Court Opinion

ID: 9893862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 19:02:15.068882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:52.925478
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14183    Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 10/30/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14183
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ROBERT LOUIS PERKINS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00032-CDL-MSH-2
                            ____________________
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                        22-14183

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Robert Perkins pleaded guilty to one count of possession
        with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
        §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). On appeal, Perkins argues that the
        district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to
        withdraw his guilty plea based on the alleged ineffective assistance
        of Perkins’s counsel and plainly erred in failing to conduct an
        evidentiary hearing on his claim prior to denying the motion to
        withdraw his plea. 1 After review, we affirm.
                                       I.       Background
            In 2021, a grand jury indicted Perkins, his wife Taylor, and a
        third individual, Constantine Varazo, on one count of possession
        with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21
        U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count

        1 To the extent that Perkins raises a separate substantive ineffective-assistance-

        of-counsel claim, in the interest of avoiding piecemeal litigation and because
        ineffective-assistance claims are better suited for a timely 28 U.S.C. § 2255
        motion upon which a record can be established specifically on the issue of
        ineffective assistance, we decline to address this claim at this time. See Massaro
        v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (explaining that “in most cases a
        motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims
        of ineffective assistance”); United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.
        2002) (“We will not generally consider claims of ineffective assistance of
        counsel raised on direct appeal where the district court did not entertain the
        claim nor develop a factual record.”). Perkins is free to assert this claim in a
        subsequent § 2255 motion.
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        22-14183                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        One), and one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin,
        in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C.
        § 2 (Count Two).2 Perkins pleaded guilty to Count Two, and in
        exchange the government agreed to dismiss Count One.
               Briefly, the parties stipulated to the following facts. In the
        late night hours of March 15, 2020, a local sheriff’s deputy
        attempted a traffic stop of a vehicle for failing to dim its high beam
        headlights when approaching other vehicles. A high speed chase
        ensued, and the occupants of the vehicle were observed throwing
        things out of the vehicle’s windows during the chase. The vehicle
        was eventually stopped following a PIT maneuver.3 Officers
        identified Perkins as the driver, his wife as the front seat passenger,
        and Varazo as the backseat passenger. Officers then seized the
        items that were thrown out the car window during the chase,
        which included multiple bags of suspected ecstasy; a bag of
        suspected marijuana; some needles; and a bookbag containing a
        handgun, several smaller bags of methamphetamine, heroin, a set

        2 Varazo was also charged with a separate firearms count that is not relevant

        to this appeal.
        3 PIT stands for “precision immobilization technique.” This technique
        “involves easing up to and making contact with a fleeing suspect’s car in such
        a way as to cause the target car to snap sideways and come to a halt.” Ga.
        Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Law Enforcement Pursuits in Georgia: Review and
        Recommendations (Rev. Aug. 8, 2006) (quoting National Institute of Justice,
        High-Speed Pursuit: New Technologies Around the Corner, U.S. Dep’t of Justice
        (Oct. 1996) at 4–5).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14183

        of scales, and Varazo’s cell phone. 4 Upon booking, Perkins’s wife,
        Taylor, provided a voluntary statement to police, in which she
        indicated that they had driven from Pensacola to Cordele, Georgia
        to purchase drugs. Varazo had offered to pay the Perkinses to drive
        him. At the time of the stop, they had completed the transaction
        and were driving home, and Varazo began throwing drugs out the
        window when the police attempted to stop the vehicle. She
        confirmed that she knew that Varazo had “some ‘ice,’ heroin, and
        ‘meth.’” Perkins, himself, was unaware of the amount of drugs
        they purchased.
               The plea agreement provided that, at sentencing, the district
        court would “determine any pertinent fact by a preponderance of
        the evidence” and could “consider any reliable information,
        including hearsay.” The plea agreement detailed that Perkins faced
        a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, and that
        the district court was “not bound by any estimate of the probable
        sentencing range that [Perkins] may have received from [his]
        attorney, the Government, or the Probation Office.” Furthermore,
        the agreement provided that Perkins
               [would] not be allowed to withdraw [his] plea because
               [he] ha[d] received an estimated guideline range from
               the Government, [his] attorney, or the Probation
               Oﬃce which is diﬀerent from the guideline range

        4 Testing results confirmed that the bag contained 190.47 grams of pure

        methamphetamine, 27 grams of pure heroin, and another 4.5 grams of pure
        methamphetamine.
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        22-14183                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

                computed . . . in the Presentence Investigation Report
                [“PSI”] and found by the [c]ourt to be the correct
                guideline range.5

        Additionally, the agreement provided that Perkins would have the
        opportunity to review and object to the information contained in
        the PSI, but that Perkins also understood and had discussed with
        his counsel that any objections or challenges to the PSI or the
        court’s rulings on said objections would not be grounds for
        withdrawing the plea. 6
               Perkins initialed each page of the agreement and signed the
        agreement under the paragraph declaring that he read and
        understood the provisions of the agreement. Perkins’s counsel,
        Jennifer Curry, also signed the agreement, attesting that she had
        read and explained the agreement to Perkins, and that she believed
        that he understood its terms.
               At the change of plea hearing, Perkins, age 38, confirmed
        that he was a high school graduate and could read and write. He
        confirmed that he understood what he was charged with in Count
        2, and that he faced a statutory maximum of 20 years’

        5 Moreover, the agreement confirmed that the district court had the authority

        to impose a more severe or less severe sentence than that provided for by the
        guideline range.
        6 The agreement also contained a sentence-appeal waiver, which provided that

        Perkins waived his right to appeal his sentence with the exception that he
        could appeal if the sentence exceeded the advisory guideline range as
        calculated by the district court or exceeded the statutory maximum. Perkins
        also preserved his “right to bring a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14183

        imprisonment. The district court explained that the guidelines
        were advisory and that it could impose a sentence above or below
        that called for by the guidelines. Perkins stated that he understood
        and that he had discussed the application of the guidelines with his
        counsel and understood how the guidelines applied. The district
        court also cautioned that Perkins’s ultimate sentence might be
        different from any estimate provided to Perkins by his attorney or
        other sources, and Perkins confirmed that he understood.
                 Next, Perkins confirmed that it was his initials and signature
        that appeared on the plea agreement and that he read the entire
        agreement, discussed it with his attorney, and that he understood
        it. The district court explained that it was not bound by any
        sentencing recommendations in the plea agreement, and that even
        if it did not follow such recommendation, that would not be a basis
        for Perkins to withdraw his plea. Perkins stated that he
        understood. Perkins stated that he was satisfied with his counsel’s
        advice and representation. Finally, Perkins averred that no one had
        promised him anything that was not written down in the plea
        agreement, and his counsel agreed with that representation. When
        asked how he was pleading to Count Two, Perkins stated he was
        guilty, that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily, and that
        no one had promised him anything to induce a plea or threatened
        or coerced him into pleading guilty. Perkins asserted that he was
        in fact guilty of the offense. The government then set forth the
        factual basis for the plea, including that the substances found in the
        bookbag tested positive for 190.47 grams of pure
        methamphetamine, 27 grams of heroin, and another 4.5 grams of
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        22-14183                   Opinion of the Court                            7

        pure methamphetamine. Perkins agreed that the government’s
        statement of facts was true. Accordingly, the district court
        accepted his plea of guilty.
               Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office
        prepared a PSI. The probation officer held Perkins accountable for
        the amount of methamphetamine and heroin recovered in the
        bookbag—194.97 grams of methamphetamine and 27 grams of
        heroin. The total converted drug weight equaled 3,926.4 kilograms
        of which 3,889.4 kilograms was methamphetamine and 27
        kilograms was heroin—resulting in a base offense level of 32. The
        probation officer added two levels for obstruction of justice
        because Perkins “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
        serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing
        from a law enforcement officer.” The probation officer then
        subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in
        an adjusted offense level of 31. An adjusted offense level of 31 and
        Perkins’s criminal history category of VI resulted in a guidelines
        range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.
               As relevant to this appeal, Perkins objected to being held
        accountable for all of the drugs recovered in the backpack.7 He
        maintained that “he was unaware of the total quantity of illegal
        narcotics possessed by his codefendant, and he should not be held
        accountable for the total quantity of narcotics found inside the
        vehicle with his codefendant.” The probation officer maintained

        7 Perkins raised another objection to the calculation of his criminal history

        score that is not relevant to the issue on appeal.
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        8                            Opinion of the Court                    22-14183

        that Perkins was accountable for the total drug quantity as relevant
        conduct, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)(i). 8 Additionally, the
        probation officer noted that he relied on the amounts stipulated to
        as part of the plea agreement.
                At sentencing, Perkins reiterated his objection to the drug
        quantity attributed to him, and his counsel maintained that “the
        spirit of the [plea] agreement and the intent of it was to limit Mr.
        Perkins’[s] exposure for purposes of sentencing, to limit the
        amount of drugs he was accepting responsibility, for being held
        accountable for.” In other words, it was Perkins’s position that he
        was accepting responsibility via the plea agreement only for the
        heroin charged in Count Two, not the methamphetamine charged
        in Count One. Counsel also reiterated that Perkins was simply

        8 This guideline provides that when, as here, there is “jointly undertaken

        criminal activity” the base offense level under the guidelines “shall be
        determined on the basis of”:
                (B) . . . all acts and omissions of others that were—

                        (i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal
                        activity,
                        (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
                        (iii)  reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
                        criminal activity;
                that occurred during the commission of the oﬀense of
                conviction, in preparation for that oﬀense, or in the course of
                attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that oﬀense.
        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
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        22-14183               Opinion of the Court                        9

        hired as a driver, and he was unaware of the amount of drugs that
        Varazo purchased. Nevertheless, upon questioning from the
        district court as to the terms of the plea agreement, counsel
        conceded that nothing in the plea agreement limited Perkins’s
        responsibility to the 27 grams of heroin, and that the factual
        stipulation included the methamphetamine.
              In response, the government argued that the heroin and
        methamphetamine were discovered in the same bookbag and,
        under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, the methamphetamine qualified as
        relevant conduct. The government asserted that Perkins was
        accountable for all of the drugs in the bookbag, even if he did not
        know the actual amount purchased, because he admitted that he
        knew they were traveling to buy drugs, and he told law
        enforcement that they had planned to resell the drugs once they
        got home. The government maintained that there was never any
        suggestion in the plea negotiations that the government would
        hold Perkins accountable for only the heroin, which is one reason
        why the government included the methamphetamine in the plea
        agreement.
                The district court overruled Perkins’s objection, concluding
        that the methamphetamine qualified as relevant conduct under the
        guidelines. Thereafter, Perkins stated that he wished to “withdraw
        [his] plea for insufficient counseling because [he] was misle[]d.” He
        asserted that he “was promised something different.” The
        following colloquy occurred:
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        10                   Opinion of the Court                22-14183

              THE COURT:        Well, what do you mean you
              “were promised something diﬀerent”?
              [PERKINS]: I was promised something that—when
              they dismissed Count 1 and I was asked—I was asked
              speciﬁcally if they dismissed Count 1, that I was
              promised that I wouldn’t be held accountable for it.
              THE COURT: So you were under the impression that
              you would only be held accountable for the 27 grams
              of heroin?
              [PERKINS]: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: And it’s your contention that that’s
              what you were told by your attorney?
              [PERKNS]: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: So you wish to withdraw your plea
              agreement unless the Court sentences you based on
              you being accountable for just 27 grams of heroin; is
              that correct?
              [PERKINS]: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: And do we know what the diﬀerence
              in his guideline range would be if he were only held
              accountable for the 27 grams?
              PROBATION OFFICER: I believe if he’s only held
              [accountable] for the 27 grams, it would be a range of
              41 to 51 months, I believe.
              THE COURT: So it’s a substantial diﬀerence,
              obviously. Well, I guess my concern . . . is whether
              he has an adequate opportunity today to present all
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        22-14183               Opinion of the Court                       11

              the evidence he wants to present on the withdrawal
              of his guilty plea and we can go ahead and address
              that today, or whether he needs to be given an
              additional opportunity to develop and present
              whatever evidence he wants to present.
              Let me ask you this, Mr. Perkins: In support of your
              motion or request to withdraw your guilty plea, do I
              understand you to say that the only basis for that is
              you believe you were provided with ineﬀective
              assistance of counsel because you state that your
              counsel told you that when the plea agreement
              dismissed Count 1, that you would not be held
              accountable at sentencing for any of the drugs except
              for the heroin that’s referenced in Count 2?
              [PERKINS]: Yes, sir. I was not told—I was not
              presented with the relevant conduct.
               The government argued that Perkins’s plea agreement
        barred his withdrawal attempt, as it explicitly provided that Perkins
        would not be allowed to withdraw his plea if the guidelines range
        as calculated by the district court differed from any estimate he
        may have received from counsel. Nevertheless, the government
        conceded that a claim that one’s lawyer had told him something
        different from the plea agreement he had signed could support a
        motion to withdraw one’s plea.
               Perkins’s attorney then stated the following on the record.
        She does “not use the word ‘promise,’” and she did not “promise
        anything” to Perkins. Indeed, it was her practice to “make it very
        clear to every client that [she] cannot guarantee anything in any
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   22-14183

        case, federal or at the state level. So no promises were ever made
        from me or by me.” However, she explained that:
               the spirit of th[e] plea agreement was, rather than
               pleading to the meth count [Count One] which
               carrie[d] a heavier sentence because the amount is
               more, we pled to the heroin count because the
               amount of drugs was in fact less than, for the
               guideline range purposes. When it came to relevant
               conduct, we did not include the ﬁrearm that was
               found and was held—that was applied to [Varazo].
               That was also in that same bag, and it could have been
               applied to Mr. Perkins just as the total weight of all
               the drugs.

               That was the spirit of the agreement. That was the
               spirit of the plea discussions. So the discussions I had
               with Mr. Perkins did include that, that we are
               pleading to the heroin count because the drug
               amount, the weight, is less; and, therefore, his
               exposure on that particular count would be
               signiﬁcantly less than if he pled to the ﬁrst count with
               the higher drug amount.[ 9] So that was the
               discussion. . . .

        Counsel confirmed that she understood the relevant conduct
        guidelines. She denied ever telling Perkins that the court would

        9 The government explained that Count One carried a mandatory minimum

        of 10 years’ imprisonment and a statutory maximum of life. Whereas, Count
        Two carried no mandatory minimum and a statutory maximum of only 20
        years’ imprisonment.
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        22-14183                  Opinion of the Court                               13

        only consider the heroin or that his sentencing exposure was
        limited to being held accountable only for the heroin. Rather, she
        told Perkins only that she would try to argue for that, and that she
        never made any guarantees.
                Accordingly, having heard from counsel, the district court
        concluded that “the record [was] fully developed as to what
        happened,” and it determined that Perkins simply “had a
        misunderstanding of what his attorney told him.” The court also
        noted that the plea agreement expressly provided “that there were
        no guarantees” and that “he couldn’t rely upon a recommendation
        as to the guideline range from his attorney.” The district court then
        denied Perkins’s motion to withdraw his plea, concluding that
        Perkins had not satisfied the relevant factors and that there was no
        fair and just reason to permit withdrawal of the plea. 10 The district
        court then gave Perkins an opportunity to speak before imposing
        sentence, stating that Perkins could “say anything [he] wish[ed],”
        and informing Perkins that it would consider his prior statement
        about the weight of the drugs to constitute a request for a
        downward variance so that he would receive a sentence as though
        he had been held only for the 27 grams of heroin. Perkins stated
        that he did not have anything else he wished to say.

        10  The district court further explained that to the extent that Perkins
        maintained his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in relation to the plea,
        it was not ruling on his ineffective assistance allegation, and Perkins was free
        to assert that claim in a collateral proceeding.
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        14                          Opinion of the Court                        22-14183

               After hearing additional argument from the parties as to the
        appropriate sentence, the district court denied Perkins’s request for
        a downward variance, and imposed a within-guidelines sentence of
        192 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 3 years’ supervised
        release. Neither party made any additional objections. This appeal
        followed.
                                        II.      Discussion
               Perkins argues that the district court erred in denying his
        motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and he asserts for the first time
        that the district court should have conducted an evidentiary
        hearing on his motion. He maintains that his plea was not
        knowingly and voluntarily entered because his counsel rendered
        constitutionally ineffective assistance by assuring him that the
        offense level would be based on only the heroin and would not
        include the methamphetamine.11
              “[T]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior
        to imposition of a sentence,” and “[t]he decision to allow
        withdrawal is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” United

        11 Perkins also asserts in passing, for the first time on appeal, that the sentence-

        appeal waiver in the plea agreement was not knowing and voluntary because
        of the same alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the appeal
        waiver does not serve to bar Perkins’s challenge to the validity of the plea
        agreement and the government is not otherwise seeking to enforce the appeal
        waiver, we decline to address this issue. See United States v. Puentes-Hurtado,
        794 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that an appeal waiver does not
        bar challenges to the validity and voluntary nature of the plea agreement
        itself).
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        22-14183               Opinion of the Court                         15

        States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471 (11th Cir. 1988). “We review the
        denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.
        There is no abuse of discretion unless the denial is arbitrary or
        unreasonable.” United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th
        Cir. 2006) (quotation and internal citation omitted).
                A defendant may withdraw an accepted guilty plea before
        sentencing if he “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the
        withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). In determining whether
        the defendant has met his burden of demonstrating a fair and just
        reason for withdrawal of the plea, a “district court may consider
        the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea,” including:
        “(1) whether close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether
        the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources
        would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be
        prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.”
        Buckles, 843 F.2d at 471–72 (internal citation omitted). “The good
        faith, credibility and weight of a defendant’s assertions in support
        of [the] motion . . . are issues for the trial court to decide.” Id. at
        472. Furthermore, there is a “strong presumption” that statements
        made by a defendant during his plea colloquy are true. United States
        v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). Therefore, “when a
        defendant makes statements under oath at a plea colloquy, he bears
        a heavy burden to show his statements were false.” United States v.
        Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988).
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        denying Perkins’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                       22-14183

        Perkins’s allegations that his counsel had promised him that his
        sentence would be based only on the heroin and not the
        methamphetamine. Prior to ruling on the motion, the court
        considered Perkins’s statements as to what his counsel told him and
        obtained statements from the counsel as to whether she made the
        alleged promises, which she denied. Additionally, Perkins’s plea
        agreement expressly provided that the guidelines calculation or the
        sentence he received could differ from any estimates he might have
        received from his counsel, and that any disagreement on that point
        would not be a ground for withdrawing his guilty plea. Perkins
        initialed those pages and signed the agreement, including the
        provision stating that he had read the agreement and understood
        its terms. Moreover, the district court reviewed these provisions
        with Perkins at the change-of-plea hearing, and Perkins confirmed
        that he understood. We presume the truth of Perkins’s
        statements. 12 Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187; Rogers, 848 F.2d at 168;
        Buckles, 843 F.2d at 471–72. In short, under the totality of the
        circumstances, the district court’s denial of Perkins’s motion to
        withdraw his guilty plea was not arbitrary or unreasonable. See
        Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298. And we cannot say it was outside the
        range of permissible choices such that the district court abused its
        discretion in denying withdrawal.

        12 Perkins’s purported mistaken belief that he would receive a sentence based

        solely on the heroin per his counsel’s advice simply was not reasonable in light
        of the plea agreement and the district court’s discussion during the plea
        colloquy that the ultimate guidelines range or sentence could be different from
        any estimate Perkins may have received from his counsel.
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        22-14183                Opinion of the Court                          17

                Relatedly, Perkins cannot show that the district court plainly
        erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motion to
        withdraw the guilty plea. As an initial matter, Perkins never
        requested an evidentiary hearing in the district court, and he did
        not object to the denial of his motion without one being held.
        Accordingly, because he raises the issue of an evidentiary hearing
        for the first time on appeal, we review only for plain error. United
        States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2012). In order to
        succeed under plain-error review, Perkins must show that (1) there
        was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected his
        substantial rights; and (4) the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
        integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. An
        appellant’s substantial rights are prejudiced when the error affected
        the outcome of the district court proceedings. United States v.
        Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). The burden is on the defendant to
        show that the error affected the district court outcome. United
        States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). If the effect
        of the error is uncertain, the defendant is not entitled to relief. Id.
        at 1300. Perkins has not cited a single decision, from this Court or
        elsewhere, holding that a district court errs by failing to hold an
        evidentiary hearing on a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
        plea where the defendant himself has not requested one. Not only
        that, but binding precedent suggests that, even where a defendant
        requests an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw, a
        district court does not abuse its discretion in denying that request,
        when, as here, it “conducted extensive Rule 11 inquiries prior to
        accepting the guilty plea.” Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298; see also United
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14183

        States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that
        “[i]n light of the extensive Rule 11 inquiries which the trial court
        made before accepting appellant’s plea,” the district court did not
        abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing
        on the motion to withdraw). Under these circumstances, the
        district court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing before
        denying Perkins’s motion to withdraw was not error, much less
        plain error. See United States v. Lejarde–Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291
        (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here can be no plain error where there is no
        precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving
        [the issue].”).
                Moreover, Perkins does not assert what information he was
        prevented from presenting by the court’s failure to conduct an
        evidentiary hearing, and he concedes that “it is impossible to know
        whether [the district court’s] decision would have been the same
        had it granted [him] an evidentiary hearing.” Because the effect on
        Perkins’s substantial rights is at best uncertain, he is not entitled to
        relief. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300. Accordingly, we affirm.
               AFFIRMED.