Court Opinion

ID: 9716663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:47:30.340154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.737343
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: In 1991, this court rejected defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. People v. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525 (1991). Two years later, in People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), this court granted relief to a defendant asserting the exact same claim, i.e., that his post-conviction counsel had violated his duty under Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)), by failing to substantiate the defendant’s pro se petition alleging his capital sentencing counsel had been ineffective for failing to call certain named prison officials to testify in mitigation about his good prison conduct. Today, the majority, sua sponte, holds that defendant may not pursue a second post-conviction petition, stating: “That we did not order the same remedy in defendant Szabo’s earlier appeal, decided before Johnson, does not mean that we must now permit defendant Szabo to proceed with a second post-conviction petition, which is based, in substance, on a challenge to the performance of his initial post-conviction lawyer.” 186 Ill. 2d at 26. I cannot agree with this holding, particularly when defendant’s life is at stake. It is true that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 1992)) contemplates the filing of only one petition, and a ruling on a post-conviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial petition. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211 (1997); People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74 (1992). The majority properly observes that successive post-conviction petitions raise two competing interests, “the State’s interest in providing a forum for the vindication of the petitioner’s constitutional rights *** [and its] interest in the finality of criminal litigation and judgments.” Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 274. Generally, the operation of waiver and res judicata contribute to the finality of criminal litigation, but this court has acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, these procedural bars may be ineffectual in bringing about the finality which ordinarily follows direct appeal and the initial post-conviction proceeding. See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 275, citing People v. Stewart, 141 Ill. 2d 107 (1990). This court has therefore allowed successive filings when the proceedings in the original petition were deficient in some fundamental way. See, e.g., People v. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972) (appointed counsel on prior petition failed, in either the trial court or the supreme court, to amend the pro se petition so that petitioner’s contentions could adequately be addressed); People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968) (inadequate representation on first petition where counsel merely repeated the conclusory allegations made in defendant’s pro se petition). Thus, the determination to be made in this case is whether defendant’s initial post-conviction proceeding was deficient in some fundamental way. The criteria for establishing that the first proceeding was deficient are not set forth with any precision in our case law. See Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at. 278-79 (noting that fundamental fairness concerns control the question); Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d at 70 (recognizing that justice and fundamental fairness will dictate relaxation of the bar); Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 285 (holding that bar will be excused where defendant did not receive adequate representation during initial post-conviction proceeding). Indeed, the author of the majority opinion herein has stated that a successive petition is permissible when the initial proceeding is deficient and “defendant can demonstrate both cause for his failure to present his claims in a timely manner and prejudice from the procedural default.” People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 407 (1996) (Miller, J., specially concurring). As these cases make clear, the determination regarding the deficiency of the initial proceeding is not subject to bright line standards; rather, the court must undertake an individualized, fact-dependant analysis in order to decide the propriety of any successive petition. In my opinion, the record in this case demonstrates that defendant’s first post-conviction proceeding was deficient in that it did not provide an adequate hearing on defendant’s pro se allegations concerning the existence of mitigating evidence from correctional officers. The record shows that defendant had, as early as 1987 in his post-conviction petition, identified by name the guards who allegedly would have been willing to testify as mitigation witnesses at his 1984 sentencing hearing, had counsel Bjekich and Doyle conducted an adequate investigation. Despite this fact, no action was ever taken by counsel Morrissey during the first post-conviction proceedings to present that evidence in any meaningful form to the circuit court. While defendant did all that could be expected of him to bring the alleged constitutional deprivation to the attention of the court in timely fashion, his claim went unheeded. To enforce the procedural bar under these circumstances would be to punish defendant for his failure to do something more to pursue this claim. However, I am at a loss to conceive of what more defendant himself could have done to have his claim addressed. As this court has stressed, the legislature provided for counsel to be appointed to represent post-conviction petitioners, “not to protect them from the prosecutorial forces of the State, but to shape their complaints into the proper legal form and to present those complaints to the court.” People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (1990). Through no fault of defendant, his claim with respect to the guards’ testimony was not adequately presented during the initial post-conviction proceeding. Thus, I believe that proceeding was fundamentally deficient and the time has now come for defendant’s claim to be heard on the merits. The majority suggests that this court’s earlier decision affirming the denial of defendant’s initial petition “would normally be sufficient to negate any suggestion that the defendant is now entitled to a second opportunity to establish a constitutional defect in the sentencing proceedings.” 186 Ill. 2d at 24. Again, I find it significant that this defendant, acting pro se, timely presented this claim in 1987, providing the names of specific witnesses he believed would have proven his claim regarding resentencing counsel’s ineffectiveness. This is not a case where a defendant has waited until the eleventh hour to debut a claim which could have been raised and addressed in previous proceedings. In those circumstances, the interests of finality provide a far more compelling reason to enforce the procedural bars which normally exist to preclude further review. While I recognize the salutary principles behind the operation of procedural bars in collateral attacks on criminal convictions, as well as the notions of finality that are at play in such proceedings, I believe that those interests must yield, under the particular facts in this case, to defendant’s interest in vindicating his constitutional rights. See Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 285 (this court has repeatedly held that the objective of finality must yield when fundamental fairness so requires). An additional reason supports relaxation of the bar in this case. As the majority notes, the State does not renew before this court its contention that res judicata preludes defendant’s second petition. The State’s decision to abandon the argument on appeal seems to be a concession that defendant’s initial post-conviction proceeding was deficient at least with respect to this issue. Certainly the circuit court, by denying the State’s motion to dismiss, found that a deficiency had existed in the initial proceedings so as to permit defendant’s second petition to stand. Given the State’s failure to press the point, there is even less reason for this court to enforce the procedural bar. Defendant’s second post-conviction petition presented the circuit court with the opportunity to complete defendant’s constitutional challenge, begun in 1987, to the effectiveness of his 1984 sentencing attorneys. Therefore, on a procedural level, I believe the circuit court correctly heard evidence regarding defendant’s claim that Bjekich and Doyle provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing by failing to investigate and call the correctional officials named in defendant’s post-conviction petition. I further dissent from the majority’s conclusion that defendant did not establish that this failure on the part of Bjekich and Doyle amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. “In the context of a death sentencing hearing, the defendant must prove that counsel’s representation was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient conduct, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 109 (1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984). It is clear that counsel has a duty to investigate potential sources of mitigation evidence, or to have reason not to make such an investigation. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 86 (1997); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1989). If mitigation exists, counsel has the duty to introduce it in support of the defendant. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d at 86. As this court recently stated in People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 385-86 (1997): “Where an adequate investigation has been conducted, the failure to present mitigating evidence does not itself establish that defense counsel was ineffective. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 535 (1995); Perez, 148 Ill. 2d at 186. ‘An informed decision not to present certain mitigating evidence may represent a valid strategic choice, particularly where the evidence is potentially damaging. However, where counsel has neglected to conduct a proper investigation into mitigating circumstances, the failure to introduce mitigating evidence cannot be attributed to strategy.’ Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d at 535; see also Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1514 (11th Cir. 1995) (a ‘strategic’ decision cannot be reasonable when counsel has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them). In such cases, counsel’s performance falls below objective standards of reasonableness. [Citation.]” In the instant case, defendant had served more than five years in custody for these charges prior to the resentencing hearing, and because his behavior during this period was exemplary, defense counsel had a unique opportunity to present the jury with this mitigation evidence in an attempt to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Nevertheless, counsel made no attempt to investigate or present evidence of defendant’s good conduct from disinterested sources readily available to them. Therefore, applying the above-stated precedent to the record herein, I would find the determination of the circuit court, that defense counsel had no duty to present the mitigating testimony of the five correctional officials, to be manifestly erroneous. See People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 194 (1992) (defendant satisfied first prong of Strickland by showing counsel’s failure to investigate and present to sentencer defendant’s mental history and his failure to investigate defendant’s background with the information he possessed). In presenting its findings and announcing its ruling, the circuit court agreed with defendant that the correctional officials were readily available as mitigation witnesses, had counsel investigated to locate them. However, the court held that Bjekich had no duty to produce these witnesses because he had made a reasonable choice to rely on defendant’s testimony instead. I believe that the record conclusively establishes that, contrary to Bjekich’s testimony, the defense plan was to have defendant testify only if the motion in limine were granted. The majority refuses to disturb the circuit court’s credibility determination on this matter. But regardless of whether the record refutes Bjekich’s claim that he believed that defendant would testify at his resentencing hearing, Bjekich had no excuse for failing to investigate and present other independent evidence about defendant’s good prison record. Bjekich testified at the post-conviction hearing that one of the defense goals at resentencing was to show the jury that defendant had a good prison record, and Bjekich recognized the importance of this evidence, stating that at least one juror might be inclined to vote against the death penalty if it were shown that defendant could serve a prison sentence without hurting other people. While acknowledging that it would have been helpful to have correctional officials testify in defendant’s behalf and despite possessing a copy of defendant’s Department of Corrections records which could have led him to officials willing to corroborate the mitigating information the records contained, Bjekich admitted he did nothing. Nor did Bjekich even attempt to introduce the Department of Corrections records to establish defendant’s good behavior. Rather, Bjekich stated that his plan at resentencing was to rely on defendant’s testimony about his conduct while in prison to “humanize” him and show he had not been a “troublemaker.” However, Bjekich acknowledged that defendant’s credibility would be severely impeached because he planned to contradict his previous testimony regarding his participation in the murders. Additionally, as noted by the United States Supreme Court in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1673 (1986), the testimony of a defendant or his family members about his good conduct in jail is “the sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving.” Conversely, “[t]he testimony of more disinterested witnesses — and, in particular, of jailers who would have had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their charges — would quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury.” Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 9, 106 S. Ct. at 1673. In my opinion, defense counsel’s decision to forgo an investigation and rely solely on defendant’s testimony was objectively unreasonable, as it was “neither the product of an informed judgment nor a strategic decision reached after weighing all available options.” People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 136 (1997). Therefore, I would find that defendant satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test. See Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, which a thorough investigation of defendant’s background would have revealed, could not be deemed a strategic decision and was representation which fell below objective standards of reasonableness). Further, I believe the circuit court correctly found that the second prong of the Strickland test was met, i.e., that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced the defense as to deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. “Mitigating evidence is extremely important under the Illinois capital sentencing scheme. Once an aggravating factor is found sufficient to impose the death penalty, there must be mitigating evidence sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty.” Perez, 148 Ill. 2d at 194. Here, strong mitigating evidence existed which defense counsel failed to investigate and introduce. The resulting prejudice to defendant is clear. As the majority notes, in Skipper, the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court’s ruling that correctional officials’ testimony as to a defendant’s good conduct was irrelevant and inadmissible, holding that a defendant’s disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination in a capital case. The Court found that the defendant was therefore deprived of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment, stating: “[T]he jury could have drawn favorable inferences from this testimony regarding [the defendant’s] character and his probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison. *** [T]here is no question but that such inferences would be ‘mitigating’ in the sense that they might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ [Citation.]” Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 6-7, 106 S. Ct. at 1671. The Court concluded that “under any standard, the exclusion of the evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error.” Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 9, 106 S. Ct. at 1673. While we are dealing herein with counsel’s ineffectiveness rather than a trial court’s erroneous ruling as the reason for the absence of the mitigation evidence, I believe the Skipper Court’s holding that the error is prejudicial “under any standard” of review demonstrates that counsel’s failure to present this evidence meets the prejudice prong of Strickland. See also Kubat v. Thieret, 867 E2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1989) (failure to introduce character witnesses constituted ineffective assistance at capital sentencing hearing, particularly where at least one of the 15 available character witnesses was a deputy sheriff). This failure raises a serious doubt as to the reliability of defendant’s resentencing. See Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d at 387-88; Perez, 148 Ill. 2d at 194-95. Here, as in Kubat, 867 F. 2d at 369 “[t]he introduction of testimony by a law enforcement officer that the defendant had a salvageable character might not have gone totally unnoticed by the jury.” Thus, I concur with the following findings made by the circuit court at defendant’s evidentiary hearing: “The essence of the [post-conviction] allegation is that the defense had an almost unique opportunity to bring a number of disinterested witnesses to testify that [defendant’s] conduct in the penitentiary, the Department of Corrections, was without violence, without threats, and that he would be able to function in that kind of a structured society without the necessity for society killing him. * * * The affidavits submitted by [defendant], in fact, showed that those people were out there and they were available, and the testimony of those people, who aren’t related to him, usually has a lot more impact with a jury than the testimony of relatives. There is a significant basis to believe in this case that had that testimony been in this record, one juror might have been convinced that while [defendant] may have deserved to die for what he did, he didn’t need to die.” Stated another way, there is a reasonable probability that had the jury known of the evidence defense counsel failed to investigate and present, the jury “would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. I therefore conclude that defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at his capital resentencing hearing and I would accordingly reverse the judgment of the circuit court denying post-conviction relief. Defendant’s death sentence should be vacated and this cause remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. Because Illinois’ death penalty law is unconstitutional (People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998) (Harrison, J., dissenting)), the circuit court should be directed to impose a sentence other than death.