Court Opinion

ID: 9898427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:38.241519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:34.310294
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ESTATE OF MARGARET ANNE
DAVIS; MEGAN DAVIS, individually,                      No. 83980-2-I

                       Appellants,                     DIVISION ONE

               v.                                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
MEDICAL CENTER, a/k/a UW
MEDICAL CENTER; UW SCHOOL
OF MEDICINE; UW MEDICINE,

                       Respondents.

       HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — The Estate of Margaret Anne Davis and Megan Davis,

individually and as personal representative of the estate, appeal the trial court’s

order on summary judgment that dismissed claims of medical malpractice,

corporate negligence, outrage, and wrongful death against the University of

Washington Medical Center. Because the complaint was not filed within the three-

year statute of limitations provided in RCW 4.16.350 and no applicable tolling

provision was invoked, dismissal was proper. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                          FACTS

       On December 13, 2017, Margaret Anne Davis1 was taken by ambulance to

the emergency room at the University of Washington Medical Center (UWMC)

       1
         Because the decedent and her daughter, Megan, share the same last name and Megan
brought the suit on behalf of her mother’s estate and individually in her capacity as personal
representative, we use first names as needed for clarity.
No. 83980-2-I/2

where she was admitted with hypoxia and hypotension, along with a number of

other medical concerns. Anne was 96 years old and had multiple health issues,

including advanced dementia. During her hospitalization, Anne was unable to

safely swallow and, as a result, could neither eat nor drink on her own. Though

her family requested that hospital staff in the intensive care unit use a feeding tube

to sustain Anne, the providers determined that she was too weak for such

treatment and that end of life care was more appropriate. Instead, Anne was

transitioned to comfort care, and, on December 23, 2017, she was discharged from

UWMC after much disagreement between the family and medical providers about

her treatment plan. Anne’s family sought a referral to Evergreen Home Health

(EHH) and requested that her records be transferred there in order to facilitate an

appointment with a gerontologist.

        On December 28, 2017, after five days at home, during which Anne

remained unable to eat or drink, her daughters took her to the emergency

department at Northwest Hospital where they again requested artificial nutrition for

her. Medical providers at Northwest Hospital explained that artificial nutrition was

not warranted under the circumstances and would be without benefit as “end-stage

dementia [was] the underlying etiology.” The providers recommended palliative

care for Anne, and explained to her daughters that home care, with comfort as the

goal, was the most reasonable option. However, the daughters disagreed with the

treatment providers and insisted that their mother be discharged as soon as

        Further, the record establishes that Margaret preferred to use her middle name, Anne. No
disrespect is intended.

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No. 83980-2-I/3

possible so they could take her to a naturopathic clinic. Anne was discharged from

Northwest Hospital on December 29, 2017.

        Anne was readmitted to Northwest Hospital on January 1, 2018, and she

ultimately passed away there on January 3, 2018. The causes of death listed on

her death certificate were acute respiratory failure (interval of 2 hours), severe

protein calorie malnutrition (interval of months), advanced dementia (interval of

years). A number of other conditions contributing to her death were also noted.

        On December 30, 2020, the Estate of Margaret Anne Davis and Megan

Davis,2 as personal representative, (collectively Davis) sent UWMC a written

request for mediation pursuant to RCW 7.70.110. The letter provided that the

request was “regarding inexplicably wrongful care at the University of Washington

Medical Center (UWMC) in December 2017, which led to [Anne’s] premature death

in January 2018.” On December 22, 2021, Davis filed suit against UWMC3 and

alleged, among other things, that it had provided negligent medical treatment to

Anne which resulted in her death. The purported acts of medical negligence set

out in the complaint all occurred between December 13 and December 23, 2017,

the period in which Anne was admitted and receiving treatment at UWMC.

        On March 4, 2022, UWMC filed a motion for summary judgment which

sought dismissal of Davis’ lawsuit with prejudice based on the statute of limitations.

As RCW 4.16.350 requires wrongful death actions premised on medical

negligence be filed within three years of the alleged negligent act or omission,

        2
           Anne’s daughter, Megan, was assigned all claims on behalf of the Estate against UWMC.
        3
           The suit named the UWMC, UW School of Medicine, and UW Medicine as defendants,
but the trial court noted in its order granting summary judgment that the latter two entities were not
proper defendants as neither provides healthcare nor employs healthcare providers.

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No. 83980-2-I/4

UWMC argued this suit was barred because it was filed more than three years

after Anne was discharged from UWMC on December 23, 2017.                    UWMC

acknowledged that RCW 7.70.110 allows the three-year filing period to be tolled

by an additional year, but asserted Davis’ December 30, 2020 request for

mediation did not toll the statute of limitations because it was also sent over three

years after Anne’s discharge from UWMC.          On April 1, 2022, the trial court

conducted a hearing on UWMC’s motion for summary judgment, at the conclusion

of which it granted the motion and dismissed Davis’ action.

       Davis timely appealed.

                                    ANALYSIS

       Davis contends the trial court failed to follow the proper legal standards of

“review and proof” when deciding UWMC’s motion for summary judgment.

According to Davis, UWMC failed to meet its initial burden of showing that her

claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and therefore, the burden should

not have shifted to her. We disagree.

       This court reviews summary judgment orders de novo and engages in the

same inquiry as the trial court. Gunnier v. Yakima Heart Ctr., Inc., 134 Wn.2d 854,

858, 953 P.2d 1162 (1998). “A motion for summary judgment based on a statute

of limitations should be granted only when the pleadings, depositions,

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in the record demonstrate there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to when the statutory period commenced.” Kim

v. Lee, 174 Wn. App. 319, 323, 300 P.3d 431 (2013). A material fact is one on

which “the outcome of the litigation depends.” Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104,

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No. 83980-2-I/5

108, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977). “The motion will be granted, after considering the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, only if reasonable

persons could reach but one conclusion.” Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wn.2d 491, 495,

951 P.2d 761 (1998).

       “Summary judgment is subject to a burden-shifting scheme.” Ranger Ins.

Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). The party moving

for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any issue

of material fact. Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wn.2d 391, 395, 334 P.3d 519 (2014).

Defendants can meet this burden in one of two ways; they can set out their version

of the facts by submitting affidavits and other evidence, or, they can simply point

out to the trial court that insufficient evidence supports the nonmoving party’s case.

Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn. App. 18, 21-22, 851 P.2d 689 (1993). Those

pursuing the latter avenue need not submit affidavits in support of their motion, but

they must identify the portions of the record, as well as any affidavits submitted by

the nonmoving party, that demonstrate a lack of genuine dispute as to any material

fact. Id. at 22. Once the moving party does so, the burden shifts to the party who

must carry the burden of proof at trial. C.L. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 200

Wn. App. 189, 204, 402 P.3d 346 (2017).           “The statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof.” Kim, 174

Wn. App. at 323. However, when a plaintiff asserts an exception to the statute of

limitations, the plaintiff must prove that it applies. Cortez-Kloehn v. Morrison, 162

Wn. App. 166, 172, 252 P.3d 909 (2011).

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No. 83980-2-I/6

         The nonmoving party, here Davis, must then “set forth specific facts which

sufficiently rebut the moving party’s contentions and disclose the existence of a

genuine issue as to a material fact.” Meyer v. Univ. of Wash., 105 Wn.2d 847,

852, 719 P.2d 98 (1986).       The nonmoving party cannot rely on speculation,

argumentative assertions, or on affidavits considered at face value. Id. Affidavits

submitted in opposition to summary judgment must be based on personal

knowledge, provide facts that would be admissible in evidence, and affirmatively

show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters addressed therein. CR

56(e).    “Affidavits containing conclusory statements without adequate factual

support are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Guile, 70 Wn.

App. at 25. Even an expert opinion that is conclusory or based on assumptions

will fail to preclude summary judgment. Lilly v. Lynch, 88 Wn. App. 306, 320, 945

P.2d 727 (1997).

         If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of any essential

element of their case, summary judgment is proper. Kendall v. Douglas, Grant,

Lincoln, & Okanogan Countys Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 6, 118 Wn.2d 1, 9, 820 P.2d

497 (1991). We may affirm summary judgment “on any grounds supported by the

record.” Blue Diamond Grp., Inc. v. KB Seattle 1, Inc., 163 Wn. App. 449, 453,

266 P.3d 881 (2011).

I.       Medical Negligence Statute of Limitations

         Davis assigns error to the trial court’s determination that UWMC met its

burden of proof at summary judgment by raising the statute of limitations as an

affirmative defense.

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No. 83980-2-I/7

       “The purpose of statutes of limitations is to shield defendants and the

judicial system from stale claims.” Burns v. McClinton, 135 Wn. App. 285, 293,

143 P.3d 630 (2006). Generally, a statute of limitations is not triggered until a

cause of action has accrued, that is, “when a party has a right to apply to a court

for relief.” Malnar v. Carlson, 128 Wn.2d 521, 529, 910 P.2d 455 (1996).

       RCW 4.16.350 governs the statute of limitations for claims of medical

negligence and wrongful death resulting from such negligence. Fast v. Kennewick

Pub. Hosp. Dist., 187 Wn.2d 27, 29, 384 P.3d 232 (2016). The statute provides

that a cause of action

       based upon alleged professional negligence shall be commenced
       within three years of the act or omission alleged to have caused the
       injury or condition, or one year of the time the patient or his or her
       representative discovered or reasonably should have discovered
       that the injury or condition was caused by said act or omission,
       whichever period expires later.

RCW 4.16.350(3). “The three-year limitations period in RCW 4.16.350(3) begins

to run from the date of the act or omission alleged to have caused injury.” Gunnier,

134 Wn.2d at 864. Accordingly, plaintiffs must file such claims “within three years

of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence

is or should have been discovered, whichever is later.” Fast, 187 Wn.2d at 29.

       A. Tolling Provision

       RCW 7.70.110 provides a tolling exception to the three-year limitation

period of RCW 4.16.350. Pursuant to this provision, a party may toll the statute of

limitations for one year by making a “written, good faith request for mediation.”

RCW 7.70.110. Though a mediation request sent within the three-year window

                                       -7-
No. 83980-2-I/8

will trigger the tolling provision, “it will not revive a period that has already expired

because there would be nothing to toll.” Cortez-Kloehn, 162 Wn. App. at 171.

        Anne was admitted to UWMC on December 13, 2017, and discharged on

December 23, 2017. In the complaint, Davis set out seven separate allegations of

negligent treatment pursuant to RCW 7.70.040; all of the purported negligent acts

or omissions by UWMC providers occurred within the 10-day period that she was

admitted at that facility. If the last alleged negligent act or omission occurred on

December 23, 2017, Davis had three years from that date to either file the wrongful

death action pursuant to RCW 4.16.350, or send a mediation request to UWMC

pursuant to RCW 7.70.110. Fast, 187 Wn.2d at 29; Cortez-Kloehn, 162 Wn. App.

at 171. Davis elected to send a mediation request pursuant to RCW 7.70.110 in

order to toll the statute of limitations by an additional year. However, that request

not sent until December 30, 2020, which was not within three years of December

23, 2017.4 Accordingly, if we determine, consistent with her complaint, that the

last alleged negligent act or omission of UWMC occurred on December 23, 2017,

then Davis’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations because she failed to

invoke the tolling provision under RCW 7.70.110, as the “written, good faith request

for mediation” was not sent until December 30, 2020. At that point, under Cortez-

Kloehn, there was “nothing to toll.” 162 Wn. App. at 171. Davis did not file the

        4
            For the first time on appeal, Davis argues that RCW 4.16.190 tolled the statute of
limitations until Anne’s death on January 3, 2018, because she was disabled during the relevant
period preceding her death as a result of her dementia. In addition to failing to comply with RAP
2.5, this argument is unpersuasive as the decedent in a wrongful death action is not the “person
entitled to bring the action” pursuant to RCW 4.16.190(1). Rather, “only the personal representative
can bring the action” and, therefore, only the disability of the personal representative will toll the
statute of limitations. Huntington v. Samaritan Hosp., 101 Wn.2d 466, 469, 680 P.2d 58 (1984).

                                                -8-
No. 83980-2-I/9

complaint until December 22, 2021, which was well outside of the three-year

requirement of RCW 4.16.350(3).5

        B. Continuing Medical Negligence

        In the complaint, Davis stated that UWMC failed to promptly send Anne’s

medical records to EHH, which delayed an appointment her daughters made with

another doctor; however, nowhere in her pleadings did Davis allege that negligent

medical treatment by UWMC occurred after Anne’s discharge on December 23,

2017. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Davis asserted for the

first time that UWMC’s negligent treatment continued until Anne’s death on

January 3, 2018. UWMC pointed to the lack of evidence that “UWMC providers

directed—or even could direct—the care provided at Northwest Hospital by

providers who exercised their own clinical judgment.” At argument on its motion,

UWMC explained that Northwest Hospital is a “separate institution with separate

policies and separate providers using their own separate clinical judgment.” In its

oral ruling, after hearing from both sides on this issue, the court stated, “Northwest

Hospital is a different hospital,” and explained that there was no “competent

evidence to say that negligent treatment continued to occur at Northwest Hospital.

And so the allegation here really is that the negligent treatment was at the

[UWMC].”

        5
           Davis expressly assigns error to the trial court’s purported finding that the statute of
limitations began on December 23, 2017. However, the order granting summary judgment properly
does not include any findings of fact or conclusions of law, and is the only order designated in
Davis’ notice of appeal.

                                               -9-
No. 83980-2-I/10

        On appeal, Davis again avers that “UWMC’s negligence (via its discharge

instructions, consultations with Northwest Hospital staff, and/or its failure to provide

medical records) continued until at least January 1, 2018 (if not January 5).” At

oral argument before this court, Davis confirmed her position that UWMC’s

discharge instructions directed the subsequent care that Anne received from the

providers at EHH and Northwest Hospital.6                  A claim premised on medical

negligence must prove the following:

        (a) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care,
        skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care
        provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or she
        belongs, in the state of Washington, acting in the same or similar
        circumstances; [and]

        (b) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.

RCW 7.70.040(1).         Our Supreme Court has interpreted these elements as

“particularized expressions of the four traditional elements of negligence: duty,

breach, proximate cause, and damage or injury.” Caughell v. Grp. Health Co-op.

of Puget Sound, 124 Wn.2d 217, 233, 876 P.2d 898 (1994).

        Although RCW 4.16.350 provides a strict three-year window for the filing of

a complaint based on medical negligence, a claim of continuing negligent

treatment may allow the plaintiff to recover for alleged negligent acts or omissions

that occurred more than three years before filing. See Caughell, 124 Wn.2d 217.

However, “[u]nder the modified continuing-course-of-treatment rule, claimants

must allege that the last negligent act, not simply the end of treatment itself,

        6
         Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, Est. of Davis v. Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr., No.
83980-2-I (Apr. 12, 2023), at 2 min., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs
Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2023041155/.

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No. 83980-2-I/11

occurred within [three] years of filing suit.” Id. at 229. To state a claim of continuing

negligent treatment, a plaintiff must show “that a series of interrelated negligent

acts occurred during the course of treatment” and, “that the series of interrelated

negligent acts caused the injury or damages at issue.” Id. at 233. A plaintiff who

simply alleges a negligent act followed by non-negligent treatment will fail to state

a claim of continuing negligent treatment; “[t]he malpractice claimant must prove

that the subsequent care was negligent in its own right.” Id. at 234.

        Davis argues she provided competent evidence in response to UWMC’s

motion for summary judgment which was sufficient to state a claim for continuing

negligent treatment. The evidence Davis submitted was comprised of portions of

Anne’s medical records and declarations from Megan and Nithiya Nadarajah,

Anne’s caretaker.

        Davis cites two pages of medical records as evidence that purports to show

Northwest Hospital “relied on UWMC’s discharge instructions to continue

withholding nutrition and hydration” from Anne.7 They show no such thing. The

first page of the records, dictated by Dr. Michael Fujimoto of Northwest Hospital,

merely provides the history of Anne’s illness and references her prior

         7
            At oral argument, Davis argued that the providers of EHH and Northwest Hospital “had
no choice” but to follow the discharge instructions from UWMC and continue to withhold artificial
nutrition from Anne. Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, supra, at 21 min., 20 sec.
         There is no competent evidence in the record to support this contention. Both Megan and
Nadarajah’s declarations begin with an assertion that their respective statements are based on
personal knowledge. However, Megan fails to explain how she would have come to have firsthand
knowledge that “UWMC’s decisions at the University of Washington campus followed [Anne]
through the course of her treatment at UWMC-Northwest Hospital campus [sic].”
         Similarly, Nadarajah’s declaration, at one point, simply concludes without explanation that
“[Northwest] Hospital followed the directives of UWMC regarding nutrition and hydration (i.e.,
providing none), until later convinced otherwise after several pleas from the family.”
         There are no medical records or declarations from Northwest Hospital providers that state
they were bound by the care decisions of UWMC or otherwise unable to independently treat Anne.
Further, the record does not include any such discharge instructions from UWMC.

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No. 83980-2-I/12

hospitalization at UWMC and transition to comfort care.8                  The second page,

dictated by Dr. Jesse Abbot Klafter of Northwest Hospital, explained that Klafter

attempted multiple times to engage Anne’s daughters in a broader conversation

regarding their goals of care, but they refused, and insisted Anne either be given

artificial nutrition immediately or be discharged from Northwest Hospital to attend

the appointment they had made at the naturopathic clinic. Klafter expressed

concern about providing artificial nutrition without first having a goals of care

conversation with Anne’s daughters, “as well as [a] desire to discuss the case with

providers at the [UWMC] in the setting of larger goals of care conversation.” There

is no indication that this desired communication with UWMC ever occurred.

Ultimately, as Klafter was not willing to immediately provide artificial nutrition to

Anne, she was discharged on December 29, 2017 at her daughters’ request. Far

from showing that Northwest Hospital relied on discharge instructions from UWMC

to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration, these medical records are bereft of any

reference to the instructions from UWMC, much less any indication of deference

by Northwest Hospital doctors to such instructions.

        Even assuming arguendo that Northwest Hospital did rely on instructions

from UWMC regarding Anne’s treatment, Davis still fails to state a claim for

continuing negligent treatment by UWMC. To state such a claim, Davis must first

show that a “series of interrelated negligent acts occurred during the course of

treatment.” Caughell, 124 Wn.2d at 233. To show that any act or omission was

        8
          Later in another portion of the record created by Fujimoto, he does appear to agree with
the ultimate recommendations of UWMC providers, with regard to hospice care, but nowhere in his
chart notes does he indicate a reliance on the decisions or discharge instructions of others.

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No. 83980-2-I/13

negligent under RCW 7.70.040, Davis must satisfy the particularized elements of

duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury. Id. at 232-33. In a claim of medical

negligence, in order to establish the standard of care and to prove proximate

cause, “expert testimony is generally required.” Guile, 70 Wn. App. at 25. Davis

provided none.

       Davis relies on Nelson v. Murphy to argue that expert testimony was

unnecessary here because it is within the layperson’s common sense and

knowledge that Anne’s death resulted from UWMC’s denial of artificial nutrition and

hydration, and UWMC’s alleged delay in the transfer of her medical records

postponed essential treatment, risking her life. 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472

(1953). Nelson provided examples of medical malpractice cases in which expert

testimony was not required, such as: a plaintiff infected with gonorrhea as a result

of a physician using an unsterilized instrument, a doctor leaving a foot-long spring

in a patient’s uterus, a broken bone attached so improperly “that it was apparent

to a layman’s eye,” and, a doctor leaving a pair of forceps in a patient’s abdomen.

42 Wn.2d at 739. In stark contrast to the examples in Nelson, the medical facts

surrounding Anne’s treatment and death are not “within the general knowledge of

laymen” nor are they “apparent to a layman’s eye.” Id. According to her death

certificate, Anne died of acute respiratory failure, severe protein calorie

malnutrition, and advanced dementia. Consequently, Nelson is inapposite.

       Davis further asserts that Nadarajah was qualified to offer expert testimony

concerning the alleged medical negligence of UWMC and rebut the motion for

summary judgment. Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a

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No. 83980-2-I/14

witness is qualified as an expert, and this court will only reverse such a

determination based on a manifest abuse of discretion. Harris v. Robert C. Groth,

M.D., Inc., 99 Wn.2d 438, 450, 663 P.2d 113 (1983).            A manifest abuse of

discretion occurs “when no reasonable person would adopt the trial court’s

position.” Unger v. Cauchon, 118 Wn. App. 165, 170, 73 P.3d 1005 (2003).

       Nadarajah’s medical credentials were provided in her declaration as

follows:

       I graduated in 2001 with a medical degree (MBBS—Bachelor of
       Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery) and practiced medicine for five
       years in Sri Lanka as a Pulmonary Specialist. I completed my
       internship in Sri Lanka. I have completed medical rotations at
       Swedish Hospital and other areas of the United States. I have
       passed all Board exams in the United States, and I have passed the
       United States Medical License Exams Part 1, Part 2, and clinical
       skills. I have been working as a full-time caregiver for over ten years,
       caring for patients with a variety of illnesses and care needs,
       including terminal patients on comfort care and hospice.

Though Nadarajah may be qualified as a caregiver, she is not a physician. As our

Supreme Court noted in Young v. Key Pharms. Inc., “we have found no cases in

which a nonphysician is found competent to testify on a physician’s technical

medical standard of care in a medical malpractice case. Rather, the cases

uniformly hold that a physician’s testimony is necessary in such cases to defeat a

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” 112 Wn.2d 216, 228, 770 P.2d 182

(1989). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

Nadarajah, a nonphysician, was not qualified to offer an expert opinion on the

medical standard of care. Further, as Davis’ medical negligence claim was not

based on negligent acts or omissions that were observable to the layperson’s eye,

e.g., “amputating the wrong limb or poking a patient in the eye while stitching a

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No. 83980-2-I/15

wound on the face,” the trial court did not err in determining that Nadarajah was

not qualified to offer an opinion on the proximate cause of Anne’s death.9 Id.

        Because Davis asserted an exception to the statute of limitations, she bore

the burden to establish it through competent evidence. Cortez-Kloehn, 162 Wn.

App. at 172. Davis relied on the theory of continuing negligent treatment to show

that the mediation request pursuant to RCW 7.70.110 was sent within the three-

year limitation of RCW 4.16.350, so she was required to “present some evidence

that a negligent act or omission took place within the limitations period.” Kim, 174

Wn. App. at 325. A claim of continuing negligent treatment requires that the

plaintiff establish the essential elements of medical negligence. Caughell, 124

Wn.2d at 233. However, Davis only pleaded acts occurring between December

13 and 23, 2017, and failed to provide competent evidence establishing the

standard of care or to show causation. Summary judgment is proper when the

nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of any essential element of their

case. Kendall, 118 Wn.2d at 9. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to

Davis, the evidence does not demonstrate an issue of material fact as to any

alleged negligent act or omission on the part of UWMC that occurred within the

statute of limitations.

        The same reasoning applies to Davis’ claim of corporate negligence. As

set out in the complaint, that cause of action was based on UWMC’s purported

failure to supervise and intervene when the medical providers were “negligent or

        9
          Again, while both the declarations of Megan and Nadarajah contain broad assertions as
to the actions of different Northwest Hospital medical providers and their respective decision-
making, neither declarant explains how they came to have personal knowledge of the actions, much
less the rationale underlying those treatment decisions.

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No. 83980-2-I/16

substandard or unsafe” in their treatment of Anne. Further, Davis claimed that

UWMC “owed a duty to promptly facilitate [Anne’s] safe transfer” to another facility

and to “ensure the coordination of her care and treatment.” In briefing and at

argument before this court, Davis averred that UWMC’s transfer of records to EHH

frustrated the family’s efforts to see another doctor. However, just like claims of

medical negligence against individual providers, claims of corporate negligence

against hospitals generally require expert testimony to establish both the standard

of care and proximate cause. Douglas v. Freeman, 117 Wn.2d 242, 249, 252, 814

P.2d 1160 (1991). Because Davis offered no expert testimony to establish these

elements and raise an issue of material fact, any claim of corporate negligence

based on the transfer of Anne’s medical records fails.

       Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor

of UWMC and we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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