Court Opinion

ID: 9919486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:36.287806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.661440
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                                RENDERED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0433-MR

ADRIAN DEAN HORD                                                     APPELLANT

                   ON APPEAL FROM LEWIS CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE BRIAN C. MCCLOUD, JUDGE
                             NO. 20-CR-00011

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      Adrian Hord appeals as a matter of right 1 from his seventy-year sentence

of imprisonment after being found guilty of four counts of first-degree wanton

endangerment, three counts of first-degree assault, three counts of first-degree

burglary, two counts of second-degree assault, one count of first-degree

criminal abuse, one count of tampering with physical evidence, two counts of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and being a first-degree persistent

felony offender (“PFO”). On appeal, Hord alleges the Lewis Circuit Court

abused its discretion by sentencing him to the jury’s initial sentencing

recommendation of eighty years instead of the twenty-year concurrent sentence

      1 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
the jury recommended in the PFO sentencing phase. Based on our review of

the record and applicable law, we conclude the trial court acted within its

discretion to impose the jury’s original recommendation of eighty-years’

imprisonment, capped at seventy years by statute. Accordingly, we uphold the

final judgment.

                                    I. Background

         On February 7, 2020, Hord assaulted his mother, Jerri, and his

girlfriend, L.C.; broke into his neighbors’ houses and assaulted them; then

barricaded himself in Jerri’s garage and fired shots at police officers during a

two-hour standoff. This chain of events began when Hord and L.C. had an

argument, leading Hord to take their two-year-old child to Jerri’s house down

the street. Hord took the child into Jerri’s detached garage and after a while,

Jerri became concerned about the child and went to check on her. Hord would

not let her enter the garage, so Jerri called L.C. for help. When L.C. arrived,

Hord had locked the garage door. Jerri unlocked it with a key and she and

L.C. entered. As L.C. spoke with Hord, Jerri approached the child but was

shoved to the ground by Hord, who kicked her twice in the mouth, breaking

her jaw. Jerri was undergoing chemotherapy treatment at the time and was

frail.

         Jerri crawled out the door and sought help at her neighbor’s house, the

Johnsons. L.C. followed with the child. Hord retrieved a long gun, then broke

down the Johnsons’ door, and went from room to room searching for L.C. and

the child. He hit both residents over the head with the butt of the gun and

                                         2
threatened that he would kill them if they did not tell him where L.C. and the

child were. He also assaulted the Johnsons’ niece.

      Hord found Jerri hiding in the bedroom, hit her on top of the head with

the gun, and kicked her. When Hord went to another room, Jerri escaped to

another neighbor’s house, the Sapps. L.C. hid in the Johnsons’ closet with the

child and called 911. Hord left the Johnsons, retrieved another gun, and

followed Jerri to the Sapp residence, busting down their door as well. Hord

held a gun to Mrs. Sapp’s head and then her son’s head until they told him

that his daughter was not there.

      Meanwhile, when L.C. heard Hord leave the Johnsons, she exited the

closet with her child and stepped out of the house. Hord caught up with her

and struck her multiple times in the head with the butt of a shotgun. L.C. fell

to the ground and covered the child with her body to protect her. Hord began

strangling L.C. and threatened to kill her. When L.C. told him the police had

arrived, Hord fled back to the garage, and barricaded himself inside. Police

officers tried to make contact with Hord, who briefly stepped outside the

garage, brandished a long gun and pointed it at the officers. When an officer

fired at him, he retreated inside the garage. Hord then fired multiple shots

through the garage door toward the police officers. After two hours of

negotiation, Hord finally exited the garage and was placed under arrest.

      At trial, a Lewis County jury convicted Hord of four counts of first-degree

wanton endangerment, three counts of first-degree assault, three counts of

first-degree burglary, two counts of second-degree assault, one count of first-

                                        3
degree criminal abuse, one count of tampering with physical evidence, and two

counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After the initial

sentencing phase, the jury recommended the minimum on each count, to run

consecutively for a total of eighty years. During the PFO sentencing phase, the

jury found Hord to be guilty of first-degree PFO and again recommended the

minimum on each count, 2 but to run concurrently, for a total of twenty years.

Obviously confused, the trial court polled the jury, asking if it was its intent to

lessen Hord’s sentence from eighty years to twenty after finding he was a PFO.

The jury affirmed its verdict.

      At the formal sentencing, Hord asked the trial court to follow the PFO-

sentencing recommendation of twenty years. The Commonwealth asked the

trial court to sentence Hord under the PFO instructions, but to run the

sentences consecutively. 3In the alternative, the Commonwealth suggested the

PFO charge be dismissed, and the trial court follow the jury’s original

sentencing recommendation of eighty years.

      The trial court indicated its belief that the jury was confused and stated

that justice required dismissing the PFO and sentencing Hord based on the

      2 To be clear, the jury was properly instructed on each conviction as to the

range of penalty for both the unenhanced penalty and the PFO enhanced penalty. The
jury in each instance recommended an appropriate penalty within the permitted
range. For example, on each Wanton Endangerment First Degree conviction, the jury
recommended a sentence of one year, but PFO-enhanced sentence of 10 years. For
each of the Class B Felonies, Assault First Degree and Burglary First Degree, the jury
recommended a sentence of 10 years, but PFO-enhanced sentence of 20 years. The
PFO-enhanced sentences totaled 220 years.
      3 We interpret the Commonwealth’s suggestion to dismiss the PFO charge as a

motion to dismiss which the trial court subsequently granted.

                                          4
jury’s initial recommendation. The court dismissed the PFO charge, as well as

two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, both without

prejudice, and sentenced Hord to eighty years, subject to the seventy-year

statutory cap. 4 Hord now appeals.

                                      II. Analysis

      Whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences “is in the

discretion of the trial judge, even though the jury initially may have

recommended a different sentence.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 839,

842 (Ky. 1992). On appeal, we will only reverse only if an abuse of discretion is

evident; that is, if the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principle.” Lopez v. Commonwealth, 459

S.W.3d 867, 873 (Ky. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d

117, 119 (Ky. 2007)).

      Hord now asserts that under the PFO sentencing statute, KRS 5 532.080,

the jury’s PFO sentence replaced its original penalty phase sentence; the

statute granting trial courts sentencing discretion, KRS 532.110, is ambiguous;

and the rule of lenity requires a twenty-year sentence. In the alternative, Hord

asks for a new penalty phase.

      The PFO sentencing statute, KRS 532.080(1), provides in relevant part as

follows: “When a defendant is found to be a persistent felony offender, the jury,

       4 The trial court also sentenced Hord to an additional six months for contempt

for his disrespectful, profanity-laden outburst toward the judge as Hord left the
courtroom following sentencing.
      5 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                          5
in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment assessed under KRS 532.060 for the

crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall fix a sentence of

imprisonment as authorized by subsection (5) or (6) of this section.” (emphasis

added). Hord maintains that the “in lieu of” language requires replacing the

jury’s original sentencing recommendation of eighty years with its PFO

sentence of twenty years. Hord’s argument misses the mark since the jury’s

PFO recommended sentences all exceeded its nonenhanced sentences with

those PFO-enhanced sentences totaling 220 years. The record reflects that the

jury’s recommendation of 20 years was merely its recommendation as to

whether the sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

      KRS 532.110(1) states, subject to limited exceptions: “When multiple

sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for more than one (1)

crime, including a crime for which a previous sentence of probation or

conditional discharge has been revoked, the multiple sentences shall run

concurrently or consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of

sentence[.]” (emphasis added).

      In Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Ky. 2008), this Court

noted that it has “repeatedly affirmed a trial court’s decision to order a

defendant to serve consecutive terms of incarceration in the face of a jury’s

recommended concurrent sentencing.” (citing Wombles v. Commonwealth, 831

S.W.2d 172, 176 (Ky. 1992) (affirming trial court's decision to run some

convictions consecutively for total term of imprisonment of forty years when

jury had recommended all convictions be served concurrently for total term of

                                         6
imprisonment of twenty years); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173, 178

(Ky. 2001) (affirming trial court's decision to sentence defendants to

consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling twenty-five years when jury had

recommended concurrent terms of imprisonment totaling ten years); Nichols v.

Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 263, 264-65 (Ky. 1992) (affirming trial court's

decision to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling ten years

despite jury's recommended concurrent sentences totaling five years'

imprisonment); Jones v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Ky. 1992)

(affirming trial court's decision to impose two consecutive twenty-year

imprisonment terms when jury recommended two concurrent twenty-year

terms)).

      The Benet court emphasized,

      [This Court] refuse[s] to require the trial judges of this state to be
      compelled invariably to follow a jury’s recommendation regarding
      whether multiple sentences to be served concurrently or
      consecutively. Rather, the trial judges of the Commonwealth
      should sentence all defendants facing multiple terms of
      incarceration as a trial judge believes in the exercise of discretion
      is a proper sentence, even if that proper sentence deviates from a
      jury’s recommendation. Of course, it is beyond cavil that trial
      judges may not increase the sentence actually determined by the
      jury; but trial judges are not bound by the jury’s recommendation
      of how that sentence shall be served.

253 S.W.3d at 535-36.

      More recently, in Howard v. Commonwealth, this Court reaffirmed that

“Kentucky statutory law affords trial courts immense discretion in setting

criminal penalties.” 496 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Ky. 2016) (citing KRS Chapter 532).

Along these lines, “trial courts retain discretion in decreasing unduly harsh

                                         7
sentences, in granting or denying probation, and in determining whether a

defendant should serve sentences concurrently or consecutively.” Id. (citations

omitted).

      Here, after dismissing the PFO charge, the trial court exercised its

discretion to run the previously recommended (unenhanced minimum

sentences) for each count consecutively. This decision was made after the

court heard arguments from both parties and considered the PSI report, the

nature of the offenses and Hord’s criminal history. The rule of lenity under

which Hord now seeks relief “requires any ambiguity in a statute to be resolved

in favor of a criminal defendant.” White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470,

484 (Ky. 2005). However, since KRS 532.110 and case law are clear about the

trial court’s authority and discretion in sentencing a criminal defendant, the

rule of lenity does not apply. Lastly, Hord’s claim that the jury exercised its

prerogative to fix the PFO sentence to be lower than the original sentence has

no bearing on whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion to

impose the jury’s original recommended sentence. Hord has failed to show the

trial court’s imposition of a seventy-year sentence was an abuse of discretion,

thus, a new penalty phase is not warranted.

                                 III.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment of the Lewis Circuit Court

is affirmed.

                                        8
      VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Keller, Lambert, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ.,

sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell, JJ., concur.

Thompson, J., concurs in result only. Conley, J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Robert Chung-Hua Yang
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett
Assistant Attorney General

                                        9