Court Opinion

ID: 9637449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:06:58.946453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:11.853704
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                         Docket No. 49240

  SHAUN BASS and LAREE BASS,              )
  Husband and Wife,                       )
                                          )
     Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-        )
     Respondents,                         )
                                          )
  v.                                      )
                                          )
  DONALD ESSLINGER and                    )                     Boise, January 2023 Term
  JENNIFER ESSLINGER, Husband             )
  and Wife,                               )                     Opinion Filed: March 2, 2023
                                          )
     Defendants-Counterclaimants-         )                     Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
     Appellants,                          )
                                          )
  and                                     )
                                          )
  DOES I-X,                               )
                                          )
     Defendants.                          )
  _______________________________________ )

        Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
        Idaho County. Gregory FitzMaurice, District Judge.

        The decisions of the district court are affirmed.

        Law Office of Westley Hoyt, Clearwater, for Appellants. Wesley Hoyt argued.

        Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, Lewiston, for Respondents. Samuel T.
        Creason argued.

                                        _____________________

BRODY, Justice.
       This appeal involves a dispute over ownership of one-third of an acre of land between two
parcels near Slate Creek, Idaho. The disputed one-third acre is located south of a fence erected in
the 1970s by the family of the current owners of the southern parcel, the Basses, and the
predecessors-in-interest to the northern parcel’s current owners, the Esslingers.

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       The district court granted summary judgment for the Basses, declined to take judicial notice
of a case file from a 2006 quiet title action concerning the northern parcel, found that a boundary
by agreement existed at the historic fence line, denied a motion to continue the summary judgment
hearing pending criminal trespass charges against the Esslingers, and granted the Basses
$107,134.32 in treble damages. Today, we affirm the decisions of the district court. We also award
attorney’s fees to the Basses for part of the appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121.
                        I.        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Outside Slate Creek, Idaho, Shawn and Laree Bass own a five-acre parcel of land off
highway 95. To the north of the Bass’s land, Donald and Jennifer Esslinger own three parcels of
land. The southern boundary of one of those parcels is the northern boundary of the Bass land.
Along this boundary line, there is one-third of an acre that both the Basses and the Esslingers
contend they own. The Basses claim that the land is theirs because of a fence that existed on the
northern side of the disputed land, while the Esslingers claim that the fence is not the correct
boundary and that they own the property just to the south of the fence.

                        Map of the disputed area between the Bass and Esslinger parcels.

       The Bass family has owned the southern parcel since at least the 1940s. The fence that they
believe marks the boundary line between their property and the Esslingers’ property was most
recently built in the 1970s by the Bass family and the prior owners of the Esslinger parcel, the
Mareks. When the fence was built, it was agreed by the owners of both parcels that it was the
boundary between the two parcels.

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        The Esslingers purchased the northern parcel in 2019. In preparing to sell the property in
late 2020, the Esslingers hired a surveyor to mark the exact boundaries between the two properties.
The surveyor determined that the actual boundary between the two properties was just south of the
fence and included the one-third acre now in dispute.
        On the day of the survey, the Basses and the Esslingers were both present. The Esslingers
contend the Basses understood where the actual boundary was located, while the Basses maintain
that they understood the fence line to be the correct division between the two properties. The
Esslingers subsequently took down the fence, cut down trees, removed underbrush, and mowed
the area. Despite the Basses’ objections, the Esslingers continued to remove trees and vegetation
from the disputed land over the next month.
            A. History of the Esslinger Parcel
        The Large family owned the northern parcel, along with two other nearby parcels, until
1976. The Marek family purchased the land at that time and owned it until 2007. When the Mareks
purchased the land from the Larges, the families entered into a financial agreement, (the “Escrow
Agreement,”) that provided that after the down payment, the Mareks would make yearly payments
to the Larges until the total purchase price had been paid. In that agreement, the Mareks agreed to
“keep the property in the same condition that it then was.”
        The purchase price was paid off and a warranty deed in favor of the Mareks was recorded
in 1999. The three parcels remained in the Mareks’ possession without issue until 2005, when it
was discovered that title to the parcels was incomplete because the warranty deed previously
recorded lacked a legal description for the northern parcel. The Mareks filed suit to quiet title to
the northern parcel in their names. Because the elder Larges who had sold the Mareks the property
had since passed away and the location of the Larges’ heirs was unknown, the Mareks filed a
motion asking for permission to publish notice of the quiet title action in the local newspaper as
authorized by Idaho Code section 5-508. The notice was published in the Idaho County Free Press
for a month and provided notice to the Larges and “their creditors (known or unknown), unknown
heirs, devisees, or legatees, their successors in interest,” or “any other parties who might claim in
interest in or to the” disputed property.
        Without response from any adverse parties, the Mareks successfully quieted title to the
northern parcel in their names. The Basses did not participate and were not named as parties in the
quiet title action (“the Quiet Title Litigation”).

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           B. Procedural History
       After the Esslingers entered the northern parcel, took down the fence, and removed the
trees, the Basses filed their initial complaint, requesting a restraining order to prevent further
damage, asking for injunctive relief to quiet title to the disputed property based on boundary by
agreement, and alleging trespass and timber trespass against the Esslingers. With their answer, the
Esslingers filed counterclaims alleging criminal racketeering, unjust enrichment, and breach of
contract, among others. Around the same time, the Esslingers learned that criminal trespass
charges were also being brought against them based on the same facts pled in the Basses’ civil
complaint. These charges included the possibility of jailtime for both Esslingers.
       Following the initial filings and an agreement not to make use of the property until the case
was resolved, the parties scheduled depositions of the Esslingers in Grangeville, Idaho. The parties
traveled to Grangeville in April 2021, to complete the Esslingers’ depositions. About half an hour
into the first deposition, Jennifer Esslinger invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination under the United States Constitution and stopped answering questions. Don
Esslinger’s deposition was over in minutes because he also invoked his Fifth Amendment right.
Based on the pending criminal charges, the Esslingers later explained, they were unable to answer
any questions during the depositions because they were concerned that they would be offering
testimony that would be misconstrued against them as direct or circumstantial evidence of criminal
conduct that had not occurred.
       After the depositions, the Basses filed a motion for summary judgment against the
Esslingers and a motion for sanctions against the Esslingers’ attorney, alleging that the “objections
and refusals to answer went far beyond particular aspects regarding the transcripts.” The Esslingers
also filed a motion for summary judgment and a hearing was set for late June 2021.
       Two days before the hearing and nearly two months after the depositions, around 10:00
p.m., the Esslingers filed a motion to continue the hearing because, based on the pending criminal
trespass charges, “Defendants [had] exercised their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and by
remaining silent, they [would be] deprived of the opportunity to testify and rebut the false
allegations against them raised in Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” They also filed a
motion for judicial notice, asking the district court to “take judicial notice of all documents
including but not limited to the pleadings, notices, judgment, Order and Decree” from the earlier
Quiet Title Litigation. The district court, citing both timeliness issues and substantive problems

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with the Esslingers’ motions, denied the motions and granted summary judgment for the Basses
on the boundary by agreement claim. The Esslingers filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
also denied, and this appeal followed.
                                            II.     ANALYSIS
    A. The district court did not err in denying the Esslingers’ motion to continue the
       summary judgment hearing.
        The Esslingers challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to continue the summary
judgment hearing, contending that the invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights precluded them
from submitting material evidence in opposition to the Basses’ motion for summary judgment.
The district court denied the motion because it was untimely and also because the Esslingers had
failed to provide legal authority supporting their position.
        “The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the
judge.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 567, 199 P.3d 123, 142 (2008). The criminal charges were
initiated in November of 2020, and the Esslingers did not file their motion until two days before
the summary judgment hearing in June 2021. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(A) requires
motions to be filed at least fourteen days prior to the hearing. The district court’s decision to deny
a continuance on timeliness grounds was consistent with the time standards set forth in Rule 7. As
such, the Esslingers have failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
    B. The district court did not err when it declined to take judicial notice of the entire file
       from the Quiet Title Litigation.
        The Esslingers requested that the district court take judicial notice of “all documents
including but not limited to the pleadings, notices, judgment, Order and Decree” from the Quiet
Title Litigation. The district court denied that request, finding that “the Esslingers did not identify
specific items in the [Quiet Title Litigation file] they were requesting the court take judicial notice
of.” Moreover, the district court pointed out that the timeliness of the motion for judicial notice
was an issue; it was filed two days before the hearing, while Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
7(b)(3)(a) states that a motion must have been filed two weeks prior. We hold that even if
timeliness was not an issue, the Esslingers have not provided the necessary information required
for the court to take judicial notice of the Quiet Title Litigation.
        Whether a district court erred in taking or not taking judicial notice is an evidentiary
question we review under the abuse of discretion standard. Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407, 413, 431
P.3d 242, 248 (2018); see also Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 863–64, 292 P.3d 248, 254–55

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(2012) (asking whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to take judicial notice of
ordinances and administrative rules but not specifying the particular judicial notice rule at issue).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 provides the general rule for judicial notice of “adjudicative facts.”
An “adjudicative fact” is a “[a] controlling or operative fact, rather than a background fact; a fact
that concerns the parties to a judicial or administrative proceeding and that helps the court or
agency determine how the law applies to those parties. State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 974, 354
P.3d 1186, 1189 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 610
(7th ed. 1999)). Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(c) provides:
       The court:
       (1) may take judicial notice on its own; or
       (2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the
       necessary information.
       When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court
       file in the same or a separate case, the court must identify the specific documents
       or items so noticed. When a party requests judicial notice of records, exhibits, or
       transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, the party must identify
       the specific items for which judicial notice is requested or offer to the court and
       serve on all parties copies of those items.
I.R.E. 201(c).
       While we have not previously examined the standard for taking judicial notice of an entire
case file in the civil context outside of post-conviction proceedings, our precedent shows that a
party must be specific in their requests for notice because “judicial notice is intended to preserve
judicial efficiency by recognizing facts that are easily and objectively verifiable.” State v.
Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 979, 354 P.3d 1186, 1194 (2015); Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407, 416,
431 P.3d 242, 251 (2018).
       In Rome v. State, a jury had convicted the defendant of aiding and abetting a burglary. 164
Idaho at 410. The defendant requested judicial notice of seven items, including “The Clerk’s
Record on Appeal” from his direct appeal, the court’s complete file from his underlying criminal
case, and the “court file” in another criminal case. Id. at 414. None of his requests asserted that
they pertained to adjudicative facts, and most of them failed to specify what the district court was
supposed to take notice of. Id. at 415. This Court considered what standard to use in reviewing the
district court’s decision and whether the defendant met the specificity requirements in his requests.
Id. In considering the specificity requirements, we explained that “[p]roviding the ‘necessary

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information’ means supplying the court with a specific reference to the adjudicative fact or facts
contained in the designated record, exhibit, or transcript that is relevant to the cause of action or
specific claim before the court.” Id. at 414.
        In this case, the Esslingers have failed to specify what adjudicative facts would have been
relevant to the cause of action. They highlighted that the case file they requested notice of was
“very small,” and that “literally, every one of the six (6) pleadings in this file is relevant to the
Esslingers’ case and should have been available for them to use and argue in the defense against
summary judgment.” The district court, in making its decision, considered the decree from the
Quiet Title Litigation, along with Peggy Marek’s explanation of the case in her declaration. The
Esslingers do not explain what, if any, additional substance the district court would have gleaned
had it considered the rest of the record. Instead, they maintained that Peggy Marek’s assertion that
she owned the disputed land, the caption and paragraphs naming the parties involved in the Quiet
Title Litigation that do not include the Basses, and the other documents are “of relevance,” but do
not explain why.
        Similar to Rome v. State, the specificity burden has not been met here. It is not enough to
simply claim that documents are relevant; the party requesting judicial notice must articulate the
specific adjudicative facts to be taken notice of and reference to an entire case file is not sufficient.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Esslingers did not
properly request judicial notice.
    C. The district court did not err when it granted summary judgment for the Basses.
        The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Basses, holding the historic
fence line is the boundary between the two parcels at issue based on the legal doctrine of boundary
by agreement. The Esslingers challenge that determination on two grounds. First, they contend the
Quiet Title Litigation precludes the Basses from litigating the boundary. And second, they contend
the Escrow Agreement between the Esslingers’ predecessors-in-interest prohibited the Mareks
from agreeing to a boundary at the fence line. The Esslingers’ arguments are not well taken.
        To put the Esslingers’ arguments in context, we have to go back to the history of their
parcel. The Mareks purchased the land from the Larges pursuant to the terms of an Escrow
Agreement that provided that after the down payment, the Mareks would make yearly payments
to the Larges until the total purchase price was paid in full. In that agreement, the Mareks agreed
to “keep the property in the same condition that it then was.”

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       The purchase price was paid off and the warranty deed in favor of the Mareks was recorded
in 1999. The three parcels remained in the Mareks’ possession without issue until 2005, when they
discovered that title to the parcels was incomplete because the warranty deed previously recorded
lacked a legal description for the parcel that is now owned by the Esslingers. The Mareks filed suit
to quiet title to the land in their names and published notice to the Larges and “their creditors
(known or unknown), unknown heirs, devisees, or legatees, their successors in interest,” or “any
other parties who might claim in interest in or to the” disputed property in the Idaho County Free
Press. Without response from any adverse parties, the Mareks successfully quieted title to the
northern parcel, allegedly including the disputed property, in their names.
       The Esslingers contend the Quiet Title Litigation conclusively established the boundary
for their parcel and the Basses’ parcel, and that the Basses were precluded from raising the doctrine
of boundary by agreement. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “bars not only subsequent relitigation
of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same
cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made.” Hindmarsh v. Mock,
138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). A claim is also precluded if it could have been brought
in the previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original action
ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the same parties as the original
action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the
original action. Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012). When
the three elements are established, claim preclusion bars “every matter offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in
the first suit.” Monitor Fin., L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Ests., LLC, 164 Idaho 555, 560–61, 433 P.3d
183, 188 (2019), (citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d
107, 110 (1993) (quoting Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241,
242–43 (1922)). The Esslingers essentially argue that, because the Basses should have been parties
to the Quiet Title Litigation, they are now precluded from this litigation. We disagree.
       While the Quiet Title Litigation resulted in a final judgment on the merits—which meets
the first element of the res judicata doctrine—the Basses were not parties to the Quiet Title
Litigation and this appeal does not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the
Quiet Title Litigation. Because the second and third elements are not met, res judicata does not
apply and the Basses are not barred from bringing this litigation.

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       The Esslingers argue that, even though the Basses were not parties to the Quiet Title
Litigation, they were on notice of the suit because of the service through publication. This is
incorrect; for the reasons explained below, the Basses were not on notice of the Quiet Title
Litigation and, because they were not designated parties to that case, are not barred from litigating
this one.
       In general, “ ‘one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been a made a party by service of process.’ ” Carter
v. Gateway Parks, LLC, 168 Idaho 428, 437, 483 P.3d 971, 980 (2020) (quoting Richards v.
Jefferson Cnty., Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996)). Idaho law
allows service through publication with permission from the court for parties who are out of state,
unknown, or otherwise cannot be found after due diligence:
       resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or cannot after due
       diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself therein to avoid the service
       of summons, or is a foreign corporation having no managing or business agent,
       cashier or secretary within this state, or where any persons are made defendant by
       the style and description of unknown owners, or unknown heirs or unknown
       devisees of any deceased person and the names of such unknown owners or heirs
       or devisees are unknown to the complainant in the action.

I.C. § 5-508. Thus, if a party’s status is not enumerated in the statute, service through publication,
even if proper for some defendants, would not be proper on a party not included in the list.
       The service through publication in the Quiet Title Litigation was for Samuel C. Large,
Rosalie M. Large Frieburger, James Large, Cleo Large, their creditors (known or unknown),
unknown heirs, devisees, or legatees, their successors in interest, or “any other parties who might
claim in interest in or to the” disputed property. The Esslingers hinge their arguments on “any
other parties who might claim in interest in or to the disputed property,” but offer no explanation
as to why the Basses were not specifically named or served personally, how they had an interest
in the property disputed in that case, or how, under the law, they would be properly included in
the service by publication when they are not within the bounds of the statute allowing said service.
       Furthermore, the Quiet Title Litigation did not involve the same claim as this appeal. The
“same claim” requirement bars both “matters offered and received to defeat the [initial] claim,”
and “every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.” Ticor Title Co. v.
Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d 613, 620 (2007). The Quiet Title Litigation was initiated to

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correct a missing legal description. At no point in that case was there a boundary dispute or a
question of where the southern perimeter of the northern parcel was located.
        Because the Basses were not parties to the Quiet Title Litigation, were not served through
publication, and the Quiet Title Litigation involved a different claim than this appeal, the
Esslingers’ res judicata argument fails. The Esslingers also contend the terms of the Escrow
Agreement between the Larges and the Mareks for the disputed property were breached by the
Mareks; thus, Peggy Marek’s testimony concerning the ownership of the land was invalid. The
Escrow Agreement contained a provision requiring the Mareks to keep the property in the same
condition until the terms of the agreement were complete and payment was fulfilled. According to
the Esslingers, Peggy Marek’s handshake “[gave] away 1/3 of the land” which “amounts to a
subdivision of the land and a transfer of real property…which would have been a breach of contract
with the Large family, leading to dire consequences for the Mareks.”
        This argument is also without merit. A breach of contract claim must be between the parties
to that claim or their third-party beneficiaries. Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 158 Idaho
957, 963, 354 P.3d 1172, 1178 (2015) (citing Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172,
1177 (1984) (“[I]t is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a
contract.”)). “Privity” refers to “those who exchange the [contractual] promissory words or those
to whom the promissory words are directed.” Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172,
1177 (1984).
        The Esslingers were not parties to the Escrow Agreement, do not have contractual privity
with the parties to that agreement, and are not third-party beneficiaries of that agreement. Any
remedy for breach of the agreement between the Larges and the Mareks potentially available for
that breach has no bearing on the Esslingers’ claim to the land in question in this case. Because
the Esslingers’ challenges to the district court’s grant of summary judgment are without merit, we
affirm the district court’s decision.
    D. Attorney’s fees are awarded to the Basses.
        The Basses request attorney’s fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-202(3)(b)(ii), which
authorizes an award in any action brought to enforce a civil trespass claim. We held in Fischer v.
Croston, 163 Idaho 331, 342, 413 P.3d 731, 742 (2018), that where the primary claim involves
land ownership and the incidental claim is civil trespass, attorney’s fees must be apportioned to
reflect the work done only in connection with the trespass claim. We have a similar situation in

                                                10
this case. Here, the difference is the Esslingers have not challenged the district court’s rulings on
the trespass claim except to the extent those rulings reflect an erroneous ownership decision. Said
differently, the work done on this case relates to the ownership dispute, not the trespass claim. As
such, attorney’s fees are denied under the civil trespass statute.
       The Basses also request a partial award of attorney’s fees under Idaho Code section 12-
121. Idaho Code section 12-121 allows fees for claims brought “frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation.” I.C. § 12-121. The Basses contend that the Esslingers presented their claims
regarding the motion for judicial notice and motion for continuance without properly researching
and responding to the district court’s decisions. We agree.
       The Esslingers’ challenges to the district court’s denial of their motion to continue the
summary judgment hearing and motion to take judicial notice of the entire record from the Quiet
Title Litigation were without legal or factual foundation. As explained above, the motions were
clearly untimely under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and no motions to shorten time were
made. In addition, on appeal, the Esslingers failed to provide any legal analysis of how the district
court abused its discretion in denying these motions. Accordingly, we award reasonable attorney’s
fees to the Basses for the work and time spent on the motion to continue the summary judgment
and motion to take judicial notice of the entire record from the Quiet Title Litigation. We also
award costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40 as a matter of course.
                                         III.    CONCLUSION
       The decisions of the district court are affirmed. The Basses are awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees for a portion of the appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. The Basses are
awarded costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40.

       Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER and ZAHN, CONCUR.

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