Court Opinion

ID: 9478633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:53:31.735337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:31.669074
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Although I join in Judge Hall’s dissent, I write separately to add a few words.
*1457First, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to dismiss actions on grounds akin to jurisdictional even after prolonged litigation. In Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363, 93 S.Ct. 647, 34 L.Ed.2d 577 (1973), the Court dismissed the action, finding that the defendant’s actions were immune from the antitrust laws. The dismissal took place some eleven years after the suit began and seven years after the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the same issue and did not.1 Hughes Tool Co., 409 U.S. at 392, 93 S.Ct. at 663 (Chief Justice Burger dissenting). Merely because the Catawbas’ suit has been in the court system for some time and the Supreme Court has addressed the suit without explicitly considering jurisdiction is no reason to shy away from the jurisdictional issue. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534-35 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378 n. 5, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).
Second, I see no reason why the presumption of possession relied upon by the Catawbas to save their action from South Carolina’s statute of limitations is not rebutted by the Catawbas’ judicial admission that they had been out of possession for 140 years when they filed suit. Although there are no South Carolina cases, similar presumptions in other States have been subject to rebuttal. See Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232, 270 P.2d 830 (1954). In Kirkman v. Holland, 139 N.C. 185, 51 S.E. 856, 857 (1905), the court would not even consider the presumption of possession arising from a statute indistinguishable from the one at issue here, given a judicial admission rebutting it. In South Carolina, the “allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader.” Elrod v. All, 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410, 416 (1964). In their complaint, the Catawbas admit being out of possession since 1840. The presumption of possession in favor of the Catawbas, assuming arguendo that they have “legal title,” has therefore been rebutted. The majority’s approach, not permitting the defendants to rebut the presumption of possession once legal title is established (except by adverse possession), defeats the very purpose of South Carolina’s statute of limitations by allowing a stale claim. If South Carolina had intended to give parties who could establish “legal title” no time limit to file suit, it could have done so instead of merely creating a presumption of possession. Civil presumptions in South Carolina are usually rebuttable. Palm v. General Painting Co. Inc., 296 S.C. 41, 370 S.E.2d 463, 466 (1988) (presumption of legitimacy when born in wedlock); McDowell v. S.C. Dept. of Social Services, 296 S.C. 89, 370 S.E.2d 878, 880 (App.1987) (presumption of gift to a close relative); Touchberry v. City of Florence, 295 S.C. 47, 367 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1988) (presumption that public contract not enforceable by an individual as third party beneficiary); Mathias v. Hicks, 363 S.E.2d 914, 916 (S.C.App.1987) (presumption that collateral is worth indebtedness); Woods v. Bivens, 292 S.C. 76, 354 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1987) (presumption that possession of one tenant in common is possession by all); Estate of Mason v. Mason, *1458289 S.C. 273, 346 S.E.2d 28, 31 (App.1986) (presumption that a missing will was destroyed by testator); McBride v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 140 S.C. 260, 138 S.E. 803, 807 (1927) (presumption that when railroad fails to use warning signals that the failure is proximate cause of injury); McMillan v. General American Life Ins. Co., 194 S.C. 146, 9 S.E.2d 562, 574-75 (1940) (presumption against suicide). Logic and South Carolina precedent require, I think, the conclusion that the presumption of possession created in S.C.Code § 15-67-210 is also rebuttable and has been rebutted in this case by the admission of the Catawbas.
Circuit Judge HALL, joins in this dissent.

. In 1964, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, but, after oral argument and briefing, which included the issues upon which the case was ultimately decided, in 1965 dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. Hughes Tool Co., 409 U.S. at 391-92, 93 S.Ct. at 662-63. The Court nevertheless did not hesitate to dismiss the suit on the same grounds in 1973 when the case was there a second time.
I have used the words "akin to jurisdictional” in an abundance of caution and out of deference to the Court in Hughes Tool which stated that the Federal Aviation Act did not "completely replace” the antitrust laws. Of course if Hughes Tool is not purely jurisdictional, it is an even stronger precedent for my point of view than a case decided on a question relating purely to subject matter jurisdiction. In this respect, I note that the Second Circuit, in an earlier appeal in this same case, Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602 (2d Cir.1964), treated the question as jurisdictional and that Sullivan in his treatise, Antitrust, West 1977, p. 746, et seq, considers the question one of primary jurisdiction. I also note that the Court in Hughes Tool, 409 U.S. at 364, 365, n. 1, 93 S.Ct. at 650, n. 1, as precedent for proceeding as it did, relied tin Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 62 S.Ct. 15, 86 L.Ed. 47 (1941), in which case a question of jurisdiction which had been presented to the Court, but not decided, was later decided upon subsequent consideration by the Court.