Court Opinion

ID: 9484465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:54:27.609558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:15.942867
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I write separately to suggest that the language and structure of the Sentencing Guidelines themselves reinforce or even dictate the impermissibility of using the defendant’s election to go to trial as a reason for placing him at a higher point in the Guidelines range, and thus giving him a longer sentence than he would have otherwise received. The precise question raised by the appeal is whether a sentencing judge, after granting a defendant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, may impose a higher sentence within the Guidelines range than he otherwise would on the explicit and sole ground that the defendant exercised his constitutional right to go to trial. In my view, the Guidelines say “no.” First, although the Guidelines do allow the sentencing judge to take into consideration the defendant’s decision to plead guilty as positive evidence in his favor when granting an acceptance of responsibility credit, they do not permit the defendant’s choice to proceed to trial to be used as negative evidence against him either in denying an acceptance of responsibility credit altogether or in placing him at a higher point in the Guidelines range after the credit has been granted. Second, the Guidelines do not anticipate that a defendant, having gone to trial, who has nonetheless been found to have “clearly” manifested acceptance of responsibility and is thereby eligible for a two-level reduction, can subsequently be penalized within the Guidelines range for not having “fully” accepted responsibility by going to trial and therefore given a higher sentence than he would otherwise receive. The majority’s insertion of “fully” as an additional requirement to “clearly” in the acceptance of responsibility guideline is a judicial creation — pure and simple — and undermines the Guidelines structure and policy for considering the effect of guilty pleas on sentencing. I therefore conclude that the district court misapplied the Guidelines in explicitly sentencing Jones to an additional six months because he exercised his Sixth Amendment right to a trial.
A The Exercise of the Right to a Trial
Since 1987 the Guidelines have dramatically altered the way in which judges sentence defendants, introducing controversial changes that have been attacked on grounds of basic unfairness, usurpation of needed discretion on the part of the sentencing judges, and the imposition of time-consuming and complicated requirements on the criminal process itself. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentences, 101 Yale L.J. 1681 (1992); Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than the Disease, 29 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 899 (1992); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U.Chi.L.Rev. 901 (1991); Federal Courts Study Committee, Report ch. 7, at 183-40 (1990). At least until today it seemed clear, however, that one aspect of traditional sentencing law was not changed by the Guidelines — the notion that defendants who exhibited remorse and acceptance of responsibility for their crimes by pleading guilty could be given more lenient treatment, but, at the same time, defendants could not be penalized for opting to go to trial. This dividing line may seem exquisitely refined, but it has nonetheless endured in our jurisprudence, and it has had practical consequences in particular cases. A sentencing judge in pre-Guidelines days could not say, “I would have given you five years if you didn’t go to trial, but since you did, I will give you seven,” but he could say, “Although I might otherwise have given you seven years, I am giving you only five years because you are remorseful, as shown, in part, by your willingness to plead guilty.” In the first ease, the judge has arrived at a benchmark sentence he believes just in all respects, but then added 'an extra increment because the defendant has burdened the system by going to trial. In the second case, the judge is according a measure of leniency by viewing the guilty plea as evidence of acceptance of responsibility and, as such, worthy of consideration. There is an important difference *1485between the two cases and that difference is critical for purposes of this appeal. For, in promulgating the Guidelines, the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) sought to essentially replicate this practice, but to minimize even further the likelihood that a defendant could be penalized for exercising a constitutional right.
Thus, the Guidelines explain that “inasmuch as those who pleaded guilty under pre-guidelines practice often received lesser sentences, the guidelines permit the court to impose lesser sentences on those defendants who accept responsibility for their misconduct.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A at 4(g) (policy statement) (emphases added). It is noteworthy that the Commission rejected an automatic sentence reduction for all defendants who plead guilty in favor of a discretionary two-point offense level reduction, available to both defendants who plead guilty and those who go to trial. In so doing, it provided for the traditional guilty plea/lenieney notion to be taken into account in a wider context, i.e., an “acceptance of responsibility” two-level reduction. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 Wake Forest L.Rev. 181,191-92 (1988). Indeed, the Commission’s decision not to limit the reduction to defendants pleading guilty was motivated, in part, by its desire to avoid the constitutional dilemma of appearing to inflict a fixed penalty on defendants insisting upon a trial. See Dan Freed & Marc Miller, Plea Bargained Sentences, Disparity and “Guideline Justice”, 3 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 175, 176 (1991); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L.Rev. 1, 28-29 (1988).
Accordingly, the 1990 Guidelines direct the sentencing judge to reduce the offense level by two “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) (emphasis added). It continues that a “defendant may be given consideration under this section without regard to whether his conviction is based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury or the practical certainty of conviction at trial,” id. at § 3El.l(b) (emphasis added), and that a “defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right,” id. at § 3El.l(e). Although the commentary, in providing a nonexhaustive list of factors for the sentencing judge to consider in deciding whether the acceptance of responsibility discount is warranted, does state that ordinarily the “adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse,” it also makes clear that going to trial does not disqualify a defendant from the reduction where, for instance, her pretrial conduct clearly evinces acceptance of responsibility. Id. at Application Note 2. Finally, the commentary notes that a defendant who pleads guilty may be denied the credit where other “conduct of the defendant ... is inconsistent with ... acceptance of responsibility.” Id. at Application Note 3.1 In sum, extrapolating from pre-Guidelines practice, § 3E1.1 treats a plea of guilty as a “positive” factor that may help to qualify a defendant for a two-level discount. But the Guidelines emphatically do not envision treating a defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to go to trial as a “negative” factor sufficient by itself either to disqualify him from an acceptance of responsibility credit or even to be weighed against other positive evidence “clearly” demonstrating an acceptance of responsibility. Exercise of a constitutional right was meant to be a neutral factor in the calculus.
In United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir.1990), the Ninth Circuit so read *1486§ 3E1.1, holding that “in determining a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, a sentencing court cannot consider against a defendant any constitutionally protected conduct.” In a subsequent case, the court reiterated that
the district court may deny the reduction because of a lack of contrition despite the increased costs imposed upon the defendant’s choice to remain silent or to proceed to trial, but may not deny the reduction because of that choice in spite of other manifestations of sincere contrition.
United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 478, 121 L.Ed.2d 384 (1993); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.1990) (denial of § 3E1.1 credit was based on defendant’s conduct at trial, not choice to go to trial). The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement with this interpretation:
[I]f a defendant has shown some sign of remorse but has also exercised constitutional or statutory rights, the sentencing judge may not balance the exercise of those rights against the defendant’s expression of remorse to determine whether the “acceptance” is adequate.
United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193, 197 (11th Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 113 S.Ct. 649, 121 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992). In a similar vein, the commentary to § 3C1.1, which provides for a two-level enhancement where a defendant obstructs or impedes the investigation or prosecution of his case, explains:
This provision is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right. A defendant’s denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or provide information to a probation officer, or refusal to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis for application of this provision.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 at Application Note 1 (emphases added). Thus, the structure and policy of the Guidelines allow the fact of a guilty plea to count as nonconclusive evidence of acceptance of responsibility, but do not permit the mere exercise of a constitutional right to be counted against a defendant in awarding the acceptance credit or in other aspects of sentencing.2 It seems to me inevitable that the same reasoning must apply when determining where to sentence a defendant within the applicable range after granting an acceptance of responsibility adjustment.
Section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines does say expansively that in setting a sentence within a Guidelines range a district court “may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (emphasis added); see 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Thus, within Jones’ Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months, the district court may well have been free to impose the rock-bottom 121 months on the basis of particularly impressive evidence of acceptance of responsibility that went beyond the “clear” expression required by the Guidelines or on the basis of other legitimate factors. Under the Guidelines structure, however, the judge was prohibited from imposing a higher sentence than he otherwise would, solely because the defendant went to trial. Election to go to trial is a factor “otherwise prohibited by law,” ie., the Constitution and the Guidelines themselves; and it may not be used, as the majority allows, to demonstrate negatively the defendant’s failure to “fully” accept responsibility.3 *1487The sentencing judge cannot be allowed, at any point, to take sentencing action based upon a defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to a trial. This Guidelines policy of neutrality transcends the elusive distinction between denying a benefit and imposing a penalty employed by the majority to justify its contrary conclusion. Whether the district court, as here, explicitly raised Jones’ sentence because he went to trial or denied Jones a shorter sentence for the same reason is irrelevant because his constitutional right was burdened either way; his constitutional choice in and of itself led to a higher sentence. I do not believe the Guidelines intended any such result, but in fact, strove to avoid it.
Of course the acceptance of responsibility concept embraced by the Commission cannot be altogether divorced from a defendant’s constitutional choice to plead guilty or go to trial. For example, a defendant who goes to trial may find it difficult to show by extrinsic evidence that his acceptance of responsibility is “timelfy],” a factor identified as relevant in the commentary. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 at Application Note 1(g).4 However, the Government’s contention that prohibiting sentencing judges from counting the act of choosing to go to trial against the defendant would require “unrealistic feats of mental gymnastics,” Government’s Brief at 29, is not right, as the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit rulings show. If the defendant can provide other affirmative (and timely) evidence of acceptance of responsibility, the fact that he opted for trial cannot be the basis for denying § 3E1.1 credit or — I would find as well— moving higher within the applicable Guidelines range after granting the credit. In any event, determining under the majority’s test whether a judge’s action is properly eonsid-ered as the imposition of a penalty or the denial of a benefit seems a far more confusing exercise.
I also disagree with the government that drawing the distinction used by the Ninth and Eleventh circuits will “ensure a lack of candor in sentencing.” Government’s Brief at 28-29. If anything, the majority’s approach would seem more likely to run this risk. The foundation of the majority opinion is the shaky penalty/benefit distinction, which even the majority only “assum[esj” to be valid. See Majority Opinion at 1477. Under the majority’s view, the sentencing judge may say, “I am lowering your sentence by only 24 of a possible 30 month reduction because you chose to go to trial,” but may not say, “I am raising your sentence from the full 30 month reduction by 6 months because you chose to go to trial.” Surely that formulaic distinction is not productive of judicial candor. On the other hand, forbidding sentencing judges from weighing a defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights negatively in any context, before or after an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, more faithfully preserves the constitutional neutrality of the Guidelines scheme.
B. The Impermissible Distinction Between “Clear” and “Full” Acceptance of Responsibility
There is a second reason why I believe the district court (and the majority) misapplied the Guidelines here. Section 3E1.1 directs a district court to grant a two-level reduction only where the defendant has met his burden of “clearly” demonstrating acceptance of responsibility. The use of the word “clearly” requires the district court to decide if all the relevant evidence, including a guilty plea (but *1488excluding going to trial) demonstrates that acceptance of responsibility has been achieved. “Clearly” means “free from obscurity or ambiguity,” “unmistakable,” “free from doubt,” and “unhampered by restriction or limitation.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 247 (1984). “Full” also means “lacking ... qualification.” Id. at 497. Is there really a difference here? Can a judge find a defendant “clearly” accepted responsibility for a two-level credit, but did not accept it “fully” enough so that he can be given a lower sentence in the Guidelines range? As discussed above, a defendant who goes to trial may indeed find it difficult to demonstrate sufficient contrition by other evidence for a court to conclude that he “clearly” accepted responsibility. Here, for reasons not enunciated, the judge must have found sufficient outside evidence of clear acceptance in order to grant the two-level adjustment. However, in the next breath, he undercut his own findings by expressing doubt whether Jones “truly was remorseful and had accepted full responsibility.” As a result, he denied Jones “full credit for acceptance of responsibility” by sentencing him to a point higher within the applicable range than he otherwise would have had Jones pled guilty and thereby exhibited fuller repentance. In today’s decision, the majority goes along with that “split the baby” practice. I do not believe the Guidelines structure allows it.
To arrive at his sentence, the district court in effect had to conclude that despite the fact Jones went to trial, his acceptance of responsibility was “clear,” but at the same time, the fact he went to trial means his acceptance was not “full.” Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes such a distinction on the part of the sentencing judge. If Jones’ acceptance of responsibility was not “full” or “true,” it is hard to see how it could have been deemed “clear.” On the basis of similar reasoning, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir.1992), held that the district court could not grant the defendant a one-level reduction under § 3E1.1 for partial acceptance of responsibility. Instead, where remorse is not clear “the better course under the sentencing guidelines appears to be for the district court to deny the reduction on the theory that in such a close case the defendant has not clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility.” Id. at 156 (emphasis added). That analysis seems reasonable and should apply in this case.
I agree with Chief Judge Mikva that the majority has gone out of its way to find in the record a different case from the one initially decided by the district court (and the original panel) in order to try to avoid a troublesome constitutional conflict. In so doing, however, it has introduced an unsatisfying and inconsistent new criterion into the already over-complicated Guidelines scheme. The Guidelines express in several places and in their overarching policy, an intention that sentencing courts not weigh against a defendant the fact that he has exercised the constitutional right to a trial. This must be as true in establishing the appropriate sentence within the applicable Guidelines range as it is in determining eligibility for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. Other circuits have construed the Guidelines to incorporate this distinction so as to avoid constitutional infirmities. See Sitton, 968 F.2d at 962; Rodriguez, 959 F.2d at 197; Watt, 910 F.2d at 592; see generally United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78, 103 S.Ct. 407, 412, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982) (describing this canon of construction). We should do likewise. Additionally, by requiring “clear” acceptance of responsibility for a reduction, I believe the Guidelines do not envision any further increase in a sentence because the “clear” acceptance was not “full” enough. In sum, the majority’s dependence upon the slippery penalty/benefit distinction in this case — even if it were supportable on this record, and I do not think it was— introduces further confusion and word-play into an already overwhelmed sentencing structure.
I respectfully dissent.

. The district courts have adhered to the rule that pleading guilty does not automatically qualify a defendant for the two-level reduction and conviction at trial does not necessarily preclude it. In 1989, 85% of defendants who pled guilty and 20% of defendants who went to trial received the adjustment, and in 1990, the figures were 90% and 21%, respectively. See llene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.Cal.L.Rev. 501, 531 (1992).

. The 1992 Guidelines commentary to § 6B1.2, concerning plea agreements, also suggests that the Commission intended to cabin consideration of a defendant's decision to plead guilty to the determination whether to grant the discount in the first instance. It states that a "defendant who enters a plea of guilty in a timely manner will enhance the likelihood of his receiving a reduction in offense level under § 3E1.1 ... [but] [further reduction in offense level (or sentence) due to a plea agreement will tend to undermine the sentencing guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 (policy statement); see also United States v. Dukes, 936 F.2d 1281, 1282-83 (D.C.Cir.1991) (Guidelines take into account guilty pleas by § 3E1.1 reduction; therefore, further downward departure because defendant pled guilty not warranted).

. For instance, a sentencing judge is prohibited by law from considering a defendant’s race when establishing the applicable Guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. Therefore, this same factor cannot be weighed, pursuant to § IB 1.4, *1487in determining the precise sentence within the range.

. As previously noted, the commentary to § 3E1.1 provides that the two-level adjustment is not ordinarily "intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.” See § 3E1.1 at Application Note 2. This is not an instruction to the judge to count against a defendant the fact that he elected to go to trial. If it were so intended, it would simply read: "The adjustment is not intended for defendants who elect to go to trial.” Rather, the language of the commentary reflects a recognition that a defendant who proceeds through the trial process will frequently be unable to demonstrate timely or sincere contrition sufficient to meet the standard of clear acceptance of responsibility. The commentary goes on to explain that in some cases a defendant's "pretrial statements and conduct” can provide the necessary evidence of acceptance of responsibility. Id.