Court Opinion

ID: 9622733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:22:40.980907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:07.076047
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully with the majority opinion with the exception of the majority’s conclusion regarding plaintiffs ownership of the condominium. Because I believe that the trial court failed to properly consider plaintiffs ownership of the condominium, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s findings satisfy the requirements set forth in section 50-16.1A(2) of the North Carolina General Statutes and our Supreme Court’s opinion in Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 183, 261 S.E.2d 849, 856 (1985).
In the instant case, the trial court found that “[pjlaintiff is currently living with her 83 year old mother in a 930 [-square foot] condo. Plaintiff’s mother purchased the home in 1982 and deeded it to plaintiff in 1993 for estate planning purposes.” The trial court further found that although “[p]laintiff does technically own this home,... it is her mother’s residence and her mother will reside there for the remainder of her life.” The majority opinion, in turn, finds no material fault with this finding.
Our courts have demonstrated a strong reluctance to impose restrictions upon title absent clear language to the contrary in the deed. See, e.g., Station Assocs., Inc. v. Dare County, 350 N.C. 367, 370, 513 S.E.2d 789, 792 (“ ‘The law does not favor a construction of the language in a deed which will constitute a condition subsequent unless the intention of the parties to create such a restriction upon the title is clearly manifested.’ ” (quoting Washington City Bd. of Educ. v. Edgerton, 244 N.C. 576, 578, 94 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1956))), reh’g denied, 350 N.C. 600, 537 S.E.2d 494 (1999). Here, there is no language in the general warranty deed limiting plaintiff’s use of the subject property in favor of her mother. It is clear that plaintiff and her mother intended that the resulting conveyance would result in an estate held in fee simple. In fact, the deed itself imposes the affirmative obligation upon plaintiff to
expressly assume[] and agree[] to be bound by and comply with all of the covenants, restrictions, terms, provisions and conditions as set forth in the Declaration and the By-Laws and any rules and regulations made pursuant thereto including, but not limited to, the obligation to make payment of assessments for the *246maintenance and operation of the condominium project which may be levied against such unit.
No right is given to nor obligation imposed upon plaintiffs mother in the deed. She merely grants all of her interest in the condominium to plaintiff in “fee simple” according to the express terms of the deed.
Although plaintiffs mother continues to reside in the condominium and, as the trial court found, plaintiff and her mother intend that she reside there for the remainder of her life, the record is devoid of any indication that plaintiffs mother reserved a life estate in the property or that plaintiff has conveyed any legally cognizable interest in the property to her mother. It is undisputed that plaintiff holds the property in fee simple, but the trial court diminished the significance of this legal interest by referring to plaintiffs interest in the property as mere “technical” ownership — a concept the majority correctly notes “is not a legal concept.” However, because she holds title to the property in fee simple, plaintiff has absolute dominion over the property and may utilize the property as she chooses. As our Supreme Court noted over a century ago,
[t]he right of property is that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. It consists in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of all a person’s acquisitions, without any. control or diminution save only by the laws of the land.
Vann v. Edwards, 135 N.C. 661, 665, 47 S.E. 784, 786 (1904) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although, the condominium may be, as the trial court found, the “mother’s residence,” it remains her residence only so long as plaintiff permits. Plaintiff’s mother’s ability and “right” to reside in the condo is wholly subject to the whim and caprice of plaintiff. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he right to exclude others is perhaps the quintessential property right. Without this right, one’s interest in property becomes very tenuous since it is then subject to the whim of others . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
I believe that the trial court erroneously failed to consider the significance of plaintiff’s fee simple interest in the condominium and, thus, did not properly determine the parties’ financial worth as required by our Supreme Court’s opinion in Williams. See Williams, 299 N.C. at 183, 261 S.E.2d at 856. Therefore, I would remand the case for proper consideration of the true nature of *247plaintiff’s ownership of the condominium and entry of corresponding findings of fact. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as to this portion of the majority opinion.