Court Opinion

ID: 9771309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:39:04.074302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:28.506319
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. The majority and concurring opinions gnaw on this case leaving me with the feeling that this case is one of our victims — not one of our decisions. First, the majority says the important issue of whether one can be imprisoned for a debt is not raised; then it goes on to say it is meritless anyway. Two domestic relations cases are cited as authority for the proposition that a man can be imprisoned for the failure to pay child support. The imprisonment is supposedly for violation of the court’s order, not failure to pay the debt. Of course, that is not true. The man is imprisoned for failure to pay the debt — it is just a forgiveable slight of the constitutional ban on imprisonment for a debt because of the strong moral obligation to support one’s children. This case involves a simple commercial debt in which the debtor will be jailed if he does not come up with the money. Isn’t that imprisonment for failure to pay a debt? The concurring opinion takes this case as an opportunity to try to tidy up the law on the question of jurisdiction of circuit and chancery courts, in the process, sideswiping one of our decisions and a court of appeals’ decision. (I only point out that the circuit court has the inherent authority to issue any orders necessary to exercise its jurisdiction. Arkansas State Police Commission v. Davidson, 252 Ark. 137, 477 S.W.2d 852 (1972) (concurrence); Dobbins Bros. v. Anderson, 199 Ark. 635, 135 S.W.2d 325 (1940). If that order happens to be an injunction, it can still be issued. Dobbins Bros., supra.) That brings me to the reason I write in the first place. It is the presence in this case of the legal mutation, the so-called mandatory injunction, which I have discussed before. Springdale Board of Education v. Bowman, 294 Ark. 66, 740 S.W.2d 909 (1987). That creature simply does not exist, and the fact that the majority has recognized it bestows upon it no legitimacy. The case should be dismissed because there is no such remedy. If I were to reach the merits, I would not treat so casually the question of using the powers of the courts to jail a man to collect a debt. Purtle, J., joins the dissent.