Court Opinion

ID: 9863711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:53:16.622362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:10.176507
License: Public Domain

*256BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants. There is most definitely an issue of material fact that should have been entrusted to a jury to decide. The issue of fact is whether the Studers’ three year old daughter, Barbara, had any tendencies or proclivities that would cause her father to be aware of where she was and what she was doing while in the proximity of an idling snowmobile. This issue is crucial to both the negligent entrustment and negligent supervision theories of recovery advanced by plaintiffs, though it is more crucial to the latter. It is clear that the negligent entrustment theory might have been readily sustained if the Seagers had not been dismissed from the action. In addition to the majority’s failure to recognize the existence of a triable issue of material fact, they erroneously rely on I.C. § 6-210 to construct an argument against the viability of plaintiffs’ negligent supervision theory of recovery.
PART I
In part I of their opinion, the majority properly acknowledges that in a summary judgment motion, all facts and inferences from the record should be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party and that such motion should not be granted unless only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts. Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984).
The pertinent facts of this case are that a three year old child had been taken on a snowmobiling excursion under the care and supervision of her father and grandfather. The child obviously was aware of how to climb onto and straddle the snowmobile, operate the throttle to propel the machine forward and perhaps even steer it.3 It is not clear whether the child gained this knowledge on the day of this excursion and ensuing disaster or from previous experiences and excursions.
The majority opinion contends that “both Studer’s and Seager’s affidavits ... stated that the Studer children were not allowed to drive or even play upon the snowmobiles nor were Studer or Seager aware of the children ever playing on the snowmobiles.” Closer examination of the affidavits shows that Seager did in fact disavow any knowledge of three year old Barbara Studer playing on his or any other snowmobile, and *257that the only time he knew her to ride on his snowmobile was when an adult was operating the machine. However, Studer’s affidavit makes no mention at all of whether he was aware that his daughter played on snowmobiles, or whether he allowed her to play on or drive his or any other snowmobile. Had the majority given closer scrutiny to the affidavits, they would have noted that Mr. Studer did not make any such statement as attributed in their opinion, and they would have realized the implications against summary judgment by his silence on the issue.
In support of their motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment, plaintiffs filed affidavits from two expert witnesses. One was a licensed psychologist, and the other a licensed psychiatrist. Both said it is likely that a three year old child would have a propensity to climb onto an idling snowmobile and experiment with it; particularly after a day of snowmobiling with the family. They also said that the average three year old is naturally learning, exploring, testing and trying things. They are naturally attracted to objects such as snowmobiles because they view them as toys and associate them with having fun. They might climb on and play as though they are driving the snowmobile. Both experts said they relied on their experience as fathers as well as their experience in psychology in making their statements.
Thus there is far more than a scintilla of evidence in support of a triable issue of material fact. There were three significant pieces of evidence before the district court: 1) Mr. Seager’s statements of how the three year old handled the snowmobile; 2) the lack of a statement in Mr. Studer’s affidavit as to whether he allowed his daughter to drive the snowmobile or was aware that she played on snowmobiles; and 3) the psychologists’ statements as professionals and as fathers concerning a three year old’s natural tendencies toward an idling snowmobile. In accordance with Idaho summary judgment precedential law, this evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, the plaintiffs. If precedent is followed, the available admissible evidence most certainly does create an issue of material fact that must properly be decided at trial. The issue, whether Andy Studer knew or should have known that his child had tendencies or proclivities to climb upon and play with an idling snowmobile, is not so black and white as the majority believes. Based upon the briefs and affidavits submitted to the district court, reasonable minds, be they of jurors or the judge at a bench trial, could conclude that Andy Studer knew or should have known of such tendencies in his lively three year old daughter. This issue of fact is crucial to the Fullers’ negligent supervision theory of recovery for the injuries caused to their daughter. Thus since more than one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts, summary judgment should not have been granted. Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho at 596, 691 P.2d at 1211.
PART II
The negligent entrustment theory would have been viable if the original named defendants, Mr. & Mrs. Seager, had not been dismissed from the action. As the majority opinion correctly states in part II of their opinion, Mr. Seager is the party who owned the snowmobile and left it running in close proximity to the child, Barbara Studer. As an owner of that snowmobile, he would be responsible for any injury done to an innocent party by reason of his negligence in allowing an operable snowmobile, with its engine running, to come into the control of some interloping person, be that person intoxicated, Ransom v. Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1987), or any person by reason of age not entitled to be in control and/or operation of a vehicle. The record is unclear as to how the plaintiffs came to stipulate that the Seagers be dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit. Had they been retained as parties in the action, the summary judgment might not have been granted by the district court.
PART III
In part III of their opinion, the majority relies on I.C. § 6-210 to conclude that *258“[t]he effect of this statute is to prohibit imposing vicarious liability upon the parents for a child’s negligent conduct.” This is an incorrect interpretation of the statute and by so indulging, the majority has misguided itself. The intent of the statute is not to preclude vicarious liability, but rather to limit recovery to $2500 against the parents for willful acts of the child. Furthermore, it is inapplicable to this case. Idaho Code § 6-210 clearly applies only to situations where a parent is liable for economic loss mllfully caused by a minor. No facts whatever have been presented which suggest, indicate, or intimate that three year old Barbara willfully injured the Fuller child, or, that she had any such intent, or that she even knew the child. Further, the issue in the case at bar is not the child’s negligence, but rather the father’s negligence. The policy implicit in I.C. § 6-210, that of restricting parental responsibility for willful acts by a minor child, cannot be superimposed upon the present situation, where the plaintiffs have asserted an independent basis for finding that the causal negligence in the instant case was attributable to Barbara’s father.
PART IV
Moreover, it is abundantly clear that the snowmobiling experience was a family affair, and hence a joint venture excursion headed by the adult father and the adult grandfather. A jury should properly hear all of the facts from the available witnesses and make a determination as to culpability. Neither the father or the grandfather can so easily be exculpated from all responsibility; it was they who possessed snowmobiles and arranged the outing. That the grandfather has been dismissed from the action is not a bar to his name being placed on a special verdict instruction which inquires as to percentage of fault. Blankenship v. Weidner, 120 Idaho 234, 815 P.2d 432 (1991).
Clearly there is a triable issue of fact, and for that reason and in the interests of justice, the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the cause remanded.

. This excerpt from the statement of Charles Seager, executed on October 10, 1988, aptly demonstrates there is a triable issue of fact surrounding three year old Barbara Studer’s proclivity for climbing on or playing with the snowmobile. Mr. Seager describes actions indicative of a certain level of understanding by a three year old that make it reasonable to conclude that she might have played on the snowmobile a few times before. Barbara’s behavior, in combination with the statements of expert witnesses, could give rise to a reasonable conclusion about the child’s tendencies that is different from the district court’s. After reading this excerpt it is clear that a jury should decide whether she was able to operate the snowmobile in such a manner without exercising prior proclivities.
We had been giving them rides during that day. The snowmobile is equipped with a throttle that is used by pushing against it with the right thumb. It is ran by centrifugal force belt. It will idle if let sit. You have to put the throttle in before the clutch will engage. The throttle is pretty stiff and it takes a little bit to push it____ I don’t remember if Andy left my machine running or if he shut it off and I started it to move it out of the way. At any rate, it was running and there was no one on it. I turned back to Andy's machine and was going to help pull it backward, out of the cable. The kids were standing around in various places. I don’t know if we said anything to ■ them about staying away from the machine. Both of our backs were to my snowmobile when Barbara, aged 3 at that time, somehow climbed onto my machine. We heard a motor rev and I turned to see who was coming by close to us. I saw my machine taking off. She took off fast enough that we couldn’t catch her. Andy tried. She somehow made a left turn and went past a lot of parked vehicles and then made a semi-right turn. She was going pretty fast by now. She isn't strong enough to actually steer it. The parking lot was very rutty and the ruts may have caused it to turn. My unit was about 6 feet away from the trailer when she climbed onto it. The snowmobile went up over the berm along the edge of the lot. I didn’t see the accident occur nor did I go over there. She was straddling the seat on the snowmobile as it left____ My machine did not malfunction____ I maintain my machine very carefully and it was in good shape.
(Emphasis added.)