Court Opinion

ID: 9602365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:53:38.148266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:03.005089
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I totally agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion and the holding that the trial court correctly submitted to the jury the issue of the insurer’s liability. I also concur in Division 3 finding that the insured has shown no reason to reverse the judgment. However, I disagree with Division 2 of the majority opinion finding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer’s motion for directed verdict as to statutory penalties, attorney fees and punitive damages. Although the majority makes a passing reference to the Supreme Court’s case of Binns v. MARTA, 250 Ga. 847 (301 SE2d 877) (1983), it is my opinion that the holding of Division 2 is totally inconsistent with the teaching of Binns. In Binns, the Supreme Court, in answering a certified question from this court, made it crystal clear that the standard of review of a jury award under OCGA § 33-34-6, the statute involved in this case, differs from the review criteria applicable to a jury award under OCGA § 33-4-6. In this connection, see this court’s opinion resolving the issues before it in reliance upon the Supreme Court’s instruction *210in Binns v. MARTA, 250 Ga. 847, supra. Binns v. MARTA, 168 Ga. App. 261 (308 SE2d 674) (1983). As has been made clear by the Supreme Court, “[t]he burden of proving good faith is on the insurer. [Cit.] Good faith in this context requires a showing of reasonable or probable cause for not paying the claim on time. [Cit.] The question of the insurer’s good faith (or lack thereof) is one of fact for the jury, and the jury’s determination on this issue should be upheld on appeal if there is any evidence to support it. [Cits.] A jury award of [penalties, attorney fees and punitive damages] for wrongful refusal to pay a claim is thus entitled to great weight on appeal and should be disturbed only if the evidence at trial does not support an inference of bad faith on the insurer’s part. [Cits.] Application of an ‘any evidence’ standard of review to § 33-34-6 (Code Ann. § 56-3406b) jury awards is consistent with the policy, previously recognized by this court, of encouraging prompt payment of no-fault insurance claims. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Binns v. MARTA, 250 Ga. 847, supra at 848.
Decided November 7, 1985
Rehearing denied December 9, 1985
Sammy J. Hawkins, for appellant.
Edgar S. Mangiafico, Jr., for appellee.
If the correct standard of review as above enunciated is applied so that the burden of proving good faith is upon the insurer, it is clear that this court should not interfere with the jury verdict in this case. The majority relies upon the fact that “this case is one of first impression in Georgia. ...” “The mere fact that a proposition with respect to an insurance policy is a first impression issue does not, per se, vindicate the good faith of the company.” Georgia Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 153 Ga. App. 623, 630 (266 SE2d 299) (1980). To the extent that this court’s decision in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Presley, 174 Ga. App. 562 (330 SE2d 779) (1985), relied upon by the majority, is inconsistent with the correct review standard above discussed, it must yield to the holding of the Supreme Court in Binns, supra. I believe that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict for statutory penalties, attorney fees and punitive damages and I believe that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in its entirety.