Court Opinion

ID: 9715301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:59:39.677329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:33.330123
License: Public Domain

*235Justice LaVECCHIA,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that attorneys subject themselves to the requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692 to 1692o (FDCPA), on the filing of a complaint in a summary dispossess action. Because our summary dispossess action is not and never was an action to collect a debt, attorneys do not become “debt collectors” by filing summary dispossess actions, no matter how regularly they engage in such practice.
New Jersey’s “summary dispossess statute originated in 1847 ... to give the landlord a quick remedy for possession.” Vineland Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 462, 173 A.2d 270 (1961). This Court previously has stated that “[t]he only remedy that can be granted in a summary-dispossess proceeding is possession; no money damages may be awarded.” Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 280, 639 A.2d 286 (1994). The judgment of possession “is nothing more than a legal sanction for the issuance of a warrant which acts as a legal justification for ... removing the tenant from and putting the landlord into possession of the premises.” Galka v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 137, 140, 30 A.2d 881 (Ch.1943). The current court rules reflect the limited remedy available in a summary-dispossess action and bar litigants from joining any additional claims. B. 6:3-4. Thus, if a lawyer properly pleads a summary dispossess action, that lawyer is not engaged in the collection of a debt because the only remedy available is possession, not money damages.
Although I reject the majority’s premise that New Jersey attorneys who regularly file summary dispossess actions are “debt collectors” subject to FDCPA penalties and conditions, I applaud the Court’s determination henceforth to require that the verified complaint in a summary dispossess action shall “expressly and conspicuously” identify precisely “the amount [of rent] the tenant is required to remit to avoid eviction.” Ante at 232, 915 A.2d at 13. That added protection improves summary dispossess practice *236and procedure. It will curb overreaching by landlords and lawyers who take advantage of uninformed tenants facing ejectment by alleging in the summary dispossess complaint an amount due that is in excess of what is allowed by law to be charged as “rent” and, therefore, is more than must be paid by the tenant to avoid eviction. I, however, would impose that improvement to our summary dispossess process pursuant to this Court’s general supervisory interest and constitutional responsibility for fairness in the practice and procedure in our courts, see N.J. Const, art. VI, § 2, ¶3, rather than basing it on some perceived impetus from the FDCPA. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the judgment of the majority in this matter.
Justice RIVERA-SOTO joins in this opinion.
For affirmance and remandment — Justices LONG, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE-4.
Concurring in part; dissenting in part — Justices LaVECCHIA and RIVERA-SOTO — 2.