Court Opinion

ID: 9698802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:00:20.321982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:05.199867
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     HASSAN HWIG,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-0752-18-0368-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: August 25, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           M. Jefferson Euchler, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Kathleen A. Giacolone, Portsmouth, Virginia, for the agency.

           Lauren Leathers, Falls Church, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed the appellant’s removal for failing to provide the agency information
     regarding his arrest. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     petition for review, REVERSE the initial decision, and AFFIRM the agency’s
     action removing the appellant.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency employed the appellant as a GS-9 Polysomnographic
     Technician. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 26. On August 16, 2016, he was
     arrested for misdemeanor sexual battery in connection with an alleged incident at
     his non-Federal part-time job.    Id. at 66, 104. In October 2016, the agency’s
     assistant security manager informed him that the Department of Defense
     Consolidated Adjudication Facility required information about his arrest to make
     a security clearance determination and requested that he provide “all details about
     the sexual battery charge, to include what led to this charge (the story behind the
     incident), fines, imprisonment, rehabilitation, disposition, etc.” Id. at 62-64, 118.
     The appellant provided a copy of the arrest warrant and a letter from his attorney
     stating that his case was scheduled for trial on November 4, 2016, in the
     Chesapeake General District Court.       Id. at 65-66, 118; IAF, Tab 14, Hearing
     Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the assistant security manager).                 On
     November 4, 2016, the district court found him guilty and sentenced him to
     365 days incarceration with 325 days suspended. IAF, Tab 6 at 105, 120. The
     appellant, through his attorney, appealed the district court judgment to the circuit
     court. Id. at 72, 104; HCD (testimony of the appellant).
¶3         Between November 2016 and June 2017, while the circuit court appeal was
     pending, the assistant security manager emailed the appellant at least five times
     requesting information and documentation regarding his court date. IAF, Tab 6
     at 67-71.    The appellant went to the assistant security manager’s office
     approximately eight to ten times during this period to discuss his court case, but
     he did not disclose that he had been convicted by the district court or that he had
     filed an appeal to the circuit court; instead, he repeatedly stated that his trial had
     been rescheduled and was “continued” or “continuing.” HCD (testimony of the
                                                                                             3

     appellant and the assistant security manager).         He testified that he asked the
     assistant security manager to contact his criminal defense attorney for
     information because he did not understand the situation but that the assistant
     security manager did not do so. HCD (testimony of the appellant). In June 2017,
     the assistant security manager searched the district court’s online case
     information system and discovered that the appellant had been found guilty and
     sentenced on November 4, 2016, and that he had appealed the judgment to the
     circuit court.   HCD (testimony of the assistant security manager); IAF, Tab 6
     at 120. The assistant security manager also looked at the circuit court’s online
     docket and discovered that the appellant’s trial was scheduled for July 11, 2017. 2
     HCD (testimony of the assistant security manager); IAF, Tab 6 at 72.                 In a
     June 2017 meeting with the appellant, his supervisor, and the assistant security
     manager, the appellant stated that his court date had been postponed multiple
     times, but he did not disclose that he had been found guilty or that he had filed an
     appeal.   HCD (testimony of the appellant, his supervisor, and the assistant
     security manager). Although the appellant invited them to contact his criminal
     defense attorney for information, they testified that it was his burden to provide
     information about his criminal case and that it was not their responsibility to
     contact his lawyer for information.          HCD (testimony of the appellant, his
     supervisor, and the assistant security manager). The agency placed the appellant
     on administrative leave pending an investigation into his conduct on June 30,
     2017. IAF, Tab 6 at 134-35.
¶4         After a July 11, 2017 trial, the Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake
     dismissed the charge against the appellant. IAF, Tab 6 at 106. In February 2018,
     the circuit court granted his petition to have all records of the criminal charge
     expunged from his record. IAF, Tab 10 at 12-13.

     2
       The docket report reflects that the appellant’s circuit court trial was rescheduled four
     times. IAF, Tab 6 at 72.
                                                                                      4

¶5        On December 13, 2017, the agency proposed to remove the appellant on the
     basis of one charge of failing to provide information regarding his arrest
     supported by the following narrative specification:
           On August 16, 2016, you were arrested for sexual battery of a
           woman you administered a sleep study to at an outside sleep
           laboratory. Upon your return to work, I asked you about the status
           of your arrest and you told me that the arrest was a misunderstanding
           and you were taking care of it. In October 2016, the assistant
           security manager requested details about the arrest and disposition in
           order for the Defense Consolidation Adjudication Facility
           (DODCAF) to make a determination about your security clearance.
           In October 2016, you provided him a letter from your lawyer
           indicating a November 4, 2016 court date. Upon further requests
           from me and the assistant security manager for information about the
           outcome of your November 4, 2016 court date, you failed to disclose
           that on November 4, 2016 you were convicted in Chesapeake
           General District Court of sexual battery and sentenced to 365 days of
           confinement, with 325 of those days suspended. Instead you
           repeatedly told me and the assistant security manager that your
           November 4, 2016 court date had been continued. After conducting
           a search of the Virginia Courts Case Information system in mid -June
           2017, the assistant security manager learned that you had been
           convicted of sexual battery on November 4, 2016 and that you were
           scheduled for another trial on July 11, 2017. When you were asked
           by the assistant security manager in late-June 2017 about what he
           found, you denied going to trial and having been found guilty.
           Additionally, in your statement during the command’s July 2017
           fact-finding investigation, you wrote that you were not told that you
           were guilty or not guilty, despite court records from November 2016,
           to the contrary. To date, the only documentation you provided to the
           assistant security manager was the arrest warrant and an October 5,
           2016 letter from your lawyer stating the hearing was scheduled for
           November 16, 2016. You also provided a June 8, 2017 court order
           and a blank expungement petition to the investigating officer during
           the July 2017 fact-finding investigation.
     IAF, Tab 6 at 96-97. The appellant provided an oral response to the proposed
     removal, insisting that he had been honest and that he had continually asked the
     assistant security manager to contact his lawyer for information . Id. at 90-94. In
                                                                                             5

     a March 1, 2018 decision letter, the deciding official found the charge supported
     by the evidence and removed the appellant effective March 9, 2018. Id. at 28-31.
¶6         The appellant timely appealed his removal to the Board, requested a
     hearing, and raised an affirmative defense of retal iation for equal employment
     opportunity (EEO) activity. IAF, Tab 1. In an order and summary of the status
     conference, the administrative judge informed the parties that he construed the
     agency’s charge as one involving lack of candor, set forth the appli cable law and
     burdens of proof, and stated that, if either party disagreed with the order and
     summary, they must file a written objection within 5 days. IAF, Tab 8. Neither
     party submitted an objection.
¶7         After holding a hearing by video teleconference, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision finding that the agency failed to prove the charge,
     nexus, or the reasonableness of the penalty and reversed the agency’s action.
     IAF, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID) at 8-15, 22. He also found that the appellant
     failed to prove his EEO reprisal affirmative defense. ID at 20 -22. The agency
     has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, the appellant has responded,
     and the agency has replied. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4. 3

     3
       It is undisputed that the agency provided interim relief. Specifically, the appellant
     submitted with his response a Standard Form 50 reflecting that the agency canceled his
     removal as of its effective date. PFR File, Tab 1, Tab 3 at 9, 11. The appellant argues
     that, because the agency canceled the removal in its entirety and began processing his
     back pay, the appeal must be dismissed as moot. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9. In its reply, the
     agency argues that it attempted in good faith to comply with the interim relief order and
     that, although it inadvertently exceeded the interim relief order, the appeal is not moot.
     PFR File, Tab 4 at 5-6. We find that the agency has exceeded the requirements of the
     interim relief order by canceling the removal rather than reinstating the appellant from
     the date of the initial decision. Although an argument could be made that the agency’s
     petition for review should be dismissed because canceling the action from its effective
     date rendered the petition moot, the Board has held that such an action does not require
     dismissal. See Nanette v. Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 127, ¶ 13 n.1 (2002)
     (declining to dismiss an agency’s petition for review as moot when the agency has in
     good faith and inadvertently exceeded the requirements of an interim relief order),
     aff’d, 155 F.3d 568 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Table). Accordingly, the Board exercises its
     discretion not to dismiss the agency’s petition for review despite the fact that the
                                                                                            6

                                          ANALYSIS
     The agency proved the charge by preponderant evidence.
¶8         As noted above, the administrative judge construed the agency’s charge of
     failure to provide information regarding the arrest and accompanying narrat ive
     specification as a charge of lack of candor. IAF, Tab 8 at 2. The parties have not
     challenged the administrative judge’s decision to construe the charge in this
     manner, and we agree that the charge and specification read together reasonably
     allege that the appellant lacked candor. See George v. Department of the Army,
     104 M.S.P.R. 596, ¶ 7 (2007) (providing that, in resolving the issue of how a
     charge should be construed, the Board examines the structure and language of the
     proposal notice and the decision notice, as well as the accompanying
     specifications and circumstances), aff’d, 263 F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
     also Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
     (stating that lack of candor is a flexible charge involving a failure to provide
     complete and accurate information but not requiring proof of intent). Therefore,
     we do not disturb the administrative judge’s decision to construe the charge as
     one of lack of candor.
           An agency alleging lack of candor must prove the following elements by a
     preponderance of the evidence:           (1) that the employee gave incorrect or
     incomplete information; and (2) that he did so knowingly. 4                 Gardner v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 23 (2016), clarified on other
     grounds by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB
     31, ¶¶ 23-24.     When, as here, the agency’s charge contains a narrative

     appellant submitted evidence showing that the agency exceeded the interim relief order.
     See, e.g., Lavette v. U.S. Postal Service, 96 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶¶ 12-15 (2004) (declining to
     dismiss the agency’s cross petition for review despite evidence that it exceeded the
     requirements of the interim relief order by canceling the action appealed) .
     4
       A preponderance of the evidence is defined as the degree of relevant evidence that a
     reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find
     that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                        7

     explanation for the basis of its action, the agency may sustain its charge by
     proving one or more of the incidents described therein; proof of every incident is
     not required. See Otero v. U.S. Postal Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 198, 204 (1997).
¶9        The administrative judge found that the agency’s narrative specification
     alleged the following three separate instances of lack of candor: (1) when the
     appellant failed to disclose that he was convicted on November 4, 2016, in district
     court of sexual battery and sentenced; (2) when, in June 2017, he “denied going
     to trial and having been found guilty”; and (3) when, in July 2017, he wrote that
     he was not told that he was “guilty or not guilty.” ID at 8-9. The administrative
     judge found that the agency did not prove that the appellant lacked candor by
     denying he was convicted or found guilty because, under Virginia state law
     governing misdemeanor prosecutions, an appeal to the circuit court annuls the
     judgment of the district court as if there had been no previous trial and entitles a
     defendant to de novo review in the circuit court. ID at 11-12. He also found that,
     even if the appellant expressly denied going to trial, there was no evidence that he
     knew such statement was incorrect given his unrefuted hearing testimony about
     his November 4, 2016 court appearance—namely, that he sat in a large courtroom
     while other proceedings were conducted, he was not allowed to testify or offer
     exculpatory video evidence, and his attorney told him not to worry and that there
     would be another proceeding before a new judge. ID at 12-13. He further found
     that the fact that the appellant offered to have the agency officials contact his
     attorney undermined the agency’s theory that he was attempting to obfuscate the
     existence of his district court proceeding and observed that the circuit court
     docket entries confirmed the appellant’s assertion that his court date had been
     rescheduled. ID at 13. Finally, he found that the appellant’s confusion about the
     proceedings and the proper terms to apply to them were reasonable in light of
     Virginia’s unique binary criminal trial process and the fact that he was not trained
     in the law. ID at 13-14. Thus, he did not sustain the charge. ID at 14.
                                                                                        8

¶10        On review, the agency argues that the Virginia law that annulled the
      appellant’s conviction upon appeal cannot supersede Executive Order 12968 and
      its implementing regulations, which require the appellant to provide any and all
      relevant information for the purposes of a security clearance determination , and
      that the administrative judge erred when he relied on state law to excuse the
      appellant from disclosing information required by the executive order. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 9-18. The agency further argues that it proved the charge because it is
      undisputed that the appellant was convicted and sentenced at the November 4,
      2016 trial but that he failed to disclose the conviction to anyone at the agency at
      any time between November 2016 and June 2017.           Id. at 18-25.   The agency
      claims that, even if the appellant was confused about the November 4, 2016
      district court proceeding, he provided incomplete and inaccurate information to
      the assistant security manager when he told him that his case was continued
      rather than truthfully disclosing that there had been a court proceeding but that he
      was confused and did not understand the process. Id. at 20. The agency argues
      that the record establishes an element of deception on the part of the appellant
      because he knew he was obligated to provide information regarding his arrest and
      criminal proceedings for the purposes of a security clearance determination but,
      assuming as true that he was confused about the nature and outcome of his district
      court proceeding, he chose to remain ignorant, did not seek clarification from his
      attorney, and falsely denied going to court. Id. at 20-24.
¶11        We disagree with the agency’s contention that the administrative judge
      erred in considering Virginia state law in determining whether the appellant
      provided incorrect or inaccurate information regarding his Virgini a state criminal
      proceedings and conviction. However, the fact that the appellant’s conviction
      was legally annulled upon the filing of an appeal does not establish that he
      provided complete and accurate information to the agency regarding his court
      case. While lack of candor need not involve an affirmative misrepresentation , it
      “may involve a failure to disclose something that, in the circumstances, should
                                                                                        9

      have been disclosed to make the statement accurate and complete.” O’Lague v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 13 (2016) (quoting Ludlum
      v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
¶12        Here, as noted above, the agency alleged that the appellant lacked candor
      when, although he was on notice that he was required to provide the agency
      information regarding his court case for purposes of a security clearance
      determination, he failed to disclose that he had been convicted, found guilty, or
      sentenced and instead repeatedly told the assistant security manager that his court
      date had been “continued.”      IAF, Tab 6 at 96-97.    Although we defer to the
      administrative judge’s determination based on hearing testimony that the
      appellant was confused about the nature and outcome of his district court
      appearance, we find that he failed to disclose information known to him that
      would have made his responses accurate and complete.           Specifically, as his
      hearing testimony confirms, he was aware that he attended a court proceeding
      regarding his misdemeanor charge of sexual battery on November 4, 2016, and
      that the judge rendered a decision at that time. HCD (testimony of the appellant).
      In addition, he testified that his attorney told him that the judge made the wrong
      decision and that he would have a second trial. Id. In failing to disclose this
      information and instead maintaining that his case was “continuing” or
      “continued,” the appellant knowingly provided incomplete and inaccurate
      information that gave the wrong impression about the status and progression of
      his court case. The fact that the appellant invited his supervisor and the assistant
      security manager to contact his criminal defense attorney for information does not
      negate the fact that he provided them incomplete and inaccurate information.
      Thus, we find that the agency proved that the appellant lacked candor and sustain
      the charge. See O’Lague, 123 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 13.

      The agency established nexus.
¶13        In addition to the requirement that the agency prove the charge it has
      brought against the appellant, the agency must also prove that there is a nexus,
                                                                                        10

      i.e., a clear and direct relationship between the articulated grounds for the adverse
      action and the appellant’s ability to satisfactorily accomplish his duties or some
      other legitimate government interest.       Canada v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 113 M.S.P.R. 509, ¶ 10 (2010).            In the initial decision, the
      administrative judge found that, even if he sustained the charge, it was unclear
      whether the appellant’s removal for failure to disclose an intermediate step in his
      criminal proceedings promoted the efficiency of the service. ID at 14 n.6. We
      disagree. An employer has a right to expect its workers to be honest, trustworthy,
      and candid, and lack of candor strikes at the heart of the employer -employee
      relationship and directly impacts the efficiency of the service .         Ludlum v.
      Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56, ¶ 28 (2000), aff’d, 278 F.3d 1280 (Fed.
      Cir. 2002). Here, as discussed above, the appellant knowingly failed to provide
      complete and accurate responses to the agency’s requests for information
      regarding his criminal court proceeding for the purposes of a security clearance
      determination over the course of approximately 7 months . Accordingly, we find
      that the agency established a nexus between its action and the efficiency of the
      service. See id., ¶¶ 14-25, 28 (finding that the appellant’s failure to respond fully
      and truthfully during an administrative investigation directly impacted the
      efficiency of the service).

      The appellant failed to establish his EEO reprisal affirmative defense.
¶14         To establish a claim of EEO reprisal, an appellant must show that the
      prohibited consideration was at least a motivating factor in the personnel action at
      issue. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31 , ¶¶ 21-22. Here, the appellant argued that his
      removal was motivated by his prior EEO activity and, in support of this claim,
      pointed to the temporal proximity between the prior activity and the removal, the
      involvement of the deciding official in both proceedings, and the absence of a
      legitimate basis for his removal. HCD (closing argument by the appellant). In
      the initial decision, the administrative judge considered these arguments but
                                                                                      11

      found that the appellant failed to show that his removal was motivated by
      retaliatory animus. ID at 20-22. Specifically, he found that the 20-month lapse
      in time between the 2016 settlement agreement resolving the appellant’s EEO
      complaint and the December 2017 proposed removal weighed against finding that
      the EEO activity was causally connected to the adverse action. ID at 22 (citing
      Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001), which
      explained that temporal proximity between protected EEO activity and an adverse
      action “must be ‘very close,’” and an “[a]ction taken . . . 20 months later
      suggests, by itself, no causality at all”).   He further found that the deciding
      official testified in a convincing manner that his personal involvement in the
      appellant’s prior EEO complaint had no bearing on his removal decision.         ID
      at 22. We agree that a 20-month lapse of time does not suggest causality and
      discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s implicit demeanor-based
      determination that the deciding official credibly denied that he was motivated by
      retaliatory animus. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301
      (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the Board must give deference to an administrative
      judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly,
      on the observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing ). Because
      we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show that
      any prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the agency’s action, we
      need not resolve the issue of whether the appellant proved that retaliation was a
      “but-for” cause of the agency’s decision.        See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.

      The penalty of removal is reasonable.
¶15        When, as here, all of the agency’s charges are sustained, the Board will
      review the agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all
      the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within the tolerable
      limits of reasonableness. Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11
                                                                                        12

      (2010); Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981)
      (articulating a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessin g the
      appropriate penalty for an act of misconduct). In making this determination, the
      Board must give due weight to the agency’s primary discretion in maintaining
      employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing that the Board ’s function is not
      to displace management’s responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment
      has been properly exercised.     Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11.     The Board will
      modify or mitigate an agency-imposed penalty only when it finds the agency
      failed to weigh the relevant factors or the penalty clearly exceeds the bounds of
      reasonableness. Id.
¶16         In the initial decision, the administrative judge stated that, even if he had
      sustained the charge, he would find that the deciding official did not properly
      exercise his judgment because he improperly relied on the underlying nature of
      the misdemeanor charge against the appellant and his annulled conviction in his
      consideration of the Douglas factors. ID at 14-15. He also found that removal
      exceeded the tolerable limits of reasonableness given the de minimis nature of the
      offense and the specific facts surrounding the appellant’s criminal proceedings
      under Virginia law. ID at 16. The agency challenges these finding on review.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-27.
¶17         The record reflects that the deciding official carefully considered the
      relevant Douglas factors in determining the appropriate penalty.        IAF, Tab 6
      at 32-35. Specifically, he found as aggravating factors the following: the nature
      and seriousness of the appellant’s failure to be truthful to avoid the possibility of
      losing his security clearance, which was a condition of his employment;
      management’s loss of trust and confidence in the appellant following his
      “prolonged concealment of information”; his May 24, 2016 letter of reprimand
      for disrespectful conduct; the notoriety of the offense; and the fact that the
      appellant was on notice of his obligation to provide inf ormation regarding any
      action taken as a result of his arrest for the purposes of a security clearance
                                                                                        13

      determination. Id. He appeared to consider as mitigating factors the appellant’s
      11.5 years of service and recent increase in productivity.       Id. at 33.   He also
      considered the appellant’s claim that his attorneys advised him not to discuss his
      case with anyone but found that there were times the appellant talked about his
      case and that he “conveniently picked and chose what [he] wanted to share” and
      was attempting to use his attorneys as a “shield” from his misconduct. Id. at 35.
      In addition, he considered the absence of comparator evidence, the table of
      penalties, and the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions but
      concluded that removal was the appropriate penalty. Id. at 32-35.
¶18         We disagree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the deciding
      official impermissibly relied on the underlying nature of the misdemeanor charge
      or the district court conviction in determining the appropriate penalty.        IAF,
      Tab 6 at 32-35.    While the deciding official indicated on his Douglas factors
      worksheet that the appellant “failed to tell the command the result of [his]
      November 4, 2016 court appearance in which [he was] convicted of sexual
      battery,” he also acknowledged that the appellant appealed the conviction, was
      later found not guilty, and had his record expunged. Id. at 32. Thus, it is clear
      that the deciding official did not consider the annulled conviction to b e the final
      disposition of the appellant’s criminal case. In addition, as discussed above, the
      agency proved that the appellant lacked candor when he failed to disclose
      important steps in the course of his criminal proceeding —specifically, that he
      attended a court proceeding, received a decision, and filed an appeal —and instead
      led the agency to believe that his court case had simply been continued. As such,
      the deciding official properly considered the appellant’s failure to be truthful
      about his court proceeding in his assessment of the appropriate penalty.
      Furthermore, although the deciding official mentioned the nature of the
      misdemeanor charge in his discussion of several of the Douglas factors, he
      emphasized that he had lost trust in the appellant because of his failure to be
      truthful, not because of the factual basis of the charge. Id. at 32-35.
                                                                                           14

¶19         In light of the foregoing, we find that the deciding official properly
      considered the relevant Douglas factors and properly exercised his managerial
      judgment in imposing the appellant’s removal.           Moreover, we find that the
      penalty of removal does not exceed the tolerable limits of reasonableness for the
      sustained charge of lack of candor. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of the Interior,
      112 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 26 (2009) (finding the penalty of removal appropriate for
      lack of candor and unauthorized absences); Kamahele v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 666, ¶¶ 2, 15 (2008) (finding the penalty of removal
      reasonable when the appellant demonstrated lack of candor and inappropriate
      conduct).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113(c)).     You may obtain review of this final decision.             5 U.S.C.
      § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for
      seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file.             5 U.S.C.
      § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights,
      the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which
      option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do
      not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall
      within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you
      should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow
      all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        15

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                16

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     17

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                18

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.