Court Opinion

ID: 9729555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:42:15.95242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.494191
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I am not in accord with the majority opinion. The judgment herein should be affirmed. I do not believe the admission of the evidence of custom and usage could possibly be prejudicial error in this case.
Defendant’s objection to the testimony was that it was an attempt to vary, contradict, or change the terms of a written contract. The insurance policy in question required a written proof of loss. The majority opinion specifically finds that under the evidence herein there was a waiver by the defendant of strict compliance with the contract, and that the failure of the plaintiff to give immediate written notice of the loss of the defendant was not a defense available to the defendant.
Further, before the questioned testimony was admitted, evidence had been adduced to show that in handling previous losses under this policy, the defendant had not insisted upon strict compliance with the proof of loss requirement of the policy, and that the plaintiff in this instance followed exactly the same procedure followed on previous losses under the policy. The testimony objected to does no more than show that other insurance companies in that particular area followed the same procedure which was followed by the defendant’s representative in this instance as well as on other adjustments made under the same policy.
*298In Smith v. Bankers Nat. Life Ins. Co., 130 Neb. 552, 265 N. W. 546, we said: • “Complaint is made that the trial court erred in permitting the appellee to testify, over objection, as to a conversation had with one of the directors of the company outside the office of the company. The law is well settled that directors of a corporation, as such, have the authority to bind it only When they act collectively as a board. They are not ex off icio' agents of a corporation and their individual declarations and admissions, when not acting as a board, are not binding on the corporation, nor admissible in evidence against it. 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, sec. 2168. This testimony seems to have been received as evidence of waiver of the provision requiring proof of insurability. The record discloses the proof on this point to be ample outside of any testimony of the director; therefore, the reception of such evidence would be, at the most, error without prejudice.”
In O’Neil v. Union Nat. Life Ins. Co., 162 Neb. 284, 75 N. W. 2d 739, we said: “The conclusion is that it was error to admit the certified copy as evidence of the cause of death, but, as was true in NcNaught v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra, the error was without prejudice since death and cause of death was otherwise positively and unequivocally proved as will hereinafter appear.”
As I view the record, therefore, the admission of this evidence, which was not relevant to any submissible issue in the case, was not prejudicial- error because -the plaintiff had previously' established by other evidence that the defendant had waived strict compliance. Harmless error in the admission of evidence has never been sufficient ground for' the reversal of a judgment. Bresley v. O’Connor, Inc., 163 Neb. 565, 80 N. W. 2d 711.
White, C. J., authorizes me to say that he joins in this dissent.