Court Opinion

ID: 9958869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:00:47.000403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:54.792951
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11325    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11325
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MICHAEL ALLEN ROBINSON,

                                                   Defendant- Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20063-BB-1
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-11325

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              Defendant-Appellant Michael Robinson, who is presently in-
        carcerated, appeals his 75-month sentence for possession of a ﬁre-
        arm as a convicted felon.
                                         I.
                On March 1, 2021, Robinson arrived at a corner store in Mi-
        ami, Florida. He exited the passenger side of a white Chevy Mal-
        ibu, and the driver remained in the parking lot. While in the store,
        Robinson removed a gun from his waistband and placed it back
        into his pants. A store clerk recognized Robinson—claiming he had
        come to the store two weeks prior and “bragged” about being in-
        volved in a local shooting. After approximately thirty minutes,
        Robinson exited the store. The store’s video surveillance showed
        him loitering outside before being approached by an unidentiﬁed
        man. Their discussion quickly escalated, and a struggle between
        the two men ensued. The video showed Robinson reaching toward
        his waistband and producing a ﬁrearm. Robinson then reached to-
        ward the man’s waistband and grabbed another ﬁrearm. The uni-
        dentiﬁed man began to run away as Robinson ﬁred several shots in
        his direction. The store clerk who had recognized Robinson earlier
        began ﬁring shots at Robinson from the store’s doorway, and Rob-
        inson shot back. Robinson then returned to the Chevy and was
        driven away.
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        23-11325               Opinion of the Court                         3

               Law enforcement responded to the scene and recovered
        store surveillance footage, which provided clear views of the en-
        counter, Robinson’s face, and the Chevy’s plate number. The next
        day, the same oﬃcer observed a white Chevy Malibu with the iden-
        tiﬁed plate. After the Chevy ran a red light, the oﬃcer initiated a
        traﬃc stop, and upon approaching the vehicle, recognized Robin-
        son from the store’s surveillance footage in the passenger seat. A
        records check conﬁrmed Robinson’s identity and his status as a con-
        victed felon. Robinson was taken into custody.
               On September 1, 2022, Robinson was charged with two
        counts of being a felon in knowing possession of a ﬁrearm. 18
        U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty in exchange for the government
        dismissing the second count.
                Robinson’s probation oﬃcer prepared a Presentence Investi-
        gation Report (PSI). The PSI calculated Robinson’s base oﬀense
        level as 27 under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2) because the oﬀense involved
        attempted murder, and because the cross-reference provision pur-
        suant § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) directs application of § 2X1.1 if the defend-
        ant possessed a ﬁrearm in connection with another oﬀense and the
        resulting oﬀense level is higher. After reducing three levels for Rob-
        inson’s acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1, Robinson’s total
        oﬀense level was 24. The PSI also reported criminal history, which
        included two armed robberies and a prior conviction for possessing
        a ﬁrearm as a felon. Robinson had six criminal history points, es-
        tablishing a criminal history category of III. The PSI determined,
        based on his total oﬀense level of 24 and criminal history category
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11325

        of III, that Robinson had an advisory sentencing guidelines range
        of 63 to 78 months of imprisonment.
               At the sentencing hearing, Robinson objected to the PSI on
        the grounds that his possession of a ﬁrearm was not in connection
        with an attempted murder because he had no ability to retreat and
        was thus acting in self-defense under Florida law and federal law.
        Robinson also moved for a downward variance, arguing that his
        history of substance abuse, poor mental health, acceptance of re-
        sponsibility, and ﬁring in self-defense justiﬁed a variance from the
        Guidelines.
                Over Robinson’s objections, the district court sentenced him
        to 75 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised
        release. Robinson timely appealed. On appeal, he argues that:
        (1) the district court erred in applying the base oﬀense level for at-
        tempted murder pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines’ cross-ref-
        erence provisions because he was acting in self-defense and, thus,
        his felon in possession oﬀense was not connected to an attempted
        murder; and (2) even if the cross-reference provisions properly ap-
        ply, the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.
                                          II.
               We review the district court’s fact findings for clear error
        and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to particular facts
        de novo. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2006).
        For a factual error to be clear, we, “after reviewing all the evidence,
        must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
        been committed.” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134,
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        23-11325               Opinion of the Court                        5

        1137 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). We defer to a credibil-
        ity determination by a factfinder “unless it is contrary to the laws
        of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no
        reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-
        Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). At
        the district court level, the government has the burden of establish-
        ing a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of reliable evi-
        dence. United States v. Askew, 193 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 1999).
               Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of
        unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has their
        oﬀense level calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. A
        base oﬀense level of 20 is assigned if they have one prior felony
        conviction for a crime of violence or a serious drug oﬀense. Id.
        § 2K2.1(a)(4). Typically, four levels are added if the defendant pos-
        sessed the ﬁrearm in connection with another felony oﬀense. Id.
        § 2K2.1(b)(6). However, a separate cross-reference provision,
        § 2X1.1, is used if the defendant possessed the gun in connection
        with another felony oﬀense and the use of the cross-reference pro-
        vision results in a higher oﬀense level. Id. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). The
        cross-reference provision directs that, whenever an attempt is sep-
        arately covered in a Guidelines provision, that provision should be
        applied. Id. § 2X1.1(c)(1). Attempted murder is covered by § 2A2.1.
        Id. § 2A2.1. The base oﬀense level thereunder is 27 unless the com-
        pleted oﬀense would have been ﬁrst degree murder. Id.
        § 2A2.1(a)(1)–(2).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11325

                In Florida, “attempted second-degree murder has two ele-
        ments: (1) the defendant intentionally committed an act that could
        have resulted, but did not result, in the death of someone, and
        (2) the act was imminently dangerous to another and demon-
        strated a depraved mind without regard for human life.” Coicou v.
        State, 39 So. 3d 237, 241 (Fla. 2010) (quotations omitted). However,
        an individual may “use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes
        that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent
        imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or an-
        other or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.”
        Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2). Such an individual has a duty to retreat if
        they are engaged in criminal activity. See id. The defendant’s esca-
        lation of an incident forecloses self-defense and permits application
        of the cross-reference. United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355, 1375–
        76 (11th Cir 2023) (discussing self-defense under a similar section
        of Alabama law, Ala. Code § 13A-3-23).
                This court has held that a federal justiﬁcation defense exists
        as to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) if the defendant: (1) was under “immi-
        nent . . . threat of death”; (2) did not recklessly place themselves in
        that situation; (3) had no reasonable alternative to possessing a gun;
        and (4) “there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal
        action and the avoidance of the threatened harm.” United States v.
        Rice, 214 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).
                As a preliminary matter, the district court correctly applied
        the cross-reference provision under § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). That provi-
        sion is applicable if the government shows by a preponderance of
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        23-11325               Opinion of the Court                        7

        the evidence that Robinson’s possession of a ﬁrearm was in con-
        nection with another oﬀense and if calculating his oﬀense levels
        under the cross-reference results in a higher oﬀense level. U.S.S.G.
        § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A); Askew, 193 F.3d at 1183.
                The district court did not err in ﬁnding that Robinson pos-
        sessed the ﬁrearm in connection with an attempted murder. The
        store’s video evidence showed that Robinson was the only one who
        drew a gun during the altercation, that he then seized a gun from
        the unidentiﬁed man, and that he ﬁred three shots at the man as
        the man ﬂed. It was not “contrary to the laws of nature” to disbe-
        lieve Robinson’s testimony at his sentencing hearing to the extent
        it contradicted the video evidence. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749
        (quotations omitted).
               Based on these facts, the district court did not err in deter-
        mining that Robinson intentionally committed an act which could
        have resulted in death, was imminently dangerous to another, and
        that demonstrated a lack of regard for human life, such that his ac-
        tions could constitute attempted murder under Florida law. Coicou,
        39 So. 3d at 241.
               Neither did the district court err in determining that Robin-
        son’s actions were not covered by Florida’s self-defense law or fed-
        eral law’s justiﬁcation defense. Robinson was not under a suﬃ-
        ciently imminent threat of death, rendering his belief in such a
        threat unreasonable. See Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2); Rice, 214 F.3d at
        1297. Robinson was the only one during the confrontation to draw
        a gun, showing that he escalated the confrontation to the level of
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11325

        deadly force. Rice, 214 F.3d at 1297; Moore, 76 F.4th at 1375–76. And
        even if the man’s ﬂight was tactical repositioning to attack Robin-
        son, the repositioning aﬀorded Robinson a chance to safely retreat.
                                          III.
               This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the
        sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard in light of
        the 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) factors. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
        (2007); United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
        curiam). This court will vacate a sentence “if, but only if, [it is] left
        with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court com-
        mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
        by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
        sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612
        F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted). This
        court may not “set aside a sentence merely because [it] would have
        decided that another one is more appropriate” because the district
        court’s sentence need only be “a reasonable one.” Id. at 1191.
               The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
        showing it to be unreasonable in light of the record and the
        § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th
        Cir. 2009). In imposing a criminal sentence, the court should con-
        sider factors including: the nature and circumstances of the of-
        fense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need to
        reﬂect the oﬀense’s seriousness, promote respect for the law, pro-
        vide just punishment, adequately deter criminal conduct, and pro-
        tect the public; and the Guidelines sentencing range. 18 U.S.C.
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        23-11325                Opinion of the Court                          9

        § 3553(a). District courts are required to “impose a sentence suﬃ-
        cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes”
        of sentencing. Id. They need not give all the factors equal weight
        and have discretion to attach great weight to one factor over an-
        other. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.
        2015). This discretion is particularly pronounced when weighing
        criminal history. United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir.
        2021).
                This court “ordinarily expect[s] a sentence within the Guide-
        lines range to be reasonable.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
        1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The Guidelines range for
        a defendant with 24 oﬀense levels and a criminal history category
        of III is 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. chap. 5, pt. A, and
        the maximum sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is 15
        years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).
               Here, Robinson’s 75-month sentence is not substantively un-
        reasonable. First, it is within the Guidelines range and falls under
        the statutory maximum. U.S.S.G. chap. 5, pt. A; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d
        at 1324; 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). Second, Robinson’s oﬀense was quite
        serious and implicated the need to protect the public, as it involved
        shooting at a retreating opponent who had not even drawn a gun.
        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C). Third, Robinson’s criminal history
        includes a crime of violence and shows rapid rearmament despite
        Robinson knowing he was not permitted to possess ﬁrearms,
        which the district court was entitled to give substantial weight in
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                 23-11325

        evaluating the need to protect the public and deter Robinson. Riley,
        995 F.3d at 1279; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C).
                                        IV.
                For the foregoing reasons, this court should aﬃrm the dis-
        trict court’s sentence.
              AFFIRMED.