Court Opinion

ID: 9951815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 13:03:13.003381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:52.046653
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: March 19, 2024

                        S24A0026. HASSAN v. THE STATE.

       ELLINGTON, Justice.

       A Fulton County jury found Muhammad Hassan guilty of

participation in street gang activity, murder, six counts of

aggravated assault, and firearms charges in connection with a drive-

by shooting that resulted in the death of Amira Cameron.1 Hassan

       1 The shooting occurred on October 4, 2015. On March 18, 2016, a Fulton

County grand jury returned an indictment charging Hassan and Jamaris
Zinnerman with participation in criminal street gang activity through
commission of the offenses of murder and aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon (Count 1); malice murder (Count 2); felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3); aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon against Amira Cameron (Count 5); and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 13). The grand jury also
indicted Hassan and Zinnerman with aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon against Myles Cameron (Count 6), Jeremecia Perry (Count 7), Jamario
Calloway (Count 8), Aquantis Hillman (Count 9), Dujuan Terry (Count 10),
Terrene Ja’Quan Perry (Count 11), and Josiah Wade (Count 12), and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 13). The grand
jury indicted Hassan individually with possession of a firearm by a first
offender probationer (Count 14) and an additional count of felony murder of
Amira Cameron (Count 4) predicated on the weapons charge. Hassan and
contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing

hearsay evidence regarding a prior drive-by shooting. In addition,

Hassan contends that the trial court committed plain error in failing

to instruct the jury about the State’s “heightened burden of proof

under OCGA § 24-14-6,” which requires the exclusion of every

reasonable hypothesis other than guilt when the case against the

accused rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. For the reasons

explained below, we affirm.

      Pertinent to Hassan’s arguments on appeal, the evidence

presented at trial showed the following. At approximately 8:20 p.m.

on October 4, 2015, a gold- or champagne-colored Chevrolet Malibu

entered the parking lot of the Oakley Shoals Apartments in Fulton

Zinnerman were tried jointly in May 2019. The jury found Hassan guilty on
Counts 1 through 7, 9 through 11, 13, and 14; the State entered nolle prosequi
on Counts 8 and 12. The jury also found Zinnerman guilty of Counts 1 through
3, 5 through 7, 9 through 11, and 13. On May 28, 2019, the trial court sentenced
Hassan to serve life in prison plus 25 years in prison. The trial court
determined that Count 5 merged for purposes of sentencing. The trial court
also declared that Counts 3 and 4 were vacated as a matter of law. Hassan filed
a timely motion for a new trial, which he amended on July 15, 2021, June 1,
2022, and March 27, 2023. After a hearing on March 29, 2023, the trial court
denied Hassan’s motion for a new trial on April 7, 2023. Hassan filed a timely
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning
in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                       2
County. Quin Vann, a resident of the complex, testified that she

heard gunfire outside of her apartment that night. She ran out to

see what had happened and saw a champagne-colored Chevy Malibu

with all its windows down drive past and then exit the parking lot.

Vann called 911 to report the shooting at 8:21 p.m.

     When the Malibu entered the parking lot, several teenagers

who were friends and acquaintances from around the neighborhood

were standing near the entrance. The group included Aquantis

Hillman, Amira Cameron, Myles Cameron, Ja’Quan Perry,

Jeremecia Perry, Dujuan Terry, and others. Five members of the

group testified at Hassan’s trial.

     Myles Cameron testified that there were four or five people in

the Malibu, all of whom appeared to be staring at his group through

the passenger-side windows as the car drove slowly by. Terry and

Hillman also testified that they saw four or five people in the car,

and all of them had their heads turned in the group’s direction as

they drove by. Uneasy, the group of teens crossed to the other side

of the street. Myles Cameron testified that Terry retrieved a “.38

                                     3
revolver” from Perry’s bookbag and held it at his side, although

Terry testified that he did not have a gun and Perry testified that

she did not have a bookbag or a gun with her that night. Myles

Cameron, Perry, and Hillman testified that the driver of the Malibu

turned around at the far end of the parking lot, turned off the

headlights, and drove back towards the group. Hillman testified that

the Malibu’s windows were open and at least two occupants of the

car were holding guns out of the front and rear passenger-side

windows. The car’s occupants then started shooting in the teenagers’

direction. Myles Cameron’s 15-year-old sister, Amira Cameron,

received a fatal gunshot wound to the right side of her head;

everyone else in the group escaped injury.

     At the time of the shooting, Jamaris Zinnerman, a member of

the Smash Krew Billy Gang (“SKBG”), was under court supervision

and wore an ankle monitor that included a GPS transmitter.

Records from that transmitter showed that at 8:19 p.m. Zinnerman’s

monitor was at the entrance of the Oakley Shoals Apartments and

then was in the parking lot where the shooting occurred at 8:20 p.m.

                                 4
The transmitter records showed that the monitor was on a nearby

parkway leaving the scene at 8:22 p.m.; was at South Fulton

Hospital on Cleveland Avenue at 8:34 p.m.; left that hospital at 9:40

p.m.; and arrived at Atlanta Medical Center at 9:56 p.m.

     Hassan testified that he drove his mother’s Malibu to the

Oakley Shoals Apartments on the night of the shooting and that

Zinnerman rode in the rear passenger seat. Hassan testified that

three “acquaintances,” who had been at a party that he had attended

that night and had asked him for a ride home, were also in the car;

one passenger asked to be dropped off at the Oakley Shoals

Apartments. Hassan testified that before beginning the drive, he

asked his passengers whether anyone was carrying a gun, because

“[b]efore [he] even let anybody in [his] car [he would] make sure”

they did not have a gun. Hassan admitted that he passed a group of

people who were standing right in front of the entrance to the

complex and testified that they were “looking crazy” at the

occupants of the car and some seemed to be “clutching,” which he

defined as reaching for weapons. Hassan testified that, based on

                                 5
that behavior, he decided not to stop to drop off his passenger and

instead turned around, and again passed the group, which had

crossed the street. Then, Hassan heard gunshots and sped away. He

testified that he was certain that no one was shooting out of his car.

In particular, Hassan testified that he did not have a gun that night

and that he did not shoot anyone. He testified that, after they left

the Oakley Shoals Apartments, Zinnerman told him he had been

shot. Hassan saw that Zinnerman was bleeding. Hassan drove to the

nearest hospital and carried Zinnerman inside. Hassan denied being

a gang member at the time of trial but admitted he had previously

been in a Bloods gang, the Nine Trey Bloods, from age 14 until some

unspecified point in 2015. Hassan testified that Zinnerman had been

in the Nine Trey Bloods gang and had tattoos that represented the

Nine Trey Bloods. Hassan testified that SKBG is not part of the

Bloods.

     A .38-caliber bullet was removed from Amira Cameron’s brain,

and a .38-caliber bullet was removed from Zinnerman’s body during

surgery. Another .38-caliber bullet was found in the Malibu. An

                                  6
expert firearms and tool mark examiner testified that the bullet

found in the Malibu and the bullet removed from Zinnerman’s body

were fired by the same gun, but the bullet that fatally wounded

Amira Cameron was fired by a different gun. DNA testing of blood

that had soaked into the Malibu’s rear seat cushion matched

Zinnerman’s DNA profile.

     In addition to Hillman’s testimony about the October 4, 2015

shooting, Hillman testified that he was a member of the Crips gang,

a rival of the Bloods gang, and that a person being a “Billy” means

he is a Blood. Hillman testified that, days before the shooting at the

Oakley Shoals Apartments, members of the Billy Bloods yelled an

insult that referred to the rivalry between the Bloods and the Crips

and then shot at him. Hillman testified that, in gang culture, one

member’s having a problem with someone means that the entire

gang has a problem with that person, regardless of whether the

other members know that person.

     An assistant district attorney testified as a criminal street

gang expert about the Bloods criminal gang, which has west-coast-

                                  7
affiliated and east-coast-affiliated subsets, and explained that the

Smash Krew Billy Gang is a branch of the Nine Trey Billy Bad-ass

Bloods, one of the east-coast-affiliated Bloods groups that are

predominant in Georgia. The assistant district attorney testified

that there is a rivalry and widespread hostility between Bloods

gangs and Crips gangs. In particular, at the time of the shooting at

the Oakley Shoals Apartments there was hostility locally between

the Crips and SKBG members, who blamed the Crips for the

unsolved drive-by shooting death of SKBG member Carlton Ramey

earlier in 2015. The assistant district attorney testified that, “even

to this day,” at the time of Hassan’s trial in May 2019, “members of

the Smash Krew Billy Gang post[ ] pictures of Carlton Ramey or [his

nickname] ‘Cash’ [on social media] as an homage to him because he

was killed.” The assistant district attorney testified that, around the

time of the shooting at the Oakley Shoals Apartments, Zinnerman

identified himself as a member of SKBG through photos and

captions he posted on social media. A detective testified that Hassan

has a five-pointed star tattooed on the right side of his face, which is

                                   8
a common marker of the Bloods, and he had a red bandana in his

pocket when he was arrested, which members of the Bloods

commonly wear or carry as “a flag of identification” with the gang.

The detective testified that Hillman, a self-identified Crips gang

member, was a person of interest in Ramey’s death.

     In closing argument, the State did not argue that there was

any evidence that Hassan fired a weapon that night. The State

argued that Hassan was guilty of the murder and the aggravated

assaults either as a party to the crime of the actual shooters, by

being the driver in the drive-by shooting, or as having participated

in a conspiracy to commit the crimes.

     1. Hassan contends that all of the evidence about Ramey’s

murder constituted inadmissible hearsay and that the superior

court plainly erred by allowing the evidence. Hassan argues that the

State’s proposed nexus between his alleged participation in a gang

and the offenses arising out of the drive-by shooting at the Oakley

Shoals Apartments was that the occupants of his car shot at the

group that included Hillman because they blamed Hillman’s gang,

                                 9
the Crips, for the murder of Ramey, a fellow member of the shooters’

gang, SKBG. See Overstreet v. State, 312 Ga. 565, 574 (1) (b) (864

SE2d 14) (2021) (To establish participation in criminal street gang

activity in violation of OCGA § 16-15-4, the State must show “some

nexus” between the alleged predicate acts and an intent to further

the interests of the gang.). Hassan argues that the State “offered no

first-hand witness to that other shooting” and that all of the State’s

evidence about the Ramey murder was elicited during the testimony

of the assistant district attorney, who testified as a gang expert, and

the detective. Hassan argues that neither witness “was a percipient

witness to the drive-by shooting [of Ramey] that they testified about.

Both learned about the incident through their investigations, which

inevitably comprised the statements of others.” Hassan concedes

that he did not object to the evidence at trial on the basis that it

constituted inadmissible hearsay, but he argues that admitting the

evidence constituted plain error.

     A trial court’s ruling that admits evidence is ordinarily

reviewable only where “a timely objection or motion to strike

                                    10
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the

specific ground was not apparent from the context[.]” OGGA § 24-1-

103 (a) (1). See Middlebrooks v. State, 315 Ga. 671, 687 (2) (a) (884

SE2d 318) (2023). Without preservation of error as provided in

OCGA § 24-1-103, an appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling

only for plain error pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-103 (d), which provides

that “nothing in [that] Code section shall preclude a court from

taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although

such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.” See

Middlebrooks, 315 Ga. at 687 (2) (a).

     To establish plain error, [the appellant] must point to an
     error that was not affirmatively waived, and that error
     must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute,
     must have affected [the appellant’s] substantial rights,
     and must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
     public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). If the appellant fails to meet

one element of the plain error test, his claim fails. See Allen v. State,

310 Ga. 411, 416 (3) (851 SE2d 541) (2020). “Satisfying all four

prongs of [the plain-error] standard is difficult, as it should be.”

                                   11
Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 490, 495 (2) (883 SE2d 733) (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted). In this case, Hassan failed to

meet the second prong, showing an error that was clear and not open

to reasonable dispute, because it is not clear that the testimony he

challenges was hearsay.

     “Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that a party offers into

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, and such

a statement generally is inadmissible at trial.” See OCGA §§ 24-8-

801 (c); 24-8-802; see also Smith v. State, 309 Ga. 240, 245 (2) (b)

(845 SE2d 598) (2020). In his appellate brief, Hassan characterizes

as inadmissible hearsay portions of the testimony of the assistant

district attorney in which the witness testified that he was “familiar

with” the Ramey murder, that Ramey had been a SKBG member,

and that there were persons of interest in the investigation but not

yet any indictment. As to the other witness, the detective, Hassan

characterizes as inadmissible hearsay portions of the detective’s

testimony in which he testified that Ramey had been a SKBG

member, that Ramey was killed in a drive-by shooting prior to the

                                 12
shooting at the Oakland Shoals Apartments, that Hillman identifies

himself as a member of the Crips, and that Hillman is a person of

interest in the Ramey murder investigation. The detective testified

that he “spoke with the detective that was working on [the Ramey

case] at the time,” but he did not testify about any statement made

by that other detective or by any other person.

     Neither witness expressly repeated the out-of-court statements

of any other person. Although the detective testified that he was

“familiar” with the Ramey investigation and referred to speaking

with another detective who worked on that investigation, the

detective did not specify what that other detective told him or how

he developed familiarity with the investigation. Given that, it was

not so obvious that the evidence was hearsay such that the trial

court should have intervened sua sponte to exclude the testimony.

Because Hassan has not shown that allowing the testimony at issue

was a clear error that was not open to reasonable dispute, his claim

of plain error fails. See Carter v. State, 317 Ga. 689, 694 (2) (895

SE2d 295) (2023); Stafford v. State, 312 Ga. 811, 820 (3) (b) (865

                                 13
SE2d 116) (2021); Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 848 (4) (d) (828

SE2d 327) (2019).

     2. Hassan contends that the trial court erred in failing to

instruct the jury regarding the State’s “heightened burden of proof”

under OCGA § 24-14-6, which provides: “To warrant a conviction on

circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent

with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable

hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” Again, Hassan

concedes that he did not object at trial to the instruction regarding

convictions based on circumstantial evidence but argues that the

instruction as given constituted plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b).

     The plain error standard with regard to jury instructions, like

the standard regarding evidentiary rulings discussed in Division 1,

supra, has four requirements: an error that has not been

affirmatively waived by the appellant, that is “clear or obvious,

rather than subject to reasonable dispute,” that affected the

appellant’s “substantial rights,” and that merits a remedy, in the

discretion of the appellate court, on the basis that “the error

                                 14
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Beard v. State, 317 Ga. 842, 844 (2) (893 SE2d

893) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). “An error is plain if

it is clear or obvious under current law. An error cannot be plain

where there is no controlling authority on point.” Hill v. State, 310

Ga. 180, 194 (11) (a) (850 SE2d 110) (2020) (citations and

punctuation omitted). And the appellate court “need not analyze all

of the elements of the plain error test when the appellant fails to

establish one of them.” Id.

     Regarding evidence, the trial court instructed the jury:

          Now, your oath requires that you will decide this
     case based on the evidence. Evidence is the means by
     which any fact that is put in issue is established or
     disproved.
          Evidence includes all of the testimony of the
     witnesses, any exhibits admitted during the trial and
     stipulations of the attorneys; that is, any fact to which the
     attorneys have agreed with the approval by the Court.
          Evidence does not include the indictment, the plea
     of not guilty, the opening and closing remarks of the
     attorneys or questions asked by the attorneys. Evidence
     may be direct, circumstantial or both.
          In considering the evidence you may use reasoning
     and common sense to make deductions and reach

                                  15
     conclusions. You should not be concerned about whether
     the evidence is direct or circumstantial.
           Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who
     asserts that he or she has actual knowledge of a fact such
     as by personally observing or otherwise witnessing that
     fact.
           Circumstantial evidence is proof of a set of facts and
     circumstances that tend to prove or disprove another fact
     by inference; that is, by consistency with such fact or
     elimination of other facts. There’s no legal difference in
     the weight you may give to either direct or circumstantial
     evidence.
           You would be authorized to convict only if the
     evidence, whether direct or circumstantial or both,
     excludes all reasonable theories of innocence and proves
     the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

     In Hill, we considered a plain-error challenge to jury

instructions “regarding the level of proof required for conviction”

and held that the appellant failed to show that giving the

instructions at issue constituted clear or obvious error where the

instructions at issue had been upheld by this Court and the

appellant cited no controlling authority for the proposition that the

instructions were erroneous. See Hill, 310 Ga. at 194-195 (11) (a).

This Court has upheld a jury instruction that, like the evidence

instruction in this case, informed the jurors that they “would be

                                 16
authorized to convict only if the evidence, whether direct,

circumstantial, or both, excludes all reasonable theories of innocence

and proves the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 580 (3) (a) (894 SE2d 27) (2023). See

Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal

Cases (4th ed. 2007, updated Jan. 2023) § 1.30.20. Noting that,

“[w]hen a requested jury instruction adds no essential point of law

to the existing instructions, it is not error for the trial court to

decline to give it[,]” we held that the instructions at issue “effectively

conveyed the point that the State was required to disprove

reasonable hypotheses of [the appellant’s] innocence.” Eubanks, 317

Ga. at 580 (3) (a). Because the instructions at issue in this case have

been upheld by this Court and Hassan has cited no controlling

authority for the proposition that the instructions were erroneous,

Hassan cannot show plain error. See id.; Hill, 310 Ga. at 194-195

(11) (a).

      We note that Hassan contends that this Court can consider the

harmful effect of the alleged evidentiary error discussed in Division

                                   17
1 and the alleged instructional error discussed in Division 2 “in the

aggregate.” Because Hassan has not established clear error in either

instance, we do not reach the issue of whether failing to exclude sua

sponte the alleged hearsay or failing to give a jury instruction in

language identical to OCGA § 24-14-6 affected Hassan’s substantial

rights, either individually or in the aggregate.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                  18