Court Opinion

ID: 9384289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 08:11:10.790527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.287412
License: Public Domain

In the
                       Court of Appeals
               Second Appellate District of Texas
                        at Fort Worth
                      ___________________________
                           No. 02-22-00139-CV
                      ___________________________

      DE LAGE LANDEN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Appellant

                                       V.

M.D.H. OILFIELD SERVICES LLC AND MICHAEL HILBURN, Appellees

                 On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
                          Tarrant County, Texas
                      Trial Court No. 2021-006122-2

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach, J.; and Lee Gabriel (Senior Justice, Retired,
                           Sitting by Assignment)
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This case involves the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 35.001–.008 (UEFJA). On October 20, 2021, De

Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. (DL) filed a document in the trial court entitled

“Affidavit of Filing Foreign Judgment” with multiple attachments. No responsive

pleading was filed by defendants M.D.H. Oilfield Services LLC and Michael Hilburn

(Appellees) until February 23, 2022, when they filed a motion to vacate, followed by

an amended motion to vacate on March 15, 2022. DL responded, in part, by

challenging the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction to rule on the motion to vacate

because it had not been filed within thirty days after the filing of the Affidavit. A

visiting judge held a hearing on the motion to vacate and orally granted it but did not

sign an order. The sitting judge subsequently conducted a hearing and signed an order

granting the motion to vacate. DL appealed, raising six issues. The first issue alleges

that the trial court lacked plenary jurisdiction to grant the amended motion to vacate.

Because we sustain this first issue, which is dispositive of the appeal, we need not

address the remaining issues. We will vacate the trial court’s order granting the

amended motion to vacate and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

      I.     Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks

& Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Kelsall v. Haisten, 564 S.W.3d

157, 162 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

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       II.    Background and Analysis

       When a foreign judgment is filed pursuant to the UEFJA, the judgment is

domesticated and acts as both the plaintiff’s petition and the final judgment. Jahan

Tigh v. De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., 545 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,

no pet.); Moncrief v. Harvey¸805 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). A

motion challenging the validity of the foreign judgment acts as a motion for new trial

and must be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment while the trial court still

maintains plenary power. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(b); Wolf v. Andreas, 276 S.W.3d 23, 26

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, pet. withdrawn). A trial court’s plenary power expires after

thirty days from the date judgment is signed if no action is taken that would extend

the plenary jurisdiction period. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f); Bahr v. Kohr, 928 S.W.2d 98,

100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, writ denied). After the trial court’s plenary power has

expired, any action taken on a domesticated foreign judgment is a nullity. Bahr, 928

S.W.2d at 100 (citing Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex.

1996)). If the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate a domesticated foreign judgment

because it acted after its plenary power expired, the proper remedy on appeal is to set

aside the void action by the trial court and dismiss the appeal. Id.

      In this case, DL’s domestication of the Pennsylvania judgment on October 20,

2021, served as its petition and final judgment. See Jahan Tigh, 545 S.W.3d at 718. The

trial court’s plenary jurisdiction expired on November 19, 2021, since no motions

were filed that would have extended its plenary power. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f); Bahr,

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928 S.W.2d at 100. Therefore, barring some other legal impediment, Appellees’

motion to vacate filed on February 23, 2022, and the ensuing order granting the

motion were nullities.

      Appellants contend that DL did not file an authenticated “foreign judgment,”

so no final Texas judgment was created. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 35.003(a). Without a final Texas judgment in place, the timetables and deadlines

applicable to post-judgment proceedings, including motions for new trial, are not

triggered. Appellees cite Love v. Moreland, 280 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2008, no pet.), and Wolfram v. Wolfram, 165 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2005, no pet.), in support of this argument. In Love, the plaintiff filed a “transcript or

description” of a Colorado judgment, which she sought to have domesticated in

Texas. 280 S.W.3d at 336. It was uncontroverted that neither the Colorado judgment

nor an authenticated copy was ever filed. Id. Because no authenticated foreign

judgment was filed, no final Texas judgment arose, and the deadlines for contesting

the foreign judgment were not triggered. Id. at 337–38.

      In Wolfram, the plaintiff sought to domesticate a California judgment. 165

S.W.3d at 757, 759. She filed an authenticated copy of the judgment in probate court

in Bexar County against the judgment debtor’s “estate.” Id. at 759. The court of

appeals held that the post-judgment deadlines to contest the domestication of the

California judgment did not start to run with the filing of the foreign judgment

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because an “estate” is not a legal entity, so there was no final judgment to trigger the

deadlines for challenging the foreign judgment. Id. at 759–60.

      We do not find these cases analogous to the present case. When reviewing a

Texas trial court’s ruling regarding the enforcement of a foreign judgment, we

determine the foreign judgment’s validity under the laws of the state that rendered it.

Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied.) (op. on reh’g); see also Int’l Armament Corp. v.

Stocker & Lancaster LLP, 565 S.W.3d 823, 830 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2018, no pet.). Texas courts presume a foreign judgment is valid absent clear and

convincing evidence that the judgment is invalid under the laws of that state. Int’l

Armament Corp., 565 S.W.3d at 830; Mindis, 132 S.W.3d at 483.

      In this case, DL filed an Affidavit of Filing Foreign Judgment. Attached to it

were the following:

      • a certification by the prothonotary (court clerk) of the Court of Common
        Pleas for Chester County certifying that the record was a copy of the full,
        entire, and whole record of the underlying Pennsylvania case;

      • an attestation of the president judge of the Fifteenth Judicial District of the
        Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Hon. John Hall, that the prothonotary’s
        certification was in due form and by the proper officer;

      • an attestation by the prothonotary that Judge Hall “was at the time the same
        bears date, and now is President Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial District of
        the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, composed of the County of Chester,
        duly commissioned and qualified, and that full faith and confidence should
        be given to all her official acts and attestations”;

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      • a document that states

             THIS JUDGMENT CERTIFIED IN FAVOR OF DE LAGE
             LANDEN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
             AND AGAINST M D H OILFIELD SERVICES LLC &
             MICHAEL HILBURN

             IN THE AMOUNT OF $78,921.60

             CERTIFIED FROM THE RECORD

             /s/ Margaret [last name illegible]
             Deputy Prothonotary

             August 13, 2021;

      • a Case Summary Report, “Certified From The Record” by the same Deputy
        Prothonotary, which appears to be a chronological listing of events in the
        case, including entries on July 8, 2021, reflecting that a default judgment in
        the amount of $78,921.60 was granted with interest at 24% from
        07/01/2021, with the judgment being indexed on 07/09/2021;

      • a “Praecipe to Enter Default Judgment” issued by DL’s counsel on July 1,
        2021, with attachments reflecting issuance and service of citation and a
        Notice of Praecipe to Enter Default Judgment dated June 9, 2021, and
        served on Appellees; and

      • a notice to Appellees from the Pennsylvania court that a Praecipe to Enter
        Default Judgment, a Notice under Pennsylvania Rule 236, and other related
        documents had been filed and could be viewed on the court’s efiling site.

      Appellees argue that these documents bear no resemblance to what we would

consider a judgment to look like in Texas. While that may be true, we cannot require

other states’ judgments to conform to Texas’s norms. We must determine whether

the “judgment” of the other state conforms to the requirements for a final judgment

from the issuing state.

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      Although we might cobble together a description of the distinctly different

procedures that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has developed, the court of

appeals in Tennessee did this quite succinctly in Wolf Org., Inc. v. TNG Contractors,

LLC, a case involving Tennessee’s version of the UEFJA and a Pennsylvania default

judgment,

      A brief explanation of Pennsylvania civil procedure is necessary here.
      One unique aspect to civil procedure in Pennsylvania is the role of the
      prothonotary. The office of prothonotary is “a creation of Pennsylvania
      law or statewide procedure.” Edward C. Sweeney, Essential Practice
      Rules and Concepts in Offices of the Prothonotary-Part I, 75 PA. B.
      ASS’N Q. 104, 105 (2004). Each county has a prothonotary who
      functions as the clerk of the court of common pleas. See 42 Pa. Stat. and
      Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2731 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. Act
      9); Brown v. Levy, 73 A.3d 514, 519 (Pa. 2013). The prothonotary’s role is
      ministerial, not judicial. Gotwalt v. Dellinger, 577 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. Super.
      Ct. 1990). The prothonotary’s authority to act is derived from
      Pennsylvania’s statutes and procedural rules. Id.; see 42 Pa. Stat. and
      Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2737 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. Act
      9) (prescribing the powers and duties of the office of the prothonotary).
              Default judgments in Pennsylvania are entered by the
      prothonotary without judicial participation upon praecipe of a
      party. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1(a)(2), 1037(b). After receipt of the
      necessary documentation, the prothonotary will review the court record
      to see if it supports entry of a default judgment. See id. 237.1, 1037(b);
      Gotwalt, 577 A.2d at 625; Bank One Del. N.A. v. Mitchell, 70 Pa. D. &
      C.4th 353, 365-66 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Bank One v. Mitchell,
      897 A.2d 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). Entry of a default judgment by the
      prothonotary “precludes the opponent from challenging his or her
      liability.” Mother’s Rest. Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 861 A.2d 327, 335 (Pa. Super.
      Ct. 2004).
              If the amount of the plaintiff’s legal damages can be
      calculated from the verified complaint, the prothonotary will also
      assess damages. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1037(b)(1) (directing the
      prothonotary to assess damages if the amount “is a sum certain or
      which can be made certain by computation”). But the prothonotary
      is not authorized to order equitable relief. See id. 1037(d). So if the

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      amount of damages is uncertain or the complaint requests equitable
      relief, “the trial court has the independent obligation to fashion the
      appropriate relief at a future date.” Mother’s Rest. Inc., 861 A.2d at 335; see
      Pa. R. Civ. P. 1037(b)(1), (d).

No. M2018-00073-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2883813, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3,

2019) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), perm. app. denied (Oct. 11, 2019).

      We have previously held that

      A party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment under the UEFJA
      has the initial burden to present a prima facie case by filing a
      judgment that appears on its face to be a final, valid, and
      subsisting judgment. Mindis Metals . . . , 132 S.W.3d [at] 484 . . . . Filing
      the foreign judgment “instantly creates an enforceable Texas judgment.”
      Jahan Tigh . . . , 545 S.W.3d [at] 720–21 . . . ; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
      Code Ann. § 35.003(c). The judgment debtor may challenge
      enforceability of the judgment by filing a postjudgment motion. See, e.g.,
      Moncrief . . . , 805 S.W.2d [at] 23 . . . . If the foreign judgment is valid
      on its face, the judgment debtor has the burden to prove by clear
      and convincing evidence one of five reasons why the foreign
      judgment should not be given full faith and credit. Mindis Metals ,
      132 S.W.3d at 484.

Lavin v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 02-19-00362-CV, 2020 WL 3865270, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth July 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op) (emphasis added).

      Given the Pennsylvania law that governs the issuance of default judgments, we

hold that the documents attached to DL’s Affidavit of Filing of Foreign Judgment

appeared to be a final, valid, and subsisting default judgment such that DL met its

initial burden to present a prima facie case. The burden then shifted to Appellees to

prove, within the time provided by law, by clear and convincing evidence why the

Pennsylvania judgment should not be given full faith and credit. Having failed to do

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this in a timely fashion, the trial court was without plenary jurisdiction to grant the

amended motion to vacate. We sustain DL’s first issue and order that the trial court’s

order granting the amended motion to vacate is set aside and this appeal is dismissed

for want of jurisdiction.

       III.   Conclusion

       Having sustained DL’s first issue, we vacate the trial court’s order granting the

amended motion to vacate and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

                                                      /s/ Mike Wallach
                                                      Mike Wallach
                                                      Justice

Delivered: March 30, 2023

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