Court Opinion

ID: 9548809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:09:05.749971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:26.682369
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
The purpose of ORS 164.380 was to make the stealing of livestock a criminal offense. The specification in the statute of the various types of bovine animals subject to theft was not intended to make the characteristics of each type of bovine animal a matter of importance in charging or proving the crime. It was merely a method of more clearly describing the general class of animals the stealing of which would constitute a crime. Certainly the sex and maturity of the animals were not intended to be material elements in describing the property stolen.
The state could have framed the indictment to charge defendant simply with stealing a calf in which case it would be immaterial whether the proof established that the calf was male or female. The recitation in the indictment of an immaterial descriptive element *324does not constitute the basis for asserting a variance when that element is not proved. I recognize that it has been held that where the indictment alleges a matter with unnecessary particularity there may be a variance if the unnecessary particulars are not proved. That rule should not be applied if the defendant-has not been prejudiced or harmed in any way as a result of the unnecessary recitation. I fail to see how defendant could have been harmed in the preparation or presentation of his defense in the present case. He knew that he was charged with the theft of a yearling Hereford. The sex of the animal was not a material factor in the preparation or presentation of his defense.
A variance is material if the accused might be exposed to the danger of again being put in jeopardy for the same offense. State v. Cook, 154 Or 62, 59 P2d 249 (1936). That danger is not present here. If defendant is again charged with the theft of a steer calf the conviction in the present case would constitute a defense.
I believe that persons accused of crime should receive every possible protection reasonably necessary to safeguard their rights. I am not in favor, however, of permitting an accused who has been adequately apprised of the charge against him and who is in no danger of double jeopardy to set up purely technical defenses as defendant has done in the present case.
The majority opinion does not purport to rest its decision upon the ground that defendant was prejudiced by the variance between the allegation in the indictment and the proof. The majority opinion simply recites certain technical rules of criminal procedure and concludes that these rules must be applied in the *325present case. That is the pattern of decision characteristic of the cases of an earlier day when the law of criminal procedure was a body of hyperteehnieal rules. The better reasoned cases today attempt to rid the law of these technical encumbrances. I had hoped that we might join in this enlightened view.
Rossman and Sloan, JJ., concur in this dissent.