Court Opinion

ID: 9752757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:33:20.056796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:21.841722
License: Public Domain

*374DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s order for a new trial and remanding for sentencing because I do not believe that the offer of proof made in the Motion in Limine was procedurally defective, and because I believe a hearing is required to determine the relevancy of the Johnson Rape Kit test results.
The Rape-Shield Law does not exclude relevant evidence showing the witness’ motive or bias, or which attacks the witness’ credibility. Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 372 Pa.Super. 566, 539 A.2d 1341 (1988), citing, Commonwealth v. Black, 337 Pa.Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985) (en banc). In Commonwealth v. Marjorana, 503 Pa. 602, 470 A.2d 80 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Lyons, 364 Pa.Super. 620, 528 A.2d 975 (1987), we found that the court erred in excluding evidence of the complainant’s sexual relations with another person. We held that this evidence was relevant to explain the presence of semen and sperm found in the complainant, (Marjorana) or blood on the child’s panties, (Lyons), and therefore, despite the protections of the Rape Shield Law, this evidence of prior sexual contact with a third party should have been admitted to prove an alternative cause or explanation for the presence of the physical evidence. These cases show that, contrary to the majority’s holding, it is not only when the victim’s credibility was allegedly affected by bias against or hostility toward the defendant that evidence of the witness’ sexual conduct may be admitted over the protections of the Rape Shield Law.
Here, the defense argued during the Motion in Limine that it was not until the Johnson Rape Kit test had been performed that the complaining witness contended that she had had sexual intercourse with the defendant. She had consistently maintained, prior to that time, that she had not had intercourse with him. (N.T. at 6, 11/2/89). This offer of proof suggested that the results of the test were the motive for her changed allegations, and evidence of this motive should have been admitted as it affected her credibility. Thus, I would find that the offer of proof was suffi*375ciently specific relating to motive and credibility, and there was, therefore, no procedural defect in the proffer.
According to the reasoning found in the offer of proof, the test results are only relevant if they establish a motive for the complainant to lie. Defendant alleged that the complainant fabricated this new charge because she was afraid of what would happen if her grandmother knew she was having sexual relations with another person. He argues that she changed her story and claimed she had engaged in intercourse with defendant to provide an alternative explanation for the test results.
However, I believe we have insufficient information at this point to establish that the test results provide a possible explanation or motive for the change in her story. The Commonwealth agreed that the sperm that was in the complainant was not the sperm of the defendant. In fact, the complainant said that she did not have contact with defendant or even see him for well over a month prior to the administration of the Johnson Rape Kit. (N.T. at 3, 11/2/89)
This brings up the question of why the test was administered in the first place; medical professionals would certainly know that sperm will not be detected a month after intercourse has occurred, if this were indeed the last time there was any contact with defendant. But more importantly, even if the test was merely inadvertently administered, through bureaucratic error, we do not know if the complainant or her grandmother knew of the test results, which might cause her to fabricate the story.
We also do not know why or on what basis the Commonwealth agreed that it was not the defendant’s sperm. Was a DNA analysis performed on the sperm, proving that it was not defendant’s sperm, or are we simply assuming that the sperm was not defendant’s without any factual basis for that assumption, apart from the Commonwealth’s concession?
*376Moreover, we do not know whether the complainant or her grandmother knew or claimed to know, prior to changing her story, that the sperm found in complainant was not the defendant’s sperm. If she and her grandmother knew or claimed to know it was not the defendant’s sperm, then they knew that complainant was having sexual relations with another person. Then, by what logic would she believe that an accusation against the defendant would somehow help her to avoid the consequences of her grandmother’s disapproval?
Given all these unanswered questions I do not believe that at this time the trial court can decide that the evidence of the test results is admissible as probative of the motive for the alleged fabrication. These areas need to be explored, and I would therefore remand for an in camera hearing similarly ordered in Commonwealth v. Black, 337 Pa.Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 389 Pa.Super. 184, 566 A.2d 1197 (1989).
We stated in Black, supra., at 337 Pa.Super. at 557, 487 A.2d 396:
While we hold that Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield Law may not be used to exclude relevant evidence showing witness’ bias or attacking credibility, we do not hold that material evidence is necessarily admissible. Although logically relevant, evidence tending to show the victim’s prejudice or lack of credibility may be excluded if ‘it would so inflame the minds of the jurors that its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice.’ [citations omitted] This balancing determination between probative value and unfair prejudice should be made by the trial court at an in camera hearing ... At this hearing, the trial court should determine the following as a matter of record to be preserved for appellate review: (1) whether the proposed evidence is relevant to show bias or motive or to attack credibility; (2) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) whether there are alternative means of proving bias or motive or to challenge credibility.
*377Therefore, I would remand for an in camera hearing, first to resolve these questions, and then to do the necessary balancing mandated by Black.