Court Opinion

ID: 9766401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:45:46.6653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:22.127250
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I am pleased to join Judge Ruiz’ opinion for the court. I think it appropriate, however, to add a few further observations.
In general, when an attorney resigns from the Bar while facing charges of wrongdoing, it is reasonable to draw an unfavorable inference. See In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427, 431 (D.C.1997) (citing D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11). It is important, however, to consider the particular circumstances, for there are cases in which the inference may not logically fit.
In the present instance, the attempted mechanical application of decisions we have rendered in cases in which a lawyer resigned from the Bar of another jurisdiction while a complaint against him or her was pending has been most unfair to Schoeneman and potentially devastating to his career. As I see it, Schoeneman has not been shown to have done anything wrong at all, except possibly committing the uncharged offense, if it was an offense, of failing to report his Virginia resignation.1 Essentially, the complaint against Schoeneman arose from his refusal to move to reopen a civil rights case in which it appeared that his client had forged a critical document. Schoeneman investigated the allegations industriously, but he could not prove that the client was not responsible for the forgery. The client demanded that her fee be returned, but she had no legal right to such relief.
Schoeneman’s decision not to file a motion to reopen a case on grounds which he believed to be spurious was consistent with his ethical obligations, and it provided no basis for any sanction against him. Indeed, the Office of Bar Counsel itself independently concluded that, on the merits, Sehoeneman’s conduct did not warrant disciplinary action in the District. Under these circumstances, I do not see how resort to reciprocal discipline against Schoeneman has served the universally recognized goal of attorney discipline, namely, the protection of the public.
Schoeneman claims that the imposition of reciprocal discipline — potentially a suspension for five years — would result in a “grave injustice” to him within the meaning of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(3). If it were necessary to reach the issue, I would be inclined to agree.

. Bar Counsel claims that Schoeneman was required to report his resignation to Bar Counsel pursuant to the last sentence of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(b). This contention presupposes that Schoeneman’s resignation amounted to "professional disciplinary action by a disciplinary court outside the District of Columbia.” Id. Our disposition of this case does not require us to determine whether Schoene-man has actually been subject to Virginia discipline, but it is not obvious to me that Bar Counsel’s reading is correct. See the opinion of the court, ante, at 261, note 2.