Court Opinion

ID: 9738359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:51:11.836837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:42:52.074183
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Dennis Smith, was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11— 501(a) (West 1994)). After defendant refused to take a breath test, defendant was served with notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges pursuant to section 11 — 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.1 (West 1994)). Defendant filed a petition in the circuit court of Champaign County to rescind the summary suspension. The circuit court granted defendant’s petition. A divided panel of the appellate court reversed. 269 Ill. App. 3d 962. This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (145 Ill. 2d R. 315) and we affirm. BACKGROUND On April 12, 1994, defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges and a motion for substitution of judge as of right (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1001(a)(2) (West 1992)). Defendant also requested that the hearing on the petition be held within 30 days (625 ILCS 5/2 — 118.1(b) (West 1992)). Judge Ford, to whom the petition and motion were originally assigned, scheduled a hearing for April 27 on the motion for substitution of judge. On April 27, the motion for substitution of judge was summarily granted without argument by the parties or objection by the State. The new judge scheduled the rescission hearing for May 24. Before presenting any evidence at the May 24 hearing, defendant argued that the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges should be automatically rescinded because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing on the rescission petition within 30 days of the April 12 filing of the petition to rescind. The trial court rejected this argument, attributing the 15-day delay while the substitution of judge motion was pending to the defendant. At the rescission hearing, the following evidence was elicited. In March of 1994, Officer Andrew Charles of the Urbana police department observed defendant leave a tavern and enter his car. Officer Charles, whose squad car was parked across the street from the tavern, decided to follow defendant to see if he would drive in compliance with the Code. He testified that if he should witness defendant violating the Code, he intended to pull defendant over and also check to see if defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Officer Charles followed defendant’s vehicle northward on Cunningham Avenue, which is a four-lane street with a fifth lane in the center for turning. He observed defendant driving in the left-hand lane, although defendant claimed he was in the right-hand lane. As Officer Charles followed defendant, he saw the driver’s side wheels of defendant’s car cross over the lane line dividing the left lane from the center lane by at least six inches. He stated that defendant failed to signal a lane change and that the car remained over the lane line for approximately 100 to 150 yards. A short time later, he saw defendant cross over the lane line dividing the left lane from the right lane by approximately six inches for 150 to 200 yards. Once again, defendant did not signal. After these two occurrences, Officer Charles determined that defendant had violated the Code for failing to signal a lane change and he stopped defendant. Officer Charles conceded that defendant did not endanger any other vehicles or persons when he deviated across the lane lines and that defendant never completely left the lane in which he was traveling. Officer Charles did not write defendant a ticket for either failure to signal or improper lane usage. Rather, he gave defendant a verbal warning. While speaking with defendant, Officer Charles noticed that defendant’s speech was slurred and that he had difficulty removing items from his wallet. He asked defendant to perform some field sobriety tests, from which Officer Charles concluded that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant was arrested and taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to further testing to determine the alcohol content of his blood. As a result, defendant was served with notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.1 (West 1992)). After hearing the evidence, the trial court framed the issue as whether Officer Charles had probable cause to stop defendant for a violation of the Code other than for driving under the influence of alcohol. The trial court found Officer Charles to be a credible witness. The trial court noted that a videotape taken on the day in question corroborated Officer Charles’ testimony that defendant was driving in the left-hand lane. The trial court nevertheless concluded that Officer Charles did not have probable cause to stop defendant for failure to signal or for the violation of any other traffic law. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges. A divided panel of the appellate court reversed, concluding that Officer Charles was justified in stopping defendant for improper lane usage in violation of section 11 — 709(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11 — 709(a) (West 1992)). 269 Ill. App. 3d at 968. The appellate court construed section 11 — 709(a) as containing two separate restrictions regarding lane usage: one which requires a vehicle to be driven as nearly as practicable within one lane and a second which prohibits a vehicle from being moved from a lane of traffic until the driver first ascertains that the movement can be made with safety. Before this court defendant argues that he is entitled to rescission of the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges because (1) he was not afforded a timely rescission hearing as required by section 2 — 118.1(b) of the Code and (2) that the initial stop of his vehicle was improper. Defendant has not challenged the constitutionality of Officer Charles’ actions in following patrons who exited the tavern, and we do not reach this issue. ANALYSIS Initially, we note that a hearing on a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of driving privileges is a civil proceeding. People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250, 257 (1993). The defendant has the burden of proof and if the defendant establishes a prima facie case for rescission, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with evidence justifying the suspension. People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326, 341 (1988). In weighing the evidence before it, the trial court is charged with passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. People v. Repp, 165 Ill. App. 3d 90, 95 (1988). Generally, the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Safiran, 229 Ill. App. 3d 639, 641 (1992). However, the decision to grant a petition to rescind may be reversed when the trial court has not applied the correct legal standard to the facts of the case. People v. Rotkvich, 256 Ill. App. 3d 124, 128 (1993). We first address defendant’s contention that he was not afforded a timely rescission hearing because the hearing took place 42 days after the petition to rescind was filed, rather than within the statutorily required 30 days. Defendant claims that his due process rights were violated as a result of the untimely hearing. A hearing on a petition to rescind must be held within 30 days of the date of filing the petition in the circuit court with venue, with service on the State (Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 261-62 (interpreting 625 ILCS 5/2 — 118.1(b) (West 1992))) or within 30 days of the date of defendant’s first appearance on the driving under the influence charge (625 ILCS 5/2 — 118.1(b) (West 1992)). However, when any delay in holding the hearing is occasioned by the defendant, that delay extends the 30-day period. See Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 262; In re Summary Suspension of Driver’s License of Trainor, 156 Ill. App. 3d 918, 922 (1987). When a defendant requests a substitution of judge, the 30-day requirement for holding the hearing does not begin to run until the newly assigned judge has been furnished with a request for the rescission hearing. See People v. Joiner, 174 Ill. App. 3d 927, 929 (1988); Trainor, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 922. In the instant case, defendant filed the motion for substitution of judge and the rescission petition on April 12. The motion for substitution of judge was granted on April 27. The rescission hearing was held on May 24, within 30 days of the date the defendant’s motion for substitution of judge was granted. Although defendant contends that he did all he could to expedite the hearing on the motion for substitution of judge and that such motions are routinely granted in the circuit court of Champaign County, the 15-day delay between April 12 and April 27 is directly attributable to defendant. We can only presume that the circuit court heard the motion for substitution of judge at the first available date, considering Judge Ford’s awareness of both the petition to rescind and the request for a hearing within 30 days. Thus, defendant received a timely rescission hearing. Next we consider defendant’s argument that Officer Charles did not have probable cause to stop him. Defendant contends that he did not violate any section of the Code. Defendant argues that a violation of section 11— 709(a) does not occur when a motorist momentarily crosses over a lane line, but occurs only when a motorist endangers others while moving from a lane of traffic. Section 11 — 709(a) of the Code provides: "Whenever any roadway has been divided into 2 or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply. (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” 625 ILCS 5/11— 09(a) (West 1992). The plain language of the statute establishes two separate requirements for lane usage. First, a motorist must drive a vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within one lane. Second, a motorist may not move a vehicle from a lane of traffic until the motorist has determined that the movement can be safely made. It follows that when a motorist crosses over a lane line and is not driving as nearly as practicable within one lane, the motorist has violated the statute. Once Officer Charles saw defendant cross over a lane line and drive in two lanes of traffic, Officer Charles had probable cause to arrest defendant for a violation of the Code. People v. Robinson, 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276 (1976) (probable cause to arrest exists when a reasonable, prudent man in possession of the knowledge of the arresting officer would believe that an offense has been committed). Thus, Officer Charles’ stop of defendant was proper. See People v. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012 (1984) (stop of motorist was supported by probable cause to make an arrest for a traffic violation). In reaching the above conclusion, we note that the appellate court found that Officer Charles had "specific, articulable facts upon which to believe defendant’s vehicle was in violation of the Code when he pulled it over.” 269 Ill. App. 3d at 968. An officer may make a valid investigatory stop, absent probable cause to arrest, provided the officer can reasonably infer from specific and articulable facts that the individual in question has committed or is about to commit a crime. 725 ILCS 5/107 — 14 (West 1992); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968). In the instant case, Officer Charles observed a violation of the Code. Thus, Officer Charles had probable cause to arrest defendant for a violation of the Code. Given that Officer Charles had probable cause to arrest defendant, the appellate court did not need to consider his reasonable and articulable suspicions surrounding defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, the statutory summary suspension of defendant’s driver’s license for failing to undergo a breath test should not have been rescinded. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Affirmed. JUSTICE HARRISON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.