Court Opinion

ID: 9375510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 23:00:11.294561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.364596
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SHAUN TAYLOR,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          CH-844E-19-0004-I-1

                  v.

     OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: February 27, 2023
       MANAGEMENT,
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Leah Bachmeyer Kille, Esquire, Lexington, Kentucky, for the appellant.

           Linnette L. Scott, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed the reconsideration decision by the Office of Personnel Management
     (OPM) denying the appellant’s application for a Federal Employees’ Retirement
     System (FERS) disability retirement annuity. For the reasons discussed below,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the initial decision and
     OPM’s reconsideration decision, and ORDER OPM to award a disability
     retirement annuity to the appellant.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant began working with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) in 2011
     and was converted to a career position covered by FERS in 2014. Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 7 at 79, 91.     He was promoted to a Manager of Distribution
     Operations (MDO) position in June 2016. Id. at 79-80. His duties as an MDO
     involved managing a small- to medium-sized group of employees, meeting with
     customers and major mailers, managing on-the-job training, resolving union
     disagreements, and monitoring operational performance. Id. at 72.
¶3        In June 2012, the appellant was diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and
     attention deficit disorder (ADD). IAF, Tab 17 at 7. In 2014, he submitted a
     medical certification of his own serious health condition under the Family and
     Medical Leave Act, completed by his treating psychiatrist.       Id. at 8-12.   The
     psychiatrist stated that the appellant would need to be absent from work during
     monthly “episodic flare-ups” for 1-2 days per episode, noting that the appellant
     “can be non-functional due to anxiety or depression.” Id. at 10. However, at that
     time in 2014, his doctor checked “no” when asked whether the appellant was
     unable to perform any of his job functions due to the condition. Id. at 9.
¶4        According to the psychiatrist, the appellant “got worse” in March 2017,
     and, in addition to maintaining his diagnoses of anxiety, depression, and ADD,
     the doctor diagnosed the appellant with “probable Borderline Personality
     Disorder.”   Id. at 17, 19.   Also in March 2017, the appellant requested to be
     reassigned from his management position “back into craft as a Clerk or a Mail
     Handler.” Id. at 14. The USPS denied this request, citing current excessing of
     the Clerks and Mail Handlers. IAF, Tab 7 at 60.
                                                                                        3

¶5           The appellant applied for a FERS disability retirement annuity in August
     2017.      IAF, Tab 7 at 80-83.   In March 2018, OPM issued an initial decision
     denying his application, finding that he was not disabled within the meaning of
     retirement law. Id. at 47-51. He requested reconsideration of this decision and
     included various medical documents and statements from his psychiatrist.          Id.
     at 16-41. In May 2018, the appellant resigned from his position with the USPS,
     citing his “worsening medical conditions” and inability to render useful and
     efficient service. IAF, Tab 17 at 15. Beginning in October 2017, and continuing
     after his resignation, the appellant was self-employed as a part-time barber. Id.
     at 26, 29.     On September 6, 2018, OPM issued a reconsideration decision
     affirming its initial decision. IAF, Tab 7 at 6-9. In reaching its decision, OPM
     found that the medical evidence provided failed to indicate any medical
     restrictions on the appellant’s work that would render him unable to provide
     useful and efficient service.     Id. at 7-8.   It further found that the appellant’s
     medical evidence failed to demonstrate that his conditions worsened while he was
     serving under FERS. Id. at 8.
¶6           The appellant appealed OPM’s reconsideration decision to the Board.
     IAF, Tab 1. After a telephonic hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision affirming OPM’s reconsideration decision denying the appellant’s
     application for a FERS disability retirement annuity.          IAF, Tab 21, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 1. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to
     demonstrate how his specific symptoms rendered him unable to perform the
     essential functions of his job. ID at 7-9. He also concluded that the appellant
     failed to show by preponderant evidence that his medical conditions were
     incompatible with useful and efficient service or retention in his position.
     ID at 7.
                                                                                              4

¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1 at 4-12. He attaches pictures of various medications he asserts he is
     taking. 2 Id. at 11-12, 14-19. The agency has responded. PFR File, Tab 3.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶8         In an appeal from an OPM decision denying a voluntary disability
     retirement application, the appellant bears the burden of proving entitlement to
     benefits by preponderant evidence. 3 Chavez v. Office of Personnel Management,
     111 M.S.P.R. 69, ¶ 6 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii). To be eligible for a
     disability retirement annuity under FERS, an employee must show that: (1) he
     completed at least 18 months of creditable civilian service; (2) while employed in
     a position subject to FERS, he became disabled because of a medical condition,
     resulting in a deficiency in performance, conduct, or attendance, or if there is no
     such deficiency, the disabling medical condition is incompa tible with either
     useful and efficient service or retention in the position; (3) the disabling medical
     condition is expected to continue for at least 1 year from the date that the
     application for disability retirement benefits was filed; (4) accommodation of the
     disabling medical condition in the position held must be unreasonable; and (5) the
     employee did not decline a reasonable offer of reassignment to a vacant position.
     Chavez, 111 M.S.P.R. 69, ¶ 6.
¶9         The record shows, and it is undisputed, that the appellant had completed
     more than 18 months of civilian service creditable under FERS at the time he

     2
       The appellant submits this evidence for the first time on review. The Board will not
     consider evidence submitted for the first time on review absent a showing that it is
     material, i.e., it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the
     initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). The
     pictures themselves do not support a basis for review because they do not demonstrate
     any error on the part of the administrative judge. However, as set forth below, we
     reverse the initial decision on other grounds.
     3
       Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
     fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                         5

      filed his application, his medical condition continued for at least 1 year from the
      date of his application, and he did not decline an offer of reassignment to a vacant
      position. IAF, Tab 7 at 25, 74, 79, 91. Thus, the appellant’s entitlement to a
      disability retirement annuity depends on whether he had a disabling medical
      condition and whether accommodation of the disabling medical condition was
      unreasonable.

      The administrative judge incorrectly determined that the appellant failed to
      establish that his medical condition was disabling.
¶10         On review, the appellant argues that the medical documentation and
      testimony sufficiently demonstrates that his unsatisfactory conduct was the result
      of his medical conditions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. He also argues that he proved
      that his medical conditions are incompatible with useful and efficient service or
      retention in the position.   Id. at 6-9.   The administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to demonstrate how his specific symptoms rendered him disabled
      under either of these alternative theories. ID at 7-9. We disagree. Because we
      find that the appellant proved, as discussed below, that his medical conditions
      were incompatible with useful and efficient service, we find it unnecessary to
      make a finding as to whether he connected those conditions with his poor
      conduct. See Thieman v. Office of Personnel Management, 78 M.S.P.R. 113, 116
      (1998) (explaining that, after an administrative judge found a n appellant did not
      prove that he had a conduct or attendance deficiency related to his medical
      conditions, the administrative judge should have addressed whether the
      appellant’s condition was incompatible under the alternative prong regarding
      disability).
¶11         The second element of establishing entitlement to a disability retirement
      annuity requires demonstrating that the appellant’s disabling medical condition
      either (1) caused a deficiency in performance, attendance, or conduct, or (2) is
      incompatible with useful and efficient service or retention in the position.
      5 U.S.C. § 8451(a)(1)(B); Jackson v. Office of Personnel Management,
                                                                                        6

      118 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 7 (2012). As applicable here, under the second method, an
      individual can establish entitlement by showing that the medical condition is
      inconsistent with working in general, working in a particular line of work, or
      working in a particular type of setting.     Jackson, 118 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 8.      An
      appellant’s own subjective complaints of disability and inability to work must be
      seriously considered, particularly when supported by competent medical
      evidence.    Balmer v. Office of Personnel Management, 99 M.S.P.R. 199, ¶ 10
      (2005). The Board has frequently stated that a physician’s conclusion that an
      employee is disabled is persuasive only if the physician explains how the medi cal
      condition affects the employee’s specific work requirements. Craig v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 92 M.S.P.R. 449, ¶ 10 (2002).
¶12         In Chavez, the Board found that the appellant sufficiently demonstrated that
      her personality disorder and depression precluded her from performing her
      specific work requirements as a window clerk.         Chavez, 111 M.S.P.R. 69,
      ¶¶ 8-11.    There, the appellant’s doctor noted that her conditions specifically
      interfered with her ability to interact appropriately with others at work, adapt to
      stress, and perform tasks requiring sustained concentration or an ability to
      organize.    Id., ¶ 8.   The doctor therein further testified that the appellant’s
      interactions with others and her cognitive functions were negatively affec ted in
      any setting involving stress or pressure. Id. The doctor’s report was generally
      corroborated by the appellant’s written statements and her supervisor’s statement.
      Id., ¶¶ 9-10. As such, the Board held that the appellant produced competent and
      unrefuted medical evidence establishing that her conditions precluded her from
      performing her specific work requirements, including concentration, organization,
      and interaction with others in any stressful environment, which was sufficient to
      show that she was precluded from useful and efficient service or retention in her
      position. Id., ¶ 11.
¶13         The record here includes a job description for the appellant’s position as an
      MDO.       IAF, Tab 7 at 72-73.    Among other duties, the position requires the
                                                                                            7

      incumbent to manage employees and on-the-job training, interact with customers
      to   resolve     problems,   and   meet   with   union   representatives   to   resolve
      disagreements.      Id. at 72.     The administrative judge below found that the
      appellant’s psychiatrist failed to sufficiently explain how the medical conditions
      affected the appellant’s specific work requirements. ID at 8. We disagree.
¶14         The record reflects that the appellant saw his psychiatrist at least 12 times
      between March 2017 and April 2018.          IAF, Tab 7 at 29-40. The psychiatrist
      diagnosed the appellant with depression, anxiety, ADD, and a probable borderline
      personality disorder. IAF, Tab 17 at 17, Tab 20, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD)
      at 44:02 (testimony of the appellant’s psychiatrist).         The symptoms of his
      conditions include “[p]eriods of depression, anxiety, mood swings, irritability,
      difficulty managing conflict, sensitiv[ity] to crowds, poor concentration/focus,
      [and] self-harm.”     IAF, Tab 17 at 18 (emphasis in original).      His psychiatrist
      reviewed the appellant’s position description for his job as an MDO and
      concluded that his medical conditions rendered him unable to fully perform
      several of the job duties. Id. at 19. Specifically, he found the appellant unable to
      manage others or train others, resolve conflicts, and maintain an inflexible
      schedule. Id. His psychiatrist testified that the appellant is susceptible to too
      much stress, that when under stress he loses the ability to do the basic functions
      of his job, and he is prone to act out due to anger issues.           HCD at 50:05
      (testimony of the appellant’s psychiatrist).         He further testified that the
      appellant’s position had too much stress for the appellant and that managing
      disputes was particularly stressful. HCD at 51:44 (testimony of the appellant’s
      psychiatrist).
¶15         The psychiatrist’s treatment notes reflect that the appellant’s work stress
      manifested itself in various ways. IAF, Tab 7 at 29-40. In one instance, the notes
      reflect that the appellant was stressed and upset from work to the point that he
      punched his own car.         Id. at 29.   The notes reflect another instance of the
                                                                                            8

      appellant having to leave work due to the stress. 4 Id. at 31. His psychiatrist
      explained that the appellant is able to handle the low stress job of cutting hair,
      which does not involve managing others or resolving disputes, but cannot handle
      situations such as managing a labor dispute between union representatives and
      employees. HCD at 1:03:12 (testimony of the appellant’s psychiatrist).
¶16         The appellant himself explained how his medical conditions rendered him
      unable to perform specific work duties.       He stated in his disability retirement
      application, and also in his testimony, that he could no longer manage groups of
      employees, manage job training, meet with union representatives to resolve
      disagreements, meet with customers and major mailers to resolve problems, and
      generally have the patience or capability to deal with angry or up set people. IAF,
      Tab 7 at 58; HCD at 9:07 (testimony of the appellant). He described employee
      and union interactions as everyone “always yelling and screaming and getting in
      your face,” which made it difficult for him to be around without “blowing up
      myself or wanting to walk away or do something inappropriate for the
      workplace.” HCD at 9:54 (testimony of the appellant).
¶17         The Supervisor’s Statement accompanying the appellant’s disability
      retirement application, completed in August 2017, additionally certified that the
      appellant’s conduct at work had become unsatisfactory. IAF, Tab 7 at 60. The
      Supervisor’s Statement explained that there “is an ongoing investigation into [the
      appellant’s] conduct and discipline is forthcoming.” Id. In October 2017, the

      4
        To the extent the appellant’s medical evidence fails to include any objective measures
      or tests, we find that absence not dispositive. See Confer v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 18 (2009) (finding an appellant may prevail in a
      disability retirement application based on medical evidence that “ consists of a medical
      professional’s conclusive diagnosis, even if based primarily on his/her analysis of the
      applicant’s own descriptions of symptoms and other indicia of disability”) ( quoting
      Vanieken-Ryals v. Office of Personnel Management, 508 F.3d 1034, 1041 (Fed. Cir.
      2007)); Doe v. Office of Personnel Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 86, ¶ 17 (2008) (finding
      an appellant disabled based on her medical documentation, which included doctor’s
      notes of therapy and various medications, despite the absence of objective measures and
      tests).
                                                                                       9

      appellant received a Letter of Warning in Lieu of a 14-day Suspension for
      “Unacceptable Conduct – Unscheduled Absences without Leave.” 5 IAF, Tab 17
      at 28.   The decision letter upholding the discipline warned that the appellant
      needed to “improve his work deficiencies or bear further consequences of his
      actions.”   Id.   When a supervisor’s statement accompanying a disability
      retirement application certifies that the applicant’s conduct is unacceptable, the
      appellant must provide evidence that the disabilit y caused the alleged misconduct.
      Johnson v. Office of Personnel Management, 87 M.S.P.R. 192, ¶¶ 14, 19 (2000).
      The appellant here did not explicitly state that his medical conditions caused the
      Letter of Warning.      However, his psychiatrist stated in response to an
      interrogatory from the appellant that he “cannot handle inflexible full-time work”
      and that he is unable to work an inflexible schedule. IAF, Tab 8 at 39 -40. Also,
      the appellant testified that his medical conditions rendered him unable to perform
      a full-time schedule.   HCD at 9:07 (testimony of the appellant).        Thus, the
      evidence suggests that this misconduct is in line with the appellant’s assertion
      that his medical conditions affect his specific work requirements under the second
      method of proving disability.
¶18        Accordingly, we find the appellant’s psychiatrist’s medical documentation
      and testimony, combined with the other record evidence, persuasive given that it
      explains how the appellant’s medical conditions specifically affect his work
      requirements. Compare Craig, 92 M.S.P.R. 449, ¶¶ 10-14 (finding a psychiatric
      social worker’s conclusion of disability persuasive when it was corroborated by
      other evidence and the social worker tied the medical conditions to the
      appellant’s specific work requirements), with Cummins v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 261, ¶ 8 (2012) (finding an appellant failed to prove
      disability when her doctor testified that she was somewhat familiar with the
      appellant’s duties but not the details of her position, and she was unwilling to
      5
        It is unclear whether this discipline is the same discipline referenced in the
      Supervisor’s Statement.
                                                                                           10

      state that the appellant was unable to perform her duties), and Anderson v. Office
      of Personnel Management, 96 M.S.P.R. 299, ¶¶ 14, 20 (2004) (finding the
      appellant’s physicians’ opinions regarding the appellant’s disability to be
      unpersuasive because they did not show how her conditions affected her specific
      job duties and requirements), aff’d per curiam, 120 F. App’x 320 (Fed. Cir.
      2005).
¶19          To the extent OPM suggests that the appellant is not entitled to a disability
      retirement annuity due to his subsequent employment as a barber, we find that
      argument unpersuasive. IAF, Tab 17 at 29-34. An appellant is not entitled to a
      disability retirement annuity when his medical condition is based on a single
      work environment, such as because of a personal conflict with a supervisor or
      from a perceived hostile work environment.             Confer v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 419, ¶ 16 (2009).                Subsequent work history is
      relevant to whether an individual’s condition is confined to a single work
      environment.      Id.     However, the ability to work in a position with different
      responsibilities, and specifically in a position without the particular work
      requirements that the appellant could not perform, does not undermine an
      appellant’s evidence that he is unable to work in the prior position.           See id.,
      ¶¶ 12-16 (finding an appellant’s subsequent work in a supervisory position in
      which she was never alone with patients, when being alone with patients is what
      triggered her symptoms, did not undermine her testimony that she was unable to
      work in her prior position providing direct nursing care to patients).
¶20          The appellant’s psychiatrist testified that his condition is not tied to
      interactions with specific persons at the USPS, but rather, the managerial duties
      in his prior position. HCD at 1:02:50 (testimony of the appellant’s psychiatrist).
      Moreover, he testified that the appellant is able to handle a low-stress position
      such as barbering, but not a more stressful managerial position handling things
      such     as   labor     disputes   between   union   representatives   and   employees.
      HCD at 1:03:12 (testimony of the appellant’s psychiatrist). The appellant himself
                                                                                          11

      testified that he does not have a lot of clients as a barber , the work is “really laid
      back,” he does not deal with any confrontational situations, and if he ever does
      get overwhelmed he can just close the shop and go home or not go in at all.
      HCD at 17:07 (testimony of the appellant).          Accordingly, we find that the
      appellant’s subsequent work as a barber does not undermine his evidence that he
      is unable to perform the specific work requirements of his prior position as an
      MDO.
¶21         Finally, the administrative judge here found that the appellant failed to
      demonstrate that he was unable to manage his condition through medication,
      occasional time off from work, or mental health counseling.            ID at 8.    We
      disagree. An applicant for disability retirement must establish the extent to which
      his disability can or cannot be controlled.        Smedley v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 23 (2008). When an appellant fails or refuses to
      follow or accept normal treatment, his disability flows not from the disease or
      injury itself, as the statute requires, but from his voluntary failure or refusal to
      take the available corrective or ameliorative action.      Id. Here, the appellant’s
      psychiatrist responded in the affirmative to an interrogatory from th e appellant
      that he was “compliant with all reasonable prescribed medical treatment regarding
      his diagnosed conditions.” IAF, Tab 17 at 20.
¶22         Moreover, the psychiatrist testified that, despite the appellant taking
      numerous medications to treat his medical conditions, those conditions were not
      controlled.   HCD at 1:05:25 (testimony of the appellant’s psychiatrist).           He
      further testified that they would frequently tweak the appellant’s medications in
      attempts to control his condition, to no avail. HCD at 1: 05:50 (testimony of the
      appellant’s psychiatrist).   Although the psychiatrist testified that the appellant
      could benefit from mental health counseling, he stated that he did not believe that
      would render the appellant capable of returning to his prior posi tion, observing
      that counseling in these situations can take several years.         HCD at 1:07:27
      (testimony of the appellant’s psychiatrist).       There is no evidence that the
                                                                                      12

      appellant ever refused counseling. HCD at 1:07:54 (testimony of the appellant’s
      psychiatrist). Accordingly, we find that the appellant has followed and accepted
      normal treatment but remains unable to control his medical conditions such that
      he cannot return to his prior position.
¶23           In light of the evidence discussed above, we find that the appellant has
      produced competent and unrefuted medical evidence establishing that his
      conditions preclude him from performing specific work requirements in cluding
      managing small- to medium-sized groups of employees, managing job training,
      and     resolving   problems/disagreements   with   both   customers   and   union
      representatives. See Doe v. Office of Personnel Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 86,
      ¶ 18 (2008) (finding disability retirement warranted based on a mental condition
      exacerbated by job-related stress that prevented the appellant from performing the
      duties of her position).      Moreover, although absences from work do not
      conclusively establish that an employee is incapable of rendering useful and
      efficient service, they are nonetheless a factor worthy of consideration in judging
      disability.   Henderson v. Office of Personnel Management, 117 M.S.P.R. 313,
      ¶ 25 (2012).    Based on the evidence from the appellant’s psychiatrist and his
      supervisor, and on his own subjective description of his inability to work, we find
      that the administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant did not prove by
      preponderant evidence that he is precluded from useful and efficient service or
      retention in his position.

      The appellant established that accommodation of the disabling medical condition
      is unreasonable.
¶24           The administrative judge made no findings as to whether accommodation of
      the appellant was unreasonable. The fourth element of establishing entitlement to
      a disability retirement annuity requires an appellant to prove that accommodation
      of his disabling medical condition is unreasonable. Chavez, 111 M.S.P.R. 69,
      ¶ 13.     When an agency certification that accommodation is unavailable is
      unrebutted and the record supports the conclusion that accommodation would not
                                                                                            13

      be possible, the Board has held that this criterion for obtaining disability
      retirement is met. 6 Id., ¶ 15.
¶25         In this case, the USPS certified that accommodation of the appellant was
      not possible, due to the severity of his condition and the requirements of his
      position. IAF, Tab 7 at 74-75. This certification is not challenged by OPM.
      Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that the appellant cannot perform
      the MDO duties, even with accommodation. IAF, Tab 7 at 58, 72, Tab 17 at 19.
      As such, we find that accommodation of his disabling medical condition is
      unreasonable.
¶26         The appellant has therefore met all the criteria for di sability retirement
      under FERS and is entitled to a disability retirement annuity. Accordingly, we
      reverse the initial decision and do not sustain OPM’s reconsideration decision.

                                             ORDER
¶27         We ORDER OPM to award the appellant a disability retirement annuity.
      OPM must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this
      decision.
¶28         We also ORDER OPM to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it
      believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken
      to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant to provide all necessary
      information OPM requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant,
      if not notified, should ask OPM about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

      6
         OPM suggested below that, in addition to proving his accommodation was
      unreasonable, the appellant must also prove that his employing agency was unable to
      “reassign him to a vacant position at the same grade or level at the position he last
      occupied.” IAF, Tab 17 at 5. However, as our reviewing court held in Gooden v.
      Office of Personnel Management, 471 F.3d 1275, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the inquiry into
      whether an appellant is qualified for reassignment to a vacant position is required onl y
      by the Civil Service Retirement System, not FERS. Under FERS, the only requirement
      regarding a reassignment is that the appellant must not have declined a reasonable offer
      of reassignment. Id.
                                                                                           14

¶29         No later than 30 days after OPM tells the appellant it has fully carried out
      the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the
      office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that
      OPM did not fully carry out the Board’s Order.          The petition should contain
      specific reasons why the appellant believes OPM has not fully carried out the
      Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications
      with OPM. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶30         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(c).

                       NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                             YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                            ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

      7
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      15

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represen t a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
                                                                                    16

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                     17

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and you wish to challenge the Board’s rulings on your whistleblower claims
only, excluding all other issues, then you may file a petition for judicial review
either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of
appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8      The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial revie w of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial re view of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                18

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.