Court Opinion

ID: 9706823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:52:21.638929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:35.523735
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because I too agree with Mr. Justice Castille that the plaintiff in the instant matter has alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to state a cause of action grounded in a breach of a bailment contract, I must dissent. However, I must disassociate myself from that portion of Mr. Justice Castille’s dissenting opinion which characterizes the majority’s decision as creating a new cause of action, that of veterinary malpractice.
Although it may be technically incorrect to refer to a cause of action against a veterinarian as malpractice, the majority correctly states that a cause of action can be based upon the negligent acts or omissions of a veterinarian in the performance of his professional duties. See, e.g., Durkin v. Equine Clinics, Inc., 313 Pa.Super. 75, 459 A.2d 417 (1983). In order to state a cause of action premised on the negligent acts of a veterinarian, a plaintiff must plead (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) a breach of that duty, ie, the failure to exercise the appropriate standard of care; (3) causation; and (4) damages. See, e.g., Morena v. South Hills Health Sys., 501 Pa. 634, 642 n. 5, 462 A.2d 680, 684 n. 5 (1983).
Despite agreeing with the majority that a plaintiff can properly allege a cause of action grounded in negligence, I take strong exception with the majority’s conclusion that a breach of a bailment is not a proper cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an animal when the animal suffers an injury or dies as a result of the surgery.
“A bailment is a delivery of personalty for the accomplishment of some purpose upon a contract, express or implied, *226that after the purpose has been fulfilled, it shall be redelivered to the person who delivered it, otherwise dealt with according to his directions or kept until he reclaims it.” Smalich v. Westfall, 440 Pa. 409, 413, 269 A.2d 476, 480 (1970) (citations omitted). As Mr. Justice Castille correctly stated in his dissenting opinion, “[u]nder Pennsylvania law ... animals may be the subject of bailments.” Dissenting Opinion, at 227.
In the instant matter, the plaintiff alleged that she delivered her English Bulldog to Dr. Brown to correct a medical condition. The following day the dog died. Despite those allegations falling squarely within the majority’s own definition of a bailment, the majority refuses to recognize a cause of action grounded in bailment. I cannot agree with such a decision. Instead, I believe that the plaintiff could have properly filed a complaint against the defendant based on either breach of a bailment or professional negligence. That being the case, I believe that the decision of the majority is incorrect as the plaintiff alleged a cause of action grounded in bailment, and if proven to the satisfaction of a jury, would result in liability being imposed upon the defendant.