Court Opinion

ID: 9855940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:34:37.274391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:18.054207
License: Public Domain

Justice NEWBY
concurring in the result only.
I agree with the Court’s holding that it would have been inappropriate in this case for the trial court to preclude the State from proceeding capitally as a sanction for noncompliance with Rule 24. However, I differ from the majority and would hold that declaring a case noncapital simply is not an appropriate means of enforcing Rule 24. By statute, the General Assembly has assigned to the Executive Branch the decision whether to seek the death penalty in first-degree murder cases with evidence of an aggravating circumstance.4 In my view, a judicial decree that capital punishment is unavailable in such a case would deny the State its sole statutory discretion and thus violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. I also be*39lieve that preventing the prosecution of accused murderers to the full extent of the law would wrongly sanction the people of this state for the faults of a few officers of the Executive Branch.
The separation of governmental powers has been embedded in the foundational law of this state since our founders promulgated North Carolina’s first constitution in 1776. N.C. Const, of 1776, Declaration of Rights IV (“That the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.”). The Court of Conference, this Court’s predecessor, likewise recognized this essential precept from its earliest days. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 15, 16, 1 N.C. 5, 6, 1 Mart. 48 (1787) (observing that our nation’s founders formed a system of government “dividing the powers of government into separate and distinct branches, to wit: The legislative, the judicial, and executive, and assigning to each several and distinct powers, and prescribing their several limits and boundaries”). The explicit separation of powers has been preserved in this state despite numerous constitutional revisions, and Article I, Section 6 of the current North Carolina Constitution provides: “The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.” Under this provision officers of one branch of government may not exercise the duties assigned to a coordinate branch or otherwise encroach upon those duties. E.g., State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 591-92, 595, 286 S.E.2d 79, 79-80, 81 (1982) (holding that members of the General Assembly could not concurrently serve on an Executive Branch commission without violating Article I, Section 6).
Our state constitution sets forth in general terms the responsibilities of district attorneys:
The District Attorney shall advise the officers of justice in his district, be responsible for the prosecution on behalf of the State of all criminal actions in the Superior Courts of his district, perform such duties related to appeals therefrom as the Attorney General may require, and perform such other duties as the General Assembly may prescribe.
N.C. Const, art. IV, § 18(1) (emphases added). One natural incident of a district attorney’s constitutional duty to prosecute criminal actions is choosing what punishment to seek. Moreover, one of the “other duties” specifically assigned to prosecutors by the General Assembly *40is to decide whether to pursue the death penalty when trying a defendant charged with first-degree murder. Section 15A-2004 of our General Statutes, entitled “Prosecutorial discretion,” provides:
(a) The State, in its discretion, may elect to try a defendant capitally or noncapitally for first degree murder, even if evidence of an aggravating circumstance exists. The State may agree to accept a sentence of life imprisonment for a defendant at any point in the prosecution of a capital felony, even if evidence of an aggravating circumstance exists.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a) (2009) (emphasis added). Particularly in capital cases, the legislature has firmly delegated to prosecutors the decision of what punishment to seek. Without a specific grant of authority from the General Assembly, the courts do not have any inherent power to participate in or interfere with that decision. E.g., In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 308-10, 255 S.E.2d 142, 144-45 (1979) (explaining that “[t]he power to define a crime and prescribe its punishment originates with the Legislative Branch” and that any judicial power to alter criminal punishments is not inherent in the judiciary, but must derive from a legislative grant of authority); see also State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 101, 340 S.E.2d 450, 459 (1986) (“It is well settled that the General Assembly and not the judiciary determines the minimum and maximum punishment which may be imposed on those convicted of crimes. The legislature alone can prescribe the punishment for those crimes.” (citations omitted)).
Pursuant to its authority under Article IV, Section 13(2) of the North Carolina Constitution, the General Assembly has granted this Court the prerogative to make procedural rules to govern the trial courts. However, those rules must not conflict with our General Statutes: “The Supreme Court is hereby authorized to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the superior and district courts supplementary to, and not inconsistent with, acts of the General Assembly.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-34 (2009) (emphasis added). Just as our procedural rules must be in accordance with the General Statutes, so too must the methods by which we enforce those rules comport with the acts of the legislature. State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 270, 500 S.E.2d 77, 79-80 (1998) (“ [Enforcement of the Rules of Practice promulgated by this Court cannot be effected in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution or acts of the General Assembly.”).
This Court has held in the past that when our constitution and statutes delegate discretion to prosecutorial officers, the courts can*41not prevent the exercise of that discretion without exceeding their authority. In State v. Camacho, we considered a trial court order that sought “ ‘to avoid even the possibility or impression of any conflict of interest’ ” by directing a district attorney’s office to immediately withdraw from a criminal action and request the Attorney General’s Office to represent the State in the case. 329 N.C. 589, 593, 406 S.E.2d 868, 870 (1991) (emphasis omitted). The order also directed the Attorney General’s Office to “ ‘immediately assume the prosecution of the case.’ ” Id. This Court held that the trial court’s directions to both the district attorney and the Attorney General were in excess of judicial authority. 329 N.C. at 594, 595, 406 S.E.2d at 871. In so holding, we noted that our constitution and statutes give the State’s district attorneys “exclusive discretion” in deciding whether to request that the Special Prosecution Division take over the prosecution of a case. Id. at 594, 406 S.E.2d at 871. We likewise observed that “even upon a proper request and authorization by a District Attorney, the Special Prosecution Division is to participate in criminal prosecutions only if the Attorney General, in his sole discretion as an independent constitutional officer, approves.” Id. at 595, 406 S.E.2d at 871. As was the case in Camacho, the discretion at issue here is vested solely in the State’s prosecutors. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a); see also N.C. Const, art. IV, § 18(1). Thus, in keeping with our analysis in Camacho, judicial interference with the decision whether to seek the death penalty in a first-degree murdér case with evidence of an aggravating factor must be held to exceed the power of the courts.
As noted by the majority, North Carolina’s capital punishment scheme once required prosecutors to seek the death penalty in all first-degree murder cases in which there was evidence of an aggravating circumstance. E.g., Rorie, 348 N.C. at 270-71, 500 S.E.2d at 80. In 2001 the General Assembly amended our capital punishment statutes to give prosecutors the discretion not to pursue the death penalty in such cases. Act of May 8, 2001, ch. 81, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 163 (codified at N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-2000(a), -2001, -2004 (2009)). The majority asserts these amendments abrogated State v. Rorie, in which this Court held that a trial court’s order precluding the State from trying the defendant capitally for first-degree murder exceeded the trial court’s authority to enforce Rule 24. 348 N.C. at 271, 500 S.E.2d at 80. Although Rorie was decided before the 2001 amendments, I do not believe this Court’s reasoning in Rorie was wholly dependent on the pre-2001 requirement that prosecutors seek the death penalty.
*42In announcing its holding in Rorie, this Court stated:
[T]he trial court’s order is potentially in conflict with the mandate of the General Assembly in the capital sentencing statute and impermissibly impinges on the district attorney’s obligation under the North Carolina Constitution to prosecute all criminal actions in the superior courts of his district. The order also impermissibly limits the right of the people to have defendant, if permitted by the evidence, prosecuted and punished to the full extent of the law for this most serious crime. For these reasons the sanction imposed for the district attorney’s violation of a rule for the superior court promulgated by this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-34 exceeds the court’s inherent authority to enforce the Rules of Practice, and the order cannot stand.
Id. (emphasis added). We thus gave three reasons for our holding. Because each of those reasons holds true in this case, I believe Rorie dictates the conclusion that declaring a case noncapital is not an appropriate means for a court to enforce Rule 24.
The first reason for our holding in Rorie was that “the trial court’s order [was] potentially in conflict with the mandate of the General Assembly in the capital sentencing statute.” Id. Although the General Assembly’s mandate has changed since Rorie was decided, this concern is equally applicable in the instant case. The capital sentencing scheme now provides: “The State, in its discretion, may elect to try a defendant capitally or noncapitally for first degree murder, even if evidence of an aggravating circumstance exists.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a). In other words, when there is evidence of an aggravating circumstance, the General Assembly has mandated that the prosecutor make a choice whether or not to pursue the death penalty. Under the majority opinion, even when there is evidence of an aggravating circumstance, the trial court has the power to preclude the prosecutor from making that choice. The majority’s analysis is therefore “potentially in conflict with the mandate of the General Assembly in the capital sentencing statute.” Rorie, 348 N.C. at 271, 500 S.E.2d at 80.
The second justification we gave for our holding in Rorie was that the trial court’s order “impermissibly impinge [d] on the district attorney’s obligation under the North Carolina Constitution to prosecute all criminal actions in the superior courts of his district.” Id. As previously observed, the choice to pursue one of multiple potential punishments is concomitant with a district attorney’s duty to *43prosecute criminal actions under Article IV, Section 18(1) of our state constitution. Like the trial court’s order in Rorie, a court order that effectively makes the choice of punishment for the prosecutor would “impermissibly impinge” on the district attorney’s constitutional duty.
The third and final stated reason for our decision in Rorie was that the trial court’s order “impermissibly limit[ed] the right of the people to have [the] defendant, if permitted by the evidence, prosecuted and punished to the full extent of the law for this most serious crime [of first-degree murder].” Id. The laws of our state include the death penalty as the most severe punishment for criminal offenses. In a first-degree murder case, when there is evidence of an aggravating circumstance (i.e., “if permitted by the evidence”), N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a) requires the State to choose between proceeding capitally and proceeding noncapitally. Thus, in a first-degree murder case with evidence of an aggravating circumstance, there is at least a possibility that the State will seek imposition of capital punishment (i.e., to prosecute and punish the defendant “to the full extent of the law”). However, a court order that deprives the State of the option of seeking the death penalty eliminates that possibility and thus limits the people’s right to have the defendant prosecuted and punished as the law provides.
This right of the people is also relevant in another sense, one which this Court likewise recognized in Rorie. We observed in that case that “the people of the State, not the district attorney, are the party in a criminal prosecution.” 348 N.C. at 270, 500 S.E.2d at 80 (citing N.C. Const, art. IV, § 13(1) (“Every action prosecuted by the people of the State as a party against a person charged with a public offense, for the punishment thereof, shall be termed a criminal action.”) and Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 368, 451 S.E.2d 858, 865 (1994)). Thus, the sanction of declaring a case noncapital is a sanction against the people of the state, not against the members of the district attorney’s office who actually violated Rule 24. It is counterintuitive to punish the citizens of the State of North Carolina for the errors of a few individuals, both because this would be unfair to the people of the state and because it is unclear that a sanction against the people would effectively deter future misconduct by the district attorney’s office. Presumably for these reasons, this Court stated in Rorie: “Repeated violations of [Rule 24] manifesting willful disregard for the fair and expeditious prosecution of capital cases may result in citation for contempt pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 5A-11(7) or *44other appropriate disciplinary action against the district attorney.” 348 N.C. at 271-72, 500 S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis added); see also State v. Matthews, 358 N.C. 102, 110, 591 S.E.2d 535, 541 (2004) (stating in a first-degree murder case that “[i]f the prosecutor fails to petition the superior court for a [Rule 24] pretrial conference, he risks disci-' plinary action” (emphasis added)). The people of the state are no less the complaining party in a criminal action today than they were when Rorie was decided. Therefore, it remains appropriate to sanction the person or persons who have violated Rule 24 rather than all the citizens of the state.
Of course, I recognize that there are other instances of courts imposing sanctions on the state as a whole in response to wrongdoing by a few executive officers. For example, the Exclusionary Rule in criminal cases requires that when officers of the State have obtained evidence in violation of constitutional search and seizure protections, the State may not present that evidence at the defendant’s trial. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961).5 However, the sanction of excluding evidence under such circumstances is utilized in part to protect specific rights of the defendant. E.g., State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 716, 370 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1988) (observing that the Exclusionary Rule is a “ ‘remedy to protect society from the excesses which led to the constitutional right’ ” to be free of unreasonable search and seizure (quoting Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 512, 141 A.2d 46, 49, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843, 79 S. Ct. 52, 3 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1958))); see also State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336-37, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (explaining that the Miranda warnings and accompanying rule of exclusion were “conceived to protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the inherently compelling context of custodial interrogations by police officers” (citation omitted)). With respect to the Rule 24 pretrial conference, this Court has stated that “[c]apital defendants do not stand to lose or gain any rights at the conference.” State v. Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 339, 464 S.E.2d 661, 666 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1023, 116 S. Ct. 2560, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1996). Because a delay in holding the Rule 24 conference does not deprive the defendant of any personal rights, it is out of keeping with standard judicial practice to punish such a *45delay in a manner that is detrimental to all the people of the state and directly beneficial to the defendant.
The sanction of declaring a case noncapital for Rule 24 violations also differs from judicial devices that protect defendants’ rights in that the sanction at issue here bears little nexus with the conduct sought to be deterred. The Exclusionary Rule, for instance, excludes the very evidence that the State procured in an unlawful manner and thus prevents the State from reaping any direct reward from its officers’ misconduct. See, e.g., Garter, 322 N.C. at 716, 370 S.E.2d at 557 (observing that one of the reasons for the Exclusionary Rule “ ‘is that government should not stoop to the “dirty business” of a criminal in order to catch him’ ” (quoting Eleuteri, 26 N.J. at 512, 141 A.2d at 49)). In the Rule 24 context, however, the State’s ability to seek the death penalty is not enhanced by a delay in holding the pretrial conference. Under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a), the prosecutor has discretion to proceed capitally or noncapitally in a first-degree murder case as long as there is evidence of an aggravating factor. The timing of the Rule 24 conference has no effect on the existence of such evidence and, therefore, no effect on the prosecutor’s discretion. Given the lack of a connection between the timing of the pretrial conference and the prosecutor’s discretion in seeking the death penalty, it makes little sense to deprive the prosecutor of that discretion in response to a delay in complying with Rule 24.
The majority offers no explanation as to why the particular sanction of precluding the State from seeking the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for Rule 24 violations. Aside from observing the 2001 amendments to our capital sentencing scheme, the majority simply cites State v. Seward, in which we held that “if the prosecution’s forecast of evidence at the Rule 24 conference does not show the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance, . . . the trial court may properly declare the case noncapital.” 362 N.C. 210, 215, 657 S.E.2d 356, 359 (2008). However, a court’s declaration that a first-degree murder case shall proceed noncapitally under Seward is not a sanction and has nothing to do with prosecutorial violations of Rule 24. A noncapital declaration under Seward is based on statutory provisions establishing that “a defendant may not receive a sentence of death in the absence of an aggravating circumstance.” Id. (citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(c) (2007)). In other words, we held in Seward that a prosecutor cannot choose between proceeding capitally and noncapitally as directed by N.C.G.S. § 15A-2004(a) unless the statutory condition precedent (namely, evidence of an aggravating cir*46cumstance) is satisfied. Nothing in Seward suggests that the noncapital declaration can be used as a sanction against the State.
I also note that the majority holds a noncapital declaration to be a proper sanction for violation of Rule 24 without clarifying the extent of the prosecutors’ violation in this case. It is undisputed that the assistant district attorney’s application for a Rule 24 pretrial conference was filed more than a month late. However, the quantum of the prosecution’s further violation of Rule 24, if any, is unclear, not least because the rule itself seems to shift the burden of holding the pretrial conference to the superior court upon the district attorney’s filing of an application. Gen. R. Pract. Super. & Dist. Cts. 24, 2009 Ann. R. N.C. 21 (“[T]he district attorney shall apply to the presiding superior court judge or other superior court judge holding court in the district, who shall enter an order requiring the prosecution and defense counsel to appear before the court within forty-five days thereafter for the pretrial conference.”). In Rorie we stated: “Repeated violations of [Rule 24] manifesting willful disregard for the fair and expeditious prosecution of capital cases may result in citation for contempt pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 5A-11(7) or other appropriate disciplinary action against the district attorney.” 348 N.C. at 271-72, 500 S.E.2d at 81 (emphases added). The majority has not clearly established that the prosecutors crossed the threshold we set forth in Rorie for imposing sanctions against the district attorney, let alone the presumably higher threshold that would be needed to justify sanctioning the people of the state.
The General Assembly has delegated to the Executive Branch exclusive authority to decide whether to seek the death penalty in first-degree murder cases with evidence of an aggravating circumstance. I do not believe our judiciary can strip prosecutors of that discretion without violating the separation of governmental powers that has been a fixture of North Carolina constitutional law for well over two hundred years. Moreover, preventing the prosecution of criminal defendants to the full extent of the law wrongly punishes the people of this state for the errors of a few government officials. I would hold that the courts may not enforce Rule 24 by precluding the State from seeking the death penalty. I therefore concur only in the result of the majority’s opinion.
Justice BRADY joins in this concurring opinion.

. For practical reasons, district attorneys are placed within the “Judicial” article of the North Carolina Constitution. N.C. Const, art. IV, § 18(1). District attorneys’ duties are set forth in conjunction with our constitution’s provisions regarding prosecutorial districts, id., which are pertinent to the Judicial Branch because they serve as the basis for our trial court districts. Notwithstanding this placement, district attorneys serve an executive function: they aid the Governor in “tak[ing] care that the laws be faithfully executed.” N.C. Const, art. Ill, § 5(4).

. The Exclusionary Rule was actually adopted in North Carolina before the Supreme Court of the United States held the rule applicable to state courts in Mapp. State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713-14, 370 S.E.2d 553, 556 (1988). It is particularly noteworthy that the North Carolina rule was not originally adopted by judicial decision, but by legislative act. Id.