Court Opinion

ID: 9587746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:25:51.701158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:32.349774
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority view because I do not believe that the state’s circumstantial evidence against Smith was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith had joint constructive possession of cocaine found under the direct control of other people.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evi*227dence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jordan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 424 (484 SE2d 60) (1997). Viewed in that light, the evidence shows that police officers executed a search warrant at the mobile home where Smith lived. When the police entered the home, Smith was lying on a couch in the living room, Wilburn ran from the kitchen to the bathroom, and Rorie was in a bedroom. The police brought Rorie from the bedroom to the living room and had her sit on a couch. Before Rorie sat on the couch, which was not the same couch on which Smith had been lying, the police had searched it and found no cocaine. Later, when the police moved Rorie from the couch, they searched it again and found a bag of cocaine under the cushion where she had been sitting. A urine sample provided by Rorie tested positive for cocaine.
Several officers chased Wilburn into the bathroom, where they saw him flushing plastic bags down the toilet. The officers seized one bag of cocaine from the toilet. They also found two bags containing cocaine in Wilburn’s pockets, seven $20 bills in his pocket and a packet containing cocaine residue behind a trash can in the kitchen. While the police were searching the home, two people called on the telephone for Wilburn and the police heard the callers ask Wilburn for cocaine.
The police searched Smith and found $1,027 in his pocket, but did not find any cocaine on him. They also did not find any cocaine on the couch where he had been lying. The officers did find a police scanner behind a chair in the living room. Smith did not testify in his own defense, but presented two witnesses who said they had purchased a pickup truck from him for $1,200, which they paid in cash.
“We have consistently held that merely finding contraband on premises occupied by a defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction if it affirmatively appears from the evidence that persons other than the defendant had equal opportunity to commit the crime. [Cits.] Where there is evidence other than a defendant’s own equal access connecting an accused to contraband, it is for the jury to determine guilt or innocence.” Williams v. State, 207 Ga. App. 782, 784 (4) (429 SE2d 153) (1993). In the instant case, I disagree with the majority conclusion that there is evidence other than Smith’s occupancy of the house which connects him to the cocaine found in the possession of Wilburn and Rorie. Most of the cocaine was found under the direct control of Wilburn in the bathroom, while the cocaine residue was found in the kitchen immediately after Wilburn had rim from there to the bathroom. The other cocaine was found beneath the couch cushion where Rorie had been sitting. No cocaine was found in Smith’s possession.
The majority does not specify exactly what evidence other than Smith’s occupancy of the mobile home connected him to Wilburn’s *228and Rorie’s cocaine. Presumably the majority is persuaded by the state’s reliance on evidence of the money found on Smith, the scanner and the two callers asking to buy drugs from Wilburn. Contrary to the state’s claims, there is no evidence that the money is connected to the cocaine found on Wilburn and Rorie. The mere presence of the currency is insufficient to demonstrate a connection to illegal activity. See Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 72 (485 SE2d 483) (1997). Likewise, it is unclear from the state’s argument and the majority opinion how telephone calls for Wilburn and the presence of a scanner connect Smith to cocaine found in Wilburn’s and Rorie’s possession.
The majority states that the evidence supports a finding that Smith had joint constructive possession of the cocaine. However, “[a] finding of constructive possession must be based upon some connection between the defendant and the contraband other than spatial proximity. Evidence of mere presence at the scene of the crime, and nothing more to show participation of a defendant in the illegal act, is insufficient to support a conviction.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Paden v. State, 216 Ga. App. 188, 189 (1) (453 SE2d 788) (1995). Here, although Smith’s occupancy of the home raised an inference that he constructively possessed cocaine found in the home, that inference was affirmatively rebutted by the proof of Wilburn’s and Rorie’s more than equal access to the cocaine. See Shreve v. State, 172 Ga. App. 190, 191 (322 SE2d 362) (1984). Thus, all that remains is Smith’s mere presence in the home while Wilburn and Rorie possessed cocaine. “As a matter of law, that presence is not enough to support a finding of criminal possession of the contraband beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.” Whipple v. State, 207 Ga. App. 131, 132 (1) (427 SE2d 101) (1993).
“[W]here a conviction for possession of contraband depends entirely on circumstantial evidence, it must both be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis. When the circumstantial evidence supports more than one theory, one consistent with guilt and another with innocence, it does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except guilt and is not sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. While the determination of whether the circumstances are sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of defendant’s guilt is usually made by the jury and while we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, we must not be blinded by that verdict when a reasonable hypothesis of innocence appears from the evidence or lack thereof, and may declare such as [a] matter of law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Paden v. State, 216 Ga. App. at 189 (1). See Jordan v. State, 225 Ga. App. at 425-426.
*229Decided November 12, 1998
James W. Smith, for appellant.
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, Kevin J. Guidry, Robin R. Riggs, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
In the present case, the state’s circumstantial evidence against Smith does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that all of the cocaine was under the control of Wilburn and Rorie and that Smith was a mere occupant of the mobile home who did not possess the cocaine. Because there is no evidence connecting Smith to the cocaine other than his occupancy of the mobile home, the trial court erred in denying Smith’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal due to insufficient evidence. See Morrison v. State, 220 Ga. App. 151, 152-154 (1) (a) (469 SE2d 686) (1996); Nations v. State, 177 Ga. App. 801, 802 (1) (341 SE2d 482) (1986).