Court Opinion

ID: 9366170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 23:01:59.912329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:50.369288
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/23 P. v. Jennings CA6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H049043
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Super. Ct. No. 155731)

           v.

 MATTHEW GEORGE JENNINGS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Matthew George Jennings appeals the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. We previously reversed the order
denying his petition. The Supreme Court granted review and has transferred the matter to
us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). The parties agree that Strong controls because
defendant’s felony-murder special circumstances were found true before the Supreme
Court clarified that standard in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. For the reasons stated here, we will again reverse the trial
court’s order and remand with directions to issue an order to show cause.
                                  I.     TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
         Our brief factual summary is derived from this court’s prior opinion affirming
defendant’s judgment on direct appeal. (People v. Jennings (Apr. 11, 2001, H017202)
[nonpub. opn.].) We take judicial notice of that opinion on our own motion for the
limited purpose of providing context for the purely legal issue raised in this appeal.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
       The manager of a craft store was ambushed at the store after it closed one night in
1991. The manager was bound with duct tape, robbed, and stabbed over 20 times which
led to his death. Approximately $9,000 was taken from the store’s safe. Defendant and
three other individuals were later arrested. Defendant was charged with first degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187), two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and two counts of
burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). (Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
As to the murder count, the information alleged special circumstances of lying in wait,
torture, burglary, and robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15), (a)(17)(A), (a)(17)(G).)
Defendant pleaded guilty to one burglary count and one robbery count before trial (both
for conduct on a different date unrelated to the homicide).
       There was trial testimony that defendant was the “ ‘leader of the pack’ ” of men
charged with the killing. An acquaintance testified to hearing defendant and the other
men brag about committing robberies using a stun gun, and overhearing the men talk
about their plan to rob the specific craft store where the manager was killed. The same
witness testified that defendant appeared to be one of the masterminds behind the planned
craft store robbery. But evidence from multiple sources suggested that defendant was not
in the store when the manager was murdered, including a jail call from defendant to his
former girlfriend and statements to police by all three codefendants that defendant was
outside during the killing. Blood matching the manager’s blood type was found on the
clothing of the three codefendants when they were arrested, but no blood was found on
defendant’s clothing at the time of his arrest.
       The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and found true three special
circumstances allegations (for lying in wait, burglary, and robbery). The trial court
sentenced him to a life term without the possibility of parole for the murder count,
consecutive to five years eight months for the burglary and robbery counts to which
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defendant had pleaded guilty before trial. (The lying-in-wait special circumstances
finding was later invalidated by a federal district court on collateral habeas review.)
       Defendant petitioned for section 1172.6 relief in 2019. The trial court ultimately
denied the petition, reasoning that “an undisturbed felony murder special circumstance
bars” section 1172.6 relief.
                                    II.   DISCUSSION
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “significantly narrowed the scope of
the felony-murder rule” and “created a path to relief for defendants who had previously
been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory but who could not have been
convicted under the new law.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703.) “Resentencing is
available under the new law if the defendant neither killed nor intended to kill and was
not ‘a major participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2.’ ” (Strong, at
p. 703.) To obtain resentencing, a petitioning defendant must declare that all eligibility
requirements are met. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a), (b)(1)(A).) The trial court must then
evaluate the petition to determine “whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (Id., subd. (c).) If the defendant makes the requisite showing, the trial court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing where the prosecution bears
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under current state law. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(3).)
       In Strong, the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant who was convicted
of felony-murder with a felony-murder special circumstances finding (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)) before the Supreme Court decided Banks and Clark is precluded from
showing prima facie eligibility for relief under section 1172.6. The Strong court
reasoned that “Banks and Clark both substantially clarified the law governing” the
felony-murder special circumstances under section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706.) Because of that significant change in the law, Strong
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concluded that issue preclusion would not prevent a defendant with a pre-Banks and
Clark special circumstances finding from stating a prima facie case for section 1172.6
resentencing. (Strong, at pp. 716–718.) Strong also rejected the Attorney General’s
contention that “a court may reject a petition at the prima facie stage if it independently
examines the record and determines, applying the Banks and Clark standards, that
sufficient evidence supports the earlier findings.” (Strong, at p. 719.) The Strong court
determined that “[n]either the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark findings nor a court’s later
sufficiency of the evidence review amounts to the determination section 1172.6 requires,
and neither set of findings supplies a basis to reject an otherwise adequate prima facie
showing and deny issuance of an order to show cause.” (Strong, at p. 720.)
       In this case, defendant’s 1997 felony-murder special circumstances findings
predated Banks and Clark. Under Strong, those findings do not preclude defendant from
making a prima facie showing to support a section 1172.6 petition. (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 721.) The trial court therefore was incorrect to deny defendant’s petition
solely on the basis of the felony-murder special circumstances findings. The parties
agree that remand is appropriate.
                                    III.   DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s petition is reversed. The matter is remanded with
directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings in accordance
with Penal Code section 1172.6.

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                                   ____________________________________
                                   Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Lie, J.

H049043 - The People v. Jennings