Court Opinion

ID: 9643518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:31:52.86832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:52.014873
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, dissenting. The majority holds that felony fleeing is an appropriate felony on which to base a manslaughter conviction. However, the plain language of the felony-fleeing statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125, does not contemplate such a use. For the reasons stated below, I respectfully dissent. According to the manslaughter statute, a person commits the offense of manslaughter if: (4) Acting alone or with one (1) or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit a felony, and in course of and in furtherance of the felony or in the immediate flight therefrom: (A) He or an accomplice causes the death of any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104 (Repl. 1997). In this case, the underlying felony upon which Mr. Fondren’s manslaughter conviction was based was felony fleeing. The statute defining fleeing states in relevant part: (a) If a person knows that his immediate arrest is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of such person to refrain from fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle. (b) Fleeing is a separate offense and shall not be considered a lesser included offense or component offense with relation to the other offenses which may occur simultaneously with the fleeing. (d) (2) Where serious physical injury to any person occurs as a direct result of fleeing by means of any vehicle or conveyance, the offense shall be a Class C Felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (Repl. 1997). Notably, the statute plainly states that fleeing shall not be considered a “component offense with relation to the other offenses which may occur simultaneously with the fleeing.” In the case of felony manslaughter, this means that fleeing cannot be a component offense for the manslaughter charge; in the instant case, however, that is precisely what happened. Instead of addressing the interplay between the manslaughter statute and the felony-fleeing statute, the majority erroneously enters into a sufficiency of the evidence analysis, but the appropriate analysis in this case is one of statutory interpretation. We construe criminal statutes strictly, resolving any doubts in favor of the defendant. Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 101 S.W.3d 235 (2003); Short v. State, 349 Ark. 492, 79 S.W.3d 313 (2002). We construe a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, and if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Harness v. State, supra. In this case, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys the clear and definite meaning that fleeing is not to be considered a component offense with relation to other offenses which may occur simultaneously with the fleeing. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125. Thus, as the death of Officer Walters occurred simultaneously with the fleeing, felony fleeing is not an appropriate felony to support the manslaughter charge. The majority avoids the pivotal issue by noting that the manslaughter statute does not specify which felonies qualify to support a conviction for manslaughter and then holding, “Rather, any felony will support a conviction for manslaughter.” Unfortunately, such a statement does not solve the underlying question at issue. The fact that the manslaughter statute does not preclude the use of felony fleeing as an underlying felony for manslaughter is irrelevant when the fleeing statute itself contains such an exclusion. We have repeatedly held there is no better settled rule in criminal jurisprudence than the rule that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and pursued. Heikkila v. State, 352 Ark. 87, 98 S.W.3d 805 (2003); Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003). The courts cannot, and should not, by construction or intendment, create offenses under statutes which are not in express terms created by the legislature. Heikkila v. State, supra; Smith v. State, supra; Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002). Despite these established tenets of statutory construction, the majority in this case affirms a manslaughter conviction based entirely on a felony specifically excluded by the legislature. I must respectfully dissent. Hannah, C.J., joins this dissent.