Court Opinion

ID: 9575452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:13:55.886686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:12.603722
License: Public Domain

Judge Timmons-Goodson
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I disagree with the holding of the majority that the trial court was correct in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the contested charge of trafficking cocaine by transportation. Considering all of the circumstances surrounding the movement of the cocaine, I believe that, as a matter of law, the evidence of defendant’s actions was insufficient to sustain the charge of trafficking in cocaine by transportation in violation of section 90-95(h)(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3) (1999).
In State v. Greenidge, 102 N.C. App. 447, 451-52, 402 S.E.2d 639, 641-42 (1991), this Court found that moving drugs from a dwelling to a point beyond its curtilage was sufficient to sustain a conviction for trafficking cocaine by transportation. While the majority quotes Greenidge, the facts are distinguishable from the facts sub judice. In Greenidge, an officer knocked on the door of a residence. The officer observed a man looking out the window and heard the man shout “it’s the police.” Id. at 448, 402 S.E.2d at 640. After the officer heard movement inside the house, he knocked a second time, and within minutes someone opened the door. Another officer, positioned near the rear entry of the residence, observed the defendant step onto a back porch, close a bag containing cocaine, and toss the bag into the yard next door. The officer yelled at the defendant, and the defendant retreated into the residence. Thus, the contraband had been moved from the area of the house to the area of a yard of a nearby residence.
The Greenidge court noted the defendant’s concern that finding sufficient evidence based upon these facts
*470could result in a charge of trafficking [by transportation] where a suspect merely throws drugs onto the ground when approached by the police, or where a suspect moves drugs from room to room in a house, or from one drawer to another drawer, or from inside the house to the porch.
Id. at 450, 402 S.E.2d at 641. The Court disagreed, stating that a determination on whether there was “ ‘substantial movement’. . . requires a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the movement and not simply the fact of a physical movement of the contraband from one spot to another.” Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
[I]n addressing the question of whether the movement is a “substantial movement” so as to constitute transportation requires, among other things, considerations as to the purpose of the movement and the characteristics of the areas from which and to which the contraband is moved.
Id. (emphasis added).
The relevant evidence in the case at bar indicates that the SBI agent involved, Tre Harrington, performed a prearranged drug sale set up by law enforcement. Several armed law enforcement officers wearing camouflage clothing were positioned in the wooded area immediately surrounding the controlled buy. Officers observed defendant retrieve a metal box from behind a tree. Harrington drove up to the location, got out of his vehicle, and approached defendant. Defendant took a plastic bag containing cocaine from the metal box. After defendant handed Harrington the plastic bag, Harrington gave defendant a paper bag containing the agreed purchase price, and defendant placed the money in the metal box. Harrington testified that at the time of the buy, he could see a camouflaged figure only fifteen to twenty feet away. Also, one officer testified that he was located twenty to twenty-five feet from the buy and was close enough to hear the conversation between defendant and Harrington.
As Harrington drove away, officers approached defendant, shouting “police, police. Don’t move. Put your hands up.” At least one officer had his weapon pointed at defendant. Officers were close enough to defendant for him to hear and respond to their commands. Defendant momentarily hesitated, looked directly at one of the officers, and attempted to flee. The group of officers ran approximately fifteen to twenty yards from their original location, at which time one of the officers tackled defendant. Officers subsequently found a tom *471bag of cocaine underneath defendant and cocaine powder scattered on the ground around defendant.
As a matter of law, the very specific factual scenario presented by this case did not constitute trafficking in cocaine by transportation. As noted above, in determining whether there has been “substantial movement,” the Greenidge court directs us to examine “the characteristics of the areas from which and to which the contraband is moved.” Id. at 451, 402 S.E.2d at 641. In utilizing the term “areas,” the Greenidge court contemplated that substantial movement includes movement of contraband from one distinct area to another, not movement within the same area.
A review of the evidence in the case at bar reveals that defendant did not “move” the cocaine from one area to another. Rather, defendant progressed from one location within an area to another location within the same isolated, wooded area that was under the complete and exclusive control of law enforcement. I am convinced that the General Assembly did not intend a person be convicted for trafficking in cocaine by transportation based on those facts. I am further convinced that the evidence presented does not support the trafficking by transportation conviction, considering that defendant’s movement was clearly in reaction to the officers’ presence, and its purpose was to evade the officers’ pursuit and to avoid criminal consequences.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trafficking by transportation conviction and find no error in the remaining convictions.