Court Opinion

ID: 9642986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:14:27.816555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:55.694101
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I am convinced the six-month notice provision of the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act1 (now repealed) violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,2 and Article 1, Section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,3 I dissent.
“The equal protection clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ F.S. Roy*150ster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed.2d 989 (1920).”
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).
“In determining whether or not a State law violates the equal protection clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the state claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).”
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969).
In this case, I agree that the standard of review applied by the majority in examining the challenged statute is the correct one. Appellee, James, suffered serious personal injuries when allegedly, he fell while descending steps leading to public transportation. He claims his fall and injuries were caused by the tortious conduct of appellant, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). Appellee has an important interest4 in seeking redress, in the courts, for his injuries. The Act in question (66 P.S. § 2036) erects a special impediment to appellee’s access to the courts. The impediment is grounded wholly on the status of the alleged tort-feasor as a transportation authority. Viewing it from the claimant’s side, the Act burdens appellee’s right to sue for damages based upon his classification as a claimant against SEPTA.
The arbitrary provisions of the Act (66 P.S. § 2036) have the effect of dividing all tort-feasors into classes: (1) private tort-feasors to whom no notice of claim is owed, and (2) governmental-authority tort-feasors to whom notice of claim is owed. Likewise, injured claimants are divided into classes: (1) claimants injured by a private tort-feasor who *151are not required to give notice within six months,5 and (2) claimants injured by a governmental-authority tort-feasor who must give notice within six months. See: Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 598, 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973); Reich v. State Highway Dept., 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
The purpose of the diverse treatment mandated by the notice of claim provisions has been stated to be:
[T]o provide the [governmentalj-defendant with the opportunity to make timely investigation and avoid the difficulty of defending against stale and fraudulent claims.
Dubin v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 219 Pa.Super. 476, 281 A.2d 711 (1971). Other reasons have been put forth for the statutory notice requirement:
“... (2) to discourage unfounded claims; (3) to facilitate prompt settlement; and (4) to allow the municipality to make the necessary reserve in the annual budget.”
O’Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W.Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977). Additionally, it is said that the relatively short notice period allows for quick repairs, thus avoiding further injuries. See: Hunter v. North Mason School District, 85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
The arbitrary division of tort-feasors into governmental-tort-feasors and private tort-feasors, and the classification of claimants as those with claims against a governmental-tort-feasor and those with claims against a private tort-feasor is unrelated to any recognized purpose of the Act. All of the reasons advanced for the notice requirement are in no way peculiar to a governmental-tort-feasor. Each of the stated reasons has equal vitality when related to private tort-feasors.6 There is no rational, substantial basis for *152burdening a victim injured by a governmental-tort-feasor with a special notice requirement which does not apply to one injured by a private tort-feasor.
As did the Supreme Courts of Michigan,7 Nevada,8 Washington,9 and West Virginia10 in considering notice of claim statutes in their states, I would hold the notice provision of 66 P.S. § 2036 violative of constitutional equal protection guarantees and affirm the order of the Superior Court.
I dissent.

. Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 984 § 36; 66 P.S. § 2036 (repealed by the Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53 § 2(a) (1371).

. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphasis supplied)

. "Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.”

. "It is fundamental to our common law system that one may seek redress for every substantial wrong.” Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).

. In this class an injured victim has the full period allowed by the Statute of Limitations to bring an action, unencumbered by any notice requirement.

. Most governmental agencies and authorities “possess special investigative resources which make them in most instances better equipped *152to investigate and defend negligence suits than most private tort-feasors, for whom no special notice privileges are provided by law." Hunter v. North Mason School District, 85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). Further, the desirable effects of discouraging unfounded claims, facilitating prompt settlements, encouraging speedy repairs and budgeting reserves are no less important to private tort-feasors. Id.

. Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).

. Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 598, 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973).

. Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).

. O’Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W.Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).