Court Opinion

ID: 9855729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:29:57.957943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:30.616129
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
The majority’s opinion holds the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion in limine to prohibit evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts. The majority further holds the trial court erred in aggravating defendant’s sentence beyond the presumptive maximum without submitting that issue to the jury. I concur with the analysis and holding in the majority’s opinion concerning defendant’s motion in limine and the decision to remand for resentencing.
The majority’s opinion further holds the trial court erred and violated defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights to have a fair and non-prejudicial trial by the trial judge’s conduct and statements toward defense counsel in the presence of the jury. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding to award defendant a new trial.
I. Trial Court’s Comments Before the Jury and During Trial
A trial judge’s unique position and duties in court commands respect and deference. “ ‘[Jjurors entertain great respect for [a *472judge’s] opinion, and are easily influenced by any suggestion coming from him [or her]. As a consequence, he [or she] must abstain from conduct or language which tends to discredit or prejudice’ any litigant in his [or her] courtroom.” State v. Brinkley, 159 N.C. App. 446, 447, 583 S.E.2d 335, 337 (2003) (quoting McNeill v. Durham County ABC Bd., 322 N.C. 425, 429, 368 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1988) (quoting State v. Carter, 233 N.C. 581, 583, 65 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1951)).
This Court has recognized that “not every improper remark made by the trial judge requires a new trial. When considering an improper remark in light of the circumstances under which it was made, the underlying result may manifest mere harmless error.” State v. Summerlin, 98 N.C. App. 167, 174, 390 S.E.2d 358, 361 (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 143, 394 S.E.2d 183 (1990). “Whether the accused was deprived of a fair trial by the challenged remarks [of the trial judge] must be determined by what was said and its probable effect upon the jury in light of all attendant circumstances, the burden of showing prejudice being upon the appellant." State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 388, 392, 255 S.E.2d 366, 369 (1979) (emphasis supplied).
Defendant argues, and the majority’s opinion agrees, the trial judge’s comments belittled defense counsel before the jury and prejudiced defendant to warrant a new trial. All comments defendant contends were prejudicial were addressed solely to his counsel. None were directed at him.
We have instructed that “care should be taken to conduct such reprimands [of counsel] outside the presence of the jury to ensure the court does not prejudice the jury against defendant.” Brinkley, 159 N.C. App. at 450, 583 S.E.2d at 338 (comments were made in the presence of the jury). As in previous cases,
when all the incidents raised by defendant, particularly . .. [those done in the presence of the jury], are viewed in light of their cumulative effect upon the jury, we are compelled to hold that the atmosphere of the trial was tainted by the trial judge’s comments to the detriment of defendant.

Id.

The majority’s opinion awards defendant a new trial based on five cited comments by the presiding judge and a statement made by alternate juror number two. Unlike the cases cited in the majority’s opinion, the record here shows the majority of the judge’s comments were *473not in the jury’s presence. Comments made were in the presence of the jury may have been inappropriate, but defendant has failed to show the comments made were so prejudicial to justify awarding defendant a new trial.
Every defendant is entitled to “a fair trial before an impartial judge.” State v. Miller, 288 N.C. 582, 598, 220 S.E.2d 326, 337 (1975). As in State v. Mack, defendant here failed to “met his heavy burden of proving the trial judge’s remarks deprived him of a fair trial and caused a prejudicial effect on the outcome.” 161 N.C. App. 595, 600, 589 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2003) (citing State v. Waters, 87 N.C. App. 502, 504, 361 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1987)).
The majority’s opinion sets out a conversation between the trial judge and alternate juror number two as further grounds to grant defendant a new trial, quoting alternate juror number two as being “scared of the judge.” Alternate juror number one also participated in that conversation. Alternate juror number one stated:
Alternate 1: I’ve never been scared.
Court: Well, you should be.
Alternate 1: Oh, really. I’ve enjoyed this. But I’m not frightened or anything. I’ve certainly enjoyed it.
Court: Really. That’s good. We rarely hear anything positive ....
The majority’s opinion cites Faircloth and considers their notion of the effect of the judge’s comments on the jury and juror number two’s answers to the judge’s question as evidence of any alleged negative effect. The majority’s opinion disregards alternate juror number one’s comments and inordinately weighs alternate juror number two’s response as the pulse of the jury. In Faircloth, the trial judge’s prejudicial comments were made in the presence of the jury. 297 N.C. at 392, 255 S.E.2d at 369. The comments the majority holds to be prejudicial were not said in front of the jury.
Defendant has not met his heavy burden in proving any prejudicial effect of the comments. Mack, 161 N.C. App. at 600, 589 S.E.2d at 172 (holding the burden of showing prejudice is upon the appellant). A judge cannot know the “fear” or lack of fear jurors may hold. One alternate juror’s opinion or alleged fears are insufficient to dictate a new trial.
*474Defendant was tried for two counts of statutory rape, two counts of indecent liberties with a minor, and two counts of statutory sex offense. The jury convicted defendant only on the lesser offenses of taking indecent liberties with a child. The jury’s acquittal of defendant for the far more serious charges he faced is evidence the jury was not “scared” or in “fear” of the trial judge.
The majority’s opinion further states the fine imposed for defense counsel’s repeated use of the word “okay” tainted the atmosphere or the “judicial calm” of the trial. Brinkley, 159 N.C. App. at 450, 583 S.E.2d at 338. The conversation between the trial judge and defense counsel about this fine did not occur in the presence of the jury. Defense counsel was told at the close of the trial no fine would be imposed.
Since our holding in Mack, our Supreme Court, citing Mack and several other cases, has again censured this trial judge for inappropriate comments and conduct during trials. In Re Hill, 359 N.C. 308, 308, 609 S.E.2d 221, 221 (2005) (“we conclude that Judge Hill’s actions constitute conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 3A(2), and 3A(3) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.”).
A trial judge should avoid inappropriate and unprofessional renditions of personal opinions or experiences which are extraneous to the issues at trial and issue reprimands, if necessary, to parties or their counsel out of the jury’s presence. Brinkley, 159 N.C. App. at 450, 583 S.E.2d at 338. Procedures are available to this Court, the Bar, and the public to challenge inappropriate judicial conduct and to recommend appropriate remedial measures. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-376 (2003).
The trial court’s comments in the presence of the jury may have been inappropriate, but defendant has failed to show these comments were prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Mack, 161 N.C. App. at 600, 589 S.E.2d at 172.
II. Conclusion
I concur with the majority’s opinion to: (1) affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion in limine as to a prior bad act; (2) vacate the aggravated sentence and remanding for a new sentencing hearing. State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256 (2005); State v. Speight, 359 N.C. 602, 614 S.E.2d 262 (2005).
Defendant has failed to show the trial court’s comments to his counsel either in or out of the presence of the jury prejudiced his case *475to warrant a new trial. Summerlin, 98 N.C. App. at 174, 390 S.E.2d at 361. Defendant has failed to meet his “heavy burden” to show a violation of his constitutional and statutory rights to have a fair and nonprejudicial trial. Any alleged error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. I respectfully dissent from awarding defendant a new trial.