Court Opinion

ID: 9702147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:56:35.99033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:34.044070
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CAPPY,
concurring and dissenting.
Today, the majority dilutes the heretofore strict and mandatory “separate vote” requirement contained in Article XI, Section 1 of our Constitution. It does so to the detriment of the citizens of our Commonwealth. Indeed, the majority’s adoption of the “subject matter test” is not only inconsistent with the plain language of the Constitution, but also with the Framers’ intent as to how to safeguard the citizenry with respect to the amendment of that social compact, and our six-year-old decision in Bergdoll v. Kane, 557 Pa. 72, 731 A.2d 1261 (1999). In adopting this test, the majority dispossesses the voters who may wish to amend certain facets of our fundamental law, but not others, of the right to do so, and instead, encumbers them with a Hobson’s choice between accepting all proposed amendments or none of them. Accordingly, while I concur as to the result reached by the majority regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to Article I, Section 6,1 respectfully dissent as to the analytical framework embraced by the majority and to its conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to Article I, Section 14 of our Constitution.
*419Article XI, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution sets forth the process and requirements for the proposal of amendments to our Constitution by the General Assembly and their ultimate adoption, or rejection, by the citizenry. With respect to these provisos, our Court has made it abundantly clear that, “no departures from or circumventions or violations of existing mandatory constitutional amendment requirements will be permitted,” Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474, 479 (1969), and “[njothing short of literal compliance with the mandate will suffice.” Kremer v. Grant, 529 Pa. 602, 606 A.2d 433, 436 (1992)(quoting Tausig v. Lawrence, 328 Pa. 408, 197 A. 235, 238 (1938)). In sum, our Constitution requires that the General Assembly must comply literally with the mandatory requirements of Article XI, Section 1.
The majority, however, has ignored these mandates with respect to Article XI, Section l’s requirement that “[w]hen two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately.” Pa. Const, art. XI, § 1. It is the majority’s interpretation of this “separate vote” provision with which I take issue in this appeal. The object in interpreting a constitutional provision is to “give full effect to the intent of its framers and the people in adopting it.” Commonwealth ex rel. Tate v. Bell, 145 Pa. 374, 22 A. 641, 643 (1891). The framer’s intent, as well as the intent of the citizenry in adopting the provision, can be ascertained from the language of the Constitution itself. Tate, 22 A. at 643 (offering that the intent is to be sought for in the instrument itself and “if the words convey a definite meaning, involving no absurdity or conflict with other portions of the instrument, that meaning which is apparent on its face must be adopted”). In construing the language, the Constitution is not to receive a technical or strained construction, but rather, the words should be interpreted in their popular, natural, and ordinary meaning. Id.
Here, the language of the Constitution setting forth the requirements for legislative amendment could not be clearer. Article XI, Section 1 unambiguously and plainly requires *420separate ballot questions for separate amendments to our Constitution.
Furthermore, in interpreting a constitutional provision, a court also may consider the circumstances attending its formation and the construction probably placed upon it by the people. Tate, 22 A. at 643. A review of the debates surrounding the adoption of the “separate vote” requirement confirms this plain meaning interpretation approach to Article XI, Section 1. Specifically, the convention debates from 1838 disclose that the reason for this part of the amendment provision is to ensure that our citizenry is fully informed of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, easily understands the amendments, and is able to vote on the various amendments separately.1 The Framers, therefore, intended for Article XI, Section 1 to guarantee that the voters may express their desires with respect to each constitutional amendment separately so that voters who favor only one o.ut of two proposed amendments are not placed in a situation in which they have to accept either both amendments or no amendment at all. Thus, the focal point of Article XI, Section 1 clearly is to grant the voter the greatest freedom to decide upon amendments to our fundamental law; and this may only be achieved by a literal and plain meaning interpretation and approach to Section 1.
We took this approach to Article XI, Section 1 a scant six years ago in our 1999 decision in Bergdoll. In Bergdoll, our Court strictly interpreted Section l’s requirement, based upon the plain language of the section. In that appeal, our Court found the proposed amendment at issue to violate Section 1. Our focus in Bergdoll was two-fold. First, we analyzed how many ways the ballot question at issue would change the *421Constitution. We concluded that the ballot question would change the Constitution in two ways and that it encompassed amendments to two articles of the Constitution. Second, we reviewed whether the ballot question permitted the electorate to vote separately upon each of the amendments. As it did not, we found the ballot question violated Article XI, Section 1. Bergdoll, 731 A.2d at 1270 (stating that when a ballot question encompasses multiple amendments, it does “not permit the electorate to vote separately upon each of the amendments in violation of Article XI, § 1.”).
In engaging in this analysis, the Court in Bergdoll implicitly eschewed a more liberal approach which would have focused upon the “interrelatedness” of the amendments to a “single subject.” This “interrelatedness” approach was expressly argued by the Commonwealth in Bergdoll, Commonwealth’s Brief at pp. 17-20, and proffered by a single concurring Justice, who echoed the position voiced by Judge Pelligrini in his dissent in the Commonwealth Court below. Bergdoll, 694 A.2d 1155, 1159 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). It is no different from the “subject matter test” embraced by the majority today. Yet, we did not adopt this approach in Bergdoll. This is because the literal and plain meaning approach employed by us in Bergdoll was inconsistent and irreconcilable with this “interrelatedness” approach advocated by the Commonwealth and the concurrence.2
Finally, and contrary to the approach taken by the Court in Bergdoll, the majority’s approach will make constitutional *422amendment a guessing game as to the predilections of a majority of Justices regarding just how “sufficiently interrelated” amendments need to be to pass constitutional muster. See Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d 549, 554 (Ariz.l934)(adopting interrelatedness approach, but acknowledging that while certain states agree upon the principle to be used, they “differ widely as to the result reached in its application to particular cases.”).
Application of the straightforward and proper approach— the one mandated by the terms of Article XI, Section 1, the Framers’ intent, and Bergdoll—to the amendments at issue, leads to the conclusion that while the proposed amendment to Article I, Section 6 (Trial by Jury) does not present separate amendments,3 the proposed amendments to Article I, Section 14 (Prisoners to be Bailable; Habeas Corpus) violate Article XI, Section 1. Specifically, the bail ballot question sought to disallow bail upon proof or presumption that the accused either committed an offense for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment or that no condition or conditions other than imprisonment would assure the safety or a person or the community. Ballot Question Regarding Joint Resolution 1998-1 (emphasis supplied).
Based upon the above amendment, it becomes clear that the proposal contains two distinct amendments: (1) disallow bail for those accused of a crime for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment and (2) disallow bail for those who are a safety risk to any person and the community. See Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829, 835-36 (1972). By combining these two amendments into a single ballot question, the voter is confronted with an impossible and unconstitutional Hobson’s choice if he or she believes that bail should be disallowed only for those individuals facing life *423imprisonment or conversely, only for those who are a safety risk. This is precisely the danger that the framers intended to eliminate in Article XI, Section 1, and the danger that the majority’s “single subject test” disregards today.
In sum, for all of the above reasons, while I find the amendment to Article I, Section 6 to be constitutional, I respectfully dissent to the framework utilized by the majority, as well as its conclusion that Article I, Section 14 passes the “separate vote” requirement of Article XI, Section I.
Justice NIGRO and BAER join this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. See, e.g., comments of Senator John Fuller of Fayette County suggesting that only one amendment be submitted to the people at one and the same time due to the fear that if two or more amendments were submitted at the same time,' "one of which may be acceptable to the people, and the other not so. In such ah event, an opportunity ought to be given to them to take the one and reject the other.” 12 Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to Propose Amendments to the Constitution, 50 (1839).

. As the interrelatedness approach—expressly before the Court in Berg-doll—was not adopted in that decision, and because such an approach is clearly inconsistent with the Bergdoll Court's analytical construct, the approach that was taken in Bergdoll represents binding precedent from this Court. The doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to recent decisions as precedential authority. See Burke v. Pittsburgh Limestone Corp., 375 Pa. 390, 100 A.2d 595 (1953). It ensures predictability and stability in the affairs of government and people and it is essential to the rule of law. While the doctrine may be disregarded when faced with an unsupportable or erroneous holding, or where the reason for a rule of law no longer exists and application would cause injustice, see Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877, 888-89 (1973), notably absent from the majority opinion are any reasons why the approach in Bergdoll is no longer supportable or erroneous. Indeed, the majority fails even to mention Bergdoll.

. I find, however, the majority's analysis regarding the implicit impact of an amendment upon other constitutional provisions to be hopelessly vague and therefore largely unhelpful, as it offers three different, and seemingly inconsistent, inquiries, i.e., whether the proposed amendments "facially'' affect, "patently” affect, and/or "substantively” affect, other parts of the Constitution. Majority Opinion op. at p. 842, 842, and 845.