Court Opinion

ID: 9668446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:13:59.064436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.546218
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The dissenting opinion dated October 31, 1991, is withdrawn and the following is substituted.
I dissented to granting the motion for leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus. I now dissent to the issuance of the writ. In my opinion there are two reasons why we should not grant the writ: (1) the facts stated in the petition for writ of mandamus were sworn to only to the affiant’s “best knowledge,” and (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in striking some of the expert witnesses.
This lawsuit was filed in May, 1986. Approximately two months later, relators answered defendants’ (the real parties in interest) written interrogatories. Interrogatory 12 requested the identity and location of each expert witness, and, among other matters “the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, including the mental impressions and opinions held by the expert and the facts known to the expert.” Interrogatory 13 requested the same information on “each expert who is used for consultation and is not expected to be called as a witness.” Relators answered “unknown at this time” to each. The succeeding interrogatory sought a copy of all written reports of each expert.
The docket sheet reflects only minimal case activity; there were seven entries pri- or to the hearing on the motion to strike: (1) an entry, the date of which is illegible, concerning agreed motions to produce and *788compel; (2) substitution of, apparently defense, counsel in March, 1989; (3) an illegible entry on June 19, 1989; (4) a notation that a motion to retain was granted on April 12,1990; (5) an entry on May 3,1990, that the case was dismissed for want of prosecution; (6) a notation dated June 18, 1990, that the case was reinstated for 120 days; referred to mediation (the trial judge signed a formal order of referral for mediation), and (7) a notation on October 23, 1990, that the case was dismissed for want of prosecution.
On November 5, 1990, the trial judge ordered the case reinstated and set a trial date of August 19, 1991. On the same date, counsel for relators filed Amended Answers to Interrogatories, and in answer to Interrogatory 12 listed eight expert witnesses, giving the name and address of each and identifying one as an accident reconstructionist, one as a speed and brake specialist, one as a human factors expert, one as a train expert, two as forensic pathologists, one as the treating physician of the minor plaintiff and the last as a dentist. Relators made no effort to comply with the remainder of Interrogatory 12.
On November 28, 1990, the real parties in interest filed a motion to strike the expert witnesses and on January 1, 1991, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. Relators have not provided us with a record of that hearing. However, in a letter, dated January 21, from relators counsel to Judge Downey, he informed the judge that the accident reconstructionist, the train expert, and the speed and brake specialist had been “contacted for investigative purposes” in 1986, and the human factors expert had been “contacted for investigative purposes” in 1987. Subsequently, on April 30, 1991, Judge Downey granted the defendants’ (real parties in interest) motion as to the four experts referred to above. It is upon this set of facts that the majority finds the trial judge abused his discretion in striking the four experts.
First, the real parties in interest challenge the sufficiency of the affidavit accompanying the petition for mandamus. Rule 121(a)(2)(F) of appellate procedure requires the petition to “contain an affidavit verifying the truth of all factual allegations.” Tex.R.App.P. 121(a)(2)(F). The affidavit attached to this petition states:
All of the factual statements made in the Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Mandamus and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus that are being filed in this court with this affidavit are true, to the best of my knowledge, (emphasis supplied).
In Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.1975), the Supreme Court stated that an affidavit containing allegations that the stated facts “are true and correct to the best of his knowledge” is insufficient to constitute an affidavit. See also Campbell v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 705 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
After we granted leave to file the petition on June 4, 1991, the real parties in interest challenged the sufficiency of rela-tors’ affidavit in their response filed on July 12,1991. However, relators have never sought to correct the deficiency of their affidavit. We err by exercising jurisdiction on an insufficient pleading. We should sustain the challenge made by the real parties in interest.
Second, I do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion in striking four of the expert witnesses. In a mandamus proceeding the only question before us “is whether the trial court abused its discretion or violated a duty imposed by law.” City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.1991). There being no contention that Judge Downey “violated a duty imposed by law,” the only question then is whether he abused his discretion.
The test for determining whether a trial judge abuses his discretion is “whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). I fail to understand how, under this test, we can find Judge Downey, in striking four of *789the expert witnesses, “acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.”
Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(6)(b) provides:
If the party expects to call an expert witness when the identity or the subject matter of such witness’ testimony has not been previously disclosed in response to an appropriate inquiry directly addressed to these matters, such response must be supplemented to include the name, address and telephone number of the expert witness and the substance of the testimony concerning which the expert is expected to testify, as soon as is practical but in no event less than thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of trial except on leave of court, (emphasis supplied).
As above stated, the evidence was undisputed that relators had known of and had contacted each of the expert witnesses some four years previously but, had never, in response to interrogatories of approximately the same age, designated them. Further, when relators did finally designate them, they still failed to comply with the interrogatory and the rule, by providing “the substance of the testimony.”
The majority states on page 787:
There is nothing in this record to indicate when relators made a decision to designate the experts in question as testifying experts. Generally, a plaintiff may contact an expert for investigative purposes months or years prior to trial, and may not make the determination to use that witness as a testifying expert unless and until all other discovery is completed and the expert has had an opportunity to review all of the evidence, deposition testimony, and any other evidence or facts pertinent to formulating the expert’s opinion.
This is indeed interesting. It would appear to me, first, that if the record does not show when relators made a decision to designate the experts in question as testifying experts, such failure of proof would preclude us from granting mandamus relief. Second, the observation made in the second sentence is interesting, but I do not find such a provision in Rule 166b. The duty imposed upon the trial court, once challenge was made by real parties in interest, was to determine if the response to the interrogatory was complete and whether it was made “as soon as practical.” He found against relators. And as above stated, relators have not provided a copy of the hearing on the motion to strike.
In the concluding paragraph of its opinion, the majority states that the trial court “clearly based its ruling on the time of contact.” I find nothing in the record to support such conclusion. In fact, relator’s May 16, 1990, sworn reinstatement motion stated that the only remaining depositions to be taken were of “experts from both sides” (emphasis added). This is clearly sufficient evidence to justify a trial court finding that relators knew which experts they were planning to use at least six months before they finally disclosed their identities. In the motion to reinstate, rela-tors swore they were “ready, willing and able to have this cause of action placed upon the next available trial docket.” The trial judge granted the motion and he reinstated the case for only 120 days. Yet, so far as this record shows, relators did absolutely nothing and the case was again dismissed for want of prosecution on October 23, 1990.
Finally, Interrogatory 13 required a disclosure of all expert witnesses who were used for consultation but who were not expected to be called as witnesses. During the four years after relators contacted the four experts for consultation, relators never attempted to comply with Interrogatory 13. The majority opinion does not even address this issue.
This record simply does not justify the granting of the relief by writ of mandamus. In my opinion, the majority errs in finding that the trial court abused his discretion.
The writ of mandamus should be denied.