Court Opinion

ID: 9729370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:33:07.584193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:57.320403
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, J udge,
dissenting.
Although I concur with respect to Part II, I respectfully dissent as to Part I.
Justice Dickson, speaking for the court in Gariup Construction Co., Inc. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Ind.1988) noted that the duty determination is made "not without difficulty", and, in quoting from a well-regarded treatise, concluded that "'Inlo better general statement can be made than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists" See Jay Tidmarsh, Tort Law: The Languages of Duty, 25 Ind. L.Rev, 1419 (1992).
It is for this reason, perhaps, that we have in the past articulated the principle that: "The Law imposes but one common law duty and that duty is to use due care {citation omitted). The duty is the same for all relations, without regard to the facts of the case." South Eastern Indiana Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Ingram 617 N.E.2d 943, 953 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).
As a corollary to this premise we have said:
"[The substantive law establishes the standard of care which must be met, Le., reasonable care. The standard is a fixed one and is independent of the conduct of others but the conduct required *206of the individual to measure up to the fixed standard varies depending upon the nature of the duty owed and the surrounding circumstances." Walters v. Kellam & Foley, 172 Ind.App. 207, 360 N.E.2d 199, 214 (1977).
In short, the duty is that of reasonable care under the cireumstances. That duty never changes. It always exists although the cireumstances may differ from case to case.
In this case, defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. - Those circumstances include knowledge of Timothy's mental state, his unrestricted access to the house and office and his strong desire and past efforts to avoid law enforcement, including the strong probability that he would attempt to resist such law enforcement. The defendants also knew of Timothy's proclivity to break the law. In this latter regard, Raymond and Patricia took extra steps to restrict Timothy from access to the company checks so that they "wouldn't be a temptation" to him. Record at 605. Thus, it is clear that defendants were conscious of Timothy's conduct vis a vis past violations of the law, including forgery and theft. In making the checks unavailable to Timothy, they took appropriate precautions to dissuade future forgeries and in doing so exercised reasonable care in that context.
They did not, however, exercise the requisite degree of similar care with regard to the handgun. The defendants were certainly aware of a duty to take precautions against discovery and use of the gun by persons who were present in the house, ie., their grandchildren, and that Raymond did, in fact, exercise a degree of reasonable care by hiding the gun in the attie when those persons were on the premises.15
*207I fail to discern any difference between the duty owed and met, when the grandchildren might gain access to the firearm, and that owed when a mentally disturbed, habitual and violent offender has free access to the premises. In my view, the defendants had a clear duty to exercise reasonable care with regard to the availability of the gun. See Irons v. Cole, 46 Conn.Supp. 1, 734 A.2d 1052 (1998) (parents had duty of care as to firearms kept by adult son on premises which they controlled); Foster v. Arthur, 519 So.2d 1092 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) (plaintiff shot by gun taken by owner's roommate from under mattress in unlocked room); Edmunds v. Cowan, 192 Ga.App. 616, 386 S.E.2d 39 (1989) (son took father's "unsecured" pistol and shot police officer), cert. denied.16
The duty of reasonable care is owed to persons who foreseeably might be injured by unauthorized possession and use of the gun. Deputy Heck was just such a person. He was a law enforcement officer presenting a real or imagined threat to Timothy and who might foreseeably become a victim (as he did) of Timothy's efforts to resist arrest and flee. In this regard, the parents were aware of past resisting law enforcement offenses.
The majority appropriately cites to Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied, which analyzed and applied the three-factor test set forth in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991), reh'g denied. Goldsberry held that it is foreseeable, in the context of duty as opposed to proximate cause, that a motorist would leave the highway and strike a utility pole thereby giving rise to liability upon the part of the utility cdmpany with *208regard to placement of the poles. It is just as foreseeable that a person lawfully present in a home will through curiosity or by design take an unsecured firearm and through negligence or design injure another person. See Irons, 46 Conn.Supp. 1, 734 A.2d 1052 (in holding that defendants owed duty of care with respect to guns maintained on premises they controlled to prevent murder by adult son who resided on premises, court stated that "in determining whether harm is foreseeable, the standard is whether harm of the general nature that occurred" was reasonably foreseeable); Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., 93 Ohio App.3d 46, 637 N.E.2d 404 (1994) (in finding duty to safeguard guns at gun shows from minors who might steal them, court stated test of foreseeability does not require that defendant foresee the exact consequences of his actions; sufficient that reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury would result from his conduct); Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Inability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 32 Comm. L.Rev. 1189, 1207, 1208 (Summer 2000). Thus, the foreseeability prong cuts in favor of finding a duty to safely store guns.
In making the factual recitations set forth above, I do not utilize such cireum-stances in the sense that they evaluate the facts of the actual occurrence as is done in the foreseeability analysis of proximate cause. My considerations are not a "recitation of the particular circumstances of an incident after the incident occurs." Goldsberry, 672 N.E.2d at 479. Rather, the facts are set forth in the context of the second factor enumerated under the Webb formula for determining the existence of duty, i.e. "the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured." 575 N.E.2d at 995. I do not approach from a "perspective that is 'after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct.'" Goldsberry, 672 N.E.2d at 479. Rather, I assess the facts as they existed before Timothy gained possession of the gun from the house and shot Deputy Heck. In this manner I reach the conclusion that defendant's knowledge of the facts and the further knowledge of the foreseeability of harm to police officers such as Deputy Heck, created a duty on the part of defendants to exercise reasonable care under those ctreumstances. Whether there was a breach of that duty and if so, whether the breach was a proximate cause of Deputy Heek's death is, as enunciated in Goldsberry, a different issue appropriate for resolution by a jury.17
I would reverse the dismissal of the Estate's amended complaint and the granting of defendants' motions for summary judgment and would remand for further proceedings.

. See Reida v. Lund, 18 Cal.App.3d 698, 96 Cal.Rptr. 102 (1971) (reversing summary judgment for parents of sixteen-year-old son who gained access to rifle and used it to shoot motorisis; jury question as to whether it was negligent to store rifle together with sack of ammunition in locked cabinet where sixteen-year-old knew of location of key to cabinet); Seabrook v. Taylor, 199 So.2d 315 (Fla.App.1967) (finding defendant negligent for keeping a loaded .22 caliber pistol, which was used by fourteen-year-old child in an intentional shooting, in the closet of bedroom), cert. denied; Jacobs v. Tyson, 200 Ga.App. 123, 407 S.E.2d 62 (1991) (twelve-year-old retrieved loaded pistol from unlocked dresser drawer), cert. denied; Wroth v. McKinney, 190 Kan. 127, 373 P.2d 216 (1962) (plumber, accompanied by his four-year-old son, went on a service call to defendant's home; plumber was accustomed to bringing his son with him to defendant's house; while plumber worked, child discovered loaded revolver on top of a dresser in defendant's bedroom and (atally shot himsel{ in the head; held trial court properly overruled defendant's demurrer; "it is well settled that one who has in his possession, or under his control, an instrumentality exceptionally dangerous in character is bound to take exceptional precautions to prevent an injury being done thereby"; the court has long adhered to the position that "the highest degree of care" is imposed on persons owning or possessing dangerous instrumentalities such as firearms); Spivey v. Sheeler, 514 S.W.2d 667 (Ky.1974) (reversing a directed verdict in favor of parents of eleven-year-old boy who gained access to a .25 caliber pistol from a locked gun cabinet and accidentally shot a playmate; son was in the family home with friends after school, stopped to examine a locked glass-fronted gun cabinet containing several guns, climbed on something and obtained a key from the top of the cabinet, unlocked cabinet, passed around several guns, removed the .25 caliber pistol and, way-ing it around, pulled the trigger discharging the pistol and wounding his friend; stating that guns are highly dangerous instrumenialities and that the propensity of young boys to be attracted to guns is a maiter of common knowledge; held that reasonable persons would not be precluded from finding negligence on the part of parents); Cathey v. Bernard, 467 So.2d 9 (La.Ct.App.1985) (nine-year-old boy gained access to a loaded pistol stored by his parenis on a high shelf in the *207closet and used it to accidentally shoot and kill a six-year-old who was living in the home as a foster child; child had been instructed never to go near the firearm, and no evidence of disobedience until the incident; deceased child's mother sued foster parenis, alleging they failed to take reasonable precautions to keep the gun away from children; appellate court held that parents had a duty of extraordinary care with respect to controlling access to the firearm, which it determined was breached by leaving the pistol where it was accessible to children); Taylor v. Webster, 12 Ohio St.2d 53, 231 N.E.2d 870 (1967) (holding that proximate cause and reasonable [ore-seeability were factual issues for the jury to resolve where defendant unlawfully and negligently permilted ten-year-old son to use air gun with pellets, knowing that he had playmates, and realized that his possession of gun might have injurious consequences, and playmate took and discharged gun at plaintiff, another playmate, thereby damaging plaintiff's eye); Thomas v. Inman, 282 Or. 279, 578 P.2d 399 (1978) (holding owner liable for loaded shotgun kept under bed); Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957) (holding grandfather liable for injuries inflicted by twelve-year-old grandchild with a loaded gun found in an unlocked dresser drawer); Stanley v. Joslin, 757 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (finding owner-grandmother negligent in storing unloaded rifle and cartridges for rifle in gun rack).

. Some jurisdictions have established that firearms require a higher standard of care than "reasonable care." See Jacoves v. United Merch. Corp., 9 Cal.App.4th 88, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (1992) (civil law holds firearm use or possession to highest standard of care, even slight deviation from which may consti-tuie actionable negligence), rev. denied; Jacobs, 407 S.E.2d at 64 (classifying firearms as an "inherently dangerous instrumentaliiy" which imposes on users a duly to employ "exceptional precautions to prevent injury"; distinguishing firearms from other products that are capable of being used to inflict harm, such as knives and golf clubs, because of the unusual dangers presented by firearms); Long v. Turk, 265 Kan. 855, 962 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1998) (court had "no difficulty concluding that a .357 Magnum handgun is a dangerous instrumentality" which requires the highest degree of care in safeguarding); Strever v. Cline, 278 Mont. 165, 924 P.2d 666, 671 (1996) (stating firearm is dangerous instrumentality that requires a higher degree of care in use and handling). We are not today, however, requested to create a higher standard of care, nor do I see any need to do so.

. I do not perceive.the public policy set forth in Article I, Section 32 of the Indiana Constitution, the right to bear arms, to militate against the existence of the duty I find present in this case. The right is not absolute. Dozier v. State, 709 N.E.2d 27 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). In the interests of public safety and welfare, the possession and use of handguns may be regulated by the State. Matthews v. State, 237 Ind. 677, 148 N.E.2d 334 (1958). Similarly, I would find no prohibition against a common law rule of negligence with regard to the care and storage of dangerous weapons.