Court Opinion

ID: 9761087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:31:21.539741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.076288
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result as I believe the Order registered in Pennsylvania was dependent upon and must be governed by the final action of the West Virginia Court. The final determination included the Order on appeal and resolution of the support issues and date fixed for modification. The Pennsylvania registered Order is controlled by this action as no independent proceeding occurred in Pennsylvania which would have established an independent result. I differ with the majority which attempts to analogize this proceeding, based upon support law and registration under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA), 28 Pa. C.S. § 4501 et seq., which is reciprocal legislation and statutory in nature and not dependent upon the full faith and credit provisions of the Constitution, with Everson v. Everson, 494 Pa. 348, 431 A.2d 889 (1981), which deals with property and registration of a foreign judgment which is governed by the full faith and credit clause. Reciprocal legislation in support was adopted because of the grey area in support and alimony cases which rendered them unenforceable under the full faith and credit provisions of the Constitution since they were not final judgments and were in personam in nature. In recent years, because of increasing involvement by the Congress in attempting to firm up support obligations, a degree of finality has been introduced in support matters, particularly with regard to vacating arrears. Registered Orders are modifiable and do not take on the true character of final judgments contemplated by the full faith and credit clause. The Arizona judgment in Everson, since it was an in rem judgment dealing with an award of community property, did not constitute a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit because the Arizona courts retained jurisdiction pending appeal. Registration of the trial court Order in Pennsylvania was a nullity since the Order was not final and Pennsylvania lacked authori*486ty to enforce it because it lacked jurisdiction. In this case, Pennsylvania did have jurisdiction by virtue of registration to enforce the Order, but it remains subject to modification by the West Virginia Court. Support and alimony Orders are unique in this respect since courts in the domicile of the obligor as well as the domicile of the obligee can effect the amount and duration of the Order. This is not possible under the full faith and credit clause with Orders registered as foreign judgments.
The majority is bringing into this area of law a confusing analysis which is not in accordance with the manner in which RURESA operates, and is confusing its operation with that of registering final judgments, pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 4306. The provisions of RURESA, section 4540, Effect and enforcement of registered order, (c) Procedure, provides the remedy for cases in which an appeal from the Order of the original state is pending. Here, the problem arose because appellee father failed to take advantage of section 4540(c) to request a stay of the Order due to the pending appeal in West Virginia, and the lack of diligence of the West Virginia Courts in resolving the issue. In cases which are registered, the registering state will proceed with caution whenever there is question as to the finality of the rendering state’s Order. The proceedings in this case simply ignored the clear mandate of the law.