Court Opinion

ID: 9494135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:30:07.607823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:14.177848
License: Public Domain

GOULD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Parts I, II, and IV of Judge Rymer’s opinion and in the judgment of the court. I decline to join Part III of the opinion, primarily because I conclude that Cooper adequately raised the Beck due process claim in his petition. Nonetheless, Cooper did not establish prejudice, and the Beck due process claim does not require a grant of the petition.
Cooper adequately raised in his habeas corpus petition, ground XII(B), the claim that, under Beck, Cooper’s due process rights were violated when the trial judge failed sua sponte to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder. Cooper disjunctively but explicitly raised the issue of the Beck due process claim in his petition. After citing Beck and Hopper to support his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for rejecting instructions to the jury on lesser-included offenses, Cooper also explicitly contended in his petition: “For the same reasons noted in the preceding argument, either the trial court had a sua sponte duty, or, in the alternative, trial counsel was ineffective.” This express claim that the trial court had a duty sua sponte to instruct on second degree murder is sufficient in my view to permit our review of the Beck due process claim.
Reaching the merits, I conclude that Cooper cannot show that he was prejudiced by the lack of jury instruction on second degree murder.1 In habeas cases, we review prejudice resulting from constitutional error by determining whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). See Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir.1997) (applying Brecht prejudice standard to capital habeas corpus case).
The Brecht standard by its terms focuses on an injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Here, the evidence more than strongly supports four first degree murder convictions, for all of the deaths, even if the jury was instructed on second degree murder: Cooper brought the murder *1115weapons to the Ryens’ home, there were four victims killed over a prolonged killing spree, and each victim suffered a great number of brutal wounds. But even if the jury could reasonably have convicted Cooper of only second degree murder on the first two murders, those of the adults, in my opinion there is no possibility that a jury reasonably could have returned second degree murder convictions for the subsequent murder of the two children.
The evidence paints unmistakably this gruesome picture: Cooper brought multiple murder instruments to the Ryens’ home (a hatchet or an axe, and a knife). There was an interval between the murders. The children, Jessica Ryen and Christopher Hughes, were killed after the adults, Douglas Ryen and Peggy Ryen, were killed. Multiple wounds were inflicted on the murdered children (46 wounds for Jessica Ryen, including additional wounds inflicted by an ice pick, and 26 wounds for Christopher Hughes). This evidence taken together demonstrates unmistakably that there was heartless premeditation for the killing of the children. Given the overwhelming evidence of first degree murder of the children, no reasonable jury could have convicted Cooper of four second degree murders.2 See Ger-laugh, 129 F.3d at 1031 (finding the Brecht prejudice standard was not met because the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming). With two first degree murder convictions, the penalty phase was inescapable under California law. Even if Beck’s due process concerns would permit us to consider the penalty phase, I do not believe that one or two second degree murder convictions, in the context of this horrific crime, could conceivably have led a penalty phase jury to impose anything short of the death penalty. Cooper cannot establish prejudice. I fully concur in the judgment.

. Because Cooper cannot establish prejudice, I need not consider and do not reach the issue whether Beck's due process protection is applicable where, as here, the jury maintains discretion to return a life sentence in a penalty phase. For the same reason, I also do not decide: (1) whether Cooper knowingly waived his right to a second degree murder instruction as part of a trial strategy or whether his waiver was based on counsel's erroneous interpretation of California law; and (2) the possible implications the resolution of this factual issue would have on the applicability of Beck here.

. Although the Strickland “reasonable probability” standard for prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel differs from the Brecht “substantial and injurious effect” standard appropriate for a Beck due process claim, both standards focus on assessing the effect constitutional error had on the jury’s verdict. Here, because of the overwhelming nature of the evidence, Cooper cannot establish prejudice under either of these standards.