Court Opinion

ID: 9850894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:00.617095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:45.134569
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). In these cases, we revisit the issue of the use of expert testimony with respect to behavioral evidence1 regarding child sexual abuse victims. See People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691; 465 NW2d 391 (1990). I dissent because the majority will allow an expert to testify that the particular child complainant’s behavior was "consistent with” that of other child sexual abuse victims. This diagnostic testimony fails to satisfy the scientific or medical foundation requirements under MRE 702 because the behavioral "symptoms” of child sexual abuse are too varied and too unreliable to be used as accurate detectors of sexual abuse. Additionally, I would continue to limit the use of behavioral reaction testimony to *382rebuttal purposes. I would also preclude an expert who is testifying about the reactions exhibited by child sexual abuse victims in general, based either on personal observations of a general class or on consensus findings from the psychological or medical professions, from making any reference to the particular complainant or defendant.
I dissent in Peterson, because the experts were impermissibly allowed to testify that the complainant had been sexually abused. This preserved constitutional error requires reversal because it invaded the province of the jury as ultimate fact-finder. I dissent in Smith, because the complainant’s credibility had not been attacked before the "rehabilitative” expert testimony was introduced. Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial in both cases.
i. "consistent with” testimony
1 first want to distinguish those behaviors that are exclusively associated with sexual abuse from those behaviors that are also associated with other types of traumatic events.2 There may come a day when a particular behavioral reaction that is exclusively associated with sexual abuse becomes sufficiently accurate, reliable, and standardized as *383a detector of sexual abuse so that it obtains general scientific acceptance by the medical and psychological professions as a diagnostic tool under the Davis/Frye test.3 If that day arrives, then diagnostic testimony may be permissible, provided that all other evidentiary requirements have been satisfied. My research has revealed that we have not yet reached that day. Therefore, I will confine my discussion to testimony concerning behavioral reactions that are not exclusive to sexual abuse.
I will also concede that courts that have addressed this issue have taken divergent approaches to the thresholds of admissibility, the permissible purposes of the testimony, and the scope of such testimony. See Steward v State, 652 NE2d 490, 495-498 (Ind, 1995) (grouping cases by approach taken).
In the instant cases, the expert witnesses described many behavioral reactions that may be caused by other nonsexual events.4 When the behavioral reactions that are exhibited by the complainant may be caused by traumatic events unrelated to sexual abuse, they are not sufficiently reliable as diagnostic tools.5 Consequently, any testimony that a child who exhibits x, y, and z *384reactions is a sexually abused child fails the Davis/Frye test’s scientific foundational requirements under MRE 702. In other words, a child exhibiting depression, withdrawal, and nightmares, cannot be diagnosed as a sexual abuse victim because such behaviors just as likely can be present with any number of stressful events.
Accordingly, child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (csaas), which was created by Dr. Roland Summit to identify and group commonly observed behaviors in child sexual abuse victims, cannot be used as a diagnostic device. Myers, Expert testimony in child sexual abuse litigation, 68 Neb L R 1, 66-67 (1989).6 Dr. Summit’s intent was to provide a method of putting professionals on the same page. Id. at 67. The syndrome’s sole function was to start with a known child victim of sexual abuse, and then to explain the child’s behavioral reactions to the abuse. The syndrome cannot be used in reverse, which would be to start with the behavioral reactions identified by the syndrome, check off the ones that the child exhibits, and conclude that, on the basis of the checklist, the child was sexually abused.7 Similarly, behavioral reactions, *385which may be produced by nonsexual abuse causes, cannot be legally probative of sexual abuse because they are also probative of other causes. The court in State v J Q, 130 NJ 554, 573; 617 A2d 1196 (1993), acknowledged:
*384Criticisms include the varying reactions children have to abuse and the fact that behavior often attributed to abuse is sometimes the result of other emotional problems that do not stem from abuse.
*385The most pointed criticism of the theory is that the same traits may equally appear as the result of other disorders. . . . Even extreme poverty or psychological abuse can produce the sense of entrapment or accommodation. In other words, the existence of the symptoms does not invariably prove abuse. [Citations omitted, emphasis added.][8]
This very point prompted one court to reject profile evidence altogether, reasoning that because there was no consensus in the medical field with respect to any particular psychological profile of a sexually abused child, such evidence is too unreliable to pass muster under the evidentiary requirements of scientific evidence. State v Ballard, 855 SW2d 557, 562 (Tenn, 1993).9
Here, the majority admits that when an expert testifies "that the particular child victim’s behavior is consistent with that of a sexually abused child[, s]uch testimony . . . comes too close to testifying that the particular child is a victim of *386sexual abuse.” Mallett, J., ante at 374. Yet, it finds such testimony acceptable if the defendant has attacked the credibility of the complainant. Id. at 375. However, as State v Cressey, 137 NH 402, 407; 628 A2d 696 (1993), recognized, there is no material distinction between express testimony that the child has been sexually abused, and implicit testimony that outlines the unreliable behavioral reactions found with sexually abused victims, followed by a list of the complainant’s own behavioral reactions, that points out that the two are consistent, and then invites the jury to add up the points to conclude that the child has been sexually abused. The majority is asking this type of evidence to perform a task that it cannot do.10 More importantly, the foundation of such testimony does not become more reliable simply because it is offered after an attack on credibility by the defendant and not before.
The lack of reliability has caused some courts to limit this type of testimony to rebuttal and to "not inconsistent” testimony. State v Jones, 71 Wash App 798, 819; 863 P2d 85 (1993), reasoned:
Because the use of testimony on general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children is still the subject of contention and dispute among experts in the field, we find that its use as a general profile to be used to prove the existence of abuse is inappropriate. However, we agree with the current trend of authority that such testimony may be used to rebut allegations by the defendant that the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with abuse. [Citations omitted.]
Many courts that have accepted expert testimony for limited purposes have expressly rejected *387this sort of "consistent with” sexual abuse testimony because its foundational basis is too unreliable to satisfy the expert testimony scientific basis requirements as diagnostic testimony.11 In State v Chamberlain, 137 NH 414, 418; 628 A2d 704 (1993), the expert testified that the complainant’s behaviors "were consistent with” other child sexual abuse victims. The court continued its earlier holding that such testimony was prejudicial error. It reasoned that syndrome evidence cannot be used as a diagnostic device. Accordingly, the only admissible purpose that the expert testimony could be offered for was "to preempt or rebut an inference from some specific behavior, action, or inconsistency displayed by the child victim that otherwise may be misinterpreted by a jury.” Id. (citation omitted). Another court, which has traditionally allowed "consistent with” testimony, has recently questioned continued approval of such evidence, because such evidence "can have an impact on the minds of the jury far disproportionate to its foundation in science.” Toro v State, 642 So 2d 78, 83 (Fla App, 1994) (citation omitted).
Indeed, Beckley held that behavioral reactions were too unreliable for an expert to testify that the complainant was in fact sexually abused. Id. at 733-734 (Brickley, J.); id. at 740 (Boyle, J.); id. at 744, n 2 (Archer, J.). Justice Brickley, in justify*388ing the admissibility of some expert testimony, stated: "so long as the purpose of the evidence is merely to offer an explanation for certain behavior, the Davis/Frye test is inapplicable.” Id. at 721.
I would argue that "consistent with” testimony is no longer merely offering an explanation. It is based on the expert’s opinion, as an expert, that this child’s behavior matches the behavior exhibited by other child sexual abuse victims. This is no different from a physician testifying that this child’s broken leg-, as revealed by the x-rays, is "consistent with,” i.e., "was caused by,” falling from a second-story roof. We would not allow a physician to make such testimony in the absence of sufficiently reliable medical evidence, first, that x-rays are accurate pictures of broken bones, second, that a fall from a second-story roof will cause fractures of this type, and, finally, that this type of fracture is unique to multistory falls.
Further, "consistent with” testimony is fundamentally different from testimony that a given set of behavioral reactions are not inconsistent with child sexual abuse. "Not inconsistent” is rebuttal-type testimony; it merely states that it could be true. "Consistent with” is positive testimony that it is true. "Not inconsistent” testimony can convey to the jury all the information that it needs to assess the issues in the case.
To illustrate, suppose the facts of the case indicate that the child has withdrawn, is exhibiting severe depression, initially reported the abuse to a school counselor, but has now recanted her story in fear that her stepfather-abuser will be taken away from the family, and her mother will be very. sad. This information will be placed before the jury by the child’s own testimony or through witnesses with personal knowledge of the child’s behavior. If the defense then focuses on the recan*389tation and argues that her initial allegations were made in retaliation or rebellion to house rules, an expert could testify that child sexual abuse victims have been known to withdraw, become depressed, and recant their allegations when they realize that the family may be torn apart. If appropriate, the prosecutor could pose a hypothetical question to the expert paralleling the facts of the case, and ask whether such testimony is "inconsistent with” sexual abuse behavioral reactions. The expert could reply, "No, it is not inconsistent.” At that point, the jury has all of the information that it needs to evaluate the child’s credibility. The expert has offered no diagnostic evidence, and therefore, Davis/Frye remains inapplicable. The prejudicial effect has been minimized because the expert will be viewed as a disinterested person. A limiting instruction would further minimize prejudice.12
The majority has offered no reason why this approach is insufficient. Therefore, I would hold that "consistent with” diagnostic testimony should not be allowed, regardless of when it is presented. Such testimony violates the Davis/Frye test because its foundation is too unreliable as a detector of sexual abuse.
*390II. REBUTTAL LIMITATION
I agree with the majority that expert testimony may be presented in the prosecution’s case in chief. Mallett, J., ante at 375. However, I would maintain the Beckley course that this testimony should be used solely for rehabilitative purposes. Consequently, I would hold that it must follow an attack on the complainant’s credibility, either by the prosecution impeaching the complainant’s testimony on the stand, or by the defense challenging the complainant’s testimony or postincident behavior.13 The alternate course that the majority navigates here, which is that the postincident behavior, in and of itself, may justify expert testimony, will create more questions than it answers. The majority has offered no direction to trial courts regarding how to decide which behaviors qualify.
Basically, the majority’s wake will make expert testimony a matter of course in child sexual abuse cases and, if the defendant presents any kind of defense, then the expert can offer diagnosis testimony that is inherently unreliable. The majority is ignoring the original premises that justified the use of this type of testimony, and is opening a door here that should not be opened.
III. TESTIMONY WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICULAR COMPLAINANT
I continue to believe that Justice Archer’s approach in Beckley was appropriate. Id. at 748. I would not allow an expert to testify about the *391particular complainant, even if the testimony is only with respect to whether the child’s behavioral reactions are not inconsistent with sexual abuse. Once the expert has given testimony disábusing the seemingly inconsistent behavioral reaction, the jury has all the information that it needs to assess the complainant’s credibility. The marginal probative value of allowing the expert to further testify with respect to the particular complainant is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that the jury will misuse the testimony. It invades the province of the jury to assess credibility.14 It invites the jury to give undue weight to testimony that is foundationally and fundamentally unreliable merely because it is cloaked with the expertise of an expert. It also invites the jury to believe that the expert knows more than he is telling, by letting the jurors infer that the expert, who works with sexually abused children every day, must believe this child’s story or else the expert would not be testifying.15
IV. SUMMARY
In conclusion, I believe that the Indiana Supreme Court has recently offered a comprehensive and persuasive approach to behavioral reaction testimony involving child sexual abuse. Steward, supra. The court summarized:
It is possible that foundational support may be discovered in the future which will expand the *392purposes for which such expert testimony may be deemed reliable. We echo the Mississippi Supreme Court in noting that "what should be emphasized about this view is that it renders dynamic the realm of expert opinion testimony. Should subsequent empirical research and scientific investigation yield a [diagnostic] child sexual abuse profile or syndrome.” Goodson [v State], 566 So 2d [1142] 1146, n 6 [Miss, 1990], our trial courts may consider admitting that evidence for any use to which it may reliably be put.
Furthermore, we decline to distinguish between expert testimony which offers an unreserved conclusion that the child in question has been abused and that which merely uses syndrome evidence to imply the occurrence of abuse. Where a jury is confronted with evidence of an alleged child victim’s behaviors, paired with expert testimony concerning similar syndrome behaviors, the invited inference—that the child was sexually abused because he or she fits the syndrome profile—will be as potentially misleading and equally as unreliable as expert testimony applying the syndrome to the facts of the case and stating outright the conclusion that a given child was abused. The danger of the jury misapplying syndrome evidence thus remains the same whether an expert expresses an explicit opinion that abuse has occurred or merely allows the jury to draw the final conclusion of abuse. Exclusion of such evidence is authorized by Indiana Rule of Evidence 403.
However, we recognize that, once a child’s credibility is called into question, proper expert testimony may be appropriate. Daubert notes the importance of "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.” Daubert [v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc,] [509] US 579; 113 S Ct [2786] 2796; 125 L Ed 2d [469] 482 [1993] (emphasis added). Because research generally accepted as scientifically reliable recognizes that child victims of sexual abuse may exhibit unexpected behavior patterns seemingly inconsistent with the claim of abuse, such evidence *393may be permissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 702(a)’s authorization of "specialized knowledge [which] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence.” Therefore, if the defense discusses or presents evidence of such unexpected behavior by the child, or if during trial testimony the child recants a prior allegation of abuse, a trial court may consider permitting expert testimony, if based upon reliable scientific principles, regarding the prevalence of the specific unexpected behavior within the general class of reported child abuse victims. To be admissible, such scientific evidence must assist the finder of fact in understanding a child’s responses to abuse and satisfy the requirements of both Rule 702(b) and the Rule 403 balancing test.
We agree with the Arizona Supreme Court’s assessment that when the relevant inquiry is the syndrome’s reliability and probative value for rehabilitative and related purposes, "[s]uch evidence may harm defendant’s interests, but we cannot say it is unfairly prejudicial; it merely informs jurors that commonly held assumptions are not necessarily accurate and allows them to fairly judge credibility.” [State v] Moran, [151 Ariz 378, 382] 728 P2d [248 (1986)]. [Steward, supra at 499.]
I would adopt this approach.
V. APPLICATION
In Peterson, the majority properly finds that there were numerous errors even under the rule that it announces today. Mallett, J., ante at 377. Nevertheless, it concludes that the errors were harmless because there was overwhelming evidence against the defendant. The majority’s attempt to identify this supposedly overwhelming nontainted evidence is insufficient. There was certainly no convincing physical evidence. As the majority notes, Dr. David Hickok testified about *394physical alterations of the complainant’s vagina, hymen, and anal opening. Id. at 354. In contrast, Dr. Anselma Ramilo "did not find any physical evidence of sexual abuse . . . .” Id. Indeed, the majority notes that the prosecutor characterized this case as a " 'classic one on one credibility test.’ ” Id. at 356.
If that is the case, then one cannot reasonably conclude that the testimony of three experts, all testifying that the complainant was in fact sexually abused, did not prejudicially taint the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant did not deny that sexual abuse may have occurred. He argues here that the trial court denied him access to a meaningful expert to refute the prosecution’s experts, and that the trial court also denied his request to present witnesses with respect to other potential perpetrators of sexual abuse to the complainant,16 and that this denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial.
When the defense theory was to admit that there may have been sexual abuse, but to deny that he was the perpetrator of it, then the credibility of the complainant became the only issue in the case. As such, improper bolstering of her testimony cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Beckley, Justice Boyle agreed with reversal in Badour, where she stated that on the basis of the unconvincing testimony of the child complainant, "and the fact that the expert testimony was directed not only to the question whether abuse had occurred but to the defendant’s participation in it, I cannot conclude that the trial did not constitute a miscarriage of justice. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096.” Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
*395Similarly, in this case, the expert testimony was directed to both the existence of sexual abuse and to the defendant’s participation in the sexual abuse. Kathy Jo Gillan testified that she referred the complainant’s case to the Department of Social Services by a "thirty-two hundred, which is a suspected sexual or physical or neglect [abuse form].” She testified at length about incestuous families and that the Peterson home symptomatology indicated incestuous relationships and that she saw very little improvement in those incestuous relationships over the course of her involvement. She also testified that most perpetrators stay in a state of denial, while most children rarely lie about sexual abuse. She was, in effect, making a direct comment on the complainant’s credibility. Moreover, as argued by the Court of Appeals dissent in this case, the expert shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that he was not denying the abuse. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 11, 1993 (Docket No. 123450).
Gillan. also testified:
Q. As a result of your work was there any other symptomatology that you noted that I interrupted you on?
A. The extreme ag[g]ressiveness at home, her teaching younger children how to be a[g]gressive in the home. When I first became involved with the family she had bruises on her buttocks where her father had hit her with a stick and I also observed some more bruising on her—very deep bruising on her forearms. [Emphasis added.]
This testimony was of course irrelevant to the allegations of sexual abuse, moreover, it was direct testimony without foundation that the defendant had hit her. The direct inference being: because *396the defendant hit the complainant, he also sexually abused her.
Margaret Green testified that the complainant had been identified as a sexual abuse victim. Mallett, J., ante at 355. She almost immediately then testified:
[The complainant] came into treatment with a very overt set of symptoms and really what I would call in trouble emotionally. She was doing a lot of acting out behavior in school. She was doing a lot of re-enactment of the abuse. She was feeling very unsafe. At the time I got her, her father’s whereabouts were not known. She was very fearful of him seeking retribution. [Emphasis added.]
Even though the defendant’s objection to this testimony was sustained, the jury still heard the expert directly testify that the defendant committed the sexual abuse.
This testimony was immediately followed by testimony of the complainant’s reenactment of the sexual abuse:
She would take Play Dough and make a buttocks and a rectum and a penis and re-enact anal intercourse. She would form a penis and mutilate it, you know, cut it up and throw it around and this type of thing. She would often draw pictures on the—I have a white board where you can erase. She would draw pictures of herself in a bed with her father over her and write, ”My father touching me.”
Again, even though the defendant’s objection was sustained and a limiting instruction was given to the jury, the jury still heard the expert testify that this defendant committed the sexual abuse.
Green also referred to the defendant when ¡she testified:'
*397The first concern would be maintaining her emotional stability in terms of her thought processes. That would be one. The second would be assisting [the complainant] with resolution of abandonment issues with the parental termination of rights, assisting with adoption placement.
Once again, even though the defendant’s objection was sustained and a limiting instruction was given, the court could not erase from the jury’s mind that the expert testified that this defendant had had his parental rights terminated.
The third expert, Thomas O’Melia testified that the complainant would score very high on a checklist of symptoms of sexual abuse. He too testified that children do not lie and that most perpetrators deny the abuse.
Even under Justice Boyle’s standard in Beckley, the improper expert testimony cannot be harmless. The untainted evidence was not overwhelming. Unlike People v Christel, 449 Mich 578; 537 NW2d 194 (1995), in which there was convincing physical evidence, here, there was simply the child complainant’s own testimony. Her credibility therefore was critical. When the jury was allowed to hear, even if some objections were sustained, that the defendant had hit the complainant, that his parental rights had been terminated, that most perpetrators deny sexual abuse and that this defendant had denied abuse, and testimony from three experts that the complainant had in fact been abused, one cannot reasonably come to the conclusion that the error was harmless. The majority’s conclusion is simply incredulous.
In Smith, I would reverse and remand for a new trial because the defendant never attacked the complainant’s credibility by challenging her delay in reporting. Because her credibility did not yet *398need rehabilitating, expert testimony was inappropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I dissent in both cases and would reverse and remand for new trials.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 The evidentiary requirements of behavioral reactions should not be confused with the evidentiary requirements of other types of evidence, such as battered child syndrome, which is based on physical evidence, or hearsay statements by the child complainant under MRE 803A. See State v J Q, 130 NJ 554, 581-582; 617 A2d 1196 (1993).

 See Myers, Expert testimony in child sexual abuse litigation, 68 Neb L R 1, 75 (1989). The authors found that there exists a general consensus that certain factors can indicate sexual abuse. Such factors include
age-inappropriate sexual knowledge; sexualized play; precocious behavior; excessive masturbation; preoccupation with genitals; indications of pressure or coercion exerted on the child; the child’s story remains consistent over time; the child’s report indicates an escalating progression of sexual abuse over time; the child describes idiosyncratic details of the abuse; and physical evidence of abuse.
See also State v Jones, 71 Wash App 798, 819; 863 P2d 85 (1993) (distinguishing sexual acting-out behavior).

 See People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955), and Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46; 293 F 1013 (1923). I do not predict what effect Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993), may have on the Davis/Frye test.

 In Peterson, Kathy Jo Gillan testified that indicators of sexual abuse include depression, withdrawal, anger, aggression, nightmares, age-inappropriate behavior, delayed disclosure, running away, hitting, kicking, spitting, and dysfunctional family role reversals and chaos.. She also testified about age-inappropriate sexual verbiage. Margaret Green testified about similar reactions, including guilt, shame, distorted self-esteem, and gender identity changes. She too testified about age-inappropriate sexual behavior. In Smith, Barbara Cross testified regarding delayed reporting.

 Compare Jones, n 2 supra at 819, which distinguished the types of behavioral reactions:
We further note that sexual acting out behavior has been *384viewed as more logically and clinically indicative of sexual abuse than other generalized reactions to emotional traumas such as nightmares and phobic behaviors. [Citing Myers, n 2 supra at 59-60.]

 He identified five behavioral reactions commonly observed: "(1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction.” Id.

 J Q, n 1 supra at 579 (citing Myers, supra at 66-67) (syndrome evidence may explain abuse, not detect it). In State v Foret, 628 So 2d 1116, 1127 (La, 1993), the court noted:

 State v Sims, 158 Vt 173, 179; 608 A2d 1149 (1991), noted:
The fact that a complainant displays symptoms similar to those displayed by children who have been sexually abused is not usually sufficient to allow an expert to testify that that particular complainant has been sexually abused. [Citations omitted.]

 Accord Jones, n 2 supra at 818:
The prevalent objection to such testimony is that a general profile of typical behaviors is not specific to sexual abuse, but .may be produced by other traumatic events in the life of the child. [Citations omitted.]

 See J Q, supra at 582 (testimony that victims’ symptoms "were consistent with sexual abuse” was prejudicial error).

 See Foret, n 7 supra at 1123, in which the court adopted the less stringent Daubert scientific evidence standard, and concluded that syndrome behaviors still fail the test as diagnostic devices, id. at 1127. However, with respect to rebuttal purposes, the court stated:
The proper presentation of this sort of expert testimony must focus on explaining to a jury why "superficially bizarre” reactions such as delayed reporting, etc. take place in such cases. [Id. at 1130 (citation omitted).]
The court limited the testimony to a discussion of the general characteristics of the behavioral reaction at issue, and precluded testimony concerning the particular complainant.

 People v Patino, 26 Cal App 4th 1737, 1745; 32 Cal Rptr 2d 345 (1994), noted:
The trial court in the instant action handled the matter carefully and correctly. The jury was immediately admonished after [the expert’s] testimony it was to consider csaas testimony only for the limited purpose of showing, if it did, that the alleged victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence were not inconsistent with her having been molested.
The instructions also required the jury to give the defendant the presumption of innocence, and further admonished that the prosecution stiU had the burden of proof of guilt, that the syndrome evidence is based on the assumption that abuse has occurred, and that the testimony could not be used as proof that the complainant’s allegation of sexual abuse was true. Id. at 1745-1746.

 See Foret, n 7 supra at 1129, which adopted the rule of admitting testimony for the very limited purpose "of rebutting attacks on the victim’s credibility based on inconsistent statements, limited disclosures, or recantations of the testimony.” (Citations omitted.) See also People v Nelson, 203 Ill App 3d 1038; 561 NE2d 439 (1990) (limiting admissibility to rebuttal after the complainant’s credibility has been attacked).

 Expert testimony concerning the particular complainant must be approached with caution, as it too often slips into impermissible comment on the complainant’s credibility. [Sims, n 8 supra at 181.]

 See id. at 179 (improper questions required answers that implicitly conveyed the expert’s belief that the complainant was truthful).

 The defendant suggests that a member of the foster family may have been one perpetrator of the abuse.