Court Opinion

ID: 9950223
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Date Created: 2024-03-13 16:09:46.629254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:10.338905
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40654

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ADAM R. ZAMORA,

      Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLFAX COUNTY
Melissa A. Kennelly, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General
Lee Green, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM
Luz C. Valverde, Assistant Appellate Defender
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1}    An October 9, 2020, criminal information charged Defendant Adam R. Zamora
with six counts of criminal sexual penetration of a child J.R. who was under thirteen
years of age, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-11(A), (D) (2009); one count of
criminal sexual penetration of a child A.S. who was under thirteen years of age, contrary
to Section 30-9-11(A), (D); two counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor A.S. and
A.L., contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-13(A), (B) (2003); and one count of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor A.L., contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-3
(1990). Following a hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss for violating his right to a
speedy trial, the district court entered an order of dismissal on speedy trial grounds. The
State appeals from the order of dismissal. We reverse and remand.

DISCUSSION

{2}    “The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New
Mexico Constitution.” State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 272. In
determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial, “we
consider the four factors articulated in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)]: (1) the
length of delay in bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the
defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the
defendant caused by the delay.” State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 5, 366 P.3d 1121.
“We defer to the district court’s factual findings in considering a speedy trial claim, but
weigh each factor de novo.” State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 4, 406 P.3d 505.

I.     Length of Delay

{3}     We first determine whether the length of the delay is presumptively prejudicial.
“The first factor, the length of delay, has a dual function: it acts as a triggering
mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of
being presumptively prejudicial, and it is an independent factor to consider in evaluating
whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 22 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has established benchmarks
for presumptively prejudicial delay according to the complexity of a case: twelve months
for a simple case, fifteen months for a case of intermediate complexity, and eighteen
months for a complex case. See State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48, 146 N.M.
499, 212 P.3d 387.

{4}    The district court found that this is a simple case. See State v. Laney, 2003-
NMCA-144, ¶ 14, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591 (“[S]imple cases require less investigation
and tend to involve primarily police officer testimony during the trial.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). The State contends that the district court’s finding that the
case was simple is not supported by substantial evidence. The State further argues that
the case is one of intermediate complexity because it involves ten charges, three
victims, and three days were set aside for trial.

{5}     The district court explained its designation of the case as simple as follows. First,
“[a]lthough the criminal information contains [ten] counts, six . . . contain the identical
allegations against the same alleged victim” and in the absence of a response to
Defendant’s motion for statement of facts, six of the counts would merge into one count,
which reduces the number of counts in this case to four. Second, the State did not
designate any of its twelve witnesses as experts and “it is unknown whether all of the
witnesses are expected to provide competent testimony.” Third, the State failed to
provide a valid cogent reason to counter Defendant’s assertion that the case was
simple. We address each of these determinations in turn.

{6}     As a preliminary matter, we do not accord deference to the district court’s
determination that six of the CSPM counts would merge into one count. See State v.
Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 4, 355 P.3d 81 (stating that “we defer to the district court’s
factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence”). In support of its
determination, the district court noted that the counts “contain the identical allegations
against the same victim” and the State did not file a statement of facts. While Defendant
did file a motion under Rule 5-205(C) NMRA seeking an order from the district court
directing the State to file a statement of facts, he did not seek a hearing on his motion or
otherwise take any action to bring the motion to the district court’s attention. The district
court did not address Defendant’s motion at any point during the hearing on his motion
to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Consequently, the district court never ruled on
Defendant’s motion, much less enter an order directing the State to file a statement of
facts.

{7}     Although Defendant has a procedural due process right, which requires “the
[s]tate to provide reasonable notice of charges against a person and a fair opportunity to
defend,” State v. Baldonado, 1998-NMCA-040, ¶ 21, 124 N.M. 745, 955 P.2d 214, the
district court never conducted an examination on a count-by-count basis as to “whether
[the] indictment [was] reasonably particular with respect to” each of the charged
offenses. Id. ¶ 26; see State v. Huerta-Castro, 2017-NMCA-026, ¶ 20, 390 P.3d 185
(stating that when a defendant requests a bill of particulars, the district court is required
to engage in the count-by-count examination outlined in Baldonado). “The district court
was obliged, but did not attempt, to analyze the sufficiency of the indictment based on
the facts underlying the charges according to the analytical framework we dictated in
Baldonado.” See Huerta-Castro, 2017-NMCA-026, ¶ 21. Moreover, our review of the
record below does not reflect that Defendant ever raised an argument that the six
counts should be merged—he simply filed the motion for the statement of facts and took
no further action. As such, without any action by the district court the State had no
obligation to file a statement of facts. See Rule 5-205(C) (providing that “[u]pon motion
of the defendant, the court may order the state to file a statement of facts”). In light of
the facts before us, it is unclear how the district court concluded that six of the CSPM
counts should merge into one count. Thus, our consideration of the complexity of the
case includes seven CSPM charges, two CSCM charges and one fourth degree
contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge.

{8}    As to the number of witnesses, the State identified twelve witnesses—the district
court correctly observed that the State did not identify any of its witnesses as experts.
However the district court also stated that “it is unknown whether all of the witnesses
are expected to provide competent testimony.” To be competent, a witness need only
“have a basic understanding of the difference between telling the truth and lying,
coupled with an awareness that lying is wrong and may result in some sort of
punishment.” State v. Hueglin, 2000-NMCA-106, ¶ 24, 130 N.M. 54, 16 P.3d 1113
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, witnesses are presumed to be
competent to testify under Rule 11-601 NMRA. The record is void of any motion or
argument challenging the competency of any of the witnesses to testify and the district
court did not identify anything in the record to support such a conclusion. Therefore the
district court’s speculation that not all witnesses will be competent to testify is not
supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Murry, 2014-NMCA-021, ¶ 10, 318
P.3d 180 (stating we defer to the district court’s findings of fact “as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence”).

{9}    Finally we turn to the district court’s third reason for categorizing the case as
simple—that the State failed to provide a valid cogent reason to counter Defendant’s
assertion that the case was simple. In its written response to Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, aside from asserting the case was not simple, the prosecutor made no
argument that the case was one of intermediate complexity. The prosecutor made no
claim that the case involved expert witnesses, scientific evidence, involved complex
evidentiary issues, or that the charges would be difficult to present. See State v. Wilson,
2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 24, 147 N.M. 706, 228 P.3d 490 (observing that cases of
intermediate complexity typically “involve numerous or relatively difficult criminal
charges and evidentiary issues, numerous witnesses, expert testimony, and scientific
evidence” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Deans, 2019-NMCA-
015, ¶ 7, 435 P.3d 1280 (same). Rather the majority of the prosecutor’s response
consisted of the prosecutor’s personal view that the “policy makers over-reacted to the
alleged ‘pandemic.’” Nor did the prosecutor address the complexity of the case during
the motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Instead, the prosecutor confined his
argument to addressing whether Defendant demonstrated prejudice. Thus we agree
with the district court that the prosecutor provided “no valid cogent reason to counter
Defendant’s assertion that this is a simple case.”

{10} On appeal, the State was left with characterizing the case as one of intermediate
complexity because substantial evidence did not support the district court’s finding that
the case was simple and because it involves ten charges and twelve witnesses. Aside
from referencing the number of charges and witnesses, the State made no argument
explaining why we should categorize the case as intermediate. Although only two of the
district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, based on the record and
argument before us, we defer to the district court’s characterization of the case as
simple. See State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 57, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (“[W]e
have determined that the [district] court is in the best position to determine the
complexity of a case.”); Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 6 (stating that the appellate courts
give deference to the district court as to the level of complexity of the case).

{11} Accordingly, the threshold for triggering a speedy trial analysis in this simple case
was twelve months from the date Defendant’s speedy trial rights attached. See Garza,
2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 2. “In general, the right [to a speedy trial] attaches when the
defendant becomes an accused, that is, by a filing of a formal indictment or information
or arrest and holding to answer.” State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 279,
87 P.3d 1061 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{12} Defendant’s speedy trial rights attached on August 26, 2020, the date he was
purportedly arrested on the original charges in this case. The district court held a
hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss on July 18, 2022, and subsequently granted
the motion. Therefore, the delay in this case was twenty-two months and twenty-two
days, which exceeded the presumptive twelve-month threshold by ten months and
twenty-two days. Because the delay was presumptively prejudicial, we continue with our
Barker analysis. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21.

{13} “[T]he greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the
[s]tate.” Id. ¶ 23. In this case, the delay was almost eleven months past the
presumptively prejudicial period. In State v. Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶ 12, 130 N.M.
651, 29 P.3d 1052, this Court held that a shorter, length of delay—nine months beyond
the date of presumptive prejudice in a simple case—weighed “heavily against the
[s]tate.” Id. In this case, we likewise conclude that the delay, which amounted to almost
twice the presumptively prejudicial period for a simple case, weighs heavily against the
State and in Defendant’s favor. See State v. Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 19, 65,
327 P.3d 1129 (concluding that the length of delay, which was twice as long as the
length of delay considered to be presumptively prejudicial, weighed heavily against the
state).

II.   Reasons for Delay

{14} The reasons for delay “may either heighten or temper the prejudice to the
defendant caused by the length of the delay.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “There are three types of delay that may be
attributed to the [s]tate and are weighed against it in varying ways.” State v. Castro,
2017-NMSC-027, ¶ 22, 402 P.3d 688. First, deliberate attempts by the state to delay the
trial and hamper the defense weigh heavily against the state. Id. Second, “negligent or
administrative delay should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant.” Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 29 (omission,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). And third, there are “appropriate” delays
for which there is “a valid reason, such as a missing witness.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). These are delays which are considered neutral and do not
weigh against the state. See id. Finally, any delay caused by the defense weighs
against the defendant. See id.

{15} By way of de novo review, we independently reweigh the reasons for delay. See
Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19 (“[W]e give deference to the district court’s factual
findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the Barker factors de novo.”
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

A.    August 25, 2020 - April 22, 2021

{16} During this period the case proceeded normally with the State initiating the case
in magistrate court on August 25, 2020, followed by Defendant’s waiver of a preliminary
hearing, and the filing of an October 9, 2020, criminal information in the district court.
On November 6, 2020, the State filed pleadings one normally expects to see filed in a
criminal case, including a request for a scheduling order, notice of an open file for
discovery and production, a motion for discovery, a demand for notice of alibi, a request
to interview witnesses, a witness list, and a certificate of compliance. On November 12,
2020, the district court entered an order amending Defendant’s conditions of release,
and Defendant filed a motion seeking an order directing the State to file a statement of
facts, a demand for speedy trial, and a request for disclosure of evidence and
witnesses. On November 13, 2020, the district court entered a scheduling order that
included an April 26, 2021 trial setting. The district court amended the scheduling order
on March 9, 2021, keeping the April trial setting. On April 22, 2021, the district court
entered an amended notice of jury trial for June 28, 2021.

{17} Until the April 22, 2021, amendment to the jury trial date, the case was
progressing normally and we therefore weigh this period of seven months and twenty-
nine days neutrally. See State v. Parrish, 2011-NMCA-033, ¶ 25, 149 N.M. 506, 252
P.3d 730 (weighing the delay neutrally when “the case progressed with customary
promptness”); State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 13, 148 N.M. 253, 233 P.3d 782
(concluding that because the “case proceeded with customary promptness and delay
cannot be held against either party”).

B.     April 23, 2021 – July 18, 2022

{18} Between June 9, 2021 and June 28, 2022, the district court rescheduled the trial
ten times, resulting in a delay of fourteen months and twenty-six days. The district court
attributed its multiple rescheduling of Defendant’s trial settings “[i]n large part” to its
“extremely large criminal” docket, which it attributed to the increase in criminal filings
and turn over in the district attorney’s office. The district court’s order does not explain
how turnover in the district attorney’s office caused delay in this case proceeding to trial
and our review of the record reveals that the State did not seek postponement of any
trial settings. Delays resulting from an overburdened docket are administrative delays,
which we weigh slightly against the State. See Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 23.

{19} In sum, the delay of twenty-two months and twenty-two days from the date the
charges were filed against Defendant to the date of the hearing on the motion to dismiss
for a speedy trial violation—we weigh seven months and twenty-nine days neutrally,
and the remaining fourteen months and twenty-six days slightly against the State as
administrative delay.

III.   Assertion of Right

{20} The third Barker factor analyzes the degree to which the defendant has asserted
his right to a speedy trial. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 32. In analyzing whether a
defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial, we “accord weight to the frequency
and force of the defendant’s objections to the delay [and] also analyze the defendant’s
actions with regard to the delay.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{21} The district court found Defendant adequately asserted his speedy trial rights and
we agree. Defendant filed a speedy trial demand early in the case and asserted his right
to a speedy trial when he filed a motion to dismiss on June 2, 2022. Cf. Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, ¶ 34 (stating that the “[d]efendant’s single demand for a speedy trial,
preceding his motion to dismiss, . . . was sufficient to assert his right”); see State v.
Lujan, 2015-NMCA-032, ¶ 18, 345 P.3d 1103 (“New Mexico courts . . . have concluded
that a motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds is an assertion of the right that is
weighed against the government, although it is generally not weighed heavily.”). We
therefore weigh this factor in Defendant’s favor.

IV.    Prejudice

{22} Finally, we consider the prejudice factor, which is “the heart of the right to a
speedy trial.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 12. “We analyze prejudice to a defendant in a
speedy trial case in light of three defense interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.” State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 60, 367
P.3d 420 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Of these three interests, “the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
[their] case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. It is
ordinarily the defendant’s burden to “make a particularized showing of prejudice to
demonstrate a violation of any of the three interests.” State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-
031, ¶ 21, 387 P.3d 230. In addition, “[i]n a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the [first]
three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, . . . [the d]efendant
must show particularized prejudice in order to prove their speedy trial [right] was
violated.” State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21, 504 P.3d 579. The defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating and substantiating a particularized showing of
prejudice. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 35.

A.     Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration

{23} Whether pretrial incarceration is oppressive “depends on the length of
incarceration, whether the defendant obtained release prior to trial, and what prejudicial
effects the defendant has shown as a result of the incarceration.” Serros, 2016-NMSC-
008, ¶ 89 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Below, the district court found
that Defendant “demonstrated significant particularized prejudice from the delay” where
“[h]is liberty ha[d] been significantly curtailed because he ha[d] been on involuntary
house arrest . . . for the last [twenty-four] months” resulting in him not being able to
leave his house in two years. Defendant argues that the conditions of his house arrest
“were so restrictive as to be likened to oppressive pretrial incarceration.” Specifically,
Defendant contends that he was subject to oppressive pretrial incarceration because he
could not leave his house to work odd jobs, he could not spend time with his family, and
as a result of the delay he suffered extreme anguish. The State responds that the
district court erred in finding that Defendant established particularized prejudice, in part,
because he “was not incarcerated during the pendency of the case [r]ather, he . . . was
placed under house arrest.” We agree with the State, and conclude that Defendant has
not demonstrated undue prejudice as a result of his house arrest while the charges
were pending against him.

{24} “Because some degree of oppression and anxiety is inherent in every
incarceration, we weigh this factor in the defendant’s favor only where the pretrial
incarceration or anxiety suffered is undue.” Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 51 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Reviewing the record below, Defendant was
placed under house arrest and was not permitted to “leave the residence unless it is for
a doctor’s appointment, court appearance or meeting with [his] attorney.” Moreover,
Defendant could not leave the County of Colfax without permission of the district court.
Defendant was released into the custody of a third party custodian, later transferred into
the custody of another third party custodian, and placed on a GPS monitor.

{25} Even assuming that the almost two-year delay while under house arrest is
presumptively prejudicial, see Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 57 (stating that “[c]ontinuous
pretrial incarceration is obviously oppressive to some degree, even in the absence of
affirmative proof”), Defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his
being under house arrest for that period of time constituted oppressive pretrial
incarceration. See State v. Valencia, 2010-NMCA-005, ¶ 29 147 N.M. 432, 224 P.3d
659 (concluding that the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating undue
prejudice where he “spent one month incarcerated, had to wear an ankle monitor for
three months after he was bonded out, and could not go out of state”). Defendant did
not sit in a jail cell pending trial—he was permitted to leave the residence for the limited
purposes outlined in the conditions of his release.1 Moreover, Defendant had the ability
to file a motion to modify the conditions of his release if he so desired—but he did not
file any motion to modify until August 2, 2022, when he asked permission to travel to
Albuquerque to meet a witness. Shortly thereafter, on August 3, 2022, the district court
granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

{26} To the extent that Defendant argues that his being on house arrest affected his
ability to work, we find no evidence in the record to support this claim other than
Defendant’s mere assertion that he could not work “odd jobs.” Defendant testified that
he had been receiving Social Security Income (SSI), due to a disability since 1984, and
had only been employed on a full-time basis for one month since that time. Moreover, in
relation to Defendant’s claim that he was unable to see his family—there were no
conditions in his release that prevented adult members of Defendant’s family from
visiting him at the residence of his third party custodian. Due to the nature of the
charges against Defendant, he could not be around children. Therefore, though
Defendant undoubtedly suffered some degree of prejudice as a result of being under
house arrest pending trial we cannot say it was undue. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶

1In State v. Vivier, an unreported opinion, we addressed a similar issue in the context of a defendant’s
speedy trial rights. No. 32,095, mem. op. at 1 (N.M. Ct. App. July 13, 2012) (nonprecedential). In that
case, the defendant argued he was subject to a form of pretrial incarceration by the conditions of his
release because “he was required to attend counseling, report weekly to pretrial services, submit for drug
screens, and pay for [an] ankle monitor.” We concluded that “[w]earing an ankle monitor instead of being
placed in a jail cell is not considered to be oppressive pretrial incarceration.” Id.
35 (stating “we weigh this factor in the defendant’s favor only where the pretrial
incarceration or the anxiety suffered is undue”); see also Valencia, 2010-NMCA-005, ¶
28 (stating that “[the d]efendant bears the burden to demonstrate and substantiate
prejudice”).

B.     Anxiety and Concern

{27} In his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, Defendant did not assert and
argue that the conditions of his house arrest while awaiting trial caused him to suffer
undue anxiety and concern. Defendant asserted that his inability to gain employment,
the restrictions on his liberty and being subject to arrest at any time for violating his
conditions of release, caused him to experience particularized prejudice and that “[t]his
stress and anxiety to . . . Defendant is also a factor.” At the hearing on Defendant’s
motion to dismiss, with regard to anxiety and concern Defendant testified that the
restrictions of his involuntary house arrest caused him “great anguish, leading [him] to
[develop] ‘suicidal thoughts,’” causing him to feel as if he could not go on with his life.
Defendant did not specify at what point during the delay he began to experience
anguish and suicidal thoughts, or testify that he sought medical attention to address his
mental state. The district court did not make an explicit finding concerning Defendant’s
“anxiety and concern” in its determination that Defendant suffered particularized
prejudice. And on appeal Defendant merely asserts that he “testified that he suffered
extreme anguish as a result of the delay in this case.” Based solely on Defendant’s
testimony, we can presume he suffered some degree of anxiety and concern, but
without more we do not conclude that the prejudice was undue. See Ochoa, 2017-
NMSC-031, ¶ 51 (stating that the anxiety suffered must be undue in order to weigh in a
defendant’s favor).

C.     Impairment to the Defense

{28} Finally, the district court made no finding of impairment to Defendant’s defense—
the interest deemed “most serious” in the particularized prejudice analysis. Garza,
2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the
Defendant makes no assertion on appeal that his defense was impaired in any way by
the delay.

{29} We conclude that Defendant failed to show particularized prejudice resulting from
his house arrest.

V.     Balancing the Barker Factors

{30} We hold that the district court erred in determining that the delay in this case
prejudiced Defendant and violated his right to a speedy trial because Defendant failed
to show particularized prejudice and only one of the factors weighs heavily in his favor.
See Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing
of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh heavily
against the [s]tate.”).
CONCLUSION

{31} For the reasons stated above, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

{32}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, sitting by designation