Court Opinion

ID: 9582899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:39.101085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:43.888922
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
INTRODUCTION
Today the majority holds that a person who is lawfully parked on the side of the road can be seized by a police officer, forced to give up his driver’s license and be detained without his consent while the officer runs a warrants check, even though there is not one iota of evidence suggesting that the person has been or is about to engage in any criminal activity and is clear*497ly not in need of police assistance. Such a result cannot be squared with the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), enunciated the dual inquiry in determining whether a seizure is unreasonable under the fourth amendment, whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. To justify seizing a suspect, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably warrant the intrusion. Further, the scope of the interference must not be more intrusive than is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the stop is authorized. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. at 1878. In this case, Officer Barbieri had no legitimate reason to seize Godwin. Additionally, even if there was a lawful reason, Officer Barbieri exceeded the scope of the reason by seizing the driver’s license and detaining Godwin during the warrants check.
I
Before discussing the Terry dual inquiry, the first question to resolve is when God-win was “seized” for purposes of the fourth amendment. The majority concludes that Godwin was seized at the time the officer required him to surrender his driver’s license and, for the purposes of this case, this author has no disagreement with that holding.3
II
The second question is whether that seizure was permissible under the fourth amendment. Here, the officer had no reason to seize Godwin because he had previously ascertained that Godwin was not in need of any assistance, was not in possession of Whitifield’s driver's license and there was no reasonable suspicion that Godwin had committed any traffic offense or crime.
The United States Supreme Court by means of Terry requires that an officer be able to point to specific and articulable facts in order to warrant an intrusion. Here, Officer Barbieri stated that he contacted Godwin for two purposes. First, to ascertain whether Godwin was in need of assistance due to possible car trouble. Second, he wanted to see if Godwin was in possession of Whitifield’s purse. However, Officer Barbieri already knew that God-win’s car was in perfect working order and that Whitifield’s license was not in the purse before he asked Godwin for his license, as evidenced by his response to questions:
Q Okay. You say you would inquire whether there was any motor trouble. Did you ask, have any motor trouble?
*498A I didn’t ask at that time because Officer Yount had asked me to look for a purse or to attempt to locate a driver’s license for Miss Whitifield.
And I’d made contact with [Godwin] and asked if he was waiting for Mrs. Whitifield or Miss Whitifield and I came to the conclusion that he wasn’t having any motor problems because his vehicle was running and he didn’t mention anything.
Q Okay. When you got to the car you readily concluded there was no need for assistance?
A Motorist assist—yes I did.
Q Okay. So then you asked for the purse?
A I asked him if there was a purse in there and he reached into the back seat and retrieved a purse.
Q When was it with respect to when you were checking out for the driver’s license of Ms. Whitifield in the purse that you asked Mr. Godwin about his driver’s license?
A I believe I asked for the purse first and then I asked for his driver’s license. I’m not one hundred per cent positive on the sequence at that time.
Q Were you at the vehicle one time for that purpose? In other words, did you go to the vehicle, ask for the purse and then ask for his driver’s license as well? A Yes, I believe I did.
Q Has Mr. Godwin committed any offense that you were aware of before you asked him for his driver’s license?
A No.
The Alaska Court of Appeals has held that in order “[t]o justify conduct that would amount to an investigative stop, an officer must be aware of at least some specific circumstances supporting a reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle need assistance.” Ozhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918, 922 (Alaska 1990). And, in a case factually similar to the one here, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the police cannot demand a driver’s license after a motorist assist stop when it is clear that the motorist is not in need of any assistance. “[0]nce it became apparent that [the driver] was not disabled, [the officer] had no reason to proceed with the stop and no right to compel [the driver] to produce identification.” State v. DeArman, 54 Wash. App. 621, 774 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1989).
Here, Officer Barbieri knew Godwin was not in need of any assistance, the officer had possession of Whitifield’s purse, and was unable to state any reason to believe that Godwin had violated any laws. Officer Barbieri could not have and, in fact, did not have a reasonable belief that Godwin was in need of assistance. The officer similarly had no reason to demand God-win’s driver’s license. Consequently, the seizure was improper at its inception. “Unless an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a driver is unlicensed or that he is otherwise subject to seizure for violations of the law, a seizure for the purpose of checking identification is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.” State v. Day, 461 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Minn.App.1990).
The majority opinion not only ignores the case law cited above, most of the cases it does cite are easily distinguishable. In State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App.1984), the defendant was pulled over because of a defective tail lamp. As part of that stop, the officer required the driver to produce proof of liability insurance. The Court of Appeals held that the officer’s demand was permissible under the fourth amendment as a because the defendant was legitimately seized as a result of his violation of traffic laws. Here, Godwin did not commit a traffic violation nor was there any other reason to justify the seizure after Officer Barbieri’s concerns about car troubles and Whitifield’s purse were allayed. Reed does not stand for the proposition that the police can detain citizens and demand to see their driver’s licenses without reason.
Likewise in State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 618 P.2d 423 (1980), the police had legally stopped the defendant at a game inspection road block. All that Tourtillott stands for is that the police may demand a driver to produce his/her driver’s license “when the driver is validly stopped.” As *499there was no basis to seize Godwin, Tourtillott is inapposite.4 The same distinction holds true for State v. Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. 57, 782 P.2d 1225 (1989). The defendant there stipulated that the stop of her vehicle at a sobriety checkpoint was constitutionally valid. All the Hawaii Court held in that case was that a police officer may demand the driver’s license of a driver “validly stopped.” (emphasis added)
Note that none of the majority’s cases discussed above are “motorist assist” cases and accordingly do not discuss the level of articulable suspicion necessary for an officer to seize a driver while “assisting” him/ her or the permissible scope of such stops. The only motorist assist case cited by the majority is State v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis.2d 91, 464 N.W.2d 427 (App.1990). In balancing the public interest in the police actions against the right to be free from police interference, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did rule in favor of the police in a holding which cannot withstand analysis.
The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than an arrest depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference from police officers____ Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.
In the absence of basis for suspecting the appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant’s right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640-41, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). In that case, the police observed Brown and another man walking away from one another in an alley in an area which had a high incidence of drug trafficking. When the police stopped Brown, he refused to identify himself to the police and was convicted of violating a Texas statute which made it a crime to refuse to identify one’s self to the police. The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not be required to identify himself to the police because the police did not have a reasonable suspicion that the appellant was involved in criminal conduct. Here, like in Brown, there was no reason to justify the police interference with God-win’s right to person security and privacy. Godwin was not suspected of any criminal activity or of even committing a traffic violation.
The Ellenbecker court, therefore, ignored the teachings of Brown when it allowed the police officer to demand the driver’s license and run a warrants check even though the driver was not suspected of any wrongdoing. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals tried to rationalize its result by arguing that “[a] community caretaker action is not an investigatory Terry stop and thus does not have to be based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d at 429. However, for the community caretaker exception to apply, the officer’s activity must be “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Once it is clear that a driver does not need assistance the community caretaking purpose has been fulfilled. Any continued seizure turns the stop from a community caretak*500ing stop into an investigatory stop. The purpose for demanding the license and running the warrants check in both Ellenbecker and this case was to ascertain whether there was any basis to arrest the driver. That is an investigatory purpose which must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
In light of Brown, the majority’s attempt to distinguish this case from Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), is unconvincing. In that case, the Supreme Court held that:
[Ejxcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that a automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. To this, the majority, rather lamely, says that Prouse is inapplicable because “this case does not concern an instance of unfettered discretion.” In my view, when the police seize an individual even though there is no reason to believe the individual is in need of any assistance or that the individual has committed an offense, that is close enough to unfettered discretion to violate the fourth amendment. This is especially true when considered in light of Brown where the circumstances were much more suspicious than they were here.
Other state courts have held, in cases which involved the detention of the driver of a vehicle, that once the purpose of a detention has been satisfied and there is no reasonable suspicion to detain him further, the stop must end. See People v. Pizzo, 144 A.D.2d 930, 534 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 (1988) (officer’s demand to see driver’s license to run warrant cheek was based on nothing more than “whim, caprice or idle curiosity” where officer had no reason to suspect the driver of any crime or traffic violation and was illegal); State v. Damm, 246 Kan. 220, 787 P.2d 1185 (1990) (Kansas Supreme Court holds that the police may not run a warrants check on a driver who was stopped for defective tail lights absent a reasonable suspicion that there were outstanding warrants for the driver); see also City of Fairborn v. Orrick, 49 Ohio App.3d 94, 550 N.E.2d 488 (1988) (police may not ask driver of motorcycle to produce driver’s license when basis of stop was that motorcycle passenger was not wearing a helmet).
Once Officer Barbieri ascertained that Godwin was not in need- of assistance and gained possession of Whitifield’s purse, the legitimate purposes for his community caretaker contact with Godwin disappeared. Officer Barbieri’s subsequent seizure of Godwin by demanding his driver’s license and the running of the warrants check was an illegal investigatory stop because it was made without reasonable and articulable suspicion that Godwin had committed a crime or traffic violation as is required by Terry.
Thus, this Court need not determine whether a community caretaker seizure was reasonable because Officer Barbieri was conducting an investigatory seizure. Because the stop had to be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the public interests found by the majority do not outweigh Godwin’s right to be free from police interference.
As Chief Justice Burger wrote in Brown:
The Texas statute under which appellant was stopped and required to identify himself is designed to advance a weighty social objective in large metropolitan centers: prevention of crime. But even assuming that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is engaged in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.
*501Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 53, 99 S.Ct. at 2641.5
Finally, the majority cannot justify the demand for Godwin’s driver’s license by the fact that Whitifield did not have a driver’s license. To the contrary, Terry requires individualized suspicion and a person’s “mere propinquity” to others independently suspected of criminal action cannot justify a seizure. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979).
This Court should follow the courts of Alaska and Washington and hold that a police officer may not demand a driver to surrender his driver’s license during a motorist assist stop after it becomes clear the motorist is not in need of any assistance.
Ill
The final step in the Terry analysis is determining whether the seizure exceeded the permissible scope of the intrusion. A detention under Terry must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
Even if Officer Barbieri had the lawful authority to demand Godwin’s driver’s license, he exceeded the scope of that authority by continuing to hold Godwin while he ran a warrants check because he had no reason to suspect that Godwin driver’s license was invalid or that Godwin was wanted on a warrant. People v. McVey, 185 Ill.App.3d 536, 133 Ill.Dec. 624, 541 N.E.2d 835, 837-38 (1989) (warrants check improper when driver explained to officer why he was parked and showed officer a driver’s license which was valid on its face).
CONCLUSION
Lest the majority forget, the law on this subject is still Terry, where the United States Supreme Court held that in order to justify an intrusion, an officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. EUenbecker is simply wrong when it holds that an officer can seize a citizen after the purpose justifying the intrusion has dissipated. If the intrusion is based upon a perceived need for assistance and it becomes clear that assistance is in fact not needed, there are no specific and articulable facts to justify the intrusion. On being called upon to rely upon the Wisconsin Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States in a matter of federal constitutional law, it seems that the oath of office answers the question.
JOHNSON, J., concurs.

. It is clear that Godwin was seized at the point when he was forced to turn over his driver’s license. In fact a powerful argument could be made that the seizure commenced at the time Officer Barbieri "activated his rear deck lights and pulled in behind Godwin’s vehicle." Professor LaFave has written that “the use of flashing lights as a show of authority—will likely convert the event into a Fourth Amendment seizure.” 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(h), at 417 (2d ed. 1987). The state courts have unanimously followed this view. See, e.g., Ozhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918 (Alaska 1990); State v. Walp, 65 Or.App. 781, 672 P.2d 374 (1983); State v. Stroud, 30 Wash.App. 392, 634 P.2d 316 (1981).
It certainly appears that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave after Officer Barbieri turned on the rear deck lights. Had Godwin attempted to drive off after being so signalled, he arguably could have been charged with a traffic infraction. See I.C. § 49-1419. Or, Godwin could have reasonably (but mistakenly) thought he could be charged with eluding a police officer, a violation of I.C. § 49-1404, if he disobeyed the implicit command to stay put. Greater legal minds than Godwin's have held the same belief. See State v. Bedard, 120 Idaho 869, 820 P.2d 1226 (1991) (Bakes, CJ. dissenting), wherein the Chief Justice argues that a person violates I.C. § 49-1404 if s/he wilfully disobeys a police signal to stop made "by whatever means.”
However, because Godwin did not argue that he was seized when the rear deck lights were activated, the issue of whether a seizure then occurs is an issue better left for another day. For the purposes of this case, it does not matter whether the seizure occurred before he was asked to produce his driver's license inasmuch as all of the incriminating evidence was obtained after Godwin’s driver's license was taken.

. Ironically, the Oregon court has recently held that the police did not have authority to demand to see a driver’s license in a case factually similar to the one at bar. In State v. Farley, 308 Or. 91, 775 P.2d 835 (1989), a police officer pulled over a vehicle because he did not see a license plate on it. As the officer approached the car, he noticed that the car had a temporary license in the windshield. Undeterred, the officer demanded the driver produce his driver’s license and proceeded to run a warrants check on the driver. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the driver had been illegally seized because once the officer had observed the valid temporary permit, he had no reason to make any further inquiry regarding defendant's driver’s license. Notwithstanding Tourtillott, what happened to Godwin would not have been tolerated in Oregon.

. Likewise, I.C. § 49-316, which requires the operator of a motor vehicle to surrender his/ her license upon a police officer’s demand, cannot save the seizure here. In order to comply with Brown, that statute must be read to apply only when the officer has a lawful independent reason to seize the person.