Court Opinion

ID: 9727774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:50:12.603469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:38.104958
License: Public Domain

PUGLIA, P. J.
I concur because the excluded evidence is of such tenuous relevance (if relevant at all) that its prejudicial effect far outweighs any probative value it may arguably have.
I agree with defendant that as a condition of admissibility the proponent of this evidence need not make an “offer of proof’ within the strict sense of that phrase (see Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (c)). In his written motion and in the oral proceedings thereon, defendant set forth the theories upon which he based his offer. Thus, prior to ruling, the trial court was advised that defendant sought admissibility on two somewhat inconsistent bases: (1) To prove consent by reason of prior consensual acts of intercourse by the victim “with other men;” (2) to prove inability to discern the means of penetration by reason of the victim’s lack of “sufficient prior sexual experience.” The trial court was adequately apprised of the purpose of the offer and no further showing in the way of an offer of proof was required. (Cf. People v. Burton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 328, 344-345 [11 Cal.Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 433].) This appeal contests only the denial of the offer in order to show inability to discern the means of penetration.
The relevance of the excluded evidence hinges upon the questionable proposition that the experience of sexual intercourse develops tactile sensitivity in the female sufficient to enable her to differentiate the means of penetration, at least as between a finger and a penis. No evidence was offered in support of this proposition (see Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(1)); even if requested, judicial notice would have been improper because the proposition is not a matter of “common knowledge” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (g)) nor has defendant shown it to be subject to “immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)
Moreover, even assuming that some evidence of the general type proffered (as described by defendant in his trial court motion, a lack of “sufficient prior sexual experience”) may have some tendency in reason to prove inability to discern the means of penetration (see Evid. Code, § 210), defendant made no effort to show at what point the amount, frequency or temporal proximity of prior sexual intercourse divests the *931victim’s sexual experience of probative value. Thus, if virginity is probative of the issue, would not a mere one, two, three, or even more sexual experiences, or an even greater number of sexual experiences remote in time, though of less probative weight, have some evidentiary value? The question is, of course, rhetorical. Under the circumstances however, admission of such evidence would be subversive of the legislative policy underlying the recent Robbins Rape Evidence Law (Stats. 1974, ch. 569; Evid. Code, §§ 782, 1103; see 26 Hastings L.J. 1551, 1552-1554).
For the foregoing reasons, absent a strong showing of relevance, the trial court was justified in excluding the evidence.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 1, 1979. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.