Court Opinion

ID: 9537819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:25:09.329289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:03.700834
License: Public Domain

*75DORAN, J.
I dissent. It is my conviction that the questions asked on voir dire were highly prejudicial and that the court’s refusal either to declare a mistrial or grant defendant’s motion for a new trial on account thereof was error.
It is conceded in the prevailing opinion that, “Attempts to impress a jury with the idea that an insurance company and not the individual defendant may be required to respond to such damages as the jury may assess are not looked upon with favor by the courts.” And the prevailing opinion further recites, “the cases are harmonious in holding that all such questions must be propounded in good faith.” For example, in Lafargue v. United Railroads, 183 Cal. 720 [192 P. 538], was concerned with alleged misconduct resulting from the examination of witnesses and statements of counsel. In that connection the court observed (at p. 725): “We certainly cannot say that there was any intent on the part of counsel to get before the jury matters which he knew were inadmissible. It seems to us from the record that he was acting in perfect good faith upon the theory that he was entitled to rebut the inference of recovery which might be drawn by jurors from plaintiff’s discharge from St. Luke’s Hospital, ...” Dermer v. Pistoresi, 109 Cal.App. 310 [293 P. 78], was an action for personal injuries. Misconduct was assigned to plaintiff’s counsel for disclosing the interest of an insurance company during the examination of a witness. In that connection the court observed (at p. 315) : “This was a perfectly legitimate cross-examination of the witness. It does not appear to have been conducted in bad faith.” Wieck v. Hockett, 115 Cal.App. 600 [2 P.2d 476], was also a personal injury action. Reference to an insurance company by plaintiff’s counsel during the course of the trial was assigned as misconduct, with reference to which the court commented as follows, at page 605: "There is absolutely nothing in the record from which it could be inferred or insinuated that plaintiff’s counsel did not ask said question in the utmost good faith or that he attempted in any way to get before the jury the fact, if it be a fact, that the defendant was insured.” (Arnold v. California Portland Cement Co., 41 Cal.App. 420 [183 P. 171].) In this action for damages for personal injuries the court went into the subject at great length, and I am in substantial accord with the court’s comments and conclusions in this decision, with the exception of *76the reference to the subject of good faith, which is as follows (p. 426). “Asking a juror whether he is interested in a specified casualty company, or, generally, in any insurance company, if the question be propounded in good faith, may be necessary . ...” In McVea v. Nickols, 105 Cal.App. 28 [286 P. 761], a personal injury action, prejudice was assigned to the inquiry regarding an insurance company. The District Court of Appeal in upholding the judgment made the following pertinent observation (at p. 33): “Appellant concedes that the decisions are against his contention, but urges that we change the law, on account of the impossibility of proving that such questions are not asked in good faith, and because of the more or less obvious dangers that are inherent in permitting such an impression or suggestion to reach the jury. While we have some sympathy with appellant’s point of view, we feel that the rule has been sufficiently established to require that any change, or consideration thereof, should come from the Supreme Court.”
Misconduct that results in prejudice is no less prejudicial because committed in good faith. Damage resulting from an act performed in good faith is just as painful as if done in bad faith. By no process of logical reasoning can the question as to the effect of improper conduct, either in the examination of jurors on voir dire or in the examination of witnesses, be determined by a consideration of the good or bad faith of the inquirer. The innocent victim gets no comfort from the assurance that such misconduct is the product of good faith. Nor is it ever possible to know definitely whether such misconduct is really performed in good faith. Bad faith can easily be concealed by cunning subterfuge.
In determining the extent of damage or prejudice the intent of the inquirer is clearly beside the issue. The damage is no less extensive when the cause is unintentional.
Here the cause was aggravated. When objection was made and the question assigned as misconduct, plaintiffs’ counsel declared, “I asked the question in good faith, believing it is a proper question.” This declaration carried the implication that actually there was a valid background for the question, and hence tended to confirm that which counsel’s objection properly sought to avoid. The contention that instructions cure such errors is based on presumptions that in fact are no more than assumptions, if indeed they amount to that. *77“Speculations” would be a more accurate term. Moreover, whether the objectionable questions were answered is also immaterial. It is the implications of the questions that constitute the misconduct, which the answers thereto cannot in any ease erase. And whether the result of good faith, bad faith, ignorance, lack of understanding or poor judgment, the effect of prejudicial misconduct is the same. Either may be an excuse but neither amounts to a valid defense for such conduct.
If there is the slightest doubt as to the possible prejudicial effect as the result of misconduct, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the innocent party. Simple justice demands such a course. As was said in Hoyt v. Davis Mfg. Co., 112 App.Div. 755 [98 N.Y.S. 1031], cited in Arnold v. California Portland Cement Co. supra, (p. 426, et seq.), “When counsel ask such questions, overreaching the limit, with a hope to gain a benefit from them, it is but fair that he should take the risk; and in a close case the court may properly consider that such suggestion had the very effect which counsel intended it should have.” Not only should the risk be borne when such questions are asked surreptitiously but, as well, when asked in ignorance of the law, or on account of any other limitation.
In such circumstances the trial court may in its discretion declare a mistrial forthwith or await the termination of the trial and pass judgment on the possible prejudicial effect of such misconduct on a motion for a new trial. In the instant case both motions were denied.
The record herein reveals the question to have been close, hence the determination thereof should have been resolved in favor of the injured party and a new trial granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 23, 1944.