Court Opinion

ID: 9666693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:25:37.019749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:32.301379
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring.
Because of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in Boutwell v. State, 719 5.W.2d 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), I am bound to join the majority’s decision to affirm appellant’s conviction. I write separately to suggest the need for a reappraisal of the underlying rationale for the Bout-well exception to the inadmissibility of extraneous offenses.
Appellant was charged with the aggravated sexual assault of his twelve-year-old niece. The indictment alleged, and the complainant testified, that the assault occurred in December 1985. Over appellant’s objection, the State elicited from complainant testimony that appellant had engaged in another act of intercourse with her during late October or early November 1985. This prior act allegedly occurred while appellant was babysitting complainant and her siblings during their parents’ vacation in Nashville.
As a general rule, proof of prior specific acts of misconduct, similar happenings or extraneous transactions committed by a party, including extraneous offenses alleged to have been committed by a defendant, are not admissible in evidence. Bates v. State, 643 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Watson v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 425, 175 S.W.2d 423, 424 (1942). This rule is deemed fundamental and is followed in all jurisdictions. Hafti v. State, 416 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex.Crim.App.1967). One basis for the rule, as applied in criminal cases, is that the accused is entitled to be tried on the accusation made in the State’s pleading and should not be tried for some collateral crime or for being a criminal generally. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex.Crim.App.1972); Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). Further, evidence of an extraneous offense is inherently prejudicial because it influences the jury to convict the defendant on his propensity to commit crimes, which is not material or relevant to the charges against him, and which unfairly tries the defendant on charges of which he has no notice. Sanders v. State, 604 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Consequently, evidence of extraneous offenses offends our system of justice and is inconsistent with due process. Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
Texas courts have recognized numerous exceptions to the inadmissibility of extraneous offenses. See, e.g., Albrecht, 486 S.W.2d at 100-01. In Boutwell, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized a “sort of ‘res gestae’ exception for cases involving sexual offenses.” Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 174. Relying upon a line of cases commencing with Battles v. State, 63 Tex.Cr.R. 147, 140 S.W. 783, 786 (1911), the court held .that extraneous transactions between a defendant and the complainant were admissible. Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 178.
Without critical analysis, the Boutwell court accepted the two-fold rationale for admissibility accepted in Battles. First, the testimony of other acts makes a child’s accusation more plausible. Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 175; Battles, 140 S.W. at 787. Second, the extraneous offenses show circumstances that throw light upon the charged act, explaining the act by showing the dominant physical and emotional position of the accused over the complainant. Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 174-75; Battles, 140 S.W. at 787. An examination of the *759Battles rationale shows that the court’s reliance on Battles is perhaps unwise.
The first rationale given, that testimony of prior acts makes the charged act more plausible, is based upon a number of erroneous presumptions. First, it presumes that a child’s testimony requires corroboration, and second, that extraneous offenses will serve this corroborative function.
In Battles, the court’s premise was that the extraneous offenses were admissible because of the nature of such an unnatural, and at that time unpublicized, act. Society considered child sexual abuse so rare and despicable that it was inherently unbelievable, requiring considerable corroboration. The child was deprived of the deference ordinarily accorded to witnesses by the fact finder because she was testifying to something absolutely unbelievable. Since the Battles era, public awareness of child sexual abuse has increased considerably. See D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1 (1984). Today, a child alleging sexual abuse is not automatically disbelieved. In fact, many people believe such stories absolutely, considering the child incapable of fantasizing such occurrences.
Further, the belief that a child’s testimony requires corroboration ignores recent studies negating the idea that child witnesses are less believable than adult witnesses. Research has shown that children are not less accurate in their perceptions than are adults, they do not have weaker memories, nor are they more suggestible or susceptible to influence than adults. In fact, research indicates that children may actually be able to recall some occurrences better than adults. See Court Roundup: How Credible Are Children As Witnesses?, 28 JUDGES’ J. 1, 1 (Fall 1984).
If one accepts the premise that a child’s testimony requires corroboration, one is faced with another problem. How does testimony from a child who is not worthy of belief corroborate other implausible testimony from that child? The Boutwell court recognizes that this is not true “corroboration,” Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 178 n. 1, but the court does not give a satisfactory explanation for its contention that extraneous transaction testimony makes the charged offense more plausible.
The Court rejected the “propensity” rationale as a method for showing the likelihood that the accused committed the charged offense. The State argued that proof of prior acts proves the accused’s lustful nature and his propensity to sexually assault children. The Court recognized that the propensity rationale was premised on the erroneous belief that sexual offenders are more likely to repeat their crimes than are other criminals. Recent studies show that sex offenders rate as one of the lowest recidivists among criminals. Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 178. Having removed the propensity rationale for increasing the credibility of child witnesses, and having considered further testimony as being as unbelievable as the child’s previous testimony, the Court has left no logical rationale for allowing extraneous offense testimony to bolster the child witness.
The second explanation given for allowing extraneous evidence of sexual acts to be put before the jury is the “res gestae” exception. Battles explained it as follows:
While it is true want of consent is wholly immaterial in a case of this sort, however, it might be that a story would sound unreasonble that a girl would willingly enter into this act of intercourse with a party in the absence of any circumstances showing familiarity or allurements preceding the act. We think this testimony was admissible as a circumstance to throw light upon the act of intercourse.
Battles, 140 S.W. at 787 (quoting Rowan v. State, 57 Tex.Cr.R. 625, 124 S.W. 668, 672 (1910)). The rationale seems based upon the assumption that the child is somehow at fault for allowing the rape unless there is proof that she was seduced by the accused. Society’s perception of the victim of sexual assault has changed considerably since 1911. It is no longer a prevalent belief that the victim “asked for” the assault to happen, or that the victim is in any way culpable for allowing the assault to occur. By accepting the rationale of Battles that it is necessary to show that the *760child s resistance was overcome by seduction or allurements, the Boutwell court is preserving the antiquated perceptions of the victim as being at fault.
It is clear, then, that the Boutwell exception is not founded on reasonable assumptions consistent with modern society. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Court of Criminal Appeals will reconsider its position in Boutwell. The court justified the continued recognition of this sexual assault exception to the extraneous offense rule in part because of its purportedly narrow applicability. However, certain language in Boutwell fosters expansive use of the exception. The court states, “Ideally, as discussed, such evidence will be admissible ... where the extraneous transaction is relevant to a material issue. But, we also recognize the validity of the ‘res gestae’ or context exception established in Battles.” Boutwell, 719 S.W.2d at 178. The Court has stated, then, that extraneous offense testimony is admissible whether relevant to a material issue or completely irrelevant to any material issue. Further, by characterizing the exception as “res gestae,” the court has guaranteed that the probative value will always outweigh the prejudicial effect. When extraneous offense evidence is offered in a criminal prosecution under the res gestae rationale, the prejudicial nature will rarely render it inadmissible. See Lott v. State, 695 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref’d); see also Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Clinton, J., concurring).
I would urge the court to reject the exception allowing extraneous offenses in sexual assault cases to be treated differently from extraneous offenses in other cases. Allowing extraneous offenses to be admitted only when relevant, and then only when the prejudicial effect is outweighed by the probative value, carefully balances the rights of the accused and the interest of the State in prosecuting offenders. Under this test, I would hold that the extraneous offense in the case sub judice is inadmissible because it was not relevant to a material issue in the case. I would further hold, however, that the error in admitting the evidence was not so harmful that reversal is required. If appellant’s alibi testimony had been stronger, there would be a danger that the jury had convicted appellant based upon the extraneous offense for which he had no alibi rather than for the charged offense. I would hold that the weakness of the alibi testimony makes it unlikely that appellant’s conviction was for other than the charged offense.
Because of Boutwell, this balancing test is not required, and I must bow to the authority of the Court of Criminal Appeals and join the majority in affirming appellant’s conviction.