Court Opinion

ID: 9909920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 16:05:58.751956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:59.543188
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2023
                                                         TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0304-DG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLANT

                  ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                         NO. 2021-CA-0873
               JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 21-CR-000186

PARADISE BURKHEAD                                                     APPELLEE

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE BISIG

                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

      Paradise Burkhead was charged with crimes committed while she was a

juvenile. Based on a juvenile transfer statute in effect at the time, which

required mandatory transfer if a juvenile over fourteen years old committed a

felony with a firearm, the Jefferson District Court transferred her case to the

Jefferson Circuit Court for prosecution as an adult. Subsequently, a new

juvenile transfer statute took effect which eliminated the mandatory transfer

requirement and instead vested district courts with sole discretion to

determine, based on prescribed factors, whether a juvenile firearm case should

be transferred to a circuit court. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 635.020(4).

Burkhead sought to take advantage of this new statute by a motion to transfer

her case back to district court for a second transfer hearing. Over the

Commonwealth’s objection, the circuit court granted the motion.
      The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s

transfer order and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This appeal followed. After

careful review, we conclude that the interlocutory appeal was proper and that

the circuit court erred by ordering a second transfer hearing. While we live in a

society that understandably embraces second chances, the duly enacted

transfer statute in effect at the time of Burkhead’s hearing must control. A

second chance is not a “do-over” of a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.

Burkhead will have a full resolution of her legal issue in circuit court.

                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Paradise Burkhead was charged with complicity to commit murder and

fourth-degree assault stemming from her participation in a series of offenses on

November 21, 2020 while she was a juvenile. Burkhead snuck out of her

house and joined four others, three of whom were over eighteen years old.

While walking down a street in downtown Louisville, one of the group members

fired a gun several times into a house. Later, the group was recorded by video

surveillance attacking an individual on a sidewalk. Then, they walked to the

area of Sixth Street and River Road where someone in the group shot and killed

Rocky Seibert. 1

      Since Burkhead was under eighteen at the time of the offenses, the

Commonwealth filed a juvenile petition in December 2020. On December 21,

        1 It is unclear whether Burkhead fired the gun or ever had possession of it. In

her brief, Burkhead states it is not alleged that she fired the gun or had possession of
it, while the Commonwealth merely indicates that one of the group members fired the
gun.
                                           2
2020, the district court held a hearing to determine whether to transfer the

case to circuit court for prosecution as an adult. At the time of the hearing,

KRS 635.020 was in effect and required a district court to transfer a juvenile to

circuit court to be tried as an adult upon a finding of probable cause that the

juvenile committed a felony in which a firearm was used, and that the juvenile

was over age fourteen at the time of the offenses. Pursuant to the statute, the

district court transferred Burkhead’s case to circuit court.

      On March 4, 2021, Burkhead filed a motion in circuit court to remand

her case back to district court for a new transfer hearing. In part, Burkhead

relied on a proposed amendment to the juvenile transfer statute. This

proposed amendment, which eventually became effective on June 29, 2021, no

longer requires mandatory transfer of juvenile cases in which the juvenile was

over fourteen years old and committed a felony involving a firearm. The

Commonwealth opposed the motion, arguing that Burkhead’s case was

unaffected by the amendment because her transfer hearing already occurred.

      On July 9, 2021, the circuit court granted Burkhead’s motion to remand

the case to district court for a second transfer hearing. The circuit court based

its ruling on the goals articulated as the reason for the statutory amendment

and not a procedural analysis. While the circuit court recognized that the

district court did not err in originally transferring the case to circuit court

under the juvenile transfer provision as it then existed, the circuit court opined

that the amendment sought to keep juveniles in district court, except in the

rarest of circumstances.

                                          3
      The Commonwealth appealed pursuant to KRS 22A.020(4), which allows

the Commonwealth to appeal adverse interlocutory orders in criminal cases.

The Commonwealth also sought emergency and intermediate relief from the

Court of Appeals, which stayed the proceedings during the pendency of the

Commonwealth’s appeal.

      In its opinion, the Court of Appeals cited KRS 446.110, which governs

the retroactive application of criminal statutes:

      [n]o new law shall be construed to repeal a former law as to any
      offense committed against a former law, . . . or in any way
      whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done,
      . . . before the new law takes effect, except that the proceedings
      thereafter had shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in
      force at the time of such proceedings. . . .

Burkhead and the Commonwealth agree that the juvenile transfer statute is

procedural, meaning it pertains to “the in-court procedures and remedies

which are used in handling pending litigation.” Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285

S.W.3d 740, 751 (Ky. 2009) (citation omitted). Relying on Rodgers, a

unanimous Court of Appeals panel reasoned that amendments to procedural

laws are to be applied retroactively so that the proceedings conform to the law

in effect at the time of the proceedings. The Commonwealth argued that the

amendment should only apply to cases still pending in juvenile court,

prompting the Court of Appeals to analyze “proceedings” as used in KRS

446.110.

      Ultimately, the Court of Appeals determined that “the plain meaning of

‘proceedings’ under KRS 446.110 means amended statutes apply retroactively

in any case with no final decision on the merits.” The appellate court then
                                        4
turned to the legislative intent of the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code which is

to rehabilitate and reform delinquent youth. KRS 600.010(2). The Court of

Appeals reasoned that the plain language of KRS 446.110 and the express

legislative intent for the Juvenile Code support the circuit court’s decision to

remand Burkhead’s case for a new transfer hearing because “the proceedings

against her are ongoing as she has not yet been convicted or acquitted under

the indictment.”

      This appeal followed. In granting discretionary review, this Court

specifically directed the parties to address the threshold question of whether

KRS 22A.020(4) permits the Commonwealth to appeal from a circuit court

order remanding a juvenile’s case to district court for a second transfer

hearing.

                                    ANALYSIS

      The issues on appeal are (1) whether the Commonwealth’s interlocutory

appeal is proper and (2) whether remanding the case for a second transfer

hearing was proper. Both issues involve statutory interpretation—questions of

law which we review de novo. Commonwealth v. B.H., 548 S.W.3d 238, 242

(Ky. 2018). We address each issue in turn.

      I.    The Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal pursuant to KRS
            22A.020(4) is proper.

      To determine whether KRS 22A.020(4) permits the Commonwealth to

appeal from a circuit court order remanding a juvenile’s case to district court

                                         5
for a second transfer hearing, we turn to the plain language of the statute.

KRS 22A.020(4) states that

      [a]n appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals by the state in
      criminal cases from an adverse decision or ruling of the Circuit
      Court, but only under the following conditions:

            (a) Such appeal shall not suspend the proceedings in the
            case.

            (b) Such appeal shall be taken in the manner provided by the
            Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of the Supreme
            Court, except that the record on appeal shall be transmitted
            by the clerk of the Circuit Court to the Attorney General; and
            if the Attorney General is satisfied that review by the Court
            of Appeals is important to the correct and uniform
            administration of the law, he may deliver the record to the
            clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by
            the above-mentioned rules.

            (c) When an appeal is taken pursuant to this subsection, the
            Court of Appeals, if the record so warrants, may reverse the
            decision of the Circuit Court and order a new trial in any
            case in which a new trial would not constitute double
            jeopardy or otherwise violate any constitutional rights of the
            defendant.

      Section 111(2) of the Kentucky Constitution grants the General Assembly

authority to “prescribe the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.”

Commonwealth v. Farmer, 423 S.W.3d 690, 692 (Ky. 2014). By enacting KRS

22A.020(4), the General Assembly created a statutory matter-of-right appeal

from interlocutory orders for the Commonwealth in criminal cases. Ballard v.

Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. 2010). Despite challenges to KRS

22A.020(4), this Court has consistently upheld its constitutionality. See, e.g.,

id.; Commonwealth v. Littrell, 677 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Ky. 1984), overruled on

other grounds by Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 80 (Ky. 2002).

                                        6
      Based on the plain language of KRS 22A.020(4), the conditions for the

Commonwealth to bring an interlocutory appeal of an adverse ruling in a

criminal case are clear: the appeal must not suspend the proceedings, must be

taken under the normal rules, and must be approved by the Attorney General

as “important to the correct and uniform administration of the law.” KRS

22A.020(4)(b).

      The conditions are satisfied here. The circuit court ruling transferring

the case back to district court for a second transfer hearing was adverse to the

Commonwealth. Adverse is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “(1) Against;

opposed to. (2) Having an opposing or contrary interest, concern, or position.” 2

The case was originally properly transferred to circuit court under a then-

existing statute, allowing the Commonwealth to prosecute. If the case were

ultimately to be tried in district court, the Commonwealth would lose the

ability to prosecute the case, which instead would be handled by the County

Attorney’s Office. Further, the penalty and ultimate resolution will differ

depending on the outcome of the transfer decision. Therefore, a transfer back

to district court coupled with the possibility that the district court may rule to

keep the case in district court after a second transfer hearing opposed the

Commonwealth’s interests.

      Additionally, the interlocutory appeal has not suspended the proceedings

as that term is used in KRS 22A.020(4). For over forty years, this Court has

      2 Adverse, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

                                         7
interpreted the term “proceedings” in KRS 22A.020(4) “to refer only to

proceedings after the attachment of jeopardy, and we will not change course

today.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.3d 421, 442 (Ky. 2021). Jeopardy

attaches when the jury is sworn, Cardine v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 641,

646 (Ky. 2009), and, in a bench trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins

to hear evidence. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). Jeopardy

has not yet attached in Burkhead’s case, so the proceedings are not being

suspended by the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal.

      As required by KRS 22A.020(4)(b), the appeal is following the normal

rules and procedures. Finally, the record indicates that the Attorney General

appointed counsel to serve as Special Assistant Attorney General and granted

the authority to represent the Commonwealth and proceed under the Attorney

General’s name in this interlocutory appeal. This serves as the Attorney

General’s affirmation that appellate review “is important to the correct and

uniform administration of the law.” KRS 22A.020(4)(b). See Smith, 636 S.W.3d

at 440 (presuming that the Attorney General reviewed the case based on him

“being listed as counsel and in assigning a Special Assistant Attorney General

to the appeal”).

      Two years after the General Assembly enacted KRS 22A.020(4) this Court

addressed the statute in Eaton v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Ky.

1978), and held that a writ of prohibition preventing a trial court from

suppressing evidence was not warranted because a writ should not control a

trial court’s discretionary acts done within its jurisdiction. In exploring the

                                         8
Commonwealth’s available remedies, the Court explained that a

Commonwealth’s Attorney seeking an appeal of a trial court’s discretionary

ruling has a remedy through KRS 22A.020(4). Id. “Unless the constitutional

right to a speedy trial were unduly threatened, we see no reason why an

interlocutory ‘ruling’ entered prior to trial, if it decides a matter vital to the

Commonwealth's case, could not be reviewed by appeal.” Id. (emphasis

added).

      We take this opportunity to clarify that we interpret the Eaton Court’s

statement that an interlocutory appeal under KRS 22A.020(4) must raise “a

matter vital to the Commonwealth’s case” as simply another way of stating the

statute’s express requirement that in order for the state to appeal an adverse

ruling in a criminal case, the Attorney General must be “satisfied that review

by the Court of Appeals is important to the correct and uniform

administration of the law . . . .” (Emphasis added). “[T]he requirement that

the Attorney General review the appeal before docketing it in the Court of

Appeals is a purely administrative act, designed to eliminate frivolous,

vexatious or meritless appeals.” Littrell, 677 S.W.2d at 885. 3

      By enacting KRS 22A.020(4), the legislature has specifically prescribed

the conditions which must be met for the Commonwealth to pursue an

      3 KRS 22A.020(4) leaves the Attorney General with discretion in determining

whether to pursue appeals. We note that generally, the Attorney General, as a
constitutionally elected official, “is entrusted with broad discretion in the performance
of his duties, which includes evaluating the evidence and other facts to determine
whether a particular claim should be brought.” Overstreet v. Mayberry, 603 S.W.3d
244, 265 (Ky. 2020).
                                            9
interlocutory appeal in a criminal case and the “matter vital to the

Commonwealth’s case” language in Eaton is merely further explanation of the

requirement that the Attorney General determine a matter is “important to the

correct and uniform administration of the law.” This premise is supported by

later cases, like Evans v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1982), in which

the Court allowed the Commonwealth to use KRS 22A.020(4) to appeal an

order transferring a Medicaid fraud prosecution from Franklin County to the

defendants’ home counties. In that case, the Court effectively allowed an

interlocutory appeal from a decision pertaining to which court would preside

over a case. Later, in Commonwealth v. Bass, 777 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Ky. 1989),

this Court allowed an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court’s dismissal of

numerous counts of an indictment because “the action of the trial court ha[d]

adversely affected an issue which is vital to the Commonwealth.” (citing Eaton,

562 S.W.2d 637).

      Here, the Commonwealth appealed from the circuit court order

transferring Burkhead’s case back to district court for a second transfer

hearing—a decision adverse to the Commonwealth’s position that the case

should be tried in circuit court, as previously determined by the district court

as it applied the then-existing juvenile transfer statute. Again, if the case were

ultimately to be tried in district court, the County Attorney, not the

Commonwealth’s Attorney, would prosecute the case. Because the Attorney

General, acting as gatekeeper to “eliminate frivolous, vexatious or meritless

appeals,” Littrell, 677 S.W.2d at 885, determined that review by the Court of

                                        10
Appeals was “important to the correct and uniform administration of the law,”

the final condition as expressly stated in KRS 22A.020(4)(b) is satisfied and we

conclude that the interlocutory appeal is proper.

      Finally, although we hold today that the Commonwealth’s appeal of the

circuit court order remanding Burkhead’s case to district court for a new

transfer hearing is proper, our holding should not be interpreted as endorsing

or otherwise approving a general right to an interlocutory appeal of a district

court decision denying transfer. The issue before us today satisfies KRS

22A.020 because it deals with the retroactivity of a statute, which the Attorney

General was wholly within his authority to determine was “important to the

correct and uniform administration of the law.”

      II.   The circuit court erred by remanding the case for a new
            transfer hearing.

      The next issue is whether the circuit court correctly remanded

Burkhead’s case to district court for a second transfer hearing. To resolve this

issue, we must first determine whether the 2021 amendment to the juvenile

transfer statute applies retroactively pursuant to KRS 446.110. Statutory

interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. B.H., 548 S.W.3d

at 242.

      KRS 446.110 provides that

                                       11
      [n]o new law shall be construed to repeal a former law as to any
      offense committed against a former law, . . . or in any way
      whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or done,
      . . . before the new law takes effect, except that the proceedings
      thereafter had shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in
      force at the time of such proceedings. . . .

If a statute is silent as to whether it applies retroactively, this Court has

determined that it nonetheless applies retroactively if it is procedural in nature.

Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 751.

      The parties agree that the change to the juvenile transfer statute was

procedural. However, the Commonwealth argues that the amendment should

only apply to cases still pending in juvenile court. Procedural amendments,

which apply to in-court procedures and remedies used in handling pending

litigation, are “to be retroactively applied (assuming no separation-of-powers

concerns) so that the proceedings ‘shall conform, so far as practicable, to the

laws in force at the time of such proceedings.’” Id. (quoting KRS 446.110). In

Smith v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 742, 745 (Ky. 2013), the Court further

explained that one of the “distinct pronouncements” made by KRS 446.110 is

that “proceedings that take place after a new law takes effect shall, so far

as practicable, conform to the laws at the time of the proceeding.”

(Emphasis added).

      The Court of Appeals determined that the proper resolution of

Burkhead’s case hinged on the meaning of “proceedings” as used in KRS

446.110. With no Kentucky caselaw defining “proceedings,” the appellate court

reviewed Black’s Law Dictionary, and referenced this Court’s explanation in

                                         12
Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 751, that amendments “used in handling pending

litigation” are procedural. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that

“‘proceedings’ under KRS 446.110 means amended statutes apply retroactively

in any case with no final decision on the merits.” The appellate court also went

a step beyond discerning the plain meaning of “proceedings” and interpreted

the statute according to legislative intent by focusing on the Juvenile Code’s

express intent to rehabilitate and reform delinquent youth.

      The Court of Appeals’ definition of proceedings is problematic.

Effectively, the Court of Appeals determined that proceedings means the

lifespan of a case, from filing to final judgment. But using that definition of

proceedings in KRS 446.110 renders the statute illogical. If proceedings means

the lifespan of a case, read literally, the statute would then allow a court to use

any procedural rule that was in effect at some point during the case’s lifespan.

It would also require a multitude of “do-overs” when procedural amendments

are enacted, thus jeopardizing judicial efficiency and economy. This overly

broad interpretation would lead to inconsistent results and negate the

authority of the General Assembly to amend statutes.

      Instead, we find it more logical to construe proceedings as used in KRS

446.110 narrowly and as referring to the distinct phases of a case, i.e.,

arraignment, sentencing, suppression hearings, plea hearings, transfer

hearings, etc. Defined in this manner, KRS 446.110 requires courts to apply

the current procedural law governing the particular procedural phase being

undertaken. That is, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, a trial court

                                        13
must always look to current procedural law when making procedural decisions

in a case.

      This narrow interpretation prevents the type of “do-over” scenarios that

Burkhead seeks in this case. More importantly, it prevents an inevitable flood

of “do-overs” from “pending litigation” cases in which a final judgment has not

been entered, which is a particularly troubling thought given the multitude of

cases that are “pending” for many years.

      The proceeding at issue—Burkhead’s original transfer hearing in district

court—occurred six months before the statutory amendment she seeks to

invoke. This procedural step thus occurred when the prior juvenile transfer

statute required a district court to transfer a juvenile case to circuit court upon

a finding of probable cause that a juvenile over age fourteen committed a felony

in which a firearm was used. Once transfer was ordered by the district court

in December 2020, that stage of the proceedings ended. Nothing in the plain

language of KRS 446.110 suggests that a court must repeat a completed phase

of the criminal process to comply with a procedural amendment. In fact, the

statute is clear that “proceedings thereafter had shall conform, so far as

practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings.” KRS

446.110. When interpreting a statute,

      we must look first to the plain language of a statute and, if the
      language is clear, our inquiry ends. We hold fast to the rule of
      construction that the plain meaning of the statutory language is
      presumed to be what the legislature intended, and if the meaning
      is plain, then the court cannot base its interpretation on any other
      method or source.

                                        14
Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Ky. 2017) (citations and

quotations omitted). Because the statute is clear, the Court of Appeals’

reliance on the purpose and intent behind the Juvenile Code, while well-

intended, was misplaced. Further, the intent behind the Juvenile Code has no

bearing on KRS 446.110 and whether the amended juvenile transfer provision

applies retroactively. As a result, the post-transfer amendment to the juvenile

transfer statute could not provide a basis for repeating the juvenile transfer

hearing completed six months earlier.

                                 CONCLUSION

      The Court of Appeals erroneously upheld the circuit court’s remand of

Burkhead’s case to district court for a second transfer hearing. Burkhead’s

juvenile transfer hearing occurred when the prior statute was in effect, and

thus that prior statute applies to that stage of the proceedings. As a result, we

reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Jefferson Circuit

Court for further proceedings.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jason B. Moore
Special Assistant Attorney General

Matthew F. Kuhn
Solicitor General

Daniel J. Grabowski
Assistant Solicitor General
                                        15
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Tricia Lister
Rob Eggert

                        16