Court Opinion

ID: 9914948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 20:00:45.422296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:41.941122
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10283    Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 01/03/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10283
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        TRAVIS C. CROSBY,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00011-LMM-CCB-3
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10283

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Travis Crosby appeals his convictions and sentences for con-
        spiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, bank
        fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, making a false statement to
        a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, and
        money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), after
        obtaining a fraudulent $300,000 loan in 2020 under the federal
        Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). On appeal, he argues that:
        (1) at trial, the district court erred by admitting testimonial evi-
        dence concerning fraudulent PPP loan activity of other conspira-
        tors, since this evidence was unrelated to the conspiracy he was
        charged with and highly prejudicial; and (2) at sentencing, the court
        erred when it held him accountable for the $600,000 loss associated
        with the PPP loans that were not his, because there was insufficient
        evidence that he was in a jointly-undertaken activity with them and
        the court failed to make individualized findings when it held him
        accountable for their loss. After careful review, we affirm.
                                         I.
                We review a district court’s decision as to the admissibility
        of evidence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and
        “will affirm even if we would have decided the other way.” United
        States v. Burnette, 65 F.4th 591, 605–06 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations
        omitted). Accordingly, even erroneous evidentiary rulings are
        only reversed if the resulting error was not harmless. United States
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        23-10283               Opinion of the Court                         3

        v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1048 (11th Cir. 2001). An error is harm-
        less where it has “no substantial influence on the outcome and suf-
        ficient evidence uninfected by the error supports the verdict.” Id.
        (quotations omitted).
                We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing
        Guidelines de novo and its loss determination for clear error. United
        States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). For a finding
        to be clearly erroneous, the appellate court, based on the record as
        a whole, must be “left with a definite and firm conviction that a
        mistake has been committed.” United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d
        1178, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). However, we
        need not reverse an error that was harmless, and an error is harm-
        less if the defendant’s guideline range is unaffected by it. United
        States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011).
                                         II.
                First, we are unpersuaded by Crosby’s argument that the
        district court erred in admitting certain testimony at trial. The Fed-
        eral Rules of Evidence define “relevant evidence” as evidence that
        “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable,” provided
        that “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R.
        Evid. 401. Generally, relevant evidence is admissible unless other-
        wise specified. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
        prohibits the introduction of evidence of a crime, wrong, or other
        act to “prove a person’s character in order to show that on a partic-
        ular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
        Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). It does, however, allow this kind of
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10283

        evidence for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity,
        intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
        or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
               When reviewing a cold record, we give substantial defer-
        ence to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations, resolving all
        credibility choices in support of the verdict. United States v. Le-
        bowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1009, 1013–14 (11th Cir. 2012). Further,
        “when a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that if disbe-
        lieved the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is
        true.” United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1279–80 (11th Cir.
        2007) (quotations and alterations omitted).
               A party abandons a claim when he does not plainly and
        prominently raise it in his brief, by, for example, devoting a section
        of his argument to that claim. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
        739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Campbell,
        26 F.4th 860, 871 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). In other words, “an
        appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing ref-
        erence to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting
        arguments and authority.” United States v. Esformes, 60 F.4th 621,
        635 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted).
              Here, Crosby challenges the district court’s admission of tes-
        timonial evidence of fraudulent PPP loan activity from Rodericque
        Thompson and Antonio Hosey -- individuals with whom Crosby
        conspired to obtain a fraudulent PPP loan and conceal the fraud
        through a check-cashing scheme -- because Crosby claims their tes-
        timony covered conspiracies unrelated to his. At the outset, we
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        23-10283                 Opinion of the Court                              5

        note that although Crosby does not cite Rule 401 in his initial brief,
        he says that Hosey’s and Thompson’s evidence “is purely extrinsic,
        since it had nothing to do with the conspiracy in which [he] was
        found guilty of having participated.” So, as we see it, he does chal-
        lenge the relevancy and intrinsic nature of the evidence under Rule
        401, and has not abandoned this issue on appeal.
               Nevertheless, we need not reach whether the district court
        abused its discretion in admitting Hosey’s and Thompson’s testi-
        mony about the fraudulent loan activity of other conspirators, be-
        cause the error was harmless in light of the substantial independent
        evidence of Crosby’s guilt. 1 As the record reflects, independent of
        the challenged testimony, which was just over two pages of a
        three-day trial transcript, the government presented sufficient evi-
        dence uninfected by the alleged error that supports the verdict.
               For starters, the unchallenged evidence -- which includes
        Crosby’s own testimony -- established that coconspirator Thomp-
        son helped Crosby obtain a PPP loan. Crosby conceded that
        Thompson had completed a PPP loan application for him that
        fraudulently claimed, on behalf of Crosby’s business, $120,000 in
        monthly payroll and 16 employees, and contained a fraudulent
        Form 941 substantiating the information. Crosby admitted to re-
        ceiving a $300,000 PPP loan as a result of the fraudulent

        1 To the extent Crosby also is seeking to challenge whether Hosey’s and

        Thompson’s testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), we do not reach
        that issue either, because, again, even assuming the testimony was inadmissi-
        ble under Rule 404(b), the error was harmless, as we’ll explain.
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                23-10283

        application. In addition, the evidence revealed that Crosby had
        written 24 purported payroll checks to individuals who did not
        work for his company, including those he testified to not knowing
        at the time, and he falsely confirmed that the checks were legiti-
        mate payroll checks when bank representatives called him to verify
        the checks. Importantly, the jury also heard Crosby testify that he
        believed that everything Thompson was instructing him to do was
        “legit,” and that he did not know that what they were doing was a
        “scam.” As we’ve long recognized, the jury, hearing Crosby’s
        words and seeing his demeanor, was entitled to disbelieve his tes-
        timony and, in fact, believe the opposite of what he said -- that he
        knew what he was doing was not legit, and that it was a scam.
        Turner, 474 F.3d at 1279–80.
               Further, Thompson gave other compelling testimony --
        aside from his testimony concerning other fraudulent schemes -- of
        Crosby’s guilt. This includes evidence that Thompson had told
        Crosby that a certain number of employees and a certain amount
        of payroll needed to be included on the application for the PPP
        loan, that Crosby was on the phone as Thompson completed the
        application and was aware that Thompson was entering that false
        information, that Thompson charged Crosby a 50 percent fee to
        provide 8 fictious employees to cash employee checks, and that
        Crosby had to come up with 8 fictitious employees to help cash the
        checks. There was also testimony from Thompson that Crosby
        had referred other people, Keith Maloney and Market Stewart, to
        Thompson to file other fraudulent PPP loans. On appeal, Crosby
        claims that this testimony was inconsistent, but we defer to the
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        23-10283                Opinion of the Court                          7

        fact-finder’s credibility determinations, resolving all credibility
        choices in support of the verdict. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d at 1009, 1013.
        Moreover, even without considering Thompson’s testimony
        (which the jury was entitled to consider), there was more than
        enough independent evidence to establish Crosby’s guilt.
               All told, on this ample record, we are compelled to conclude
        that the challenged testimony had no substantial influence on the
        outcome on the verdict, and we affirm Crosby’s convictions. See
        Dickerson, 248 F.3d at 1048.
                                          III.
                 We also are unconvinced by Crosby’s argument that the dis-
        trict court erred at sentencing when it held him accountable for a
        $600,000 loss, part of which was associated with the PPP loans of
        other people. Under the sentencing guidelines, a defendant is ac-
        countable for all acts that he “committed, aided, abetted . . . or will-
        fully caused.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). In cases involving joint crim-
        inal activity, a defendant is also accountable for the conduct of oth-
        ers if that conduct was (1) “within the scope of the joint undertaken
        criminal activity,” (2) “in furtherance of that criminal activity, and”
        (3) “reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activ-
        ity.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
               “When determining the loss amount attributable to a partic-
        ular defendant convicted of a conspiracy offense, the district court
        must first determine the scope of criminal activity the defendant
        agreed to jointly undertake, and then consider all reasonably fore-
        seeable acts and omissions of others in the jointly undertaken
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10283

        criminal activity.” United States v. McCrimmon, 362 F.3d 725, 731
        (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). We’ve held that the district
        court erred when it did not make specific factual findings upon
        which to base the loss amounts. Medina, 485 F.3d at 1304–05.
        However, we’ve also recognized that “a sentencing court’s failure
        to make individualized findings regarding the scope of the defend-
        ant’s activity is not grounds for vacating a sentence if the record
        supports the court’s determination with respect to the offense con-
        duct, including the imputation of others’ unlawful acts to the de-
        fendant.” United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002).
                Because loss amount is a factual finding, in calculating the
        amount of loss attributable to a defendant, a district court may rely
        on “trial evidence, undisputed statements in the presentence re-
        port, or evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.” United
        States v. Pierre, 825 F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2016). “The amount
        of loss must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and the
        burden must be satisfied with reliable and specific evidence.” Me-
        dina, 485 F.3d at 1304 (quotations omitted).
               For offenses involving fraud, under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, the
        Guidelines provide an increase to a defendant’s offense level de-
        pending on the amount of loss that resulted from the fraud, starting
        with a base level of 7 where “the defendant was convicted of an
        offense referenced to this guideline,” and where the “offense of
        conviction has a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 20
        years or more.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1). Section 2B1.1 of the 2021
        Guidelines provides for a 14-level increase for a fraud offense
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        23-10283               Opinion of the Court                        9

        involving a loss amount that is more than $550,000, but less than
        $1,500,000. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).
               Here, the district court did not clearly err in holding Crosby
        accountable for a $600,000 loss. Although the court did not make
        individualized findings at sentencing, as it should have, the record
        supports holding Crosby responsible for this loss amount. Petrie,
        302 F.3d at 1290. As we’ve already discussed, the record established
        that Crosby received a $300,000 PPP loan as a result of his fraudu-
        lent application. In addition, the record included testimony from
        Thompson -- testimony that, as we’ve explained, we defer to and
        deem credible in support of the verdict, see Lebowitz, 676 F.3d at
        1009, 1013 -- that Crosby had referred another person, Keith Malo-
        ney, to Thompson for help in filing a fraudulent PPP loan on Malo-
        ney’s behalf. The government also produced text messages be-
        tween Crosby and Thompson in which Thompson sent Crosby a
        picture of Maloney’s loan approval showing that Maloney had re-
        ceived $300,000. Thompson texted that “Keith [Maloney] was ap-
        proved,” and Crosby responded saying, “that’s was [sic] up.” Plus,
        the government introduced text messages between Thompson and
        Crosby in which Crosby was providing Thompson with Maloney’s
        contact information. On this record, the loss of the $300,000 PPP
        loan made to Maloney was reasonably foreseeable to Crosby, and
        we cannot say that we are left “with a definite and firm conviction”
        that the district court’s decision to hold Crosby responsible for
        Maloney’s loss was a mistake. Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1195.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10283

                 In short, the evidence reveals that Crosby was aware of
        Thompson’s fraudulent PPP loan scheme, that Crosby applied for
        his own $300,000 fraudulent loan, that he referred Maloney to
        Thompson for a fraudulent PPP loan, and that Maloney was ap-
        proved for a $300,000 PPP loan -- which altogether results in a loss
        amount of $600,000. We need not address whether the district
        court erred in attributing to Crosby the loss from another $300,000
        PPP loan -- one for coconspirator Market Stewart -- because any
        error in the inclusion of Stewart’s loan in Crosby’s loss amount was
        harmless. Indeed, even excluding Stewart’s $300,000 PPP loan, the
        loss amount still would be $600,000, which, under the Guidelines,
        still results in a 14-level increase. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). Ac-
        cordingly, we affirm.
               AFFIRMED.