Court Opinion

ID: 9381337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 18:03:11.94115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.839152
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/23 Cotzomi v. Universal Protection Service CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 PABLO COTZOMI,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A164301
 v.
 UNIVERSAL PROTECTION                                                   (Alameda County
 SERVICE, LP et al.,                                                    Super. Ct. No. RG20080769)
           Defendants and Appellants.

         Defendants Universal Protection Service, LP (UPS LP), Universal
Protection Service, LLC, Allied Universal Security Services, and Allied
Universal Security Services, LLC (collectively the Allied defendants) appeal
from the trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of this
action filed by plaintiff Pablo Cotzomi. The Allied defendants contend the
trial court’s decision rested on an erroneous legal assumption, to wit, that
direct evidence of plaintiff’s execution of the electronic signature on the
alleged arbitration agreement was necessary to authenticate the agreement.
On the record before us, we conclude the court erroneously declined to
consider the circumstantial value of the Allied defendants’ evidence
indicating that plaintiff executed the electronic signature on the arbitration
agreement. We therefore reverse the order and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                               1
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. Complaint and Motion to Compel Arbitration
      Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the Allied defendants and
Point to Point Global Security, Inc. (P2P) alleging violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.). The lawsuit arises
out of defendants’ alleged failure to provide plaintiff with proper disclosures
and a summary of rights under FCRA at the time of his hiring.
      The Allied defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that
plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any claims he had against them as a condition of
his employment. In support of their motion, the Allied defendants submitted
the declaration of UPS LP’s regional human resources director, Peggy
Grzywacz, who stated that her responsibilities included onboarding
employees and conducting new hire orientations. Based on her review of
plaintiff’s personnel records, Grzywacz stated on information and belief that
plaintiff became employed with UPS LP in May 2019 following UPS LP’s
acquisition of the security firm P2P.1 UPS LP began transitioning former
P2P employees during two orientation sessions held on April 25, 2019.
According to Grzywacz, plaintiff and other former P2P employees attended an
April 25 orientation, during which human resources coordinators provided
each employee with a laptop computer and helped them work through an
online onboarding packet administered by Emptech, a third-party workforce
management services provider. The onboarding packet included the Allied
defendants’ “standard Arbitration Agreement,” a copy of which was attached
to Grzywacz’s declaration.

1     As Grzywacz explained, Universal Protection Service, LLC is a direct
subsidiary of UPS LP, while Allied Security Services, LLC and Allied
Universal Security Services are fictitious names under which UPS LP does
business.

                                       2
      The arbitration agreement states in pertinent part: “By continuing
employment with [UPS LP], you agree to the terms of this Agreement unless
you affirmatively opt out of the Agreement by returning the opt-out form
provided at the end of this Agreement within 30 days of receipt of this
Agreement.” (Bold type omitted.) With exceptions not relevant here, the
agreement to arbitrate applies to “all claims or causes of action that the
Employee may have against [UPS LP] . . . which could be brought in a court
of law” and contains a class and collection action waiver. At the end of the
agreement is a section entitled “Acknowledgment of Receipt of Arbitration
Policy and Agreement” that displays plaintiff’s printed name under the
heading “Signed Name,” an Internet Protocol (IP) address2 of 10.113.3.125,
and the date and time of “4/25/2019 9:16:46 AM.” (Bold type omitted.)
      Grzywacz further stated “on information and belief from [her] review of
the documents [that] this Arbitration Agreement was signed and submitted
by [plaintiff],” and that plaintiff did not opt out of the arbitration agreement
before it became effective in May 2019. Attached to Grzywacz’s declaration
was a sign-in sheet purporting to show that plaintiff attended the April 25
orientation and a business record “from Emptech’s employer-facing portal,
Optima, summarizing the onboarding documents reviewed and e-signed by
[plaintiff] on April 25, 2019,” including the “Arbitration Policy and
Agreement.”

2     An IP address is a numeric identifier for a computer connected to the
Internet “consist[ing] of ‘four sets of numbers separated by periods’ [citation],
such as ‘12.34.56.78.’ ‘IP addresses function much like Social Security
numbers or telephone numbers: each IP address is unique and corresponds to
a specific entity connected to the Internet.’ ” (Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings
Corp. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 334, 337.)

                                        3
      In opposition to the motion, plaintiff argued that the Allied defendants
failed to prove the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was his.
Plaintiff acknowledged that he “was present during the orientation” but
stated in his declaration that he did not recall seeing, reviewing, or signing
“any documents” at the April 25 orientation session, including “any document
entitled Arbitration Policy and Agreement or any other arbitration
agreement.” Plaintiff further asserted that had he been provided with an
arbitration agreement, he would have refused to sign it or opted out as he has
done in the past. Plaintiff objected to the Grzywacz declaration, arguing she
lacked personal knowledge to authenticate his electronic signature and failed
to authenticate the documents she relied upon in making her assumptions.
      In reply, the Allied defendants submitted the declaration of Lisa Crane,
a human resources coordinator for UPS LP who was present at the April 25
orientation. According to Crane, the orientation session was conducted in a
large conference room, and she and two colleagues were seated in front of two
rows of tables where the employees sat. Two employees were seated at each
table and were provided with computers to access, review, and sign the
onboarding documents. To access those documents on Emptech, employees
had to enter their unique employee identification numbers and their Social
Security numbers. Based on her review of plaintiff’s personnel records,
Crane stated on information and belief that plaintiff began reviewing his
orientation packet at around 9:09 a.m., and that he electronically signed the
arbitration agreement at 9:16 a.m. Attached to the Crane declaration was a
register of documents that plaintiff purportedly signed on Emptech, including
the arbitration agreement and an “Emergency Contact Form” that appeared
to contain contact information for plaintiff’s wife (e.g., her name, address, and
two different telephone numbers). Each of the onboarding documents

                                       4
contained date and time stamps purporting to show when they were
electronically signed.3
      Crane further stated that during the April 25 orientation, her
colleagues periodically surveyed the room and monitored employee progress,
and she “[did] not recall seeing any employees moving about the room except
to go to the restroom.” Based on her review of the arbitration agreement,
Crane believed the document was signed and submitted by plaintiff. Crane
stated her belief was “supported by the requirement that all prospective [UPS
LP] employees must enter their unique employee ID number and social
security number to access Emptech and review [UPS LP’s] new-hire
onboarding packet. Therefore, an electronic signature in the name of ‘Pablo
Cozomi [sic]’ could only have been placed on the e-signed Arbitration
Agreement by a person using [plaintiff’s] unique employee ID and social
security number. Moreover, [UPS LP] does not have a practice of sharing an
employee’s unique ID number with other employees.” Crane further stated
she was unaware of any complaints or allegations that electronic signatures
were falsified during the onboarding process, which would “be extremely
difficult due to the unique employee ID and social security numbers required
to generate the electronic signatures at the same time period in which the
employee is present at the onboarding meeting” and would “be a terminable
violation of [UPS LP’s] policies and process.”
      Plaintiff was granted leave to file a surreply, and he also filed
evidentiary objections to the Crane declaration.

3      All of the onboarding documents attached to the Crane declaration
reflected a date of “4/25/2019,” with different times on that day. For instance,
the arbitration agreement was time stamped “9:16:46 AM,” while the
emergency contact form was time stamped “9:19:25 AM.”

                                        5
        B. Trial Court’s Ruling
        After hearing argument, the trial court issued its order denying the
motion to compel arbitration. The court first found the Grzywacz declaration
“was not based on [Grzywacz’s] personal knowledge, and, although she
described the documents as business records, she failed to establish the
requisites for admission of such records, including the ‘mode of preparation’
of such records.” Accordingly, the court sustained plaintiff’s objections “on
these grounds” and found that Grzywacz failed to “adequately authenticate
the arbitration agreement as signed by plaintiff.”
        Turning to the Crane declaration, the trial court sustained plaintiff’s
objections for lack of personal knowledge “as to the portions of the declaration
that purport to authenticate plaintiff’s signature on the documents.” Relying
on Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 (Ruiz), the
court found that Crane’s presence “did not provide her personal knowledge
that plaintiff in fact executed the electronic signature. The time stamps
likewise are not helpful since they beg the question of whether plaintiff
executed the electronic signature.” The court also rejected the Allied
defendants’ reliance on the emergency contact form because “defendants do
not establish how this was filled out by plaintiff, and, in any case, it was not
the arbitration agreement.” Finally, the court rejected the Allied defendants’
request to present Crane’s oral testimony, as “Crane’s lack of personal
knowledge is manifest in her declaration.”
        Based on the foregoing, the trial court determined the Allied
defendants had not met their burden of proving the existence of a valid
agreement to arbitrate. This appeal followed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd.
(a).)

                                         6
                                   DISCUSSION
      “Under section 1281.2, a trial court must grant a motion or petition to
compel arbitration only ‘if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists.’ The court makes this determination in a summary
process. [Citation.] ‘[T]he trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the
affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.’ ”
(Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164
(Gamboa).)
      “The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the
existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a
preponderance of the evidence,” but the burden of production involves a
three-step process. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–165.) At the
first step, the moving party bears the burden of producing prima facie
evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate, either by stating the provisions
verbatim, or “by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly
bearing the opposing party’s signature.” (Espejo v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 (Espejo).) The
moving party “is not required to authenticate an opposing party’s signature
on an arbitration agreement as a preliminary matter” (Ruiz, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 846, italics omitted), and “the court is only required to
make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary
determination of its validity” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001)
88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219). If the moving party meets its initial burden of
production, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to produce
evidence challenging the authenticity of the agreement. (Gamboa, at p. 165.)

                                         7
If that burden is met, “the moving party must establish with admissible
evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Ibid.)
      “ ‘ “There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration.” ’ ” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc.
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066 (Fabian).) For instance, when an appeal
challenges the trial court’s finding that the moving party failed to carry its
burden of proof, “ ‘ “the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1067; see also Trinity v. Life
Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1122, 1125.) This is
because a reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or make its own
determination of credibility, and instead must view all factual matters
favorably in support of the judgment. (Fabian, at p. 1067.) But where, as
here, the appeal challenges a purely legal decision by the trial court that
affirmatively appears on the record—namely, the court’s legal assumption
that direct evidence of signature authentication was required—we
independently review that claim of legal error. (See Espejo, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1057–1058 [denial of petition to compel arbitration is
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, but review is de novo where pure
question of law is presented].)
      Here, there appears to be no dispute that the Allied defendants met
their initial burden on the motion to compel. Although the trial court
excluded portions of Grzywacz’s declaration purporting to authenticate the
arbitration agreement, the Allied defendants were not required to
authenticate the agreement at this initial step. (Ruiz, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 846.) At this stage, UPS LP’s regional human resources

                                          8
director Grzywacz was a competent witness for purposes of adducing a copy
of the Allied defendants’ standard arbitration agreement, which sufficed as a
prima facie showing of an agreement to arbitrate.
      There is likewise no dispute that plaintiff met his burden to challenge
the authenticity of the arbitration agreement. Through his declaration,
plaintiff stated that he did not recall seeing, reviewing, or signing the
purported arbitration agreement, and that he would have refused to sign
such an agreement had he been provided one. Courts have affirmed this
method of satisfying an opposing party’s responsive burden on a motion to
compel arbitration. (See Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 167; Ruiz,
supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.)
      Thus, the dispute in this appeal centers around the Allied defendants’
ultimate burden of persuasion to establish a valid arbitration agreement
between the parties. “Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction
of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the
proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by
any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.) “The means of
authenticating a writing are not limited to those specified in the Evidence
Code. [Citations.] For example, a writing can be authenticated by
circumstantial evidence and by its contents.” (People v. Skiles (2011) 51
Cal.4th 1178, 1187 (Skiles).) Circumstantial evidence “is testimony not based
on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of
other facts from which deductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts

                                        9
sought to be proved.” (Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Group Inc. (2005) 135
Cal.App.4th 21, 51.)4
      An electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten one.
(See Civ. Code, § 1633.7, subd. (a).) “An electronic record or electronic
signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of
the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy
of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the
electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1633.9, subd. (a).) “[T]he burden of authenticating an electronic signature
is not great.” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 844–845.)
      Taken together, these authorities illustrate that on a motion to compel
arbitration, an arbitration agreement may be authenticated by facts
reasonably deduced from the evidence indirectly showing that an electronic
signature on the agreement was the act of the opposing party. We conclude a
trier of fact could reasonably have found this burden satisfied on the record
here. As set forth in Crane’s declaration, the attendees at the April 25
orientation were each furnished with a computer to access an online portal
where they could review and complete an onboarding packet that included
the arbitration agreement. The portal could be accessed only by someone
using an employee’s unique identification number and Social Security
number, and UPS LP had no practice of sharing these numbers with its
employees. Plaintiff concedes he attended the April 25 orientation session,
and a sign-in sheet for the orientation reflects his presence from 8:20 a.m. to
10:00 a.m. All of the onboarding documents purportedly signed by plaintiff

4      In contrast, “ ‘direct evidence’ means evidence that directly proves a
fact, without an inference or presumption, and which in itself, if true,
conclusively establishes that fact.” (Evid. Code, § 410.)

                                       10
bore date and time stamps for April 25, 2019, between 9:09 a.m. and 9:31
a.m., as well as the same IP address. In other words, the onboarding
documents appeared to be executed using the same computer and on the
same day and around the same time that plaintiff was indisputably at the
orientation. During that session, Crane was seated at the front of the room
and saw no unusual activity. From this evidence, one could reasonably
deduce that during the April 25 orientation, plaintiff was the person who
used plaintiff’s unique credentials to access and electronically sign the
arbitration agreement at the date and time indicated on the agreement.
      In concluding the Allied defendants failed to carry their burden, the
trial court found that Crane’s presence at the April 25 orientation “did not
provide her personal knowledge that plaintiff in fact executed the electronic
signature,” and that the date and time stamps on the arbitration agreement
simply “beg[ged] the question of whether plaintiff executed the electronic
signature.” But because case law makes clear that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to authenticate a signature (Skiles, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1187),
Crane’s personal knowledge of plaintiff’s execution of the signature—that is,
direct evidence of the signature’s authenticity—was not required for the
Allied defendants to authenticate the arbitration agreement.
      On this score, the trial court seemed to dismiss the relevance of the
emergency contact form on the grounds that the Allied defendants “[did] not
establish how this was filled out by plaintiff, and, in any case, it was not the
arbitration agreement.” A trier of fact, however, could reasonably deduce
that plaintiff filled out the form because it contained specific information
regarding his wife (see Chaplin v. Sullivan (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 728, 734
[letter’s authenticity may be established if it “states facts which could only be
known to or relate to the purported writer”]), and it bore a date and time

                                       11
stamp that coincided with plaintiff’s undisputed presence at the April 25
orientation. And because the evidence suggests the emergency contact form
was completed using the same computer and on the same day and around the
same time as the arbitration agreement, the combined evidence had some
tendency in reason to suggest that the electronic signatures on both
documents were the acts of plaintiff. In declining to ascribe any relevance to
the circumstantial evidence before it, the trial court erroneously restricted
the legal scope of its discretion in evaluating whether the electronic signature
was likely the act of plaintiff.
      Citing Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th 836, plaintiff nevertheless
contends the Allied defendants’ evidence failed to establish that no one other
than plaintiff could have signed the alleged agreement or altered the
documents. Plaintiff’s reliance on Ruiz is misplaced. In Ruiz, the sum total
of the evidentiary showing by the moving defendant (Moss Bros.) was an
initial declaration of its business manager (Mary Main) “summarily
assert[ing]” that the plaintiff electronically signed the arbitration agreement
followed by a reply declaration in which Main generally stated that each
Moss Bros. employee was required to log into the company’s human resources
system with a unique login and password to review and electronically execute
the arbitration agreement. (Ruiz, at pp. 839, 840–841). As Ruiz explained,
this showing was deficient because “Main did not explain how, or upon what
basis, she inferred that the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was
‘the act of’ Ruiz. [Citation.] This left a critical gap in the evidence supporting
the petition.” (Id. at p. 844; see also Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 170
[declarant failed to provide specific details about circumstances of contract’s
execution and offered little more than bare statement that plaintiff entered
contract].)

                                       12
      Here, in contrast, Crane provided a reasoned explanation for her belief
that plaintiff was the person who electronically signed the arbitration
agreement, and her conclusions were based on her personal knowledge of the
details and events of the April 25 orientation and the onboarding procedures
that she, as a human resources coordinator, was competent to explain, in
conjunction with her review of the documentary records attached to her
declaration. That Crane’s ultimate conclusions involved deductions
reasonably drawn from the evidence does not mean the showing suffered
from fatal evidentiary gaps.
      We also reject the sweeping principle plaintiff seeks to extrapolate from
Ruiz—i.e., that a moving party must rule out the possibility that someone
else signed an arbitration agreement in order to authenticate it. Ruiz applied
no such standard, and the court otherwise reaffirmed that a party may
satisfy the undemanding burden of authenticating an electronic signature “in
any manner.” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 844–845, citing Civ. Code,
§ 1633.9, subd. (a); Evid. Code, § 1400, subd. (a).)
      To be clear, this was not a case in which plaintiff presented evidence
that another person could have caused his electronic signature to appear on
the arbitration agreement. For instance, in Bannister v. Marinidence Opco,
LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 544–545 (Bannister)—a case that also
involved an online onboarding process5—the plaintiff (Maureen Bannister)
submitted evidence that a human resources manager (Barbara Matson)
visited the facility where Bannister worked and completed the onboarding
process and arbitration agreement for her by asking for the necessary

5     Unlike the instant case, however, Bannister’s onboarding process
required no employee-specific user name to access the portal. (Bannister,
supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.)

                                        13
information without showing Bannister what was on the computer. (Id. at
pp. 546–547.) Bannister also presented evidence that Matson completed the
onboarding process for other employees remotely and without their
participation. (Id. at p. 547.) In affirming the denial of the motion to compel
arbitration, Division Five of this court concluded this was “a classic example
of a trial court drawing a conclusion from conflicting evidence.” (Id. at
p. 545.) That is, the trial court disbelieved Matson’s account of the
onboarding process and instead credited Bannister’s evidence that Matson
completed the onboarding process for her. (Id. at p. 548.) No similar conflict
appears in the record here. Plaintiff’s declaration contains no suggestion that
Crane or other human resources personnel completed his onboarding
documents (or the onboarding documents for other employees without their
knowing participation) during the April 25 orientation. The trial court made
no such factual finding, and the record is lacking in evidence to support an
implied finding to that effect.
      In further defense of the trial court’s order, plaintiff contends the Allied
defendants failed to submit evidence of “security measures” that would have
prohibited others from accessing or affixing his electronic signature to the
alleged arbitration agreement, as well as evidence of “the reliability of
Emptech’s policies, procedures, or practices” and the reliability of any
“document retention or security protocols” in place. No matter. By statute,
an electronic signature may be authenticated “in any manner, including a
showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the
person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was
attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, while a
showing of the efficacy of document security protocols is one way of
demonstrating authentication, such a showing is not required in every case.

                                       14
      In any event, there was evidence in this case that the Allied defendants
employed certain precautionary measures regarding the transmission and
execution of the onboarding documents. As Crane explained, access to the
onboarding packet on Emptech required knowledge of unique employee
credentials that UPS LP did not share, and the presentation and review of
the onboarding documents occurred in a controlled environment overseen by
human resources personnel, with each employee receiving their own device to
access Emptech. Of course, a finding as to the ultimate efficacy of these
measures goes to the weight of the evidence. But for our purposes, it is
sufficient to recognize that the Allied defendants presented circumstantial
evidence supporting the reliability of the onboarding process in order to
explain Crane’s belief that it was plaintiff who executed the electronic
signature on the arbitration agreement.
      Finally, plaintiff contends the IP address evidence does not assist the
Allied defendants because they “fail[ed] to provide any evidence as to what
the IP address is associated with, the location of its origin, or any identifying
information linking the IP address to [plaintiff] in any way.” Although it is
true that the Allied defendants did not provide detailed evidence regarding
the IP address (e.g., testimony or documentation that directly linked the
10.113.3.125 address to the computer assigned to plaintiff at the April 25
orientation), we cannot say the evidence was incapable of supporting a
reasonable inference in the Allied defendants’ favor. Because the same IP
address appeared on all of the onboarding documents in question, including
the arbitration agreement and the emergency contact form that bore indicia
of plaintiff’s review and execution, the chain of inferences was at least
capable of a reasonable conclusion that plaintiff executed all of the

                                       15
onboarding documents, including the arbitration agreement, from the same
computer during the April 25 orientation.6
      In sum, we conclude the trial court erred in denying the motion to
compel arbitration for want of direct evidence that plaintiff executed the
electronic signature on the arbitration agreement. As for the appropriate
disposition of this appeal, the Allied defendants ask that we reverse and
remand with instructions to compel arbitration. However, the trial court
made clear it found the absence of direct evidence dispositive despite the
law’s contemplation that the arbitration agreement could be authenticated by
facts reasonably deduced from evidence indirectly showing that the electronic
signature on the agreement was the act of plaintiff. (E.g., Skiles, supra, 51
Cal.4th at p. 1187.) As in other cases where the trial court’s decision was
based on an erroneous legal assumption, we conclude the proper disposition
here is to reverse and remand so that the trial court may properly consider
and weigh the circumstantial value of the Allied defendants’ evidence in the
first instance. (See, e.g., Ramirez v. Balboa Thrift & Loan (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 765, 777; F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 26.)

6      At oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel maintained that the paramount
issue in this case is not the trial court’s refusal to consider the circumstantial
evidence of signature authentication, but its evidentiary ruling that the
Allied defendant’s documents were inadmissible because Grzywacz and
Crane did not have personal knowledge of the records themselves and failed
to establish the foundational requirements for the business records exception
to the rule against hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1271). We disagree, as it is
reasonably clear from the record that the court did not exclude the Grzywacz
and Crane declarations or their attached exhibits as inadmissible hearsay or
for lack of personal knowledge of the records. Rather, the court explicitly
found that the declarants lacked personal knowledge to authenticate
plaintiff’s signature on the arbitration agreement.

                                        16
                                             DISPOSITION
        The order denying the motion to compel is reversed, and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In the
interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

                                                  FUJISAKI, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

PETROU, J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

Cotzomi v. Universal Protection Services LP (A164301)

                                                        17