Court Opinion

ID: 9523022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:35:10.182479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:28.379581
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff states in her petition for rehearing that this court misunderstood “the nature of the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict” in that, contrary to our view that the motion was for a directed verdict only as to liability, she states that it “was also for a directed verdict (‘ruling’) on various issues including the defendant’s relationship with DECA.” While there may have been a hearing on her motion for a directed verdict, the record is silent as to what occurred. In fact, the only reference to such a motion appears in the following colloquy: “MR. LESZAK [plaintiff’s counsel]: Your Honor, with regard to the plaintiff’s Motion for a Directed Verdict on the same basis, should I argue that motion? I think the court heard the arguments that were made and the law that I have given you in regard to the employment relationship, the partnership or joint relationship between the hospital and the Doctors Emergency Care Association and its employees. THE COURT: The motion will be denied.” Neither the agreements mentioned nor the law which counsel said was presented are in the record, and it is unclear from the above comments as to what was included in the motion for directed verdict. It is clear, however, that counsel referred to “a motion” rather than a number of motions and that the court also considered it as “a motion” in its ruling. Furthermore, plaintiff’s notice of appeal is from “the order denying the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict during the course of the trial.” It is indicated that the notice of appeal could only refer to the ruling in the colloquy set forth above denying plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict. It thus appears that the trial court considered the motion to direct as applying to liability only and denied it because there was a factual issue as to malpractice, and we took the same view as to the motion. Plaintiff, nevertheless, maintains the motion sought a directed verdict as to each of the issues stated in it and that the denial of the motion in effect was a refusal to direct all of them, and she argues the denial as to the agency issue was improper. In this regard, however, we note nothing in the record indicating that plaintiff requested a specific direction as to agency or as to any other of those issues, and no order was entered denying a motion to direct as to any of them. In view thereof, we adhere to the conclusion in our opinion that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict. Even if we were to accept plaintiff’s position that the court’s order included the denial of a directed verdict as to agency, we believe it was proper. It is well established that a verdict ought to be directed only where the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504), and that a principal is liable for the acts of an agent but not for the acts of an independent contractor (Yuhas v. Allis-Chalmers Distribution Service Corp. (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 814, 299 N.E.2d 166). Unless the relationship is so clear as to be undisputed, the issue of whether one is an agent or independent contractor is a question of fact (Blake v. Dickinson (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 379, 332 N.E.2d 575), and the right to control the manner in which the work is to be performed is the predominant factor in determining whether a principal-agency relationship exists (Allstate Insurance Co. v. National Tea Co. (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 449, 323 N.E.2d 521), the resolution of which depends upon the particular circumstances of each case (Yuhas v. Allis-Chalmers Distribution Corp.). On the question of agency here, the record discloses that prior to March 1, 1972, defendant managed the emergency department of its hospital but it had entered into an agreement whereby DECA undertook the management on that date. Defendant continued to provide, as it had before March 1, 1972, all emergency room facilities, operations, nurses, aides and orderlies, as well as the forms and papers used by the department. When decedent was first brought to the hospital emergency room by plaintiff on May 24, 1972, she came under the care of DECA physicians and continued under their care on her subsequent visits, but plaintiff was not informed at any time that DECA rather than the hospital managed and operated the emergency room. All the billings for the care of decedent were prepared and sent to plaintiff by defendant, and a form initially signed by plaintiff gave consent to the hospital for such treatment of decedent as was believed necessary in the judgment of the attending or emergency room physicians. The name of DECA did not appear on any of the bills or consent forms. It appears that, under its agreement with defendant, DECA was to provide continuous and uninterrupted medical services in the emergency department, to employ physicians to perform those services, to be responsible for the professional supervision, direction and operation of the department, and to assume responsibility for the nature and quality of the medical services rendered patients entering the emergency room. Plaintiff points out, however, that the agreement also provides that DECA physicians “are to be of a superior quality consistent with the requirements of the hospital” and that their responsibility was to be “in accordance with the standards established therefor by the administration of the hospital.” Thus, she argues, “[i]t is clear that DECA was the agent of the Hospital because it was contractually bound to obey the rules promulgated by the Hospital.” In opposition thereto, defendant refers to the testimony of Dr. Greene (president of DECA), that all the physicians in the emergency department were employed by DECA; that they were totally and solely in charge of whatever medication and treatment to be given; and that the hospital could not tell DECA to treat a patient differently. In addition, a member of the hospital staff testified that DECA promulgated its own regulations and procedures for the emergency department and that they preempted the hospital regulations.  Considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that an agency relationship was so clear as to be undisputed (cf. Yuhas v. Allis-Chalmers Distribution Service Corp.), and we conclude that a factual question existed as to agency. The cases cited by plaintiff are not persuasive. In Mduba v. Benedictine Hospital (1976), 52 App. Div. 2d 450, 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, the trial court dismissed an action against a hospital on the basis that a physician operating its emergency room under a contract was an independent contractor. The reviewing court reversed because there was no question that the physician was under control of the hospital. Here, of course, we have found there was a factual question as to control. So also, in Nordland v. Poor Sisters of St. Francis Seraph of Perpetual Devotion (1954), 4 Ill. App. 2d 48, 123 N.E.2d 121, and Komel v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 967, 372 N.E.2d 842, the pertinent facts as to control were so clear as to be undisputed, which is not the case here. We see no merit in plaintiff’s further contention that, under the facts presented, a verdict should have been directed as to agency on the basis of estoppel. As stated in Atwater v. Atwater (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 202, 210, 309 N.E.2d 632, 639: “ ‘Equitable estoppel may be defined as the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he (or she) is absolutely precluded from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as against another person who has, in good faith, relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquired some corresponding rights.’ Slavis v. Slavis, 12 Ill. App. 3d 467, 473, 299 N.E.2d 413, 417.” (Emphasis added.) See also Dill v. Widman (1952), 413 Ill. 448, 109 N.E.2d 765; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. D. F. Bast, Inc. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 960, 372 N.E.2d 829; 18 Ill. L. & Prac. Estoppel §22 (1956). Estoppel must be proved by clear and unequivocal evidence (Slavis v. Slavis) and, before the doctrine may be applied, there must have been reliance in good faith upon the conduct of another which leads a person to change his or her position for the worse (Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. D. F. Bast, Inc.; Atwater v. Atwater). As stated in 18 Ill. L. & Prac. Estoppel §23 (1956): “Since the doctrine of estoppel is invoked to prevent injustice or a fraudulent result, there can be no estoppel where * * * the person claiming equitable estoppel has not been induced to alter his position in such a way that he will be injured if the other person is not held to the representation. It is not necessary, however, that actual malice motivate the representations or conduct which have been acted on to work an estoppel, so long as there is a change in position by the adverse party to his detriment.” In the instant case, although plaintiff did not specifically testify to any reliance on the conduct of defendant, we believe, as plaintiff argues, that the facts lead readily to the assumption of such reliance. She does not, however, point to any change of position induced by reason of any conduct or silence of defendant. She brought decedent to the hospital for medical care which she received, albeit allegedly improper. She does not contend, and it does not appear, that she would have taken any other action had she been informed that the emergency room doctors were not employees of the hospital, and we find nothing in the record from which a conclusion could be made. We find that the record discloses no change of position by plaintiff for the worse and, accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable. For the reasons stated, the petition for rehearing is denied. MEJDA and WILSON, JJ., concur.