Court Opinion

ID: 9809237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:04:43.217634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:38.647269
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/31/23 In re A.S. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re A.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.

    FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF                                                              F085482
    SOCIAL SERVICES,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 14CEJ300111-2)
             Plaintiff and Respondent,

                    v.                                                                    OPINION
    R.S.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
            APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly J.
Nystrom-Geist, Judge.
            Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
            Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Ashley N. McGuire, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*           Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.
       Appellant R.S. (mother) is the mother of A.S. who is the subject of this
dependency case. Mother challenges two orders issued by the juvenile court following a
combined hearing considering her Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 petition,
and a section 366.26 permanency plan for A.S. Following the hearing, the court denied
mother’s section 388 petition, concluded adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for
A.S., and terminated mother’s parental rights,2 rejecting the applicability of the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception.
                     PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
       On August 26, 2020, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services
(Riverside County department) received a referral alleging “caretaker absence/incapacity
of [A.S.].” It was alleged that mother left A.S., who was born in October 2016, with a
friend to travel on her own to Mexico after their truck broke down. At some point, the
friend, who was described as paranoid, possibly due to drug use, called the police
complaining that people were knocking on his door repeatedly. In fact, the friend called
the police again several times and was then arrested after admitting he had been using
drugs, specifically “ ‘crystal.’ ”
       That same day, law enforcement was able to reach mother, who was on her way
back from Mexico to pick up A.S. When initially interviewed, mother denied
methamphetamine use. However, when asked to take a test, mother said she likely would
be positive for methamphetamine. Mother’s test results for methamphetamine were in
fact positive. While mother eventually admitted she recently had relapsed and was again
using methamphetamine, she emphasized she had been sober for a year prior to that time.

1      All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2      The presumed father, whose parental rights were also terminated, is not part of this
appeal.

                                             2
       A.S.’s physical exam revealed evidence of neglect. The exam specifically showed
a lack of hygiene, old wounds, tooth decay, and the existence of lice. Due to concerns
about mother’s judgment, her substance use, and the findings of neglect, the Riverside
County department requested a protective custody warrant for A.S. on August 26, 2020.
A.S. was placed into foster care on that same date.
       On August 28, 2020, the Riverside County department filed a juvenile dependency
petition alleging the following:

       “b-1 The mother … abuses controlled substances, including but not
       limited to methamphetamine. Such actions limit her ability to provide the
       child with adequate care, endanger the child’s safety and well-being, and
       create a detrimental home environment.

       “b-2 The mother … neglected the health and safety of the child, in that
       she left the child in the care of [her friend], who abused methamphetamine
       while caring for the child. The mother knew or reasonably should have
       known that [her friend] abused methamphetamine and was not a safe or
       suitable adult to supervise the child.

       “b-3 The mother … lives transiently and is unable to provide the child
       with a stable, safe, and suitable living environment.

       “b-4 The mother … has neglected the hygiene and medical health needs
       of the child, in that the child has healing abscesses, the child has multiple
       scabs on her skin, the child had not bathed in quite some time, the child has
       tooth decay, and the child has advanced stage lice, for which the mother has
       not sought medical or dental treatment.

       “b-5 The mother … has juvenile dependency case history in Fresno
       County for substantiated allegations of allowing unsafe individuals access
       to the child’s half-sibling. Current circumstances indicate the mother has
       failed to benefit from previous services provided to her.”3
During a detention hearing held on August 31, 2020, mother denied the allegations of the
petition. The court found the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) might be applicable, and

3     An additional allegation was contained in the petition stating the presumed father
was incarcerated and could not provide for A.S.’s care.

                                            3
necessary notices would have to be provided. The court then made a prima facie finding,
resulting in A.S. being detained from her parents. However, mother was granted
supervised visits for a minimum of two hours per week.
       On November 17, 2020, the Riverside County department provided ICWA notices
to the Yaqui tribe. On December 2, 2020, the Riverside juvenile court ordered the case
transferred to Fresno County.
       The Fresno juvenile court accepted jurisdiction of the case from Riverside County
on December 30, 2020, and set a disposition hearing for February 3, 2021. The hearing
was continued to March 4, 2021, to give the presumed father the opportunity to be
present. Before this new court date, the Yaqui tribe finally responded to the inquiries
sent by the Riverside County department, stating mother, the presumed father, and A.S.
were not members of the tribe and did not have applications pending with the tribe.
       On February 3, 2021, the Fresno County Department of Social Services
(department) filed a report recommending A.S. be declared a dependent, mother receive
family reunification services, and father not be granted placement or services. The report
confirmed presumed father was incarcerated in the Fresno County jail after being
convicted of possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm. The report
also revealed mother’s intention to remain in a relationship with presumed father once he
was released.4 At this point, A.S. was already living in a relative’s home in Fresno
County pending an assessment. This report was considered by the juvenile court at the
disposition hearing held on March 4, 2021, which mother attended. The court found
ICWA was not applicable, and formally approved the removal of A.S. from mother’s
custody.

4      The report includes a statement that presumed father previously sexually abused
an older half sister of A.S. This statement appears to be incorrect. Presumed father’s
son, who shared his name, was the person who was charged with this act. Mother
confirmed this fact during a prior hearing in Riverside County.

                                             4
       The department prepared a report for the six-month status review hearing, held on
July 22, 2021. The report recommended A.S. should continue as a dependent of the
juvenile court and mother should continue to receive family reunification services. The
report noted A.S. was still in the same placement with a family member. A summary of
crucial milestones was then provided. Specifically, the report noted mother was
attending services on her own through Turning Point of Fresno, but failed to attend a
substance use disorder evaluation scheduled on January 11, 2021, and continued to test
positive for substance use or had not shown up for testing. However, the report
acknowledged mother participated in a substance abuse assessment on April 13, 2021,
completed a risk assessment and psychological evaluation on May 20, 2021, and a
parenting program on June 23, 2021. A recommendation was made in the report that
mother attend group substance abuse sessions on a weekly basis.
       The report further noted that at a child family team meeting held on June 28, 2021,
mother reported she had received consistent negative drug tests for the previous
two months. Mother’s visits with A.S. were increased one hour per week to a total of
four hours per week, along with weekly phone calls. The report also noted mother
continued to show a willingness to participate in the required services and was actively
demonstrating what she was learning in her classes, thus making progress. Finally, the
report recommended continued family reunification services for mother.
       An addendum filed after the initial report was completed indicated mother had
become inconsistent with her visits with A.S., and was facilitating phone visits between
A.S. and presumed father although permission had not been provided for such contact.
As a result, a recommendation was made that future visits be conducted at the visitation
center, and not in the caregiver’s home. The minute order issued after the six-month
review hearing and the juvenile court’s review of the report and addendum, stated mother
had made significant progress but concluded that returning custody of A.S. to her would

                                            5
pose a substantial risk of detriment and that the current placement should continue. After
ordering reunification services continued, the court set a date of February 16, 2022, for
the combined 12-month/18-month review.
       In September 2021, mother acknowledged she had not had contact with the
presumed father in over a month and understood her chances of reunifying with A.S.
would be compromised if she had contact with him. As a result, the child family team
agreed that mother and A.S. could proceed with unsupervised visits. In October 2021,
the department social worker reminded mother that even though her visits with A.S. were
now unsupervised, she was required to get permission if she intended to have anyone else
participate in those visits.
       In January 2022, A.S. disclosed that her mother had taken her for a visit with
presumed father and had instructed her not to share this information with anyone.
Mother explained she ran into presumed father while she was pumping gas. A.S.’s
therapist expressed concern that mother told the child not to be honest or to hide the
information. There was also information in the record about an incident in which A.S.
answered mother’s phone and had a conversation with presumed father. Around this
period of time, A.S.’s therapist noticed A.S. seemed more fearful. After these incidents,
a determination was made that all future visits had to be supervised.
       The department’s next report, dated February 11, 2022, was submitted to the
juvenile court for the combined 12-month/18-month status review. At this point, A.S.
remained in the same relative placement. The report acknowledged that mother
continued to test negative in periodic drug tests. It was also reported that visits between
A.S. and mother were conducted weekly and were going well.
       On February 16, 2022, mother requested a contested hearing. The contested
hearing was held on May 17, 2022. At the hearing on May 17, both parents appeared via

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video5 and were sworn in to testify about the applicability of ICWA. Mother testified she
did not have American Indian heritage. Presumed father testified he believed he might
have a connection to the Yaqui tribe, but on the Mexican side of the border. After
reviewing the juvenile court file, the court noted that prior notices had been sent to the
Yaqui tribe and that no new information had been provided requiring further inquiries.
The court concluded they had met their responsibilities under ICWA to inquire and
investigate.
          The majority of the testimony presented at the hearing was on behalf of mother,
who called presumed father to testify, as well as the assigned social worker, and mother’s
cousin. Finally, mother testified as part of her case-in-chief. The focus of this testimony
addressed the concern that mother was improperly exposing A.S. to presumed father
without permission and in violation of the reunification plan. During the social worker’s
testimony, there was also confirmation mother was often warned about bringing A.S. into
contact with other individuals not approved in the reunification plan during unsupervised
visits.
          After testimony concluded, counsel for mother asked the juvenile court to continue
services, arguing there was a failure to provide adequate reasonable services, or a failure
to adjust those services when needed. Mother’s counsel then asked that A.S. be placed
with mother and that she receive family maintenance services, in recognition of her
willingness to participate in whatever was needed to benefit her daughter.
          When summarizing the evidence presented at the hearing, the juvenile court noted
mother’s biggest challenge was keeping A.S. safe and not bringing her into contact with
unsafe people, even after being warned this could jeopardize her reunification with A.S.
While summarizing the testimony and the various reports prepared before the hearing, the

5      Mother eventually participated in the hearing in person when the court gave her
that opportunity by providing a break in the proceedings.

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court returned again to the basic problem presented in this matter, that mother had
difficulties with establishing boundaries when it came to A.S.’s presumed father. For
example, the court provided the following summary:

               “The [c]ourt agrees with county counsel’s argument, the issue is not
       that the mother’s home was previously unsafe or it lacks a gate, it is the
       mother who drives the child to the father. It is the mother who provides
       access to the child for the father, whether the mother takes the child to the
       father’s house—and the testimony is conflicting. The father said it never
       happened. I think the cousin said it did happen three times, but the cousin’s
       testimony was kind of all over. The mother said it happened once, but the
       child didn’t go in. The child disclosed it on more than one occasion, but
       did indicate that she had gone inside and seen the house.”
Recognizing they had reached the 18-month point and that decisions had to be made on a
future placement for A.S., the court concluded:

              “The mother has not demonstrated the protective capacity in that she
       has instructed the child to keep secrets. The mother has not demonstrated a
       protective capacity in that she questions the child about the child’s
       statements in violation of court orders and in violation of the lessons the
       mother would have learned in her parenting program. It is not a question of
       whether or not the mother should have completed more classes. It is a
       question of whether the mother can keep A[.S.] safe, be protective by
       keeping her away from unsafe people and allow A[.S.] the freedom to
       report things that frighten her to people that could help her.”
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services had been
provided to mother, terminated mother’s reunification services, set a date for the
section 366.26 hearing, and ordered the department to prepare a permanent plan
recommending adoption, legal guardianship, or foster home placement.
       The report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, initially set for September 7,
2022, noted A.S. was in good health and was developmentally on track. The report
further noted A.S. was in therapy and was making progress. A.S.’s therapist stated the
child appeared to shut down or change the subject when the topic of not returning to her
mother’s care was discussed. A.S.’s relative caregivers expressed their commitment to

                                             8
provide a permanent plan of adoption for A.S. The report acknowledged mother had
consistently participated in scheduled supervised visits with A.S., and that those visits
were generally beneficial. However, after discussing the relationship A.S. had developed
with her caregivers and their extended family, the report concluded A.S.’s relationship
with her caregivers outweighed the relationship she had with her birth parents. While
ultimately recommending a permanent plan of adoption for A.S., the report also noted a
post adoption contract was finalized and signed on July 28, 2022, by all parties involved,
providing for monthly visits, and specifically highlighting the fact mother would be
invited to share special occasions with A.S.
       On September 7, 2022, mother requested the section 366.26 hearing considering
the recommendation of adoption be set for trial. Thereafter, on November 14, 2022,
mother filed a section 388 petition for modification, asking that reunification services be
provided for an additional six months. The court scheduled a hearing on mother’s
petition for December 5, 2022.
       On December 5, 2022, the court considered both the section 388 petition seeking a
modification of the court’s earlier decision to pursue a permanent placement for A.S., as
well as the section 366.26 contested trial on the permanent placement plan. After making
further inquiries to confirm there had been compliance with ICWA, the court took
testimony from A.S., mother, and presumed father. Because mother is the only party
appealing the decision of the juvenile court, this summary will focus only on the
testimony relevant to her parental rights.
       A.S., who was six years old at the time of the contested hearing, testified that she
loved her mother and described the “fun” activities they engaged in when they were
together. A.S. stated she always looked forward to visits with her mother. A.S.
expressed that she wanted to live with her current caregivers forever. When asked if she

                                               9
would like to live there or with her mother, A.S. responded, “I would rather be with my
mom and my auntie.” A.S.’s great-aunt is her current caregiver.
       Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the parties made their arguments to the
juvenile court on both the section 388 modification petition and the section 366.26
permanency plan. First, mother requested her section 388 modification petition be
granted and that further reunification services be provided because she had made
consistent efforts to address the problems resulting in A.S. being taken out of the home.
With respect to the section 366.26 petition, mother asked the court not to order a
permanent plan of adoption, as she had a beneficial parent-child relationship with A.S.,
the loss of which would be detrimental to A.S. The court continued the matter to
December 19, 2022, at which time rulings on both petitions would be provided.
       On that date, when addressing mother’s section 388 petition, the juvenile court
noted mother was required to show a change of circumstances and not simply ask for a
reconsideration of the prior court order setting a section 366.26 hearing. The court
concluded mother had not met her burden of showing there had been a change in
circumstances. After also concluding it could not find the request for a modification
would be in A.S.’s best interest, the court denied mother’s section 388 modification
petition.
       After again confirming that ICWA requirements had in fact been met, the juvenile
court turned its attention to the section 366.26 portion of the hearing. The court found
A.S. was adoptable, both “generally and specifically.” Addressing the section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception to termination of parental rights, the court found
mother had consistently visited with A.S. The court also found there was some incidental
benefit to A.S. in the relationship she had with her parents. The court then found that
while there would be a loss to A.S. if parental rights were terminated, that loss did not
outweigh the benefit of stability provided to A.S. of living with a forever family, the

                                             10
people she now defined as her family. The court, therefore, concluded the parents had
not met their burden of proving the beneficial parent-child exception applied. As a result,
the court found adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for A.S. and terminated
parental rights.
         Mother filed a timely notice of appeal challenging these findings by the juvenile
court.
                                       DISCUSSION
         The focus of mother’s appeal is on the section 388 petition for modification.
Mother contends the failure to grant that petition was legally flawed and improperly
impacted the court’s decision at the section 366.26 hearing finding adoption was the
appropriate permanent plan for A.S.
I.       The Section 388 Petition Seeking Modification
         A.    The Applicable Law and the Standard of Review
         “Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child
of the juvenile court[,] … upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence,
[may] petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a
dependent child of the juvenile court … for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any
order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388,
subd. (a)(1), italics added.) “The petitioner requesting the modification under section 388
has the burden of proof.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1).) The party seeking a
modification under section 388 has the burden of establishing “by a preponderance of the
evidence that a change of circumstances exists and the proposed change is in the child’s
best interests.” (In re M.V. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1057.)
         A petition for modification is “committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile
court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of
discretion is clearly established.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)

                                              11
“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 318–319.) A court exceeds the bounds of reason “ ‘ “by making an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 318.)
       B.     Application
       Again, when ruling on mother’s section 388 petition, the juvenile court recognized
mother seemed to be seeking a reconsideration of the court’s ruling in May 2022, setting
a section 366.26 hearing. Mother’s specific request for an additional six months of
reunification services was also rejected as not in A.S.’s best interest given her age and the
need for stability in her life after already spending one-third of her life living away from
her mother.
       Mother was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a change in
circumstances existed and that this change served the best interest of A.S. (See
In re M.V., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057.) The evidence mother presented showed
she was still working toward becoming a better parent and sought more time with the
benefit of reunification services before her parental rights could be terminated. The fact
circumstances might change or are changing for the better, “ ‘does not promote stability
for the child or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] “ ‘[C]hildhood does not wait for the
parent to become adequate.’ ” ’ ” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206. )
       Based on our review of the court’s ruling on the section 388 petition, we cannot
conclude the court abused its discretion. The decision was within the “bounds of reason”
while contemplating the best interests of A.S. (See In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th
at pp. 318–319.)

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II.    The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Mother’s Parental Rights
       A.     The Applicable Law and the Standard of Review

               “The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and
       implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have
       failed. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304; see also § 366.26,
       subd. (b).) At that stage, ‘the welfare agency’s focus shifts from
       monitoring the parents’ progress toward reunification to determining the
       appropriate placement plan for the child.’ (In re Marilyn H., at p. 305.)”
       (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851–852.)
Because the overriding concern is to protect the child, if the designated time period has
expired and the efforts to reunify the family have failed, a juvenile court must move
toward selecting and implementing a permanent plan for the child under section 366.26.
(Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1008–1009.) However, relevant to our
inquiry, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception “where ‘[t]he
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)
This is often referred to as the “beneficial parent-child relationship exception.”
       The leading case defining this exception is In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614
(Caden C.). The Caden C. court stated there are three elements a parent has the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence to justify the application of the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and
(3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced
against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at pp. 632–633, 636.)
       The first element of this test asks a court the “straightforward” question of whether
the parent visited consistently, to “the extent permitted by court orders.” (Caden C.,

                                             13
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus of this element is on the best interest of the child
as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good behavior in maintaining contact.
(Ibid.)
          The second element of the test asks “whether ‘the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child
relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s focus
again should be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child
relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)
          Finally, when considering the third element, courts are required to ask “how the
child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severing the relationship
might include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties
in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) In contrast, an adoptive home might
provide a new source of stability that alleviates “emotional instability and
preoccupation,” making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under
this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way:
it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
          Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.)
The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two elements of regular visitation
and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) The

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court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) “Review
for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence but the
application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court
has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
       The standard of review for a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or
her burden to prove the beneficial parent-child relationship exception before terminating
parental rights is “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the [parent] as a
matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other
grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the
question is “whether the [parent’s] evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)
       B.     Application
       Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence supports the first
two elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. Mother, for the most
part, consistently visited A.S. as allowed by the reunification plan, even after the decision
was made by the court to set a hearing under section 366.26 for a permanent plan. With
respect to the second element, there is also substantial evidence supporting the conclusion
A.S. would benefit from continuing her relationship with mother. In her testimony, A.S.
expressed how happy those visits made her feel and how she looked forward to the
activities she engaged in with mother.
       However, when moving on to the third element, we cannot conclude the juvenile
court abused its discretion when finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
did not apply. The court stated its belief that the benefits and stability that adoption by

                                                15
her caregivers would provide to A.S. would not be overcome by any detriment resulting
from the termination of mother’s parental rights. The court cited the fact A.S. had
experienced stability in her current placement for approximately two years and was doing
well, not having to worry about removal, or that the placement would be challenged, even
though there was an obvious loving relationship between A.S. and mother. The court
then concluded clear and convincing evidence showed it was likely A.S. would be
adopted, and that adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for A.S.
       While section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D) requires the court to “ ‘state its
reasons in writing or on the record’ ” in concluding that termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child, the court is not required to recite specific findings
when it concludes that terminating parental rights would not be detrimental to the child.
(In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Although a trial court’s statement of its
findings for its decision may be helpful when conducting appellate review, it is not a
legal requirement. (Ibid.) We do not presume the court erred. Absent an affirmative
showing of error by mother, we must indulge every presumption to uphold the judgment.
(In re A.L., at p. 1161.)
       Based on the record provided in this case, including mother’s history during the
period of reunification, the fact A.S. had already spent one-third of her very young life in
a consistent placement at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, and because her
caregivers were committed to providing a permanent plan of adoption, we cannot
conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion when terminating mother’s parental
rights. Under these circumstances, the court’s ruling is entitled to a presumption of
correctness and remand is unwarranted. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) We
cannot conclude mother was entitled to a finding in her favor on the termination of her
parental rights as a matter of law. (See In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)

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                                     DISPOSITION
      The order denying mother’s section 388 petition for modification and the order
terminating mother’s parental rights are affirmed.

                                            17