Court Opinion

ID: 9710433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:09:49.697894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:56.540309
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with my colleagues on the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act portion of the opinion. I disagree on the question of whether the circuit *248court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the decision of the Personnel Appeal Board (pab).
In Fort v Detroit, 146 Mich App 499; 381 NW2d 754 (1985), we held that there was no legislatively created avenue of direct appellate review from decisions of municipal civil service commissions but we indicated that the appropriate remedy would be an action for superintending control in circuit court. We stated in Fort that where the aggrieved party filed an independent civil action and not a claim of appeal, the avenue of superintending control would be open. I am satisfied that the aggrieved parties in this case, the defendants, were properly granted leave to appeal and that the subsequent order of the circuit court dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous. Although there is no right of direct appeal, any proceeding which seriously affects or wrongfully divests private rights must necessarily be open to review in some form. See The First National Bank of Detroit v The E T Barnum Wire & Iron Works, 58 Mich 315; 25 NW 202 (1885). Due process applies to any adjudication of important rights. While I do not believe the parties have a direct right of appeal, it is clear to me that they are entitled to at least the opportunity to seek some form of discretionary review under Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
There is some authority for the proposition that this constitutional provision allows application for leave to appeal from such decisions. In Evans v United States Rubber Co, 379 Mich 457, 461; 152 NW2d 641 (1967), the Supreme Court wrote:
We do not read the above language, "shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law” to mean that in each such case review shall be compulsory or as of right upon its being *249invoked by either party but only that review shall be had when, in the exercise of judicial judgment and discretion, the court shall, on application, so determine, or when so provided by law. [Emphasis supplied.]
In Viculin v Dep’t of Civil Service, 386 Mich 375, 392; 192 NW2d 449 (1971), the Court wrote:
Article 6, § 28 does not guarantee a review in the nature of certiorari of "right” but an appeal of such a nature may require "leave” or be automatic as provided by law.
As indicated above, other authorities have stated that the proper method of reviewing the action of a municipal civil service commission is by way of superintending control. See Fort, supra, p 504 and cases cited therein; 11A Callaghan’s Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed), § 92.21, p 596; 4 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed) p 74. The order of superintending control supersedes the writs of certiorari, mandamus when directed to a lower court or tribunal, and prohibition. MCR 3.302(C). An order of superintending control enforces the power of a court over lower courts or tribunals. MCR 3.302(A). Because defendant seeks review of a question of law and review of a lower tribunal’s record, the appropriate superintending control order is in the nature of certiorari. Such a superintending control order is limited to review of judicial or quasi-judicial acts. Erlandson v Genesee Co Employees’ Retirement Comm, 337 Mich 195; 59 NW2d 389 (1953). This procedure allows review to determine whether an inferior tribunal failed to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law. Dyson v Detroit, 333 Mich 116; 52 NW2d 623 (1952). Such would include a failure to base a *250decision on competent material and substantial evidence where required to do so. An order of superintending control is discretionary, as was the writ of certiorari it superseded. Silver v Hamilton Twp Bd, 146 Mich 393; 109 NW 664 (1906); Marshall v Pech, 95 Mich App 454; 291 NW2d 78 (1980), lv den 409 Mich 904 (1980).
Whatever the name given to the relief sought, only discretionary review of a municipal civil service commission is permitted. Such is all the defendants sought in the instant case. On remand I would direct the circuit court to reconsider the matter as on leave granted and decide the case on the merits. Had the circuit court originally denied the application for lack of jurisdiction I would have allowed the circuit court to reconsider the matter on the assumption that it had jurisdiction and I would have simply directed the circuit court to decide whether it would grant leave. In this case, however, the circuit court already granted leave in the first instance and then reversed itself on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. Since I would hold that there is jurisdiction I would simply reinstate the original grant of leave to appeal so that the circuit court can decide the appeal on the merits.