Court Opinion

ID: 9541583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:26:52.66658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:50.505233
License: Public Domain

COATS, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that Officer Gary A. Yamamoto had no legal basis to detain Castle merely because Castle was ,a witness.1 Since Officer Yamamoto had personally observed Browning’s offense, Officer Yama-*178moto had no basis to believe that Castle was an important witness. But I disagree with the majority that the record in this case establishes that Officer Yamamoto conducted an illegal investigative stop.
The record in this case is very limited. The parties agreed to have District Court Judge Sigurd Murphy decide this issue based upon the grand jury testimony of Officer Yamamoto. According to Officer Yama-moto’s testimony, after he placed Browning-under arrest, he took Browning back to his patrol car. As he was taking Browning back to the patrol car, the passenger, Donald L. Castle, got out and stated, “I need to leave.” Officer Yamamoto responded, “Well, hold on just a moment. Why don’t you have a seat in the ear. I’ll be right back with you.” Officer Yamamoto continued back towards his patrol car, pat searched Browning, placed him inside the patrol ear, then returned to Browr-ing’s vehicle. Castle was no longer there.
Officer Yamamoto went inside the Mapco station and asked the clerk if he knew where the passenger (Castle) had gone. The clerk told Officer Yamamoto that Castle had come in through the front door and then gone out the side door. Officer Yamamoto went back to the patrol car and drove around the neighborhood, hoping to find Castle. After spotting Castle walking on the sidewalk down 23rd Street, Officer Yamamoto pulled up to him and stated, “Sir, I need to talk to you for just a moment.” At that point Castle started running. Castle ran “out into the middle of the road, right in front of [the] patrol ear ... and down 23rd [Street].”
Judge Murphy concluded that, up to this point, no seizure had occurred. He found that the seizure occurred when Yamamoto activated his overhead lights and later pushed Castle into the snow. The majority concludes that Officer Yamamoto violated Castle’s rights when he asked him to remain at the scene for a moment and later when he recontacted him and stated, “Sir, I need to talk to you for just a moment.” I agree with Judge Murphy and disagree with the majority-
Castle was in Browning’s car and was a witness to a crime. It was reasonable for Officer Yamamoto to attempt to identify Castle and to obtain a statement from him. It would be unprofessional and foolish for Officer Yamamoto to fail to take these steps. As I have previously stated, however, I agree with the majority that Castle was not an important enough witness to justify ordering him to stay. But, I agree with Judge Murphy’s finding that Officer Yamamoto did not order Castle to stay. According to Officer Yamamoto’s testimony, the only evidence we have before us, he politely requested that Castle stay. I fail to see that this request was an infringement of Castle’s rights. After Castle left the scene, Officer Yamamoto attempted to contact Castle in order to complete his investigation. Again, I agree with Judge Murphy’s finding that Officer Yama-moto did not violate Castle’s rights by driving up to him and stating, “Sir, I need to talk to you for just a moment.” I fail to see why Officer Yamamoto could not contact Castle to attempt to interview him as a witness. In addition, I fail to see how Officer Yamamoto could approach Castle in a less intrusive manner than he did.
The majority hinges its decision on the conclusion that Officer Yamamoto violated Castle’s Fourth Amendment rights by his attempts to interview Castle. The majority concludes that because Officer Yamamoto violated Castle’s rights, “that even if Castle broke the law by running in the middle of the street, his conduct was the direct result of Officer Yamamoto’s unjustified attempt to seize him.” I disagree that Officer Yama-moto violated Castle’s rights, thereby justifying Castle’s illegal conduct.
According to Officer Yamamoto’s testimony, after he told Castle, “Sir, I need to talk to you for just a moment,” Castle “ran out into the middle of the road right in front of my patrol car and started running [in the middle of the road] down 23rd.” Yamamoto chased Castle, and ultimately managed to stop him, finding drugs. According to Judge Murphy’s findings, “Castle began running into and down the middle of the street. He continued this behavior which created an imminent threat to his own safety and possibly the safety of other drivers for several blocks.” The state argues that Castle’s behavior of running down the street violated *179the law which requires a pedestrian to walk on a sidewalk, or, in the absence of a sidewalk, to walk on the edge of the roadway.2 The state concedes that Officer Yamamoto did not use this justification for the stop and Judge Murphy did not rely on this justification either. But the state points out that there is authority which would permit us to independently uphold the trial court’s decision in spite of the fact that this theory was never advanced in the trial court.3 I am not sure it would be fair to uphold the trial court’s decision on this basis because the record is so limited and the parties did not focus on this issue in the trial court. Castle had a right to refuse to talk to Officer Yama-moto and to walk away. I doubt that Officer Yamamoto could stop Castle for something as minor as a jaywalking violation. However, if Castle’s actions were more serious and there was a significant independent ground for stopping him, I see no basis for suppression. Since I conclude that the record, findings, and briefing in this ease are inadequate to resolve this issue, I would remand to allow the parties to focus on these issues.

. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(b), at24(3ded,1996).

. In pertinent part, 13 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 02.175 provides:
(a) Where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, a pedestrian may not walk upon an adjacent roadway except when crossing the roadway.
(b) Where a sidewalk is not available, a pedestrian walking upon a highway shall walk on a shoulder as far as practicable from the edge of the roadway. Where neither a sidewalk nor a shoulder is available, a pedestrian walking on a highway shall walk as near as practicable to the outside edge of the highway and, if walking along a two-way roadway, shall walk only on the left side of the roadway.
Fairbanks General Code Ordinance (FGCO) § 78.241 incorporates this provision.

. McGee v. State, 614 P.2d 800, 805-06 n. 10 (Alaska 1980); Snider v. State, 958 P.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Alaska App.1998).