Court Opinion

ID: 9788273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:34:57.367947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:45.992134
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that section 16-3-503(1)(c), C.R.8.2008, limits bond forfeiture to fees collected by professional bonding agents, rather than the entire posted bond, when a non-appearing defendant is later determined to have been present illegally in the United States. However, I would not address the legislative history in conjunction with that statute. See Bd. of County Commr's v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 192 P.3d 582, 585-86 (Colo.App.2008) (if the language of a statute is clear, we need not resort to other rules of statutory interpretation; when statute is ambiguous we look to legislative history, among other factors).
However, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that this statute does not, apply retroactively to this case. because I conclude that the statute is procedural, not substantive, and it is not retrospective in its application.
I. Facts
I agree with the majority's recitation of the facts surrounding this dispute. However, I note that in the motion to reseind bond forfeiture and for exoneration of further bail bond liability filed by surety, Rosalie Montoya, on December 20, 2007, her counsel advised the court that defendant, Jose Chavar-ria-Sanchez, was deported to Mexico on March 12, 2007. On December 20, 2007, the court denied surety's motion and declined to grant surety another stay from execution on the bond judgment.
*908Further, because I believe that section 16-3-503(1)(c) applies retroactively, I conclude that the dates cited by the majority are not significant.
II. Retroactivity
A. The Relevant Law
As the majority correctly notes, absent legislative intent to the contrary, we presume a statute operates prospectively. § 2-4-202, C.R.S.2008; City of Colorado Springs v. Powell, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo.2007). This presumption is based on the view that unless intent to the contrary is shown, legislation shall apply only to those transactions occurring after it takes effect. In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849, 854 (Colo.2002).
Although disfavored, retroactive changes are permitted by case law, and the retroactive application of a statute is not necessarily unconstitutional. Powell, 156 P.3d at 465. Further, express language of retroactive application is not required for courts to find such intent. Ficarra v. Dep't of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 15 (Colo.1993); Abromeit v. Denver Career Service Bd., 140 P.3d 44, 50 (Colo.App.2005).
Our courts have used the term "retrospective" to describe a constitutionally prohibited retroactive application of a statute. See People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Colo.1993).
A statute is retrospective if it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past." In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d at 854 (quoting Denver S. Park & Pac. Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162, 167 (1878)). As the supreme court noted, "This proscription is intended to prevent the unfairness that would otherwise result from changing the consequences of an act after that act has occurred." Powell, 156 P.3d at 465.
However, application of a statute to an existing claim for relief does not violate the prohibition against retrospective legislation when the statute effects a change that is not substantive, but is only procedural or remedial in nature. Abromeit, 140 P.3d at 51; see also Loredo v. Denver Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 827 P.2d 633 (Colo.App.1992) (procedural change in statute applies to existing cause of action, unless contrary intent is expressed in statute). Further, substantive statutes create, eliminate, or modify vested rights or liabilities, while procedural statutes relate only to remedies or modes of procedure to enforce such rights or liabilities.
B. Analysis
I first consider whether the General Assembly intended that the statute would operate retroactively. As noted, there is no bar to conclude that the General Assembly intended that a statute operate retroactively.
Here, sections 16-3-501 to-503, C.R.S. 2008, were enacted by the General Assembly in 2007 to provide a legislative scheme to ensure that when a person is illegally present in the United States, is arrested, and is later deported prior to the disposition of the criminal charges, that a record would be kept of all such criminal charges by requiring that the cases not be dismissed and that a warrant be issued. See Ch. 397, sec. 1, 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1770 (legislative declaration). As part of this legislative scheme, the General Assembly established provisions to issue warrants for persons illegally in the country, § 16-3-501; not to dismiss cases against persons illegally in the country, § 16-3-502; and to recover bonds for persons illegally present in the country, § 16-3-503.
Section 16-3-503 provides a program to limit bond forfeitures to fees collected by professional bonding agents, when a non-appearing defendant is later determined to have been present illegally in the United States. This provision is consistent with the overall legislative intent to ensure that criminal charges not be dismissed against persons illegally present in the United States and later deported. As the majority notes in analyzing section 16-3-503(1)(c), this provision provides special protection for professional sureties and bonding agents, thereby encouraging them to post bonds for arrestees *909when they have no basis to believe they are in the country illegally.
Subject to the retrospectivity analysis below, it is reasonable to conclude that the General Assembly intended these provisions in sections 16-3-501 to -503 to apply retroactively in order to maintain records of criminal charges against persons later found to be in the country illegally who are subsequently deported.
C. Procedural Versus Substantive
As noted, retroactive application of a statute is permissible when it effects a change that is merely procedural. See Abromeit, 140 P.3d at 51 (amendments to career service board rules eliminating appeals of classification decisions were procedural); American Compensation Ins. Co. v. McBride, 107 P.3d 973, 977 (Colo.App.2004) (amendment providing certain workers' compensation benefits are subject to administrative lien and attachment was procedural); Johnson v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 15 P.3d 309, 313 (Colo.App.2000) (amended policy for review of tenured faculty was procedural). I disagree with the majority that section 16-3-503(1)(c) effects a substantive change. A procedural statute relates only to remedies or modes of procedure to enforce such rights or liabilities. Abromeit, 140 P.3d at 51.
To determine whether the statute at issue here is substantive or procedural, we must view it in context. That context is provided by examination of Colorado's bail bond statutes, sections 16-4-101 to -112, C.R.8.2008. Section 16-4-101 sets forth those offenses for which pretrial release on bail is possible, while section 16-4-102 provides that, for bailable offenses, any person who is in custody and for whom no bail has been set, has the right to request that bail be set. Further, section 16-4-108 concerns fixing of bail and conditions of bail bonds, section 16-4-104 addresses alternatives to bail bonds, and seetion 16-4-105 provides for judicial determination of the amount of bail and the type of bond. In particular, section 16-4-105(1) lists the criteria a court must consider in fixing the amount of bond and in determining whether to grant bond to one who has been arrested.
The general bail bond statutes provide exoneration procedures for any person executing a bail bond as principal or as surety, including determination of when the condition of the bond has been satisfied, when the amount of the forfeiture has been paid, and when a surety provides satisfactory evidence to the court that the defendant is unable to appear because of the defendant's death, detention, or incarceration in a foreign jurisdiction. Another procedural provision is section 16-4-112(5)(h), C.R.S.2008, noted by the majority, which allows compensated sureties to seek discretionary relief by appealing to the conscience of the court to show that justice requires that a bail forfeiture judgment be vacated. See People v. Escalera, 121 P.3d 306 (Colo.App.2005) (judgment on bond forfeiture set aside when defendant did not appear in court after deportation to Mexico).
In this context, it is evident that the 2007 legislative change contained in section 16-3-503(1)(c) is procedural because it provides a mechanism for forfeiture of fees collected by bonding agents, rather than for forfeiture of the entire bond amount.
The majority nevertheless concludes that section 16-3-508(1)(c) is substantive because it changed the consequences for two contracting parties, sureties and the state, when a defendant is later determined to have been in the country illegally and failed to appear for a required court proceeding. However, changing the consequences of a defendant's nonappearance with respect to sureties and the state does not make this provision substantive. Rather, in my view, the substantive statutes are those discussed above that provide for a defendant's right to obtain bail when incarcerated for certain offenses and the criteria a trial court must consider in determining whether to grant bail and the amount of such bail. See People v. Tyler, 797 P.2d 22, 25 (Colo.1990) ("The very purpose of a bail bond contract is so that, through the device of a monetary bond, a third party can guarantee the continued appearance of the defendant at all proceedings in a particular action.").
I conclude that Allegheny Casualty Co. v. Roche Surety, Inc., 885 So.2d 1016 (Fla.Dist. *910Ct.App.2004), and Marshall v. State, 797 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.App.1990), are distinguishable and do not support the conclusion that section 16-8-508(1)(c) is substantive. In Allegheny Casualty, the court held that a Florida statute providing that an original appearance bond shall expire thirty-six months after such bond had been posted for the release of the defendant from custody was substantive and, therefore, not retroactive. The court concluded that the statute was substantive because it extinguished the county's right to forfeiture of bonds. Here, in contrast, the state's right to obtain forfeiture of bonds was not unequivocal, and seetion 16-3-503(1)(c) merely provided another cireumstance in which the state is not entitled to forfeiture of a bond.
Marshall is also distinguishable. There, the court held that amendments to the bond statute could not be applied retroactively because, under Texas law, a bond is a contract between a surety and the state. Here, in contrast, the state may be a "creditor," but the bond agreement is between defendant and surety. In any event, as discussed above, the state does not have an unequivocal right to seek the forfeiture of a bond in all circumstances. Consequently, I conclude that the cireumstances presented in Marshall are different from those here and, as discussed below, that the state here did not have a vested interest in obtaining forfeiture of surety's bond.
Also, as discussed below, section 16-3-508(1)(c) is not unconstitutionally retrospective because it does not take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, does not create a new obligation, does not impose a new duty, and does not attach a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. See Johnson, 15 P.3d at 311.
D. Vested Rights
A vested right is one that is not dependent on the common law or the statute under which it was acquired for its assertion, but has an independent existence. A vested right must be something more than a mere expectation based on an anticipated continuance of the existing law. It must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property or to the present enjoyment of the demand, or legal exemption from a demand made by another. Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 16.
Thus, "[hlaving the benefit of particular procedures or the ability to invoke particular remedies generally does not constitute a vested right." Abromeit, 140 P.3d at 51. Here, any "right" of Montoya or the state is dependent on the pre-2007 statutes. The state's interest in obtaining a forfeiture of the entire bond amount is simply an expectation based on continuance of that law. However, neither the state nor Montoya as surety possessed a vested right that the cireum-stances for exoneration from bond liability in section 16-4-108 or the relief available by appealing to the conscience of the court under section 16-4-112(5)(h) would. remain the only procedures available to benefit sureties.
Further, to the extent that the state was or may be considered a party to the bail bond contract as a "creditor," as the majority indicates, the state did not have an unqualified right to collect on the bond posted by the defendant in the event of his nonappearance for two reasons. First, sections 16-4-108 and 16-4-112(5)(h) already provided circumstances in which the state might not be able to obtain a judgment for forfeiture of a bond, when a defendant did not appear in court when required to do so. Second, the supreme court has noted that the purpose of a bond is "not to enrich the treasury, but to serve the convenience of the party accused, but not convicted, without interfering with or defeating the administration of justice." Allison v. People, 132 Colo. 156, 160, 286 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1955) (quoting People v. Pollock, 65 Colo. 275, 277, 176 P. 329, 330 (1918)). Moreover, in Smith v. People, 67 Colo. 452, 453, 184 P. 372, 372 (1919), the supreme court stated, "The enriching of the public treasury is no part of the object at which the [bail forfeiture] proceeding is aimed. There is no reason for penalizing the sureties when it appears that they are unable, by no fault of their own or of their principal, to perform the condition of the bond." Accordingly, while the state has a legitimate interest in recovering forfeited bonds when defendants do not *911appear in court when required to do so, that right is not unqualified.
Based on these cireumstances, I conclude that the state did not have a vested right to the prior existing remedies. See Abromeit, 140 P.3d at 51 (there is no such thing as a vested right in remedies).
E. Creating a New Obligation, Imposing a New Duty, or Attaching a New Disability
I further conclude that section 16-3-503(1)(c) does not create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability. Here, the statute modifies surety's original obligation; the statute only changes the cireumstances in which a forfeiture of the bond may be declared and provides payment of fees as an alternative to satisfy that obligation. Thus, section 16-8-508(1)(c) did not impose a new obligation on surety. The only other obligation contained in the statute is a ministerial one, requiring the jail or court to return all documents concerning the defendant that are signed by the bail bonding agent to the agent, if it is determined that the defendant is illegally present in the country after a bail bond has been posted for him or her. This new obligation is insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the statute may not be applied retroactively.
Section 16-3-503(1)(c) also does not impose a new duty, other than the ministerial one to return papers just discussed. The only new duty imposed on a surety is one to request forfeiture of its fees, rather than forfeiture of the entire bond amount. In my view, this "duty" is only ministerial and is not the kind of new duty that precludes retroactive application of a statute.
Finally, the statute does not attach a new disability. Rather, it provides a limited benefit to professional bonding agents, as discussed above.
Accordingly, I coneur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion.