Court Opinion

ID: 9762572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:26:40.169638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.554901
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 1 I find much in the majority opinion with which I agree in principle. We differ in the application of those principles to the problem before us. Petitioner absconded after his guilty plea and thus, it is more than fair to conclude that he waived the right to interpose any challenge to the conviction of a felony based on that plea.1 However, in a negotiated plea, the sentence ultimately imposed can affect the voluntariness of the plea which supports the conviction. Where the district court decides to impose a sentence other than the agreed sentence for which the Petitioner has exchanged his right to trial by jury, the plea induced is to that extent not knowing and voluntary, and the district court should grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea. Morgan v. State, 33 Okl.Cr. 277, 281-82, 243 P. 993, 994-95 (1926) (finding district court should grant motion to withdraw a guilty plea induced by assurances from the court that defendant would receive a particular sentence, which the district court later refused to impose). Where a district court abuses its discretion in the matter, this Court will ordinarily grant the writ of certio-rari, vacate the conviction obtained as a result of the guilty plea, and remand the case for further proceedings.
¶ 2 The record shows that the district court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment twice the agreed sentence that induced his plea, which would typically require this Court to issue the writ. However, the Court correctly finds that vacating the conviction here would miscarry justice, because Petitioner’s thirty year flight has prejudiced the State’s ability to try him. Although Petitioner’s plea was clearly induced by the promise of a five year sentence that he ultimately did not receive, the Court concludes Petitioner’s misconduct has forfeited his right to appeal.
¶ 3 I would not go so far. It is not a mere guilty plea or a district court’s acceptance of that plea, but a “conviction” in the district court which triggers a petitioner’s right to appeal. Burnham v. State, 2002 OK CR 6, ¶ 6, 43 P.3d 387, 389. A conviction upon a plea of guilty occurs when the final judgment and sentence is pronounced in district court. Turner v. State, 1975 OK CR 207, ¶ 7, 541 P.2d 1355, 1356.2 Petitioner’s “conviction” *136occurred when he was brought before the district court in January, 2009, and finally sentenced upon his guilty plea. He timely sought to withdraw his plea, and sought appellate review by timely filing a petition for the writ of certiorari. Petitioner thus invoked the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, including our jurisdiction to “reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or sentence appealed from, and ... if necessary or proper, order a new trial or resentencing.” 22 O.S.2001, § 1066.
¶ 4 I agree that Petitioner has forfeited the challenge to his guilty plea and the district court’s earlier finding of guilt, or more specifically, has forfeited the usual remedy for an otherwise meritorious challenge to his plea, because his misconduct has prejudiced the State’s ability to try him. However, because Petitioner’s plea was plainly induced by the earlier agreement with the State for a five year sentence of imprisonment, and his plea cannot now be withdrawn without unfair prejudice to the State, I would affirm Petitioner’s conviction and modify the sentence to five years imprisonment. I therefore respectfully dissent from the sanction of outright dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal.

. Blackstone tells us that one who absconded after conviction for a felony, but before the judgment, could "be prosecuted even to outlawry,” which anciently meant the felon was said to have caput lupinum, or the “wolf's head,” and consequently "might be knocked on the head like a wolf, by anyone that should meet him.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 315, 368 (1st ed. 1769). This harsh consequence of absconding had been discarded long before Blackstone's time, for when he wrote even the outlawed felon was "still under the protection of the law,” and a judgment of outlawry for felony was "frequently reversed by writ of error ... upon which reversal the party accused is admitted to plead to, and defend himself against, the indictment.” Id. at 315.

. In Gilmore v. State, 3 Okl.Cr. 639, 640, 108 P. 416, 417 (1910), Judge Doyle, speaking for the Court, said:
*136In its ordinary sense the term 'conviction’ is used to designate that particular stage of a criminal prosecution, when a plea of guilty is entered in open court, or a verdict of guilty is returned by a jury. But in a strict legal sense it denotes the final judgment of the court. Chief Justice Marshall defines ‘conviction’, as 'a technical term applicable to judgment in a criminal prosecution.’ A conviction within the meaning of the Constitution is an adjudication that the accused is guilty. It imports the final consummation of the prosecution, from the complaint to the judgment of the court by sentence. (emphasis added).