Court Opinion

ID: 9530485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:16.609095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:07.673105
License: Public Domain

Price, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion this case has been decided incorrectly.
It is conceded by all parties that two statutes are involved.
G. S. 1959 Supp. 60-3203 provides that an action for wrongful death must be brought within two years.
*622G. S. 1959 Supp. 44-504 provides that the action must be prosecuted by the dependents of a deceased workman within eighteen months from the date of the fatal injury, and that failure to do so operates as an assignment to the employer of the cause of action in tort, and that such employer may enforce the same in his own name or in the name of the dependents or personal representatives for their benefit as their interest may appear.
When this action was filed plaintiff widow (a dependent) had long since been barred by the eighteen-month provision from maintaining it. It could have been filed on that date by her deceased husband’s employer, but neither the employer nor its insurance carrier (G. S. 1949, 44-532) saw fit to do so. They were not even injected into the case until defendants’ answer was filed, long after the two-year statute had fallen. The second amended petition— filed still later — was not brought by the employer in its own name or in the name of the dependents as their interest may appear, but was brought by plaintiff widow (a dependent) on behalf of herself, her minor children, her deceased husband’s employer and its insurance carrier as their interest may appear — thus clearly distinguishing it from the Sundgren case.
Whitaker v. Douglas, 179 Kan. 64, 292 P. 2d 688, was a case where the workman was injured, rather than killed, as here, but the principle involved was the same. It was held that one who attempts to proceed under 44-504 must act within the time provided in that section, and in the course of the opinion it was said:
“In defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was sustained and from which this appeal was taken, one of the grounds of the motion was that plaintiff’s action was brought too late under the above statute. Appellant’s pleadings disclosed that the injury for which he seeks to recover occurred on June 19, 1951, and the original petition was filed in this case on May 18, 1953. This was a year and eleven months after the accident occurred. Neither the Victory Sand Company, nor its insurance carrier was named as a party plaintiff in that petition, nor was any mention made that they were asserting any right which they might have had. Any cause of action in tort which the workman had, was assigned to his employer eleven months before the petition was filed. The petition was never amended. The first time that his employer and its insurer was mentioned as having anything to do with the case was in the amended reply which was filed February 2, 1955, which was more than three and a half years after the date of the accident.
“It is clear that when the petition was filed plaintiff had lost his right to file it in the form it was, and that the late reference to his employer and its insurer having an interest in the matter was belatedly injected into the case. . . . (citing cases).
*623“We think the court did not err in sustaining defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.’’ (pp. 71 and 72.)
It is quite true that in the present case the petition was amended —but such was done long after the running of the two-year statute —and, as heretofore stated, was not in compliance with 44-504.
In Elam v. Bruenger, 165 Kan. 31, 193 P. 2d 225, which was a death case, it was said, in reference to 44-504:
“Under the statute the personal representative could institute an action within eighteen months, and in the succeeding six months the employer could, but there was no time in which each could institute actions at the same time.” (p. 36.)
I realize fully that courts are properly committed to a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the compensation act so as to prevent injustices to injured workmen or their dependents, but in my opinion such liberal construction should not be extended so as to do violence to the plain wording of a statute.
For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent.