Court Opinion

ID: 9961515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 05:07:24.869906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:51.846018
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re WEEMS/MCDANIEL/HILL/HUNTER, Minors.                            April 18, 2024

                                                                     No. 368408
                                                                     Washtenaw Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC Nos. 21-000004-NA;
                                                                             21-000005-NA;
                                                                             21-000006-NA;
                                                                             21-000014-NA;
                                                                             22-000025-NA

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BORRELLO and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this interlocutory appeal arising from child protective proceedings, appellant Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) Director Heidi Washington, appeals by leave granted 1 the
trial court’s October 10, 2023 order that, in relevant part, ordered appellant to “allow supervised,
video visitation” two times per month between respondent-mother and four of her seven minor
children while respondent-mother was incarcerated in the Huron Valley Women’s Correctional
Facility (HVWCF). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the trial court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

      The few underlying facts relevant to the narrow issue before us on appeal are undisputed.
Respondent-mother’s minor children were removed from her care, and she was subsequently

1
 See In re Weems/McDaniel/Hill/Hunter, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
November 14, 2023 (Docket No. 368408).

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convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against one of her minor children. Respondent-
mother was sentenced2 and then incarcerated in the HVWCF.

        Following her criminal conviction, the trial court in the child protective proceedings that
are the subject of the present appeal entered orders that respondent-mother was to have supervised
parenting time, once per week, either in person or by video, with five of her minor children. Her
parenting time with the other two children, which included the victim of her criminal conduct, was
suspended.

         It is undisputed that respondent-mother never received parenting time with any of her
children while incarcerated in the HVWCF. Respondent-mother subsequently filed a motion in
the trial court seeking an order to require the MDOC and HVWCF to show cause why they should
not be held in contempt for failing to arrange visitation between respondent-mother and her
children pursuant to the court’s order regarding parenting time. The MDOC and the warden for
the HVWCF appeared as nonparties in this action. As relevant to the arguments presented to this
Court on appeal, the MDOC and the HVWCF warden argued in the trial court that the court did
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over its administrative rules regarding visitation in its penal
institutions.

        The trial court held a hearing on the motion to show cause. Notably, at the time the trial
court entertained a motion to show cause, it had yet to hold an adjudication hearing and
accordingly, the minor children had not yet been found to be within the court’s jurisdiction under
MCL 712A.2(b). However, despite failing to hold an initial adjudication hearing, the trial court
nonetheless went ahead with a hearing on the show cause and subsequently entered an order
requiring appellant to “allow supervised, video visitation” two times per month between
respondent-mother and four of her seven minor children while respondent-mother was incarcerated
in the HVWCF. The trial court relied on MCL 712A.6 as authority for entering the order and for
exercising jurisdiction over appellant. Additionally, the trial court declined to hold any person or
entity in contempt. We granted the director’s application for leave to appeal and stayed
enforcement of the trial court’s order pending resolution of this appeal.

                                         II. ANALYSIS

        The issue before this Court is whether the trial court was authorized under MCL 712A.6 to
enter the order requiring appellant, the director of the MDOC, to permit respondent-mother’s
supervised parenting time while respondent-mother was incarcerated.

      This issue presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. In re PAP, 247
Mich App 148, 152; 640 NW2d 880 (2001).

       MCL 712A.6 provides in relevant part as follows:

2
  Respondent was sentenced to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for that conviction. Her appeal from
that conviction is also pending in this Court in Docket No. 365866.

                                                -2-
                The court has jurisdiction over adults as provided in this chapter . . . and
       may make orders affecting adults as in the opinion of the court are necessary for
       the physical, mental, or moral well-being of a particular juvenile or juveniles under
       its jurisdiction. However, those orders must be incidental to the jurisdiction of the
       court over the juvenile or juveniles. [Emphasis added.]

        Although MCL 712A.6 grants the court “broad authority” to enter dispositional orders, that
authority is only applicable after the court has found that the child is within the court’s jurisdiction
under MCL 712A.2(b). In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 404-406; 852 NW2d 524 (2014); see also
MCL 712A.6.

        There are two phases to child protective proceedings: the adjudicative phase, during which
the court “determines whether it can take jurisdiction over the child in the first place,” and the
dispositional phase, during which the court determines the “course of action” that will “ensure the
child’s safety and well-being.” Id. at 404. A court can only enter dispositional orders under its
authority in MCL 712A.6 “[o]nce [the] court assumes jurisdiction over a child.” Id. at 406.
Assuming jurisdiction over the child requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that one
or more of the allegations in the petition are true and fall within MCL 712A.2(b), which may be
established by plea or by a trial at which the rules of evidence are generally applicable. Id. at 404-
406; see also In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 15; 934 NW2d 610 (2019).

        In this case, as the trial court should have been aware, it had not yet conducted an
adjudication and therefore had not found by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor
children were within the court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b). Notably, we deem it
necessary to remind the trial court that its decision following a preliminary hearing to authorize
the petition for filing, which only requires a finding of probable cause, is not equivalent to an
adjudication and does not establish the court’s jurisdiction over the minor children. In re Ferranti,
504 Mich at 15 (“After receiving the petition, the trial court must hold a preliminary hearing and
may authorize the filing of the petition upon a finding of probable cause that one or more of the
allegations are true and could support the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction under MCL
712A.2(b).”).

        Therefore, the court could not rely on MCL 712A.6 as authority for entering the order at
issue in this case because the court had not yet obtained jurisdiction over the children under MCL
712A.2(b). The trial court erred as a matter of law by putting the cart before the horse and acting
as if it were in the dispositional phase without first properly obtaining jurisdiction over the
children, thereby skipping the adjudicative phase. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order
requiring appellant to permit respondent-mother parenting time. In light of our disposition of this
matter, we need not address the parties’ additional arguments generally involving the alleged
conflict between the trial court’s authority in child protective proceedings and the MDOC’s
authority over penal institutions. We leave these questions to be answered should they arise in an
appropriate case, and we express no opinion on those questions here.

       Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not

                                                  -3-
retain jurisdiction.

                             /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                             /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                             /s/ Sima G. Patel

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