Court Opinion

ID: 9703456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:57:40.679638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:48.255174
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The presiding Justice properly denied, the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. There was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant placed another person in fear of imminent bodily injury and that he acted either intentionally or knowingly. . The evidence as to the defendant’s abnormal condition of the mind was not such as to require a rational trier of fact to have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. My disagreement with the majority is that I believe there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s abnormal condition of mind to require that the jury be instructed that it could consider such evidence in determining whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had acted intentionally or knowingly.
17 — A M.R.S.A. § 58(1-A) provides:
In a prosecution for a crime which may be committed intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, where such culpable state of mind is a necessary element, the existence of a reasonable doubt as to such state of mind may be established by evidence of an abnormal condition of mind.
During the direct examination of the victim, the defendant’s mother, she testified as follows:
*671A: He started talking about his own mother was killed, because he was in a test tube, and I was not his real mother and didn’t I agree with him, and I said, no, I was his mother.
Q: Did he then say something else?
A: He said something about I didn’t know what the Japanese had injected into my breast and I said they had not injected anything into my breast, and he said, well, they had. And he was going to have to prove it to me and something about the Bible, he came out with the Bible in his hand, that it was all in the Bible and he walked around in back of my chair with the knife in his hand and I just shut my eyes and sat there.
Later in her direct examination when asked why she didn’t call the police immediately the victim testified:
A: Because I wanted to get in touch with my lawyer when Bruce wasn’t right handy, because I wanted to get him committed to a mental hospital because I thought he was very sick.
Q: Had your son been committed to a mental hospital before by you?
A: Yes.
Q: When was that?
A: Nineteen seventy-eight.
Q: In the spring?
A: In the spring of nineteen seventy-eight.
Later in her cross-examination she stated:
Well, I was — I don’t know what I felt. I really don’t, deep in my heart, I don’t think I felt he would really harm me, but I also felt there was — that he was sick and when people are not thinking correctly — -
Joan Brussard, the defendant’s sister and a witness to the incident, testified:
Well, I realize that Bruce was not in his right mind, from past experiences, and Bruce did not realize what he was doing so that is why I was afraid that anything might happen.
In order to prove its case, the State must have proved that the defendant intentionally or knowingly placed another person in fear of imminent bodily injury. 17 — A M.R. S.A. § 209(1). It was not sufficient for the State to prove merely that the physical acts were performed as a result of an exercise of the defendant’s volition. The State had to show that the acts were performed either with the “conscious object to cause” his victim to have fear of imminent bodily injury, id., § 10(1)(A), or with an awareness that it was “practically certain that his conduct” would cause his victim to have fear of imminent bodily injury. Id., § 10(2)(A). Proof of either of those culpable mental states was an essential element of the State’s case. 17 — A M.R.S.A. § 11(1). The State was constitutionally required to prove one of those mental states beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699— 700, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).
In the ordinary criminal case, as in this case, the State must rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant’s mental state. Rarely is there direct evidence of the mental state of a defendant at the time of the commission of the prohibited act. The jury is, quite properly, permitted to infer the requisite mental state by the objective manifestation of the defendant’s state of mind as reflected in his conduct and all of the surrounding circumstances. When the surrounding circumstances, including the defendant’s history of mental illness, suggest that at the time of the prohibited acts the defendant may have been suffering from an abnormal condition of the mind, the jury may decline to draw the inference that he acted intentionally or knowingly. The defendant’s physical acts are no more indicative of his state of mind than are the opinions of those who knew him that at the time he “did not realize what he was doing.” Indeed, even disregarding the impressions of the witnesses, the defendant’s irrational statements were sufficient evidence of abnormal condition of mind to require jury consideration. To suggest that the defendant must prove the *672existence of an abnormal condition of the mind by expert testimony or by a particular quantum of proof is to shift the burden of persuasion in a manner previously held unconstitutional. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. at 703-04, 95 S.Ct. 1881. It must be remembered that we deal with proof of an essential element of the offense, not with the insanity defense where the burden may be placed on the defendant. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). The jury must consider all of the circumstances in evaluating whether the State has met its burden of proving the defendant’s culpable state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury should have been instructed that in determining whether the State had proven the culpable state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt it might consider evidence that at the time of the commission of the prohibited acts the defendant was suffering from an abnormal condition of the mind. Defendant neither requested such an instruction nor objected to the failure of the court to give such an instruction. See M.R. Crim.P. 30(b). The failure of the court to so instruct must be evaluated to determine whether it is “obvious error affecting substantial rights.” M.R.Crim.P. 52(b).1 I conclude that standard was met in this case and reach this conclusion for two reasons.
First, the court clearly indicated its intention to submit this issue to the jury. In ruling upon the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the court stated:
Well, the bottom line is I am going to deny your motion. I appreciate the fact that there is some evidence there that may suggest that he might not have been functioning in a normal pattern of behavior at the time. I think it is for the jury or the fact finder to make a judgment as to whether or not that at that time he possessed sufficient amount of control of himself to either form the necessary intent, or that he could understand and had knowledge of the consequences of his act. I think that is for the jury to determine.
The presiding Justice’s recognition that the issue had been generated and was for the jury to determine was an implicit statement that he would instruct on the issue.
Second, and more significant, the failure to instruct the jury on the appropriate use of the evidence relating to the defendant’s abnormal condition of mind deprived the defendant of a substantial right — the right to have the jury consider all of the evidence relating to his state of mind at the time of the commission of the prohibited acts. For these reasons, the judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.

. This Court has traditionally applied the standard of “manifest error.” See, e. g., State v. Thibodeau, Me., 353 A.2d 595, 605 (1976); State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489, 499 (1974). That concept does not differ from the standard enunciated in M.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See generally 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 856 (1969).