Court Opinion

ID: 9533700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:02.209103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:08.288687
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
concurring and dissenting: Except for the majority’s restriction on the defendant’s right of cross-examination, I concur. Under the circumstances of this case, the majority effectively deprives the defendant of a meaningful cross-examination in an effort to keep the jury from hearing the possible penalty the defendant could receive if convicted of the crime charged.
*162Under the Kansas law it is for the jury to determine from the facts presented into evidence whether or not the defendant is guilty. If the defendant is convicted, it is the duty of the trial judge to sentence that defendant pursuant to the statutory guidelines. The possible penalty that may be imposed upon a person if convicted by jury is not material nor relevant to the issues the jury must decide. Therefore, neither the State nor the defendant is allowed to introduce into evidence the statutory penalties for the crimes charged.
The right of cross-examination is one of the cornerstones of our trial procedure. The general rule is when one party introduces a portion of a conversation into evidence, the other party through cross-examination has a right to introduce the balance of that conversation, when relevant or material to the issues, into evidence.
We have always allowed great latitude in the cross-examination of an accomplice who testifies for the State at the trial of his associates. The accomplice must disclose all that he and his associates may have said or done in relationship to the offense. Cross-examination is used to impeach or discredit the accomplice, and the accomplice may be required to disclose whether or not he has been promised leniency or immunity for testifying. We instruct our jury, “An accomplice witness is one who testifies that he was involved in the commission of the crime with which the defendant is charged. You should consider with caution the testimony of an accomplice.” PIK Crim. 2d 52.18.
Here the majority will allow inquiry into whether the accomplice, who has turned State’s witness, was offered any arrangement or deal by the State in exchange for his testimony. The majority then would allow the trial judge by using his discretion to determine whether or not the differences in the penalty provisions, which resulted from the accomplice’s plea bargaining, should or should not be admitted into evidence. It is only the difference in the penalty provisions that convinced the accomplice to enter a plea and, without that information, the value received by the accomplice for his testimony is withheld from the jury.
The majority has, in effect, deprived the defendant of the right to show to the jury the true value of the plea bargaining agreement received by the accomplice. Under such circumstances the *163defendant was deprived of his fundamental right of cross-examination.
Prager and Herd, JJ., join the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.