Court Opinion

ID: 9633776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:59:32.613825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:41.923327
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
HEEN, J.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I am constrained, albeit belatedly, to express disenchantment with the uniform starting points (USP) first established by this court in Hashimoto v. Hashimoto, 6 Haw. App. 424, 725 P.2d 520 (1986). Although I joined in Hashimoto and, indeed, in nearly every other decision of this court reviewing family court marital property divisions in divorce cases, I have gradually come to realize that the imposition of the USP on the family court judges is contrary to the *428legislative intent of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1990).
HRS § 580-47(a) reads in pertinent part as follows:
Upon granting a divorce.,. the court may make such further orders as shall appear just and equitable .. . finally dividing and distributing the estate of the parties, real, personal, or mixed, whether community, joint, or separate[.]... In making such further orders, the court shall take into consideration: the respective merits of the parties, the relative abilities of the parties, the condition in which each party will be left by the divorce, the burdens imposed upon either party for the benefit of the children of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case.
The statute, and its nearly identical predecessor, has been interpreted in a number of supreme court cases. The thrust of all those cases has consistently been that the division of the marital property under the statute is in the discretion of the trial court, and each case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances. See, e.g„ Carson v. Carson, 50 Haw. 182, 436 P.2d 7 (1967). In Carson, the supreme court also said that “the division and distribution of all property, including separate property, must be just and equitable[,]” id. at 184, 436 P.2d at 9, and that placing undue emphasis on any particular factor listed in the statute was an abuse of discretion. Id. So strongly has the supreme court adhered to the principle that the statute establishes the sole basis for division of marital property that it has stated:
There is no fixed rule for determining the amount of property to be awarded each spouse in a divorce action other than as set forth in HRS § 580-47.
Au-Hoy v. Au-Hoy, 60 Haw. 354, 357, 590 P.2d 80, 82 (1979) (emphasis added).
In my view, the USP, contrary to the line of supreme court cases, in fact establish a fixed rule governing the split of marital *429property by the family court. Consequently, they violate the letter and the spirit of HRS § 580-47(a). Opinions by the supreme court in reviewing our decisions on certiorari support my view.
Although Hashimoto was the seminal case establishing the USP, the concept really had its genesis in Mochida v. Mochida, 5 Haw. App. 348, 691 P.2d 771 (1984), where we formulated “general rules” regarding division of marital property in divorce cases. In Cassiday v. Cassiday, 6 Haw. App. 207, 716 P.2d 1145 (1985), we put forth another general rule. In reviewing our decision on certiorari, the supreme court struck down the “rule,” again referring to the discretion accorded to the family courts by HRS § 580-47(a) and the legislative intent that each case must turn on its own facts. Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. 383, 716 P.2d 1133 (1986). In Myers v. Myers, 70 Haw. 143, 764 P.2d 1237 (1988), another review of an intermediate court decision, the supreme court reaffirmed its decisions in Carson, Au-Hoy, and Cassiday, stating that it has “avoided, where possible, the adoption of general rules governing the division of marital assets.” Id. at 149, 764 P.2d at 1241. In keeping with its rule of avoidance, the supreme court struck down “Category 6” established in Woodworth v. Woodworth, 1 Haw, App. 11, 740 P.2d 36 (1987), applied by the family court in Myers. However, the supreme court did not review the other five categories of USP.
In response to the supreme court’s decision in Cassiday, we “relabeled” the “general rule” to USP. Hashimoto, 6 Haw. App. at 426, 725 P.2d at 522. The relabeling, in my view, did not change the nature of the USP; the USP remained a general rule. That the nature of the beast was not changed is indicated by our language in Hashimoto, where we stated:
If family court judges are required to commence deciding in what proportion to equitably divide the value of the property from a uniform starting point, and to identify each of the factors that cause them to deviate and *430award a different proportion, then their decisions will be more uniform and predictable and the process of appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard will be greatly facilitated.
Id. at 427, 725 P.2d at 523 (emphasis added).
Although each family court judge may view the facts of each divorce case differently, that is exactly what the statute allows them to do. The statute is based on a sound realization that there cannot be predictability in marital property splits because no two cases involve the same set of facts. It is up to the appellate courts to determine whether the result the family court reaches is within the bounds of reason, not whether the individual judge had started from the same point. Facilitation of that review is not the purpose of HRS § 580-47(a).
The standard of review in discretion cases is unquestionably of judicial origin as the majority points out. However, the USP overlook the fact that the legislature has accorded the family court a wide discretion not only to reach a just and equitable result, but also to determine, based on the facts in each case, where they will begin applying the factors of HRS § 580-47(a). In my view, the USP represent a restrictive approach to the division of marital property which the legislature did not intend and which we are powerless to impose, even under the guise of appellate review.
In my view, this case illustrates the unnecessary rigidity of the USP and is a clear demonstration of the USP “getting in the way” of the family court’s decision process. The comments of the trial judge clearly indicate that, had he not felt bound by the USP, he not only would have ended up with a different result but would have started out differently. I do not deny that the trial judge apparently misunderstood the cases in which we explained the USP. However, it seems clear to me that, if it were not for the USP, he would have reached a different, more equitable result, a result we in all probability could have affirmed.