Court Opinion

ID: 9710743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:16:40.407501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.659487
License: Public Domain

TRAPP, J., dissenting: I concur in the principal opinion upon the issue of inadmissibility of the “product” of the sodium amytal interview, but I cannot agree that the order of the trial court is appealable as an order suppressing evidence under the Supreme Court Rule 604. The trial court has not yet determined from evidence in the record what are the facts or supposed facts which Carmen Goodwin may have learned solely from the amytal interview, and upon the issues presented the order does not suppress testimony upon any specific matter of fact. The State’s Attorney answers the motion for a “protective order” with the allegation that Goodwin can now identify the defendant. It is apparent that defendant’s counsel would insist that such testimony is solely the result of the amytal interview. It will then be necessary for the trial court to hear evidence and determine whether such testimony is subject to exclusion under the ruling announced. Under the statutory motions to suppress a confession, c 38, § 114-11, or to suppress evidence illegally seized, c 38, § 114-12, the court hears evidence as to the manner of obtaining items of evidence and then enters an order stating that specific items of evidence are to be excluded. Upon review the issue is whether the court, upon the record, erred in admitting item A or in excluding item X. Here such steps are missing. As a result, the prosecution’s brief and argument is essentially a series of ques-particular fact. Neither counsel nor this court can now state what has been suppressed. The defendant’s motion was for a “protective order.” The court’s ruling was responsive, but it was only advisory of prospective rulings upon the admissibility of evidence. It did not, in fact, suppress, i. e., determine that specific matters of testimony would be excluded under the stated rule of admissibility.