Court Opinion

ID: 9687361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:26:16.684905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:26.636803
License: Public Domain

Weaver, C.J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493 did not violate equal protection. I believe that the statute creates a classification based on illegitimacy and that the statute cannot withstand the heightened scrutiny applied to such a classification. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Because there are situations in which illegitimate children receive a right to modifiable support, the majority opines that this statute does not create a classification based on illegitimacy, but one based on whether “paternity ha[s] been legally determined.” Ante at 264. I disagree.
Children have a right to support from their biological parents. See Evink v Evink, 214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995). As the majority acknowledges, MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493 affects only the right of illegitimate children, precluding them from obtaining additional support to meet changing needs where the parties have reached a settlement agreement pursuant to the statute. By contrast, there are no circumstances under which a legitimate child *294would be foreclosed from petitioning for future modification of child support. Pursuant to MCL 552.17(1); MSA 25.97(1), children of divorced couples may petition the court to modify a support award upon demonstrating changed circumstances, and the parents cannot bargain away the right to seek modification of support. See Calley v Calley, 197 Mich App 380, 382, n 1; 496 NW2d 305 (1992); Johns v Johns, 178 Mich App 101, 106; 143 NW2d 446 (1989). Therefore, I would conclude that the statute classifies children on the basis of illegitimacy and not on the basis of whether paternity has been legally determined.
Classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to heightened scrutiny. Clark v Jeter, 486 US 456, 461; 108 S Ct 1910; 100 L Ed 2d 465 (1988); Spada v Pauley, 149 Mich App 196, 203; 385 NW2d 746 (1986). To withstand heightened scrutiny, the statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. Clark, supra at 461. This level of scrutiny “is not a toothless one.” Pickett v Brown, 462 US 1, 8; 103 S Ct 2199; 76 L Ed 2d 372 (1983), quoting Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 510; 96 S Ct 2755; 49 L Ed 2d 651 (1976). MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493 fails to satisfy this standard.
In upholding the statute, the majority concludes that the statute is substantially related to the “permissible, important, and even compelling governmental interest” of providing financial support for children. Ante at 273. The majority reasons that the statute affords illegitimate children an “additional optional mechanism for obtaining support” by allowing the parties to circumvent the proof problems that may arise in paternity cases. Ante at 279. I disagree.
*295I recognize that the problems in proving paternity distinguish legitimate children from illegitimate children in their claims for child support. However, this justification is neither “sufficiently weighty nor substantially related to the limitation” to uphold MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493 under equal protection. Mills v Habluetzel, 456 US 91, 102; 102 S Ct 1549; 71 L Ed 2d 770 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring).1 Nor are the state’s interests in settlement and finality sufficient to justify a classification based on illegitimacy.
As noted earlier, children have a right to support. Evink, supra at 175-176. However, rather than operate as an additional mechanism for support, the statute, in reality, imposes a burden on illegitimate children by restricting their ability to obtain adequate support. The Wisconsin Supreme Court made a similar conclusion when striking down a statutory scheme that precluded illegitimate children involved in lump-sum settlement agreements from seeking additional support, stating,
[I]t is an option that has in reality worked to the detriment of many nonmarital children. It is, at best, an illusory benefit amounting to no benefit at all. It is, in reality, an additional burden. [Gerhardt v Estate of Moore, 150 Wis 2d 563, 571; 441 NW2d 734 (1989).]
The possibility that children may encounter circumstances that alter their need for support does not vary between illegitimate and legitimate children. Both may encounter circumstances that give rise to a need for increased support. Yet, in the case of illegitimate children, they may be deprived of the opportunity to *296seek increased support on the basis of changed circumstances because their parents entered an agreement, pursuant to the statute, that precludes modification. Thus, the statute actually operates to their detriment.
In my opinion, neither proof problems nor the interests of settlement and finality outweigh the irrevocable and potentially damaging effect that a nonmodifiable settlement may have on the changing financial needs of illegitimate children. Consequently, the statute is not substantially related to the supposed interest it seeks to serve — namely, providing an additional mechanism for obtaining support for illegitimate children — and it should be determined to be violative of equal protection.

 A total of five justices joined this section of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion. Mills, supra at 102.