Court Opinion

ID: 9891370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 15:00:40.982293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:04.617637
License: Public Domain

23-470
     Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v. Tara Bafna-Louis

                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER

     RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
     CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
     PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
     PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
     SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
     MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
     (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
     ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
     COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
 3   City of New York, on the 18th day of October, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5           PRESENT: REENA RAGGI,
 6                            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 7                            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
 8                                    Circuit Judges.
 9           ------------------------------------------------------------------
10           ROYAL BOROUGH OF
11           KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA,
12
13                            Petitioner-Appellee,
14
15                      v.                                                        No. 23-470
16
17           TARA BAFNA-LOUIS, ALSO
18           KNOWN AS TALIA BECKER,
19           TALIA LOUIS, TARA BECKER,
20           TARA MAYNARD, TALIYA
21           BECKER, AND/OR TALIYA LOUIS,
22

                                                           1
 1                          Respondent-Appellant.
 2         ------------------------------------------------------------------
 3
 4         FOR PETITIONER-APPELLEE:                                  KELLY ANN POWERS, Stephen
 5                                                                   John Cullen, Miles &
 6                                                                   Stockbridge P.C., Washington,
 7                                                                   DC

 8         FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT:                                 VALDI LICUL, Wigdor LLP,
 9                                                                   New York, NY

10         Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern

11   District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, Judge).

12         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

13   AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

14         Respondent-Appellant Tara Bafna-Louis appeals from an order of the

15   United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Castel, J.)

16   requiring the return of her child, Baby L, to the United Kingdom pursuant to the

17   Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.

18   25, 1980 T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494

19   (Mar. 26, 1986) (“Hague Convention” or “Convention”) and its implementing

20   statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001

21   (“ICARA”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the

                                                       2
 1   record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our

 2   decision to affirm.

 3         The Convention seeks “to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully

 4   removed to or retained in any Contracting State,” and “to ensure that rights of

 5   custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively

 6   respected in the other Contracting States.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010)

 7   (quoting Hague Convention, Art. 1). “The United States is a Contracting State to

 8   the [C]onvention.” Hofmann v. Sender, 716 F.3d 282, 290 (2d Cir. 2013). “[T]o

 9   prevail on a claim under the [] Convention a petitioner must show that (1) the

10   child was habitually resident in one State and has been removed to or retained in

11   a different State; (2) the removal or retention was in breach of the petitioner’s

12   custody rights under the law of the State of habitual residence; and (3) the

13   petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of the removal or retention.”

14   Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2005). A respondent who opposes a

15   child’s return may establish certain defenses under Article 13 of the Convention.

16   See Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013). In cases arising under the

17   Convention and ICARA, we review a district court’s factual findings for clear

18   error and its legal conclusions de novo. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 368 (2d

                                               3
 1   Cir. 2013). “Legal conclusions include interpretations of the Convention and

 2   applications of the appropriate legal standards to the facts.” Id.

 3      I.      Habitual Residence

 4           Bafna-Louis first challenges the District Court’s determination that Baby

 5   L’s habitual residence is the United Kingdom. A child’s habitual residence

 6   presents a “mixed question of law and fact—albeit barely so.” Monasky v.

 7   Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 730 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). “Once “the trial

 8   court correctly identifies the governing totality-of-the-circumstances standard,

 9   however, what remains for the court to do in applying that standard . . . is to

10   answer a factual question: Was the child at home in the particular country at

11   issue?” Id. Because the District Court here identified the correct legal standard,

12   we review its habitual residence determination “by a clear-error review standard

13   deferential to the factfinding court,” id., keeping in mind that “courts must be

14   sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common

15   sense,” id. at 727 (quotation marks omitted).

16           In general, “[a] child ‘resides’ where she lives. [A child’s] residence in a

17   particular country can be deemed ‘habitual,’ however, only when her residence

18   there is more than transitory.” Id. at 726 (citations omitted). For children who

                                                4
 1   are too young to acclimate to their surroundings — as is the case with Baby L —

 2   the “intentions and circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant

 3   considerations.” Id. at 727. “No single fact, however, is dispositive[.]” Id.

 4         Here, the District Court considered all of the relevant factors and credited

 5   Bafna-Louis’s testimony that she intended to relocate to New York with Baby L.

 6   The District Court nevertheless found that Baby L was a habitual resident of the

 7   United Kingdom. That finding was supported principally by the following

 8   record evidence: (1) Baby L was born in London and was issued a passport by

 9   the United Kingdom; (2) at the time Baby L was born, Bafna-Louis “had long

10   maintained a residence in [the United Kingdom];” (3) when Bafna-Louis traveled

11   internationally prior to Baby L’s birth, she resided principally in the United

12   Kingdom; and (4) Baby L’s biological father was physically located in the United

13   Kingdom, and the court proceedings related to him occurred there. Royal

14   Borough of Kensington & Chelsea v. Bafna-Louis, No. 22-CV-8303 (PKC), 2023 WL

15   2387385, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2023). On such a record, we cannot conclude

16   that the District Court clearly erred in finding that Baby L’s habitual residence is

17   the United Kingdom.

                                               5
 1      II.      Custody Rights

 2            Bafna-Louis next challenges the District Court’s conclusion that the Royal

 3   Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (“RBKC”) had custody rights over Baby L at

 4   the time Baby L was removed from the United Kingdom. Article 3 of the

 5   Convention states, in relevant part, that the removal of a child is wrongful where

 6   “(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any

 7   other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child

 8   was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and (b) at

 9   the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either

10   jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or

11   retention.” Hague Convention, Art. 3 (emphasis added).

12            Under the Convention, “rights of custody” are defined to include “rights

13   relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to

14   determine the child’s place of residence.” Hague Convention, Art. 5(a). Thus,

15   “‘the Convention’s broad definition’ of ‘rights of custody’ is not constrained to

16   ‘traditional notions of physical custody.’” Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 367 (quoting

17   Abbott, 560 U.S. at 12). Instead, those rights “may arise . . . by operation of law or

                                                6
 1   by reason of a judicial or administrative decision . . . .” Hague Convention, Art.

 2   3. Ne exeat 1 rights, for example, “are rights of custody.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 15.

 3          According “considerable weight” to the laws of the United Kingdom, the

 4   country of Baby L’s habitual residence, we affirm the District Court’s conclusion

 5   that RBKC had custody rights over Baby L at the time of removal. See Abbott, 560

 6   U.S. at 10, 16. First, before Baby L was removed, the Family Court in London

 7   issued two ne exeat orders prohibiting the removal of Baby L from the United

 8   Kingdom. See App’x 77; App’x 898 (“The mother must not remove the child

 9   from the jurisdiction of England and Wales until further order.”). Referring to

10   the date of the first order, the High Court of Justice (“High Court”), Family

11   Division declared that “[t]he Court of England and Wales has been and remains

12   seized of proceedings concerning [Baby L] since December 2021.” App’x 917

13   (emphasis added). The High Court also confirmed that Bafna-Louis’s removal of

14   Baby L after the ne exeat orders was “in breach of the rights of custody of the

15   Court.” App’x 918; see A v. B (Abduction: Declaration) [2009] 1 FLR 1253, 1259-60

16   (noting that courts become vested with rights of custody once a “judicial

     1 In the family law context, a ne exeat order is “[a]n equitable writ restraining a person
     from leaving, or removing a child or property from, the jurisdiction.” Black's Law
     Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
                                                  7
 1   determination” has been issued); see also Abbott, 560 U.S. at 15. Second, under the

 2   law of the United Kingdom, the RBKC was delegated the authority to enforce the

 3   rights of the High Court relating to Baby L. App’x 918. Third, the law of the

 4   United Kingdom also provides that an institution “claiming that a child has been

 5   removed or retained in breach of custody rights . . . does not [it]self have to have

 6   custody rights but has to show that the removal is in breach of rights of custody

 7   attributed to a person, an institution or any other body either jointly or alone

 8   under the laws of the state in which the child was habitually resident

 9   immediately before the removal.” Re J (A Minor) (Abduction) [1990] 1 F.L.R. 276,

10   279-80 (quotation marks omitted).

11         Our review of the laws of the United Kingdom, including the

12   pronouncements of the High Court, persuades us that the Family Court’s ne exeat

13   orders vested the RBKC with custody rights over Baby L before his removal and

14   that the RBKC properly exercised those rights in this case. 2 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at

15   13.

     2Because we hold that the ne exeat orders conferred rights of custody, we need not
     address whether the child protection plan also conferred such rights.
                                                8
 1      III.   Affirmative Defenses

 2         Finally, Bafna-Louis contends that the District Court erred in determining

 3   that Baby L did not face a “grave risk that his . . . return would expose the child

 4   to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable

 5   situation,” within the meaning of Article 13(b) of the Convention. While the

 6   holder of a “ne exeat right has a right of custody and may seek a return remedy, a

 7   return order is not automatic.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 22. “[A] respondent who

 8   opposes the return of the child has the burden of establishing . . . by clear and

 9   convincing evidence” that Article 13(b) applies. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A); see

10   Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1999). But Article 13(b)’s “grave risk

11   of harm” standard “involves not only the magnitude of the potential harm but

12   also the probability that the harm will materialize.” Souratgar, 720 F.3d at 103.

13   “The potential harm to the child must be severe, and the level of risk and danger

14   required to trigger this exception has consistently been held to be very high.” Id.

15   (quotation marks omitted). More specifically, “a grave risk of harm from

16   repatriation arises in two situations: (1) where returning the child means sending

17   him to a zone of war, famine, or disease; or (2) in cases of serious abuse or

18   neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country

                                               9
 1   of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give

 2   the child adequate protection.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

 3         Based principally on her testimony that Individual-1 and Individual-2

 4   raped, harassed, and assaulted her, Bafna-Louis argues that there is a grave risk

 5   that Baby L will be exposed to great harm from those individuals if he is

 6   returned to the United Kingdom. Substantially for the reasons set forth in the

 7   District Court’s March 7 order, however, we agree that Bafna-Louis failed to

 8   show that Baby L’s removal to the United Kingdom poses a grave risk of harm to

 9   the child or would create an intolerable situation under Article 13(b). Bafna-

10   Louis, 2023 WL 2387385, at *25-27.

11                                        Conclusion

12         We have considered Bafna-Louis’s remaining arguments and conclude

13   that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District

14   Court is AFFIRMED.

15                                          FOR THE COURT:
16                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
17

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