Court Opinion

ID: 9949396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 16:05:19.667522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.174665
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Mar 11 2024, 9:07 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                  Christopher S. Applegate,
                                        Appellant-Defendant

                                                    v.

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                           March 11, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CR-954
                              Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court
                         The Honorable Vickie L. Carmichael, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                         10C04-2007-F1-12

                               Opinion by Judge Mathias
                          Judges Tavitas and Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024                 Page 1 of 17
      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   Christopher S. Applegate appeals his convictions for Level 3 felony armed

      robbery, Level 5 felony battery, Level 6 felony auto theft, and Class A

      misdemeanor criminal mischief. He also appeals his adjudication as a habitual

      offender. On appeal, Applegate raises four issues for our review, which we

      restate as follows:

              1. Whether the trial court erred when it permitted two law
              enforcement officers to testify to out-of-court statements made to
              them by Applegate’s girlfriend.

              2. Whether Applegate failed to preserve for appellate review his
              assertion that the trial court erred when it permitted a law
              enforcement officer to testify to out-of-court statements made to
              him by Applegate.

              3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
              Applegate’s conviction for Level 6 felony auto theft of a Dodge
              Nitro.

              4. Whether the trial court erred when it had the jury determine
              the facts underlying the habitual offender allegation but reserved
              for itself the determination of whether Applegate was a habitual
              offender based on those facts.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In July 2020, Applegate was dating Tiffany Cox. The morning of July 13,

      Applegate drove a Dodge Nitro along Upper River Road in Clark County. Cox
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024            Page 2 of 17
      was in the passenger seat at the time. The two got into an apparent argument,

      and Applegate, who had a handgun with him, shot Cox in the right leg and

      then exited the vehicle.

[4]   When Applegate exited the vehicle, Cox moved into the driver’s seat, put the

      vehicle into reverse, and backed the vehicle into a wooded area. The vehicle

      became stuck there. At that point, Cox exited the vehicle and ran down a

      nearby gravel driveway.

[5]   Soon after, she ran in front of a pickup truck being driven by Bonnie

      Cummings. Cox was “wav[ing] her hands” and “jumped . . . in front” of

      Cummings’s truck as Cummings attempted to navigate around her. Tr. Vol. 2,

      p. 246. Cox attempted to get into the passenger’s side seat of the truck, but

      Cummings had filled that space with coolers. Cox then “jumped into the bed”

      of the truck and “said go, go.” Id. at 247. As Cummings was “processing what’s

      going on,” she saw Applegate running at her from the same driveway Cox had

      run down. Id. Applegate then jumped into the back of the truck with Cox. The

      two struggled there. Cox managed to get out of the back of the truck, forced

      herself in the front passenger seat, and told Cummings to “go, go, go, he’ll kill

      me, he’ll kill us both.” Id. at 248. Cummings then saw Applegate get out of the

      bed of the truck, and she “heard a shot.” Id. at 249. Cummings “put the truck

      [in] gear and pressed the [gas pedal] down and . . . got out of there.” Id.

[6]   Meanwhile, Emma Sternberg was driving her Volkswagen Tiguan down Upper

      River Road and came up behind Cummings’s stopped truck. She observed

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024         Page 3 of 17
      Applegate and Cox struggling in the back of the truck. She then saw Applegate

      jump out of the back of the truck and the truck “t[ake] off” down the road. Tr.

      Vol. 3, p. 21. Applegate approached Sternberg and pointed his gun at her.

      Applegate yelled at her to exit the Volkswagen. As Sternberg attempted to

      comply, Applegate fired his gun at her driver’s side window. The bullet went

      through the window but did not hit Sternberg, who immediately exited the

      vehicle. Applegate then took Sternberg’s Volkswagen and pursued Cummings

      and Cox. However, some ways down the road, Applegate crashed the

      Volkswagen, causing significant damage to it.

[7]   Cummings and Cox eventually drove to Cox’s father’s house. Cox exited the

      vehicle and yelled, “daddy, daddy, he shot me,” and Cummings called 9-1-1.

      Id. at 7. Clark County Sheriff’s Department Officers Larry Pavey and Charlie

      Scott responded to Cummings’s 9-1-1 call. When they arrived, they observed

      Cox’s gunshot wound. Officer Pavey observed that Cox “had quite a bit of

      blood on her and she was physically shaking.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 47. Cox was also

      “crying really bad.” Id. at 48. Officer Scott likewise observed that Cox was

      “[p]anicked, very much in a traumatic state, she was crying, visibly upset,

      visibly injured, a lot of yelling and screaming.” Id. at 69. Cox told Officer Pavey

      that her boyfriend was “trying to kill me,” and she told Officer Scott that “Chris

      Applegate” was the person who had “shot” her. Id. at 49, 69. Officer Pavey

      concluded there was “a shooter on the loose,” which he considered “an

      emergency situation.” Id. at 50.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024        Page 4 of 17
[8]   While Officer Pavey was at Cox’s father’s house, he received a report from

      dispatch that Applegate may be nearby. Officer Pavey went to the reported area

      and located Applegate. Officer Pavey placed Applegate in handcuffs, read him

      his Miranda rights, and asked him if he wanted to talk. Applegate said “no,” he

      did not want to talk. Id. at 55. Officer Pavey could tell that Applegate had been

      injured, and he told Applegate that paramedics would be there soon. Officer

      Pavey then asked Applegate, “are you hurt in any shape or form?” Id. at 55-56.

      Applegate responded that his “knees hurt” and that he thought he had “some

      loose teeth.” Id. at 56. Officer Pavey asked, “how did you obtain that injury?”

      Id. Applegate responded, “she hit me,” and when Officer Pavey asked who had

      hit him, Applegate identified Cox and said she was mad at him “for fooling

      around.” Id. at 57.

[9]   Officer Scott later assisted with the investigation along Upper River Road, and

      he located the Dodge Nitro, which had been crashed but was still running. He

      observed that the vehicle had a Kentucky license plate. He searched the

      vehicle’s registration number in an interstate database, and he learned that the

      vehicle was registered to a Yolanda Sims in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the

      vehicle had been reported stolen on July 7, 2020. Another officer investigating

      the Dodge Nitro, Detective August Vissing, located a driver’s license, an Aetna

      card, a Capitol One credit card, and a Visa credit card inside the vehicle. Each

      of those four cards was in a different name, and none of the cards were in

      Applegate’s or Cox’s names.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024        Page 5 of 17
[10]   The State charged Applegate with numerous offenses and also alleged him to be

       a habitual offender. Prior to the commencement of Applegate’s jury trial, Cox

       died due to unrelated circumstances. At the first phase of the ensuing bifurcated

       jury trial, the court permitted Officer Pavey and Officer Scott, over Applegate’s

       objections, to testify to what Cox had said to them at her father’s house on the

       day of the incidents. The court also permitted Officer Pavey to testify to what

       Applegate had said to the officer upon Applegate’s arrest; Applegate did not

       object to this portion of Officer Pavey’s testimony. And the court permitted

       Officer Scott to testify to his investigation of the Dodge Nitro’s registration;

       however, after Applegate lodged a hearsay objection to Officer Scott’s recitation

       of records he had observed, the court responded that it would permit Officer

       Scott’s testimony solely for the purpose of understanding his investigation and

       not for the purpose of whether the statements he observed were “true or not.”

       Id. at 76. The jury found Applegate guilty of Level 3 felony armed robbery (for

       stealing the Volkswagen), Level 5 felony battery (against Cox), Level 6 felony

       auto theft (of the Dodge Nitro), and Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief

       (for the damage done to the Volkswagen).

[11]   The court then held the second phase of the bifurcated jury trial to determine

       Applegate’s status as a habitual offender. For this phase, the court asked the

       jury, without objection from Applegate, to find whether the alleged prior

       convictions underlying the habitual offender allegation were true. The court

       reserved for itself the determination of whether Applegate was a habitual

       offender based on the jury’s findings. After the jury found the requisite prior

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024          Page 6 of 17
       offenses to be true, the court adjudicated Applegate to be a habitual offender.

       The court then entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Applegate

       accordingly.

[12]   This appeal ensued.

       1. The trial court did not err when it permitted Officers Pavey
       and Scott to testify to Cox’s statements to them at her father’s
       house on the day of the incidents.
[13]   On appeal, Applegate first asserts that the trial court erred when it permitted

       Officers Pavey and Scott to testify to Cox’s out-of-court statements to them.

       Applegate’s argument on this issue is two-fold. He first asserts that the trial

       court violated his right to confront a witness against him, Cox, as guaranteed by

       the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also asserts that the

       admission of her out-of-court statements was contrary to our Rules of Evidence.

       We address each argument in turn.

       1.1. Cox’s statements to the officers at her father’s house were in
       response to an ongoing emergency, and, therefore, they were
       nontestimonial under the Sixth Amendment.

[14]   We first address Applegate’s argument under the Sixth Amendment. We review

       a trial court’s ruling on the constitutionality of evidentiary decisions under a

       standard “similar to other sufficiency issues”—that is, we consider only the

       evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, along with any

       uncontradicted evidence to the contrary, to decide whether the evidence is

       sufficient to support the ruling. McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024          Page 7 of 17
       2014). Of course, the ultimate determination of whether that evidence

       demonstrates a constitutional violation is a question of law that we review de

       novo. See id.

[15]   The Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of “testimonial” statements of a

       witness who does not appear at trial unless that witness is unavailable and the

       defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Collins v. State,

       873 N.E.3d 149, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. As the Supreme Court

       of the United States has explained:

               [s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
               police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
               that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
               assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
               when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
               ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
               interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
               relevant to later criminal prosecution.

       Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). In applying that definition, we

       have looked to several factors, including:

               (1) whether the declarant was speaking about events as they were
               actually happening or describing past events; (2) whether the
               declarant was facing an ongoing emergency; (3) whether the
               nature of the questions asked by law enforcement were such that
               they elicited statements necessary to resolve the present
               emergency rather than simply to learn about past events; and (4)
               the level of formality of the interrogation.

       Gayden v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024        Page 8 of 17
[16]   Here, the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling demonstrates that

       Cox’s statements to the officers at her father’s house were nontestimonial.

       Cox’s statements were about events as they were actually happening. She, and

       the community, were facing what Officer Pavey expressly identified in his

       testimony as an “emergency situation”—Cox was suffering a loss of significant

       blood from her gunshot wound, and the community was facing a shooter-at-

       large. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 50. Further, the officers did not elicit statements from Cox

       that were not essential to meeting either her emergency or the community’s,

       and there was nothing formal about how the officers engaged Cox on her

       father’s porch while they were awaiting emergency medical personnel to arrive.

       Cf. Collins, 873 N.E.2d at 155-56 (holding that a declarant’s statements to a 9-1-

       1 operator regarding a recent shooting were for the primary purpose of enabling

       police to meet an ongoing emergency and therefore nontestimonial).

       Accordingly, the admission of Cox’s statements to the officers did not violate

       Applegate’s Sixth Amendment rights.

       1.2. Cox’s statements to the officers at her father’s house were excited
       utterances, and, thus, they were admissible as an exception to the
       prohibition against hearsay.

[17]   Applegate also asserts that Cox’s statements to the officers were inadmissible

       hearsay. A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence,

       and its decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 177

       N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only if the trial court’s ruling

       was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it

       and the errors affect a party’s substantial rights. Id.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024         Page 9 of 17
[18]   Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

       asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible. See

       Evid. R. 802. However, Evidence Rule 803(2) provides that hearsay may be

       admissible if the statement is an excited utterance, which is “[a] statement

       relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under

       the stress of excitement that it caused.” Such statements are “deemed reliable”

       because of their “spontaneity and lack of thoughtful reflection and

       deliberation.” Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 463 (Ind. 2005).

[19]   We have little trouble concluding that Cox’s statements to the officers were

       excited utterances. At the time Cox made her statements to the officers at her

       father’s house, she “had quite a bit of blood on her and she was physically

       shaking.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 47. She was “crying really bad,” and she was

       “[p]anicked, very much in a traumatic state, . . . visibly upset, visibly injured,

       [and there was] a lot of yelling and screaming.” Id. at 48, 69. In other words,

       the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court

       demonstrates that Cox was “under the stress of [the] excitement” about which

       her statements were made. Evid. R. 803(2).

[20]   Still, Applegate asserts that Cox could have thoughtfully reflected on matters.

       He even goes so far as to state that “[t]here was no extreme and continuing

       stress in this case.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. But Applegate’s assertions are not

       supported by the record, and we reject them. The trial court did not abuse its

       discretion when it permitted the officers to testify to Cox’s out-of-court

       statements to them.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024         Page 10 of 17
       2. Applegate did not preserve his argument under the Fifth
       Amendment for appellate review.
[21]   Applegate next contends that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right

       to remain silent when it permitted Officer Pavey to testify to Applegate’s out-of-

       court statements upon his arrest. Specifically, Applegate asserts that his rights

       were violated when Officer Pavey continued to ask him questions—to which

       Applegate provided incriminating responses—after Applegate had told Officer

       Pavey “no,” he did not want to talk. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 55. As our Supreme Court

       has noted: “When a person ‘indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or

       during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must

       cease.’” Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 623 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Miranda

       v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).

[22]   However, Applegate did not contemporaneously object to Officer Pavey’s

       testimony on this issue in the trial court. Accordingly, he has not preserved the

       issue for appellate review. E.g., Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018).

       As our Supreme Court has explained, the contemporaneous-objection rule is

       “designed to promote fairness by preventing a party from sitting idly by.” Id.

       (quotation marks omitted). The rule also “gives the [trial] court an opportunity

       to cure the alleged error, which, in turn, can result in enormous savings in time,

       effort and expense to the parties and the court” while giving the court on appeal

       the benefit of “a sufficiently-developed record on which to base its decision.” Id.

       (quotation marks omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024        Page 11 of 17
[23]   Further, after the State here asserted in its responsive brief that Applegate had

       forfeited this issue, Applegate argued for the first time in his Reply Brief that we

       should review this issue for fundamental error. “An error is fundamental, and

       thus reviewable on appeal, if it made a fair trial impossible or constituted a

       clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process

       presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. at 652. But

       fundamental error

               is extremely narrow and encompasses only errors so blatant that
               the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the
               situation. At the same time, if the judge could recognize a viable
               reason why an effective attorney might not object, the error is not
               blatant enough to constitute fundamental error.

       Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

[24]   Because Applegate did not argue fundamental error until his Reply Brief, he has

       waived appellate review of his Fifth Amendment argument under that doctrine.

       It is well established that a party may not present an argument for the first time

       in a Reply Brief. E.g., Town of Zionsville v. Town of Whitestown, 49 N.E.3d 91, 100

       (Ind. 2016). Indeed, our Supreme Court has expressly recognized that not even

       fundamental error may be raised for the first time in a Reply Brief. Curtis v.

       State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (“parties may not raise an issue, such

       as fundamental error, for the first time in a reply brief”).

[25]   And our conclusion that Applegate failed to preserve his Fifth Amendment

       argument is especially appropriate here. Even if we were to assume for the sake

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024         Page 12 of 17
       of argument that Applegate’s out-of-court statements to Officer Pavey should

       not have been admitted, error alone does not demonstrate reversible error. See,

       e.g., Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491-92 (Ind. 2023). It was Applegate’s

       burden on appeal to demonstrate how this alleged error made a fair trial

       impossible on this record. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind.

       2010). He has not done so, and it is not appropriate for this Court to make that

       argument on his behalf. E.g., Rodts v. Heart City Auto., Inc., 933 N.E.2d 548, 554

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“We will not become a party’s advocate, and the failure

       to put forth a cogent argument acts as a waiver of the issue on appeal.”); see also

       Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1980) (observing that a court runs the

       risk of being an advocate rather than an adjudicator when it searches the record

       and makes up its own arguments because a party presented them in a

       perfunctory manner).

[26]   Accordingly, we conclude that Applegate’s argument under the Fifth

       Amendment is not properly before us, and we do not consider it.

       3. The State presented sufficient evidence to support
       Applegate’s conviction for Level 6 felony auto theft.
[27]   We next address Applegate’s argument that the State failed to present sufficient

       evidence to support his conviction for Level 6 felony auto theft. For sufficiency

       of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable

       inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d

       1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness

       credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024        Page 13 of 17
       could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. To

       prove that Applegate committed Level 6 felony auto theft, the State was

       required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Applegate knowingly or

       intentionally exerted unauthorized control over a motor vehicle—the Dodge

       Nitro—of another person with the intent to deprive that person of the vehicle’s

       value or use. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2020).

[28]   Much of the parties’ dispute on this issue is whether Officer Scott’s testimony

       regarding his investigation into the registration of the Dodge Nitro was

       admissible for the truth of the matter or for another purpose. We need not

       resolve this dispute; the trial court expressly said that Officer Scott’s testimony

       here was admissible only to understand the course of his investigation and not

       for any truth of the matters asserted. In our review of the sufficiency of the

       substantive evidence, then, we accept the trial court’s limit to Officer Scott’s

       testimony.

[29]   The State argues in the alternative that the remaining evidence still permitted a

       reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Applegate committed Level 6 felony

       auto theft with respect to the Dodge Nitro, and we agree. The substantive

       evidence shows that Applegate drove the Dodge Nitro on Upper River Road in

       Clark County in the morning hours of July 13, 2020. The vehicle had a

       Kentucky license plate, but Applegate had an Indiana residential address. After

       Cox had crashed the vehicle and fled on foot, rather than attempting to recover

       the Dodge Nitro or even turn it off and collect the vehicle’s key, Applegate

       instead chased Cox on foot himself. Then, when Cox escaped in Cummings’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024         Page 14 of 17
       truck, Applegate stole the Volkswagen. After he crashed that vehicle, Applegate

       again fled the scene, as he had done with the Dodge Nitro. Further, Detective

       Vissing later located a driver’s license, an Aetna card, a Capitol One credit card,

       and a Visa credit card inside the vehicle, each of which was in a different name

       and none of which were in Applegate’s or Cox’s names.

[30]   We disagree with Applegate’s assertion that that evidence merely establishes his

       possession of a vehicle that was not his. Rather, a reasonable fact-finder could

       have found from the totality of that substantive evidence that the State

       demonstrated the elements of Level 6 felony auto theft with respect to the

       Dodge Nitro. We therefore affirm his conviction for that offense.

       4. The trial court’s procedure in determining Applegate’s
       status as a habitual offender is not contrary to a majority
       opinion of our Supreme Court in Harris v. State.
[31]   Last, Applegate argues that the trial court violated his right under Article 1,

       Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution to have the jury determine both the law

       and the facts of the State’s habitual offender allegation. Again, during the

       second phase of Applegate’s trial, the court asked the jury, without objection

       from Applegate, to find whether the alleged prior convictions underlying the

       habitual offender allegation were true. The court reserved for itself the

       determination of whether Applegate was a habitual offender based on the jury’s

       findings. Thus, after the jury found the requisite prior offenses to be true, the

       court adjudicated Applegate to be a habitual offender.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024           Page 15 of 17
[32]   Applegate’s argument on this issue rests on whether part I of the lead opinion in

       Harris v. State, 211 N.E.3d 929, 935-38 (Ind. 2023), which was decided while

       this direct appeal was pending, should apply to his habitual offender

       determination. 1 But that part of the lead opinion in Harris did not have the

       support of three of our five Justices. Only our Chief Justice concurred in part I

       of the lead opinion. See id. at 947 (Rush, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting

       in part). Justice Molter, joined by Justice Massa, joined only in other parts of

       the lead opinion. See id. at 943 (Molter, J., concurring in part and concurring in

       the judgment). And Justice Slaughter expressly refused to join part I of the lead

       opinion. See id. at 956 (Slaughter, J., dissenting) (“I do not join Part I”).

[33]   There is therefore no “holding” from part I of Harris to direct the trial court to

       apply here.2 Accordingly, we affirm on this issue as well.

       Conclusion
[34]   For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm Applegate’s convictions and

       habitual offender adjudication.

       1
         The State responds that Applegate is attempting to apply a new rule of law, announced in Harris,
       retroactively to a case on collateral review. Appellee’s Br. at 31-36. But this is a pending direct appeal, not a
       case on collateral review. We therefore do not consider the State’s response. Cf. Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d
       265, 271-72 (Ind. 2008) (announcing tests to apply to determine whether a new rule of Indiana constitutional
       law should apply to a pending direct appeal).
       2
        We emphasize that Applegate’s argument on appeal is limited to applying part I of Harris. Appellant’s Br. at
       15-16. He does not argue that this Court should adopt the plurality opinion of part I, and we therefore do not
       consider that possibility. See, e.g., Keller, 549 N.E.2d at 373; Rodts, 933 N.E.2d at 554 (“We will not become a
       party’s advocate, and the failure to put forth a cogent argument acts as a waiver of the issue on appeal.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024                                  Page 16 of 17
[35]   Affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Christopher Sturgeon
       Clark County Public Defender Office
       Jeffersonville, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana
       Sierra A. Murray
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-954 | March 11, 2024   Page 17 of 17