Court Opinion

ID: 9586017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:22.131818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:18.752257
License: Public Domain

*651HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the majority opinion insofar as it holds that Moseley did not have standing to seek to compel appellees to initiate legal action challenging the constitutionality of the Panel’s sentence reduction authority under OCGA § 17-10-6,1 cannot agree that Moseley has standing to seek an injunction against enforcement of OCGA § 17-10-6. Areview of the record and pleadings in this case demonstrates that Moseley did not seek to directly challenge OCGA § 17-10-6 and even if he had, the issue of his standing to raise such a challenge is not properly before this Court.
Purporting to liberally construe the complaint, the majority holds that ‘Moseley sought, in his own former official capacity, an injunction against enforcement of OCGA § 17-10-6, which he alleges to be unconstitutional,” and that Moseley had standing to pursue such an action “in his own former official capacity.” A review of the complaint reveals, however, that while it may be apparent that Moseley’s ultimate goal in the underlying action was to obtain a judicial ruling that OCGA § 17-10-6 is unconstitutional, he sought to obtain such a determination not by filing his own legal challenge to the statute as intimated by the majority, but by seeking to compel appellees to initiate such legal action or, in the alternative, to enjoin appellees from enforcing the statute without first seeking such a determination. Thus, Moseley did not seek direct relief; he sought to force appellees to initiate legal action to determine the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-6, either through injunctive or mandamus relief.1 Because the majority’s “liberal construction” of the complaint results in the substantial rewriting of the complaint and the relief sought therein, I must dissent.
Even assuming Moseley sought to directly challenge the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-6 and that the trial court ruled on his standing to assert such a claim, I further dissent because Moseley has not challenged that ruling on appeal. Consistent with his pleadings in the trial court, Moseley claimed in his appeal that he had standing under OCGA § 9-6-24 as a citizen seeking to compel enforcement of a public duty involving a public right. He did not enumerate as error the trial court’s determination that he was without standing as the district attorney to challenge the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-6 and his briefs are devoid of any argument or citation to authority on that issue. Under this Court’s own rules, therefore, the issue of *652Moseley’s standing to directly challenge OCGA § 17-10-6 was abandoned. Supreme Court Rule 22.
Decided June 26, 2006.
Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, J. Brown Moseley, for appellant.
Joseph K. Mulholland, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Nicholas G. Dumich, Marla-Deen Brooks, Assistant Attorneys General, Gray, Hedrick & Edenfield, Bruce M. Edenfield, Susan L. Rutherford, for appellees.
Charles C. Olson, amicus curiae.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this opinion.

 Indeed, Moseley alleged in his complaint that “since there is no other means of reviewing the constitutionality of the Panel’s authority under OCGA § 17-10-6 and the [appellees’] future conduct has been brought into question by the Panel’s actions . . . [appellees] have a duty to resolve this controversy via judicial action.”