Court Opinion

ID: 9648767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:34:34.311543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.366405
License: Public Domain

KAUFFMAN, Justice,
concurring.
As stated by Justice Pomeroy in Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 593-94, 375 A.2d 1267, 1275 (1977),
[Wjhere a task of an arbitrator, PERA or otherwise, has been to determine the intention of the contracting parties as evidenced by their collective bargaining agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execution, then the arbitrator’s award is based on a resolution of a question of fact and is to be respected by the judiciary if “the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention . . . .” Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969).
In adopting such a highly circumscribed scope of judicial review, we have recognized the policy considerations which command that judicial interference in the arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements be kept to a minimum.1 Bearing in mind the limited scope of *387judicial review, I turn to a consideration of the collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter “Agreement”) in this case.
The Agreement expressly recognizes the existence of unwritten past practices2 and by means of what is commonly referred to as a “past practice provision,”3 stipulates for *388their continuation. The relevant unwritten practice in effect at the time the Agreement was signed was for the School District to grant leaves of absence without pay to teachers for attendance at Association conferences and meetings. Thereafter, the School District and the Association entered into and implemented an oral modification of the practice providing that teachers who were granted leave to attend Association conferences would be paid. The new arrangement, which lasted for an entire school year, unilaterally was discontinued by the School District, giving rise to the grievance sustained here by the arbitrator.
A mutually agreed upon subsequent oral modification expanding an unwritten practice existing on the effective date of the Agreement would not offend Article 11(B) thereof, which provides: “This Agreement shall not be modified in whole or in part by the parties except by an instrument in writing, duly executed by both parties.” See Wagner v. Graziano Construction Co., 390 Pa. 445, 136 A.2d 82 (1957). In any event, the School District effectively waived any such objection when it voluntarily implemented the expanded practice for an entire year. See Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 430 Pa. 550, 244 A.2d 10 (1968); S. Williston, 4 Williston on Contracts, § 591 at 203-207.
We should defer to the arbitrator’s award sustaining the grievance since it was rationally derived from and “[drew] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.” United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1428 (1960); Community College of Beaver County, supra. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
EAGEN, C. J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. In the Steelworkers Trilogy, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise *387Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960), the Supreme Court of the United States established the federal policy that arbitration, as opposed to litigation, is the preferred manner of resolving labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements. We, too, have recognized that the special considerations present in the field of labor relations necessitate deference by the courts to an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. See Community College of Beaver County, supra; County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 476 Pa. 27, 381 A.2d 849 (1977).

. The meaning of “past practice” has been described as follows: “A custom or practice is not something which arises simply because a given course of conduct has been pursued by Management or the employees on one or more occasions. A custom or a practice is a usage evolved by men as a normal reaction to a recurring type situation. It must be shown to be the accepted course of conduct characteristically repeated in response to the given set of underlying circumstances. This is not to say that the course of conduct must be accepted in the sense of both parties having agreed to it, but rather that it must be accepted in the sense of being regarded by the men involved as the normal and proper response to the underlying circumstances presented.” Sylvester Garrett, Chairman, Board of Arbitration, U.S. Steel — Steelworkers, Grievance No. NL-453, Docket No. N-146, January 31, 1953. Reported at 2 Steelworkers Arbitration Bulletin 1187. (Emphasis in original.)
County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 476 Pa. at 34, 381 A.2d at 852.

. Article V of the Agreement provides, in pertinent part:
A. Savings Clause
Except as this Agreement shall otherwise provide, all terms and conditions of employment applicable on the signing date of this Agreement as established by the rules, regulations and/or written policies of the Board in force on said date, shall continue to be so applicable during the term of the Agreement. Unless otherwise provided in the Agreement, nothing contained herein, shall be interpreted and/or applied so as to eliminate, reduce, or otherwise detract from any teacher benefit existing prior to its effective date. It is likewise understood that all inherent management prerogatives existing at the present time and not specifically negotiated as part of this Agreement shall continue to be in full force and existence during the contractual period of this Agreement.