Court Opinion

ID: 9531024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:06:28.208858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:19.634814
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, dissenting: This case is not about the legality of defendant’s arrest. We are neither faced with a fourth amendment question nor need we ponder whether the arresting officer had probable cause to “stop” defendant or look into his motor vehicle. The record includes an unsigned motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence; however, there is no transcript to any hearing, no order with respect to this motion, and defendant does not raise the issue on appeal. Only the majority speculates that the arresting officer may not have had actual probable cause. This issue, if it ever was an issue, is waived on appeal. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Twenty-two months after the evening in question, the officer testified to the events of December 15, 1998. The majority reverses because the testifying officer did not make reference, in the police report, to the initial encounter with the informer (although every line of the report was used) and cannot remember the name of the other officer who was serving with him when the informer came forward. Further, the majority places very little, if any, weight on the fact that the officer’s police report makes reference to the alleged telephone call he made to defendant and the person on the other end of the line stating that defendant would meet the officer in 15 minutes at the location indicated by the officer. It is, of course, interesting to note that 15 minutes later the defendant did appear at the appointed location and that the officer immediately called his support team before approaching defendant’s car. While it is a bit disconcerting that the informant was alleged to be wearing jeans and a T-shirt in mid-December, it is more interesting to note that the informant advised the officer to call and ask for “Gumby.” It may come as a surprise to the majority that the defendant has a tattoo of Gumby on his back, as stated in the police report that was introduced into evidence. It is further interesting to note that the testifying officer did not recover the cocaine from defendant’s car. Rather, it was Officer Albie that entered defendant’s car and obtained the plastic bag containing the drugs. The majority makes much of the fact that an “eight ball” in street parlance is one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine and the bag contained only 2.9 grams of cocaine or .6 grams less than an “eight ball” would be. I am shocked that a drug dealer would cheat a customer out of .6 grams of cocaine. We know that we cannot trust Enron Corporation or Arthur Andersen, but now even drug dealers are not to be trusted? Whom can we trust? At trial, the arresting officer did testify that drug users are often short-changed by their dealers. Surely, it would be comforting if the testifying officer knew the identity of the officer who served with him 22 months earlier, the phone number he called, whose cell phone he used to place the call, and the identity of the mysterious informant. However, this is not a case where the officer testified that the “drugs were on the front seat.” We are always suspicious of those cases because we think drug dealers must be smarter than to leave their merchandise in plain view. Here, we have a defendant who set up a rendezvous to deliver the goods, honked his horn at the appropriate place, as agreed, and was prepared to deliver on his telephonic promise to provide cocaine to the officer. Contrary to the majority’s view, the elements of possession were proved and the trial court had the benefit of watching the witnesses’ demeanor. The trial court obviously took great care in hearing the evidence, which is illustrated by the trial court’s decision to find defendant not guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Lastly, the majority has accurately set out the standard of review, stating “it is our duty to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374 (1992).” 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1048. I cite few cases with respect to the proper standard of review, because the majority has accurately set forth the standard of review ... and then ignored it. For the foregoing reasons, the majority should have affirmed the defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.