Court Opinion

ID: 9738820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:03:39.31995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.683615
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(concurring). On this appeal appellant city advanced two grounds why there should be reversal and a new trial. The first of these was that plaintiff interjected improper matters in her testimony and her counsel made certain remarks which tended to prejudice the jury against the city and incite the jury’s sympathy. The court’s opinion grants a new trial on this first ground. There were further incidents other than those recounted in the opinion of which the city complains and I believe rightly so. Although some of these incidents standing alone might not be cause for a new trial, their cumulative effect in this case was disastrous from the city’s standpoint and constitutes ample ground for the new trial which has been directed.
The second ground advanced by the city for a new trial relates to the illegal nonconforming use of the premises in violation of the city zoning ordinances. The question was raised on trial whether the city was estopped to raise the issue of illegal nonconforming use. Instead of ruling on this question of estoppel, the trial court left it to the jury to decide in determining the amount of damages in the verdict and permitted expert testimony on value based on the illegal nonconforming use to go intp the record. The city rightfully contends that this was error and that the trial court should have disposed of the issues of illegal nonconforming use and estoppel as a matter of law- Because these issues will undoubtedly arise on the new trial that has been directed, their resolution on this appeal would appear proper for the benefit of the trial court in conducting the new trial.
Plaintiff’s property could legally have been divided into five or six family units or apartments under the zoning ordinances. This zoning restriction on the number of family units or apartments was in effect in 1930 when the two double *597flats were converted without the securing of a building permit from two to four family units each. Subsequently, however, in 1940, 1947, 1948, and 1949, building permits were issued for some remodeling and repairs. Thus the question arises, Is the city estopped to assert in this action the illegality of the nonconforming use' of the property by its acts of issuing these building permits and collecting taxes based on an assessed valuation of the property as a nine family unit instead of a five or six family unit ?
In eminent-domain cases, the damages awarded for the taking of property are to be based on its most-advantageous use. Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Grant County (1929), 200 Wis. 185, 190, 227 N. W. 863; Carazalla v. State (1955), 269 Wis. 593, 598, 70 N. W. (2d) 208, 71 N. W. (2d) 276; and Utech v. Milwaukee (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 352, 358, 101 N. W. (2d) 57. Nevertheless, this rule of most-advantageous use, sometimes referred to as “highest and best use,” is subject to the limitation that an illegal use cannot be considered in fixing such damages. 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed. rev. 1962), p. 187, sec. 12.3143. Thus the illegal division of the property into nine family units cannot be considered in determining fair market value for purposes of eminent domain unless the city is estopped from raising the illegal use.
We start with the premise that zoning ordinances are enacted pursuant to the police power for the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland (1955), 269 Wis. 262, 69 N. W. (2d) 217; and State ex rel. Carter v. Harper (1923), 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451, 33 A. L. R. 269. In Park Bldg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 78, 88, 100 N. W. (2d) 571, this court quoted with approval from the annotation entitled, “Applicability of doctrine of estoppel against government and its governmental agencies,” 1 A. L. R. (2d) 338, 340, as follows:
*598“As a general rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the public, the United States government, or the state governments, where the application of that doctrine would encroach upon the sovereignty of the government and interfere with the proper discharge of governmental duties, and with the functioning of the government, or curtail the exercise of its police power; . . .”
In the Park Bldg. Corp. Case, we held that estoppel might not be invoked against the industrial commission to waive the stairwell requirements in the state building code on the ground that the commission knowingly permitted the Milwaukee building inspector to waive such requirements many years prior to the time that the commission sought to enforce the code provision. Although this court has not specifically decided whether a municipal corporation such as a city may be estopped from enforcing a zoning ordinance, the same principle ought to apply. A municipality should not be precluded by the acts of any municipal officers from enforcing any ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power for the promotion of the general welfare. Authorities so holding are: Fass v. Highland Park (1949), 326 Mich. 19, 39 N. W. (2d) 336; The Alexander Co. v. Owatonna (1946), 222 Minn. 312, 24 N. W. (2d) 244; Yonkers v. Rentways, Inc. (1952), 304 N. Y. 499, 109 N. E. (2d) 597; and Universal Holding Co. v. North Bergen Tp. (1959), 55 N. J. Super. 103, 150 Atl. (2d) 44. The Nebraska court has applied this rule against estoppel with respect to an ordinance establishing setback lines. Beatrice v. Williams (1961), 172 Neb. 889, 112 N. W. (2d) 16. The New York court in the Yonkers Case stated (p. 505):
“A municipality, it is settled, is not estopped from enforcing its zoning laws either by the issuance of a building permit or by laches. (See Rollins v. Armstrong, 251 N. Y. 349, affg. 226 App. Div. 687; Village of North Pelham v. Ohliger, 245 N. Y. 593, affg. 216 App. Div. 728.)”
*599See also 19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, p. 820, sec. 168; 31 C. J. S., Estoppel, p. 421, sec. 142.
There is a broad area, apart from matters of the police power in which the rule against estoppel should be applied, in which estoppel may be raised against a municipal corporation such as when it engages in a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental function, or when its financial operations such as in tax matters and claims for damages are involved. In dealing with matters of police power, however, the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of the municipality are at stake. Thus the power of the city to act effectively to enforce ordinances which guard such safety, health, and welfare should never be precluded on the ground that some municipal officer, in plain disregard of the provisions of a zoning ordinance, may have issued a building permit many years before which authorized the improvement of the property for a use prohibited by the ordinance.