Court Opinion

ID: 2964883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:34.9907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:03.067727
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                              _________________________
          No. 97-1327
                        ASSOCIATED FISHERIES OF MAINE, INC.,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                             WILLIAM M. DALEY, SECRETARY
                    OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
                                Defendant, Appellee.
                              _________________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                              _________________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                            Hill,* Senior Circuit Judge,
                             and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                              _________________________
               Gene 
                    R. 
                       Libby, with whom Michael 
                                                W. 
                                                   MacLeod-Ball, Robert 
                                                                         C.
          Brooks, and Verrill & Dana were on brief, for appellant.
               David E. Frulla
                             , 
                               Stanley M. Brand
                                               , and 
                                                    Brand, Lowell & Ryan
                                                                         on
          brief for Seafarers International Union of North America, amicus
          curiae.
               Andrew 
                      C. 
                         Mergen, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources
          Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Lois 
                                                                         J.
          Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General,  David 
                                                       C. 
                                                           Shilton and  Lyn
          Jacobs, Attorneys, and Gene 
                                       Martin, Office of Regional Counsel,
          National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, were on brief, for
          appellee.
                              _________________________
                                 September 16, 1997
                              _________________________
          _______________

          *Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

                    SELYA, Circuit 
                                   Judge. Associated Fisheries of Maine
          (AFM) and its amicus, the Seafarers International Union, warn that
          the final version of a fishery management plan promulgated by the
          Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) could have significant
          adverse effects on the fishing industry in the Northeast and that
          fishermen caught in the regulatory net will not be able to survive
          financially. They unsuccessfully asked the district court to
          invalidate the Secretary's final rulemaking and thereby avert this
          potential calamity. They now ask us for the same relief, urging
          that the Secretary failed to comply with both the Magnuson Act, 16
          U.S.C. SS 1801-1882 (1994), and the Regulatory Flexibility Act
          (RFA), 5 U.S.C.A. SS 601-612 (1994 & Supp. 1997). Although we have
          considerable empathy for the fishermens' concerns, we conclude,
          after wading through an administrative record which comprises
          roughly 30,000 pages, that the Secretary acted within his lawful
          purview.
          I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
                    Responding to depletion of the nation's fish stocks due
          to overfishing, Congress enacted the Magnuson Act in 1976 to
          protect fishery resources.   See 16 U.S.C. S 1801(a).   The Act
          created eight regional fishery management councils, each of which
          has responsibility for fashioning a fishery management plan (FMP)
                              
               After this litigation had begun, Congress passed the
          Sustainable Fisheries Act, which amended the Magnuson Act (referred
          to now as the Magnuson-Stevens Act). See Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110
          Stat. 3559 (Oct. 11, 1996). All references herein are to the
          Magnuson Act, which was in effect when the challenged rules were
          promulgated, not to the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
                                          3

          to regulate commercial fishing within a particular geographic
          region.  See id. SS 1852(a)(1)-(8), 1852(h)(1). When a proposed
          FMP (or a plan amendment) is developed, the council must submit it
          to the Secretary for review.   See id. S 1853(c). The Secretary
          then determines whether the proposed FMP is consistent not only
          with the Magnuson Act's seven national standards for fishery
          conservation and management, see  id. S 1851(a)(1)-(7), but also
          with other applicable law, including the RFA,        see  id. SS
          1854(a)(1)(B), 1855(e). In making this determination, the
          Secretary must publish an appropriate notice,        see  id. S
          1854(a)(1)(C), consider the comments engendered in response
          thereto, 
                  see 
                      id. S 1854(a)(2)(A), and consult with the Coast Guard
          anent enforcement, see  id. S 1854(a)(2)(C). If the Secretary
          approves the amendment, he then promulgates final implementing
          regulations, which are subject to judicial review.     See id. S
          1855(b).
          II. THE COURSE OF EVENTS
                    The New England Fishery Management Council (the Council)
          has authority over commercial fishing in the Atlantic Ocean off the
          New England coast.  See id. S 1852(a)(1). Under its aegis, the
          management and conservation of the New England Groundfish Fishery
          has had a tangled history. See 
                                        generally Peter Shelley et al., 
                                                                        The
          New England Fisheries Crisis:
                                        
                                        What Have We Learned?
                                                            , 9 Tul. Envtl.
          L.J. 221, 223-33 (1996).  When less intrusive efforts did not
                              
               Groundfish include cod, haddock, flounder, and other species
          that dwell near the ocean floor. 
                                          See Shelley, 
                                                       supra, 9 Tul. Envtl.
                                          4

          prevent overfishing, the Council developed the Northeast
          Multispecies Fishery Management Plan in 1985. The Secretary
          approved it only as a stopgap. Four amendments to the interim rule
          followed, none of which proved adequate.    See Conservation 
                                                                        Law
          Found. 
                 of 
                    New 
                        Eng., 
                              Inc. v.  Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir.
          1993). Litigation over the last of these amendments resulted in a
          consent decree. The decree established a timetable for adopting an
          FMP that would reverse the continuing depletion of cod, flounder,
          and haddock stocks within specified periods.  See id.
                    In 1994, the Council recommended, and the Secretary,
          acting through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the
          National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, approved Amendment
          5. This amendment sought to eliminate overfishing of cod, haddock,
          and yellowtail flounder stocks by sharply reducing permissible
          fishing over a five to seven year period.  See 59 Fed. Reg. 9872
          (1994) (final rule). To achieve this goal, the amendment proposed
          a gradual reduction in the annual number of working days at sea
          (DAS) for certain fishing vessels and created three classes of
          permits. See 50 C.F.R. SS 651.22, 651.4 (1995). The class that is
          relevant here comprises limited access multispecies permits (which,
          in turn, are subdivided into fleet and individual permits).
          Amendment 5 sets up a DAS notification program that requires
          vessels covered by fleet permits to notify the NMFS of departure
          and arrival times.  See id. S 651.29. In addition, the amendment
                              
          L.J. at 223 & n.4 (listing the 13 species included in the
          groundfish management plan).
                                          5

          establishes a vessel tracking system (VTS) that is intended to
          function by means of electronic devices installed on board vessels
          with individual permits. See 
                                       id. S 651.28. Because the VTS is not
          yet operational, both classes of permit holders must satisfy the
          call-in requirements of the DAS notification program for the time
          being.  See id. S 651.29(a)(2).
                    Dismayed by the Secretary's handiwork, AFM challenged
          Amendment 5 in Maine's federal district court. By that time,
          however, haddock and yellowtail stocks had collapsed, and cod
          stocks were near collapse. See NMFS, 
                                               Report of the 18th Northeast
          Regional Stock Assessment Workshop (18th SAW):  The Plenary 53-54
          (1994). In light of this troubling new information, Amendment 5
          seemed inadequate either to protect or rebuild these stocks, and
          NMFS's Stock Assessment Review Committee recommended that the
          Council reduce ichthyic mortality to as low a level as possible.
          See id. at 53. In response, the Council adopted Amendment 6 (an
          emergency measure designed to protect haddock,  see 59 Fed. Reg.
          32,134 (1994)) and thereafter developed Amendment 7.
                    The Secretary promulgated Amendment 7 as a final rule
          after notice and comment. See 61 Fed. Reg. 8540 (proposed rule) &
          27,710 (1996) (final rule) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 651).
          Among other things, Amendment 7 seeks to reduce ichthyic mortality
          rates and rebuild multispecies stocks by (1) setting annual
          "allowable catch" targets for regulated species, (2) orchestrating
          new area closures, and (3) implementing further DAS cutbacks
          (including acceleration of the reduction schedule originally
                                          6

          established in Amendment 5). Although the Secretary acknowledged
          the significant negative economic impacts (especially on trawl
          vessels) which Amendment 7 would invite, he concluded that
          conservation of the fishery would yield greater long-term benefits.
          See 61 Fed. Reg. at 27,731.
                    Unmollified, AFM amended its pending judicial complaint
          to challenge Amendment 7 as well as Amendment 5. It alleged, inter
          alia, that both amendments violated the Magnuson Act and the RFA.
          The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district
          court then held a one-day informational hearing, during which the
          parties' experts explained their respective positions on
          scientific, economic, and ecological principles.
                    In the end, the court granted summary judgment in the
          Secretary's favor. See 
                                 Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc.
                                                                  v. 
                                                                     Daley,
          954 F. Supp. 383 (D. Me. 1997). As to issues that are relevant in
          this appeal, the court held that the newly enacted judicial review
          provisions of the RFA did not apply retroactively, and that, in all
          events, the Secretary had complied with the RFA.  See id. at 386-
          87. The court also held that the Secretary's rulemaking did not
          run afoul of the Magnuson Act.     See id. at 388-90. AFM now
                              
               Because the Secretary recognized his inability to foresee the
          effect of various measures with certitude, he inserted in Amendment
          7, as in Amendment 5, a process that allows him to adjust DAS
          allocations and requirements as stocks recover or as other
          circumstances change.  See 50 C.F.R. S 651.40.
                                          7

          appeals.
          III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
                    We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de
          novo.  See Coyne v. Taber 
                                    Partners 
                                             I, 53 F.3d 454, 457 (1st Cir.
          1995); 
                Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare
                                                    v. 
                                                       Secretary of Agric.
                                                                          ,
          984 F.2d 514, 520 (1st Cir. 1993). This rubric has a special twist
          in the administrative law context. The Magnuson Act incorporates
          the familiar standard of review associated with the Administrative
          Procedure Act (APA).   See 16 U.S.C. S 1855(b). Where the APA
          standard obtains, a court may set aside an administrative action
          only if that action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary
          to law.  See 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A)-(D). Because the APA standard
          affords great deference to agency decisionmaking and because the
          Secretary's action is presumed valid, judicial review, even at the
          summary judgment stage, is narrow.     See Citizens  
                                                               to  
                                                                   Preserve
          Overton 
                  Park, 
                        Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971);  Sierra
          Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 769 (1st Cir. 1992). Consequently,
          our brief _ like that of the district court _ is only to determine
          whether the Secretary's decision to promulgate the fishery
          regulation was consonant with his statutory powers, reasoned, and
                              
               In the district court, AFM advanced claims under various other
          statutory provisions, as well as claims implicating constitutional
          standards and executive orders. None was successful.          See
          Associated 
                     Fisheries, 954 F. Supp. at 385 & n.3. AFM does not
          pursue any of these theories on appeal, and we express no opinion
          on them.
                    We note, moreover, that in this court, as below, AFM
          challenges Amendment 5, as modified by Amendment 7. For
          simplicity's sake, we refer mainly to the latter.
                                          8

          supported by substantial evidence in the record.    See  Alliance
          Against 
                  IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1996),    cert.
          denied, 117 S. Ct. 1467 (1997); C 
                                             & 
                                               W 
                                                 Fish 
                                                      Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d
          1556, 1562 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1052, 1055
          (1st Cir. 1977).
                    An agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if the agency
          lacks a rational basis for adopting it _ for example, if the agency
          relied on improper factors, failed to consider pertinent aspects of
          the problem, offered a rationale contradicting the evidence before
          it, or reached a conclusion so implausible that it cannot be
          attributed to a difference of opinion or the application of agency
          expertise. See 
                         Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n
                                                    v. 
                                                       State Farm Mut. Ins.
          Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Rhode Island Higher Educ. Assistance
          Auth. v. Secretary 
                             of 
                                Educ., 929 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1991).
          Subject, of course, to statutory constraints, policy choices are
          for the agency, not the court, to make. Even if a reviewing court
          disagrees with the agency's conclusions, it cannot substitute its
          judgment for that of the agency.   See Overton 
                                                         Park, 401 U.S. at
          416; Kreps, 563 F.2d at 1055.
                    Finally, when reviewing agency action, we apply the same
          legal standards that pertain in the district court and afford no
          special deference to that court's decision.    See  Massachusetts
          Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 984 F.2d at 521 n.5. This approach is not
          altered simply because the court held an informational hearing at
          which experts testified. Although some degree of deference may be
          appropriate if a district court's determination turns on factual
                                          9

          findings, evidence presented by witnesses, or "even upon lengthy
          district court proceedings in which knowledgeable counsel explain
          the agency's decisionmaking process in detail,"   Sierra 
                                                                   Club v.
          Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 872 (1st Cir. 1985), this case does not
          implicate that principle. The district judge made it pellucid that
          the dissertations which he entertained "were not evidence, but
          rather were advocacy presentations by non-lawyers skilled in their
          respective areas and therefore better able to present the material
          to [the court]."  Associated 
                                       Fisheries, 954 F. Supp. at 388 n.9.
          A presentation which serves only to educate the district court, not
          to enlarge the administrative record, does not affect the standard
          of judicial review. See 
                                  Fisherman's Dock Coop., Inc.
                                                               v. 
                                                                  Brown, 75
          F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1996).
          IV. CLAIMS IMPLICATING THE MAGNUSON ACT
                    AFM asseverates that Amendment 7 violates the Magnuson
          Act because the regulation is unnecessary to achieve the
          Secretary's stated goals and inconsistent with the national
          standards embodied in the Act. Neither asseveration holds water.
                            A.  The Need for Amendment 7.
                    The record contradicts AFM's assertion that Amendment 7
          is not necessary to achieve a rebuilding of groundfish stock
          because the status quo suffices. The Secretary was presented with
          reliable scientific data indicating that stocks had collapsed; he
          was advised that the prophylactic measures specified in Amendment
          5 were clearly inadequate to alleviate the steadily worsening
          plight; and he also was told that certain ichthyic mortality rates
                                         10

          ought to be reduced significantly. Responding to this influx of
          new information, the Council conducted extensive scientific
          analyses and devised Amendment 7 as a means of ensuring the long-
          term stability of the fishery. The Secretary studied the data,
          weighed plethoric comments, and decided to promulgate the rule.
                    Having carefully reviewed the record, we cannot say that
          the Secretary exercised his discretion in an irrational, mindless,
          or whimsical manner. When an agency is faced with conflicting
          scientific views and chooses among them, its decision cannot be
          termed arbitrary or capricious. Indeed, a reviewing court must
          afford special deference to an agency's scientific expertise where,
          as here, that expertise is applied in areas within the agency's
          specialized field of competence. See 
                                               Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.
                                                                         v.
          Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983);
          United 
                 States v. Members 
                                   of 
                                      Estate 
                                             of 
                                                Boothby, 16 F.3d 19, 21-22
          (1st Cir. 1994).
                       B.  Compliance with National Standards.
                    The Magnuson Act sets up a series of seven national
          standards.  See 16 U.S.C. S 1851(a)(1)-(7). To ensure compliance
          with these standards, the responsible agency must perform a
          cost/benefit analysis ancillary to the promulgation of an FMP.
          Here, the analysis for Amendment 7 showed a projected net benefit
          of $18 million over the ten-year rebuilding period. AFM insists
          that the Secretary put his thumb on the scale when conducting this
          analysis, and that Amendment 7 therefore fails to satisfy the
          national standards. Specifically, AFM charges that the Secretary
                                         11

          arbitrarily disregarded certain enforcement and compliance expenses
          which, when properly included, would demonstrate that the likely
          costs of Amendment 7 substantially exceed the likely benefits.
                    The Magnuson Act defines "optimum yield" as the amount of
          fish which will secure the greatest overall benefit to the nation
          based on the maximum sustainable yield from a fishery, as modified
          by relevant economic, social, or ecological factors.   See id. S
          1802(21). The bedrock principle of National Standard 1 is that
          conservation and resource management measures, such as Amendment 7,
          "shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis,
          the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing
          industry."  Id. S 1851(a)(1). Relatedly, National Standard 7
          requires that "[c]onservation and management measures shall, where
          practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication."
          Id. S 1851(a)(7). In pursuance of his statutory duty,  see id. S
          1851(b), the Secretary established regulatory guidelines to assure
          that FMPs would be developed in accordance with these national
          standards.   See 50 C.F.R. pt. 602 (1995). The regulatory
          guidelines make it plain that the agency should weigh the costs
          associated with an FMP (including industry compliance and
          enforcement costs) against the forecasted benefits.    See id. S
          602.17(b)(2)(vii), (d).
                    In this case, the Secretary excluded Coast Guard
          enforcement costs from the calculus. AFM terms this exclusion
          arbitrary, but the administrative record belies that
          characterization. The Secretary specifically addressed this issue
                                         12

          and the documentation supporting the final rules contains a
          rational explanation for his decision. Although the Coast Guard
          estimated that Amendment 7 would increase enforcement costs by
          approximately $20,800,000 per year, its estimate assumed sea-based
          enforcement whereas Amendment 7, as drafted, relied primarily on
          land-based enforcement through the notification and tracking
          systems.  See 61 Fed. Reg. at 27,719. Even if certain sea-based
          costs occurred under Amendment 7, the Secretary explained, they
          would not comprise increases in overall costs because they would
          "actually represent programmatic improvements that could also be
          expected to be made in the out years of [Amendment 5]."  Id. For
          this reason, the Secretary's cost/benefit analysis explicitly
          assumed that Amendment 7 would not yield enforcement costs greater
          than those which would have been borne under Amendment 5.  See 61
          Fed. Reg. at 27,719, & 27,722.
                    In our view, this explanation is sufficiently logical,
          and sufficiently rooted in the record, to dispose of AFM's argument
          concerning Coast Guard enforcement costs. It also answers AFM's
          additional argument that the Secretary improperly excluded the
          costs of industry compliance with Amendment 7. The Secretary's
          assumption _ that compliance costs will not vary materially as
                              
               Moreover, as alluded to in agency correspondence and further
          explicated during the informational hearing held by the district
          court, the Secretary considered the Coast Guard's estimate to be
          budgetary in nature and not rooted in cost increases which were
          likely to accompany the implementation of Amendment 7. The
          Secretary must be accorded some latitude to make such judgment
          calls.  Cf. Sierra Club, 976 F.2d at 771.
                                         13

          between Amendment 5 and Amendment 7 _ flows rationally from
          Amendment 7's retention of the enforcement mechanism established
          under Amendment 5.  See 50 C.F.R. S 651.29. Consequently, since
          Amendment 7 does not alter the taxonomy that determines which
          vessels will require VTS installations, AFM's claim that the new
          regulation fails to account for added VTS-related costs lacks
          force.
                    To recapitulate, the record reveals that the Secretary
          carefully considered the enforcement measures associated with
          Amendment 7 and, consistent with the evidence before him, concluded
          (1) that the Coast Guard estimate was largely a figment of
          bureaucratic imagination which did not track the actual enforcement
          mechanism needed for the FMP, and therefore did not warrant
          inclusion in the calculus of likely costs and benefits, and (2)
          that compliance costs for the fishing industry would remain roughly
          the same under Amendment 7. Whether or not we, if writing on a
          pristine page, would have reached the same set of conclusions is
          not the issue. What matters is that the administrative judgment,
          right or wrong, derives from the record, possesses a rational
          basis, and evinces no mistake of law. Consequently, it merits our
          approbation.  See State 
                                  Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Kreps, 563 F.2d at
          1056.
                    The sockdolager, of course, is the enormous difficulty of
          estimating enforcement costs in advance.       Administrative
                              
               The agency discussed this difficulty in the final
          environmental impact statement and noted that it was compounded
                                         14

          decisionmaking is not an exact science, and judicial review must
          recognize that some arbitrariness is inherent in the exercise of
          discretion amid uncertainty. Accordingly, courts reviewing this
          type of administrative decision must leave room for a certain
          amount of play in the joints.   See Fisherman's 
                                                          Dock, 75 F.3d at
          171-72; Alaska Factory Trawler Ass'n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456,
          1460 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Here, the reasons offered to
          explain the Secretary's determination that Amendment 7 is
          consistent with the national standards reflect an understanding of
          analytical factors and constitute a rational exercise of
          deliberative decisionmaking. Hence, we cannot say that this
          determination offends the applicable standard of review.
          V. CLAIMS IMPLICATING THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
                    An FMP (or a plan amendment) promulgated pursuant to the
          Magnuson Act must be consistent with the RFA.   See 16 U.S.C. SS
          1854(a)(1)(B), 1855(e). AFM next charges that the Secretary failed
          to meet this obligation when promulgating Amendment 7.
                    Some background may prove helpful. Congress enacted the
          RFA to encourage administrative agencies to consider the potential
          impact of nascent federal regulations on small businesses.    See
          Pub. L. No. 96-354, S 2(b), 94 Stat. 1164, 1165 (1980) (statement
          of purpose); 
                      see 
                          generally Paul R. Verkuil, 
                                                    A Critical Guide to the
          Regulatory 
                     Flexibility 
                                 Act, 1982 Duke L.J. 213, 215-26 (1982).
          Under the RFA, an agency that publishes a notice of proposed
                              
          here because enforcement resources are shared among several
          management plans.
                                         15

          rulemaking must prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis
          (IRFA) describing the effect of the proposed rule on small
          businesses and discussing alternatives that might minimize adverse
          economic consequences.  See 5 U.S.C. S 603. When promulgating a
          final rule, the agency not only must prepare a final regulatory
          flexibility analysis (FRFA) but also must make copies available to
          members of the public and publish directions for obtaining such
          copies.  See id. S 604.
                    The Secretary promulgated Amendment 7 on May 31, 1996.
          At that time, the law expressly prohibited judicial review of
          agency compliance with sections 603 and 604.  See id. S 611;  see
          also Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
          Approximately two months earlier, however, Congress had amended the
          RFA by enacting the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
          Act (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 857, 864-68
          (1996). The 1996 Amendments reshaped the contours of the mandated
          flexibility analysis and provided for judicial review of the
          agency's product.   See  id. SS 241, 242, 110 Stat. at 864-66
          (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. SS 604(a), 611(a)(1) (Supp.
          1997)). Because Congress delayed the effective date of these
          amendments until ninety days after passage,  see  id. S 245, 110
          Stat. at 868, they were not in effect when the Secretary
          promulgated Amendment 7.
                                A.  Judicial Review.
                    The threshold question is whether we have jurisdiction to
          review AFM's claim under the RFA. This question depends on whether
                                         16

          the judicial review provision contained in the 1996 Amendments
          applies retrospectively.
                    AFM argues that the judicial review provision should be
          accorded retroactive application under 
                                                Landgraf v. 
                                                           USI Film Prods.
                                                                          ,
          511 U.S. 244 (1994). Judge Hornby concluded otherwise, remarking
          the absence of any express legislative intent to apply the SBREFA
          retroactively, and reasoning that, inasmuch as the 1996 Amendments
          were "one legislative package," "[i]t would be anomalous to apply
          the judicial review portion of the 1996 amendments to past agency
          actions but at the same time not apply the substance of those
          amendments."  Associated Fisheries, 954 F. Supp. at 387.
                    The Supreme Court decision in      Landgraf and, more
          recently, the decisions in 
                                    Lindh v. 
                                            Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997),
          and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997),
          provide a roadmap for deciding questions of retroactivity. The
          roadmap is not easy to use, and in this case the guideposts point
          in more than one direction. On one hand, the delayed effective
          date points toward prospective application, 
                                                    see 
                                                        Wright v. 
                                                                  FEMA, 913
          F.2d 1566, 1572 & n.13 (11th Cir. 1990); 
                                                 Criger v. 
                                                           Becton, 902 F.2d
          1348, 1351 (8th Cir. 1990), and the legislative history of the 1996
          Amendments points the same way,   see 142 Cong. Rec. E571, E574
          (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (twice
          indicating that judicial review would be available for rules
          promulgated after the effective date). On the other hand, the new
          judicial review provision does not affect substantive rights but
          merely confers jurisdiction, and courts often give retroactive
                                         17

          effect to such statutes.  See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274; but  see
          Hughes Aircraft
                        , 117 S. Ct. at 1878 (drawing a distinction between
          an amendment which merely allocates jurisdiction among fora and one
          which creates jurisdiction where none previously existed, and
          stating that the latter is subject to the presumption against
          retroactivity). Moreover, the Third Circuit, contradicting Judge
          Hornby's "one legislative package" rationale, recently held that
          the 1996 Amendments were severable and that the judicial review
          provision could be applied to a legislative rule promulgated before
          their effective date.   See Southwestern 
                                                    Pa. 
                                                        Growth 
                                                               Alliance v.
          Browner, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (3d Cir. 1997) [No. 96-3364, 1997 WL
          418420, at *15-16].
                    In the last analysis, it is unnecessary to decide the
          retroactivity question here. We have long adhered to the practice
          that, when an appeal presents a jurisdictional riddle, yet the
          merits of the underlying issue are readily resolved in favor of the
          party challenging jurisdiction, a court may sidestep the quandary
          and simply dispose of the appeal on the merits. See 
                                                              United States
          v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 715 (1st Cir.) (collecting cases), cert.
          denied, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996). We follow that praxis today.
                           B.  The Renovated Section 604.
                    By electing to reach the merits,  we do not avoid the
                              
               Our task is made much easier because the lower court, though
          concluding that the judicial review provision did not apply,
          nonetheless proceeded to reach the merits and, in an alternate
          holding, laid out a blueprint that makes very good sense.     See
          Associated 
                     Fisheries, 954 F. Supp. at 386-87. We commend Judge
          Hornby for his prudent belt-and-suspenders approach.
                                         18

          question of retroactivity entirely. AFM contends that the
          Secretary failed to comply with section 604 of the RFA both in its
          original and renovated incarnations. As our next order of
          business, we address whether the amended version applies
          retroactively to this case.
                    We hold that the Secretary's compliance with the RFA
          should be measured against the original requirements of section
          604, that is, against the law as it read when the Secretary
          promulgated Amendment 7. The 1996 Amendments substantively altered
          section 604 by reformulating and augmenting the required content of
          an FRFA.  See 5 U.S.C.A. S 604(a) (Supp. 1997). The renovated
          version now requires that an FRFA contain the following:
                         (1) a succinct statement of the need for,
                    and objectives of, the rule;
                         (2) a summary of the significant issues
                    raised by the public comments in response to
                    the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a
                    summary of the assessment of the agency of
                    such issues, and a statement of any changes
                    made in the proposed rule as a result of such
                    comments;
                         (3) a description of and an estimate of
                    the number of small entities to which the rule
                    will apply or an explanation of why no such
                    estimate is available;
                         (4) a description of the projected
                    reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance
                    requirements of the rule, including an
                    estimate of the classes of small entities
                    which will be subject to the requirement and
                    the type of professional skills necessary for
                    preparation of the report or record; and
                         (5) a description of the steps the agency
                    has taken to minimize the significant economic
                    impact on small entities consistent with the
                    stated objectives of applicable statutes,
                    including a statement of the factual, policy,
                    and legal reasons for selecting the
                    alternative adopted in the final rule and why
                    each one of the other significant alternatives
                                         19

                    to the rule considered by the agency which
                    affect the impact on small entities was
                    rejected.
          5 U.S.C.A. S 604(a) (Supp. 1997).
                    A comparison of this iteration with the prior version, 5
          U.S.C. S 604(a) (1994), reveals that subsections (3) and (4) are
          brand new insofar as FRFAs are concerned, and that subsection (5),
          modifying the former subsection (3), imposes more specific content
          requirements. Since the Secretary completed the FRFA and
          promulgated Amendment 7 before the effective date of the 1996
          Amendments, applying the neoteric version of section 604 would
          impose new strictures with respect to matters already completed,
          and, thus, would contravene the rule against retroactivity.   See
          Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
                    AFM offers only a weak rejoinder. It says that
          retroactive application would not impose new duties because
          Congress passed the 1996 Amendments before the agency prepared the
          FRFA. That is so _ but it is beside the point. SBREFA's effective
          date constitutes the cut-off point, and the Secretary had completed
          and published both the FRFA and the final rule prior to that time.
          Thus, imposing incremental requirements on these actions would have
          an impermissible retroactive effect.  See id.
                            C.  The Original Section 604.
                    Having determined that the original version of section
          604 governs our RFA-related review of Amendment 7, we turn to that
          proviso. Under it, an FRFA must contain three elements:
                         (1) a succinct statement of the need for,
                    and the objectives of, the rule;
                                         20

                         (2) a summary of the issues raised by the
                    public comments in response to the initial
                    regulatory flexibility analysis, a summary of
                    the assessment of the agency of such issues,
                    and a statement of any changes made in the
                    proposed rule as a result of such comments;
                    and
                         (3) a description of each of the
                    significant alternatives to the rule
                    consistent with the stated objectives of
                    applicable statutes and designed to minimize
                    any significant economic impact of the rule on
                    small entities which was considered by the
                    agency, and a statement of the reasons why
                    each one of such alternatives was rejected.
          5 U.S.C. S 604(a) (1994). Congress designed this provision "to
          assure that agencies engage in principled decision-making." 126
          Cong. Rec. S21,448 & 21,459 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
                                                               Legislative
          history confirms that Congress, in enacting section 604, intended
          to compel administrative agencies to explain the bases for their
          actions and to ensure that alternative proposals receive serious
          consideration at the agency level. See 
                                                id. at S21,460; 
                                                                see 
                                                                    also S.
          Rep. No. 96-878, at 13-14 (1980), 
                                          reprinted 
                                                    in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
          2788, 2800-01.
                    Notwithstanding this intention, Congress emphasized that
          the RFA should not be construed to undermine other legislatively
          mandated goals. See 126 Cong. Rec. at S21,459-60; 
                                                           see 
                                                               also S. Rep.
                              
               RFA traveled a somewhat unconventional route in its march
          towards passage. The Senate rejected the Senate bill, S. 299, as
          reported by the Judiciary Committee, and adopted Senator Culver's
          substitute bill. See 126 Cong. Rec. S21,449-51 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
          1980). The House passed the bill without either amendment or
          separate hearings, and endorsed the Senate's section-by-section
          analysis.  See  Thompson, 741 F.2d at 406 (tracing legislative
          history); see generally Verkuil, supra, at 226-27. We therefore
          examine the substitute bill and its accompanying analysis as the
          relevant guide to legislative intent.
                                         21

          No. 96-878, supra, at 10, 14, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2797, 2801.
          Thus, section 604 does not command an agency to take specific
          substantive measures, but, rather, only to give explicit
          consideration to less onerous options:
                    [T]his provision does not require that an
                    agency adopt a rule establishing differing
                    compliance standards, exemptions, or any other
                    alternative to the proposed rule. It requires
                    that an agency, having identified and analyzed
                    significant alternative proposals, describe
                    those it considered and explain its rejection
                    of any which, if adopted, would have been
                    substantially less burdensome on the specified
                    entities. Evidence that such an alternative
                    would not have accomplished the stated
                    objectives of the applicable statutes would
                    sufficiently justify the rejection of the
                    alternative.
          126 Cong. Rec. at S21,459-60; see also S. Rep. No. 96-878, supra,
          at 14, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2801.
                    We think that a useful parallel can be drawn between RFA
          S 604 and the National Environmental Protection Act, which furthers
          a similar objective by requiring the preparation of an
          environmental impact statement (EIS). See 42 U.S.C. S 4332 (1994).
          The EIS requirement is meant to inform the agency and the public
          about potential adverse ecological effects and about the
          availability, if any, of less harmful alternatives prior to a final
          decision on the fate of a particular project or rule.         See
          Robertson v. Methow 
                               Valley 
                                      Citizens 
                                               Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349
          (1989); 
                 Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't
                                                 v. 
                                                    Aldridge, 886 F.2d 458,
          459-60 (1st Cir. 1989). In light of this purpose, courts do not
          review challenges to the adequacy of an EIS under a standard of
          mathematical exactitude but under a standard of reasonableness.
                                         22

          See 
             Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 459; 
                                       Conservation Law Found. of New Eng.,
          Inc. v. 
                 Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 719 (1st Cir. 1979). Recognizing the
          analogous objectives of the two acts, we believe that the same rule
          of reason should apply to judicial review of challenges under RFA
          S 604. Thus, we proceed to examine whether the Secretary made a
          reasonable, good-faith effort to carry out the mandate of section
          604.
                    In this instance, NMFS prepared an FRFA consisting of its
          initial workup (the IRFA) and its responses to submitted comments.
          See 61 Fed. Reg. at 27,730-31;  see also 59 Fed. Reg. 9872, 9883
          (1994) (final rule, Amendment 5). AFM contends that this proffer
          misfires for two reasons. First, AFM maintains that dressing up an
          IRFA by tacking on responses to comments does not comply with the
          statutory directive that the agency prepare an FRFA. Second, AFM
          asserts that the Secretary failed sufficiently to identify, and
          adequately to explain his rejection of, alternatives designed to
          minimize deleterious economic effects on small businesses. We
          address these objections in turn.
                                         1.
                    We reject AFM's charge that the FRFA is inadequate on its
          face. Section 604 prescribes the content of an FRFA, but it does
          not demand a particular mode of presentation. To disregard
          otherwise compliant analysis simply because it is not ensconced in
                              
               Since an EIS, unlike an FRFA, must contain a "detailed"
          statement, 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C), the analogy seems more than fair
          to AFM.
                                         23

          a specific format would be inconsistent both with the RFA's
          explicit authorization to avoid duplicative or unnecessary
          analyses, see 5 U.S.C. S 605(a), and with the legislative
          concession that an agency "may incorporate in a regulatory
          flexibility analysis any data or analysis contained in any other
          impact statement or analysis required by law," 126 Cong. Rec. at
          S21,460. Accordingly, we hold that an agency can satisfy section
          604 as long as it compiles a meaningful, easily understood analysis
          that covers each requisite component dictated by the statute and
          makes the end product _ whatever form it reasonably may take _
          readily available to the public.
                    We do not mean to suggest that the combination of an IRFA
          and responses to comments always _ or even often _ will pass
          muster. But in the absence of a statutory or regulatory directive
          specifying the form of document to be produced, the preparing
          agency must be accorded ample latitude in making the choice.  See
          Town 
               of 
                  Orangetown v.  Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 40 (2d Cir. 1983).
          This precept is especially pertinent here, since the IRFA was
          reasonably extensive, the wide range of comments anent the proposed
          rule (many of which were submitted by small businesses or proxies
                              
                In pressing for a contrary result, the appellant relies
          heavily on a letter written to NMFS by the Small Business
          Administration (SBA) criticizing the agency's earlier efforts to
          comply with the RFA in the development of Amendment 5. We give
          little, if any, weight to the letter. For one thing, it is
          directed only to compliance vis-a-vis Amendment 5. For another
          thing, although the RFA authorizes the SBA to appear as an amicus
          curiae, see 5 U.S.C.A. S 612(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997), the SBA has
          chosen not to exercise that prerogative in respect to Amendment 7.
                                         24

          on their behalf) provided a natural forum for the Secretary in
          striving to fulfill his section 604 obligation, and the agency
          punctiliously complied with the notice requirements of RFA S
          604(b). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Secretary
          acted within his proper province in designating the IRFA and the
          responses to comments as the FRFA required by the statute.
                                         2.
                    We turn now from form to substance and inspect the
          adequacy of the FRFA's contents. We preface this discussion by
          remarking two important considerations. First, section 604 does
          not require that an FRFA address every alternative, but only that
          it address significant ones.  See 5 U.S.C. S 604(a)(3). Second,
          the majority of commercial fishing vessels in the Northeast are
          deemed small businesses for purposes of the RFA.  See 5 U.S.C. S
          601(3); 13 C.F.R. S 121.601 (1995); 
                                             see 
                                                also 61 Fed. Reg. at 27,731
          (memorializing the Secretary's recognition of this reality). It
          follows that any attempt to reduce the adverse economic impacts of
          a regulation aimed at rebuilding stocks in this fishery is
          necessarily an attempt to minimize the negative effects of the
          regulation on small businesses. To that extent, Congress' desire
          to have agencies write rules that distinguish (where desirable)
          between big and small businesses has diminished relevance.
                              
                Citing 5 U.S.C. S 608(b), AFM argues that failure to prepare
          a suitable FRFA caused Amendment 7 to lapse. This argument is
          jejune. The lapse provision applies only to delayed compliance
          following the promulgation of emergency rules.  See Thompson, 741
          F.2d at 407-08. That is not the situation here.
                                         25

                    After poring over the FRFA, we conclude that the
          Secretary fulfilled his substantive obligation under section 604.
          The agency's reply to a comment which suggested that the final rule
          violates the spirit of the RFA demonstrates a keen understanding of
          the RFA's objectives and states the parameters of the Secretary's
          obligation quite well:
                    The intent of the RFA is not to limit
                    regulations having adverse economic impacts on
                    small entities, rather the intent is to have
                    the agency focus special attention on the
                    impacts its proposed actions would have on
                    small entities, to disclose to the public
                    which alternatives it considered to lessen
                    adverse impacts, to require the agency to
                    consider public comments on impacts and
                    alternatives, and to require the agency to
                    state its reasons for not adopting an
                    alternative having less of an adverse impact
                    on small entities.
          61 Fed. Reg. at 27,721. The analysis that the agency undertook is
          fully consonant with this aspirational language.
                    To begin with, the IRFA (incorporated into the FRFA)
          describes several possible alternatives and summarizes the
          potential economic impact of each. The agency concluded that each
          of these scenarios would have a greater negative impact on the
          fishing industry than would the proposed rule. For example, the
          agency rejected Alternative 1 (which included a ban on fishing with
          certain gear until the spawning stock biomass reached a minimum
          threshold level) because it would result in unacceptably high
          levels of foregone income; it rejected Alternative 2 (which
          proposed closing half of certain fishing areas and placing
          restrictions in open areas) on the basis that it would be massively
                                         26

          inefficient and would dramatically increase vessel operating costs;
          and it rejected Alternative 4 (which favored a quota system) for
          much the same reasons.
                    The responses to submitted comments (which also form a
          part of the FRFA) discuss and dismiss additional alternatives. For
          example, responding to a comment that characterized closures in the
          Gulf of Maine as detrimental to the industry, NMFS explained that
          this was a temporary default measure to reduce ichthyic mortality
          in situations where DAS reductions were insufficient. In that
          regard, the FRFA noted that the Council had considered reducing DAS
          allotments but declined to pursue that alternative after receiving
          industry comment indicating a preference for flexibility.  See 61
          Fed. Reg. at 27,714-15. By like token, the agency explicated its
          rejection of the status quo alternative, reiterating that Amendment
          5 had been conceived as a means of arresting the decline in
          spawning stock biomass, whereas Amendment 7 responded to a new,
          emerging need and purposed to rebuild the biomass to levels which
          would ensure stability.   See  id. at 27,721. The agency also
          explained why some DAS exemptions under the status quo alternative,
          which had the capacity partially to alleviate burdens on small
          vessels, could not be retained under the more rigorous conservation
          goals of Amendment 7.  See id. at 27,715.
                    We think it is noteworthy, too, that the RFA identifies
          steps taken for the express purpose of mitigating adverse economic
          impacts on small fishing businesses. In this vein, the Secretary
          eliminated a provision requiring layover days, thereby easing the
                                         27

          concerns of smaller vessels (which are more sensitive to inclement
          weather).  See 61 Fed. Reg. at 27,717. Similarly, the Secretary
          phased in the DAS reduction schedule over two years instead of one
          because, though conservationists recommended an 80 percent
          reduction in mortality rates, the Secretary feared that vessels
          could not financially weather a DAS reduction greater than 50
          percent. The Secretary also moved to establish a vessel buyout
          program reducing the socioeconomic burden on small entities.  See
          id. at 27,731.
                    We think that these selected examples convey the flavor
          of the FRFA as a whole. The point is not whether the Secretary's
          judgments are beyond reproach, but whether he made a reasonable,
          good-faith effort to canvass major options and weigh their probable
          effects. Here, the record reveals that the Secretary explicitly
          considered numerous alternatives, exhibited a fair degree of
          sensitivity concerning the need to alleviate the regulatory burden
          on small entities within the fishing industry, adopted some
          salutary measures designed to ease that burden, and satisfactorily
          explained his reasons for rejecting others. The fact that AFM has
          pointed to no 
                       significant alternative that escaped the Secretary's
          notice attests to the thoroughness of the Secretary's efforts.
          Because the Secretary's specification and discussion of significant
          alternatives was reasonable, it fulfilled the substantive
          requirements of section 604.
                    AFM makes one last-ditch argument in respect to section
          604. It carps that the Secretary failed to develop an alternative
                                         28

          that substantially lessens the economic impact on small entities.
          This puts the catch before the cast and, in the bargain, confuses
          what the fishermen desire with what the statute obliges the
          Secretary to do. An adequate discussion of alternatives in an FRFA
          is context-specific. Of necessity, given the distressed condition
          of groundfish stocks in this fishery, any alternative consistent
          with the Secretary's conservation mandate under the Magnuson Act
          will produce economic hardships for the industry. The FRFA reveals
          that the Secretary assessed the potential impact of Amendment 7 on
          small businesses, mulled other options in good faith, and sought to
          strike the best available balance between conservation goals and
          the legitimate concerns of the fishing community. No more is
          exigible.
                                  D.  Section 609.
                    Section 609 of the RFA, 5 U.S.C. S 609, directs agencies
          to assure that small entities are given an opportunity to
          participate in the rulemaking process for any rule that is likely
          to produce significant economic impacts.   AFM claims that the
          Secretary improperly limited participation in the process and
          failed to provide adequate assistance to small entities in
                              
                The 1996 Amendments provide that agency compliance with
          section 609 is subject to judicial review in conjunction with
          judicial review of challenges under amended section 604.   See 5
          U.S.C.A. S 609 (Supp. 1997). Noting that the substantive
          alterations to section 609 effected by the 1996 Amendments are of
          little significance to this appeal, AFM does not pursue its
          retroactivity argument with regard to section 609. Accordingly, we
          test compliance against the language of the provision as it stood
          on May 31, 1996 (the date the Secretary promulgated Amendment 7).
                                         29

          evaluating agency reports. We do not agree.
                    While section 609 instructs the Secretary to assure
          participation, the method and manner of doing so is left primarily
          to the Secretary's sound discretion. In this situation, we are
          satisfied that the Secretary provided adequate participatory
          opportunities for small businesses.
                    Council meetings were open to all interested parties and
          were well-attended. Public hearings were held in six states.
          Scientific data was broadly disseminated through open workshops and
          otherwise.  See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. at 27,714 & 27,720 & 27,723.
          Several representatives of small entities participated in a
          regional stock assessment workshop, at which scientific data was
          presented and peer-reviewed. The nature and volume of the
          submitted comments is emblematic of a very high level of public
          participation. Furthermore, the substance of the comments leaves
          no doubt but that small fishing businesses were intimately familiar
          with the crisis and were well aware of the potential significance
          of the management efforts that were being studied.   See 61 Fed.
          Reg. at 27,712-29.
                    To be sure, the development of Amendment 7 involved
          daunting scientific complexities. That stems from the intrinsic
          nature of the problem, not from some fault on the Secretary's part.
          Since the Secretary provided repeated and varied opportunities for
          meaningful participation by small entities, he met the relatively
          modest demands that section 609 imposes.
                    The complaint that the Secretary did too little to assist
                                         30

          small entities wishing to participate in the process is equally
          unavailing. Section 609 does not mandate specific types of
          assistance. Rather, it offers a list of suggested techniques to
          assure participation.  The legislative history confirms the
          purport of the statutory language; agencies have the discretion to
          select among various methods of outreach.  See 126 Cong. Rec. at
          S21,460. Here, the record discloses that the Secretary handled the
          matter in a perfectly reasonable way.
          VI. CONCLUSION
                    To sum up, it is evident that rapidly deteriorating
          conditions required the Secretary to fish in troubled waters. The
          immediacy of the need to rebuild groundfish stocks left him no easy
          way out. In the absence of a perfect (or even near-perfect)
          solution, he reasoned his way to a decision that balanced the
          significant adverse impacts that Amendment 7 would have on the
                              
                In pertinent part, the statute directs that the promulgating
          agency
                    shall assure that small entities have been
                    given an opportunity to participate in the
                    rulemaking for the rule through techniques
                    such as _
                         (1) the inclusion in an advanced
                         notice of proposed rulemaking, if
                         issued, of a statement that the
                         proposed rule may have a significant
                         economic effect on a substantial
                         number of small entities;
                         . . .
                         (4) the conduct of open conferences
                         or public hearings concerning the
                         rule for small entities; and
                         . . . .
          5 U.S.C. S 609 (1994).
                                         31

          industry against the severe depletion which plagued this fishery
          and the legal obligation to develop an FMP that would eliminate
          overfishing. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record,
          we conclude that the product of his labors _ Amendment 7 _ is
          rational and fairly supported by the record.
                    We need go no further. Although we are not unsympathetic
          to the plight of the individuals who will suffer adverse
          consequences from the choices embodied in the final rule, we must
          uphold the balance struck by the Secretary among competing
          concerns.  See Strycker's Bay N'hood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
          U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam).
          Affirmed.
                                         32