Court Opinion

ID: 9844615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:30.295161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.996838
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Chief Justice.
Plaintiffs-respondents instituted this action to recover damages for the death of their minor daughter, Charlotte Ann Reed, resulting from a collision between the automobile in which she was riding and a tank-truck and tank-trailer of the appellant Sinclair Refining Company, driven at the time of the accident by appellant Green. The accident occurred at about 11:30 p. m., March 8, 1963, on Main Street, also designated as Highway 30, in Burley, Idaho.
Following trial by the court, sitting without a jury, the court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment awarding the respondents $10,993.10 damages, from which judgment this appeal was taken.
The accident occurred near the western limits of Burley. The highway at that point runs generally in an east and west direction; it was straight with unobstructed vision to the west for 1000 feet or more; some distance to the east there was a slight turn in a southeasterly direction. This highway has two westbound and two eastbound lanes of traffic marked by solid double yellow lines down the center.
The night of the accident Joseph Green, was driving a Mack tank-truck with tank-*529trailer of the appellant Sinclair Refining Company, his employer. Green had loaded the tanks with fuel from a pipe-line terminal east of Burley for transportation to the company bulk plant adjacent to and north of the highway at the place where the accident occurred. After loading the truck and trailer, Green proceeded west through Burley, and stopped at a railroad track crossing the highway. He then continued on, made a left turn to the south across the highway, and entered a parking area of the Union Seed Company, adjacent to the highway on the south. He proceeded through the parking area, and made a half circle turn to the right to cross the highway from the Union Seed Company area to the Sinclair property north of the highway. Green stopped at the Union Seed Company curb cut leading to the highway, shifted his truck into first gear, and looked for traffic coming from the east and west. He observed no cars approaching from the east, but saw two coming from the west and waited until they passed, and then started across the highway to enter the bulk plant. When Green was about halfway across the highway he saw a car driven by Cecil Matlock approaching from the east, in the westbound half of the highway. This car slowed down and stopped in the inside lane fifty feet east of the truck and trailer. Green continued driving the truck across the highway and when the truck itself was inside the west gate of the bulk plant, with the trailer crossing the westbound lanes, Green saw another car rapidly approaching from the east. This car was driven by Joseph Dale Durham; in it respondents’ daughter was riding.
On the evening of the accident Durham had been “dragging” Main Street, which term was used in the vernacular, meaning two cars racing from a stop. Just prior to the accident Durham was driving west on the highway to take some of the occupants of his car to work in plants west of Burley. Durham was driving in the outside west bound lane, and at the same time another car driven by Arthur Ramsey, was driving along the inside west bound lane and beside the Durham car, with the occupants of the two cars talking back and forth. Everett Mounce observed these two cars driving along together as they passed the intersection of Occidental Avenue and Main Street, [which intersection was about 690 feet east of the point of the accident], Mounce, at the time he observed the cars was stopped on Occidental Avenue at its intersection with Main Street.
Both the Ramsey and Durham vehicles continued west about even with each other. When they neared the Matlock vehicle, stopped in the inside lane some 50 feet east of the truck and trailer, the Ramsey vehicle turned to the left to miss the Mat-lock vehicle, and the Durham vehicle continued straight in the outside lane until *530just a few feet from the trailer, when it turned to the left, and struck the right rear dual wheels of the trailer which was in the inside lane of the west bound traffic. When the Durham car hit the right rear ■dual wheels, it sheared the bolts from the trailer chassis and drove the dual wheels out.from underneath the rear end of the tank-trailer.
The trial • court found that appellant Green at the time he started across the highway had about six hundred ninety feet visibility along the highway to the east. The trial court also found that the crossing could be accomplished by the truck in twenty seconds, and that a driver proceeding west on the highway driving thirty-five miles per hour requires only 13.44 seconds to travel the distance from the point of eastern most visibility to the point of the accident. The trial court concluded that the appellants were negligent and their negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and death of respondents’ daughter.
Appellants have assigned as error the finding by the trial court that visibility was only 690 feet to the east, asserting the evidence shows visibility was 850 feet, and also that the court erred in its finding that it was impossible for appellants truck and trailer to cross the highway in the time it takes westbound traffic not visible to the driver of the truck and trailer, approaching and travelling within the legal speed limit to reach the crossing point.
Green testified that he could see westbound traffic from the east as far as Occidental' Avenue. Detective Higens of the Burley police department testified that from the Union Seed Company curb cut to the center of Occidental Avenue was 690 feet. Higens also testified that he had measured the distance from the curb cut of the Union Seed Company to the most distant point visible to the east of the oustide lane for westbound traffic, which point was at the west end of Shelley Processing Plant, and that distance was 850 feet. Officer Wright of the Burley police department in his testimony fully corroborated Higens’ testimony in regard to the distance a person could see down the highway to the east from the Union Seed Company curb cut.
The trial court in remarks at the close of the case stated: “I further find that visibility for westbound traffic in the area of the point of impact extends at least to Occidental Avenue and perhaps to the east for another one or two hundred feet.” The trial court in a written opinion stated: “Simple arithmetic establishes that a driver going west at thirty-five miles per hour takes only 13.44 seconds to travel the distance from the point of easternmost visibility to the crossing point.” It is established that a vehicle traveling at thirty-five miles per hour traverses 51.33 feet per second, and from that it is evident the trial court in its opinion considered 690 feet as the most easterly distance appellant Green could see *531down the highway to the east. Nevertheless the trial court’s finding was that appellant Green could sec only 690 feet to the east.
The trial court in reaching the conclusion of law that respondents were negligent relied upon the cases of Sandberg v. Spoelstra, 46 Wash.2d 776, 285 P.2d 564 (1955) and Kerlik v. Jerke, 56 Wash.2d 575, 354 P.2d 702 (1960). In the Sandberg case the Washington Supreme Court stated:
“Plaintiff’s driver had a right to take the truck and trailer back onto the highway from the parking place on the private driveway, but in leaving such parking place it was his duty: (1) to bring his vehicle to a full stop at a point where, before entering the highway, he could see traffic approaching from either direction; (2) to look in both directions and observe traffic conditions; (3) to yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the highway; and (4) to adopt such additional precautions as may have been necessary to assure' a reasonable margin of safety under the existing circumstances.” 285 P.2d at 566.
In that case the plaintiff truck driver was leaving a private driveway and entering a highway at a point 375 feet from a blind curve, and as he was entering the highway another truck came around the curve and there was a collision. The action was brought by plaintiff for damages to his truck, and the defendants cross-claimed for damages to their truck. The trial court dismissed both the complaint and cross-complaint. The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the trial court’s judgment that the plaintiff’s driver was negligent in entering the highway at a point where he did not have sufficient visibility to assure him that he could proceed across the highway without interference, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Kerlik v. Jerke, 56 Wash.2d 575, 354 P.2d 702 (1960), was an action for damages sustained when the plaintiff’s automobile traveling on an arterial highway, struck defendants’ automobile while it was attempting to enter the highway from a private parking area. The defendant driver was held negligent as a matter of law in failing to stop and observe the highway from a point where traffic could be seen. The court relied upon and quoted from Sandberg v. Spoelstra, supra.
Two statutes involved in this action are: I.C. § 49-730: “The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a 'private road or driveway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said highway.”
I.C. § 49-521 (a) : “‘Right of way.’ — The privilege of the immediate use of the roadway.”
The facts are without dispute that Green stopped at Union Seed Company curb cut *532before entering upon the highway, and that he looked both directions before attempting to drive across the highway; that he allowed two cars approaching from the west to pass, and entered upon the highway at a time when no cars were visible to him. To the west he could see over a thousand feet, and io the east he could see no cars approaching for more than 690 feet. Under these facts, even considering the length and size of the loaded truck and trailer, it is difficult to see where he violated the provisions of I.C. § 49-730. That section requires a driver about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway to yield the right of way [the privilege of the immediate use of the roadway] only to vehicles approaching on said highway. The facts fail to disclose that the Durham vehicle was “approaching” as that term is generally understood.
The verb “approach” has been defined as ‘to come or go near or nearer to in place or time; draw nearer to; to come or go near or nearer to in character or quality.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. “Approach” connotes “near, draw near or nigh, go or come near, come closer or nearer, come to close quarters,” and the adjective “approaching” connotes, “nearing, advancing, coming, oncoming, forthcoming”. Roget’s International Theasaurus, Third Ed.
In discussing the term “approaching” as used in a statute similar to and comparable with I.C. § 49-730, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Dwyer v. Christensen, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1958), stated:
“ ‘In Peterson v. Lang, 239 Minn. 319, 58 N.W.2d 609, 612, the court in interpreting the meaning of a statue similar to SDC Supp. 44.0319 stated:
“ ‘It is to be presumed that the legislature in granting the right of way to approaching vehicles did not intend the absurd or unreasonable result of including distant vehicles which are wholly outside any zone of danger.’
“When we apply the word approaching to vehicles advancing on the highway this must be given a reasonable construction. A vehicle on the highway is approaching within the meaning of the statute when such vehicle is so close that if it continues in the same course at the same speed there is a reasonable likelihood or danger of collision should the driver of a vehicle entering the public highway from a private road or drive fail to yield the right of way. Peterson v. Lang, supra. It is apparent here that when defendant backed his car upon the highway there was no reasonable likelihood or danger of collision with plaintiff’s car. Reasonable minds could not differ as to this. The instruction as re*533quested by plaintiff is not applicable under the facts of this case.”-
In Peterson v. Lang, in addition to that portion of the opinion quoted by the South Dakota court above, it is stated:
“As applied to vehicles advancing on the highway, the word approaching must be given a reasonable construction. A vehicle on the highway is approaching within the meaning of the statute when such vehicle is so close that, if it continues in the same course at the same speed, there is a reasonable likelihood or danger of collision should the vehicle on the private road or driveway enter upon or cross the highway. If there is a reasonable likelihood of a collision, it is the duty of the driver of the vehicle on the private road to delay his entry on the highway until the other vehicle has passed. If, however, the approaching vehicle is so far away that a reasonably prudent person would have reason to believe that, if such vehicle maintains its -course at the same rate of speed, there is no reasonable likelihood or imminent -danger of collision, a driver upon a private road may enter upon the highway without violating the statute. Whether ■under the circumstances of a particular -case the driver upon a private road has acted as a reasonably prudent person with respect to approaching vehicles in entering upon or crossing the highway is usually a question of fact for the jury.” 58 N.W.2d at 612 to 613.
California appellate courts have considered the application of a statute, comparable to I.C. § 49-730, i. e., Sec. 553 Calif. Vehicle Code [§ 21804 Vehicle Code], In Shannon v. Thomas, 57 Cal.App.2d 187, 134 P.2d 522 (1943), it was held that the purpose of the requirement of Sec. 553, is to prevent drivers on private roads from entering the highway when another vehicle is approaching so near as to constitute an immediate hazard. In Pandell v. Hischier, 166 Cal.App.2d 693, 333 P.2d 762 (1959), it was held that a prospective entrant from a private road may lawfully enter the highway so long as there is no vehicle so near as to constitute an immediate hazard.
In Wakefield v. Horn, 109 Cal.App. 325, 293 P. 97 (1930), plaintiff drove his truck from a private road while defendant’s car on the main highway was some 255 feet away. In upholding judgment for the plaintiff, that court stated:
“ * * * and the only point made is that, at the time the truck emerged from the private road to the highway, the defendant Mary Horn, driving her car as aforesaid, had the right of way. This is based upon the provisions of subdivision b of section 131 of the California Vehicle Act of 1923 * * * which then read: ‘The driver of a vehicle entering a public highway from a private *534road or drive shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said public highway.’ The argument is made that, irrespective of the distance between the approaching car driven by the defendant Mary Horn and the private highway on which the truck was emerging, it gave the defendant the right of way. The subdivision of the section, however, is not susceptible of any such interpretation. If interpreted literally as the subdivision reads, or as it then read, no one could ever drive from a private road upon a public highway if any one were approaching upon such highway, irrespective of the distance. The subdivision must be construed to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, which was to prevent automobile drivers on private roads from entering a public highway when a car was approaching upon such highway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard, and not that no one should enter upon a public highway from a private road or driveway so long as the public highway was in use.” 293 P. at 98.
The interpretation given by the court to the California code provisions in Wakefield v. Horn, supra, has been followed by the Court of Appeal of California in subsequent cases. In Pandell v. Hischier, supra, the court stated:
“Section 553 of the Vehicle Code provides that: ‘The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from any private road or driveway or from an alley * * * shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said highway.’ Literally, this section would require the prospective entrant from a private road to yield the right of way to all vehicles on the highway regardless of where they were. This would be an unreasonable interpretation. For that reason, the courts have interpreted the section to mean that a prospective entrant from a private road may lawfully enter a highway so long as there is no vehicle so near as to constitute an immediate hazard. Wakefield v. Horn, 109 Cal. App. 325, 293 P. 97; Jansen v. Sugiyama, 29 Cal.App.2d 717, 85 P.2d 476; McDougall v. Morrison, 55 Cal.App.2d 92, 130 P.2d 149; Malinson v. Black, 83 Cal.App.2d 375, 188 P.2d 788; See cases collected 7 Cal.Jur.2d p. 54, § 243.” 333 P.2d at 763.
' Where, as in Idaho, “right of way” means “the privilege of the immediate use of the roadway”, I.C. § 49-521 (a), the reasoning of the California courts set out above is persuasive here. If any other interpretation were given the meaning of the I.C. § 49-730, appellant Green would never have been lawfully entitled to cross the highway as long as any vehicles were upon *535the highway, whether he could observe 'them or not.
Even though the trial court found the range of Green’s vision of oncoming traffic to his right to be 690 feet, the unrefuted and unimpeached testimony of officers Higens and Wright, which was not inherently improbable, indicated Green’s view of oncoming traffic was some 850 feet.1 With no approaching vehicles in view, Green had the right to commence crossing the highway at the time he did. The distance of his unobstructed view was such that it cannot be said he was negligent in crossing the highway. When he entered the highway under these circumstances he was fully complying with the law. After once lawfully gaining entry -upon the highway, vehicles approaching in the interim period between commencement and completion of the crossing were under the duty either to slow down or stop. I.C. § 49-701 (a). Drury v. Palmer, 84 Idaho 558, 375 P.2d 125; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 347b, p. 811. The trial court was in error in finding the appellants negligent in that regard.
Appellants cannot be held guilty of negligence by the action of Green driving his truck across the double yellow line. The double yellow line was only to divide eastbound from westbound traffic, and was the authorized marking for the center line on a two-way street with four or more lanes for moving traffic. See Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, U. S. Department of Commerce, June 1961, p. 121 2B-3, which was adopted by the Idaho Board of Highway Directors by order of September 19, 1961. This double yellow line did not cause this highway to be a “divided highway” within the meaning of I.C. § 49-718, which proscribes the driving over, or across the dividing space, barrier or section of a highway divided into two roadways by leaving an intervening space or by physical barrier or clearly indicated dividing section so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic.
Nor can the appellants he charged with negligence towards the respondent’s daughter in the fact that Green entered into the Union Seed Company parking area preparatory to crossing the highway. At the time this truck and trailer crossed from the westbound lane over the eastbound lane and into the parking lot, the occupants *536of the Durham car were so far from the scene that negligence, if any there was, could not be considered as connected with the tragic accident. See Sandberg v. Spoelstra, 46 Wash.2d 776, 285 P.2d 564, 565 (1955), which held to the effect that it was not negligence for a truck to make a left turn off of a highway, absent any oncoming or following traffic.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Costs to appellants.
McQUADE and SMITH, JJ., concur.

. “ * * * either a board, court or jury must accept as true, the positive, uneontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances" disclosed at hearing or trial.” Pierstorff v. Gray’s Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74 P.2d 171; First Trust & Savings Bank v. Randall, 59 Idaho 705, 89 P.2d 741; Idaho Times Pub. Co. v. Industrial Accident Board, 63 Idaho 720, 126 P.2d 573; Watkins v. Watkins, 76 Idaho 316, 281 P.2d 1057; National Ro-Tile Corp. v. Loomis, 82 Idaho 65, 350 P.2d 217.