Court Opinion

ID: 9854931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:08.900622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.796380
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring specially.
Because the trial court in this case did not err by refusing to give Chester’s requested charge on the battered person syndrome, as there was not sufficient evidence presented by Chester to warrant such a charge, I concur in the result of the majority opinion. However, I am concerned that the majority opinion could be misconstrued to mean that the defense of battered person syndrome is merely a form of the defense of justification, and that when the syndrome is properly asserted as a defense, a standard jury charge on justification will suffice. Because our prior case law establishes that the battered person syndrome is not subsumed entirely within the defense of justification, it follows that a standard jury charge on justification should not suffice when the syndrome is properly asserted as a defense.
1. The majority opinion states that “the battered person syndrome is not a separate defense, and ... is admissible only to assist *15the jury in evaluating a defendant’s claim of self defense.”2 The majority then goes on to rule that because there was no evidence of battering in this case, the battered person syndrome was irrelevant to Chester’s claim of self-defense. The majority’s treatment of the battered person syndrome defense indicates an underlying assumption that the syndrome is subsumed entirely within the defense of justification, and that a standard jury charge on justification would be sufficient when a battered person defense is properly asserted. However, that assumption is not altogether supported by the case law the majority relies upon.
The majority’s reliance upon Chapman v. State, an earlier opinion of this Court, is entirely accurate insofar as the defenses of battered person syndrome and justification both require a defendant’s reasonable belief that the threat or use of force was necessary in order to defend against the use of unlawful force.3 However, Chapman also indicates that the battered person syndrome cannot be subsumed entirely within the defense of justification. Rather, Chapman establishes that the battered person syndrome has at least one essential element that is entirely contradictory to an essential element of a standard justification defense:
[E]vidence of the [battered person] syndrome is admissible in an attempt to show that the defendant had a mental state necessary for the defense of justification, although the actual threat of harm does not immediately precede the homicide.
(Emphasis supplied.)4
In contrast, the defense of justification requires that a defendant who uses force against another must reasonably believe that such force “is necessary to defend himself.. . . against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” (Emphasis supplied.)5 Under a justification defense, the use of deadly force is not justifiable unless the defendant reasonably believes that it is necessary to protect herself against imminent death or imminent serious bodily harm.
Thus, under Georgia law, the defenses of justification and bat*16tered person syndrome have at least one essential difference — the former applies where the threat or use of unlawful force is imminent, and the latter does not require that there be an imminent use or threat of force. It follows that a standard charge on justification cannot adequately permit a jury to consider a properly asserted defense of battered person syndrome, because such a charge incorrectly instructs that “imminence” is an element of the syndrome.6
There are research studies and public policy reasons which support omitting the imminence requirement from the defense of battered person syndrome. For example, researchers report that the battered person syndrome frequently is characterized by several distinct and identifiable traits, including the psychological paralysis of the afflicted person and a firm belief that she is completely powerless to escape the violence perpetuated against her.7 Such a person may feel so hopelessly trapped that the only means of possible escape she can discern is to target the source of her misery — the batterer. Over time and after repeated and severe incidents of abuse interspersed with relatively peaceful lapses, it is possible that the victim may become unable to predict when the abuse will resume, and she may experience a change in cognitive thinking ability, in which she may reexperience past incidents of abuse and believe that they are recurring again.8 When that happens, the abused victim may believe that the use of deadly force against her is “imminent,” regardless of whether that may be accurate in the legal sense, and she may go into a dissociative state and take what she sees as necessary lifesaving action.9 It is incomprehensible to me to permit such severely abused individuals existing in such a deeply troubled state of mind to justifiably use defensive force only when the use or threat of unlawful force against them is in fact “imminent.”
Of course, there is a solution to this concern that will accommodate the particularities of the battered person syndrome while remaining entirely consistent with our case law regarding the justification defense. As was recognized by the Chapman court, evidence that a defendant suffers from battered person syndrome may be sufficient to establish the defense of justification. In such instances, the *17threat or use of unlawful force need not be imminent, as is required with a standard justification defense.10 As explained more fully below, I believe that we would do well in directing trial courts to instruct juries accordingly.
2. My second concern with the majority’s treatment of the battered person syndrome stems from the fact that it could be construed to permit a jury charge on justification to suffice in cases where a battered person defense is properly asserted, when such a charge is based entirely upon a purely objective “reasonable person” standard.11 As noted by other courts and commentators, the purely objective “reasonable person” standard does not permit juries to consider fully the defense of battered person syndrome.
Insofar as the objective “reasonable person” standard requires a jury to view the circumstances surrounding an accused at the time he uses defensive force from the standpoint of a hypothetical reasonable and prudent person, it simply cannot adequately contemplate the plight of a battered individual.12 As discussed briefly above, the battered person syndrome is often characterized by numerous psychological features that in no way comport with the experiences and reactions of a reasonable and prudent person (even a hypothetical one). Moreover, it is manifestly unfair to hold a battered individual to the same standard as a typical reasonably prudent person, when at the time she uses defensive force, she may be existing in a dissociative state unsure of when the next attack upon her may begin and is unable to discern between her present and past realities. Consequently, I believe that in these cases, the “reasonable person” standard should be slightly modified in order to permit juries to consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the use of force was necessary in light of both his circumstances at the time he used force, and any psychological condition resulting from such circumstances.
3. As noted, Chester failed to present evidence to support a jury charge on the battered person defense. Hence, I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the requested charge in this case.
However, in future cases, I believe that trial courts faced with a properly asserted battered person defense would be well advised to instruct juries that evidence that a defendant suffers from battered *18person syndrome may be sufficient to establish that the defendant is justified in threatening or using force to the extent that they reasonably believe that such threat or force is necessary to defend against a third person’s use of unlawful force, and under such circumstances the third person’s use of force need not be imminent. In determining the reasonableness of a battered defendant’s belief that defensive force was necessary, I would suggest that trial courts instruct juries to consider whether the circumstances were such as would excite not merely the fears of the particular defendant, but also the fears of a reasonable person possessing the same or similar psychological and physical characteristics as the defendant, and faced with the same particular circumstances surrounding the defendant at the time he or she used defensive force.

 Opinion at 10 citing Pugh v. State, 260 Ga. 874, 876 (401 SE2d 270) (1991); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707 (386 SE2d 129) (1989).

 See 259 Ga. at 707-708; 192 Ga. App. at 305. In this regard, as well explained in Justice Hunstein’s persuasive special concurrence, I would not restrict application of the syndrome to incidents of actual or attempted battery perpetrated against an abused individual.

 259 Ga. at 708.

 OCGA § 16-3-21 (a); see Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, p. 43, § AA (1991). For purposes of this special concurrence, “imminence” is understood to mean “ready to take place” or “impending,” see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 1130 (1961), and thus is synonymous with “immediate.”

 In this regard, see Pugh v. State, supra; Motes v. State, 192 Ga. App. 302, 304 (384 SE2d 463) (1989), both of which provide, I believe incorrectly, that a standard jury charge on justification is sufficient to encompass a properly asserted battered person syndrome defense.

 See Klis, Reforms to Criminal Defense Instructions: New Patterned Jury Instructions Which Account for the Experience of the Battered Woman Who Kills Her Battering Mate, 24 Golden Gate Univ. Law Rev. 131, 138-140 (1994).

 See Walker, Understanding Battered Woman Syndrome, Trial at 32 (Feb. 1995).

 Id. See also the discussion at p. 17, infra, regarding the need to particularize the “reasonable person” standard in battered person cases, and to remove it from a purely objective analysis.

 See n. 4, supra, and accompanying text.

 See Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, p. 45, § AA (2) (b) (1) (1991) (identifying the standard for determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that the use of defensive force was necessary as “whether the circumstances were such that they would excite (not merely the fears of the defendant but) the fears of a reasonable person").

 See Klis, supra, n. 5 at 144-145; State v. Leidholm, 334 NW2d 811, 817-818 (N.D. 1983).