Court Opinion

ID: 9779822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:49:38.790392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:42.241572
License: Public Domain

NAJAM, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the designated evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings on the issue of prejudice. On that basis, the majority determines that reversal is required. But, as the majority acknowledges, in reviewing a summary judgment, we are not bound by the trial court's specific findings and conclusions. Rice v. *1123Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind.1996). They merely aid our review by providing us with a statement of reasons for the trial court's actions. Id. Thus, rather than relying on the trial court's findings and conclusions, we must base our decision upon the materials properly presented to the trial court under Trial Rule 56(C). Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condominiums Phase I, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 709 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). In fact, we may "sustain a grant of summary judgment if it is sustainable on any legal basis supported by the record." Landmark Health Care Assocs. L.P. v. Bradbury, 671 N.E.2d 113, 115 n. 2 (Ind.1996) (citation omitted).
The issue on summary judgment was the application of laches to this paternity action. The majority holds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Mother's establishment of one element of lach-es, namely, prejudice arising from Putative Father's unreasonable delay in seeking to establish paternity.8 Specifically, the majority holds that an issue of fact exists as to whether Putative Father's delay prejudiced Mother or the child.
It is significant that Putative Father designated no evidence to the trial court. He did not contradict Mother's evidence that he had exercised "inconsistent" visitation with the child since 2006, that the child had a "loving relationship" with Presumptive Father until the father's untimely death, and that the child's current family unit consists of Mother and the child's sister (who is also the child of the Presumptive Father). Appellee's App. at 14. Mother's designated evidence is uncontro-verted and shows that the child lived with Presumptive Father for a decade without interacting with Putative Father, at Putative Father's request. The establishment of paternity in Putative Father, following ten years during which Putative Father had no contact with and showed no apparent interest in the child, would necessarily involve a change in this child's family life that would permanently alter. his family unit. In other words, the only reasonable inference from the designated evidence is that the establishment of paternity would destroy Presumptive Father's standing as the only father the child has ever known and interrupt the child's well-established relationship with his current family, his mother and sister. See C.L. v. Y.B. (In re D.L.), 938 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that the establishment of paternity in one man necessarily results in the disestablishment of paternity in another), not yet certified.
We have held that an interruption in the stability of the child's family is, in itself, insufficient as a matter of law to establish prejudice. Nash v. Howell (In re K.H.), 709 N.E.2d 1033, 1036 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). But Mother's designated evidence also shows that the establishment of paternity in Putative Father would negatively impact the support received by the child. The Social Security Death Benefits paid to the child pursuant to the death of Presumptive Father would not continue intact after paternity has been established and a support order has been entered against Putative Father. These benefits are the child's primary source of support.9 The *1124only reasonable inference from the designated evidence is that the establishment of paternity in Putative Father would disestablish paternity in Presumptive Father and would, thus, terminate the child's future Social Security Death Benefits, which is a substantial economic consideration.
The majority observes that there is a lack of any designated evidence to show that Putative Father would be unable to pay child support if ordered or would be ordered to pay an amount less than the Social Security Death Benefits that the child currently receives. This is correct as far as it goes. But onee Mother made her prima facie showing of economic harm, it was Putative Father's burden to designate evidence to the contrary and show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact so as to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Without any evidence showing Putative Father's income or financial circumstances, Putative Father has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the child's support level would be adversely affected by the establishment of paternity and the entry of a support order against Putative Father.10
Again, Mother's designated evidence established a prima facie case for the entry of summary judgment. See Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind.2009). The facts revealed by Mother's affidavit demonstrate that Putative Father's 1996 decision to forego the responsibilities of paternity was tantamount to a waiver of those rights and that his subsequent 2008 decision to seek paternity,. reversing his 1996 decision, was inexcusably delayed. Mother's affidavit also demonstrates that allowing Putative Father at this late date to reverse his now fourteen-year-old decision would prejudice the child. Generally, Indiana law does not allow a putative father to wait longer than two years after the child's birth before filing a petition to establish paternity. Ind.Code § 31-14-5-3(b).11 Here, however, Putative Father permitted the child to spend the first ten years of his life believing Presumptive Father to be his biological father, and, at least until 2006, Putative Father made no attempts whatsoever to involve himself in the life of the child. Ten years is a long time for a child. Cf. In re Marriage of Moser, 469 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (holding that six years between the child's birth and the filing of the petition to establish paternity was "a substantial lapse of time," but, because there was no dispute that the putative father had always also played the role of the child's father, Mother could not demonstrate a prejudicial change of circumstances to establish her claim of laches). Further, Mother has demonstrated that establishing paternity in Putative Father would not only disrupt the stability of the child's family unit but also prejudice the child by interfering with his receipt of *1125child support through the Social Security Death Benefits Either or both results would constitute a significant change in cireumstances for the child.
Parental rights are not immutable. For example, consent for an adoption need not be obtained from a parent who has abandoned the child. See Ind.Code § 831-19-9-8(a)(2). And there is no absolute right to establish parental rights. Thus, a putative father may be barred from establishing paternity where he has failed to assert those rights for an unreasonable length of time and, without good cause, allowed another man to give his name to and raise the child, and that inexcusable delay has prejudiced the child.
Both society and government are concerned that a man accept responsibility and be held accountable for his paternity. But a man who knows or has good reason to believe that he is the father of a child should not be allowed to stand by and wait for an indefinite period to claim his paternity until it is convenient for him. This is not a case where a man learned many years after the fact that he is the father of a child, nor is this a case involving the mere passage of time. Here, Putative Father has wholly failed to designate any evidence that might justify his extraordinary delay or otherwise place at issue any element of Mother's claim of laches.
Thus, the majority's reliance on insufficient evidence as grounds for reversal is misplaced.12 We may sustain a grant of summary judgment on any legal basis supported by the designated evidence. See Ferrell, 751 N.E.2d at 709, Rice, 670 N.E.2d at 1283. The question in a summary judgment is whether the designated evidence discloses a genuine issue of material fact. Mother's designated evidence supports the trial court's entry of summary judgment because Mother has made a prima facie showing of all three elements required to prove laches. Putative Father designated no evidence to challenge Mother's designations and, therefore, he has not met his burden of showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. |
A trial court exercises its sound discretion when acting on an equitable defense such as laches. In re K.H., 709 N.E.2d at 1036. Putative Father has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Mother's motion to dismiss considering Putative Father's failure to designate any evidence, Mother's designated evidence, and the reasonable inferences from that evidence. The designated evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Putative Father's petition is barred by laches. I would, therefore, affirm the trial court's dismissal of Putative Father's petition. ~

. The majority appears to treat prejudice and the best interest of the child standard as opposite sides of the same coin. The two are related to an extent, but the majority takes the relationship to the extreme. If, as the majority holds, Mother failed to show prejudice, that does not necessarily mean that it would be in the child's best interests to derfy laches and establish paternity.

. In her motion to dismiss, Mother reminded the court that she was in bankruptcy and that the court had entered a temporary order for Putative Father to pay $50 in weekly child support. Thus, she stated, the child's "pri*1124mary support' was from the Social Security Death Benefits. Appellant's App. at 5.

. Putative Father designated no evidence to the trial court to demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact on any of the elements of laches. In fact, before the trial court he did not address the elements of lach-es but argued instead that a question of fact may only be determined after an evidentiary hearing. Putative Father is incorrect in that blanket assertion and misstates the nature of a motion for summary judgment. Again, summary judgment shall be entered if the designated evidence shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

. Putative Father relies on Indiana Code Section 31-14-5-2, which permits a child's next friend to file a petition on the child's behalf until the child reaches the age of twenty.

. The cases cited by the majority, Habig v. Bruning, 613 N.E.2d 61 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied, and Woods v. Harris, 600 N.E.2d 163 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), do not support the contention that the designated evidence in this case is insufficient to support the grant of summary judgment. Neither Habig nor Woods considered whether, as in this case, a movant who has made a prima facie showing for summary judgment can be defeated where the nonmovant has designated no evidence.