Court Opinion

ID: 9918378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 19:02:54.365144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:05.269126
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
            precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2024 IL App (3d) 230184-U

                                 Order filed January 12, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2024

      In re Marriage of:                     )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                             )     of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
      THEODORE JANUSZEWSKI,                  )     Will County, Illinois.
                                             )
            Petitioner-Appellee,             )     Appeal No. 3-23-0184
                                             )     Circuit No. 15-D-1303
            v.                               )
                                             )     The Honorable
      COLLEEN JANUSZEWSKI,                   )     David Garcia,
                                             )     Judge, presiding.
            Respondent-Appellant.            )
                                             )
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court’s order is reversed and remanded, where the parties’ marital
                  settlement agreement precluded the modification of permanent maintenance.

¶2          This case arises from dissolution of marriage proceedings between petitioner-appellee,

     Theodore Januszewski, and respondent-appellant, Colleen Januszewski. Pursuant to a 2016

     dissolution judgment, which incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement, petitioner

     was ordered to pay respondent a monthly amount for permanent maintenance.
¶3          In 2023, petitioner filed a motion to modify or terminate his maintenance obligations, and

     respondent subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that petitioner’s

     maintenance obligations are nonmodifiable pursuant to the marital settlement agreement. The

     circuit court denied respondent’s complaint for declaratory judgment and certified the denial for

     interlocutory appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶4                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶5          The parties were married on May 10, 1981, and had four children during the marriage.

     On December 29, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court

     of the Twelfth Judicial District, Will County. Respondent later filed a counter-petition for

     dissolution of marriage.

¶6          On September 20, 2016, the circuit court entered a dissolution judgment that incorporated

     a marital settlement agreement (“Agreement”) that the parties executed on that same date. The

     Agreement provides as follows, in pertinent part:

                                                  “ARTICLE II
                                                 MAINTENANCE

                                                         *****

                    2.3     HUSBAND shall pay to WIFE pursuant to statutory

                    guidelines as and for permanent maintenance, the fixed sum of

                    $2,742 (twenty seven hundred forty two dollars) per month,

                    commencing on the day of his vacation of the marital residence.

                                                         *****

                                                 ARTICLE X
                                             NON-MODIFIABILITY

                                                      2
                         10.1   HUSBAND and WIFE agree that this Agreement shall not

                         be changed, modified or altered by any order of any Court after

                         this Agreement has been incorporated into a Judgment for

                         Dissolution of Marriage, or after it has become effective by the

                         entry of any Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage.

                                                           *****

                                                    ARTICLE XI
                                                GENERAL PROVISIONS

                                                           *****

                         11.10 Except as provided herein, no provision of this Agreement

                         shall be amended or modified unless by agreement in writing duly

                         subscribed and acknowledged with the same formality as this

                         Agreement.”

¶7            On January 20, 2023, petitioner filed a motion to modify or terminate his maintenance

       obligations, on the basis that he anticipated retiring from his full-time employment on February

       3, 2023. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting therein

       that the circuit court deny petitioner’s motion to modify or terminate his maintenance

       obligations.

¶8            On April 25, 2023, the circuit court entered an order denying respondent’s complaint for

       declaratory relief and certifying the denial for interlocutory appeal. Respondent now appeals

       from the order.

¶9                                                 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10          Respondent argues that the circuit court erred by denying her complaint for declaratory

       judgment that petitioner’s maintenance obligations cannot be modified or terminated. In

                                                          3
       declaratory judgment actions, standing is a preliminary question that must be considered at the

       outset. Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 438 n. 1 (2002). Consequently, although petitioner does

       not challenge respondent’s standing to obtain declaratory relief, we will nevertheless begin by

       analyzing the issue. See AIDA v. Time Warner Ent., 332 Ill. App. 3d 154, 158–59 (2002)

       (addressing the issue of standing, despite the defendant’s failure to assert lack of standing as an

       affirmative defense in its earlier motion to dismiss).

¶ 11          “The essential requirements of a declaratory judgment action are: (1) a plaintiff with a

       legal tangible interest; (2) a defendant having an opposing interest; and (3) an actual controversy

       between the parties concerning such interests.” Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 372 (2003).

       There exists an “actual controversy” between the parties when the underlying facts and issues of

       the case are not moot or premature, but rather give rise to “a concrete dispute admitting of an

       immediate and definitive determination of the parties’ rights, the resolution of which will aid in

       the termination of the controversy or some part thereof.” Underground Contractors Ass’n v. City

       of Chi., 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1977).

¶ 12          Relevant to the first two requirements for standing, section 2.3 of the Agreement

       obligates petitioner to pay respondent permanent maintenance. Thus, respondent has a legal

       tangible interest in receiving maintenance, and petitioner has an opposing interest regarding his

       obligation to pay said maintenance. As to the third requirement for standing, in his January 20,

       2023, motion, petitioner seeks to modify or terminate his maintenance obligations to respondent,

       and respondent opposes the motion on the basis that the terms of the Agreement render

       petitioner’s maintenance obligations nonmodifiable. Because respondent opposes petitioner’s

       January 20, 2023, motion, there is an actual controversy between the parties concerning their

       respective interests and respondent has standing to obtain declaratory relief.

                                                         4
¶ 13          Respondent’s standing having been determined, the next issue is whether she is correct

       that the terms of the Agreement render petitioner’s maintenance obligations nonmodifiable. It is

       axiomatic that Illinois law favors the amicable settlement of property rights in cases of marital

       dissolution. In re Marriage of Haller, 2012 IL App (5th) 110478, ¶ 44. A marital settlement

       agreement is in the nature of a contract, and as such, its interpretation is governed by the

       ordinary rules of contract construction. See City of Chi. Heights v. Crotty, 287 Ill. App. 3d 883,

       885 (1997) (“A settlement agreement is in the nature of a contract, and construction of such

       agreements are governed by the principles of contract law.”); Haisma v. Edgar, 218 Ill. App. 3d

       78, 87 (1991) (“A settlement agreement is considered a contract, and construction and

       enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of contract law.”).

¶ 14          Under the rules of contract construction, the primary objective in interpreting a contract is

       to give effect to the parties’ intent, which is to be ascertained from the contract’s language.

       Bankier v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Champaign, 225 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869 (1992). If

       the words in a contract are clear and unambiguous, then they must be given their plain and

       ordinary meaning. Thompson v. Gordon, 241 Ill. 2d 428, 441 (2011). However, if the language

       of the contract is susceptible to more than one meaning, then it is ambiguous, and a court may

       consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Lease Management Equipment Corp.

       v. DFO Partnership, 392 Ill. App. 3d 678, 685 (2009).

¶ 15          A contract must be interpreted as a whole, so as to give meaning and effect to each of its

       provisions. Camelot, Inc. v. Burke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., 2021 IL App (2d) 200208, ¶ 48. The

       burden is upon the party asserting a marital settlement agreement to prove its existence by clear

       and convincing evidence, and such an agreement is binding, absent a finding of

       unconscionability. In re Marriage of Stoker, 2021 IL App (5th) 200301, ¶ 46–47. “The

                                                         5
       interpretation of a marital settlement agreement is reviewed de novo as a question of law.” Blum

       v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 33 (2009).

¶ 16          Respondent argues that petitioner’s maintenance obligations cannot be modified or

       terminated because such would contravene the express language of their Agreement. Relevant to

       respondent’s argument, section 2.3 of the Agreement obligates petitioner to pay respondent

       $2,742 per month in “permanent maintenance.” Separately, section 10.1 of the Agreement states

       that the parties “agree that [the] Agreement shall not be changed, modified or altered by any

       order of any Court after [the] Agreement has been incorporated into a Judgment for Dissolution

       of Marriage, or after it has become effective by the entry of any Judgment for Dissolution of

       Marriage.” Section 11.10 of the Agreement further states that “no provision of [the] Agreement

       shall be amended or modified unless by agreement in writing duly subscribed and acknowledged

       with the same formality as [the] Agreement.”

¶ 17          Respondent argues that the provisions of sections 10.1 and 11.10 are applicable to the

       terms of the entire Agreement and prohibit any such terms from being modified. Disagreeing,

       petitioner argues that a reading of the entire Agreement instead shows that the nonmodifiability

       provisions of sections 10.1 and 11.10 do not apply to provisions regarding permanent

       maintenance.

¶ 18          Petitioner points to section 4.1 of the Agreement to illustrate his argument. Section 4.1 of

       the Agreement requires petitioner to maintain his current life insurance policy through his

       employer and to list respondent as an irrevocable beneficiary of a death benefit, “for as long as

       he is employed and has a duty to provide maintenance.” This section also indicates that the court

       reserves jurisdiction on the issue, in the event that petitioner loses his employment or insurance

       coverage. Petitioner argues that such language shows that the parties intended for him to pay

                                                        6
       permanent maintenance for only as long as he was employed, and that to find otherwise would

       vitiate the meaning of the provisions of section 4.1.

¶ 19          Petitioner does not explain exactly how he believes that the language in section 4.1

       indicates that his maintenance obligations are contingent upon his continued employment.

       Additionally, because section 4.1 solely refers to petitioner’s life insurance obligations, and not

       to his maintenance obligations, we find that the language therein does not give rise to his

       proposed reading.

¶ 20          Moreover, a finding that petitioner must continue paying respondent permanent

       maintenance after he retires is consistent with the provisions of section 4.1 and does not vitiate

       them as petitioner suggests. This is because section 4.1 states that two separate conditions must

       end before petitioner’s life insurance obligations may terminate: (1) his employment, and (2) his

       maintenance obligations. As follows, if petitioner’s employment were to end, yet his

       maintenance obligations to persist, then section 4.1 would still be given effect, so long as

       petitioner was required to continue to fulfill his life insurance obligations. Conversely, if

       petitioner’s employment ending were, alone, sufficient to end his maintenance obligations, as he

       suggests, then there would be no need for section 4.1 to list both conditions, as one would be

       superfluous of the other, rendering meaningless the inclusion of one in light of the other. For

       these combined reasons, we reject petitioner’s argument that his maintenance obligations are

       modifiable due to the existence of section 4.1.

¶ 21          Next, petitioner argues that his maintenance obligations are modifiable because his

       retirement constitutes a substantial change in circumstances, as contemplated under section

       502(f) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (“Act”) and, in the Agreement,

       the parties never clearly expressed an intent to make petitioner’s maintenance obligations

                                                         7
       nonmodifiable. Relevant to petitioner’s argument, section 502(f) of the Act provides as follows,

       in pertinent part:

                       “The parties may provide that maintenance is non-modifiable in

                       amount, duration, or both. If the parties do not provide that

                       maintenance is non-modifiable in amount, duration, or both, then

                       those terms are modifiable upon a substantial change of

                       circumstances. . . . The judgment may expressly preclude or limit

                       modification of other terms set forth in the judgment if the

                       agreement so provides.”

       750 ILCS 5/502(f) (West 2016).

¶ 22           Collectively, sections 10.1 and 11.10 of the Agreement prohibit the Agreement from

       being modified after it has been incorporated into, or been made effective by, a dissolution

       judgment, and unless done so by written agreement. However, the parties dispute whether these

       provisions clearly express their intent to make petitioner’s maintenance obligations

       nonmodifiable. Petitioner argues that the provisions do not clearly express such an intent, and

       that the only way that the parties could have clearly expressed said intent is by including a

       provision in section 2.3 that specifically prohibits modification of permanent maintenance, which

       they did not.

¶ 23           The parties cite to In re Marriage of Schweitzer, 289 Ill. App. 3d 425 (1997) and In re

       Marriage of Scarp, 2022 IL App (1st) 210711, to support their respective positions. In

       Schweitzer, the parties executed a marriage settlement agreement, later incorporated into a

       dissolution judgment, that directed the husband to pay the wife a monthly amount for her support

       and maintenance. 289 Ill. App. 3d at 426. The settlement agreement also provided that the

                                                         8
       husband’s maintenance payment would “not terminate upon the occurrence of any of the

       statutory events for the termination of maintenance, except for the death of either party,” and that

       the settlement agreement was nonmodifiable. Id. at 427. After the dissolution judgment was

       entered, the husband filed a petition to modify the judgment, asking that his maintenance

       obligations be reduced due to a material change in circumstances. Id. Namely, the husband

       alleged that he would be losing approximately $20,000 per year in income, and that the wife was

       preparing to sell property, which would provide her additional income. Id.

¶ 24          The circuit court dismissed the husband’s petition, ruling that his maintenance obligations

       were nonmodifiable. Id. On appeal, the appellate court explained that “parties may agree that

       maintenance shall not be modified or terminated except upon certain specified conditions,” and

       that, “[w]hen the parties so agree, maintenance may be modified or terminated only under the

       circumstances specified in the agreement.” Id. at 428. The appellate court also explained that the

       parties’ intent to limit or preclude modification of maintenance obligations must be clearly

       manifested in the settlement agreement. Id.

¶ 25          Analyzing the case before it, the appellate court then found that, by agreeing that the

       entire settlement agreement was nonmodifiable, the parties clearly expressed their intent that the

       maintenance provisions were likewise nonmodifiable. Id. at 429. The appellate court ultimately

       concluded that the settlement agreement precluded the husband’s maintenance obligations from

       being modified, and affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the husband’s petition. Id.

¶ 26          Similarly, in Scarp, the circuit court entered a dissolution judgment that incorporated a

       marital settlement agreement between the parties. Scarp, 2022 IL App (1st) 210711 ¶ 3. The

       settlement agreement provided for the husband to pay the wife a monthly amount in

       maintenance, for 163 months following entry of the dissolution judgment, or until the wife

                                                        9
       remarried, she cohabitated for more than 6 months, or the death of either party. Id. The

       settlement agreement also stated that it could not be changed, altered, or modified after it had

       been incorporated into, or made effective by, a dissolution judgment, except by the parties’

       mutual assent and via a signed written agreement. Id.

¶ 27          After the circuit court entered the dissolution judgment, the husband filed a petition, later

       amended, to modify or terminate his maintenance obligations, on the basis that the wife had

       earned more money than he had during one year and had increased her overall earnings during

       two other years. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. The circuit court denied the husband’s request to modify or terminate

       his maintenance obligations, finding that the settlement agreement rendered those obligations

       nonmodifiable. Id. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s denial, similarly finding that

       the provision in the parties’ settlement agreement that the agreement could not be changed,

       altered, or modified except by the parties’ mutual assent clearly indicated an intent to make the

       husband’s maintenance obligations nonmodifiable. Id. ¶¶ 15, 25.

¶ 28          Like the marital settlement agreements in Schweitzer and Scarp, the parties’ Agreement

       in this case contains provisions requiring petitioner to pay respondent a monthly amount in

       maintenance, and prohibiting the Agreement from being modified after it has been incorporated

       into, or made effective by, a dissolution judgment, and unless by written agreement. Thus, we

       find that, by stating in sections 10.1 and 11.10 that the Agreement was nonmodifiable, the parties

       clearly demonstrated their intent to make petitioner’s maintenance obligations likewise

       nonmodifiable under section 2.3.

¶ 29          However, petitioner asserts that, if his maintenance obligations are deemed

       nonmodifiable, then after he retires, he will have to continue paying respondent maintenance

       from his pension, even though, pursuant to section 5.1(d) of the Agreement, she would also then

                                                       10
       be receiving half the value of his employment and retirement accounts. Petitioner argues that

       respondent’s ability to recover both maintenance and half the value of his employment and

       retirement accounts renders the Agreement unconscionable.

¶ 30          Although a settlement agreement is not ordinarily subject to appellate review because it is

       considered a recording of the parties’ agreement, rather than a judicial determination of the

       parties’ rights, a settlement agreement can be set aside if it is shown to be unconscionable. In re

       Marriage of Baecker, 2012 IL App (3d) 110660, ¶ 25. “A marriage settlement is unconscionable

       if there is ‘an absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with

       contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.’” In re Marriage of

       Bielawski, 328 Ill. App. 3d 243, 251 (2002). In determining whether a settlement agreement is

       unconscionable, we must consider the following two factors: (1) the conditions under which the

       agreement was made, and (2) the economic status of each party that results from the agreement.

       In re Marriage of Hamm-Smith, 261 Ill. App. 3d 209, 219 (1994). To rise to the level of being

       unconscionable, a marital settlement agreement “must be improvident, totally one-sided[,] or

       oppressive.” In re Marriage of Labuz, 2016 IL App (3d) 140990, ¶ 51.

¶ 31          Related to the first unconscionability factor, petitioner does not allege that any conditions

       under which the Agreement was made warrant the settlement being set aside. Nor, from our

       review of the record, are we aware of any such conditions. This case involves the dissolution of a

       34-year marriage, and the parties presumably considered their history and the equities of their

       respective situations in reaching the terms of the Agreement. Additionally, both were represented

       by counsel and had access to legal advice throughout the process of preparing the Agreement,

       and there is nothing tending to show that petitioner did not know or intend any terms of the

       Agreement at the time it was made.

                                                        11
¶ 32          As to the second factor, while petitioner asserts that a finding that his maintenance

       obligations are nonmodifiable would permit respondent to receive a monthly maintenance

       payment in addition to half of his employment and retirement accounts, courts have repeatedly

       explained that the mere fact that a settlement agreement favors one party over another does not,

       alone, render it unconscionable. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gorman, 284 Ill. App. 3d 171, 181

       (1996) (“‘[T]hat an agreement merely favors one party over another does not make it

       unconscionable.’ [Citation.]”); In re Marriage of Gibson-Terry and Terry, 325 Ill. App. 3d 317,

       325 (2001).

¶ 33          Additionally, although, under section 5.1(d) of the Agreement, respondent may recover

       half of petitioner’s employment and retirement accounts, petitioner himself is still entitled to

       receive the remaining half. Pursuant to section 5.1 of the Agreement, petitioner is also entitled to

       receive one of the parties’ two automobiles and half of the value of the parties’ banking and

       investment accounts, among other marital property. Thus, it cannot be said that the provisions of

       the Agreement place him in an economic status that renders the settlement so improvident, one-

       sided, or oppressive as to be unconscionable, and we reject his argument otherwise.

¶ 34          Petitioner has failed to show that the Agreement is unconscionable, and so it remains

       valid. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any indication that the parties executed a written

       agreement, pursuant to section 11.10, amending the terms of section 2.3 to make petitioner’s

       maintenance obligations modifiable. Consequently, we find that petitioner’s maintenance

       obligations are nonmodifiable, and that the circuit court erred by denying respondent’s complaint

       for declaratory judgment.

¶ 35                                           III. CONCLUSION

                                                        12
¶ 36          For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order denying respondent’s

       complaint for declaratory relief and remand the cause for further proceedings.

¶ 37          Reversed and remanded.

¶ 38          JUSTICE DAVENPORT, specially concurring:

¶ 39          I agree the circuit court’s ruling should be affirmed for the reasons stated by the majority.

       I write separately, however, to make clear that the outcome here—a permanent and

       nonmodifiable maintenance payment—flies in the face of common sense. Due to an

       improvidently drafted marital settlement agreement, petitioner is required to make maintenance

       payments to respondent from his pension distribution when respondent, under the same

       agreement, has already been awarded a significant portion of that asset. I believe the concept of

       permanence goes to duration, not amount. The result in this case is absurd but legally correct

       nonetheless.

                                                       13