Court Opinion

ID: 9845088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:15:06.224223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:51.510350
License: Public Domain

PETERS, J.
I dissent.
The defendant was arrested in Kern County for an offense not here involved. The instant crime had occurred in Stanislaus County. Sergeant Hall, a law enforcement officer of Stanislaus County, came to Bakersfield for the purpose of interrogating defendant about the killing here involved. When Hall arrived defendant was called into the interrogation room to be questioned by Hall and the other officers. He was told of his right to an attorney and of his right to remain silent. He was then vigorously interrogated for 50 minutes. He consistently denied complicity in the Stanislaus County murder. During this interrogation a brief recess was called, and then the questioning was renewed. Defendant at that time stated that he wanted an attorney before making a statement. The police did not directly deny this request but asked defendant if he had an attorney in Bakersfield or Kern County and whether he intended to use a private attorney or the public defender in Stanislaus County. Upon receiving the reply that defendant had no Kern County lawyer and probably would use the public defender, the interrogation continued, and defendant continued to deny complicity in the murder. He then asked to be returned to his cell to think the matter over. After three hours he was again taken to the interrogation room. He immediately told the officers that before he made a statement he wanted to talk to his mother. The interrogating officers told him that that was *328not necessary because the decision was his alone. Then defendant requested permission to consult with his wife, or with his father, but was dissuaded by the same arguments used to deny him access to his mother. Thereafter, in response to further questioning he confessed.
Looking at the interrogation in its entirety, as we are required to do, the conclusion is inevitable that the confession here involved was secured by evasion and artifice and certainly in violation of the fundamental philosophy behind Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361],
The police were dealing with a young man of limited intelligence, a young man who was described by the court-appointed psychiatrists as being of “dull normal intelligence” and as being “in the borderline mental defective groups.” Although defendant was told of his right to an attorney, the police failed to honor his request for one and continued to interrogate him. Then defendant demanded the right to see his mother, his wife, or his father, before making any further statements. The granting of these requests was avoided by specious arguments.
This factual situation falls directly within the rule stated in People v. Anderson, 63 Cal.2d 351 [46 Cal.Rptr. 763, 406 P.2d 43], There the court stated that the defendant had requested counsel, and (p. 362) that the “police improperly persisted in questioning him. Although upon the commencement of the inquiry defendant did not immediately demand counsel, but said that he could not remember what had happened, he did not thereby forfeit his right to counsel. Before he gave the incriminating statements he asked for counsel; the request does not lose its force because the questioning continued. The denial of the right to counsel by evasion or neglect of the suspect’s request for counsel constitutes no less a constitutional violation than a denial by explicit rejection. In Escobedo the United States Supreme Court held that defendant’s statements uttered during the prearraignment accusatory stage cannot be admitted into evidence if, at that stage, he has been denied his right to counsel. Since the police, by ignoring defendant’s request for counsel at the accusatory stage, deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel, the admission of statements elicited during that time was erroneous.” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Luker, 63 Cal.2d 464, 474 [47 Cal.Rptr. 209, 407 P.2d 9].)
*329The majority, in apparent recognition that the interrogation should not have proceeded after defendant had made it clear that he wanted an attorney or a member of his family with whom to consult, urge that there was a waiver, because defendant continued to talk after his demands were parried and evaded. The quotation from Anderson, supra, demonstrates that no such inference is permissible. Although defendant continued to talk after he was unable to get a lawyer, he continued to deny complicity, and then, when called back to the interrogation room, he made it clear that he did not want to talk until he had consulted with some member of his family. The police parried the last request by the specious argument that the decision was his and that his family could not assist him. To hold that there was a waiver under such circumstances is contrary to the decided eases. A waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made. (Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 [8 L.Ed.2d 70, 82 S.Ct. 884].) It is also contrary to the fundamental theory of Escobedo and Dorado, supra. The basic concept behind those eases and their numerous progeny, is that it is unfair, and encourages coercion, to continue to interrogate a layman in the unfriendly atmosphere of the stationhouse, after he has clearly indicated that he does not want to talk until he has consulted with an attorney or his family. The police, when such a request is made, may not continue to interrogate unless the accused makes a knowing and intelligent waiver. They cannot dissuade him by specious and evasive arguments and continue to interrogate him with the intent of eliciting incriminating statements. They must grant his request or stop the interrogation.
It was clearly error to admit the confession. Even if that error were not per se reversible (but see Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 [2 L.Ed.2d 975, 78 S.Ct. 844] ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733] ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 [71 L.Ed. 749, 47 S.Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243] ; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [9 L.Ed.2d 922, 83 S.Ct. 917]; Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 [89 L.Ed. 1029, 65 S.Ct. 781]; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 [3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 79 S.Ct. 1202] ; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 [10 L.Ed.2d 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336]; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [12 L.Ed.2d 908, 64 S.Ct. 1774, 1 A.L.R.2d 1205]; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]), it was clearly prejudicial (Chapman v. California, supra). It was not cured by the subsequent confes*330sions. Those confessions must be deemed to have been induced by the earlier improper one (People v. Spencer, ante, p. 158 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715]).
I would reverse the judgment.
Tobriner, J., concurred.