Court Opinion

ID: 9406092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 19:03:52.978111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.583055
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/29/23 In re S.L. CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re S.L. et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
 OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,                                              E080199

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. DPIN2200065)

 v.                                                                      OPINION

 M.L.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Susanne S. Cho, Judge.

Affirmed.

         Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Catherine E. Rupp,

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                    INTRODUCTION

       M.L. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional

orders as to her children, S.L., J.L., and A.L. (the children). Mother’s sole contention on

appeal is that the juvenile court and the Riverside County Department of Public Social

Services (DPSS) failed to comply with the duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare

Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California statutes,

specifically Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 224.2, subdivision (b). DPSS argues

it had no duty to ask extended family members about the children’s potential Indian

status since the children were taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant.

(§§ 224.2, subd. (b), 340.) We agree with DPSS and affirm the court’s orders.

                            PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On September 16, 2022, DPSS received an immediate response referral alleging

physical abuse and general neglect of A.L. and risk of abuse of mother’s four other

children—J.L., S.L, A.V., and A.E. It was reported that A.L. had a bruise on the right

side of her eye. A social worker interviewed mother, who denied knowing how A.L. got

the bruise. The social worker spoke with A.L., who initially said mother hit her, but then

retracted her statement and said she got hurt at school by a boy. J.L. disclosed that

mother hit him with a wooden stick, “other hard stuff,” and a belt. S.L. disclosed that

mother hit him and his siblings.

       1 All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.
                                             2
       On September 22, 2022, DPSS obtained protective custody warrants (§ 340) for all

five children from the Riverside County Juvenile Court, and social workers placed them

in protective custody.

       On September 27, 2022, DPSS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of all the

children, alleging S.L., J.L., and A.L. came within the provisions of subdivision (a)

(serious physical harm) and (b) (failure to protect), and that A.V. and A.E. came within

the provisions of subdivision (b) and (j) (abuse of sibling).2 The petition listed S.L.

(Father L.) as the father of S.L., J.L., and A.L.; F.V. (Father V.), as the father of A.V.;

and A.E. (Father E.) as the father of A.E.

       On September 16, 2022, mother stated she had no Native American ancestry. On

September 22, 2022, Father E. and Father V. also reported they had no Native American

ancestry, and on September 26, 2022, Father L. reported the same.

       The court held a detention hearing on September 28, 2022. Father L. and Father

E. each filed a Judicial Council Form, form ICWA-020 (ICWA-020), stating neither had

Indian heritage. Father V. filed an ICWA-020 form stating he was or might be a member

of the Yaqui tribe of Arizona. Mother filed an ICWA-020 form and checked the box

indicating that one or more of her relatives “is or was a member of a federally recognized

tribe”; however, she did not identify the tribe. The court ordered DPSS to interview

mother for more information. It also ordered all parents to provide any information about

any kind of Indian background they may have.

       2 DPSS subsequently filed an amended section 300 petition to add and modify
some of the factual allegations under subdivision (b).
                                              3
       The court held a contested detention hearing on October 4, 2022. The court

declared Father E. the presumed father of A.E., Father V. the presumed father of A.V.,

and Father L. the presumed father of the rest of the children. It also found that ICWA did

not apply and that DPSS had conducted a sufficient inquiry. The court found that a prima

facie case had been made, and the children came within section 300; however, it ordered

that A.E. and A.V. remain in the care of their respective fathers and detained the other

children. It then set a jurisdiction hearing.

       The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on November 9, 2022, and

indicated that the court had determined ICWA did not apply at the hearing on October 4,

2022. On October 26, 2022, mother confirmed she had no Native American ancestry.

On October 28, 2022, Father E. confirmed he had no Native American ancestry. On

October 30, 2022, Father L. confirmed he had no Native American ancestry, and his

mother and grandmother also denied having Native American ancestry. On October 31,

2022, Father V. stated his grandmother told him her family had Pascua Yaqui ancestry,

but neither he nor his mother was registered with the tribe. Mother also reported that she

was raised by her mother and maternal great grandmother, and her father “was not

involved while she was growing up.” Mother said she had some contact with her paternal

half siblings, who lived in Apple Valley, California.

       The court held a jurisdiction hearing on November 15, 2022, and again found that

ICWA did not apply. It sustained the petition and adjudged the children dependents of

the court. The court ordered that A.V. and A.E. remain in their respective father’s

custody and be made available to DPSS for welfare checks. The court removed the other

                                                4
three children from mother and Father L. and ordered reunification services to be

provided. The court set a six-month review hearing for mother and Father L., and a

family maintenance hearing for the other fathers for May 1, 2023.

                                      DISCUSSION

 Under the Plain Language of Section 224.2, DPSS Was Not Required to Ask Extended

            Family Members About the Children’s Potential Indian Ancestry

       Mother argues that the court failed to require DPSS to inquire of all of her and

Father L.’s “readily obtainable” extended family members about the potential Indian

ancestry of their children. Relying on section 224.2, subdivision (b), she asserts that

DPSS failed to inquire of the following maternal extended family members: the maternal

great-grandmother, mother’s paternal half siblings, and “the rest of her family.” As to the

paternal extended family members, she states DPSS failed to inquire of Father L.’s

maternal grandparents, a paternal aunt, a paternal uncle, and a paternal aunt or uncle

(Angel). DPSS responds that since the children were removed pursuant to custody

warrants under section 340, it had no duty to inquire of extended family members. We

agree with DPSS.

       “ICWA establishes minimum federal standards that a state court must follow

before removing Indian children from their families. [Citation.] California law

implementing ICWA also imposes requirements to protect the rights of Indian children,

their families, and their tribes.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 678 (Ricky

R.).) DPSS and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire”

whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,

                                             5
subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty of initial inquiry and

the duty of further inquiry.” (Ricky R., at p. 678.) We note that this case does not

concern the duty of further inquiry, which arises only if the court or the department has

“reason to believe that an Indian child is involved.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)

       The duty of initial inquiry begins with the initial contact when DPSS must ask “the

party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child

may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Under section 224.2, subdivision (b), once

a child has been taken into temporary custody, DPSS must ask the child, parents, legal

guardian, extended family members, and others who have an interest in the child whether

the child is or may be an Indian child “[i]f [the] child [has been] placed into the

temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to Section 306 . . . .”

(§ 224.2, subd. (b).)3

       “Section 306 permits a social worker to take a child into temporary custody

‘without a warrant’ in emergency situations—namely, when ‘the social worker has

reasonable cause to believe that the child has an immediate need for medical care or is in

immediate danger of physical or sexual abuse or the physical environment poses an

immediate threat to the child’s health or safety.’ ” (In re Robert F. (2023) 90

Cal.App.5th 492, 500-501 (Robert F.); see § 306, subd. (a)(2).) In contrast, section 340

       3  In all instances, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the court shall
ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to
know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall [also] instruct the parties to inform
the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child
is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
                                              6
authorizes the juvenile court to issue protective custody warrants when a section 300

petition has been filed and “the circumstances of [the minor’s] home environment may

endanger the health, person, or welfare of the minor, or whenever a dependent minor has

run away from his or her court-ordered placement.” (§ 340, subd. (a).) A court may also

issue a protective custody warrant without a section 300 petition. (§ 340, subd. (b).)

“[S]ection 340 requires neither imminent danger nor the threat of physical harm for the

court to issue a warrant.” (Robert F., at p. 501.)

       The language of section 224.2, subdivision (b), is clear. It plainly states: “If a

child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to

Section 306 . . . the county welfare department . . . has a duty to inquire whether that

child is an Indian child.” (§ 224, subd. (b), italics added.) As we recently explained in

detail in Robert F., the legislative history supports the view that the Legislature intended

to apply section 224.2, subdivision (b), narrowly. (See Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th

at p. 501.) “The Legislature intended to impose a duty to question extended family

members if the child was placed into the county welfare department’s temporary custody

under section 306.” (Id. at p. 500.)

                                              7
       In this case, the children were not placed into DPSS’s temporary custody

“pursuant to Section 306.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Rather, DPSS obtained protective

custody warrants from the juvenile court under section 340. Section 306 played no role

in this removal. Thus, as DPSS asserts, the expanded duty of initial inquiry under section

224.2, subdivision (b), does not apply. (Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504; see

In re Adrian L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 355-357 (conc. opn. of Kelley, J.).) As a

result, mother’s argument that DPSS violated its duty of initial inquiry under section

224.2, subdivision (b), lacks merit.

       In her reply brief, mother argues that section 224.2, subdivisions (a) and (b), and

section 306 do apply to this case. First, she cites section 224.2, subdivision (a), which

provides that “the duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not limited

to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any

information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) She claims that

the “but not limited to” language “includes that extended family members be inquired

of.” However, the language of section 224.2, subdivision (a), does not say anything

about inquiring of extended family members; rather, it specifically states “the duty to

inquire begins with the initial contact,” or the reporting party. (§ 224.2, subd. (a), italics

added.)

       Mother next cites section 306, subdivision (a)(1) and (a)(2), and states that

“[v]arious forms of temporary custody are taken until permanent custody is taken during

the dispositional hearing.” She points out that, at the detention hearing, the court recalled

the section 340 protective custody warrants and then detained the children with DPSS,

                                               8
“but no longer under a warrant.” She then concludes that “DPSS had temporary custody

of the children without warrants . . . pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision (b),” and

therefore had a duty to inquire of the extended relatives. Mother’s argument has no

merit. Again, the children were not placed into DPSS’s temporary custody “pursuant to

Section 306.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Mother attempts to make the circumstances here fit

into section 306, subdivision (a)(2); however, the language of that statute says a social

worker may “[t]ake into and maintain temporary custody of, without a warrant, a child

who has been declared a dependent child of the juvenile court under Section 300 or who

the social worker has reasonable cause to believe is a person described in subdivision (b)

or (g) of Section 300, . . .” (Italics added.) Here, DPSS obtained protective custody

warrants from the juvenile court under section 340 and took temporary custody of the

children under those warrants. Thus, section 306, subdivision (a)(2), does not apply.

Further, we note that section 306, subdivision (a)(1), applies when the social worker takes

custody of a child “who has been delivered by a peace officer,” which was not the case

here.

        In the alternative, mother argues that section 306, subdivision (b), applies to this

case. Section 306, subdivision (b), provides that “[u]pon receiving temporary custody of

a child, the county welfare department shall inquire pursuant to Section 224.2, whether

the child is an Indian child.” Mother asserts that DPSS received temporary custody of the

children and had a duty to inquire pursuant to section 224.2, since “section 306,

subdivision (b) does not indicate whether temporary custody is to be taken with or

without a warrant.” However, we must construe the words of the provision within the

                                               9
context of the statute. (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 [“We do not,

however, consider the statutory language ‘in isolation.’ ”]) In other words, “[w]e must

harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular

clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” (Ibid.) Mother

contends that since subdivision (b) of section 306 “does not indicate whether temporary

custody is to be taken with or without a warrant … a werrent [sic] isn’t relevant.” Thus,

DPSS should have inquired of the extended relatives pursuant to section 224.2.

However, when section 306, subdivision (b), is read in the context of the statute,

temporary custody must be taken by a social worker after receiving a child under one of

the circumstances listed in section 306, subdivision (a), before the duty to inquire

pursuant to section 224.2 applies. As explained ante, neither of the circumstances in

subdivision (a) occurred here.

       “We emphasize that nothing in this opinion is intended to limit DPSS’s or the

court’s duty of inquiry prescribed by subdivisions (a) and (c) of section 224.2. As

already explained, those subdivisions describe the duty of inquiry that arises in every

dependency case.” (Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 503-504.) However, “the

plain language of those subdivisions does not require [DPSS] or the court to question

extended family members as part of the initial inquiry in every case.” (Id. at p. 504.)

Although case-specific circumstances may require DPSS to interview extended family

members under one of those subdivisions, such as when a family member contacts the

social worker and volunteers that the family has Indian ancestry, mother has not

identified any such circumstances here. (Ibid.)

                                             10
       In sum, we conclude that section 224.2, subdivision (b), “requires a county welfare

department to ask extended family members about a child’s Indian status only if the

department has taken the child into temporary custody under section 306.” (Robert F.,

supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.) Because section 306 played no role in the children’s

removal here, section 224.2, subdivision (b), does not apply. Even if we were to find

ICWA inquiry error, such error would not be a basis for reversing the jurisdictional or

dispositional orders since the case is ongoing. (In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th

560, 567 [“ICWA inquiry and notice errors do not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s

jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the ICWA finding itself.”].)

                                      DISPOSITION

       The court’s orders are affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                FIELDS
                                                                                              J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.

MILLER
                          J.

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