Court Opinion

ID: 9871570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 20:35:24.089787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:19.520957
License: Public Domain

Chambers, J.P.,
dissents, and votes to affirm the judgment, with the following memorandum: Prior to the commencement of trial, the People made an application pursuant to People v Sandoval (34 NY2d 371 [1974]), requesting that they be permitted to inquire about the defendant’s prior convictions for murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, disorderly conduct, unauthorized use of a vehicle, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, attempted petit larceny, and two separate convictions for petit larceny.
Insofar as relevant to this appeal, defense counsel argued that since a knife allegedly was used in this case, evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree, both of which also involved the use of a knife, would be overly prejudicial. The Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that if the defendant elected to testify, he could be cross-examined on the fact that he had been convicted of petit larceny and attempted petit larceny. The People could also cross-examine him on the underlying facts of his conviction for robbery in the first degree, including the defendant’s use of a knife but excluding the fact that the defendant had threatened to kill the complainant. The court further ruled that the People could not cross-examine the defendant on the conviction for murder in the second degree in any respect, since the nature of that conviction would have a disproportionate effect on the jury.
The majority holds that the Supreme Court’s Sandoval ruling was an improvident exercise of discretion insofar as it allowed the People to cross-examine the defendant with respect to his use of a knife in connection with his prior conviction for robbery in the first degree. Since I believe the court’s Sandoval ruling was a provident exercise of discretion, I respectfully dissent.
“[A] criminal defendant who chooses to testify, like any other civil or criminal witness, may be cross-examined regarding prior crimes and bad acts that bear on credibility, veracity or honesty” (People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203, 207 [2002]; see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 376). In making a Sandoval ruling, the hearing court must strike a proper balance between the probative value of the evidence of prior crimes on the issue of credibility and “the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, measured both by the impact of such evidence if it is admitted after his testimony and by the effect its probable introduction *974may have in discouraging him from taking the stand on his own behalf” (People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 375).
The determination rests largely within the sound discretion of the hearing court (see People v Hayes, 97 NY2d at 207; People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 458-459 [1994]; People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 374). “A court may exclude the evidence entirely; limit [the prosecution’s] inquiry to the mere fact that there has been a prior conviction; it may limit inquiry to the existence and nature of the prior conviction; or it may permit examination into the facts and circumstances underlying the prior conviction’ ” (People v Smith, 18 NY3d 588, 593 [2012], quoting People v Hayes, 97 NY2d at 208).
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly “eschewed fixed rules to determine where to draw the line” and has “declined to prohibit cross-examination solely because of the similarity of prior acts to the crimes charged” (People v Hayes, 97 NY2d at 208; see People v Smith, 18 NY3d at 594).
In Hayes, as here, the defendant was accused of rape in the first degree, his sole defense was lack of forcible compulsion, and the only witness who could have disputed the complainant’s testimony on lack of consent was the defendant himself (see People v Hayes, 278 AD2d 592, 593-594 [2000], revd 97 NY2d 203 [2002]). The hearing court in Hayes had ruled that, if the defendant were to take the stand, he could be cross-examined on his prior convictions for assault in the third degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. While the underlying facts of those convictions could not be elicited, the nature of the convictions would be revealed (see id. at 593). In upholding the hearing court’s Sandoval ruling, the Court of Appeals noted that “[n] either the similarity of defendant’s prior convictions nor the alleged singularity of his testimony . . . required that impeachment be limited to the existence of defendant’s prior convictions” (People v Hayes, 97 NY2d at 206). The Court further observed that “the possible unavailability of other witnesses does not mandate a specific outcome, as a hearing court may conclude that this factor increases the importance of defendant’s credibility as well as the importance of defendant’s presence on the witness stand” (id. at 208; see People v Lopez, 37 AD3d 496, 497 [2007]).
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Hayes is unconvincing. Indeed, in the context of a rape trial in which the only defense is consent and the only witnesses are the defendant and the complainant, it is difficult to imagine any more prejudicial revelation than the fact that the defendant previously had *975been convicted of sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. Where, as in Hayes, the prior convictions are nearly identical to the offenses for which the defendant is on trial, disclosing the nature of the prior convictions is undoubtedly enough to cause prejudice, regardless of whether the jury is also apprised of the underlying facts. In fact, the potential disclosure of a single prior use of a knife in this case seems far less prejudicial than the proposed revelation, in Hayes, of the accused’s multiple prior sexual offense convictions.
I am cognizant of the fact that the majority’s reversal in this case is not made upon the law, but solely “on the facts and in the exercise of discretion.” However, holdings by this Court that a Sandoval ruling constituted an “improvident exercise of discretion” are exceedingly rare (see People v Anderson, 130 AD3d 1055 [2015], lv granted 26 NY3d 1142 [2016]; People v Brothers, 95 AD3d 1227 [2012]; People v Finger, 166 AD2d 714 [1990]; People v Williams, 157 AD2d 760 [1990]; People v Moore, 156 AD2d 394 [1989]), and I do not see what distinguishes this particular case from myriad other cases in which this Court, using its unique power to review the exercise of discretion by the trial court, upheld Sandoval rulings involving similar prior crimes or similar facts as provident exercises of discretion (see e.g. People v Rosado, 115 AD3d 884 [2014] [prior convictions for petit larceny, trespass, and attempted petit larceny, in prosecution for burglary]; People v Marcus, 112 AD3d 652, 653 [2013] [prior attempted robbery conviction, in prosecution for robbery and burglary]; People v Betancourt, 106 AD3d 831, 832 [2013] [prior uncharged larcenies, in prosecution for robbery and murder]; People v Lewis, 101 AD3d 1154 [2012] [prior grand larceny conviction, in prosecution for robbery]; People v Hicks, 84 AD3d 1402 [2011] [prior assault conviction, in prosecution for assault]; People v Harris, 74 AD3d 984 [2010] [prior robbery conviction, in prosecution for robbery]; People v Avila, 69 AD3d 642, 642 [2010] [prior assault involving a weapon, in prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon]; People v Hayes, 44 AD3d 683, 683 [2007] [prior attempted robbery and robbery convictions, in prosecution for robbery]; People v Fotiou, 39 AD3d 877 [2007] [prior convictions for falsely appearing as an attorney-at-law, in prosecution for grand larceny, fraud, and falsely appearing as an attorney-at-law]; People v Lopez, 37 AD3d 496 [2007] [prior felony criminal possession of a weapon conviction, in prosecution for second degree robbery (displaying what appears to be a weapon)]; People v Lewis, 31 AD3d 788, 789 [2006] [prior petit larceny and attempted robbery convictions, in prosecution for robbery]; People v Dahlbender, 23 *976AD3d 493 [2005] [prior attempted robbery and petit larceny convictions, in prosecution for felony murder (robbery)]; People v Whitney, 287 AD2d 585, 585 [2001] [prior attempted armed robbery conviction, in prosecution for armed robbery and burglary]; People v Hilaire, 211 AD2d 642 [1995] [prior uncharged robbery committed the same night and in the same general location as the subject robberies]).
In a rape case where, as here, the prosecution was expressly permitted to inquire about a prior knifepoint assault, this Court upheld the trial court’s Sandoval ruling as a provident exercise of discretion, reasoning that “[t]he defendant’s past acts demonstrated his willingness to place his own interests ahead of those of society, and were relevant on the issue of his credibility” {People v Levy, 290 AD2d 565, 565 [2002]). To summarily dismiss Levy, as does the majority, on the ground that “each case requires a balancing of its own particular facts” offers precious little by way of guidance to future trial courts whose Sandoval rulings will be scrutinized under this Court’s discretionary review power.
Indeed, from the majority’s recitation of the facts, the only explanation for concluding that the Supreme Court’s Sandoval ruling was an improvident exercise of discretion is that the prosecution’s case against this defendant was weak because of the complainant’s history of drug abuse and mental illness, as well as the lapse of time between the crime and the defendant’s arrest. Such reasoning, however, improperly conflates the Sandoval analysis with the question of harmless error, and misconstrues the prejudice prong of the Sandoval inquiry.
In weighing the prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the touchstone is not the perceived strength or weakness of the prosecution’s case; rather, it is whether a decision by the defendant not to testify will deprive the factfinder of significant, material evidence (see People v Grant, 7 NY3d 421, 424 [2006]; People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 378). Here, the majority overlooks the fact that although the defendant elected not to testify, his statement to the police, in which he explained that he had met the complainant “eight to ten times” at his house, and that he would usually have sexual relations with her and give her “between 15 and 20 dollars,” was admitted into evidence as part of the People’s case-in-chief. While the defendant’s statement is not a substitute for his live testimony, it did present the jury with a version of events that was fundamentally at odds with the complainant’s trial testimony. At minimum, the complainant’s testimony did not go unchallenged, even though the defendant elected not to testify. Thus, *977under the facts of this case, it is far from clear that the defendant’s decision not to testify deprived the factfinder of any significant, material evidence.
In weighing the probative value of the impeachment evidence against the likely prejudice to the defendant, the Supreme Court in this case took care to exclude any evidence of the defendant’s prior murder conviction. Even with respect to the prior robbery conviction, the court excluded any evidence that the defendant threatened the complainant’s life. Taking into account the defendant’s statement, as well as the complainant’s own history of criminality, drug use, and prostitution — all of which were extensively explored during her testimony — the court providently exercised its discretion in concluding that the defendant should not be shielded from impeachment merely because he chose to use a knife in committing prior crimes. I respectfully dissent.