Court Opinion

ID: 9474454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:57:28.07115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:05.393974
License: Public Domain

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion insofar as it affirms the conviction of appellant Paul Briggs on the count of conspiracy to transport vehicles in interstate commerce. I join in the remainder of the majority’s opinion.
Briggs was charged with and convicted of two counts of the ten count indictment: one count alleging he was part of a conspiracy to transport stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2312, and the other alleging the substantive offense of receiving a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. Count 1, the conspiracy count, charges that codefendant Shirl Kapp stole a 1977 Peterbilt Tractor; that code-fendants Robert Miller, Kapp and Robert Lewis stole a 1973 Kenworth Tractor; that Kapp, Miller and Ronald Klingler transported a stolen 1978 Freightliner Tractor; and that Klingler and Kapp stole a 1981 International Harvester Tractor. Briggs was neither charged with nor implicated in any of those thefts.
The only charge as to Briggs was that Kapp sold a stolen 1978 International Tractor to Briggs, and that Briggs concealed and stored this vehicle in his garage. The sale of the 1978 International Tractor to Briggs was also the basis of the substantive count against Briggs of receiving a stolen motor vehicle.
As the majority correctly notes, the relationship of a buyer and seller does not establish conspiracy to transport stolen goods even though the parties know of the stolen nature of the goods. Majority op. at 1010. What is missing is the element of a joint objective to commit the underlying *1015offense charged. As this court stated in United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977), “to convict a defendant of participating in a conspiracy, there must be some evidence tending to prove that he entered into an agreement and that he knew the agreement had the specific unlawful purpose charged in the indictment.” (emphasis in original).
“The sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy prosecution requires close scrutiny.” United States v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168, 171 (7th Cir.1975). As we stated in United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840, 841 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939, 77 S.Ct. 814, 1 L.Ed.2d 761 (1957), “The question is whether all the pieces of evidence against the defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” With these general legal principles in mind, it is necessary to review the evidence presented against Briggs.
The conviction of Briggs is tied to the testimony of two witnesses. Shirl Kapp testified that he transported the stolen 1978 International from Indiana to his residence at Shippenville, Pennsylvania, after it had been pointed out to him by Jack Gillum, and Gillum supplied the key. App. at 88a. Kapp testified that Gillum did not give him any paper or title with the vehicle, and that he proceeded to hunt for paperwork or a title to put on it. He went to several people and eventually wound up with Briggs. Kapp testified he told Briggs that he had a truck that he needed paperwork for, that he had to get back at work, and asked Briggs if he might have any. He told Briggs that the truck was an insurance scam, that it had been burned and that the owner did not want it to turn up again. He testified that Briggs “supplied the paperwork”, which consisted of “a title. The same kind of title you get for your car or whatever, that proves ownership.” App. at 92a.
Briggs testified that he had an inoperable truck that he was keeping for parts, that Kapp contacted him seeking cab parts, and that he provided Kapp with the truck and its title because he figured Kapp “was as broke as I was.” App. at 243a. He denied supplying Kapp the paperwork without the truck. App. at 266a. Kapp’s testimony also supports Briggs’ story that Kapp contacted him for cab parts. He testified:
Q. At some point you went to Mr. Briggs and told him that you needed parts for a truck. Isn’t that correct? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And isn’t it also true that one of the parts you needed is what is called a cab? A. Well, he give me a whole truck for parts, sir.
Q. Did you give him any money?
A. No, sir. He wouldn’t take any money. I offered to pay him.
Q. On the evening that you went over to speak to Mr. Briggs about this — Was it a junked truck. I imagine, or was it a—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You went over and you told him you needed a junked truck for parts to do what? To reassemble a truck that needed repair?
A. Well, I just needed some parts for the truck that I had already gotten. Q. And you didn’t know what particular truck you wanted at that point. Is that correct? In other words, you didn’t have in mind a specific truck that he owned? A. No, sir.
Q. And you were not aware exactly where the trucks that he owned were on his property. Is that correct?
A. No, sir, — or yes, sir, that’s correct. He has got trucks all over his property. Q. He has a very large piece of property, in fact. Isn’t that true?
A. Yes, sir.
App. at 127a-128a. We can assume that the jury could have found that Briggs in fact supplied only the paperwork, as Kapp testified on direct examination. That is not the significant fact in this transaction. Although the majority says that “it is uncertain that [Briggs] knew the truck was stolen at this point in time”, Majority op. at *10161011, in fact there is no evidence whatsoever in the record to show that Briggs knew that the truck was stolen at the time he supplied the paperwork at Kapp’s request.
Briggs’ second connection with the truck occurred several months later. In the interval, Kapp had used the truck for several months to haul coal, which was the way he made his living. After Gillum returned Kapp’s truck. Gillum wanted to sell the 1978 International and asked Kapp if he knew anybody who would be interested in buying it. Kapp replied that “there’s several people that’s in trucking in our area and they buy used trucks, new and used.” App. at 93a. Kapp knew that Briggs needed a truck because “his GMC had went sour on him, it blowed up or something.” App. at 98a. Thereafter, Kapp telephoned Briggs to see if he was interested in buying a truck. Kapp testified:
Q. When you spoke to Mr. Briggs on the phone, did he indicate that he was interested in buying a truck?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you tell him that you were in any particular hurry to buy — to sell the truck?
A. Just that the owner wanted to go back home and if he wanted to see it, that it was there, and to talk to the owner.
Q. So did you set up an appointment for him to come and see the truck at the time?
A. I believe I went down and picked him up.
Q. How much did he pay for that truck? A. I believe it was $5,000.
Q. When you called him on the phone, did you tell him — When you called him on the phone, you did not know it was a stolen truck. Isn’t that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you picked him up to go see the truck, you were not aware that it was a stolen truck. Is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When Mr. Briggs examined the truck, he did not know it was a stolen truck. Is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was this truck an International?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Briggs when he paid his money for this truck that it was a stolen truck?
A. No, sir.
App. at 130a-131a.
Kapp’s final testimony with respect to Briggs was to the effect that he told Briggs that the truck was stolen months after the transaction when, as developed by other testimony, he became concerned about the investigation in this case. He testified:
Q. Later on you called Mr. Briggs on the phone and you asked him if you could repurchase the truck. Is that true? Several months later?
A. Yes.
Q. Approximately how long was that?
A. I just couldn’t tell you on the time.
Q. Fine. He refused to sell it to you. Isn’t that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you told him at that time for the first time, it is your testimony, I believe, that you told him that this was a stolen truck.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He still didn’t sell it back to you, did he?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you advise him to hide it or not to run it?
A. I told him to get rid of it.
Q. He kept running it, though, didn’t he?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. As far as you know, he never stopped running it. Is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
App. at 132a-133a.
This is corroborated not only by Briggs’ testimony but by the testimony of Mrs. Kapp, another government witness. Briggs testified:
*1017Q. Did someone eventually offer to buy this truck from you?
A. Yes. Some time maybe three or four months before they — the authorities came, either Mr. Kapp sent someone to my house or — he didn’t call me, but maybe he sent word over that he wanted to buy the truck or was thinking about buying the truck off me, and I told him that I bought a 1974 International [which Briggs testified that he thought it was] and I wanted to keep it. I had been hunting that for a long time, that particular motor, and I didn’t want to sell it; and there was maybe some ill wind that the truck might have been stolen or something, but I didn’t believe them, and I figured I was right and I was going to keep my truck, and so I wasn’t interested in selling it at no time.
Q. Did you keep on running it after this—
A. I kept right on running it until it expired just a few days or a week or so before the authorities come to my place.
App. at 258a-259a.
Mrs. Kapp also testified that she overheard a conversation in September or October of 1982 between her husband and Briggs, about the International and in which Kapp told Briggs Gillum said the truck “was hot and Mr. Briggs was supposed to get rid of it.” App. at 40a.
It is evident that nothing in any of this testimony implicates Briggs in a conspiracy to transport stolen motor vehicles. According to Kapp, who was the individual who handled the transaction with Briggs, Briggs did not know the truck was stolen at the time he purchased it. A fortiori, Briggs could not be implicated in the conspiracy to transport the truck which was stolen and transported months before.
The second witness on whom the government and the majority rely for the conviction of Briggs was John (Jack) Gillum. Although Gillum was implicated in all or almost all of the thefts which were the subject of this indictment, he was not named therein. He had, however, been indicted in 1982 in the Southern District of Indiana on seven counts, agreed to cooperate, and thereafter pled guilty to one count of concealing a stolen vehicle. In 1976, he had been convicted in connection with some stolen lumber.
Gillum admitted to stealing the 1978 International vehicle with Kapp from Indiana, after which Kapp hauled coal with it for awhile. Gillum testified:
Q. And what happened to it after Mr. Kapp was hauling coal?
A. Mr. Kapp and I sold it to Paul Briggs.
Q. And when the vehicle was stolen was there any paper work or title with the vehicle?
A. Yes. It was my understanding that Sonny had a title for it.
MR. HEFFERNAN: Objection as to what his understanding was.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. Do you know — Was there a title or paper work with the vehicle when you stole it?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. Do you know where the title work for that vehicle came from?
A. No, ma’am, I don’t.
Q. Did Mr. Kapp tell you?
THE WITNESS: Yes, he did.
MRS. JORDAN: Your Honor, in accordance with the prior ruling of the Court,—
Q. What did Mr. Kapp tell you about the title work?
Q. What did Mr. Kapp tell you about the paper work?
A. He told me that he got a title from Mr. Briggs.
App. at 145a-146a.
There were two meetings between Gil-lum, Kapp and Briggs on the day the 1978 International was sold to him. After Kapp contacted Briggs about buying a truck, Kapp transported Briggs to his place, *1018which was nearby, to see the truck. Briggs testified he believed it was a 1974 International that “looked rough, but it had the type of motor in it that I wanted.” App. at 244a. He told Kapp that the most he would give for it was $5,000. App. at 245a.
Before he went to Kapp’s to look at the truck, he had arranged to sell one of his trucks to another buyer. After seeing Kapp’s truck, he made arrangements to get a $5,000 check from his buyer and he and his buyer went together to the bank to cash that check. Briggs then called Kapp who came over again and picked him up and took him back to the truck. App. at 246a. Briggs then walked around the truck to make sure that it hadn’t been dismantled while he was gone and then said “well it’s a deal”. Briggs testified:
Q. I went to hand Mr. Kapp the money (indicating), and there was a — I found out later it was a Mr. Gillum there. He kind of reached in across and he said, “That’s my money,” and he snatched it. He grabbed it. So it ended up that I don’t really think Kapp put the money in his pocket. I think Mr. Gillum got it.
App. at 247a. Briggs also testified:
Q. When you gave — When you handed Mr. Kapp the money, at that point had he told you that this was a stolen truck?
A. Absolutely not. I wouldn’t have bought it if it was a stolen truck.
Q. Did Mr. Gillum tell you at this time?
A. No. I wouldn’t have bought it off him either.
Q. Did you receive anything else?
A. Yeah. When I made a deal with Mr. Kapp at this time, he gave me a title, and I looked at it and it said Shirl Kapp on it and it said International.
Q. I show you what had been marked as Defendant’s Exhibit T and I ask you if you can identify this.
A. Yes. This is a copy of the title I received from Mr. Kapp at that time.
Q. What year does this title say that this truck is, Mr. Briggs?
A. It didn’t. It didn’t say what. The year is blank.
Q. What make does this title say that this vehicle is?
A. It says it’s an International.
Q. Directing your attention to the back of that exhibit, whose signature appears in the space marked for seller?
A. Shirl F. Kapp.
Q. And to whom or what was this vehicle sold?
A. Excuse me?
Q. To whom was this vehicle sold to? A. It was sold to Aze, Incorporated, Knox, R.D. 2.
Q. Who signed on behalf of Aze, Incorporated?
A. I did as company president.
App. at 247a-249a.
The title was admitted into evidence.
The sole testimony which the majority states is the basis for affirming Briggs’ conviction of conspiracy appears in the last three lines of the following colloquy from the testimony of Gillum:
Q. Now you said you sold the vehicle to Mr. Briggs?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And how much did you sell it to him for?
A. I think $10,000.
Q. Did he ever pay you for the vehicle?
A. He paid $5,000, I think, possibly six.
Q. And how did he pay you?
A. Cash.
Q. Did you ever have any face-to-face dealings with Mr. Briggs?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What did you tell Mr. Briggs about the vehicle?
A. I told him it was stolen and we had no paper work for it.
Q. What did he say?
A. He says, “I’ve got the paper work. ”
App. at 146a-147a (emphasis added).
Gillum’s testimony is in conflict with that of the government witness Kapp who testi*1019fied Briggs was not told at that time that the vehicle was stolen. However, even the majority concedes that the mere purchase of the stolen vehicle would not suffice to make Briggs a conspirator to transport vehicles. Instead the majority relies on Gil-lum’s answer “He says, ‘I’ve got the paper work’ ”.
However, Gillum’s testimony itself shows some confusion with respect to the status of the title to the truck. On cross-examination, he conceded that when the truck was sold to Briggs it already had title to it.
Q. Now the truck, that wasn’t titled in Jack Gillum’s name, was it, sir?
A. No, sir.
Q. That tiuck was titled in Sonny Kapp’s name. Is that correct, sir?
A. That’s correct.
Q. So when that truck was sold to Paul Briggs, it already had a title to it. Is that correct, sir?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And that title was in the name of Sonny Kapp, and then it was eventually transferred to Aze Corporation. Is that correct?
A. I’m not sure.
Q. Well, it was sold to Mr. Briggs?
A. That’s right.
App. at 174a.
If, as Kapp, Briggs and Gillum also agree, there was already paperwork accompanying the 1978 International, there was no need for Briggs to supply paperwork a second time. Neither the government nor the majority offers any, much less a plausible, explanation.
Furthermore, Gillum, at another part of his testimony, appears to acknowledge that Briggs had no inculpatory knowledge until substantially after he bought the vehicle. He testified:
Q. Did you ever make a comment to Sonny Kapp, “Is Old Man Briggs still running that International?”
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
Q. So you were asking Sonny Kapp about Paul Briggs and his use of that International. Is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And didn’t Sonny Kapp ask you if he should tell Paul Briggs about the questionable origin of that 1974 International?
A. Repeat that now?
THE COURT: Would the reporter read the question back? (Last question read.)
A. Yes, I think he did.
THE REPORTER: “What were the exact words, if you can recall, of what he said to you?”
THE WITNESS: Of what Mr. Kapp said to me?
Q. With regards to Mr. Briggs.
A. I asked him if Mr. Briggs knew what was going on.
Q. And what did Sonny Kapp say?
A. “No.”
Q. And what did you say?
A. “Well, just let the son of a bitch rest. Okay?”
Q. And what did Sonny Kapp say to you?
A. “Think I ought to go tell him?”
Q. What did that mean, “Think I ought to go tell him?”
A. That the FBI was investigating the tractor.
Q. Okay, and what was your reply?
A. “No.”
App. at 191a-198a.
As this court said in United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308, 310-11 (3d Cir.1975):
It is imperative, however, that we keep in mind the essential nature of what a conspiracy is in general and what this particular conspiracy was proven to be. It is well established that the “gist” of a conspiracy is an agreement. However slight or circumstantial the evidence may be, it must, in order to be sufficient to warrant affirmance, tend to prove that the appellant entered into some form of agreement, formal or informal, with his *1020alleged co-conspirators. Similarly, we have stated that the essence of a conspiracy is a “unity of purpose” or “common design.”
(footnotes omitted).
In considering a contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of conspiracy, our task is to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government in order to determine if the factfinder could find the requisite agreement beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d at 253. When the evidence has, in fact, been inadequate, we have not hesitated to overturn the conviction. See United States v. Cooper, supra; United States v. Kates, supra; United States v. De Cavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1272-75 (3d Cir.1971).
This trial involved a number of transactions regarding other defendants and vehicles with which Briggs was not involved. His involvement with the purchase of a stolen 1978 International is not enough to convict him of conspiracy to transport stolen vehicles. The government did not charge Briggs with conspiracy to receive a stolen vehicle. Thus, even if it could have proven that unlawful conspiracy, it was not the crime which it charged. See United States v. De Cavalcante, 440 F.2d at 1275.
The majority’s theory is that it was Briggs’ “providing of the fraudulent paperwork the second time for what he then knew was a stolen vehicle that implicates him in the conspiracy.” Majority at 1011. There is no evidence that Briggs knew that the vehicle he was buying was the one involved in the earlier transaction for which he supplied paperwork. Even if we accept Gillum’s testimony that he told Briggs at the time of the sale that the vehicle was stolen (which contradicts all of the other relevant government witnesses on this point), it is the supposed supply of paperwork the second time that constitutes the element of conspiracy.
The government produced no evidence that Briggs in fact supplied paperwork a second time. No one testified to that, and it defies logic. Kapp testified he gave Briggs the title, which Kapp already had in his name. Gillum agreed that there was indeed paperwork accompanying the truck when it was sold to Briggs. The mere testimony by Gillum that Briggs said “I’ve got the paper work,” is too slender a reed to sustain Briggs’ conviction on this count, on which Briggs was sentenced to serve four years in jail.
Even if the evidence is viewed in the implausible manner in which the majority views it, there is yet another disturbing aspect to the majority’s analysis. Neither the government nor the majority contends that Briggs knew of or participated in the actual transport of the 1978 International. Concededly, a person who knowingly supplies paperwork to enable those who have transported a stolen truck in interstate commerce to use it or sell it may be found to have evinced a common purpose with the other conspirators and thereby joined the conspiracy. Thus, if there had been any evidence from which the jury could have found that Briggs knew the truck was stolen the first time he provided the paperwork, which assisted Kapp in using the truck or which would have assisted Kapp and Gillum in selling it, Briggs’ conviction for conspiracy should be upheld.
However, under the majority’s theory, Briggs' nexus with the conspiracy is proven by (1) his supply of paperwork “the second time” and (2) his being told at that time by Gillum that the vehicle was stolen. Since it is uncontradicted on this record that at the time of the sale of the truck to Briggs it already had the necessary papers, the majority fails to explain how Briggs, when providing a second set of papers in connection with the sale to himself, is tied any closer to the common purpose of the conspiracy than if he knowingly purchased a stolen truck. Because the majority concedes that the latter situation would not establish a conspiracy to transport a stolen vehicle, I find its affirmance in this situation inexplicable.
It is questionable whether the evidence to connect Briggs to the conspiracy would be sufficient even under the “slight evi*1021dence” rule, now repudiated by the circuits that spawned it, see United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); United States v. Silverman, 771 F.2d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir.1985), and not relied upon by the majority. As this court has previously stated, it would be reversible error to charge a jury that it may connect a participating defendant to a conspiracy by “slight evidence”, rather than by evidence proving the connection beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d at 253. More recently, we explained in United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 573 n. 4 (3d Cir.1984), that the “slight evidence” rule does not lessen the government’s ultimate burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, the majority fails to explain or even attempt to explain how the meager evidence introduced as to Briggs suffices under any standard of review to satisfy the evidentiary standard required to support a conviction in a criminal case.