Court Opinion

ID: 9905410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 15:07:42.957332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:22.782499
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1017-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LUCIA MANZANO,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________

                   Submitted November 9, 2023 – Decided November 29, 2023

                   Before Judges Vernoia and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,
                   Docket No. FO-18-0101-23.

                   John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for appellant (Ryan A. Quiñones, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

                   DeFilippo & DeFilippo, LLC, attorneys for respondent
                   (Angel M. DeFilippo, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      The State appeals from an order dismissing its prosecution of defendant

Lucia Manzano on contempt and resisting arrest disorderly persons offenses

based on a finding defendant's actions constituted de minimis infractions under

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11. Having reviewed the parties' arguments, the record, and the

applicable legal principles, we find the court abused its discretion by dismissing

the prosecution and reverse.

                                        I.

      N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 permits an assignment judge to dismiss a prosecution

under certain specified circumstances. In its consideration of a dismissal motion

under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11, a court must "assume[] that the conduct charged

actually occurred[,]" accept as true the State's allegations, and view the facts in

the light most favorable to the State. State v. Zarrilli, 216 N.J. Super. 231, 236

(Law Div. 1987); see also State v. Evans, 340 N.J. Super. 244, 249 (App. Div.

2001). We therefore rely on, and accept as true, the following facts gleaned from

the State's allegations in the complaint-warrant filed against defendant, an

affidavit of probable cause, and police reports provided to the motion court.

      At 3:04 a.m. on July 2, 2022, a municipal court judge entered a temporary

restraining order (TRO) against defendant under the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on a claim defendant

                                                                             A-1017-22
                                        2
committed the predicate act of assault by punching the individual (the plaintiff)

who sought the TRO, and causing the plaintiff physical injury. The TRO barred

defendant from returning to the scene of the violence—the plaintiff's residence

he "shared" with defendant—and from having "any oral, written, personal,

electronic, or other form of contact or communication with" the plaintiff.

(Emphasis in original).    The TRO permitted defendant to obtain personal

belongings from the residence, but only with a police escort.

      The TRO had been entered following defendant's arrest on charges arising

out of the alleged domestic violence incident. The police served defendant with

the TRO, and she was then released from the custody attendant to her arrest.

      Within an hour of the issuance of the TRO, at 3:56 a.m., the plaintiff

reported to the police defendant had violated the TRO during the short time

following her release from custody by "calling him about seventeen times and

texting him." The plaintiff also reported defendant was at the residence. Two

officers went to the residence but did not locate defendant there. The plaintiff

informed the officers "he was in fear of his life," and the officers searched the

building complex where the residence was located but did not find defendant

and left.

                                                                           A-1017-22
                                       3
      Twenty minutes later, the plaintiff contacted police headquarters and

advised that defendant was in the residence. The plaintiff advised he was

"downstairs," and he could see defendant "on the balcony of" the residence. The

officers returned to the residence but did not locate defendant.

      As the officers left, they observed defendant's vehicle running "in the

parking lot and [they] heard a female voice yelling." The officers approached

the vehicle and observed defendant "sitting in the car."

      One of the officers asked defendant to get out of car because she was under

arrest for violating the TRO. In response, defendant "kept saying she was not

going to exit the vehicle." After multiple requests to defendant to get out of the

car, one of the officers removed her from the vehicle. As the officers then

attempted to arrest defendant and put her in handcuffs, defendant resisted by

"flailing her arms and not complying with" the officers' orders.

      The officers were subsequently successful in their efforts to handcuff

defendant, and they transported her to police headquarters where she was

charged with the disorderly persons offenses of contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

9(b)(2), and resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1).

      In the complaint-warrant charging the offenses, the State alleged

defendant committed the offense of contempt by communicating by phone and

                                                                            A-1017-22
                                        4
via text message with the plaintiff in violation of the TRO.    In an affidavit of

probable cause supporting defendant's arrest, one of the officers stated

"defendant was believed to have gone into" the plaintiff's residence in violation

of the TRO.

      The complaint-warrant further alleged defendant resisted arrest "by,

refusing to obey the officer's orders to exit [her] vehicle [and] place her hands

behind her back as directed," and by "flailing her body in an attempt to resist"

the officer's efforts to place her in handcuffs. The affidavit of probable cause

similarly asserted defendant had refused orders to exit her vehicle and "flail[ed]

her body in an attempt to break the officer's physical contact [with her] during

the arrest."

Defendant's Motion

      Defendant moved to dismiss the charges as de minimis infractions under

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11. At the hearing on the motion, defendant offered a different

version of the events leading to her arrest that was apparently, at least in part,

supported by the court's review of the officers' body-cam recordings of

defendant's arrest. 1   The court also considered an unsworn letter from the

1
  The body-worn recordings were not admitted in evidence or marked as exhibits
at the hearing on defendant's motion and are not part of the record on appeal.

                                                                            A-1017-22
                                        5
plaintiff, dated more than two weeks after the July 2, 2022 incident, in which he

stated: defendant is the "love of [his] life"; he does "not feel [defendant] is a

threat to [his] safety"; he felt "terrible about getting the courts involved"; he

had been "over-emotional and vindictive" when making the calls to the police

that led to defendant's arrest; and he requested the charges against defendant "be

dropped."

      Defendant's counsel argued the charges against defendant should be

dismissed as de minimis under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 because the plaintiff had

requested dismissal, the plaintiff admitted to calling the police in a vindictive

manner, and the officers' body-cam recordings showed defendant's refusal to

follow the police directives to exit the vehicle and cooperate while being

handcuffed was based on her concern about what would happen to the small dog

she had with her at the time. 2 Counsel also argued there was no evidence

We summarize the court's findings concerning what was depicted on the
recordings based on its review of them. We note that in its brief on appeal, the
State does not dispute the court's findings.
2
   In its decision on defendant's motion, the court found that during the police
interaction with defendant in the parking lot, defendant said she went to the
residence and "that her cousin got her small dog, gave it to her, and she was on
her way home," when the police intervened to place her under arrest. The record
does not reveal the location from which the cousin purportedly obtained the dog,
but the court found the residence at issue was "shared" by plaintiff and

                                                                            A-1017-22
                                        6
defendant entered the plaintiff's residence in violation of the TRO and the TRO

did not prevent defendant from "getting her car in the parking lot" of the

plaintiff's apartment building. Counsel further asserted defendant may have

acted "inappropriately" during her interactions with the police, but there was

insufficient evidence she committed either of the charged offenses.

      Relying on the body-cam recordings, the State argued defendant clearly

resisted arrest, telling the officers, "I am not going to the police station" and

making numerous requests that the officers "shoot" her as they attempted to

place her under arrest both before and after the dog was taken from her.     The

State further noted the complaint-warrant's narrative and the officers' reports

explained that the plaintiff had stated defendant made "more than a dozen calls"

to him following entry of the TRO, and the court was bound "to accept the

conduct" as alleged by the State in determining defendant's dismissal motion

under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11.

defendant. The record does not indicate whether the officers observed the
alleged cousin at or near the residence during the short time that elapsed from
the issuance of the TRO at 3:04 a.m. and the time of defendant's arrest or how
the cousin obtained the dog from the residence or gained entry into the residence
to do so. We note, however, the TRO barred defendant from retrieving personal
property from the residence without a police escort.
                                                                           A-1017-22
                                       7
      The court granted defendant's motion in a decision from the bench. The

court found defendant had been served with the TRO, which barred her from

returning to the residence she "shared" with the plaintiff. The court further

found the officers returned to the residence twice in response to reports made by

the plaintiff that defendant was at, and then in, the residence.        The court

explained the officers saw defendant in the "parking garage of the residence,"

and defendant denied she had been in the residence, but stated she went there

and "her cousin got her small dog, and gave it to her."

      The court further found the officers directed defendant to "get out of the

car," but [s]he objected saying she "didn't know what to do with the dog."

According to the court, the officers asked defendant to either place the dog on

the ground in the garage or leave the dog in the car, but defendant "objected to

both of those." The court found the officers then "grabbed defendant" and "took

her from the car," and an officer took the dog and handed it to the plaintiff. The

court did not make any findings contrary to the State's allegations that defendant

flailed her arms and body as a means of resisting the officers' efforts to handcuff

her and effectuate an arrest.

      The court further rejected the State's allegation that defendant called the

plaintiff seventeen times after she had been served with the TRO that barred her

                                                                             A-1017-22
                                        8
from having any contact with him. Although the complaint-warrant and police

reports stated the plaintiff had reported that defendant made seventeen calls and

texts to him following service of the TRO, the court found there was no support

in the record that those calls were made. The court further noted the plaintiff

had dismissed the TRO and requested dismissal of the charges against defendant.

      The    court   also   explained   defendant    asserted   the   "underlying

facts . . . suggest no TRO violation or resisting arrest occurred," and defendant's

actions in response to the officers' directives were reasonable because she

needed time to arrange for the dog's care. The court further found no evidence

defendant had entered the plaintiff's residence.

      The court determined "the underlying facts" support dismissal of the

charges as de minimis infractions under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b) and (c). The court

concluded "there is no evidence defendant actually caused or threatened the

harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law in defining the offense[s,] and

the actions were too trivial to warrant condemnation or conviction."           See

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b). The court also granted defendant's motion based on a

separate finding "the case presents extenuating circumstances that cannot be

reasonably regarded as [envisaged] by the Legislature," see N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(c),

                                                                             A-1017-22
                                        9
but the court did not identify or make any findings as to the extenuating

circumstances on which it relied.

      The court entered an order granting defendant's motion and dismissing the

charges. The State appealed the court's order as of right. See ibid.

                                        II.

      The determination of a motion to dismiss charges as de minimis under

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 rests in the assignment judge's discretion. Evans, 340 N.J.

Super. at 248.    We therefore review the court's order granting defendant's

dismissal motion on de minimis grounds for an abuse of discretion. Ibid.

      We "may find an abuse of discretion when a decision 'rest[s] on an

impermissible basis' or was 'based upon a consideration of irrelevant or

inappropriate factors.'" State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 497, 515 (2018) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 231, 255 (App. Div. 2017)). We

"can also discern an abuse of discretion when the trial court fails to take into

consideration all relevant factors and when its decision reflects a clear erro r in

judgment." Ibid. (quoting C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255). Where a "trial court

renders a decision based upon a misconception of the law, that decision is not

entitled to any particular deference and consequently will be reviewed de novo."

Ibid. (quoting C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255).

                                                                             A-1017-22
                                       10
       N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 authorizes an assignment judge to dismiss a prosecution

on any one of three grounds after considering "the nature of the conduct charged

to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances." More

particularly, the statute allows an assignment judge to dismiss a prosecution

based on a determination the defendant's conduct:

             a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither
             expressly negated by the person whose interest was
             infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law
             defining the offense;

             b. Did not actually cause or threaten harm or evil sought
             to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did
             so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
             condemnation of conviction; or

             c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot
             reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature
             in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall
             not dismiss the prosecution under this section without
             giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be
             heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any
             such dismissal.

             [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11.]

       The statute, with modifications, was modeled after § 2.12 of the Model

Penal Code (MPC).3 State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 587 (1997) (citing 1 The

3
    MPC § 2.12 provides as follows:

                                                                          A-1017-22
                                       11
New Jersey Penal Code, Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision

Commission, cmt. to § 2C:2-11, at 23 (1971)).                 "The drafters of

the MPC summarized the historical basis for that section as a 'kind of

unarticulated authority to mitigate the general provisions of the criminal law to

prevent absurd applications.'" Ibid. (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 The New

Jersey Penal Code, Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision

Commission, cmt. to § 2C:2-11, at 74 (1971)). Indeed, the Court has noted there

            The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard
            to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an
            offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances,
            it finds that the defendant's conduct:

            (1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither
            expressly negatived by the person whose interest was
            infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law
            defining the offense; or

            (2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil
            sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
            or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
            condemnation of conviction; or

            (3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot
            reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature
            in forbidding the offense.

            The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under
            Subsection (3) of this Section without filing a written
            statement of its reasons.

                                                                           A-1017-22
                                      12
is no hesitancy in our jurisprudence "to terminate a potential prosecution when

the charge has been trivial or the prosecution would have been absurd." Ibid.

      Here, the assignment judge granted defendant's dismissal motion, finding

grounds to do so under subsections (b) and (c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11. In making

its decision, the court did not apply the correct legal standard. Contrary to the

well-established principles governing the disposition of a motion under N.J.S.A.

2C:2-11, the court neither accepted the State's allegations as true nor considered

the facts in the light most favorable to the State. Evans, 340 N.J. Super. at 251;

Zarrilli, 216 N.J. Super. at 236. Rather, the court accepted defendant's version

of the events, viewed the alleged facts supporting defendant's version in a light

most favorable to her, and suggested defendant's conduct constituted de minimis

infractions because defendant did not commit any infractions at all.

      The court found there was no evidence defendant called the plaintiff

following her receipt of the TRO, but in the complaint-warrant and affidavit of

probable cause, the State alleged the plaintiff reported defendant called him

seventeen times following her receipt of the TRO. Similarly, the court did not

accept as true that the plaintiff reported to officers he saw defendant at, and in,

                                                                             A-1017-22
                                       13
the residence following her receipt of the TRO.4 Moreover, the court did not

accept as true the State's evidence defendant defiantly refused to heed to the

officers' orders that she exit her vehicle after being informed she was arrested ,

or that she physically resisted arrest by flailing her arms and body to prevent the

officers from placing her in handcuffs. 5

      We conclude the court abused its discretion in granting defendant's motion

because it did not apply the correct legal standard in its assessment of the facts

pertinent to the determination of a dismissal motion under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11.

See S.N., 231 N.J. at 515. Based on our de novo review of the record, see ibid.,

we are also persuaded that application of the correct legal standard to the State's

4
   In support of its decision, the court relied in part on the plaintiff's unsworn
letter, written more than two weeks after the incident, in which he expresses
regret at calling the police on July 2, 2022. However, the letter does not
contradict the complaint-warrant and police reports detailing his statements to
the police on July 2, 2022, that defendant called and texted him seventeen times
and entered the residence twice shortly after she was served with the TRO. That
is, although the plaintiff may have regretted calling the police, his letter does
not state he falsely informed the police about defendant's calls and texts to him,
or her presence at and in the residence, following entry of the TRO.
5
   The court's bench decision dismissing the resisting arrest charge as a de
minimis infraction makes no mention of the State's allegation, which the court
was required to accept as true, ibid., that defendant physically resisted being
placed in handcuffs before and after the dog was taken from her.
                                                                             A-1017-22
                                       14
version of the pertinent facts requires reversal of the court's order granting the

motion.

      As noted, the court granted defendant's motion under subsections (b) and

(c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11. Under subsection (b), a court does not determine

"whether the defendant is innocent or guilty of the offense[s] charged." Evans,

340 N.J. Super. at 249. Instead, the court must decide whether the conduct

charged "'actually cause[d] or threaten[ed] the harm sought to be prevented,'

or . . . was . . . 'too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.'" Ibid.

(quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b)). Again, in making those determinations, "the

judge must assume 'that the conduct charged actually occurred.'" Ibid. (quoting

State v. Cabana, 315 N.J. Super. 84, 86 (Law Div. 1997), aff'd, 318 N.J. Super.

259 (App. Div. 1999)).

      The State charged defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1) with contempt

of the TRO entered pursuant to the PDVA. A defendant is guilty of contempt if

the defendant "purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order

entered under the provisions of the" PDVA.         N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1).      To

establish the elements of the offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that: "(1) a restraining order was issued under the [PDVA]; (2) the

defendant's violation of the order; (3) that defendant acted purposely or

                                                                            A-1017-22
                                       15
knowingly; and (4) the conduct that constituted the violation also constituted a

crime or disorderly persons offense." 6 State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334,

341-42 (1996).

      Under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b), the "harm or evil sought to be prevented" by

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)(2) is the "vindication of the authority of the court . . . [as]

court orders must be obeyed." In re Adler, 153 N.J. Super. 496, 501 (App. Div.

1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Restraining orders are entered for

purposes of shielding a victim who needs protection and who is compelled to

seek judicial assistance to obtain that security[.]" State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161,

189 (2010). Issuance of restraining orders under the PDVA "effectuates the

notion that the victim of domestic violence is entitled to be left alone. To be left

alone is, in essence, the basic protection the law seeks to assure" victims of

domestic violence. State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)); see also In re

Forfeiture of Pers.Weapons and Firearms Identification Card Belonging to F.M.,

225 N.J. 487, 509 (2016) (quoting Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 584-85) (explaining

domestic violence restraining orders entered pursuant to the PDVA are intended

6
  Where, as here, the conduct constituting the alleged violation of a TRO "would
otherwise not constitute a crime," the contempt charge "is treated as a criminal
disorderly persons offense." State v. E.J.H., 466 N.J. Super. 32, 37 (App. Div.
2021); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2).
                                                                              A-1017-22
                                        16
to prevent the harm or evil presented by "those who commit acts of domestic

violence, [who] may 'have an unhealthy need to control and dominate their

partners and frequently do not stop their abusive behavior despite a court

order'").

      Here, the State's allegations concerning defendant's actions, which we

accept as true for purposes of our analysis of the dismissal motion under

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11, caused, and threatened to cause, the harm sought to be

prevented under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)(2), the contempt statute pursuant to which

defendant was charged. The plaintiff sought the protections afforded to victims

of domestic violence under the PDVA by obtaining the TRO and reported to the

police defendant's alleged violations of the TRO—numerous telephone calls to

him and returns to the residence—within one hour of service of the TRO and her

release from custody on charges she assaulted the plaintiff, who reported to the

officers he feared for his life. To be sure, the plaintiff later requested dismissal

of the TRO and the disorderly persons offense charges, but his change of heart

does not alter the fact that defendant's alleged actions in violating the TRO

caused and threatened to cause the harm or evil—violations of a properly issued

TRO and of an alleged domestic violence victim's right to be left alone—

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)(2) was intended to prevent.

                                                                              A-1017-22
                                        17
      For the same reasons, we reject defendant's claim the contempt

prosecution should be dismissed as de minimis because the alleged violation of

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)(2) is "to too trivial to warrant the condemnation of

conviction." N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b). "[W]hat is most important" in assessing the

triviality of a defendant's conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b) "is the risk of harm

to society of defendant's conduct." Evans, 340 N.J. Super. at 253 (citing Zarrilli,

216 N.J. Super at 239).

      In Evans, we reversed the dismissal of a shoplifting prosecution finding

the defendant's theft of a $12.90 hair bow was not trivial under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-

11(b) because of the seriousness of the risk of harm to society presented by the

offense of shoplifting. Ibid. So too here, we find nothing trivial in defendant's

actions in contacting the plaintiff through seventeen phone calls and twice being

at the residence in violation of the TRO during early morning hours immediately

following her release from custody after being charged with assaulting the

plaintiff. Defendant's alleged actions posed a significant risk of harm to society

because her actions are precisely those the PDVA is intended to prohibit and

                                                                             A-1017-22
                                       18
prevent.7 See, e.g., Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 587-90 (finding defendant violated the

contempt statute by "sending . . . two mailings" to the victim); State v. E.J.H.,

466 N.J. 32, 39 (App. Div. 2021) (reinstating contempt charge under N.J.S.A.

2C:29-9(b)(1), based on a violation of a restraining order entered under the

PDVA, after finding the defendant "was aware of the high probability" the

7
    We are aware that in assessing the risk of harm to society posed by a
defendant's conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b), the court may consider the
following subordinate factors:

            (a) The circumstances surrounding the commission of
            the offense. . . .

            (b) The existence of contraband.

            (c) The amount and value of the property involved.

            (d) The use or threat of violence.

            (e) The use of weapons.

            [(Evans, 340 N.J. Super. at 250) (quoting Zarrilli, 216
            N.J. Super at 240).]

      The court did not consider or assess these factors in its analysis of
defendant's motion. In our de novo review of the motion, and for the reasons
we explain, we find nothing in the circumstances of the offenses, as alleged by
the State, supporting a finding defendant's conduct did not pose a risk of harm
to society. Although her conduct did not involve contraband, property, or the
use of weapons, defendant's alleged violation of a TRO issued pursuant to the
PDVA and physical resistance to the officers' efforts to arrest her support our
determination the charged conduct presented a risk of harm to society.
                                                                           A-1017-22
                                      19
victim would hear comments and observe a gesture directed at her through a

security camera).

      In sum, for those reasons, we therefore conclude the court abused its

discretion by finding defendant was entitled to a dismissal of the prosecution of

the contempt charge based on its determination defendant's alleged actions

constituted a de minimis infraction under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b).

      Defendant is also not entitled to a dismissal of prosecution of the

disorderly persons resisting arrest charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b). The record

does not support the court's conclusory determination that defendant's defiance

of the officers' orders to exit her vehicle to be arrested, and flailing of her arms

and body to prevent the officers from placing her in handcuffs, did not actually

cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

2(a)(1), the statute pursuant to which defendant was charged with resisting

arrest.

      N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1) provides that a person is guilty of the disorderly

persons offense of resisting arrest "if [s]he purposely prevents or attempts to

prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting an arrest." The Supreme Court

has explained that "the text, composition, and structure of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2

reveal an overall legislative purpose to avoid physical confrontation between

                                                                              A-1017-22
                                        20
arrestees, police officers, and the public." State v. Brannon, 178 N.J. 500, 508

(2004).

      In enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2, the Legislature eschewed the MPC's "view

that mere non-submission should not be an offense, believing an affirmative

policy of submission to be appropriate as now seems to be our law." Ibid.

(quoting 2 The New Jersey Penal Code, Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal

Law Revision Commission, commentary 1 on § 2C:29-2 at 282 (1971). "[A]

person has no right to resist arrest by . . . any . . . means, even if the arrest

constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the constitution." State v. Crawley,

187 N.J. 440, 453 (2006). Most simply stated, under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a), a

person is required to "submit to an arrest, even if illegal." Ibid.

      The harm or evil sought to be prevented by N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) is the

avoidance of "self-help" by individuals against law enforcement officers'

attempts to arrest. Id. at 453-54. The policy underlying the resisting arrest

offense is "that in a society governed by laws[,] our courts are the proper forum

for challenges to the misuse of official power and for the vindication of rights."

Id. at 454. The statute embodies a recognition that "resisting arrest greatly

increases the likelihood of physical harm to both the arresting officers and the

suspect, as well as innocent bystanders." Ibid.

                                                                            A-1017-22
                                       21
      Defendant's actions in refusing to follow the officers' directives that she

exit her vehicle, and her subsequent flailing of her arms and body in response to

the officers' efforts to place her in handcuffs, threatened the harm or evil sought

to be prevented by N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2. Indeed, defendant did not submit to the

officers' orders and physical efforts to place her under arrest. She defied them.

And, in doing so, the officers were compelled to physically remove her from the

vehicle and physically confront the flailing of her arms and body while they

attempted to effectuate a lawful arrest. Those physical interactions, borne from

defendant's defiance and actions, are precisely the harm and evil the resisting

arrest statute sought to prevent.

      Further, defendant's actions were not trivial under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b).

Defendant was defiant throughout the incident, first refusing to exit the vehicle

and then physically resisting the officers' efforts to place her in handcuffs. That

defendant did not use or threaten to use physical force against the officers or

create a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the officers or others is

pertinent only to a determination of the degree of the offense for which she was

charged. See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a) and (b) (defining elements of third-

degree resisting arrest). As to the disorderly persons resisting arrest offense with

which she was charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1), defendant's actions posed

                                                                              A-1017-22
                                        22
a risk of harm to society—the creation of disorder and physical interactions with

the officers—that is not "too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction"

of the disorderly persons offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b); see also Evans, 340 N.J.

Super. at 252.    Defendant is therefore not entitled to a dismissal of the

prosecution for resisting arrest under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b).

      The court also erred by dismissing the prosecution of both charges under

subsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 based on its conclusory determination that

defendant's conduct presented extenuations such "that it cannot reasonably be

regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense." The court

did not identify any such extenuations as to either charge, defendant does not

point to evidence of any, and we find none.

      Accepting the State's allegations as true, defendant brazenly violated the

TRO by calling the plaintiff seventeen times and entering his residence within

minutes of being served with a TRO that expressly prohibited such conduct.

There is simply nothing in defendant's alleged conduct, nor the circumstances

surrounding it, supporting a reasoned conclusion that defendant's actions are

beyond those which the Legislature envisioned in enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

2(a)(1). And, in our view, defendant's apparent desire to obtain the return of her

dog is simply not an extenuation vaulting her alleged numerous violations of the

                                                                            A-1017-22
                                       23
TRO beyond what the Legislature intended would be prohibited by N.J.S.A.

2C:29-2(a)(1).

      The record similarly lacks evidence of any extenuations such that

prosecution of defendant for resisting arrest, based on her defiance and physical

actions in response to the officers' efforts to place her in custody, is beyond that

which the Legislature intended in its enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2).

Again, in our view, defendant's concern for her dog was not an extenuating

circumstance such that her resistance to the officers' orders and efforts to place

her under arrest falls outside what the Legislature, which adopted the statute to

make clear arrestees must simply submit to officers' efforts to arrest, intended.

In sum, the record is simply bereft of extenuating circumstances supporting

dismissal of the prosecution of the charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(c).

      We reject defendant's claim the court correctly granted her motion for

dismissal of the prosecution on the charges because she did not commit the

offenses charged. As noted, the court's decision accepted defendant's claims and

effectively granted the motion based on a finding defendant did not commit the

offenses. It was error to do so, and we will not repeat the error by offering an

opinion on defendant's guilt of the offenses or by considering defendant's claim

we should affirm the order because she did not commit them. Defendant is

                                                                              A-1017-22
                                        24
presumed innocent of the charges until the State satisfies its burden of proving

her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.       For purposes of the analysis of the

dismissal motion under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11, however, we must "assume[] the

conduct charged actually occurred," Zarrilli, 216 N.J. Super. at 236; Evans, 340

N.J. Super. at 249, and, in doing so, we find no support in the record for a

dismissal of the prosecution on either charge.

      Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                                          A-1017-22
                                      25