Court Opinion

ID: 9659824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:55:33.865247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.903715
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
When a case which has been tried to a court without a jury is appealed to this Court, the appellant can claim that either (1) one or more of the findings of fact are clearly erroneous [Rule 52a, N.D.R.Civ.P.], or (2) the trial court erroneously applied the law.
Although a motion to amend the findings under Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., is not a prerequisite to appellate review [5A Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 52.11(4)] and the burden is not on the appellant to request specific findings [Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974)], there are contrary holdings and many courts, including this one, have recommended greater use of Rule 52(b) motions. See Schock v. Ocker, 248 N.W.2d 786 (N.D.1976); Jahner v. Jacob, 233 N.W.2d 791 (N.D.1975); and cases cited in 5A Moore’s Federal Practice. There are some valid reasons. First of all, Rule 52 is a part of the rules governing practice in the trial court and is not to be reserved for use only in those cases where an appeal is contemplated. Greater attention to proper findings and more use of Rule 52(b) motions calling matters to the trial judge’s attention might entirely obviate the need for an appeal. Obviously, too, there are situations where it would be unproductive to move for adoption of a finding that contradicts another finding, which the court has specifically considered and adopted.
Another important reason for refining findings in the trial court is that, on appeal, the appellate court must be able to obtain a clear understanding of the basis for the trial court’s conclusions from the findings of fact (or from the memorandum opinion). See Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass’n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829, 836 (N.D.1974).
We rely to a major extent upon interpretations in the federal courts of Federal Rule 52, from which our Rule was patterned. Federal courts have consistently held that parties may not waive the requirement for findings of fact, specially stated so as to permit a clear understanding. See Swanson v. Levy, 509 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1975).
The majority opinion applies Rule 52(a) and finds nothing clearly erroneous. When I read the findings, none of which were specifically attacked by appellant, I find them confusing and contradictory. I would therefore remand, pursuant to the provisions of § 28-27-29, NDCC, for the preparation of proper findings or for retrial.