Court Opinion

ID: 9351779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 17:06:38.948644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:45.048107
License: Public Domain

J-S38044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 EVAN CASTELLANOS                         :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1636 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 18, 2022,
           in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001114-2015.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                        FILED JANUARY 3, 2023

      Evan Castellanos appeals pro se from the order denying his untimely-

filed petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-46. We affirm.

      The PCRA court succinctly summarized the procedural history of this

case as follows:

            [Castellanos] filed a direct appeal attacking his
         negotiated plea with sentence bargain [to attempted
         murder] as unknowing and involuntary. The direct appeal
         was denied by Superior Court on March 30, 2017.
         [Castellanos’] petition for allowance of appeal to the
         Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was denied on August 2,
         2017. The Supreme Court’s order of August 2, 2017, was
         the final order affirming [Castellanos’] conviction.

            [Castellanos] filed his first, timely PCRA [petition] on
         February 13, 2018. The first PCRA petition was denied after
         a hearing by [the PCRA court’s order] entered June 1, 2018.
         [Castellanos] appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior
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        Court affirmed [the] order denying PCRA relief on June 24,
        2019.

           On October 7, 2019, [Castellanos] filed his second PCRA
        petition styled as a “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief”
        purportedly filed against an agency of the Commonwealth –
        the Department of Corrections – in the court of common
        pleas.   In his second PCRA filing [Castellanos] again
        attempted to attack the validity of his guilty plea. [The
        PCRA court] recognized the petition for habeas corpus relief
        as an effort to circumvent the PCRA and it was untimely
        under the one year jurisdictional time bar set forth under
        the PCRA. On October 17, 2019, [the PCRA court] denied
        the habeas corpus petition. No appeal was filed.

           On June 25, 2021, [Castellanos] filed his third PCRA
        petition, this time styled as a “Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc
        Reinstatement of PCRA Petition filed 2/13/2016”. [The
        PCRA court] again denied the filing as untimely under the
        [PCRA]. An appeal was filed. The Superior Court denied
        [Castellanos’] appeal on February 22, 2022.

           [O]n April 1, 2022, [Castellanos] filed another petition
        for writ of habeas corpus, advancing a theory that his guilty
        plea was unknowing and involuntary due to ineffective
        assistance of counsel. This filing was yet another attempt
        to evade the jurisdiction time frame of Pennsylvania’s
        [PCRA]. On May 18, 2022, [the PCRA court] entered an
        order denying this fourth attempt for [post-conviction relief]
        as time barred, after circulating a notice of intent to dismiss
        without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 1-2 (citation and excess capitalization

omitted). This appeal followed. Both Castellanos and the PCRA court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

     Castellanos now raises the following issue on appeal:

        A. Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion in
           dismissing [Castellanos’] petition for habeas corpus relief
           alleging his confinement is based on the denial of his
           right to a counseled PCRA proceeding.

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Castellanos’ Brief at 3 (excess capitalization omitted).

         Using the applicable standard of review, we must determine whether

the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of legal

error.     Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749-50 (Pa. 2014)

(citations omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions. Id.

         Before we consider the issue Castellanos raises on appeal, we first note

that the PCRA court properly considered his latest filing for post-conviction

relief as a serial PCRA petition because he raises a claim of ineffectiveness of

counsel. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole

means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law

and statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus”);

Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining

that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under

that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . conviction

resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9543(a)(2), including ineffectiveness of counsel”).

         Treating Castellanos’ filing as a PCRA petition, we must next determine

whether the PCRA court’s conclusion that his fourth PCRA petition was

untimely filed, and that he failed to establish a time-bar exception.        The

timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v.

Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for

relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed

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within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the

petition is met.

      The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.        Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to    address   the    substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth     v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      Here, Castellanos’ judgment of sentence became final on October 31,

2017, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance

of appeal, and the time for filing a writ of certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court expired.             See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).     Therefore,

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Castellanos had until October 31, 2018, to file a timely petition.       Because

Castellanos filed his fourth PCRA petition in 2022, it is patently untimely unless

he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

       Castellanos has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s

time bar. In his pro se brief, he raises a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.

Such allegations cannot establish an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 349 (Pa. 2013) (explaining

that allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel will not overcome the

jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA). Therefore, the PCRA court

correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the

Castellanos’ fourth PCRA petition.1 Derrickson, supra.2 We therefore affirm

its order denying post-conviction relief.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

1  Castellanos’ 2022 filing does not appear in the certified record.
Nevertheless, we note that in his May 9, 2022, response to the PCRA court’s
Rule 907 notice, Castellanos did not acknowledge the PCRA’s time restrictions
or the exceptions thereto.

2 Although we likewise lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Castellanos’
issue, we note that his first PCRA petition was not uncounseled. Rather, the
record reflects that counsel was appointed for Castellanos, but after a review
determined the petition to be meritless and filed a motion to withdraw. We
concurred with counsel’s assessment, granted counsel’s motion, and affirmed
the denial of post-conviction relief. See Commonwealth v. Castellanos,
219 A.3d 258 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision). The fact that
Castellanos disagrees with these determinations does not render his first
petition uncounseled.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/3/2023

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