Court Opinion

ID: 9364169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 17:00:41.051759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.203550
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12483    Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 01/18/2023    Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-12483
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        BENEDICT MOHIT,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        MORRIS WEST,
        Individual Capacity; Mayor of Haines City, A
        Municipal Corporation in the State of Florida,
        ANNE HUFFMAN,
        Individual Capacity; Vice Mayor of Haines City,
        HORACE WEST,
        Individual Capacity; Commissioner of Haines City,
        JAYNE HALL,
        Individual Capacity; Commissioner of Haines City,
        ROY TYLER,
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                    21-12483

        Individual Capacity; Commissioner of Haines City, et al.,

                                                          Defendants-Appellees.

                               ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-00813-VMC-SPF
                             ____________________

        Before GRANT, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Benedict Mohit sued officials of Haines City in their individ-
        ual capacities under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 because they required
        him to obtain permits to conduct farming operations on his resi-
        dentially zoned property. The district court dismissed Mohit’s reg-
        ulatory takings, substantive due process, and equal protection
        claims for failure to state a claim. We affirm. 1

        1
         Mohit also claimed that the City officials were barred from charging him an
        assessment or fee for stormwater management for his farm. Because Mohit
        makes no argument about this claim on appeal, we do not discuss it further.
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        21-12483               Opinion of the Court                        3

                           FACTUAL BACKGROUND
               Mohit was born in the Caribbean, has dark skin color, speaks
        with a foreign accent, and is a naturalized United States citizen.
               Mohit bought a residentially zoned abandoned farm in
        Haines City and, in compliance with state agricultural regulations,
        used the property to establish a commercial hay crop and to raise
        horses. Haines City then adopted an ordinance that prohibited
        keeping farm animals in the City and that required a conditional
        use permit to use residentially zoned property for agricultural pur-
        poses.
                Mohit met with Haines City Development Services Director
        Richard Greenwood and Deputy Director Mark Bennett to discuss
        changing his hay crop and horse operations to other livestock op-
        erations, and they threatened to shut down his farm for violating
        the ordinance. They also threatened to impose fines and get a lien
        on his farm if he continued to operate it without a permit. Before
        Mohit applied for a permit, Deputy Director Bennett told him to
        “list only a few animals” on his application to improve the odds for
        “a person like him” to get approved.
                Mohit believed that the City’s permit requirement con-
        flicted with state agricultural statutes, but he applied for a permit
        to maintain his hay crop and to keep twenty cows, twenty goats,
        and five horses on his property. The City approved his application
        in full and required him to apply to renew the permit in ten years.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12483

               Mohit wanted to do more on his farm. For example, he
        wanted to expand to twenty-five pregnant cows and ten horses; to
        keep bees and poultry; to conduct sod, dairy, fish, and forestry op-
        erations; to cultivate fruits and vegetables; to build a barn for his
        cows, a stable for his horses, a coop for his chickens, a greenhouse
        for his vegetables, and a storage building for fertilizer and other
        equipment; to keep, store, and repair tractors and farm equipment;
        and to put up barbed wire fencing.
                Mohit alleges that his neighbor, Miguel Grullon, was treated
        more favorably than he was, in that the City allowed Mr. Grullon
        to keep an unlimited number of livestock animals of any species on
        Mr. Grullon’s farm. Mr. Grullon’s farm and Mohit’s farm were
        classified as agricultural lands under the state’s greenbelt law, were
        permitted for livestock operations under the same state regulation,
        and were about the same size.
                            PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               Since 2014, Mohit has sued the City and its officials in state
        and federal court over the regulation of his property, alleging that
        the ordinance violated multiple state statutes and state and federal
        constitutional provisions. Mohit lost these lawsuits.
               In July 2018, Mohit sued the City for regulatory takings, sub-
        stantive due process, and equal protection violations. Mohit v. City
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        21-12483                  Opinion of the Court                              5

        of Haines City, 845 F. App’x 808, 810 (11th Cir. 2021). 2 The district
        court dismissed with prejudice the substantive due process and
        equal protection claims because Mohit insufficiently alleged a sub-
        stantive due process violation and provided an equal protection
        comparator who was not similarly situated (Mr. Grullon). Id. The
        district court granted summary judgment to the City on the regu-
        latory takings claims because Mohit did not show that the ordi-
        nance deprived his property of all economically beneficial uses. Id.
                We affirmed. Id. at 812. We explained that the regulatory
        takings claims failed because Mohit “was permitted to engage in
        some agricultural activities, even if those activities were less exten-
        sive than he would have liked,” so the ordinance did not deprive
        him of all economically beneficial uses of his property. Id. at 811.
        The substantive due process claims failed, we said, because Mohit
        did not show that the ordinance lacked a rational basis. Id. And
        the equal protection claims failed, we explained, because Mohit in-
        sufficiently alleged discriminatory animus. Id. at 812.
               After the dismissal of the substantive due process and equal
        protection claims but before the summary judgment on the regu-
        latory takings claims, Mohit filed this case against nine City officials
        in their individual capacities: Director Greenwood, Deputy Direc-
        tor Bennett, City Attorney Fred Reilly, City Manager Deric
        Feacher, Mayor Morris West, Vice Mayor Anne Huffman, and

        2
         Mohit also brought a claim under the Fair Housing Act, id., but that claim is
        not relevant to this appeal.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                        21-12483

        Commissioners Horace West, Jayne Hall, and Roy Tyler. Mohit
        again alleged regulatory takings, substantive due process, and
        equal protection violations based on the City’s ordinance and per-
        mit requirement.
                The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint
        was a shotgun pleading containing only unsupported legal conclu-
        sions, that Mohit’s prior lawsuits precluded him from bringing this
        case because the only difference here was that Mohit sued City of-
        ficials instead of the City itself, that Mohit’s claims were time-
        barred, and that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity,
        absolute legislative immunity, and statutory immunity and were
        improper defendants.
              The district court granted the officials’ motion and dismissed
        Mohit’s amended complaint with prejudice because it failed to
        state a plausible claim for relief. 3 The district court explained that
        the regulatory takings claims failed because Mohit argued only that

        3
          Mohit does not argue that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
        his amended complaint with prejudice instead of granting him leave to amend.
        See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing the de-
        cision not to allow a pleading amendment for an abuse of discretion). Nor
        does Mohit give us any indication of how he would amend his complaint. In
        any event, we discern no abuse of discretion here because Mohit was “given
        at least one chance to amend [his] complaint”—and, counting his prior related
        lawsuits, much more than one chance—“before the district court dismisse[d]
        the action with prejudice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991),
        overruled as to counseled plaintiffs by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am.
        Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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        21-12483                Opinion of the Court                          7

        he was deprived of all economically beneficial uses of his property,
        and his allegations that he was allowed to maintain his hay crop
        and to keep twenty cows, twenty goats, and five horses showed
        that he was not so deprived. The substantive due process claims
        failed, the district court said, because Mohit’s state-created prop-
        erty rights were not fundamental rights, the officials’ enforcement
        of the ordinance against him was executive, and the ordinance had
        a rational basis and did not violate state law. The equal protection
        claims failed, the district court explained, because “[Mohit’s] re-
        quest for a conditional use permit was fully granted” and because
        the complaint “lack[ed] sufficient allegations to support an infer-
        ence of discriminatory animus.”
                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

                We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
        “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
        them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321
        F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). The complaint must plead
        “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
        Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
        facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that al-
        lows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
        is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
        662, 678 (2009). Section 1983 cases do not have a heightened plead-
        ing standard. Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th
        Cir. 2016).
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12483

                                   DISCUSSION

              Mohit argues that in adopting and enforcing the ordinance
        against him, the officials committed regulatory takings, substantive
        due process, and equal protection violations. We discuss these
        claims in turn.
                                Regulatory Takings
              Mohit contends that the officials “den[ied] him of all eco-
        nomically beneficial and productive use of his farm, making his
        property worthless.”
                “The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to
        the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the gov-
        ernment from taking private property for public use without just
        compensation.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)
        (citation omitted). A government regulation may be “so onerous
        that it constitutes a taking” when it (1) “denies all economically
        beneficial or productive use of land” or (2) “impedes the use of
        property . . . based on a complex of factors, including . . . the eco-
        nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant; . . . the extent to
        which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
        backed expectations; and . . . the character of the governmental ac-
        tion.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–43 (2017) (quota-
        tions omitted). Mohit proceeds under the first theory only.
              Mohit’s own allegations establish that after the officials en-
        forced the ordinance against him, his farm still had economically
        beneficial uses in the hay crop, twenty cows, twenty goats, and five
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        21-12483                Opinion of the Court                         9

        horses that he could keep on his property. Mohit complains that
        even though his permit application was approved in full, he “did
        not get what he wanted—to farm without restrictions or limita-
        tions.” But property restrictions do not amount to takings unless
        they (1) “den[y] all economically beneficial or productive use of
        land” or (2) “impede[] the use of property . . . based on [the] com-
        plex of [regulatory takings] factors.” Id. Because Mohit has not
        alleged that either circumstance applies, the district court did not
        err in dismissing his regulatory takings claims.
                              Substantive Due Process
                Mohit claims that because his property was classified as ag-
        ricultural under state statute and because state law preempted the
        City from regulating agriculture, the officials violated his substan-
        tive due process rights when they adopted the ordinance and en-
        forced it against him, requiring him to apply for permits to engage
        in various farming activities. The officials’ adoption of the ordi-
        nance, he argues, was an arbitrary and irrational legislative act, in
        violation of substantive due process, because the ordinance con-
        flicted with state statutes. Mohit also contends that the officials are
        not entitled to any type of immunity.
               Substantive due process protects certain “fundamental”
        rights created by the Constitution, and it protects state-created,
        non-fundamental rights against arbitrary and irrational legislative
        acts. Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2005). Lo-
        cal government officials sued in their individual capacities are enti-
        tled to absolute legislative immunity for their “actions taken in
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                    21-12483

        connection with promulgating zoning ordinances and classifica-
        tions.” Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1392 (11th
        Cir. 1993); see Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1012 &
        n.15 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining that even “an unworthy purpose,”
        like “conspiracy or bad faith,” “does not preclude absolute immun-
        ity to legislators acting in their legislative capacity”). The immun-
        ity “inquiry is not bound by officials’ titles and the characterizations
        officials place on their own activities. Instead, we examine the facts
        of each case to determine whether the [officials] . . . [were] engag-
        ing in legislative activity.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1305
        (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
                Mohit’s substantive due process claims involve only state-
        created property rights, not fundamental rights, so Mohit cannot
        base the claims on the officials’ enforcement of the ordinance
        against him. See Lewis, 409 F.3d at 1274 (explaining that plaintiffs
        cannot bring substantive due process claims when zoning enforce-
        ment infringes on state-created rights). Mohit asserts that the adop-
        tion of the ordinance—a legislative act—violated substantive due
        process. But because he sued the officials in their individual capac-
        ities for their participation in this legislative act, they are entitled to
        absolute legislative immunity. See Corn, 997 F.2d 1369, 1392 (11th
        Cir. 1993) (explaining that we have “extended absolute legislative
        immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983 to purely local
        legislators in land use and zoning cases”); see also Blackburn v.
        Shire U.S. Inc., 18 F.4th 1310, 1317 (11th Cir. 2021) (“We may af-
        firm the district court on any basis supported by the record.”).
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        21-12483                 Opinion of the Court                          11

                Because Mohit must base his substantive due process claims
        on a legislative act and the officials are entitled to absolute immun-
        ity for their legislative acts, the district court did not err in dismiss-
        ing Mohit’s substantive due process claims.
                                   Equal Protection
                Mohit, finally, contends that the officials “intentionally reg-
        ulate[d] [his] existing and proposed state-regulated farm activities
        because: (1) he had challenged their alleged regulatory miscon-
        duct, (2) he refused to obey them when they threatened to shut his
        farm down and they wanted to drive him out of the city, but in
        defiance, he continued his hay crop operations, and (3) because of
        his minority race and foreign origin.” And Mohit contends that the
        officials treated his property less favorably than Mr. Grullon’s sim-
        ilarly situated farm and told Mohit to list only a few animals on his
        permit application “because of [Mohit’s] minority race, dark skin
        color, and foreign origin.”
                “To establish an equal protection claim, a [plaintiff] must
        demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated with other [persons]
        who received more favorable treatment,” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d
        944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted), and (2) the de-
        fendant “engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on
        race, . . . national origin, . . . or some other constitutionally pro-
        tected interest,” Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d
        929, 932–33 (11th Cir. 1986).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12483

                Mohit does not plead facts to support that he was treated less
        favorably than Mr. Grullon or any other person. Mohit alleged that
        Deputy Director Bennett told him to “list only a few animals on
        [his permit] application to improve the chances for a person like
        him to get an approved permit,” Mohit took this advice and applied
        for “only” twenty cows, twenty goats, and five horses, and the of-
        ficials approved Mohit’s application and permitted him the animals
        he requested. Mohit says that in contrast, the officials “approved a
        permit . . . for [Mr.] Grullon to keep an unlimited number of live-
        stock animals . . . of any species on [Mr. Grullon’s] farm.”
               We may reasonably infer that Mr. Grullon got what he
        asked for when the officials approved his permit application. The
        same is true for Mohit: he got what he asked for. The only possible
        difference is that Deputy Director Bennett advised Mohit not to ask
        for much. But Mohit does not claim that Mr. Grullon received any
        advice—let alone better advice—from any City official. And we
        will not speculate that Mr. Grullon did. See Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC,
        981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e cannot act as de facto
        counsel [for a pro se plaintiff] or rewrite an otherwise deficient
        pleading to sustain an action.”).
               Because Mohit’s allegations do not support that the officials
        treated a similarly situated person more favorably than they treated
        him, the district court did not err in dismissing the equal protection
        claims.
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        21-12483                  Opinion of the Court                              13

                                      CONCLUSION
              Because the district court did not err in dismissing Mohit’s
        regulatory takings, substantive due process, and equal protection
        claims, we affirm.

               AFFIRMED. 4

        4
          Given the failures of Mohit’s prior related lawsuits, the defendant officials
        moved to dismiss this appeal as frivolous and sought sanctions. Because our
        affirmance resolves this appeal, we deny the motion to dismiss as moot. And
        because we generally hesitate to impose sanctions on pro se appellants, see
        Woods v. IRS, 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir. 1993), we deny the motion for sanc-
        tions.