Court Opinion

ID: 9649949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:15:18.240886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:48.488796
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring.
On October 30, 1989, the Honorable Gerard M. Bigley entered an order pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507(a). Judge Bigley was satisfied that there were no genuine issues of material fact, that Bennie Harry Brimage (Brimage) was not entitled to P.C.R.A. relief, and that no purpose would be served by further proceedings. The trial court gave Brimage notice of its intention to dismiss the P.C.R.A. petition. In response, counsel for Brimage did nothing more than to restate that Brimage’s 1982 P.C.H.A. counsel was “ineffective for not taking an appeal” from the trial court’s order denying post-conviction relief filed October 31, 1983. Understandably, in my view, Judge Bigley thereupon filed an opinion and order denying P.C.R.A. relief.
I would agree with my distinguished colleagues that the order denying P.C.R.A. relief must be affirmed. However, I would not reach the question of whether a defendant has an absolute right to appeal from an order denying a first-time petition for post-conviction relief. On the facts of this case, the order denying P.C.R.A. relief must be affirmed based solely upon the posture adopted by Brimage through his counsel.
Brimage was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. That judgment of sentence was affirmed by our Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Brimage, 497 Pa. 589, 442 A.2d 693 (1982) (Per Curiam). Brimage filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act in June, 1982. Counsel was appointed and, on December 20, 1982, a hearing was held. On October 31, 1983, Judge Bigley filed an eleven page opinion together with an order of court, dated October *14428, 1983, dismissing the P.C.H.A. petition. No appeal was taken from the 1983 order denying P.C.H.A. relief.
Now, six years later, in August 1989, a motion for post-conviction collateral relief is filed, on a form made obsolete by the Post Conviction Relief Act, as amended April 13, 1988, immediately effective. The original 1989 petition found in the record certified to this court has neither been signed nor verified by the defendant, Brimage. Petition Under Post Conviction Hearing [sic] Act, filed August 3, 1989, page 6, R.R. 19a. The fact that the petition has not been verified is enough, in my judgment, to warrant our affirmance of the trial court order denying relief. Pa.R. Crim.P. 1501, 1502(a)(14). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
If we ignore the fact that Brimage has neither signed nor verified the petition, the claimed eligibility for relief arises from (1) alleged ineffectiveness of counsel and (2) “the abridgement of a right guaranteed by the constitution ...,” apparently the alleged “absolute right of appeal” mentioned in the Brief of Appellant.
Judge Bigley correctly looked to the Post Conviction Relief Act to determine whether Brimage was eligible for any relief. Judge Bigley found, as would I, that Brimage’s claims are not cognizable under the Act.
The Post Conviction Relief Act is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that existed in April 1988, including habeas corpus and coram nobis. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. The Act is not intended to provide a means for raising issues waived in prior proceedings. Id.
First Brimage’s claim that his 1982 P.C.H.A. counsel was ineffective because “counsel failed to file an appeal,” is Without merit. I agree with Judge Bigley that the mere assertion that prior counsel failed to file an appeal, without more, does not bring into question the reliability of the adjudication of guilt. Under the Act, eligibility based upon ineffectiveness of counsel must result from:
*145(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(h), (emphasis added). Brimage has not set forth in his brief, and I cannot fathom, how the failure to file an appeal in a collateral proceeding operates to so undermine the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Under the Act itself, the ineffectiveness claim must fail.
Moreover, even if the statute by its express terms did not preclude Brimage’s first claim, the law of our Supreme Court is dispositive. In Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107 (1988), our Supreme Court announced that a second or any subsequent post-conviction request for relief should not be entertained unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Rather than addressing himself with, and directing this court’s attention to, any perceived miscarriage of justice, present P.C.R.A. counsel merely tells us that, in the event an appeal is allowed, Brimage and/or his counsel will assert “all the matters raised in the lower court in the [1982] PCHA petition.” Petition, supra, page 3, R.R. page 16a.
More recently, our Supreme Court once again has instructed us that allegations of the deprivation of the right to effective counsel are not self-sustaining. The burden of proof of the allegations remains with the claimant. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 521 Pa. 482, 486, 556 A.2d 370, 372 (1989). As the Commonwealth points out in its brief, Brimage has failed to articulate for this court what issues he wished to have raised on direct appeal. The 1982 Petition contains twelve numbered paragraphs of allegations along with, at least, fifteen subparagraphs. At the time the 1982 petition was originally filed, Brimage asserted that he intended to pursue all those issues raised within those paragraphs and sub-paragraphs. I would neither assume *146that all twenty-seven issues are proper subjects for appeal nor would I relieve Brimage of his obligation to argue to this court whether any of those twenty-seven issues involve a miscarriage of justice.
Finally, Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1332 (1981) remains good law. Assertions of ineffectiveness in a vacuum cannot be ineffectiveness. Counsel must set forth, in the P.C.R.A. petition now before this court, an offer to prove at an appropriate hearing sufficient facts upon which a reviewing court can conclude that prior counsel may have, in fact, been ineffective. Assuming that ineffectiveness claims may be laid against counsel who has appeared in a collateral proceeding, successor counsel still would have the obligation of detailing sufficient facts, accompanied by meritorious arguments, to support the claimed ineffectiveness. Here, counsel has done neither.
With respect to Brimage’s second issue, the alleged “absolute right of appeal,” the short answer is simply that the Act contains no such provision. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9550(b) (repealed) provided, at the time the order denying the 1982 P.C.H.A. petition was entered, that “This order [finally disposing of the petition] constitutes a final judgment for purposes of review.” The language is carried forward almost verbatim into the P.C.R.A., where it sets forth, in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(c):
(c) Status of order.—The order constitutes a final judgment for purposes of review.
Brimage would have us restore his right to appeal the issues contained in his 1982 P.C.H.A. petition, more than seven years after those issues had been reviewed by the trial court and rejected in a careful and thorough opinion. He has not explained to my satisfaction why he is not bound by the Act, which, in pertinent part, provides:
§ 9544. Previous litigation and waiver
(a) Previous litigation.—For the purpose of this sub-chapter, an issue has been previously litigated if:
*147(3) it has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)(3). To be eligible for relief, a person must both plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence, among other things, that the allegation of error has not been previously litigated. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). The former requirement, that an issue be “finally litigated” (former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a), repealed by amendment, Act 47 of 1988, April 13, 1988, P.L. 336, at 340), along with its requirement that the petitioner “has knowingly and understandingly failed to appeal the trial court’s ruling” is no longer the law. Under the present Act, the mere fact that Judge Bigley did, in 1982 and 1983, consider and decide the only issues now urged upon this court is sufficient to end the matter. And this most certainly must be true where there is not even an attempt to argue a miscarriage of justice, other than in the abstract.
I would not reach the issue of any alleged absolute right of appeal on the facts presented here. The appellant has not brought any food for thought to the table. The statute is clear. I would affirm. And I would acknowledge the concise and cogent opinion of the distinguished trial judge, the Honorable Gerard M. Bigley.