Court Opinion

ID: 9857642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 15:50:27.332999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:31.000246
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that the judgment should be reversed but I do not agree that the remand should be for the purpose of recalculation of the damages. On remand, the judgment should be entered for Amoco.
The application for the Torch Club credit card was made by Smith, office manager, whose authority to do so is questioned, and by Switzer, secretary-treasurer, whose authority to do so is not questioned. It is noted that Switzer testified that he was the general manager.
The court made no findings of fact as contemplated by Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., but if we search hard enough and use our imagination, in the court’s memorandum opinion we find what appears to be a finding of fact that the application for the Torch Club credit card “carried the forged signature of Mr. Switzer.” That is a controlling question in this ease. As a finding of fact, it is unsupported by any substantial evidence and that makes it “clearly erroneous.”
Switzer testified on direct examination as follows:
“Q [by Mr. Rau] Does that appear to be your signature on this letter?
“A [by Mr. Switzer] That is very like my signature, yes. ” [Emphasis added.]
On cross-examination Switzer testified:
“Q [by Mr. Durick] I am just wondering. I think signatures are quite personal and I know — I think I could identify mine.
“A [by Mr. Switzer] If this were handed to me and said, ‘Is this your signature?’ I would have to say it certainly looks like it, yes. ” [Emphasis added.]
Then the judge inquired as follows:
“THE COURT: That is essentially what he is doing. In your opinion, I know you can’t be totally certain, but you feel it is your signature?
“THE WITNESS: Yes.” [Emphasis added.]
Commenting on the holding in Verry v. Murphy, 163 N.W.2d 721 (N.D.1969), this court said in Malarchick v. Pierce, 264 N.W.2d 478, 480 (N.D.1978), that:
*217“We believe, however, that testimony unfavorable to one’s own contention can be a ‘judicial admission’ if it is ‘deliberate, clear and unequivocal.’ ”
The fact that other witnesses may have said that this was a forged signature does not reduce Switzer’s answers to something less than a judicial admission. I do not agree that either the federal statute (15 U.S.C. 1643) or the state statute (§ 51-14.-1-02, NDCC) has any bearing on this case.