Court Opinion

ID: 9902222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:38.749316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.880371
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0243-MR

CHANCELLOR ANTHONY                                                   APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-00395

KENTUCKY JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
SAFETY CABINET, DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING                                           APPELLEE

                        OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART,
                            REVERSING IN PART,
                             AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: The Appellant (“Anthony”) asks this Court to reverse the

dismissal of his disability discrimination claim. Because the status of the Appellee

(“DOCJT”) as an “employer” of Anthony as defined by law could not be

determined from the allegations contained in the Complaint, we reverse the

dismissal for failure to state a claim and remand for further proceedings. We
affirm the dismissal of Anthony’s administrative appeal of DOCJT’s decision not

to certify Anthony after his training.

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                Anthony was employed by the Leitchfield Police Department (“LPD”)

a department of the City of Leitchfield, Anthony’s direct employer. To obtain

certification as a peace officer for this employment, Anthony attended training

provided by DOCJT. He did so at the direction of LPD. Unlike some larger police

agencies in Kentucky, LPD did not have its own training program and sent its

recruits to DOCJT.

                Anthony was born without a fully formed right arm. He uses a

prosthesis for his right forearm and hand. Anthony proceeded through the training

and was scheduled to graduate the program. At the last minute, Anthony was

denied his certification after previously being listed as a graduate.

                Anthony appealed the certification denial within the administrative

agency, but this appeal was unsuccessful. Anthony filed an appeal of the final

administrative decision to the circuit court. Unfortunately, Anthony failed to

attach the order he sought to appeal, which KRS1 13B.140(1) requires. In addition

to the attempted appeal, Anthony claimed disability discrimination by DOCJT in

violation of KRS 344.070.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -2-
             Anthony conceded the error about the appeal portion of his suit.

DOCJT sought to dismiss not only the appeal but also the discrimination claim.

The circuit court concluded that DOCJT was not Anthony’s employer, nor a labor

organization governed by KRS 344.070. As a result, the circuit court dismissed

Anthony’s suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This

appeal follows.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
             upon which relief may be granted admits as true the
             material facts of the complaint. So a court should not
             grant such a motion unless it appears the pleading party
             would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
             which could be proved . . . . Stated another way, the
             court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be
             proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief? Since a
             motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
             relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a
             reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s
             determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
             issue de novo.

Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Because of this deference to alleged facts, motions to dismiss

often turn on questions of law.

                                    ANALYSIS

             Anthony does not contest the dismissal of his administrative appeal.

Because appeals of administrative decisions are a matter of legislative grace, strict

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compliance with the appeal requirements must be observed. Without strict

compliance, the circuit court has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Board of

Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1978).

                DOCJT did not argue any aspect of res judicata of the administrative

decision on the discrimination claim in the circuit court proceedings. DOCJT was

not yet required to assert this affirmative defense under CR2 12.02. Even if it had,

neither we nor the circuit court could determine that issue because the record of the

administrative action was not sent to the circuit court.

                At this point, we cannot ascertain why the certification was denied.

DOCJT suggested at page 3 of its Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to

Dismiss filed with the circuit court that Anthony could not perform critical tasks,

such as defensive maneuvers, without his prosthesis, and Anthony indicated that he

did not intend to wear the prosthesis on a day-to-day basis. But there is no record

to support this statement. We must assume for the sake of a dismissal motion that

Anthony’s allegation of discrimination due to disability is true.

                If Anthony is a “qualified person with a disability,” then “an

employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee” cannot

discriminate again him in training opportunities. KRS 344.070. Disability as it

may apply to Anthony means “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -4-
limits one (1) or more of the major life activities of the individual.” KRS

344.010(4)(a). A qualified person with a disability means “an individual with a

disability as defined in KRS 344.010 who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position

that the individual holds or desires unless an employer demonstrates that he is

unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s

disability without undue hardship on the conduct of the employers’ business.”

KRS 344.030(1).

             For a motion to dismiss, we must assume Anthony could prove the

factual predicates to satisfy the definition of a qualified person with a disability.

The legal question is whether Anthony’s claim is barred because of the limitation

in KRS 344.070, which creates liability for an “employer.” We must decide

whether DOCJT can be considered an employer under this statute.

             Before addressing the controlling question of employer status, we will

comment on Anthony’s added argument of DOCJT being a labor organization. We

need not delve into the disagreement over preservation of this argument. The

circuit court correctly determined DOCJT is not a labor organization as a matter of

law after review of the allegations about DOCJT in the Complaint. KRS

344.030(4). See B.L. v. Schumann, 380 F. Supp. 3d 614, 648 (W.D. Ky. 2019).

                                          -5-
             In B.L., the plaintiff did not allege that the governmental agency

running the program in question was an employer. Id. In the present case,

Anthony did make this allegation. In Paragraph 22 of his Complaint, Anthony

alleged DOCJT was his employer for purposes of his KRS 344.070 claim, while in

Paragraph 1 Anthony says LPD was his employer.

             Claiming two employers appears to be inconsistent. But Anthony

provided further relevant allegations in Paragraphs 3 and 19 of his Complaint. In

Paragraph 3, Anthony alleges DOCJT was responsible for his training protected by

KRS 344.070. In Paragraph 19, Anthony said LPD sent him to the training

provided by DOCJT.

             The parties have not discussed the statutory definition of employer.

As used in KRS 344.070, a definition of employer was provided by the General

Assembly. The definition includes not just the employer itself but also any “agent”

of the employer. KRS 344.030(2).

             We have little published Kentucky authority applying KRS 344.070.

Since the Kentucky Civil Rights Act borrows the language of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, the provisions of Kentucky law “should be interpreted

consonant with federal interpretation.” Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840

S.W.2d 814, 821 (Ky. 1992). Where a state agency provides police training for

officers of other agencies, the state agency may be found to be an agent of the

                                         -6-
employer within the definition of KRS 344.030(2) and thus under KRS 344.070.

See Pathan v. Connecticut, 19 F. Supp. 3d 400, 416 (D. Conn. 2014).

             Again, this is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We

cannot determine based on the limited record whether Anthony will be able to

establish the factual predicates to show DOCJT as an agent for his direct employer.

But, as it would not be impossible for Anthony to establish the required agency of

DOCJT providing training for the employees of LPD, the dismissal of the

disability discrimination claim must be reversed.

             We recognize that the concept of DOCJT as an agent within the

definition of employer was not specifically argued by the parties. As a result, the

circuit court did not have the opportunity to rule on the question. As an appellate

court, we must apply the law even if certain aspects of the law have not been

directly addressed. Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991). We were

required only to look up the definition of employer within the same statutory

chapter as KRS 344.070 to discover the question of agency. In this case, the

statutory definition of employer which governs KRS 344.070 as including an agent

is a key component to the law of this case and must be addressed.

                                  CONCLUSION

             We affirm the dismissal of Anthony’s appeal of the administrative

decision. We reverse the dismissal of Anthony’s disability discrimination claim

                                         -7-
under KRS 344.070 for further proceedings to determine if DOCJT acted as the

agent of LPD in providing training for Anthony and, if so, whether Anthony can

prove discrimination. Consideration of other issues by the circuit court will follow

from further pleadings in the case.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Thomas E. Clay                            Robin Cornette
Louisville, Kentucky                      Frankfort, Kentucky

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