Court Opinion

ID: 9951610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 15:02:20.077825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:46.002502
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11022    Document: 45-1      Date Filed: 03/18/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11022
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        NAEH MEDIA GROUP LLC,
        TK ENTERPRISES, INC.,
                                                     Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        CITY OF LAUDERHILL, FLORIDA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cv-61270-RKA
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11022

                             ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Two businesses located in Lauderhill, Florida, sued the City
        government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural-due-process vi-
        olations after the City forced them to close for tax and certification
        issues. The businesses alleged that the City failed to provide ade-
        quate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The district
        court granted summary judgment to the City, reasoning that the
        businesses’ complaint failed to allege a City custom or policy that
        caused their alleged constitutional injury and that they could not
        amend their complaint through argument at summary judgment.
        Because we conclude that the complaint provided fair notice of the
        custom or policy on which the businesses relied at summary judg-
        ment, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
                                          I.
               Plaintiffs NAEH Media Group LLC (a news publication) and
        TK Enterprises, Inc. (a catering company), sued the City, a “Florida
        municipality,” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging viola-
        tions of their procedural-due-process rights under the federal and
        Florida constitutions.
                 In February 2021, according to the complaint, the City, fac-
        ing COVID-pandemic-related revenue shortfalls, began “blan-
        ket[ing] the municipality with notices threatening business closures
        if certificates of use (and associated fees paid) were not updated and
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        23-11022                Opinion of the Court                          3

        local business taxes were not paid by the offending commercial op-
        erations.” On February 24, 2021, a City code enforcement officer
        posted a notice at Plaintiffs’ shared office stating that they were
        “subject to immediate closure” if the certificate of use and tax vio-
        lations were not corrected within 24 hours of the notice. The next
        day, City code- and law-enforcement officers entered Plaintiffs’ of-
        fice, ordered employees to depart immediately, and hired a lock-
        smith to change the locks. The complaint continues, “[I]n its rush
        to increase revenue, however,” the City failed to inform Plaintiffs
        of the notice and hearing procedures outlined in City ordinances,
        which required at least ten days’—not 24 hours’—advance notice,
        and also provided a right to a due-process hearing.
               In Count I, Plaintiffs alleged that the City violated their “fed-
        eral due-process rights by removing and excluding Plaintiffs from
        the companies’ office space and business property without provid-
        ing notice and an opportunity to be heard as explicitly required by
        Sections 12-3(c)(1), 12-33(d) and 12-7(c) of the City of Lauderhill,
        Florida, Code of Ordinances and implicitly demanded by the Four-
        teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Count II
        made the same basic claim under the Florida Constitution. The
        City answered the complaint and then, following discovery,
        moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for
        summary judgment, and the parties filed various responses and re-
        plies.
              In relevant part, the City argued that summary judgment
        was appropriate because the complaint failed to plead a claim of
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11022

        municipal liability under § 1983 and instead sought to hold the City
        vicariously liable for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of its
        employees, which was not a valid basis for § 1983 liability under
        Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The City
        also contended that Plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest
        and failed to utilize available post-deprivation procedures.
                The Plaintiffs responded that a “reasonable evaluation of the
        Complaint demonstrates it contains sufficient factual allegations to
        satisfy Monell pleading standards,” and that the other issues raised
        by the City did not warrant summary judgment. Plaintiffs also ar-
        gued in their own motion for summary judgment that the evidence
        otherwise sufficed to establish that an unofficial policy or custom
        of closing businesses on only 24 hours’ notice, in violation of City
        ordinances and due process, caused their injuries. Specifically, they
        cited the testimony of April Skinner, the City’s Chief of Code En-
        forcement, who stated that Lauderhill Code Enforcement had been
        issuing 24-hour notices to businesses rather than providing 10 days’
        notice “since [she’s] been working for the City of Lauderhill,”
        which had been close to 18 years.
                The district court granted summary judgment to the City.
        The court agreed with the City’s argument that the complaint
        failed to adequately plead a Monell claim, so the court did not ad-
        dress the City’s remaining arguments on the merits of the claims.
        In particular, the court found that the complaint was fatally defi-
        cient with regard to any potential Monell claim because it failed to
        “allege[] that the City caused the (purported) deprivation of the
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        23-11022               Opinion of the Court                         5

        Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in any of the three ways the Elev-
        enth Circuit outlined in Hoefling [v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271,
        1279 (11th Cir. 2016)].” Rather, in the court’s view, the complaint
        was “expressly limited to the City’s (purported) violation of the
        Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”
               Although the district court acknowledged that Plaintiffs had
        presented evidence of an unofficial, 24-hour notice policy or cus-
        tom at summary judgment, the court found this evidence insuffi-
        cient for two reasons. First, the court stated, Plaintiffs “forfeited
        any such argument” by failing to present it in response to the City’s
        motion for summary judgment, instead of its own motion for sum-
        mary judgment only. And second, in the court’s view, the evidence
        should be disregarded, in any case, “because a party cannot use its
        summary-judgment briefing to amend its complaint,” which did
        not identify the alleged 24-hour notice policy or any supporting ev-
        idence.
               Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment
        to the City on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. Having resolved the sole
        federal claim, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
        tion over the remaining state-law claim.
                                         II.
               We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
        the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
        nonmoving party. Boyle v. City of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th
        Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant
        shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11022

        the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 56(a).
                                          III.
                In Monell and later cases, the Supreme Court held that, while
        local governments are subject to liability under § 1983, a plaintiff
        cannot rely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious
        liability, to hold the government liable. Monell v. Dep’t of Social
        Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693–94 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
        378, 385 (1989); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
        397, 403 (1997). Rather, the Court has “required a plaintiff seeking
        to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a mu-
        nicipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”
        Brown, 520 U.S. at 403. This requirement is “to ensure that the mu-
        nicipality is held liable only for its own conduct.” Id. at 404; see
        McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004).
                A plaintiff can establish the requisite degree of culpability in
        several ways. “A municipality can be liable for an official policy
        enacted by its legislative body (e.g., an ordinance or resolution
        passed by a city council).” Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1279. “Municipal
        liability may also attach if final policymakers have acquiesced in a
        longstanding practice that constitutes the entity’s standard operat-
        ing procedure.” Id.
                                          A.
              The district court granted summary judgment to the City
        because it found that Plaintiffs failed to plead a Monell claim in the
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        23-11022                   Opinion of the Court                                7

        complaint. As a result, the court declined to consider Plaintiffs’ ev-
        idence of a custom or policy at summary judgment.1
               The federal pleading rules require “a short and plain state-
        ment of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which “give[s] the defend-
        ant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
        which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (cleaned
        up). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal dis-
        covery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed
        facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”
        Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–14 (2002).
               “Despite the liberal pleading standard for civil complaints,
        plaintiffs may not raise new claims at the summary judgment
        stage.” White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1200
        (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The proper procedure
        for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in ac-
        cordance with Rule 15, Fed. R. Civ. P. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald
        & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).

        1 The district court also reasoned that this argument was forfeited because

        Plaintiffs failed to raise it in response to the City’s summary-judgment motion.
        But the City’s motion did not seek summary judgment for lack of sufficient
        evidence of a custom or policy, so Plaintiffs had no reason or obligation to
        raise the evidence in their response. Plus, Plaintiffs’ response clearly disputed
        the City’s argument that the complaint failed to allege a Monell claim based on
        an alleged 24-hour-notice policy. And as the court itself noted, Plaintiffs ar-
        gued the evidence in other summary-judgment filings, to which the City had
        the opportunity to respond. We see no grounds for forfeiture on these facts.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11022

                But no amendment is required if the complaint “put [the de-
        fendant] on notice” of the claim. White, 789 F.3d at 1200. In that
        regard, “[a] complaint need not specify in detail the precise theory
        giving rise to recovery. All that is required is that the defendant be
        on notice as to the claim being asserted against him and the
        grounds on which it rests.” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v.
        United Auto. Ins. Co., 60 F.4th 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation
        marks omitted). At bottom, the complaint must identify any “basis
        for liability” relied on at summary judgment. See MSP Recovery
        Claims, 60 F.4th at 1319–20 (claim based on a settlement agreement
        was forfeited where the complaint failed to allege “that the settle-
        ment agreement served as a basis for liability”); see also Hurlbert v.
        St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006)
        (claim based on a “separate statutory basis for entitlement to leave”
        than alleged was not properly raised at summary judgment because
        it “effect[ed] a fundamental change” in the nature of the claim); Gil-
        mour, 382 F.3d at 1315 (“Gates had no notice of a contract claim
        based on the tort claims set forth in the complaint.”).
                                          B.
               Here, the district court erred in determining that Plaintiffs
        raised a new claim at summary judgment. According to the com-
        plaint, Plaintiffs sought to hold the City, a “Florida municipality,”
        liable under § 1983 for causing the closure of their business on 24-
        hour notice. The complaint asserted that this conduct violated
        Plaintiffs’ procedural-due-process rights and City ordinances,
        which required at least 10 days’ advance notice and provided for a
        due-process hearing. The complaint also indicated that Plaintiffs’
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        23-11022               Opinion of the Court                          9

        alleged constitutional injury was not isolated, but rather was part
        of a city-wide campaign—“blanket[ing] the municipality with no-
        tices threatening business closures”—undertaken in a “rush to in-
        crease revenue” following pandemic-related budget shortfalls.
                Although the complaint did not expressly cite Monell or use
        the terms “custom” or “policy,” it put the City on notice that Plain-
        tiffs sought to prove that the City itself—not simply individual ac-
        tors employed by the City—was the moving force behind the al-
        leged constitutional injury. See Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1279–80; White,
        789 F.3d at 1200. In particular, it provided notice that the basis for
        liability was the allegedly deficient 24-hour notice Plaintiffs and
        other businesses received from the City. Thus, evidence that City
        Code Enforcement had an unofficial 24-hour-notice custom or pol-
        icy, even if it preceded the pandemic, does not present a new basis
        for liability. See MSP Recovery Claims, 60 F.4th at 1319. In other
        words, the evidence is better characterized as “additional facts as-
        serted in support of the [municipal liability] claim already pled in
        [the] complaint,” not a “fundamental change” in the nature of the
        claim. Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1297. In our view, no amendment of
        the complaint was necessary for Plaintiffs to argue this evidence at
        summary judgment.
                Notably, if the City believed the complaint alleged vicarious
        liability only, which is not actionable against a municipality, see Mo-
        nell, 436 U.S. at 693–94, it could have moved to dismiss the com-
        plaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
        dure 12(b)(6). But it didn’t. Instead, the City answered the
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11022

        complaint, engaged in discovery, and then moved for summary
        judgment. And the question at summary judgment is not whether
        the complaint stated a plausible claim, but whether the evidence
        reasonably could support a verdict for the nonmoving party on its
        claims. See, e.g., Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121,
        1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
               For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred
        in granting summary judgment based on perceived deficiencies in
        the complaint. We decline to resolve the other grounds for affir-
        mance raised by the City, preferring that the district court address
        them in the first instance. See, e.g., Waldron v. Spicher, 954 F.3d
        1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 2020) (declining to resolve certain issues at
        summary judgment and remanding for the district court to address
        them “in the first instance”). Accordingly, we vacate and remand
        for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
               VACATED AND REMANDED.