Court Opinion

ID: 9781086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:06:32.269797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:12.152740
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 22-0386
                               Filed August 30, 2023

JASON LEROY HUDDLESTON,
    Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tamra Roberts, Judge.

      Jason Huddleston appeals the denial of his application for postconviction

relief. AFFIRMED.

      Joseph C. Glazebrook of Glazebrook Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Mullins, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                          2

MULLINS, Senior Judge.

       Jason Huddleston appeals the denial of his application for postconviction

relief (PCR). He argues the court “improperly denied the PCR application because

it failed to order the department of corrections [(DOC)] to calculate [his] sentence

as a Category A offense” for earned-time purposes. See Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)

(2018). Alternatively, he argues he is entitled to relief because his “guilty plea was

premised on a false impression of the prospective sentence rendering it involuntary

and unknowing” and his criminal attorney was ineffective in relation to his plea.

I.     Background

       A.     Criminal Proceeding

       Huddleston pled guilty to third-or-subsequent domestic abuse assault. See

id. § 708.2A(4). In April 2019, the court sentenced him in accordance with the

terms of the plea agreement—five years in prison, with a mandatory minimum of

one year and credit for time already served.        See id. §§ 902.13 (mandatory

minimum), 903A.5(1) (credit).1

       In June 2020, Huddleston file a “motion for resentencing,” stating that

despite the mandatory minimum of only one year, “[t]he [DOC] has listed the

sentence as 85% of time to be served.” He argued he “needs to be resentenced

to reflect the court’s intention for the one year mandatory minimum.”           In its

resistance, the State pointed out that the Iowa Board of Parole (IBOP) is the arbiter

1 Huddleston states “the sentencing order was flawed,” because it cited section

902.1(3) instead of section 902.13 for the mandatory minimum. This was obviously
a scrivener’s error. Indeed, in a subsequent order, the court noted the “section for
the mandatory minimum was erroneously entered in the sentencing order as
902.1(3) and should be correctly stated as 902.13.”
                                         3

of parole decisions and has discretion to select a term anywhere from the one-year

mandatory minimum up to the five-year indeterminate term. In a supplemental

resistance, the State added the sentence could not be reconsidered or reopened.

       The matter proceeded to a hearing.2        In its ensuing ruling, the court

explained Huddleston was only seeking clarification of his sentence, not

reconsideration. In response to Huddleston’s claim that the DOC was “subjecting

him to a mandatory minimum sentence of 85%,” the court simply explained the

sentence imposed involved only a one-year mandatory minimum.

       B.     PCR Proceeding

       In August, Huddleston filed his PCR application. In an attachment to his

application, he explained that, in May 2020, his case manager told him he had “to

serve 85%.”     Despite the order clarifying his sentence, discussed above,

Huddleston still believed he was going to be required to serve an 85% mandatory

minimum. In an amended application, court-appointed counsel argued the State

violated the plea agreement and the sentence was not part of the plea agreement.

In its answer, the State denied these allegations and argued that, because the

one-year mandatory minimum had now expired, when Huddleston was granted

parole or work release was solely up to the IBOP.          So the State requested

dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

2 We  are without a transcript for this hearing, although it was reported, as is
evidenced by a court reporter memorandum and certificate. While the underlying
criminal record automatically becomes part of the record of a PCR proceeding
under section 822.6A, litigants on appeal must still use the combined certificate to
order transcripts following a notice of appeal. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.803(1),
.804(2).
                                         4

       Huddleston filed a second amended application in October 2021. While he

agreed he was granted parole by that point, he argued the DOC “illegally imposed

a mandatory minimum sentence upon” him beyond what the court imposed in its

sentencing order, in violation of separation-of-powers. In other words, he claimed

that the DOC unconstitutionally imposed a requirement that he serve 85% of his

total sentence before he could be eligible for parole or work release. At the same

time, however, he implicitly agreed he served far less than the alleged mandatory

minimum imposed by the DOC before he was granted parole. The State likewise

moved to dismiss the amended application, pointing out that if the DOC had done

what was alleged, then Huddleston would still be in prison.

       A PCR hearing was held in February 2022.             Huddleston presented

testimony from an executive officer of the DOC. This witness specifically testified

she is not trained in the DOC’s time-computation practices, nor did she have any

involvement with Huddleston’s time computation.        But in looking at his time

computation sheet,3 she gathered that “[h]e was sentenced to a domestic abuse

charge, 85 percent. When his time comp was done in 2019, he had a mandatory

minimum of November 10th of 2019 and a discharge date of March 8th of 2023.”4

While the witness believed “that he has to serve 85 percent of his sentence before

he’s eligible for release consideration,” she explained on cross-examination that

she had no idea whether it would be 85% of the mandatory minimum or the total

3 This document was not admitted as evidence.
4 The mandatory minimum date of November 10, 2019 would be consistent with

the district court’s imposition of a one-year mandatory minimum with credit for time
served, since Huddleston was originally arrested exactly one year prior to that date
and remained in jail until he was sent to prison.
                                          5

indeterminate sentence. In summary, this witness had little knowledge, if any,

about Huddleston’s time computation.

       Huddleston himself testified that roughly a year after he was sentenced, he

received a time-computation sheet and “found out [he] had 85 percent.” He

decided to speak to his case manager, who told him this was because of “a law

that happened in 2017.” Based on this, Huddleston had his attorney file the motion

for resentencing in June 2020, discussed above. After Huddleston learned the

outcome of that motion was that the court was “leaving it in the hands of the DOC,”

he filed his PCR application.     Huddleston’s main complaints in his testimony

seemed to be that (1) he believed the time he served in jail before he went to prison

did not count toward his mandatory minimum and (2) the DOC should not have

been able to hold him any longer than the one-year mandatory minimum imposed

by the court. He submitted that if he knew anything about the potential for having

to serve 85% of his total sentence, then he would have not pled guilty and would

have proceeded to trial. His request for the court was to discharge him from parole.

       In its ruling, the court found “[t]he math just does not support [Huddleston’s]

arguments” that the DOC subjected him to an 85% mandatory minimum, pointing

out that Huddleston was incarcerated for a total of 980 days, and if an 85%

mandatory minimum was indeed imposed he would have been required to serve

1551 days. The court attributed the confusion to earned-time calculations, noting

Huddleston’s sentence was likely a Category “B” sentence under section

903A.2(1)(b), which is “subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time of

fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement,” thus resulting in a maximum

reduction for good conduct to 85%. The court also noted it was not surprised
                                           6

Huddleston was not granted parole after the mandatory minimum, given his

criminal history.5 The court also noted that parole decisions are at the discretion

of the IBOP. Based on the foregoing, the court determined Huddleston was not

entitled to relief and denied his application.

       Huddleston appeals.

II.    Standard of Review

       We ordinarily review rulings in PCR proceedings for legal error, but our

review is de novo when constitutional issues come into play.               Sothman v.

State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021).

III.   Discussion

       A.     Earned Time

       On appeal, Huddleston maintains that “the 85% calculation is a sort of de

facto mandatory minimum that was improperly imposed to elongate his sentence

which should have otherwise expired.” But deviating from the general position he

took below, Huddleston now argues the PCR court improperly “failed to order the

[DOC] to calculate [his] sentence as a Category A offense” for earned-time

purposes under section 903A.2(1).

       As the State points out, Huddleston never requested this as relief in the

district court or raised it as an issue. Nor did he dispute that his sentence fell within

Category “B” for purposes of earned-time accrual, either in response to the State’s

assertions that it did or the district court’s adoption of the unchallenged position of

the State. Rather, Huddleston’s claim was that the DOC simply decided that he

5 The record discloses Huddleston has eleven convictions for domestic abuse

assault.
                                           7

would have to serve 85% of his total sentence before he was eligible for parole or

work release. That clearly wasn’t true because he was granted parole well before

that alleged mandatory minimum was satisfied. The claim that he is making for

the first time now, that the DOC calculated his earned-time credits based on an

incorrect categorization, is not preserved. See, e.g., State v. Dessinger, 958

N.W.2d 590, 598 (Iowa 2021) (noting a party cannot “raise a new claim or defense

on appeal that could have been, but failed to be, raised at trial”); State v.

Brown, 656 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2003) (noting error-preservation doctrine

requires first giving the district court the opportunity to correct any alleged errors).

We will not allow the intricacies of categorical differentials in Iowa Code section

903A.2(1) to be litigated in this case for the first time on appeal.6

       Aside from our conclusion that Huddleston failed to preserve error, we note

the supreme court recently signaled that any conviction subject to the enhanced

sentence in section 902.13(1)—like Huddleston’s—falls within Category “B” for

purposes of earned-time accrual.          See Anderson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 989

N.W.2d 179, 182–83 & n.5 (Iowa 2023). Finally, given the fact that Huddleston

discharged his sentence while this appeal was pending, this issue is moot. 7 See

6  While it’s true that challenges to sentences as illegal are immune to error-
preservation defects, that immunity only extends “to those cases in which a trial
court has stepped outside the codified bounds of allowable sentencing” or “the
sentence is illegal because it is beyond the power of the court to impose.” Tindell
v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). Here, there is no
claim that the district court stepped out of bounds in sentencing or exceeded its
jurisdiction, so that exception to the error-preservation rules does not apply.
7 In March 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot due to the

recent discharge of Huddleston’s sentence and Huddleston’s requested relief on
this issue being discharge of his sentence. In his resistance, Huddleston agreed
he discharged his sentence but resisted dismissal on the basis that he was also
challenging his plea. We are inclined to conclude the supreme court denied the
                                          8

State v. Johnson, No. 16-0976, 2017 WL 2684342, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

June 21, 2017) (collecting cases).

       B.     Guilty Plea

       Alternatively, Huddleston argues he is entitled to relief because his “guilty

plea was premised on a false impression of the prospective sentence rendering it

involuntary and unknowing” and his criminal attorney was ineffective in relation to

his plea.   But Huddleston did not specifically raise these claims in the PCR

proceeding. As the district court noted in its ruling, “[o]nly one issue was presented

to the court in this case,” that being that the DOC improperly applied an 85%

mandatory minimum sentence. And to the extent Huddleston did raise claims

about his plea or the effectiveness of his counsel, which he didn’t, the district court

did not rule on them. So error is not preserved here either. See Lamasters v.

State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate

review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court

before we will decide them on appeal.” (emphasis added) (quoting Meier v.

motion to dismiss the entire appeal for this reason. As to the earned-time issue,
Huddleston argued the issue was not moot because he could pursue collateral
relief under Iowa Code section 663A.1, or in an action under 42 U.S.C § 1983,
which would require exhaustion of other remedies. But actions based on wrongful
imprisonment under section 663A.1 are not available to individuals who plead
guilty. Iowa Code § 663A.1(1)(b). And actions under section 1983 relating to
deprivation of good-time credits are not subject to an exhaustion requirement. See
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997). To the extent Huddleston would
need to prove his conviction or sentence is invalid through one of various ways in
order to recover damages in a section 1983 action, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 487–88 (1994), that contemplates whether a claim is cognizable, not
whether a particular remedial step must be exhausted.
        So these reasons do not save this issue from being moot. We also note
that while federal habeas corpus indeed requires exhaustion, that remedy is only
available to a person in custody. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
                                           9

Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002))). Assuming the issues were properly

raised, the proper procedure to preserve error was to file a motion raising the

court’s failure to decide them prior to appealing. See id. (“When a district court

fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue

must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.” (citation

omitted)). We decline to consider these issues for the first time on appeal.

IV.    Conclusion

       Finding Huddleston is not entitled to any relief on appeal, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.