Court Opinion

ID: 9696398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:46:43.386883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.975392
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I agree that appellee’s preliminary objections should be dismissed and this case should be permitted to go to trial, but I do so because, in my view, appellant’s complaint alleges facts which if established would prove that appellee’s actions have created a contract.
Initially I believe that for appellant to be entitled to recovery, he must establish that appellee’s utilization of the procedure proposed by appellant resulted from appellant’s suggestion. Although appellant’s complaint is hardly clear as to whether it is alleging a causal connection between the suggestion and the “adoption” of the suggestion, appellant did, in his second amended complaint, allege that appellee “has appropriated to its own use and benefit” appellant’s idea. Since we should allow a case to be dismissed on preliminary objections only where it is clear that on any view of the facts, a plaintiff cannot prevail, see, e.g., Baker v. Brennan, 419 Pa. 222, 213 A. 2d 362 (1965); Schrader v. Heath, 408 Pa. 79, 182 A. 2d 696 (1962), I believe that it is proper for us to consider the allegation that appellee “appropriated to its own use and benefit” the idea of appellant as pleading that appellee’s use of the technique in question resulted from appellant’s suggestion.
Accepting, as we must, that allegation of appellant, in my view a contract has been created, notwithstanding appellee’s formal “rejection” of appellant’s idea. I believe it does not matter that appellee sent appellant a notice of rejection; as long as appellee by its actions accepted the suggestion, a contract existed.* If appellee utilized appellant’s idea as a result of the re*295eeipt of appellant’s suggestion, appellant was entitled to whatever payment should have been forthcoming under the agreement.
I cannot accept, however, the majority’s conclusion that appellant can withstand appellee’s preliminary objections on an “unjust enrichment” theory. When appellant submitted his suggestion on appellee’s form, in accordance with appellee’s procedure, in my view he gave up any claim he might have had to unjust enrichment damages. If appellant is to recover at all, it must be within the limitations of appellee’s procedure for offering suggestions. I do not believe that it is wise to become entangled in metaphysical notions of whether appellee extended an offer or an invitation to deal, and whether appellant thus tendered an acceptance or an offer. In my view it is enough to say that appellant cannot, under these circumstances, recover outside of appellee’s established procedure, a procedure appellant accepted when tendering his suggestion, and thus unjust enrichment in my judgment is not appropriate.
Had appellant’s suggestion been formally accepted by appellee, appellant presumably would have to be satisfied with a $5.00 reward if that is what the Suggestion Committee chose to pay him. But under the majority’s theory, because appellee “rejected” appellant’s suggestion, appellant can now receive damages perhaps in excess of the $15,000 maximum, and in no way controlled by the discretion of the Suggestion Committee. I do not believe that that distinction makes very much sense, and in any event the distinction does violence to the clear language of the written suggestion program. I therefore concur only in the result reached by the majority.
Mr. Justice O’Brien joins.

 Under this theory, as well as under that of the majority, it is irrelevant whether the contract is classified as “bilateral” or *295“unilateral”, or whether any distinction is drawn between bilateral and unilateral contracts.