Court Opinion

ID: 9709277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:44:00.311164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.349440
License: Public Domain

RAKER and HARRELL, JJ.,
Dissent.
Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, J., which RAKER, J., Joins.
I dissent. While the Majority is welcome to pin its decision on the reasoning adopted previously by only three federal *64district courts,1 a handful of law journal articles,2 and a dissent,3 I would choose to follow and adopt the reasoning of the other courts (the vast majority) that have decided that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act permits binding arbitration to be elected for disputes arising under a covered warranty. See, e.g., Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir.2002); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, Inc., 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir.2002); Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Dixon, 399 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1306-07 (S.D.Ala.2005); Dombrowski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 318 F.Supp.2d 850, 850-51 (D.Ariz.2004); Pack v. Damon Corp., 320 F.Supp.2d 545, 558 (E.D.Mich.2004); Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So.2d 997, 1005-06 (Ala.2005); Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 818 N.E.2d 527, 536 (Ind. 2004); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, 209 Ill.2d 376, 283 Ill.Dec. 669, 808 N.E.2d 957, 970 (2004); Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 603, 677 N.W.2d 325 (2004); Howell v. Cappaert Manufactured Housing, Inc., 819 So.2d 461, 464 (La.Ct.App. 2002); In re American Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 492 (Tex.2001); S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So.2d 1131, 1135 (Ala.2000).
The Majority opinion, to its credit, gives a fair (and persuasive) summary of the reasoning in Davis and Walton. See Maj. op. at 54-57, 919 A.2d at 732-34. I need not repeat that here. Suffice it to add that the Federal Trade Commission’s anti-arbitration bias, expressed in its 1999 renewal of the view that “Section 110(a)(3) of the [Magnuson-Moss] Warranty Act ... clearly implies that a [informal dispute settlement] mechanism’s decision cannot be legally binding, because if it were it would bar later court action” (64 Fed.Reg. 19700, 19708 (1999)) is completely out-of-step with both Congress’ and the U.S. *65Supreme Court’s views regarding arbitration not being inherently hostile to consumers’ interests. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.—Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90, 121 S.Ct. 513, 521-22, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000).
Judge RAKER authorizes me to state that she joins the views expressed in this dissent.

. Rickard v. Teynor's Homes, Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 910 (N.D.Ohio 2003); Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F.Supp.2d 827 (E.D.Va.2002); and Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F.Supp.2d 958 (W.D.Va.2000).

. See Maj. op. at 54-57, n. 8, 919 A.2d at 734, n. 8.

. Chief Judge King’s dissent in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, Inc., 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir.2002).