Court Opinion

ID: 9382442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 18:07:33.114669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.405171
License: Public Domain

J-A04006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: TERM. OF PAR. RIGHTS TO             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    P.G.D.W., A MINOR                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: S.A.B., MOTHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1127 MDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Decree Entered July 11, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
                       Orphans’ Court at No.: 2022-0055a

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED: MARCH 27, 2023

       S.A.B. a/k/a S.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the July 11, 2022 decree

entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas (“orphans’ court”),

granting the petition of the York County Office of Children, Youth & Families

(“CYF” or “the Agency”) and terminating involuntarily her parental rights to

her minor daughter, P.G.D.W. a/k/a P.W. (“Child”), born in May 2019,

pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and

(b).1 After careful review, we vacate the decree and remand.
____________________________________________

1 By the same decree, the court additionally terminated the parental rights of
Child’s father, S.V.W. (“Father”). Father did not file a separate appeal.
Further, counsel for Father, representing that Father is now deceased, filed a
petition on February 13, 2023, requesting that Father be removed as a party
from the instant appeal and that counsel be excused from oral argument.
Counsel’s request is dismissed as moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-W.,
227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in
ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force
or effect.”) (citation omitted).
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       The family has been involved with CYF since 2017, prior to Child’s birth.

N.T., 7/11/22, at 65, 89. CYF obtained emergency protective custody of Child

on January 29, 2021, following Mother’s arrest and incarceration on driving

under the influence and other charges, and placed Child with foster mother, a

pre-adoptive resource, where she has since remained. Id. at 90, 94, 114-15;

Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 2/11/21, at 1-2.2           Mother was

incarcerated until February 26, 2021. N.T., 7/11/22, at 68, 70-71, 90, 117.

She was then re-incarcerated from March 25, 2021, to July 14, 2021.3 Id. at

68, 70-71, 91, 119.

       The court adjudicated Child dependent on February 11, 2021, and

established a placement goal of return to parent or guardian.          Order of

Adjudication and Disposition, 2/11/21, at 2-3.       Thereafter, CYF instituted

objectives aimed at reunification, which were communicated to Mother. CYF

Exhibit 6; N.T., 7/11/22, at 66. As testified by CYF caseworker, Elyse Nangle,

Mother was required to address mental health, substance abuse, and housing,

which remained consistent throughout the case. N.T., 7/11/22, at 66-67; see

also CYF Exhibits 6-8.

____________________________________________

2 We observe that counsel for CYF requested that the court incorporate the
dependency record, which the court granted without objection. N.T., 6/2/22,
at 9. As such, Child’s dependency record was included as part of the certified
record.
3Mother was released to a human trafficking shelter and then moved to a
halfway house. Following that, she resided in a hotel, where she remained
until just prior to the July 11, 2022 hearing. N.T., 7/11/22, at 67-71, 120,
123-25.

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       Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court found

Mother to be in minimal or no compliance with the permanency plan and

minimal or no progression toward alleviating the circumstances necessitating

placement.     As a result, on January 11, 2022, the court changed Child’s

permanency goal to adoption.

       Thereafter, on March 8, 2022, CYF filed a petition for the termination of

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

Mother filed a motion to dismiss the termination petition on April 25, 2022,

alleging that the petition failed to strictly comply with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b).

As such, she asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition.

Motion to Dismiss Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights,

4/25/22, at ¶¶ 7-9. The court denied Mother’s motion the following day, on

April 26, 2022.

       The court held hearings on June 2, 2022, and July 11, 2022.4 Mother

was present and represented by counsel. Child, who was three years old at

the time, was represented by legal counsel as well as a guardian ad litem

(“GAL”).5    On June 2, 2022, CYF presented the testimony of Abbie Fulton,

family   advocate,     Catholic    Charities;    Robert   Gordon,   M.Ed.,   licensed
____________________________________________

4 Aside from a continued termination hearing as to Child, the July 11, 2022
hearing also served as a permanency review hearing with respect to Child and
her half-sibling, I.B., who is not a subject of the instant appeal. N.T., 7/11/22,
at 3.

5 Both legal counsel and the GAL argued in favor of termination of Mother’s
parental rights. N.T., 7/11/22, at 148-50. The GAL and CYF additionally filed
a joint appellee brief in support of the decree.

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psychologist, who conducted an evaluation of Mother, dated November 30,

2021, and was accepted as an expert in parenting capacity examinations

without objection; and Christianne Brennan, family therapist, Catholic

Charities. On July 11, 2022, CYF presented the testimony of Elyse Nangle,

CYF caseworker; Jill Egbert, D & A Program Supervisor, Family United

Network; Carla Arp, therapist, Pressley Ridge; and Katlyn Gumpper, parent

advocate, PA Child TIFFSS (Trauma Intensive Family Focused Support

Services) Program.    Mother presented the testimony of J.G., Child’s foster

mother. She additionally testified on her own behalf.

      By decree dated and entered July 11, 2022, the court terminated

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),

and (b).   Thereafter, on August 9, 2022, Mother, through counsel, filed a

timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

      On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

      [1.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
      matter of law in finding the Petition for Involuntary Termination of
      Parental Rights, filed by [the Agency] satisfied strict compliance
      with the legal requirements of the Adoption Act where the Petition
      did not set forth specific facts and therefore, lacked jurisdiction to
      hear said petition?

      [2.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
      matter of law in taking judicial notice of records of another case
      (over objection) and incorporating the record from the related
      dependency proceedings (over objection) wherein evidence and
      documents contained within said record were admitted under a
      separate and distinct body of law (the Juvenile Act), contained
      documents admitted into evidence under a lower standard of

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     proof, were not properly authenticated, and consisted of hearsay
     within hearsay with no exceptions presented?

     [3.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
     matter of law in admitting (over objection) hearsay evidence in
     the form of a threat of harm evaluation without applicable
     exception, without proper authentication, and without providing
     Mother, the subject of said evaluation, the opportunity to cross
     examine the individual who authored the report, thereby violating
     the Rules of Evidence and denying Mother her right to due
     process?

     [4.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
     matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
     proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother’s conduct
     evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to
     her child or has refused to perform parental duties pursuant to 23
     Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?

     [5.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
     matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
     proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother’s repeated
     and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the
     child to be without essential care, control, or subsistence
     necessary for their physical or mental well-being, and the
     conditions and causes cannot or will not be remedied by Mother
     pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?

     [6.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
     matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
     proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions
     which led to the removal and placement of the child continued to
     exist and Mother failed to remedy those conditions within a
     reasonable time pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?

     [7.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
     matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
     proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions
     which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
     exist, and termination of parental rights would best serve the
     needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
     2511(a)(8)?

     [8.] Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
     matter of law in concluding that the Agency met its burden of
     proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of

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        Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
        of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 5-8 (suggested answers omitted).

        With her first issue, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred in

denying Mother’s motion to dismiss the Agency’s termination petition for

failure to strictly comply with the Adoption Act (“Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-

2910.     Mother asserts that the subject petition did not strictly comply with

the Act in that it failed to set forth the factual basis for termination as required

by Section 2512(b)(1).6 As such, she contends the court lacked jurisdiction

to hear the petition. Mother’s Brief at 34-37.
____________________________________________

6   The petition provided in part:

        13. Set forth the ground(s) for involuntary termination of parental
        rights, including the specific subsection(s) of 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §]
        2511, which establish(es) the legal basis for the requested
        termination(s): 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and
        [(b)].

        Regarding the mother and father:

        The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six (6)
        months immediately preceding the filing of the Petition either has
        evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing a parental claim to a
        child or has refused to perform parental duties.

        The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal
        of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
        care, control, or subsistence necessary for the child’s physical or
        mental well-being and the conditions or causes of the incapacity,
        abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
        parent.

        The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
        Court or under a voluntary agreement with the Agency for a period
        of at least six (6) months, the conditions which led to the removal
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
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       The orphans’ court found the Agency’s restatement of the statutory

language to be sufficient factual averments. While noting that “more specific

detail would be helpful,” the orphans’ court found this met strict compliance.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 16-17.

       Mother’s issue involves the interpretation and application of a statute, a

question of law.     G.A.P. v. J.M.W., 194 A.3d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted). Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review

is plenary to determine whether the court committed an error of law. Id.;

see also In re Adoption of K.M.D., 261 A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(interpreting notice requirements of the Act and the Rules of Orphans’ Court

Procedure). This Court has stated:

       When interpreting a statute, this [C]ourt is constrained by the
       rules of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (the “Act”). 1
       Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 1501-1991. The Act makes clear that the goal in
       interpreting any statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
       of the General Assembly while construing the statute in a manner
____________________________________________

       or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
       will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
       time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent
       are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal
       or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and
       termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
       welfare of the child.

       The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
       court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months
       or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
       conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
       continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best
       serve the needs and welfare of the child.

Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 3/8/22, at ¶ 13.

                                           -7-
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      that gives effect to all its provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(a).
      The Act provides: “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and
      free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
      under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(b).
      Moreover, it is well settled that “the best indication of the General
      Assembly’s intent may be found in a statute’s plain language.”
      Cagey v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 458, 462 (Pa. 2018). . . .

G.A.P., 194 A.3d at 616-617; see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1924 (“The title and

preamble of a statute may be considered in the construction thereof.”).

      It is well-settled that “[a] petitioner’s strict compliance with the

requirements of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101–2910, is a

prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction to hear a petition to terminate parental

rights.”   In re Adoption of J.F.D., 782 A.2d 564, 565 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(citation omitted); see also In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1284-85 (Pa. Super.

2012). In K.M.D., we explained the rationale for strict compliance of the Act,

as follows.

      [W]e are unwilling to allow the termination of parental rights
      “without strict compliance with the procedures set forth by the
      Legislature. . . .” [In re A.N.P., 155 A.3d 55, 66, 68 (Pa. Super.
      2017)] ([citing] In re Adoption of K.G.M., 845 A.2d 861, 865
      (Pa. Super. 2004)) (further citation omitted) (emphasis added).

      Strict compliance is warranted in termination matters because of
      the gravity of such cases. Given the “complete and irrevocable”
      nature of the decision, our Supreme Court has explained that
      “termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and
      severe steps a court can take[.]” In re Adoption of M.R.D.,
      [145 A.3d 1117, 1129 (Pa. 2016)] (citation omitted). . . .

K.M.D., 261 A.3d at 1059-60.

      As to the contents of a petition for involuntary termination, Section

2512(b) provides:

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        § 2512. Petition for involuntary termination.

        ...

        (b) Contents.--The following apply:

              (1) The petition shall set forth specifically those
              grounds and facts alleged as the basis for
              terminating parental rights.

              (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), the petition
              filed under this section shall also contain an averment
              that the petitioner will assume custody of the child
              until such time as the child is adopted.

              (3) If the petitioner is a parent and section 2514
              (relating to special provisions when child conceived as
              a result of rape or incest) applies, or if the petitioner
              is an agency, the petitioner shall not be required to
              aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor
              that a person with a present intention to adopt exists.

        ...

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b) (emphasis added).7

        Significantly, in J.F.D., emphasizing strict compliance with the Adoption

Act, we concluded that the Act compels a termination petition to contain

certain allegations as a prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction to hear the

petition. In re Adoption of J.F.D., 782 A.2d at 565-67. This Court affirmed

an order dismissing the termination petition filed on child’s behalf by counsel

for failure to comply with the prior version of Section 2512(b). 8 Specifically,
____________________________________________

7   The current version of Section 2512 became effective December 28, 2020.

8   The version of Section 2512(b) in effect at the time provided:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the petition failed to include averments that the petitioner will assume custody

of the child until such time as the child is adopted and that an adoption is

contemplated. Id. In so concluding, this Court found that “[i]n the petition,

Appellant included the facts alleged as the basis for the termination. However,

Attorney Jackson, as petitioner, did not aver that he will assume custody of

J.F.D. until such time as she is adopted.” Id. at 567.

        By contrast, in E.M.I., recognizing that the requirements of Section

2512(b) had been met,9 we stated,

        In the present case, Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s
        parental rights to Child, alleging the grounds and facts which form
        the basis for terminating Father’s parental rights, S.S. would like
        to adopt Child, and Mother agrees to assume and continue to
        assume custody of Child until such time as Child is adopted.
        Therefore, Mother’s petition fulfilled the minimal requirements to
        invoke the court’s jurisdiction over the petition.

In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d at 1287 (citations omitted).

____________________________________________

        § 2512. Petition for involuntary termination

        ...

        (b) Contents.--The petition shall set forth specifically those
        grounds and facts alleged as the basis for terminating parental
        rights. The petition filed under this section shall also contain an
        averment that the petitioner will assume custody of the child until
        such time as the child is adopted. If the petitioner is an agency it
        shall not be required to aver that an adoption is presently
        contemplated nor that a person with a present intention to adopt
        exists.
        ...

23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b).

9   Again, we were dealing with the prior version of Section 2512.

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       Instantly, we are constrained to conclude that the orphans’ court erred

as a matter of law in failing to dismiss the Agency’s termination petition. As

the subject petition failed to strictly comply with Section 2512(b)(1) of the Act

to allege even minimal facts to support the petition, the court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the petition.

       Section 2512(b)(1) provides that the petition shall set forth specifically

those grounds and facts alleged as the basis for terminating parental rights.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b)(1) (emphasis added).10 As such, the plain language

of the statute necessitates the pleading of facts.     Here, while the Agency

stated the alleged grounds for termination within its petition, it neglected to

further set forth any facts supporting the requested termination and merely
____________________________________________

10The Orphans’ Court Rules in effect at the time of the filing of the subject
petition provided similarly. Former Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 15.4,
provided, in relevant part:

       15.4. Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights

       (a) Petition. A petition for involuntary termination of parental
       rights under Sections 311 and 312 of the Adoption Act shall
       include the following allegations:

       ...

       (6) facts constituting grounds for the involuntary termination
       under Section 311 of the Adoption Act, and a reference to the
       applicable subsection or subsections;

       ...

Former Pa.O.C.R. 15.4(a)(6) (emphasis added). We note that the Orphans’
Court Rules on this topic were amended in 2022 and effective July 1, 2022.
See Pa.O.C.R. 15.10(a)(9), (10).

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parroted the statutory language as to the grounds for termination.       See

Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 3/8/22, at ¶ 13. As a

result, the subject petition failed to “fulfill[] the minimal requirements to

invoke the court’s jurisdiction over the petition.” In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d at

1287.

        For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decree and remand to the

orphans’ court for entry of an order dismissing the Agency’s petition for

involuntary termination of parental rights filed on March 8, 2022.11

        Decree vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/27/2023

____________________________________________

11As Mother’s first issue is dispositive, we do not address the remainder of
Mother’s issues.

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