Court Opinion

ID: 9713195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:10:41.243689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.449462
License: Public Domain

Oliver, J.
(concurring specially) — I concur specially in this opinion and call attention to the following language at the end of Division I:
“Nor does the fact that when he [defendant] first observed the stop sign he applied his brakes absolve him. One who; by his recklessness, has created a hazard which he should have foreseen and guarded against is not exonerated from the charge of gross indifference to the safety of others by a, futile last minute effort to retrieve the situation and avoid the danger and injury. Such an attempt may have some bearing upon the degree of the indifference, but it is not an absolute cleaning of the slate. Mescher v. Brogan, supra, at page 578 of 223 Iowa, page 648 of 272 N.W.”
That the foregoing statement is correct is. hardly open to question. However, it is directly contrary to a recent holding of the majority that such evidence furnished a basis for a directed verdict for defendant in a civil case based upon a charge of recklessness. That decision, Hartman v. Kruse, 249 Iowa 1320, 1326, 91 N.W.2d 688, 691, states:
“We should also consider whether there is evidence of ‘no care, coupled with disregard for consequences.’ In the present case there is undenied evidence the defendant driver, as soon as he observed the stop sign at the Highway No*. 12 T intersection, put on the brakes of his car. It was then 100 feet from the stop sign. From this point it skidded into the intersection and then proceeded another 62 feet to the west shoulder of Highway No. 12 and rolled over. As the car skidded into the highway *449the defendant driver, according to his testimony, ‘* # * thought I had better straighten it out and it kept going. Then I thought, well, there is a telephone pole- straight ahead and a big embankment — a low embankment, but I didn’t want to hit that so I tried to turn to the left.’
“We are unable to- conclude the driver’s actions showed <* * * acts utterly inconsistent with prudence or proper regard for the safety of the guest in his car, from which the inference could be drawn that the operation of the vehicle was reckless.’ ”
The foregoing holding in the Hartman case may not be excused as an oversight of the court since the dissenting opinion in that case called attention to it and cited as authority to the contrary the identical statement from Mescher v. Brogan, supra, cited as authority for the holding in the case at bar. The dissenting opinion in Hartman v. Kruse, supra, 249 Iowa 1320, 1335, 1336, 91 N.W.2d 688, 697, states:
“In Division III the majority opinion states that as soon as defendant saw the stop sign at the T intersection he put on the brakes and as the car skidded 100 feet into the intersection he tried to turn to the left to avoid the telephone pole and embankment. The opinion then appears to hold ‘there is no evidence the driver did not do everything in his power to- avoid the accident’ and hence no ‘inference could be- drawn that the operation of the vehicle was reckless.’
“That proposition was considered in the much cited case of Mescher v. Brogan, 223 Iowa 573, 578, 272 N.W. 645, in which the driver was operating the- automobile over a wide, well-settled gravel highway, with which he was- unfamiliar, at a speed of 65 miles per hour at night and was unable to- negotiate a turn:
“ ‘There is nothing in the testimony to- indicate that the driver did not exercise all the care possible to- avoid injury after he discovered the corner or turn in the- road. In other words, there is no evidence of recklessness, or even want of care, in the operation of the car from the moment the defendant discovered that he could not make the turn in safety. The recklessness, if any, consists in. the high rate of speed at night with visibility limited, coupled with his apparent attitude of indif*450ference to consequences [etc.], * * * and * # * it was for-the jury to determine, and not a case presenting facts upon which minds of reasonable men might not differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant came within the definition of recklessness, as defined by this court, as hereinbefore set forth.’ ”
In the Hartman case the majority declined to mention or even consider the sound doctrine so clearly stated in Mescher v. Brogan, supra, and in effect overruled it. Now the case at bar overrules Hartman without mentioning it and reinstates the rule of Mescher v. Brogan. The court should have ended this conflict by expressly overruling the Hartman case.