Court Opinion

ID: 9894750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 19:03:51.673212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:32.595047
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/2/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                D081200

       Plaintiff and Respondent,

       v.                                  (Super. Ct. No. INF062219)

EDGAR ANTONIO FLORES,

       Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John

D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.

       Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christine
Y. Friedman, Lynne G. McGinnis, and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

       Edgar Antonio Flores appeals the order denying a petition for
resentencing on his second degree murder conviction. The superior court
denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing on the ground
Flores was ineligible for resentencing because he had been convicted of
provocative act murder. We affirm.
                                        I.
                                BACKGROUND
A.    Murder
      This case arises out of a gun battle during a high-speed vehicle chase in
2008. Flores drove a car that had been reported stolen, and with him were
Alexis Melendrez in the front seat and Anthony Albert Paez in the back seat.
When California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers spotted the car and tried to
stop it, Flores sped off. The CHP officers pursued the car. During the
pursuit, Paez leaned out a rear window and fired a handgun at the officers.
The officers returned fire and fatally shot Melendrez.
B.    Trial
      Flores and Paez were charged with the murder of Melendrez (Pen.
Code, § 187; undesignated section references are to this code) and several
other crimes. The only theory of murder presented to the jury was the

provocative act murder doctrine.1

1      The provocative act murder doctrine describes “circumstances under
which a defendant comes within the statutory definition of murder when his
or her unlawful conduct provokes another into committing the fatal act.”
(People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 867, fn. 10 (Cervantes).) The
doctrine applies “when the perpetrator of a crime maliciously commits an act
that is likely to result in death, and the victim kills in reasonable response to
that act.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 655 (Gonzalez); accord,
People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 581 (Briscoe).) It is the only
murder theory available when someone other than the defendant or an
accomplice kills during the commission or attempted commission of a crime.
(People v. Antonelli (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 712, 721, review granted Oct. 18,
2023, No. S281599.)
                                        2
      To find Paez guilty, the jury was instructed it had to find that during
his commission of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, or shooting at
an occupied vehicle, he committed the provocative act of shooting at the
pursuing CHP officers, which he knew was dangerous to human life,
committed with conscious disregard for life, should have foreseen had a high
probability of initiating a chain of events resulting in someone’s death, and
caused Melendrez’s death. (See CALCRIM No. 560.) To find Flores guilty,
the jury was separately instructed it had to find that while he was aiding and
abetting Paez in the commission of the same three offenses, Flores committed
the provocative act of driving in a manner that allowed Paez to shoot at the
pursuing CHP officers, which Flores knew was dangerous to human life,
committed with conscious disregard for life, should have foreseen had a high
probability of initiating a chain of events resulting in someone’s death, and
caused Melendrez’s death. (See CALCRIM No. 561.) The instruction specific
to Flores advised the jury it could not find him guilty unless the People
proved he committed a provocative act that caused Melendrez’s death, and he
was not guilty if the jury decided Paez committed the only provocative act
that caused the death.
      Each instruction advised the jury that for the murder to be first degree,
the jury had to find Melendrez was killed during an attempted murder the
specific defendant intended to commit and as a result of the provocative act
committed by that defendant; that a murder that did not satisfy those
requirements was second degree; and that in determining the degree, the
jury should refer to the instructions on attempted murder. The jury was
given separate instructions on willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder (CALCRIM Nos. 600, 601) and aiding and abetting
(CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401).

                                       3
      Flores and Paez were tried together in early 2010 and found guilty of

the murder of Melendrez and other crimes.2 The jury fixed the degree of the
murder as first for Paez and second for Flores. The judgment of conviction
against Flores was affirmed on appeal in 2012. (People v. Paez (July 3, 2012,
D058373) [nonpub. opn.].)
C.    Section 1172.6 Proceeding
      After Flores’s judgment became final, legislation narrowed the scope of
liability for felony murder and abolished liability for murder based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§§ 188, 189, as amended by
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2019; see People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842–843, 846.) The legislation enacted former section 1170.95,
which established a procedure for persons to seek relief if they had been
convicted of murder before the legislation took effect but could not have been
so convicted had the legislation been in effect at the time of the killing.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; see Gentile, at p. 843.) Later legislation amended
section 1170.95 to expand the scope of persons eligible for relief to include
those convicted of murder under any “other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.”
(Former § 1170.95, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan.

2      The jury also found Paez guilty of two counts of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 21a, 187), two counts of assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle
(§ 246), but acquitted Flores of those charges. The jury additionally found
Paez guilty of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd.
(a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021), and found Flores
guilty of receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d) and reckless driving while
attempting to evade a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). The jury found
true several gang and firearm enhancement allegations against Paez and a
gang enhancement allegation against Flores. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C),
12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (c).)
                                        4
1, 2022.) The procedure is now codified as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch.
58, § 10; see People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869, fn. 9 (Wilson).) We
use that statutory number for simplicity.
      Flores, representing himself, filed a form petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 on March 10, 2021. He checked boxes on the form
stating he was charged in a document that allowed the People to proceed
under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; he was convicted of murder on a theory of felony
murder or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; and he
could not presently be convicted of murder because of the legislative changes
described in the immediately preceding paragraph. Flores also checked a box
requesting appointment of counsel.
      The superior court appointed counsel for Flores. At a status
conference, the People asked the court to deny the petition because Flores
had been convicted of murder based on the provocative act doctrine and not
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Flores’s counsel stated he had seen the jury instructions and agreed
the petition should be denied because the conviction was for provocative act
murder. Based on those statements, the court found Flores ineligible for
relief and denied the petition.
                                      II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Flores contends the superior court erred by denying his section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie review stage. He argues the instructions given at
his trial allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder based on a now-invalid
theory of imputed malice, namely, that he aided and abetted Paez’s
provocative act without himself acting with malice. Flores also argues

                                       5
counsel who represented him in the superior court provided ineffective
assistance by failing to amend the petition after legislation made relief
available to persons convicted of murder on any theory that imputed malice
based solely on participation in a crime and by failing to make the
instructional argument he now urges. He asks us to reverse the denial order
and to remand the matter with directions to the superior court to issue an
order to show cause and to appoint new counsel.
A.    Standard of Review
      We review de novo an order denying a section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie review stage. (People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200;
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.) Although at that stage a
court presented with a section 1172.6 petition may not engage in factfinding
that requires weighing evidence or exercising discretion, the court may
consider jury instructions, jury verdicts, and other documents that are part of
the record of conviction to determine whether the petitioner satisfies the
conditions for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 970–972 (Lewis); Coley, at pp. 545–548.) We granted Flores’s request to
augment the record to include the jury instructions, transcripts of closing
arguments, and verdicts from his trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
B.    Denial of Petition
      Section 1172.6 provides “a procedural mechanism for those convicted of
murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief.” (Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 869.) For a petitioner convicted of murder, the statute sets out three
conditions for relief: (1) the accusatory pleading allowed prosecution on a
theory of felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
some other theory by which malice is imputed based solely on participation in
a crime; (2) the conviction followed a trial or guilty plea; and (3) the petitioner

                                        6
could not now be convicted of murder “because of changes to Section 188 or
189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Flores cannot
satisfy the third condition.
      The statutory change relevant to Flores’s claim that he might have
been convicted based on a theory of imputed malice that is no longer valid is
the addition of subdivision (a)(3) to section 188. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)
Under that provision, except in cases of felony murder, “in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The only theory of murder
presented to Flores’s jury was provocative act murder, which “requires proof
that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice, and either
the defendant or an accomplice intentionally committed a provocative act
that proximately caused an unlawful killing.” (Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 655, italics added; accord, People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 663
(Concha) [“The defendant or an accomplice must proximately cause an
unlawful death, and the defendant must personally act with malice.”]; see
People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 868 [“malice aforethought—
conscious disregard for life—is a necessary element of a conviction for

provocative act murder”].)3 The jury was instructed that Flores was guilty of

3      The requirement the defendant personally harbor malice to be guilty of
provocative act murder is consistent with the general rule that “[t]o satisfy
the mens rea element of murder, the defendant must personally act with
malice aforethought.” (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 660.) Concha applied
the general rule in a provocative act murder case, but our Supreme Court had
made clear several years earlier that outside the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, a person who aids and abets another in a killing is
liable for her own acts and those of the other person, but each “person’s
mental state is her own; she is liable for her mens rea, not the other
person’s.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118.) Once guilt is
                                        7
murder only if, during his aiding and abetting Paez in the commission of a
specified felony, Flores committed a provocative act he knew was dangerous
to human life, did so with conscious disregard for life, and thereby caused
Melendrez’s death. “Malice will be implied if the defendant commits a
provocative act knowing that this conduct endangers human life and acts
with conscious disregard of the danger.” (Gonzalez, at p. 655; accord, People
v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 704 (Gilbert), revd. on other grounds sub nom.
Gilbert v. California, (1967) 388 U.S. 263; Briscoe, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p.
581.) For such a defendant, “section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which provides
malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime, does not affect the theory of provocative act murder.”
(Mancilla, at p. 868.) Since the law has always required a defendant who
committed a provocative act personally harbor malice and still does, Flores
fails to satisfy the condition for relief that he “could not presently be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) He thus failed to state a
prima facie case for relief. (People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 867
(Burns).)

established for provocative act murder, the degree of the murder is based on
the defendant’s personal mental state. (Concha, at p. 663.) “In the classic
provocative act murder prosecution, malice is implied from the provocative
act, and the resulting crime is murder in the second degree.” (Cervantes,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 872–873, fn. 15.) But “when malice is express
because the defendant possessed a specific intent to kill, first degree murder
liability may be proper if the charged defendant personally acted willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation.” (Concha, at p. 662; accord, Cervantes,
at pp. 872–873, fn. 15.) Because attempted murder requires intent to kill
(People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 62), the provocative act murder doctrine
does not limit a defendant’s liability to second degree murder when an
unintended person is killed by the victim or a law enforcement officer during
an attempted murder (Concha, at p. 663).
                                         8
      In urging us to reach the opposite conclusion, Flores argues the
superior court’s instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder
either by committing a provocative act himself with the required mental state
(CALCRIM No. 561) or, alternatively, by aiding and abetting Paez’s
commission of a provocative act with only Paez having the required mental
state (CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401, 560). Hence, Flores argues, his murder
conviction might have rested on the jury’s impermissible imputation of malice
from Paez to him. In support of this argument, he relies on People v.
Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado) and People v. Langi
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), where the Courts of Appeal reversed
orders denying section 1172.6 petitions at the prima facie review stage
because, in their view, instructions on aiding and abetting and implied malice
could have allowed juries to impute malice based solely on the appellant’s
participation in a crime. Flores also relies on People v. Lee (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1164 (Lee), where the Court of Appeal reversed an order denying
a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie review stage because at the time
of the appellant’s conviction of provocative act murder in 1994, the law did
not require a defendant personally act with malice and allowed conviction
based on the provocative act and mental state of an accomplice, and the jury
was so instructed. Flores’s cited authorities and related arguments do not
persuade us that he has stated a prima facie case for relief.
      One flaw in Flores’s argument is that it has nothing to do with the
changes to the law of murder that authorize convicted murderers to seek
relief under section 1172.6. When Flores was convicted in 2010, a
provocative act murder conviction required the defendant personally harbor
malice, whether it was the defendant or an accomplice who committed the
provocative act that caused the death. (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 663

                                       9
[“The defendant or an accomplice must proximately cause an unlawful death,
and the defendant must personally act with malice.”]; McCoy, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 1118 [defendant “is liable for her mens rea, not the other
person’s”]; Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1181–1182 [Concha indicated “a
murder conviction, whether first or second degree, requires proof of a

defendant’s individual mental state”].)4 That requirement is fully consistent
with the 2019 amendments to section 188, which require for a murder
conviction not based on the felony-murder rule that each principal in a crime
act with malice aforethought and prohibit imputation of malice based solely
on participation in a crime. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) Hence, Flores cannot
show he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3);
see Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.)
      Bereft of any legislative change supporting relief, Flores’s argument
reduces to a claim that the instructions given at his trial did not clearly
require the jury to find that he personally acted with malice to find him
guilty of provocative act murder, and instead let the jury impute malice from

4     We reject Flores’s suggestion that not until the Supreme Court of
California decided Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th 643, on July 5, 2012, did the
case law require a defendant personally act with malice to be guilty of
provocative act murder. We think the Supreme Court made that
requirement clear in ruling in 2001 that “when guilt does not depend on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, . . . the aider and abettor must
know and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.” (McCoy,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118; see fn. 3, ante.) In any event, the requirement
was established no later than November 12, 2009, when the Supreme Court
applied McCoy in a provocative act murder case and ruled: “The defendant or
an accomplice must proximately cause an unlawful death, and the defendant
must personally act with malice.” (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 663; see
Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1185 [noting that “before Concha, a
provocative murder conviction could have been based on a theory of imputed
malice”].)
                                       10
Paez to him. Such a routine claim of instructional error could have been
asserted on appeal from the judgment of conviction. “Section 1172.6 does not
create a right to a second appeal,” however, and Flores “cannot use it to
resurrect a claim that should have been raised in his . . . direct appeal.”
(Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 865; accord, People v. Farfan (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not
afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error”]; People
v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [“statute does not permit a
petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error”].)
      Another flaw in Flores’s argument is that the cases on which he relies
are not on point. Lee is distinguishable because in 1994, when the appellant
in that case was convicted of provocative act murder, our “Supreme Court
had not separated out the mens rea of individual defendants in provocative
act murder cases,” and “case law imposed culpability on all perpetrators of
the underlying crime so long as the provocateur acted with malice, and did so
in furtherance of the common criminal design.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1182.) As we already explained, that was no longer true by the time of
Flores’s conviction in 2010, when the law was clear the defendant must
personally act with malice. (Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 663; McCoy,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118; see fn. 4, ante.) As for Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th 972, and Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, we recently
said there is no “indication the opinions considered the effect of the language
in subdivision (a)(3) of section 1172.6 requiring that defendants show they
can no longer be convicted ‘because of’ the recent legislative changes.”
(Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at 868, fn. 7.) “ ‘It is axiomatic that cases are
not authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50
Cal.4th 616, 684.)

                                         11
      Moreover, the problems the Langi, Maldonado, and Lee courts
perceived with the jury instructions given in those cases were not present in
the instructions given in Flores’s case. Lee concluded the jury might have
imputed malice from an accomplice because the instructions allowed the jury
to find the appellant guilty if during the commission of a robbery a
“ ‘surviving perpetrator . . . intentionally committed a provocative life-
threatening act . . . [¶] . . . with knowledge of the danger to and with
conscious disregard for human life.’ ” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p.
1182].) Langi and Maldonado concluded that because, in the view of those
courts, the instructions did not adequately explain that to be guilty of implied
malice murder or murder by lying in wait an aider and abettor personally
had to act with malice, the juries might have imputed malice from the direct
perpetrator to the aider and abettor based solely on his participation in the
crime. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 983–984; Maldonado, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1266–1267.) The instructions in Flores’s case, however,
presented no such possibility for imputing malice.
      As we recounted earlier (see pt. I.B., ante), the superior court gave two
separate instructions on provocative act murder, one patterned after
CALCRIM No. 560 for Paez as the direct perpetrator and the other patterned
after CALCRIM No. 561 for Flores as the aider and abettor. The instruction
for Flores stated he was guilty if the People proved that while he was an
accomplice of Paez in committing attempted murder, assault with a firearm,
or shooting at an occupied vehicle, Flores intentionally committed a
provocative act, he knew the natural and probable consequences of the
provocative act were dangerous to human life and then acted with conscious
disregard for life, and in response to his provocative act a CHP officer killed
Melendrez. The instruction identified the provocative act charged against

                                       12
Flores as “driving in a manner that allowed the right passenger [i.e., Paez] to

shoot at [CHP officers],”5 and stated the jury could not find Flores guilty
unless all jurors agreed he committed the provocative act and the act was a
direct and substantial factor that caused the killing. Thus, unlike the
instruction in Lee, which allowed conviction based on an accomplice’s
malicious conduct, or those in Langi and Maldonado, which were criticized
for purportedly inadequately focusing the jury’s attention on the aider and
abettor’s mental state, the instruction in Flores’s case directed the jury’s
attention to both his acts and his mental state. It explicitly stated the jury
could not convict Flores of murder unless his provocative act caused
Melendrez’s death and he intentionally committed that act with knowledge it
was dangerous to human life and with conscious disregard for life. Therefore,
although the instruction did not use the phrase “implied malice,” the jury was
specifically instructed it could find Flores guilty of murder only if he
personally acted with the mental state that constitutes implied malice. (See
Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655 [“Malice will be implied if the defendant
commits a provocative act knowing that this conduct endangers human life
and acts with conscious disregard of the danger.”]; accord, Gilbert, supra, 63
Cal.2d at p. 704.)
      Flores insists, however, his acquittal of the charges of attempted
murder, assault with a firearm, and shooting at an occupied vehicle (see fn. 2,
ante) suggests the jury most likely found him guilty for aiding and abetting
Paez’s provocative act, and “merely found that Mr. Paez possessed the mens

5     Attempting to evade law enforcement officers “by engaging in a high-
speed, dangerous chase” may constitute a provocative act. (People v. Lima
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 259, 268.) On Flores’s appeal from the judgment of
conviction, we ruled the evidence was sufficient to establish his driving
constituted a provocative act.
                                       13
rea necessary to convert the police’s [sic] act of shooting into a murder for
which [Flores] was responsible.” We disagree. The jury was instructed to
consider all the instructions together; to separately consider the evidence as
it applied to each defendant; to decide each charge for each defendant
separately; that the crimes charged required the union of act and wrongful
intent; and that the act and specific intent or mental state required for
murder were explained in the instruction for that crime. (CALCRIM Nos.
200, 203, 252.) As noted above, on murder the jury was given one instruction
tailored to Paez and another tailored to Flores. Those instructions identified
the separate provocative act charged against each; required each commit the
provocative act charged against him; defined the required mental state in
committing the provocative act; and stated that for the murder to be first
degree, Melendrez must have been killed as a result of a provocative act
committed during an attempted murder that was intentionally committed.
We presume the jury understood and followed the instructions in rendering
its verdicts on the murder charges. (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th
367, 431; People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 948.) By finding Paez
guilty of first degree of murder, which required express malice, and Flores of
second degree murder, which required only implied malice (Concha, supra, 47
Cal.4th at p. 663; see fn. 3, ante), the jury appears to have followed the
instructions by considering their mental states separately and not simply

imputing Paez’s to Flores.6

6     Any inconsistency between the verdict finding Flores guilty of murder
and the verdicts finding him not guilty of attempted murder, assault with a
firearm, and shooting at an occupied vehicle does not “imply that the jury
must have been confused. [Citation.] An inconsistency may show no more
than jury lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the
validity of a verdict.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656; accord,
People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 630.)
                                       14
C.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Finally, we reject Flores’s contention that counsel appointed to
represent him on the section 1172.6 petition provided ineffective assistance
by failing to amend the petition and to argue that Flores was entitled to relief
because he might have been convicted of murder on a theory of imputed
malice. As we have explained, the jury did not find him guilty of murder on a
theory that allowed imputation of malice based solely on his participation in
a crime at the time of conviction but no longer allows such imputation
because of the legislative changes authorizing convicted murderers to seek
relief under section 1172.6. Since Flores is ineligible for relief on the ground
he now urges, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that ground in
the superior court. (See, e.g., People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488
[counsel not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile motion]; In re
Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 519 [mere omission of meritless claim insufficient
to show counsel’s performance was deficient]; In re M.V. (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1495, 1528 [when issues raised on appeal were not likely to have
succeeded at trial, counsel was not ineffective for having failed to press them
at trial].)

                                        15
                                   III.
                             DISPOSITION
    The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                                                   IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                    16