Court Opinion

ID: 9705144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:57:55.097693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:08.279620
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
Due to the procedural posture of the case, I must dissent. Although I agree that the two averments in paragraphs 13 and 14 were insufficient to withstand a demurrer, I believe this became a moot issue after the trial took place and the jury awarded Lumax a $70,000.00 verdict.
At trial, testimony provided that:
... MCA was established primarily to handle the Kinney orders with Lumax when [Appellant’s] father was no longer able to deal with Kinney. [Appellant] testified Lumax comprised 80-85% of the business dealings of MCA. [TT. 31] [Appellant] is the sole officer, shareholder and full-time employee of MCA. The corporation issued no stock and had no fixed assets. [TT. 78, 80] The accountant, Mr. Kays [sic] testified the corporate expenses listed gave the appearance of being unrelated to the business of the corporation. [TT. 83-86] The corporate minutes for the time period of *441/26/87-1/16/90 consisted of three handwritten pages. [TT. 32]
Trial Court Opinion at 5.
The trial court found that, “[w]hether or not the complaint was sufficient to set forth a cause of action is no longer a relevant issue. A jury heard the facts of this case and decided the evidence was sufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil.” Trial Court Opinion at 4-5.
I agree. As evidence was presented at trial to support the piercing of the corporate veil, the deficient pleading cannot now erase what has occurred. Furthermore, it is well-established that the court has the discretion to allow a plaintiff to amend the complaint to conform to the proof at trial. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033.
Had the court granted the demurrer, the plaintiff would mostly likely have had the opportunity to amend its pleading and would not have suffered any outright dismissal with prejudice. Thus, the Appellants receive greater relief from the Majority than if their demurrer had been granted, a result I find unacceptable and unjust.1
NIX, C.J., joins this Dissenting Opinion.
MONTEMURO, J., participates by designation as a senior judge as provided by Rule of Judicial Administration 701(f).

. The injustice resulting from the majority’s conclusion is further demonstrated when compared to similar circumstances in a criminal proceeding. We have held that the Commonwealth's failure to establish a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing is immaterial where at trial the Commonwealth met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. McCullough, 501 Pa. 423, 461 A.2d 1229 (1983). See also. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 433 Pa.Super. 411, 640 A.2d 1326 (1994). This sound reasoning should be applicable to the instant civil case when the burden of proof at trial has been met.