Court Opinion

ID: 9756482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:30:36.422037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:23.594516
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that section 33 of the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act (Act)1 authorizes a county to assign tax liens. Thus, I would reverse the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) dismissing Catherine B. Maierhoffer’s complaint.
Section 33 of the Act, 53 P.S. § 7147 .(emphasis added), provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any claim filed or to be filed, under the provisions of this act, and any judgment recovered thereon, may be assigned or transferred to a third party, either absolutely or as collateral security, and such assignee shall have all the rights of the original holder thereof.
The majority interprets section 33 of the Act to mean that a municipality may assign any claim, tax or municipal, to a party that is a stranger to the original transaction. (Majority op. at 551.) For the following reasons, I cannot accept this interpretation.
The phrase “third party” in section 33 of the Act presupposes the existence of an agreement, transaction or action involving two other parties. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1479 (6 th ed.1990). Here, we are concerned with tax claims or municipal *552claims. Tax claims are in rem actions and never involve two other parties. Therefore, section 33 of the Act cannot apply to tax claims.2 Moreover, municipal claims, which are also in rem actions, only involve two other parties where the claims exist for the use of a contractor, the so-called “use-plaintiff’ claims.3 Thus, section 33 can apply only to “use-plaintiff’ municipal claims.
Moreover, the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Toward this goal, we must presume that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain and that none of the provisions of the statute are mere surplusage. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2); Masland v. Bachman, 473 Pa. 280, 374 A.2d 517 (1977). Thus, a particular section of a statute must be construed “with reference to the entire statute and not apart from its context.” Commonwealth Insurance Department v. Adrid, 24 Pa.Cmwlth. 270, 355 A.2d 597, 599 (1976). Taking section 33 in the context of the entire statute, I cannot conclude that the legislature intended counties to assign tax claims.
Here, section 33 of the Act is not the only provision of the statute that addresses the assignment of claims.4 Section 4 of the Act, 53 P.S. § 7107, authorizes certain municipal authorities to assign their municipal claims and liens to the city, borough or township in which the property subject to the claim or hen is located.5 Unlike section 33, section 4 does not require the assignment of the claim to a “third party.” Thus, to give effect to both sections of the Act, it is necessary to view section 33 as governing “use-plaintiff’ claims, which involve two other parties, and to view section 4 as governing in rem claims that do not involve two other parties. The majority’s view that section 33 governs all claims ignores this required distinction and, thus, renders section 4 of the Act without effect and superfluous. Because such construction is contrary to the presumption that the General Assembly intends every provision of the Act to have effect, I do not believe that the majority’s interpretation of section 33 of the Act can be correct.
Accordingly, I dissent.6
Judge PELLEGRINI joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. § 7147.

. In reaching a contrary result, the majority interprets the words "third party” broadly to refer to anyone who is a stranger to the transaction. (Majority op. at 550.) However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that the Act is in derogation of the common law and, thus, must be strictly construed. City of Philadelphia to Use of Montgomery Paving Co. v. Egolf, 314 Pa. 216, 171 A. 604 (1934); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928.
Moreover, in interpreting the words "third party” in section 33 of the Act, the majority relies on the common and approved usage of the terms. However, the assignment of rights to third parties is a technical area of the law. Thus, I believe that this court must rely on the technical meaning of the words "third party” in the context of the entire Act. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a).

. The only instance set forth in the Act involving two other parties in a claim is a claim that exists for the use of a contractor who is to be paid by assessment bills. See 53 P.S. § 7107. Thus, section 33 of the Act allows the assignment of such a claim.

. Parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same things, and when sections of a statute are in pari materia, they must be construed together. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932.

. The legislature authorized such assignments through a 1949 amendment to section 4 of the Act. Whenever a section of a statute is amended, the amendment shall be construed as merging into the original statute, and "the remainder of the original statute and the amendment shall be read together and viewed as one statute passed at one time.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1953.

. In addition, there may be public policy concerns that should be considered in determining whether section 33 of the Act authorizes the assignment of tax claims. For example, if a municipality could assign its tax claims, the municipality would be giving up potential income and, thus, would be increasing the tax burden on other taxpayers. However, Maier-hoffer has not raised any specific public policy arguments in her brief.