Court Opinion

ID: 9407628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 18:01:02.447008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.276100
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM BERNAL; CELIA               No. 22-15690
BERNAL,
                                       D.C. No.
         Plaintiffs-Appellants,     2:19-cv-00482-
                                       MCE-AC
 v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY                     OPINION
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;
HINKLEY, Sacramento County
Sheriff Deputy; SCOTT JONES,
Sacramento County Sheriff;
RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE
DEPARTMENT; FOLSOM POLICE
DEPARTMENT; BRADSHAW,
Folsom Police Officer; COUCH,
Sergeant; WINKEL, Sacramento
County Sheriff Deputy; KENNEDY,
Sacramento County Sheriff Deputy;
SUTTER, Sacramento County Sheriff
Deputy; CHHLANG, Sacramento
County Sheriff Deputy; BLISS,
Sacramento County Sheriff Deputy;
QUACKENBUSH, Sacramento
County Sheriff Deputy,

         Defendants-Appellees.
2        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

       Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Eastern District of California
     Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted March 31, 2023
                 San Francisco, California

                        Filed July 7, 2023

    Before: Ronald M. Gould and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit
        Judges, and James V. Selna, * District Judge.

                     Opinion by Judge Selna

                          SUMMARY **

                           Civil Rights

    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court’s summary judgment in favor of Sacramento
County Sheriffs’ Deputies in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action that
presents the question of whether and to what extent law
enforcement may detain people who are not suspected of
engaging in criminal activity but who have information
essential to preventing a threatened school shooting.

*
 The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
**
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         3

     The Deputies encountered Celia and William Bernal
(collectively “the Bernals”) at their home during the
Deputies’ investigation into allegations that the Bernals’ son
Ryan planned a shooting at his school that day. During the
interaction, the Deputies held Celia’s arms and used a twist-
lock to prevent her from leaving. The Deputies also pointed
a firearm at William, forcibly restrained him, and put him in
handcuffs.
    The district court held that the Deputies did not violate
the Fourth Amendment by detaining the Bernals even in the
absence of reasonable suspicion. The district court further
found that the Deputies did not use excessive force during
the Bernals’ detention and, even if they had, qualified
immunity applied.
    Tha panel first considered whether the initial seizure of
the Bernals was reasonable. Because the Bernals were
detained but not arrested, the reasonableness of their
detention depends on a balance between the public interest
and the individual’s right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers. To justify the
suspicionless seizure of a material witness, there must be
exigencies requiring immediate action, the gravity of the
public interest must be great, and the detention must be
minimally intrusive. Applying these principles, the panel
held that the Deputies had limited authority to briefly detain
and question the Bernals about Ryan’s location due
primarily to the exigencies inherent in preventing an
imminent school shooting. This holding was predicated on
two key facts: first, the Deputies knew the Bernals had
information crucial to stopping a potential mass shooting—
the suspected shooter’s location; and second, there was an
ongoing emergency threatening numerous lives which
required immediate action. The panel further held that it
4       BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

need not set a definitive rule for the maximum length a non-
suspect witness detention may last because the detention
here lasted approximately twenty minutes, far less than
previous detentions that the court has considered. The
Deputies’ continued detention of Celia after she informed
the Deputies she did not want to speak with them did not
exceed this boundary. William’s initial detention was
likewise permissible, up to a point.
    The panel next considered the Bernals’ Fourth
Amendment claims of excessive force. The district court
found the amount of force used against both Celia and
William reasonable under the circumstances. The panel
concluded that the district court was correct in its analysis
regarding Celia but erred as to William.
    First, as to Celia, the panel held that the nature and
quality of the Deputies’ intrusion was slight because the
Deputies utilized a minimal amount of force on
Celia. Moreover, the Deputies utilized warnings and less
intrusive     means      before     resorting    to   physical
coercion. Weighing the Deputies’ minimal use of force
against the government’s interests, the panel applied the
factors outlined in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989). Factors considered in analyzing the government’s
interest include: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2)
whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect actively
resisted arrest or attempted to escape. The panel weighed
the first Graham factor slightly in favor of the Deputies
because, by disregarding the Deputies’ commands, Celia
prolonged a dire emergency situation. The panel weighed
the second and most important Graham factor in favor of
Celia because merely being behind the wheel of an
operational vehicle does not automatically create a safety
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         5

hazard; any threat to officer safety was minimal and quickly
mitigated. The panel weighed the third Graham factor in
favor of the Deputies because Celia was uncooperative, and
refused to comply with the Deputies’ requests to exit the
vehicle. Only then did the Deputies restrain her, using holds
on both her arms. The panel held that this type of minimal
force was reasonable to prevent continued resistance or
flight. On balance, the panel concluded that the Deputies’
use of force against Celia was reasonable under the
circumstances.
    Next, the panel concluded that the district court erred in
finding that the Deputies’ use of force against William was
not excessive. The intrusion on William’s liberty was too
great in the context of detaining a non-suspect
witness. According to William, the Deputies pointed a gun
at him, kicked his legs apart, turned his head beyond its
natural range of motion, kicked his knees to force his legs to
buckle, smashed his head into the hood of the car, and tightly
handcuffed him, resulting in a great deal of pain. Applying
the Graham factors, the first Graham factor weighed in favor
of Deputies, but only slightly. The Deputies did not suspect
William of committing a crime when they first arrived at the
Bernals’ home, and asserted they had probable cause to
arrest William when he physically resisted their attempts to
detain him. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Bernals, the panel found a triable issue of fact
regarding whether the Deputies’ commands to William were
lawful because verbally challenging and recording officers
are not illegal actions, and thus commands to cease such
actions are not lawful orders. Nevertheless, the unfolding
emergency of a threatened school shooting must be taken
into account. The second and most important Graham factor
weighed in favor of William because a genuine dispute of
6       BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

material fact remained as to whether William reached into
an unsearched bag, and the undisputed facts reflected that
the Deputies knew William was unarmed, undermining their
claim that they feared for their safety. On the third Graham
factor, to the extent William actively resisted the Deputies’
attempts to restrain him, this factor weighed only slightly in
favor of the Deputies. Weighing all relevant factors, the
panel found that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Deputies by disregarding genuine disputes
of material fact. The panel also found that the Deputies used
excessive force when they violently detained William
despite knowing he was unarmed and posed no reasonable
threat to officer safety.
    Having found that the Deputies violated William’s
Fourth Amendment rights, the panel considered whether the
Deputies were nonetheless entitled to qualified
immunity. The panel concluded that the Deputies violated
clearly established law whether they accepted the Bernals’
or the Deputies’ account of events. Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Bernals, William never
reached into his bag, and instead yelled at the Deputies to
stop assaulting his wife and attempted to record the
Deputies. Williams’ recording of the incident and his
verbally challenging of the police were not only legal actions
but were protected by the First Amendment. Even if the
Deputies’ account of events is taken as true, the Deputies
were on notice that merely reaching into an unsearched bag,
without more, could not reasonably lead to an inference that
William was armed such that the use of force was
justified. Finally, once it became apparent that William held
a cell phone, and not a weapon, the officers were on notice
they could not violently restrain him.
         BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T                 7

    Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment as to Celia and reversed as to
William. Because the panel reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on William’s Fourth
Amendment claims, it reinstated William’s pendent state law
claims.

                            COUNSEL

Matthew Becker (argued), Becker Law Practice,
Sacramento, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Nicole M. Cahill (argued) and Van Longyear, Longyear &
Lavra LLP, Sacramento, California, for Defendants-
Appellees.

                            OPINION

SELNA, District Judge:

    This case asks us to decide the extent of law enforcement
officers’ authority to detain non-suspect witnesses, and how
much force, if any, may be used to effectuate such
detentions. Six Sacramento County Sheriffs’ Deputies
(collectively “the Deputies”) encountered Celia and William
Bernal (collectively “the Bernals”) 1 at their home during the
Deputies’ investigation into allegations that the Bernals’ son

1
 Because this case involves multiple members of the Bernal family, we
will refer to each Bernal by their first name (e.g., Celia, William, or
Ryan) when discussing them individually and “the Bernals” when
discussing them collectively.
8       BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

Ryan planned a shooting at his school that day. During the
interaction, the Deputies held Celia’s arms and used a twist-
lock to prevent her from leaving. The Deputies also pointed
a firearm at William, forcibly restrained him, and put him in
handcuffs. Based on these actions, the Bernals filed a
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Deputies and the
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department alleging, among
other things, violations of their Fourth Amendment rights.
    The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Deputies, concluding the Deputies did not violate the
Fourth Amendment by detaining the Bernals even in the
absence of reasonable suspicion. The district court further
found that the Deputies did not use excessive force during
the Bernals’ detention and, even if they had, qualified
immunity applied. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    At approximately 10:00 a.m. on March 5, 2018, six
deputies from the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department
responded to a request for help in finding Ryan Bernal, a
student at Vista Del Lago High School who was absent that
day. The Folsom Police Department received information
that Ryan sent a text to his friend saying he intended to
“shoot up the school, and today [March 5, 2018] was the
day.” Deputies Winkel, Kennedy, Couch, Sutter, Chhlang,
Bliss, and Quackenbush, all of whom were in uniform,
responded to the call.
    The Deputies met in a parking lot near the Bernals’ home
for approximately ten minutes to coordinate their efforts and
gather more information. Deputy Chhlang performed a
premises history check on Ryan’s residence which identified
Celia and William, whom the Deputies presumed to be
Ryan’s parents, as residents of the home. Deputy Winkel
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T       9

performed a weapons check on the home which showed no
firearms registered to the address or in any of the Bernals’
names.
    Deputy Chhlang called Celia, identified himself as a
deputy with the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office,
informed Celia about the threats Ryan allegedly made, and
asked to speak with Ryan. Celia responded that Ryan was
not at home but was at his grandmother’s house. She refused
to provide the address. According to Celia, she did not give
Ryan’s location because the number Deputy Chhlang called
from was blocked. Since she could not verify whether
Deputy Chhlang was, indeed, a member of law enforcement,
she did not want to give a stranger her son’s location.
    The Deputies proceeded to the Bernals’ home in six
marked patrol cars and parked around the cul-de-sac in front
of the house. As the Deputies walked up to the Bernals’
driveway, they saw Celia and William exiting the home and
heading towards their car. They did not see Ryan or anyone
matching his description. The Deputies intended to briefly
detain the Bernals to ask them about Ryan’s location.
   A. Celia’s Interaction with the Deputies
    Deputies Chhlang and Kennedy approached Celia, who
appeared agitated and was talking very loudly. Deputies
Chhlang and Kennedy identified themselves as law
enforcement and asked to speak to her. Celia again informed
the Deputies that Ryan was not at home, stated she did not
want to speak to them any further, and proceeded to enter
her vehicle. Deputy Kennedy stood behind Celia’s car and
ordered her to stay out of her vehicle; she ignored him and
got in. Deputy Kennedy then ordered Celia to exit the
vehicle, but she again ignored him and remained inside.
10        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

    The parties dispute whether Celia actually started the car,
but at least two deputies saw that the vehicle’s tail lights had
illuminated. Believing the car to have started, Deputy
Kennedy, still behind the vehicle, tapped on the rear window
to warn Celia not to back up, then moved to the driver’s side.
Deputy Kennedy reached through the driver’s side window
to remove the keys from the car, but Celia blocked him from
doing so. Deputies Kennedy and Chhlang proceeded to take
hold of Celia’s left forearm while Deputy Winkel held
Celia’s right arm from the passenger side in a twist lock. 2
Celia called out for William to record the Deputies
restraining her. After William had been handcuffed, Celia
stopped resisting. Deputies Winkel and Kennedy removed
her from her car and told her to sit in a plastic chair in her
yard. Celia was not placed in handcuffs.
     B. William’s Interaction with the Deputies
    As Deputies Chhlang, Kennedy, and Winkel spoke to
and restrained Celia, William, standing at 6 feet 3 inches and
weighing 290 pounds, was in front of Celia’s car and placed
a small duffel bag on the hood. The parties present differing
accounts of what happened next.
    According to the Bernals, William did not reach into the
bag and instead had his cell phone in his hands from the time
he stepped out of his house until he was placed in handcuffs.
When Celia told William to record the Deputies’ use of force
against her, William held his cell phone with both hands to
record the interaction and yelled at the officers to stop
touching Celia. Celia stated that she was watching William

2
 A twist-lock is a type of control hold which uses pain to gain control.
After a twist-lock is applied, most people bend forward on account of the
pain.
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         11

the entire time and saw that he never reached into the bag on
the car’s hood.
    According to Deputy Bliss, who stood at approximately
5 foot 7 inches and weighed 160 pounds, William
“aggressively” reached into the bag. Worried that William
could be retrieving a weapon, Deputy Bliss aimed his
firearm at William, ordering him to put his hands up.
William did not comply and instead continued yelling,
pulled out his cell phone from the bag, and raised it with both
hands. Deputy Bliss recognized the cell phone was not a
weapon, holstered his firearm, and helped Deputy Chhlang,
approximately the same size as Deputy Bliss, get William’s
hands behind his back. Deputy Chhlang reported a similar
account of events, including that he saw William reach into
the bag, heard Deputy Bliss tell William to take his hands
out of the bag and raise them, and saw that William was
holding a cell phone, not a weapon.
    Another deputy and a third party also recalled William’s
use of his phone. Deputy Winkel reported hearing William
say “he was going to record the whole thing.” Gary Turner,
a third-party witness, stated that he saw William holding his
phone, filming the deputies, and yelling. Turner further
recalled that the Deputies told William to put his phone away
and calm down.
    Importantly, the parties do not dispute that the Deputies
quickly recognized the object he held was a cell phone and
not a weapon. Despite acknowledging that William had not
retrieved a weapon, the Deputies proceeded to forcibly
restrain William. In addition to wrenching William’s arms
behind his back, the Deputies pushed William’s head into
the hood of the car. William also stated that the Deputies
kicked his legs apart and forced his knees to buckle, putting
12      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

the full force of his torso on the hood of the car and forcing
his head to turn past its natural range of motion. Deputies
Bliss and Chhlang contended they did not touch his legs or
knees.
     As he was attempting to handcuff William, Deputy
Chhlang felt William elbow him in the chest. Deputy
Chhlang interpreted this as resistance and pushed William
forward onto the hood of Celia’s car to gain leverage and
utilized a rear twist-lock. William later stated he did not hit
any of the Deputies, although he did recall twisting away
from the Deputies’ holds to relieve the pain from his
surgically repaired shoulders.
    As the Deputies restrained William, Celia yelled that
they were hurting William due to his recent surgery. After
the Deputies initially handcuffed William, they used a
second pair of handcuffs to create a “daisy chain,” allowing
William’s shoulders more room. The Deputies then placed
William in the back of one of their squad cars for less than
ten minutes. In total, the interaction lasted approximately
twenty minutes.
    After restraining William and Celia, the Deputies
confirmed that Ryan was at his grandmother’s house.
William provided the address, and the Bernals led the
Deputies to Ryan’s grandmother’s house at approximately
10:45 a.m. Ryan was arrested by the Folsom Police
Department and pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor
violation of California Penal Code Section 422 for making
threats to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily
injury to another person. He was also charged with, but was
not convicted of and did not plead guilty to, unlawfully
possessing a firearm.
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T          13

            PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The Bernals filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California against the Deputies
and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department alleging,
among other things, violations of their Fourth Amendment
rights. The Deputies moved for summary judgment on all
claims. The district court granted the Deputies’ motion as to
the federal claims, finding no genuine dispute of material
fact that the initial seizure and the Deputies’ use of force
were reasonable. In addressing qualified immunity, the
district court stated in a footnote that, even if a jury found
the seizure or use of force unreasonable, qualified immunity
would apply because the Bernals had failed to present any
on-point cases. The court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the Bernals’ pendent state law causes of
action. The Bernals now timely appeal the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment
claims.
                STANDARD OF REVIEW
    On appeal, a district court’s ruling on a motion for
summary judgment is reviewed de novo, viewing all
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986); Del. Valley Surgical Supply, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008). A district
court’s ruling on whether an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity is also reviewed de novo. Glenn v. Washington
County, 673 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2011).
                       DISCUSSION
     The Bernals argue the district court erred by finding their
initial seizure reasonable, the Deputies’ use of force
14       BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

reasonable, and that qualified immunity applied. We address
each argument in turn.
     A. Fourth Amendment Claim for Unreasonable Seizure
    The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the
people to be free from unreasonable seizures. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. “No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
    In safeguarding this right, the Fourth Amendment
protects individuals from both unreasonable detentions and
excessive force used during the detention. See Torres v.
Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2021). The rule defining when
the Fourth Amendment permits seizures is well-established:
absent an exception, the government may not detain an
individual unless there is, at a minimum, reasonable
suspicion the individual is engaging in criminal activity. See
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82
(1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
     It is undisputed that the Bernals were detained within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that, prior to their
initial seizure, the Bernals were not suspected of any
criminal wrongdoing. The controversy, then, is whether
their seizure was reasonable notwithstanding the lack of
reasonable suspicion. Because the Bernals were detained
but not arrested, the reasonableness of their detention
“depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the
individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers.’” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T        15

51 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
109 (1977) (per curiam)). Thus, we weigh “the gravity of
the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Id.
       1. Legal Framework
    This case presents a particularly unique question:
whether and to what extent law enforcement may detain
people who are not suspected of engaging in criminal
activity but who have information essential to preventing a
threatened school shooting. Generally, when no reasonable
suspicion exists, police have no authority to detain. See City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
However, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to
this general rule in certain circumstances, permitting the
detention of non-suspect witnesses for the purpose of
obtaining information. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419,
423–24 (2004). In contemplating this exception, we
concluded that the government’s interest is greatly decreased
when detaining non-suspect witnesses. See Maxwell v.
County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013)
(en banc). Thus, until now, we have not upheld a
suspicionless witness detention because the government’s
interests in solving crime did not outweigh the individuals’
liberty interests. See id.; United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d
162, 169 (9th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
    We first explored whether law enforcement may detain
a witness for the purpose of questioning them about the
crime of a third person in Ward. 488 F.2d at 169. There,
FBI agents searching for federal fugitives wanted to question
a motorist whom they believed had information relevant to
their investigation. Id. at 163. Considering the unique
16      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

factual nature of the case, we held the seizure
unconstitutional for three reasons. First, the agents made the
stop not “in connection with any particular crime,” but rather
“pursuant to a general criminal investigation that had begun
several months before.” Id. at 169. Accordingly, “[t]here
was no emergency situation nor any need for immediate
action.” Id. Second, we acknowledged the different scopes
of responsibility between federal agents, who only enforce
federal laws, and local law enforcement officers, who
typically conduct traffic stops “as guardians of the peace
generally.” Id. Third, “and most significantly,” the agents
did not suspect the motorist himself of engaging in criminal
activity. Id. Rather, the stop “was made for the purpose of
questioning the defendant about a third person.” Id. (italics
in original).
     Forty years later, we explored this question for a second
time. We held in Maxwell that detaining witnesses to a fatal
shooting for five hours was an unreasonable seizure. 708
F.3d at 1084. While we noted that Ward left “the door open
to investigatory witness detentions” in limited
circumstances, such as in an unfolding emergency situation,
id. (citing 488 F.2d at 169), we nonetheless clarified “that in
the hierarchy of state interests justifying detention, the
interest in detaining [non-suspect] witnesses for information
is of relatively low value,” id. In concluding that the
government’s interest did not outweigh the plaintiffs’, we
found particularly relevant the length of the detention and
the fact that there was no ongoing emergency because the
crime had been solved. Id.
    Supreme Court precedent confirms that, while detentions
solely for the purpose of obtaining information may be
permissible in very limited cases, the government’s interest
in effectuating such seizures is at a low ebb. In Lidster, the
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         17

Supreme Court held that a traffic checkpoint in which police
briefly detained all motorists in a specific area to inquire
about a fatal hit-and-run incident did not run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment. 540 U.S. at 427. The “[m]ost
important[]” reason for the Court’s holding was that “the
stops interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect.” Id. The motorists
were delayed “a very few minutes at most,” contact with
police “lasted only a few seconds,” and the contact
“consisted simply of a request for information and the
distribution of a flyer.” Id. at 427–28. Further, “the contact
provided little reason for anxiety or alarm” due to the stop’s
brevity and the fact that “police stopped all vehicles
systematically.” Id. at 428.
    Taken together, these precedents establish that, while
detaining non-suspect witnesses can be permissible, the
government’s interest in such detentions is greatly decreased
for the simple yet significant reason that police do not have
individualized suspicion that the witness engaged in criminal
activity. See Ward, 488 F.2d at 169–70 (“Clearly, the
narrow exception of Terry v. Ohio . . . cannot be stretched so
far as to allow detentive stops for generalized criminal
inquiries.”). Accordingly, to justify the suspicionless seizure
of a material witness, there must be exigencies requiring
immediate action, the gravity of the public interest must be
great, and the detention must be minimally intrusive, both in
length of time and amount of force used. See Edmond, 531
U.S. at 44 (recognizing that suspicionless checkpoints may
be permissible when certain exigencies exist, such as
thwarting a terrorist attack); Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427
(approving of suspicionless witness detention due to the
stop’s minimally intrusive nature).
18      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

       2. Initial Seizure
    Applying these principles to the case before us, we hold
that the Deputies had limited authority to briefly detain and
question the Bernals about Ryan’s location due primarily to
the exigencies inherent in preventing an imminent school
shooting. “There is nothing in the Constitution which
prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone
on the streets. Absent special circumstances, [however,] the
person approached may not be detained or frisked but may
refuse to cooperate and go on his way.” Terry, 392 U.S. at
34 (White, J., concurring). We find that the emergency
presented by an impending school shooting coupled with the
information the Deputies knew the Bernals possessed
constituted such “special circumstances.”
    Our holding is predicated on two key facts. First, the
Deputies knew the Bernals had information crucial to
stopping a potential mass shooting: the suspected shooter’s
location. Celia told the Deputies over the phone that Ryan
was at his grandmother’s house, although she did not divulge
the precise address at that time. Celia’s hesitance to share
Ryan’s grandmother’s address was because she could not
confirm she was speaking with law enforcement on the
phone and did not want to provide Ryan’s precise location
to a stranger. Thus, this is not a case in which police merely
suspected or believed an individual had credible
information, but one in which the witness herself confirmed
that she knew the location of a suspected school shooter.
    Second, and most importantly, there was an ongoing
emergency threatening numerous lives which required
immediate action. The Deputies were actively investigating
credible threats of a school shooting weeks after the
devastating and highly publicized events in Parkland,
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         19

Florida. We believe this to be precisely the type of exigency
contemplated by the Supreme Court in approving
suspicionless witness detentions. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at
427 (finding the relevant public concern grave because
“police were investigating a crime that had resulted in a
human death”); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (recognizing that
suspicionless checkpoints may be permissible when certain
exigencies exist, such as thwarting a terrorist attack).
    This exigency separates this case from our previous
cases in which the crime had already been solved, see
Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1084, or there was no crime to solve,
see Ward, 488 F.2d at 169; see also Hill v. City of Fountain
Valley, No. 21-55867, slip op. at 14 (9th Cir. June 1, 2023)
(finding that an “exigent circumstance in investigating a
potentially kidnapped woman” justified ordering the
suspected kidnappers’ family members out of their home).
We are hard-pressed to imagine a more important, time-
sensitive matter than preventing the unspeakable tragedy of
a school shooting. Thus, while the government’s interest in
detaining non-suspect witnesses begins at a low ebb, the fact
that the Deputies were actively attempting to prevent a mass
shooting at a school sufficiently increased the government’s
interest to warrant a brief detention.
    Even still, the Bernals’ liberty interests remained very
high, as they were not themselves suspected of engaging in
any criminal activity. See Maxwell, 703 F.3d at 1084.
Accordingly, the detention must be brief, ending after it is
clear the witness is not willing to divulge the information
sought. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6
(1969) (noting that witnesses may not be compelled to
answer law enforcement officers’ questions). The longer a
witness refuses to answer questions, the less the government
maintains an interest in the interaction. Similarly, the longer
20      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

the government detains non-suspect witnesses, the more the
detention interferes with liberty of the sort the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427.
    We need not set a definitive rule for the maximum length
a non-suspect witness detention may last because the
detention here lasted approximately twenty minutes, far less
than previous detentions we have considered. See, e.g.,
Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1084 (finding witnesses’ detention of
five hours unreasonable). Our sister circuits addressing this
issue have reached similar conclusions regarding the length
of witness detentions. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Scott, 887 F.3d
190, 197 (5th Cir. 2018) (detaining a non-suspect witness for
two hours in handcuffs in a police car is unreasonable);
Lincoln v. Turner, 874 F.3d 833, 845 (5th Cir. 2017) (same);
Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1131 (10th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (detaining non-suspect witness for one hour is
unreasonable); Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1150
(10th Cir. 2006) (detaining non-suspect witnesses for ninety
minutes is unreasonable).
    The Deputies’ continued detention Celia after she
informed the Deputies she did not want to speak with them
did not exceed this boundary. The time in which the
Deputies attempted to ask Celia questions was very brief,
lasting only a few seconds. Indeed, the record reflects the
Deputies had only one opportunity to ask Celia if she would
speak with them before she attempted to drive away. In light
of the unique exigencies inherent in preventing a school
shooting, we determine that law enforcement was permitted
a few minutes in which to ask questions. Requiring Celia to
remain at her home for those few minutes does not exceed
the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.
          BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T                  21

    William’s initial detention was likewise permissible, up
to a point. As with Celia, the Deputies had limited authority
to briefly detain William for the purpose of asking him
questions about Ryan’s location. However, as we discuss
further below, the Deputies exceeded this authority when
they used a significant amount of force to restrain William
who was unarmed and compliant with the Deputies’ lawful
orders. 3
    Application of the Brown factors further supports our
conclusion. First, the “gravity of the public concerns served
by the seizure” could hardly have been weightier. Brown,
443 U.S. at 51. Ryan threatened to commit a mass shooting
at his school that day, rendering finding his location a highly
time-sensitive public matter. Additionally, this threat
occurred less than three weeks after a student at the Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida killed
seventeen people and injured seventeen more. Second,
detaining and speaking to the Bernals advanced the public
interest to the highest degree—locating the suspected school
shooter. See id. Finally, while the Deputies undoubtedly

3
  The Deputies assert that William’s refusal to comply with their
commands constituted resistance and provided probable cause to arrest
under Section 148 of the California Penal Code separate and apart from
their authority to detain him as a witness. However, when viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the Bernals, William only disregarded
unlawful commands to stop yelling at and recording the Deputies, which
“does not rise to the level of a [S]ection 148 violation.” In re Chase C.,
196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 388 (Ct. App. 2015). “Speech is generally
protected by the First Amendment, even if it is intended to interfere with
the performance of an officer’s duty, provided no physical interference
results.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because William
engaged in protected First Amendment conduct and did not physically
interfere with the Deputies’ performance of their duties, the Deputies did
not have probable cause to arrest him under Section 148.
22      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

interfered with the Bernals’ individual liberty, the initial
seizure was not so disproportionately intrusive as to
outweigh the other considerations. See id. We note that our
conclusion on the final Brown factor is based solely on the
initial detention; we separately assess the use of force
employed below.
    The Bernals contend that whatever authority the
Deputies had to detain them terminated when Celia indicated
she did not wish to continue speaking with the Deputies. In
arguing so, the Bernals rely on Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491 (1983). There, the Supreme Court held that a person
approached by police “need not answer any question put to
him . . . he may decline to listen to the questions at all and
may go on his way.” Id. at 497–98.
    However, Royer is inapposite because the quoted
language refers to a different situation, where a law
enforcement officer is “merely approaching an individual on
the street or in another public place” without “convert[ing]
the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective
justification.” Id. Under those circumstances, the person
approached “may go on his way” without answering the
questions, and the refusal to do so, “without more” does not
“furnish . . . grounds” to use force to detain the person any
further. Id. at 498. Here, conversely, the Deputies had
authority to detain and question the Bernals about Ryan’s
location due to exigent circumstances. The objective
justification giving the Deputies authority to briefly detain
the Bernals also justifies the use of limited force to prevent
the Bernals from going on their way. Id.
   Thus, we hold that the Deputies could briefly detain the
Bernals because of the ongoing, time-sensitive investigation
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T        23

into a threatened school shooting about which the Bernals
had vital information.
   B. Fourth Amendment Claim for Excessive Force
    The Bernals next argue that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the Deputies on the claims
for excessive force. The district court found the amount of
force used against both Celia and William reasonable under
the circumstances. We conclude the district court was
correct in its analysis regarding Celia but erred as to
William.
    As a threshold matter, we recognize that “the right to
[detain] necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). However,
any use of force must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Id. To assess objective reasonableness, we balance the
nature and quality of the intrusion against the government’s
interests. O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir.
2021) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Factors considered
in analyzing the government’s interest include “(1) the
severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or
attempted to escape.” Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1086 (citing
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). These factors are not exclusive,
and we consider “whatever specific factors may be
appropriate in a particular context, whether or not listed in
Graham.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (quoting Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d
805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010)). “Underlying Graham’s objective-
reasonableness test is the clear principle that the force used
to [to effectuate a detention] must be balanced against the
24       BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

need for force: it is the need for force which is at the heart of
the Graham factors.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485
F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
   We address the specific factual circumstances of the
Deputies’ use of force against Celia and William in turn.
        1. Use of Force Against Celia
            a. Nature and Quality of the Intrusion
     In assessing the reasonableness of the use of force
against Celia, we look first to the nature and quality of the
intrusion on her liberty. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. We
determine that the intrusion was slight because the Deputies
utilized a minimal amount of force on Celia. When Celia
disregarded the Deputies’ commands to remain outside of
her vehicle, three Deputies restrained both her arms to
prevent her from leaving. Deputy Kennedy used the greatest
amount of force, utilizing a “twist-lock” on Celia’s right
arm. Even still, a twist-lock is one of the least intrusive
control holds available. See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d
725, 734 (7th Cir. 2013) (approving of officers’ use of the
“arm bar” and “wrist lock” positions to secure an
uncooperative individual). Furthermore, the Deputies
restrained Celia for no more than a few minutes, releasing
her after she stopped attempting to leave. She was then
permitted to sit in a chair in her lawn, unhandcuffed.
    Moreover, the Deputies utilized warnings and less
intrusive means before resorting to physical coercion. See
Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2021)
(considering whether there were “less intrusive alternatives
to the force employed and whether proper warnings were
given”). The undisputed facts reflect that the Deputies
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T          25

issued orders to Celia to stay out of and then exit her vehicle,
both of which she disregarded. Deputy Kennedy then
reached through the driver’s side window to remove the car
keys, but Celia prevented him from doing so. Only at this
point did the Deputies resort to using force, and even then,
only a small amount.
           b. Severity of the Crime at Issue
    We now weigh the Deputies’ minimal use of force
against the government’s interests. The first Graham factor
addresses the severity of the crime at issue. See Graham,
490 U.S. at 396. When analyzing this factor, we typically
look to the alleged crime of the person being detained. See,
e.g., Mattos, 661 F.3d at 449 (considering the plaintiff’s
alleged crime of obstruction rather than the crime of
domestic violence to which police responded); Nelson v.
City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2012)
(declining to consider the potential crime of trespass and
disturbance to which police responded when the plaintiff
himself did not commit a crime). “Where officers are
presented with circumstances indicating that no crime was
committed, the ‘severity of the crime at issue’ factor is
necessarily diminished as a justification for the use of force.”
Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th
Cir. 2015). However, when police are responding to an
ongoing emergency, we consider the “serious—indeed, life-
threatening—situation . . . unfolding at the time.” Ames v.
King Cnty., 846 F.3d 340, 349 (9th Cir. 2017); cf. Nelson,
685 F.3d at 880 (finding “the lack of serious criminal
behavior” and “the absence of exigency . . . significantly
reduce[d] the governmental interest involved” and provided
“minimal, if any, justification for the use of force”).
26      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

    It is undisputed that the Deputies did not suspect Celia of
committing a crime when they first arrived at the Bernals’
home. At most, Celia resisted the Deputies’ orders to remain
outside of her vehicle. Disregarding an officer’s lawful
commands, “while a legally-punishable offense, is a minor
infraction that justifies, at most, only a minimal use of
force.” Nelson, 685 F.3d at 880 (citing Davis v. City of Las
Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007)). However,
when viewed in light of the time-sensitive, actively
unfolding emergency of a threatened school shooting, the
severity of the crime increases. By disregarding the
Deputies’ commands, Celia “prolong[ed] a dire” emergency
situation. Ames, 846 F.3d at 348–49. We therefore weigh
the first Graham factor slightly in favor of the Deputies.
           c. Threat to Deputies’ Safety
    The second and “most important” Graham factor asks
whether Celia presented an immediate danger to the
Deputies or others. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Ames,
846 F.3d at 349. The district court found that Celia might
pose a risk to officer safety because she was at the wheel of
an operational vehicle behind which Deputy Kennedy was
momentarily standing. However, merely being behind the
wheel of an operational vehicle does not automatically create
a safety hazard. See Mattos, 661 F.3d at 444 (noting that the
plaintiff, while “behind the wheel of her car . . . was not
physically threatening”). Furthermore, any threat to officer
safety was minimal and quickly mitigated. Although at one
point Deputy Kennedy stood behind Celia’s vehicle, he
promptly moved to the driver’s side door. Accordingly, we
weigh the second factor Graham factor in favor of Celia.
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T        27

           d. Active Resistance or Attempt to Flee
    Finally, we look to whether Celia actively resisted or
attempted to flee. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The
Bernals argue that Celia was not resisting a lawful detention
or attempting to escape from custody when Deputies
employed force. However, the undisputed facts counsel
otherwise. Celia was in her car, intent on leaving. As
analyzed above, the Deputies had authority to briefly detain
Celia. Pursuant to that authority, the Deputies first ordered
Celia to not get in her car, then ordered her to exit her car,
then attempted to retrieve Celia’s keys from her car to
prevent her from leaving. Celia remained uncooperative,
refusing to comply with the Deputies’ requests to exit the
vehicle. Only then did the Deputies restrain her, using holds
on both her arms.
    We and our sister circuits have held this type of minimal
force reasonable to prevent continued resistance or flight.
See, e.g., Ames, 846 F.3d at 349; Fitzgerald, 707 F.3d at 734.
Moreover, it is unlikely that officers could have used less
force than briefly holding Celia’s arms to restrain her. The
Deputies never handcuffed Celia and allowed her to sit in a
chair in her yard while William was in the Deputies’ patrol
vehicle. We therefore weigh the third Graham factor in
favor of the Deputies.
    On balance, we conclude the Deputies’ use of force
against Celia was reasonable under the circumstances. The
authority to detain Celia “necessarily carrie[d] with it the
right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat
thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Because the
government’s interest in detaining Celia, as a non-suspect
witness, was at a low ebb, so too was the accompanying right
to use physical force. Thus, because the undisputed facts
28      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

indicate the Deputies briefly applied among the lowest levels
of force possible, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Deputies for the seizure of and use
of force against Celia.
       2. Use of Force Against William
    We now address the Deputies’ use of force against
William and conclude that the district court erred in finding
it was not excessive.
           a. Nature and Quality of the Intrusion
    We again begin by assessing the nature and quality of the
intrusion. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. We find the
intrusion on William’s liberty was “simply too great” in the
context of detaining a non-suspect witness. Washington v.
Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996). According to
William, the Deputies pointed a gun at him, kicked his legs
apart, turned his head beyond its natural range of motion,
kicked his knees to force his legs to buckle, smashed his head
into the hood of the car, and tightly handcuffed him,
resulting in a great deal of pain. Although the Deputies
employed mitigating measures when they learned that
William’s shoulders were healing from surgery, the initial
use of force and the harm it caused remain significant.
    Even when police have reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop, “drawing weapons and using handcuffs
and other restraints will violate the Fourth Amendment.”
Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1187. William’s expectation of privacy
as a non-suspect witness was even greater than that of an
individual subject to an investigatory stop. Moreover, when
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Bernals,
the Deputies did not utilize sufficient warnings or attempt
less intrusive means before resorting to harsh physical holds.
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         29

See Rice, 989 F.3d at 1122. When William raised up a cell
phone to record the incident, Deputy Bliss’s first reaction
was to draw his firearm, aim it at William, and order him to
put his hands up. When William did not immediately
comply, Deputies Bliss and Chhlang proceeded to forcibly
restrain William, causing him to suffer significant pain.
           b. Severity of the Crime at Issue
    We now weigh the nature and quality of the intrusion
against the government’s interests. See Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396. We arrive at the same conclusion for William as we
do for Celia on the first Graham factor. As with Celia, the
Deputies did not suspect William of committing a crime
when they first arrived at the Bernals’ home. The Deputies
assert they had probable cause to arrest William when he
physically resisted their attempts to detain him.
    However, “[i]t is well established under California law
that even an outright refusal to cooperate with police officers
cannot create adequate grounds for [police] intrusion
without more.” Velazquez, 793 F.3d at 1023. Furthermore,
for William to be properly arrested for obstruction under
Section 148 of the California Penal Code, the Deputies must
have been acting lawfully prior to the obstruction. Lemos v.
Cnty. of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2022) (en
banc) (“[T]he validity of a conviction of an offense
involving a peace officer engaged in the performance of his
or her duties depends on whether the officer was acting
lawfully at the time the offense against the officer was
committed.” (internal quotations omitted) (citing People v.
Williams, 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 599 (Ct. App. 2018))).
Thus, if the Deputies’ reasons for forcibly detaining William
were predicated on his failure to obey unlawful orders, there
can be no Section 148 violation.
30      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Bernals, we find a triable issue of fact regarding whether the
Deputies’ commands to William were lawful. Verbally
challenging and recording officers are not illegal actions,
and thus orders to cease such actions are not lawful orders.
See Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that “making obscene gestures” and “yelling
profanities,” while “boorish, crass and, initially at least,
unjustified,” is “not illegal”); Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid
Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating
that “[e]ven though the police may dislike being the object
of abusive language,” they are not permitted “to use the
awesome power which they possess to punish individuals for
conduct that is not only lawful, but which is protected by the
First Amendment”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436,
439 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that officers could not “prevent
or dissuade” the plaintiff “from exercising his First
Amendment right to film matters of public interest”).
Therefore, when William did not comply with the Deputies’
orders to put his phone down and stop yelling, he was not
disobeying a lawful command. See In re Chase C., 196 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 388. Accordingly, the Deputies were not acting
lawfully when they restrained William, negating any
probable cause they had to arrest him for resisting under
Section 148. See Lemos, 40 F.4th at 1008.
    The only remaining crime at issue was the threatened
school shooting. Although William himself was not
involved in this crime, the unfolding emergency of a
threatened school shooting must be taken into account. See
Ames, 846 F.3d at 349. The first Graham factor therefore
weighs in favor of the Deputies, but only slightly.
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         31

           c. Threat to Deputies’ Safety
    The second and “most important” Graham factor weighs
in favor of William. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Ames, 846
F.3d at 349. The district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the Deputies was premised primarily on the Deputies’
assertion that they reasonably feared for their safety. We
find the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this
issue improper for two reasons. First, a genuine dispute of
material fact remains as to whether William reached into an
unsearched bag. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23. Second, the undisputed facts
reflect that the Deputies knew William was unarmed,
undermining their claim that they feared for their safety.
    The Deputies’ primary argument, which the district court
accepted, is that they thought William was reaching for a
weapon when he put his hand into his duffel bag. However,
this cannot justify the Deputies’ use of force for two distinct
reasons. First, whether William, in fact, had his hand in the
bag at any point is hotly disputed. According to the Bernals,
William never reached into a bag. Rather, he used both
hands to hold his cell phone as he attempted to record the
Deputies restraining Celia. On a motion for summary
judgment, courts must not weigh the evidence or assess
credibility, but rather must make all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 655–59 (2014) (per curiam) (holding that, in
determining whether a dispute about a material fact is
“genuine,” the trial court must not weigh the evidence and
instead must draw all reasonable inference in the nonmoving
party’s favor). The district court’s acknowledgment and
rejection of the Bernals’ version of the events, however
implausible the court perceived it to be, was improper. See
Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017)
32      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

(holding that a court may not discount “self-serving”
testimony that includes contrary factual assertions and
requires the observation of a witness’s demeanor to assess
credibility). Thus, when taking all inferences in the light
most favorable to the Bernals, William held his phone,
attempted to record the Deputies, and yelled at them to stop
assaulting his wife. None of these actions warrants any use
of force, much less to the extent the Deputies used.
     Second, even taking the Deputies’ account as true, the
Deputies were not entitled to forcibly restrain William
because of his purportedly reaching into the duffel bag. Our
inquiry on this issue asks whether, at the time of the
detention, the Deputies could reasonably have believed that
William’s reach into the bag posed a threat to their safety.
See Davis v. United States, 854 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017)). We
conclude they could not.
    We have held there was no reasonable threat to officer
safety when an uncooperative individual put their hand in
their weighted-down pocket because the officers had
information that the individual was unarmed and was not
suspected of committing a crime involving weapons. A.K.H.
ex rel. Landeros v. City of Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2016). In A.K.H., officers responded to a domestic
violence call where the victim reported that Herrera, a
known member of the “Southside Gang,” hit her on the head
and left on foot. Id. at 1011–12. When the officers
encountered Herrera, he was noncompliant and put his hand
in his pocket which appeared to be weighed down by
something heavy. Id. Fearing Herrera was armed, the
officers shot and killed Herrera. Id. We held this use of
force unreasonable because the officers “had little, if any,
reason to believe that Herrera was armed.” Id. at 1012.
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T        33

Before the officers encountered Herrera, police dispatch
informed the officers that, despite being associated with a
gang, Herrera “was not known to carry weapons.” Id. We
further noted that, although Herrera had a traffic warrant out
for his arrest and had been convicted for drug possession,
those were “relatively minor crimes, neither of which
entailed violence or gun possession.” Id.
    The Deputies in this case had even less reason to believe
William was armed than the officers in A.K.H. The Deputies
conducted a weapons check prior to arriving at the Bernals’
house and learned that there were no firearms registered to
the home. Further, William was not a gang member, had no
prior convictions, and no warrants out for his arrest. William
was not suspected of committing a crime, much less a crime
that entailed violence or gun possession. The Deputies
responded to a call regarding the potential crime of a third
person who they had substantial reason to believe was not
even at the Bernals’ home. Thus, William’s lack of
cooperation and reach into the duffel bag did not create cause
to point a firearm at and aggressively restrain him.
   Independent of whether William reached into the duffel
bag, we find that the Deputies did not have cause to use force
against William even under the undisputed facts. The
uncontroverted facts in the record reflect that it was
immediately apparent to everyone at the scene that William
had a cell phone in his hands, not a weapon. Before Deputies
Chhlang and Bliss restrained William, they stated they saw
William pull out a cell phone, and not a firearm or other
weapon. The third-party witness, Gary Turner, stated he saw
William holding his phone, filming, and yelling at the
Deputies. Turner additionally testified that he recalled the
Deputies telling William to put the phone down. William
even voiced his intention, loudly yelling he was “going to
34      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

record the whole thing.” And yet, despite knowing the
object William held posed no danger to them or others, the
Deputies proceeded to use a substantial amount of force to
restrain William, injuring him in the process. Based on their
own admissions, the Deputies could not have reasonably
believed that William, a non-suspect witness, posed such a
threat to officer safety that would require the level of force
the Deputies used on William. See Tekle v. United States,
511 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The proposition that
police may not inflict pain on non-suspects . . . in the absence
of any law enforcement reason, should be so obvious to
reasonable officers that qualified immunity cannot shield
them.”) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring)).
    The Deputies also argue that William’s “belligerent”
demeanor caused them to fear for their safety. It is
undisputed that William yelled at the Deputies to stop
touching his wife and refused to put his cell phone down.
However, verbally challenging and recording officers are not
illegal actions. See Duran, 904 F.2d at 1377 (holding that
“making obscene gestures” and “yelling profanities,” while
“boorish, crass and, initially at least, unjustified,” is “not
illegal”).    Furthermore, William’s actions remained
protected under the First Amendment “even if [they were]
intended to interfere with the performance of an officer’s
duty, provided no physical interference occurs.” In re Chase
C., 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 388; see also Fordyce, 55 F.3d at
439. William did not attempt to physically interfere with the
Deputies as they restrained Celia. Thus, the Deputies
therefore could not have reasonably used force to stop
William from yelling or recording. See Johnson, 724 F.3d
at 1174.
      Furthermore, while in some cases “abrupt movements or
. . . suspicious, furtive behavior” may “justifiably prompt[]”
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T          35

an officer to fear for their safety, United States v. Brown,
996 F.3d 998, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and
quotation marks omitted), officers merely stating they feared
for their safety “is not enough; there must be objective
factors to justify such a concern,” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272
F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001). There are no such indicia
here. William did not approach the Deputies, assault them,
or attempt to fight them. See Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s
Dept., 872 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2017) (officer’s fear for
their safety was reasonable where the detainee “engaged in
a struggle with the deputies, physically resisting them, and .
. . tossing them around”). William merely breathed heavily,
widened his eyes, and was upset at seeing Deputies
forcefully restrain his wife. Moreover, as we noted
previously, William was not suspected of committing any
crime, much less a serious one which would give rise to an
inference that he was armed. Cf. Nehad v. Browder, 929
F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2019) (weighing the fact that
the detainee had been reported threatening people with a
knife in favor of the officers’ use of force); Estate of Diaz v.
City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 605 (9th Cir. 2016)
(weighing the fact that the detainee was believed to be a
member of a gang that was investigated for selling and
possessing firearms in favor of the use of force).
    Finally, the Deputies contend that William’s large size
compared to Deputies Bliss and Chhlang justified their use
of force. While disparities in size are germane to a use of
force inquiry, they are most relevant when they create a
change in the status quo, leading to an actual need to employ
greater force. For example, in Isayeva, we noted that a
similar “disparity in size posed obvious risks of physical
harm to the officers.” 872 F.3d at 949. There, however, the
deputies detained a self-proclaimed schizophrenic who
36      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

appeared to be on drugs and was acting and speaking
erratically. Id. at 943. When the deputies attempted to
detain him, he punched one deputy in the face and threw
another into the wall. Id. at 944.
    Despite William’s large stature, there are no
circumstances here justifying the Deputies’ escalation of
force as there were in Isayeva. Accepting William’s version
of the facts, he twisted away from Deputy Chhlang to
alleviate the pain he experienced when his surgically
repaired arms were wrenched together. Unlike the detainee
in Isayeva, William did not push the Deputies, punch them,
or throw them off him. See id. at 943. In short, William’s
height and weight advantage over the Deputies did not create
a need to restrain him and thus cannot serve as a justification
for their use of force.
   Accordingly, we weigh the second Graham factor in
favor of William.
           d. Active Resistance or Attempt to Flee
    To the extent William “actively resist[ed]” the Deputies’
attempts to restrain him, this factor weighs only slightly in
favor of the Deputies. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The
Deputies first argue that William resisted the Deputies’
attempts to question him. However, the record does not
indicate that Deputies asked William any questions or even
attempted to—they were directing their questions to Celia.
The Deputies never spoke to William until he purportedly
reached into his bag. William could therefore not have been
resisting Deputies’ attempts to question him. Moreover, as
we previously discussed, William yelling at the officers does
not, on its own, constitute resistance. See Johnson, 724 F.3d
at 1174 (holding that a person cannot be arrested merely for
yelling at police).
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T          37

    The Deputies next contend that William resisted the
Deputies’ efforts to restrain him. When viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to William, we conclude
this, at most, constitutes minimal resistance. William
testified he did not hit any of the officers, although he did
recall struggling against the Deputies’ holds to relieve the
pain from his surgically repaired shoulders. Moreover, even
if William intentionally elbowed Deputy Chhlang, this
resistance is not proportionate to the significant amount of
force the Deputies used to restrain him. Accordingly, we
weigh this factor slightly in favor of William.
    Weighing all relevant factors, we find that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to the Deputies
by disregarding genuine disputes of material fact. We
additionally find that the Deputies used excessive force
when they violently detained William despite knowing he
was unarmed and posed no reasonable threat to officer
safety.
   C. Qualified Immunity
    Having found that the Deputies violated William’s
Fourth Amendment rights, we consider whether the
Deputies are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers from
civil liability under § 1983 “unless the officers violated a
clearly established constitutional right.” Monzon v. City of
Murrieta, 978 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020). We make
two inquiries in determining whether qualified immunity
applies: first, did the Deputies violate a constitutional right,
and if so, was that right “clearly established” at the time of
the misconduct? Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 232–33 (2009)).
38        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

    As noted, the first step in the analysis is satisfied. Thus,
we turn to the second and ask whether William’s
constitutional right the Deputies violated was clearly
established. “An officer cannot be said to have violated a
clearly established right unless the right’s contours were
sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the
defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was
violating it.” 4 City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500,
503 (2019) (per curiam) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.
Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam)). In the Fourth
Amendment context, defining clearly established law with
specificity is particularly important because “it is sometimes
difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal
doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual

4
   The Bernals additionally argue that we should not apply qualified
immunity because the doctrine is unconstitutional. We decline to do so
for two reasons. First, the Bernals argue that qualified immunity violates
the right to petition for redress of grievances in the First Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging .
. . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances”). This is an improper basis for challenging the doctrine.
Although Congress promulgated the Civil Rights Act of 1871, including
Section 1983, qualified immunity itself is a court-created doctrine. See
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 160 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Therefore, the First Amendment’s requirement that “Congress shall
make no law” cannot serve as a vehicle to overturn qualified immunity.
Second, consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance, we have and
continue to apply qualified immunity. See, e.g., Rivas-Villegas v.
Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021) (per curiam); Williamson v. City of
Nat’l City, 23 F.4th 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2022). While Justice Thomas
has recently expressed his view that qualified immunity is an improper
judicially created doctrine, his opinion is not currently the law. See
Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 157–60 (Thomas, J., concurring); Baxter v. Bracey,
140 S. Ct. 1862, 1863 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T         39

situation the officer confronts.” City of Tahlequah v. Bond,
142 S. Ct. 9, 11–12 (2021) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
“While there does not have to be a case directly on point,
existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular
action beyond debate.” Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 504 (cleaned
up). We conclude that the Deputies violated clearly
established law whether we accept the Bernals’ or the
Deputies’ account of events.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Bernals, William never reached into his bag, and instead
yelled at the Deputies to stop assaulting his wife and
attempted to record the Deputies. Recording and verbally
challenging police are not only legal actions but are
protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held
in Houston v. Hill that “the First Amendment protects a
significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed
at police officers.” 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987). Although not
an absolute right, the “freedom of individuals verbally to
oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking
arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we
distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Id. at 462–63;
see also United States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th
Cir. 2001) (“Criticism of the police, profane or otherwise, is
not a crime.”). Therefore, William’s right to verbally
challenge police is clearly established.
    Similarly, we held in Fordyce that the First Amendment
protects the right to film matters of public interest. 55 F.3d
at 439. This right is further established in California’s penal
code, which states that it is not obstruction to make an “audio
or video recording” of an officer “while the officer is in a
public place” or the person making the recording “is in a
place he or she has the right to be.” CAL. PEN. CODE § 148(g)
(West 2014). William was recording, or attempting to
40      BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T

record, police in his front yard, a place where he undoubtedly
had the right to be. Accordingly, William’s right to record
police is clearly established and the Deputies are not entitled
to qualified immunity.
    Even if we take the Deputies’ account of events as true,
the Deputies were on notice that merely reaching into an
unsearched bag, without more, could not reasonably lead to
an inference that William was armed such that a use of force
was justified. We held in A.K.H. that police used excessive
force in part because there was no rational reason to believe
Herrera was armed even though he put his hand into his
pocket which appeared to be weighed down by something
heavy. See A.K.H., 837 F.3d at 1012–13. Although the
police in that case used deadly force, rather than the
intermediate amount of force the Deputies used against
William, A.K.H.’s holding put the Deputies on notice that
reaching into an unsearched pocket, or bag, without any
other indicia that weapons may be present does not permit
them to assume William was reaching for a firearm as a
justification for using force. The Deputies here had even less
reason to assume William was armed than those in A.K.H.
There, the decedent was a known gang member, was
reported to have assaulted his partner, had prior convictions,
and had a warrant out for his arrest. See id. at 1012. As we
previously noted, there were no similar indicia William
could be armed here.
    Finally, once it became apparent that William held a cell
phone, and not a weapon, the officers were on notice they
could not violently restrain him. William was an unarmed,
non-suspect witness who posed no physical threat to the
Deputies or others. “The proposition that police may not
inflict pain on non-suspects . . . in the absence of any law
enforcement reason, should be so obvious to reasonable
        BERNAL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T        41

officers that qualified immunity cannot shield them.” Tekle,
511 F.3d at 860 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
    Thus, even accepting the Deputies’ account of events, we
find they violated William’s clearly established right and are
not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to William.
                      CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment as to Celia and reverse as to
William. Because we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on William’s Fourth Amendment
claims, we reinstate William’s pendent state law claims. See
Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2009).