Court Opinion

ID: 9781595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:53:48.798242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.804826
License: Public Domain

BRYANT, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I first note that the majority begins their analysis by addressing, sua sponte, whether the juvenile court terminated its exclusive jurisdiction by order of the court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a) and 201(a). While the majority “stress[es] the need for the parties to include sufficient documentation in the record to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction and the need for the juvenile courts to be mindful of the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201(a) when terminating juvenile court jurisdiction^]” it concludes that the 4 August 2008 juvenile review order appropriately “terminated the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the children as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201(a).” Because this issue is not raised on appeal by either party and because this analysis does not affect the outcome of the appeal, I do not agree that it was necessary to address this issue sua sponte.
I concur with the portion of the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s order that plaintiff grandparents had standing by noting that plaintiffs demonstrated a sufficient relationship with and interest in the children to proceed in an action for custody pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-13.1(a). Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing.
However, as I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s findings of fact were not sufficient to address defendant’s intentions or acts affecting the parent-child relationship, and there*281fore, the trial court erred in concluding that defendant acted inconsistently with her protected parental status, I respectfully dissent.
“In a child custody case, the trial court’s findings of fact are binding on this Court if they are supported by competent evidence.” Davis v. McMillian, 152 N.C. App. 53, 58, 567 S.E.2d 159, 162 (2002) (citation omitted). “[A] trial court’s determination that a parent’s conduct is inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 63, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001) (citation omitted). However,
in custody cases, the trial court sees the parties in person and listens to all the witnesses. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 625, 501 S.E.2d 898, 902-03 (1998). This allows the trial court to “detect tenors, tones and flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges.” Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 426, 256 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1979), quoted in Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 625, 501 S.E.2d at 903. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings of fact “ ‘are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.’ ” Pulliam, 348 N.C. at 625, 501 S.E.2d at 903[.]

Id.

Being mindful of the trial court’s superior position to observe the parties involved, a review of the record reveals the following: Following the death of the children’s father, defendant and her children moved to Las Vegas, Nevada in February 2007 and thereafter to Brunswick County. The dependency petition that brought the children to the attention of Brunswick County Department of Social Services was based on a school nurse reporting bruises on one of the children in February 2008. The dependency adjudication found that defendant “was unable to provide for [her children’s] care or supervision due to the emotional issues with which she and the children were dealing.” These issues “included relocation to North Carolina, the untimely and traumatic death of [defendant’s] husband, the father of her children, by suicide, and the trauma and emotional issues related to physical and mental abuse [defendant] reports she received at her husband’s hands.” The trial court also found that defendant is “high-strung, easily angered and tends to allow her voice to rise as she becomes angry.”
In addition, “conduct inconsistent with the parent’s protected status, which need not rise to the statutory level warranting termination of parental rights . . . would result in application of the ‘best interest of the child’ test[.]” Speagle v. Seitz, 354 N.C. 525, 531, 557 S.E.2d 83, 86 *282(2001). In the case before us, the trial court found that defendant “ha[d] acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status as aparent[.]” Particularly, the court also found
17.... [t]hat the [p]laintiffs appeared to have a great relationship with the children.
32. [t]hat... it is in the best interests of the minor children that custody be placed and remain with [defendant,] with the [plaintiffs being allowed visitation/secondary custody[.]”
33. [t]hat the [p]laintiffs are fit and proper persons to have the secondary custody in the form of visitational privileges, and it is in the best interests of the two (2) minor children '. . . that the [p]laintiffs be awarded child visitational privileges.
Because there was competent evidence in the record, namely the previous adjudication and the trial court’s independent observation of defendant’s continued emotional issues, I believe that the trial court’s findings of fact adequately support its conclusion that defendant acted inconsistently with her protected parental status. Accordingly, I believe the trial court’s findings are conclusive on appeal and that there is no error. Such findings and conclusions do not give plaintiffs superior rights over these children, but it does allow plaintiffs, as paternal grandparents, to have visitation with their grandchildren. Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.