Court Opinion

ID: 9646837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:13:04.852459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:42.593548
License: Public Domain

ESQUIVEL, Justice,
concurring.
Although I am in complete agreement with the majority, it is important to state specifically why McCarty does not apply in this case. It is evident that the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties in this case when it entered its original judgment of divorce. Since no direct attack upon the trial court’s judgment was ever made, the decree of divorce became final. I agree that McCarty has rendered the decree of divorce erroneous, but I do not reach the conclusion of the majority in Buckhanan that McCarty rendered the decree of divorce void ab initio. Moreover, trial court judgments which, at the most, are erroneous, are entitled to sanctity of finality and must not be defeated by collateral attacks such as is present in the case at bar. Accordingly, I would expressly hold that McCarty’s application be limited to those judgments which are not final and which are challenged on direct appeal.
I am compelled to present a further reason for denying relator’s application for relief from the order of commitment.
The decree of divorce states that:
The Court finds that Chester B. Hover-male is a trustee for that portion of the retirement income award from the Navy retirement and that he shall provide payment by allotment to the wife Elizabeth M. Hovermale of her separate share of each monthly amount [38.37%] (including that percentage of any increased authorized by Congress); If an allotment is not possible, and only in that event, in alternative, the Court finds that Chester B. Hovermale shall hold each monthly payment in trust and he shall provide to Elizabeth M. Hovermale the amount above prescribed, with the first payment due and payable 1 July, 1979, and like payments due and payable on the first day of each month thereafter, based on the above formula.
Even though the facts of this case differ with the facts of Ex parte Rodriguez, 636 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.App.1981) with respect to the trust being created by agreement incident to divorce and subsequently being incorporated by reference in the Rodriguez divorce decree, the law which was applied in Rodriguez should be applied here as well.
It is undisputed that a trust was created by the trial court. Relator Hovermale was designated trustee under the terms of the trust and the respondent was designated the beneficiary. The trust res in issue on application for writ of habeas corpus was described as consisting of 38.37% of the total monthly military retirement retirement entitlements received by the relator.
The law is well-settled that legal title to the trust res is vested in the trustee. McCamey v. Hollister Oil Co., 241 S.W. 689, 695 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1922), aff’d on other grounds, 115 Tex. 49, 274 S.W. 562 (1925); Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235, 247 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1952, writ ref’d n. r. e.); See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 7425b-7(F) (Vernon 1960). As a result, the trial court has the power to hold relator Hovermale in contempt of court for refusing to obey an order directing him to pay to respondent funds which he holds as trustee and to which the respondent is legally entitled. Ex parte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 384, 347 S.W.2d 938, 940-41 (1961); See Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 846-47 (Tex.1979); Ex parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex.1975); and Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1976, no writ).
Therefore, for these reasons, I would deny relator’s writ and remand him to the custody of the sheriff.