Court Opinion

ID: 9677990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:08:08.446854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.000932
License: Public Domain

Justice YÁÑEZ,
dissenting.
I join in the majority’s opinion with regard to cause numbers 13-99-604-CR, 13-99-605-CR, and 13-99-606-CR. However, I dissent from that portion of the ma-' jority opinion affirming appellant’s conviction in cause number 13-99-498-CR. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that appellant received reasonable notice of the State’s intent to use extraneous offenses at trial.
The majority acknowledges that the Waco court has held that “Friday notice” was unreasonable in Hernandez, 914 S.W.2d at 235, but distinguishes that case on the ground that the request for notice had been on file for ten months in that case, whereas the request had been on file for only six weeks in this case. While the timing of the defendant’s request for notice has some bearing on the reasonableness of the State’s notice, see, e.g., Chimney v. State, 6 S.W.3d 681, 694 (Tex. App. — Waco 1999, no pet. h.), I think the timing of the State’s notice is the more important factor. In this case, the State did not provide notice until the final business day before trial. Furthermore, the six weeks this request sat on file provided ample time for the State to respond more promptly than it did.
In Webb v. State, 2000 WL 64018, — S.W.3d — (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2000, no pet. h.) the court of appeals held that notice given on the Thursday preceding a Monday trial was unreasonable where the request had been on file for six months. While the request for notice in Webb had been pending longer than the request in this case, the defendant was given one more day’s notice than in the instant case, and the notice in Webb was still held unreasonable.
The majority also states that “in light of the fact that the defense counsel had the statement which contained the references to the extraneous offenses, the trial court may have determined that three days was an adequate period to eliminate the possibility of surprise.” However, the court of criminal appeals has held that mere awareness by the defendant that the State possesses extraneous offense evidence is insufficient; the defendant must be provided with reasonable notice of the State’s intent to use that evidence at trial. See Buchanan v. State, 911 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex.Crim. App.1995) (rejecting argument that defendant’s access to prosecution’s “open file” containing offense report detailing extraneous offenses constituted reasonable notice).
I would hold that the “Friday notice” provided in this case, where the State had six weeks to consider and comply with the request, was unreasonable, and that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce the extraneous offense evidence.
I would also hold that this error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal of the trial court’s judgment. Texas courts that have considered this issue have applied the reversible error standard of rule of appellate procedure 44.2(b). See Webb, 2000 WL 64018 at *7, at-; see also Umoja v. State, 965 S.W.2d 3, 11 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). I agree that the violation of rule 404(b) and article 37.07 § 3(g) of the code of criminal procedure is non-constitutional error, and that the proper standard for reversible error is that of rule 44.2(b).
Under rule 44.2(b), errors must be disregarded unless they “affect a substantial right.” Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is affected where the error has a substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s *825verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557, (1946). In Kotteakos, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the standard of review:
If, when all is said and done, the [reviewing court] is sure that the error did not influence the jury or had but very slight effect, the verdict and judgment should stand.... But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239.
In this case, the extraneous offense evidence informed the jury that appellant had admitted to committing the offense of aggravated sexual assault three other times in addition to the one offense he was charged with. I cannot say with fair assurance that the jury was not influenced by the knowledge of these additional offenses when it assessed appellant’s punishment. I would reverse the judgment in cause number 13-99-498-CR and remand for further proceedings.