Court Opinion

ID: 9686775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:06:02.619879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:11.930281
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(dissenting). I dissent because the majority apparently has misread the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint.
As the majority correctly states, plaintiff alleges, "... she has suppressed and been unable to perceive the existence ... of her psychological and emotional injuries until approximately April, 1992." (Majority opinion at 316).
The allegation is plain that she did not "perceive" her injuries until April of 1992. If this allegation is true, a matter that must eventually be decided at trial, she has brought her action within the period of limitations.1
The majority would object to this result because it relies on the discovery rule, i.e., that a cause of action does not accrue until the victim is not only aware of the injury but also must be aware of the cause of the injury.
That statement of the discovery rule is substantially correct, but the majority would insist that, because plaintiff alleges that she knew of the coerced *332sexual episode when it occurred and knew the identity of the tortfeasor, the cause of action accrued instanter. This overlooks the allegation that it was not until April of 1992 that she "perceive [d] the existence of her psychological and emotional injuries."
As I understand the complaint, it does not seek damages for whatever injury or trauma was occasioned at the time of the alleged sexual misconduct. It seeks damages for emotional and psychological harm which subsequently ensued and which could not be objectively associated with the original misconduct until decades later.
Thus the plaintiff alleges a harm of which she was unaware until 1992. Whether that allegation is in fact true must be decided by a factfinder not by a court on motion to dismiss. The majority opinion by its reference to the pleadings demonstrates that a material fact is in dispute.
The majority would further insist that the discovery rule, were it technically applicable, should, as a matter of public policy, not be applied to permit a litigant to get to a jury on so stale a claim. There is much philosophically to support the majority's position. Memories grow faint and proof is more difficult to produce as time passes, but the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and not upon the defendant. Also, the particular type of tort alleged is an emotionally charged one that may have a tendency to skew memories and stir old emotions. However, from a legal viewpoint, such problems can be handled by a factfinder, judge or jury, by appropriate instructions that caution a jury to be mindful that the lapse of time and the emotionally charged nature of the tort should be considered when evaluating evidence produced by either the plaintiff or *333defendant, bearing in mind the proper allocation of the burden of proof.
1 share the majority's skepticism of proof that may be offered in a case of this kind,2 but that is not sufficient reason to ignore a claim which is actionable by the application of the discovery rule.
The majority urges that the bringing of a stale claim is contrary to public policy. Of course, all causes of action that rely on the discovery rule are, in the absence of that rule, stale claims. They are, however, not stale if they have accrued, as is alleged here, within the period of limitations. It is accepted as good public policy, as enunciated by the legislature, to allow claims to go forward if the claim has accrued, as appears from the face of the complaint, within the three-year period oflimitations.
Moreover, as we stated in Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), the discovery rule is to be applied to all cases except where the legislature has specifically provided otherwise. It has not done so in respect to the facts here. Rather than furthering public policy the majority contravenes the public policy determined by the legislature.
While I understand the sentiments of the maj ority, the position taken is legally insupportable. Accordingly I dissent.3

 The refreshing or stimulation of latent memories upon the goading of "therapists" is sometimes suspect. The possibility of suggesting a scenario to a disturbed and injured person should be carefully scrutinized by courts and juries, and it is the factfinder, usually the jury, who should pass upon the credibility of the evidence. It is not the function of this court to do so unless evidence presented is incredible as a matter of law.

 The dissenting opinion of Justice Abrahamson points out that Donovan's case is not before us. She also points out that the *334majority reached the conclusion that therefore this action against the Archdiocese is barred. It seems to me that the appropriate disposition of this case, in view of its posture in this court, is to dismiss as improvidently granted.