Court Opinion

ID: 9622299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:15:19.514386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:51.855786
License: Public Domain

*629Schultheis, C.J.
Kay and Norma Lybbert appeal the summary judgment dismissal of their claim for damages against Grant County. We reverse the order of dismissal and remand for trial on the merits.
On March 8, 1993, Mr. and Mrs. Lybbert sustained serious physical injuries as well as damage to the vehicle they were operating when it left the road. The accident was allegedly the result of a washout of a county road due to a sudden downpour in Grant County. The Lybberts filed a tort claim against the County claiming it was negligent in failing to maintain the road or warn of a hazardous condition. Receiving no response, the Lybberts commenced this negligence action.
RCW 4.16.080(2) requires that a negligence action be filed and served within three years of the date of the occurrence giving rise to the harm. The Lybberts met the filing requirement when they filed their summons and complaint with the Adams County Clerk on August 30, 1995.
The Lybberts attempted service of process on the County on September 6. After receiving instructions from the Lybberts’ attorney, a process server from Moses Lake served the summons and complaint on Peggy Grigg, the administrative assistant to the Grant County Board of Commissioners. It is unclear from the record whether Ms. Grigg knew at that time that she was not statutorily authorized to accept service on behalf of the County. Nevertheless, she accepted service, made copies of the summons and complaint, and forwarded the paperwork to the commissioners, the prosecutor’s office, and the public works department of Grant County. Ms. Grigg said she did not forward a copy of the summons and complaint to the County auditor’s office. She stated the County did not have a formal policy in place in 1995 regarding acceptance of service.
Pursuant to RCW 4.28.080(1),1 proper service of a summons and complaint against the County must be made on *630the County auditor or a deputy auditor. The County auditor did not receive a copy of the summons and complaint until the time of his deposition on July 26, 1996, which was after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. There is no evidence a deputy auditor had knowledge of the lawsuit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Approximately two weeks after “service” on Ms. Grigg, the Lybberts received a notice of appearance by Grant County Deputy Prosecutor, Stephen Hallstrom. Approximately one month later they received the notice of association of counsel joining George Fearing as co-counsel. The County made an immediate request for a statement of damages and sent a set of interrogatories and requests for production to the Lybberts on October 23, 1995. No mention was made of insufficient service of process.
The Lybberts sent their first set of interrogatories and requests for production to the County on February 29, 1996. Interrogatory 65 specifically asked if any affirmative defenses would be raised, including insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process. The County did not respond to the interrogatories until well after the statute of limitations had expired.
The County made a motion for summary judgment in late June 1996, citing lack of service or improper service of process and expiration of the statute of limitations. The Lybberts made a motion to strike the County’s affirmative defense based on waiver and estoppel. They petitioned the court to allow them to conduct limited discovery in order to determine when the County knew that service of process was insufficient. The Lybberts’ motion to compel the County to comply with this request was denied.
*631After a hearing, the trial court denied the Lybberts’ motion to strike the affirmative defense and granted a summary judgment dismissal in favor of the County. The Lybberts filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Lybberts contend the trial court erred when it granted a summary judgment dismissal in favor of Grant County on the grounds of insufficient service of process. We agree.
A summary judgment dismissal is reviewed de novo. All facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case the Lybberts. Marincovich v. Tarabochia, 114 Wn.2d 271, 274, 787 P.2d 562 (1990). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 123 Wn.2d 891, 897, 874 P.2d 142 (1994). A material fact is one on which the result of litigation depends. Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Wn.2d 243, 249, 850 P.2d 1298 (1993).
The parties agree the issue on appeal is the Lybberts’ reliance on Ms. Grigg’s “acceptance” of service of the Lybberts’ summons and complaint and the County’s response thereto. The parties disagree, however, on whether the lawsuit should have been dismissed as a result of that acceptance.
The County contends that Ms. Grigg is not statutorily authorized to accept service of process for the County. Accordingly, there was insufficient service of process of the Lybberts’ summons and complaint and the action is now time barred due to the three-year statute of limitations.
The County cites Nitardy v. Snohomish County, 105 Wn.2d 133, 712 P.2d 296 (1986) as support for the summary judgment dismissal. In Nitardy, a former employee sued Snohomish County for wrongful discharge within the statutory time limit. The summons and complaint were not served on the county auditor as required by RCW 4.28.080. Snohomish County filed a notice of appearance and discovery proceeded. The case does not elaborate on the *632subject matter of discovery. After the statute of limitations had expired, Snohomish County sought to have the lawsuit dismissed on the grounds of improper service, which could no longer be remedied. Ms. Nitardy argued substantial compliance and an equal protection violation as her defense to improper service. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court, under the facts of the case presented, affirmed holding that the statute regarding service is clear. There can be no substantial compliance; service on anyone other than the county auditor or deputy auditor is insufficient service of process. Id. at 134-35.
The Lybberts argue the County waived the affirmative defense of insufficient service of process because it was not raised in a timely fashion within the statutory time period. Romjue v. Fairchild, 60 Wn. App. 278, 281, 803 P.2d 57, review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1026 (1991). Additionally, the Lybberts claim that because the County engaged in discovery unrelated to the affirmative defense while the claim was still actionable it is estopped from asserting the claim now that the action is time barred. Raymond v. Fleming, 24 Wn. App. 112, 115, 600 P.2d 614 (1979), review denied, 93 Wn.2d 1004 (1980). Finally, they maintain that as a governmental litigant, the County should be “scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens.” State ex rel. Shannon v. Sponburgh, 66 Wn.2d 135, 143, 401 P.2d 635 (1965).
In Romjue, this court determined the defendant waived the defense of insufficient service by engaging in discovery that was not directed toward determining whether facts existed to support that affirmative defense. Mr. Fairchild chose not to reveal the insufficient service until after the statute of limitations expired despite the knowledge that Mr. Romjue had relied on what he thought was proper service of process. The court held: “If a defendant conducts himself in a manner inconsistent with the later assertion of the defense of insufficient service, the court is justified in declaring a waiver.” Romjue, 60 Wn. App. at 281.
Here, the record reveals the County held itself out to the *633Lybberts as going forward in defending the tort claim for approximately 10 months after the defective service. The Lybberts received notices of appearance from two attorneys defending the County in the tort claim. Counsel for the County immediately sent interrogatories and a request for a statement of damages to the Lybberts to complete. The Lybberts, in turn, sent a set of interrogatories to the County and were given some sort of verbal assurance, as late as April 1996, that the answers were forthcoming. When the Lybberts requested information from the County regarding potential affirmative defenses, the facts reveal the County waited until the statute of limitations had run to claim insufficient service of process.
We find the County’s reliance on Nitardy is misplaced. In the case at bar, the Lybberts do not argue substantial compliance with the statute. They argue the County acted in a manner inconsistent with the later assertion of the defense of insufficient service. We agree.
 Because equitable estoppel is not a favored doctrine, a party must establish by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence the following elements: (1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with a claim afterward asserted, (2) action by another in reasonable reliance on that act, statement, or admission, and (3) injury to the party who relied on the admission, statement or act if the court allows the first party to contradict or repudiate the prior act, statement, or admission. Kramarevcky v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 64 Wn. App. 14, 18-19, 822 P.2d 1227 (1992), aff’d, 122 Wn.2d 738, 863 P.2d 535 (1993). When we review the facts in the light most favorable to the Lybberts, we find the County is estopped from raising the affirmative defense.
In early April 1996 a sheriffs deputy contacted the Lybberts’ attorney, upon the advice of the County prosecutor, to find out how to answer the interrogatories. The deputy explained to the Lybberts’ counsel that he was the chief investigator on this claim and was currently working on the answers to the interrogatories. He assured the Lyb*634berts’ attorney that the County would be finished in the near future. The Lybberts’ counsel relied on that statement. The Lybberts did not receive the answers until approximately 10 weeks later. By the time the answers were finally received, the statute of limitations on the tort claim had expired and the Lybberts discovered, for the first time, the County’s insufficient service defense. The trial court dismissed the Lybberts’ claim as a result of this affirmative defense. The record provides clear, cogent and convincing evidence that estoppel is proper.
The duty to conduct litigation in a manner above reproach is essential for all governmental entities. “The conduct of government should always be scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens . . . .” Shannon, 66 Wn.2d at 143. Because the defendant in the underlying action is a governmental entity, we find it should have raised the issue of insufficient service prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. By failing to do so, the County is estopped from using it as an affirmative defense. The Lybberts deserve to have a court decide this case on its merits. We reverse the summary judgment dismissal and remand for trial on the merits.
Kato, J., concurs.

RCW 4.28.080 states in relevant part:
*630“Service made in the modes provided in this section shall be taken and held to be personal service. The summons shall be served by delivering a copy thereof, as follows:
“(1) If the action he against any county in this state, to the county auditor or, during normal office hours, to the deputy auditor, or in the case of a charter county, summons may be served upon the agent, if any, designated by the legislative authority.”