Court Opinion

ID: 9774692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:30:12.708808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:28.157263
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I agree with the majority’s interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-208 (1987), consent for adoption, and Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-220 (1987), relinquishment and termination of parent/child relationship. These two statutes provide mutually exclusive methods for executing adoptions. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of these statutes to the facts before us. The majority avoids deciding whether § 9-9-208 requires a ten day revocation period as set out in § 9-9-220. Instead, it reasons that because the form (“Affidavit and Consent of the Natural Mother”) signed by the appellant on October 12,1989, contained language combining the two statutory methods for placing a child for adoption, the “affidavit resulted in prejudice to Parsons, the natural mother.” The majority disregards entirely the welfare of the child or the interests of the adopting parents, in whose custody and care the child has reposed since October 13, 1989, all of which occurred at the behest of the appellant, who incidentally received some $2,603.08 during her pregnancy plus the payment of all medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, the appellant herself instigated the placement of her child for adoption by responding to a newspaper ad placed by adoptive parents, and later by personally talking with the appellees. The Affidavit and Consent form signed by the appellant included a section entitled “Surrender of the Child” which corresponds to § 9-9-220. Under this paragraph the appellant read language stating that she may automatically withdraw her consent within ten days of signing this consent. Additionally, this document contained a paragraph entitled “Consent,” corresponding to § 9-9-208. Under this paragraph the appellant read that “notice of revocation of my consent shall be given effect only if the adoptive parents fail to oppose such revocation, or if they oppose such revocation and the court determines that the best interest of the child will be promoted by giving force and effect to such revocation.” [Emphasis in original.] Although the document signed contained language relating to § 9-9-208, consent to adoption, and language pertinent to § 9-9-220, relinquishment of parent/child relationship, by concluding that prejudice resulted to the natural mother, the majority implicitly decides that the relinquishment language of § 9-9-220 dominates, granting the appellant a ten day revocation period,, or alternatively, judicially legislating a ten day revocation period into § 9-9-208. Admittedly, the ambiguous language in this document is unfortunate and the ten day withdrawal provision included in the chancellor’s decree of adoption complicates the issue. But the solution, as I see it, is not to interpret this document as a “relinquishment of the parent/child relationship” or as a “consent to adoption.” The proper course in attempting to deal with this situation should be for us to remand the case for a determination of the best interests of the child. The majority opinion simply directs the trial court to return the child to its natural mother irrespective of other compelling considerations. Adoptions were unknown to the common law and are entirely statutory. Any attempt to grant rights to the natural relatives, in the absence of statutory authority, is against public policy and is void. Irvan v. Kizer, 286 Ark. 105, 689 S.W.2d 548 (1985). Lynn Pence, Central Arkansas Legal Services, for appellant. Hartenstein, Taylor & Montgomery, by: Ray Hartenstein, for appellee.