Court Opinion

ID: 9829485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:20:57.492631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:01.553207
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
As is often the case, when judgments of Courts of Civil Appeals are adverse to parties, much labor has been expended and great ingenuity evinced in this case in discovering and discussing supposed conflicts with decisions of other courts in Texas, and it is asserted that this court has overruled at least three decisions of the Supreme Court and numerous decisions of other Courts of Civil Appeals. “If it were so, it were a grievous fault,” for, in so far as the latter decisions are concerned, it is a direct violation of a statute of this state which commands this court to certify questions to the Supreme Court when it is unable to agree with its sister Courts of Civil Appeals. However, there is no conflict, in our opinion, with any decision of any Texas court, either real or apparent.
The seventh assignment presents that the trial court erred in refusing a new trial; the first ground being “because the evidence does not support the verdict and judgment rendered,” and' the fifth ground being “because the testimony overwhelmingly shows that there was no negligence on the part of defendant authorizing a recovery by the plaintiff.” The last ground is sufficient to bring in review the evidence on the subject of negligence as a whole, and in all of its parts, and in considering that assignment we have not come in conflict with Searcy v. Grant, 90 Tex. 97, 37 S. W. 320, nor with Oil Co. v. Kimball (Tex.) 122 S. W. 533. This court undoubtedly has the power and authority to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to show negligence, and it has simply exercised that authority in this case, in connection with the subsequent injuries inflicted on ap-pellee.
The doctrine of invited error as applied to instructions requested by a party, but refused, was first announced in Texas by this court on October 16, 1895, in the case of Railway v. Sein, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 386, 33 S. W. 558, and on motion for rehearing in the same case the question was certified to the Supreme Court, and it decided in the same way on December 16, 1895. 89 Tex. 63, 33 S. W. 215, 558. This court has followed that ruling in numerous eases since, and it has no desire to change its opinions or recede from its position on the question of invited error. The error, however, must be invited, which was not done in this case, as, we think, can be clearly shown from the record.
When appellee sought to testify to the subsequent injuries, appellant objected to the testimony on the ground that the injuries were too remote, “and that the original injury. by the push car, if any, could not have ■been the proximate cause of his leg’s giving way at a time when he was handling heavy timbers two weeks thereafter,” and that the slipping on the floor and the fall was for the same reasons objectionable. The court overruled the objections, and thereby committed itself to the principles afterwards written into the charge. The position assumed by the court was not only uninvited by appellant, but was taken over its objections.
Again, in special charges 5 and 6, which appellee so strenuously insists invited the error of the court, the language indicates that the charge of the court had already been given, for No. 5 begins with the statement: “In the event that you should find in favor of plaintiff, under the instructions given by the court.” And in special instruction 6 the charge of the court is recognized as being in existence, and the special instruction is conditioned on certain matters stated therein.
We have concluded to modify our former opinion as to the injuries inflicted on appel-lee when he was, in discharge of his duties, lifting a plank, and hold that such injuries having, perhaps, arisen from weakness in the injured leg of appellee, appellant might have anticipated and had in contemplation such injuries, and the question as to the original cause producing those injuries would be one of fact to be determined by the jury. We adhere, however, to our opinion as to the last injuries which were caused by appel-lee’s uninjured foot slipping on a greasy floor. In that instance there was the interposition of an independent, efficient cause which produced the injury.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.