Court Opinion

ID: 9964537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:07:34.005545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.553696
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-1721-22

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REVOCATION OF ROBERT
SANDERS'S FIREARMS
PURCHASER IDENTIFICATION
CARD AND COMPELLING THE
SALE OF HIS FIREARMS.
_____________________________

                Submitted March 5, 2024 – Decided April 30, 2024

                Before Judges Natali and Puglisi.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                Division, Bergen County, Docket No. GPR-0009-21.

                The Tormey Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant
                Robert Sanders (Travis J. Tormey, of counsel; Jeffrey
                Anthony Skiendziul, on the brief).

                Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
                respondent State of New Jersey (William P. Miller,
                Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Catherine A. Foddai,
                Legal Assistant, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Appellant Robert Sanders appeals from the Law Division's January 25,

2023 order revoking his firearms purchaser identification card (FPIC) and

compelling the sale of his firearms. We affirm.

      In September 2018, the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Narcotics Task

Force received information from a confidential informant that appellant was

selling narcotics in Bergen County. A detective arranged for two separate

controlled buys of Adderall and methadone pills from appellant; the first buy

was $120 for eight Adderall and six methadone pills and the second was $160

for ten Adderall and eight methadone pills.

      Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with four counts of

distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS). His release from jail

was conditioned on the surrender of his seven firearms to police. Appellant was

admitted into the pretrial intervention program (PTI), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22,

and after he successfully completed one year of supervision, the charges against

him were dismissed.

      The forfeiture of appellant's firearms was not imposed as a condition of

PTI. Instead, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant's FPIC and compel the

sale of his firearms pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f), which permits the county

prosecutor to apply to the court for revocation of an FPIC when the holder

                                                                          A-1721-22
                                       2
becomes subject to a disqualifying disability under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c).

Pertinent to this case, the statute provides:

            [A] person shall not be denied a permit to purchase a
            handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card,
            unless the person is known in the community in which
            the person lives as someone who has engaged in acts or
            made statements suggesting the person is likely to
            engage in conduct, other than justified self-defense,
            that would pose a danger to self or others, or is subject
            to any of the disabilities set forth in this section or other
            sections of this chapter. A handgun purchase permit or
            firearms purchaser identification card shall not be
            issued:

            ...

            (3) To any person who suffers from a physical defect
            or disease which would make it unsafe for that person
            to handle firearms, to any person with a substance use
            disorder involving drugs as defined in [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-
            21-2], . . . unless any of the foregoing persons produces
            a certificate of a medical doctor, treatment provider, or
            psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, or other
            satisfactory proof, that the person is no longer suffering
            from that particular disability in a manner that would
            interfere with or handicap that person in the handling
            of firearms; . . .

            ...

            (5) To any person where the issuance would not be in
            the interest of the public health, safety or welfare
            because the person is found to be lacking the essential
            character of temperament necessary to be entrusted
            with a firearm.

                                                                            A-1721-22
                                         3
            [N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c) (Dec. 2022).]

      A hearing on the motion was held on January 20, 2023, before Judge

Christopher R. Kazlau. At the time of the hearing, appellant was self-employed

in the computer business for twenty-five years, where he set up and built

computers. He had no prior indictable convictions or juvenile adjudications and

no history of mental health commitments or in-patient treatment for substance

abuse. Appellant had not been arrested since the 2018 CDS offenses and

possessed his FPIC for twenty-three years in two different towns without any

issues. He believed he was not a danger to the public, nor did he lack the

essential character to be entrusted with a firearm.

      The State cross-examined appellant about his prior criminal history,

including a conviction in 1990 for theft by deception. Appellant's explanation

of the offense was that, while he was having a party, someone else used his

house phone to charge $225 to his neighbor's credit card. Appellant said he did

not commit the offense and pleaded guilty to something he did not do because

he "wanted it to go away." The State then produced appellant's sworn statement

he provided to detectives at the time. In that statement, appellant admitted he

saw his neighbor's mail in the street, opened it, and used the information from a

bank statement to call a phone sex line. When questioned by the motion judge,

                                                                           A-1721-22
                                        4
appellant maintained that he had been placed under oath, admitted to something

he did not do and, by doing so, lied to the judge during his guilty plea.

      Although appellant also had arrests for possession of marijuana in 1992

and criminal mischief in 1998, the judge did not afford these prior arrests any

weight in his decision because they were remote and predated the issuance of

appellant's FPIC.

      Appellant presented a report dated June 2, 2021 from his treating

psychiatrist, Dr. Joseph Siragusa, but did not produce him to testify.         Dr.

Siragusa documented appellant's prior history of alcohol and opioid abuse,

diagnosed him with "unspecified anxiety disorder, history of adjustment

disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, as well as opioid-use disorder

severe in full, sustained remission." However, Dr. Siragusa opined "[a]t no time

has [appellant] demonstrated excessive anger or inability to control his

impulses," nor did appellant suffer from any disability that would interfere with

or handicap him in the handling of a firearm.

      Despite his own treating psychiatrist's diagnosis, appellant repeatedly

denied ever having a substance abuse problem. He testified he had sustained a

fractured disc in his back so he was put on "medication." At the time of the

                                                                            A-1721-22
                                        5
hearing, he had been taking Percocet four times a day, every day for more than

five years.

      Appellant recalled he was diagnosed with anxiety at some point after his

parents took him to an emergency room in April 2016 because he was "feeling

unwell." He had been treating with a psychiatrist since at least 2019 and was

taking Xanax as needed for anxiety and to help him sleep, since he was in pain.

Appellant estimated he took fifteen Xanax per week.

      When asked about the two controlled buys of CDS in 2018, the details of

which the investigating detective testified, appellant admitted to selling

Adderall and methadone but offered an implausible explanation of why he did

so. Appellant said he studied to be a certified alcohol and drug counselor and

claimed he was only trying to help a friend who was addicted to pain medication

by selling him methadone. The judge asked a few follow-up questions:

              Q:   Okay. Now, you testified on direct that you were

                   studying to be a certified alcohol and drug

                   counselor, and you were just trying to help out a

                   friend?

              A:   Yeah.

                                                                         A-1721-22
                                       6
Q:   Why would you charge the friend for the drugs

     that you were getting him?

A:   It was a friend's friend.

Q:   So it was a friend's friend.

A:   I had never met the person.

Q:   And you stated that you were trying to—basically

     trying to help out and assess that person?

A:   That is correct.

Q:   So the way that you were going to do that was to

     sell—disregard the law and sell CDS to that

     person, that's the way you were going to help

     them?

A:   I was going to help them by evaluating them and

     giving them a name of a psychiatrist so they

     could get medication to get off drugs.

Q:   By selling drugs to them in exchange for money

     for yourself?

A:   That's what happened.

Q:   Is that what you did?

                                                        A-1721-22
                           7
            A:    Yes.

      After considering the testimony and evidence presented, Judge Kazlau

granted the State's motion.     In his oral decision on the record, the judge

determined the detective's testimony to be "most credible, most direct, [and]

consistent throughout." With regard to the CDS transactions, the judge found:

            It's not the fact of the arrest. It's not the fact of the
            disposition to PTI. It's the underlying conduct that I'm
            concerned about. And that underlying conduct in
            selling drugs in exchange for money—and quite
            frankly, I don't find [appellant]'s testimony to be
            credible at all regarding his intentions on selling the
            CDS that he was training to be a certified drug
            counselor and he was just trying to help out a friend.

            He changes that up later on upon questioning from the
            [c]ourt that he was trying to help out a friend of a friend,
            when I asked him, well, you know, you're going to help
            out a friend, you're going to do that in exchange for
            money, as though that would make it okay. I find his
            testimony regarding that to be incredible. I mean, it's
            clear, based upon the testimony before me from
            [appellant] and [the detective], who was intimately
            involved in the investigation that [appellant] was
            selling CDS for profit.

            Certainly, in evidence is the disregard for the law. The
            evidence is a disregard for the law that certainly causes
            harm to the community.

            But also in some ways the evidence is [appellant] . . .
            in some ways minimizing his conduct and almost trying
            to justify his conduct in disregarding the law in selling
            CDS.

                                                                           A-1721-22
                                         8
      The judge also found appellant was "trying to minimize the conduct"

regarding his 1990 conviction for theft. While the judge acknowledged the

conduct was remote in time and appellant had not had any issues with a firearm

since obtaining his FPIC, he found it "relevant with respect to his demeanor

throughout the course of his testimony." The judge recognized appellant

suffered from anxiety, which could have impacted his demeanor in court , but

noted he "displayed a palpably anxious demeanor throughout his testimony. At

times, even coming across angry in his testimony and minimizing his conduct."

      The judge also discussed his concerns about appellant's substance abuse

when considering the totality of the evidence:

            [A]t the outset of his testimony . . . [counsel] asked
            [appellant] whether or not he's ever had a problem with
            substance abuse. And [appellant] denied that. Says he
            hasn't had a problem with substance abuse. Actually,
            even doubled down on it after I asked for some
            clarification and still maintains that.

                  Quite frankly, given—when I view that denial
            that he's ever had a problem with substance abuse
            through the lens of the totality of the evidence, I simply
            don't find that credible. It's actually very concerning
            because it's completely contrary to the findings of his
            own psychiatrist who's treated him for a number of
            years, that being Dr. Siragusa.

                  . . . At the request of [appellant] and his counsel,
            I admitted Dr. Siragusa's report 2021 psychiatric
            evaluation of [appellant] into evidence. And the

                                                                         A-1721-22
                                        9
      diagnostic impression of Dr. Siragusa in his report is
      unspecified anxiety disorder, history of adjustment
      disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, and
      opioid-use disorder severe, in full sustained remission.

              That is completely contrary to [appellant]'s own
      testimony. I infer from that that [appellant] remains
      and perhaps is in some level of denial of . . . either a
      current or a past substance-abuse disorder. And that
      . . . he would even offer and wants this [c]ourt to accept
      certain aspects of Dr. Siragusa's opinion, when
      [appellant] himself disagrees with one of the actual
      diagnoses of Dr. Siragusa I find to be quite remarkable.

The judge further discussed Dr. Siragusa's report:

            I have other concerns about Dr. Siragusa's report.
      You know, quite frankly, I do not accept the opinion of
      Dr. Siragusa and his report. Let's make this clear. Dr.
      Siragusa was not called to testify as a witness. He
      wasn't placed under cross-examination so that his
      opinion, his findings, the basis for his opinion could be
      more fleshed out and examined by [the State] on cross-
      examination.

            And I'm not obligated to accept the opinion of Dr.
      Siragusa that whatever psychiatric conditions that
      [appellant] suffers from or has suffered from in the past.
      I do not accept his opinion that there's nothing about
      those conditions presently that would not interfere with
      or handicap [appellant] in the safe handling of firearms
      presently.

             Quite frankly, given the level of past psychiatric
      treatment, medication for anxiety disorder, adjustment
      disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, the
      history of severe opioid-use disorder, the history of
      selling narcotics to an undercover officer as well as a

                                                                   A-1721-22
                                 10
            [confidential informant] on more than one occasion, it
            almost boggles my mind that the conclusion of Dr.
            Siragusa and the opinion of Dr. Siragusa is that it would
            be safe not only for the public.

                  . . . [M]y concern here, you know, isn't just the
            safety of others besides [appellant]. It's [appellant]
            himself.

      After placing his findings on the record, the judge found the State had met

its burden by a preponderance of the evidence and granted the motion to revoke

appellant's FPIC and compel the sale of his firearms. This appeal follows.

      "We review a trial court's legal conclusions regarding firearms licenses de

novo." In re N.J. Firearms Purchaser Identification Card by Z.K., 440 N.J.

Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 2015) (citing In re Sportsman's Rendezvous Retail

Firearms Dealer's License, 374 N.J. Super. 565, 575 (App. Div. 2005)).

      However, our review of a trial court's factual findings on such matters is

"limited." In re Z.L., 440 N.J. Super. 351, 355 (App. Div. 2015). "Ordinarily,

an appellate court should accept a trial court's findings of fact that are supported

by substantial credible evidence." In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J.

108, 116 (1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607

(1989)).   We also defer to the trial judge's credibility findings.        State v.

Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 382 (2015) (noting we "should defer to trial courts'

credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of

                                                                              A-1721-22
                                        11
the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that

are not transmitted by the record").

      Appellant first contends the trial court erred by refusing to accept Dr.

Siragusa's report as "satisfactory proof" that he is no longer suffering from a

disability that would interfere with his handling of firearms, because the statute

does not require live testimony. We disagree. A trial judge may accept or reject

an expert report and weigh it appropriately. Maison v. N.J. Transit Corp., 460

N.J. Super. 222, 232 (App. Div. 2019); see also State v. S.N., 231 N.J. 497, 514

(2018) ("[R]egardless of whether the evidence is live testimony, a videotaped

statement, or documentary evidence, deference is owed to the trial court 's

determinations of fact and credibility.") (citing State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379

(2017)).   There may be instances where a judge may accept a psychiatric

evaluation without having the doctor testify and be subject to cross-examination,

but here the judge detailed his reasons for rejecting the report's conclusions,

particularly in light of appellant's own testimony. We find no abuse of discretion

in that decision.

      Appellant next argues the judge erred by failing to make specific findings

as to how appellant's past conduct presently reflects on his fitness for firearms

ownership. We reject this argument as belied by the record. The judge fully

                                                                            A-1721-22
                                       12
explained the serious concerns raised by appellant's current prescribed

medication use and mental health issues and his denial of any substance abuse,

which was "completely contrary to his own doctor." This lack of insight and

appreciation for the seriousness of his conduct, along with his denial of a

substance abuse disorder, amplified the judge's concern about appellant's

"egregious disregard for the law that[ was] very recent." Thus, the record plainly

reflects the judge's careful consideration of appellant's current mental health and

wellbeing in light of his prior history.

      Appellant also contends N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) is unconstitutionally

vague, overbroad and violative of United States Supreme Court case law. We

rejected this argument in In re M.U.'s Application for a Handgun Purchase

Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 2023), and discern no reason to deviate

from our previous decision. We also find without merit appellant's contention

this matter should be stayed pending resolution of the petition for certification

in M.U. because he has not shown any of the requisite elements to justify a stay.

See Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 320 (2013); Crowe v. De

Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982) (an applicant seeking a stay must demonstrate

his claim rests on settled law and has a reasonable probability of succeeding on

                                                                             A-1721-22
                                           13
the merits, the relief is needed to prevent irreparable harm, a balancing of the

hardships favors relief, and the relief is consistent with the public interest.)

      Affirmed.

                                                                              A-1721-22
                                        14