Court Opinion

ID: 9686127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:30:39.089961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:15.239954
License: Public Domain

Williams, C.J.
(concurring). While I concur in *684the result and general reasoning of Justice Riley’s opinion, I continue to believe that Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 (1981), was wrongly decided.
Archer, J., concurred with Williams, C.J.
Levin, J.
(separate opinion). The opinion of the Court (i) holds that the majority opinion in Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 (1981), "becomes binding precedent for intermediate appellate and trial courts”1 when the signed opinion was filed with the clerk of the Court, and, consistent with Gusler, the minimum workers’ compensation rates are not subject to upward adjustment pursuant to § 355 of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act,2 and (ii) remands to the Court of Appeals to consider the "retroactive effect of Gusler” and to reconsider the res judicata issue.3
I agree that, pursuant to Gusler, the minimum rates are not subject to adjustment under § 355, but would additionally hold, as indicated in Gus-ler, that the rule announced in Gusler is effective as to any payment of workers’ compensation benefits after December 30, 1981.
i
A court speaks through its judgments, orders, or *685decrees, not through its opinions.4 Unless a judgment, order, or decree is issued adjudicating a controversy on the merits, there is no decision, and, absent a decision, there is only expression of opinion(s) and hence no precedent.5
In Gusler, before a judgment order was issued by the clerk of this Court pursuant to the opinions filed in that case, an order was entered by the clerk dismissing the appeal.6 Consequently no order was entered adjudicating the controversy between the parties. There thus was no decision by this Court. Absent a decision, there were only opinions. Since the Court as a court speaks only through its orders and not through its opinions, the Court as a court has not spoken on the merits of the issues dealt with in the Gusler opinion.
An opinion or opinions filed by this Court, after full briefing and argument, may and should be regarded upon filing as functioning much like an advisory opinion until issuance of the judgment order. The opinions filed represent the views of the justices who sign them; the majority opinion is not, however, precedentially binding under the doctrine of stare decisis until a judgment order issues pursuant to the opinions. The trial courts and the Court of Appeals may and generally will be guided by the majority opinion from the time of *686filing, but are not required to follow the majority opinion until a judgment order is issued.
The concept that an opinion without an order adjudicating a controversy is not precedentially binding has been recognized in the decisions of this Court and of other courts7 stating that an advisory opinion is not precedentially binding. "[T]he court does not act as a court in rendering such opinions”; "such opinions are regarded as expressing the views of the justices and not a judicial determination of the questions by the court.” Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich 592, 603; 179 NW 350 (1920). It has been said: "Since in an advisory opinion there is no decision, such an opinion of a court does not have stare decisis effect,” and that only a judicial opinion "expressed in connection with a decision that has become final can have stare decisis effect. . . .”8
This Court recognized the difference between a precedentially binding decision and an advisory opinion in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982). In In re Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 462; 208 NW2d 469 (1973), a majority of the justices had indicated that the question of what constitutes a "serious impairment of body function” within the meaning of the no-fault automobile liability act9 was a question to be decided by the trier of fact. In Cassidy, supra, p 495, the Court, in concluding that the question was to be decided by *687the Court, observed that the statements in In re Advisory Opinion did "not constitute a decision of the Court and [were] not precedentially binding in the same sense as a decision of the Court after a hearing on the merits.” The Court said that "[although advisory opinions are not binding, they may be persuasive,” but the "validity” of what was said in In re Advisory Opinion would "have to find a basis other than stare decisis.” Id., p 498.
ii
Since Gusler is not precedentially binding, this Court might remand the cause to the Court of Appeals to decide whether the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Jolliff v American Advertising Distributors, Inc, 49 Mich App 1; 211 NW2d 260 (1973), lv den 391 Mich 780 (1974), or the view expressed by a majority of the justices in Gusler is correct. I think it would be more appropriate for this Court to decide the question and would do so.10 The question has been fully briefed in this Court by both sides of the controversy.
I would, for the reasons set forth in the majority opinion in Gusler, which I signed when the opinions in Gusler were filed, adhere to the view there stated that the minimum rates are not subject to adjustment.
hi
I would also decide the retroactivity and res judicata issues. Again, the questions have been *688fully briefed in this Court by both sides of the controversy.
A
In Gusler, p 298, the majority opinion concluded with the following statement:
In the interest of fairness we do not believe our holding should affect any disability compensation payments already made. Consequently, no recipient will be obligated to repay sums already received by reason of the erroneous computation formula we have nullified today. However, any benefits due and not yet paid or to be awarded after the date of this opinion shall be in accord with this ruling.
The majority thus indicated that Gusler would apply to cases decided before December 30, 1981, as to payments made after that date. Although the majority opinion did not go into an extended retro-activity/res judicata analysis, that is what the opinion stated.
The question of retroactivity is, as set forth in Gusler, ultimately one of fairness. There is nothing unfair in applying the rule stated in Gusler, which appears to have been reaffirmed today on varying analyses, from and after the date of the announcement of the opinions of the justices in Gusler.
The statement in the foregoing concluding paragraph of the majority opinion in Gusler was surely adequate notice to the workers’ compensation department, the wcab, bench and bar, that Jolliff should no longer be followed. The "interest of fairness” adverted to in Gusler, that prompted this Court to state that Gusler should not "affect any disability compensation payments already made,” *689does not require that the effect of Gusler be deferred until this Court has reaffirmed Gusler. It would not be "unfair” to hold in the instant case that, as declared in Gusler, "any benefits due and not yet paid or to be awarded after the date of [the Gusler opinion] shall be in accord with th[e] ruling” stated in Gusler that the minimum rates are not subject to adjustment.
To defer the effectiveness of the overruling of Jolliff beyond the filing on December 30, 1981, of the Gusler opinions would be unfair to employers and their insurers who have been required to pay out large sums because of an incorrect construction of § 355.
B
There is no constitutional impediment to changing, upwards or downwards, workers’ compensation benefits after an adjudication awarding such benefits. See Franks v White Pine Copper, 422 Mich 636, 653-654; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), where this Court said that "[workers’ compensation benefits are social-welfare income-maintenance benefits,” and that "[i]n providing for such benefits, the Legislature did not covenant not to amend the legislation,” and that an award of such benefits is not insulated "from substantive change by subsequent legislation.”
A workers’ compensation award differs from a lump sum tort judgment in that it operates prospectively and is subject to change in response to subsequent events. Just as a change in legislation may result in an upward or downward adjustment in the amount of benefits, so too a change in a rule of law announced by judicial decision may effect a change in the amount of the benefits payable.
The doctrine of res judicata does not preclude *690giving effect to such a change in law. In Socialist Workers Party v Secretary of State, 412 Mich 571, 584; 317 NW2d 1 (1982), this Court adopted the view expressed in the Restatement of Judgments that although an issue has been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, relitigation of the issue between the parties is not precluded where the issue is one of law and "[a] new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws.” Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 28.11
Were this Court to give preclusive effect to a prior adjudication that was based on Jolliff as to payments of workers’ compensation benefits after Gusler it would perpetuate, in the name of a judicial doctrine, a judicial error in construing a statute that thwarts legislative intent. The policies that explain the judicial doctrine of res judicata do not require the continued imposition on employers and their insurers of payments contrary to the intendment of the statute._

 This suggests that following decision after remand to the Court of Appeals whoever is dissatisfied with its decision may seek to bring the meritorious question whether minimum rates are subject to upward adjustments back to this Court one more time.

 MCL 418.355; MSA 17.237(355).

 It does not appear why what was said on the meritorious question, whether minimum rates are subject to upward adjustment, is regarded as precedentially binding, but what was said in the concluding paragraph of the Gusler opinion (see Part iii-a, infra) on the retroactivity/res judicata issues is not precedentially binding.

 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, § 189, pp 524-525; 49 CJS, Judgment, § 22, p 51. Michigamme Oil Co v Huron Valley Bldg & Savings Ass’n, 280 Mich 12,14; 273 NW 329 (1937); Kingsbury v Kingsbury, 20 Mich 212, 215 (1870); Newbould v Stewart, 15 Mich 15 (1866).

 Because this Court speaks only through its orders, it cannot properly, through construction of a court rule, make an opinion precedentially binding, before issuance of an order pursuant to the opinion.

 The reason why a judgment order pursuant to the opinions was not issued before issuance of an order dismissing the appeal was that a timely petition for rehearing had been filed and subsequently that petition was granted. Under the court rule the timely filing of a petition for rehearing deferred the time for issuing a judgment order. GCR 1963, 864.4.

 See 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, n 4 supra; 21 CJS, Courts, § 211, p 386.
See also Opinion of the Justices, 170 A2d 652 (Me, 1961); Commonwealth v Welosky, 276 Mass 398; 177 NE 656 (1931), cert den 284 US 684 (1931); In re Opinion of the Justices, 81 NH 566; 129 A 117 (1925).

 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, n 4 supra. "The conclusion arrived at and announced upon the several questions discussed and essential to a proper disposition of the case, is that of the court . . . .” Larzelere v Starkweather, 38 Mich 96,100 (1878). (Emphasis supplied.)

 MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135.

 If the Court of Appeals were on remand to decide the meritorious question in accord with the majority opinion in Gusler, that would establish a conflict in the Court of Appeals between Jolliff and the decision of the Court of Appeals on remand that, depending on how the majority opinion in the instant case is read, might or would require resolution by this Court.

 Similarly see Young v Detroit City Clerk, 389 Mich 333, 338; 207 NW2d 126 (1973). Socialist Workers Party quoted from Restatement Judgments, 2d (Tentative Draft No 1, 1973), § 68.1, pp 170-171, which became Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 28.
Just as each income tax year is a separate period, Comm’r of Internal Revenue v Sunnen, 333 US 591, 599; 68 S Ct 715; 92 L Ed 898 (1948), so too each week that workers’ compensation benefits are payable is a separate period.