Court Opinion

ID: 9931188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:05:48.197662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:19.650960
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                           STATE OF LOUISIANA

                            COURT OF APPEAL

                               FIRST CIRCUIT

                              NO. 2023 CA 0413

                      DR. JOHN K. SMART M.D. AND
                    MR. MARK CHRISTOPHER SAUCIER

                                   VERSUS

                              BRYCE AMOND

                                    Judgment Rendered.       FEB 0 8 2024

                              Appealed from the
                          21st Judicial District Court
                      In and for the Parish of Tangipahoa
                              State of Louisiana
                      Case No. 2021- 0002476, Division C

             The Honorable Erika W. Sledge, Judge Presiding

Russell C. Monroe                          Counsel for Plaintiffs/ Appellants
Ponchatoula, Louisiana                     Dr. John K. Smart, M.D. and
                                           Mark Christopher Saucier

Patrick G. Coudrain                        Counsel for Defend ant/Appellee
Andre G. Coudrain                          Bryce Amond
Hammond, Louisiana

           BEFORE: THERIOT, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.
THERIOT, J.

        Dr. John K. Smart, M.D., and Mark Christopher Saucier appeal the 21"

Judicial District Court' s December 5,    2022 judgment granting Bryce Amond' s

motion for summary judgment and denying Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier' s motion

for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in

part.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Appellants, Dr. John K. Smart, M.D., and Mark Christopher Saucier, reside

in Ponchatoula, Louisiana, on immovable property owned by Dr. Smart. Appellee,

Bryce Amond, owns and resides on property south of Dr. Smart' s property.        The

instant appeal relates to Mr. Amond' s usage of a driveway that crosses over Mr.

Smart' s land to reach his own home.

        The two properties at issue were once a single tract of land, consisting of

approximately 12. 6 acres, purchased by Errol and Virginia Bordelon in 1995.     The

Bordelons subsequently partitioned the single tract of land into the two tracts at

issue, which are made up of approximately 11. 5 acres and 1. 1 acres respectively.

Mr. Smart currently owns the 1. 1 - acre tract of land (" the Smart property"), while

Mr. Amond owns the 11. 5 -acre tract (" the Amond      property").   Both properties

were sold on several occasions prior to Dr.      Smart and Mr. Amond acquiring

ownership of their respective tracts.   Dr. Smart purchased the Smart property on

September 25, 2020.      Mr. Amond and his wife, Brandi Amond, acquired the

Amond property on November 20, 2020.

        On August 27, 2021,    Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier filed a " Petition for

Restraining] Order, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages," naming Mr. Amond as

defendant.    Dr. Smart and Mr.   Saucier alleged that Mr. Amond had repeatedly

trespassed on Dr. Smart' s driveway, which runs down the west side of the Smart

property,    in order to reach his own property.     They further alleged that the

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driveway is private and that Mr. Amond' s alleged trespasses had interfered with

their use and enjoyment of the property.'

         Dr. Smart        and Mr.       Saucier sought a declaratory judgment stating,                           in

pertinent     part,   that the property is owned by Dr. Smart, who has use of the

driveway; Mr. Amond has no right to enter the driveway; and Dr. Smart has full

right to establish any fences to prevent Mr. Amond' s use of the driveway.                                     Dr.

Smart and Mr.            Saucier further sought a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction prohibiting Mr. Amond and his agents, assigns, and invitees

from using the driveway.

         On October 6, 2021, Mr. Amond filed an answer wherein he opposed the

issuance of a preliminary injunction as it relates to his use of the driveway.                                  He

alleged that the driveway at issue is the only driveway that has been used to reach

his home over its 120+ year lifespan.

         On October 12, 2021, the Bordelons transferred a small strip of land just off

of Wadesboro Road to Mr. Amond.                     As a result of this transfer, the driveway first

passes over this strip of land, now owned by Mr. Amond, and then passes over the

Smart property.

         On October 20, 2021, the trial court signed a stipulated judgment wherein

the parties agreed that Mr. Amond and his agents, assigns, and invitees would not

enter Dr. Smart' s property or harass Dr. Smart or Mr. Saucier.2

         Pertinently, on August 26, 2022, Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier filed a motion

for summary judgment relating to Mr. Amond' s use of the driveway.' They argued

  Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier specifically allege that Mr. Amond and his agents, assigns, and invitees have disturbed
the property by: ( 1) trespassing on the driveway at issue and on Dr. Smart' s property; ( 2) intentionally throwing
fireworks at Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier in an effort to injure, threaten, harass, assault, and intimidate them; ( 3)
shouting loud derogatory epithets at Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier; ( 4) stalking and harassing Dr. Smart and Mr.
Saucier on the property; and ( 5) creating a nuisance by regularly playing music so loud that the sound cannot be
ignored and having gatherings in which underaged individuals allegedly drink alcohol provided by Mr. Amond.

z In the stipulation, " harassment" was defined to include using the driveway at an unreasonable rate of speed, to
watch Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier, or as a recreational track for bicycles, motorcycles, and other vehicles.      The
stipulation further defined " harassment" to include Mr. Amond playing or making any unreasonably loud music or
noise.

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that Mr. Amond is not landlocked and can create his own driveway west of Dr.

Smart' s driveway.           They also denied that Mr. Amond had acquired a predial

servitude over the driveway via acquisitive prescription.

            On October 14, 2022, Mr. Amond filed a motion for summary judgment,

arguing that he enjoys a predial servitude of passage by reference over the

driveway by title and by acquisitive prescription.

            A hearing on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment occurred on

October 31,          2022.    On December 5,            2022, the trial court signed a judgment

granting Mr. Amond' s motion for summary judgment and denying Dr. Smart and

Mr. Saucier' s motion for summary judgment. The trial court specifically found

that Mr. Amond enjoys a predial servitude of passage, in title, over the driveway

where it crosses over Dr. Smart' s property.                  The trial court further found that Mr.

Amond enjoys a predial servitude of passage over the driveway, where it crosses

over Dr. Smart' s property, by law of acquisitive prescription of ten years of good

faith uninterrupted use and possession with just title by Mr. Amond' s ancestor -in -

title as of the year 2015.

            This appeal by Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier followed.

                                   ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

            Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier assign the following as error:

             1)   The trial court committed reversible error in declaring that Amond
            had a predial servitude in title to the driveway that crosses over Dr.
            Smart' s property, depicted as being within the broken parallel dashed
            lines in that plat of survey dated March 6, 2001, by Roy C. Edwards,
            Jr., recorded with, and specifically referenced within the property' s
            legal description in that Act of Cash Sale recorded at COB 921 Page
            691, as File No. 587344 of the Record Vol. 2 of Tangipaboa Parish.

            2)    The trial court committed reversible error in declaring that
            Amond' s predecessor in title acquired a predial servitude by law of

I Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier further sought summary judgment declaring that the repeated playing of " painfully
loud" music is a nuisance and prohibiting Mr. Amond and his agents, assigns, and invitees from contacting and
harassing Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier or entering any property owned by Dr_ Smart. The trial court noted at the
hearing that it would not be proper to render a summary judgment on certain allegations made without evidence
being presented. The trial court ultimately denied Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier' s motion for summary judgment in its
entirety.

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         acquisitive prescription of ten years good faith uninterrupted use and
         possession with just title, in 2015.

          3)   The trial court committed legal error in failing to declare, in
         response to Appellants'  motion for partial summary judgment, that
         Amond had no predial servitude of passage or other right to use the
         driveway on the Smart property through title, or through prescription.

                                      STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Summary judgment procedure is favored and " is designed to secure the just,

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action .... and shall be construed to

accomplish these ends."              La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 2).         In reviewing the trial court' s

decision on a motion for summary judgment, this court applies a de novo standard

of review using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether

summary judgment is appropriate.                   Bass v. Disa Glob. Sols., Inc., 2019- 1145 ( La.

App. 1 Cir. 6/ 12120), 305 So. 3d 903, 906, writ denied, 2020- 01025 ( La. 11/ 4120),

303 So. 3d 651.

         After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents

show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3).                           The only documents

that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings,

memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories,                              certified    medical

records, written stipulations, and admissions.'                   La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4); Bass, 305

So. 3d at 906.          The mover bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to

summary judgment. However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at

trial on the subject matter of the motion, he need only demonstrate the absence. of

factual support for one or more essential elements of his opponent' s claim, action,

or defense.      La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).          If the moving party points out that there is

4 We note that the motions for summary judgment at issue in this appeal were filed and decided under La. C. C. P. art.
966 prior to its amendment by 2023 La. Acts No. 317, § 1, and 2023 La. Acts No. 368, § 1, which became effective
on August 1, 2023,

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an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse

party' s claim, action, or defense, then the nonmoving party must produce factual

support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or

that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.         La. C. C. P.   art.

966( D)( 1);   Bass, 305 So. 3d at 906.

        In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court' s role is not to

evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but

instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. A " genuine"

issue is a triable issue, which means that an issue is genuine if reasonable persons

could disagree; if on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only

one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue. A fact is " material" when

its existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiff' s cause of action under

the applicable theory of recovery. Bass, 305 So. 3d at 906- 07.

                                      DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error #1

       In their first assignment of error, Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier argue that the

trial court committed reversible error in declaring that Mr. Amond has a predial

servitude in title to the driveway that crosses over Dr. Smart' s property.

        A predial servitude is a charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a

dominant estate.     The two estates must belong to different owners. There must be

a benefit to the dominant estate.         There is no predial servitude if the charge

imposed cannot be reasonably expected to benefit the dominant estate.         La. C. C.

arts. 646 and 647.     The owner of the servient estate is not required to do anything.

His obligation is to abstain from doing something on his estate or to permit

something to be done on it.       La. C. C. art. 651; Templeton v. darreau, 2018- 0240

La. App. 1 Cir. 9124118), 259 So. 3d 356, 360.

                                             M
          Predial servitudes may be established by an owner on his estate or acquired

for its benefit.     La. C. C.   art.   697.    The use and extent of such servitudes are

regulated by the title by which they are created, and, in the absence of such

regulation, by the rules set forth in La. C. C. arts. 698 through 774.            See La. C. C.

art. 697. A right of passage is an example of a predial servitude. See La. C. C. art.

699.      The servitude of passage is the right for the benefit of the dominant estate

whereby persons, animals, or vehicles are permitted to pass through the servient

estate.    Unless the title provides otherwise, the extent of the right and the mode of

its exercise shall be suitable for the kind of traffic necessary for the reasonable use

of the dominant estate. La. C. C. art. 705. The establishment of a predial servitude

by title is an alienation of a part of the property to which the laws governing

alienation of immovables apply.                La. C. C.   art.   708.   Predial servitudes are

established by all acts by which immovables may be transferred. La. C. C. art. 722.

Doubt as to the existence, extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall

be resolved in favor of the servient estate.          La. C. C. art. 730; Brehm v. Amacker,

2019- 1452 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9121120), 314 So. 3d 58, 62- 63, writ denied, 2020-

01224 ( La. 1126121), 309 So. 3d 343.

          A servitude of passage is created when one subdivides property by plat of

survey that designates a right-of-way or servitude of passage and thereafter sells

one or more tracts of land by reference to said survey, regardless of whether or not

the instrument in question specifically describes or makes reference to the

servitude.     Brehm, 314 So. 3d at 63.           Where an act of sale is silent as to an

easement, but the survey plat referred to in the property description, which was

attached to a previous act of sale that was recorded in the conveyance records,

indicated that there was an easement, a servitude is created. Brehm, 314 So. 3d at

63; Templeton, 259 So. 3d at 362.

                                                  7
Relevant History of the Amond Property

      Per the exhibits     attached to Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier' s motion for

summary judgment and Mr. Amond' s opposition to that motion, the relevant

ownership history of the Amond property is as follows. The Bordelons purchased

the single,   12. 6 -acre tract of land in 1995.   They subsequently partitioned the

property into an 11. 5 -acre tract ( the Amond property) and a 1. 1 acre tract ( the

Smart property).

      On July 5, 2001, the Bordelons sold the Amond property to Glenda Howell.

The act of cash sale specifically provides that "[ t] his transfer is subject to such

prior servitudes, reservations and lease of record in the office of the Clerk and

Recorder for the Parish of TANGIPAHOA, State of Louisiana."           The act of cash

sale' s property description refers to a survey conducted by Roy C. Edwards, Jr. on

March 6, 2001 ("    the first Edwards map").       The act of cash sale and the first

Edwards map were recorded in the conveyance records of Tangipahoa Parish on

July 6, 2001.

      On November 1,       2005, Ms.    Howell sold the Amond property to Troy

Koehlar.   The November 1, 2005 act of sale included a clause stating that the act of

sale is accepted subject to "[ a] ny and all restrictions, conditions, servitudes, and

encroachments that may be contained in the chain of title and/or plan of

subdivision."
                The property description in the act of sale also refers to the first

Edwards map.

      In the affidavit of Mr. Koehlar, which is attached to Mr. Amond' s opposition

to Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier' s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Kochlar stated

that he believed that he had acquired a predial servitude of passage over the then -

gravel driveway connecting the Amond property to Wadesboro Road.           He further

stated that he used the driveway without physical or legal interruption during his

entire term of ownership of the property. Additionally, Mr. Koehlar attested that

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he and Lori Rayborn, a prior owner of the Smart property, shared the costs to have

the entire driveway paved in asphalt in 2005.

       On April 17, 2009, Mr. Koehlar entered into a boundary agreement with a

neighbor who owns the property directly east of the Smart property and north of

the Amond property. The boundary agreement referenced a more recent survey,

performed by Daniel McCabe and dated January 13, 2009 (" the McCabe survey")

Mr.   Koehlar and that neighbor agreed to adjust a boundary between their

respective properties.   This agreement did not relate to the driveway at issue, nor

did it purport to establish or extinguish a servitude.   The boundary agreement and

the McCabe survey were both recorded in the conveyance records of Tangipahoa

Parish.

      On August 9, 2019, Mr. Koehlar entered into a bond for deed contract with

Mr. Amond and his wife relating to the Amond property.           The bond for deed

contract was mutually cancelled after the parties executed a cash sale of the

property on November 20, 2 02 0.

Relevant History of the Smart Prosy

      As established by the above -referenced exhibits, the Bordelons sold the

Smart property to Ted Rayborn, Jr. and Lori Rayborn on September 21, 2002. The

act of cash sale provides that the purchase is "[ s] ubject to all restrictions and

servitudes of record."   The act of sale, which is recorded in the conveyance records

of Tangipahoa Parish, also refers to a second map created by Roy C. Edwards, Jr.

 the second Edwards map").         The second Edwards map shows a servitude of

passage, but does not expressly indicate where that servitude ends.      The second

Edwards map is recorded in the mortgage records of Tangipahoa Parish.

      On July 29, 2020, Mr. Rayborn donated his interest in the Smart property to

his former wife, Ms. Rayborn. Ms. Rayborn became the owner of the entire 1. 1 -

                                           it
acre tract as a result.     The property description contained within the donation

references the second Edwards map.

         On September 25, 2020, Ms. Rayborn sold the 1. 1 - acre tract of land to Dr.

Smart.    The act of cash sale further states that it is being made subject to " any and
all applicable ...
                     servitudes [ or] rights of way ...   which may appear in the chain

of title ...   or elsewhere in the public records of Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana[.]"

The act of cash sale' s property description refers to the second Edwards map.
Predial Servitude by Title

        The parties present different interpretations of the first Edwards map, which

was referenced in and recorded in the conveyance records with the act of sale

between the Bordelons and Ms. Howell.

       Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier argue that the first Edwards map fails to delineate

the western and southern boundaries of the servitude. They argue that doubt exists

relative to the extent and location of the servitude as a result and that said doubt

must be resolved in favor of the servient estate pursuant to La. C. C. art. 730. They

further argue that the servitude indicated in the first Edwards map ends at the

northern boundary of Dr. Smart' s property, which would mean that Mr. Amond

has no right to access any part of the driveway that crosses through Dr. Smart' s

property.

       Mr. Amond argues that the first Edwards map clearly identifies a roadway,

indicated by dashed lines, crossing over the Smart property and connecting the

Amond property to Wadesboro road. He further asserts that the only explanation

for the dashed lines outside of the bounds of his property in the first Edwards map

is the intent to create a predial servitude of passage over the driveway for the

benefit of the owner of the 11. 5 acre tract.

         Following our review of the first Edwards map, we conclude that the map

depicts a servitude of passage through the Smart property. The dashed lines, which

                                             10
are labeled " 20' Servitude of Passage,"                 clearly begin at Wadesboro Road and end

at the northern border of the Amond property. Therefore, although the act of sale

between the Bordelons and Ms. Howell does not describe the servitude, the survey

plat referred to in the property description and attached to the act of sale and

recorded in the conveyance records created a servitude.'                          See Brehm, 314 So. 3d at

63.

         Considering the foregoing, we find that the trial court properly denied Dr.

Smart and Mr. Saucier' s August 26, 2022 motion for summary judgment. Because

we agree with the trial court' s finding that a predial servitude by title exists, we

find that the issues raised by Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier' s second and third

assignments of error are moot.6

        Although we affirm the trial court' s denial of Dr. Smart' s motion for

summary judgment due to the existence of a predial servitude by title, we cannot

affirm the trial court' s judgment insofar as it grants Mr. Amond' s motion for

summary judgment. Dr. Smart and Mr. Saucier attached a number of exhibits to

their August 26, 2022 motion for summary judgment, including acts of sale to

establish the chain of title. Mr. Amond attached several affidavits to his opposition

to their motion for summary judgment, but failed to attach any exhibits to his own

motion for summary judgment. Instead, Mr. Amond refers to exhibits elsewhere in

the record.

        Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966, which governs motions for

summary judgment, was recently amended by 2023 La. Acts. No. 317, §                                                1,

effective August 1, 2023. This court has determined that the 2023 amendments to

5 We further note that the Bordelons first sold the tract that became the Amond property several months before
selling the tract that became the Smart property. Had the Bordelons not created a servitude via the first Edwards
map, they would have had no access to Wadesboro Road, Further, Errol and Virginia Bordelon each signed
affidavits attesting that the driveway at issue was intended to remain as the sole driveway and means of access to the
Amond property.

b An issue is moot when a judgment or decree on that issue has been " deprived of practical significance" or " made
abstract or purely academic."   See City of Hammond v_ Par. of Tangipahoa, 2447- 4574 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 26148),
985 So.2d 171, 178.

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La. C. C. P.     art.   966, which expanded the exclusive list of documents that are

considered competent evidence in support of or in opposition to a motion for

summary judgment and changed the duties of parties in supporting and opposing

motions for summary judgment, are substantive and therefore cannot be applied

retroactively.      See Ricketson v. McKenzie, 2023- 0314, p. 7- 9 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

1014123),          So. 3d ;                see also La. C. C. art. 6 (" In the absence of contrary

legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and

interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a

legislative expression to the contrary."). Accordingly, we must apply the version

of La. C. C. P. art. 966 in effect at the time of October 31,                     2022 hearing on the

parties'    motions for summary judgment to the matter before us.                         See Ricketson,

2023- 0314 at p. 10,             So. 3d at

         Prior to the 2023 amendments, the trial court could only consider those

documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary

judgment.'       La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 2).         The mover' s supporting documents must

prove the essential facts necessary to carry the mover' s burden.                     Troncoso v. Point

Carr Homeowners Assn, 2022- 0530 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1/ 10123), 360 So. 3d 901,

914- 15.     Contrary to the requirements of the applicable version of La. C. C.P. art.

966( D)( 2),   Mr. Amond failed to file any evidence or documentation in support of

the claims asserted in his motion for summary judgment.                          Because he failed to

present     sufficient    evidence to        establish that there          were no genuine       issues of

material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, he did not

sustain his own burden of proof.                  See James as Co -Trustees of Addison Family

Trust v. Strobel, 2019-0787, p. 10 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6124/ 20), 2020 WL 3446635, at

 3- 4.   Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Amond refers to other exhibits appearing in

the record, we note that the applicable version of La. C. C. P. art. 966 only allows

7 Following the 2023 amendments, La. C.C.P. art. 966( D(2) now allows the court to consider documents filed or
referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

                                                        12
documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment

to be considered by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment.            See

Troncoso, 360 So.3d at 915; see also James, 2020 WL 3446635, at * 3- 4.

      Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse the trial court' s December 5,

2022 judgment insofar as it grants Mr. Amond' s motion for summary judgment.

Our ruling in this matter does not prevent Mr. Amond from filing another motion

for summary judgment, with appropriate documentary support in accordance with

the applicable version of La. C. C. art. 966. See Troncoso, 360 So. 3d at 915.

                                     DECREE

      For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the 21st Judicial District

Court' s December 5, 2022 judgment insofar as it denies Dr. John K. Smart, M.D.,

and Mark Christopher Saucier' s motion for summary judgment.         We reverse the

December 5,    2022 judgment insofar as it grants Bryce Amond' s motion for

summary judgment. Costs of this appeal are to be split equally, with half assessed

to Appellants, Dr. John K. Smart, M.D., and Mark Christopher Saucier, and half

assessed to Appellee, Bryce Amond.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

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