Court Opinion

ID: 9742792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:20:27.065466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:36.686642
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
There is no question that Carl Gall sustained serious bodily injury and had a valid claim under the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Act. On February 26 Voyles knew that Dr. Scott, the attending physician, did not authorize Carl Gall’s return to work. With that medical information and the additional knowledge about Debby Gall’s pregnancy, then in the fourth month, Voyles telephoned Debby on her job at the bank or at home some six times after February 26. Debby’s coworkers verified Voyles’ telephone calls to Debby at the bank. During telephone contacts, Voyles told Debby that Carl would be fired if he did not return to work and accept a new job with Great Western, although Voyles, a claims adjuster, had no position of authority with Great Western to make such decision or change in Carl’s employment. According to Voyles, termination of Carl’s employment at Great Western would cause a forfeiture of health insurance coverage and benefits on which Galls were relying to pay maternity medical bills regarding Debby’s pregnancy. Existence of health insurance provided by the bank was apparently unknown to Debby when Voyles called, *363because, after leaving employment at the bank in May, Debby never applied for benefits under the bank’s program, and Debby’s supervisor at the bank “took it upon himself” to process a claim on behalf of Debby.
As a result of Voyles’ calls, Debby broke out in hives, experienced headaches, became nervous, cried, was unable to carry out her duties at the bank without help from her co workers, and suffered nervous twitches, primarily in her fingers. According to third parties’ affidavits before the court, the calls from Voyles caused Debby to “become extremely upset” even to the point that Debby was “unable to do her work and [was required] to leave her post [at the bank] to use someone’s office to try to regain her composure. . . . [H]er hands would quiver.” One affiant stated that Debby’s emotional state did not “settle down before the next call would come [from Voyles].” Another affiant characterized Debby as “suffering from extreme emotional distress” as a result of Voyles’ calls.
Although an insurer, in pursuing its economic interests, may be privileged to assert in a permissible way its legal rights, such assertion must be done in good faith and not in an outrageous manner. See Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
“The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment e. at 74 (1965). An employee, as a third-party claimant on a policy of workmen’s compensation coverage, may bring a cause of action against an employer’s insurance company for “outrage” in adjusting the employee’s valid claim for workmen’s compensation. See Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 845, 427 N.E.2d 302 (1981).
As expressed in Eckenrode v. Life of American Insurance Company, 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972):
It is recognized that the outrageous character of a person’s conduct may arise from an abuse by that person of a position which gives him power to affect the interests *364of another; and that in this sense extreme “bullying tactics” and other “high pressure” methods of insurance adjusters seeking to force compromises or settlements may constitute outrageous conduct. ... It is also recognized that the extreme character of a person’s conduct may arise from that person’s knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental. condition or peculiarity. [Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment/. (1965).]
The record shows Voyles’ persistent calls raised the recurring specter of Debby’s maternity expenses with Carl unemployed and without family health insurance. Did Voyles intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional distress to Debby? Did Voyles go beyond the bounds of decency into a sphere of atrocious and intolerable conduct?
Liability for the tort of outrage has been said to exist when, “ [generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ ” Restatement, supra, comment d. at 73. Under the circumstances there was a genuine issue of fact for a jury — whether Voyles’ activities with Gall were outrageous.
If Voyles’ activities were an exercise of a legal right in a permissible way, as indicated by the majority, insurance adjusters have been granted a gilt-edged license to run roughshod over families of claimants having legitimate claims against an insurance company. However, the truly troublesome feature in the present case is adoption of a standard allowing jury determination of “outrage” only in cases of conduct which would cause Attila the Hun to cringe.
Grant, L, joins in this dissent.