Court Opinion

ID: 9775705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:07:40.021149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.524779
License: Public Domain

LAGARDE, Justice,
dissenting.
In an opinion wide in scope and shallow in rationale, the majority today have held that the criminal defendant in a Batson1 hearing is not only entitled to an adversarial hearing but is also entitled to cross-examination of the State’s representative at that hearing.2 And not content to limit its holding to the case at bar, the majority purport to set up certain general procedural rules to be followed in all cases involving a Batson hearing. I am at a loss to know by what authority they have such supervisory power. Although I agree with Justice Enoch’s dissenting opinion that the limits of the inquiry should be within the sound discretion of the trial judge, I would go further and hold that there is no right to cross-examine the prosecutor at a Batson hearing. I write separately to state considerations that have led me to that conclusion.
In order to understand the competing interests involved and the impact of today’s holding, I find it helpful to carefully examine the Batson decision itself — from whence it came and to whence it appears to be going. It is against this Batson back*884drop that I have concluded that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives a defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” should not be extended to cross-examination of the State’s representative, the prosecutor, at a Batson hearing.

Batson v. Kentucky

In 1986, the Supreme Court, in Batson, lessened the evidentiary burden that a criminal defendant must meet to establish a denial of equal protection through the State’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury. Throughout the litigation of the issue in the Kentucky state court system, Batson conceded that his equal protection claim was foreclosed by Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) and only urged his federal constitutional right, under the Sixth Amendment, to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.3 The equal protection claim, except as permitted by Swain, was apparently never urged, briefed or argued. See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1715, 1731. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose to base its holding on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Court explains its equal protection choice in a footnote. Bat-son, 106 S.Ct. at 1716 n. 4. The Court agreed with the State that reconsideration of its holding in Swain was necessary to resolve the issue inasmuch as the State relied on Swain as a basis for affirmance. It expressed no view on the merits of Bat-son’s Sixth Amendment claim. Id.4
In Swain, the Court had considered two types of peremptory challenges — first, those made for the purpose of prevailing in the specific case at bar, or in other words a case-specific challenge, and second, those made for the purpose of excluding black jurors, or a non case-specific challenge. The Court in Swain upheld the case-specific challenge and, although its holding turned on a failure of proof and not on the unconstitutionality of the non case-specific challenge, it intimated that a non case-specific challenge would be unconstitutional.
The Batson decision does not expressly overrule Swain. Batson states that Swain is overruled only to the extent that anything in Swain is contrary to the principles articulated in Batson. Batson, 106 S.Ct. 1725 n. 25. The only conflict, in my view, is one of the evidentiary burden. Batson, unlike Swain, allows a criminal defendant to make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination by relying solely on the facts concerning the jury’s selection in his case. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1722. Batson created a new remedy, not a new right. Seubert v. State, 749 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
In Batson, the Court seems to use the equal protection clause as a means to an end, i.e., to eliminate racial discrimination in the exclusion of black citizen-jurors (thereby protecting society’s interest) as a means to the end of a fair and impartial jury to decide the guilt or innocence of the particular criminal defendant on trial (thereby protecting the individual’s right). Thus, as I read Batson, I find that it implicates the right to a fair and impartial jury although it does not bottom its holding on the Sixth Amendment.
The Court states:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial_ A person’s race simply “is un*885related to his fitness as a juror.” [Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217] at 227, 66 S.Ct. [984] at 989 [90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946)] (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1717-18 (emphasis added).
It is significant, at least to me, that Bat-son did not apply traditional or conventional equal protection principles but limited its application of those principles to race. In doing so, the Court apparently recognized that the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily directed toward racial discrimination, but specifically failed to recognize, at least in its holding, the extent to which equal protection has now been applied.- Clearly its holding is a limited application of equal protection principles.
The Court goes on to say that “[selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1718. Although I agree wholeheartedly with the wisdom of assuring public confidence, I do have doubts that unequal application of the equal protection guarantee serves that worthy goal. I read Batson as an effort to strike a balance between institutional and individual interests.
But, I further conclude that by resting its holding on the equal protection clause the Court in Batson also, either consciously or subconsciously, sought a remedy which would place a lesser burden of proof on the State in the context of a criminal trial. Because the Court “express[ed] no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel,” Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1718 n. 12, and only allowed limited judicial inquiry of the prosecutor, I do not find this insignificant. By applying the equal protection clause, the burden of persuasion remains at all times on the criminal defendant. The only burden on the State is to give a “racially-neutral” 5 reason for its strike if and only if the trial court finds that the defendant has established an inference of racial discrimination. If an inference of racial discrimination is established, Batson then requires an explanation by the prosecutor. If the prosecutor states a reason which is accepted by the Court, that does not mean the State wins — that simply means that the inference is rebutted. The burden of persuasion remains on the defendant. The trial court could conclude that the reason given is a legitimate reason and still find purposeful discrimination based on the totality of the circumstances. In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1721.
On the other hand, if the decision had been based on the Sixth Amendment, the State would have had a heavier burden. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 670 n. 26, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), a case decided on the Sixth Amendment, the Court stated:
Those equal protection challenges to jury selection and composition are not entirely analogous to the case at hand. In the cited cases, the significant discrepancy shown by the statistics not only indicated discriminatory effect but also was one form of evidence of another essential element of the constitutional violation — discriminatory purpose. Such evidence is subject to rebuttal evidence either that discriminatory purpose was not involved or that such purpose did not have a determinative effect. See Castaneda [v. Partida] supra, 430 U.S. [482] at 493-495, 97 S.Ct. [1272] at 1279-1280 [51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)]; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In contrast, in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant’s interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section. *886The only remaining question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringement.
Id. 99 S.Ct. at 670 n. 26. In my view, the majority here impose such a burden on the State. They state: “In the context of a Batson hearing such other evidence must include a racially neutral explanation by the prosecuting attorney and must be legally adequate to support a judgment in favor of the State.” However, they do recognize, at least in form, that the burden of persuasion never shifts.
In light of Batson itself and in light of the historical, and present, use of the peremptory challenge as a means to an end, i.e., that by the process of elimination of jurors perceived to be partial to one’s opponent, an impartial jury results, one might wonder why the Court based its holding where it did. See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1732 (Burger, C.J. dissenting joined by Rehnquist, J.). By its effort to protect the individual interest through the institutional interest, perhaps it sought to serve not only the end of reality, but also the end of appearance. In addition to the curious and questionable evolution of Batson, I also find other considerations significant.

Institutional Biases

At the outset, the jurisprudential scales vis-a-vis the guarantee of an impartial jury are weighted against the State. Jurors are pledged to favor the defendant — the presumption of innocence requires partiality toward the defendant. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt favors the defendant. The unanimous verdict requirement 6 favors the defendant. The difficulty of ferreting out juror bias because of unreliable responses by jurors, made either subconsciously out of the human weakness of denial, or perhaps more often because of an overriding desire to serve on the jury, further skews the balance. And the concept of jury nullification should also be considered. The jury has the absolute prerogative to acquit in the face of compelling evidence and to do so with virtual impunity.
“Our criminal justice system requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.” Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1729 (Marshall, J., concurring in part) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 7 S.Ct. 350, 351, 30 L.Ed. 578 (1887).
With a view toward evening the balance, I have reached the conclusion that Williams should not have a right of cross-examination.

The Transformation of the Peremptory Challenge

In a recent decision extending Batson to civil actions between private litigants, on a theory that state action is involved,7 a dissenting federal appeals justice stated:
What remains after today’s holding is not the peremptory challenge which our procedure has known for decades — or not one which can be freely exercised against all jurors in all cases, at any rate. Justice Marshall would dispense with strikes entirely, and perhaps this will be the final outcome. Batson 476 U.S. at 106-8, 106 S.Ct. at 1728-9 (Marshall J., concurring). In this much at least he is surely correct, that we must go on or backward; to stay here is to rest content with a strange procedural creature in*887deed: a challenge for semi-cause, exercisable differentially as to jurors, depending on how the ethnic group to which they belong correlates with that of the striker’s client — a skewed and curious device, exercisable without giving reasons in some cases but not in others, all depending on race.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1308, 1317 (5th Cir.1988) (Gee, J. dissenting).

Role of the Trial Judge

Although the Court in Batson purports to specifically address the “evidentiary burden” of its Swain decision, it is silent as to any further guidance concerning whether an adversarial process is required and, if so, the issue of cross-examination. The Court speaks in terms of “the trial court,” and “judicial ” inquiry and “a court undertaking] a sensitive inquiry ...” Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1721 (emphasis added). Perhaps that is because “the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge_” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981). To the large extent credibility is a factor, the credibility choice is to be determined exclusively by the trial court. Its findings are to be given “great deference.” Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21. Who, then, is better than the one to be convinced to determine what is needed to convince him or her? Further, the credibility of the prosecutor is not a predominate factor in the evaluation. See Seubert v. State, 749 S.W.2d at 589 (Hoyt, J. concurring). Justice Hoyt states:
To begin this process, a trial judge has a duty to examine and evaluate the State’s explanation using a three-part test: First, the trial judge must determine whether the explanation is facially adequate; second, whether the explanation is refuted by the record; and finally, if both prior questions are resolved in the affirmative and negative, respectively, his decision turns on the credibility of the witnesses. See Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987). An appellate court evaluates the trial court’s findings and conclusions following this three-pronged test keeping in mind that the first two prongs require evaluation as questions of law. In essence, whether the explanation is facially adequate or refuted by the record is a question of law.
... When the State gives its explanation, a trial court cannot view its role as simply evaluating the evidence from a believability standard. Simply concluding that the State’s response is racially neutral and that the State intended no harm are inappropriate conclusions. This approach overlooks the first part of the evaluation process and permits the third area, concerning the credibility of the State’s response, to predominate the evaluation. A prosecutor may not rebut a defendant’s prima facie case merely by denying a discriminatory motivation, or by affirming his good faith in individual selections. It is incumbent upon the prosecutor to articulate a clear and reasonably specific neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (Emphasis added).
An explanation is facially adequate if after its examination, an inference of bias on the part of the juror relative to the law, the case, the parties, the attorneys, or the subject matter can be discerned. This is to say that a venireper-son must express a trait or characteristic peculiar to him that may otherwise prejudice or color his reasoning, thereby preventing him from following the law and instructions in the case. In short, the bias must be individual bias of the veni-reperson; not a group bias or that of the prosecutor. People v. Turner, 42 Cal.3d 711, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102 (1986).
As a practical matter, the trial judge’s credibility choice as to the prosecutor’s explanation will no doubt be directly related to the judge’s own evaluation of the juror’s impartiality as to the law, the offense, the parties and the attorneys, and cross-exami*888nation of the prosecutor would add nothing to the inquiry.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

By holding that a criminal defendant has an absolute right of cross-examination in a Batson hearing the majority, in my view, impose a burden on defense counsel to risk an ineffective assistance claim if he or she fails to (a) file a Batson motion and (b) to cross-examine the prosecutor in virtually every case, even though he or she may feel there is absolutely no reason to do so. Cf. Randle v. State, 760 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (abating appeal and ordering trial court to assure defendant’s right to effective assistance on appeal where counsel failed to assert a Rose8 point of error on appeal).

Inquisitorial v. Adversarial

The majority state:
the selection of a fair and impartial jury to hear the case on the merits is of such vital importance to an accused that we conclude and hold the selection process is part and parcel of the “adversarial” nature of the trial on the merits. When a Batson motion is timely made, the trial court should conduct the hearing in an adversarial manner.
“The obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge_” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S.Ct. at 1634. I have found no Texas authority to the contrary.
In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 790, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965), a unanimous Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, stated:
The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result....
The Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him” (emphasis added). This Sixth Amendment right is secured for criminal defendants in state court. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). However, it has been held to be a trial right. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (emphasis added).
I find no Texas case that has held that the right of cross-examination applies to preliminary proceedings. Other jurisdictions have reached conflicting results. However, most of the times cross-examination has been allowed in preliminary proceedings, it goes to matters involving evidence against the accused. In the limited context of a Batson hearing, in Texas the prosecutor becomes an “accused.” 9 When considered in light of the Fifth Amendment,10 I find this particularly troublesome.
It is well established in Texas law that the conduct of voir dire examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and only an abuse of discretion will call for reversal. Clark v. State, 608 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). If the defendant has a right of cross-examination, the trial court’s discretion is subordinate to the defendant’s right of cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Vasilios, 598 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 742, 62 L.Ed.2d 737 (1980). I would hold that the defendant does not have a *889right of cross-examination of the prosecutor during a Batson hearing.
Considering the “given” in Batson that “the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact ... that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate’ ” (emphasis added), 106 S.Ct. at 1723 quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 892, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953), the myriad of variables that arise in each case, and the case-specific requirement of Batson, assuming proper application of the rules of evidence, there would be little, if anything at all, to be gained by cross-examination. Given Batson’s extremely limited encroachment of the prosecutor’s exercise of the peremptory, I believe it should be just as narrowly applied. Otherwise, the State’s right to peremptory challenge is sacrificed with no resulting value toward eliminating racial discrimination in jury selection.

Supervisory Role

Not being content to limit the holding to the case at bar, the majority purport to set up a procedure to be followed in all Bat-son hearings. By doing so, it goes too far, in my view, and casts itself in a supervisory role over the district court.
I recognize that federal appellate courts possess broad supervisory powers over lower federal courts and have invoked that power to “preserve judicial integrity” over other federal courts. See United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 568, 570 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986) (Williams, J. dissenting). Id. at 570 n. 2. Their authority, however, is based on a congressional grant of power. I know of no State counterpart. And in fact, the federal courts have no supervisory role over state courts. United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d at 570 n. 2 and 572. Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals recently cautioned against issuing advisory opinions. See Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 803-04 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (on State’s motion for rehearing). Even the Court of Criminal Appeals has limited rule-making authority. I am, therefore, at a loss to know the basis of this Court’s assumed supervisory and rule-making power.
Article 35.26111
Responding to Batson, the Texas legislature in 1987 enacted article 35.261 which provides:
(a) After the parties have delivered their lists to the clerk under Article 35.26 of this code and before the court has impan-elled the jury, the defendant may request the court to dismiss the array and call a new array in the case. The court shall grant the motion of a defendant for dismissal of the array if the court determines that the defendant is a member of an identifiable racial group, that the attorney representing the state exercised peremptory challenges for the purpose of excluding persons from the jury on the basis of their race, and that the defendant has offered evidence of relevant facts that tend to show that challenges made by the attorney representing the state were made for reasons based on race. If the defendant establishes a pri-ma facie case, the burden then shifts to the attorney representing the state to give a racially neutral explanation for the challenges. The burden of persuasion remains with the defendant to establish purposeful discrimination.
(b) If the court determines that the attorney representing the state challenged prospective jurors on the basis of race, the court shall call a new array in the case.
Had the legislature felt the need to prescribe certain procedures to be followed in a Batson hearing, it could have done so. It did not. Had the legislature felt the need for state appellate courts to have supervisory power to preserve the “integrity of the judicial system” it could have given them that power. It did not. If the suspicion and distrust of prosecutors and trial judges, which the majority suggest, is warranted, the majority should be concerned that they are providing an easy vehicle by which a creative and cunning prosecutor *890can cause to be discharged a jury array which he or she finds unacceptable.
Article 35.261 already provides a vehicle by which a trial judge can achieve that result, if so inclined. By its decision today, the majority further extend that vehicle to the prosecutor. Because experience has taught me otherwise, I do not view either prosecutors or trial judges with such suspicion and distrust. Neither does the Supreme Court, who puts “considerable trust” in the trial judge. See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1725.
Based on the foregoing considerations, in addition to many of the reasons stated by Justice Enoch, I would hold that Batson contemplates judicial inquiry of the prosecutor at a Batson hearing, and would further hold that Williams had no right to cross-examination of the prosecutor, but at most a privilege, and that the privilege was subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. Finding no abuse of discretion, I would overrule Williams’ fifth point of error.
Concerning Williams’ point of error number six, that the trial court erred in giving unconstitutional parole law instructions, I would hold that it was error, Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2). I have examined the remaining points of error and found them to be without merit for the reasons stated in the State’s appellate brief. I would therefore, affirm.

. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

. In footnote three, the majority have stated that prior to establishing a prima facie case, any attempt to require the prosecutor to explain his peremptory challenges would be improper. See Tompkins v. State, No. 68,870, slip op. at 5, (Tex.Crim.App. Oct. 7, 1987).

. He also based his claim of an impartial jury right on the Kentucky State Constitution.

. It is noted that Swain was decided in 1965, three years prior to the Sixth Amendment being made applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). In De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968) (per curiam), the Court held that Duncan was inapplicable to cases in which trial began prior to the date of the Duncan decision.

. The Batson decision is not internally consistent. At one point it speaks in terms of challenges based solely on racial discrimination, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, yet at another it requires the State to state a "racially-neutral" explanation related to the particular case to be tried. 106 S.Ct. at 1723.

. Although there is no requirement in the United States Constitution of unanimonity, such a requirement does exist under Texas law. See Molandes v. State, 571 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); TEX. CONST, art. 5, § 13; TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN., arts. 37.03, 36.29.

. The fifth federal circuit court found state action in the Supreme Court decisions in Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1345, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2755, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961) and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948). The rationale applied by the majority, in Edmondson, it seems to me, would necessarily result in defense counsel— particularly court-appointed counsel or public defenders — being state actors. This in spite of the holding in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) that a public defender employed by the State is not a state actor.

. Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (op. on reh’g).

. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.02(a)(2) ("A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he ... intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful.’’) An offense is a Class A misdemeanor. § 39.02(c).

.U.S. CONST, amend. V. I recognize that, like the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not absolute; however, it should be worthy of consideration and, at least, mention.

. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon Supp.1989).