Court Opinion

ID: 9951136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:03:18.335246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.465777
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Orozco CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                      (El Dorado)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C096465

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. P20CRF0480)

           v.

    JUAN CARLOS VASQUEZ-OROZCO,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In a prosecution stemming from an early-morning shootout with law enforcement
in which one officer was killed and another wounded, a jury found defendant Juan Carlos
Vasquez-Orozco guilty of second-degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1)1
and two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), counts 2 and 3). The jury
also found true allegations that defendant personally used and discharged a firearm
causing death in the commission of count 1 (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)) and that he

1        Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

                                                             1
personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 2 (§ 12022.7, subd.
(a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 15 years to life plus six
years in state prison. The court struck the section 12022.53 enhancements under section
1385, subdivision (c).
       On appeal, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the
jury with CALCRIM Nos. 571, 3471, and 3472 because (1) the evidence was insufficient
to support giving CALCRIM No. 3471, and (2) CALCRIM Nos. 571 and 3472 were
incomplete and misstated the law under the facts of this case. He further contends that
the instructional errors unconstitutionally deprived him of his right of self-defense.
Alternatively, he claims his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to
the instructions.
       We find no error affecting the convictions. However, we have identified a
sentencing error that resulted in an unauthorized sentence. We therefore remand for
resentencing, but otherwise affirm the judgment.
                                 BACKGROUND FACTS
       A.     Prosecution’s Case
              1.     The Incident
       On October 23, 2019, at about 12:25 a.m., El Dorado County Sheriff’s Deputies
Brian Shelton, Brian Ishmael, and Shawn Taroli (and his ride-along, San Joaquin County
Sheriff Deputy Josh Tasabia) were dispatched to 4740 Sandridge Road in El Dorado
County. The owner of the property, Christopher Ross, had reported seeing flashlights in
his yard and believed people were trying to steal his marijuana plants.
       Ross’s heavily wooded, nine-acre rural property had a long gravel driveway that
led to a house and some outbuildings. A path behind the house led to an above-ground
pool dug into the hillside. Up a steep incline from the pool was a clearing, which
contained approximately 100 marijuana plants. Further up the hillside, near the top of the
ridge, was a tent, partially obscured by bushes and a fallen tree branch.

                                              2
       When the deputies arrived at the property, they initially converged at the bottom of
the hill behind the house. Ross pointed out the path leading up the hill to the marijuana
grow. Ross did not inform the deputies that two people—defendant and Ramiro
Morales—were living in a tent on his property, having been hired to tend and protect the
marijuana plants.
       It was pitch black and visibility was poor as the deputies slowly proceeded up the
hill, sparingly using their flashlights. As the deputies approached the top of the hill,
Deputy Taroli saw the tent and illuminated it with his flashlight. As he did so, he noticed
a Hispanic male attempting to hide behind some shrubs. Deputy Taroli loudly
announced, “Sheriff’s Office. Show me your hands. Put them up.” Deputy Shelton
simultaneously shined his flashlight and yelled, “Show me your hands.”2 The man
turned and ran. Deputy Taroli told the other deputies to let him go.
       Shortly thereafter, Deputy Tasabia saw the same suspect—subsequently identified
as defendant—emerge from behind a berm in a shooting stance, pointing a semiautomatic
handgun in the direction of him and Deputy Ishmael. Defendant yelled something and
then fired his gun. While the other deputies retreated and took cover, Deputy Ishmael
returned fire.
       Deputies Tasabia and Ishmael started to retreat, sliding backwards on their
stomachs down the hill while keeping their weapons ready. As they were doing so, they
saw defendant point his gun at them and fire several shots. Almost simultaneously,
Tasabia and Ismael fired multiple rounds back at defendant. During the gunfire
exchange, Tasabia was shot in the left hip and Ishmael was shot in the chest, just below
the esophagus.

2      Both Deputies Taroli and Shelton were wearing microphones that recorded audio
on the night of the incident. Portions of those audio recordings, including the parts in
which they identified themselves as deputy sheriffs, were played for the jury.

                                              3
       Deputy Tasabia grabbed Deputy Ishmael and began helping him down the hill. At
one point, Tasabia saw defendant and fired two more rounds in his direction. From the
pool area, Deputy Taroli and Deputy Shelton also fired shots at defendant.
       Eventually, Deputy Tasabia and the other deputies transported Deputy Ishmael
down the hill. Deputy Ishmael was taken to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead,
having suffered a gunshot wound to his right foot and a fatal shot to his upper chest.
       California Highway Patrol air units arrived and located the two suspects using an
infrared sensor. When defendant was taken into custody, he had no weapons, but he had
a bullet wound in his right hip and a nine-millimeter cartridge in his front pant pocket.
              2.     Morales’s Testimony
       Morales’s federal plea agreement required him to testify truthfully at defendant’s
trial in exchange for a reduced sentence.
       Morales testified that he was hired to help harvest marijuana plants on Ross’s
property. Morales was expected to live on the property and protect the plants at night.
Morales was given a pistol and instructed to fire a warning shot in the event of a theft or
robbery; he relayed this information to defendant.
       On October 23, 2019, between midnight and 1:00 a.m., defendant was sleeping in
the tent and Morales was on guard duty. Morales’s cousin called and told him to “get
ready” because there had just been a robbery. A short time later, Morales saw lights
outside the tent. Morales woke defendant, told him they were being robbed, and handed
him the gun. Defendant took the gun and told Morales to run. Morales heard the words
“one more,” in English, and then a gunshot. Morales ran and hid. One or two minutes
later, he heard more gunfire. He did not know how many shots were fired. Eventually,
defendant called and said he was wounded and directed Morales on how to find him.
When Morales arrived, defendant told him there were five people there and that he had
used the gun to defend himself. Morales helped defendant down the hill until he saw the
police, at which point he dropped defendant, hid the gun, and surrendered.

                                             4
              3.     Forensic Evidence
       Near the area where defendant and Morales surrendered to SWAT officers,
investigators found a Smith and Wesson nine-millimeter handgun and forty-six rounds of
ammunition. Biological evidence found on the Smith and Wesson and the ammunition
matched defendant’s DNA.
              4.     Defendant’s Statements to Law Enforcement
       Defendant was interviewed twice by law enforcement officers while he was in the
hospital. Defendant told investigators that, on the night of the incident, Morales woke
him and said people were there to rob them. Defendant initially denied having a gun, but
eventually admitted that he had a nine-millimeter pistol. Defendant said he took the gun,
walked out of the tent, and saw five or six men coming up the hill. Although it was very
dark, defendant said he could see that they were carrying rifles. He said he could hear the
men speaking but did not understand what they were saying. Defendant did not think the
men were police.
       At first, defendant denied firing his gun, but eventually admitted that he fired one
or two warning shots into the ground, to the side of the men, to scare them off. When the
men started shooting at him, he started running and shooting back, firing multiple
rounds.3 During a calm period that lasted about two to three minutes, defendant
reloaded. When defendant stood up, the shooting resumed, and defendant was shot.
Defendant returned fire as he was running away. When the shooting stopped, defendant
called Morales and asked for help.

3      Defendant initially claimed that he fired only two shots before admitting that he
fired multiple rounds.

                                             5
       B.     Defense Case
              1.     Defendant’s Testimony
       Defendant testified on his own behalf, using an interpreter since he does not speak
English. Defendant testified that he was hired to live and work on the property, tending
to and protecting the marijuana plants. He was given a gun and instructed to use it to
scare away intruders. Defendant was told that there had been a robbery nearby and that
the robbers had shot someone. About a week before the incident, defendant encountered
two people on the property in the early morning. Defendant fired two shots to the side of
the intruders, who ran away.
       On October 21, 2019, Morales arrived at the property and defendant told him
about the incident the previous week. Morales shared that he had been robbed while
working at a marijuana grow in Oroville. Defendant and Morales agreed to take turns
sleeping while the other was on guard duty.
       On the night of the incident (October 23), defendant was sleeping while Morales
stood guard. Morales woke defendant and told him that he had been advised to be on
alert because another grower had just been robbed.4 Defendant went back to sleep,
telling Morales to awaken him if something happened.
       Later, Morales woke defendant and told him the robbers were at the property.
Defendant took the gun and exited the tent. It was dark, but defendant saw some lights
about 10 to 15 meters below the tent. Defendant could not hear anything but could see
shadows of people. He denied seeing any rifles.
       Defendant walked to the right of the tent and fired two warning shots into the
ground, briefly pausing between shots. Defendant testified that he was only trying to

4      The parties stipulated that at 12:14 a.m. on October 23, 2019, there was a 911 call
regarding a robbery, and El Dorado County Sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to a
nearby property.

                                              6
scare the people. Before shooting, defendant did not hear any of the people identify
themselves as police officers. He believed they were the same intruders who had been
there the week before.
       After the second warning shot, the people started shooting at him. Defendant was
afraid and believed the people were trying to kill him, so he shot back.
       After the shooting stopped, defendant waited several minutes before looking to see
if the people were gone. As he looked around, he heard a shot and realized he had been
grazed by a bullet. He started running, firing his gun as he ran. As he was running,
defendant was hit by another bullet and fell to the ground.
       Defendant called Morales for help, who helped defendant head towards the road
by carrying him. They surrendered a few minutes after seeing a police vehicle.
Defendant later learned that the people he shot at were police officers and that he had
killed an officer. Defendant claimed that he never intended to injure anyone.
              2.     Defense Experts
       Rahn Minagawa, an expert in forensic and clinical psychology, testified on human
physiological or biological reactions to unknown and/or potentially life-threatening
situations. Based on a hypothetical reflecting the facts of the case, Minagawa opined it
would be objectively reasonable for a 20-year-old male like defendant to believe his life
was in imminent danger when the “intruders” were shooting at him.
       Robert C. Maher, an expert in forensic audio analysis and audio engineering,
reviewed law enforcement audio recordings from the incident. Based on that review, he
opined there were four different episodes of gunshots. “Episode 1” consisted of a single
gunshot. “Episode 2” included approximately nine shots and began about 25 seconds
after Episode 1. “Episode 3” included two shots and occurred about 35 seconds after
Episode 2. “Episode 4” involved multiple, overlapping gunshots, and occurred after a
four-to-five-minute gap.

                                             7
       Chris Coleman, an expert in crime scene reconstruction, shooting reconstruction,
crime scene processing, firearms and ammunition, and force options, went to the scene on
October 13, 2020, around midnight. He chose that date because the conditions were like
the night of the incident. Coleman testified that it was very dark and difficult to see, and
that the terrain was steep and dangerous. Coleman opined, based on his review of the
evidence, that the location of shell casings was consistent with a person standing in front
of the tent and firing to the right, and then running away along the path.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                 Self-Defense Instructions
       Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it instructed the jury on
limitations to the right of self-defense under CALCRIM Nos. 571, 3471, and 3472. We
disagree.
       A.     Additional Background
       The trial court provided the jury with multiple instructions on self-defense.
Regarding perfect self-defense, the trial court instructed the jury using CALCRIM
No. 505, the standard instruction for justifiable homicide.5 The jury was told that “[t]he
defendant is not guilty of murder or manslaughter if he was justified in killing someone
in self-defense or defense of another.” The jury was told that a defendant acts in lawful
self-defense if he reasonably believed that he or someone else was in imminent danger of
being killed, suffering great bodily injury, or being robbed; reasonably believed that the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger; and used no
more force than was necessary to defend against that danger. The jury also was told that
“[t]he defendant’s belief that he or someone else was threatened may be reasonable even

5     The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3470, describing self-
defense in non-homicide crimes.

                                              8
if he relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and
reasonably have believed that information was true.” In addition, the jury was told that
“[a] defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground
and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the
danger of death or great bodily injury or robbery has passed.”
       Regarding imperfect self-defense, the trial court instructed the jury in the language
of CALCRIM No. 571 that a killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person in the actual but unreasonable
belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury. The
court further informed jurors, using the optional bracketed language of the standard form
instruction, that: “Imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through his
own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances justifying his adversary’s use of force.”
       The trial court told jurors that the People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in perfect or imperfect self-defense.
       As relevant here, the trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 3471
and 3472. CALCRIM No. 3471 is the standard instruction on the right to self-defense in
a mutual combat or initial aggressor scenario. The court instructed the jury that: “A
person who engages in mutual combat or starts a fight has a right to self-defense only if:
[¶] 1. He actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; and, [¶] 2. He indicated by
word or by conduct to his opponent in a way that a reasonable person would understand
that he wanted to stop fighting and that he had stopped fighting; and, [¶] 3. He gave his
opponent a chance to stop fighting. [¶] If the defendant meets these requirements, he
then had a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight. However, if the
defendant used only nondeadly force, and the opponent responded with such sudden and
deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had
the right to defend himself with deadly force and was not required to stop fighting,
communicate the desire to stop to the opponent, or give the opponent a chance to stop

                                              9
fighting.” The court did not include the following bracketed language defining mutual
combat: “A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual consent or
agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and must occur before the
claim to self-defense arose.”
        CALCRIM No. 3472 is the standard instruction on contrived self-defense. The
trial court’s instruction told the jury: “A person does not have the right to self-defense if
he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.”6
        The record does not reflect any objections from defense counsel to any of these
instructions.
        During closing argument, the prosecutor structured a significant portion of his
argument around defendant’s claim of self-defense. The prosecutor argued that
defendant did not act in self-defense because defendant did not actually or reasonably
believe that he (or Morales) were in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great
bodily injury. The prosecutor also argued that defendant did not have a right to self-
defense because the evidence showed (1) defendant was the initial aggressor who shot
first (CALCRIM No. 3471), (2) defendant provoked a fight with the intent to create an
excuse to use force (CALCRIM No. 3472), and/or (3) defendant’s wrongful conduct
created the circumstances that justified the adversary’s use of force (CALCRIM No.
571).

6       After defendant’s trial, CALCRIM No. 3472 was revised to include additional
bracketed language to be given “if there is evidence that the defendant intended to
provoke only a non-deadly confrontation and the victim responded with deadly force.”
(Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2022 ed.) Bench Notes to CALCRIM
No. 3472, p. 115.) This new bracketed language states: “However, if the defendant used
only non-deadly force, and the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force
that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to
defend (himself/herself) with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting.”
(CALCRIM No. 3472.)

                                             10
       The prosecutor noted that there is a “sudden escalation exception” if the
defendant, as the initial aggressor, used only non-deadly force, and the opponent
responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from
the fight. However, the prosecutor argued the exception did not apply because
defendant’s initial act of firing a gun constituted the use of deadly force.
       Defense counsel argued that defendant did not intend to kill anyone. Rather,
defense counsel argued, defendant was “a 20-year-old inexperienced boy who [w]as met
with intruders while he was sleeping in his tent. He tried to scare [the intruders] off by
shooting to the ground and was met with a flurry of rifle fire.” Defendant then returned
fire in (perfect or imperfect) self-defense. Defense counsel referred to the incident as a
“horrible tragedy” that was set in motion by Ross.
       During deliberations, the jury asked for a definition of imminent danger and
whether shooting a gun at the ground is considered deadly force. The trial court referred
the jury to CALCRIM No. 571 for the definition of imminent danger. The trial court
answered the deadly force question as follows: “Please refer to [CALCRIM No. 200],
paragraph 6 regarding definitions. [¶] Deadly force does not have a specific legal
definition. Therefore, you are to apply this term using its ordinary, everyday meaning.
[¶] As the trier of facts, it is up to you and you alone to determine based on the evidence
presented to you whether the act to which you are referring ‘shooting a gun at the ground’
is considered deadly force.”
       B.     Standard of Review
       The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all “general principles of law that
are ‘ “closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983,
1021.) At the same time, it is in error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating
a principle of law, is not supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Marshall (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1, 39-40; People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.)

                                              11
       When a trial court chooses to instruct on a legal point, it must do so correctly.
(People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 58.) Generally, however, a court has no sua
sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law, and a party may not
complain on appeal that an otherwise correct instruction was too general or incomplete
unless the party made an appropriate objection. (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620,
638; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 570.)
       We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Fiore (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378.) In assessing a claim of instructional error, we look to the
instructions as a whole and the entire record of the trial, including the arguments of
counsel, and we assume that jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and
correlating all instructions given. (People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 708.) In
reviewing a purportedly ambiguous or misleading instruction, we inquire whether there is
a reasonable likelihood the jury applied it in an impermissible manner. (People v.
Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.) Instructions should be interpreted to support the
judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.
(Lopez, supra, at p. 708.)
       C.     CALCRIM No. 3471
       Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 3471 because there was insufficient evidence that he was the initial aggressor or
engaged in mutual combat. Defendant contends the error was prejudicial because it
allowed the jury to rely on an improper theory to reject his claim of self-defense.
       As a preliminary matter, we agree with the People that defendant technically
forfeited this issue because there is nothing in the record to suggest his trial counsel
objected to the challenged instruction. (People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463,
498.) Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion under section 1259 to reach the merits
because the error arguably affected defendant’s substantial rights. (People v. Jimenez
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 730.)

                                              12
       Focusing on the evidence favorable to his position, defendant contends there was
no substantial evidence to support the initial aggressor instruction. Although defendant
fired his gun first, he did so only as a “warning,” to scare off the intruders who he
believed were there to rob him. Defendant contends this evidence was insufficient to
support the initial aggressor instruction. We disagree.
       When deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the
trial court does not determine the credibility of the evidence, but only whether it is
sufficient to deserve consideration by the jury. (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th
69, 102; People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.) Evidence is sufficient to deserve
consideration if a reasonable jury could find it persuasive and therefore conclude that the
particular facts underlying the instruction exist. (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186,
201, fn. 8; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.) Thus, in reviewing for
substantial evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the instruction.
       Here, defendant cites the evidence favorable to his position, but disregards the
unfavorable evidence. Such evidence includes the testimony of Deputies Tasabia and
Taroli that defendant initiated the shooting, not by firing warning shots into the ground,
but by pointing his gun and firing in the direction of Tasabia and Ishmael, who were less
than 20 feet away. Deputy Tasabia also testified that after he and Deputy Ishmael started
to retreat, defendant initiated the second exchange of gunfire. By itself, this evidence
was sufficient to support the initial aggressor instruction. Thus, the trial court did not err
in giving that instruction.
       In contrast, the parties agree, and so do we, that the mutual combat portion of the
instruction was not supported by substantial evidence. As the court explained in People
v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033 (Ross), “ ‘mutual combat’ means not merely a
reciprocal exchange of blows but one pursuant to mutual intention, consent, or agreement
preceding the initiation of hostilities.” (Id. at p. 1045, italics omitted.) “In other words, it
is not merely the combat, but the preexisting intention to engage in it, that must be

                                              13
mutual.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Here, no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant
and the law enforcement officers had a preexisting agreement or intent to exchange
gunfire before the shooting began. Thus, it was an error for the trial court to give that
portion of the instruction.
       The parties disagree about the appropriate standard for assessing whether this error
was prejudicial. Relying on Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, defendant argues that
the trial court’s decision to instruct on mutual combat, without defining that term, means
the jury could have rejected his claim of self-defense simply because the parties got into a
gunfight. Thus, he contends the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, [17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 711]) applies. The
People argue that the mutual combat instruction was only a technical error, subject to
harmless error review under the standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818
(Watson). We agree with the People, for three reasons.
       First, unlike Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at page 1057, there is nothing in this
record to suggest the jury’s verdict was based on a mistaken understanding of mutual
combat. In Ross, the jury asked the trial court to define “mutual combat” and the court
not only failed to provide a definition, but mistakenly advised the jury that none could be
given. (Id. at pp. 1042-1043.) Ross held that the trial court was obligated to define the
term precisely because the jury had exhibited confusion as to its meaning. (Id. at
p. 1047.) No similar showing of jury confusion exists here.
       Second, even in Ross, the appellate court applied the Watson standard. (Ross,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1054-1055.) The court expressly rejected the contention
that the court’s failure to define “mutual combat” effectively removed a theory of defense
from the jury’s consideration. (Ibid.)
       Third, “ ‘[t]he meaning of instructions is no[t] . . . determined under a strict test of
whether a “reasonable juror” could have understood the charge as the defendant asserts,
but rather under the more tolerant test of whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that

                                              14
the jury misconstrued or misapplied the law in light of the instructions given, the entire
record of trial, and the arguments of counsel.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mathson (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1312; People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220
[possibility of confusion may be diminished by the parties’ closing arguments], overruled
in part on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.) Here, the
jury was told that the limitation on self-defense applies either when a person engages in
mutual combat or “starts a fight.”7 Yet the prosecution never argued that defendant was
engaged in mutual combat or that mutual combat prevented defendant from claiming self-
defense; the prosecution argued only that defendant was the initial aggressor who started
the fight. Defense counsel likewise never mentioned the phrase mutual combat in her
closing argument.
       For these reasons, we are not persuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury applied the mutual combat instruction in a manner that violated defendant’s
constitutional rights.8 (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 906.) Accordingly,
Watson is the correct test.
       Under Watson, reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable a more
favorable result would have been reached absent the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at
p. 836.) The Watson test “ ‘ “focuses not on what a reasonably jury could do, but what

7      Jurors also were instructed under CALCRIM No. 200 that some of the instructions
given to them might not apply, depending on the facts, and that they should not assume
the inclusion of a particular instruction suggests anything about the facts. We presume
the jury followed this instruction. (People v. Fiore, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1378.)
8      That the jury asked for a legal definition of imminent danger, asked whether
shooting a gun at the ground is considered deadly force, and asked for multiple readbacks
of defendant’s testimony further support the conclusion that the jury did not dismiss the
right of self-defense based on an erroneous application of the “mutual combat”
instruction.

                                             15
such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration.” ’ ”
(People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 968, italics omitted.)
       Defendant has not carried his burden to show that it is reasonably probable he
would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the claimed instructional error not
occurred. As discussed, the prosecution did not rely on a mutual combat theory, instead
arguing that defendant was subject to the limitations of CALCRIM No. 3471 as the initial
aggressor. And there is nothing in the record to suggest the jury was confused or
sidetracked by the mutual combat portion of the instruction. We therefore do not find it
reasonably probable that a different outcome would have resulted in the absence of the
mutual combat instruction. (See People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1381-
1382.) Having found no prejudicial error, we conclude that the trial court’s actions did
not affect defendant’s substantial rights.
       D.       CALCRIM Nos. 571 & 3472
       Defendant next contends that the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 571, the standard instruction on imperfect self-defense, and
CALCRIM No. 3472, the standard instruction on contrived self-defense. Defendant
contends that the instructions were incomplete or misleading under the facts of this case
because they “ ‘made no allowance for an intent to use only nondeadly force and an
adversary’s sudden escalation to deadly violence.’ ” Defendant claims the erroneous
instructions, coupled with the prosecution’s arguments, effectively foreclosed his right of
self-defense.
       Because there is no evidence that defendant objected to the instructions or
requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language, we conclude defendant has
forfeited any claim that the instructions should have been modified. (People v. Lee,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 638.) Nevertheless, we shall address the merits because the
claimed error arguably affects his substantial rights and because he raises an ineffective

                                             16
assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to object. (People v. Campbell, supra,
51 Cal.App.5th at p. 498; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 74.)
       We conclude the trial court did not err by instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 3472. As explained in People v. Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, “CALCRIM
No. 3472 is generally a correct statement of law, which might require modification in the
rare case in which a defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly confrontation and
the victim responds with deadly force.” (Id. at p. 1334.)
       Here, neither party argued (nor presented evidence) that defendant provoked a
fight or quarrel as a pretext to use nondeadly force. Under the defense’s theory of the
case, defendant did not intend to provoke anything; he simply tried to scare off the
intruders he thought were there to rob him. When the intruders instead started shooting at
him, defendant shot back in self-defense. Conversely, the prosecution’s theory was that
defendant acted with the intent to kill, intentionally provoking a deadly gunfight to
prevent the (perceived) theft of the marijuana plants. Thus, this was not the “rare case” in
which a modification to the standard instruction was required.
       Defendant’s reliance on People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940 (Ramirez)
is misplaced. In Ramirez, there was evidence that the defendants had intended to provoke
only a non-deadly fistfight with a rival gang until one of the defendants saw a rival gang
member raise an object that looked like a gun, escalating the fistfight to a deadly conflict.
(Id. at pp. 944-945.) Further, the prosecutor in Ramirez repeatedly misrepresented the
law to the jury by arguing, based on CALCRIM No. 3472, that the defendants forfeited
any right of self-defense if they contrived to use any force, even nondeadly force.
(Ramirez, supra, at pp. 949-950.)
       Unlike in Ramirez, there was no evidence here that defendant intended to provoke
only a non-deadly fight or quarrel. Further, the prosecutor did not argue that CALCRIM
No. 3472 “obliterated all forms of self-defense . . . if the defendant contrived to use any
force.” (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 950.) To the contrary, consistent with the

                                             17
trial court’s instruction under CALCRIM No. 3471, the prosecutor told the jury that if the
defendant started a fight with nondeadly force, and the victim suddenly escalated the
fight by using deadly force, the defendant had the right to use deadly force in self-
defense. Accordingly, Ramirez has no application to the facts in this case.
          We likewise reject defendant’s challenge to the instruction (under CALCRIM
No. 571) that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant,
through his own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify his adversary’s
use of force. Defendant contends the trial court should have clarified that this instruction
only applies where a victim’s use of force is legally justified and that the imperfect self-
defense doctrine is available when the victim’s use of force against the defendant is
unlawful, even if the defendant set in motion the chain of events that led the victim to
attack.
          We disagree that such clarification was necessary. By informing the jury that
imperfect self-defense is not available if the defendant’s wrongful conduct created
circumstances under which the adversary’s use of force was justified, the instruction
adequately conveyed that the defense is available if the defendant, without acting
wrongfully, set in motion a chain of events under which the adversary’s use of force was
not justified. Considered in the context of the overall charge, and the parties’ arguments,
a reasonable juror would understand that a justified use of force means a “legally”
justified (i.e., lawful) use of force. Thus, a reasonable juror would have understood
CALCRIM No. 571 precludes the application of imperfect self-defense only if the
defendant committed wrongful conduct that legally justified the adversary’s use of force,
and that the defense remains available if the adversary’s use of force against the
defendant was unlawful. The trial court’s instruction was an accurate statement of the
law. (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761; People v. Frandsen (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 266, 273; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1.) As such,

                                              18
there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions in an
impermissible manner.
       Defendant has failed to show the trial court prejudicially erred when it instructed
the jury on self-defense under CALCRIM Nos. 571 and 3472. Thus, we reject his claim
that his substantial rights were affected and his related claim that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to object. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.)
                                             II
                                     Sentencing Error
       At the May 13, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed on count 3 a
sentence of one year (one-third of the middle term) and ordered it to run concurrent to
counts 1 and 2. In an amended minute order dated May 17, 2022, the trial court, on its
own motion, amended the sentence for count 3 to reflect a one-third of the midterm
sentence to be served consecutive to count 2, noting that the original sentence on count 3
was an “incorrect sentence.”
       We invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether the trial court
erred by (1) imposing a one-third of the midterm concurrent sentence and then
(2) amending that sentence to a consecutive term on its own motion.
       The parties agree, and so do we, that the trial court erred by originally imposing
the one-third of the midterm concurrent sentence on count 3. (People v. Quintero (2006)
135 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1156, fn. 3 [“Because concurrent terms are not part of the
principal and subordinate term computation under section 1170.1, subdivision (a), they
are imposed at the full base term, not according to the one-third middle term formula,
. . . .”]; People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1197.) The parties also agree, as do
we, that the trial court erred by subsequently resentencing the defendant to a consecutive
term on its own motion without defendant or his counsel being present. (People v.
Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344; People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 347-
349; §§ 977, 1172.1.)

                                             19
       The parties disagree, however, as to the proper remedy for these errors. Defendant
argues that because the trial court originally imposed a concurrent term, and the law does
not preclude a concurrent sentence, we should remand this matter with directions to
reinstate the concurrent term and otherwise correct the sentence to reflect a lawful term of
confinement. The People argue that because the original sentence was unauthorized, we
should remand for a full resentencing. Because the record does not clearly reflect the
trial court’s intent, we agree with the People that a full resentencing is appropriate.

                                              20
                                      DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for resentencing in a
manner consistent with this opinion. After resentencing, the trial court is directed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the corrected sentence and send a
copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                       \s\                    ,
                                                  Krause, J.

We concur:

     \s\                    ,
Robie, Acting P. J.

     \s\                    ,
Wiseman, J.*

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                             21