Court Opinion

ID: 9734938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:53:11.229114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:52.685575
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
TODD, J.:
¶ 1 Because I disagree with my esteemed colleague’s conclusion that the trial court improperly dismissed the charge of aggravated assault, I respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion.
¶ 2 The facts of the instant case are not in dispute, and the sole issue before this en banc Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the charge of aggravated assault against Patrick. Section 2702(a)(1) of the Crimes Code provides that a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: “(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is defined as “[bjodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
¶ 3 Our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 653 A.2d 616 (1995), clarified the kind of criminal conduct which must be exhibited by a defendant to constitute recklessness under Section 2702(a)(1):
[F]or the degree of recklessness contained in the aggravated assault statute to occur, the offensive act must be performed under circumstances which almost assure that injury or death will ensue. The recklessness must, therefore, be such that life threatening injury is essentially certain to occur. This state of mind is, accordingly, equivalent to that which seeks to cause injury. Examples of such behavior make the distinction clear. In Commonwealth v. Daniels, 467 Pa. 35, 354 A.2d 538 (1976), appellant had fired a gun into a crowd; in Commonwealth v. Laing, 310 Pa.Super. 105, 456 A.2d 204 (1983), appellant drove his car into a crowd, after having aimed it at an individual; in [Commonwealth v.] Scofield, [360 Pa.Super. 552, 521 A.2d 40 (1987),] the appellant drove at a pedestrian. See also, Commonwealth v. Hlatky, 426 Pa.Super. 66, 626 A.2d 575 (1993); Commonwealth v. Rohach, 344 Pa.Super. 229, 496 A.2d 768 (1985). In each’ of these instances, the defendant could reasonably anticipate that serious bodily injury or death would be the likely and logical consequence of his actions. In each case, the consequence was ignored.

Aggravated assault is, indeed, the junc-tional equivalent of a murder in which, for some reason, death fails to occur.

*1049O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. at 482-83, 653 A.2d at 618 (emphasis added).7
¶ 4 While the Majority appears to base its conclusion that the Commonwealth established a prima facie case of aggravated assault on the fact that Appellee punched the victim in the side of his head without warning, and the victim sustained serious injuries (see Majority Opinion at 1047), I do not believe that Patrick exhibited the degree of recklessness required by O’Hanlon. Specifically, I cannot conclude that Patrick is “a failed murderer,” and unless or until our Supreme Court modifies its holding in O’Hanlon, which sets an admittedly high bar for establishing the requisite level of recklessness, we are bound thereby.
¶ 5 Indeed, following our Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hanlon, this Court, in Commonwealth v. Roche, 783 A.2d 766 (Pa.Super.2001), held that a single, closed-fisted punch to a victim’s eye, resulting in a serious injury, was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault where “the attendant facts and circumstances do not suggest that Appellant delivered that lone blow with the specific intent of inflicting serious bodily injury upon the victim.” Id. at 770. We further explained that “[sjimply showing that the victim sustained a serious bodily injury is not enough to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault. The aggravated assault statute is not a strict liability statute.... [T]he Commonwealth must also prove that the Appellant acted with the requisite mens rea or criminal state of mind.” Id. Relying on our Supreme Court’s explanation in O’Hanlon, we concluded:
Appellant’s act of throwing one punch after using belligerent words was clearly insufficient to establish that he acted with such a heightened degree of recklessness that he was virtually assured that death or serious [bodily] injury would occur from his act. Appellant was not, nor could he be, virtually or even reasonably certain that death or serious injury would be the likely and logical result of his lone punch. This was not the functional equivalent of a murder in which for whatever reason death failed to occur.
Id. at 772 (footnote omitted).
¶ 6 I conclude that the trial court in the instant case properly followed Roche in dismissing the charge of aggravated assault against Patrick, as the key facts of Roche are indistinguishable from those of the instant case. In Roche, the appellant and the victim had a verbal argument in a bar, after which the victim and his companion left the bar. After walking approximately 300 feet down an alleyway, the victim’s companion turned around and saw the appellant and another male exit the bar and begin to follow them. The appellant caught up to the victim and his companion, and asked the victim “Are you a tough guy?” When the victim turned around to face the appellant, the appellant delivered a closed-fist blow to the victim’s left eye, and the victim fell to the ground unconscious, sustaining a head laceration, orbital blowout, and sinus fractures. *1050Thus, Roche, like the case sub judice, involved a punch to the victim’s head without warning.
¶ 7 To the extent the Majority distinguishes Roche on the basis that, in Roche, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence following his conviction for aggravated assault at a bench trial, whereas in the instant case, the trial court dismissed the charge following a review of the preliminary transcript, I do not believe that such distinction is relevant. While the Majority is correct that the Commonwealth is not required to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt at the habeas corpus stage of a proceeding, the Commonwealth must produce sufficient evidence “such that if presented at trial, and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury.” Commonwealth v. James, 863 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Pa.Super.2004) (citation omitted). As I believe the Commonwealth failed to present evidence of the required level of recklessness to establish intent, the stage of proceedings of the instant case is not.determinative.
¶ 8 For the reasons set forth above, I would hold that the trial court properly dismissed the charge of aggravated assault against Patrick, and would affirm the trial court’s order.

. Prior to its decision in O’Hanlon, our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 477 Pa. 190, 383 A.2d 887 (1978), held that an appellant’s single blow to a victim’s nose, resulting in a broken nose, was, without more, insufficient to support a finding that the appellant intended to inflict serious bodily injury. The Court recognized that the head is a vital part of the human body, but concluded that where in the absence of other direct or circumstantial evidence to support a finding that the single blow to the face was accompanied by an intent to inflict serious bodily injury, a finding that there was sufficient evidence to support an aggravated assault charge would “allow an admitted simple assault to be bootstrapped up to an aggravated assault.” Id. at 194, 383 A.2d at 889.