Court Opinion

ID: 9396888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 21:00:40.650998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.987548
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4549

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        AMORD DEMETRICH JACOBS,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:18-cr-00155-FL-1)

        Submitted: May 5, 2023                                            Decided: May 22, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA & STROUD LAW GROUP, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A.
        Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, David G. Beraka, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Amord Demetrich Jacobs appeals his jury conviction for possession with intent to

        distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base and a quantity of cocaine, in violation of 21

        U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), and the imposed 140-month sentence. Jacobs first asserts that the

        district court reversibly erred by not declaring a mistrial based on the jury’s failure to

        follow the court’s instructions. Jacobs also asserts that the court erred in denying his Fed.

        R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal because he argues that the Government

        failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish that he intended to distribute the

        narcotics seized on the day of his arrest. Jacobs last challenges the reasonableness of his

        sentence based on the district court’s decision to (1) enhance his offense level for

        obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 3C1.1

        (2018), without holding an evidentiary hearing; and (2) deny his motion for a downward

        variance. Finding no error, we affirm.

               I.     Failure to Declare Mistrial

               Where, as here, a defendant fails to move for a mistrial, but argues on appeal that

        the trial court should have declared a mistrial sua sponte, we review for plain error. United

        States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 754 (4th Cir. 2011). Under the plain error

        standard, Jacobs may not obtain relief unless he establishes that the district court erred, that

        its “error was plain,” that “the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning that there is

        a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have

        been different,” and that “the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public

        reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Heyward, 42 F.4th 460, 465 (4th Cir.

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        2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This standard is difficult to satisfy.” Id.

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               We conclude that the district court committed no plain error in failing to sua sponte

        declare a mistrial. We first find that the district court committed no error because it

        promptly and adequately remedied any failure by the jury to follow the court’s instructions

        and promptly issued an Allen charge. *        And even if the jury’s behavior potentially

        warranted a mistrial, Jacobs posits no argument as to how the jury’s conduct affected his

        substantial rights. Indeed, even more egregious jury misconduct than is at issue here will

        not necessarily affect a defendant’s substantial rights. See United States v. Basham, 561

        F.3d 302, 321 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding district court’s declination to declare mistrial after

        juror contacted multiple media outlets during trial where the communications were “devoid

        of substantive content” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. West,

        877 F.2d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 1989) (“A defendant must show prejudice in order for the

        court’s ruling to constitute an abuse of discretion, and no prejudice exists if the jury could

        make individual guilt determinations by following the court’s cautionary instructions.”).

        In any event, we find that the jury’s behavior here did not seriously affect the fairness,

        integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings or give rise to “the most extraordinary

               *
                “Derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the commonly termed
        Allen charge is a supplemental instruction given by a trial court when the jury has reached
        an impasse in its deliberations and is unable to reach a consensus.” United States v.
        Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 625 (4th Cir. 2015).

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        of circumstances” required to warrant a reversal. United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248,

        257 (4th Cir. 1997).

               II.    Rule 29 Motion

               A district court, “on the defendant’s motion[,] must enter a judgment of acquittal of

        any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim.

        P. 29(a); see United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Under Rule

        29 . . ., the defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s

        case, after the close of all evidence, or after the jury returns a guilty verdict.”). “We review

        de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion.” United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th

        180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we must “draw[]

        all reasonable inferences from the facts” in the light most favorable to the Government,”

        United States v. Denton, 944 F.3d 170, 179 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

        omitted), and “will uphold the verdict if . . . it is supported by substantial evidence,” United

        States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Substantial evidence “is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as

        adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

        doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant “legal question [is] whether,

        after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

        of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

        Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Accordingly, “[a] defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy burden, as

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        appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the

        prosecution’s failure is clear.” Savage, 885 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               As is relevant here, “[t]he elements necessary to prove a conviction for possession

        with intent to distribute cocaine base are: (1) possession of the cocaine base; (2) knowledge

        of this possession; and (3) intention to distribute the cocaine base.” United States v.

        Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Notably, “[t]he requisite intent to

        distribute may be inferred if the quantity of drugs is greater than would be used for personal

        consumption.” Id. We have reviewed the record and considered the parties’ arguments

        and conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

        guilty verdict. See United States v. Smith, 21 F.4th 122, 134 (4th Cir. 2021) (recognizing

        that “[t]here is no perfect demarcation between drug users and distributors—many are

        both—and district courts must enjoy discretion in policing this line”); cf. United States v.

        Wright, 131 F.3d 1111, 1113-16 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant found in

        possession of only 3.25 grams of cocaine not entitled to jury instruction on lesser included

        offense of simple possession).

               III.   Sentence

               We review a sentence for “reasonableness” by applying the “deferential abuse-of-

        discretion standard.” United States v. McCain, 974 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). In doing so, “[o]ur inquiry proceeds in two steps.” United States

        v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 724 (2021). We must “first

        ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to

        calculate (or improperly calculating) the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the

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        Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a

        sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen

        sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only if we determine that the sentence

        is procedurally reasonable do we then proceed to substantive reasonableness by

        considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “In assessing whether a district court properly calculated the Guidelines range,

        including its application of any sentencing enhancements, [we] review[] the district court’s

        legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Pena,

        952 F.3d 503, 512 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]lear error exists

        only when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

        conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224, 233

        (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Our consideration of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence “takes into

        account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused

        its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in §

        3553(a).” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

        marks omitted). “[A]ny sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines

        range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir.)

        (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 164 (2022). A defendant can

        only rebut that presumption “by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured

        against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir.

        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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               Jacobs first argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district

        court increased his offense level for obstruction of justice without a proper evidentiary

        hearing. But this court has recognized that “[d]istrict courts hold an especial advantage in

        fact finding where the sentencing enhancement is based upon testimony or trial

        proceedings that they have personally observed.” See United States v. Andrews, 808 F.3d

        964, 969 (4th Cir. 2015). As the district court here personally observed Jacobs’ trial

        testimony, we find that the court was not required to hold a separate evidentiary hearing

        regarding Jacobs’ testimony in this case.

               Admittedly, “the advantages that district courts enjoy in their fact-finding capacities

        impose the concomitant obligation to actually find the facts necessary for meaningful

        appellate review.” Id. Thus, “[w]here the enhancement for obstruction of justice is based

        on a defendant’s perjurious testimony, trial court findings should encompass the factual

        predicates for perjury, namely that the defendant (1) gave false testimony; (2) concerning

        a material matter; (3) with willful intent to deceive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        We find that the district court fully satisfied its obligations and discern no error in the

        court’s decision to enhance Jacobs’ offense level for obstruction of justice under USSG §

        3C1.1. See United States v. Kiulin, 360 F.3d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 2004) (“In order to apply

        [the] sentencing enhancement . . ., the district court must conclude that the government has

        shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant willfully obstructed or

        impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice” (internal

        quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)

        (explaining that a district court may apply the enhancement based on trial testimony when

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        a defendant obstructed justice by giving “false testimony concerning a material matter with

        the willful intent to provide false testimony”).

                  We also reject Jacobs’ argument that his 140-month sentence is excessive and that

        the district court erroneously denied his motion for a variance. Jacobs’ within-Guidelines

        sentence is presumed substantively reasonable and he may only rebut that presumption “by

        showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a)

        factors.” Bennett, 986 F.3d at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). Jacobs’ challenge

        to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence appears to be nothing more than a request

        that we substitute our own judgment for that of the sentencing judge, which we may not

        do. Cf. United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that this

        court “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on

        a whole, justify the extent of [a] variance, and the fact that [it] might reasonably have

        concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the

        district court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, the record establishes that

        the district court fully considered Jacobs’ arguments in mitigation but exercised its

        discretion in fashioning the imposed sentence. As we find that the district court ably

        fulfilled its sentencing duties here, we afford “due deference to the district court’s decision

        that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify [the 140-month sentence].” Nance, 957 F.3d

        at 215.

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               We therefore affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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