Court Opinion

ID: 9651527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:23:54.562157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:16.760594
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1627-28 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held: “Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. ... If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.” (Emphasis added)
There is no question that in the instant case appellant was informed of his Miranda rights and did state that he wanted to contact his attorney.1 The *420only question is whether interrogation ceased, whether thé police did “respect his decision to remain silent.” If interrogation did not cease—and I believe that it did not—Miranda requires that the confession obtained be excluded from use at trial.
The testimony of Detective Thompson, given at the suppression hearing, speaks for itself: “Q. [defense counsel] How many times had he asked for an attorney ... ? A. He had asked once. He told me once that he wanted an attorney. This was around 9:40, 9:45 [P.M.] when I first went in to interview him. Q. At that point I think you said you stopped questioning him because he said that he wanted an attorney; is that correct? A. True. Q. When did you continue or begin again to question him? A. When I again questioned him was when I was taking Mm down to the cell room [at 2:55 A.M.]. . . . We was talking in general and I *421told him we didn’t have to have a statement from him because witnesses had identified him but we would like to hear his side of the story. At this time he said, ‘Take me back up and I will tell you what happened.’ * * * Q. On this trip down the elevator when you started to talk to the defendant, was that initiated by you or Lieutenant Patterson? A. That was initiated by me.” (emphasis added)
This testimony certainly shows that the police recommenced the questioning of appellant without counsel, despite appellant’s request, thus violating the holding of Miranda.2 In fact, the type of questioning used here is quite similar to the subtle interrogation which this Court recently held impermissible in Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A. 2d 575 (1969). In Símala, the police brought the defendant into the mayor’s office, where he sat for one-half hour. The mayor then said: “ ‘What’s the matter, Mike, you look kind of down in the dumps; do you want to talk? ... if you want to talk, talk.’ ” Id. at 222, 252 A. 2d at 576. We held that these statements by the mayor constituted interrogation and that the resulting confession was inadmissible: “This certainly was not an innocent attempt on the part of the mayor to strike up a friendly conversation to help appellant pass the time until the police returned from their search. There is no difference for constitutional purposes between questioning an accused outright and more subtly suggesting that he incriminate himself without being asked specific questions. ... In our view, any question likely *422to elicit a confession constitutes ‘interrogation’ under Miranda.” Id. at 227, 252 A. 2d at 579 (emphasis added).
Certainly the officer’s request for appellant’s side of the story was “likely to elicit a confession” and thus constituted interrogation. Yet the majority holds that appellant’s statement was “volunteered.” I fail to see how the majority can reach this conclusion, for the confession was clearly given in response to police-initiated questioning. This is hardly a case where a confession was given by an accused “without any prompting.” See Simala, 434 Pa. at 226, 252 A. 2d at 579.
Although Miranda holds that after a suspect requests counsel all interrogation must cease,3 the police conduct involved here did not show appellant that his interrogators were “prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose ¡to exercise it.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 86 S. Ct. at 1625. On the contrary, the constant custodial pressure on appellant could only have convinced him of the futility of further resistance.4 In *423essence, appellant was merely told of Ms right to the assistance of counsel—he was never allowed to exercise it.
I dissent and would grant appellant a new trial.

 Appellant received his Miranda warnings, and requested counsel, at 9:40 p.m. Over the next eight hours the following occurred :
10:00 p.m.: questioned by police officer about how he sustained knife wound in neck.
*42010:25 p.m.: attempted to call bis attorney, but failed; returned to interrogation room and given something to eat.
11:30 p.m.: informed by police that he was to be placed in a line-up; refused services of Voluntary Defender to represent Mm at line-up and refused to participate in line-up.
12:35 a.m.: confrontation with three witnesses without a lineup or counsel.
12:50 a.m. to 1:20 a.m. permitted to talk with wife.
1:20 a.m. to 2:30 a.m. drank coffee.
2:30 a.m. neck wound photographed by police,
2:45 a.m. slated by police.
2:55 a.m. in elevator on way to be photographed and fingerprinted, in response to police-initiated interrogation (see text following ¿ote 1, infra), acquiesces in giving police a statement.
3:00 a.m. statement begins; appellant again given Miranda warnings.
5:35 a.m. statement concluded.

 Just as giving the Miranda warnings only after interrogation has begun cannot cure the original defect, the giving of the warnings before taking his statement, but after the questioning in the elevator—and after appellant had asserted his rights—cannot cure the error. Certainly these warnings must have rung hollow to appellant, since they were given at 3:00 a.m., some five and one-half hours after interrogation was supposed to have stopped.

 Cf. United States ex rel. Daley v. Yeager, 415 F. 2d 779, 783 (3d Cir. 1969) : “Once the prosecution has commenced, law enforcement officers may not secure confessions from an accused which circumvent the protection a lawyer might provide.”

 it is to be noted that when appellant gave his statement he had been in' custody for five hours, he was tired, he had recently received stitches in his neck for a knife wound, he had been confronted by witnesses in a possibly unconstitutional manner, he had not as yet been brought before a magistrate, and he had never been left alone to relax, spending most of his time in a smaU interrogation room. This raises serious doubts about the voluntariness of the confession, even apart from Miranda. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860 (1961) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A. 2d 426 (1968). However, I find it difficult, on the state of this record, to decide whether appellant’s will had been overborne. There is no indication that an opinion has ever been filed by the suppression court or the trial court, and thus it is extremely difficult to review that court’s decision as to voluntariness. Hence, in any event, the ease should at *423least be remanded for tbe filing of an opinion, see Pa. S. Ot. R. 63, so that we might properly decide this issue.