Court Opinion

ID: 9514583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:35.845013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.987011
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring in result). [¶ 16.] If Doctor Sorrels was prohibited from ordering, dispensing, or prescribing controlled substances, then merely recommending that they be administered to his patient would not violate the terms of his agreement with the hospital. For this reason, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that ordering or recommending the controlled drug makes no difference. On its face, his claimed statement to the nurse in the form of a recommendation, not an order, would be sufficient to create a material issue of fact on whether he violated his agreement. But is it a genuine issue? That is the foremost question. SDCL 15-6-56(c) (summary judgment proper if no “genuine issue as to any material fact”).
[¶ 17.] At one time, Doctor Sorrels claimed the authority to order drugs so long as another physician later co-signed his order. Now he says that he never ordered the drug, but only recommended it. Would the nurse have been within her bounds to reply, “I think not, Doctor”? Not likely! And she denies having received anything but an unequivocal order. In fact, in his earlier appeal, Sorrels did not dispute the nurse’s version of events. A nurse has no privilege to overrule a doctor’s orders, especially a doctor with hospital privileges, conditional or otherwise.
[¶ 18.] In hearing summary judgment motions, trial courts are empowered to do more than merely identify claimed material issues of fact. They may also engage in some qualitative analysis.
When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a ration*610al trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no “genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting First Nat’l. Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569, 592 (1968)). “[I]f the factual context renders [nonmovants’] claim[s] implausible ... [they] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim[s] than would otherwise be necessary.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d at 552.
[¶ 19.] Faced with implausible assertions advanced to defeat summary judgment, trial judges ought not be forced to sift feathers. Doctor Sorrels’ claim is so insubstantial, so illogical, and so contrary to standard medical practice, that he had the duty to come forward with some persuasive proof to support his assertion that he only recommended the prescription. Other than his bare claim that he gave the name of the drug as a recommendation, Sorrels can muster no other evidence to sustain his position. No jury could reasonably find that he had not dispensed a controlled substance in violation of his agreement. See generally 1 S. Childress & M. Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 5.04 (2d ed. 1992)(discussing the standards developed by the United States Supreme Court for summary judgment).
[¶ 20.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this special writing.