Court Opinion

ID: 9493610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:13:00.256055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:55.753493
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The central and threshold question in this appeal is whether certain sections of the federal criminal code, specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2242(1), apply extra-territorially so as to reach crimes committed on foreign soil. I conclude that they do not and therefore respectfully dissent. As the Supreme Court so clearly stated in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991) (“Aramco”), “[w]e assume that Congress legislates against [a] backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.” In my view, this presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law, combined with the ambiguous language of *1184the statutes and the absence of any clear Congressional intent to include foreign locations, compel the conclusion that the district court did not have jurisdiction. In short, I do not think that Congress has provided for the application of these statutes to government-leased housing in the Philippines or housing on a military base in Japan. Notably, Congress recently confirmed the existence of this “jurisdictional gap” by passing legislation to extend jurisdiction to American civilians like Corey who are employed by or accompany the military overseas. Absent such clear intent to extend the reach of U.S. laws to Corey, however, we are without jurisdiction in this case.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority creates a circuit split, see United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2000),1 chooses not to apply the well-established presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes, and misinterprets 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) by ignoring its legislative history and instead relying upon a tangential historical record. Regardless of the recent legislation, this case raises a very important issue, both for Corey individually and because the majority adopts an unprecedented view of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
I. THE NARROW ISSUE PRESENTED
The majority and I share significant common ground. I agree that neither the Constitution nor the principles of international law would prevent Congress from extending the reach of a federal criminal law to Corey, a U.S. citizen. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States”); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73, 61 S.Ct. 924, 85 L.Ed. 1193 (1941) (“[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.”); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir.1983) (“Nationality and the protective principle do allow the United States to assert jurisdiction over individuals for events occurring at United States embassies and consulates.”); see generally United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 840 & n. 5 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining various bases of jurisdiction under international law).2
I also agree that the relevant international agreements, namely (1) the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (SOFA), Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652, and (2) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, provide the necessary authority for Congress to enact criminal legislation applicable to these locales. In short, there is no doubt that Congress can ensure that U.S. citizens who engage in heinous criminal activity overseas will stand trial in a United States court.
*1185But this is not a case about power. The issue before us is whether Congress exercised that power, specifically whether Congress intended the penal statutes that criminalize Corey’s conduct to apply extra-territorially. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (“Whether Congress has in fact exercised that authority ... is a matter of statutory construction.”); Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 839. Put another way, we are not considering here whether Congress can bring Corey within the reach of the U.S. Criminal Code, nor are we considering whether Congress should do so. The only question before us is whether Congress did so, and it is on this point that the majority and I differ.
II. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A. The Law
Guiding our inquiry is the well-established cannon of statutory construction— the presumption against extraterritoriality — based on the understanding that Congress “is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.” Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680 (1949). “[T]he presumption against extraterritorial application of United States statutes requires that any lingering doubt regarding the reach of the [statute] be resolved against [extraterritorial application], It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04, 113 S.Ct. 1178, 122 L.Ed.2d 548 (1993) (internal quotations omitted) (case involving Federal Torts Claims Act). This presumption “has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of other nations.” Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993). As the Supreme Court explained:
[w]e have in this case a question of statutory construction. The necessary locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of nations. Crimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement and frauds of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them is to be extended to include those committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard.
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922).
In light of this longstanding principle, courts have examined the extraterritorial applicability of statutes with the view that Congress knows how to place crimes committed outside our borders within the jurisdictional reach of a statute. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989) (explaining that Congress extended jurisdiction to vessels on the high seas in 18 U.S.C. § 7(1)); see also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (“We assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.”).3
*1186B. The Presumption Applies Here
The statutes at issue here, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2242(1), prohibit certain forms of sexual misconduct committed ‘“in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.... ” In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) defines “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” as
[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.
Neither precedent nor logic supports the majority’s conclusion that the extraterritoriality presumption is inapplicable because a jurisdictional statute is at play. Under Bowman, the presumption clearly applies to criminal statutes. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39. And the majority’s effort to avoid the presumption because § 7(3) defines territorial jurisdiction is bootstrapping at its worst. Although jurisdictional statutes address how far Congress wishes to extend U.S. law, absent clear language or some meaningful signal, such statutes do not necessarily indicate whether Congress intended extraterritorial jurisdiction. The majority’s conclusion that we “should simply employ the standard tools of statutory interpretation” when interpreting § 7(3), see Maj. Op. at 1171 (quoting Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d at 206 n. 32), brings us right back to the question at hand. In § 7(3), Congress defined “territorial jurisdiction.” But “territorial” cannot be equated with “extraterritorial,” and hence, we still need to determine whether Congress intended to extend the reach of “territorial jurisdiction” to foreign lands. To proceed otherwise would allow an end-run around the requirement that Congress must be explicit in demonstrating its intent to legislate extraterritorially.
Nevertheless, the majority relies on the jurisdictional nature of § 7(3) as a reason to avoid application of the presumption.4 This position has been adopted by one district court in New York, see United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d 189, 206 n. 32 (S.D.N.Y.2000), but subsequently was criticized by the Second Circuit in Gatlin. Although a district court opinion from another circuit would have no precedential value in this court, in some cases it might be instructive; but that is hardly the case here when the decision was already disavowed by the Second Circuit.5 See also United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 160 *1187(4th Cir.1973) (failing to address canon of construction and explaining that “[w]here the power of the Congress is clear, and the language of the exercise is broad, we perceive no duty to construe a statute narrowly.”).
In its effort to avoid the presumption against extraterritoriality, the majority extends Bowman far beyond its holding or any reasonable extension of it. The majority states that “the presumption does not apply where the legislation implicates concerns that are not inherently domestic” and then cites Bowman as an example, explaining that in that case “the Supreme Court held that the territorial presumption does not govern the interpretation of criminal statutes that, by their nature, implicate the legitimate interests of the United States abroad.” Maj. Op. at 1170-71.
Bowman does not stand for such a far-reaching proposition. Rather, Bowman recognizes a narrow exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality for “criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependant on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents.” 260 U.S. at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39.6 There can be little doubt that the narrow Bowman exception does not cover the penal statutes at issue here. Nor, in my view, does the narrow exception emanating from Bowman and its progeny-the commonsense principle that courts should not presume Congress intended to legislate domestically when it criminalizes behavior that presents a cognizable threat within our borders7 — support the majority’s conclusion. See Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir.1994) (“The Supreme Court’s recent discussions of the presumption against extraterritoriality, none of which mentions Bowman, seem to require that all statutes, without exception, be construed to apply within the United States only, unless a contrary intent appears.”).
The majority offers a second reason for not applying the presumption here, namely that “[l]and subject to subsection 7(3) is not ‘extraterritorial,’ as the Supreme Court has defined the term.” Maj. Op. at 1171. In support of this statement, the majority cites to a single statement in Aramco. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (“In applying this rule of construction, we look to see whether ‘language in the [relevant Act] gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.’ ”) (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285, 69 S.Ct. 575) (emphasis added).8
*1188Read literally, as the majority proposes, this language would eviscerate the concept of extraterritoriality. If “territorial” automatically includes foreign lands where U.S. law applies, then the presumption against extraterritoriality is pointless because there would be no “extraterritorial” application of U.S. law.
The Second Circuit declined to go down a similar path in Kollias. The court rejected the argument that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to a case involving application of the Long-shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (the “LHWCA”) to an injury on an American flag vessel because the ship “was in effect a United States territory as it traveled across the high seas.” 29 F.3d at 72. After first recognizing that the law of the flag does not necessarily govern shipboard conduct, the court exposed the underlying circularity of this reasoning:
In any case, the concept of extraterritoriality does not refer to the body of law that governs the dispute; if it did, extraterritorial application of United States statutes would be an impossibility because any place where United States law governed a particular dispute would be considered United States territory. Accordingly, we decline to characterize the [ship] as a kind of floating United States territory, where application of the LHWCA would not be extraterritorial.
M9
Simply declaring the foreign locations to be part of U.S. territory is a semantic sleight of hand that avoids the real question of statutory interpretation and congressional intent. I turn next to an examination of the statute itself.
III. THE STATUTE
A. The Statute is Ambiguous
With the presumption against extraterritoriality application as the viewing lens, the first task is to analyze the statutory text to determine whether Congress intended § 7(3) to cover the foreign locations at issue here.10 As noted before, the spe*1189cial maritime and territorial jurisdiction includes:
Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.
18 U.S.C. § 7(3).
On its face, the language of § 7(3) is ambiguous and certainly does not demonstrate an intent to apply to locations outside the borders of the United States. Although “any lands” could arguably be stretched to include foreign lands, a “plausible” reading of a statute does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (“If we were to permit possible, or even plausible, interpretations of language such as that involved here to override the presumption against extraterritorial application, there would be little left of the presumption.”). Indeed, the fact that the statute has spawned such a multiplicity of interpretations, ranging from Gatlin to Erdos to the majority, underscores not only the ambiguity of the statute but also the need for the presumption itself.
Nor does the structure of § 7(3) support an intention to include foreign lands acquired overseas. In my view, both the first and second clauses of § 7(3) refer to lands ivithin our borders, as the federal government may acquire lands other than “by consent of the legislature” of a state. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 142, 147, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937). Indeed, the United States acquired many lands within our present borders without the “consent” of the legislature of any state. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 215-16 & n. 10 (quoting Jordan J. Paust, Non-Extraterritoriality of “Special Territorial Jurisdiction” of the United States: Forgotten History and the Errors of Erdos, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 305, 318-20 (1999), noting that the United States acquired Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia, places within the District of Columbia, and lands acquired in territorial form before states existed in those areas without the consent of the legislature of any state).
The argument that the statute must apply extraterritorially also ignores a key term within the first clause: “reserved.” The first clause refers to “lands reserved or acquired.” “Reserved” has a special historical meaning that has nothing to do with foreign countries. See Paust, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. at 325 (“[I]f the land is not owned by the United States, the land as such is not ‘reserved’ or ‘acquired’ by the United States within the ordinary meaning of those terms or the meaning clarified by legislative history and historical context, especially the special meaning of ‘reserved lands.’ ”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1307-08 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “reserved land” as “[pjublic land that has been withheld or kept back from sale or disposition” and “reservation” as “a tract of land ... which is by public authority withdrawn from sale or settlement, and appropriated to specific public uses; such as parks, military posts, Indian lands, etc.”).
This proposition is illustrated by the legislative history of the precursors to § 7(3) and the Assimilated Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, which adopts the criminal law of the states, territories, possessions, or districts as the criminal laws for “places now exist*1190ing or hereafter reserved, or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title .... ” 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (emphasis added). In 1909, Congress added “reserved” to the 1874 version of that statute11 after courts held that the statute did not apply to any territory that had been obtained by the United States in any manner other than by cession:
[I]t was held that ... under section 5391, this law did not apply to any territory that had been obtained since [the statute was enacted in] 1825 except by cession, and it was discovered that a great deal of property, for military reservations, for arsenals, post-offices, custom-houses, quarantine stations, and court-houses had been acquired by reservation; that the United States, owning the land, existing in territorial form, would reserve a portion of it for Federal purposes, and then admit the State to the Union. The Supreme Court said, “Your act does not cover that class of cases. It is specific. It relates to territory subsequently acquired by cession. It relates to the laws of the United States that were in force at the time you passed it, to lands ceded to the United Sates by the legislature of a State in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, but it does not relate to territory that has been subsequently acquired in any other way.”
42 Cong. Rec. 584 (1908); accord id. at 593; Paust, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. at 316-17.12 In other words, in 1909, Congress was concerned about the need for legislation governing land that the United States owned and retained when a new state was created. See Paust, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. at 317. The pointed reference to “reserved” in the first clause of § 7(3), which Congress similarly included in its 1909 precursor, suggests that both clauses of § 7(3) apply only domestically.
Even if, as the majority concludes, § 7(3) applies “outside the borders of the fifty states,” Maj. Op. at 1172, that conclusion does not perforce mean that Congress intended it to cover lands that remain part of foreign countries. As the majority itself points out, see Maj. Op. at 1173-74, new lands became a part of the United States through, among other means annexation, conquest, and purchase.
Finally, the highly piecemeal fashion in which § 7 was compiled undermines the majority’s attempt to read the statute holistically. See Maj. Op. at 1171-72. “[I]t makes little sense to inquire into congressional intent by looking at the statute as a whole since most subsections of § 7 were enacted separately by Congress and have their own legislative histories.” Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 216 n. 11. Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, the other subsections of § 7 demonstrate that Congress explicitly provides for jurisdiction when it intends to do so. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (high seas); 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (outer space). Congressional intent with respect to the other subsections of § 7, however, does not reflect congressional intent to extend § 7(3) across foreign borders. Indeed, in light of the fact that Congress clearly legislated extraterritorially in the *1191other subsections of § 7 but did not do so in § 7(3), the presumption against extraterritoriality applies with full force.
In conclusion, although the structure of § 7(3) reinforces the conclusion that the United States may acquire lands in more than one fashion, it is a dead end in terms of analyzing whether Congress meant to include lands outside the United States and within the borders of other nations. To suggest, as the majority does, that “Congress unmistakably had foreign locales in mind when it set about defining that jurisdiction,” and that the statute “extends the jurisdiction ... to areas where American citizens and property need protection, yet no other government effectively safeguards those interests,” Maj. Op. at 1171, is to manufacture congressional intent by substituting a judicial policy judgment for a congressional one. The most one can conclude is that the language manifests no clear congressional intent. This statute is a poster-child for ambiguity— every court attempting to construe and harmonize the statute goes through contortions trying to explain what Congress meant but did not say. In this instance, we should look to other “available evidence,” namely, the legislative history. Sale, 509 U.S. at 177,113 S.Ct. 2549.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of § 7(3) and its precursors, see Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790); 70 Rev. Stat., ch. 3, § 5539 (1874); Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909), reinforces the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nothing in that history suggests that Congress intended the statute to apply to foreign localities, such as embassy housing and military bases, within foreign countries; indeed, the legislative history counsels that Congress intended to address domestic, not foreign, jurisdiction.
Addressing the identical question presented here, in the context of a military base in Germany, the Second Circuit in Gatlin exhaustively traced the history of § 7(3) and concluded that “the legislative history of § 7(3) and its precursors demonstrates unequivocally that Congress, in fact, intended the statute to apply exclusively to the territorial United States.” 216 F.3d at 220; id. at 219 (“Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1909 Act-either in the floor debates or in the lengthy report of the Special Joint Committee on the Revision of the Laws' — -is there any indication that the statute was meant to extend federal criminal jurisdiction to land in a foreign nation”) (citations omitted); see also Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d at 209-10; Paust, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. at 314-24.
Gatlin lays out the legislative history in detail and there is no need to reproduce a similar analysis here. The key to the legislative history and to interpretation of this statute lies in examination of the statute at three points in time: upon enactment in 1790, at the time of recodification in 1909, and when the statute was amended in 1940.
The statute can be traced to legislation passed by the First Congress, “An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes Against the United States.” Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). Unlike the current substantive criminal law, which references a separate statutory section that defines jurisdiction, the 1790 Act incorporated jurisdiction into the substantive definition of the offense, limiting it to certain lands “under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at §§ 3, 6-7. As noted in Gatlin, “the fact that the 1790 Act delimited the jurisdiction of the federal courts to lands over which the United States exercised exclusive legislative jurisdiction ‘virtually guarantees’ that the provision was not intended to apply to offenses committed in a foreign territory.” Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 216 (quoting Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d at 209).
The 1790 Act remained essentially unchanged until 1909, when Congress undertook a comprehensive codification of the criminal code. For the first time, the section defining jurisdiction was codified in a separate statute, but again, this precursor *1192to § 7(3) applied only to lands over which the United States had “exclusive” jurisdiction. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321 § 272, 35 Stat. 1143 (1909) (“When committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dock-yard, or other needful building.”). Congress could not have intended this provision to apply to property in foreign countries. Congress knew how to extend criminal jurisdiction when it wanted to,13 and its failure to do so in 1909 is telling.
It was not until 1940 that Congress expanded the statutory scope to include land over which the federal government had “concurrent” jurisdiction. See Act of June 11, 1940, ch. 323, 54 Stat. 304 (1940) (“When committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.”).
The legislative history of the 1940 amendment indicates that Congress did not intend to expand the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction by adding “concurrent,” and surely not to foreign lands. Rather, according to the legislative history, Congress intended to respond to a 1937 Supreme Court decision that held that states consensually transferring lands to the United States may retain partial or concurrent jurisdiction:
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in James v. Dravo Contracting Company (302 U.S. 134, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155) (December 1937), it was the accepted view that the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction over any lands purchased with the consent of the State fdr any of the purposes enumerated in article I, section 8, clause 17, of the Constitution, and that any provision of a State statute retaining partial or concurrent jurisdiction was inoperable. In the Dravo case it was held that a State may properly retain partial or concurrent jurisdiction.
The provisions of the Criminal Code ... limited the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government to such Federal reservations in respect to which the United States had acquired exclusive jurisdiction.
This bill simply restores to the Federal Government the jurisdiction it was recognized as having until the Dravo decision was handed down.
The most significant effect of this bill is to grant Federal courts concurrent criminal jurisdiction on reservations where the United States does not have exclusive jurisdiction.
H.R.Rep. No. 76-1623, at 1 (1940); see also Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 219-20 n. 14 (“Notwithstanding this change, it is apparent from what little legislative history there is of the 1940 Act ... that, in making this change, the 76th Congress did not intend to extend the reach of the statute to lands outside the United States.”); Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d at 210-11 & n. 37. In other words, Congress intended the addi*1193tion of “concurrent” to address the issue of a state’s concurrent jurisdiction.
The addition of “concurrent” in 1940, without any contemporary indication that the change was brought about by a desire to include locations in foreign countries, undermines the majority’s reliance on the statute’s reference to “concurrent” jurisdiction. I cannot agree with the majority’s unsupported assertion that there is no reason “to presume that when, in 1940, Congress extended criminal jurisdiction to those lands under the concurrent authority of the United States, it intended to limit the reach of subsection 7(3) to areas under the concurrent authority of the states, but not those under the concurrent authority of other sovereigns.” Maj. Op. at 1175. Although the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to this statute, we do not need to presume anything here — an examination of the statute and its history indicates that § 7(3) does not extend to lands abroad. The majority’s quantum leap from the statute’s long-standing reference to “exclusive” jurisdiction to assertion of jurisdiction over crimes in foreign countries cannot be sustained.
The legislative history points to one conclusion: § 7(3) applies only in the domestic context, not to federal criminal jurisdiction beyond our borders.
IV. RESORT TO HISTORY
The majority’s effort to find support through reference to the history of our nation’s westward expansion and overseas acquisitions in no way informs the question here. ' Rather the history demonstrates simply that Congress knew how to extend explicitly the reach of the federal criminal code when it so desired. I am not persuaded by the majority’s attempts to locate in the general history of our country’s nineteenth century expansion evidence of an intent that a provision, which at the time covered only lands over which the United States had “exclusive” jurisdiction, would apply to places undoubtedly located in foreign countries.
The majority begins with the statement that, at the turn of the century (when the precursor to § 7(3) spoke only of lands over which the U.S. had “exclusive” jurisdiction), Americans “may have believed that, so long as territory remained unequivocally foreign, it lay outside the jurisdiction of the United States, [but] they were well aware that territory could change hands, and the United States could gain exclusive jurisdiction over territory that other countries claimed as their own.” Maj. Op. at 1173. Indeed, as the majority points out, the turn of the century marked a period of great expansion in our nation’s history, which suggests that “[t]his was clearly not a time when Americans thought of their borders as static or of foreign territory as sacrosanct.” Id. at 1173. True enough, but, at risk of being perceived as glib, I ask, so what? Neither was this a time when Americans viewed themselves as having exclusive jurisdiction over land clearly within the territorial boundaries of a foreign sovereign.
This historical digression does not advance our inquiry, for we are dealing here with embassy housing and a military base, not lands that became part of our country through annexation, purchase or conquest, and as such fell within our exclusive jurisdiction. Nor are we dealing with land over which United States sovereignty or jurisdiction is disputed. See Maj. Op. at 1175 (“Courts had no hesitation about treating these territories as within our exclusive jurisdiction, even though foreign governments claimed the territory as their own.”).14 The natural application of § 7(3)’s precursors to such lands does not *1194suggest, let alone conclusively determine, that Congress expected property used by the United States but located squarely and unequivocally within foreign borders15 to fall within our “exclusive” jurisdiction.16
The discussion of legislation extending federal criminal jurisdiction to territory under Indian control and islands claimed by Americans for their guano deposits also fails to provide support for the majority’s decision. See Maj. Op. at 1174-75.17 Rather, these acts further demonstrate that when it so desires, Congress knows how to make explicit its intent to include lands within the reach of the federal erimi-nal code. In fact, the majority underscores this conclusion by observing that “[wjhen the United States claimed territory far beyond its borders, Congress promptly extended federal jurisdiction to those areas under U.S. control.” Maj. Op. at 1175. Nor is the majority’s recognition that Congress “understood criminal jurisdiction to extend to all lands claimed by the United States, without regard to whether they were within a particular state or even within the continental United States,” Maj. Op. at 1175, helpful, because the locations at issue here are not “lands claimed by the United States.”
*1195The history of our westward expansion, while interesting, is far afield from congressional intent in 1790 or remedial legislation adopted in 1940. To the extent we look beyond the statute, I find the legislative history far more instructive and compelling.
V. LEASED HOUSING AND MILITARY BASES
Because I conclude that § 7(3) does not extend the reach of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2242(1) extraterritorially, it is unnecessary to consider whether the United States exercises “exclusive or concurrent” jurisdiction over the leased housing or military base in this case. Nonetheless, some discussion of the nature of these locations is useful, as it illustrates the far-reaching consequences of the majority opinion and the tremendous conflict it creates with the long-held understanding of the Supreme Court, Congress, the military, and the commentators.
A. Leased Housing
Bearing in mind that § 7(3) was intended at the outset to extend only to lands under the exclusive control of the United States, an apartment leased by the United States in a foreign country is both legally and conceptually far afield from that category. The United States is not an infrequent tenant abroad. Under the majority’s approach, criminal jurisdiction would extend to more than 10,000 properties leased by the United States in foreign countries, ranging from Australia to the Vatican City, and not including extensive property leased by defense agencies. See United States Gen. Servs. Admin., Summary Report on Real Property Leased by the United States Throughout the World as of September 30, 1999, at 13 (1999). Absent congressional directive, we should not treat lightly such a far flung extension of criminal jurisdiction.
B. Military Bases and the Jurisdictional Gap
Jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military abroad presents a special case. The United States typically negotiates this jurisdiction with other countries via Status of Forces Agreements (“SOFAs”). See Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 37 A.F. L.Rev. 169, 171 (1994) (“Today, it is widely agreed that in the absence of a treaty like SOFA, jurisdiction over foreign forces rests exclusively with the host state.”).18 The 1960 U.S. — Japan SOFA follows the standard format,19 giving Japan the exclusive power to prosecute American civilians like Corey when their offenses are not punishable under the laws of the United States.20
*1196Until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957), it was generally presumed that United States military courts had jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military who committed crimes abroad. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 220 n. 15; Lepper, 37 A.F. L.Rev. at 171. In Reid, however, the Supreme Court held to the contrary, concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction over a civilian dependent in a capital case during peacetime was unconstitutional. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 40-41, 77 S.Ct. 1222. In so holding, the Court created a “jurisdictional gap” with respect to civilians accompanying the military abroad. See Gregory A. McClelland, The Problem of Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Forces Overseas-Still With Us, 117 Mil. L. Rev. 153, 173-74 (1987).
Although the Court was not addressing § 7(3), Reid suggests that the Court was aware of the jurisdictional gap issue. For example, Justice Frankfurter noted that the government argued that an adverse decision meant that “only a foreign trial could be had.” 354 U.S. at 48, 77 S.Ct. 1222 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Clark recognized that “[t]he only alternative remaining — probably the alternative that the Congress will now be forced to choose — is that Americans committing offenses on foreign soil be tried by the courts of the country in which the offense is committed.” Id. at 88, 77 S.Ct. 1222 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Three years after Reid, in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960), the dilemma of the jurisdictional gap again surfaced. With respect to civilians accompanying the military outside the United States, the Court pointed to “the want of legislation providing for trials in capital cases in Article III courts sitting in the United States,” noting that, “[a]t argument, the Government indicated that there had been no effort in the Congress to make any provision for the prosecution of such cases either in continental United States or in foreign lands.” Id. at 245, 80 S.Ct. 297. Justice Whittaker agreed that “jurisdiction of our civil courts does not extend” to “bases in foreign lands.” Id. at 276, 80 S.Ct. 297 (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, Justice Harlan, in dissent, wrote that the Court’s decisions “are ... regrettable because they are bound to disturb delicate arrangements with many foreign countries, and may result in our having to relinquish to other nations ... a substantial part of the jurisdiction now retained over American personnel under the Status of Forces Agreements.” Id. at 259, 80 S.Ct. 297 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The majority gives short shrift to the conclusion that such a jurisdictional gap exists. See Maj. Op. at 1172 n. 3. But Congress recently passed legislation specifically to close the gap. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, S. 768, 106th Cong. (2000). I view the recent legislation as confirmatory “icing on the cake” and not, as the majority suggests, evidence of congressional intent in 1790. The gap is not illusory. Prior to this new legislation, Congress made numerous efforts to enact legislation to fill the gap. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 222 n. 23 (documenting multiple failed congressional attempts to close gap); Susan S. Gibson, Lack of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Civilians: A New Look at an Old Problem, 148 Mil. L.Rev. 114, 136-37 (1995); Thomas G. Becker, Justice on the Far Side of the World: The Continuing Problem of Misconduct by Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 18 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 277, 287 (1995) (discussing recent proposals to make conduct that would be punishable if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction also punishable if committed by civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas); Robinson O. Everett and Laurent R. Hourcle, Crime Without Punishment-Ex-Servicemen, Civilian Employees and Dependants, 13 U.S.A.F.J.A.G. L. Rev. 184 (1971) (discussing § 7(3) at length); McClelland, supra at 199-200 (discussing *1197proposals to expand § 7(3) during the 1980s that would have covered crimes committed “within a United States military installation abroad”). Although this new legislation does not apply to Corey, it certainly confirms the existence of the gap in this case — and, by implication, the conclusion that § 7(3) does not fill the gap. Moreover, the military has also recognized the existence of this jurisdictional gap. See Department of Defense Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee, Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Time of Armed Conflict 41 (1997) (“Installations in foreign countries are not currently within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”).21
My conclusion that a jurisdictional gap exists — and that § 7(3) does not fill it — is consistent with the consensus among the Supreme Court, Congress, the military, and commentators. I agree with the Second Circuit that “the existence of this jurisdictional gap is an issue that ... warrants serious congressional consideration.” Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 209. But because Congress chose not to address this problem in § 7(3), we are without jurisdiction over Corey.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether we see this as a problem that requires fixing, it is a problem that the federal courts are without power to fix. Simply put, the onus is not on the courts to provide for jurisdiction in this case. Congress has the power under both the Constitution and international law to extend the reach of our criminal laws beyond the borders of the United States. The question is not whether jurisdiction should extend extraterritorially, but whether, under this statute, Congress in fact extended the jurisdiction. The an-Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority creates a circuit split with regard to application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Gatlin holds that the presumption is applicable; the majority disagrees. When the Fourth Circuit interpreted § 7(3) more than 25 years ago, it did not address the issue. See United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.1973).

. Whether the 'jurisdiction” at issue here is labeled subject-matter jurisdiction (of the district court) or legislative (also referred to as prescriptive) jurisdiction (in other words, the power of Congress to legislate), see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing difference and explaining that legislative jurisdiction "refers to the authority of a state to make its laws applicable to persons or activities”) (internal quotations omitted), does not affect the analysis. The question remains whether Congress in fact provided for overseas application of these federal penal statutes. See id. at 814, 113 S.Ct. 2891 ("[Ijhe question in this litigation is whether, and to what extent, Congress has exercised that undoubted legislative jurisdiction in enacting the Sherman Act.”).

. In fact, the criminal code is replete with examples of unambiguous congressional intent to apply U.S. law overseas. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 112(e) (protection of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons); 18 U.S.C. § 175 (prohibitions with respect to biological weapons); 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination, kidnaping, and assault); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (treason). The clear manifestation rule has been followed outside the criminal context as well. See Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the Presumption Against *1186Extraterritoriality, 21 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L.Rev. 177, 179 (1997) (providing examples); see generally Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258, 111 S.Ct. 1227 ("Congress’ awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute.”).

. See Maj. Op. at 1171 ("When Congress is considering the scope of federal jurisdiction, its attention is focused precisely on how far U.S. law should reach. Unlike ordinary domestic statutes, jurisdictional statutes inherently present the question of how far Congress wishes U.S. law to extend. There is therefore no reason to presume that Congress did, or did not, mean to act extraterritorially.”).

. As the Second Circuit in Gatlin explained, In the present case, both parties appear to agree that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies. However, in a recent opinion involving the same jurisdictional provision at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 7(3), Judge Sand declined to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality. See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d 189, 206 n. 32 (S.D.N.Y.2000). The presumption, Judge Sand reasoned, "was designed to apply to provisions that define offenses. When presented with the task of interpreting jurisdictional statutes such as Section 7(3), courts should simply employ the standard tools of statutory interpretation: analysis of text, structure, and legislative history.” Id.
We respectfully disagree with Judge Sand. Although § 7(3) is the immediate focus of our inquiry, the ultimate question here is whether a criminal statute — i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) — applies extraterritorially. The presumption against extraterritoriality plainly applies to criminal statutes (other than the Bowman variety ...), so § 2243(a) applies extraterritorially only if there is a clear manifestation of Congress's affirmative intent. That this inquiry requires us to *1187look to Congress’s intent in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 7, which is incorporated by reference in § 2243(a), does not, in our view, alter the applicable rule of statutory interpretation. Indeed, to accept Judge Sand’s view would seriously undermine the presumption against extraterritoriality since Congress often enacts jurisdictional provisions that are then incorporated by reference elsewhere.
Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 212 n. 6.

. This exception, however, applies to statutes involving crimes against the government, see, e.g., United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.1973), and crimes relating to drug smuggling, see United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir.1991) (marijuana smuggling).

. See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 73-74, 61 S.Ct. 924 (“[A] criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular locality, is to be construed as applicable to the citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no express declaration to that effect.”) (citing Bowman); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir.1977) ("[I]f the nature of the law does not mandate its extraterritorial application, then a presumption arises against such application.”) (citing Bowman).

.The majority’s citation to Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C.Cir.1993), does little to advance its argument. In Massey, the court addressed extraterritorial application of the National Environmental Policy Act. The court held, however, that "the presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes de*1188scribed in Aramco does not apply where the conduct regulated by the statute occurs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States, and the alleged extraterritorial effect of the statute will be fell in Antarctica — a continent without a sovereign, and an area over which the United States has a great measure of legislative control.” Id. at 529. Unlike the conduct in Massey, the conduct here occurred entirely outside our borders. Moreover, the Philippines and Japan are governed by other sovereigns, unlike Antarctica, which "is generally considered to be a 'global common’ and frequently analogized to outer space.” Id. (citation omitted)

. Although in my view the presumption against extraterritoriality applies with full force here and plainly directs the analysis, I agree with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that the same result would be reached even if the presumption did not apply. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 212 n. 6; see also Erdos, 474 F.2d at 159-60 (acknowledging that, "indeed, it is possible that when the statute was enacted the attention of the Congress was not in the slightest focused on extraterritorial jurisdiction.”). I certainly cannot join in the majority's apparent attempt to turn the presumption on its head.
It also bears noting that we are dealing with a punitive statute, and as such the rule of lenity resonates, even if not directly applicable. See generally Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n. 17, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (explaining that the rule of lenity, "under which an ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of the accused,” applies "where, after seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived, the Court is left with an ambiguous statute”) (internal quotations omitted).

. The presumption against extraterritoriality is not insurmountable. For example, in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 390, 69 S.Ct. 140, 93 L.Ed. 76 (1948), the Supreme Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which by its terms applies to "any Stale of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United Slates,” included land leased by the United States in Bermuda for use as a military base, reasoning that "possessions” includes leased bases overseas. But see United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 224, 70 S.Ct. 10, 94 L.Ed. 3 (1949) (Frankfurter, L, concurring) (criticizing Vermilya-Brown); id. at 225, 70 S.Ct. 10 (Jackson, J., concurring) (suggesting that Court should "retreat from” Vermilya-Brown). The Court, however, did not address the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nor does the statute here include any specific language, such as “possession,” to guide our inquiry.
*1189Similarly, in the area of antitrust law, the Supreme Court has held that Congress has overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Adopling reasoning similar to that in Bowman, the Supreme Court found that the Sherman Act “reach[es] conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an effect on American commerce.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); accord Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) ("[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”).

. The 1874 version of the statute appeared as Section 5391 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. That section provided, in relevant part:
If any offense be committed in any place which has been or may hereafter be, ceded to and under the jurisdiction of the United States, which offense is not prohibited, or the punishment thereof is not specially provided for, by any law of the United States, such offense shall be liable to, and receive, the same punishment as the laws of the State in which such place is situated.... 70 Rev. Stat. § 5391 (1874) (emphasis added).

. The amended Section 5391 provided: "Whoever, within the territorial limits of any State, organized Territory, or District, but within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired, described in [Section 272] of this'Act,” shall commit an act which is not criminalized by the United States shall be prosecuted under state law. See Act of March 4, 1909. ch. 321, § 289, 35 Stat. 1145 (emphasis added). As discussed infra, § 272(3) was the 1909 precursor to § 7(3) in which Congress similarly referred to lands "reserved or acquired.”

. For example, Congress did not presume that "Indian country” fell within the. sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, but rather explicitly provided that ".the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of crimes committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States ... shall extend to the Indian country.” Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 558, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (quoting 28 Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 2145). Further, the Supreme Court recognized the need for Congress to be explicit when providing for federal jurisdiction over Indian reservations falling outside the Western territories: "If the land reserved for the exclusive occupancy of Indians lies outside the exterior boundaries of any organized Territorial government [including by treaty], it would require an act of Congress to attach it to a judicial district....” Id. at 559, 3 S.Ct. 396.

. The majority's discussion of Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288 (Wash.Terr.1870), is incomplete. See Maj. Op. at 1174-75. The statute at issue in that case was the precursor to § 7(3) created by the 1790 Act. See 1790 Act, ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 113. The court in Watts first concluded that, despite a conflict between the U.S. and Great Britain, because the U.S. "claims San Juan Island, we must treat it as under the general laws of the United States...." Watts, 1 Wash. Terr, at 296. The court, however, went on to find that, "in order that the crime of which the defendant is charged should be within the jurisdiction of *1194the Court below, it was not only necessary that it he committed within the United States, hut in a place within the ‘sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.' This phrase ‘sole and exclusive’ means exclusive of any. other domestic jurisdiction, and has no reference to foreign authority.” Id. (emphasis added). The court then held that the U.S. did not have sole and exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 299.
Watts suggests that determining whether criminal jurisdiction exists involves a two-part inquiry, namely: (1) whether the land was within the U.S. and, if so, (2) whether the U.S. had sole and exclusive jurisdiction over that land. See also id. at 301 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) (“We all agree that the phrase 'sole and exclusive jurisdiction’ as used in the [act] has no reference to a claim of jurisdiction made by any foreign power, but to state and federal jurisdiction, or as we are situated, to federal as contradistinguished from Territorial jurisdiction.”). The implication of this reasoning is that the “exclusive or concurrent” language of § 7(3) as it reads today similarly pertains to the federal government vis a vis the states.
The majority’s reliance on Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 11 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed. 691 (1890), is also misplaced. See Maj. Op. at 1174-75. That case involved an island containing guano deposits over which the U.S. had exclusive jurisdiction, see id. at 217, 11 S.Ct. 80, and to which Congress expressly extended federal criminal laws, see id. at 211-12, 11 S.Ct. 80. There was no question in that case that Congress intended to bring the island at issue within the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction, although there was a question regarding Haiti's challenge to U.S. sovereignty over the island. See id. at 219-24, 11 S.Ct. 80.

.See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219, 70 S.Ct. 10, 94 L.Ed. 3 (1949) (holding that "claims arising in a foreign country” exclusion in Federal Tori Claims Act applies lo a leased U.S. airbase in Newfoundland because the base remained subject to the sovereignty of Great Britain and therefore lay within a “foreign country”).

. The majority's recognition that the “original 1790 Act provided basic criminal laws for lands outside the jurisdiction of any other sovereign,” Maj. Op. at 1173, carries little weight here, for neither of these locations is "outside the jurisdiction of any other sovereign.” Although embassy officials may be immune from prosecution in the host state, that does not imply that the host state does not have jurisdiction over the embassy. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 466 cmt. a (1986) ("That [embassy] premises are inviolable does not mean that they are extraterritorial. Acts committed on those premises are within the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state....”). Similarly, under the U.S. — Japan SOFA, the two countries have concurrent jurisdiction over criminal acts committed on military bases in Japan (presuming the acts are in fact criminal under the laws of both countries). See SOFA, art. XVII. In light of this situation, the government’s alternative argument — that jurisdiction lies under § 7(7), which provides that the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction also includes "Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States,” is misplaced.

. The guano islands are more akin to newly discovered, previously unclaimed territory over which the United States may assert exclusive jurisdiction, see Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. at 212, 11 S.Ct. 80, than to U.S. embassy housing and military bases located within the borders of a foreign nation.

. See generally 1 Oppenheim’s International Law § 558, at 1157 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("The view, formerly widely held, that the force was in all respects to be regarded as beyond the jurisdiction of the territorial state ,.. and subject only to that of its own authorities can no longer be maintained. The fiction of extraterritoriality has in this area, as in others, been discarded.”) (footnote omitted).

. Article XVII provides:
1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,
(a) the military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise within Japan all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the United States over all persons subject to the military law of the United States;
(b) the authorities of Japan shall have jurisdiction over the members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependants with respect to offenses committed within the territory of Japan and punishable by the law of Japan.
A complete reading of the SOFA suggests that the land remained Japanese territory. See, e.g., Art. XXIII ("The Government of Japan agrees to seek such legislation and to take such other action as may be necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records and official information of the United States, and for the punishment of offenders under the applicable laws of Japan.”) (emphasis added).

.Article XVII § 2(b) provides for Japan’s jurisdiction over dependents of the U.S. military in Japan for offenses punishable under the law of Japan by not under the law of the U.S.; "The authorities of Japan shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependants with respect to offenses ... punishable by its law but not by the law of the United States.”

. The majority dismisses the views of the military as well as those of academics regarding the “jurisdictional gap.” See Maj. Op. at -. Although I am well aware that these views are not entitled to special deference, I also recognize that the military has a particular interest in this issue, and its conclusion that a gap exists is noteworthy.