Court Opinion

ID: 9627433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:43:29.317002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:50.077044
License: Public Domain

Williams, C.J.
(dissenting) — I disagree that the issue in this case is moot, or of purely academic interest. Had the case become moot, the issue presented is one of substantial public interest, capable of recurring. I would reach the question of the validity of the City of Lynden's ordinance *374633 which prohibits all dancing in establishments where alcoholic beverages are sold. In resolution of that issue, the ordinance is not valid.
Generally, we do not review moot cases or proceedings. Leonard v. Bothell, 87 Wn.2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976); Grays Harbor Paper Co. v. Grays Harbor Cy., 74 Wn.2d 70, 442 P.2d 967 (1968). The term "moot" is generally applied to cases where the determination does not rest on existing facts or rights, cases in which no judgment rendered could be carried into effect, or cases in which no actual controversy exists. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 762 (1962). The majority's position is that the case has become moot because appellant, Harvest House Restaurant, Inc. (Harvest House), has leased the restaurant, and has no existing rights or interest.
Harvest House retains a sufficient interest in the licensed premise to withstand dismissal for mootness. Appellant submitted an affidavit stating that it had an obligation under the .lease to the current proprietors to take back the lease and the liquor license should the existing business fail. In that event, or at the expiration of the lease, Harvest House would again want to resume dancing there. While Harvest House's interest is less immediate than when this litigation began, it is nonetheless real. Property rights include future obligations and the right to operate a lawful business. Lee & Eastes, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 52 Wn.2d 701, 328 P.2d 700 (1958). Harvest House has an existing property interest in the business, and the validity of the statute is not academic to it. At some point in the future, either at the expiration of the lease or sooner, if the current business fails, the judgment in this case will have a direct impact on the appellant. In the interest of judicial economy, we should decide the case now, rather than require appellants to begin the litigation anew.
As an exception to the general rule of declining to decide moot cases, this court will review a case which has substantial public interest. Criteria for determining whether such a public interest exists includes: (1) the public nature of the *375question, (2) the desirability of a decision for the guidance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of recurrence. Leonard v. Bothell, supra at 849; Hartman v. State Game Comm'n, 85 Wn.2d 176, 532 P.2d 614 (1975).
The enacted ordinance has immediate applicability to the residents of Lynden. But beyond its impact on this small community, the case questions the extent of police power authorized to municipalities under our state laws controlling liquor, and is thus of importance to other officials in other municipalities. In addition, the owners of a tavern in Lynden submitted an affidavit stating that they, too, are desirous of obtaining permission to allow dancing on their premises. The majority's dismissal of their interest because there are no facts from which to determine the ordinance's applicability to them, ignores that this case presents issues of law only. We are not asked to direct the issuance of a permit to allow dancing, but to determine the validity of the ordinance in question.
The degree of regulation permitted governmental entities varies with the classification of the business and the authority under which it is passed. The right of the State to control and regulate alcoholic beverages is long established, and the State may prohibit it entirely. State ex rel. Shannon v. Sponburgh, 66 Wn.2d 135, 401 P.2d 635 (1965); State ex rel. Thornbury v. Gregory, 191 Wash. 70, 70 P.2d 788 (1937). Businesses which involve some social or economic evil, including liquor, may be regulated to a greater extent than ordinary business pursuits conducted on private property. Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wn.2d 747, 505 P.2d 126 (1973). Some conduct, otherwise constitutionally protected, may be prohibited by a state under its broad powers of regulation of liquor. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342, 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972). We recognized in Seattle v. Hinkley, 83 Wn.2d 205, 208, 517 P.2d 592 (1973) that the power of the State to regulate liquor has been extended to municipalities under RCW 66.08.120 and RCW 66.28.080.
The powers of a municipality to regulate are not without *376limit. Const. art. 11, § 11 authorizes cities to adopt ordinances in the exercise of their police power so long as they are not in conflict with the state constitution or general laws, and further provided the state enactment does not show on its face that it was intended to be exclusive. State v. Lundquist, 60 Wn.2d 397, 374 P.2d 246 (1962). The ordinance must bear a reasonable relation to a lawful purpose — the promotion of health, welfare, safety, or morals. Lundquist, at 400. The power of a political subdivision is limited strictly to that granted by the Legislature. State ex rel. Bain v. Clallam Cy. Bd. of Cy. Comm'rs, 77 Wn.2d 542, 463 P.2d 617 (1970); State ex rel. King Cy. v. Superior Court, 33 Wn.2d 76, 204 P.2d 514 (1949).
The Legislature has preempted the field of liquor licensing and taxation, but granted municipalities power to adopt police ordinances and regulations not in conflict with RCW Title 66 or regulations made by the Liquor Control Board. RCW 66.08.120.2 RCW Title 66 is an exercise of police power for the protection of the health, welfare, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the state. RCW 66.08.010. Thus, any ordinance enacted by a municipality which regulates liquor must first not conflict with other provisions of RCW Title 66 and, second, must be reasonably related to the legitimate exercise of police power. See also State v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 615 P.2d 461 (1980); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn.2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
*377Lynden's ordinance,3 prohibiting all dancing on state licensed premises, conflicts with state law. We have said that a conflict exists when '". . . the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa . . . Judged by such a test, an ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which the statute permits'." Sno-homish Cy. v. State, 97 Wn.2d 646, 649, 648 P.2d 430 (1982), quoting State v. Lundquist, supra. RCW 66.28.080 permits dancing on licensed premises under some circumstances. Lynden's ordinance forbids dancing under all circumstances.
RCW 66.28.080 provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation holding any retailer's license to permit or allow upon the premises licensed any music, dancing, or entertainment whatsoever, unless and until permission thereto is specifically granted by appropriate license or permit of the proper authorities of the city or town in which such licensed premises are situated . . .
(Italics mine.) It is apparent that the authority granted municipalities is to issue or deny permits. Corral, Inc. v. State Liquor Control Bd., 17 Wn. App. 753, 759, 566 P.2d 214 (1977). The issuance or denial of permits involves a discretionary determination made on the basis of individual permit applications. Peterson v. Department of Ecology, 92 Wn.2d 306, 596 P.2d 285 (1979). The enactment of an ordinance which absolutely bans dancing on licensed premises precludes exercise of discretion. No reading of the statute suggests that a total ban was within the scope of authority delegated by RCW 66.28.080.
The City argues that the grant of authority to permit dancing entails the authority to withhold permission. This is certainly true. Nevertheless authority to grant or deny *378permission of dancing is not equatable to across-the-board prohibition. The Legislature did no more than delegate to local authorities discretionary power to act on individual permit applications.
If a state of facts can be conceived to exist which justifies the regulation enacted under police powers, the facts will be presumed to exist. Homes Unlimited, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 154, 158, 579 P.2d 1331 (1978). Lynden argues that the prohibition on dancing will enable the city to maintain a smaller police force.
While some forms of dancing and other entertainment have been deemed to require additional police resources, dancing per se on premises where liquor is served does not lead to the same conclusion.4 Nude dancing has been legitimately banned, in part because of the tendency of other illegal activities to occur simultaneously. See California v. LaRue, supra; Richter v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 559 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1977); Bolser v. State Liquor Control Bd., 90 Wn.2d 223, 580 P.2d 629 (1978).
Prohibition of nude dancing has been shown necessary by a factual nexus between its occurrence and police involvement. For example, in LaRue, hearings had been held which disclosed sexual conduct between dancers and customers, prostitution, rape, and assault on police in and around licensed premises. In Richter, hearings showed that a vast number of various crimes were taking place on or near the premises which had sexually explicit entertainment. In Bolser, a showing was made that there were increases in arrests of disorderly persons, and other violations of the liquor act where topless table dancing was permitted.
Lynden has not made any such showing of a connection *379between dancing per se and increased need for police intervention. A Lynden police officer testified that he had responded to calls for assistance to break up barroom brawls in neighboring communities that permit dancing on licensed premises. The officer was unable to say whether there was any connection between dancing and the brawls, or even whether the bars to which he was called permitted dancing.
Lynden introduced evidence that its police force was smaller than other towns of comparable size that permit dancing in bars. Many factors may account for the difference in size of the respective police forces. None of those possible factors were eliminated, nor were any correlations offered to show that dancing in bars created the need for a larger police force.
Respondent cites Bungalow Amusement Co. v. Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269 P. 1043, 60 A.L.R. 166 (1928) for the proposition that a municipality may totally ban public dance halls. To the extent that this case retains any current vitality, it can be distinguished. There the ordinance was concerned with permits for operation of dance halls in which permits had been procured by fraud, or where indecent or violent acts were permitted, or where solicitation of dances or drinks on a commission basis occurred. The evils sought to be avoided in the ordinance in that case were rationally related to legitimate ends.
Conclusion
The controversy in this case is not moot, because appellant retains an interest in the current lease of the premises. The ordinance passed by the City Council of Lynden conflicts with RCW 66.28.080 by prohibiting what the statute permits. A total prohibition of dancing is not rationally related to the promotion of the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the public, and is therefore invalid.
Rosellini and Dore, JJ., concur with Williams, C.J.

RCW 66.08.120 provides:
"No municipality or county shall have power to license the sale of, or impose an excise tax upon, liquor as defined in this title, or to license the sale or distribution thereof in any manner; and any power now conferred by law on any municipality or county to license premises which may be licensed under this section, or to impose an excise tax upon liquor, or to license the sale and distribution thereof, as defined in this title, shall be suspended and shall be of no further effect: Provided, That municipalities and counties shall have power to adopt police ordinances and regulations not in conflict with this title or with the regulations made by the board."

In 1981, Lynden adopted ordinance 633 amending chapter 5.04 of the Lynden Municipal Code, as follows:
"5.04.035 Dancing Prohibited — When. Dancing, either singly, or in groups of two (2) or more persons, is prohibited in any establishment where beer, wine or other intoxicating beverages are sold for on-premises consumption."

The prohibition of dancing was enacted as a part of an ordinance which does permit dancing and serving liquor. Issuance of single dance permits is limited to three permits by one applicant in any 60-day period. The appellant did not raise this possible equal protection argument, and I mention it only to illustrate that the Lynden City Council must not have believed that drinking and dancing inevitably leads to evil results.