Court Opinion

ID: 7820686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:53:37.868814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:28:53.893851
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. The appellants had been employed by the Delinquent Tax Board of Pulaski County for several years before the present suit was filed. The Delinquent Tax Board consists of the county judge, the mayor of Little Rock, and a representative from the schools of Pulaski County. The appellants retain a fee from the funds collected and remit the balance to the county treasurer. The chancellor did an outstanding job in determining the facts and the law in this complicated case. He correctly interpreted the law and applied the facts as they relate to officers or employees of county officers. My disagreement is only as to whether the laws cited apply to appellants. I think not. It is my feeling that appellants are employees of the cities and towns and various school districts and the county. The county has only a one-third voice in employing or discharging them and the other two-thirds lie with the cities and school districts. Even if we were to hold appellants were officers or employees of Pulaski County it would not alter my opinion. Admittedly, Amendment 55 is the key to the solution in this matter. Had Amendment 55 not been enacted no problem would exist. However, Amendment 55 required enabling legislation as it was not self-executing. Therefore, the General Assembly was required to enact legislation for execution of the amendment. Act 127 of 1975, implementing § 5 of Amendment 55, applies to county officers and employees. It specifically applied to certain officers and employees. However, it did not mention the Delinquent Tax Board or delinquent tax collectors. The chancellor held Act 127 included appellants by implication and thereby repealed Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 84-1006 — 1010 which is Act 342 of 1941. Following Act 127 of 1975, the General Assembly passed Act 131 of 1975 which set the manner and method of payment of county officers and their employees until January 1, 1977. The same reasons apply as to whether appellants were included in this act as these set out above for Act 127. The General Assembly passed Act 897 of 1975 which provides for the salaries of delinquent tax collectors commencing in 1977. This was the first time the General Assembly had made provisions for delinquent tax collectors. The last time the General Assembly had addressed the subject of delinquent tax collectors was Act 342 of 1941 as amended. Since the General Assembly enacted legislation in 1975 requiring the quorum court to deal with delinquent tax collectors, we know they were aware of the fee arrangement in 1975 and did not see fit to make any change until January 1, 1977, through the process of Act 897 of 1975. We must also presume they were aware of the prior enactment and existence of Act 342 of 1941 as amended. We have never favored repeal by implication and will not so treat a statute if it can be reconciled with the existing statutes. Polk v. Booker, 112 Ark. 101, 165 S.W. 262 (1914). It is also well established that statutes existing prior to constitutional amendment will be repealed by implication only if there is irreconcilable conflict or where the statute is repugnant to the constitutional amendment. Repeal by implication, whether by the General Assembly or constitutional amendment, is not favored by the law unless the two provisions simply cannot stand together. McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 500 S.W. 2d 357 (1973). We have many times held that an act of the General Assembly is presumed constitutional and therefore will not be held unconstitutional unless there is clear incompatibility between them. In such case, all doubt must be resolved in favor of the legality of the act. Jones v. Mears, 256 Ark. 825, 510 S.W. 2d 857 (1974). The General Assembly’s power is limited only by the constitution. Of course, their actions are subject to the processes of referendum if exercised by the people. We have stated that it is our duty to construe an act as constitutional if it is possible to do so. Stone v. State, 254 Ark. 1011, 498 S.W. 2d 634 (1973). It seems clear to me that the General Assembly was fully aware of the existence of Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 84-1006 — 1010 at all times while they were passing enabling statutes pursuant to Amendment 55. At no time did they address the delinquent tax collectors until the enactment of Act 495 of 1977. However, as previously stated, the quorum court was authorized through Act 897 of 1975 to establish salaries of delinquent tax collectors commencing on January 1, 1977. As I see it, the acts of the General Assembly and the provisions of Amendment 55 are not at all irreconcilable when viewed in the light stated herein. In fact, it seems obvious to me that the General Assembly consciously intended to leave the delinquent tax collectors’ salaries as they were until such time as they could address it properly.