Court Opinion

ID: 9411477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 20:05:03.942947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.932296
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 210423

                                  Opinion filed July 26, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                  )             Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                   )             of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                  )             Will County, Illinois,
          Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, )
                                                  )             Appeal No. 3-21-0423
          v.                                      )             Appeal No. 3-21-0426
                                                  )             Circuit No. 02-CF-1974
      TRAVARIS T. GUY,                            )
                                                  )
          Defendant-Appellee and Cross-           )
          Appellant.                              )             Honorable
                                                  )             David M. Carlson,
                                                  )             Judge, Presiding.

      ___________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justices Hettel and Albrecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 OPINION

¶1          In appeal No. 3-21-0426, defendant, Travaris T. Guy, challenges the stage-two dismissal

     of a claim set forth in his successive, postconviction petition made pursuant to the Post-Conviction

     Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)). He argues that the jury was not properly

     apprised of the mental state required for attempted first degree murder and that his attempted first

     degree murder conviction was inconsistent with his second degree murder conviction and should
     be outright reversed with no new trial. In appeal No. 3-21-0423, the State challenges the court’s

     stage-three decision to grant defendant a new trial on the attempted first degree murder charge due

     to the trial court’s allegedly confusing answers to jury questions. On its own motion, this court

     consolidated the appeals for purposes of decision, with No. 3-21-0426 being the lead case. For the

     reasons that follow, we agree with defendant’s arguments in appeal No. 3-21-0426. We uphold

     defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, which defendant has not challenged, but outright

     reverse defendant’s attempted first degree murder conviction, with no new trial. We necessarily

     determine that the question posed by appeal No. 3-21-0423, whether potential jury confusion

     entitles defendant to a new trial on the attempted first degree murder charge, is moot.

¶2                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶3          Following a shooting that occurred on November 1, 2002, defendant was charged with

     three felony counts. Count I charged him with first degree murder for shooting David Woods

     “without lawful justification and with the intent to kill David Woods” (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West

     2002)). Count II charged defendant with first degree murder for shooting David “knowing such

     act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to David Woods” (id. § 9-1(a)(2)).

     Count III charged defendant with attempted first degree murder for shooting Sheena Woods with

     the intent to commit first degree murder (id. §§ 8-4(a), (c)(1)(D), 9-1(a)(1)).

¶4          At trial, defendant testified that, at the time of the incident, he was seated on the passenger

     side of a car that was stopped at a red light. David was the driver of a van stopped in the next lane.

     David opened the driver’s door and exited the van. Defendant testified that he feared David based

     on a history of violence between their families and that David appeared to be holding a silver gun.

     Defendant stated that he immediately put his head down, pulled a gun from his jacket pocket, and

                                                       2
     fired three or four shots. He fired the shots in quick succession and did not look where he was

     shooting. David was killed. A stray bullet wounded Sheena, who was a passenger in the van.

¶5                                A. Jury Instructions and Deliberations

¶6          As to the first degree murder charge(s) as to David, the jury instructions explained that the

     State needed to prove the following propositions for either first degree murder or the lesser

     mitigated offense of second degree murder:

                   “First Proposition: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death

            of David Woods; and

                   Second Proposition: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or do great

            bodily harm to David Woods;

                                                    [or]

            he knew such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to David

            Woods;

                                                    and

                   Third Proposition: That the defendant was not justified in using the force which he

            used.” See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.06 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter

            IPI Criminal 4th) (titled “Issues Where Jury Instructed On Both First Degree Murder And

            Second Degree Murder—Belief In Justification”).

¶7          With regard to the first degree murder charge(s), the instructions further explained that

                   “[a] mitigating factor exists so as to reduce the offense of first degree murder to the

            lesser offense of second degree murder if at the time of the killing the defendant believes

            that circumstances exist which would justify the deadly force he uses, but his belief that

                                                     3
              such circumstances exist is unreasonable.” See IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.05 (titled “Definition

              Of Mitigating Factor—Second Degree Murder—Belief In Justification”).

¶8            As to the attempted first degree murder charge as to Sheena, the jury was instructed: “A

       person commits the offense of attempt first degree murder when he, without lawful justification

       and with the intent to kill an individual, does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward

       the killing of an individual. The killing attempted need not have been accomplished.” (Emphasis

       added.) See IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.05X (titled “Definition Of Attempt First Degree Murder”).

¶9                    The jury was also instructed as follows:

                      “To sustain the charge of attempt first degree murder, the State must prove the

              following propositions:

                      First Proposition: That the defendant performed an act which constituted a

              substantial step toward the killing of an individual; and

                      Second Proposition: That the defendant did so with the intent to kill an individual;

              and

                      Third Proposition: That the defendant was not justified in using the force he used.”

              (Emphasis added.) See IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.07X (titled “Issues In Attempt First Degree

              Murder”).

              See also IPI Criminal 4th No. 24-25.06A (titled “Issue In Defense Of Justifiable Use Of

              Force”).

¶ 10          The trial court gave the jury two sets of verdict forms, one set pertaining to the first degree

       murder charge(s) and another set pertaining to the attempted first degree murder charge. The first

       set included the following verdict forms: guilty of first degree murder, not guilty of first degree

                                                        4
       murder, and guilty of second degree murder. The court instructed the jury to select and sign only

       one verdict form that reflected its verdict.

¶ 11          The second set included the following verdict forms: guilty of attempted first degree

       murder, not guilty of attempted first degree murder, and guilty of aggravated battery of a firearm.

       The State had not charged defendant with aggravated battery of a firearm. Rather, defense counsel

       sought instructions on that offense as a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder.

       The court gave that instruction over the State’s objection. The court again instructed the jury to

       select and sign only one verdict form that reflected its verdict.

¶ 12          During deliberation, the jury asked two questions. First, at 1:38 p.m., the jury asked: “Are

       there only two counts? Number one, murder of David Woods?, number two, attempt murder of

       Sheena Woods?” The trial court recalled that it had read the three counts during jury selection. The

       parties agreed to the trial court’s answer: “There were three counts, i.e., two counts of murder and

       one count of attempt murder[.] The two counts of murder have been merged into one series of

       verdict forms.”

¶ 13          Second, at 2:10 p.m., the jury asked: “The attempted murder charge means attempted on

       whom?” The jury instructions had stated that attempt required “the intent to kill an individual.”

       Defense counsel argued that the court should respond by telling the jury that it meant attempted

       on Sheena. The State argued that the law reads “on that individual or another” and that the court

       should respond by telling the jury that the answer to their question is in the instructions. The court

       responded by telling the jury, “The answer to your questions is in the instructions,” over the

       objection of defense counsel.

                                                         5
¶ 14          The jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder as to David and attempted first

       degree murder as to Sheena. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive 30-year prison

       terms for each offense.

¶ 15                  B. Posttrial Motions, Direct Appeal, and Initial Pro Se Postconviction Petition

¶ 16          Defendant filed a posttrial motion, arguing in part that the attempted first degree murder

       conviction was inconsistent with the second degree murder conviction. The trial court summarily

       denied the motion in an oral ruling. Defendant did not raise the inconsistent verdict issue in his

       direct appeal or his initial pro se petition for postconviction relief, which was summarily

       dismissed.

¶ 17                          C. The Instant Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 18          On June 2, 2015, defendant moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition,

       which alleged, inter alia, inconsistent verdicts. He asserted cause and prejudice, attaching two

       letters from appellate counsel showing that counsel advised him not to raise the inconsistent verdict

       issue. The first letter, dated just prior to defendant’s direct appeal, cited People v. Lopez, 166 Ill.

       2d 441 (1995), and advised that it was “not possible to challenge [defendant’s] attempt first degree

       murder challenge.” The second letter, dated prior to defendant’s initial pro se postconviction

       petition, more generally advised: “having seen the issues that were and were not raised so far in

       your case, I suggest you focus on new issues.”

¶ 19          The State objected to defendant’s motion for leave, arguing that his arguments could have

       been raised earlier. The trial court granted the State’s objection and denied defendant’s motion for

       leave. This court reversed, remanding the matter for the trial court to consider defendant’s motion

       for leave without the State’s input.

                                                         6
¶ 20           On May 31, 2018, the trial court granted defendant leave to file a successive postconviction

       petition and appointed counsel, and in appeal No. 3-21-0426, the State does not argue that

       defendant failed to satisfy cause and prejudice. On February 28, 2020, counsel filed an amended

       successive postconviction petition. In it, defendant again argued that his attempted first degree

       murder conviction was inconsistent with his second degree murder conviction. Defendant

       explained that, in convicting him of second degree murder, the jury found that he intended to kill

       and that he also believed, albeit unreasonably, in the need for self-defense. His belief in the need

       for self-defense did not change between the time he fired the shot which caused David’s death and

       formed the basis of the second degree murder conviction and the time he fired the shot that injured

       Sheena and formed the basis of the attempted first degree murder conviction. In defendant’s view,

       a defendant acting with the belief, albeit unreasonable, in the need for self-defense does not have

       the mental state required to support a conviction for attempted first degree murder. Defendant also

       argued that the court’s instructions to the jury and answers to its questions during deliberation (see

       supra ¶¶ 12-13) created jury confusion.

¶ 21           On March 9, 2020, the State moved to dismiss the petition. The State argued that

       defendant’s inconsistent verdict issue was controlled by People v. Guyton, 2014 IL App (1st)

       110450. The State also argued that the jury question issue was without merit, as the trial court’s

       answers to the jury were legally correct.

¶ 22           On June 4, 2021, the trial court dismissed defendant’s inconsistent verdict claim at the

       second stage, accepting the State’s argument that Guyton controlled. After protracted discussion

       and amendment to the pleadings, the trial court allowed the jury question issue to proceed to the

       third stage.

                                                         7
¶ 23          On September 10, 2021, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted defendant

       a new trial on the attempted first degree murder charge due to potential jury confusion and

       “fundamental fairness.” Defendant and the State each filed separate appeals, which we consolidate

       herein for the purposes of decision.

¶ 24                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25          In appeal No. 3-21-0426, defendant challenges the stage-two dismissal of his

       postconviction petition. Defendant argues that his conviction for attempted first degree murder

       should be reversed due to (1) inconsistent verdicts and (2) instructional error in that the jury was

       not properly apprised of the mental state required to prove attempted first degree murder. The

       instructional error issue, different from the jury question issue in appeal No. 3-21-0423, is an

       outgrowth of the inconsistent verdict issue. Both issues are subject to de novo review. People v.

       Price, 221 Ill. 2d 182, 189 (2006) (inconsistent verdicts); People v. Parker, 223 Ill. 2d 494, 501

       (2006) (legal propriety of jury instructions). Defendant requests direct relief, as opposed to a

       remand for stage-three proceedings, because his appeal turns entirely on questions of law. See

       People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 47.

¶ 26          Due to the procedural posture of this case, we must consider whether appellate counsel was

       ineffective for failing to raise either issue and whether successive postconviction counsel provided

       unreasonable assistance in failing to present the instructional error issue in his amended petition.

       See People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 329 (2000); People v. Kirk, 2012 IL App (1st) 101606, ¶ 18.

       We determine that this procedural bar is cleared. As we will explain, the record shows that

       appellate counsel affirmatively misstated the law by informing defendant that Lopez precludes him

       from challenging his attempted first degree murder conviction. While counsel is not obligated to

       brief every conceivable issue, counsel is ineffective when his appraisal of the merits is patently

                                                        8
       wrong. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d at 329. Successive postconviction counsel, in turn, failed to file a

       certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). Rule 651(c) requires

       that counsel make any amendments necessary to the adequate presentation of a defendant’s claim

       (Kirk, 2012 IL App (1st) 101606, ¶ 18), and here, counsel overlooked the instructional error issue

       that went part and parcel with the inconsistent verdict issue. Even if we were to determine that

       postconviction counsel’s omission did not rise to the level of unreasonable assistance, we would

       reach the same outcome. We ultimately agree with defendant on the merits of both the inconsistent

       verdict issue and the instructional error issue. The instructional error issue informs our

       understanding of the case, and so we address that issue before the inconsistent verdict issue.

¶ 27          In deciding the instructional error issue and the inconsistent verdict issue, we must first

       determine the requisite mental state for attempted first degree murder. More specifically, we must

       determine whether the mental state required to prove attempted first degree murder is “intent to

       kill” or “intent to kill without lawful justification.” For the reasons that follow, we hold that the

       mental state and specific intent required to prove attempted first degree murder is “intent to kill

       without lawful justification.”

¶ 28                          A. Mental State Required for Completed Offenses of

                                        First and Second Degree Murder

¶ 29          Before we discuss the nuances that the attempt statute brings to the inconsistent verdict

       issue, we first consider the completed offenses of first and second degree murder. Also instructive

       is our supreme court’s analysis in People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104 (1995), which explains the

       statutory scheme for first and second degree murder.

¶ 30          The first degree murder statute provides in relevant part:

                                                        9
                     “(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first

              degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:

                             (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or

                     another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or

                             (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great

                     bodily harm to that individual or another; or

                             (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second

                     degree murder.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2002).

¶ 31          The second degree murder statute provides in relevant part:

              “(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he commits the offense

              of first degree murder as defined in paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1

              of this Code and either of the following mitigating factors are present:

                             (1) At the time of the killing [the defendant] is acting under a sudden and

                     intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or

                     another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally

                     causes the death of the individual killed; or

                             (2) At the time of the killing [the defendant] believes the circumstances to

                     be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the

                     principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his [or her] belief is unreasonable.”

                     Id. § 9-2(a).

¶ 32          In Jeffries, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the statutory scheme for first

       and second degree murder and explained how the scheme worked in practice. 164 Ill. 2d at 107.

       In 1986, the legislature renamed the offense of murder to first degree murder. Id. at 111. It

                                                       10
       abolished the offense of voluntary manslaughter and substituted for it the offense of second degree

       murder. Id.

¶ 33          The court clarified that the mental states required for first and second degree murder are

       identical: “Illinois law recognizes only the following four mental states: intent, knowledge,

       recklessness, and negligence. [Citation.] Murder and second degree murder each require the same

       mental state: either intent or knowledge.” (Emphases omitted.) Id. at 122.

¶ 34          Because first and second degree murder require the same mental state, second degree

       murder cannot be considered a lesser included offense of murder. Id. Rather, it is more accurately

       described as a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder. Id. The statute only imposes a burden

       upon the defendant to establish the existence of a mitigating factor—provocation or imperfect self-

       defense—once the State has met its initial burden in proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the

       elements of first degree murder. Id. at 113, 119.

¶ 35                  B. Mental State for the Inchoate Offense of Attempted First Degree Murder

¶ 36          The mental state required for the inchoate offense of attempted first degree murder is not

       the same as the mental state required for the completed offense of first degree murder. See, e.g.,

       Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 449 (the attempt statute requires the intent to commit a specific offense, not

       simply the intent required to commit the predicate offense). Specifically, the attempt statute

       provides in relevant part: “A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific

       offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that

       offense.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2002).

¶ 37          Our supreme court has addressed the mental state required for attempted first degree

       murder in a series of cases. First, in People v. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198 (1977), and People v. Harris,

       72 Ill. 2d 16 (1978), the court expressly held that attempted first degree murder requires a specific

                                                        11
       intent to kill. Second, in People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319 (1980), the supreme court suggested that

       “intent to kill” was not enough, and, in our view, in People v. Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d 238, 240 (1983),

       and Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 449, it implicitly held that the “intent to kill” in attempted murder and

       attempted first degree murder, respectively, means an “intent to kill without lawful justification.”

¶ 38                                          1. Trinkle and Harris

¶ 39          In Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d at 199, defendant became angered after the bartender refused to serve

       him, went to a second bar to drink more, returned to the area of the first bar, and shot a handgun

       through its door. He wounded a patron inside the bar and was charged with attempted murder. Id.

       The indictment and instructions stated that the defendant should be found guilty of attempted

       murder if he knew that shooting a gun through the door of the bar created a strong probability of

       death or great bodily harm. Id. at 201. The jury found the defendant guilty. Id. at 199.

¶ 40          The supreme court explained that the indictment and instructions constituted reversible

       error. Id. at 204. The attempt statute requires that a defendant be guilty of an action “with intent to

       commit a specific offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 201. Thus, to be guilty of

       attempted murder, the defendant must have intended to commit the crime of murder. Id. at 200. It

       was not sufficient that the defendant shot a gun “ ‘knowing such act created a strong probability

       of death or great bodily harm.’ ” Id. at 201. If that were the test, “then a defendant who committed

       a battery with knowledge that such conduct could cause great bodily harm would be guilty of

       attempted murder. But, in law, he would be guilty of aggravated battery, a completely different

       offense with a different penalty.” Id. The court concluded with an excerpt from Wayne R. LaFave

       and Austin W. Scott (Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 59,

       at 428-29 (1972)), pointing out that the inchoate offense of attempted first degree murder and the

       completed offense of first degree murder require different mental states:

                                                         12
                      “ ‘Some crimes, such as murder, are defined in terms of acts causing a particular

              result plus some mental state which need not be an intent to bring about that result. Thus,

              if A, B, and C have each taken the life of another, A acting with intent to kill, B with an

              intent to do serious bodily injury, and C with a reckless disregard of human life, all three

              are guilty of murder because the crime of murder is defined in such a way [under the

              criminal scheme upon which LaFave uses for its analysis] that any one of these mental

              states will suffice. However, if the victims do not die from their injuries, then only A is

              guilty of attempted murder; on a charge of attempted murder it is not sufficient to show

              that the defendant intended to do serious bodily harm or that he acted in reckless disregard

              for human life. Again, this is because intent is needed for the crime of attempt, so that

              attempted murder requires an intent to bring about that result described by the crime of

              murder (i.e., the death of another).’ ” Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d at 204.

¶ 41          In Harris, 72 Ill. 2d at 18, the supreme court consolidated the appeals of two separate

       defendants. The jury instructions in each defendant’s trial had properly instructed that the crime

       of attempted first degree murder required the defendant to have intended to commit the crime of

       murder and perform an act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime

       of murder. Id. at 20, 22. However, complimentary instructions then defined murder as requiring a

       defendant to have killed an individual and, when performing the acts which caused the death, that

       defendant intended to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual (as to defendant A), or knew

       that such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual (as to

       defendant B). Id.

¶ 42          The supreme court found that the set of instructions was improper, explaining:

                                                        13
              “Since an attempted murder requires an intent to kill ***, it is obvious that the ‘specific

              offense’ referred to in section 8-4(a) [of the attempt statute] cannot be construed as

              incorporating the alternative definitions of murder contained in section 9-1(a) in their

              entirety [such as intending to do great bodily harm or knowing that one’s acts create a

              strong probability of death or great bodily harm].” Id. at 24.

       It cautioned: “An instruction must make it clear that to convict for attempted murder nothing less

       than a criminal intent to kill must be shown.” Id. at 27.

¶ 43          Despite the supreme court’s edict in Harris, many trial courts persisted in providing

       attempted first degree murder instructions that included the full definition of murder. See People

       v. Velasco, 184 Ill. App. 3d 618, 632-33 (1989). As a result, the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions

       committee amended the instruction definition of attempt. See IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.05; IPI

       Criminal 4th No. 6.05X. In attempted first degree murder cases, courts were directed to no longer

       give the general definition of attempt, which had provided: “A person commits the offense of

       attempt when he, with the intent to commit the offense of ___, does any act which constitutes a

       substantial step toward the commission of the offense of ___. The offense attempted need not have

       been committed.” (Emphasis added.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 6.05 (2d ed.

       1981) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d ) (titled “Definition of Attempt”). Instead, they were to give a

       definition of attempt specially crafted for the crime of attempted first degree murder: “A person

       commits the offense of attempt first degree murder when he, [without lawful justification and]

       with the intent to kill an individual, does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the

       killing of an individual. The killing attempted need not have been accomplished.” (Emphasis

       added.) IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.05X.

                                                        14
¶ 44           Replacing “intent to commit the offense of [murder]” in the original definition instructions

       for attempt (IPI Criminal 2d No. 6.05) with “intent to kill” in the amended definition instructions

       for attempted first degree murder (IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.05X), removed the risk that a jury would

       convict a defendant charged with attempted first degree murder who did not have an intent to kill.

       However, in solving one problem, the committee created another. While the committee purported

       to follow Harris in specifying that a defendant have an “intent to kill,” Harris in fact had directed

       that instructions in attempt murder cases make clear that a defendant have a “criminal intent to

       kill.” Harris, 72 Ill. 2d at 27. As the supreme court would go on to suggest in Barker, “intent to

       kill” is not enough to satisfy the attempt statute and show that a defendant had the intent to commit

       the specific offense of first degree murder.

¶ 45                                      2. Barker, Reagan, and Lopez

¶ 46           In Barker, 83 Ill. 2d at 323, the defendant was charged, inter alia, with attempted first

       degree murder. The indictment provided that he “ ‘knowingly with intent to commit the offense of

       murder, did acts which constitute[d] a substantial step towards the commission of murder, to wit:

       firing a sawed-off shotgun in the direction of [two police officers, neither of whom died].’ ”

       Emphasis added.) Id. The defendant pleaded guilty, but later sought to withdraw his plea. Id. at

       324. He argued that the indictment to which he pleaded guilty was fatally defective for failing to

       allege an essential element of the offense, i.e., an intent to kill. Id. at 322-23.

¶ 47           The supreme court disagreed, explaining that the indictment was adequate. Id. at 326-27.

       Because the attempt statute requires an intent to commit a specific offense and the indictment

       charged that the defendant intended to commit the specific offense of murder, the indictment

       complied with the literal requirements of the statute. Id. at 326. The court noted that, unlike in

       Trinkle and Harris, the case before it involved a guilty plea and an indictment, not jury instructions.

                                                          15
       Id. at 325. Accordingly, there was no danger that a jury would convict a defendant who did not

       have the intent to kill. Id. The erroneous instruction defining the alternative definitions of murder,

       including intent to do great bodily harm or knowledge that one’s acts create a strong probability

       of death or great bodily harm, was not present in Barker. Id. Further:

              “Admittedly the indictment could have been in more detail and, in addition to the two

             allegations it now contains, could have further stated that the acts were performed with the

             intent to kill. However, this further allegation would have been redundant. Under section 9-

             1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)) a person may

             commit murder without specifically intending to kill anyone. However, since all murders

             involve a killing, a person cannot intend to commit murder without intending to kill. It is

             not logical to argue that an indictment charging one with the intent to commit murder does

             not charge that he had the intent to kill. Since the indictment has charged that the defendant,

             with the intent to commit murder, did certain acts, it is unnecessary to again charge that the

             acts he performed, as a substantial step toward the commission of that offense, were

             committed with the specific intent to kill. If the indictment had only charged the defendant

             with the intent to kill and did not include the allegation that the defendant acted with the

             intent to commit murder, it would have been defective under section 8-4(a) of the Criminal

             Code, quoted above, in that it would not have charged the defendant with an intent to

             commit a specific offense. The act of killing, or even intending to kill, is not necessarily a

             criminal offense (self-defense, for example).” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 326-27.

¶ 48          Thus, in Barker, the language in the challenged indictment mirrored the language in the

       original IPI Criminal 2d No. 6.05 defining attempt. Id. at 323. In the above italicized quote, the

       Barker court stated that the terms “intent to commit murder” and “intent to kill” are not

                                                        16
       interchangeable, and it is not accurate to replace the term “intent to commit murder” with “intent

       to kill.” Id. at 327. However, that is exactly what the committee did in amending the instructions

       to create IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.05X, which we discuss later (infra ¶ 61).

¶ 49           In Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 240, and Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 448, our supreme court considered

       whether the crimes of attempted voluntary manslaughter and attempted second degree murder,

       respectively, have ever existed in Illinois. The supreme court determined that they have not,

       explaining in the process that the “intent to kill” required to be convicted of attempted voluntary

       manslaughter and attempted second degree murder, if those crimes existed, meant the “intent to

       kill without lawful justification.” Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 240; Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 448-49.

¶ 50           In Reagan, the defendant engaged in a shootout with three police officers, none of whom

       were killed. People v. Reagan, 111 Ill. App. 3d 945, 947 (1982). The trial court instructed the jury

       on attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense). Id. The jury

       acquitted defendant of attempted murder and convicted him of attempted voluntary manslaughter

       (imperfect self-defense) and three counts of armed violence. Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 239.

¶ 51           The supreme court reversed the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, holding

       that no such crime existed. Id. at 241. The court first defined the crimes of voluntary manslaughter

       and attempt, respectively. Id. at 239-40. It noted that “ ‘[a] person who intentionally or knowingly

       kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the

       circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the

       principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 239 (quoting Ill.

       Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, ¶ 9-2(b)). Attempt, in turn, requires an “ ‘intent to commit a specific

       offense.’ ” Id. (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, ¶ 8-4(a)). It then explained:

                                                         17
              “The requirement of the attempt statute is not that there be an intent to kill, but that there

             be an intent to kill without lawful justification. If *** defendant at the time of the shooting

             believed the circumstances to be such that if they existed would justify the killing, then there

             was no intent to commit an offense.

                     We agree with the appellate court that ‘there is no crime of attempted voluntary

             manslaughter under section 9-2(b). To commit an attempted voluntary manslaughter, the

             defendant could not merely have an intent to kill, for that is not a crime. [Barker , 83 Ill. 2d

             319 (1980).] The defendant would have to specifically intend to kill with an unreasonable

             belief in the need to use deadly force in self-defense. As the State concedes, it is impossible

             to intend an unreasonable belief. If a defendant intended to kill with the knowledge that such

             action was unwarranted, he has intended to kill without lawful justification and could be

             prosecuted for attempted murder. In the case at bar, the defendant intended to defend

             himself. Although his belief in the need to defend himself or in the need to use deadly force

             was unreasonable, his intent was not to commit a crime. His intent was to engage in self-

             defense, which is not a criminal offense.’ 111 Ill. App. 3d 945, 950-51.’ ” (Emphases

             added.) Id. at 240-41.

¶ 52          In Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 442, the supreme court consolidated the appeals of two defendants.

       One defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and armed violence. Id. He had

       asked for and was denied an instruction on the crime of attempted second degree murder

       (provocation). Id. The other defendant was also convicted of, inter alia, attempted first degree

       murder and armed violence. Id. at 442-43. He had asked for and was denied an instruction on the

       crime of attempted second degree murder (imperfect self-defense). Id. at 443.

                                                        18
¶ 53           The supreme court agreed that the instructions were properly denied. Id. at 451. Just as

       there was no such crime as attempted voluntary manslaughter, there was no crime of attempted

       second degree murder. Id. at 448, 451. In analyzing the question, the court first reviewed the

       principles set forth in Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 122, which, again, had held that the completed offenses

       of first and second degree murder require the same mental state. Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 447.

¶ 54           The supreme court next considered the mental state issue in determining that the inchoate

       offense of attempted second degree murder did not exist. Id. at 447-48. In contrast to the completed

       offenses of first and second degree murder, which allow for the mental state of intent or

       knowledge, the inchoate offenses of attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree

       murder, if it existed, would require the specific intent to kill. Id. at 445-46. The court noted,

       however, that simply intending to kill is not necessarily a crime. Id. at 446, 448 (discussing Barker,

       83 Ill. 2d at 327, and Reagan, 199 Ill. 2d at 240). As the attempt statute requires the intent to

       commit a specific crime, “the intent required for attempted second degree murder, if it existed,

       would be the intent to kill without lawful justification, plus the intent to have a mitigating

       circumstance present.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 448. The court reasoned, as in Reagan, that one

       cannot intend the mitigating circumstances of a sudden and intense passion nor can one intend the

       unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force. Id. Also, concerning the mitigating factor of

       imperfect self-defense, one cannot intend to kill unlawfully while at the same time intend to use

       justifiable deadly force. Id. at 448-49.

¶ 55           Accordingly, the supreme court expressly rejected the notion that the specific intent

       required for attempted second degree murder is simply intent to kill:

               “[W]hile *** legal commentators have argued [citations] that the specific intent required

               for attempted second degree murder is simply the intent to kill, their assertion is without

                                                         19
              merit. These arguments fail to consider the specific language of Illinois’ attempt statute,

              which plainly requires the intent to commit a specific offense, not simply the intent required

              to commit the predicate offense. Thus, our decision is based on the wording of our attempt

              statute rather than some notion of how the crime of attempt should be defined.” Id. at 449.

¶ 56          Finally, the supreme court addressed the defendants’ argument that the failure to recognize

       the crime of attempted second degree murder results in the possibility that a defendant would be

       sentenced to a greater term of imprisonment if the victim lives than if the victim dies. Id. at 450.

       To be sure, attempted first degree murder is a Class X felony punishable by a term of 6 to 30 years’

       imprisonment, without the possibility of probation. Id. However, second degree murder is a Class

       1 felony punishable by a term of 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment, with the possibility of probation. Id.

       The court appeared to accept the defendants’ premise that it is possible for a defendant acting

       subject to alleged mitigating factors to nevertheless have the mental state required to be convicted

       of attempted first degree murder in certain unspecified circumstances. Even so, the court explained

       that it would not override the legislature with respect to a sentencing disparity absent a

       determination that the punishment was cruel, degrading, or so disproportionate to the offense

       committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. Id. at 450-51.

¶ 57          We recognize that Reagan and Lopez addressed whether the crime of attempted voluntary

       manslaughter and attempted second degree murder, respectively, were viable offenses. Answering

       that question required the supreme court to determine the mental state required to be convicted of

       voluntary manslaughter and attempted second degree murder, if those crimes existed. The instant

       case calls upon us to answer a slightly different question, namely, what is the mental state required

       for attempted first degree murder. Still, we determine that the only reasonable reading of Reagan

                                                        20
       and Lopez, and the leading cases upon which they relied, is that the mental state required for

       attempted first degree murder is intent to kill without lawful justification, not simply intent to kill.

¶ 58          As firmly established, the attempt statute requires the intent to commit a specific offense.

       Id. at 447-48. The mere intent to kill is not necessarily a crime. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d at 327. If a

       defendant believed that circumstances were such that, if they existed, would justify a killing, then

       there would be no intent to commit the offense of first degree murder. Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 241.

       If, in contrast, defendant intended to kill with the knowledge that such act was unwarranted, then

       “ ‘he *** intended to kill without lawful justification and could be prosecuted for attempted

       murder.’ ” Id. at 240.

¶ 59          The State at times seems to argue that the specific intent required for attempted first degree

       murder is simply intent to kill, but this argument fails for the same reason the supreme court

       rejected the argument that the specific intent required for attempted second degree murder is

       simply intent to kill—“These arguments fail to consider the specific language of Illinois’ attempt

       statute, which plainly requires the intent to commit a specific offense, not simply the intent

       required to commit the predicate offense.” Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 449. In the context of the attempt

       statute, a defendant cannot intend to commit the specific offense of first degree murder unless he

       intends to kill without lawful justification.

¶ 60                                           C. Jury Instructions

¶ 61          We next consider defendant’s argument that the People’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16,

       modeled after IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 6.05X, 6.07X, and 24-25.06A, regarding attempted first

       degree murder are incorrect. Again, those instructions provided that “[a] person commits the

       offense of attempt first degree murder when he, without lawful justification and with the intent to

                                                         21
       kill an individual, does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the killing of an

       individual,” and that,

               “[t]o sustain the charge of attempt first degree murder, the State must prove *** [t]hat the

               defendant performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward the killing of an

               individual; and *** [t]hat the defendant did so with the intent to kill an individual; and ***

               [t]hat the defendant was not justified in using the force he used.” See IPI Criminal 4th No.

               6.05X; IPI Criminal 4th No. 6.07X; IPI Criminal 4th No. 24-25.06A.

       We agree with defendant’s observation that objectively acting without lawful justification, as the

       instructions currently require, is different than intending to kill without lawful justification.

       Objectively acting without lawful justification is not a mental state or a description of a specific

       intent. The current instructions fail to inform the jury that the mental state required to prove

       attempted first degree murder is intent to kill without lawful justification. We have noted that, per

       Barker, 83 Ill. 2d at 327, the terms “intent to commit murder” and “intent to kill” are not

       interchangeable. We have also held that the specific intent required for attempted first degree

       murder is intent to kill without lawful justification, not simply intent to kill. Informing the jury that

       it need find only an intent to kill, not an intent to kill without lawful justification, enabled the jury

       to simultaneously find that defendant committed attempted first degree murder, which requires an

       intent to kill without lawful justification, even though it also found that defendant believed in the

       need for self-defense. We address this point next.

¶ 62                                         D. Inconsistent Verdicts

¶ 63           Defendant asserts that the mental state required for attempted first degree murder, intent to

       kill without lawful justification, is inconsistent with the jury’s determination that at, the time of

                                                          22
       the shooting, he believed, albeit unreasonably, in the need for self-defense. Our supreme court has

       explained:

              “ ‘Legally inconsistent verdicts occur when an essential element of each crime must, by

              the very nature of the verdicts, have been found to exist and to not exist even though the

              offenses arise out of the same set of facts.’ [Citation.] When offenses involve mutually

              inconsistent mental states, a determination that one mental state exists is legally

              inconsistent with a determination of the existence of the other mental state.” Price, 221 Ill.

              2d at 188-89 (quoting People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 343 (1992)).

¶ 64          In this case, the State concedes that defendant’s mental state and intent did not differ when

       firing the shot that killed David, resulting in the second degree murder conviction, and when firing

       the shot that injured Sheena, resulting in the attempted first degree murder conviction. Indeed,

       defendant fired four shots in rapid succession, not looking where he fired, and the State never tried

       to distinguish defendant’s mental state and intent vis-à-vis each specific shot. In conjunction with

       the second degree murder conviction, the jury determined that, when firing the shot that killed

       David, defendant had a belief in the need for self-defense, although unreasonable. Therefore, when

       firing the shot that injured Sheena, defendant also had a belief in the need for self-defense, although

       unreasonable. We know, given the jury instructions regarding attempted first degree murder and

       the jury’s verdict of guilty as to attempted first degree murder, that the jury determined that

       defendant intended to kill when he fired the shot that injured Sheena. However, per Barker, simply

       intending to kill is not enough. Per Reagan and Lopez, attempted first degree murder requires the

       specific intent to kill without lawful justification. Defendant cannot have intended to kill without

       lawful justification where he also believed, albeit unreasonably, in the need for self-defense.

       Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 240.

                                                         23
¶ 65          Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s conviction for attempted first degree murder is

       inconsistent with his conviction for second degree murder, where the parties agree that defendant’s

       mental state and intent did not change when committing the acts which formed the basis of each

       offense.

¶ 66          We recognize that the jury’s finding, made in conjunction with the second degree murder

       conviction, that defendant believed in the need for self-defense is not a “mental state” but, rather,

       it is a mitigating factor making second degree murder a lesser mitigated offense of first degree

       murder. See Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 123. In labeling the belief in the need for self-defense a

       mitigating factor, Jeffries observed that the court’s earlier holding in People v. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d

       186, 194-95 (1985), was implicitly overruled. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 121-22 (citing People v.

       Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 18, 28 (1986)). Hoffer had incorrectly held that a belief in the need for self-

       defense was a “mental state” such that voluntary manslaughter was a lesser-included offense of

       murder. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d at 194-95. However, Hoffer had also held that the defendant’s

       convictions for murder and voluntary manslaughter were legally inconsistent because a defendant

       could not both believe and not believe that circumstances existed justifying the use of force. Id. In

       context, Jeffries’s criticism of Hoffer was not directed at the gravamen of Hoffer’s inconsistent

       verdict analysis and does not undermine our ruling. Jeffries was not an inconsistent verdict case

       and, just months after Jeffries, the supreme court was squarely faced with the question of whether

       a jury’s determination that a mitigating factor both did and did not exist rendered a verdict

       inconsistent, which the court answered in the affirmative. See People v. Porter, 168 Ill. 2d 201,

       214 (1995). That the mitigating factor of provocation in Porter was not technically a mental state

       did not stop the supreme court from holding that the defendant’s convictions for first and second

       degree murder were legally inconsistent, as the defendant could not have acted both with and

                                                        24
       without provocation in murdering the victim. Id. Also just months after Jeffries, the supreme court

       held that the belief in the need for self-defense is a finding that cannot coexist with the intent to

       kill without lawful justification. See Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 448.

¶ 67           Simply put, the jury’s finding that defendant believed in the need for self-defense is a

       factual determination that precludes a finding of guilt for attempted first degree murder.

¶ 68           We recognize that our holding is at odds with the First District’s ruling in Guyton, 2014 IL

       App (1st) 110450, 1 which we conclude was incorrectly decided. The facts in Guyton are on all

       fours with those in the instant case. In Guyton, the defendant testified that his vehicle collided with

       a van. Id. ¶ 20. He argued with the van’s driver and passenger. Id. ¶ 21. The passenger exited the

       van and threatened the defendant with a gun if the defendant did not pay for the resulting damage.

       Id. The passenger told the defendant that the dispute was not over. Id. ¶ 22. The defendant parked

       his car, took his gun from his car, and began to walk home. Id. The defendant saw the van approach.

       Id. The defendant saw the passenger reach down with his right arm, and the defendant thought that

       the passenger was going to shoot him. Id. The defendant shot at the van and ran away. Id. The

       driver was killed, and the passenger suffered a minor injury. Id. ¶¶ 4, 15.

¶ 69           The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder as to the driver, attempted first

       degree murder as to the passenger, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant

       argued on appeal that his conviction for second-degree murder shows that the jury determined that

       he believed in the need for self-defense, although his belief was unreasonable. Id. ¶¶ 35, 39.

               1
                 As the State notes, the Second District accepted Guyton in an unpublished order. People v. Russell,
       2022 IL App (2d) 200119-U. However, Russell cited Guyton in the context of holding that trial counsel did
       not provide ineffective assistance for failing to ask for instructions concerning imperfect self-defense in an
       attempted first degree murder case. Id. ¶ 55. Russell correctly observed that attempted first degree murder
       cannot be mitigated by imperfect self-defense, and it could have relied exclusively on Lopez for that
       principle. Id. ¶ 49. Unlike Guyton or the instant case, Russell does not involve a defendant convicted of
       both attempted first degree murder and second degree murder.
                                                            25
       Defendant further argued that his mental state did not differ when firing the shot that killed the

       driver and resulted in his second degree murder conviction (which would have required an intent

       to kill, but not an intent to kill without lawful justification) and the shot that injured the passenger

       and resulted in his attempted first degree murder conviction (which would have required an intent

       to kill without lawful justification). Id. ¶ 40. Therefore, he urged that he could not have had the

       requisite specific intent to be convicted attempted first degree murder and that conviction should

       be vacated. Id. ¶ 35.

¶ 70          The Guyton court held that the verdicts were not inconsistent:

                      “There is no difference between the mental states required to prove attempted first

              degree murder and second degree murder. First degree murder and second degree murder

              share the same elements, including the same mental states, but second degree murder

              requires the presence of a mitigating circumstance. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 121-22. The

              presence of a mitigating factor does not negate the mental state of murder because

              mitigating factors are not elements of the crime. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 121.” (Emphasis

              added.) Id. ¶ 41.

¶ 71          The Guyton court agreed with the defendant’s premise that, in committing the acts that

       formed the basis of each offense, defendant had the same unreasonable belief in the need for self-

       defense. Id. ¶ 46. It reasoned, however, that because the offense of attempted second degree

       murder does not exist, the jury was powerless to mitigate the attempted first degree murder

       conviction based on its determination that defendant had an unreasonable belief in the need for

       self-defense. Id.

¶ 72          The Guyton court appeared to recognize a sense of unfairness in this, referencing the

       dissent in Lopez where “Justice McMorrow predicted the precise conundrum presented here:

                                                         26
       absent a crime of attempted second degree murder, a defendant could be punished more severely

       if the victim lives than if the victim dies.” Id. ¶ 43. The Guyton court stated that, in 2010, the

       legislature addressed the sentencing disparity between attempted first degree murder and second

       degree murder, but only as to second degree murder (provocation) not second degree murder

       (imperfect self-defense). Id. ¶ 44. The legislature added subsection (c)(1)(E) to section 804 (720

       ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(E) (West 2010); see Pub. Act 96-710 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)) to the sentencing

       provisions in the attempt statute, which provided that if, at sentencing, the defendant is able to

       prove provocation by a preponderance of the evidence, then the sentence for the attempted first

       degree murder is a Class 1 felony rather than a Class X felony. Guyton, 2014 IL App (1st) 110450,

       ¶ 44.

¶ 73           The Guyton court reasoned that the legislature could have added a similar provision

       addressing the sentencing disparity between attempted first degree murder and second degree

       murder (imperfect self-defense), but it chose not to. Id. ¶ 45. It reasoned that this suggested the

       legislature’s agreement with the supreme court’s holding in Lopez that the crime of attempted first

       degree murder cannot be mitigated to attempted second degree murder. Id. The Guyton court

       added, “[s]hould our presumption be incorrect, the legislature again has the opportunity to consider

       whether subsection 8-4(c)(1)(E) should be amended to allow proof of imperfect self-defense as a

       basis for mitigation of a sentence for the crime of attempted murder.” Id.

¶ 74           Thus, the Guyton court’s analysis may be thought of in two parts: (1) its conclusion that

       the verdicts were not inconsistent and (2) its recognition that the crime of attempted first degree

       murder cannot be mitigated by a belief, albeit unreasonable, in the need for self-defense (citing

       Lopez, the Lopez dissent, and the legislature’s apparent response to the Lopez dissent).

                                                       27
¶ 75           The Guyton court’s conclusion that the verdicts were not inconsistent is set forth in a single

       sentence without citation to authority: “There is no difference between the mental states required

       to prove attempted first degree murder and [completed] second degree murder.” (Emphasis added.)

       Id. ¶ 41. The court subsequently cites Jeffries (id. (citing Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 121-22.)) but its

       reliance on Jeffries is misplaced. Jeffries compared the mental states of the completed offenses of

       first and second degree murder, finding them to be the same. Jeffries did not address the mental

       state and intent required for the inchoate offense of attempted first degree murder.

¶ 76           The holding in Jeffries that the mental state for first and second degree murder are the same

       cannot be used to support the Guyton court’s assertion that there is no difference between the

       mental states required to prove attempted first degree murder and second degree murder. The

       mental state required to prove attempted first degree murder cannot be substituted for the mental

       state required to prove first degree murder. The supreme court has repeatedly indicated that the

       mental state required to prove an inchoate offense is not the same as the mental state required to

       prove the completed offense. See, e.g., Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 449 (“the specific language of Illinois’

       attempt statute *** plainly requires the intent to commit a specific offense, not simply the intent

       required to commit the predicate offense”); Reagan, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 950 (“The confusion we

       see here is the result of two different intent requirements: The intent necessary to commit a

       completed offense differs from the specific intent necessary to commit the inchoate offense of

       attempt.”), aff’d 99 Ill. 2d 238; Barker, 83 Ill. 2d at 326-27; Harris, 72 Ill. 2d at 23, 27-28; Trinkle,

       68 Ill. 2d at 204. As discussed, the specific intent required to prove attempted first degree murder

       is intent to kill without lawful justification. See Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d at 448-49; Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at

       240. The mental state required to prove the completed offenses of first degree murder is simply

       the intent to kill (setting aside for the purposes of this case the alternative definitions of murder

                                                          28
       contained in section 9-1(a), such as intending to do great bodily harm or knowing that one’s acts

       create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm). See Harris, 72 Ill. 2d at 27; Trinkle, 68

       Ill. 2d at 201. The mental state required to prove the completed offense of second degree murder

       is the same, intent to kill. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 122. Emphatically, the mental state required to

       prove attempted first degree murder and the completed offense of second degree murder are not,

       as the Guyton court asserts, the same.

¶ 77           We next turn to the second part of the Guyton court’s analysis, its recognition that the crime

       of attempted first degree murder cannot be mitigated—either at the conviction stage as logically

       impossible or, as is legislatively available for provocation, at the sentencing stage—by a belief,

       albeit unreasonable, in the need for self-defense. A more critical analysis demonstrates these

       observations to be irrelevant to the question posed by the Guyton defendant: what is the specific

       intent required to be convicted of attempted first degree murder and is it legally inconsistent with

       the jury’s determination that, at the time of the offense, defendant believed, albeit unreasonably,

       in the need for self-defense? As we have delineated above, the mental state required to be convicted

       of attempted first degree murder is intent to kill without lawful justification and that mental state

       is indeed inconsistent with a jury’s determination that a defendant believed in the need for self-

       defense, albeit unreasonably.

¶ 78           We agree with defendant that the best explanation for the legislature’s failure to address a

       sentencing mitigation for a defendant who attempted to commit first degree murder yet who also

       believed, albeit unreasonably, in the need for self-defense, is that there is no such legally convicted

       defendant. Such a defendant cannot properly be convicted of attempted first degree murder in the

       first place.

                                                         29
¶ 79          Finally, we note that at oral argument the State agreed that a defendant cannot have the

       specific intent to murder a victim if the defendant believed he was legally justified. Nevertheless,

       the State maintains that, per Guyton, the latter part of the foregoing statement, belief in

       justification, is but a mitigating factor which could not be considered until after the jury found the

       elements of first degree murder to be satisfied. Thus the State argues that considering this

       mitigating factor in the context of attempted first degree murder “puts the cart before the horse.”

       The State continues that, because the crime of attempted first degree murder cannot be mitigated,

       this court should not consider defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense.

¶ 80          The State’s argument fails to recognize that the completed offenses of first and second

       degree murder are not at issue in this appeal. Unlike those offenses, the inchoate offense of

       attempted first degree murder does not require a two-step analysis. The jury’s determination that

       defendant had a belief in the need for self-defense, no matter how characterized, makes it legally

       impossible to establish that defendant intended to kill without lawful justification. This case is not

       about mitigating the offense of attempted first degree murder. As defendant readily agrees, that is

       not possible. Rather, this case is about whether defendant may be properly convicted of attempted

       first degree murder where the jury has found him guilty of second degree murder for a series of

       shots fired where his intent did not change. He cannot.

¶ 81                                               E. Remedy

¶ 82          Typically, when a jury returns an inconsistent verdict, the trial court should send the jury

       back to deliberate further to resolve the inconsistency. Porter, 168 Ill. 2d at 214. If the trial court

       fails to do so, the remedy is usually to reverse and remand for a new trial on all counts. Id. at 214-

       15. The State makes no meaningful argument as to remedy, but it states in conclusory fashion that

       the remedy should be to remand for a new trial. It does not specify whether it favors a remand for

                                                         30
       a new trial on all charges or just on the attempted first degree murder charge. Defendant urges that

       his second degree murder conviction as to David should stand and that his conviction for attempted

       first degree murder as to Sheena should be outright reversed with no new trial.

¶ 83          This case is different from a typical inconsistent verdict case, where the jury finds that an

       essential element or mental state both exists and does not exist. In Porter, again, the jury found

       that defendant acted both with provocation and without provocation when he murdered the victim.

       Id. at 214. In contrast, here, the jury did not find that defendant acted both with a belief in the need

       for self-defense and with an intent to kill without lawful justification when firing the series of shots

       at the van. Rather, intent to kill without lawful justification is what the jury was required to find to

       support a conviction for attempted first degree murder but, as explained, the jury instructions for

       attempted first degree murder as to Sheena merely asked the jury if defendant objectively lacked

       lawful justification when he fired the shots. Therefore, the jury never made a finding as to Sheena

       in contradiction of its finding, as to David, that defendant believed in the need for self-defense

       when he fired the shots. As such, we see no reason to disturb defendant’s conviction for second

       degree murder as to David. The findings substantiating that conviction were not contradicted and

       it would violate principles of double jeopardy to subject defendant to the chance that a new jury

       might convict him of the completed offense of first degree murder as to David. See, e.g., People

       v. Daniels, 187 Ill. 2d 301, 321 (1999).

¶ 84          Moreover, once the second degree murder conviction is locked in place, we see no purpose

       in remanding for a new trial as to the attempted first degree murder charge. As we have explained,

       a jury cannot legally find a defendant to have intended to kill without lawful justification when he

       believed in the need for self-defense. As the State concedes, a jury has already determined that

       defendant believed in the need for self-defense when he fired four shots in quick succession. When

                                                         31
       a trier of fact determines an issue of ultimate fact as part of a valid and final judgment—here the

       second degree murder conviction—that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties

       in any future lawsuit. Id. at 320-21.

¶ 85          For these reasons, we outright reverse the attempted first degree murder conviction,

       without remand for a new trial. Nor do we remand for a jury to decide whether defendant is guilty

       of aggravated battery with a firearm. The State never charged defendant with aggravated battery

       with a firearm. This was a lesser included instruction provided to the jury over the State’s objection

       that does not survive our outright reversal of the greater offense.

¶ 86          In appeal No. 3-21-0426, we outright reverse defendant’s attempted first degree murder

       conviction. Appeal No. 3-21-0423 is rendered moot and, as such, dismissed. As our analysis has

       turned entirely on questions of law, there is no need for a remand for stage-three postconviction

       proceedings. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 47.

¶ 87                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 88          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed as to the attempted first degree

       murder conviction. (Defendant’s conviction and sentence for second degree murder were not

       challenged in either appeal No. 3-21-0426 or No. 3-21-423 and remain in force.)

¶ 89          No. 3-21-0423, Appeal dismissed.

¶ 90          No. 3-21-0426, Reversed.

                                                        32
                         People v. Guy, 2023 IL App (3d) 210423

Decision Under Review:      Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 02-CF-1974;
                            the Hon. David M. Carlson, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                   James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino,
for                         Thomas D. Arado, and Justin A. Nicolosi, of State’s Attorneys
Appellant:                  Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Attorneys                   James E. Chadd, Santiago A. Durango, and Dimitri Golfis, of State
for                         Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, and Zachary Pollack, of
Appellee:                   Pollack Law Group, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellee.

                                           33