Court Opinion

ID: 9851665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:17:16.0269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:11.355486
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
special concurrence:
I concur in the result. A better ground upon which to base this result, however, is art. I, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution. This section declares that: “Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.” (Emphasis added.)
As I stated in Theriault v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 303, 698 P.2d 365, 371 (1985) (Bistline, J., dissenting), art. I, § 18 does not invalidate statutes of limitations per se. It does, however, require that “people be granted a reasonable opportunity to seek redress through this state’s court system.”
In Theriault, I quoted the language of Justice Shepard and Chief Justice Donaldson, as recorded in Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970), in which they declared that allowing a statute of limitations to cut off a person’s cause of action before he or she knew, or had a reasonable opportunity to learn of it, would be “manifestly unjust,” “palpably unjust,” “patently inane,” “inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice,” and “manifestly inconsistent and unfair.” Theriault, supra, 108 Idaho at 309-10, 698 P.2d at 371-72, quoting Renner, supra at 839, 842-43, 475 P.2d at 533, 536-37. Accordingly, these two Justices, joined by Justice McQuade, held that the forerunner of today’s I.C. § 5-219(4) does not begin to run until a person knows or has had a reasonable opportunity to learn of his or her *180cause of action. Renner, supra, at 838, 475 P.2d at 532.
The “discovery rule” adopted by the Renner Court did not explicitly ground its result in art. I, § 18, or any other constitutional provision. Nevertheless, the language of that opinion, as well as the unavoidable reasoning behind it, lead inexorably to one conclusion — the Renner dis-. covery rule is constitutionally mandated pursuant to art. I, § 18. Thus, attempts to repeal or modify it by the legislature, which have subsequently occurred, are invalid and should be held unconstitutional.
As T documented in Theriault, the position from which I argue is far from novel; rather, it is rapidly becoming the universal rule in American jurisprudence. See Theriault, supra, 108 Idaho at 311-13, 698 P.2d at 373-75 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Following these decisions is neither radical nor extreme, but instead enables this Court to arrive at a fair and equitable solution in accommodating the various interests implicated in cases such as this one.
With the foregoing thus said, I would hold that the plaintiffs’ cause of action is not barred by I.C. § 5-219(4), because they filed their law suit within two years of discovering the defendants’ negligent acts. There is no basis for concluding that the plaintiffs could have reasonably discovered their cause of action at any earlier point in time than when they actually did. Thus, the plaintiffs have satisfied the mandate of I.C. § 5-219(4), and the defendants should be required to respond to plaintiffs’ claims for damages.
Whether the discovery rule as announced in Renner, supra, is constitutionally required, and, whether I.C. § 5-219(4) can constitutionally make the classification it does between plaintiffs whose claims are premised on the existence of a foreign object or fraudulent concealment and those whose claims are premised on a different cause, is yet to be addressed by this Court. Theriault, supra, 108 Idaho at 309-14, 698 P.2d at 371-76 (Bistline, J., dissenting). As I stated in Theriault, these issues “demand deliberation.” Id., at 314, 698 P.2d at 376. When ultimately considered, only two conclusions are plausible. First, no statute of limitations can constitutionally preclude an injured person from his day in court without first requiring that that person know of or have had reasonable opportunity to discover his cause of action. Second, I.C. § 5-219(4)’s classification of plaintiffs based upon the type of cause of action violates equal protection. See Theriault, supra, at 313-14, 698 P.2d at 375-76.