Court Opinion

ID: 9377759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:07:00.54772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.440598
License: Public Domain

J-S06033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    COLBY RICHARD DIXON                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1397 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 30, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-36-CR-0003407-2007

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED: MARCH 8, 2023

        Appellant Colby Richard Dixon appeals from the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Lancaster County denying his petition pursuant to the Post-

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw his

representation as well as an accompanying brief pursuant to Commonwealth

v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550

A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). After careful review, we affirm the PCRA

court’s order and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

        The PCRA court summarized the factual background of this case:

              The events surrounding [Appellant’s] conviction and
        sentence occurred on May 25, 2007, at Rookies Bar & Grill in
        Manheim Township, Pennsylvania. [Appellant] arrived at Rookies
        dressed in a white shirt, jeans, and large diamond earrings. Upon
        entering Rookies, [Appellant] was observed to be arguing with [a]
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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     female, later identified as “Jayla.” Sometime thereafter, Keith Pitt,
     Jr. and Rashad Watts also arrived at Rookies. Inside the bar, Jayla
     approached Keith Pitt, Jr. and struck up a conversation. During
     the midst of their conversation, [Appellant] approached and began
     making comments about Keith Pitt, Jr. and Rashad Watts;
     [Appellant] continually walked back and forth behind Jayla and
     Keith Pitt, Jr., only stopping when Jayla walked away from Keith
     Pitt, Jr.
            Approximately twenty minutes after Jayla walked away,
     [Appellant], while still inside Rookies, began firing a handgun at
     Keith Pitt, Jr., striking him numerous times. Dale Cook, a
     bystander standing three feet from [Appellant] when he was firing
     at Keith Pitt, Jr., later identified [Appellant] as the shooter. Rashad
     Watts, an associate of Keith Pitt, Jr., also identified [Appellant] as
     the shooter. Additional witnesses, while unable to specifically
     identify [Appellant] as the shooter, described the shooter as
     wearing the same clothing that [Appellant] was observed to have
     been wearing on the night of the shooting. A New York Yankees
     baseball hat recovered at the scene of the shooting was found to
     have [Appellant’s] DNA on it.

PCRA opinion, 8/30/22, at 1-2 (citations omitted).

     After Appellant was charged in connection with this shooting, a jury

convicted Appellant of criminal attempt – homicide, aggravated assault, and

recklessly endangering another person. The trial court sentenced Appellant to

an aggregate term of twenty-one (21) to forty-two (42) years’ imprisonment.

     On April 7, 2010, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and on

September 28, 2010, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for

allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 317 MAL 2010 (Pa. 2010);

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 1426 MDA 2009 (Pa.Super. April 7, 2010)

(unpublished memorandum).

     On September 12, 2011, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. After an

evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on December

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7, 2012. This Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s first PCRA petition. See

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 533 MDA 2013 (Pa.Super. January 7, 2014)

(unpublished memorandum).

      On July 26, 2020, Appellant filed a “Motion for Remand/Newly

Discovered Evidence” in which he attached an affidavit from a fellow inmate

who claimed to have witnessed the shooting in question and identified the

shooter as an individual named DeShawn White. The lower court denied this

motion without holding a hearing.

      On March 4, 2021, this Court found the lower court had erred in failing

to treat the July 26, 2020 motion as a PCRA petition and in failing to issue

notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. This Court remanded for an evidentiary

hearing or the proper issuance of Rule 907 notice. See Commonwealth v.

Dixon,   1135    MDA    2020   (Pa.Super.   March    4,   2021)   (unpublished

memorandum).

      Upon remand, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing and

summarized the testimony of Appellant’s proposed witness, La’Quanta

Chapman as follows:

            [La’Quanta Chapman] testified that he had met [Appellant]
      at SCI Greene, and that the two of them had conversed while
      playing chess together, eventually realizing that they shared a
      mutual acquaintance - Jayla. [Appellant] revealed Jayla to be the
      mother of his child, and La’Quanta Chapman admitted that he had
      dated Jayla, and that the last time he spoke to her, “something
      crazy happened.”
            La’Quanta Chapman testified that Jayla had asked him to
      meet her at Rookies, and that he arrived after midnight with a
      friend, DeShawn White, entered Rookies, and saw Jayla speaking

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      with a group of men. Upon seeing the men, DeShawn White told
      La’Quanta Chapman that they were being set up to be robbed.
      After Jayla left the group of men she was with, she began
      conversing with La’Quanta Chapman, and DeShawn White
      approached the group of men. La’Quanta Chapman testified that
      he heard gunshots ring out within Rookies, and that he saw
      DeShawn White shooting at the group of men that Jayla had
      previously been speaking with.
             La’Quanta Chapman continued that he ran out of Rookies,
      only to see DeShawn White across the street at a gas station. He
      indicated that he only spent “a couple of minutes” in Rookies
      before the shooting occurred, and that the only people he knew in
      Rookies were Jayla and DeShawn White. He then stated that he
      jumped in his truck, pulled up to the gas station, told DeShawn
      White to throw the gun used in the immediate shooting into some
      bushes, and then the two of them left the area together in
      La’Quanta Chapman’s truck. During the evidentiary hearing,
      La’Quanta Chapman testified that DeShawn White was wearing
      dark colored shorts, a white shirt, and a baseball hat. He further
      testified that he remembered the date of the shooting being May
      26, 2007.
             On cross-examination, he testified that he had smoked
      marijuana on the night of the shooting, and that he was standing
      on the opposite side of the bar from the location in which the
      shooting took place. La’Quanta Chapman admitted that he could
      not recall if the alleged true shooter, DeShawn White, was wearing
      a Yankees or Mets hat, what the lighting was like in the bar, or if
      anyone else in Rookies was dressed similarly to DeShawn White.
      Additionally, La’Quanta Chapman testified that he never contacted
      Jayla again after this incident, nor did he inquire about what
      happened after that night until he spoke to [Appellant] about it.

PCRA opinion, 8/30/22, at 1-3 (citations omitted). Chapman testified that

White is now deceased. PCRA Hearing, 12/9/21, at 19.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s

petition as untimely filed and found that Appellant had not pled or proven that

he was entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered fact exception to

the PCRA timeliness rules. In the alternative, even assuming that Appellant

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had met the timeliness exception, the PCRA court concluded that his after-

discovered evidence claim was meritless. This timely appeal followed.

     On collateral appeal, Appellant’s current counsel was appointed to

prepare an appellate brief on Appellant’s behalf. Thereafter, counsel filed a

petition to withdraw and a no-merit Turner-Finley brief.

     As an initial matter, we must first review counsel’s petition to withdraw.

     Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
     proceed ... under Turner, supra and Finley, supra and ... must
     review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then
     submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to
     this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel's diligent
     review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to
     have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit,
     and requesting permission to withdraw.

     Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no
     merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel's petition to withdraw;
     and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro
     se or by new counsel.

     Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that ...
     satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court — trial
     court or this Court — must then conduct its own review of the
     merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims
     are without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and
     deny relief.

Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007) (brackets

omitted)).

     After reviewing the record and counsel’s petition to withdraw, we find

PCRA counsel has complied with the technical requirements of Turner and

Finley, supra. PCRA counsel detailed the nature and extent of his review,

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listed the issue which Appellant wished to appeal, and explained why he

believed the claim was meritless. Counsel indicated that after conscientious

review of the record, he could not identify any meritorious issues that he could

raise on Appellant’s behalf. Moreover, counsel attached the letter he sent to

Appellant in which counsel specifically indicated that he believed the appeal

was meritless based on the reasons set forth in his brief and notified Appellant

of his right to raise additional points for consideration by proceeding pro se or

with the assistance of privately retained counsel. See Commonwealth v.

Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511 (Pa.Super. 2016).

      We now consider the issue PCRA counsel presents in his brief to

ascertain   whether   the   claim   entitles   Appellant   to   relief.   Appellant

acknowledged that the instant PCRA petition was untimely filed but argued

that he is entitled to the application of the newly-discovered fact exception to

the timeliness requirements.

      Our standard of review is as follows:

      When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we must determine
      whether the PCRA court's order is supported by the record and
      free of legal error. Generally, we are bound by a PCRA court's
      credibility determinations. However, with regard to a court's legal
      conclusions, we apply a de novo standard.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (quotation

marks and quotations omitted).

      It is well-established that “the PCRA's timeliness requirements are

jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address

the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.”

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Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations

omitted). Generally, a PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent

petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence

becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes

final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

the review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

       Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA

petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three

exceptions enumerated in Subsection 9545(b)(1), which include: (1) the

petitioner's inability to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference;

(2) the discovery of previously unknown facts or evidence that would have

supported a claim; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been

held to apply retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). In addition,

any petition invoking a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of

the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).2

____________________________________________

2  Subsection 9545(b) previously required a petition invoking a timeliness
exception is required to be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could
first have been presented. In an amendment effective December 24, 2018,
the legislature modified Subsection 9545(b)(2) to read: “Any petition invoking
an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the
date the claim could have been presented.” See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)
(effective December 24, 2018). The amendment to Subsection 9545(b)(2)
only applies to “claims arising on [December] 24, 2017, or thereafter.” See
id., cmt.

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      In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition

for allowance of appeal on September 28, 2010 and Appellant did not seek

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus,

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on December 27, 2010, when

the ninety-day period for filing a petition for allowance of appeal in the U.S.

Supreme Court expired. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. As a result, Appellant had

until December 27, 2011 to file a timely PCRA petition. Thus, Appellant’s

petition filed on July 26, 2020 is facially untimely.

      Appellant claims the PCRA court erred in finding Appellant failed to

satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar under

Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). “To qualify for an exception to the PCRA's time

limitations under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner need only establish

that the facts upon which the claim is based were unknown to him and could

not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth

v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017). If the petitioner can establish both

prongs, then the PCRA court may exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

Commonwealth v. Fears, 250 A.3d 1180, 1199 (Pa. 2021). Our courts have

indicated the focus of Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) is “on [the] newly discovered

facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known

facts.” Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 745 (Pa.Super. 2020).

      Appellant’s instant petition requesting a new trial is based on his

discovery of the testimony of La’Quanta Chapman, who asserts that he

witnessed DeShawn White commit the shooting at issue. The PCRA court

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concluded that Appellant failed to satisfy the newly-discovered fact timeliness

exception based on its determination that Chapman’s testimony is simply a

new source for an argument that Appellant had previously advanced at trial,

e.g., that another individual committed crimes for which Appellant was

convicted. The PCRA court observed that the defense theory at trial was

mistaken identity as Appellant had argued that the shooter was wearing

similar clothing that resembled Appellant’s attire on the night of the shooting.

       However, the fact that Appellant claimed at trial that the prosecution

failed to prove he was the shooter does not support the PCRA court’s finding

that Mr. Chapman’s affidavit merely constitutes a “newly willing source for

previously known facts.” Maxwell, 232 A.3d at 745 (emphasis added).

Rather, Chapman claims that he witnessed another individual, who Appellant

did not identify at trial, commit the shooting in question. This allegation, if

proven, would constitute a newly discovered fact. See Commonwealth v.

White, 237 A.3d 439, 478 WDA 2019 (Pa.Super. May 8, 2020) (unpublished

memorandum) (finding eyewitness testimony identifying a second individual

as a shooter present at the scene to be a newly discovered fact).3

       Our review of the record shows that Appellant alleged in his petition that

he first learned of DeShawn White’s involvement in the crimes at issue after

he met and conversed with Chapman, a fellow inmate, in June 2020. At the
____________________________________________

3 We acknowledge that the White decision is not binding precedent, but may
be considered as persuasive authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (permitting the
citation of non-precedential decisions filed by this Court after May 1, 2019 for
their persuasive value).

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PCRA hearing, Chapman testified that after becoming acquainted with

Appellant, he informed Appellant that he witnessed DeShawn White commit

the shooting for which Appellant is incarcerated. Thereafter, Appellant filed his

“Motion for Remand/Newly Discovered Evidence” on July 16, 2020.

      The PCRA court found that even assuming that Appellant had met the

newly-discovered fact timeliness exception, Appellant’s claim that he is

entitled to a new trial based on after-discovered evidence is meritless.

      It is important to note the difference between the newly-discovered fact

exception to the PCRA time-bar as set forth in Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) and

a claim for relief based on after-discovered evidence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9542(a)(2). Once the PCRA court’s jurisdiction has been properly invoked

by a petition that has been timely filed or satisfies one of the PCRA timeliness

exceptions, a petitioner raising a claim of after-discovered evidence must

prove that “(1) the exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial and

could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence;

(2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach

credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.” Burton, 158

A.3d at 629 (quoting Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (Pa.

2004)).

      In reviewing Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim, we focus on

the last prong to assess whether Mr. Chapman’s testimony would likely compel

a different verdict if presented at trial. Our Supreme Court has held that the

“salutary goal of the after-discovered evidence rule [is] to limit continued

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litigation without being so rigid as to shut out [after-]discovered evidence

from a credible source which may lead to a true and proper judgment.”

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 975 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted,

emphasis added).

      When addressing      an after-discovered evidence      claim based on

presentation of exculpatory eyewitness testimony, the PCRA court must

assess the witness’s credibility and its impact, if any, on the outcome of the

case. See generally, Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1181

(Pa. 1999) (noting that the PCRA court is in a superior position as factfinder

to assess the importance of a witness’s testimony to the outcome of the case).

In determining whether after-discovered evidence is of such nature and

character that it would compel a different verdict if a new trial were granted,

“a court should consider the integrity of the alleged after-discovered evidence,

the motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall strength of the

evidence supporting the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d

356, 365 (Pa.Super. 2010).

      In this case, the PCRA court specifically found that Chapman’s testimony

lacked credibility. First, the PCRA court noted that Chapman only recalled facts

about the shooting that were included in the discovery information such as

the date of the incident, the location of the shooting, and the allegation that

the shooter stashed the gun in some bushes by a nearby gas station. Second,

the PCRA court found it peculiar that Chapman could remember the exact date

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of the shooting that occurred on May 25, 2007, when he testified that he had

not thought about the shooting until he met Appellant in prison in June 2020.

      Third, evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial contradicts

Chapman’s allegations. The prosecution presented the testimony of two

eyewitnesses who positively identified Appellant as the shooter; one of those

eyewitnesses was standing only three feet away from Appellant. The

prosecution also obtained statements from twenty-one witnesses who were

present at the bar at the time of the shooting and none of them mentioned

La’Quanta Chapman or DeShawn White. In addition, police recovered a New

York Yankees cap at the crime scene with Appellant’s DNA on it.

      Fourth, the PCRA court pointed out that Chapman alleges that the

shooter was actually DeShawn White, who is now deceased, cannot defend

himself against these accusations, and cannot be charged in connection with

the shooting. Lastly, the PCRA court noted that Chapman had nothing to lose

by testifying in this case as he is serving a life sentence for murder. Based on

this evidence, the PCRA court shared its suspicion that Appellant and Chapman

had collaborated in prison to fabricate these allegations in an attempt to seek

a new trial for Appellant on these charges.

      As a result, we find the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant

is not entitled to collateral relief based on his claim of after-discovered

evidence as there was no reasonable possibility that a jury would have

credited Chapman’s testimony and rendered a more favorable verdict for

Appellant. Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court properly dismissed

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Appellant’s petition, which does not contain any issues of arguable merit.

Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition

and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

     Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2023

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