Court Opinion

ID: 9810021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:29.888124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:19.954277
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MARQUEZ,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
T 25 I agree with the majority that a prosecutor's inaccurate recollection of a potential juror's voir dire response is insufficient, standing alone, to prove that the prosecutor's peremptory strike of that juror was racially motivated. See maj. op. T2, 24. I also agree with the majority that the court of appeals erred by concluding that the record's refutation of the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reason for the strike necessarily established a Batson violation. See id. at % 18. I write separately, however, because the record before us does not demonstrate that the trial court actually conducted step three of the Batson analysis. When a trial court conducts an inadequate Batson analysis, "the appropriate procedure is to remand the case for more detailed findings by the trial court." Craig v. Carlson, 161 P.3d 648, 654 (Colo.2007); see also People v. Rodriguez, 2015 CO 55, ¶ 22, 351 P.3d 423. Unlike the majority, I would remand this case for a Batson hearing and more particular findings. I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
126 I begin with a brief overview of the facts of this case before explaining why I believe that the record before us warrants a remand for a Batson hearing.
127 During voir dire, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors a series of questions to elicit whether they could return a guilty verdict based on a DNA match if the alleged rape victim could not identify her attacker. When the prosecutor reached Mr. E., who is black, she asked him, "Do you have confidence in scientific evidence?" Mr. E. responded, "Yes, I do." He admitted that the lack of eyewitness identification might give him pause, but when the prosecutor asked him whether he could find the defendant guilty if the People proved their case using scientific evidence, Mr. E. replied, "I believe so."
1 28 The prosecutor used only one peremptory strike, which she exercised against Mr. E. Defense counsel immediately raised a Pat-son challenge. The prosecutor explained that she struck Mr. E. because of his "discomfort with the DNA evidence and his concern about the ability to return a verdict of guilty if, in fact, the victim could not do an eyewitness identification." Defense counsel pointed out that Mr. E. in fact "said the exact opposite" about DNA evidence. The trial court nevertheless excused Mr. E.
T29 To use a peremptory strike to remove a potential juror solely because of that juror's race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 LEd.2d 69 (1986). Batson's three-step analysis is designed to uncover whether a peremptory strike reflected "purposeful discrimination." 1 Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. If the record of voir dire is clear, an appellate court can review whether a trial court correctly performed a Batson analysis. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008). But *1136where the record does not present a clear picture, a reviewing court must be cautious when affirming or reversing the trial court, given that "a cold appellate record may be very misleading." Id. at 483, 128 S.Ct. 1203.
130 The trial court's ruling on Wilson's Batson challenge was cursory. The court stated that, "in terms of the DNA, [Mr. E.] kind of waffled back and forth." The court also observed that Mr. E. "hesitated for an extended period" and "indicated some concern or question" about the lack of witness identification. The court then summarily concluded that it was "satisfied that the prosecution [] stated an appropriate basis to exeuse" Mr. E.
131 The majority correctly concludes that our focus here must be on the third step of the Batson analysis: the trial court's determination of the credibility of the proffered race-neutral explanation for the strike, and its finding whether the opponent has established purposeful discrimination. Maj. op. 112; see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The record before us, however, does not establish that the trial court conducted this third step. The majority, in my view, draws unsupported inferences from an ambiguous record. I believe that this ambiguity warrants a remand.
32 First, the trial court's credibility evaluation is suspect. "[A] trial court's step-three finding as to the existence of discrimination is due 'great deference'" precisely because it "turn[s] on evaluation of eredibility."2 Maj. op. ¶ 13 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338-89, 123 S.Ct. 1029. "[The challenger must 'convinee the [trial] court that the reason proffered for the strike was unworthy of belief....'" Maj. op. ¶ 17 (quoting Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1548 (10th Cir.1997)).
€33 Here, the court did not, and indeed could not, evaluate the prosecutor's credibility because it had the same inaccurate recollection as the prosecutor regarding Mr. E.'s comfort with DNA evidence. The trial court thus could not tell if the prosecutor's proffered reason "was unworthy of belief" because the court itself did not correctly recall Mr. E.'s statements. When defense counsel tried to point out that Mr. E.'s answers indicated the "exact opposite" of the prosecutor's recollection, the court cut off discussion and made its ruling. Defense counsel was given no opportunity to establish that the stated basis was, in fact, refuted by Mr. E.'s actual statements. Although the court's observation that Mr. E. hesitated before answering questions is precisely the type of finding that trial courts should make when considering a proponent's reason for striking a juror, the court's confusion about Mr. E.'s actual statements calls into question the accuracy of the trial court's memory of voir dire,
{ 34 Second, the court did not actually find that the prosecutor did not remove Mr. E. based on his race. As the majority points out, "the trial, court never uttered the magie words 'no purposeful discrimination, > 5 maj. op. 119; instead, the court merely concluded that the prosecutor "stated an appropriate basis" for the strike. But a proponent's "appropriate basis" (Le., race-neutral reason) is a Batson step-two finding. Nothing in the record confirms that the trial court reached step three, considered the prosecutor's credibility, and actually found that there was no purposeful discrimination.
135 That the trial court did not complete step three of the analysis would be reason enough, in my view, to remand for a proper Batson hearing. However, my conclusion that this case warrants further serutiny is bolstered by the fact that another venire-member, who voiced real skepticism about DNA evidence, was in fact empaneled with *1137the prosecution's assent. During voir dire, Mr. M. initially stated that he believed DNA evidence works. The prosecutor asked him whether he could return a guilty verdict based on DNA evidence, and he responded, "I think I can." However, under defense counsel's questioning, Mr. M. elaborated that he believed that the DNA in Wilson's case was suspect because it was from 2008, more than six years before the trial:
But from 2008, there is a problem, you know. DNA did not work that well because if you have DNA now, why should you go back 2008 [sic] until today to see if he's guilty? You know. So I think maybe that there was a problem with the DNA.
136 The majority acknowledges that where a proponent's race-neutral reason for striking a member of a racial minority applies "with equal force" to another, unchallenged veniremember, it raises the question of racial bias. Maj. op. 116 (citing Flowers v. State, 947 So.2d 910, 923-26 (Miss.2007)). I recognize that it can be a tricky endeavor to conduct a comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record to resolve whether the prosecutor treated similarly situated venire-members differently based on their race. Maj. op. 122. But see Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483-85, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (conducting a retrospective comparison of potential jurors and concluding that the prosecution's proffered race-neutral explanation gave rise to an inference of discriminatory intent where similarities between the jurors were explored at trial). Yet this is precisely why this case warrants a remand. Did the prosecutor treat a similarly situated juror differently than Mr. E.? Was the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reason pretextual, or did the trial court find that the prosecutor was credi--ble? Most importantly, did the trial court actually find that there was no purposeful discrimination? Absent a remand for a Bat-son hearing, we cannot know.
T37 After accepting the trial court's perfunctory conclusion that the prosecutor articulated "an appropriate basis" to strike Mr. E., the majority concludes that, "(alt most, the record suggests that the prosecutor may have misremembered Mr. E's voir dire." Maj. op. 122. I disagree. The record suggests that the prosecutor removed Mr. E. on a basis that applied with equal, if not greater, force to another juror whom the prosecution allowed to remain on the jury. Perhaps the discrepancy between the prosecutor's recollection and Mr. E.'s actual voir dire responses reflects no more than mistaken recollection. But on this record, we simply cannot tell. That the prosecution chose not to strike another juror who actually did express uncertainty about DNA evidence calls into question the validity of the prosecutor's explanation for striking Mr. E. Importantly, the record before us does not conclusively show that the trial court actually completed step three of the Batson analysis. Indeed, the trial court could not have completed this step, given that it accepted the prosecutor's mischaracterization of Mr. E.'s statements.
138 Because "the proper remedy for an inadequate inquiry into a Batson challenge at the time of jury selection is to remand the case to the trial court with directions to conduct the three-part Batson analysis and make the required factual findings," Rodriguez, 1 22, I would remand this case. Therefore I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

. "Purposeful discrimination" in this context does not require racial animus, ie., ill will or animosity toward a racial minority, see Black's Law Dictionary 107 (10th ed. 2014). However, a strike is "racially motivated" where it is based on the juror's race-for example, striking a black veniremember in the hopes of increasing the likelihood of a favorable verdict. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any reason at all ... the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir.1987) (finding an Equal Protection violation where the government exercised peremptory challenges against black veniremembers because the prosecutor "simply presumed from his previous experience" that black jurors would be influenced by a black defense counsel to acquit the defendant).

. The majority ascribes to the trial court a "pivotal role" in evaluating "the credibility and demeanor of both the prosecutor and the prospective juror." Maj. op. 118 (emphasis added) (citing Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203). While Snyder supports the proposition that a trial court must evaluate the challenged juror's demeanor to determine whether the juror demonstrated the proffered basis for the strike, it is the credibility of the proponent of the strike-not the veniremember-that is at issue at Batson's step three. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203; see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338-39, 123 S.Ct. 1029.