Court Opinion

ID: 9729931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:52:55.384887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:02.359266
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: In this appeal, defendant argues that (1) he was entitled to be present when several notes from the jury were discussed by the trial judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel; and (2) the trial judge improperly sent a deputy sheriff into the jury room to direct the jury to continue deliberations. The problem with these arguments is that defendant never raised them in the circuit court, as he was required to do in order to preserve the issues for appellate review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87 (1988); People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393-94 (1997). Defendant acknowledges that he has forfeited the opportunity to raise the issues, but he contends that we may excuse his forfeiture. He argues that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to raise the points before the trial judge. He argues that his forfeiture can be excused as plain error. He also argues that this court should excuse the forfeiture because the points involve the conduct of the trial judge. I disagree with how the court ultimately rejects defendant’s arguments. I agree that the circuit court’s judgment must be affirmed, but the reason to do so rests with rejection of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, not the analysis that the majority offers. The failure to raise issues in the trial court denies that court the chance to correct argued errors and grant relief, if warranted. See People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31-32 (1984). The requirement of a written postsentencing motion allows “the trial court the opportunity to review a defendant’s contention of sentencing error and save the delay and expense inherent in appeal if they are meritorious.” People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 394 (1997). In so doing, it “gives the appellate court the benefit of the trial court’s reasoned judgment on those issues.” Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 394. For these reasons, when a claim is not presented in the trial court, it is forfeited, or more precisely, procedurally defaulted, on appeal. Historically, amelioration of the perceived harsh effect of the forfeiture rule owed, in large part, to inadequate representation at trial, as both this court and commentators have recognized. See People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill. 204, 206-07 (1922) (noting that “where the evidence.is close *** and it is clear that the prosecuting attorney has taken advantage of the accused because he was poorly represented and the trial court has permitted such advantage to be taken, then we will consider the errors notwithstanding the failure to properly preserve the questions for review”); People v. Nowak, 372 Ill. 381, 382 (1939) (holding that where the case is close, the court “will consider errors in the record notwithstanding the failure of counsel to save the questions for review, where it is clear that the court has permitted the prosecuting attorney to take advantage of the accused because he was poorly represented”); see also 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure §5043 (1977) (observing that the original basis for the adoption of exceptions to the forfeiture doctrine, such as plain error, was the desire to protect criminal defendants from inadequate representation). That justification for excusing procedural default, however, was entirely subsumed by the recognition of the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable and fair. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Thus, when a defendant raises a meritorious sixth amendment claim, the considerations of finality that underscore the procedural default doctrine (see Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190) provide an insufficient basis to compromise the constitutional protections afforded a defendant at trial by the sixth amendment. Under Strickland, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under a two-part test. See also People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984) (adopting the Strickland test in Illinois). Under that test, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there exists a reasonable probability that the substandard performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Because a defendant must satisfy both components of the Strickland test, the failure to establish either is fatal to the claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Here, the argument that defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland, as defendant has asserted, provides the appropriate and most straightforward means to address defendant’s contentions. As the majority itself notes, the record suggests no basis on which one could conclude that counsel’s objections, if made, would “ ‘have fallen on deaf ears.’ ” 235 Ill. 2d at 488, quoting People v. Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (2007). Applying the Strickland test, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be disposed of on prejudice grounds alone. Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by what occurred during jury deliberations. As the majority concludes, defendant cannot establish prejudice for either of his claims of error. 235 Ill. 2d at 496, 499. Defendant therefore cannot establish the requisite prejudice under Strickland, and his claims of error fail. Instead of addressing the substance of defendant’s contentions on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the majority assesses them in the course of an incomplete plain-error analysis that is out of step with our case law. With respect to the first of defendant’s claims, at the conclusion of the section entitled Right of Presence the majority states, “As we have discussed, however, defendant in the present case did not properly preserve his objections. Because he has forfeited his claims, we review them only for plain error, and the burden of persuasion remains on defendant to show prejudice. He has not done so. Because defendant was denied neither a fair trial nor any other substantive right, we hold that his right of presence was not violated.” (Emphasis added.) 235 Ill. 2d at 495-96. The emphasized text suggests a ruling on the merits and not a ruling that the issue is procedurally defaulted. As this court stated in People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995), “[T]hough it is often not expressed, short of a conclusion that an asserted error is a ‘plain’ one, the so-called plain error doctrine offers no basis to excuse a procedural default. (See Wangerin, 29 DePaul L. Rev. at 772.) The point is crucial, for while all plain errors are reversible ones, not all reversible errors are also ‘plain’ for purposes of Rule 615(a). (See generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §103.10, at 33 (6th ed. 1994).) Of course, to determine whether a purported error is ‘plain’ requires a substantive look at it. But if, in the end, the error is found not to rise to the level of a plain error as contemplated by Rule 615(a), the procedural default must be honored.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, if the majority believes that defendant has not established plain error, the majority should conclude not that defendant’s “right of presence was not violated” (235 Ill. 2d at 496), but that no basis exists to excuse the default. See Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 19, 33. Similarly, at the conclusion of the section entitled Interference With the Jury, the majority states that defendant “has alleged nothing more than generalities to support his claim that the bailiff’s communication with the jury prejudiced him.” 235 Ill. 2d at 499. Again, this language suggests a ruling on the merits. The majority should conclude this section with a statement that plain error being absent, no basis exists to reach the merits of the claim. This is no small matter. As I have previously explained, there are consequences when state courts of review do not clearly state their holdings with respect to procedural default and plain error. See People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 529 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.). When this court concludes that a defendant has not satisfied the plain-error rule and holds the matter procedurally defaulted, that conclusion is recognized as an adequate and independent state ground4 precluding the issue from federal habeas corpus review. Neal v. Gramley, 99 F.3d 841, 944 (7th Cir. 1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 655-56, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553-54 (1991). As I pointed out in Terrell, federal courts in habeas proceedings cannot properly apply the foregoing principles if the underlying state court judgment is abstruse. The courts are left to discern whether the state court resolved the issue on the independent and adequate state ground or on substantive principles grounded in or interwoven with federal law. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court attempted to address this problem by specifically “encouraging] state courts to express plainly, in every decision potentially subject to federal review, the grounds upon which their judgments rest.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 662, 111 S. Ct. at 2559. In my view, the majority opinion is needlessly ambiguous in this respect. I conclude this concurrence with a few observations regarding the majority’s discussion of People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963). 235 Ill. 2d at 485-89. This discussion is triggered by defendant’s reliance on the case in arguing that, because the errors were committed by the trial court, the rules of forfeiture should be relaxed.5  The majority notes that Sprinkle holds that forfeiture rules are relaxed when the conduct of the judge occurs in front of the jury, but it also acknowledges that this court “has occasionally applied the Sprinkle principle[6] even where no jury is present.” 235 Ill. 2d at 487. The majority then observes (i) that the general rule of relaxing forfeiture under Sprinkle will only be found “under extraordinary circumstances” (235 Ill. 2d at 488), and (ii) “[t]hat we have seldom applied Sprinkle to noncapital cases further underscores the importance of uniform application of the forfeiture rule except in the most compelling of situations” (235 Ill. 2d at 488). This court, in its past cases, has never spoken in terms of (i) using the holding in Sprinkle in “compelling” situations, or (ii) limiting the application of the holding in Sprinkle to capital cases or “extraordinary circumstances.” If it is the intent of the majority today to limit the application of the holding in Sprinkle, it should say so directly. In any event, the majority’s effort in this respect is unnecessary; Sprinkle is limited by its own circumstances, a fact that belies its purported establishment of a “doctrine” or “principle.” As noted, the underlying premise for the holding in Sprinkle was concern arising from the perceived reluctance of defense attorneys to raise objections that suggest criticism of the trial judge. This reluctance owed to fear of what effect such objections would have on the jury and what conclusions the jury would draw against the defendant. See Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d at 400-01. Such fears can be avoided if defense counsel asks for a sidebar and during the course of the sidebar makes a standing objection to the question or comment for the record. In that way, a contemporaneous objection can be made outside the presence of the jury, and the issue can be preserved properly for appellate review (assuming, of course, counsel includes the matter in the posttrial motion). If this court were to require such a procedure to be followed in our trial courts, the need for the holding in Sprinkle would be alleviated. Claims not preserved because the procedure was not followed could then become the basis for an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on appeal.  To be deemed “adequate,” the state procedural rule must have been “firmly established and regularly followed.” James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51, 80 L. Ed. 2d 346, 353-55, 104 S. Ct. 1830, 1835-36 (1984). The rule must also be applied in a “consistent and principled way;” a rule that is “ ‘infrequently, unexpectedly, or freakishly’ ” applied is not an adequate state ground that bars relief. Thomas v. McCaughtry, 201 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2000), quoting Bobo v. Kolb, 969 F.2d 391, 399 (7th Cir. 1992). A state court rule is independent if it is independent of the federal question and the court “ ‘actually *** relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.’ ” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308, 316, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989), quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 238, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 1638 (1985).   Sprinkle holds that when a judge questions witnesses, it is often difficult for a defense attorney to make objections without looking bad in the eyes of the jury. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d at 400. The holding has been applied in a handful of cases over the decades.   The majority refers to the holding in Sprinkle as a “principle” (235 Ill. 2d at 487) and a “doctrine” (235 Ill. 2d at 487 n.1). This court has never before recognized that case as announcing some new doctrine or principle of law.