Court Opinion

ID: 9468342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:12:27.612117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:49.518841
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
Part I of the majority opinion is entirely satisfactory, and with it I fully agree.
Moreover, it may be agreed that generally speaking a defendant is entitled to a “theory of defense” or “position” instruction and that trial courts should be liberal in giving them. But where a requested position instruction singles out one evidentiary fact issue, recital of position with respect to that issue may in fairness require elaboration so as to include other fact issues or aspects as well, and when no such elaborated instruction is requested or given refusal to give the original request is not necessarily error, much less reversible error. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976).
To be sure, there are cases holding that a single act such as an isolated purchase of a small quantity of drugs is insufficient to support a finding of participation in a conspiracy to distribute drugs; but even the single act cases hold that a single act may be the foundation for drawing the actor within the ambit of the conspiracy provided the act is such as to justify an inference of intent to participate in the unlawful enterprise. See, e. g., United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1975), citing United States v. Reina, 242 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 913, 77 S.Ct. 1294, 1 L.Ed.2d 1427 (1957) and United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 974, 80 S.Ct. 1057, 4 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1960).
As the majority opinion reflects, there were many evidentiary facts tending to support a finding of appellant’s knowing membership and participation in an unlawful conspiracy, and the single act in question, a purchase of a large quantity of cocaine, was one from which appellant’s knowledge of the conspiracy could be inferred.
Thus, it becomes clear that the requested single act instruction 1 without elaboration could well have confused the jury by leading them to believe that the circumstances of the sale could not be the basis for any inference of guilty knowledge or intent.
The experienced trial judge obviously was mindful of problems in connection with instructions about the sale. The transcript reflects that the court considered giving an instruction on the amount of the purchase as it might tend to show intent to distribute. Ultimately the court chose not to mention specifics of the sale at all, but rather chose to leave such to argument and to cover the whole subject under other instructions, in particular Instruction No. 7. That instruction left the entire conspiracy matter to be considered in light of the actions and declarations of the alleged participants but with the admonition that “mere similarity of conduct among various persons, and the fact they may have associated with each other, and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests does not necessarily establish proof of a conspiracy.”
The majority found no fault with the instruction given. With that conclusion there is no disagreement. In the circumstances of this case, however, I would go on to hold that there was no error in refusing appellant’s requested instruction, and affirm the conviction.
■ Thus, with respect to Part II of the majority opinion I dissent.

. See n.4 in majority opinion.