Court Opinion

ID: 9387329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 17:06:59.772834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.915689
License: Public Domain

J-S40037-22

                                   2023 PA SUPER 68

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    KATHLEEN SHANHOLTZ                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1791 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered June 10, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0005179-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.:                                    FILED APRIL 17, 2023

        Appellant, Kathleen Shanholtz, appeals from the order entered in the

Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied her motion to waive

outstanding court costs.1 We affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

On October 4, 2021, Appellant assaulted her boyfriend during a domestic

dispute. The Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging Appellant

with simple assault and the summary offense of harassment.2 On February

____________________________________________

1 In her brief, Appellant argues that the order denying her motion to waive
outstanding court costs “constitutes an appealable final order of court
pursuant to [the] Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 341.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 10). Under the circumstances of this case, where the
order at issue disposes of Appellant’s challenge to the propriety of the costs
imposed with her judgment of sentence, we agree that the order is appealable.
See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (defining final order as order that disposes of all
claims and parties).

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1) and 2709(a)(1), respectively.
J-S40037-22

1, 2022, counsel from the public defender’s office entered her appearance on

Appellant’s behalf. Following trial, a jury found Appellant not guilty of simple

assault. Nevertheless, the court found Appellant guilty of harassment. On

March 4, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to pay the costs of prosecution

with no further penalty.   Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a

notice of appeal.

      On April 29, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to waive outstanding court

costs. In it, Appellant indicated that the court ordered her to pay $237.75 in

costs. Appellant complained that she “is financially unable to pay the costs

because her sole source of income is Social Security Disability and child

support payments.” (Motion, filed 4/29/22, at ¶3). Citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 706,

Appellant insisted that the court possessed the discretion to waive the costs.

(See id. at ¶6).

      The court conducted a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2022. At that

time, Appellant submitted evidence regarding her income. Appellant provided

the court with a Social Security benefit verification letter indicating that

Appellant received $967.00 per month. (See Appellant’s Exhibit D1, entered

6/10/22, at 1). Appellant also claimed that she received food stamps and

medical assistance, she had $80.00 in her bank account, her car was worth

$4,000.00, and she received an additional $196.00 per month in child support.

(See N.T. Hearing, 6/10/22, at 3-4). At the end of the hearing, the court

deemed the costs at issue to be “reasonable,” and it denied Appellant’s

                                     -2-
J-S40037-22

motion. (Id. at 5). The court, however, extended the period for Appellant to

pay the costs, giving her “up to 12 months” to complete payment. (Id.)

      Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 6, 2022. In conjunction

with the notice of appeal, Appellant also filed verification of her continuing in

forma pauperis status. That same day, the court ordered Appellant to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On

July 27, 2022, Appellant timely filed her Rule 1925(b) statement.

      Appellant now raises one issue on appeal:

         Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to waive
         outstanding court costs where Appellant is indigent and has
         no present or future ability to pay?

(Appellant’s Brief at 7).

      Appellant maintains that she cannot pay her outstanding court costs.

Appellant reiterates that she is indigent, and she is not employable due to a

disability. Appellant acknowledges that she receives some income through

Social Security, but these funds are exhausted after she pays for her rent and

other daily living expenses. Under these circumstances, Appellant insists that

Rule 706 provided the court with the discretion to waive the outstanding costs.

Appellant concludes that the court erred in denying her motion to waive

outstanding costs. We disagree.

      The resolution of Appellant’s issue requires an examination of the type

of relief available pursuant to Rule 706. “The interpretation of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure presents a question of law and … our standard of review

                                      -3-
J-S40037-22

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Dowling,

598 Pa. 611, 616, 959 A.2d 910, 913 (2008).

     Rule 706 governs the payment of fines or costs as follows:

        Rule 706. Fines or Costs

           (A) A court shall not commit the defendant to prison
        for failure to pay a fine or costs unless it appears after
        hearing that the defendant is financially able to pay the fine
        or costs.

           (B) When the court determines, after hearing, that the
        defendant is without the financial means to pay the fine or
        costs immediately or in a single remittance, the court may
        provide for payment of the fines or costs in such
        installments and over such period of time as it deems to be
        just and practicable, taking into account the financial
        resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden its
        payments will impose, as set forth in paragraph (D) below.

           (C) The court, in determining the amount and method
        of payment of a fine or costs shall, insofar as is just and
        practicable, consider the burden upon the defendant by
        reason of the defendant’s financial means, including the
        defendant’s ability to make restitution or reparations.

           (D) In cases in which the court has ordered payment
        of a fine or costs in installments, the defendant may request
        a rehearing on the payment schedule when the defendant is
        in default of a payment or when the defendant advises the
        court that such default is imminent. At such hearing, the
        burden shall be on the defendant to prove that his or her
        financial condition has deteriorated to the extent that the
        defendant is without the means to meet the payment
        schedule. Thereupon the court may extend or accelerate
        the payment schedule or leave it unaltered, as the court
        finds to be just and practicable under the circumstances of
        record. When there has been default and the court finds the
        defendant is not indigent, the court may impose
        imprisonment as provided by law for nonpayment.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 706.

                                    -4-
J-S40037-22

       “Rule 706 requires the court to determine the defendant’s ability to pay

prior to committing [her] to prison for a default but no sooner.”

Commonwealth v. Lopez, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 280 A.3d 887, 901 (2022). In

Lopez, our Supreme Court analyzed Rule 706 and various cases dealing with

the interplay between a defendant’s indigent status and the payment of fines

and costs. Lopez expressly held that “Rule 706(C) does not require a trial

court to consider a defendant’s ability to pay prior to imposing mandatory

court costs at sentencing.” Id. at ___, 280 A.3d at 910-11. In reaching this

conclusion, the Court evaluated its prior decision in Commonwealth v. Ford,

655 Pa. 255, 266, 217 A.3d 824, 831 (2019), which held that the defendant

“received an illegal sentence when the trial court imposed non-mandatory

fines without any evidence that [the defendant] was (or would be) able to pay

them.” Regarding Ford, the Lopez Court observed: “[I]n specifying that only

the ‘non-mandatory fines’ were illegal, Ford indicated the sentencing court

lacked discretion to modify or waive mandatory fines or costs.” Id.

___, 280 A.3d at 901 (emphasis added).3

       Instantly, Appellant’s motion to waive outstanding court costs stated

____________________________________________

3  In its brief, the Commonwealth states that “the costs imposed upon
Appellant were mandatory.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 8) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9721(c.1), 9728(b.2)). Appellant’s brief does not address the mandatory
nature of the costs. The certified record, however, includes a copy of the
itemized account of costs. (See Appellant’s Exhibit D1, entered 6/16/22, at
2). The itemized account confirms that the costs at issue were mandatory
court costs. See Lopez, supra at ___, 280 A.3d at 901 (distinguishing
between “non-mandatory fines” and “mandatory fines or costs”).

                                           -5-
J-S40037-22

that she could not pay the court-ordered costs due to her limited income.

Based upon the averments in Appellant’s motion, the court conducted a

hearing on the matter. At that time, Appellant presented evidence regarding

her income and expenses. The court considered the evidence, determined

that the costs at issue were “very low and reasonable,” and ordered Appellant

to pay the costs over the course of twelve months. (See N.T. Hearing at 5).

     Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the court complied with Rule 706.

Specifically, the court provided Appellant with relief by allowing payment of

the costs “in such installments and over such period of time” as the court

deemed to be just. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(B). Significantly, Rule 706 does

not provide the court with authority to waive the costs completely. See id.

See also Lopez, supra. Rather, if Appellant remains unable to pay under

the new installment plan, she may request a rehearing where the court has

the option to extend the payment schedule.        See Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(D).

Because our review leads us to conclude that the court adhered to the

mandates of Rule 706, we affirm the order denying Appellant’s motion.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2023

                                    -6-