Court Opinion

ID: 9593713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:24:11.192848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:33.358994
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
I would reverse the conviction and dismiss the indictments because the Commonwealth (1) failed to establish a justification for the warrantless entry into Clyde Servís’ motel room, (2) did not establish a valid basis for impounding and searching Servís’ auto*526mobile, and (3) did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Servís possessed the controlled substances with intent to distribute.
I.
A warrantless entry into a residence, like a warrantless search, is presumptively unreasonable and, thus, violative of the fourth amendment. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970). “[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); see Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 644, 347 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1986). The fourth amendment protections against a warrantless entry and search of a residence apply with equal force to an individual’s motel room. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 63 (1986).
Although I concur with the majority opinion’s view that the police should not be exposed to unnecessary danger in the performance of their jobs, I strongly disagree that the officers had a legal basis for entering Servís’ motel room. In my opinion the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. See Walls, 2 Va. App. at 645, 347 S.E.2d at 178. Even though the majority rejects the Commonwealth’s assertion that exigent circumstances existed, it concludes that the police may “make a warrantless entry into a dwelling” to effect a Terry stop. I find no support for this holding, nor can I subscribe to reasoning adopted by the majority to sustain warrantless invasions of dwellings by police. “The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
The evidence relating to the entry into the room established that at approximately 4 a.m. Deputies Farmer and Talley arrived at the manager’s office of a Hanover County motel in response to her telephone call and were told that the occupant of room 315 *527had reported that someone was trying to break into the room. The manager testified that at the time she called she did not give the deputies the names of the room’s occupants or any other information. Deputy Farmer testified, however, that the manager informed him at that time that the two adjoining rooms were registered to Eric Steinherner and gave him the license number of the vehicle that was registered to the room.
The deputies observed room 315 from their automobile for four to five minutes without noticing unusual activity and then knocked on the door. Servís answered the door and informed the deputies that he placed the call because he thought someone was attempting to break into his room. Deputy Farmer testified that Servís was nervous and appeared to be “under the influence of something.” Although Deputy Talley could not see into the adjoining room, he was able to see into the room where Servís stood and he observed chairs stacked against the door. Deputy Farmer could not see into the room.
Deputy Farmer asked Servís if he could come into the room. Servís said “no.” He told the deputies that he did not need them and that he had only wanted the motel’s security personnel. Servís gave his name to the deputies and identified his automobile, parked approximately six parking spaces away from the door, by pointing to it. He also informed the deputies that the room was registered to his friend, who was out but was expected back. Deputy Farmer testified that he identified his friend by the name “Phillip;” however, Deputy Talley recalled that he identified his friend by the name “Dan.”
The deputies then left Servís and returned to their vehicle. Both testified that they did not suspect Servís of anything at that point. After sitting outside the room for a while, Deputy Farmer returned to the manager’s desk; Deputy Talley and the manager testified that it was during this second visit to the manager’s office that Deputy Farmer received a description of the vehicle that was registered to the room. It was the same vehicle that Servís had previously identified. The manager also testified that on Deputy Farmer’s second visit to her office she gave him the registration form that showed the room registered for two persons in Steinherner’s name. She also informed him that earlier several visitors had gone to the room. While Deputy Farmer was at the manager’s office, a taxi driver arrived, stating that he had received *528a call to pick up a passenger from rooms 315 and 317.
Deputy Farmer testified that he called the Commonwealth’s Attorney from the manager’s office, seeking a search warrant. He was told that “there was no way [he] could get a search warrant.” Although the record does not contain the reasons he believed a warrant was justified, Deputy Farmer did testify that he had no reason to go into the room “at that point.”
Deputy Farmer testified that he returned to Servís’ room “before [Servís] came out to the cab.” Deputy Farmer said he knocked on the door and asked again who the room was registered to. He testified that when Servís said “Dan,” he asked Servís for some type of identification. His testimony at various times was as follows:
A I asked him, I said I need to see some identification. At that time, he turned around and walked directly back into the room.
Q Okay. Was this before or after he had gone to the car? Do you remember?
A This is before he went to the car.
* * *
Q All right. When you asked for his identification, where did he go?
A He went directly from the open doorway through into the room on the left.
Q Okay.
A I was right behind him the whole way.
On cross examination by the Commonwealth he stated:
Q Now when you go back to the room, you ask him again who the room’s registered to?
A Yes, sir.
Q And does he give you the name of the person the room is registered to?
A He gave me the name of Dan which —
Q What you get is not a name that’s on the registration?
A Correct.
*529Q And now he’s given you two different names. What did you do at that point?
A At that point, I asked him, I said I need to see some identification from you right now, and he turned around and went back into the room and that’s when I followed right behind him.
Deputy Talley testified that when Deputy Farmer went to the manager’s office and returned to the motel room he (Talley) remained in his automobile where he could observe the room. A few minutes after Deputy Farmer entered the room, Deputy Talley said that he went into the room and observed Servis sitting on the bed while Deputy Farmer was speaking on the telephone.
The majority concludes, and I agree, that these facts do not remotely establish exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless entry. However,.the majority holds that “in the interest of police protection” a police officer may enter a dwelling to conduct a protective search when he is suspicious of the conduct of the occupant. I find no support in the case law for the majority’s thesis.
The majority relies upon Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) to support its theory that entry into a dwelling may be made to effect a “Terry stop.” A statement of the holding of Chrisman, however, is sufficient without further elaboration to illuminate precisely why it is inapposite to this case:
[I]t is not “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgment dictates, following the arrest. . . . Such surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of the privacy or personal liberty of an individual who has been arrested.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The majority also relies upon State v. Mayfield, 15 Kan. App.2d 175, 694 P.2d 915 (1985), which easily can be distinguished factually from this case. In Mayfield, unlike the present case, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant, who was stopped outside his residence, had violated a state statute. Moreover, the Mayfield court cites only Chrisman as its authority for upholding a “stop and frisk” detention which had not ripened into an arrest, yet it fails to provide a principled *530basis for such an extension of the Chrisman holding. In Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa. Super. 278, 421 A.2d 721 (1980), also cited by the majority, the court ruled that the police officers “had the consent of Daniels to enter the premises.” Id. at -, 421 A.2d 723. No such argument has been or could be advanced upon the facts of this case.
Using principles applicable to automobile stop cases, the majority opinion glosses over the distinctive and fundamental protections afforded to dwellings under fourth amendment analysis and asserts that Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), an automobile case, is “[o]f particular importance to this case.” While the Supreme Court has used the “automobile exception” doctrine to relax fourth amendment warrant requirements because of special circumstances inherent in automobile stops, see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court has consistently given dwellings the highest degree of fourth amendment protection against warrantless entry by law enforcement officers. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). In Long, on which the majority bases, in part, its justification for applying a “Terry stop” analysis to searches of private dwellings, the Supreme Court discussed in detail the circumstances that give rise to the “inordinate” risk that confronts officers who, late at night, approach automobiles whose drivers have been stopped for committing traffic violations. Id. at 1047-51. Long had driven his automobile into a ditch after speeding and driving erratically. He was frisked and his vehicle searched after police saw a large knife in his vehicle. Id. at 1035-36. The Supreme Court grounded its decision “in part on [a] view of the danger presented to police officers in ‘traffic stop’ and automobile situations.” Id. at 1048; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977).
The majority notes that, as in Long, the hour was late and the location not well traveled. Such circumstances, however, were given in Long as relevant considerations when analyzing the “inordinate” risk of stopping automobiles. No justification exists for applying those concerns to the circumstances of this case where there has been a warrantless entry into a place that is functionally equivalent to a dwelling and, as such, is entitled the greatest protection under the fourth amendment. The relevance of those considerations as applied to the entry of a motel room are de minimis *531and unexplained by the majority. The majority opinion’s thesis that in the absence of exigent circumstances “the interest of police protection” justifies a warrantless entry into a dwelling upon a mere showing of “extenuating circumstances” simply lacks a sound foundation.
In State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802 (1983), a case with circumstances similar to this one, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected the precise argument that the Commonwealth relies upon and majority asserts here.
The state attempts to bootstrap the police officers’ entry into Defendant’s room by merging two independent doctrines i.e., the stop and frisk doctrine with the emergency doctrine, in order to fill the gaps of one doctrine with the arguably permissible scope of another. Thus, their “emergency” or exigent circumstance, is, in their words, the need to “neutralize” the area for their own protection while carrying on the questioning. We decline the invitation to stretch either of these doctrines in order to justify the police officers’ actions based on the facts presented here. Such a modification or blending of the two doctrines would create an exception to the warrant requirement which would effectively swallow the rule.
The very purpose of our constitutional provision was to protect a person’s home from governmental intrusions. This right against intrusion should be stringently protected by the courts. As such, any exceptions to the warrant requirement should be narrowly and carefully drawn. The state’s proposed rule that police officers, having authority to encounter a defendant and make reasonable inquiry, are thereby entitled to enter a defendant’s premises in order to serve the needs of their safety, would be contrary to this principle of carefully drawn exceptions. We are mindful of the dangers inherent in the work of police officers. The potential for violence exists in all confrontations between police and private citizens. But a remote possibility to harm to the police officers cannot justify a warrantless entry into the private recesses of one’s house.
Id. at 242-43, 666 P.2d at 812 (citations omitted). The justification for the authorization of a warrantless entry, which the major*532ity opinion crafts upon the circumstances of this case, is equally unwarranted.
Furthermore, in my opinion the record does not otherwise provide a basis upon which the trial court or this Court could conclude that Deputy Farmer had a legitimate basis for entering the room without, a warrant. Beyond Deputy Farmer’s naked statement that he entered the room because of “[f]ear of my life,” there is no factual basis for his entry into the room. The record does not support a conclusion that Deputy Farmer could reasonably have believed that his life was in danger, nor does it support a conclusion that he had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Servís had committed or was about to commit a crime. Although Deputy Farmer testified that Servís was nervous and apparently under the influence of something when the deputies first knocked on the door and became upset when the deputies asked to enter the room, both deputies testified that they did not suspect Servís of anything at that time. Their lack of concern at that time is buttressed by the fact that Servís was not then or later frisked for weapons.
According to Deputy Farmer’s testimony, it was not until he learned from the manager that several persons had visited the room that night and learned that a taxicab had been called to the room that he became “suspicious.” He then called the Commonwealth’s Attorney who told him that based on his observations a search warrant was out of the question. The record is silent as to what Deputy Farmer suspected. Whatever it was that he suspected, Deputy Farmer pointed to no facts from which he could reasonably have concluded, based on his suspicions or other circumstances, that Servís was dangerous.
Having been told that a search warrant would not be issued, Deputy Farmer returned to the room ostensibly to require Servís, who had previously given his name and identified his car, to provide some identification. As Servís acted to comply with his request, Deputy Farmer gave the following as his basis for concluding that his life was in danger:
He disappeared in the room quickly and from the manner in which he had been acting and the information that he’d given to me, I felt at that point, I asked him for his identification and he turned around and went back into the room *533and I felt at that point because of my safety and other officers involved, I should stay right with him. I didn’t know what he was going to retrieve.
Having failed to alert Deputy Talley of his suspicion and having approached the room without the assistance of Deputy Talley, Deputy Farmer’s actions belie his stated concern for his own safety and render doubtful his concern for the safety of Deputy Talley, who, according to his testimony, remained seated in the vehicle. It is also significant that Deputy Farmer did not frisk Servís, despite his professed fear, as stated at trial, that he believed Servís was dangerous.
Moreover, Deputy Farmer did not articulate grounds for an objectively reasonable suspicion that Servís had committed or was about to commit a crime at the time Farmer demanded that he produce documentary identification. Although no statute requires one who is not driving a motor vehicle to carry an identification card or to produce an identification card upon the demand of a police officer, Deputy Farmer demanded that Servís produce documents and used Servís’ attempt to promptly comply with his demand as a pretext to enter his room. Having earlier made a request for a search warrant, the evidence clearly supports the inference that, before he demanded documentary identification, Farmer wanted to enter the room. The evidence also supports the inference that the ruse of requesting documentary identification provided the pretext that Farmer needed to cross the threshold.
The facts relied upon by the majority also do not support the conclusion that Deputy Farmer reasonably believed he was in danger. That Servís may have appeared “under the influence of some intoxicants” while in his motel room does not translate into a belief that he must have been armed or dangerous. Likewise, that Servís appeared upset when denying a law enforcement officer free reign of his room does not support the notion that he was armed or dangerous. It is of no moment that he responded quickly to the officer’s demand for identification. Had he not quickly responded, the majority, which relies upon Long to justify this entry, would have considered his lack of promptness as a reason for also concluding that he was a threat to the officers. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1036 (driver slow to responding to officer’s request for driver’s license and car registration).
*534The facts and circumstances that the deputies encountered, while peculiar, provided no reasonable basis for either of them to believe that Servis was armed or dangerous. In every police-citizen encounter one can detail a laundry list of facts which can be cited as “unusual;” however, in order to justify a stop the evidence must establish the existence of a “reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988). Moreover, under traditional fourth amendment analysis, in order to justify a “frisk,” there must be shown a nexus between those “unusual” circumstances and the officer’s purely subjective assumption of danger. In my opinion, the facts established in this case do not rise to that level. Furthermore, there is no basis upon which to conclude that Servis posed a danger justifying the extraordinary kind of “frisk” or entry to a dwelling that is sought to be upheld.
II.
Even if it is assumed that Farmer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Servis was dangerous and that the entry into his room was justified, there is no basis for upholding the impoundment and subsequent search of his automobile. The Commonwealth does not contend that there was probable cause to search the automobile; instead, the Commonwealth seeks to justify the search of Servis’ automobile on the ground that it was necessary to impound the automobile and inventory its contents in order to safeguard the automobile and its contents.
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld a protective inventory, also described as a “caretaking search,” of an automobile which was “lawfully within police custody.” Id. at 375-76. The inventory of the contents of a lawfully impounded automobile was recognized as a means of protecting “[1] the owner’s property while it remains in police custody, ... [2] the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and ... [3] the police from potential danger.” Id. at 369 (citations omitted). However, in order “[f]or an inventory search to be valid, the vehicle searched should first be in the valid custody of the law enforcement officers conducting the inventory.” United States v. Brown, 787 F.2d 929, 931-32 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 837 (1986); see South Dakota v. *535Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374; Randall v. State, 656 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
The government must demonstrate that [the] vehicle was in lawful police custody prior to its search; that the search was routine and conducted pursuant to standard police procedures following the guidelines laid down in Opperman; and that the search was conducted solely for the purpose of securing and inventorying the automobile’s contents, and not for the purpose of gathering incriminating evidence against the owner.
United States v. Abbott, 584 F. Supp. 442, 447 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
Thus, the initial questions to be resolved are whether the deputies had valid custody of Servís’ automobile and, if so, whether a need to impound the automobile was demonstrated. It is undisputed that Servís’ automobile was lawfully parked on the motel grounds and was locked. Servís was not apprehended in the vehicle nor was he arrested based upon a charge having a connection with the automobile. Deputy Farmer testified that he arrested Servís in the motel room for giving false information to a police officer and because he possessed a box of aluminum foil and a box of baking soda, which Deputy Farmer believed to be drug paraphernalia. The record contains no description of the alleged false information that gave rise to the arrest. On these facts the majority somehow concludes that the automobile, which was lawfully parked on the motel’s lot, was impounded pursuant to the police “community caretaking function.” I disagree.
Farmer’s sole justification for impounding Servís’ automobile was as follows:
I placed him under arrest .... I stayed with the vehicle. I contacted the clerk at the front desk and advised her that the gentleman who was in the room had been arrested, that — did she want to take responsibility of the vehicle being left in the parking lot and she stated, she said no. At that point, I called for a wrecker. All vehicles that I tow personally I do an inventory on them.
The motel manager confirmed that Farmer contacted her but gave the following account:
*536He come back and asked me if I was going to tow the car or he wanted — or if I wanted him to call somebody to tow it and I told him to go ahead and do it because I didn’t know who to call.
The majority’s assertion that the manager asked that it be moved or desired that it be moved is unsupported by this record. Clearly, Farmer’s inquiry to the manager, implying that the car, if left on the motel’s lot, would be her responsibility, was so deceptive that it produced her response. His inquiry whether she wanted to call someone to tow the automobile or whether she wanted him to cause it to be towed prompted the predictable, if not desired, response. Deputy Farmer’s inquiry was, at the least, “disingenuous,” and clearly placed the manager in the position of opting to have him tow the car. His manipulative inquiry indicates that his actions were motivated “more [by] investigative opportunism than [a] genuine solicitude for personal property.” Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 38, 327 A.2d 516, 527 (1974).
Furthermore, the Commonwealth does not contend that it was responsible for the automobile simply because Servís was arrested. It certainly cannot be seriously argued that, merely because Servís had arrived at the motel from Baltimore in an automobile, the Commonwealth had an obligation to protect the lawfully parked automobile. No statute or case law places such a burden on the Commonwealth. Moreover, there is no evidence in this record that the sheriffs department had a requirement or standard procedure requiring the officers to impound the automobile. Deputy Farmer testified: “I did not impound the car because of the arrest. I had the car towed because of the arrest. I impounded because of the drugs.”
In Opperman, the Supreme Court stated that the “authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” 428 U.S. at 369 (emphasis added). The Court further stated in Opperman that “[t]he owner, having left his car illegally parked for an extended period, and thus subject to impoundment, was not present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings.” 428 U.S. at 375. In Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 521, 184 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972), the impounded automobile had been *537illegally parked so “as to partially block the ambulance driveway leading to the hospital emergency entrance.” The driver in Cabbler also requested that the police close his vehicle’s windows to protect it from the rain, and he made no protest when told that the vehicle would be removed to the city garage. 212 Va. at 521, 189 S.E.2d at 782. In Brown the driver responded to an officer’s signal to stop by “pull[ing] his car off the street into a small parking lot that serviced . . . businesses and apartments.” 787 F.2d at 931. When given the option of having his vehicle towed or driven to the police station following his arrest for driving under the influence, he asked a police officer to drive it. Id. at 932.
In Stevens v. State, 412 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court held that it was unreasonable to impound an automobile without advising the owner that “the motor vehicle will be impounded unless he or she can provide a reasonable alternative to impoundment.” Id. at 457. In Mitchell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 244, 245-46, 342 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1986) the court stated:
Although the State attempted at trial and on appeal to justify that search as an inventory pursuant to impoundment of the car, the record does not support that argument. There was no evidence of any connection between the car and appellant’s arrest, no evidence that the car was illegally parked or was a hazard to traffic, or that appellant was consulted regarding alternate disposition of the vehicle. In short, there was no showing that the impoundment of the car was reasonably necessary.
See also State v. Lunsford, 655 S.W.2d 921, 923-24 (Tenn. 1983).
None of the circumstances cited in Opperman, Cabbler, Brown, Stevens, or Mitchell that support the validity and need for the impoundment of vehicles are present in the instant case. Servís’ automobile was properly parked off the street and was neither impeding traffic nor posing a threat to public safety. Servís never requested that the police safeguard his automobile. The police never asked how he preferred his automobile to be handled. Cf. Code § 19.2-80.1. Furthermore, no evidence on this record supports the view that Servís’ automobile was impounded in accordance with established policies of the Hanover Sheriff’s Department. Cf. Cabbler, 212 Va. at 522, 184 S.E.2d at 782. The sole *538justification for the decision to tow the automobile from the motel lot was that the owner of the automobile was arrested. The reason for arrest, however, bore no relationship to the existence of or ownership of the automobile. Servis was neither driving the vehicle when arrested nor charged with a traffic offense. The evidence, thus, fails to establish a reasonable connection between his arrest and the impoundment. See Nolan v. State, 588 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1979). In my view, the absence of such a connection gives rise to a reasonable inference of pretext.
None of the circumstances present in the valid impoundment cases cited are present in this case. Furthermore, Farmer’s disingenuous actions, in placing responsibility for Servis’ automobile upon the motel manager and the absence of a standard procedure requiring the impoundment of the automobile, raise the inference of improper motivation. “To have impounded the car and towed it away, under these circumstances, was a bizarre thing to do, explainable only as a subterfuge to search the car.” Dixon, 23 Md. App. at 39, 327 A.2d at 527. The absence of evidence justifying the impoundment suggests that the impoundment of Servis’ automobile was “a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376. Such an impoundment cannot be justified as a basis upon which to predicate a lawful inventory search.
III.
Finally, even assuming that the entry and inventory search were authorized under law, I can find no basis to support the majority’s conclusion that this record contains evidence to establish that Servis possessed the cocaine and marijuana with the intent to distribute it.
It is elementary that where, as here, an indictment charges an offense which consists of an act combined with a particular intent, proof of the intent is essential to conviction. . . . Because direct proof is often impossible in this type case, intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Existence of the intent, however, cannot be based upon surmise or speculation.
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 698, 699, 213 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1975)(citation omitted).
*539The majority concedes that the amount of cocaine and marijuana was “relatively small.” In Dukes v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 313 S.E.2d 382 (1984), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence in a case involving a “relatively small quantity of marijuana” and stated that the intent to distribute a controlled substance may be inferred from the quantity of the substance possessed by the accused “if it is greater than the supply ordinarily possessed for one’s personal use.” Id. at 122, 313 S.E.2d at 383. The evidence in this case neither establishes that the amounts of marijuana and cocaine were incompatible with Servis’ defense that he possessed them for his own personal use nor provides a basis upon which to conclude that the quantities of marijuana or cocaine were greater than the supply ordinarily possessed by a narcotics user for personal use. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973).
The method of packaging adds nothing to the analysis whether Servis had an intent to distribute. “The mode of packaging and the way the packages were hidden are as consistent with possession for personal use as they are with intent to distribute. It is just as plausible that the defendant purchased the packaged substances for personal use as it is that [he] packaged the [substances] for distribution.” Dukes, 227 Va. at 123, 313 S.E.2d at 384. “[Possession and ownership may imply intent to use rather than intent to distribute. . . .” Hunter, 212 Va. at 571, 193 S.E.2d at 780.
The majority’s assertion that “paraphernalia used in the packaging process was seized” is pure surmise because no evidence in this record establishes that any of the cocaine or marijuana seized from Servis’ room was packaged in aluminum foil. Nor is there any evidence that either substance was mixed with the baking soda. At no time did either officer testify that either item had been used to distribute the substances or to prepare the substances for distribution. Deputy Farmer testified that the foil and the baking soda could be used either for freebasing (a method of injecting cocaine) or for packaging the cocaine. Moreover, the evidence established that Servis was a drug user, and the search of his vehicle disclosed evidence that indicated he had in fact used the cocaine.
The record also contains an explanation for the cash in his possession and contradicts the majority’s assertion that Servis had no *540bank account and no satisfactory explanation for how he earned his money. All of the money that was seized was in large denominations and wrapped with Maryland bank labels. Servís testified that his bank account had a remaining balance of $10. He said that he had the large amount of money because he was on his way to Alabama, where he intended to relocate, and because he did not want to leave his money in the bank due to his belief that the Maryland financial institutions were having difficulties. He testified that he earned the money through his business as a shrimp salesman in Maryland. He further testified that his business consisted of purchasing large quantities of shrimp for sale and distribution to restaurants and roadside stands. Copies of his commercial trading licenses were placed in the record. Servís’ testimony concerning his employment and his reason for having the money was uncontradicted, was supported by documentary evidence, and was not inherently improbable, contradictory, or inconsistent with the evidence.
When the Commonwealth’s evidence is wholly circumstantial, “ ‘all necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Dukes v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. at 122, 313 S.E.2d at 383 (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)). “Where inferences are relied upon to establish guilt, they must point to guilt so clearly that any other conclusion would be inconsistent therewith.” Dotson v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 514, 518, 199 S.E. 471, 473 (1938). “There is no stronger presumption afforded than that an accused is presumed to be innocent, which cannot be overthrown except by proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 517, 199 S.E. at 473.
The evidence establishes possession beyond a reasonable doubt; however, the evidence and any inferences to be drawn from the evidence do not point so clearly to guilt of possession with intent to distribute as to make unreasonable a conclusion that Servís possessed the substances for his personal use. Thus, the evidence in this record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, fails to exclude that reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Dukes, 227 Va. at 123, 313 S.E.2d at 384.