Court Opinion

ID: 9947246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 14:09:33.286499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:17.749783
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Heather Honey                              :
                                           :
       v.                                  : No. 57 C.D. 2023
                                           :
Lycoming County Offices                    :
of Voter Services                          :
                                           :
Appeal of: Al Schmidt, in his              :
Official Capacity as Secretary             :
of the Commonwealth                        : Argued: December 6, 2023

BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
              HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
              HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
              HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                 FILED: March 4, 2024

       Appellant Al Schmidt, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the
Commonwealth (Secretary),1 appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming
County’s (Common Pleas) December 16, 2022 order. Through that order, Common
Pleas reversed the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records’ (OOR) January 6, 2022
Final Determination. In that Final Determination, OOR had denied Appellee

       1
         Leigh M. Chapman (Chapman) was the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth at the
time of this appeal’s filing. However, Secretary was then appointed in an acting capacity by
Governor Josh Shapiro on January 17, 2023, and officially assumed his position by operation of
law effective June 29, 2023. As a consequence, Secretary was automatically substituted for
Chapman as the named appellant in this matter pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 502(c), Pa. R.A.P. 502(c).
Heather Honey’s (Honey) Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)2 request for a digital copy
of the ClearVote Cast Vote Record (CVR) for the 2020 General Election from
Lycoming County’s Electronic Voting System (EVS).3 After careful review, we
reverse.

                                          I. Background
       As cogently explained by Common Pleas, the genesis of this matter occurred
when Honey filed her RTKL request with the Lycoming County Office of Voter
Services (Voter Services) on October 20, 2021, in which she sought
                a “[d]igital copy of the [CVR] for every precinct tabulator
                and central tabulator used in the 2020 General
                Election.”[FN3]
                        [FN3]
                              . . . ClearVote is the election management system that
                        [Voter Services] uses to conduct elections in Lycoming
                        County. In elections utilizing the ClearVote system, each
                        voter fills out a physical ballot and inserts it into a scanner,
                        which reads the ballot and transmits the results to a
                        “tabulator,” a piece of equipment that counts votes. Each
                        precinct has one scanner and one associated tabulator. The
                        results from each precinct tabulator are then transferred to
                        the central tabulator for Lycoming County. Ballots not cast
                        on [E]lection [D]ay — such as mail-in and absentee ballots
                        — are processed directly by the central tabulator. Thus, the
                        CVR for each precinct tabulator is a spreadsheet showing
                        raw data associated with the ballots cast at that precinct, and
                        the CVR for the central tabulator is a similar spreadsheet
                        showing raw data associated with every ballot cast in
                        Lycoming County.

       2
           Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.

       3
         Per Section 1101-A of the Pennsylvania Election Code (Election Code), Act of June 3,
1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, added by the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600, EVS is defined as
follows: “a system in which one or more voting devices are used to permit the registering or
recording of votes and in which such votes are computed and tabulated by automatic tabulating
equipment. The system shall provide for a permanent physical record of each vote cast.” 25 P.S. §
3031.1.

                                                   2
            On November 18, 2021, [Voter Services] denied
            [Honey’s] RTKL request on the basis that “[t]he contents
            of ballot boxes and voting machines are not public
            pursuant to [Section 308 of] the Election Code[,] 25 P.S.
            § 2648.”[FN4] On November 24, 2021, [Honey] appealed
            that decision to the [OOR], which solicited briefing and
            other relevant information from the parties.
                  [FN4]
                       Section [308] of the Election Code provides that most
                  records and documents in the possession of each county’s
                  board of elections are open to public inspection, except for
                  “the contents of ballot boxes and voting machines and
                  records of assisted voters. . . .” 25 P.S. § 2648.
            On January 6, 2022, the OOR issued a Final Determination
            denying [Honey’s] appeal. In the Final Determination, the
            OOR first discussed [Section 308] and its exception to
            public inspection. The OOR reviewed the affidavit of
            Forrest Lehman ([]Mr. Lehman[]), Director of Elections
            for Lycoming County, which provided information about
            the process by which votes are scanned and stored in
            Lycoming County. Mr. Lehman ultimately asserted [Voter
            Services’] belief that CVRs fall under the exception to
            public inspection in [Section 308,] because “[r]eviewing a
            CVR is the digital equivalent of inspecting the contents of
            a ballot box, one ballot at a time.” The OOR also reviewed
            [Honey’s] argument that CVRs do not fall under the
            exception in [Section 308] but are instead analogous to
            other records that are available for public inspection.
            After considering the parties’ arguments, the OOR denied
            [Honey’s] appeal on the basis that it found Mr. Lehman
            credible and knowledgeable, rendering it improper for the
            OOR to “substitute its judgment for that of those with far
            more familiarity with the issues.” Specifically, the OOR
            determined that “the CVR is the digital equivalent of the
            contents of ballot boxes,” and thus not a public record
            under [Section 308] of the Election Code.
Common Pleas Op., 12/16/22, at 1-2 (some footnotes omitted).
      Honey then appealed the OOR’s decision to Common Pleas. On May 16,
2022, Appellees Jeffrey J. Stroehmann, Donald C. Peters, and Joseph D. Hamm
(collectively Intervenors) filed a joint petition to intervene, which Common Pleas

                                           3
subsequently granted. Common Pleas then held two days of evidentiary hearings in
June 2022, and subsequently issued an opinion and order, through which it
adjudicated Honey’s appeal, on December 16, 2022.4
       In its opinion, Common Pleas first addressed the assertion that Honey and
Intervenors lacked standing to pursue the appeal. With regard to Honey, Common
Pleas concluded that she did not have standing to obtain the CVR she had requested,
because she was registered to vote in Lebanon County and, thus, was not a “qualified
elector” under the Election Code. Common Pleas Op., 12/16/22, at 47-49.5 Common
Pleas did not reach the same conclusion regarding Intervenors, and instead held that
they had standing to pursue in their own right the claims Honey had put forth on her
behalf. Id. at 49-50.
       Moving on to the merits, Common Pleas then analyzed the language used in
Section 308 of the Election Code to determine whether CVRs were rendered exempt
from public disclosure. Common Pleas broke its statutory analysis down into three
parts, each of which focused upon a single word or phrase used in the statute: “ballot
boxes,” “voting machines,” and “contents.” First, it concluded that the plain meaning
of “ballot boxes” in the Election Code was consistent with the dictionary definition
of the term as a “locked box into which ballots are deposited after voting[,]” as well
as that “the sealed bags attached to scanners, into which ballots fall after they are

       4
        Common Pleas was the ultimate finder of fact in this matter, as ordained by the RTKL,
and consequently conducted a de novo, plenary review of the OOR’s decision. See Bowling v. Off.
of Open Recs., 75 A.3d 453, 474 (Pa. 2013).
       5
         Curiously, Common Pleas did not include language in the order attached to its December
16, 2022 opinion that formally dismissed Honey as a party or otherwise addressed her standing to
challenge Voter Services’ denial of her RTKL request. See Common Pleas Op., 12/16/22, at 73-
74. We, however, agree with Common Pleas’ assessment that Section 308 barred Honey from
obtaining the records she sought, due to the fact that she was registered as a voter in Lebanon
County, rather than Lycoming County, at the time she filed that request.

                                               4
scanned, are ‘ballot boxes.’” Id. at 53-54. Second, Common Pleas noted that the
Election Code did not define “voting machines,” but concluded that, under existing
case law and certain provisions of the Election Code, not every EVS constituted a
voting machine for purposes of this statutory scheme. Id. at 54-56. On that basis, it
ruled that the optical scanners used to record the votes made on paper ballots in
Lycoming County did not qualify as voting machines under the Election Code. Id.
at 57. Finally, Common Pleas deemed the word “contents” to be ambiguous, stating
that
             [c]learly, the term “contents” as used in the Election Code
             covers at least the physical sense of ballots physically
             inside of a ballot box. However, it is unclear whether the
             term also includes things that are contained in “ballot
             boxes and voting machines” more abstractly, such as
             intangible information or ideas that are “within” a ballot
             box or voting machine in a less-than-physical sense.
Id. at 58. As a result, Common Pleas concluded “that the phrase ‘contents of ballot
boxes or voting machines’ as used in [Section 308] is susceptible to multiple
reasonable readings, and thus does not have a single plain and unambiguous
meaning.” Id. Common Pleas then turned to the rules of statutory construction to
resolve this putative ambiguity, considering the history and purpose of both Section
308 and the Election Code as a whole; the Department of State’s (Department)
administrative reading of Section 308; and the consequences of adopting each side’s
preferred interpretation. Id. at 58-67. Ultimately, Common Pleas ruled that the public
access restriction imposed by Section 308 was to be construed narrowly, and
concluded that the General Assembly “intended the ‘contents’ of ballot boxes or
voting machines to refer to voted ballots physically deposited into ballot boxes and
the mechanical inner workings of voting machines, rather than the information
‘contained’ in those physical items.” Id. at 68.

                                          5
       Applying this logic to the matter-at-hand, Common Pleas held that the CVR
in this matter was not shielded from disclosure by Section 308 and, thus, was a public
record that could be obtained via an RTKL request. Id. Common Pleas then reasoned
that disclosure of the CVR would not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution’s ballot
secrecy requirement, because the record evidence established “that the order of the
numbered list of voters [in the CVR] does not necessarily correspond to the order in
which ballots are cast”; in Common Pleas’ view, this data randomization rendered
tenuous any concerns that disclosure would result in a breach of that requirement.
Id. at 69-72. As a result, Common Pleas ordered Voter Services to provide
Intervenors with the CVR from the 2020 General Election in Lycoming County, but
stayed its order for 30 days, so that it would not go into effect until the appeal
window had closed. Id. at 73-74.
       This timely appeal followed.
                                        II. Discussion
       Secretary presents two arguments for our consideration, which we summarize
as follows.6 First, Common Pleas erred by concluding that Section 308 of the
Election Code is ambiguous. To the contrary, Section 308’s plain language exempts
CVRs from disclosure for three reasons: (a) a CVR is the electronic, modern-day
equivalent of all voted ballots contained in a ballot box; (b) EVSs like the optical
scanners used by Lycoming County qualify as voting machines under the Election
Code, and CVRs are the contents of those EVSs; and (c) reading Section 308 to
exempt CVRs from disclosure is consistent with other provisions of the Election

       6
         “When[, as here,] the court of common pleas is the ‘Chapter 13’ or reviewing court, our
appellate review is limited to whether the trial court has committed an error of law and whether
the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Off. of the Dist. Att’y of Phila. v.
Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119, 1123 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citing Twp. of Worcester v. Off. of Open
Recs., 129 A.3d 44, 49 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)).

                                               6
Code that only authorize public access to the contents of ballot boxes and voting
machines upon allegations of error or fraud. Secretary’s Br. at 14-20. Second, even
if Common Pleas correctly concluded that Section 308 was ambiguously worded,
the lower court still erred by failing to give deference to the Department’s
interpretation of the statute, which was that CVRs constitute the modern version of
ballot box contents, as well as that optical scanners like the ones used to record votes
in Lycoming County are the modern equivalent of voting machines. Id. at 20-25.
      Generally speaking, the purpose of the RTKL is “to promote access to official
government information in order to prohibit secrets, scrutinize the actions of public
officials[,] and make public officials accountable for their actions.” Off. of Governor
v. Raffle, 65 A.3d 1105, 1107 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Accordingly, local agencies
are statutorily required to “provide public records [to individuals who request them]
in accordance with [the RTKL].” Section 302(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.302(a).
However, that does not mean that all local agency records are “public” and eligible
for dissemination upon request. Per Section 305(a) of the RTKL:
             A record in the possession of a Commonwealth agency or
             local agency shall be presumed to be a public record. The
             presumption shall not apply if:
                    ....
                    (3) the record is exempt from disclosure under any
                    other [f]ederal or [s]tate law or regulation or judicial
                    order or decree.
65 P.S. § 67.305(a); accord Section 102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.102 (defining
“public record” in relevant part as “[a] record, including a financial record, of a
Commonwealth or local agency that . . . (2) is not exempt from being disclosed under
any other [f]ederal or [s]tate law or regulation or judicial order or decree”). In other
words, the RTKL’s presumption that all records possessed by a local or state agency

                                           7
are public in nature, and are thus disclosable to a requester, yields where a statutory
exemption exists for a certain kind of record.
      Secretary, through his first argument, posits that Section 308 of the Election
Code establishes such an exemption regarding public disclosure of CVRs. This
assertion presents a pure question of statutory interpretation; thus, “our standard of
review [here] is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary and non-deferential.”
Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 234 A.3d 665, 674 (Pa. 2020).
             The object of statutory construction is to ascertain and
             effectuate legislative intent. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). In
             pursuing that end, we are mindful a statute’s plain
             language generally provides the best indication of
             legislative intent. See Com[.] v. McClintic, . . . 909 A.2d
             1241 ([Pa.] 2006). Thus, statutory construction begins
             with examination of the text itself. [Se.] Pa. Transp. Auth.
             v. Holmes, 835 A.2d 851 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
             In reading the plain language of a statute, “[w]ords and
             phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar
             and according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.
             C.S. § 1903(a). Further, every statute shall be construed, if
             possible, to give effect to all its provisions so that no
             provision is “mere surplusage.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a).
             Moreover, although we must “listen attentively to what a
             statute says[,] [o]ne must also listen attentively to what it
             does not say.” Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
             Ins. Co., . . . 788 A.2d 955, 962 ([Pa.] 2001). We may not
             insert a word the legislature failed to supply into a statute.
             Girgis v. Bd. of Physical Therapy, 859 A.2d 852 (Pa.
             Cmwlth. 2004).
Malt Beverages Distribs. Ass’n v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 918 A.2d 171, 175-76
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). “However, if we deem the statutory language
ambiguous, we must then ascertain the General Assembly’s intent by statutory

                                           8
analysis, wherein we may consider numerous relevant factors.” Bowman v. Sunoco,
Inc., 65 A.3d 901, 906 (Pa. 2013) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c)). “An ambiguity exists
when language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations and not merely
because two conflicting interpretations may be suggested.” Tri-Cnty. Landfill, Inc.
v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d 488, 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Regardless
of whether a statute is deemed ambiguous or not, our rules of construction forbid a
court from adopting an interpretation that will produce “a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution[,] or unreasonable.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1). Furthermore,
             [w]hen construing one section of a statute, courts must
             read that section not by itself, but with reference to, and in
             light of, the other sections. Com. v. Mayhue, 639 A.2d 421,
             439 (Pa. 1994). Statutory language must be read in
             context, “together and in conjunction” with the remaining
             statutory language. [Pa. Gaming Control Bd.] v. Off. of
             Open Recs., 103 A.3d 1276, 1284-85 (Pa. 2014) (citing
             Bd. of Rev. of Taxes, City of Phila. v. City of Phila., 4 A.3d
             610, 622 (Pa. 2010)).
             ....
             A fundamental principle in statutory construction is that we
             must read statutory sections harmoniously. Off. of Open
             Recs., 103 A.3d at 1284-85. Parts of a statute that are in
             pari materia, i.e., statutory sections that relate to the same
             persons or things or the same class of persons and things,
             are to be construed together, if possible, as one statute. 1
             Pa. C.S. § 1932. “If they can be made to stand together,
             effect should be given to both as far as possible.” Off. of
             Open Recs., 103 A.3d at 1284 (quoting Kelly v. City of
             Phila., 115 A.2d 238, 245 (Pa. 1955)). In ascertaining
             legislative intent, statutory language is to be interpreted in
             context, with every statutory section read “together and in
             conjunction” with the remaining statutory language, “and
             construed with reference to the entire statute” as a whole.
             Bd. of Rev. of Taxes, 4 A.3d at 622. We must presume that
             in drafting the statute, the General Assembly intended the
             entire statute, including all of its provisions, to be effective.
             1 Pa. C.S. § 1922. Importantly, this presumption requires

                                            9
              that statutory sections are not to be construed in such a way
              that one section operates to nullify, exclude or cancel
              another, unless the statute expressly says so. Cozzone ex
              rel. Cozzone v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (PA
              Mun[.]/E[.] Goshen Twp.), 73 A.3d 526 (Pa. 2013); Off. of
              Open Recs., 103 A.3d at 1284-85.
Tr. Under Agreement of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1155, 57 (Pa. 2017).
        Turning to Section 308 of the Election Code, this statute reads as follows, in
full:
              The records of each county board of elections, general and
              duplicate returns, tally papers, affidavits of voters and
              others, nomination petitions, certificates and papers, other
              petitions, appeals, witness lists, accounts, contracts,
              reports and other documents and records in its custody,
              except the contents of ballot boxes and voting machines
              and records of assisted voters, shall be open to public
              inspection, except as herein provided, and may be
              inspected and copied by any qualified elector of the county
              during ordinary business hours, at any time when they are
              not necessarily being used by the board, or its employes
              having duties to perform thereto: Provided, however, That
              such public inspection thereof shall only be in the presence
              of a member or authorized employe of the county board,
              and shall be subject to proper regulation for safekeeping
              of the records and documents, and subject to the further
              provisions of this act: And provided further, That general
              and duplicate returns, tally papers, affidavits of voters and
              others, and all other papers required to be returned by the
              election officers to the county board sealed, shall be open
              to public inspection only after the county board shall, in
              the course of the computation and canvassing of the
              returns, have broken such seals and finished, for the time,
              their use of said papers in connection with such
              computation and canvassing.
25 P.S. § 2648 (emphasis added). Thus, by its plain language and with relevance to
this case, Section 308 exempts from public disclosure “the contents of ballot boxes
and voting machines[.]” Id.

                                           10
      Secretary does not dispute Common Pleas’ observation that the term “ballot
boxes” is not specifically defined in the Election Code, or that this phrase, when
defined according to its commonly understood meaning and applied to this situation,
clearly refers to the sealed bags that catch ballots after they have been scanned. He,
however, challenges Common Pleas’ conclusion that “voting machines,” as used in
Section 308, does not encompass EVSs like the ones used in Lycoming County, as
well as Common Pleas’ determination that CVRs do not constitute the “contents” of
those voting machines or of the ballot boxes.
      We agree. Admittedly, the Election Code is not a model of clarity with regard
to establishing what constitutes a “voting machine.” This term is not specifically
defined therein, even though it is used throughout in both single and plural form, and
despite the fact that the General Assembly titled an entire article of this law as
“Voting Machines.” Tit. 25 P.S., Ch. 14, Art. XI, Sections 1101-18 of the Election
Code, 25 P.S. §§ 3001-3018; see, e.g., Sections 404, 414, 530, 1216-17, 1226-27,
1230, 1404, 1702-03, 1818, 1824, and 1830 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. §§ 2674,
2684, 2730, 3056-57, 3066-67, 3070, 3154, 3262-63, 3518, 3524, 3530. Nor is the
relationship between EVSs and voting machines, or lack thereof, straightforwardly
apparent from the Election Code’s text. Article XI-a of the Election Code, which
specifically pertains to EVSs, contains what appears to be contradictory language on
this point. On one hand, this article includes multiple references that suggest that
such machines are components of EVSs. See Section 1105-A of the Election Code,
25 P.S. § 3031.5(b)7 (emphasis added) (stating in relevant part: “With respect to any
[EVS] approved for use in this Commonwealth by the secretary, the report of the
secretary shall specify the capacity of the components of that system, the number of

      7
          Added by the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600.

                                               11
voters who may reasonably be accommodated by the voting devices and automatic
tabulating equipment which comprise such system and the number of clerks and
machine inspectors.”); Section 1108-A of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3031.88
(provision titled “Payment for machines” that requires “[t]he county commissioners
or such other authority as levies the taxes for county purposes of any county which
adopts an [EVS to], upon the purchase, lease or other procurement thereof, provide
for payment therefor by the county”); Section 1112-A of the Election Code, 25 P.S.
§ 3031.129 (emphasis added) (stating, in relevant part: “When the votes for
presidential electors are counted [in voting districts that use EVSs], the votes
appearing upon the counter or registering device corresponding to the ballot label
containing the names of the candidates for President and Vice-President of any party
or body shall be counted as votes for each of the candidates for presidential elector
of such party or body, and thereupon all candidates for presidential elector shall be
credited, in addition, with the votes cast for them upon the ballots deposited in the
machine, as provided in this section.”); Section 1120-A(b) of the Election Code, 25
P.S. § 3031.20(b)10 (emphasis added) (stating in relevant part: “If any electronic
voting system or any component thereof being used in any election shall become
inoperable during such election, it shall, if possible, be repaired or another machine
substituted by the custodian or county board of elections as promptly as possible[.]”).
On the other hand, this article also expressly mandates that “[u]pon the installation
of an electronic voting system in any election district, the use therein of paper ballots
and of voting machines shall be discontinued, except as otherwise provided herein.”

      8
          Added by the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600.

      9
          Added by the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600.

      10
           Added by the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600.

                                               12
Section 1104-A of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3031.411 (emphasis added). The same
inconsistency is also present elsewhere in the Election Code. Some portions indicate
that an EVS is a type of voting machine, or that the two terms are effectively
synonymous. See Sections 1702 and 1703 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. §§ 3262-63
(Section 1702 mentions petitions for recanvassing votes cast via voting machines,
without making reference to EVSs, but Section 1703 establishes that Section 1702
petitions can be filed regarding votes cast through EVSs or voting machines).
Others, however, imply that EVSs and voting machines may, in fact, be entirely
different kinds of apparatuses. See Section 1404(e) of the Election Code, 25 P.S. §
3154(e) (setting forth three slightly different vote recanvass and recount procedures,
the precise applicability of each depending on whether a given election district used
“voting machines,” “paper ballots other than those used in conjunction with an
[EVS],” or “an [EVS] utilizing paper ballots,” while also specifying that, where an
election district used “any other type of [EVSs],” a vote recanvass or recount must
be conducted in a manner “similar to the procedure specified in [25 P.S. §
3154(e)(1)] for voting machines”).
      These impediments are not insurmountable for us, however. “Where a term is
not [statutorily] defined, . . . ‘words and phrases shall be construed according to rules
of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.’” P.R. v. Pa. Dep’t
of Pub. Welfare, 759 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). “In ascertaining the
common and approved usage or meaning, a court may resort to the dictionary
definitions of the terms left undefined by the legislature.” Mountz v. Columbia
Borough, 260 A.3d 1046, 1050 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Leventakos v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Spyros Painting), 82 A.3d 481, 484 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth.

      11
           Added by the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600.

                                               13
2013)). Generally speaking, Merriam-Webster defines “machine” as “a
mechanically, electrically, or electronically operated device for performing a task.”12
Therefore, a “voting machine” can be described as a device of this nature that is
designed to allow for the performance of that specific task (i.e., voting).
Furthermore, “voting machine” has itself been defined in common parlance with
some specificity. Merriam-Webster describes it as follows: “a mechanical device for
recording and counting votes cast in an election.”13 Similarly, the Cambridge
Dictionary states that a “voting machine” is “a machine used to automatically record
and count votes in an election.”14 Even more precisely, the United States Election
Assistance Commission (EAC)15 describes a “voting machine” as “[t]he mechanical,

      12
          Machine, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/machine
(last modified Feb. 14, 2024).
      13
             Voting  machine,      MERRIAM-WEBSTER,       https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/voting%20machine (last modified Feb. 3, 2024).

      14
            Voting machine, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/voting-machine (last visited Mar. 1, 2024).

      15
           The EAC
              was established by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)[,
              42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545]. The EAC is an independent, bipartisan
              commission charged with developing guidance to meet HAVA
              requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and
              serving as a national clearinghouse of information on election
              administration. The EAC also accredits testing laboratories and
              certifies voting systems, as well as audits the use of HAVA funds.
              Other responsibilities include maintaining the national mail voter
              registration form developed in accordance with the National Voter
              Registration Act of 1993[, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-20511].
              HAVA established the Standards Board and the Board of Advisors
              to advise the EAC. The law also established the Technical
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                             14
electromechanical, and electric components of a voting system that the voter uses to
view the ballot, indicate his/her selections, and verify those selections. In some
instances, the voting machine also casts and tabulates the votes.”16
       The question then becomes whether the components of Lycoming County’s
EVS constitute “voting machines.” Section 1101-A of the Election Code defines an
EVS as “a system in which one or more voting devices are used to permit the
registering or recording of votes and in which such votes are computed and tabulated
by automatic tabulating equipment. The system shall provide for a permanent
physical record of each vote cast.” 25 P.S. § 3031.1. “Automatic tabulating
equipment” is defined in that same part of the Election Code as “any apparatus which
automatically examines and computes votes registered on paper ballots, ballot
cards[,] or district totals cards or votes registered electronically and which tabulates
such votes.” Id. “Voting device” is also defined therein as
              either an apparatus in which paper ballots or ballot cards
              are used in connection with an implement by which a voter
              registers his votes with ink or other substance or by
              punching, or an apparatus by which such votes are
              registered electronically, so that in either case the votes so
              registered may be computed and tabulated by means of
              automatic tabulating equipment.

              Guidelines Development Committee to assist the EAC in the
              development of voluntary voting system guidelines.
              The four EAC commissioners are appointed by the president and
              confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The EAC is required to submit an
              annual report to Congress as well as testify periodically about
              HAVA progress and related issues. The [EAC] also holds public
              meetings and hearings to inform the public about its progress and
              activities.
About, EAC, https://www.eac.gov/about (last visited Mar. 1, 2024).

       16
             Glossary      of    Election      Terminology,     EAC       (July  16,   2021),
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/glossary_files/Glossary_of_Election_Terms_EAC.pdf.

                                              15
Id. Applying these three definitions to the matter-at-hand, it is evident that the optical
scanners used by Lycoming County, which receive filled-out paper ballots, scan the
votes recorded thereon, and transmit the results to a database, are voting devices that
contain automatic tabulating equipment, and which are part of Lycoming County’s
EVS.     These    voting    devices     are        undoubtedly   mechanical,   electrical,
electromechanical, or electronic components of a voting system that are specifically
used for the task of voting, including with regard to the casting and tabulation of
votes. Therefore, these devices also fit the generally understood definition of “voting
machines.”
       Again, we recognize that the General Assembly has directed, via Section
1104-A of the Election Code, that “[u]pon the installation of an [EVS] in any election
district, the use therein of paper ballots and of voting machines shall be discontinued,
except as otherwise provided herein.” 25 P.S. § 3031.4. We also remain cognizant,
however, that we must endeavor to harmonize seemingly inconsistent statutory
language, within reason, to the fullest possible extent. Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1157. As
noted supra, Article XI-a includes multiple references suggesting that machines are
components of EVSs. Tit. 25 P.S., Ch. 14, Art. XI-a. In addition, Section 1702 and
1703, when read together, indicate that “EVS” is synonymous with “voting
machine” under the Election Code. See 25 P.S. §§ 3262-63. We therefore come to
two conclusions. First, the General Assembly’s usage of the term “voting machines”
in the Election Code is beset by inconsistencies and poor draftsmanship. Second, we
must read Section 1104-A’s reference to voting machines as pertaining to
mechanical devices used in the voting process, but not to similarly deployed
electronic devices, in order to harmonize those inconsistencies and to allow for the

                                              16
Election Code’s provisions to be given the fullest effect possible.17 In other words,
we hold that EVS components that are used directly in the processing and
recordation of votes must also be considered voting machines under the Election
Code.
        As for the meaning of “contents,” that word is not defined in the Election
Code either. Per Merriam-Webster, though, it means “something contained.”18
CVRs thus qualify as “contents” under the Election Code, regardless of whether the
container holding the CVRs is deemed to be a voting machine or a ballot box.
Common Pleas, however, essentially found that the CVR in this instance was
digitally equivalent to the information recorded on physical ballots, but narrowly
construed Section 308’s usage of “contents” as only “refer[ring] to voted ballots
physically deposited into ballot boxes and the mechanical inner workings of voting

        17
           We also note that our Court, in a single-judge opinion issued in another matter, recently
ruled that electronic devices do not constitute voting machines under the Election Code. See In re
Recount of Berks Cnty. Gen. Election of Nov. 8, 2022, 296 A.3d 64, 77 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (single-
judge op.) (Wallace, J.), aff’d 297 A.3d 687 (Pa. 2023). However, the analysis in that matter did
not address the meaning of “voting machines” with the same level of detailed analysis that we
have in this matter, but merely predicated that conclusion upon a smattering of cases that also did
not contain thorough analyses of this term’s meaning. See id. (citing and quoting Banfield v.
Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 170 (Pa. 2015); Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002, 1010 n.21 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2002); and In re Gen. Election for Twp. Supervisor of Morris Twp., Wash. Cnty., 620 A.2d 565,
568-69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)). Given this, as well as the fact that the Supreme Court’s per curiam
affirmance of Berks County only pertained “to [its] interpretation of Sections 1701 and 1703 of
the Election Code, 25 P.S. §§ 3261, 3263, [(which relate to petitions requesting a vote recount),]”
In re Recount of Berks Cnty. Gen. Election of Nov. 8, 2022, 297 A.3d 687, 688 (Pa. 2023), we
overrule the single-judge Berks County opinion to the very limited extent that it stands for the
proposition that electronic devices cannot be voting machines for purposes of the Election Code.
See Com. v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (Pa. 1996) (in instances where Supreme Court affirms
lower court decision via per curiam order, Supreme Court endorses rationale underpinning that
decision only to extent higher tribunal affirms on express basis of opinion issued by lower court).

        18
          Contents, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contents
(last modified Feb. 10, 2024).

                                                17
machines, rather than the information ‘contained’ in those physical items.” Common
Pleas Op., 12/16/22, at 68; see id. (“Only three such things have been made
inaccessible: the contents of ballot boxes, the contents of voting machines, and the
records of assisted voters. The [General Assembly] did not exempt records that were
the ‘equivalents’ or ‘analog[ue]s’ of those things from public access.”). We find that
interpretation flawed for two reasons. First, the voting machines used by Lycoming
County compiled recorded votes in digital form, rather than physical. Thus, the
machines had no “contents” beyond those digitized records, i.e., the CVR. Second,
it may appear at first blush that Section 308 is ambiguous in this context, in that it is
not clear whether the ballot boxes’ “contents” are just the physical ballots themselves
or also include the voting data from those ballots. However, this apparent ambiguity
disappears by virtue of Common Pleas’ effective determination that the CVR is
digitally equivalent to those physical ballots. It would produce an absurd result if
physical ballots were protected from public disclosure, but digital analogues of those
very same ballots were freely available upon request, as what is special about the
ballots is not so much the form which they take, but the voting information which
they contain. Consequently, Common Pleas erred by ruling that the word “contents”
was ambiguous in this instance, that the CVR was not the contents, in digital form,
of ballot boxes and voting machines, and that the CVR was thus not exempt from
public disclosure.

                                           18
                                       III. Conclusion
       In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we reverse Common Pleas’
December 16, 2022 order.19

                                             __________________________________
                                             ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       19
          Due to our resolution of this matter in Secretary’s favor, we need not address the merits
of his remaining argument.

                                                19
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Heather Honey                     :
                                  :
      v.                          : No. 57 C.D. 2023
                                  :
Lycoming County Offices           :
of Voter Services                 :
                                  :
Appeal of: Al Schmidt, in his     :
Official Capacity as Secretary    :
of the Commonwealth               :

                                 ORDER

      AND NOW, this 4th day of March, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County’s December 16, 2022 order is
REVERSED.

                                  __________________________________
                                  ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Heather Honey                                      :
                                                   :    No. 57 C.D. 2023
               v.                                  :
                                                   :    Argued: December 6, 2023
Lycoming County Offices                            :
of Voter Services                                  :
                                                   :
Appeal of: Al Schmidt, in his Official             :
Capacity as Secretary of the                       :
Commonwealth                                       :

BEFORE:             HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
                    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
                    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                    HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
                    HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                               FILED: March 4, 2024

                    I would affirm the trial court in this matter as it correctly interpreted the
unambiguous language of the Pennsylvania Election Code (Election Code)1 in
finding that a cast vote record (CVR) is not and cannot be construed as part of the
ballot boxes or voting machines. Here, there is no need to look further than the
statutory language itself.2 Section 308 of the Election Code provides in relevant
part:

        1
            Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2600-3591.

        2
          When engaging in statutory construction, a court’s duty is to give effect to
        the legislature’s intent and to give effect to all of a statute’s provisions. The
(Footnote continued on next page…)
             The records of each county board of elections, general and
             duplicate returns, tally papers, affidavits of voters and
             others, nomination petitions, certificates and papers, other
             petitions, appeals, witness lists, accounts, contracts,
             reports and other documents and records in its custody,
             except the contents of ballot boxes and voting machines
             and records of assisted voters, shall be open to public
             inspection, except as herein provided, and may be
             inspected and copied by any qualified elector of the county
             during ordinary business hours, at any time when they are
             not necessarily being used by the board, or its employes
             having duties to perform thereto[.]
25 P.S. § 2648 (emphasis added).
            It is important to note that Lycoming County only utilizes paper ballots,
which are inserted into a scanner after voting and then dropped into a black box (i.e.,
“black bag”). (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 196a, 210a.) Testimony established that
when the precincts close, election officials take the ballot box (the black bag), which
is separated from the scanner and taken to the County Voter Services Office pursuant
to the Election Code. Election officials retrieve from the scanners the USB drives
containing data downloaded from the scanners. Voter Services also secures the bags
that contain provisional, military, and absentee ballots once these have also been
separately scanned.
             There is no dispute by the parties and, in fact, even the Director of
Elections testified, that scanners create a record, the purpose of which is to assist

        best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. When
        determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider the statutory
        language in context and give words and phrases their common and approved
        usage. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect
        to the words of the statute and not disregard the text to implement its
        objective. Only if the statute is ambiguous, and not explicit, do we resort to
        other means of discerning legislative intent.
Houghton Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of State, 297 A.3d 862, 869 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)
(citations omitted).
                                       PAM - 2
in tabulating. Relevant to this, the legislature enacted Section 1101-A of the
Election Code, which provides:
            “Automatic tabulating equipment” means any apparatus
            which automatically examines and computes votes
            registered on paper ballots, ballot cards or district totals
            cards or votes registered electronically and which
            tabulates such votes.
25 P.S. § 3031.1, added by the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600 (emphasis added).
           Clearly, the scanners here fit within the ambit of Section 1101-A as
“automatic tabulating equipment.” As such, the scanners are not ballot boxes or
voting machines and must be viewed as separate and distinct parts of the voting
process, the purpose of which is to tabulate vote data. That data is used by Voter
Services to tabulate results, create reports, and produce other data related to the
election, including but not limited to the CVR. The CVR is generated from the
information contained in Voter Services’ central computer. (Honey’s Br., at 7-11;
R.R. at 130a, 135a.) The CVR is not physically located in the ballot box or the
voting machine.     The CVR is stored electronically in Voter Services’ central
computer until printed out in a format not resembling a ballot and not containing
information that identifies any voter. (Trial Ct. Op., December 16, 2022, at 70.)
             As the trial court properly found, the CVR is not a copy of the ballot.
It is “a spreadsheet that shows the adjudication of every choice on every ballot cast
in the election.” Id. at 3. As also found by the trial court, permitting examination of
the CVR simply allows the public to “check the math of the board of elections,
making sure a line-by-line tally of votes for each candidate is consistent with the
final number reported by the election board.” Id. at 65-66. Also as correctly found
by the trial court, there is no information in the CVR that could associate a voted
ballot with a certain voter. The order of the numbered list of voters does not

                                      PAM - 3
even correspond to the order in which ballots are cast. The only way a person
could determine an elector’s ordinal position is by personally observing that
elector cast his or her ballot. Id. at 71.
             Based on the above, and as found by the trial court, the scanners utilized
in Lycoming County are automatic tabulating equipment, NOT voting machines or
part of the ballot box. Simply by virtue of the Election Code definitions, automatic
tabulating equipment cannot be construed as a voting machine or ballot box without
ignoring the clear intent of the legislature. The data from the scanners is used to
create reports, the CVR, which does not contain information that could associate a
voted ballot with a certain voter. The reports are used to help ensure the vote count
is correct, information which the legislature has clearly deemed should not be denied
to the public. The trial court did not err in concluding Section 308 does not exempt
Lycoming County’s CVRs from public access.
             Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

                                             ________________________________
                                             PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                      PAM - 4
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Heather Honey                                   :
                                                :
                 v.                             : No. 57 C.D. 2023
                                                : Argued: December 6, 2023
Lycoming County Offices of                      :
Voter Services                                  :
                                                :
Appeal of: Al Schmidt, in his Official          :
Capacity as Secretary of the                    :
Commonwealth                                    :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                 HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
                 HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
                 HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                 HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                 HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
                 HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                             FILED: March 4, 2024

         Respectfully, I disagree with two critical aspects of the Majority’s analysis in
this case. The first is the Majority’s determination that the electronic voting system
used in Lycoming County is a type of “voting machine.” See Honey v. Lycoming
Cnty. Offs. of Voter Servs., ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 57 C.D. 2023, filed
March 4, 2024), slip op. at 11-17 (Maj. Op.). Under the Pennsylvania Election Code
(Election Code),1 “the term ‘voting machines’ applies to paperless mechanical lever

1
    Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2600-3591.
systems.”2 Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 170 (Pa. 2015) (citing In re: Gen.
Election for Twp. Supervisor of Morris Twp., Wash. Cnty., 620 A.2d 565, 568-69
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)). The Election Code contains provisions dealing separately with
“electronic voting systems” and “voting machines.”3 Additionally, “[u]pon the
installation of an electronic voting system in any election district, the use therein .
. . of voting machines shall be discontinued, except as otherwise provided” in the
Election Code. Section 1104-A(b) of the Election Code, added by Act 128, 25 P.S.
§ 3031.4(b) (emphasis added).
       The Majority points to language found in Section 1703 of the Election Code,
25 P.S. § 3263, which provides that a petition for recanvass may be filed with respect
to a voting machine or electronic voting system, for the proposition that electronic
voting systems are “a type of voting machine, or that the two terms are effectively
synonymous.” Maj. Op. at 12, 16. This is a misreading of Section 1703. The
Election Code applies the voting machine recanvassing procedures to some, but not
all, electronic voting systems. Section 1118-A of the Election Code, added by Act
128, 25 P.S. § 3031.18, directs the recount procedures for traditional paper ballots
apply to “an electronic voting system utilizing paper ballots,” while the recanvassing

2
  See also Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002, 1010 n.21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (explaining a “‘voting
machine’ . . . is a mechanical device, not an electronic device. . . . [B]y using a voting machine,
the voter will vote by operating the key, handle, pointer or knob, upon or adjacent to which the
name of such candidate is placed.”) (emphasis added).

3
  Indeed, the Election Code contains separate requirements for “voting machines” and “electronic
voting systems,” as well as separate election and post-election procedures. Compare Sections
1107, 1216, and 1227 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. §§ 3007, 3056, and 3067, with Sections 1107-
A, 1112-A, and 1113-A of the Election Code, added by Section 4 of the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L.
600, No. 128 (Act 128), 25 P.S. §§ 3031.7, 3031.12, and 3031.13. See also Section 1404(e) of the
Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3154(e) (distinguishing, in the same subsection, between recounts and
recanvasses of paper ballots, voting machines, electronic voting systems that use paper ballots,
and “any other type of electronic voting systems”).

                                             SW - 2
procedures for voting machines apply to “any other type of electronic voting
system.”4 The electronic voting system at issue here uses paper ballots, so the voting
machine recanvassing procedures would not apply. Further, the fact that our General
Assembly specified the voting machine recanvassing procedures would apply to
some, but not all, electronic voting systems demonstrates it did not consider
electronic voting systems to be “synonymous” with voting machines.5 See Maj. Op.
at 12, 16.
       I must also disagree with the Majority’s suggestion that our General Assembly
intended Section 308 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2648, to prevent the public

4
  The quoted language applies specifically to recount and recanvassing procedures under Sections
1701-03 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. §§ 3261-63. More broadly, Section 1118-A governs any
recount “ordered as provided by law” in an election district using an electronic voting system and
directs “the ballots shall be recounted in accordance with [S]ection 1404(e).” 25 P.S. § 3031.18.
Section 1404(e)(3)-(4) provides as follows:

       (3) In a county in which an election district uses an electronic voting system
       utilizing paper ballots, all of the following apply:

       (i) The county board shall recount all ballots using manual, mechanical or electronic
       devices of a different type used for the specific election.

       (ii) All ballots containing overvotes shall be counted manually.

       (4) In a county in which an election district uses any other type of electronic
       voting systems, the county board shall conduct the recanvass similar to the
       procedure specified in clause (1) for voting machines.

25 P.S. § 3154(e)(3)-(4) (emphasis added).

5
  The Majority criticizes part of an alternative analysis in In re: Recount of Berks County General
Election of November 8, 2022, 296 A.3d 64 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (Wallace, J.) (single-Judge op.),
affirmed, 297 A.3d 687 (Pa. 2023), which cited the statements from Banfield and Dayhoff, quoted
above. Maj. Op. at 16 n.12. The Majority should not be so quick to condemn these prior decisions,
particularly when its own analysis fails to address statutory provisions that directly contradict its
reasoning, and when it eschews case law in favor of dictionaries and the United States Electoral
Assistance Commission website. See id. at 13-16.

                                              SW - 3
from accessing “voting information.” See Maj. Op. at 18. To the contrary, Section
308 permits the public inspection of election records containing all sorts of “voting
information,” including “general and duplicate returns, tally papers . . . reports and
other documents and records.” 25 P.S. § 2648 (emphasis added). If the disputed
ClearVote Cast Vote Record (CVR) resembles anything specified in Section 308, it
would be a “report.” Alternatively, it would fall under Section 308’s catchall
language relating to “other documents and records.” Although Section 308 includes
an exception for “the contents of ballot boxes and voting machines and records of
assisted voters,” our General Assembly did not have an electronic spreadsheet in
mind when it enacted this exception nearly 90 years ago, and construing the
exception to apply under the circumstances would be inconsistent with Section 308’s
overall goal of encouraging transparency and public trust in election results.
      One purpose of Section 308’s exception may have been to mitigate fraud. The
Election Code is replete with provisions limiting the opportunities individuals would
have to tamper with ballot boxes or voting machines and imposing penalties on those
who do. See, e.g., Section 530(a) of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2730(a) (providing
polling places “shall be furnished with a guard rail or barrier . . . so constructed and
placed that only such persons as are inside said rail or barrier can approach within
six feet of the ballot box . . . or voting machines, as the case may be”); Section 1827
of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3527 (“If any person . . . shall deposit fraudulent
ballots in the ballot box; or shall register fraudulent votes upon any voting machine;
or shall tamper with any . . . ballot box or voting machine . . . , he shall be guilty of
a felony of the third degree . . . .”). Here, there is no reason to believe public
inspection of the disputed CVR would facilitate fraud. See Reproduced Record
(R.R.) at 577A-78A.

                                        SW - 4
       The exception may also serve to promote secrecy in voting. See, e.g., Section
1826 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3526 (penalizing any person “who, before any
ballot is deposited in the ballot box as provided by this act, shall unfold, open or pry
into any such ballot, with the intent to discover the manner in which the same has
been marked”). Article VII, section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution expressly
enshrines the secret ballot. See Pa. Const. art. VII, § 4 (“All elections by the citizens
shall be by ballot or by such other method as may be prescribed by law: Provided,
That secrecy in voting be preserved.”).        The disputed CVR lacks identifying
information and is randomized, which alleviates concerns that public inspection
would reveal an individual voter’s selections. See R.R. at 581A-83A; Schmidt’s Br.
at 8 n.1.
       Section 308’s exception most clearly relates to the recount and recanvassing
procedures discussed above, which limit when ballot boxes may be opened or voting
machines examined. The exception ensures ballot boxes and voting machines will
be preserved and protected if a recount or recanvass is necessary. Even considering
the exception in this context, however, it would further no legislative purpose to
deny public inspection of the disputed CVR. Once again, the recount procedures for
traditional paper ballots apply to electronic voting systems like the one in this case,
which “utilize[] paper ballots.” 25 P.S. § 3031.18; 25 P.S. § 3154(e)(3). In the event
of a recount, the ballots themselves would be recounted to determine the outcome of
the election, not the CVR. 25 P.S. § 3154(e)(3).
       I recognize Appellant Al Schmidt’s contention that the public could
misinterpret or misuse information contained in the disputed CVR. The same thing
might be said about many other publicly available records, particularly those relating
to politically sensitive or controversial topics. More importantly, that is a policy

                                        SW - 5
argument for our General Assembly, which could just as easily determine that the
potential benefits of public inspection, including increased transparency and public
trust, outweigh any risks of misinterpretation or misuse. I would conclude that the
electronic voting system at issue is not a type of voting machine, and that the CVR
is subject to public inspection as a report, other document, or other record, consistent
with Section 308’s language and purposes. Accordingly, I dissent.

                                               ______________________________
                                               STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                        SW - 6