Court Opinion

ID: 9364608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 19:00:38.13395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.374033
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13922    Document: 41-1      Date Filed: 01/19/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13922
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        WAYNE DALE EPPS, JR.,
        a.k.a. ksaber2040,
                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00036-BJD-JRK-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-13922

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Wayne Dale Epps, Jr. appeals his 144-month sentence for
        attempted online enticement of a minor to engage in illegal sexual
        activity. Epps argues that the district court both misinterpreted
        and then misapplied the guidelines for determining whether his
        earlier October 2019 conduct was “relevant conduct” under
        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Alternatively, Epps argues that the district
        court clearly erred when it found that his earlier conversations with
        the undercover agent in October 2019 were used “in preparation
        for” enticing a fictitious minor in February 2020. After careful
        review, we affirm Epps’s sentence.
                              I.     BACKGROUND
        A.    Facts
               On October 2, 2019, a Federal Bureau of Investigations
        (“FBI”) agent began an undercover investigation to identify adults
        who were seeking to contact and engage in illegal sexual activity
        with children. In a public chatroom, the agent posted that he “had
        access to an 11-year-old child.” That same day, Epps contacted the
        agent through private message.
               Between October 2 and 17, 2019, Epps communicated with
        the agent as “ksaber2040.” The agent described his “daughter” as
        an 11-year-old girl, and Epps asked for a photo of the agent and his
        daughter. The agent sent a photo of what appeared to be an 11- or
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        21-13922               Opinion of the Court                        3

        12-year-old child, but the photo did not depict an actual child. Epps
        stated that he could only “hang out” with the agent and his
        daughter in the “early mornings or late nights” because of his work
        schedule. When the agent asked what Epps meant by “hang out,”
        Epps stated he “need[ed]” oral sex and clarified that he wanted the
        11-year-old child to do it. The agent said that they could not meet
        up that evening, but he would check when his wife was working
        the night shift and he might be able to the following day.
               A few days later, Epps followed up with the agent. Epps
        reiterated that he wanted the child to perform oral sex on him. The
        agent asked if Epps would be willing to have sex with the child if
        she wanted to, and Epps said, “Yeah if she was cute.” Epps stated
        that he would not “bail” if the agent set up a time for them to meet.
               The agent explained that his wife worked normal shifts so
        Epps would not be able to meet the child that week. In response,
        Epps asked, “Till then can i have another pic of her?” The agent
        asked what kind of photo Epps wanted, and Epps asked for one that
        showed the child’s genitalia. The agent responded that he would
        “try to get one” if Epps wanted him to. Epps replied, “Yes please.”
               A few days later, the agent contacted Epps and informed him
        that he had his daughter alone the following night. Epps said he
        could meet at 11:00 p.m. and confirmed again that he wanted the
        child to perform oral sex on him. However, Epps did not follow
        through on his stated intention to meet the child for sex.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13922

               Several months later, on February 14, 2020, Epps reinitiated
        contact with the agent. Epps said he “[h]ad alot [sic] of stupid stuff
        happen” and “inquir[ed] about [the agent’s] offer.” The agent
        asked who Epps was. Epps explained how the agent knew Epps
        and asked if he could still meet the agent’s daughter. The agent
        said, “Dude I don’t remember u what did we agree to?” Epps
        explained that he wanted to meet the child and “possibly have her
        stroke or suck” him.
               The agent said he did not remember Epps, so Epps clarified
        that his name was Wayne, they spoke before, and the agent’s wife
        was supposed to move to a night shift. The agent said, “Wait r u
        the dude who was supposed to meet and didn’t show.” Epps
        replied, “No. I was waiting on you to let me know when her shift
        changed. Then my work schedule got crazy and we fell outta
        contact. We never set a time to meet because of that.” The agent
        told Epps that his daughter had turned 12 and asked if Epps still
        wanted her to perform oral sex. Epps said he did and explained
        that he “got shifted to an over night for a month and half till [the
        company] had enough people trained to fill the shift.” The agent
        asked if Epps was “clean,” and Epps replied that he was and that he
        could use a “flavored condom.”
               Epps and the agent agreed to meet on February 18 at a
        shopping area in Jacksonville, Florida. Epps lived in Jacksonville.
        Upon Epps’s arrival at the predetermined location, FBI agents
        arrested Epps.
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        21-13922               Opinion of the Court                       5

               A short time later, Epps was interviewed. During that
        interview, Epps admitted that he had “engaged in sexually explicit
        conversations with the [agent’s] persona on the app and traveled to
        the particular predetermined location to meet the [agent] and the
        purported child.”
               Epps consented to a search of his residence, cellphone, and
        vehicle. The search of his cellphone revealed that the application
        he used to communicate with the agent was “actively running on
        the device,” the username listed on the account was “ksaber2040,”
        and the private message section of the application, beginning on
        February 14, 2020, was preserved on the cellphone.
        B.    District Court Proceedings
               A federal grand jury indicted Epps with one count of
        attempted online enticement of a minor to engage in illegal sexual
        activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). In June 2021, Epps
        pleaded guilty to that count.
               Ordinarily, a defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) has
        a base offense level of 28. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(3). However,
        Epps’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”) recommended a
        base offense level of 32 under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(a). Specifically,
        § 2G1.3(c)(1) provides as follows: When the offense involves
        enticing “a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the
        purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct,” a district
        court instead must apply § 2G2.1 (which provides for a base offense
        level of 32), “if the resulting offense level is greater than that
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                        21-13922

        determined [through the application of § 2G1.3].” See id.
        § 2G1.3(c)(1) & cmt. n.5(A). Because 32 is greater than 28, the PSR
        recommended that the district court apply § 2G2.1(a)’s base offense
        level of 32 pursuant to the cross reference in § 2G1.3(c)(1). In this
        regard, the PSR reported that in October 2019 Epps “requested that
        the [agent] send him a picture of the ‘child,’ and specifically asked,
        ‘Do you have any that shows her tits or pussy?’” Thus, Epps
        requested a sexually explicit picture of the child. 1
                The PSR also recommended (1) a four-level increase under
        § 2G2.1(b)(1)(A) because the offense involved a minor who was
        under 12 years old; (2) a two-level increase under § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)
        because the offense involved the use of a computer or computer
        service “to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel
        of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or to otherwise
        solicit participation by a minor” to produce sexually explicit
        material; and (3) a five-level increase under § 4B1.5(b)(1) because
        Epps engaged in a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct. Lastly, the
        PSR recommended reducing Epps’s offense level by three levels
        under § 3E1.1(a) and (b) because Epps demonstrated acceptance of
        responsibility. These recommendations yielded a total offense
        level of 40.
              With no criminal history points, Epps’s criminal history
        category was I. Based on a total offense level of 40 and a criminal

        1 Although Epps challenged the application of this cross reference in the district

        court based on United States v. Caniff, 955 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2020), Epps
        does not raise this Caniff argument on appeal.
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        21-13922              Opinion of the Court                      7

        history category of I, the PSR calculated an advisory guidelines
        range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. The statutory
        minimum term of imprisonment was 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
               Before sentencing, Epps filed a sentencing memorandum
        and argued, in part, that his October 2019 conduct was not
        “relevant conduct” for any purposes in sentencing and should not
        be considered at all. Epps asserted that the October 2019 conduct
        took place four months before the February 2020 conduct, that he
        had stopped communication with the agent, and that he had
        abandoned his intent to follow through with his October 2019
        conduct. Epps claimed that his October 2019 conduct would have
        hurt his February 2020 efforts if the victim was anyone other than
        an undercover agent because it would have “hurt his credibility”
        and would have made him seem “suspicious and untrustworthy.”
        Accordingly, Epps argued that his October 2019 conduct did
        nothing to further the February 2020 enticement, and there was no
        indication that his October 2019 communications were in
        preparation for enticing a minor in February 2020.
               At the sentencing hearing, Epps did not object to the PSR’s
        facts about his offense conduct or to the government’s exhibits
        showing screenshots of Epps’s chats with the agent in October 2019
        and February 2020. Instead, Epps reiterated the arguments from
        his memorandum.
              In response, the government argued that Epps’s October
        2019 conduct was “relevant conduct” under the guidelines because
        he acted “in preparation for the commission of the offense.” The
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        8                         Opinion of the Court              21-13922

        government emphasized that in October, Epps “establish[ed] the
        ground rules” by telling the agent that he wanted to have sex with
        an 11-year-old child, but after a plan was made to meet, Epps did
        not follow through “because other things got in the way.” In other
        words, the government contended that the October 2019 conduct
        was “relevant conduct” to his February 2020 offense because Epps
        paused—not abandoned—his attempt.
               The district court acknowledged that Epps made an “erudite
        argument” but stated that his argument was “undercut by the
        facts” of his case. The district court explained that Epps’s October
        2019 conversations were “certainly used as a means [for him to]
        reengag[e]” in conversation with the agent in February 2020 and
        were thus “in preparation for” the February 2020 offense.
        Therefore, the district court determined that the PSR properly
        calculated the guidelines and adopted them.
               The district court adopted the PSR’s guidelines calculations,
        varied downward from the advisory guidelines range of 292 to 365
        months, and imposed a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment,
        followed by a lifetime of supervised release. After the district court
        pronounced the sentence, Epps objected to the district court’s
        “rulings on [his] presentence report objections.”
              This appeal followed.
                         II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
               Ordinarily, we review de novo the district court’s legal
        interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and the district court’s
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        21-13922               Opinion of the Court                        9

        application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts. United States
        v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014). However, when a
        party fails to make specific objections at sentencing after being
        given an opportunity to do so, challenges to the sentence on appeal
        will be reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Ramirez-
        Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014).
               Additionally, we review for clear error the application of the
        “relevant conduct” guidelines in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 to the facts of the
        case. United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir.
        2008).
                               III.   DISCUSSION
               We begin with an overview of the “relevant conduct”
        guidelines in § 1B1.3(a)(1) and then address Epps’s arguments.
                                          A.
                When calculating a defendant’s advisory guidelines range, a
        district court must consider all “relevant conduct,” as defined in
        § 1B1.3. United States v. Siegelman, 786 F.3d 1322, 1330–31 (11th
        Cir. 2015).     Activity that qualifies as “relevant conduct”
        includes “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
        counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by
        the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the
        offense of conviction[] [or] in preparation for that offense.”
        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (emphasis added). “[R]elevant conduct is
        broadly defined to include both uncharged and acquitted conduct
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-13922

        that is proven at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.”
        Siegelman, 786 F.3d at 1332.
                                          B.
              Epps argues that the district court misapplied § 1B1.3(a)(1)
        by both (1) misinterpreting the legal phrase “in preparation for”
        and (2) making a finding that his October 2019 conduct was “in
        preparation for” the charged offense.
               Epps contends that because the guidelines do not define the
        phrase “in preparation for,” the plain meaning should apply.
        Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, Epps argues that the plain
        meaning of “preparation” is “[t]he act or process of devising the
        means necessary to commit a crime.” Epps claims that the
        government must show the conduct was “taken prior to, and in
        order to facilitate, the charged offense.” Epps contends the mere
        fact that his prior conduct made it easier to reengage with the agent
        in February 2020 is insufficient to meet the standard of “in
        preparation for,” either legally or factually. Epps also claims the
        government must show he explicitly intended in October 2019 to
        entice a minor in February 2020.
                In response, the government argues that Epps waived his
        legal interpretation argument by not raising it adequately in the
        district court and that this Court should review that legal issue for
        plain error. Epps disagrees, contending his arguments in the
        district court were broad enough to preserve both the legal and
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        21-13922               Opinion of the Court                        11

        factual issues as to whether his October 2019 conduct was “relevant
        conduct.”
               We need not resolve that debate as Epps has not shown any
        error, plain or otherwise, for several reasons.
               First, Epps is correct that the guidelines do not define “in
        preparation for” and that Black’s Law Dictionary defines
        “preparation” as “[t]he act or process of devising the means
        necessary to commit a crime.” Preparation, Black’s Law
        Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). However, Epps is incorrect that the
        government must show Epps had the specific intent in October
        2019 to entice a minor at a specific later time in February 2020.
        Nothing in the “relevant conduct” guidelines or the plain meaning
        of “in preparation for” mentions or requires a showing of such
        specific intent as Epps asserts.
               Second, we need not resolve the parameters of the phrase
        “in preparation for” because, as the district court found, Epps’s
        October 2019 acts so clearly facilitated the means necessary to
        commit the charged offense. Indeed, the district court found
        Epps’s October 2019 conversations with the agent were used “as a
        tool” to help Epps reengage with the agent just a few months later.
               Furthermore, during the October 2019 conversations, the
        agent posing as the child’s father repeatedly expressed disbelief that
        Epps would follow through with his stated desires. By requesting
        in October 2019 that the agent send a sexually explicit photograph
        of the child, Epps laid the groundwork (1) to show he truly was
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13922

        interested in engaging in sexual activity with the child and (2) to
        arrange a meeting with the child to do just that. In short, Epps
        asked the agent for a photograph to facilitate his plan to later entice
        the child.
               The fact that Epps did not follow through on his plan until
        four months later does not mean his October 2019 conversations
        with the agent were not in preparation for the crime he planned,
        and later attempted, to commit. In fact, when Epps restarted
        communications with the agent in February 2020, Epps reminded
        the agent about the previously exchanged messages. Epps also
        explained that he had stopped responding because he (1) “had a lot
        of stupid stuff happen,” (2) was waiting for the agent to tell him
        when his wife had started working a night shift, and (3) had moved
        to an overnight shift at his job. Epps then renewed his request to
        engage in sexual acts with the child by “inquiring about [the
        agent’s] offer,” referring back to his October 2019 conversations
        with the agent that demonstrated his serious interest.
                Accordingly, under the particular facts of this case, the
        district court did not err, much less clearly err, when it found
        Epps’s October 2019 conduct—including his requesting a sexually
        explicit photograph of the 11-year-old child from the agent—was
        “in preparation for” his February 2020 offense of attempting to
        entice that child to engage in sexual activity.
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                               IV.    CONCLUSION
                For these reasons, we find no reversible errors in the district
        court’s determination that Epps’s October 2019 conduct was
        relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1). Epps’s 144-month sentence
        is affirmed.
               AFFIRMED.