Court Opinion

ID: 9819129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:46.205236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:10.875012
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring: I agree that the circuit court properly adjudicated Faith B. and Stephen B. neglected minors. I also agree that the appellate court had jurisdiction to review the permanency goal set by the circuit court in this case and that, as a result, remand is necessary. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s rationale for finding the permanency goal reviewable. As the majority acknowledges, dispositional orders have long been deemed final and appealable as of right, despite the fact that they are subject to modification. See In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43-44 (2005). However, permanency orders, i.e., orders issued after a permanency hearing held pursuant to section 2 — 28 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 — 28 (West 2000)), are generally interlocutory, and thus appealable only at the discretion of the appellate court. See In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53 (2002). In the case at bar, respondent, Perseta D., did not appeal from a “permanency order.” Rather, she sought review of the appropriateness of a permanency goal, which was set at the dispositional hearing and made a part of a dispositional order. For this reason, the appellate court’s reliance on In re Curtis B. to find that the permanency goal is not appealable is misplaced. The majority of this court does not directly address the applicability of In re Curtis B. Instead, the majority holds that, here, the permanency goal is appealable, but only because of the “somewhat unusual circumstances of this case.” 216 Ill. 2d at 16. In my view, the majority’s holding is too narrow. I would hold that permanency goals are appealable as of right when they are part of the dispositional order, which is an appealable order. The permanency goal selected at the dispositional hearing is an intrinsic part of the dispositional order. Pursuant to section 2 — 21(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 — 21(2) (West 2002)), once a court determines a minor to be abused, neglected or dependent, “the court shall then set a time not later than 30 days after the entry of the finding for a dispositional hearing.” At the dispositional hearing, the court must determine, in accord with the requirements set forth in section 2 — 22 of the Act, whether it is in the best interests of the minor(s) and the public that the minor(s) be made wards of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2 — 22(1) (West 2002). In addition, the court must decide “the proper disposition best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor[s] and the public” and consider “the permanency goal set for the minor[s], the nature of the service plan for the minor[s] and the services delivered and to be delivered under the plan,” as required by section 2 — 22(1) (705 ILCS 405/2 — 22(1) (West 2002)). Section 2 — 23(l)(a) of the Act identifies the various types of dispositional orders that may be issued. In accord with this section, “[a] minor under 18 years of age found to be neglected or abused under Section 2 — 3 *** may be *** (2) placed in accordance with Section 2 — 27 [705 ILCS 405/2 — 27 (West 2002)].” 705 ILCS 405/2— 23(l)(a)(2) (West 2002). Section 2 — 27(a—5) provides that the court may: “with the approval of the Department of Children and Family Services, place the minor in the subsidized guardianship of a suitable relative or other person as legal guardian; ‘subsidized guardianship’ means a private guardianship arrangement for children for whom the permanency goals of return home and adoption have been ruled out and who meet the qualifications for subsidized guardianship as defined by the Department of Children and Family Services in administrative rules[.]” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 — 27(l)(a—5) (West 2002). In addition, section 2 — 23 of the Act provides in subsection (3) that the dispositional order may also include “any other orders necessary to fulfill the service plan” and states: “If the court concludes that the Department of Children and Family Services has abused its discretion in setting the current service plan or permanency goal for the minor, the court shall enter specific findings in writing based on the evidence and shall enter an order for the Department to develop and implement a new permanency goal and service plan consistent with the court’s findings. The new service plan shall be filed with the court and served on all parties. The court shall continue the matter until the new service plan is filed.” 705 ILCS 405/2 — 23(3) (West 2002). I conclude from the statutory procedures outlined above that the setting of the permanency goal is an intrinsic part of the dispositional hearing and, thus, appealable as part of the dispositional order. In the case at bar, the circuit court, in accord with section 2 — 23(3), found that the permanency goal of returning the minors to the custody and care of their mother was not appropriate in light of the fact that the mother had refused to acknowledge her own mental illness and adamantly refused to seek treatment or take medication prescribed for her. The court held that “guardianship would be the appropriate goal,” ordered DCFS to set the permanency goal to guardianship, and ordered DCFS to develop a client service plan consistent with the guardianship goal. The court also ordered that the mother be allowed visitation with the minors. The record before this court contains the four-page dispositional order, which provides a written record of the court’s rulings at the dispositional hearing. The dispositional order is a preprinted form on which the court has indicated its findings and orders by checking the appropriate boxes and filling in the blanks provided. Paragraph (i) of the order provides the court with the choice of finding the permanency goal “appropriate” or “not appropriate.” (Emphasis in original.) If “not appropriate” is selected, the court must give its reasons on the blank lines provided on the form. In the case at bar, the court found that the permanency goal was “not” appropriate “because it should be set at guardianship because of the mother’s mental health.” As a result of the circuit court’s findings, including its determination that the permanency goals of return home and adoption should be ruled out, the court ordered that the minors be made wards of the court and placed in the custody and guardianship of their maternal aunts. See 705 ILCS 405/2 — 27 (West 2002). It is from this dispositional order that Perseta D. appeals. Because the court’s determination concerning the appropriate permanency goal was an intrinsic part of its dispositional order, there is no reason why Perseta D. should not be allowed to challenge the court’s determination as to the permanency goal. The fact that Perseta’s main objection is to the court’s selection of the permanency goal does not change this result. I note that, pursuant to section 2 — 23(3) of the Act, visitation orders, like orders directing DCFS to set a new permanency goal, may be made a part of the dispositional order. Courts have typically allowed appeals from dispositional orders when the only objection has been to the visitation order contained therein. See In re D.S., 307 Ill. App. 3d 362 (1999); In re Beatriz S., 267 Ill. App. 3d 496 (1994). I see no reason, therefore, to foreclose an appeal from a dispositional order because the objection is to the permanency goal portion of the order.