Court Opinion

ID: 9594047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:26:33.515226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:50.832200
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent to section III of the majority opinion addressing Crouse’s right to recover pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In my view, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986), hold that negligent misconduct does not support a claim for relief under section 1983. Although the language in Daniels may imply that constitutional provisions other than the fourteenth amendment provide a basis for section 1983 liability for mere negligence, the Court has not held that such recovery is permitted under the fourth amendment.
The attempted arrest in this case is alleged to be an unreasonable seizure that was conducted by police officers in a negligent manner. The fourth amendment only protects individuals against “unreasonable” seizures, not seizures conducted in a “negligent” manner. See Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir.1987). The fourth amendment test balances the nature of the intrusion on the individual’s interests against the importance of the governmental interests allegedly justifying the intrusion to determine if the seizure was constitutionally reasonable and does not involve a determination of negligence.
Because of the procedural posture of this case, I believe that the majority prematurely determines that the fourth amendment may provide a basis for relief under section 1983 for negligent conduct. In my view, *665the majority's discussion of the fourth amendment in section III is dictum that is not essential to the resolution of the issues in this case.
I am authorized to say that Justice VOL-LACK joins in this concurrence and dissent.