Court Opinion

ID: 9462744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:49:02.665417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:45.470482
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
For reasons discussed in my dissent in Anschul v. Sitmar, No. 74-1908 (7th Cir., May 17, 1976), I would hold that all three interlocutory orders are appealable and that this court has jurisdiction to review them.
Judge Bryan says that as a “practical matter” an injunction granted one individual plaintiff, enjoining the continuation of present discount practices and bank interchange practices, would eliminate these practices. Similarly, he states that any injunction against the named banks would for “all practical purposes” cover the correspondent banks. With deference to Judge Bryan’s views, I do not think we should resolve the jurisdictional question, and by indirection the rights and duties of class members, on a “practical” basis. Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., in no way conditions the right to maintain a class action upon such a prediction, and I do not think it permissible for a court to introduce such a vague and uncertain criterion. If absent class members are not afforded legal protection when they are entitled to it, or if proposed class defendants have no legal obligation to obey an injunction, practicality may prove a weak reed to rely upon. In any event, it simply cannot be denied that ultimate denial of class certification does have the effect of refusing injunctive relief as to the absent class members. Since I believe that the refusal of an immediate appeal of an order which denies class certification reduces the *1016chance for an effective appeal of this question to almost nothing, I cannot agree that the orders in this case fail to fall within section 1292(a)(1), which makes appealable “[interlocutory orders of the district court . refusing injunctions . . .
As to the appeal on the question relating to notification, a delay in considering the district court’s ruling until after the merits are heard is, to my way of thinking, an effective means of aborting any meaningful appeal of the question. I respectfully dissent from the view that the “content and form of the notice can be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment regardless of who prevails on the merits.” How can serious faults in content and form be effectively rectified if such faults are found to exist only on appeal after the merits have been tried and the faulty notices have been sent?