Court Opinion

ID: 9859218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:16:18.018566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:42.202901
License: Public Domain

VERNIERO, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the underlying premise of the Court’s holding, namely, that plaintiffs who successfully arbitrate their discrimination complaints are entitled to seek reasonable counsel fees. I differ from my colleagues only insofar as how to implement that holding. In my view, the Court should encourage arbitrators to resolve fee applications rather than reserve that function exclusively for the Law Division unless the parties agree otherwise.
The salutary purpose of New Jersey’s arbitration system is to adjudicate disputes efficiently and inexpensively “and to ease the caseload of state courts.” Behrn v. Ferreira, 286 N.J.Super. 566, 574, 670 A.2d 40 (App.Div.1996). Consistent with that purpose, arbitrators have proved themselves to be skilled in resolving complaints, and I see no reason why those same professionals should not decide the question of fees. In the binding arbitration setting, the Court acknowledges the practice of arbitrators determining fee awards, ante at 233, 764 A.2d at 1010; yet, it divorces them from that function in the non-binding setting unless the parties affirmatively agree to submit the fee question to arbitration. I do not believe that the differences between the two forms of arbitration are so great as to warrant those separate procedures.
Whether in the context of a binding or non-binding system, arbitrators develop a “feel of the case” much like trial judges in the Law Division and are thus in an excellent position to determine the reasonableness of any fee award. Having witnessed firsthand the legal services rendered in a particular matter, arbi*236trators are uniquely infused “with a fresh personal knowledge of the issues involved[.]” Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216, 67 S.Ct. 752, 755, 91 L.Ed. 849, 852 (1947). That unique perspective is lost once the matter is transferred.
The majority correctly describes this case as one of first impression, ante at 231, 764 A.2d at 1009, and acknowledges that there is merit to the argument on both sides, id. at 228, 764 A.2d at 1007. Under those circumstances, I would not impose a holding that governs all future cases. Rather, because this matter arose by virtue of a pilot program in one county, I would seek input from the program’s designers before passing on prospective procedures. In sum, I would remand this matter to the arbitrator to consider plaintiffs fee application. The Court’s holding should not be carved in stone until program designers and other interested parties have had the opportunity to offer us their views.
LONG, J., joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, COLEMAN, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI — 5.
Concurring in part/dissenting in part — Justices LONG and VERNIERO — 2.