Court Opinion

ID: 9659194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:34:44.155747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:05.004545
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. We have never before addressed the issue of whether a person can recover from an employer for an injury caused by the criminal act of an employee, based upon negligent hiring. The concept is feasible, but should be approached very cautiously. The majority holds that an employer is financially liable for the violent crime of rape committed by an employee. The decision is extremely far-reaching and the ramifications suggested are extensive. All types of scenarios can be imagined where an employer would be liable for the crimes of another, including homicide, under this decision.
The employer’s negligence in failing to investigate the criminal record and parole status of Graffice was not the proximate cause of the injury because his violent criminal act was an unforeseeable intervening efficient cause. The failure to investigate the criminal record of an applicant for employment does not render it reasonably foreseeable that the hired individual will commit a violent crime.
“Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such consequences the wrongdoer is responsible even though he could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow.” Christianson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co., 67 Minn. 94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896) (emphasis supplied). Ordinarily one can proceed on the assumption that others will obey the criminal laws, and the general rule is that the criminal act of a third person is an intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation.
This situation is controlled by Hilligoss v. Cross Companies, 304 Minn. 546, 228 N.W.2d 585 (1975). There a landlord changed the locks on all the apartment doors and posted signs on each door indicating that the locks had been changed and that new keys were available at the office. Several items' of personal property were stolen from an apartment. The tenant, who had been hospitalized for several days while the sign was posted, argued that the posting of the sign was notice to all the world that the apartment was vacant and led to the criminal act and resultant loss of the property. We upheld a grant of summary judgment for the landlord, finding that “as a matter of law, the criminal act in this case was not reasonably foreseeable and was, therefore, an intervening efficient cause.” Id. at 548, 228 N.W.2d at 586.
Similarly in this case, I would hold that the failure of an employer to investigate the criminal record of an applicant does not render it reasonably foreseeable that the individual hired will rape a tenant.
What if an investigation into his criminal record had been made and, as the facts display, no record of sexual deviation disclosed, and the employee had still been hired? Would the taking of a chance on such an employee have spelled out negligent hiring? Although not directly applicable, Minn.Stat. § 364.03 (1982) provides that “no person shall be disqualified from public employment * * * because of a prior conviction of a crime or crimes, unless the crime or crimes for which convicted directly relate to the position of employment sought * * * » employer should be able to rely to some extent on the criminal justice system’s determination that the individual is ready again to become an active member of society.
This brings us to the second impact of the majority’s decision. Such a decision will startle all employers who have been working with various successful diversionary programs such as Amicus, PORT and oth*917ers, and give them considerable financial pause before hiring persons with criminal records, or even suggesting such hiring to their fellow business associates. I would not place this added burden on either the employer or on the formerly convicted employee. The devastation can be tremendous.
Creating additional barriers to the employment of persons with criminal records gives rise to social costs the majority does not take into consideration. Undoubtedly, the odds of successfully reassimilating a former convict are significantly enhanced if that person is able to obtain employment.
I would hold that in a case of negligent hiring, an intentional, violent crime is not the foreseeable result of a failure to determine an applicant’s criminal record, and is therefore not the proximate cause of the injury. I would enter judgment for the defendants.