Court Opinion

ID: 9577142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:32:05.074655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:00.757527
License: Public Domain

BONEY, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority that Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 89 violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Because the due process clause affirms fundamental notions of fairness rather than specific rules of law, the words “due process of law” are not susceptible to precise definition.1 Thus consideration of whether certain procedures comply with or violate the due process clause must begin with an identification of the interests involved.2 The conflicting interests must then be balanced to determine whether or not those interests supporting the contested procedures outweigh those opposed.3
The interests of the parties in an attachment proceeding are obvious: the creditor-plaintiff wishes to collect his money due and to prevent the debtor from hiding his assets available to satisfy the debt; the debtor-defendant has interests in the possession of, the use of, and the ability to alienate his property as well as in ensuring he is not wrongfully deprived of his property. Certain interests of the state must also enter into the balance. There are public interests in ensuring the collectability of debts, in promoting the extension of credit, and in preventing the transfer of property for the purpose of defrauding creditors.4
I believe that an attachment procedure, in order to satisfy due process, must further the public interest and protect the *156creditor’s interest without undue detriment to the debtors’ rights. With all due respect, I believe that the majority, while greatly protecting the interests of debtors, does so at great harm to the legitimate claims of creditors and of the public. The majority ignores the statutory protections accorded the debtor: the creditor must post a bond for costs and damages in the event he does not prevail;5 and the debtor may secure the release of his property by posting his own bond.6
The majority opinion also creates a legal vacuum. No suggestions are made for procedures which would satisfy the majority’s notions of due process. I can see no other meaningful way to protect the interests of creditors, while risking a lesser detriment to the interests of debtors, than is presented by our attachment procedure. An ex parte temporary restraining order would have exactly the same effect in the instant case. There is no difference to a debtor between attaching his checking account7 and restraining him from using it. In either case he has legal possession but has been denied the use of his property.8 The majority, by its decision, thus makes pre-judgment attachment impossible without a pre-attachment hearing. Implicitly, a restraining order prohibiting a debtor from alienating the property sought to be attached would likewise not be allowed pending the outcome of the attachment hearing.
T do not believe that we are compelled by recent United States Supreme Court cases to strike down our attachment procedure. I find Fuentes v. Shevin,9 which the majority regards as controlling, to be distinguishable. That case concerned replevin actions. There the debtors were being deprived, without advance hearing, not only of the ability to alienate but also of the use and the possession of their property. The difference between the instant case and Fuentes is that other procedures could easily be devised which would not infringe upon the interests of the debtors and which would protect equally the interests of the creditors.10 In such circumstances the due process balance tips in favor of the debtors and the contested procedures must be struck down. Here, as discussed above, there are no alternatives available, and the extant procedures should be upheld.
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.11 is likewise distinguishable. There the debtor had no present ability to alienate his seized property, his future wages, at the time of the seizure. The interests of the creditor would not be prejudiced by the short delay required for notice of a hearing. Here, the debtor has the present ability to drain his checking account dry the moment he receives notice. The creditor is, therefore, prejudiced if the debtor receives any advance notice of a hearing.
In short, the instant case is distinguishable from Fuentes and Sniadach by the nature of the property here involved. In each of those cases, other procedures could *157be devised so that the interests of the debtors could receive greater protection with no further prejudice to the interest of the creditors. Here, to overturn Alaska’s attachment procedure is to ignore entirely the interest of the state and of the creditors : there is no procedure devisable which could accord any greater protection to the interests of the debtors while not ignoring the interests of the state and of the creditors. Rule 89 should therefore be upheld.
I regard Sniadach and Fuentes as encroachments into an area of established law. As such I believe that they should be closely read and narrowly applied.
I would therefore affirm the superior court’s denial of Etheredge’s motion for summary judgment.

. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 1236 (1961) ; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1320, 1321 (1960) ; Territory of Alaska v. Craig Enterprises, Inc., 355 P.2d 397, 401 (Alaska 1960).

. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 296 (1970) ; Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 1236 (1961).

. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 296 (1970) ; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950).

. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F.Supp. 284 (E.D.Pa.1970) ; Note, Attachment and Garnishment — Constitutional Law — Due Process of Law, 68 Mich.L.Rev. 986, 996 (1970) ; Note, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 Stan. L.Rev. 1254, 1259 (1970).

. AS 09.40.020.

. AS 09.40.110.

. An attachment is merely a lien, AS 09.40.090.

. The same is true for other forms of attached property. The debtor may enjoy the use and possession but not consume or alienate other forms of property (such as a color television set) when either they are attached or he is restrained from alienating or consuming them.

. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972).

. For example, the creditors could obtain ex parte temporary orders restraining the debtors from alienating the property. The interests of the creditors would thereby be protected and the debtors would lose only the ability to alienate, and not the use and the possession of their property.

. 395 Ü.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed. 2d 349 (1969).