Court Opinion

ID: 9747114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:57:19.008369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:20.248730
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
On the basis of a statute clearly inapplicable to this case, the majority concludes that appellants have standing to bring an action against the six corporations holding city-granted franchises to develop cable television in Philadelphia. Appellants having asserted no valid ground affording them standing to institute this action, I dissent.
The majority decides that section 1 of the Act of June 19, 1871, P.L. 1360, 15 P.S. § 117 (1967) 1 grants appel*477lants standing. We interpreted that section in Gingrich v. Blue Ridge Memorial Gardens, 444 Pa. 420, 282 A.2d 315 (1971), where Mr. Chief Justice Jones wrote for a unanimous Court:
“The 1871 Act does not usurp the power of the Commonwealth to inquire into ultra vires acts of a corporation or to forfeit a corporation charter; the statute simply grants an individual or corporate body the right in a court of equity to inquire whether or not a corporation is exceeding its charter powers, and, thereby, inflicting an injury upon such individual as distinguished from the public. Moreover, the individual or corporate body must demonstrate to the court of equity that the acts in excession of its charter power directly invade his rights as distinguished from consequential injuries.”
Id. at 424, 282 A.2d at 317.
Clearly, under that decision, unless appellants allege that they have sustained injury in some capacity other than as members of the public, they have not established standing under the Act. Appellants concede in their brief that their alleged injury is in fact shared by the community at large. According to Gingrich, this admission is fatal to appellants’ claim of standing under the Act of 1871.
The only other basis upon which appellants claim standing is section 1 of the Act of May 3, 1927, P.L. 515, *47817 P.S. § 305, 1962.2 This section permits a citizen to bring an action to enjoin encroachments upon sidewalks in front of certain edifices. On this record the claim is patently frivolous.
I would affirm the decision of the chancellor sustaining appellees’ preliminary objections.
JONES', C. J., and POMEROY, J., join in this dissent.

. That section provides:
“In all proceedings in courts of law or equity of this commonwealth, in which it is alleged that the private rights of individuals or the rights or franchises of other corporations are injured or invaded by any corporation claiming to have a right or franchise to do the act from which such injury results, it shall be the duty of the court in which such proceedings are had, to examine, inquire and ascertain whether such corporation does in fact possess the right or franchise to do the act *477from which such alleged injury to private rights, or to the rights and franchises of other corporations, results, and if such rights or franchises have not been conferred upon such corporation, such courts, if exercising equitable power, shall, by injunction, at suit of the private parties or other corporations, restrain such injurious acts; and if the proceedings be at law for damages, it shall be lawful therein to recover damages for such injury as in other cases.”
For the purpose of this dissent, I will assume that this section applies to limitations on corporate power contained in a franchise granted by a municipality as well as to those imposed by the corporate charter itself.

. That section provides:
“The courts of common pleas of the several counties of this Commonwealth, in addition to the powers and jurisdictions heretofore possessed and exercised, shall have the jurisdiction and powers of a court of chancery, so far as relates to the prevention, restraint, and abatement of encroachments on public sidewalks in front of residences, churches, hotels, apartment houses, or retail stores contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community, upon the complaint of any municipality, or any citizen thereof, alleging injury thereby, without regard to whether or not such citizen has suffered damage or injury which is special to himself, where the said municipality has failed or refused to institute action for the prevention or restraint of such encroachments in front of residences, churches, hotels, apartment houses, or retail stores contrary to law, within thirty days after written notice thereof to such municipality by or on behalf of such citizen.”