Court Opinion

ID: 9647581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:41:24.564837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.958330
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s disposition of this cause for reasons articulated in my dissenting opinions in Lawrence v. State, 700 S.W.2d 208, at 215 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) and Ex parte Chandler, 719 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Cr.App.). I would also take issue with the conclusion of the court of appeals that the issue of “sudden passion” was not raised in this cause.
The court of appeals concluded that appellant’s testimony, liberally excerpted in the majority opinion, failed to raise the issue of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically the court found that, because appellant testified he wanted, in effect, to launch an initial sneak attack at the door, he therefore “was consciously aware of his actions and planned them out.” 681 S.W.2d at 625. The court thus impliedly held that appellant’s behavior lacked sufficient spontaneity to be construed as either “sudden” or “passion.”1 I disagree.
Treating first the court of appeals’ intimation that any passion under which the killing might have taken place was not shown to be “sudden,” I would note that the behavior “planned” by appellant did not contemplate the infliction of “serious bodily injury.”2 According to his testimony, as he approached the door appellant intended to use it to knock the deceased off balance to gain the upper hand so as to “hit” him. Such a scenario does not necessarily rule out the possibility that,- once appellant’s scheme was foiled, and he was then stabbed in the leg, such a passion suddenly arose in him as to induce him to commit an act clearly dangerous to the life of the deceased. Passion may be “sudden” under § 19.04(b), supra, which is not solely the result of former provocation. Here it is clear that appellant was provoked by Knoedl to the point of following him outside to engage in a fight. However, this does not exclude the possibility that the stab wound to appellant’s leg was the further, incremental provocation which directly caused the sudden passion under which the killing occurred.
The facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), cited by the court of appeals, and of Hobson v. State, 644 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). In Daniels it was clear that the defendant reflected on the actual killing itself before committing it. The provocation claimed by the defendant in Hobson occurred during the morning, where as the killing took place later in the evening. In the case sub judice appellant anticipated a fight prior to the killing. But it is far from clear that he intended to inflict serious bodily injury to the deceased prior to his having been stabbed. A reasonable jury could have found “sudden” passion under these circumstances.
The court of appeals also implied that appellant’s testimony failed to establish fear which rises to the level of terror, and concluded therefore that there was no sudden “passion” in the case. It is true this Court observed in Daniels, supra, that evidence sufficient to raise selfdefense, in combination with “a bare claim of ‘fear,’ ” will not necessarily operate to establish “terror ... sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.” Sec. 19.04(c), supra. Much mischief and misunderstanding has been engendered by this observation. See Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844 *101(Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Clinton, J., concurring); Gonzales v. State, 717 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Clinton, J., dissenting). In Daniels the defendant’s own testimony on recrossexamination demonstrated that whatever fear he may have felt did not prevent him from reflecting on his situation before he acted. 645 S.W.2d at 460. See Gonzales supra. There was no such testimony in the present case. Appellant testified that he was “scared.” Under the circumstances the jury would be entitled to infer that appellant’s fear was such as to have rendered him incapable of cool reflection. See Steen v. State, 88 Tex.Cr.R. 256, 225 S.W. 529 (1920). The issue should have been submitted to the jury to decide (1) whether the deceased engaged in the provocative conduct, i.e., did he in fact stab appellant; (2) was appellant in fact provoked, i.e., did he in fact lose his capacity for cool reflection as a result of the provocative conduct; and (3) did that provocative conduct amount to “adequate cause” under § 19.-04(c). Gonzales, supra. It stretches credulity to say that the cause of appellant’s purported fear, viz, the stab wound, and a reasonable prospect of another or more wounds, could not have been of such a nature as to render a person of ordinary temper incapable of cool reflection.3 Manifestly, that determination should have been left to the jury.
Without always examining the factual details as precisely as I have done here, in a number of cases the Court has found evidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, or to uphold a finding that the offense was committed: Humphries v. State, 615 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (stabbing in course of heated argument); Braudrick v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (stabbing in escalating barroom brawl); Lucky v. State, 495 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (shooting shortly after insulting conduct led to heated argument); Parks v. State, 473 S.W.2d 32 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) (stabbing during argument over dollar debt). Here also I would find that the record contains evidence sufficient to raise the issue of “sudden passion.”

. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.04(b) and (c) read:
"(b) ‘Sudden passion' means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation.
(c) ‘Adequate cause’ means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.”

. That phrase is defined in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.07(a)(34) thusly:
“ ‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”

. Whether the wound was of such a degree of severity is perhaps another question: Appellant testified that, on later inspecting the wound, he concluded that "[i]t didn’t seem that bad." Nonetheless it was reasonable for the trial court to find that, at the time and under the circumstances, the infliction of what turned out to be a not so serious wound might have frightened a person of ordinary temper to the point of losing his capacity for cool reflection. This is a classic example of an issue to be reserved for the trier of fact.