Court Opinion

ID: 9729142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:27:19.574691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.593491
License: Public Domain

GARDNER, P. J.
I dissent.
The majority has seen fit to reverse an otherwise error-free murder conviction simply because a trial judge, with vision and intestinal fortitude, faced with the lonely responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, saw fit to avail himself of a truth-finding technique which has not as yet received the formal stamp of approval from the courts of this state. With this decision I cannot agree.
*1003This case represents a classic reflection of an attitude of the courts toward the rules of evidence which I find to be completely out of step with the facts of life as they exist today.
Too much of the law of evidence has its roots in an era when jurors were ignorant peasants and an elite group (the lawyers and judges) carefully hand fed them such information as they (the elite) felt the peasants could safely absorb.1 At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, De Tocqueville observed that lawyers had become, in their eyes at least, a sort of intellectual aristocracy in American society. At the risk of ruffling the feathers of other members of my chosen profession, I would point out that that happy social arrangement no longer exists. It is now the latter portion of the Twentieth Century and while many, and perhaps most, lawyers and judges still cohsider themselves an elite corps, any substantial experience on the trial court level should persuade all but the most barnacle-encrusted traditionalist that the average juror today enjoys a knowledge, an awareness, a sophistication and in many cases an education comparable to or superior to that of law school graduates. It is high time that lawyers and judges accept the fact that the rest of society is entitled to the respect and consideration of equals. The mere possession of an LL.B. or J.D. does not anoint the holder with powers of discernment not vested in ordinary mortals. Today it takes a certain effrontery, a certain intellectual arrogance, a certain intellectual snobbery, to say to a juror, “You cannot hear this evidence because you are not capable of effectively evaluating it.” Because of a lack of appreciation of the stability and integrity of the jury system, too much emphasis is still being put on the danger of prejudicing the jury by the admission of allegedly improper evidence.2 Basically, everything helpful to the truth-finding process should be admissible as relevant evidence with this limitation, that the trial court *1004be afforded a great deal more discretion than it presently enjoys in conducting proceedings in such a way that unnecessarily time consuming and nonproductive evidence be excluded. Thus, the trial court should, in the exercise of its discretion, deny admission to that evidence the probative value of which is outweighed by undue consumption of court time.
Turning to the case at bench, the majority states “to this date, neither the Supreme Court nor any appellate court of this state has admitted into evidence polygraph or truth serum tests for the truth of the matters stated. The rationale for refusing admissibility of such tests is that there has been a lack of scientific certainty about the results.” (People v. Jones, 52 Cal.2d 636, 653 [343 P.2d 577].)
Jones is an interesting case.
In Jones, the defendant offered to repeat his testimony under the influence of truth serum. The court held that counsel had not made a proper offer of proof and made the following holding: “Therefore, even if the results of such a test were admissible, no error was here committed in the absence of a proper offer of proof. [Citation.]”
After this holding the court made the following broad statement: “Moreover, the result of such a test is not admissible in a criminal case. The courts have consistently held that whether the test is a polygraph test, or a sodium amytal or sodium pentothal test, the results aré not such as to be admissible for or against the defendant because of a lack of scientific certainty about the results. (People v. Aragon, 154 Cal.App.2d 646, 658 . . . ; People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal.App.2d 124, 127 . . . ; People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 752 . . . ; People v. Parrella, 158 Cal.App.2d 140, 147 . . . ; People v. Porter, 99 Cal.App.2d 506, 510 . . . ; People v. McNichol, 100 Cal.App.2d 554, 558 . . . ; People v. Cullen, 37 Cal.2d 614, 626 . . . ; Witkin, California Evidence, pp. 371-373, § § 332-335; 39 Cal.L.Rev. 439; 6 Stan.L.Rev. 172; 42 Cal.L.Rev. 880, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 683; 23 A.L.R.2d 1310.) These tests do not scientifically prove the truth or falsity of the answers given during such tests. [Citation.]” (People v. Jones, supra, 52 Cal.2d 636, 653.)
I submit that the above statement qualifies as dictum, the holding having been that there had not been a proper offer of proof. While the stare decisis doctrine requires us to follow the holdings of the Supreme Court, this doctrine does not apply to dictum. We are to accord dictum the weight to which it is entitled as the expression of a majority of the Supreme Court; however, it is not binding on this court. (People v. Gregg, 5 Cal.App.3d 502 [85 Cal.Rptr. 273].)
*1005Wochnick, Aragon, Carter, Parrella and Porter, cited in Jones, are clear holdings that polygraph evidence is inadmissible.3
However, the sainé cannot be said of drug-influenced evidence. I submit that the Supreme Court has made no such firm ruling in this field.
In McNichol, the defendant, who claimed to have been drinking to the extent that he had no recollection of passing certain fictitious checks on which his conviction was based, attempted to introduce into evidence statements he made while under the influence of sodium pentothal. The offer was made on three grounds with the following rulings: (1) Past recollections recorded. The court declared that this was an improper ground since the defendant had no recollections to record. (2) To show the facts upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion (that the defendant had been drinking and had no intent to defraud). The court held that a showing of the facts themselves was not a necessary part of the psychiatrist’s opinion. (3) To be allowed as a matter of defense although otherwise inadmissible. In this respect the court held that the statements would be hearsay and self-serving declarations. Thus, McNichol hardly stands for a blanket repudiation of the use of drug-influenced testimony.
In Cullen, the defendant asked the court to appoint a psychiatrist to examine him under the influence of sodium pentothal and offered proof as to the reliability of the result. The court held “[i]t is questionable whether the results of such an examination would be admissible in evidence [citing McNichol. And the offer of proof indicated that the statements to be produced would be hearsay, self-serving and conjectural since the truth thereof would depend entirely on the psychiatrist’s opinion which conceivably might conflict with. the opinion of another psychiatrist.” (Italics supplied.)
Thus, it would appear that the two authorities cited in the blanket statement of disapproval of drug influenced testimony by the court in Jones hardly afford support for that statement.
In another People v. Jones, 42 Cal.2d 219 [266 P.2d 38], the court held it to be error to deny admission of the testimony of a psychiatrist *1006that a person charged with Penal Code section 288a, was not a sexual psychopath which opinion was based on a so-called truth serum interview. The court said at page 225, “[ajlthough, as the attorney general properly points out, it is questionable whether the results of examinations made while a person is subject to the ‘truth drugs’ are admissible in evidence [citing McCracken, below, and Cullen, above] that conclusion is correct only if the statements are offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted [citing McCracken and Cullen to the effect that the evidence would be self-serving hearsay].” (Italics supplied.)
In People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336 [246 P.2d 913], the defendant complained of the trial court’s refusal to permit that he be subjected to “truth drugs” while on the witness stand. The court held “[i]t is questionable [that word again] whether the results of such examination would-have been admissible in evidence [citing Cullen]. But even if they were admissible, the procedure would be discretionary with the trial court, and it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion.” (Italics supplied.)
In People v. Cartier, 51 Cal.2d 590 [335 P.2d 114], the court held it was error to deny admission to the opinion of a doctor as to the defendant’s sanity when an examination had been made while the defendant was under the influence of sodium pentothal.
Thus, I find that it is abundantly clear that while the Supreme Court has stated that the admission of drug-influenced evidence is questionable, there has as yet been no clear cut adjudication of the admissibility of this type of evidence. In Jones [52 Cal.2d 636], the picture was blurred by reason of the failure of counsel to establish the proper foundation. In McNichol and Cullen, a basis for the rejection of the testimony was that it would be hearsay and self-serving. (In the instant case, the latter objection is not valid since the statements are being received as admissions and, therefore, constitute an exception to the hearsay rule.) In Jones [42 Cal.2d 219] and McCracken, the court merely observed that the admission of such evidence was questionable. Thus, all the Supreme Court has said is that it is questionable that the results of such an examination are admissible. In other words, while we are not writing on a completely clean slate, we are not, I submit, bound by a direct holding of the Supreme Court that such evidence is inadmissible. I would prefer to allow the admission of this evidence in this case. In view of the present state of the law, I feel no compulsion for supine acquiescence to the dictum of the 52 Cal.2d Jones.
The objection of the majority to the admission of this evidence is twofold:
*1007(1) That the evidence- was admitted for the truth of the matters stated therein.
Strangely enough we allow a psychiatrist, a member of that most inexact , of the sciences, to testify that from the results of such a test a defendant does not have a certain state of mind essential to the crime (the 42 Cal.2d Jones) yet deny the trier of fact the opportunity to actually see and hear the evidence upon which the psychiatrist comes to this rather extraordinary conclusion. Basically, the objection to polygraph, drug-influenced, or hypnotically induced evidence is based on the fact that the polygraph operator, the psychiatrist or the hypnotist is attempting to substitute his opinion for that of the jury as to the truth or falsity of the witness’ testimony. I will concede the validity of this concept but for the life of me I cannot find any validity to a ruling by which the trier of fact may not be exposed to a video tape of what the witness actually stated when that video tape is offered for the truth of the matters contained therein when, as in this case, the basic hearsay problem does not exist. Had I my “druthers,” I would “druther” allow the trier of fact to evaluate the video tape testimony itself—for the truth of the matters stated therein—than accept the conclusion of the expert as to the results of this examination.
(2) There was no evidence of the reliability of such tests.
In this holding the majority violates the basic rule of appellate review and accepts the testimony of the defense experts and entirely ignores the testimony of Dr. Lindauer who testified as to the effect of sodium amytal. Dr. Lindauer testified that it has a tendency in some people to break down certain repressive inhibiting functions of the subconscious mind and under its influence some people are more inclined to tell the truth than without the benefit of the drug. However, it was rrlade clear that in some cases this result does not occur. It all depends on the individual. With this as a background, I would have no hesitancy in admitting the evidence. I cannot agree with the statement of the majority that Dr. Lindauer “cannot reasonably be considered an expert in truth serum interviews.” I liked his testimony. He has not tried to oversell his product. The majority apparently desires an expert to say that a witness under sodium amytal will tell the truth. That kind of expert, I don’t want.
I think I should attempt to make clear that I am distinguishing the instant situation from one in which it is necessary that there be proof not only that tests are scientifically reliable but that the technique has received general acceptance in the scientific community. I authored an opinion recently (Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.3d 778 [106 Cal. Rptr. 547]) in which the results of spectographic analysis of the human *1008voice—voiceprints—were held to be admissible. I will not attempt to repeat that overlong analysis of the applicable law as set forth in that case to this already seemingly interminable dissent. I would merely suggest that we are dealing with an entirely different situation in the instant case. Had Dr. Lindauer testified that, in his opinion, the defendant was telling the truth during his interview the good doctor would not only be usurping the function of the jury but the record would be sadly lacking in substantial evidence of the scientific reliability of the technique or its acceptance in the scientific community. However, the doctor merely testified as to the probable or perhaps possible results of the use of sodium amytal that, in layman’s language, it dulled the inhibitory nerve. The trier of fact by seeing and hearing the video tape was able to draw its own conclusion as to the ultimate fact, i.e., the truth or falsity of the statement made. This is a far cry from a situation such as that in the above mentioned voiceprint case where, without interpretation by the expert, the spectograph would be nothing but a meaningless jumble to the jury.
Here, there was a lengthy, painstaking, meticulous and fair investigation by the authorities. At one stage, Officer Oxandaboure told the defendant, “We don’t want a false confession.” The defendant himself wanted help in finding the truth. He said, “He wanted to find out the truth about himself and then he said that he would ask for hypnosis or a pentothal interview that very day.” At the interview not only voluntarily taken but sought by the defendant, his memory became clearer until he finally remembered what happened on the night of the crime. The trial court found that the statements were voluntarily made and the defendant was not under the influence of sodium amytal to the point that it affected his ability to make free decisions about whether to answer questions put to him by the interrogator. Tire court concluded, based on a reasonable doubt standard, that the statements were, voluntary. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. Unhappily, the majority has seen fit to usurp the function of the trial judge in now finding that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the drug-influenced statements were voluntary and admissible.
A final statement of the majority is that the use of a confession obtained while a criminal defendant is in such an artificially suggestive state that his free will is overborne amounts to a denial of due process. This is true—if the evidence is that the defendant’s free will is overborne. However, this holding, if that is what it is, runs contrary to the ruling of the trial judge, supported by substantial evidence that the defendant’s free will was not overborne. I would merely observe that there is a ple*1009thora of authority to the effect that admissions or confessions are not necessarily involuntary because the defendant is under the influence of alcohol or drugs (see People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869]; People v. Matteson, 61 Cal.2d 466 [39 Cal.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161]; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576 [6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 1418]; People v. Wright, 273 Cal.App.2d 325 [78 Cal.Rptr. 75]; People v. Dacy, 5 Cal.App.3d 216 [85 Cal.Rptr. 57]; People v. McPherson, 2 Cal.3d 109 [84 Cal.Rptr. 129, 465 P.2d 17]; People v. Lyons, 18 Cal.App.3d 760 [96 Cal.Rptr. 76]), and I fail to find a valid distinction between a statement made when a defendant has self-ingested alcohol or drugs and a statement by a defendant who has requested the use of drugs for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and a prosecution witness administers the drug.
Putting a judicial stamp of disapproval on all drug-influenced testimony contributes little to the judicial process. I would prefer to leave more discretion in the trial court. If the process tends to become a circus, he can cut it off.
In the instant case, I would not reverse simply because a trial judge availed himself of a somewhat novel tool in his effort to ascertain the truth. While this court, as a court of intermediate jurisdiction, can do little to change some of the hoary and outmoded rules of evidence, we should, when a trial judge with vision and courage attempts to open new vistas in the ever-continuing search for the truth, support that effort.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 1973. Gardner, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petitions of the appellant and the respondent for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied August 16, 1973.

recognize that this was a nonjury trial. However, our rules of evidence are basically built around the jury system and I shall discuss this matter as though it had been a jury trial. There is probably some way to weasel out a nonprejudicial error concept in this case because the case was tried by a court and not by a jury. However, I do not choose to avail myself of such an opportunity. Knowing Judge Murray, I am sure he would have made the same ruling on admissibility of this evidence had this case been tried before a jury. I would have—and have. When on the trial bench, I admitted a video tape of an interview with a defendant under hypnosis. Unhappily, even though there was a conviction and an appeal, this issue was not presented on appeal since the defendant presented the evidence.

That same fear of prejudicing the jury is the basis for some of the rather unrealistic rules now being promulgated in the field of prejudicial pretrial publicity. This is not the time or place to become embroiled in the continuing free pyess-fair trial controversy. I will, for the moment at least, let the press carry on their side of this battle. I merely suggest that a true appreciation of the modern day jury would make clear that many of the current rules in this field are completely unnecessary.

While the excuse for judicial activism as opposed to judicial restraint has been that when the Legislature fails to act, a vacuum exists, and the courts must step in, strangely enough in the field of polygraph testing the reverse is apparently about to take place. The judicial attitude toward the polygraph test was stated quite clearly by Senator Ervin recently in the Watergate hearings when he referred to the polygraph as “Twentieth Century witchcraft.” Yet, as this is being written, the Legislature is apparently in the process of acting in the field. Senate Bill 119 permitting limited admissibility of polygraph testing results has passed the Senate and is now pending in the Assembly.