Court Opinion

ID: 9692402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:53:25.845602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:55.562132
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, J.,
concurring and dissenting:
¶ 1 While the expression of the majority view provides a persuasive analysis and sound rationale, I am obliged to concur and dissent. I disagree that the court below should have suppressed the firearm because, after much reflection, I feel constrained to interpret the statute by its plain meaning. I therefore dissent on that one issue. On the other issues, I concur with the majority.
¶ 2 The Commonwealth argues that the police legally conducted an inventory search on the vehicle. To show that the search was legal, the Commonwealth must prove two things: (1) “the vehicle [was] lawfully in the custody of the police” and (2) “the search was in fact a search conducted for purposes of protection of the owner’s property.” Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 669 A.2d 896, 903 (1995). Both prongs are at issue here.
¶ 3 First, appellant’s vehicle was legally in the custody of the police pursuant to section 3352. Section 3352(c)(3) allows the police to remove to a garage any vehicle found on the highway where “[t]he person driving or in control of the vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for which the officer is required by law to take the person arrested before the issuing authority without unnecessary delay.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3352(c)(3) (emphasis added). The statute thus requires two things: that the car was on a highway, and that the police arrested the person driving or in control of the vehicle. Appellant does not dispute that his car was on a highway; rather, he claims that his car had to be involved in the crime in order for the police to impound it. But this language is nowhere in the statute. As noted above, the statute requires only that the police arrest the person driving or in control of the vehicle. Therefore, the only issue here is whether appellant was in control of the vehicle. He owned the car, had the keys in his pocket, and drove the car to the scene. Thus he was in control of the vehicle. While I share the majority’s philosophical discomfort regarding the broad language of the statute, it is well settled that “philosophy cannot be exalted over the plain meaning of the statute.” See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 464 (Pa.Super.1999) (quoting West v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Transp., 685 A.2d 649, 651 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996)). Here, the statute is clear; and when the statute’s language “is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect in accordance with its plain and common meaning.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Harner, 533 Pa. 14, 617 A.2d 702, 705 (1992)). While I would be more comfortable if the legislature wanted the police to only impound cars used in the crime for which they arrested the driver or cars left on the highway after police arrest the driver, the legislature did not say so. Instead, it said clearly that the police could impound a vehicle where they arrested the person in control of that vehicle. Because the language here is unambiguous, I will not speculate as to what the legislature may have or should have intended.
*263¶ 4 Further, my disposition is entirely consistent with this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Collazo, 440 Pa.Super. 13, 654 A.2d 1174,1177 (1995). In Collazo, a man sold heroin in a park with his car parked nearby and the police, after arresting him, impounded his vehicle. See id. While the appellant in Collazo did return to his car, apparently for heroin, it is important to note that, when police arrested the appellant, he was some distance from his vehicle, as was the appellant before us. See id. at 1175. Moreover, the Court did not rely on the car’s involvement in the crime in holding that section 3352 provided the police with the authority to impound the vehicle. See id. at 1177. The Court instead relied on the caretaking duties of the police: “the vehicle had been seized by police [pursuant to section 3352] after appellant’s arrest for selling heroin to the informant_ The search, therefore, was within the caretaking function of the police, and, as such, was properly conducted without a warrant.” Id. Thus, the case is not so distinguishable as it may appear at first glance. Consequently, while section 3352’s validity was not the issue directly before that panel, Collazo does guide my analysis, particularly when coupled with the language of the statute itself.
¶ 5 Because the police legally impounded the vehicle, the next question is whether the search was “conducted for the purposes of protection of the owner’s property.” White, 669 A.2d at 903.
“An inventory search is not designed to uncover criminal evidence. Rather, its purpose is to safeguard the seized items in order to benefit both the police and the defendant....
Four goals underlie such searches. First, they protect the defendant’s property while he is in custody; second, police are protected against theft claims when defendants are given their property upon release; third, they serve to protect the police from physical harm due to hidden weapons; and fourth, when necessary they ascertain or verify the identity of the defendant. Intrusions into impounded vehicles ... are reasonable where the purpose is to identify and protect the seized items.
As long as the search is pursuant to the caretaking functions of the police department, the conduct of the police will not be viewed as unreasonable under the Constitution.”
Id. at 1176-77 (quoting Commonwealth v. Nace, 524 Pa. 323, 571 A.2d 1389 (1990)). A search is not an inventory search if it “was conducted as part of a criminal investigation.” White, 669 A.2d at 903. On cross-examination, Officer Rayfield testified:
Q. Is that your standard procedure, to remove cars from the front of homes when individuals who are charged with drug activity are arrested inside of homes?
A. If we can ascertain that they own a vehicle, we would take it back with us. Yes.
Q. Even if the person lives at that residence, you would take their car back to the station?
A. At times, depending on the circumstances, yes.
Q. What was it that made you think that, in this particular case, there was any need for safekeeping of this car?
A. The house that we had the search warrant for was almost abandoned. I believe it’s abandoned now, and your client doesn’t live in that area.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 10/6/98, at 90-91. The court then found that the officers took the car to safeguard it. See id. at 92, 115. It appears that the officer searched the vehicle as part of his caretaking duties. Thus, this was a valid inventory search. Therefore, I would hold that the court below correctly admitted the weapon found in appellant’s vehicle.
¶ 6 I do not dissent lightly, and I share the majority’s fear that, as written, this statute allows the police to impound any *264vehicle parked on the street when they arrest its owner. But my inherent unease cannot overcome the statute. I refuse to rewrite the statute because I personally would have written it differently. I am thus constrained to dissent.