Court Opinion

ID: 9677444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:52:35.786797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:56.011308
License: Public Domain

*774THOMAS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of Campbell’s appeal. I write separately, however, to confess that I cannot square the plain requirements of Rule 52(a), as interpreted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Marin, with the treatment accorded incurable jury argument as so-called “fundamental” error, i.e., a complaint that can be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex.R.App.P. 52(a); Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 388-90 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1988).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has separated a litigant’s rights into three distinct categories: (1) rights that can never be waived or forfeited because they are based on absolute requirements and prohibitions— jurisdiction, for example; (2) rights — such as the right to counsel and right to a jury trial — that can be waived but only by an intentional and knowing relinquishment in the record; and (3) rights that are waived merely by the failure to speak up. Ex parte Sims, 868 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (orig. proceeding); Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279-80. The procedural-default effect of Rule 52(a) applies only to the third category. Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 280.
"What is it about incurable jury argument that elevates it into the first two categories so as to entitle a litigant to complain about it for the first time on appeal? All it takes for improper argument to qualify as fundamental is that it fall outside the boundaries of permissible argument, either be manifestly improper or violate a mandatory statute or inject some new fact harmful to the defendant, and be so damaging that a curative instruction could not have removed the harm. Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d 378, 385-86 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279,112 L.Ed.2d 234 (1990); Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 907 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989).
Is it accorded such special treatment solely on the basis that to subject the right to a procedural default somehow implicates a defendant’s right to due process? Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has occasionally alluded to the exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement as being based on the denial of a fair and impartial trial, there is no clear-cut requirement in Texas case law that improper argument result in the denial of due process or due course of law before it will qualify as fundamental error. Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2835, 100 L.Ed.2d 935 (1988) (“Reversible error occurs only when statements to the jury, either individually or collectively, are so extreme, manifestly improper, inject new and harmful facts into the case, or violate a mandatory statutory provision ... that they deprive the accused of a fair and impartial trial”). Moreover, incurable jury argument does not automatically result in a denial of due process. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-81, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (holding that there is a meaningful distinction between ordinary trial error and the sort of egregious misconduct that results in a denial of due process).
Fundamental error — meaning, in this instance, the right to complain for the first time on appeal about improper jury argument — seemingly depends in the final analysis upon the efficacy of a hypothetical curative instruction. If an instruction would have been effective, the defendant has lost his right to complain because of a procedural default under Rule 52(a); on the other hand, if an instruction could not have cured the harm, Rule 52(a) does not deprive him of the right to raise the complaint for the first time on appeal. Rule 52(a)’s application thus depends, at least in the realm of improper jury argument, not upon the category of the right involved but upon whether the harm is incurable. This analytical approach simply does not square with the guidelines in Marin. Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279-80.
According to Marin, determining the correct category of the particular right involved will usually settle the question of Rule 52(a)’s application and, thus, decide whether a procedural default has occurred. Id. at 279. *775The right involved — presumably, the right of a litigant not to be incurably harmed during the state’s argument — does not possess the rare characteristics that would justify its inclusion in the first category: rights that are so absolutely guaranteed by the judicial system that they can never be waived or forfeited, even with the litigant’s consent. Nor does it share the distinguishing characteristics of category two: rights that may be waived but only in a specialized manner. Rights in both of these categories are not subject to procedural default under Rule 52(a) and, consequently, a complaint about their non-observance can be raised for the first time in the appellate court. Id. at 280. A court even has an independent duty to implement rights in the first two categories, with or without the litigant’s request. Id.
The right not to be incurably harmed by improper jury argument does, however, fit comfortably within category three: rights based on the evidentiary and procedural rules that attend the trial of a criminal case. Id. at 278. This category includes all but the most fundamental rights; some constitutional guarantees can even be lost by procedural default. Id. at 279. Category-three rights are optional with a litigant, ie., they may be lost by procedural default or insisted upon, and the court has no independent duty to guarantee their enforcement or implementation. Id. at 279-80.
Incurable harm does not arise only from improper jury argument. A defendant is often irreparably harmed by the improper introduction, without any objection, of evidence relating to extraneous offenses. He might get a reversal, but it would have to be on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, not on the basis of fundamental error resulting from the improper introduction of evidence. The right to be tried on the offense charged and not as a criminal generally is subject to procedural default. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (on rehearing). However, if the prosecutor improperly mentions a defendant’s extraneous offenses during argument, without objection, and the harm proves to be incurable, the defendant is entitled to treat it as fundamental error. If the right to be tried on the offense charged is treated as a category-three right during the evidentiary phase, ie., it is subject to procedural default during the evidentiary phase, why is it that the same right cannot be procedurally defaulted during the argument phase? Keep in mind that to be fundamental error there is no absolute requirement that incurable jury argument equate to a denial of due process, just that the harm to the defendant be incurable. Nichols v. State, 754 S.W.2d 185, 200 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Carter v. State, 717 S.W.2d 60, 79-80 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 108 S.Ct. 467, 98 L.Ed.2d 407 (1987). A myriad of other examples can be conjured up to illustrate the dichotomy of subjecting a right to forfeiture during the evidentiary phase but treating it during argument as if it were a right entitled to special protection under category one or two.
The judicial policy served by Rule 52(a) has many salutary effects. First, its requirement of a timely objection allows the trial court to “correct the complained of error at that time and to then proceed with the trial.” Janecka v. State, 823 S.W.2d 232, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (on rehearing). If irreparable harm has indeed occurred, as the defendant claims, the court can interdict the proceedings with a mistrial, thereby protecting the defendant’s rights and promoting overall judicial economy. Moreover, it prevents the defendant from “lying behind the log” with a good objection, gambling on an acquittal, and then appealing. Yet, the current state of the case law encourages just such a result, which has a deleterious effect on the judicial resources of the state. Finally, except for the unique protection that is understandably afforded rights which cannot be waived or which can only be waived in a special manner, it seems unfair to reverse a court for an act not of its own doing and for an error never brought to its attention: “No appellate court would think of reversing a trial court for improper argument of counsel or for misconduct of the jury or any other act not of the court himself, without in some way calling the matter to the attention of the trial court and procuring his ruling thereon.” Bell v. Blackwell, 283 S.W. 765, 767 (Tex. Comm’n App.1926, judgment adopted). Although predating the adoption of Rule 52(a) *776by sixty years, this statement by the Commission of Appeals perhaps best sums up the fairness rationale behind Rule 52(a).
A three-step analytical process is necessarily required by Rule 52(a). First, the appellate court must determine whether the particular complaint has been preserved for review. This can be done usually by a quick examination of a precise portion of the record. If not preserved, the point encompassing the complaint is overruled without any reference to its merit. Second, if preserved, the appellate court must determine whether the court acted erroneously on the complaint. If it acted properly, there is no error and the point is overruled on its merits. If error occurred, however, the final step is to determine from the record as a whole whether the error is harmless or harmful. Only if the error is harmful will the point be sustained and the judgment reversed. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2).
The problem with complaints about jury argument, incurable or otherwise, is that the analytical process required by Texas case law essentially requires every complaint to be considered on its merits after a review of the whole record. Opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals invariably mention the so-called general rule that a timely objection is necessary to preserve a complaint about jury argument for appellate review. Willis, 785 S.W.2d at 385; Briddle, 742 S.W.2d at 389; Romo v. State, 631 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982). This would seem to narrow initial consideration of the complaint to a quick, precise examination of the record — if no objection, nothing is presented for review. However, a missing objection “does not end our inquiry.” See Willis, 785 S.W.2d at 385.
Because only a certain type of jury argument — i.e., improper argument that produces incurable harm — is not subject to procedural default, an appellate court must first determine whether the complained-of argument was improper. Is it (1) a summation of the evidence, (2) a reasonable deduction from the evidence, (3) an answer to argument of opposing counsel, or (4) a plea for law enforcement? Id. at 384. A court can hardly answer the first three questions without a careful review of the record. In other words, the court must at the very outset consider the merits of any complaint relating to jury argument, just as if it has been preserved by an objection and an adverse ruling. Of course, if a review of the record shows it to be proper argument, then presumably the complaint has been procedurally defaulted under the general rule that a timely objection is necessary to preserve a complaint relating to jury argument. Id. at 385. Declaring a complaint procedurally defaulted retrospectively, often after an exhaustive review of the record and a consideration of the merits of the complaint, seems nonsensical.
If, however, the complained-of argument falls outside the bounds of permissible comment, the reviewing court must then determine, in light of the whole record, whether the argument is manifestly improper, violates a mandatory statute, or injects some new fact harmful to the defendant. Id. Again, the court must consider the record and the merits of the complaint. If the argument turns out to be manifestly improper, violative of a mandatory statute, or injects a new, harmful fact, the appellant court must finally consider whether an instruction to disregard would have removed the harm. Id. This obviously requires a harm analysis based on the entire record. If a curative instruction would have been effective, the appellate court then declares — after engaging in an extensive review of the record and after considering the merits of the complaint — that “appellant is not entitled to the Romo exception to the waiver rule.” Id. at 386; Romo, 631 S.W.2d at 505-06. In other words, appellant, your complaint cannot be considered because you failed to object; accordingly, nothing is presented for review. What could be more nonsensical?
Technically speaking, a complaint relating to jury argument can be “considered” for the first time on appeal only when it involves incurable harm. See Willis, 785 S.W.2d at 386. However, as already mentioned, the analytical process requires a reviewing court to treat all such complaints as fundamental error, i.e., it must examine the record and delve into the merits of every complaint.
*777These musings on incurable jury argument may be for naught. Perhaps there are others who wonder why complaints about improper juiy argument, whether or not the harm is curable, are not subject to procedural default under Marin. Why is every right implicated by incurable jury argument entitled to the same treatment accorded rights that are considered so fundamental that either they can never be waived or can only be forfeited in a special way?
If Marin is correctly decided, then the test for fundamental error should not be whether the harm is incurable. Instead, the definitive test should be whether the prosecutor’s comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 179-81, 106 S.Ct. at 2471 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 641-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1871). This would at least elevate the test to the level of a constitutional violation and preserve a meaningful distinction between ordinary trial error and the type of egregious conduct that amounts to a denial of due process. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 646-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1873. Now, nothing more is required other than simple harmful trial error.
Furthermore, requiring the defendant to establish a violation of due process as a condition precedent to reversal would harmonize the treatment of fundamental error in jury argument with the guidelines in Marin. “A judgment of conviction obtained in violation of due process of law is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to enter such a judgment.” Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Crim.App.1967)). If violation of due process is made the test, then treating complaints of improper jury argument as fundamental error would comport with the first category of rights recognized in Marin — rights based on absolute requirements and prohibitions.
As long as complaints can be raised for the first time on appeal, an appellate court can never forego its duty to determine whether the complaint falls within the first two categories of Marin, which necessarily involves a review of the record and a consideration of the merits. But, as the Court noted in Marin, fundamental-error treatment is reserved only for those relatively few rights that our society and system deem so precious that they are entitled to special protection from procedural default. As things stand now, we essentially grant every complaint of incurable jury argument such special treatment based on plain harmful trial error.
Of course, as a lower court we are bound by the interpretations and rulings of our superior courts. That does not mean, however, that we should not suggest that a review of the case law in this particular area may be warranted.