Court Opinion

ID: 9533333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:30:39.598176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:00.934502
License: Public Domain

SAUFLEY, C.J.,
with whom ALEXANDER, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 40] It is the responsibility of the courts to assure that government does not abuse its extraordinary power to take the private property of its citizens against their wishes. Because the taking in this case is for the benefit of identifiable private individuals, the taking does not satisfy the public use requirement of the Maine Constitution. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
[¶ 41] It is well established that, without the consent of the property owner, the government may only exercise its power of eminent domain when the property is to be put to a public use and when a public exigency requires it.4 ME. CONST. art. *1129I, § 21; Ace Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. City of Augusta, 337 A.2d 661, 663 (Me.1975); Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm’n, 328 A.2d 791, 794 (Me.1974).
[¶ 42] As a preliminary matter, whether any public exigency existed in this case is seriously in question. The Department initiated eminent domain proceedings despite the fact that the Blanchards were still negotiating a potential lease with the Chebeague Island Transportation Company. It is not clear from the record that the parties would not have entered into a renewed contract. Moreover, this is not a case where no spaces would be available to residents of Chebeague Island if the property was not taken.
[¶ 43] Our review of public exigency findings, however, is limited to determining whether there is any rational basis to support a finding of public exigency. Ace Ambulance Serv., Inc., 337 A.2d at 663 (“[T]he question of determining exigency has long been considered to be a political decision for the Legislature to make, free from judicial review (unless it can be said there is no rational basis upon which exigency could be found).”).5 The asserted basis for the taking, to resolve uncertainties about the future availability of the lot, the terms of a new agreement, and the cost to patrons, could rationally be said to satisfy this highly deferential standard.
[¶ 44] In contrast to the deferential standard applied to the question of public exigency, however, a determination as to whether a use is public or private is a question of law subject to our de novo review. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026, 1033 (Me.1984); Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 231, 107 A.2d 841, 849 (1954). Courts across the country are increasingly scrutinizing the use of eminent domain to ensure that property is not taken for private purposes. Engaging in this scrutiny, the Illinois Supreme Court recently reminded the parties that “[t]he power of eminent domain is to be exercised with restraint, not abandon.” Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 199 Ill.2d 225, 263 Ill. Dec. 241, 251, 768 N.E.2d 1, 11 (2002) (holding that property could not be taken for use as a private parking lot, thereby enabling a private business to avoid the open real estate market); see also 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, No. CV 00-07572 SVW, 2001 WL 811056, at *6 (C.D.Cal.2001) (finding a taking unconstitutional where property was taken to enable a private company to expand); Henn v. City of Highland Heights, 69 F.Supp.2d 908, 913 (E.D.Ky.1999) (“Naked and unconditional governmental power to compel a citizen to surrender his productive and attractive property to another citizen ... [to use] predominantly for his own private use just because such an alternative private profit is thought ... preferable in the subjective notion of governmental authorities is repugnant to our constitutional protections .... ”), vacated on other grounds by 3 Fed. Appx. 487 (6th Cir.2001); Condemnation of 110 Wash. St., 767 A.2d 1154, 1160 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2001) (holding that a private party may not direct condemnation of property), appeal denied by 567 Pa. 748, 788 A.2d 379 (2001).
[¶ 45] A public use is “ ‘one in which all the public has a right to demand and share ....’” In re Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 515, 106 A. 865, 872 (1919) (quoting Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 372, 61 A. 785, 794 (1905)). Property cannot be *1130taken from one private individual solely for the benefit of another private individual. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984).
[¶ 46] Although the mere fact that the government’s use of a piece of property will benefit private parties does not render a taking unconstitutional, a public use must be the dominant purpose of the taking. Crommett, 150 Me. at 236, 107 A.2d at 852 (holding that the dominant purpose of the taking was a public purpose); In re Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. at 516, 106 A. at 872 (finding the public benefit to be only incidental). As one court framed the issue: “ ‘[T]he tail cannot wag the dog’ and allow the public purpose to be only incidental to a predominantly private one ....” Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Fort Lauderdale, 315 So.2d 451, 456 (Fla.1975). The use “must be more than a mere theoretical right to use. It must be an actual, effectual right to use.” Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. at 373, 61 A. at 794.
[¶ 47] A use that benefits a particular class of identifiable individuals, rather than the community at large, is a private use. See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 245, 104 S.Ct. 2321. In addition, a use is public only if the right to use the property is “ ‘independent of the will of the person or corporation taking title under condemnation, and [] such use by the public is protected by law.’ ” Oxford County Agric. Soc’y v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 161 Me. 334, 337, 211 A.2d 893, 895 (1965) (quoting Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1964)). In Brown v. Gerald, the illustrations used demonstrate this notion:
If it be a railroad company, the public have a right to be transported, and to have their goods carried from place to place, upon payment of reasonable tolls. The company must accommodate them, whether it will or no. If it be a canal or turnpike or bridge, all may travel thereon. If it be a boom company, all who have logs in the river are entitled of right to have the booms used for them. If it be a telephone or telegraph company, its privileges are open to, and com-pellable by all. If it be a water company, the entire public has, and must have, a right to the use of the water.
100 Me. at 372, 61 A. at 794.
[¶ 48] Here, prior to the taking, the Blanchard property had been used as a private parking lot, with spaces allocated on a priority basis. After the taking, the same use was made of the property. The only difference was that the Chebeague Island Transportation Company was charged a lower fee for leasing the property.6 The ancillary private benefit to the company would not prove fatal to the taking if the post-taking use of the parking lot was in fact a public use. The dominant beneficiaries of the parking lot, however, are a select group of individuals living on Chebeague Island rather than the Chebeague Island community at large. The spaces in the lot are not available to the general public, but rather are allotted to private individuals. Only households with a member who lives on the island year-round and who works on the mainland get top priority for a space, and only one space is available per household. This is a particular, identifiable group of individuals. They have a private need for the spaces, which was being met by a private parking lot. Moreover, the priority system results *1131in public access at the will of the company, thus preventing any member of the Che-beague Island community from demanding a right to use the lot.
[¶49] Because the State has exercised its extraordinary powers to take private property by eminent domain in circumstances that benefit a private individual or industry, that is, the individuals allotted spaces and the company, there is insufficient public use of the property that has been taken, and therefore the taking does not satisfy the requirements of the Maine and United States constitutions.
[¶ 50] I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.

. The public exigency requirement exists only under Maine’s Constitution. Compare ME. *1129CONST. art. I, § 21 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.

. The same standard of review applies when an administrative agency makes the determination of public exigency. In re Bangor Hydro Elec. Co., 314 A.2d 800, 805-06 (1974).

. The Superior Court indicated that the company's savings at the Blanchard lot were more than offset by increases at a satellite lot, for which the company was not charged prior to the taking. Nonetheless, the cost of using the Blanchard lot was reduced substantially.