Court Opinion

ID: 9638197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:37:24.967218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:19.303346
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting in part and
concurring with the judgment.
The majority opinion is premised on a general proposition that is unassailable: “Whether a defendant is entitled to probation is for the trial court, in its discretion, to decide.” However, as Judge Teague points out, in this cause putatively that entitlement flowed from a negotiated plea *425bargain. Thus, when honored by a trial court, terms of the bargain become guarantees, so to speak. See Article 26.13, Y.A.C. C.P.
That a trial judge is given express statutory authority to pick and chose from a wide variety of conditions to be imposed when granting probation may not be relevant in a plea bargain situation, for usually all options of any consequence are settled in negotiations leading to the bargain. Conceptually, then, to come to grips with what occurred in the court below is, for me at least, a slippery undertaking.
The record reveals that before the “obedience training” contretemps reproduced in the majority opinion, Respondent conducted a guilty plea hearing. While inquiring of petitioner as to his understanding of the plea bargain agreement, Respondent asked, “What have you agreed to? How much time?” Petitioner responded, “Four years probation.” Continuing in that vein, Respondent had petitioner state his understanding that the bargain also included a fine and restitution in certain amounts and caused both counsel to confirm that such was “the full extent of the plea bargaining agreement;” he then admonished petitioner with respect to limitations of appeal in accordance with Article 44.02, V.A.C.C.P., concluding, “If the Court decides not to accept it, you will be allowed to withdraw your plea.” However, Respondent then immediately stated, “In this case the Court is going to follow the plea bargaining agreement,” and reiterated the term and conditions to which all had just assented in open court. Confinement for thirty days as a condition of probation was not one of them.
The majority sees nothing to be troubled about, perceiving that “the decision to require petitioner to serve 30 days as a condition is clearly a discretionary act.” But, again, the majority utterly ignores the fact that the plea bargain negotiated by the State and petitioner exists — it is not even mentioned in that opinion — much more the fact that the agreement does not contemplate confinement for thirty days. Indeed, as observed by the majority, Respondent did not opt for confinement until “twice admonishing petitioner of the consequences of his failing to respond to questioning as requested.” Obviously, his decision is de-hors the plea bargain to which petitioner agreed, and the question thus raised is the extent to which a plea bargain limits discretion of a trial judge in these premises.
Though inappropriate in a mandamus proceeding, nevertheless the majority summarily finds “no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s action,” thereby begging the question. Yet, in an accompanying note there is an indication of enough concern that such actions are “hardly models for judicial behavior” to prompt a suggestion that remedial measures may be still available in another forum.
Patently the majority never gets a hold on a solution. By its enigmatic reference to Santobello v. New York, the majority seems to hint that petitioner may be entitled to specific performance of his plea bargain or to leave to withdraw his plea. I agree with that notion, and had petitioner prayed for that kind of order here, surely the Court would have granted it. Even now we may treat the instant application as an original application for writ of habeas corpus, as Judge Teague demonstrates. To the failure of the majority to do so, I respectfully dissent.1
Nowhere in its opinion does the majority directly address Respondent’s making the underlying admonition to youthful defendants in the first place. That is, “Every time you say ‘yes,’ I want a ‘sir’ behind it. But by implication at least the majority seems to sanction it. As I view the situation, however, the Court need not — indeed, should not — approve it in this mandamus action.
*426In the final analysis, it seems to me, the admonishment routinely given by Respondent in such cases is truly the nub of the problem. From the bench in his courtroom Respondent affects the part of Professor Higgins in Pygmalion. Yet, however we, as men, may regard his playing that role, still we may not, as judges, critique it through writ of mandamus.
Accordingly, I concur with the judgment of the Court.

. Perhaps unnoticed by all concerned, on July 19, 1984, the Clerk of the Court received from applicant his motion for leave to file an application for writ of prohibition and amended application for writ of mandamus, seeking relief from other conditions of probation imposed by Respondent in this case. In my judgment significant issues are raised by applicant, and because the Court does not grant leave to file, I also dissent.