Court Opinion

ID: 9665432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:48:36.538072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:15.782463
License: Public Domain

REES, Justice
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent.
The action of plaintiff-bank against Mrs. Curran to recover the deposits in joint tenancy at the time of Miss Crosby’s death was in several divisions, but on trial the case turned upon the sole question as to whether the transfers of the deposits into joint tenancy were invalid because of a confidential relationship between the two women. When trial court held for the bank on that basis, Mrs. Curran appealed.
While Mrs.. Curran asserts several propositions here, I find it necessary to consider the issue of confidential relationship only.
The evidence does not support a claim that the transfers into joint tenancy resulted from actual fraud or duress. The bank’s claim must therefore rest on the general principle stated in Oehler v. Hoffman, 253 Iowa 631, 634, 113 N.W.2d 254, 256:
“Under our decisions, if it is clearly shown a confidential relationship existed, at the time a deed is made, between the grantor and grantees in which the latter were the dominant persons and the former the subservient one, a presumption arises the deed was procured by fraud or undue influence which the grantees must rebut by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.”
Two inquiries are made by a court in applying this principle in a given case. First, is a confidential relationship clearly shown? If so, second, has the recipient of the transfer upheld it by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence? In the present case the first inquiry is determinative.
In connection with the first inquiry, the evidence in a particular case must show that the confidential relationship gave the recipient dominance. Kunz v. Kunz, 255 Iowa 1087, 1096, 125 N.W.2d 226, 232 (the gist of the doctrine is the presence of a dominant influence under which the act is presumed to have been done). The court said this in Albaugh v. Shrope, 197 Iowa 844, 849, 196 N.W. 743, 745:
“The essential thing, the gist of the doctrine, whether it is found in the very relationship itself, as in the case of trustee and cestui que trust, and situations where a strict fiduciary relation exists, or arises from any relation of a confidential nature and the surrounding circumstances of the parties, is the presence of a dominant influence, under the impulse of which the áct is presumed to have been done. The presumption may arise from various relationships where, from the situation of the parties and the circumstances surrounding them, it appears that one possessed and was in a position to exercise a dominating influence over the other.”
Normally the showing of trust and confidence reposed by one person in another is sufficient to- make the principle apply. By virtue of the reposed confidence itself, the recipient of the transfer has influence he would not possess if the two individuals were at arm’s length. See Utterback v. Hollingsworth, 208 Iowa 300, 302, 225 N.W. 419, 421 (“It is prerequisite to the application of the doctrine that faith and confidence be reposed; that the repository shall be thereby in a position of superiority and dominance” — italics added); Burns v. Nemo, 252 Iowa 306, 311, 105 N.W.2d 217, 220 (“A confidential relationship is present when one person has gained the complete confidence of another, purports to act with only the interest of the other party in mind, and discards any selfish advantage for himself.”).
*325But the situation is not always so. Cases may arise in which a person reposes confidence in another, even great confidence, and yet in fact retains full decision-making to himself. Then the element of dominance is lacking. See Moorhead v. Miller, 171 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa); Jeager v. Elliott, 257 Iowa 897, 134 N.W.2d 560; Oehler v. Hoffman, 253 Iowa 631, 113 N.W.2d 254 (supra); Groves v. Groves, 248 Iowa 682, 82 N.W.2d 124. I believe this is such a case.
In Groves v. Groves, supra, at page 131 of 82 N.W.2d, this court said:
“We have been slow to define the precise limits of a confidential relationship. It is clear it may exist although there is no fiduciary relation. As Restatement, Trusts, section 2, comment b, says, it exists when one person has gained the confidence of another and purports to act or advise with the other’s interest in mind. It does not arise solely from blood relationship such as between parent and child. The gist of the doctrine of confidential relationship is the presence of a dominant influence under which the act is presumed to have been done. Purpose of the doctrine is to defeat and correct betrayals of trust and abuses of confidence.”

“That a person by kind and considerate treatment induces an affectionate regard on the part of another raises no presumption of confidential relation, as the term is used in this connection, in the absence of some showing that by this means, a dominant influence was obtained over the other. Albaugh v. Shrope, supra; Hess v. Pittman, 214 Iowa 269, 276, 242 N.W. 113.”
Miss Crosby was an extraordinary person. She not only had a good mind, she had singular determination in her affairs. While Mrs. Curran made out the checks to pay Miss Crosby’s debts, Miss Crosby directed how the checks were to be issued. Although Mrs. Curran kept the records at her own home, Miss Crosby recalled parts of them to her room from time to time for review. Miss Crosby, using Mrs. Curran for eyesight, studied the checks and records from the bank each month. Though she could see but poorly Miss Crosby remained in control of her financial affairs, made decisions according to her own wishes, and retained her mental acuity, to the last day.
After examining all the proofs and giving deference to the trial court’s findings (notwithstanding the confidence Miss Crosby had in Mrs. Curran), I feel the record rather abidingly establishes that Miss Crosby was not subservient but that she was her own master to the end. The bank did not clearly show the presumption applies, and I would hold therefore that the presumption does not apply. Hence I would not reach the inquiry as to whether the presumption if applicable, was overcome. Much of the evidence on that inquiry would be the same as on the first inquiry, but the burden and quantum of proof would be different. See In re Estate of Lundvall, 242 Iowa 430, 46 N.W.2d 535; Moorhead v. Miller, 171 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa).
Since the bank’s case rests on the presumption, the decree should be reversed and the bank’s petition should be dismissed.