Court Opinion

ID: 8634530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:43:01.798399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:53.173636
License: Public Domain

LOWELL, District Judge.
It is plain that the money was raised for the express purpose of paying a pre-existing debt, and the intent to prefer the creditor may be fairly inferred. The only doubt is, whether the mortgagee was a party to the fraud upon the statute, or was kept in the dark by his friends. There is evidence from which it may be argued that he must have understood the scheme, unless he were wilfully blind; but the assignee relies more particularly upon the second clause of the thirty-fifth section of the statute, as imposing such knowledge upon him by operation of law, unless he made diligent inquiry. It is strenuously urged, in opposition to this view, that the clause in question does not refer to mortgages at ail, nor to preferences, whether direct or indirect, but only to sales out of the ordinary course of business of a trader.
Clauses one and two of section thirty-five are copied from the general statutes of Massachusetts (chapter 118, §§ 89, 91), with this important difference, that in both those sections the limitation was six months, whereas in clause one of the bankrupt act, relating more particularly to preferences, it is four months. Under the state statute the second clause was held to apply to preferences equally with the first. Metcalf v. Munson, 10 Allen, 491; Nary v. Meerill, 8 Allen, 451. And it is plain that the language of the second clause, taken by itself, does fairly include preferences, excepting such as are made by payments of money. But under the bankrupt act, the tendency of opinion has been, that the difference in limitation shows an intention to put preferences on a different ground from other technical frauds. For instance, in a late ease it was held in an action by an assignee to recover back money paid by the bankrupt to a pre-existing creditor, that the declaration was bad for alleging the payment to have been made within six months instead of four months before the bankruptcy. Bean v. Brookmire [Case No. 1,168]. I hold it still open to argument whether the thirty-ninth section does not substitute six months as the limitation in all cases, repealing to that extent the thirty-fifth section. In the case just cited, it appears to have been argued that the thirty-ninth section abolished all limitation; this argument was very properly overruled. But it may be said with a good deal of plausibility, that when congress in the thirty-ninth section made a preference an act of bankruptcy and proceeded to say, that if it was made the foundation of a petition within six months, the debtor might be adjudged a bankrupt, and if he were, the assignee might recover , the money or other property, they were establishing a general rule, by means of a special example, and that that rule is, that preferences within six months may be avoided by the assignee. If so, this section, to that extent, repeals the earlier section. This is a view that has lately occurred to me, and in which I reserve my final opinion. If this construction should be ultimately adopted it will certainly reconcile some apparent discrepancies, and remove some apparent difficulties.
The precise point of this case is, whether a person advancing his own money to a trader, and taking security from him, out of the ordinary course of the trader’s business, is to be held liable to reconvey the security, if the only fraud intended by the debtor is the payment of a creditor by way of preference. In Massachusetts it was held in the affirmative. Crafts v. Belden, 99 Mass. 535. But, as we have already seen, the statute of that state made no distinction between pi’eferences and other technical frauds. Here the argument is, that if the creditor himself, who has received the preference, cannot be pursued after four months, it is very hard that one who is merely aiding him to obtain his money should be liable for two months longer. I feel the force of this objection, but the language of the act plainly includes this case, and it does not seem to come within the first clause, which contemplates that the money or property coming from the debtor should be applied by the person receiving it to the payment or security of the creditor. A transaction of the kind now in question is one step farther from the preference and fully within the second elause. In fact this mortgage was given within the four months, so that if it came within the first clause, the assignee would be entitled to recover, but it seems to me that it does not, and the assignee would be without remedy if it were not for the second clause. And I cannot believe the statute is so defective.
Taking this to be so, it is clear that the mortgage was out of the ordinary course of business of Mr. Butler, because he was a retail trader, doing a business of about one hundred dollars a day, and a mortgage of such a trader’s whole stock is a confession of insolvency. Nary v. Meerill, 8 Allen. 451. If made directly to the creditor, it would have been an act of bankruptcy, as I have often decided. And both parties considered it injurious to his credit, and for that reason agreed that it should not be recorded until some necessity should arise therefor.
The petition of the mortgagee must for these reasons be dismissed. I here desire to express my preference that such cases should be brought in the form of actions at law, that a jury may decide the facts. Here the evidence tends very strongly to show that a creditor was preferred. If the creditor himself were innocent, but the debtor and mortgagee contrived the preference, the latter would be liable, though the creditor would not be. Crafts v. Belden, 99 Mass. 535. But in this case it is possible that the mortgagee was hoodwinked by the others, though the prima facie evidence is against him, and is not met, and I do not believe the truth to be so. Supposing, however, that he was not aware of the exact nature of the transaction, *3the assignee could certainly recover of.the creditor, who is the party benefited, and Justice would seem to require that he should be the person to repay the money. If, then, the mortgagee should apply to me to direct the assignee to bring an action against the creditor, on some proper terms, I should probably make such an order.
Petition dismissed. Money .to remain in court for ten days unless the mortgagee waives his right to apply to the circuit court for a revision of this decree. •