Court Opinion

ID: 9574141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:02:38.140126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:08.095074
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
This is not a case in which parents have refused or failed to support their child in the home environment and for that reason the youngster was removed. This is a case in which the juvenile committed two serious criminal acts: sexual abuse of a sibling, and vehicle tampering in violation of Vehicle Code section 10852. Thus he was declared a ward of the court, removed from his home involuntarily, his custody was awarded to a juvenile probation officer, and he was detained in a regulated environment.
*1258It is evident that the primary motivation of the court in this instance was protection of the public. Under such circumstances the rule of In re Jerald C. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 1, is controlling.1
I agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeal in this case, written by Justice Newsom and concurred in by Presiding Justice Racanelli and Justice Holmdahl. I therefore adopt that opinion in relevant part, omitting footnotes: Appellants’ minor child was declared a ward of the juvenile court on August 11, 1982, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.2 Custody of the minor child was removed from appellants and he was placed with a juvenile probation officer. The child was not confined to a juvenile detention facility, however; instead, he was placed in the Children’s Home of Stockton, and then the EE Residential Group Home, both nonsecure facilities. State aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) funds were used to support the child.
The trial court awarded respondent reimbursement for the costs of ca.re of the child pursuant to section 11350, which mandates compulsory reimbursement from “the family” of AFDC funds paid to a foster care facility. (County of Ventura v. Stark (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1117 [205 Cal.Rptr. 139]; County of San Mateo v. Booth (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 388, 397 [185 Cal.Rptr. 349].) The central issue presented in this appeal is whether collection from appellants of the AFDC funds used to support their minor child would constitute a violation of the equal protection clause under the principles announced by our state high court in In re Jerald C, supra, 36 Cal.3d 1 (hereafter Jerald C).
In Jerald C, supra, the minor child was declared a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 602, placed in custody at juvenile hall, and subsequently committed to the California Youth Authority. (36 Cal.3d at p. 4.) The County of Santa Clara sought reimbursement pursuant to section 903 (prior to its amendment). While acknowledging that “[statutes requiring responsible relatives to reimburse governmental agencies for support have *1259been sustained against claims of denial of equal protection” (id. at p. 5; citingSwoap v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 490 [111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840], and In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513 [86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204]), the court observed: “However, relative responsibility statutes have been invalidated when the government charges were not for support which the relative refused but for the cost of maintaining public institutions for public benefit. . . . [ffl The cases have reasoned that when incarceration or commitment is for the protection of society, it is arbitrary to assess the relatives for the expense.” (Jerald C, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 6.)
Relying on its earlier decision in Dept, of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 720, the court concluded that the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in commitments pursuant to section 602 encompass “‘the protection of society from the confined person .... Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class of society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause.’ ” (In re Jerald C, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 8; see also Pennell v. City of San Jose (1986) 42 Cal.3d 365, 372 [228 Cal.Rptr. 726, 721 P.2d 1111].) Additionally, the court recognized that “the common law duty to support minor children does not authorize the state to recover the costs of confinement imposed for the protection of society and the minor and his rehabilitation.” (In re Jerald C, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 10; see also County of Ventura v. Stark, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 1118.)
Respondent seeks to distinguish Jerald C. from the case at bench on two grounds: first, the statutory basis for reimbursement—in Jerald C, section 903 was declared unconstitutional, while here the county seeks to recover AFDC benefits under authority of section 11350—and second, the fact that appellants’ child was placed in a nonsecure, private group home rather than confined in juvenile hall, a secure facility like Jerald C. Respondent stresses that under the current statutory scheme AFDC funds cannot be used to support juveniles confined in secure institutions, and thus the placement of appellants’ minor in group homes was not for the benefit of society as in Jerald C.
The focus of our inquiry must be upon whether the purposes of the minor’s confinement include the protection of society. (Jerald C, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 7.) “As we noted in Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 892, 910 [223 Cal.Rptr. 379]: ‘The basis for the equal protection violation is that society as a whole benefits from the incarceration; . . .’ ‘It is a denial of equal protection when the government seeks to charge the cost of operation of a state function, conducted for the benefit of the public, to a particular class of persons. (Nor-*1260wood v. Baker (1898) 172 U.S. 269, 279 et seq. [43 L.Ed. 443, 447 et seq., 19 S.Ct. 187]; In re Jerald C. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 1, 6 [201 Cal.Rptr. 342, 678 P.2d 917]; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal. 2d 716, 723 [36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, 20 A.L.R.3d 353] (remanded 380 U.S. 194 [13 L.Ed.2d 753, 85 S.Ct. 871]); sub. opn. 62 Cal.2d 586 [43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321, 20 A.L.R.3d 361].) “To charge the cost of operation of state functions conducted for public benefit to one class of society is arbitrary and violates the basic constitutional guarantee of equal protection of law. [Citation.]” In re Jerald C., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 6.)’ (Cunningham v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 336, 348 [222 Cal.Rptr. 854].)” (County of Marin v. Pezok (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1441, 1445 [236 Cal.Rptr. 56].)
Although the reasons underlying placement of appellants’ minor child were the subject of some controversy at trial, the legal basis for the commitment is undisputed. The minor was initially referred to the juvenile court because of emotional disturbance and his sexual molestation of a sibling. He subsequently committed a violation of Vehicle Code section 10852 (unlawful taking of a vehicle without consent of the owner), which “led to his becoming a ward of the Court . . . .” The commitment was pursuant to section 602 and, according to the probation officer in charge of placement, was for three reasons: protection of the public; rehabilitation of the minor, and protection of the family.
Thus, among the obvious objectives served by the placement was the protection of society from possible future criminal acts by the minor. His rehabilitation also benefits society, even as it indirectly promotes the protection of this family. A second critical factor is the involuntary nature of the placement, which resulted directly from juvenile proceedings rather than voluntary or consensual actions on the part of the parents. Nor was it due, as far as we can tell from the record, to any failure or refusal by appellants to provide support for their child.
The fact that respondent seeks reimbursement of AFDC funds pursuant to section 11350 is no basis for distinguishing Jerald C. from the present case. As we recently observed in County of Marin v. Pezok, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1445-1446, “it is the purpose and derivation of the commitment rather than the source of the funds used to pay for it which is dispositive in an equal protection analysis.” Here, as in Pezok, the commitment resulted from commission of criminal acts and was imposed under section 602 for the benefit of the public. (Ibid.; see also County of Merced v. Dominguez (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1513, 1517 [231 Cal.Rptr. 455].) And the fact that Children’s Home of Stockton and EE Residential Group Home are not secure facilities does not alter the essential purpose of the detention to protect the public. (Id. at pp. 1517-1518.) Accordingly, under the *1261compulsion of Jerald C., we conclude that the county is precluded from obtaining reimbursement from appellants for the AFDC funds used to care for their minor child. {Ibid.) [End of Court of Appeal opinion.]
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

 The majority declare in their footnote 5 that the opinions in Jerald C. were an anomaly as to form. Whether or not that is an accurate description, the fundamental rule emanating from those opinions has been recognized and followed.
The majority complain that the Court of Appeal did not consider sections 202 and 903 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. They overlook the fact that those sections were in effect in 1984 when this court decided Jerald C. The lead opinion in Jerald C. discussed both sections and concluded that if broadly interpreted they would offend the rule in Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716 [36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, 20 A.L.R.3d 353], The opinion signed by other members of the court did not convincingly dispute that conclusion.

 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.