Court Opinion

ID: 9571176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:39.720926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:15.383260
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding in Division 1, wherein the majority acknowledges the issue of whether the award to appellee for temporary business losses was proper (conceding that appellant raises it “by implication” in its second enumeration of error) but disposes of the question by concluding that the issue was not adequately raised at trial. In my view, appellant adequately raised this issue below and we must proceed to address it.
My review of the record indicates that in its motion for new trial, appellant raised the general grounds. Because absolutely no evidence was adduced at trial to show any permanent business loss and the law in this state allows damages to be awarded only for permanent business losses, it follows that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict awarding business loss damages. Consequently, relying on the holding in Dept. of Transp. v. Fitzpatrick, 184 Ga. App. 249, 250 (361 SE2d 241) (1987) that a motion for new trial on the general grounds was sufficient to warrant review, and indeed reversal, of this issue, it was properly raised below here and I would not avoid addressing this important and timely question.
Turning to the merits of the issue, appellee in this case sought damages for three intrusions on its property by appellant, each of which it claimed constituted a “taking”: construction of the frontage road wall; disruption caused by utility trenches on the frontage road and driveway; and dust and debris from the construction which fell on the merchandise (and customers) in appellee’s car lot. The firs two of these embrace a theory of taking by denying access, discusse in Division 2 of the majority opinion, and I disagree with the major *645ity’s conclusion that they were compensable. In my view, if any com-pensable loss occurred, therefore, it must have been attributable to the third intrusion — the dust and debris “fallout” over appellee’s merchandise.
It is perfectly clear, however, from the evidence presented at trial, as well as from the jury’s answer to a special verdict interrogatory that the award of damages for business losses was for the time period “from the beginning of the construction in September, 1985 through the end of [appellee’s] lease expiring April 30, 1986,” that these were temporary losses — not due to any alleged condemnation, but merely temporary inconveniences due to the construction in progress. “ ‘Damages caused by mere temporary inconvenience due to the construction of the project for which the property was taken is not a proper element for consideration in determining just and adequate compensation for condemned realty. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Fitzpatrick, supra at 250 (2). See also Housing Auth., Atlanta v. Southern R. Co., 245 Ga. 229, 232 (IB) (264 SE2d 174) (1980).
Nor does Hillman v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 338 (359 SE2d 637) (1987) require a different result, as argued by appellee. Notwithstanding appellee’s assertion in its brief that had the author of Fitzpatrick known about the Supreme Court’s decision in Hillman the result in Fitzpatrick would have been different, that argument was addressed squarely and decided adversely to appellee in this court’s recent decision in Buck’s Svc. Station v. Dept. of Transp., 191 Ga. App. 341 (381 SE2d 516) (1989). In an opinion authored, interestingly, by the author of Fitzpatrick, this court held that Hillman was not controlling on the issue of business losses, because Hillman relates only to consequential damages, of which business losses is not an element. Rather, “regardless of the holding in Hillman as to the recoverability of ‘temporary’ consequential damages, the holding in Housing Auth [of the City of Atlanta v. Southern R. Co., 245 Ga. 229, 232 (IB) (264 SE2d 174) (1980)] is that only ‘permanent’ business losses are recoverable as a separate element of damages. Unless and until the Supreme Court reviews and overrules its holding in Housing Auth., this court and the trial court are bound thereby, and ‘temporary’ business losses are not recoverable by the condemnee. In this case, we have no more authority to fail to follow the holding in Housing Auth. than this Court had in . . . Fitzpatrick.” Id. at 342. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Buck’s, and perhaps what is merely contemplated in that opinion — reversal of Housing Auth., supra — will take place. However, as the law in this state now stands, this case presents a situation no different from that presented in Buck’s, and accordingly, I would reverse the award of temporary usiness losses.
Although I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority *646in Division 5 of its opinion, I would not reach that issue or the necessity of overruling Brock v. Dept. of Transp., 151 Ga. App. 905 (2) (262 SE2d 156) (1979) or Big-Bin Dispos-All v. City of Valdosta, 172 Ga. App. 746 (324 SE2d 501) (1984).
Decided July 31, 1989
Rehearing denied August 17, 1989
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Marion 0. Gordon, First Assistant Attorney General, Harrison Kohler, Deputy Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Beverly B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Reynolds & McArthur, Charles M. Cork III, for appellee.