Court Opinion

ID: 9910837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 18:02:43.410974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:41.463070
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/18/23 P. v. Stevenson CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B321803

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. MA081176)
                   v.

LAMAR DUWAN
STEVENSON,

    Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.
      Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
       Defendant and appellant Lamar Duwan Stevenson appeals
from his conviction of first degree murder and a sentence of
25 years to life, plus 10 years. Defendant contends hearsay
statements of a codefendant were improperly admitted, the
statements were not supported by the requisite corroboration, the
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, and
the court violated newly amended Penal Code sections 1170 and
1170.1 by imposing the upper term on the firearm enhancement.
       We affirm.
          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       In November 2020, Cory McAlpine was fatally shot at an
apartment complex in Palmdale where friends had gathered for a
birthday party. Two of the female partygoers, T.J. and N.M.,
testified as prosecution witnesses. (We refer to the two witnesses
only by their initials to protect their privacy.) Video footage
recovered from several security cameras in the apartment
complex captured some of the activity before and after the
shooting. The shooting itself was not captured on video.
       T.J. was the girlfriend of the victim, McAlpine, and they
had a young son together. McAlpine was a Hoover gang member
known as Groove.
       Other gang members were at the party, including
defendant, who is a Neighborhood Crip with the moniker Skatt,
and two of his friends, Trippy and Delvon Carnell Moore-Gulley
(Gulley). Trippy and Gulley were members of the 10th Street
gang (also known as Dime Bloc), which was associated with the
Neighborhood Crips and rivals of McAlpine’s gang.
       Early that evening, T.J. had an argument with McAlpine
because he did not want her to go to the party, but she went

                                2
anyway since it was for her sister. At some point, McAlpine
arrived at the party.
      Before heading to the party, N.M. drove to a liquor store to
buy some alcohol, and defendant accompanied her. N.M. had her
handgun with her in a bag. It was a .38- or .357-caliber
revolver—the same caliber revolver used to kill McAlpine.
Defendant knew she had the gun. When they arrived back at the
apartment complex, N.M. left her gun in the bag underneath the
front passenger seat.
      About an hour before the shooting, defendant got into an
“animated” or “heated” argument with McAlpine. Gulley and
Trippy were standing nearby. N.M. saw the argument but could
not hear what was said. Video footage captured the argument.
McAlpine walked away after the argument and did not return to
the apartment where most of the party guests were still hanging
out and drinking.
      Shortly thereafter, defendant went inside the apartment
and asked N.M. for her car keys. She gave them to him without
asking why he wanted them. Video footage captured defendant
walking in the parking lot area with Gulley. Defendant was
holding a lanyard with keys that looked like N.M.’s keys. N.M.
said she did not see defendant return to the party, and another
friend later returned her car keys to her.
      Video footage taken around 3:00 a.m. showed both Gulley
and Trippy walking in the direction of a courtyard in the complex
where McAlpine’s body was eventually found. There was no
video from the courtyard area itself. A couple of minutes later,
another segment of video showed defendant and McAlpine also
walking in the direction of the courtyard. At 3:05 a.m., video
footage captured Gulley and Trippy running away from the

                                3
courtyard area and defendant walking in a different direction.
Shortly thereafter, video showed defendant and Trippy meet up
in a different area of the complex and leave together on foot.
       T.J., who was still at the party and unaware of any
shooting, realized her cell phone was missing. She used a friend’s
cell phone to call her own number and defendant answered her
phone. Defendant told her he must have grabbed her phone by
mistake and that he had found her phone in N.M.’s car. They
agreed to meet at N.M.’s house so that T.J. could retrieve the
phone. When T.J. arrived at N.M.’s house, defendant was there
with Trippy. T.J. got her phone from defendant. Shortly
thereafter, her sister called and told her to come back to the
apartment because something had happened to McAlpine.
       Meanwhile, N.M. heard a commotion outside the
apartment and heard someone say there had been a shooting.
N.M. was frightened, and she collected her things to leave. She
left with her wife, another friend and her kids. When N.M. got
into her car to drive everyone home, she saw her bag on the front
passenger seat, not under it, where she had left it, and her gun
was missing.
       N.M. returned to her home on 10th Street. About 20 or
30 minutes later, defendant showed up alone. N.M. asked where
was her gun, and he told her he had gotten rid of it. When she
asked what happened, defendant said something to the effect
that “ ‘Oh, that nigga got what he had coming.’ ” Cell phone
location data confirmed that defendant was in the vicinity of
N.M.’s home after the time of the shooting.
       Later, when N.M. was interviewed, she said defendant
scared her. She did not understand why he had shot McAlpine.
N.M. later received threats about her involvement in this case

                                4
and was given assistance in relocating for her safety. T.J. also
testified she did not want to talk to law enforcement about
anything that happened because she was scared of being seen as
a snitch.
       McAlpine died from a single gunshot wound to his face.
Ballistics analysis on the bullet recovered from McAlpine’s neck
showed the murder weapon was a .38- or .357-caliber revolver.
No shell casings were recovered at the scene, consistent with the
murder weapon being a revolver. Photographs of the crime scene
showed glass from a broken bottle near McAlpine’s body.
       Defendant was charged with one count of murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). As to
count 1, it was alleged defendant personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
       Gulley was charged as a codefendant in the murder. Just
before the start of the first trial in April 2022, Gulley pled no
contest to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to an
upper term of 11 years.
       Defendant proceeded to trial. The jury in the first trial
could not reach a verdict and the court declared a mistrial.
Defendant was retried in June 2022. Before opening statements,
defendant admitted he suffered a prior felony conviction in 2006
for purposes of count 2 only.
       When the prosecution called Gulley as a witness, he
refused to testify. Gulley was held in contempt and given
another opportunity to testify, and he refused again. The court
declared him unavailable as a witness and admitted, over
defendant’s objection, selected portions of Gulley’s out-of-court
statement describing aspects of the shooting. The prosecutor’s

                                5
closing argument included comments about Gulley’s refusal to
testify. We reserve a more detailed discussion of Gulley’s out-of-
court statements and the prosecutor’s argument to parts 1 and 3,
respectively, of the Discussion below.
       The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder
(count 1) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 2),
and found true the personal firearm use allegation on count 1.
The court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life on
count 1, plus a 10-year upper term for the firearm enhancement.
The court imposed and stayed a two-year midterm on count 2.
The court awarded defendant 443 actual days of presentence
custody credits.
       This appeal followed.
                           DISCUSSION
1.     Gulley’s Out-of-court Statements Were Properly
       Admitted.
       Defendant contends the court violated his rights to due
process and a fair trial by admitting Gulley’s out-of-court
statements. Defendant says the statements were not admissible
as statements against penal interest because Gulley only spoke
about facts that implicated defendant but not himself. Defendant
says the evidentiary error was prejudicial because there was no
physical evidence linking him to the crime and only Gulley
identified him as the shooter. “We review a trial court’s decision
whether a statement is admissible under Evidence Code section
1230 for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th
698, 711 (Grimes).) We find no abuse of discretion in the
admission of the statements.

                                6
        a.    Background
        After Gulley was arrested, he refused to be interviewed and
made no incriminating statements when an undercover operative
was placed in a holding cell with him. Thereafter, two Dime Bloc
gang members, who were arrested on an unrelated matter, were
placed in Gulley’s cell which, unbeknownst to all of them, was
equipped to record their conversations. Over the course of
several hours, Gulley made various statements to his fellow gang
members about the shooting of McAlpine.
        When called to testify at trial, Gulley refused. After being
held in contempt and being declared unavailable, the prosecution
presented, over defendant’s objection, 11 passages culled from the
jail cell recordings.
        In two passages, Gulley related some of what led up to the
shooting of McAlpine: (1) “ ‘[N.M.], cuz and I go outside, smoke a
cigarette. Cuz tell me, ‘where [N.M.] park at?’ I said, ‘I don’t
know, there behind the gate.’ That where her car, woo, woo, had
a strap. He tell me, ‘Hey, walk with me real quick.’ I walk with
cuz. Cuz was like, ‘Yeah, woo, woo, woo, Nigga, on the hood, I’m
gonna smoke cuz. On Neighborhood Crip *** get away with it.’ I
started laughing, said, ‘Nah cuz, leave cuz alone, bro.’ ” (2) “Cuz
tellin me this as he went to get the strap. ‘Nigga, on
Neighborhood Crip, I’m gonna kill cuz. I’ll show you inside how
to fuckin’ get away with it, on the hood. Neighborhood, come
watch this nigga.’ No talkin’, walk up and blow cuz’s head off.”
(Other testimony explained that saying “on Neighborhood” meant
doing something for the gang.)
        Gulley also said defendant told McAlpine (referring to him
by his moniker Groove) “ ‘I don’t like how you talked to me and
stuff.’ ” In several passages, Gulley referenced “Snoova,” a

                                 7
derogatory term for the Hoover gang and that McAlpine was shot
once in the face: (1) “[F]uck Snoova. Boom! One shot. Cuz over
with.” (2) “Face, head. Blew his shit off.”
       Gulley twice emphasized how close he was when defendant
shot McAlpine: (1) “Cuz, I was this close. This close.” (2) “I was
close, cuz. When the bottle, when the bottle, I, I think some
ricochet bust the bottle or when I hit the ground, the bottle bust.
But when the bottle bust, that shit split open.”
       Gulley also said several times that he told defendant to
leave it alone. “Skatt was on cuz. That’s why I had to tell cuz,
‘Bro, just leave.’ ” Gulley also said defendant believed McAlpine
had drugs. “He talkin about nigga had drugs. Nigga had
nothing. He had a black sweater on and some shorts. Cuz got his
pockets checked and all that.”
       b.    Analysis
       The declaration against interest exception to the hearsay
rule allows for the admission of an out-of-court statement by a
declarant “if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the
statement, when made . . . so far subjected him to the risk of civil
or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true.” (Evid. Code, § 1230.)
       In Grimes, the Supreme Court explained that the
admissibility of a declaration against interest must be assessed
from the context in which it was made. The “contextual approach
accords with the rationales underlying the modern expansion of
the rule governing the admission of statements against interest.”
(Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 717.) In resolving whether an out-
of-court statement is against the declarant’s penal interest
“ ‘ within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence

                                 8
is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take
into account not just the words but the circumstances under
which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant,
and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.’ ” (Id. at
p. 711.)
       Moreover, “the nature and purpose of the against-interest
exception does not require courts to sever and excise any and all
portions of an otherwise inculpatory statement that do not
‘further incriminate’ the declarant.” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 716.) Courts are permitted “to consider whether the portion of
a confession that tends to exculpate another, rather than to shift
blame or curry favor, should be admitted in view of surrounding
circumstances, even though the exculpatory portion of the
statement is not independently disserving of the declarant’s
interests.” (Id. at p. 715.)
       While Gulley’s statements assign more culpability to
defendant, identifying him as the shooter, Gulley nonetheless
implicated himself as an accomplice in the shooting. Gulley
acknowledged going with defendant to N.M.’s car, after pointing
out that it was behind the gate when asked by defendant where
N.M. had parked, and saying that the car “had the strap” in it.
Gulley admitted knowing defendant was angry with McAlpine
and that his intent was to kill him. He said defendant thought
McAlpine had disrespected him, that he was going to kill him,
and he would show Gulley how to get away with it. Gulley
continued to accompany defendant after defendant declared his
intent, multiple times, to kill McAlpine and was apparently
standing right next to defendant when the fatal shot was fired.
       These statements reasonably subjected Gulley to criminal
liability as an aider and abettor in the death of McAlpine, and

                                9
they were made under circumstances which rendered them
sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible. Gulley was speaking
with fellow gang members with whom he was friendly, not with
law enforcement, and he spoke using words that could be
reasonably construed as boasting about the crime and his role in
it. Gulley was not making the statements to curry favor with the
authorities or deflect responsibility. (See, e.g., People v.
Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 335 [“most reliable
circumstance is one in which the conversation occurs between
friends in a noncoercive setting that fosters uninhibited
disclosures”].)
       Defendant relies heavily on People v. Gallardo (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 51 (Gallardo) in arguing that Gulley’s statements
should have been excluded. His reliance on Gallardo is
misplaced.
       Gallardo concluded that a declarant’s statements
identifying two other individuals as the shooter and the driver of
the vehicle from which the shots were fired were not admissible
as declarations against interest. (Gallardo, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 76.) In so holding, Gallardo cited several
factors, none of which is present here. The trial court in Gallardo
admitted the entire 40-page transcript of the declarant’s
conversation with undercover operatives without any redaction of
collateral and inadmissible statements. (Id. at p. 72.) The
declarant made his remarks not to friends or confidants in a
noncoercive setting but to undercover operatives who directed
and prompted most of the more incriminating revelations. (Id. at
p. 75.) The trustworthiness of the statement was further
undermined by the fact the declarant made clear from the very
outset of the statement that he was angry with authorities for

                                10
trying to blame the crime entirely on him, and he gave
“conflicting versions of what had occurred, further mitigating his
role in the offense with each successive telling.” (Id. at pp. 73,
75-76.) There is nothing analogous with the facts surrounding
Gulley’s out-of-court statements here.
         Finally, defendant argues Gulley never expressly admitted
he assisted defendant in the murder. But that is not the
standard for admissibility set forth in Grimes. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of his
statements.
2.       There Was Sufficient Corroborating Evidence.
         Defendant argues that a reversal is warranted even if we
conclude Gulley’s out-of-court statements were properly
admitted, because the record does not contain corroborating
evidence in support of those statements and no other evidence
linked him to the murder. We do not agree.
         Penal Code section 1111 requires accomplice testimony to
“be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense.” (Ibid.) But,
“ ‘ “it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be
sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense
charged.” ’ ” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982.)
“[E]vidence of corroboration is ‘sufficient if it tends to connect the
defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that
the accomplice is telling the truth.’ ” (People v. Gonzales and
Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 304.) Corroborating evidence may be
entirely circumstantial, as well as “ ‘ “slight and entitled to little
consideration when standing alone.” ’ ” (Zapien, at p. 982.)
         The evidence recited above was ample corroboration of
Gulley’s statements linking defendant to the fatal shooting.

                                  11
3.     The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct During
       Closing Argument.
       Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for
Gulley’s credibility during argument. Defendant says the
prosecutor’s assertion that everyone was afraid of defendant and
that he too would be scared to testify gave credence to Gulley’s
refusal to testify and likely made his statements about defendant
more credible to the jury. He says it was prejudicial and the
court’s brief admonition to the jury was insufficient to cure the
harm as evidenced by the fear the jurors expressed the next day
in their note requesting an escort. We disagree.
       a.     Background
       In his closing argument, the prosecutor responded to
defense counsel’s argument about Gulley’s refusal to testify by
saying, “I think we all know why [Gulley] doesn’t want to talk.
Why nobody in this case wants to talk. It has to be pulled out of
people, extracted like [from] a dentist chair. Because everybody
is afraid of [defendant]. [¶] And especially Mr. Gulley. He’s
scared to death of him because he killed somebody for no reason
right in front of him. I know I would be scared to death of that
person. If you put me up there and I had to say something about
them, I wouldn’t say a word.”
       Defense counsel objected that was improper argument, and
the court sustained the objection. The prosecutor concluded his
argument shortly thereafter. No further objections were made.
Immediately after the prosecutor finished, the judge turned to
the jury and said, “Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to read you a
brief instruction regarding the objection that was sustained: I’m
going to invite you to disregard any personal vouching as to any

                               12
statements that were made by [the prosecutor] as to personally
vouching as opposed to his argument.”
       After the jury was excused, defense counsel made a motion
for mistrial which the court denied.
       The next day, before the start of the afternoon session, the
jury informed the court they had a verdict. The jury also sent out
a note saying they believed someone from the audience may have
been taking video of them on a cell phone. They requested that
deputies escort them from the building and that their identifying
information be permanently sealed. The court admonished
everyone in the courtroom that recording the jurors was
absolutely prohibited. The court then asked who in the audience
was suspected of doing the recording. (The reporter’s transcript
is unclear to whom the question was directed.) An individual was
asked to step forward, and his cell phone was checked and found
not to contain any footage of the jurors. The court then took the
verdict, dismissed the jurors, and ordered they be escorted to
their cars. Defendant did not raise any objection to the court’s
handling of the matter in this fashion.
       b.     Analysis
       “Under California law, to establish reversible prosecutorial
misconduct a defendant must show that the prosecutor used
‘ “deceptive or reprehensible methods” ’ and that it is reasonably
probable that, without such misconduct, an outcome more
favorable to the defendant would have resulted. . . . A
prosecutor’s misconduct violates the federal Constitution if the
behavior is ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘ “so egregious that it infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due
process.” ’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 510 (Caro),

                                  13
citation omitted; accord, People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 894 (Covarrubias).)
       Where, as here, misconduct is alleged to have occurred
during closing argument, we must consider the objected-to
remarks in the context of the prosecutor’s argument as a whole
and the court’s instructions to the jury. (Covarrubias, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 894.) “ ‘In conducting [our] inquiry, we “do not
lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather than
the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ”
(Ibid.)
       A prosecutor is entitled to comment on the credibility of
any witness based on facts contained in the record and any
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts.
(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1329.) Impermissible
vouching occurs when a prosecutor assures the jury a witness is
credible or suggests there is evidence available to the government
but not presented to the jury that corroborates the witness’s
testimony. (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 593; Seumanu,
at p. 1329.) Vouching in either case is objectionable because such
“prosecutorial comments may be understood by jurors to permit
them to avoid independently assessing witness credibility and to
rely on the government’s view of the evidence.” (Cook, at p. 593.)
       The prosecutor did not vouch for Gulley here. The
prosecutor’s brief argument that Gulley refused to testify out of
fear was reasonably based on evidence in the record. There was
evidence from both T.J. and N.M. that they were scared to testify
or speak to the authorities. N.M. and Detective Mark Marbach
both testified about N.M. receiving threats and being given
relocation assistance for her safety. Detective Marbach also said
in cases involving gang members, most witnesses were fearful

                               14
and did not want to be involved. It was not unreasonable for the
prosecutor to argue that Gulley refused to testify out of fear. The
prosecutor did not belabor the point, and his argument as a whole
focused on the evidence and the jury instructions.
       To the extent the prosecutor’s remarks did constitute
vouching, the court promptly admonished the jury. The jurors
were instructed that nothing the attorneys said was evidence
(CALCRIM No. 104), and that they alone were the judges of
witness credibility (CALCRIM No. 105). (Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 511 [claimed vouching was harmless given the strength of
the evidence and the jury instruction that credibility was for the
jury alone to decide].)
4.     Defendant Forfeited His Claim of Sentencing Error.
       Defendant argues he is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing because the trial court failed to comply with the
requirements of newly amended Penal Code sections 1170 and
1170.1 by imposing the upper term of 10 years on the firearm use
enhancement instead of the presumptive midterm of four years.
       At the start of the sentencing hearing, the court asked the
parties to focus their arguments on the firearm use enhancement,
noting it was the only aspect of the sentence where the court had
discretion. The prosecution argued for an upper term, and
defendant argued that, based on the amended statute, nothing
greater than the midterm would be proper.
       Before imposing sentence, the court described the murder
as “horrific” with the victim having been “shot in the face at point
blank range.” The court also acknowledged the amendments to
Penal Code sections 1170 and 1170.1, saying “I’m aware of the
new law. I know there were no findings made by [the] jury.” The
court then said it was not limited to relying on jury findings

                                15
under the new law, saying it could refer to the court file which
included defendant’s probation report. “Defendant’s probation
report indicates his prior convictions as an adult are numerous
and of increasing seriousness, and I do find that from the court
file. I do not need a jury finding on that to elevate it to [the] high
term. [¶] In addition, the defendant has served a prior prison
term. He was given probation. He was unsuccessful and was
sentenced to prison not long before this occurred. [¶]
Furthermore, I think just the nature of the case itself and the
conviction represents that the defendant has engaged in violent
conduct that indicates he’s a serious danger to society.”
       The court went on to explain that, even if an appellate
court were to find it was inappropriate to rely on defendant’s
dangerousness as an aggravating factor, the court would still
impose the high term “just from the defendant’s prior convictions
[which] are numerous and increasing [in] seriousness; and, in
addition, he served a prior prison term.”
       At no point did defendant object to the court’s reliance on
the probation report and defendant’s criminal history as the
bases for imposing the upper term. Defendant had previously
stipulated to a prior felony conviction. Because no objection was
raised, the contention has been forfeited.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

                                       GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:
                         STRATTON, P. J.          VIRAMONTES, J.

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