Court Opinion

ID: 9393252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 18:07:31.995045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.978191
License: Public Domain

J-S09022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 DEVIN MCCALL                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 563 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0002835-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                  FILED: MAY 9, 2023

      Devin McCall appeals from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate

term of six and one-half to thirteen years of incarceration imposed upon his

convictions for multiple possessory offenses involving controlled substances

and firearms. We affirm.

      The following is a factual summary gleaned from the trial court’s

recitation of the evidence underlying Appellant’s convictions. In early January

2020, Detective Michael Slatcoff of the City of Pittsburgh Police’s Narcotics

and Vice Unit conducted an investigation of illegal drug sales out of a residence

at 709 Industry Street, Apartment 1 after receiving a tip from a confidential

source (“CS”).     In surveilling the apartment, police observed multiple

individuals enter the residence, some without knocking first, and exhibit signs

of drug use. The police also orchestrated a controlled buy of narcotics through
J-S09022-23

the CS, who was searched beforehand, given serialized money to purchase

narcotics, and searched afterwards to recover the acquired contraband.

Through their investigation, the police further learned that the leaseholder of

the apartment was Michael Shearn. The suspected drug dealer, whose phone

number police had, was “a black male with long dread locks and a slightly

heavy-set build” who “went by the nickname ‘D,’ ‘Dirty,’ and/or ‘Dirt.’” Trial

Court Opinion, 8/9/22, at 4 (cleaned up). The police utilized this information

to obtain a search warrant for the apartment, Mr. Shearn, and “D.”

      A SWAT team that included narcotics detective Matthew Costabile

executed the warrant on January 9, 2020. According to Detective Costabile,

      entry was made directly into the living room, where a white male
      was located on a couch. At this same time a heavy-set black male
      with dreadlocks ran from the living room towards a hallway. The
      black male, later identified as Appellant, was wearing a white t-
      shirt and black pants. He was using both of his hands to hold his
      front waistband as he ran towards the back of the residence.
      Detective Costabile gave several commands for Appellant to show
      his hands and come to the front of the residence. Appellant did
      not comply, whereafter, Detective Costabile and other members
      of SWAT entered the hallway. Several more commands were
      given, ordering Appellant to show his hands and come out.
      Thereafter, Appellant’s head peered around a kitchen wall and
      only his left hand was visible. Again commands were given
      instructing Appellant to display both of his hands. He finally
      complied and was detained with handcuffs. No other persons were
      located in the kitchen. After removing Appellant, Detective
      Costabile observed a digital scale on the counter with white
      residue, and a silver revolver on the floor located approximately
      three feet from where Appellant had been standing.

Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted).    A search of Appellant’s person yielded no

contraband, but did produce an identification card listing an address different

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from the searched apartment and just under $600 in cash, none of which was

from the controlled buy.        “Prior to transporting Appellant from the scene,

police allowed him to get dressed.             At this time Appellant requested three

belongings from the kitchen: a jacket hanging on a chair, a pair of boots on

the floor below the jacket and the black LG phone found on top of the stove.”

Id. at 6.

        Detectives then began a search of the apartment. Inside the
        kitchen . . . police observed various narcotics, drug paraphernalia
        and personal items.      From a kitchen drawer, police recovered
        sandwich bags and diaper baggies,[1] and underneath the baggies
        they located a digital scale, a small bag of crack cocaine, and four
        stamp bags of heroin. On the kitchen counter police found a
        second digital scale, and a sandwich baggie containing five
        individual bags with crack cocaine. Inside an orange bag located
        in front of the kitchen cabinet, police recovered additional
        narcotics, heroin and fentanyl. Additionally, a Smith and Wesson
        revolver was recovered from the floor in a corner of the kitchen.
        . . . Two additional cell phones were retrieved from the floor of
        the kitchen. A test call made by Detective Slatcoff to the phone
        number used by the CS to arrange the controlled buy connected
        to one of the cell phones on the floor. A cell phone number
        subsequently provided by Appellant did not connect to the black
        cell phone recovered from the top of the stove.

____________________________________________

1   Detective Slatcoff explained:

        So diapers are another very common item you will find with
        distributors. You have a sandwich bag, the narcotics a variety of
        which are packaged into corners. The distributor will either cut
        off that corner on both sides or rip it off.

        Sometimes you will see it twisted off and knotted, and then the
        remnants looks like a diaper. That’s why we call it that. It’s very
        specific evidence for us that narcotics are being packaged.

N.T. Trial, 9/28-29/21, at 107.

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Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).

      Appellant was charged with three counts each of possession of a

controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), as well

as one count each of conspiracy (PWID), possession of drug paraphernalia,

person not to possess firearms, and possession of an instrument of crime. He

filed an omnibus pretrial motion in which he, inter alia, sought to suppress the

evidence obtained from execution of the search warrant because the lack of

detail about the reliability of the CS rendered the warrant unsupported by

probable cause. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 7/9/21, at 5-6. The trial court

denied the motion and proceeded to a bench trial.

      The Commonwealth presented evidence of the above facts through

Detectives Slatcoff and Costabile, as well as the facts that the suspected

narcotics tested positive for heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine; the recovered

firearm was operable; and Appellant had prior convictions that rendered him

ineligible to possess a firearm. Id. at 6. Detective Slatcoff further testified

as an expert witness to opine that, based upon the packaging of the narcotics

and the presence of digital scales and other paraphernalia, multiple cell

phones, and cash, the evidence suggested street-level drug sales and

distribution rather than personal use.

      Appellant testified in his defense as follows:

            Appellant testified that for the three days leading up to
      January 9, 2020, he had been visiting his uncle, who lives in the
      second-floor apartment located at 709 Industry Street, while
      Appellant’s car was being fixed. He testified that although his

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     uncle allowed him to visit, he does not allow anyone in the
     apartment when he is not home. Consequently, he testified that
     his uncle arranged for Appellant to stay at a neighboring
     apartment during his work hours, which ran from 7:00 a.m. until
     8:00 or 9:00 p.m. This neighboring apartment was the first-floor
     apartment belonging to Mr. Shearn. Appellant stated he did not
     know Mr. Shearn prior to the days leading up to the search.

            On the day the search warrant was executed Appellant
     testified that he was in the bathroom of Mr. Shearn’s apartment
     having sex with his girlfriend Christina Cobaugh. He stated that
     after hearing loud bangs, he quickly pulled up his pants and went
     into the living room. Police then made entry with guns drawn and
     Appellant ran towards the kitchen. He explained that he ran out
     of fear because he [had] been the victim of a prior shooting.
     Appellant denied using his hands to hold up his pants when he fled
     the living room, because he was wearing a belt. He explained that
     he was trying to comply with police commands to show his hands,
     but because of his body angle he was only able to show his right
     hand at first. He further explained he had a cell phone on his
     person and had to put it down in order to show both of his hands.
     He later testified that the phone was registered to either his uncle
     or his wife, and that both Mr. Shearn and Ms. Cobaugh used this
     phone. In terms of his personal belongings, Appellant described
     that the $600 retrieved from his person was money to pay for his
     car repairs. His only other belongings were a black jacket and a
     pair of boots that were outside the bathroom because he had
     removed them in order to have sex with Ms. Cobaugh. He
     speculated that both the jacket and boots must have been kicked
     around while SWAT was inside the apartment. Appellant denied
     going by the nicknames “D” or “Dirt,” but testified that his uncle,
     whose name he could not spell, is known by those names. He
     further denied that any of the drugs in the kitchen belonged to
     him, but offered that both Ms. Cobaugh and Mr. Shearn are drug
     users.

Id. at 9-10 (cleaned up).

     Upon this evidence, the trial court acquitted Appellant of conspiracy but

found him guilty of the remaining charges.          Following a presentence

investigation (“PSI”), the court sentenced Appellant as indicated above.

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Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion (1) challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence to support the convictions; (2) claiming that the verdict was

against the weight of the evidence; and (3) asking the trial court to reconsider

its imposition of a manifestly excessive aggregate sentence by ordering

multiple consecutive sentences based only upon the serious nature of the

crime and without adequately considering Appellant’s rehabilitative needs.

See Post-Sentence Motion, 1/28/22, at ¶¶ 4-6.

      The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion in all respects,

and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.      Thereafter, the trial court

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant complied.          The trial court

thereafter authored an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).         Appellant

presents the following questions for our consideration:

      1.    Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as
            a matter of law to sustain a conviction for any of the charged
            offenses?

      2.    Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
            to convict [Appellant] of any of the charged offenses?

      3.    Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Appellant]’s
            pretrial motion to suppress evidence when the
            Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the search
            warrant contained sufficient probable cause?

      4.    Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in sentencing
            [Appellant]?

Appellant’s brief at 3 (cleaned up).

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       We begin with Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, mindful of our standard

of review:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
       a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In
       addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
       the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
       innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
       resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
       inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
       drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
       may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
       evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
       must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered.
       Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of
       witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
       believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).

       Each of Appellant’s convictions required proof that he possessed the

contraband in question. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105; 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(16),

(30), (32).   That is the only element of any of the crimes that Appellant

challenges in this appeal.      See Appellant’s brief at 15-18.      Since the

Commonwealth did not prove that Appellant had been in actual possession of

any of the prohibited items, to be sound, his convictions must rest on proof

that he constructively possessed the firearm, drugs, and paraphernalia. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa.Super. 2019).

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      This Court has explained constructive possession as follows:

      Where possession is an element of the offense, the concept of
      constructive possession is a legal fiction used to prove the element
      although the individual was not in physical possession of the
      prohibited item. The evidence must show a nexus between the
      accused and the item sufficient to infer that the accused had the
      power and intent to exercise dominion and control over it.
      Dominion and control means the defendant had the ability to
      reduce the item to actual possession immediately, or was
      otherwise able to govern its use or disposition as if in physical
      possession. Mere presence or proximity to the contraband is not
      enough. Constructive possession can be established by inferences
      derived from the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 741 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc)

(cleaned up). “For the Commonwealth to prove constructive possession where

more than one person has access to the contraband, the Commonwealth must

introduce evidence demonstrating either the defendant’s participation in the

drug-related activity or evidence connecting the defendant to the specific

room or areas where the drugs were kept.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 199

A.3d 954, 961 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). While mere presence in a place

where contraband is found is not sufficient, “presence at a scene where drugs

are being processed and packaged is a material and probative factor which

the [fact-finder] may consider.” Id. (cleaned up).

      Appellant argues that the trial evidence merely showed that he was

present along with other people in the apartment where the contraband was

recovered, and no evidence “rule[d] out the possibility that another individual

possessed the contraband.” See Appellant’s brief at 16. He maintains that

“virtually none of the contraband was in plain view,” and there was no

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indication that Appellant, who did not reside in the apartment, was even aware

of the drugs that were found inside cabinets and drawers.2        Id. at 17.

Appellant posits that it makes no sense for him to have run into the kitchen

when police arrived if he had known about the drugs and gun, because “if an

individual is aware of the presence of illegal contraband and knows they are

guilty of possessing such items, they would not run to and purposely place

themselves in the area where all the contraband was found.”        Id. at 18.

Moreover, Appellant asserts that, even if he had known the contraband was

present, no evidence established that he had any intent to control it. Id. at

17.

       Here, the police executed a search warrant where a CS had purchased

illegal narcotics and where Appellant, by his own testimony, had recently

spent more than half of each day. See N.T. Trial, 9/28-29/21, at 34, 68, 122.

Appellant, who matched the description the CS gave of the drug dealer, did

____________________________________________

2 Appellant also observed that no fingerprint or DNA evidence was recovered
from the contraband to connect Appellant to it. See Appellant’s brief at 16.
That type of forensic evidence would have been circumstantial evidence that
Appellant had previously been in actual possession of the items, rather than
evidence that Appellant merely had the conscious ability to reduce them to
actual possession. Compare Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730,
741 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) (“Constructive possession requires no proof
that the defendant had been in actual possession of the contraband at another
time.”), with Commonwealth v. Fudge, 213 A.3d 321, 329 (Pa.Super.
2019) (“Whether [the defendant’s] fingerprints were present on the
contraband is solely relevant to whether [he] was in actual, physical
possession of the contraband.”).        The distinction between evidence of
constructive possession and evidence of past actual possession is often
overlooked in the litigation and decision of cases such as this one.

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not comply with directions to put his hands in the air, but rather ran away

from the police grasping at his waistband.      Id. at 68-71.   A firearm was

recovered from the kitchen floor, a few feet from where Appellant ultimately

surrendered, one hand at a time, with an amount of cash on his person

consistent with street-level drug distribution. Id. at 68-71, 108. Evidence

that drugs were being packaged and processed was found out in the open in

the kitchen, along with Appellant’s only personal effects in the apartment. Id.

at 40-44. Further, Detective Slatcoff testified that “the discovery of a firearm

and multiple cell phones, one of which belonged to Appellant and the other

involved in the controlled buy, was significant,” along with the firearm “that

drug dealers typically use . . . to protect their drug operation.” Trial Court

Opinion, 8/9/22, at 12-13 (citing N.T. Trial, 9/28-29/21, at 106-08).

      From this, the fact-finder was properly able to find that Appellant was

not an innocent bystander, but rather was an active participant in the drug-

selling operation who exercised conscious dominion over the contraband

associated with it.   Accord Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 961

(Pa.Super. 2018) (holding evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s

constructive possession of contraband found, some in plain sight, in an

apartment where others had been present). Appellant’s fleeing from police

exhibited a consciousness of guilt which further supported an inference of

knowledge and constructive possession. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz,

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21 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2011).               Therefore, we conclude that

Appellant’s sufficiency challenge merits no relief.

       Appellant next contends that the verdicts are against the weight of the

evidence. The following law applies to our consideration of that claim:

       A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
       the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
       trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
       conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
       would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
       the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
       certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
       or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

       An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
       weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
       applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
       review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
       of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

Accordingly, our task is to determine whether the trial court, in ruling on

Appellant’s weight challenge, “abused its discretion by reaching a manifestly

unreasonable judgment, misapplying the law, or basing its decision on

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”3    Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d

1049, 1056 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

____________________________________________

3 “We recognize the inherent incongruity in asking a trial judge to conclude
that his non-jury decision shocked his own conscience. Nonetheless, this
Court applies the same standard of review to weight claims regardless of
whether the trial judge presided over a jury or non-jury trial.”
Commonwealth v. Peters, 276 A.3d 226 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-
precedential decision at 4 n.2)

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      Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting

a new trial because “Commonwealth witnesses presented contradictory and

incredible evidence to which the trial court assigned too much weight, while

not providing enough weight to [Appellant’s] own, credible testimony.”

Appellant’s brief at 19-20 (cleaned up).      For example, Appellant points to

allegedly inconsistent testimony about whether he had been “wearing black

pants or black sweatpants,” notes that no photographs were offered showing

his clothing in the kitchen where the detectives said it was, and that

“unconvincing evidence was presented to indicate that a controlled buy even

occurred” before the warrant was issued. Id. at 22, 24. Appellant maintains

that only his testimony, namely that his uncle made arrangements for

Appellant to spend thirteen to fourteen hours each day with a neighbor who

did not know Appellant, that the cash recovered from his person had been the

paycheck of his drug-addict girlfriend with whom he had been having sex in

said stranger-neighbor’s bathroom when the warrant was served, and that he

inadvertently implicated himself by running away from the officers and into a

contraband-infested room because it triggered fears from a previous home

invasion of which Appellant was a victim, better matched the physical evidence

and therefore should have been believed instead. Id. at 20-21.

      The trial court explained that it rejected Appellant’s testimony as

incredible “because it defies common sense and every day common

experiences.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/22, at 15. Further, the court opined

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that it, “as fact finder, was presented with testimony from three witnesses and

over twenty exhibits. There is nothing in the record to reflect that the court

did not properly weigh this evidence, as further demonstrated by the court

finding Appellant not guilty of the charge of criminal conspiracy.” Id. at 16.

       We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Plainly, Appellant

wishes this Court to make our own credibility determinations from a cold

record and to weigh the evidence more favorably to him than the trial court

did. That is not our task. Our review of the certified record reveals that the

trial court did not deny Appellant’s weight claim by “reaching a manifestly

unreasonable judgment, misapplying the law, or basing its decision on

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Clay, supra at 1056. Thus, no relief is

due.

       Next, Appellant challenges the denial of his pretrial suppression motion.

We consider that claim mindful of the following:

       We review trial court suppression orders to determine whether the
       factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
       conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by
       the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are
       supported by the record.        In reviewing an appeal by the
       Commonwealth of a suppression order, we may consider only the
       evidence from the defendant’s witnesses along with the
       Commonwealth’s evidence which remains uncontroverted. Our
       scope of review of suppression court factual findings is limited to
       the suppression hearing record. We, however, are not bound by
       a suppression court’s conclusions of law; rather, when reviewing
       questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
       of review is plenary.

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Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d 907, 915-16 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).

       Appellant asserts that his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution were

violated because “the affidavit in support of the search warrant executed on

709 Industry Street was unsupported by probable cause[.]” Appellant’s brief

at 25. In that vein, we observe the following.

       Probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
       In determining whether probable cause exists to support a search
       warrant, the issuing authority is simply to make a practical,
       common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
       forth in the affidavit there is a fair probability that contraband or
       evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. A court
       reviewing the underlying probable cause determination must view
       the information offered to establish probable cause in a common-
       sense, non-technical manner. Probable cause is based on a
       probability, not a prima facie case of criminal activity.

Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d 541, 551 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up). Our

Supreme Court has made it clear that “a reviewing court is not to conduct a

de novo review of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, but is

simply to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record

supporting the decision to issue the warrant.” Commonwealth v. Jones,

988 A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. 2010) (cleaned up).

       We have noted that probable cause exists based upon an informant’s tip

“where police independently corroborate the tip, or where the informant has

provided accurate information of criminal activity in the past, or where

the informant himself participated in the criminal activity.” Commonwealth

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v. Manuel, 194 A.3d 1076, 1083 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (emphases in

original). In other words, “[i]nformation received from an informant whose

reliability is not established may be sufficient to create probable cause where

there is some independent corroboration by police of the informant’s

information.” Id. (cleaned up).

      When information essential to a finding of probable cause is
      garnered from the use of confidential informants, the issuing
      authority determines the reliability of the informant’s information
      from the facts supplied by the police official. The determination
      of reliability does not hinge on disclosed records regarding the
      track record of the informant. Furthermore, the affidavit need not
      contain the names, dates, or other information concerning prior
      arrests or convictions. The affidavit must, however, at the very
      least, contain an averment stating the customary phrase that the
      informant has provided information which has in the past resulted
      in arrests or convictions.

Commonwealth v. Dukeman, 917 A.2d 338, 341–42 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(cleaned up).

      Appellant maintains that the affidavit of probable cause proffered to

obtain the warrant in the case sub judice “relied upon nothing more than the

bare assertion that the [CS] was reliable.” Id. at 26. While he acknowledges

that statements of a CS are sufficient if independently corroborated, Appellant

insists that the surveillance conducted in this case was insufficient. Id. In

particular, Appellant argues that the detectives did not witness Appellant sell

narcotics during the controlled buy or at any other time, did not indicate that

Appellant was even present at the residence during the controlled buy, or even

substantiate that a controlled buy took place, given that neither the amount

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nor serial numbers of the funds used was listed.        Id. at 26-27.    Finally,

Appellant observes that, while the affidavit indicates that information from the

CS led to four other arrests, it “does not specify whether those arrests actually

led to any convictions.” Id. at 26.

      The suppression court rejected Appellant’s arguments, concluding that

the affidavit of probable cause indicated both that the CS had provided reliable

information in the past and that the police had independently corroborated it.

As to reliability based upon prior tips, the court noted that there was no

authority for the proposition that prior arrests stemming from the CS’s

information led to convictions, “particularly when the other information

provided in this matter are brought to light including the controlled buy and

the detectives’ observations within a 48-hour period of seeking and obtaining

the warrant.” N.T. Trial, 9/28-29/21, at 15-16. Even if the reliability of the

CS’s tip was not sufficiently established by past events, the court opined that

sufficient corroboration was established by the procurement of narcotics from

that apartment through the controlled buy and from the other information

gleaned through the surveillance operation. Id. at 14-15. Therefore, the trial

court held that the affidavit of probable cause established that there was a

reasonable likelihood that evidence of criminal activity would be found in the

location specified in the warrant. We agree.

      Detective Slatcoff’s affidavit of probable cause stated as follows

regarding the CS’s history of reliability:

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      Within the past week, [two detectives] and your affiant made
      contact with a reliable, confidential source who claimed to have
      knowledge of narcotics distribution occurring within the City of
      Pittsburgh. Your affiant has had many conversations with this
      individual who we will refer to as [the CS]. Based upon these
      conversations, your affiant has learned that he/she has been a
      drug abuser for many years. [The CS] is familiar with how heroin
      and crack cocaine are packaged, sold and ingested in the City of
      Pittsburgh. [The CS] has provided detectives with information and
      cooperation leading to search warrants and the seizure of
      narcotics,   including     as   recently    as   12/11/2019.     The
      information/cooperation provided by [the CS] has led to the arrest
      of in excess of four individuals for felony drug offenses at both the
      state and federal levels. [The CS] has also used official police
      funds at detectives[’] direction to make controlled purchases of
      narcotics that has led to arrests. The information provided to your
      affiant and assisting detectives has been corroborated and found
      to be credible on numerous occasions for both ongoing and closed
      investigations.

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 1/9/20, at 4 (cleaned up). The affidavit further

detailed that it corroborated information supplied by the CS in this case, such

as that a white male named Mike was the resident of the apartment, that a

black male with distinctive long dreadlocks was staying there, and the quantity

and nature of the foot traffic to the residence. Id. at 4-5.

      Hence, the affidavit established that the CS had supplied reliable

intelligence in the past that was verified by not only arrests, but the seizure

of narcotics from the locations searched pursuant to warrants secured upon

the CS’s information. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 457 A.2d 537,

539 (Pa.Super. 1983) (“It is now axiomatic that prior arrests attributed to

information supplied by the informant need not result in convictions to

establish the credibility of the informant, or the reliability of his information.

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. . . The essential fact is that the informant gave prior information implicating

others in criminal activity which information proved to be correct.” (cleaned

up)).

        When also considering the additional fact that the police conducted the

controlled buy through which they observed the CS enter the residence in

question and come out with narcotics, we have no hesitation in concluding

that the issuing authority was presented with sufficient information to

conclude that “given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit there is a

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found at

Apartment 1 of 709 Industry Street. See Green, supra at 551 (cleaned up).

Accord Dukeman, supra at 342 (holding affidavit provided adequate

probable cause where informants, including one who had given information

that led to past arrests and convictions, provided information about the

presence and sale of drugs at a residence and police surveillance confirmed

traffic consistent with drug sales).

        With his last issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. Initially, the following legal principles govern our disposition of his

claim:

        An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the
        discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an
        appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
        must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the
        appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the following
        four factors:

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              (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of
              appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
              at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
              sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
              defect [pursuant to] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4)
              whether there is a substantial question that the
              sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
              Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Lucky, 229 A.3d 657, 663–64 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned

up).

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his issues in a timely

post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. In

his statement, Appellant asserts “that the sentencing court failed to consider

and reference the statutory factors in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and instead

fashioned a sentence that only reflected the seriousness of the crime, which

is contrary to the fundamental norms that underlie the sentencing process.”4

Appellant’s brief at 12-13 (cleaned up). We agree that Appellant has stated a

substantial question for our review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Riggs,

____________________________________________

4 That statute provides, in relevant part that, in choosing from among the
available sentencing alternatives:

       the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence
       imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with
       section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection of
       the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on
       the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative
       needs of the defendant. The court shall also consider any
       guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the
       Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

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63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa.Super. 2012) (holding substantial question was raised

by claim that the court failed to consider all § 9721(b) factors and only focused

on one).

      Therefore, we turn to the merits of Appellant’s claim, mindful of the

following. “When reviewing sentencing matters, this Court must accord the

sentencing court great weight as it is in the best position to view the

defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the

overall effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194

A.3d 625, 637 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).          “We cannot re-weigh the

sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing

court.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Thus, we review the trial court’s sentencing determination for an abuse of

discretion.

      In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
      error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
      reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
      misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
      partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
      unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.Super. 2014).

      Although its discretion is broad, “the trial court’s discretion is not

unfettered.” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 144 (Pa.Super.

2011). The sentence imposed “should call for confinement that is consistent

with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

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needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). “Where the sentencing court

had the benefit of a [PSI] we can assume the sentencing court was aware of

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      Appellant maintains that the trial court “at no point took into

consideration the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense in relation

to the impact on the victim and the community, and the rehabilitative needs

of the defendant, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §9721(b).” Appellant’s brief at 32.

He argues that the court failed to consider Appellant’s “substantial mitigating

evidence presented by defense counsel about [Appellant]’s rehabilitative

needs and the tremendous strides he took while incarcerated.” Id. Instead,

Appellant urges that the court’s “sole focus was on the seriousness of the

crime.” Id. at 34.

      The trial court addressed Appellant’s claims as follows:

           At the outset, the court stated that it considered the [PSI]
      and read the sentencing guidelines into the record, thereby
      acknowledging the same.

            Additionally, it was presented to the court that Appellant has
      untreated mental health diagnoses, is the father of one child, and
      completed various programs while housed at the jail pending trial.
      The court acknowledged these rehabilitative needs and mitigation
      when it imparted:

            And in imposing the sentence here, I have to balance
            his rehabilitative needs, which I think are significant,
            I think there is a component of this, and this is one of
            those unfortunate situations where I look at

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            [Appellant] and say, boy, if there had been an
            opportunity to intervene at an earlier point, some of
            this could have been avoided. He’s now 31, and he’s
            spent a substantial portion of his adult life
            incarcerated in some form. I’m not discounting the
            fact that he has rehabilitative needs, but his prior
            record score is significant. It’s all within his time as
            an adult, so it’s all within the last 12 or 13 years. One
            involves a crime of violence. One involves a felony
            involving drugs.       These are convictions involving
            firearms and drugs. I do recognize that there is some
            mitigation in his background.

            Moreover, the court could not have been clearer that it
      crafted a sentence in full consideration of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b),
      when after referencing the nature of the crimes, along with
      Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and mitigation, it stated:

            So I’ve tried to balance all of that, but I also believe
            and do agree with the Commonwealth that these are
            separate offenses. So the Court is going to impose
            mitigated range sentences at Count 1 and Count 2
            consecutively because I believe, while there is
            mitigation and the Court recognizes that there is
            hopefully a path for [Appellant] moving forward, these
            offenses are serious.

            As illustrated above, this court properly and thoughtfully
      considered the statutory factors under § 9721. Appellant came
      before the court with a significant prior record score comprised of
      a crime of violence, robbery, and a prior conviction for possessing
      drugs with the intent to deliver. The available standard range
      sentence at Count 1 called for 6 years of incarceration, and at
      Count 2, 27 months of incarceration. It was in the exercise of the
      court’s discretion that it imposed two mitigated range sentences
      in acknowledgment of Appellant’s needs and mitigation, while
      running those terms consecutively to reflect the distinct and
      serious crimes committed by Appellant.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/22, at 17-19 (cleaned up).

      As the above, which is supported by the certified record, clearly reflects,

the trial court committed no abuse of discretion or sentencing error. Appellant

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equates the trial court’s lack of recitation on the record of certain factors it

considered with a failure to have considered them at all. The two are not the

same. The trial court, through review of the PSI, was presumptively aware of

all pertinent information, see Hill, supra at 1117, and, as the above-quoted

discussion confirms, clearly considered all relevant factors.   The court just

failed to weigh them the way Appellant preferred. It is not the role of this

Court to substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing court and reweigh

sentencing factors. See Macias, supra at 778.

      Since Appellant has not pointed to record evidence to show that the

sentence was manifestly unreasonable or based upon “partiality, prejudice,

bias or ill will,” we have no cause to disturb it. Antidormi, supra at 760.

Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/9/2023

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