Court Opinion

ID: 9402167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:33.036316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.005683
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
                                                           TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                 2021-SC-0503-MR

TRAY C. SPALDING                                                      APPELLANT

                   ON APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE SAMUEL T. SPALDING, JUDGE
                         NOS. 19-CR-223 & 19-CR-225

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                 OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CONLEY

                                      AFFIRMING

      A Marion Circuit Court jury found Tray Spalding guilty of two counts of

trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second or greater

offense. The jury recommended a sentence of twenty-seven years in prison,

but the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years pursuant to KRS1

532.070. Spalding now appeals as a matter of right.2 He alleges the trial court

violated his right to confront the witnesses against him when it permitted three

witnesses to testify via Zoom. Additionally, Spalding claims the trial court

erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to join three indictments for trial.

We hold the trial court did not err when it joined the three indictments for trial.

While we find the trial court erred when it permitted three witnesses to testify

      1   Kentucky Revised Statues.
      2   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
remotely yet find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm

the judgement of the Marion Circuit Court.

                       I.   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On December 19, 2018, Joshua O’Bryan was working as a confidential

informant for Detective Brad Scholl, when he met with Spalding to purchase

illegal drugs from him. O’Bryan subsequently completed two more transactions

working under Detective Scholl on January 2nd and the 9th of 2019. Spalding

was charged in three separate indictments by a Marion County grand jury for

three counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second

or greater offense.3

      On August 27, 2020, the Commonwealth moved the trial court to join

these separate indictments pursuant to RCr4 9.12. A hearing was held on the

issue, but the trial court declined to consolidate at that point because it

decided it did not have enough available information. The Commonwealth

bided its time and again moved the trial court to consolidate the cases for trial

on January 19, 2021. Both parties submitted memorandum in support of their

position and the trial court conducted a hearing on the matter on January 27,

2021. In a four page order the trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and

consolidated the three cases for the purposes of trial.

      On July 23, 2021, three days before the start of the jury trial scheduled

for the 26th, the trial court ruled, over defendant’s objection, that it would

      3   Spalding was acquitted at trial on case number 19-CR-00224.
      4   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                          2
allow some of the Commonwealth’s witnesses to testify remotely. These

witnesses were to testify regarding the chain of custody of the purported

narcotics. Spalding’s objection was that doing so violated his right of

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. At that time, the trial court did

not state a reason other than their testimony was limited to the chain of

custody.

      On the morning of trial, the Commonwealth again requested two

witnesses to testify remotely, though ultimately, the Commonwealth would call

three witnesses to testify as to chain of custody remotely. During this

discussion, the Commonwealth stated it would prefer these witnesses to testify

remotely but “she could do it either way.” Again, Spalding objected and

correctly cited the requirement of a compelling need under Maryland v. Craig.

497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990). The trial court ruled that there was a compelling

need as the witnesses had relocated and cited the limited scope of their

testimony as to the chain of custody.

      Several witnesses testified in person as to the handling and testing of the

narcotics. Det. Scholl testified that after each controlled buy he placed the

original container of narcotics in a zip lock bag, sealed it with evidence tape

and his initials. Then he wrote the case information on the bag, including case

number, date, suspect and a brief description of the narcotics. Then he placed

this in a manilla envelope, sealed it with brown postal tape then put evidence

tape on it along with his initials. Det. Scholl placed the registered mail sticker

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on the envelope and delivered it to the post office and mailed it to the Kentucky

State Police (KSP) Central Laboratory in Frankfort.

      James Williams also testified in person. He was a laboratory scientist in

the KSP Central Laboratory. His job was to receive any incoming evidence,

open the package, fill out a form, reseal the container and log in the

information into the system and label each package with a unique laboratory

number5 and the date it was received. He would then route the package to

supervisor who would assign it to an analyst for identification and analysis.

Once the analyst was finished, she would place it in the release locker where it

would be picked up by the evidence custodian at Drug Enforcement and

Special Investigations (DESI) West. Spalding asked no questions of Williams on

cross-examination.

      Sgt. Robert Chambers was the evidence custodian at DESI West. Sgt.

Chambers testified about each package received by the laboratory. He

recounted each package was sealed by evidence tape and stored behind a

double locked door in the evidence locker which was equipped with an alarm.

Sgt. Chambers identified each item by agency case number and described how

each item was handled in the laboratory and when it was received from the

laboratory. He also testified that Trooper Downs transported the evidence from

Agency Case #32-19-0010 back to the laboratory to be tested,6 and after it was

      5 The laboratory would assign a number different from the police agency
submitting it. Both numbers are on the final analyst report and labeled as such.
      6 Trooper Downs was one of the witnesses who later testified by Zoom. The

import of Trooper Down’s testimony is identical to what Sgt. Chambers relates here

                                          4
tested, Sgt. Chambers retrieved it from the laboratory and returned it to the

evidence locker.

      Three witnesses testified remotely regarding the chain of custody on the

second day of trial. Lieutenant Brad Riley testified that he was, at the time, the

Administration Sergeant at DESI West. As part of his responsibilities, he was

tasked to log in evidence. Lt. Riley testified he received the evidence back on

three different cases7 from the Central Lab from Unit TF 27 in February of

2019. Lt. Riley stated that he was currently assigned to KSP Post 4 and

assisted operations at the Kentucky State Fair. Spalding did not ask any

questions on cross-examination.

      Trooper Downs also testified via Zoom, but no explanation was given for

his excusal from testifying in person. He told the jury that he transported the

evidence for Agency case #32-19-0010 from the evidence locker back to the

KSP Central Laboratory for testing. Spalding did not ask any questions on

cross-examination.

      Lt. Mark Watkins also testified remotely. The Commonwealth, during

opening statements, told the jury that Lt. Watkins was ill with Covid.8 He was

assigned as a Task Force officer to DESI West. He testified that he retrieved the

without objection from Spalding: That he transported this item from the evidence
storage unit at DESI West to the KSP Central Laboratory. It is not clear why this item
was not tested by the laboratory initially.
        7 Agency case nos. 32-18-0573, 32-19-0001, and 32-19-0010, respectively.
        8 The Commonwealth did not mention this when seeking to have this witness to

testify remotely when it was discussed three days before trial or on the morning of
trial. The trial court did not use this as a justification when it ruled it would allow
remote testimony. In its brief the Commonwealth seems to have a adopted a post hoc
rationalization.

                                           5
three items from the Central Laboratory in Frankfort and returned them to the

storage locker at DESI West. Spalding did not ask any questions of this witness

either.

      Spalding was convicted on two counts of trafficking in a controlled

substance in the first degree, second or greater offense, while he was acquitted

on case 19-CR-224.9 The jury recommended a total sentence of twenty-seven

years, but the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years. We now discuss

the merits of the appeal.

                                  II.    ANALYSIS

      Spalding argues the trial court erred by allowing three witnesses to

testify remotely, violating his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Section 11 of the

Kentucky Constitution. Spalding also claims the trial court abused its

discretion by consolidating these three cases for trial.

      A. The trial court erred when it permitted witnesses to testify
         remotely, however this error was harmless beyond a reasonable
         doubt.

      As noted above, the trial court allowed three witnesses to testify remotely

over defense objection. The Commonwealth in its brief claims a compelling

need for Lt. Brad Riley to testify remotely because of his duties at the state fair,

gives no reason at all why Trooper Downs needed to testify remotely, and states

that Lt. Mark Watkins was ill with Covid as the reason he testified remotely.

      9 Joshua O’Bryan, the confidential informant, had trouble remembering this
transaction and Det. Scholl neglected to record the transaction.

                                         6
      Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). The

test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary,

unfair, unreasonable or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth

v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      This Court was recently confronted with a similar issue involving the use

of remote technology, or Zoom, to allow witnesses to testify remotely. Campbell

v. Commonwealth, No. 2021-SC-00479, 2023 WL 3113315 (Ky. Apr. 27, 2023).

In Campbell, we held that the trial court erred by allowing a doctor to testify

remotely on the issue of serious physical injury and that error required reversal

of the conviction of assault in the first degree. Id. This Court was bound by the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,

840 (1990). That decision permitted courts to balance the defendant’s right of

confrontation in order to further an important public policy where there was a

finding of necessity on a case-specific basis. In Campbell, we held no

compelling need existed to justify the trial court’s decision to allow the doctor

to testify remotely. 2023 WL 3113315 at *6. In Campbell, it should be noted,

this Court’s hands were tied by the United States Supreme Court’s refusal to

revisit the Craig decision in light of the undermining of its rationale after that

Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).10

      10 Our opinion in Campbell v Commonwealth provides an in-depth analysis of
the Craig- Crawford conundrum.

                                         7
      Here, we are faced with a nearly identical issue. Although in this case,

Spalding, in addition to arguing his rights were violated under the U.S.

Constitution, asserted his rights under the Confrontation Clause under Section

11 of the Kentucky Constitution as well. While this Court has no authority to

contravene the U.S. Supreme Court when interpreting the U.S. Constitution,

this Court is the final authority on the Kentucky Constitution. This Court has

previously held that the protections afforded defendants by the Confrontation

Clause of Section 11 and the Sixth Amendment are coextensive.

Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986). And yet the rationale

behind Willis, like Craig, was based on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). All

of these cases were decided many years prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s

decision in Crawford. Now, it has been nearly twenty years since Crawford has

been decided and the rationale supporting the Willis and Craig decisions have

been fatally undermined. And yet it is not necessary, at this point, to uncouple

ourselves from Craig in order to vindicate Spalding’s confrontation rights in

this case. Because even under Craig, the trial court erred.

      Three days before trial, the Commonwealth, Spalding, and the trial court

discussed the upcoming trial. At one point, discussion turned to these

witnesses and the trial court suggested to the Commonwealth to have them

appear by zoom. The trial court surmised that “if the higher courts allow me to

decide where children live, and there’s not too much more important than that,

by Zoom, then I can’t imagine they wouldn’t allow at least the chain of custody

people to testify at trial by Zoom.” On the docket sheet the trial court wrote

                                        8
that the “Court ruled that chain of custody witnesses can testify by Zoom, over

the Defendant’s objection.” This rationale, however, ignores that while issues

concerning the placement and well-being of children are extremely important,

they remain civil matters not afforded the right of confrontation under our

constitutions.

      The morning of trial, Spalding again renewed his objection to any

witnesses testifying remotely, whereupon the Commonwealth stated they

preferred not to drag them down here but could “do it either way.” Nowhere in

this discussion is any mention of Covid or the Kentucky State Fair. The trial

court stated that these witnesses probably were not needed but ruled there was

a compelling need because the witnesses had relocated and then cited the

limited scope of their testimony as chain of custody witnesses. On the docket

sheet, the trial court wrote, “Court ruled [their] two witnesses could testify by

Zoom. Both witnesses are only chain of custody witnesses and the Court

concludes there is a compelling need as both have moved.”

      While a witness sick with Covid could arguably be a compelling need

justifying remote testimony under the Craig standard, the trial court made no

such finding, and this was not mentioned during either discussion of remote

testimony. The first time Covid was mentioned was during the

Commonwealth’s opening argument and the record is not clear whether

Spalding had been informed of this before the jury was. Had this been

discussed with Spalding prior to the commencement of the trial, the trial court

could have advised Spalding whether he wished to continue the trial so the

                                         9
ailing witness could be physically present and thereby waive his right to a

speedy trial or carry on with the trial with the witness testifying remotely. As

for Lt. Brad Riley, the witness tied up with the Kentucky State Fair, this hardly

needs further comment from this Court. As important as the state fair is, it in

no way rises to the level of necessity as contemplated by Craig. And no

rationale has been offered by the Commonwealth for Trooper Downs’s absence,

either at trial or in its briefs before this Court. The trial court abused its

discretion when it allowed these witnesses to testify remotely.

      As we have now decided there is a confrontation clause error, we now

must determine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence

complained of might have contributed to the conviction . . . or put

otherwise, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Talbott v.

Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 24 (1967)). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that:

      An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of
      whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or
      the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation;
      such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and
      harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the
      remaining evidence.

Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021–22.

      Three witnesses testified remotely as to the chain of custody of the

narcotics. Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 901(a) states that “[t]he

requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to

                                         10
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what its proponent claims.” This Court has held that:

      Logically, a proper foundation requires the proponent to prove that
      the proffered evidence was the same evidence actually involved in
      the event in question and that it remains materially unchanged
      from the time of the event until its admission. The necessary
      foundation depends upon the nature of the evidence. Evidence
      readily identifiable and impervious to change may be admitted
      solely on testimony that it appears to be the actual object in an
      unchanged condition. However, the more fungible the evidence, the
      more significant its condition, or the higher its susceptibility to
      change, the more elaborate the foundation must be.

Thomas v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Ky. 2004). However, this

Court has never held that proffered evidence requires a perfect chain of

custody.

      Even with respect to substances which are not clearly identifiable
      or distinguishable, it is unnecessary to establish a perfect
      chain of custody or eliminate all possibility of tampering or
      misidentification, so long as there is persuasive evidence that the
      reasonable probability is that the evidence has not been altered in
      any material respect. Gaps in the chain normally go to the weight
      of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.

Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). “All possibility of tampering does not have to be negated. It

is sufficient in these cases that the actions taken to preserve the integrity of the

evidence are reasonable under the circumstances.” Penland v. Commonwealth,

463 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Ky. 1971) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 738

(Ky. 1969)).

      Three witnesses testified remotely regarding chain of custody, but the

Commonwealth also had several witnesses physically present to testify as to

the chain of custody regarding the integrity of the narcotics. Det. Brad Scholl
                                        11
testified that he labeled and sealed the packages and mailed them via

registered mail to the Central Laboratory. Jason Williams testified that he

received the narcotics at the Central Lab and described the procedures

employed at the lab and how they were routed to the analysts. The two

analysts testified as to the methods they employed in order to test the samples

and the results of their analysis. Sgt. Raymond Chambers, the evidence

custodian at DESI West, testified how the evidence was returned from the

laboratory and how Trooper Downs transported the sample from Agency Case#

32-19-0010 back to the laboratory because it had not been tested. Det. Scholl,

Jason Williams, Sgt. Chambers and the two lab analysts all testified the

evidence was sealed and how if anyone unsealed the evidence, by breaking the

evidence tape, they would place their initials on the tape. The Commonwealth

in this case showed there was a reasonable probability that the narcotics had

not been altered, even absent the testimony of the remote witnesses. Therefore,

the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

      B. The trial court did not err by consolidating the three
         indictments for trial.

      Spalding complains that the trial court, by joining his three indictments

in one trial, unduly prejudiced him. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure

(RCr) 6.18 states:

      Two (2) or more offenses may be charged in the same complaint or
      two (2) or more offenses whether felonies or misdemeanors, or
      both, may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
      separate count for each offense, if the offenses are of the same or
      similar character or are based on the same acts or
      transactions connected together or constituting parts of a
      common scheme or plan.
                                       12
(Emphasis added). The Commonwealth did in fact elect to charge Spalding in

three separate indictments but later moved to consolidate under RCr 9.12

which provides:

      The court may order two (2) or more indictments, informations,
      complaints or uniform citations to be tried together if the offenses,
      and the defendants, if more than one (1), could have been joined in
      a single indictment, information, complaint or uniform citation.
      The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a
      single indictment, information, complaint or uniform citation.

Even if two or more indictments can be joined under RCr 6.18, this Court has

held that a trial court should order the offenses to be tried separately if it

would be prejudicial to either the defendant or the Commonwealth to try them

together. Elam v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Ky. 2016) (citing

Cherry v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.3d 787, 793 (Ky. 2015)). A trial court has

broad discretion when deciding to join separate offenses for trial. Murray v.

Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Ky. 2013). This Court will not disturb a

trial court’s ruling absent a showing of actual prejudice and a clear abuse of

discretion. Id.

      Spalding was initially charged under three separate indictments for

trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second or greater

offense. The same confidential informant was used in all three transactions

which occurred over twenty-one days. These are all the same offense and thus

clearly allowable under RCr 6.18 as they are the “same or similar character” as

contemplated under the rule. Joinder would still be appropriate under RCr

6.18 as these three separate illegal drug transactions constitute a common

                                         13
scheme or plan in order to sell illegal drugs for money. In Peyton v.

Commonwealth, a trial court consolidated two separate counts of cocaine

trafficking which this Court upheld as within the discretion of the trial court.

253 S.W.3d 504, 514 (Ky. 2008). We upheld the trial court even though

separate police agencies and different confidential informants were involved in

those cases and despite them occurring over the course of several months. Id.

In the present case, Spalding’s confidential informant and the detective were

the same in all three cases which occurred over a twenty-one-day period.

Besides, the jury acquitted Spalding on the charge where the confidential

informant had trouble remembering the transaction and the detective neglected

to record the transaction. That the jury acquitted where the Commonwealth

failed to prove he committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt

demonstrates the absence of undue prejudice as the jury was able to consider

each separate transaction on its own merits. As such the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it consolidated the three indictments for one trial.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, we hereby find that the trial court erred when it

allowed the three chain of custody witnesses to testify remotely and yet find

that error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, we find the trial

court acted well within its discretion when it consolidated the three trafficking

indictments for trial. Finding no reversible error, we hereby affirm the

judgment of the Marion Circuit Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

                                        14
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

C. Thomas Hectus

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Christopher Henry
Assistant Attorney General

                               15