Court Opinion

ID: 9680369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:30:52.181078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:28.311586
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Before ESQUIVEL, BUTTS and CANTU, JJ.
BUTTS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of possession of heroin. After having been found guilty, appellant tried the issue of punishment to the court. The court found the enhancement paragraph not true, and assessed a punishment of ten (10) years’ confinement. The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged. A brief *942discussion of the facts is necessary, however, for a proper disposition of appellant’s grounds of error.
The record reflects that San Antonio police detective Clyde Gentle received a phone call from an undisclosed informant on August 24, 1977. He was told that a white male, approximately thirty years old, six foot one to two, with light brown hair and a mustache, wearing a tan long sleeved shirt, and driving a maroon Pontiac with a tan top bearing California license plates was in possession of a quantity of heroin. He was informed that the suspect was located at South Leona Street in San Antonio and that he would be leaving the location in the very near future. Gentle and two other police officers drove to the location. They saw a man matching the informant’s description getting into a car also matching the informant’s description. He was subsequently followed and stopped, and the automobile was searched. Several balloons were found in the automobile. Five of the balloons were chemically tested and were found to contain heroin.
In his first ground of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to require the State to disclose the identity of the informant. The rule is well established that unless the informant participated in the offense, was present at the time of the offense, or was otherwise shown to be a material witness to the transaction or as to whether the defendant knowingly committed the act charged, his identity need not be disclosed. Rodriguez v. State, 614 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Etchieson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Varela v. State, 561 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Hardeman v. State, 552 S.W.2d 433, 439 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Carmouche v. State, 540 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); See also, Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).
In the instant case, none of these elements were present. There was no showing that the informant was present at the time the appellant was stopped and arrested, nor that the informant was a participant in the offense. The appellant was in possession of the heroin when the police officers stopped him. The trial court’s refusal to order the prosecution to disclose the name of the informant was not error. The ground of error is overruled.
In his second ground of error, appellant complains that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress, and in allowing the introduction of evidence seized pursuant to an illegal warrantless search and seizure not based on probable cause. We disagree.
The question of whether a war-rantless search is constitutionally valid can only be decided in terms of the concrete factual situation presented by each individual case. Nastu v. State, 589 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Rivas v. State, 506 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). In order for a warrantless arrest or search to be justified, the State must show the existence of probable cause at the time the arrest or search was made, as well as the circumstances which made the procuring of a warrant impracticable. Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Probable cause for a search exists where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find evidence pertaining to a crime. Britton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Brown, supra, 481 S.W.2d, at 110. The requirement of “reasonably trustworthy information” is satisfied when there are underlying circumstances from which the officer could conclude that the undisclosed informant providing the information was credible or his information reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). This standard is met when the officer affirms that he has received information from the undisclosed informant on previous occasions and that such information has proved to be true and correct. Carmichael v. State, 607 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Gonzales v. State, 577 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex.Cr. *943App.1979). In assessing the sufficiency of the probable cause to search a suspect, the court may also consider the accuracy of the information supplied by the informant as verified by the officer, as well as the specificity of that information. Draper v. U. S., 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). In the instant ease, Gentle testified at the suppression hearing that he received a phone call from an undisclosed informant who described in detail the appellant and the car he would be driving, as well as the fact that the appellant had heroin in his possession and would be leaving the location soon. He further testified that the informant knew that the police wanted information based only upon the personal observation by the informant of the subject in possession of heroin, that the informant had provided Gentle with reliable and credible information concerning narcotic traffic in the past, and that several other heroin possession cases had been made in the past on the basis of information provided by the informant.
Gentle also testified that it was his experience that it takes him at least 45 minutes to type up a search warrant and affidavit and obtain a judge’s signature on it. In light of that fact and the fact that the suspect would be leaving a known location at any time, Gentle had not sought to obtain a search warrant prior to the search of appellant.
Since the record indicates that the undisclosed informant had proven reliable in the past and the information provided by him proved to be accurate and sufficiently specific, we find a sufficient showing of probable cause to warrant the search of the appellant and the area within his care, custody and control. Rangel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). Since probable cause did exist and the record indicates that it was impracticable to obtain a search warrant under the circumstances, there were exigent circumstances to alleviate the necessity to obtain a search warrant. We find that the arresting officers were entitled to search the appellant without a warrant and that the evidence obtained as a result of that search was admissible at appellant’s trial. Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after a witness stated that he had become acquainted in the past with a particular address in his capacity as a narcotics detective. The trial court sustained appellant’s objection to the elicited testimony and the prosecutor proceeded to elicit the same testimony again. Appellant again objected, and the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to “disregard the last question of the State’s attorney and disregard the answer that was given by the witness.”
This court will not reverse a conviction solely because an improper question was propounded. To cause reversal the question must be obviously harmful. Walker v. State, 513 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Hartman v. State, 507 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Generally an error in asking an improper question may be cured or rendered harmless by a withdrawal of such testimony and an instruction to disregard the same, except in extreme cases where it appears that the question is clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the opinions produced on their minds. Walker, supra, 513 S.W.2d, at 42. While the questioning in the present case was improper and in violation of the court’s order, nevertheless, in view of the trial court’s ruling and its instructions to the jury, we find no reversible error. The third ground of error is overruled.
Appellant’s fourth ground of error complains that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion for mistrial when a witness testified that another officer had described the balloons as appearing to be covered with saliva, as such testimony was so prejudicial that the court’s instruction to disregard could not cure the harm to the appellant. Appellant’s brief offers no citation of authority and is a general allegation. Therefore, we consider it to be without merit and overrule it.
*944Appellant has filed a pro se brief in which some of his grounds of error duplicate those raised by counsel. We have reviewed all of his contentions and find them to be without merit. The judgment is affirmed.