Court Opinion

ID: 9663802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:51:32.296515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:57.070324
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring in affirmance). I agree with Mr. Justice Kelly that we should not reverse the chancellor’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss. However, I do not believe that this Court can decide now, on the record and briefs before it, that the chancellor does, or does not, have jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief requested of him by plaintiffs. Consequently, I agree only that the chancellor did not err in refusing to dismiss the case.
Threshold challenges to a court’s jurisdiction should be granted when determination of the jurisdictional issue can be made with certainty as a matter of law. But when uncertainty persists, as it does for me in this case, judicial prudence requires that the ultimate decision be deferred. Uncertainty persists in this case because there are unresolved faetq*620al and legal questions relevant to jurisdiction which., in my judgment, have not been presented to this Court in a manner adequate for decision in this ease of substantial public significance.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss was based upon tbe theory that the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs is in the nature of relief usually granted by a court’s writ of mandamus and, because our statutory law and court rule deny to circuit courts the power to issue writs of mandamus against State officers, that, therefore, the circuit court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief requested against the defendants, some of them being State officers. See CLS 1961, § 600.4401 as amended by PA 1967, No 65 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 27A.4401) and OCB 1963, 714.1 (1), which limit jurisdiction to issue mandamus against State officers to the Court of Appeals and to this Court. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ purpose is, and the effect of the injunction sought would be, to force the defendant secretary of State to establish new positions subject to the plaintiff civil service commission’s jurisdiction, contrary to a constitutional provision1 which grants the secretary of State the authority to establish such classified positions without the approval of the commission and contrary to a statutory provision2 which *621authorizes the secretary to establish branch offices to be managed by persons appointed by him and compensated as he may determine.
The reasoning offered by defendants in support of their argument is based upon their pleaded allegations of the practical consequences of the injunctive relief sought. They allege that if they are enjoined from paying fees to certain of the secretary of State’s branch office managers currently compensated on a fee basis, that those fee office managers will refuse to perform further services for the State; that the secretary of State, in order to perform his duty to provide distribution of motor vehicle and watercraft license plates in those areas theretofore served by such fee office managers, will be forced to create additional salaried positions in his department subject to the jurisdiction of the plaintiff civil service commission; and that, therefore, the purpose of the plaintiffs is, and the effect of such an injunction would be, to accomplish in the circuit court by injunction what can be compelled judicially of a State officer only by writ of mandamus and that such writ, by virtue of the above cited statute and court rule, can only be issued by the Court of Appeals or by this Court.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, relying upon other provisions3 of the constitutional article and section relied upon by defendants, assert for themselves the power to dissapprove vouchers for payment for all personal services rendered to the State, whether or not rendered by persons within the classified civil service. Plaintiffs allege that defendants *622have disbursed fees disapproved by the commission and have manifested their purpose to continue to do so notwithstanding the constitutional provisions quoted.
If the constitutional language relied upon by the plaintiffs does, indeed, grant to the civil service commission the power to disapprove disbursements for personal services rendered on a contractual basis, then, of course, a court of equity would have jurisdiction to enforce the constitutional mandate by injunctive order if necessary and if the equities of the case require enforcement. On the other hand, if it were concluded that the constitutional language applies only to disbursements for personal services rendered by employees in the State’s classified civil service, then the plaintiff commission’s disapproval of the fee disbursements made by the defendants would be without authority and a court of equity could not, on the basis of the commission’s disapproval thereof, enjoin the defendants from making fee disbursements to managers of the secretary of State’s branch offices.
Defendants also challenge the reasonableness of the commission’s disapproval of fee payments to only 35 of the 230 fee office managers of the secretary of State’s branch offices. It is their claim that, even if the commission has the power to disapprove such disbursements for personal services not rendered within the classified civil service, the power cannot be exercised capriciously, but only if there is some legal. impediment against fee payments to such branch office managers and that if there be such impediment, defendants reason it must apply to all 230 fee office managers, not only to 35 of them.
Justice Kelly does not consider these issues nor, in my judgment, should this Court do so now. The record and the parties’ briefs are not adequate pres*623ently for their consideration and reliable decision by this Court.
Under these circumstances, I would affirm the chancellor’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss, but without prejudice to the defendants’ renewal of their motion preferably after the evidentiary hearing on the merits. A public question being involved, I would assess no costs.
Black, T. M. Kavanagh, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.

 “The appointing authorities may create or abolish positions [in the civil service] for reasons of administrative efficiency without the approval of the commission. Positions shall not be created nor abolished except for reasons of administrative efficiency. Any employee considering himself aggrieved by the abolition or creation of a position shall have a right of appeal to the commission through established grievance procedures.” Const 1963, art 11, § 5.

 “(a) The secretary of State shall maintain an office in the State capitol, and in sueh other places in the State as he may deem necessary to earry out the powers and duties vested in the department. * * *
“(c) Any person appointed to conduct a branch office shall receive such compensation as the secretary of State may fix, and necessary expenses of the offiee, which compensation and expenses shall be paid out of the State highway fund and shall be deducted from said fund before the same is certified to the auditor general.” (Emphasis supplied.) CES 1961, § 257.205 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 9.1905).

 “The [civil service] commission shall * * * approve or disapprove disbursements for all personal services * * * .
“No payment for personal services shall be made or authorized until the provisions of this constitution pertaining to civil service have been complied with in every particular. Violation of any of the provisions hereof may be restrained or observance compelled by injunctive or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the State.” Const 1963, art 11, § 5.