Court Opinion

ID: 9394493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 17:00:50.23608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.502595
License: Public Domain

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                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-10410
                         ____________________

        POET THEATRICALS MARINE, LLC,
        POET PRODUCTIONS, LLC,
        POET TECHNICAL SERVICES, LLC,
        POET HOLDINGS, INC.,
                                                   Plaintiffs-Appellees,
        versus
        CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC.,

                                                 Defendant-Appellant,

        ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., et al.,
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                   21-10410

                                                                    Defendants.

                              ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-24619-CMA
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               This is a case about shows on cruise ships. Poet Theatricals
        Marine, LLC1 and Celebrity Cruises, Inc. entered into a series of
        agreements. In those agreements, Poet agreed to produce shows
        for Celebrity’s ships. When those agreements went south, Poet
        sued Celebrity in state court, asserting various claims under state
        law. Celebrity, in turn, removed the case to federal court. Celeb-
        rity argued that Poet’s state-law claims were actually federal copy-
        right claims. In doing so, Celebrity invoked the doctrine of com-
        plete preemption, which treats certain state-law claims as if they
        were federal.

        1
          The plaintiffs were Poet Theatricals Marine, LLC, Poet Productions, LLC,
        Poet Technical Services, LLC, and Poet Holdings, Inc. We’ll refer to them
        together as “Poet.”
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        21-10410               Opinion of the Court                         3

               The district court dismissed all of Poet’s claims except for
        one: a state unjust enrichment claim. The district court concluded
        that the unjust enrichment claim was not completely preempted
        by the Copyright Act. The district court declined to exercise sup-
        plemental jurisdiction over that claim and remanded it to state
        court. On appeal, Celebrity argues that the district court erred by
        remanding the claim because it was completely preempted.
               We affirm. A state-law claim is completely preempted (and
        thus removable) if (1) a federal statute creates an exclusive cause of
        action and (2) the state-law claim falls within that exclusive federal
        cause of action. Even if the Copyright Act created an exclusive fed-
        eral cause of action (at step one), Poet’s unjust enrichment claim
        fell outside of that cause of action (at step two). Because Poet’s
        unjust enrichment was not completely preempted, the claim was
        neither federal nor removable. As the district court concluded, it
        belonged in state court.

           FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               Poet is an entertainment company. As part of its business,
        Poet created, produced, and executed live shows for cruise ships.
        In 2007, Poet signed a series of agreements with Celebrity Cruises,
        Inc. In those agreements, Poet agreed to produce shows for Celeb-
        rity. These shows regularly appeared on Celebrity’s ships until the
        agreements ended in 2016. Over the course of these performances,
        Celebrity took videos and photographs of Poet’s shows.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-10410

               The contracts gave Celebrity “the exclusive right and limited
        license to use, perform or display [Poet’s] shows” on Celebrity’s
        ships for the term of the agreements. They also stated that, if Ce-
        lebrity wanted to “use any [p]roject [m]aterials for any other pur-
        pose other than in [Poet’s] [s]hows within the scope” of the agree-
        ments, Celebrity had to “obtain a license for such use from” Poet.
        “Project materials” were defined to include Poet’s intellectual
        property developed and used in its shows. The agreements pro-
        vided that “[a]ll [p]roject [m]aterials shall be and remain the sole
        property of [Poet] and shall be delivered to [Poet] upon termina-
        tion” of the agreements.
                 According to Poet, Celebrity didn’t live up to these agree-
        ments. The agreements granted Celebrity a “limited license” to
        use, perform, or display the shows over the duration of each agree-
        ment. But Celebrity “continued to use the video recordings and
        still photographs of scenes in Poet’s shows in promotional materi-
        als . . . following termination of the agreements.” Celebrity dis-
        played images of Poet’s shows on its websites, brochures, and post-
        ers. And Celebrity continued to use videos of Poet’s shows on its
        YouTube channels and its website.
               Poet sued Celebrity, its parent corporation, and nine travel
        agencies in Florida state court. Poet asserted twenty-one state-law
        causes of action, including one against Celebrity for unjust enrich-
        ment (count two). In setting out its unjust enrichment claim, Poet
        alleged that it had “granted [Celebrity] a limited license to use
        Poet’s intellectual property.” But Celebrity continued to use and
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        21-10410               Opinion of the Court                         5

        benefit from Poet’s intellectual property outside the terms of that
        limited license. And so Poet alleged that Celebrity was liable for
        unjust enrichment. Although Poet’s claim was based on Celebrity
        using its intellectual property, Poet didn’t bring any federal copy-
        right claims.
               Celebrity removed the case to federal court. In doing so,
        Celebrity asserted federal question jurisdiction through the com-
        plete preemption doctrine. Celebrity recognized that, under the
        well-pleaded complaint rule, a plaintiff may generally “avoid fed-
        eral jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” But there is an
        exception: when federal law has “entirely displace[d] any state
        cause of action,” we will treat those displaced state causes of action
        as federal claims “removable to federal court.” Celebrity argued
        that the Copyright Act completely preempts state law in this way.
        And it contended that Poet’s state-law claims fell within the Copy-
        right Act’s scope such that Poet’s claims were (in fact) federal cop-
        yright claims.
               Poet moved to remand. Poet argued that complete preemp-
        tion was a “rare doctrine” that the Supreme Court had applied in
        only three statutes: the Labor Management Relations Act, the Em-
        ployee Retirement Income Security Act, and the National Bank
        Act. Poet pointed out that this court had “display[ed] no enthusi-
        asm to extend the [complete preemption] doctrine into new areas
        of law.” Poet also argued that, even if the Copyright Act could
        completely preempt state law, the Copyright Act didn’t completely
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-10410

        preempt its particular claims in this case. That’s because, in Poet’s
        view, its claims fell outside the Copyright Act’s scope.
                The district court agreed almost entirely with Celebrity.
        First, the district court—following the unanimous view of other
        circuits that have considered the question—concluded that the
        Copyright Act completely preempts state-law claims that fall
        within the Act’s scope. Second, the district court held that twenty
        of the twenty-one claims were completely preempted. The sole
        exception was Poet’s unjust enrichment claim against Celebrity.
        The district court reasoned that the unjust enrichment claim fell
        outside the Copyright Act’s scope and thus wasn’t completely
        preempted.
               Because it found that the Copyright Act completely
        preempted twenty of Poet’s state-law claims, the district court con-
        cluded that it had federal question jurisdiction over the case. In
        other words, it found that twenty of Poet’s “state-law claims” were
        really federal copyright claims. The district court thus denied
        Poet’s motion to remand. But it dismissed those twenty claims
        without prejudice, leaving only the state unjust enrichment claim
        against Celebrity. This claim, the district court concluded, was not
        completely preempted because it fell outside the Copyright Act’s
        scope. The district court then declined to exercise supplemental
        jurisdiction over the unjust enrichment claim and remanded it to
        state court.
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        21-10410                Opinion of the Court                         7

               Celebrity timely appealed the district court’s decision to re-
        mand Poet’s unjust enrichment claim. None of Poet’s other claims
        are on appeal.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
               “Whether a district court may exercise jurisdiction over a
        case based upon complete preemption is a question of law that this
        court reviews de novo.” Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d
        1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).
                                     DISCUSSION
                Celebrity argues that Poet’s state unjust enrichment claim is
        completely preempted by the Copyright Act—such that the claim
        is in fact a federal copyright claim. Because the unjust enrichment
        claim arises (in Celebrity’s view) under federal law, Celebrity con-
        tends that the district court erred by remanding the claim to state
        court. This raises two questions. First, does the Copyright Act cre-
        ate an exclusive cause of action? Second, does Poet’s unjust enrich-
        ment claim fall within that exclusive cause of action? Poet’s claim
        is completely preempted only if the answer to both of these ques-
        tions is “yes.” We’ll take each in turn.
                               Complete Preemption
               The district court asserted jurisdiction under the removal
        statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The removal statute provides that
        any civil action brought in state court may be removed to federal
        court . . . so long as the federal court has original jurisdiction over
        the case under either federal question or diversity jurisdiction.”
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10410

        Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 182
        F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1999). The parties agree that there’s no
        diversity jurisdiction in this case because they aren’t completely di-
        verse. And so our power to hear this case hinges on whether we
        have federal question jurisdiction.
                The presence of federal question jurisdiction is generally
        governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Caterpillar Inc.
        v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The well-pleaded complaint
        rule “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
        question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
        complaint.” Id. “The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the
        [case]; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance
        on state law.” Id. It’s thus “settled law that a case may not be re-
        moved to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including
        the defense of pre-emption.” Id. at 393.
                But there’s an exception—or corollary—to the well-pleaded
        complaint rule: the complete preemption doctrine. Under the
        complete preemption doctrine, a complaint that (on its face) raises
        only state-law claims can still be removed “when a federal statute
        wholly displaces the state-law cause[s] of action through complete
        pre-emption.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8
        (2003). In assessing whether Congress has completely preempted
        state law, the “dispositive question” is whether “Congress intended
        the federal cause of action to be exclusive.” Id. at 9 & n.5. If so,
        any state-law claim falling within that exclusive federal cause of
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        21-10410                Opinion of the Court                         9

        action “necessarily arises under federal law,” rendering the case
        “removable.” Id. at 9.
                The doctrine is based on the idea that, “[w]hen the federal
        statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim
        which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if
        pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.” Id.
        at 8. In other words, if Congress has entirely displaced state law
        and replaced it with a federal cause of action, there’s no such thing
        as a state-law claim falling within that cause of action. It can only
        be federal. And so the claim must be removable. The doctrine is
        designed, at least in part, to combat artful pleading: “a plaintiff may
        not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal ques-
        tions in a complaint.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vaca-
        tion Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983); see also Arthur R. Miller,
        Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 Tex. L. Rev.
        1781, 1785 (1998) (“[A] plaintiff may not disguise an inherently ex-
        clusive federal cause of action, which, if properly pled, would pro-
        vide a basis for removal.”).
               Complete preemption is “rare.” Cmty. State Bank v. Strong,
        651 F.3d 1241, 1260 n.16 (11th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has
        found only three statutes to completely preempt state law: (1) sec-
        tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, see Avco Corp.
        v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
        Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560–61 (1968); (2) section 502(a)(1)(B) of the
        Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, see Metro. Life
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  21-10410

        Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1987); and (3) sections 85 and 86
        of the National Bank Act, see Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 11.
                Turning to our case, Celebrity argues that the Copyright Act
        completely preempts state law. Every circuit to consider the issue
        has held that the Copyright Act provides an exclusive federal cause
        of action and thus is completely preemptive. See GlobeRanger
        Corp. v. Software AG, 691 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We hold
        that [s]ection 301(a) of the Copyright Act completely preempts the
        substantive field.”); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 (6th Cir.
        2005) (same); Briarpatch Ltd., L.P v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373
        F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs.,
        Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 1993) (same).
               But we don’t need to decide the issue here. We’ll assume—
        without deciding—that the Copyright Act is completely preemp-
        tive. As we’ll see, though, that won’t help Celebrity’s appeal.
        That’s because it’s not enough to say that a federal statute com-
        pletely preempts state law. Instead, a removing party relying on
        complete preemption must also show that the plaintiff’s state-law
        claim falls within the federal statute’s exclusive cause of action. It’s
        only then that the claim is completely preempted, offering a basis
        for removal. On this point, Celebrity falls short.
                   Complete Preemption Applied to Our Claim
               We now turn to whether Poet’s claim falls within the Cop-
        yright Act’s exclusive cause of action. “[I]f a federal cause of action
        completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that
        comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
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        21-10410                  Opinion of the Court                              11

        ‘arises under’ federal law.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 7
        (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24). A state-law claim “falls
        within the scope” of an exclusive federal cause of action when “an
        individual, at some point in time, could have brought [the state-
        law] claim under” that exclusive federal cause of action. Aetna
        Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004) (cleaned up). 2
               But Poet couldn’t have brought a copyright claim, so its un-
        just enrichment claim doesn’t fall within the Copyright Act’s cause
        of action. To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
        prove two elements: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
        copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”
        Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1223
        (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
        499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)); accord Compulife Software Inc. v. New-
        man, 959 F.3d 1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020) (same).
               As to the first element (ownership of a valid copyright), “a
        plaintiff must prove that [its] work is original and that the plaintiff
        complied with applicable statutory formalities.” Latimer v.

        2
           In Davila, the Supreme Court held that there were two steps in assessing
        whether state-law claims fell within ERISA’s exclusive cause of action. A claim
        is completely preempted by ERISA where (1) the plaintiff “could have brought
        his claim under ERISA” and (2) “there is no other independent legal duty that
        is implicated by a defendant’s actions.” Davila, 542 U.S. at 210. Some courts
        have extended this two-part test to other statutes. See, e.g., Hawaii ex rel.
        Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014). Because
        Celebrity fails at the first step, we need not decide whether the second step
        also applies to our complete preemption analysis for the Copyright Act.
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                    21-10410

        Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned
        up). One of those statutory formalities is the Copyright Act’s reg-
        istration requirement, which provides that “no civil action for in-
        fringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be in-
        stituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim
        has been made.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see also Smith v. Casey, 741
        F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that registration is one
        of the Copyright Act’s necessary “formalities”).
                In other words, “the Copyright Act [generally] requires cop-
        yright holders to register their works before suing for copyright in-
        fringement.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157
        (2010); see, e.g., Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com,
        LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017) (dismissing a copyright
        claim where the plaintiff “did not allege that the Register of Copy-
        rights had yet acted on the [copyright] application”), aff’d, 139 S.
        Ct. 881 (2019); Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter, LLC, 907 F.3d 1335, 1341
        (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “a complaint claiming infringe-
        ment of an unregistered copyright can be dismissed for failure to
        state a claim”). 3
               Here, Poet never alleged that it registered any copyright be-
        fore bringing this case. In fact, both sides agree that Poet never
        registered its copyrights. The parties also agree that, because Poet
        has no registration, any copyright claim it brought “would have to

        3
          There are some exceptions to this registration requirement. See 17 U.S.C.
        § 411(a). But none of those exceptions apply here.
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        21-10410               Opinion of the Court                        13

        be dismissed.” This isn’t a case, then, where Poet could have
        brought a federal claim but didn’t to avoid federal court. Poet
        couldn’t have brought a copyright claim; it had no registration. Be-
        cause Poet couldn’t have brought a copyright claim, its unjust en-
        richment claim doesn’t fall within the Copyright Act’s exclusive
        cause of action. Poet’s claim isn’t completely preempted.
                Comparing a copyright claim and Poet’s unjust enrichment
        claim only confirms that Poet’s claim falls outside the Copyright
        Act’s exclusive cause of action. A copyright claim requires “(1)
        ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent ele-
        ments of the work that are original.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. By
        contrast, an unjust enrichment claim, under Florida law, requires
        proof that “(1) the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defend-
        ant; (2) the defendant voluntarily accepted and retained that bene-
        fit; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable
        for the defendants to retain it without paying the value thereof.”
        Virgilio v. Ryland Grp., 680 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
        Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Winter Park, 887 So. 2d 1237, 1241 n.4
        (Fla. 2004)). These elements are entirely different.
               Poet’s allegations also show that its claim falls outside the
        Copyright Act’s exclusive cause of action. Poet asserted that Ce-
        lebrity was liable for unjust enrichment because (1) Poet conferred
        a benefit (its intellectual property) on Celebrity, (2) Celebrity ac-
        cepted, used, and retained that intellectual property, and (3) it
        would be unjust for Celebrity to retain the benefits of that use after
        the termination of the parties’ agreements. Poet alleged that
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  21-10410

        Celebrity’s use was unfair—not because Poet owned a registered
        copyright for its shows—but because Celebrity exceeded the terms
        of its licenses without paying Poet to use its creations.
                Against all this, Celebrity never tries to show that Poet’s un-
        just enrichment claim falls within the Copyright Act’s exclusive
        cause of action. Instead, Celebrity argues that Poet’s unjust enrich-
        ment claim falls within section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, which
        expressly preempts certain state claims. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
        Specifically, the Act preempts any state claim asserting rights that
        “(1) fall within the ‘subject matter of copyright’ set forth in sections
        102 and 103 [of the Act] and (2) are ‘equivalent to’ the exclusive
        rights of section 106.” Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305,
        1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Celebrity argues that
        Poet’s claim falls within section 301(a) and that this is enough to
        find complete preemption.
               Some of our sister circuits have suggested that Celebrity is
        right: that state-law claims preempted by the Copyright Act are
        completely preempted—giving rise to removable federal claims.
        See, e.g., Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305 (“[T]he district courts have
        jurisdiction over state law claims preempted by the Copyright
        Act.”); Rosciszewski, 1 F.3d at 232 (“[A]ctions pre-empted by [sec-
        tion] 301(a) of the Copyright Act [are to] be regarded as arising un-
        der federal law.”); GlobeRanger, 691 F.3d at 706 (holding that the
        plaintiff’s claims were completely preempted to the extent “the
        Copyright Act preempt[ed] any of [the plaintiff’s] claims”).
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        21-10410                Opinion of the Court                        15

                But this approach, in our view, “conflate[s] complete and or-
        dinary preemption.” See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City
        Ry., 785 F.3d 1182, 1190 (8th Cir. 2015). Ordinary preemption
        “arises when the text of a federal statute explicitly . . . displace[s]
        state law.” See Am.’s Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F.3d 1319,
        1329 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). That’s what section 301
        of the Copyright Act does: it expressly displaces state-law claims
        that fall within its reach. Complete preemption, on the other hand,
        arises—not where a state claim falls within a statute’s preemption
        provision—but where the state-law claim “comes within the scope
        of the [exclusive] federal cause of action.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank,
        539 U.S. at 7 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24).
                 Put another way, “[t]he scope of complete preemption turns
        primarily on the provision creating the federal cause of action—not
        on an express preemption provision.” Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1190.
        “It is the federal cause of action that ultimately supplants the state-
        law cause of action and effectuates complete preemption.” Id. It’s
        only when a state-law claim “comes within the scope of [the exclu-
        sive federal] cause of action” that the claim is completely
        preempted. Davila, 542 U.S. at 208 (quotation omitted). The ques-
        tion, in other words, is whether the plaintiff “could have brought
        [its] claim under” the exclusive federal cause of action. Id. at 210.
        And so Celebrity’s argument—that Poet’s claim is expressly
        preempted—misses the point. That argument goes to the merits,
        not to jurisdiction. It’s one that the state courts can (and should)
        decide. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398 n.13 (noting that “the merits
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 21-10410

        of . . . any of the [parties’ ordinary] pre-emption arguments . . .
        must be addressed in the first instance by the state court”).
               Indeed, courts routinely look to the federal cause of action—
        not a statute’s preemption provision—in assessing complete
        preemption. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 66 (finding that
        a state-law claim was completely preempted because the state
        “cause of action [fell] within the scope” of ERISA’s “civil enforce-
        ment provisions”); Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393,
        411 (3d Cir. 2021) (“The question is whether the [plaintiff’s] allega-
        tions fall within the scope of the [federal] cause of action—that is,
        whether the claims could have been brought under that section.”
        (quotation omitted)); Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C., 28 F.4th
        580, 586 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Assuming—without deciding—that the
        [federal] cause of action is completely preemptive, the question is
        whether [the plaintiff] could have brought the instant claims under
        that cause of action.” (quotation omitted)).
                Celebrity would instead have us federalize any claim that
        comes within the Copyright Act’s preemption provision. But that
        approach would take what’s meant to be a “narrow exception” to
        the well-pleaded complaint rule and blow it wide open, allowing
        the removal of more cases to federal court and undermining our
        system of dual sovereignty. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at
        5; cf. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (“Due regard for the
        rightful independence of state governments . . . requires that [fed-
        eral courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction[.]”). That’s
        because—like many statutes—the Copyright Act’s preemption
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        21-10410               Opinion of the Court                      17

        provision is broader than its cause of action. See 1 Nimmer on
        Copyright § 1.16[A] (“[T]he shadow actually cast by the Act’s
        preemption is notably broader than the wing of its protection.”
        (quotation omitted)). “Therefore, a state-law claim may be . . .
        preempted [by section 301] but not completely preempted under”
        the Copyright Act’s exclusive cause of action. Conn. State Dental
        Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir.
        2009). In such a case, the proper approach is to “assert preemption
        as a defense” in state court, not to “remov[e] [the case] to federal
        court.” Id. That’s what Celebrity must do.
                                  *      *      *
              In sum, we agree with the district court that the Copyright
        Act doesn’t completely preempt Poet’s unjust enrichment claim.
        That claim belongs in state court.
              AFFIRMED.