Court Opinion

ID: 9418324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:21:23.30746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:00.634653
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Day,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the opinion and judgment just pronounced. The very serious constitutional questions involved seem to warrant a statement of the reasons which constrain me to this action.
I am not prepared to deny to Congress, in view of its constitutional authority to regulate commerce among the *365States, the right to fix by lawful enactment the wages to be paid to those engaged in such commerce in the operation of trains carrying passengers and freight. While the railroads of the country are privately owned, they are engaged in a public service, and because of that fact are subject in a large measure to governmental control.
The regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution is of a broad nature, but is subject to the applicable limitations of the Constitution.
I agree that upon the reasoning which sustained the power of Congress to regulate the hours of service of employees, and the degree of care which employers must observe to protect the safety of those engaged in the service and in view of the enactments which are held to be lawful regulations of interstate transportation, Congress has the power to fix the amount of compensation necessary to secure a proper service and to insure reasonable rates to the public upon the part of the railroads engaged in such traffic. While this much must necessarily follow from the constitutional authority of Congress, in the light of the interpretation given to the commerce clause in decisions of this court, it is equally true that this regulatory power is subject to any applicable constitutional limitations. This power cannot, any more than others conferred by the Constitution, be the subject of lawful exercise when such exertion of authority violates fundamental rights secured by the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505, 571; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 353.
The power to legislate, as well as other powers conferred by the Constitution upon the coordinate branches of the Government, is limited by the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution preventing deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The phrase “Due Process of Law” has been the subject *366of much discussion, and while its precise definition has not been attempted, and its limitations have been left to the' gradual process of inclusion and exclusion, the binding force of its requirements is always conceded, and has been frequently enforced in cases as they have arisen. If the Constitution is not to become a dead letter the protection of the due process clause must be given to all entitled to this safeguard of rights which the Amendment intended to secure. The due process clause restrains alike every branch of the Government, and is binding upon all who exercise federal power, whether of an executive, legislative,, or judicial character. It withholds from the executive the exercise of arbitrary authority, it prevents the judiciary from condemning one in his person or property without orderly methods of procedure adapted to the situation, and opportunity to be heard before judgment. We are now immediately concerned with its effect upon the exercise of legislative authority.
While every case must depend upon its peculiar circumstances, certain general principles are well settled; perhaps they have not been better stated than in the words of Mr. Justice Matthews, speaking for this court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 531, wherein he said: “The concessions of Magna Charta were wrung from the King as guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations of his prerogative. It did not enter into the minds of the barons to provide security against their own body or in favor of the Commons by limiting the power of Parliament; so that bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws declaring forfeitures of estates, and other arbitrary acts of legislation which occur so frequently in English history, were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land. . . . The actual and practical security for. English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the Commons. In this country written constitutions were deemed essential to *367protect the rights and liberties of the people against the encroachments of power delegated to their governments, and the provisions of Magna Charta were incorporated into Bills of Rights. They were limitations upon all the-powers of government, legislative as well as executive and judicial. ■ . . . Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyranny, here they have become also bulwarks against arbitrary legislation.” See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235; 2 Story on the Constitution, 4th ed., § 1944; Cooley on the Constitution, 241 et seq.; McGehee on Due Process of Law, p. 22 et seq., and the illuminating discussion of the subject by Mr. Justice Moody in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78.
It results from the principles which have been enforced in this court, and recognized by writers of authority, that due process of law, when applied to the legislative branch of the Government, will not permit Congress to make anything due process of law which it sees fit to declare such by the mere enactment of the statute; if this were true, life, liberty, or property might be taken by the terms of the legislative act, depending for its authority upon the will or caprice of thh legislature, and constitutional provisions would thus become a mere nullity. See the frequently quoted argument of Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; McGehee on Due Process of Law, p. 30.
The underlying principle of the decisions which have constrained this .court in rare instances to exercise its constitutional right to declare'.congressional enactments void, is the protection intended to be afforded against legislation of an arbitrary character.
While it is true, as stated in the majority opinion, that it is the duty of courts to enforce lawful legislative enact*368ments of Congress, it is equally their duty and sworn obligation when differences between acts, of the legislature and the guaranties of the Federal Constitution arise, to govern their decisions by the provisions of that instrument which represents the will of all the people, and under the authority of which- every branch of the Government is enabled to discharge the duty imposed upon it.
The act in question must be brought to the test of these fundamental principles, and if found to be violative of the Federal Constitution it must be declared void. Grave and important as the duty is it cannot be avoided consistently with the obligations imposed by the Constitution upon every branch of the judiciary, federal and state, and particularly upon this court, to which under our system is entrusted the ultimate decision of questions of this nature.
Applying these principles, in my opinion this act cannot successfully withstand the attack that is made upon it as an arbitrary and unlawful exertion of supposed legislative power. It is not an act limiting the hours of service. Nor is it, in my judgment, a legitimate enactment fixing the wages of employées engaged in such service. In one of its most important aspects, and in view of the mandatory provisions of § 3 of the act, it is one the effect of which is to increase the wages of certain employees in interstate commerce by the requirement that pending investigation, the wages which have theretofore been paid for ten hours’ service shall be given for eight hours’ service of the same character. The increase of wages is to be in force only during the period of observation provided in the act. Before the passage of this enactment the wages of the character involved herein had been fixed hy agreement, or determined by arbitration between the parties concerned. By this enactment the wage theretofore paid for a ten-hours’ service is required to be paid for an eight-hours’ service pending the investigation provided for in other parts of the law. In other words. Congress upon the face *369of the enactment expresses its inability to fix in advance of investigation a just and proper wage for the employees concerned. It inevitably follows that the cost of the experiment, measured by the increase in wages amounting, it is stated, to many millions of dollars, and certain to cost a very large sum, must be paid, not by the public, nor be equally borne by the contracting parties, but by legislative edict is made to fall entirely upon one of the parties, with no provision for compensation should the subsequent investigation establish the injustice or impropriety of the temporary increase.
An examination of the history of the legislation, and public documents submitted for our consideration, amply support this conclusion. In submitting the matter to Congress the President recommended: “Explicit approval by the Congress of the consideration by the Interstate Commerce Commission of an increase of freight rates to meet such additional expenditures by the railroads as may have been rendered necessary by the adoption of the eight-hour day and which have not been offset by administrative readjustments and economies, should the facts disclosed justify the increase.”
This recommendation was not followed in the enactment of the statute. The Senate Committee having the subject under consideration expressed a desire for investigation and consideration before enacting a law of this character. Such was not had, and the law in its present form was speedily passed.
In fixing wages, conceding the power of Congress for this purpose, that body acts having in mind the rights of the public, of the owners of railroads, and of the employees engaged in their service. Inherently, such legislation requires that investigation and deliberation shall precede action. In fixing rates Congress has itself recognized this principle and has delegated its power to a Commission which acts only upon full investigation, and an oppor*370tunity to be heard, wherein the interest of the public, the carrier, and the shipper may be given ample consideration.
Conceding that every presumption exists in favor of the legitimate exercise of legislative power, and that there is no authority in the courts to inquire into the motives which may have influenced legislators, and that every such enactment presupposes the possession of proper motives and sufficient information and knowledge to warrant the action taken, nevertheless Congress has in this act itself declared the lack of the requisite information for definite action, and has directed an experiment to determine what it should do, imposing in the meantime an increase of wages peremptorily declared, the expense of which is to be borne entirely by the carrier, without recompense if the investigation proves the injustice or impropriety of the increase.
Such legislation, it seems to me, amounts to the taking of the property of one and giving it to another in violation of the spirit of fair play and equal right which the Constitution intended to secure in the due process clause to all coming within its protection, and is a striking illustration of that method which has always been deemed to be the plainest illustration of arbitrary action, the taking of the property of A and giving it to B by legislative fiat. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104.
It may be taken to be true, as stated in the majority opinion, that but for this legislation a strike of employees engaged in interstate commerce would have been precipitated, disastrous in its consequences to the commerce of the country.
If I am right in the conclusion that this legislation amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law, no emergency and no consequence, whatever their character, could justify the violation of constitutional rights. The argument of justification by emergency was made and answered in this court in Ex parte Milligan, *3714 Wall. 2, decided more than fifty years ago, in which it was held that not even the perils of war could impair the right of a resident of a loyal State, not connected with the military service, and where the courts were open, and in the proper exercise of their jurisdiction, to be tried, convicted, or sentenced only by the ordinary courts of law, with trial by jury >and with the safeguards intended to secure a fair trial in the courts of law. Speaking of the purposes which controlled in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and animated those who framed that instrument this court said, p. 120: “Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted- in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority.”
This principle is equally applicable to-day. Constitutional protection is more essential in times of unrest and agitation than it can be in the security of. less turbulent periods. The Constitution intended to protect the citizen *372against encroachments upon his rights impelled by existing emergencies, or supposed necessity of prompt and vigorous action. Constitutional rights, if they are to be available in time of greatest need, cannot give way to an emergency, however immediate, or justify the sacrifice of private rights secured by the Constitution.
I agree that a situation, such as was presented to Congress at this time, properly called for the exertion of its proper authority to avert impending calamity. I cannot agree tfcat constitutional rights may be sacrificed because of public necessity, nor taken away because of emergencies which might result in disaster or inconvenience to public or private interests. If this be not so, the constitutional limitations for the protection of life, liberty, and property, are of little value, and may be taken away whenever it is supposed that the public interests will be promoted by the sacrifice of rights which the framers of the Constitution intended should be forever protected from governmental invasion by any branch of the Government.
There are certain matters in the opinion of the majority which I am unable to approve by silent acquiescence. I am not prepared to admit that Congress may when deemed necessary for the public interest coerce employees against their will to continue in service in interstate commerce. Nor do I think it necessary to decide, as declared in the majority opinion, that in matters of this kind Congress can enact a compulsory arbitration law. These questions are not involved in this case and their decision need not be anticipated until they actually arise.
The reasons, which I have outlined, impel me to the conclusion that the enactment under consideration necessarily deprives the complaining railroad companies of rights secured to them, as well as to others, by one of the most essential of the protections guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. In this-view I am constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case.