Court Opinion

ID: 9846486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:42:14.082966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:34.780594
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding parole eligibility and in charging the jury that their decision must be unanimous after being informed by the jury that it seemed to be “hung.”1
I. PAROLE ELIGIBILITY
During penalty phase deliberations, the jury submitted the following question to the trial judge.
Since this jury is dealing with two separate cases, could it recommend two life sentences that would be served consecutively?
In response and over defense counsel’s objection, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
*224[T]he answer is no period, absolutely. As to each case, you have two verdicts and two verdicts only. One is the imposition of death, and the second is life in each case. You have no authority to recommend to me consecutive sentences. I will sentence separately as to each case, depending on your verdict.
The solicitor objected, stating: “[Ijmplicit in that question is their [the jury's] desire to give this defendant forty years in prison.” The solicitor requested a specific instruction that “the parole eligibility is twenty years, regardless of the two murders.” Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial judge subsequently charged the jury as follows:
... I don’t want you to be under any misapprehension as to what the law is. And so I give you the following instruction. You will recall on yesterday that I told you that in the event of life imprisonment, this defendant would not be eligible for parole for a period of twenty years. Now, that same proposition applies if he’s convicted once or twice or several. I would not want you to think that— based on the question you handed me about consecutive sentences, I would not wish you to think that he would not be eligible for forty years because that’s simply not the law. I don’t know whether that was your concern or not. But my concern is simply that since it was requested by one of the parties, regarding parole eligibility, that you have the benefit of it.
The trial judge went on to say that although the appellant would be eligible for parole, he would not necessarily be paroled, and that the jury should not speculate about parole. However, the judge.concluded by .saying, “I think it’s only fair ■ to tell you that two convictions doesn’t extend that to forty... you’re talking about eligibility of twenty years.”
In my view, the trial judge erred in his charge that the appellant would be eligible for parole in twenty years, even if sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.2
*225The majority correctly recognizes that this question is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. However, I am of the opinion that its reliance on Mims v. State, 273 S.C. 740, 259 S.E. (2d) 602 (1979), and the resulting holding are misplaced. In Mims, this Court was called upon to interpret two indictments upon which each defendant was separately sentenced. This Court held that where the defendants were sentenced on one indictment to a term of six years and on the other to five years “consecutive, suspended,” the sentences were to be considered as one of eleven years for purpose of parole eligibility. Thus, the Court required that determination of statutory parole eligibility be based upon the aggregate sentence. Rather than supporting the majority’s view, Mims adds credence to appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that he would become eligible for parole after twenty years on two consecutive life sentences.3
Additionally, a cursory review of provisions for incarceration reveals the legislature’s cognizance that actual prison time served under a life sentence may not extend to the end of natural life. Therefore, the legislature intended to provide for separate, consecutive life sentences under a scheme where prison release would be deferred by basing parole eligibility upon the aggregate of the required minimum incarceration period for each sentence, consecutively served.
Sentences which are consecutive are intended to run one after the other, as would statutory periods of time required to qualify for parole eligibility. Under the majority’s holding, the consecutive provision for multiple life sentences would become a nullity. Such a ruling is contrary to prior practice and extinguishes the distinction between multiple life sentences, consecutively imposed, and a single or concurrent life sentences for determining incarceration time and parole eligibility.
II. “HUNG” JURY
During its deliberations, the jury communicated to the trial court that it seemed to be hung and inquired whether to con*226tinue deliberations. In the ensuing colloquy, the trial judge told the jury that “three and a half hours would not be sufficient for you to have deliberated fully,” and subsequently stated: “.. .[Y]our decision must be a unanimous decision of all twelve of you...”
In capital cases, the General Assembly has set forth a clear directive when a jury is unable to render a decision as to a sentence. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (1985 & Supp. 1989) states, in relevant part:
In the event that all members of the jury after a reasonable deliberation cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant found guilty of murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment...
I would find that the trial judge’s incorrect statement of the law, under these circumstances, tended to coerce the jury into reaching a unanimous verdict. Due to the unique nature of the death penalty, practices allowed in other noncapital criminal cases may be constitutionally impermissible if utilized in a capital case. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 705, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2073, 80 L. Ed. (2d) 674 (1984).
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand this case for a new sentencing phase trial.

. The vote was ten to two.

 The appellant had previously been convicted of two counts of murder and received the death penalty on each count. State v. Joseph Ernest Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E. (2d) 302 (1987).

 I am fully aware of the fact that under our sentencing scheme, the jury has no involvement in determining whether a sentence will be consecutive or concurrent; that determination is "for the trial court.