Court Opinion

ID: 9480019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:35:29.98979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:25.861705
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
In this case, both defense counsel and the prosecutor disputed the probation officer’s recommendation to deny Cardenas a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The probation officer recommended the denial for two reasons: (1) failure to voluntarily surrender promptly after commission of the offense, and (2) Cardenas’ assertion that someone else, one Carlos Guerra, owned the gun and coerced him into carrying it.
Notwithstanding the joint objections, the district court’s only “finding” on Cardenas’ acceptance of responsibility occurred after the imposition of sentence — following defense counsel’s specific request for clarification:
MS. SCHOOLY [defense counsel]: Your Honor, are you then agreeing with probation that he does not receive acceptance for responsibility?
THE COURT: That is correct.
Sentencing Transcript at 8. The above “finding” on acceptance of responsibility is insufficient. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the United States Sentencing Guidelines require district courts to resolve disputed factors before imposing sentence, not after the fact as occurred here. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines *322Manual, § 6A1.3(b) & comment, (backg’d) (Nov. 1987) (amended 1989) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Further, it remains unclear from the above colloquy whether the district court adopted the probation officer’s factual findings as its own or agreed with only the probation officer’s ultimate conclusion. Such ambiguity is impermissible under Rule 32(c)(3)(D). See United States v. Hamilton, 794 F.2d 1345, 1347 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Petitto, 767 F.2d 607, 609-10 (9th Cir.1985).
In addition, Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(2)(D) requires courts to resolve disputes over alleged factual inaccuracies in the presen-tence report or to explicitly forego the use of such information in sentencing. Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Anderson, 886 F.2d 215, 216-17 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (requiring district court to resolve critical factual dispute). This requirement extends to inaccurate factual inferences which could be drawn from undisputed facts, United States v. Gomez, 831 F.2d 453, 455-57 (3d Cir.1987),-at least when such inferences are reasonable, cf. United States v. Jones, 856 F.2d 146, 148-49 (11th Cir.1988) (findings not required for far-fetched inferences), and material to the sentencing determination, cf. Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d at 825-26 (trial court need not correct every objectionable nuance in PSI).
At the sentencing for this case, defense counsel disputed the probation officer’s inference that Cardenas’ failure to immediately surrender himself during the heat of a police break-in indicated that Cardenas had failed to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct. The district judge’s only response to this argument was that Cardenas “should not have been under that situation.” The court’s response not only failed to resolve this clearly material factor, it also suggested that the district judge denied the reduction because of the very behavior resulting in Cardenas’ arrest. In my view, a defendant’s conduct prior to arrest constitutes an improper basis for denying credit for acceptance of responsibility.
Furthermore, both defense counsel and the prosecutor disputed the relevance of Cardenas’ contention that Guerra owned the weapon and forced Cardenas to hold it. Because these facts potentially comprised an important factor in the sentencing determination, U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 required the district court to explicitly resolve the question of their relevance. Cf. United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 640-41 (2d Cir.1989) (requiring finding as to relevance of gun found in defendant’s car); United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 767-68 (5th Cir.1989) (requiring finding as to appropriateness of computing offense level based on total drugs found at scene of crime). Indeed, such findings are necessary to protect a defendant’s right to appeal based on incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) (1988). See Palta, 880 F.2d at 641; Burch, 873 F.2d at 767.
Moreover, neither the district court nor the probation officer ever explicitly found that Cardenas’ claim of coercion lacked credibility. Cf. Hamilton, 794 F.2d at 1347 (requiring finding as to reliability of disputed allegations). In fact, the presen-tence report suggests that the contrary is actually the case.1 Obviously, had Cardenas fabricated this account to mitigate his role, the district court could have properly denied the reduction for accepting responsibility. The majority was not free, however, to draw these negative inferences of its own accord to support the district court’s conclusory result. See United States v. Blanco, 884 F.2d 1577, 1583 (3d Cir.1989); United States v. Arefi, 847 F.2d 1003, 1008 (2d Cir.1988).2
*323Finally, the prosecutor, in objecting to the presentence investigation, explicitly asserted that Cardenas’ positive admissions of guilt and his offer to assist Government investigations outweighed the negative impact of any momentary lapse at the time of arrest. Neither the presentence report nor the district court addressed this issue.
The sentencing judge must assume the responsibility for correct application of the Guidelines, see United States v. Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650, 655 (8th Cir.1989), but failed to do so in this case.
Accordingly, I would vacate Cardenas’ sentence and remand this case to the district judge for a resolution of the factual and legal issues and for such further hearing as might be appropriate.

. Under the Guidelines, furnishing a material falsehood during a presentence investigation constitutes obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment, (n.l(e)). Despite this consideration, however, the probation officer's report explicitly states: “There is no information suggesting that the defendant impeded or obstructed justice."

. Significantly, absent a specific finding that Cardenas lacked credibility, his statement should have mitigated his culpability, not aggravated it. This claim of coercion, uncontradicted *323in the record, suggests that Cardenas played a lesser role in the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 & comment, (backg’d), and acted under a threat of physical injury, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12. Such factors, if true, would indicate a downward adjustment in sentence even if, as here, they apparently failed to constitute a complete defense. United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 479-80 (3d Cir.1989).