Court Opinion

ID: 9579363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:23.438363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:28.591422
License: Public Domain

Harwell, Justice
(dissenting):
*271Disagreeing with my brethren’s opinion, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
The alleged principal felon, appellant’s son Randy, had been negotiating with the State to plead guilty to manslaughter since he contended the accidental killing occurred while he was having an epileptic seizure. Appellant was indicted for and subsequently convicted of accessory after the fact of murder. She attempted to prove the killing was not murder and therefore she could not be guilty of the crime with which she was charged. The majority of the Court concludes that appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to admit the psychiatrist’s testimony because his testimony to a hypothetical set of facts would merely be cumulative to the State’s stipulation that Randy may have been suffering from epilepsy. I disagree. Laymen, aware of the plea bargaining process and of its connotations, see discussion in Medlin v. State, 276 S. C. 540, 280 S. E. (2d) 648 (1981), may not be persuaded of an accused’s innocence of murder by the State’s acceptance of a twelve year old boy’s guilty plea to manslaughter. I can only speculate concerning the jury impact of the testimony of a state psychiatrist who personally examined Randy after the incident. I believe the appellant should have been allowed to introduce the psychiatrist’s testimony.
The trial judge cited State v. Massey, 267 S. C. 432, 229 S. E. (2d) 332 (1976), as his reason for refusing the testimony. I disagree with the court’s interpretation of Massey. The elements of the crime of accessory after the fact are stated in State v. Nicholson, 221 S. C. 399, 70 S. E. (2d) 632, 634 (1952):
An accessory after the fact is one who, knowing a felony to have been committed receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon... Three conditions must unite to render one an accessory after the fact: (1) The felony must he complete. (2) The accessory must have knowledge that the principal committed the felony. (3) The accessory must harbor or assist the principal felon .... (Emphasis added).
By raising a reasonable doubt concerning any one of these three elements, an accused can successfully defend against the charge of accessory after the fact.
*272In State v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 S. E. 937 (1898) this Court stated that the principal felon need not be convicted in order to indict, convict, and punish the accessory after the fact. See also, S. C. Code Ann. § 17-21-60 (1976). However, we clarified that statement in State v. Massey, supra.
That the jury in the trial of the accessory must find as a fact that the principal did actually commit the crime involved is a rule that remains as valid and unchanged as before____This rule affords the accused accessory the necessary degree of protection.
Although the majority ostensibly concedes that Massey requires the jury to find that Randy actually murdered the victim, nevertheless, in effect, it ignores the Massey requirement. Before appellant could be convicted of accessory after the fact of murder, I would require that the State prove a murder. Likewise, the defendant should then be provided the opportunity to negate the fact of murder since murder is an element of the crime with which she is charged. In State v. Lyle, 125 S. C. 406, 118 S. E. 803, 814 (1923), this Court held that a trial court has no discretionary power to exclude competent evidence that is not merely cumulative and offered to prove a material element of a party’s defense. “And where there is'serious doubt as to the admissibility of evidence, the doubt should always be resolved in defendant’s favor.” 118 S. E. at 814. Therefore, I believe the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding the psychiatrist’s testimony.
This Court has never addressed the defense of unconsciousness. However, the weight of authority recognizes that a person cannot be held criminally responsible for acts committed while he or she is unconscious. 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law § 55 (1961). The North Carolina Supreme Court recognizes unconsciousness as a complete defense to a criminal charge. State v. Caddell, 287 N. C. 266, 215 S. E. (2d) 348 (1975). I would hold that unconsciousness is a defense to a criminal charge under the law of this State. The majority holds that Randy’s epileptic state would not be a valid defense to murder because “ ‘insanity’... voluntarily brought on by defendant should not constitute excuse for his after conduct...” State v. Coyle, cited by the majority as authority for that analysis, is not dispositive of the facts before us. Although Randy and the victim *273were involved in a childish altercation when the victim struck him on the head, his resulting epileptic seizure cannot be compared to temporary insanity elicited by the passions of an argument. Coyle addressed the latter situation. In addition, the majority states Randy’s capacity to commit murder merely relates to the degree of culpability and to his intent. Intent, however, is the heart of murder, defined as “the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied.” S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (1976). Malice consists “of the intentional doing of a wrongful act toward another without legal justification or excuse.” (Emphasis added). State v. Heyward, 197 S. C. 371, 375, 15 S. E. (2d) 669, 671 (1941). Therefore, I believe the majority errs by dismissing the principal felon’s unconscious state as merely relating to his intent.
During cross-examination appellant’s counsel asked the alleged principal felon, “Did you have a seizure?” The trial court sustained the State’s objection that the witness was not a doctor and stated that the question was “self-serving.” Appellant’s counsel was obviously having a hard time communicating with the twelve-year old witness; when he asked the young witness if he knew what “conscious” meant, he nodded negatively. However, when he asked the witness if he knew what “seizure” meant, he responded affirmatively. I believe that under the circumstances, appellant’s counsel should have been allowed to cross-examine Randy about whether he had suffered a seizure at the time he apparently killed the deceased. The right of cross-examination is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation and helps assure the accuracy of the truth-determining process. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. (2d) 297 (1973). The cross-examiner is permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory. David v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. (2d) 347 (1974). By limiting appellant’s cross-examination of the State’s primary witness, the trial court prevented appellant from asserting her defense that there had been no murder.
Finally, appellant asserts the following jury charge was misleading:
When you have weighed all of the testimony produced by the State and on behalf of the Defendant, Frances Price, and then have applied the law as I charged it to you you *274are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knew Randy Price had murdered Trade Whiteside or caused her death and knowing these facts she sheltered, gave aid or in some way assisted Randy Price, it will be your duty to find the Defendant, Frances Price, guilty of being an accessory after the fact____(Emphasis added).
An accessory after the fact of murder must have knowledge that the principal committed a murder, not merely that the principal caused the death. It was uncontested that Randy had caused the victim’s death. I agree that the charge was misleading.
Accordingly, I would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.