Court Opinion

ID: 9753401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:12:48.319877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:35.994483
License: Public Domain

DANA, J.
[¶ 1] James Spencer, individually and as the personal representative of Nancy Spencer’s estate, and Brittany Spencer appeal from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Oxford County, Gor-man, J.) in favor of V.I.P., Inc. They con*367tend that the court erred in concluding that, when V.I.P. employee Justin Lali-berte’s vehicle collided with the Spencers’ vehicle, Laliberte was not acting within the scope of his employment, and V.I.P., consequently, could not be held vicariously liable. Finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether Laliberte was acting within the scope of his employment, we vacate the summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The following facts are undisputed. Laliberte, an hourly employee at V.LP.’s Lewiston warehouse, volunteered to help set up for the 2002 Show, Shine & Drag, an annual promotional event sponsored by V.I.P. and held at the Oxford Plains Speedway, during which the public is invited to view cars, vendor products, and drag racing. Hourly employees who volunteered to help set up received $25 cash and a T-shirt.
[¶ 8] Pursuant to his commitment, Lali-berte awoke at 4:30 A.M. on July 20, 2002, and drove to the Oxford Plains Speedway where he began setting up at 6:00 A.M. He completed his work in approximately one hour and then departed. While driving home, Laliberte’s vehicle crossed into the on-coming lane and collided with the vehicle containing James, Nancy, and Brittany Spencer. As a result of the collision, Nancy was killed and James and Brittany were injured.
[¶ 4] James, individually and as the personal representative of Nancy’s estate, and Brittany commenced this action against Laliberte and V.I.P., seeking damages for James’s and Brittany’s personal injuries and Nancy’s suffering and wrongful death. V.I.P. moved for a summary judgment arguing that, inasmuch as Laliberte was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, V.I.P. could not be held vicariously liable. The court granted V.LP.’s motion, and James and Brittany brought this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 5] Summary judgment is appropriate when the parties’ statements of material facts and the portions of the record referred to therein disclose no genuine issues of material fact and reveal that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. In our review, we consider the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment has been granted in order to determine if the parties’ statements of material facts and referenced record evidence reveal a genuine issue of material fact.
Lever v. Acadia Hosp. Corp., 2004 ME 35, ¶ 2, 845 A.2d 1178, 1179.
[¶ 6] In determining whether an employer is vicariously hable for the actions of an employee, Maine follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) and holds an employer hable only if its employee’s action occurred within the scope of employment. Mahar v. StoneWood Transp., 2003 ME 63, ¶ 13, 823 A.2d 540, 544. Under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1) as it applies in the present case, an employee’s action occurs within the scope of employment if “(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.”1
*368[¶ 7] To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the travel to and from the Oxford Plains Speedway was within the scope of Laliberte’s employment, we begin by considering whether the statements of material facts and referenced record evidence support a finding that the travel was part of a task Laliberte was employed to perform. James referenced testimony that the $25 received by hourly employees who helped set up was intended to cover any expenses, including gas.2 James further referenced testimony that hourly employees who traveled more than two hours to help set up could, upon approval, receive mileage in addition to the $25 and that salaried employees could receive only mileage. Inasmuch as these references suggest that the $25 was intended, at least in part, as compensation, they support a finding that the travel was part of a task Laliberte was employed to perform.3
[¶ 8] We next consider whether the statements of material facts and referenced record evidence support a finding that the travel occurred substantially within the authorized time and space limits. Certain references indicating that the travel at issue occurred at the time reasonably expected — i.e., immediately before and after Laliberte completed his set-up work— support such a finding.
[¶ 9] We finally consider whether the statements of material facts and referenced record evidence support a finding that the travel was actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve V.I.P. Inasmuch as it was necessary in order to perform the set-up work, the travel might be found to have been actuated by a purpose to serve V.I.P. Because the statements of material facts and referenced record evidence reveal a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the travel was within the scope of Laliberte’s employment, the summary judgment cannot stand.4
The entry is:
Summary judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. The Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006) is now extant. At the time of the events at issue, *368the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) was operative and relied on by this Court.

. A supervisor stated: "The $25 was to cover any expenses they would have, whether it was gas on the way up, or they could use the money any way they wanted.”

. Because Laliberte was apparently compensated, we need not address his argument that V.I.P. could not legally accept his services as a volunteer. See 26 M.R.S. §§ 661-672 (2005); 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 201-205 (1993 & Supp. 2006); 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 206-219 (1992 & Supp. 2006).

.Because we vacate the summary judgment, we do not address Laliberte's argument that the court erred in deeming one of V.I.P.’s statements of material fact admitted.