Court Opinion

ID: 9908216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:00:55.179617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:00.152397
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1833   Document: 23     Page: 1    Filed: 12/08/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                YVETTE V. RODRIGUEZ,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
                  Respondent
            ______________________

                       2023-1833
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DC-0752-17-0368-I-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: December 8, 2023
                 ______________________

    YVETTE V. RODRIGUEZ, Midland, TX, pro se.

     DANIEL FALKNOR, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

     Before LOURIE, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1833    Document: 23      Page: 2    Filed: 12/08/2023

 2                                           RODRIGUEZ v. DHS

 PER CURIAM.
      Former United States Department of Homeland Secu-
 rity (“DHS”) employee Yvette V. Rodriguez appeals from a
 final decision of the United States Merit Systems Protec-
 tion Board (“Board”) affirming an initial decision declining
 to reinstate Rodriguez after she was terminated from her
 position at DHS for failing to maintain a security clear-
 ance. Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. DC-0752-
 17-0368-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 29, 2023) (“Final Decision”),
 S.A. 1 1–6; see also Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
 DC-0752-17-0368-I-1 (M.S.P.B. June 20, 2017) (“Initial De-
 cision”), S.A. 7–17. For the following reasons, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     Rodriguez was employed by the federal government for
 24 years. Relevant to this appeal, her final position was
 that of Criminal Investigator (National Program Manager)
 within DHS’s Homeland Security Investigations Office. In
 September 2013, Rodriguez’s security clearance was sus-
 pended. Informal Opening Br. at 4. On November 9, 2015,
 DHS revoked Rodriguez’s security clearance, S.A. 18,
 which action was subsequently upheld on appeal by the Se-
 curity Appeals Board, id. at 21–22.
     On October 21, 2016, DHS sent Rodriguez a notice pro-
 posing her removal from her position because she failed to
 maintain a security clearance and therefore could no longer
 “perform the full range of duties” of her position. Id. at
 23–24. After proceedings in which Rodriguez and her at-
 torney challenged the proposed removal, she was removed
 from her position and federal employment on February 7,
 2017. Id. at 37. DHS explained that its adverse action was
 “not intended as a sanction or penalty for misconduct,” but
 rather was taken because Rodriguez had “failed to

     1 As used herein, “S.A.” refers to the Supplemental
 Appendix filed with Respondent’s Informal Brief.
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 RODRIGUEZ v. DHS                                             3

 maintain a condition of employment.” Id. at 38. DHS also
 noted that there was no statute, regulation, or policy re-
 quiring DHS to seek out alternative employment for Rodri-
 guez. Id.
     Her appeal to the Board was assigned to an adminis-
 trative judge (“AJ”). Before the AJ, Rodriguez argued that
 she should not have been removed because she was making
 a meaningful contribution to the agency through the per-
 formance of duties that did not require her to have a secu-
 rity clearance. Initial Decision at 3, S.A. 9. She also
 asserted that (1) DHS should have mitigated its actions by
 reassigning rather than removing her, (2) DHS had estab-
 lished a past practice that required the agency to continue
 to allow her to work, and (3) her removal did not promote
 the efficiency of the service because she was capable of per-
 forming her job without a security clearance. See id.
     During the proceedings, the parties agreed to the fol-
 lowing stipulations:
     (1) Rodriguez’s position required a Top Secret secu-
     rity clearance;
     (2) Her security clearance was revoked;
     (3) The agency gave her 30 days advance written
     notice of the reasons for the proposed removal;
     (4) She was given a reasonable time to answer the
     proposal orally and in writing and to provide rele-
     vant evidence;
     (5) Rodriguez provided both an oral and written re-
     sponse;
     (6) The appellant was notified of her right to be rep-
     resented;
     (7) Rodriguez’s removal was effective February 7,
     2017; and
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 4                                            RODRIGUEZ v. DHS

     (8) The agency was not obligated by statute, regu-
     lation, or policy to reassign the appellant to a posi-
     tion that did not require a security clearance.
 Initial Decision at 2, S.A. 8; see also S.A. 34–35.
      The AJ determined that the Board’s authority to re-
 view a removal based on the revocation of a security clear-
 ance is limited to a review of whether or not: (1) the
 employee’s position required a clearance, (2) the clearance
 was revoked, and (3) the employee was provided with the
 procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b). Ini-
 tial Decision at 4, S.A. 10 (citing Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan,
 484 U.S. 518, 530–31 (1988); Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d
 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc); Ingram v. Dep’t of Def., 120
 M.S.P.R. 420, ¶ 9 (2013)). The procedures required by
 § 7513(b) include: (1) thirty days advance written notice of
 the reasons for the proposed removal; (2) a reasonable time
 to answer orally and in writing and to provide relevant ev-
 idence; (3) the opportunity to be represented; and (4) a writ-
 ten decision explaining the reasons for the decision. Id.
 (citing Drumheller v. Dep’t of the Army, 49 F.3d 1566, 1570
 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Given the evidence presented and stipu-
 lations made by the parties, the AJ found that the agency
 had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Ro-
 driguez’s position required a Top Secret security clearance,
 (2) her clearance was revoked, and (3) the agency complied
 with the procedures outlined in § 7513(b). Initial Decision
 at 5, S.A. 11.
     The AJ further found that in the absence of a statute
 or regulation giving an employee the right to transfer to a
 non-sensitive position, the Board lacks the authority to re-
 view whether or not reassignment to a position not requir-
 ing clearance or access would have been feasible. Initial
 Decision at 4–5, S.A. 10–11 (citing Munoz v. Dep’t of Home-
 land Sec., 121 M.S.P.R. 483, ¶ 15 (2014)). Since the parties
 had stipulated that the agency was not obligated by stat-
 ute, regulation, or policy to reassign Rodriguez to a position
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 RODRIGUEZ v. DHS                                            5

 that did not require a security clearance, the AJ found that
 the Board did not have the authority to review the feasibil-
 ity of reassignment. Initial Decision at 5, S.A. 11.
     The AJ also rejected Rodriguez’s argument that by al-
 lowing her to work after the suspension and ultimate revo-
 cation of her security clearance, DHS had condoned that
 practice and must continue to allow her to work. Id. The
 AJ noted that none of the cases cited by Rodriguez “in-
 volved employees who had their security clearance revoked
 and were removed for failure to maintain a condition of em-
 ployment, like the appellant,” and that the Board only had
 narrow authority to review matters involving revocation of
 a security clearance. Id. The AJ further found that it was
 well-settled that “when an adverse action is based on de-
 nial or revocation of a security clearance, the action pro-
 motes the efficiency of the service.” Initial Decision at 6,
 S.A. 12 (citing Ingram, 120 M.S.P.R. at ¶ 15). The AJ
 therefore concluded that the agency’s removal of Rodriguez
 promoted the efficiency of the service, and it would not be
 appropriate to consider mitigation. Id.
      Rodriguez timely filed a petition for review of the AJ’s
 initial decision to the full Board. On March 29, 2023, the
 Board affirmed the initial decision, which subsequently be-
 came the Board’s final decision. Final Decision at 2, S.A.
 2. Rodriguez timely appealed the decision, and we have
 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(b)(1)(A).
                         DISCUSSION
     A Board decision may only be set aside if it is “(1) arbi-
 trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
 in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”            5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c). “The petitioner bears the burden of establishing
 error in the Board’s decision.” Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans
 Affs., 142 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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 6                                           RODRIGUEZ v. DHS

     On appeal, Rodriguez argues, not that she should have
 been reassigned to another position that did not require a
 security clearance, but rather that she should have kept
 the position that she already had because she was able to
 perform her duties without a security clearance. See Infor-
 mal Opening Br. at 4. She asserts that, by permitting her
 to work in her position without a security clearance for sev-
 eral years following the suspension of her clearance, the
 agency condoned the practice and cannot later reverse
 course. Id. at 7–9. Rodriguez also argues that the Board
 erred in failing to apply the factors in Douglas v. Veterans
 Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 313 (1981), which set forth a
 test for reviewing the reasonableness of an agency’s pen-
 alty, and that her removal did not promote the efficiency of
 the service as required for an adverse action under 5 U.S.C.
 § 7513(a) and 5 C.F.R. § 752.403(a). See Informal Opening
 Br. at 9, 14–16.
      As an initial matter, Rodriguez stipulated to the fact
 that her position required a Top Secret security clearance.
 Initial Decision at 2, S.A. 8; see also S.A. 34–35. She has
 thus waived any argument that her former position did not
 require a security clearance. Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A party in an MSPB
 proceeding must raise an issue before the administrative
 judge if the issue is to be preserved for review in this
 court.”). Furthermore, an agency’s determination that a
 position requires a security clearance is unreviewable. See
 Skees v. Dep’t of Navy, 864 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
 (“If the Board cannot review the employee’s loss of security
 clearance, it is even further beyond question that it cannot
 review the [agency]’s judgment that the position itself re-
 quires the clearance.”).
     We next turn to Rodriguez’s condonation argument. As
 the AJ pointed out, none of the cases cited by Rodriguez
 involve revocation of a security clearance. But more im-
 portantly, simply because Ms. Rodriguez was allowed to
 continue to work while proceedings regarding the
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 RODRIGUEZ v. DHS                                           7

 revocation of her clearance and ultimate removal were oc-
 curring does not entitle her to continue working. See Skees,
 864 F.2d at 1578 (“We do not subscribe to the view that
 when [an agency], whether through benevolence or self-in-
 terest, tries to keep an employee who loses his security
 clearance aboard in another capacity, it thereby opens it-
 self up to administrative and judicial second-guessing.”).
 Finding condonation when an employee was allowed to
 work while proceedings required by rule, regulation, or
 statute to remove them occurred would be illogical.
     We also reject Rodriguez’s argument that the Board
 erred in not applying the Douglas factors. It is well-estab-
 lished that the Board does not need to apply the Douglas
 factors if the removal action is based on an employee’s fail-
 ure to maintain a security clearance. Ryan v. Dep’t of
 Homeland Sec., 793 F.3d 1368, 1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
 (declining to apply Douglas to a removal based on loss of a
 clearance because “decisions of this court considering or
 mentioning a Douglas mitigation analysis have involved
 penalties for misconduct rather than loss of a required
 qualification for a position”); Griffin v. Def. Mapping
 Agency, 864 F.2d 1579, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding
 that, in the absence of a policy mandating the transfer or
 reassignment of an employee who is denied a security
 clearance, “the Board has no role” in reviewing whether or
 not an employee should have been reassigned instead re-
 moved).
     Rodriguez’s arguments regarding efficiency of the ser-
 vice likewise fail, as we and the Board lack the authority to
 consider whether or not removal for failing to maintain a
 security clearance promotes the efficiency of the service.
 See Adams v. Dep’t of Def., 688 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
 2012) (finding that “the limits of our [court’s] review” are
 examining whether the requirements of § 7513(b) were met
 and that “it was not legal error for the agency to terminate
 Mr. Adams’ employment when he no longer possessed the
 requisite security status”); Robinson v. Dep’t of Homeland
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 8                                           RODRIGUEZ v. DHS

 Sec., 498 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[I]n an adverse
 employment action, such as removal, based on failure to
 maintain the security clearance required by the job de-
 scription, the absence of a properly authorized security
 clearance is fatal to the job entitlement.”).
                        CONCLUSION
      We have considered Rodriguez’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.