Court Opinion

ID: 9853495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:35.157132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:50.095190
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting).
I most respectfully dissent. The fourth defense stricken by the lower court, in my view, alleged no evidentiary matter. *434It clearly contained no irrelevant or redundant matter and Sec. 10-606 of the Code is, therefore, inapplicable.
While this court has not heretofore had occasion to pass upon the precise question, there is considerable authority from several other jurisdictions, including numerous Missouri cases in addition to Long v. Mild, cited in the majority opinion, for the proposition that “the sole cause issue” may be raised under a general denial and that such does not have to be pled. No case, however, has come to my attention holding that it is erroneous, or prejudicial to a plaintiff, to allow the pleading of such matter in defense. Indeed, I cannot conceive of how such could possibly be prejudicial to a plaintiff. To the contrary, a plaintiff is normally benefited as a result of being advised precisely as to what a defendant contends.
Whether such be necessary or required, it is and has been rather common practice in this state to plead, in defense, the negligence of a third party as the sole proximate cause of an injury. Whether such be denominated a defense, separate defense, or otherwise, in this jurisdiction it is well recognized that proof of such constitutes a bar to recovery against the defendant. Stone v. Bethea, 251 S. C. 157, 161 S. E. (2d) 171 (1968) ; Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S. C. 539, 59 S. E. (2d) 149 (1950). Whether or not required to be pled, the negligence of a third party as the sole proximate cause is recognized and denominated as a defense in other jurisdictions, including those holding that such defense may be raised under a general denial. We quote the following from 65A C. J. S. Negligence § 181, p. 321. “The sole negligence of a third person is a complete defense.”
As stated in the majority opinion, a motion to strike is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, provided, however, such discretion not be abused or the exercise thereof be not controlled by error of law.
In the present case, the motion to strike was predicated upon an untenable legal ground. The motion shows that *435counsel erroneously equated negligence on the part of the parents or custodian, as the sole proximate cause of the injury, a complete bar to recovery, with contributory negligence on the part of the parents, which, of course, is not a bar to recovery in an action by the child. The ruling of the trial judge in granting the motion and the subsequent conduct of the trial rather clearly indicate to my mind that he was controlled by error of law in granting the motion. His ruling was, to some extent, ambiguous, but clearly he did not rule in accordance with the majority opinion, that evidence was admissible, under a general denial, tending to prove that third party negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury. While no exception is specifically addressed to the exclusion of evidence, it is clear from the statement of the case and briefs of counsel that his Honor followed up his ruling, striking the fourth defense, by actually excluding evidence proffered to prove that, in fact, the negligence of the parents and/or custodian was the sole proximate cause of the injury.
While I am inclined to agree with the proposition that, as a general rule, evidence is properly admissible under a general denial, tending to prove the negligence of a third party as the sole proximate cause, and conclude that the trial judge was in error in excluding such evidence in the instant case, after striking the defense, I am, nevertheless, convinced that it is good practice to plead such matter. There are, indeed, cases in which, in my view, a defendant should be required to plead such in order to avoid surprise to the plaintiff and to prevent delay in the administration of justice. For instance, cases sometimes arise wherein there is mistaken identity, either alleged or actual, of a particular driver or a particular vehicle in automobile collision cases. If, perchance, a plaintiff has made, or is alleged to have made, a mistake of identity, a defendant should not be allowed to wait until trial and spring such as a surprise on the plaintiff. The plaintiff can never suffer prejudice as a result of having been advised of the alleged fault of a third party, as sole *436proximate cause, but to the contrary, is benefited by knowing fully any defenses of a defendant. Of course, if a defendant should fail to produce evidence to substantiate such a defense, a motion to strike the same at the conclusion of the trial would be in order.
On the other hand, a defendant should be entitled to plead all relevant matters in defense, in order that the jury might know at the outset of the trial all of the contentions of the respective parties and be able to weigh all of the evidence in the light of such contentions. If such a plea on the part of a defendant be held improper or impermissible, situations could well arise in which the jury would not be advised of a most important contention of a defendant until late in a trial.
In any event, in this case, to the extent that the motion was addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, I am convinced that the exercise of his discretion was controlled by error of law in granting the motion, with resulting prejudice to the defendants. It is accordingly my view that the order of the lower court should be reversed.