Court Opinion

ID: 9524071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:49:46.842846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:49.335172
License: Public Domain

BAILEY, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the reversionary clause in the 1960 Deed is unenforceable. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion in footnote five regarding the applicability of Indiana Code Section 32-24-l-15(a)(4) (2004).7
In response to the Appellants’ contention that the State forfeited the Fawcett Property based on failing to utilize the land within five years, the majority concludes that the State did adapt a portion of the land within five years, preventing the reversion of the Fawcett Property to the condemnee. This conclusion assumes that the interest acquired by the State was not a fee simple interest, thus requiring the State to act within five years of acquisition. I disagree with this underlying assumption.
Indiana Code Section 32 — 24—1—15(a)(4) (2004), provides:
If the person seeking to take property under this article fails to take possession of the property and adapt the property for the purpose for which it was acquired not later than five (5) years after the payment of the award or judgment for damages, except where a fee simple interest in the property is authorized to be acquired and is acquired, the person seeking to acquire the property forfeits all rights in the property as fully and completely as if the procedure to take the property had not begun.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines fee simple as “an interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs; esp., a fee simple absolute.” Black’s Law Dictionary 648 (8th ed.2004). Although the definition denotes that fee simple is especially a fee simple absolute, the definition does not mean that fee simple is exclusively synonymous with the term fee simple absolute. In fact, there is a comment under the definition of fee simple absolute:
Although it is probably good practice to use the word “absolute” whenever one is referring to an estate in fee simple that is free of special limitation, condition subsequent, or executory limitation, lawyers frequently refer to such an estate as a “fee simple” or even as a “fee.”
Id. at 649 (quoting Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 24 (2d ed.1984)).
Lawyers may use as shorthand “fee simple” or “fee” when they are truly speaking of a fee simple absolute. However, the term “fee. simple” or “estate in fee simple” is a generic term. See Restatement (First) of Prop.: Intro. To Freehold Interests § 14 (1936). A fee simple is “the largest possible interest which one can create in land. It is regarded as of infinite or potentially infinite duration.” 1 John A. Borron, The Law of Future Interests § 62 at 44 (3d ed.2002) (emphasis added). There are five types of “fee simple” estates recognized in Indiana. These are: (1) fee simple absolute; (2) fee simple determinable; (3) fee simple subject to a condition subsequent; (4) fee simple subject to an executory limitation; and (5) fee simple conditional. 12 West’s Indiana Law Encyclopedia, Estates, eh. 2, § 4, p. 315 (2001).
In construing a statute, the primary task is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Hendricks Coun*533ty Bank & Trust Co. v. Guthrie Bldg. Materials, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. When a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court may not interpret the statute. Id. Rather, the court looks to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and phrases in a statute to discern the legislative intent, although technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import. Ind.Code § 1 — 1—4—1.
The language employed in a statute crafted by the legislature is deemed to have been used intentionally. Parkview Hospital, Inc. v. Roese, 750 N.E.2d 384, 386 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Therefore, we must conclude that the legislature intentionally used the generic term of “fee simple.”
Furthermore, the employ of the general term of “fee simple” comports with the purpose of the forfeiture statute. In the context of eminent domain, the condemnor or acquirer is not limited to taking only a fee simple interest in the land it wishes to utilize. Rather, it may seek to take a right-of-way, an easement, or any other interest in the land. See I.C. § 32-24-1-3(b)(2) (Before exercising the power of eminent domain the acquirer “must make an effort to purchase for the use intended the land, right-of-way, easement, or other interest, in the property.”) and § 32-24-1-4(b)(3) (In filing a complaint for the determination of condemnation damages, the acquirer must state the “use the plaintiff intends to make of the property or right sought to be acquired.”).
The effect of I.C. § 32-24-l-15(a)(4) is to require those authorized to use eminent domain proceedings for the acquisition of temporary8 or limited-use9 property interests to take action in the execution of their plan within a reasonable amount of time or face forfeiture of the temporary or limited-use property interest acquired by them. In other words, the statute is to prevent an acquirer from needlessly depriving the long-term property owner of the use of his own land for an indefinite period of time. If an acquirer obtains an interest in land of infinite or potentially infinite duration through the process of eminent domain, there would be no need to encourage or force the acquirer to hasten the utilization of the acquired land. Under such circumstances, a citizen is not being deprived of the use of their land; rather, the citizen has been paid fair compensation for the permanent transfer of their title to the land.
The estate granted in the present case is a fee simple determinable, which creates an estate in fee simple that can automatically expire upon the occurrence of a specified event. Restatement (First) of Prop.: Intro. To Freehold Interests § 44 (1936). Because the State acquired this interest in fee simple, the circumstances fall within the exception of I.C. § 32-24-l-15(a)(4), making the forfeiture statute inapplicable.
For these reasons, I write separately but otherwise concur fully in the majority opinion.

. See op. at 531 n. 5.

. See, e.g., Portland Natural Gas Transmission Sys. v. 19.2 Acres of Land, 318 F.3d 279 (1st Cir.2003).

. An example of a limited use interest is an easement. See North Snow Bay, Inc. v. Hamilton, 657 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (Easements are limited to the purpose for which they are granted.).