Court Opinion

ID: 9712613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:57:19.16296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.300259
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENT TO OPINION UPON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR HEARING Substitute counsel has filed a Petition for Rehearing alleging additional grounds for reversal not previously raised or argued. He now urges that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the substance in question was marijuana in accordance with the statutory definition; that the trial court erred in not submitting an instruction defining marijuana in accordance with the statutory requirements; and that the statute classifying marijuana as a narcotic is arbitrary and infects the severe penalty for sale of marijuana with unconstitutionality.  Charles R Turcotte, the crime laboratory analyst for the Bureau of Criminal Investigation in Joliet, testified for the State. The purpose of his testimony was to determine “whether or not there was any material known as Cannabis or Marijuana in the plant material.” He first made a microscopic examination, looking for hairs “referred to in the trade as bear claws” on the leaf material. He also performed a Duquenois chemical test from extracted resins. His opinion was that both plastic bags contained “Cannabis Sativa, or Marijuana.” He was then asked to “break down” the product, and answered, “It consists of seed material, leaf material, and some stalk material.” He was then asked whether he was able to ascertain whether the seeds were capable of germination and answered, “I did not.” There was no cross-examination. In our opinion, the testimony was sufficient to prove that the substance contained a narcotic drug in the form of the leaf material within the statute and not falling within the statutory exceptions. Defendant’s reliance upon The People v. Lott, 24 Ill2d 188, 181 NE2d 112 (1962) is misplaced. In Lott, the testimony on cross-examination was that the substance was composed of “mature” portions of the Cannabis plant and no reference is made to the presence of resin in the particular cigarettes he examined. The defendant thereby brought himself within the statutory exceptions.  We also consider the question raised as to the instructions, although not previously abstracted or argued. The record discloses no instruction defining marijuana. The following instruction (as well as one relating to aiding and abetting in similar terms) was given without objection. “A person commits the crime of violating the narcotic drug act who sells marijuana.” Defendant argues that possession of marijuana is not a criminal offense unless it is of the specific quality and kind defined by the statute, citing The People v. Sowrd, 370 Ill 140, 143, 18 NE2d 176 (1938). The Sowrd case does not apply to this prosecution brought under a different statute. Under the present statute all Cannabis is subject to the act, excluding the specific exceptions. The proof was clearly sufficient to sustain the guilty finding and defendant did not bring himself within the exceptions set forth in the statute. See Ill Rev Stats 1967, c 38, § 22-44; The People v. Yeargain, 3 Ill2d 25, 28, 119 NE2d 752 (1954); and People v. Washington, 81 Ill App2d 90, 102, 225 NE2d 472 (1966).  People v. Lewis, 112 Ill App2d 1, 250 NE2d 812 (1969) is relied upon by defendant for the proposition that the failure to give a specific instruction defining Marijuana or Cannabis, on the court’s own motion, was reversible error. Since no issue was properly raised disputing the nature of the drugs involved, we are of the opinion that no further instruction was required. In any event, in view of the clear and convincing evidence of defendant’s guilt, and the absence of any evidence tending to bring the defendant within the statutory exceptions, reversal is not justified. The People v. Truelook, 35 Ill2d 189, 192, 220 NE2d 187 (1966); and People v. Ciconte, 102 Ill App2d 1, 14, 243 NE2d 407 (1968). The argument that classification of marijuana as a narcotic drug with the severe penalty attached to its sale makes for unconstitutionality is not open for our consideration. We again refer to The People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill2d 235, 240, 184 NE2d 833, supra. Counsel has also raised a question in the Petition for Rehearing, which had been previously raised and argued. This relates to the testimony of defendant’s presence in Haynes’ apartment on other occasions when narcotics were allegedly sold by Haynes. The quotation of a pertinent portion of our opinion in the Petition for Rehearing is erroneous. Our opinion does not refer to this evidence as tending to prove defendant’s guilt of the crime charged against him by proof of defendant's commission of other crimes. We held that this proof was admissible as tending to show defendant’s knowledge of the commission of illicit sales by Haynes on previous occasions when no criminal activity of defendant was suggested, to meet defendant’s theory that he was an innocent bystander at the time of this crime charged against him. We adhere to our opinion on this point. The Petition for Rehearing is therefore denied and we hold to our opinion as filed. ABRAHMASON and MORAN, JJ., concur.