Court Opinion

ID: 9481158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:10:16.239757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:08.355508
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I think that the affidavit of Thomas N. White, Jr. was not “conclusory” and unsupported by “specific facts”, as the majority opinion labels it, but was sufficiently explicit to create a genuine dispute of material fact, for, if credited by the factfinder, it was sufficient to support a finding of gross negligence.
These are the facts and opinions based on fact recited by White:
I have reviewed the circumstances concerning the loss of all computer business data on August 11, 1987, by Orthopedic and Sports Injury Clinic. In so reviewing I have examined the affidavits of Paul Wardel and Betty J. Ledbetter, the deposition transcripts of Gloria Doyle, Mark Bimle and Ed Martinez together with attached exhibits.
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It is never acceptable to subject the last copy of valuable data to even a properly working computer unless extreme precautions have been taken, unless there is no alternative to subjecting the data to such risk and only when there is a compelling need to use the data.
None of those circumstances existed.
In addition and much worse, Wang subjected this only copy of this valuable *228data to a computer known by Wang to be malfunctioning.
Other related acts of negligence well below the standard of practice are:
a. Failure initially to make sufficient copies (at least two) of the first set of backup disks in the next format (and saving the old format set).
b. Failure to test and verify the reformat and backup process with valueless test data before subjecting valuable data to this process.
c. Subjecting any valuable data to loss while modifying and repairing the Orthopedic and Sports Injury Clinic computer.
d. Failure to make a print out of the data before attempting a reformat or copy of the last copy.
These statements appear to me to be explicit and, to the extent they state opinions, sufficiently based on recited facts. An opinion, which is admissible under Fed. Rule of Evidence 702, is necessarily a conclusion, but that is not sufficient to condemn it as “conclusory” else all opinion evidence would be inadmissible.
White’s affidavit is, therefore, sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Neither judges nor juries know or are expected to know what standards of care are required in repairing a computer under the circumstances described in the majority opinion. The question is not what would constitute gross negligence on the part of a layman, but what is gross negligence by a computer-servicing expert. We are dependent on the industry’s standards of care to determine both whether there was a departure from the standard and, if so, how egregious that nonconformity was. White was well qualified to inform the fact-finder of both. According to his affidavit he had this experience:
I am an electronics engineer, BSEE 1964, Southern Methodist University....
I first began working with computers and computer installations in 1963 and have continued doing so to date. I have had complete large computer systems under my control and authority. I wrote computer specifications for computer installations at the Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston. At one time I was responsible for a very large complete missile and satellite tracking operation in the United States space effort with about 80 engineers and technicians working for me, said operation included a centralized computer system. I continue to have exposure to standard procedures in the operations of computer systems....
I am also an attorney licensed to practice law in California with fifteen years experience. A large part of my practice is devoted to matters involving electronics and computer companies and their computer operations.
I would not substitute our judgment on whether the alleged negligence was “gross” for that of the factfinder who, after hearing the testimony, might conclude that Wardel’s failures to comply with industry standards, explicitly described by White, were sufficient to justify affixing the pejorative description1 to what the majority concedes was sufficient to constitute negligence if proved.

. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 494, 23 L.Ed. 374 (1875) ("gross negligence is ordinary negligence with a vituperative epithet”).