Court Opinion

ID: 9444254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:04:57.348441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.762950
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221361-U
                                  Order filed: August 3, 2023

                                                                             FIRST DISTRICT
                                                                           FOURTH DIVISION

                                         No. 1-22-1361

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )        Appeal from the
                                                 )        Circuit Court of
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )        Cook County.
                                                 )
 v.                                              )        No. 18 CR 17459
                                                 )
 ANIBAL AGUILAR,                                 )        Honorable
                                                 )        Diana L. Kenworthy,
       Defendant-Appellant.                      )        Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

       Held: Defendant’s conviction is affirmed where, even if a violation of his right to
             confrontation is assumed, plain error could not be established as the evidence of
             defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and any improperly admitted evidence was
             cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.

¶1     Defendant-appellant, Anibal Aguilar, appeals from his convictions for predatory criminal

sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial

court committed plain error by admitting evidence that violated his constitutional right to

confrontation. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2     In December 2018, defendant was charged by indictment with three counts of predatory

criminal sexual assault and six counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The counts generally
No. 1-22-1361

alleged that between April 20, 2012, and November 17, 2018, defendant sexually abused M.Z., a

minor. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on those charges in June 2022.

¶3     Idalia Jaimes, M.Z.’s mother, testified at trial through an interpreter that she was the wife

of defendant. She had four children, and defendant was the stepfather of the three oldest—

including M.Z.—and the father of her youngest child. Both Jaimes and defendant were

undocumented, but the children were citizens. Jaimes had applied for a special visa for those

involved in a criminal case. The family lived in Chicago, across the street from the hair salon

Jaimes owned.

¶4     On the night of November 17, 2018, Jaimes was working at her salon, doing the hair of

Olga Camacho. M.Z., was present, as was Camacho’s daughter. The salon had three stations for

hair styling in the main area, a bed for doing facials further back near the register, and a small

storage room in the rear near the bathroom. A two-way mirror above the register was situated

between the storage room and the main floor of the salon.

¶5     At approximately 9 p.m., defendant arrived at the salon and spoke with Camacho. During

this time Jaimes could see M.Z. combing a doll’s hair on the bed. Jaimes then saw defendant

talking to M.Z. for a few minutes in the area between the back room and the bathroom but was

unable to hear what they were saying.

¶6     About 15 minutes later, when Jaimes was finished working on Camacho’s hair, she called

for her daughter who was nowhere to be seen. She then walked behind the counter, looked through

the two-way mirror, and saw defendant in the back room putting his penis back in his pants while

M.Z. left the room. Jaimes confronted defendant and asked him, “what’s going on.” Defendant

responded that, “it was nothing.” M.Z. had returned to the bed she had been sitting on earlier and

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No. 1-22-1361

was talking to Camacho while Jaimes called the police. Defendant left the salon and walked across

the street to their home.

¶7     After police arrived, Camacho drove Jaimes and M.Z. to the hospital, where a sex assault

kit was performed on M.Z. The next morning, before going to the Chicago Children’s Advocacy

Center (CCAC), M.Z. told Jaimes that defendant had been abusing her for many years when Jaimes

was not around. M.Z. said that he would hurt her with his penis and fingers in her vagina. Jaimes

then took M.Z. to the CCAC. She never told M.Z. what to say while there.

¶8     M.Z., born April 20, 2006, was 16 years old when she testified. M.Z. testified that on

November 17, 2018, when she was 12 years old, she was at the salon with her mother, Camacho,

and Camacho’s daughter. When defendant arrived, she was sitting in the back area of the salon

braiding a doll’s hair. Defendant greeted Jaimes and made his way to the back room. Defendant

sat in a chair and asked M.Z. to sit on his lap. The two were alone the back room. M.Z.’s back was

to defendant’s chest, and they were both facing the same direction. Through the two-way mirror,

M.Z. could see her mother was finishing up Camacho’s hair.

¶9     M.Z. testified she could feel that defendant’s penis was hard. Defendant began touching

M.Z.’s breasts underneath her bra. Defendant used his fingers to touch M.Z.’s vagina and “he kind

of went like in and out” of “the hole of [her] vagina.” M.Z. testified that defendant kissed her on

her neck and on her mouth. When defendant unzipped his pants and pulled her pants down, M.Z.

could see his penis and defendant then rubbed his penis back and forth on her “bare butt.” While

defendant was doing this, his breathing started getting heavier and quicker. Defendant moved his

penis towards her vagina and rubbed it on the skin of her vagina but did not put it in her “vagina

hole.” While defendant was doing this, M.Z.’s mother began walking towards the back room and

defendant stopped. M.Z. could see her mother peeking through the two-way mirror, and M.Z. got

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No. 1-22-1361

up and went to sit on the bed in the front room. Her mother started yelling at defendant, and he left

the salon.

¶ 10     Police arrived, and then M.Z. went to the Swedish Covenant Hospital with her mother,

Camacho, and Camacho’s daughter. M.Z. met with two police officers there, then described what

had happened to a nurse. M.Z. disrobed and showed the nurse where on her body defendant had

contact with her. A sex assault kit was administered, which involved taking swabs from different

parts of M.Z.’s body and recovering M.Z.’s clothes. After being discharged, M.Z. went home to

sleep.

¶ 11     The following morning, M.Z. spoke with a woman named Felicia at CCAC. Subsequently,

M.Z. went to Lurie Children’s Hospital where she had previously been treated “too many [times]

to count” for urinary incontinence, headaches and urinary tract infections, all of which began after

defendant began touching her.

¶ 12     The incident on November 17, 2018, was not the first time defendant had touched M.Z.

She did not remember the first time it occurred, but she recalled him touching her as early as age

four. Defendant would touch M.Z.’s vagina and breasts with his hands, and defendant would take

M.Z. into the bedroom he shared with her mother and put his mouth on her vagina. M.Z. said this

happened “[f]or as long as I can remember.” Defendant would close and lock the bedroom door

when he touched her. Defendant also touched his penis to her vagina in the same bedroom. At

times, defendant “tried to put [his penis] all the way in [the hole of her vagina], while at other

times he would just move it back and forth.” Defendant would ask M.Z. if she liked it. M.Z. never

told anyone about the abuse because she was scared, and she initially thought it was normal.

Defendant also told her not to tell anyone or she would get in trouble with the police.

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No. 1-22-1361

¶ 13   On cross-examination M.Z. testified that she told the police officers what had happened on

November 17, 2018, but did not tell them everything that defendant had done to her over the years.

M.Z. testified that defendant had been sexually abusing her a few times a week from the time she

was four until she was 12 years old.

¶ 14   Theresa Gaudio, a registered nurse at Swedish Covenant Hospital, testified that she is a

trained Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE). On November 17, 2018, M.Z. was her patient.

She described M.Z. as withdrawn, tearful, using short one-word sentences and not making eye

contact with her. As part of her medical forensic examination, Gaudio asked M.Z. what had

happened to her. Gaudio quoted M.Z. as saying, “I was in my mom’s beauty shop and my

stepfather came into the shop. He came into the back room and told me to come into the back

room. He told me to sit on his lap and he started to kiss my neck.” At that point, M.Z. pointed to

the back of her neck where Gaudio observed a red mark. M.Z. further stated,

       “[H]e kissed my face all over and kissed my mouth. He then put his hands on my chest and

       fondled my breasts. He put his hand in the front of my pants and he put his finger into my

       private parts. He then pulled his pants down and tried to put his private parts into my private

       part. He hurt me and he stopped. I got up and told my mother what happened and she called

       the police. He has done this to me a couple of times before.”

¶ 15   Gaudio also performed a sexual assault kit on M.Z. This included swabbing of M.Z.’s neck,

chin and face, the areas M.Z. said defendant kissed and licked her. Gaudio also swabbed the small

of M.Z.’s back, the folds of her legs in her groin area and the outside of her vaginal area. She also

collected M.Z.’s fingernail clippings as well as a pubic combing sample, and took an anal swab

and a vaginal swab from M.Z.’s body. She then collected blood from M.Z. for DNA analysis.

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No. 1-22-1361

Upon completion, Gaudio sealed the kit and locked it in a cabinet until it was retrieved by the

police.

¶ 16      Gaudio testified that M.Z. was prescribed medications for sexually transmitted diseases,

nausea and antibiotics; she was referred to Lurie Children’s Hospital for follow-up treatment.

Gaudio also testified that a urinary tract infection is a bacterial infection of the urine which may

be caused by not wiping properly, such as wiping from the back to the front, or by sexual activity

such as the penis rubbing against the urethra from the back side to the front.

¶ 17      Felicia Papafio, a forensic interviewer for the CCAC, described her recorded forensic

interview with M.Z. on November 18, 2018, which was admitted into evidence and published to

the jury. During the recorded interview, M.Z. stated that defendant began abusing her when she

was around 6 years old, and that defendant had been touching her for years and that it happened

“a lot.” M.Z. then described the events of the previous night, and her description was consistent

with her trial testimony.

¶ 18      Gregory DiDomenic, a DNA supervisor at the Illinois State Police (ISP) Forensic Center,

testified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis. DiDomenic explained how DNA analysis allows

for the differentiation between individuals as possible donors of a given DNA stain. He provided

an overview of how DNA analysis is carried out at the ISP laboratory, including how the originally

assigned analyst authors the final report. Then he described his review of the work of forensic

scientist Angela Kaeshamer, who conducted the actual DNA analysis in this case for the ISP lab.

DiDomenic testified that according to his review, the proper procedures were followed in the

testing and analysis of the DNA materials in this case.

¶ 19      Based on his review of this case, DiDomenic was able to conclude that the swab from

M.Z.’s neck contained a mixture of DNA profiles that could not be separated out. Given that it

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No. 1-22-1361

could be assumed that M.Z.’s DNA profile would be present on a swab from her own neck, the

lab subtracted out her contribution, leaving one remaining DNA contributor. The analysis revealed

a remaining male DNA profile, from which defendant “cannot be excluded.” DiDomenic testified

that the statistical frequency of finding that male profile in the general population was one in one

nonillion.

¶ 20   DiDomenic also testified that the vaginal swab taken from M.Z. was analyzed at a private

laboratory, not by the ISP. He did not testify about those specific results, but stated that it is

possible for penis-to-vagina contact to take place without leaving male DNA behind. On cross-

examination, DiDomenic stated that it was not possible to know how long a DNA stain might have

persisted on a given surface. He also acknowledged the possibility of DNA transfer where two or

more people lived together.

¶ 21   Thereafter, several stipulations were entered into evidence, establishing that: (1) a proper

chain of custody was maintained at all times with respect to M.Z.’s sexual assault kit and a buccal

swab taken from defendant, (2) the vaginal, oral and anal swabs and the swabs from M.Z.’s lower

back and buttocks were analyzed, and they contained no male DNA, (3) swabs collected from

M.Z.’s chest, anterior neck and chin contained too much female DNA to detect a male donor, and

(4) no semen was detected on the underwear collected from M.Z. The State also introduced M.Z.’s

birth certificate into evidence, which showed she was born on April 20, 2006.

¶ 22   Detective Emily Rodriguez, assigned to the Chicago Police Department’s Special

Investigations Unit, testified that she interviewed defendant on November 18, 2018. The interview

was video recorded. Detective Rodriguez spoke to defendant in Spanish because he preferred that

to English. After acknowledging that he understood his Miranda warnings, defendant chose to

speak with the detectives.

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No. 1-22-1361

¶ 23    In that statement defendant admitted that on the prior evening in the back room of his wife’s

salon, he had M.Z. sit on his lap, facing away from him and he put his hand in her pants beneath

her underwear and touched her vagina. He said he rubbed the lips of M.Z.’s vagina with the middle

finger of his right hand. He also said he kissed M.Z. on the lips the way a boyfriend kisses his

girlfriend. At that moment, defendant saw his wife approaching, M.Z. got off his lap, and defendant

said his wife saw him pulling up the zipper of his pants. Defendant said Jaimes was very upset,

and he told her that nothing happened.

¶ 24    In addition to kissing M.Z. on this day, defendant said there were two prior occasions where

he “kissed her on the lips as he grabbed her butt with his hand” and she would tell him not to touch

her. During this interview, the detectives obtained written consent to collect a buccal swab from

defendant and his cheek was swabbed. A video of the interview was then entered into evidence

and published to the jury. On cross-examination, Rodriguez testified that he believed defendant

was arrested on November 17, 2018, around 11:00 p.m. and she spoke with him 12 hours later the

following morning. The State rested and defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was denied.

¶ 25    Defendant testified on his own behalf through an interpreter. He denied ever touching

M.Z.’s vagina with his hand, penis, or mouth, or kissing her in a sexual way at any time when she

was 4 through 12 years old. He further denied ever taking M.Z. into his bedroom and locking the

door.

¶ 26    With respect to the events of November 17, 2018, defendant testified that he arrived at the

salon around 9:00 p.m. to find Jaimes working on Camacho’s hair. Defendant spoke briefly with

Camacho, then went to the back room. He then noticed M.Z. was “a little bothered” as she combed

a doll’s hair. She said she wanted to go home but Jaimes would not let her leave. Defendant told

her to just wait until Jaimes was finished and they would all leave together.

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No. 1-22-1361

¶ 27   Defendant returned to the back room, and M.Z. soon joined him. She sat on defendant’s

lap, hugged him, and again asked him to go home. Defendant told her to stay with him until Jaimes

was finished, and he gave her a kiss on her neck when he “told her calm down, we will be leaving

soon.” Defendant denied that the kiss was sexual in nature.

¶ 28   At that point, Jaimes looked through the window and thought he “was doing something

with the child.” She came into the room and asked defendant what he was doing, and he said

“nothing.” Jaimes said she saw him raising the zipper of his pants, but defendant stated that was

not the case; he had worn a large belt buckle that day and was simply adjusting the buckle. Jaimes

and Camacho were upset, so defendant told Camacho not to think he had done anything

inappropriate. He went home and the police arrived soon thereafter and arrested him. Defendant

denied touching M.Z.’s breasts or vagina with his hand, touching any part of her body with his

penis, putting his hand down her pants, or removing her pants or underwear on that night.

¶ 29   Defendant acknowledged that he spoke with the police the following day and the

confessions he made. At trial, defendant asserted that these confessions were untrue, and resulted

from him lacking sleep, as well as being scared and confused. On cross-examination, defendant

testified that he would often comfort M.Z. if she was upset but this was the only time he kissed her

neck in an effort to calm her. The defense then rested.

¶ 30   Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of three counts of predatory

criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The trial court denied

defendant’s amended motion for a new trial, which notably did not include a challenge to

DiDomenic’s testimony. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to 12 years’

imprisonment on each of the three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, to be served

consecutively, and 5 years’ imprisonment on each of the two counts of aggravated criminal sexual

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No. 1-22-1361

abuse counts. One of those was to be served consecutively to the predatory criminal sexual assault

counts, for an aggregate sentence of 41 years’ imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 31    Defendant contends on appeal that his convictions should be reversed, and he is entitled to

a new trial, because his constitutional right to confrontation was violated at trial when

“DiDomenic, who did not conduct the DNA laboratory analysis himself, provided surrogate

testimony regarding the findings and conclusions of a non-testifying forensic scientist

[Kaeshamer] who actually conducted the analysis and authored the DNA report.” Conceding that

he did not preserve this issue by failing to object at trial or include the issue in his posttrial motion,

defendant asks this court to review the matter for plain error. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186

(1988) (to preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the alleged

error in a written posttrial motion).

¶ 32    A defendant has a constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. U.S. Const.,

amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.”). Moreover, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004),

the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause prohibits the introduction of

any hearsay statements against the accused if they are deemed “testimonial” in nature, unless the

declarant is unavailable for trial and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine

that declarant. However, Crawford left “for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive

definition of ‘testimonial.’ ” Id. at 68.

¶ 33    Since Crawford, the United States Supreme Court “has, on three subsequent occasions,

considered whether scientific reports are testimonial under Crawford and subject to the strictures

of the confrontation clause.” People v. Barner, 2015 IL 116949, ¶ 44. These include the decisions

issued in Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564

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No. 1-22-1361

U.S. 647 (2011), and Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012). “Each of these opinions was issued

by a closely divided Court, and the dissenters from the earlier cases formed the plurality in the

latest case.” People v. Lewis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160864, ¶ 33. Several different relevant standards

and tests were proposed in these three cases. Our own supreme court first attempted to resolve the

“split of opinion and the confusion” resulting from these three United State Supreme Court

decisions in People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 136, and made another attempt in Barner, 2015

IL 116949.

¶ 34    On appeal, the State and defendant vigorously dispute whether DiDomenic’s testimony

regarding the DNA laboratory analysis conducted by Kaeshamer implicated or violated

defendant’s right to confrontation, considering the various standards and tests that have evolved

from the decisions cited above. We need not delve further into these issues to resolve this appeal,

however, as defendant cannot demonstrate plain error even if a violation of his right to

confrontation is assumed.

¶ 35    The plain-error doctrine “bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing

court to consider unpreserved error.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186 (2005). The plain-

error doctrine is applied where “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless

of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious

that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial

process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565

(2007). In either circumstance, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. Herron, 215

Ill. 2d at 182.

¶ 36    Defendant only asserts first-prong plain error on appeal, claiming that “the trial evidence

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No. 1-22-1361

was sufficiently close that the erroneously admitted DNA evidence provided by Kaeshamer via

DiDomenic might have tipped the scales of justice against Aguilar. *** The DNA analysis and

conclusion to which DiDomenic improperly testified was the only physical evidence implicating

Aguilar in any of the charges lodged against him.” We disagree.

¶ 37   First, it is axiomatic that physical evidence is not necessary to prove defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Williams, 182 Ill. 2d 171, 192 (1998). Furthermore, the

positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction even if the

defendant contradicts it. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 27. Additionally, “[i]t has been

observed that ‘a confession is the most powerful piece of evidence the State can offer, and its effect

on a jury is incalculable.’ ” People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 36 (quoting People v. R.C., 108

Ill. 2d 349, 356 (1985)).

¶ 38   Here, the evidence against defendant included the positive, credible, and consistent

testimony of M.Z. as to the events of November 17, 2018, as well as defendant’s prior abuse. This

testimony was corroborated by her prior consistent statements to Gaudio and Papafino, the

testimony of Jaimes that she saw defendant putting his penis back in his pants as she looked into

the back room of the salon, and M.Z.’s long history of urinary tract infections. It was also

corroborated by defendant’s own confession to the police. The only contrary evidence was

defendant’s recantation at trial. Notwithstanding defendant’s recantation, and even without the

evidence of defendant’s DNA on M.Z.’s neck, we find the evidence of defendant’s guilt to be

overwhelming.

¶ 39   Furthermore, we also note that if an error is “harmless, it most certainly cannot rise to the

level of plain error.” Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 141. “In deciding whether an error is harmless, a

reviewing court may ‘determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative

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No. 1-22-1361

or duplicates properly admitted evidence.’ ” People v. Temple, 2014 IL App (1st) 111653, ¶ 59,

quoting People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 240 (2010). The evidence defendant challenges only

served to prove that defendant’s DNA was found on M.Z.’s neck. However, other properly

admitted evidence already established that defendant had kissed M.Z. on the neck. In fact, despite

his other recantations at trial defendant admitted on the witness stand that he kissed M.Z. on the

neck where his DNA was ultimately found. As such, the DNA evidence was merely cumulative

and duplicative of other properly admitted evidence, any possible error in its admission was

harmless, and it therefore could not amount to plain error.

¶ 40   Finally, we note again that defendant only asserts first-prong plain error on appeal and has

therefore forfeited any claim under the second prong. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 61 (“If a defendant

fails to make a plain-error argument, we generally honor his procedural default”); Ill. S. Ct. R.

341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited.”). Moreover, even if defendant had

raised a second-prong argument, the “second prong of the plain error rule can be invoked ‘only in

those exceptional circumstances where, despite the absence of objection, application of the rule is

necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.’ ” People v. Jackson,

2022 IL 127256, ¶ 28, quoting People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 214 (1990). Illinois courts have

repeatedly concluded that confrontation-clause errors do not satisfy this standard. See People v.

Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 424 (2005); People v. Tucker, 2022 IL App (1st) 172982, ¶ 67; People

v. Fox, 2022 IL App (4th) 210262, ¶ 103; Lewis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160864, ¶ 53; People v. Cox,

2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 87.

¶ 41   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 42   Affirmed.

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