Court Opinion

ID: 9941622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:05:05.528886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:48.552732
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Feb 16 2024, 9:48 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
        In the Matter of A.M.J. and A.L.J., Minor Children Alleged to
                       be Children in Need of Services;
                                            S.J. (Father),
                                        Appellant-Respondent

                                                     v.

                          Indiana Department of Child Services,
                                          Appellee-Petitioner

                                          February 16, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-JC-2241
                              Appeal from the Allen Superior Court
                             The Honorable Lori K. Morgan, Judge
                         The Honorable Sherry A. Hartzler, Magistrate
                                       Trial Court Cause Nos.
                                        02D08-2203-JC-149
                                        02D08-2203-JC-150

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024             Page 1 of 22
                                               02C01-1007-JP-465

                                      Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                Judges Mathias and Weissmann concur.

      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   S.J. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying custody of his sons,

      A.M.J. and A.L.J. (collectively “the Children”), in favor of L.G. (“Maternal

      Grandmother”). The Children previously lived with Maternal Grandmother

      after the death of their mother. After the Children returned to Father, they

      were adjudicated CHINS based, in part, on Father’s substance abuse and

      physical abuse of the Children. The Children were removed from Father and

      placed with Maternal Grandmother throughout the CHINS proceedings, during

      which Father made little progress on the services he was required to complete.

      The trial court then modified custody of the Children in favor of Maternal

      Grandmother. Father argues that the trial court erred by modifying custody

      because the trial court should have given him more chances to complete the

      services and work towards reunification. We are not persuaded by Father’s

      arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024    Page 2 of 22
      Issue
[2]   Father raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its

      discretion by modifying custody in favor of Maternal Grandmother.

      Facts
[3]   A.M.J. and A.L.J. are the sons of Father and A.G. (“Mother”). A.M.J. was

      born in March 2010, and A.L.J. was born in June 2012. Father’s paternity was

      later adjudicated, and on May 20, 2014, the paternity court awarded Mother

      primary physical custody of the Children.

[4]   In November 2016, Mother died from an overdose. In re A.L.J., No. 22A-JC-

      2558, slip op. p. 4 (Ind. Ct. App. May 11, 2023) (mem.). At the time, Father

      was incarcerated or on home detention, and he either requested or consented to

      the Children living with Maternal Grandmother. The Children lived with

      Maternal Grandmother for the next three years.

[5]   At some point, the Children began living with Father. The Department of

      Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that Father was abusing alcohol and

      drugs and was physically abusing the Children. In March 2022, DCS removed

      the Children from Father and placed them with Maternal Grandmother and

      filed a petition that alleged the Children were children in need of services

      (“CHINS” and “CHINS petition”). 1 The Children remained with Maternal

      1
          The CHINS petition was filed pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, which provides:

               A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024                                     Page 3 of 22
      Grandmother throughout the CHINS proceedings. Father was originally

      ordered to have supervised visits with the Children; however, the trial court

      later ordered that those visits be “therapeutic[ally] supervised.” Tr. Vol. II p.

      10.

[6]   On June 13, 2022, the trial court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. In its

      order, the trial court found the following: Father physically abused the

      Children, often “for no reason”; Father “put a gun to [A.L.J.]’s face with

      [Father’s] finger on the trigger”; the Children witnessed Father engage in

      domestic violence with his partner; Father had previous convictions for

      domestic battery and a history of involvement with DCS; A.L.J. felt “terrified”

      of Father and “unsafe” around him; A.M.J. had trouble sleeping at Father’s

      house due to Father’s behavior, which affected A.M.J.’s performance at school;

      Father drove while intoxicated with the Children in the vehicle; Father tested

      positive for cocaine and “cannabinoids/THC” 2 on the day the CHINS petition

      was filed and used cocaine on at least one additional occasion during the

            (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a
            result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
            the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
              (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
              (B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek
              financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
            (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
              (A) the child is not receiving; and
              (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
      2
       Tetrahydrocannabinol, commonly abbreviated as THC, is the main active chemical in marijuana. Medina v.
      State, 188 N.E.3d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024                                 Page 4 of 22
      CHINS proceedings; and Father had not engaged in any of the services offered

      by DCS. Ex. Vol. pp. 74-76.

[7]   In its June 28, 2022 dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to, as

      relevant here: (1) refrain from criminal activity and “physical discipline” of the

      Children; (2) refrain from the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, and other substance

      abuse; (3) complete substance abuse treatment recommendations and submit to

      random drug screening; (4) complete a drug and alcohol counseling program,

      family counseling program, and home based services program, including

      “parenting, discipline, developmental stages, coping skills, and stress

      management without substance use”; (5) submit to a diagnostic assessment to

      “identify and recommend reunification/preservation services” and follow those

      recommendations; (6) cooperate with DCS caseworkers and the guardian ad

      litem (“GAL”); and (7) attend and “appropriately participate” in all visits with

      the Children. Id. at 78-79.

[8]   Father appealed the CHINS adjudication, and in an unpublished opinion, this

      Court affirmed the adjudication. See A.L.J, No. 22A-JC-2558. In particular,

      this Court noted that: A.M.J. wrote a letter to school personnel stating that he

      “wished Father would stop physically abusing him”; A.L.J. reported that

      Father “waved” a gun in A.L.J.’s face, Father’s “finger slipped on the trigger,”

      and the gun fired, with the bullet missing A.L.J. “by mere inches”; Father

      “admitted to hitting the Children with an open hand on the back of their heads

      on a daily basis and giving them a ‘good whooping’ about once a month”; the

      Children were diagnosed with stress disorders based on Mother’s death and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024     Page 5 of 22
       Father’s parenting; and the Children felt safer with Maternal Grandmother. Id.

       at 2, 7, 10.

[9]    In March 2023, the permanency plan changed from the concurrent plan of

       reunification with Father or the granting of custody to Maternal Grandmother,

       to only the granting of custody to Maternal Grandmother. On April 4, 2023,

       DCS filed a “Motion for Permanency & Joinder,” in which DCS sought to join

       Maternal Grandmother as a party to the CHINS proceedings and to modify

       custody of the Children in her favor. Ex. Vol. p. 96. The trial court held a

       hearing on that motion on June 11, 2023.

[10]   At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Father’s caseworker,

       Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Paulette Eldridge. According to FCM

       Eldridge, Father had not started the court-ordered individual counseling

       services, Father was disruptive during a group substance abuse treatment

       program, and Father was unsuccessfully discharged from an individual

       substance abuse treatment program because he was making only “minimal

       progress.” Tr. Vol II p. 44. Father had also refused numerous drug screens

       and, although he had several negative drug screens, Father had tested positive

       for THC and cocaine during the previous few months. FCM Eldridge believed

       it was “unsafe” for the Children to return to Father’s care. Id. at 48.

[11]   The trial court also heard testimony from Zarifa Nazarov, the therapist who led

       Father’s therapeutically supervised visits with the Children, which took place

       weekly for one hour. Nazarov was chiefly concerned with Father’s anger

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024     Page 6 of 22
       management. According to her, Father “has a temper” and “[s]mall things set

       him off and he becomes aggressive and talks in a high pitch.” Id. at 12. Father

       would become aggressive and disrespectful when Nazarov intervened during

       visits, and Nazarov often felt threatened and needed to “de-escalate” Father.

       Id. at 30. On one occasion, Father became frustrated and, when Nazarov took

       the Children to the parking lot to meet Maternal Grandmother, Father drove

       around the parking lot and called Nazarov inappropriate names in the presence

       of the Children. Father did not leave until one of the Children told him that

       Nazarov felt threatened and would call the police. On a different occasion,

       Father became frustrated when Nazarov intervened, approached Nazarov

       aggressively, and ended the session early.

[12]   After several months, due to Father’s behavior during visits, Wilbert Monroe,

       Father’s Fatherhood Engagement services provider, also began attending the

       visits to help Father manage his aggression. Nazarov testified that it was

       “unusual” to have more than one person supervise visits. Id. at 23.

[13]   Nazarov recommended that therapeutically supervised visits continue because

       of Father’s inappropriate behavior and because Father had not begun court-

       ordered parenting skills and anger management services. She was also

       concerned with Father’s psychological evaluation, which placed him at an

       “extremely high [risk] for future child abuse.” Id. at 56. Nazarov could not

       predict when visits would progress from therapeutically supervised to

       supervised.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024   Page 7 of 22
[14]   The GAL was concerned with Father’s failure to complete services,

       unwillingness to engage in substance abuse treatment, recent substance abuse

       related charges, criminal history, and the risk of future child abuse. The GAL

       recognized that the Children loved Father and that A.M.J. desired to return to

       Father one day; however, the GAL recommended that visits remain

       therapeutically supervised and that custody be modified in favor of Maternal

       Grandmother.

[15]   As for Maternal Grandmother, the Children were doing well in school, playing

       sports, and thriving in her care. Maternal Grandmother testified that she would

       facilitate Father’s continued involvement in the Children’s lives. Lastly, Father

       testified and opposed the modification of custody. He requested that the trial

       court give him more chances to complete services and work toward

       reunification.

[16]   On August 31, 2023, the trial court issued its order joining Maternal

       Grandmother in the proceedings, granting custody of the Children to her, and

       terminating DCS’s wardship over the Children. In doing so, the trial court

       found the following: (1) Father has not demonstrated “appropriate parenting

       techniques, despite having received homebased parenting education”; (2)

       Father behaved inappropriately during visits; (3) Father has not refrained from

       abusing substances and was unwilling to do so; (4) Father tested positive for

       “marijuana and cocaine” in May 2023; (5) Father had “pending criminal

       charges and prior convictions for resisting arrest, conversion, and public

       nudity” and a “history of convictions related to substance abuse”; (6) despite

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024    Page 8 of 22
       the age of the case, visits had not progressed beyond one hour weekly; (7)

       Father “wa[]ved a gun in the face of [A.L.J.]”; (8) the Children were “not safe”

       in Father’s care; and (9) the Children were “thriving” in Maternal

       Grandmother’s care. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 35-37.

[17]   The trial court concluded:

               26.      The Court finds that there has been a change of
                        circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the
                        terms of the custody, support and parenting time orders
                        entered by the court . . . unreasonable. The Court finds
                        that there has been a substantial change in one or more of
                        the factors which the Court may consider under I.C. 31-
                        14-13-2 and I.C. 31-14-[1]3-6 for purposes of modifying
                        custody.

               27.      [F]rom the facts recited hereinabove, including the fact
                        that [Father has] not completed the services required for
                        reunification in the Child In Need of Services case, the
                        Court concludes that [the] presumption favoring [Father]
                        has been rebutted.

               28.      The Court find[s] that there is clear and convincing
                        evidence that it is in the best interests of the children to
                        grant [Maternal Grandmother] sole legal and physical
                        custody.

               29.      The Court ultimately concludes that these proceedings
                        began with child abuse and now unfortunately end with a
                        high probability of child abuse occurring, but for the
                        protection of placement with [Maternal Grandmother].
                        Despite there being some benefit from services and a bond
                        observed with the Father and children, it is not presently
                        safe to expand visitations beyond one hour in a therapeutic
                        session with three professionals to redirect Father and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024           Page 9 of 22
                        protect the children. Father further has not addressed his
                        substance use and continues to use illegal substances and
                        has not demonstrated an ability to benefit from substance
                        abuse counseling.

       Id. at 37-38. Father now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[18]   Father argues that the trial court erred by modifying custody in favor of

       Maternal Grandmother. Father has not carried his burden of persuasion.

       I. Standard of Review

[19]   As a general matter,

               [T]here is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting
               latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law
               matters. Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold
               transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who
               saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their
               testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly
               understand the significance of the evidence. On appeal it is not
               enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion,
               but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by
               appellant before there is a basis for reversal.

       Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting

       Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)) (internal citations omitted).

       Given our deferential review, we review orders granting custody to a third party

       rather than a natural parent only for abuse of discretion. In re Paternity of L.J.,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024      Page 10 of 22
       223 N.E.3d 716, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023); accord K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903

       N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009).

[20]   Additionally, where, as here, neither party requested special findings under

       Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) and the trial court entered its findings and conclusions

       sua sponte:

               [W]e apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence
               supports the findings, and whether the findings support the
               judgment.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). We
               reverse “the findings only if they are clearly erroneous.” In re
               Adoption of I.B., 32 N.E.3d 1164, 1169 (Ind. 2015). We review
               any remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under
               which we will affirm the judgment “if it can be sustained on any
               legal theory supported by the evidence.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.
               We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the
               witnesses, and we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de
               novo. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013).

       Hahn-Weisz, 189 N.E.3d at 1141. When, as in this case, the factual findings are

       unchallenged, we accept those findings as true. In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 675

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2019)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024     Page 11 of 22
       II. Concurrent Jurisdiction

[21]   We first clarify that the trial court had concurrent jurisdiction to modify custody

       of the Children here. At the time of the custody hearing, Indiana Code Section

       31-30-1-13 provided, in relevant part: 3

                (a) Subject to subsection (b), a court having jurisdiction under IC
                31-14 over establishment or modification of paternity, child
                custody, parenting time, or child support in a paternity
                proceeding has concurrent original jurisdiction with another
                juvenile court for the purpose of establishing or modifying
                paternity, custody, parenting time, or child support of a child
                who is under the jurisdiction of the other juvenile court because:

                         (1) the child is the subject of a child in need of services
                         proceeding; or

                         (2) the child is the subject of a juvenile delinquency
                         proceeding that does not involve an act described under IC
                         31-37-1-2.

                                                            *****

                (c) If, under this section, a juvenile court:

       3
         After the hearing in this matter but before the trial court’s order was issued, Indiana Code Section 31-30-1-
       13 was subsequently amended to its current language, which explicitly states that “a court having jurisdiction
       over a child who is the subject of a child in need of services proceeding or juvenile delinquency proceeding
       has concurrent jurisdiction with a court having jurisdiction under IC 31-14 [paternity actions] for the purpose
       of establishing or modifying paternity, custody, parenting time, or child support of the child.” Ind. Code §
       31-30-1-13(b) (effective July 1, 2023). Under either version of the statute, the trial court had concurrent
       jurisdiction here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024                            Page 12 of 22
                  (1) establishes or modifies paternity, custody, child
                  support, or parenting time of a child; and

                  (2) terminates a child in need of services proceeding or a
                  juvenile delinquency proceeding regarding the child;

         the order establishing or modifying paternity, custody, child
         support, or parenting time survives the termination of the child in
         need of services proceeding or the juvenile delinquency
         proceeding until the court having concurrent original jurisdiction
         under subsection (a) assumes or reassumes primary jurisdiction
         of the case to address all other issues.

         (d) A court that assumes or reassumes jurisdiction of a case under
         subsection (c) may modify child custody, child support, or
         parenting time in accordance with applicable modification
         statutes.[ 4]

As this Court has observed, this statute “evidences a clear intent by the

legislature for a CHINS court to be able to establish or modify custody, child

support, or parenting time of a child over whom it exercises jurisdiction,” even

when the child is also subject to a paternity action. 5 M.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs., 118 N.E.3d 70, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

4
 Indiana Code Section 31-30-1-12 contains similar provisions regarding concurrent jurisdiction between trial
courts in dissolution and children in need of services cases.
5
  We note that Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-3(a)(3) requires that a child custody proceeding be commenced
by “a child, by the child’s next friend, if the child is the subject of a” CHINS petition. A “child’s next friend”
means “(1) the department; (2) the child’s court appointed special advocate; or (3) the child’s guardian ad
litem.” I.C. § 31-17-2-3(b). As Father makes no argument regarding this statute, we do not address it.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024                               Page 13 of 22
       III. Third-Party Custody

[22]   Where a third party seeks to modify custody in favor of the third party rather

       than the natural parent, our courts engage in a three-step analysis. First,

       Indiana recognizes the presumption that “‘natural parents are entitled to the

       custody of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be

       entrusted with their care, control, and education.’” In re Guardianship of B.H.,

       770 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Gilmore v. Kitson, 74 N.E. 1083, 1084

       (Ind. 1905)). The parent “comes to the table with a ‘strong presumption that a

       child’s interests are best served by placement with the natural parent.’” K.I.,

       903 N.E.2d at 460 (quoting B.H., 770 N.E.2d 287)). Accordingly, when

       custody is at issue between a third party and a natural parent, we begin with the

       presumption in favor of the natural parent. Id.

[23]   In the second step, the third party must rebut the natural-parent presumption

       with clear and convincing evidence. Id.; B.H., 770 N.E.3d at 287. “‘The

       presumption will not be overcome merely because a third party could provide

       the better things in life for the child.’” B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287. Instead, in

       determining whether the presumption is overcome, the trial court may seek

       “guidance” from the three Hendrickson 6 factors: “(i) unfitness on the part of the

       parent, (ii) long acquiescence in the third party’s custody of the child, or (iii)

       voluntary relinquishment of the child such that the affections of the child and

       6
           Hendrickson v. Binkley, 316 N.E.2d 376 (1974).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024      Page 14 of 22
       third party have become so interwoven that to sever them would seriously mar

       and endanger the future happiness of the child.” K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 459. The

       trial court is also free to rely on relevant factors other than the Hendrickson

       factors. Id.

[24]   Additionally, in determining whether the natural-parent presumption has been

       overcome, the trial court must make “‘detailed and specific findings . . . .’” In re

       Guardianship of B.W., 45 N.E.3d 860, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting B.H.,

       770 N.E.2d at 287). “A generalized finding that placement with a third party is

       in the child’s best interests is insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor

       of the natural parent.” Id. (citing B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287). “And if a decision

       to place custody of a child in a third party, rather than a parent, is based solely

       upon the child’s ‘best interests,’ as opposed to a finding of parental unfitness,

       abandonment, or other wrongdoing, ‘such interests should be specifically

       delineated, as well as be compelling and in the real and permanent interests of

       the child.’” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 231 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2001), trans. denied).

[25]   If the third party overcomes the natural-parent presumption, the trial court

       proceeds to the third step. In the third step, the third party must demonstrate

       that, based on the relevant custody statutes, a “substantial change” occurred

       and that “‘the child’s best interests are substantially and significantly served by

       placement’” with the third party. K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 460-61 (quoting B.H., 770

       N.E.2d at 287); Ind. Code § 31-30-1-13(e) (providing that “[a] court that

       assumes or reassumes jurisdiction of a case under subsection (d) [governing the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024      Page 15 of 22
       modification of custody and termination of CHINS proceedings in the same

       action] may modify child custody, child support, or parenting time in

       accordance with applicable modification statutes”). 7 The third-party’s burden

       of proof in this step remains proof by clear and convincing evidence. K.I., 903

       N.E.2d at 460-61.

[26]   In sum, to modify custody in favor of Maternal Grandmother here, the trial

       court was required to begin with the presumption in favor of Father, the

       Children’s natural parent. Then, in the second step, the trial court was required

       to find by clear and convincing evidence that the natural-parent presumption

       was overcome. Lastly, if the trial court so found, the trial court was required to

       find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that, based on the relevant custody

       statutes: (1) a substantial change occurred, and (2) modifying custody was in

       the Children’s best interests.

       IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying custody in
       favor of Maternal Grandmother

[27]   We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying

       custody in favor of Maternal Grandmother. Beginning with the natural-parent

       presumption, DCS overcame this presumption with evidence that Father was

       “unfit[]” as a parent. K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 459.

       7
           This provision was codified at subsection (d) at the time of the custody hearing here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024                        Page 16 of 22
[28]   Father’s unfitness is demonstrated by his substance abuse and physical abuse of

       the Children. The Children were adjudicated CHINS based, in part, on these

       factors. And despite services offered in the CHINS proceeding, Father’s

       substance abuse was unresolved. Father abused alcohol, marijuana, and

       cocaine; drove while intoxicated with the Children in the vehicle; and has

       several substance abuse related convictions. By the time of the custody hearing

       here, Father had failed several drug tests, failed to complete substance abuse

       related treatment services, and had not demonstrated any willingness to curb

       his substance abuse. Cf. In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2006) (affirming finding that parent was unfit based, in part, on parent’s

       “drug use and criminal convictions” and affirming children’s adoption by

       relatives).

[29]   As for Father’s physical abuse of the Children, Father admitted at the CHINS

       fact-finding hearing that he regularly physically disciplined the Children.

       Inexplicably, Father also accidentally fired a gun near A.L.J.’s head. Father

       and the Children engaged in therapeutically supervised visits to help the family

       address trauma and work toward reunification; however, Father demonstrated

       aggressive tendencies toward the therapist and failed to demonstrate proper

       anger management and appropriate parenting skills. Psychological testing

       placed Father at an extremely high risk of abusing the Children in the future.

       The trial court concluded that the Children were “not safe” in Father’s care.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 37.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024   Page 17 of 22
[30]   Turning to the significant change and best interests elements, the trial court

       relied on statutes governing modification of custody in paternity actions,

       Indiana Code Sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-14-13-6. Indiana Code Section 31-14-

       13-6 provides:

               The court may not modify a child custody order unless:

                        (1) modification is in the best interests of the child; and

                        (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the
                        factors that the court may consider under [Indiana Code
                        Section 31-14-13-2] and, if applicable, [Indiana Code
                        Section 31-14-13-2.5].

       Indiana Code Section 31-14-13-2, in turn, provides:

               The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
               interests of the child. In determining the child’s best interests,
               there is not a presumption favoring either parent. The court shall
               consider all relevant factors, including the following:

               (1) The age and sex of the child.

               (2) The wishes of the child’s parents.

               (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
               child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

               (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

                        (A) the child’s parents;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024          Page 18 of 22
                         (B) the child’s siblings; and

                         (C) any other person who may significantly affect the
                         child’s best interest.

                (5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

                (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

                (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
                parent.

                (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
                custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
                consider the factors described in [Indiana Code Section 31-14-13-
                2.5].[ 8]

[31]   The trial court found that, based on these statutes, a substantial change

       occurred and modifying custody was in the Children’s best interests. Father’s

       substance abuse and physical abuse of the Children, coupled with the fact that

       the Children were thriving with Maternal Grandmother, support this finding.

       See Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2 (listing relevant factors as the “interaction and

       interrelationship of the child with . . . the child’s parents,” (§ 2(4)(A)); the

       8
         Indiana Code Section 31-14-13-2.5(a) provides, “This section applies only if the court finds by clear and
       convincing evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian.” The trial court here did not
       make a finding regarding whether Maternal Grandmother was a de facto custodian of the Children.
       Accordingly, we do not analyze this statute. Cf. Hahn-Weisz, 189 N.E.3d at 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)
       (declining to analyze de facto custodian statute applicable in dissolution proceedings, Indiana Code Section
       31-17-2-8.5, when trial court made no findings regarding de facto custodianship).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024                           Page 19 of 22
       “child’s adjustment to home” (§ 2(5)); the “mental and physical health of all

       individuals involved (§ 2(6)); and a “pattern of . . . family violence” by the

       parent” (§ 2(7))).

[32]   Father makes no argument regarding whether the evidence overcame the

       natural-parent presumption. Rather, Father only challenges the best interests

       element. Father argues that he made progress in his Fatherhood Engagement

       program, which did not begin until December 2022. Father also argues that his

       visits with the Children improved after Monroe became involved. Father

       ultimately argues that he should be given more chances to complete the court-

       ordered services and that “[m]oving this quickly to permanency, through a

       change of custody to the maternal grandmother, does not allow Father to

       continue with his improvement and succeed through reunification with his

       children.” 9 Appellant’s Br. pp. 15-16.

[33]   We are not persuaded by this argument, as Father has had ample time to make

       progress on the court-ordered services. The Children were removed in March

       2022 and adjudicated CHINS in June 2022. On June 28, 2022, the trial court

       ordered Father to engage in services. By the time the custody hearing took

       place on June 11, 2023, nearly one year had passed since the trial court ordered

       Father to engage in these services. Although Father was participating in the

       9
        Additionally, Father argues that the trial court erred by finding that “the conditions that gave rise to the
       children’s removal would not be remedied.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. The trial court made no such finding, and
       moreover, that standard applies in termination of parental rights proceedings, see Ind. Code § 31-35-2-
       4(b)(2)(B)(i), which are not at issue here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024                          Page 20 of 22
       Fatherhood Engagement program, he had not completed any of the other

       required services. Father had also not demonstrated meaningful progress on his

       substance abuse treatment. Finally, Father and the Children had engaged in

       therapeutically supervised visits for over one year, yet the therapist was unable

       to predict when visits would progress to supervised, let alone unsupervised,

       visits.

[34]   Based on these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred by

       finding that the natural-parent presumption was overcome, that a significant

       change occurred, and that modifying custody in favor of Maternal

       Grandmother was in the Children’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court

       did not abuse its discretion by modifying custody.

       Conclusion
[35]   We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying custody of

       the Children in favor of Maternal Grandmother. Accordingly, we affirm.

[36]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Roberta L. Renbarger
       Fort Wayne, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024   Page 21 of 22
Marjorie Lawyer-Smith
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-2241 | February 16, 2024   Page 22 of 22