Court Opinion

ID: 9906044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:28.439453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.895195
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. El-Zein CA4/3
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff,                                                         G061492

           v.                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 14HF1049)

 ISMAEL RAGHEB EL-ZEIN,                                                  OPINION

      Defendant;

 RAGHEB ISMAIL EL-ZEIN et al.,

      Objectors and Appellants;

 OLGA DEQUILLIEN,

      Respondent.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Julian W. Bailey, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
directions.
                   Gladych Law and John A. Gladych for Objector and Appellant Ragheb
Ismail El-Zein.
                   John A. Gladych, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.
                   Coast Law Group, David A. Peck, Livia B. Beaudin and Amy C. Johnsgard
for Respondent.
               Ragheb Ismail El-Zein and his attorney John A. Gladych (collectively
appellants) appeal from the trial court’s postjudgment order imposing attorney fees and
other expenses as sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and
708.170 (all further undesignated statutory references are to this code). The sanctions
were imposed after Gladych unilaterally cancelled a stipulated examination related to
restitution owed by El-Zein’s son.
               We conclude the trial court’s order did not comply with section 128.5’s
demand for written details and that some of the attorney fees and all of the other expenses
imposed on El-Zein were not authorized by section 708.170. We reverse in part, affirm
in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                                          FACTS
                                                        1
               In 2013, El-Zein’s then 20-year-old son, drove an automobile after
consuming alcohol and caused a collision that injured two victims, one of whom is Olga
                                                            2
DeQuillien. The son pleaded guilty to two felony charges and the trial court, as part of
its jail sentence, ordered him to pay restitution to the victims totaling $532,434 plus
interest.
               In September 2021, counsel for the victims, Livia B. Beaudin, conducted a
debtor’s examination of El-Zein’s son pursuant to the Enforcement of Judgments Law
(Code Civ. Proc., § 680.010 et seq.; Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (i) [covered restitution
order “enforceable as if the order were a civil judgment”]). Subsequently, El-Zein was
served with a trial court order to also undergo an examination (§ 708.120) and produce

1
               The son, Ismael (also known as Ismail) Ragheb El-Zein, is not a party to
this appeal.
2
              The charges were reckless driving causing one or more specified injuries
(Veh. Code, § 23105, subd. (a); counts 1-3) and driving with an illegal blood-alcohol
concentration while under the age of 21 years (Veh. Code, § 23136, subd. (a); count 4).
The guilty pleas were to counts 1 and 4 pursuant to a plea bargain.

                                               2
documents in response to an accompanying subpoena (§ 1985 et seq.). At all relevant
times, Gladych represented him.
              The initial examination was ordered for March 28, 2022 (all dates without
mention of the year will refer to 2022), then continued to April 21 at 9:00 a.m. based on
the parties’ stipulation, because Gladych requested a three-week delay, Beaudin agreed,
and the trial court approved the stipulation. In a nutshell, the sanctions in this case were
imposed because on April 20 at 3:52 p.m., Gladych, through his paralegal, advised
                                     3
Beaudin he would not be appearing.
              Beaudin appeared in the trial court and requested enforcement of the
examination order. The court issued an order to show cause why sanctions should not be
imposed for the nonappearance by appellants. Ultimately, the parties briefed the issue,
completed an examination of El-Zein (on May 3), and the court entertained oral
arguments on the sanctions issue.
              As noted, the trial court granted the request for sanctions pursuant to
sections 128.5 (frivolous bad faith conduct) and 708.170 (failure to appear for
examination without good cause). Its order stated, among other things, that appellants
were jointly liable to pay Beaudin’s law firm for DeQuillien’s “attorney[] fees and costs”
in the amount of $11,102.72.
                                         DISCUSSION
              Appellants assert three grounds for reversal. They argue the sanctions
order: (1) contains insufficient details under section 128.5; (2) awards fees not
authorized by section 708.170; and (3) imposes sanctions that shock the conscience.
Because there is merit to the first and second arguments, as discussed below, we conclude

3
              The paralegal’s e-mail stated in its substantive entirety: “The Judgement
[sic] Debtor Examination of our client, [El-Zein] needs to be rescheduled. [¶] Please
contact me at your earliest convenience to reschedule the examination to a mutually
convenient date. [¶] Thank you.”

                                              3
a partial reversal and remand for further proceedings is the appropriate disposition for
this appeal.
I. Standards of Review and Governing Statutes
               We generally review an exercise of statutory authority to impose monetary
sanctions for abuse of discretion (Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443,
1452), but where material facts are undisputed, we review application of the authorizing
statute de novo (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163). “‘Our
fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as
to effectuate the purpose of the statute. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To accomplish this task,
we look first to the words of the statute, because they ‘“generally provide the most
reliable indicator of legislative intent.”’ [Citations.] Of course, the language of a specific
section must be construed in the context of the larger statutory scheme of which it is a
part. [Citations.]” (Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 804, 811.)
               Sections 128.5 and 708.170 independently authorize trial courts to order the
payment of attorney fees as sanctions. (§ 128.5, subd. (h) [“The liability imposed by this
section is in addition to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions within
the purview of this section”].) Section 708.170 does not authorize sanctions against an
examinee’s counsel (see Eby v. Chaskin (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049 [noting no
provision for covered person’s counsel]), but section 128.5, subdivision (a), explicitly
does. We begin our review there.
II. Analysis
A. Sanctions Imposed on Gladych
               As noted, appellants argue the trial court’s order contains insufficient
details under section 128.5. We agree on this point but disagree with appellants that there
can be no basis whatsoever for sanctions under the statute.
               Section 128.5’s requirements are demanding. Most relevant here, it
explicitly requires that “[a]n order imposing [sanctions] shall be in writing and shall

                                              4
recite in detail the action or tactic or circumstances justifying the order.” (§ 128.5,
subd. (c), italics added.) Section 128.5 also specifies its sanctions must be based on
“expenses . . . incurred . . . as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are
frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay” (§ 128.5, subd. (a)), with
“‘[f]rivolous’” defined as “mean[ing] totally and completely without merit or for the sole
purpose of harassing an opposing party” (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2)).
               The sanctions order signed by the trial court in this matter was based on a
proposed written order Beaudin had submitted four days before oral arguments. The
reporter’s transcript of the hearings on sanctions was not incorporated into the order.
(See Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 [“The conduct or circumstances justifying the imposition of
sanctions may be satisfied by incorporating by reference ‘papers setting forth the
conduct, circumstances, and legal arguments underlying the court’s conclusions’”].)
               The order recited the following findings: “Notice was duly given and
[appellants] were given an opportunity to be heard. [¶] There is good cause to order
sanctions against El-Zein and Gladych and award [DeQuillien] fees and costs. [¶] El-
Zein failed to appear for his examination on April 21, 2022, after being properly served
with an order for his appearance at the examination by a registered process server and
such failure was without good ca[u]se. [¶] Gladych failed to appear at El-Zein’s
scheduled examination. Such failure to appear as well as Gladych’s failure to timely
notify both the [trial c]ourt and [Beaudin] of his failure, the circumstances of his failure,
or his plan not to appear at the examination were frivolous actions made in bad faith
which were solely intended to cause unnecessary delay and caused [DeQuillien] to incur
attorney[] fees and costs for unnecessary legal service.”

                                                5
              The written order does not pass muster under section 128.5 because of its
                       4
lack of factual details. A major benefit of the statute’s explicit detail requirement is to
allow for meaningful appellate review of a trial court’s decision to impose sanctions
(Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 996 (Childs)) and the
lack of detail here frustrates that purpose. Whether Gladych’s notice of nonappearance
was sufficiently dilatory for section 128.5 sanctions was a fact-sensitive issue. His after-
the-fact declaration proffered the following explanation: the day before the stipulated
examination, he “had to change [his] previous travel plan to drive [his] wife’s 93-year-old
uncle from Austin to [a medical center] in Houston[, Texas] . . . and [he] could not find a
flight that would get [him] to Orange County in time for the examination,” nor was he
able to secure local counsel to appear in his stead.
              On the face of the record, Gladych’s failure to let the trial court and
opposing counsel know about his unavailability earlier than he did, by itself, does not
show the only reason for his conduct was to either cause unnecessary delay (§ 128.5,
subd. (a)) or harass DeQuillien (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2)), or that Gladych’s conduct was
“totally and completely without merit” (ibid.). A good faith basis (even one showing
negligence) could have explained the failure.
              Given the way the order is explained, good faith negligence could have
been the reason for the trial court’s imposition of sanctions on Gladych because, as
quoted above, the order states Gladych’s “failure to appear as well as [his] failure to
timely notify both the [c]ourt and [DeQuillien]’s counsel of his failure, the circumstances
of his failure, or his plan not to appear at the examination were frivolous.” (Italics

4
               The parties dispute whether appellants forfeited their challenge to the trial
court’s findings. The dispute is immaterial because even if appellants failed to properly
preserve the issue, we would exercise our discretion in reviewing it, given the undisputed
material facts. (See Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1275-
1276, fn. 3.)

                                              6
added.) The possibility is problematic because negligence alone does not satisfy section
128.5’s definition of frivolous.
              It was undoubtedly the trial court’s prerogative to reject any or all of
Gladych’s proffered explanation. (People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330
[“It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence”].) But by section 128.5’s explicit terms,
the court was required to sufficiently explain why in writing. We cannot deem the lack
of detail harmless because we cannot discern whether the court found Gladych’s conduct
had been frivolous because he was negligent or acted in bad faith. (See Cooper v.
Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 90 [“‘a discretionary order based on an application
of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumption is not an exercise of informed
discretion and is subject to reversal’”].)
              Importantly, we also conclude the facts presented in the record do not
compel a denial of section 128.5 sanctions. Contrary to Gladych’s position, the statute’s
demands do not amount to a proposition that an attorney’s words must be taken at face
                                     5
value unless facially unreasonable. Gladych’s lack of proffered specifics that would
have allowed a reasonable opportunity to cross-reference asserted facts was relevant for
the trial court’s decisionmaking. Accordingly, because we express no opinion on
whether the facts compel a particular result, the order imposing sanctions on attorney
Gladych is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. (Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 996; see People v. Barragan (2004) 32
Cal.4th 236, 248 [discussing effect of law of the case doctrine on new proceeding after
remand].)

5
               We explain this in response to Gladych’s characterization of his factual
assertions in the trial court as having presented “[r]eal life events (that were fully
explained without contradiction).”

                                               7
B. Sanctions Imposed on El-Zein
              Next, we turn to the sanctions imposed on El-Zein. In contrast to the above
                                                                                  6
analysis, section 708.170 presented a less demanding rubric to justify sanctions. As
quoted earlier, the statute’s touchstone was whether there was “good cause” for his
failure to appear. (§ 708.170, subd. (a)(2); see In re Woodham (2001)
95 Cal.App.4th 438, 446 [reviewing case law on other sanctions statutes, noting case law
analysis for whether violation of valid court order was “‘without a valid excuse’”].)
Appellants do not respond to DeQuillien’s argument that good cause was not shown in
the trial court and we therefore conclude appellants concede the point. (Johnson v.
English (1931) 113 Cal.App. 676, 677 [“[a]ppellant, by failing to file a reply brief,
concedes that respondent’s position is unassailable”].)
              Even without the concession, we would affirm the trial court’s decision on
lack of good cause. The proffered reasons for the nonappearance that were personal to
El-Zein was that he had been suffering from “extreme jetlag [sic].” As the court pointed
out, El-Zein only presented hearsay on the assertion, in the form of Gladych’s
declaration. Even putting aside the form of the information presented, there was no
specific information provided on the asserted jet lag, which bore on the credibility of the
proffered excuse and El-Zein’s good cause burden, which had shifted to him after
Beaudin’s prima facie showing. In other words, we agree with the court that good cause
had not been shown.

6
              Based on the written order’s lack of detail, section 128.5 does not justify
affirming the sanctions imposed on El-Zein.

                                             8
              Finally, we also exercise our discretion to review whether section 708.170
                                                                 7
authorized the sanctions imposed in the amount of $11,102.72. The issue is governed by
the following sentence in the statute’s subdivision (a)(2): “If the person’s failure to
appear is without good cause, the judgment creditor shall be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees incurred in the examination proceeding.” (§ 708.170, subd. (a)(2).) We
interpret the words according to their usual and ordinary meaning. (Granberry v. Islay
Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744.)
              Doing so, we conclude three categories of sanctions awarded must be
reversed: (1) costs totaling $1,092.72; (2) all attorney fees that predated the April 21
nonappearance and would have been incurred as part of the May 3 examination of El-
Zein that did occur; and (3) all fees claimed for time spent pursuing sanctions. On the
first category, there should not have been any award of costs because the statute only
specifies fees in its authorization. (Cf. § 128.5, subd. (a) [distinguishing between general
“expenses” and “attorney’s fees”]; see also generally § 685.070 [claimable “costs of
enforcing a judgment”].)
              On the second category, Beaudin presented to the trial court two March 21
time entries that read, respectively, “Exchange of e[-]mails with opposing counsel
regarding continuance of [judgment debtor examination],” and, “Review and exchange
e[-]mails with [c]ourt [c]lerk regarding continued [judgment debtor examination] and
waiver of service regarding same.” These activities occurred because Beaudin stipulated
to continue the initial examination date and would have occurred independent of the
subsequent nonappearance. Given that an examination of El-Zein was actually
completed after his nonappearance, we conclude the March 21 time was not “incurred in

7
             DeQuillen contends appellants forfeited their argument that the trial court’s
award of nonfee expenses as sanctions (e.g., a filing fee, travel costs for hearings, etc.)
were not authorized by section 708.170 because they did not brief the issue in the trial
court. Appellants do not dispute the contention.

                                              9
the examination proceeding” that was missed. (§ 708.170, subd. (a)(2).) DeQuillien
argues this interpretation of the subdivision is “nonsensical.” To the extent she is arguing
our plain meaning construction is prohibited because it leads to an absurd result (see
California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Bd. of South Orange County
Community College Dist. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 574, 588), we reject it.
               Similarly, on the third category, we conclude the plain meaning of section
708.170, subdivision (a)(2), precludes fees for time spent pursuing sanctions. The
Legislature has explicitly authorized such fees in section 128.5, subdivision (f)(1)(C) [“If
warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable
expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion”], and did not
so specify in the statute at issue.
                                                                                     8
               The remainder of the sanctions imposed on El-Zein, totaling $3,740, are
affirmed based on section 708.170, subdivision (a)(2), and appellants’ lack of objection
to the claimed amounts in the trial court. Given our partial reversal and remand for
further proceedings, we do not reach the merits of Beaudin’s request for attorney fees on
appeal.

8
              The total is based on an April 20 time entry claiming $165, an April 21
time entry claiming $1,100, and another April 21 time entry claiming $2,475.

                                             10
                                      DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order of May 24, 2022, is affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In the interests
of justice, no costs on appeal are awarded. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

                                                 O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

SANCHEZ, J.

                                            11