Court Opinion

ID: 9582179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:23:29.768236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:30.553695
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the court’s holding that the transfer of Judge Hornaday was not authorized by statute or administrative rule, but I disagree with the analysis of the primary holding in Section I. I believe that the court’s reliance on the second sentence of Administrative Rule 24(d) to demonstrate that presiding judges are not authorized to make intra-district transfers is misplaced. The court’s interpretation requires an assumption that the first and second sentences of Administrative Rule 24(d) refer to entirely different subjects. The first sentence of section (d) refers by its terms to temporary assignments of judicial officers to other judicial districts, which may not exceed 90 days. I believe that the second sentence refers to the subject matter of the first sentence. It thus provides that those intra-district assignments which do exceed 90 days, as well as assignments — whether of more or less than 90 days — to which the judge involved does not consent, may be made only by special order of the chief justice. I believe that the sentence makes sense as a whole only if it is read as referring to a single subject: inter-district transfers of judges.
*1345Based on this interpretation, I believe that Administrative Rule 24(d) is irrelevant to the case at hand. However, as the majority acknowledges in its alternative ruling, it is not necessary for a holding that Judge Rowland’s action was not authorized. I agree with the alternative ruling and with all other aspects of the court’s opinion.