Court Opinion

ID: 9455559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:25:57.894876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:38.635688
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In the first place, I entertain grave doubts that the evidence was sufficient to sustain con*425viction. The indictment was predicated upon three alleged perjurious answers given by the accused during his interrogation before a grand jury. At its best, the English language is often imprecise, and it seems to me that one should not be indicted for perjury as a result of answers given to questions characterized by any ambiguity whatsoever.
One of the questions put to Vitello was whether he had “placed a wager” with Ruth Hughes. The Government admits that this form of question is reasonably susceptible to at least two opposing interpretations — i. e., whether he had given her money to be transmitted to someone else or whether he had actually bet with her personally on the outcome of a particular race. Since Vitello was led to believe, in the questioning regarding Harrison, that “place a wager” referred to employing another as an intermediary with the ultimate bookmaker, it may well be assumed that he continued to have this interpretation in mind when asked about Ruth Hughes.1 Thus, his answer as to Hughes could have been truthful, based on the fact that he had bet personally with her but had not intended to employ her as an intermediary. This explanation could also reasonably account for his negative answer to the question of whether he had ever “placed a bet” with anyone other than Harrison. I therefore submit that the original interrogator did not employ that caution and precision which should be demanded of an interrogator when subsequent charges of perjury are either then contemplated or may possibly be predicated upon the answers to the questions.
The third alleged perjurious statement, a negative answer to the question whether he knew anyone named Charles Otis Spencer, is of a type that should hardly justify conviction unless the prosecution clearly proves that the defendant, when he gave his answer, actually knew the particular individual by that particular name. Here, it was not established that, at the time of his questioning, the man whom Vitello knew as “Spence” was in fact Charles Otis Spencer and so known by Vitello. In Whaley v. United States, 362 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1966), we reversed a conviction for perjury in almost identical circumstances.
While I would, if permitted to act alone, reverse this particular judgment of conviction for the above stated reasons, my principal objection to the majority opinion is the portion thereof which deals with the issue of the appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights. As pointed out, the indictment was framed in one count, alleging that Vitello had perjured himself in three particulars. The jury was instructed in general terms that it could not return a verdict of guilty without unanimity of opinion. It was not, however, advised, either directly or indirectly, that it must reach unanimity of opinion of falsity in at least one particular answer among the three set forth in the indictment. It seems clear to me that the jury could have believed, under the instruction giv*426en, that it could return a verdict of guilty if each of the jurors found that there was perjury on one or more of the answers, without regard to whether they all agreed that at least one of the answers was perjurious. For example, six jurors could have believed that perjury had been committed in the first answer, while five believed that perjury had been committed by the second answer only and the remaining juror believed that perjury had been committed only as to the third answer. The instruction given by the trial court would enable the jury to find the defendant guilty in any such combination of jurors’ opinions. Since we are unable to determine from the general verdict upon what ground the jurors reached their conclusion, the , judgment of conviction should be vacated. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36, n. 45, 65 S.Ct. 918, 89 L.Ed. 1441 (1945).
I would reverse.

. I cannot accept the majority’s casual treatment of the question of whether Vitello could have fully understood the questions before the grand jury. When the subject of “place a wager” first came up, the interrogation was as follows:
“Q. Have you ever placed a wager on a horse race with Mr. Harrison?
“A. Well — that would be indefinite. With Mr. Harrison, no. If he—
“You—
“A. —he may have carried a bet for me to someone else.
“Q. Let me put it this way: Did you ever give Mr. Harrison a bet on a horse race? Whether or not he kept the action himself or gave it to someone else we are not yet concerned with.
“A. Yes, I have.”
The confusion demonstrated by this exchange certainly must have carried over to the questioning concerning Ruth Hughes. Moreover, despite the majority’s assertion that Vitello never once claimed to have misunderstood the questions, the record of the trial testimony is replete with efforts by Vitello, as well as by both prosecution and defense counsel and the court, to draw distinctions between the various ways in wrhich bets could be placed and between the various ways in which Vitello had actually placed bets.