Court Opinion

ID: 9929914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:06:30.801957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:33.333231
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bricher, 2024-Ohio-394.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MERCER COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                           CASE NO. 10-23-02
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

ALAN J. BRICHER,                                           OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. 22-CRM-069

                                       Judgment Affirmed

                            Date of Decision: February 5, 2024

APPEARANCES:

        Peter Galyardt for Appellant

        Erin M. Minor for Appellee
Case No. 10-23-02

MILLER, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Alan J. Bricher (“Bricher”), appeals the March

13, 2023 judgment entry issued by the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas.

Following a two-day trial, a jury found Bricher guilty of seven offenses, and the trial

court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of eight to twelve years. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2} Bricher and Zachary Frazier (“Frazier”) were friends. They met each

other in 2011 while in prison, and Bricher later married the mother of Frazier’s

oldest child. At least as of March 2022, Frazier was living on the couch at Bricher’s

residence (a trailer) in Coldwater, Ohio. Based on citizen complaints and other

information, police suspected Bricher and Frazier were operating a drug-trafficking

business and began surveilling Bricher’s residence daily, starting in approximately

February 2022. According to testimony at trial, Bricher was not employed during

the course of the police surveillance.

       {¶3} On May 12, 2022, officers watched Frazier leave the residence in a car

registered to Bricher. Officers followed Frazier, who went to various locations in

the Dayton area. As Frazier headed back towards Coldwater, officers saw him make

two lane violations, so they conducted a traffic stop. After a narcotics dog alerted

on the back passenger door of the car, officers conducted a search and found three

                                         -2-
Case No. 10-23-02

baggies containing fentanyl in the car. The combined weight of the substances

containing fentanyl was approximately 44.84 grams. At the scene of the traffic stop,

Frazier told officers that Bricher orchestrated the drug deal and there were more

drugs—specifically, methamphetamine (“meth”)—at Bricher’s residence.

       {¶4} Police officers arrested Frazier and then obtained a search warrant for

Bricher’s residence. During the subsequent search, officers found personal items

belonging to Bricher (including a wallet containing his driver’s license) alongside

several items related to drugs and drug trafficking. This included a ledger with

names and weights next to the names (including the name “Twan”); rolling papers;

cut straws; several “stash containers,” two of which had methamphetamine residue;

and Narcan. Hidden behind a piece of drywall in another room, officers found two

electronic scales, as well as a list of names and phone numbers. Officers also found

$550 in cash, all in 50- or 100-dollar bills. Officers did not find anything in the

residence that identified Frazier.

       {¶5} When Frazier implicated Bricher on May 12 at the scene of the traffic

stop (prior to his arrest), Frazier did not have any deal in place with the prosecutor’s

office. The same was true when Frazier spoke to officers a second time (now after

his arrest), when he provided information consistent with what he had told officers

at the scene of the traffic stop. At trial, Frazier testified he divulged this information

because he realized at that point how much trouble he was in, knew he would be

                                           -3-
Case No. 10-23-02

“going away for a while” to prison, and he “wanted to get back to [his] kids” as

quickly as possible. (Tr. at 269).

       {¶6} As a result of the investigation and his admissions, Frazier was indicted

on three counts. A few months later, he made an agreement with the prosecutor to

testify as a State’s witness at Bricher’s trial and pleaded guilty to two counts

(engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and possession of fentanyl), while the State

dismissed the third count (trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound). The trial

court sentenced Frazier to 30 months in prison on the first count, to be served

concurrently with his sentence of four-to-six years in prison on the possession count.

       {¶7} On May 19, 2022, Bricher was indicted by the grand jury. The court

held a jury trial from March 8 to March 9, 2023 on seven counts:

       1.     Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, in violation of R.C.
              2923.32(A)(1), a second-degree felony;

       2.     Trafficking in a Fentanyl-Related Compound, in violation of
              R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a first-degree felony;

       3.     Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound, in violation of
              R.C. 2925.11(A), a first-degree felony;

       4.     Aggravated Possession of Drugs, in violation of R.C.
              2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony;

       5.     Aggravated Possession of Drugs, in violation of 2925.11(A), a
              fifth-degree felony;

       6.     Possessing Criminal Tools, in violation of 2923.24(A), a fifth-
              degree felony; and

       7.     Illegal Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation
              of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1), a fourth-degree felony.

                                         -4-
Case No. 10-23-02

       {¶8} Prior to trial, the State filed a Bill of Particulars. Regarding Count 1

(engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity), it expanded the date range to “on or about

March 1, 2022 to May 12, 2022” and specified that “[t]he predicate offenses for this

charge are Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment, as well as uncharged instances of

possession of and trafficking in methamphetamine and fentanyl in quantities

constituting felonies of the fourth degree or more serious felonies.”

       {¶9} At trial, several witnesses testified for the State, including Frazier.

According to Frazier, he would sell drugs for Bricher and also pick up drugs in

Dayton for Bricher. This included the May 12, 2022 trip, when Bricher had asked

him to do a drug run, gave him cash to buy fentanyl, and gave him the names of

who to meet up with that day to get the drugs (one of which was Twan). Frazier

testified he picked up two bags of drugs from Twan: a bulk amount and a small bag

for his own personal use. Frazier paid Twan with the cash he had received from

Bricher. Frazier used the fentanyl in the small bag then went to another location

where he picked up two more bags of fentanyl from a different person, again paying

for the drugs with the cash he had received from Bricher. He put the three remaining

bags of fentanyl—which Frazier testified was “a lot more” than the amount he had

personally used—underneath the backseat of his car. He was headed back to

Bricher’s residence when the police pulled him over for the lane violations.

       {¶10} Frazier also testified at trial about the general nature of the drug runs

he would do for Bricher. He would pick up drugs—sometimes meth, sometimes

                                         -5-
Case No. 10-23-02

fentanyl, sometimes both—at least twice a week. According to Frazier, Bricher

would arrange the drug runs. Bricher would call the drug dealers; Bricher would

give Frazier the money to buy the drugs; Bricher would tell Frazier who he would

be meeting to obtain the drugs; and Bricher would let Frazier use Bricher’s car to

drive from Bricher’s residence to meet the drug dealers. After completing the drug

buys as Bricher instructed, Frazier would bring the drugs back to Bricher who would

then weigh the drugs on a digital scale to verify they were the correct amount

purchased. Bricher would usually store the drugs in his bedroom.

       {¶11} Frazier testified he also sold both methamphetamine and fentanyl for

Bricher. Frazier would watch Bricher measure the drugs for the buyers using a

scale. Initially, drug buyers contacted Bricher, who would then have Frazier deliver

the drugs to the buyer. Later, the buyers would directly contact Frazier, who would

then go to Bricher and get the drugs in order to make the sale. Frazier would use

one of Bricher’s vehicles to make these drug deliveries.

       {¶12} Regarding the quantity of methamphetamine he would typically pick

up for Bricher, Frazier testified: “In the beginning [i.e., early March 2022], it was

smaller amounts, like quarter pounds, half pounds, but towards the end [i.e., when

he was arrested on May 12, 2022], it was more one or two pounds.” (Tr. at 244-

246). Concerning the quantity of fentanyl he would pick up, he testified: “It’s like

the meth, it started off slow, smaller, but towards the end, about maybe an ounce or

more.” (Id. at 244-245). In summary, “every week, twice per week, from early

                                         -6-
Case No. 10-23-02

March to when [he] got arrested in May,” Frazier made drug runs arranged by

Bricher with the amount of drugs increasing as time went on—but always in

amounts that were much more than for personal use. (Id. at 245-246). With respect

to drug costs and proceeds, Frazier testified a gram of methamphetamine would cost

about $15; he would sell it for $20 or $25. (Id. at 257-58). There was no similar

testimony regarding the cost or proceeds of the fentanyl.

       {¶13} Also during the trial, the State played portions of phone calls made by

Bricher while in jail awaiting trial. (See Tr. at 401-415; State’s Exhibit 46). In one

call, Bricher asked his wife to reach out to Frazier and tell him all will be forgiven

if he “forgets” his statement to the police. In another call, Bricher stated he “just

can’t stop selling dope.” (Id.).

       {¶14} After the State rested its case, and the trial court denied Bricher’s

Crim.R. 29 motion, Bricher decided not to call any witnesses and rested his case.

The judge gave the jury instructions. This included instructions regarding witness

credibility and accomplice testimony. For example, the judge told the jury:

       As jurors, you are the sole judges of the facts, the credibility of the
       witnesses, and the weight to give to the testimony in evidence. To
       weigh the evidence, you must consider the credibility of each witness
       who testifies. You will use the tests of truthfulness which you use in
       your daily lives. These tests include * * * their intelligence, interest
       and bias, if any, together with all the facts and circumstances
       surrounding the testimony of that witness.

       ***

       In this case, you heard the testimony of a codefendant, or someone
       who would be known as an accomplice. The testimony of an
                                         -7-
Case No. 10-23-02

       accomplice does not become inadmissible because of their complicity,
       moral turpitude or self-interest, but the admitted or claimed
       complicity of a witness who testifies may affect his credibility and
       make his testimony subject to grave suspicion, and require that it be
       weighed with great caution. It is for you, as jurors, in light of all the
       facts presented to you from the witness stand, to evaluate the
       testimony of an accomplice and determine the quality and worth of
       that testimony, or the lack of quality and worth.

(Tr. at 456-458). This latter paragraph corresponds with a requirement in the

complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03(D).

       {¶15} The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all seven offenses. On March

10, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court found the second

and third offenses merged. The judge sentenced Bricher to a term of eight to twelve

years in prison for count two. The trial court ordered the terms of incarceration for

the remaining offenses to run concurrently to this sentence. This appeal followed.

II.    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶16} Bricher raises five assignments of error for our review:

                                First Assignment of Error

       Alan Bricher’s pattern-of-corrupt activity and first-degree-felony drug
       trafficking and possession findings of guilt are not supported by the
       manifest weight of the evidence. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
       United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 10 and 16, Ohio
       Constitution. Tr. 279, 284-287, 290-291, 410, 412, 416, 457-458.

                               Second Assignment of Error

       Alan Bricher’s pattern-of-corrupt-activity conviction is not supported
       by sufficient evidence. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, United
       States Constitution; Article I, Sections 10 and 16, Ohio Constitution.
       R.C. 2923.31(D); R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c); Crim.R. 29. Tr. 145-438, 439-
       444, 460-461.

                                         -8-
Case No. 10-23-02

                              Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court committed plain error, thereby abusing its discretion,
       and violated Alan Bricher’s constitutional due process rights when it
       provided an improper, inaccurate, and misleading jury instruction for
       the pattern-of-corrupt-activity charge.      Fifth and Fourteenth
       Amendments, United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 10 and 16,
       Ohio Constitution. R.C. 2923.31(E); R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). Crim R.
       52(B). Tr. 460-461.

                             Fourth Assignment of Error

       Ohio’s sentencing scheme of potentially enhanced penalties for
       qualifying first- and second-degree felonies as administratively
       determined by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, which
       was applied to Alan Bricher, is unconstitutional. Sixth and Fourteenth
       Amendments, United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 5 and 14,
       Ohio Constitution. State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424,
       933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 39-53; State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132,
       135, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000). Mar. 13, 2023 Judgment Entry.

                               Fifth Assignment of Error

       Alan Bricher’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel,
       in violation of his constitutional rights. Sixth and Fourteenth
       Amendments, United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 10 and 16,
       Ohio Constitution; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
       2052, 80 L.E.2d 674 (1984). Sentencing Tr. 11-27.

III.   DISCUSSION

       {¶17} In his reply brief and at oral argument, Bricher withdrew his fourth

assignment of error, in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v.

Hacker, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2023-Ohio-2535. Therefore, we proceed with addressing

the remaining assignments of error in the order presented.

                                        -9-
Case No. 10-23-02

       A.     First Assignment of Error

       {¶18} In the first assignment of error, Bricher argues the findings of guilt for

the engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity offense (Count 1), drug trafficking

offense (Count 2), and drug possession offense (Count 3) are not supported by the

manifest weight of the evidence.       According to Bricher, it was Frazier who

committed all the criminal acts, asserting that “the evidence would look the exact

same if [Frazier] coordinated all the acts and asked to borrow Mr. Bricher’s car to

perform them.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4). Bricher also says that, “while complicit

liability requires only that Mr. Bricher solicited or procured the accomplice, the only

evidence pointing toward that possibility is [Frazier’s] word.” (Id.)

              1.     Standard of Review

       {¶19} The “manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to

the state’s burden of persuasion.” State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-

Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. “To evaluate a claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether

in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such

a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a

new trial.” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Yet, “[o]nly in

exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’

                                         -10-
Case No. 10-23-02

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio

St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

              2.     Drug Trafficking (Count 2)

       {¶20} Looking first to Count 2, drug trafficking is proscribed by R.C.

2925.03. The statute states, in relevant part:

       (A) No person shall knowingly * * * [p]repare for shipment, ship,
       transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled
       substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows
       or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or a
       controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the
       offender or another person.

       ***

       If the drug involved in the violation is a fentanyl-related compound *
       * * whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of trafficking
       in a fentanyl-related compound.

       ***

       If the amount of the drug involved * * * exceeds twenty grams but is
       less than fifty grams * * * trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound
       is a felony of the first degree, and the court shall impose as a
       mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony
       of the first degree.

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(9).

       {¶21} The trial judge instructed the jury regarding complicity to drug

trafficking and explained: “The State of Ohio has presented a theory that the

Defendant acted in complicity with the principal offender, Zachary Frazier, in

commission of the offense of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound.” (Tr. at

                                         -11-
Case No. 10-23-02

461). The complicity statute states, in relevant part: “No person, acting with the

kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall * * * [s]olicit or

procure another to commit the offense” or “[a]id or abet another in committing the

offense.” R.C. 2923.03(A)(1), (2); see also State v. Lamarr, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-

04-39, 2005-Ohio-6030, ¶ 8 (“[i]t is well-settled law that the prosecution may

advance a complicity theory even though a criminal defendant was indicted as the

principal offender”). The complicity statute also provides that someone who is

guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense shall be punished as if he were

a principal offender. R.C. 2923.03(F).

        {¶22} Here, police officers found approximately 44.84 grams of substances

containing fentanyl in a car registered to Bricher and driven by Frazier on May 12,

2022.    Frazier’s testimony demonstrates Bricher solicited him to procure the

fentanyl, having asked Frazier to make the May 12, 2022 trip to Dayton, giving

Frazier cash to buy the fentanyl, and directing Frazier to meet with Twan and

another supplier to obtain the fentanyl. Frazier also testified that he picked up bags

of substances containing fentanyl and paid for the drugs with the cash he had

received from Bricher. In the phone recordings played for the jury, Bricher (1)

asked his wife to reach out to Frazier and tell Frazier all would be forgiven if Frazier

would forget his statements to the police and (2) said he can’t stop selling dope.

        {¶23} Even considering the concerns with accomplice testimony, the

evidence weighing in favor of the jury’s conclusion that Bricher trafficked in a

                                         -12-
Case No. 10-23-02

fentanyl-related compound “is weightier than the evidence that” he was not. State

v. Thompson, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-17-26, 2018-Ohio-637, ¶ 100 (determining

the jury’s conclusion defendant-appellant was preparing cocaine for distribution

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence). At the least, the evidence

shows Bricher was complicit in Frazier knowingly transporting a controlled

substance when he knew (or had reasonable cause to believe) the controlled

substance was intended for sale or resale by Frazier or himself.

       {¶24} Bricher’s argument that Frazier’s testimony was “the only evidence

pointing toward” Bricher soliciting or procuring Frazier to commit the offense is

incorrect.   There was additional evidence.     For example, Bricher’s jail calls

supported Bricher’s knowledge and participation in the illegal drug transactions, as

do the items found during the search of his residence. Moreover, “even when a

conviction is based solely or substantially upon accomplice testimony, it is not

necessarily improper or against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Fox,

4th Dist. Washington No. 14CA36, 2015-Ohio-3892, ¶ 23 (collecting cases); see

also State v. Taylor, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-939, 2011-Ohio-3162, ¶ 24 (“[a]s

the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized * * * a jury is not precluded from basing

a criminal conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice”). The jury

was made aware of the charges against Frazier, the plea agreement he had reached

with the prosecutor in return for his testimony, the charges he was convicted of

committing, and the sentence he received as a result of his conduct. He was cross-

                                        -13-
Case No. 10-23-02

examined by Bricher’s counsel, and he testified about his involvement as an

accomplice, his agreement with the prosecutor, and any bias he may have had.

Additionally, the trial court gave cautionary instructions regarding Frazier’s

testimony, including how his testimony was “subject to grave suspicion” and must

“be weighed with great caution.” (Tr. at 457-58). “We also note that the jury was

able to view [Frazier’s] direct and cross-examination, and was in the best position

to observe his demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections.” Fox, 2015-Ohio-3892, at

¶ 24 (guilty verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, despite the

jury’s reliance on the accomplice’s testimony); see also State v. Holland, 3d Dist.

Auglaize No. 2-03-27, 2004-Ohio-537, ¶ 3 (even when determining whether a

conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he fact-finder’s verdict

must be granted due deference as it is in a better position to determine credibility of

the witnesses”). And, a jury can make reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Thompson, 2018-Ohio-637, at ¶ 102.

       {¶25} Having reviewed the record as a whole, we do not find the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction, that the trier of fact lost its way, or that a

manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. “We will not substitute our judgment for

that of the jury.” Fox, 2015-Ohio-3892, at ¶ 24; see also Taylor, 2011-Ohio-3162,

at ¶ 26-27 (where the jury was aware of the potential credibility concerns presented

by an accomplice’s testimony, the convictions were not against manifest weight of

                                         -14-
Case No. 10-23-02

the evidence). Therefore, we conclude Bricher’s conviction for drug trafficking

(count 2) is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              3.     Drug Possession (Count 3)

       {¶26} Although the jury found Bricher guilty of both the second offense

(trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound) and third offense (possession of a

fentanyl-related compound), the trial court merged those offenses and sentenced

Bricher only on the trafficking offense. Because we have concluded that Bricher’s

conviction on the trafficking offense was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence, an erroneous verdict on the merged count (possession) would be harmless.

State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3934, 2022-Ohio-371, ¶ 51 (where

defendant-appellant was found guilty of both drug trafficking and drug possession

offenses, “if sufficient evidence supports appellant’s trafficking conviction, and if

the conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, an erroneous

verdict on the merged [drug possession] count would be harmless”); State v. Wolff,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07 MA 166, 2009-Ohio-2897, ¶ 70 (“[w]hen a trial court

dispatches with a count through merger, any error in the jury’s verdict on the merged

count is rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).            Therefore, it is

unnecessary for us to analyze his manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument with

respect to the possession offense. E.g., Smith at ¶ 69-72 (overruling assignment of

error without analyzing the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument concerning

the merged drug possession offense, where the appellate court found the drug

                                        -15-
Case No. 10-23-02

trafficking conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence); State v.

Alexander, 4th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1144, 2022-Ohio-1812, ¶ 38.

              4.      Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity (Count 1)

       {¶27} Finally, in relation to the engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity

offense (count 1), the applicable statute reads, “[n]o person employed by, or

associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly,

the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of

an unlawful debt.” R.C. 2923.32(A)(1).

       {¶28} The term “enterprise” is broadly defined to include “any individual,

sole proprietorship, partnership, * * * or other legal entity, or any organization,

association, or group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity.” R.C.

2923.31(C). An enterprise “includes illicit as well as licit enterprises.” Id. The

phrase “pattern of corrupt activity” is defined as “two or more incidents of corrupt

activity, whether or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the

affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each

other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.” R.C.

2923.31(E). And, the term “corrupt activity” includes:

       engaging in, attempting to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or
       soliciting, coercing, or intimidating another person to engage in * * *
       conduct constituting * * * [a]ny violation of section * * * 2925.03 *
       * * of the Revised Code [or] any violation of section 2925.11 of the
       Revised Code that is a felony of the first, second, third, or fourth
       degree * * *, when the proceeds of the violation, the payments made
       in the violation, the amount of a claim for payment or for any other

                                         -16-
Case No. 10-23-02

       benefit that is false or deceptive and that is involved in the violation,
       or the value of the contraband or other property illegally possessed,
       sold, or purchased in the violation exceeds one thousand dollars, or
       any combination of violations described in division (I)(2)(c) of this
       section when the total proceeds of the combination of violations,
       payments made in the combination of violations, amount of the claims
       for payment or for other benefits that is false or deceptive and that is
       involved in the combination of violations, or value of the contraband
       or other property illegally possessed, sold, or purchased in the
       combination of violations exceeds one thousand dollars[.]

R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). Thus, both the drug trafficking and the drug possession

statutes are included as potential predicate offenses in the definition of corrupt

activity.

       {¶29} Additionally, there is a monetary threshold for violations to be

considered corrupt activity. R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). The violation or combination of

violations must involve proceeds, payments, claims, or value that exceeds the

statutory threshold amount of $1,000. Id. For example, one way in which drug

trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03 can constitute a corrupt activity is when

“‘the total proceeds of a violation of that statute or a combination of violations of

that statute’” exceed $1,000. State v. Kolle, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 21CA8, 2022-

Ohio-4322, ¶ 38, quoting State v. Liggins, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. 16 CAS 32, 2018-

Ohio-243, ¶ 23; see also R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). “Thus, individual transactions can

be aggregated to form a single corrupt activity.” Kolle at ¶ 38. “However, ‘in order

for the state to establish a pattern of corrupt activity it must produce evidence of at

least two corrupt activities where the proceeds of each corrupt activity exceeded

                                         -17-
Case No. 10-23-02

$1,000.’” Id., quoting Liggins at ¶ 23. Additionally, “[c]ourts have held that

‘offenses committed by accomplices will qualify as predicate acts sufficient to

convict other participants in the enterprise of engaging in a pattern of corrupt

activity.’” State v. Donaldson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29473, 2023-Ohio-234, ¶

24, quoting State v. Barnes, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-7-024, 2008-Ohio-1854, ¶ 23.

         {¶30} Here, evidence at trial showed Bricher was associated in an illicit

enterprise with Frazier that involved obtaining, transporting, and selling illegal

drugs. Yet, we agree with Bricher that any fentanyl-related incidents—including

the one on May 12, 2022—cannot qualify as “corrupt activity” under the statute.

This is because no evidence concerning the value of the fentanyl was presented at

trial.

         {¶31} However, as set forth above, the Bill of Particulars filed by the State

not only identified Counts 2 and 3 as being predicate offenses for Count 1, but it

also identified “uncharged instances of possession of and trafficking in

methamphetamine * * * in quantities constituting felonies of the fourth degree or

more serious felonies” that took place between March 1, 2022 to May 12, 2022. See

State v. Thomas, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-36, 2017-Ohio-4356, ¶ 66-67 (upholding

the sentence for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity where the bill of particulars

“specifically said that the predicate offenses were those charged in Counts One,

Two, and Three, as well as uncharged instances of possession of and trafficking in

marijuana in quantities constituting at least felonies of the third degree”); State v.

                                         -18-
Case No. 10-23-02

Siferd, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-02-09, 2002-Ohio-6801, ¶ 25 (no plain error where

State used unindicted offenses as predicate offenses for the R.C. 2923.32(A)

violation and appellant-defendant did not object when “trafficking, funding, and

possession were identified as the predicate offenses in the state’s trial brief or when

the jury was instructed as to these offenses”).

       {¶32} While there was no testimony regarding the value of the fentanyl that

was purchased, possessed, or trafficked, the same is not true regarding the

methamphetamine. We note that methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled

substance, and its bulk amount is three grams or more. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12;

R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(g); State v. Rhodus, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2023-03-029,

2023-Ohio-3678, ¶ 19.

       {¶33} At the trial, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bricher

at least twice violated R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) during the relevant timeframe, in

quantities of methamphetamine that constituted at least felonies of the fourth degree.

A forensic scientist for the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigations testified that

methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled substance. (Tr. at 316). Additionally,

an officer testified that the police found two stash containers containing

methamphetamine residue during the search of Bricher’s residence. (Id. at 172; see

also id. at 332, 336). More importantly, Frazier testified he would pick up, transport,

and sell methamphetamine for Bricher during the relevant time frame. (Id. at 243-

244, 254). Frazier also testified about the amounts and value of the trafficked

                                         -19-
Case No. 10-23-02

methamphetamine. Specifically, Frazier testified: “In the beginning [i.e., early

March 2022], it was smaller amounts, like quarter pounds, half pounds, but towards

the end [i.e., when he was arrested on May 12, 2022], it was more one or two

pounds.”   (Id. at 244-246).    Therefore, at a minimum, Frazier acquired and

transported for sale or resale: (1) a quarter pound of methamphetamine during the

early portion of the enterprise; and (2) a pound of methamphetamine during the

latter portion of the enterprise. This was done within the context of a pattern of

Bricher and Frazier working together to acquire, transport, and sell drugs at least

twice per week, continuously every week, from early March to May 12, 2022, when

Frazier was arrested.

       {¶34} Frazier testified a gram of methamphetamine would cost about $15

and he would sell it for $20 or $25. (Id. at 257-58). Given the large quantities of

methamphetamine purchased by Frazier and then sold by him and Bricher, a jury

could easily conclude that the value of the contraband involved in those two separate

violations of R.C. 2925.03 each exceeded $1,000. R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c).

       {¶35} The quantities of methamphetamine in these two violations also each

qualify as (at least) fourth-degree felonies, thus meeting the “corrupt activity”

threshold for seriousness of the incidents. See R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). Violating the

drug trafficking statute, when the drug involved “is any compound, mixture,

preparation, or substance included in schedule I or schedule II,” is a felony of the

fourth degree, regardless of how small a quantity is trafficked.                R.C.

                                        -20-
Case No. 10-23-02

2925.03(C)(1)(a). The seriousness of the drug trafficking violation increases as the

quantity of the controlled substance increases. R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(c), (d), (e), (f).

       {¶36} The evidence presented at trial established that Bricher solicited

Frazier   to engage       in   multiple    violations of R.C. 2925.03            involving

methamphetamine. The evidence established two or more separate instances of

corrupt activity with a value possessed, sold, or purchased exceeding $1,000 during

the time frame between March 1, 2022 and May 12, 2022.                           See R.C.

2923.31(I)(2)(c); R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1).

       {¶37} In conclusion, evidence at trial demonstrated that Bricher participated

in the affairs of his illicit enterprise with Frazier through a pattern of corrupt activity,

in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). Bricher’s conviction for engaging-in-a-pattern-

of-corrupt-activity is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v.

Smale, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-17-44, 2018-Ohio-5218, ¶ 20-22 (conviction for

violating R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence

where the jury heard testimony regarding appellant’s complicit trafficking conduct

from appellant’s roommate); State v. Cobb, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-06-153,

2008-Ohio-5210, ¶ 106-07 (conviction for engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-

activity not against manifest weight of the evidence where the jury heard testimony

and recorded phone calls that offered credible evidence defendant-appellant

trafficked in drugs on multiple occasions); State v. Jazdzewski, 4th Dist. Washington

No. 14CA15, 2015-Ohio-2416, ¶ 42, 44 (rejecting appellant’s argument that his

                                           -21-
Case No. 10-23-02

conviction for engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity was improper because it

rested on the testimony of an accomplice).

       {¶38} Bricher’s first assignment of error is overruled.

       B.     Second Assignment of Error

       {¶39} In the second assignment of error, Bricher argues the trial court erred

in overruling his Crim.R 29 motion on Count 1. He contends “the prosecution failed

to present sufficient evidence on the pattern-of-corrupt-activity offense in two ways:

(1) the threshold dollar amount, and (2) two incidents of corrupt activity as

statutorily defined.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6).

              1.     Standard of Review

       {¶40} “A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same

standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient

evidence.” State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37, citing State

v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995) and Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d at 386. A sufficiency challenge disputes whether a party met its burden of

production at trial. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 26. “In reviewing a record

for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Tenace at

¶ 37, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph

two of the syllabus. Thus, “[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not

                                         -22-
Case No. 10-23-02

resolve evidentiary conflicts or assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Jackson,

3d Dist. Allen No. 1-22-27, 2023-Ohio-2193, ¶ 26; see also Jenks at 279.

              2.     Analysis

       {¶41} For the reasons set forth in our analysis of the first assignment of error,

we determine that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Brownlow, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-02-95, 2003-Ohio-5757, ¶ 28-33 (trial court did not err in

overruling defendant-appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal of the R.C.

2923.32(A) count involving drug transactions).

       {¶42} Concerning his first argument in support of this assignment of error,

Bricher contends “the prosecution presented no evidence regarding the proceeds of

the fentanyl from the traffic stop that supported the drug-trafficking offense.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 6). We agree, but, as shown above, that does not conclude our

analysis because there were other potential predicate offenses to support the pattern-

of-corrupt-activity conviction.

       {¶43} In his second argument in support of this assignment of error, Bricher

says, “[e]xcept for the possession of fentanyl, which was merged into the drug-

trafficking offense, the drug-possession offenses in this case were fifth-degree

felonies.” (Appellant’s Brief at 7). Again, as shown above, that does not conclude

our analysis because it ignores other potential predicate offenses to support the

                                         -23-
Case No. 10-23-02

pattern-of-corrupt-activity conviction, namely trafficking in methamphetamine in

quantities constituting felonies of the fourth degree or more serious felonies.

       {¶44} The trial court did not err in overruling Bricher’s Crim.R. 29 motion

concerning the pattern-of-corrupt-activity offense. Bricher’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

       C.     Third Assignment of Error

       {¶45} In the third assignment of error, Bricher argues the trial court

committed plain error “when it provided an improper, inaccurate, and misleading

jury instruction for the pattern-of-corrupt activity charge.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8).

Bricher points to alleged errors (1) in failing to define the threshold dollar amount

for drug trafficking and (2) in failing to provide an accurate statutory definition

regarding drug possession. (Id.).

              1.      Standard of Review

       {¶46} Bricher’s counsel did not object to the trial court’s jury instructions.

Therefore, our review is limited to plain error. Crim.R. 30(A) (“[o]n appeal, a party

may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any instructions unless the

party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating specifically the

matter objected to and the grounds of the objection”); Crim.R. 52(B); State v.

Daboni, 4th Dist. Meigs Nos. 18CA3, 18CA4, and 18CA5, 2018-Ohio-4155, ¶ 64

(because appellant did not object at trial, appellate court reviewed only for plain

error the trial court’s failure to include language in jury instructions regarding the

                                         -24-
Case No. 10-23-02

$1,000 monetary threshold for the engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity

charge).

        {¶47} To qualify for plain-error relief, the appellant must establish: (1)

occurrence of an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule; (2) the error was plain, i.e.,

it was an obvious defect in the trial proceedings; and (3) the error affected the

appellant’s substantial rights, meaning the error “must have affected the outcome of

the trial.” State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 36. Yet, even

when an appellant establishes those three prongs, “[n]otice of plain error under

CrimR. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long,

53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus; see also

Morgan, 2017-Ohio-7565, at ¶ 37; State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-

2459, ¶ 23 (“even if an accused shows that the trial court committed plain error

affecting the outcome of the proceeding, an appellate court is not required to correct

it”).

               2.     Applicable Law

        {¶48} “As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed

on all elements that must be proved to establish the crime with which he is charged.”

State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 153, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). For example,

“where specific intent or culpability is an essential element of the offense, a trial

court’s failure to instruct on that mental element constitutes error.” Id. However,

                                           -25-
Case No. 10-23-02

“a trial court’s failure to separately and specifically charge the jury on every element

of each crime with which a defendant is charged does not per se constitute plain

error nor does it necessarily require reversal of a conviction.” Id. at 154. “Only by

reviewing the record in each case can the probable impact of such a failure be

determined, and a decision reached as to whether substantial prejudice may have

been visited on the defendant, thereby resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”

Id.

       {¶49} Therefore, “[w]here a trial court’s failure to separately and specifically

instruct the jury on every essential element of each crime with which an accused is

charged is asserted to be plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), the reviewing court must

examine the record in order to determine whether that failure may have resulted in

a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. For

example, the error can be overcome if there was no scenario in which the jury could

have reasonably concluded, based on the evidence, that the State did not prove the

element(s) at issue—such as where the evidence on that element is undisputed. See,

e.g., id. at 152, 155 (reversing finding of plain error in the trial court’s failure to

instruct the jury on the degree of mental culpability required to find criminal liability

under the endangering children statute); State v. Daley, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-

26, 2014-Ohio-2128, ¶ 58 (“[w]e do not find that a manifest miscarriage of justice

occurred [despite the jury instructions lacking an essential element of the offense,

                                          -26-
Case No. 10-23-02

i.e., the victim being under the age of 13,] because our review of the record discloses

that the age of the victim was not a disputed fact in this case”).

              3.     Analysis

       {¶50} We initially address the second alleged error: failing to provide an

accurate statutory definition regarding drug possession. As shown above, it was

unnecessary to consider potential predicate offenses of drug possession to convict

Bricher on Count 1 (the charge at issue in this assignment of error). Instead,

instances of drug trafficking in methamphetamine supported the conviction.

Therefore, we disagree with Bricher that, “[h]ad the instruction detailed that drug

possession had to be a first-, second-, third-, or fourth-degree felony to constitute a

corrupt activity, Mr. Bricher would not have been convicted of the pattern-of-

corrupt-activity offense because the drug-possession offenses at issue were fifth-

degree felonies.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). This alleged error in the statutory

definition regarding drug possession does not qualify for plain-error relief.

       {¶51} We next turn to the failure to define the threshold dollar amount for

drug trafficking as a predicate offense to engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.

As explained above, the definition of “corrupt activity” sets forth a monetary

threshold in order for a violation to be considered “corrupt activity” under the

engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity statute.       R.C. 2923.32(A)(1); R.C.

2923.31(I)(2)(c). To meet the definition of “corrupt activity,” the violation or

combination of violations must involve proceeds, payments, claims, or value that

                                         -27-
Case No. 10-23-02

exceeds the statutory threshold amount of $1,000. Id. Bricher is correct that the

trial court here did not instruct the jury regarding the requisite monetary threshold.1

R.C. 2923.32(A)(1); R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c); see also Liggins, 2018-Ohio-243, at ¶

23 (referring to the “exceeds one thousand dollars” portion of the corrupt activity

definition as an element of an engaging-in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity offense).

The State concedes this error, but argues it was harmless—asserting that, “had the

trial court provided a complete jury instruction, the outcome would have been the

same.” (Appellee’s Brief at 19.)

         {¶52} In line with the Ohio Supreme Court’s guidance in Adams, because

Bricher failed to object, “we must examine the record and we will only reverse the

conviction if we decide that ‘substantial prejudice may have been visited on the

defendant, thereby resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Daley, 2014-

Ohio-2128, at ¶ 58, quoting Adams at 154. The burden “is on [Bricher] to show the

irregularity affected the outcome.” State v. Bethel, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 13CA11,

1
 The trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part:
          The first offense is engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. And the Defendant is charged
          with one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Before you can find the
          Defendant guilty of this offense, you must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
          Defendant, on or about March 1st * * * 2022, to May 12, 2022, and in Mercer County,
          Ohio, while associated with an enterprise, did conduct or participate in, directly or
          indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity.
          ***
          Pattern of corrupt activity means two or more incidents of corrupt activity that are related
          to the affairs of the same enterprise, that are not isolated, and are not so closely related to
          each other and connected in time in place to constitute a single event. Corrupt activity
          means engaging in, attempting to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or soliciting, coercing
          or intimidating another person to engage in a violation, among other offenses, such as
          trafficking in drugs and felony possession of drugs.
(Tr. at 459-461). Among other things, the instructions also provided definitions for “enterprise,” “conduct,”
and “participate,” as well as instructions regarding drug trafficking. (Id. at 459-464).

                                                   -28-
Case No. 10-23-02

2014-Ohio-3861, ¶ 11. We also construe the State’s harmless error argument as an

effort to show the omission “did not affect a substantial right, i.e. it was not outcome

determinative.” Id.

       {¶53} A similar scenario was presented to the Fourth District Court of

Appeals in Daboni.      There, “the trial court’s overall instruction and specific

definition of corrupt activity provided to the jury did not include language regarding

the monetary threshold of one thousand dollars that must be proven.” Daboni, 2018-

Ohio-4155, at ¶ 63. Thus, “the trial court’s instruction did contain an error,” but the

defendant-appellant did not object to the court’s jury instructions. Id. at ¶ 64, 66.

At trial, one of defendant-appellant’s drug “runners” testified to the amount of

heroin he would sell for defendant-appellant and the typical selling price for the

heroin he sold. Id. at ¶ 70. The appellate court explained that, “[e]mploying simple

math and applying it to the testimony, the jury could not have concluded that the

State failed to prove the monetary threshold amount of $1,000.00 required by the

statute.” Id. Therefore, the appellate court could not “conclude that the trial court’s

failure to instruct the jury on the required monetary threshold resulted in plain error

as to the first count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.” Id.

       {¶54} Here, as in Daboni, the omission in the jury instructions did not result

in a manifest miscarriage of justice. The evidence concerning both the value of the

methamphetamine and the amount involved in the two incidents referenced in the

first assignment of error was neither challenged nor in dispute at trial. As further

                                         -29-
Case No. 10-23-02

explained in our analysis of the first assignment of error, applying the use of

common sense and simple math to Frazier’s undisputed testimony concerning the

amounts and value of the methamphetamine, there was no scenario in which the jury

could have reasonably concluded the State did not prove the requisite monetary

threshold to constitute two separate incidents of “corrupt activity” for the engaging-

in-a-pattern-of-corrupt-activity offense. We find the incomplete jury instruction did

not result in substantial prejudice to Bricher. See Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d at 154;

Daboni, 2018-Ohio-4155, at ¶ 63-70; State v. Keeling, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

010610, 2002-Ohio-3299, ¶ 28 (where only one person provided testimony

concerning the events surrounding the offense, defendant-appellant did not dispute

that person’s version of the events (only his participation in them), and that person’s

testimony established the offense’s element at issue, the failure to instruct the jury

on that element was harmless because “[u]nder no possible scenario could the jury

have rationally found” the element had not been established).

       {¶55} Bricher’s two cited cases are distinguishable. In Bethel, “the court’s

instructions were incorrect because they omitted the element ‘by means of a deadly

weapon or dangerous ordnance’” for a felonious assault offense. Bethel, 2014-

Ohio-3861, at ¶ 9-10. At the trial in that case, the State presented evidence that the

defendant attacked the victim with a dangerous weapon and caused injury, while the

defendant testified he never had the dangerous weapon and denied hitting the victim

with any weapon. Id. at ¶ 13. “Thus, whether [defendant-appellant] used a deadly

                                         -30-
Case No. 10-23-02

weapon was very much in dispute between the parties,” and “the court’s failure to

submit that essential element to the jury caused a manifest injustice because it

deprived [defendant-appellant] of his right to have the jury decide that issue beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id. Bricher’s other cited case is distinguishable too. In

Chamblin, the appellate court did not apply the legal standards set forth in Adams

for analyzing the error. State v. Chamblin, 4th Dist. Adams No. 02CA753, 2004-

Ohio-2252. Additionally, the appellate court in Chamblin determined the trial court

gave inadequate jury instructions on the underlying predicate offense that was the

only potential second predicate offense to support the engaging-in-a-pattern-of-

corrupt-activity conviction. Id. at ¶ 24-29. Among other distinguishing factors, the

predicate offenses here were drug trafficking offenses, but Bricher does not

challenge the drug trafficking instructions. Ultimately, we disagree with Bricher’s

assertion that, “[w]ithout the faulty instruction, there could be no guilty finding

because there were not two incidents of corrupt activity as statutorily defined, and,

therefore, no pattern.” (Appellant’s Brief at 10).

       {¶56} Bricher’s third assignment of error is overruled.

       D.     Fifth Assignment of Error

       {¶57} In the fifth assignment of error, Bricher contends his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when she (1) failed to challenge the

constitutionality of Ohio’s sentencing scheme, and (2) failed to object to the jury

instructions for the pattern-of-corrupt-activity offense. (Appellant Brief at 17).

                                        -31-
Case No. 10-23-02

               1.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       {¶58} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant “must

show (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an

objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been

different.” State v. Tench, 156 Ohio St.3d 85, 2018-Ohio-5205, ¶ 118.

       {¶59} With respect to the first requirement, “[i]n order to show counsel’s

conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that

counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional

judgment.” State v. Houston, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-10-06, 2010-Ohio-6070, ¶ 35,

citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984). “Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id., citing State v. Sallie, 81

Ohio St.3d 673, 675, 693 N.E.2d 267 (1998). “Tactical or strategic trial decisions,

even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance.” Id. at ¶ 36,

citing State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995). “Rather, the

errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s essential

duties to his client.” Id.

       {¶60} Regarding the second requirement, “prejudice results when ‘there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

                                         -32-
Case No. 10-23-02

proceeding would have been different.’” Id., quoting State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d

136, 141-42, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). “‘A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., quoting Bradley at 142.

              2.     Analysis

       {¶61} Concerning Bricher’s first contention, in accordance with his

withdrawal of the fourth assignment of error on the same issue and the Ohio

Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, his trial counsel did not

render ineffective assistance of counsel. Addressing his second contention, in

accordance with our assessment of the third assignment of error on the same issue,

his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. Bricher has not

shown any prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged deficient performance.

Bricher’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

IV.    CONCLUSION

       {¶62} For the foregoing reasons, Bricher’s assignments of error are

overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Mercer County Court of

Common Pleas.

                                                               Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

                                        -33-