Court Opinion

ID: 9899647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 15:00:47.369604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:45.283556
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2048    Document: 37    Page: 1   Filed: 11/17/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

            BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC,
                    Appellant

                            v.

  ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING,
                    INC.,
                   Appellee
            ______________________

                        2022-2048
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2021-
 00180.
                  ______________________

                Decided: November 17, 2023
                  ______________________

    ALAN WRIGHT, Devlin Law Firm, Wilmington, DE, ar-
 gued for appellant. Also represented by TIMOTHY DEVLIN.

    STEVEN J. RIZZI, McKool Smith, P.C., New York, NY,
 argued for appellee. Also represented by RAMY HANNA,
 Houston, TX.
                 ______________________

    Before TARANTO, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-2048     Document: 37      Page: 2    Filed: 11/17/2023

 2                              BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.
                 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
      Bell Semiconductor LLC is the patent owner of record,
 by assignment in 2020, of U.S. Patent No. 6,624,007, which
 describes and claims methods for making semiconductor
 devices. Advanced Semiconductor Engineering, Inc. peti-
 tioned the United States Patent and Trademark Office
 (PTO) for an inter partes review (IPR) of all of the ’007 pa-
 tent’s claims (1–8) under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. After Bell
 disclaimed claim 8, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, act-
 ing as delegatee of the PTO’s Director, instituted the re-
 quested review of claims 1–7. The Board ultimately issued
 a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318 determining
 that claims 1–7 are unpatentable. Advanced Semiconduc-
 tor Engineering, Inc. v. Bell Semiconductor, LLC, No.
 IPR2021-00180, 2022 WL 1797393 (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2022)
 (Decision).
     Bell appeals the final written decision under 35 U.S.C.
 §§ 319 and 141(c). The appeal was timely filed under 35
 U.S.C. § 142 and 37 C.F.R. § 90.3(a)(1). Bell principally
 challenges the Board’s claim construction. We affirm.
                               I
      We begin by addressing our jurisdiction to review the
 Board’s decision. The constitutional standing requirement
 for this court’s jurisdiction under Article III is met. It suf-
 fices that Bell has a pending action in district court in
 which it asserts the ’007 patent and seeks to recover for the
 alleged infringement; its concrete stake in that action is
 unquestioned; and the Board’s determination of unpatent-
 ability, unless set aside on appeal, will defeat any ability it
 has to recover in the infringement suit, whereas setting
 aside the Board’s decision will restore that ability.
     This court’s statutory jurisdiction is governed by 28
 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), which grants this court “exclusive
 jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a decision” of the Board
 “with respect to” an “inter partes review under title 35, at
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 BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.                                    3
 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 the instance of a party who exercised that party’s right to
 participate in the . . . proceeding before . . . the Board.” We
 plainly have an appeal from a Board decision in an IPR—
 an appeal filed under the authority provided by 35 U.S.C.
 §§ 319 and 141, within the time allowed by 35 U.S.C. § 142
 and 37 C.F.R. § 90.3(a)(1). What warrants some discussion
 is the requirement that the appeal be “at the instance of a
 party who exercised that party’s right to participate in the”
 IPR before the Board. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
     Neither Bell nor Advanced Semiconductor Engineering
 nor anyone else has contended that this requirement is not
 met. We need not decide whether this “at the instance of a
 party” requirement is jurisdictional or, instead, a nonjuris-
 dictional statutory standing requirement. Cf. CACI, Inc.-
 Federal v. United States, 67 F.4th 1145, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
 2023) (explaining that the “interested party” requirement
 of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) is not jurisdictional). Even if the
 requirement is jurisdictional, and so must be considered
 even if satisfaction of it is undisputed, we conclude that the
 requirement is met here, i.e., that Bell was a party with a
 right to participate in the IPR before the Board. We so con-
 clude recognizing that, in two district-court cases filed by
 Bell to enforce the ’007 patent, questions arose about the
 interest, if any, Rohm Co., Ltd.—the assignee listed on the
 face of the ’007 patent—retains in the ’007 patent despite
 the assignment from Rohm to Bell on file with the PTO.
     The “patent owner” is a party with the right, granted
 by statute, to participate in an IPR. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
 § 313 (“[T]he patent owner shall have the right to file a pre-
 liminary response to the petition.”); 35 U.S.C. § 314 (“The
 Director shall notify the petitioner and patent owner, in
 writing, of the Director’s determination [regarding institu-
 tion of an IPR].”); 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (“During an [IPR] in-
 stituted under this chapter, the patent owner may file 1
 motion to amend the patent.”). Bell participated as the sole
 patent owner in the IPR appealed here. Who is a “patent
 owner” depends on facts, but the statute does not prescribe
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 4                              BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.
                 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 how the PTO is to determine the facts. Here, we see no
 error in the Board’s treatment of Bell as the patent owner,
 giving Bell a right to participate in the IPR.
      Although Bell was not the original applicant for the
 ’007 patent—Rohm was—the Board properly found Bell to
 be the patent owner of record by the time relevant for par-
 ticipation as the patent owner. Patent ownership may
 transfer via assignment, see 35 U.S.C. § 261, but “[i]n order
 to request or take action in a patent matter, an assignee
 who is not the original applicant must establish its owner-
 ship of the patent property . . . to the satisfaction of the Di-
 rector.” 37 C.F.R. § 3.73(c)(1); see also 37 C.F.R. § 3.54
 (“When necessary, the Office will determine what effect a
 document has, including whether a party has the authority
 to take an action in a matter pending before the Office.”).
 Patent ownership may be established through an assign-
 ment document recorded at the Patent Office. 37 C.F.R.
 § 3.73(c)(1)(ii). A recorded patent assignment is not conclu-
 sively valid, but the recordation “creates a presumption of
 validity as to the assignment and places the burden to re-
 but such a showing on one challenging the assignment.”
 SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,
 601 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
     Here, Advanced Semiconductor Engineering named
 Bell as the patent owner in its November 10, 2020 petition
 for an IPR and served the petition on counsel for Bell. In
 March 2020, Bell had submitted to the PTO an assignment
 transferring the entire right, title, and interest in the ’007
 patent from Rohm to Bell, and that assignment was rec-
 orded at the PTO a few days later. Reel 052261/Frame
 0102–05 (executed March 26, 2020; recorded March 30,
 2020). On March 12, 2021, Bell filed a preliminary re-
 sponse to the petition, stating in that filing that it was the
 patent owner. Bell further stated in the preliminary re-
 sponse that it had filed a disclaimer of claim 8, and it at-
 tached as an exhibit the disclaimer under 37 C.F.R.
 § 1.321(a), dated March 11, 2021, along with the statement
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 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 under 37 C.F.R. § 3.73(b), also dated March 11, 2021, de-
 claring that it was “the assignee of the entire right, title,
 and interest” in the ’007 patent and identifying the
 Reel/Frame location of the assignment. J.A. 1886–87. On
 that record, and with no dispute from Advanced Semicon-
 ductor Engineering, from Rohm, or from anyone else (as
 has remained true), the Board deemed Bell the patent
 owner when instituting the IPR on June 9, 2021, and it did
 not, and had no reason to, change that determination later
 in the proceeding.
     We see no error in the Board’s treatment. It is con-
 sistent with Board practice. “In inter partes review pro-
 ceedings, the Board generally accepts a party’s
 identification of itself as patent owner,” particularly when
 the party seeking to proceed as patent owner is the as-
 signee and patent owner of record and when no other party
 purporting to be the patent owner appears before the
 Board. FedEx Corp. v. Patent Owner, No. IPR2017-01786,
 2018 WL 3870035, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 13, 2018); see Leg-
 end3D, Inc. v. Prime Focus Creative Services Canada Inc.,
 No. IPR2015-01350, 2015 WL 7301808 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19,
 2015); Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Acceleration Bay, LLC,
 No. IPR2015-01951, 2016 WL 8969284, at *1–2 (P.T.A.B.
 July 13, 2016); The Jewelry Channel, Inc. USA v. America’s
 Collectibles Network, Inc., No. CBM2014-00119, 2014 WL
 5386840, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 2014).
     Nor is the Board’s treatment of Bell contradicted by
 any court determination regarding Rohm’s continuing in-
 terest in the ’007 patent. In one district-court case filed by
 Bell to allege infringement of the ’007 patent, the district
 court granted an unopposed motion to join Rohm as a “Re-
 quired Party” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
 19(a)(1)(B)(i), i.e., as a party that “claims an interest relat-
 ing to the subject of the action.” Bell Semiconductor, LLC
 v. Microchip Technology Inc., No. 6:20-cv-00296 (W.D. Tex.
 May 4, 2021), ECF No. 64 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
 19(a)(1)(B)(i)). The unelaborated ruling that Rohm claims
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 6                              BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.
                 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 an interest relating to the ’007 patent is not a finding that
 Rohm has an interest making it a patent owner. On May
 21, 2021, the Microchip case was dismissed by agreement
 of the parties. Id. ECF No. 67 (order granting joint motion
 to dismiss); id. (May 20, 2021), ECF No. 66 (joint motion to
 dismiss). Subsequently, a similar issue was raised in a sec-
 ond case, Bell Semiconductor, LLC v. NXP Semiconductors,
 N.V., No. 1:20-cv-00611 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2022), ECF 113,
 but that case was stayed (pending the present IPR) before
 any ruling on the issue, id. (Feb. 7, 2022), ECF No. 114.
 Bell explained in NXP that Rohm, after the joinder order
 in Microchip in May 2021, quickly declined to participate
 voluntarily after receiving notice of the litigation. Id. at 2–
 3 (Feb. 3, 2022), ECF 113.
      Finally, just as Rohm declined to participate in the Mi-
 crochip litigation—even though invalidity of the ’007 pa-
 tent was asserted as a counterclaim, Defendants Answer to
 Original Complaint and Counterclaims at 47, Microchip,
 No. 6:20-cv-00296 (Sept. 14, 2020), ECF No. 22 (counter-
 claim XIV)—Rohm has made no attempt to assert an own-
 ership interest in the ’007 patent in the present IPR
 matter, either when the matter was before the Board or
 since then. Without ruling on the legal implications, we
 note various forms of notice of the IPR. The PTO’s Official
 Gazette published a notice of the IPR in January 2021,
 which might constitute constructive notice of the proceed-
 ing. AIA Trial Proceedings Filed before the Patent Trial
 and Appeal Board, 1482 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office
 74 (Jan. 5, 2021); cf. MPEP § 2230 (discussing constructive
 notice in an ex parte reexamination). In late March 2021—
 more than two months before institution of the IPR here—
 the PTO notified Rohm’s counsel of record of the revocation
 of that counsel’s power of attorney based on the 2020 as-
 signment documents filed in the Patent Office. Letter from
 United States Patent & Trademark Office, to Merchant &
 Gould P.C. (Mar. 29, 2021) (“Notice Regarding Change of
 Power of Attorney,” on file at the PTO). And at oral
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 BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.                                  7
 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 argument before this court, Bell’s counsel represented that
 Rohm had recently been contacted again about the pen-
 dency of this appeal, after this court ordered the parties to
 be prepared to discuss the ownership issue at the upcoming
 argument. See, e.g., Oral Arg. at 11:17–13:20; Order (Oct.
 24, 2023), ECF No. 35. In these circumstances, we have no
 occasion to address issues that could arise if a nonparty
 seeks to assert ownership of a patent that is the subject of
 an IPR, issues that might well vary according to the timing
 of such an assertion.
                              II
     On the merits, we reject Bell’s challenge to the final
 written decision of the Board now before us. The ’007 pa-
 tent describes and claims methods of producing an “inter-
 mediate product” that includes a semiconductor chip
 mounted on a leadframe and enclosed in a “packaging
 layer,” then cutting that intermediate product from the
 surrounding leadframe in two steps to release a finished
 semiconductor device. Claim 1 is representative:
     1. A method of making a semiconductor device, the
     method comprising the steps of:
         mounting a semiconductor chip on a lead-
         frame;
         producing an intermediate product by
         forming a packaging layer to enclose the
         chip, the intermediate product including
         the leadframe, the chip and the packaging
         layer; and
         cutting the intermediate product;
         wherein the cutting step is performed by
         using a first cutter having a first thickness
         and a second cutter having a second thick-
         ness greater than the first thickness, the
         first cutter being used for making a full cut
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 8                              BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.
                 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

         in the leadframe, the second cutter being
         used for making a partial cut in the lead-
         frame, the full cut and the partial cut cor-
         responding in position to each other.
 ’007 patent, col. 8, lines 51–65.
     Bell challenges the Board’s claim constructions for
 three claim terms: “an intermediate product,” “packaging
 layer,” and “cutting the intermediate product.” The Board
 construed those claim limitations, based on the “unambig-
 uous” claim language and “consistent with the . . . [s]peci-
 fication,” as including within their scope an intermediate
 product with only a single chip encased in a resin packag-
 ing layer. Decision, at *8, *11, *14. Bell’s claim construc-
 tion arguments, in contrast, all flow from the premise that
 “an intermediate product” must be construed to have the
 structure shown in Figure 16—specifically, each such in-
 termediate product must itself include a plurality of chips,
 all enclosed in a continuous resin “packaging layer” that
 runs on and between the chips. Appellant’s Opening Br. at
 36–56. Bell has made no meaningful argument for over-
 turning the Board’s decision independent of its challenge
 to the Board’s claim constructions. We review the Board’s
 claim constructions, here determined by intrinsic evidence,
 without deference. Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Brent, 48
 F.4th 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
     We reject Bell’s claim-construction arguments because
 we reject Bell’s multi-chip view of “an intermediate prod-
 uct” based on Figure 16. First, Bell’s proposed construc-
 tions are inconsistent with the claim language. Claim 1
 claims an intermediate product that includes, by defini-
 tion, “the chip” enclosed in “a packaging layer,” where “the
 chip” refers back to “a semiconductor chip” for its anteced-
 ent basis. (Emphasis added.) Articles like “a” and “an”—
 and “the” when used to refer back to “a” or “an”—must be
 construed to mean “one or more” unless the claim lan-
 guage, specification, or prosecution history demand
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 BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.                                    9
 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 otherwise. See ABS Global, Inc. v. Cytonome/ST, LLC, 84
 F.4th 1034, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing cases). Sometimes
 we have found context to make clear that “a” before a noun
 is restricted to one only (of the things named by the noun),
 rather than covering both one and more than one (of the
 noun-named things). Bell has not cited examples of what
 in any event must be far more extraordinary—use of “a” or
 “an,” in patent usage or English usage outside patents, to
 require a plurality, excluding the singular. And nothing in
 claim 1’s language otherwise requires “an intermediate
 product” with a “packaging layer” to contain multiple
 chips.
     Second, the ’007 patent’s specification does not contra-
 dict the singular-permitting construction strongly sup-
 ported by the claim language. Bell relies heavily on the
 embodiment shown in Figure 16, but “the claims of the pa-
 tent will not be read restrictively” as limited to a single em-
 bodiment, even when the patent “describes only a single
 embodiment,” “unless the patentee has demonstrated a
 clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or ex-
 pressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’” Liebel-
 Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir.
 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa
 North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
 The ’007 patent’s specification does not restrict claim 1’s
 language by clearly and expressly defining “an intermedi-
 ate product” with a “packaging layer” as limited to the em-
 bodiment shown in Figure 16.
      Instead, the specification directly supports a singular-
 permitting construction of the claim language. The Sum-
 mary of the Invention discusses a first aspect of the inven-
 tion in singular-permitting language that mirrors the
 claim: It refers to producing “an intermediate product” by
 mounting “a semiconductor chip on a leadframe” and form-
 ing a “packaging layer” to enclose “the chip.” ’007 patent,
 col. 2, lines 32–34. When the ’007 patent describes meth-
 ods for enclosing a chip within a packaging layer to produce
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 10                             BELL SEMICONDUCTOR LLC v.
                 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

 “an intermediate product,” the specification explains that
 each individual chip may be enclosed within a single resin
 mold. Id., col. 6, lines 27–42 (“[E]ach of the chips 3 is ac-
 commodated in the relevant one of the molding cavities.
 Then, a thermosetting resin for example is poured into the
 . . . cavities.” (emphasis added)). And more broadly, the in-
 ventive aspect of the ’007 patent is a two-step cutting
 method that removes the burrs that can form when only a
 single-step cutting method is used. Id., col. 8, lines 15–32.
 That method is described and claimed in terms that are ag-
 nostic as to whether the particular semiconductor device
 being cut from the leadframe is adjacent to other semicon-
 ductor devices.
      Finally, regarding the proper construction of the claim
 phrase “cutting the intermediate product,” Bell’s argu-
 ment—that “cutting the intermediate product” requires
 cutting through the packaging layer—is merely an exten-
 sion of Bell’s argument, based on Figure 16, that a packag-
 ing layer must be continuous between multiple adjacent
 chips, and it fails for similar reasons. Claim 1 defines “the
 cutting step” performed when “cutting the intermediate
 product” as involving two cuts “in the leadframe.” (Empha-
 sis added.) The claim language does not define “cutting the
 intermediate product” or “the cutting step” as necessarily
 involving cutting through any layers or pieces of the inter-
 mediate product other than the leadframe. The specifica-
 tion, too, states that the cutting step described and claimed
 in the ’007 patent is directed to making cuts “in the lead-
 frame.” See id., col. 2, lines 31–51; see also id., col. 3, lines
 5–7 (“Preferably, the packaging layer maybe be formed in
 a manner such that it . . . allows part of the leadframe to
 be exposed.”); id. Figures 14A–E (showing semiconductor
 devices with the leadframe exposed). In short, the claims
 and specification nowhere limit “cutting the intermediate
 product” to only the embodiment described in Figures 16–
 18, to the exclusion of all other disclosed and claimed em-
 bodiments.
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 ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR ENGINEERING, INC.

                             III
     We affirm the Board’s claim constructions and its final
 written decision determining that claims 1–7 are unpatent-
 able.
                       AFFIRMED