Court Opinion

ID: 9378837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 18:07:06.795454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:09.388096
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2023-Ohio-762.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                  CASE NO. 2022-L-053

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                  Court of Common Pleas

MCKINLEY JACKSON,
                                                Trial Court No. 2022 CR 000101
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                             OPINION

                                    Decided: March 13, 2023
                                Judgment: Reversed and remanded

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Kristi L. Winner, Assistant Prosecutor,
Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH
44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Victoria Bader, Assistant State Public
Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendant-
Appellant).

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, McKinley Jackson, appeals the sentencing court’s acceptance of

his guilty plea and the imposition of indefinite sentences. For the following reasons, we

reverse and remand the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.

        {¶2}     The state indicted Appellant on four counts: (1) attempted murder, a first-

degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.02; (2) felonious assault, a second-degree felony,

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with a repeat violent offender specification; (3) felonious
assault, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); and (4) tampering

with evidence, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1).

       {¶3}   Appellant pled not guilty. The state offered Appellant a plea agreement to

plead guilty to count two and all other counts would be dismissed. Appellant accepted

the plea agreement.

       {¶4}   On March 31, 2022, the court held a change of plea hearing. The court

explained the charge to Appellant and asked if he understood, to which he replied that he

did. The court then stated:

              Before accepting your guilty plea, I need to determine that you know
              and understand the rights that you will be waiving or giving up, the
              consequences of your guilty plea, and the maximum penalty that
              could be imposed on you and I must be satisfied that your plea is
              being made freely and that your plea is being made knowingly,
              intelligently, and voluntarily.

       {¶5}   The court next asked Appellant a series of questions and found that his plea

was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court accepted the guilty plea.

       {¶6}   On May 16, 2022, the court held a sentencing hearing. The court explained

to the prosecution and defense counsel that Appellant had written the court a letter stating

that he wished to fire his attorneys because “there was nothing done on my behalf” and

that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. The court asked defense counsel if she was

aware of the letter and Appellant’s wishes. She replied that she was not aware. The

court then asked defense counsel to explain the work she performed on the case.

Defense counsel told the court that she met with Appellant multiple times in jail and had

explained to him the state’s evidence against him and the possible prison sentence if he

were found guilty on all charges.

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       {¶7}   The court proceeded and asked Appellant if he still wished to withdraw his

guilty plea. Appellant replied that he did. Defense counsel asked the court if she may

speak to Appellant privately first and the court replied: “You may. However, I want you to

make sure that he understands that I don’t take pleas on the same case from the same

person more than once. * * * So that if I allow him to withdraw his plea, he’ll go to trial on

the original indictment, and I will never take a plea from him on this case again.”

       {¶8}   After speaking with counsel, Appellant decided not to withdraw his guilty

plea. The court asked Appellant if he was sure and he replied, “I’m sure.” The court

sentenced Appellant to an indefinite sentence of eight to twelve years for felonious assault

and four years for the repeat violent offender specification to be served consecutively.

       {¶9}   Appellant timely appeals and raises two assignments of error.

       {¶10} First assignment of error: “The trial court plainly erred by coercing Mr.

Jackson to withdraw his motion to withdraw his plea by stating a blanket policy against

accepting a plea after a plea withdraw [sic].”

       {¶11} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before

sentence is imposed * * *.” Crim.R. 32.1. As a general rule, “a presentence motion to

withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d

521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). However, “[a] defendant does not have an absolute

right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

“The decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within

the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, it is

for the trial court “to determine what circumstances justify granting such a motion,” and

for the reviewing court to affirm that decision unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

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unconscionable. Id. at 526-527. In this case, we find the blanket policy rejecting “pleas

on the same case from the same person more than once” arbitrary and unreasonable.

       {¶12} Appellant offers three arguments in support of this assignment of error. We

only address one since it is dispositive of this assignment of error.

       {¶13} Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it

established (and expressed its intention to use) a “blanket policy” against accepting more

than one plea, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. We agree.

       {¶14} It is well settled that the trial court enjoys wide discretion in deciding whether

to accept or reject a negotiated plea agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,

262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Akron v. Ragsdale, 61 Ohio App.2d 107, 109–

10, 399 N.E.2d 119 (9th Dist.1978). We have defined an abuse of discretion as conduct

that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d

217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).          An “arbitrary” decision is one made “without

consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.” Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v.

McGee, 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 359, 423 N.E.2d 1095 (1981), quoting Black's Law Dictionary

96 (5th Ed.1979).

       {¶15} However, the court's discretion is not without limits. State v. Caldwell, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99166, 2013–Ohio–5017, ¶ 11. (“Although there is no evidence the

trial court had a blanket policy rejecting all pleas after the commencement of trial, the

court's rationale became a de facto policy of rejecting any plea offered in this case

because it provided no principled reason justifying its all-or-nothing approach. Had the

court articulated some objective reason by which we could review its exercise of

discretion, we might have found no abuse of discretion.”) Id. at ¶ 15. “For example, a

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Case No. 2022-L-053
trial court abuses its discretion when it rejects a plea agreement by relying on a blanket

policy rather than considering the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at

¶ 11, citing State v. Fitzgerald, 188 Ohio App.3d 701, 2010-Ohio-3721, 936 N.E.2d 585,

¶ 11 (8th Dist.). "A blanket policy rejecting plea agreements results in rejections based

on policy rather than reason.” Id.

       {¶16} “A court's discretion may be exercised erroneously if the court fails to give

reasons for its decisions and its reasons are not apparent from the record.” Id. at ¶ 12.

“A decision rejecting a plea bargain should be accompanied by the trial court's reasons

therefor, absent facts and circumstances otherwise appearing which permit an evaluation

of the decision.” Ragsdale at paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶17} The above cases reference plea agreements, however, we find no reason

why the same logic would not apply to all cases involving blanket policies rejecting pleas,

negotiated or otherwise, absent facts and reasoning. Similar to this case, in State v.

Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 13, the Ohio Supreme

Court reviewed a trial court’s “blanket policy of not accepting no-contest pleas. In other

words, the court rejected any and all no-contest pleas as a matter of course without any

consideration of the facts or circumstances of each case.” The Court held that the trial

court’s blanket policy was arbitrary because it was offered without regard to the facts or

circumstances, and concluded that the trial court’s “adherence to such an arbitrary policy

constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. As a result of the trial court’s blanket policy, which

led to Beasley pleading guilty, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the judgment and

remanded the matter to allow Beasley to enter a new plea. Id. at ¶ 17.

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       {¶18} Here, the trial court had a blanket policy rejecting all “pleas on the same

case from the same person more than once” and based on that policy, the court stated

that it “will never take a plea from [the defendant] on this case again.” Similar to Beasley,

the court had a blanket policy against pleas, that policy was offered without any

justification or reason considering the relevant facts and circumstances, and, after hearing

that policy, Appellant plead guilty.

       {¶19} “‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and

the Ohio Constitution.’” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d

621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). “In

determining whether a guilty * * * plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,

an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review

of the record to ensure that the trial court complied with constitutional and procedural

safeguards.” State v. Willison, 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA18, 2019-Ohio-220, ¶ 11. “* * *

A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a

voluntary act, is void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to collateral attack.”

Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962).

       {¶20} The trial court’s policy was arbitrary and its adherence to that policy

constitutes an abuse of discretion.      The circumstances show that the court’s policy

induced Appellant’s decision and led him not to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant twice

informed the trial court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. In the first instance, he

wrote a letter to the court before the sentencing hearing. In the second instance, he

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reiterated his desire to withdraw his guilty plea at sentencing. Appellant only changed his

mind (mere minutes after reiterating his desire to withdraw his guilty plea) when he was

advised of the court’s blanket policy against accepting more than one plea by the same

person in the same case. The record here demonstrates that, in this set of facts, the

court’s blanket policy constituted a threat that infected Appellant’s decision to not

withdraw his guilty plea and renders his guilty plea involuntary.

       {¶21} Because Appellant’s decision not to withdraw his guilty plea was

involuntary, we reverse.

       {¶22} Appellant’s first assignment of error is with merit.

       {¶23} Second assignment of error: “The trial court erred when it sentenced Mr.

Jackson to an indefinite sentence under the unconstitutional Reagan Tokes Law.”

       {¶24} Appellant’s second assignment of error is rendered moot by the disposition

of his first assignment.

       {¶25} We conclude that the trial court erred in adopting a blanket policy of refusing

to accept pleas more than once and that policy induced Appellant’s guilty plea. The

judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this case is

remanded for a hearing on Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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