Court Opinion

ID: 9905786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 15:06:49.616082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.942270
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ATHENS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                       : CASE NO. 23CA2

        v.                                        :

KENNETH E. CUNNINGHAM, Jr.                        : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
     AKA BRYAN C. SATTELMYER
                                                  :
        Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

                                             APPEARANCES:

Christopher J. Pagan, Middletown, Ohio, for appellant1.

Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Merry
M. Saunders, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for
appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:11-16-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}    This is an appeal from an Athens County Common Pleas

Court judgment of conviction and sentence.                  Kenneth Cunningham, aka

Bryan Sattelmyer, defendant below and appellant herein, assigns two

errors for review:

                FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                “SATTELMYER’S ALFORD PLEA WAS UNLAWFUL.”

        1
        Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
court proceedings.
                                                                      2
ATHENS, 23CA2

            SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “SATTELMYER’S REAGAN TOKES SENTENCE WAS
            UNLAWFUL.”

     {¶2}   In January 2020, an Athens County Grand Jury returned a

ten-count indictment that charged appellant with (1) two counts of

rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), first-degree felonies,

(2) four counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), first-

degree felonies, (3) one count of gross sexual imposition in

violation of R.C. 2907.05(B), a third-degree felony, (4) two counts

of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1),

fourth-degree felonies, and (5) one count of having weapons while

under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree

felony.     Appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.

     {¶3}   On September 8, 2020, the state filed a notice of alias

that appellant has been known as Bryan Sattelmyer, Kenneth E.

Cunningham Jr., Kenneth Cunningham, Kenneth E. Cunningham, Kenneth

Cunningham, Jr., Casey Cunningham, Bryan Sattelmyer, Bryan Casey

Sattelmyer, and KC Cunningham.     Subsequently, appellant filed a

motion to suppress evidence and a motion for a bill of particulars.

On October 9, 2020, the state filed a bill of particulars.

     {¶4}   On November 19, 2020, the state filed a notice of
                                                                       3
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violation of bond.   The state alleged that appellant instructed his

son to contact a family member of one of the minor victims, in

violation of the trial court’s no-contact order.

     {¶5}   Appellant also filed a motion for reconsideration of bond

and argued that he did not change his name to allow him to commit

crimes, but rather “because his stepfather had never legally

adopted him, thus, the two names.”    The supporting memo also

alleged that, after arraignment, appellant’s mental and physical

health “had deteriorated to the point he may not be competent to

stand trial,” and the jail ignored his complaints.

     {¶6}   The state’s memo contra asserted that Cortney Hottinger,

the LPN from the behavioral health center who allegedly had spoken

with jail nursing staff, is appellant’s friend and “had been

speaking to him regularly on recorded jail phone calls.    She is

also best friends with Amanda Seals-Defendant’s fiancé - who is

currently under indictment for Intimidation of a Victim and

Intimidation of a Witness.”    The state further alleged that (1) it

subpoenaed appellant’s medical information from the jail and

learned he made no health complaints during his incarceration, (2)

appellant’s healthcare power of attorney listed Hottinger, and is a

conflict of interest if she acted as his nurse, (3) appellant’s

healthcare power of attorney listed two witnesses (Summer Ward and
                                                                     4
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Natalie Dorman) who did not appear at the jail to witness

appellant’s signature, (4) the state’s analyst listened to several

recorded jail phone calls between appellant and Hottinger, and

between appellant and Amanda Seals, and determined that Hottinger,

Seals, Ward, and Dorman worked together at Access Ohio, a

behavioral health center in Heath, Ohio, and Access Ohio had

terminated all four employees for improprieties.   It is unclear

whether the trial court ruled on the motion for reconsideration of

bond.

     {¶7}   On April 21, 2021, the state amended the indictment to

reflect appellant’s name as “Kenneth E. Cunningham Jr., AKA Bryan

C. Sattelmyer.”   The trial court also granted appellant’s motion

for a competency evaluation and ordered the examiner to file a

written report within 30 days.

     {¶8}   On June 29, 2021, appellant’s trial counsel filed a

motion to withdraw and stated that although appellant had witnesses

prepared to testify at trial, “two of those witnesses have now been

charged with crimes” and other witnesses “now refuse to [testify]

or will not do so.”   Counsel also stated that he had filed a

grievance because the state’s actions violated appellant’s right to

due process.    The state responded that a grand jury had returned

indictments that charged all four defendants with forgery,
                                                                       5
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tampering with records, telecommunications fraud, and identity

fraud.   On July 6, 2021, the trial court appointed another attorney

to represent appellant.

     {¶9}   Subsequently, the state moved to: (1) amend Count One

from a violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) to

charge that appellant had sexual conduct by force or threat of

force with the victim whose initials are ZA, (2) amend the date

range on that count from July 11, 2019 to May 31, 2020, and (3)

dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment.

     {¶10} On January 6, 2022, appellant entered a guilty plea,

pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27

L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to: (1) Amended Count 1 in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony with a prison term of 3 to 11

years and a possible $20,000 fine, and (2) Count 5 in violation of

R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony with a prison term of 3

to 11 years and possible $20,000 fine.    The plea agreement included

a joint recommendation of an 8-to 12-year prison sentence (with 8

years mandatory) on Count 1, to be served concurrently to the 8

years for Count 5, for a total aggregate sentence of 8 to 12 years

in prison.    In addition, appellant agreed to Tier III sex offender

registration.

     {¶11} After the trial court accepted appellant’s pleas, the
                                                                        6
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court: (1) imposed an 8-to 12-year mandatory prison sentence for

Count One (eight years mandatory), (2) imposed an 8-to 12-year

mandatory prison sentence for Count Five, (3) ordered the counts to

be served concurrently, (4) ordered appellant to pay costs, (5)

ordered appellant to register as a Tier III sex offender, and (6)

ordered a mandatory five-year post-release control term.    This

appeal followed.2

                                   I.

     {¶12} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that

(1) he failed to enter his Alford plea on the record, (2) the trial

court failed to adequately explain Alford or perform a heightened

Alford inquiry, and (3) the court failed to determine appellant’s

competency.

     {¶13} Crim.R. 11(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]

defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity,

guilty or, with the consent of the court, no contest.”    A “plea of

guilty is a complete admission of the defendant's guilt.”    Crim.R.

11(B)(1).     However, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.

     2
      On December 20, 2022, this court dismissed appellant’s
initial appeal because the record was unclear whether the trial
court dismissed counts two, three, four, six, seven, eight, nine,
and ten of the indictment. Thus, the trial court’s judgment did
not constitute a final appealable order. The trial court’s
January 10, 2023 entry dismissed the “hanging charges.”
                                                                         7
ATHENS, 23CA2

25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant may

believe he or she is innocent of the charges, but reluctantly

conclude that the evidence is so incriminating that a significant

likelihood exists that a jury would return a guilty verdict.        An

Alford plea “is predicated upon the defendant's desire to obtain a

lesser penalty rather than risk the consequences of a jury trial.”

State v. Krieg, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008442, 2004-Ohio-5174, ¶

9, citing State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 271 N.E.2d 852

(1971), syllabus.    Therefore, it is a “species” of guilty plea.

State v. Watson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–13–1089, 2014-Ohio-2839, ¶

16; State v. Hart, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 14 BE 0025, 2016-Ohio-

1008, ¶ 14.

      {¶14} An Alford plea is procedurally indistinguishable from a

guilty plea in that it severely limits the errors which may be

claimed on appeal.    State v. McDay, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–96–027,

1997 WL 243584, *2 (May 9, 1997).    However, it differs from a

guilty plea because, before accepting an Alford plea, a court must

evaluate the reasonableness of a defendant's decision to plead

guilty, notwithstanding the protestation of innocence.    State v.

Karsikas, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2014–A–0065, 2015-Ohio-2595, ¶

18.   This requires a presentation of some basic facts that surround

the charge from which a court may determine whether an accused has
                                                                       8
ATHENS, 23CA2

made an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.     Krieg at ¶ 14;

State v. Drzayich, 2016-Ohio-1398, 62 N.E.3d 850, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.).

    {¶15} When a defendant contends that a guilty plea is invalid

because a court failed to comply with nonconstitutional

requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), or the constitutional

requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) or the Alford requirements, 400

U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, (1970), a reviewing court must undertake a

de novo review.   State v. Hughes, 4th Dist. Highland No. 20CA2,

2021-Ohio-111, ¶ 6, citing State v. Cassell, 2017-Ohio-769, 79

N.E.3d 588, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.).

    {¶16} The United States Supreme Court held that a court may

accept a guilty plea, notwithstanding a defendant’s claim of

innocence, “when * * * a defendant intelligently concludes that his

interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the

judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.”    Alford, 400 U.S.

at 37.   A court in an Alford case has a “heightened duty upon the

trial court to ensure that the defendant’s rights are protected and

that entering the plea is a rational decision on the part of the

defendant.”   State v. Carey, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-10-25, 2011-

Ohio-1998, ¶ 7.

    {¶17} When a defendant enters an Alford plea, “[t]he trial

judge must ascertain that notwithstanding the defendant’s
                                                                      9
ATHENS, 23CA2

protestations of innocence, he has made a rational calculation that

it is in his best interest to accept the plea bargain offered by

the prosecutor.”   State v. Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d 332, 338, 586

N.E.2d 1194 (2d Dist.1990).   Further, the standard to determine an

Alford plea’s validity is “whether the plea represents a voluntary

and intelligent choice among the alterative courses of action open

to the defendant.”   Alford, 400 U.S. at 31.   The Supreme Court of

Ohio determined that this standard is met:

    Where the record affirmatively discloses that: (1)
    defendant’s guilty plea was not the result of coercion,
    deception or intimidation; (2) counsel was present at the
    time of the plea; (3) counsel’s advice was competent in
    light of the circumstances surrounding the indictment; (4)
    the plea was made with the understanding of the nature of
    the charges; and, (5) defendant was motivated either by a
    desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the
    consequences of a jury trial, or both, the guilty plea has
    been voluntarily and intelligently made.

Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971), paragraph one of
the syllabus.

    Where a defendant enters an Alford plea, the trial court
    must inquire into the factual basis surrounding the charges
    to determine whether the defendant is making an intelligent
    and voluntary guilty plea. The trial court may accept the
    guilty plea only if a factual basis for the guilty plea is
    evidenced by the record. “When taking an Alford plea, the
    trial court cannot determine whether the accused was making
    an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea absent some basic
    facts surrounding the charge, demonstrating that the plea
    cannot seriously be questioned.” “An Alford plea may not
    be accepted when the record fails to demonstrate facts upon
    which the trial court can resolve the apparent conflict
    between a defendant’s claim of innocence and the
                                                                      10
ATHENS, 23CA2

     defendant’s desire to    plead   guilty   to   the   charges.”
     (Citations omitted.)

State v. Redmond, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0068, 2018-Ohio-
2778, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Alvedo, 2017-Ohio-742, 85 N.E.3d 1032,
¶ 23 (8th Dist.).

     {¶18} In the case sub judice, appellant first contends that,

although he signed a plea agreement to enter an Alford plea, he did

not, in fact, enter his plea on the record.    Instead, appellant

alleges he “merely told the court he intended to do that * * * [s]o

his convictions were a nullity.”   We disagree.     Here, appellant

affirmatively acknowledged his intention to enter a plea and the

transcript reveals that the trial court stated: “Keeping all these

rights in mind is it your wish to waive these rights and enter an

Alford Plea of Guilty to counts one and five of the indictment as

amended?”   Appellant replied, “Yes your honor I do.”

     {¶19} Appellant next argues that the trial court failed to

engage in the required heightened Alford inquiry.     In the case sub

judice, at the January 6, 2022 change of plea hearing the state

asked the trial court to amend count one of the ten count

indictment from a violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to R.C.

2907.02(A)(2):

     which would * * * show that the Defendant has sexual conduct
     by force or threat of force with the victim whose initials
     are ZA.   And we would also ask the Court to grant the
                                                                             11
ATHENS, 23CA2

    State’s request for amendment of the date range on that
    particular count to be on or about July 11th of 2019 up to
    and including May 31 of 2020 as written in the plea
    agreement. In addition there is a count five. * * * [T]here
    is no amendment with that particular count.        Uh, the
    Defendant is going to change his plea to guilty. Pursuant
    to that count and it was that the Defendant engaged in
    sexual conduct with the victim by compelling her to submit
    by force or threat of force.     Obviously with regard to
    those two charges uh, the Defendant is entering his plea
    pursuant to a North Carolina vs. Alford. So although he
    is not admitting his guilt here today. Uh, he is entering
    or changing his plea to guilty pursuant to that particular
    case.   The State would ask the Court to dismiss the
    remainder of the counts as indicated. The Defendant has
    agreed to the amendment on count one and would waive any
    procedural issues on those, on that amendment. Again, as
    stated in the plea agreement just to, for purposes of this
    Court he is changing his plea pursuant to North Carolina
    vs. Alford.   There would be a joint recommendation that
    the Defendant would be sentenced to eight to twelve years
    on count one as amended.      With the eight years being
    mandatory. And then eight years on count five for a total
    of aggregate sentence of eight to twelve years in prison.
    With regard to an F1 Rape charge. It is required that he
    be subject to Tier III registration, sexual, sexual
    offender registration and PRC would remain mandatory for
    five years. HE has served a significant time in jail. 496
    days and any time awaiting transport. We would ask this
    Court to also order. This case has been pending for quite
    some time as the Court is aware.         There were three
    originally indicted victims in this case.     We have lost
    contact with the victim in regards to the later counts in
    six, seven, eight and nine despite multiple attempts to
    contact her. Uh, however, we have been in contact with
    the other two uh, remaining minor victims and their
    guardians and their parents and they are in accord with
    this agreement. Uh, and so I would ask this Court to adopt
    the plea agreement after going through the Criminal Rule
    11 soliloquy and we would like to waive PSI and proceed
    directly to sentencing today.

    COUNSEL:    *   *   *   With   respect   to   the   joint   sentencing
                                                                  12
ATHENS, 23CA2

    recommendation of eight years my client understands that
    it is an indeterminate sentencing due to the Reagan Tokes
    law and that there is a presumption that the minimum
    sentence would be eight years provided he does not have
    problems in prison.    Just for his clarification and for
    the Court’s as well. We concur with the jail day credit.
    496. I have prepared the form for the Tier III sex offender
    registration. * * * and further we have no objection to
    the amendments both in the charge as well as the date range
    with respect to count one.

The trial court then addressed appellant:

    TRIAL COURT: So I just want to go over with you uh, it’s
    the same section of the statute in both cases now involving
    two different alleged victims.    Count one is an alleged
    victim involving ZA and the date range is also being
    amended from the original indictment on that case.      The
    date range on that plea is now, the allegation is that
    these, this offense took place sometime between uh, July
    11th of 2019 to March 31st of 2020.      Uh, with the same
    alleged victim initials ZA.    And the allegation is that
    during that date range in Athens County * * * that you did
    engage in sexual conduct with this person by purposely
    compelling her or submitting by force or threat of force.
    So my question for you is, just do you understand that
    charge?

    DEFENDANT: Yes your honor I do.

    TRIAL COURT: Okay. Very good. And count five is the same
    allegation, same section of the statute. Also a felony of
    the first degree. That allegation involves a date range
    of April 1 of 2020 to April 30 of 2020 and the alleged
    victim in this case is a person with the initials A.H. And
    again the allegation is that during that date range, in
    Athens County, that you purposely compelled her to submit
    by force or threat of force and that’s also a count of
    rape. A felony of the first degree. You understand that
    charge?

    DEFENDANT: Yes your honor I do.
                                                                    13
ATHENS, 23CA2

With respect to the Alford plea, the trial court stated:

    TRIAL COURT: Okay. Now let’s talk a little bit about the
    Alford Plea that’s being proposed here today. So typically
    in a guilty plea a person is * * * admitting that yes they
    committed the offense being alleged by the State and that
    they are * * * admitting that the legal finding of guilt
    is appropriate. An Alford Plea works a little differently.
    So that would be, what you would be doing, if I were to
    allow you to move forward on this plea today. Would be
    that you are still maintaining your innocence essentially
    against the actual charge itself but that you are
    acknowledging that if we had a jury trial in this case or
    even if it was a bench trial that the State would likely,
    be able to put forth sufficient evidence to convince either
    a judge or a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that you would
    be guilty of that offense. Do you understand that?

    DEFENDANT: Yes your honor I do.

    TRIAL JUDGE: And have you had a good chance to talk to your
    lawyer about what a [sic.] Alford plea means?

    DEFENDANT: Yes your honor I did.

    TRIAL JUDGE: And did he answer all your questions about
    that?

    DEFENDANT: Yes sir.

    {¶20} The trial court also asked general Crim.R. 11 questions

about whether appellant was under the influence of drugs or

alcohol, if threats had been made against him, if anyone offered

anything of value in exchange for his plea, if anyone coerced him,

whether his attorney answered all questions, and whether he was

satisfied with his legal representation.   As noted above, the trial

court then read from the indictment and explained the purpose of
                                                                    14
ATHENS, 23CA2

the Alford plea.   The trial court then discussed maximum penalties,

postrelease control, right to a trial by jury, right to an

attorney, and right to confront witnesses.   At that point, the

court accepted appellant’s plea and proceeded to sentencing.

     {¶21} The information the trial court had before it to

determine whether the record contained “strong evidence of actual

guilt,” Alford at 37, reveals that the arrest warrant affidavit

states: “Victim, A.H. * * * reported that on the weekend of April

17, 2020, at the Ohio University Inn, [appellant] started touching

her and removing her shirt and bra, shorts and underwear and

engaged in oral sex with her.”

     {¶22} The initial indictment as it relates to counts one and

five stated:

     Count One Rape - F1
     R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b)

     Date of Offense On or about July 10, 2017 to May 31, 2020
     On or about the date of the offense set forth above, in
     the County of Athens, unlawfully did engage in sexual
     conduct with Z.A. 7/10/2009 who was not the spouse of the
     offender, whose age at the time of the said sexual conduct
     was less than thirteen years of age, to wit: 8 years old,
     whether or not the offender knew the age of Z.A. 7/10/2009.

     FURTHERMORE, the victim was less than ten years of age.

     * * *

     Count Five Rape - F1
     R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

        Date of Offense On or about April 1, 2020 to April 30, 2020
        On or about the date of the offense set forth above, in
        the County of Athens, unlawfully did engage in sexual
        conduct with A.H. 6/15/2006 when [appellant] purposely
        compelled her to submit by force or threat of force.

The Bill of Particulars also added the location of the offense to

Count 1 (767 Hudson Ave) and Count 5 (OU Inn) “in the hotel room he

was staying in for work.”

        {¶23} In Hughes, supra, 2021-Ohio-111, this court recently held

that the trial court failed to engage in the required heightened

Alford inquiry when the trial court (1) did not ask the state to

provide the basic facts surrounding the indictment, (2) discovery

was not made part of the record, (3) the record contained no bill

of particulars upon which the trial court might discern the

strength of the state’s charges, and (4) the record contained no

witness statements or investigative reports.      Id. at ¶ 12, 15.    In

fact, in Hughes the court asked no questions whatsoever concerning

facts that surrounded the indictment.

        {¶24} In State v. Bolin, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-22-02, 2022-

Ohio-3777, the court upheld an Alford plea when the trial court

discussed the Crim.R. 11 requirements and “what an Alford plea

was,” with the defendant, the state presented facts regarding the

charges and stated it “had proof to prove the facts alleged beyond
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

a reasonable doubt,” defense counsel stated he received “full

discovery from the State of Ohio in which we have been able to

review, all of the potential evidence that the State of Ohio would

present at a jury trial if we were to go forward,” and the trial

court inquired of defense counsel whether, in light of the

discovery he had received, he believed this guilty plea was in the

defendant’s best interest and whether it was “supported by a strong

factual basis of truth.”                  Id. at ¶ 7-8.

        {¶25} Similarly, the Twelfth District upheld an Alford plea in

State v. Satterwhite, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-09-063, 2021-

Ohio-2878, when the trial court had access to the defendant’s

interview, the prosecutor read into the record anticipated evidence

that would be introduced at trial, and a detective testified

concerning how police identified the defendant as the suspect.                 Id.

at ¶ 27- 28.

        {¶26} Appellant contends that Hughes requires reversal.          We,

however, disagree.              In Hughes, we concluded that the record did not

include a presentation of the basic facts or circumstances

surrounding the indictment and the trial court did not ask the

state to provide the basic facts surrounding the indictment, but

rather immediately proceeded with sentencing.             Moreover, the record

in Hughes contained no bill of particulars, no witness statements
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

or investigative reports, and no recitation of basic facts to

satisfy Alford.            Hughes at ¶ 15.        Thus, Hughes’ plea did not meet

the heightened Alford standards because the record was “ ‘devoid of

a basic factual framework against which the trial court could

weigh’ ” appellant’s claims of innocence against his willingness to

waive trial.           Hughes at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Casale, 34 Ohio

App.3d 339, 340, 518 N.E.2d 579 (8th Dist.1986).

        {¶27} In contrast, in the case at bar the record includes the

initial indictment, which included sufficient detail about the

offenses, an arrest warrant affidavit that contained additional

details regarding the specific actions that constituted the

offenses, and the bill of particulars that added further details,

such as the location of each offense.                  Moreover, the trial court

asked appellant if he had the opportunity to speak with his counsel

about “what a [sic] Alford plea means,” to which appellant replied,

“yes, your honor I did.”                  The court asked if counsel answered all

of appellant’s questions, and appellant replied, “Yes sir.”                  Thus,

unlike Hughes, the case sub judice contains strong evidence of

guilt.       See also Krieg, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008442, 2004-Ohio-

5174, ¶ 16 (“a bill of particulars as requested by defense counsel

and answers to discovery” formed a sufficient factual basis for the

trial court to accept Alford plea); State v. Remines, 9th Dist.

Lorain No. 97CA006700, 1988 WL 103350, *2 (Feb.25, 1998)(concluding
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

that the factual basis for an Alford plea presented where record

included bill of particulars); Katz, Martin, & Macke, Baldwin’s

Ohio Practice Criminal Law, Section 43.15 (3d Ed.,

Nov.2019)(discussing the factual basis requirement for an Alford

plea, “Ascertaining that there is a factual basis for the plea does

not necessarily require the taking of testimony.              Determining a

factual basis may be accomplished by * * * deriving information

from a pre-sentence report” among other methods).

        {¶28} Therefore, we believe that the trial court record

affirmatively establishes that appellant’s plea was not the result

of coercion, deception or intimidation.              Here, counsel was present

at the time of the plea, counsel’s advice was competent, the plea

made with the understanding of the nature of the charges, and

defendant was motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty

or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both.              In fact,

in the case at bar the state dismissed eight counts and the parties

also reached a joint sentencing recommendation.              Moreover, at no

time did appellant express to the court any reservation whatsoever

concerning his plea, his counsel, or the joint sentencing

recommendation.            Thus, appellant’s plea was voluntarily and

intelligently made.               Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 271 N.E.2d 852

(1971), paragraph one of the syllabus.
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

        {¶29} Finally, appellant asserts that his plea was not knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent because the trial court failed to

determine his competency.                   Appellant filed a motion to determine

competency on March 5, 2021 when his first attorney represented

him.     This filing alleged that appellant informed a health care

agency that he had a “history of mental illness, traumatic brain

injury, and has medical problems including Parkinson’s disease

which have affected his ability to communicate.”                      The trial court

ordered a competency evaluation.

        {¶30} Later, appellant’s first trial counsel sought to withdraw

and indicated that four defense witnesses “who claimed to be health

care surrogates with a power of attorney to counsel and provide

mental health advice, medical advice and to advocate for

[appellant], * * * were taken into custody and charged with crimes

* * * and now await trial.”                      The state’s response to counsel’s

motion to withdraw indicated that the employees of the “health care

agency” had been indicted for criminal activity that occurred

during the pendency of appellant’s case and through their

employment with the health care agency.                      Further, the state

explained that appellant “has filed a frivolous motion for

competency based on fraudulent information contained in an email

from defendants trying to get Defendant ‘out on medical.’ ”
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

        {¶31} As appellee points out, at the June 30, 2021 final

pretrial conference, the trial court informed the parties it had

received the competency evaluation and shared it with counsel, but

the court also received a motion from appellant’s first trial

counsel to withdraw.                After the court ascertained appellant’s

intention to seek a public defender, the court appointed new

counsel on July 6, 2021.                  Appellee points out that new counsel met

appellant several times prior to trial and did not renew

appellant’s initial motion for competency.                 Further, appellant did

not enter his Alford plea until six months later, which gave new

counsel adequate time to pursue the competency issue.

        {¶32} In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4

L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), the United States Supreme Court defined the

test for competence to stand trial as whether the defendant “ ‘ has

sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against him.’ ”            The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a person who

“ ‘lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the

proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in

preparing his defense,’ ” may not stand trial.                 State v. Skatzes,

104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 155.
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

        {¶33} Appellee argues that the case at bar is similar to State

v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986).                    In Bock,

counsel filed a request for a competency hearing, alleged that the

defendant had been hospitalized for drug-related problems, and “the

record further reveals testimony by Bock of his emotional distress

and comments about suicide.”                     The court, however, concluded that

this alone “is not sufficient to indicate a lack of competency.”

Bock at 110.           More specifically, the court explained:

        Defense counsel, after the original motion for a hearing,
        failed ever again to mention the defendant’s competency
        until the time for appeal. The record reveals no adequate
        indication of any behavior on the part of the defendant
        which might indicate incompetency. Nor is there any expert
        or lay opinion in the record that defendant was actually
        incompetent.

Bock at 111.

        {¶34} We similarly conclude that in the case at bar, after

appellant’s first trial counsel requested a competency evaluation

and the trial court granted the motion, the issue of appellant’s

competency faded into the background of these proceedings.                     We

further point out that neither appellant or his counsel raised this

issue or engaged in conduct that could cause the court to question

or have any concern about appellant’s competency.                     This, coupled

with the fact that the initial motion relied on statements made by

staff persons later indicted for forgery, tampering with records,
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

telecommunications fraud and identity fraud, leads us to conclude

that the trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing

constitutes, at most, harmless error.                      Bock, syllabus paragraph

one.

        {¶35} In State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 2002-Ohio-481, 761

N.E.2d 591, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that a defendant is

entitled to a pretrial competency hearing and the failure to hold

that hearing is error and requires reversal.                       However, Were is

distinguishable from the case at bar because in Were, counsel

“repeatedly requested” a competency hearing.                      The court noted that,

although the trial court ordered a competency evaluation, the

requested hearing was not held or waived, but rather the trial

court issued an entry that determined competency without a hearing.

Id. at 174.          Counsel raised the issue of Were’s competency on

numerous occasions - through a motion before trial, after opening

arguments, during trial, and before mitigation.                       Were also refused

to speak with his defense team and filed numerous pro se motions to

dismiss his attorneys in which he accused them of threatening his

life and conspiring with the state. Moreover, Were’s signs of

paranoia, and his refusal to cooperate, led his attorneys to file

two motions to withdraw as counsel.                      Were at 176.   Thus, the Were

court found the record “replete with suggestions of [the

defendant’s] incompetency.”                      Id. at 175.   Therefore, the trial
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

court’s failure to hold a competency hearing was not harmless.                Id.

at 177, 761 N.E.2d 591.

        {¶36} “The right to a hearing on the issue of competency rises

to the level of a constitutional guarantee where the record

contains ‘sufficient indicia of incompetence,’ such that an inquiry

into the defendant’s competency is necessary to ensure the

defendant’s right to a fair trial.”                State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d

354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1995), quoting Drope v. Missouri,

420 U.S. 162, 175, 95 S.Ct. 896, 905, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 115.               Thus,

the Were court held that “[a]n evidentiary competency hearing is

constitutionally required whenever there are sufficient indicia of

incompetency to call into doubt defendant’s competency to stand

trial.”       Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 175, citing Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d

354, 650 N.E.2d 433.                But see State v. Flanagan, 2017-Ohio-955, 86

N.E.3d 681 (8th Dist.)(reversal required when competency raised

prior to trial, court failed to hold hearing, record reflects no

formal finding or adoption of competency, no stipulation to

competency or results of evaluation); State v. Dowdy, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 96642, 2012-Ohio-2382 (because psychiatric evaluation

not made part of record and not stipulated, court unable to glean

sufficient information to determine court’s failure to conduct the

hearing is harmless).
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

        {¶37} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently reaffirmed the Bock

standard and noted that, whether a trial court’s failure to hold a

competency hearing constitutes reversible error is to be determined

on a case-by-case basis.                  State v. Hough, 169 Ohio St.3d 769, 2022-

Ohio-4436, 207 N.E.3d 788, citing Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d at 109-110,

502 N.E.2d 1016.             The Hough court reversed the convictions and

pointed to (1) few interactions with the trial court, (2) a

discounting of the defendant’s mental health diagnoses, (3) the

defendant not oriented to time and held several delusional beliefs,

such as the belief that others could control his thoughts or force

thoughts into his head and that people were trying to follow him

and cause him problems,(4) defendant suffered auditory

hallucinations, (5) that cognitive tests revealed a low IQ, and low

verbal concept formation and verbal and nonverbal reasoning, and

(6) counsel raised concerns about Hough’s competency at sentencing.

Id. at ¶ 32-35.

        {¶38} In State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 19CA9, 2020-Ohio-

7037, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to determine competency

that the trial court denied without a hearing.                 After the defendant

pleaded guilty to murder, he later requested to withdraw his plea

and alleged he lacked competency to plead guilty.                 The trial court

denied the motion and we affirmed.                 In Jones, we noted that we have
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

recognized some factors that would require a court to sua sponte

order a competency evaluation including “(1) doubts expressed by

counsel as to the defendant’s competence, (2) evidence of

irrational behavior, (3) the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (4)

prior medical opinion relating to competence to stand trial.”            Id.

at ¶ 20, citing State v. Barnhart, 4th Dist. Washington No. 96CA32,

1997 WL 600045, at *2 (Sept. 24, 1997).            We summarized the

interplay between Bock and Were:

        Together Bock and Were effectively instruct that if a
        pretrial request for a competency hearing is made, it is
        mandatory for a trial court to hold a competency hearing
        consistent with R.C. 2945.37. But, if a court fails to
        hold a competency hearing pursuant to a pretrial request
        and the record is replete with indicia of incompetency, it
        is a reversible error under Were. Alternatively, if the
        record does not reveal indicia of incompetency, then the
        failure to hold a hearing is harmless error under Bock.

Jones at ¶ 25.            We concluded that counsel’s actions were not those

of an attorney who believed his client incompetent, see Bock at 111

(counsel’s failure to continue to pursue competency evaluation is

indicia that Appellant is not incompetent); see also State v.

Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 2020-Ohio-3459, ¶ 35 (competency

hearing required only when issue raised and maintained.)            Moreover,

we pointed out, as in the case at bar, that the trial court engaged

in a lengthy colloquy with Jones during the plea hearing and the

record did not indicate that appellant acted “irrationally” or his
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

“demeanor” unusual, factors we have recognized as possible

competency concerns.                Id. at ¶ 29, citing Barnhart, 4th Dist.

Washington No. 96CA32, 1997 WL 600045, at *2.

        {¶39} Therefore, because the record does not reveal any indicia

of incompetency, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to hold

a hearing was harmless error.                    Furthermore, appellant’s plea

represented a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

alternative courses of action open to the defendant, Alford, 400

U.S. at 43.          Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

                                                  II.

        {¶40} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court failed to notify him at the hearing of his Reagan

Tokes Act R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requirements.                   In State v.

Bontrager, 2022-Ohio-1367, 188 N.E.3d 607 (4th Dist.), we concluded

that the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate due process.                    Id. at ¶

48.     However, appellant contends that the trial court failed to

inform him of the mandatory R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications.

The state concedes this point and requests this court remand the

case to the trial court for resentencing.                   We agree.   See State v.
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

Massie, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-50, 2021-Ohio-3376 (when

considering language in sections R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(a) and

(B)(2)(b) together, it becomes clear that the phrase “notify the

offender” in (B)(2)(a) necessarily refers to notice that should be

given at the sentencing hearing, since section (B)(2)(b) instructs

the trial court to include the same information in the sentencing

entry.); State v. Hodgkins, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-08-048,

2021-Ohio-1353 (trial court failed to inform appellant of mandatory

notifications set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the sentencing

hearing, thus, failed to comply with the statute, and resentencing

required).

        {¶41} Accordingly, based on the foregoing reasons, we sustain

appellant’s second assignment of error and remand the case to the

trial court for the limited purpose of resentencing.

                                                 III.

        {¶42} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s first

assignment of error and sustain appellant’s second assignment of

error.       Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part,

reverse it in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.
[Cite as State v. Cunningham, 2023-Ohio-4305.]

                                                 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
                                                 IN PART, AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR
                                                 FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
ATHENS, 23CA2

                                                                    29
                          JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed in part, reversed
in part and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. Appellee shall pay the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.