Court Opinion

ID: 9712918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:02:59.106701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.268022
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: The majority concludes the food delivery (“pizza”) exclusion in Progressive’s policy was not void and does not violate this state’s mandatory liability insurance law. 215 Ill. 2d at 140. Accordingly, Progressive may enforce its exclusion even as applied to the mandatory minimum $20,000/40,000 coverage required by section 7 — 203 of the Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/7 — 601 (West 2000). I believe this holding contravenes the clear public policy underlying the mandatory insurance law and, therefore, I respectfully dissent. Section 7 — 601 of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall operate *** a motor vehicle designed to be used on a public highway unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy.” (Emphasis added.) The statute further provides: “The insurance policy shall be issued in amounts no less than the minimum amounts set for bodily injury or death and for destruction of property under Section 7 — 203 of this Code ***.” 625 ILCS 5/7 — 601(a) (West 2000). The majority acknowledges our holding in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 376 (2001), that the “principal purpose of this state’s mandatory liability insurance requirement is to protect the public by securing payment of their damages.” 215 Ill. 2d at 129. Yet the majority’s holding subverts this purpose by allowing mandatory minimum coverage to be defeated by a contractual exclusion not explicitly authorized by the legislature. Although section 7 — 601 exempts certain categories of vehicles such as government vehicles and implements of husbandry from its application, no statutory language authorizes any contractual exclusion from coverage, including the so-called “pizza exclusion.” The majority contends the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law clearly contemplates policies may contain enforceable exclusions because section 7 — 602 of the statute (625 ILCS 5/7 — 602 (West 2000)) requires insurance cards to contain a disclaimer admonishing policy holders to “[ejxamine policy exclusions carefully.” 215 Ill. 2d at 138. It is not disputed that coverage exclusions may be enforced above the statutorily required minimum limits. Hence, the warning in section 7 — 602 is appropriate and is not in conflict with the express requirement that all vehicles shall be covered for bodily injury and property damage in minimum amounts. The result reached by the majority increases the likelihood tortiously caused vehicular accidents will go uncompensated because no insurance coverage will be available from the tortfeasor. Although the majority recognizes this possibility, it holds this result is offset by the statutory requirement of uninsured-motorist coverage. 215 Ill. 2d at 139. The unfortunate possibility remains, however, that innocent injured parties, such as pedestrians, entitled to recovery may not have their own uninsured-motorist coverage and may, thus, be totally unprotected. The majority asserts in a footnote that such gaps in coverage present questions for the legislature, rather than this tribunal. 215 Ill. 2d at 140 n.3. I disagree. A plain reading of section 7 — 601 compels the conclusion that the legislature intended to mandate liability coverage for all automobiles operated in Illinois with statutory minimum limits of liability. Contractual coverage exclusions are simply incompatible with that intention. With the validation of the “pizza exclusion” in this case, the vehicle driven by Robin Abbinante was not “covered” as expressly required by the statute. Other jurisdictions considering this issue have concluded mandatory insurance statutes render policy exclusions unenforceable to the extent of required minimum limits as a matter of public policy. In Salamon v. Progressive Classic Insurance Co., 379 Md. 301, 841 A.2d 858 (2004), the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that state’s highest tribunal, considered whether a commercial use exclusion, identical to the exclusion in the case before us, could be applied to defeat coverage. Progressive moved for summary judgment, arguing the policy unambiguously excused it from both coverage and the duty to defend. Salamon countered that Progressive’s exclusion contravenes Maryland public policy and, as a result, is invalid and unenforceable. Salamon, 379 Md. at 305, 841 A.2d at 861. The trial court granted Progressive’s motion, Salamon appealed, and the reviewing court reversed. The court noted the Maryland General Assembly had enacted a “ ‘comprehensive law that, among other things, inaugurated compulsory insurance or other required security, established [the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund] as an insurer of last resort, prohibited the arbitrary cancellation and non-renewal of motor vehicle insurance policies, and required policies to contain collision and [personal injury protection] coverage.’ ” Salamon, 379 Md. at 310, 841 A.2d at 864, quoting Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund v. Perry, 356 Md. 668, 674, 741 A.2d 1114, 1117 (1999). Thus, the Maryland statutory scheme, while not identical, is substantially similar to our own. As in State Farm, the Maryland court had earlier held Maryland’s statute was intended to “make certain that those who own and operate motor vehicles in this State are financially responsible.” Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154, 416 A.2d 734, 736 (1980). The Gartelman court further noted that “[t]his legislative policy has the overall remedial purpose of protecting the public by assuring that operators and owners of motor vehicles are financially able to pay compensation for damages resulting from motor vehicle accidents.” Gartelman, 288 Md. at 154, 416 A.2d at 736. The Salamon court reviewed a series of cases over a 30-year period consistently declaring invalid insurance policy exclusions excusing or reducing the insured’s coverage below the statutory minimum when such exclusions were not explicitly authorized by the General Assembly. Salamon, 379 Md. at 311-14, 841 A.2d at 864-67. The court concluded the “pizza exclusion” was not expressly authorized by the legislature and was, therefore, invalid. Salamon, 379 Md. at 316-17, 841 A.2d at 868. The court rejected Progressive’s argument, also made in the case before us, that a distinction should be drawn between policy exclusions “ ‘pertaining to classes of insureds, as opposed to exclusions pertaining to acts of individual insureds.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Salamon, 379 Md. at 314, 841 A.2d at 866. New York’s highest reviewing court reached a similar conclusion in Matter of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hogan, 82 N.Y.2d 57, 623 N.E.2d 536, 603 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1993). In that case, Liberty Mutual sought to enforce its “livery exclusion” in an uninsured-motorist endorsement to a personal automobile liability policy. The exclusion applied if the insured vehicle was used to carry persons or property for a fee. Passengers in the insured’s car demanded arbitration, and Liberty Mutual petitioned for a stay. The trial court denied the stay, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting New York’s mandatory uninsured-motorist statute did not provide for exclusions. The court reasoned that “[t]he exclusion is inconsistent with the sound public policy of this State of ensuring that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents are compensated for their injuries and losses.” Liberty Mutual, 82 N.Y.2d at 61, 623 N.E.2d at 539, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 412. Intermediate appellate courts in Louisiana and Colorado have also reached similar results. See Stanfel v. Shelton, 563 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 18 P.3d 854 (Colo. App. 2001). The majority acknowledges other jurisdictions, including the Maryland court in Salamon, have found policy coverage exclusions incompatible with mandatory minimum coverage laws. The majority declines to rely on the reasoning of those cases because “[t]he litigation before us today is governed by the law of Illinois, not Maryland.” 215 Ill. 2d at 138-39. Under Illinois law, however, a court must give an unambiguous statute effect as written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). The majority’s holding ignores this rule by construing the statute to allow operation of a vehicle on a public highway when the vehicle is not “covered” by a policy of liability insurance. Thus, according to the majority, “covered” does not necessarily mean covered. This is the non sequitur. The reasoning of the Maryland and New York courts is persuasive, and our appellate court used a similar rationale. I agree with the appellate court that the “impetus behind mandatory automobile liability insurance is to protect the public by assuring that its damages will be paid [citation], and Progressive’s food delivery exclusion contravenes that goal.” 347 Ill. App. 3d at 416-18. Like the appellate court, I find no indication the legislature intended to permit such an exclusion. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the appellate court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.