Court Opinion

ID: 9372305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 13:05:18.751148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.774428
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                  No. COA22-560

                              Filed 21 February 2023

North Carolina Industrial Commission, I.C. No. 18-035130

GLORIA GILLIAM and REX MAURICE CONNELLY, Parents of MAURICE
CONNELLY, Deceased Employee, Plaintiffs,

             v.

FOOTHILLS TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT, Employer, SYNERGY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants.

      Appeal by Defendants and cross appeal by Plaintiffs from Opinion and Award

entered 19 April 2022 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the

Court of Appeals 10 January 2023.

      Sellers, Ayers, Dortch & Lyons, PA, by Christian R. Ayers, John F. Ayers, III,
      and I. Matthew Hobbs, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

      Goldberg Segalla LLP, by Gregory S. Horner and Allegra A. Sinclair, for
      Defendants-Appellants.

      COLLINS, Judge.

      Defendants Foothills Temporary Employment and Synergy Insurance

Company appeal from an Opinion and Award entered by the North Carolina

Industrial Commission awarding Plaintiffs Gloria Gilliam and Rex Maurice Connelly,

parents of Decedent Maurice Connelly, death benefits at a rate of $64.37 per week for
                          GILLIAM V. FOOTHILLS TEMP. EMP’T

                                  Opinion of the Court

500 weeks. Defendants contend that the Commission erroneously admitted expert

testimony under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, and that, absent

such testimony, the Commission’s findings of facts and conclusions of law are

unsupported. Plaintiffs cross appeal, contending that the Commission erroneously

calculated Decedent’s average weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5).

Defendants failed to preserve their argument regarding the admission of expert

testimony under Rule 702. Although the Commission did not err by using the fifth

method of calculating average weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5), the

Commission erred in its calculation of Decedent’s average weekly wage. We dismiss

Defendant’s appeal, and we vacate and remand the Opinion and Award with

instructions.

                I.   Procedural History and Factual Background

      Decedent was an employee of Foothills Temporary Employment, a temporary

employment agency that places individuals with various employers. On 15 July 2018,

Decedent was assigned to work at Bimbo Bakeries, a large-scale bread-making

facility, in a “general utility” position for $11.50 per hour. Bimbo Bakeries had been

training Decedent in multiple areas, but on 29 July 2018 he was working on the lid

line. The lid line is approximately 4 feet wide by 60 feet long and runs along a

conveyor belt. Lid line workers “are generally responsible for observing that the lids

are being produced efficiently, for ensuring that the type of lid being produced is

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                                    Opinion of the Court

consistent with the product currently being baked, and for stacking the lids to the

side of the conveyor belt in racks as appropriate during changeover periods.”

      On 29 July 2018, Decedent’s shift began “around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m.” On that

day, Decedent was working on the lid line with Larry Brooks, a Bimbo Bakeries

employee, and “monitoring the lids.” Decedent gave Brooks a 20-minute break in the

break room while he continued to work on the lid line. Leon Weaver, an oven operator

for Bimbo Bakeries, spoke with Decedent a few minutes prior to his collapse: “I looked

at him and I asked him, I was like, ‘Are you – are you okay? You good? You need

water or anything?’ He said he was fine and then I just walked back down to the

oven.” When Brooks came back from his break, he found Decedent lying face down

on the lid line platform.

      Burke County EMS arrived at the scene where Decedent was “unresponsive to

all stimuli,” his “pupils were fixed and dilated,” and he was “placed on the cardiac

monitor via defibrillation pads . . . [and] found to be in Vfib.” Lieutenant Nicole

Carswell, a paramedic with Burke County, noted that “we defibrillated quite a few

times and there was no significant change in that until we were arriving at the

hospital. He stayed in defib the entire time.” Decedent was pronounced dead at the

hospital, and an autopsy revealed that

             [t]he cause of death is probable dysrhythmia due to
             cardiomegaly. Major findings at autopsy were an enlarged
             heart with increased concentric left ventricle thickness. An
             enlarged heart impairs proper coordinated electrical
             conduction and predisposes to a fatal arrythmia. In

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             addition to the increased muscle mass, there was an
             increased fibrosis seen microscopically.

Plaintiffs filed a workers’ compensation claim, alleging that Decedent “collapsed and

died while working in high heat inside bakery.”           Defendants denied Plaintiffs’

workers’ compensation claim on the basis that Decedent “died from natural causes as

ruled by OSHA and Medical Examiner.” After a hearing, Deputy Commissioner

Tiffany M. Smith entered an Opinion and Award, concluding that Decedent’s death

was compensable and ordering Defendants to pay death benefits calculated pursuant

to the third statutory method of calculating average weekly wage under N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 97-2(5).    Defendants appealed the Opinion and Award, and the Full

Commission affirmed the compensability of Decedent’s death but recalculated the

average weekly wage pursuant to the fifth statutory method. Defendants appealed

the Commission’s Opinion and Award, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed.

                                 II.   Discussion

A. Expert Witness Testimony

      Defendants contend that the Commission erred under Rule of Evidence 702 by

admitting Dr. Owens’ testimony and thus the Commission’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law concerning compensability are unsupported. Plaintiffs contend

this issue is not preserved for our review.

      Pursuant to North Carolina Industrial Commission Rule 701, an application

for review of a Deputy Commissioner’s opinion and award must be made within 15

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                                       Opinion of the Court

days from the date notice of the opinion and award was given. Workers’ Comp. R.

N.C. Indus. Comm’n 701(a), 2021 Ann. R. N.C. 635-36.1 The Commission must

acknowledge the request for review by letter and within 30 days, must prepare and

provide the parties involved with the official transcript and exhibits, if any, along

with a Form 44 Application for Review. Id. Rule 701(c).

               The appellant shall submit a Form 44 Application for
               Review stating with particularity all assignments of error
               and grounds for review, including, where applicable, the
               pages in the transcript or the record on which the alleged
               errors shall be recorded.       Grounds for review and
               assignments of error not set forth in the Form 44
               Application for Review are deemed abandoned, and
               argument thereon shall not be heard before the Full
               Commission.

Id. Rule 701(d).

       “[T]he portion of Rule 701 requiring appellant to state with particularity the

grounds for appeal may not be waived by the Full Commission.” Roberts v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 173 N.C. App. 740, 744, 619 S.E.2d 907, 910 (2005). The penalty for

non-compliance with the particularity requirement on appeal to the Full Commission

is waiver of the grounds. Wade v. Carolina Brush Mfg. Co., 187 N.C. App. 245, 249,

652 S.E.2d 713, 715 (2007) (citations omitted). Grounds waived on appeal to the Full

Commission are not preserved for this Court’s review. See Bentley v. Jonathan Piner

Constr., 254 N.C. App. 362, 368, 802 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2017).

       1 The Rules of the North Carolina Industrial Commission are codified as 11 N.C. Admin. Code
23A.0701 (2021).

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                                        Opinion of the Court

       Defendants argue that the following assignment of error2 in its Form 44 was

sufficient to preserve its argument that the Commission erred under Rule 702 by

admitting Dr. Owens’ testimony: “Defendants allege error in Findings of Fact 1-2,

7-9, 21, 23-27, 34-49 as these findings are either unsupported by competent evidence,

conflict with the evidence of record and/or are against the weight of the evidence

taken as a whole.”

       However, that assignment of error is only a generalized assignment of error

regarding the Commission’s findings of facts that fails to state with particularity as

grounds for review the admissibility of Dr. Owens’ testimony under Rule of Evidence

702. See Reed v. Carolina Holdings, 251 N.C. App. 782, 787-88, 796 S.E.2d 102, 106

(2017) (holding that Defendants failed to preserve an issue where there was “no

indication in the record that [the] issue was raised at all before the Commission prior

to the Opinion and Award” and that “Defendants pleaded only a generalized

assignment of error . . . .”). Furthermore, the record on appeal before this Court does

not contain Defendants’ brief or other document filed with the Full Commission

stating with particularity as grounds for review the admissibility of Dr. Owens’

testimony under Rule 702. Cf. Cooper v. BHT Enters., 195 N.C. App. 363, 369, 672

       2  Although our Rules of Appellate Procedure no longer limit the scope of appellate review to
those issues presented by assignments of error set out in the record on appeal, North Carolina
Industrial Commission Rule 701(d) requires a party appealing a Deputy Commissioner’s opinion and
award to the Full Commission “to submit a Form 44 Application for Review stating with particularity
all assignments of error and grounds for review . . . .” Workers’ Comp. R. N.C. Indus. Comm’n 701(d).

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                                  Opinion of the Court

S.E.2d 748, 753-54 (2009) (“Since both this Court and the plain language of the

Industrial Commission’s rules have recognized the Commission’s discretion to waive

the filing requirement of an appellant’s Form 44 where the appealing party has stated

its grounds for appeal with particularity in a brief or other document filed with the

Full Commission, we overrule these assignments of error.”). See also Reed, 251 N.C.

App. at 789-90, 796 S.E.2d at 107-08 (“Although Defendants contend in response to

the Motion to Dismiss that they stated their challenge to the Commission’s authority

to award attorney’s fees in their brief to the Commission on appeal from the Deputy

Commissioner’s decision, they did not include the referenced brief in the record.”).

Finally, the Commission did not explicitly address in its Opinion and Award the

admission of Dr. Owens’ testimony under Rule 702; thus, it is not apparent that the

Commission considered that ground for review. See Adcox v. Clarkson Bros. Constr.

Co., 241 N.C. App. 178, 186, 773 S.E.2d 511, 517 (2015). Accordingly, there is no

indication in the record that the admission of Dr. Owens’ testimony under Rule 702

was raised before the Commission prior to the filing of the Opinion and Award from

which this appeal arises.    Accordingly, that ground was abandoned before the

Commission and Defendants have failed to preserve it for our review.

B. Average Weekly Wage

      Plaintiffs contend that the Commission erred by concluding that the fifth

method of calculating average weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) should be

applied instead of the third method. Plaintiffs further contend that even if the fifth

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                                 Opinion of the Court

method is used, the Commission erroneously calculated Decedent’s average weekly

wage by using the earnings he accrued from 17 May 2018 to his death on 29 July 2018

rather than the earnings he would have accrued from 17 May 2018 to when he would

have ceased working for Defendant-Employer in August 2018.

      Review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission “is limited to

consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings of

fact and whether the findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law.”

Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582,

584 (2008) (citation omitted). “The Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive on

appeal when supported by such competent evidence, even though there is evidence

that would support findings to the contrary.” McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C.

488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004) (brackets, quotation marks, and citation

omitted). The Commission’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Pickett v.

Advance Auto Parts, 245 N.C. App. 246, 249, 782 S.E.2d 66, 69 (2016).

   1. Application of the Fifth Method

      Plaintiffs contend that the Commission’s decision to apply the fifth method of

calculating average weekly wage was erroneous.

      Whether the Commission selected the correct method of calculating average

weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) is a question of law that we review de

novo. Nay v. Cornerstone Staffing Sols., 380 N.C. 66, 85, 867 S.E.2d 646, 659 (2022).

Whether a particular method of calculating average weekly wage produces “fair and

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just” results is a question of fact subject to the “any competent evidence” standard.

Id.

      The calculation of average weekly wage is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 97-2(5). “Subsection 97-2(5) sets forth in priority sequence five methods by which

an injured employee’s average weekly wages are to be computed and establishes an

order of preference for the calculation method to be used . . . .” Id. at 77, 867 S.E.2d

at 654. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      The third method of calculating average weekly wage states: “Where the

employment prior to the injury extended over a period of fewer than 52 weeks, the

method of dividing the earnings during that period by the number of weeks and parts

thereof during which the employee earned wages shall be followed; provided, results

fair and just to both parties will be thereby obtained.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5)

(2021). Results fair and just, within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5), “consist

of such average weekly wages as will most nearly approximate the amount which the

injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury, in the employment in

which he was working at the time of his injury.” Liles v. Faulkner Neon & Elec. Co.,

244 N.C. 653, 660, 94 S.E.2d 790, 796 (1956) (emphasis and quotation marks

omitted).

      The fifth method of calculating average weekly wage states: “But where for

exceptional reasons the foregoing [methods of calculating average weekly wages]

would be unfair, either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing

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                                 Opinion of the Court

average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount

which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 97-2(5). The fifth method may not be used unless there has been a finding

that unjust results would occur by using one of the first four methods. McAninch v.

Buncombe Cnty. Sch., 347 N.C. 126, 130, 489 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1997).

      Here, the Commission found, in relevant part, as follows:

            6.     Although       Decedent’s      employment       with
            Defendant-Employer was at-will and had no specified end
            date, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that
            Decedent would have ended his employment with
            Defendant-Employer and returned to school in August
            2018. The medical record from the 11 July 2018 “Well Male
            Check” reflects that Decedent was “currently in grad school
            for sports communication at Mississippi college.”
            Furthermore, an 18 July 2018 Facebook post authored by
            Decedent expressed his plan to return to school: “I’m so
            glad school starts in August so I don’t have much longer in
            the bakery lol.” Decedent’s sister testified that Decedent
            was “in school” at the time of his death. Moreover, ceasing
            his employment to return to school in August 2018 would
            have followed the pattern of Decedent’s work history in
            recent years. The Work Experience portion of Decedent’s
            14     May     2018     employment       application   with
            Defendant-Employer reflects that he worked for two
            different employers during the previous two summers
            before departing each August. The document reflects that
            Decedent worked from 8 June 2017 until 7 August 2017
            and from 31 May 2016 until 1 August 2016, and on this
            form he indicated that he discontinued his work in those
            positions due to “school.”
            7. According to the Form 22 Statement of Days Worked and
            Earnings of Injured Employee stipulated into evidence,
            Decedent worked for Defendant-Employer for 64 days over
            a 73-day period starting 17 May 2018 and ending with his

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            death on 29 July 2018. Defendant-Employer’s payroll
            records reflect that Plaintiff earned $5,021.13 during this
            period.
            ....
            33. Based upon the preponderance of the evidence in view
            of the entire record, exceptional reasons, including the
            limited     duration       of    Decedent’s     work      for
            Defendant-Employer and the fact that Decedent would
            have terminated the employment within a few weeks but
            for his death, the first four methods of calculating average
            weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) are
            inappropriate. Given the nature of Decedent’s employment
            with Defendant-Employer, the Full Commission finds that
            dividing Decedent’s total earnings by 52 yields an average
            weekly wage which most nearly approximates what
            Decedent would be earning were it not for the injury.

      Decedent’s medical records, Facebook post, employment application, and Form

22 are competent evidence to support the Commission’s findings of fact, including

“that Decedent would have ended his employment with Defendant-Employer and

returned to school in August 2018” and that “Decedent would have terminated the

employment within a few weeks but for his death . . . .” Because Decedent began

working for Defendant-Employer on 17 May 2018 and would have ceased working for

Defendant-Employer in August 2018, within a few weeks of his death, Decedent’s

earnings from May to August would have constituted his total earnings in 2018. If

Decedent’s total earnings are divided by the number of weeks and parts thereof that

he would have worked, this would yield an average weekly wage reflecting that

Decedent would have worked for the entire year rather than just three months.

      Accordingly, the Commission’s findings of fact support its conclusion of law

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                                        Opinion of the Court

that applying “a third method [of] calculation would be unfair to Defendants in this

case in that it would overestimate the wages Decedent would have earned but for the

compensable accident. The third method is therefore inappropriate in this case as it

would not produce results ‘fair and just to both parties.’” See Joyner v. A. J. Carey

Oil Co., 266 N.C. 519, 521-22, 146 S.E.2d 447, 448-49 (1966) (holding that dividing

plaintiff’s earnings by the number of weeks in his brief period of employment during

peak season would not be fair and just where plaintiff’s employment was “inherently

part-time and intermittent” and did not “provide work in each of the 52 weeks of the

year; some weeks the job is non-existent”).

       Furthermore, the Commission’s findings of fact support its conclusion that the

fifth method should be used:3

               Given the highly unusual situation presented by the facts
               of this case, “exceptional reasons” exist and “such other
               method of computing average weekly wages” “as will most
               nearly approximate the amount” Decedent “would be
               earning were it not for the injury” must be used. N.C. Gen.
               Stat. § 97-2(5). The fifth method of calculation under N.C.
               Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) is therefore appropriate. See Pope v.
               Johns Manville, 207 N.C. App. 157, 700 S.E.2d 22 (2010).

   2. Calculating Average Weekly Wage under the Fifth Method

       Plaintiffs further contend that, even if the fifth method is used, the

Commission erroneously calculated Decedent’s average weekly wage by using his

       3  The Commission’s conclusion of law 4 also details why the first, second, and fourth methods
of calculating Decedent’s average weekly wage should not be used. Plaintiffs do not argue that this
portion of the Commission’s conclusion was erroneous.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

date of death to calculate his total earnings when there was no competent evidence

that Decedent would have ceased working for Defendant-Employer on that date.

      Findings of fact 6, 7, and 33, as recited above, including that “Decedent would

have ended his employment with Defendant-Employer and returned to school in

August 2018[,]” that “Decedent would have terminated the employment within a few

weeks but for his death,” and that “dividing Decedent’s total earnings by 52 yields an

average weekly wage which most nearly approximates what Decedent would be

earning were it not for [his death]” are supported by competent evidence. However,

these findings do not support the Commission’s conclusion of law calculating

Decedent’s average weekly wage as follows:

             5. . . . In the case at bar, the evidence shows that Decedent
             earned $5,021.13 during his summer employment with
             Defendant-Employer. This figure divided by 52 yields an
             average weekly wage of $96.56. This average weekly wage
             most nearly approximates the amount Decedent would be
             earning were it not for the injury. This average weekly
             wage yields a corresponding weekly workers’ compensation
             rate of $64.37. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(5); 97-38 (2021).

      Because there is no evidence that Decedent would have ceased working for

Defendant-Employer on 29 July 2018 but for his death, using the $5,021.13 Decedent

earned from 17 May 2018 to 29 July 2018 as his “total earnings” to calculate his

average weekly wage underestimates the wages Decedent would have earned but for

the compensable accident. Instead, using the amount Decedent would have earned

from 17 May 2018 to the date he would have ceased working for Defendant-Employer

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                                     Opinion of the Court

in August 2018 as his “total earnings,” and dividing that figure by 52, yields an

average weekly wage that most nearly approximates the amount Decedent would be

earning were it not for his death.

      Accordingly, the Commission erroneously calculated Decedent’s average

weekly wage under the fifth method by using the “total earnings” he accrued from 17

May 2018 to 29 July 2018 rather than the “total earnings” he would have accrued had

he worked from 17 May 2018 to August 2018, within a few weeks of his death.

                               III.      Conclusion

      Defendants did not properly preserve their argument that Dr. Owens’

testimony was inadmissible, and we therefore dismiss Defendants’ appeal.         The

Commission did not err by concluding that the third method of calculating Decedent’s

average weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) would not produce results “fair

and just to both parties” in that it would overestimate the wages Decedent would

have earned but for the compensable accident. As such, the Commission did not err

by concluding that the fifth method of calculation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) is

appropriate.

      However, the Commission erred under the fifth method in calculating

Decedent’s average weekly wage by using his “total earnings” from 17 May 2018 to

29 July 2018 instead of the “total earnings” he would have accrued had he worked

until August 2018. Accordingly, we vacate the Commission’s Opinion and Award and

remand with the following instructions: find, based on competent evidence, the date

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                                 Opinion of the Court

Decedent would have ended his employment with Defendant-Employer, had he not

died; determine Decedent’s “total earnings” based on his start date of 17 May 2018

and the date Decedent would have ended his employment with Defendant-Employer;

calculate Decedent’s average weekly wage by dividing Decedent’s “total earnings” by

52; enter a new opinion and award consistent with these findings and conclusions.

      DISMISSED       IN    PART;     VACATED           AND   REMANDED       WITH

INSTRUCTIONS IN PART.

      Chief Judge STROUD and Judge ZACHARY concur.

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