposition testimony in the record refleets:
MR. MOORE: To try and get right to this, can you tell me why DART had essentially 11 million dollars’ worth of liability coverage when there is a statutory cap limiting liability to $300,000?
MR. HILLIS: The cap wasn’t tested in court. And through conversations with the Deputy Attorney General, it was felt that we did not want to have the opportunity to test that case and have it not upheld, and consequently, putting the assets of DART in jeopardy.
Thus, since the enactment of § 1329, DART has continued to purchase $11 million in primary and excess commercial liability insurance coverage.

Delaware History Sovereiyn Immunity

The remaining question to be answered is whether the State has otherwise waived sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the invalid attempted waiver in § 1329. Sovereign immunity has been a part of the law of Delaware throughout the State’s history. This Court first considered the question of sovereign immunity, as applied to a lawsuit brought against the State, in the case of Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. v. State, 66 Del. 298, 187 A.2d 71 (1962). In Shellhorn, this Court noted the long tradition of sovereign immunity enjoyed by English monarehs. Id. at 73-74. We concluded that sovereign immunity was unquestionably a part of the English common law prior to the American Revolution. Id. Accordingly, this Court held that sovereign immunity was retained by Article 25 of the 1776 Constitution, which provided that the common law of England would remain in force in Delaware until altered by the newly formed Delaware General Assembly. Id.
The 1792 Delaware Constitution directly addressed sovereign immunity in Article I, § 9, providing that “suits may be brought against the state, according to such regulations as shall be made by law.” That language has been retained without alteration in all successive Delaware Constitutions and continues to be the basis for the doctrine of *1388sovereign immunity in Delaware. Id. Sovereign immunity, therefore, is an absolute bar to liability claims against the State of Delaware unless it is waived by the General Assembly. Blair v. Anderson, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 94 (1974). See also King v. State, 57 Del. 562, 203 A.2d 74 (1964).
Despite the venerable historical background of sovereign immunity in Delaware, this Court has noted that “neither the certainty of the doctrine ... nor its longevity necessarily makes its application right or just.” Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429, 433 (1976). In fact, Delaware’s history reflects that its courts have applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity “with express reluctance and with an invitation to the General Assembly to remove it.” Id. In Shellhorn & Hill, for example, after acknowledging that the Delaware Constitution “is no less binding on the courts than on any other branch of government” and, therefore, this Court could not refuse to enforce the doctrine of sovereign immunity when it was asserted, this Court then stated:
We suggest to it [the General Assembly] as eminently proper for its consideration the desirability of permitting, at least to some extent, suits against the State for injuries caused by the torts of State employees. By the enactment of a general law permitting suit against the State under such conditions and circumstances as public policy make desirable, the basic rights and interests of both the State and the individual citizen would be protected.
Shellhorn & Hill, 187 A.2d at 74-75. One of the General Assembly’s responses to this Court’s entreaty in Shellhorn & Hill was embodied in an act entitled “Insurance for the Protection of the State.” 18 Del.C. ch. 65.

Sovereign Immunity Waived State Insurance Protection Act

This Court first considered the import of the State Insurance Protection Act in Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). We determined that Title 18, Chapter 65, created “a comprehensive insurance program with implementing administrative provisions.” Id. at 435. We also noted that Chapter 65: mandated that a Committee be formed to determine insurance coverage (Section 6502); specified the forms of coverage (Section 6503); authorized the Insurance Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out policy determinations (Section 6504); and formed a State Insurance Coverage Office (Section 6505). Id. We also found that the provisions of the chapter are mandatory, because the word “shall” is used in every significant section. Id.
This Court concluded, in Pajewski, that 18 Del.C. ch. 65 was more than mere enabling legislation. Id. This Court, therefore, held that the State could not escape liability merely by arguing that Section 6511 is inanimate “until it is vitalized by appropriation.” Id. at 436.
Section 6511 states flatly that the defense of sovereignty “is waived” and “will not be asserted.” There is a limitation to that waiver, that is, it extends to “any risk or loss covered by the state insurance coverage program.” To determine what risk or loss is covered by that program, we look to § 6502 which directs the Committee to insure any type of risk to which the State may be exposed. Such risk may be protected by commercially acquired insurance or through a self-insurance program but, the •point is, it must be protected. In other words, the statutory plan, as we read it, contemplates a waiver of immunity eo-ex-tensive with the insurance program, which shall cover “any type of risk to which the State may be exposed.”
In the view we take here of the Statute, the State is not entitled to dismissal of the complaint merely by showing, as it has done, that there is neither commercial nor self-insurance covering the liability for the kind of tortious conduct alleged in the complaint. Immunity is presumptively waived by § 6511 and it is, therefore, incumbent upon the State to provide all of the facts as to how the Committee met its responsibilities under 18 Del. C. ch. 65.
Pajewski v. Perry, 363 A.2d at 436 (emphasis added).
In 1985, however, this Court determined that the State had rebutted the presumptive *1389waiver of sovereign immunity provided in 18 Del.C. § 6511. Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985). We reached that conclusion because of the events that had transpired during the nine years since Pajewski had been decided. During that period of time, the Committee formed by 18 Del. C. ch. 65 had made numerous unsuccessful good faith attempts to secure funding from the General Assembly to formulate a comprehensive insurance coverage plan. Id. at 1177-79.
In Cates, this Court noted that “it was never said that the Committee was responsible for ensuring that coverage actually exists. It was impossible for the Committee to create coverage without funding.” Id. at 1178. We therefore found, as a matter of law, that because the State had never funded the comprehensive State Insurance Coverage Program described in 18 Del.C. § 6511, the State had rebutted the presumption that it had waived sovereign immunity pursuant to such a program. Id. at 1179.

State Commercial Insurance Separate Authorization and Funding Constitutes Sovereign Immunity Waiver

Nevertheless, for purposes of the case sub judice, the most significant holding in Cates is found in the last three paragraphs of that opinion. Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175, 1188 (1985). Notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion that the comprehensive insurance coverage plan contemplated by Chapter 65 of Title 18 had not been implemented despite the Committee’s good faith efforts, this Court remanded the case “for discovery on the issue of whether the State has insurance coverage for the claim asserted.... ” Id. This Court then held that “[i]t is clear the existence of an insurance policy covering [the] appellant[’s] ... claim could constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity under 18 Del.C. § 6511.” Id. (emphasis added).
This Court always has acknowledged that the State’s sovereign immunity can be waived only by a legislative act. Blair v. Anderson, Del.Supr., 325 A.2d 94, 96 (1974). This Court also has stated, however, that “[i]t is clear ... that waiver need not be made in express statutory language.” Id. In Blair, for example, this Court held that “when the General Assembly authorizes a contract to be made it implicitly and necessarily waives immunity to suit for breach by the State of that contract.” Id. Accord Sandt v. Delaware Solid Waste Authority, Del.Supr., 640 A.2d 1030 (1994).17 Similarly, when the General Assembly authorizes and funds the purchase of a commercial liability insurance contract, it acts to waive sovereign immunity to the extent of the limits of the policy that is purchased. 2 Del.C. § 1309(20); 18 Del.C. ch. 65.
In a manner consistent with Blair, this Court subsequently explained and applied the alternative holding set forth at the end of the Cates decision. Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990). On behalf of this Court, Justice Walsh wrote:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not favored in the law because its application tends to defeat claims and disputes on grounds other than the merits. Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976). The General Assembly’s adoption of 18 Del.C. § 6511, which provides that the defense of sovereign immunity “cannot and will not be asserted” as to risks or loss covered by “commercially procured insurance,” reflects a public policy that liability insurance purchased with public funds must be considered as a source for payment of claims against State agencies. Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175, 1183 (1985). It may be that upon an enlarged record, or at trial, it can be demonstrated that the defense of sovereign immunity is valid because of the absence of liability insurance. On the present record, however, sufficient factual and legal doubt exists as to render inappropriate the grant of summary judgment based on that defense.
*1390Kennerly v. State, 580 A.2d at 566 (emphasis added).
Thus, the trilogy of decisions by this Court in Pajewski, Cates, and Kennerly followed an orderly and logical progression. In Pajew-ski, this Court held that the State could not defeat Section 6511’s waiver of sovereign immunity by not funding a comprehensive insurance program. In Cates, this Court held that the existence of some commercial insurance coverage, without a comprehensive program for the State, could constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 6511. In Kennerly, this Court held that the existence of commercial insurance would constitute such a waiver. Consequently, the holdings in Pajewski, Cates, and Kennerly reflect consistent determinations by this Court that the unambiguous waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity set forth in Section 6511 could not be rendered inoperative by the General Assembly’s failure to fund a comprehensive insurance coverage program but, in fact, would be an effective waiver to the extent that the General Assembly otherwise authorized and funded the purchase of some commercial liability insurance coverage. Kennerly v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 561 (1990); Doe v. Cates, Del.Supr., 499 A.2d 1175 (1985); Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976).
It is logical to ask how commercial insurance could exist which would constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity under Section 6511, if a comprehensive State insurance coverage plan had never been promulgated? One answer to that question is found in Section 6510, which provides:
Existing insurance contracts and any renewals thereof may continue in full force and effect unless and until otherwise provided by the Director.
18 Del.C. § 6510. Thus, until a comprehensive State insurance plan became operative, the waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 6511 would be commensurate with the level of any “existing insurance contracts and any renewals thereof.” Id.
Another basis for the existence of commercial liability insurance to protect the State would be specific legislation enacted subsequent to the adoption of Title 18 ch. 65. It was such specific subsequent legislation which authorized and funded the purchase of the commercial insurance that is at issue in this case.

Sovereign Immunity Waived Commercial Insurance Acquired

The concerns that this Court expressed in Pajewski were known to the General Assembly in 1979 when the legislation establishing the Delaware Transportation Authority was enacted. 2 Del.C. ch. 13. In view of the nonexistence of a program that could arrange for the comprehensive purchase of commercial insurance for the benefit of all State agencies, the General Assembly expressly authorized the Delaware Transportation Authority to acquire its own insurance. In Section 1309(20) of Title 2, the General Assembly specifically gave the Delaware Transportation Authority power to
Procure insurance against any losses in connection with its property, operations or assets of any its administrations or subsidiaries in such amounts and from such insurers as it deems desirable.
1 Del.C. § 1309(20).
DART was established as a subsidiary corporation of the Delaware Transportation Authority on October 1, 1979, pursuant to 2 Del.C. § 1307(a), which grants the Delaware Transportation Authority the power to create subsidiary corporations. The parties agree that since DART was established in October, 1979, it has procured annually commercial liability insurance. The parties also agree that the money for the purchase of those commercial insurance policies has been appropriated by the General Assembly from the Delaware Transportation Authority fund.
With regard to the claims at issue in this proceeding, the record reflects that DART renewed a commercial liability policy with Reliance Insurance Company, effective July 1, 1988 to July 1, 1989, in the amount of one million dollars. That policy was renewed again on July 1, 1989. DART also renewed two $5 million umbrella and excess policies with other commercial carriers for the period of July 1,1988 through July 1,1990.
*1391When the General Assembly authorized and funded the acquisition of commercial liability insurance policies by the Delaware Transportation Authority and its subsidiary DART, it acted to provide a method by which those injured by the State or its agencies will be compensated while, at the same time, protecting the State treasury. 2 Del.C. § 1309(20); 18 Del.C. ch. 65. The General Assembly recognized that it was logically inconsistent to purchase insurance and then allow a commercial carrier to assert the defense of sovereign immunity. 18 Del.C. § 6511. Permitting a commercial insurer to assert the defense of sovereign immunity would not only deny protection to those individuals who were injured by the State’s negligence but, rather than protecting the State treasury, would mean that the public funds expended on premiums for commercial insurance had been wasted. The General Assembly’s actions, read in pari materia, were intended to preclude such illogical results. 18 Del.C. ch. 65; 2 Del.C § 1309(20).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. See also Attorney General of Pennsylvania Opinion No. 78-16, 1978 Pa. AG LEXIS 18, at *7-9 (discussing cases).

. See Attorney General of Pennsylvania Opinion No. 78-16, 1978 Pa. AG LEXIS 18, at *9-20.

. See, e.g., Attorney General of Pennsylvania Opinion No. 78-16, 1978 Pa. AG LEXIS 18, at *6.

. See also Dept. of Education v. Lewis, Fla.Supr., 416 So.2d 455, 459 (1982).

. Pa. Const, art. Ill, §§ 3, 11; Pa. Const, art. IV, § 16. See also Attorney General of Pennsylvania Opinion No. 78-16, 1978 Pa. AG LEXIS 18, * 6 (1978) (purpose of provisions is “to prevent the practice of passing legislation by log-rolling or by rider.”).

. The drafters of the 1897 Delaware Constitution emphasized the importance of the Governor's line-item-veto power over appropriation bills:
Provisions in regard to his power to veto separate items over appropriation bills, have been adopted into all the new Constitutions, and the absence of it in the Federal Constitution is a fact greatly to be lamented. But that, perhaps, is a little aside from the subject of this amendment which I want to discuss.
Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 1, p. 233. See also Perry v. Decker, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 357, 360-61 (1983). The debates on the provision that became Article III, § 18 of the Delaware Constitution focused primarily on the number of votes necessary to override the Governor’s veto. Id. at Vol. 1, pp. 225-243, 247-262, 264-284.

. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed the purpose of such constitutional provisions:
The only provision invoked here is section 15 of article 3: “The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the commonwealth.” etc. The history and purpose of that section are well known. It was aimed at the objectionable practice of putting a measure of doubtful strength, on its own merits, into the general appropriations bill, — in legislative phrase, "tacking it on as a rider," — in order to compel members to vote for it, or bring the wheels of government to a stop. The same constitutional intent is embodied in section 16 of article 4, giving the governor power to disapprove separate items of appropriations bills. It is the practice of thus forcing the passage of extraneous matters, not germane to the purpose of the bill itself, that was intended to be abolished. As to general legislation, the same object, among others, was secured by the provision of section 2 of article 3 that "no bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed, containing more than one subject.” General appropriation bills, from their nature, usually cover a number of items, not all relating strictly to one subject. They were therefore excepted from the requirement of section 2, and this exception necessitated the special section 15 relating to them. The object of both is the same.
Commonwealth v. Gregg, Pa.Supr., 29 A. 297, 297-98 (1894) (emphasis added).

. The Pennsylvania Constitution was repeatedly referred to as a model by the drafters of the 1897 Delaware Constitution, especially with regard to provisions such as the governor's line-item veto power and the single-subject and title rules:
In our great neighbor, Pennsylvania, here nearby whose Constitution was framed by a Convention composed of many of the ablest men of that Commonwealth, many of the ablest lawyers and statesmen were in that Convention which sat for about a year in 1874, I think, and which resulted in the Constitution which is now in force in Pennsylvania, and which I have before me, the provisions are substantially the same.
Delaware Constitutional Debates 1897, Vol. 1, p. 234. See also, id., Vol. 4, pp. 2641-43.

. In Sandt, we held that the General Assembly had expressly waived the Delaware Solid Waste Authority's sovereign immunity by enacting 7 Del.C. § 6406(a)(5) which gives the Waste Authority the power to "[s]ue and be sued.” We were therefore not called upon to rule on Sandt's alternative argument that the Waste Authority’s purchase of insurance waived its sovereign immunity under 18 Del.C. § 6511.