Court Opinion

ID: 9300382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:06:50.627261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:39.721195
License: Public Domain

DRUMMOND, Circuit Judge.
X concur in general in the views of the district judge. I may be allowed to express the hope that there will be no trouble growing out of this decision, and that the state court will not insist upon its receiver retaining control of the property. If it should, it may then become a question for this court to determine what course shall be pursued if the receiver appointed by this court shall seek to obtain possession of the property, and should be resisted by the receiver appointed by the state court. The only question there is in this case is whether the appointment of a receiver by the state court is of such a character as to confer rights which are to be protected under the rule already stated. During the interregnum between the dismissal of the ease in this court, and its resumption by the order setting aside that dismissal, has anything occurred so that the rights of other persons need protection? They are such only in this case as grow out of the appointment of the receiver by the state court. It cannot be said that Nickerson has himself acquired any special rights or interests which are to be affected. It is only whether the state court should maintain its control over the property. Now, conceding that there.might have been during this interval rights acquired by third parties which should be protected by this as well as all courts, what was the status of the case at the time that the receiver was appointed? If we concede that Nickerson might commence a suit in the state court for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the property the same as was asked by the plaintiff in the original case in this court, when this court resumed control of the case, as it did by its order of the 24th of July setting aside the previous order of dismissal, then Nickerson and his counsel should have suspended all proceedings in the state court as to the appointment of a receiver. Whatever may be said as to the order of dismissal, the cause then stood precisely, as my brother judge has said, as though no order of dismissal had ever been made; and it presents, therefore, a case where there was. at the time that the order was made by the state court for a receiver, a bill pending in this court which also asked for a receiver of the same property, and of which this court had jurisdiction.
These conflicts, of course, are always unpleasant to us. We desire to proceed harmoniously with the state courts and state judges. We cannot, however, shrink from duties imposed upon us, where we have once obtained jurisdiction of a case, as we think we have here. We believe that it is our duty to maintain it, according to well-settled principles. And we trust that there may be no such conflict between the state and federal courts in this instance as has been intimated.
However .this may be, we have to proceed according to our views of law and equity in the case. We would hope that there will be no controversy about the person to be appointed receiver. If the plaintiff can suggest some name, and the counsel on the other side have no objection, we shall appoint him. But if they object, we may appoinfone of our own motion.
[It was then stated by the court that the parties might have until Saturday next to determine upon their action.] 3

 [From 7 Chi. Leg. News, 33.]