Court Opinion

ID: 9376548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 01:00:32.748947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.513616
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30037        Document: 00516664150             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/02/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-30037
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                                  March 2, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Latorris Conley,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 6:19-CR-360-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Southwick, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Latorris Conley appeals his conviction of possession of a firearm and
   ammunition by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the resulting
   70 months of imprisonment. We AFFIRM.
         Conley first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion
   for a judgment of acquittal. He maintains that the evidence did not show he

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-30037

   had knowledge that the firearm and ammunition in question were in the
   vehicle he was driving. “We will affirm the jury’s verdict,” however, “if a
   reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements
   of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the
   evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable
   inferences from the evidence to support the verdict.” United States v.
   Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, there was ample
   evidence at trial to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable
   doubt that Conley knew the firearm and ammunition were in the vehicle. He
   was the one driving the vehicle, and the (loaded) firearm and ammunition
   were found in the dash compartment—right next to cash, drugs, and a digital
   scale that Conley admitted were his. United States v. Garza, 990 F.2d 171, 174
   (5th Cir. 1993) (“The general rule in this circuit is that knowledge can be
   inferred from control over the vehicle in which [contraband is] hidden if there
   exists other circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in nature or
   demonstrates guilty knowledge” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
   jury also heard evidence that Conley confessed to being in possession of the
   firearm. The jury was not required to accept Conley and his mother’s
   alternative explanation for how the firearm came to be in the vehicle. See
   United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the
   district court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal.
          Conley next argues that the district court erred by failing to determine
   whether the evidence preponderated heavily against the guilty verdict in
   ruling on his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion for a new trial.
   But the court was not required to do so. Although Conley included some
   boilerplate language regarding the weight of the evidence in his motion for a
   new trial, Conley based his motion on alleged prosecutorial misconduct and
   did not raise his preponderance argument as the basis for his new-trial
   motion. Thus, the district court was not required to evaluate whether the

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                                     No. 22-30037

   weight of the evidence preponderated against the verdict. See United States
   v. Nguyen, 507 F.3d 836, 839–40 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district
   court erred in granting a new trial on the basis of an issue mentioned only in
   passing in the defendant’s motion).
          Conley also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
   for a new trial based on various statements by the Government in its closing
   rebuttal remarks, only some of which he objected to at trial. But we discern
   no abuse of discretion or plain error in the court’s denial.
          First, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of a new
   trial on the ground that the Government commented on Conley’s failure to
   call Trooper Butts as a witness. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 756 F.3d
   422, 433 (5th Cir. 2014). The Government made this comment in direct
   response to defense counsel’s own remark about the Government not calling
   Trooper Butts—suggesting the potential witness would have been bad for the
   Government’s case. See United States v. Palmer, 37 F.3d 1080, 1086 (5th Cir.
   1994) (finding no error under these circumstances). Moreover, even if these
   remarks were improper, they did not affect Conley’s substantial rights
   because he testified on his own behalf. See United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d
   457, 474 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Commenting on a failure to call witnesses
   generally is not an error, unless the comment implicates the defendant’s right
   not to testify.”).
          Second, Conley argues that the Government improperly referenced
   evidence not in the record, see United States v. Murrah, 888 F.2d 24, 26 (5th
   Cir. 1989) (“A prosecutor may not directly refer to or even allude to evidence
   that was not adduced at trial.”), and improperly bolstered the image and
   credibility of both its key witness and its prosecutor. Because he did not
   object to these remarks at trial, however, our review is for plain error. United
   States v. Vargas, 580 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abroms,

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   947 F.2d 1241, 1249 n.6 (5th Cir.), as amended (Dec. 18, 1991). We find none.
   The trial record confirms that these statements, too, were made in direct
   response to defense counsel’s theories of the evidence and merely drew
   reasonable inferences from properly admitted evidence. United States v.
   Vargas, 580 F.3d 274, 278–79 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A prosecutor is confined in
   closing argument to discussing properly admitted evidence and any
   reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from that
   evidence. . . . [A]n argument to counter the defense’s theory of the evidence
   is within bounds.”).
          The lone exception is the Government’s statement that Trooper
   Butts’s testimony would have been cumulative had Trooper Butts testified.
   This is because it is “error for the prosecutor to tell the jury what witnesses
   who did not testify would have said had they testified.” Palmer, 37 F.3d at
   1087. Conley has not shown that his substantial rights were affected,
   however, because—as mentioned—the Government’s statement directly
   rebutted defense counsel’s own statement to the jury that it was the
   Government who failed to call Trooper Butts; because substantial evidence
   supported the jury’s verdict; and because the district court issued
   instructions reminding the jury that they were to consider only the evidence,
   not counsel’s arguments. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 756 F.3d 422,
   434 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of new trial where prosecutor’s
   improper remarks did not “cast serious doubt” on the verdict). And because
   Conley has demonstrated only one potentially erroneous, but harmless,
   statement made by the Government, he fails to demonstrate that this is “the
   unusual case in which synergistic or repetitive error” violated his right to a
   fair trial as an independent basis for relief. United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d
   320, 344 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
          As for his arguments that the Government wrongly attacked Conley’s
   character and commented on unauthenticated documents in front of the jury,

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   we deem such arguments forfeited because Conley did not adequately brief
   these issues on appeal. See United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 439–40
   (5th Cir. 2009) (deeming forfeited a “laundry list of grievances” in the
   defendant’s brief because the defendant did “not fully explain them and
   often [did] not cite the record or relevant law”).
          Finally, Conley argues that the district court erred by denying his
   motion to suppress the evidence seized from the search of the vehicle he was
   driving, contending that Trooper Langley impermissibly extended the traffic
   stop. At the suppression hearing, however, Trooper Langley testified that he
   smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle as soon as he made
   contact with Conley’s passenger, a mere two minutes into the traffic stop.
   When Trooper Langley smelled the odor of marijuana, he developed the
   necessary reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity to extend the
   detention beyond the time it took to investigate Conley’s traffic offense. See
   United States v. Reyes, 963 F.3d 482, 487–88 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v.
   Garcia, 592 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that
   reasonable suspicion “was supplied by the smell of the marijuana”); United
   States v. Arrasmith, 557 F.2d 1093, 1094 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The odor of
   marijuana provided probable cause, authorizing the search.”). And Conley
   has not persuaded us that we should disturb the district court’s implicit
   credibility finding as to Trooper Langley’s testimony. See United States v.
   Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 356–57 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that findings of fact
   underlying the denial of a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error);
   United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Where a district
   court’s denial of a suppression motion is based on live oral testimony, the
   clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong because the judge had the
   opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.”). He therefore fails
   to establish that Trooper Langley violated the Fourth Amendment or that the
   court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

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                             No. 22-30037

         AFFIRMED.

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