Court Opinion

ID: 9811675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:13.493264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:05.969793
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY,
Justice, dissenting.
The appellant-father is imprisoned. His testimony by telephone at the post-trial hearing and his late-filed subsequent affidavit indicate he is indigent. By statute, an indigent parent has a right to counsel in these proceedings. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 107.013(a)(1), 263.405(e) (Vernon Supp.2007); In re KS.M., 61 S.W.3d 632, 633 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, no pet.). The trial judge stated on the record at the post-trial hearing that he was discharging appellant’s attorney, but the clerk’s record does not contain an order allowing trial counsel to withdraw as attorney of record. The procedures to be followed in a parental rights termination case are accelerated. See In re H.R. 87 S.W.3d 691, 701-03 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). “[T]he practical effect is that it places an appellant’s trial counsel in the position of being appellate counsel because it is this attorney who will undertake the required steps to preserve their client’s appellate rights.” Id. at 703. Generally, the trial court should not discharge counsel before the abbreviated appeal of the section 263.405 findings. Of course, there will be circumstances where different counsel is required for the appeal. By letter, this Court notified counsel of the due date for appellant’s brief, and informed counsel that if the Court did not receive a brief or other response, the Court would presume the trial court’s post-trial findings were not contested. We received from counsel a letter forwarding an affidavit of indigen-cy, and stating that the appellant “would like” to appeal the order on the section 263.405 hearing. I believe under the circumstances this Court should require briefing — by some counsel representing appellant — on the trial court’s findings under section 263.405. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405.1 respectfully dissent.