Court Opinion

ID: 9769461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:51:28.016184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:03.995512
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The portion of the majority opinion with which I take issue begins with the following statement:
In Doucet v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 966 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, writ denied), we expressed our concerns as to the ever increasing lack of veracity of jurors on voir dire; however, the constitutionality of Rule 327(b) was not presented. We now address the conflict of Rule 327(b) with our constitutional man*959date that the jury be composed of competent jurors free from bias and prejudice. Rule 327(b) literally makes it impossible to satisfy the constitutional mandate that the purity of the composition of the jury was maintained.
In subsequently holding Rule 327(b) unconstitutional, the majority “burns the house to roast the pig.” I will attempt to explain why, when construed properly in light of Rule 327(a), Rule 327(b) is not in fatal conflict with the Texas Constitution. In doing so, I will also show that the trial court did not err in overruling the appellant’s motion for new trial. As I appreciate the majority’s opinion, it had no quarrel with the trial court’s August 14,1996, ruling contained in a letter sent to each party. The letter stated in part:
The plaintiffs first grounds [sic] for new trial stems from alleged jury misconduct. In support of this, the plaintiff offered the affidavits of several jurors as well as live testimony of a juror. All of the matters revealed by this evidence pertained to jury deliberations. As such, this evidence was incompetent to establish jury misconduct. Rule 327(b) T.R.C.P.; Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Civ.[sic] App.—El Paso 1994, writ den’d) (and cases cited therein).
The record before us clearly indicates that the information contained in the affidavits concerning how Juror Maxwell attempted to influence other jurors was taken directly from the deliberation stage of the trial. The jurors had been provided with their written instructions and had been placed in the jury deliberation room when the discussions in question took place. Use of any information taken from the jury’s deliberations is expressly prohibited by Rule 327(b). No interpretation of the rule is needed as this violates the exact letter of the rule. I, and apparently the majority, have no problem with this ruling.
However, as to the issue of jury misconduct regarding Juror Maxwell’s deliberate failure to reveal her bias toward the type of lawsuit in question, the record before this Court indicates that the trial court recognized that certain portions of the affidavit and testimony of Juror Darold Frederick could be considered as evidence of Maxwell’s voir dire misconduct. As I read Rule 327(a), the following portion of Juror Frederick’s affidavit could have been properly considered by the trial court, notwithstanding Rule 327(b):
At a recess during the trial after the testimony of the witness Mulaney, the juror Barbara Maxwell told me that she had been on a previous jury in which a family was suing for the death of another family member. Her comment was that the jury she was on awarded nothing, and that she did not believe in “awarding money in stuff like that”, [sic] She also said, “We are the ones that end up paying for it.” I reminded her that she had been asked about that by Mr. Smith and she gave no answer.
Clearly, this colloquy between the two jurors took place at a recess while testimony was still being taken during the trial. In my opinion, this was not and never could be considered to have occurred “during the course of the jury’s deliberations.” Furthermore, Juror Frederick’s affidavit quoted above does not even hint at “the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.... ” I would be more than willing to join the majority if it chose to expressly condemn eases such as Baley v. W/W Interests, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied), which made the following bold pronouncement, (totally unsupported by any authority I might add):
Any conversation regarding the case occurring between or among jurors is a part of jury deliberations regardless of the time and place where it occurs. To hold otherwise would reinstate the post-trial questioning of jurors under prior law. The present procedural and evidentiary rules restrict a juror’s testimony solely to matters of “outside influence improperly brought to bear upon any juror.”
Subsequent cases have supported Baley’s position regarding “outside influence,” as well as the scope of “jury deliberations.” See Mitchell v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 955 *960S.W.2d 300, 322 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ); Wilson v. Texas Parks and Wildlife Dept., 853 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 886 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.1994).
My humble research has turned up no Texas Supreme Court opinion interpreting the scope of Rule 327(b), and with cases like Baley in the books, it is clear to see how use of Rule 327(b) has resulted in “the tail wagging the dog” vis a vis Rule 327(a). In my view, they are separate rules and should be read in harmony whenever possible, not in conflict. See Owens—Illinois, Inc. v. Chatham, 899 S.W.2d 722, 732 (Tex.App.—Houston 1995 [14th Dist.], writ dism’d). Rule 327(a) explicitly mandates that a trial court “shall hear evidence thereof from the jury ” on the issue of a juror giving an incorrect or erroneous answer on voir dire. Rule 327(a) is not modified by any reference to 327(b), nor is 327(b) modified by any reference to 327(a).
In the instant case, the trial court apparently recognized a clear distinction between the two rules as is evident in his ruling on the misconduct issue regarding Juror Maxwell’s voir dire responses:
Plaintiff next complains that a certain juror failed to disclose a bias towards lawsuits during the course of voir dire. During the voir dire proceeding, counsel for plaintiff asked the entire jury panel whether any of them, for any reason (identifying several potential reasons including bias against lawsuits), would not want to sit on the jury. While the evidence submitted in support of plaintiffs Motion for New Trial on the basis of jury misconduct would certainly support a conclusion that the juror in question had a bias towards product liability lawsuits, the question posed was a general “catch-all” question which has been held to be insufficient for purposes of new trial. See Durbin, supra; Soliz v. Saenz, 779 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ.[sic] App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ den’d) (and cases cited therein).
This ruling relies on two cases that place the rules in their proper context and apply them harmoniously. As pointed out by the SolizG-ourt, and also recognized in Durbin:1
In certain circumstances, failure to disclose biases and prejudices during voir dire examination can amount to jury misconduct not affected by Rules 327(b) and [Tex.R. Civ. Evid] 606(b). For instance, when a party discovers that a juror lied about a matter which reveals that the juror was clearly biased or prejudiced, this could amount to jury misconduct. See General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. v. Coffman, 326 S.W.2d 287, 291-92 (Tex.Civ.App. —Waco 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Soliz, 779 S.W.2d at 933. See also Durbin, 871 S.W.2d at 272. (emphasis mine).
In both Soliz&nd Durbin, the courts affirmed the respective trial courts’ rulings denying the motions for new trial as the lies or misstatements by the jurors were discovered having emanated from inside the juries’ deliberations. Again, I have no quarrel with a rule that protects the “sanctity” of the jury’s deliberations, so long as it is indeed limited in scope to a time after the jury is given its instructions and commences to deliberate. Cases such as Raieyapply a construction of Rule 327(b) which is strained to herniating proportions.
And if all of the above were not enough, the majority is flying in the face of the law which provides that in order to challenge a legislative or judicial enactment on constitutional grounds, a party must have suffered some actual or threatened restriction under the statute in question, and must contend that the statute unconstitutionally restricts his rights, not someone else’s rights. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 (Tex.1995). In the instant case, the trial court’s ruling on the issue of Maxwell’s voir dire misconduct did not involve Rule 327(b) at all as the trial court apparently did consider certain evidence accompanying appellant’s motion for new trial. The trial court’s ruling was based upon the apparent lack of specificity of the voir dire questions by appellant’s trial coun*961sel to Juror Maxwell which resulted in her misleading, if not false, responses. The majority has simply not shown, at least to my satisfaction, how, under the record before us, Rule 327(b) was even implicated in the trial court’s decision on the voir dire misconduct issue. I would, therefore, overrule points of error seven and eight, and address the remaining points of error. Because the majority holds otherwise, I must dissent.2

. Soliz v. Saenz, 779 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994, writ denied).

. The majority fails to note that the jury verdict in this case was 10 — 2 favoring plaintiff Jackson, and that juror Maxwell voted favorably for plain-