Court Opinion

ID: 9473534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:32:28.50569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:35.271559
License: Public Domain

WEIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although the majority has reached an equitable result, I must dissent, but without enthusiasm. Through a judicious reading of the controlling statutes and regulations, the majority has in effect found that the regulation providing for service on counsel estops the Secretary from reliance on the statutory limitation period.
The difficulty is that estoppel may not often be invoked successfully against the government. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (May 22, 1984). Although adherence to that yields harsh results, it is applied because strict compliance with the law provides assurance that the government will function within the perimeters of the Con*561stitution. Justice Holmes remarked, “Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.” Rock Island, A. & L. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143, 41 S.Ct. 55, 56, 65 L.Ed. 188 (1920). That maxim is a two-way street. Those within governmental agencies are also constrained by statutes which both grant and limit their authority. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 440, 55 S.Ct. 440, 442, 79 L.Ed. 977 (1935) (administrative power confined to that conferred by statute).
The statutory provisions governing the administrative appeal process are straightforward. “The order ... shall be filed in the office of the deputy commissioner, and a copy ... shall be sent ... to the claimant and to the employer at the last known address of each.” 33 U.S.C. § 919(e). “A compensation order shall become effective when filed in the office of the deputy commissioner as provided in section 919 of this title and unless proceedings for the ... setting aside of such order are instituted ... [it] shall become final at the expiration of the thirtieth day thereafter.” 33 U.S.C. § 921(a).
The statute provides for an administrative appeal within 30 days after filing with the deputy commissioner and after mailing notice to the parties. These are the only two conditions specified in the statute. In adopting regulations, the Secretary may neither take away procedural benefits from the claimant, Trent Coal, Inc. v. Day, 739 F.2d 116 (3d Cir.1984), nor confer additional ones inconsistent with the statute. Insurance Company of North America v. Gee, 702 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1983).
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remarked in Gee, although an agency is “usually bound to comply with its own regulations ... this Court will not interpret an agency regulation to thwart a statutory mandate.” 702 F.2d at 414. I agree that the Secretary “cannot by regulation place further conditions on the filing of an effective order.” Id. See also, Dawe v. Old Ben Coal Co., 754 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.1985); Wellman v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 706 F.2d 191 (6th Cir.1983). I conclude that Gee, Dawe, and Wellman correctly state the law.
The Secretary has not made the point, but it appears from the regulation that service on the representative was intended as a means of satisfying the statutory requirement of service on the claimant. The regulation says that service on the representative “shall have the same force and effect as if it had been sent to the party represented.” 20 C.F.R. § 725.301 (1984). Seemingly, the regulation contemplates a circumstance in which the party is not given actual notice but the representative is. In that situation the intention is to fulfill the statutory mandate through substituted service.
In the case at hand, the Secretary served the notice directly on the party. Hence, the claimant has been given exactly what Congress spelled out and not the indirect substitute provided for in the regulation.
Accordingly, I dissent, albeit reluctantly.