Court Opinion

ID: 9514390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:08.803143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:16.864316
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring in result).
[f 31.] The majority declined to undertake this question, but I believe it is of sufficient importance to merit discussion and concern. Loftus maintains the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Detective Kerdell Remboldt of the Rapid City Police Department to testify about his opinion upon comparing two writings when the origin of each was disputed. The only purpose for this testimony was to prove Loftus was the perpetrator of the offense at the Jug Liquor store. Detective Remboldt compared writings in a notebook discovered during the search of Loftus’ residence and writings found on a cooler door at the liquor store.
[¶32.] He may be an expert in certain endeavors, but Detective Remboldt conceded on cross-examination he is not credentialed as a handwriting analyst. Under SDCL 19-17-1 (Rule 901), adopted from the Federal Rules of Evidence, the testimony of a nonex-pert related to a particular handwriting sample is sufficient for purposes of authentication only if it is based on a familiarity with such writing not acquired for purposes of litigation. Moreover, only when a lay witness establishes a familiarity with another’s handwriting and describes the relationship or circumstance from which that knowledge might have been acquired may the testimony be admitted. United States v. Tipton, 964 F.2d 650, 655 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 202 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025, 97 S.Ct. *176646, 50 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976); Wileman v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 642, 484 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1997)(“[A] lay witness may only offer an opinion as to the authenticity of an alleged writing ... where the witness has seen and is familiar with that person’s writing.”); M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, § 901.2, at 694 (4th ed 1996). Nothing in the record intimates Remboldt ever had occasion to gain familiarity with Loftus’ handwriting other than in preparation for this ease. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Remboldt to impart to the jury his amateur comparison of the two writings. State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 70 (Tenn.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing a lay witness to give her opinion on the comparison of two writings when the witness, was not familiar with the handwriting of the defendant); Wileman, 484 S.E.2d at 624 (“Such a side-by-side comparison ... by a party unfamiliar with the alleged writer’s handwriting is the sole province of [an] expert witness.”); see also 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 901.04(l)(2d ed 1997)(“... Non-expert handwriting evidence is not admissible if the proponent has not shown even a minimal factual basis from which knowledge of, and a familiarity with, another’s handwriting might reasonably have been acquired.”).
[¶ 33.] Moreover, Detective Remboldt compared two writings of unknown origin. Though the notebook was found in the defendant’s bedroom, it must be observed that the defendant shared this bedroom with his wife, Natalie. In fact, Natalie testified under oath that the notebook was hers. There were captions and intimate passages in the notebook indicating it was Natalie’s, thus corroborating her testimony. If there is doubt about the source of a writing, even the most precise comparison will be nothing more than immaterial and irrelevant. 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at § 901.05(2)(a).
[¶ 34.] A writing sample may be authenticated and identified by comparing it with a specimen of known origin already in evidence or admitted by the court as genuine. Id. at § 901.05(1). Yet even if one of the writings in this case was unequivocally established as the defendant’s, such a comparison can only be made by a handwriting expert or the trier of fact, if the similarities are obvious. Id. at § 901.05(1); M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, § 901.2, at 696.
[¶ 35.] Where a witness is neither a handwriting expert nor familiar with the writings of the person whose writing is in question, it is error for the trial court to allow the witness to offer an opinion on such comparison. Adams v. Ristine, 138 Va. 273, 122 S.E. 126, 130 (1924). What saves this from being prejudicial error, was the other circumstantial evidence in this case along with Remboldt’s candid admission before the jury that his analysis was not very beneficial because he lacked the expertise to furnish the very opinion he rendered.
[¶ 36.] I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.
[¶ 37.] SABERS, J., joins this writing and I am authorized to so state.