Court Opinion

ID: 9736091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:43:26.396004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:54.845662
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
I must respectfully dissent.
Tbe rule in child custody cases that the first and governing consideration must be the best interest of the child is well established. Rule 344(f) 15, R. C. P.; Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152; Alingh v. Alingh, 259 Iowa 219, 144 N.W.2d 134. Further it is not necessary that a parent be found unfit to care for the child in order that custody be awarded to another. This rule is not announced in either Painter v. Bannister, supra, or in this case but is implicit in the results of both. I do not disagree with such rules or with the philosophy behind them.
Having said this much, a protest should be made against the apparent willingness of this court to allow the principle, that a child once well situated should not be uprooted or moved, to harden into a conclusive presumption that the status quo must be maintained at all costs and in every situation. This is a compelling factor, but should not be conclusive. Yet I think that it has become a conclusive factor with this court.
There is much in the record to indicate that these grandparents will find increasing difficulties in rearing this boy. There is much more in the record to indicate that this mother is at least as well able to care for her son as are the grandparents.
The majority gives only lip service to the preferential right to custody that has been established in the parents not only by this court’s prior decisions but by statute.
Presumptively the parents, or the survivor of them, if one is dead, have the right to custody of their minor child. Allender v. Selders, 227 Iowa 1324, 291 N.W. 176. This presumptive right must give way where it has been relinquished or where the welfare and best interest of the child calls for other custody. In re Guardianship of Plucar, 247 Iowa 394, 72 N.W.2d 455. The present relevant statute was enacted in 1963. It reads: “The parents of a minor, or either of them, if qualified and suitable,, shall be preferred over all others for appointment as guardian.” Acts of the Sixtieth General Assembly, chapter 326, section 559. *540This section replaces sections 668.1 and 668.2 of the Iowa Code and preserves in similar language the preference noted above. Our interpretation of the effect of this'new statute (promulgated as part of our new Iowa Probate Code) leaves the thrust of the statutory presumption unchanged. Carrere v. Prunty, 257 Iowa 525, 530, 133 N.W.2d 692, 695. This preference noted in the statute has not, in my judgment at least, been overcome.
I cannot agree that affirmance here would be tantamount to adoption of the rule that-parental preference must'control in the absence of abandonment or parental unfitness. It would simply give weight to our statutory and common-law preference. I respect the American Bar Association’s section on family law and other eminent authority quoted by the majority. However, the proposed code on family law has not been adopted in this state. That portion which states that de facto satisfactory custody shall prima facie entitle the person having such custody to an award is, it seems to me, in conflict with our Iowa statute stating that parents, if qualified and suitable, shall be preferred over all others for appointment as guardian. Where such a conflict occurs the letter and the spirit of our statutes should control over those proposed by,the American Bar Association section on family law.
I would next protest this court’s increasing disregard of trial court’s findings. This protest was well articulated in the dissent in Thein v. Squires, 250 Iowa 1149, 1161, 97 N.W.2d 156: “The record clearly indicates the trial court carefully and deliberately weighed the matter. We have repeatedly said the trial court is often in a much better position than we to solve such a perplexing problem, and I think that pronouncement was never more applicable. Here the court visited with these children in his chambers in addition to seeing and hearing the witnesses. Its finding, then, should not be disturbed without compelling reasons, and I find none. Finken v. Porter, supra, 246 Iowa 1345, 1347, 72 N.W.2d 445, and citations, Joiner v. Knieriem, supra, 243 Iowa 470, 481, 52 N.W.2d 21, and citations, and Slattery v. Slattery, 139 Iowa 419, 116 N.W. 608, refer to the trial court’s discretion on matters of this nature.?’
It seems to me that the objection is well taken. ■ Where the *541ability of human beings to take care of children is at issue, a cold printed record is a very unsatisfactory basis for decision. This is not to say that the trial court should never be overruled in these eases. But where, as here, there are at least as many reasons for the trial court’s decision as there are against it, the superior position of the trial court to observe the witnesses and weigh the evidence should be given due weight.
The record indicates that this plaintiff has shown without contradiction that she has made a success of her present marriage. She has successfully cared for and reared her daughter, Terry. She has a place of respect and acceptance in the community. She has a good husband and a good home in which to rear Phillip. There is no evidence against her that does not date back at least seven years.
Both before and after the divorce plaintiff did much to show her affection and sense of responsibility toward her children. There is evidence that in 1954, James Halstead brought the children to his parents. All other evidence, without exception, finds plaintiff caring for the children when they were not with their grandparents. True it is that they were with their grandparents a great part of the time. Yet it was invariably plaintiff who brought them there and took care of. them ..at other times. ■
Plaintiff’s action in assigning her full allotment check was a further act of responsible concern. She also showed her responsible attitude by the frequency of her visits and her letters. There is a conflict as to the number of visits and the number of letters, but it is clear that plaintiff has traveled from the vicinity of Beaumont, Texas, to Or an, Iowa (some 1200 miles), at least four and perhaps six times since the, 1958 divorce. All trips involved seeing and being with her boy, some involved care for the welfare of her girl.
The age and the financial status of the grandparents militate against their ability to continue to meet the responsibilities incident to rearing this boy. The age differential between adult and child would be markedly decreased by affirming the trial court’s opinion. Sister and brother would be reunited. The family situation into which Phillip is to move has been shown to be good, *542with a seven-year history of stability. The relevant time- for the determination of this problem is the present, not seven years in the past.
There is no evidence that this youth is disturbed or is other than a quite well adjusted boy. He has not been moved from family to family in such a way as to foster uncertainty or create instability. His contacts with his mother have been reasonably frequent. His contacts with his sister have been more frequent and of longer duration. We have no evidence, expert or otherwise, that the move necessitated by the trial court’s decision would place an intolerable, or even undue, strain on his human ability to adjust. These factors provide cogent reasons for ordering this change in custody.
Where, as here, the various factors from which a decision must be forged are at least in equipoise, I believe that the statutory preferential presumption and the trial court’s findings should both be given their due weight. I would affirm.