Court Opinion

ID: 9947592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:02:09.592577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:35.873955
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                      JAQUAN L. BROWN, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 23-0145
                               FILED 3-5-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2021-001988-001
            The Honorable Howard D. Sukenic, Judge, Retired

                                  AFFIRMED

                               APPEARANCES

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jesse Finn Turner
Counsel for Appellant

Jaquan L. Brown, Florence
Appellant
                             STATE v. BROWN
                            Decision of the Court

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1             Defendant Jaquan L. Brown appeals his convictions and
sentences for one count of molestation of a child and one count of sexual
conduct with a minor. Brown’s counsel filed a brief per Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), advising us there
are no meritorious grounds for reversal. Brown filed a supplemental brief
in propria persona. After reviewing the entire record for reversible error, State
v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999), including arguments raised in
his supplemental brief, we affirm Brown’s convictions and sentences.

               FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2           In 2020, Brown (then twenty-one years old) met thirteen-year-
old Sage at an apartment complex where they both lived. The two began
         2

communicating through social media. Brown told Sage he was sixteen years
old. Over the next several months, the two had sexual interactions three
times according to Sage.

¶3              As to the first occurrence, Sage’s mother saw Brown in
between her daughter’s legs while Sage was sitting on an electrical box
outside of their apartment. The two were clothed. Sage’s mother told Brown
to get off of her daughter and that her daughter was only thirteen years old.
Sage’s mother called police but Sage refused to speak with them. Sage
confronted Brown about his age and Brown admitted he was twenty-one
years old.

¶4         After the second occurrence, Sage returned to the apartment
with “hickeys” on her neck. Sage’s mother called police. Police

1 We view the facts in “the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions

with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” State v.
Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996).
2 Sage is a pseudonym used to protect the victim’s privacy. See Ariz. R. Sup.

Ct. 111(i).

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                             STATE v. BROWN
                            Decision of the Court

photographed the hickeys but, once again, Sage refused to speak to law
enforcement.

¶5           When Sage returned to the apartment after the third occasion,
she and her mother got into an argument. Sage’s mother sent her to a
recovery treatment center. Several weeks later, Sage agreed to speak with
police.

¶6            The State originally charged Brown with eight felonies, but
later moved to dismiss two counts. Brown was tried by a jury on the
remaining six counts—four counts of sexual conduct with a minor, each a
class 2 felony; one count of molestation of a child, a class 2 felony; and one
count of sexual abuse, a class 3 felony.

¶7            The jury convicted Brown of two felonies—molestation of a
child and a single count of sexual conduct with a minor. He was acquitted
on the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Brown to twenty-five
years’ imprisonment (eleven years for molestation and fourteen years for
sexual conduct, to run consecutively as required under A.R.S. § 13-705). The
court gave Brown credit for fifty-four days of presentence incarceration.

¶8            This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

                                DISCUSSION

¶9            Brown argues that given his “lack of capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his offense and his youthful age, 25 years of
imprisonment is disproportionate to the offense and the offender,”
violating both Article II, Section 15, of the Arizona Constitution and the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Brown contends the
“Judge [] did what he could to impose an appropriate punishment for [the]
offense but his hands were tied by . . . statutory requirements.”

¶10            Both the United States Supreme Court and our Arizona
Supreme Court have squarely addressed sentencing outcomes through the
lens of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003); State v. Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, 475, ¶ 7 (2006). Because courts “accord
substantial deference to the legislature and its policy judgments as reflected
in statutorily mandated sentences,” it is “exceedingly rare” for a prison
sentence to be considered disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 476–77, ¶¶ 13, 17 (citation omitted). The court “first determines if there

                                       3
                            STATE v. BROWN
                           Decision of the Court

is a threshold showing of gross disproportionality by comparing ‘the
gravity of the offense [and] the harshness of the penalty.’” Id. at 476, ¶ 12
(citation omitted). Only if this comparison leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality will the court then consider the sentence imposed in
Arizona on similar crimes and sentences imposed by other states. Id.
(citation omitted).

¶11          Here, Brown was sentenced within the statutory range for his
crimes and he has failed to make a threshold showing that his sentences are
grossly disproportionate to his crimes. See A.R.S. §§ 13-701 through -718 (as
applicable).

¶12            Further, our review reveals no fundamental error. See Leon,
104 Ariz. at 300 (“An exhaustive search of the record has failed to produce
any prejudicial error.”). All the proceedings were conducted in compliance
with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals,
Brown was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and was
present at all critical stages of the proceedings, except for a portion of the
trial on October 13, 2022, and the restitution hearing, where counsel waived
Brown’s presence. See State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 104 (1990) (right to
counsel at critical stages); see also State v. Bohn, 116 Ariz. 500, 503 (1977)
(right to be present at critical stages).

¶13            The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of
the charged offenses, the State’s burden of proof, and Brown’s presumption
of innocence. The jury was comprised of twelve jurors with two alternates,
and the record shows no evidence of juror misconduct. See A.R.S.
§ 21-102(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(a). At sentencing, Brown was given an
opportunity to speak, and the court stated on the record the evidence and
materials it considered in imposing the sentences. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.9,
26.10.

                              CONCLUSION

¶14           We affirm Brown’s convictions and sentences.

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                            STATE v. BROWN
                           Decision of the Court

¶15          After this decision’s filing, defense counsel’s obligations in
this appeal will end. Defense counsel need do no more than inform Brown
of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless, upon review,
counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme
Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984).
Upon this court’s motion, Brown has thirty days from the date of this
decision to proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona motion for
reconsideration or petition for review.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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