Court Opinion

ID: 9660485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:14:28.880152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:19.980172
License: Public Domain

STEAKLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Consuelo Serna Lorusso sued' Armando Valdez, Jr., for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident. She joined her insurance carrier, Members Mutual, alleging that Valdez was uninsured and thus, as to this, invoked her policy coverage. Members Mutual filed a third party action against Valdez for indemnity. Before selection of the jury, Lorusso, who was allowed six peremptory jury challenges, objected to the allowance by the trial court of six peremptory challenges each to Valdez and Members Mutual, the two parties aligned on the opposing side. The following extract from the trial of the cause was brought forward:
Be it remembered that on this the 13th day of February, 1978, concluding on the 15th day of February, 1978, the above entitled and numbered cause came on for trial before said Honorable Court, Charles R. Schulte, Judge Presiding, with a jury, and the following proceedings, as requested by Counsel, were extracted from the trial of said cause as follows:
THE COURT: Prior to the selection of the Jury in this cause, the Counsel for the Plaintiff objected to the Court’s extending to the Defendants, and each of them, six peremptory challenges. Position of Plaintiff being that the Defendants were entitled to six challenges, peremptory challenges between the two of them. The Court at that time indicated that on paper the adversity appeared of record. That there was a suit for damages over and against the individual Defendant Armando Valdez, Jr. on behalf of Members Mutual Insurance Company, a Third-Party Complaint, by virtue of which the Court felt compelled to extend to each of the Defendants six challenges to which Mr. Ben Endlich on behalf of the Plaintiff excepted. Do you wish to add to that, sir?
MR. ENDLICH: Yes, Your Honor. If it please the Court, along with the objection of Counsel would like to point out that the attorney for Armando Valdez, Jr., Mr. Bowen, as reflected in the deposition taken of Kenneth Compton on January the 19th, 1978, waived his presence; and appearing at the deposition, only, was Ben Endlich and Mr. Tatem, reflecting that Mr. Bowen, in fact, relied upon the actions and the cross-examination by Mr. Tatem of that witness. And that, likewise, the deposition taken of Dr. Mario Palafox, taken on the 6th day of Feb*823ruary, 1978, it reflects therein at page 3 of the deposition that Mr. Bowen, Attorney for Mr. Valdez, waived appearance at the taking of this deposition indicating that, in fact, the interests of the parties are mutual.
Also, the fact that Mr. Bowen and Mr. Tatem took their strikes together in a common room, each advising the other, I’m sure, of what strikes the other was taking.
This Counsel submits that on the face of the pleadings, the interests may be conflicting; however, that in actuality during the course of the trial the interests of the parties will be mutual. And that that being the case, the opportunity to strike together is an overwhelming opportunity that deprives this Counsel of a fair jury selection in allowing the Defendants mutually six extra strikes.
THE COURT: Exceptions overruled.
There is included in the transcript a list of thirty jurors. The names of six jurors on the list are marked through; whether they were dismissed on the basis of a challenge for cause, or were subject to the exercise of a peremptory challenge by one or more of the parties, cannot be determined. The list also indicates eleven jurors who were selected. The verdict, however, is signed by twelve jurors; the name of one of the twelve does not appear on the list of jurors.
Upon trial the jury found that both Lo-russo and Valdez were negligent in certain respects and apportioned the percentage of negligence that proximately caused the occurrence 80% to Lorusso and 20% to Valdez. The jury also answered “None” to the issue inquiring if Lorusso suffered any injuries or damages. Based on the jury verdict, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment against Lorusso.
I agree with the writing and determination by the Court of Civil Appeals in both the majority and dissenting opinions that no antagonism existed between Valdez and Members Mutual with respect to a question the jury would decide, and that the allowance of six strikes each to them was error.
The question upon which the Court of Civil Appeals divided, and upon which we granted writ of error, is whether under the appellate record, and as required by Rule 503, Tex.R.Civ.P., “the error amounted to such a denial of the rights of [Lorusso] as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case.” The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that it did not. 580 S.W.2d 72.
A peremptory jury challenge is defined by Rule 2321 as one “without assigning any reason therefor.” Each party to a district court civil suit “shall be entitled to six peremptory challenges.” Rule 233. Article 2151a, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. was enacted by the Legislature in 1971. It provides:
After proper alignment of parties, it shall be the duty of the court to equalize the number of peremptory challenges provided under Rule 233, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Annotated, in accordance with the ends of justice so that no party is given an unequal advantage because of the number of peremptory challenges allowed that party.
We have written in the two contexts in which the problem of allocating peremptory strikes arises, i. e., where there is antagonism between litigants on the same side of the docket, see Patterson Dental Company v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.1980) and Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.1965); and where, as here, there is no antagonism, see Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.1974). In Perkins we wrote:
. We are of the opinion that the awarding of six peremptory challenges to both the defendant and the intervenors gave them an unequal advantage; and that this unequal advantage was so materially unfair that the judgment cannot be upheld.
The award to the defendant and inter-venors of double the amount of peremptory challenges to which they were not entitled is calculated to cause the trial to *824be materially unfair. Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.1965); Tuloma Gas Products Company v. Lehmberg, 430 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Civ.App.1968, writ ref. n. r. e.).
Id. at 534.
It is to be noted that the record in Perkins v. Freeman included a statement of facts upon a review of which the Court of Civil Appeals did not find that the error in the award of peremptory challenges probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Cited was Rule 434. However, no reference was made to the statement of facts in the opinion of this Court reversing the judgments of the trial court and of the Court of Civil Appeals, and remanding the cause for a new trial.
In stating the threshold question in Patterson Dental Company v. Dunn, i. e., whether there was antagonism on the same side, we commented, “Where no antagonism exists, each side must receive the same number of strikes.” Cited were Perkins v. Freeman, and intermediate court decisions to the same effect. Referring to Tamburel-lo, we wrote:
. We relaxed the requirement of the traditional “harmless error” rule by establishing the burden on the complaining party to show that “the trial which resulted against him was materially unfair” and held that the denial of strikes to each defendant, without any further showing, resulted in a trial that was so materially unfair that the judgment must be reversed.
In Perkins v. Freeman, supra, a child custody case, the plaintiff-mother was given six strikes, the defendant-father was given six, and the intervenors, paternal grandparents, were given six. Because the pleadings demonstrated that no antagonism existed between the father and his parents, we reversed and remanded, holding that their twelve strikes gave them “an unequal advantage, [that] was so materially unfair that the judgment cannot be upheld.” Id. at 534. No further showing of harm was made or discussed.
Normally, the question whether the trial was materially unfair in either the determination of antagonism or the equalizing of strikes requires that the entire record, including the statement of facts, be examined by the appellate court.
592 S.W.2d 914 at 921.
In Tamburello, we commented that the harmless error rule undoubtedly applies where a party is denied the number of peremptory challenges to which he is entitled; we recognized, however, that an appellant will usually be unable to show that an improper judgment probably resulted from an error of this nature. We also noted that the parties not given the challenges to which they were entitled made no attempt to give their reasons for wishing to challenge three of the jurors who served on the case, and did not offer any proof indicating that the individuals named by them were biased, prejudiced, or failed to render an impartial verdict. Finally, we said that the proper approach to the question of harm is whether the denial of jury challenges to which the party is entitled resulted in a materially unfair trial; and we held that it did. Perkins v. Freeman then followed by saying in the non-antagonism context that an award of excess peremptory challenges results in an unequal advantage so materially unfair as to require a reversal of the judgment.
So we reach the present case. From the record, including unchallenged statements in the briefs of the parties, see Rules 419 and 496, we can determine the following:
(1) Lorusso objected to the award of six strikes each to Valdez and Members Mutual between whom there was no antagonism on an issue to be decided, by the jury. Lorusso did not move that she be given six additional strikes to equalize the twelve given to Valdez and Members Mutual.
(2) Valdez and Members Mutual collaborated in the exercise of their twelve strikes. Lorusso did not move that they not be allowed to strike together.
(3) The trial was vigorously contested with the jury findings substantially *825more unfavorable to Lorusso than to Valdez.
Among other things, the jury found that Lorusso failed to keep a lookout; that she failed to make a proper application of the brakes of her vehicle; that she began to turn left when the vehicle driven by Valdez was within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard. As previously noted, the jury assessed 80% of the negligence to Lorusso and 20% to Valdez.
Contrariwise, we cannot determine how the parties exercised their challenges, i. e., whether all were exercised, or whether there were double strikes. Nor can we determine if there were any challenges for cause or, if so, by whom and whether sustained or denied. The inference can perhaps be fairly drawn that Valdez and Members Mutual used their strikes from these statements by the parties. Lorusso in her application for writ of error argued:
How can a party whose opponents, utilize twice as many strikes as she does and exercise those strikes in a room together be assured of a fair and impartial jury? The answer is that she cannot. How can a party in a case in which the jury is almost certainly disposed to her opponents receive a trial which is not materially unfair? She cannot. Petitioner cannot agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that she must preclude, by means of a full statement of facts, that the great weight of the evidence might have compelled a finding that she was eontributo-rily negligent or that she was not hurt.
There was no challenge to the assertion that Valdez and Members Mutual utilized “twice as many strikes” beyond the following in the answer of Valdez and Members Mutual to the application for writ:
The fact that Respondents chose to exercise their strikes together after they had been awarded their peremptory challenges by the Court, when no motion had been made that Respondents not be allowed to strike together, cannot be used as a basis for showing that six (6) separate strikes should not have been awarded.
Since we do not have a complete state of facts, we do not know the factual circumstances surrounding the occurrence in question; and we cannot evaluate the evidence favorable or unfavorable to the respective parties. Nor can we determine if Lorusso suffered injuries or damages contrary to the jury finding that she did not. It is the burden of an appealing party claiming reversible error in the award of peremptory challenges to bring forward a record sufficiently complete to demonstrate that the error probably resulted in a materially unfair trial. This conclusion should not be presumed from the fact of the error, standing alone, and necessarily must be determined in the light of the record available to the appellate court. This does not mean that a complete statement of facts is prerequisite in all instances. In Patterson v. Dunn, supra, we ruled that a disparity of strikes of as much as 4-to-l results in a materially unfair trial as a matter of law. We did so in the absence of a statement of facts demonstrating that the non-complaining party would otherwise have been entitled to a judgment or that the case was not seriously disputed on its facts.
The 2-to-l disparity here where there was no antagonism presents the same situation of harm to Lorusso that was recognized in Dunn, the plaintiff, in Patterson v. Dunn. Consistent with Patterson v. Dunn and Perkins v. Freeman, I would hold under the record here that the allowance by the trial court of six peremptory challenges each to Valdez and Members Mutual who were non-antagonistic parties on the defensive side of the docket, while allowing Lorusso, the plaintiff, only six peremptory challenges, resulted in a materially unfair trial requiring a reversal of the judgments below, and a remand of the cause for another trial.
DENTON, CAMPBELL and SPEARS, JJ., join in this dissent.

. The references are to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.