Court Opinion

ID: 9686098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:27:32.113318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:14.808814
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority's view that the public policy of this state bars Tank Transport's claim.
Public policy determinations in this state that are within the ambit of judicial authority are made by the supreme court. See Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 Wis. 2d 87, 93-94, 394 N.W.2d 732, 734-735 (1986); Cox v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, 184 Wis. 2d 309, 315 n.1, 517 N.W.2d 526, 528 n.1 (Ct. App. 1994). The supreme court has accepted the no-holds-barred view of tort liability: "The duty of any person is the obligation of due care to refrain from any act which *452will cause foreseeable harm to others even though the nature of that harm and the identity of the harmed person or harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act." A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 214 N.W.2d 764, 766 (1974).
A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone. A party is negligent when he commits an act when some harm to someone is foreseeable. Once negligence is established, the defendant is liable for unforseeable [sic] consequences as well as foreseeable ones. In addition, he is liable to unforeseeable plaintiffs.
Id., 62 Wis. 2d at 484, 214 N.W.2d at 766. Thus, under Wisconsin law a tortfeasor is liable to an injured plaintiff "if there is an unbroken chain of causation from the negligent act to the injury sustained and if the negligence is a substantial factor," unless public-policy considerations intervene. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 515, 523a-523b, 219 N.W.2d 576, 577 (1974) (per curiam, on reconsideration).
"Some of the various public policy factors that may be appropriately invoked to deny liability even in the face of an unbroken chain of causation" are:
[T]he injury is (1) too remote from the negligence or (2) too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor, or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm, or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden upon users of the highway, or (5) be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims, or (6) would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
*453Id., 63 Wis. 2d at 523b, 219 N.W.2d at 577 (quoted source and internal quotes omitted). When viewed in the light of Wisconsin precedent, none of these considerations is present here.
1. Remoteness. Under existing Wisconsin tort law, the injury to Tank Transport can hardly be considered "remote." See Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 597, 599-600, 85 N.W.2d 345, 347, 348 (1957) (man's death from heart failure ten days after he was "frightened" when truck hit house in which he was napping was not too remote even though defendant "neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred").
2. Proportionality to fault. Tank Transport seeks to recover damages that are the direct result of the tortfeasor's negligence. Under existing Wisconsin tort law the injury to Tank Transport can hardly be considered out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability. See Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740, 762-763, 501 N.W.2d 788, 796-797 (1993) (liability for eighty-five percent of $427,000 in damages to building caused by an unexpected surge of electricity resulting from the electric company's failure to properly trim trees near power lines not disproportionate to electric company's negligence).
3. Foreseeability. Increase of insurance premiums assessed against those involved in accidents but who are without fault is common. It can hardly be argued that "in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm" (Howard, 63 Wis. 2d at 523b, 219 N.W.2d at 577). See Beacon Bowl, 176 Wis. 2d at 764, 501 N.W.2d at 797 (electric corn-*454pany liable for damages caused by its failure to trim trees even though chain of events resulting in fire was rare).
4. Burden on drivers. Permitting recovery here would not add to the burden of drivers, who already are required to drive without negligence. See Beacon Bowl, 176 Wis. 2d at 763-764, 501 N.W.2d at 797 (imposing liability on electric company for damages caused by its failure to trim trees properly "will neither increase [it's] common-law duty nor subject it to an unreasonable burden").
5. Possibility of fraudulent claims. Imposing liability upon the tortfeasor here for Tank Transport's damages will no more open the door to a rush of fraudulent claims than does imposing liability on tortfeasor/drivers for damages to either other drivers and pedestrians or other third-party claimants such as spouses and minor children.
6. Stopping points. The majority recites what it sees as possible complications that would flow from permitting recovery here. They and similar problems of apportioning liability between responsible parties are routinely resolved by our tort-law system, and, indeed, present obstacles that are de minimus compared to some that are handled without significant difficulty — for example, how to "compensate" a decedent's estate for any pain and suffering that the decedent might have endured in the moments between an accident and death, see Blaisdell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 19, 24-26, 82 N.W.2d 886, 889-890 (1957), or even pre-fatal-injury fear, see Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 30-32 (Neb. 1989) (five seconds) (collecting cases). Specific problems of liability and calculation can *455be considered when and if they arise. As Judge (and later Justice) Benjamin Nathan Cardozo once observed in another context: "Grotesque or fanciful situations, such as those supposed, will have to be dealt with when they arise." Gaines v. City of New York, 109 N.E. 594, 596 (N.Y. 1915). In my view, none of the difficulties hypothesized by the majority is present here.
The purpose of tort law is to make whole those who suffer damages as a result of another's negligence. See Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 918, 537 N.W.2d 74, 82 (Ct. App. 1995). Indeed, the courts often impose liability without proof of negligence or fault, see Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (adopting Restatement (Second) OF Torts § 402A), and even order the payment of money to living, uninjured persons as "compensation" for the pain and fear of death suffered by their dead relatives, see Blaisdell; Nelson.
Tank Transport is an innocent victim of another’s negligence. I see no persuasive reason why, under established Wisconsin precedent and public policy as crafted by the supreme court, it should not be able to recover damages that flow directly from that negligence. See Ledex, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 461 N.E.2d 1299, 1300, 1303-1304 (Ohio 1984) (Neither Ohio workers' compensation law nor public policy bars "an employer whose employee suffers injuries and recovers workers' compensation therefor from recovering damages for increased workers' compensation premiums from a third party whose conduct caused the employee's injuries.").1
*456I would reverse.2

 Pennsylvania and Connecticut do not permit recovery. Whirley Industries, Inc. v. Segel, 462 A.2d 800 (Pa. Super. 1983 *456(per curiam); RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 650 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1994). There are substantial differences, however, between the law and policy of those states and that of Wisconsin. Unlike Pennsylvania, Wisconsin has rejected the foreseeability focus of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) ("Relatively to [the plaintiff] it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed."). The essence of Whirley is that lack of foreseeability bars recovery as a matter of policy. Whirley, 462 A.2d at 804 ("an increase in an employer's Workmen's Compensation premiums following an automobile accident is not reasonably foreseeable by a driver"; adhering to the foreseeability/duty theory of Pal-sgraf). That is not the law in Wisconsin. Moreover, RK Constructors held that although the increased worker's compensation premiums were foreseeable by the tortfeasor, RK Constructors, 650 A.2d at 156, the damages were "too remote to be chargeable to the" tortfeasor, id., 650 A.2d at 157. For the reasons noted in the main body of this dissent, I respectfully disagree.

 Unlike the defendants, the majority does not contend that Wisconsin's worker's compensation law bars this action. I agree that it does not.
As material here, § 102.29(1), Stats., provides:
The making of a claim for compensation against an employer or compensation insurer for the injury or death of an employe [sic] shall not affect the right of the employe [sic], the employe's [sic] personal representative, or other person entitled to bring action, to make claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party for such injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a 3rd party; nor shall the making of a claim by any such person against a 3rd party for damages by reason of an injury to which ss. 102.03 to 102.64 are applicable, or the adjustment of any such claim, affect the right of the injured employe [sic] or the employe's [sic] dependents to recover compensation. The employer or compensation insurer who shall have paid or is obligated to pay a lawful claim under this chapter shall have the same right to make claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party for such injury or death.
*457(Emphasis added.)
Kottka v. PPG Industries, Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 499, 521-522, 388 N.W.2d 160, 170 (1986), recognizes that a non-employee damaged (wife's loss of consortium) by a tortfeasor's injury to an employee covered by the worker's compensation law (husband) may sue the third-party tortfeasor to recover those damages without reference to § 102.29(1), STATS. Indeed, the amount recovered by Mrs. Kottka was not subject to allocation under § 102.29(1), STATS., because her loss-of-consortium claim was "a claim for personal injury to her, not a claim 'for the injury or death of an employe' [sic] within the meaning of sec. 102.29(1), Stats." Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 521-522, 388 N.W.2d at 170. By the same token here, Tank Transport's negligence claim against the tortfeasor seeks recovery for its own damages, not "for the injury" to it's employee within the meaning of § 102.29(1).