Court Opinion

ID: 9723634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:23:50.512932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:12.047464
License: Public Domain

*36Concurring Opinion
Emmert, J.
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion by the Chief Justice. Appellant was a Negro, twenty-eight years old, and stood charged with a sexual offense for which the penalty was life imprisonment. He was “ignorant of the law and of his rights both before and during the trial of his cause.” The petition for the writ of error coram nobis charged “that the defense of his cause by said attorney was less even than pro forma." An examination of the entire record discloses his pauper counsel failed to give “ ‘entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,’ to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.” Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics.
Appellant was tried by the court without a jury. There was conflicting evidence as to whether or not appellant waived his rights to a trial by jury, and under such circumstances we will not disturb the finding of the trial court on this issue. The same rule applies on the issue that the confession was coerced by physical force.
However, there is no conflict in the evidence that there was no official court reporter present to report the evidence at the trial which resulted in his conviction. Appellant’s pauper counsel stated the reason he did not insist upon this right was that “I thought that *37was one of the easiest cases that I was going to win, because Thomas Hillman never was there and he never signed a statement and, under those circumstances, I thought it would be impossible to get a conviction.”
Appellant’s counsel made no investigation other than talking to his client and attempting to get one witness who he was unable to locate. Appellant until the time of trial denied signing a confession, which he had done. Appellant, as revealed by this record, just escaped being stupid. He had never been convicted before for any offense, and when he was arrested he was intoxicated, at least to some degree. One of the police officers testifying for the state said, “we put Thomas Hillman back into the car and, like he said, I could smell alcoholic beverages on his breath, but he didn’t appear to be too highly intoxicated.” (Italics supplied.) He was then taken to be confronted by the prosecutrix, who refused to identify him, then to his rooming house where he changed clothes, then back to the home of the prosecutrix, who, after she had talked to the police, then confronted him and identified him. Following that he was taken to police headquarters, where under questioning he signed the confession the same afternoon.
A careful lawyer would have double-checked the story of appellant. See Rhodes v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 183, 156 N. E. 389. The transcript discloses that the prosecuting attorney, in compliance with the criminal code, endorsed the names of six witnesses on the back of the affidavit. None of these were ever called or interviewed by appellant’s counsel, although as a matter of law he knew the state had listed them as witnesses against his client. Even a casual investigation of the evidence the police officers were prepared *38to give would have disclosed that a confession had been signed.
Under §9-2301, Burns’ 1942 .Replacement, the appellant had a right to appeal from his conviction to this court as a matter of right, and regardless of his guilt or innocence. Under the rule laid down in Burton v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 246, 111 N. E. 2d 892, the testimony of the prosecutrix required corroboration. Appellant’s counsel made no attempt to ascertain what her testimony would be, and without a bill of exceptions containing the evidence he would not have been in a position to present a question of corroboration to this court on appeal. Failure to have the testimony reported in effect denied appellant of a right to appeal. Denial of a right to appeal is denial of equal protection under the law to which he is entitled. Dowd, Warden v. U. S. ex rel. Cook (1951), 340 U. S. 206, 210, 71 S. Ct. 262, 95 L. Ed. 215, 19 A. L. R. 2d 784.1
Inability to obtain a bill of exceptions is cause for a new trial. Cook v. State (1951), 231 Ind. 695, 97 N. E. 2d 625; Cook v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 702, 110 N. E. 2d 749, and authorities therein cited. Earlier cases to the contrary have been overruled by these authorities.
I concur in the reversal of the judgment.

. “The Fourteenth Amendment precludes Indiana from keeping respondent imprisoned if it persists in depriving him of the type of appeal generally afforded those convicted of crime.” Dowd, Warden v. U. S. ex rel. Cook (1951), 340 U. S. 206, 210, 71 S. Ct. 262, 95 L. Ed. 215, 19 A. L. R. 2d 784.