Court Opinion

ID: 9891471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 18:00:44.481328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:24.850442
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 18 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FAWN MICHELLE ACUNA,                            No.    22-16575

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00360-DJH

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Arizona
                   Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted October 16, 2023**
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: IKUTA, BADE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      Fawn Acuna appeals from a district court decision affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Social Security

disability benefits. “We ‘review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of social security benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the

decision contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.’”

Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue,

533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm.

      1. The ALJ did not err in assigning less weight to the opinions of Acuna’s

treating physicians. Because Acuna applied for benefits before March 27, 2017, the

ALJ was required to evaluate the medical opinion evidence under 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527.1 Under those regulations, “[i]f a treating or examining doctor’s opinion

is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s specific and legitimate reasons for

determining that Acuna’s limitations were less severe than Dr. Robinson and

Dr. Teff indicated.

      The ALJ concluded that Dr. Robinson’s check-box assessment was entitled to

little weight because of its conclusory nature and because Dr. Robinson’s sparse

treatment notes did not provide a sufficient explanation for his assessment.

1
 New regulations govern claims filed after March 27, 2017, but they do not apply
here. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c; Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 789 (9th Cir.
2022).

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Substantial evidence supports that determination, as an “ALJ need not accept the

opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief,

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart,

278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

      The ALJ also provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by

substantial evidence for discounting Dr. Teff’s opinion. As the ALJ explained,

Dr. Teff’s opinion that Acuna had “extreme limitations” was inconsistent with his

own exam notes and with other evidence in the record documenting Acuna’s

“normal motor strength, sensation, and reflexes.” Inconsistencies in the medical

record provide a valid basis for discounting a medical provider’s opinion. Ford v.

Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, we conclude that the ALJ

reasonably weighed the medical evidence. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (“[T]he

ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical

evidence.” (citation omitted)).

      2. For substantially similar reasons, the ALJ did not err in assigning little

weight to the opinion of Acuna’s psychologist, Dr. Geary. The ALJ explained that

Dr. Geary’s assessment of Acuna’s “marked or extreme” social limitations was

inconsistent with evidence concerning Acuna’s demeanor, living situation, and

positive interactions with friends and family. The ALJ also found that Dr. Geary’s

opinion about Acuna’s concentration was “internally inconsistent” with his testing

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results. As previously noted, these types of inconsistencies qualify as specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s opinion. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154.

Dr. Geary’s vague descriptions of Acuna’s limitations provided another appropriate

reason for affording less weight to his opinion. See id. at 1156 (affirming an ALJ’s

discounting of an examining physician’s assessment using the generic descriptions

of “fair” and “limited”).

      3. The ALJ gave “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting

Acuna’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2014)). We reject Acuna’s argument that the ALJ “cherry-pick[ed]” evidence

to discount her pain, migraines, and psychiatric conditions. The ALJ credited certain

aspects of Acuna’s testimony, but identified other portions of the testimony that were

inconsistent with Acuna’s exam records and treatment history. “When objective

medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective

testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v.

Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022).

      In addition, the ALJ appropriately considered Acuna’s condition and

treatment history during the entire period at issue. The ALJ’s findings that Acuna’s

symptoms improved with treatment provided substantial evidence for discounting

Acuna’s testimony. See Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017)

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(“[E]vidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine

a claim of disability.” (citations omitted)).

      Finally, the ALJ’s findings with respect to Acuna’s mental and social

disabilities are also supported by substantial evidence.     Contrary to Acuna’s

assertions, the ALJ did not penalize her for being hospitalized only once. Rather,

the ALJ appropriately described Acuna’s hospitalization history in considering

whether her treatment matched the severity of her self-reported symptoms. The

ALJ’s findings that Acuna’s alleged mental and social limitations were inconsistent

with her attempts to find work and complete a bachelor’s degree were also supported

by substantial evidence. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499–500.

      AFFIRMED.

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