Court Opinion

ID: 9419975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:52:22.206995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:21.444525
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rutledge,
dissenting.
As the Court’s opinion says, there is no necessary inconsistency between enforcing Interstate Commerce Commission regulations concerning “qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees” affecting safety, 49 Stat. 543, 546, and at the same time, within those limitations, requiring compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s provisions for overtime pay. Indeed the latter would *686reinforce the former. Ordinarily, when statutes are not inherently conflicting, the rule applied in construing them is to give each as much room for operation as is consistent with its terms and purposes, rather than to create conflict unnecessarily between them.
Nothing in the Motor Carrier Act forbids or inhibits the operation of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The latter statute, it has been held repeatedly, is to be broadly and liberally applied, in order to achieve its prime objects of distributing and raising standards of employment and living.1 The Act however contains certain exempting provisions, which are to be narrowly construed in the light of and in order to accomplish the same statutory purposes.2
Among these is § 13 (b) (1). It reads: “The provisions of section 7 shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 . . . .” 52 Stat. 1060, 1068. It is the meaning and effect of § 13 (b) (1) which we have now to determine in relation to employees who do some work affecting safety in operations and some not affecting it.3
Read literally, in the light of the Southland decision,4 the section would exempt all employees who do any work affecting safety operations, as the Illinois Court of Ap*687peals held in this case.5 For, factually speaking, not the amount of time an employee spends in work affecting safety, but what he may do in the time thus spent whether it be large or small determines the effect on safety. Ten minutes of driving by an unqualified driver may do more harm on the highway than a month or a year of constant driving by a qualified one.
It would seem essential therefore to effective safety control by the Commission that it should have power to determine the qualifications and maximum hours of service of all employees whose work substantially affects safety, whether or not they spend what may be found to be less than a “substantial” amount of time in that sort of work. Anything less than this would open the door to the greatest danger to motor traffic from casual, unqualified drivers or other employees whose work affects safety.
There is or may be in some circumstances a relation between time spent in such work and substantial effects upon safety, but it is by no means an exclusive or controlling one. Time affects the duration and scope, not necessarily the existence, of the risk.
I accept the “safety first” view of the Commission’s power. And this requires acceptance of the view that, in relation to some kinds of work, the Commission has power to prescribe the qualifications of all employees who engage in it to any extent, though the time thus spent is not five minutes daily or weekly. “Substantial effect” in these instances has little if any relation, negatively speak*688ing, to “substantial time.” Driving and the work of mechanical repair of trucks are obvious examples. Loading may be another, less obviously as the Court says, but depending upon the circumstances under which it is done.6 So with the work of helpers in these three functions.
Notwithstanding the Commission’s contrary finding,7 this means that all employees who do any part of certain kinds of work, for however short a time, regularly or casually, fall within the Commission’s power. It means, for instance, that a person who spends ten minutes a day or an hour a week in driving or in mechanically repairing trucks, and the remaining 39 hours of a 40-hour week in work having no effect upon safety falls within the Commission’s authority. For, in such circumstances, it cannot be held that the comparatively minute amount of time spent in work affecting safety is trivial or inconsequential in its possible effects upon safety. And in the Court’s view, as I understand it, the result is not only that the Commission has power to prescribe the qualifications of all such employees,8 but also that they are thereby ex*689empted from the overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
It is from the latter conclusion that I dissent. I cannot believe that Congress, when it incorporated § 13 (b) (1) in the statute, intended to exclude from those provisions every employee who might spend ten minutes a day in work substantially affecting safety and seven hours and fifty minutes in work having no effect whatever upon it. An exactly literal application of § 13 (b) (1), it is true, would lead to this result. But we are frequently told that rigidly literal application of a statute may be ruinous to achieving its purposes.9 It is especially so in this instance, in view of the nature and purposes of the Act we are construing, for a variety of reasons.
The legislative history shows, in my judgment, that Congress did not have in mind so expansive and destructive an exemption as literal application of § 13 (b) (1) and the Court’s ruling10 would produce. Congress clearly intended to exempt some employees who do not devote all their time to such work. But at the time it acted its pri*690mary concern and that of the Commission11 were with full-time employees, principally drivers, so engaged. In view of that fact, it cannot be taken that Congress intended every employee assigned for a few minutes daily or weekly to work substantially affecting safety to be eliminated from the overtime pay provisions. Such a view in practical effect would nullify the Act’s broad and inclusive purposes for large numbers of employees as to whom, at the time, the Commission had shown no concern in exercising its safety power or in its representations to Congress, and as to whom therefore there was no sound reason for or purpose of exemption.
Moreover, acceptance of such a construction would set up an easy mode for evasion of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s requirements. An employer so minded readily could assign to nonsafety employees whom he desired to remove from the overtime pay requirements work affecting safety for minute portions of their total service. Committing the Act’s coverage in all such possible situations to a determination of the employer’s good faith could only invite continuous litigation upon his motive, a result in itself tending strongly to defeat the rights given by the Act. I do not think Congress intended such consequences for the statute’s effective operation when it included § 13(b) (1).
The difficulty lies of course not only in the rigidly literal interpretation given to that section, but in the corol*691lary assumption of intended complete mutual exclusiveness of the Commission’s power and the Fair Labor Standards Act’s applicability drawn from it. As I do not think Congress intended the one, in relation to the problem now presented, so I do not believe it had the other in mind. And if this was true, then the problem for us becomes, as it most often does in such situations, one of making accommodation between the two statutes in a manner which will give to each its maximum effect without nullifying Congress’ manifest intention.12
If the spirit and purposes of the statutes are taken into account, we are not inescapably compelled to choose between the equally untenable alternatives of a completely literal application of § 13 (b) (1) and a construction which would nullify the Commission’s power concerning the great bulk of employees to which it rightfully extends. Although the exemption of § 13 (b) (1) is not among those which specifically empower the Administrator to determine their scope by regulations,13 he is charged with the duty of administering it and his experience is entitled to weight when he formulates conclusions from it for the purpose of applying the Act’s provisions, albeit, they are not conclusive. The present problem has not been without difficulty for the Administrator,14 but his final ruling, *692resulting from his experience, presents in my opinion both the most workable solution and the one most consistent with Congress’ purpose and intent relating to the operation of both Acts. It is that the exemption is inapplicable to any employee “who spends the greater part of his time during any workweek on non-exempt activities (such as producing, processing, or manufacturing goods, warehouse or clerical work, or other type of work which does not affect safety of operations).”
Such a standard is more consistent with the Act’s purposes than the one applied by the Court, not only in the light of the legislative history, but also in that it is more definite, more easily applied, and not invitingly conducive to litigation. For these reasons, and because I do not believe a totally literal application of § 13 (b) (1) was comprehended for the situations now presented, I think a line so drawn most nearly consistent with what Congress had in mind to accomplish by the exemption.
However, since there is no essential inconsistency in the two statutes or their operation, I do not think it necessarily follows that part-time employees thus not excluded from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s coverage are thereby excluded from the Commission’s safety power. That power I would leave unqualified as to them, since nothing in either statute compels qualification, as to employees not exempted, of the authority given the Commission to regulate “qualifications and hours of service of employees” whose work affects safety. The two statutes clearly are mutually exclusive, though not essentially inconsistent, as to employees primarily engaged in operations affecting *693safety. They are not necessarily or, I think, by virtue of Congress’ intent or command, thus exclusive as to others.
I therefore agree that “substantial effect” upon safety rather than “substantial time” spent in doing work affecting it determines the scope of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s safety power. However, in accepting this conclusion, though not the further one that all employees so covered are within the exemption of § 13 (b) (1), I do so not upon the basis of the Commission’s own determination, which expressly adopts the criterion of “substantial time” and is therefore both narrower than and inconsistent with the Court’s ruling as to the extent of its power.15 The Commission’s determination tends strongly to support the Administrator’s position as to the scope of the exemption intended to be created by § 13 (b) (1). But its voice is only persuasive, not conclusive, upon the question of the scope of its power. In adopting “substantial time” rather than “substantial effect,” I agree that the Commission has *694ruled too narrowly. Indeed, its brief in this case maintains as much.16 Accordingly I conclude, independently of its formal determination, that the full and adequate performance by the Commission of the safety function conferred by the Motor Carrier Act requires the larger scope which the Court’s ruling allows for its operation.
The views expressed in this opinion, of course, would apply also in Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U. S. 695, decided this day, but in view of the decision in this case it is not necessary to file a separate dissent in the companion one.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Murphy join in this dissent.

 Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U. S. 590, 597; Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493; Calaf v. Gonzalez, 127 F. 2d 934, 937.

 Phillips Co. v. Walling, supra; Calaf v. Gonzalez, supra.

 As to employees engaged full time in such work, Southland Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44, held that the existence of power in the Commission, whether or not exercised, to prescribe qualifications and hours of service, excludes them under § 13 (b) (1) from coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act’s terms. Cf. note 11.

 Ibid.

 Thus, one who has the sole responsibility of loading or of directing loading, where weight of the articles carried is unequal and its distribution may affect safety, would seem clearly to be within the classification whether the time spent is large or small. On the other hand, if the worker is merely a helper, loading under direct and active supervision of another, with no responsibility other than to obey his superior’s orders as to placement, it would seem clear that his work does not affect safety.

 See text infra at note 15; and note 16.

 The opinion puts the matter in various ways. E. g., “The fundamental test is simply that the employee’s activities affect safety of operation.” “The term ‘partial-duty loader’ is used , . . so as to avoid the implication that time spent in certain activities, rather than the character of those activities, is to be the conclusive factor . . . .” Note 3. “It is essential to the Commission’s safety program whenever and wherever hazardous activities are engaged in that affect *689safety . . . that those who engage in them shall be qualified . . . “We recognize that the Commission has such power over all employees . . . whose activities affect safety . . . .” “It is the character of the activities rather than the proportion of either the employee’s time or of his activities that determines the actual need for the Commission’s power . . . .” “The loading of any truck load of mixed freight requires that the general qualifications of the loader be adequate, regardless of the proportion of his working time that may have been devoted to this activity . . . .” “The petitioner’s activities thus affected safety of operation, although it does not appear what fraction of his time was spent in activities affecting safety of operation.”

 Cf. note 12. “All construction is the ascertainment of meaning. And literalness may strangle meaning.” Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U. S. 39, 44; Markham v. Cabell, 326 U. S. 404, 409; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457.

 See note 8 and text infra at note 15.

 The exemption made by § 13 (b) (1) was suggested to Congress originally by the Interstate Commerce Commission. United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 549. The legislative history shows that the section “was adopted to free operators of motor vehicles from the regulation by two agencies of the hours of drivers,” Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44, 48-49, upon the understanding that the Interstate Commerce Commission “had already acted upon maximum hours for drivers . . . .” Id., at 49, n. 5. (Emphasis added.) See also note 16.

 “The problem of statutory construction . . . should not be solved simply by a literal reading of the exemption section of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the delegation of power section of the Motor Carrier Act. Both sections are parts of important general statutes and their particular language should be construed in the light of the purposes which led to the enactment of the entire legislation.” Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44, 47.

 See §§ 13 (a) (1), 13 (a) (7), 13 (a) (10), 14.

 The Administrator originally interpreted the exemption to be inapplicable to any employee who spent a substantial amount of his time in nonexempt work. Subsequently “substantial” was explained to mean more than twenty per cent of the employee’s time. Interpre*692tative Bulletin, No. 9, March, 1942, Wage & Hour Manual (1943 ed.) 186, 189. Later the ruling was changed so that the exemption was given its present form as stated in the text, infra. Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, November, 1943, Wage & Hour Manual (1944-1945 ed.) 520, 523.

 The Court purports to adopt the Commission’s basis for determining what employees are within the safety power, especially as made in Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M. C. C. 125. But since the test the Court now prescribes is apparently one of “substantial effect” rather than “substantial time,” see note 8, it differs from the basis of the Commission’s ruling. The Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth in the text of the majority opinion. The quoted finding is that loaders “devote a large part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation.” 28 M. C. C. at 139. And the conclusion of law is stated in terms of time, namely, “that our jurisdiction ... is limited to those employees who devote a substantial part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation,” and “that we have power ... to establish qualifications . . . for the classes of employees” covered by the findings of fact, and “that we have no such power over any other classes of employees, except drivers.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) This necessarily excluded employees of the classes covered not devoting a substantial part of their time to work affecting safety, in view of the findings.

 The difference in the Commission’s findings and conclusions, as made in Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, see note 15, and the position taken here by counsel in its behalf was the occasion for some difficulty, if not embarrassment, at the argument. The brief and argument, by contrast with the findings and conclusions, maintained: "... it seems clear that, regardless of the amount of time devoted to the work by an individual loader (or loader foreman), he is expected to be fitted, and in fit condition, to perform it when the occasion arises and therefore intended to be subject to the Commission’s authority over qualifications and hours of service.” Reliance was placed squarely upon the position taken in this case by the Illinois Court of Appeals. See note 5.
Able counsel for the Commission sought to avoid the effect of the findings and conclusions by restricting it to classes of employees without reference to individual employees. It was not satisfactorily explained, however, how an individual employee could be brought within the class without being brought within the outer boundary prescribed by the Commission for defining the class.