Court Opinion

ID: 9390518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 18:00:27.186733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.057591
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30153        Document: 00516728774             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/27/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                     April 27, 2023
                                       No. 22-30153
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk

   Wayland Collins; Alvin Polk,

                                                                  Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                            versus

   Mark Ingle; John C. Benton, doing business as Q & M Motor
   Transports,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 2:18-CV-7465

   Before Jolly, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Wayland Collins and Alvin Polk (hereinafter, “Plaintiffs”) were
   allegedly side-swiped by an 18-wheeler while driving on a highway in
   Louisiana. Relevant here, they subsequently sued the driver, Mark Ingle, and
   his employer, John C. Benton, d/b/a Q & M Motor Transports (hereinafter,
   “Defendants”), for negligence.            The parties filed several pretrial and

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30153         Document: 00516728774                Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                          No. 22-30153

   evidentiary motions, which the district court largely denied. A jury trial
   followed resulting in a verdict for Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs filed
   several post-trial motions, which the district court also denied. Plaintiffs then
   timely appealed claiming the district court committed reversible errors in its
   pretrial, evidentiary, and post-trial rulings. For the reasons set forth below,
   we AFFIRM.
                                           I.       Facts
           In August 2017, Plaintiffs were driving on Interstate 10, near the I-510
   southbound merge, in Louisiana—an area in close proximity to a stretch of
   highway where a number of car accidents were staged or intentionally caused
   by drivers—when their vehicle was struck by an 18-wheeler that attempted
   to merge into their lane. Shortly thereafter, Collins’s wife, 1 who was also in
   the car, was escorted to the hospital by an ambulance because she was several
   months pregnant. Around the same time, the police arrived on scene and
   took statements from Plaintiffs and Ingle. Ingle stated that he thought the car
   in the right-hand lane was speeding when he attempted to merge, but the
   officer ultimately issued him a traffic citation. Plaintiffs both told the officer
   they were not injured nor needed medical attention. Thereafter, however,
   Plaintiffs received medical care. 2
           Plaintiffs subsequently sued Defendants for negligence arising from
   the car accident.         Defendants answered the complaint, asserting an
   affirmative defense that Plaintiffs staged or intentionally caused the car
   accident.     Thereafter, protracted litigation ensued.               As relevant here,

           1
             Collins’s wife’s claims were resolved prior to trial. Therefore, she is not a party
   to this appeal.
           2
             The evidence in the case demonstrated that both Plaintiffs were previously
   involved in car accidents and suffered injuries to their necks and/or lower backs.

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                                           No. 22-30153

   Plaintiffs asserted a Daubert 3 challenge against Defendants’ expert, Louis
   Fey, who sought to testify about certain indicia—what he called “red
   flags”—of an intentionally caused or staged car accident that were present in
   the case, including the similarities to other suspicious car accidents in the
   area. Plaintiffs also moved to strike Defendants’ affirmative defense on the
   ground that it was the functional equivalent of fraud and thus subject to
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s particularity requirement. The
   district court denied both motions. Defendants, on the other hand, filed a
   motion in limine to exclude admission of Ingle’s traffic citation and
   purported corresponding guilty plea, which the district court granted,
   precluding admission for any purpose.
          At trial, several experts were called to the stand, including
   Defendants’ expert, Dr. Baratta, who testified that the sheet metal pulled
   backwards on Plaintiffs’ car indicated that it “was traveling faster than the
   tractor trailer when” the accident occurred. Before the case was submitted
   to the jury, Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law seeking dismissal
   of Defendants’ affirmative defense, which the district court denied.
   Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs finding that: (1) Ingle was
   a fifty percent cause of the accident; (2) Plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by
   the accident; and (3) Collins, but not Polk, was a fifty percent cause of the
   accident. The jury awarded Plaintiffs damages for future, but not past,
   medical expenses and disability. The district court then entered judgment in
   favor of Plaintiffs and reduced their respective damages awards according to
   the finding of comparative fault.

          3
              Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).

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           Plaintiffs subsequently filed a renewed motion for judgment as a
   matter of law 4 and a motion for a new trial claiming the jury’s award of future
   but not past medical expenses arising from the same injury was internally
   inconsistent under Louisiana law. They also filed a motion to alter or amend
   the judgment claiming there was no evidence to support the finding of
   comparative fault. The district court denied the motions. Plaintiffs timely
   appealed.
                       II.    Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
           The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
   appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Meadaa v. K.A.P. Enters.,
   L.L.C., 756 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining “all interlocutory orders
   of the district court leading up to the judgment merge into the final judgment
   and become appealable at that time” (quotation omitted)).
           We generally review interlocutory orders—such as evidentiary
   rulings, the admission of expert testimony, and denials of motions to strike
   pursuant to Rule 12(f)—for an abuse of discretion. See Williams v. Manitowoc
   Cranes, L.L.C., 898 F.3d 607, 615 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted);
   Cambridge Toxicology Grp., Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 178 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (citation omitted). Even when the district court abuses its discretion, we will
   not reverse unless the error affected the “substantial rights” of the party.
   E.E.O.C. v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir. 1994)
   (quotation omitted).
           Similarly, we review motions for a new trial and to alter or amend the
   judgment for an abuse of discretion. McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Tex.), N.A.,

           4
             Plaintiffs refer to this motion as a “motion for judgment notwithstanding the
   verdict,” but it is now properly referred to as a renewed motion for judgment as a matter
   of law pursuant to Rule 50(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.

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                                         No. 22-30153

   788 F.3d 463, 472 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); Rosenblatt v. United Way
   of Greater Hous., 607 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We
   review motions for judgment as a matter of law and such renewed motions,
   however, de novo. Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 799 F.3d 374,
   377 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
                                  III.      Discussion
          Plaintiffs appeal several of the district court’s pretrial, evidentiary,
   and post-trial rulings claiming they constitute reversible error.
      A. Pretrial and Evidentiary Rulings
          Plaintiffs challenge three pre-trial and evidentiary rulings on appeal.
   First, they challenge the district court’s ruling that the traffic citation and the
   purported corresponding guilty plea could not be used for any evidentiary
   purpose at trial. Second, Plaintiffs contend the district court erred by
   denying their motion to strike Defendants’ affirmative defense. Third, they
   argue the district court committed a series of errors by admitting Fey’s
   testimony about the “red flags” or indicia of an intentionally caused or staged
   car accident.
          Plaintiffs carry the burden of showing reversible error on each of these
   rulings. Williams, 898 F.3d at 615 (“The party asserting the error has the
   burden of proving that the error was prejudicial.” (quotation omitted)). For
   the district court’s alleged errors to be harmful, we must be convinced, “after
   reviewing the entire record, that the error did not influence the jury or had
   but a very slight effect on its verdict.” Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d
   761, 776 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
          Even assuming arguendo that the district court erred in ruling on these
   motions, Plaintiffs have failed to show that any error was prejudicial. Starting
   with the exclusion of the traffic citation and purported guilty plea, Plaintiffs

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   contend the district court’s ruling was harmful error because it, in effect,
   prevented them from discrediting Ingle at trial. Notably, though, Plaintiffs
   do not sufficiently explain how this would have impacted the verdict or
   influenced the jury, and much of what they wanted to address was already
   addressed (for example, Ingle’s failure to undergo and his employer’s failure
   to administer a post-accident drug and alcohol test was raised at trial). In any
   event, the jury found for Plaintiffs by concluding Ingle was a cause of the
   accident, meaning this alleged error would have had only a very slight effect
   on the verdict, if at all. Any such error then is harmless. See Baki v. Bigelow
   Mgmt., Inc., 220 F. App’x 302, 304 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (concluding
   the exclusion of a witness was harmless because he would have merely
   reiterated substantive testimony already in the record). Additionally, the
   jury’s verdict also refutes the argument that there was harmful error from the
   alleged failure to dismiss the affirmative defense.
           We reach the same conclusion with respect to the court’s denial of the
   motion to strike and admission of Fey’s testimony. Plaintiffs contend these
   alleged errors were harmful because they caused the jury to assign fifty
   percent fault to Collins for the accident when there was no evidence to
   substantiate this finding. The record belies this contention. Defendants
   presented evidence, independent from Fey’s testimony, suggesting Collins
   was equally as negligent as Ingle. For example, Defendants’ expert, Dr.
   Baratta, testified that “the [Plaintiffs’ car] was traveling faster than the
   tractor trailer when” the car accident occurred.                  As such, there was
   independent evidence from which the jury could conclude Collins
   contributed to, but did not intentionally cause, the accident.                        This
   demonstrates a lack of harmful error. 5 See Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways,

           5
            Plaintiffs argue a question sent by the jury during deliberation about other staged
   car accidents shows that the jury was adversely impacted by Fey’s testimony. But the

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   Inc., 762 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding the erroneous admission
   of evidence was harmless because the verdict was otherwise supported).
           In sum, none of Plaintiffs’ contentions of error in the pretrial and
   evidentiary rulings constitute grounds for reversal.
       B. Post-Trial Motions
           Plaintiffs’ challenges to the rulings on their post-trial motions fare no
   better. They contend the district court erred in denying their renewed
   motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) and motion for
   a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) because, under Louisiana law, it is
   internally inconsistent for the jury to award future but not past medical
   expenses arising from the same injury. 6 Similarly, according to Plaintiffs, the
   district court erred in denying their motion to alter or amend the judgment
   under Rule 59(e) because there was no evidence supporting a finding of
   comparative fault. We, again, disagree.
           Starting with the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, we
   conclude Plaintiffs failed to properly raise this argument on appeal.
   Plaintiffs’ opening brief merely alludes to this argument by citing Rule 50(b),
   but there is neither developed discussion nor any discernable argument with
   relevant citations on this issue. As such, it is not before us. United States v.
   Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding argument was
   not properly before the court because party only “mention[ed] or allude[d]
   to a legal theory” and failed to adequately “press its claims” (quotation

   verdict suggests otherwise because it reflects the jury’s finding that an accident occurred,
   and that it was at least partially caused by Ingle.
           6
              While this concept may be true in some cases, the evidence in this case established
   Plaintiffs suffered soft tissue injuries that warranted future medical treatment but that their
   past medical expenses were not caused by this accident.

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                                       No. 22-30153

   omitted)). In any event, even if this argument had been properly briefed, we
   lack the power to address it because Plaintiffs failed to move for judgment as
   a matter of law on the issue of damages at trial; i.e., they failed to claim that
   the jury must award past medical expenses in this case. See OneBeacon Ins.
   Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Assocs., 841 F.3d 669, 680 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding
   it lacked the power on appeal to address an argument raised for the first time
   in the Rule 50(b) motion).
          As for Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court erred in denying
   their motion for a new trial, we conclude they have failed to show there is “an
   absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” McCaig, 788
   F.3d at 472 (quotation omitted). Therefore, the district court did not abuse
   its discretion in denying the motion.
          Similarly, we decline to address Plaintiffs’ argument on the motion to
   alter or amend the judgment. It merely reiterates the argument raised in their
   harmful error analysis—that there was no evidence to support comparative
   fault—which we already addressed above and rejected. See Youmans v.
   Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
                                 IV.      Conclusion
          For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   pretrial and evidentiary rulings and denials of Plaintiffs’ post-trial motions.

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