Court Opinion

ID: 9689980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:50:48.103939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.018346
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). I write separately because *330I respectfully disagree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the defendant’s sentence of 100 to 200 years for second-degree murder was unlawful. The statute provides that second-degree murder is punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years. The issue is not whether the defendant can serve the sentence, but whether the Court can lawfully impose it. The conclusion follows "with the force and simplicity of Aristotelian syllogism”1 that the sentence was authorized by the Legislature.
Having decided People v Johnson, 421 Mich 494; 364 NW2d 654 (1984), which produced the anomalous result that a life sentence for a Proposal b offense may actually be for less than a term of years, the Court now concludes that a term of years must be less than life. The conclusion is founded on the unarticulated and impermissible premise that an inmate serving a life sentence will probably be paroled. People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408; 410 NW2d 266 (1987).
More understandably, the motivating impulse of this opinion may well be a misguided attempt to mitigate the disparity between those serving life terms and those sentenced to lengthy indeterminate sentences. In fact, however, today’s result runs counter to the philosophy of sentence reform that "Neither justice nor the appearance of justice is served when similar offenders committing similar offenses receive dissimilar sentences, Michigan Sentencing Guidelines—Statement of Purpose.” The court now declares as a matter of law that an older offender must receive a different sentence than a younger offender who has committed a similar offense.
If the majority is offended by the sentence im*331posed, it ought to forthrightly say so under the "shock the conscience” standard of People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983).2 Instead, the majority shifts responsibility to the Legislature for the result it wishes to achieve.
The motivating factor for this sentence was the trial judge’s determination of how much time he thought the defendant should actually serve in prison. The Legislature has not foreclosed this option.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.3
i
The defendant was charged with first-degree *332murder4 for stabbing his former girlfriend to death on February 25, 1985. The defendant was also charged with possession of a firearm during the commission of this felony.5
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder6 and of felony-firearm. He was sentenced on October 31, 1985, to a 100- to 200-year prison term for the murder conviction and to a mandatory consecutive two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction.
At the trial it was established that the victim was at her home with her fiancé on February 25, 1985. The victim’s fiancé testified that at approximately five o’clock a car pulled up in the driveway and that he recognized the person getting out of the car as the defendant. While the defendant’s sister remained in the car, the defendant came to the porch, knocked on the door, and called out the victim’s name. The defendant asked to speak to the victim, saying that he wanted some pictures and albums that belonged to him and stated that, "I got my sister with me. I’m not going to do anything.” At that point the victim opened the door.
The defendant asked the victim to step out on the front porch where she informed him she would pack up the albums immediately and went back into the house. The defendant then returned to the car, and his sister got out of the car and they both came into the house.
When the defendant and his sister entered the home, they remained in the living room, and when the victim came into the room, the defendant indicated he wished to speak to her in the back. *333The victim’s fiancé testified that he said no and that the defendant opened up the briefcase and produced a gun and stated, "Oh yes. I’m going to talk to her.” The defendant then jumped off the couch and grabbed the victim’s hand and pulled her into the bedroom.
Both the defendant’s sister and the victim’s fiancé testified that they heard the victim plead, "Please don’t kill me.” The defendant fired two shots and the victim screamed, "Somebody help me.”
Medical documentation revealed that the defendant stabbed the victim seven times, either with a knife or a screwdriver. The evidence technician assigned to the homicide case testified that it appeared the struggle originated in the bedroom, then went through the hallway into the living room area, finally ending in the kitchen. The living room walls, which were eleven feet apart had blood smears and droplets on both sides of the walls, as did the entrance to the bedroom, the bedroom itself, and the hallways.
After a three-day trial the jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder and felony-firearm. On October 31, 1985, the day of sentencing, the trial judge reviewed the evidence presented at trial and the information contained in the presentence report. According to the report, the defendant had intended to carry out this plan over a period of time. The defendant had threatened the victim a number of times, and she had tried changing her address on two occasions.
The thirty-four-year-old defendant had a juvenile history that began at age fifteen, three prior felony convictions, and one misdemeanor conviction. The presentence report revealed the circumstance of defendant’s prior armed robbery conviction which involved forcible entry into an apart*334ment and a robbery and rape of one of its occupants.
The judge noted:
We know from the evidence and the testimony that at some given point the deceased must have been physically in a position where she was cowering down. At least the shot that was fired, was fired in the direction that it traveled in a downward fashion, grazing the scalp, I believe, and the hand, and then entering into the dresser drawer. We know that by the trail of blood from that bedroom throughout and into the kitchen that she was fleeing or trying to escape from Mr. Moore. And we know that Mr. Moore did in fact mutilate the deceased by stabbing her some seven times.
I don’t know what any appellate court would need by way of recitation other than what I just stated, but a heinous crime of this nature deserves a substantial sentence in order to deter others and as straight out punishment in the hope that Mr. Moore will not be in a position to be in society to do it again in this life. Because the appellate courts of our state have said that in point of fact a life sentence for this sort of crime allows him to be reviewed in ten years, I intend to utilize numbers with the belief that the law requires that the numbers be served before you become eligible for review.
The defendant was sentenced to a 100- to 200-year prison term, and, on appeal, the sentence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.7
ii
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
The defendant was sentenced pursuant to MCL *335769.9; MSA 28.1081, the relevant section of which provides:
In all cases where the maximum sentence in the discretion of the court may be imprisonment for life or any number or term of years, the court may impose a sentence for life or may impose a sentence for any term of years. If the sentence imposed by the court is for any term of years, the court shall fix both the minimum and the maximum of that sentence in terms of years or fraction thereof, and sentences so imposed shall be considered indeterminate sentences. The court shall not impose a sentence in which the maximum penalty is fife imprisonment with a minimum for a term of years included in the same sentence. [Emphasis added.]
The majority states that "[o]n its face, the stated penalty for second-degree murder ('life, or any term of years’) indicates that a term of years is a lesser penalty than life.” Ante, p 317. The statute obviously does not mandate on its face that a term of years must be a term less than life.
It is well established that words should be given their ordinary meaning:
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its term. [Caminetti v United States, 242 US 470, 485; 37 S Ct 192; 61 L Ed 442 (1917).]
The language of the statute does not evidence an intent on the part of the Legislature to confine a sentence of a term of years to a term less than the defendant’s life expectancy.
*336The use of the word "any” as an adjective is defined as "one or more without specification . . . in whatever quantity or number, great or small; some.” The Random House College Dictionary (rev ed, 1975), p 61. The ordinary meaning then of "any,” used to describe "term of years,” simply indicates the obvious: the Legislature has not limited the judge as to the duration of the term of years.8 The plain meaning of the phrase "any term of years” is a term of years without limitation as to duration.
The lead opinion asserts that the use of the word "or” inserted between "life” and "any term of years” indicates alternatives that are mutually exclusive,9 concluding "there are two types of sentences that a judge may impose upon a person convicted of second-degree murder—a sentence of life in prison, or a sentence of a term of years less than life.”10 Ante, p 319. Obviously the terms are "mutually exclusive” only in the sense that a court may not both sentence an individual to a term of life and to a term of years. It does not *337logically follow that a term of years must be less than life; it logically follows that the term of years could be equal to or less than life, and that life could be greater than or equal to a term of years. Thus, the Legislature has in terms authorized any term of years that equals actual life.
While it may be a truism to conclude that the alternatives, "term of years” or "life” present choices that are mutually exclusive in that if one is chosen the other must be rejected, it does not follow that one must be less than the other. Id. There is no basis for the conclusion, that the alternative of "life” is a "term of years less than life.”
As a basis for this conclusion the lead opinion initially relies on People v Blythe, 417 Mich 430; 339 NW2d 399 (1983). Ante, p 317, n 10. Blythe involved only the question whether "life or any term of years” referred to the mandatory minimum sentence imposed, thus requiring a minimum sentence of at least a year and a day. Blythe is inapposite to the case before us.11 Id., p 433.
Nor does People v Johnson, 421 Mich 494, 498; 364 NW2d 654 (1984), support this conclusion. In Johnson, this Court discussed the holding of Blythe, supra, and observed that the "sentence concepts 'life’ and 'any term of years’ are mutually exclusive and a sentencing judge may (in the appropriate case) opt for either but not both.” This statement was made in the context of observing that if a life sentence was imposed there could be no minimum term of years, concluding then that since "Proposal b” mandated only that a defendant serve the calendar minimum term imposed *338by the court before being eligible for parole, the lifer law only applied to a determinate life sentence.12 MCL 791.233b; MSA 28.230(3).
Since Johnson held that a life sentence under Proposal b was subject to the lifer law, a "life” sentence now carries the potential to require a shorter sentence than a term of years, the very anomaly the trial court here observed. However, despite Johnson’s holding that a defendant sentenced to life for a "Proposal b” offense is eligible for parole after ten years, the lead opinion now holds that a sentence of life is a greater penalty than a term of years, implying life is the most severe penalty that can be imposed.13 This conclusion focuses on the function of the sentence, and assumes incorrectly that an inmate serving life will probably be paroled. There is no support for the assumption. If a life inmate is not paroled, his sentence is identical to the defendant’s. If a life inmate is paroled, his sentence is less than Mr. Moore’s. Thus, the assumption is not only logically flawed, it is based on a speculation as to how the system will actually operate, a consideration this Court held was impermissible as a factor in imposing a sentence. People v Fleming, supra, p 425.
*339The Legislature has mandated that
a parole shall not be granted to a prisoner sentenced for the commission of a crime described in section 33b(a) to (cc) until the prisoner has served the minimum term imposed by the court less an allowance for disciplinary credits .... A prisoner described in this subdivision is not eligible for special parole.[14] [MCL 791.233(1)(c); MSA 28.2303(1)(c).]
If it is true that life is more severe than a term of years, then, despite the mandate of the Legislature that a "Proposal b” offender serve the calendar minimum prior to being considered eligible for parole, defendants sentenced to indeterminate terms must presumably not only be sentenced to a term of years less than life, but it should follow that defendants should be eligible for parole prior to the service of ten years of their calendar minimum term, since a term of years must necessarily be a less severe penalty than life imprisonment.15
*340Finally, despite protestations to the contrary, to impose a limit on the number of years as the lead opinion suggests would require the sentencing court to compute a criminal’s life expectancy upon the basis of age, physical health, and family history. If it is the maximum term of years that violates the statute, the maximum term would have to be less than this computed life expectancy and then under People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972); the court would have to perform the final computation, the one-third/two-thirds formulation, which would become the minimum sentence.16 This procedure is also inconsistent with the guidelines which recommend a minimum sentence up to life in prison. People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987). This procedure would essentially require every court to function as an actuary:
For example [take] a person who has the foresight to commit a murder at the age of 45 years old and due to his genetic history, his current physical health and diet, has a projected life span of 55 years. The maximum term of years then would have to be less than 10 years. The appropriate computation under Tanner would then result in a minimum term of six years. This would have the net result of eliminating any discretion from the sentencing judge if "any term of years” is determined to be less than life. Indeed, murder committed by a defendant who has outlived his individual life expectancy would not be punishable by a term of years at all. Life would be the only permissible sentence. This eliminates a portion of the penalty provision established by the Legislature and would have the impermissible result of eliminating the trial court’s exercise of discretion which is required by statute.
*341The above example assumes the opinion’s holding refers to the maximum term. On the other hand, if it is the minimum term of the sentence that is of significance to the majority the trial court must also presumably use actuarial tables to impose a minimum no greater than two-thirds of the defendant’s life expectancy.17 Whether the term addressed by the majority is the minimum or the maximum,18 the observation is well taken that the inevitable direction of the opinion is the impo*342sition of determinate life sentences for the majority of serious offenders and the elimination of the indeterminate portion of the penalty provision established by the Legislature.
This Court recognized in its dicta in Johnson that the lifer law does not apply to a defendant sentenced to a term of years for a Proposal b offense. The purpose of Proposal b is to prevent early release. The ultimate illogic in the majority result is to conclude that it is contrary to the legislative will to impose a term of years that precludes parole when Proposal b was enacted for the purpose of precluding early parole. If the Legislature wished to restrict that authority it could modify Proposal b, increase disciplinary credits, or modify the "lifer law.” To conclude that given terms of years are "unnecessary” is simply to frustrate the very authority given to the sentencing judge by the Legislature.
Therefore, because the language of the statute is unambiguous, no judicial interpretation is necessary. We would find the sentence of 100 to 200 years within the statutory limits which authorize the sentencing judge to impose a sentence of "life” or "any term of years.”
iii
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Under Michigan law the appellate court may *343review a trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing and will provide relief for the defendant only in those instances in which the sentence "shocks the conscience of the appellate court.” People v Coles, supra, 550. We agree with the conclusion reached in the lead opinion that as the reviewing court we are not shocked, and thus do not find the effective length of this sentence to be an abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion. Ante, p 325.
However, we disagree with the conclusions also reached by the lead opinion that the sentencing judge abused his discretion by entering an order that is impossible for the defendant to obey, and one which effectively foreclosed his, or his successor’s, future exercise of discretion in regard to granting approval of parole prior to the service of the defendant’s minimum calendar term. Ante, pp 325-326. It cannot be an abuse of discretion to do what the Legislature has authorized, nor can it be an abuse of discretion to foreclose the discretion of the Parole Board when the Legislature has authorized foreclosure by mandating that a defendant serve the calendar minimum term of the sentence.
To repeat, the issue is not whether a defendant can actually serve the sentence imposed by the trial court, but rather whether the court has the lawful authority to impose the sentence. The sentencing judge stated the sentence imposed on defendant Moore was designed so that the defendant would not be released from prison during his natural life. The judge noted that "[b]ecause the appellate courts of our state have said that in point of fact a life sentence for this sort of crime allows [the defendant] to be reviewed in ten years, I intend to utilize numbers with the belief that the *344law requires that the numbers be served before you become eligible for review.”19
Under People v Coles, supra, a sentence must bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate sentencing goal.20 The trial judge stated that the purpose of the 100- to 200-year sentence was to foreclose parole and thus provided a rationale for the sentence which bore a reasonable relationship to the shocking, heinous crime committed by the defendant.21 The sentence does not constitute an abuse of the trial court’s discretion because the legislative referendum authorized avoidance of the lifer law.22
The lead opinion’s assertion that the action of the trial judge precluded the judge or his successor from the opportunity to deny or approve early release is simply incorrect. The Legislature itself has precluded the court’s discretion by enacting legislation which declares that "Proposal b” offenders are ineligible for special parole.23 In this case, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, a "Proposal b” offense. Thus the defendant could not be released prior to serving the *345calendar minimum, even with the sentencing judge’s approval. MCL 791.233b(n); MSA 28.2303(3)(n).
It cannot be an abuse of discretion to foreclose a sentencing judge’s discretion in a situation, such as here, where the Legislature effectively foreclosed both the judiciary’s and the Parole Board’s discretion regarding release prior to serving a minimum term. Thus, there is no basis for the lead opinion’s conclusion that the sentence of 100 to 200 years constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
CONCLUSION
To be clear, while all might not agree with this sentence, the sentence was within the authority legislatively granted to the trial court. There is no support for the construction of the statute offered in the lead opinion. Accordingly, I would affirm the opinion below.
Riley, C.J., and Griffin, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 People v Oscar Moore, 164 Mich App 378, 394; 417 NW2d 508 (1987) (Tahvonen, J., dissenting).

 People v Coles has not led this Court or the Court of Appeals to find many sentences that "shock the conscience.” It appears that trial courts are, with few exceptions, imposing sentences which are in context not offensive. If the shock-the-conscience standard has not in practice accomplished reduction of sentences, it seemingly is because the template selected does not fit the facts reviewed.

 We would also find that the punishment is proportionate to the crime and does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
An examination of all the factors in Solem v Helm, 463 US 277; 103 S Ct 3001; 77 L Ed 2d 637 (1983), does not require a finding of excessive punishment in this case. The punishment in this case, while admittedly strong, is not disproportionate to the violent and brutal murder of which the defendant was found guilty. In addition, other criteria, such as disciplining the wrongdoer, the protection of society, and deterrence of others from committing like offenses, must be taken into account. People v Snow, 386 Mich 586; 194 NW2d 314 (1972).
Second, contrary to the majority’s assertion that "[njeither the Legislature nor the people . . . have authorized the imposition of a nonparolable term of years” (ante, p 323) or that the Legislature did not intend a drastic change in sentencing law, we believe this is precisely what the Legislature intended in enacting "Proposal b.” MCL 791.233b(b); MSA 28.2303(3)(b). As the Legislature itself has foreclosed parole prior to service of the minimum sentence for "Proposal b” offenders, a sentence within statutory limits cannot be considered a usurpation of the Parole Board’s authority.
Further, there is no infringement by the judiciary upon a legislative function since the Legislature by statute expressly authorized a sentence within the range imposed here, that is "any term of years.” Thus, as the imposition of the sentence does not usurp either the Parole Board’s authority or that of the Legislature, the sentence does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

 MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548.

 MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).

 MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549.

 People v Timothy Moore, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided February 19, 1987 (Docket No. 89319).

 Although the lead opinion notes the usage found in MCL 769.12(1)(b); MSA 28.1084(1)(b) and MCL 769.12(2); MSA 28.1084(2) has persuaded them that "a lesser term” and the phrase "any term of years” may be read interchangeably, there is no basis for this conclusion. Ante, p 319, n 13.

 When the term "or” is used, it is presumed to be used in the disjunctive sense and when used in penal statutes seldom indicates anything other than permissible alternative sentences. 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 540, p 897. See also 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 21.14, p 127. The ordinary, plain meaning of an alternative, when used as a noun is "a choice limited to one of two or more possibilities.” Random House Dictionary, supra, p 40.

 United States v O’Driscoll, 761 F2d 589, 597-598 (CA 10, 1985), cert den 475 US 1020 (1986). The Tenth Circuit of the Court of Appeals held that a sentence of 300 years in prison with eligibility of parole following 99 years was not outside the statutory limits or illegal or an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, nor did it constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. See also Passman v Blackburn, 797 F2d 1335 (CA 5, 1986), cert den 480 US 948 (1987); United States v Rhodes, 779 F2d 1019 (CA 4, 1985), cert den 476 US 1182 (1986); Stevens v Armontrout, 787 F2d 1262 (CA 8, 1986).

 In a unanimous opinion the Court held: "[T]he language 'for life or for any term of years’ refers to the maximum sentence which may be imposed for armed robbery and that this statute does not include a mandatory minimum for the non-aggravated offense.” Blythe, supra, p 437.

 Then, as now, we agree with the conclusion reached in People v Cohens, 111 Mich App 788; 314 NW2d 756 (1981), that the intent of the Legislature in enacting Proposal b "was to restructure parole policies to ensure that defendants would serve their full minimum term when convicted of one of the listed offenses.” Johnson, supra, p 500 (dissent of Boyle, J.) There is no reasonable explanation to support a conclusion that the Legislature intended to only restructure parole policies in regard to "Proposal b” offenders sentenced to a term of years.

 See People v Oscar Moore, unpublished order of the Supreme Court, dated March 29, 1988 (Docket No. 82069), held in abeyance pending decision in the present case.
In Oscar Moore, the Court of Appeals built upon the majority opinion in Johnson, supra, noting that “[i]f 'life’ and 'any term of years’ are mutually exclusive concepts, the Court’s statement that the latter allows imposition of 'any number of years’ must mean 'any number of years less than life.’ ” Ante, p 318, citing Oscar Moore, supra, p 389.

 Although "non-Proposal b” offenders are eligible for special parole, release prior to the expiration of their minimum terms of imprisonment whenever the sentencing judge, or his successor gives written approval, MCL 791.233(1)(b); MSA 28.2303(1)(b), "Proposal b” offenders cannot be paroled, even if the sentencing judge approves, prior to serving the calendar minimum. Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directive 45.14, Habitual Offenders (August, 1988).

 As an example of the problems the Johnson decision has wrought, see People v Hurst (After Remand), 169 Mich App 160; 425 NW2d 752 (1988). The Court of Appeals initially vacated the defendant’s sentence of concurrent terms of prison sentences of forty to eighty years and remanded for resentencing. See People v Hurst, 155 Mich App 573; 400 NW2d 685 (1986).
The reason for remand was that if a person given a lengthy indeterminate sentence for a "Proposal b” violation was significantly worse off than an offender sentenced for "life,” for purposes of parole consideration, then the sentence imposed would shock the reviewing court’s conscience. Hurst, supra, 169 Mich App 161. While the Court concluded a sentence for life was the better alternative, the trial judge had resentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of life, thus the Court found the sentence did not shock its conscience. 169 Mich App 168-169.

 The sentencing guidelines do not include age as a variable. Nonetheless, the effect of today’s decision is to mandate that age be considered when it benefits a defendant.

 Regardless of a defendant’s prior criminal record and the serious nature of the crime, this Court would be forced to review every defendant’s sentence if we were to adopt the interpretation proposed by the lead opinion, that is, that a sentence for a term of years may not exceed a defendant’s life expectancy.
While the Court granted leave in People v Moore and People v Milbourn to review the legality of sentences of imprisonment for very long terms of years, there are cases being held in abeyance for Moore in which defendants have been sentenced to terms of twenty to fifty, thirty to fifty, and twenty-five to fifty years, on the basis that, for example, because of the defendant’s age at the time of sentencing or the fact that the defendant has a history of heart problems, these sentences which exceed the defendant’s life expectancy are unlawful.
See People v Golidy (Docket No. 83516) (the defendant had a long history of involvement in illegal gambling and drug dealing, was sentenced twenty to fifty years for delivery of a controlled substance and of being an habitual offender and was fifty-three when sentenced); People v Walker (Docket No. 84881) (the defendant, sentenced to thirty to fifty years for a bank robbery, twenty-five to fifty years for assault and the mandatory term for felony-firearm, challenged his sentence because he was almost forty-four at the time of sentencing and has a heart problem); People v Wilkins (Docket No. 82666) (the defendant, convicted of assault with intent to murder and felony-firearm, was sentenced to seventy-five to one hundred fifty years. This defendant, at thirty-one years of age, had been convicted of ten felonies and prior to that had ten or eleven juvenile contacts); People v Lowman (Docket No. 83289) (the defendant who raped the victim at knifepoint and had a lengthy criminal record, the last conviction being for assault with intent to rob while armed, was sentenced to a fifty- to one hundred-year prison term).

 The discussion in the lead opinion regarding the Parole Board’s jurisdiction once the defendant has served the minimum term of his sentence indicates it is the minimum term which is of significance to the holding. Ante, pp 322-324. The dicta in Johnson, supra, still requires a defendant to serve the minimum term of his sentence. It ought to follow then that the significant portion of the sentence is the minimum term and not the maximum. As long as the minimum term imposed is less than the defendant’s life expectancy, the defendant *342could serve the minimum term and there would be some time within which the Parole Board could exercise jurisdiction. The disparity-observed in Johnson will still exist because Proposed b requires service of the minimum sentence and the lifer law has not been amended to eliminate the parole eligibility disparity between life and an indeterminate sentence. Note, The effect of Proposal b on the lifer law, 65 U of D L R 725, 748 (1988).

 Although a defendant must serve the calendar minimum term minus disciplinary credits when sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, if sentenced to life imprisonment, the defendant may be eligible for parole after ten years. MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4). See People v Johnson, supra.

 The imposition of a severe sentence within legal limits is not error, and insofar as standard sentencing is concerned, not every offense in a like category calls for identical punishment. Williams v Oklahoma, 358 US 576; 79 S Ct 421; 3 L Ed 2d 516 (1959).

 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The panel noted that the trial court correctly considered the shocking nature of the crime, deterrence, and the needs to protect society and punish the defendant.

 See, for example, People v Martinez, 147 Mich App 94; 382 NW2d 741 (1985).

 As previously noted, a defendant sentenced to an indeterminate sentence for a "Proposal b” offense must serve the calendar minimum term minus disciplinary credits and is not eligible for special parole. MCL 791.233(1)(c); MSA 28.2303(1)(c).