Court Opinion

ID: 9585806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:04:05.335962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:15.174666
License: Public Domain

Oxner, Justice
(concurring).
As pointed out in the foregoing opinion, a majority of the Court is of the view that the trial Judge erred in granting the corporate defendant’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. We desire to briefly state our reasons for this conclusion.
We do not question the general rule, to which this Court has consistently adhered, that in order to hold a corporation liable for a slander uttered by its agent, it must appear that the latter was acting within the scope of his employment and in the actual performance of the duties *372thereof touching the matter in question. But we are not in accord with the restricted interpretation sought to be placed upon it. After stating the rule, it is said in Insurance Law and Practice by Appleman, Volume 16, Section 8901, page 362: “An insurance company is thus liable for the slanderous words of its agent if the agent at the time is transacting the business of the corporation, and the words are spoken in the course of such business and in conection therewith.” As authority for this statement, the distinguished author cites several of our decisions.
In the leading case of Courtney v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 120 S. C. 511, 113 S. E. 332, 333, 24 A. L. R. 128, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cothran, said: “After much discussion and great divergence of opinion, it may be regarded as settled by practical unanimity of text-writers and decided cases, that slander is in the same category with all other malicious torts, and that a corporation may be liable for it as well as for any of the others, under like circumstances.” In the Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations by Fletcher, Permanent Edition, Volume 10, page 403, it is stated without reservation that according to the better rule a corporation “is liable where the slander is uttered by its servant or agent within the scope of his employment and in the performance of his duties while prosecuting or transacting the business of the corporation.”
Applying the foregoing principles to the fates of the instant case, we think it may be reasonably inferred that the defamatory words were uttered by Stewart “within the scope of his employment and in the performance of his duties while prosecuting or transacting the business of the corporation.” He was transacting the business of the corporation and the words were spoken in connection with the business in which he was then engaged. His duties were to collect premiums on policies already issued and to sell additional insurance. While endeavoring to discharge the latter duty, an inquiry was made by the person solicited as to the failure of the company to pay the Johnson claim. The alleged defamatory *373language was used in response to this question. It was for the jury to say whether Stewart was then endeavoring to promote the corporation’s business. It cannot be said as a matter of law that he stepped aside from his duties and volunteered a slanderous statement wholly for his own purposes. It is true that the Johnson claim had been paid and from the. standpoint of the company it would have been better to have so stated. But Stewart did not know this claim had been settled. He answered incorrectly. However, it was for the jury to say whether his reply was in good faith'and actuated to some extent by an intent to serve the company. An agent does not depart from the scope of his employment merely because, in discharging the responsibilities assigned to him, he acts unwisely or through lack of of judgment or discretion, or in a manner which his employer would disapprove. The question is whether the words were uttered while Stewart was acting within the scope and in the performance of his duties in the course of transacting the business of the company. It is true that Stewart had no authority to adjust claims, but it may be reasonably inferred that he had implied authority to vouch for the reputation of the company in paying them.
The learned author of the main opinion, with characteristic clearness and accuracy, has reviewed most of our decisions relating to the liability of a corporation for slander uttered by its agent or servant but none, we think, require a conclusion that the corporate defendant here is entitled to a directed verdict. Cases like Courtney v. American Ry. Exp. Co., supra, 120 S. C. 511, 113 S. E. 332, 24 A. L. R. 128, would be applicable if Stewart or some other agent of the company had used this defamatory language in expressing a personal opinion as to why the Johnson claim had not been paid at a time when such agent was not engaged in the discharge of a duty committed to him by the company.
The case of Mann v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 132 S. C. 193, 129 S. E. 79, 80, tends to sustain our conclusion. There Smith, a district superintendent of the in*374surance company, while addressing about a dozen agents under his supervision with reference to their duties, charged the plaintiff Mann, a former agent, with failure to turn in money collected. The company contended that there was no liability because 'Smith was not at the time entrusted with any duty in regard to Mann who was no longer employed by the company, but the Court held that the case should have been submitted to the jury on the theory that the alleged defamatory language was used by Smith within the scope of his' employment and while engaged in the actual discharge of his duties. It is true that the Court stated that the plaintiff Mann had not made a final settlement with the company and that Smith had the duty to adjust his account. But it clearly appears from the opinion of the majority of the Court on a petition for a rehearing that liability was not predicated upon this fact. It was there said: “The liability of the corporation for the alleged slander is based, not upon the fact that Smith was at the time engaged in some matter of business between Mann and the corporation, but in a matter of business between Smith and the corporation, the instruction of subordinate agents under his supervision.”
With commendable frankness it is conceded by the author of the main opinion'that the cases of Wisemore v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 190 La. 1011, 183 So. 247, and Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Bridwell, 103 Ark. 345, 147 S. W. 64, clearly sustain appellant’s position. It is said, however, that a different conclusion was reached on similar facts by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Hand v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 174 Miss. 822, 165 So. 616, 618. Not only was the Court divided in the Hand case' but the facts are distinguishable. There a soliciting agent of an insurance company, while calling on a prospect, saw a policy written by another company of which the plaintiff was president. The mere sight of this policy provoked and aroused the agent who thereupon, without any excuse- or justification, made derogatory remarks with reference to the company issuing that policy and also used certain defamatory language impugning *375the integrity and honesty of the plaintiff who was president of the company. A majority of the Court concluded that in uttering the defamatory language, the agent was acting beyond the scope of his authority. In an opinion concurring in the result, the Chief justice agreed that there was no liability for the reason that it was not shown that the agent’s purpose in making the remarks was to aid him in the discharge of his duty. But he added: “If Palmer (the agent) uttered the defamatory words for the purpose of inducing Robinson (the prospect) to accept an insurance policy from the appellee, it, the appellee, is liable in damages therefor.” The case supposed by the Chief Justice is strikingly similar to the one now presented.
Stukes and Taylor, JJ., concur.
Baker, C. j., dissents.