Court Opinion

ID: 9578179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:42:29.170786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:02.251127
License: Public Domain

STAPLETON, J.,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the Court’s analysis and disposition of Wilkerson’s failure to accommodate claim. Moreover, I, too, would reverse and remand for further proceedings on her Title VII discriminatory termination claim and the associated aiding and abetting claim. I write to explain why I would affirm, rather than reverse, the dismissal of Wilkerson’s retaliation claim.
Section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s ... religion.” I agree that, under our pleading rules as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), Wilkerson has sufficiently pled a cause of action under this section.
Section 2000e-3(a) of Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII] or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” As the Court acknowledges, in order to state a cause of action for unlawful retaliation under this independent statutory provision, one must allege that one has engaged in activity protected by Title VII and that such activity has resulted in an adverse employment action. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir.2006).
The adverse employment action of which Wilkerson complains is the termination of her employment which she attributes to “her Christian religious beliefs, her refusal to engage in the ‘libations’ ceremony, and her complaints related to the ceremony.” As I have indicated, I agree that the allegations of the complaint tending to show a causal connection between her termination and “her Christian religious beliefs” and “her refusal to engage in the libation ceremony” suffice to state a discriminatory termination claim under Title VII. The allegations tending to *324show a connection between her termination and “her complaints related to the ceremony,” however, do not state a retaliatory discharge claim. Wilkerson does not allege that her employment was terminated because she engaged in activity made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. Her complaints were not about an employment practice of New Media but rather about its having conducted a libation ceremony as a part of its curriculum. Wilkerson explains in her complaint that she complained because she “did not believe that it was appropriate for a publicly-funded school to engage in religious worship such as the ‘libation’ ceremony.” App. at 66a. This may be a tenable position to take under the Establishment of Religion clause, but her complaints were not about an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII.
While it is not altogether clear to me, the Court’s opinion seems to suggest that it understands Wilkerson to be alleging that her employment was terminated in retaliation for her having complained about New Media’s failure to accommodate her religious beliefs. Failure to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee is, of course, made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. This does not help Wilkerson, however. As the Court has explained, given the facts alleged, New Media did not commit an unlawful employment practice by failing to accommodate Wilkerson’s religious beliefs. Wilkerson “did not inform New Media that the ceremony presented a conflict” and while she shared that information “after the fact, at that time there was nothing to accommodate.” Maj. Op. at 319. Moreover, while it is true that the retaliation provisions of Title VII protect an employee who complains about employer conduct he or she reasonably believes to be an unlawful employment practice whether or not it is such, that rule applies only when the employee’s belief is “objectively reasonable.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-41. An employee who does not ask for an accommodation at the only time there is something to accommodate cannot have an objectively reasonable belief that her employer committed an unlawful employment practice by failing to address her concerns.
I would reverse the judgment of the District Court with respect to Wilkerson’s discriminatory termination and associated aiding and abetting claims and remand them for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.