Court Opinion

ID: 9943260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 22:03:27.467061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:37.980933
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                  2024 IL App (4th) 231237-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                    FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                    February 21, 2024
                                           NO. 4-23-1237
not precedent except in the                                                        Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                  4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                  IN THE APPELLATE COURT                             Court, IL

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

In re S.R., a Minor                                             )     Appeal from the
                                                                )     Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois,                           )     Peoria County
              Petitioner-Appellee,                              )     No. 21JA26
              v.                                                )
Champaine W.,                                                   )     Honorable
              Respondent-Appellant).                            )     Derek G. Asbury,
                                                                )     Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1      Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed
              the trial court’s judgment where no meritorious issues could be raised on appeal
              that the court’s fitness and best interest findings were against the manifest weight
              of the evidence.

¶2              In April 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent

Champaine W. to her minor child, S.R. (born in 2021). In September 2023, the trial court found

respondent was an unfit parent under the Adoption Act (see 750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2022)) and that

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in S.R.’s best interest.

¶3              Respondent appealed. Thereafter, respondent’s appointed counsel moved to

withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing respondent’s appeal

presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. We grant the motion and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.
¶4                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶5             Respondent and Albert R. are the biological parents of S.R. Both parents were

parties to the proceedings below. Albert R. has separately appealed the termination of his parental

rights in appellate court case No. 4-23-1238. Accordingly, this disposition is limited to addressing

respondent’s potential claims on appeal.

¶6                     A. The State’s Petition for Adjudication of Wardship

¶7             In January 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship. The State

alleged S.R. was neglected because she lived in an environment injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS

405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). Specifically, the State alleged (1) respondent consumed alcohol

throughout her pregnancy and stopped just two weeks before giving birth to S.R., resulting in S.R.

suffering from microcephaly, (2) respondent had not properly addressed her substance abuse

issues, (3) respondent repeatedly contacted the police regarding her other children, including at

least four times in October 2020, (4) respondent was involved in numerous incidents of domestic

violence involving Albert R. and her other children, (5) respondent was twice involved with the

Intact Family Services Program of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services

(DCFS), (6) respondent was indicated by DCFS four times prior to the initiation of the instant case,

and (7) Albert R. was indicated by DCFS prior to the initiation of the instant case.

¶8             In April 2021, the trial court adjudicated S.R. neglected (id.). At the dispositional

hearing held the same day, the court found respondent unfit for reasons other than financial

circumstances alone to care for S.R., made her a ward of the court, and placed her guardianship

and custody with DCFS. The court found respondent’s “substance abuse issues, domestic violence,

prior indicated findings of risk of physical injury, and possible mental health issues” formed the

basis for her unfitness.

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¶9                             B. The State’s Termination Petition

¶ 10           In April 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

The State alleged respondent was an unfit person within the meaning of the Adoption Act for

failing to make reasonable progress toward S.R.’s return during the nine-month period following

the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)). The State alleged a nine-month

period of June 22, 2021, to March 22, 2022 (the relevant time period).

¶ 11                 C. The Fitness Portion of the Termination Proceedings

¶ 12                                 1. The State’s Evidence

¶ 13           In June 2023, after numerous continuances, the trial court held the hearing on the

fitness portion of the termination proceedings.

¶ 14                            a. The Testimony of Maria Peters

¶ 15           Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI) child welfare specialist Maria Peters

was the assigned caseworker from June 22, 2021, until mid-December 2021. Respondent reported

completing a parenting class but did not provide Peters a copy of the completion certificate.

Respondent was discharged from domestic violence classes in November 2021 and was referred

again in December 2021. Respondent was referred to individual counseling prior to the relevant

time period but was unsuccessfully discharged during the relevant time period (on June 29, 2021).

Peters referred respondent to individual counseling again in December 2021, but respondent did

not complete it while Peters was the caseworker. Respondent was required to do drug tests twice

per month but only completed one, on September 9, 2021, which tested positive for

tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).

¶ 16           Peters attempted an unannounced visit at the foster home on July 27, 2021, but

learned S.R. was at respondent’s home at the time, even though she was unfit and not permitted to

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have unsupervised visits. When Peters attempted to take S.R. from respondent’s home, respondent

took S.R. away from Peters, ran inside, locked the doors, and began screaming. After police

officers arrived, respondent placed S.R. in her car seat outside the door of the apartment for Peters

to take her.

¶ 17            Peters observed a visit on August 2, 2021, during which respondent became

agitated while hearing another of her children talking about the foster home. Respondent tried to

feed S.R., but S.R. would push the bottle away. Respondent then stopped trying to feed S.R., who

began crying. Respondent put S.R. in the car seat and told her to go to sleep if she was going to

cry. S.R. remained in the car seat for about half of the visit. At one point, respondent picked S.R.

up by her arm, which alarmed Peters given S.R.’s small size. Respondent spent most of that visit

on the phone. When Albert R. arrived, respondent left the visiting area and began arguing with

him.

¶ 18            Peters described respondent’s and Albert R.’s cooperation with the agency as “not

very good.” According to Peters, respondent explained her difficulty completing services was due

to transportation and mental health issues, specifically, anxiety with leaving her home. During her

time as the caseworker on this matter, Peters never felt it was safe to return S.R. to her parents.

This was because “[n]either were complying with services to correct any of the conditions that

brought [S.R.] into foster care in the first place.”

¶ 19                             b. The Testimony of Gerald Suelter

¶ 20            Peoria police officer Gerald Suelter responded to a violent incident involving

respondent at her apartment building on October 20, 2021. A woman reported being battered by a

tenant of the building. Suelter noticed a chunk of the woman’s hair had been pulled out. Suelter

identified respondent as the other individual involved in the incident. Respondent “appeared to be

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extremely intoxicated, and she was hard to talk to.” Respondent was slurring her words and had

an empty alcohol bottle next to her.

¶ 21                          c. The Testimony of Ma’Lachi Jimoh

¶ 22           LSSI permanency achievement specialist Ma’Lachi Jimoh was the assigned

caseworker from February 14, 2022, to April 7, 2022. On March 7, 2022, Jimoh referred

respondent to domestic violence classes. Respondent was previously unsuccessfully discharged

from this service and failed to complete this service by the end of the relevant time period.

Respondent had stable housing during Jimoh’s time as the caseworker and completed parenting

classes. Respondent did not complete any drug testing during Jimoh’s time as the caseworker.

Respondent completed a mental health assessment in January 2022 and only “sporadically”

participated in individual counseling thereafter.

¶ 23                                   2. Respondent’s Evidence

¶ 24           Respondent testified she had not completed individual counseling by the end of the

relevant time period but maintained she was regularly attending counseling. Respondent stated she

attended all her visits with S.R. and described them as “amazing.”

¶ 25           The trial court then took the matter under advisement.

¶ 26                        3. The Trial Court’s Fitness Determination

¶ 27           In September 2023, the trial court found respondent unfit as alleged in the State’s

termination petition. The court noted respondent missed 13 consecutive drug tests between

September 2021 and March 2022, despite being required to complete 2 per month. The court also

noted respondent was unsuccessfully discharged from domestic violence classes and individual

counseling and failed to complete either despite being referred again to both.

¶ 28           The trial court also found the following:

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                       “So when I look at it objectively during these nine months and I look

               at the services—I’m trying to do *** this as fair as I can. When I look at

               what they order and what was done, almost the majority if not all of the

               things that were ordered to do were not completed during this nine-month

               period. I can’t find that under the rules applied by the Supreme Court and

               under the statute that that is reasonable progress. The caseworker testified

               directly that during this nine-month period the child was not going to be

               returned home or close to being returned home because the services weren’t

               done.

                       *** [W]ith all these things asked to do if you maybe do one or two

               of ten that is not reasonable progress.”

¶ 29           The trial court then proceeded to the best interest hearing.

¶ 30               D. The Best Interest Portion of the Termination Proceedings

¶ 31                                  1. The State’s Evidence

¶ 32           As reflected in the best interest report and testimony of LSSI child welfare specialist

Kayla Hanten, S.R.’s foster mother, Marisa W., was able, willing, and committed to provide

permanency to S.R. through adoption. S.R. had been with Marisa since August 2022. Marisa met

S.R.’s food, shelter, health, and clothing needs. Hanten observed the home to be safe and to have

adequate space. S.R. had an appropriate sleeping space within the home. S.R. was continuing to

attend Eastside Educational Center. Respondent was not always attending her scheduled visits,

and S.R. did not have a visible bond with respondent when she did visit. By contrast, S.R. and

Marisa had developed a significant parent/child bond. In addition to respondent not completing

her drug tests, Hanten noted in her report:

                                                -6-
               “[T]here have been concerns reported by [respondent’s] counselor

               regarding her behavior and attitude that have ‘seriously declined’. The

               agency has concerns regarding [respondent’s] reported anxiety and her

               ability to manage her emotional health in order to care for [S.R.]

               [Respondent] has reported that her anxiety is debilitating and that it hinders

               her from leaving her home, bringing up concerns of [her] ability to

               effectively meet [S.R.’s] needs.”

¶ 33           Hanten believed it was in S.R.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be

terminated and the permanency goal changed to adoption.

¶ 34                                2. Respondent’s Evidence

¶ 35           Respondent testified that S.R. smiles, runs to her, and hugs and kisses her when

they first see each other at visits. S.R. and respondent both cry at the end of visits, which

“[e]verybody at the agency” has seen. S.R. tells respondent not to leave when the visits end.

Respondent described her bond with S.R. as “loving, caring, [and] nurturing.” Having participated

in counseling, respondent felt she was “totally different from two years ago” and “[t]his experience

has humbled [her] wholeheartedly.” Respondent took “full accountability” for drinking while

pregnant and acknowledged she was not a victim of her choices. Respondent felt it was not in

S.R.’s best interest “for her to go anywhere but with her mommy and her father and all of our

family.”

¶ 36                        3. Additional Testimony of Kayla Hanten

¶ 37           Hanten was recalled to the stand and testified she never witnessed S.R. cry at the

end of a visit and was not aware if S.R. had ever done so. Moreover, respondent only participated

in 12 out of 30 visits since February 2023. Hanten acknowledged respondent had shown “growth”

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with counseling but still needed to continue to address her anger management issues. Respondent

reported not completing drug tests because she thought they were no longer court-ordered (despite

Hanten admonishing her in a family team meeting as recently as April or May that it was important

for her to complete them to have visits in her home) and not attending visits due to her anxiety

issues.

¶ 38                     4. The Trial Court’s Best Interest Determination

¶ 39           The trial court acknowledged respondent’s anxiety-related difficulties with

maintaining visitation but emphasized it “can’t change” the fact that the visits “were sporadic.”

The court noted S.R. had spent approximately half her life in foster care and that “the heavy lifting”

of providing shelter, food, medical care, and education had been done by her foster parent. The

court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence it was in S.R.’s best interest to

terminate respondent’s parental rights and changed the goal to adoption.

¶ 40           This appeal followed.

¶ 41                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 42           Appellate counsel has moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders, arguing that the

appeal of this case presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. See In re S.M., 314 Ill.

App. 3d 682, 685-86 (2000) (holding Anders applies to termination of parental rights cases and

providing the proper procedure to be followed by appellate counsel). Counsel identifies two

potential issues for review: (1) whether the trial court’s determination that respondent was unfit

was against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) whether the court’s determination that

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in S.R.’s best interest was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. As to the unfitness finding, counsel contends there is no meritorious

argument respondent made reasonable progress during the relevant time period given her

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(1) completion of only parenting classes, (2) failure to complete drug tests or domestic violence

classes, and (3) new domestic violence incident, unauthorized unsupervised contact with S.R., and

missed visits. As to the best interest finding, counsel contends all the best interest factors favored

termination of respondent’s parental rights. Counsel provided respondent notice of the motion to

withdraw. Respondent has not filed a response.

¶ 43           Because we agree this appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review,

we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 44                          A. The Trial Court’s Unfitness Finding

¶ 45           Section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West

2022)) provides a two-step process to involuntarily terminate parental rights. The State must first

prove by clear and convincing evidence the respondent is “unfit” as contemplated in section 1(D)

of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28.

¶ 46           The trial court found respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the

return of the minors during the relevant time period pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption

Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)).

               “Reasonable progress is examined under an objective standard based upon

               the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time

               custody was taken from the parent. [Citation.] The benchmark for

               measuring a parent’s reasonable progress under section 1(D)(m) of the

               Adoption Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans

               and court’s directives in light of the condition that gave rise to the removal

               of the child and other conditions which later become known that would

               prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.

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               [Citation.] Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can conclude that

               progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the

               return of the minor is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that

               the trial court will be able to order the minor returned to parental custody in

               the near future. [Citations.]” In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17.

¶ 47           The trial court is in a superior position to observe witnesses and evaluate their

credibility. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002). Accordingly, the court’s findings regarding

parental unfitness are afforded great deference and will not be reversed unless they are against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence

where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).

¶ 48           The evidence presented in this case demonstrates the trial court’s unfitness

determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent was unsuccessfully

discharged from individual counseling and did not complete it during the relevant time period after

being referred again. Respondent was also unsuccessfully discharged from domestic violence

classes and did not complete them following another referral. Despite being required to complete

2 drug tests per month, respondent only did 1 during the relevant time period, testing positive for

THC and missing 13 consecutive subsequent tests. Respondent’s substance abuse, while pregnant

with S.R., was a significant reason for S.R. coming into foster care. Additionally, respondent was

involved in a violent incident, in which she was reportedly extremely intoxicated, with another

tenant of her apartment building during the relevant time period. Moreover, respondent also had

unauthorized unsupervised contact with S.R., which required police intervention. Respondent’s

inability to apply whatever skills she learned through her limited participation in services

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undermines the notion of having made reasonable progress. See In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985,

999 (2004).

¶ 49           In sum, the record adequately supports the testimony from Peters that respondent

did not comply with services or correct any of the conditions that brought S.R. into foster care in

the first place. Accordingly, we agree with counsel that there are no potentially meritorious

arguments that could be advanced on appeal that the trial court’s unfitness determination was

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 50                         B. The Trial Court’s Best Interest Finding

¶ 51           “If the trial court finds the parent to be unfit, the court then determines whether it

is in the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347,

352 (2004). The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th)

190420, ¶ 71. The preponderance of the evidence standard is a less stringent standard than proof

beyond a reasonable doubt; it is less stringent than even the intermediate standard of clear and

convincing evidence. In re K.P., 2020 IL App (3d) 190709, ¶ 41 (citing People v. Peterson, 2017

IL 120331, ¶ 37).

¶ 52           In evaluating a child’s best interest, the trial court must consider the following

statutory factors:

               “(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the

               child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural and religious background

               and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security,

               familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement

               alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s

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                community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for

                stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings;

                (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to

                substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for

                the child.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072 (2006); 705 ILCS

                405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022).

“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these

factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming

its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. On review, “[w]e will not disturb

a court’s finding that termination is in the child[ ]’s best interest unless it was against the manifest

weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005).

¶ 53            The evidence presented in this case demonstrates the trial court’s best interest

determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. “[A]t a best-interests hearing,

the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest

in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. Other factors, such as “the child’s need for

permanence which includes the child’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent

figures” (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(g) (West 2022)), may properly be considered.

¶ 54            Here, S.R. had spent approximately half of her life in her current placement. The

evidence showed Marisa, who was S.R.’s foster mother since August 2022, was willing, able, and

committed to providing permanency to S.R. through adoption. The evidence also showed

respondent continued to experience anxiety issues, which inhibited her from meeting S.R.’s needs.

Marisa, on the other hand, was meeting S.R.’s food, shelter, health, clothing, medical, and

educational needs. Hanten testified the foster home was safe with adequate space and an

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appropriate sleeping area for S.R. Hanten also testified that respondent was not attending her

scheduled visits and S.R. did not have a visible bond with her when she did attend. By contrast,

the evidence demonstrated that S.R. and Marisa had developed a significant parent/child bond.

¶ 55           We agree with appellate counsel that no potentially meritorious arguments can be

raised on appeal that the trial court’s best interest determination was against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

¶ 56                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 57           For the reasons stated, we agree with appellate counsel that no meritorious issues

can be raised on appeal. We therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

¶ 58           Affirmed.

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