Court Opinion

ID: 9664687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:25:43.812892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:08.582224
License: Public Domain

W. O. MURRAY, Chief Justice.
• I concur in the opinion written by Associate Justice POPE. We have here a petitioner who advises us in his petition for a writ of mandamus that the trial judge has ordered him to answer certain questions propounded to him by the defendants in an oral deposition, and that he has disobeyed this order of the trial judge and intends to continue to disobey such order. The respondents, who are the defendants below, have alleged and the trial court has found, in effect, that the respondents cannot properly prepare their defense to petitioner’s suit until these questions are answered.
Petitioner does not contend that the matter inquired about is a privileged matter, but at most only contends that the trial court ruled incorrectly on a question of evidence in requiring him to answer the questions. We cannot pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the trial court on a matter of evidence, not shown to be privileged, in a mandamus proceeding. 35 Am. Jur. § 258, p. 29; 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, § 87, page 142. Such errors, if any, can be" corrected only when properly presented on appeal, and ' on a mandamus hearing we must presume such ruling of the trial to be correct. 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, § 87, page 142.
Here we have a petitioner who admits that he is the author of his own trouble; that the only reason he cannot secure a trial of his case is that he has refused to obey the solemn order of a trial judge in the very case in which he here seeks relief. All of this in the face of 'the fact that the respondents have alleged and the trial judge has found that respondents cannot properly prepare their defense until petitioner obeys the order of the trial judge and answers the questions.
What was said in Campbell v. Justices of Superior Court, 187 Mass. 509; 73 N.E. 659, 660, 69 L.R.A. 311, is so appropriate that I here quote: “And it is inconsistent with the petitioner’s contention that a plaintiff who has failed to do that which properly is required of him in the case may insist upon a trial as a matter of right. If a plaintiff prays for a decree against his adversary, we are of opinion that the principles stated in the cases first cited should-be applied to a request to proceed with the case to a final judgment, as well as to requests for preliminary favors. It is plain that misconduct of a plaintiff that is treated *320as a contempt may often be of such a kind as would make it impossible to go on with the case without great injustice to the defendant. * * * In Gordon v. Gordon, 141 Ill. 160-163, 30 N.E. 446, 21 L.R.A. 387, 33 Am.St.Rep. 294, the court said: ‘Where a complainant is in contempt, there may be cogent reasons for holding that his proceeding shall be stayed so long as he remains in contempt, under the well-known maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity.’ * * * We are of opinion that a plaintiff who is in contempt of court cannot go on with his case against the defendant as a matter of right. In many cases it would be plainly wrong to permit him to do so. It is conceivable that in others his objectionable conduct may be of such a kind; and the circumstances of the case may be such, that the court, .in the exercise of its discretion, properly may permit him to go on. In a case like the present the court ought not to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the superior court to proceed with the trial.”
Petitioner, while freely admitting that he is defying and disobeying a solemn order of a trial judge not shown to be void, is here seeking a writ of mandamus from this Court to compel that trial judge to proceed to the trial of the action in which the disobedience occurred. That we would grant petitioner a writ of mandamus under such circumstances is unthinkable.