Court Opinion

ID: 9388678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 14:04:26.761965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.816849
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 14, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0924-ME

SAMANTHA KRUEGER                                                     APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE SHELLEY M. SANTRY, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 22-D-502041-001

JANET CAMPBELL                                                            APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Samantha Krueger appeals from a domestic violence order

(DVO) entered by the Jefferson Family Court in favor of her mother, Janet

Campbell. We affirm.

            On June 20, 2022, Campbell filed a petition for an emergency order of

protection (EPO) against Krueger; Campbell alleged that Krueger:

            Calls or texts, arguing, threat[en]ing, coming to the house
            wanting to fight, argue all hours of the night, threatening
             myself and other family members. She is bipolar and has
             said she at least has kept herself from shooting me in the
             head. This has been an issue with her most of her life
             and she needs help. She refuses to take medication. Her
             father just passed 7 months ago from covid and she
             seems more angry now. I just don’t want any more
             trouble.

The EPO was granted to Campbell, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on July

5, 2022. At the hearing, the family court, after placing Campbell under oath, read

the petition, and Campbell affirmed that she wished to adopt the allegations as her

testimony. Campbell stated that Krueger’s behavior seems exacerbated by alcohol

and that she blamed her mother for allowing the father to pass away. Campbell

also alleged that Krueger had also contemplated suicide. According to Campbell,

Krueger’s husband owned guns but Krueger herself did not.

             On cross-examination by Krueger’s counsel, Campbell admitted that

there had been no further trouble since the petition was signed. Campbell, her son,

and Krueger all live within a couple of blocks of each other.

             Krueger did not wish to testify on her own behalf, but she answered

questions posed to her by the family court. Krueger did not deny making the

threatening statements to her mother. Nor did she dispute that she was off her

medication. In response to the family court’s questions about it, Krueger

acknowledged that she had taken herself off the prescriptions in 2015 but claimed

that it was so that she could return to work and no longer be considered disabled.

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She did not volunteer where she works or for how long she had been employed.

Krueger also claimed to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder “from growing

up with her” (and pointing toward her mother). Krueger also stated that she does

“really well as long as [she] doesn’t have anything to do with [her] family.” She

admitted that she became “very emotional” because she felt excluded during her

father’s funeral by not being permitted to sit with the family. But she insisted that

she would never do anything to hurt her mother. Krueger further stated that she

has sought counseling but did not wish to return to taking prescription medication.

             The family court issued a one-year DVO which included a no contact

provision “in the hopes that things resolve themselves and there is no further need

for court intervention.”

             Krueger appeals, arguing that the family court erred by entering the

DVO without sufficient evidence that acts of domestic violence had occurred and

may occur again.

             We begin by stating our standard of review, namely:

                    We review the entry of a DVO for whether the trial
             court’s finding of domestic violence was an abuse of
             discretion. McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 133
             (Ky. App. 2008). Our review of the trial court’s factual
             findings is limited to whether they were clearly
             erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”)
             52.01; Hall v. Smith, 599 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky. App.
             2020). A trial court’s factual determination is not clearly
             erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence,
             which is evidence of sufficient probative value to induce

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             conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Moore v.
             Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).

                    “A trial court is authorized to issue a DVO if it
             ‘finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic
             violence and abuse has occurred and may again
             occur[.]’” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Ky.
             App. 2019) (quoting Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)
             403.740(1)). “The preponderance of the evidence
             standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes
             the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been
             a victim of domestic violence.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318
             S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Baird v. Baird,
             234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007)). In Caudill, this
             Court addressed the DVO process and discussed the
             construction of DVO statutes:

                   While domestic violence statutes should be
                   construed liberally in favor of protecting
                   victims from domestic violence and
                   preventing future acts of domestic
                   violence[,] the construction cannot be
                   unreasonable. Furthermore, we give much
                   deference to a decision by the family court,
                   but we cannot countenance actions that are
                   arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

             Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks and citations
             omitted).

Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky. App. 2021).

             Domestic violence includes not just acts of violence but words or

actions creating a fear of such violence. KRS 403.720(2)(a) (which contains “the

infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,

strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried

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couple”). Here Krueger’s threat to shoot her mother in the head formed sufficient

basis for the family court to enter the DVO. When coupled with Krueger’s mental

health diagnosis and her refusal to take prescribed medication, along with her

conceded emotional state subsequent to the father’s death, the likelihood of another

incident existed. The record supports the findings, and Kentucky law supports the

holding. Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008).

            The order of the Jefferson Family Court is affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

John Olash
Louisville, Kentucky

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