Court Opinion

ID: 9491064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:02:43.198707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:29.288315
License: Public Domain

CANBY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I dissent from that portion of Judge Klein-feld’s opinion that upholds the striking of Williams’ entire testimony. As the majority recognizes, the standard to be applied to determine whether a defendant’s testimony may be stricken is that of Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987):
Restrictions of a defendant’s right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a *746State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.
Id. at 55-56, 107 S.Ct. at 2711 (emphasis added). In my view, the striking of all of Williams’ testimony was disproportionate to the purposes the sanction was .designed to serve.
“[SJtriking a witness’s entire testimony is an extreme sanction, not to be lightly imposed.” United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir.1992). As Rock makes clear, striking the testimony of the defendant himself is even more extreme. “[TJhe most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself.” Rock, 483 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 2709. The defendant’s right to testify is protected not only by the due process clause; it is also protected by the Sixth Amendment and is a corollary to the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. Id. at 51-52, 107 S.Ct. at 2708-10.
In reaching a proper balance between the constitutional right of the defendant to present a case and the need for an effective adversarial process, we have made use of the distinction between collateral and non-collateral matters on cross-examination.
Where a defense witness’s invocation of Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination amounts to a refusal to be cross-examined, the testimony cannot be considered rehable. We therefore join with those circuits that have permitted the exclusion of a defense witness’s testimony when the witness has refused on cross-examination to respond to questions on non-collateral matters.
Denham, 954 F.2d at 1504 (emphasis added). In Denham, we held that the testimony in that case was properly stricken because “the questions which [the witness] refused to answer were germane to his testimony on direct examination and therefore not collateral.” Id. (emphasis added). A fair reading of these comments surely indicates that the distinction between collateral and non-collateral matters is relevant to a determination whether a defense witness’s testimony should be stricken. In normal circumstances a finding that the questions a witness refused to answer related to collateral matters means that the governmental interest in a full and fair presentation of the evidence is not sufficiently strong to overcome the defendant’s right to present witnesses. See Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d at 1280; see also United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.1983).
The questions that Williams refused to answer were collateral because they did not relate to his direct testimony. There is no indication that Williams would have refused to answer questions other than those relating to his prior conviction, because he was never given the chance; no such questions were asked on cross-examination.
The district court concluded that the questions Williams refused to answer did not relate to collateral matters because the prior convictions affected credibility, and credibility was obviously a crucial issue in the ease. But cross-examination on collateral matters often affects general credibility; that fact does not make the matters examined any less collateral. Other courts have made the distinction “between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear only on the credibility of the witness and those cases in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination.” United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822, 84 S.Ct. 60, 11 L.Ed.2d 55 (1963); see United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203, 1209 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 973, 79 L.Ed.2d 211 (1984). We have made the same distinction in finding no plain error in the refusal to strike a prosecution witness’s testimony. United States v. Norman, 402 F.2d 73, 76-77 (9th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 938, 90 S.Ct. 949, 25 L.Ed.2d 119 (1970).
In the one case in which our court has upheld the striking of a defendant’s entire testimony, we again recognized the distinction between cross-examination on collateral matters and cross-examination relating to the defendant’s direct testimony. United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3019, 65 *747L.Ed.2d 1118 (1980). In Panza, the defendant testified that he had not committed the bank robbery with which he was charged, but had been recruited only to transport money for two unnamed individuals. Id. at 435. On cross-examination he refused to identify one of the unnamed individuals, and also refused to answer certain other questions regarding his activities. Id. at 435-36. The trial court struck his testimony in its entirety. Id. at 436. On appeal, we held that the sanction was appropriate, and in doing so we made several points that the State relies upon here. We said that the trial court should retain discretion to sanction contumacious defendants, and that the sanction of striking the defendant’s entire testimony did not have to be a last resort. Id. at 439. But we said these things only after pointing out that “[t]he questions asked by the prosecution were directed at the core of the defense Panza had outlined in his direct testimony.” Id. We also said that “[w]here the defendant’s refusal touches only collateral matters, striking his testimony may be an abuse of discretion.” Id.; see also Magyar v. United Fire Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851, 108 S.Ct. 151, 98 L.Ed.2d 107 (1987).
Although these decisions involved federal prosecutions, in which the reviewing court had supervisory power over the trial court, we applied the eollateral-non-eollateral distinction to a state court prosecution, as a constitutional matter, in Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d at 1504. And Rock itself makes clear that the Constitution limits the states in precluding a criminal defendant from testifying.
The fact that the questions Williams refused to answer related to collateral matters therefore weighs in Williams’ favor in the balancing required by Rock So do the facts that his right to testify is-protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and that his testimony constituted virtually his entire ease. If the jury was to acquit, it could do so rationally only by accepting his testimony.
On the State’s side, there is no question that the interest in protecting the truth-seeking function of the adversarial process is a very high one. In deciding, however, whether the sanction of striking all of Williams’ testimony was disproportionate, we ought not to ignore the existence of less drastic alternatives that would accomplish the State’s purpose. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61, 107 S.Ct. at 2714 (stating that “[t]he more traditional means of assessing accuracy of testimony also remain applicable in the case of a previously hypnotized defendant”). A variety of sanctions was available to eliminate the effect of Williams’ refusal to answer questions concerning his prior convictions. The court could have instructed the jury upon the adverse inferences it might draw from the refusal to answer questions, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494-95, 37 S.Ct. 192, 198, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917), and it could have allowed the prosecutor to comment upon this refusal during closing argument, Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315-16, 20 S.Ct. 944, 948-49, 44 L.Ed. 1078 (1900). The court could have allowed proof of the prior convictions by documentary evidence. Cal. Evid.Code § 788. These alternatives could have virtually eliminated any impediment to the truth-seeking function posed by Williams’ refusal to answer questions about his convictions. With these alternatives available, the sanction of striking all of Williams’ testimony was “disproportionate to the purposes” it was intended to serve. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 56, 107 S.Ct. at 2711.
I fully recognize that there is something particularly grating ■ about a defendant who insists upon testifying on his own terms. The contempt remedy remains available for such contumacious behavior, however. The penalty of striking Williams’ entire defense to charges resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment is disproportionate to the offense of refusing to answer questions about his prior convictions. I therefore dissent on this issue.
In all other respects, I join Judge Klein-feld’s opinion.