Court Opinion

ID: 9797060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:12:12.764795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:30.109445
License: Public Domain

BARKER, Judge,
dissenting.

I.

¶ 26 My focus on this constitutional question differs from that of the majority. Specifically, the legislature could properly conclude that no act that is otherwise required in the work place is a “necessary risk or danger of such employment, or a necessary risk or danger inherent in the nature thereof,” Ariz. Const, art. 18, § 8 (emphasis added), when undertaken by a person whose actions are influenced by having intentionally and voluntarily consumed illegal drugs.
¶ 27 I appreciate that the act of being on stilts for this employee was a “necessary risk” of his employment. But being on stilts while under the influence of illegal drugs was not a “necessary risk.” The legislature could justifiably determine that it is appropriate to look at the entirety of the risk when it is shown that the necessary element of the risk (being on stilts) cannot be factually separated from the unnecessary element of the risk (being on stilts while under the influence of illegal drugs). This is particularly true when the unnecessary element of the risk was voluntarily and intentionally undertaken. Thus, the legislature can be constitutionally justified in concluding that no “part” of being on stilts while under the influence of illegal drugs was a “necessary risk.” An example and a reference to our earlier cases help make the point.
¶ 28 If one is employed as a meat cutter, a “necessary risk or danger of such employment” is the use of a knife to cut meat. However, if a meat cutter, while using the knife in the process of cutting meat, intentionally and voluntarily decides to cut off his hand, his conduct is not constitutionally protected. The legislature need not separate the necessary part of the risk (using a knife) from the combined whole represented by all *17aspects of the risk (using the knife to intentionally cut off one’s hand while at work).
¶ 29 The exception for self-inflicted injuries has been expressly called out by the legislature. A.R.S. § 23-102KA) (Supp.2003) (granting compensation for injury in the course of employment “unless the injury was purposely self-inflicted”). Recognizing the statute, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that if an injury is self-inflicted, it is uncompensable, even though it would otherwise be in the course of employment. Lopez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 71 Ariz. 212, 213, 225 P.2d 702, 703 (1950). More recently, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the Industrial Commission’s refusal to compensate an employee who had suffered an injury to his hand when he intentionally struck a metal door at work. Glodo v. Indus. Comm’n, 191 Ariz. 259, 260, 955 P.2d 15, 16 (App.1997). The Glodo court held that this injury was not an accident because the employee should have known that punching his hand into a metal door would result in injury. Id. at 263, 955 P.2d at 19.
¶ 30 Though Grammatico did not intentionally and voluntarily jump from his stilts, he voluntarily and intentionally ingested three to four lines of methamphetamine within nine hours of reporting to work.6 It does not take an imaginative mind to consider that such conduct is a “self-inflicted” injury just waiting to happen. That the legislature thought so is borne out in the legislative history. See Min. of Ariz. State Senate Comm, on Professions & Employment, S.B. 1246, 42nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Feb. 7,1996) (testimony presented to the Senate that “according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, drug users are 3.6 times as likely to have on-the-job accidents as are non-drug users, and drug users are 5 times more likely than non-drug users to file workers’ compensation claims”). A 360% increase in “on-the-job accidents,” caused by illegal drug use, is certainly a basis to review such conduct. It is certainly reasonable for the legislature to conclude that the term “necessary risk” does not include conduct at the workplace while under the influence of illegal drugs.7
¶ 31 We have upheld statutes in other constitutional areas when the statute represented a reasonable legislative interpretation of the constitution’s otherwise explicit terms. For instance, Article 2, Section 6, of the Arizona Constitution states: “Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects____” (Emphasis added.) The word “all” is both explicit and broad. Yet we have upheld legislative interpretations in which the legislature has placed reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the freedom of speech in some instances. See Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson, 204 Ariz. 50, 56, ¶ 9, 59 P.3d 814, 820 (App.2002) (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court has made it “clear that the protection afforded by article II, § 6 does not foreclose limited governmental regulation”) (citing Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 160 Ariz. 350, 358, 773 P.2d 455, 463 (1989)).
¶ 32 Here, the legislature can constitutionally give a reasonable construction to the term “necessary risk” that does not include conduct in the workplace that is affected by the use of illegal drugs. This is particularly true when the employee has the opportunity to show that the influence of illegal drugs did *18not contribute to the conduct at issue. Although the worker’s compensation statutes must be construed liberally to protect employees under the constitutional mandate, “[a] burden or liability not within the terms or spirit of the law is not to be imposed upon industry.” Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 62 Ariz. 398, 402, 158 P.2d 511, 513 (1945).

II.

¶ 33 The majority contends that this analysis, based on a legislative decision of what may constitute a “necessary risk,” represents a “restrictive definition” that “injects fault” into the worker’s compensation system and may act to “exclude a host of injuries if caused in part by an employee’s reckless or negligent actions.” Supra ¶ 20. The majority also submits that this case is akin to Rural Metro Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 197 Ariz. 133, 3 P.3d 1053 (App.1999). I disagree with the majority’s view.

A.

¶ 34 As to “injecting fault,” if the “necessary risk” is defined as being on stilts, as opposed to being on stilts while under the influence of illegal drugs, then the majority is clearly correct. Our eases have long held that “fault remains no consideration” when determining whether compensation is due. Aitken v. Indus. Comm’n, 183 Ariz. 387, 393, 904 P.2d 456, 462 (1995). This dissent has no quarrel with these holdings.
¶35 Our cases also hold, however, that certain employee conduct is not compensable even though occurring at work. See, e.g., Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 62 Ariz. at 402, 158 P.2d at 513 (finding noncompensable an employee’s injuries when engaging in conduct at work that had been specifically precluded); Dependable Messenger, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 175 Ariz. 516, 518-19, 858 P.2d 661, 663-64 (App.1993) (employee injuries from personally-motivated fight during work hours not compensable); Scheller v. Indus. Comm’n, 134 Ariz. 418, 421, 656 P.2d 1279, 1282 (App.1982) (noncompensable injuries found when security guard chased burglars off premises after being told not to do so); Anderson Clayton & Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 125 Ariz. 39, 42, 607 P.2d 22, 25 (App.1979) (horseplay at work is a “substantial deviation” from employment and results in noncompensability of injuries). Obviously, if cast strictly in terms of “fault,” each of these decisions would be in doubt as it was conduct of the employee, contrary to some directive or policy, which resulted in the injuries being noncompensable.8 Thus, the concept of fault cannot cast so broad a net that it overwhelms the other terms of the constitutional mandate.
¶36 The question here is whether performing a required task at work while under the influence of illegal substances is a “necessary risk” of employment. That is the language of the constitutional mandate. Ariz. Const, art. 18, § 8. We may not discard it.

B.

¶ 37 The majority also posits that by permitting the legislature to use a “restrictive definition” of the constitutional phrase “necessary risk” there will be a “host of injuries” based on “reckless or negligent” employee conduct that will be excluded from coverage. Supra ¶ 20.
¶38 First, when construing a statute to determine whether it complies with the constitution, we have a duty to give it a reading that will promote its constitutionality. See Arizona Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen’s Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 554, 637 P.2d 1053, 1057 (1981) (stating that courts have a “duty to construe a statute so as to give it, if possible, a reasonable and constitutional meaning”). We do not simply view a statute in terms of plausible interpretations that may be unconstitutional; rather the rule is that “[w]e will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the act is in conflict with the federal or state constitutions.” Chevron Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 438, 641 P.2d 1275, 1282 (1982) (emphasis added). I suggest that the majori*19ty has not followed this heightened standard of review — that of “beyond a reasonable doubt” — in analyzing this statute. The majority’s interpretation is clearly plausible, but it is not the only interpretation that the language of the constitution and the statute bear. In such circumstances, we must adopt a constitutional interpretation and reject the unconstitutional interpretation. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988) (“[Wjhere an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27, 100 S.Ct. 895, 63 L.Ed.2d 171 (1980) (“It is well settled that this Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
¶ 39 Second, this is a focused statute. It requires that the employer “establish [] a policy of drug testing [in compliance with the statute], is maintaining that policy on an ongoing manner and, before the date of the employee’s injury, the employer files the written certification with the industrial commission” that it has provided “notification to its employees ... that the employer is maintaining that policy.” A.R.S § 23-1021(D) & (F) (Supp.2003) (emphasis added). If the employer “had actual knowledge of and permitted or condoned the ... employee’s unlawful use of any controlled substance,” the statute does not apply. A.R.S. § 23-1021(E) (Supp.2003). If the “employee’s use of any unlawful substance ... was not a contributing cause of the employee’s injury,” the statute also does not apply. A.R.S. § 23-1021(D)(1).
¶ 40 This statute is not an attack on “fault” by a legislature seeking to thwart its constitutional mandate. This is a narrow, focused statute that may be upheld on the basis that the intentional and voluntary use of illegal drugs does not constitute a “necessary risk” of employment. The only “host of injuries” that this statute will leave uncompensated are those in which an employee, after being specifically notified of a drug testing program that his employer has implemented and is maintaining on an on-going basis, nonetheless voluntarily and intentionally uses illegal drugs which then contribute to his or her injuries at work.

c.

¶41 The majority also asserts that the Rural Metro case is more apt for analysis. 197 Ariz. 133, 3 P.3d 1053. In Rural Metro a paramedic went back to work prior to the time that her doctor released her. Id. at 134, ¶ 3, 3 P.3d at 1054. She said that “she ‘had no choice’ because of financial reasons.” Id. She injured herself when lifting a patient. Id. at 134, ¶4, 3 P.3d at 1054. The court found that the injury was not “purposely self-inflicted.” Id. at 136, ¶ 9, 3 P.3d at 1056.
¶ 42 The majority relies on the presumption stated in Rural Metro of the lack of intent to injure oneself “regardless of how inadvisable, careless, or even reckless the claimant’s conduct may have been.” Id. at 135, ¶ 8, 3 P.3d at 1055. The conduct here (being under the influence of illegal substances while performing tasks at work) was intentional, voluntary, and unlawful — not merely “inadvisable, careless, or even reckless.” With all due respect, the intentional and voluntary use of illegal drugs within nine hours of reporting for work, all the while knowing that the employer has implemented a mandatory and on-going drug testing program to stop such use, is a significantly different fact pattern than going back to work too soon “because of financial reasons.”
¶ 43 Even if Rural Metro were the better analogy (a proposition I do not accept), the primary point is that by enacting A.R.S. § 23-1021(D) the legislature has called out a rational scenario for what is not a “necessary risk” of employment. This enactment of A.R.S. § 23-1021(D), calling out the use of illegal drugs when the employer has instituted and is maintaining a drug testing program, is similar but certainly not identical to the legislature calling out self-inflicted injury for exclusion from the worker’s compensation scheme. Neither is expressly referenced in the Arizona Constitution. Both are within *20the constitution’s parameters. The legislature is not bound by our non-constitutional holdings. To disagree with our earlier non-constitutional decisions (such as Rural Metro ) is completely within the legislature’s prerogative. In my view, however, A.R.S. § 23-1021(D) has absolutely no impact on the Rural Metro holding even when viewed as the majority construes it. A decision upholding A.R.S. § 23-1021(D) as applied here would do no violence to the holding or principles in Rural Metro.

III.

¶44 For the foregoing reasons, I would find A.R.S. § 23-1021(D) constitutional as applied. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Grammatico testified that he ingested between three and four lines of methamphetamine between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. Sunday night and reported to work at 5:00 a.m. on Monday. The accident occurred on Monday.

. The majority indicates that its holding is "as applied in this case." Supra ¶ 1. The majority then enlarges its holding to a person who "fails to pass, fails to cooperate with or refuses to take a drug or alcohol test.” Supra ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
The only matter at issue here relates to an employee who has taken and failed a test for illegal drugs under A.R.S. § 23-1021(D)(l) (Supp.2003). The circumstances dealing with any aspect of alcohol use (A.R.S. § 23-1021(D)(1)) or an alcohol test (A.R.S. § 23-1021(D)(2) and (3)) are not at issue. Neither is there an issue in this case in which an employee has refused to take or failed to cooperate with a test for illegal drugs. As the majority recognizes, the ALJ only applied § 23-1021(D)(l). Supra V 5 ("Applying § 23 — 1021(D)(1), the ALJ found the claim noncompensable____"). My analysis is limited solely to the facts and issue presented in this case: an employee who failed a test for illegal drugs and to whom § 23 — 1021 (D)( 1) applies.

. For a discussion of Arizona cases dealing with the concept of fault in various settings see Roger A. Schwartz, Look Ma, No Fault!, Arizona Attorney, Apr. 2000, at 26-32.