Court Opinion

ID: 9753896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:34:15.627838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:50.350017
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell:
Plaintiff recovered a verdict against defendant in the sum of $29,150 for personal injuries. The Court en banc — because, considering the record as a whole, the verdict was grossly excessive — remitted that part of the verdict in excess of $17,000 and upon plaintiff’s refusal to file the suggested remittitur granted a new trial. From the Order granting a new trial, plaintiff took this appeal.
In considering — not the grant of a new trial but— the entry of a judgment non obstante veredicto, it is hornbook law that an appellate Court considers only the evidence in favor of the verdict winner, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom: Coradi v. Sterling Oil Co., 378 Pa. 68, 105 A. 2d 98; Shaw v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 374 Pa. 8, 96 A. 2d 923; Lanni v. *343Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 371 Pa. 106, 88 A. 2d 887; Miller v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 368 Pa. 507, 84 A. 2d 200; Miller v. Hickey, 368 Pa. 317, 81 A. 2d 910; McDonald v. Ferrebee, 366 Pa. 543, 79 A. 2d 232.
The test for the grant or refusal of a new trial is as different from the n.o.v. test as day is from night.
In Mozino v. Canuso, 384 Pa. 220, 120 A. 2d 300, Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Jones said (page 223) : “One who appeals from the grant of a new trial assumes a very heavy burden indeed. Before we will reverse, the appellant must be able to show that the trial court was guilty of a palpable abuse of discretion* or acted on an erroneous rule of law which, in the circumstances, controlled the outcome of the case •and is certified by the trial court as the sole reason ■for the granting of a new trial. The statement of the rule most frequently cited appears in Marko v. Mendelowski, 313 Pa. 46, 47, 169 A. 99, which has been quoted many times down to the present. See e.g., Pendleton v. P. T. C., 376 Pa. 598, 600, 103 A. 2d 724; Beal v. Reading Company, 370 Pa. 45, 47-48, 87 A. 2d 214; Foster v. Waybright, 367 Pa. 615, 618, 80 A. 2d 801; and Tupponce v. Pa. R. R. Co., 358 Pa. 589, 590, 57 A. 2d 898.”
We note parenthetically that this technical certification requirement, although it is presently of relatively little importance, has been iterated and reiterated in more than forty decisions of this Court. On the other hand, a half dozen or a dozen decisions of this Court do not require such certification where the sole reason for granting the new trial clearly appears in the lower Court’s opinion: Muroski v. Hnath, 392 Pa. 233, 139 A. 2d 902; Londrino v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 377 Pa. 543, 105 A. 2d 333; Fitzpatrick v. Sheppard, 346 Pa. 240, 29 A. 2d 475; Beal v. Read*344ing Co., 370 Pa. 45, 87 A. 2d 214; Hess v. Gusdorff, 274 Pa. 123, 117 A. 671; Samuels v. Johnson, 355 Pa. 624, 50 A. 2d 670; Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 81 A. 2d 857. The cases on this technical point of certification are irreconcilable; however, I welcome the clearing np of this confusion and the adoption of the present practical test which I have always favored, namely — it is not necessary for the trial Judge or the lower. Court to certify that its' reason for granting a new trial was the sole reason if such- fact clearly appears from his (or its) opinion.
However, when an appellee is entitled to a new trial for any sound reason whatsoever, the grant thereof by the lower Court will be sustained even though that Court gave an inadequate or erroneous reason for its action. Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A. 2d 899; Mumbower v. Weaver, 282 Pa. 605, 128 A. 535; State Hospital for Criminal Insane v. Consolidated Water Supply, 267 Pa. 29, 110 A. 281; Commonwealth v. Wing, 253 Pa. 226, 97 A. 1072; Corgan v. George F. Lee Coal Co., 218 Pa. 386, 67 A. 655; Independence Party nomination, 208 Pa. 108, 57 A. 344; Brew v. Hastings, 206 Pa. 155, 55 A. 922; Derry Council v. State Council, 197 Pa. 413, 47 A. 208; Young’s Estate, 65 Pa. 101.
When a trial Court grants a new trial because the verdict was excessive (or inadequate) it is long and undisputably established that the test in an appellate Court is whether the action of the lower Court, considering all the evidence in the case, constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Allegheny County, 377 Pa. 365, 105 A. 2d 137; Duffy v. The Monongahela C. R. R. Co., 371 Pa. 361, 89 A. 2d 804; Ferruzza v. Pittsburgh, 394 Pa. 70, 145 A. 2d 706; Wargo v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 376 Pa. 168, 101 A. 2d 638; Dupont v. Gallagher, 360 Pa. 419, 62 A. 2d 28; King v. Equitable Gas Co., 307 Pa. 287, 161 A. 65; Jones v. *345Williams, 358 Pa. 559, 58 A. 2d 57; Bochar v. J. B. Martin Motors, Inc., 374 Pa. 240, 97 A. 2d 813; Sherman v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Company, 389 Pa. 61, 132 A. 2d 255; Clewell v. Pummer, 388 Pa. 592, 131 A. 2d 375; Smith v. L. Blumberg’s Son, Inc., 388 Pa. 146, 130 A. 2d 437; Givens v. W. J. Gilmore Drug Company, 337 Pa. 278, 10 A. 2d 12; Edwards v. Crawford, 328 Pa. 449, 196 A. 58; Brown v. Castle Shannon Boro., 318 Pa. 363, 178 A. 678; Petrie v. Kaufmann & Baer, 291 Pa. 211, 139 A. 878; Smith v. Times Publishing Co. et al., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296.
. In Smith v. Allegheny County, 377 Pa. 365, 105 A. 2d 137, the Court said (page 368) : “An appellate Court rarely ever reverses a lower Court because the verdict was excessive, but it is our duty to do so if the jury’s verdict shocks our sense of justice, or when the action of the lower Court, in dismissing a motion for a new trial, constituted a clear abuse of discretion: Wargo v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 376 Pa. 168, 101 A. 2d 638; Duffy v. The Monongahela C. R. R. Co., 371 Pa. 361, 89 A. 2d 804; Dupont v. Gallagher, 360 Pa. 419, 62 A. 2d 28; King v. Equitable Gas Co., 307 Pa. 287, 161 A. 65; Jones v. Williams, 358 Pa. 559, 58 A. 2d 57.”
In Bochar v. J. B. Martin Motors, Inc., 374 Pa. 240, 97 A. 2d 813, Mr. Justice Musmanno said (pages 241-242) : “The appellants in this case appeal from judgment on a verdict which they contend is excessive. The jury’s verdict was $15,464.20, which the lower court reduced to $12,000. We begin, therefore, with the accepted rule that — ‘It is the duty of the lower court to control the amount of the verdict; it is in possession of all the facts as well as the atmosphere of the case, which will enable it to do more even-handed justice between the parties than can an appellate court.’ (King v. Equitable Gas Co., 307 Pa. 287.) We can only disturb the lower court’s adjudication of the verdict in *346the event it ‘shocks a sense of justice’ to allow it to stand.”
In Sherman v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Company, 389 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 68) : “In the light of (1) the conflicting medical evidence with the radically different opinions expressed as to the cause of plaintiff’s condition and its prognosis ... we cannot say that the lower Court’s refusal of a new trial, because of the inadequacy of the verdict of $22,-000 constituted a manifest abuse of discretion.”*
To say that a verdict is excessive is merely to pin-pointedly say that it is against the weight of the evidence.
In Kiser v. Schlosser, 389 Pa. 131, 132 A. 2d 344, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cohen, said (pages 132-133) : “The issue raised by these appeals has been before this Court on innumerable occasions: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding new trials on the ground that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence? . . . The determination of whether a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, so that a new trial should be granted, rests primarily within the discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed unless there is a palpable abuse of that discretion as determined from a careful review of the entire record, or a clear error of law which controlled the outcome. True it is that the assaying of the credibility of witnesses and the resolving of conflicts in their testimony are for the jury. But it is
*347equally true that the trial judge may not hide behind the jury’s verdict; he has a duty to grant a new trial when he is convinced that the judicial process has resulted in the working of an injustice upon any of the parties.”
In Clewell v. Pummer, 388 Pa. 592, 131 A. 2d 375, the Court said (pages 598-599) : “Where a trial Judge or Court sees and hears the witnesses, it has not only an inherent fundamental and salutary power, but it is its duty, to grant a new trial when it believes the verdict was capricious or was against the weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice: Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 81 A. 2d 857; Wilson v. Kallenbach, 332 Pa. 253, 2 A. 2d 727; Campbell v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 366 Pa. 484, 77 A. 2d 437; Elia v. Olszewski, 368 Pa. 578, 84 A. 2d 188; Maloy v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 Pa. 466, 103 A. 882; Frank v. Losier & Co., Inc., 361 Pa. 272, 64 A. 2d 829; Dinan v. Supreme Council C. M. B. A., 213 Pa. 489, 62 A. 1067. In such a ease we will not reverse, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which necessarily controlled the grant of the new trial: Edelson v. Ochroch, 380 Pa. 426, 111 A. 2d 455; Foster v. Waybright, 367 Pa. 615, 80 A. 2d 801; Mozino v. Canuso, 384 Pa. 220, 120 A. 2d 300.
“In Coward v. Ruckert, 381 Pa. 388, 113 A. 2d 287, Justice Musmanno, speaking for this Court, said (page 393) : In Frank v. W. S. Losier & Co., Inc., 361 Pa. 272, 276, this Court . . said: “. . . The granting óf a new trial is an inherent power and immemorial right of the trial court and an appellate court will not find fault with the exercise of such authority in the absénce of a clear abuse of discretion. (Citing cases) One of the least assailable grounds for the exercise of such-power is the trial court’s conclusion that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the interests of justice therefore require that a new trial *348be awarded; especially in such a case is an appellate court reluctant to interfere.” ’
“Moreover, in such circumstances, namely, where the jury’s verdict is capricious or against the weight of the evidence or results in a miscarriage of justice, it should not be allowed to stand, no matter how many new trials must be granted in the interest of justice: Elia v. Olszewski, 368 Pa., supra, and Maloy v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 Pa., supra. In Maloy v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 472) :
“ . . While the ascertainment of the underlying facts, and the drawing of the inferences and final conclusions therefrom, are for the jury, even where strong conflicting oral evidence is produced by a defendant, yet, in every such instance, a grave responsibility rests upon the trial judge to see to it that no verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence or shocking to judicial conscience is allowed to stand, no matter how many new trials.must be granted in order to effect the ends of justice; . . .’. See to the same effect: Elia v. Olszewski, 368 Pa., supra, and Dinan v. Supreme Council C. M. B. A., 213 Pa., supra.”
See also the learned opinion of former Chief Justice Stern in Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, supra, which very ably analyzed and reviewed many cases and reiterated the above mentioned principles pertaining to the grant or refusal of a new trial.
The Evidence of Both. Parties.
The majority has stated in great detail the injuries suffered by plaintiff, who was 55 years old and conducted a sports store from which his net income prior to the accident was ¡$3,900 a year. The majority opinion does not mention the fact that plaintiff was discharged from the hospital where he was treated for cuts and bruises and X-rayed, 3% hours after he had entered the hospital. Plaintiff was treated by an osteopath 122 times, 17 times at his home and the remaining 105 *349times at the osteopath’s office, with total medical expense of $897. Two years after the accident plaintiff testified he was still suffering intermittent pain, a limp when ,he walked, and that he must continually wear a back brace or support. Plaintiff’s osteopath testified that his disability was between 50 per cent and 60 per cent and his disability would be permanent.
On the other hand, defendant’s doctor, Irvin Stein, who examined plaintiff 8 months' after the accident as well as during the trial, testified that the X-ray examination, which was taken right after the accident, was essentially negative; that he could find no evidence of bursitis; that both legs and hips were normal and that the patient complained a great deal. At the time of plaintiff’s second examination by Dr. Stein two years after the accident plaintiff said that he had improved relatively little, “He said that he has not yet been able to do his work. . : . There.is in my opinion much exaggeration on the part of the patient. . . . He. is wearing a very light elastic support . . . which is of no supporting value and ... is not related to the accident. As to the prognosis — the prognosis is the outlook — it appears that his acute difficulty here was pretty well gone within a few weeks after the accident. Despite his continued complaints and his indication of disability, I can find no objective reason for it. At this time, this patient, in my opinion, is not disabled, nor do I feel that he requires the cane that he makes so much use of. I found that he can move when his attention is deviated, and much less when his attention is fixed. For instance,- he will walk one step after another, moving one leg after another, without his cane when walking. Yet, if he is asked to stand and pick up one leg after another, he goes into quite a performance, such as collapsing, grasping onto something, saying he can’t do it and so forth.
*350“Q. As a result of your examination, is your opinion any different than it was in December of 1956, or is it the same? A. Well, I have no doubt he may have had some injuries at the time of the accident, but he was recovered from them at the time I saw him, and I see no reason to change my opinion at this date.”
Edmond Doran, an investigator for defendant, testified that on June 4, 1958 he went to plaintiff’s home, that he watched plaintiff climbing up and down a ladder and painting the outside of his house for over half an hour; that he then took pictures of him carrying the ladder and bending up and down in the area of the house. “After I took about 25 or 30 feet of motion pictures he turned around as he was holding up a ladder and then he immediately put the ladder down and started to move in a peculiar manner and disappeared out of sight.” Doran saw plaintiff working for about an hour and 20 minutes at the windows, going up and down the 7 or 8 rung ladder, and painting the awning and the house. Plaintiff never dragged or moved his right leg in a peculiar fashion until he saw Doran.
Plaintiff testified that he was unable to attend to his business, as a result of which his income fell from .$3900 to $1479 a year, and because of his incapacity he was forced to close out and sell his business after the accident. Defendant called MeKeown, a real estate broker, who testified that plaintiff had engaged him to sell his business before the accident because his business “was going down, down, down.” MeKeown also produced a written agreement dated March 9, 1956 (the accident was April 18, 1956), authorizing MeKeown to sell plaintiff’s home and business for $17,-500.
The trial Judge who, we repeat, saw and heard all the witnesses, none of whom we saw or heard, granted a new trial because the verdict was “grossly excessive *351It is obvious that the trial Judge could have believed from plaintiff’s own testimony or from his manner of testifying that he was greatly exaggerating his injuries and the period of his pain; and he certainly could have believed from defendant’s evidence that plaintiff’s injuries and pain cleared up within a relatively short time after the accident, and that plaintiff was a gross exaggerator, a faker and a liar.
In the light of all these facts and circumstances, I don’t see how this Court cán possibly say — considering all the evidence, i.e., the evidence for the defendant as well as the evidence for the plaintiff, and likewise the unknown factor of credibility — that the lower Court clearly and palpably abused its discretion in granting a new trial because the verdict was grossly excessive, unless we wish to greatly emasculate the immemorial power of a trial Judge or lower Court to grant a new trial.
For these reasons I dissent.

 Italics throughout, ours.

 “It is sometimes erroneously contended that in considering the grant or refusal of a new trial, just as in a consideration of an appeal from the refusal to take off a nonsuit or from the entry of a judgment non obstante veredicto, all of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Of course this is not the correct test on an appeal from the grant or refusal of a new trial: [Citing 23 decisions of this Court]”.