Court Opinion

ID: 9658786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:13:39.811089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:59.422416
License: Public Domain

RENTTO, J.
(dissenting). The promulgation of statutes of limitation is not a judicial act. It is a legislative function. Concerning legislative acts in general this court has held that when they are unambiguous, as is the one here involved, there is no basis for the exercise of our powers of statutory construction. Under such circumstances our only function is to declare .the expressed meaning of the statute. State ex rel. Widdoss v. Esmay, 72 S.D. 270, 33 N.W.2d 280. No exception is made to this basic principle when the enactment under consideration is a statute of limitation. Concerning such statutes this -court has said, “It must run in all cases not expressly excepted from its operation.” Kirby v. Madden, 66 S.D. 397, 284 N.W. 54, 56.
Statutes of limitation are necessarily arbitrary in their nature. Nevertheless they provide a defense which is honorable and legitimate. They should not be subjected to judicial *526exceptions to accommodate supposed equities or alleviate hardships. If exceptions are to be made for these purposes they should come from the legislature.
In SDC 33.0235 our law-making body has provided that the cause of action shall not accrue until the fraud is discovered. However, this applies only where fraud is the ground of the action. The legislature has failed to expressly provide a fraudulent concealment exception in the case of an action for malpractice and we have no right to read such exception into the statute by implication. Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Or. 688, 213 P.2d 797; Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 724; In re Natherson’s Estate, Ohio App., 134 N.E.2d 852. See also Witt v. Witt, 271 Wis. 93, 72 N.W.2d 748.
Accordingly, I must dissent.
RUDOLPH, J., concurs in the views above expressed.