Court Opinion

ID: 9574052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:01:58.252132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:00.187122
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice QUINN
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s holding that, pursuant to section 13-90-106(1)(B)(II), 6A C.R.S. (1987 & 1989 Supp.), a child unable to understand the difference between telling the truth and lying is nonetheless competent to testify as a witness in a judicial proceeding.
I.
It has been a long-standing requirement of the common law that a witness affirm in some manner the duty to speak truthfully before testifying as a witness. The purpose of this requirement is to enhance the truth-seeking process by securing “a hold on the conscience of the witness.” See VI J. Wigmore on Evidence § 1816 at 383 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (quoting W. Best, Evidence, §§ 58, 161 (1849)). The common law requirement, in other words, promotes the cause of truth by impressing on the witness a duty to speak only the truth. See United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 50 (2nd Cir.1977); United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir.1969); D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 265 at 48 (1979).
Implicit in the requirement of an oath or affirmation is the witness' moral understanding of the obligation to tell the truth. When the witness lacks the capacity to understand the obligation of truth-telling, the witness’ testimony is no more reliable than an unsworn statement of a witness. For a court or jury to rely on such unsworn “testimony” in resolving a case or contro*687versy is irreconcilable with the judicial process as we know it to be.
II.
Section 13-90-106(l)(b) states:
(1) The following persons shall not be witnesses:
* * * 4c * *
(b)(1) Children under ten years of age who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined or of relating them truly.
(II) This proscription does not apply to a child under ten years of age, in any civil or criminal proceeding for child abuse, sexual abuse, sexual assault, or incest, when the child is able to describe or relate in language appropriate for a child of that age the events or facts respecting which the child is examined.
The majority’s construction of subsection (l)(b)(II) of this statute permits a child witness to testify in court notwithstanding the fact that the child lacks any moral sense of the obligation of truth-telling inherent in the requirement of an oath and, in that respect, jeopardizes the integrity of the factfinding process of a judicial proceeding. In contrast to the majority, I would construe subsection (l)(b)(II) to authorize the receipt of the sworn testimony of a child-witness, even though the child is unable to describe the events or facts about which the child is examined in language ordinarily used by adults, as long as the child is capable of understanding the obligation to tell the truth and “is able to describe or relate in language appropriate for a child of that age the events or facts respecting which the child is examined.” This construction would give full effect to both subsection (l)(b)(I) and subsection (l)(b)(II) of the statute.
I acknowledge that subsection 13-90-106(l)(b)(II) expresses an important public policy favoring the admissibility of child-witness’ testimony in civil or criminal proceedings involving child abuse, sexual abuse, sexual assault, or incest, and thus is within the proper domain of both the legislative and judicial branches of government. See, e.g., People v. Bobian, 626 P.2d 1132 (Colo.1981); People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978). The mutual interest of the legislature and the judiciary in child-witness testimony in these cases furnishes an even more compelling reason to construe subsection (l)(b)(II) in a manner that harmonizes its provisions with Rule 603 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Rule 603 was adopted in 1980 pursuant to this court’s constitutional rulemaking authority, Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21, and states as follows:
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.
The harmonious construction of both the statute and the rule would permit a child-witness to testify in a judicial proceeding as long as the child is able to understand the difference between telling the truth and lying and the child can relate the events or facts under consideration in language appropriate for a child of that age.
III.
The determination of a child’s competency to testify by reason of a child’s understanding of the obligation to tell the truth is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. E.g., Marn v. People, 175 Colo. 242, 486 P.2d 424 (1971); Jordan v. People, 161 Colo. 54, 419 P.2d 656 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992, 87 S.Ct. 1308, 18 L.Ed.2d 338 (1967); Victor v. Smilanich, 54 Colo. 479, 131 P. 392 (1913). The trial court’s resolution of this issue should not be disturbed unless the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the child’s competency to testify. Marn, 175 Colo. 242, 486 P.2d 424; Victor, 54 Colo. 479, 131 P. 392. In this case the trial court determined, after extensively questioning the four-year old child, that the child could not speak truthfully because he did not know the difference between the truth and a lie. In light of the child’s responses to the court’s *688questioning, I am satisfied that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the child was not competent to testify as a witness.
I would discharge the rule to show cause.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON and Justice MULLARKEY join in this dissent.