Court Opinion

ID: 9704690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:43:16.55803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.455506
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, Justice.
The defendant, Victor G. Lowatchie, appeals from the denial of a motion for summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Fritzsche, J.) in this paternity action brought by the Department of Human Services (Department).1 Lowatchie contends that an earlier paternity action brought against him by the Department that was dismissed in 1981 for want of prosecution pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1), precluded the filing of this identical second suit. The Department maintains that this appeal is interlocutory and must be dismissed. The Department also contends that the Superior Court was correct in determining that principles of res judica-ta are inapplicable to cases such as this presenting domestic relations issues. The unique circumstances of this case require us to apply an exception to the final judgment rule and to reach the merits of the case. Because the prior judgment was res judicata, we vacate the Superior Court’s denial of summary judgment and remand the case for entry of judgment for Lowat-chie.
In October 1988, the Department filed a two-count complaint against Lowatchie to establish the paternity of Crystal and Cor-rina B.2 Lowatchie denied the allegations of that complaint and pleaded the affirmative defenses of res judicata and laches. The basis of Lowatchie’s defense is the dismissal with prejudice of an earlier action brought by the Department in 1979 to establish the paternity of the same two children. Lowatchie maintains that the District Court’s (Portland, Ross, J.) dismissal, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1), of the earlier action for want of prosecution amounted to an adjudication on the merits that prevents the Department from bringing the action a second time. The Superior Court denied Lowatchie's motion for summary judgment upon the ground that res judicata could not bar a subsequent suit in cases involving issues of domestic relations.
Lowatchie’s motion for report of the case to this court, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 72(c),3 was denied by the Superior Court. After his subsequent motion for reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment and a request for a hearing on the matter were also denied, Lowatchie filed this appeal.
I.
We first address the Department’s contention that Lowatchie’s appeal must be *199dismissed because no final judgment has been entered. It is not disputed that the Superior Court’s denial of Lowatchie’s motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment. Olson v. Albert, 523 A.2d 585, 589 (Me.1987). This court has long noted that only final judgments are ripe for appellate review. Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 568 A.2d 1108 (Me.1990); Fern Const. Co. v. Binnall, 443 A.2d 67, 68-69 (Me.1982); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Bodwell Granite Co., 102 Me. 148, 152, 66 A. 314, 316 (1906); M.R.Civ.P. 73(a).
“The judicially created final judgment rule is based on sound reasoning. Among other goals, it promotes judicial economy and curtails interruption, delay, duplication and harassment. The rule saves an appellate court from deciding issues that may later be mooted by proceedings in other courts_” In re Erica B., 520 A.2d 342, 343 (Me.1987) (citing State v. Maine State Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d 461, 464 (Me.1984)). Exceptions to the final judgment rule have been recognized and applied in those instances where its application would not further its purpose. Maine State Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 464. While these exceptions have been described as “few, narrow and well-defined,” id,4 we have not hesitated to apply them in appropriate circumstances. We have also noted that additional exceptions to the final judgment rule may be created if the extraordinary circumstances of a case warrant doing so. Id. at 465; Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 77 (Me.1980).
One of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment is applied when the interests of judicial economy dictate that the merits of the case should be addressed immediately. Milstar Mfg. Corp. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 351 A.2d 538, 541 (Me.1976). This judicial economy exception is appropriately used when “review of a non-final order can establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation,” Maine State Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 465, and the interests of justice require that immediate review be undertaken. Munsey, Exec. v. Groves, 151 Me. 200, 202, 117 A.2d 64, 66 (1955); see also Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169, 175 (Me.1971). Both of those factors are present in this case.
The Superior Court ruled that the prior judgment did not have res judicata effect in this subsequent action, not because of factual disputes that could affect the applicability of the prior judgment to this case, but because this paternity action could not, as a matter of law, be barred by the prior judgment. Our review of the merits of that ruling can establish “a final ... disposition of the entire litigation.” Maine State Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 465. Moreover, justice compels us to apply an exception to the final judgment rule in this case. Were we to dismiss this appeal because of the lack of a final judgment, on remand the Department would be allowed to pursue, and Lowatchie would be required to defend, an identical case involving the identical parties and the identical issue as the case brought by the same state agency ten years ago and dismissed with prejudice seven years before the instant action was filed. That result would not only not serve the purposes of the final judgment rule, particularly the promotion of judicial economy and the curtailment of duplication and harassment, Erica B., 520 A.2d at 343, (especially in this case, harassment by a state agency) but would also seriously undermine the integrity of the prior valid judgment and the principles of res judicata upon which Lowatchie is entitled to rely.
The application of res judicata is an indication[] of the natural aversion of the court to protracted litigation and multiplicity of action. It is against public policy that controversies should not have an end; the public should not be called on to bear the expense of two trials where one will suffice. Nor should *200parties be called on to pay the bills for two suits where one only is necessary.
Pillsbury v. Kesslen Shoe Co., 136 Me. 235, 238, 7 A.2d 898 (1939). Our dismissal of this appeal under the final judgment rule would result in Lowatchie being twice vexed on the same issue, the very harassment the doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent. Emerson v. Lewiston, Augusta & Waterville St. Ry., 116 Me. 61, 66, 100 A. 3 (1917); Foss v. Whitehouse, 94 Me. 491, 497-98, 48 A. 109 (1901). See also Beegan v. Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 646 & n. 5 (Me.1982). Moreover, the oppressive harassment comes at the hands of the Department, a state agency. Though we are mindful of the importance of the final judgment rule, in this case involving the refusal of the trial court to give effect to an admittedly valid prior judgment involving the identical parties and the identical issue, we are moved in the interest of judicial economy and by the integrity due prior judgments, to address the merits of the appeal in order to prevent oppressive action by a state agency.
II.
The prior judgment on which Lowatchie relies to bar this action resulted from the District Court’s 1981 dismissal under M.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1)5 of an identical suit brought against him by the Department. We have long recognized that such a dismissal, under the language of M.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(3),6 operates as an adjudication on the merits of the claim dismissed. Gurski v. Culpovich, 540 A.2d 764, 766 (Me.1988); Kradoska v. Kipp, 397 A.2d 562, 567 (Me.1979). See 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19, comment b(2)(b), at 163 (1982). That dismissal becomes a valid final judgment upon which the parties and the courts can rely and “bars another action by the plaintiff on the same claim.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments, supra § 19, at 161. After the expiration of the appeal period, relief from such a judgment may be obtained only under the provisions of M.R.Civ.P. 60(b), an avenue not pursued by the Department. The principle of res judicata is grounded on concerns for judicial economy, the dignity due final judgments and certainty for litigants. Bee-gan, 451 A.2d at 646 & n. 5.
The Department in the instant action seeks to establish Lowatchie’s paternity of two children. The prior action, dismissed under M.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1), sought the same determination as to the same two children. Contrary to both the ruling of the Superior Court and the contention of the Department that domestic relations issues are not subject to principles of res judicata in the same way as are other areas of the law, res judicata forecloses the relitigation of the fact of paternity established in an earlier proceeding. Odle v. Patrick, 538 A.2d 770, 771 (Me.1988). Unlike alimony, child support or custody, or even grounds for divorce, paternity is a status not subject to change and is fully subject to the principles of res judicata. Id. (citing 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 27, 31 (1982)). Having failed to seek relief from the valid judgment under M.R. Civ.P. 60(b), the Department is barred from again seeking to establish Lowatchie’s paternity in this duplicate action.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment for the defendant.
ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and COLLINS, JJ., concurring.

. See 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 271-287 (1981 & Supp. 1989).

. Both the instant complaint and the earlier action were brought by the Department of Human Services pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A. § 272 (1981) to recover amounts paid to the children’s mother.

.Reporting a case under M.R.Civ.P. 72 is a method of securing appellate review of an interlocutory ruling. Olson v. Albert, 523 A.2d 585, 589 (Me.1987). Despite being requested to do so, the Department refused to join with Lowat-chie in moving the court to report the case to the Law Court. See M.R.Civ.P. 72(a).

. The generally recognized exceptions to the final judgment rule are the "death knell,” "collateral order” and "judicial economy” exceptions. State v. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 482 A.2d 461, 464-65 (Me.1984).

. M.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(1) provides:
(1) On Court's Own Motion. The court, on its own motion, after notice to the parties, and in the absence of a showing of good cause to the contrary, shall dismiss an action for want of prosecution at any time more than two years after the last docket entry showing any action taken therein by the plaintiff other than a motion for continuance.

. M.R.Civ.P. 41(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Effect. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision ... operates as an adjudication upon the merits.