Court Opinion

ID: 9478178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:42:24.559331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:17.251277
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result in the majority’s opinion and in the discussion which affirms the district court’s limitation of defense counsel’s closing arguments. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s reliance by analogy upon Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) in reaching this result.
In Luce, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s finding that a district court did not commit reversible error when, in ruling a defendant’s prior convictions admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the district court did not first undertake the probative-prejudicial balancing required by that Rule. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 40, 105 S.Ct. at 462. As I read Luce, the Court held essentially that it was not possible for the lower courts to weigh the probative and prejudicial effects of the impeaching evidence unless the defendant actually testified. For the trial court to do that balancing, or for the appellate court to review the trial court’s decision, would, in the Court’s view, have required hollow speculation. The Court therefore held that the defendant could not, on appeal, challenge the admission of the prior-crimes evidence unless he testified at trial, and subjected himself to possible impeachment. “ ‘Only in this way,’ ” wrote the Court, “ ‘may the claim be presented to a reviewing court in a concrete factual context.’ ” Id. at 43, 105 S.Ct. at 464 (quoting New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 462, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)).
The Luce Court based its holding on the fact that, until the testimony of a defendant unfolds on the record, it is very difficult for a trial court (or an appellate court) to determine how probative of the defendant’s lack of credibility the convictions introduced under Rule 609(a) would be, and how unfairly prejudicial those prior convictions would be to him.
This case, however, involves a very different question. Here, the district court could, prospectively, have reviewed what the defense counsel’s arguments would have been, and could have held the defense counsel to those proffers of argument. In contrast, in Luce the Court noted that the defendant’s prospective offer of testimony *907would not make the district court’s ruling any less speculative, because “his trial testimony could, for any number of reasons, differ from the proffer.” 469 U.S. at 41 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. at 463 n. 5. However, a defense counsel’s description to the court of his proposed arguments is far more predictable and binding, and would give a district court far surer grounds on which to base its balancing of the probative and prejudicial effects of the other-acts evidence. Thus, unlike in Luce, the courts would not have to indulge in unreasonable speculation in undertaking the type of Rule 403 balancing demanded here by the appellant.
In this case, the thrust of the defendant’s appeal is that the district court erred in failing to undertake the Rule 403 balancing before threatening to admit the defendant’s prior convictions if she raised the question of personal drug use. The defendant argues that the threat was inappropriate, and that the result — the limiting of the defendant’s summation — constituted reversible error.
Warrant for the district court’s action is to be found in United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 754 n. 12 (2d Cir.1979). Once a defendant has taken intent out of a case, that defendant cannot thereafter, without sufficient reason, attempt to renege on that waiver by reintroducing the issue of intent. “[Under such circumstances], the trial court [may] devise appropriate remedies, such as striking contrary evidence or remarks proffered by defense counsel.’’ Id. (emphasis added). In deciding whether, and to what extent, to address the defendant’s reversal of position, the trial court must balance both its need to administer the trial effectively and the threat of significant unfairness to the prosecution, against the defendant’s right to a full and fair opportunity to present his defense. If the defendant persists and in effect reintroduces the issue of intent, or, alternatively, if he insists on reintroducing the issue of intent and offers reasonable grounds therefor, the court should ensure that the requisites of the Huddleston test are met, see — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1502, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), before the other-acts evidence is admitted under Rule 404(b).
Plainly, the shifts of position by defense counsel in this case went beyond the broad flexibility to be afforded a defendant in such circumstances. The district court therefore acted prudently and correctly in its effort to shape an “appropriate remedy” for the meanderings of the defense on the question of intent.
Applying the analysis suggested by Mo-hel to the facts of this case, the district court acted within its discretion when it refused to allow defense counsel to take unfair advantage of the defendant’s earlier concession that intent was out of the case. I concur, therefore, in the result of the majority opinion, but only in so much of the opinion as does not rely by analogy upon the reasoning of Luce.