Court Opinion

ID: 9753102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:57:47.844651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:29.865091
License: Public Domain

Terry, J.
(dissenting):
*528The issues of liability arising on this appeal are as follows:
“(1) Was the defendant free from negligence as a matter of law in the manner in which it constructed the guy wire to its high voltage line?
“(2) If the defendant was negligent in its construction of the guy wire, was it relieved of liability as a matter of law because of the intervening act of an unknown person in cutting the guy wire?
“(3) If the defendant was negligent in the construction of the guy wire, was it relieved of liability as a matter of law because of the contributory negligence of the decedent in grasping the loose end of the wire?”
The majority has rendered moot the issues relating to intervening cause and contributory negligence by holding that the defendant was free from negligence, as a matter of law, in the manner which it constructed the guy wire to the pole. Both sides presented testimony of expert witnesses on the relative merits of this particular construction. As the majority opinion indicates, there was sharp conflict between the testimony of plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts.
Heedless of this conflict, however, the majority casts itself in the role of a jury and attempts to resolve issues of fact —completely ignoring the long standing rule of this Court that in matters not relating to equity, we must confine our holdings strictly to rulings on the law. We cannot try facts. Hannigan v. Italo Petroleum Corp., 6 Terry (45 Del.) 593, 77 A. 2d 209 (1949); DuPont v. DuPont, 34 Del. Ch. 267, 103 A. 2d 234 (1954).
The majority opinion sets forth the conflict of experts, discusses it, and then proceeds to resolve it by the assertion that there is no real conflict because the local custom followed by defendant exonerates it from negligence as a matter of law.
*529I view that ruling with much concern. It is a noval innovation which for very obvious reasons has no foundation in the law whatsoever. It is elementary that custom cannot change the quality of an act; it can only aid in determining what that quality is. A party cannot by his own continued negligence establish a custom by which he is made exempt from liability, nor is legal responsibility for negligence mitigated by the fact that others have been alike negligent.
The conduct of the defendant in this case is not to be measured by a standard established by it or others, but by a standard fixed by law — that standard is an external one— the degree of care exercised by a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances. To follow a custom shown to be general, uniform and notorious may be the conduct of a reasonably prudent person, or it may not. In any event, such an issue presents a factual situation for jury determination. State of Delaware to Use of Henderson v. Clark, 2 Terry 246, 20 A. 2d 127 (1941).
In a case, closely related on its facts, and identical to the issues raised by the defendant here, a New Jersey Court has ruled:
“The general custom of the industry, although evidential as to what is the reasonable standard in an industry, does not conclusively establish the care a public utility must exercise in performance of its operations. Adherence to an industry standard is not necessarily conclusive as to the issue of negligence and does not of itself absolve the defendant from liability. * * * The defendant must still use reasonable care under all the circumstances and if the prevailing practices in the industry do not comport to that standard, the defendant may be found negligent notwithstanding compliance with industry custom.” Buecafusco v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 49 N. J. Super. 385, 140 A. 2d 79 (1958).
It seems to me that the law is so universally clear on *530this subject that a further discussion of it would be unnecessary.
It is my conclusion that Issue (1), supra, relating to proper construction in the light of a foreseeable risk of harm to others presents a question that cannot be resolved by this Court under the present state of the record. The question is one for jury determination under adequate instructions.
Necessity does not require that I set forth a detailed discussion of Issues (2) and (3), supra. It will suffice to say that in my opinion each issue presents a question for jury determination under adequate instructions.