Court Opinion

ID: 9699415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:23:07.690261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:50.033223
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge:
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the presumption created by § 1212 of the Motor Vehicle Code.1 This presumption is unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh, 468 Pa. 618, 364 A.2d 687 (1976). Alternatively, we believe that the Commonwealth did not produce sufficient evidence to convict appellant of violating the Motor Vehicle Code. Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh, supra. Accordingly, we order appellant discharged.
On June 22, 1975, Pennsylvania State police officers observed drag races on a public highway in Lancaster County. The police officers recorded the license number of a participating vehicle and determined that appellant owned the car. The police officers subsequently filed criminal complaints charging appellant with three counts of drag racing and several other traffic offenses. On November 7, 1975, appellant filed an Application to Quash Indictments based on the *484alleged unconstitutionality of § 1212 of the Motor Vehicle Code. In particular, appellant asserted that the presumption created by § 1212 unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to appellant, infringed his right not to incriminate himself, and violated due process. The lower court dismissed this application. On November 21, 1975, appellant waived his right to trial by jury and trial commenced. At appellant’s trial, the parties stipulated that: “. [T]he Commonwealth has in fact made out a prima facie case of Racing on the Highway, and the further stipulation is that the identity of the Defendant is being proved only by the presumption in the Vehicle Code, Section 1212 of the Vehicle Code, prima facie evidence of his registration.” The court accepted this stipulation and then listened to appellant’s counsel argue that § 1212 violated the United States Constitution for the reasons specified in the Application to Quash Indictments. At the conclusion of this argument, the lower court found appellant guilty of all charges. Appellant’s counsel and the lower court then engaged in the following interchange:
“[Appellant’s counsel]: The defense at this time would enter a motion.
“THE COURT: I mean that the Court finds the Defendant guilty on the three misdemeanor charges as enumerated by the District Attorney and on the seven summary offenses as also enumerated by the District Attorney, and refers to the terms and numbers of those cases as heretofore more fully set forth, and finds the Defendant guilty.
“[Appellant’s counsel]: Off the record.
“(Discussion off the record.)
“THE COURT: The Court bases this decision on the presumption of the Act of Assembly here and above quoted that indicates that there is a presumption that the owner of the car was driving it at the time of the alleged violation, and that it’s his burden to overcome that presumption under *485the present law until changed by an appellate court if so done.
“[Appellant’s counsel]: The defense, at this time, would enter a motion for a new trial and arrest of judgment.
“THE COURT: I direct you not only to file the motions in writing within seven days but get that stipulation signed before you forget about it, the waiver of jury trial.”
In the official docket, the lower court made an entry confirming that appellant had made an oral post-verdict motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. At no time did the court give the required Rule 1123(c) warnings as to the necessity of filing specific post-verdict motions in order to preserve contentions for appellate review.2 Subsequently, appellant filed boiler-plate written post-verdict motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. On June 17, 1975, the lower court denied appellant’s post-verdict motions; the court filed an opinion thoroughly discussing and rejecting appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 1212. On July 9, 1976, the lower court imposed a one year term of probation upon appellant. This appeal followed.
In his brief, before us, appellant specifically asserts the unconstitutionality of the § 1212 presumption. The Commonwealth’s reply brief consists of one sentence acknowledging that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared the § 1212 presumption unconstitutional, Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh, supra, and agreeing that appellant should therefore be discharged. The Dissenting Opinion however, would hold that appellant did not properly preserve his challenge to the unconstitutionality of the § 1212 presumption, and would remand for a hearing on whether appellant intelligently waived this claim.
*486We believe that appellant properly preserved his constitutional challenge for appellate review. Our Court has recently held that a defendant may preserve contentions for our consideration by making specific oral post-verdict motions on the record at the conclusion of trial pursuant to Rule 1123(b). Commonwealth v. Erhart, 248 Pa.Super. 481, 375 A.2d 342 (Filed June 29, 1977); Commonwealth v. Kinsey, 249 Pa.Super. 371, 375 A.2d 727 (Filed June 29, 1977); Commonwealth v. Babb, 246 Pa.Super. 471, 371 A.2d 933 (Filed March 31, 1977). In the instant case, all pre-trial, trial,3 and post-trial proceedings focussed exclusively on one issue; the constitutionality of the § 1212 presumption. Indeed, the Commonwealth and appellant stipulated that this was the only issue involved in the case. After a thorough discussion of the constitutionality of the presumption at trial, the lower court explicitly predicated its guilty verdict upon the operation of the presumption. Appellant’s counsel immediately filed a motion for a new trial and arrest of judgment; the record makes patently clear that this motion could only refer to appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the § 1212 presumption.4 The lower court accepted the filing of this motion and responded with a thorough opinion on the issue raised by appellant. Under these circumstances, we hold that appellant specifically and properly preserved his constitutional challenge by filing oral post-verdict motions on the record at the conclusion of trial pursuant *487to Rule 1123(b).5 Accordingly, we reach the merits of appellant’s argument.
In Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh, supra, 468 Pa. at 624, 364 A.2d at 690, our Supreme Court declared that the § 1212 presumption violated the following constitutional rights of a defendant:
“(1) That all men are innocent until ‘proven’ guilty. See Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441 (1959).
“(2) The Fifth Amendment protection not to be compelled to testify when one is a criminal defendant. See Fifth Amendment to U. S. Constitution. See also art. I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Act of May 23,1887, P.L. 158, § 10, 19 P.S. § 631.
“(3) The requirement that the Commonwealth prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974).”
Accordingly, the Court reversed a conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an accident because the Commonwealth relied solely on the § 1212 presumption to establish that Slaybaugh operated the offending vehicle.
If Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh applies to cases pending on appeal when it was decided, then Slaybaugh controls the instant case. In Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977), our Supreme Court recently divided sharply over the proper standard to be employed in determining whether a new court interpretation of constitutional law applies to cases pending on appeal at the time of its decision. In Cain, the Commonwealth charged appellant with murder. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on voluntary *488manslaughter. An appeal followed conviction. While Cain’s appeal was pending, our Supreme Court, pursuant to its supervisory powers, announced a prospective rule that in a homicide trial, trial courts must, if requested, charge a jury on voluntary manslaughter, despite the lack of evidence to support such a verdict. Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 322 A.2d 119 (1974). Shortly thereafter, a Third Circuit panel held that a trial court’s refusal to give a requested voluntary manslaughter charge in a murder case violated due process. United States ex rel. Matthews v. Johnson, 503 F.2d 339 (3rd Cir. 1974). In United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson, 536 F.2d 1013 (3rd Cir. 1976), a Third Circuit panel held that Matthews only governed cases tried after Matthews. Our Supreme Court subsequently confronted Cain’s appeal, and an equally divided court affirmed his conviction.
Justice (now Chief Justice) EAGEN filed an Opinion in Support of Affirmance in which Chief Justice JONES and Justice POMEROY joined. In addressing the issue of the applicability of Matthews to Cain’s appeal, Justice EAGEN considered the following three factors:
“ ‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards;
‘(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and
‘(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.’
Matthews, supra at 347-8, quoting from [United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424, 431-32 (3rd Cir. 1971)]; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 [1965]. . .."
In particular, Justice EAGEN, quoting from Cannon, supra at 1016, stressed that “. . . ‘foremost’ consideration should be given ‘to the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule,’ and the later holding of Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971), that retroactivity should be accorded *489‘[wjhere the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.’ ” Commonwealth v. Cain, supra, 471 Pa. at 161, 369 A.2d at 1245. (Emphasis in original). Justice EAGEN determined that the rule of Matthews impaired, rather than aided, the jury’s truth-finding function. Moreover past Commonwealth reliance on the old standard and a future burdensome impact on judicial administration militated against applying Matthews to pending appeals. Accordingly, Justice EAGEN refused to apply Matthews to cases tried before the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Jones, supra.6
Justice ROBERTS authored an Opinion in Support of Reversal in which Justices O’BRIEN and MANDERINO joined. Justice ROBERTS stated his belief that a court deciding a case on direct appeal has an obligation to apply the decisional constitutional law as it exists at the time of its judgment and not as it existed at the time of trial. In essence, no question of retroactivity confronted the Court because appellant’s conviction had not yet been “finalized” by the exhaustion of direct appeals. Accordingly, Justice ROBERTS asserted that the three factors considered by Justice EAGEN were inappropriate considerations in determining the applicability of new court made constitutional rules to cases pending on direct appeal. Moreover, Justice EAGEN’S approach would have the inequitable result of according unequal treatment to similarly situated individu*490als. Therefore, Justice ROBERTS would have reversed Cain’s conviction.7
Regardless of whether one applies the standard advocated by Justice EAGEN or that championed by Justice ROBERTS, Slaybaugh controls the instant case. Justice ROBERTS’ approach, of course, automatically requires Slaybaugh’s application. Justice EAGEN’S standard requires that ‘retroactivity’ be accorded “. . . [wjhere the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.” Commonwealth v. Cain, supra, 471 Pa. at 162, 369 A.2d at 1245. (Emphasis in original) In Slaybaugh, our Supreme Court invalidated the § 1212 presumption because, in part, it shifted the burden of proof to a defendant and because it was not logically tenable to assume that an owner of a car necessarily operated the car at the time of a Motor Vehicle Code infraction. In short, the presumption severely compromised the integrity of the fact-finding process and raised serious questions about the accuracy of past guilty verdicts. Under Justice EAGEN’S approach, therefore, Slaybaugh should be applied to the instant case. Because the lower court expressly premised its finding of guilt on the § 1212 presumption, we order appellant discharged.
Assuming that appellant failed to preserve specifically his challenge to the constitutionality of § 1212, we still believe that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to convict appellant of the crimes charged. The Dissenting Opinion concedes that appellant properly pre*491served this contention. Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh quite clearly states that the § 1212 presumption does not alone provide sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an owner operated his car at the time of a Vehicle Code infraction. Accordingly, we hold that the Commonwealth’s failure to adduce sufficient evidence to identify appellant as the operator of his car on June 22,1975, provides an alternative basis for discharging appellant.
Because the § 1212 presumption is unconstitutional and is not alone sufficient to prove that appellant operated his vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, we order appellant discharged.
WATKINS, former President Judge, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
PRICE, J., files a dissenting opinion.
VAN der VOORT, J., files a Dissenting Opinion in which JACOBS, President Judge, joins.

. The Motor Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 1212; Act of July 13, 1959, P.L. 534, § 1; 75 P.S. § 1212. Repealed, Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 7, effective July 1, 1977. 75 P.S. § 1212 provided: “In any proceeding for a violation of the provisions of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, the registration plate displayed on such vehicle or tractor shall be prima facie evidence that the owner of such vehicle or tractor was then operating the same. If at any hearing or proceeding, the owner shall testify, under oath or affirmation, that he was not operating the said vehicle or tractor at the time of the alleged violation of this act or any local ordinance, rule or regulation, and shall submit himself to an examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle or tractor, and reveal the name of the person, if known to him, or, if the information is made in a county other than that of his own residence, shall forward to the magistrate an affidavit setting forth these facts, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registration plate shall be overcome and removed and the burden of proof shifted.”

. Rule 1123(c) provides:
“Upon the finding of guilt, the trial judge shall advise the defendant on the record: (1) of his right to file post-verdict motions and of his right to the assistance of counsel in the filing of such motions and on appeal of any issues raised therein; (2) of the time within which he must do so as set forth in paragraph (a); and (3) that only the grounds contained in such motions may be raised on appeal.”

. We note that the trial transcript consumed only nine pages, all devoted to the parties’ discussion of § 1212’s constitutionality.

. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Grace, 473 Pa. 542, 375 A.2d 721 (Filed July 8, 1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated a willingness to look beyond the bare wording of post-verdict motions in order to determine if appellant had sufficiently preserved on the record his contention for appellate review. In Grace, the Court held that a written memorandum in support of issues raised in prior post-verdict motions preserved specific contentions because the memorandum assured certainty in the record and guaranteed that appellant actually presented the issues to the lower court. In the instant case, the Application to Quash Indictments, the nine page transcript, and the oral post-verdict motion made on the record at the conclusion of trial all afford the requisite certainty that appellant asserted the unconstitutionality of § 1212 at all stages of the proceedings before the lower court.

. We note that the Dissenting Opinion holds that although appellant did not preserve his constitutional objection, the lower court’s failure to comply with Rule 1123(c) necessitates an evidentiary hearing to determine if appellant waived this contention. However, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 248 Pa.Super. 289, 375 A.2d 102 (1977), our Court recently held that if a lower court does not give Rule 1123(c) warnings and counsel files only boilerplate post-verdict motions in contravention of Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975), then a defendant must be given the opportunity to file post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc.

. Justice POMEROY filed a separate Opinion in Support of Affirmance. He stated his belief that “. . . if a constitutional rule has been offended, similarly situated defendants should normally be treated the same unless, in Mr. Justice HARLAN’S phrase there is ‘a principled reason for acting differently.’ Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 .. . (HARLAN, J„ Dissenting)” Commonwealth v. Cain, supra, 471 Pa. at 170, 369 A.2d at 1249. However, Justice POMEROY believed that the decision of the Third Circuit panel in Cannon on a matter of federal constitutional law bound our Supreme Court. Justice POMEROY also emphasized that the Matthews rule did not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process.

. Justice MANDERINO filed a separate Opinion in Support of Reversal stating his basic agreement with Justice ROBERTS. Justice MANDERINO also analyzed the three factors considered by Justice EAGEN and determined that these factors required the application of the Matthews rule to cases pending on appeal.
While Justice NIX did not participate in Cain, he has subsequently made clear his allegiance to the approach endorsed by Justice EAG-EN. See Commonwealth v. Myles, 471 Pa. 616, 370 A.2d 1193 (1977).