Court Opinion

ID: 5085616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-10-01 13:52:18.509929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:24.211296
License: Public Domain

Case Number: 01-92-01269-CV 08/23/1995 Mandate issued 08/23/1995 Created for Data Conversion -- an event inserted to correspond to the mandate date of a process 06/15/1995 Opinion issued judgment/s of courts below affirmed 06/15/1995 Opinion issued judgment/s of courts below affirmed 06/15/1995 Opinion issued judgment/s of courts below affirmed 06/15/1995 Opinion issued judgment/s of courts below affirmed 06/15/1995 Concurring opinion issued. 06/15/1995 Concurring opinion issued. 06/15/1995 Dissenting opinion issued. 06/15/1995 Court approved judgment sent to attys of record 04/17/1995 Amicus Curiae Brief received 03/17/1995 Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief. See Remarks 03/07/1995 Amicus Curiae Brief received 01/18/1995 Oral argument 01/18/1995 Created for Data Conversion -- an event inserted to correspond to the submitted date of a process 01/18/1995 Created for Data Conversion -- an event inserted to correspond to the submission date of a process 11/22/1994 Application for Writ of Error - Disposed Granted 11/22/1994 Application for Writ of Error - Disposed Granted 11/22/1994 Writ of error issued to Court of Appeals. 11/22/1994 Set for Submission 11/22/1994 Amount of time allotted for oral argument. 11/22/1994 Application for Writ of Error - Disposed Granted 08/04/1994 Case forwarded to Court 08/03/1994 Reply filed 07/25/1994 Application for Writ of Error - Filed
 OPINION
The trial court entered a judgment in favor of William Carl Young, appellee, after a jury found he was not negligent in rear ending the automobile of appellants, Thelma Reinhart and Sallye Treme. The sole complaint on appeal is that the court erred in submitting an instruction on unavoidable accident. We affirm.
Mr. Young, appellee, testified that he was behind appellants' vehicle when it went over the top of an overpass. Mr. Young was trailing appellants' vehicle between 1/8 and 1/4 of a mile as it disappeared over the overpass. As Mr. Young came over the overpass, he saw appellants' vehicle just on the other side either stopped or going very slowly. Mr. Young said he could not swerve left because of a guard rail, and because of traffic, he could not swerve right. Mrs. Treme, the driver of the other car, testified that at the time of impact, she was stopped due to traffic in front of her. The accident occurred on the back side of the overpass, although there was serious dispute as to the exact point of the accident.
The only function of an explanatory instruction in the court's charge is to aid and assist the jury in answering the issues submitted. Atchison, Topeka, Santa Fe Ry. v.O'Merry, 727 S.W.2d 596, 601 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). If an instruction might aid the jury in answering the issues presented to them, or if there isany support in the evidence for an instruction, the instruction is properly given. TEX.R.CIV.P. 277. A trial court is given broad discretion in determining the sufficiency of the instructions and definitions that it submits to the jury. Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
It is the trial judge's duty to determine whether the doctrine of unavoidable accident has been raised by the evidence. Francis v. Cogdell, 803 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The general rule for submission of an instruction on unavoidable accident is if there is evidence supporting the theory, the trial court is required to submit such an instruction.Scott v. Atchison, Topeka, Santa Fe Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 280 (Tex. 1978). If the judge finds there is some evidence tending to establish the necessary elements of the doctrine, and the doctrine is plead, then it is clearly the judge's duty to submit such explanatory instructions as are proper to enable the jury to render a just verdict.Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 658 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
An unavoidable accident instruction is proper only when there is evidence that the event was proximately caused by a nonhuman condition and not by the negligence of any party to the event.Hill v. Winn Dixie Texas, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. 1992). The instruction is ordinarily given in cases involving environmental conditions such as fog, snow, sleet, wet or slick pavement, or obstruction of view. Id.;Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex. 1971);Brown v. Goldstein, 678 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984) rev'd on othergrounds, 685 S.W.2d 640.
The dissent asserts, and we agree, that appellants presented evidence through several witnesses that disputed appellee's claim of unavoidable accident; however, there was some evidence from Mr. Young himself that the overpass obstructed his view and prohibited him from seeing Mrs. Treme slow down or stop. With the evidence and the pleading, the instruction was proper. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d at 229. Appellants have raised no points of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding of no negligence and have confined their complaint solely to the instruction on unavoidable accident.
We overrule, therefore, appellants' only point of error.
We affirm the trial court's judgment. *Page 775