Court Opinion

ID: 9531622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:13:26.367115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:32.912459
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I would deny Ronald Baker’s prayer for relief in this original action. The majority opinion notes that Judge Cieslik, in his response, contends that the appropriate remedy for Baker should have been by way of direct appeal challenging the sentence. I agree. Baker did file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment. This appeal is now pending in the appellate court, as noted in the majority opinion. This court now orders Judge Cieslik to vacate the amended mittimus, determine the correct release date, and enter a new order of commitment. If the matter is still pending in the appellate court, the trial court may not be able to comply with the order of this court. When a notice of appeal is filed, the trial court loses jurisdiction of the case except for certain limited purposes. “When a notice of appeal is perfected the trial court loses jurisdiction as to the judgment or part thereof from which the appeal is taken and, as to such matter, the case thereafter proceeds in the appellate court ***.” Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wetzel (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 243, 249. This is not simply a case in which an original action in this court is used as a means of circumventing the appellate process. This is a case in which the appellate process was invoked and by which jurisdiction was vested in the appellate court. For some reason Baker has elected to also seek relief by way of an original action in this court. Presumably, the relief granted by the majority opinion is meant to divest the appellate court of the jurisdiction that was vested in it by the filing of the notice of appeal. The majority acknowledges that this court has stated many times that original actions in this court are not permissible substitutions for direct appeal. However, for some inexplicable reason, plaintiff has in this case been granted relief. I find unconvincing plaintiff’s argument that the appeal process did not afford adequate relief because his sentence would have been served before a final decision could have been rendered. The appeal was perfected on June 27, 1984. If the appeal would have been diligently prosecuted, relief could have been obtained just as rapidly as it has been through this original action. Furthermore, in cases where a person will have served his sentence or substantially all of his sentence before the completion of the appellate process, courts of review almost routinely release the defendant on bail pending appeal. Plaintiff has made no showing that he sought release on bail pending appeal either in the appellate court or in this court. But a short time ago a petition for relief by way of an original action in this court was a rarity. Recently, however, such petitions have become quite commonplace. In fact, this court is being virtually inundated with such petitions. What has caused this sudden change is not clear. It may be that the attorneys filing such petitions are uncertain of the proper remedy and file such a petition as a matter of convenience. It may be that an original action in this court is perceived as offering a quicker and more easily obtained remedy. Why bother with an appeal to the appellate court, a petition for leave to appeal to the supreme court, and briefs and arguments in both courts? Why not just file a petition for leave to pursue an original action in the supreme court? In a few instances original actions afford the only relief available and should be allowed. When we do so, however, it seems to encourage a spate of petitions which are not meritorious. This court has neither the time nor the resources to entertain petitions for original actions except in cases where it is absolutely necessary to do so. We should guard against dissipating our time and resources on petitions for original actions in which the petitioner has, for some reason, chosen not to pursue the remedy provided by law and the rules of this court. I fear that by granting relief in this case we have simply encouraged the filing of countless similar actions. I therefore dissent.