Court Opinion

ID: 9353319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:05:47.968039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:12.533177
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 21-1611
                            Filed January 11, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

GREGORY CECIL HETTMANN,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David M. Porter, Judge.

      Gregory Hettmann appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse.

AFFIRMED.

      John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

         Gregory Hettmann appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse,

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.       We review claims of insufficient

evidence for correction of errors at law. State v. Buman, 955 N.W.2d 215, 219

(Iowa 2021). In doing so, we view the evidence and any inferences drawn from it

in the light most favorable to the State and affirm if substantial evidence supports

the verdict. See id. Because there is substantial evidence showing Hettmann

committed third-degree sexual abuse, we affirm.

         The State charged Hettmann with third-degree sexual abuse for performing

a sex act on K.H. while she was suffering from a mental defect or incapacity that

precluded her from giving consent. See Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(b)(1) (2018). The

parties agree that Hettmann performed a sex act on K.H. in December 2018; he

admits that he performed oral sex and attempted to penetrate K.H.’s vagina with

his fingers but stopped when she “freaked out.” The question is whether K.H. was

mentally incapacitated.       Chapter 709 defines mentally incapacitated as

“temporarily incapable of apprising or controlling the person’s own conduct due to

the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating substance.”             Id. at

§ 709.1A(1).

         Hettmann’s conviction arises from events that occurred after K.H. went to

Hettmann’s apartment in December 2018. K.H. arrived at around 7:00 p.m. with a

bottle of vodka. The two shared the bottle, drinking in large gulps as they passed

it back and forth. But while talking at the start of the night, K.H. made her intentions

clear:
                                         3

              Q. . . . What did you talk to him about? A. We caught up and
      he asked questions about my life and stuff, just small talk since we
      hadn’t known each other. Then, I did tell him before I started drinking
      that I wanted it to be known that I don’t want to go any further than
      kissing, that if that were the case, we could do that sober.
              Q. When you say, “If that were the case, we could do that
      sober,” do you mean anything beyond kissing? A. Anything beyond
      kissing. I didn’t want to cross that boundary.
              Q. Why not? A. I don’t like crossing boundaries like that
      drunk. I like to make sober decisions.
              Q. Did Mr. Hettmann say anything to you after you gave him
      those boundaries? A. He agreed.
              Q. Did he verbally agree or just nod his head or what do you
      remember? A. I believe he verbally agreed, but I’m not for certain.
              Q. Was he looking at you when you were having that
      conversation about your boundaries? A. Yes.
              Q. Was there anybody else in the room talking to him that
      would have been distracting him? A. No.
              Q. From what you remember, was it very clear what you had
      indicated your boundaries were? A. Yes.

K.H. also explained that she had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Although

she recalled kissing Hettmann on the lips, she did not remember permitting him to

perform oral sex or penetrate her with his fingers. K.H. was adamant that she

would not have:

             Q. Do you believe you would have given him permission to do
      that? A. No.
             Q. Why not? A. Because I have extremely bad PTSD, and I
      do not enjoy that.
             Q. . . . When you’re talking PTSD, is that a trigger with vaginal
      contact or what type of contact? A. I don’t like penetration.
             Q. Are we talking vaginal penetration? A. Yes.

      K.H. cannot recall anything from about 10:00 p.m. until she was awakened

by the sound of a fire alarm around 4:00 a.m. She was not wearing pants. When

she asked Hettmann, he said that she was hot and wanted to remove them. K.H.

accepted this explanation, and she returned to sleep in Hettmann’s bedroom after

the fire alarm ended. K.H. did not become alarmed until she discovered her
                                        4

underwear was on inside out and sideways later that morning. She tried to contact

Hettmann to find out why, but he had blocked her on his Facebook account. When

K.H. reached Hettmann on a different account, he told her that she drank most of

the alcohol and passed out by 10 p.m.

      According to Hettmann, K.H. passed out by 10:00 p.m. He told K.H. that he

performed oral sex on her when she was awake and stopped after attempting to

penetrate her. He claimed that his penis remained in his pants during the act but

admitted to masturbating in the bathroom afterward. Testing on the underwear

K.H. wore that night showed Hettmann’s seminal fluid and spermatozoa on it.

      On appeal, Hettmann notes the trial court found it was a “close call” on

whether the State provided sufficient proof of the elements of the crime. He argues

the evidence does not show that K.H. was so intoxicated that she could not control

her own conduct.1 We disagree. K.H. consistently maintained that she could not

remember anything that happened after 10 p.m. Hettmann admits that K.H. was

so intoxicated that she passed out and he consulted his roommates about what to

do. He also encouraged her to force herself to vomit, and she did so several times.

      Hettmann cites State v. King, No. 17-0063, 2018 WL 1865107, at *7 (Iowa

Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2018), in support of his claim that K.H. was not mentally

incapacitated.   The defendant in King appealed a conviction for first-degree

burglary, which was based on an act of sexual abuse against M.A. 2018 WL

1865107, at *5; see also Iowa Code § 713.3(1)(d) (stating first-degree burglary

1 The acts at issue occurred during a period during which K.H. was drinking
excessively. She admits drinking to the point of intoxication on about twenty-four
out of thirty evenings. K.H. weighed about one-hundred pounds, and she testified
that she had eaten nothing since lunch that day.
                                         5

occurs when a person commits sexual abuse while burglarizing an occupied

structure). The question was whether sufficient evidence showed the defendant

entered with specific intent to commit third-degree sexual abuse on a person who

was mentally incapacitated. King, 2018 WL 1865107, at *6-7. The court found

there was not, noting there was no evidence that the complaining witness “was

sick or intoxicated to the point of helplessness.” Id. The court further noted, “She

did not vomit, slur her words, or lose consciousness. Most important, in her own

words, M.A. was clearheaded.” The facts before us differ significantly. And, unlike

in King, Hettmann’s intent is irrelevant to our inquiry. See State v. Kelso-Christy,

911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018) (“The focal point of the crime of sexual abuse is

consent. This critical element does not inquire into the mind of the defendant to

create a specific-intent crime, but turns on the intentions and mental state of the

victim.” (internal citation omitted)); State v. Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843, 845

(Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (holding “a defendant’s awareness of a putative sexual abuse

victim’s lack of consent is not an element of third-degree sexual abuse”).

      Substantial evidence shows K.H. could not give meaningful consent at the

time Hettmann performed the sex act. See State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 146

(Iowa 2011) (noting that “meaningful consent is the important inquiry”).          In

determining whether meaningful consent was given, we “take[] into account

circumstances indicating any overreaching by the accused, together with

circumstances indicating any lack of consent by the other person.” Id. K.H.

testified that while she was sober, she informed Hettmann that she did not want to

go farther than kissing. K.H. explained to Hettmann, as well as the court, that she

objected to doing more while intoxicated because of past experiences, which have
                                       6

caused PTSD. As the trial court noted, her refusal to submit to a speculum exam

during the examination for sexual assault was “more proof that she would be

uncomfortable with vaginal penetration.” K.H. was consistent in stating that she

could not recall much of what happened once she began drinking and remembered

nothing that occurred between 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. The evidence suggests

the sex act occurred shortly before K.H. passed out at 10:00 p.m., at which point

she was too intoxicated to apprise or control her conduct and thus unable to give

meaningful consent.

      Because substantial evidence supports Hettmann’s conviction for third-

degree sexual abuse, we affirm.

      AFFIRMED.