Court Opinion

ID: 9378774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 16:16:01.189103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:57.028466
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Reed v. Reed, 2023-Ohio-756.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               HARDIN COUNTY

KATHY B. REED,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE/
        CROSS-APPELLANT,                                CASE NO. 6-22-03

        v.

DOUGLAS R. REED,
                                                        OPINION
        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT/
        CROSS-APPELLEE.

                 Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court
                           Domestic Relations Division

                             Trial Court No. DRB 2020 3080

      Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded

                            Date of Decision: March 13, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Paul Giorgianni for Appellant/Cross-Appellee

        Tim Steinhelfer and Sheila E Minnich for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Case No. 6-22-03

WALDICK, J.

       {¶1} Husband-appellant-cross appellee, Douglas R. Reed (“Douglas”), and

wife-appellee-cross appellant, Kathy B. Reed (“Kathy”), both appeal the Hardin

County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relation Division’s February 28, 2022

decree of divorce dividing the parties’ assets and ordering Douglas to pay Kathy

spousal support. On appeal, Douglas challenges, inter alia, the trial court’s

determinations that he engaged in financial misconduct, and the trial court’s award

of spousal support to Kathy. In her appeal, Kathy also challenges the trial court’s

award of spousal support, arguing that it was too low, and she challenges other

divisions of marital assets by the trial court. For the reasons that follow, the trial

court’s judgment is affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

                                    Background

       {¶2} Douglas and Kathy were married in November of 2003. They had no

children together. During the parties’ marriage, they acquired a substantial amount

of assets including multiple residences and numerous parcels of farmland.

       {¶3} Kathy had a lucrative career selling natural gas, which she retired from

in 2013. However, in 2018 Kathy took a job at Edward Jones so that the parties

could have health insurance when Douglas’s employment no longer provided it.

Meanwhile, Douglas managed the parties’ significant farming operation, and he was

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Case No. 6-22-03

also the owner/operator of Silver Creek Supply. Additionally, the parties earned

income from wind turbines on their property and from cash-renting farmland.

       {¶4} In 2020, both parties filed for divorce. Temporary orders were

instituted, which ordered Douglas to pay Kathy temporary spousal support of $8,500

per month. Although the parties were able to agree on the division of many of their

assets, the matter proceeded to a final hearing on the division of their remaining

assets and on the issue of spousal support. The final hearing was held over four days:

August 11-12, 2021, October 7, 2021, and November 5, 2021.

       {¶5} On February 28, 2022, the trial court filed a lengthy judgment entry

discussing the numerous stipulations and agreements of the parties, then analyzing

the remaining pending issues. As relevant to this appeal, the trial court determined

that Douglas had engaged in financial misconduct during the pendency of the

divorce. As a result of Douglas’s financial misconduct, the trial court awarded

Kathy additional compensation from Douglas’s distribution of the parties’ assets.

The trial court also awarded Kathy $4,000 in spousal support per month.

       {¶6} Both parties appealed the trial court’s judgment. Douglas asserts the

following assignments of error for our review.

                     Douglas’s First Assignment of Error
       The court erred by finding that Doug committed financial
       misconduct related to stored grain and by imposing a $283,100
       financial misconduct award against Doug.

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Case No. 6-22-03

                  Douglas’s Second Assignment of Error
      The trial court erred by finding that Doug’s failure to make
      estimated federal income-tax payments constituted financial
      misconduct, and by imposing a $34,752 financial-misconduct
      award against Douglas.

                    Douglas’s Third Assignment of Error
      The court erred by making the termination date of Doug’s
      obligation to pay permanent spousal support contingent upon
      exercise of appellate rights, the uncertainty of the real estate
      market, and Kathy’s whim.

                   Douglas’s Fourth Assignment of Error
      The court erred in determining the amount of permanent spousal
      support.

                     Douglas’s Fifth Assignment of Error
      The court erred to the extent the court ordered Doug alone to bear
      the carrying costs of the real estate that the court ordered the
      Reeds to sell.

                   Douglas’s Sixth Assignment of Error
      The court erred by failing to characterize as a distribution of
      property to Kathy $10,000 for a forensic accounting expert even
      though Kathy never retained or paid a forensic accounting expert.

      {¶7} Kathy’s appeal from the trial court’s judgment asserts the following

assignments of error for our review.

                     Kathy’s First Assignment of Error
      The trial court erred by ordering an equal division [of] marital
      assets Douglas willfully failed to disclose.

                     Kathy’s Second Assignment of Error
      The trial court abused its discretion with regard to 2020 taxes by
      finding that a stipulation for equal division existed.

                                       -4-
Case No. 6-22-03

                       Kathy’s Third Assignment of Error
         The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of periodic
         spousal support by fashioning the award too low.

         {¶8} Where the parties’ assignments of error are related, we will address

them together.

                          Douglas’s First Assignment of Error

         {¶9} In Douglas’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred

by finding that he committed financial misconduct related to the sale of grain

harvested in 2020. Further, he argues that the trial court erred by imposing a

$283,100 financial-misconduct award against him for his dissipation of the martial

grain.

                                   Standard of Review

         {¶10} The burden of proving financial misconduct rests with the

complaining spouse. Davis v. Davis, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G-3018, 2013-

Ohio-211, ¶ 104. The term “financial misconduct” includes “the dissipation,

destruction, concealment, nondisclosure, or fraudulent disposition of assets[.]” R.C.

3105.171(E)(4). “ ‘Financial misconduct implies some type of wrongdoing which

results in the offending spouse either profiting from the misconduct or intentionally

defeating the other spouse’s distribution of marital assets.’ ” (Citations omitted.)

Cianfaglione v. Cianfaglione, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-134, 2019-Ohio-71, ¶ 51,

quoting Chattree v. Chattree, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99337, 2014-Ohio-489, ¶ 18.

                                            -5-
Case No. 6-22-03

        {¶11} A trial court’s finding that financial misconduct has been committed

is reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Guagenti v.

Guagenti, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-47, 2017-Ohio-2706, ¶ 84. On review

for manifest weight, the standard in a civil case is identical to the standard in a

criminal case: a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed

and a new trial ordered. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179,

¶ 20.

        {¶12} In weighing the evidence, however, we are always mindful of the

presumption in favor of the trial court’s factual findings. Eastley at ¶ 21. This

presumption arises because the trial court is in the best position “to view the

witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these

observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal

Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Accordingly, “[a] reviewing

court should not reverse a decision simply because it holds a different opinion

concerning the credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial

court.” Id. at 81.

                                         -6-
Case No. 6-22-03

      {¶13} In the event that the trial court finds that financial misconduct was

committed, we will “not reverse an award to compensate for financial misconduct

absent an abuse of discretion.” Guagenti at ¶ 84 . Under the abuse of discretion

standard, an appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for the trial court’s

judgment. Schroeder v. Niese, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-16-05, 2016-Ohio-8397, ¶ 7.

Thus, a mere error of judgment does not rise to the level of an abuse of

discretion. Siferd v. Siferd, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-17-04, 2017-Ohio-8624, ¶ 16.

“[T]o constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision must be

unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Southern v. Scheu, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-

17-16, 2018-Ohio-1440, ¶ 10.

                                Controlling Statute

      {¶14} Financial misconduct in a divorce proceeding is governed by R.C.

3105.171(E)(4) and (E)(5), which read as follows:

      (4) If a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including, but
      not limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment,
      nondisclosure, or fraudulent disposition of assets, the court may
      compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with
      a greater award of marital property.

      (5) If a spouse has substantially and willfully failed to disclose
      marital property, separate property, or other assets, debts,
      income, or expenses as required under division (E)(3) of this
      section, the court may compensate the offended spouse with a
      distributive award or with a greater award of marital property
      not to exceed three times the value of the marital property,
      separate property, or other assets, debts, income, or expenses that
      are not disclosed by the other spouse.

                                        -7-
Case No. 6-22-03

                                     Analysis

      {¶15} In determining that Douglas engaged in financial misconduct with

regard to dissipating stored grain from the 2020 harvest, the trial court conducted

the following analysis:

           FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT/DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE

      ***

      From the evidence herein it is clear that Husband was in total
      control of the farming operations. As such, the evidence supports
      that the parties always had stored grain carried over from year to
      year. [Trial court lists the values of stored grain for the years 2010
      – 2019, which range from a low of $87,000 in 2017 to a high of
      $929,000 in 2011.] * * *

            Average per year for ten years: $566,200.00 per year.

            Average per year for the most recent five years: $450,800.00

           No credible explanation was given concerning why, after a
      long history of yearly significant amounts of stored grain, during
      farming years that appeared to be normally lucrative (gross
      receipts in 2019 of $2,857,648.00, and in 2020 of $1,539,059.00)
      there should be absolutely no stored grain at this time. The Court
      can only draw the conclusion that Husband has acted in a manner
      as to dissipate, destroy, conceal, fail to disclose, or fraudulently
      dispose of grain which should be in existence.

           Additionally, as previously stated, after separation of the
      parties Husband failed to make estimated payments for income
      taxes to the tune of an average of $69,504.25 per year.

           Using the ten-year average of stored grain of $566,200.00
      plus the average of $69,504.25 estimated taxes that should have

                                        -8-
Case No. 6-22-03

       normally been paid, it appears that Husband has converted a total
       of $635,704.25 to his own use.

            Husband may claim that he was paying Wife $8,500.00 per
       month ($102,000.00 per year) per the temporary order #2 * * *
       but a yearly payment of $102,000.00 is far less than $635,704.25.

            Therefore, the Court therefore [sic] specifically finds that
       Husband has engaged in financial misconduct, and substantially
       and willfully failed to disclose marital property in the minimum
       sum of $566,200, being the average stored grain from 2010 to
       2019, and in failing to pay estimated payments for income tax in
       the amount of $69,504.25.

(Emphasis sic.) (Doc. No. 103).

       {¶16} Douglas argues that the trial court’s determination regarding financial

misconduct was against the manifest weight of the evidence for numerous reasons.

First, he argues that the only evidence in the record indicates that there was no stored

grain from 2020 at the time of the final hearing because he had sold all the grain

from the 2020 harvest in December of 2020 and January of 2021. Second, Douglas

argues that there was no evidence that he willfully failed to disclose the sale of any

of the 2020 grain, particularly given that the money he received was used, at least

in part, to pay Kathy’s spousal support and to pay the mortgages on the farms. In

addition, Douglas argues that any sales of grain were shown on his financial ledger,

which was provided in discovery.

       {¶17} In reviewing Douglas’s arguments, we emphasize that it was the

established practice of the parties to carry-over significant amounts of stored grain

                                          -9-
Case No. 6-22-03

each year from their harvest in order to sell the grain at a higher price. The trial court

entered temporary orders while the divorce was pending for the parties to continue

to act according to prior custom.1 Rather than store some, or any, of the grain from

the 2020 harvest to sell later at a higher price, Douglas unilaterally decided to sell

all the grain from 2020 in December of 2020 and January of 2021, keeping no stored

grain.2 By selling the grain early, Douglas admitted that he effectively devalued it.

At the May 6, 2021, pretrial hearing Douglas testified: “Normally I would have

carried that grain, I would have had it all right now. And to be honest, if I had that

grain right now, we would have got twice as much money out of it.” (May 6, 2021,

Tr. at 31).

         {¶18} A ledger of Douglas’s financial transactions was introduced into

evidence at trial, illustrating Douglas’s grain sales from the 2020 harvest. (Pl.’s Ex.

69). In December of 2020, Douglas’s financial account showed “Grain deposit[s]”

of $76,591.69, $93,870.12, $37,026.24, $116,163.99, $47,694.61, $85,818.01, and

$103,107.59. In early January of 2021, when Douglas indicated he sold the last of

the grain from the 2020 harvest, Douglas’s account showed deposits that had no

description for $47,981.16, $16,638.44, $153,359.38, and $54,428.38.

1
  At the first temporary orders hearing, the trial court stated, “You should continue to do your business in the
manner that you’ve done your business in the recent past.” (Oct. 8, 2020, Tr. at 44).
2
  As Doug suggests in his argument, the only evidence in the record did indicate that all stored grain had been
sold by January of 2021 at the latest. Kathy may have speculated that there was additional stored grain
somewhere but we have no actual evidence to support this claim.

                                                     -10-
Case No. 6-22-03

         {¶19} Douglas thus sold all the 2020 grain, including some amount that the

parties normally would have stored, without consulting Kathy, and without any

order by the trial court. Douglas claims that he decided to unilaterally sell the 2020

grain that he normally would have stored in order to pay mortgages and to pay his

court-ordered spousal support. However, some of the parties’ marital assets were

sold during the pendency of the divorce by agreement and by order of the trial court

such as grain bins and a pole barn in order to pay the parties’ obligations. Moreover,

even if Doug needed to sell some of the stored grain, there is no indication that

Douglas had to determine to unilaterally sell all of the grain he normally would have

stored early.

         {¶20} Furthermore, it is not clear what money received from the 2020 grain

went to pay for marital debt. For example, Douglas’s ledger shows that he was also

paying significant amounts of money to Silver Creek for “bills,” which was his

wholly owned corporation that he took separately in the divorce.3 In addition,

Douglas paid his attorney’s fees from this case and a prior unrelated case out of the

account where the grain deposits were present.4

3
  The ledger entries for “bills” to Silver Creek are separate and distinct entries in the ledger from payments
on “Silver Creek Debt.”
4
  In a journal entry the trial court filed May 7, 2021, the trial court stated:
          It is undisputed that since the filing of this action Defendant-Husband has received
          and transferred large sums of money, hundreds of thousands of dollars going to the
          Silver Creek business of which he is the sole owner; approximately $30,000.00 in legal
          fees for this case and other legal matters; $10,000.00 paid to a forensic accountant; as
          well as pre-paying his mortgage expense until the month of trial. Husband has
          approximately $30,000.00 in cash deposits, and has sold all the stored grain.
 (Doc. No. 72).

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Case No. 6-22-03

       {¶21} After reviewing the record, and Douglas’s claims related to the lack of

stored grain for 2020, the trial court determined that “no credible explanation was

given” as to why Douglas had no stored grain at the time of the final hearing. (Doc.

No. 103). Stated differently, the trial court did not find Douglas credible in his

contention that he had no choice but to unilaterally decide to sell all his stored grain

from the 2020 harvest earlier than prior customs would dictate. The trial court

determined that it could only draw the conclusion that Douglas had acted in a

manner as to “dissipate, destroy, conceal * * * or fraudulently dispose of grain which

should be in existence.” (Id.) As Douglas, by his own admission, sold the grain at a

lower price than he could have, in contravention of his custom, we do not find that

the trial court clearly lost its way by finding that he committed financial misconduct.

See Smith v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26013, 2012-Ohio-1716, ¶ 21 (affirming

finding of financial misconduct wherein, inter alia, husband “made critical and

unilateral decisions concerning the parties’ retirement funds and other assets”).

       {¶22} With this decided, we must determine whether the trial court abused

its discretion by compensating Kathy for Douglas’s financial misconduct. Douglas’s

sale of the 2020 grain contrary to his prior practice of storing it made it difficult for

the trial court to determine how much value Douglas had effectively dissipated. As

a result, the trial court used the averages of the prior 10 years of stored grain to

determine an amount that seemed appropriate. We do not find that the trial court’s

                                          -12-
Case No. 6-22-03

use of averages from prior years was an abuse of discretion where the prior years of

stored grain were meticulously calculated and acknowledged by Douglas as

accurate.5 For all of these reasons, Douglas’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                            Douglas’s Second Assignment of Error

         {¶23} In Douglas’s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by determining that his failure to make estimated federal income-tax payments

constituted financial misconduct. In addition, Douglas argues that even if he did

commit financial misconduct for failing to pay “estimated taxes” ahead of time, the

taxes were ultimately paid, thus the only actual “damages” from any misconduct

were the late penalties from the IRS, not the amount of estimated taxes.

                                                Analysis6

         {¶24} After a hearing on temporary orders in this case wherein the parties’

tax liabilities for 2020 were discussed, the trial court issued the following order:

         10) Each party shall deposit with the Internal Revenue Service the
         appropriate amount of quarterly estimated taxes based on income
         received or controlled by that party.

(Doc. No. 53).

         {¶25} Pursuant to the trial court’s temporary order, and because the evidence

established that Douglas was “in total control” of the farming operation, Douglas

5
  In fact, the trial court’s average amount is significantly less than taking the amounts received from grain
sales in December of 2020 and the unattributed deposits from January of 2021 and multiplying them by 2
(because Doug testified if he held on to the grain he could have received twice as much for it).
6
  The same standard of review applied in the first assignment of error applies here as well.

                                                   -13-
Case No. 6-22-03

should have paid quarterly estimated taxes in this case. However, Douglas failed to

comply with the trial court’s order despite the fact that the parties’ established

practice was to make significant estimated income tax payments in the years

preceding their separation. Based on these actions, the trial court found that

       No evidence was adduced concerning why Husband failed to pay
       the normal amount of estimated taxes on farm income in [2019
       and 2020]. Failure to do so resulted in more taxes being due at the
       time of ultimate filing.

           Radical changes in established financial practices after
       separation of the parties are always of interest and concern to the
       Court in any divorce.

(Doc. No. 103).

       {¶26} The trial court determined that Douglas failed to pay estimated taxes

of $69,504.25 in contravention of its prior order and in contravention of the parties’

established practice. Thus the trial court determined that Douglas engaged in

financial misconduct, awarding Kathy $34,752.13 (one-half of the amount of

estimated taxes Douglas failed to prepay).

       {¶27} Douglas now argues that the trial court’s determination was against

the manifest weight of the evidence. He contends that failing to make estimated tax

payments did not constitute financial misconduct; he contends that failing to comply

with the temporary order cannot form the basis of an award because the order was

filed in January of 2021 but Douglas was being held accountable for estimated taxes

he did not pay in 2019 and 2020; he contends that Kathy also failed to make

                                        -14-
Case No. 6-22-03

estimated tax payments in 2019 and 2020; and he contends that the amount of the

award is contrary to law given that the taxes were actually paid.

       {¶28} In reviewing Douglas’s arguments, we emphasize that his decision not

to pay estimated taxes was completely against the parties’ established practice. It

was also in contravention of the trial court’s temporary orders. For these reasons

alone we find that the trial court’s financial misconduct finding was supported by

the record.

       {¶29} However, we emphasize that while Douglas did not pay estimated

taxes in advance as ordered, the taxes were ultimately paid-in-full. As a result of

Douglas’s failure to pay estimated taxes, the parties were assessed penalties,

according to the record, of just over $1,000. Despite the parties’ only being

penalized just over $1,000 for Douglas’s failure to pay estimated taxes in advance,

the trial court awarded Kathy $34,752.13—one half of the estimated taxes that

Douglas did not pay early. Though, again, the taxes were ultimately paid here.

       {¶30} The trial court could have properly compensated Kathy for Douglas’s

failure to pay estimated taxes, but ordering him to pay her roughly 30 times the

amount is punitive in nature. In Eggeman v. Eggeman, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-04-

06, 2004-Ohio-6050, we reversed the amount of an award of financial misconduct

where the award was not directly commensurate with a financial loss, but rather

punitive in nature. We held, “the purpose of R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) is to neutralize

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Case No. 6-22-03

losses caused by the offending spouse’s conduct and not to simply reward one

spouse for the other’s wrongdoing when no loss in value has occurred.” Eggeman

at ¶ 26.

       {¶31} Here, compensating Kathy with over $34,000 when her losses were,

at most, just over $1,000 (or half of this amount), is punitive in nature and not

reflective of the loss in value of marital funds. See Walker v. Walker, 3d Dist.

Marion No. 9-12-15, 2013-Ohio-1496 (reversing the amount of a financial

misconduct award for being too speculative and inequitable). Thus based on the

record before us, we find that the amount awarded by the trial court for Douglas’s

failure to pay estimated taxes that were ultimately paid was unreasonable.

Accordingly, Douglas’s second assignment of error is sustained.

                        Douglas’s Third Assignment of Error

       {¶32} In Douglas’s third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by ordering him to pay Kathy $4,000 in monthly spousal support for an

indefinite period until the parties’ real estate was sold.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶33} Trial courts have broad discretion concerning an award of spousal

support. Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-49, 2020-Ohio-

4881, ¶ 69. Therefore, a trial court’s decision related to spousal support will not be

reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

                                          -16-
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                                      Analysis

       {¶34} With regard to spousal support in this case, the trial court ordered

Douglas to pay Kathy $4,000 per month, but only “until all properties are sold, all

debts are paid and refinanced as ordered herein, and all distribution made according

to the terms of this order.” (Doc. No. 103). The trial court then provided detailed

orders regarding the properties and their distribution as follows:

       2) Wife shall quit claim her interest in the properties described in
       attached Exhibit B and C to Husband within 30 days of the
       expiration of the appeal periods to this order, upon the condition
       that within the same period Husband shall remove Wife’s liability
       on the mortgages thereon to Liberty National Bank, and save
       Wife harmless therefrom.

       3) Husband shall quit claim his interest in the property described
       in attached Exhibit D to Wife within 30 days of the expiration of
       all appeal periods to this order, upon the condition that within the
       same period Wife shall remove Husband’s liability on the
       mortgage thereon to Liberty National Bank, and save Husband
       harmless therefrom.

       4) All remaining real estate (Assets 4, 5, 6, and 7) shall be sold at
       public sale upon the following terms, and from the proceeds of
       sale shall be paid the mortgages or land contracts thereon (Debuts
       D, E and F) and all expenses of sale and costs of closing. The
       remaining proceeds shall immediately upon sale be escrowed
       equally (50-50) with each attorney of record.

       Note: Each tract of land shall be sold or transferred subject to all
       wind turbines contracts for equipment on said tract.

       The terms of sale shall be as follows:

       a) The parties shall jointly attempt to sell each property at
          private sale for a period of 90 days after the expiration of all

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                appeal periods for this journal entry, for any amount mutually
                agreeable to each party.

           b) Should any tract fail to sell during said period of 90 days, then
              the said property or properties shall be sold at public auction
              to the highest bidder, equaling or exceeding the value listed in
              the Balance Sheet, upon the condition that no family member
              within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity shall be
              permitted to bid on or purchase any said property. The parties
              shall employ Devin Dye, of Lima, Ohio, to advertise and
              conduct said sale according to best practices to obtain the
              highest price[.]

           The parties may, however, mutually agree to another
           auctioneer/broker or other terms of sale, but only as set forth in
           writing signed by each party. Additionally, upon written waiver of
           appeal by both parties, the parties may then immediately proceed
           pursuant to the terms set forth herein.

           Until sold the parties shall proceed to farm said real estate
           according to their prior practice. Mutually agreed costs of
           farming shall be paid from the escrow account held herein until
           sale of the properties. All net profits of the farming operation shall
           be equally divided between the parties, subject to further orders
           herein.

(Emphasis sic.)7 (Doc. No. 103).

           {¶35} Douglas now takes issue with the indefinite duration of the trial court’s

spousal support order, arguing, inter alia, that the order gives Kathy the power to

prolong her spousal support by being obstinate and not agreeing to a sale price for

the real estate, or by pursuing an appeal. He also argues that the trial court’s decree

7
    The section italicized by this Court was bold in the trial court’s judgment entry.

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Case No. 6-22-03

is ambiguous as to what the “appeal periods” mean. Further, Douglas argues that

the decree effectively forces him to farm against his will.

       {¶36} In reviewing the trial court’s spousal support order, we emphasize that

there is nothing unlawful about the indefinite award that is set to end after an express

event. See Houck v. Houck, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 97-T-0025, 1997 WL 800923.

Here, spousal support was only awarded to Kathy until the properties in this case

are sold, at which point she will have enough liquid assets to support herself in the

future. We see nothing arbitrary about the trial court’s decision here.

       {¶37} Moreover, contrary to Douglas’s argument, there is nothing

ambiguous about “appeal periods” in the trial court’s entry given that App.R. 4

contains the dates to file an appeal as of right and S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.01(A) contains the

timeline for filing a jurisdictional appeal.

       {¶38} Finally, we note that Douglas’s argument that the trial court’s entry

forces him to farm against his will is simply inaccurate. Although the trial court

ordered the parties to continue to act as they had previously until the property is

sold, Douglas’s testimony at the final hearing was that he had largely given up

farming and had been allowing his son to farm his land through cash-rent. Thus this

is the most recent practice.

       {¶39} In sum, we find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable about the trial

court’s award of spousal support until all real estate is sold. The trial court set forth

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Case No. 6-22-03

numerous contingencies for the parties and there is nothing unlawful about the trial

court’s order. Therefore, Douglas’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                               Douglas’s Fourth Assignment of Error;
                                Kathy’s Third Assignment of Error

           {¶40} In Douglas’s fourth assignment of error he argues that the trial court

erred by awarding Kathy the amount of $4,000 per month in spousal support. In

Kathy’s third assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred by awarding

a spousal support amount that was too low.

                                           Relevant Authority8

           {¶41} Revised Code 3105.18 governs the award of spousal support in

divorce cases. “ ‘[S]pousal support’ means any payment or payments to be made to

a spouse or former spouse, or to a third party for the benefit of a spouse or a former

spouse, that is both for sustenance and for support of the spouse or former spouse.”

R.C. 3105.18(A). “In divorce * * * proceedings, upon the request of either party and

after the court determines the division or disbursement of property * * *, the court

of common pleas may award reasonable spousal support to either party.” R.C.

3105.18(B).

8
    The same standard of review applied in the third assignment of error is applicable here.

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       {¶42} Importantly, an award of spousal support is not based solely on the

need of a party. Schwieterman at 69. An award of spousal support must be balanced

against the obligor’s ability to pay. Id.

       {¶43} In order to determine whether spousal support is appropriate and

reasonable, R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) provides a list of factors that a trial court must

consider. These factors read as follows:

       (a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but
       not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed,
       or distributed under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code;

       (b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

       (c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions
       of the parties;

       (d) The retirement benefits of the parties;

       (e) The duration of the marriage;

       (f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party,
       because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the
       marriage, to seek employment outside the home;

       (g) The standard of living of the parties established during the
       marriage;

       (h) The relative extent of education of the parties;

       (i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but
       not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;

       (j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or
       earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to,

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       any party’s contribution to the acquisition of a professional
       degree of the other party;

       (k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking
       spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience
       so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate
       employment, provided the education, training, or job experience,
       and employment is, in fact, sought;

       (l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal
       support;

       (m) The lost income production capacity of either party that
       resulted from that party’s marital responsibilities;

       (n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant
       and equitable.

                                       Analysis

       {¶44} In this case, the trial court explicitly analyzed all of the factors in R.C.

3105.18(C)(1) and determined that Douglas should pay Kathy $4,000 per month

until all the parties’ properties that had been ordered to be sold in the final divorce

decree were sold, all debts were paid or refinanced as ordered, and all distributions

had been made according to the trial court’s final order.

       {¶45} Douglas contends that the trial court should not have awarded spousal

support at all because Kathy would ultimately be receiving over $3 million in assets

in the property division. At the very least, Douglas argues that the spousal support

award was too high. By contrast, Kathy argues that the award was too low given,

inter alia, Douglas’s earning potential.

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         {¶46} In our own review of the matter, we emphasize that the trial court’s

judgment entry addressed each and every factor of R.C. 3105.171(C)(1).9 The trial

court considered the income of the parties, their earning abilities, their age and

health, their retirement benefits, the duration of the marriage, their standard of

living, the education of the parties, and the assets and liabilities being distributed.

         {¶47} The parties’ claims to individual erroneous statements in the trial

court’s analysis are either inaccurate or do nothing to undermine the trial court’s

analysis in its entirety. For example, Douglas argues that the trial court improperly

determined that he was receiving “income producing properties,” but he ignores the

fact that he was receiving Silver Creek in the distribution.10 For Kathy’s part, she

ignores the significant assets that she was receiving in the division of property, and

the significant amount of money she would receive once the parties’ properties were

sold.

         {¶48} The trial court fashioned a spousal support award that took into

account the parties’ “upper-middle class lifestyle” and determined that Douglas, the

primary earner for the prior decade of the relationship, should pay Kathy $4,000 per

month essentially until she had the money from the sale of the parties’ assets. When

9
  Some of the factors were found to be inapplicable to the parties.
10
   Douglas also argues that the trial court erred by determining that Douglas should only spend $25 per month
on life insurance when he had made significant investments prior to, and during the marriage, in life
insurance. While the trial court did discuss Douglas’s life insurance expenditures in its entry, it was not
specifically mentioned in the trial court’s spousal support analysis. Moreover, we emphasize that the trial
court analyzed each parties’ expenditures and reduced some of them or equalized them.

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reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot find that the trial court abused its

discretion. See Brown v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100499, 2014-Ohio-2402,

¶ 39 (holding the trial court’s consideration of all the factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)

supported spousal support award). Therefore, Douglas’s fourth assignment of error

and Kathy’s third assignment of error are overruled.

                       Douglas’s Fifth Assignment of Error

       {¶49} In Douglas’s fifth assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by ordering “Doug alone to bear the carrying costs of the real estate that the

court ordered the Reeds to sell.” (Appt.’s Br. at 23). Despite this statement in his

brief, Douglas then readily acknowledges that “[n]othing in the Decree suggests that

Doug alone bears the post-decree carrying costs.” (Appt.’s Br. at 23). These

contradictory statements alone are enough to defeat his assignment of error.

       {¶50} Nevertheless, we emphasize that Douglas’s assignment of error is

simply not reflective of the record. The trial court indicated that mutually agreed

costs of farming shall be paid from the escrow account and the net profits should be

divided equally between the parties. Thus the farming costs, including, presumably,

mortgages and property taxes, were covered by the trial court. The equity in those

farms will be divided equally once the properties are sold, so we see no error here.

Therefore, Douglas’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

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                        Douglas’s Sixth Assignment of Error

        {¶51} In Douglas’s sixth assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by failing to make a distributive award to Douglas in the amount of $5,000,

one-half of the amount Kathy received during the pendency of the case to retain a

forensic accountant.

                                      Analysis

        {¶52} Douglas’s sixth assignment of error is entirely undermined by a

stipulation the parties entered into on the first day of the final hearing. The parties

stipulated that, “[H]usband is not going to be reimbursed for any money that he has

given to the wife. You had ordered him to pay 12,500 in attorney fees. He’s not

getting reimbursed for that. And you ordered him to pay 10,000 on the accountant

fees. Everybody’s paying their own, and he’s not getting reimbursed.” (Tr. at 104-

105).

        {¶53} As Douglas entered into an agreement regarding the accountant fees

and that agreement was presented to the trial court without objection, we can find

no error here. See Bispeck v. Battin Insurance Agency, Inc. 11th Dist. Trumbull No.

3453, 1985 WL 10189 (holding that oral stipulations are binding if understood by

the parties and relied upon.) Therefore, Douglas’s sixth assignment of error is

overruled.

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                          Kathy’s First Assignment of Error

       {¶54} In Kathy’s first assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred

by ordering an equal division of the marital assets, including those Douglas willfully

failed to disclose.

                                       Analysis

       {¶55} Contrary to Kathy’s argument, Douglas was ordered to compensate

Kathy for his financial misconduct. Pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(E), the trial court

could have awarded Kathy a greater distributive share of the marital assets, and the

trial court did, in fact, order Douglas to pay Kathy from his share of the division as

a result of his financial misconduct. Thus Kathy’s argument is an inaccurate

characterization of the record. Here, the trial court’s determination to compensate

Kathy was entirely discretionary, and there was nothing arbitrary or unreasonable.

Therefore, Kathy’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                          Kathy’s Second Assignment of Error

       {¶56} In Kathy’s second assignment of error, she argues that the trial court

abused its discretion regarding the 2020 taxes by finding that a “stipulation” for

equal division existed.

                                       Analysis

       {¶57} Kathy’s second assignment of error claims that the trial court erred by

finding that a “stipulation” for an equal division of the 2020 taxes existed. However,

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she does not cite to the record where the trial court found such a stipulation. Her

failure to cite to the record is in contravention of App.R. 16(A)(3). Moreover, as the

cross-appellee states, the record does not reflect that such a stipulation exists.

Rather, the record reflects that the parties’ 2020 taxes were paid out of their escrow

account, effectively dividing the tax burden, which would be an equitable result. We

can find no error in the record here. Therefore, Kathy’s second assignment of error

is overruled.

                                     Conclusion

       {¶58} For the foregoing reasons Douglas’s first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth

assignments of error are overruled, and his second assignment of error is sustained.

Kathy’s assignments of error are all overruled. Therefore, the judgment of the

Hardin County Common Pleas Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this

cause is remanded for the trial court to determine the proper award for Douglas’s

financial misconduct in failing to prepay the parties’ taxes as ordered.

                                                        Judgment Affirmed in Part,
                                                             Reversed in Part and
                                                                 Cause Remanded

MILLER, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.

/jlr

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