Court Opinion

ID: 9606314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:05.849975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:02.331540
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
concurring.
In my view there is a question of fact as to the scope of the permission which Duvall gave Stacy. Stacy’s testimony reflects his belief that he was operating the vehicle beyond the permission given him:
Q. Tom, how did you feel about using the Kallerson vehicle the night of the accident. Did you feel you had a right to use it for whatever you wanted on that evening?
A. Well, no not really. .

Q. Do you feel that Russ Duvall would have minded you using it on that evening if he had known you were going to?
A. He might have, yeah.
Q. And what makes you say that?
A. Well he is — I don’t know — he is kind of a person that he worries sometimes quite a bit.
Stacy depo. pp. 76-77.
Because I think a question of fact does exist I would reach the question whether the initial permission rule should be adopted in Alaska. It holds that when a person is given permission to use a vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use “barring theft or the like,”1 is a permissive use within the terms of the standard omnibus clause even though the permittee may have ignored the lender’s admonitions as to the vehicle’s use.2 In my view this rule best meets the reasonable expectation of a policy holder that those whom he allows to drive his car will be insured; it tends to eliminate lawsuits, such as the present one, which turn on fine, and often petty, factual questions concerning the nature of the limitations3 on permission granted which, if not followed, were not meant by the named insured to result in a forfeiture of coverage in any event; and it advances the goal that motorists be financially responsible for their negligent acts so that those who are wrongfully injured may receive compensation. I would therefore adopt the initial permission rule as the rule of decision in this case. The question of fact which I believe exists concerning whether Stacy was operating the vehicle in violation of the permission given him would then be irrelevant.

. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 54 Ill.2d 333, 297 N.E.2d 163, 168 (1973); Odolecki v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 55 N.J. 542, 264 A.2d 38, 42 (1970).

. See United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. McManus, 64 Ill.2d 239, 1 Ill.Dec. 78, 356 N.E.2d 78, 80 (1976); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 54 Ill.2d 333, 297 N.E.2d 163, 168 (1973); Hull v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 Neb. 130, 187 N.W.2d 650, 651 (1971); Arndt v. Davis, 183 Neb. 726, 163 N.W.2d 886, 889 (1969); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Fisher, 88 Nev. 155, 494 P.2d 549, 551 (1972); Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 55 N.J. 542, 264 A.2d 38, 42 (1970). See generally 5 Loy.U.L.J. 284 (1974).

. See, e. g., National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 106 N.H. 36, 203 A.2d 645, 646 (1964) (“would rather not have him take [the] car into Canada”); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gore, 99 N.H. 277, 109 A.2d 566, 568 (1954) (“Well, that’s all right but please don’t use it as a taxi all night”); Costanzo v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers’ Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 30 N.J. 262, 152 A.2d 589, 591 (1959) (“not be out running around”); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Behringer, 419 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex.Civ.App.1967) (“No you’re not taking him for a ride”); or, as here, “Don’t monkey with it”, Duvall depo. p. 19.