Court Opinion

ID: 9690568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:23:48.343774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:59.697578
License: Public Domain

GUIDUGLI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority relies on Cavin v. Lake Construction Co.3 However, I do not believe Cavin to be binding authority in this matter. In Ca-vin, the court affirmed the Fayette Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, which rejected Cavin’s claim for disability benefits. While the Board found that Ca-vin’s claim was not compensable, it did order that medical expenses under KRS 342.020 would be paid. On appeal, the court expressed surprise that the Board did not find the injury compensable based upon the medical evidence, but affirmed nonetheless, stating, “there is a vast difference between what the board is free to do and what it can be forced to do under a given state of the evidence. In this case we must conclude that the evidence on causation was not sufficiently strong and unequivocal to force a checkmate.” 4 This statement appears to be in compliance with what would become the standard of review set out in Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly.5 The court then acknowledged that the only party who was in a position to complain about the medical expenses was the employer, who did not appeal. Thus, although the issue was not properly before the court, it stated, “[w]e do not believe it is necessarily inconsistent for the board to award payment of medical expenses without finding some extent of disability. It is not impossible for a non-disabling injury to require medical attention.”6 While this statement appears to apply to the issue now before this Court, that issue was not properly before the Cavin court and any discussion on the issue was purely dicta. I do not believe the language in Cavin on the issue of future medical expenses is binding on this Court. Not being bound by Cavin, I believe the Board’s majority opinion was correct when it stated:
To summarize, under KRS 342.020(1) an employer may be ordered to pay medical benefits reasonably required at the time of injury for the cure and relief of a work-related injury without regard to disability. Thereafter, however, KRS 342.020(1) only authorizes an award of medical benefits “during disability.”
In the claim presently on appeal, Combs had reached MMI. Combs was found to have 0% permanent impairment ratings for her cervical and lumbar injuries. The award of medical benefits, therefore, should not have encompassed future medical expenses.
Accordingly, the decision of Hon. Andrew F. Manno, Administrative Law Judge, to award medical benefits is VACATED. Any award of benefits on REMAND shall be limited to past expenses incurred up until the date on which Oma Combs reached maximum medical improvement.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion in this case and would affirm.

. 451 S.W.2d 159 (Ky.1970).

. Id. at 161. (Emphasis in original.)

. 827 S.W.2d 685 (Ky.1992).

. Cavin, 451 S.W.2d at 161-62.