Court Opinion

ID: 9729333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:32:11.553243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:56.974060
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: The supplemental opinion begins: “At the time of defendant’s trial, the supreme court rules did not provide for discovery at a death penalty hearing. [Citation.] Our holding in this case followed the dictates of the rules then in effect. Shortly after this opinion was filed, this court determined that the discovery rules should be extended to death penalty hearings.” 196 Ill. 2d at 387-88. Thus, the supplemental opinion expressly concedes that the original opinion rests upon a premise that no longer is valid. Oddly, however, the supplemental opinion contains not a trace of analysis as to whether the demolition of that premise actually affects the outcome of this case. Because I am convinced that the decision to vacate defendant’s death sentence cannot survive the recent amendment to Rule 411, I respectfully dissent from the supplemental opinion. Effective March 1, 2001, this court amended Supreme Court Rule 411 to state that the supreme court rules governing discovery in criminal cases “shall he applied to the separate [capital] sentencing hearing provided for in section 9 — 1(d) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9 — (d)).” (Emphasis added.) 188 Ill. 2d R. 411. Such rules include Rule 413(e), which provides that: “Upon a showing of materiality, and if the request is reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to the State of relevant material and information ***.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 413(e). As the supplemental opinion recognizes, the amended version of Rule 411 — and consequently Rule 413(e) — will apply to defendant’s new capital sentencing hearing on remand. See 196 Ill. 2d at 389. Thus, the only limitations upon the. trial court’s authority to enter the identical discovery order on remand are those set forth in Rule 413(e)—i.e., materiality, relevance, and reasonableness. Now, there is no question that information relating to defendant’s mental health is both material and relevant. Indeed, an alleged mental illness formed the cornerstone of defendant’s mitigation strategy. Likewise, there is no question that the State’s request to have defendant examined by Dr. Markos was reasonable, as defendant waited until his sentencing hearing to first raise a claim of mental illness, and the State is entitled to rebut that claim. See 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(e) (West 1998) (“[t]he State *** shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing”). Thus, assuming that Rule 413(e) applied to defendant’s original sentencing hearing, the trial court would not have abused its discretion by ordering defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination by Dr. Markos. To be sure, the amendment to Rule 411 does not undermine the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s original discovery order was improper.1 See 196 Ill. 2d at 382. An order that was unauthorized when entered remains so, irrespective of any subsequent action by this court. However, the amendment to Rule 411 unquestionably renders that error harmless. As demonstrated above, the trial court’s discovery order is perfectly appropriate under Rule 413(e), which the majority acknowledges will apply on remand. In other words, a remand will result in a new sentencing hearing at which the trial court may lawfully enter the very order that forms the basis for the remand. And the entry of that order will result in a new jury hearing the very same testimony that was heard by the original jury. I cannot discern — and the supplemental opinion does not even attempt to identify — the prejudice that defendant suffers from the entry of an order that, while improper the first time around, will be proper the second time around. Given this court’s recent amendment to Rule 411, I see no justification for the majority’s continued commitment to vacating defendant’s death sentence and remanding this cause for a new — and quite possibly identical— sentencing hearing. I therefore respectfully dissent from the supplemental opinion.  A conclusion with which I strongly disagree. See 196 Ill. 2d at 385-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).