Court Opinion

ID: 9778005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:29:58.367655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.059159
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I understand the Supreme Court has made it clear that the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant knew that the peril was unreasonable; the plaintiff need only show that the defendant knew of the existence of a peril.1
The majority concludes that because Olin posted no flagman, erected no barricades and provided no flashing lights, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding of gross negligence. In considering factual insufficiency points of error, the court examines the whole record to determine not only that there is some evidence to support the finding, but also to determine whether considering all the evidence, the finding is not manifestly unjust. If it is so weak that the finding is manifestly unjust, the court will sustain the point. Burnett v. Motyka, 610 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.1980); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1952). We concluded in our first opinion that the evidence was sufficient to show that Olin Corporation knew or should have known that parking the cherrypicker on the road without any warning devices or barricades created a peril. As stated in our first opinion, Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 678 S.W.2d at 658, a reasonable person would recognize the peril or risk of physical harm created by the parked cher-rypicker.
It is the mental attitude of “conscious indifference” by the defendant that lifts ordinary negligence into gross negligence and justifies the penal nature of the imposition of exemplary damages. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex.1981). International Armament Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.1985); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex.1983).
But by what standard should it be determined whether the defendant was “consciously indifferent” to the safety of the plaintiff? The Supreme Court has not given any clear guidance on this question. The Supreme Court appears to have established the following guidelines. First, the indifference must be conscious, which means that the defendant must know or should have known of the existence of a *255peril. Second, the attitude of indifference is to be inferred from the nature or degree of the negligence or want of care. Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 922. But at what point does the negligence or want of care become great enough to prove “conscious indifference?”
I propose not that the standard be changed, but that it be further developed to be more objective. A true and objective test of “conscious indifference” is the existence of a high degree of probability that harm will result from the defendant’s negligence or want of care. If a defendant knows or should know that his negligent act or omission will likely cause injury, it is reasonable to conclude that he was “consciously indifferent” to the consequences. However, if the defendant knows or should know, that his negligence creates only a remote risk of injury, it is far less certain that he was “consciously indifferent.”2
The concept that “conscious indiffence” is indicated by a knowledge that the act or omission will probably cause injury is implicit in the Supreme Court’s statements of the rule relating to punitive damages. In Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1943) and Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex.1964)3 the court adopted the following statement as the general rule relating to exemplary damages:
“ ‘In order that a recovery of exemplary damages may be sustained, the plaintiff must show, not merely that the defendant could have or ought to have foreseen and prevented the loss or injury of which the plaintiff complains, but that he acted intentionally or wilfully, or with a degree of “gross negligence” which approximates a fixed purpose to bring about the injury of which the plaintiff complains. The mental factor is also described in the reports by the terms “malice,” “fraud,” “oppression,” “recklessness,” and the like. Regardless of the expression which is used to describe it, the purpose or intention of the defendant is determinative of his liability for exemplary damages.’ ” 13 Tex.Jur. p. 241, § 133. (emphasis added)
The language “acted ... with a degree of gross negligence which approximates a fixed purpose to bring about the injury ...” suggests that the “consciously indifferent” defendant is aware that his conduct is likely to cause injury.
The culpable mental state of “conscious indifference” is described in the rule as “recklessness.” An element of “recklessness” is knowledge that the act or omission is likely to cause injury. The Second Restatement of Torts § 500 defines Reckless Disregard of Safety as:
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent, (emphasis added)
The Restatement focuses on the degree of risk created by the actor. It must be substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. Comment f, § 500, contrasts intentional misconduct and recklessness:
*256... While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result ...
Comment g, § 500, contrasts negligence and recklessness:
The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in the degree of risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind.
In Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corporation v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825, 829-830 (Tex.1964), the court equates “conscious indifference” with “wantonness.”
It may be said that the accident in this case was the result of negligence because the company did not use the care that was required to avoid the accident. But the absence of this care does not authorize the jury to levy damages upon the company beyond the limit of compensation for the injury actually inflicted. To justify that penalty there must have been some wilful misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences. The same rule is followed in most other jurisdictions. See 98 A.L.R. 262.
Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393, 62 A.L.R.2d 806 holds that when an injury is caused by negligence any attempt to differentiate variations from slight to gross negligence is fraught with maximum difficulty. Wantonness, on the other hand, connotes intentional wrongdoing. Where malicious or wilful injury is not involved, wanton conduct must be alleged and shown to warrant the recovery of punitive damages. Conduct is wanton when in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others.
In Texas “wantonness” has been defined as:
where the party doing the act or failing to act is conscious of his conduct, and without having the intent to injure, is conscious from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct will likely or probably result in injury.
Brown v. Lundell, 334 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1960), aff'd on other grounds, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961). Because “conscious indifference” and “wantonness” are virtually identical in meaning, the existence of such mental state ought to be determined by the same means, namely the probability of injury.
In other jurisdictions that follow the Texas approach to punitive damages the culpable mental state, whether it is described as “conscious indifference,” “wantonness,” or “recklessness,” includes an awareness that the actor’s conduct will probably cause injury.
“Wantonness” is the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty under the knowledge of the existing conditions, and conscious that from the doing of such act or omission of such duty injury will likely or probably result.
Kilcrease v. Harris, 259 So.2d 797 (Ala.1972).
In Idaho, then, so long as the evidence shows that there has been an injury to the plaintiff from an act which is an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or a disregard for its likely consequences ... it is appropriate for the trier of fact to award punitive damages, (emphasis added)
Linscott v. Ranier National Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980). In Taylor v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., 24 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) the court held that punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action against an intoxicated driver. The court stated that to justify an award of punitive damages on the basis of conscious *257disregard of the safety of others, “the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” Taylor, 598 P.2d at 856. The dissenting opinion in Taylor, 598 P.2d at 864, stresses that this “test requires probable dangerous consequences.”
Although the “probability of injury” approach has not yet been applied by Texas courts, its application would be harmonious with and in furtherance of the principles of punitive damages as thus far developed by the Supreme Court. Because of the soundness of this approach we should use it in reviewing the sufficiency point before us. Thus, the issue before us is whether the evidence is sufficient to show that Olin Corporation was “consciously indifferent” to the safety of Dyson and this should be tested by whether there is sufficient evidence which shows Olin Corporation knew or should have known that leaving the cherrypicker on the road without any warning devices or barricades was likely to cause injury.
The cherrypicker extended several feet into the air supporting a section of pipe. It was parked in broad daylight and was plainly visible to drivers on the road. The road was straight with the exception of a curve about 300 feet from it.4 The cher-rypicker obstructed only four feet of the lane and did not block a driver’s vision of any on-coming traffic. Dyson testified that a dip in the road beyond the cherrypicker prevented him from seeing a van in the opposing lane of traffic. This is contradicted by the testimony of Darryl A. Pillans who was a bystander at the accident scene. He testified that there was no van or any other vehicle. He further states that the dip in the road was a small one, not more than four or five inches, and not large enough to conceal a van. The photographs of the accident scene admitted into evidence show the road to be level with no dip large enough to conceal a vehicle.
In these conditions it is highly probable that a driver would see the cherrypicker in time to either stop or safely maneuver around it. Although the cherrypicker created some risk of injury, it was not a likely one. This is demonstrated by the fact that previous to Dyson’s accident Olin had used cherrypickers to repair pipe along the road many times for several years without mishap. Because there is no direct evidence of conscious indifference and the circumstantial evidence weighs heavily towards the conclusion that the risk of injury created by Olin’s negligence was remote, I would hold that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of gross negligence.

. I consider this holding to be questionable. It is contrary to § 500 of Second Restatement of Torts which states:
500. Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an “unreasonable risk" of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent, (emphasis added)
The Restatement requires knowledge of an unreasonable risk. To justify the punishment of a defendant it ought to be shown that the defendant knew or should have known that the risk of physical harm was unreasonable. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently said:
“Thus, the test for gross negligence is both an objective and a subjective test. A plaintiff may prove a defendant’s gross negligence by proving that the defendant had actual subjective knowledge that his conduct created an extreme degree of risk. In addition, a plaintiff may objectively prove a defendant’s gross negligence by proving that under the surrounding circumstances a reasonable person would have realized that his conduct created an extreme degree of risk to the safety of others", (emphasis added). Renee McCracken Williams et al. v. Steves Industries, Inc. d/b/a Ingram Equipment Company, 29. TEX. SUP.CTJ. 53, 54 (November 16, 1985)
This test, it seems to me, does require a new and independent examination of the nature or character of the peril.

. The Supreme Court has apparently recognized this dilemma in the Renee McCracken Williams case, supra, when it stated:
“No exact line can be drawn between negligence and gross negligence. However, the character of the actual act required is determined by the terms used to define gross negligence: "conscious indifference” denotes a decision in the face of impending harm to another party, to not care about the consequences of the act which may ultimately lead to that harm.” (emphasis added) Williams, 29 TEX. SUP.CT.J. 53, at 54, 55 (November 16, 1985).

. In Burk Royalty the court overruled Sheffield because of its use of the “some care test” in determining legal sufficiency points. But the court did not disapprove of the rule as stated above.

. Dyson testified that he was about forty to fifty yards from the cherrypicker before he realized it was parked in the road and not moving. He did not give an opinion as to the distance from the curve to the cherrypicker.