Court Opinion

ID: 9775205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:50:04.891325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:23.427114
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached. Just as in Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568, 162 A.L.R. 578 (1944), the conveyance *175in issue here involves an option for repurchase which the contracting parties intended should be of indefinite duration.
See Justice Norvell’s discussion of an option of indefinite duration (as in Maddox v. Keeler, supra) and the one “generally of limited duration” found in Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312, 318-319 (Tex.1963). In our case the option is for an indefinite duration and is unenforceable.
Defendants’ reliance upon Lusher v. First Nat. Bank of Fort Worth, 260 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.), is misplaced. There, the Court distinguished between an option agreement and a conditional sale, noting that in an option contract, “ ‘time is of the essence,’ ” and when a time for performance is not specified, the law will imply that a reasonable time is meant. (260 S.W.2d at 626) This holding is entirely consistent with Mattern v. Herzog, supra.
Plaintiff was entitled to recover the relief sought in the trial court and I join in the judgment of this Court.