Court Opinion

ID: 9412381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-30 08:10:33.766238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:14.602476
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion filed July 27, 2023.

                                      In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-22-00579-CV

       WOLFE’S CARPET, TILE & REMODELING, LLC, Appellant
                                        V.
               GARY AND BEVERLY BOURELLE, Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 129th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 2018-69479

                                 OPINION

      Appellant Wolfe’s Carpet, Tile & Remodeling, LLC (“Wolfe”) sued appellees
Gary and Beverly Bourelle (together, “the Bourelles”), asserting the Bourelles owed
Wolfe money pursuant to a construction contract. The Bourelles filed a motion for
summary judgment and argued that the parties’ contract was void for violating Texas
Insurance Code section 4102.051, which prohibits a person from “act[ing] as a public
insurance adjuster . . . unless the person holds a license.” See Tex. Ins. Code Ann.
§ 4102.051(a). The trial court granted the Bourelles’ summary judgment motion.
After the trial court signed a final judgment, Wolfe appealed. For the reasons below,
we affirm the trial court’s final judgment.

                                     BACKGROUND

      The Bourelles hired Wolfe to make certain repairs on their property after it was
damaged during Hurricane Harvey. According to Wolfe, it performed approximately
$40,000 in work on the Bourelles’ property but the Bourelles refused to remit the
amount owed to Wolfe.

      Wolfe sued the Bourelles in 2018 and asserted claims for breach of contract,
quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Wolfe also requested a declaratory judgment
regarding the mechanic’s and materialman’s lien on the Bourelles’ property. The
Bourelles filed an answer and asserted multiple counterclaims against Wolfe.

      The Bourelles filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the parties’
construction contract was void under the Texas Insurance Code because, via the
contract’s terms, Wolfe was holding itself out as a public insurance adjuster. On
November 2, 2021, the trial court signed an order granting in part the Bourelles’
summary judgment motion. The trial court granted summary judgment on Wolfe’s
claims and, in its findings, stated that the Bourelles “have opted to void the Contract
with [Wolfe] per the Texas Insurance Code.” The trial court denied the Bourelles’
summary judgment motion with respect to their counterclaims.

      The Bourelles then filed a second summary judgment motion addressing the
lien on their property, which the trial court granted in January 2022. The Bourelles
filed a “Notice of Nonsuit” with respect to their remaining counterclaims. But in an
apparent change of heart, the Bourelles withdrew their notice of nonsuit and filed a
fourth amended answer reasserting their counterclaims.

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      In March 2022, the trial court signed an “Order on Motions for Modification,
Correction and New Trial.” In its order, the trial court (1) affirmed the November
2021 order granting in part the Bourelles’ summary judgment motion and voiding the
parties’ contract, (2) vacated the January 2022 order granting the Bourelles’ second
summary judgment motion with respect to the lien on their property, and (3) granted
the Bourelles’ motion for leave with withdraw their nonsuit.

      The Bourelles filed a third summary judgment motion, again seeking to remove
the lien on their property. The trial court signed an order granting the motion and
removing the lien. The trial court signed a final judgment on July 8, 2022, that
(1) reiterated its rulings granting the Bourelles’ first and third summary judgment
motions, (2) imposed a $25,000 bond to stay enforcement of the order removing the
lien, and (3) dismissed without prejudice the Bourelles’ claims against Wolfe. The
final judgment states that it “dispos[es] of all remaining causes of action and is
appealable.” Also on July 8, 2022, the trial court signed and dated a “Notice of
Nonsuit” filed by the Bourelles, in which they nonsuited all their claims against Wolfe.
Wolfe timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                         ANALYSIS

      Raising two issues on appeal, Wolfe asserts the trial court erred by
(1) voiding the parties’ contract for violating the Texas Insurance Code, and
(2) removing its lien on the Bourelles’ property. The Bourelles respond to Wolfe’s
issues and also contend that Wolfe’s notice of appeal failed to preserve any issues
for appellate review. We begin with the Bourelles’ preservation contention before
turning to Wolfe’s issues.

I.    Wolfe’s Notice of Appeal

      Wolfe’s notice of appeal states that it appeals the following orders signed by

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the trial court:

       1.     the Notice of Nonsuit signed July 8, 2022;
       2.     the Final Summary Judgment signed January 26, 2022; and
       3.     the Order for Interlocutory Summary Judgment signed November 2,
              2021.

The Bourelles assert that these listed orders are insufficient to preserve Wolfe’s
appellate issues for the following reasons:

       •      The trial court signed two orders on July 8, 2022: a final judgment
              and the Bourelles’ “Notice of Nonsuit.” Wolfe’s appellate brief did
              not raise any issues challenging the “Notice of Nonsuit” even though
              this was the challenged order listed on its notice of appeal.
       •      The trial court vacated the January 2022 final summary judgment.
       •      The November 2021 interlocutory summary judgment (which voided
              the parties’ contract) merged into the final judgment.

We conclude that these challenges do not deprive us of jurisdiction to consider
Wolfe’s issues on appeal.

       The contents of a notice of appeal are governed by the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which state that the notice must include “the date of the
judgment or order appealed from.” Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d). In cases challenging
the sufficiency of a notice of appeal, the Texas Supreme Court has consistently
held that “a timely filed document, even if defective, invokes the court of appeals’
jurisdiction.” Sweed v. Nye, 323 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam); see
also Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (“disposing of
appeals for harmless procedural defects is disfavored”).       The supreme court
advocates for a policy that “appl[ies] rules of procedure liberally to reach the
merits of the appeal whenever possible.” Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners
v. Park Warwick, L.P., 244 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).

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      Applying this precept, this court also takes a liberal approach when
evaluating alleged errors in notices of appeal. See, e.g., Human Biostar, Inc. v.
Celltex Therapeutics Corp., 514 S.W.3d 844, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (rejecting the appellee’s argument that the court lacked
jurisdiction because appellants’ notices of appeal listed the wrong order); Lackshin
v. Spofford, No. 14-03-00977-CV, 2004 WL 1965636, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Sept. 7, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (notice of appeal was not
defective despite listing incorrect date for final judgment); Griggs v. Wood, No.
14-00-00226-CV, 2001 WL 987906, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 30, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (declining to dismiss
notice of appeal because it did not state the date of the judgment or the order
appealed from).

      Based on a liberal application of the appellate rules, Wolfe’s notice of appeal
is sufficient to preserve its issues for appellate review. Wolfe seeks to challenge
(1) the trial court’s summary judgment voiding the parties’ contract on grounds
that it violates the Insurance Code, and (2) the trial court’s removal of the lien on
the Bourelles’ property. The summary judgment complained of in Wolfe’s first
issue was ruled on in the trial court’s November 2021 order, which was one of the
challenged orders listed in Wolfe’s notice of appeal. The Bourelles do not cite any
case law holding that listing the interlocutory order — but not the final judgment
— in the notice of appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider
the issue. See Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Garza, 371 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. 2012)
(“An appellant can preserve error in the body of their appellate brief, even if it is
not separately listed in the notice of appeal or presented as an issue in the brief.”);
see also, e.g., Anderson v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 806, 809-10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2003, no pet.) (holding that the appellant could challenge an interlocutory partial

                                          5
summary judgment even though the notice of appeal stated that the appeal was
from the order sustaining a subsequent plea to the jurisdiction).

      Wolfe’s notice of appeal also lists the “Notice of Nonsuit signed July 8,
2022” as one of the appealed orders. On the trial court’s docket sheet, the July 8,
2022 final judgment also is listed as the “Order of Non-Suit signed July 8, 2022”
despite the document’s header stating that it is a “Final Judgment.” Construing the
notice of appeal in conjunction with the trial court’s docket sheet suggests Wolfe
was attempting to appeal the final judgment — particularly since Wolfe did not
raise any issues in its appellate brief challenging the nonsuit that also was signed
on July 8, 2022.

      Finally, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require only that the notice
of appeal list “the date of the judgment or order appealed from.” Tex. R. App. P.
25.1(d) (emphasis added). Wolfe’s notice includes the correct date for the final
judgment, even though it lists the incorrect title.

      In sum, because notices of appeal are to be liberally construed, the alleged
issues with Wolfe’s notice of appeal do not warrant declining to reach the merits of
its appeal. We overrule the Bourelles’ argument on this point.

II.   Texas Insurance Code Section 4102.051

      In the trial court, the Bourelles filed a summary judgment motion seeking to
void their contract with Wolfe on grounds that the contract violated the Texas
Insurance Code’s prohibition against persons holding themselves out as public
insurance adjusters. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 4102.051. The trial court signed an
order granting the summary judgment motion and declaring the parties’ contract
void. Wolfe challenges this summary judgment in its first issue on appeal.

      We review a trial court’s order granting a traditional summary judgment de

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novo. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007).
To prevail on a traditional summary judgment, a movant must prove entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law on the issues pled and set out in the motion. Tex. R.
Civ. P. 166a(c); Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594, 607 (Tex.
2013). When a defendant moves for summary judgment, it must disprove at least
one essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action in order to prevail. Doggett
v. Robinson, 345 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

      As part of our summary judgment review, we consider all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Leonard v. Knight, 551 S.W.3d 905,
909 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). When, as here, the trial
court specifies the grounds on which it is granting summary judgment, our review
is limited to the question of whether it was proper to grant summary judgment on
those grounds. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex.
1993).

      The issue resolved on summary judgment centers around the parties’
construction contract.   In construing a written contract, the court’s goal is to
ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. J.M.
Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003). When construing a
contract, we give contract terms their plain, ordinary, and generally-accepted
meanings unless the contract itself shows them to be used in a technical or
different sense. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex.
2005). We construe contracts from a utilitarian standpoint, bearing in mind the
business activity sought to be served; we avoid a construction that is unreasonable,
inequitable, or oppressive. Frost Nat’l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d
310, 312 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).

      If a contract is unambiguous, we construe it as a matter of law. Am. Mfrs.

                                         7
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex. 2003).              A contract is
unambiguous if it can be given one certain or definite legal interpretation. Lane-
Valente Indus. (Nat’l), Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The fact that the parties disagree about
a contract’s meaning does not necessarily show that the contract is ambiguous. Id.

      Here, the trial court’s summary judgment concluded that the parties’ contract
violates Texas Insurance Code section 4102.051(a), which states:

      A person may not act as a public insurance adjuster in this state or
      hold himself out to be a public insurance adjuster in this state unless
      the person holds a license issued by the commissioner[.]

Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 4102.051(a). The term “person” is defined to include a
corporation. See id. § 4102.001(2). Any contract entered into by an insured and a
person or company acting in violation of section 4102.051 “may be voided at the
option of the insured.” Id. § 4102.207(a). If a contract is so voided, the insured “is
not liable for the payment of any past services rendered, or future services to be
rendered, by the violating person under that contract or otherwise.”                 Id.
§ 4102.207(b).

      The Texas Insurance Code defines “public insurance adjuster” as follows:

      (A)    a person who, for direct, indirect, or any other compensation:
             (i)    acts on behalf of an insured in negotiating for or effecting the
                    settlement of a claim or claims for loss or damage under any
                    policy of insurance covering real or personal property; or
             (ii)   on behalf of any other public insurance adjuster, investigates,
                    settles, or adjusts or advises or assists an insured with a claim or
                    claims for loss or damages under any policy of insurance
                    covering real or personal property; or
      (B)    a person who advertises, solicits business, or holds himself or herself
             out to the public as an adjuster of claims for loss or damage under any
             policy of insurance covering real or personal property.

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Id. § 4102.001(3).

      Section 4102.051 has been substantively applied in only three cases. See
Stellar Restoration Servs., LLC v. Courtney, 533 F. Supp. 3d 394 (E.D. Tex. 2021);
Hill v. Spracklen, No. 05-17-00829-CV, 2018 WL 3387452 (Tex. App.—Dallas
July 12, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Lon Smith & Assocs., Inc. v. Key, 527
S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied).

      In Lon Smith, the appellant (a roofing and construction company) appealed
an order certifying a class action and asserted that the trial court misapplied the law
underlying the claims at issue, including section 4102.051. 527 S.W.3d at 610,
615, 617. Specifically, the appellant asserted the trial court erred by relying on
section 4102.051 to void the parties’ contracts. Id. at 617. In relevant part, the
parties’ contract stated:

      This Agreement is for FULL SCOPE OF INSURANCE ESTIMATE
      AND UPGRADES and is subject to insurance company approval. By
      signing this agreement homeowner authorizes [the appellant] to
      pursue homeowner[s’] best interest for all repairs, at a price agreeable
      to the insurance company and [the appellant]. The final price agreed
      to between the insurance company and [the appellant] shall be the
      final contract price.
Id. at 620.

      On appeal, the appellant asserted that it merely agreed to “discuss” the
amount of damages and costs of replacement with the homeowners’ insurance
companies but did not agree to “advocate on behalf of a consumer.” Id. Rejecting
this argument, the court focused on the fact that the parties’ contract authorized the
appellant to (1) pursue the homeowners’ “best interest for all repairs”, and
(2) settle the final contract price between the insurance company and the appellant.
Id. Accordingly, the contract ran afoul of section 4102.051’s prohibition against
companies advertising, soliciting business, or holding themselves out as public
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insurance adjusters. Id. at 620-21.

       The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that it did not act as a
public insurance adjuster but merely held itself out as a public insurance adjuster.
Id. at 620. Stating that this was “a distinction without a difference,” the court held
that the appellant “was prohibited from both acting as and holding itself out as a
public insurance adjuster” under section 4102.051. Id.

       The Dallas Court of Appeals in Hill v. Spracklen 1 reached the same
conclusion when it analyzed similar contractual language. 2018 WL 3387452, at
*4-5. In relevant part, the Hill contract stated:

       This agreement is for FULL SCOPE OF INSURANCE ESTIMATE
       AND UPGRADES and is subject to insurance company approval. By
       signing this agreement homeowner authorizes [the appellant] to
       pursue homeowner’s best interests for all repairs at a price agreeable
       to the insurance company and [the appellant], and at NO
       ADDITIONAL COST TO HOMEOWNER EXCEPT THE
       INSURANCE DEDUCTIBLE AND UPGRADES. The final price
       agreed to between the insurance company and [the appellant] shall be
       the final contract price.
                        *                    *                    *

       By signing this agreement the homeowner authorizes [the appellant]
       to work on behalf of the insured to secure approval for estimate of
       necessary roof and any other repairs of the home. Once insurance
       approval is secured, this agreement becomes a binding contract for the
       work approved by the insurance company, homeowner and [the
       appellant]. Cost of job will be as per insurance estimate.
       This agreement does not obligate [the appellant] or the homeowner in
       any way, unless work is approved by the insurance company on
       homeowner’s behalf.

       1
         This case was transferred from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the
court noted that it was bound by the 2017 Lon Smith decision discussed above. See Hill, 2018
WL 3387452, at *4 n.5.

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Id. at *2. Concluding that the contract violated section 4102.051, the court noted
that the appellant agreed to (1) “pursue [the] homeowners[’] best interests,” and
(2) reach a settlement with the appellees’ insurance company.                  Id. at *5.
Therefore, the appellant “explicitly agreed to advocate on behalf of a consumer,
which is prohibited conduct.” Id.

          Conversely, in Stellar Restoration, the district court concluded that the
parties’ contract did not violate section 4102.051. 533 F. Supp. 3d at 420-21. The
district court pointed to four key differences between the contract at issue and
those analyzed in Lon Smith and Hill:

          •     The contract did not authorize or require Stellar to act in the insured’s
                best interest.
          •     The contract did not authorize Stellar to reach a final contract price
                with the insurance company. Rather, the contract authorized Stellar to
                obtain “an estimate” after investigating and evaluating the sustained
                damage.
          •     The contract acknowledged that other parties may be involved, “such
                as an insurance carrier, public insurance adjuster, agents, consultants,
                and others.”
          •     The contract contained a disclaimer stating: “Customer acknowledges
                that Stellar is not a public adjuster and cannot act to negotiate or settle
                an insurance dispute or claim.”
Id.
          Here, the relevant language in the parties’ contract falls between that
analyzed in Lon Smith/Hill and Stellar Restoration. In relevant part, the contract
states:

          OWNERS [sic] ONLY FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE
          THE DEDUCTIBLE AND DEPRECIATION.
          NOTE: THE WORK TO BE COMPLETED AND MONIES DUE
          WILL BE THE AGREED SCOPE OF PRICE AGREED UPON
          WITH THE ADJUSTER AND INSURANCE COMPANY.
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      FINANCIAL PROCEEDS: If the cost of the work being performed
      by [Wolfe] is subject to the provisions of an insurance policy,
      Owner(s) agree to instruct its mortgage company(s) to make payable
      to Owner(s) and [Wolfe] on any checks to be distributed on behalf of
      the Owner(s) for the payment of such covered work for materials and
      labor. Owner(s) further consent that all such checks shall be
      surrendered to both Owner(s) and [Wolfe], be deposited into a
      financial account in the name of [Wolfe], and be applied to the
      balanced of the build back from the insurance scope to [Wolfe].
                       *                 *                   *
      ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT: We furthermore authorize [Wolfe]
      to negotiate to said Insurance Company and Mortgage Institution if
      necessary, on our behalf a quick and fair settlement with our
      insurance carrier (With Owners Approval). All checks are to be
      made payable to both Owner(s) and [Wolfe].
(emphasis added).

      We agree with the trial court: this contractual language violates section
4102.051.      Section 4102.051 prohibits a company from advertising, soliciting
business, or holding itself out as a “public insurance adjuster,” which includes
acting on behalf of an insured “in negotiating for or effecting the settlement” of an
insurance claim covering real property. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 4102.001(3),
4102.051(a). By its terms, the parties’ contract authorized Wolfe to “negotiate to
said Insurance Company . . . on [the Bourelles’] behalf a quick and fair
settlement.”     This language falls squarely within that prohibited by section
4102.051.

      The courts in Lon Smith and Hill emphasized two components of the
contracts at issue to support their conclusions that the contracts violated section
4102.051:      that the contracts authorized the appellants to (1) pursue the
homeowners’ “best interest” for all repairs, and (2) reach a settlement price with
the insurance companies. See Hill, 2018 WL 3387452, at *5; Lon Smith, 527

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S.W.3d at 617. Although the contract here does not use the phrase “best interest,”
it does state that Wolfe is permitted to work on the Bourelles’ behalf to secure “a
quick and fair settlement.”      The agreement also authorizes Wolfe to reach a
“settlement.” These similarities to the analyses in Lon Smith and Hill provide
further support to the conclusion that the parties’ contract violates section
4102.051. Likewise, the parties’ contract permitted Wolfe more liberties than the
one analyzed in Stellar Restoration and did not contain a disclaimer stating that
Wolfe was not acting as a public insurance adjuster.

      Arguing against this conclusion, Wolfe asserts that “[n]o acts were taken by
[Wolfe] to negotiate [the Bourelles’] scope of work with the insurance company.”
This argument was rejected in Lon Smith. See 527 S.W.3d at 617. As the Lon
Smith court pointed out, section 4102.051 prohibits a company from advertising,
soliciting business, or holding itself out as a public insurance adjuster — not just
taking action as a public insurance adjuster.            See Tex. Ins. Code Ann.
§§ 4102.001(3)(B); 4102.051(a). Accordingly, Wolfe’s argument does not vitiate
the fact that, via its contract with the Bourelles, it advertised, solicited business, or
held itself out as a public insurance adjuster in violation of section 4102.051.
Therefore, the Bourelles were entitled to void the contract and avoid liability for
the payment of any past services rendered by Wolfe. See id. § 4102.207(a), (b).

      Wolfe also points out that, with their summary judgment motion, the
Bourelles attached an unsworn declaration by Gary Bourelle voiding the parties’
contract. Wolfe argues that the court may not void the parties’ contract because
Beverly Bourelle did not file a similar declaration.

      Wolfe does not cite any case law or other authority to support this
contention. In Lon Smith and Hill, a declaration was not mentioned as a necessary
prerequisite to voiding the parties’ contracts. See also Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v.

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White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 490-91 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing that when an agreement
cannot be performed without violating the law or public policy, it is per se void);
Indian Oil Co. v. Bishop Petroleum Inc., 406 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied (“A contract to do an act which cannot be
performed without violation of the law violates public policy and is void.”).
Therefore, this argument does not impede the Bourelles’ ability to void the parties’
contract under the provisions of the Texas Insurance Code.

      In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding that the parties’ construction
contract violates section 4102.051 of the Texas Insurance Code. See Tex. Ins.
Code Ann. §§ 4102.001(3)(B); 4102.051(a). Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in granting summary judgment on Wolfe’s breach of contract claim. See id.
§ 4102.207.

      Wolfe also pleaded claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment in its
original petition. On appeal, Wolfe does not argue that these claims are not
similarly invalidated on grounds that the parties’ contract violates section
4102.051. See id. § 4102.207(b) (“If a contract is voided under this section, the
insured is not liable for the payment of any past services rendered, or future
services to be rendered, by the violating person under that contract or otherwise.”);
see also Hill, 2018 WL 3387452, at *4-5 (after holding that the parties’ contract
violated section 4102.051, the court concluded that it did not need to address
whether the trial court erred by refusing to submit a jury question on the
appellant’s quantum meruit claim).       Nor did Wolfe raise any other grounds
challenging the trial court’s summary judgment on these claims. See Tex. R. App.
P. 38.1; see also, e.g., DeWolf v. Kohler, 452 S.W.3d 373, 388 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment because the
appellant did “not challenge the summary judgment on this claim on any

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grounds”). Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on
these claims.

       We overrule Wolfe’s first issue.

III.   Removal of the Lien on the Bourelles’ Property

       The trial court also signed an order granting the Bourelles’ motion to remove
Wolfe’s lien on their property, finding that the lien was unenforceable under Texas
Property Code section 53.160. Wolfe challenges this order in its second issue.

       Section 53.160 provides that, when a lien affidavit is filed on homestead
property, a motion to remove the lien may be based on the assertion that “no
contract was executed or filed.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 53.160(b)(6). A valid
contract is required to fix a construction lien on a homestead. See id. § 53.254(a).

       Here, the Bourelles relied on section 53.160 to remove the lien on their
property and argued that the parties’ contract was void under Texas Insurance
Code section 4102.051. As discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did
not err when it held that the parties’ contract violated section 4102.051. See Tex.
Ins. Code Ann. §§ 4102.001(3)(B); 4102.051(a). Therefore, the trial court did not
err in removing the lien on the Bourelles’ property.

       We overrule Wolfe’s second issue.

                                   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s July 8, 2022 final judgment.

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                                      /s/    Meagan Hassan
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Wilson.

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