Court Opinion

ID: 9729399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:34:03.588832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:57.622210
License: Public Domain

*127CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that Claimants’ (the Intervenors) actions did not constitute willful misconduct and that Claimants are therefore entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because their violation of a work rule prohibiting employees from wearing T-shirts attacking or insulting any individual working for appellant, Caterpillar, Inc., did not constitute willful misconduct since the T-shirts which resulted in Claimants’ suspensions did not personally attack Caterpillar’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and the rule unfairly restrained Claimants’ ability to support a union position. Because the facts demonstrate that Claimants were aware of the work rule and that Claimants deliberately violated the work rule (indeed, flaunted the work rule), I believe that Claimants engaged in willful misconduct which made them ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits for their period of suspension. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
As correctly noted by the majority, Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law precludes claimants who engage in willful misconduct from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. While Section 402(e) does not define “willful misconduct,” this Court has defined willful misconduct as:
an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer’s interest, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of an employee, or negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.
Myers v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 533 Pa. 373, 378, 625 A.2d 622, 625 (1993). Caterpillar, as the employer, bears the burden of proving that the suspended Claimants engaged in willful misconduct. Gillins v. Unem*128ployment Compensation Board of Review, 584 Pa. 590, 600, 633 A.2d 1150, 1155-56 (1993). Where, as here, Caterpillar claims that Claimants’ willful misconduct is based upon a violation of its work rules, the Court must determine if the work rule is reasonable in light of all the circumstances and whether Claimants had good cause to violate the work rule. Frumento v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 466 Pa. 81, 87, 351 A.2d 631, 634 (1976).
Here, Caterpillar had a work rule which prohibited both union and non-union employees from wearing T-shirts that “attack or insult individual persons, whether they are hourly employees, supervisors, managers, local Union leaders, the president of the UAW or even the chairman of Caterpillar.” As the majority acknowledges, there is no dispute that Claimants were fully aware of this work rule, especially since Caterpillar reiterated the work rule and its intention to enforce the rule less than two months before the incident which resulted in Claimants being suspended. The purpose for having this work rule was to avoid in-plant confrontations between employees since both Caterpillar and union officials were concerned over violence on the shop floor. The majority also acknowledges that this constitutes a reasonable purpose for having such a work rule, a conclusion that I join.
Despite recognizing that Claimants were aware of the work rule and that there was a reasonable basis for having the work rule, the majority still finds that the work rule, as applied to the specific facts of this case, was not reasonable. In particular, the majority finds that the language of the T-shirts worn by Claimants was not offensive, that the work rule was not specific enough as to what actually constituted a violation of the work rule, and that the work rule interfered with Claimants’ right to support a union position. I cannot agree.
Here, the T-shirts in question contained in bold print the slogan “PERMANENTLY REPLACE FITES,” indicating the chairman- and CEO of Caterpillar. Despite Claimants’ attempt to disguise this message with other less noticeable language describing a National Labor Relations Board complaint filed against Caterpillar for suspending an employee *129who wore this same slogan, I believe that this T-shirt could reasonably be viewed as attacking or insulting the chairman and CEO of Caterpillar. Since the plain language of the work rule prohibited the wearing of a T-shirt insulting or attacking a Caterpillar employee, the Claimants clearly violated the work rule in dispute.
Also, I cannot agree with the position that the Caterpillar work rule failed to clearly delineate that the T-shirts worn by Claimants would be considered a violation of the work rule. Here, the record reveals that Caterpillar supervisors informed Claimants that their T-shirts violated the work rule before any suspensions were imposed. The supervisors also warned Claimants that they would be suspended unless they removed the T-shirt, covered up the offending statement or wore the T-shirt inside out. Under these circumstances, I must conclude that Claimants were given reasonable notice that Caterpillar deemed their T-shirts to be violative of the work rule and had a reasonable opportunity to comply with the work rule before Claimants were suspended for violating the rule.
Neither can I agree that the work rule unreasonably interfered with Claimants’ ability to support a union position. One of the Claimants, who was a union official, testified that he was aware that the Claimants could have complied with the options presented by Caterpillar and subsequently filed a grievance protesting Caterpillar’s action. Since such recourse was available, I believe that Caterpillar’s actions did not unreasonably interfere with Claimants’ ability to support a union position. Moreover, an employee’s conduct which violates recognized company policy, which is otherwise reasonable and lawful, fails to automatically become protected because the employee alleges it was done to further union activity. See Flores v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 686 A.2d 66, 74 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (Commonwealth Court has consistently held that “willful misconduct is not excused simply because it occurred while an employee is engaging in union activities”); Williams v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 109 Pa. Commw. 329, 531 A.2d 88 (1987) (claimant engaged in willful misconduct and was not eligible for benefits where in *130the course of his representation of union meetings with management, claimant violated a work rule prohibiting the use of profane and vulgar language). Thus, since the T-shirt clearly violated Caterpillar’s work rule and it did not interfere with Claimants’ ability to support a union position, I believe that the work rule in question was reasonable when it was applied to the facts of this case.
Based on the above, the record clearly demonstrates that Caterpillar had a work rule which prohibited all employees from wearing a T-shirt which insulted or attacked another employee, that this work rule was reasonable, that Claimants were aware of this work rule’s existence, that Claimants were made aware that their T-shirts which contained the slogan “PERMANENTLY REPLACE FITES” were considered by Caterpillar to violate the work rule and that Caterpillar offered Claimants three remedial options in order to avoid being suspended. Nevertheless, Claimants freely chose to deliberately violate the work rule without just cause by continuing to wear the T-shirts. As a matter of law, I believe this evidence established that Claimants engaged in willful misconduct by wearing the T-shirts since they knowingly violated a work rule which Caterpillar indicated it would enforce. See County of Luzerne v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Pa. Commw. 473, 478, 611 A.2d 1335, 1338 (1992) (when an employee is advised that a rule will be strictly enforced, even though it had not been previously enforced, violation of the rule constitutes willful misconduct and renders the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits).1 Therefore, since Caterpillar met its burden of proving that Claimants engaged in willful misconduct, I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court affirming the award of unemploy*131ment compensation benefits to Claimants. Accordingly, I must dissent.
NIGRO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The majority attempts to distinguish County of Luzerne on the grounds that the employee in that case was specifically advised that her actions violated a court policy and that the policy involved an objective, nondiscretionaiy guideline whereas in this case, Caterpillar’s work rule involved a subjective policy. I believe that the majority makes a distinction without a difference since as noted above, Claimants were informed before they were suspended that their t-shirts violated the work rule and that there were three alternatives available to Claimants in order to avoid being suspended.