Court Opinion

ID: 9427539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:07.121394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:07.841853
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Stevens,
with whom Mr. Justice Beennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
At midnight on the night of April 5-6, 1973, three persons pried open a window to petitioner’s business office and secretly entered the premises. During the next three hours they moved freely about the building, eventually implanting a listening device in the ceiling. Several weeks later, they again broke into the office at night and removed the device.
The perpetrators of these break-ins were agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Their office, however, carries with it no general warrant to trespass on private property. Without legislative or judicial sanction, the conduct of these agents was unquestionably “unreasonable” and therefore prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.1 Moreover, that conduct *263violated the Criminal Code of the State of New Jersey unless it was duly authorized.2
The only consideration that arguably might legitimate these “otherwise tortious and possibly criminar’ invasions of petitioner’s private property,3 is the fact that a federal judge had entered an order authorizing the agents to use electronic equipment to intercept oral communications at petitioner’s office. The order, however, did not describe the kind of equipment to be used and made no reference to an entry, covert or otherwise, into private property. Nor does any statute expressly permit such activity or even authorize a federal judge to enter orders granting federal agents a license to commit criminal trespass. The initial question this case raises, therefore, is whether this kind of power should be read into a statute that does not expressly grant it.
In my opinion, there are three reasons, each sufficient by itself, for refusing to do so. First, until Congress has stated otherwise, our duty to protect the rights of the individual should hold sway over the interest in more' effective law enforcement. Second, the structural detail of this statute precludes a reading that converts silence into thunder. Third, the legislative history affirmatively demonstrates that Congress never contemplated the situation now before the Court.
I
“Congress, like this Court, has an obligation to obey the mandate of the Fourth Amendment.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But Congress is better equipped than the Judiciary to make the empiri*264cal judgment that a previously unauthorized investigative technique represents a “reasonable” accommodation between the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and effective law enforcement.4 Throughout our history, therefore, it has been Congress that has taken the lead in granting new authority to invade the citizen’s privacy.5 It is appropriate to accord special deference to Congress whenever it has expressly balanced the need for a new investigatory technique against the undesirable consequences of any intrusion on constitutionally protected interests in privacy. See id., at 334-339.
But no comparable deference should be given federal intrusions on privacy that are not expressly authorized by Congress.6 In my view, a proper respect for Congress’ important *265role in this area, as well as our tradition of interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional issues,7 compels this conclusion.
The Court does not share this view. For this is the third time in as many years that it has condoned a serious intrusion on privacy that was not explicitly authorized by statute and that admittedly raised a substantial constitutional question. In United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, the Court upheld an Executive regulation authorizing postal inspectors to open private letters without probable cause to believe they contained contraband.8 In United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, the Court upheld orders authorizing the surreptitious pen-register surveillance of an individual and directing a private company to lend its assistance in that endeavor. Again, no explicit statutory authority existed for either order, despite Congress’ otherwise comprehensive treatment of wire surveillance in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III).9
*266Today the Court has gone even further in finding an implicit grant of Executive power in Title III. That Title “does not refer explicitly to covert entry” of any kind, much less to entries that are tortious or criminal. Ante, at 249. Nevertheless, the Court holds that Congress, without having said so explicitly, has authorized the agents of a national police force in carrying out a surveillance order to break into private premises 10 in violation of state law. Moreover, the Court finds in the silent statute an open-ended authorization to effect such illegal entries without an explicit judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe they are necessary or even appropriate. In my judgment, it is most unrealistic to assume that Congress granted such broad and controversial authority to the Executive without making its intention to do so unmistakably plain. This is the paradigm case in which “the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to determining Congress' intent.” 11 I would not enlarge the coverage of the statute beyond its plain meaning.
II
The Court’s conclusion that the statute implicitly authorizes breaking and entering is especially anomalous because the statutory scheme in all other respects is exhaustive and ex*267plicit.12 “It simply does not make sense”13 to conclude that Congress — having minutely detailed (1) the process that “[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General” must follow in authorizing federal police officers to seek an electronic surveillance order,14 (2) the limited number of suspected offenses that will justify such an order,15 (3) the showing that must be made to “a Federal judge” before he issues the order,16 (4) the *268standard the judge must apply in approving, and the format he must follow in preparing, the order,17 (5) the time frame of execution and the manner of execution with respect to *269minimizing the interception of communications not likely to involve criminal activity,18 and even having more recently specified (6) certain “unobtrusive” means by which those *270orders might be carried out without the awareness of the suspect19 — was content to leave national police officers with unbounded authority to carry out the resulting orders in any unspecified and obtrusive fashion they chose “subject of course to constitutional limitations.” Ante, at 250.20
*271In my view, it is the opposite conclusion that is true to the statutory structure. For “one simply cannot assume that Congress,” see ante, at 252, wished to erect various procedural barriers against poor judgment on the part of the Attorney General and his subordinates in seeking, and on the part of federal district judges in issuing, eavesdropping orders only to commit their execution, even through illegal means, entirely to “the judgment and moderation of officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in the search.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The detailed timing and minimization restrictions on the executing officer, see n. 18, supra, as well as the 1970 amendment to Title III concerning “unobtrusive” execution, see n. 19, supra, lead inescapably to the conclusion that Congress withheld authority to trespass on private property except through the limited means expressly dealt with in the statute.21
Ill
Only one relevant conclusion can be drawn from a review of the entire legislative history of Title III. The legislators never even considered the possibility that they were passing a statute that would authorize federal agents to break into private premises without any finding of necessity by a neutral and detached magistrate.
A
The meager legislative remarks that are said to demonstrate that Title Ill’s supporters implicitly endorsed breaking and *272entering in order to install listening devices actually provide no support for that conclusion.
The reference to “judicial warrants authorizing [police] to hide bugs in the premises of criminal suspects/’ see ante, at 251 n. 12, was a comment by an opponent of the bill on investigative techniques that he believed this Court had ruled illegal in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41.22 Since neither he, nor any supporter of the bill, suggested that those techniques would be authorized by Title III, his comment is hardly indicative of a legislative endorsement of such practices. Moreover, there is a marked difference between the judicially warranted “hid[ing of] bugs in the premises of criminal suspects” and a forcible entry that has not been expressly authorized by any judge. The difference between subterfuge and forcible trespass should not be ignored.
That difference explains why the Court’s reliance on two statements by proponents of Title III that emphasize the technological limitations on “bugs” and “taps” is misplaced. The proponents believed these limitations would discourage the frequent use and abuse of electronic surveillance. Thus, in answer to repeated charges that passage of Title III would recreate Hitler’s Germany or anticipate Orwell’s “1984,” Senator Tydings, in a passage partially quoted by the Court, ante, at 252, argued:
“Contrary to what we have heard, electronic surveillance is not a lazy way to conduct an investigation. It *273will not be used wholesale as a substitute for physical investigation.
“The reason [s] for such sparing use are simple. First, electronic surveillance is really useful only in conspiratorial activities. . . .
“Second, surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape must be installed on telephones and wires strung. Bugs are difficult to install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is necessary to adjust equipment. . . .
“Third, monitoring this equipment requires the expenditure of a great amount of law enforcement’s time . . . .” 114 Cong. Rec. 12988-12989 (1968) (emphasis added).23
Read in context, this and like commentary are inconsistent with, rather than an endorsement of, unauthorized break-ins. For although it is of course true that surreptitious entry is often “impossible” when it must be accomplished without violating the law, surreptitious entry is by no means impossible (indeed, it is hardly “difficult”) if it may be effected by whatever means the police — unhampered by the provisions of the criminal law — can bring to their disposal. Despite the Court’s understanding of it, I read Senator Tydings’ remark as only one of many expressions by Title Ill’s supporters of their belief that authorized electronic surveillance would be “carefully circumscribed,” id., at 13203 (Sen. Scott) and “rigidly controlled,” id., at 14715 (Sen. Tydings), not only by technology but also by “strict court supervision,” id., at 13200 (Sen. Scott), the “strictest guidelines,” id., at 16076 *274(Rep. Harsha), and “an elaborate system of checks and safeguards.” Id., at 13204 (Sen. Scott).24
Even the opponents of Title III, in parading before Congress the various invasions of privacy that they felt would accompany the passage of the statute, never once referred to breaking and entering private property. E. g., id., at 14710 (Sen. Cooper); id., at 14732 (Sen. Yarborough); id., at 16066 (Rep. Celler). That they omitted such references while decrying far less aggravated invasions is strong evidence that they, at least, never thought about the issue that this case raises.25 And since the sponsors of the legislation expressly stated that they had specified “every possible constitutional safeguard for the rights of individual privacy,” id., at *27514469 (Sen. McClellan),26 their omission of any significant reference to these aggravated intrusions surely demonstrates that they did not consider this issue either.
In sum, as far as my research reveals, during the debates on Title III neither the proponents nor the opponents of the bill directly or indirectly expressed the view that the statute would authorize uninvited forcible trespasses by police officers as a means of implanting a listening device.
B
Because the drafters of Title III made “indiscriminate reference ... to the types of surveillance this Court reviewed” in prior cases, ante, at 251, the Court draws the conclusion that Congress meant to authorize all “types of surveillance” discussed in those cases. The premise does not support the conclusion.
Many of those cases, including the two specifically cited by the Court,27 held that the police conduct involved was unlawful. Rather than endorsing all of the techniques discussed in those cases, Congress was quite clearly trying to avoid the incidents of unconstitutionality those cases had *276identified.28 Moreover, in drafting Title III, the Senate Judiciary Committee did more than merely isolate and exclude from the bill the illegal elements of the police activity involved in those cases. Thus, the Chairman of the Committee, in answer to a colleague’s question whether Title III was drafted in conformity with the Fourth Amendment, stated:
“Completely so, let me say to my friend. Completely so, and it is even more restrictive. We have gone to every length which is proper, we think, to protect people’s privacy.” 114 Cong. Ree. 14470 (1968).
It is of greater importance, however, that although Congress was concerned with the “types of surveillance” involved in our prior cases, none of the congressional references to those cases discussed the type of entry made to effectuate the surveillance. Not a word in any of those pre-1968 opinions, save one, described an illegal entry or even implied that such an entry had occurred. Those opinions instead described situations in which a listening device had been surreptitiously placed: against an office wall in order to hear conversations in the next office, Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129; on the person of a federal agent who recorded a conversation in the defendant’s laundry, On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747; in a cabaret, Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427; in a law office, Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323; against a spike inserted under a party wall, Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505; on the outside of a public telephone booth, Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347; and inside a private office, Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41. It is, of course, true that the conduct in each cited case was surreptitious, but there is a vast difference between detective work that is merely clandestine and work that involves breaking and entering into private property. Before the decisions in Katz and Berger, the former technique was considered to be lawful, warrant or *277no warrant,29 whereas the latter was considered unlawful.30 The fact that Congress was prepared to enact a statute authorizing practices previously thought to be lawful surely does not justify the conclusion that it was equally prepared to authorize conduct that had always been made unlawful by the criminal laws of the various States.
Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, was the only pre-1968 case in which this Court had actually confronted the implantation of an electronic listening device by way of a "trespass, and probably a burglary, for which any unofficial person should be, and probably would be, severely punished.” Id., at 132.31 The plurality of four, speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson, had this to say about the police conduct in that case:
“That officers of the law would break and enter a home, secrete such a device even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversations of the occupants for over a month would be incredible if it were not admitted. Few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the funda*278mental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment... Ibid.
No Member of the Court disagreed with this assessment, although a majority refused to overturn the conviction because the exclusionary rule did not then apply to the States. While it is true, as the Court points out, ante, at 247, that four Members of the Irvine Court adverted to the lack of a “search warrant or other process” to support the entry, 347 U. S., at 132 (while the other three Members who discussed the issue found the police activity “offensive” and “revolting” without relying on the lack of a warrant32), it is also true that no Justice condoned a break-in absent some court order explicitly contemplating physical entry on the premises. Under any reading of the case, it cannot be taken as condoning official trespass and burglary absent specific authorization.
More importantly, the fact that Congress cited Irvine, without comment or explanation, when it was considering Title III cannot fairly be interpreted as an endorsement of the questionable police behavior that had been condemned so thunderously by Mr. Justice Jackson 14 years earlier. My respect for the lawmaking process forecloses the inference that Congress authorized burglarious conduct by such stealthy legislative history.
IV
Because it is not supported by either the text of the statute or the scraps of relevant legislative history,33 I fear that the *279Court’s holding may reflect an unarticulated presumption that national police officers have the power to carry out a surveillance order by whatever means may be necessary unless explicitly prohibited by the statute or by the Constitution.
But surely the presumption should run the other way. Congressional silence should not be construed to authorize the Executive to violate state criminal laws or to encroach upon constitutionally protected privacy interests. Before confronting the serious constitutional issues raised by the Court’s reading of Title III,34 we should insist upon an unambiguous statement by Congress that this sort of police conduct may be authorized by a court and that a specific showing of necessity, or at least probable cause, must precede such an authorization. Without a legislative mandate that is both explicit and specific, I would presume that this flagrant invasion of the citizen’s privacy is prohibited. Cf. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S., at 178-179 (Stevens, J., dissenting *280in part); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S., at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).35
I respectfully dissent.

 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297. The Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, *263and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

 N. J. Stat. Ann. §§2A:94-1, 2A:9-3 (West 1969).

 T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 110 (1969).

 Cf. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 353; United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311; Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72, 76.

 “Beginning with the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, and concluding with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 219, 238, Congress has enacted a series of over 35 different statutes granting federal judges the power to issue search warrants of one form or another. These statutes have one characteristic in common: they are specific in their grants of authority and in their inclusion of limitations on either the places to be searched, the objects of the search, or the requirements for the issuance of a warrant.” United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 179-180 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter gathered the pre-1945 statutes in his dissenting opinion in Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 616-623. He commented that “[w]hat is significant about this legislation is the recognition by Congress of the necessity for specific Congressional authorization even for the search of vessels and other moving vehicles and the seizures of goods technically contraband.” Id., at 616, n.

 I realize that since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, the Court has applied the same Fourth Amendment principles to state and federal law enforcement officers alike. Nonetheless, I purposely limit my discussion here to the federal context. For purposes of discussing the necessity of statutory authority, it seems useful to me to treat the Fourth Amendment concept *265of reasonableness as flexible enough to recognize differences between state and federal courts and police forces. Thus, because the power of the Federal Government to combat crime, like the jurisdiction of its courts, is more limited than the comparable power and jurisdiction inhering in the States, it is logical in the federal context to assume that governmental authority is lacking unless expressly mandated by legislation. See, e. g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389, 396; Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206; United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U. S. 441.

 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10; Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 430; Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64.

 It found authority for those searches in the Postal Service’s recent reinterpretation of an awkwardly drawn 1866 statute that authorized certain border searches of “vessels” but that could not reasonably be read to authorize either the mail openings themselves or the regulation allowing them. Moreover, its adoption of that interpretation left it no choice but to resolve a troublesome constitutional question without any considered guidance from Congress. See 431 U. S., at 625-632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

 See 434 U. S., at 178-190 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).

 Although this case involves an office, the invasion of a home would raise precisely the same statutory issue.

 “Congress drafted [Title III] with exacting precision. As its principal sponsor, Senator McClellan, put it:
“ '[A] bill as controversial as this ... requires close attention to the dotting of every “i” and the crossing of every “t” . . . [114 Cong. Rec. 14751 (1968).]
“Under these circumstances, the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to determining Congress’ intent, and we would do well to confine ourselves to that area.” United States v. Donovan, 429 U. S. 413, 441 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

 See ante, at 249-250; nn. 13-18, infra, and text accompanying.

 As Judge Merritt, writing for the Sixth Circuit, cogently observed:
“It simply does not make sense to imply Congressional authority for official break-ins when not a single line or word of the statute even mentions the possibility, much less limits or defines the scope of the power or describes the circumstances under which such conduct, normally unlawful, may take place. As the dissents of Holmes and Brandéis in Olmstead [v. United States, 277 U. S. 438] suggest, this is a serious, if not a ‘dirty,’ business; and we do not believe we should imply the power to break in under the statute, as the government argues, when Congress has not confronted and debated the issue and expressed such an intention clearly.
“In some circumstances, the installation of an electronic bug may not be possible without a forcible breaking and entering of the suspect’s premises, but that does not imply that the power to break and enter is subsumed in the warrant to seize the words. The breaking and entering aggravates the search, and it intrudes upon property and privacy interests not weighed in the statutory scheme, interests which have independent social value unrelated to confidential speech. We are not inclined to give the government the right by implication to intrude upon these interests by conducting official break-ins, especially when the purpose is secretly to monitor and record private conversations, a dangerous power otherwise carefully limited and defined by statute.” United States v. Finazzo, 583 F. 2d 837, 841-842 (CA6 1978). See also United States v. Santora, 583 F. 2d 453, 456-466 (CA9 1978).

 18 U. S. C. §2516 (1).

 18 U. S. C. §§ 2516 (1) (a)-(g).

 “Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the *268applicant’s authority to make such application. Each application shall include the following information:
“(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the officer authorizing the application;
“ (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted;
"(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
“(d) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter;
“(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oral communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the judge on each such application; and
“(f) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.” 18 U. S. C. §2518(1).

 “(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that—
“(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, *269has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter;
“(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
“(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
“(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
“(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral communication shall specify — ■
“(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;
“(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted;
“(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
“(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of the person authorizing the application; and
“(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained_” 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 (3), (4).

 “No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days. Extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and the court making the findings required by subsection (3) of this section. The period of extension shall be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted and in no event for longer than thirty days. Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not other*270wise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.” 18 U. S. C. §2518 (5).
The statute also details procedures for the storage and protective custody of the resulting tapes, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2518 (8) (a)-(c), for authorized disclosures and uses of the tapes both in and out of court, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2517, 2518 (9), and for after-the-fact notice to persons whose conversations were overheard. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (8) (d).

 The following provision was added to Title III in 1970:
“An order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication shall, upon request of the applicant, direct that a communication common carrier, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that such carrier, landlord, custodian, or person is according the person whose communications are to be intercepted. Any communication common carrier, landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall be compensated therefor by the applicant at the prevailing rates.” 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (4).

 The Court analyzes this problem as simply one of Judicial authority under the statute. Ante, at 250, and n. 10. Even if I could agree that Title III afforded judges “broad” and unconfined authority with respect to break-ins, I would still be left with the problem, never mentioned by the Court, of the Executive’s authority to break and enter at will without any judicial authorization.
Indeed, I am not at all certain that the Court puts any confines on either Judicial or Executive authority in this area, despite the lip service it pays to “constitutional limitations.” For, having stated that “breaking and entering” in execution of a search warrant is constitutionally permissible “where such entry is the only means by which the warrant effectively may be executed,” ante, at 247 (emphasis added), the Court then equates a surveillance order with a search warrant, but see Taylor, supra n. 3, at 84-85, and allows a break-in under the former upon a showing merely that the break-in was “the safest and most successful,” rather than the “only,” method of installing the device. 426 F. Supp. 862, 866.

 A Congress that was careful to limit the temporal extent of electronic surveillance and the opportunity for it to infringe on protected (i. e., noncriminal) conversations, and one so quick to amend the statute to provide for “unobtrusive” entry through the aid of private persons (i. e., “custodians” and “landlords”) who already have a degree of access to the property, surely cannot have condoned unlimited and unauthorized breaking and entering by police officers with the aid of nothing but a burglar’s tools.

 In full, the paragraph excerpted by the Court is as follows:
“In Berger against the State of New York, decided on June 12, 1967, the majority of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, threw out the New York State court-approved eavesdropping statute, declaring it to be unconstitutional. The New York statute permitted the police to obtain judicial warrants authorizing them to hide bugs in the premises of criminal suspects. The Court’s majority opinion outlawed this bugging statute because, it said, the procedures did not contain specific safeguards against violations of the fourth amendment, which limited police searches.” 114 Cong. Rec. 14708 (1968) (Sen. Long of Missouri).

 See also Anti-Crime Programs: Hearings on H. R. 5037, etc., before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1031 (1967), cited ante, at 251.

 “[Title III] sets forth in the most elaborate and precise detail the safeguards surrounding the application to a court of competent jurisdiction for authority to make a wiretap. I am satisfied that it is fully designed to guard against any unwarranted invasion of the precious right of privacy.” 114 Cong. Rec. 16276 (1968) (Rep. MacGregor). See also id., at 14763 (Sen. Percy); id., at 16296 (Rep. Boland); S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968).
On at least two occasions the Court has commented on the circumspection with which Title III was drafted:
“[Title III] sets forth the detailed and particularized application necessary to obtain such an order as well as the carefully circumscribed conditions for its use. The Act represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective control of crime while protecting the privacy of individual thought and expression.” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S., at 302 (emphasis added). See also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U. S. 41, 48. See also n. 8, supra.

 Had Congress expressly considered the issue, I am confident that it would not have granted the Executive the broad authority to bréale and enter that is conferred by the Court in today’s decision. Illustrative of its probable reaction to such investigative techniques are the responses of some Members to the officially sanctioned break-in committed against the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, and to the possibility of official participation in the Watergate break-in. E. g., 119 Cong. Rec. 14607-14608 (1973) (Sen. Edwards); id., at 15332 (Rep. Sarasin).

 The dimensions of the constitutional protection of privacy were certainly not underestimated by the supporters of Title III. Senator Lausohe, for example, had this to say about the intent of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment:
“[T]hey also knew that the innocent individual would be protected in his home; that no one shall enter. Even though it is a hovel, to him it is a palace. So they wrote into the Constitution, regardless of how poor one’s home may be, that it shall not be entered by the government without the law-enforcement official having first obtained a warrant for search and seizure issued on the basis of evidence establishing probable cause.” 114 Cong. Rec. 14729 (1968).

 Kate v. United States, 389 U. S. 347; Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41. See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505; Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128.

 See S. Rep. No. 1097, supra, at 66, 75, 101.

 E. g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438.

 E. g., Silverman v. United States, supra; Irvine v. California, supra.

 Mr. Justice Jackson described the entry as follows:
“On December 1, 1951, while Irvine and his wife were absent from their home, an officer arranged to have a locksmith go there and malee a door key. Two days later, again in the absence of occupants, officers and a technician made entry into the home by the use of this key and installed a concealed microphone in the hall. A hole was bored in the roof of the house and wires were strung to transmit to a neighboring garage whatever sounds the microphone might pick up. Officers were posted in the garage to listen. On December 8, police again made surreptitious entry and moved the microphone, this time hiding it in the bedroom. Twenty days later, they again entered and placed the microphone in a closet, where the device remained until its purpose of ¡enabling the officers to overhear incriminating statements was accomplished.” 347 U. S., at 130-131.

 Id., at 145 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Burton, J.); id., at 150 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

 The Court argues that Congress’ goals in enacting the statute would be frustrated if Title III were not read to include the authority exercised by the Government in this case. Ante, at 252-254. Of course, if Congress intended to sanction “even the most reprehensible means for securing a conviction,” Irvine, 347 U. S., at 146 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), then withholding some of those means would indeed frustrate the legislative purpose. But there is no reason to impute such an intent to Congress or to ignore its conscientious attention to the importance of safeguarding the *279rights of individual privacy. See 114 Cong. Rec. 14469-14470 (1968) (Sen. McClellan); see supra, at 272-273, 276.
Congress quite clearly expected exterior wiretaps to provide the most effective means of electronic surveillance authorized by Title III. The unavailability of certain interior “bugs" — i. e., those implanted by means of forcible trespass — can hardly be seen as frustrating the entire law enforcement scheme. E. g., S. Rep. No. 1097, supra n. 24, at 72; 114 Cong. Rec. 12988 (1968) (Sen. Tydings); id., at 13206 (Sen. Scott); id., at 14481 (Sen. McClellan); id., at 14714 (Sen. Murphy).
Congress' prediction proved correct:
“Telephone taps apparently account for most instances of electronic surveillance, and this can be accomplished in most circumstances by placing a tap on the line outside the premises of the suspect. According to the final report of the National Commission for Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, only 26 out of some 1,220 electronic surveillance orders executed between 1968 and 1973 involved a trespassory intrusion. National Wiretap Commission, Electronic Surveillance 15 (1967) . . . ." United States v. Finazzo, 583 F. 2d, at 841 n. 13.

 Compare opinion of the Court, ante, at 246-248, 254-259, with opinion of Mr. Justice BrenNan, ante, at 259-262.

 In addition to Title III, the Government claims authority for the break-ins under the federal “no-knock” statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3109, and under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41. Because I believe that Title III has preempted the field of electronic surveillance, it is conclusive for me that it nowhere authorizes the entries involved in this case as a means of executing an eavesdropping order. Even if Congress had never enacted Title III, however, I would nonetheless conclude that these other asserted justifications for official breaking and entering are unavailing in this case. Both provisions refer to “warrants” issued by a magistrate with the awareness that their execution would probably require the police to find some otherwise illegal means of entering the premises. No such awareness was evidenced by the District Court when it authorized electronic surveillance in this case. See generally United States v. Finazzo, supra, at 845-848.