Court Opinion

ID: 9581489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:15:28.075274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:00.086553
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur because liability was ultimately a question of whether plaintiff exercised reasonable care for his own safety in the circumstances. Goldsmith v. Hazelwood, 93 Ga. App. 466, 468 (92 SE2d 48) (1956). Cf. Pound v. Augusta Nat., 158 Ga. App. 166 (279 SE2d 342) (1981).
This was the first time plaintiff went to these premises. He could see that the asphalt parking lot was not smooth and testified that it was “all busted up.” When he fell at the junction of the asphalt and *398the smooth concrete pad around the fuel pump island, he was looking up at the gas price sign on the pump. Because he was not looking at where he was placing his feet, he did not see the unevenness on which-he tripped.
There was no evidence that the invitee could not have seen the hazard if he had looked where he was walking. Thus it is straining logic to say that the proprietor had superior knowledge of it, because it was plainly visible. The invitee even testified unequivocally that he could see it when he glanced up from the ground after he fell.
With regard to the element of superior knowledge, the proprietor is charged with constructive knowledge, i.e., what he should have known, as well as with actual knowledge. Shannon v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 96 Ga. App. 458, 461 (100 SE2d 478) (1957). In measuring the relative knowledge of the invitee, he too is charged with constructive knowledge, which relates to his duty to use reasonable care for his own safety in walking about. Amear v. Hall, 164 Ga. App. 163, 167 (296 SE2d 611) (1982). That is why “superior knowledge” is not a foregone conclusion in this case.
The invitee’s duty is also related to the element of his ignorance of the defect and danger. If the ignorance is caused by his failure to look and see what is patent, it may not be legally justified.
These matters were subject to jury determination, given the total evidence relevant to liability in this case, although that itself is a close question. See Bell v. Abercorn Toyota, 175 Ga. App. 668 (333 SE2d 880) (1985). Compare Pound, supra, and Shackelford v. DeKalb Farmer’s Market, 180 Ga. App. 348 (349 SE2d 241) (1986).
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley joins in this special concurrence.