Court Opinion

ID: 9430941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:57.342689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.563611
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
For years, I have been troubled by our disposition of appeals and petitions for certiorari through summary per curiam opinions, without plenary briefing on the merits of the issues decided.1 Other Justices have registered similar objections, disputing the Court’s application of the criteria that supposedly determine when a summary disposition is clearly justified.2 Our persistent indulgence in this practice over the objections of our colleagues has tarnished what has long been considered one of this judicial institution’s greatest qualities, the fairness and integrity of its decisionmaking process.
Through summary dispositions, we deprive the litigants of a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits. Our Rules tell the petitioner and respondent that we will grant review on *406writ of certiorari “when there are special and important reasons therefor.”3 In listing the considerations that are important in deciding whether review should be granted, we mention such things as conflicting decisions from other courts and unsettled questions of federal law. We do not indicate that the parties should address the merits of the lower court’s decision beyond what is necessary to demonstrate whether the case is important enough to receive plenary review.4 Our 30-page limit for petitions and responses, and the command that they be “as short as possible,”5 unmistakably indicate that these papers should not contain detailed discussions of the merits. If we find the case sufficiently important, the Rules inform the parties that the petition will be granted and “[t]he case then will stand for briefing and oral argument.”6 Yet when we issue a summary disposition we ignore these instructions and proceed to decide the case as if it has been fully briefed on the merits. In my view, simply put, this is not fair.7
Admittedly, the Rules indicate that summary dispositions on the merits are possible,8 but in light of our instructions regarding the preparation of petitions ■ and responses this places the litigants in a difficult dilemma. If they venture *407beyond arguments for granting or denying certiorari, they risk violating the Rules; but if they fail to cover the merits of the lower court’s decision in full, they risk summary disposition without having been heard.9 In response to these pressures, counsel may tend to extend their arguments in petitions and responses beyond the purposes defined in the Rules. Apart from increasing the litigants’ costs, this tendency can only increase our workload, thereby giving those who favor uncounseled summary dispositions additional justification for not allowing full briefing on the merits.10
Not only do we reach these summary dispositions without the benefit of thorough briefing, but the Court often acts without obtaining the complete record of the proceedings below. Records are no longer automatically certified and delivered to us for every petition.11 In fact, we expressly discourage transmission of the record at this stage of the proceedings,12 which again indicates that the focus of certiorari is on whether a case is important erough to warrant plenary review and not whether, after abbreviated review, we are able to conclude that the case was rightly or wrongly decided below. Of course, we may call for the record where we think a summary disposition might be proper, and our Clerk notifies the parties of this development, but we do not provide for supplemental briefing on the merits.13 All too often, as in the case decided today, the Court does not even bother to call *408for the record. Again, counsel face a dilemma: they may routinely request that records be transmitted, thus protecting the interests of their clients at the risk of violating the •Rules, or they may fail to request transmission and risk summary disposition based on less than complete review.
I cannot accept the proposition that additional briefing and review of the full record will increase the workload of this Court unbearably. Our duty to litigants today is to consider carefully every petition and response filed in this Court. But our duty extends to future litigants as well, and it is heightened when we issue written opinions. To reduce the incidence of mistakes and to avoid delivering conflicting or confusing opinions, our decisions in these cases should be made only after we have had an opportunity to consider comprehensive briefs and review the records in their entirety. We are not infallible, as is evidenced, for example, by the number of cases each Term that are dismissed after plenary briefing and oral argument as having been improvidently granted. The time and effort required to read supplemental briefs in cases for which we are considering summary dispositions would be minimal,14 and the relative gains substantial.
More is at stake, however, than offsetting the litigants’ entitlement to be heard on the merits against our desires to avoid increasing the workload. Summary dispositions often do not accord proper respect for the judgments of the lower *409courts, particularly when these judgments are reversed.15 The judges below have had the benefit of full briefing on the merits and review of the entire record. They must perceive — correctly—that our cavalier reversals are inherently less well informed.
I believe, moreover, that summary dispositions in many instances display insufficient respect for the views of dissenting colleagues on this Court. The tendency is to forget that we are equally uninformed. What troubles a single Justice about a particular case may become, after full briefing, a decisive factor in the judgment of the Court. As it is, we forge ahead issuing per curiam opinions as if the issue were crystal clear, at times over objection from as many as four other Justices.16 It is not unreasonable to believe, as I do, that the integrity of a summary decision from a divided Court would benefit from additional briefing on the merits by those who have litigated the issues of the case from its inception.
“Per curiam” is a Latin phrase meaning “[b]y the court,”17 which should distinguish an opinion of the whole Court from an opinion written by any one Justice. Our use of a lengthy per curiam opinion, over the dissent of those who would set the case for briefing, to resolve the merits of a case without devoting the usual time or consideration to the issues presented, is wrong. Such an opinion does not speak for the entire Court on a matter so clear that the Court can and should speak with one voice. Instead, it speaks for a majority of Justices who take it upon themselves to resolve the merits of a dispute solely on the basis of preliminary petitions and responses.
I can think of no compelling reason, and to date none has been suggested, why we should nurture a practice that can *410only foster resentment, uncertainty, and error. Rather, I believe that when the Court contemplates a summary disposition it should, at the very least, invite the parties to file supplemental briefs on the merits, at their option. This simple accommodation to the reasonable expectations of the litigants, to the integrity of the lower courts, and to the desires of other Justices for a more studied decision would go a long way toward achieving the fairness and accuracy that the Nation rightfully expects from its Court of last resort. Until this, or some other, reasonable accommodation is implemented, I remain in dissent.

 See, e. g., Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255, 261 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 120 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 62 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U. S. 42, 50 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U. S. 339, 349 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U. S. 651, 652 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U. S. 463, 466 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

 See, e. g., Board of Education of Rogers, Ark. v. McCluskey, 458 U. S. 966, 971-972 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U. S. 263, 271 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 387 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 47 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Oregon State Penitentiary v. Hammer, 434 U. S. 945, 947 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U. S. 697, 707 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Shipley v. California, 395 U. S. 818, 821 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).

 This Court’s Rule 17.1.

 At our direction the respondent focuses instead on “disclosing any matter or ground why the cause should not be reviewed.” Rule 22.1.

 Rules 21.4 and 22.2. In this case, petitioner devoted 12 pages to the merits of the double jeopardy issue decided by the Court today, respondent only 7. Pet. for Cert. 10-21; Respondent’s Brief in Opposition 8-14. An amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of 17 States devoted a total of five pages to the merits. Brief for the States and Commonwealths of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae 2-6.

 Rule 23.2.

 This lack of fairness has not escaped the notice of commentators. See, e. g., E. Brown, The Supreme Court 1957 Term—Forward: Process of Law, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 80, 82, (1958); R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 284-285 (6th ed. 1986).

 Rule 23.1. This Rule was not codified until 1980. Stern, Gressman, & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice, supra, at 277.

 Cf. United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., supra, at 271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

 See Hutto v. Davis, supra, at 387, n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Stern, Gressman, & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice, supra, at 286.

 See generally Stern, Gressman, & Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice, supra, at 329-333.

 Rule 19.1.

 A party may, at any time, file a supplemental brief not exceeding 10 pages, but these briefs can only address a “new matter” not available at the time of the party’s last filing. Rule 22.6. This Rule does not envision supplemental briefing when the Court calls for the record. See also Rule 21.3 (supplemental brief in support of petition will not be received).

 To put matters in perspective, were we to shorten the acceptable length of petitions and responses merely by one-fifth of a single page, it would free up at least 2,000 pages worth of our reading time to consider full briefs for the relatively few summary dispositions we issue each year. That comes to 40 briefs, at 50 pages each, or 20 cases decided in which the parties and the Court would have the benefit of full briefing. This assumes that 5,000 petitions are filed each year, and that on the average litigants use the complete 30 pages allowed. The former assumption is conservative and is a matter of record; based on my personal observation the latter assumption is more than fair.

 See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S., at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Oregon State Penitentiary v. Hammer, 434 U. S., at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

 See, e. g., Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U. S. 92 (1986).

 Black’s Law Dictionary 1023 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).