Court Opinion

ID: 9930805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 18:11:38.210333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:30.013126
License: Public Domain

02/07/2024
                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT KNOXVILLE
                                Assigned on Briefs October 31, 2023

              ERIC DANIEL PASCHKE v. JESSICA RUTH PASCHKE

                     Appeal from the Chancery Court for Bradley County
                        No. 2022-CV-229 Jerri Bryant, Chancellor
                          ___________________________________

                                 No. E2023-00239-COA-R3-CV
                             ___________________________________

Appellant filed this declaratory judgment action against his sister, seeking to enforce a
contract concerning property owned by the siblings’ parents at their deaths. After a bench
trial, the trial court found that the contract was unenforceable, as there was no meeting of
the minds due to a mutual mistake of fact. The trial court further found that a conveyance
of real property was barred by the statute of frauds. Because Appellant has failed to supply
this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence presented at trial, we must affirm
the trial court’s finding that there was no meeting of the minds due to a mutual mistake.

    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
                                     and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.
GOLDIN, and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Jeffrey A. Miller, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellant, Eric Daniel Paschke.

Sheridan C.F. Randolph, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jessica Ruth Paschke.

                                     MEMORADUM OPINION1

1
    Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

          This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
          or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
          would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it
          shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not
          be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
                      I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        On July 26, 2022, Petitioner/Appellant Eric Daniel Paschke (“Appellant” or “Eric”)
filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the Bradley County Chancery Court (“the trial
court”). Therein, Appellant alleged that his stepmother, Donna Fay Paschke (“Mother”)
died intestate and was survived by her husband, Michael Paschke (“Father”), her daughter,
Respondent/Appellee Jessica Ruth Paschke (“Appellee” or “Jessica”) and another stepson,
James Aaron Paschke (“James”). Father died two days after Mother, also intestate.

       Appellant alleged that the family came together shortly after the deaths of Mother
and Father, and entered into a written and signed distribution agreement. Appellant
attached the “writing” to his petition. The handwritten document provides as follows:

The writing also contains three signature lines, which appear to reflect the signatures of all
three children.

       Appellant further alleged that despite signing this document, Appellee thereafter
repudiated the agreement. Appellant therefore asked for a declaratory judgment declaring
the writing to be an enforceable contract, as well as attorney’s fees.

       Appellee filed an answer on September 8, 2022. Therein, Appellee admitted that
“there was a writing purportedly regarding property disposition” but argued that the writing
was unenforceable. Appellee also asserted that her assent to the writing was procured with
duress. As defenses in addition to duress, Appellee asserted that the contract lacked
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consideration, was ambiguous, and was barred by the statute of frauds.

       On November 1, 2022, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
no enforceable contract existed because the agreement lacked consideration, was “so vague
and ambiguous as to prevent a court from being able to identify the property or enforce the
terms[,]” and lacked identification or description of the land conveyed so as to satisfy the
statute of frauds. Appellee supported her motion for summary judgment with a
memorandum of law, her own affidavit, the affidavit of a witness to the agreement,2 and a
statement of undisputed material facts. Appellant thereafter responded in opposition,
relying on his own affidavit.

        For whatever reason, the case was not disposed of via summary judgment. Instead,
the trial court conducted a bench trial “on the merits” on December 1, 2022. The trial court
entered its final order dismissing Appellant’s petition on January 24, 2023. As an initial
matter, the trial court first ruled that James was a necessary party to the action,3 and that,
having waived service of process, he agreed to be bound by the trial court’s order. The trial
court then recited the proof submitted concerning the deaths of Mother and Father, as well
as the execution of the writing in dispute. In particular, the trial court noted that the dispute
concerned real property that was owned by Mother alone; Appellee was the only “natural
child” of Mother. The trial court further found as follows:

        On Nov 17, 2021, days after the funeral, the parties met after the sudden
        death of both parents to talk about who wanted what in the estate. [Appellee]
        had met with an attorney and had given him information about both parents’
        deaths. The attorney told her something about administering both estates in
        the same probate. While it is unclear to Court what the attorney said,
        [Appellee] believed she was advised that both estates would be administered
        as one estate. This information was incorrect.
                At the meeting of November 17th, upon discussion of who wanted
        which estate property, James [] wrote a document that was not produced at
        trial. [Appellee] wrote a second document; this document was signed by all
        three parties. The Court credits Katerina Kanavos’s testimony describing
        [Appellee] as begging for additional time to think about everything before
        signing anything.

       The trial court further detailed that “there could have been consideration,” but “the
lack of consideration was influenced by the fact” that the parties made “a mistake of fact
and law between all of them in thinking that the real property was owned by both parents.

        2
           This witness, Michaela Slater, stated in her affidavit that she “was left with the impression that
the siblings’ parents only had one home on one piece of property.”
         3
           James explained that he had not involved himself in the dispute in the interest of keeping family
harmony.
                                                   -3-
It was not.” As the trial court then explained,

       Since the parties did not make a knowing decision about who owned what
       and likewise did not know what they were giving up, there was a mutual
       mistake of fact. The real property belonged to [Mother]. None of the parties
       knew the law and none knew that the property was in [Mother’s] name only.
       Further, probating both matters in one estate is mistake of law by the lawyer
       first advising [Appellee] on the probate matters.

The trial court therefore held that law providing that a contract among family “was
enforceable where the parties acted with a full knowledge of their rights” was not
applicable, citing Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). The trial court
further ruled that the contract failed because it did not include a sufficient property
description to satisfy the statute of frauds pursuant to Baliles v. Cities Service Company,
578 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. 1979). With regard to the personal property, the trial court held
there was no meeting of the minds because there was “[n]o proof that everyone knew what
property was referenced nor what their rights in the property were.” So the trial court
dismissed the petition for a declaratory judgment, and Appellant timely appealed to
this Court.

                                   II. ISSUES PRESENTED

        Appellant raises a single issue in this appeal, which is taken from his brief: “Whether
the trial court erred in finding that the document entered into by the parties was not an
enforceable contract.”

                                III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “We review the judgment of a trial court in a bench trial de novo upon the record,
according a presumption of correctness to the factual findings of the court below.” Marla
H. v. Knox Cnty., 361 S.W.3d 518, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Tenn. R. App. P.
13(d)). We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo with no presumption of
correctness. Burress v. Shelby Cnty., 74 S.W.3d 844, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

                                       IV. ANALYSIS

       In this case, the trial court made two alternative rulings in dismissing Appellant’s
petition for a declaratory judgment: (1) that there was no meeting of the minds on the
contract due to a mutual mistake of fact and a mistake of law; and (2) that, at least as to the
real property at issue, the contract failed due to the statute of frauds. When the trial court
makes independent, alternative rulings in support of its decision, the appellant is required
to appeal both rulings, lest his argument be waived. See Hatfield v. Allenbrooke Nursing
& Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. W2017-00957-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3740565, at *7 (Tenn.
                                             -4-
Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2018) (“Generally, where a trial court provides more than one basis for
its ruling, the appellant must appeal all the alternative grounds for the ruling.” (citing 5
Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 718; Tower Oaks Blvd., LLC v. Procida, 219 Md. App.
376, 392, 100 A.3d 1255, 1265 (Md. 2014))). In other words, “where a trial court provides
more than one separate and independent ground for its judgment and a party fails to appeal
one or more of the independent grounds, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court on
the ground that was not challenged on appeal.” Buckley v. Elephant Sanctuary in Tenn.,
Inc., 639 S.W.3d 38, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Hatfield, 2018 WL 3740565, at *7).

        Here, Appellant’s designated issue broadly encompasses both rulings. And
Appellant has specifically addressed both rulings in the argument section of his appellate
brief. What Appellant has not done, however, is provide this Court with an appropriate
record from which we can review both of these issues. “This Court’s authority to review a
trial court’s decision is limited to those issues for which an adequate legal record has been
preserved.” Taylor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 158 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). To
achieve this end, Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the
appellant “have prepared” a transcript or statement of the evidence “as is necessary to
convey a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues
that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b) (involving transcripts); see also Tenn.
R. App. P. 24(c) (involving statements of the evidence). Thus, the appellant generally bears
the burden of supplying this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence in order
to facilitate appellate review. See State v. Knowles, 470 S.W.3d 416, 427 (Tenn. 2015).

        The failure to present this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence has
significant consequences. Specifically, when the appellant fails to provide a transcript or
statement of the evidence detailing the proof presented at trial, “this Court presumes that
sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s decision.” Irvin v. City of Clarksville,
767 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); see also Ramsay v. Custer, 387 S.W.3d 566,
568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“In the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, a
conclusive presumption arises that the parties presented sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s judgment, and this court will affirm the judgment.”). “This conclusive
presumption applies, however, to the trial court’s factual findings concerning proof
presented at trial and not to the trial court’s conclusions regarding issues of law.” In re Est.
of Kysor, No. E2014-02143-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 9465332, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2015) (citing In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)); see also State
ex rel. Weeks v. Kirkland, No. E2007-01735-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 1765126, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2008) (“No transcript of the evidentiary hearing has been filed in
the record, but the issue before us is a question of law, and the Trial Court’s decision does
not enjoy a presumption of correctness.”).

       Here, the ultimate ruling by the trial court was that the parties had not entered into
an enforceable contract. The question of whether a contract has been formed is a question
of law. German v. Ford, 300 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Murray v.
                                            -5-
Tenn. Farmers Assurance Co., No. M2008-00115-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3452410, at
*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.12, 2008)). But the trial court’s conclusion that no contract was
formed was based on two different rulings: (1) that there was no meeting of the minds due
to a mutual mistake;4 and (2) that at least part of the contract was barred by the statute of
frauds.5 Whether a contract is barred by the statute of frauds is also a conclusion of law
that this Court reviews de novo. See Blair v. Brownson, 197 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tenn. 2006).
In contrast, whether a meeting of the minds has occurred and whether there was a mutual
mistake of fact are questions of fact to which the presumption of correctness attaches. See
Wofford v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home Inc., 490 S.W.3d 800, 807 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2015) (“[W]hether a meeting of the minds occurred is a question of fact.” (citation
omitted)); McGinnis v. Mills, 733 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“Whether a
release has been executed under a mutual mistake of material fact is a question of fact to
be resolved by the trier of fact.”). Thus, the question of whether a mutual mistake prevented
a meeting of the minds is “fact-based.” Coakley v. Daniels, 840 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1992). And “[w]here the issues raised go to the evidence, there must be a
transcript” or statement of the evidence. Id.

       Although Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment in this case, there appears
to be no dispute that the case was eventually tried as a bench trial. As such, a transcript or
statement of the evidence is necessary for this Court to review the factual issues presented
by this appeal. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, we are simply unable to
determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. See Richardson v. Richardson,
No. M2020-00179-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4240831, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17,
2021) (“Mother’s failure to file a transcript or statement of the evidence means that we are
largely unable to independently review the evidence to determine where the preponderance
of the evidence lies.”).

        Appellant attempts to sidestep the lack of transcript or statement of the evidence by
citing to the affidavits that were filed in conjunction with Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that these affidavits were admitted as
substantive evidence at trial. We have previously held that such affidavits cannot be
considered a substitute for a transcript or statement of the evidence. See Harris v. White,
No. M2011-00992-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1795086, at *9 & n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16,

        4
          A contract “must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms,
must be based upon a sufficient consideration, free from fraud or undue influence, not against public policy
and sufficiently definite to be enforced.” Higgins v. Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, Local #
3-677, 811 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting Johnson v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 210 Tenn.
24, 34–35, 356 S.W.2d 277, 281 (Tenn. 1962)).
        5
          The statute of frauds applies to “any alienation of real property” and requires “a written
memorandum or note evidencing the parties’ agreement[.]” Waddle v. Elrod, 367 S.W.3d 217, 224, 226
(Tenn. 2012). “[T]o comply with the statute of frauds, a memorandum of an agreement to sell must show,
with reasonable certainty, the estate intended to be sold.” Baliles v. Cities Serv. Co., 578 S.W.2d 621, 623
(Tenn. 1979).
                                                   -6-
2012) (holding that the presumption in favor of the trial court’s finding would apply where
the appellant provided this Court with only a portion of the transcript and an affidavit of
his expert witness that “were not admitted into evidence but appear as trial exhibits for
identification only”). Indeed, this Court has explained that

       [E]vidence introduced at trial takes the form of testimony of live witnesses
       who are subject to cross-examination, depositions of unavailable witnesses
       who have been available for cross-examination, and properly authenticated
       exhibits. The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the use
       of affidavits as evidence at trial except by consent.

Nagarajan v. Terry, 151 S.W.3d 166, 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). Thus,
without the consent of the parties, affidavits that may not be cross-examined are not
considered proper evidence at trial. And Appellant has not asserted that the parties were
not permitted the opportunity to present live testimony on this issue, as all parties were
present for the trial. Moreover, the testimony of at least one witness who testified at the
trial does not appear to have been the subject of an affidavit.6 So it appears that the
affidavits presented in the summary judgment stage are not an appropriate substitute for a
transcript or statement of the evidence in this case.

       In sum, the trial court made two interconnected factual findings—that, based on the
evidence presented, no meeting of the minds occurred because the parties made a mutual
mistake of fact. Because Appellant has failed to provide this Court with a transcript or
statement of the evidence, we are unable to determine if the evidence preponderates against
these findings. Instead, we must conclusively presume that the evidence presented
supported the trial court’s factual findings and we must therefore affirm the trial court’s
findings that a mutual mistake of fact prevented a meeting of the minds. Because these
findings serve as a separate and independent basis for the trial court’s decision to dismiss
Appellant’s petition for a declaratory judgment, we need not address Appellant’s additional
argument that the trial court erred in its application of the statute of frauds. See Buckley,
639 S.W.3d at 55.

                                         V. CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the Bradley County Chancery Court is affirmed, and this cause is
remanded for all further proceedings as may be necessary and in accordance with this
Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant, Eric Daniel Paschke, for which
execution may issue if necessary.

       6
           Specifically, the trial court credited some of the testimony of witness Katerina Kanavos. No
affidavit from Ms. Kanavos is included in the technical record on appeal.
                                                 -7-
      S/ J. Steven Stafford
      J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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