Court Opinion

ID: 9494120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:29:51.4737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:13.942041
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I agree with the majority’s analysis of the Title VII issue and concur in that portion of the opinion, unfortunately, this case cannot be disposed of solely on that basis. The real issue on appeal is the FTCA claim, and I believe that (1) it was neither waived nor forfeited, and (2) the *713plaintiff states a claim that survives a motion to dismiss. It is only on the failure to state a claim question that the majority and I disagree.
In the first amended complaint, Somma-tino sets forth two claims arising under the FTCA. In the first count, for Sexual Harassment/Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the plaintiff alleges that the conduct involved, including the physical contact, “was not based on the type of assaultative behavior excluded from the FTCA.” The second count, also alleging an FTCA violation, is for “Negligent Supervision/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.”
In her first claim, Sommatino alleges that Hollifield “frequently brushed against plaintiffs arms, legs, and hips. On one specific occasion, he came up behind plaintiff ... reached both arms around plaintiff, over plaintiffs head and down her body, intentionally brushing her breasts as he did so.” Sommatino further alleges that Hollifield, on meeting her outside the office, would “restrain her and engage her in private conversation,” and that on other occasions he would brush his arms against her breasts. Sommatino asserts that these acts placed her in fear of her safety. In her second claim, Sommatino alleges that she was forced into close physical contact with Hollifield because of the negligent acts of her supervisors.
The majority concludes that “Hollifield’s conduct, while highly offensive, is not of the order of magnitude of the personal violation[s]” in our other sex-harassment FTCA cases. See Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir.1995); Arnold v. United States, 816 F.2d 1306, (9th Cir. 1987); and Otto v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.1986). However, in Arnold, we held that a plaintiff stated a claim under the FTCA by alleging that a government employee fondled her knees, blocked her exit from his office, and held the plaintiff close to his body, kissing and fondling her. See id. at 1307. Here, Sommatino has alleged that Hollifield rubbed his arms against her breasts, brushed against her legs, arms and hips, and restrained her outside the workplace. These acts, as the district court itself recognized, are “sufficient to meet the ‘highly personal! test” set forth in Brock.1 Moreover, Sommatino’s allegations that she was in fear of physical violence are, in my opinion, sufficient for purposes of this appeal, even though her fear was based on her knowledge of Holli-field’s conduct towards other similarly situated female employees. Certainly, judgment for the government at the dismissal stage was premature.
I do not believe that the majority opinion establishes a principled line between conduct that gives rise to an FTCA claim and conduct that does not. To the contrary, it adds to whatever confusion may have been engendered by Brock, Arnold, and Otto. In my view, we can and should clarify, not obfuscate, the question Somma-tino’s complaint raises. I would adopt a simple test for determining when sexual harassment gives rise to an FTCA claim: if the conduct rises to the level of an assault, it meets the standard for asserting such a claim. If it does not, an FTCA claim may not be asserted. Here, Holli-field’s alleged conduct plainly constitutes an assault. Thus, it may properly serve as the basis for an FTCA claim. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings on Sommatino’s FTCA claims.
While the approach I would adopt might, in the majority’s view, open the *714door to a host of duplicative claims in sex discrimination cases, that consequence is highly unlikely. As the majority points out, Congress now permits damages in Title VII cases, removing the most obvious reason for bringing an action under the FTCA. Furthermore, plaintiffs proceeding under Title VII receive benefits unavailable to plaintiffs proceeding in tort: pre-litigation administrative remedies, pre-trial proof of discrimination using a burden-shifting analysis, the opportunity to put forward disparate impact evidence, and a variety of other mechanisms enabling plaintiffs to raise a cognizable claim of discrimination. Finally, were there floodgates to be opened, they would surely have been opened by Brock, Otto, and Arnold. Despite those cases, however, the courts in this circuit have not been deluged with FTCA claims. Establishing a principled rule governing FTCA claims arising out of sexual harassment might even reduce, rather than increase, the small number of such causes of action currently being filed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Section D.2 of the opinion.

. The district court erroneously held that Sommatino could not state a claim based on negligent supervision, and dismissed her FTCA claim. Brock expressly permits her to maintain an action against her supervisors. 64 F.3d at 1424.