Court Opinion

ID: 9781871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:31.515232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.813717
License: Public Domain

Nuss, J.,
dissenting: It is undisputed that when mother was 4 months pregnant, she intentionally lied when telling father that she had received an abortion. At the time of her fabrication, she was living in Kansas. Father was living and working 1500 miles away in New York, the place of conception. From the time mother first told this he in Januaiy 2004 until the following Christmas Eve she continually repeated it. She testified that she lied because she knew that father would not consent to an adoption. In my view, any analysis of this case should start with this vital, uncontested fact: a year’s worth of mother’s abortion lies to father.
Also in my view, this starting analysis should simultaneously consider that since 1976 the law of the land has provided that, regardless of the desires of any father—including a husband-—-to preserve the mother’s pregnancy, she alone has the right to decide whether to terminate it. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-71, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976). As the United States Supreme Court explained, this exclusive right resides with the mother because “it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, [and thus] as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.” 428 U.S. at 71. Indeed, the exclusivity of the mother’s right is emphasized by the Court’s later holding that not even a married woman has any obligation to simply notify her husband of the fact of her abortion. See Planned Parenthood *631of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-98, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
Obviously, there is no undoing an abortion. Nor would there appear to be any legal recourse to a father who desires to prevent or even delay the abortion, e.g., through an injunction. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308, 100 L. Ed. 2d 909, 108 S. Ct. 2136 (1988) (unwed biological father prohibited from enjoining abortion of pregnant biological mother). As far as the law — and by necessity the father — are concerned, the abortion effectively ends the issue. Mother’s announcement of her abortion essentially produces the same effect. By contrast, once a mother chooses not to abort, upon the child’s birth the father has rights, e.g., typically he must consent to any adoption. It is through this legal lens that this particular New York father’s situation must be viewed.
The year of mother’s abortion lies, when coupled with her absolute constitutional right to unilaterally abort, easily distinguishes the instant case from those upon which the majority relies. In short, this is not a case where a father simply happened to be unaware of a pregnancy, birth, or adoption of his child. Nor is it a case where the mother simply attempted to prevent a father from developing a relationship with his known child. Rather, it is a case in which the mother has expressly informed the father that the pregnancy and, consequently, the potential child with whom he could develop a constitutionally protected parental relationship have both been legally and irreversibly terminated.
In my view, the majority opinion wholly fails to consider the unique Danforth-based position from which this particular father starts. This failure greatly damages its analysis of the question, subject to our de novo review, of whether he sufficiently grasped the opportunity to be a parent and thus created a constitutionally protected interest. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). The magnitude of the failure is underscored by the undisputed facts disclosing that mother’s absolute Danforth rights did not simply exist in a vacuum. Rather, while father disagreed with mother, he nevertheless fully respected and essentially felt bound by those rights and her resultant decision. Mother herself testified:
*632“Q. Had he ever asked you to have an abortion?
“A. We had talked about it.
“Q. Okay. Had he ever said that’s what I want you to do?
“A. He told me the decision was up to me.
“Q. Okay. And that’s what his testimony reflects, that he told you to do what you have to do. But, he didn’t want you to do it, did heP
“A. I don’t believe he did.” (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, father s total respect for mother s rights caused him to start with a distinctive and sizable disadvantage in proving he grasped opportunities to become a constitutionally protected father. See Lehr, 463 U.S. 248.
There is clearly a threshold question to the inquiry of whether father adequately grasped such opportunities. More particularly, after mother s January 2004 lie to father about her abortion, did he even know, or reasonably should he have known, of her carrying the pregnancy to term? The majority appears to acknowledge the validity of the “reasonably should have known” threshold standard. 287 Kan. at 609 (“within a short time after he discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the biological mother was pregnant with his child”). If father reasonably could not have known, he cannot legitimately be expected to have grasped the numerous opportunities to be a father asserted by the majority, e.g., paying mother’s medical expenses during the balance of the pregnancy.
The California Supreme Court acknowledged this threshold in Adoption of Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 1054, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 898 P.2d 891 (1995), cert. denied sub nom. Mark K. v. John S., 516 U.S. 1176 (1996):
“ ‘A court should consider all factors relevant to that determination [father’s full commitment to his parental responsibilities]. The father’s conduct both before and after the child’s birth must be considered. Once the father knows, or reasonably should know of the pregnancy, he must promptly attempt to assume his parental responsibilities as fully as the mother will allow and the circumstances permit.” (Emphasis added.) 10 Cal. 4th at 1054 (citing Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216 [1992]).
Throughout the majority’s opinion it contends that even after mother’s lies, father reasonably should have known, i.e., discovered, that mother continued her pregnancy. Indeed, it points to several findings of the trial court to this effect and to that court’s *633determinations that father should have taken action to verify whether mother aborted and “to protect his parental rights.” There are several problems with this position, as will be thoroughly discussed later in the opinion. As a threshold matter, however, and most important, we must acknowledge that the trial court concluded that mother had committed fraud and that this determination has never been challenged, much less appealed.
Specifically, this father alleged fraud based upon, among other things, mother s continual abortion lies to him. He claims that these lies prevented him from acting — during the later months of pregnancy and the early months of his son’s life — to demonstrate his desire to establish a parental relationship. The trial judge clearly agreed that fraud had been committed, ruling from the bench that “I . . . find that there’s just blatant, direct fraud involved in this lawsuit.” Similarly, the court stated as a “conclusion of law” in its journal entry that “[t]he fraud that was perpetrated in this matter was committed by [mother].” Indeed, the court only rejected fraud as a reason to relieve father from the judgment because mother was not an adverse party to the suit as is required under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3). While mother’s fraud could not serve as a basis for judgment relief for this limited reason, her fraud nevertheless remains a valid judicial determination.
Because of this finding and conclusion, which were not challenged at the trial level or appealed to this court, it is indisputable that all of the elements of fraud were present. See Cooke v. Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, Syl. ¶ 2, 176 P.3d 144 (2008) (an issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned); cf. Hill v. Farm Bureau, 263 Kan. 703, 706, 952 P.2d 1286 (1998) (Litigant must object to inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to give the trial court opportunity to correct them. In absence of objection, omissions in findings will not be considered on appeal. Where there has been no such objection, the trial court is presumed to have found all facts necessary to support the judgment.). Among these fraud elements are an untrue statement of fact, known to be untrue by the party making it, made with the intent to deceive, upon which another party justifiably relies and acts to his or her detriment. Alires v. McGehee, 277 Kan. 398, 403, 83 P.3d 1191 *634(2004). See PIK Civ. 4th 127.40 (others “reasonably relied and acted upon” false representations and “sustained damage by relying upon them” [Emphasis added.]).
These trial court findings and conclusions appear to be at odds with its determination that father reasonably should have known of the continued pregnancy and taken action to protect his rights. Yet the majority opinion does not acknowledge, much less try to reconcile, them.
Nevertheless, in my view the following was conclusively established well before the parties appeared for oral arguments before this court: (1) father reasonably and justifiably relied upon mother’s lies about her abortion; (2) in reliance upon mother’s lies, father reasonably and justifiably failed to act, i.e., to attempt to verify whether she aborted; and (3) because of father’s reliance, mother’s lies caused him damage, i.e., his ability to establish more than a biological link with his son. See Cooke, 285 Kan. 748, Syl. ¶ 2; Hill, 263 Kan. at 706.
Even if this court were to sua sponte examine the fraud issue on appeal, fraud clearly exists. Fraud is a question of fact. Nordstrom v. Miller, 227 Kan. 59, 65, 605 P.2d 545 (1980). Because fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court obviously believed that the truth of the fraud facts asserted was “highly probable.” See In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 695-97, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). On appeal, we consider whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to father, we are convinced that a rational factfinder could have found it highly probable, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, that mother had committed fraud against father and others. See B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. at 705. Based upon the testimony of father and mother, I am so convinced.
If the presence of fraud under our particular facts, e.g., the judicial determination of reasonable and justifiable reliance upon abortion lies which caused father damage, is not dispositive of the constitutional question, it certainly is an important part of the reasonableness calculus and therefore cannot be ignored. The abortion lies case of Doe v. Queen, 347 S.C. 4, 552 S.E.2d 761 (2001), is of substantial guidance. There, similar to the instant case, the *635natural father and mother had a relationship in another state for about 4 months. In the third month of the relationship, mother informed father she was pregnant and wanted an abortion; father objected. The next month mother moved out and eventually settled in neighboring South Carolina. She later informed father that she had obtained an abortion in Atlanta. This was a he; a child was bom 7 months after she moved out.
Three months before the birth, mother had signed a criminal warrant against father. A consent order the following month prohibited him from going near mother for 1 year.
Because mother withheld father s address on the Consent for Adoption form, he was not notified of his child’s birth for 2 months. For the 9-10 months between his notification and the contested adoption hearing, father prepared a nursery, arranged for medical insurance, and established a bank account for his son. He was unable to make financial contributions to his son or the proposed adoptive parents because they kept their identity a secret. Mother did access $200 from their joint bank account.
The trial court found that father’s consent to adoption was required because of his compliance with the state statute requiring him to pay reasonable sums for the support of the child or for expenses incurred in connection with pregnancy or birth. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding father had failed to meet the literal requirements of the statute and the failure was not excusable under case law.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. It first addressed the consequences of the father’s failure to act during the pregnancy, stating:
“Initially, we find [the father] should not be penalized for his actions, or lack thereof, prior to [the child’s] birth. Mother left their apartment when she was approximately 8-10 weeks pregnant, telling [the father] she intended to have an abortion. She thereafter lied, telling him she had, in fact, had an abortion in Atlanta. She then made every attempt to conceal from [the father] the fact that she had not had an abortion, effectively isolating herself from him and, through court orders, ensuring that [the father] could have no contact with her until well after the baby’s birth.” (Emphasis added.) 347 S.C. at 8-9.
Suggestive of our fraud requirements, the Doe court also rejected the Court of Appeals’ insinuation that father’s and mother’s *636appearances in the same courtroom — perhaps for the criminal matter — meant that he would know, or should have known, that she was pregnant because she was far enough along in her pregnancy to make her true condition apparent. It held this mere fact was patently insufficient, without more, to charge him with such knowledge. 347 S.C. at 9. This particular holding implied that father had reasonably relied upon mother s misrepresentations and acted reasonably in his efforts, or nonefforts, to discover the concealment.
The Doe court analogized the case to another where “ ‘an unwed father s ability to cultivate his opportunity interest in his child [was] thwarted by the refusal of the mother to accept the father’s expressions of interest in and commitment to the child.’ ” 347 S.C. at 9. It ultimately ruled:
“Given Mothers representations that she had obtained an abortion, coupled with her extraordinary efforts to conceal her pregnancy from [father], we find the preponderance of the evidence amply demonstrates that [father’s] failure to support during the pregnancy was through no fault of his own and, accordingly, we decline to require literal compliance with the statute.” (Emphasis added.) 347 S.C. at 9.
After effectively finding that father should not have reasonably known of the continued pregnancy, the court then examined the consequences of his actions after actually learning of the birth. Here too it applied a reasonableness test and concluded his efforts were sufficient to excuse literal compliance with the state statute:
“Moreover, we find [father’s] actions subsequent to learning of [child’s birth] demonstrate ‘sufficient prompt and good faith efforts to assume parental responsibility.’
“The family court found [father] had made sufficient efforts in drat he had ‘established a nursery, arranged for health insurance and began a savings account for the child.’ We agree. While [father] conceded he had not paid support during the ten-mondi period prior to the hearing, he testified he was willing to do so, and would reimburse the adoptive parents for their expenses. Further, due to a February 1999 order preventing the disclosure of the identity of the adoptive parents, [fadier] was unaware of the name or identify of the Does, and/or their location. Under these circumstances, we simply cannot say that [father’s] failure to support or visit [son] defeats his constitutional interest in establishing a relationship with his son.
*637“Given the circumstances of this case, and the fact that the [adoptive parents] were unwilling to reveal their identity or whereabouts, we find [father] took the only reasonable available alternative measures, to wit, establishing a nursery, putting money in a bank account, and taking steps to provide for [the child] when he received custody.” (Emphasis added.) 347 S.C. at 9-10.
Accordingly, the Doe court upheld the family court decision to deny the adoption; the custody of the then 3-year-old child was transferred to the father. 347 S.C. at 10.
Like Doe, the majority opinion admits that in the instant case, “once learning of his child’s birth, the father immediately and diligently took action to assert his legal connection with the child.” 287 Kan. at 614.
The Doe decision is of additional guidance because the South Carolina court also essentially applied the doctrine of “interference with” or “obstruction of’ a father’s efforts to parent. This is a doctrine well-established in Kansas law. Although research has not uncovered lies about abortion in our case law as in Doe and the instant case, there are numerous examples of applying the doctrine to efforts to terminate a resisting father’s rights in an adoption context. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. 454, 465, 866 P.2d 1029 (1994); In re Adoption of F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, 747 P.2d 145 (1987); In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 22 Kan. App. 2d 119, 129-30, 912 P.2d 761, review denied 260 Kan. 929, cert. denied 519 U.S. 870 (1996); In re K.D.O., 20 Kan. App. 2d 559, 889 P.2d 1158 (1995); In re Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d 574, 585, 874 P.2d 680, review denied 255 Kan. 1001, cert. denied 513 U.S. 1018 (1994). In a number of these cases, the court has refused to allow an adoption and termination of the father’s rights despite his limited, even absent, efforts because of mother’s interference or obstruction.
Kansas case law appears to be devoid of situations like the instant case where the issue is whether the father has initially grasped enough opportunity to create a parental interest which would then give him a right to notice before severance of those rights under K.S.A. 59-2136(h). Nevertheless, our cases applying that statute have important application to the opportunity-grasping issue for several reasons. First, the interests in both instances are similar *638and often overlap: (1) whether the father s interest is based upon more than a biological link and worthy of constitutional protection and, if so, (2) whether that established interest should nevertheless be terminated for later failing to perform like a father.
Second, the legislature’s policy choices appearing in K.S.A. 59-2136(h) certainly can apply to the issue in the instant case. Toward that end, the Court of Appeals has recognized that “[t]hose instances specified under . . . K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7) in which consent may be declared unnecessary are examples of situations in which the right of a natural father is little more than biological.” (Emphasis added.) Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d at 584. Perhaps to comply with that appellate court direction, when deciding that the father had no more than a biological link entitling him to no protection, the present trial court nevertheless concluded that he did not abandon the mother upon learning that she was pregnant or during her pregnancy. See K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(5).
The majority opinion fails to consider, or at least give appropriate weight to, this vital interference factor which is well known in Kansas adoption law, e.g., mother’s repeated abortion lies and other efforts to hide the truth. In my view, this failure to appropriately consider it in the reasonableness calculus represents yet another significant problem with the majority opinion. Amplification of some of the cases cited in Justice Beier’s dissenting opinion therefore is warranted.
An excellent example of the interference doctrine’s application in Kansas is this court’s decision in Baby Boy £>., 254 Kan. 454. There, as in the instant case, an unwed mother consented to the adoption of her newborn child by a married couple; the father refused, instead wanting to raise the child. The adoptive parents sought to terminate his parental rights in the adoption petition on the ground that he had failed, without reasonable cause, to provide support for the mother during the 6 months prior to the child’s birth pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(4). Similar to the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Michael H. discussed earlier, this court held that the test to be applied “is one of reasonableness under all the relevant circumstances existing in the case.” (Emphasis added.) Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. at 464.
*639Consistent with this test, we observed that the mother refused considerable assistance from the father, and therefore “[t]he district court properly considered her [natural mother’s] refusal as a factor in determining if the father provided support to the mother.” 254 Kan. at 465. We eventually upheld the trial court’s denial of the adoptive parents’ petition, i.e., mother’s refusal was a reasonable cause for the father not paying more support. 254 Kan. at 465-66.
In our earlier decision in F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, we did not address an adoption of a newborn. The decision is of guidance, however, because we addressed an area analogous to the instant case: an attempt to adopt and to sever a father’s rights for his alleged failure or refusal “ ‘to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years.’ K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(a)(3) [predecessor to K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(7)].” 242 Kan. at 232. There, the trial court denied a stepfather’s petition to adopt children of a prison inmate, finding that the stepfather failed to meet his burden of proof that consent was not required. Among other things, the trial court found that certain “ ‘actions by the mother constitute interference with the rights of the non-custodial parent to maintain contact with his sons.’ ” 242 Kan. at 234.
We held that the lower court was correct in so finding, and we necessarily implied it was correct in even considering this factor. 242 Kan. at 237. Foreshadowing our later decision in Baby Boy B., we stated that “[i]n considering whether a nonconsenting parent has failed to assume his or her parental duties for two consecutive years, all the surrounding circumstances must be considered.” (Emphasis added.) 242 Kan. at 236. Despite the absence of any language in this statutory subsection requiring reasonableness or reasonable cause, we nevertheless considered it relevant to examine whether the father made “reasonable attempts” to contact and maintain an ongoing relationship with his children. 242 Kan. at 236. We eventually upheld the trial court’s denial of the stepfather’s petition.
Similarly, in K.D.O., 20 Kan. App. 2d 559, as in the instant case, an unwed mother consented to the adoption of her newborn child but relinquished her rights to a child placement service. The father *640refused, instead wanting to raise the child. Within 2 weeks of birth, the service sought to terminate his parental rights on the ground that he had failed, without reasonable cause, to provide support for the mother during the 6 months prior to the child’s birth pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(4).
The Court of Appeals held that substantial competent evidence supported the trial court’s denial of the petition to terminate the father’s rights because of mother’s interference with his ability to provide support. 20 Kan. App. 2d at 562. Although father only gave $100 during the pregnancy, he testified that he would support her and the baby; however, she refused all offers. In language reminiscent of the mother’s attitude and behavior in the instant case, tire K.D.O. mother testified, “ T pretty much just shut him out and it was just myself and the social worker working toward that goal of getting through the pregnancy.’ ” 20 Kan. App. 2d at 561. Repeating the reasonableness and interference refrains, the Court of Appeals stated:
“Where a trial court finds that a father’s reasonable efforts to provide support for the mother during the six months prior to the child’s birth have failed because of interference by the mother, an adoption agency, or the adoptive parents, K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(4) should not operate to terminate his parental rights. [Baby Boy N.,] 19 Kan. App. 2d at 585.” (Emphasis added.) K.D.O., 20 Kan. App. 2d at 562.
In Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d 574, as in the instant case, an unwed mother consented to the adoption of her newborn child by a married couple; the father refused, instead wanting to raise the child. The adoptive parents sought to terminate his parental rights on die ground that he had failed, without reasonable cause, to provide prebirth support pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(4). Quoting In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 16 Kan App. 2d 311, 313, 822 P.2d 76 (1991), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that die determination under this statutory subsection was
“ ‘analogous to cases where the trial court must determine if a parent has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years prior to an adoption pursuant to . . . 59-2136(b)(7) . . . [and that] [t]he tests and rules applicable in those instances are equally applicable [here].’ ” 19 Kan. App. 2d at 587.
*641Echoing the Supreme Court decisions in F.A.R. and Baby Boy B., it reiterated that when making either determination, “all the relevant surrounding circumstances must be considered.” Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d at 587; see also Baby Boy S., 22 Kan. App. 2d at 129-30 (same).
In summary, the analysis should begin by viewing mother’s year’s worth of abortion lies through the Danforth lens: an acknowledgment that not even a married woman has an obligation to notify her husband of the fact of her abortion; much less does an unmarried woman have an obligation to obtain the consent of the father before aborting. As reflected in this unwed mother’s own testimony, while father disagreed with her, he nevertheless fully respected and essentially felt bound by mother’s Danforth-based rights and her resultant decision to abort.
The analysis should proceed with a consideration of whether father reasonably should have known of the continued pregnancy based upon all relevant surrounding circumstances, including not only mother’s abortion lies to him but also her other efforts to conceal or otherwise obstruct and interfere. A similar standard of reasonable efforts under all the relevant circumstances should apply to father’s efforts once he learned of the birth.
The adoptive parents’ failure to challenge at the trial court level, much less appeal, that court’s fraud findings and conclusions conclusively establishes that father reasonably and justifiably relied upon mother’s lies about her abortion; that in reliance upon mother’s lies, father reasonably and justifiably failed to act, i.e., to attempt to verily whether she aborted; and that because of father’s reliance, mother’s lies caused him damage, i.e., his ability to establish more than a biological link with his son. The Doe court characterized the ability to form more than a biological link as a constitutional interest. 347 S.C. at 10.
Assuming that reasonable reliance and resultant damage is not conclusively established by the failure to challenge or appeal, then as Justice Beier discusses, the evidence of record demonstrates the father made considerable efforts that were reasonable when considering all the circumstances. As she mentions, determination of whether the evidence is sufficient to establish his rights of father*642hood is a question of law that we review de novo. Most of the relevant facts have been well chronicled by other separate opinions and need not be repeated here. Several additions are important, however, as they further support the conclusion that father has done “enough” to prove more than a biological link. In providing the additions, we will also examine the majority’s interpretation of Lehr.
Mother’s deception of others.
The majority opinion criticizes father for not grasping numerous opportunities to develop a parental relationship, particularly in failing to take the steps necessary to catch mother in her abortion lies. The majority then suggests a number of missed opportunities, i.e., steps available to him. Its analysis, however, fails to fully consider that mother was such a good liar she was able to deceive absolutely everyone.
Mother fooled members of her immediate family. Specifically, during the last 7 months of mother’s pregnancy, she lived with her mother (for ease of reference, “grandmother”), stepfather, and sister. According to mother’s own testimony, when her baby was bom, she lied to grandmother, her sisters and stepfather at the hospital, telling them that the baby had died in childbirth. Again according to mother’s testimony, because grandmother and some other family members had actually seen the live child, mother had to he again. She told them that the baby had later died. She testified further that the family, even those with whom she lived, apparently did not attempt to conduct any verification:
“Q. Did they question that?
“A. Yeah.
“Q. You’ve got a seemingly healthy newborn and then you say, well, -he died.
“A. Yes, that’s what I said. And if I didn’t give them any more answers to their questions, they just left it alone.” (Emphasis added.)
Father testified similarly. Grandmother told him that after birth, she bought baby clothes and accessories and went to the hospital room. There, she saw the adoptive parents. Each side wondered who the other was: “What’s going on here?” The nurse then rushed *643grandmother out of the room. Later mother called grandmother and said the baby had died. But grandmother had doubts:
“And [grand]mother said, well, I seen that baby. I raised babies .... That was a healthy baby. I know a healthy baby when I see one. He wasn’t sickly at all. Something’s wrong. And [mother] called her sister and said the same thing, that the baby died. [Mother] had told the church and her minister that the baby had died. Everybody thought the baby had died for a while.’’ (Emphasis added.)
After these additional lies, obviously mother did not tell grandmother of the baby’s immediate adoption. Not only did mother testify that the family just “left it alone,” but also the record is devoid of any other evidence suggesting that her family or church members, who lived in the same town as mother, attempted to ascertain her veracity on any of these occasions.
In addition to deceiving members of her close family and church with her lies, mother was obviously successful in deceiving the lawyer appointed to represent the father’s interests at the original adoption proceeding. In reliance upon mother’s lies, the lawyer repeated the deceits in her own affidavit filed with the court. Mother not only deceived this attorney and the adoption services agency, but she also deceived the adoptive parents and their lawyers. There is no evidence that any of these people attempted to ascertain mother’s veracity. Yet inherent in the trial court’s unchallenged finding of mother’s fraud is a finding that they all reasonably relied upon her lies and reasonably failed to act as a result. Mother’s lies also ultimately deceived the trial court judge who initially granted the adoption.
It may be argued that, unlike these numerous people, father had suspicions which are contained in the record. A closer look at this evidence, however — his purported express suspicions and his conduct implying he harbored suspicions — reveals they were not truly suspicions.
Father’s alleged suspicions.
Father testified he did not undertake any independent efforts to determine the truth or falsity of what mother was telling him about the abortion because “I didn’t question it.” He further testified that he was never aware of any prior dishonesty in their relation*644ship. She hid her continued pregnancy; according to him, she talked on the phone as if nothing happened. He testified that even when she called the day after the baby was bom, there was no evidence at all that would alert him to a birth. He also testified, and mother confirmed during her testimony, that she repeatedly and consistently told him that she was fine and would be returning to him in New York City “in the very near future.”
As for the suspicions father purportedly expressed to mother, he explained them in his deposition, which was later read at trial:
“Q. Were you . . . suspicious about whether or not she was telling you the truth [about the abortion]?
“A. It was- — -it was — I mean, don’t think I’m a type of witch doctor here, all right? But it’s like I was sleeping, and when I asked my grandfather — my mother is like, why are you sleeping so much? You got somebody pregnant? And I’m saying to myself, like, I had somebody pregnant, you know, but never telling them, like, yeah, I had somebody pregnant. So I’m thinking, like, why is everybody that’s older asking me, you know, why are you sleeping? Why are you gaining weight? Why you — I’m thinking, like, these are all things they say men go through when they get somebody pregnant. So every time somebody would ask me, I'd be like, [Mother], are you sure you’re not pregnant? Because I’m — it was that type of conversation. You sure you’re not pregnant, [Mother]? Because I’m. gaining ten pounds. Or [Mother], you sure you’re not pregnant because I’m sleeping all the time, always lazy. It had nothing to do with, like, I think she’s pregnant. Because if I thought that she was pregnant, then I probably would have gotten an investigator to come out here and seen and try to find her. But, I mean, if I — I could only believe what she told me. If she told me- — if she told me that she had the abortion and she wasn’t pregnant and she was coming up here [to New York] to see me, that’s a throw-off fact. Well, she can’t [still] be pregnant if she’s saying she’s coming up here to see me. That’s the furthest thing from my mind. I just want to see her.” (Emphasis added.).
Adoptive parents’ counsel then pointed out to the father that despite mother’s repeated assurances about coming back to New York from Kansas, she never did:
“Q. Yeah, but she never came.
“A. Exactly.
“Q. Excuse me. Month after month after month after month after month she put you off.
“A. Uh-huh.
*645“Q. Would say, I’m coming home. I’m coming home for St. Patty’s Day. I’m coming home for Easter.
“A. Uh-huh.
“Q. And she didn’t come.
“A. Exactly.
“Q. And didn’t that make you the least bit suspicious about what she was up to?
“A. No. I didn’t think that anybody would have been pregnant by me or anybody and not tell them that they was pregnant. That’s the furthest thing from my mind, that this woman is carrying my child.” (Emphasis added.)
Adoptive parents’ counsel persisted with the suspicion line of inquiry in his deposition. Father returned to his earlier explanation:
“Q. . . . And was there a little voice inside of you that was saying, I think she might be trying to hide a he?
“A. I gained 10 — I was coming in at 200 pounds. I’m 230 now.
“Q. Is that a yes or a no?
“A. The only reason why I asked [mother], was she pregnant, any time I asked her, because I would ask my grandfather, for example, Pop, you got anything for fatigue, because I’m tired, you know. My grandfather does this tea stuff where you put tea in vinegar and drink this, it will give you a burst of energy. Right? And he like, boy, it seem like you’re making bones. And I ask him, what is making bones? He says, well, somebody’s pregnant. And this is them telling me somebody’s pregnant. You know?” (Emphasis added.)
Father then testified that he truly wanted to forget about the whole abortion situation and explained why:
“A. . . . Quite honestly, 1 wanted to forget about the whole — the whole abortion situation. I wanted forget — I wanted to forget about that, so I wasn’t constantly every time I speak to her, are you pregnant, are you pregnant? You’re telling me you’re not, you’re pregnant, you’re pregnant. I wouldn’t do that. My grandmother passed away. I felt like the abortion was a punishment from God for her leaving me. So I wouldn’t have never — I was trying to stay away from that subject. I felt like 1 was being punished for having the abortion. So God came down and took grandma.
“Q. When did you lose your grandmother?
“A. In April [2004].” (Emphasis added.)
The death of father’s grandmother, and the feeling he had for why she had died, was also his explanation for what little, if any, communication he had with mother in May and June.
“I kinda strayed away from her [mother], because my grandmother passed away, and like I said, I thought I was being punished for having abortion, and I didn’t *646want to speak to the person that I was being punished/or, so I thought the best thing for me to do was just stay away from her until I could be able to handle my situation.” (Emphasis added.)
As for the suspicions purportedly evidenced by father’s purchase of earrings in December 2004 for the daughter he told his friend that he “knew” he had, the full explanation is contained in the following deposition testimony:
“Q.....The question was whether you ever bought any baby clothes I assume in anticipation of having a baby girl. . . .
“A. I bought — let me put this on the record. I bought two earrings, a set of earrings, thinking that I had a daughter. Well, just keep saying I had a daughter. Told it to my best friend. His name is [D.T.]. And [D.T.] looked at me and said, you don’t have no kids, man. This was on Christmas — this is on Christmas Eve. I bought a set. Most people buy one earring. I bought a set. And I made a comment, like, well, when I have a daughter, I’m going to take both these out, put them in her ear, so it won’t be — it’s not like I’m wasting money.
“Q. And that would have been Christmas of what year?
“A. That’s just this past Christmas.
“Q. 2004.
“A Yeah.
“Q. So it is fair to say you had some intuition, something internal was going on that didn’t feel right about what [mother] was telling you or doing?
“A. I don’t know — I don’t know if it was what she was telling me, but I was — I was constantly — I was — I was sad, thinking that I had had that — that she had an abortion, and I was dealing with that. And I also was on — I just- — I don’t know if — if that was my way of grieving saying like I had a daughter, I could have had a daughter. I mean, because when you tell a person — when you tell a person that don’t have no kids — I’m—at the time I’m 35 years old. What am I having abortions for? I’m not young. I hadn’t got raped. So what am I— what am I having abortions for? You know. Then you have somebody that— like I stated earlier, that you don’t argue with, so why not? So yeah, I was going through something. I was going through something to the fact, well, I was hoping that I had a kid, but thinking that she gave up the kid, and still couldn’t go at her the way I wanted to go at her, because I’m figuring well, she’s grieving like I’m grieving, because I know what I was feeling.
“Q. I’m not sure I understand that response at all. When you’re talking about her grieving, are you talking about her grieving as a result of placing the child for adoption?
“A. No.
“Q. You’re talking about—
*647“A. For her having abortion. I never knew — I never knew about no adoption. I never knew about adoptions. I never knew that she was still pregnant. I never knew she gave the baby up for adoption.” (Emphasis added.)
Father s trial testimony was consistent with the “someday a daughter” deposition testimony:
“Q. And your testimony today is that you were buying these earrings in anticipation of a daughter being bom some day?
“A. But I also said in the deposition when I get a daughter. I mean—
“Q. You also told it to your best friend that you were getting these for a daughter and he said you don’t have no kids, man?
“A. Exactly.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the purported evidence of “his suspicions” should be analyzed with his testimony of his reaction when the mother eventually told him the truth — that he was a father:
“December 24, the night she [mother] called me. . . . It wasn’t about our child. It was about [M., the father of her other child, N.] and [mother.] In that conversation she was telling me when [M.] got mad at her, he wouldn’t pay attention to [N.].
“ . . . I said if [N.] was my child you wouldn’t have to worry about that.
“And I went into this big thing about how if I had a child how I would act towards my child, and I heard her crying in the background and I said what’s wrong. And I thought at the time that she started to cry that I was sparking— opening up old wounds like maybe she’s depressed about the abortion, and I said, I’m sorry, I’m sorry, and she said, no, no, don’t be sorry. I was, like, you understand what I’m saying, [mother]? I kept going on. And she was like you got a child and I like you have a child — I have a child and she said, yeah, you have a child. And she still was crying so she was trying to work through the emotions of crying, and I just was in shock. And I think she was still on the phone. I ran upstairs and told my mother. I was like I got a child and my mother looked at me almost like boy, get out of my room, two o’clock in the morning you talking about you got a child.
“And I ran back downstairs and picked up the phone and I said well, what did I have? And then I thought, I was like well, what did I have and then she stated a boy. And I was, like, where are you, . . . how do I get to you, where are you at? She kept crying and crying. . . . [A]nd she was, like, wait a minute, ... I gave him up for adoption. I said, why would you do that? So in the likes of me being happy about the situation, it was more like a downfall.” (Emphasis added.)
Father s failure to physically check in Kansas.
The majority also appears to criticize father for failing to ascertain mother s veracity by physically checking on her in Kansas. As *648mentioned above, he testified that he did not try to locate her in Kansas because she kept saying she was coming “home.” According to him, “Every holiday that came about . . . [she would say] I’m going to come up . . . [and] she would like lead me to think that she was coming, she was coming, she was coming, she was coming. Never seen her. Now I know why.”
Father testified that even after she told him that she had received the abortion, “We still was on the phone, and she still said she was going to come back next month every month. I offered to buy her a plane ticket if that was the problem.” Mother confirmed this fact, testifying, “He asked me when I was going to see a doctor, and I told him when I get back. That was my answer for everything, when I get back [to New York].” On being asked whether he ever asked her for the name of her OB/GYN doctor in Kansas, she responded, “I was planning on going back to New York, so why would I have an OB/GYN here?”
The Kansas house phone number.
The majority also criticizes the father for failing to follow up regarding the Kansas house phone number. Mother testified that she felt safe in maintaining her deception when on December 5, 2003, she gave father the phone number of the house where she lived with family members because no one would answer the phone except her: her stepfather never answered the phone, grandmother worked third shift and slept all day, and the sister was in school. According to mother, “he never would have talked to anybody but [me].” She testified that although he would ask if he could speak with grandmother or stepfather, she would tell him “no.” Moreover, he testified mother told him that grandmother did not like him, so “I’m not going to call [grand] mother’s house if she doesn’t like me.” As a result, mother also told him to call at times when grandmother was not even at home. Accordingly, while the majority cites mother’s testimony that grandmother would have told father about mother’s carrying the pregnancy to term if he had simply asked, the “reasonable efforts” analysis should consider that mother took many steps to prevent the two from communicating so father could not ask if he desired to. See, e.g., In re Adoption *649of Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. 454, 464, 866 P.2d 1029 (1994); In re Adoption of F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, 236, 747 P.2d 145 (1987); Adoption of Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 1054, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 898 P.2d 891 (1995), cert. denied sub nom. Mark K v. John S., 516 U.S. 1176 (1996) (once father knows, or reasonably should know, of the pregnancy).
Other father efforts to parent/support.
The majority also criticizes father for failing to grasp numerous opportunities because he failed to provide much, if any, financial support to mother. Mother testified, however, that she never wanted anything from father; she simply wanted this chapter in her fife to close. Accordingly, she never requested that he help with expenses or medical bills. She testified that whenever she did ask father for something, he would always do it. For example, he gave her money during her pregnancy before she left New York. When she told him she needed money to return to New York the month after the alleged abortion, he sent her $200. She also told father that she had her own insurance, i.e., to cover medical expenses of pregnancy and birth and that “cost wouldn’t be a problem.” See, e.g., In re K.D.O., 20 Kan. App. 2d 559, 889 P.2d 1158 (1995) (although father only provided $100 during the pregnancy, mother refused all offers; court held mother interfered with his ability to provide support).
Relationship harmony.
In my view, none of the separate opinions sufficiently consider the delicate situation created between a man and a woman when the woman, especially one who is unwed, becomes pregnant, nor do they sufficiently consider the resultant sensitivity required. As the Supreme Court suggested on the general subject of abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705, reh. denied 410 U.S. 959 (1973):
“Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.”
*650The Supreme Court also acknowledged the delicacy of the pregnancy issue in the marital context in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-70, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976):
“We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife’s pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying. . . . Moreover, we recognize that the decision whether to undergo or to forego an abortion may have profound effects on the future of any marriage, effects that are both physical and mental, and possibly deleterious.”
And as mentioned previously, by law the decision whether to terminate the pregnancy is exclusively the mother s. “The Court has held that ‘when the wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners [the mother’s] can prevail.’ ” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71).
In my view, the sensitivity required by the father is not only an important factor, but also one that must be kept at the forefront. One must consider whether legitimate efforts of the father, designed to ascertain the unwed pregnant woman’s veracity, are nevertheless construed by her as serious assaults on her integrity. When a mother becomes aware of a father’s efforts to ascertain her veracity — whether calling the grandmother or the sister, as the majority suggests, or hiring a detective or coming to Kansas himself — those efforts can backfire. They can tip what already may be a precarious balance into the mother’s unappealable decision to now obtain an abortion because she considers the father’s efforts to be interfering with her unilateral right to abort. A mother might also realistically view the father’s actions as stalking and a danger to her physically. Although the exact reasons are not provided, in Doe v. Queen, 347 S.C. 4, 552 S.E.2d 761 (2001), the pregnant unwed mother signed a criminal warrant against the father with whom she was no longer living and obtained a consent order to prohibit him from going near her for 1 year.
And even assuming no word of the father’s veracity checks gets back to the mother, or if it does and she nevertheless elects to *651remain pregnant, will the father be required to monitor mother s activities for the remainder of the pregnancy “just in case” she changes her mind? And even assuming the mother has not been driven away by father’s actions, how may his actions affect the chances for eventually establishing a good relationship with her for the benefit of the couple and also the child?
These concerns are not theoretical. Based upon mother’s testimony, they were proven real in the instant case. According to her, for a period in May and June of 2004, she terminated telephone contact with father because she felt he questioned whether she was still pregnant after she had informed him months earlier of the abortion. Mother testified that she did not permit the communication to resume until June 25, when her only reason for then calling was to inform father that she had given birth to his son the day before. Once on the phone, however, she could not bring herself to tell him the truth. She testified that although grieving, she told him she was doing fine.

Lehr

The majority relies upon the dissenting opinion in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983), to detail facts indicating mother’s obstruction or interference with the biological father’s rights. It then points to the interference in the instant case. The majority appears to suggest that the Lehr interfering facts did not prevent that court from ruling against the father and, as a result, the interfering facts in the instant case cannot protect the father here. I disagree.
First, to the extent the Lehr dissent’s position could be characterized as promoting an obstructionist-based argument — “but for the actions of the child’s mother there would have been the kind of significant relationship that the majority concedes is entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process protections” (463 U.S. at 271 [White, J. dissenting])^ — it is important to realize that this was not an argument identified by the father in his two appellate briefs or even developed as one at oral arguments. The closest the Lehr majority opinion may be said to acknowledge a possible obstructionist argument and supportive facts is contained in its foot*652note 23 at 265. There, it stated: “There is no suggestion in the record that appellee engaged in fraudulent practices that led appellant not to protect his rights.” As a result, the Lehr dissent’s “obstructionist” facts and arguments clearly had no bearing on the majority’s opinion. Indeed, the majority does not even acknowledge that there is a dissent. The majority simply held that father’s failure to register with the state putative father registration was all that was needed to decide the issue in the case, i.e., “whether New York has adequately protected his opportunity to form such a [developed] relationship [with his child.].” 463 U.S. at 262-63.
Second, even to assume that the “obstructionist” argument had been raised and rejected by the Lehr majority, it still does not affect this father’s rights because of the presence of fraud in the instant case. The Lehr majority’s statement — “no suggestion in the record that appellee engaged in fraudulent practices that led appellant not to protect his rights” — suggests that a fraud allegation would have affected the case’s outcome, or at least would have been considered. Unlike Lehr, fraud was not only alleged in the instant case, but it was also expressly found by the trial court. Moreover, the fraud found was precisely the type identified in Lehr, Le, a mother’s fraud “that led [father] not to protect his rights.” As discussed earlier, an unwed pregnant woman telling a man that she — pursuant to her exclusive constitutional right to so decide — has just terminated the pregnancy would, in his eyes and in the eyes of the law, effectively terminate any rights he might have had as a prospective father. Pursuant to Kansas fraud law, that he would reasonably lead the father to believe he had no recourse. See Dan-forth, 428 U.S. 52; Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308, 100 L. Ed. 2d 909, 108 S. Ct. 2136 (1988).
The majority also points to the putative father registry in Lehr as being available in the instant case because coincidentally both fathers lived in New York. The mother’s fraud here would have made that registration futile. Father undoubtedly would have registered under his true name. The mother’s lies would have resulted in the Kansas court — similar to creating its faulty newspaper notice —sending a different name to the New York registry for eventual *653notification of all men in that state with that name. It is extremely doubtful the natural father would have been notified.
The majority opinion suggests that even if registering in New York were ineffective, it at least would demonstrate that the father took action signifying his desire to grasp opportunities to establish a relationship. Because Kansas has no such registry, we have no history telling us when such a registration should have occurred in the instant case. When this particular man and woman are in a relationship, and she becomes pregnant, does he file as soon as he learns of the pregnancy in order to protect Iris rights? Or does he wait — and file when she leaves New York to visit Kansas relatives because, despite her assurances to return, she may not? Or does he wait until a certain amount of time passes and she has still not returned? Or does he wait until she tells him the pregnancy has been aborted, and he should nevertheless disbelieve her? Or does he wait until sometime afterward — when it becomes clear she is probably not returning to New York and he cannot see for himself if she is still pregnant? And as mentioned, what deleterious effect upon her decision on whether to abort and upon their relationship does her eventual knowledge of such a registration have? A registration essentially says: “Mother, I don’t trust you to tell the truth so I’m filing to protect my rights.”
The same questions and concerns arise about another effort the majority appears to suggest could be taken by the father: filing a paternity action. When does he file, and what message does he send the mother when he does? More particular to this option, should he file even after she tells him she has had an abortion at 4 months? Or would such a legal action be moot, in bad faith, or both? And if she is still pregnant when she files her answer to the petition, will a judge allow him to keep it on file until her due date — just in case she may decide to keep the baby instead of abort? Unlike the majority’s statement regarding a New York statute (287 Kan. 620-21), Kansas law does not appear to allow the filing of a paternity action before birth. So at what later point does he file?
In any event, I readily conclude as a matter of law that the father in the instant case already took enough reasonable steps to establish *654his constitutionally protected parental relationship with his child. There was no notice given before the State took his liberty interest. Accordingly, relief from the judgment should be granted under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4); the judgment is void because it was granted in a manner inconsistent with due process. See Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 221 Kan. 17, 21, 558 P.2d 101 (1976).
If necessary, father should also be granted relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2), i.e., newly discovered evidence. The majority rejects this position, concluding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the natural father, by exercising reasonable diligence, could have discovered the natural mothers Mes about obtaining an abortion and her concealment and adoption of their child.” (Emphasis added.) 287 Kan. at 629. It concludes that “the evidence could have been discovered with minimal diligence.” (Emphasis added.) 287 Kan. at 629.
The primaiy problem with the majority holding on this issue was addressed in the preceding discussion about the judgment being void under subsection (b)(4) of K.S.A. 60-260. Specifically, it is unchallenged that the trial court found fraud. That determination requires clear and convincing evidence, i.e., that the existence of the fraud elements were found to be “highly probable.” In re B.D.Y., 286 Kan. 686, 695-97, 705, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). Necessarily contained within that unchallenged finding is a determination that the father “reasonably” relied upon the “natural mother’s fies about obtaining an abortion and her concealment and adoption of their child.” Yet the trial court denied relief under 60-260(b)(2) because father “should have taken action to verify whether [mother] had an abortion.”
I remain puzzled about how a trial court can find it highly probable that father reasonably relied upon abortion lies to his detriment but then find that father should have discovered those lies with reasonable diligence (State v. Lora, 213 Kan. 184, 194, 515 P.2d 1086 [1973]) or due diligence (K.S.A. 60-260[b][2]). A fortiori, I question how the majority opinion can then conclude that the lies could have been discovered with “minimal” diligence.
We have held that despite an abuse of discretion standard, “ ‘[questions of law are presented when an appellate court seeks *655to review the factors and considerations forming a district court’s discretionary decision.’ ” State v. White, 279 Kan. 326, 332, 109 P.3d 1199 (2005) (quoting Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 270 Kan. 443, 456, 14 P.3d 1170 (2000). In White, we also quoted Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996), which stated: “ ‘A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. . . . The abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.’ ” By the same rationale, here the trial court failed to consider its own ruling on fraud when it denied relief under the newly discovered evidence standard in K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2). Accordingly, at a minimum the matter should be remanded for its consideration and reconciliation.
Remand is unnecessary for this consideration under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2), however, because, as discussed in the earlier analysis under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4), father had a constitutionally protected interest that was taken from him in a manner inconsistent with due process. Accordingly, that particular judgment declaring that he had no interest and approving the adoption is void.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.