Court Opinion

ID: 9389789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 14:09:09.976255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.548257
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00080-CV

              ALAN HEADMAN, Appellant

                            V.

                COTIVITI, INC., Appellee

         On Appeal from the 115th District Court
                Upshur County, Texas
                Trial Court No. 136-22

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
      Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

            The trial court granted a special appearance in favor of Cotiviti, Inc. Alan Headman has

appealed. Even so, Headman fails to argue in his pro se brief that the trial court’s special

appearance ruling was erroneous. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.          Background

            A Utah court entered a divorce decree that ordered Headman to pay alimony to his

former wife. Headman’s employer, Cotiviti, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place

of business in Utah, garnished Headman’s wages pursuant to the Utah order. Headman filed

many pro se pleadings attempting to collaterally attack the Utah order, and as a result, in 2019,

the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, declared Headman a vexatious

litigant.

            Headman moved to Texas during the COVID-19 pandemic and sued Cotiviti. In his

petition, Headman requested relief that would have required Cotiviti to “immediately cease

garnishments . . . and immediately return all previously seized financial assets.” Cotiviti filed a

verified special appearance, which the trial court granted. Headman appeals.

II.         There is No Complaint About the Trial Court’s Ruling on the Special Appearance

            In his opening brief on appeal, Headman raises four points of error, but none apply to the

issue of whether the trial court erred in granting the special appearance. 1 Even though Cotiviti’s

1
    Headman’s brief raises the following points:

            1.       Whether the 115th District Court in Upshur County, and/or any other Jurisdiction within
                     Texas, has a Constitutional duty to grant a minimum level of discovery and due process
                     whenever involuntary servitude within such jurisdiction is claimed to exist in violation of
                     the Thirteenth Amendment.
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response noted that Headman’s brief “completely fail[ed] to address any of the facts specific to

the trial court’s . . . decision to grant Cotiviti’s Special Appearance,” the body of Headman’s

reply brief only focused on his contacts with Texas, not Cotiviti’s.

        “Although we may read the language of pro se documents broadly, we do not otherwise

apply lesser standards for the benefit of pro se litigants.” Foster v. Williams, 74 S.W.3d 200, 202

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied). At a minimum, a point of error on appeal must

complain about a trial court’s ruling or failure to rule. Headman did not argue in his pro se briefs

that the trial court erred by granting Cotiviti’s special appearance. Instead, Headman asked this

Court to “issue an immediate Sua Sponte order protecting [his] earnings.” In the absence of any

challenge to the trial court’s ruling on the special appearance, we must affirm the trial court’s

judgment.2

        2.      Whether the Thirteenth Amendment language prohibiting the existence of Involuntary
                Servitude within any state, provides any exclusions for non‐criminal involuntary
                servitude imposed by one state but being enforced through garnishment in the physical
                jurisdiction of another.

        3.      Whether a party in one state, attempting to enforce involuntary servitude upon an
                individual within another, creates a duty to intervene by the Courts of both states and
                whether a failure to intervene by either court, once protection is sought, is a violation of
                the protection‐seekers Thirteenth Amendment right to be free of involuntary servitude
                and/or Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of law.

        4.      Whether equal protection of law requires that an Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
                Canon of Construction approach which dictates “The enumeration of specific items
                implies the exclusion of all others”, be applied by this Court to the Thirteenth
                Amendment clause, “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
                duly convicted” as the first test in determining if a Court must grant discovery over
                claims that involuntary servitude “exists” in Texas.
2
 We need not address Headman’s remaining points of error regarding the merits of his complaint because (1) the
trial court did not rule on the merits, and (2) our affirmance of the special appearance is dispositive.
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III.   Conclusion

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Scott E. Stevens
                                               Chief Justice

Date Submitted:       April 13, 2023
Date Decided:         April 26, 2023

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