Court Opinion

ID: 9825822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:07:18.750721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:23.335199
License: Public Domain

Mjehafpv, J., (on rehearing). Thé facts are stated in the original opinion, and it is unnecessary to restate them here. A. majority of the court has reached-the conclusion that a rehearing should be granted and that the ease should be reversed and remanded for a new trial, a majority believing that the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence under the circumstances in this case is a question about which fair minded men would differ, and, having reached that conclusion, under the decisions of this court, this question should have been submitted to the jury for its determination. The ease of Lauson v. Fond du Lac, 123 N. W. 629, 141 Wis. 57, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 40, 135 Am. St. Rep. 30, referred to as the leading case on the subject, we think states the rule too broadly, and that the better rule is announced in the case of. Murphy v. Hawthorne, 244 Pacific 79, 117 Ore. 319, 44 A. L. R. 1397, decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon, March 2, 1926. The court said: “Appellant’s principal contention, aside from the question as to the proper measure of damages, is that we should hold as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to stop his automobile within the range of his vision. While some courts have announced a hard and fixed rule that it is negligent to drive an automobile at such rate of speed that it cannot be stopped within the range of the driver’s vision, * * * we think it improper to do so. Each case must be considered in the light of its own peculiar state of facts and circumstances. After all, the test is, what would an ordinarily prudent person have done under the circumstances as they then appeared to exist! Can we say that all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion that plaintiff failed to exercise due care to avoid this collision ? We think not. Plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that defendant would not put this dusty gray colored truck on the highway after dark without displaying a red light on the rear thereof. If the truck had been lighted, the jury might, well have drawn the reasonable inference that plaintiff would have been able to avoid striking it. * * * While there is authority to the contrary, we believe the better reasoned cases support the holding that whether plaintiff failed to exercise due care to avoid the collision was a question of fact for the jury.” After a careful consideration of the case of Lauson v. Fond du Lac, supra, and many other authorities, we have concluded that the rule adopted by the Oregon court in Murphy v. Hawthorne, supra, is the better rule. The Wisconsin case was decided in 1909, and has been followed by a number of cases. The Oregon case was decided in 1926, and is therefore a much more recent decision, and the court in that case reviewed the authorities, considered those supporting both rules, and, we believe, reached the proper conclusion. This court has frequently in negligence cases approved the rule announced in the Oregon case. This court has said: ‘ ‘ The rule is that, where fair-minded men might honestly differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from facts, either controverted or uncontroverted, the question at issue should go to the jury.” St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua, 114 Ark. 112, 169 S. W. 786. “ While appellee did not succeed in stopping his car before striking the train, he almost did so after he discovered it, and he would perhaps have done so within the distance if the road had not been wet and unduly slick. * * * The most careful and cautious man will frequently make mistakes in measuring and estimating distances within which he can stop his automobile. We think, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the question of negligence on the part' of the appellees in this regard is a question solely for the jury. ’ ’ Bush v. Brewer, 136 Ark. 246, 206 S. W. 322. “The jury were the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and might have found that the evidence was in equal poise as to the negligence of Edmonton. Hence it might have returned a verdict in his favor because, as above stated, the burden was upon appellee to establish his negligence, and it might have returned a verdict against appellant because the burden was upon it to show that it was not negligent. Therefore the court did not err in refusing.to give the instruction.” Davis v. Hareford, 156 Ark. 67, 245 S. W. 833. In the case at bar the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, as well as the question of the negligence of the defendant, was a question that should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions, -because his contributory negligence was a matter about which fair-minded men might honestly differ. Many other decisions might be cited in support of the rule we have announced. The California court has said: “From the recognized disposition of every rational person to avoid injury, the jury doubtless may infer, where the circumstances shown in evidence warrant it as a legitimate inference of fact, that the injured person did use due care.” Ham v. Los Angeles County, 189 Pac. 462, 46 Cal. App. 148. This court therefore recognizes that it is a question for the jury to determine whether the injured party was in the exercise of due care; whether he was guilty of contributory negligence. And certainly it will not be contended that any person would intentionally run into a truck where injury would certainly follow. But the disposition of every rational person, as said by the California court, is to avoid injury. And -whether he exercised ordinary care is a question of fact. “It was shown that appellant’s driver might have, without the contour of the ground preventing him from so doing, removed the train of vehicles entirely off the paved portion of the roadway before stopping. He gave his reason for not so doing that the ground was wet and he was afraid the wheels might slip. It was a question for the jury to determine whether his act in this, as in other regards, was consistent with the exercise of a reasonable degree of care.” Western Indemnity Co. v. Wascon Land & Stock Co., 197 Pac. Rep. 390, 51 Cal. App. 672. It would be useless to undertake to cite all the authorities. There are the two rules — one announced by the Wisconsin court, the other announced by the Oregon court. We think that the rule announced by the Oregon court is the better rule, and we think it is supported by many decisions of this court. In every case where fair-minded men would honestly differ about a question, that! fact makes it a question for the jury and not for the court. It is contended by appellant that the court erred in permitting the city ordinance to be introduced in evidence, and erred in giving instruction number one, based on said ordinance. -The ordinance reads as follows: “ All automobiles shall have at least two white lights forward and one red light to the rear, and all motorcycles and bicycles one light forward from dark to daylight, same to be visible at least 200 feet. Where' two lights forward for automobiles, as prescribed by this section, cannot be had, one will be considered sufficient.” Instructions number 1 and number 5, referring to the city ordinance, should not have been given. If it was improper to introduce the ordinance, and we hold that it was, then, of course, it was improper to instruct the jury with reference to the ordinance or any of its provisions. The authorities are in conflict about the admissibility of municipal ordinances, some authorities holding that a violation of a municipal ordinance is negligence per se, and others holding that it may be introduced and considered as a circumstance with the other evidence in determining whether the person who violated the ordinance was guilty of negligence. This court said, with reference to a city ordinance: “The ordinance passed by the city council o;f Little Rock did not impose upon appellant any additional duty, so far as affected the issues in this case; did not aid the jury, was unnecessary, and should not have been read in evidence.” S. W. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beatty, 63 Ark. 65, 37 S. W. 570. The ordinánce introduced in the case át bar, which is set out above, certainly did not impose upon the appellant any additional duties so far as it affected the issues in this case; it. did not laid the jury, it was unnecessary, and it should not have been read in evidence. We do not mean to be understood as saying that a city ordinance may not.be read in evidence if it aided the jury in any way to determine the issues in the case. We said in a recent case: “The admission of every light which reason and experience can supply for the discovery of truth, and the rejection of that only Avhich serves not to guide, but to bewilder and mislead, is the great principle that ought to be the foundation of every system of evidence. Common experience rather than technical rules should be adopted as the test. Mercantile and industrial life, producing, as they do, nearly all the transactions of men that come 'before the courts of law and equity, are essentially practical. * * * The courts need not discredit what the common experience of mankind relies upon. Judge Cooley once said that 'courts would justly be the subject of ridicule if they should deliberately shut their eyes to the'sources of information which the rest of the world relies upon.’ Lastly, whenever there is any serious doubt in the law as to whether certain proof is or is not permissible, ia safe rule to pursue is to permit the testimony to go to the jury.” 10 R. C. L. 861; Heard v. Bank of Hardy, post, p. 194. The ordinance introduced has been interpreted since its passage by the public and the officers as applying to cars being used on the streets and*not to cars parked on the streets. Hundreds of cars may be seen every night parked on the streets with no light. This is the universal custom, and the above is the interpretation of the ordinance, the meaning given to it by both the public and officials. And, if it does not apply to cars parked on the streets, then, of course, it was improper to introduce it. Its introduction in effect told the jury that a oar parked oh the street in the night time without light was in violation of the ordinance. Whether it was negligent to leave the car parked as it was, at the time without light was a question to be determined by the jury. If a person of ordinary prudence, under the circumstances, would not have left it without lights because of the danger to persons traveling on the street, then it was negligent to leave it that way. In other words, negligence is the doing something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do under the circumstances, or the failure to do something that a person of ordinary prudence would do under the circumstances. This rule for measuring the conduct of persons charged with negligeuce has been approved by this court many times. And'whether .the ordinance prohibited parking a car on the streets without light or not, if parking them without light was negligence and this negligence caused injury, the person so parking the car would be liable. But the ordinance, since we hold that it did not apply to cars parked on the street, had no connection with the case whatever. All-facts are admissible in evidence which afford reasonable inferences or throw any light upon the matter contested, but circumstances having no direct connection with the case, which are remote, collateral and irrelevant, should not be admitted as evidence. And this ordinance, as it did not refer to cars parked on the street, was collateral and irrelevant and should not have been admitted. The views expressed in the original opinion are adhered to, except as Ave have stated above. After a careful reconsideration of the entire matter, we decline to follow the Wisconsin rule and we íoIIoav the Oregon rule, Avhich Ave think is the one in harmony Avith our .own opinions. It follows from what we huA^e said that the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial, and it is so ordered. Wood, Saiitit and Hitmphrf.ys, JJ., dissent.