Court Opinion

ID: 9630093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:59:48.618349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:30.793955
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting in part)—There is no question that the state’s evidence was circumstantial as to Mr. Kelly’s ownership and operation of the speak-easy. The majority opinion indicates this evidence was such that the jury would have to speculate as to whether Mr. Kelly was the owner and manager after October 20th; that is, at the time of the raid on November 21st. On this hypothesis, the conclusion is reached that the dismissal as to Mr. Kelly was proper. I am considerably in doubt as to the propriety, that is, the soundness legally, of this conclusion. I am more inclined to the view that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to take the case to the jury, and was sufficient to support a reasonable inference, or an inference to the degree of a moral certainty, on the part of the jury that Mr. Kelly was the owner and manager on November 21st. In other words, I think that the evidence was sufficient to present a question for the jury, and that the trial court was not justified in dismissing as to defendant Kelly at the end of the state’s case. See State v. Donckers, 200 Wash. 45, 93 P. (2d) 355. In the Donckers case, we quoted with approval from 8 R.C.L. 226, 227, as follows:
*601“ ‘It is not essential that no inference or presumption shall be indulged in by the jury that does not in their minds necessarily arise, from the circumstances proved. Although circumstantial or presumptive evidence is allowed to prevail, even to the convicting of an offender, still the circumstances must themselves be proved and not presumed. While the evidence must lead to the conclusion so clearly and strongly, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, still, it is not necessary that the evidence should produce absolute certainty in the minds of the jurors, or that it should dissipate mere conjectures and speculative doubts,—for metaphysical and demonstrative certainty is not essential to proof by circumstances. It is sufficient if the evidence produce moral certainty, to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt.’ ” (Italics mine.)
Furthermore, in the Donckers case, we quoted with approval from Allen v. State, 26 Ariz. 317, 323, 225 Pac. 332, as follows:
“ ‘The weight of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is a matter for the jury. When the evidence is of the latter kind, it is for the jury to say whether it excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. That it may not be so convincing to us, or may be hard to reconcile in some of its aspects, or may appear in some of its features to refute or negative guilt, or to cast doubt thereon, will not justify the court in setting aside the verdict of the jury.’ ” (Italics mine.)
Considering the foregoing views, I am convinced that the action of the trial court in dismissing as to defendant Kelly should be reversed. Otherwise, I am in agreement with the results reached in the majority opinion.