Court Opinion

ID: 9377384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 18:08:14.181369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.776215
License: Public Domain

J-S40043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellee              :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
 NIGEL DEDIEECE CARTER                   :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :        No. 2164 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000411-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 7, 2023

     Appellant, Nigel Dedieece Carter, appeals pro se from the order entered

in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, denying as untimely his serial

petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

     The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

January 30, 2012, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to two counts of

possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.    The court

sentenced Appellant that day to an aggregate term of 6½ to 14 years’

imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

     On March 29, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The court

appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on May 31, 2016. On

July 13, 2016, the court issued notice per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to
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dismiss the petition without a hearing. The court formally denied PCRA relief

on September 9, 2016.

      On June 17, 2021 and July 12, 2021, Appellant filed pro se petitions for

writ of habeas corpus, which the court treated together as a serial PCRA

petition. The court issued Rule 907 notice on July 21, 2021. Appellant filed a

pro se response on July 29, 2021. On September 3, 2021, the court denied

PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on September 20, 2021,

per the prisoner mailbox rule.

      Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

         Were the mandatories used to pressure Appellant into
         accepting an unknowing guilty plea sentence that exceeds
         the lawful maximum?

         Was 18-24 months plus or minus nine months for each
         count of [PWID] the applicable sentencing guidelines if the
         mandatories were not invoked?

         Was [plea counsel’s] assistance … effective or ineffective
         when she allowed Appellant to sign the guilty plea colloquy
         and failed to act [to] withdraw [the plea] or file an appeal?

         Was [PCRA counsel’s] assistance … effective or ineffective
         when she abandoned the 1st PCRA and failed to appeal from
         its dismissal?

(Appellant’s Brief at 9).

      Preliminarily, any petition for post-conviction collateral relief will

generally be considered a PCRA petition, even if styled as a request for habeas

corpus relief, if the petition raises issues for which the relief sought is available

under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d

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638 (1998); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA shall be sole means of

obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and

statutory remedies for same purpose).

      As well, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016).                 A PCRA

petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one

year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final.           42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final “at the conclusion of

direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of

time for seeking the review.”     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).      The statutory

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow very limited circumstances to excuse

the late filing of a petition; a petitioner must also assert the exception within

the time allowed under the statute. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) and (b)(2).

      Instantly, Appellant’s petitions for writ of habeas corpus attacked the

legality of his sentence, the validity of his guilty plea, and asserted the

ineffective assistance of counsel. As these claims are cognizable under the

PCRA, the court properly treated the petitions under the confines of the PCRA.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii), (iii), (vii); Peterkin, supra. Appellant’s

judgment of sentence became final on February 29, 2012, which was 30 days

after the court sentenced Appellant and the date by which Appellant had to

file his direct appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (allowing 30 days to file notice of

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appeal); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant did not file his pro se petitions

for writ of habeas corpus until June 17, 2021 and July 12, 2021, well beyond

the one-year time limit.

       Significantly, Appellant fails to develop an argument concerning any

exception to the PCRA time-bar on appeal.1         Under these circumstances,

____________________________________________

1  The only reference to the PCRA time-bar in Appellant’s brief is in the scope
and standard of review section, where Appellant states: “Counsel’s
abandonment for timeliness exception,” followed by a few case citations with
no explanation of the propositions of law contained therein. (See Appellant’s
Brief at 7). We will not develop Appellant’s argument for him on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 631 Pa. 1, 46, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (2014),
cert. denied, 576 U.S. 1009, 135 S.Ct. 2817, 192 L.Ed.2d 857 (2015)
(explaining that while Pennsylvania appellate courts historically have liberally
construed materials filed by pro se litigants, pro se status does not entitle
litigant to any special benefit, and court cannot be expected to become
litigant’s counsel or find more in written pro se submission than is fairly
conveyed therein).

We observe that in his response to Rule 907 notice, Appellant baldly alleged
that he satisfied all three of the PCRA time-bar exceptions. (See Response to
Rule 907 notice, filed 7/29/21, at 2). In that filing, Appellant suggested that
his prior PCRA counsel’s failure to file an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief
concerning his first PCRA petition satisfied the “governmental interference”
exception to the time-bar. (See id. at 3). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1)(i) (regarding governmental interference time-bar exception). To
the extent we can consider Appellant’s assertion of a time-bar exception raised
in his response to Rule 907 notice (even where undeveloped on appeal),
Appellant still cannot overcome the jurisdictional hurdle. Notably, the PCRA
court denied relief on Appellant’s first PCRA petition on September 9, 2016.
Appellant did not file the current petitions until 2021. Appellant does not
indicate when he became aware of prior counsel’s failure to appeal the denial
of PCRA relief. Therefore, Appellant has not complied with Section 9545(b)(2)
(stating that any petition invoking timeliness exception shall be filed within
one year of date claim could have been presented, for claims arising on
December 24, 2017 or thereafter).            See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Moreover, for purposes of the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions, “governmental
officials” do not include defense counsel. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(4).

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Appellant’s current prayer for relief remains time-barred and the PCRA court

properly denied relief.2 Accordingly, we affirm.

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/7/2023

____________________________________________

2 Appellant has filed two applications for relief in this Court, claiming that he
is currently imprisoned for a parole violation at the underlying docket, based
on new charges at docket No. CP-15-CR-1929-2021. According to Appellant,
he posted bail regarding the new charges and is being detained solely based
on the parole violation while the new charges are still pending. Appellant
claims he sought relief in the trial court, the trial court denied relief, and he
has an appeal pending at docket No. 1913 EDA 2022. Although Appellant asks
us to remove the parole detainer or set reasonable bail, the avenue for seeking
relief is not at the current appellate docket related to the denial of his untimely
PCRA petition. Appellant may pursue further relief in this Court at docket No.
1913 EDA 2022.

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