Court Opinion

ID: 9538362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:35:45.339153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:48.303958
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice:
The defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle in violation of 76-6-408. We reverse. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The defendant was arrested on the morning of November 11, 1978, after being found asleep in the back of a brown Dodge van. At the time of the arrest the van was parked in plain view at 400 North 800 West, Cedar City, Utah. When questioned about his possession of the van the defendant answered that an individual named “Mike” allowed him to sleep in the van, but gave no explanation of who Mike was or how he could be contacted.
At the trial the prosecution introduced the testimony of the defendant’s girlfriend, Lori Pledger, hereinafter Pledger, concerning the defendant’s possession of the van. Pledger testified the defendant first took possession of the van prior to the time of arrest. She recounted that while walking to an apartment rented by friends of the defendant she and the defendant passed the van which was parked in a community park. Upon finding the friends not at home the couple walked to Hughes Cafe for coffee. Returning to the apartment they found the defendant’s friends at home and remained there for approximately two hours.
When the couple left the apartment, they walked to the van, entered it and used it to drive initially to the home of the defendant’s brother and then to the apartment where Pledger was living with her uncle. This apartment was located at 390 North 800 West, Cedar City, Utah. The witness further testified she did not see the defendant again that night but saw him the next day at school without the van. She also testified she saw the van parked behind the apartment building the morning after they used it and saw the defendant being arrested the next day at the same location.
*401In the information and complaint the prosecution alleged the van in question belonged to the U & S Motor Company. The evidence adduced at trial, however, established Robert and Raina Robertson were the registered owners of the van.1 The current Utah certificate of title and passenger registration for the van provided the address of the owners as 800 West 400 North, ¶ 56, Cedar City, Utah. The evidence presented at the trial explained the owners lived at a trailer park located behind the apartment building in which Pledger lived. The parking lot in which the van was found separated the trailer park and the apartment building.
Following the presentation of the prosecution’s case the defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground the State had failed to establish a prima facie case. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury which returned a guilty verdict.
On appeal the defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him, on the ground the State failed to establish a prima facie case. Although the issue is not argued effectively upon appeal, and the defendant’s brief emphasizes irrelevant issues concerning the ownership of the vehicle in question, the critical error was recognized and objected to at a trial; and serious injustice would result if this Court refused to correct the error.2
The prosecution’s failure to correctly identify the elements of the crime of receiving stolen property under 76-6-408 is more reprehensible than the manner in which the defendant presented his case. The State’s representation that the elements of the crime are merely two-fold, i. e., (1) receiving or disposing of the property, and (2) knowledge the property was stolen, evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of the statute and the very essence of the culpable activity. This general misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the crime must be remedied by this Court.
The defendant was found guilty of violating 76-6-408, i. e., receiving stolen property. This statute provides in pertinent part:
“(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, . . . with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.”
Implicit in the language of the statute are the basic elements of the crime: (1) property belonging to another has been stolen; 3 (2) the defendant received, retained or disposed of the stolen property; (3) at the time of receiving, retaining or disposing of the property the defendant knew or believed the property was stolen; and (4) the defendant acted purposely to deprive the owner of the possession of the property.4
Before the defendant can be convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property *402the prosecution must present a quantum of evidence sufficient to establish each element of the crime.5 In the present case, the prosecution contends they introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima fa-cie case for consideration by the jury. We cannot agree with this conclusion.
Specifically, the prosecution argues they presented a sufficient quantum of evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt; (1) the defendant received or retained the property of another; and (2) the defendant knew or believed the property probably to be stolen. However, their argument overlooks two essential elements of the crime, i. e., the fact the property was stolen and the defendant’s intent at the time of the possession.6
Before an individual can be convicted of violating 76-6-408 the prosecution must establish the defendant’s acts of receiving, retaining or disposing of the property in question were accompanied by a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
The legislature has specifically defined the term “purpose to deprive” in 76-6-401:
“(3) ‘Purpose to deprive’ means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.”
We recognize proof of a defendant’s intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof and therefore the prosecution usually must rely on a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence to establish this element.7 However criminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.8
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to introduce any evidence either circumstantial9 or direct to establish and prove an unlawful purpose at the time of the defendant’s possession of the vehicle.10
*403Under the evidence presented at trial, the defendant drove the vehicle for one evening and then parked it at the address of the registered owners.11 He did nothing to alter its appearance, impair its future usefulness to the owners or reduce its subsequent economic value. The defendant requested no reward or other compensation for its return and did not dispose of it under circumstances that would make it unlikely the owners would recover it.
The prosecution’s failure to establish this requisite element of the crime renders the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion erroneous and mandates our overruling it. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime as charged and the defendant should be declared not guilty as a matter of law.

. At the close of the prosecution’s case the trial judge allowed the state to amend the information to conform to the proof of ownership established during the trial. Thereafter, Robert and Raina Robertson replaced U & S Motor Company as named owners in the information.

. Cf. State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970); (“However, we recognize that if it appears that the interests of justice so require, this [CJourt may review claimed errors even, in the absence of the proper objection.” 470 P.2d at 248). In this case a proper objection to the error was submitted at trial and upon appeal the defendant averred: “When the State rested the first time, evidence of the elements of the alleged crime were missing so that no question for the jury was involved and the court had a duty to withdraw the case from the jury." Therefore, the issue was properly presented for review on appeal and this Court should address it.

. This requirement is fundamental to the offense. See Darnell v. State, 92 Nev. 680, 558 P.2d 624 (1976); Felker v. State, 254 Ark. 185, 492 S.W.2d 442 (1973); State v. Niehuser, 21 Or.App. 33, 533 P.2d 834 (1975); see generally 66 Am.Jur.2d, Receiving Stolen Property, Sec. 7, p. 298.

. Cf. State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980), see also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); Parish v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 627, 145 S.E.2d 192 (1965); Beard v. State, 42 Md.App. 276, 399 A.2d 1383 (1979); Jackson v. State, 10 Md.App. 337, 270 A.2d 322 (1970).

. Fundamental to our system of criminal jurisprudence is the proposition that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. This concept is embodied in 76 1 -501 which provides: “(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.” If the prosecution fails to carry its burden of establishing and proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged against him, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. See State v. Housekeeper, Utah, 588 P.2d 139 (1978) (“It is recognized that the State has the burden of proving each and every element of the offense and if it fails so to do the defendant is entitled to an acquittal” at 140); see also State v. Haywood, 297 N.C. 686, 256 S.E.2d 715 (1979).

. While there are states in which the crime of receiving stolen property does not incorporate a specific intent element, the exclusion of that element is based upon the language of the applicable statutes and not judicial oversight. See Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937); Wertheimer v. State, 201 Ind. 572, 169 N.E. 40 (1929).

. See State v. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410 (1978).

. See State v. Lamm, supra note 4.

. The circumstantial evidence presented at trial, points to the defendant’s innocence rather than guilt and can not be relied upon as establishing the requisite element of specific intent. See State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P.2d 911 (1941.) See also State v. John, supra note 7, at 411.

. While the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence on this element, the existence of it for a conviction of theft by receiving was recognized in the information which stated: "... the said defendant, Keith Wilbert Murphy, did receive or retain an operable motor vehicle .. . and did so knowing that said vehicle had been stolen or believing that it had probably been stolen, and did so with the purpose to deprive the said owner of the same.” See 76-6 401(3).

. Due to the circumstantial character of the proof concerning the defendant’s intent, facts relating to the ownership, location and condition of the van become important.