Court Opinion

ID: 9368654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 16:02:35.371768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:09.506770
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

C&D CONTRACTORS, INC.                  )
                                       )
      Employer-Below/Appellant         )
           Cross-Appellee,             ) C.A. No.: N22A-04-002 FJJ
                                       )
                                       ) CITATION ON APPEAL
      v.                               ) FROM THE DECISION OF
                                       ) THE INDUSTRIAL
WILLIAM McLAUGHLIN, JR.,               ) ACCIDENT BOARD OF THE
                                       ) STATE OF DELAWARE
      Claimant-Below/Appellee          ) NEW CASTLE COUNTY,
            Cross-Appellant.           ) HEARING NO. 1478363

                            Submitted: January 27, 2023
                             Decided: February 3, 3023

                             OPINION AND ORDER

        Upon Consideration of Claimant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
                    GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

David Crumplar, Esquire, of JACOBS & CRUMPLAR, PA, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney
for William McLaughlin, Jr.

Linda Wilson, Esquire, of MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN, PC,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for C&D Contractors.

Jones, J.
                                            INTRODUCTION
          Before the Court is a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and a Motion for Costs pursuant

      to 19 Del. C. § 2350(f), filed by counsel for the Estate of William McLaughlin (the

      “Estate”). Section 2350(f) provides that where a worker’s compensation claimant

      successfully appeals a position taken before the Industrial Accident Board (the

      “Board” or the “IAB”), a reasonable attorney’s fee may be allowed for the time

      spent on the appeal. This fee, if allowed, is taxed against the employer without

      depleting the claimant’s award.             The Estate’s Motion is opposed by C&D

      Contractors (“C&D”), the employer and appellant below. For the reasons that

      follow, the Estate’s Motion will be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

                                       FACTUAL OVERVIEW
          This opinion assumes familiarity with the case and includes only those facts

      necessary to the Court’s analysis. For a more comprehensive factual recitation, the

      Court directs readers to its previous Opinion affirming, in part, and reversing, in

      part, the Board’s initial order.1

          Before the Board, the Estate contended the triggering event for calculating death

      benefits in the asbestos context was the date of Mr. McLaughlin’s mesothelioma

      diagnosis. C&D, on the other hand, argued the date of Mr. McLaughlin’s last

      exposure to asbestos should serve as the triggering event. Ultimately, the Board

      agreed with the Estate and found the date of diagnosis to be the triggering event for

1
    McLaughlin v. C&D Contractors, 2022 WL 17683750 (Del. Super. Dec. 14, 2022).

                                                       2
    the average weekly wage calculation. But, the Board sided with C&D in regards to

    the average weekly rate calculation and used the rate in effect at the time of Mr.

    McLaughlin’s last asbestos exposure in 1989.

        Thereafter, both sides appealed the Board’s findings to this Court. The Estate

    challenged the Board’s holding as to the average weekly wage calculation; C&D,

    on the other hand, took issue with the weekly rate the Board subjected to its analysis.

    By opinion dated December 14, 2022, the Court partially affirmed and partially

    reversed the Board’s decision, finding the date of mesothelioma diagnosis to control

    the calculation of both the weekly wage and weekly rate. To the extent there is any

    doubt, this means the Estate’s position was affirmed on appeal.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
        Section 2350(f) gives the Court discretion to award a “reasonable fee to [the]

    claimant’s attorney for services on an appeal from the [IAB] to the Superior Court

    … where the claimant’s position in the hearing before the [IAB] is affirmed on

    appeal.”2 These awards are based on a “twofold inquiry.”3 First, a claimant’s

    eligibility for attorneys’ fees depends on the Court finding the claimant’s position

    before the IAB was affirmed on appeal.4 Second, if the claimant’s position was

    affirmed on appeal, then the Court must determine what fee is reasonable.5

2
  19 Del. C. § 2350(f).
3
  Weddle v. BP Amoco Chemical Co., 2020 WL 5049233, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 26, 2020).
4
  Id. As discussed above, the Court so finds.
5
  Id.

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                                                  ANALYSIS
         Because the Board’s only task on remand will be to enforce the Court’s order,

    the Court is satisfied the Estate’s Motions for Fees and Costs are not premature.6

    And, as mentioned above, it is undisputed that the Estate’s position before the Board

    was affirmed on appeal. Thus, the Court must turn to what fees, if any, are

    reasonable under § 2350(f).

                  A. The Paralegal Fees
         Preliminarily, the Court will address C&D’s contention that paralegal fees are

    unrecoverable under § 2350(f), which broadly provides, in relevant part, for

    recovery of “a reasonable fee to the claimant’s attorney for services.”7 Upon careful

    review, the Court disagrees.

         First, had the General Assembly intended for “services” to merely mean

    attorneys’ fees, it easily could have said so.8 But, presumably by design, it did not.

    And, more importantly, a far-reaching interpretation of “services” achieves the

    General Assembly’s purpose of reducing requested fees, as it encourages attorneys

    to pass work to a person with a lower billable rate while assuring recovery of the

    fees under § 2350(f).9

6
  See Chandler v. Pinnacle Foods, 2010 WL 3447551, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 23, 2010) (deferring award of attorneys’
fees until the Board determined if the claimant “[would] actually be awarded anything by the Board on her claim [on
remand].” Id.
7
  19 Del. C. § 2350(f) (emphasis added).
8
  Of course, attorneys’ fees, by definition, do not include paralegal fees.
9
  See P.J.M. v. F.M., 1998 WL 59843, at *4 (Del. Super. June 9, 1988) (finding the phrase “all or part of the costs of
the other party of maintaining or defending” broad enough to include fees incurred by a legal assistant or paralegal).

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        In short, because the word “services” is broad enough to include paralegal fees,

     and this interpretation will ultimately reduce the fees requested under statute, the

     Court will award the fees accordingly.

                B. The “Reasonable” Fees
        In determining a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees, the factors set forth in the

     Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct10 and the Delaware Supreme

     Court’s holding in General Motors Corp. v. Cox11 serve as a guide. These factors

     include:

                1) The time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the
                question involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
                service properly; 2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that
                the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
                employment by the lawyer; 3) the fees customarily charged in the
                locality for similar legal services; 4) the amount involved and the
                results obtained; 5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
                by the circumstances; 6) the nature and length of the professional
                relationship with the client; 7) the experience, reputation, and
                ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 8)
                whether the fee is fixed or contingent.12

     The Estate’s application seeks $34,502 for 103.4 hours of work performed by two

     lawyers and one paralegal, all of whom charge different rates based on experience,

     as follows: Thomas Crumplar, Esquire, 18.5 hours of work at $675 per hour; David

     Crumplar, Esquire, 65 hours of work at $300 per hour; and paralegal Paula

     Ainsworth, 19.9 hours of work at $125 per hour.

10
   DEL. LAWYERS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(A) (2003).
11
   304 A.2d 55 (Del. 1973).
12
   Id. at 57.

                                                   5
           The Court understands this appeal involved a novel issue, and, therefore,

       required considerable time, labor, and skill. The Court also acknowledges the hours

       billed by each person on the Estate’s legal team is commensurate with that

       individual’s skill, and that the time spent helped to produce a favorable outcome for

       the Estate. Accordingly, the Court is comfortable with the hours worked by each

       member of the Estate’s counsel.

           Next, the Court turns to the appropriate hourly rate. Roughly two years ago, this

       Court had occasion to address the hourly rate of the Estate’s counsel in Weddle v.

       BP Amoco Chemical Company.13 There, the Weddle Court approved reduced rates

       for Thomas Crumplar at $450 per hour, David Crumplar at $200 per hour, and a

       paralegal at $50 per hour.14

           In light of Weddle and the relevant Cox factors, the Court will adjust the rates

       requested to fashion a reasonable attorneys’ fees award. As noted, the underlying

       appeal involved a novel issue and, consequently, required considerable time and

       labor. So, the first Cox factor favors the Estate’s application.

           Additionally, the fourth Cox factor favors the Estate’s counsel because the legal

       team obtained a favorable result for the Estate. And, given Thomas Crumplar’s

       significant experience with workers’ compensation cases, the seventh factor favors

       the Estate, as well.

13
     2020 WL 5049233, at *3.
14
     Id. at *4.

                                                 6
        The third factor, however, weighs against the Estate’s requested rates. It bears

     mention that the Estate’s counsel has failed to demonstrate the rates it charged are

     consistent with those customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.

     As Weddle noted, “recent decisions of this Court addressing applications for

     attorneys’ fees under § 2350(f) suggest [] the customary rates for the legal services

     provided here are considerably lower than the rates requested, even when the

     claimant’s lawyer has significant experience.”15

        In consideration of the above, the Court shall award attorney’s fees based on the

     following adjusted rates, which the Court finds are reasonable:16

                     • Thomas Crumplar: $500 per hour;

                     • David Crumplar: $250 per hour; and

                     • Paula Ainsworth: $100 per hour.

        And because the Court is satisfied with the amount of hours requested by

     Claimant’s counsel, it will award attorneys’ fees as follows:

                                       Hours                       Rate                        Total
      Thomas                           18.5                        $500                      $9,250.00
      Crumplar
      David                               65                       $250                     $16,250.00
      Crumplar
      Paula                             19.9                       $100                      $1,990.00
      Ainsworth
      Total:                                                                                $27,490.00

15
   Id.
16
   In light of the rise in inflation rates and passage of time since Weddle was issued, the Court has adjusted the
attorneys’ fee rate from the Weddle rates.

                                                        7
          C. The Estate’s Request for Costs
   Finally, the Estate seeks moves for costs in the amount of $221.25. C&D, in

response, correctly points out that § 2350(f) does not cover costs. Nevertheless, 10

Del. C. § 5101 does. As such, the Court will award the requested costs, in full,

under § 5101.

                                 CONCLUSION
   Based on the foregoing, the Estate’s application for attorneys’ fees is

GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The Estate is awarded $27,490.00 in

attorneys’ fees and $221.25 in costs.

   IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                     /s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
                                                    Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge
/jb
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