Court Opinion

ID: 9406952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 14:11:17.049226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:32.936796
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Athey and White

              LETONYA LESHELLE ROANE
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0950-22-2                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                                  JULY 5, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
                                             W. Reilly Marchant, Judge

                              (Kelsey Bulger, Senior Appellate Attorney; Virginia Indigent
                              Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Letonya Leshelle Roane (“Roane”) pled no contest to carnal knowledge, in violation of

              Code § 18.2-63, under the terms of a written plea agreement. The Circuit Court for the City of

              Richmond (“trial court”) sentenced Roane to ten years of suspended incarceration, consistent with

              the terms of the plea agreement. On appeal, Roane contends that the trial court abused its discretion

              by denying her request to take the matter under advisement and withhold a finding of guilt. After

              examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is

              unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).

                                                        I. BACKGROUND

                     The facts underlying Roane’s conviction in this case are undisputed. The Commonwealth

              proffered that Roane engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with I.F., a 12 year old who had

              run away from home. I.F. went to “extreme lengths” to hide her true age from Roane; she showed

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
Roane fake credit cards, fake identification, and enlisted third parties to confirm her false assurances

to Roane that she was 20 years old. As soon as Roane discovered that I.F. had been reported

missing, Roane took her to the police station, where Roane made a “full confession” about her

relationship with I.F. Following Roane’s arrest, I.F. made “numerous” and “concerning statements”

in apparent attempts to get Roane out of trouble, including that she had “put a knife to” Roane’s

throat.

          Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend that Roane be

sentenced to ten years’ incarceration, with all ten years suspended. After entering her plea, Roane’s

counsel interrupted the plea colloquy and motioned for the trial court to take the case under

advisement and withhold a guilty finding. Roane acknowledged that the written plea agreement did

not provide for a deferred disposition, and the Commonwealth objected to her motion. Roane

argued that the trial court should take the case under advisement because of the “extenuating

circumstance[s]” surrounding the offense. These circumstances included I.F.’s false representations

“about her age,” and Roane’s immediate actions in taking I.F. to the police and making a full

confession when she learned the truth. Roane emphasized her low risk of recidivism based on a

psychosexual evaluation she fully cooperated with completing. She stated that her “main concern

with the conviction” was the mandatory, lifetime registration requirement on the sex offender

registry. Roane maintained that she had been “consistently compliant” with the trial court’s orders

and asked that the trial court place “whatever conditions” were necessary to “have a different

outcome in this case.”

          The trial court found it incredible that Roane could have believed that the 12-year-old victim

was 20 years old. The trial court acknowledged that Roane had made “valid points” regarding the

circumstances of the case but also noted the objections of the Commonwealth and I.F.’s parents.

                                                  -2-
The trial court found that there was “too great of an age disparity” between I.F. and Roane,1 and

therefore denied her motion to take the case under advisement. The trial court resumed its plea

colloquy to ensure that Roane understood the implications of her no contest plea. After completing

the plea colloquy and reviewing the plea agreement with Roane, the trial court found that Roane

entered her plea “freely, intelligently, and voluntarily” and understood its consequences.

Accordingly, the trial court accepted Roane’s plea of no contest and convicted her of carnal

knowledge.2 Before pronouncing the sentence provided in the plea agreement, the trial court found

that Roane had received “some consideration” under the plea agreement, which recommended a

fully suspended sentence, notwithstanding that the discretionary sentencing guidelines

recommended a minimum of seven months’ incarceration.3 Roane appeals.

                                            II. ANALYSIS

                                       A. Standard of Review

       A trial court’s inherent authority to defer dispositions in criminal cases is “narrow” and

whether to exercise that judicial authority is discretionary. Harris v. Commonwealth, 63

Va. App. 525, 533 (2014). Thus, we review a trial court’s decision not to grant a deferred

disposition under its inherent authority under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Id.

       We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing

party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard the

evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

       1
           Roane was 28 years old at the time of the offense.
       2
         The Commonwealth had amended the original charge of aggravated sexual battery of a
victim less than 13 years of age to carnal knowledge in violation of Code § 18.2-63.
       3
         The discretionary sentencing guidelines recommended between seven months to one year
and four months’ incarceration, with a midpoint of nine months.
                                               -3-
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

           B. The trial court did not err by refusing to take the case under advisement.

        Roane argues that the trial court abused its discretion. By convicting her rather than taking

the case under advisement, Roane claims the trial court “failed to give weight to the mitigating

circumstances of the offense” and the “devastating effect this conviction would have on [her] life.”

Roane also contends that because I.F. “wanted to avoid Roane getting in trouble” and I.F.’s parents’

“primary goal was to avoid” I.F. having to testify, “deferring disposition would have been a just

result for [both] Roane and I.F.” In Roane’s estimation, “[t]he trial court’s refusal” to take the case

under advisement “is reversible error.” We disagree.

        A trial court that has not entered a conviction order has the authority “to defer the

disposition of a criminal trial until a later date.” Harris, 63 Va. App. at 533. “But that discretion is

not limitless.” Id. It provides “neither a gateway nor a loophole for acquitting or refusing to

convict a defendant whose guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” White v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 599, 615 (2017) (quoting Harris, 63 Va. App. at 537). Thus, a trial

court “cannot simply acquit a defendant through an act of judicial clemency (or judicial

nullification), where the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and

where no statutory authority exists to allow the trial court to dismiss the charge.” Harris, 63

Va. App. at 537.

        Roane’s plea of no contest admitted, “for the purposes of the case, all facts supporting the

accusation.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 710, 723 (2012). In fact, the written plea

agreement expressly provided, “[t]he defendant hereby stipulates that the Commonwealth’s

evidence is sufficient to find her guilty of above stated offense[ ].” Roane acknowledged to the

trial court that her “main concern” was the mandatory, “lifetime registration” requirement

                                                  -4-
actuated by the conviction. See Code §§ 9.1-902, 9.1-903 (establishing registration requirements

for the Sex Offender Registry). She therefore asked the trial court “to consider using its inherent

authority to take [the case] under advisement” to monitor Roane’s “compliance” and “possibly

have a different outcome.” But given her stipulation to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s

evidence and the mandatory registration requirement for a violation of Code § 18.2-63(A), the

motion’s only purpose was “to delay an unavoidable guilty verdict or to persuade the trial court

to acquit” Roane “purely as an act of judicial clemency.” Harris, 63 Va. App. at 537. The record

demonstrates that the trial court considered Roane’s proffered extenuating circumstances and the

lasting consequences of a conviction and acknowledged that Roane had made “good” and “valid

points.” The trial court found, however, that the proffered evidence and Roane’s plea supported

a finding of guilt and that it was inappropriate under the circumstances to “override” the

Commonwealth’s objections and those of I.F.’s parents. On this record, we cannot say that every

reasonable jurist would have granted Roane’s motion; thus, we are not permitted to second-guess

the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying it. Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 1,

10-11 (2019).

                                         III. CONCLUSION

       Finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm the judgment.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

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