Court Opinion

ID: 9707975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:26:22.262266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:40.788984
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN, dissenting: The majority vacates the judgment granting defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice because, as stated in its opinion, “not only has defendant consistently misapplied section 2 — 619 but, in addition, the circuit court allowed such confusion to continue. The motion practice utilized by defendant below and acquiesced in by the trial court cannot be sanctioned. Because of the commingling of motions for relief under sections 2 — 615 and 2 — 619, we could only speculate as to whether the circuit court has found a failure to state a cause of action or has found that some affirmative matter precludes relief, thus necessarily finding that a cause of action was stated. We will not so speculate because to do so could cause prejudice to either party.” 157 Ill. App. 3d at 695. However, as the majority also pointed out in its opinion, a judgment should not be set aside because of a commingling in a motion to dismiss of grounds under both sections 2 — 615 and 2 — 619 unless the commingling results in prejudice to the nonmovant. (Wilde v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 722, 729, 480 N.E.2d 1236; Cali v. DeMattei (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 623, 628, 460 N.E.2d 121; Premier Electric Construction Co. v. La Salle National Bank (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 638, 641-43, 450 N.E.2d 1360.) Because the majority has made no finding of prejudice and since plaintiff makes no contention that he was prejudiced, it follows that vacatur is inappropriate and that this appeal should be decided on its merits. Furthermore, contrary to the expression of the majority, it should not be required to speculate on the basis for the trial court’s ruling. It would only be necessary that this court consider the issues presented and argued here by the parties. They are (a) whether plaintiff’s complaint was timely under the discovery rale, (b) whether defendant’s letter exceeded the scope of his privilege and (c) whether plaintiff’s complaint alleged special damages. Issues (a) and (b) clearly set forth grounds under sections 2 — 619(5) and 2 — 615(9), respectively, and (c) is clearly a ground under section 2 — 615. In remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion the majority does not delineate “the further proceedings,” but it would appear to require that defendant present separate motions under sections 2 — 615 and 2 — 619 for rulings by the trial court. This, of course, would result only in a representation in a later appeal of the same issues that are now before us. In view thereof, judicial expediency suggests that they be considered now. See Bescor, Inc. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 65, 446 N.E.2d 1209, where the court stated in a footnote: “This ‘hybrid’ procedure of combining a motion under section 45 [now 2 — 615] and a motion under section 48 [now 2— 619] has been disapproved. (See Moreno v. Joe Perillo Pontiac, Inc. (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 670; see also James v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 398, 312 N.E.2d 605.) Nonetheless in the interest of judicial economy and to avoid delay we do not remand because of the foregoing but consider each of the issues thereby presented.” 113 Ill. App. 3d 65, 66.