Court Opinion

ID: 2964375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:44.020194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:54.932569
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2146

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   DENNIS JOSLEYN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2147

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  JOHN W. BILLMYER,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                 [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                 ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             David W. Long, with whom Joseph E. Zeszotarski, and Poyner &
             _____________            _____________________      ________
        Spruill, LLP were on brief for appellant Billmyer. 
        ____________
             Paul Twomey, with whom Twomey & Sisti Law Offices was on brief
             ___________            __________________________
        for appellant Josleyn.
             Michael J. Connolly and Donald A. Feith, Assistant United States
             ___________________     _______________
        Attorneys, with whom Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on
                             ______________
        brief for appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   October 15, 1996
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                          2

                    CYR, Circuit  Judge.   A  federal jury  sitting in  New
                    CYR, Circuit  Judge.
                         ______________

          Hampshire  returned guilty  verdicts against  appellants John  W.

          Billmyer and  Dennis R. Josleyn  for conspiring to  defraud their

          former  employer,  American  Honda  Motor  Company ("Honda"),  by

          accepting money and other valuable consideration from prospective

          Honda  dealers in  exchange for  lucrative dealership  rights and

          sundry advantage.  See 18 U.S.C.    371 (conspiracy) & 1341 (mail
                             ___

          fraud) (1994).   Verdicts were returned also against  Josleyn for

          racketeering, conspiracy, and mail fraud, see id.    1962(c), 371
                                                    ___ ___

          & 1341, relating, inter alia, to kickbacks received in connection
                            _____ ____

          with national  sales  training seminars  and  dealer  advertising

          programs  for Honda  dealers.   On  appeal, Billmyer  and Josleyn

          principally contend that  New Hampshire was an improper venue for

          the  franchise conspiracy charge in  Count II and  that there was

          insufficient evidence  to support the guilty verdicts.  We affirm

          the district court judgments in all respects.  

                                          I
                                          I

                                     BACKGROUND1
                                     BACKGROUND
                                     __________

                    Following the second OPEC oil embargo in 1979, American

          consumer demand for the energy-efficient automobiles manufactured

          by  Honda skyrocketed, and remained strong  for a decade thereaf-

          ter.  Just  as demand in the  United States surged, the  Japanese

          government imposed export restraints  on its carmakers, and Honda

                              
          ____________________

               1We recite  the background  facts the jury  reasonably could
          have found, viewing the  evidence in the light most  favorable to
          the  verdicts.  See United  States v. Bello-Perez,  977 F.2d 664,
                          ___ ______________    ___________
          666 (1st Cir. 1992). 

                                          3

          was unable to  meet the demand for its  automobiles in the United

          States.   These  uncommonly favorable  market conditions  endured

          throughout much of the 1980s, causing enterprising car dealers in

          the United  States to  compete fiercely (and  sometimes unfairly)

          for exclusive Honda franchises  in anticipation of the extraordi-

          narily  large  profit margins  available  on  such popular  Honda

          models as the Civic, Prelude, and Accord.

                    Appellant  John Billmyer  joined  Honda  as a  district

          sales representative in  1970, and rose rapidly  through all four

          management  levels  in  its  field  sales  division.2    By 1977,

          Billmyer  had  been  appointed  regional sales  manager  for  the

          eastern United  States.   By 1980, he  held the  top field  sales

          position at Honda     national  sales manager     and soon  moved

          from its New Jersey  office to headquarters in California.   When

          Honda  launched a  line of  luxury automobiles in  1985, Billmyer

          became national sales manager for the new Acura Division as well.

          He  remained  the top  Honda field  sales  manager in  the United

          States until he retired on March 31, 1988.

                    After Billmyer  retired, he was  succeeded as  national

          sales manager by S. James Cardiges, his closest associate at Hon-

          da.  Billmyer had hired Cardiges  as the Honda sales manager  for

          the  Baltimore/Washington  D.C.  district in  1977,  and  rapidly
                              
          ____________________

               2At Honda,  district sales managers in  the field maintained
          day-to-day  contact  with their  dealers  and  reported to  their
          respective zone sales managers.   Each zone manager was responsi-
          ble  for Honda sales  in several states.   Zone  managers in turn
          reported to  their respective regional  sales managers.   The two
          regional  managers each supervised  Honda sales in  the field for
          roughly one-half the country.  

                                          4

          promoted him through  the ranks:  from zone  manager for the mid-

          Atlantic states in 1979,  to zone manager for the west coast (the

          largest and  most prestigious zone)  in 1981,  to regional  sales

          manager  for the  western  United States  in  late 1982.    While

          western  regional sales  manager,  Cardiges worked  closely  with

          Billmyer.    The two  often traveled  to  work together  and took

          business trips within the  United States and overseas.   Finally,

          Cardiges succeeded  Billmyer as  national sales manager  in 1988.

          He  resigned in April 1992  by "mutual agreement"  with Honda, to

          forfend termination.

                    Appellant Dennis  R.  Josleyn joined  Honda in  January

          1983, and followed a  similar path:  assistant sales  manager for

          the mid-Atlantic zone in 1985; mid-Atlantic zone manager in March

          1987; and zone manager  for the west coast, resident  in Califor-

          nia, in  early 1991, a  position he held  until he resigned  from

          Honda in April 1992.

                    Throughout  appellants'  tenure  with Honda,  corporate

          policy and procedures for awarding new Honda dealerships were set

          forth  in the  "Honda  Automobile Dealer  Appointment  Procedures

          Manual."   The first step was to  identify a geographic area ripe

          for a new dealership    in  Honda terminology an "open point"    

          through  reference to  marketing  and  demographic studies,  data

          relating to competition, and  an assortment of other information.

          Next, the district  and zone  sales managers for  the area  under

          consideration were to "prospect"  for a qualified dealer  to fill

          the  "open point," then compose a slate of three or more suitable

                                          5

          candidates.   Honda policy directed that  sales managers evaluate

          candidates according to their experience in automobile retailing,

          available capital, personal reputation,  and the quality of their

          location and  facilities, all  with the  ultimate aim that  Honda

          dealerships be awarded to the best candidates. 

                    Honda sales managers at  each level, see supra note  2,
                    _____ _____ ________ __  ____ _____  ___ _____

          were required to participate in recommending and approving candi-
          ____ ________ __ ___________ __ ____________ ___ _________ ______

          dates  for  any "open  point."   With  the possible  exception of
          _____  ___  ___  ____  _____

          Billmyer and Cardiges, in their respective capacities as national

          sales manager, no sales manager at any level possessed unilateral
                         __ _____ _______ __ ___ _____ _________ __________

          authority to award  a new dealership.   Furthermore, approval was
          _________ __ _____  _ ___ __________

          required  from  managers  representing  the  parts,  service, and

          market-representation departments as well.  

                    Once selected for an  "open point" dealership, with the

          approval of sales managers  at the district, zone, regional,  and

          national levels, a successful candidate received a "Letter of In-

          tent"  ("LOI") from Honda via United States mail, authorizing the

          prospective  dealer to  open the  new, exclusive  dealership upon

          certain  conditions, such  as  constructing a  facility within  a

          specified time.   Until the  franchise itself was  issued to  the

          prospective  dealer,  however,  these  LOI  rights  remained  the

          property  of Honda.  Like  its competitors, Honda  exacted no fee

          for its dealership franchises.  Nor were  Honda personnel allowed

          to accept money or  other consideration of significant value  for

          assistance in obtaining a Honda franchise.  

                    In addition  to Honda policy  and procedures  governing

                                          6

          new  dealerships, its  "conflict of  interest" policy  prohibited

          employees  from accepting  anything of  significant value  from a

          Honda  dealer and  from acquiring  or holding  any interest  in a

          Honda or Acura dealership.  The "conflict of interest" policy was

          disseminated among all Honda sales managers, who were required to

          sign disclosure  forms  indicating  ongoing  compliance.    Sales

          managers  at  every level  were duty-bound  to ensure  that their

          respective subordinates honored the policy  prohibiting conflicts

          of interest, and report all violations to their senior manager or

          the Human Resources Department.

                    Notwithstanding  these  rigorous  internal  procedures,

          however,  there  were numerous  violations  of  the "conflict  of

          interest" policy.  From  the late 1970s through the  early 1990s,

          sales managers at every level  commonly accepted money and  valu-

          able  gifts, including  Rolex  watches,  furniture, and  business

          suits, from prospective dealers  vying for "open points"  or from

          dealers  seeking  increased Honda  automobile  allocations.   Yet

          their illicit activities apparently escaped notice by nonpartici-

          pating sales managers and dealers for years.  

                    Finally,  in 1991  an internal investigation  was trig-

          gered by an uninvolved  district sales representative in Arkansas

          who provided  a Honda  executive vice-president with  evidence of

          payoffs involving Cardiges, then  the national sales manager, and

          a zone manager.   By early 1992, Honda had begun "cleaning house"

          and Cardiges had resigned.  An  extensive federal criminal inves-

          tigation ensued.    

                                          7

                    On  March 11, 1994, a  federal grand jury  in New Hamp-

          shire returned an indictment  against Billmyer, Josleyn, Cardiges

          and two lower-level Honda sales managers responsible for  the New

          England  region,  David  L.  Pedersen  and  Damien  C.  Budnick.3

          Superseding indictments were returned against  Billmyer, Josleyn,

          and  Cardiges in  October  1994 and  January  1995.   Ultimately,

          Budnick, Cardiges, and Pedersen  entered into plea agreements and

          cooperated with the  government.  Cardiges and Pedersen  were key

          government witnesses at trial.  

                    The second superseding  indictment charged Josleyn  and

          Cardiges, in Count I, with a pattern of racketeering in violation

          of the  Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt  Organizations Act ("RI-

          CO"), 18  U.S.C.    1962(c) (1994).   As  Racketeering Act 1,  it

          alleged that Josleyn and Cardiges had persuaded Honda to select a

          particular outside vendor (from which the defendants had received

          kickbacks) to conduct sales training seminars for Honda salespeo-

          ple employed in New Hampshire and elsewhere in the United States.

          Racketeering  Acts 2  through 8  related to  regional advertising

          associations  which pooled  monies  advanced by  individual Honda

          dealers to defray  their local Honda advertising  costs.  Josleyn

          and Cardiges were charged with causing Honda to match the contri-
                              
          ____________________

               3Pedersen  had joined Honda in July 1979 as a district sales
          manager for Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and  upstate New York.
          Within a year he was transferred to Minnesota.  Around June 1982,
          he  became a district sales manager in  northern Ohio; in 1985, a
          district sales manager in the new Acura Division, responsible for
          a  territory  extending from  Maine to  Minnesota; and,  in March
          1987,  an assistant zone manager, responsible  for the area which
          included New Hampshire.   Budnick, a district sales  manager also
          responsible for New Hampshire, reported directly to Pedersen. 

                                          8

          butions made  by the Honda dealers to  these regional advertising

          associations, on the condition  that the advertising associations

          hire  a particular  vendor (controlled  by Josleyn's  brother) to

          provide the advertising services.   After receiving payments from

          the regional advertising associations, the vendor allegedly  made

          kickbacks  to  Josleyn and  Cardiges.    Other Racketeering  Acts

          described  in  Count  I alleged,  inter  alia,  that Josleyn  and
                                            _____  ____

          Cardiges received kickbacks for awarding numerous LOIs to various

          dealership  candidates in  California,  Maryland,  New York,  and

          other states.

                    Count  II charged Billmyer,  Cardiges, and Josleyn with

          conspiring  to  defraud Honda  by  accepting  payments and  other

          valuable  consideration from  dealers and prospective  dealers in

          exchange  for  LOIs  or  other preferred  treatment.    Count III

          (conspiracy)  and  Count  IV  (mail fraud)  charged  Josleyn  and

          Cardiges  with accepting  kickbacks  from 1989  through 1992,  in

          relation  to the sales  training seminars.   Overall, Josleyn was

          charged in all four counts, whereas Billmyer was charged with the

          Count II "dealer franchise" conspiracy only.

                    Trial  began on  February 7,  1995, before  Chief Judge

          Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.4   After presenting thirty-five witness-

          es,  including Cardiges and Pedersen  and many Honda dealers from

          around the country,  the government  rested its case  on May  10,

          1995.   Billmyer opted  to present  no  witnesses, while  Josleyn
                              
          ____________________

               4Three  weeks into the trial, we were called upon to resolve
          a  discovery dispute. See United  States v. Billmyer,  57 F.3d 31
                                ___ ______________    ________
          (1st Cir. 1995).

                                          9

          mounted  a defense based on  the theory that  top Japanese execu-

          tives in Honda had condoned the activities alleged in the indict-

          ment.   At the  close of the evidence,  the district court denied

          appellants' renewed  Rule 29 motions for  judgments of acquittal.

          See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).
          ___

                    The case went  to the jury on May 19.   Seven days into

          the  deliberations, guilty  verdicts were  returned  against both

          Billmyer  and Josleyn.  After denying their motions for judgments

          of acquittal,  the district court  sentenced Billmyer to  a five-

          year prison term and a $125,000 fine; and Josleyn to six and one-

          half years  in prison on Count  I and a five-year  prison term on

          each  of the three remaining counts, all to be served concurrent-

          ly.

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A. Joinder of Defendants 
          A. Joinder of Defendants
             _____________________

                    As in the district  court, Josleyn and Billmyer contend

          on  appeal that their joint indictment and trial violated Fed. R.

          Crim. P. 8.5  
                              
          ____________________

               5Rule 8 provides:

                    (a) Joinder of Offenses.  Two or more offenses may
                    (a) Joinder of Offenses.
               be  charged in the same  indictment or information in a
               separate  count  for  each  offense  if  the   offenses
               charged, whether felonies or  misdemeanors or both, are
               of  the same or similar  character or are  based on the
                       ____ __ _______  _________
               same  act  or transaction  or on  two  or more  acts or
               ____  ___  __ ___________  __                   ____ __
               transactions connected together  or constituting  parts
               ____________
               of a common scheme or plan.
                    ______ ______ __ ____
                    (b) Joinder of Defendants.  Two or more defendants
                    (b) Joinder of Defendants.
               may be charged in the same indictment or information if
               they  are alleged to have  participated in the same act
                         _______          ____________        ____ ___

                                          10

                    The federal  courts have long recognized  that consoli-

          dated trials tend to  promote judicial economy, conserve prosecu-

          torial resources, and foster the consistent resolution of factual

          disputes common to properly joined defendants.  See, e.g., United
                                                          ___  ____  ______

          States v.  MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 60 (1st
          ______     ________________________________

          Cir. 1991).  In resolving a Rule 8(b) misjoinder claim, the trial

          court must examine the indictment to determine whether there is a

          factual basis  for  joining the  defendants.   United  States  v.
                                                         ______________

          Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 245 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498  U.S. 849
          ______                                _____ ______

          (1990).   While Rule 8 harbors the potential for unfair prejudice

          in  consolidated trials, see King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700,
                                   ___ ____    _____________

          703-04 (1st Cir. 1966) (Aldrich, C.J.) (noting risk that jury may

          infer  guilt by association), the  rule nonetheless may be gener-

          ously construed in favor of joinder, given the protective discre-

          tion vested in the trial court under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.

                    The district court apparently  concluded that the Count

          II  dealer  franchise  conspiracy  charge  against  Billmyer  and

          Josleyn warranted their joinder under  Rule 8(b).  Its conclusion

          plainly  would  have  been  unexceptionable  had  the  indictment

          contained only Count  II, see  United States v.  Morrow, 39  F.3d
                                    ___  _____________     ______

          1228,  1237-38 (1st  Cir. 1994),  cert. denied,  115 S.  Ct. 1421
                                            _____ ______

          (1995),  or had the conspiracy alleged in Count II clearly encom-
                              
          ____________________

               or  transaction or in the same series of acts or trans-
                                         ____ ______ __ ____
               actions  constituting  an offense  or  offenses.   Such
                        ____________  __ _______
               defendants may be charged in one or more counts togeth-
               er  or separately and all of the defendants need not be
               charged in each count. 

          Fed. R. Crim. P. 8 (emphasis added).

                                          11

          passed all  substantive offenses alleged in the  indictment.  See
                                                                        ___

          United  States  v. Arruda,  715 F.2d  671,  678 (1st  Cir. 1983).
          ______________     ______

          Otherwise,  joinder under  Rule 8(b)  was problematic  unless the

          criminal  acts alleged in all counts were part of the same series
                                 __ ___ ______                  ____ ______

          of acts or  transactions.  See United States v.  Yefsky, 994 F.2d
                                     ___ _____________     ______

          885, 895 (1st Cir. 1993).  

                    A misjoinder of defendants  requires a reversal only if

          the resulting prejudice "`had substantial and injurious effect or

          influence in determining the jury's  verdict.'"  United States v.
                                                           _____________

          Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (mandating "harmless error" review
          ____

          of Rule 8(b) misjoinder) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328
                                            _________    _____________

          U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).  As  it would be incumbent upon this court

          in  all events to conduct  the "harmless error" analysis mandated

          in Lane were we to conclude that a  misjoinder occurred, see id.,
             ____                                                  ___ __

          and  since the misjoinder question  itself is far  from clear, we

          will assume,  without deciding,  that the misjoinder  occurred as

          claimed by Billmyer, and proceed directly to the "harmless error"

          inquiry.  See United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 504 (1st Cir.)
                    ___ _____________    _____

          (bypassing misjoinder  question where any  error ultimately would

          prove harmless), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S.
                           ________ ___ _____ _____

          July 16, 1996) (No. 96-178).  We conclude that any misjoinder was

          harmless.  

                    Not  only did  the  parties  marshal their  evidentiary

          presentations to  minimize prejudicial spillover,  but throughout

          the trial  the district  court prudently and  carefully cautioned

          the  jury to consider the evidence against each individual defen-

                                          12

          dant.   No  less importantly,  Billmyer's retirement  from Honda,

          prior to the time Josleyn launched the dealer advertising associ-

          ation and sales training schemes,  unquestionably facilitated the

          individualized factfinding  focus  to which  each  defendant  was

          entitled from the jury.  Cf.  Morrow, 39 F.3d at 1235-36 (errone-
                                   ___  ______

          ous admission of hearsay under coconspirator exception held to be

          "harmless"  given distinctiveness  of two  fraudulent  schemes). 

          Finally, at the close of all the evidence, the trial judge gave a

          careful cautionary instruction, once  again reminding the jury to

          consider the  evidence against each defendant  individually.  See
                                                                        ___

          Lane, 474  U.S. at 450 (limiting  instructions mitigate prejudice
          ____

          from misjoinder). 

                    Although  these  safeguards may  not  have sufficed  in

          another case, the evidence  against both Billmyer and Josleyn can

          only be described as overwhelming.  See Randazzo, 80 F.3d at 628.
                                              ___ ________

          An  army   of  former   Honda  executives,   including  Cardiges,

          Billmyer's proteg   and eventual  successor, as well  as numerous

          Honda  dealers, presented  a wealth  of telling  evidence against

          appellants.    See Lane,  474  U.S. at  450  (noting overwhelming
                         ___ ____

          evidence of guilt);  see infra Section II.B.3.   Consequently, we
                               ___ _____

          are  persuaded that no aspect of the jury's decision was substan-

          tially influenced by any misjoinder.  See O'Neal v. McAninch, 115
                                                ___ ______    ________

          S. Ct. 992, 995 (1995).

          B.   Sufficiency of the Evidence and
          B.   Sufficiency of the Evidence and
               _______________________________
               Venue (Franchise Conspiracy Count)
               Venue (Franchise Conspiracy Count)
               _________________________________

                    The jury found that both appellants participated in the

                                          13

          dealership franchise  conspiracy alleged  in Count II.6   Neither

          appellant  seriously disputes  that he  conspired with  Cardiges.

          Rather, their principal contention is that there was insufficient

          evidence  to prove,  beyond a  reasonable doubt,  that  they both
                               ______ _  __________ _____

          participated in  the same  conspiracy with Pedersen,  which, they

          maintain, was  essential to  establish both the  substantive con-

          spiracy charge in Count II and proper venue in New Hampshire.  As
                                     ___

          their contention  confuses the  standards of proof  applicable to

          these two distinct  issues, and the record  demonstrates that the

          government readily met both, appellants'  convictions under Count

          II must be affirmed.

                    1.  Standard of Proof
                    1.  Standard of Proof
                        _________________

                    The  unchallenged instructions  apprised the  jury that

          the government  was  required to  prove four  elements, beyond  a

          reasonable doubt,  in order to prevail  on Count II:   (i) two or

          more persons entered into  the unlawful agreement charged  in the

          indictment; (ii) the particular defendant, knowing the purpose of

          the agreement,  knowingly and  willfully became  a member  of the

          conspiracy; (iii) some member of the conspiracy knowingly commit-

          ted at least one alleged  overt act; and (iv) at least  one overt
                              
          ____________________

               6Count II  alleged  that Billmyer,  Josleyn,  Cardiges,  and
          others known and unknown, conspired to defraud Honda by accepting
          money and other valuable consideration in exchange for LOI rights
          and  other preferential  treatment to  various Honda  dealers and
          prospective  dealers.  Only one  overt act in  furtherance of the
          franchise  conspiracy  alleged  in Count  II  took  place  in the
          District  of New Hampshire.  It alleged that David Pedersen, then
          an assistant  zone sales  manager responsible for  New Hampshire,
          had  recommended one Thomas Bohlander for  an Acura dealership in
          Nashua,  New Hampshire,  in return  for approximately  $18,000 in
          college tuition payments for Pedersen's son.

                                          14

          act was committed in  furtherance of the conspiracy.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 714 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing
          _____________    ______

          United  States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 653 (1st Cir. 1996));
          ______________    ___________

          United  States v.  Brandon, 17  F.3d 409,  428 (1st  Cir.), cert.
          ______________     _______                                  _____

          denied, 115  S. Ct. 80  (1994).   Thus, the jury  need only  have
          ______

          found  beyond a  reasonable doubt  that each  appellant conspired

          with at least one  other person (e.g., Cardiges), and  not neces-

          sarily with Pedersen as well.

                    Putting aside for the moment the question of guilt, see
                                                                        ___

          infra  Section  II.B.3, it  is  clear that  adequate  evidence of
          _____

          Pedersen's role in the  dealer franchise conspiracy was essential

          to  establish  New Hampshire  as a  proper  venue for  Count II.7

          Without objection,  the district  court instructed the  jury that

          the government must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence
                                              _____________

          (rather than beyond a  reasonable doubt), that Pedersen, Billmyer

          and  Josleyn  joined the  Count II  conspiracy and  that Pedersen

          committed the alleged overt act involving the Acura dealership in

          Nashua,  New Hampshire.  See  United States v.  Cordero, 668 F.2d
                                   ___  _____________     _______

          32, 45 n.18 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying preponderance standard,  as

          venue is not  an element  of conspiracy offense);  supra note  6.
                                                             _____
                              
          ____________________

               7Venue rights  are guaranteed by the  Constitution, see U.S.
                                                                   ___
          Const. art. III,   2, cl. 3;  United States v. Georgacarakos, 988
                                        _____________    _____________
          F.2d  1289, 1293 (1st Cir.  1993), and prescribed  by the Federal
          Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 ("Except  as
                                       ___
          otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution
          shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed.").
          Venue  "concerns only the place  where the case  may be tried[,]"
          whereas jurisdiction "has to do with the authority  or power of a
          court  to try  a case."    Wayne R.  LaFave &  Jerold H.  Israel,
          Criminal  Procedure   16.1, at 334 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (footnotes
          ___________________
          omitted).  

                                          15

          Thus,  consistent  with  the unchallenged  jury  instructions  on

          conspiracy and venue,  as well as applicable  law, the government

          could establish venue in New Hampshire by only a preponderance of

          the  evidence,  but it  was  required to  prove  each appellant's

          participation in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.8  

                    2.  Standard of Review
                    2.  Standard of Review
                        __________________

                    We  will uphold the verdicts under Count II if a ratio-

          nal  juror  could have  found  each  substantive  element of  the

          alleged conspiracy  beyond a  reasonable doubt, United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656,  660 (1st Cir.), petition for  cert. filed,
          _______                                ________ ___  _____ _____

          No. 96-5578 (U.S. Aug.  13, 1996), and proper venue by  a prepon-

          derance  of the  evidence, Cordero,  668  F.2d at  45 n.18.   All
                                     _______

          credibility  issues  are to  be  resolved,  and every  reasonable

          inference drawn,  in  the light  most favorable  to the  verdict.

          DiMarzo, 80 F.3d at 660; United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d
          _______                  _____________    _____________

          298, 301  (D.C. Cir.  1991) (venue).   A  thorough review  of the

          entire record  discloses ample  evidentiary support for  the ver-
                              
          ____________________

               8The  following  explanation  exposes  the  fallacy  in  the
          unitary standard of proof urged by appellants.  

                    [T]he  evidence  may  well  be  sufficient to
                    permit  reasonable  inferences  that a  given
                    individual was  more likely than not a member
                    of the  alleged  conspiracy and  performed  a
                    given  act in  furtherance of  the conspiracy
                    within the district  of prosecution,  thereby
                    satisfying the venue requirement, even if the
                    jury finds the same evidence not sufficiently
                    persuasive to cause  it, for purposes of  as-
                    sessing  guilt, to draw  those inferences be-
                    yond a reasonable doubt.  

          United  States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 45 n.18 (2d Cir.) (citation
          ______________    ____
          omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 211 (1994).
                    _____ ______

                                          16

          dicts against each appellant. 

                    3.  Guilt      
                    3.  Guilt      
                        _____

                    The Count II conspiracy  charge required proof that the

          particular  defendant and at least  one other person expressly or

          tacitly agreed to commit a federal  offense.  DiMarzo, 80 F.3d at
                                                        _______

          660.   The government must  have shown that  the defendant volun-

          tarily participated to promote a criminal objective.  Brandon, 17
                                                                _______

          F.3d  at 428.   When, as in  this case, mail fraud  is an alleged

          goal  of the  conspiracy, the  government must  prove either  the

          intent to use  the mails or that such use was reasonably foresee-

          able.  Yefsky, 994 F.2d  at 890; see also United States  v. Dray,
                 ______                    ___ ____ _____________     ____

          901 F.2d 1132,  1137 (1st  Cir.) (noting that  intent element  in

          conspiracy  differs from  substantive mail fraud),  cert. denied,
                                                              _____ ______

          498 U.S. 895 (1990).   A particular defendant need not have  been

          familiar  with  all the  details of  the  conspiracy or  with the

          identities  of   all  other  conspirators.     United  States  v.
                                                         ______________

          Innamorati,  996 F.2d 456, 470 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
          __________                                      _____ ______

          U.S. 1120 (1994); United States v. Bello-Perez, 977 F.2d 664, 668
                            _____________    ___________

          (1st Cir. 1992).  

                    A  brief  overview  leaves  no  reasonable  doubt  that

          Billmyer,  Cardiges, and  other Honda  sales  executives, respec-

          tively, conspired to defraud  Honda by accepting valuable consid-

          eration for awarding dealership franchises and other preferential

          treatment to Honda dealers and prospective dealers.  

                         a.   Billmyer
                         a.   Billmyer
                              ________

                    As  early  as  1979,  while Billmyer  was  the  eastern

                                          17

          regional sales manager,  Cardiges, as zone  manager for the  mid-

          Atlantic states, accepted  a $10,000 payment from  a Honda dealer

          in  Philadelphia, and split  it with Billmyer.   In  late 1979 or

          early  1980, Cardiges presented Billmyer  with a gold Rolex watch

          worth as much as $15,000  from a large Honda dealer in  the Wash-

          ington,  D.C. area.  Beginning  with the 1984  holiday season and

          continuing  through 1992,  Cardiges received  $20,000  to $25,000

          each year  from John Rosatti,  a Honda  dealer in New  York City.

          Rosatti told Cardiges that he  was paying Billmyer also, because,

          as Cardiges testified at trial, like other dealers Rosatti wanted

          "favorable  treatment, wanted more  automobiles, more franchises,

          and wanted the ability to have the ear of the  people who were in

          power at Honda."   

                    Cardiges and  Billmyer both helped a  dealer named Rick

          Hendrick acquire approximately thirty  Honda and Acura franchises

          in various  states, including Texas, Georgia,  and the Carolinas.

          In return,  Hendrick helped  Cardiges buy a  California residence

          from which Cardiges later realized  a $250,000 gain.  Thereafter,

          Hendrick defrayed approximately $150,000 in interest payments  on

          a loan Cardiges  had obtained to  buy a $700,000  home in  Laguna

          Hills, California.  During this same 1989-92 time frame, Hendrick

          intimated  to   Cardiges  that  he  was   involved  in  financing

          Billmyer's home in Palm  Springs as well.  Cardiges  also learned

          from Billmyer  that Hendrick had provided Billmyer with a top-of-

          the-line BMW. 

                    Cardiges  described  periodic  payoffs  from  one Marty

                                          18

          Luftgarten, who  owned dealerships  in New  Jersey, Philadelphia,

          and southern California.   For example, at the grand opening of a

          Luftgarten dealership  during the mid-1980s,  Billmyer, Cardiges,

          and two  other  Honda  sales managers,  Bill  Kutchera  and  Jeff

          Conway,  gathered in  a conference  room where  Luftgarten handed

          each an envelope containing  $5,000 in cash.  Around  the holiday

          season,  another  dealer  customarily sent  Cardiges  $5,000 gift

          certificates from  Neiman-Marcus for both Cardiges  and Billmyer.

          See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 242 (noting that defendants often cooper-
          ___ ______

          ated with one  another by  collecting payments).   The record  is

          replete with  other evidence  of cash  payments from  dealers and

          lavish shopping trips to Hong Kong. 

                         b.   Josleyn
                         b.   Josleyn
                              _______

                    Similarly, there was ample  evidence to enable a ratio-

          nal jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Josleyn conspired

          with  Cardiges and others to defraud Honda in connection with the

          Honda dealership franchises.   In early 1991, while  zone manager

          for  the west coast, Josleyn  arranged for a  "friend" back east,

          Joe Pope,  to pay  $150,000 for  the "open  point" in  Elk Grove,

          California.  Josleyn approached Cardiges, national sales manager,

          and  Robert  Rivers,  regional  manager for  the  western  United

          States, and  advised that there would  be money in it  for all of

          them if Pope were to receive the Elk Grove dealership.   Thereaf-

          ter, Cardiges,  Rivers, and Josleyn, in direct violation of Honda

          procedure,  decided  not  to  prospect  for  suitable  dealership

          candidates, and awarded the Elk Grove franchise outright to Pope.

                                          19

          As  promised,  Pope issued  a $150,000  check  payable to  Gary &

          Associates, a company controlled by Josleyn and his brother Gary.

          Josleyn in turn gave Cardiges and Rivers each $50,000 in cash. 

                    Cardiges testified that Ed  Temple, a former Honda zone

          manager, approached  him in the summer  of 1991 in behalf  of Bob

          Frink,  a  dealer interested  in  the  Folsom, California  point.

          Temple had accepted payoffs from dealers while employed by Honda,

          and  after  leaving the  company in  1989  established a  firm   

          Blakely Consultants    to facilitate payments to Honda executives

          from dealers seeking  new Honda franchises.   Simply put,  Temple

          told  Cardiges that Frink was willing to pay Cardiges and Josleyn

          for  the Folsom dealership.   On August 5,  1991, Cardiges signed

          the Folsom LOI, and  on the same day  Frink paid Blakely  Consul-

          tants $500,000 for services rendered.   Three days later,  Temple

          wrote  a $166,666 check to  Magnum Marketing, a  company owned by

          Josleyn.  Cardiges reported  $166,666 from Blakely Consultants on

          his own 1991  income tax  return, although Temple  had agreed  to

          hold Cardiges' one-third share until Cardiges left Honda.  

                    We need  belabor the  point  no further,  as there  was

          ample evidence to enable the  jury reasonably to conclude, beyond

          a reasonable  doubt, that  Josleyn was a  member of the  Count II

          dealership franchise conspiracy.  See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 242.
                                            ___ ______

                    4.  Venue
                    4.  Venue
                        _____

                    As a general rule,  venue in a conspiracy case  depends

          upon whether an overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspira-

          cy occurred in the  trial district.  United States  v. Uribe, 890
                                               _____________     _____

                                          20

          F.2d 554, 558 (1st  Cir. 1989); see  18 U.S.C.   3237(a)  (1994).
                                          ___

          The  defendant need not have been physically present in the trial

          district during  the conspiracy.   United States v.  Santiago, 83
                                             _____________     ________

          F.3d 20, 24-25 (1st  Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Cordero,  668 F.2d at
                                           ___  ____  _______

          43-44 (furthering drug importation conspiracy with phone calls to

          undercover  DEA  agent  in Puerto  Rico);  cf.  United  States v.
                                                     ___  ______________

          Georgacarakos, 988  F.2d 1289, 1294 (1st  Cir. 1993) (contrasting
          _____________

          venue  for  "group" and  "individual"  crimes).   The  government

          acknowledges that venue was  proper in the District of  New Hamp-

          shire only if  there was enough evidence  for a rational  jury to

          find  it more likely than not that Pedersen, Josleyn and Billmyer

          belonged to the Count II conspiracy.  

                    Upon joining Honda  as a district sales manager in July

          1979, see supra notes 2  & 3, Pedersen learned that Honda  policy
                ___ _____

          prohibited sales executives from  awarding LOIs for personal gain

          and  from accepting gifts valued  at more than  $25 from dealers.

          In  keeping with Honda policy, Pedersen objected in December 1979

          when Bill  Lia, a dealer in upstate New York, stuffed an envelope

          containing  cash  into  Pedersen's  pocket.    Although  Pedersen

          threatened  to report the incident, he relented when Lia told him

          not to worry because Lia had  "already handled the zone."   More-

          over,  Pedersen knew at the time that both his immediate supervi-

          sor, Northeast Zone Manager Bill Kutchera, and Billmyer, regional

          manager  for the  eastern  United States,  as  well as  Cardiges,

          worked  at Honda  headquarters  in New  Jersey.   In  fact,  when

          Pedersen  told Kutchera  about the  cash  bribe tendered  by Lia,

                                          21

          Kutchera  advised Pedersen to ask for a gift certificate in place

          of the  cash.  Accordingly,  Pedersen ultimately accepted  a $300

          gift  certificate  from Lia  with  Kutchera's  explicit approval.

          Around this same  time, Kutchera also  told Pedersen that  during

          the course of the previous year  he had received two Rolex watch-

          es, a cruise, furniture, and other gifts, valued at $13,000, from

          various dealers.

                    Pedersen testified that he frequently  discussed dealer

          payoffs with Roger  Novelly and Larry Finley,  his Honda supervi-

          sors in Ohio.  Novelly, the assistant zone manager,  specifically

          told Pedersen that  Billmyer and Cardiges were  being "taken care

          of" by dealers, and  Finley, the zone manager, admitted  that Tom

          Bohlander  had paid  him for  the Honda  "open  point" dealership

          franchise in West Cleveland.9  See, e.g., Boylan, 898 F.2d at 243
                                         ___  ____  ______

          (noting that tacit accord among alleged conspirators is permissi-

          bly inferred from evidence that defendants  "often spoke to their

          victims  about other victims  or other defendants  in words which

          plainly revealed that the crimes were interdependent").  Based on

          this  evidence,  and there  was more,  the  jury would  have been

          permitted to draw the reasonable  inference that Pedersen and his

          various supervisors over the years had developed a  shared under-
                                                              ______

          standing of an "unwritten  policy" at Honda:  dealers had  to pay

          Billmyer and Cardiges, as  well as other sales executives  in the
                              
          ____________________

               9Significantly,  Cardiges  identified  Finley, Novelly,  and
          Kutchera as fellow conspirators.  In addition, Pedersen testified
          that he  subsequently received $5,000  from John  Rosatti, a  New
          York Honda dealer who admittedly paid both Cardiges and Billmyer.
          See supra Section II.B.3(a).
          ___ _____

                                          22

          chain of command, in order to receive a Honda or Acura  franchise

          or other favorable treatment.  Id.
                                         __

                    John Orsini,  a Honda and Acura  dealer in Connecticut,

          provided  corroborative  testimony at  trial,  characterizing the

          kickbacks he had made to Billmyer, Pedersen,  and Damien Budnick,

          Pedersen's subordinate,  as a "way of doing business" with Honda.

          At Budnick's  suggestion, Orsini  met with Billmyer  in September

          1987  to discuss obtaining another Acura dealership.  A few weeks

          later, Billmyer offered  Orsini a franchise in  Nanuet, New York,

          if Orsini created a "no-show" job for Billmyer's friend,  Douglas

          T.  Richert, at  $1,000  per week.    After Orsini  accepted  the

          Billmyer proposal, he received the Nanuet LOI.   

                    Around the same time, Orsini discussed with Budnick and

          Pedersen the possibility that Orsini  might obtain a new  dealer-

          ship franchise in Salem,  New Hampshire.  According to  Pedersen,

          Orsini  and other  dealers routinely  and unilaterally  mentioned

          Billmyer's  name in conversation, as a means of "impress[ing]" on

          Pedersen the  dealers' established connections  with higher-level

          Honda  sales managers.   Orsini  told Pedersen  that he  would be

          willing  to  pay for  the Salem  franchise,  but not  the $50,000

          demanded by Budnick.   After  agreeing to help  secure the  Salem

          dealership for Orsini in February 1988, Pedersen received between

          $2,000 and $4,000  in cash from Orsini.   Thus, given the circum-

          stantial evidence that both Billmyer and Pedersen shared a common

          goal or plan to defraud Honda  by accepting illicit consideration

          for awarding new dealership franchises, the jury reasonably could

                                          23

          infer, by  a preponderance  of  the evidence,  that Billmyer  and

          Pedersen  defrauded  Honda  in  connection with  the  Salem,  New

          Hampshire LOI by accepting payoffs from a common  source, Orsini.

          See, e.g., Brandon,  17 F.3d at  450 (finding single  conspiracy,
          ___  ____  _______

          despite variations in details  and tactics, where main objective,

          structure,  intended  victim, and  modus  operandi remained  con-

          stant); supra Section I. 
                  _____

                    In addition to accepting  illicit payments from Lia and

          Orsini,  the  record  demonstrates,  by a  preponderance  of  the

          evidence, that  Pedersen committed an overt act  in New Hampshire

          in  furtherance of the Count  II conspiracy, by  accepting a free

          Acura Integra  from Bohlander's West  Cleveland, Ohio, dealership

          in  1986.  After Bohlander  and Pedersen became friends, Pedersen

          agreed  to  help  Bohlander  acquire more  Acura  dealerships  in

          exchange for a silent  ownership interest in a Nashua,  New Hamp-

          shire, dealership.   Pedersen  recommended Bohlander for  the new

          Nashua  franchise,  and  in  due course  Bohlander  received  it.

          Although  Pedersen later  declined an  ownership interest  in the

          Nashua  dealership,  he  nonetheless  let  Bohlander  pay roughly

          $18,000  in college tuition fees  for Pedersen's son.   Thus, the

          evidence sufficed to demonstrate,  by a preponderance, that venue

          was proper in the District of New Hampshire.  See Uribe, 890 F.2d
                                                        ___ _____

          at 558.

                    Finally, there was evidence  from which a rational jury

          reasonably could have  inferred, by a  preponderance of the  evi-

          dence,  that Bohlander  routinely paid  Billmyer and  Cardiges as

                                          24

          well.   Pedersen described  a  card game  at Bohlander's  Florida

          condominium  in February  1991,  during which  Bohlander and  Lou

          Tecco, a  dealer associated  with Marty Luftgarten,  talked about

          paying  bribes as a "way of doing business" with Honda, and noted

          that Billmyer and Cardiges had to be paid in order to get dealer-

          ships  and other  favorable treatment.   Along with  the evidence

          that Bohlander had paid Finley for  the West Cleveland dealership

          and that dealers commonly bribed sales executives at each succes-

          sive level, see  supra p. 22, Pedersen's  testimony permitted the
                      ___  _____

          jury reasonably to conclude that it was more likely than not that

          Bohlander  had paid Billmyer, the Acura Division head, as well as

          Pedersen, in return for the Nashua dealership in 1987.  Thus, the

          similarity in the pattern  of fraudulent transactions relating to

          new dealership franchises, the  common core of "insider" partici-

          pants, and  the temporal  overlap would  enable  a rational  jury

          reasonably to infer, under the applicable preponderance standard,

          that Pedersen,  Billmyer, Josleyn, and Cardiges  agreed, at least

          tacitly, to defraud Honda by accepting illicit consideration from

          candidates for  new Honda dealership franchises  in direct viola-

          tion  of established Honda policy and procedures.  See Morrow, 39
                                                             ___ ______

          F.3d at  1233-34;  Bello-Perez,  977  F.2d at  668  (noting  that
                             ___________

          conspirators need  not know all coconspirators);  see also United
                                                            ___ ____ ______

          States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147, 1152-54 (5th Cir. 1987).
          ______    _________

          C.  Other Claims By Josleyn
          C.  Other Claims By Josleyn
              _______________________

                    1.   Sufficiency of the Evidence
                    1.   Sufficiency of the Evidence
                         ___________________________
                         (Counts I, III & IV) 
                         (Counts I, III & IV) 
                          __________________

                    After the government rested its case, Josleyn moved for

                                          25

          acquittal under Counts I, III, and IV, claiming that the evidence

          was insufficient  to establish,  beyond a reasonable  doubt, that

          the Honda  dealers and their dealer  advertising associations had

          been victimized by the  alleged mail fraud since the  dealers and

          advertising  associations had  received  the sales  training  and

          advertising  services for which they  paid.  This  claim fails as

          well. 

                    In United  States v.  Allard, 926 F.2d  1237 (1st  Cir.
                       ______________     ______

          1991),  we explained  that  it is  no  "defense that  the  victim

          received something in exchange even if it was equivalent in value
                   _________

          to what the victim was deceived into relinquishing."  Id. at 1242
                                                                ___

          (citing United States v.  King, 860 F.2d  54, 55 (2d Cir.  1988),
                  _____________     ____

          cert.  denied,  490 U.S.  1065 (1989)).    Given that  the proper
          _____  ______

          inquiry under Allard is whether  Josleyn intended to defraud  the
                        ______

          dealers  and advertising  associations  into  parting with  their

          money, there  was ample  evidence, particularly the  testimony of

          Cardiges,  to support  the  jury verdicts  against Josleyn  under

          Counts I, III, and IV.             2.     Jury   Instructions  on
                                             2.     Jury   Instructions  on
                                                    _______________________

          Condonation
          Condonation
          ___________

                    The district  court  rejected Josleyn's  proposed  jury

          instruction that  the government must prove,  beyond a reasonable

          doubt, that  Honda had not condoned  Josleyn's fraudulent activi-

          ties.  Ordinarily, a  defendant is entitled to an  instruction on

          his theory of  the case as long as it is  legally valid and there

          is sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

          defendant, to permit a reasonable juror to credit the defendant's

                                          26

          theory.  United  States v.  Flores, 968 F.2d  1366, 1368-69  (1st
                   ______________     ______

          Cir.  1992); United States v. Shenker, 933  F.2d 61, 65 (1st Cir.
                       _____________    _______

          1991).  The government does not dispute that the evidence adduced

          at  trial would  have  permitted the  jury  to find  that  native

          Japanese  executives at  the highest  levels of  Honda implicitly

          condoned the  acceptance of bribes and  kickbacks.  Nevertheless,

          the trial court need not adopt the precise instructional language

          proposed by the defendant.   United States v. DeStefano,  59 F.3d
                                       _____________    _________

          1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995).  

                    Viewed as a  whole, we think  the instruction given  by

          the district court fairly summarized Josleyn's defense theory: 

                    Since  the  essential  element of  the  crime
                    charged is intent to defraud, it follows that
                    good faith on  the part of the defendant is a
                    complete defense to  a charge of mail  fraud.
                    A defendant,  however has no burden to estab-
                    lish a defense of good faith.  The burden  is
                    on the government  to prove fraudulent intent
                    and the consequent lack of good faith  beyond
                    a reasonable doubt. 
                         . . . .

                         It  is the defendant Josleyn's theory of
                    the case that American Honda knew of and con-
                    doned; that  is, gave  tacit approval  to the
                    activities  of its  employees alleged  in the
                    indictment  that  were  in violation  of  its
                    policies.  American Honda's knowledge or con-
                    donation of the commission of an offense does
                    not  by  itself  constitute a  defense  or an
                         __  ______
                    excuse.   However,  any evidence  of American
                                        ___ ________  __ ________
                    Honda's  actions or omissions, or evidence of
                    _______  _______ __ _________  __ ________ __
                    deficiencies in the manner in which it imple-
                    ____________ __ ___ ______ __ _____ __ ______
                    mented  and enforced its  policies and proce-
                    ______  ___ ________ ___  ________ ___ ______
                    dures, may be considered by you to the extent
                    _____  ___ __ __________ __ ___ __ ___ ______
                    that  such  evidence bears  on  the  issue of
                    ____  ____  ________ _____  __  ___  _____ __
                    whether  or not  Mr. Josleyn  formed  the re-
                    _______  __ ___  ___ _______  ______  ___ ___
                    quired intent to commit the crimes with which
                    ______ ______ __ ______ ___ ______ ____ _____
                    he  is charged.   Mr.  Josleyn contends  that
                    __  __ _______
                    because  he believed  American Honda  knew of
                    and condoned the  activities in question,  he

                                          27

                    did not possess the required intent to commit
                    the offenses with which he is charged. 
                         The  defendant  has no  obligation what-
                    soever  to prove  to you  that his  theory is
                    correct, but rather  the burden is always  on
                    the government to prove  all of the  material
                    elements  of  each offense  charged  beyond a
                    reasonable doubt[,] including the  element of
                    intent with  respect to each  offense[,] as I
                    have  already  explained to  you.   (Emphasis
                    added.) 
                 
                    The  charge  given  by  the  trial  judge  unmistakably

          permitted  the jury to  consider all the  condonation evidence in

          determining whether  Josleyn had  formed the requisite  intent to

          defraud Honda.   No more was required.  See generally New England
                                                  ___ _________ ___________

          Enters.,  Inc. v.  United States,  400 F.2d  58, 71-72  (1st Cir.
          ______________     _____________

          1968)  (discussing "good  faith"  defense to  mail fraud),  cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied, 393  U.S.  1036  (1969).   Since  Josleyn  neither  cites
          ______

          authority, nor  demonstrates, that  any condonation by  Honda was

          relevant to an element of the charged offenses other than intent,

          see  Yefsky, 994 F.2d at  890-91 (listing elements  of mail fraud
          ___  ______

          conspiracy  and substantive mail fraud); see also Aetna Cas. Sur.
                                                   ___ ____ _______________

          Co. v.  P &  B Autobody,  43 F.3d 1546,  1558-60 (1st  Cir. 1994)
          ___     _______________

          (RICO),  we conclude  that  the  jury  instruction given  by  the

          district  court was  adequate.   See  DeStefano,  59 F.3d  at  3;
                                           ___  _________

          Shenker,  933  F.2d  at  65-66  (rejecting  proposed  instruction
          _______

          predicated on impermissibly broad  defense); cf. United States v.
                                                       ___ _____________

          Wallach, 935 F.2d  445, 464  (2d Cir. 1991)  (mail fraud  statute
          _______

          protects  property  interests  of  shareholders  and  corporation

          against officers' schemes). 

                    3.  Impeachment of Cardiges
                    3.  Impeachment of Cardiges
                        _______________________

                                          28

                    Josleyn contends that though the prosecutor was respon-

          sible for  deliberately suborning false testimony  from Cardiges,

          the district  court unduly  impeded Josleyn's efforts  to impeach

          Cardiges on cross-examination.   These claims are meritless.  See
                                                                        ___

          generally United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 759-60 (1st Cir.
          _________ _____________    ______

          1991)  (approving  reasonable  restrictions  by  trial  court  on

          repetitive,  harassing, unduly prejudicial, irrelevant, or other-

          wise improper  cross-examination); cf. United States  v. Tavares,
                                             ___ _____________     _______

          93 F.3d  10, 14-15  (1st Cir.  1996) (rejecting  baseless perjury

          allegation).     

                    On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Cardiges to

          explain  two newspaper  articles in  which his  lawyer reportedly

          stated that  the government  had evidence  that the top  Japanese

          managers at Honda knew about  the alleged criminal activities  in

          its sales  division.  Cardiges  testified that he  neither autho-

          rized the press statements,  nor knew their basis.   On redirect,

          the prosecutor  elicited testimony  that though Cardiges  and his

          attorney  had been  afforded  "open access"  to the  government's

          file, Cardiges had  seen "no documents  that either indicated  or

          show[ed] that the Japanese knew anything about kickbacks or gifts

          or anything like that."  In response, Josleyn's counsel sought to

          confront Cardiges with several  FBI interview reports    obtained

          from the government's file    which contained statements by Honda

          employees to the effect  that the Japanese knew about  the bribes

          and kickbacks.  

                    The district court permitted defense counsel to use the

                                          29

          FBI reports for impeachment purposes, i.e., to show that Cardiges
                                                ____

          either did not  tell the  truth, or had  not reviewed the  entire
                                                                     ______

          contents  of the government  file.  But the  court ruled that the

          FBI interview  reports were  inadmissible hearsay if  offered for

          their truth.   See Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 480-81;  Fed. R. Evid.
                         ___ __________

          801(c) (defining  hearsay).  On  appeal, Josleyn argues  that the

          district  court  impermissibly restricted  recross-examination by

          refusing  to allow the jury to consider all hearsay statements in
                                                  ___

          the FBI interview reports.  

                    Our review  of the trial transcripts  satisfies us that

          the district court  accorded Josleyn ample leeway  to explore the

          FBI interview  reports in sufficient  detail to  enable the  jury

          fairly to weigh Cardiges'  testimony relating to the government's

          file.   For  example, Cardiges  admitted on  recross that  he had

          never seen the FBI  interview reports, and was "quite  sure" that

          he was  not able to get  through the "thousands and  thousands of

          documents"  during the  four-hour period  he spent  reviewing the

          government file.  The district  court did sustain several hearsay

          objections when  defense counsel  attempted to delve  more deeply

          into  the  contents of  the  FBI interview  reports.   It  did so

          properly,  however, since  Josleyn  proffered  no  relevant  non-

          hearsay purpose  for  probing  further.   Cf.  United  States  v.
                                                    ___  ______________

          Hudson,  970 F.2d 948,  956-57 (1st  Cir. 1992)  (defense counsel
          ______

          responded to  hearsay objection  with impeachment proffer).   Nor

          does Josleyn  now challenge these hearsay  rulings.  Accordingly,

          we find no error.  See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2).  
                             ___

                                          30

                    4.  Delayed Disclosure of Condonation Evidence 
                    4.  Delayed Disclosure of Condonation Evidence 
                        __________________________________________

                    Josleyn  claims that  he was  deprived of  a meaningful

          opportunity  to  cross-examine  Cardiges  and  other  prosecution

          witnesses due  to the government's delayed  disclosure of certain

          letters written to the government by Cecil Proulx, a former Honda

          executive, outlining his efforts  in the late 1980s to  bring the

          pervasive bribes and  kickbacks to the  attention of Honda's  top

          Japanese  executives.  The government produced some of the Proulx

          materials before trial, including a summary of his FBI interview,

          but found and  unseasonably produced  additional material  months

          later    upon learning that Josleyn intended  to call Proulx as a

          witness     tending to show  that Honda's  Japanese managers  had

          condoned  the illegal activities in  its sales division.  Josleyn

          unsuccessfully  moved to  dismiss the  indictment on  due process

          grounds. 

                    Given  the specific  discovery request  for condonation

          evidence,  the government  plainly had  an obligation  to furnish

          Josleyn with  the Proulx materials in a more timely fashion.  See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1161, 1178 (1st  Cir. 1993),
          _____________    _________

          cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.  2714 (1994); see also Fed. R.  Crim. P.
          _____ ______                           ___ ____

          16(a)(1)(C)  (discovery  relating  to documents  material  to de-

          fense);  16(c) (continuing duty to  disclose).  Since the govern-

          ment failed seasonably to disclose evidence "material to guilt or

          punishment,"  United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 289 (1st Cir.
                        _____________    _____

          1990) (citing Brady v.  Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87  (1963)), which
                        _____     ________

          includes both  exculpatory and impeachment  evidence, we  inquire

                                          31

          whether  as  a  consequence  of the  delayed  disclosure  defense

          counsel was unable to use  the material "effectively in preparing

          and presenting the defendant's case."  Id. (quoting United States
                                                 __           _____________

          v.  Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st  Cir. 1986)).  Due to its
              ________

          greater  familiarity with the dynamics  of the case,  we will not

          reverse a district court's ruling on delayed disclosure unless it

          amounts to a demonstrable abuse  of discretion.  Id.   We discern
                                                           ___

          no abuse of discretion.

                    First, a principal concern  in delayed disclosure cases

              whether the failure to supply the information in a seasonable

          fashion  caused the defense to change its trial strategy, see id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          at 290    is not significantly implicated in this case.   Josleyn

          consistently  pursued the  same  defense theory  both before  and

          after  the Proulx materials  were provided,  by arguing  that the

          Japanese  managers at  Honda  had condoned  the charged  conduct.

          Secondly, even though the Proulx materials unquestionably provid-

          ed additional support  for the condonation "defense," we  are not

          persuaded  that the  delay in  disclosure adversely  affected the

          defense in any important respect.  In fact, while Cardiges was on

          the   witness  stand,   Josleyn's  counsel  observed   that  "the

          government's file is like 100,000 pages  or so."  See also  infra
                                                            ___ ____  _____

          note  10.   The defense  took full  advantage of  the condonation

          evidence  by using it  in its own  case, even before  the tardily

          produced Proulx materials were  made available, then featured the

                                          32

          government's delayed disclosure in its closing argument.10  

                    On  this record,  we think  the district  court soundly

          concluded that the Proulx materials added little to  the evidence

          previously  produced by  the government,  and therefore  its late

          disclosure  had not  impeded Josleyn's  defense to  a significant

          degree.  See United States v.  Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir.
                   ___ _____________     ______

          1995)   (noting   cumulativeness   of   impeachment   materials);

          Sepulveda, 15  F.3d  at 1179  (holding  that failure  to  produce
          _________

          "incremental information" caused no prejudice).   We note as well

          that Josleyn makes no claim that the prosecutor intentionally de-

          layed disclosure.  

                    Furthermore,  and by  no  means least  importantly, the

          only  relief Josleyn requested was  the outright dismissal of the

          indictment.  The district court  has broad discretion to  redress

          discovery  violations  in  light  of their  seriousness  and  any

          prejudice occasioned the defendant.  Osorio,  929 F.2d at 762-63;
                                               ______

          see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2) (authorizing district court to
          ___ ____

          "permit  the discovery  or  inspection, grant  a continuance,  or

          prohibit the  party from introducing the  evidence not disclosed,
                              
          ____________________

               10Defense counsel argued in closing: 

                    When  you ask  [a  witness] a  question, when  the
               question  is asked  [whether] you've  gone through  our
               files and there's nothing there to indicate that Ameri-
               can Honda executives knew  about these activities, or a
               question  of that  type,  and there's  tons of  things,
               reams of things in  that file, that's wrong.   When the
               file isn't even complete  because you have a memorandum
               from Mr. Proulx  that you  haven't turned  over to  the
               defense at  all and don't  get turned  over till  weeks
               later, well, isn't  that question kind of a  little bit
               false?

                                          33

          or .  . .  enter such  other order  as it  deems  just under  the

          circumstances").  On the other hand, the draconian relief demand-

          ed  by   Josleyn  was   grossly  disproportionate  both   to  the

          prosecution's nonfeasance and  any prejudice to the defense.  See
                                                                        ___

          Bello-Perez, 977 F.2d at  670 (favoring continuance over dismiss-
          ___________

          al);  accord  Devin, 918  F.2d at  290-91.   As  Josleyn eschewed
                ______  _____

          various alternative remedies more consonant with the government's

          culpability  and any prejudice to the defense, see, e.g., Osorio,
                                                         ___  ____  ______

          929 F.2d  at 762-63  (noting, as alternative  remedies, recalling

          witness  for  additional  cross-examination,   affording  defense

          greater leeway with witnesses,  and instructing jury that govern-

          ment failed to meet  discovery obligations), we find no  abuse of

          discretion in refusing to dismiss the indictment.  

                    5.  Closing Argument 
                    5.  Closing Argument 
                        ________________

                    Josleyn  claims  that  the lead  prosecutor  improperly

          vouched for the credibility of government witnesses, and Cardiges

          in particular, during  rebuttal.   Absent contemporaneous  objec-

          tion, we may notice only "plain error."  United States v. Tuesta-
                                                   _____________    _______

          Toro, 29 F.3d  771, 776-77 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.  denied, 115 S.
          ____                                        _____  ______

          Ct. 947 (1995); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  Viewed in the context of

          the entire trial,  United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 682 (1st
                             _____________    _____

          Cir. 1993), the prosecutor's  remarks, though plainly inappropri-

          ate,  did not  undermine  the fundamental  fairness of  Josleyn's

          trial.  See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985). 
                  ___ _____________    _____

                    Although at  times it  may be difficult  to distinguish

          improper  vouching from zealous  advocacy, there can  be no doubt

                                          34

          that the statements at issue here constituted improper rebuttal: 

                    Now there  was a  lot of suggestion  of false
                    play in this case.  I  want to say this.  I'm
                    a married person with a family, and I go home
                    at  night with  a sound  conscience.   I have
                    worked very hard on this case.  Mr. Feith has
                    worked very hard on  this case.  Mr. Mulvaney
                    and Miss  Roux have worked very  hard on this
                    case.   And we are very proud of what we have
                    done.   We  have done  nothing to  be ashamed
                    of.11 

          Injecting  the prosecutor's personal  life and individual efforts

          into the decisional  mix not  only invited the  jury to  consider

          irrelevant matters  beyond the  record, but unfairly  evoked jury

          sympathy and  diverted attention from the relevant evidence.  See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v.  Rosales,  19 F.3d  763,  767 (1st  Cir.  1994)
          ______________     _______

          (prosecutor denied fabricating evidence against defendant).  

                    There should  be no need to  remind federal prosecutors

          that they are not free to disregard the bounds of proper argument

          even in response to  perceived provocation.  See Young,  470 U.S.
                                                       ___ _____

          at  18-19.   The important  precept that  the prosecutor  may not

          vouch  for  the credibility  of  a government  witness  is deeply

          rooted in American law.   See Rosales, 19 F.3d at 767  ("When the
                                    ___ _______

                              
          ____________________

               11Nor have we  any doubt that  defense counsel provoked  the
          prosecution  to these excesses.  See United States v. Grabiec, __
                                           ___ _____________    _______
          F.3d __, __ (1st Cir. 1996) [No. 96-1131, slip op. at 4 (1st Cir.
          Sept. 25,  1996)].   Referring to Cardiges'  testimony, Josleyn's
          counsel argued:  "It's wrong to  lie, and it's also wrong to help
          you lie; to  ask them questions [when you  know] that the answers
          are going to be untrue. . . .   I call it disgusting."  Later, he
          added:   "You want to see  mail fraud?  Stick  this indictment in
          the mail and you'll see a mail fraud."  Josleyn's counsel made an
          improper appeal for jury  nullification as well:   "People aren't
          born and  the Almighty says  you may be  a prosecutor.   That's a
          right that's given by  the people.  It's a trust.   And when it's
          abused, somebody's got to do something about it."  

                                          35

          prosecutor  places  the  credibility  of counsel  at  issue,  the

          advantage lies with the government . . . .") (citations omitted).

          Thus, a prosecutor may not lend the prestige of the government to

          buttress a  witness, nor  indicate to  the jury that  information

          known to the prosecutor, but  not admitted in evidence,  supports

          the government's theory of the case.  Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19.  
                                                _____

                    The appropriate  response for  the prosecutor in  these

          circumstances is to lodge a contemporaneous objection and request

          an appropriate curative  instruction.   See id. at  13.   Failing
                                                  ___ ___

          that, the prosecutor is  constrained to a fair discussion  of the

          evidence.   But for the  brief passage challenged  on appeal, see
                                                                        ___

          supra p. 34, the prosecution adhered to the appropriate standard.
          _____

                    Under the "plain  error" standard, appellants  bear the

          burden  of  showing that  the  prosecutor's  remarks resulted  in

          prejudice, i.e.,  affected their substantial rights.   See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,  732-34 (1993).  Even then, howev-
          ______    _____

          er,  we will not notice error  unless it caused "a miscarriage of

          justice" or seriously undermined "the integrity or public reputa-

          tion of judicial proceedings."  Id.   We must consider the likely
                                          ___

          impact the  prosecutor's remarks had on the  jury in light of the

          entire record,  including the  closing argument presented  by the

          defense.  Young, 470 U.S. at 16-17.  
                    _____

                    Compared  with  defense  counsel's  attack  against the

          integrity of the  prosecuting attorneys throughout closing  argu-

          ment, see supra note 11, their rebuttal was moderate.  See United
                ___ _____                                        ___ ______

          States v. Oreto,  37 F.3d  739, 746 (1st  Cir. 1994)  (tolerating
          ______    _____

                                          36

          measured response to repeated attempts to magnify government mis-

          conduct),  cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1161  (1995).  In all events,
                     _____ ______

          the  district  court  prudently  countered the  risk  of  serious

          residual prejudice by promptly cautioning the jury that counsel's

          arguments  are not evidence, and  directing the jury  to base its

          verdicts solely on  the evidence.   See United  States v.  Mejia-
                                              ___ ______________     ______

          Lozano,  829 F.2d  268, 274  (1st Cir.  1987).   Given  the over-
          ______

          whelming evidence  against Josleyn, see supra  Section II.B.3(b),
                                              ___ _____

          the provocative excesses in the closing argument presented by his

          own  counsel, and  the timely jury  instructions by  the district

          court, the improper remarks by the prosecutor in rebuttal did not

          rise to the level of plain error.  See Rosales, 19 F.3d at 767-68
                                             ___ _______

          (finding similar vouching harmless error).12
                                    ________

          D.  The Billmyer Sentencing Claim
          D.  The Billmyer Sentencing Claim
              _____________________________

                    Billmyer challenges a two-level enhancement of his base

          offense level ("BOL")  for abusing a  position of private  trust.

          See  U.S.S.G.   3B1.3  (1995).  We  review the    3B1.3 ruling de
          ___                                                            __

          novo.   United States v. Tardiff,  969 F.2d 1283,  1289 (1st Cir.
          ____    _____________    _______

                              
          ____________________

               12Citing United  States v. DiLoreto,  888 F.2d 996,  999 (3d
                        ______________    ________
          Cir. 1989), Josleyn suggests that prosecutorial vouching requires
          reversal per se.   DiLoreto was not only inconsistent  with First
                   ___ __    ________
          Circuit case  law, it has been  overruled.  See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________
          Zehrbach, 47  F.3d  1252,  1264-65 (3d  Cir.)  (en  banc),  cert.
          ________                                                    _____
          denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995).  Furthermore, Josleyn's strongest
          ______
          authority,  see United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 933-36 (9th
                      ___ _____________    _____
          Cir. 1992)  (finding plain  error),  is readily  distinguishable.
          There, defense  counsel did not allege that the prosecutor either
          withheld evidence or suborned perjury,  id. at 934; moreover, the
                                                  ___
          prosecutor had invoked  both the prestige  of the government  and
                                                                        ___
          the authority of  the court in  rebuttal, id. at 936;  cf. United
                                                    ___          __  ______
          States v. Perez, 67 F.3d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (distinguish-
          ______    _____
          ing Smith on latter ground).  
              _____

                                          37

          1992).  As Billmyer acknowledges a sound factual basis for the   

          3B1.3  enhancement, we  need only  apply the  pertinent guideline

          language. 

                    If the defendant abused a position  of public
                    or private trust, or used a special skill, in
                    a manner that  significantly facilitated  the
                    commission  or  concealment  of the  offense,
                    increase  by 2  levels.  This  adjustment may
                                 2           ____  __________ ___
                    not be employed if an abuse of trust or skill
                    ___ __ ________ __ __ _____ __ _____ __ _____
                    is  included  in  the base  offense  level or
                    __  ________  __  ___ ____  _______  _____ __
                    specific offense characteristic.   
                    ________ _______ ______________

          U.S.S.G.   3B1.3 (Nov. 1995) (emphasis added).  

                    The district court applied U.S.S.G.   2B4.1 (commercial

          bribery) to  determine Billmyer's BOL.   As the  specific offense

          characteristics  listed in   2B4.1(b) are  not germane,13 we must

          consider  whether the  BOL prescribed  in    2B4.1  "included" an

                              
          ____________________

               13Section 2B4.1(b) provides:

               Specific Offense Characteristics

               (1)  If  the greater of the  value of the  bribe or the
                    improper  benefit  conferred exceeded  $2,000, in-
                    crease  the  offense  level by  the  corresponding
                    number  of levels  from the  table in   2F1.1 [of-
                    fense-conduct   guideline   for   fraud  and   de-
                    ceit/forgery].

               (2)  If the offense --

                    (A)  substantially  jeopardizes   the  safety  and
                         soundness of a financial institution; or 

                    (B)  affected  a  financial  institution  and  the
                         defendant  derived  more  than $1,000,000  in
                         gross receipts from the offense,

                    increase by  4 levels.   If the  resulting offense
                                 4
                    level is less than 24, increase to level 24.
                                       24                    24

          U.S.S.G.   2B4.1(b).

                                          38

          abuse-of-trust  component which  would render  the offense  level

          enhancement invalid under the second sentence in   3B1.3.

                    The  Guidelines  prohibit  the  sentencing  court  from

          imposing an abuse-of-trust enhancement  in a public bribery case,
                                                       ______

          see U.S.S.G.   2C1.1, comment. (n.3), unless special circumstanc-
          ___

          es  require reference  to  other offense  guidelines,  see id.   
                                                                 ___ ___

          2C1.1(c).  Thus,  in its  main thrust the  present challenge  at-

          tempts  to  equate  Billmyer's commercial  bribery  offense  with

          bribery  of a public official.   According to  Billmyer, the same

          general  rule  must  apply  because public  bribery  and  private

          bribery are "virtually identical" offenses.   We are not persuad-

          ed. 

                    The  absence of  an explicit provision  restricting the
                                        ________

          application  of  the  abuse-of-trust  enhancement  in  commercial

          bribery cases  severely undercuts the analogy  urged by Billmyer.

          See United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 673-74 (1st Cir. 1992)
          ___ _____________    ______

          (applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle in this
                    _________ _____ ___ ________ ________

          sentencing context), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 812 (1993).  Further-
                               _____ ______

          more, the Sentencing Commission  took pains throughout the Guide-

          lines to  specify the  circumstances in  which courts  should not

          impose  enhancements for abuse of  trust.14  In  sum, the overall

          structure of the Guidelines simply does not warrant the categori-
                              
          ____________________

               14See,  e.g., U.S.S.G.   2A3.1(b)(3), comment. (n.4) (sexual
                 ___   ____
          abuse);  id.     2H1.1(b)(1),  comment.  (n.5)  (violating  civil
                   ___
          rights); id.   2P1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.3) (prison escape); id.  
                   ___                                                ___
          2T1.4(b)(1), comment. (n.2) (aiding  tax fraud); see also Newman,
                                                           ___ ____ ______
          982 F.2d  at 673-74; cf. United  States v. Wong, 3  F.3d 667, 670
                               ___ ______________    ____
          (3d Cir.  1993) (noting  Commission's awareness of  potential for
          "double counting").  

                                          39

          cal ban advocated by Billmyer.

                    Moreover,  not only  does Billmyer  cite no  supporting

          case law, but our research discloses ample authority for imposing

          an  abuse-of-trust enhancement in such  a case.   For example, in

          United States  v. Butt, 955  F.2d 77  (1st Cir. 1992),  the court
          _____________     ____

          provided  clear explication  of  its rationale  for upholding  an

          abuse-of-trust  enhancement  in  the  case of  a  police  officer

          convicted on a RICO charge, even though the underlying racketeer-

          ing activity included extortion under color of right.  

                    The  base offense  level  prescribed  by  the
                    guidelines for a particular  crime presumably
                    reflects,  or "includes,"  those characteris-
                    tics considered by Congress  to inhere in the
                    crime  at issue.   In  the case  of extortion
                    under color of right, abuse of trust would be
                    one such characteristic, since Congress could
                    reasonably have determined  that every act of
                    extortion  under color  of right  involves an
                    abuse of  public  trust.   Because  the  RICO
                    statute,  by  contrast,  can be  violated  in
                    innumerable ways, there are, arguably, no of-
                    fense  characteristics  common  to  all  RICO
                    offenses.

          Id. at 89.  The same holds true here.  
          ___

                    Billmyer  was convicted  of  mail  fraud conspiracy  in

          violation of 18 U.S.C.   371.  As not every mail fraud conspiracy

          involves an abuse of  trust, we cannot conclude that  the BOL for

          commercial bribery necessarily includes an abuse-of-trust element

          so as to preclude an enhancement pursuant to   3B1.3.  See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Kummer, 89 F.3d 1536, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1996) (reject-
          ______    ______

          ing  similar argument  under  U.S.S.G.    2E5.1 (bribe  affecting

          employee  benefit plan)); cf. United States  v. Connell, 960 F.2d
                                    ___ _____________     _______

          191, 199 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that BOL applicable to currency

                                          40

          reporting  violations did  not  encompass  stockbroker's  special

          skill).15           United States v. Sinclair,  74 F.3d 753, 762-
                              _____________    ________

          63  (7th Cir.  1996), likewise  demonstrates that  the commercial

          bribery guideline does not take into account an abuse of trust.16

          Sinclair, a bank officer,  was convicted of accepting a  bribe in

          violation  of  18 U.S.C.    215(a)(2),  a  crime that  would seem

          almost  invariably to  entail an abuse  of trust.   Yet the court

          noted that the statute did  not define a single crime, see  id.  
                                                                 ___  ___

          215(a)(1) (prohibiting  person from offering bribe  to bank offi-
                                              ________

          cer), and  reasoned that  it would be  wrong to require  that the
                                                          _______

          briber,  who did  not  necessarily breach  a  position of  trust,

          receive  the   same  sentence  as   the  bank-officer  recipient.

          Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 763.  Similarly, we think Billmyer's greater
          ________

          culpability, relative to other defendants who need not necessari-

          ly  have abused a position of trust in the course of a mail fraud

          conspiracy, entitled the  district court  to impose  the    3B1.3

          adjustment in this case.  Accordingly, we affirm the enhancement.

                              
          ____________________

               15One  reasonable explanation  for the  two-level difference
          between  the BOL for private bribery, see U.S.S.G.   2B4.1 (level
                                                ___
          8), and public bribery, see U.S.S.G.    2C1.1 (level 10), may lie
                                  ___
          in the fact that the Sentencing Commission factored the abuse-of-
          trust element into the BOL for public bribery only.  

               16Sinclair  is  the only  case  involving  an abuse-of-trust
                 ________
          enhancement under U.S.S.G.   2B4.1.  We note, however, that other
          courts commonly allow an abuse-of-trust enhancement  in embezzle-
          ment cases  under U.S.S.G.   2B1.1.   See, e.g., United States v.
                                                ___  ____  _____________
          Broumas, 69 F.3d 1178,  1182 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.  denied, 116
          _______                                        _____  ______
          S. Ct. 1447 (1996).

                                          41

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    Finding no reversible  error, the district court  judg-

          ments are affirmed. 

                    AFFIRMED.
                    AFFIRMED.
                    ________

                                          42