Court Opinion

ID: 9716201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:30:40.179909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:42.622915
License: Public Domain

WELCH, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority notes the ground for decision stated by the trial court was erroneous, because under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act deceptive acts or practices are “unlawful whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 1211/2, par. 262.) Our next inquiry is whether the judgment should be affirmed on some other ground. (See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Department of Labor (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 541, 543, 485 N.E.2d 1102, 1104.) The majority decides Grissom did not establish the van was “clipped” when he bought it. In my opinion there was compelling evidence that he bought it “clipped.” The following facts are significant on that issue: Grissom’s testimony showed he first drew the conclusion the van was “clipped” in April of 1982 when he tied up some wires he noticed were dragging. According to Grissom these wires were for an auxiliary fuel tank which the van as pieced together did not have, though the dashboard had an auxiliary fuel tank gauge. Grissom also testified that the first time it rained, one week after the purchase, the van leaked “through the windshield and on the side doors.” This corresponds neatly with the testimony of Nick Gomric, an experienced auto-body repairman, that the vehicle was cut in two and welded across the floor and around the windshield and windshield post. There was much testimony from various witnesses regarding the van’s condition and its substantial rust and deterioration, yet not the slightest suggestion the van was ever painted subsequent to the sale by Brockland to Grissom. Obviously no bodywork was done subsequent to the sale. Finally, none of Brockland’s employees positively denied the van was sold “clipped.” Mr. Brockland’s testimony fell far short of an express denial. Mr. Brockland was cross-examined and testified: “Q. I imagine if you were going to buy a car and it was a clipped model, you’d like to know that that was exactly what you were getting when you bought it, wouldn’t you? A. We did buy this car, sir. Q. I imagine you would have liked to have known that that was what you were getting when you bought the thing? A. I would have liked to have known what now? Q. That it was a clipped model when you bought it, if it was. A. There was nothing on that van to indicate from the appearance that it was a clipped van. Q. You just bought it from— A. When our agent purchased that van. Q. You bought it from some individual over in Missouri? A. It was purchased from an individual who lives in St. Charles, Missouri, or somewhere in that area, and I believe Mr. Watson located it through an ad in the newspaper.” The evidence that the van was “clipped” before Grissom bought it was overwhelming. A reviewing court may substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact where the lower court’s judgment rested on unsatisfactory or insufficient evidence. (Stavins v. Stavins (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 622, 626-27, 388 N.E.2d 928, 931.) We should reverse as to both GMAC’s claim and Grissom’s third-party complaint and remand for assessment of Grissom’s damages in his counterclaim against GMAC and his third-party action against Brockland.