Court Opinion

ID: 9411406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 19:04:26.574243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.611218
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/26/23 Trans World Assurance Co. v. Lara CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 TRANS WORLD ASSURANCE
 COMPANY,                                                           A163865
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                    (San Mateo County
 v.                                                                 Super. Ct. No. 19CIV01583)
 RICARDO LARA, as Insurance
 Commissioner, etc.,
           Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff Trans World Assurance Company (Trans World) filed a
petition for writ of mandate challenging the California Department of
Insurance’s (CDI) denial of its disclaimers of affiliation under the Insurance
Holding Company System Regulatory Act (Ins. Code,1 § 1215 et seq.; Holding
Company Act). Trans World contends CDI failed to provide it with an
evidentiary hearing and otherwise comply with certain statutory procedures
as required by law. The trial court denied Trans World’s petition, concluding
CDI was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Trans World’s
disclaimers. We affirm.

         1 All statutory references are to the Insurance Code unless otherwise

specified.
                                        I.
                               BACKGROUND
      Trans World is a wholly owned subsidiary of TWA Corporation (TWA)
and is licensed to sell life insurance in California and various other states.
As such, Trans World reports to CDI as a member of an insurance holding
company system subject to the Holding Company Act. In 2000, Trans World
and CDI identified AMFI Corp. and American Fidelity Life Insurance
Company (AFLIC) as affiliates under the Holding Company Act. In later
years, both CDI and Trans World identified various affiliates via CDI
examinations and Trans World’s annual statements and transaction notices.
      In 2012, CDI concluded that Five Flags Banks, Inc. and its subsidiary
banks, Warrington Bank, Bank of the South, and First Navy Bank (jointly,
the banks), should be considered affiliates “based on common management,
principal banking relationships, and shared investment strategies.” This
conclusion was based on (1) two common directors, Marilyn Woodbury Hess
and William Woodbury; (2) Trans World and its affiliate, AFLIC, had
principal banking relationships with the banks; and (3) Trans World, AFLIC,
and two of the banks participated in a mortgage loan. CDI requested that
Trans World “report its stock ownership” in these entities, disclose these
entities as affiliates, and “report all material transactions with these
entities.”
      In 2013, Trans World submitted a disclaimer of affiliation as to Bank of
the South, Warrington Bank, and First Navy Bank. In connection with that
disclaimer, Trans World argued there was no direct or indirect control
between Trans World and the banks, noting the banks neither owned stock in
Trans World nor extended loans or credit to Trans World. It also submitted
two letters stating Marilyn Woodbury Hess, a director of both Trans World

                                        2
and Warrington Bank, was unable to control either entity, and Warrington
Bank had not been involved in Trans World’s operations. CDI granted the
disclaimer as to Ms. Hess only. CDI also subsequently granted a disclaimer
as to Mr. Woodbury.
      In 2016, CDI sent a draft organization chart to Trans World and
requested it identify any incorrect information regarding listed entities.
Trans World objected to the inclusion of ownership positions in AMFI Corp.
and AFLIC, claiming that TWA had “no interest” in those entities and the
inclusion of such entities “is an invasion of privacy” and “demonstrates an
agenda, not an unbiased examination.” It further claimed the information
contained in the chart “is riddled with incorrect or unverifiable information
and is internally inconsistent.” Trans World asserted the draft chart
indicated CDI improperly disclosed confidential business information and
sought to invade the privacy of “beneficial owners of TWA Corp.’s stock who
have elected to hold their positions in ‘street name.’ ”
      CDI denied the allegations in Trans World’s correspondence and again
requested that Trans World identify any errors in the draft organizational
chart. CDI also requested that Trans World provide an explanation and
supporting documentation as to each error. In response, Trans World again
objected to the draft organizational chart as a whole and asserted (1) the
chart “is indecipherable and many of the lines and arrows connect to entities
about which Trans World has no interest or knowledge,” (2) the chart’s
terminology was “undefined and vague and ambiguous,” and (3) “[m]any of
the percentage entries are unverifiable by Trans World since they are based
on the confidential information of other businesses to which Trans World
does not have access.”

                                        3
      In 2016, CDI conducted an examination of Trans World and identified
AMFI Corp., AFLIC, Little Sabine, Inc., MB Corporation, TBH Corporation,
Dunes Motel, Inc., and the banks as affiliates of Trans World. CDI also
specifically explained its determination to include Five Flags Banks, Inc. as
an affiliate, while also acknowledging the disclaimer of affiliation granted to
Ms. Hess. Trans World agreed to include Five Flags Bank, Inc. as its affiliate
due to its stock ownership in the bank.
      Following this examination, CDI notified Trans World that it and
AFLIC “should be part of the same holding company group” due to their
“affiliation through ownership and management.” The letter justified this
decision due to “the level of inter-company ownership . . . ; common directors
and officers . . . ; shared operations; and joint investments.” The letter also
noted CDI and the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation would conduct
coordinated examinations on an ongoing basis.
      Trans World objected to CDI treating Trans World and AFLIC as part
of the same holding company group. It also disputed CDI’s conclusion that it
was affiliated with the other entities, and claimed it had submitted several
disclaimers of affiliation as to AMFI Corp., AFLIC, Little Sabine, Inc., MB
Corporation, TBH Corporation, Dunes Motel, Inc., and Five Flags
Corporation.
      In connection with this correspondence, Trans World submitted
"Form D,” entitled “Disclaimer of Affiliation Pursuant to California Insurance
Code § 1216.4.” This disclaimer, on behalf of Trans World and TWA,
contested any affiliation with AMFI Corp., AFLIC, Little Sabine, Inc., MB
Corporation, TBH Corporation, Dunes Motel, Inc., and Five Flags
Corporation. The disclaimer asserted (1) Trans World did not directly or
indirectly control the disclaimed entities, and (2) Trans World and TWA were

                                        4
not directly or indirectly controlled by or under common control with any of
the disclaimed entities. In support of its position, Trans World referenced
CDI’s letter notifying it of the coordinated examination and its letter in
response.
      CDI disallowed the disclaimer as incomplete. It further noted CDI had
not received any other disclaimer from Trans World apart from the resolved
disclaimer regarding Ms. Hess.
      Trans World then submitted an “Amended Disclaimer.” That
submission contained a brief cover letter and the following attachments:
(1) Trans World’s 2013 disclaimer; (2) two letters from Trans World objecting
to CDI’s draft organizational chart; (3) CDI’s letter to Trans World regarding
its determination that Trans World and AFLIC “should be part of the same
holding company group”; (4) Trans World’s letter to CDI asserting it had
outstanding disclaimers unresolved by CDI; (5) Trans World’s response to
CDI’s letter regarding Trans World and AFLIC; and (6) Trans World’s 2016
disclaimer. CDI again disallowed the disclaimer as incomplete pursuant to
section 1215.4, subdivision (l) (section 1215.4(l)).
      Shortly thereafter, Trans World submitted a letter to CDI to
“supplement” its 2013, 2016, and amended disclaimers. The supplement
asserted neither Trans World nor TWA had any stock ownership in, or
control of, AFLIC, AMFI Corp., the banks, and “certain investment entities
identified in correspondence with [CDI] and the Disclaimers.” The
supplement stated the 2013 disclaimer encompassed AFLIC, AMFI Corp.,
Bank of the South, and Warrington Bank, and CDI had not held a hearing on
the disclaimer. The supplement also claimed its objections to CDI’s draft
organizational chart constituted disclaimers, for which there had been no
hearing. Finally, the supplement provided additional information

                                         5
challenging CDI’s conclusion that Trans World and AFLIC should be part of
the same holding company system. It noted Trans World and TWA (1) own
26 percent of the stock in AMFI Corp. and no stock in AFLIC, (2) share one
common director, Ms. Hess, who is one of five directors, (3) do not have
common officers, and (4) do not have joint operations. The supplement
concluded by requesting a hearing under section 1215.4(l) on its disclaimers
and objections.
      In response, CDI informed Trans World it had previously resolved the
2013 disclaimer. CDI also summarized the bases for its affiliation findings
and explained why it disallowed Trans World’s 2016 disclaimer and amended
disclaimer. Notably, CDI’s letter emphasized Trans World and TWA’s
26.8 percent ownership in AMFI Corp. (the parent company of AFLIC), past
submissions by Trans World acknowledging AFLIC and Little Sabine, Inc. as
affiliates, and comments by Trans World’s president that it only participates
in mortgage loans with affiliates. CDI again requested Trans World to
“respond substantively” to CDI’s affiliation findings and “provide[] full
disclosure of ‘all material relationships and bases for affiliation . . . as well as
the basis for disclaiming affiliation.’ ”
      In March 2017, Trans World submitted a further supplement to its
disclaimers. That further supplement again noted Trans World was not a
“direct affiliate” of AFLIC, and argued Trans World is separately managed,
does not own any AFLIC stock, has no proxy agreement that would allow it to
vote AFLIC shares, does not have a representative on AFLIC’s board, has
never attempted to exert control over AFLIC, and does not share financial
information with AFLIC. Trans World noted that while AFLIC services its
policies, it does so on a fee-for-service basis. Trans World further emphasized

                                            6
that while it may share some investments with AFLIC, it is a passive
investor and those investments are managed by other entities.
      As to AMFI Corp., Trans World argued it is merely a passive investor,
does not control AMFI Corp., does not have a representative on the board or
in management of AMFI Corp., and has never attempted to control AMFI
Corp. or vote, and only once attended a board meeting. For the remaining
entities, Trans World argued those were long-term passive investments over
which it has never sought to exert control or management.
      After reviewing these materials, CDI informed Trans World that it
“remains unconvinced that there is no affiliation . . . between and among
[Trans World], [TWA]; [AFLIC]; AMFI Corp.; Five Flags Bank, Inc. (FFB);
and FFB’s three subsidiary banks: Bank of the South; Warrington Bank and
First Navy Bank.” CDI explained the supplemental materials failed to
identify all bases for affiliation or describe Trans World’s inability to control
the affiliates, and CDI noted its intent to deny the disclaimer. CDI
acknowledged Trans World could request a hearing on its disclaimer, and
CDI would provide a transcribed public hearing at which Trans World could
present documentary evidence and sworn testimony.
      In response, Trans World requested that CDI provide “an adjudicative
hearing before the [Insurance] Commissioner or an administrative law judge”
with the right to issue discovery requests, present evidence, and cross-
examine staff from CDI and the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation.
Trans World also asserted CDI would be required to provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard to all alleged affiliates of Trans World.
      On July 3, 2018, CDI set a hearing date of August 10, 2018 for Trans
World “to address CDI staff regarding [its] disclaimer and CDI’s disallowance
of the disclaimer,” “in accordance with [section] 1215.4(l), which provides for

                                        7
notice and opportunity to be heard.” It stated its disallowance would take
immediate effect if Trans World did not attend the meeting. Trans World
agreed to attend the scheduled meeting, but argued “CDI Staff does not have
authority to deny the Disclaimers and such a meeting is not a substitute for
the adjudicatory hearing by the [Insurance] Commissioner . . . that is
required by [section] 1215.4(l).”
      Prior to the meeting, Trans World submitted a summary of its positions
and a declaration from its president, Charles Royals (Royals declaration), in
support of the disclaimers. Trans World reiterated its position that, despite
stock ownership in excess of 10 percent, it does not in fact control any entity.
Trans World also noted it did not share any common directors or officers as
the only two individuals who overlap companies, Ms. Hess and Mr.
Woodbury, received disclaimers.
      In August 2018, Trans World met with seven CDI staff and officials,
including Susan J. Stapp, CDI’s deputy general counsel, and Valerie J.
Sarfaty, assistant chief counsel of CDI’s Corporate Affairs Bureau II.
Following the meeting, Trans World submitted further information about
Trans World’s board of directors and a proposed resolution.
      In February 2019, CDI informed Trans World it would disallow its
second disclaimer and amended disclaimer, as supplemented. CDI concluded
the information provided by Trans World “do[es] not overcome the evidence
that demonstrate[s] that Applicants [(TWA and Trans World)] are affiliated
with the Disclaimed Entities because Applicants are under common control
with AMFI Corp. and AFLIC.” CDI based its conclusion on evidence of
common control, common ownership, and prior Trans World filings
acknowledging affiliation.

                                        8
      After Trans World continued to object to the meeting as satisfying the
statutory hearing requirement and declined to withdraw its disclaimers, CDI
sent a letter to Trans World, stating in relevant part, “[T]he [Insurance]
Commissioner hereby disapproves Applicants’ disclaimer of affiliation
application.”
      Trans World subsequently filed a petition for peremptory writ of
mandate with the superior court. That petition alleged Trans World had filed
various disclaimers of affiliation “which never have been the subject of a
hearing and findings by the [Insurance] Commissioner.” The petition asked
the court to “set aside” CDI’s decision disallowing Trans World’s disclaimers
of affiliation and requiring it to register and file reports identifying AFLIC,
AMFI Corp., and the other entities as affiliates. The petition further
requested the court to order CDI to grant its disclaimers or, alternatively,
convene a hearing regarding the disclaimers.
      The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying Trans World’s
petition. The court concluded due process did not require CDI to provide a
public evidentiary hearing, and Trans World did not demonstrate the impact
of CDI’s ruling was “ ‘so severe’ ” as to require a formal evidentiary hearing.
The court also concluded the California Administrative Procedure Act (Gov.
Code, § 11340 et seq.; APA) is inapplicable because section 1215.4(l) does not
require an evidentiary hearing. Trans World did not contest the tentative or
request a statement of decision. The trial court adopted its tentative ruling
and entered judgment in favor of the Insurance Commissioner
(Commissioner). Trans World timely appealed.

                                        9
                                       II.
                                DISCUSSION
      Trans World contends the trial court erred in denying its petition
because the Holding Company Act required CDI to comply with the
requirements of section 1215.4(l) and provide it with an evidentiary hearing
by the Commissioner on its disclaimers of affiliation. In response, CDI
asserts the hearing conducted by its staff satisfied its statutory obligations.
A. Standard of Review
      The parties agree this action is one of traditional mandamus arising
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085.2 “In such actions, the standard
of review can be quite deferential where, for example, the agency is acting as
a quasi-legislative body in adopting a regulation in accordance with a
legislative delegation of authority.” (Matteo v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 624, 630.) However, where an agency is instead
interpreting a controlling statute, “the standard of review is much less
deferential. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, we independently judge
the text of the statute while ‘taking into account and respecting the agency’s
interpretation of its meaning.’ [Citation.] As the California Supreme Court
explains: ‘Where the meaning and legal effect of a statute is the issue, an
agency’s interpretation is one among several tools available to the court.
Depending on the context [(i.e., whether the agency’s interpretation is
embodied in a formal rule or less formal representation)], it may be helpful,
enlightening, even convincing. It may sometimes be of little worth.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 630–631.)

      2 Trans World notes its first amended petition seeks relief under Code

of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5, but “submits that Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1085 applies.”

                                       10
      At issue here is whether section 1215.4(l) and section 1215,
subdivision (d) (section 1215(d)) require CDI to conduct an evidentiary
hearing before either the Commissioner or an administrative law judge.
CDI’s interpretation of these provisions does not appear to arise from formal
agency decisionmaking, but rather a position adopted by CDI under more
informal circumstances. As such, we find CDI’s interpretation of
section 1215.4(l) and section 1215, subdivision (k) to be of limited
significance, and rely primarily on our own independent judgment. (See
Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1,
12–13.)
B. Whether Trans World Is Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing
      Trans World does not contend CDI’s failure to provide an evidentiary
hearing violated its due process rights.3 Instead, its brief asserts “[t]he issue
to be determined is whether Sections 1215(d) and 1215.4(l) require an
evidentiary hearing.” Without providing any meaningful statutory analysis,
Trans World asserts it is “entitled to an adjudicative hearing before the
Commissioner with notice, a court reporter, sworn testimony, exhibits and
findings with the safeguards of the Charter 4.5 of the APA to rebut the
presumption of control.” It concludes “[i]t is hard to imagine” the
Commissioner making specific factual findings “without receiving evidence on
control in fact, i.e. an evidentiary hearing.”

      3 We note one of the “Questions Presented” in Trans World’s opening

brief asks: “Did the Trial Court err by refusing to consider any of the specific
factors [required by certain authorities] in determining whether Due Process
requires a hearing under the circumstances of this case?” But Trans World’s
brief does not argue the present dispute involves a private interest that
would trigger due process protection or otherwise explain how the principles
of due process should be applied here.

                                        11
      1. Relevant Statutory Framework
      The Holding Company Act governs registration of insurers who are
members of an insurance holding company system. “An ‘insurance holding
company system’ consists of two or more affiliated persons, one or more of
which is an insurer.” (§ 1215, subd. (h).) Affiliation arises if an individual or
entity “directly, or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, or
is controlled by, or is under common control with, the [individual or entity]
specified.” (§ 1215, subds. (a), (m).) The Holding Company Act further
defines “ ‘control’ ” as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract other than a
commercial contract for goods or nonmanagement services, or otherwise,
unless the power is the result of an official position with or corporate office
held by the person. Control shall be presumed to exist if any person, directly
or indirectly, owns, controls, holds with the power to vote, or holds proxies
representing, more than 10 percent of the voting securities of any other
person. This presumption may be rebutted by a showing that control does
not exist in fact pursuant to the filing of a disclaimer of affiliation in
accordance with subdivision (l) of Section 1215.4. The commissioner may,
after furnishing all persons in interest notice and opportunity to be heard,
determine that control exists in fact, notwithstanding the absence of a
presumption to that effect.” (§ 1215, subd. (d).)
      Section 1215.4(l) further provides: “Any person may file with the
commissioner a disclaimer of affiliation with any authorized insurer. A
disclaimer of affiliation may be filed by an insurer or any member of an
insurance holding company system. The disclaimer shall fully disclose all
material relationships and bases for affiliation between the person and the

                                         12
insurer, as well as the basis for disclaiming an affiliation. After a disclaimer
has been filed, the insurer is relieved of any duty to register or report under
this section that may arise out of the insurer’s relationship with the
disclaimed person unless and until the commissioner disallows the
disclaimer. The commissioner shall disallow the disclaimer only after
furnishing all parties in interest with notice and opportunity to be heard and
after making specific findings of fact to support the disallowance. If the
commissioner at any time determines that the information disclosed in the
disclaimer is incomplete or inaccurate, the commissioner may disallow the
disclaimer.” (§ 1215.4, subd. (l).)
      2. Hearing Requirements
      As noted above, section 1215.4(l) only requires the Commissioner to
(1) “furnish[] all parties in interest with notice”; (2) provide an “opportunity
to be heard”; and (3) if disallowing the disclaimer, “mak[e] specific findings of
fact to support the disallowance.” Trans World argues the “opportunity to be
heard” must be interpreted as requiring an evidentiary hearing. We
disagree.
      We are unaware of any authority that evaluates the phrase
“opportunity to be heard” in section 1215.4(l). Nor has Trans World cited any
such authorities. However, the phrase “notice and opportunity to be heard”
mirrors language used in procedural due process jurisprudence and provides
useful guidance. (See, e.g., Sustainability of Parks, Recycling & Wildlife
Legal Defense Fund v. County of Solano Dept. of Resource Management (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359 [“procedural due process requires reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a
person of a significant property interest”].)

                                        13
      “ ‘What safeguards comport with due process or what due process
requires under specific circumstances varies, as not every context to which
the right to procedural due process applies requires the same procedure. The
primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with
the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
Consequently, due process is a flexible concept, as the characteristic of
elasticity is required in order to tailor the process to the particular need.
[Citations.] Thus, not every situation requires a formal hearing accompanied
by the full rights of confrontation and cross-examination. [Citation.] “What
due process does require is notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action affecting their property interest and an
opportunity to present their objections.” ’ ” (Barri v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 428, 465–466, italics omitted.)
      Courts also have interpreted similar phrases in other statutes. For
example, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides for “notice to any
affected party, person, or attorney” and an “opportunity for hearing.” In that
context, the phrase “opportunity for hearing” has not been interpreted as
requiring an evidentiary hearing or even an opportunity to present oral
testimony. (Seykora v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1082.)
Rather, the trial court has discretion in conducting the proceedings, so long
as the parties have a reasonable opportunity to present their position. (Ibid.)
Likewise, the California Supreme Court has explained the term “hearing”
does not necessarily encompass a right to an oral presentation. (Lewis v.
Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1247–1249.)
      We find a similar interpretation is appropriate here and decline to
interpret “opportunity to be heard” in section 1215.4(l) as requiring an
evidentiary hearing. Rather, Trans World was entitled to a meaningful

                                        14
opportunity to present its position and objections. (See Barri v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) Our interpretation of
the phrase “opportunity to be heard” also finds support in certain principles
of statutory interpretation. “In construing a statute, it is the role of the
judiciary to simply ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance
contained in the statute, not to insert what has been omitted . . . .” (People v.
Massicot (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925; accord, Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [“In
the construction of a statute . . . , the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain
and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert
what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted”].) Nothing in the
statute indicates the Legislature sought to require CDI to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on disclaimers of affiliation, and it is not our role to
impose such a requirement.
      Here, Trans World was provided the required opportunity to be heard.
Specifically, CDI requested that Trans World provide support for its
disclaimers of affiliation and accepted supplemental materials from Trans
World on these issues. CDI then scheduled a meeting to evaluate these
disclaimers pursuant to section 1215.4(l). CDI identified its staff who would
be present, along with the issues Trans World “should be prepared to
address.” In advance of the meeting, Trans World submitted to CDI a
detailed letter outlining its position and enclosing relevant documents. Trans
World also submitted in advance of the meeting a declaration from its
president and an “Offer of Proof as to the evidence that would have been
offered by Trans World” during an evidentiary hearing. Trans World’s
representative and its counsel attended the meeting and provided
information to CDI about its disclaimers, including information regarding its

                                         15
board of directors. In light of the foregoing, CDI satisfied its obligation to
provide Trans World with an “opportunity to be heard.”
      While Trans World questions how CDI can fulfill its statutory duty to
make “ ‘specific findings of fact’ ” without an evidentiary hearing, Trans
World fails to cite any authority to support its point. Moreover, CDI
identified all of the relevant facts upon which it relied in rejecting Trans
World’s disclaimers of affiliation. Trans World does not claim CDI
misrepresented or failed to identify any relevant facts. Nor does Trans World
explain what additional factual information it was unable to provide without
an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, Trans World has not demonstrated an
evidentiary hearing is required for CDI to make “specific findings of fact,” as
required by section 1215.4(l).
      Trans World also disputes two cases cited by the trial court in support
of its conclusion that section 1215.4(l) does not impose an evidentiary hearing
requirement: Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of
Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 and Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial
Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371.4 The trial court cited these authorities in
connection with the proposition that procedural due process does not
necessarily require an evidentiary hearing, and Trans World had not
demonstrated the issues raised by its disclaimers of affiliation justify the
burden of a full evidentiary hearing. Trans World does not dispute the legal
conclusions for which these cases are cited—namely, that due process merely
requires an opportunity to be heard “ ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’ ” (See Today’s Fresh Start, at p. 205.) Instead, Trans

      4 Trans World also objects to the trial court’s reliance on “Matthews v.

Eldridge.” However, the “Order Denying [Trans World’s] Petition for Writ of
Mandate” does not cite a case with this title.

                                        16
World attempts to draw distinctions between the investigation and meetings
in those cases and here. However, nothing in those cases suggests the
meeting and discussions between CDI and Trans World were insufficient to
constitute an “opportunity to be heard” in this instance.
      In sum, neither section 1215(d) nor section 1215.4(l) require CDI to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on a disputed disclaimer of affiliation.
Rather, CDI was required to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
and it did so. The trial court did not err in concluding Trans World was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
      3. Delegation of Authority
      Apart from the adequacy of the hearing, Trans World asserts only the
Commissioner or an assistant to the Commissioner is authorized to rule on
its disclaimers of affiliation. Trans World contends none of the CDI staff
present at the meeting satisfied this requirement. It further asserts any
delegations were by a deputy commissioner “who had no right of delegation”
under section 1215, subdivision (c).
            a. Relevant factual background
      In connection with its opposition to Trans World’s petition, CDI
submitted a declaration from Valerie J. Sarfaty, the assistant chief counsel of
the Corporate Affairs Bureau II at CDI (Sarfaty declaration). The Corporate
Affairs Bureau oversees licensing, oversight, and enforcement of regulated
entities and persons, “including processing applications and filings submitted
under the [Holding Company Act].”
      The Sarfaty declaration states the chief deputy Insurance
Commissioner of California “specifically delegated authority to me to act on
her behalf in performing all duties necessary for purposes of managing the
Corporate Affairs Bureau” pursuant to section 7 and Government Code

                                       17
section 18572. Sarfaty asserts this delegation “was in effect during [CDI’s]
August 10, 2018, meeting” with Trans World.
      The Sarfaty declaration further states the chief deputy Insurance
Commissioner of California “specifically delegated authority to then-deputy
general counsel, Susan J. Stapp, to act on the Commissioner’s behalf in
performing all actions necessary for purposes of managing the [Regulatory
and Legal Services Division of CDI’s] Legal Branch,” and she believes this
delegation was in effect during the Trans World meeting. The Regulatory
and Legal Services Division “ensures all regulated entities’ and persons’
compliance with the California Insurance Code.”
      The Sarfaty declaration explains that reviewing and disallowing
disclaimers fell within her and Stapp’s delegated authority to act on behalf of
the chief deputy Commissioner, and they acted within this role when
participating at the Trans World meeting and reviewing and authorizing the
subsequent letter disallowing Trans World’s disclaimers of affiliation.
      Trans World objected to the Sarfaty declaration and moved to strike it.
Trans World argued the declaration lacked foundation, constituted an
impermissible attempt to introduce new evidence outside the administrative
record, was irrelevant because the delegations did not comply with
section 1215, subdivision (c), and contained inadmissible hearsay and legal
conclusions. Trans World requested the court strike the declaration on these
grounds.
      In denying the petition, the trial court did not include an express ruling
on these objections.5

      5 We need not rule on CDI’s argument that Trans World waived its

objections to the Sarfaty declaration. Even assuming the objections were
preserved, Trans World has the burden to renew the objections in the
appellate court. (Accord, Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534.)
                                      18
             b. Analysis
       Pursuant to section 1215, subdivision (c), “ ‘Commissioner’ ” is defined
as the “Insurance Commissioner of the state and any assistant to the
Insurance Commissioner designated and authorized by the commissioner
while acting under their designation as the Insurance Commissioner.”
Section 7 provides: “Whenever, by the provisions of this code, a power is
granted to a public officer or a duty imposed upon such an officer, the power
may be exercised or the duty performed by a deputy of the officer or by a
person authorized pursuant to law by the officer, unless it is expressly
otherwise provided.” (See also Gov. Code, § 18572 [same].)
       We are unaware of any authority that would suggest a deputy
insurance commissioner does not qualify as an “assistant to the Insurance
Commissioner” under section 1215, subdivision (c). Rather, section 7
explicitly provides that a deputy of the officer may perform the powers
granted to that officer. And the Sarfaty declaration states the deputy
commissioner delegated to Sarfaty “all duties necessary for purposes of
managing the Corporate Affairs Bureau,” which includes the task of
“processing applications and filings submitted under the [Holding Company
Act].” Accordingly, Trans World’s disclaimers appear to fall within the scope
of filings managed by the Corporate Affairs Bureau, and Sarfaty was properly
delegated the authority to manage the processing and consideration of those
filings.
       Likewise, Sarfaty was properly delegated authority to resolve the
pending disclaimers. And CDI—with her approval and authorization—sent

While Trans World noted its objections before the trial court, it has not
argued the validity of those objections on appeal. Accordingly, the validity of
those objections are not before the court.

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Trans World a letter denying the disclaimers and setting forth the specific
factual findings upon which the denial was based. Specifically, the denial
outlined various findings regarding (1) common control, (2) Trans World’s
past filings acknowledging certain affiliations, and (3) AFLIC’s annual
statements acknowledging certain affiliations. The denial also set forth its
assessment of the Royals declaration on the findings of affiliation. This
denial satisfies CDI’s statutory obligation to provide “specific findings of fact.”
(See § 1215.4, subdivision (l).)
      4. Notice of Hearing
      Trans World also asserts (1) it was entitled to notice, (2) the entities
identified by CDI as affiliates should have received notice of the hearing
under section 1215.4(l) because “[t]hey all have important interests in the
outcome of any hearing on the disclaimers,” and (3) no notice was provided.
However, Trans World raises these arguments in a purely conclusory fashion.
Trans World does not cite any authority or evidence or otherwise raise a
substantive argument that notice to Trans World was insufficient or that the
affiliates were entitled to notice. Accordingly, Trans World has waived its
challenge to the adequacy of the notice. (See Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners
Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [claim waived when appellant fails to
support it with “ ‘reasoned argument and citations to authority’ ”]; see also
Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 517, 538 [failure to brief issue on
appeal waives it].) While Trans World attempts to address the scope of the
notice in its reply brief, it again does so with scant analysis and no citation to
relevant legal authorities. Moreover, “[w]e do not consider arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief.” (Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of
Palm Springs (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 607, 636, fn. 8.)

                                        20
      Trans World claims CDI “did nothing in response to the Trans World
disclaimers.” As discussed above, that statement is false. Here, CDI
provided notice of the hearing, conducted a hearing, and issued specific
findings regarding control. CDI complied with its statutory obligations and
was not required to provide Trans World with additional procedures not
required by statute or law.6
C. APA Does Not Apply
      While Trans World argues in passing that it is entitled to a hearing
“with all the safeguards of the APA,” it does not support this position with
any substantive argument or citations to authority. Accordingly, Trans
World has waived any such argument. (Behr v. Redmond, supra,
193 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 [failure to brief issue on appeal waives it].)
                                       III.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent may recover their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

      6 Because we conclude CDI complied with its statutory obligations and

the trial court did not err in denying Trans World’s petition, we need not
address whether any error was harmless.

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                                        MARGULIES, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A163865
Trans World Assurance Company v. Lara

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