Court Opinion

ID: 9805158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 17:38:59.001354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:10.390488
License: Public Domain

Acosta and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.,
dissent in part in a memorandum by Manzanet-Daniels, J., as follows: I would find that plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). I would accordingly reverse the motion court’s order and reinstate the complaint.
Plaintiffs treating orthopedic surgeon affirmed that the left knee injury was causally related to the accident. Plaintiff’s surgeon opined, inter alia, that plaintiff sustained traumatically induced tears of the posterior horn of both the medial and *511lateral meniscus. He also stated in his report “[p]revious medical and surgical history: noncontributory,” consistent with plaintiff’s testimony that he had never previously been diagnosed with arthritis, scoliosis or osteoporosis, and had never sustained a trauma to the left knee before the accident. Plaintiffs surgeon opined that plaintiff suffers from atrophy of the quadriceps musculature consistent with unhealed damage to the meniscus, and that the damage to the cartilage of his knee places him at significant risk of needing total joint replacement.
The affirmation of plaintiffs surgeon, attributing the injury to the accident as opposed to any other cause, suffices to raise a triable issue of fact (see Yuen v Arka Memory Cab Corp., 80 AD3d 481 [1st Dept 2011]). The fact that defendants’ experts attribute the injury to degenerative causes is of no moment. We have held, repeatedly, that it is unnecessary for a plaintiff’s expert to specifically refute defense evidence as to degeneration; attributing the injury to another, equally plausible cause, i.e., the accident, is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see e.g. Vaughan v Leon, 94 AD3d 646, 648-649 [1st Dept 2012]; Yuen, 80 AD3d at 482; Linton v Nawaz, 62 AD3d 434, 439-440 [1st Dept 2009], affd 14 NY3d 821 [2010]).
In Malloy v Matute (79 AD3d 584 [1st Dept 2010]), wherein we confronted strikingly similar facts, we modified to deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the claim of serious injury to the right knee and reinstated the complaint, reasoning that while the defendant’s experts had ascribed his injuries to degenerative causes, “plaintiffs doctors were unanimous in concluding that the subject accident was the sole competent producing cause of plaintiff’s knee injuries, based upon (1) their individual examinations; (2) MRI results; and (3) the necessity of surgery to repair a tear in the medial meniscus.” The plaintiff in Malloy, like plaintiff here, had no previous knee problems or injuries, and underwent surgery within months of the accident.
Defendants’ reliance on Henchy v VAS Express Corp. (115 AD3d 478 [1st Dept 2014]) and Farmer v Ventkate Inc. (117 AD3d 562 [1st Dept 2014]) for the proposition that plaintiff must refute defendant’s evidence of degeneration is misplaced. The plaintiff in Farmer had a preexisting arthritic condition in the knee, and her expert concurred that X rays showed advanced degenerative changes. The plaintiff in Henchy submitted no contemporaneous objective evidence of injury or limitations in the knee. It was for these reasons that we deemed their respective experts’ opinion as to causation conclusory and insufficient *512to rebut the defendants’ showing. While the MRI, as the majority notes, was not definitive regarding the existence of a tear, the fact that the surgeon visually observed tears and attributed them to a traumatic origin ought to suffice to raise a triable issue of fact.