Court Opinion

ID: 9553619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:32:52.179852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:54.497816
License: Public Domain

Schwellenbach, C. J.
(dissenting) — After the conclusion of the hearing the trial court found:
“The plaintiff here moves for an allowance to her to be paid by the defendant prior to trial.
“The background of this situation is revealed in 37 Wn. (2d) 377, where it is said:
“ ‘The wealth of detail in support of the alibi, which was so convincing to the trial court, is not compatible with mere inadvertence or faulty memory, but, rather, supports an inference of fabrication.’
“This amounts to a description of willful perjury, and it may be assumed by counsel for the plaintiff that a retrial will require both expense and detailed preparation.
“The law has long been clear in this state that the plaintiff in this form of action is entitled to the aid of the court in preparation for trial, and the language of chapter 215 of the Session Laws of 1949 does not change the long stand-rule. Section 12 of the new statute was designed to permit the court to award separate maintenance in cases where only a divorce or annulment was sought in the pleadings. Heretofore the court was without power to do this.
“It is a fact this plaintiff is not insolvent. She is gainfully employed and the record shows that she received certain cash as the result of a property sale together with a judgment for costs. This latter will probably equal no more than the costs of an appeal, apparently made necessary by perjury, which is the act of the defendant.
“It is not the policy of the law to require a wife to finance litigation under the circumstances shown by the record here.
“I am of the opinion, on the entire record, that this defendant should pendente lite, contribute a reasonable amount to the end that this plaintiff may reveal the actual facts to the court with the aid of counsel.
*569“I am of the opinion that the sum of $1,250.00 should enable this woman to have her day in court.”
The court thereupon made the following order:
“ . . . and the court being fully advised in the premises and it appearing to the court that the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1250.00) is a reasonable sum to be awarded to the plaintiff for suit money and attorneys’ fees pendente lite, and the court having announced its decision in a letter to counsel dated February 5, 1951;
“Now Therefore, the defendant, Gerald D. Stibbs, Is Hereby Ordered to pay forthwith to the plaintiff or to her attorneys of record the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1250.00) as attorneys’ fees and suit money pendente lite.”
After a full and complete hearing, the trial court concluded that a sufficient showing was made to warrant the order requiring relator to pay to respondent the sum of $1,250.00 as attorneys’ fees and suit money pendente lite in order to enable her to have her day in court. It has long been the law, and needs no citation of authority, that such allowances are within the discretion of the trial court and they will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of discretion. We find nothing in the record which would warrant a holding by this court that the trial court abused its discretion in entering such order.
Beals, Grady and Hamley, JJ., concur with Schwellenbach, C. J.
August 3, 1951. Petition for rehearing denied.