Court Opinion

ID: 9841118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 14:00:43.014811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:39:46.292140
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13005   Document: 29-1    Date Filed: 09/21/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-13005
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        ANTHONY OLIVER,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        AMERIS BANK,
        CHEX SYSTEMS, INC.,
        EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,
        EQUIFAX INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, LLC,

                                                Defendants-Appellees,

        GEOVISTA CREDIT UNION, et al.,
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      21-13005

                                                                          Defendants.

                                ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00273-RSB-CLR
                             ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:

               Anthony Oliver, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 ap-
        peals the district court’s 10 August 2021 order (1) dismissing with
        prejudice Oliver’s pro se civil action as a sanction for Oliver’s at-
        tempting to deceive the district court; and (2) imposing additional
        pre-ﬁling restrictions on Oliver’s future ﬁlings in the district court.
        Reversible error has been shown; we aﬃrm in part and vacate in
        part the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
                                                  I.
               We begin with some background. In earlier unrelated civil
        actions, the district court has previously declared Oliver a vexatious

        1 We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants.See Timson v.
        Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se
        pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
        1998).
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        21-13005                   Opinion of the Court                                3

        litigant. 2 See, e.g., Oliver v. City of Pooler, No. 4:18-cv-00100, 2019
        U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33078 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2019). In May 2018 -- in
        response to Oliver’s continued abusive litigation practices despite
        repeated warnings -- the district court entered an order enjoining
        Oliver from ﬁling pro se any new civil action unless he satisﬁed cer-
        tain pre-conditions. See Oliver v. Cty. of Chatham, No. 4:17-cv-00101,
        2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90887 (S.D. Ga. May 30, 2018). Among the
        pre-conditions, Oliver was required to post a $1000 contempt bond
        in addition to paying the district court’s normal ﬁling fee: an
        amount that would be returned to Oliver at the conclusion of his
        case if he conducted himself appropriately. See id.
                In October 2019, the district court concluded that it was nec-
        essary to impose additional pre-conditions to discourage Oliver’s
        continued vexatious conduct. See Oliver v. Lyft, Nos. 4:19-cv-00063
        & 4:19-cv-00125, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181836 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 21,
        2019), adopting 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182484 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 13,
        2019) (providing that -- if Oliver failed to post the required $1000
        contempt bond -- the district court would conduct an initial screen-
        ing and dismiss without further judicial action any complaint that
        failed to state a plausible claim for relief ).
               In June 2020, Oliver ﬁled pro se the civil action underlying
        this appeal. Oliver ﬁled the initial complaint in state court and the

        2 Oliver has also been identified as a vexatious litigant in the Central District

        of California. See Oliver v. Luner, 2:18-cv-02562, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220345
        (C.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2018).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13005

        action was later removed to federal district court. At the time of
        ﬁling, Oliver was incarcerated at a state prison in Georgia.
               On 15 January 2021, the district court suspended the con-
        tempt-bond requirement for federal civil actions ﬁled during Oli-
        ver’s incarceration and in which Oliver was proceeding in forma
        pauperis. The district court reasoned that -- while Oliver was in
        prison -- the provisions of the Prison Reform Litigation Act
        (“PLRA”) would serve to deter Oliver from ﬁling frivolous lawsuits.
                For all other cases ﬁled while Oliver was incarcerated -- in-
        cluding cases like this one that had been removed from state court
        -- the district court ordered that Oliver be permitted to move for a
        waiver of the contempt-bond requirement. The district court pro-
        vided that a motion for waiver be accompanied by supporting doc-
        umentation, including a copy of Oliver’s prisoner trust account and
        a sworn aﬃdavit declaring under penalty of perjury an inability to
        pay.
               The district court declined to address whether the PLRA’s
        three-strikes rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) was applicable to this case.
        The district court said expressly that it was the district court’s un-
        derstanding that Oliver had not accumulated the requisite prior dis-
        missals to trigger the three-strikes bar.
               In July 2021, a magistrate judge issued a 27-page report and
        recommendation (“R&R”). The magistrate judge recommended
        that the district court dismiss with prejudice Oliver’s complaint.
        The magistrate judge determined that Oliver had tried actively to
        deceive the court by failing to correct the district court’s
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        21-13005                Opinion of the Court                          5

        misunderstanding about Oliver’s status as a three-striker under sec-
        tion 1915(g). The magistrate judge identiﬁed four cases that quali-
        ﬁed as strikes for purposes of section 1915(g): Oliver v. Gore, 3:09-
        cv-02505, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46822 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2010); Ol-
        iver v. Sloane, 4:10-cv-00169 (D. Ariz. June 8, 2010); Oliver v. Reays
        Ranch Inv’rs, 4:10-cv-00158 (D. Ariz. Jul. 19, 2010); and Oliver v. Cty.
        of Isanti, 0:10-cv-04218 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2011). Based on a determi-
        nation that Oliver knew about his status as a three-striker, the mag-
        istrate judge recommended that Oliver’s complaint be dismissed
        with prejudice as a sanction for Oliver’s attempt to deceive know-
        ingly the court. The magistrate judge also recommended that the
        district court impose additional pre-ﬁling conditions in the light of
        Oliver’s continuing pattern of abusive and vexatious conduct de-
        spite repeated warnings.
               Oliver objected to the R&R. Oliver challenged the magis-
        trate judge’s determination that Oliver qualiﬁed as a three-striker,
        arguing (1) that he was not the person who ﬁled the civil actions in
        Sloane, Reays Ranch, and Isanti; and (2) that the dismissal in Gore
        constituted no strike. Oliver also disputed the magistrate judge’s
        determination that Oliver had engaged in abusive conduct.
               On 10 August 2021, the district court issued a detailed order
        overruling Oliver’s objections and adopting the R&R. The district
        court rejected Oliver’s assertion that he was not the plaintiﬀ in
        Sloane, Reays Ranch, and Isanti. The district court found that Oliver
        knowingly withheld information about his three-striker status and
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                     21-13005

        that dismissal was an appropriate sanction for Oliver’s attempt to
        deceive the court. 3
                The district court also determined that Oliver’s continued
        vexatious conduct warranted additional pre-ﬁling conditions. The
        district court thus ordered that all of Oliver’s future ﬁlings be sub-
        ject to an initial review by the presiding judge and that only those
        complaints that alleged a plausible claim for relief be approved for
        ﬁling. The district court ordered all other cases be dismissed with-
        out further judicial action after 30 days. For any case approved for
        ﬁling, the district court required Oliver to post a $1000 contempt
        bond. The district court’s order included no language about waiv-
        ing the bond requirement.
                                                 II.
                On appeal, Oliver ﬁrst challenges the district court’s dismis-
        sal of his complaint as a sanction for attempting to deceive the dis-
        trict court. Oliver denies that he qualiﬁes as a three-striker and con-
        tinues to assert that he is not the person who ﬁled the civil actions
        in Sloane, Reays Ranch, and Isanti.
               We review a district court’s imposition of sanctions -- includ-
        ing dismissal with prejudice -- under an abuse-of-discretion stand-
        ard. See Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 612-13 (11th Cir. 1997).
        A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal

        3 The district court also denied Oliver’s motion to waive the contempt bond

        in this case. Oliver raises no substantive argument challenging that ruling on
        appeal.
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        21-13005                Opinion of the Court                            7

        standard, follows improper procedures, or makes ﬁndings of fact
        that are clearly erroneous. See Sciarretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
        778 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015).
               Oliver has failed to show that the district court clearly erred
        in determining that Oliver was in fact the person who ﬁled the civil
        actions in Sloane, Reays Ranch, and Isanti. The district court ex-
        plained that the facts alleged in those civil actions -- including the
        name of the plaintiﬀ’s ex-girlfriend, the circumstances of their re-
        lationship, and the plaintiﬀ’s address and prisoner identiﬁcation
        number -- were consistent with information provided in recent civil
        actions ﬁled by Oliver. The district court also determined that the
        plaintiﬀ’s handwriting in the earlier civil actions was suﬃciently
        similar to Oliver’s handwriting to support a ﬁnding that Oliver was
        the plaintiﬀ in Sloane, Reays Ranch, and Isanti.
                Oliver has also failed to show that the district court clearly
        erred in determining that Oliver knew about his history of previous
        strikes. Among other things, Oliver twice had civil actions dis-
        missed on grounds that Oliver was a three-striker under section
        1915(g). See Oliver v. Kemp, 1:19-cv-05014 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2019);
        Oliver v. Chex Sys., Inc., 3:20-cv-00030 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2020).
               The district court determined reasonably that Oliver at-
        tempted knowingly to deceive the court when he failed to correct
        the record by disclosing his previous strikes. Given Oliver’s lack of
        candor -- and Oliver’s history of bad faith litigiousness -- the district
        court acted within its discretion by dismissing Oliver’s civil action
        with prejudice as a sanction. See Attwood, 105 F.3d at 613 (aﬃrming
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13005

        the dismissal with prejudice of a pro se prisoner complaint as a sanc-
        tion based on the district court’s ﬁnding that the plaintiﬀ made false
        claims of indigency and had a history of bad-faith litigation).
                                             III.
               Oliver next contends that the district court erred in ﬁnding
        that he engaged in vexatious conduct warranting additional pre-ﬁl-
        ing conditions. Oliver also argues that the district court’s con-
        tempt-bond requirement forecloses his access to the courts.
               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s imposi-
        tion of a pre-ﬁling injunction. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc.,
        376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004).
                “Federal courts have both the inherent power and the con-
        stitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct
        which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.”
        Procup v. Strickland, 792, F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
        We have recognized that a district court has “[c]onsiderable discre-
        tion” in this area. See id. at 1074. An abusive litigant may be “se-
        verely restricted as to what he may ﬁle and how he must behave in
        his applications for judicial relief ” as long as he is not “completely
        foreclosed from any access to the court.” Id. (emphasis in original);
        see Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993)
        (“The only restriction this Circuit has placed upon injunctions de-
        signed to protect against abusive and vexatious litigation is that a
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        21-13005                   Opinion of the Court                                 9

        litigant cannot be ‘completely foreclosed from any access to the
        court.’” (emphasis in original)). 4
               The district court acted within its considerable discretion in
        determining that additional pre-ﬁling conditions were warranted
        under the circumstances presented in this case. The record sup-
        ports the district court’s determination that Oliver has continued
        to engage in abusive and vexatious litigation conduct despite re-
        peated warnings and the imposition of less restrictive pre-ﬁling
        conditions. The magistrate judge described in detail Oliver’s his-
        tory of abusive litigation conduct and provided examples of how
        Oliver’s conduct in this case -- including Oliver’s motion to strike a
        portion of an already-withdrawn pleading, his motion for sanctions
        against opposing counsel, and his motion to dismiss voluntarily the
        case -- was similar to the kinds of conduct for which Oliver had
        been sanctioned in the past.
               Turning to the district court’s newly-imposed pre-ﬁling con-
        ditions themselves, the district court abused no discretion by sub-
        jecting Oliver’s future ﬁlings to an initial frivolity screening. We
        have concluded under circumstances similar to those presented in
        this case that requiring an abusive litigant to submit future ﬁlings
        for pre-ﬁling screening is permissible because it still allows the

        4 On appeal, Oliver relies chiefly on factors described by the Second and Ninth

        Circuits in Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1986), and De
        Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1990). We decline to consider this
        kind of multi-factor approach and rely, instead, on our binding precedent in
        this area.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13005

        litigant adequate access to the courts. See Coﬁeld v. Ala. Pub. Serv.
        Com., 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991) (“As long as the district court
        judges merely screen out the frivolous and malicious claims and
        allow the arguable claims to go forward, [the abusive litigant] is not
        placed in a position diﬀerent from other in forma pauperis liti-
        gants.”).
               We do, however, have concerns about the portion of the dis-
        trict court’s order requiring Oliver to post a contempt bond for
        cases that survive the frivolity screening process. Unlike the district
        court’s 15 January 2021 order, the 10 August 2021 order includes no
        express language permitting Oliver to move for a waiver of the con-
        tempt-bond requirement. Given the district court’s silence on the
        matter, we cannot determine whether the district court intended
        to revoke -- or to leave in place -- Oliver’s ability to seek such a
        waiver. We have little doubt that ﬂatly prohibiting Oliver from
        moving for a waiver of the contempt-bond requirement could fore-
        close completely -- and impermissibly -- Oliver’s access to the
        courts.
               Because we ﬁnd the district court’s 10 August 2021 order un-
        clear on the subject of waiver, we vacate in part the district court’s
        order. We remand with instructions for the district court to include
        -- among the list of pre-ﬁling conditions -- language detailing the
        procedure by which Oliver may seek a waiver of the contempt-
        bond requirement if he is unable to aﬀord one.
              In sum, we aﬃrm the portions of the district court’s 10 Au-
        gust 2021 order dismissing with prejudice Oliver’s civil action and
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        21-13005              Opinion of the Court                      11

        determining that additional pre-ﬁling restrictions are warranted.
        We vacate only the portion of the district court’s order pertaining
        to the contempt-bond requirement and remand for further pro-
        ceedings consistent with this opinion.
            AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
        REMANDED.