Court Opinion

ID: 9567523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:54:58.093043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:39.220599
License: Public Domain

Justice Frye
concurring in result.
The majority holds that summary judgment was appropriately entered for the defendants in these cases in which the plaintiffs sought recovery for tortious invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private but true facts concerning the plaintiffs. I agree that plaintiffs have failed to forecast evidence sufficient to withstand defendants’ motions for summary judgment and that summary judgment was appropriately entered against the plaintiffs. I therefore concur in the result reached by the majority.
I do not concur in the reasoning of the majority which leads it to “reject the notion of a claim for relief for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of true but ‘private’ facts.” I do not accept the notion that the tension already existing between the first amendment and the law of torts requires the nonrecognition of a legitimate claim by a nonpublic figure against a media defendant for wrongfully publishing highly offensive private facts which are not of legitimate concern to the public. While public figures give up some of their rights to privacy in the public interest, I do not believe that the media should be given a license to pry into the private lives of ordinary citizens and spread before the public highly offensive but very private facts without any degree of accountability. Such is not required by either the federal or state constitutions.
In this case the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants against both plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was improperly granted, and in so holding explicitly found that the publication of private but true facts may give rise to a cause of action for an invasion of the right to privacy. While I agree with the Court of Appeals that this tort is recognizable in this jurisdiction, I would reverse its *271decision on the grounds that the published information in this case was of legitimate concern to the public.
On appeal, defendants contend they were entitled to summary judgment because publication of private but true facts is not a recognizable invasion of privacy tort in this State. In the alternative, if this Court recognizes the tort, defendants contend that they were still entitled to summary judgment because the matter they published concerning plaintiffs was neither private nor highly offensive and was of legitimate concern to the public.
Although jurisdictions were slow to recognize invasion of privacy causes, today the tort has been adopted, in one form or another, in virtually all jurisdictions. W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
North Carolina first recognized the invasion of privacy tort as a separate cause of action when this Court held that a plaintiff stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy when a defendant newspaper used without authorization a photograph of the plaintiff in an advertisement. Flake v. News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (recognizing the “appropriation” form of invasion of privacy). Recently, however, this Court refused to recognize the “false light” invasion of privacy tort. Renwick v. News and Observer and Renwick v. Greensboro News, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E. 2d 405, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858, 83 L.Ed. 2d 121 (1984). The reasoning behind this Court’s decision in Renwick was a concern that “any right to recover for a false light invasion of privacy will often either duplicate an existing right of recovery for libel or slander or involve a good deal of overlapping with such rights.” Id. at 323, 312 S.E. 2d at 412. Further, this Court was concerned that “the recognition of a separate tort ... to the extent it would allow recovery beyond that permitted in actions for libel or slander, would tend to add to the tension already existing between the First Amendment and the law of torts in cases of this nature.” Id.
Heretofore, we have not been called upon to determine whether North Carolina would recognize a cause of action for the remaining two torts — unreasonable intrusion and unreasonable *272publicity of private facts.1 Although plaintiffs, in their appeal to the Court of Appeals, contended that their claims constituted both an intrusion into their private affairs and an unreasonable disclosure of private facts, I agree with the majority and with the Court of Appeals that the unreasonable intrusion tort is not involved here. See Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. at 615, 355 S.E. 2d at 823-24. Therefore, I express no opinion as to whether the intrusion tort is cognizable in this jurisdiction.
According to the Restatement, liability is imposed for the unreasonable publication of private facts when “the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). In the commentary to § 652D, the tort is divided into four distinct elements: (1) publicity; (2) private facts; (3) offensiveness; and (4) lack of legitimate public concern.
The publicity given to a private fact means that the fact is communicated “to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). Thus, publication by the media would satisfy the publicity requirement. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F. 2d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998, 48 L.Ed. 2d 823 (1976).
Next, the matter disclosed must be private. There is no liability for publishing a fact that is already in the public domain, such as publishing facts that are in the public record. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 43 L.Ed. 2d 328 (1975). However, merely revealing private facts to family members and close friends does not mean that the fact has become public:
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close personal friends. Sexual rela*273tions, for example, are normally entirely private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a man’s life in his home, and some of his past history that he would rather forget.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comment b (1977).
Third, the fact published must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. “Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part.” Id. comment c.
Finally, even when the fact published is highly offensive to the ordinary person, if the matter is of legitimate concern to the public, the publisher of the fact will incur no liability. See Bereskey v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E. 2d 979 (1978) (fact that man died of drug overdose held newsworthy, as a matter of law).
Since the inception of the private facts tort, courts have struggled with the tension between the freedom of the press, secured by the first amendment, to disseminate information to the public and an individual’s right to be left alone. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 43 L.Ed. 2d 328; Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F. 2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F. 2d 1122; Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P. 2d 34 (1971); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471 (Miss. 1971).
The first amendment encourages robust debate and the gravamen of the first amendment, as recently stated by the Supreme Court, is the “recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.” Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. ---, 99 L.Ed. 2d 41, 49 (1988). Furthermore, “the freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty — and thus a good unto itself — but also is essential to the common quest for truth and vitality of society as a whole.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04, 80 L.Ed. 2d 502, 518 (1984).
*274Alternatively, the right to be free from unwarranted publicity is premised on the right to keep private facts private. Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P. 2d 988 (1975). The private facts tort protects one’s “ability to make and implement autonomously decisions regarding access to personal and private information.” Swan, Publicity Invasion of Privacy: Constitutional and Doctrinal Difficulties With a Developing Tort, 58 Ore. L. Rev. 483, 488 (1980).
However, neither the constitutional right of freedom of the press nor the right to be free from publicity is absolute. For example, in defamation cases, the Supreme Court has held that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.” Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340, 41 L.Ed. 2d 789, 805 (1974) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964)). Conversely, it has been held that when a private fact is also of legitimate concern to the public, the right to be free from unwarranted publicity must yield to the right of the public to know. See Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E. 2d 979.
The Supreme Court has specifically left unanswered the “question whether truthful publication of very private matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally proscribed.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491, 43 L.Ed. 2d 328, 347. However, I agree with our Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the resolution of the conflicting rights lies in the “application of a ‘newsworthiness’ or ‘public interest’ standard in determining what publications are constitutionally privileged and what publications are actionable.” Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. at 616, 355 S.E. 2d at 824. Adopting this standard gives credence to the viewpoint that neither the right to privacy nor the right of freedom of the press is absolute.
At the outset, I recognize the concern voiced by many courts and commentators concerning the possible chilling effect that the recognition of this tort may have on the freedom of the press to publish matters of legitimate public concern. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 43 L.Ed. 2d 328; Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F. 2d 305; Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 *275F. 2d 1122; Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co. Inc., 300 Ore. 452, 712 P. 2d 803 (1986); Zimmerman, Requiem For A Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandéis’ Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291 (1983); Swan, Publicity Invasion of Privacy: Constitutional and Doctrinal Difficulties With A Developing Tort, 48 Ore. L. Rev. 483 (1980). The freedom to publish matters of legitimate public concern is guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. I; N.C. Const, art. I, § 14 (freedom of the press shall never be restrained). However, the chilling effect is minimized if the question of whether the published material is of legitimate concern to the public is initially a question of law for the trial court. This eliminates the fear voiced by the amici in their brief filed with this Court that if the question of public concern was one for the jury it would subject every print and broadcast journalist to an ex post facto jury of lay censors and would convert every news story about a private citizen into a potential jury issue. Therefore, if the court determines that every reasonable person applying the proper standard would have to conclude that the published matter was of legitimate concern to the public, then the publication would be privileged and the granting of summary judgment would be proper. See Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
In determining whether published information is of legitimate concern to the public, I would adopt the standard set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
[t]he line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D comment h. See also Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F. 2d 1122.
Thus, if the court determines that there is “no possibility that a juror could conclude that the personal facts were included for any inherent morbid, sensational, or curiosity appeal they might have,” Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289, then as a matter of law there would be no cause of action.
*276In short, I would adopt the private facts tort consisting of the elements as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. I now consider these elements.
1. Publicity
The publicity element of this tort was not applied by the Court of Appeals to the facts of this case, apparently because once a matter is published in a newspaper, the publicity element is presumed satisfied. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F. 2d 1122, 1126.
2. Offensiveness
The Court of Appeals stated that it is a jury determination as to whether a challenged publication would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, because, as in negligence cases, a reasonable person standard generally requires a jury determination. Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. at 623, 355 S.E. 2d at 828. I agree with the Court of Appeals that generally it is a jury determination as to the offensiveness of the publication. Moreover, I agree that summary judgment was improper on this issue because, in applying this standard to the facts of this case, “a jury could properly find that an ordinary reasonable person (adoptive mother or child) would find it highly offensive and distressing to have spread before the public gaze their identities, the fact that the child had been abandoned by carnival workers, or the sensational emotional details of their encounter with the natural mother.” Id.
3. Private Facts
In addressing the question whether the published matter was still private, the Court of Appeals stated the correct standard: (a) No liability attaches when a defendant merely gives further publicity to a fact that is already in the public domain, and (b) A fact may still be private even though an individual has confided the information to family members or close personal friends. Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. at 621, 355 S.E. 2d at 827.
Defendants contend here, as they did in the Court of Appeals, that they presented evidence that the plaintiffs’ story was not private prior to the publications at issue and that plaintiffs failed to come forward with proof sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
*277In applying the above standard to the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals held that, based on the affidavits, pleadings, and other materials before the court, the trial judge erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. I agree with the Court of Appeals that, “taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, these materials raise an issue of fact regarding whether some or all of the facts published about the plaintiffs were publicly known or were, in fact, private prior to publication of the two articles complained of by the plaintiffs.” Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App. at 623, 355 S.E. 2d at 828. Thus, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the facts were public, rather than private.
4. Public Concern
The Court of Appeals adopted the public interest, i.e., legitimate concern to the public, standard as set out in the Restatement:
In determining what is a matter of public interest, account must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards would say that he has no concern.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comment h (1977).
While I generally agree with this standard, it must be considered in context with the guarantees granted to the press by the first amendment.
I agree with defendants that the legitimate concerns to the public must be defined in the most liberal and far-reaching terms in order to avoid any chilling effect on the constitutional right of the media to publish information of public interest. I am not unmindful of the wide privilege granted the media for enlightening the public:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential *278as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. “Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388, 17 L.Ed. 2d 456, 467 (1967) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 1102 (1940)).
I now turn to the application of the legitimate public concern standard to the facts of the case sub judice. I do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a reasonable juror could conclude that the articles at issue here constituted a “morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.” On the contrary, the article was initiated when the biological mother, Aledith Gottschalk, returned to Salisbury in search of her daughter, whom she had abandoned seventeen years earlier. This was unquestionably a story of matters of public interest and concern. The central focus was on a mother’s search for her abandoned daughter, and the events and emotions relating thereto. When defendants reported that Mrs. Gottschalk thought that her daughter might have been left with a Mary Hall, and subsequently that she had located her daughter, defendants were simply reporting the details of a news story that had arisen as a result of Mrs. Gottschalk’s return. However much plaintiffs may have wished to keep their personal histories out of public view, they became a legitimate public concern upon Mrs. Gottschalk’s return. “There are times when one, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest.” Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 337, 95 S.E. 2d 606, 609 (1956).
I conclude that, taking the Post articles as a whole, no reasonable juror could conclude that the articles constituted a morbid and sensational prying into plaintiffs’ private lives for its own *279sake. Therefore, I would hold, as a matter of law, that the published information was of legitimate concern to the public. Thus, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the facts were of legitimate concern to the public.
In summary, I would hold that the private facts tort is cognizable in this jurisdiction but that plaintiffs’ forecast of evidence was insufficient to withstand defendants’ summary judgment motion. Thus, I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case while disagreeing with the reasons given therefor.
Justice Meyer joins in this concurring opinion.

. Although this Court has not had occasion to determine the viability of the “private facts” tort, the Court of Appeals, prior to this case, had on two occasions denied recovery, without expressly deciding whether such cause of action exists. See Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E. 2d 617, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E. 2d 18 (1986); Morrow v. Kings Department Stores, Inc., 57 N.C. App. 13, 290 S.E. 2d 732, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E. 2d 210 (1982).