Court Opinion

ID: 9459173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:12:25.482714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:02.948657
License: Public Domain

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached in the foregoing opinion, but wish to add this statement concerning petitioner’s claim of improper electronic surveillance. Petitioner contends that his telephone con*733versations were monitored by various agencies of the Federal and State Government and that either evidence secured from that surveillance or the fruits derived from that evidence were utilized in connection with the charges of deportability, the evaluation of his credibility, and the denial of discretionary relief.
Petitioner first raised this issue by a supplemental motion to reopen the deportation proceedings, filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals on February 23, 1967.1 That motion was denied. Matter of Bufalino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 277 (BIA 1967).
However, while on appeal, the Government by Memorandum of January 27, 1969, reported to this court that conversations of petitioner had been monitored by the F.B.I. The Government felt, apparently relying on the decisions in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), that a remand would be necessary in order to examine whether or not the evidence relied upon in the deportation proceeding had been infected by taint.2
After consideration of that Memorandum, this court, by order of February 20, 1969, remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals “for supplemental administrative proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, solely on the issue of whether any evidence relied on in petitioner’s deportation proceeding resulted from the electronically monitored conversation referred to on page 2 of the MEMORANDUM of the United States. . . .”
At the hearing petitioner’s attorney extensively and skillfully examined Mr. Vincent Schiano, the service officer assigned to the petitioner’s case, and his former assistant, Mr. James Hostetter, in an effort to obtain an admission that they relied on evidence derived from electronic surveillance. Both of these men emphatically denied authorizing or, to the best of their knowledge, relying on such evidence. They both testified that the case they developed against the petitioner “was based on evidence they secured independently of investigatory reports by federal, state or local governments.” (Petitioner’s Supp. Brief, SA 24).3
*734In addition, the Government submitted an affidavit from B. Franklin Taylor, the Deputy Chief of the Administrative Regulations Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, that provided:
“The Department of Justice has made appropriate inquiry to ascertain all instances in which conversations occurring in his premises have been monitored by electronic surveillance conducted by the United States. The inquiry has revealed that the only instances in which such conversations have been monitored are reflected in the logs of those conversations which have been furnished to Bufalino for the supplemental administrative proceedings ordered by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. . . .”
Petitioner contends that under 18 U. S.C. § 3504 4 the affidavit submitted by the Government was insufficient, since it failed to reveal whether the Government had inquired into the possibility of unlawful surveillance by agencies other than the United States. It is clear that § 3504(a)(1) places an affirmative duty upon the Government to either affirm, or deny the allegation of a party aggrieved by inadmissible evidence derived from unlawful electronic surveillance. As the Supreme Court has recently noted, § 3504 “actually places or codifies a burden upon the Government, rather than the defendant.’’ Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 56, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972); see United States v. Popkin, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972); In re Evans, 146 U.S.App. D.C. 310, 452 F.2d 1239 (1971).
However, based on the facts presented in a lengthy and complex record, I believe that the testimony of the two officers of the Immigration Service, who were active in the investigation and presentation of the evidence in the deportation proceedings, and the affidavit submitted by the Department of Justice constitute an effective compliance with § 3504. Under the circumstances presented by this record, I do not read § 3504 to require, as has been suggested by petitioner’s attorney, the Government to produce every F. B. I. agent who has “participated in the surveillance of Mr. Bufalino and everyone else who conducted investigation of Bufalino. . . .” (N.T. S-110, Nov. 17, 1970).
*735On this record, the hearing officer properly concluded that his jurisdiction was “bounded strictly by the four corners of the orders of the Court of Appeals. . . .” (see order of the Special Inquiry officer, petitioner’s supp. brief and appendix, SA 7), since petitioner failed to file any motions with this court seeking to enlarge the scope of the hearing into evidence tainted by unlawful electronic surveillance ordered by the court on February 20, 1969, which he had previously consented to on February 3, 1969. During the period between February 3, 1969, and October 21, 1970, various motions were made by both parties and acted upon by this court.5 Yet, despite this court’s continued consideration of the terms of the remand, petitioner never requested an expansion or alteration of that part of the February 20, 1969, order set forth at page 2 and in note 2, supra. I believe that it is too late to come to this court and request renewed administrative proceedings to look into additional possible electronic surveillance more than one year after the administrative proceedings have been terminated (October 7, 1971) and more than two years after the termination of the hearings pursuant to this court’s February 20, 1969, order.
Furthermore, the Government has provided petitioner with the logs of conversations overheard by the Federal Bu-rean of Investigation through electronic surveillance. The logs were from surveillance conducted at four different locations extending over approximately a two-year period (see letter from Charles Gordon, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Jack Was-serman, petitioner’s counsel, on June 24, 1970). These logs provided petitioner with every opportunity to designate conversations that he believed resulted in tainted evidence relied upon in the deportation proceeding. This he steadfastly refused to do.6
Instead, petitioner made the general claim that the information provided to him that was derived from electronic surveillance was incomplete. However, as was properly noted in United States v. De Sapio, 299 F.Supp. 436, 449 (S.D. N.Y.1969): *736conducted electronic surveillance or wire tapping of a defendant’s premises, or used such means to overhear his conversations, is sufficient to deny a motion to suppress. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (March 24, 1969) (footnote denying certiorari to some of the petitioners); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536 (2d Cir., March 24, 1969). A hearing will not be held upon a general, unsubstantiated request to inquire into whether electronic surveillance or wire tapping took place in connection with this case. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); United States v. Kelley, 395 F.2d 727, 730 (2d Cir. 1968).”
*735“The cases indicate that a representation by the government that it has not
*736Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), it was proper to deny petitioner’s request to further examine B. Franklin Taylor (the above-mentioned affiant). While Alderman requires the Government to disclose conversations illegally overheard; it does not require an adversary proceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue raised by electronic surveillance. Nor does it provide the petitioner “an unlimited license to rummage in the files of the Department of Justice.” 394 U.S. at 185, 89 S.Ct. at 973; Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969).
Since the petitioner has not demonstrated the necessary “taint” to justify the protection offered by Alderman, the Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion when it refused to reopen petitioner’s deportation proceeding. Therefore, I would affirm the Board’s orders of June 5, 1967, and October 7, 1971.
Also, I concur in the opinion of Judge ADAMS.

. His motion requested the Board to reopen the proceedings against petitioner in order “to ascertain the extent to which evidence herein and fruits thereof were obtained by illegal wiretapping and by unauthorized interceptions of the telephones of [petitioner] and his attorneys.” (N.T. Part 14,. at 12)

. The pertinent portion of the Government Memorandum stated:
“ . . . [P]ursuant to the established policy of the Department of Justice to make disclosure to the courts of electronically monitored conversations of defendants in pending cases, Respondent advises this Court that conversations of Petitioner have been monitored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on several occasions in the past. Although Respondent has stated, and still contends and believes, that no evidence relied upon in the deportation proceeding resulted from information obtained in the course of electronic surveillance, we believe that, under the authorities, the subject matter of the monitored conversations is such that the presence or absence of taint cannot be determined from the monitoring logs by this Court as a matter of law.”

. For instance, Mr. Hostetter on cross-examination stated :
“Q. . . . Do you have any knowledge, either affirmative or negative, as to whether or not any state or county official conducted electronic surveillance in the Bufalino case, and I am concerned with the period prior to September 9, 1964?
“A. I do not have the slightest suspicion that any type of electronics or wire tapping existed by any state or local or federal law enforcement agencies prior to the date of tire second hearing.
“Q. In other words, when you say you have no suspicion your attention was not called to it. Is that correct?
“A. It just did not exist in any of the records shown to me. Mr. Was-serman, I might explain too that *734I was an investigator for 25 years. It doesn’t take you very long if you are reading a file to know whether it’s a wire tap or whether it’s a track surveillance or whether it is just a result of someone’s efforts. You can readily tell it the moment you start reading it.” (X.T. S-51, Oct. 7, 1970)

. Section 3504 provides in full:
“ § 3504. Litigation concerning sources of evidence
“(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States—
“(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act;
“(2) disclosure of information for a determination if evidence is inadmissible because it is the primary product of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, shall not be required unless such information may be relevant to a pending claim of such inadmissibility; and
“(3) no claim shall be considered that evidence of an event is inadmissible on the ground that such evidence was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, if such event occurred more than five years after such allegedly unlawful act.
“(b) As used in this section ‘unlawful act’ means any act the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device (as defined in section 2510(5) of this title) in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant thereto. Added Pub.L. 91^452, Title VII, § 702(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 935.”

. The following motions and orders were among those entered by this court in the period from January 27, 1969, to November 21, 1970:
January 27, 1969 — The Government requested a remand for the reasons set forth in footnote 2, supra.
February 3, 1969 — Petitioner consented “to the request of respondent that supplemental administrative proceedings be authorized to ascertain whether any evidence relied upon in the deportation proceedings resulted from electronically monitored conversations of petitioner, his attorneys, or agents, and the fruits thereof.”
February 20, 1969 — The court issued an order pursuant to the Government’s motion.
April 1J¡, 1970 — The Government requested a protective order “prohibiting any . . . parties . . . from
disclosing the contents of the communication to any third persons. . . . ”
April 17, 1970 — Petitioner opposed the above motion.
May 1, 1970 — The court granted the motion for protective order.
September S, 1970 — Petitioner moved to enlarge the hearing into whether discretionary relief was improperly denied.
October 21, 1970 — The court denied this motion to enlarge “without prejudice to the right of petitioner to apply for administrative hearings on discretionary relief at the time of the argument on the petition to review contemplated by the order of February 20, 1969.”

. By letter dated July 3, 1970, petitioner’s counsel stated:
“In response to your request that I identify the conversations which resulted in the taint of evidence relied on in the deportation proceedings, I wish to advise you that I do not feel that I am obliged to make such identification at this time.”
Subsequently, at the supplemental administrative proceeding ordered by this court, petitioner’s counsel again refused to designate the evidence which he claimed to be tainted (N.T. S-2, Oct. 7, 1970).