Court Opinion

ID: 9807085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:46:48.482319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:22:11.842029
License: Public Domain

GURICH, J.,
with whom EDMONDSON, J., joins dissenting:
T1 I must respectfully dissent from this Court's decision to summarily dismiss the above-captioned appeal filed by Appellant, Sue Aun Hamm. The majority has chosen to dismiss the Wife's Petition in Error while leaving intact Appellee Harold Hamm's Counter Petition in Error. The majority reasons that Wife's acceptance of payment from Husband pursuant to the underlying divorce judgment resulted in a waiver of her *128right to proceed with appellate review. Resolution of this issue in the pre-decisional stage of appellate proceedings is inequitable and contrary to current notions of domestic relations law. Rigid application of the acceptance of benefits rule is no longer consistent with fundamental jurisprudence in marital dissolution appeals. Vesting one party with total control of all marital property throughout trial and appellate proceedings to the detriment of the other spouse is unjustifiable. Under the majority's logic, there is no problem with Husband enjoying his share of the marital estate; however, the majority concludes Wife cannot maintain control of 'the marital property she was awarded-such a result is unacceptable. At a minimum, I would consider the motion simultaneously with the merits of the case, after this Court , has received the entire record and after briefing has been completed.1
Divorce Cases Are Distinguishable From Ordinary Civil Judgments
T 2 The majority suggests that Wife "could have refused to accept the' judgment ... thereby maintaining her right to appeal.2 In other words, Wife's only option was to reject the tendered check and to allow Husband absolute and unfettered control over their marital property during the pendency of what would be a lengthy appeal As Wife points out in her response to the motion to dismiss, acceptance of the check was done solely to protect her rights in the marital estate and was not intended to relinquish her right to appeal. We have held that the waiver rule will not stand to defeat an appeal by one attempting to protect his or her property and rights thereto. Robert L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 1991 OK 95, ¶ 7, 818 P.2d 475, 478 (noting that "acts done in defense of or to protect one's rights may not constitute a waiver of a party's right to appeal under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine.... [A] party must intend to relinquish a known right, either expressly or by such conduct as warrants an inference of such a relinquishment").
T3 Bright line application of the acceptance of benefits rule to divorcee judgments is fundamentally flawed. Unlike an award pursuant to a contractual obligation or judgment incidental to a personal injury, a divorce decree divides joint assets-assets in which Wife had an existing ownership prior to the judgment.3 Allowing one party to maintain absolute control of all marital assets during the pendency of an appeal, to the detriment of the other spouse, is a draconian approach to divorcee law comparable to the manner cases were 'resolved in centuries past.
T4 Domestic relations cases are unique. Unlike most other civil judgments, the dissolution of a marriage is generally effective when pronounced. See 12 O0.S8.2011 § 696.2(E). Moreover, the stay and superse-deas provisions of 12 0.S8.2011 § 990.4 are inapplicable to matrimonial appeals. Section 990.4(C) affords the trial and appellate courts with concurrent jurisdiction during the pen-deney of an appeal to enter such orders as are necessary to preserve the marital estate:
Subsections A and B of this section shall not apply in actions involving temporary or permanent injunctions, actions for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, paternity, custody, adoption, or termination of parental rights, or in juvenile matters, postdecree matrimonial proceedings or ha-*129beas corpus proceedings. The trial or appellate court, in its discretion, may stay the enforcement of any provision in a judgment, decree or final order in any of the types of actions or proceedings listed in this subsection during the pen-dency of the appeal or while any posttrial motion is pending upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the parties. If a temporary or permanent injunction is denied or dissolved, the trial or appellate court, in its discretion, may restore or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal and while any post-trial motions are pending upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the parties.
12 0.§$.2011 § 990.4(C) (emphasis added). The purpose behind the highlighted text is to afford trial and appellate courts with the ability to fashion specialized orders as needed to protect marital assets during an appeal, taking into consideration the particular facts and cireumstances in each case.
T5 Other jurisdictions have expressly abrogated the acceptance of benefits rule in marital dissolution appeals. The State of Florida has adopted a rule which eliminates the principle of waiver in matrimonial appeals. Specifically, Rule 9.600 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure reads in relevant part:
(c) Family Law Matters. matters: In family law
(2) The receipt, payment, or transfer of funds or property under an order in a family law matter shall not prejudice the rights of appeal of any party. The lower tribunal shall have the jurisdiction to impose, modify, or dissolve conditions upon the receipt or payment of such awards in order to protect the interests of the parties during the appeal. (emphasis added).
See also, Grant v. Wester, 679 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (recognizing that the acceptance of benefits doctrine has been abolished in Florida dissolution of marriage actions). Similarly, Rule 2.5, Rules of Appellate Procedure for the State of Washington provide in part:
(b) Acceptance of Benefits. (1) Generally. A party may accept the benefits of a trial court decision without losing the right to obtain review of that decision only ... (iv) if the decision is one which divides property in connection with a dissolution of marriage, a legal separation, a declaration of invalidity of marriage, or the dissolution of a meretricious relationship. (emphasis added).
See also Scheetz v. Scheetz, 509 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (superseded by rule on other grounds) ("Likewise, [Wife's] acceptance of the family residence, a lake house, and eash distribution for the property division do not estop her from attacking the judgment.... [Wife], however, is not prevented from appealing a judgment merely because she has accepted some benefits of the judgment. If she loses, she is required to restore any benefits accepted, together with interest and/or damages.").
{6 With the authority bestowed by 12 0.S.2011 § 990.4(C), a more suitable approach would be for this Court to enter an order restricting both parties from wasting marital property and directing the trial court to implement security measures to ensure the efficacy of such a ruling. Such a result would be far more appropriate and equitable than outright dismissal. Instead, the majority has chosen to take a hardline and rigid approach in hastily dismissing Wife's appeal. It is inequitable to dismiss Wife's appeal while allowing Husband's appeal to go forward. No doubt Husband is enjoying the fruits of the trial court's judgment as much or more so than Wife. Forcing parties to leave property commingled and titled jointly during an appeal could also create discord if one party should die during the pendency of an appeal.
Wife Did Not Intentionally Relinguish Her Right of Appeal
T7 To reach the result today, the majority has applied the archaic "acceptance of benefits rule." Under this aged doctrine, one who voluntarily accepts payment of a judgment waives his or her right to appeal. See Yates v. Yates, 1916 OK 772, ¶ 2, 60 Okla. 217, 159 P. 1107. Rooted in principles of waiver and estoppel, the acceptance of bene*130fits rule requires an intent to relinquish the right to appeal, and has been rejected by this Court when a party is merely seeking to protect his or her interests. Im re Reid's Estate, 1956 OK 64, ¶¶ 13-14, 294 P.2d 544, 547-548.4 Wife attempted to prevent application of the waiver rule by presenting her concerns to the trial court in a hearing on January 6, 2015. As explained in her response to the motion to dismiss, there was never any intent to abandon her right to appeal.5 During the January hearing, the "trial judge gave Wife the option of cashing the property division check; however, the only caveat was that she would have to place it in a joint account with Husband.6 Curiously, the same requirement was not imposed by the trial judge on Husband's share of the marital estate.
18 When delivering the check to Wife, Husband specifically reserved his right of appellate review, even referencing the Grand River Dam Auth. v. Eaton, 1990 OK 133, ¶ 14, 803 P.2d 705, 709 decision in his Notice of Respondent's Tender of Property Division Alimony.7 It is disconcerting that a judgment debtor has the ability to pay his ereditor in accordance with a judgment and preserve his right of appeal; yet the converse is not acceptable to this Court. In fact, Husband specifically made the property division payment in toto for his own benefit-to stop the accumulation of interest. To allow Husband's appeal to proceed while dismissing Wife's appeal under these circumstances is arbitrary and an unequal application of the law.
Conclusion
T9 Because the property at issue is marital, it is unreasonable to condone one party's ability to control all joint assets throughout the appellate process. I believe justice demands both appeals be heard on their merits. Additionally, I would utilize the authority in 12 0.8.2011 § 990.4(C), and issue an order directing the trial court to place appropriate restrictions on the parties' marital property during the pendency of this case.

. Our decision in this matter is based solely on the motion to dismiss and the response in opposition. We have not received the original trial record, which under Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules is not yet due to be completed. Oka. ~ Sup.Ct. R. 1.28 and 1.34. Initially filed in May 2012, the parties' divorce litigation was pending in the trial court for more than two and a half years. The trial itself lasted approximately two months.

. As noted, Husband has been in total control of the parties' joint assets since the filing of the divorce case in May 2012. Given the sheer magnitude of this case, an appeal could realistically take two more years to complete. Although Wife could have asked for alimony pendente lite during the pendency of the appeal, she should not be required to concede full control over the marital estate to Husband.

. As we have recognized in prior decisions, complete severance of marital property interests is necessary to avoid potential conflicts and is an essential objective in divorce proceedings. Champion v. Champion, 1950 OK 81, ¶ 10, 203 Okla. 105, 218 P.2d 354, 356.

. Rejecting the waiver doctrine to dismiss an appeal, this Court in Reid's Estate, 1% 13-14, explained:
We therefore conclude that, in order to effect a waiver or estoppel, there must be some intent to enjoy a benefit from, or base some interest on, the judgment appealed from ... On the contrary, he excepted to the judgment and order of the county court and gave notice of appeal. We cannot feel that such protective measures constitute waiver.
Our research has failed to disclose where we have ever passed on the identical question here involved. Other jurisdictions have held that, a waiver is not implied from acts done or measures taken by appellant in defense of and to protect his rights or interests.

. "I will not dismiss my appeal and do not feel that my right to appeal should be denied because I have accepted, in the interim, a small portion of the estate that we built over more than two decades. I want to allow the Oklahoma Supreme Court to speak to the issue of acceptance of benefits, and to the important issues raised by the trial court's judgment-including the inequity of that ruling. It is my hope that the Court will determine that the acceptance of benefits rule has no place in matters of this nature, because to hold otherwise would allow, in every case, the spouse who has "control" over marital property to utilize it to the exclusion of the other spouse, potentially for years. In my case, including the time when this case was pending, that could amount to as much as 7 years." Husband's Supplement to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Exhibit A-1 (emphasis added). "

. Husband's Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A-2.

. Along with the check, Husband provided a self serving notice which read:
Respondent, Harold Hamm, subject to his express reservation of his right to appeal and with intent to compromise or settle, hereby submits his Notice to the Court of his tender to the Petitioner of the full amount of alimony in lieu of property division and interest due under the terms of this Court's Decree of Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage.
Footnoted in the Notice was a citation to Grand River Dam Authority v. Eaton, 1990 OK 133, ¶ 14, 803 P.2d 705, 709. The cited paragraph reads in part:
We therefore hold that unless the payment of a final judgment by a judgment debtor is shown to be made with the intent to compromise or settle the matter and, thus, to abandon the right to appeal or the payment in some way, not involved here, makes relief impossible in case of reversal, the payment will not be deemed to either waive the right to appeal or moot the controversy. (footnote omitted).