Court Opinion

ID: 9633738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:58:33.834164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:41.417130
License: Public Domain

Guy, J.
(dissenting)—Resolution of Beaman's contract claim does not require determination of issues within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board). Accordingly, Supreme Court precedent compels the *713conclusion that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not preempt Beaman's contract claim.
As the majority points out, Yakima Valley Disposal refused to allow Beaman to grieve his discharge, in part because it alleged the union had abandoned its interest in representing the workers. Yet, Valley now asserts the NLRA preempts Beaman's contract claim. This could be interpreted as allowing Valley to have it both ways, which at a minimum is patently unfair to Beaman. More significantly, there is no precedent that would support finding preemption on the basis of the record before this court.
Section 301
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 provides in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
This provision has been interpreted to preempt inconsistent local rules in order to provide uniformity. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985) (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972, 77 S. Ct. 912 (1957)) and Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 7 L. Ed. 2d 593, 82 S. Ct. 571 (1962)). It has been construed to govern claims founded directly on rights created by collective bargaining agreements and claims "'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.'" Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987) (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Heckler, 481 U.S. 851, 95 L. Ed. 2d 791, 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987)).
However, section 301 does not provide the Board with general jurisdiction over all breaches of collective bargaining agreements. NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 427, 17 L. Ed. 2d 486, 87 S. Ct. 559 (1967). Most importantly, Congress rejected a bill that would have given *714the Board jurisdiction over all such breaches. C&C Plywood, at 427. Thus, while the Board retains authority to interpret unfair labor charges, it has no jurisdiction to determine individual rights under a collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp., supra.
Moreover, section 301 says nothing about the content or validity of individual employment contracts. Caterpillar, at 394. Such contracts are outside the jurisdiction of the Board. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 340, 88 L. Ed. 762, 64 S. Ct. 576 (1944). Consequently, an individual covered by a collective bargaining agreement may under state law assert legal rights independent of that agreement, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective bargaining agreement and provided that application of state law does not require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Caterpillar, at 396 (citing J.I. Case, at 339); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
Since interpretation of individual contract rights lies outside the jurisdiction of the Board even where a collective bargaining agreement is in force, it follows that state courts have the jurisdiction to determine individual contract rights where no such agreement exists. It is undisputed that no collective bargaining agreement exists in this case.
No Unfair Labor Practices/No Jurisdiction
In Beaman's case it is undisputed that no collective bargaining agreement exists and that his claim is premised upon an individual contract that does not require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. The majority, however, concludes that Beaman's claim is preempted because resolution of the alleged breach might involve discussion of issues that may have occurred in the failed collective bargaining process between Valley and the union. The majority, however, does not explain how such discussion would relate to determination of Beaman's contract claim. It incorrectly concludes that there are potential unfair labor practices warranting preemption.
*715In Beaman's case, the majority fails to show what conduct might constitute bad faith impasse or that the terms of the final implemented offer varied from the expired collective bargaining agreement and were unilaterally imposed by Valley. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 8 L. Ed. 2d *716230, 82 S. Ct. 1107 (1962) (unilateral change in employment conditions by employer violates the duty to "bargain collectively" imposed by § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA).
To the contrary, the record discloses that the terms of the final implemented offer do not differ notably from the expired collective bargaining agreement, thereby leading to the conclusion that there were no Katz unilateral changes by Valley and, thus, no unfair labor practice. Compare Clerk's Papers, at 29 with Clerk's Papers, at 91-92. Perhaps more significantly, although a party to the expired collective bargaining agreement and the final implemented offer, Valley fails to allege any specific unfair labor activity on the union's part.
In discussing the facts necessary to show that conduct is arguably prohibited by the NLRA, the Supreme Court has held "that the party claiming pre-emption is required to demonstrate that his case is one that the Board could legally decide in his favor." International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 395, 90 L. Ed. 2d 389, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986). With the record barren of both employer and union activity upon which to infer an unfair labor practice occurred, it is not possible to conclude that preemption is justified premised solely upon Valley's factually unsupported assertions that issues as to impasse, good faith bargaining, and the final implemented offer might arise.
Moreover, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) sets forth a statute of limitation for filing unfair labor practices with the Board. See also DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476, 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983). Section 160(b) provides in relevant part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board . . . shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect . . . Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board . . ..
*715Initially, a contract violation is not of itself an unfair labor practice, even where the contract is a collective bargaining agreement. 1 C. Morris, Developing Labor Law 909 (2d ed. 1983); NLRB v. Los Angeles Yuma Freight Lines, 446 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1971); Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235 F.2d 401, 405 (3d Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Pennwoven, Inc., 194 F.2d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 1952); see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483, 82 S. Ct. 519 (1962). Beaman alleges breach of a promise of specific treatment under his employment contract and nothing more. The majority fails to show how this alleged breach in any way resembles an unfair labor practice cognizable by the Board.
Further, the majority maintains that under the "arguably subject to" test of Garmon, there are possible issues as to impasse, good faith bargaining, the legal status of the union, Valley's refusal to deal with the union, and the status of the final implemented offer that arguably would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Board. See generally San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959); majority opinion, at 705-06. The majority does not provide specific facts demonstrating conduct on the part of either the union or Valley that would constitute a cognizable unfair labor practice under section 8 of the NLRA. In those cases relied upon by the majority, the courts have identified the type of conduct comprising the alleged unfair labor practice or otherwise protected labor activity warranting preemption. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, supra (union picketing of employer that formed basis of state court injunction might constitute unfair labor practice under section 8 or comprise protected concerted activity under section 7 thereby justifying preemption).
*716(Some italics mine.)
*717The statute begins to run at the time the plaintiff either was aware of or should have been aware of the injury. Farr v. H.K. Porter Co., 727 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Benson v. General Motors Corp., 716 F.2d 862, 864 (11th Cir. 1983)). See also DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, supra. Of those potential violations raised by Valley, the final offer implemented June 1, 1986, would be the last possible unfair labor practice in the sequential chain of the collective bargaining process. Assuming there were problems with the final offer, the statute of limitation would begin to accrue at the date of implementation. To date, neither the union nor Valley has filed any unfair labor charges and aré now time barred from doing so.
While the Board's jurisdiction is not necessarily displaced by failure to file within the statute of limitation, both the union's and Valley's failure to do so supports an inference that the violations Valley suggests may have occurred do not in fact exist. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 2d 601, 77 S. Ct. 598 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 1 L. Ed. 2d 613, 77 S. Ct. 604 (1957).
Thus, Beaman's claim that the Board cannot provide him with the relief he seeks is correct. Not only is the Board time barred from hearing his grievance, but the Supreme Court has stated that "the injury" involved here, breach of promise with respect to employment, "has no relevance to the Board's function” and that the "Board can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other relief". Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 511, 77 L. Ed. 2d 798, 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983) (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 63, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582, 86 S. Ct. 657 (1966)).
The majority suggests that the unavailability of relief is irrelevant, stating: ”[T]he fact that a given remedy cannot be granted by the NLRB does not necessarily mean his claim is not preempted." Majority opinion, at 710-11. To support this assertion, it refers to Garmon, which held: *718"[S]ince remedies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation, to allow the State to grant a remedy here which has been withheld from the National Labor Relations Board only accentuates the danger of conflict." Garmon, at 247; see also majority opinion, at 709.
However, in Garmon, unlike Beaman's case, the Board determined it had jurisdiction over the matter, but withheld it. Nowhere did the Court suggest that the preemption announced in Garmon applied where the Board had no jurisdiction to begin with. To hold otherwise would contradict the rationale that prompted Garmon, which is recognition of the need for uniform interpretation of sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. In Beaman's case, unlike Garmon, the majority fails to identify any cognizable unfair labor practices. Therefore, the Board has no jurisdiction.
Garmon Preemption
Assuming the majority is correct that there may be issues constituting unfair labor practices the Board should decide, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cy. Dist. Coun. of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 56 L. Ed. 2d 209, 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978) and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra, compel the conclusion that Beaman's cause of action is not preempted under Garmon even where the unfair labor practice violations fall within section 8 of the NLRA. As in those cases, the relationship between Beaman's claim and any potential violation of section 8 is too attenuated to justify preemption.
Garmon preemption protects the primary jurisdiction of the Board in determining what constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Majority opinion, at 704 (quoting Garmon, at 244-45). Under Garmon, where an activity is "arguably subject to" section 7 or 8, state action is preempted by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Garmon, at 245. In interpreting the scope of this phrase, the Supreme Court has stated:
"Our cases indicate . . . that inflexible application of the [Garmon] doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct *719at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme."
(Italics mine.) Sears, at 188 (quoting Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 302, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338, 97 S. Ct. 1056 (1977)).
Thus, the Court has refused to apply Garmon in a literal, mechanical fashion and instead has determined whether preemption is appropriate by focusing upon the nature of the particular interest being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of permitting the state court to proceed. Sears, at 188-89 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180, 17 L. Ed. 2d 842, 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967)).
The Sears Court held that the touchstone or "critical inquiry" under Garmon is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application, but whether the controversy presented to the state court is "identical" to or different from that which could have been presented to the Board. Sears, at 197; see also majority opinion, at 708. It is only in the former situation that a state court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine was designed to avoid. Sears, at 197.
Thus, accepting arguendo Valley's assertion that violations of sections 8(a)(5) or (d) may have occurred, preemption is not warranted unless the resulting unfair labor controversy was identical to or at least roughly similar to Beaman's individual breach of contract claim. In that regard, the majority concludes that resolution of Beaman's contract claim might involve discussion of potential violations of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA. Those sections govern the collective bargaining process between employer and union. They impose a mandatory duty upon the employer to meet with and bargain in good faith with a representative of the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d); majority opinion, at 705-06.
*720Consequently, to justify preemption under Garmon, Beaman's breach of contract claim must be identical to the issues of impasse, good faith bargaining, and the status of the final offer that would be reserved for the Board. The majority not only fails to show that the controversy would be identical, it fails to show that there is a controversy.
Beaman's claim is based upon Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). See majority opinion, at 700. Under Thompson, to sustain his claim, Beaman must establish a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, that the promise induced the employee to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, and that the promise was breached. Thompson, at 230. Because consideration by the individual employee is required to establish a contract under Thompson, unilateral implementation of an offer alone cannot establish a right based upon the contract.
Given these considerations, a state court would be concerned with whether there was a valid employment contract between Valley and Beaman under Thompson and whether Valley breached that contract. In contrast, the Board would be concerned with whether the union and Valley collectively bargained in good faith, whether impasse was reached in good faith, and whether the final implemented offer contained Katz unilateral changes. Consideration of one is wholly irrelevant to the resolution of the other. Thus, preemption is inappropriate.
Moreover, Belknap supports the conclusion that preemption is not warranted. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 77 L. Ed. 2d 798, 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld state court adjudication of a claim brought by an employee alleging wrongful discharge. The facts of Belknap support preemption far more strongly than do the facts in Beaman's case; nevertheless, the Court found no preemption.
In Belknap, the union engaged in a strike after impasse was reached during the renegotiation of an expired collective bargaining agreement. The employer hired replacement *721workers and told them that the jobs were permanent positions. The strike was subsequently settled and the employer fired some of the replacement workers to make room for returning strikers. Belknap, at 494-96. Under the provisions of the NLRA, the employer is obligated to reinstate employees who strike to protest unfair labor practices. Belknap, at 508 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278, 100 L. Ed. 2d 309, 76 S. Ct. 349 (1956)). Thus, because the strike could be characterized as one to protest unfair labor practices, the employer arguably had to fire the replacement workers to avoid unfair labor charges. Belknap, at 508; 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (It should be noted that the majority did not disagree with this statement. See Belknap, at 508.)
The fired replacement workers sought damages in state court alleging misrepresentation and breach of contract. Belknap, at 496-97. The employer argued that resolution of the claims would necessarily involve section 8 of the NLRA and, thus, Garmon preemption should apply.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Reasoning that the issues arising under section 8 and the breach of contract claims were not identical, the Court found no preemption, even though success in state court would ultimately result in damage awards for the firing of the employees, which was arguably compelled by the NLRA. Belknap, at 510. As in Sears, the Court identified the "identical controversy" inquiry as the crucial factor, with the results of that inquiry determining no preemption. Belknap, at 510.
As in Belknap and Sears, allowing Beaman to proceed in state court would not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Board. An award of damages for breach of contract would not in any way preclude the Board's determination of potential unfair labor practices. Allowing employees to benefit from the terms of individual contracts does not conflict with the need to protect the collective bargaining process. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, supra. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that such individual contracts may exist *722and be enforceable in the collective bargaining context, stating:
Men may continue work after a collective agreement expires and, despite negotiation in good faith, the negotiation may be deadlocked or delayed; in the interim express or implied individual agreements may be held to govern.
J.I. Case, at 337.
It is important to note that such contracts could not justify a refusal to bargain collectively, nor could they supersede the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. J.I. Case, at 339. In short, individual contracts may not be used to defeat the policies of the NLRA. J.I. Case, at 337. Since no collective bargaining agreement exists, however, Beaman's contract claim cannot create such a conflict.
In J.I. Case, the J.I. Case Company had entered into individual employment contracts with its employees. Subsequently, after the contracts were in effect, the union was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. It asked the company to bargain; however, Case refused. J.I. Case, at 333-34. The Board found this refusal to bargain collectively constituted an unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court agreed; but it modified the Board's order so that the contracts would not in any way limit the individual employee's right to bargain collectively. J.I. Case, at 341. In doing so, the Court carefully preserved the employees' right to recover for breaches of individual contracts unless those contracts were superseded by a collective bargaining agreement. J.I. Case, at 342.
Thus, J.I. Case not only permits an employee to seek damages for breach of promises made while collective bargaining negotiations are ensuing, it allows the employee to proceed in state court even where the employer committed an unfair labor practice in making the promise.
Moreover, Beaman's claim is of peripheral concern to the ÑLRA. See Belknap, at 509. Washington's interest in applying Thompson as a method of providing a remedy to its citizens for breach of contract outweighs the Board's *723discrete concern with unfair labor practices. Belknap, at 512.
Finally, in the wake of Belknap, the Michigan Court of Appeals found no preemption of a wrongful discharge claim based on a unilateral contract theory. See Roberts v. Automobile Club, 138 Mich. App. 488, 360 N.W.2d 224 (1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). Like Beaman, Roberts based his cause of action on a Michigan case which, like Thompson, modifies the employment-at-will doctrine through a unilateral contract theory. Roberts, at 491 (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)).
Roberts squarely rejects the argument that sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) preempt a wrongful discharge claim made under Garmon, the precise claim at issue here. The Michigan court recognized that in resolving Roberts' claim, the state court would determine whether there was an implied employment contract and whether it was breached. Roberts, at 497. In contrast, it noted that the Board's focus would involve whether the defendants had bargained in good faith. It further concluded, in accordance with Belknap, that the states' interest in adjudicating contractual disputes outweighed any possible interference with the federal labor laws. Roberts, at 497.
Not only does the majority summarily dismiss Roberts, in which the issues are substantially similar to the issues in this case, it fails to apply properly the Sears-Belknap "identical controversy" test which the Supreme Court has identified as critical. It attempts to distinguish Sears by suggesting that there was no management-labor relationship between Sears and the union picketers. Majority opinion, at 709-10. It incorrectly contrasts this alleged lack of relationship to that between Valley and Beaman and concludes that because a management-labor relationship exists between them, Sears is distinguishable. Contrary to the majority's position, the Sears Court specifically stated that sections 7, 8(b)(4)(D) and 8(b)(7)(C) arguably applied to the picketers, thus treating the relationship as one between *724management and labor. Further, union attempts to secure employer compliance with prevailing wage standards, to gain recognition, and to force the employer to hire union members are all aspects of labor-management relations. See Sears, at 185-87.
The majority also points out that the replacement workers in Belknap did not base their argument on a current or expired agreement between the employer and the union. Significantly, neither does Beaman. Rather, he bases his claim upon his supervisor's promise to him. Majority opinion, at 700.
Conclusion
In reaching its conclusion of preemption, the majority applies Garmon in a literal, mechanical fashion and distinguishes binding precedent on untenable grounds. In doing so, it fails to analyze the nature of the claims being asserted and the resulting effect upon the administration of the national labor policies. Further, the majority fails to identify what unfair labor practices occurred. Nor does it compare the alleged unfair practices with the unilateral contract claim to determine if, in fact, a conflict will result.
In sum, other than reliance upon a factually unsupported statement by Valley that unfair labor practices may have occurred, there is no support for a finding of preemption. Consequently, I would reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings on Beaman's implied contract claim under Thompson.
Dore, C.J., and Utter, J., concur with Guy, J.