Court Opinion

ID: 9419242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:47:52.607942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:16.395594
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting:
I cannot believe that experts of the subject—say, referees charged with the duties of administering the bankruptcy law—would conclude that every bankruptcy arose without exception from conditions which were with*85in the “control” of the bankrupt in any accepted meaning of the word. Nor do I think that that view would be taken in case of receiverships. Yet that is the irrebuttable presumption which the Commission has created in this type of case. Congress did not create it. Congress merely provided that this class of carrier had a right to the statutory grant on a showing, inter alia, that it was in “bona fide operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle on June 1, 1935” and “has .so operated since that time” except as to “interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control.” Motor Carrier Act of 1935, § 206 (a); 49 U. S. C. § 306 (a). I would have supposed that the question of “control” was “an issue of fact to be determined by the special circumstances of each case.” Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 145. That would mean that “So long as there, is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert, body it must stand.” Id. pp. 145-146. But that is quite different from giving the word “control” a construction which prevents a person from showing under any circumstances that the events which led to his business disaster were not subject to his “control.” On the one hand, the Commission rules that interruptions of service owing to floods,1 snow,2 unsafe3 or impassable4 roads, highway construction,5 droughts which destroy a carrier’s chief source of business,6 ill health,7 strikes,8 or the illegal action of govern*86mental authorities9 constitute grounds for holding that an interruption of service is beyond an applicant’s “control.” But similar misfortunes of a purely accidental character which affect financial stability and end in bankruptcy or receivership are held as a matter of law to be subject to the carrier’s “control.”
The distortion which that interpretation involves is well illustrated by this case. There was evidence tending to show the following: During the year 1936 the applicant was insured against public liability and property damage by the Central Mutual Insurance Co. Hearing rumors that Central Mutual was in financial difficulties and was not paying claims, applicant dropped its policy in December 1936 and placed its insurance with another company. On January 11, 1937, Central Mutual was adjudged a bankrupt and ceased payment of all claims. In the fall of 1937, applicant was forced to pay several substantial damage claims arising from accidents during the period when its insurance policy was in effect with Central Mutual. These payments seriously impaired its working capital. Furthermore, applicant was confronted with approximately 175 additional claims for personal injury and property damage. These were estimated at about $200,000 and arose during the period when applicant was insured by Central Mutual. Applicant settled some of these claims. It was impossible, however, to satisfy the demands of all of these claimants. Receivership followed and on its heels came bankruptcy. There is not the slightest evidence in this record of any negligence, dereliction, or mismanagement on the part of applicant. It is undisputed that its failure was due to the failure of its insurer. And there is no evidence in this record that it did not exercise due care in the selection of that insurer. It would indeed be ironical to cast a *87presumption against the applicant on that score when the insurance policy presumably was' accepted by the Commission, and under its regulations promulgated pursuant to §§ 211 (c) and 215 of the Act (49 U. S. C. §§ 311 (c) and 315) had to be “approved” by it.10 Federal Register (1936) Yol. 1, p. 1163, Rule 1. And see 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Pt. 174, § 174.1.
An applicant carries the burden of establishing his right to the statutory grant which is contained in the “grandfather” clause. Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15. But he should not be met at the threshold with a conclusive presumption against him, unless Congress has clearly indicated that in the circumstances of his case he has no right even to undertake the burden of proof. If Congress had desired to eliminate all applicants whose continuous service was interrupted by bankruptcy or receivership, I believe it would have said so. As stated by Commissioner Lee in his dissenting opinion (10 M. C. C. p. 263): “If such interruptions in service are to be construed as putting an end to 'grandfather’ rights of carriers, whose applications therefor have not been determined, then, where such a carrier goes into receivership or bankruptcy, and such an interruption occurs, it would be impossible for the carrier to come out of receivership and resume operations; it could not effect a composition or an arrangement with its creditors and resume operations; if a corporation, it could not be reorganized under the corporate reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, and creditors could realize nothing from 'grandfather’ rights, however valuable.” Such a wholesale destruction of operating rights should not be readily or lightly inferred. Operating rights are the very life of any business. Without them this business certainly has no more than scrap value.
*88Great deference is owed a commission’s interpretation of the law which it enforces, especially where the meaning of the statutory language, generally or in specific application, gains body and flavor from the content of the highly specialized field in which the expert body works. See Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U. S. 177; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381; Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402; Alton R. Co. v. United States, supra. But that is quite different from acceding to the suggestion that the non-technical word “control” may be interpreted in a way which goes against all human experience and which does violence to its ordinary and accepted meaning. In this connection it should be noted that, if the misfortune which ended in bankruptcy or receivership was not subject to the carrier’s “control,” then an interruption of service made by the trustee or receiver cannot be attributed to him. Once the court acquires jurisdiction over the estate, the affairs of the business are in its hands, not the debtor’s.
Congress has provided that those who attained a position in the competitive transportation system should be allowed to retain the fruits of their struggle. Whether that policy was wise or unwise is not for us to appraise. But we should not permit those statutory grants to be whittled away on the basis of technical and legalistic grounds which find no expression in the statute, however much the administrative chore may be alleviated. If the services of a carrier have been interrupted by bankruptcy or receivership, his burden of proving that that default was not subject to his “control” may be onerous. Perhaps in most cases he could not maintain it. But he should be given the opportunity to do so. It is hard for me to imagine a clearer case where he probably could succeed than this one. Yet before we passed on that issue, as the opinion of the Court undertakes to do, we should remand the case to the Commission. For it made *89no findings on that issue but invoked an irrebuttable presumption which would automatically foreclose in all cases an opportunity to be heard on the real cause of the bankruptcy or receivership.
Mr. Justice Black: and Mr. Justice Byrnes join in this dissent.

 Waltz Transportation, Inc., 10 M. C. C. 30, 33.

 Lewis McKay, 4 M. C. C. 93, 94.

 Edwards Motor Transit Co., Inc., 2 M. C. C. 73, 74.

 Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Co., 21 M. C. C. 633, 635; Walter Stages, Inc., 24 M. C. C. 451, 454.

 Magee Truck Lines, Inc., 28 M. C. C. 386, 389.

 Barnes Truck Co., Inc., 24 M. C. C. 465, 467.

 H. Bruce Blackburn, 20 M. C. C. 747, 748-749.

 Motor Freight Express, 26 M. C. C. 374, 375; Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 28 M. C. C. 493, 502.

 W. H. Tompkins Co., 29 M. C. C. 359, 362.

 And see Federal Register, op. cit., Rule IX; 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Pt. 174, § 174.9.