Court Opinion

ID: 9732974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:47:36.508084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:36.817682
License: Public Domain

FOURT, J.
I concur in the affirming of the judgment in this ease because I can do nothing else under the circumstances, There are, however, some factors in this matter *287which in my opinion warrant further attention. It is to be noted that the information charged ‘ ‘ [t] hat at the time of the commission of the above offense, said defendant was armed with a deadly weapon to wit, one small caliber automatic pistol” and ‘ ‘ [t] hat before the commission of the offenses hereinbefore set forth in this information, said defendant, Jack Bay Ethridge, was in the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of Los Angeles, convicted of the crime of robbery, a felony, and the judgment of said court against said defendant in said connection was on or about the 14th day of March, 1950, pronounced and rendered and said defendant served a term of imprisonment therefor in the State Prison.”
Evidence was taken at the trial on July 11, 1961. At the conclusion of the testimony on the 11th the prosecution waived the opening argument and counsel for defendant indicated that he desired to say something. The judge, before any argument was commenced in behalf of defendant stated that he, the judge, was finding the defendant not guilty of the offense charged in the second count of the information, even though the defendant was positively and unequivocally identified by the victim in that episode. In counsel’s argument to the judge he stated with reference to the prior conviction charged in the information (which the defendant frankly admitted in his cross-examination) that “he got into trouble—he got in some trouble and we have stipulated that he served time on that” and “I think he learned a lesson on this first robbery.”
The prosecutor then argued very briefly in a closing statement and upon the court’s asking the prosecutor “Do you submit it ? ” an answer was made in the affirmative. The judge then said, “I will find him guilty on Count 1. I will enter a motion for a new trial and for probation and sentence.” This in the face of there being no request for either of such by the defendant or his counsel and further despite the fact that under the circumstances of the case and the law the defendant could not possibly be eligible for probation.
There then followed an argument by counsel for the defendant wherein he urged the judge to release the defendant upon his own recognizance pending further proceedings. The order finally was made that the defendant be released upon the bail previously set and made.
A check of the records shows that there was on file in Superior Court case No. 130730 (the case referred to as the prior conviction in the information) a copy of a judgment *288showing in effect that the defendant was convicted of armed robbery, and as heretofore stated the defendant admitted such on cross-examination. The prosecution, in spite of such record, for some inexplicable reason did not offer into evidence any document to establish the prior conviction. The probation officer’s report in the present case recites with reference to the previous conviction that the defendant was received into the state prison on April 1, 1950 (supported by criminal records and records of the state prison system), that “he was involved in the robbery of a motel—that he was on parole at the time of such robbery and that he had been associated in other robberies.”
On August 16,1960, the matter came on for further hearing. After listening to the additional witnesses of the defendant and each side submitting the ease, the judge said, "feel we have wasted the morning. I will find him guilty,” and upon request of the prosecutor to fix the degree the judge said, “First degree.”
Thereupon counsel for the defendant stated that no gun had been introduced into evidence and the prosecutor advised that they would “stipulate that the Court may resolve that conflict upon the information furnished in the probation report. ’ ’ The judge then announced that he had read the probation officer’s report and that said report noted that no gun was introduced into evidence and that he would “make it second degree” and further that “having in mind the purpose of the indeterminate sentence law, 1 will make no finding on the prior.”
The probation officer’s report to which the judge referred states, among other things: “ [t] he testimony is to the effect that defendant used a weapon at the time of the offense and since the weapon was not recovered, it cannot be stated whether it was loaded or not.” The report further discloses that the defendant apparently started his criminal career at a very early age—that a psychiatric evaluation showed him to be “egocentric—unsympathetic, ruthless—” and that he had other unsocial characteristics.
It is not necessary under the law in this state that a gun be loaded to constitute it a dangerous or deadly weapon and where the robber is shown to have been carrying, at the time of the offense, a firearm such fact will justify the conclusion that he was armed with a dangerous weapon, even though it was not loaded, and he is therefore guilty of first degree robbery. (People v. Egan, 77 Cal.App. 279 [246 P. 337]; *289People v. Shaffer, 81 Cal.App. 752 [234 P. 666]; People v. Freeman, 86 Cal.App. 374 [260 P. 826] ; People v. Barnett, 87 Cal.App. 243 [261 P. 1068]; People v. Ward, 84 Cal.App.2d 357 [190 P.2d 972]; People v. Raner, 86 Cal.App.2d 107 [194 P.2d 37].)
The evidence at the trial demonstrated that at about 8:30 p. m. the defendant entered the place of business attended by the lone storekeeper, that defendant had what appeared to be a handkerchief or piece of gauze held over the lower part of his face with his left hand and an automatic pistol held in his right hand and pointed at the storekeeper. As defendant approached the storekeeper he said, “Open up the register.” The storekeeper opened the register and was then directed to lie down on the floor face down. He did so. The defendant then rifled the cash register, took considerably over $100 therefrom and then stated to the storekeeper, “You-lie there for about two minutes or I will blow your head off. ’ ’
The law, as I understand it, is clear in a case such as this. In People v. Wallace, 36 Cal.App.2d 1 [97 P.2d 256], Mr. Justice White appropriately stated: “Neither the definition of robbery nor the specification of the degrees thereof contemplate that any fine distinctions shall be drawn for the benefit of highwaymen.”
In People v. Raleigh, 128 Cal.App. 105, 108 [16 P.2d 752], Mr. Justice Spence, in speaking of the classes of dangerous or deadly weapons said for the court:
“From a reading of the decisions on the subject we are of the opinion that a distinction should be made between two classes of ‘dangerous or deadly weapons.’ There are, first, those instrumentalities which are weapons in the strict sense of the word, and, second, those instrumentalities which are not weapons in the strict sense of the word, but which may be used as such. The instrumentalities falling in the first class, such as guns, dirks and blackjacks, which are weapons in the strict sense of the word and are ‘dangerous or deadly’ to others in the ordinary use for which they are designed, may be said as a matter of law to be ‘ dangerous or deadly weapons. ’ This is true as the ordinary use for which they are designed establishes their character as such.” (Emphasis added.)
In this case the evidence is crystal clear to the effect that the defendant not only had an automatic pistol in his possession and was armed with such hut he exposed it to view in a threatening manner in the commission of the crime and further stated to the storekeeper in effect that he would blow his head *290off if he did not comply with his directions. Whenever the perpetrator of a robbery is armed with an instrumentality of the first class as described in People v. Raleigh he is, as heretofore indicated, guilty of robbery of the first degree as a matter of law.
The proof was abundantly made in this ease that the defendant pointed the gun at the storekeeper, that the defendant was within close proximity of the storekeeper and there certainly was the threat, both expressly and impliedly made that the gun would be used to shoot the storekeeper if the storekeeper did not comply with the directions ordered by the defendant. Under such circumstances a judgment of robbery in the first degree is the only proper determination. (See People v. Seawright, 72 Cal.App. 414 [237 P. 796]; People v. Hall, 87 Cal.App. 634 [262 P. 50]; People v. Milburn, 89 Cal.App. 526 [265 P. 285] ; People v. Newman, 102 Cal.App.2d 302 [227 P.2d 470].)
As heretofore indicated counsel for the defendant made the novel contention that the gun used in the crime was not introduced into evidence and therefore the court should find that no gun was used in the commission of the robbery and further that the crime should be robbery in the second degree. In speaking of a similar argument it was stated in People v. Newman, 102 Cal.App.2d 302 [227 P.2d 470] at page 306: “No court or jury would be so naive as to expect a bandit to tie up his loot [or his gun] in a handsome package and preserve it for exhibition. His instinct to avoid apprehension is too deeply ingrained for such a performance.”
In People v. Miller, 190 Cal.App.2d 361, 364 [11 Cal.Rptr. 920] (hearing denied), the court said: “The next claim is that he could not be found guilty of first degree robbery because the guns were not produced at the trial. There is no requirement that the weapon be produced. Both robbery victims testified that both appellant and his accomplice were armed with guns which they used in accomplishing the robbery. This evidence was sufficient to support the finding of first degree robbery.”
I realize that it is exclusively for the trial judge to determine the degree of a crime where there is substantial evidence to support a choice of degrees. However, in this ease there is no evidence whatsoever to support a judgment of robbery in the second degree as distinguished from robbery in the first degree. Penal Code section 211a states as follows: “All robbery which is perpetrated by torture or by a person being *291armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon is robbery in the first degree. All other kinds of robbery are of the second degree. '’
Robbery in the first degree is punishable by imprisonment for not less than five years; robbery in the second degree for not less than one year. (Pen. Code, § 213.)
Penal Code section 3024, subdivision (b) provides in part in effect that a person previously convicted of a felony in this state and armed with a firearm at the time of his commission of the offense shall suffer a minimum sentence of four years.
It is readily apparent that here in this case of an “egocentric” and “ruthless” defendant who was plainly guilty of first degree robbery (if he was guilty of any offense at all), who had suffered at least one prior conviction for an armed robbery and served a term in San Quentin Prison therefor, is now by the tactics of the prosecutor and the trial judge found to be in effect a first offender and was sentenced as such; furthermore that because the gun which was used was not introduced into evidence the court apparently found the robbery to be of the reduced variety, namely robbery in the second degree. In other words the defendant was found to be an unarmed first offender.
It is a felony for an ex-convict (without a permit) to have an automatic pistol in his possession. (Pen. Code, § 12025.)
Penal Code section 12022 provides in part in effect that any person who commits a felony while armed with a pistol, without having a license to carry such, and is convicted thereof, shall in addition to the punishment prescribed be punishable by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than ten years. Such additional period of imprisonment shall commence upon the expiration of the sentence imposed for the crime of which he is convicted and shall not run concurrently with such sentence. Furthermore upon a second conviction under like circumstances the additional period of imprisonment shall be for not less than ten years.
It may be good news to armed robbers and especially the ex-convict armed robbers to learn that if they get rid of their guns following a holdup and do not get caught with the gun which they used in the commission of a robbery that there is at least one court which may declare the offense to be a second degree robbery and thereby flaunt the law. It is bad news for law enforcement officers and the sound administration of justice.
*292The procedure which was followed in this case can do nothing but add to the disrespect of the administration of justice of which there is already far too much. It is little wonder that the statistics with reference to crimes of violence show a rapid increase of such offenses in this state.
In my opinion it is bad enough to coddle the so-called passive offenders of the law but when a court pampers the ruthless and violent criminal who states in the course of his offense, “I’ll blow your head off” and is prepared to do just that, then indeed we can expect anything in the administration of the criminal law. The defendant should have been convicted of first degree robbery and found to have been previously convicted of armed robbery and sentenced as such.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 20, 1962.