Court Opinion

ID: 9719824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:05:44.117766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:10.379410
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: The majority has offered several reasons for skirting the merits of defendant’s arguments, including waiver by defense counsel and a failure to show prejudice. However, in my opinion, we cannot and should not allow such reasons as these to preclude our consideration of such a fundamental right as trial before an impartial jury. Accordingly, even if this point was waived through the lack of a specific objection, I deem this an appropriate case in which to exercise discretionary review under Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 615(a)). In my opinion, prejudice through the substitution of jurors in this case was manifest in light of the mandatory language of section 115 — 4(g), which reads in relevant part: “If before the final submission of a cause a member of the jury dies or is discharged he shall be replaced by an alternate juror in the order of selection.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 115 — 4(g).) (Emphasis added.) While the above language is silent concerning the use of alternate jurors after the commencement of deliberation, it impliedly indicates that such use is contrary to, and not authorized by, the statute. The majority discounts the significance of United States v. Lamb (9th . Cir. 1975), 529 F.2d 1153, which construed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), a provision nearly identical to section 115 — 4(g). That rule reads in pertinent part: “Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict or become or are found to be unable or disqualified * # In holding that the language of this statute is mandatory, the court in Lamb was of the opinion that the prejudice resulting from the inherent coercive effect upon an alternate juror who joined a jury that had commenced deliberations is substantial. Further, to allow substitution under such circumstances would, according to Lamb, create the opportunity for a juror who could not or would not vote a guilty verdict for reasons of conscience, to secure an alternate to replace him. I consider Lamb a persuasive precedent. The crime of murder is indeed heinous, an offense for which the culpable should without a doubt be punished. But every person is entitled to a fair trial and to have his case determined by a jury free from the interference of an unauthorized person, no matter how conclusive the evidence against him. (People v. Kawoleski, 313 Ill. 257,14 N.E.2d 203.) The use of an alternate juror in this case was improper. The mandatory phraseology of section 115 — 4(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 115 — 4(g)) precludes the use of alternate jurors after deliberations have been initiated. It is my opinion that in unusual situations such as these where a serious doubt is raised as to the partiality of a juror, a defendant’s right to a fair trial should never give way to the interests of judicial economy. I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.