Court Opinion

ID: 9401659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 18:08:07.024646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:54.096618
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Starner v. Onda, 2023-Ohio-1955.]
                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Jeffrey Starner et al.,                            :

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,             :           No. 22AP-599
                                                          (C.P.C. No. 19CV-4489)
v.                                                 :
                                                       (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Robert J. Onda et al.,                             :

                Defendants-Appellees.              :

                                             D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on June 13, 2023

                On brief: Thomas C. Loepp, Law Offices, Co., LPA, and
                Thomas C. Loepp, for appellants. Argued: Thomas C. Loepp.

                On brief: Gallagher Sharp LLP, Theresa A. Richthammer,
                Richard C.O. Rezie, and Taylor M. Iacobacci, for appellees.
                Argued: Taylor M. Iacobacci.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

LELAND, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants Jeffrey Starner, Merchants 5 Star, Inc., and Merchants
5 Star, Ltd., appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that
granted summary judgment to defendants-appellees Robert J. Onda, Brian K. Kim,
Timothy S. Rankin, and Onda, LaBuhn, Rankin, & Boggs Co., LPA (“OLRB”). For the
following reasons, we reverse that judgment and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} Merchants 5 Star, Ltd. was a trucking company based in Marietta, Ohio.
Merchants 5 Star, Inc. owned a fleet of semi-tractors and trailers (“rolling stock”), which
Merchants 5 Star, Ltd. leased and used to operate. In 2014, Starner owned all the
No. 22AP-599                                                                                          2

membership interests of Merchants 5 Star, Ltd. and all the issued and outstanding stock of
Merchants 5 Star, Inc. Starner also ran the trucking business.
       {¶ 3} In spring 2014, Starner began seriously exploring selling Merchants 5 Star,
Ltd. and Merchants 5 Star, Inc. (the “M5S entities”) to an investment group led by Jim Pack
(the “Pack Investors”). The negotiations culminated in a letter of intent in which the
investors agreed to: (1) assume the liabilities of the M5S entities; (2) infuse cash into the
companies, “probably in the $350K to $500[K] range”; (3) pay Starner for his interests in
the M5S entities with a $400,000 note, which would not accrue interest for 6 months and
would be secured with Merchant 5 Star, Inc. stock and Merchant 5 Star, Ltd. membership
interest; and (4) continue to employ Starner for at least 3 years. (Defs.’ Ex. 25.) Importantly,
“[t]he key element” of the deal was “to make sure [the M5S entities’] debts [were] resolved.”
(Defs.’ Ex. 25.)
       {¶ 4} Pack’s attorney drafted a purchase agreement using the terms in the letter of
intent, and forwarded the draft agreement to Starner. At that point, Starner hired Onda to
represent him and the M5S entities in the sale of Starner’s interests in the M5S entities.1
Starner gave Onda the letter of intent and the draft purchase agreement. Starner asked
Onda “to put together a deal that was within this framework that provided every protection
possible [for him and the M5S entities].” (Starner Depo. at 164; see also Starner Aff. at ¶ 10
(“I asked Onda to build in every possible protection to protect me and my companies.”).)
       {¶ 5} Onda revised the draft purchase agreement and forwarded the revised
agreement to Pack. The Pack Investors accepted the revised agreement. Starner signed the
purchase agreement selling his interests in the M5S entities on July 18, 2014. As part of the
sale, Merchants Holding, LLC, the company formed to purchase the M5S entities, executed
a cognovit note promising to pay Starner $400,000. Merchants Holding also executed a
security agreement, pledging as security for the note Merchants Holding’s membership
interest in Merchants 5 Star, Ltd. and the stock of Merchants 5 Star, Inc.

1Onda maintains that he represented Starner individually with respect to the sale, and did not represent
the M5S entities during the sale transaction. In this appeal, we review a judgment granting summary
judgment to defendants. When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court construes
the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party. Bliss v. Manville, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-
Ohio-4366, ¶ 13. Consequently, we construe conflicts in the evidence in favor of Starner, the non-moving
party.
No. 22AP-599                                                                                  3

       {¶ 6} Soon after the sale, Starner noticed that Pack was not paying the M5S entities’
monthly obligations. Pack also changed the computer system, which prevented Starner
from accessing financial and business information. Starner eventually discovered that Pack
had sold much of the unencumbered rolling stock, but had not used the sale proceeds to
meet Merchants Holding’s obligations under the purchase agreement.
       {¶ 7} Starner sought assistance from Onda in dealing with Merchants Holding’s
failure to comply with the terms of the purchase agreement. On March 10, 2015, Onda sent
Pack a letter providing notice of an event of default under the cognovit promissory note.
The letter stated that Merchants Holding had defaulted because it failed to make payments
under the note to Starner, pay the M5S entities’ debts, and contribute working capital as
required in the purchase agreement.
       {¶ 8} In May or June 2015, Starner started losing confidence in Onda. Starner
began thinking that his problems may have originated with Onda because “none of the
provisions in [the letter of intent] that were critical to the success of it were being followed
[and] [t]here seemed to be no way to make them happen.” (Starner Depo. at 225.)
       {¶ 9} Around that time, Onda had suggested that Starner might want to exercise
his right under the security agreement to reclaim the membership interest in Merchants 5
Star, Ltd. and the stock in Merchants 5 Star, Inc. Given that the M5S entities’ liabilities
greatly exceeded their assets, Onda recommended that upon retaking ownership, Starner
immediately place the M5S entities into a receivership. Starner explained that “at that
point[,] I went to another attorney because I became so concerned that [Onda] had
responsibility in this thing.” (Starner Depo. at 226.)
       {¶ 10} According to Starner, he hired attorney Danny Caudill on June 16, 2015 to
represent him in an action against Merchants Holding on the cognovit promissory note.
Starner explained that “[i]nitially, both [Caudill and Onda] were involved” in advising him.
(Starner Depo. at 241.) “But,” Starner further clarified, “[Onda] knew that I had retained
[Caudill] and that everything was turning over to [Caudill].” (Starner Depo. at 242.)
Although Starner was unsure of the exact date the turnover occurred, he believed it
happened in mid-June 2015.
       {¶ 11} However, Starner’s memory is inconsistent with Onda’s recall of the
transition between the two attorneys. According to Onda, Caudill did not take over as
No. 22AP-599                                                                                              4

Starner’s counsel until late July 2015. Onda confirmed that, as of July 10, 2015, he and
Caudill were still concurrently representing Starner.
        {¶ 12} On July 20, 2015, Starner exercised his security interest in the M5S entities
and took back from Merchants Holding its interests in the M5S entities. Two days later,
the M5S entities filed a receivership action. Starner engaged Rankin, an OLRB attorney, to
file that action and act as the M5S entities’ attorney in the receivership action. In an order
dated July 28, 2015, the trial court appointed a receiver to wind down the M5S entities, and
to liquidate the assets of the M5S entities and distribute the proceeds to their creditors.
        {¶ 13} While the receivership was pending, on September 6, 2016, Starner and the
M5S entities filed suit against defendants for legal malpractice arising out of Starner’s sale
of his interests in the M5S entities to Merchants Holding. Starner—not the receiver—filed
the legal malpractice action on behalf of the M5S entities. The receiver determined it was
not in the M5S entities’ best interests to litigate the legal malpractice action. The receiver
moved the trial court for the authority to sell and assign the M5S entities’ interests in any
legal malpractice claims against defendants. The trial court granted the motion. On
February 28, 2017, the receiver conducted an auction, which Starner won. Starner thus
acquired an assignment of “any [and] all right, title, and interest of [the M5S entities] in the
Malpractice Claims.” (Defs.’ Ex. A, Aug. 13, 2021 Mot. for Summ. Jgmt.)
        {¶ 14} Starner moved to amend the complaint in the legal malpractice action to add
the allegation that he had purchased from the receiver all right, title, and interest in and to
the legal malpractice claims the M5S entities had against defendants. The trial court denied
Starner’s motion. On June 7, 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their legal malpractice
action against defendants pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A).
        {¶ 15} On March 20, 2019, after receiving a report from the receiver that he had
completed a liquidation and distribution of all the assets of the receivership estate, the trial
court issued an order terminating the receivership. The March 20, 2019 order also
judicially dissolved the M5S entities.2

2 The parties did not include in the record of this case court filings from the receivership action or the
original legal malpractice action. However, appellate courts may take judicial notice of publicly accessible
online records. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Struckman, 4th Dist. No. 21CA7, 2023-Ohio-
244, ¶ 76; Ltd. Invest. Group Corp. v. Huntington Natl. Bank, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-61, 2022-Ohio-3657,
¶ 46; Fipps v. Day, 8th Dist. No. 111633, 2022-Ohio-3434, ¶ 2, fn. 1. The court filings we need to fully
elucidate the facts are publicly available on the internet, so we take judicial notice of them.
No. 22AP-599                                                                               5

       {¶ 16} On June 3, 2019, plaintiffs brought the instant legal malpractice action.
Before defendants could respond to the complaint, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
       {¶ 17} Defendants filed two motions for summary judgment. In their first motion,
defendants argued they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Starner’s legal
malpractice claim because Starner failed to file his claim within the statute of limitations.
In their second motion, defendants argued they were entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on the M5S entities’ legal malpractice claims because Starner lacked standing to assert
those claims on behalf of the M5S entities. On September 6, 2022, the trial court issued a
judgment granting both motions for summary judgment.
II. Assignment of Error
       {¶ 18} Starner and the M5S entities now appeal the September 6, 2022 judgment,
and they assign the following error:
              The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the
              Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims for legal malpractice.

III. Analysis
       {¶ 19} A trial court must grant summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 when the moving
party demonstrates that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, and
that conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party. A.J.R. v. Lute, 163 Ohio St.3d 172,
2020-Ohio-5168, ¶ 15; McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St.3d 388, 2019-Ohio-4740, ¶ 18.
Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo.
A.J.R. at ¶ 15. This means that an appellate court conducts an independent review, without
deference to the trial court’s determination. Zurz v. 770 W. Broad AGA, L.L.C., 192 Ohio
App.3d 521, 2011-Ohio-832, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.); White v. Westfall, 183 Ohio App.3d 807, 2009-
Ohio-4490, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.).
       {¶ 20} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the
record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt,
75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The moving party does not discharge this initial burden
under Civ.R. 56 by simply making conclusory allegations. Id. Rather, the moving party
must affirmatively demonstrate by affidavit or other evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that
No. 22AP-599                                                                                  6

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Id. If the moving party meets its burden, then the non-moving party has
a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Civ.R. 56(E); Dresher at 293. If the non-moving party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the non-moving party. Dresher at 293.
       {¶ 21} We will first address Starner’s argument that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on his legal malpractice claim. Starner contends that questions of fact
remain regarding whether he timely asserted his claim and, thus, the trial court should not
have found as a matter of law that the statute of limitations barred his suit. We agree.
       {¶ 22} Claims for legal malpractice “against an attorney or a law firm or legal
professional association * * * shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action
accrued.” R.C. 2305.11(A). The application of R.C. 2305.11(A) in this case is complicated
by Starner’s reliance on the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19. In relevant part, the savings
statute provides: “In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in
due time * * * the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff * * * may
commence a new action within one year after the date of * * * the plaintiff’s failure otherwise
than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations,
whichever occurs later.” R.C. 2305.19(A). “ ‘A voluntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)
constitutes a failure otherwise than upon the merits within the meaning of the savings
statute, R.C. 2305.19.’ ” Vitantonio, Inc. v. Baxter, 116 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-6052,
¶ 4, quoting Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St.3d 38 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 23} Here, Starner originally filed his legal malpractice claim against defendants
on September 6, 2016, and he voluntarily dismissed that claim pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A) on
June 7, 2018. Starner then refiled his legal malpractice claim in the instant action on
June 3, 2019. Thus, Starner recommenced his legal malpractice claim within one year of
the failure of the original claim for a reason unrelated to the merits of the claim.
       {¶ 24} Nevertheless, for the savings statute to apply, Starner must clear one
additional hurdle. “ ‘The Ohio saving clause cannot save an action from the running of the
statute of limitation unless the original action was commenced or attempted to be
commenced within the applicable period of limitation.’ ” Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Found.,
155 Ohio St.3d 1, 2018-Ohio-3263, ¶ 11, quoting Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St.2d 130, 133-
34 (1972). Thus, we must determine whether Starner met the one-year statute of limitations
No. 22AP-599                                                                                  7

applicable to legal malpractice claims when he filed his original action against defendants
on September 6, 2016.
        {¶ 25} “[A]n action for legal malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations begins
to run when there is a cognizable event whereby the client discovers or should have
discovered that his injury was related to his attorney’s act or non-act and the client is put
on notice of a need to pursue his possible remedies against the attorney or when the
attorney-client relationship for that particular transaction or undertaking terminates,
whichever occurs later.” Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54 (1989),
syllabus, applying Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St.3d 385 (1988). This
test requires two factual determinations: (1) when the client knew or should have known
that he may have an injury caused by his attorney; and (2) when the attorney-client
relationship terminated. Smith v. Conley, 109 Ohio St.3d 141, 2006-Ohio-2035, ¶ 4. The
statute of limitations starts running on the latter of the two dates. Id.
        {¶ 26} A cognizable event is an occurrence that alerts or should alert a client “ ‘that
[a] questionable legal practice may have occurred.’ ” Fisk v. Rauser & Assocs. Legal Clinic
Co., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-427, 2011-Ohio-5465, ¶ 23, quoting Zimmie at 58; accord
Harris v. Reedus, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-181, 2015-Ohio-4962, ¶ 15 (a “cognizable event” is
an event that “does or should alert a reasonable person that a questionable legal practice
may have occurred”); Virginia Homes, Ltd. v. Goldman, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1012, 2014-
Ohio-1750, ¶ 21 (same). The inquiry into whether a cognizable event has occurred focuses
on the point of discovery, i.e., the point at which the client realized or should have realized
he was injured by his attorney’s actions or omissions. Smith v. Barclay, 10th Dist. No.
11AP-798, 2012-Ohio-5086, ¶ 24. However, the client need not be aware of the full extent
of his injuries before the cognizable event triggers the statute of limitations. Harris at ¶ 15;
Goldman at ¶ 21; Fisk at ¶ 23. Knowledge of a potential problem starts the statute to run,
even when the client does not know all the details. Barclay at ¶ 25. The cognizable event
puts the client on notice to investigate the facts and circumstances relevant to his legal
malpractice claim, and the plaintiff does not need to have discovered all the facts necessary
to file the claim for the statute of limitations to begin running. Harris at ¶ 15; Goldman at
¶ 21.
        {¶ 27} In his deposition, Starner was asked about when he suspected that Onda may
have provided subpar legal services:
No. 22AP-599                                                                          8

             Q: When did you start to suspect that [Onda] may have screwed
             up in writing that agreement?

             A: To tell you the truth, I maintained my confidence in Bob
             Onda until probably May or June of 2015. And at that point I
             started really realizing what happened to me.

             Q: And why - - what made you start to think that the problem
             may have been with [Onda] at that point?

             A: Several things. A, none of the provisions in that letter [of
             intent] that were critical to the success of it were being
             followed. There seemed to be no way to make them happen. I
             had determined that Jim Pack was a liar at that point and said
             a lot of false things * * *.

             And there was a meeting * * *. * * * And there were some very
             pointed questions asked. Like Bob Onda asked [investor] Ben
             MacDowell, did you have the down payment money when you
             made this deal? And Ben MacDowell very sheepishly said, no,
             he did not.

             And that’s the first time I heard the word “fraud.” [Onda] said,
             well, that’s fraud, Ben.

             So not to extend this out, but from that point on I started
             questioning what’s going on here? And then particularly when
             [Onda] urged me that the best solution was receivership, that
             was the only way. Because there were unknown accounts
             payable. They were in the vicinity of $2 million, an unbelievable
             amount.

             And that’s when [Onda] directed me towards Matt Fisher and
             his firm as receiver. And shortly after that, I had a choice to
             make as to how I was going to pursue things. And I chose to
             hire another attorney because I became concerned - - [Onda]
             wanted me to keep his firm and have Tim Rankin do this and
             do that.

             And at that point I went to another attorney because I became
             so concerned that [Onda] had responsibility in this thing * * *.

(Starner Depo. at 224-26.)
      {¶ 28} This testimony reflects that, in May or June 2015, Starner began to believe
that Onda had not adequately protected his interests in the purchase agreement, which
resulted in injury to him when Merchants Holding breached that agreement. According to
No. 22AP-599                                                                                             9

his testimony, after receiving advice from Onda to place the M5S entities into a
receivership, Starner hired another attorney because he thought Onda “had responsibility”
for the losses associated with the breach of the purchase agreement. (Starner Depo. at 226.)
Starner hired Caudill on June 16, 2015. The evidence, therefore, establishes that Starner
understood as of June 16, 2015, at the latest, that a questionable legal practice may have
occurred that caused him injury. Consequently, we determine that reasonable minds could
only conclude that a cognizable event occurred, at the latest, on June 16, 2015—more than
one year before Starner filed his original complaint on September 6, 2016.
        {¶ 29} In contesting this conclusion, Starner points out that in October 2015, Onda
discussed with the receiver contesting liens a M5S creditor had filed against M5S assets.
Starner, however, does not explain how this conversation has any relevance as to when a
cognizable event occurred. The October 2015 conversation simply does not pertain to the
question of when Starner became aware that Onda’s actions may have injured him.
        {¶ 30} Starner also points out that he did not learn until 2016 that the receiver
decided not to take any action to recover M5S assets, i.e., the rolling stock, that Pack
allegedly wrongly sold.3 Again, Starner fails to clarify how the receiver’s decision has any
bearing on when he first knew that a questionable legal practice may have occurred that
caused him injury. Conceivably, the receiver’s decision to forego steps to recover the
contested assets may have harmed Starner. The receiver’s decision potentially decreased
the size of the receivership estate and, thus, the amount distributable to the M5S entities’
creditors. Starner had personally guaranteed loans for the M5S entities, so the amount he
had to pay M5S creditors to settle the debts he guaranteed theoretically increased when the
asset pool decreased. But, as we stated above, a client need not be aware of the full extent
of his injuries before a cognizable event triggers the statute of limitations. Harris, 2015-
Ohio-4962, at ¶ 15; Goldman, 2014-Ohio-1750, at ¶ 21; Fisk, 2011-Ohio-5465, at ¶ 23.
        {¶ 31} We next turn to the second part of the statute of limitations test for legal
malpractice: determining the date on which the attorney-client relationship terminated.

3 Starner argues that Onda deviated from the standard of care by not insisting that Merchants Holding use
the M5S entities’ unencumbered assets, specifically the rolling stock, as security for Merchants Holding’s
obligation to pay the promissory note. According to Starner, had such a security interest existed, he could
have blocked Pack from selling the rolling stock. Thus, Starner theorizes, he suffered damages caused by
Onda’s alleged malpractice when the receiver refused to “claw back” M5S rolling stock that Pack supposedly
wrongly sold to third parties.
No. 22AP-599                                                                                10

Generally, the attorney-client relationship is consensual and, thus, subject to termination
by the acts of either party. Felix v. Gerth Law Office, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-533, 2018-
Ohio-3133, ¶ 13; Nichter v. Shamansky, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-811, 2015-Ohio-1970, ¶ 12. To
determine whether an attorney-client relationship has ended, courts look for an act by
either party that signals the severing of the relationship. Felix at ¶ 13; accord O’Driscoll v.
Paoloni, 11th Dist. No. 2016-P-0031, 2016-Ohio-8520, ¶ 19 (holding that the termination
of the attorney-client relationship depends not on a subjective loss of confidence, but on an
affirmative act by either party signaling the end of the relationship). Such acts include the
client’s retention of another attorney to represent the client in the same matter for which
the client retained the previous counsel. Felix at ¶ 13; Goldman at ¶ 33. Notably, an explicit
statement terminating the attorney-client relationship is not necessary. Nichter at ¶ 12;
Goldman at ¶ 31.
       {¶ 32} The date on which an attorney-client relationship terminates is a question of
fact. Conley, 2006-Ohio-2035, at ¶ 9. However, a court may decide that question as a
matter of law if either party has undertaken affirmative actions that are patently
inconsistent with a continued attorney-client relationship. Axline v. Kevin R. Conners,
L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-924, 2015-Ohio-4679, ¶ 15; Nichter at ¶ 10; Goldman at ¶ 30.
“Where the evidence is clear and unambiguous as to when the attorney-client relationship
terminates for a particular transaction so that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion from that evidence,” no question of fact remains to prevent a court from
deciding the matter on summary judgment. Goldman at ¶ 30.
       {¶ 33} As we stated above, Starner testified during his deposition that he hired
another attorney, Caudill, “because [he] became so concerned that [Onda] had
responsibility in this thing.” (Starner Depo. at 226.) Starner discussed Caudill again later
in his deposition:
              Q: What was Danny Caudill’s involvement?

              A: I mentioned earlier at some point I decided to retain another
              attorney because I was becoming suspect of what had occurred
              and what happened to me. And I had retained Danny Caudill
              as opposed to retaining [Onda’s] firm to represent me at that
              point.

              Q: At this point you suspected that [Onda] may have done
              something wrong?
No. 22AP-599                                                                             11

              A: Yes.

              Q: At what point did Danny Caudill take over for [Onda’s] firm?

              A: Initially, both firms were involved.

              * * * Tim Rankin represented us in filing the receivership in
              court down here. But [Onda] knew that I had retained [Caudill]
              and everything was turning over to [Caudill].

              Q: Everything was turning over to [Caudill] around this time
              when [Caudill] [was] cc’d on these [June 15, 2015] e-mails,
              correct?

              A: Yes. I’m not sure exactly, but it was mid-June, yes.

              Q: Okay. And you mention that Tim Rankin was dealing with
              the receivership, correct?

              A: Tim Rankin represented the [M5S] companies in the
              Franklin County Courthouse filing for [the] receivership. That
              was his role.

(Starner Depo. at 241-42.)
       {¶ 34} Later, when discussing an e-mail sent July 23, 2015, counsel asked Starner:
“At this point [Caudill] had replaced [Onda], correct?” Starner answered, “[y]es, that is
correct.” (Starner Depo. at 245.)
       {¶ 35} In sum, therefore, Starner stated in his deposition that he hired Caudill “as
opposed” to Onda, and “everything was turning over” to Caudill. (Starner Depo. at 241-42.)
Hiring Caudill, however, did not sever Starner’s connection with OLRB. Upon reassuming
ownership of the M5S entities, Starner hired Tim Rankin, an OLRB attorney, to represent
the M5S entities in the receivership action.
       {¶ 36} In an affidavit authored after his deposition, Starner offered a different
recollection regarding the course of his relationship with Onda. Starner stated:
              Even though [he] began to question whether Onda made
              mistakes negotiating the [purchase] [a]greement, [he]
              continued to consult and receive advice from Onda throughout
              the remainder of 2015, and even into the year 2016, with regard
              to [his] rights and remedies against the Pack Investors [i.e.,
              Pack and the individuals who invested with Pack to purchase
              the M5S entities]. [He] did not terminate [his] attorney-client
              relationship with Onda and [Onda] did not inform [Starner]
No. 22AP-599                                                                              12

               that he was terminating [the] attorney-client relationship. For
               the remainder of the year 2015, Caudill and Onda collaborated
               on [Starner’s] behalf with regard to clawing the assets of the
               [M5S entities] back in the receivership and pursuing claims
               against the Pack Investors for breach of contract and fraud.

(Pls.’ Ex. 2; Starner Aff. at ¶ 19.)
       {¶ 37} Onda set forth his own rendition of the facts. In his affidavit, Onda testified
that he became aware by June 2015 that Starner hired Caudill to replace him as Starner’s
personal counsel, and Onda began transitioning the representation to Caudill around that
time. Onda stated that “[by] July 27, 2015, [he was] no longer represent[ing] Mr. Starner,
individually.” (Defs.’ Ex. M; Onda Aff. at ¶ 15.)
       {¶ 38} Onda continued to bill Starner for legal work he performed after July 27,
2015. However, Onda stated that all the work he performed after July 2015 was on behalf
of the M5S entities rather than Starner.
       {¶ 39} As an initial matter, we disregard Starner’s affidavit testimony regarding the
length of his attorney-client relationship with Onda. When deposed, Starner testified he
hired Caudill “as opposed” to Onda and “everything” turned over to Caudill by mid-June
2015. This testimony conflicts with Starner’s averment in his affidavit that he “continued
to consult and receive advice from Onda” after he hired Caudill and “Caudill and Onda
collaborated” in providing him representation throughout 2015. Compare Starner Depo.
at 241-42 with Starner Aff. at ¶ 19.
       {¶ 40} “ ‘[W]hen an affidavit is inconsistent with [an] affiant’s prior deposition
testimony as to material facts and the affidavit neither suggests [the] affiant was confused
at the deposition nor offers a reason for the contradictions in her prior testimony, the
affidavit does not create a genuine issue of fact which would preclude summary judgment.’ ”
Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, ¶ 28, quoting Lemaster v. Circleville
Long Term Care, Inc., 4th Dist. No. 87 CA 2 (Feb. 22, 1988).             Conceivably, some
explanation may exist for the inconsistency we perceive between Starner’s affidavit and
deposition testimonies. Starner, however, makes no effort to offer such an explanation in
his affidavit. Absent an explanation, we agree with the trial court that Starner’s affidavit
testimony regarding the length his attorney-client relationship with Onda warrants no
consideration. See Allen v. Dept. of Adm. Servs. Office of Risk Mgt., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-
No. 22AP-599                                                                                 13

729, 2020-Ohio-1138, ¶ 26 (disregarding affidavit testimony that conflicted with prior
deposition testimony without explanation).
       {¶ 41} Considering the remaining evidence in the record, we must determine
whether, as defendants argue, Starner severed the attorney-client relationship with Onda
when he hired Caudill. While retaining another attorney for representation in the same
matter normally signals the termination of the attorney-client relationship, neither Starner
nor Onda treated the hiring of Caudill as the end of their relationship. On June 15, 2015,
Starner sent both Onda and Caudill an e-mail asking what he should do when he learned
that Pack planned to shut down the M5S entities the next day. Onda replied: “The only
thing you can do, which is not what I am recommending without [Caudill’s] input and
input from a bankruptcy attorney, is to exercise your rights under the security agreement
and take back the stock and membership interests so that they can no longer act on behalf
of the companies.” (Emphasis added.) (Pls.’ Ex. 9.) Thus, just as Starner later testified in
his deposition, Onda worked cooperatively with Caudill for a period in advising Starner
regarding the breach of the purchase agreement. The question, therefore, is how long this
period of tandem representation continued. Starner testified in his deposition that he was
unsure, but then said mid-June 2015. Onda, on the other hand, admitted that both he and
Caudill were still representing Starner as late as July 10, 2015.
       {¶ 42} The trial court found that an e-mail sent by Caudill on July 27, 2015 was
telling evidence of the end date of Starner and Onda’s attorney-client relationship. The trial
court characterized this e-mail as “confirm[ing] that Onda no longer represented Starner
in his individual capacity.” (Sept. 6, 2022 Decision & Entry Granting Defs.’ Mots. for
Summ. Jgmt. at 14.) In the e-mail, Caudill wrote to another attorney, “I received your letter
asking whether I represent Mr. Starner, the [M5S] entities or both. * * * I represent Jeff
Starner individually and in his capacity as shareholder and member of the [M5S] entities.”
(Ex. A, Onda Aff.) As shown by the content of this e-mail, it only confirmed that Caudill
represented Starner; it said nothing regarding whether Onda represented or did not
represent Starner. Thus, the e-mail does not definitively establish the date on which
Starner’s attorney-client relationship with Onda terminated.
       {¶ 43} We find more probative the billing records attached to Onda’s affidavit.
Although Onda claimed in his affidavit that all his billing entries after July 2015 reflect work
performed for the M5S entities, the substance of certain entries belies this claim. The
No. 22AP-599                                                                                              14

February 1, 2016 bill shows that on December 30, 2015, Onda spent four hours
“[r]eview[ing] all correspondence and emails, draft[ing] documents, [and] prepar[ing] [a]
chronology and supporting documentation regarding waiver of due diligence and
representations and warranties by Purchaser with regards to finances and conditions of
assets. Forward[ed] to D. Caudill.” (Ex. B, Onda Aff.) From this entry, it appears Onda
reviewed and summarized his previous work negotiating and drafting the purchase
agreement for Starner. Because Onda forwarded the resulting work product to Caudill, a
reasonable person could infer he performed this work to further Starner’s individual claims.
        {¶ 44} The February 29, 2016 bill shows that on January 4, 2016, Onda
“[r]eview[ed] and finalize[d] [an] affidavit in regard[ ] to [the] [c]ognovit [n]ote litigation
matter.” (Ex. B, Onda Aff.) On January 26, 2016, Onda “[r]eview[ed] information received
from D. Caudill and R. Brunner” and “[p]repare[d] documents responding [to]/refuting
claims made by Brunner.” (Ex. B, Onda Aff.) Two days later, Onda had a “[m]eeting with
Rick Brunner regarding [the] Rule 60B motion” and “[fo]llow[ed] up with D. Caudill.” (Ex.
B, Onda Aff.)
        {¶ 45} These billings appear to relate to the action that Caudill filed on Starner’s
behalf to collect on the cognovit promissory note. On November 17, 2015, Merchants
Holding filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion in that action. Starner’s memorandum contra to that
motion, filed January 4, 2016, attached Onda’s affidavit in support. Attorney Rick Brunner
entered an appearance on behalf of Merchants Holding in the cognovit action on January 7,
2016.4 These events in the cognovit action correlate with the actions reflected in the billing
entries, suggesting Onda performed work for Starner with regard to the cognovit action.
        {¶ 46} Finally, the May 12, 2016 bill includes an entry dated March 18, 2016 for
“[c]onferenc[ing] with D. Caudill revising trial testimony” and “[r]eview[ing] files in
preparation for testimony.” (Ex. B, Onda Aff.) A second entry, dated March 21, 2016,
reflects that Onda “[met] with D. Caudill [to] prepar[e] for trial testimony” and
“[a]ttend[ed] trial to testify.” (Ex. B Onda Aff.) These entries show that Onda worked with
Caudill—who represented Starner individually—to prepare to testify about a matter on

4 The court filings from the cognovit action are not in the record, but they are publicly accessible online.
Therefore, we take judicial notice of them. See Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-244,
at ¶ 76 (appellate courts may take judicial notice of publicly accessible online records); Ltd. Invest. Group
Corp., 2022-Ohio-3657, at ¶ 46 (same); Fipps, 2022-Ohio-3434 at ¶ 2, fn. 1 (same).
No. 22AP-599                                                                                  15

which Onda maintained files. Consequently, a reasonable person could surmise that Onda
billed Starner for taking part in an action Starner pursued in his individual capacity to
recover against Merchants Holding or the Pack Investors.
         {¶ 47} Potentially, these six billing entries could all relate to work Onda did for the
M5S entities, as Onda claims in his affidavit. However, the entries include enough
information to create an issue of fact as to whether Onda, in fact, performed the work in
question for Starner, individually, and not the M5S entities. If Onda continued to perform
legal work for Starner, then the attorney-client relationship could not terminate.
         {¶ 48} The work in the billing entries occurred from December 15, 2015 to March 21,
2016. Starner filed his original complaint for legal malpractice on September 6, 2016.
Consequently, if any of the entries reflects work performed for Starner individually, then
Starner filed his complaint within one year of the end of the attorney-client relationship.
         {¶ 49} In sum, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the date
of the termination of the attorney-client relationship. See Accelerated Sys. Integration,
Inc. v. Ritzler, Coughlin & Swansiger, Ltd., 8th Dist. No. 97481, 2012-Ohio-3803, ¶ 57
(because the attorney continued to bill the client for work performed in connection with the
particular transaction, the appellate court found a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to when the attorney-client relationship terminated). The record includes evidence that
could lead reasonable minds to conclude that the attorney-client relationship terminated
less than one year before Starner filed his claim for legal malpractice. Consequently, the
trial court erred in granting defendants summary judgment on Starner’s legal malpractice
claim.
         {¶ 50} We next turn to the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in
defendants’ favor on the M5S entities’ claims for legal malpractice. The trial court entered
summary judgment on these claims because it found Starner lacked standing to pursue
legal malpractice claims on behalf of the M5S entities. In doing so, the trial court erred.
         {¶ 51} Standing depends on whether a plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in the
litigation to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v.
Holden, 147 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-4603, ¶ 20; Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d
55, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 21. In the case at bar, defendants argued that Starner could not
acquire standing to sue on behalf of the M5S entities by obtaining an assignment of the M5S
entities’ claims for legal malpractice. Defendants maintained that Ohio law prohibits the
No. 22AP-599                                                                                16

assignment of legal malpractice claims, making the receiver’s assignment of the M5S
entities’ claims to Starner void. The trial court agreed with defendants that the purported
assignment failed and, thus, concluded that Starner lacked standing to sue on the M5S
entities’ behalf. Consequently, the trial court granted defendants summary judgment on
the M5S entities’ claims.
       {¶ 52} For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that claims for
legal practice are not assignable. As a result, the assignment is invalid and the M5S entities
retained their legal malpractice claims against defendants.
       {¶ 53} A party has standing to assert its own rights. Util. Serv. Partners, Inc. v. Pub.
Util. Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284, 2009-Ohio-6764, ¶ 49. As parties to this action, the M5S
entities have standing to assert their own claims. The M5S entities do not need Starner to
assert their claims on their behalf.
       {¶ 54} We recognize that reasons may exist for the dismissal of the M5S entities
from this action, including the fact that the M5S entities have been judicially dissolved.
Although, on the other hand, the M5S entities may be proper parties given that dissolved
corporations can sue on claims that existed prior to dissolution.           R.C. 1701.88(B);
1706.471(C)(2). However, at this point, the M5S entities remain parties to this action.
Consequently, we will treat them as parties.
       {¶ 55} Because the M5S entities have standing, the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to defendants on the M5S entities’ claims on the basis that Starner
lacked standing to assert those claims. Starner did not need to prove standing to assert the
M5S entities’ claims when the M5S entities are also plaintiffs to this action and, thus, have
their own standing.
       {¶ 56} Finally, we turn to defendants’ argument that alternative grounds exist to
affirm the grant of summary judgment in their favor on Starner’s claim for legal
malpractice. Specifically, defendants contend that they did not breach any duty owed to
Starner, and that Starner failed to offer any evidence that their actions proximately caused
Starner any damage. Although defendants raised these arguments in the motion for
summary judgment, the trial court declined to rule on them.
       {¶ 57} While an appellate court reviews a trial court’s summary judgment decision
de novo, Civ.R. 56(C) “mandates that the trial court make the initial determination whether
to award summary judgment; the trial court’s function cannot be replaced by an
No. 22AP-599                                                                           17

‘independent’ review of an appellate court.” Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356,
360 (1992). Consequently, appellate courts generally do not address issues raised in a
summary judgment motion, but not decided by the trial court. Anderson v. Bright
Horizons Children’s Ctrs., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-291, 2022-Ohio-1031, ¶ 59; Tower
10, L.L.C. v. 10 W Broad Owner, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-998, 2020-Ohio-3554, ¶ 52;
Peterson v. Martyn, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-39, 2018-Ohio-2905, ¶ 51. Considering summary
judgment arguments in the first instance on appeal effectively deprives the non-moving
party of appellate review. Anderson at ¶ 59. Here, because the trial court did not rule on
defendants’ alternative arguments, we will not consider them.
       {¶ 58} In summary, we conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
on Starner’s claim and the M5S entities’ claims for legal malpractice. Accordingly, we
sustain Starner and the M5S entities’ sole assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 59} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the sole assignment of error, reverse
the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and remand this matter to
that court for further proceedings consistent with law and this decision.
                                                                   Judgment reversed and
                                                                        cause remanded.

                        BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur.

                                  ____________________