Court Opinion

ID: 9956840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 23:02:09.801992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:55.473400
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/2/24 P. v. Harring CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F086023
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. SC073336A)
                    v.

 DAVID LEE HARRING, JR.,                                                                  OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G.
Bush, Judge.
         Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Robert C.
Nash, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                      INTRODUCTION
       This is petitioner David Lee Harring, Jr.’s second appeal from his 2018 petition for
recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d). In a partially
published opinion, we vacated the trial court’s denial of Harring’s petition and remanded
for a resentencing hearing. (People v. Harring (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 483, 503
(Harring I).) Upon resentencing, the trial court reimposed a term of life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder Harring committed in 1997 when he was
17 years old.
       On appeal, Harring challenges that resentencing determination and additionally
seeks a new juvenile transfer hearing in light of ameliorative changes in the law since his
original transfer hearing conducted in 1997. We conclude Harring has not established the
sentencing court abused its discretion in reimposing a term of LWOP. Nonetheless,
Harring is entitled to remand for a new juvenile transfer hearing in view of the
amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707 under Proposition 57 (as
approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) (Proposition 57)), Assembly Bill No. 2361,
and Senate Bill No. 545; and the amendment to section 607 under Senate Bill No. 135.2
Accordingly, we conditionally reverse Harring’s sentence and remand for a
transfer/amenability hearing before the juvenile court.

1      All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless indicated
otherwise.
2      Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2361), effective
January 1, 2023; Senate Bill No. 545 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 545), effective
January 1, 2024; Senate Bill No. 135 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 135), effective
September 13, 2023.

                                                2.
                                FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.     November 1997 Murder and Procedural History
       In November 1997, when Harring was 17 years old, he and three other youths3
approached brothers Arnulfo S. and Arturo S., who were walking home from an English
language class they had just completed. During an attempted robbery of the brothers,
Harring shot them both. Arnulfo was fatally shot in the head and the neck. Arturo was
shot in the arm, which passed into his chest, but he survived. (Harring I, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 490.)
       The People charged Harring with (1) first degree willful, deliberate and
premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) of Arnulfo with a special circumstance
allegation that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery (id.,
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and an enhancement allegation for personal use of a firearm under
Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a); (2) attempted first degree premeditated
murder (id., §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) of Arturo with enhancement allegations for the
personal use of a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and
inflicting great bodily injury (GBI) under Penal Code section 12022.7; (3) attempted
robbery (id., §§ 664, 212.5, subd. (c)) of Arnulfo with an enhancement allegation of
personal use of a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.5; and (4) attempted robbery
(id., §§ 664, 212.5, subd. (c)) of Arturo with enhancement allegations for the personal use
of a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and for inflicting GBI
under Penal Code section 12022.7.
       On June 9, 1998, a jury convicted Harring of each offense and found true all
enhancement allegations. The court sentenced Harring on July 30, 1998, to LWOP on
count 1, plus an additional 10-year determinate term for the firearm enhancement. The

3      Harring indicated in his sentencing brief filed in September 2022 that the others with him
were also juveniles.

                                               3.
trial court imposed a term of life with the possibility of parole on count 2, plus an
additional 10-year determinate term for the firearm enhancement and a three-year
additional term for the GBI enhancement on this count to be served consecutive to
count 1. Harring was also sentenced to a term of three years each on counts 3 and 4,
which were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, as were the terms imposed for the
enhancements found true as to counts 3 and 4.
II.    Petition For Resentencing and Recall (Pen. Code, § 1170, Subd. (d))
       On December 19, 2018, approximately 20 years after beginning to serve his
sentence, Harring filed a petition with the Kern Superior Court for recall and resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, former subdivision (d)(2). A hearing was held on
March 13, 2019, where Harring’s mother and Harring testified.
       Sharon Kelley testified Harring’s father was killed in a robbery when Harring was
five years old. She remarried when Harring was seven years old, but her new husband
was in and out of jail. Kelley raised her five children on her own for the most part, and
worked more than 40 hours a week out of the house. As the oldest sibling, Harring would
care for his younger siblings when she was gone. When Harring was in high school, they
moved to an area that had “a lot of crime and drug traffic.” Harring had done well in
high school to that point; he kept his grades up, had no disciplinary issues except one she
recalled on cross-examination, and participated on multiple sports teams. After the
family moved, Harring was ineligible to participate in high school sports and he became
angry and closed off; he began hanging around with relatives who were “bad actors.”
Disciplinary issues arose at school, and he was arrested in March 1997 for a shoplifting
incident in a department store, which Kelley acknowledged on cross-examination
involved a physical altercation with store personnel. Kelley testified Harring had been
the target of a shooting in the past, but he had not actually been hit with a bullet; some of
his cousins with whom Harring spent time were gang members.

                                              4.
       When Harring committed the robbery and murder in November 1997, he was with
some of his cousins of whom Kelley did not approve. Since Harring has been
incarcerated, Kelley testified he has demonstrated remorse and had changed a lot. He
participated in the Defy program which he completed in 2018 and now resolves conflict
in a different manner. Kelley testified that if Harring was released from prison, he would
have family support and a place to stay. She acknowledged on cross-examination that
Harring had acquired numerous disciplinary violations while in prison, including for
fighting, drugs, and having a cell phone.
       Harring testified his father died when he was about five years old; his mother
remarried, but his stepfather was periodically in and out of prison and they never formed
a particularly close relationship. In high school, Harring had to switch high schools and
became ineligible to play high school sports due to school district boundaries; the
neighborhood had negative influences, including extended family who were gang
members. After someone had fired a gun at him, Harring started carrying a gun. In
March 1997, he was caught shoplifting, and he was sentenced to community service,
which he did not complete.
       Later in 1997, Harring was arrested with some of his cousins for murder. Harring
stated one of the cousins claimed the victims owed him money, and when the victims
fought back, Harring and the others came to the cousin’s assistance. Harring said his
mind “went red” and he started shooting in the belief he was defending his cousin and
himself.
       When Harring was sent to prison at 18 years old, he “felt like a zombie.” It was
stressful, and he was angry. In 2004, he obtained a GED certificate. He did not
immediately enroll in college courses because those required books and materials for
which he did not have the money. He was not afforded much opportunity to participate in
rehabilitative programs because he had a life sentence, and priority was given to those
with release dates. The program offerings started to get better when new laws were

                                            5.
passed for juvenile offenders. He explained the basis for certain prison violations for
battery and fighting he had acquired in 2000, 2008, 2011 and 2015, and detailed different
programs in which he had participated that had helped him mature, develop more
communication skills, and make better choices to avoid fighting and conflict. He noted
the support he would have upon release, including housing and job opportunities, and
explained he had gotten married in 2018. He expressed remorse and regret for the
murder he had committed.
       On March 27, 2019, the court denied the petition, finding Harring ineligible for
resentencing. On appeal, we reversed the trial court’s eligibility determination, vacated
the sentence, and remanded for the trial court to resentence defendant under Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (d). (Harring I, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 503, 504.) Upon
remand before the trial court, Harring submitted an updated sentencing brief; the People
filed a reply brief; the parties presented argument at a hearing on March 7, 2023; the trial
court agreed to consider the 2019 hearing testimony of Kelley and Harring; and the trial
court took the matter under submission. At a subsequent March 21, 2023, hearing, the
trial court again sentenced Harring to a term of LWOP for the murder conviction on
count 1. The aggregate sentence was 11 years determinate (enhancements on counts 1 &
2), plus LWOP (count 1), plus life with the possibility of parole (count 2). The terms
imposed for counts 3 and 4 (attempted robbery) were stayed under Penal Code
section 654, as were the sentences on the attached enhancements.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Remand is Required For Juvenile Transfer/Amenability Hearing
       Harring argues the recall of his sentence (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(2))
rendered the judgment nonfinal, Proposition 57 and subsequent ameliorative changes in
the law relevant to juveniles apply retroactively, and his case must be returned to the
juvenile court for a new juvenile transfer hearing under section 707. (People v. Padilla
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 166–167.) The People argue this claim has been forfeited because

                                             6.
Harring failed to request a juvenile transfer hearing in March 2023 when the resentencing
occurred, but they otherwise agree that if the claim is not forfeited, the changes in the law
apply retroactively and Harring is entitled to a new juvenile transfer/amenability
hearing.4
       A.      Harring’s Judgment is Nonfinal
       The parties agree, and we concur, that when Harring’s sentence was recalled in
2021 (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(2)) and remanded to the trial court for resentencing
(Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(6) (Penal Code section 1170(d)(6)), the judgment in
Harring’s case was rendered nonfinal. (People v. Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 161–
162 [sentence vacated during habeas corpus proceedings rendered judgment nonfinal];
see People v. Montes (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 47–48 [recall and resentencing under
Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d), rendered judgment nonfinal, entitling adult defendant to
retroactive application of Prop. 57 and a new juvenile court transfer hearing]; People v.
Lopez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 835, 845 [resentencing under Pen. Code, § 1170, former
subd. (d)(1), “replaces the original sentence” such that the “finality of the original
sentence is no longer material”].) As such, Harring is entitled to retroactive application
of ameliorative changes in the law.
       B.      Changes in the Law Since 1997
               1.     Changes Enacted Before March 2023 Resentencing Hearings
                      a.      Proposition 57
       When Harring committed the crimes in 1997, “‘a child could be tried in criminal
court only after a judicial determination … that he or she was unfit to be dealt with under
juvenile court law.’” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 305 (Lara).)

4       The parties were offered an opportunity to address the issues of retroactivity and remedy
as to Senate Bill 545 and Senate Bill 135, which were enacted while this appeal was pending,
and both parties filed supplemental briefs. The parties agree the changes in the law under
Proposition 57, Assembly Bill 2361, Senate Bill 545, and Senate Bill 135 all apply retroactively
to nonfinal judgments such as Harring’s.

                                                7.
A juvenile was “presumed to be not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile court law unless the juvenile court conclude[d] … the minor would be amenable
to the care, treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court based upon an evaluation of” specifically enumerated criteria. (§ 707, former subd.
(c); Stats. 1997, ch. 910, § 2.)
       With the passage of Proposition No. 215 in 2000, prosecutors were required to
charge minors 14 years old or older directly in criminal court for specified murders and
sex crimes. (O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 88 (O.G.), citing § 602, former
subd. (b), repealed by Prop. 57, § 4.1.) For other identified serious offenses,
Proposition 21 provided prosecutors with discretion to charge minors 14 years of age or
older directly in criminal court instead of juvenile court. (O.G., supra, at p. 88, citing
§ 707, former subd. (d), repealed by Prop. 57, § 4.2.)
       “In the years after the passage of Proposition 21, there was ‘a sea change in
penology regarding the relative culpability and rehabilitation possibilities for juvenile
offenders, as reflected in several judicial opinions.’ [Citation.] These changes were
based upon developments in scientific research on adolescent brain development
confirming that children are different from adults in ways that are critical to identifying
age-appropriate sentences. [Citations.] In the same period, the California Legislature
enacted numerous reforms reflecting a rethinking of punishment for minors.” (O.G.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 88.)
       Consistent with this trend, in November 2016, California voters passed
Proposition 57, changing the procedure for charging juveniles. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal. 5th at
p. 303.) “‘Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the Welfare and Institutions
Code so as to eliminate direct filing by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors …

5      Proposition No. 21, titled the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998,
approved by voters at the March 7, 2000, Primary Election (Proposition 21).

                                              8.
[could] still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conduct[ed] a
transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of
criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be
rehabilitated.’” (Id. at p. 305.) Proposition 57 did away with the presumption the
juvenile was unfit to be dealt with in juvenile court, and provided that the People had the
burden to show that the juvenile should be treated as an adult. (People v. Padilla, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 166–167.)
                      b.      Assembly Bill 2361
       Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended section 707, adding the
following language: “In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1). This amendment changes section 707 in
several respects. First, it increases the burden of proof borne by the prosecution from
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)), an
“intermediate standard [that] ‘requires a finding of high probability’” (Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998). “‘Where clear and convincing proof is required, the
proponent must convince the jury or judge, as the case may be, that it is highly probable
that the facts which he asserts are true. He must do more than show that the facts are
probably true.’” (Id. at pp. 998–999.)
       Second, this amendment to section 707, subdivision (a)(3), makes amenability to
rehabilitation the dispositive question rather than one of merely five factors to consider.
(In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416 (E.P.); accord; In re S.S. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 1277, 1284 (S.S.).)
       Third, “the previous version [of the statute] required that if the juvenile court
orders a transfer, it shall recite the basis for its decision in the order.” (E.P., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 416.) As amended, section 707, subdivision (a)(3), requires more of the

                                               9.
court: “If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis for its
decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting
the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.…” (Italics added.)
               2.       Changes After the 2023 Resentencing Hearing
                        a.    Senate Bill 545
       In addition to these changes, Senate Bill 545 amended section 707 effective
January 1, 2024. Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 545, to transfer an individual to
criminal court, the juvenile court was required to find by clear and convincing evidence
that the individual is not amenable to rehabilitation when under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court after consideration of specified criteria. In evaluating these specifically
identified criteria, the prior law allowed the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant
factor. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 545 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.).)
       Under the new law, the juvenile court is required to give weight to any factor
relevant to the specifically identified criteria for making the amenability determination.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii) & (E)(ii).) The new law also specifies
additional factors the juvenile court must consider when evaluating the minor’s criminal
sophistication, including the effect of the minor’s community environment; the existence
of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system;
and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual
battery (id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii)). Finally, the law now requires the court to give weight to
evidence that indicates the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an
offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Id.,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii)).
                        b.    Senate Bill 135
       Senate Bill 135 amended section 607, subdivision (d), effective September 13,
2023. Under the prior version of the law, a juvenile court retained jurisdiction over a

                                               10.
person found to be a ward or dependent child of the juvenile court until the ward or
dependent child attained, at most, 25 years of age or two years from the date of
commitment to a secure youth treatment facility pursuant to section 875, whichever
occurs later. (§ 607, subds. (a), (b), and (c).)
       Senate Bill 135 expanded the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to account for
individuals over the age of 25 years: “The court may retain jurisdiction over a person
who is 25 years of age or older for a period not to exceed two years from the date of
disposition if the person is found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the
commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707. The court shall
exercise jurisdiction in conformance with the objectives of the juvenile court.” (§ 607,
subd. (d).) This amendment was effective September 13, 2023, and was made expressly
retroactive under section 607, subdivision (m).
       C.     These Changes in the Law Apply Retroactively
       “‘It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively’”
(People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 698), but pursuant to In re Estrada (1965) 63
Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), “[n]ewly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or
reducing criminal liability presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at the
time of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852,
citing Estrada, supra, at pp. 744–745.) Absent evidence to the contrary, we must assume
that an amended statute that mitigates the possible punishment for a class of persons is
presumptively retroactive and applies to all persons whose judgments were not final at
the time the statute took effect. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624; Lara, supra,
4 Cal.5th at pp. 303–304.)
       In Lara, the court concluded that Estrada applied in the context of Proposition 57
because while it did not ameliorate the punishment or possible punishment for a
particular crime, it ameliorated the possible punishment for juveniles as a class. (Lara,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 308.) Similarly, the amendments to section 707 brought about by

                                              11.
Assembly Bill 2361 and Senate Bill 545 represent ameliorative changes in the law
because those changes “make it more difficult to transfer juveniles from juvenile court,
which similarly reduces the possible punishment for juveniles.” (S.S., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 1289; accord, In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 170
(Miguel R.) [concluding Sen. Bill 545 is ameliorative and applies retroactively to nonfinal
judgments].) Senate Bill 135 made the changes it effected expressly retroactive. As
such, we agree with the parties that the changes under these new laws apply retroactively.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3); see S.S., supra, at pp. 1288–1289.)
        D.    Remedy
        Under the California Constitution, “No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial
granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for
any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) “California law
generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage of justice requirement ‘as permitting
reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have
been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error [citations].’” (In re K.H.
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 607, quoting In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 [citing
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson)].) However, “not every error is of
the type that lends itself to resolution under [Watson’s] likelihood-of-success test
[citation].” (In re K.H., supra, at p. 608, citing In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 252–
253.)

                                             12.
       As the California Supreme Court recently explained in the context of a retroactive
change in the law affecting determinate sentencing,6 “‘there is a practical difference in
assessing the effect of an error when the court has not articulated whether a discretionary
decision was made in the first place, as compared to when there were errors in a decision
the court actually rendered.’ (In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 716.) Where … the
sentencing court was not aware of the scope of its discretionary powers at sentencing,
Watson does not properly take into consideration the ‘more speculative inquiry’ of what
choice the court is likely to make in the first instance. (Ibid.; accord, People v.
McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 426.) Indeed, when the applicable law governing
the defendant’s sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always
speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it
had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing. Accordingly,
when … a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers,
‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly
indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had
been aware that it had such discretion.”’” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425
(Salazar), quoting People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 (Gutierrez).)
“[W]hen a court has not exercised its informed discretion, remand is the default ‘unless
the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.”’” (Salazar, supra, at
p. 431, quoting Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1391.)7

6       Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (amending Pen. Code, §§ 1170 and 1170.1,
eff. Jan. 1, 2022).
7       In S.S., the Court of Appeal found, viewed through the lens of retroactive application of
Assembly Bill 2361, that the juvenile court erred in ordering the minor’s transfer. (S.S., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289.) The court then assessed the error under Watson and concluded a
miscarriage of justice had occurred. (Ibid.) The decision in S.S., however, predated Salazar,
which addressed the appropriate standard for assessing error where, as here, the appellant is
entitled to the retroactive application of ameliorative legislation affecting the scope of the court’s

                                                 13.
       Despite the People’s agreement that each of these laws, including Senate Bill 545
and Senate Bill 135, apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments, the People nonetheless
maintain Harring has forfeited any claim to a new juvenile transfer hearing because he
did not request one at the resentencing hearings in March 2023.
       While there were ameliorative changes to section 707 made effective before the
March 2023 resentencing, there were further relevant, ameliorative changes to
sections 607 and 707 after the resentencing hearings. The People cite no authority for the
proposition that a party can forfeit future ameliorative changes in the law, especially
changes that may be of even greater benefit to the party. Significantly, as the law
provided in March 2023, defense counsel might have reasonably concluded then-existing
limitations to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction (see § 607, former subd. (c))8 rendered futile
any request for a juvenile transfer/amenability hearing under section 707 with respect to
an individual older than 25 years of age, such as Harring who was 43 years old at the
time of resentencing. Effective September 13, 2023, Senate Bill 135 expanded the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction to individuals who, like Harring, are older than 25 years of
age. (§ 607, subd. (d) [“The court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is 25 years
of age or older for a period not to exceed two years from the date of disposition”].) At
the time of resentencing, Harring had no opportunity to request a juvenile transfer hearing

discretion. Relying on S.S., the Miguel R. court also applied Watson to conclude that retroactive
application of Senate Bill 545 did not require remand. Like S.S., the application of Watson in
this context is out of step with Salazar. (See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 170–171.)
8       Section 607, former subdivision (c), stated a juvenile court “may retain jurisdiction over a
person who is found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the commission of an
offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 until that person attains 25 years of age, or two
years from the date of commitment to a secure youth treatment facility pursuant to Section 875,
whichever occurs later, if the person, at the time of adjudication of a crime or crimes, would, in
criminal court, have faced an aggregate sentence of seven years or more.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 38.)

                                                14.
in light of the change in the law effected under Senate Bill 135, and thus forfeiture does
not apply.9
       The juvenile court’s original transfer decision in 1997 was necessarily made
without the benefit of any of the subsequent ameliorative changes in the law under
Proposition 57, Assembly Bill 2361, Senate Bill 545 or Senate Bill 135.10 As Harring’s
judgment is nonfinal, he is entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing conducted by a fully
informed juvenile court under the law and jurisdictional scope currently in effect. (In re
F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 716; Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 425; see People v.
Montes, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 48 [conditionally reversing judgment in the context
of Pen. Code, § 1170(d)(6), resentencing for retroactive application of Prop. 57 in a new
juvenile transfer hearing].)
II.    Reimposing LWOP Under Penal Code Section 1170(d)(6)
       In addition to seeking a new transfer hearing, Harring argues the trial court abused
its discretion in reimposing a term of LWOP in resentencing defendant pursuant to Penal
Code section 1170(d)(6). The People maintain Harring forfeited his specific arguments
regarding the various factors considered as to resentencing because no objection was
made with respect to any of Harring’s arguments below. Even considered on the merits,
however, the People argue Harring has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.11

9      As there was no forfeiture, we do not reach Harring’s alternative argument his counsel
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a hearing.
10      Although the juvenile court’s transfer decision is not contained in the record, the
prosecutor’s sentencing brief filed with the trial court on January 23, 2023, states that “[o]n
December 18, 1997, the juvenile court determined Harring was unfit for juvenile court and
transferred the defendant’s case to adult court.”
11      For the reasons explained post, we agree with the People on the merits and thus do not
reach the issue of forfeiture.

                                                15.
       A.     Penal Code Section 1170(d)
       Penal Code section 1170(d)(6) provides that a trial court may consider different
factors “when determining whether to resentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment
with the possibility of parole,” which includes whether (1) the defendant was convicted
pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law (id.,
subd. (d)(6)(A)); (2) the defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault
or other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to
the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP (id., subd. (d)(6)(B)); (3) the
defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant (id.,
subd. (d)(6)(C)); (4) prior to the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to LWOP,
the defendant had insufficient adult support or supervision and had suffered from
psychological or physical trauma or significant stress (id., subd. (d)(6)(D)); (5) the
defendant suffers from cognitive limitations due to mental illness, developmental
disabilities, or other factors that did not constitute a defense but influenced the
defendant’s involvement in the offense (id., subd. (d)(6)(E)); (6) the defendant has
performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation,
including, but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or
vocational programs, if those programs have been available at their classification level
and facility, using self-study for self-improvement or showing evidence of remorse (id.,
subd. (d)(6)(F)); (7) the defendant has maintained family ties or connections with others
through letter writing, calls, or visits or has eliminated contact with individuals outside of
prison who are currently involved with crime (id., subd. (d)(6)(G)); and (8) the defendant
has had no disciplinary actions for violent activities in the last five years in which the
defendant was determined to be the aggressor (id., subd. (d)(6)(H)).
       “In addition to the criteria in paragraph (6), the court may consider any other
criteria that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court identifies them
on the record, provides a statement of reasons for adopting them, and states why the

                                              16.
defendant does or does not satisfy the criteria.” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(11).) “The
court shall have the discretion to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the
defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is
not greater than the initial sentence. The discretion of the court shall be exercised in
consideration of the criteria in paragraph (6).…” (Id., subd. (d)(7).)
       B.     Standard of Review
       Discretionary sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. On
appeal, it is the appellant’s burden to establish an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.) A judgment or order of a lower court is
presumed to be correct on appeal, and all presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
       A trial court abuses its sentencing discretion when its decision is arbitrary or
capricious, inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the law, or based on “circumstances
that are not relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for
decision.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “In reviewing for abuse of
discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the
party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to
have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objections, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’
[Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people
might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting
its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’ [Citations.] Taken together, these
precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.)

                                              17.
       “When the sentencing decision involves an assessment of various factors, the trial
court has discretion to accord different weight to each factor, and its decision need not be
determined by the sheer number of factors on one side or the other. Rather, the trial
court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion ‘requires “[a] quantitative and qualitative
analysis” of multiple factors. [Citation.]’” (People v. Willover (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
302, 323, quoting People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 719.)
       C.     Trial Court’s Reasoning
       The trial court explained its reasoning for reimposing a sentence of LWOP as
follows:

              “And then [Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(6)] indicates
       the factors the Court may consider whether to resentence the defendant to a
       term of prison with the possibility of parole include, but are not limited to,
       the defendant was convicted pursuant to—that’s not true. The defendant
       does not have felony adjudications assaultive or felony crimes. That’s not
       true we found out. The defendant committed the offense with at least one
       adult co-defendant. That’s not true. Prior to the offense the—was
       sentenced to [LWOP], the defendant had insufficient adult support or
       supervision, suffered from psychological or physical, significant stress,
       or—I think there’s some evidence to his upbringing, which is an
       unfortunate upbringing, but I don’t know that it raises to that level.

               “The defendant suffers from cognitive limitations. I’m not sure that
       that’s true. The defendant has performed acts to tend to indicate
       rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation in [California Department of
       Corrections and Rehabilitation]. There’s more to that subdivision. He has
       done some things, but as [the prosecutor] pointed out, they were late in the
       process after the law changed, which I don’t know if that is surprising or
       not, but that’s the facts.

               “The defendant has maintained family ties or connections. I think he
       has at some level. No disciplinary action in the last five years. That might
       be true, but prior to five years he had, and he had some other nonviolent
       activities in the last five years.

               “As long as this sentence cannot be greater than the initial sentence.
       I, of course, recognize he was under 26 or he was 17 at the time. I have
       considered all these factors along with counsel’s arguments, and I just don’t

                                             18.
       see why I would not sentence him to anything less than [LWOP]. This is an
       unprovoked, heinous crime. Two gentlemen who were trying to better
       themselves, they were at English class. On their way home, were just
       brutally—one is brutally murdered. The other one is injured to the point
       that many, many years later he’s still suffering from the affects [sic] of
       that.”
       D.     Analysis
       Although the trial court must exercise its discretion “in consideration of the
criteria” in Penal Code section 1170(d)(6) (id., subd. (d)(7)), a trial court is not obligated
to ascribe any particular mitigating weight to factually supported factors (id., subd. (d)(6)
[identifying factors the court “may” consider when determining whether to resentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment with the possibility of parole]). Viewing its
reasoning as a whole, the trial court concluded the circumstances of the murder and
Harring’s prison disciplinary record outweighed the other factors. Harring and three of
his cousins (who were all juveniles at the time) approached two brothers walking home
from an evening language class and attempted to rob the men. A physical altercation
arose, and Harring pulled out a gun and shot at the brothers multiple times. (Harring I,
supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 490–491.) Harring was not simply present or involved in
the robbery when the killing occurred, he was the actual shooter. The manner of the
killing—firing the weapon multiple times and shooting Arnulfo in the head and the neck
and Arturo in the arm and chest—was strongly suggestive of express malice and did not
tend to connote the killing was an accident or a botched attempt to merely scare the
victims to submit to the robbery.
       Thus, when the trial court concluded Harring had not been convicted of murder
pursuant to theories of felony murder or aiding and abetting (Pen. Code,
§ 1170(d)(6)(A)), that finding was supported by the record before the trial court. While
Harring argues it was possible he was convicted under a theory of felony murder because
the murder occurred during the course of a robbery, that argument was never presented to
the trial court at the time of resentencing, no objection to the trial court’s finding was

                                              19.
made, and there was no factual evidence presented to support a contrary finding. Harring
was the actual shooter who was charged with willful, deliberate and premeditated first
degree murder with a separate special circumstance felony-murder allegation attached to
the first degree premeditated murder charge. A willful killing is one performed with
express malice—conviction on a charge of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder
requires express malice. (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 29 [“[F]irst degree murder
requires express malice, and the concept of express malice includes that of willfulness. A
willful murder is an intentional murder, and malice is express when there is an intent to
unlawfully kill a human being.”].) The record does not establish any facts showing the
jury was instructed on a felony-murder theory or that the premeditated murder conviction
was (or could have been) based on that theory. There was no evidentiary basis for the
trial court to find this factor was true and weigh it in favor of a life term with the
possibility of parole.
       With respect to the second factor identified under Penal Code section 1170(d)(6),
it is true that Harring did not have any juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other
felony crimes with a significant potential for harm to victims prior to the murder offense.
(Id., subd. (d)(6)(B).) This was the crux of our holding in Harring I with respect to recall
of the sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). When it referenced this
factor at resentencing, the trial court noted it was “not true [as] we found out.” This
appears to have been a misstatement rather than a misunderstanding of the facts. By
explaining the factor was “not true [as] we found out,” the trial court was referencing
Harring I, which reversed the trial court’s initial determination on this factor with respect
to recall of the sentence. In the full context of the two resentencing hearings, it appears
the trial court merely misspoke as the statute articulates this factor in the negative—
whether the defendant does not have certain types of juvenile felony adjudications. (Pen.
Code, § 1170(d)(6)(B).)

                                              20.
       While the trial court gave this factor no mitigating weight, the statute does not
require it to do so. (Pen. Code, § 1170(d)(6).) Further, Harring admitted during his
hearing testimony that he had engaged in a physical altercation with the security
personnel during a shoplifting crime that resulted in a juvenile felony adjudication for
second degree burglary. As Harring could have caused injury to a victim during this
altercation, there was a basis to afford no mitigating weight to this factor despite that it
was true the shoplifting incident had ultimately not resulted in a juvenile felony
adjudication for assault or other crime with a significant potential for harm to victims.
       As to the factors under Penal Code section 1170(d)(6)(C) and (E), there was no
evidence that Harring committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant, nor was
there evidence Harring suffered from any cognitive limitations that influenced his
involvement in the offense.
       Under Penal Code section 1170(d)(6)(D), the trial court was to consider whether
prior to the offense for which Harring was sentenced to LWOP, Harring had insufficient
adult support or supervision and had suffered from psychological or physical trauma or
significant stress. Harring had several difficult childhood experiences, which the trial
court recognized. His father had been shot and killed when Harring was young, his
mother worked a lot and was absent from the home during those work hours, his
stepfather was sent to prison during his childhood, and Harring had to transfer high
schools, which precipitated quitting after school sports programs and spending time with
peers and relatives who had gang affiliations. The neighborhoods where they lived
tended to be dangerous, and Harring recalled being shot at, which was why he started
carrying a gun. The trial court took this testimony into account—at the March 7, 2023,
hearing the trial court expressly agreed to consider Harring’s and his mother’s 2019
testimony in conjunction with the resentencing determination. But consideration of these
facts did not require the trial court to give them dispositive or great weight in making the
sentencing determination.

                                              21.
       Harring’s childhood was not ideal, particularly given the death of his father, the
incarceration of his stepfather and growing up in a difficult neighborhood, but there was
no evidence Harring had spent time in foster homes, experienced homelessness, was
afflicted with addiction issues, or suffered psychological or physical abuse inside his
mother’s home or elsewhere. Although his mother was gone during working hours and
Harring spent time caring for his younger siblings, the trial court was not compelled to
conclude Harring suffered from insufficient adult support or supervision. While
reasonable minds could differ about the weight to afford this factor, the trial court’s
conclusion that this was not a factor that weighed in mitigation was not irrational or
outside the bounds of reason.
       The trial court acknowledged the evidence of Harring’s rehabilitative efforts
through prison programs (Pen. Code, § 1170(d)(6)(F)), but the court found those efforts
were made only more recently after the law had changed to allow an opportunity for
resentencing. Other than his GED, which was completed in 2004, the documentation
Harring provided regarding his rehabilitative efforts shows courses and programs
completed since 2015. Harring argues the trial court should have given more weight to
his testimony that his security classification initially precluded him from participation in
most of the available opportunities, and that priority for those types of classes and
activities are typically given to inmates with release dates. Fundamentally, Harring’s
argument is that the trial court should have weighed the facts differently. However,
neither Harring’s nor another court’s disagreement with the trial court’s assessment of the
factors suffices to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 377.)
       In prison, Harring had maintained some family ties or connections with others, as
the trial court noted. (Pen. Code, § 1170(d)(6)(G).) He maintained visits with his
mother, and he met (and married) his wife while in prison. The trial court implicitly gave
this factor less weight when it was balanced against the nature of the murder Harring

                                             22.
committed and his prison disciplinary record. Yet, the trial court was not required to
ascribe favorable or dispositive weight to this factor just because there were facts
supporting it. The court recognized and considered the factor, but ultimately found it was
outweighed. That does not amount to an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Clair (1992)
2 Cal.4th 629, 655 [reasonable difference of opinion about how to weigh facts does not
establish abuse of discretion].)
       Harring’s prison disciplinary record between 1998 and 2023 was noted. Although
the court recognized Harring had not committed any violent or assaultive attacks in the
five years before the 2023 hearing (Pen. Code, § 1170(d)(6)(H)), he had committed a
battery on another inmate in 2000 and again in 2011 when he was approximately 31 years
old (id., subd. (d)(11)). He was also cited for fighting with other inmates in 2008
(participating in a riot), 2011 (fighting) and 2015 (fighting). Additionally, Harring had
multiple violations for other types of disciplinary issues in 2004 (obstructing/delaying
officers); 2009 (obstructing peace officer); 2011 (cell phone possession); 2012 (drugs),
2013 (two cell phone possession violations), 2014 (refusing urinalysis and for drug use),
and 2015 (drug use). He was cited for additional violations in 2017 for disobeying an
order, in 2018 for possessing a cell phone, in 2020 for disobeying an order, and in 2022
for altering personal property. Based on these facts, the trial court’s decision to discount
the fact Harring had not been disciplined for violent activities in the five years before the
hearing was not irrational or outside the bounds of reason.
       Finally, Harring argues the trial court erred by failing to expressly discuss the
Miller12 factors in reaching its sentencing determination. In Miller, the United States
Supreme Court held that sentencing schemes that mandate terms of LWOP for juvenile
offenders violate the Eighth Amendment because they fail to consider youth-related
mitigating factors that may diminish a juvenile’s culpability and suggest a capacity for

12     Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller).

                                             23.
reform. (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 476.) “[U]nder Miller a sentencing court
considering a sentence of [LWOP] for a juvenile offender must consider evidence that
may exist regarding (1) ‘a juvenile offender’s “chronological age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”’; (2) ‘“the family and home environment that surrounds [the juvenile]—
and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional”’; (3) ‘“the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of
[the juvenile defendant’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him”’; (4) ‘whether the offender “might have been charged
and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for
example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea
agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys”’; and (5) ‘“the possibility of
rehabilitation.”’” (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1048, quoting Gutierrez, supra,
58 Cal.4th at pp. 1388–1389.)
       Harring asserts the trial court’s failure to expressly discuss the Miller factors
“violated Harring’s Eighth Amendment rights,” but changes in the law have mooted this
constitutional claim. Effective January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) “extend[ed] the availability of a mandatory parole hearing to juveniles sentenced to
[LWOP].” (People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 850 (Ochoa).) This amendment
added subdivision (b)(4) to Penal Code section 3051, and permits juveniles serving a life
sentence to a parole hearing in their 25th year of incarceration, affording them a
meaningful opportunity for release. Thus, they are no longer serving a term of LWOP or
its functional equivalent, which effectively moots an Eighth Amendment challenge under
Miller. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 279–280 [possibility of release in
parole hearing under Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3), mooted constitutional claim under
Miller]; Ochoa, supra, at p. 850 [extending mootness principle articulated in People v.
Franklin to the defendant’s claim his LWOP sentence was unconstitutional under Miller

                                             24.
in light of Senate Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)]; see Montgomery v. Louisiana
(2016) 577 U.S. 190, 212 [“A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile
homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”].)
       Harring’s state law challenge to the trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion
remains viable, however. (See People v. Montes, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 44 [in Pen.
Code, § 1170, subd. (d), resentencing, trial court did not abuse discretion in concluding it
was not convinced the defendant’s crime was a reflection of the transient immaturity of
youth under Miller].) In 2014, the California Supreme Court held that Penal Code
section 190.5, subdivision (b), which, for defendants like Harring, prescribes a sentence
of LWOP or 25 years to life for a 16- or 17-year-old defendant found guilty of special
circumstance murder, “authorizes and indeed requires” consideration of the youth-related
mitigating factors identified in Miller before imposing LWOP on a juvenile homicide
offender. (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387.) This conclusion was grounded in the
aggravating and mitigating factors enumerated under Penal Code section 190.3 and the
California Rules of Court that a court must consider in sentencing under Penal Code
section 190.5, subdivision (b). (Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1387.) Specifically, Penal Code
section 190.3, subdivision (i), requires the court to consider the age of the defendant at
the time of the crime. (Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1388.) The court explained this factor
permits the sentencing court to consider “not simply a defendant’s age but also ‘any age-
related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might
reasonably inform the choice of penalty.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Lucky (1988) 45
Cal.3d 259, 302.)
       In resentencing Harring to LWOP, the trial court expressly recognized that Harring
was 17 years old when he committed the crime, but the trial court made no reference to
Miller. Thus, on review, we do not have the benefit of a record that provides insight into
the details of the court’s full evaluation of the Miller factors. Yet, at the time of
resentencing, the trial court had the benefit of Miller and Gutierrez and recognized

                                              25.
Harring’s youth at the time of the crime. Additionally, defense counsel expressly
referenced Miller in the resentencing brief and presented arguments about how relevant
youth-related factual circumstances warranted a lesser punishment than LWOP. These
facts and circumstances of youth were raised again at the hearing, and counsel argued
Harring’s home life as a juvenile, his juvenile record, the circumstances of his offense,
and his rehabilitative efforts in prison all militated a lesser punishment. At defense
counsel’s request, the trial court agreed to take into account Harring’s and Harring’s
mother’s testimony regarding these youth-related factors that had been presented during
the 2019 hearing on Harring’s petition.
       Nothing in the record suggests the court was unaware of the scope of its
sentencing discretion or that it failed to consider the Miller factors. (People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527 [“[I]n light of the presumption on a silent record that
the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing,
[the reviewing court] cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face
that the trial court misunderstood the scope of [its] discretion.”]; see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.409 [“[r]elevant factors enumerated in these rules must be considered by the
sentencing judge, and will be deemed to have been considered unless the record
affirmatively reflects otherwise”]; cf. Ochoa, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 853 [remand
appropriate where record is ambiguous as to whether court understood its obligation to
consider youth-related mitigating factors at sentencing before making discretionary
sentencing decision under Pen. Code, § 190.5, subd. (b)].)
       Without any indication to the contrary, we are obligated to presume the trial court
was aware of its sentencing authority and the scope of its discretion. (Denham v.
Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564 [reviewing court presumes judgment is correct
and all presumptions are indulged to support it]; see People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
861, 867 [“[i]f the record is silent” on the court’s awareness of its discretionary authority
in sentencing, it is presumed the trial court understood the scope of its discretion].) As

                                             26.
such, Harring has not established an abuse of discretion with respect to the court’s
consideration of the Miller factors in reimposing a sentence of LWOP.
       E.     Conclusion
       As Harring has pointed out, there are facts suggesting the trial court could have
exercised its discretion differently. Harring committed the crime with three of his cousins
(also juveniles) who apparently had gang affiliations—familial and peer pressures, to
which youths are uniquely vulnerable, were arguably involved in the commission of the
crime and potentially could have been weighed in Harring’s favor when assessing the
nature of the crime. Harring’s childhood history of losing his father, growing up with
only one parent, having relatives with gang affiliations, and living in a higher crime
neighborhood could have been viewed as transient and environmental vulnerabilities that
led Harring to make impulsive and reckless choices with regard to the crime. (Miller,
supra, 567 U.S. at p. 476 [among the mitigating qualities of youth are transient qualities
of immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness, and recklessness and the susceptibility to
influence and to psychological damage].) Harring’s rehabilitative efforts largely have
been made since 2015, but his testimony suggests he was unable to take advantage of
programs sooner because of his LWOP status; crediting his testimony, this could signal an
authentic desire for rehabilitation. Harring’s prison disciplinary record is significant, but
he had not been involved in any violent behavior since 2015—eight years prior to the
hearing—which could suggest that his participation in programs and education since
2015 have been paying rehabilitative dividends. Harring has maintained contact with his
family during his more than two decades in prison, including getting married, also
potentially suggestive of maturation and rehabilitation.
       These are just some examples of the different ways the trial court could have
evaluated and weighed the facts, which in turn could have supported a different
conclusion with respect to reimposing a sentence of LWOP. Yet, the trial court’s election
to weigh and analyze the facts as it did is the “very essence of the exercise of

                                             27.
‘discretion’”—the power to make “comparisons, choices, judgments, and
evaluations .…” (Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 749 [explaining
why the exercise of discretion involved in the county’s selection of a custodian for
potentially dangerous minor is immunized under Gov. Code, § 820.2].) It bears
underscoring that the abuse of discretion standard is deferential, and we review the trial
court’s decision to determine whether it was “‘arbitrary or capricious’ or otherwise
exceed[ed] the bounds of reason under the circumstances.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45
Cal.4th 375, 384, accord, People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 682.) Neither
Harring’s nor another court’s disagreement with the trial court’s decision in this case
suffices to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 377.)
       F.     Remand to a Different Trial Judge is Unwarranted
       Harring argues remand to a different trial judge is warranted because the trial court
“express[ed] some irritation at the original remand,” which, according to Harring, may
have colored its resentencing consideration. We find nothing inappropriate in the trial
court’s observation at the March 21, 2023, resentencing hearing that “because the Fifth
District has ordered a resentencing, recalling and resentencing, it was as if the defendant
had never been sentenced before.” Nor was there anything improper in the trial court’s
acknowledgment that in Harring I, we concluded Harring does not have any juvenile
felony adjudications for assault or similar crimes with a significant potential for personal
harm to victims. There is no basis to direct that further proceedings be heard before a
different trial judge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (c).)
                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior
court with directions to refer the case, within 30 days of the filing of the remittitur, to the
juvenile court for a transfer/fitness hearing in accordance with the current law.

                                              28.
       If the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Harring is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, it shall
transfer the case to criminal court, which shall then reinstate Harring’s sentence.

                                                                                MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

                                             29.