Court Opinion

ID: 9573836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:59:45.023521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:25.703180
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: This decision must be controlled by the only competent evidence in the case upon which the trial court made specific findings. These specific findings, in my opinion, are inconsistent with the conclusion ultimately reached by the trial court.
*741It must be conceded under G. S. 1949, 58-501, that a grant of personal property to two or more persons creates in them a tenancy in common with respect to such property unless the language used in such grant makes it clear that a joint tenancy was intended to be created. Here the only written evidence of the contract establishing the grant by Fern Henery was the ledger account with the Havensville State Bank. It was titled “Fern Henery or J. C. Higgins and to the survivor of them upon the death of either.” These are the “magic” words commonly regarded by decisions of this court as clearly creating interests in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. In other words, the intention of the grantor where such words are used is clearly indicated.
Now, if it becomes necessary to go beyond the written evidence of such grant or contract to establish the intention of the grantor, the inquiry should be confined to the time the contract was entered into, without reference to subsequent events or circumstances, since it is only the intention of the grantor at the time of the creation of such account that is material. (See, Brewer v. Schammerhorn, 183 Kan. 739, 332 P. 2d 526.)
With this rule in mind what was the intention of Fern Henery? For many years she had an account in the Havensville State Bank with her husband titled “W. A. Henery or Fern Henery and to the survivor of them upon the death of either.” Her husband died in 1951 or 1952 and as the surviving tenant of such joint account, Fern Henery directed the bank (both Miss McKee, the cashier at the bank, and W. E. Shane, president of the bank, being present) to change her account to read: “Fern Henery or J. C. Higgins and to the survivor of them upon the death of either.” At the time Fern Henery was serving as a temporary employee of the bank and directed Miss McKee to change the ledger sheet. In accordance with the foregoing and other competent evidence in the record the trial court, recognizing the facts to be almost entirely undisputed, found as follows
“The deceased, Fern Henery, and her husband, W. A. Henery, prior to his death in 1951, had an account in defendant bank, titled on the ledger sheet ‘W. A. Henery and Fern Henery and to the survivor of them upon the death of either.’ On January 24, 1952, at which time deceased was an employee in defendant bank, she requested Hazel McKee, cashier of defendant bank, to change the ledger title of her account, to be headed just like her and her husband’s account had been. Miss McKee testified that she answered, ‘Well, go ahead and change it.’ The deceased replied, ‘You *742work here all the time, you change it.’ ‘So we are standing right there together and I changed it. It’s my handwriting.’ Miss McKee further testified that Mr. W. E. Shane, President of the bank, was present at the time. The witness Shane’s testimony is substantially the same as that of Miss McKee’s. Miss McKee then further testified that immediately after this request the title on the ledger sheet was changed ‘while we were working together.’ The evidence disclosed that from that time on the various ledger sheets pertaining to this account, that were received in evidence, carried the title, ‘Fern Henery or J. C. Higgins and to the survivor of them upon the death of either.’ The ledger sheet marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15, disclosing the various items of the account for the month of December, 1958, carried the same title and was written in the handwriting of Fern Henery, the deceased. The evidence disclosed that it was the custom and practice of defendant bank, where the depositors were well known to the bank, not to require signature cards or formal contracts, and there were never any signature cards for the Fern Henery account, either the W. A. and Fern Henery account or the Fern Henery and J. C. Higgins account.”
The record discloses the following testimony of Mr. Shane, the president of the bank:
“Q. As President of the bank, what type of account did you consider this to be?
"A. Well, always considered it a joint account with right of survivorship is what we considered it.
“Q. And, Mr. Shane, did you consider that such an account a joint account with right of survivorship was created right then and there when that entry was made?
“A. I supposed it was.
“Q. As far as you and the depositors were concerned the joint account had been created right then and there?
“A. Yes.
•, “Q. Mr. Shane, as President of the bank, and on behalf of the bank, did you consider that a joint bank account had been created at that time, that very day, that the change was made?
“A. Yes.
“Q. It was your testimony, was it not, that she desired it to be changed to the same type and form as was previously carried on the face of that ledger sheet when she and her husband held it?
“A. That was the conversation.”
The record further discloses that Fern Henery was an intelligent Woman, had been an executive officer of the First National Bank of Havensville at one time, and was also a large stockholder in the bank — “perhaps a controlling interest.” When Mr. Shane was asked whether he ever had any discussions with her relative to the nature of a joint account, he answered: “No. She knew what a joint account was.” Mr. Shane further testified that at no time was *743a signature card required of Fern Henery or J. C. Higgins, and that he was familiar with the signatures of both of them. This was given as the reason why signature cards were not required of them.
Where it becomes material to establish the intention of a person at a given time concerning a given transaction this may be proved by evidence of two types: (1) The statements made at that time by the person whose intention it is sought to establish, including the circumstances surrounding such statements, and (2) acts of such person which evidence his or her intention. In my opinion, evidence of all activity in the account subsequent to its creation and prior to the death of Fern Henery is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial as being subsequent to the event concerning which the intention of Fern Henery is material.
Even if such subsequent acts be regarded as material, they do not establish an intention inconsistent with the creation of a joint account with right of survivorship. (See cases reviewed in Malone v. Sullivan, 136 Kan. 193, 14 P. 2d 647.)
The fact that J. C. Higgins knew nothing of the creation of , this joint checking account, and did not appear with Fern Henery at the bank when it was established, is immaterial. The legal significance of the contract entered into between Fern Henery and the bank was the creation of a joint account with the right of survivor-ship, wherein J. C. Higgins was a third party donee beneficiary. In Goeken v. Bank, 104 Kan. 370, 179 Pac. 321, it was held:
“A person may avail himself of a promise made by a second party to a third for the benefit of the first, although the latter was not a party to it and had no knowledge of it when made.” (Syl. f 2.)
Although stated in various ways, this point of law has been affirmed in Weld v. Carey, 122 Kan. 666, 253 Pac. 235; Derby Oil Co. v. McPherson Gas Co., 142 Kan. 373, 46 P. 2d 872; West v. Sims, 153 Kan. 248, 109 P. 2d 479; Haynes Hardware Co. v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 156 Kan. 356, 133 P. 2d 574; Holmes v. Kalbach, 173 Kan. 736, 252 P. 2d 603, and cases cited therein.
Insofar as acceptance is required by J. C. Higgins it may be presumed where, as here, the contract is beneficial and there is no evidence to the contrary. (Wellman v. Knapp, 126 Kan. 473, 268 Pac. 817.)
In Malone v. Sullivan, supra, the court was confronted with a joint savings account in a bank, and various rules applicable to cases of this type were announced. There the trial court concluded that a joint tenancy account had not been created, but on appeal *744this court reversed on the ground the findings of the trial court compelled a contrary conclusion holding the arrangement was essentially contractual, not subject to recision or cancellation, and binding on all three parties, thus holding the account to be one of joint tenancy with right of survivorship. In the Malone case many decisions from other jurisdictions were reviewed, and the tenor of some which are very similar to the instant case on the facts hold that a joint account with right of survivorship was established.
Clearly, Spark v. Brown, 167 Kan. 159, 205 P. 2d 938, involving the ownership of a share certificate in a building and loan association, has many features which distinguish it from the case presently before the court. There Henry J. Spark made application for a savings share account in the Wichita Federal Savings and Loan Association for individual membership, and he signed no application for a joint membership with any person. The account, which was brought into court by the president of the association at the time of the trial, showed three names, but there was no evidence as to when or by whom those names were added to the account, and the account itself did not state anything about the rights of a survivor. Furthermore, the rules of the association were that moneys deposited in the savings share account could be withdrawn only upon the presentation of a pass book by some person entitled thereto, and the pass book issued to Henry J. Spark was one for an individual account of Henry J. Spark.
The undisputed evidence in the instant case discloses the Plavensville State Bank required no pass book concerning deposits or withdrawals from a checking account.
In my opinion, it is somewhat revolting to think of the many joint bank accounts in Kansas, where the surviving joint owner may ultimately be subjected to suit by an executor or administrator on the question of the grantor’s intention, because the words “A or B and to the survivor of them upon the death of either” have been used in creating the account by so titling the ledger sheets in such account, and where this is the only written evidence of the contract establishing the account. On the question of the grantor’s intention the grantor’s lips are sealed by death, and in many instances the lips of the surviving joint owner will be sealed by the so-called “dead man statute” regarding statements made by the decedent. (G. S. 1949, 60-2804.)
It is respectfully submitted the trial court should be reversed.