Court Opinion

ID: 9890879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 18:03:31.842204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:05.494079
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23 Mission Peak Conservancy v. County of Alameda CA1/4
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 MISSION PEAK CONSERVANCY
 et al.,
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
 v.
                                                                          A165954
 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA,
           Defendant and Respondent;                                      (Alameda County Super.
                                                                          Ct. No. RG18905553)
 CHRISTOPHER GEORGE et al.,
      Real Parties in Interest and
 Respondents.

         Petitioners Mission Peak Conservancy and Kelly Abreau appeal a
judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate, which sought (1) to
compel respondent County of Alameda (the County) to set aside building
permits issued to real parties in interest Christopher and Teresa George (the
Georges) for improvements on their property and to comply with the
California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.
(CEQA))1 and (2) to compel the County to enforce its zoning laws against the
Georges’ property. With respect to petitioners’ CEQA claim, we conclude that

         1 All further statutory references are to the Public Resources Code

unless otherwise indicated.
substantial evidence supports the County’s determination that its issuance of
ministerial building permits was exempt from CEQA review. With respect to
petitioners’ zoning enforcement claim, we reject their argument that the
County has abused its discretion by not commencing enforcement proceedings
against the Georges’ property. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment
denying the petition for writ of mandate.

                              BACKGROUND
      The Georges own an approximately 700-acre agricultural-zoned ranch
on Morrison Canyon Road in rural Alameda County. In July 2014, the
Georges applied to the County for building permits to replace an existing
barn with a two-story, 12,000-square-foot barn, stating the new barn would
be used “for storage, canning and a someday soon the making of olive oil or
wine from the trees and grapes we are presently planting.” At that time, the
County suggested the project may be subject to CEQA review due to possible
impacts from proposed “paving and subsequent outfalls into wetlands.” In
December, however, after reviewing a report by the Georges’ CEQA
consultant, the County agreed that the project was exempt from CEQA
review. Between February and November 2015, the County issued the
building permits necessary for construction of the new barn. Construction
commenced shortly thereafter.
      In August 2016, petitioners complained repeatedly to the County about
the Georges’ “2,000 square foot ‘ag’ building.” Petitioners speculated that the
Georges intended to use the barn as a brewery or event center and asked,
“Could you ascertain the purpose/usage of this ‘ag building’? Has the County
permitted that usage?” In response, the County advised petitioners that the
planning department would be involved if the owner wanted to petition for a

                                       2
special permit to operate a brewery with events, but that any future use of
the building was speculative at that time.
      In June 2017, petitioners emailed the County again regarding the
Georges’ barn. The email notes that “[t]he building which is designed as a
brewery or events center has construction permits, but they describe it as an
‘agricultural barn.’ ” Petitioners requested that “the Planning Department
and/or Code Enforcement officials inspect the structures, recreational lake,
dam, and grading/excavations. Officials should review the zoning, ensure
they comply with CEQA reporting, and issue the needed permits.”
Throughout the summer and fall of 2017, petitioners repeatedly asked the
County to require that the Georges comply with CEQA and obtain any
permits and zoning adjustments necessary for any use of the barn for non-
agricultural purposes. For example, on October 14, 2017, petitioner Abreau
stated in an email to the County: “Copper sheathing was installed recently on
the roof of the ‘agricultural barn.’ The ‘barn’ exudes an aura of luxury, from
the shiny reflection of the copper that saturates the camera sensor. The
copper sheathing promises that the cows, bison, agricultural supplies and/or
hay stored inside the ‘barn’ will be protected from the elements. However, an
official with the County Supervisor’s Office has stated that it is not a ‘barn.’ ”
A November 13, 2017 email written by petitioners explains further: “By any
normal and customary definition, this is not an ‘agricultural barn.’ It is
luxurious, with in-floor radiant heating on the second floor. The roof has
costly, ostentatious copper sheathing. It has an attached 2,000 sq ft patio,
with cedar awnings, which overlooks the recreational lake or pond, the
artificial beach and the beach-side gazebo. It has an upgraded 400-Amp
electrical supply, and an upgraded septic system. The maintenance of farm
animals do not require expanded septic systems for normal operations.” The

                                        3
email adds, “The CEQA issue is not ministerial versus discretionary. Either
way, CEQA reporting is required. According to an email from a County
Planner on July 14, 2014 at 11:12 a.m., ‘It’s part of a much bigger project,
that does require CEQA and rezoning.’ ”
      During that same time period, the County conducted a code
enforcement investigation at the Georges’ property and determined that the
Georges had constructed several improvements without permits. Petitioners
were apprised of the County’s ongoing investigation. Thereafter, the County
worked with the Georges to obtain the necessary permits to resolve the code
enforcement matter.
      During the course of the investigation, the Georges informed the
County that the second story of the building would be used to host non-
commercial social events. Concerned that the original building plans, which
complied with building code requirements for utility (U) and storage (S2),
were insufficient for this new use, the County required the Georges to submit
modified building plans that complied with the building code requirements
for assembly (A2) use. Around this time, the County also sought to have the
Georges sign a deed restriction that would limit the use of the property to
prohibit, without prior authorization, “public activities, such as but not
limited to organized events, with or without remuneration.” The Georges did
not, however, sign the proposed document.
      On November 14, 2017, petitioners were informed, “From its inception,
the project has been proposed to be a non-commercial venue, it is being
proposed for personal use and storage and the building permit that was
obtained reflects this use. Based on recent complaints we have visited the
site 2 times in the last month or so to look at the ongoing construction of the
barn facility as well as discuss the overall use of the property and any other

                                       4
permits that may need to have been secured by the property owner. [¶] The
use of the main barn, as mentioned above, is not being proposed for anything
other than storage and personal use, there is no proposal to open a brewery,
winery or any other commercial activity at the site. Although the
construction is of a quality not usually associated with a barn, this is a
matter of personal taste and that is not something we regulate.” In response
to petitioners’ concerns about “whether or not the owner can have other uses
on [this] property that are not related to agriculture,” the email advises that
the “rules adopted by the county do allow other uses that are compatible with
Agriculture.” Finally, the email adds, “[N]o discretionary permits have been
required so far based on the proposed use, and if through the code
enforcement process this remains true, then the CEQA process will not be
necessary.”
      On November 17, 2017, the County approved revised building plans for
the new barn based on the Georges’ intended use of the building for private
social events, with a total occupancy limit of 406 people (385 on the upper
level and 21 on the lower level). The project description on the approved
plans states, “The second floor of the building is for the personal, non-
commercial use of the owner for the owner’s personal private events.”
      On November 21, 2017, the County issued a permit to extend a
retaining wall and to build a courtyard, gas fireplace and waterfall (the
courtyard permit). The permit indicates that no commercial use of the barn
is permitted. Thereafter, the County issued five additional building permits.2

      2 The county issued permits for installation of a gas line to the

courtyard, a water line from a well to the barn, an extension of the gas line,
an inground spa and a gazebo. Several of these permits were required as
part of the County’s investigation discussed above. Petitioners also claim an

                                        5
      On May 18, 2018, petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandate
alleging that the County failed to comply with CEQA by approving building
permits on and after November 21, 2017, without conducting any
discretionary CEQA review of the Georges’ actual and intended use of the
property for “assembly use.” The petition was subsequently amended to
allege a cause of action seeking to compel the County to enforce zoning laws
that, according to petitioners, prohibit the Georges from using their property,
including the barn, for assembly use without a conditional use permit,
variance, or zoning adjustment.
      In June 2022, the trial court issued judgment in favor of the County on
all claims. Petitioners timely filed a notice of appeal.
      While the appeal was pending, the County adopted Ordinance
No. 2023–15, which modifies the zoning ordinance to define an “agricultural
building” as “[a] structure designed and constructed or used to house farm
implements or farm equipment; poultry, livestock, or similar farm or ranch
animals; or hay, grain, olives, nuts, hops, wine, or other horticultural
products in bins, tanks, barrels, case goods, or other storage vessels.” The
new legislation adds that the structure “shall not be a place of human
habitation, nor shall it be a place used by the public or for social events.”
Petitioners request this court take judicial notice of the new legislation and
argued in their reply brief that this court should apply this new law on
appeal. The County and the Georges oppose the request for judicial notice

application for a grading permit, submitted in November 2020, and the
construction of a new road between 2019 and 2020 are part of the modified
project.

                                        6
and argue that the new legislation is irrelevant to the issues on appeal.3 We
grant petitioners’ request for judicial notice and discuss below the limited, if
any, relevance of the new legislation.4

                                DISCUSSION
   1. The CEQA Claim
      “CEQA was enacted to advance four related purposes: to (1) inform the
government and public about a proposed activity’s potential environmental
impacts; (2) identify ways to reduce, or avoid, environmental damage;
(3) prevent environmental damage by requiring project changes via
alternatives or mitigation measures when feasible; and (4) disclose to the
public the rationale for governmental approval of a project that may
significantly impact the environment.” (California Building Industry Assn. v.
Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 382.)
      As a threshold matter, we reject the Georges’ argument that petitioners
lack standing to challenge the County’s compliance with CEQA. Petitioner
Mission Peak Conservancy is “a neighborhood political advocacy organization
dedicated to the preservation of the environment, protection and
enhancement of park access, and the construction of a network of bicycle and
pedestrian trails in southern Alameda County near Fremont, California,
including the area in which [the Georges’ property is] located in Vargas
Plateau.” Petitioner Abreau is resident of Fremont, California. Petitioners’

      3 The County and the Georges also moved to strike petitioners’ reply

brief on the ground that they impermissibly raised this and other new issues.
We denied the motion to strike but permitted the County and the Georges to
submit supplemental briefing responsive to the new issues raised in the
petitioners’ reply.
      4 The requests for judicial notice of several other provisions of the

Alameda County Municipal Code and the California Building Code, filed by
the County and the Georges, are also granted.

                                          7
geographic proximity to the project is sufficient to support standing. (See
Burrtec Waste Industries, Inc. v. City of Colton (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1133,
1137 [“ ‘[I]n a writ of mandate against a municipal entity based on alleged
violations of CEQA, a property owner, taxpayer, or elector who establishes a
geographical nexus with the site of the challenged project has standing.
[Citations.] Moreover, the geographical nexus can be attenuated . . . because
“[e]ffects of environmental abuse are not contained by political lines” ’ ”].)
      To determine whether CEQA applies to a proposed activity, a public
agency must “determine whether the activity is a ‘project’ for purposes of
CEQA and, if it is, whether it falls under an exemption.” (Sierra Club v.
County of Sonoma (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 11, 19; Communities for a Better
Environment v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
715, 721.) CEQA defines a “project” as “an activity which may cause either a
direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable
indirect physical change in the environment” and, as relevant here, which
“involves the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or
other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.” (§ 21065.) A
“project” includes “the whole of an action” (Guidelines § 15378, subd. (a))5 and
“refers to the activity which is being approved and which may be subject to
several discretionary approvals by governmental agencies.” (Id. at § 15378,
subd. (c).) It “does not mean each separate governmental approval.” (Ibid.)
      Petitioners define the “project” at issue as including the Georges’
“assembly use” of the barn, as well as “the permits for which the Georges
applied and those the County approved for the physical construction of

      5  We will cite and refer to CEQA’s implementing regulations codified at
title 14, division 6, chapter 3 of the California Code of Regulations, as the
“Guidelines.”

                                         8
certain improvements made to the property after November 21, 2017.” They
contend that the County “violated CEQA by narrowly defining the project as
the building permits only, even though it knew it would be used for assembly
use.” Assuming, without deciding, that petitioner’s project definition is
correct, the trial court properly denied the petition on the ground that
substantial evidence supports the County’s determination that the courtyard
permit and other building permits issued after November 21, 2017, were
ministerial and thus, exempt from CEQA.6
      “ ‘Ordinarily issuance of a building permit for a project meeting the
criteria of the applicable zoning ordinance and Uniform Building Code is a
ministerial project to which CEQA does not apply.’ ” (Friends of Juana
Briones House v. City of Palo Alto (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 286, 302; § 21080,
subds. (a) and (b)(1) [CEQA applies only to “discretionary projects proposed to
be carried out or approved by public agencies” and exempts “[m]inisterial
projects” from review]; Guidelines § 15268, subds. (a) & (b) [The “[i]ssuance of
building permits” are “presumed to be ministerial”].) The issuance of a
building permit is considered discretionary only where the agency has “ ‘the
power to deny or condition th[e] building permit or otherwise modify this
project in ways which would have mitigated environmental problems an EIR
might conceivably have identified.’ ” (Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma,

      6 Although listed in the statement of facts, petitioners’ opening brief did

not individually address any permits issued within the limitations period
other than the courtyard permit. Accordingly, any argument that these
permits were not ministerial has been waived. Petitioners’ argument in their
reply brief that the modified project includes a new road and spillway “even
without formal agency approval” exceeds the scope of any argument made in
their opening brief. In any event, petitioners again fail to make any specific
argument as to those improvements, but rather lump them in as part of the
project to use the barn as an event center.

                                       9
supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 11, 20; see also Friends of the Juana Briones House v.
City of Palo Alto, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 308, [permit is discretionary if
agency “has [the] authority to condition the permit in environmentally
significant ways”].)
      “We . . . review an agency’s determination that an activity falls under
the ministerial exemption for ‘ “a prejudicial abuse of discretion.” ’
[Citations.] ‘Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not
proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is
not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma,
supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 23.)
      Petitioners argue that the County’s approval of the courtyard permit as
ministerial was an abuse of discretion because it was based on a factually
unsupported finding that the barn, to which the courtyard would be attached,
was for agricultural use. They suggest that the County knew the barn would
be used for assembly rather than agricultural use when it approved the
courtyard permit and that “the County could have refused the courtyard
permit since assembly use of the banquet hall of which it is a part is not a
right or an allowed accessory use in an agricultural zone.” We disagree.
      Substantial evidence supports the County’s determination that the
barn was for agricultural use and that the use of the barn for private social
events was consistent with the property’s existing zoning designation. While
the intended use of the second floor of the barn expanded to include hosting
private parties, the Georges repeatedly asserted that the lower level,
although they did not consider it a “traditional barn,” would be used for
agricultural purposes: production of wine or beer for personal use and/or
storing antique farm equipment. When the courtyard permit was issued, a
variety of uses were allowed in agricultural zones, such as horticulture,

                                        10
wineries, homes, and barns. As the County explains, “the fact that assembly
is not expressly listed as a permitted use in the Agricultural (or other) zone
districts does not mean that social gatherings are banned County-wide.
Rather, periodic private gatherings can be ‘accessory’ to principal uses. For
example, agricultural zoning permits all uses ‘normally accessory to a
dwelling’ in addition to expressly permitted uses (e.g., homes, barns,
maintenance buildings). . . . Accessory uses are not limited to those
specifically listed, but may include ‘the broad sphere of home activities as
they existed at common law,’ such as ‘the use of a home as a social
institution, for the private religious, educational, cultural and recreational
advantages of the family.’ ” The county reasonably concluded that, under
existing zoning laws, accessory use of the Georges’ barn for personal social
events was permissible.7
      Petitioners’ reliance on the proposed deed restriction to establish the
County’s alleged knowledge that the barn was not “legal land-use wise” is
misplaced. The proposed document did not, as petitioners suggest, prohibit
“all assembly use, commercial or personal.” It prohibited “public activities
. . . with or without remuneration” (italics added) and limited use of the
property to those uses permitted or accessory to permitted uses in
agriculturally zoned districts. Petitioners’ argument that “commercial v.

      7 Petitioners’ argument that the County’s new legislation defining the

permissible uses of an agricultural building should be applied retroactively is
without merit. As the County explains, “The new definition in the zoning
ordinance has no bearing on the County’s past CEQA compliance. . . . [T]he
new definition is ‘future looking’ and prospective and is applicable only ‘in the
future, not to past approvals.’ ” The Georges agree that “[a]ny unauthorized
‘assembly use’ of the barn as an ‘agricultural building’ under the new County
Ordinance, should that ever become an issue, is a future Code Enforcement
matter, not a CEQA issue.”

                                       11
private use is immaterial” for the purpose of assessing environmental harm
under CEQA likewise misses the point. While commercial use of the property
would require issuance of a discretionary use permit or zoning variance,
private use of the property for parties and/or weddings was, as the County
determined, authorized under the zoning ordinance at the time the permits
were issued. Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the language included on
the courtyard permit that the barn was “For Private use Only—No
Commercial Use” did not add a discretionary condition to the permit. It
merely reflects the County’s prior determination that personal accessory use
of the barn, but not commercial use, was permitted under its zoning laws.
The courtyard permit itself was ministerial and issued without any
restrictions or conditions.
      We also reject petitioners’ argument that the County engaged in
improper “piecemealing” at the time the courtyard permit was issued by
deferring “CEQA review of assembly use.” (See, e.g., Banker’s Hill, Hillcrest,
Park West Community Preservation Group v. City of San Diego (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 249, 281 [“ ‘[a] public agency is not permitted to subdivide a
single project into smaller individual subprojects in order to avoid the
responsibility of considering the environmental impact of the project as a
whole’ ”]; Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266,
280 [“piecemealing” refers to artificially dividing a project into components
for the purpose of evading CEQA review].) When, in the course of its
investigation, it became clear to the County that the Georges intended to use
the barn for private parties, the County determined that the use of the barn
for private social events was consistent with applicable zoning and that no
change in zoning or conditional use permit was required. Accordingly, the
County’s approval of the courtyard and other permits was ministerial and

                                       12
was not dependent upon the approval of any unauthorized use of the
property. The County’s deferred consideration of any commercial use of the
project until such permit application is presented by the Georges does not
constitute improper piecemealing. As set forth above, the Georges have
consistently and repeatedly denied any intention to use the barn for
commercial events. The argument that commercial use of the barn is
“reasonably foreseeable” is therefore entirely speculative. (See Banning
Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209,
1224–1225 [noting cases “rejecting piecemealing claims on the ground the
future actions were too speculative”]; Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay Com. v.
Board of Port Cmrs. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1362 [omission of future
plan from project description was permissible where “the stated long-range
goal of expanded runway capacity is entirely speculative”].)
      Accordingly, the trial court correctly entered judgment in favor of the
County on petitioners’ CEQA claim. In light of this conclusion, we do not
reach respondents’ additional argument that any challenge to the barn and
other related improvements is moot.
   2. The Zoning Enforcement Claim
      a. Factual Background
      After the certificate of occupancy was issued in August 2018, the
Georges held the following events at the barn: a wedding in August 2018
with 100 to125 guests in attendance; a wedding in August 2019 with 100 to
125 guests in attendance; a birthday celebration in June 2019 with 25 to
30 guests in attendance; a financial meeting in November 2019 with 30 to
40 guests in attendance; and a financial meeting on January 8–9, 2020 with
30 to 40 guests in attendance.

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      In July 2020, petitioners complained to the County about the
August 2019 wedding and the January 2020 business event. The complaint
was forwarded to the County Planning Director.
      In October 2020, the Georges hosted another wedding at the barn with
25 guests in attendance.
      In March 2021, petitioners complained to the County about a wedding
event being planned for December 2021. The County sent a warning letter to
the Georges reminding them they cannot use the barn for “commercial uses
and use of the site as an event venue.” The Georges assured the County that
the wedding was for family friends and not for commercial purposes. The
wedding took place in December 2021.8
      b. Legal Background
      Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a), “A writ of
mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially
enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.” A writ of
mandate “ ‘will issue against a county, city, or other public body.’ ” (Venice
Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1558.)
      “ ‘Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency’s
performance or to correct an agency’s abuse of discretion when the action
being compelled or corrected is ministerial. [Citation.] “A ministerial act is

      8 The County argues that insofar as petitioners’ claim rests on a failure

to enforce its zoning laws in response to events held after the filing of the
amended petition in October 2019, their claim fails because a “petitioner’s
right and the respondent’s duty are measured as of the time the proceeding is
filed.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 731–732.) Petitioners
do not directly address this argument, but appear to disagree. In light of our
discussion below, we need not resolve this dispute.

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an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his [or her]
own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety,
when a given state of facts exists. Discretion . . . is the power conferred on
public functionaries to act officially according to the dictates of their own
judgment. [Citation.]” [Citations.] Mandamus does not lie to compel a public
agency to exercise discretionary powers in a particular manner, only to
compel it to exercise its discretion in some manner.’ ” (Center for Biological
Diversity v. Department of Conservation (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 161, 171.)
      c. Analysis
      Petitioners seek a writ of mandate compelling the County to enforce its
zoning laws against the George property. Petitioners argue that the County’s
mandatory duty to enforce its zoning laws arises from the following
provisions in the Alameda County Municipal Code (“Municipal Code”):
(1) section 17.58.010, which provides that “every employee of the county
authorized to issue permits . . . affecting the use or occupancy . . . shall
comply with the provisions of this title,” (2) section 17.58.020, which reads,
“It is the duty of the planning commission to ensure the proper
administration of this title,” and (3) section 17.58.040, which provides, “It is
the duty of the planning director and of all other officials . . . to enforce [the
zoning ordinance].” Petitioners acknowledge that the court cannot compel
the County to take any specific action to enforce its zoning laws, but argue
that the County can and should be compelled, in the face of the Georges’
allegedly clear violation of the zoning code, to exercise its “ ‘discretionary
powers in some way.’ ” (See Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands (1993)
73 Cal.App.4th 215, 222 [if a public entity refuses to act, “mandate is
available to compel the exercise of those discretionary powers in some way”];

                                         15
Morris v. Harper (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 52, 62–63 [“A refusal to exercise
discretion is itself an abuse of discretion”].)
      Petitioners explain, “In this case, the County took no discretionary
action regarding the Georges’ continuous unlawful use of the venue for
assembly use. The County responded to just one of Petitioners’ many
complaints, regarding the December 2021 wedding, simply issuing a warning.
[ ¶ ] But warnings are not action. . . . Indeed, the warning letter in 2021,
warned of ‘the potential for enforcement action,’ indicating the letter itself is
not a discretionary act enforcing the zoning code, but just a warning such
enforcement may be forthcoming.”
      The County responds that it cannot be compelled to act when the
decision to commence enforcement proceedings is itself discretionary. We
agree.
      In Riggs v. City of Oxnard (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 526, 528–530, the
court held that because the City of Oxnard had the discretion to resolve a
zoning violation in a number of ways, the city could not be compelled to
commence enforcement proceedings against the offending property. The
court explained that the use of the term “may” in the relevant zoning
ordinance indicated that prosecutorial enforcement was discretionary rather
than mandatory: “Ordinance No. 1506 of the City of Oxnard states that a
violation of a license or permit condition granted pursuant to chapter 34
(zoning) ‘may be prosecuted as a violation of the Code of the City of Oxnard
pursuant to Section 1-10.’ The language of the statute is clear in that it does
not require prosecution for a violation, but uses the word ‘may,’ thereby
allowing the city discretion to make such a determination. The respondent
city is not, therefore, mandated to issue a criminal citation for a zoning
violation, but may logically resolve a violation in other ways, as it did in this

                                         16
case.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in this case, the Municipal Code provides that the
County may take various enforcement actions for violations of the zoning
ordinance, but does not impose a mandatory duty upon it to do so. (See
Municipal Code § 17.58.050 [“Any building or structure set up, erected,
constructed, altered, enlarged, converted, moved or maintained contrary to
this title is unlawful and is hereby declared to be a public nuisance and may
be abated by the enforcement officer as set forth herein” (italics added)];
Municipal Code § 17.58.060, subd. (B) [Any condition caused or permitted to
exist in violation of any of the provisions of this title shall be deemed a public
nuisance and may be summarily abated as such by the county” (italics
added)].)
      The County also argues that even if it had a duty to act in some way
other than issuing a warning, petitioners have not established that the
Georges’ use of the barn clearly violated the zoning ordinance. As set forth
above, the County reasonably concluded that use of the property for
occasional private social events was permitted under the zoning designation
of the property. The County correctly asserts that it “has broad discretion in
interpreting and applying its own zoning code and determining at what point
occasional parties and weddings are ‘normally accessory’ and at what point
such uses cross the line.” Petitioners concede that under the prior zoning
ordinance, “[r]ecreational assembly use of a barn is a qualified accessory use
in an agricultural zone . . . but only if the venue is a barn.” As set forth
above, although the Georges did not consider it a “traditional barn,” they
repeatedly indicated the ground floor would be used for some agricultural
purpose.
      The County’s explanation for its decision is reasonable. The County
investigated and concluded that the Georges’ use of the barn for private social

                                        17
gatherings did not violate its zoning laws. The County warned the Georges
that commercial use would be a violation and received assurances that the
December 2021 wedding was not a commercial event. The County has
provided a reasonable explanation for its decision not to proceed on
petitioners’ complaint. Accordingly, contrary to petitioners’ argument, the
County did not abuse its discretion by not commencing enforcement
proceedings. (See Helena F. v. West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. (1996)
49 Cal.App.4th 1793, 1799 [“In determining whether an agency has abused
its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the
agency’s action, its determination must be upheld”].)
      As set forth above, while the appeal was pending, the County adopted
legislation prohibiting the use of agricultural structures for “social events.”
Petitioners argue under the new definition, “it is not a matter of discretion to
determine whether or not Real Parties violated the code. The new definition
is clear when it states that an agricultural building shall not be for social
events.” The County disputes that the new ordinance eliminates its
“discretion to decide whether or how to enforce its code” and that, in any
event, “it is prospective only. It is thus wholly irrelevant to the zoning
enforcement claims on appeal, which assert that the County violated an
alleged duty to bring an enforcement action against the Georges for actions
[petitioners] claim violated the County code.” We agree that insofar as the
new legislation applies only prospectively, it is not relevant to whether the
County abused its discretion by failing to initiate enforcement proceedings
based on activity that occurred prior to its enactment. We offer no opinion as

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to how the new legislation impacts the County’s enforcement of its zoning
ordinance against the Georges’ property in the future.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. The County and real parties in interest are
entitled to their costs of appeal.
                                            GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
HIRAMOTO, J. *

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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