Court Opinion

ID: 9785386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:38:12.287076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:21.950466
License: Public Domain

TIMMER, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 54 I respectfully dissent. After applying accepted principles of statutory construction to A.R.S. § 16-919(A) and (B), I conclude that a corporation, limited liability company, or labor organization14 violates these provisions only when making contributions to prospective candidates, candidates, or their campaign representatives for the purpose of influencing elections involving those candidates. Because the corporate contributions to the Party at issue in this case were not made for this prohibited purpose, I would reverse the summary judgment and remand to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of the Party.
¶ 55 Both the Majority and I agree that the pivotal language in § 16-919(A) and (B) is the phrase that prohibits corporations from contributing money or anything of value “for the purpose of influencing an election.” I part ways with my colleagues, however, when they label this phrase ambiguous, see supra, ¶ 23, and proceed to employ secondary principles of statutory construction, see supra, ¶¶ 24-40, without first considering the meaning of the phrase within the context of the entire statute. Calmat of Arizona v. State ex rel. Miller, 176 Ariz. 190, 193, 859 P.2d 1323, 1326 (1993) (concluding that to determine legislative intent court must first review statute’s language); State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993) (holding that statute’s language is best and most rehable guide of its meaning). When the entirety of § 16-919 is examined, the phrase “influencing an election” must be given a narrower construction than the one offered by the Majority. See supra ¶ 31.
¶ 56 For purposes of § 16-919(A) and (B), the term “election” is defined as follows:
“Election” means any election to any political office, any election to any political convention or caucus, or any primary election held for the purpose of selecting any candidate, political committee or other person for any political office, convention or caucus.
A.R.S. § 16-919(F)(1). Employing this definition, § 16-919(A) and (B) only prohibit corporate contributions for the purpose of influencing elections of individuals for enumerated political positions. The provision neither proscribes corporate contributions made to influence elections for any initiative, referendum, or other measure or proposition15 nor prohibits other political contributions not made for the purpose of influencing elections of individuals. The Majority therefore errs by interpreting § 16-919(A) and (B) as broadly prohibiting all corporate contributions made for “political purposes.” See supra ¶ 31.
¶ 57 This conclusion is further supported by examining the identity of the parties who cannot lawfully receive corporate contributions made “for the purpose of influencing an election.” After prohibiting such corporate contributions, § 16-919(A) continues, in relevant part, as follows:
... and it is unlawful for the designating individual who formed an exploratory committee, an exploratory committee, a candidate or a candidate’s campaign committee to accept any contribution of money or anything of value from a corporation or a limited liability company for the purpose of influencing an election.”
Thus, only prospective candidates, candidates, and their campaign representatives are prohibited from receiving proscribed corporate contributions. Section 16-919(A) does not prohibit individuals and entities that are not associated with an individual’s campaign from accepting corporate contributions. The only logical reason for so limiting the list of *120prohibited recipients is that the legislature only intended to prohibit corporate contributions made to influence elections to individual political positions.16 See Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design and Const. Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226 (App.1992) (“What a statute necessarily implies is as much a part of the statute as what it makes explicit.”).
¶ 58 Additionally, if the Majority is correct, application of § 16-919(A) and (B) would produce absurd results. City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 175, 178, 677 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1984) (concluding court should interpret statute to give it fair and sensible meaning); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474, 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997) (‘We presume the framers of the statute did not intend an absurd result and our construction must avoid such a consequence”). Specifically, the Majority concludes that any corporate contributions for political purposes, unless statutorily excepted, are prohibited under § 16-919(A) and (B), including the contributions made to the Party in this case for operating expenses. See supra ¶¶ 31, 39-40. But although the corporations which made the contributions committed crimes, A.R.S. § 16-919(C), the Party did not because they are not listed among the prohibited recipients of such funds, A.R.S. § 16-919(A). Conversely, if the corporations had contributed money for an individual’s campaign operating expenses, both the corporations and the recipient would be subject to criminal prosecution. A.R.S. §§ 16-919(A), (C), (D). No reason appears for such anomalous results, and the only logical conclusion is that the legislature solely intended to punish corporations and recipients who, respectively, contribute and receive money or anything of value for the purpose of influencing elections to individual political positions.
¶ 59 Finally, although it is unnecessary to look beyond the language of § 16-919 to discern the meaning of the phrase “influencing an election,” I am compelled to address the Majority’s contention that A.R.S. § 16-920 sets forth an exclusive list of permitted corporate contributions. See supra ¶ 29. Section 16-920(A) provides a list of expenditures that “shall not be construed to be political contributions prohibited by law.” The Majority, citing the legal principle that “the expression of one or more items of a class indicates an intent to exclude all items of the same class which are not expressed,” Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 134, 654 P.2d 281, 282 (1982), concludes that § 16-920 delineates the class of permissible corporate contributions. See supra ¶¶ 29-31. I disagree with this conclusion for two reasons.
¶ 60 First, § 16-920(A) does not purport to establish an exclusive class of permissible corporate contributions. Rather, the provision merely directs that certain expenditures shall not be construed as prohibited political contributions. Second, if the legislature had intended by § 16-920 to set forth an exclusive class of permissible corporate contributions, its enactment of § 16-919 to broadly prohibit corporate contributions made for the purpose of influencing an election would be meaningless. See Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ariz. 430, 434, ¶ 14, 4 P.3d 973, 977 (App.1999) (noting court avoids interpreting statute “so as to render any of its language mere ‘surplusage,’ [and instead] give meaning to ‘each word, phrase, clause, and sentence ... so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’ ”). Thus, the legal maxim relied upon by the Majority, which should be applied with great caution, Lou Grubb Chevrolet v. Indus. Comm’n, 171 Ariz. 183, 190, 829 P.2d 1229, 1236 (App.1991) (citing Atkinson, Kier Bros., *121Spicer Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 35 Ariz. 48, 274 P. 634 (1929)), is inapplicable.
¶ 61 In sum, I conclude that A.R.S. § 16-919(A) and (B) only prohibit corporate contributions made to influence elections to individual political positions. The parties stipulated that the corporate contributions made to the Party were intended to defray the Party’s operating expenses. No facts in the record suggest that the contributions were made for the purpose of influencing an election of an individual to a political position. Likewise, the record does not support a conclusion that the Party impermissibly tunneled the contributions to an individual’s campaign. I would, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Party.

. For ease of reference, and because § 16-919 does not significantly distinguish its treatment of corporations, limited liability companies, and labor organizations, I hereafter collectively refer to the entities as “corporations” unless otherwise specified.

. Indeed, the legislature explicitly approves this construction by providing in A.R.S. § 16-920(A)(5) that "[c]ontributions for use to support or oppose an initiative or referendum measure or amendment to the constitution” shall not be construed as prohibited political contributions.

. The Majority infers that this point should be ignored because the parties did not raise it. Supra ¶ 25. But when considering the proper interpretation and application of statutes, we are not limited to the arguments made by the parties. Evenstad v. State, 178 Ariz. 578, 582, 875 P.2d 811, 815 (App.1993). The Majority also notes that § 16-919(B), which prohibits labor organizations from contributing money or anything of value for the purpose of influencing an election, does not list any prohibited recipients of such funds. While this is certainly so, whether the legislature intended to prohibit the recipients listed in subsection (A) from similarly receiving contributions from labor organizations must be left for resolution in a future case. For purposes of this appeal, however, I do not discern, and the Majority does not explain, how the omission in subsection (B) affects the implication derived from the partial listing of prohibited recipients in subsection (A).