Court Opinion

ID: 9624553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:08:16.372412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:11.595470
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice,
with whom RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I agree with the opinion that the exception to the hearsay rule of statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment is inapplicable where a statement is made for the purpose of revealing the identity of an assailant.
I also agree as to the requirements for admission of dying declarations. To the extent that Hewitt v. State, 514 P.2d 6 (Alaska 1973), may be construed as requiring that the utterance be made by one who has abandoned all hope of recovery, it should be overruled. It is rare indeed that all hope of recovery is abandoned, and a victim’s general awareness that his death is impending can create sufficient solemnity to assure the trustworthiness of the testimony. Of course, death is always impending in one sense, for everyone:
But at my back I always hear
Time’s winged charriot hurrying near.1 There must be a belief that the likelihood of death is so imminent as to remove ordinary worldly motives for misstatement. I further agree that the court may consider the totality of the circumstances including the presence or absence of motive to falsify and the manner in which the statement was volunteered or elicited. Of course, the fact that the declarant is not available for cross-examination and demeanor observation must also be considered.
The trial judge in his decision on the motion to suppress in this case appropriately endeavored to make findings of fact as to the deceased’s state of mind at the time she made the declarations. He considered the pain she was undergoing. As a countervailing factor, he noted that the internal nature of the injury to the pancreas might not create an awareness of its critical nature. Judge Craske stated:
. I just can’t as a finder of fact establish that first of all there was that all hope was abandoned. I think that it’s agreed that lack of situation really wasn’t conveyed to the decedent by the doctors, . . But I don’t find both in terms of when the death actually occurred, I think it was on February 2, that the total mental structure of the deceased at that time was so focused on death that the statements made would lose any relevance to her returning to a marital state with the defendant. One always has to be careful in these situations that the animosity or motives of the victim would enter into what you (garbled) might say . . ..
The decision as to whether a dying declaration has been made with awareness of impending death is for the trial judge to resolve, and not the jury.2 In reviewing that decision, we must give great weight in favor of the correctness of his ruling, since he has had the opportunity of observing the witnesses. We shall apply the same standard of review as for other findings of fact made by a trial judge: such findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. A finding is not clearly erroneous unless the reviewing court is left with the firm conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been committed.3
The majority believes that the circumstances surrounding the January 5 statement, made almost a month prior to Mrs. Johnson’s death, compel a finding that it was made under an appropriate awareness of impending death. In other words, the majority takes the position that there exists no issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
*28Certainly, Sgt. Thornton’s statement that Mrs. Johnson had advised him that she had consulted a priest would normally be strong evidence of awareness of impending death, but the reasons for the consultation were not brought out. There is no indication that last rites were performed or requested, and the statement pertaining to the priest was not included in Mrs. Johnson’s taped interview.. The doctors advised her of the seriousness of her condition, but still gave her hope of recovery. The nature of her actual awareness of impending death must be determined from inferences. The portions of the taped interview involving Mrs. Johnson’s impression of Dr. Longenbaugh’s advice unfortunately is garbled. Moreover, the significant portions of the statement pertaining to the involvement of her husband were at one time denied by Mrs. Johnson and eventually were elicited by leading questions. While a review of the facts of this case presents circumstances from which a trier of fact could well conclude that Mrs. Johnson had such an awareness of impending death as to justify admission of the declarations, I conclude that the question should properly be left to the trier of fact who has the opportunity of observing the witnesses.
Because Judge Craske seemed to rely on the “abandonment of hope test” referred to in Hewitt, I would remand the matter to the superior court for reconsideration of its ruling, in light of the standard set forth in the majority opinion.

. Andrew Marvell, To His Coy Mistress (1650-52).

. 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 345 at 173 (13th ed. 1972); V Wigmore on Evidence, § 1451 at 317 (Chadbourn ed. 1974).

. Beech Aircraft v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879, 886-87 (Alaska 1976); Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 630-31 (Alaska 1969).