Court Opinion

ID: 9669701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:06:43.346517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:59.852513
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
This was a noncontact accident where no physical evidence existed to either confirm or refute the respective litigant’s version of the facts. All of the events transpired “in the country” and not “in the city.” The only witnesses were the parties and appel-lee’s passenger. The jury did not return a unanimous verdict but did return a verdict in favor of appellee after resolving a tremendous conflict in the evidence and obviously weighing the credibility of the witnesses’ statements, under oath, concerning how this accident happened.
Believing that the evidence of a lack of license was evidence which was substantially more prejudicial than probative, the trial court saw fit to exclude any evidence on a lack of driving license.1 We are confronted with an issue of simple abuse of discretion. Was there abuse of discretion or not? It appears the trial court feared prejudicing the jury against the party who did not have a driver’s license. Rather, the trial court believed the case should be decided upon negligence rather than a violation of a failure to obtain a driver’s license.2 Although prohibiting appellant from inquiring into appellee’s failure to have a valid driver’s license at the time of accident, the trial court ruled that appellant could legitimately probe and cover, by way of examination, the driving experience of appellee. Throughout the trial, from the opening statement through the examination of ap-pellee, the driving experience of appellee was thoroughly canvassed. In fact, the jury heard evidence that appellee had driven the car in question only in the driveway and had never operated the car other than in the driveway. Further, examination revealed appellee had driven on a gravel road only when accompanied by her parents. That appellee had taken a course in driver’s education but did not complete the last two classes, was further evidence brought before the jury to enable the jury to learn of appellee’s experience and education in driving. All of this is mentioned in order to reflect that the trial court was not trying to cut appellant’s case short of probative evidence — evidence directly going to the question of driving competence.
Surely, a violation of a driver’s license law, per se, should not be evidence, per se, of negligence. There simply has to be some causal connection between the viola*641tion and injury.3 First, the trial court should, as a matter and determination of law, determine whether the violation is relevant; and, secondly, the trial court should determine if the violation is the proximate cause of any damage or injury, the latter being a finding of fact for the jury.4 Here, the trial court made a determination, as a matter of law, that the violation was not relevant; yet, the trial court was abundantly fair in permitting evidence to go to the jury concerning the skills of the driver who did not have a license. It was thoroughly developed that appellee was an inexperienced driver and had failed to complete her driver’s education. Notwithstanding, the jury held in her favor in this noncon-tact, country-road accident involving young people at the wheel.

. As the majority opinion points out, the longstanding majority rule states "the mere lack of a driver’s license is immaterial and incompetent in determining whether at the time of the accident the operator was guilty of negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle." 8 Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1023, at 184 (1980). See Dance v. Town of Southampton, 95 A.D.2d 442, 467 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1983); Mills v. Park, 67 Wash.2d 717, 409 P.2d 646 (1966); Mattero v. Silverman, 71 NJ.Super. 1, 176 A.2d 270 (1961); W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 36, at 226 (5th ed. 1984); 3 S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 12:63, at 680 (1986); 4 T. Shear-man & A. Redfield, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence § 685, at 1622-23 (rev. ed. C. Zipp 1941).

. Prosser notes ”[m]ost licensing statutes, such as those applicable to automobile drivers ... have been construed as intended only for the protection of the public against injury at the hands of incompetents, and to create no liability where the actor is in fact competent but unlicensed.” Keeton, supra § 36, at 226 (footnotes omitted).

. If the opposite were true, and negligence per se is blindly applied whenever a law is violated, defendants will be adjudged negligent even in situations where they may not be at fault. Such a result is untenable. See Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 Harv.L. Rev. 453, 458 (1932). Moreover, a licensing statute is not a safety statute.
It does not specify the standard or correct way to do anything; while driving without a license does not signify in any conceivable way that at the time in question such driving did not come up to the approved standard in any respect. This is true because a licensing statute does not stipulate what standard conduct on the road should be, so that breach of the licensing statute (i.e., not having a license) is tantamount to not having observed the statutory standard of conduct in driving. An unlicensed driver may be a superb driver; and whether he is or not, he may have driven with due care on the occasion in question.
Certainly his not having a license at the time is hardly probative of his not having done so. Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 Cornell L.Rev. 622, 634-35 (1951).

. Even those cases in which lack of an operator’s license was held relevant, some causal connection must appear between the statutory violation and the accident. See, e.g., Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Serv., Inc., 426 Mich. 78, 393 N.W.2d 356 (1986); Brackin v. Boles, 452 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1984). As the Supreme Court of Michigan recently wrote: "Relevancy is usually inherently established when the traffic regulation which was violated concerns the manner in which an automobile was operated. Relevancy is not so easily established when the traffic regulation which was violated concerns a licensing requirement.” Klanseck, 426 Mich, at 88, 393 N.W.2d at 360 (emphasis added) (quoting Brac-kin, 452 So.2d at 545).