Court Opinion

ID: 9582923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:49.034686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:45.514484
License: Public Domain

Buchanan, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot assent to the proposition that the statute of limitation on the alleged libel in this case runs not from the date of its publication but from the date of the alleged republication. It seems to me unwise to establish the principle that after the publication of a libelous letter a new and independent cause of action arises against its author each time its recipient shows it to some third person if, in the opinion of a jury, the recipient’s act was a natural and probable consequence of the original wrong, or was actually or presumptively authorized by the author. On that basis suits may be brought, I suppose, just as long as the author lives and the recipient is able to exhibit the letter.
I do not understand the authorities cited in the court’s opinion to say that every such republication establishes a new date from which the limitation begins to run. They simply say that it is generally agreed that the author of a defamation who publishes it is liable for the injurious consequences of a republication thereof by the person to whom it is addressed if such republication is authorized or is the natural and probable result of the original publication. 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 197, p. 185. Or, as expressed in 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 83, p. 136, there is in such event “a separate cause of action against the person responsible for such new publication.” (Emphasis added) That is far from saying that a new cause of *203action, subject to a new period of limitation, arises against the original author of the libel in every instance that the libel is published afresh by the person who first received it.
The question dealt with by the authorities cited in the opinion is whether liability against the author exists for such republication, not how long it will continue; and the question has usually arisen on the admissibility of evidence in actions against the original author relating to repetitions or new publications of the original libel. Not all the courts have agreed as to the extent of the original author’s responsibility and a different rule is generally recognized as between libel and slander. See the opinion of Judge Sanborn in Maytag v. Cummins, 171 C. C. A. 110, 260 F. 74, 16 A. L. R. 712 and Annotation at 726.
Sawyer v. Gilmers, Inc., 189 N. C. 7, 126 S. E. 183, 41 A. L. R. 1184, dealt with the admissibility of evidence of repetition of a slander by third persons in an action against the author of it. The court said:
“We hold it to be the law in this state that the author of a defamation, whether it be libel or slander, is liable for damages caused by or resulting directly and proximately from any secondary publication or repetition which is the natural and probable consequence of his act. He is not liable for such damages where the secondary publication or repetition is without authority from him, express or implied. If the defamation is uttered under such circumstances as to time, place, or conditions as that a repetition or secondary publication is the natural and probable consequence of the original defamation and damage resulting therefrom, he is liable for such damage and evidence of such repetition or secondary publication and of damages resulting therefrom is admissible.”
A libel is published when the defamatory writing is read by or otherwise communicated to someone other than the person defamed. Weidman v. Ketcham, 278 N. Y. 129, 15 N. E. 2d 426. When that is done the wrong is committed, the cause of action arises and the limitation on the right to sue should begin at that time. Questions of repetition and republication are relevant on the quantum of damages, depending in libel cases on whether the repetition or republication was authorized by the author or was a natural and probable consequence of the original act. Jean v. Hennessy, 69 Iowa 373, 28 N. W. 645, cited in the court’s opinion, seems to hold no more than that. See also Newell, Slander and Libel, 4 ed., § 299, p. 336; Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d 676; *204Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45; Rigney v. W. R. Keesee & Co., 104 W. Va. 168, 139 S. E. 650, 54 A. L. R. 1139; 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 156, p. 238.
We aligned ourselves pretty closely with this view in Luhring v. Carter, 193 Va. 529, 69 S. E. 2d 416. There the action was brought for a slander which was alleged to have occurred December 16, 1948. Later the plaintiff filed a bill of particulars alleging a repetition of the slander. The defendants moved to strike out this allegation on the ground that it had the effect of allowing the plaintiff to amend his original action and it was argued that it set up a new and distinct cause of action committed January 9, 1949, not by the defendants but by a third party, and a tort that was actually barred by the statute of limitations before the bill of particulars was filed. We held that the repetition was a natural and probable result of the slander and an element of damage that was a natural, direct and probable result of the original wrong, and “that the bill of particulars did not state a new and distinct cause of action against defendants nor was it an amendment to the original notice of motion. It only particularized, specified, and pointed out the intended and accomplished result of the original statements and the damages directly caused thereby.”
The present opinion states that in an action on the original publication evidence of a republication bears on the quantum of damages. That would necessarily be because it is an element of the original cause of action, as held in Luhring v. Carter. To say now, contrary to that holding, that a republication creates a new and distinct cause of action is to give the plaintiff two causes of action for an element of damage arising from the same wrong.
We are committed in Virginia to the rule that in tort actions the limitation on the right to sue begins to run when the wrong is committed and not when the plaintiff discovers that he has been damaged. Street v. Consumers Min. Corp. 185 Va. 561, 39 S. E. 2d 271; Housing Authority v. Laburnum Corp., 195 Va. 827, 838, 80 S. E. 2d 574, 581.
I think the judgment below should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Whittle joins in this dissent.