Court Opinion

ID: 9624777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:17:17.311007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:23.008781
License: Public Domain

Judge BRYANT,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority opinion which affirm the award of attorney’s fees and the trial court’s denial of discovery.
*458N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6 clearly states that “the court may in its discretion order payment of reasonable attorney’s fees to an interested party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit.” It must be determined whether plaintiff, as the interested party in this matter, had insufficient means to defray the expense of suit, not the minor children. See Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996) (stating that defendant was an interested party acting in good faith and evidence existed that she could defray the costs of litigation); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 147 N.C. App. 566, 557 S.E.2d 126 (2001) (stating that plaintiff, as an interested party, acted in good faith and did not have the means to defray the costs of suit); Thomas v. Thomas, 134 N.C. App. 591, 518 S.E.2d 513 (1999) (noting that the trial court failed to make findings as to whether mother, as the interested party, acted in good faith and could defray expenses of litigation); Osborne v. Osborne, 129 N.C. App. 34, 497 S.E.2d 113 (1998) (stating that defendant in the proceedings was an interested party acting in good faith, who could not defray the expenses of suit without impoverishing herself); Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992) (stating that mother was an interested party acting in good faith).
The majority states that plaintiff provided financial support for the children in the absence of defendant. The majority states that plaintiff was deprived of $21,900.00 in child support. In addition, the majority states that children, even upon attaining the age of majority, would not have sufficient means to bring suit for past due child support. Based on the above stated facts, the majority concluded that “the trial court made sufficient findings to support its award of attorney’s fees.” I disagree.
It may be correct, as the majority alludes, that in a case involving child support or custody issues, a parent is technically acting on behalf of or in the interests of her minor children. However, I find it inconceivable that our legislators intended the courts to consider the minor children’s ability to bear the expense of suit (instead of focusing on the parent’s ability to bear the expense of suit when the parent is the party seeking enforcement of the underlying child support order). See, e.g., Van Every v. McGuire, 348 N.C. 58, 62, 497 S.E.2d 689, 691 (1998) (stating that when determining a party’s entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees in child custody dispute, “if [the] trial court finds from the evidence that [the party] has sufficient means to defray the expense of the suit, then [the party’s] request for attorney’s fees shall be denied”); Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 54, 468 S.E.2d 33, *45935 (1996) (“[B]efore attorney’s fees can be taxed in an action for custody or in [an] action for custody and support, . . . the party seeking the award” of attorney’s fees must both allege and prove that party is an interested party acting in good faith and that party has insufficient means to defray the expense of suit). It is uncontroverted that defendant was found to be in contempt of a child support order, with arrears totaling $21,900.00. Moreover, it is undisputed that plaintiff provided care and support for the children in the absence of support from defendant. However, these facts do not lend themselves to the direct conclusion that plaintiff, as the interested party bringing this action in good faith, was of insufficient means to defray the expense of suit. The statutorily required findings of N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6 cannot be circumvented in the manner in which the majority reasons.
The trial court failed to make findings regarding plaintiff’s ability to defray the expense of suit. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s decision as to this issue and remand for findings as to plaintiff’s ability to defray the expense of suit.
In addition, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to compel discovery of information relevant to plaintiff’s financial ability to pay her attorney’s fees.
In North Carolina, a party may obtain discovery of any unprivileged information, as long as that information is relevant to the pending action and is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. N.C.R. Civ. R 26(b)(1). Whether or not to grant a party’s motion to compel discovery resides in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent abuse of that discretion. See Wagoner v. Elkin City Schools’ Bd. of Education, 113 N.C. App. 579, 585, 440 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1994).
As noted above, I believe that the trial court committed error in failing to make findings concerning plaintiff’s financial ability to pay her attorney’s fees. The information defendant sought to discover was both relevant to and reasonably calculated to reveal evidence admissible as to the issue of plaintiff’s financial ability to pay her attorney’s fees. Defendant having satisfied the requirements enunciated in N.C.R. Civ. R 26(b)(1), I believe that the trial court committed error amounting to an abuse of discretion in failing to grant defendant’s motion to compel discovery of information relevant to plaintiff’s ability to pay her attorney’s fees.
*460For the reasons set forth herein, I would reverse and remand to the trial court to make findings in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6. Specifically, the trial court should be ordered to make findings regarding whether plaintiff has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit. In addition, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to compel discovery.