Court Opinion

ID: 9746401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:14:26.358474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:12.832133
License: Public Domain

GRACI, J.,
Concurring.
¶ 1 While I am reluctant to disagree with the analysis set forth in the majority opinion, under the facts presented here, as I understand them, I am unable to join. Accordingly, I concur only in the result.
¶ 2 Here, there is no question that the car in which appellant, Benjamin R. Rep-pert (“Reppert”), was a passenger was lawfully stopped for a violation of the Mo*1210tor Vehicle Code.3 At that point Chief Ho-vanec of the Beaver Borough Police Department was authorized, under both the Pennsylvania and the United States Constitution, to order Reppert, the car’s driver, and the other passenger to alight from the car. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)(driver); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997)(extending Mimms to passengers); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 695 A.2d 864, 871 (Pa.Super.1997) (following Wilson and rejecting argument that Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection for passengers in this circumstance as “meritless”). When there is a lawful traffic stop (as was conceded here), an order by a police officer for the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle is reasonable and needs no further justification. Rodriguez, 695 A.2d at 869, citing Wilson and Commonwealth v. Brown, 439 Pa.Super. 516, 654 A.2d 1096 (1995).
¶ 3 Here, it is clear that Chief Hovanec did not invoke the full extent of his authority when he first pulled the vehicle over.. I am unable to conclude, however, that by the time he ordered Reppert from the car, the traffic stop had otherwise reached a clearly articulated endpoint. See Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 900 (2000); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 563 Pa. 82, 757 A.2d 903, 907 (2000). There was no objective indication or any articulation that the driver of the vehicle was free to drive off before the chief ordered Reppert to get out of the car. There was no appreciable time lapse, on this record, between the chiefs questioning of the driver and his order to Rep-pert to exit the vehicle. They were of one part.4 An objective view of the totality of the circumstances yields the inescapable conclusion that the initial, lawful traffic stop had not come to an end when Reppert was ordered from the car. Accordingly, different from the majority, I conclude that Reppert’s “seizure” was ongoing from the time of the initial lawful vehicle stop and included the lawful order to exit the car.5
¶ 4 My conclusion that the stop was and continued to be lawful when Reppert was ordered from the car does not end the inquiry, however.6 While Mimms and its *1211progeny allow ordering passengers of lawfully stopped vehicles from their cars, they do not allow a “frisk” or “pat down” of the person so ordered. Any such police conduct requires an independent justification. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 555 Pa. 170, 723 A.2d 644, 648 n. 6 (1999)(opinion in support of affirmance)(citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 830)(“Once the occupants have alighted, the officer may conduct a pat-down search for weapons if the officer concludes that the occupants may be armed and dangerous.”); Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 543 Pa. 164, 670 A.2d 128, 132 (1995)(search of passenger’s purse, where there was no reason to believe criminal activity was afoot or that she was armed and dangerous, was improper).7 Here, Chief Hovanec had a reasonable, articula-ble suspicion to believe that Reppert might be armed and dangerous. Accordingly, the chief would have been justified in frisking Reppert.
¶ 5 As we have regularly said, in “[d]e-termining whether a reasonable suspicion exists requires an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. These circumstances are viewed through the eyes of a trained officer, not an ordinary citizen.” Commonwealth v. Fink, 700 A.2d 447, 449 (Pa.Super.1997); In re N.L., 739 A.2d 564, 567 (Pa.Super.1999)(same); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 734 A.2d 864, 869 (Pa.Super.1999)(same), See also Commonwealth v. Nobalez, 805 A.2d 598, 600 (Pa.Super.2002) (assessing totality of circumstances to determine probable cause to arrest, “not as a layperson, but through the eyes of a trained police officer”). We consider the officer’s experience in making this assessment. Nobalez, 805 A.2d at 599 (observing that arresting officer was “highly experienced” after being on the force for nine years). We view the evidence through the eyes of a trained officer notwithstanding the fact that the officer is involved in “the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” In re D.E.M., 727 A.2d 570, 578 n. 19 (Pa.Super.1999) (quoting Terry at 11-12, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The record in this case leads me to conclude that Chief Hovanec was not acting on a hunch but that he had the requisite suspicion to frisk Reppert.8
¶ 6 The chief, a 29-year law enforcement veteran, N.T., 8/31/00, at 14, observed Rep-pert making furtive movements in the back seat of the car in which he was a passenger. The movements were consistent, based on the chiefs experience, with the person trying to hide something, id., by either “stuffing something in his trousers or into the back seat of the car.” Id. at 5. After the car was stopped, Reppert was *1212“very, very nervous.” Id. at 5, 18. He was “very antsy.” Id. He was moving around in the back seat during Chief Ho-vanec’s brief interaction with the driver. Id. at 18. He properly ordered Reppert out of the car. Id. at 5. As he alighted, the chief saw that Reppert’s front pockets “had large bulges.” Id. at 6. At that point, Reppert told the chief his name. Id. at 16. When he heard Reppert’s name, the chief said: “We have been looking for you.” Id. at 30.9 The chief was aware of an open drug investigation in his department concerning Reppert. Id. at 16. Upon seeing the bulges in Reppert’s pockets Chief Ho-vanee, based on his experience, became concerned for his safety. Id. at 6.10
¶ 7 Based on a totality of the circumstances as seen through the eyes of a 29 year police veteran, it would have been objectively reasonable for Chief Hovanec to frisk Reppert (who was, as explained above, subject to a valid vehicle stop). It was likewise permissible for the chief to ask Reppert if he had anything in his pockets that might harm the chief while conducting the limited pat down permitted under Terry. Commonwealth v. Kondash, 2002 PA Super 309, 808 A.2d 943 (2002), citing Commonwealth v. Bowers, 400 Pa.Super. 377, 583 A.2d 1165, 1170 (1990)(citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-659, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984)).
¶ 8 Here, however, the chief exceeded the current bounds of Terry and Kondash. Terry allows a limited pat down of the outer clothing of a detained individual to determine if he or she is armed and dangerous. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); Commonwealth v. E.M., 558 Pa. 16, 735 A.2d 654, 659, 661 (1999); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 408 Pa.Super. 601, 597 A.2d 616, 619-620 (1991). A Terry frisk or pat down is not a search for evidence or contraband. Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 561 Pa. 545, 751 A.2d 1153, 1158 (2000); E.M., 735 A.2d at 661 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)); Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130; Marconi 597 A.2d at 620-621. Kondash allows safety-related questioning in anticipation of a Terry pat down.11 Neither allows a police officer to require a detainee to expose the contents of his or her pockets. See E.M., 735 A.2d at 661, citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (officer was not entitled under Terry to search suspect’s pocket for non-threatening contraband). Such a command effected an unreasonable search in excess of that allowed by Terry, and, in my view, requires suppression of the evidence thus obtained. *
¶ 9 It may be that had Chief Hovanec actually conducted a pat down of Reppert’s pants for a weapon as he was permitted to do under Terry and its progeny, the “plain *1213feel” corollary to the plain view exception to the warrant requirement might have resulted in a legitimate seizure of the contents of Reppert’s pockets. See Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1163. This was the suppression court’s conclusion. Memorandum Opinion, 4/20/01, at 5-6.
¶ 10 A “plain feel” seizure is valid where the officer is lawfully entitled to conduct a pat down for weapons and where it is immediately apparent to the officer conducting the pat down that the item he or she feels is contraband. Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1163. This inquiry “takes into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the frisk, including, inter alia, the nature of the object, its location, the conduct of the suspect, the officer’s experience, and the reason for the stop.” Id. “[A]n officer’s subjective belief that an item is contraband is not sufficient unless it is objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances that attended the frisk.” Id.
¶ 11 In Zhahir, while the officer was conducting the limited pat down for weapons under Terry, it was immediately apparent, based on his experience, that the large number of vials in the defendant’s pocket was contraband. Given their number, “their presence was not equally consistent with legitimate purposes.” Id. The court in Zhahir distinguished its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 560 Pa. 345, 744 A.2d 1261, 1267 (2000), where it had concluded that it was not immediately apparent that a “pill bottle” detected during a frisk was contraband. Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1163. Finally, the Zhahir court explained that the officer did not exceed the bounds of a lawful Terry frisk: he did not conduct an additional search to determine that the vials were contraband. Id. In so explaining, the court contrasted the facts before it from those in Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378-79, 113 S.Ct. 2130, where the Court concluded that by “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket” the officer exceeded the bounds of a Tern/ pat down and constituted an additional, improper search. Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1163. See also Commonwealth v. Stoner, 710 A.2d 55 (Pa.Super.1998)(plain feel requirements satisfied under facts); compare Marconi, 597 A.2d at 621 (requirements not satisfied under facts); Commonwealth v. Fink, 700 A.2d 447 (Pa.Super.1997) (same); Commonwealth v. Stackfield, 438 Pa.Super. 88, 651 A.2d 558 (1994); Commonwealth v. E.M., 558 Pa. 16, 735 A.2d 654 (1999)(same).
¶ 12 Given the fact-intensive determination which “plain feel” cases require, I find no support in the record for the suppression court’s conclusion. See Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 324 (Pa.Super.2000) (“Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based on the facts.”); Commonwealth v. Wood, 2002 PA Super 304 (2002), citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 451 Pa.Super. 129, 678 A.2d 798, 800 (1996)(“[w]hen reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we must determine whether the factual findings are supported by the evidence of record”).12 Here, there was no testimony or other evidence upon which to reach this speculative conclusion.13
*1214¶ 18 While, under the circumstances, I do not find Chief Hovanec’s actions unreasonable in this day of hepatitis and HIV, see Kondash, 2002 PA.Super. 309, 808 A.2d 943, I am constrained to say they were constitutionally impermissible. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority in ordering the evidence suppressed.

. Reppert’s attorney conceded this point at oral argument.

. Chief Hovanec's testimony that his interaction with the driver had "pretty much” come to an end before he ordered Reppert from the car, N.T., 8/31/00, at 9, does not alter this conclusion.

. Given my view of this case, discussion of cases requiring a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot is unnecessary since those cases deal with the legality of the initial stop. In Commonwealth v. Donaldson, 786 A.2d 279 (Pa.Super.2001), for instance, which is relied on substantially by the majority, the defendant was not lawfully stopped for a traffic offense. Accordingly, the initial stop required a justification under Terry. On the facts presented, that court concluded that the stop was illegal as not being supported by reasonable suspicion. Since the stop here was lawful at its inception, cases like Donaldson provide no guidance.

.It could be argued that a determination that the seizure was lawful ends our inquiry. Reppert's "Statement of Question Involved” appears to center on the invalidity of the “investigative detention” of Reppert after the conclusion of the "routine traffic stop.” He frames the question in terms of a lack of .“reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot” to justify what he argues was a subsequent "investigative detention.” He asserts that the resulting search flowed from the illegal investigative detention. Substituted Brief for Appellant, at 3. However, he argues, inter alia, that there were insufficient facts to yield the conclusion, required for a frisk, that Reppert was armed and dangerous. Id. at 15-18. In its Rule 1925 opinion, Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a), the suppression court, after identifying Reppert’s first issue on appeal as *1211"[w]hether [the suppression cjourt’s denial of [Reppert's] motion to suppress evidence was in error,” Memorandum Opinion, 4/21/01, at 2, spent a substantial portion of its opinion discussing the standard for a "frisk” and the propriety of a "frisk” under the circumstances presented in this case. Id. at 3-7. The Commonwealth, in its brief to this court, likewise discusses the propriety of a "frisk” under the facts presented here. Commonwealth’s Substituted Brief, at 9-14. Accordingly, the challenge to the propriety of the actions following the stop has not been waived and is properly before us.

. Indeed, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), itself speaks of a separate justification for a "stop” (reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot) and for a "frisk” (reasonable, articula-ble suspicion that person stopped may be armed and dangerous). Our cases have recognized these distinct requirements. See In the Interest of N.L., 739 A.2d 564 (Pa.Super.1999); In the Interest of C.C., 780 A.2d 696 (Pa.Super.2001).

. In assessing the record, I consider only the Commonwealth's evidence and the defendant’s evidence that remains uncontradicted. Nobalez, 805 A.2d at 600, citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 451 Pa.Super. 129, 678 A.2d 798, 800 (1996).

. This was part of the evidence adduced at the hearing by the defendant. It is considered here because it was not contradicted. See note 6, supra.

. He was also concerned for Reppert's safety. Id. at 6. This should seem odd to no one. When it is discovered that a suspect has a weapon, not only is the officer at risk but so, too, is the suspect. If a gunfight or other . altercation ensued, the suspect could easily be injured.

.The learned trial court, the Honorable Robert C. Reed, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, like our colleague, the Honorable Corréale Stevens, who authored the unanimous opinion in Kon-dash, astutely recognized "that many drug peddlers carry’ sharp and dangerous objects, such as needles and razor blades, on their person. It is prudent for officers such as Chief Hovanec in this case, to take added precautions when searching suspected drug dealers so as to avoid injury.” Memorandum Opinion, 4/20/01, at 7.

. It cannot be said that a search of the contents of Reppert’s pockets, on these facts, was inevitable. Commonwealth v. Germann, 423 Pa.Super. 393, 621 A.2d 589, 594 (1993)(proper search not inevitable; evidence should have been suppressed).

. I recognize that the chief described Rep-pert's pockets as having large bulges, N.T., *12148/31/00, at 6, and that he described their contents upon being emptied. Id. at 6, 26. I likewise recognize that Reppert described the contents when he testified and that the contents were observed by the suppression court. Id. at 47-49. There is no record evidence, however, that describes what the contents would have felt like during a proper pat down.