Court Opinion

ID: 9522240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:20:37.733804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:25.619433
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TRAPP, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the dismissal of the appeal of the trial court order dated October 26,1983. I dissent from the portion of the opinion which reverses the order of the trial court dated December 21, 1983, wherein plaintiff’s motion to add count II and count III to the amended complaint was denied and the motion to dismiss filed by Schetz and Bey, respondents in discovery, was granted as to them. The latter order of the trial court includes the specific finding: “That Plaintiff herein failed to secure leave of Court to add John J. Schetz and Douglas R. Bey as Defendants within the time above described.” Within the context of the language in Torley v. Foster G. McGaw Hospital (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 19, 452 N.E.2d 7, this finding should control upon the facts in issue here. In that opinion, it is said: “Under section 21.1 (now section 2 — 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure), the only authority plaintiff is given to add respondents in discovery as defendants is on motion. As in other cases, it is the court which may allow or deny leave to do so. The further requirement for adding such defendants is that the evidence disclose the existence of probable cause for such action. *** It would be equally absurd to construe this provision as permitting plaintiff to make the unilateral judgment that such probable cause does indeed exist without court authorization. The statute must reasonably be read as requiring the court to which the motion is addressed to make such a finding on whatever evidence may be presented and to grant or deny leave to add respondents in discovery as parties defendant.” 116 Ill. App. 3d 19, 22-23, 452 N.E.2d 7, 9-10. The opinion here rests upon the fact that a third amended complaint adding the defendants was filed on July 29, 1983. The handwritten order of that date does not show Schetz and Bey present in person or by counsel, but notes the objection of an original defendant in the action. Moreover, this opinion does not grapple with the fact that at a hearing upon the motion of Schetz and Bey to dismiss the third amended complaint, the trial court on October 26, 1983, vacated the order of July 29 which granted leave to file the third amended complaint and add Schetz and Bey as defendants for the reason that the motion for leave “[w]as not served timely,” and “ORDERED that this Court’s Order of July 29, 1983, granting Plaintiff leave to file its Third Amended Complaint is hereby set aside and is of no force or effect with regard to Respondents, JOHN J. SCHETZ and DOUGLAS R. BEY.” The record supports the conclusion of the trial court that plaintiff failed to comply with the Uniform Rules of Practice adopted throughout the circuit, and to hold otherwise would recognize such rules as a ruin of meaningless desuetude. Upon such facts, the filing of a motion to dismiss and obtaining a ruling thereon was a rational procedure to produce a rational result. I would affirm the trial court.