Court Opinion

ID: 9766938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:03:41.861845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:27.347231
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Justice
(dissenting on rehearing).
I concur in the .holding that appellee is a beneficiary under the contract in question, ;-and .that consequently his action is not barred by limitation.
I am not in accord with the holding that the erroneous injection of insurance in the trial of this case was not prejudicial, but harmless. Plaintiff admittedly did not rely for recovery on any oral promise of defendant to pay damages, in consideration of forbearance to sue, or otherwise. This, counsel for appellee conceded in argument, and the majority recognizes. Appellant first objected to the reading in evidence by appellee of the latter’s deposition testimony concerning appellant’s promise to pay damages and that “when we get through blasting over here and finish the job, we will be back around with an adjuster and make adjustments on your home”. Thereafter, its motion for mistrial because this portion of the deposition was read over objection, was overruled. This motion and the briefs reflect the court had previously instructed that no allusion be made to insurance. The deposition testimony was further. that another man accompanied appellant’s foreman when the promise testified to was made. Appellee thereafter took the stand and testified concerning the conversation, the foreman was “the only one that I know his name.” Then: “Q. Without stating anything about him, was there another man with him? A. There was. He said he was with the insurance company.” After appellant’s further motion for mistrial was overruled, appellee continued: Q. The foreman, Freeman, “and this other gentleman remained right there together during all your conversation with Freeman, didn’t they? A. Yes.” There was then repeated, over objection, testimony that the foreman said that if plaintiff was damaged, “we will come back and pay you for it,” and “some one will come back here and make adjustments.” Appellee’s counsel concede on argument that liability and damages were in sharp issue .during - the trial, and the record so reflects.
The total effect of this evidence is that appellant was insured; that the insurer agreed to pay appellant, and failed to do so. To say that appellant failed to carry its burden under Rule 434 is an anomaly. Just how is the burden to be carried ? An effort to ask jurors if this evidence affected their verdict would be to improperly probe their mental processes. Texas Employers’ Iris. Ass’n v. McCaslin, 159 Tex. 273, 317 S.W.2d 916, 920. As said in the cited case, the conclusion of probable injury must be drawn from “what was said and done”. Rule 434 does not require a showing of injury beyond a reasonable doubt, and “in estimating the probability of injury, the act of overt misconduct in itself may be the most compelling factor in establishing prejudice.” The burden here was met, prima facie, “by simply showing the improper act and nothing more”, id., 317 S.W.2d 921. It was not necessary to show a different judgment would necessarily have resulted. Pittman v. Baladez, 158 Tex. 372, 312 S.W.2d 210, 216. I think there is a prima facie showing of probable harm. See Dennis v. Hulse, Tex., 362 S.W.2d 308, 309.
*554If we are to make the matter of improper injection of insurance always a “wrist-slapping” matter in Texas, we should completely and plainly drop the barrier. If we are ever to enforce the rule, this is a case to do so.