Court Opinion

ID: 9907144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 19:01:12.895726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:26.758762
License: Public Domain

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
                            In the
         United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Eleventh Circuit

                   ____________________

                         No. 22-13863
                   Non-Argument Calendar
                   ____________________

TERESA DARLENE CHAPMAN,
                                              Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
versus
COMMISIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

                                            Defendant-Appellee.

                   ____________________

          Appeal from the United States District Court
             for the Northern District of Alabama
              D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01959-HNJ
                   ____________________
22-13863               Opinion of the Court                        2

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
       Teresa Chapman appeals the district court’s order affirming
the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her claim for
supplemental security income (“SSI”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(3). First, she argues that the Appeals Council erred in
denying review of the administrative law judge’s denial of her
claim for SSI when it refused to consider new evidence that was
dated after the ALJ’s decision. Second, she argues—for the first
time on appeal—that the ALJ’s exclusion of incontinence from the
list of her severe impairments is not supported by substantial
evidence. Finally, Ms. Chapman contends that her new arguments
on appeal are properly preserved because they relate to the same
claim put forward at the district court. We address each claim in
turn.
                                  I
       Ms. Chapman filed an application for SSI in June of 2019,
alleging a disability onset date of May 1, 2013. In her initial
disability report, she stated that the two stents placed in her heart
following a heart attack limited her ability to work. Because
disability examiners denied her applications initially and on
reconsideration, Ms. Chapman requested a hearing before the ALJ.
       The ALJ held a hearing in May of 2020 and, one month later,
denied Ms. Chapman’s application, concluding that she was not
disabled and thus did not qualify for SSI. Ms. Chapman
22-13863               Opinion of the Court                          3

administratively appealed to the Appeals Council, arguing, among
other claims, that new and material evidence supported her claim.
To this end, Ms. Chapman submitted a physical capacities form
completed in August of 2020 by Theresa Price, a physician assistant
who examined Ms. Chapman five times from October of 2018 to
March of 2019. On the form (“the Price Opinion”), Ms. Price placed
severe limitations on Chapman’s ability to work due to her
impairments and indicated that these limitations existed at least as
far back as May 22, 2019. Ms. Price did not, however, refer to any
past evaluations or findings in reaching her conclusions, nor did
Ms. Chapman submit further evidence indicating that the
disabilities alleged in the August 2020 form were based on Ms.
Price’s earlier examinations of her.
        The Appeals Council declined review of the ALJ’s decision.
It stated that the Price Opinion did not relate to the period at issue,
and therefore did not affect the ALJ’s decision that Ms. Chapman
was not disabled from May 1, 2013, through June 9, 2019.
       Ms. Chapman subsequently sought judicial review of the
agency’s decision in the Northern District of Alabama, arguing,
among other claims, that the Appeals Council erred by failing to
consider the Price Opinion as new, chronologically relevant, and
material evidence. The district court affirmed, finding that the
Price Opinion was not chronologically relevant and, even if it were,
would not have made a difference in the ALJ’s decision. Ms.
Chapman timely appealed.
22-13863               Opinion of the Court                        4

                                 II
       In social security appeals, we review the agency’s legal
conclusions de novo, and its factual findings to determine whether
they are supported by substantial evidence. See Ingram v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). Substantial
evidence is “less than a preponderance” and “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2005). The individual seeking social security benefits bears the
burden of proving that they are disabled. Id.
       Generally, a claimant may present evidence at each stage of
the agency’s administrative review process, including to the
Appeals Council. See Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin, Comm’r, 883 F.3d
at 1308. When a claimant properly presents new evidence to the
Appeals Council, we consider whether that new evidence renders
the denial of benefits erroneous. See Ingram, 496 F.3d at at 1262.
When an incorrect application of Social Security regulations results
in harmless error because the correct application would not
contradict the agency’s ultimate findings, the agency’s decision will
stand. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983).
      As part of our de novo review, we may consider factors that
the Appeals Council did not when it initially refused to consider
new evidence. See, e.g., Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 806
F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (considering both chronological
relevance and materiality when the Appeals Council had
considered only chronological relevance).
22-13863                Opinion of the Court                          5

                                  III
       Ms. Chapman first argues on appeal that the Appeals
Council erred in declining to consider the Price Opinion because it
did not relate to the period during which Ms. Chapman claimed to
be disabled. We disagree.
       “If a claimant presents evidence after the ALJ’s decision, the
Appeals Council must consider it if it is new, material, and
chronologically relevant.” Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. There must
also be a reasonable probability that the new evidence would
change the outcome of the ALJ’s decision. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.1470(a)(5).     Whether evidence is new, material, and
chronologically relevant is a question of law subject to de novo
review. See Washington, 806 F.3d at 1321. For the purposes of
Appeals Council review, evidence is considered material if there is
a reasonable probability that it would change the administrative
result. See Hyde v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987).
        Evidence is chronologically relevant if it relates to the period
before or on the date of the ALJ decision. See Keeton v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Medical
examinations conducted after an ALJ’s decision may still be
chronologically relevant if they relate back to a time on or before
the ALJ’s decision. See Washington, 806 F.3d at 1319, 1323. But we
have also held that the Appeals Council correctly declined to
consider new medical records because the records were “about a
later time” than the ALJ’s decision and, therefore, did not affect the
decision about whether the claimant was disabled during the
22-13863               Opinion of the Court                          6

relevant period. See Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. In Hargress, we held
that the new records were not chronologically relevant because
nothing in them indicated that the doctor, who did not treat the
claimant during the relevant period, had reviewed the appellant’s
medical records, or that the information in the new records related
to the period at issue. See id. at 1309‒10.
       To support her argument, Ms. Chapman relies heavily on
Washington. In that case, the claimant submitted to the Appeals
Council a psychologist’s evaluation and accompanying opinion
about the degree of the claimant’s mental limitations, which were
prepared seven months after the ALJ’s decision. See 806 F.3d at
1319. We concluded that the psychologist’s materials were
chronologically relevant because (1) the claimant described his
mental symptoms during the relevant period to the psychologist,
(2) the psychologist had reviewed the claimant’s mental health
treatment records from that period, and (3) there was no evidence
of the claimant’s mental decline since the ALJ’s decision. See id. at
1322-23 (limiting its holding to “the specific circumstances of the
case.”).
       Ms. Chapman also cites to Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935
F.3d at 1262 (11th Cir. 2019) where we held that “check-box”
questionnaires from treating sources should be considered in light
of their prior treatment notes of the claimant, rather than in a
vacuum. We explained that “a medical opinion’s failure to address
all possible functional limitations is not a logical reason to discount
what it says about the limitations that it does address,” and we
22-13863               Opinion of the Court                          7

rejected the notion that the use of a check-box form automatically
warranted discounting the opinion as conclusory. See id. We also
noted that the doctor’s treatment notes were consistent with the
conclusions regarding the claimant’s health status. See id.
       After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Appeals
Council did not err in determining that the Price Opinion was not
chronologically relevant. While Ms. Price may have checked a box
on the form indicating that Ms. Chapman’s limitations existed as of
the initial SSI application date, such an indication is not dispositive
of chronological relevance. See, e.g., Howze v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022
WL 152236, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 2022) (finding that a form
submitted by doctor eight months after ALJ decision was not
chronologically relevant because nothing in the form indicated that
the doctor evaluated claimant’s past medical records when forming
her opinion). Although Howze is unpublished, we find it persuasive
on this point.
       Unlike Ms. Chapman’s contention to the contrary, a treating
source does not automatically “incorporate[e] into that form their
entire experience with the patient.” As in Washington, there must
be an indication that the source at the very least “reviewed the
prior records” and “based [their] opinions on the combined effects”
of the claimant’s alleged disabilities. Washington, 806 F.3d at 1322.
       In reviewing Ms. Chapman’s treatment history, nothing in
the record indicates that Ms. Price relied on her prior treatment
notes of Ms. Chapman to reach the conclusions submitted in the
August 2020 form. For example, while Ms. Price referred to the
22-13863                  Opinion of the Court                                8

conditions of peripheral neuropathy and radiculopathy as the basis
of her post-ALJ opinion, she never diagnosed Ms. Chapman with
those conditions during the period of alleged disability. Because
Ms. Price did not assess any of these conditions during the relevant
period, they are not chronologically relevant, even though she
included them in the August 2020 form.
       The facts at hand distinguish Ms. Chapman’s case from
Washington, where the treating source’s additional form submitted
to the Appeals Council accurately reflected his historical treatment
notes of the claimant’s conditions. Here, the only condition that
the Price Opinion mentions and is present in Ms. Price’s treatment
notes of Ms. Chapman is incontinence. Despite the mention of
incontinence, however, there is no reasonable probability that the
Price Opinion, weighed against all the evidence heard by the ALJ,
would change the outcome of the administrative result. 1
      Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the Price
Opinion is not chronologically relevant and thus did not have to be
considered by the Appeals Council.

1 Although the district court did not make an explicit ﬁnding on materiality, it
held that “a review of [Ms.] Chapman’s St. Michael’s Clinic records [where Ms.
Price examined Ms. Chapman] does not indicate that considering those
records would have made a diﬀerence.”              Chapman v. Soc. Security
Administration, Comm’r, No. 4:20-CV-01959-HNJ, 2022 WL 4236627, at *7
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2022). We conclude now that the Price Opinion was not
material, either. See Washington, 806 F.3d at 1321 (allowing the consideration
of factors that the Appeals Council did not when refusing to review new
evidence).
22-13863               Opinion of the Court                         9

                                 IV
       Next, we turn to Ms. Chapman’s argument that the ALJ
erred by not finding an additional severe impairment of
incontinence at step two of the administrative hearing. In the
Social Security context, we generally do not address issues not
raised before the district court. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004). See also Stewart v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Serv., 26 F.3d 115, 115-16 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating
that, “[a]s a general principle, this [C]ourt will not address an
argument that has not been raised in the district court”). Because
Ms. Chapman never raised this argument before the district court
and extraordinary circumstances do not exist, we decline to
consider it for the first time on appeal.

                                  V
       For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s
decision.
      AFFIRMED.