Court Opinion

ID: 9786049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:46:01.635764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:41.166465
License: Public Domain

Judge RUSSEL
specially concurring.
For the most part, I agree with the views expressed in the majority opinion:
I. The trial court found that defense counsel willfully violated a pretrial order by using the term "boyfriend" to imply a sexual relationship between the alleged victim and her male friend. Because the record supports these findings, we must uphold the court's order declaring a mistrial and requiring defendant to stand trial again. It does not matter whether the court's pretrial order was correct. Right or wrong, a trial court must be able to enforce its own orders.
II. Defendants must be allowed to suggest, through evidence and argument, that a witness has a motive to lie. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Here, the defense should have been allowed to advance the theory that the alleged victim lied about her sexual contact with defendant-saying it had been unwelcome, when it had been consensual-so that she could maintain her relationship with her boyfriend. By precluding this line of impeachment, the trial court abridged defendant's constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 233, 109 S.Ct. 480, 484, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988); People v. Golden, 140 P.3d 1, 6 (Colo.App.2005). Because the court's error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant is entitled to a new trial.
I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority's remand order. The majority states that, on retrial, the trial court must allow defendant to "elicit evidence of the alleged victim's romantic and sexual relationship with the friend" (emphasis added). I do not agree that this is necessary.
In some cases, evidence of sexual conduct is essential if a jury is to gain a proper understanding of a witness's motive to lie. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981) (the defendant was allowed to show that the alleged victim had been charged with prostitution after being found engaged in sexual activity in a car; this evidence was admissible to show that her allegations against the defendant may have been motivated by a desire to avoid further prosecution).
But in other cases, evidence of sexual conduct is not essential to establish the witness's motive. Courts have recognized, for example, that evidence of sexual conduct is not essential where the witness's motive may be premised on evidence of a romantic relationship. See, e.g., People v. Golden, supra, 140 P.3d at 6 (remanding for new trial at which defendant may elicit evidence that the witness was in a "committed romantic relationship"); Richardson v. State, 276 Ga. 689, 581 S.E.2d 528 (2003) (evidence that the victim wanted to rekindle a romantic relationship with another man was admissible so long as the defendant confined questioning to the nonsexual nature of the relationship); State v. Pride, 528 N.W.2d 862, 865, 867 n. 5 (Minn.1995) (evidence that the victim had a motive to lie "in an effort to move her relationship with [another man] from friendly to romantic" was admissible where the defendant "made it clear he did not intend to ask questions regarding the sexual nature of their relationship").
Here, defendant theorized that the alleged victim was motivated by a desire to preserve her relationship with her boyfriend. Because this desire could be the same regardless of whether the relationship was sexual, evidence of the alleged victim's sexual conduct has little incremental probative value. I therefore would allow the trial court to exclude evidence of the victim's sexual conduct (including specific instances of conduct, as well as any general reference to sexual activity) under CRE 403 and § 18-8-407, C.R.S. 2006. In my view, such a ruling would not abridge defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 678, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); People v. Saiz, 32 P.3d 441, 449 (Colo.2001) ("A trial court retains the discretion to assess the incremental pro*577bative value of evidence offered by a criminal defendant and to exclude even logically relevant evidence that would be more wasteful of time, confusing, or misleading than helpful to the jury.").