Court Opinion

ID: 9881120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 18:00:55.230067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:09.531375
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13364   Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 09/29/2023    Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13364
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       JOSE PABLO GARCIA GALLARDO,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                          ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A216-732-760
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13364

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Jose Pablo Garcia Gallardo (“Garcia Gallardo”) appeals the
       Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the Immi-
       gration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision not to adjudicate his application for
       a waiver of inadmissibility that he submitted with his application
       for a U visa as a derivative of his wife’s application. He argues: that
       the BIA erred in finding that the IJ correctly determined that he did
       not have to adjudicate the waiver request; that the BIA erred by
       failing to remand his case to the IJ after he filed his derivative U visa
       application for the first time before the BIA; and that the IJ and BIA
       abused their discretion by requiring him to show prima facie eligi-
       bility for a U visa in conjunction with his application for a waiver
       of inadmissibility without giving him an opportunity to do so.
               When the BIA issues its own decision, we only review that
       decision, except to the extent the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s opin-
       ion or reasoning. Murugan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 10 F.4th 1185, 1192
       (11th Cir. 2021). We review de novo questions of law and our sub-
       ject matter jurisdiction. Ponce Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 64 F.4th 1208,
       1217 (11th Cir. 2023). We review issues concerning statutory in-
       terpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) de
       novo, deferring to the BIA’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A.,
       Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), if the statute
       is ambiguous or silent and the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable.
       Meridor v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 891 F.3d 1302, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2018). If
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       22-13364               Opinion of the Court                         3

       the BIA has issued a single judge order that relies on its own prec-
       edent or ours, we will afford Chevron deference if applicable. Hin-
       capie-Zapata v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 977 F.3d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 2020).
              When a petitioner files a motion to remand to the BIA and
       “seeks to introduce evidence that has not previously been pre-
       sented, it is generally treated as a motion to reopen.” Chacku v. U.S.
       Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008). We will then re-
       view the BIA’s denial of that motion to reopen for an abuse of dis-
       cretion. Id.
               We give significant discretion to the BIA to deny a motion
       to reopen, “even where the movant has made a prima facie case that
       reopening would otherwise be appropriate.” Bing Quan Lin v. U.S.
       Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2018). “Reopening may be
       warranted only where the movant presents evidence that is new,
       material, and unavailable when the removal order was entered.”
       Id. at 872. The BIA may deny a motion to reopen where the mo-
       vant fails to produce evidence that was material and previously un-
       available. Id. at 874.
              Our jurisdiction to review orders of removal is limited by
       the INA, which provides that no court has jurisdiction to review
       any final order of removal against a non-citizen who is removable
       for committing a controlled substance offense. INA § 242(a)(2)(C),
       8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). We also lack jurisdiction to review discre-
       tionary decisions of the Attorney General or Secretary of the De-
       partment of Homeland Security. INA 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
       1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Notwithstanding these jurisdictional bars, we
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13364

       retain jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims and questions
       of law. INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We have
       stated that we have jurisdiction under INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.
       § 1252(a)(2)(D), to review questions of law that are “the application
       of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.” Patel v. U.S.
       Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotation
       marks omitted). However, abuse of discretion arguments cloaked
       in constitutional or legal language, as well as challenges to the evi-
       dentiary basis for a factual finding, are not sufficient to invoke our
       jurisdiction. Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir.
       2007).
              An otherwise inadmissible foreign national “who is in pos-
       session of appropriate documents or is granted a waiver thereof
       and is seeking admission, may be admitted into the United States
       temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney
       General.” INA § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A). In discuss-
       ing this statute, we have explained that “[t]he ‘Attorney General’
       includes his delegates, including, as is relevant here, IJs under cer-
       tain circumstances.” Meridor, 891 F.3d at 1305-06. Further, “the
       Secretary of Homeland Security, in the [Secretary’s] discretion,
       may waive the application of subsection (a),” which describes
       noncitizens who are inadmissible to the United States, for nonciti-
       zens applying for a U visa “if the Secretary of Homeland Security
       considers it to be in the public or national interest to do so.” INA
       § 212(d)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14); see also Meridor, 891 F.3d at 1306
       n.6 (noting that this section reads “in the Attorney General’s discre-
       tion” but is likely a scrivener’s error and should read “in the
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       22-13364                Opinion of the Court                          5

       Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretion,” as the official version
       of the Code recognizes).
              “A U visa is a nonimmigrant visa that is available to nonciti-
       zen victims of certain crimes to encourage noncitizens to come for-
       ward and help law enforcement investigate and prosecute criminal
       activity.” Meridor, 891 F.3d at 1304 n.1. Qualifying family members
       such as spouses and children of the principal U visa applicant may
       apply as a derivative of the principal’s application. INA
       § 101(a)(15)(U)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii). Like the principal,
       the qualifying family member must be admissible to the United
       States to be eligible for a U visa, and if not, may file a Form I-192 to
       waive inadmissibility. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(iv), (f)(ii). The prin-
       cipal U visa applicant will file a Form I-918, while the derivative
       beneficiary will file a Form I-918, Supplement A. Id. §
       214.14(c)(2)(i), (f)(2).
              In Meridor, we held that “the plain language of section
       1182(d)(3)(A) grants to the Attorney General authority to waive the
       inadmissibility of an individual subject to removal applying for a
       temporary nonimmigrant visa, and therefore permits the Attorney
       General to waive the inadmissibility of U Visa applicants.” Meridor,
       891 F.3d at 1307 (internal citations omitted).
               “The word ‘may’ customarily connotes discretion.” Jama v.
       Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005). “[T]he use of the
       word ‘shall’ suggests that discretion may not be granted.” Brasil v.
       Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 28 F.4th 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2022). In
       Brasil, we found in analyzing a different section of the INA than the
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                        22-13364

       one at issue here that in contrast to the use of “shall,” the phrase
       “the Attorney General may . . . waive” “indicate[s] a grant of dis-
       cretion.” Id.
              Here, because our precedent and the relevant statute indi-
       cate that an IJ may adjudicate an application for a waiver of inad-
       missibility in this situation but is not required to do so, the IJ did
       not err in finding that it did not have to adjudicate Garcia Gal-
       lardo’s waiver. The BIA’s interpretation here that INA § 212(d)(14),
       8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14), does not mandate IJs to adjudicate waivers
       was a reasonable interpretation of the statute in light of the stat-
       ute’s use of the word “may” and its reliance on Meridor. Hincapie-
       Zapata, 977 F.3d at 1200. Nothing in Meridor suggests that IJs must
       adjudicate requests for inadmissibility waivers in this situation, as
       this Court held that the INA “permits the Attorney General to
       waive the inadmissibility of U visa applicants,” not that the INA
       requires the Attorney General to do so. Meridor, 891 F.3d at 1307
       (citing L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022, 1030 (7th Cir. 2014)). 1 The
       statute also does not differentiate between whether an IJ can adju-
       dicate an inadmissibility waiver before or after a final order of re-
       moval has been issued as Garcia Gallardo argues.

       1 Thus, we reject Garcia Gallardo’s argument that the IJ was required to adju-

       dicate his application for a waiver of inadmissibility. It is not clear whether he
       is also arguing that the IJ abused his discretion in declining to adjudicate his
       waiver request. However, to the extent he is challenging a discretionary deci-
       sion, this Court lacks jurisdiction and we dismiss the petition as to any such
       discretionary decision.
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       22-13364                Opinion of the Court                          7

               The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by not reopening
       Garcia Gallardo’s proceedings after he filed his derivative U visa
       application before the BIA for the first time. First, as discussed
       above, the BIA correctly found that the IJ did not have to adjudicate
       the inadmissibility waiver, even if he was prima facie eligible, so
       there was no reason for it to look at the U visa application. Second,
       Garcia Gallardo provided no context as to why he was filing his
       derivative U visa application with his appeal to the BIA or why it
       was previously unavailable to him while the case was still before
       the IJ, as he filed it with USCIS more than a year before his Notice
       to Appear was issued. Bing Quan Lin, 881 F.3d at 873. Although he
       argues that he did not have a chance to present evidence of his
       prima facie eligibility for a U visa, he does not explain why he did
       not or could not have filed his derivative U visa application with
       the IJ. Lastly and most importantly, Garcia Gallardo did not file
       his wife’s U visa application that he was a derivative of before the
       BIA or IJ, so neither court could have determined whether the prin-
       cipal visa application was likely to be granted, and thus neither
       court would be able to determine his eligibility for lawful status if
       his inadmissibility were waived. Garcia Gallardo has not provided
       any meaningful reason as to why remand or reopening would be
       warranted. Bing Quan Lin, 881 F.3d at 873-74.
               It is also unclear what legal basis Garcia Gallardo is relying
       on to argue that the IJ and BIA abused their discretion in requiring
       him to file his U visa application in support of his request for a
       waiver of inadmissibility and requiring him to establish prima facie
       eligibility for a U visa in support of that request. Instead, it appears
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                22-13364

       this is just an abuse of discretion argument as to the agency’s deci-
       sion not to adjudicate his inadmissibility waiver, which is not a le-
       gal or constitutional argument that this Court has jurisdiction to
       review. Arias, 482 F.3d at 1283. Because we lack jurisdiction to
       rule on the agency’s discretionary decisions, we dismiss his petition
       as to his argument that the BIA abused its discretion in requiring a
       showing of prima facie eligibility for a U visa when deciding
       whether to adjudicate his request for a waiver of inadmissibility.
           PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN
       PART.