Court Opinion

ID: 9830369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:09:16.833021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:20.351606
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In their motion for rehearing, appellants say:
“The appellants, and each and both of them, waived and conceded by implication, if not exr pressly, the issues made, as stated by the court, that is whether or not-the Houek-Dieter Company was the agent for the brewing company, and in effect conceded they were not, and no question is or could be presented to this court that would be material in this appeal, as to the agency vel non of the Houck-Dieter Company. Appellants having alleged that the brewing company was engaged in business in other counties in Texas proceeded without objection to have other process issued, and such issues cannot legally be raised in this court.”
This admission narrows the question of jurisdiction over the person of the bfewing company down to the service of the alias citation issued to Webb county and served on Joe Moser. The sheriff’s return states that *720it was served on Joe Moser, “the duly authorized local agent for service on said Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Co., at Laredo, Webb county, Texas.” '
It is earnestly insisted that the service of the alias citation upon Joe Moser, as shown by the sheriff’s return was sufficient of itself to authorize and require the rendition of the default judgment. In this connection it may be well to state the fact not shown in the original opinion, that the citation did not give the name of Moser as the agent of the brewing company in Webb county; and the further fact that the petition of Chaffin, upon which the citation was issued, did not allege the agency pf Moser in Webb county. The allegation of the petition was:
“That defendant Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Company is a corporation duly incorporated at this time, and upon the dates hereinafter mentioned has and had an office and agent in El Paso county, Texas', and is now engaged in business at El Paso county, Texas, and other points in the state of Texas, and that the Houck-Dieter Company, which resides in El Paso county, Texas, is the duly authorized agent and manager of the business of said defendant, Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Company in the county of El Paso, Texas.”
In this state of the record we are clearly of the opinion, under the authorities cited in the original opinion, that judgment by default against the brewing company,1 based upon the service of the alias citation upon Moser, would hot be proper, unless proof was made aliunde the sheriff’s return that Moser was the appellant’s agent in Webb county.
But whether that conclusion is correct or not there is another conclusive reason in support of the trial court’s action respecting the default judgment. The statute requires that the citation “shall state * * * the names of all the parties. * * * ” Article 1852, R. S. It has been repeatedly held that a citation which failed so to do will not support a judgment by default. Some of the eases to this effect are as follows: Burleson v. Henderson, 4 Tex. 49; Heath v. Eraley, 50 Tex. 209; Higgins v. Shepard, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 365, 107 S. W. 79; Bilby v. Rodgers, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 125 S. W. 616; Moran O. & G. Co. v. Anderson (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S. W. 1033; McCaully v. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 1000; Fire Ins. Co. v. Talley (Tex. Civ. App.) 211 S. W. 653.
The citation to Webb county was issued subsequent to the date of the intervention by Naquin, the trustee, who intervened under leave of court and adopted the allegations of the plaintiffs’ petition and asked judgment accordingly. Such citation failed to show that Naquin was a party to the suit His name is not mentioned therein. Under the authorities, _ this citation, by reason of such omission, was insufficient to support a default judgment against the brewing company. This defect in the citation was not called to our attention, and was not observed by us until this time.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.