Court Opinion

ID: 9561454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:09:59.512926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:49.214841
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I am compelled to specially concur because I do not believe the inferential evidence of venue in this case is sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed aggravated child molestation in Catoosa County, Georgia as alleged in the indictment. Because venue was not an issue at trial, however, I believe that slight evidence is sufficient to satisfy Georgia’s venue requirement in the case sub judice and that the circumstantial evidence of venue cited by the majority is more than sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding that venue was proper in Catoosa County, Georgia. I am also compelled to say that the problem of proof over venue highlighted in the case sub judice does not appear to be the result of shoddy police work or prosecutorial oversight. The problem appears because a majority of this Court fails to recognize that children of tender years — such as the three-year-old victim in this case — have difficulty conceptualizing space and time with relation to past events, a natural condition which I believe is compounded by the traumatic memories the young victim in this case must endure as a *302result of the loathsome incident which is the basis of the crime charged.
Decided March 21, 1997
Reconsideration dismissed April 29, 1997.
Before Judge Log-gins. ,
Michael E. Brush, for appellant.
Jerry S. Hall, pro se.
Ralph L. Van Pelt, Jr., District Attorney, John L. ODell, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
“‘Circumstantial, as well as direct evidence, may be used to establish venue. Loftin v. State, 230 Ga. 92, 94 (2) (195 SE2d 402) (1973). Where there is no conflicting evidence, slight evidence is sufficient. Aldridge v. State, 236 Ga. 773, 774 (1) (225 SE2d 421) (1976). Since venue is a question for the jury, its decision will not be set aside if there is any evidence to support it. (Cits.)’ Taylor v. State, 176 Ga. App. 567 (1) (a) (336 SE2d 832) (1985). See also Woodruff v. State, 191 Ga. App. 338 (381 SE2d 582) (1989).” White v. State, 193 Ga. App. 428 (1), 429 (387 SE2d 921). In the case sub judice, the indictment charged defendant with committing aggravated child molestation “in the County of Catoosa and the State of Georgia on or before the 8th day of September, 1993. . . .” Evidence adduced at trial shows that defendant is the victim’s father; that defendant, the victim and the victim’s mother resided together in Catoosa County, Georgia from April 1992 until July 1993, and that the victim first reported events indicating that defendant had sexually molested her shortly after July 20, 1993, when the victim was three years old. I believe this proof — although circumstantial — is alone sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding that defendant committed the act of aggravated child molestation in Catoosa County, Georgia as charged in the indictment.