Court Opinion

ID: 9866213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 01:04:37.134575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:13:54.768237
License: Public Domain

Jones, J.,
dissented and delivered the following opinion :
For the reasons which are given in the following expression of my views I have felt constrained to dissent, though with *658great respect, from the conclusions of the Court in this case. Though the facts of the case appear in the opinion of the Court it will conduce perhaps to a better understanding of the views I shall here submit, to accompany them with a particular statement of the facts.
On the 29th of June, 1887, Samuel P. Ryland and Chauncy Brooks, partners, obtained in the Baltimore City Court a judgment for $457.16, with interest and costs against George W. Grafflin, Jr., and William Coath, partners, trading as Grafflin & Co., which was on the 28th of April, 1899, entered to use of the Ryland & Brooks Lumber Company, a body corporate. On the 28th of April, 1899, a writ of scire facias to revive this judgment was issued and was returned as “made known to George W. Grafflin and William Coath, co-partners, trading as Grafflin & Co., by service” on each of the partners in the regular form. On the 8th of May, 1899, judgment of fiat was entered in the scire facias proceeding. On the 23rd of June following the plaintiffs sued out an attachment upon which there was the following return: “Entry made and attached and appraised as per schedule on the 24th day of June, 1899. Notice of this attachment given to Charles F. Evans and John B. Spence, trading as Evans and Spence, occupants in possession of the property attached, described in schedule. Also notice of this attachment given to Sarah E. Wright and Ella C. Dunlap, on the 8th day of July, 1899. Also laid in the hands of Sarah E. Wright on the 8th day of July, 1899, at 1.50 o’clock P. M., in presence of Bernard Schminke, and garnishee summoned.” The property embraced in the schedule accompanying the return was all the right, title, interest, estate, &c., of William Coath in and to a lot of ground with the improvements thereon, and particularly the annual sub-rent issuing thereout of $ 180, which was described as situated on Lombard street, in the City of Baltimore, and as “being the same property subleased by Maria Coath to Moses Moses by sub-lease bearing date the thirty-first day of January, 1868,” &c.
Sarah E. Wright, who was returned as garnishee, appeared *659to the attachment and pleaded: ist, that the land and tenements mentioned in the schedule annexed to the sheriff’s return at the time of entering up the judgment upon which the attachment was issued^ and at the time of laying the said attachment were and always since have been and still are, her property; 2nd, that they did not at any of the times mentioned belong to the defendants, nor to either of them ; and, 3rd, the defendants did not at any of said times nor did either of them have any right, title or interest in or to said lands and tenements. The plaintiffs traversed the pleas and upon issues joined the case was submitted to the Court for trial.
Upon the trial the evidence showed that one Maria Coath, in the month of August, 1892, died intestate, possessed of the annual sub-ground rent of $180 issuing out of the lot of ground described in the schedule returned by the sheriff with the writ of attachment sued out in this case; that William Coath, one of the defendants in this case, Sarah E. Wright, the garnishee, and one Ella C. Dunlap were the next of kin of the said deceased, and entitled, as distributees, to her estate ; that on the 30th day of January, 1894, William Coath executed, in consideration of one thousand dollars, to Sarah E. Wright an assignment of all his “right, title interest and distributive share in and to all the personal estate of” his mother, Maria Coath, which assignment was acknowledged before a justice of the peace and recorded in the office of the Register of Wills of Baltimore City ; that William Coath, as administrator of the estate of Maria Coath, in making distribution thereof, distributed to “Sarah E. Wright, a daughter of the intestate and assignee of the distributive share” of himself, “a son of said deceased, under deed dated January 30th, 1894, left to be recorded in the office of the register of wills, two undivided one-third interests in the annual sub-rent of $ 180,” &c., and to Ella C. Dunlap “one undivided one-third interest” in the said sub-rent; and that thereafter, in pursuance of an order of the Orphans’ Court the said administrator executed on the 23rd day of April, 1894, to the said Sarah E. Wright and the said Ella Dunlap a deed of the said *660annual sub-rent; giving to the former two, and to the latter one', undivided interest in the same. This deed was duly recorded among the land records of Baltimore City, and by virtue of this deed and of the before-mentioned assignment the said Sarah E. Wright and Ella Dunlap entered into possession of their respective interests in and to said sub-rent.
Upon this evidence under the pleadings the plaintiffs offered a prayer which the Court granted ; and the garnishee offered three prayers to the effect that there was no evidence- legally sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff; or to entitle plaintiff to a judgment of condemnation of the lands and tenements mentioned, &c.; or to show that the' defendants or either had any right, title’ ■ or interest in or 'to said lands and tenements 'at the time of entering up the judgment upon'which the attachment was-issued or at the laying of the attachment or at any time since. ' These prayers the Court rejected. The action of the Cou'rt upon the prayers is the subject of the first exception contained in the record. The garnishee then made a motion to quash the attachment upon the grounds set up as a defense in her pleas and upon the additional ground that the original judgment upon which the attachment was issued, was extended June '29th, 1887, and scire facias proceedings to renew the same were instituted by plaintiffs on April 28th, 1889, and judgment of fiat'was entered thereon on May 8th, 1889; and that the defendant, William Coath, had prior to these proceedings in scire facias, by a good and valid deed “assigned, conveyed and granted to the garnishee the lands and tenements mentioned in the schedule annexed to the sheriff’s return, and at the time of the institution of said proceedings in scire facias the garnishee was an alienee ór terre-tenant of said lands and tenements deriving title from said Coath ; and that said garnishee was not made a party defendant in said scirefacias proceedings, and was not served with the writ of scire facias; nor were the lands and tenements mentioned in said schedule' annexed to the shertff’s return in this attachment case,'described in the sheriff’s return in said scire facias proceedings ; and the defendant, Grafflin, has not now, and never *661at any time had' any right, title, interest or estate in and to said lands and tenements.” The motion to quash was submitted by counsel to the Court upon the evidence that had already been given in the case and was overruled by the Court. This action of the Court was made ground for the second exception by the garnishee as disclosed by the record. After the overruling of the motion to quash a verdict was entered by the Court for the plaintiff followed by “judgment of condemnation of the property attached as per schedule” from which the appeal here was taken.
■ The attachment issued in this case recited the original judgment against the defendants therein, and also the scire facias proceedings and the judgment of fiat thereon, which was. proper (Hall v. Clagett et al., 63 Md. 57), and showed upon its face that the garnishee had not been brought in under the. scire facias and made a party to that proceeding. The real question in the ease, though there' is some confusion in the record in presenting it, is whether this omission to so bring in the garnishee under the scire facias proceedings as terre-tenant is fatal to the attachment as levied against the property described in the sheriff’s schedule, which is now possessed by the garnishee under .the circumstances detailed in-the proof. At the death of his mother, Maria Coath, in 1892, William Coath became entitled to an equitable interest in the property levied upon under the attachment in this case, to the extent of one undivided third part thereof as one of her distributees ;• and this interest immediately became subject to the lien of the original judgment rendered against him and his partner on. June 29th, 1887; 2 Code, Art. 83, sec. 1; 1 Code, Art. 26 sec. 19; and subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased, and to abide the due administration of her estate, was liable to immediate execution thereunder as-the law then stood. Formerly execution could not have been had, where the judgment had been standing for a year and a day, unless the same was first revived by scire facias proceedings. This was first changed by Act of 1823, ch. 194, which extended the time, within which execution might issue, without a resort to scire *662facias to revive thfe judgment to be executed, to three years. When the'judgment here in question was rendered the Act of 1884, ch. 178, which had repealed and enlarged the provisions of the Act of 1874, ch. 320, had provided that an execution might issue at any time within 'twelve years from the date of a judgment. This Act has been followed'by Acts of 1888, ch. 421, and 1890, chap. 114, which are practically identical with it as respects the quéstion which has been stated as' the one involved in this case.
Under the law as it stood prior to the Act of 1823, it was at one time held by the General Court that no execution could be levied on land which the judgment debtor had aliened, after judgment, bona fide and for a valuable consideration, although when so aliened a year and a day had not expired and the j udgment w'as still alive, unless a scire facias had been sued out and fiat had against the alienee. Arnott, &c., v. Nicholls, I Har. & John. 471. But this case was subsequently overruled in the case of McEldery v. Smith, 2 Har. & John. 72, as interpreted in the case of Warfield v. Brewer, 4 Gill, 265, where it is said that the law was then settled “ that if the fieri facias be issued within a year'and a day (now three years), after the rendition of the jüdgment it may be levied as well on land conveyed by the defendant after the judgment as on lands belonging to him at the time of levying the fieri facias.” In the case of McEldery v. Smith, the alienation was made pending scire facias proceedings to revive the judgment, and execution was levied by the plaintiffs upon the' land aliened, under the judgment of fiat upon said proceedings without having proceeded by 'scire facias against the alienees. This the General Court held to be irregular, but this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In the subsequent case of Murphy v. Cord, 12 Gill & John. 182, a judgment was obtained against a certain John Dallam, who, within a year and a day after the rendition of the judgment (on the 6th of February, 1822), executed a mortgage of the lands which w'ere subject to the lien of the judgment. The plaintiffs in the judgment not having issued execution on the same within a year and a day instituted a *663scire facias proceeding and obtained a fiat thereon, but did not make the mortgagee a party to this proceeding. On this judgment of fiat execution was issued under which the mortgaged premises were levied upon and sold, and it was held by the County Court and affirmed on appeal that the mortgagee could not maintain ejectment against the purchaser. In affirmance of rulings in this case see Doub v. Barnes, 4 Gill, 1 (page 11).
The facts in reference to which these several rulings were made show them to have been that where a judgment debtor aliened lands, subject to the lien of the judgment, while the judgment was still alive a fieri facias issued upon the judgment, subsequent to such alienation, and before it became dormant could' be levied upon such lands without first suing out a scire f acids against the alienee. And that where a scire facias had been sued out against the original defendant in a judgment, while the judgment was yet alive, to have it revived, and pending the proceeding on the scire facias, but after the time had elapsed when, in the absence of proceedings to revive, the judgment would have become dormant, lands subject to the lien were aliened, a fieri facias under the judgment of fiat could be levied upon such lands without first proceeding by scire facias against the alienee. Lastly, that where lands subject to a judgment were aliened when the judgment was still alive if subsequently it was revived by scire facias against the original defendant to which the alienee was not a party, execution could be had against the lands so aliened under the judgment of fiat. The effect of these rulings was to require that, in the conditions named, all parties should, at their peril, take notice of the rights of the judgment creditor. This was entirely consistent with the reason given for requiring scire facias to revive judgments remaining unexecuted, first, for a year and a day and then (under the Act of 1823) far three years, before execution 'could be had of them. This reason was that after such lapse of time the judgment was presumed to be satisfied or released. Foster's Writ of Sci. Fa., 3 (marg.), 3 Bac. Abridg. 724; Johnson v. Lemmon, 37 Md. 336-343. In *664Warfield v. Brewer, supra, the Court said: “When the plaintiff himself has suffered his judgment to die and a sci. fa. is necessaiy to reanimate it, the law presumes it, until revived, to be satisfied, and the purchaser has some right to presume it also, and may have purchased it (the property) under that belief.” On the other hand, it may reasonably be presumed that an alienee of property who has taken it with the notice that the records give him of an existing judgment encumbering it as a lien and which can, at any moment, be executed against it, has so taken it, as regards price paid and precautions for protection, with reference to the existence of the judgment; just as he would take it with reference to any other existing lien or encumbrance of which, the law would require him to take notice. .
Now, under our statutes which have been referred to, the law as it now stands, and as it stood at the date of the original judgment in the case, neither raises nor suggests any.presumption of satisfaction or release of a judgment during the period of twelve years that it remains a lien on the real and leasehold property of the judgment debtor. During that period it is unnecessary to have scire facias proceedings to revive the judgment for. the purpose of executing the same, for the statute now provides, and did so provide at the date of the original judgment here, that execution may issue “at any time within twelve years from the date of judgment,” or that it “may be otherwise proceeded with within twelve years from its date.” So that the judgment is continued and invested with its full “active energy” during the full period of twelve years. It is also further provided “that at any time before the expiration of twelve years from the date of any judgment or decree, or in case of the death or marriage of any defendant in the judgment, the plaintiff shall have right to have a writ of scire facias to renew or revive the same.” When, therefore, a purchaser, or alienee, takes property subject to the lien of a judgment under our present statute law, he does so with notice of the existence of an active, live judgment upon which process of execution may issue at any moment. *665There is no fiction to excuse any want of care. Not only so, but he has notice that the judgment may, by the express terms of the statute, be revived by scire facias at any time during the twelve years and so have its “active energy” continued im definitely. Is it not reasonable to suppose that a purchaser in taking property under such circumstances has provided for his own protection ? And ought the law' not to require this of him rather than expose the plaintiff in the judgment to further expense and the risk of further litigation with such purchaser or alienee by exacting the giving, of a notice to him of the rights of the plaintiff under the judgment before they can be enforced against property taken subject to those rights ? Would it not be more just and reasonable to treat him as already having notice of these rights ?
The rights of a plaintiff in a judgment under our present statute law, with respect to continuing the effectiveness of the same, may be likened to his right to issue an execution “ to lie ’ ’ and renewing the same from term to term whereby the judgment may be kept alive, and operative for an indefinite time. Hagerstown Bank v. Thomas et al., 35 Md. 511. Here, according to the authority just cited, the judgment creditor by the proceeding of issuing an execution “ to lie ” preserves the effectiveness of the judgment and its priority over subsequent lienors ; and for the same reason he would be protected against subsequent purchasers. This reason must be that the law requires all parties to take notice of the rights of the judgment creditor who by the proceeding of having execution issued and repeated from term to term puts on record notice of his rights. Why would it not be even more consonant w'ith reason to require of all parties to take notice at their peril of the rights secured to the judgment creditor by our present statute law as to continuing the effectiveness of his judgment when they are notified by the public records of the existence of a live, active judgment and by the law of the right of the party holding the lien to have it renewed and kept indefinitely in active force ? This would seem to be in accord with the spirit and policy of the legislation in question; the *666object of which was to promote convenience and diminish expenses to suitors in using the process of the Courts by simplyfying and making less cumbrous the proceedings which events subsequent to the judgment sometimes made necessary, as the law formerly stood, to enable the fruits of a judgment to be realized. The inconvenience and delay of having to resort to scire facias proceedings in many instances where it was formerly required are now dispensed with and avoided— the statute providing the easy and summary mode of a suggestion in writing upon the record of the fact necessary to appear in the further prosecution of rights under the judgment. In case of the death or marriage of any defendant a scire facias may still be issued to revive the judgment against, and bring in the necessary parties, and at any time within twelve years from the date of the judgment “'the plaintiff shall have the right to have a writ of scire facias to renew or revive the same.” It is not in terms provided that alienees shall be served with notice of the scire facias proceeding, and this is not without significance in legislation which provided for making a judgment live and active during the whole twelve years that it is provided the judgment shall remain a lien; when, as we have seen, there were decisions to the effect that when lands subject to the lien of a judgment were alienated while the judgment was alive and active it could be revived by scire facias so as to affect the lands so alienated without making the alienees parties to the proceeding. If it was not intended to preservé the whole effect of such a judgment it would have been proper to employ terms of modification or exclusion. The foregoing considerations require, it would seem, that the principle in the ruling in Murphy v. Cord, supra, shofild be applied in the construction of our present statute law regulating the issuing of a scire facias to revive a judgment and that it ought to be accordingly held that, where a judgment creditor avails of the right to have scire facias to revive his judgment within the twelve years from the date thereof, it is not necessary that he should bring in and make parties to the proceeding the alienees of the real or leasehold *667estaté of the judgment debtor to whom such estate has been conveyed after the judgment has become a lien thereon. This view of the case makes it unnecessary to discuss or decide the question, which was argued, whether the garnishee under the title which she has attempted to show to the property upon which the attachment in this case was laid is, in the purview of the law, a terre-tenant of that property.
If the foregoing views be correct there is no error in the ruling in which the trial Court refused to sustain the motion to quash the attachment in this case.
The grounds upon which the motion was based are all at variance with these views. As to the first three grounds, the extent to which they are supported by the evidence is that the title to the property upon which the attachment was levied devolved upon William Coath, one of the defendants in the case, as distributee of the estate of his mother, pending the original judgment which was revived by proceeding on scire facias; and that prior to this proceeding to which the garnishee was not a party the property had been assigned by him and subsequently to his assignment conveyed by deed from the administrator of his mother’s estate to the garnishee. It would follow from the-views herein expressed that these facts could not avail to defeat the attachment-. The fourth ground of the motion did nothing more than to set out and detail these facts. In reference to the first exception the prayers of the defendant were in my judgment properly rejected. There was evidence to sustain the verdict, and evidence sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to condemnation of the property, which was' the subject of the levy and which was described in the sheriffs return in the case. The first two prayers of the defendant assert propositions to the contrary of this. The third prayer was based on the facts herein already recited in disposing of the motion to quash as being the basis of the allegations in the first three grounds of the motion which, as we have seen, do not support the legal conclusion deduced therefrom by the prayer. The prayer of the plaintiffs may have been open to criticism in' its assump*668tion of some of the facts which were embodied therein but no special exceptions were filed, and it was .substantially correct in the legal proposition it asserted. After rehearsing the facts which had appeared in evidence other than those that appeared on the face of the proceedings on the attachment it in effect asked the Court to rule as matter of law that the one undivided third interest which passed to William Coa’th as distributee of his mother’s estate was subject to the lien of the plaintiff’s judgment and liable to condemnation under the attachment, notwithstanding the transfer of this interest by him to the garnishee by the. assignment of the 30th of January, 1894, and the subsequent deed by him as administrator, dated the 23rd of April, 1894, to the garnishee and Ella C. Dunlap. This legal conclusion is in accord with the views expressed herein.
(Filed August 14th, 1901.)
I am of the opinion the judgment below ought to be affirmed.