Court Opinion

ID: 9928099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 20:05:30.167936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:10.338212
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/30/24 P. v. Mendoza CA2/8
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B327467

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. VA153388)
                   v.

OSCAR RYAN MENDOZA,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Roger T. Ito, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
      Sarah M. Javaheri, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                          **********
       This is defendant and appellant Oscar Ryan Mendoza’s
second appeal challenging his upper term sentence. In his first
appeal, we remanded for a new sentencing hearing in light of the
passage of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) while that
appeal was pending. In this appeal from the resentencing hearing,
defendant contends the trial court’s imposition of an upper term
sentence was improper on several grounds, including that it fails to
accord with the requirements of Penal Code section 1170, as
amended by Senate Bill No. 567. Defendant also contends the court
failed to recalculate custody credits. We remand with directions to
the superior court to recalculate custody credits and otherwise
affirm the judgment.
                           BACKGROUND
       Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of felony
vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a), count 2) and acquitted of
arson (§ 451, subd. (d), count 1). The charges arose from an
incident in May 2020 in which defendant used a baseball bat to
repeatedly strike a car belonging to Marvin Marroquin and then set
the car on fire in a residential neighborhood.
       At the original sentencing hearing on April 12, 2021, the court
conducted a bench trial on the prior strike allegation. The
prosecution presented certified records pursuant to Penal Code
section 969b regarding defendant’s prior convictions. The court
found true the allegation that defendant had suffered a prior 2016
conviction for a serious or violent felony (attempted first degree
robbery). Defendant made an oral motion to strike the conviction
pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497, 529 which the court denied. The court imposed a six-year
prison term, selecting the upper term of three years which was then
doubled due to the prior strike. Defendant was awarded 644 days of

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presentence custody credits (322 actual days, 322 conduct credits).
Defendant appealed.
       Senate Bill No. 567 went into effect on January 1, 2022.
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) It made various changes to Penal Code
section 1170, including narrowing the parameters of when a court
may impose an upper term sentence. Accordingly, we reversed
defendant’s upper term sentence, remanded for a new sentencing
hearing and otherwise affirmed defendant’s conviction. (People v.
Mendoza (Apr. 29, 2022, B311851) [nonpub. opn.].)
       After issuance of the remittitur, the resentencing hearing was
held on December 16, 2022 before Judge Ito, who had presided over
defendant’s trial. Defendant appeared via Webex and was
represented by appointed counsel.
       The prosecutor filed an amended information alleging two
aggravating circumstances: (1) defendant had suffered prior
convictions that were numerous and increasing in seriousness; and
(2) defendant had served a prior prison term. Defendant was
arraigned on the amended allegations and denied the aggravating
circumstances.
       The trial court and counsel then discussed the court’s prior
consideration of the certified Penal Code section 969b packet in
finding true the allegation of defendant’s prior strike conviction.
The court stated it had reviewed the certified copy of defendant’s
CLETS (California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System)
report submitted by the People.
       The court asked defense counsel if he wanted to be heard
further, and counsel submitted. The court received the CLETS
report into evidence and said it was finding “beyond a reasonable
doubt those two aggravating circumstances to be true, and I will
resentence [defendant] to the high term of three years in state
prison, term to be doubled because of the prior strike offense.”

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       Defense counsel interjected and said he had not had the
opportunity to renew his Romero motion. The court allowed counsel
to argue the Romero motion. Defense counsel said that because the
record indicated defendant “does suffer from mental health issues,”
the court should consider that as a mitigating circumstance and
impose less than an upper term or strike the prior conviction.
       The court said it appreciated counsel’s argument but that the
trial had shown defendant’s behavior was unprovoked and
abhorrent. The court denied the motion and reiterated that it was
imposing an upper term sentence doubled due to the prior strike.
The court did not recalculate custody credits, indicating it believed
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation would do so, if
necessary.
       This appeal followed.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     The Upper Term Sentence
       Defendant contends the trial court acted outside the scope of
its sentencing authority under newly amended Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b). Defendant says the court improperly
considered circumstances related to the crime as aggravating
factors and failed to consider his mental illness as a mitigating
circumstance. He further argues the court erred in finding that his
convictions were increasing in seriousness. Defendant says the
CLETS report did not, as a matter of law, establish or otherwise
support a finding that his convictions were increasing in
seriousness. We reject defendant’s contentions.
       The passage of Senate Bill No. 567 resulted in several
significant amendments to Penal Code section 1170, the statute
under which defendant was sentenced. Changes to the language in
section 1170, subdivision (b) are relevant here.

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       Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) now provides that
the middle term of a sentencing triad is the presumptive term.
(Ibid. [“When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the
statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle
term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”].) An upper
term sentence is not statutorily authorized unless “there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated
to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(2).)
       Notwithstanding this limiting language, the sentencing court
“may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (Pen. Code, § 1170,
subd. (b)(3).) While there is some disagreement among the Courts
of Appeal, we agree with People v. Wiley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 676
that the amended language of section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) “does
not specify the court is limited to finding that a prior conviction
occurred; instead, it states the court may ‘consider the defendant’s
prior convictions in determining sentencing.’ (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
And, as our Supreme Court has recognized in the context of the
prior conviction exception to the constitutional jury trial right,
consideration of prior convictions may establish recidivism-based
aggravating factors such as increasing seriousness of the
convictions.” (Wiley, at p. 686, petn. for review pending, petn. filed
Jan. 8, 2024; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421 [aggravating
circumstances include that a defendant’s convictions are numerous

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or increasing in seriousness and that a defendant has served a prior
prison term].)
       After reviewing certified records of defendant’s prior
convictions, the court here made factual findings that defendant’s
convictions were numerous and increasing in seriousness, and that
defendant had served a prior prison term. The court therefore acted
within the scope of its authority under the amended language of
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(3).
       Defendant mischaracterizes the court’s ruling in urging us to
find that the court improperly relied on factors related to the crime
that must be either admitted by defendant or submitted to the jury.
(Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2).) The court only mentioned the
violence and abhorrent nature of defendant’s actions in denying
defendant’s renewed Romero motion. At that point, the court had
already stated its ruling that it was imposing the upper term based
on its findings regarding the two recidivism-based aggravating
circumstances consistent with the language of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3).
       We also reject defendant’s argument that the court failed to
give adequate consideration to his mental illness as a mitigating
circumstance. The record demonstrates the court, which had
presided over defendant’s trial, was well aware of defendant’s claim
he suffered from mental illness. It is not our role to reweigh the
factors considered by the court in exercising its sentencing
discretion.
       Defendant next argues that we should independently review
the CLETS report and find that it fails as a matter of law to
establish that his prior convictions are increasing in seriousness.
Defendant acknowledges that abuse of discretion is ordinarily the
standard of review in assessing a trial court’s sentencing decision
under Penal Code section 1170. But he argues that, because the

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People relied only on the CLETS report and did not offer additional
evidence demonstrating the nature of the conduct underlying
defendant’s crimes, there is no factual dispute to resolve, and de
novo review is therefore the correct standard for reviewing the
court’s order.
       We disagree. It is well established that a “trial court’s
sentencing decision is ‘review[ed] for abuse of discretion.’ ” (People
v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205, quoting People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) The CLETS report
established that in 2016, defendant was sentenced to an upper term
of three years for attempted first degree robbery. While in custody
on the attempted robbery charge, he committed another felony
(damaging jail property) and was sentenced to 16 months on that
charge. In 2018, defendant was convicted of assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury which carries a sentencing
triad of two, three and four years. Defendant was sentenced to
three years of probation and ordered to serve 118 days in jail. In
May 2020, while still on probation, defendant then committed the
present felony, which included setting a car on fire in a residential
neighborhood. Defendant has not shown it was an abuse of
discretion for the court to find his criminal conduct was becoming
more serious, raising the threat of injury to persons and not just
property.
2.     The Custody Credits
       The People concede that a remand is appropriate for the court
to recalculate custody credits. We agree that the trial court must
recalculate actual days of custody credits for the period between the
date of original sentencing and the resentencing hearing (613 days)
in accordance with People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29
(Where, as here, “a prison term already in progress is modified as
the result of an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court

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must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual
time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison,
and whether before or since he was originally committed and
delivered to prison custody.”).
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The case is remanded
with directions to the superior court to recalculate and award actual
days of custody credits for the period between the date of original
sentencing and the resentencing hearing. The superior court is
ordered to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                              GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        WILEY, J.

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