Court Opinion

ID: 9728028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:55:43.336308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.031682
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes, in part, that the district court properly took legal custody of the minor child. I respectfully dissent.
The majority finds that there has been a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the decree. The majority then addresses whether the ordered modification was proper, that is, whether the court properly obtained legal custody of the child. In this context, the majority confronts our *989opinion in Ensrud v. Ensrud, 230 Neb. 720, 433 N.W.2d 192 (1988).
In Ensrud, we held that a court may take legal custody of a child in a dissolution proceeding only if both parents are unfit or if the court lacks adequate information regarding the best interests of the child. Although the majority states that Ensrud does not apply, the majority in fact expands the Ensrud rule and holds that a court may also take legal custody of a child if the court lacks adequate information regarding the parents’ fitness. In applying the expanded rule, the majority assumes that the trial court in the present case lacked information regarding the parents’ fitness and concludes that the court was therefore justified in taking legal custody.
I disagree with the majority’s assumption and conclusion. In the present case, the trial court did not lack information regarding the fitness of both parents.
The father’s fitness was called into question by the mother. In her answer, the mother alleged that the father was an unfit parent. The mother testified to support this allegation. The mother also presented an expert who testified that it would not be in the child’s best interests to grant custody to the father. The trial court stated that it viewed the mother’s testimony with some skepticism. Nevertheless, the trial court respected the expert as a witness with an unbiased opinion. Arguably, then, the trial court may have concluded that the father’s fitness required further investigation.
The mother’s fitness, however, was never called into question. There were neither allegations nor evidence to suggest that the mother was unfit. The mother’s only failings as a parent were (1) that she would be in jail on contempt charges for 30 days and (2) that she had previously taken the child out of the state without the court’s permission. Even if these failings raised a question of the mother’s fitness — which I do not purport to decide — both of these failings were fully known to the court at the time of the hearing; neither of these failings required further investigation.
In fact, the trial court never explicitly addressed the parents’ fitness. Instead, the trial court stated that “it would be in the best interests of the minor child that neither party have legal *990custody and that the Court take legal custody of the child at this time until further order.” The trial court’s custody order does not mention fitness, but instead echoes the “best interests” language.
I would find that the trial court did not lack information regarding the mother’s fitness. The trial court was not entitled to take legal custody of the minor child under the expanded Ensrud rule.
I would also find that the trial court was not entitled to take legal custody of the minor child under the old Ensrud rule. The trial court did not find that either the mother or the father was unfit. As a general rule, unfitness must be affirmatively established. See Peterson v. Peterson, 224 Neb. 557, 399 N.W.2d 792 (1987). The trial court also did not find that this was one of the extraordinary situations in which the court lacked information as to the best interests of the child. See Ensrud, supra.
The record reflects that the trial court had no need to investigate fitness, that the parents were not affirmatively adjudicated to be unfit, and that the court did not lack information as to the best interests of the child. Therefore, the trial court could not properly retain legal custody of the child.
Caporale, J., j oins in this dissent.