Court Opinion

ID: 9478070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:39:25.816418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:13.510736
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 permits the conviction of one who receives in the mail child pornography for personal use rather than for circulation to others. My examination of the statutory language and legislative history of § 1461 reveals that the Ninth Circuit erred in United States v. Hurt, 795 F.2d 765 (1986), modified on other grounds, 808 F.2d 707, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 69, 98 L.Ed.2d 83 (1987), when it upheld the conviction of a recipient of obscene material. The reasoning is more persuasive in United States v. Sidelko, 248 F.Supp. 813 (M.D.Pa.1965), which concluded that Congress did not intend for § 1461 to apply to persons who order and receive obscene material for personal use.
In determining the meaning of a statute, courts must first look to the plain language adopted by Congress. If the statute’s language is unambiguous, “ordinarily it is to be regarded as conclusive unless there is ‘a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary.’ ” Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110, 103 S.Ct. 986, 990, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)).
The relevant language of § 1461 provides:
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything declared ... to be nonmailable, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon ... or knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years....
(emphasis added). Counts 2-16 of the indictment in this case state that the defendant “did knowingly cause to be delivered by mail according to the directions thereon” several obscene items. App. 13-21. The question before us is whether Congress intended for this “cause” provision of § 1461 to apply to recipients, as well as to senders, of obscene material.
The language of the “knowingly causes to be delivered” provision does not specify whether its application is limited to senders. On the one hand, the provision may apply to receivers of obscene material for personal use because, in one sense, they “cause to be delivered” certain materials when they request distributors to mail obscene materials. On the other hand, the statute can be interpreted to apply only to senders of obscene material and not to receivers. It is the sender who literally “causes to be delivered by mail” material which he himself puts in the mail or causes another to put in the mail.
The next significant phrase contained in the eighth paragraph of § 1461 suggests that the “knowingly causes to be delivered” provision applies only to senders. The criminal act described in this paragraph is: “or knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating....” This provision obviously applies to receivers of obscene material; but not all receivers, just those who intend to circulate the material. Since this provision separately and explicitly deals with receivers, it is certainly arguable that the previous provisions deal only with senders.
The words “according to the direction thereon,” following “knowingly causes to be delivered by mail” lead to the same conclusion because receivers’ “directions” or requests, are not on the mailed material. If receivers are contemplated by this provision, then these five, words are meaningless. By making the words “according to direction thereon” apply to senders only, we can make some sense of the language. The address placed on the mailed material by the sender would constitute the “direction thereon” under the statute.
*308I.
This ambiguity in the plain meaning of the language leads me to the view that an investigation of the legislative history on this point may illuminate the intended meaning. The majority states that its examination of § 1461’s legislative history revealed “no expressed legislative intent to exclude persons who order and receive obscene material in the mail.” Opin. 13. My research into the legislative history of the “knowingly causes to be delivered” provision reveals that Congress did not intend for it to cover receivers.
Section 1461 was amended in 1958 to include the “knowingly causes to be delivered” provision. Previously, the applicable paragraph of § 1461 was divided into a “sender” clause and a “receiver” clause:
[1] Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or [2] knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose of circulating ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned. ...
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952); H.R.Rep. No. 1614, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1958). In 1953, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d 619, interpreted the sender provision of § 1461 as limiting prosecution of those who mailed obscene material to jurisdictions in which the mail was deposited. The court affirmed dismissal of an indictment seeking to prosecute defendants in Kansas, where obscene mail sent by them was delivered. Defendants were prosecuted in Kansas because their earlier prosecution in California, where the mail was deposited, was dismissed when a court ruled that the mailed material was not obscene. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1614, 2624, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 4016. The Tenth Circuit held that the sender provision did not establish a continuing crime and thus the offense occurred in the jurisdiction where the deposit was made. Ross, 205 F.2d at 620-21. The court explained:
We think there is a clear distinction between a deposit for mailing or delivery and the use of the mails_ [T]he unlawful act defined in § 1461 is the deposit for mailing and not a use of the mails which may follow such deposit. That act is complete when the deposit is made and is not a continuing act.
Id. at 621.
As a direct response to the Ross opinion, Congress amended § 1461’s sender provision for the explicit purpose of making the offense of “deposits for mailing” a continuing offense. See H.R.Rep. No. 1614, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4; S.Rep. No. 1839, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 4013-14; H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 2624, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 4016-17. Congress sought to authorize the prosecution of depositors in jurisdictions where the material was delivered, or where it was mailed. Id. Another impetus for expanding the venue of the sender provision was the Supreme Court’s decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). 104 Cong.Rec. 1396 (1958). In Roth, Justice Brennan announced that an appropriate standard for judging obscenity is “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” Id. at 489, 77 S.Ct. at 1311 (emphasis added). Congress wanted defendants prosecuted as “smut peddlers” in districts where obscene material was delivered because these were the areas harmed by the offense. 104 Cong.Rec. 9530. As explained below, the sender provision amendment was never intended to apply to receivers of obscene material. On the contrary, Congress viewed receivers— children and “adults of low mentality” — as the victims of solicited and unsolicited obscene materials. 104 Cong.Rec. 8994.
In early 1958, both the House and the Senate introduced bills for the § 1461 amendment. The bills were similar, but differed in one major respect. The Senate bill, introduced by Senator Kefauver, sought to permit prosecution “for the sending of nonmailable matter through the United States mails, not only at the place where the mail is deposited, as under the
*309existing law, but also at the place where the mail is received.” 105 Cong.Rec. 6865. The House bill intended to expand the venue of the sender provision to include not only the judicial districts where the mail was deposited and delivered, but also the districts in which the mail passed through en route to its destination. 104 Cong.Rec. 8991. The House bill’s language specifically adopted the language suggested in Ross, that whoever “uses the mails” would commit a continuing offense, allowing prosecution in several districts. Id.; H.R.Rep. No. 1614 at 7. The House Bill contained the specific provision disputed in this case, “knowingly causes to be delivered.” Id. No significant changes were proposed for the receiver provision. The Senate version also contained the “knowingly causes to be delivered” phrase. S.Rep. No. 1839 at 1, 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4012. Like the House, the Senate did not propose changes for the receiver provision. After a conference between the House and Senate, Congress passed the House version of the sender provision amendment. See H.R. Rep.Conf. No. 2624 at 1; 104 Cong.Rec. 17,832.
The majority states that it gleaned its interpretation of the legislative history of § 1461 from the Senate and Conference Reports. Opin. 13. Although it is true that the reports do not indicate that receivers are excluded from the sender provision amendment, it is also true that the only purpose for the amendment was to expand the venue of the former sender provision. There is no indication whatsoever in any of the reports that receivers would be included in the sender provision amendment.
The Senate Report states that the purpose of the proposed amendment is to:
make it possible to prosecute violators of section 1461 of title 18 of the United States Code (mailing of obscene or crime-inciting material) not only at the place at which the objectionable matter is mailed, but also at the place of address or delivery.
S.Rep. No. 1839 at 2, 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4013 (emphasis added). “Violators” are those who mail obscene material. The report’s explanation that the amendment was brought to avoid the Ross problem further reveals that the “violators” in this context are the senders, and not the receivers, of obscene material. Id. at 2-4, 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4013-4014. Nowhere in the Senate Report is there any mention of an interest in expanding the sender provision’s coverage to include receivers. The report clearly indicates that the Senate viewed the senders as the evildoers, and the receivers as the victims: “The main evil to be com-batted is the harm done to those who are exposed to obscene material at the point of receipt.” Id. at 3, 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4013. Letters accompanying the report also show that the proposed amendment only applied to senders. Representative Celler’s letter states:
This bill will amend section 1461 ... so as to make the deposit of obscene matter in the mails a use of the mails.... The importance of this decision [i?oss] rests in the fact that it is sometimes difficult to obtain a conviction for the mailing of obscene matter in certain jurisdictions.
Id. at 4, 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 4014 (emphasis added).
Similar to the Senate Report, the House Report also states that the purpose of the amendment is to:
make it possible to prosecute violators of section 1461 ... (mailing of obscene or crime-inciting material)_
H.R.Rep. No. 1614 at 2 (emphasis added). Accompanying letters and statements to the Report also support the view that the bill would expand the venue for obscenity senders and not receivers. The General Counsel of the Post Office Department’s position is included in the Report:
The purpose of the bill ... is that persons mailing obscene literature ... may be prosecuted in the district in which the mailing took place, in any district through which the mail passed, and in the district where it is delivered.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
The Conference Report clearly states that § 1461 was being amended “to make the mailing of obscene matter a continuing *310offense.” H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 2624 at 3, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4016. Explaining that the amendment was a direct response to Ross, the report states: “[t]he importance of this decision rests in the fact that it is sometimes difficult to obtain a conviction for the mailing of obscene matter in certain jurisdictions.” Id. (emphasis added). The conference agreed on the original House bill indicating that the “purveyors” of obscene material committed a continuing crime when they used the mail for their deeds. Id. at 1, 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4016.
The numerous pages of congressional statements regarding both houses’ proposals also reveal that there was virtually no opposition to the proposed amendment to the sender provision of § 1461. Over fifteen congressmen made lengthy statements on the House and Senate floors in favor of the amendment. The statements reveal a uniform belief that the amendment to the sender provision would expand the jurisdictions in which the “obscenity merchants” could be prosecuted. 104 Cong. Rec. 8991. Senator Kefauver’s statements explain why the sender provision was amended, and to whom the amendment applied:
This restriction [from Ross ] has seriously impaired the ability of the Post Office Department and the Department of Justice to fight the interstate pornography racket. The greatest impact on the community is often felt at the place where the objectionable material is received. It is frequently in the community where the matter is received that the largest number of complaints are made and the greatest impetus to prosecution exists.
A heavy percentage of objectionable material is being deposited in the mails in the Los Angeles area, resulting in the tunneling of a large number of prosecutions into one already overcrowded federal jurisdiction. Many of these cases have been acted on by one judge in the Southern California Federal jurisdiction, with the result that his interpretation of the law has become almost a controlling factor on a national footing in the enforcement of section 1461. The proposed change in the law simply implements section 3237 of Title 18, United States Code Annotated, which provides for prosecution for material sent through the mail “in any district from, through, or into which such commerce or mail matters move.”
The strengthening of the criminal statute with respect to the sending of obscene or objectionable matter ... is necessitated by the indiscriminate use of commercial mailing lists by persons in the mail-order pornography business.
104 Cong.Rec. 6865 (emphasis added). The remarks of Representative Sullivan explain that after Ross,
[sjmart smut peddlers now base their operations largely in Los Angeles and New York City. Experience has shown them that courts and juries there are lenient with them. In short, they are free to shop around and settle in a district where the judges or jurors are broadminded about their sleazy kind of business.
This year, Congress is going to try to plug some of these loopholes.
Id. at 9530. Representative Saylor stated:
I intend to support it [the bill] if only to serve notice on the purveyors of obscenity that Congress resents their diabolical business and is determined to stop it.
Id. at 7672 (emphasis added). And Representative Feighan explained:
Certainly, while the technical crime may have been consummated in a distant location by the deposit of such pornography in the mail, the impact and ramifications of this vicious criminal act were found in the minds and morals of those who were subjected to it upon receipt.... Merely to permit the moral, God-fearing members of the community to pass judgment upon purveyors of filth who would destroy the homes of a community ... should strike fear in no one’s heart other than those who fear justice and the loss of degrading profit in human misery.
Id. at 8994 (emphasis added). The numerous floor statements of members of Congress reveal that they were interested in prosecuting the purveyors or senders of *311obscene material, and not the receivers. See, e.g., id. at 19,842, 17,832, 15,611, 9530, 8991-94, 7672, 6626.
Hearings were also conducted on the House’s proposed amendment to the sender provision of § 1461 at which 25 witnesses testified. Mailing of Obscene Matter, 1958: Hearings on H. 6239 et al. Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-100 (1958). Twenty-two of the witnesses strongly favored the proposed amendment. Those who opposed the bill, such as the American Book Publishers Council, objected to the possibility that a jurisdiction with a narrow view of obscenity could determine the legality of a work for all other jurisdictions in the country. See id. at 57. None of the witnesses’ statements indicate that the proposed venue amendment would apply to receivers of obscene material.
In sum, the reports, floor statements and hearing testimony uniformly reveal that in amending the sender provision of § 1461, Congress was simply attempting to expand the venue for prosecutions of “smut peddlers.” Nowhere in this voluminous legislative history is there even mention of the view that the amendment should also apply to receivers of obscenity. The receiver provision itself was left untouched by the sender provision amendment.
This study reveals that the majority is attempting to create a new offense that Congress did not intend to criminalize — receipt of obscene material for personal use.
This interpretation of § 1461 through its legislative history is reinforced by the fact that nine of the counts in the indictment here charge that the receiver “did knowingly cause to be delivered by mail” advertisement sheets, that were themselves obscene, for obscene literature. App. 13-20. Congressional statements made during floor discussion of the sender provision amendment indicate that Congress specifically did not intend to criminalize the receipt of advertisements for obscene material. See 104 Cong.Rec. 15,610, 8991-92, 6865. Recipients of these advertisements were viewed as the victims of a nationwide obscenity sales campaign. Representative Reuss explained that Americans
are being given the “hard sell” to buy obscene photographs and movies.... \D ]irect-mail advertisements — often more provocative than the product they peddle — are sent to our teen-agers each year.
To date, no one, from post-office official to parent, has been able effectively to curb this mushrooming trade in pornography — no one, although it is abhorrent to us all.
Id. at 8992 (emphasis added). Representative Keating stated:
It is estimated 50 million direct-mail advertisements for such [obscene] material were circulated into American homes last year.
Promoters are raking in enormous profits, often apparently in the millions. Their methods are devious and deceptive. They prey upon the innocent and unsuspecting. Their filthy produce is contaminating young minds all over our country.
Id. at 8991 (emphasis added). Applying this legislative history to the facts of this case demonstrates that Congress never envisioned that the victim’s conduct in receiving advertisements for obscene material would be criminal.
II.
Counts 2-16 of the indictment charge defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2 as well as § 1461. Since mere receipt of obscene material for personal use is not a violation of § 1461, the government must show that defendant violated § 2. Section 2 provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
Although in its briefs the government has not described exactly how defendant violated § 2, presumably the theory is that defendant’s mere receipt of the obscene mate*312rial shows that he aided and abetted the sending of the material — a violation of § 1461.
The legislative history discussed above reveals that Congress intended the prosecution of senders of obscene material or of receivers who circulate the material. Defendant does not fall into either category. His conviction under § 2 for aiding and abetting the sending of obscene material by his mere receipt contravenes Congress's intention that only certain receivers can be prosecuted under § 1461 — those who circulate the material.
This situation is similar to Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123, 53 S.Ct. 35, 38, 77 L.Ed. 206 (1932). In Gebardi, the Court reversed the conviction of a female defendant who allegedly conspired to violate the Mann Act by consenting to her transportation across state lines. Applying Wharton’s Rule, the Court reasoned that Congress did not envision that a participant or victim in the Mann Act crime could be indicted for conspiracy to commit the crime — even if she consented. Id. The Court explained:
[W]e perceive in the failure of the Mann Act to condemn the woman’s participation in those transportations which are effected with her mere consent, evidence of an affirmative legislative policy to leave her acquiescence unpunished. We think it a necessary implication of that policy that when the Mann Act and the conspiracy statute came to be construed together, as they necessarily would be, the same participation which the former contemplates as an inseparable incident of all cases in which the woman is a voluntary agent at all, but does not punish, was not automatically to be made punishable under the latter. It would contravene that policy to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers.
Id. (emphasis added).
Applying Gebardi’s reasoning and Wharton’s Rule to this case, it is obvious from the legislative history that Congress only intended to criminalize a certain kind of receipt — when the receiver intended to criminalize the material. If the receiver can be convicted of violating § 2 by aiding and abetting the sending of obscene material, then a different type of receipt would be criminalized. Congress’s intention was clear: senders or receivers who circulate violate § 1461. The government’s reformulation of a § 1461 offense through § 2 contradicts the result Congress explicitly intended.
III.
I would not only reverse defendant’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461 and 2, but I would also reverse his conviction under § 2252 and remand the case for a new trial on this charge. The spillover effect of the voluminous evidence admitted to prove counts 2-16 of the indictment severely prejudiced defendant’s entrapment defense for the § 2252 charge. Given the extremely strong entrapment showing defendant has made, I would remand for a new trial on the § 2252 offense.