Court Opinion

ID: 9961502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 21:07:36.923664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:50.085014
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion 30
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                STEPHEN SISOLAK, GOVERNOR OF                               No. 83999
                NEVADA; AARON D. FORD,
                ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEVADA;
                GEORGE TOGLIATTI, DIRECTOR OF
                THE NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
                PUBLIC SAFETY; AND MINDY                             „.                    FO)
                MCKAY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
                RECORDS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND                                   APR 18 20
                COMPLIANCE DIVISION OF THE
                                                                            ELI
                NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC                               CLE                      RT

                SAFETY,                                                   BY
                                                                                IEF DEPUTY CLERK
                Appellants,
                vs.
                POLYMER80, INC.,
                Respondent.

                            Appeal from a district court order declaring unconstitutional
                and granting a permanent injunction against the enforcement of several
                statutes regulating unfinished firearms.'    Third Judicial District Court,
                Lyon County; John Schlegelmilch, Judge.
                            Reversed.

                Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Steven G. Shevorski, Chief Litigation
                Counsel, and Kiel B. Ireland, Deputy Solicitor General, Carson City,
                for Appellants.

                      1The clerk of the court shall amend the caption on this court's docket
                so that it is consistent with the caption appearing on this opinion.
SUPREME COURT
      OF
     NEVADA
                                                                               241-
(0) IQ47A

     •
                Simons Hall Johnston PC and Brad M. Johnston, Yerington,
                for Respondent.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

                                                 OPINION

                By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
                            This appeal involves a facial challenge to the constitutionality
                of several statutes regulating so-called "ghost guns."           Except for
                transactions between firearms importers and manufacturers and where
                imprinted with a serial number, NRS 202.3625 generally criminalizes the
                sale or transfer of an unfinished firearm frame or receiver, and NRS
                202.363(1) generally criminalizes the possession, purchase, transport, or
                receipt of an unfinished frame or receiver. Respondent argues that the
                definition of "unfinished frame      or   receiver" in NRS 202.253(9) is
                impermissibly vague, rendering it, NRS 202.3625, and NRS 202.363(1)
                unconstitutional.   The district court agreed and concluded that the
                definition did not explain key terms or notify ordinary individuals precisely
                when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The
                district court also concluded that the definition enabled arbitrary and
                discriminatory enforcement.
                            We disagree and reverse. The terms used to define "unfinished
                frame or receiver" have ordinary meanings that provide sufficient notice of
                what the statutes proscribe, such that it cannot be said that vagueness
                pervades their texts. We further conclude that the statutes are general
                intent statutes that do not lack a scienter requirement and do not pose a

SUPREME COURT
         OF
     NEVADA
                                                     2
(0) I 947A

                                                                           -
                risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The district court thus

                erred in declaring that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague and
                enjoining thern.
                                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            The federal Gun Control Act (GCA) and its amendments

                regulate the possession, manufacture, sale, and transfer of "firearms." See
                18 U.S.C. §§ 921-934. The GCA requires gun manufacturers, importers,

                and dealers to obtain a federal firearms license. Id. §§ 922(a)(1), 923(a).
                Licensed entities are called federal firearms licensees. Federal firearms
                licensees are required to serialize each firearm, run a background check
                before selling a firearm, and record each transaction. Id. §§ 922(c), (t)(1),
                923(g), (i). A firearm is defined, in relevant part, as "any weapon (including
                a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to

                expel a projectile by the action of an explosive" or "the frame or receiver of
                any such weapon." Id. § 921(a)(3).
                            In 2021, Nevada legislators put forward a bill, A.B. 286, to
                regulate firearm components that are not imprinted with a serial number.
                Assernblyperson Sandra Jauregui—a sponsor of A.B. 286-spoke on the
                purpose of the bill.   She said that it "deals with the rising epidemic of
                unmarked, untraceable guns known as 'ghost guns.' She explained that
                "[g]host   guns are    growing in popularity because they circumvent
                background checks and are untraceable" and that they are "types of guns
                [that] are manufactured in homes and also sold online as kits that are often
                easily assembled." An advocate testified to the Legislature that ghost guns
                evade regulation under the GCA as they "exploit[ ] a loophole in the way the
                federal government regulates firearms" because companies that sell ghost
                guns "sell a frame or receiver that has not quite been fully manufactured
                [often referred to as 80% receiver or frame} and, as a result, the federal
SUPREME COURT
        OF

     NEVADA
                                                      3
(0) I947A
                                government does not classify it as a firearm." As such, "it is not required to

                                be serialized and not subject to any form of background check under the
                                federal guidelines." Another advocate testified that respondent Polymer80
                                sold "a 'Buy, Build, Shoot' kit" that contained every piece needed to
                                assemble a firearm within 20 to 40 minutes using simple hand tools.
                                            A representative for the National Shooting Sports Foundation,
                                Inc., however, raised vagueness concerns, arguing that "[Ander this bill,
                                there is not a clear definition of when that frame or receiver becomes a
                                firearm. . . . At what point would a manufacturer or retailer need to comply
                                with or treat that hunk of metal as a firearm?"
                                            The Legislature ultimately passed the bill, and then-Governor
                                Stephen Sisolak approved A.B. 286 on June 7, 2021. See 2021 Nev. Stat.,
                                ch. 496, at 3222.   A.B. 286 amended NRS Chapter 202 to "prohibit [] a
                                person from engaging in certain acts relating to unfinished frames or
                                receivers under certain circumstances" and proscribe "certain acts relating
                                to firearms which are not imprinted with a serial number." Id. Pointedly,
                                A.B. 286 enacted NRS 202.253(9), NRS 202.3625, and NRS 202.363. NRS
                                202.253(9) defines "unfinished frame or receiver":
                                            "Unfinished frame or receiver" means a blank, a
                                            casting or a machined body that is intended to be
                                            turned into the frame or lower receiver of a firearm
                                            with additional machining and which has been
                                            formed or machined to the point at which most of
                                            the major machining operations have been
                                            completed to turn the blank, casting or machined
                                            body into a frame or lower receiver of a firearm even
                                            if the fire-control cavity area of the blank, casting
                                            or machined body is still completely solid and
                                            unmachined.

SUPREME COURT
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                                      4
(0) 1.947A    0005

                     `7r1   .
                     NRS 202.3625 provides

                                     1. A person shall not sell, offer to sell or
                               transfer an unfinished frame or receiver unless:
                                     (a) The person is:
                                         (1) A       firearms      importer      or
                               manufacturer; and
                                         (2) The recipient of the unfinished
                               frame or receiver is a firearms importer or
                               manufacturer; or
                                     (b) The unfinished frame or receiver is
                               required by federal law to be imprinted with a
                               serial number issued by an importer or
                               manufacturer and the unfinished frame or receiver
                               has been imprinted with the serial number.
                                     2. A person who violates this section:
                                    (a) For the first offense, is guilty of a gross
                               misdemeanor; and
                                     (b) For the second or any subsequent offense,
                               is guilty of a category D felony and shall be
                               punished as provided in NRS 193.130.
                     And NRS 202.363 provides
                                     1. A person shall not possess, purchase,
                               transport or receive an unfinished frame or receiver
                               unless:
                                   (a) The person is a firearms importer or
                               manufacturer; or
                                     (b) The unfinished frame or receiver is
                               required by federal law to be imprinted with a
                               serial number issued by a firearms importer or
                               manufacturer and the unfinished frame or receiver
                               has been imprinted with the serial number.
                                     2. A person who violates this section:
                                    (a) For the first offense, is guilty of a gross
                               misdemeanor; and

SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVAOA
                                                          5
(0) 1947A    elpy'
                                         (b) For the second or any subsequent offense,
                                   is guilty of a category D felony and shall be
                                   punished as provided in NRS 193.130.
                                   Polymer80 is a Nevada corporation that manufactures gun-
                       related products and afterrnarket accessories. It sells gun-related kits "that
                       provide ways for [its] customer[s] to participate in the build process."
                       Polymer80 argued that these newly enacted statutes are unconstitutionally
                       vague and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against appellants
                       Sisolak; Aaron Ford, Attorney General of Nevada; George Togliatti, Director
                       of Nevada Department of Public Safety; and Mindy McKay, then-
                       Administrator of the Records, Communications, and Compliance Division of
                       the Nevada Department of Public Safety (collectively Sisolak).             After
                       discovery, Polymer%) and Sisolak filed cross-motions for summary
                       judgment.    Polymer%) argued that (1) NRS 202.253(9)'s definition of
                       unfinished frame or receiver is vague because it does not define what a
                       finished frame or receiver is; (2) the statute's definition of unfinished frame
                       or receiver does not define "blank," "casting," or "machined body"; and (3)
                       the definition does not clarify precisely when raw material becomes an
                       unfinished frame or receiver. The district court granted summary judgment
                       in Polymer80's favor, entered a declaratory judgment that the statutes are
                       unconstitutionally vague, and issued a permanent injunction barring
                       enforcement of NRS 202.3625 and NRS 202.363. Sisolak appeals.
                                                      DISCUSSION
                                   Sisolak   argues    that   the   challenged   statutes   are    not
                       unconstitutionally vague and provide fair notice of what is prohibited. He
                       argues that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" uses terms
                       commonly understood in the industry and that have ordinary dictionary
                       definitions. Polymer80 maintains, as it did below, that several material

SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                              6
(0) 194TA    •t.   •

                         •
                terms   in   NRS    202.253(9)   have       uncertain   definitions,   specifically
                highlighting that "blank," "casting," and "machined body" are not defined

                by statute and that "unfinished frame or receiver" also does not define what
                a "finished" frame or receiver is.
                             We review de novo whether a statute is constitutional and
                presume that it is valid. Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 292,
                129 P.3d 682, 684 (2006).     A statute is unconstitutionally vague if the
                statute either (1) "fails to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of
                ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited" or (2) "lacks
                specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to
                prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Gallegos v. State, 123
                Nev. 289, 293, 163 P.3d 456, 458 (2007). Vagueness on either basis will
                invalidate a statute. State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 482 n.1, 245 P.3d
                550, 553 n.1 (2010). In reviewing a criminal statute, we examine whether
                "vagueness so permeates the text that the statute cannot meet these
                requirements in most applications." Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v.

                Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 513, 217 P.3d 546, 554 (2009). Accordingly, "this
                standard provides for the possibility that some applications of the law would
                not be void, but the statute would still be invalid if void in most
                circumstances." Id.
                Ordinary meaning in context and trade usage provides sufficient clarity
                             The terrns challenged here may be ascertained with sufficient
                specificity by consulting their ordinary meanings in context. "[W]here the
                Legislature does not define each term it uses in a statute, the statute will
                not be deemed unconstitutional if the term has a well-settled and ordinarily
                understood meaning." Collins u. State, 125 Nev. 60, 63, 203 P.3d 90, 92
                (2009). "When a word has more than one plain and ordinary meaning, the
                context and structure inform which of those meanings applies," Lofthouse
SUPREME COURT
         OF
     NEVADA
                                                        7
(0) I.947A
                u. State, 136 Nev, 378, 380, 467 P.3d 609, 611 (2020), and we interpret
                statutes "in light of the policy and spirit of the law," Flamingo Paradise, 125

                Nev. at 509, 217 P.3d at 551. "[V] agueness analysis does not treat statutory
                text as a closed universe." Castaneda, 126 Nev. at 483, 245 P.3d at 553. As

                a result, "[e]nough clarity to defeat a vagueness challenge may be supplied
                by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute." Id. (internal quotation
                marks omitted).

                             Where a statute targets a group engaging with a specifically
                regulated subject, resources specific to that subject rnay provide additional
                guidance. See Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffrnan Ests., Inc., 455
                U.S. 489, 501 & n.18 (1982) (consulting and finding accord between ordinary
                and specialized dictionaries in examining vagueness of an ordinance
                regulating drug paraphernalia from the perspective of a "business person of
                ordinary intelligence" and concluding that "roach clip" was a "technical term
                [that] has sufficiently clear meaning in the drug paraphernalia industry");
                Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926) (recognizing that
                statutes generally have been upheld "as sufficiently certain" when "they
                employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning,
                well enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply
                thern").2   In such instances, trade reference materials such as specialized

                      2And though we do not deal here with statutes solely regulating a
                particular industry, where parties practice within a regulated industry,
                trade usage has particular salience. For instance, parties who "were
                knowledgeable in the wastewater field" were charged with being able to
                understand Environmental Protection Agency regulations restricting the
                discharge of effluent into navigable water. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35
                F.3d 1275, 1286-87, 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, technical language in
                the Commodity Futures Trading Act regulating cornmodity options was not
                unconstitutionally vague where members of the regulated group held

SUPREME COURT
          OF
       NEVADA
                                                      8
( 0 ) 1947 A
                dictionaries and industry association publications may be consulted to
                ascertain a term's meaning.     See Flipside, 455 U.S. at 501 n.18; United

                States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering a definition
                from a chemical manufacturer trade association, among others, in

                concluding that a regulation of a particular type of chemical waste was not
                vague).
                            As vagueness analyses do not treat a statute as a closed

                universe, at the outset let us consider what the criminal statutes at issue
                aim to cover. It is common knowledge that firearms are heavily regulated
                objects, and existing law provides notice that the mere possession of
                firearms that do not comply with the applicable regulations constitutes a
                crime.    See 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (enumerating prohibited acts involving
                firearms). The statutes here only regulate conduct involving an object that
                is intended to ultimately become a firearrn.      See NRS 202.253(9); NRS
                202.3625; NRS 202.363. They prohibit acts involving such not-yet-complete
                firearms that have not been imprinted with a serial number.               NRS
                202.3625(1)(b); NRS 202.363(1). But the object must be intended to become
                a firearm. Should it become so and lack an imprinted serial number so as
                to fall within the scope of the criminal sanctions here, existing law already

                specialized expertise and thoroughly knew what was prohibited, Precious
                Metals Assocs., Inc. v. CFTC, 620 F.2d 900, 907-08 (1st Cir. 1980), just as
                "fish trap" is not vague most critically because it has a definite meaning
                within the fishing industry, Se. Fisheries Ass'n v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 453 So.
                2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1984) (concluding as well that an ordinary person may
                grasp the meaning of the terrn), and "tidal marshlands" is not vague when
                considering the commercial knowledge of a company that dredges sand and
                gravel, Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor, 293 A.2d 241, 252 (Md.
                1972). See also Silverwing Deu. v. Nev. State Contractors Bd., 136 Nev. 642,
                645-46, 476 P.3d 461, 464-65 (2020) (recognizing authorities giving terms
                in a statute their trade meaning when the common meaning does not apply).
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                      9
(0) I947A
                subjects the possessor of such a firearm to criminal liability. 26 U.S.C.
                § 5842(b) (requiring a serial number), § 5861(i) (providing that receipt or
                possession of firearm lacking a serial number is a crime). Further, the act
                of converting the uncompleted firearm into a firearm is also a crime unless
                one complies with federal restrictions as to the manufacture of a firearm.
                26 U.S.C. § 5861(0 (criminalizing acts "to make a firearm in violation of the
                provisions of this chapter"). In recognizing that statutes need not provide
                mathematical precision and that "the practical necessities of discharging
                the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which
                legislators can spell out prohibitions," the United States Supreme Court has
                explained that it is not "unfair to require that one who deliberately goes
                perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he
                may cross the line." Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340
                (1952). Here, one cannot dance up to the line of criminality and then plead
                ignorance of terms commonly known in the regulated subject.
                An "unfinished frame or receiver"
                            With that in mind, we return to the text.       To recall, NRS
                202.253(9) defines an "unfinished frame or receiver" as
                            a blank, a casting or a machined body that is
                            intended to be turned into the frame or lower
                            receiver of a firearm with additional machining and
                            which has been formed or machined to the point at
                            which most of the major machining operations have
                            been completed to turn the blank, casting or
                            machined body into a frame or lower receiver of a
                            firearm even if the fire-control cavity area of the
                            blank, casting or machined body is still completely
                            solid and unmachined.

SUPREME COURT

        OF
     NEVADA
                                                     10
101 1947A
                The district court had three bases for declaring NRS 202.3625 and NRS
                202.363 unconstitutionally vague: (1) NRS 202.253(9) does not specifically
                define blank, casting, machined body, frame or lower receiver, major
                machining operations, and fire-control cavity area; (2) the definition does
                not make clear precisely when a raw material becomes a prohibited

                unfinished frame or receiver; and (3) NRS 202.3625 and NRS 202.363 lack
                a scienter requirement. We conclude, however, that the meanings of the

                terms contested here are readily ascertainable, and their meanings resolve
                the district court's second and third reservations.
                A "blank," a "casting," or a "rnachined body"
                             Dictionary definitions supply meaning to each of the terms of
                the first component of NRS 202.253(9) based on the context of statutes
                aiming to regulate firearm components designed to be firearms with
                additional manufacturing.        A "blank" is "a roughly cut metal... block
                intended for further shaping or finishing."          Blank, The New Oxford
                Dictionary of English (3d ed. 2010).         A "casting" is "an object made by
                shaping molten metal or other material in a mould." Casting, The New
                Oxford Dictionary of English. And a "machined body" is "a material object"
                that has been "ma[d]e or operate[d] on with a machine." Body, Machine,
                The New Oxford Dictionary of English.          Industry definitions accord and
                similarly encompass a generic object.        See, e.g., Casting, Glossary of the
                Association of Firearm & Tool Mark Examiners (6th ed. 2021) (defining
                (( casting" as "the process of
                                                 pouring a liquid or suspension into a mold to
                produce an object of desired shape"); Glossary, Sporting Arms and
                Ammunition Manufacturers' Institute, http s://saami.org/saami- glossary/
                ?letter=C (last visited Feb. 28, 2024) (defining "casting" as "Nile act of
                forming an object, such as a bullet, by pouring molten material into a
                mold"). Moreover, the terms "blank," "casting," and "machined body" are
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                        11
(0) 1947A
                used in describing firearm components in guidance provided for these
                specific products. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
                (ATF), Are "80%" or "unfinished" receivers illegal?, https://www.atf.gov/
                firearms/qa/are-"80"-or-"unfinished"-receivers-illegal (last visited Feb. 28,
                2024) ("ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, 'castings' or
                'machined bodies' in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid
                and un-machined have not reached the 'stage of manufacture' which would
                result in the classification of a firearm according to the GCA." (emphasis
                added)).    And Polymer80's counsel's letters to the ATF use "blank,"
                "casting," and "machined" in reference to its own products, showing that
                these terms are commonly understood.
                             That the terms "blank," "casting," and "machined body" are
                generic and broad does not render them vague; rather, it requires
                interpreting them in context with the modifying clause, namely that they
                are "intended to be turned into the frame or lower receiver of a firearm." Cf.
                Blackburn v. State, 129 Nev. 92, 97, 294 P.3d 422, 426 (2013) ("A statute
                cannot be dissected into individual words, each one being thrown onto the
                anvil of dialectics to be hammered into a meaning which has no association
                with the words from which it has violently been separated." (internal
                quotation marks omitted)).     The definition of an "unfinished frame or
                receiver" thus encompasses a wide range of materials intended to ultimately
                be firearms where other elements are also met, as we will revisit in
                discussing the mens rea the State must show.
                The "frame or lower receiver of a firearm"
                            We next turn to the meaning of "frame or lower receiver of a
                firearm."   These terms likewise may be understood by their ordinary
                meanings, which accord with and are given greater specificity by the
                firearms industry. A "frame" is "the basic unit of a handgun which serves
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                     12
(0) 1947A

                •i;
                as a mounting for the barrel and operating parts of the arm." Frame,
                Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002); see also Frame,
                Glossary of the Association of Firearm & Tool Mark Examiners (defining
                "frame" as lib revolvers, pistols, and break-open guns, the basic unit of a
                firearm which houses the firing and breech mechanism and to which the
                barrel and grips are attached"). And a "receiver" is "the metal frame in
                which the action of a firearm is fitted and to which the breech end of the
                barrel is attached" or "the rnain body of the lock in a breech mechanism."
                Receiver, Webster's Third New International Dictionary. Industry groups
                also accord with these ordinary meanings and tend to describe the frarne
                and receiver in relation to each other.        See Receiver, Glossary of the
                Association of Firearm & Tool Mark Examiners (defining "Receiver" as "the
                basic unit of a firearm which houses the firing and breech mechanism and
                to which the barrel and stock are assembled. In revolvers, pistols, and
                break-open guns, it is called the Frame"); Receiver, Glossary, Sporting Arrns
                and   Ammunition      Manufacturers'      Institute,   https://saami.org/saami-
                glossary/?letter=R (last visited Feb. 28, 2024) (same). This understanding
                aligns with a definition that Polymer80's own counsel used and described
                as "ordinary nomenclature" in a letter to the ATF. Indeed, even the district
                court judge remarked at a temporary-restraining-order hearing that "frame
                or lower receiver" were not vague but were instead "common terms in
                relation to firearms." As such, we conclude that this language is not vague.
                "Mo.st of the major machining operations"
                            The next component of NRS 202.253(9) requires the State to
                show that "most of the major machining operations have been completed."
                Here too, dictionaries provide critical notice. "[M]ost" in this context means
                "the majority of'; that is, more than 50 percent. Most, The New Oxford
                Dictionary of English.     And "major machining operations" designates
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                     13
(0) L947A
                "greater or more important" "mak[ing] or operat[ing] on with a machine" in
                the process of "functioning or being active." Machine, Major, Operations,
                The New Oxford Dictionary of English.         Insofar as -greater or more
                important" manufacturing lacks definiteness, we          distinguish major
                operations from minor operations and interpret this term contextually to
                mean that "major" operations are those that pertain to the ultimate
                functioning of the object as a firearm—as distinct from "minor" operations

                that may be merely decorative or otherwise incidental to the object's
                operation as a firearm. See Castaneda, 126 Nev. at 483, 245 P.3d at 553
                (recognizing that a judicial gloss on an uncertain term may cure vagueness).
                And while the district court singled out both "machining" and "major
                machining operations" as lacking clarity, we construe them in the same
                sense and conclude that "machining" means "mak[ing] or operat[ing] on
                with a machine." See In re Nev. State Eng'r Ruling No. 5823, 128 Nev. 232,
                240, 277 P.3d 449, 454 (2012) (recognizing that "[t]he same words used twice
                in the same [statute] are presumed to have the same meaning" (quoting 2A
                Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
                § 46:6 (7th ed. rev. 2014))).
                             Whether a given operation constitutes a major machining
                operation should be determined by a district court based on the facts of each
                case.   See Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 102 & n.37 (9th Cir. 1953)
                (concluding that whether the cruelty or atrocity there at issue was
                "extreme" was not vague but a matter of degree and recognizing that it

                presented a question for resolution by the factfinder). In the context of a
                facial challenge, we are ill-situated to determine as a factual matter
                whether the work performed on a blank, casting, or machined body would
                constitute a major machining operation. Doing so may involve assessing

SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                     14
(0) I947A
                the condition of the object, the degree of its completion, the types of
                processes that have been performed to manipulate the object, and other
                factual circumstances.      That the statutes have not provided granular
                precision in this regard does not render them facially vague, and courts will
                be able to determine whether a given object falls within their scope in the
                ordinary course of factfinding. See Castanecia, 126 Nev. at 482, 245 P.3d at
                553 ("[M]athematical precision is not possible in drafting statutory
                language." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                             The district court here declared the statutes unconstitutional in
                part because "[t]he definition [of unfinished frame or receiver] does not tell
                anyone when during the manufacturing process a blank, casting, or
                machined body.... has gone through the 'major machining operations'
                (whatever those are) to turn that blank, casting, or machined body into a
                frame or lower receiver." This conclusion neglected to closely engage with
                the text of the statutes, particularly in light of the presumption that a
                statute is constitutional. That the meaning of the terms at issue appeared
                obscure to the district court when presented with hypotheticals does not
                render them vague.         Rather, it highlights the difficulty of analyzing
                vagueness when considering a facial challenge to the statutory definition of
                an object, and we conclude that Polymer80 has not shown vagueness in this
                regard. See Silvar v. Eighth th.tcl. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d 682,
                684 (2006) ("The challenger bears the burden of showing that a statute is
                unconstitutional."); cf. State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760, 767 n.12 (Fla. Dist.
                Ct. App. 1988) ("Most vagueness challenges concern laws which define
                conduct, not objects.").

SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                      15
(0) 1947A
"Tire-control cavity area"
                And lastly we clarify the meaning of "fire-control cavity area."
This term refers to "an empty space within a solid object" "allocated for a
specific use," which is to "regulate (a mechanical. . . process)," namely, to
"discharge a gun or other weapon in order to propel (a bullet or other
projectile)."    Area, Cavity, Control, Fire, The New Oxford Dictionary of
English. NRS 202.253(9) provides that an object may still constitute an
unfinished frame or receiver even if the fire-control cavity area is still solid
or unmachined. Notably, this forecloses a defense but does not present an
element that a potential prosecution must show. We conclude that ordinary
meanings of "fire-control cavity area" provide sufficient guidance to
interpret this terminology in context.
                In sum, the meaning of the terms used in NRS 202.253(9) are
readily ascertainable through their ordinary usage and understandings
common to the heavily regulated subject of firearms. A district court will
be well situated to determine whether a particular object constitutes an

unfinished frame or receiver in the course of performing its customary
functions.      On its own terms, the language of NRS 202.253(9) provides
sufficient notice, and vagueness does not permeate its text.3

      3Polymer80's   invocation of Gallegos does not compel a different
outcome. Gallegos held a statute using, without defining, "fugitive from
justice" to be unconstitutionally vague. 123 Nev. 289, 291, 163 P.3d 456,
457 (2007). Unlike here, Gallegos concluded that the challenged term
lacked an ordinary meaning and was subject to multiple definitions that
significantly differed. Id. at 295, 163 P.3d at 460. Nor is Polymer80's
argument that the statute is infirm for failing to define "finished frame or
receiver" persuasive. Not only is "finished" not used in the statutes, but the
term may be readily understood by the broader regulatory context—a
finished frame or receiver would be a completed frame or receiver, that is,
one subject to the GCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (defining "firearm").

                                        16
                      A defendant must know that the object is intended to be turned into a firearm
                      to be subject to potential criminal liability under NRS 202.3625 or NRS
                      202. 363
                                   Sisolak argues that the district court erred in concluding that
                      express scienter language was required. The district court concluded that
                      the offenses set forth in NRS 202.3625 and NRS 202.363 lack a scienter
                      requirement because the definition of an "unfinished frame or receiver" in
                      NRS 202.253(9) is silent as to scienter. The court stated that "the object
                      itself cannot transfer specific intent to the possessor of the item." In this,
                      we conclude that the district court erred.
                                  Nevada law requires each crime to involve the union of act and
                      intent. NRS 193.190. Though the statutes in question do not state mens
                      rea requirements, it does not necessarily follow that they exclude such
                      elements, as "mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of
                      criminal intent should not be read as dispensing with it." Elonis v. United
                      States, 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                      Notwithstanding certain exceptions, a "guilty mind" is necessary to
                      establish that a crime was committed, and courts generally construe
                      criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even
                      where the statute by its terms does not contain them."              Id. (internal
                      quotation marks omitted).

                                  While the definition of an "unfinished frame or receiver" refers
                      to an object intended to be turned into a frame or lower receiver of a firearm,
                      that definition does not state a crime. Instead, NRS 202.3625 and NRS
                      202.363 set forth the conduct that is criminalized here.           NRS 202.3625
                      generally bars the sale, offer to sell, or transfer of an unfinished frame or
                      receiver, and NRS 202.363 generally bars the possession, purchase,
                      transport, or receipt of the same. While the Legislature did not designate

SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NJ EVA DA
                                                                  17
(0) 1947A    ctliDp

                                                        •   f •        . A                 rryr,s1,i71-vp.dail
                                                                               ,   •-•
                     the necessary mental state, the statutes do not indicate that it intended to
                     require either strict liability or specific intent. Accordingly, we conclude
                     that NRS 202.3625 and NRS 202.363 are general intent statutes.           See
                     Busefink v. State, 128 Nev. 525, 535-36, 286 P.3d 599, 606-07 (2012)
                     (construing criminal statute as requiring general intent where it omitted
                     mention of mental state and provided adequate notice of what was
                     prohibited); Jenkins v. State, 110 Nev. 865, 870-71, 877 P.2d 1063, 1066-67

                     (1994) (concluding that statute criminalizing statutory sexual seduction
                     that omitted a mental-state term was a general intent crime); Glegola v.
                     State, 110 Nev. 344, 346-47, 871 P.2d 950, 952 (1994) (concluding that the
                     Legislature intended for two criminal statutes that did not mention mental

                    state to create general intent offenses where it omitted any language
                    indicating that specific intent was required).
                                 Where a criminal statute includes an element that an object be
                    intended for use in a particular way, the prosecution must show that a
                    defendant knew of the characteristics bringing the object within the scope
                    of the statute.    For example, the United States Supreme Court has
                    construed the phrase "intended for use" to "refer[ ] to a product's likely use
                    rather than to the defendant's state of mind" and noted that the phrase
                    should "be understood objectively and refers generally to an item's likely
                    use." Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 519, 521 (1994)
                    (construing a statute criminalizing the sale of drug paraphernalia); see also
                    id. at 522 (remarking that Congress's omission of language stating that the
                    product was "knowingly" intended to be so used did not establish a
                    legislative intent to eliminate the scienter requirement). And thus, to be
                    convicted of selling drug paraphernalia, a defendant must know the

                    proscribed characteristic of the paraphernalia, that is, that the objects

SUPREME COURT
      OF
   NEVADA
                                                         18
(0) 1947A

                •1, Y."                                        , :":7-17,57ki.'11141
                                                                   .:;
                would likely be used with illegal drugs. Id. at 524. Similarly, the Court has
                held that a conviction for mailing obscene materials required the
                prosecution to show that a defendant knew the characteristics of the
                contents of a mailed package—but not that they were obscene as a matter
                of law.   Harnling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-21 (1974).          More
                analogously, the Court overturned a conviction for criminal possession of an
                unregistered machinegun where the State showed that the defendant
                knowingly possessed the firearm but failed to show that the defendant knew
                that the firearm was capable of firing automatically so as to constitute a
                machinegun. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611-12, 620 (1994).
                            Applying these principles here bolsters our conclusion that the
                challenged statutes are not unconstitutionally vague due to the lack of an
                express scienter requirement. In prosecuting an offense pursuant to NRS
                202.3625 or NRS 202.363, the State must show that the defendant willfully
                sold, offered to sell, transferred, possessed, purchased, transported, or
                received an unfinished frame or receiver and that the defendant knew that
                the object at issue had the objective characteristics of being intended to be
                turned into a firearm.   Our discussion of specific factual characteristics
                showing the knowledge element is limited, given that the district court here
                conducted a facial rather than as-applied vagueness analysis. Accordingly,
                it did not enter findings as to specific characteristics of any challenged
                object. It is not our role to speculate about what facts future cases may
                present, and it suffices here to recognize that, once again, this knowledge
                element will require a factual determination in the district court and the
                statutes are not unconstitutionally vague on this basis.
                The statutes do not pose a risk of arbitrary enforcement
                            Sisolak argues that the challenged statutes provide sufficient
                guidance to alleviate any risk of arbitrary enforcernent.            Polymer80
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                     19
(0) 1947A

                                                       717,                            :.M:intAgtr711.4
                                                                           ' •   •
                  counters that the statutes lack meaningful standards and encourage
                  discriminatory enforcement. We agree with Sisolak.
                              A statute is impermissibly vague if it would "allow the police,
                  prosecutors, and juries to 'pursue their personal predilections.' Silvar, 122
                  Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 685 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358
                  (1983)).   We conclude that the definition of NRS 202.253(9) provides
                  sufficient notice of what is prohibited and the conduct proscribed in NRS
                  202.3625 and NRS 202,363 is sufficiently definite that these statutes do not
                  present a risk of arbitrary enforcernent. Whatever discretion they leave is
                  no greater than any other criminal statute.
                  The district court erred in granting summary judgment
                              In light of our deterrnination that NRS 202.253(9) is not
                  unconstitutionally vague, we conclude that the district court erred in
                  granting declaratory relief and abused its discretion issuing a permanent
                  injunction enjoining the enforcement of NRS 202.3625 and NRS 202.363.
                  See Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdiv., 129 Nev. 99, 108, 294 P.3d 427, 433
                  (2013) (reviewing the district court's decision to issue a permanent
                  injunction for abuse of discretion but reviewing purely legal issues de novo).
                                                 CONCLUSION
                              The district court erred in declaring that the definition of
                  "unfinished frame or receiver" in NRS 202.253(9) is unconstitutionally
                  vague and in enjoining the enforcement of NRS 202.3625 and NRS 202.363.
                  Given that the definition employs terms ascertainable by their ordinary
                  meanings and that align with trade and industry usage, we conclude it is
                  not vague. Further, we conclude the statutes are general intent statutes
                  and are sufficiently definite that they do not risk arbitrary or discriminatory

SUPREME COURT
      OF
    N EVADA
                                                        20
(0) 1947A oGrta
                enforcement. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Polymer80 on the
                basis of vagueness was not warranted. Given the foregoing, we reverse.

                                                         A4...5C4A-0
                                                   Stiglich

                We concur:

                                         , C.J.
                Cadish                                   Pickering

                Herndon                                  Lee

                Parraguirre                              Bell

SUPREME COURT
        OF
      NEVADA

(O   l 47A.4*
                                                   21