Court Opinion

ID: 9680619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:35:16.557493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.699548
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately to dispute the majority’s conclusion that whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the discretion of the trial court and that the standard of review is whether there was an “abuse of discretion.” I believe that to be an incorrect statement of the law. See, e.g., Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 760 S.W.2d 84 (1988) and cases cited therein at 88. The majority opinion and the case upon which it primarily relies, Couch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 712 (1975), both cite in support of this conclusion the language of RCr 8.10, viz:
*489[T]he court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.
(Emphasis added.) The rule does not say that “the court may or may not permit, etc.” In other words, RCr 8.10 vests the trial court with discretion to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn; however, whether to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not discretionary but requires a factual inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the plea, primarily to ascertain whether it was voluntarily entered. That is especially true where, as here, the allegation is that the plea was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. If the motion is denied, the decision is reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard, i.e., whether the trial judge’s denial of the motion was supported by “substantial evidence.” At times, the majority opinion appears to adhere to this standard:
Evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea is an inherently factual inquiry which requires consideration of “the accused’s demean- or, background and experience, and whether the record reveals that the plea was voluntarily made.”
Op. at 487 (quoting Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (1990)).
In its role as fact-finder, the trial court found significant testimony of the judge who accepted Bronk’s guilty plea.
Id. at 487.
Our review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Bronk’s plea finds substantial evidence that supports the trial court’s finding.
Id. at 488.
At other times, the opinion appears to use the standards interchangeably:
Accordingly, this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea only for abuse of discretion by “ascertain[ing] whether the court below acted erroneously in denying that Appellant’s pleas were made involuntarily.”
Id. at 487 (quoting Lynch v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 610 S.W.2d 902, 905 (1981)). (Lynch, however, did not purport to apply an abuse of discretion standard, but held that “we are unable to state that the findings of the evidentiary hearing were in error and that the court below acted erroneously in relying upon same to deny appellant’s 11.42 motion.” Id.)
Ultimately, however, the majority opinion concludes that whether to deny Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was within the discretion of the trial court. Op. at 488. I disagree with that statement as a general proposition. However, a review of the record and the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion reveals that the trial judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, that his conclusion was not “clearly erroneous.” Thus, I concur in the result reached in this case.
STUMBO, J., joins this concurring opinion.