Court Opinion

ID: 9797789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:29:29.126805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:39.485283
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Justice,
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
[¶ 47] The majority holds that the statutory scheme at issue in this case presents no constitutional problems. I cannot agree and must therefore respectfully dissent. I would hold that the ability to charge a person for the exact same conduct under two different statutes with two vastly different punishments violates equal protection as afforded by both the Wyoming Constitution and the United States Constitution.
[¶ 48] Generally, equal protection is thought to prevent the government from making classifications in the law based on impermissible standards. Yet, equal protection also forbids the arbitrary application of the law. For instance, selective enforcement based on unjustifiable standards such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification is prohibited by equal protection. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). We have said: “Equal protection ‘mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.’ ” Allhusen v. State, by and through Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Small v. State, 689, P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo.1984)). The statutes at issue in this case make no improper classification on their face. Rather, the danger in this instance is the possible arbitrary or capricious application of the statutes.
[¶ 49] The Wyoming Constitution provides: “In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal.” Art. 1, § 2. The Wyoming Constitution further provides that: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” Art. 1, § 34. These two provisions combine to afford citizens equal protection under the law. “Equal protection guarantees that similar people will be dealt with similarly and that people in different circumstances will not be treated as though they were similar.” Bell v. State, 693 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo.1985) (citing Nowak, Rotunda and Young, Constitutional Law (2nd ed.1983), p. 587). We have declared: “Equal protection in Wyoming requires a law to operate alike upon all persons or property under the same circumstances and conditions.” WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo.1998) (citing Ludwig v. Harston, 65 Wyo. 134, 197 P.2d 252, 257 (1948)).
[¶ 50] We have stated on numerous occasions “the Wyoming Constitution offers more robust protection against legal discrimination than the federal constitution.” Allhusen, 898 P.2d at 884 (citing Wilson v. State ex rel. Office of Hearing Examiner, 841 P.2d 90 (Wyo.1992); Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo.1992); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler; 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980), cert, denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo.1978)). Yet, the majority declines to discuss Johnson’s argument in this regard, dismissing the idea of greater protection afforded by the Wyoming Constitution. The statutory scheme at issue in this case permits unequal treatment for people whose conduct is identical. In the face of our long tradition claiming the Wyoming Constitution provides more protection than the federal constitution and the real possibility of the law operating differently on similarly situated people, I think Johnson’s argument to have merit.
[¶ 51] Nevertheless, I need not make the determination that the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution in this area either. For even if it does, the Batchelder case relied *1253upon by the majority is distinguishable from the case at hand. I therefore cannot agree with the majority’s statement “the issues Johnson raises in this regard have been decided against him by the United States Supreme Court on the basis of his federal constitutional claims.” ¶33. As noted by the discussion of LaFave, Israel, and King quoted by the majority, three groups of duplica-tive statutes exist. ¶ 30. This case is akin to the third group, where the statutes are identical. As such “there is nothing at all rational about this kind of statutory scheme, as it provides for different penalties without any effort whatsoever to explain a basis for the difference.” 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 13.7(a), 96 (1999 and Supp.2002).
[¶ 52] The elements of first degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of child abuse and the elements of felony child abuse involving the death of a child are identical. The duplication .of these two crimes occurs in part because the felony murder statute necessitates the use of the child abuse statute to define “abuse of a child.” Therefore, both crimes require the intentional or reckless killing of a child under the age of sixteen by an adult or person six years older than the child.1 The only difference between the two crimes is the punishment.
[¶ 53] To further illustrate this point, I consider what proof would be required under each statute for Johnson’s conduct. If the prosecutor wanted to charge child abuse in this instance, he would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Daniel Johnson is an adult and that he inténtionally or recklessly inflicted upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) years physical injury, in this ease death. If the prosecutor wanted to charge felony murder in this instance, he would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Daniel Johnson killed a child while perpetrating child abuse on a child under the age of sixteen. The elements of child abuse here would require proof that Johnson intentionally or recklessly inflicted upon a child under 16 years of age physical injury, in this case death. The statutes are identical in the sense that they punish the exact same conduct with no differing elements of proof. Obviously, the statutes include other instances of conduct that are prohibited; but, as applied to child abuse that results in death, they are identical. At least one commentator has opined that the United States Supreme Court would declare a statutory scheme unconstitutional if confronted with identical statutes but differing punishments. See, Martin H. Tish, Comment, Duplicative Statutes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Illinois Armed Violence Statute, 71 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 226, 236 (1980). Other Jurisdictions have drawn such distinctions. See, People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo.1981); State v. Modica, 58 Haw. 249, 567 P.2d 420 (1977); Incorporated County of Los Alamos v. Montoya, 108 N.M. 361, 772 P.2d 891 (App.1989) (reaffirming State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966)); State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ¶¶ 46-48, 52 P.3d 1194, ¶¶ 46-48 (Utah 2002) (explaining State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) and its progeny).
[¶-54] Moreover, with overlapping statutes as opposed to identical statutes, the statutes themselves frequently focus on different types of conduct, thereby giving the prosecutor some idea as to which statute he should proceed under. See, LaFave, at 97. The statutory scheme before us presents no such guidance. Under both statutes, causing the death of a child from child abuse is the conduct the State is seeking to punish. No extra proof is required for one crime over the other, nor is there any indication of factors to consider in making the charging decision. With this complete lack of guidance, it ap*1254pears that the prosecutor’s charging decision is completely arbitrary. For example, two persons, conducting themselves identically, each shake a baby resulting in the death of the child. The statutes authorize one person to be exposed to a possible sentence of death and the other to be exposed to a sentence of no more than five .years. Such obvious unequal treatment of persons identically situated clearly violates the guarantee of equal protection.
[¶ 55] Under this scheme, the prosecutor could randomly discriminate against persons simply because of the group they belong to, or because he dislikes them, or because he is simply having a bad day. The statutory scheme “furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’ ” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1860, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 911 (1983) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170, 92 S.Ct. 839, 847-48, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972)). If the prosecutor pursues a harsher penalty against those persons he does not like, his action brings about selective enforcement based on an arbitrary classification (i.e. the prosecutor’s dislike). Such arbitrary action has long been prohibited by the federal constitution. See, Tish at 232; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
[¶ 56] Batchelder is distinguishable on yet another ground. In Batchelder, the disparity between the punishments under the two overlapping statutes was small. LaFave, Israel, and King explain this issue as follows:
In response to the Court of Appeals’ objection that the prosecutor was given unfettered discretion in “selection of which two penalties to apply,” the Supreme Court answered that the government had not been allowed “to predetermine ultimate criminal sanctions” but instead had simply enabled “the sentencing judge to impose a longer prison sentence.” That is, the prosecutor’s choice of the statute which allowed imprisonment “not more than five years” rather than the one providing for imprisonment “not more than two years” had simply added to the judge’s sentencing dis- ■ cretion. But what if, for example, one statute permitted imprisonment up to ten years and the other made ten years the mandatory minimum? It has been forcefully argued that in such a case, where the prosecutor actually “makes a sentencing decision, without either sentencing information or expertise in sentencing,” this “sentencing aspect of the prosecutor’s choice distinguishes the prior cases and is the strongest support for the equal protection argument.”
LaFave, at 97-98 (footnote omitted). This case presents precisely the problem the professors envision.- Under the statutory scheme in Batchelder, the possibility existed that the same or very similar punishments would be levied regardless of the charging statute. Here, the enormous difference between punishments leaves no possibility of the same or even similar punishment. Disparity such as this smacks of an equal protection violation.
[¶ 57] I would lastly mention one other area in which Batchelder is distinguishable. In Batchelder, the Supreme Court heavily relied on legislative intent divined from legislative history. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 119-21, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2201-02, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). There, it was clear that “Congress intended to enact two independent gun control statutes, each fully enforceable on its own terms.” 442 U.S. at 119, 99 S.Ct at 2202. We do not have any such legislative history in this case to indicate the legislature’s intent. Instead, what we do have is the legislature later amending the statutes to remove the offending portion.2 Such action indicates to me that the legislature recognized its error and the problems it *1255would cause and corrected the error.3
[¶ 58] Thus, differences between Batchel-der and the case at hand render that decision distinguishable on several levels. Considering the significant differences indicated above, I find the majority’s reliance on Bat-chelder misplaced.

. The statute in effect when Johnson was charged made no distinction between "a person responsible for a child’s welfare” and "a person who is not responsible for a child's welfare.” The statute has been subsequently amended and now contains such a distinction. Compare Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 (Michie 1988 and Supp. 1995) with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 (LexisNex-is 2001 and Supp.2002). Thus, while Johnson was the victim’s father and would presumably meet the definition of "a person responsible for a child’s welfare”, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-3-202(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001 and Supp.2002), the statute in effect at that time required only that the child be under the age of sixteen (16) regardless of the "actor." The later amendment utilizes a standard of eighteen (18) for "a person responsible for a child's welfare.”

. The 2002 amendment to the definition of "physical injury” as found in Wyo: Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B), removed the word "death" and added additional language regarding skin bruising. See, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202 (Lex-isNexis 2001 and Supp.2002); ¶¶ 23-24. By removing the word "death” from the definition of "physical injury” the legislature eliminated the very problem at issue in this case. The duplica-tive statutes seen in this case no longer exist.

. Because providing two vastly different penalties for the exact same conduct makes no sense, I can only conclude that the duplication at issue in this case is error. Surely, if the legislature had given any thought to the overlap, it would have drafted the statutes to avoid duplication. La-Fave, Israel, and King suggest that duplicative statutes such as these are the consequence of legislative carelessness. LaFave at 96. I agree, "and even if it is not such a scheme serves no legitimate purpose. There is nothing at all rational about this kind of statutory scheme, as it provides for different penalties without any effort whatsoever to explain the basis for the difference ” Id.