Court Opinion

ID: 9852693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:34:59.90156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:32.367042
License: Public Domain

Rhodes, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion. I feel Martin v. Ellisor, 264 S. C. 202, 213 S. E. (2d) 732 (1975), is factually and legally distinguishable, and does not control the disposition of this appeal. The instant case involved acts within Richland County and the injunction issued by the trial judge was not general in application but restricted to Harden only. The pertinent part of the order states:
“It is ordered, that the Defendants [appellants] are permanently enjoined from conducting such a hearing with regard to the Plaintiff’s [Harden] alleged refusal to take the chemical test on January 1, 1975, and further enjoined from changing the Plaintiff’s driving status for his alleged refusal to take such a test.”
Martin involved the interpretation of a provision in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), S. C. Code § 1-20 et seq. (1962). The purpose of the suit was to obtain a copy of computer tapes containing the names of all registered voters in South Carolina. Additionally, the FOIA expressly provided that “[a]ny citizen of the State may apply to the circuit court for injunctive relief to enforce the provisions of this article in appropriate cases.” (emphasis added) S. C. Code § 1-20.4 (1962).
Therefore, I would reverse and remand on the ground that there exists no basis in this record which justified the refusal of the trial judge to allow appellants to answer on the merits after he had overruled the demurrer interposed by them. S. C. Code § 10-644 (1962); See Conch Creek Corp. v. Guess, S. C., 219 S. E. (2d) 575 (1975) (1975, Smith’s Advance Sheets No. 31).
Ness, J., concurs.