Court Opinion

ID: 9831567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:11:41.398626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:35.952683
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is contended by appellant that we erred in holding that Brokaw was not a necessary party to this action. We think the authorities cited in the original opinion, and the general rule whch obtains in the enforcement of equitable remedies that only persons who are interested in the controversy are necessary parties, are sufficient to sustain our holding. Since the original opinion was written, the Third Edition of Pomeroy’s Specific Performance of Contracts has reached the library. In discussing the rule as enforced by the English courts, which it is said does not obtain in America, the writer says;
‘‘The evident tendency of the American courts, however, is towards the adoption of a more comprehensive rule than the one which prevails in England, and to admit, if not to require as parties to the suit many classes of persons who are not parties to the contract, nor the representatives of such parties, but. who have acquired an interest in the subject-matter and in the relief, even though it be' hostile to that of the vendee and of the vendor. The general' doctrine as supported by the weight of American authority is that all persons who are interested in the enforcement of the contract must be, and all those directly and specifically interested in the subject-matter may he joined as parties to the suit for specific performance” — citing, amongst many other cases, Allison v. Shilling, 27 Tex. 450, 86 Am. Dec) 622.
In section 493 the author says;
“All persons having or claiming an interest in the land derived from the vendor after the contract and with notice thereof are necessary defendants in a suit brought by the vendee or his representatives. If the vendor, subsequent to thé contract, conveys or contracts to convey the subject-matter to a person who has notice of the original contract, such grantee or second vendee is bound, as has been already shown, to perform, and, of course, a necessary party defendant.”
In the note to this section it Is said;
“That the vendor himself, who has conveyed his entire interest, is not a necessary party. See Simmons v. Henderson, 207 Ala. 692, 93 So. 624 (though not an improper party); Fowler v. Fowler, 204 Ill. 82, 68 N. E. 414; Topeka Water Supply Co. v. Root, 56 Kan. 187, 42 P. 715; Burrill v. Garst, 19 R. I. 38, 31 A. 436; Van Hyke v. Cole, 81 Vt. 379, 70 A. 593, 1103; Vermont Marble Co. v. Mead, 85 Vt. 20, 80 A. 852.”
In the same note he cites one case from Georgia and one from Mississippi holding to the contrary.
 The movant also insists that we erred in holding that the court was justified in disregarding the immaterial findings of the jury, and in rendering judgment upon the court’s finding that there was such adverse possession of the premises by Wilson as to give Hart notice of his claim. In this connection, it is insisted that Wilson was an interested party, and that the question of his credibility was one for the jury, and that, since the jury has found that Hart had no actual notice that Wilson was in possession of the land or was claiming any interest therein, and had no notice of any facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry, the court could not disregard such findings and render a judgment contrary thereto upon a finding based alone upon Wilson’s testimony of his possession. The general rule is that the credibility of the witnesses -is a matter for the determination of the jury, and it may be admitted that there is a further general rule that the jury has the right to disregard the evidence of a party or an interested witness; but this rule is not without exceptions. Where the issue is one of motive intention, or where the interested party testifies as to value, the extent of his suffering, conversation, and other matters unsupported by physical facts and circumstances, the general rule is ordinarily recognized. The issue decided by the coui*t is that Hart had constructive notice of the right of plaintiff, Maple Wilson, .to buy the land in controversy ; and the court might have found that he had actual notice óf thé adverse possession of Wilson. The question presented is not one of the credibility of Wilson as a party or an interested witness. The issue is rather the fact of possession and the existence of physical facts sufficient as a matter of law to put Hart upon notice of such adverse possession. The rule is that, where the testimony of an interested party is as to the existence *344of physical facts such as that the land was fenced on two sides, and cattle were being grazed upon it, and where the written,lease under which such possession is held and the cattle are pastured for several years is in evidence, and where the opposite party, as did Hart in this case, testified that he knew that the land was fenced on two sides at the time he purchased it, and where no testimony was offered which even tended to contradict the fact of adverse possession, the- rule is never applied. A matter about which there is no controversy in the evidence should never be left to the jury. Pullman Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 231 S. W. 741. The action of the court in disregarding the immaterial findings and rendering a judgment upon the material issue of adverse possession under the circumstances above stated is sustained by numerous authorities in this state. Dallas Hotel Co. v. Newberg (Tex. Civ. App.) 246 S. W. 754; Kocur v. Pawelek (Tex. Civ. App.) 268 S. W. 241; Southwestern Lumber Co. of New Jersey v. Allison (Tex. Civ. App.) 261 S. W. 1085; L. L. & G. Insurance Co. v. Cabler (Tex. Civ. App.) 271 S. W. 441; Grand Fraternity v. Melton, 117 S. W. 788, 102 Tex. 390.
With reference to the right of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it is said in San Jacinto Rice Co. v. Ulrich (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 777:
“But, notwithstanding this rule, under the facts in this case this jury was not authorized to disregard all the testimony before it, and to render a judgment unsupported by even an intimation from any source that the testimony of Lyons was not true on this issue.”
In Guerra v. Garcia (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 S. W. 531, the court was discussing the findings of the trial judge with reference to possession under the 5 and 10 years statutes of limitation, and of the action of the trial court in refusing to submit a special issue under a claim of title where the issue of limitation was involved in the case, and the court said:
“We have examined special charge No. 1, requested by the appellants. This charge really was a request to submit to the jury the issue of limitation. This charge would have been ■correct, had it not been for the fact that the issue was undisputed. Where the facts are undisputed in any ease, it becomes a question of ¡aw for the court to determine, and there is nothing for the jury to do.
“We might commend this practice, giving this case as an example. The superior training of the court enabled him to listen to this testimony carefully, to weigh the same and determine as to whether or not there was a dispute. • If he had submitted it to the jury and the jury found against-his view, it would have necessitated granting a new trial, or the rendition of a judgment contrary to the finding of the jury. The court did not err in this charge or in its findings.”
In Cochran v. Hamblen (Tex. Civ. App.) 215 S. W. 374, the issue was as to the wages due the agent of an insurance agency, and the value of the agency business which plaintiff had sold to the defendant insurance agency. The court, after recognizing ’the rule that the jury has the right to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, says:
“As we view the record in this case, as. disclosed in the statement made by us, and in the statements made under the assignments above discussed, plaintiff’s testimony was not unsupported. In estimating the compensation to be paid plaintiff under * * * the contract, it must have been in the contemplation of both parties that plaintiff’s books would have to be used by them in determining 10 per cent, of the gross premiums of all old business brought into [the] agency by the plaintiff.”
The court then continues as follows:
“We believe that the testimony of plaintiff was sufficiently corroborated to warrant the court in instructing the jury as to the value of old business, as set out in section 5 of the contract.”
The other contentions advanced in the motion, we think, have been satisfactorily disposed of in the original opinion, and will therefore not be further discussed here.
The motion-is overruled.