Court Opinion

ID: 9775604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:04:41.709536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:29.336933
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Chief Justice
(dissenting)-
The policy issued by U.S.F. & G. to Dorothy Kloepper contained the following omnibus clause:
“The following are Insureds under Part I:
(a) with respect to the owned automobile,
(1) the Named Insured and any resident of the same household,
(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission of the Named Insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission, and . . .”
The principal opinion gives this omnibus clause the following construction:
“4. Permission from the named insured can be found or implied from a course of conduct which evidences the willingness of the named insured to permit the first permittee to authorize others to drive, such as the broad and unrestricted use given by the named insured to her daughter in this case.”
In effect, the Court has now ruled “that a named insured’s grant of the unrestricted general use of the automobile to another includes authority to the latter to delegate its use to third persons, and that under *823* * * permission of that character a second permittee’s use of the car * * * is with the implied permission of the named insured within the meaning of the omnibus clause.” 4 A.L.R.3d 10, 75.
I must respectfully disagree for at least the following reasons:
(1) I do not believe parents intend this result whén they give a child such use of a family automobile.
(2) In my opinion, an insured cannot be expected to intend to pay for coverage of persons who use his vehicle without his consent.” American Motorists Insurance Company v. LaCourse, 314 A.2d 813 (Me.1974).
(3) Until today, the word “permit” has been defined by this Court “as meaning ‘to allow after notice or knowledge.’ ” Sanders v. City of Carthage, 330 Mo. 844, 852, 51 S.W.2d 529, 532 (1932).
I dissent.