Court Opinion

ID: 9552496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:12:05.071902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:37.806790
License: Public Domain

HERNANDEZ, Judge (specially concurring). I concur. I do not agree with the majority that Children’s Court Rule 14 “does not, however, provide that objections not raised before. the adjudicatory hearing are deemed waived.” Rule 14, in my opinion, encompasses the same matters as Rules 18 and 33(a), N.M.R.Crim.Proc. In the case of State v. Helker, 88 N.M. 650, 545 P.2d 1028 (Ct.App.1975), cert. denied 89 N.M. 5, 546 P.2d 70 (1976), where we were considering Rule 18(c), we held that the “rules of criminal procedure can put a time limitation on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.” Consequently, it is my opinion that the defendant waived any claim that his constitutional rights had been violated. The defendant’s third point of error was that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing him to cross-examine the doctor as to the results of the laboratory culture test which was negative as to gonorrhea. This is not quite accurate. The defendant was allowed to cross-examine the doctor about the laboratory culture test and elicited the answer that the results of that test were negative as to gonorrhea. The State objected and requested that the answer be stricken as hearsay. The motion was granted and the jury instructed to disregard the answer. It is my opinion that the trial court erred in doing this. It must be mentioned that the State had qualified the doctor as an expert in the diagnosis of this venereal disease. Considerable latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of expert witnesses for the purpose of testing knowledge, judgment and bias. Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572 (1943). Rule 705, N.M.R.Evid. provides: “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. (Emphasis added.) The trial court also erred in striking the answer because it was hearsay. Our Supreme Court in State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972), adopted the following from Brown v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 134, 142, 375 F.2d 310, 318 (1967): “In forming an expert opinion it may be necessary to rely upon information— hearsay though it be * * *. The information is winnowed through the mental processes of the expert, and is by him either accepted or rejected.” The Supreme Court in Chambers also quoted the following with approval from Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 304, 307 F.2d 637, 641 (1962): “* * * the better reasoned authorities admit opinion testimony based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.” Rule 703, N.M.R.Evid. provides: “The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.” (Emphasis added.)