Court Opinion

ID: 9895655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 14:00:36.344805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:22.546658
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10896   Document: 24-1    Date Filed: 11/08/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-10896
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        JUNIOR GALETTE,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        ROGER GOODELL,
        SEATTLE SEAHAWKS,
        LOS ANGELES RAMS,
        LAS VEGAS RAIDERS,
        CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL COMPANY, LLC, et al.,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10896       Document: 24-1        Date Filed: 11/08/2023      Page: 2 of 10

        2                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10896

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                        D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-61565-BB
                            ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Junior Galette, a former professional football player, appeals
        the district court’s dismissal of his pro se second amended complaint
        against seven constituent teams of the National Football League
        (“NFL”), the NFL’s Commissioner Roger Goodell, and the NFL
        Players Association (“NFLPA”). The district court dismissed
        Galette’s second amended complaint with prejudice because,
        despite being given an opportunity to fix pleading deficiencies,
        Galette still failed to allege facts sufficient to plausibly state a claim.
        After review, we affirm.
                             I. BACKGROUND FACTS
        A. Original Complaint
               In August 2022, Galette, proceeding pro se, filed his original
        complaint. In addition to the NFLPA and Goodell, Galette named
        as defendants: (1) the Seattle Seahawks, (2) the Los Angeles Rams,
        (3) the Las Vegas Raiders, (4) the Cleveland Browns, (5) the Kansas
        City Chiefs, (6) the Carolina Panthers, and (7) the Washington
        Football Team (formerly known as the Redskins and now known
        as the Commanders). We refer to the Washington Football Team
        as the Washington Redskins given that was its name at the time of
        the relevant events.
USCA11 Case: 23-10896      Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 11/08/2023     Page: 3 of 10

        23-10896               Opinion of the Court                         3

               We recount the factual allegations. Galette’s original
        complaint alleged that in March 2018, the Buffalo Bills signed his
        former white teammate on the Washington Redskins, Trent
        Murphy, to a three-year deal worth up to $30 million. Murphy
        “played behind” Galette in the same position but had not played in
        2017 due to an injury. Meanwhile, the Redskins offered Galette,
        who is African American, a two-year, $4 million contract, even
        though Galette was healthy and coming off a strong 2017 season.
        Shortly after Galette complained about the Redskins’s offer on
        social media, calling it a “slave deal,” the Redskins withdrew the
        offer without explanation.
                Over the next few months, Galette spoke to, met with, and
        worked out for other NFL teams, including the teams named as
        defendants. However, the only offers Galette received were for
        “veteran’s minimum” contracts of $660,000.             Hoping for
        something better, Galette did not take the first such offer made by
        the Oakland Raiders. Later, Galette decided to accept a similar
        offer from the Los Angeles Rams. But when he flew to Los Angeles
        to practice with the team, Galette was told there had “been a
        change of plans,” and he was taken back to the airport. Unable to
        play in the NFL, Galette believed that he was blacklisted by the
        NFL owners, “just like Colin Kaepernick,” in retaliation for
        complaining about the Washington Redskins’s racially
        discriminatory offer.
               Galette’s pro se complaint alleged that all of the defendants:
        (1) discriminated against him based on his race, in violation of 42
        U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I); (2) violated his free speech rights under the
        U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of Florida and Virginia
        (Count II); and (3) conspired to breach the anti-discrimination
USCA11 Case: 23-10896         Document: 24-1        Date Filed: 11/08/2023         Page: 4 of 10

        4                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10896

        provision in the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement
        (“CBA”) (Count III). 1
        B.     Dismissal of Original and First Amended Complaints
               The defendants moved to dismiss Galette’s original
        complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6)
        and attached excerpts from the 2011 and 2020 CBA. The district
        court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions.
                The district court dismissed Count III with prejudice
        because Galette’s CBA claim was subject to the CBA’s mandatory
        arbitration clause. As to Counts I and II, the district court identified
        numerous pleading deficiencies but determined they were not
        insurmountable. Therefore, the district court dismissed Counts I
        and II with leave for Galette to file an amended complaint that
        cured those deficiencies and that omitted Count III. The district
        court warned Galette that failure to comply with its order would
        result in sua sponte dismissal.
                Galette filed an amended complaint that, despite the district
        court’s instructions, included allegations as to Count III. The
        district court sua sponte dismissed Galette’s amended complaint
        under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply
        with its prior order. The district court granted Galette leave to file
        a second amended complaint that complied with its prior order.

        1 Count I of Galette’s complaint alleged the defendants violated §§ 1 and 2 of

        the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The district court found that the “essence of
        Count I” was that Galette’s former, white teammate was offered a better
        contract even though Galette was an equal or better player. The district court
        therefore liberally construed Count I as alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
        because it is where the relevant portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866—
        prohibiting race discrimination in contracts—is now codified.
USCA11 Case: 23-10896      Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 11/08/2023      Page: 5 of 10

        23-10896               Opinion of the Court                          5

        C.     Dismissal of Second Amended Complaint
               Galette then filed his second amended complaint, which was
        far from a model of clarity. Rather than replead the facts and
        counts, Galette merely set out his “response and amendment to”
        Counts I and II and referred back to his original complaint several
        times. Galette also alleged as to Count I that the defendant NFLPA
        was aware of NFL owners’ and general managers’ acts of
        discrimination and retaliation and had a contractual obligation to
        defend his rights, but failed to do so.
               The defendants again moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
        arguing that Galette did not cure the pleading deficiencies
        identified by the district court and still failed to state a plausible
        claim. The NFLPA also argued that to the extent Galette sought
        to assert a new claim that it breached the duty of fair
        representation, the second amended complaint’s allegations were
        wholly conclusory, and the claim was untimely.
                The district court granted the defendants’ motions and
        dismissed Galette’s second amended complaint with prejudice.
        After discussing the pleading standards of Rules 8(a)(2) and
        12(b)(6), the district court concluded as to Count I that Galette
        “failed to cure any of the five deficiencies that this Court previously
        noted regarding Count I of Galette’s original Complaint.” The
        district court found the second amended complaint’s allegations of
        race discrimination “even more conclusory than those within the
        original Complaint.” The district court stressed that the second
        amended complaint alleged that all defendants were liable for
        discrimination based on the Washington Redskins’s less lucrative
        offer than the offer given to an inferior white teammate by a team
        (the Buffalo Bills) that was not a defendant. The district court
        concluded that these allegations, even if true, failed to state a claim
USCA11 Case: 23-10896       Document: 24-1        Date Filed: 11/08/2023      Page: 6 of 10

        6                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10896

        “because, among other reasons previously discussed, they fail to
        specify a discriminatory act taken by a Defendant.”
               As to Galette’s free speech claim in Count II, the district
        court again concluded the second amended complaint “failed to
        cure the primary deficiency” identified in the original complaint,
        namely it lacked “a credible allegation of state action.” Because
        Galette was given specific instructions about these pleading
        deficiencies and yet was unable to cure them, the district court
        determined “that further amendment would be futile.” This
        appeal followed.
                                   II. DISCUSSION
        A.     General Principles
                Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain . . . a short and
        plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
        relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may
        move to dismiss a complaint if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which
        relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule
        12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain suﬃcient facts, accepted
        as true, to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
        Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
        678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if it “pleads factual content
        that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
        defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
        678; see also Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (stating that under the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard, the
        complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations
        respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery
        under some viable legal theory”).
USCA11 Case: 23-10896         Document: 24-1        Date Filed: 11/08/2023         Page: 7 of 10

        23-10896                  Opinion of the Court                                7

                “[A] plaintiﬀ’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
        entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and
        a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
        do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). A complaint’s factual
        allegations must be suﬃcient “to raise a right to relief above the
        speculative level.” Id. Although pro se pleadings are liberally
        construed and held to less stringent standards than those drafted by
        attorneys, they still must suggest some factual basis for a claim.
        Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). 2
                An appellant, even a pro se appellant, who fails to brief
        adequately an issue by “plainly and prominently” raising it in his
        opening brief, abandons that claim. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridan
        Ins., Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); Timson v. Sampson, 518
        F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385
        F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). Although we liberally construe a
        pro se litigant’s pleadings, we still require conformity with
        procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir.
        2007). Liberal construction of pro se pleadings “does not give a
        court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an
        otherwise deﬁcient pleading in order to sustain an action.”
        Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (quotation marks omitted).
        B.      Galette’s Preserved Claims on Appeal
               On appeal, Galette’s pro se opening brief primarily attacks
        the district court’s dismissal order on grounds that wholly lack

        2 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to

        state a claim. Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 952 (11th Cir. 2021). In reviewing
        the dismissal, “[w]e accept the allegations in the complaint as true and con-
        strue them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.
USCA11 Case: 23-10896       Document: 24-1       Date Filed: 11/08/2023      Page: 8 of 10

        8                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10896

        merit and warrant little discussion. The grounds include that:
        (1) the defendants’ motions to dismiss constituted inadmissible
        hearsay and violated the prohibition against an attorney acting as a
        witness because they were prepared by the defendants’ attorneys;
        (2) the defendants’ motions to dismiss failed to rebut or dispute his
        complaint with admissible evidence, such as depositions or
        aﬃdavits; (3) the district court’s dismissal order violated his
        constitutional right to a jury trial; and (4) the district court violated
        his due process rights by not being impartial.
                Many of these arguments misunderstand the role of the
        Rule 12(b)(6) motion in federal civil litigation. At the motion-to-
        dismiss stage, the district court does not evaluate any evidence or
        determine whether there is a factual dispute between the parties
        that a jury must decide. Instead, both the defendant moving to
        dismiss and the district court accept the plaintiﬀ’s factual
        allegations in the complaint as true, and the district court merely
        determines whether those allegations are suﬃcient to state a claim
        for relief.
                Thus, the statements in a defendant’s motion to dismiss do
        not constitute evidence, much less hearsay evidence, and the
        attorney drafting the motion is not acting as a witness. Moreover,
        a district court’s proper dismissal of a complaint under Rule
        12(b)(6) does not violate a plaintiﬀ’s constitutional right to a jury
        trial. See Jeﬀerson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 919-20 (11th Cir.
        2018) (holding that a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56
        does not violate the Seventh Amendment even though it prevents
        the parties from having a jury rule upon the facts); Garvie v. City of
        Fort Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining
        that a plaintiﬀ had no right to a jury trial when no factual dispute
        existed for a jury to resolve).
USCA11 Case: 23-10896      Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 11/08/2023     Page: 9 of 10

        23-10896               Opinion of the Court                         9

               As to Galette’s bald assertion that the district court was not
        impartial and was a “co-opted judge,” a district court’s adverse
        rulings alone are insuﬃcient to demonstrate the court’s partiality
        absent a showing of pervasive bias. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,
        1239 (11th Cir. 2000). Galette does not point to anything in the
        record demonstrating bias, let alone pervasive bias, on the part of
        the district court.
               Liberally construed, Galette’s opening brief also argues that
        the district court erred in dismissing his “duty to defend” claim
        against the NFLPA. Galette argues that the NFLPA had “a contrac-
        tual obligation and duty to defend [his] rights . . . and failed to do
        so.”
               The district court did not err in dismissing this claim. Mixed
        in with his racial discrimination claim in Count I, Galette’s second
        amended complaint states in passing that the NFLPA was aware of
        the NFL defendants’ actions and failed to defend his rights. This
        threadbare allegation does not provide fair notice to the NFLPA
        under Rule 8(a)(2) of a separate claim for breach of the duty of fair
        representation under the National Labor Relations Act. See
        Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
        C.    Galette’s Abandoned Claims
                Importantly, Galette’s opening brief does not challenge the
        district court’s rulings that his second amended complaint failed to
        allege suﬃcient facts to state a plausible claim of racial
        discrimination under § 1981 or for the violation of his free speech
        rights under either federal or state law. Indeed, apart from
        conclusory references to the violation of his rights under the U.S.
        Constitution, the constitutions of all ﬁfty states, and the Civil
USCA11 Case: 23-10896     Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 11/08/2023     Page: 10 of 10

        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10896

        Rights Act of 1866, Galette’s brief fails to raise any argument on
        appeal expressly challenging the merits of the district court’s
        dismissal order.
               Even construing Galette’s brief liberally, as we do with pro se
        litigants, these conclusory statements, without more, do not
        plainly and prominently raise any issue as to the district court’s
        dismissal of Counts I and II. At best, they are “passing references,”
        raising claims in a “perfunctory manner without supporting
        arguments and authority.” See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681-82.
        Accordingly, Galette has abandoned any issue as to the district
        court’s dismissal of Counts I and II for failure to plausibly state a
        claim. See id. at 681.
              Galette’s brief makes no mention at all of the district court’s
        dismissal of Count III in his original complaint. Therefore, he also
        abandoned any challenge to that ruling.
                                III. CONCLUSION
               For all these reasons, Galette has shown no reversible error
        in the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of his second amended
        complaint for failure to state a claim.
               AFFIRMED.