Court Opinion

ID: 9478251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:44:07.380088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:19.325008
License: Public Domain

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Section 4-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4207 (Purdon 1980), has dictated the result in *299this ease and I do not fault the majority’s strict adherence to its provisions. I write today only to express dissatisfaction with the Code § 1201’s definition of good faith upon which Mellon (East)’s liability was based.
Under § 4207 the payor bank has an action against the depository bank for breach of presentment warranty when the depository bank handles materially altered checks. A theory of liability without fault underlies the breach of warranty action and allocates the loss to the depository bank as the first taker even if it exercised the highest degree of care in handling the altered check. It is perceived that the depository bank should bear the loss since it is in the best position to protect against the possibility of loss. Hawkland, Leary and Alderman, Uniform Commercial Code Series, § 4207:03 (1984).
The Code can be construed as carving out limited exceptions to the imposition of this warranted liability. One possible defense to a claim of material alteration is untimely assertion of the alteration. 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4207(d); see also J. White and R. Summers. Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Code, § 15-5 (1980).
The second exception, and this is the cause for my concern, occurs when the collecting bank does not act in good faith in exercising its right of collection under § 4207.
Good faith is defined under the Code as “Honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.” 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1201. The cases dealing with the collecting bank’s good faith requirement can be read as holding that only a dishonest payor will not receive the warranties. Cf. First National Bank of St. Paul v. Trust Company of Cobb County, 510 F.Supp. 651 (N.D.Ga.1981) (negligence not a bar to recovery); Menthor, S.A. v. Swiss Bank Corporation, 549 F.Supp. 1125 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (commercial reasonableness is not standard). Adherence to the position that a. defeat of good faith can only be accomplished by a demonstration of subjective dishonesty underscored Mellon (East)’s liability in this case.
The majority correctly identifies the cornerstone of Mellon (East)’s case as its assertion that First Pennsylvania’s knowledge of the prior stop payment order on the check negated a finding that its claim for breach of warranty was presented in good faith. Mellon (East) relies strongly on Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 577 F.Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 738 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.1984). This case held that a drawee bank which had received a stop payment order from its customer had knowledge of suspicious circumstances sufficient to bar it from maintaining an action for breach of the presenter’s warranty against the collecting bank. Although much has been made of the factual dispute as to whether the stop payment order was actually in effect, what I stress as the importance of this case is its departure from the strict liability standard imposed in cases alleging a breach of the presentment warranty. In Savings Bank,1 lack of good faith was not equated with dishonesty; instead, an element of negligence was integrated by the fashioning of a “suspicious circumstances” test. In a per curiam opinion the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “[Kjnowledge and disregard of suspicious circumstances are sufficient to vitiate an assertion of good faith where negotiable instruments are concerned.” Id. at 574.
If writing on a clean slate today I would adopt the leverage afforded by the suspicious circumstances test in making good faith determinations in presentment warranty cases.2 By so stating, I do not form *300an opinion as to whether the facts in this case would survive suspicious circumstances scrutiny, merely that Mellon (East) should have been allowed the latitude provided by such a test.
Two other sections of the Code, dealing with forged signatures, specifically incorporate a standard of care for banks. Under § 3406, a drawer who has substantially contributed to the making of an unauthorized signature may not assert the lack of authority against a bank “who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with ... reasonable commercial standards.” (Emphasis added.) Section 4406, which requires a bank customer to examine the bank statements timely and to notify the bank of any unauthorized signatures, nevertheless allows recovery against the bank despite failure to do so if the customer establishes “lack of ordinary care” on the part of the bank paying the items. (Emphasis added.) Western Casualty & Surety Company v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 676 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir.1982).
I can see no rational basis for not imposing the duty to exercise reasonable care recited in §§ 3406 and 4406 to instances where two banks are involved. Why should conformity with reasonable banking practice be excused on the basis that another commercial institution is involved in the subject transaction? To the contrary, an obligation to perform in accordance with commercial standards seems most appropriate in instances when both parties’ dealings are governed by similar standards.
In its opinion the majority states that “[W]e generally agree that payment over a stop order would not be in good faith....” Unless the majority is implying that a payment over a stop order duplicates dishonesty this statement rings of negligence considerations. What if the unauthorized payment resulted from failure to note the presence of the stop order? Such an event represents garden variety lack of due care, not an overtly dishonest act on the part of the bank. I believe, and feel the majority is in accord, that any payment over a stop order should deny the collecting bank its right to assert a breach of presentment warranty.3
An additional practical rationale for adopting a less restrictive definition of good faith rests upon the advanced technology of today’s banking processes. An indication of the non-utility of the UCC in today’s banking market is evidenced by some courts’ refusals to apply the Code to automatic teller machine transactions. Erva Corporation v. Swiss Bank Corporation, 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017, 103 S.Ct. 377, 74 L.Ed.2d 511 (1982) (electronic fund transfers not within contemplation of Code drafters); accord Delbrueck & Company v. Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Company, 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.1979); see generally Graziano & Baharoglu, Automated Teller Machines: Boon or Bane?, 91 Commercial Law Journal 451 (1986).
Sophistication has crept into both sides of the spectrum. A look at the reproduced copy of the check which is the subject of this matter is case in point. The addition of the payee and the change in the date clearly fit within the Code definition of material alteration, but, to the eye, admittedly an untrained one viewing a reproduced copy, evidence of the alteration was decidedly unglaring and perhaps indecipherable. If the theory behind the presentment warranty is premised upon the accepting bank being in the best position to uncover the alteration, the nefarious abili*301ties of those on the wrong side of the check alteration game should at least be considered as a factor when it comes time to allocating the loss.
I would alert the UCC drafters to reconsider the imposition of strict liability necessarily imposed by its restrictive definition of good faith and to amend the Code to allow for consideration of factors other than overt dishonesty when determining loss based upon breach of the warranty of presentment.

. The decision has been criticized for its departure from the Code’s definition of good faith. See H. Bailey and R. Hagadorn, Brady on Bad Checks, § 8.532 (Cum.Supp.1987); B. Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards, § 6.3(3) (Cum.Supp.1987).

. We note that in Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. v. Dal International Trading Company, 798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.1986), Judge Stapleton, while stating that the UCC imposes no burden of inquiry and, in fact, rejecting the suspicious circumstances test, made an assumption that, under New Jersey law, a purchaser under Article 2 *300of the Code may not be certain of the existence of a certain flaw and still have knowledge of sufficient facts to keep him from being fairly characterized as having been "honest in fact." Id. at 106. I interpret this statement to indicate judicial acknowledgment of the possibility of adopting a more lenient approach than, unless I take an overly optimistic view of banking practice and practitioners, the almost impossible task of defeating the good faith requirement only by a showing of subjective dishonesty.

. I note that, even adopting this broad approach, First Pennsylvania would, in the absence of suspicious circumstances, prevail over Mellon. There is no question that the stop payment order on the check had expired and had not been renewed. Here, however, suspicious circumstances might exist in that the payor bank had previously been notified that the check had been stolen.