Court Opinion

ID: 9910133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 20:09:55.185527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:59.653273
License: Public Domain

J-A23014-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.D.A., III, A   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: T.M.A., MOTHER            :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 755 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0008a

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.J.A., A        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: T.M.A., MOTHER            :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 756 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0009a

 IN THE INT. OF: R.M.A., A MINOR      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: T.W.A., MOTHER            :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 757 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0010a
J-A23014-22

  IN THE INT. OF: A.B.A., A MINOR              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: T.W.A., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 758 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                               2022-0019a

  IN THE INTEREST OF: B.W., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: T.W.A., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 759 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                               2022-0007a

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED DECEMBER 14, 2023

       T.W.A. (“Mother”), appeals from the decrees entered on April 20, 2022,

which terminated involuntarily her parental rights to B.W., born in May 2014;

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

                                           -2-
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Ed.A., III, born in June 2015; R.A., born in June 2018; El.A., born in August

2019; and A.A., born in June 2021.1 We affirm.

       The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) first

became involved with the family in 2019 due to concerns with substance abuse

by Mother and Father. A referral was made to CYF in August 2020 based on

an allegation that they were abusing drugs and not properly disciplining or

supervising the four oldest children. Those children were placed into care and

adjudicated dependent on September 16, 2020. After A.A. was born, he was

likewise placed into care and adjudicated dependent.2

____________________________________________

1 We have adjusted the abbreviations used within this writing to align with
those used by this Court in several related cases presently or recently before
this Court. To wit, with respect to termination, E.A., Jr. (“Father”), El.A., and
R.A., have also appealed, and those appeals are docketed at 683-687 MDA
2022, 740 MDA 2022, and 741 MDA 2022, respectively. Additionally, Father
and Mother also appealed the goal change from reunification to adoption,
docketed at 201-205 MDA 2022 and 295-299 MDA 2022, respectively. Finally,
Father and Mother appealed from an order finding them both perpetrators of
abuse as to B.W. and E.J.A. This Court stayed all matters, including the
instant termination appeal, pending resolution of the abuse appeals.
Ultimately, we affirmed the findings of abuse. See Int. of B.W., 2023 WL
5526687 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision) (affirming the finding
of abuse as to Father); Int. of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239
(Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision) (affirming the finding of abuse
as to Mother). Although the stay has been lifted in the termination matters,
it remains active on the goal change appeals. Regrettably, the cumulative
effect has been the tragic prolongation of several Children’s Fast Track cases
for this family, which are, by nature, meant to be resolved quickly by this
Court for the benefit of the impacted children.

2 All five children were eventually placed in the same pre-adoptive resource

home, where they remained together at the time of the termination hearing.

                                           -3-
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       As a result of the dependency adjudications, Mother was ordered to,

inter alia, cooperate with both announced and unannounced home visits by

CYF;    complete   a   mental   health   evaluation     and   follow   treatment

recommendations; actively participate in services; obtain employment and

provide proof of income to CYF; maintain safe, clean, and appropriate housing;

submit to random drug testing; and continue her drug and alcohol treatment

and participation in the methadone program.           See Family Service Plan,

10/2/20, at 14, 16-18; see also Family Service Plan, 3/12/21, at 14 (adding,

among other things, that Mother notify CYF of any change in household

members and attend medical appointments for the children); Family Service

Plan, 8/9/21 (same, issued following A.A.’s birth and adjudication of

dependency).

       Meanwhile, in the companion dependency matters, allegations of

physical abuse were made against Father and Mother in December 2020 and

January 2021, as to B.W. and El.A., leading to an abuse investigation. The

report included allegations that the parents slapped the children with an open

hand and also with a belt, including when El.A. was less than one month old.

This Court recounted the testimony offered at the March 10, 2022 finding of

abuse hearing as follows:

       The [Child Advocacy Center] forensic interviewer. . . testified:
       “B.W. disclosed being beat — his words — that El.A. was slapped
       with a belt,” Father beat R.A. and El.A., Mother slapped B.W., and
       B.W. observed potential drug use. B.W. further reported El.A.
       suffered injuries, including bleeding from the mouth.

                                     -4-
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      CYF Caseworker [Kristen] Marshall, who observed the interview,
      testified:

            B.W. disclosed that he and his siblings were being
            punished with a black belt with little spikes on it. He
            reported that it was hurtful. B.W. actually stated it
            hurt more than a gun. He stated the spikes were
            sharp and caused him to bleed. He stated he would
            cry and he was hit over and over. The very red marks
            like — were left like it was bleeding, but it wasn’t. And
            he stated that both parents would hit him.

      CYF additionally entered into evidence the forensic interview
      summary and a DVD video of the forensic interview. Ms. Marshall
      sought, but did not receive, medical records that might show
      physical injury to B.W. She also attempted multiple times to
      schedule an interview with Mother and Father, but was
      unsuccessful.

      With respect to El.A., Ms. Marshall testified that B.W. stated
      Mother and Father sometimes slapped El.A., so there was blood
      under his tongue, and that El.A. would cry a lot and neighbors
      would hear. As stated above, B.W.’s statements led to a referral
      as to El.A. An investigation revealed El.A. was taken to the York
      Hospital emergency room for bleeding from the mouth in August
      2019 when he was less than a month old.

Int. of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239, at *2-3 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(non-precedential   decision)    (cleaned   up).      Following    a    prolonged

investigation, partially due to the parents’ refusal to submit to police

interviews, the court found both Mother and Father to be perpetrators of abuse

against B.W. and El.A. As noted, this Court affirmed those findings.

      On January 19, 2022, CYF filed petitions to terminate Mother’s rights to

all five children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). As to the

four oldest children, B.W., Ed.A., R.A., and El.A., CYF also sought termination

pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).

                                      -5-
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       The court held hearings on the petitions on April 1 and 18, 2022.3 With

respect to Mother, CYF presented the testimony of Ms. Marshall, the family

advocate and family therapist from Pressley Ridge, and Mother’s methadone

counselor at Pyramid Healthcare and recovery specialist at RASE Project.

Through their testimony, it was relayed that Mother had been consistent with

her visits with the children and had made significant progress resolving her

substance abuse. However, as of the first day of the hearing, CYF remained

concerned because Mother had not alleviated the environmental concerns at

the house, made progress in her mental health treatment, or established

financial stability. Additionally, visits had not progressed beyond supervised,

and Mother recently tested positive for alcohol, which particularly concerned

CYF given her addiction issues and the serious medical consequences of

mixing methadone with alcohol.

       At the second hearing, over two weeks later, Father and Mother

testified. During the gap between hearings, Mother re-initiated mental health

treatment and the family therapist visited the home during a scheduled visit.

Mother attempted to demonstrate that the house had since been made

appropriate for reunification through her own testimony and by recalling the

family therapist. Mother also explained her work history, the utility payments

at the house, and her attendance at medical appointments for the children.
____________________________________________

3 At the termination hearing, each child had their own attorney representing

their respective legal interests.       David Worley, Esquire, collectively
represented the best interests of all five children as their guardian ad litem
(“GAL”).

                                           -6-
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Father, in pertinent part, presented testimony from another CYF caseworker

regarding Ms. Marshall’s alleged bias.

       The children’s GAL argued that termination was in the best interests of

each child. Specifically, the GAL was concerned that the physical abuse had

been unaddressed and was wary of the last-minute efforts by the parents to

finally re-initiate mental health treatment and attempt to make the home

environment appropriate. Through legal counsel, the children expressed the

following: B.W. wanted to return to his parents; Ed.A. wished to remain in

the foster home and not return to his parent’s home;4 El.A., despite the finding

of abuse, had a strong bond with his parents and would oppose termination;

R.A. also had a strong bond with her parents and would oppose termination;

and A.A., given his young age, could not express a legal position different

from that expressed by the GAL.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, adopting the GAL’s concerns, the

orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to all five children, and

issued separate orders changing each child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The orphans’ court complied with Rule 1925(a). Mother

presents the following issues for our consideration:

____________________________________________

4 Given the bond between Ed.A. and his parents, Ed.A.’s attorney interpreted

his wish not to return to his parents’ home as a request for more time for
Mother and Father to continue to make progress and not as a request for
termination of their parental rights.

                                           -7-
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     I.     Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
            and/or abused its discretion by finding under 23 Pa.C.S.
            § 2511(a)(1) that Mother, by conduct continuing for a
            period of at least six months immediately preceding the
            filing of the petition, either evidenced a settled purpose of
            relinquishing parental claim to the child and/or has refused
            or failed to perform parental duties[.]

     II.    Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
            and/or abused its discretion by finding under 23 Pa.C.S.
            § 2511(a)(2) that sufficient evidence showed repeated and
            continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of Mother
            caused the child to be without essential parental care,
            control, or subsistence necessary for the physical or mental
            well-being and that the conditions and causes of any
            incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be
            remedied by Mother[.]

     III.   Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
            and/or abused its discretion by finding under 23 Pa.C.S.
            § 2511(a)(5) that the child was removed from the care of
            Mother for a period of six months and the conditions that
            led to the removal continue to exist and the Mother cannot
            or will not remedy those conditions in a reasonable period
            of time and termination will serve the needs and welfare of
            the child[.]

     IV.    Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
            and/or abused its discretion by finding under 23 Pa.C.S.
            § 2511(a)(8) that the child was removed for twelve months
            or more and the conditions which led to the removal
            continue to exist and termination best serves the needs and
            welfare of the child[.]

     V.     Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
            and/or abused its discretion by finding under 23 Pa.C.S.
            § 2511(b) that termination will help the physical and
            emotional needs and welfare of the child when there was
            direct testimony to the contrary[.]

     VI.    Whether the [orphans’ court erred as a matter of law and/or
            abused its discretion when it accepted the testimony of the
            biased caseworker despite testimony from multiple other
            sources that disputed said caseworker.

                                     -8-
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       VII.   Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
              and/or abused its discretion when it failed to take into
              account that the parents were stymied from progress due to
              an open investigation from approximately January 2021
              until January 2022[,] during which [CYF] refused to
              progress contact between Mother and child but failed to
              progress the investigation of abuse.

       VIII. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
             and/or abused its discretion in terminating [Mother’s]
             parental rights when it failed to account for the regular and
             consistent progress made by the parents.

Mother’s brief at 4-6 (cleaned up).5

       We begin with whether there was statutory support for termination and

set forth our well-settled standard of review:

       In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
       appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
       decree of the termination court is supported by competent
       evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
       employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
       accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
       trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
       require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
       or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
       we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
       or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
       merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
       different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
       upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
       prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
       error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
       decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
       our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,

____________________________________________

5 The GAL for all five children, CYF, and legal counsel for B.W. and Ed.A.,
respectively, filed a single, collective brief in support of affirming the orphans’
court’s decrees.

                                           -9-
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      we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
      order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
      by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings,

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In

re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed

by the needs and welfare of the child.

      Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must
      engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.
      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
      and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
      child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,

                                     - 10 -
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weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).

       Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). T.B.B.,

supra at 395.       Mother asserts that CYF failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination of her parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm

a decree terminating parental rights, we need only agree with the orphans’

court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus our analysis

for all five children on § 2511(a)(5)6 and (b), which provide as follows:
____________________________________________

6 We cannot countenance the dissent’s constrained interpretation that because

A.A. was placed into care following his birth, he was never in Mother’s care
and therefore, because he was not “removed” from her care, § (a)(5) cannot
apply. See Dissent at 20-21. Our Court has held that § (a)(5) does not apply
when a child is removed while the parent is incarcerated. See In re C.S.,
761 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). In such a scenario, the
parent could not have exercised custody, regardless of whether they were
otherwise capable. Respectfully, that is not the case here. Mother was not
incarcerated at the time of A.A.’s birth such that it was impossible for her to
have custody of A.A. Both Father and Mother were available to take custody
of A.A. and would have, in fact, been in custody of A.A. but for his removal
by CYF at the hospital. In other words, despite A.A. not being removed from
the home of Father and Mother, he was clearly removed from their care at the
time of his birth. That is consistent with both the statutory language and our
case law. See e.g., In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 889-890 (Pa.
1986) (affirming termination pursuant to § (a)(5) where child had been under
the care of the agency since his birth and where the father had “never had
custody of, nor provided support for, [the] child”). Accordingly, we find no
impediment to applying § (a)(5) as to A.A.

                                          - 11 -
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     (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

                  ....

           (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
           by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
           for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
           to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
           the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
           a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
           reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
           the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
           child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
           the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
           of the child.

           ....

     (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

     Pursuant to this framework, we first address whether the orphans’ court

abused its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

§ 2511(a)(5). Termination under this subsection requires that the moving

party prove the following elements:

                                      - 12 -
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      (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
      months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal or
      placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not
      remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within
      a reasonable period time; (4) the services reasonably available to
      the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to
      removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5)
      termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
      welfare of the child.

In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

      Mother argues that the adjudication for the four oldest children was

based upon concerns regarding her drug abuse, which she correctly argues

she has addressed. See Mother’s brief at 25. As to A.A., she notes that while

his adjudication order referenced the abuse investigation, no additional goals

were added with respect to the abuse allegations, no concerns of abuse were

raised during visits, and visits could not progress beyond supervised because

CYF delayed the investigation. Id. As to the environmental concerns and

financial stability, Mother points to testimony from a January 11, 2022 hearing

that a Pressley Ridge worker deemed the house appropriate, and claims that

she provided income documentation to that same individual. Id. at 26.

      While Mother urges us to accept the testimony that favored her

assertion that the environmental issues had been resolved and financial

documentation had been provided to one of the service team members, it was

wholly within the province of the orphans’ court to make credibility

determinations   regarding   the   testimony    offered.    Those    credibility

determinations are supported by the record and therefore remain undisturbed.

See M.G., supra at 73-74; T.B.B., supra at 394. Accepting these credibility

                                    - 13 -
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determinations, our review of the certified record indicates that it was not

solely the inability to provide financial documentation that supported

termination. Rather, it was the failure to demonstrate the ability to provide

safe and stable care for the children, as evidenced by the housing concerns,

Mother’s declining to take seriously the mental health treatment, and lack of

evidence of a stable income to support five children.

      Ms. Marshall, who had been assigned to the case since October 2020,

testified that Mother’s primary concerns at adjudication were substance

abuse, environmental issues in the home, mental health, and drug testing.

See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 197. With regard to the environmental issues,

as noted hereinabove, Mother’s goals included complying with unannounced

and announced home visits by CYF, maintaining safe appropriate housing, and

performing routine housekeeping.

      During Ms. Marshall’s tenure, she attempted to make eight home visits.

In November 2020, there were lice issues, the heavy smell of animal feces

and urine smell, and problems with the toilet, stairwell railing, and one of the

bedroom floors. At the next two visits, both in December 2020, the toilet and

railing issues had been repaired. In January 2021, she was unable to enter

the house due to COVID-19 concerns and lice. In July 2021, a proxy visited

the house but was not permitted inside. Nonetheless, the proxy noted that it

smelled like garbage outside and the front porch was messy. In August 2021,

Ms. Marshall was denied entry into the house but noted a strong smell of

animal feces when the door was opened. Again, in January 2022, she was not

                                     - 14 -
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allowed into the house to conduct a home visit. Her last visit was conducted

on March 24, 2022. See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 46-47.

      During the last visit, which was unannounced, Mother was away from

the home, but returned when called and was inside for a few minutes before

admitting Ms. Marshall and her supervisor into the home. There was a potent

smell of animal feces and urine, feces in the kitchen trash, a dog peeing

sporadically in the house, space heaters throughout the home, including one

on top of a laundry basket filled with clothes, no sink in the only bathroom,

concerns with water damage in the parents’ bedroom, and animal feces in one

of the children’s rooms. See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 200-203.

      Turning to the elements of § 2511(a)(5), Mother does not contest that

all five children were removed from her care for a period exceeding six

months. Therefore, the first element is satisfied. As to the second, third, and

fourth elements, the initial placement was based upon concerns about

Mother’s drug use, inappropriate parenting, unstable employment, unsafe

housing, and the need for mental health treatment.          Once there were

allegations and findings of abuse, that naturally became part of the concerns

as to Mother’s parenting and ability to provide a safe home environment. The

orphans’ court concluded that while Mother had made progress with regard to

her drug treatment and the methadone program, she could not remedy the

remaining conditions leading to adjudication within a reasonable amount of

time. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/17/22, at 32.

                                    - 15 -
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     As the record shows, the children were removed from Father and
     Mother for more than parents’ drug use or Father’s overdose. CYF
     received a referral several days prior to Father’s overdose. CYF
     had prior history with the family and feared Mother would revoke
     the safety plan implemented for the children’s welfare. From the
     outset, the revised safety plan, dated October 2, 2020, provided
     objectives that are not beyond the control of the parents related
     to cooperating with agency services, gaining employment and
     financial stability, providing proof of income, securing appropriate
     housing and sleeping quarters for the children, routine
     housekeeping, and methadone treatment, etc.

     Furthermore, the allegations of physical abuse by B.W. and the
     finding of abuse raise safety concerns regarding the children. The
     parents’ consistent denials that anything happened regarding the
     finding of abuse is concerning. During the period that the children
     have been outside of the home, a report to the court for a
     permanency review hearing indicated that Father often escalates
     to yelling and cursing during team conversations. On August 31,
     2021, the Catholic Services Intensive Family Services Team closed
     out services and recommended anger management because
     Father was inappropriate. In September 2021, Mother reported
     that an argument escalated to the point that her mother
     threatened to file a protection from abuse order against her. In
     October 2021, Father pleaded nolo contendere to disorderly
     conduct for fighting for 12 months’ probation. The court is not
     aware of the date of the specific disorderly conduct. However,
     these other instances occurred after or while Mother and Father
     were receiving various services and raise concerns regarding the
     safety of the children.

     The children were removed from the home for more than six
     months. They have been removed for almost twenty months at
     this time. Parents certainly made progress with regard to the
     methadone program as required by the family service plan cited.
     The parents could not remedy the remaining conditions within a
     reasonable time. Given that parents have had some services close
     unsuccessfully or declined, it is not likely that available services
     will remedy the remaining conditions that led to the removal or
     placement of the children within a reasonable period of time. . . .
     [T]he court believes termination serves the best interests of the
     children who require permanency.

Id. at 30-32 (cleaned up).

                                    - 16 -
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      While Mother made significant progress towards alleviating her drug

addiction concerns and should be commended for doing so, the children were

not removed solely on the basis of her substance abuse. Mother has failed to

make sufficient progress towards her remaining goals, namely, correcting the

environmental concerns in the home, demonstrating financial stability, and

engaging with mental health treatment to address, inter alia, the abuse.

      [T]he statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held
      in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
      necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
      and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence
      and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
      future.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Therefore,

we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding

statutory support for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(5) as to B.W., Ed.A.,

R.A., El.A., and A.A.

      Turning to § 2511(b), we again set forth the guiding principles:

      [C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
      placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
      welfare above concerns for the parent.

      Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular
      developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must
      be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law
      regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
      mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
      and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
      Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.

      Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include
      intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
      further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs

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      and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always
      consider. The court must consider whether the children are in a
      pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
      parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent,
      the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not
      always an easy task.

Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105–06 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up).

      This Court has emphasized that “the extent of the bond-effect analysis

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”           In re

Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up).              In

weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep

the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269

(Pa. 2013). “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation   to   see   to   their   healthy    development    quickly.     When

courts   fail. . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted

children.” Id. A court cannot “toll the well-being and permanency” of a child

indefinitely in the hope that a parent “will summon the ability to handle the

responsibilities of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1007 (Pa.Super.

2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that

termination was in the best interests of all five children as it relates to Mother.

Notably, the GAL for all five children advocated in favor of termination as being

in their best interests. See Appellees’ brief at 28 (arguing that termination is

in the best interests of the children).        The court acknowledged the bond

between the children and Mother, and that Mother has made progress towards

some of her goals.      However, the court held that it “cannot and will not

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subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” Orphans’ Court Opinion,

6/17/22, at 38 (quoting R.J.S., supra at 513). As the children are together,

safe, and bonded with their foster mother, the court concluded that it was in

their best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights so that the children

could achieve permanency. Id. at 38-39. We discern no abuse of discretion

in the court’s decision in that regard.

      Mother raises a separate claim that the orphans’ court erred in crediting

Ms. Marshall’s testimony over that of conflicting individuals.          However,

because we find support for the orphans’ court’s credibility determinations

with regard to Ms. Marshall’s testimony, no relief is due.

      Mother next argues that the orphans’ court failed to consider that

progress in visitation was “stymied” as a result of the open abuse investigation

that CYF delayed.    She alleges that “by letting the investigation pend for

approximately one year then using that as reason that the parents could not

proceed to partial or in-home visitation, it is clear that CYF lacked food faith.”

Mother’s brief at 35.    According to Mother, the Pressley Ridge witnesses

indicated that they had been agreeable to progressing visitation but could not

because of the ongoing abuse investigation. Id.

      The orphans’ court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, set forth how Mother’s

allegations were belied by the record. First, CYF continued to provide services

during the investigation and the court increased the amount of visitation. See

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/17/22, at 36. As to the lack of progress to partial

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or in-home visitation, the Pressley Ridge witnesses testified that the open

investigation was only one of the reasons and they would only have been

comfortable with partially-supervised visits at the time of the termination

hearing. Id.

      Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusions.

Certainly, the abuse allegations were one factor against moving to partially-

supervised visits. See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 207-08. However, it was not

the only reason.   As noted by Ms. Marshall, the visits were not moved to

partially supervised because of the open abuse investigation, the condition of

the house remained inappropriate, the parents’ difficulties in setting

boundaries during visits, and generally insufficient progress with their

parenting goals. See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 68-69.

      Ms. Marshall’s testimony was supported by that of the Pressley Ridge

witnesses. The family advocate, Michele Mahoney, testified that the original

concern necessitating supervised visits was parenting capacity of Mother and

Father.   See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 56.     The parents demonstrated an

improved ability to control visits after therapy started in September 2021, and

at the time of the termination hearing, would now be amenable to partially-

supervised visits. Id. at 56. Likewise, the family therapist, Jessica Myers,

testified that a second supervisor was added to the visits because there were

concerns with the parents whispering to the children, as well as for someone

to monitor B.W.’s mental health during visits. Id. at 77-78. The whisperings

and potentially manipulative conversations were one of the reasons that visits

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had not progress to partially supervised.         Id. at 109.   Nonetheless, she

testified that, at the time of the termination hearing, she would support

partially-supervised visitation. Id. at 107.

      Even if the open investigation had been the only reason preventing visits

progressing to partially supervised, that was not the sole fault of CYF. Ms.

Marshall explained the procedure regarding open abuse investigations, and

that the police must initially conduct interviews in order to move the

investigation along.    Father and Mother refused to participate in those

interviews. Once Ms. Marshall was directed by the court in November 2021

to proceed without the benefit of those interviews, she completed the abuse

investigation by January 11, 2022.      See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 63-64;

B.W., supra at *2.      While parents may have wished for Ms. Marshall to

assume control of the investigation more quickly, it was their refusal to

participate that stalled the investigation. Once Ms. Marshall conducted the

investigation, it appears to have been completed with expediency. Therefore,

Mother is not entitled to relief on this claim.

      Finally, Mother argues that the orphans’ court, instead of focusing on

where the parents erred, should have commended them for the progress they

did make “given the circumstances of a caseworker that refused to work

towards reunification, and a stalemate in visits created by a battery of CPS

investigations that supposedly occurred prior to the children’s adjudication.”

Mother’s brief at 36. Our review of the record indicates that the orphans’ court

did acknowledge the progress that the parents had made, particularly with

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their drug treatment, but nonetheless concluded that termination was

warranted and in the best interests of the children. See e.g., Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 6/17/22, at 38 (“Along with the drug issue, for which there was great

progress, these other conditions, which were part of the conditions that led to

the removal or placement of the children, continued to exist.”). Accordingly,

Mother’s final issue likewise garners no relief.

      As detailed hereinabove, the facts as found by the orphans’ court are

supported by clear and convincing evidence. Its conclusions are free from

legal error and, in our review, are not manifestly unreasonable, or the subject

of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See C.M., supra at 359. In light of

our deferential standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion, and affirm

the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights as to B.W., Ed.A., R.A., El.A.,

and A.A.

      Decrees affirmed.

      P.J.E. Stevens joins this Memorandum.

      Judge McCaffery files a Dissenting Memorandum.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2023

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