Court Opinion

ID: 9952734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 16:14:38.095449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:04.437367
License: Public Domain

J-S07020-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ZANDER KEITH SHEARER                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1183 MDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-18-CR-0000169-2022

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED: MARCH 20, 2024

       Zander Shearer appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) and possessing

marijuana.1 He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We

affirm.

       On December 19, 2021, Trooper Joshua Eichenlaub of the Pennsylvania

State Police stopped Shearer and searched his car.           Trooper Eichenlaub

charged Shearer with DUI and other crimes; the charges were held for court.

On August 15, 2022, Shearer filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, including

motions to suppress the fruits of the stop and the search.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2) (DUI, a combination of controlled substances),

3802(d)(1)(i) (DUI, marijuana), and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)(i) (possessing
a small amount of marijuana for personal use).
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      The suppression court heard Shearer’s motion on October 4, 2022. The

Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Eichenlaub and introduced

a video from his dashboard camera into evidence. Shearer testified on his

own behalf.

      On January 30, 2023, the suppression court entered an opinion and

order denying Shearer’s motion to suppress. The court made the following

findings of fact about Trooper Eichenlaub’s observations of Shearer’s vehicle:

            Joshua S. Eichenlaub [has been a Pennsylvania State Police
      Trooper since 2017 and has prior police experience as well]. At
      approximately 1:03 a.m. on December 19, 2021, Trooper
      Eichenlaub was operating a marked State Police vehicle working a
      scheduled 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift along with Trooper Brian
      Kitko. At [1:03 a.m.], while traveling south on Coudersport Pike
      in Woodward Township, Trooper Eichenlaub [began following] a
      gray 2019 Honda Accord. Trooper Eichenlaub followed the Honda
      Accord [left onto] West Hillside Drive and then [right] on to North
      Allegheny Street.     The vehicle then made a left turn onto
      Woodward Avenue and then a quick [left] turn onto [Richey]
      Street. Trooper Eichenlaub, while traveling behind the Honda
      Accord on [Richey] Street, observed that the vehicle was traveling
      less than 35 miles per hour and failed to signal at a proper
      distance. The Honda Accord then [turned left two more times,
      continuing] to travel in a complete circle around the block for no
      apparent reason. [Trooper Eichenlaub then initiated a traffic stop,
      where Shearer showed signs of marijuana impairment.]

Opinion, 1/30/23, at 2–4 (format altered).        With respect to the ensuing

search, the suppression court found as follows:

            [Shearer] told Trooper Eichenlaub on numerous occasions
      that he did not want him to search the vehicle but eventually
      consented. Trooper Eichenlaub had conducted the traffic stop for
      approximately twenty . . . minutes before [Shearer] gave his
      consent to the search of his vehicle. [In that time,] Trooper
      Eichenlaub had requested [Shearer’s] consent on multiple
      occasions. Trooper Eichenlaub advised [Shearer] that if he did

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       not give consent that [Shearer’s] vehicle would be towed. . . . At
       the time of the traffic stop it was cold outside. The Troopers
       provided [Shearer] with his coat. During questioning, Trooper
       Eichenlaub was a couple of feet in distance from [Shearer].
       Trooper Kitko was further away from [Shearer]. [Shearer] was
       not handcuffed during the investigation. Trooper Eichenlaub was
       not shouting at [Shearer]. Trooper Kitko was not shouting at
       [Shearer. Shearer] had sufficient time to consider the request for
       consent to search. After numerous requests, [Shearer] advised
       Trooper Eichenlaub to “go ahead if you want.”[2]

Id. at 6 (reordered, formatting altered).

       Using these facts, the suppression court ruled that Trooper Eichenlaub

had probable cause to stop Shearer for a turn signal violation and that Shearer

gave valid consent to search his car. Accordingly, the court denied Shearer’s

motion to suppress.

       Shearer had a non-jury trial on June 9, 2023, and the trial court found

him guilty of the above crimes. On July 18, 2023, Shearer was sentenced to

probation with restrictive conditions and a fine.    Shearer timely appealed.

Shearer and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925.

       Shearer presents two questions in this appeal:

       I.     Whether the Suppression Court abused its discretion and
              erred as a matter of law in denying [Shearer’s] motion to
              suppress all evidence and fruit of the poisonous tree, which
              was obtained as a result [of] an unlawful search and seizure
              since the traffic stop at issue was conducted without
              reasonable suspicion or probable cause?

____________________________________________

2 The notes of testimony and the dashboard camera video reflect that 26
minutes into the stop, Shearer said: “Search (it) if you want.” N.T., 10/4/22,
at 30; Exh. 2 (video), at 0:27:29.

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      II.     Whether the Suppression Court abused its discretion and
              erred as a matter of law in denying [Shearer’s] motion to
              suppress all evidence and fruit of the poisonous tree, which
              was obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure
              since any purported consent to search [Shearer’s] vehicle
              was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary since [Shearer]
              was continuously and repeatedly badgered into giving
              consent by two state troopers after [Shearer] unequivocally
              denied consent[] to search his vehicle?

Shearer’s Brief at 9.

      When this Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress evidence,

we follow a well-established standard:

      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
      denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are
      supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a
      suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the
      prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record.
      Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court,
      we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
      conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 281 A.3d 320, 323–24 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc)).

      Shearer’s first challenge is to the legality of the initial traffic stop. The

Commonwealth could meet its burden by showing that, when Trooper

Eichenlaub activated his lights, he had either (1) reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity, requiring further investigation or (2) probable cause to

believe that the driver had violated the Vehicle Code. The suppression court

found probable cause that Shearer violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334(b) by

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activating his turn signal less than 100 feet before turning. We will address

reasonable suspicion instead. See Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704,

729 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“[A]s an appellate court, we may affirm on any legal

basis supported by the certified record.”).3

       A traffic stop is a seizure for constitutional purposes, analogous to an

investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884,

891 n.10 (Pa. 2000) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439

(1984)).    To demand such a stop, a police officer must have at least a

“reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). This entails an objective inquiry into “whether the facts available to

police at the moment of the intrusion warrant a person of reasonable caution

in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”     Commonwealth v.

Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. 2022) (brackets and citation

omitted). Unlike a stop supported by probable cause, a traffic stop based on

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity “must serve a stated investigatory

purpose.”     Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super.

2010) (en banc).

       [R]easonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to
       articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
       reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
       reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth has briefed this alternative justification for the stop, as

it did before the suppression court. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9–11; Brief,
1/18/23, at 5 (quoting Trooper Eichenlaub’s summary of his suspicions).

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      activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in
      that activity.

      To demonstrate reasonable suspicion, the detaining officer must
      articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized
      suspicion or hunch. To determine whether reasonable suspicion
      exists, we examine the totality of the circumstances through the
      eyes of a trained officer and not an ordinary citizen.

Cunningham, 287 A.3d at 8–9 (brackets, quotation marks, and citations

omitted).

      An attempt to evade police is relevant in analyzing reasonable suspicion.

Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc)

(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), and Commonwealth v.

Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 2000)). This could include “headlong flight”

from police, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, continually looking at police and

walking away, Foglia, 979 A.2d at 361, crossing the street away from a police

vehicle, Cunningham, 287 A.3d at 10, or driving on back roads to avoid

known police presence, see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. This kind of evasive

behavior “is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly

suggestive of such.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Likewise, the time of day

is relevant in the reasonable suspicion analysis, although time alone is not a

particularized basis to suspect criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Price,

225 A.3d 1118, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. Hicks,

208 A.3d 916, 951 (Pa. 2019)).

      Here, Shearer’s evasive behavior provided Trooper Eichenlaub with

reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Shearer turned several times in

an apparent attempt to elude the marked police vehicle behind him, eventually

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circling a block to drive down the same street he had just taken. Trooper

Eichenlaub testified that based on his training and experience, he suspected

that Shearer was “trying to evade being in front of” him. N.T., 10/4/22, at

40. Although there could be an innocent explanation for Shearer to circle a

block at 1:00 a.m., it was reasonable for Trooper Eichenlaub to suspect that

Shearer was trying to conceal criminal activity by evading the police.

Therefore, Trooper Eichenlaub could        lawfully   stop   Shearer, and the

suppression court did not err in failing to suppress the stop.

      Shearer’s second challenge is to the ensuing search of his car.     He

argues that his consent was invalid, as it was based on pressure from the

police. The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that consent is a

voluntary product of free will based on the totality of the circumstances.

Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901. Factors relevant to the consent inquiry include:

      1) the presence or absence of police excesses; 2) whether there
      was physical contact; 3) whether police directed the citizen’s
      movements; 4) police demeanor and manner of expression; 5)
      the location and time of the interdiction; 6) the content of the
      questions and statements; 7) the existence and character of the
      initial investigative detention, including its degree of
      coerciveness; 8) the degree to which the transition between the
      traffic stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter
      can be viewed as seamless, thus suggesting to a citizen that his
      movements may remain subject to police restraint; and 9)
      whether there was an express admonition to the effect that the
      citizen-subject is free to depart, which is a potent, objective
      factor.

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 151 A.3d 170, 177 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing

Strickler, 757 A.2d at 898–99).

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      Here, the suppression court concluded that the Commonwealth proved

Shearer’s consent was valid:

            [Shearer’s] consent was not a product of duress. Both
      Trooper Eichenlaub and Trooper Kitko were calm and patient with
      [Shearer]; Trooper Eichenlaub continued to speak with [Shearer]
      trying to keep [Shearer] focused to make sure [Shearer]
      understood what was being asked of him. [Shearer] was not
      restrained. Although [Shearer] was not advised that he was free
      to leave, [Shearer] was aware that he had the right to refuse
      consent. [T]here was nothing inherently coercive about the
      circumstances that evening. Although [Shearer] was outside of
      his vehicle, he was provided with his coat. Trooper Eichenlaub
      always kept a distance from [Shearer] and Trooper Kitko kept an
      even further distance from [Shearer]. . . . While the request for
      consent was repetitive [over approximately 26 minutes], the
      Court does not find it was prolonged under the circumstances.

Opinion, 1/30/23, at 9.

      We agree with the suppression court. Shearer showed awareness of his

right to refuse consent by denying it repeatedly while the officers continued

to talk with him.    The video reflects that Trooper Eichenlaub spoke with

Shearer in a non-aggressive tone, accurately informing Shearer about the stop

and asking questions relevant to further his investigation. Under these facts,

the Commonwealth demonstrated that Shearer had given voluntary consent.

Therefore, the suppression court did not err in denying Shearer’s motion to

suppress the fruits of the search of his car.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/20/2024

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