Court Opinion

ID: 9829097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:59:13.892967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:57.189607
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
There was sufficient evidence that tended to show that Joseph Seholtz was not guilty of contributory negligence. /It is true that Mrs. Stamper at one time swore that she saw the. boy turning to the left, but she does not testify that she slowed up or made any effort to avoid a collision. In another part of her testimony she swore that she did not see the boy at all until she struck him. We recall the assertion that there was no evidence justifying the submission to the jury of contributory negligence of the boy, but hold that had the charge been properly objected to on the subject of minority it might have, raised error. No such objection was made by appellants' to the charge. The objections as to the charge on contributory negligence were as follows:
“1. Defendants object and except to all of the paragraph on page two of said charge, which relates to instructions regarding contributory negligence of the minor, for the following reasons:
“(a) Same states an erroneous instruction of law.
“(b) Said paragraph does not state the correct degree of care imposed upon a minor by law.
“(c) Because same assumes that a minor of the age of plain till, Joseph Seholtz, cannot be guilty of contributory negligence.
“(d) Because as a matter of law, plaintiff, Joseph Seholtz, as shown by the allegations in his petition, may be guilty of contributory negligence, if said allegations had been proven.
“(e) Because the allegations and proof showing that plaintiff was a boy of bright mentality and at the age of approximately thirteen years, then the instruction regarding the degree of care to be exercised by a child of such age and mentality would be ‘that measure of care to be exercised by a child of plaintiff’s age, capacity, mentality and experience, under like or similar eircumtsances.’
“(f) Because said instruction is confusing, misleading, prejudicial, and is vague and indefinite.”
The objections were of such a general nature as not to call attention to the defect in the charge, if there was any, and in no part of it does any objection bring the charge within the purview of the charge condemned in the case of Manlove v. Lavelle (Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. W. 324, the cases therein cited, or any other case cited by appellants. They do not complain that the charge on minority was on the weight of the testimony, but insist that the proper charge was the one substantially given by the court. They do not claim that no charge on the subject should have been given, but tacitly admit that one should have been given embodying their views of the law. Appellants argue that Joseph Seholtz was a precocious boy, because at the age between twelve and thirteen he was in the fifth grade in a church school and had been riding a bicycle for five years. There was not one word of testimony tending to show that the boy had above ordinary mentality.
Appellants seem to labor under the impression that this court should credit the testimony of their witnesses, but that testimony has been discredited by the jury, and this court must find as true the evidence that sustains the verdict. There was positive evidence that the boys' on the two bicycles had not passed the ear that Mrs Stamper was driving, but she caught up with them and ran into the bicycle on which Joseph Seholtz was riding. The boy who testified to these facts is called a “little boy” by appellants, but he was sixteen years of age and gave a reasonable account of the accident. Mrs. Stamper’s testimony, taken by deposition, contradicted her testimony in several vital particulars. She stated in her verbal testimony that Joseph was starting across the street in front of her when she struc-k him, but in the deposition she stated she ran upon him and struck him from the rear. She stated on the stand that her car did not skid, but in her deposition stated that it skidded as far as across the room. If, as she swore, she struck the boy from the rear and he was going the same way she was, he must necessarily have been in front of her; and if she had been looking forward, she would necessarily have seen him.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.