Court Opinion

ID: 9480377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:46:20.599066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:39.123856
License: Public Domain

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because the record supports the trial judge’s conclusion that law enforcement personnel, confronted with exigent circumstances, had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that loss or destruction of evidence was imminent if the premises were not secured, I respectfully dissent.
*364It seems to me that when the case is viewed in the context of the factual circumstances that actually confronted law enforcement officials, the case law cited by the majority supports affirmance.
Although the majority is willing to credit the trial court’s conclusion that the facts warranted a reasonable belief that someone was present on the premises, they do not think the facts are sufficient to ground a reasonable belief that destruction of controlled substances was imminent. This is apparently based upon their conclusion that the “secluded location of the property and its abundant vegetation would have made it impossible for its occupants to see the agents’ activities” on the road. That appears to me to stretch and strain the record.
To be sure, there was testimony that the buildings were set back from the road and that agents’ view of the buildings was impeded by vegetation. But there was no evidence at all concerning the view of those from inside the enclosure. The trial court made no finding that it was “impossible,” and we ought not speculate, particularly since to do so defies common experience. Any tenderfoot knows it is easier to see out of the thicket than into it. Nor was the point argued by defense counsel at the hearing — his argument was based upon lack of evidence that anyone was on the premises.
I assume the view was never put at issue since the government’s witness said his concern about discovery arose because “anybody that had been driving by on Scio Church Road in the area would have seen law enforcement activities” on the road, due to the number of law enforcement vehicles and the stop of Potalivo, and any passerby could have contacted an occupant of the house. Contrary to the impression left by the majority, there was no evidence that the officers knew the premises were not served by a telephone. What the government’s witness found upon entering the residence was the absence of a telephonic instrument; he very carefully pointed out that he was not saying that the house was without telephone service.
The “impossible” view from the house appears to be the only basis for the majority’s conclusion that the government failed to satisfy the second prong of Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d at 1512. They conclude that while it was reasonable for agents to believe that someone was in the house, it was not reasonable for them to believe that someone could see out through the trees. That’s hard to follow, since it would seem as reasonable to think that one in defendant’s position would be alert, as it is to believe that he would not be alert. In fact, it is eminently reasonable to assume that he would make it his business to see out. In the absence of evidence that it was impossible for someone to see out from any vantage point within the enclave — from the house or from out among the outbuildings or elsewhere on the grounds — I am hard-pressed to understand why a reasonably objective police officer must assume that such a person would not at least try to peer out now and then. It is undisputed that police activity was there for the seeing. Why were agents required to assume that in the midst of all the illegal hustle and bustle taking place on the premises that day their targets nevertheless would totally relax their guard?
And of course there is no evidence at all that agents’ concern about passersby tipping off occupants was ill-founded. Theirs was the only testimony about vehicular traffic. And in addition to the cars driven out of the complex by Pelkey and Potalivo, a third car had been followed to another home nearby and agents were also preparing to search that house. Potalivo was driving defendant’s automobile — shouldn’t agents have been concerned that the owner would be awaiting its return or word from its driver? Under all these circumstances, it seems to me that only the most obtuse police officer would fail to appreciate the very real risk and form a reasonable belief that occupants would learn that something was afoot and move to destroy evidence.
The majority also suggests that “the agents had ample time to obtain judicial authorization prior to entering and ‘securing’ the residence.” While the implication *365is that sufficient facts existed of conduct prior to the Pelkey stop which would have enabled the government to obtain a search warrant, I doubt the majority seriously contends that was the case. Instead, while the government’s information up to that point may have suggested a large ongoing drug operation, it was not until Pelkey’s car was stopped that the government possessed hard evidence that hashish was being distributed from the Scio Church Road address. But the same time frame that provided this evidence to support the issuance of a warrant also revealed the circumstances pointing to the emergency nature of securing the evidence. There simply was no convenient breather that set in before destruction became imminent.
Agent Nelson said he was required to wait for half an hour for local deputies to come for Pelkey. He then had thirty minutes to transfer the prisoner to the deputies, return the eight or nine miles over country roads to Scio Church Road, acquaint himself with what had transpired there in the meantime — including the arrival of more law enforcement personnel and the detention of Potalivo — and to organize the evidence securing exercise. There is no indication there was also time to obtain a search warrant from far-off Detroit.