Court Opinion

ID: 9411875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 07:09:33.637503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:16.378980
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-21-00185-CR
                              __________________

                      HUDSON BORGELLA, Appellant

                                         V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 128th District Court
                       Orange County, Texas
                     Trial Cause No. A190463-R
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The trial court convicted Hudson Borgella of the second-degree felony

offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying information and sentenced him

to six years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(c)(3). In a single issue, Borgella

challenges the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Dismiss State’s Indictment. We

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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                                 BACKGROUND

      An Orange County grand jury indicted Borgella as follows:

            THE GRAND JURY, for the County of Orange, State of Texas,
      duly selected, empaneled, sworn, charged, and organized as such at the
      JULY Term A.D. 2019 of the 163RD Judicial District Court for said
      County, upon their oaths present in and to said court at said term that
      HUDSON BORGELLA hereinafter styled Defendant, on or about
      April 11, 2019, and before the presentment of this indictment, in the
      County and State aforesaid,

      did then and there, with intent to harm or defraud another, possess ten
      or more but less than fifty items of identifying information of three or
      more persons, to wit: [Complainant 1], [Complainant 2], [Complainant
      3], and [Complainant 4], hereinafter styled the complainants, without
      the consent of the said complainants, and the identifying information
      was two drivers licenses, six debit cards, a checkbook, a Texas license
      to carry a handgun, and an American Express card.

      against the peace and dignity of the State.

      The heading of the indictment indicated the offense was “Fraudulent Use or

Possession of Identifying Information,” and noted the Penal Code section as

“32.51x3.” Borgella filed a Motion to Dismiss the State’s Indictment asserting the

identical arguments he raises on appeal. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss

in its Order of Denial.

                                    ANALYSIS

       In his sole issue, Borgella challenges the trial court’s denial of his Motion to

Dismiss the State’s Indictment, contending the indictment is void because it “fails

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to incorporate the proper element required by law as well as fails to support the

validity upon which a conviction could stand.” In support of this assertion, Borgella

argues the indictment alleges four complaining witnesses and “that the Defendant

possessed identifying information from the complainants without their consent and

with the intent to harm or defraud the complainants,” but failed to allege which

pieces of identifying information belong to which complainant, “thereby [a]ffecting

the punishment range and jurisdiction.”

      We review the trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss an indictment under

a bifurcated standard. State v. Krizan-Wilson, 354 S.W.3d 808, 815 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). We must give almost total deference to the trial court’s fact findings that are

supported by the record and to its determinations of mixed questions of law and fact

that depend on witness credibility. Id. We review de novo any determinations of pure

legal questions and of mixed questions that do not depend on witness credibility. Id.

      A person commits the offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying

information if the person, with the intent to harm or defraud another, obtains,

possesses, transfers, or uses an item of identifying information of another person

without the other person’s consent. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(b)(1). For

purposes of subsection (b)(1) of the statute, the actor is presumed to have the intent

to harm or defraud another person if the actor possesses the identifying information

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of three or more persons. Id. § 32.51(b-1)(1). An offense under section 32.51 is a

felony of the second degree if the number of items obtained, possessed, transferred

or used is “10 or more but less than 50[.]” Id. § 32.51(c)(3).

      To meet the constitutional definition of “indictment” and vest the court with

personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the indictment must: (1) charge a person;

and (2) charge the commission of an offense. Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 898

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b)). An indictment with a

substantive defect can still qualify as one that vests the trial court with jurisdiction.

Id. (citing Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). An

indictment is sufficient if it

      charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language
      in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
      know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the
      defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged, and
      enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment[.]

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.11.

      Borgella appears to complain that the second requirement was not met – that

the indictment did not charge the commission of an offense. Borgella contends that

“the State’s indictment not only does not track the statute, but it combines and

comingles the different parts of the statute to create an offense that does not exist,

and one that misstates the actual punishment range.” Borgella further states the

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offense requires “an owner of property or provider of services whose interests are

inherently jeopardized by the conduct constituting the offense.”

      To obtain a conviction in this case, the State was required to prove each of the

following elements: (1) Borgella possessed an item of identifying information

belonging to another person, and the total number of items was 10 or more but less

than 50; (2) Borgella possessed each item without the other person’s consent; and

(3) Borgella possessed each item with the intent to harm or defraud the other person.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(a)(1), (b)(1), (b-1)(1), (c)(3). Despite his contention,

the indictment alleges Borgella committed fraudulent use or possession of

identifying information as defined in section 32.51. See id. Further, the indictment

specifies all the complaining witnesses.

      Regarding the punishment range, Borgella asserts the punishment ranges

listed in section 32.51(c) are “for the number of items possessed that belong to the

one complaining witness.” Borgella argues that an indictment for fraudulent use or

possession of identifying information requires that there be only one complaining

witness per indictment that specifies the specific identifying information with the

specific complaining witness.

      Borgella cites to no authority for this proposition, nor do we find any to

support it. In fact, the Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated the opposite. The

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Court has held that “the statute elevates the range of punishment depending on ‘the

number of items’ of identifying information fraudulently used or possessed,” and

that the “use or possession of ten to forty-nine items” is punished as a second-degree

felony. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(c). Thus, the focus of punishment under the statute is on

the number of items, not the number of complainants. See id.; see also, e.g., Boykin

v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that if language of a

statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of those words is applied).

Likewise, the statue clearly states that the law presumes that a defendant has the

intent to harm or defraud another if the defendant possesses the identifying

information of three or more persons. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.51(b-1)(1). Thus,

the statute contemplates that multiple complaining witnesses may be used in a single

prosecution of the offense. See id.

      The indictment in this case was sufficient to put Borgella on notice that the

State charged him with the second-degree felony offense of fraudulent use or

possession of identifying information and to vest the district court with jurisdiction.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.11; Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 898. Furthermore,

there is no requirement under section 32.51(c) that the items of identifying

information be from a single complaining witness to increase the punishment range.

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We conclude the indictment is not void and the trial court did not err by denying

Borgella’s Motion to Dismiss State’s Indictment. We overrule Borgella’s sole issue

and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                  _________________________
                                                   W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                        Chief Justice

Submitted on March 6, 2023
Opinion Delivered July 26, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

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