Court Opinion

ID: 9962484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 18:22:01.753199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:18.657519
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                          April 23, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                           DIVISION II
 ERIC HOOD,                                                           No. 58362-3-II

                                 Appellant,

         v.

 CENTRALIA COLLEGE,                                               UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                 Respondent.

        GLASGOW, J.—Eric Hood submitted a public records request to Centralia College in

September 2019. He later sued the College in October 2020, under the Public Records Act (PRA),

ch. 42.56 RCW, alleging the College’s response to his request was inadequate.

        In the discovery phase of the 2020 litigation, Hood requested additional documents,

including board minutes, that both the trial court and appellate court deemed not responsive to his

earlier 2019 public records request. Other documents filed in the 2020 litigation, including his

complaint and legal briefing before the trial court and on appeal, also made it clear that Hood

wanted additional documents. Hood has identified six written statements made in the course of the

2020 litigation that he refers to as his “litigation requests.”

        The trial court in the 2020 litigation ultimately concluded that the College did not violate

the PRA when responding to Hood’s 2019 public records request. We affirmed the trial court, and

the Washington Supreme Court denied review. This concluded the 2020 litigation.
58362-3-II

       Hood then sued the College again in March 2023, arguing that his “litigation requests”

made during the course of the 2020 litigation constituted new public records requests that required

the College to respond under the PRA. The College filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of

collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court

granted the College’s motion.

       Hood appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by granting the College’s motion to dismiss

because his 2023 complaint asserted new claims, articulated a new cause of action, and was filed

within the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations. He also seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal

and on remand.

       We affirm the trial court and decline to remand. We decline to award Hood attorney fees

and costs on appeal.

                                              FACTS

       The current appeal arises from some of the same underlying facts as Hood v. Centralia

Coll., No. 56213-8-II (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2022) (unpublished).1

                                I. 2019 PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST

       In September 2019, Eric Hood emailed Centralia College a public records request for

records pertaining to a recent audit. Hood’s 2019 request stated, “I learned that your organization

was recently audited by the state auditor. May I have all records it got from the auditor and all

records of any response to the audit or to the audit report?” Hood, No. 56213-8-II, slip op. at 2.

1
 https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056213-8-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf,
review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1032, 525 P.3d 151 (2023).

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       A public records officer at the college collected records she deemed responsive to Hood’s

request. After a few emails to Hood where she communicated about how she was interpreting

Hood’s request, the public records officer sent a response containing the audit report and an

associated letter, the College’s response, and emails about the College’s response.

              II. 2020 LAWSUIT ARISING FROM THE 2019 PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST

       Unsatisfied with the records he received, Hood filed a complaint against the College in

October 2020 (the 2020 lawsuit). He now argues that a discovery request and arguments made in

briefing in the course of his 2020 lawsuit constituted new public records requests independent from

his 2019 request. Hood specifically identifies six “litigation requests.” Br. of Appellant at 3-6.

       In his 2020 complaint, Hood alleged that “Hood’s records request encompassed records

other than the documents it provided him,” and the College “with[held] records responsive to

Hood’s [2019] request.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 182. Hood contends that this language constituted

the first of his “litigation requests.” Hood did not identify what the missing records were in his

2020 complaint.

       During discovery, Hood began to seek documents beyond the scope of his 2019 public

records request. Request for production 23 in the first set of Hood’s discovery requests sought “all

records related to the State Auditor’s Office audit of the College . . . that have not been previously

produced, whether or not the College considers them responsive to the Plaintiff’s Request.” CP at

64-65, 303. Hood refers to this request for production as the second “litigation request.”

       The College objected to request for production 23, stating that it was “overly broad” and

“unduly burdensome” and sought information that was “outside the scope of discovery.” CP at 65.

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Without waiving these objections, the College produced documents responsive to request for

production 23 after a discovery conference where the parties clarified the scope of that request.

       The College, in its own interrogatory 11, asked Hood to describe what he considered to be

encompassed in the phrase ‘response to the audit,’ in his 2019 public records request for “all

records of any response to the audit or to the audit report.” Hood, No. 56213-8-II, slip op. at 2, 10.

Hood’s response, which he argues constitutes his third “litigation request,” explained that he

sought “any ‘reply or reaction’ to the audit or audit report and he included a link to a resource on

the Office of the Washington State Auditor’s website. Id. at 10. The linked resource provided a

general outline of the audit process, including a preaudit phase, an information-gathering phase,

audit findings, and communication of recommendation. Hood alleged that “[s]ome or all of the

actions described by the [State Auditor’s Office] involve records in the possession of the College

that are responsive to Plaintiff’s Request which it nonetheless withheld.” Id. at 11.

       The College produced its final response to Hood’s discovery requests on June 9, 2021. The

College produced 1,737 pages of records that were not part of the College’s response to Hood’s

2019 public records request.

       In his June 2021 brief on the merits, Hood pointed to the additional records produced in

discovery as proof that the College’s response to the 2019 public records request was inadequate.

Hood also argued that the College’s responses to his discovery requests were inadequate—notably

its failure to search its board files: “The College’s post-lawsuit search, not in response to Hood’s

records request but only in response to his discovery, was also inadequate. . . . The College’s failure

to search its Board files is unreasonable . . . . Its failure to produce [the board’s] minutes shows an

inadequate search . . . . The Minutes were not produced to Hood by the College, thus it withholds

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them.” CP at 98-99. Hood asserts this argument in his brief to the trial court was his fourth

“litigation request.”

       The College responded that Hood’s 2019 public records request was ambiguous. The trial

court agreed and ruled that the College did not violate the PRA, finding that Hood’s 2019 request

was “open to subjective interpretation,” the College’s interpretation was reasonable, and its search

was “reasonably calculated to identify all responsive records.” Hood, No. 56213-8-II, slip op. at

13. As a result, the trial court dismissed Hood’s 2020 lawsuit.

                        III. APPEAL OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE 2020 LAWSUIT

       In his brief to this court on appeal, Hood continued to argue that the College’s response to

his 2019 public records request was inadequate. Hood stated that his October 2020 complaint

“notified the College that Hood considered the College’s response to have been overly narrow.”

CP at 115. He asserted that “[t]he College nonetheless required Hood to engage in a prolonged

discovery dispute, and only then reluctantly produced records that it continue[d] to consider non-

responsive to his PRA request.” Id. Hood argued that “the College should have immediately

disclosed all the records that it instead produced to Hood only after a discovery dispute, along with

its Board’s minutes.” CP at 116. Hood asserts that this was his fifth “litigation request.”

       We affirmed, holding that the College’s search was “reasonably calculated to find

responsive records.” Hood, No. 56213-8-II, slip op. at 22. We further held that the College’s failure

to search Board records for minutes responding to the audit was reasonable.

       Hood then filed a petition for review with the Washington Supreme Court in November

2022. In the petition, Hood argued that “[e]ven if any part of Hood’s request was ambiguous, [the]

College had an obligation to modify its response as new information became available.” CP at

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147-48. According to Hood, because the College learned Hood wanted certain records, it had a

duty to produce them. Hood identifies these arguments in his petition as his sixth “litigation

request.” The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on March 8, 2023. See Ruling Den.

Rev., Hood v. Centralia Coll., No. 101464-3 (Wash. Mar. 8, 2023).

                                      IV. CURRENT LAWSUIT

       Shortly after the Washington Supreme Court denied his petition for review in March 2023,

Hood served the College with a new summons and complaint. Hood’s 2023 complaint claimed

that over the course of his 2020 lawsuit, the College learned that Hood wanted records independent

of his 2019 public records request:

                3.14 While litigating [Hood’s 2020 lawsuit, the] College disclosed some
       records to Hood that it considered non-responsive to his September 23, 2019 PRA
       request.
                3.15 While litigating [Hood’s 2020 lawsuit], Hood indicated to the College
       that he wanted other audit-related records he had identified during the course of
       litigation, including Board minutes that discuss the audit of the College.
                3.16 Whether [the] College considered Hood’s identification of other audit-
       related records, including Board records discussing the audit, to be a clarification
       of his September 23, 2019 PRA request or a new records request or something else,
       [the] College knew Hood wanted them.
                3.17 [The] College failed to disclose records, including Board minutes
       discussing the audit that Hood certainly identified during litigation of [Hood’s 2020
       lawsuit].
                3.18 The denial of Hood’s Petition for Review regarding [Hood’s 2020
       lawsuit] indicated that the College was not obligated to disclose, in response to
       Hood’s September 23, 2019 PRA request, its Board’s minutes and other records
       identified during litigation of that case.
                3.19 [The College] intentionally withholds records that Hood both
       identified and indicated that he wanted while litigating [Hood’s 2020 lawsuit],
       including Board minutes discussing the audit.
                ....
                4.3 Hood’s litigation of [Hood’s 2020 lawsuit] identified records that he
       wanted the College to produce to Hood, regardless of whether the College or courts
       considered them responsive to his September 23, 2019 PRA request.

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CP at 6-7. Hood sought an order requiring the College to respond and disclose the newly requested

records. He also sought penalties and attorney fees under the relevant PRA provisions.

       The College moved to dismiss Hood’s 2023 lawsuit under CR 12(b)(6) on the grounds that

Hood’s complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as well as the

PRA’s one-year statute of limitations. The College’s res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments

were based on its assertions that “Mr. Hood is still arguing that the records he sought in both the

prior and present case are responsive to his September 23, 2019, request for records,” and that the

issue in this 2023 lawsuit is still “the reasonableness of the College’s interpretation of [Hood’s

2019 public records request].” CP at 17, 19.

       In response to the College’s motion to dismiss, Hood moved to amend his complaint to

clarify that the 2023 complaint was “not based on his September 23, 2019[,] request, but rather on

his subsequent November 16, 2020[,]request for public records,” referring to request for

production 23 from the 2020 litigation. CP at 242. The trial court denied Hood’s motion to amend

based on the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations, as the College’s last production of records,

even including records produced during discovery in the 2020 litigation, was in June 2021. Hood’s

current lawsuit was filed in March 2023, more than one year later.

       At a hearing on the College’s motion to dismiss, the trial court explained that it planned to

base its decision on res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the PRA’s statute of limitations. The trial

court granted the motion to dismiss after reviewing “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and all

records and pleadings.” CP at 222. Hood appeals the dismissal of his 2023 lawsuit.

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                                            ANALYSIS

                                        I. SCOPE OF APPEAL

       The College argues as a threshold matter that the claims and arguments made in Hood’s

briefing to this court are not properly before us on appeal. Specifically, the College argues that the

“relief Hood sought in his 2023 complaint is an order for the College to ‘promptly and properly

respond to Mr. Hood’s public records request . . . .’” Resp’t’s Opening Br. at 14. Because the only

explicit mention of a public records request in Hood’s complaint was his September 2019 request,

the College asserts that Hood merely seeks to re-litigate that 2019 public records request. The

College further argues that Hood’s motion to amend his complaint sought to add the new claim

that Hood’s discovery requests and legal briefing in the 2020 litigation were new public records

requests. But the trial court did not allow Hood to amend his complaint. Thus, the College argues,

because Hood does not contest the trial court’s denial of his motion to amend, those new claims

are not before this court.

       Hood responds that his 2023 complaint sufficiently raised the argument that his “litigation

requests” are new public records requests, distinct from his 2019 public records request. Thus,

Hood asserts that his claims and argument made on appeal are squarely within the claims and

argument made below. We agree with Hood.

       We “may refuse to review any claim of error [that] was not raised in the trial court.” RAP

2.5(a). However, to raise a claim, a pleading need only contain “(1) a short and plain statement of

the claim . . . and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems the pleader

is entitled.” CR 8(a). Further, CR 8(f) demands that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do

substantial justice.” This rule requires that “[c]ourts must liberally construe complaints.” Kitsap

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County v. Kitsap County Corr. Officers’ Guild, Inc., 179 Wn. App. 987, 994, 320 P.3d 70 (2014).

Thus, for a plaintiff’s complaint to be sufficient, it need not be “a vision of precise pleading” so

long as it “seems sufficient to put defendants on notice [of the plaintiff’s legal theory].” Schoening

v. Grays Harbor Cmty. Hosp., 40 Wn. App. 331, 336-37, 698 P.2d 593 (1985).

        Here, Hood’s 2023 complaint, read in context, sufficiently raises the issue argued in his

opening brief—that his “litigation requests” made in the course of the 2020 litigation were also

public records requests separate from the 2019 public records request. In his 2023 complaint, Hood

asserted that he identified and requested documents during the course of the 2020 litigation that

were independent of his 2019 request. Specifically, Hood asserted that “[the] College failed to

disclose records, including Board minutes discussing the audit that Hood certainly identified

during litigation of [Hood’s 2020 lawsuit].” CP at 6. Further, he claimed that “Hood’s litigation of

[Hood’s 2020 lawsuit] identified records that he wanted the College to produce to Hood, regardless

of whether the College or courts considered them responsive to his September 23, 2019 PRA

request.” CP at 7. Finally, Hood’s request for relief was for an order to disclose records, Hood had

requested but not yet received, penalties, and attorney fees. This language was clear enough to put

the College on notice that Hood was, at least in part, claiming PRA penalties and attorney fees for

the failure to adequately respond to his “litigation requests” made in the course of his 2020

litigation.

                                     II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        In an appeal from a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint under CR 12(b)(6), our review is

de novo. Kinney v. Cook, 159 Wn.2d 837, 842, 154 P.3d 206 (2007). “Dismissal is warranted only

if the court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiff cannot prove ‘any set of facts [that]

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would justify recovery.’” Id. (quoting Tenore v. AT & T Wireless Servs., 136 Wn.2d 322, 329-30,

962 P.2d 104 (1998)) “The court presumes all facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint are true and

may consider hypothetical facts supporting the plaintiff’s claims.” Id. Here, the facts before the

trial court were undisputed, and the parties’ arguments were about the legal effect of Hood’s

requests.

       In granting the College’s motion to dismiss, the trial court considered “all records and

pleadings on file.” CP at 222. This included our unpublished decision from Hood’s 2020 lawsuit,

as well as declarations from both parties that attached pleadings and discovery from the 2020

litigation. Neither party objected to the trial court’s consideration of these materials.

       Generally, where “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the

court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” CR 12(b)(7). However,

“‘[d]ocuments whose contents are alleged in a complaint but which are not physically attached to

the pleading may . . . be considered in ruling on a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’” Trujillo v. Nw.

Tr. Servs., Inc., 183 Wn.2d 820, 827 n.2, 355 P.3d 1100 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting

Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 726, 189 P.3d 168 (2008)). “Further, where the

‘basic operative facts are undisputed and the core issue is one of law,’ the motion to dismiss need

not be treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Ortbald v. State, 85 Wn.2d 109,

111, 530 P.2d 635 (1975)). Additionally, a court “‘may take judicial notice of public documents if

their authenticity cannot be reasonably disputed’ without converting the motion to a motion for

summary judgment.” Wash. State Hum. Rts. Comm'n v. Hous. Auth., 21 Wn. App. 2d 978, 983,

509 P.3d 319 (2022) (quoting Rodriguez, 144 Wn. App. at 725-26).

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       The parties do not disagree on the underlying facts of this case, which were established in

our prior unpublished opinion, nor do they dispute the contents of the litigation documents from

Hood’s 2020 lawsuit. The core issues here are legal. Thus, we may review the record before us

without treating the College’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.

                                   III. “LITIGATION REQUESTS”

       Hood argues that his “litigation requests” made during the 2020 litigation gave fair notice

to the College that they were actually public records requests. The College responds that Hood’s

discovery requests in the 2020 litigation explicitly invoked the authority of the civil rules of

discovery, not the PRA. The College further points out that Hood’s non-discovery “litigation

requests,” specifically the arguments Hood made in his briefing to the trial court, this court, and

the petition for review to the Washington Supreme Court, do not even “remotely resemble . . .

PRA request[s].” Resp’t’s Opening Br. at 23. We agree that Hood’s litigation requests were not

public records requests.

A.     Fair Notice Test

       The PRA states, “Agencies shall honor requests received . . . for identifiable public records

unless exempted by provisions of this chapter. No official format is required for making a records

request.” RCW 42.56.080(2). However, for the PRA to apply, requests must be recognizable as

public records requests. Germeau v. Mason County, 166 Wn. App. 789, 805, 271 P.3d 932 (2012).

For a request to be recognizable as a public records request, the requester must give the agency

“fair notice” that they are requesting records under the PRA. Id. at 804-05.

       We apply the “fair notice” test to “distinguish PRA requests from those arising from some

other legal authority.” O’Dea v. City of Tacoma, 19 Wn. App. 2d 67, 80, 493 P.3d 1245 (2021).

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Courts use a multifactor test to determine whether a request has established fair notice. Germeau,

166 Wn. App. at 805. “These factors fall under two broad categories: (1) the characteristics of the

request itself, and (2) the characteristics of the requested records.” Id.

       The factors relating to the characteristics of the request are its language, its format, and the

recipient of the request. O’Dea, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 81. The factors relating to the characteristics

of the records are whether the request was for specific records, as opposed to information about or

contained in the records; whether the requested records were actual public records; and whether it

was reasonable for the agency to believe that the requester was requesting the documents under an

independent, non-PRA authority. Id.

       While courts weigh all of the above factors, if a request for records reasonably appears to

be made under an authority other than the PRA, this factor is usually dispositive. See Germeau,

166 Wn. App. at 805 (finding it dispositive, despite most factors favoring fair notice, that plaintiff’s

letter appeared to request documents under a collective bargaining agreement, not under the PRA);

Wood v. Lowe, 102 Wn. App. 872, 880-81, 10 P.3d 494 (2000) (finding no fair notice where

plaintiff’s public records request was ambiguous and could have been construed as a personnel

action under RCW 49.12.250(1)).

       It remains possible to provide fair notice where a request is submitted in the shadow of

non-PRA legal authority. However, to do so, the request must clearly distinguish itself as a public

records request. O’Dea, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 72-73 (finding fair notice despite plaintiff’s letters

requesting documents being attached as an exhibit to a complaint, where the letters explicitly

requested documents under the PRA, and their subject lines read “‘PUBLIC RECORDS

REQUEST’”).

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B.      Our Prior Application of the Fair Notice Test

        In Germeau, the plaintiff was a representative for the Mason County Sheriff’s Office

Employees Guild, which had a collective bargaining agreement with Mason County. 166 Wn. App.

at 792. Germeau represented a detective who was under investigation by the county’s sheriff’s

office. Id. at 793. In his capacity as the detective’s guild representative, Germeau wrote a letter to

the chief of the sheriff’s office requesting information about the investigation. Id. at 793-94. The

letter introduced Germeau as the detective’s “guild representative regarding any internal affairs

investigation or line investigation.” Id. at 794. The third paragraph of the letter stated that “the

guild is requesting and has the right to be privileged to any work product, or investigative findings

regarding any investigation involving [the detective]. This includes any notes, interoffice memo’s

. . . or emails that may be related.” Id. Germeau later argued that the letter was a public records

request. Id. at 799.

        This court held that Germeau’s letter did not provide fair notice. Germeau, 166 Wn. App.

at 804-10. Of the three characteristics of the request, which are its language, format, and recipient,

we found the language of the letter to be determinative. Id. at 805-06. In the letter, Germeau

identified himself as a guild representative and as the detective’s point of contact for any

investigation-related communications. Id. at 806. Where the letter requested documents, its focus

was on “investigative findings.” Id. at 807. This language showed the purpose of the letter was for

Germeau to “become privy to any investigation” of the detective; the letter did not appear to be a

public records request. Id.

        We further found that neither the format nor the recipient of Germeau’s letter was

dispositive. Id. at 806 n.17. Regarding format, we noted that although Germeau did not use the

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County’s PRA form as he had in the past, there is no official format for a valid PRA request. Id.

As for the recipient of the request, Germeau’s choice of the chief deputy, as opposed to the Mason

County Sheriff’s Office public disclosure coordinator, did not “render his claim fatal.” Id.

       We also found that the characteristics of the requested records failed to provide fair notice.

Id. at 807-08. The letter identified specific documents, namely the Sheriff’s Office’s investigative

findings, related interoffice memos, and related emails, and those documents were actually public

records. Id. But because the Guild had a right under its collective bargaining agreement to receive

information from the sheriff’s office, the third factor—whether it was reasonable for the agency to

believe that the requester was requesting the documents under an independent, non-PRA

authority—was determinative. Id. It was reasonable for the County to have believed the letter

invoked the authority of the collective bargaining agreement between the Guild and the Sheriff’s

Office, not the PRA. Id. We explained that “the letter’s language strongly suggested that the

[collective bargaining] agreement entitled Germeau (in his capacity as guild representative) to the

requested records or, at the very least, that Germeau was making the request in such a capacity,

not as a PRA request.” Id. at 808.

       In contrast, in O’Dea, we found the disputed requests were public records requests made

under the PRA. O’Dea, a Tacoma police officer, was placed on administrative leave after a

shooting incident. 19 Wn. App. 2d at 71. O’Dea’s lawyer mailed two public records requests to

the City of Tacoma’s Public Records Office, but the public records officer never received the

letters. Id. O’Dea then sued the City under the PRA because the City failed to respond. Id. at 74.

       O’Dea attached the two public records requests as exhibits to his complaint. Id. Both letters

explicitly requested documents under the PRA, and their subject lines read, “‘PUBLIC RECORDS

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REQUEST.’” Id. at 72-73. The requested documents included certain claims filed against the

Tacoma Police Department, policies for notifying department staff about incidents involving use

of force, training directives, and more. Id. at 73. The City answered the complaint, but did not

disclose the records requested in the attached public records requests until nine months later. Id.

at 71. O’Dea argued that the City violated the PRA by failing to timely respond to the two letters

attached to his complaint. Id. at 74.

       This court held that O’Dea’s public records requests provided fair notice. Id. at 81. The

characteristics of the request favored O’Dea. Id. First, the language explicitly referenced the PRA.

We noted each letter was clearly titled “‘PUBLIC RECORDS ACT REQUEST.’” Id. For the same

reason, the letter’s format, with a clear reference to the PRA in the title, indicated it was a public

records request, even though it did not arrive through the City’s online PRA submission form. Id.

Third, even though the letters were received during litigation, the letters were addressed to the

City’s public records officer. Id.

       The characteristics of the records also favored O’Dea. The first two factors, whether the

request was for specific and actual public records, were clear: “O’Dea asked for documents relating

to Department investigations, deadly force review board incidents, claims for damages, policies

and procedures, training directives, personnel rosters, and other internal communications, all

public records that the City possessed.” Id. at 81. The third factor was a “closer question” but also

favored O’Dea. Id. We found that it was not reasonable for the City to believe O’Dea requested

documents under an independent, non-PRA authority. Id. “Although the City received the letters

as attachments to a complaint, when read in context with the substance of the complaint, it was

obvious that the plaintiffs had already attempted to submit these letters as public records requests.”

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Id. Further, O’Dea stated in his complaint that he was awaiting a response to his public records

request letters, which both expressly referenced the PRA. Id. at 82. Because the complaint and

request letters so clearly invoked the PRA, the fact that they were attached as exhibits to a

complaint did not prevent a finding of fair notice. Id.

C.     Fair Notice Factors Applied to Hood’s “Litigation Requests”

       When we apply the fair notice factors to Hood’s “litigation requests,” this case is more like

Germeau than O’Dea.

       1.      Characteristics of the request

       None of the factors relating to the characteristics of Hood’s requests favors a finding that

the requests now at issue were public records requests.

               a.      Language

       First, the language of Hood’s “litigation requests” does not support fair notice. Throughout

his “litigation requests,” Hood merely sought to define the scope of his 2019 public records request

or repeatedly demanded records he deemed responsive to his 2019 public records request.

       In each of his six “litigation requests,” Hood did not use language suggesting he was

making a new public records request. Hood’s 2020 complaint sought “records responsive to

Hood’s [2019] request.” CP at 182. Request for production 23 mimicked his 2019 public records

request and again sought records “related to the . . . audit.” CP at 64,303. Hood’s response to the

College’s interrogatories merely answered the College’s efforts to clarify his 2019 request. Hood,

No. 56213-8-II, slip op. at 10. Hood’s legal briefing in the 2020 litigation repeated Hood’s

disagreement with the College and courts as to whether he was entitled to documents he deemed

“responsive”—meaning responsive to his 2019 public records request. CP at 9,115-19. Finally, in

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his petition for review to the Washington Supreme Court, Hood argued that “as new information

became available” over the course of the 2020 litigation, the College “had an obligation to modify

its response [to Hood’s 2019 litigation request].” CP at 147-48.

       This language fails to distinguish Hood’s “litigation requests” as independent of his 2019

public records request. It stands in clear contrast to the language in O’Dea, where O’Dea explicitly

stated in his complaint that the attached letters were public records requests. Here, Hood’s

“litigation requests” repeatedly refer to his previous 2019 request—they do not make clear that

they are unanswered, standalone public records requests like those in O’Dea. Rather, like in

Germeau, where the language of Germeau’s letter failed to identify a public records request

independent of the surrounding investigation, here, Hood’s language fails to illustrate the existence

of a public records request independent from arguments about his 2019 request.

       Hood’s “litigation requests” were discovery requests that invoked the civil rules or legal

briefing arguing about his 2019 request. Hood expressed dissatisfaction with the College’s and

courts’ interpretation of his 2019 public records request, but he did not make a new public records

request. Holding otherwise would be absurd and would cause discovery disputes and legal briefing

in PRA litigation to become an endless breeding ground for new public records requests. Parties

would be obligated to scour pleadings in PRA cases to avoid missing a “litigation request” that

could be the basis for another PRA lawsuit.

               b.      Format

       Second, the format of Hood’s request fails to provide fair notice. Hood’s “litigation

requests” are a far cry from O’Dea, where the letters were clearly labeled “‘PUBLIC RECORDS

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REQUEST.’” 19 Wn. App. 2d at 72-73. Instead, Hood’s “litigation requests” were expressly

labeled as various pleadings or discovery requests, rather than public records requests.

               c.      Recipient

       Third, the recipient of the request also disfavors a finding of fair notice. The fact that Hood

neither sent nor addressed his “litigation requests” to the College’s public records officer, does not

alone “render his claim fatal.” Germeau, 166 Wn. App. at 806 n.17. However, Hood’s “litigation

requests” were litigation documents sent to the College, its counsel, or the courts during active

litigation over his 2019 public records request. The context in which these recipients received the

“litigation requests” did not suggest there was any new, independent public records request.

       2.      Characteristics of the requested records

       The fair notice factors relating to the characteristics of the records are whether the request

was for specific records, as opposed to information about or contained in the records; whether the

requested records were actual public records; and whether it was reasonable for the agency to

believe that the requester was requesting the documents under an independent, non-PRA authority.

O’Dea, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 81. The first two factors favor a finding of fair notice. Hood’s “litigation

requests” sought specific and actual public records, namely Board minutes and other documents

Hood deemed responsive to his 2019 public records request. However, like in Germeau, we find

it dispositive that the College reasonably interpreted Hood’s requests as discovery requests or legal

arguments pertaining to its initial response to his 2019 public records request.

       Hood relies heavily on O’Dea again. However, in that case, “when read in context with the

substance of the complaint, it was obvious that the plaintiffs had already attempted to submit [the

attached letters] as public records requests.” 19 Wn. App. at 81-82. The complaint in O’Dea

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“explicitly referenced the attached letters” that were clearly labeled “‘PUBLIC RECORDS

REQUEST,’” and made obvious that the plaintiffs were awaiting a response to those letters. Id. at

72-73, 82. Because the letters were clearly distinguishable public records requests awaiting

response, the City’s failure to respond was unreasonable. Id. at 82.

        In contrast, Hood’s “litigation requests” existed in the context of a lawsuit over his 2019

public records request, which the College had already received and responded to. The “litigation

requests” consist of small excerpts of discovery documents and legal briefing. Further, request for

production 23 explicitly drew on non-PRA legal authority, the civil rules of discovery. Thus,

because of the surrounding context in which the “litigation requests” were made and Hood’s failure

to distinguish his “litigation requests” as independent from his 2019 public records request, it was

reasonable for the College to think that Hood was requesting documents under the authority of the

civil rules or making arguments in civil litigation about the scope of his 2019 request, not making

a new public records request.

        In sum, we conclude that under the fair notice factors, Hood’s “litigation requests” did not

give the College fair notice he was seeking records under the PRA, and thus, these requests were

not public records requests.

                                         IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS

        Hood further argues that because, in his view, request for production 23 was a public

records request, the PRA applies and the College cannot refuse to respond to it on the grounds that

it was outside the scope of discovery in the litigation over his 2019 public records request. This

argument fails because, as explained above, we find that request for production 23 was not a public

records request in the first instance.

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       Additionally, Hood points to the PRA’s strongly worded command that it be “liberally

construed” to encourage us to hold that his “litigation requests” are actually public records

requests. RCW 42.56.030. However, when we interpret the PRA “[w]e . . . avoid absurd results.”

Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth., 177 Wn.2d 417, 431, 327 P.3d 600 (2013).

Importantly, “we endeavor to provide clear and workable guidance to agencies insofar as

possible.” Id. For reasons we explained above, requiring agencies to interpret discovery requests

and legal arguments that are not clearly and expressly labeled as new public records requests would

be absurd and unworkable.

       Finally, Hood argues that we should reverse and remand for the parties to have an

opportunity to develop more evidence. But Hood does not identify what evidence or arguments he

would add that have not already been presented to the trial court and included in this record.

Because Hood was able to fully explain his “litigation requests” to the trial court in this record,

and because we resolve this case on the legal question of what constitutes a public records request,

we need not remand for further proceedings.

                                COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

       Because Hood does not prevail in his action against the College and because unrepresented

parties are not entitled to attorney fees, Hood is not entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal

under the PRA. RCW 42.56.550(4). Hood also seeks attorney fees on remand, but because we

affirm, we are not remanding and Hood is not entitled to fees at the trial court level either. In his

reply brief, Hood claims that he is entitled to costs and “consulting attorney fees” based on RAP

18.1, because the College has been intransigent. Reply Br. of Appellant at 15. We reject this basis

for costs and attorney fees on appeal as well.

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                                        CONCLUSION

       We affirm. We also decline Hood’s request to remand and we decline to award costs and

attorney fees on appeal.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                    Glasgow, J.
 We concur:

 Lee, J.

 Cruser, C.J.

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