Court Opinion

ID: 9914107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 17:02:53.78803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:18.707037
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Dec 29 2023, 8:58 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ronald J. Moore                                            Theodore E. Rokita
The Moore Law Firm, LLC                                    Attorney General of Indiana
Richmond, Indiana                                          Abigail R. Recker
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination                           December 29, 2023
of Parental Rights of:                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-JT-901
A.B. (Minor Child),
                                                           Appeal from the Randolph Circuit
and                                                        Court
I.B. (Mother),                                             The Honorable Jay L. Toney,
Appellant-Respondent,                                      Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
        v.                                                 68C01-2209-JT-138

Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

                             Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                    Chief Judge Altice and Judge Weissmann concur.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023                            Page 1 of 12
      Case Summary
[1]   Due process and due diligence go hand-in-hand. These principles are of utmost

      importance in proceedings terminating parental rights. In this case, I.B.’s

      (“Mother”) parental relationship with her child, A.B., was terminated even

      though Mother was not adequately served with process. This shortcoming

      violated Mother’s due process rights and prevented the trial court from

      obtaining personal jurisdiction over her. Because the trial court’s order was

      therefore void, we reverse and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Mother and C.B. (“Father”) are the biological parents of A.B. 1 Within a month

      of A.B.’s birth, Randolph County Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a

      petition alleging A.B. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), in part

      because of Mother’s and Father’s persistent drug use. Mother and Father

      admitted A.B. was a CHINS on June 24, 2021—a day after A.B. turned two

      months old.

[3]   Because Mother and Father continued to use drugs and had not maintained a

      stable home, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights.

      A summons was sent to Mother by certified mail addressed to her last known

      address in Ohio. It was returned to DCS, marked as not deliverable. Before the

      initial hearing, the trial court appointed the attorney who represented Mother in

      1
          Father—whose parent-child relationship with A.B. was also terminated—does not participate in this appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023                             Page 2 of 12
      the underlying CHINS proceeding to represent her in the TPR proceeding.

      Mother’s appointed counsel appeared at the initial hearing. Mother did not.

[4]   In mid-November 2022, DCS requested permission to serve Mother via

      publication. Although DCS did not file an affidavit of diligent inquiry along

      with its praecipe, the trial court granted DCS permission to serve Mother by

      publication. DCS did not file proof of publication thereafter. Instead, a few

      days later, DCS submitted proof of service upon Mother based on DCS Family

      Case Manager Brittany Duffer personally serving Danielle Smith—Father’s

      mother 2—at Smith’s home in Richmond, Indiana. DCS and the trial court

      deemed Smith to have accepted service on Mother’s behalf.

[5]   The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on February 2, 2023. And just like at

      the initial hearing, Mother’s appointed counsel was present, but Mother herself

      was not. At the start of the hearing, Mother’s counsel indicated she tried to

      contact Mother and inform her about the fact-finding hearing multiple times.

      But Mother never responded. Mother’s counsel further explained she had “no

      good address” for Mother and had “not had contact with [Mother] for a

      substantial period of time.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. Shortly after, counsel for DCS

      conveyed to the trial court that DCS “did make in-person service on both

      parents for the date and time of today’s hearing.” Id. at 5.

      2
       The record refers to Smith as “Paternal Grandmother.” Mother and Father are not married, so Mother and
      Smith have no blood or legal relationship.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023                       Page 3 of 12
[6]   The trial court terminated Mother’s parental relationship with A.B. In its order,

      the trial court stated: “All persons required to be notified of these proceeding[s]

      and the hearings were so notified.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 68. It continued:

      “Mother received adequate service of the Petition and of the date and time of

      these proceedings, and she has willfully chosen not to attend this hearing.” Id.

      Additional facts are provided when necessary.

      1. Due Process is Essential in TPR Proceedings
[7]   On appeal, Mother claims her due process rights were violated because she was

      not served with process. 3 A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of

      his or her children is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.”

      In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quotation omitted). And the parent-

      child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture. See In

      re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ind. 2014).

[8]   That is not to say parental rights are absolute; they are not. See R.S., 56 N.E.3d

      at 628. But parents’ liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of

      their child “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model

      parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” In re C.G.,

      3
        On appeal, DCS contends Mother waived her due process argument by failing to raise it in the trial court.
      Generally, a party waives on appeal an issue that was not raised before the trial court. See, e.g., Plank v. Cmty.
      Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013). But we have discretion to address such claims, especially
      when they involve constitutional rights, the violation of which would be fundamental error. Id. at 53–54. As
      further discussed below, terminating Mother’s parental rights implicates her substantive and procedural due
      process rights. Thus, we exercise our discretion to review Mother’s due process claim even though it was not
      raised below. See id.; see also Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1268 (Ind. 2015) (denoting a preference for
      resolving cases on their merits).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023                                 Page 4 of 12
      954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753

      (1982)). Said differently, parental rights are “an important interest warranting

      deference and protection, and a termination of that interest is a ‘unique kind of

      deprivation.’” Id. at 916–17 (describing involuntary termination of parental

      rights as “an extreme measure that is designed to be used as a last resort when

      all other reasonable efforts have failed”) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

      452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). Thus, “[w]hen the State seeks to terminate the parent-

      child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due

      process.” In re J.K., 30 N.E.3d 695, 699 (Ind. 2015) (quoting In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d

      1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014)) (emphasis added).

[9]   Due process embodies the idea of fundamental fairness and the “opportunity to

      be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” C.G., 954 N.E.2d

      at 917 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). Due process is

      “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation

      demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quotation omitted). When determining

      the process due in a termination of parental rights proceeding, we balance three

      factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error

      created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing

      governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. C.G., 954

      N.E.2d at 917. The balancing of these factors often turns on the risk of error

      created by DCS’ actions and the trial court’s actions because a parent’s private

      interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child and the State’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023          Page 5 of 12
       parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of a child are both substantial.

       Id. at 917–18.

       2. DCS Did Not Comply with the Indiana Trial Rules; Thus,
       the Trial Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction Over Mother
[10]   In essence, Mother contends she was not served with a summons, the trial court

       lacked personal jurisdiction over her because of the lack of service, and the

       order terminating her parental rights was therefore void. “Ineffective service of

       process prohibits a trial court from having personal jurisdiction over a

       respondent.” In re J.H., 898 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.

       denied. A judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant

       violates due process, is void, and may be attacked at any time. Id. And the

       existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law entitled to de novo review.

       Id.

[11]   Whether process was sufficient to warrant exercise of personal jurisdiction over

       a party turns on two issues: (1) Was there compliance with the Indiana Rules of

       Trial Procedure regarding service; and (2) Did the attempts at service satisfy the

       Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Id.

[12]   A proceeding to terminate parental rights is essentially an in rem proceeding and

       as such is governed by the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. Id. Indiana Trial

       Rule 4.1 provides the following for service of process upon individuals:

               (A) In General. Service may be made upon an individual, or an
               individual acting in a representative capacity, by:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023        Page 6 of 12
               (1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered
               or certified mail or other public means by which a written
               acknowledgment of receipt may be requested and obtained to his
               residence, place of business or employment with return receipt
               requested and returned showing receipt of the letter; or

               (2) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him
               personally; or

               (3) leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his dwelling
               house or usual place of abode; or

               (4) serving his agent as provided by rule, statute or valid
               agreement.

               (B) Copy Service to Be Followed With Mail. Whenever service
               is made under Clause (3) or (4) of subdivision (A), the person
               making the service also shall send by first class mail, a copy of
               the summons and the complaint to the last known address of the
               person being served, and this fact shall be shown upon the return.

[13]   DCS first tried to serve Mother under Rule 4.1(A)(1) by sending a copy of the

       summons and complaint by certified mail to Mother’s last known address in

       Ohio. 4 The summons and complaint were returned as undeliverable. See King

       v. United Leasing, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining

       4
         DCS contends, “Mother would have been informed in the underlying CHINS case that her failure to
       comply with services and to maintain contact with DCS could result in the termination of her parental
       rights.” Appellee’s Br. at 23. Of course, we hope this is true, but neither party has provided us with any
       indication that Mother was actually informed. A copy of the Parental Participation Plan was not made part
       of the appellate record and we were unable to access it in the Odyssey Case Management System.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023                           Page 7 of 12
       unclaimed service is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that a

       defendant received adequate notice and to confer personal jurisdiction); see also

       Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stating service upon a

       defendant’s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction),

       trans. denied. Service was not made under Rule 4.1(A)(1), so DCS pursued

       another method.

[14]   Next, DCS requested permission to serve Mother by publication. Trial Rule

       4.9—governing in rem proceedings—allows service of a summons to be made

       by publication. Under Rule 4.13, the person or entity seeking service by

       publication shall submit to the court a request for such service in a praecipe. See

       Ind. Trial Rule 4.13(A); see also J.H., 898 N.E.2d at 1268. The praecipe shall be

       filed “along with supporting affidavits that diligent search has been made” and that the

       defendant cannot be found, has concealed her whereabouts, or has left the state.

       T.R. 4.13(A) (emphasis added); see also Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 58–59

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (describing this portion of the rule as a presumptive

       requirement that a party swear to due diligence in attempting to locate an

       interested party before he or she may seek service by publication). We note that

       Rule 4.13 employs mandatory language of “shall” rather than the permissive

       language of “may.” Therefore, it is not “merely a suggestion to counsel seeking

       service by publication to prepare these specific documents; it is a directive.”

       Harris v. Del. Cnty. Div., of Fam. & Child. Serv., 732 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2000). Put differently, strict compliance with Rule 4.13 is required for

       service by publication.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023          Page 8 of 12
[15]   Here, the trial court granted DCS permission to serve Mother by publication.

       See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 46–49. Upon review of the record, however, we

       cannot find any indication that DCS filed an affidavit of a diligent search

       alongside its praecipe, as required by Rule 4.13, even though the praecipe

       references the filing of an affidavit. Problematically, the trial court still granted

       DCS permission to serve Mother by publication. Further, DCS did not submit

       proof of published notice. See T.R. 4.13(E). At bottom, DCS’ efforts fell well

       short of the requirements of Rule 4.13.

[16]   Then, DCS attempted to serve Mother by giving a copy of the summons to

       Smith at Smith’s home in Richmond, Indiana. DCS believes this method of

       service satisfied Rule 4.1(A)(3)—which permits serving an individual by leaving

       a copy of the summons and complaint at her dwelling house or usual place of

       abode—claiming “[s]ervice at [Smith’s] home was reasonably calculated to

       render [Mother] service of process, and was thus the best method to inform

       Mother of the termination proceedings.” Appellee’s Br. at 19. In DCS’ view, “it

       was reasonable for DCS to consider [Smith’s] home Mother’s ‘usual place of

       abode’ because Mother had often lived with [Smith] during the underlying

       CHINS case.” Id. at 18. And DCS contends Smith “was acting as Mother’s

       personal representative” when she accepted service on Mother’s behalf. Id. at

       12.

[17]   We need not address whether DCS complied with Rule 4.1(A)(3), however,

       because DCS did not comply with Rule 4.1(B). Whenever service is made

       under Rule 4.1(A)(3), the party making service is also required to send a copy of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023        Page 9 of 12
       the summons and complaint to the last known address of the person being

       served. See T.R. 4.1(B). Confirmation of the additional mailing must be shown

       on the return. See T.R. 4.1(B). The purpose behind Rule 4.1(B) is to “increase

       the odds that the served party will receive timely notice of the suit.” Boczar v.

       Reuben, 742 N.E.2d 1010, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Compliance with Rule

       4.1(B) is “a jurisdictional prerequisite to obtaining personal jurisdiction.”

       Barrow v. Pennington, 700 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (describing Rule

       4.1(B) as “unambiguously mandatory”). In other words, “service of process in

       contravention of T.R. 4.1(B) is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over

       a defendant.” LePore v. Norwest Bank Indiana, N.A., 860 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Barrow, 700 N.E.2d at 479).

[18]   Technically insufficient service under Rule 4.1(B) may nevertheless be sufficient

       under Trial Rule 4.15(F) if the service is “reasonably calculated to inform the

       person to be served that an action has been instituted against [her].” T.R.

       4.15(F). But Rule 4.15(F) “will not excuse noncompliance with trial rule

       4.1(B).” Barrow, 700 N.E.2d at 479; see also LaPalme v. Romero, 621 N.E.2d

       1102, 1106 (Ind. 1993) (explaining Rule 4.15(F) cures only technical defects in

       service of process, “not the total failure to serve process”); see also In re C.C., __

       N.E.3d __, 2023 WL 6979258, at *5, No. 23A-JT-848 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 24,

       2023) (indicating “the ‘savings provision’ contained in Rule 4.15(F) is meant to

       excuse minor, technical defects in the method of service where actual service

       has been accomplished”) (quotation omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023         Page 10 of 12
[19]   DCS concedes “there is no evidence in the record that DCS . . . sent the

       summons and petition to Mother’s last known address as required by Trial Rule

       4.1(B).” Appellee’s Br. at 19. DCS contends noncompliance should not matter

       because the clerk had already sent a copy of the summons and complaint to

       Mother’s last known address in Ohio and the attempt came back as

       undeliverable. But our case law indicates noncompliance with Rule 4.1(B) does

       matter. See Barrow, 700 N.E.2d at 479. The record lacks assurances that DCS

       sent a follow-up copy of the summons by first-class mail. And any such efforts

       were not indicated on the return. Said another way, DCS’ complete failure to

       provide adequate proof of service is not a “minor defect” that can be cured by

       Rule 4.15(F). See C.C., __ N.E.3d __, 2023 WL 6979258, at *5. 5

[20]   In sum, Trial Rules 4–4.17 provide several methods DCS could have used to

       serve Mother with process. Because DCS failed to fully comply with any of its

       available options, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over

       5
         Mother’s whereabouts were largely unknown at the time of the termination hearing. Mother (and Father)
       lived at Smith’s home during various portions of the underlying CHINS case, but it is unclear whether she
       still lived there during the termination proceeding. For instance, Mother’s counsel did not have a current
       address for Mother and had “not had contact with [Mother] for a substantial period of time.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 4.
       And DCS first sent a copy of the summons and complaint to Mother’s last known address in Ohio before
       turning to Smith’s home in Richmond, Indiana. Further, at the time DCS served Smith, DCS was
       investigating an unrelated CHINS matter involving Smith and her children, and found that Smith’s
       methamphetamine use and pending drug-related criminal charges eliminated her as a viable placement
       option for A.B. Although this information does not affect our determination that DCS did not comply with
       Rule 4.1(B), it does shed light on the adequacy of serving Mother through Smith pursuant to Rule 4.1(A)(3).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023                            Page 11 of 12
       Mother. The trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights was

       therefore void. 6

       Conclusion
[21]   Put bluntly, the record is replete with procedural irregularities and demonstrates

       an overall lack of care and caution required in this type of proceeding.

       Significant and blatant service errors were overlooked by counsel and the trial

       court. Because Mother’s due process rights were violated below and the trial

       court never obtained jurisdiction over Mother, we reverse and remand.

[22]   Reversed and remanded.

       Altice, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       6
         In addition to complying with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure when a petition is filed, the person who
       filed the petition to terminate the parent-child relationship is required to send notice of the termination
       hearing at least ten days prior to the hearing date to a number of interested persons, including the parents.
       See I.C. § 31-35-2-6.5(b). Failure to comply with statutory notice, however, is a defense that must be asserted.
       In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Although Mother did not raise this defense below, we
       note that the record reveals DCS did not comply with the notice requirements imposed by statute. This
       furthers our concern regarding the deprivation of Mother’s due process rights below.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-901 | December 29, 2023                              Page 12 of 12