Court Opinion

ID: 9622423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:17:26.626005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:16.266470
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 3 (c) that Reid’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the abridgment of Reid’s constitutional right to a public trial under the facts of this case.
The right to a public trial may be limited if (1) there is an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the courtroom closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest; (3) the trial court considers reasonable alternatives to closure; and (4) the trial court makes findings adequate to support closure. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39 (II) (B) (104 SC 2210, 81 LE2d 31) (1984). The transcript of Reid’s trial shows that the extent of the discussion regarding the reason for closing the courtroom during the testimony of witnesses Wendell Dozier and Latasha Boone consisted of the following:
STATE: . . . We are pretty much asking for the courtroom to be cleared. . . . And just based on the highly sensitive — and my witnesses feel like their lives are endangered. . . .
THE COURT: What is the defendant’s position on that?
DEFENSE: We don’t have any position on that, your Honor.
THE COURT:... If you, as an officer of the Court, have proffered to me that they have told you that their[ ] lives are threatened — have been threatened, and given some of the other procedural history in this case that the Court is aware of, I’ll make a finding that due to security reasons that the courtroom be cleared for that particular witness. . . .
STATE: ... I want to make sure that the record is clear, I don’t think that he’s been directly threatened. He feels like there’s indirect threats because he knows people, or more importantly, everyone in this case knows that the witness, Jordian Brown, was shot very short in time after this murder. ... It won’t come out in the evidence, but there is a firm belief by this community that she was shot because she is a witness, and so that leads to the fear in this case, as well as I’ve had a witness attacked and screwdriver put in his head we also believe as a result of the defendant’s *490actions. So I think that there is enough in this case that my witnesses have reason to be fearful.
THE COURT: All right. Do you wish to be heard further on that, madam?
DEFENSE: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I’ll make a finding for those particular reasons so that — and for reasons of the security of the witnesses I’ll clear and close the courtroom to the exception of all necessary personnel that will be required to testify in regards to this particular matter for those limited witnesses only, okay?
Thus, concern for the security of witnesses Dozier and Boone was based in part, if not primarily, on the shooting of witness Brown shortly after the crimes. But Brown survived the shooting and went on to testify in open court during Reid’s trial, along with several other witnesses to the crimes. No reason was articulated to support closing the courtroom for the testimony of Dozier and Boone when such closure was not sought for others who not only might have been, but actually were, placed in peril because of their testimony. The trial court’s findings were clearly inadequate to support closure of the courtroom. See Waller, supra, 467 U. S. at 45 (overriding interest must be articulated along with findings specific enough that reviewing court can determine whether closure order was properly entered). Moreover, the trial court failed to consider any alternatives to closure. See Waller, supra, 467 U. S. at 48. The recent case of Presley v. Georgia, 558 U. S_(130 SC 721, 175 LE2d 675) (2010) makes clear that the trial court has an obligation to consider such alternatives, sua sponte, even when none are offered by the parties.
A defendant asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “must show both prongs of the Strickland test, i.e., that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).” Boseman v. State, 283 Ga. 355, 358 (3) (659 SE2d 364) (2008). Here, the trial court failed to make the necessary findings and consider alternatives to closing the courtroom, and Reid’s trial counsel was deficient in failing to object. Although the majority concludes that Reid has not shown prejudice, Op. at 488, Reid is not required to do so in order to obtain relief for a structural error such as a violation of the public-trial right. Waller, supra, 467 U. S. at 49. The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that prejudice cannot be presumed when the issue of improper courtroom closure is raised in the context of an ineffective *491assistance of counsel claim are not controlling precedent and should not be followed.*
Decided February 8, 2010.
Brian Steel, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Peggy . R. Katz, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Sara K. Sahni, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Because the trial court erred by rejecting Reid’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the closing of the courtroom during portions of his trial, I must respectfully dissent to Division 3 (c) of the majority opinion and the affirmance of Reid’s convictions.

 I would overrule the Georgia Court of Appeals cases cited on this point as wrongly decided. Glover v. State, 292 Ga. App. 22 (3) (663 SE2d 772) (2008) relies on the non-controlling Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F3d 734 (III) (11th Cir. 2006); Hunt v. State, 268 Ga. App. 568 (6) (a) (602 SE2d 312) (2004) relies on Turner v. State, 245 Ga. App. 294 (4) (e) (536 SE2d 814) (2000), which is a case involving the application of OCGA § 17-8-54 (providing for partial closure of the courtroom when a person under the age of 16 is testifying concerning a sex offense).