Court Opinion

ID: 9755796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:51:06.969641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:11.414604
License: Public Domain

ANNABEity Clinton Imber Justice, dissenting. The majority correctly points out that our recent decisions do not construe the Workers’ Compensation Act to mean that medical opinions addressing compensability are the only evidence that can establish a causal connection between an injury and work conditions. See Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000); Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 341 Ark. 527, 20 S.W.3d 280 (2000); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). However, whenever a medical opinion does address the causation component of compensability, such medical evidence must still satisfy the statutory requirement that medical opinions be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(B) (Supp. 1999). In this case, Appellant’s family physician, Dr. Jones, gave his medical opinion that her injuries were overuse-type injuries consistent with her job duties; whereas, Dr. Nix, an orthopedic surgeon, declined to state definitively whether Appellant’s job, or other outside activities, were the cause of her injuries. The majority opinion appears to give weight to Dr. Jones’s opinion without deciding whether his opinion is stated with a reasonable degree of medical certainty. While I am also at a loss to understand why Appellant’s alleged failure to report a single incident to Dr. Jones should be a reason for discounting Dr. Jones’s opinion as to a gradual-onset injury, the fact remains that appellate courts defer to the Commission on issues involving the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Crudup, 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900. In reviewing the evidence in this matter, the Commission was entided to compare and weigh the opinion of Dr. Jones against the opinion of Dr. Nix. Furthermore, Appellant admitted that she had been experiencing pain and numbness in her hands and elbows, accompanied by a loss of grip strength, for several months before the “spilled tea” incident,” but never reported her problems as being work-related to her employer until after she learned from Dr. Jones that she suffered from a condition — carpal tunnel syndrome and tennis elbow — that would require treatment by a specialist and possibly surgical intervention. When asked why she did not notify anyone at Con-Agra immediately about her problems, Appellant testified that she thought it was “just part of the job.” And yet, when she filled out the forms at Dr. Jones’s office, she “did put on there Blue Cross/ Blue Shield, not work related.” Based upon the record in this case, and after giving deference to the Commission on issues involving the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, I cannot say that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. For the above-stated reasons, I must respectfully dissent.