Court Opinion

ID: 9688462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:48:28.338885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:20.059909
License: Public Domain

Garfield, J.
(dissenting in part) — I agree with Division I of the majority opinion except the statement therein that the case must be reversed for instruction errors. The verdict finds adequate support in the evidence and I would be slow to reverse the judgment entered thereon.
I. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding in Divisions II and III it was reversible error to instruct that evidence of testator’s menial conditiooi (not mental weakness) may be considered as bearing upon his susceptibility to undue influence.
Instruction 3 plainly states the issue of mental unsoundness has not been established, is withdrawn from the jury and they *361should consider it established that testator had testamentary-capacity when he executed his will. The instruction then says: “Although the issue of testamentary capacity has been withdrawn, yet there is left in the case evidence which has been introduced to show the mental condition of Henry J. Hurlbut. You may consider such evidence as bearing upon his susceptibility to undue influence, if any, and upon his powers to resist the same.”
The only objection in the trial court to this part of instruction 3 is that it permits the jury “to bring back into the case the issue of mental incompetency, and when that issue was taken from the jury it was taken as a whole and there was no attempt' * * * to offer evidence of the mental condition of Henry J. Hurlblit as affects his susceptibility to undue influence.” Of course no other objection to the instruction can be urged here. Rule 196, R. C. P.
Certainly the quoted part of instruction 3 does not “bring back into the case the issue of mental incompetency” as proponent contends. Nor does the majority so hold. The instruction is not vulnerable to proponent’s objection. Nor does it lead the jury to believe, as the majority seems to feel, that “mental condition” means only “mental weakness.” Plainly the two terms have different meaning.
There is neither reason nor authority to support the majority holding that such an instruction is proper only where there is evidence of mental weakness. At least this court has never before so held.
The quoted part of instruction 3 obviously was taken from the third instruction in Hansen v. Waugh, 237 Iowa 304, 316, 21 N.W.2d 762, 768. It is a verbatim copy of the portion of the instruction there quoted except for testator’s name and the use of “his” for “her.” In the cited case the only ground of the contest and of course the only issue submitted was undue influence. We there approve the instruction, stating, “There was evidence of Rikka’s mental condition in the record and the instruction was proper. In re Estate of Eiker, 233 Iowa 315, 6 N.W.2d 318. See, also, Shaw v. Duro, 234 Iowa 778, 783, 14 N.W.2d 241.” We do not say there was evidence of Rikka’s mental weakness which rendered the instruction proper.
*362So there is evidence here of testator’s mental condition and the instruction was proper. The majority opinion refers to three items of such evidence — that testator was of sound mind when his will was made and, from two witnesses, that he was of strong mind. If, as the majority apparently feels, this were all the testimony as to testator’s mental condition this part of instruction 3 would not be prejudicial to proponent-appellant since it calls attention to testimony favorable to her.
However, there is other evidence which bears on testator’s mental condition. In December 1948, he was “very worried, cried and was very upset.” In January 1949, a witness saw him in the railroad station at Madison crying. After this he seemed in great pain or strain. On June 28, 1949 (the will was made June 18, thirty-two days before death caused by cancer from which he had long suffered), he asked the train dispatcher to be relieved from duty, started to cry and the dispatcher “assumed he was all done.” On July 14, there is evidence from two witnesses he was in a stupor, did not know what was going on and was unable to recognize his son, daughter-in-law or son-in-law.
The record in Hansen v. Waugh, supra, 237 Iowa 304, 21 N.W.2d 762, shows that the paragraph of the instruction (withdrawing the issue of testamentary capacity) there considered, preceding the portion quoted in the cited opinion, is substantially the same as the paragraph preceding the portion of instruction 3 hereinbefore quoted. The setting of the two paragraphs of the instructions in the two cases is identical. Further, the record and arguments in the Waugh case disclose that proponent urged in the trial court and this court the objection that the instruction left with the jury the impression “mental condition” referred to “mental weakness” which rendered testatrix susceptible to undue influence and there was no evidence of mental weakness. This is the objection the majority raises to instruction 3 here. Proponent’s argument in the Waugh case upon this proposition cites the same decision (In re Will of Muhr, 218 Iowa 867, 256 N.W. 305) appellant has cited here. The majority decision sustains substantially the same contention that is rejected in Hansen' v. Waugh and seems to be in direct conflict with the cited case.
*363Instruction 3 in Hansen v. Waugh, supra, was probably-patterned after instruction 11 quoted in In re Estate of Eiker, supra (page 326 of 233 Iowa, page 324 of 6 N.W.2d), where the jury was told that although the issue of testamentary capacity was withdrawn, the evidence to show mental strength or weakness may be considered as bearing upon undue influence as charged. The Eiker opinion states (page 327): “We are satisfied that the evidence did tend to' prove mental weakness. There was no issue of unsoundness of mind in the case. The issue withdrawn by the court was testamentary capacity. The terms are not synonymous. * * * There is no reversible error in this instruction.”
In Shaw v. Duro, supra, 234 Iowa 778, 783, 784, 14 N.W.2d 241, 244, the issue of testamentary capacity was withdrawn, only undue influence was submitted to the jury. We said, “This court has frequently held * * * we may take into account the physical condition and strength of mind of a person whose will is under consideration. [ Citations.] ”
In In re Will of Soderland, 239 Iowa 569, 575, 30 N.W.2d 128, 131, the question of mental capacity was withdrawn from the jury, only undue influence was submitted. We said, “While the question of mental capacity was withdrawn by the court, the mental condition of the deceased has a bearing upon the question of undue influence.” (Italics added.) Referring to an instruction, we state (page 584 of 239 Iowa, page 136 of 30 N.W.2d) > “It fairly tells the jury the matters they can consider, such as the testator’s state of mind’ * * * in determining whether or not the will was the product of undue influence.” See also In re Estate of Telsrow, 237 Iowa 672, 677, 22 N.W.2d 792, 796, quoted from.in the Soderland opinion, supra.
II. One of contestants’ objections to probate of the will was that it was induced by proponent’s fraud in leading testator to believe she was free to marry him. Proponent was divorced from her previous husband August 13,1948. The decree provided “this judgment insofar as it determines the status of the parties * * * shall not become effective until one year from date * *
Instruction 3 states the issue of fraud has not been established, is withdrawn from the jury and they should consider it established that the will was not procured by fraud of proponent. *364The instruction adds there was left in the case evidence introduced to show alleged false representations of proponent and such evidence may be considered as bearing upon the question of undue influence and as to whether it showed any acts of undue mental pressure or importunity by proponent against testator.
It must be admitted there is no direct evidence of false representations of proponent to- testator. Instruction 3 does not say there was such- evidence. While it is not clear what eyidence the trial court had in mind by the above statement in instruction 3, apparently he felt there was evidence proponent had falsely represented to the clerk who issued the license for her to marry testator (on April 6, 1949) that she had not been divorced within a year. It is true the false affidavit so stating was signed by the attorney, Mr. Coon, but proponent was doubtless present at the time, had full knowledge of its falsity and took advantage of it.
While this portion of instruction 3 may be unfortunate and probably should have been omitted, since the issue of fraud was unequivocally withdrawn and there are no other errors, the part objected to hardly seems sufficiently prejudicial in itself to require a reversal. Only six lines of appellant’s opening argument are devoted to argument on this proposition.
I would affirm.
Wennerstrum, C.J., joins in' this dissent.