Court Opinion

ID: 9578241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:43:20.006504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:22.836481
License: Public Domain

Oliver, J.
This is a suit for the specific performance of an alleged -oral contract between testatrix, Mary A. Sehneberger, and her husband, James D. Sehneberger, who: predeceased her, for the disposition of her property in the particular manner shown by a will executed by her, February 10, 1956, in so far *970as the same was applicable to plaintiffs and intervenor, said will having been revoked by her last will, executed July 30, 1957, five days before her death. Trial resulted in judgment establishing the contract and ordering its specific performance, as, to the provisions for said beneficiaries. Defendants' and third-party defendants have appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Robert C. Nelson, a practicing attorney in Cedar Rapids, testified James D. and Mary A. Sehneberger came to- his office together in February 1956 and engaged him to. draw wills for them. They told him they were husband and wife1, had no children, Mr. Sehneberger had no relatives, they had discussed the disposition of their property and wanted the wills drawn so that the property would pass between themselves, and after they wore dead they wanted the five sisters of Mrs. Sehneberger to have.it. The five sisters were Jennie Rawlings, Frances Philley, Bessie Danek, Lillian Barron and Mae Buzzell. Mr. Nelson told Mr. and Mrs. Sehneberger wills could be drafted to accomplish the ultimate disposition of .the property they wanted and that if wills were drawn in that manner, “the right to change as far as the survivor is concerned would be gone.”
Mr. Nelson did not prepare the wills that day but arranged with the Schnebergers to. return to his office at a later date. They returned February 10, 1956. He told them the wills were ready and handed the wills to them. After they read the wills, he asked them if that met with their 'approval and “they both indicated that it was all right.” Each will was then executed in the presence of both spouses 'and of Mr. Nelson and Elva Becker, the attesting witnesses.
The wills were identical in form and context. The dispositive paragraph of Exhibit C, the will of James. D. Sehneberger, recited:
“I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my property * * * unto, my beloved wife, Mary A. Sehneberger, * * * in fee simple and absolutely. Should, however, my beloved wife predecease me, then, in that event, and that event only, I give, devise and bequeath all of my property, * * * unto the following named persons, share and share alike:” naming Jennie *971Rawlings, Frances Philley, Bessie Danek, Lillian Barron and Mae Buzzell.
The dispositive paragraph of Exhibit B, the will of Mary A. Sehneberger, recited:
“I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my property '* * * unto my beloved husband, James D. Sehneberger, * * * in fee simple and absolutely. Should, however, my beloved husband predecease me, then, in that event, and that event only, I give, devise and bequeath all of my property, * * * unto the following named persons, share 'and share alike:” naming Jennie Rawlings, Frances Philley, Bessie Danek, Lillian Barron and Mae Buzzell.
James D. Sehneberger died August 19, 1956. Thereafter his will was probated and Mary A. Sehneberger took the estate which passed to her thereunder. July 30, 1957, Mary A. Schneberger executed her last will, Exhibit A, which recited it revoked all former wills and which named as beneficiaries certain nieces, her five sisters, and her neighbors Mr. and Mrs. Pigrnan who were also nominated coexecutors. She died August 4, 1957, and her last will was admitted to probate, August 19, 1957. Thereafter this suit was instituted by Lillian Barron and Bessie Danek, two of testatrix’ sisters. A third sister, Jennie Rawlings, subsequently intervened by joining with plaintiffs. See R. C. P. 75. Defendants were Kenneth Pigrnan and Marie Pigrnan, neighbors of decedent, individually and as coexecutors of the estate of Mary A. Sehneberger. Subsequently, Virginia Schultz and Miriam Burris, nieces of decedent and Mae Buzzell and Frances Philley, two of her sisters, were brought into the case as necessary parties (see R. C. P. 25) and became third-party defendants.
 I. Mutual or reciprocal wills have been defined as those executed pursuant to an agreement or compact between two or more persons to dispose of their property in a particular manner, each in consideration of the other. Luthy v. Seaburn, 242 Iowa 184, 188, 46 N.W.2d 44, and citations. The principal question in this case is the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the alleged agreement between the spouses to dispose of their property in the manner provided by their wills executed February 10, 1956. Upon this question Allinson v. Horn, 249 *972Iowa 1351, 1356, 92 N.W.2d 645, 648, cites authorities holding a quantum of proof greater than that furnished by the simultaneous execution of reciprocal wills is necessary to establish such a contract. Among the authorities: listed are: Fowler v. Lowe, 241 Iowa 1093, 1094, 42 N.W.2d 516; Hatcher v. Sawyer, 243 Iowa 858, 52 N.W.2d 490; Bell v. Pierschbacher, 245 Iowa 436, 62 N.W.2d 784; 94 C. J. S., Wills, section 113 (2); 57 Am. Jur., Wills, section 730.
In the language of In re Estate of Lenders, 247 Iowa 1205, 1214, 78 N.W.2d 536, 541, there must he other evidence. In re Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 797, 89 N.W.2d 337, 341, states: “* * * In order that either party be denied the right to revoke, it must appear by clear and satisfactory evidence, or on the face of the wills, that they were executed in pursuance of such contract provisions between the parties.”
The evidence in the case: at bar shows the spouses executed the reciprocal wills, each with the knowledge of the other and ait (the same time (arad place. But the proofs were not limited to> this. The record shows without dispute they had previously considered, discussed and orally agreed upon this disposition of their property upon their respective deaths, and that their reciprocal wills were executed to1 formally express and give legal effect to their compact. The proof Mrs. Sclmeberger’s will of date February 10, 1956, was executed pursuant to that agreement or compact is clear, satisfactory and convincing.
II. Appellants complain that Exhibit 1, identified as a carbon copy of Mrs. Schneberger’s will of February 10, 1956, was admitted in evidence and considered by the trial court over tbeir objections that it was not the best evidence and no proper foundation had been laid for the introduction of secondary evidence of said former will. Attorney Nelson testified he did not have the original will he had prepared for Mrs. Schneberger and did not know where it was; when the reciprocal wills were executed in 1956 he placed them in separate envelopes and gave Mrs. Schneberger the envelope containing her will, upon which envelope his letterhead was printed and the words “Last Will and Testament of Mary A. Schneberger” were typewritten ; after Mr. Schneberger died and bis will was admitted *973to probate Mrs. Sehneberger and he (Nelson) cheeked the contents of Mr. Schneberger’s lockbox in a local bank and Nelson saw there the envelope from his office upon which was the typewritten statement, “Last Will and Testament of Mary A. Sehneberger.” Mr. Nelson produced what he testified was a carbon copy and a true copy of her will, made when the original was made, and retained by him.
In addition to the foregoing testimony the Answer filed in this suit by defendants Pigman and wife as eoexeeutors of the will of Mary A. Sehneberger denied her former will, Exhibit B, pleaded by plaintiffs, was in existence, either when that answer Avas filed or at the time Mr. Schneberger’s will Avas probated.
The best-eAÚdence rule requires the production of original documents unless their absence is satisfactorily explained. 32 O. J. S., Evidence, section 782. Whether such absence is satisfactorily explained is to' be determined by the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. Fisher & Ball v. Carter, 178 Iowa 636, 642, 160 N.W. 15.
In the case at bar the proper persons to have custody of Mrs. Schneberger’s earlier Avill, if it were in existence, were the executors of her estate. They were defendants in the case and they answered denying the existence of such Avill. The trial court correctly found that rendered unnecessary the giving of notice to produce. Postel v. Palmer, 71 Iowa 157, 159, 32 N.W. 257; Cook Manufacturing Co. v. Randall & Dickey, 62 Iowa 244, 246, 247, 17 N.W. 507; Meginnes v. McChesney, 179 Iowa 563, 582, 160 N.W. 50, L. R. A. 1917E 1060; Farmers Savings Bank v. Neel, 193 Iowa 685, 696, 697, 187 N.W. 555, 21 A. L. R. 1116; 32 C. J. S., Evidence, section 844, pages 778, 779; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, section 443.
We find the admission and consideration of the carbon copy of the Avill Avas not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. — Affirmed.
Thompson, C. J., and Bliss, Garfield, Garrett, Hats, Larson, and Peterson, JJ., concur.
Thornton, J., dissents.
*974Thornton, J.