Court Opinion

ID: 9692379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:52:51.680129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.280445
License: Public Domain

TENNEY, District Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Although I concur with the majority’s disposition of plaintiffs’ first amendment claims,1 I must dissent from their *177holding under the fourteenth amendment.
Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), the test for determining whether a state welfare classification is violative of equal protection is the traditional “rational basis” test:
“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id. at 485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161.
The Dandridge Court gave great weight to the fact that states have finite resources to devote to social welfare and that the federal Social Security Act gives them great latitude in dispensing them. As long as “a solid foundation for the regulation can be found” (Id. at 486, 90 S.Ct. at 1162.) in the state’s legitimate purpose in enacting the regulation, no constitutional violation will ensue.
Dandridge, therefore, sets forth four factors to be considered in determining whether a state welfare classification is violative of equal protection: (1) the state’s legitimate purpose in enacting the challenged regulation; (2) the means used to effect that purpose; (3) whether the means used are rationally related to the purpose sought to be achieved; and (4) whether the means used are such as to ensure the fiscal integrity of the state’s welfare program — i. e., whether the means used are economically sound.
In Dandridge, the purpose of the challenged regulation was to provide the greatest amount of aid to the largest number of needy people by the most economic method. The means used to effect that purpose was a maximum grant system whereby the state was able to provide grants to a larger number of family units by reducing the amount of the grants provided to very large family units. Clearly, the means were rationally related to the purpose of the regulation, and moreover, were such as to ensure the fiscal integrity of the state’s welfare program.
Applying the foregoing analysis to the instant case, the purpose of the federal AFDC-WIN program and accompanying state regulations which embody the academic-vocational distinction is to “help [AFDC recipients] to attain or retain capability for . . . maximum self-support and personal independence” (emphasis added) (42 U.S.C. § 601) and to restore “the families of . individuals [receiving AFDC] to independence and useful roles in their communities.” 42 U.S.C. § 630. The means adopted by the state to effect that purpose is to provide public assistance benefits to those enrolled in two-year college programs or vocational training courses, but not to those enrolled in four-year college programs.
The instant case differs from Dandridge, however, in that the means used by the state to effect the legitimate statutory purpose are not rationally related to the ends sought to be achieved, and moreover, are not such as to ensure the fiscal integrity of the state’s welfare program.
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971) supports this view, for although that case was decided on statutory grounds, the Court strongly questioned the rationality of the academic-vocational distinction:
“The majority [of the court below] justified the classification as designed *178to attain the twin goals of aiding needy children to become employable and self-sufficient, and of insuring fiscal integrity of the State’s welfare program. We doubt the rationality of the classification as a means of furthering the goal of aiding needy children to become employable and self-sufficient; we are not told what basis in practical experience supports the proposition that children with a vocational training are more readily employable than children with a college education.” Id. at 291, 92 S.Ct. at 508.2
The statistics cited to this Court with regard to the rationality of the academic-vocational distinction show that as of March 1971, 25,900 AFDC recipients had been referred to the WIN program since its inception in 1967. Of these 25,900, only 1,921 have successfully completed their training and are employed. Of these 1,921, a “predominant” number are still receiving welfare assistance. Depos. of Comm’r Wyman by Phillips, Ass’t Comm’r, at 23-25. It is apparent, therefore, that the academic-vocational distinction is not rationally related to the legitimate statutory purpose of enabling AFDC recipients to become financially independent and off the welfare roles.
The majority insists that these statistics show only that the WIN program is not working very well, but to me they demonstrate not only the irrationality of the academic-vocational distinction, but also unsound fiscal policy.
This latter point is particularly evident when one examines the way in which the academic-vocational distinction operates. Theoretically, the state sets forth two conditions an AFDC recipient must meet in order to qualify for assistance while engaged in training under either the WIN program or the state work rule: (1) her program must be of a maximum duration of two years, and (2) it must lead to a specific vocational objective. Although specifying a two-year maximum, the state actually provides benefits to AFDC recipients engaged in training for more than two years if, for instance, the recipient needs pre-vocational training to complete her basic literacy or to obtain her high school equivalency certificate. But New York has clearly demonstrated that it does not provide public assistance benefits to enable a recipient to matriculate at a four-year college, even if she has less than two years to complete for her degree, solely because she would be engaged in academic rather than vocational training. Depos. of Comm’r Wyman by Phillips, Ass’t Comm’r, at 37.
So while the state is willing to provide benefits for more than two years to a welfare recipient who, even after receiving vocational training, is not likely to get off the welfare rolls, it is unwilling to provide such assistance for four years or less to enable a recipient who has the requisite aptitude to obtain a degree that would ensure her becoming financially independent.3 I find this irrational.
It is just this latter situation which is presented most sharply by the Westchester intervenors. Each of the three Westchester intervenors is estranged from her husband; each has from three to six minor dependent children; each *179has a long history of receiving public assistance, even while employed; and two of the three have one year of college credit acquired some years ago. All three were encouraged by their respective caseworkers to enroll in four-year college programs precisely because vocational training would never generate the income necessary to enable them to become financially independent.
The majority holds that the academic-vocational distinction “is based upon the state’s desire to use its limited welfare funds to secure at least some useful training to a larger number of people.” But I question the “usefulness” of vocational training for those AFDC recipients, like the plaintiffs herein, for whom such training will not make it possible for them to become financially independent, and who, moreover, possess the intellectual capacity to pursue a course of study which would ensure such a result.
I am not suggesting that the state be required to provide public assistance benefits to all AFDC recipients who desire to enroll in four-year college programs. Whether any particular AFDC recipient would be accorded benefits while pursuing academic training should depend, as it has in the past,4 upon that recipient’s intellectual capabilities and on whether the degree she seeks is tied to a specific vocational objective to ensure her becoming self-supporting and off the welfare rolls. An across-the-board denial of public assistance to those AFDC recipients enrolled in four-year academic programs, while providing such assistance to those enrolled in vocational training programs, is not rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in providing training for welfare recipients to enable them to become financially independent, and does little to ensure the fiscal integrity of its welfare program.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, I would find for the plaintiffs.

. Plaintiffs attempt to come within the more stringent “compelling state interest” test set forth in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1969), by alleging that the academic-vocational classification challenged herein infringes upon their first amendment rights of free association. The only case even possibly supporting such an argument is Cole v. Housing Authority, 312 F.Supp. 692 (D.R.I.), aff’d, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970), wherein the court struck down a two-year residency requirement for admission to public housing as violative of the equal protection clause on the grounds that it limited access to a necessity of life (shelter) and tended directly to infringe upon the constitutional right to travel and indirectly to diminish familial and consen*177sual associations of persons. The opinion fails to develop the freedom of association point, however. In the instant case, any infringement upon first amendment freedoms is so minor as not to rise to the level of a constitutional issue. See Lane v. McGarry, 320 F.Supp. 562, 564 (N.D.N.Y.1970).

. The Court further stated that “a classification which channels one class of people, poor people, into a particular class of low paying, low status jobs would plainly raise substantial questions under the Equal Protection Clause.” Townsend v. Swank, supra, 404 U.S. at 292 n. 8, 92 S.Ct. at 908.

. It is important to note that the instant case is distinguishable from Money v. Swank, 432 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1970), cited by the majority in support of its holding that the academic-vocational distinction does not violate the equal protection clause. There, as in Napper v. Wyman, 305 F.Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (which has a similar holding), the plaintiffs sued the state for tuition grants. Here, plaintiffs seek only living expenses ; their tuition is completely financed by scholarships and loans.

. It appears that until the end of 1969, the Department of Social Services did authorize attendance at four-year colleges for individual welfare recipients on a discretionary basis. Depos. of Comm’r Wyman by Phillips, Ass’t Comm’r, at 3-4.