Court Opinion

ID: 9731665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:53:56.081465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.294228
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s decision except its conclusion that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to move for dismissal of the armed violence counts on speedy-trial grounds. In fact, had counsel made such a motion, the trial court should have denied it. As the State correctly points out, that ruling would have been appropriate because the armed violence charges were lesser included offenses of the attempt (first degree murder) charges the State originally filed. The majority cites Dressier, which states that the so-called Williams rule does not apply where later-filed charges describe lesser included offenses. Dressier, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 387, 739 N.E.2d at 637. That is exactly what happened in this case. In Bowens, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 487, 718 N.E.2d at 605, the First District Appellate Court needed to determine whether the entry of multiple convictions against the defendant was proper where those convictions included attempt (first degree murder) and armed violence. As in this case, the convictions arose out of a stabbing incident. The First District concluded that the multiple convictions could not stand because the armed violence counts were lesser included offenses of attempt (first degree murder). Bowens, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 495, 718 N.E.2d at 610-11. The analysis in Bowens is sound, and this court should follow it here. Further, it must be remembered that this matter comes before us on a claim of plain error (that the trial court erred by permitting the State to file the four new counts of armed violence) or, alternatively, ineffective assistance of counsel (because defendant’s trial counsel failed to object to the State’s request to file these additional charges). I conclude neither applies. From trial counsel’s point of view, he was asserting the only available defense (voluntary intoxication), given the overwhelming case against his client. The State had already charged his client with attempt (first degree murder) concerning the four victims who were similarly named in the newly added armed violence counts. It is certainly not clear to me that no reasonable lawyer would have failed to object to the filing of these new counts. Similarly, I have serious difficulty finding any prejudicial effect since, as earlier stated, the State was entitled to file these charges because they were lesser included offenses. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate defendant’s convictions for armed violence.