Court Opinion

ID: 9540701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:59.50385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:12.396220
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, J.,
(concurring in a separate opinion):
I VOTE to reverse the conviction and sentence of the appellant and to remand for a new trial because of the egregious error committed by the circuit judge in submitting a copy of the trafficking statute to the trial jury.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

After the circuit judge charged the jury and sent them back to the jury room to begin deliberations, the judge asked whether there were any exceptions from the State or the defense.
Mr. Warder [counsel for Covert]: Yes, sir. It’s the procedure I’m beginning to object to. We’ve now sent the jury out with a statute that provides—
The Court: Did they-—
*198Mr. Warder: — four ways to—
The Court: I meant to take up all those papers. Go get those papers from them. Every paper I gave them. Sir, go ahead.
Mr. Warder: Yes, sir. We have a verdict form that in essence breaks the statute down in parts. And, of course, for trafficking it gives them four different choices, all to ñnd him guilty. You know, I figure if we gave everybody enough choices, if we broke it down long enough we could have fifteen or twenty ways to find somebody guilty. And I just think that’s highly prejudicial.
You know, I’d really like to send a sheet out that had the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof, and have it all broken down in one line sentences so they could read through and check, do you ñnd that on each of them? I mean, it’s a way of highlighting the case to make it more likely that somebody will sooner or later check a yes. And it seems to me that it’s highly prejudicial.
It seems to me like the form in itself tends to keep going until there’s a high probability that somebody will think they’re supposed to find one of the four. They have four things, and they’re asked for an amount four times. And I think that the jury’s going to think that they’re supposed to fill one of them in and write an amount in. And I just — I just think it’s prejudicial. Mr. Abdalla: Your honor, I’d like to be heard on that. My position is I’d just rather have the indictment sent back as is with the way we’ve — I’ve always thought it was guilty or not guilty. And that’s just my position, your honor.
The Court: Well, we can’t do that because the jury has to determine the amount. So we can’t just send the indictments in. I note your exceptions. I don’t think by splitting it out into four is doing anything but making it easier for the jury to understand. They’re going to still have every bit of it. And in a case like this, I can’t conceive a jury deliberating without having a copy of the statute. It’s very frequently that a copy of the statute is sent back in, or some portion of the charge that they request be in writing, or sometimes the entire charge is sent back in writing.
*199Mr. Warder: You know, I’ve heard of the entire charge being sent, but I’ve never heard of a court selecting the parts that they want to send back so it would be emphasized. And I—
The Court: Well, I’ve explained to them it’s not that I’m emphasizing, it’s trying to help them understand.
Mr. Warder; I understand, but that’s—
The Court: Now I don’t bring them back — I don’t object to bringing them back out and telling them that, you know, they can’t find them guilty of anything unless the State has proven that particular charge beyond a reasonable doubt. But I don’t see how there can be any doubt in their minds of that fact.
Mr. Abdalla: And, your honor, just for the record, I’ve joined in on Mr. Warder’s objections.
The Court: All right. Well, it seems the verdict form doesn’t suit anybody but me. But that’s the way it’s going back. I’m going to make the couple of corrections that we made at the bench a few minutes ago and that I explained to the jury while I was going through it. And then I’ll let you gentlemen look at it to be sure we’ve done that before I send it back. And then I’ll have it sent back. So we’ll be at ease a few minutes.
(Whereupon court was in recess)
The Court: All right. I have made the changes that we talked about to the verdict form. If either one of you want to look at it the bailiff has it. Mr. Warder, the jury has already asked that I send into them the definition of the trafficking statute, the print form.
Mr. Warder: Well, I mean—
The Court: And I note your objection.
Mr. Warder: — it’s predictable when we took it all to them. The Court: Well, it’s — I think it’s proper. I think it’s good. I think it would be worse not to do it than to do it. So I overrule your objection.
“The general rule of issue preservation states that if an issue was not raised and ruled upon below, it will not be considered for the first time on appeal.” State v. Passmore, 363 S.C. 568, 583, 611 S.E.2d 273, 281 (Ct.App.2005) (citing *200State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 587 S.E.2d 691 (2003); State v. Lee, 350 S.C. 125, 564 S.E.2d 372 (Ct.App.2002)). Our courts have “consistently refused to apply the plain error rule.” Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 306, 486 S.E.2d 750, 759 (1997) (citations omitted). Instead, we have held: “it is the responsibility of counsel to preserve issues for appellate review.” Id.
Our supreme court, in I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000), explained the rationale behind this longstanding rule:
Imposing this preservation requirement on the appellant is meant to enable the lower court to rule properly after it has considered all relevant facts, law, and arguments. The requirement also serves as a keen incentive for a party to prepare a case thoroughly. It prevents a party from keeping an ace card up his sleeve — intentionally or by chance— in the hope that an appellate court will accept that ace card and, via a reversal, give him another opportunity to prove his case.
Id. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724 (citations omitted); see also Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 358 S.C. 78, 103, 594 S.E.2d 485, 498 (Ct.App.2004) (“Without an initial ruling by the trial court, a reviewing court simply would not be able to evaluate whether the trial court committed error.”).
The rule that an unpreserved issue will not be considered on appeal does have its exceptions. Foremost is the axiomatic principle of law that lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at anytime, including for the first time on appeal. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 495 S.E.2d 773 (1998); State v. Richburg, 304 S.C. 162, 403 S.E.2d 315 (1991). Additionally, an exception exists where the interests of minors or incompetents are involved. See Shake v. Darlington County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 306 S.C. 216, 219 n. 2, 410 S.E.2d 923, 924 n. 2 (Ct.App.1991) (noting, in a termination of parental rights action, that “[although it is questionable whether Mrs. Shake properly raised each of [the] grounds for termination at trial, we nevertheless address them all.”); Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 536 S.E.2d 372 (2000) (approving the court of appeals’ conclusion that procedural rules are subservient to the court’s duty to zealously guard the rights of minors); Caughman v. Caughman, 247 S.C. 104, 109, 146 *201S.E.2d 93, 95 (1965) (holding that “the duty to protect the rights of incompetents has precedence over procedural rules otherwise limiting the scope of review.”).
Furthermore, our courts have developed the doctrine of futility, which recognizes that in circumstances where it would be futile to raise an objection to the trial judge, failure to raise the objection will be excused. See State v. Pace, 316 S.C. 71, 74, 447 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1994) (finding “[a]s to counsel’s failure to raise an objection, the tone and tenor of the trial judge’s remarks concerning her gender and conduct were such that any objection would have been futile.”); State v. Higgenbottom, 344 S.C. 11, 542 S.E.2d 718 (2001) (employing the futility doctrine).
In the present case, counsel for Covert perspicuously raised an objection (1) to the submission of the statute to the jury and (2) to the lack of a “not guilty” option on the jury verdict form. As to the judge providing the jury with a written copy of the statute, counsel professed, “We’ve now sent the jury out with a statute,” before his argument was interrupted by the court. Counsel noted he had “never heard of a court selecting the parts that they want to send back so it would be emphasized,” and averred, “You know, I’d really like to sénd a sheet out that had the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof, and have it all broken down in one line sentences so they could read through and check, do you find that on each of them?”
Additionally, Covert’s attorney took exception to the jury verdict form’s failure to provide for the option of “not guilty”: “You know, I figure if we gave everybody enough choices, if we broke it down long enough we could have fifteen or twenty ways to find somebody guilty. And I just think that’s highly prejudicial.”
Lucidly, a contextual reading of the trial record demonstrates Covert’s attorney timely objected both to the format of the jury verdict form and to the procedure of providing the jury with the trafficking statute. The circuit judge acknowledged: “I note your exceptions,” and again, “... I note your objection.” Further, the judge observed, “Well, it seems the verdict form doesn’t suit anybody but me. But that’s the way it’s going back.” Finally, he pronounced: “So I overrule your *202objection.” Pursuant to Rule 18 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure, “Counsel shall not attempt to further argue any matter after he has been heard and ruling of the court has been pronounced.” Rule 18(a), SCRCrimP. My reading of the transcript leads me to the ineluctable conclusions that (1) counsel raised multiple objections to the jury verdict form and the submission of the statute, and (2) the court acknowledged and overruled the objections. Therefore, both objections are pristinely preserved.

PREJUDICIAL SUBMISSION OF THE TRAFFICKING STATUTE TO THE JURY

Historically in South Carolina jurisprudence, circuit judges have NOT submitted in writing to the trial jury any portion of the jury charge. The circuit judge committed a colossal prejudicial error in the instant case by submitting only the trafficking statute. This practice defies fairness and justice by emphasizing the offense while ignoring the basic constitutional guarantees afforded the defendant which were in the jury charge, including: (1) the presumption of innocence; (2) the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the credibility of witnesses; (4) an elemental analysis of the actual charge of which the defendant is accused; and (5) the right not to testify. In my judgment, submitting the statute to the jury violated Covert’s right to a fair trial.
Admittedly, some states permit a judge to submit the jury charge to the fact finder for purposes of edification and enlightenment during jury deliberations. Most of the states that allow this procedure do so through a court rule or statute.
Under Louisiana law, after a court charges the jury, “a copy of the written charge shall be delivered to the jury if such delivery is consented to by both the defendant and the state in open court but not in the presence of the jury.” LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 801(B)(1). However, “No charge shall be reduced to writing at the request of a juror pursuant to this Article unless consent is obtained from both the defendant and the state in open court but not within the presence of the jury.” LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 808. See State v. Joseph, 875 So.2d 1011, 1016-17 (La.App. 5 Cir.2004) (“With the 2001 amendments to LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 801 and 808, it is now statutorily permissi*203ble for the jury to receive a copy of the written jury instructions to use during deliberations. However, the use is clearly conditioned upon the consent of the parties.”).
In Alabama,
Neither a copy of the charges against the defendant nor the “given” written instructions shall go to the jury room; provided, however, that the court may, in its discretion, submit the written charges to the jury in a complex case. Alabama RCRP Rule 21.1. See Wright v. State, 740 So.2d 1147 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).
The Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure require that written instructions be provided to the jury. “The court shall reduce its final instructions to writing or make an audio, electronic, or other recording of those instructions, provide at least one written copy or recording of those instruction to the jury for use during deliberations, and preserve those instructions for the record.” Ohio Crim. R. Rule 30(A); see State v. Kersey, 124 Ohio App.3d 513, 706 N.E.2d 818 (1997).
Under the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, “The court may show the written instructions to the jury and permit the jury to take the written instructions to the jury room.” W.Va.Rules of Cr. P. 30; see State v. Lutz, 183 W.Va. 234, 395 S.E.2d 478 (1988).
The law in Arkansas is succinctly declared by that state’s supreme court in Oliver v. State, 286 Ark. 198, 691 S.W.2d 842 (1985): “A.R.Cr.P. Rule 33.3 clearly states it is the duty of the judge to deliver to the jury a typewritten copy of the oral instructions. This is to be done upon the request of either party or any juror.” Id. at 842.
The California Penal Code provides:
Upon the jury retiring for deliberation, the court shall advise the jury of the availability of a written copy of the jury instructions. The court may, at its discretion, provide the jury with a copy of the written instructions given. However, if the jury requests the court to supply a copy of the written instructions, the court shall supply the jury with a copy.
CaLPenal Code § 1093(f) (West 2004).
The rule in Minnesota is:
*204(4) Giving of Instructions. The court in its discretion shall instruct the jury either before or after the arguments are completed except, at the discretion of the court, preliminary instructions need not be repeated. The instructions may be in writing and in the discretion of the court a copy may be taken to the jury room when the jury retires for deliberation.
Rules Crim. Proc., rule 26.08, subd. 18(4), 27A M.S.A.
Unlike Louisiana, 'Alabama, Ohio, West Virginia, Arkansas, California, and Minnesota, there is no court rule or statute in South Carolina which gives a judge the discretion to submit to the jury written copies the charge. My research reveals no case from the appellate entities in South Carolina placing their imprimatur or approbation upon this practice.
In Florida,
Under certain circumstances, it is reversible error for the trial court to provide the jury with a copy of only a portion of the jury instructions; if the trial court provides the jury with any written instructions, it must provide the jury with all of the instructions. Van Loan v. State, 779 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Pettit v. State, 612 So.2d 1381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Wilson v. State, 746 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.400(a)(3).
Bouchard v. State, 847 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.2003).
According to Jewell v. State, 624 N.E.2d 38, 43 (Ind.App. 1 Dist.1993):
In Indiana, the accepted practice is not to allow the jurors to take the written instructions with them into the jury room. Cornett [v. State], 436 N.E.2d 765 [(Ind.1982)]. However, the trial court has discretion to send the entire body of written instructions to the jury “cleansed” of extraneous information. Mitchell v. State (1989), Ind., 535 N.E.2d 498, 501.
See also Denton v. State, 455 N.E.2d 905 (Ind.1983) (“It is also the general rule of law that jury instructions are not to be sent to the jury room.”).
Pursuant to statute in New York,
At any time during its deliberation, the jury may request the court for further instruction or information with respect *205to the law, with respect to the content or substance of any trial evidence, or with respect to any other matter pertinent to the jury’s consideration of the case. Upon such a request, the court must direct that the jury be returned to the courtroom and, after notice to both the people and counsel for the defendant, and in the presence of the defendant, must give such requested information or instruction as the court deems proper. With the consent of the parties and upon the request of the jury for further instruction with respect to a statute, the court may also give to the jury copies of the text of any statute which, in its discretion, the court deems proper.
N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law 310.30 (McKinney 2002). In People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 980, 981-82, 599 N.Y.S.2d 525, 615 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y.1993), the Court of Appeals of New York held:
We affirm the order of the Appellate Division because CPL 310.30 prohibits giving “copies of the text of any statute” to a deliberating jury without the consent of the parties. Here, defendant expressly objected to complying with the jury’s request to receive the entire charge in writing, which included statutory textual material.
The fact that CPL 310.30 allows a deliberating jury to “request the court for further instruction or information * * * with respect to any * * * matter pertinent to the jury’s consideration of the case” does not impliedly authorize an override of the specific prohibition. Inasmuch as the entire written jury instruction included forbidden statutory textual material, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the trial court committed reversible error in providing that material to the jury over defendant’s objection {see, People v. Taylor, 76 N.Y.2d 873, 560 N.Y.S.2d 982, 561 N.E.2d 882 [(1990)]; People v. Nimmons, 72 N.Y.2d 830, 530 N.Y.S.2d 543, 526 N.E.2d 33 [(1988)]; People v. Owens, 69 N.Y.2d 585, 516 N.Y.S.2d 619, 509 N.E.2d 314 [(1987)]).
The New York case of People v. Sanders, 70 N.Y.2d 837, 523 N.Y.S.2d 444, 517 N.E.2d 1330 (1987), is particularly on point. In Sanders, the Court of Appeals of New York ruled the “consent of defense counsel is an ‘absolute precondition’ to furnishing the jury with the text of a statute because ‘questions may arise concerning which sections of pertinent statuto*206ry material should be given to the jury.’ ” Sanders at 838, 517 N.E.2d 1330.
Because South Carolina has no applicable statute or rule, I vote to reverse Covert’s conviction on the ground that submission of only the trafficking statute to the jury tainted the fairness of his trial.

JURY VERDICT FORM

In addition to the submission of the trafficking statute, I find prejudicial error in the court’s verdict form. The jury verdict form utilized by the circuit judge read as follows:
I. Trafficking in Cocaine
Do you unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt that Kevin Paul Covert:
1. Knowingly sold, manufactured, cultivated, delivered, purchased or brought into this state 10 grams or more of cocaine?
YES_ NO_
If yes, how many grams? _
2. Provided financial assistance or otherwise aided abetted attempted or conspired to sell, manufacture, cultivate, deliver, purchase or bring into this state 10 grams or more of cocaine?
YES_ NO_
If yes, how many grams? _
3. Was knowingly in actual or constructive possession of 10 grams or more of cocaine?
YES_ NO_
If yes, how many grams? _
4. Knowingly attempted to become in actual or constructive possession of 10 grams or more of cocaine?
YES_ NO_
If yes, how many grams? _
II. Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine
If your answer to all four of the above questions is NO, then answer this question:
*207Do you unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt that Kevin Paul Covert possessed with intent to distribute less than 10 grams of cocaine?
YES_ NO_
III. Simple Possession of Cocaine
If your answer to all five of the above questions 1 through 4 and II is NO, then answer this question:
Do you unanimously find that Kevin Paul Covert possessed cocaine?
YES_ NO_
IV. Proximity
If your answer to any of the above questions except III, Simple Possession of Cocaine, was YES, then answer this question:
Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt, that the above conduct occurred within a radius of one half mile of the grounds of a public or private elementary, middle, or secondary school or public playground or park, a public vocational or trade school or technical educational center; or a public or private college or university?
YES_ NO_
In my view, the jury verdict form should have provided the specific option of finding the defendant NOT GUILTY. This Court, in State v. Myers, 344 S.C. 532, 536, 544 S.E.2d 851, 853 (Ct.App.2001), observed,
It is the preferred practice to submit the possible verdict of “not guilty” to the jury; however, the law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented. State v. Somerset, 276 S.C. 220, 221, 277 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1981); State v. Rogers, 275 S.C. 485, 486, 272 S.E.2d 792, 792 (1980). A jury should be instructed that one verdict it can reach is “not guilty,” especially where the crime charged is of a serious nature. State v. Griggs, 184 S.C. 304, 315-16, 192 S.E. 360, 365 (1937) (stating that where the trial judge in his charge instructed the jury that if it had a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt it must find him not guilty, there is no reversible error if the trial *208judge then fails to tell the jury that “not guilty” is one verdict it could render).
(Emphasis added.)
The Myers court found the “trial judge’s clear and cogent jury instructions ameliorated any possible prejudice emanating from the failure to include ‘not guilty’ on the verdict form.” Id. In contradistinction to the judge’s “clear and cogent jury instructions” in Myers, the judge’s jury instructions in this case failed to immunize the verdict form due to the improper and prejudicial act of submitting the trafficking statute to the jury. Not only was the jury inundated with the many ways it could find the defendant guilty, the defective verdict form omitted the “not guilty” option. Therefore, the judge’s charging practice compounded the prejudice of the verdict form rather than ameliorating it.
“A denial of due process occurs when a defendant in a criminal trial is denied the fundamental fairness essential to the concept of justice.” State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 129, 484 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1997) (citation omitted). I find the circuit judge’s overemphasis of the ways the jury could find Covert guilty and the concomitant underemphasis of Covert’s fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed rights encouraged the jury, again and again, to find the defendant guilty. The result in the instant case is that the jury was excessively encouraged to find the defendant guilty, rendering the trial unfair. Covert was deprived of due process of law. Accordingly, I VOTE to REVERSE the conviction and sentence and REMAND for a new trial.