Court Opinion

ID: 9847207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:55:52.120068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:03.231720
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, J.
I dissent. The majority, confronted with the settled rule that the acceptance of the benefits of a judgment constitutes a waiver of any appeal, attempt to circumvent it by creating a special exception for homesteads. The exception is grounded on the premise that “at stake” are two rights favored by the law—the right of appeal and the right of homestead. (Majority opn., ante p. 113.) This of course is quite meaning*119less: the question whether an appeal is waived, of necessity involves the “right of appeal"; the problem of enforcing a judgment by levying a writ of execution on the debtor’s property implicitly involves the condition of the property at the time of the levy. In short, any appeal may be waived—even though appeals are favored by the law; any sale on execution may require disposition of the homestead—even though homesteads are favored by the law.
Actually then the above rights are not “at stake” at all in the instant case. The single, simple question before us is whether defendants by accepting the amount of their homestead exemption have brought themselves within the above waiver rule and the case of Turner v. Markham (1907) 152 Cal. 246 [92 P. 485], which is clearly on point. Faced with Turner, the majority attempt to avoid its impact by confessing that it sets forth “a legal principle that is sound in its general application” and at the same time rejecting the principle since “it does not accomplish a fair result within the homestead context” (majority opn. ante pp. 113-114)—whatever that may mean, since Turner itself was a case involving execution on a homestead. Yet the majority neither overrule Turner nor disapprove of any of its language. They are all at once in agreement with the precedent but unhappy with its results.
In the instant case, plaintiff recovered judgment against defendants in the sum of $42,366.54 and to enforce the judgment caused a writ of execution to be levied on defendants’ real property already subject to their declaration, of homestead. This property was evaluated by three appraisers (Civ. Code, § 1245) and eventually the trial court filed its “Decision and Orders on Application to Subject Homestead Surplus to Execution.” This decision, covering six pages in the clerk’s transcript, after detailing the procedure followed and finding “that the net value of the homesteaded property over and above all liens and encumbrances substantially exceeds the homestead exemption of $15,000” ordered “that the homesteaded property be sold under execution . . . [and] that the proceeds of said sale shall be applied ... in the following order of priority: first, to the discharge of the liens and encumbrances ... second, to the defendants to the amount of $15,000.00 ... .” It is noteworthy that this decision was a unitary disposition of the matter before the court and that the order for payment of $15,000 to defendants is an inseparable part of the judgment. Since the decision was unfavorable to them, defendants appealed. However defendants did not stay enforcement of the judgment by giving an undertaking and the sale of the property on execution proceeded. Nevertheless despite their appeal, defendants *120accepted from the proceeds of the sale on execution the sum of $15,000 representing the amount of their homestead exemption, which was paid to them pursuant to the above-quoted order of the court from which defendants had theretofore appealed.
It is long and well established law in this state that ordinarily a party may not accept the benefits of a judgment and then proceed to attack that judgment by appeal.1 (See Preluzsky v. Pacific Co-operative C. Co. (1925) 195 Cal. 290, 293 [232 P. 970]; Estate of Ayers (1917) 175 Cal. 187, 190 [165 P. 528]; Turner v. Markham, supra, 152 Cal. 246, 247; Estate of Shaver (1900) 131 Cal. 219, 221 [63 P. 340]; In re Baby (1890) 87 Cal. 200, 202 [25 P. 405]; Miller v. National American Life Ins. Co. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 331, 343 [126 Cal.Rptr. 731] Pickins v. Coffey (1933) 136 Cal.App. 105, 106 [27 P.2d 914]; see also 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 136-137, pp. 4131-4133.)
It is clear that by accepting pursuant to the trial court’s decision the amount of their homestead exemption from the proceeds of the sale on execution, defendants accepted the benefits of the judgment and thereby under the above rule waived their right of appeal.
To elude this result, the majority attempt to bring this case within exceptions to the above rule. Clearly none of them is pertinent. Nonetheless the majority, although conceding that the so-called severability and forfeiture exceptions are not “directly applicable,” construe them as providing a “compelling rationale” for jettisoning the waiver of appeal rule where a homestead is involved. This position becomes further obscured by the majority’s express finding that the judgment in the present case is not severable.2 Eventually, the majority appear to say that the forfeiture exception may be applicable.
To support this last position, the majority reason as follows. If in order to proceed with his appeal a judgment debtor were required to refuse to accept from the proceeds of the sale the amount of his homestead exemption, he would risk forfeiture of the exemption which continues to *121attach to the money for a period of six months only. (See Civ. Code, § 1257.)3 Should the appeal process take more than six months, the funds representing the amount of the homestead exemption could be reached by creditors before the debtor would have an opportunity to invest them in substitute property upon which another homestead could be declared.
Of course the simple answer to the above rationale, as indeed- the majority seem to recognize, is that under section 1257, the amount of the homestead will be free from creditors for a six-month period after the debtor has actual possession of the proceeds. (See Thorsby v. Babcock (1950) 36 Cal.2d 202, 204 [222 P.2d 863]; Chase v. Bank of America (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 259, 263-264 [38 Cal.Rptr. 567]; Note, Homesteads: Exemptions: Proceeds of Voluntary Sale (1951) 39 Cal.L.Rev. 444, 446-447; all of which are cited by the majority.) Under this reasonable construction of section 1257 defendants were under no compulsion to accept from the proceeds of the sale the amount of their homestead exemption but could have allowed these funds to remain with the court pending the outcome of their appeal without any risk of the forfeiture of their additional six months exemption. Failing to win reversal, they could then accept the funds which would remain exempt from forced sale or execution for six months after such acceptance. Clearly then there is no compulsion of risk of forfeiture which would bring this case within the forfeiture exception to the waiver of appeal rule. The majority’s rejoinder that they “are not required, however, to construe section 1257 within this context” (majority opn., ante, p. 117) does nothing to counter the foregoing conclusions.
Since neither the forfeiture exception nor any other exception is apposite, the case at bench remains squarely within the established rule of waiver of appeal. Moreover, our opinion in Turner v. Markham, supra, 152 Cal. 246, wherein this court unanimously held that this rule of law is specifically applicable to the homestead setting, is directly on point. In Turner, the judgment creditor successfully subjected the judgment debtor’s homestead to execution and the judgment debtor appealed the court order of sale. The property was sold on execution and while the appeal was pending the judgment debtor accepted from the proceeds of *122the sale his $5,000 homestead exemption. This court granted the judgment creditor’s motion to dismiss the appeal, stating: “ ‘The right to accept the fruits of a judgment and the right of appeal therefrom are not concurrent. On the contrary, they are totally inconsistent. An election to take one of the courses is, therefore, a renunciation of the other.’ ” (Id., at p. 248; citation omitted; italics added.) Furthermore, we observed in Turner that the rule of election is particularly relevant in the homestead context in that the allowing of an appeal subsequent to the acceptance of the amount of the homestead exemption could seriously prejudice the judgment creditor. (Id., at pp. 248-249.) If the debtor is insolvent, he may squander the homestead exemption prior to the outcome of the appeal. Should the debtor win a reversal on the appeal, we reasoned in Turner, the purchaser at the execution sale could recover the full amount paid from the judgment creditor. (Id., at. p. 249.) This would leave the judgment creditor with an unsatisfied judgment and a liability in the amount of the homestead exemption. Therefore, we held in Turner that the doctrine of estoppel by election was “clearly applicable” in the homestead context. (Id.)4
Faced with this formidable precedent which they neither overrule nor disapprove, the majority attempt to distinguish Turner from the case at bench. The attempt fails. The only basis advanced for distinguishing the cases is the insolvency of the judgment debtor in Turner. By inference, the majority would have us believe that the present judgment debtors are solvent. The facts belie such a conclusion. Defendants were unable to satisfy the original judgment. The record shows that in addition to liens and encumbrances totalling $25,437.23 existing on the homestead property, defendants owed $6,104.41 to B. L. Noonan, $424.53 to the Retailers Credit Association, $1,308.66 to Anderson & Perkins, Inc., $238.66 to J. Lee, $130.54 to Lake County Collections, and $124.29 to Oroville Credit Bureau. In his declaration in support of opposition to motion to dismiss appeal, defendant-appellant Edward F. Brown stated “I had no money to purchase a bond to stay these proceedings.” In oral argument before this court, counsel for plaintiff stated.that defendants *123were insolvent and defendants’ counsel did not deny or challenge the statement in any way. Logic demands a conclusion that defendants are impecunious and that Turner cannot be distinguished on the basis of insolvency.5
The general rule that one who accepts the benefits of a judgment is estopped from pressing an appeal is firmly established. The case now before us clearly does not come within any of the recognized exceptions to this rule. This court in a factually indistinguishable case has specifically applied this rule in the homestead context. Therefore reason compels a conclusion that defendants, having accepted the amount of the homestead exemption, cannot proceed with their appeal. Fairness demands the same conclusion. Defendants’ property on which they had declared a homestead, after being sold on execution, remained subject to redemption within 12 months from the date of the sale. (Code Civ. Proc., § 700a et seq.) During this period of redemption, defendants under the law were entitled to remain in possession of the property (Code Civ. Proc., § 706; see 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Enforcement of Judgment, § 98, p. 3464)—a circumstance the majority choose to ignore.6 In short, during this period of time, defendants have not only the possession and use of their home but also the possession and use of the $15,000 amount of the homestead exemption. If defendants desire to challenge on appeal the trial court’s order for an execution sale, it is certainly no hardship on them to require that they leave the $15,000 on deposit in court. The majority however would permit them to remain in possession, have full and unrestricted disposition of the $15,000 and in addition take the “totally inconsistent” (Turner; supra) position of attacking the execution sale. Such a course is not only contrary to the controlling precedent of this court but, in my view, is downright inequitable.
In sum, in the instant case defendants have accepted the benefits of a judgment. They have made their choice and under existing California *124law they have waived their right of appeal.7 The motion to dismiss should be granted.
Wright, C. J., concurred.

This rule of election is similarly the established rule in other jurisdictions. (See Note, 169 A.L.R. 985.)

Clearly the severability exception does not apply. To come within this exception the party must be entitled to the benefits of the judgment in the event of a reversal on appeal. (See Estate of Hubbell (1932) 216 Cal. 574, 577 [15 P.2d 503].) The judgment debtor in the present case does not qualify. Should the order of sale be reversed on appeal and the homestead property be restored to the judgment debtors, they would have no right to the $15,000 exemption.

Section 1257 provides: “The money paid to the claimant is entitled, for the period of six months thereafter, to the same protection against legal process and the voluntary disposition of the husband, which the law gives to the homestead.”

As previously noted, the majority do not dispute the validity of the general rule of waiver of appeal. Rather they find the general rule of Turner to be inapplicable to the homestead context. This is a strange conclusion in view of the fact that Turner was a homestead easel Furthermore, in the only other homestead case reaching our appellate courts involving the appeal of an order for execution sale and the acceptance of a homestead exemption, Turner was followed without question. (See Pickens v. Coffey, supra, 136 Cal.App. 105, 106.)

The majority’s effort to distinguish Turner on the solvency of the judgment debtor must stem from a promise by the judgment debtor to repay the $15,000 exemption upon reversal. This is no basis for a conclusion of solvency. Moreover, reliance on a promise to repay as a rationale for invalidating the waiver of the right of appeal is contrary to existing law. (See Schubert v. Reich (1950) 36 Cal.2d 298, 300 [223 P.2d 242].)

The execution sale in the case at bench took place on January 25, 1975. During oral arguments before this court, it was revealed that the judgment debtor was still in possession of the homestead.

Defendants have elected to accept the fruits of the judgment. Therefore I need not reach the issues of remedies had they chosen the alternate course of appeal. However, should the occasion arise where a debtor, having declined to accept from the proceeds of the execution sale the amount of his homestead exemption, prosecutes the appeal and wins a reversal of the order of sale, I am in agreement with the majority that our courts have broad powers to order restitution so as to restore all parties to the status quo ante. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 908.)