Court Opinion

ID: 9569024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:46.664703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:46.381396
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
By motion for rehearing, the motels cite State Hwy. Bd. v. Baxter, 167 Ga. 124 (144 SE 796) (1928), and MARTA v. Datry, 235 Ga. 568 (220 SE2d 905) (1975), and *436insist that their original right of access to U. S. 41 continued when that highway became 1-75, and that they have a right of direct access to and from their properties and 1-75.
As the Baxter case, supra, shows, the easement of access "includes the right of ingress [entry], egress [exit], and regress [reentry], a right of way from a locus a quo to the locus ad quern, and from the latter forth to any other spot to which the party may lawfully go, or back to the locus a quo.” State Hwy. Bd. v. Baxter, supra, p. 133. It has not been shown that the motels’ right of ingress, egress and regress from the locus a quo to the locus ad quern and from there to any other spot or back to the locus a quo, has been taken. The evidence shows that they presently have a usable right of vehicular access by road to their property (cf. MARTA v. Datry, supra, 235 Ga.at 576-577), and from their property to that roadway, but they have not shown that they have a right of direct access under law to any particular type of highway. See Tift County v. Smith, 219 Ga. 68 (131 SE2d 527) (1963). Hence, the motels have not shown that they have a right to injunctive relief. State Hwy. Dept. v. Strickland, supra.

Motion for rehearing denied.

All the Justices concur, except Bowles, J., who dissents.