Court Opinion

ID: 9468037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:02:33.03706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:38.797299
License: Public Domain

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Despite the carefully articulated reasons set forth in the majority opinion which holds that an aerial tramway in an amusement park is within the jurisdiction of the Consumer Product Safety Commission under the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (the Act), I continue to believe that the language of the Act itself, interpreted by taking the words as they are commonly and ordinarily understood, as well as the legislative history, dictate the conclusion that the aerial tramway • is not a consumer product and not under the Act. Consequently, I dissent.
Whether or not the aerial tramway known as the Skyride is a consumer product, under the jurisdiction of the Act, hinges specifically on the interpretation of the words of Section 2052(a)(1) which defines that term as follows:
The term “consumer product” means any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise; but such term does not include—
(A) any article which is not customarily produced or distributed for sale to, or use or consumption by, or enjoyment ' of, a consumer .. .. ”
Plaintiffs state (referring to subsection ii) that if each of the four phrases (1) “in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence,” (2) “a school,” (3) “in recreation,” and (4) “or otherwise” provide independent bases of jurisdiction, as the majority now holds, the Act’s jurisdiction extends to the entire universe of articles produced for the use or enjoyment of consumers. Thus, under the majority’s interpretation, the Act’s jurisdiction is virtually limitless in this context. It is true that “or otherwise” is a broad and all-inclusive term, but the phrase “in recreation, or otherwise” should be construed to modify the preceding words “household or residence, a school.” Unless such modification is accepted, there can be no sensible reason for Congress including the home and school use provisions which would be mere surplusage under the majority’s interpretation since the “or otherwise” term is without restriction.
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the identical statute in Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 645 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1981), and concluded that the term “in recreation, or otherwise” did, indeed, modify the home and school use provisions in subsection ii. In my view, this is a more reasonable and proper construction and I would apply it here.
The legislative history of the Act supports the view that consumer products should be restricted to those used at home or at school. In the section of the House Report entitled Basis for Legislation, the Committee made specific reference to the home or household five times in the space of two and one-half pages. H.R.Rep.No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-24 (1972). More importantly, the House Report stated, “Within the last six years, the Congress has exhibited an increasing concern with the safety of the products which consumers encounter in their daily lives.” In contrast, although many people ride the Skyride each *1336year, it can hardly be said that an aerial tramway at the State Fair of Texas is the type of product which consumers encounter in their daily lives.1
I dissent.

. There is no absence of governmental regulation of the State Fair grounds. Safety of the buildings and structure has been provided for since 1941 under the Dallas City Code. See Dallas City Code art. 96-1 et seq. (1941); Dallas City Code § 32-12 et seq. (1961).