Court Opinion

ID: 9965455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 16:00:30.132106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:05.643301
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     GERALDINE JONES-SAILOR,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-17-0280-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: May 1, 2024
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Jerry Girly , Esquire, Orlando, Florida, for the appellant.

           Kathleen Harne , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

           Lee R. Jones , Kansas City, Kansas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                             Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her alleged involuntary retirement appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On
     petition for review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
     jurisdictional finding, arguing that she made erroneous findings of fact and
     improperly interpreted statutes. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of
     the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After
     fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     supplement the administrative judge’s analysis regarding the appellant’s claims
     that her retirement was coerced by the agency’s unjustified failure to
     accommodate her disability and by sexual harassment, we AFFIRM the initial
     decision.
¶2         The appellant was employed as a GS-11 Correctional Treatment Specialist
     (Case Manager) at a Bureau of Prisons correctional facility where she had been
     employed since 1985. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 7 (testimony of the appellant).
     Her position was designated as a law enforcement position. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 12, Appellant’s Exhibit C. Case Managers were generally assigned to
     units on the same floor as the inmates whose cases they managed. However, the
     appellant was assigned to a unit on the first floor, even though the inmates whose
     cases she managed were housed on the second floor, and they were required to be
     brought to her when she needed to see them. This arrangement was based on an
     informal accommodation due to the appellant’s claimed difficulty in navigating
     stairs as a result of an injury she suffered to her neck, shoulder, and back. IAF,
     Tab 6 at 36-37 (Final Agency Decision (FAD)).
                                                                                          3

¶3        When a new supervisor arrived in August 2014, he informed the appellant
     that her informal accommodation had expired and that she would have to move
     her office to the second floor or provide updated medical documentation. IAF,
     Tab 19 at 75-76; Tab 17 at 18. In response, the appellant submitted a Department
     of Justice (DOJ) Form 100A, Request for Reasonable Accommodation, asking to
     work in a lower level building “to avoid health damage to [her] physical body and
     mental well- being” and stating that she was unable to climb stairs and lift over
     10 pounds. IAF, Tab 12, Appellant’s Exhibit I. In support of her request, she
     submitted a September 15, 2014 form from a treating physician, stating that the
     appellant had suffered an injury to her shoulder, neck, and back and seeking the
     same accommodations. Id., Appellant’s Exhibit H. The appellant’s supervisor
     responded by requesting additional specific information from the appellant’s
     physician. Id., Appellant’s Exhibit J. The appellant then submitted another DOJ
     Form 100A requesting the same accommodations, id., Appellant’s Exhibit K,
     accompanied by a November 4, 2014 supporting letter from her physician, asking
     for the same accommodations for 12 weeks and indicating that the appellant
     would be reassessed at the end of that period, id., Appellant’s Exhibit L. On
     November 19, 2014, the appellant’s supervisor officially denied her reasonable
     accommodation request as not supported by documentation, medical or otherwise,
     and also stated that her requested accommodation would be ineffective, cause the
     agency undue hardship, and remove essential functions from her law enforcement
     position. Id., Appellant’s Exhibit M.
¶4        On December 8, 2014, the appellant filed an equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) complaint based on sex, age, disability (physical/mental), and reprisal in
     which she challenged a number of agency actions. 2 IAF, Tab 6 at 34-35 (FAD).
     She later amended her complaint to include the matter that is the subject of this
     appeal. On January 21, 2015, the agency directed the appellant to report for a
     2
       The appellant did not return to work beginning in late September 2014 and continuing
     until the action here under review and was carried as absent without leave during this
     time. IAF, Tab 7 at 33-51; Tab 19 at 19.
                                                                                            4

     fitness-for-duty examination to determine if she was medically able to perform
     the duties of her position. IAF, Tab 19 at 59. She reported for the examination
     but left before it was conducted.      HT at 53 (testimony of the appellant).        On
     May 13, 2015, the appellant submitted paperwork to retire, providing, as the
     reason, that “[management] continues to retaliate and discriminate against me.”
     IAF, Tab 6 at 222. The action was effective on May 29, 2015. IAF, Tab 7 at 7.
     The agency issued its FAD on the appellant’s EEO complaint on January 23,
     2017, finding that she had not established any of her claims. IAF, Tab 6 at 35-62.
     On appeal from that decision, the appellant challenged her retirement as
     involuntary, IAF, Tab 1 at 2, and requested a hearing, id. at 1.
¶5         The administrative judge issued an Order on Jurisdiction and Proof
     Requirements regarding appeals of alleged involuntary actions, IAF, Tab 3, to
     which the appellant responded, IAF, Tab 8.               On review of the parties’
     submissions, the administrative judge determined that the appellant was entitled
     to a jurisdictional hearing which was duly scheduled and convened. IAF, Tab 9
     at 1. Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an initial decision in which she
     dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 30, Initial Decision (ID)
     at 1, 11.   The administrative judge considered the incidents upon which the
     appellant relied in support of her claim, but found that a reasonable person in the
     appellant’s position would not have felt compelled to retire under the
     circumstances. ID at 611. The appellant has filed a petition for review, to which
     the agency has not responded. 3 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3.

                         DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         Generally, an appellant may overcome the presumption that a retirement is
     voluntary by showing that it resulted from misinformation or deception by the
     3
       With her petition for review, the appellant has submitted a copy of the hearing
     transcript, Petition for Review File, Tab 3, not certified by the court
     reporter, id. at 411. We have not considered it, but rather have considered the certified
     copy provided to the Board by the court reporter as it constitutes the official hearing
     record. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.53(b).
                                                                                      5

     agency or was the product of coercion by the agency. Terban v. Department of
     Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir 2000).              The touchstone of the
     “voluntariness” is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, factors
     operated on the employee’s decision-making process that deprived her of freedom
     of choice. Coufal v. Department of Justice, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 22 (2004); Heining
     v. General Services Administration, 68 M.S.P.R. 513, 519-20 (1995). Therefore,
     in order to establish involuntariness on the basis of coercion, an appellant must
     show that the agency effectively imposed the terms of the retirement, that she had
     no realistic alternative but to retire, and that the retirement was the result of
     improper acts by the agency. The Board will find a retirement involuntary when
     the employee demonstrates that the employer engaged in a course of action that
     made working conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in
     that employee’s position would have felt compelled to retire.          Markon v.
     Department of State, 71 M.S.P.R. 574, 577-78 (1996). This mode of analysis
     remains appropriate when the appellant’s appeal is from an agency’s FAD based
     on the employee’s underlying complaint in which she claims that her retirement
     was involuntary based on discrimination. See, e.g., Williams v. Department of
     Agriculture, 106 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶¶ 10-11 (2007).             When allegations of
     discrimination and reprisal for prior EEO activity are made in connection with a
     claim of involuntariness, such allegations may only be addressed insofar as they
     relate to the issue of voluntariness and not whether they would establish
     discrimination or reprisal as an affirmative defense. Pickens v. Social Security
     Administration, 88 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 6 (2001). Thus, evidence of discrimination or
     reprisal goes to the ultimate question of coercion. Id.
¶7        The appellant first challenges the administrative judge’s finding that,
     because the appellant’s requested accommodation would eliminate the essential
     functions of her position, there was no reasonable accommodation available. ID
     at 8. The appellant asserts that she is physically able to perform her duties and
     that she did so successfully under the accommodation before her new supervisor
                                                                                                6

     arrived. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. However, the issue in this case is not whether the
     agency was required to grant the appellant’s requested accommodation, but rather
     the extent to which the agency’s failure to continue her informal accommodation
     was a factor in her decision to retire. Pickens, 88 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 6. Chapter 75
     jurisdiction may be established over a disability retirement if the agency
     unjustifiably refused to offer the employee a reasonable accommodation that
     would have allowed her to continue working.              PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10; see
     SanSoucie v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 149, ¶ 15 (2011); Nordhoff
     v. Department of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 88, 91 (1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 886 (Fed.
     Cir. 1999) (Table). We disagree, however, that the analysis in this appeal should
     be restricted to that applicable in disability retirement situations because the
     appellant did not, in fact, retire on disability. 4 We therefore modify the initial
     decision to the extent the administrative judge applied the standard for disability
     retirements to the instant case.        ID at 7.      Nevertheless, we understand the
     appellant’s broader point that the administrative judge failed to make a sufficient
     analysis of her claim that her retirement was coerced by the agency’s unjustified
     failure to accommodate her disability.
¶8         We agree with the appellant that the administrative judge did not
     sufficiently analyze this claim. The administrative judge noted that, in support of
     her claim, the appellant testified that she is physically able to perform the duties
     of her position as a Case Manager but that her medical restrictions require she
     stay on the first floor, not climb stairs, and not lift or pull more than 10 pounds.
     ID at 7; HT (testimony of the appellant). The administrative judge noted that, in
     addition to the duties pertaining to appellant’s position as a Case Manager, such
     as counseling inmates and implementing and monitoring their treatment plans, the

     4
      We note that we use the term “restricted” because that is just what the Nordhoff line of
     cases does; it restricts chapter 75 jurisdiction over disability retirements to situations in
     which reasonable accommodation was available. Okleson v. U.S. Postal Service,
     90 M.S.P.R. 415, ¶ 7 (2001). Thus, even if we were to apply this standard to the
     appellant’s case, it would not inure to her benefit.
                                                                                     7

appellant was also required to perform law enforcement functions and respond to
emergencies when needed.         Citing to the appellant’s position description, the
administrative judge found that the appellant’s medical limitations required more
than a modification of her working conditions. ID at 8. The administrative judge
concluded that, if the appellant could not perform her law enforcement duties,
there was no reasonable accommodation available because she could not perform
the essential functions of her position. Id. However, as raised by the appellant
on review, the administrative judge did not address the fact that the appellant had
been performing her Case Manager duties successfully for some time with the
informal accommodation, that she could climb stairs if necessary, and that she
had responded to emergency alarms as necessary. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5-7, 9; HT
at 82, 84, 112 (testimony of the appellant). We find the agency’s explanation for
denying the appellant a reasonable accommodation in denying her request to work
on the first floor to be unpersuasive. Notwithstanding the agency's unpersuasive
analysis   in   this   regard,   the   agency’s   shortcomings   in   the   reasonable
accommodation process are simply a factor to be considered in assessing whether
a resignation was involuntary. Brown v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609,
¶ 16, aff’d, 469 F. App’x 852 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Board examines the totality
of the circumstances under an objective standard to determine voluntariness and
does not rely on the employee’s purely subjective evaluation.                  Coufal,
98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 22. As further explained below, the appellant has not shown
that this rendered her working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person
in her position would have felt compelled to resign. See Vitale v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 26 (2007) (finding that, although an agency
official may have caused the appellant apprehension and exacerbated his medical
ailments, the appellant failed to establish that his working conditions were so
intolerable that a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to
retire).
                                                                                         8

¶9         The appellant also argues on review that she was placed in an absent
      without leave status because she was sent home for her own safety. PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 6-7. She alleges that she refused to take any form of personal leave
      because she had been able to perform the duties of her Case Manager position
      with an accommodation. While a resignation or retirement procured in violation
      of the regulations for granting leave may be coercive, the appellant did not assert
      that she was denied any request to use leave.       Cf. Landahl v. Department of
      Commerce, 83 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶¶ 7-11 (1999) (finding a nonfrivolous allegation of
      involuntariness based on the appellant's claim that the agency coerced his
      resignation by violating the regulations for granting leave under the Family and
      Medical Leave Act of 1993). Moreover, to the extent that the appellant’s claim
      might have formed the basis for a constructive suspension appeal, there is no
      indication that she filed any such appeal.    See Schultz v. U.S. Postal Service,
      78 M.S.P.R. 159, 163 (1998) (holding that, if a disabled employee who is absent
      from work requests to return with altered duties or working conditions, and if
      there was a reasonable accommodation available that the agency was bound by
      the Rehabilitation Act to offer but did not, the employee’s absence becomes a
      constructive suspension).
¶10        Further, the appellant reiterates on review her allegations that she was
      subjected to sexual harassment by male inmates and that the agency took no steps
      to remedy the situation. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10-12. We modify the initial decision
      to further address the appellant’s assertions. In support of these allegations, the
      appellant notes that the agency settled a class action suit about the rampant sexual
      harassment that occurred in that facility.   Id. at 11. The administrative judge
      considered the appellant’s testimony that inmates would make cat calls towards
      her, use offensive and crude language, and expose themselves. ID at 9 & n.8.
      However, the administrative judge found that a reasonable person in the
      appellant’s position—a Case Manager with over 29 years of experience with the
      Federal Bureau of Prisons—would not have felt compelled to retire. ID at 10.
                                                                                        9

      While the appellant has raised serious allegations of sexual harassment, we
      ultimately agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion. In relevant part, the
      appellant has not alleged that the harassment she endured escalated to a level that
      potentially endangered her safety.        See Bates v. Department of Justice,
      70 M.S.P.R. 659, 671-72 (1996) (finding that the appellant was effectively
      coerced into resigning by the continuous and unredressed pattern of harassment,
      which had escalated to a level potentially endangering her safety). While the
      appellant may have been subjected to stressful working conditions, it is
      well-settled that an employee is not guaranteed a stress-free work environment
      and difficult or unpleasant working conditions generally are not so intolerable as
      to compel a reasonable person to resign.        Miller v. Department of Defense,
      85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 32 (2000).
¶11        Considering all of the evidence together, we find that the appellant’s
      retirement was precipitated by several factors, some of which were the result of
      wrongful agency actions and some of which were not. Nevertheless, in the final
      analysis, we agree with the administrative judge that this case turns on the
      voluntariness element, i.e., whether the appellant had a meaningful choice in her
      retirement.   See Coufal, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 22.         We further agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant failed to establish this element.
¶12        Although the appellant’s retirement was precipitated in part by the agency’s
      wrongful actions in connection with her reasonable accommodation request, the
      combined circumstances were not of the nature and severity that would have
      made a reasonable person in the appellant’s situation believe that she had no
      realistic alternative but to retire. While a reasonable person might have felt that
      retirement was her best option, she would not have felt that it was her only
      option.   See Lawson v. U.S. Postal Service, 68 M.S.P.R. 345, 350 (1995)
      (finding that the fact that an employee is faced with an inherently unpleasant
      situation or that her choices are limited to unpleasant alternatives does not make
      her decision involuntary).        Moreover, the most probative evidence of
                                                                                           10

      involuntariness will usually be evidence in which there is a relatively short period
      of time between the employer’s alleged coercive act and the employee’s
      retirement. Terban, 216 F.3d at 1024. In the instant case, the appellant has not
      established any precipitating event that occurred relatively close in time to the
      retirement that would have given a reasonable employee no choice but to retire.
      See id. at 1025; cf. Bates, 70 M.S.P.R. at 671-72 (while the Board considered
      evidence of a 5-year period of harassment, that evidence only served to put into
      context the life-endangering incident that precipitated her retirement). The length
      of time between which the appellant filed her EEO complaint and then retired
      also undermines her claim that her retirement was involuntary due to intolerable
      working conditions. The appellant initially raised allegations of discrimination
      on December 8, 2014, when she filed her EEO complaint, but she did not file an
      application for retirement until May 13, 2015. IAF, Tab 6 at 34-35, 222. This
      5-month lapse of time undercuts the appellant’s assertion that her working
      conditions were so intolerable as to have compelled her retirement.           Searcy v.
      Department of Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 13 (2010).
¶13         We therefore find that the appellant’s retirement was not involuntary and
      that she has not established jurisdiction over her retirement as a constructive
      removal under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. 5

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
      5
        Because the appellant raised a claim of disability discrimination in this constructive
      removal appeal, and the Board has now issued a Final Order dismissing the appeal for
      lack of jurisdiction, the agency is required, under Equal Employment Opportunity
      Commission (EEOC) regulations, to reissue a notice under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f)
      giving the appellant the right to elect between a hearing before an EEOC administrative
      judge and an immediate final decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b).
      6
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      11

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
                                                                                   12

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
                                                                                  13

      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
                                                                                     14

competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       15

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.