Court Opinion

ID: 9679878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:12:05.047146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:22.926737
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
The State has filed a motion for rehearing in which it contends this Court erred in failing to consider that, at the time the police officers obtained permission from Herrera to search his vehicle and his apartment, they already had a reasonable suspicion Herrera was engaged in or soon would engage in criminal activity. The State argues the officers were justified in detaining Herrera for an investigation unrelated to the initial traffic stop because of the collective knowledge the officers had of Herrera’s suspicious conduct before the stop.
The evidence relied on by the State as showing a reasonable suspicion was presented at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, not at the suppression hearing. As stated in our original opinion, in determining whether a trial court’s decision is supported by the record, we generally consider only the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing because the ruling was based on that evidence rather than evidence introduced later. Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex.Crim.App. *2911996); see, e.g., Hardesty v. State, 667 S.W.2d 130, 133 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). This general rule, however, is inapplicable when the suppression issue has been consensually relitigated by the parties during trial. Radial, 917 S.W.2d at 809. Where the state raises the issue at trial, either without objection or with subsequent participation in the inquiry by the defense, the defendant has made an election to reopen the evidence and consideration of the relevant trial testimony is appropriate. Id.; see also Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 272 n. 13 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
In this case, the pax-ties did not consensually relitigate the issue. During trial, the State asked Officer Pena if Herrera gave him permission to search the apartment, and Herrera objected pursuant to his motion to suppress and obtained a running objection to this line of questioning. Herrera clearly objected to relitigating the issues decided at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The other evidence cited in the State’s motion as showing the officers’ reasonable suspicion was not introduced for this purpose, but was developed in response to Hen-era’s defense. Herrera made it clear in his opening statement that his defensive theory would be he was coerced into the drug trade by another person. The evidence on which the State now relies as establishing the officers’ reasonable suspicion was introduced not for that purpose, but to attack Herrera’s stated defense. Because this evidence was adduced at trial and not at the suppression hearing, and because the suppression issue was not consensually relitigated by the pax-ties during trial, we apply the general rule that we consider only the evidence adduced at the suppression heax-ing.
Even if this evidence had been adduced at the suppression healing, our opinion would remain unchanged. The officers investigating Herrera’s suspicious activities before the stop obviously knew their collective knowledge was not sufficient to detain him. Therefore, they made a pretextual stop for a traffic violation, which Herrera does not contest on appeal. But, they still could not detain him any longer than necessary to investigate that violation unless the officers developed other reasonable suspicion during the investigation of the traffic violation. In other words, the officers could not stop him for a traffic violation and, ignoring that violation, proceed to act on the suspicions they already had before stopping him. Once the reason for the stop had been satisfied, the stop could not be used as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 356 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
In its motion, the State cites United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), in which the United States Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision that the defendant had been stopped without reasonable suspicion. In that case, the evidence cited by the Supreme Court showed that a border patrol agent stopped Arvizu on an unpaved remote Arizona road. The officer was working an immigration checkpoint when the “intrusion devices” used to help the border patrol cover remote roads used by smugglers alerted the officer of traffic on a ten-mile unpaved stretch of road rarely traveled except by local ranchers and forest service personnel. Id., 534 U.S. at —, 122 S.Ct. at 747-49, 151 L.Ed.2d at 746-47. The triggereing of the sensor was crucial-because it indicated someone might be trying to circumvent the checkpoint and the timing coincided with a shift change at the checkpoint, which leaves the area unpatrolled. Id. 534 U.S. *292at —-—, 122 S.Ct. at 748-49, 151 L.Ed.2d at 747. The officer testified he knew smugglers did extensive scouting of the area and seemed to be most active during shift changes, when agents were en route to and from the checkpoint. Id. When he went to investigate, the officer saw a minivan, the type smugglers use, being driven down the road. As he passed the officer, the, driver of the minivan slowed dramatically from about fifty to fifty-five miles per hour to twenty to twenty-five miles per hour. The driver of the minivan appeared stiff and tried to pretend the officer was not there, avoiding looking at the officer. The officer found this behavior suspicious because in his experience most people look over to see what is going on, and in that area most people give the border patrol officer a friendly wave. Id. 534 U.S. at —, 122 S.Ct. at 749-50, 151 L.Ed.2d at 748. The officer could see that the knees of the children in the minivan were up very high, as if their feet were resting on something. The officer began following the minivan, and shortly thereafter all of the children, who though still facing forward, raised their hands at the same time and began waving at the officer in an abnormal pattern. The children continued this pattern on and off for about five minutes. The driver of the minivan then turned off at the last point that would allow him to avoid a checkpoint remaining on a road that, though passable for a minivan, is primarily utilized by four-wheel-drive vehicles. Id. The officer radioed in a registration check and, after it returned, decided to pull the minivan over. Id. The Supreme Court determined that the totality of these circumstances warranted the stop for further investigation. However, the officer did not stop the minivan because of a traffic violation, but because he had a reasonable suspicion, based on the location of the stop and all the observations he had made just before the stop, that the defendant was engaged in illegal activity. Id. 534 U.S. at —-—, 122 S.Ct; at 752-53, 151 L.Ed.2d at 752.
In this case, Herrera was stopped because an officer had observed him commit a traffic violation. He was not stopped because of the location of his vehicle or for any other suspicious conduct observed by the officers just before the stop. Although the State contends the evidence it cited in its motion indicates Herrera was engaged in narcotics trafficking, the only reason given by Officer Garrison for stopping Herrera was that he had been informed Herrera had violated a traffic law. The purpose of the detention was to investigate the traffic violation. Any consent to search the apartment or the vehicle had to be obtained during the course and scope of the traffic investigation. The State cannot use the evidence from tailing Herrera to justify reasonable suspicion to detain Herrera beyond the time necessary to effectuate the traffic stop absent further evidence of reasonable suspicion. Arvizu is inapplicable.
We overrule the State’s motion for rehearing.