Court Opinion

ID: 9389705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 06:07:40.91337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.061786
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed April 21, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00132-CR

                        ANGEL AMBROSE, Appellant
                                   V.
                         STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F10-59769-X

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Breedlove
                          Opinion by Justice Breedlove
      In 2012, appellant Angel Ambrose was convicted of aggravated sexual assault

of a child under the age of 14 and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In 2018,

appellant obtained post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the trial court found that “had these

results been available during Ambrose’s trial, it is NOT reasonably probable that he

would not have been convicted.”

      Appellant appeals the trial court’s finding, complaining that the trial court

erred in failing to hold a hearing under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article
64.04 and that had the results of the DNA testing been available during appellant’s

trial it was not reasonably probable that he would not have been convicted. We

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                I.   BACKGROUND

      Appellant was charged with penetrating the sexual organ of a minor with his

finger. Complainant J.G. was seven years old at the time of the offense on or about

April 11, 2009. J.G. was taken to a hospital where she underwent a sexual assault

examination. At that time, vaginal, anal, and oral swabs were collected. The

samples were tested for the presence of seminal fluid shortly after, but no seminal

fluid was found on the samples and no DNA testing was conducted. The samples

were retained by the Dallas Police Department.

      On December 17, 2012, appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty and was

sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. On April 10, 2017, appellant filed a motion

and supporting affidavit requesting post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to Chapter

64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The State did not oppose the motion.

The court granted the motion on March 21, 2018, and ordered Short Tandem Repeat

(STR) Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Y-STR testing of the swabs from the

sexual assault kit along with buccal swabs obtained from appellant.

      The DPS lab presented the results of the testing in three written reports. The

first report, dated August 14, 2019, described the items received and analyzed by

DPS. These items included the vaginal, anal, and oral swabs from the sexual assault

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kit along with a buccal swab from appellant. The kit also contained some smear

slides which were not examined.

      The second report, dated December 3, 2019, concluded that based on STR

testing of the swabs, all swabs yielded a partial DNA profile that originated from a

single female individual. Appellant was excluded as a contributor to these profiles.

      The third report, dated the same day, reported that no Y-STR profile was

obtained from either the vaginal or anal swabs. However, a partial Y-STR profile

consistent with appellant was obtained from the oral swabs. DPS concluded that “At

these loci, the selected profile is found in 4 of 5,717 total individuals within the

database. In addition any paternally-related male relatives of [appellant] cannot be

excluded as being the contributor of this male DNA profile.”

      On April 29, 2021, the trial court held a hearing via Zoom on the results of

the post-conviction DNA testing which both the State and appellant’s counsel

attended. On August 11, 2021, the court issued its findings, concluding that “had

these results been available during Ambrose’s trial, it is NOT reasonably probable

that he would not have been convicted.”

      Appellant appealed the trial court’s ruling on September 7, 2021. In two

issues, appellant complains that (1) the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing

under Article 64.04; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that had the DNA results

been available during appellant’s trial it was not reasonably probable that he would

not have been convicted. In response, the State argues that (1) the trial court

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complied with Article 64.04 by holding a hearing on the post-conviction DNA test

results; and (2) the trial court properly found that there was no reasonable probability

the DNA test results would have led to appellant’s acquittal had they been available

during his trial.

                       II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We apply a bifurcated standard of review of a trial court’s findings under

article 64.04, affording almost total deference to the trial court’s resolution of

historical facts and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on determinations of

witness credibility and demeanor but reviewing de novo questions of law and mixed

questions of fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor determinations.

Dunning v. State, 572 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We review the trial

court’s finding in this case de novo because it does not turn on witness credibility or

demeanor determinations. See Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002).

                                  III.   DISCUSSION

A. Whether the trial court failed to hold a hearing under Article 64.04

       In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to hold a

hearing under Article 64.04. Article 64.04 provides that “[a]fter examining the

results of testing under Article 64.03, the convicting court shall hold a hearing and

make a finding as to whether, had the results been available during the trial of the

offense, it is reasonably probable that the person would not have been convicted.”

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TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.04. Appellant states that the trial court failed

to hold a hearing on the results as required by statute. Specifically, appellant argues

that the failure to hold a hearing deprived him of the opportunity to cross-examine

the DPS analyst who conducted the testing and to present objections to the test

results or reasons for the court to consider the results as favorable to appellant’s

claim. He further argues that he was deprived of any opportunity to explain to the

court why his guilty plea was inaccurate or unreliable. However, the reporter’s

supplemental record shows that the trial court did hold an article 64.04 hearing on

April 29, 2021, via Zoom, and that both the State and appellant’s counsel attended.

At the hearing, the court provided appellant’s counsel the opportunity to present

evidence or challenge the State’s evidence or arguments. Instead, appellant’s

counsel stated:

      I would agree with everything that State’s counsel has stated about the
      case and the testing so far. We have not been able to discover any
      additional newly discovered evidence that would support any other
      identification of the actual perpetrator, if there was one.

      So we have not been able to find or develop any evidence that would
      lead to an alternative suspect that we could argue would elevate this
      evidence to the necessary level to meet the burden coming forth that
      this would be exculpatory.

      So we are in agreement that this is not exculpatory because it does
      include, potentially, Mr. Ambrose as a perpetrator in this testing.

When asked if either side had anything further or any questions for the court,

appellant’s counsel responded that he did not. Because appellant did in fact have an

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opportunity to present evidence and argument to the trial court regarding the test

results or to object to the State’s evidence and did not do so, we overrule appellant’s

first issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

B. Whether the trial court erred in finding no reasonable probability that the
   DNA results would have led to appellant’s acquittal

      In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in finding that had

the DNA results been available before his trial, he likely would not have pleaded

guilty and would have been acquitted at trial because the results did not corroborate

the allegations of vaginal penetration or establish him as the perpetrator of the assault

“to the exclusion of anyone else.” However, we must first examine whether

appellant preserved his complaint for appellate review.

      To preserve error for appellate review, an appellant must show that he

objected in the trial court and that his objection “stated the grounds for the ruling

that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to

make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were

apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Clark v. State, 365

S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The issue on appeal must comport with

the objection made at trial. Id. (citing Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1986).

      The objecting party must “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he

thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him

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at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.” Pena v.

State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lankston v. State, 827

S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). In determining whether an argument on

appeal comports with an objection made at trial, we look to the context of the

objection and the shared understanding of the parties at the time. Lankston, 827

S.W.2d at 911. A trial court’s ruling will not be reversed based on a legal theory

that the complaining party did not present to the court. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d

729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002)).

      As noted above, appellant’s counsel attended the article 64.04 hearing on

April 29, 2021. At that hearing, the State argued that the results of the testing were

not exculpatory as to appellant, and that, in fact, appellant could not be excluded as

a contributor to the male DNA sample found on the oral swab. In response,

appellant’s counsel agreed with the State’s arguments as we have quoted above.

Based upon the statements of counsel and the findings in the reports, the court then

signed the order finding that there was no reasonable probability that appellant

would not have been convicted. He did not object to the contents of the report. He

did not object to the court’s findings. He did not ask for or receive rulings. Instead,

appellant agreed with the State’s (and ultimately the trial court’s) conclusions

regarding the import of the DNA test results. Therefore, we hold appellant did not

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preserve his complaint on this issue for appellate review.        TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(1)(A); Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339.

      However, even if appellant had preserved the issue for appeal, the trial court

did not err in finding it was not reasonably probable that appellant would not have

been convicted in light of the new DNA test results because the results contained no

exculpatory evidence, and in fact, contained new inculpatory evidence that supports

the complainant’s assertions that appellant kissed her on the mouth and put his hand

over her mouth during the alleged sexual assault. See Ex parte Gutierrez, 337

S.W.3d 883, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (to create a reasonable probability of

acquittal, the DNA results must “affirmatively cast doubt upon the validity of the

inmate’s conviction” and not merely “muddy the waters”). We overrule appellant’s

second issue.

                               IV.    CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                           /Maricela Breedlove/
                                           MARICELA BREEDLOVE
                                           JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

220132F.P05

                                        –8–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

ANGEL AMBROSE, Appellant                     On Appeal from the Criminal District
                                             Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00132-CR          V.               Trial Court Cause No. F10-59769-X.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Breedlove. Justices Molberg and
                                             Reichek participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered April 21, 2023

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