Court Opinion

ID: 9703895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:11:58.099113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.826025
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. In the past, Nebraskans were required to bear the cost of compensating one’s physically manifested fear for his or her own safety. Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981). Now, Nebraskans are required to bear the more onerous cost of compensating one’s psychic pain over the injury of another.
Contrary to the view of the majority, the “dollars and cents” argument has not been dispelled, at least not for me. The harsh reality is that there are societal costs to compensating for accidents; the greater the number of elements of deunage, the greater are those costs. See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, A Legal and Economic Analysis 22, 23 , 26, 27, 215-25 (1977). I find nothing in the record before us, or the majority opinion, which deals with those arguments other than the bald assertion that they have been “aptly dispelled.” The case to which the majority opinion cites as supporting that statement, D’Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975), does nothing of the sort. The D’Ambra opinion makes it quite clear that, in the judgment of that court, the economic policy issues were “no bar to an extension of potential liability.” Id. at 654, 338 A.2d at 530. That approach, I respectfully suggest, dispels nothing; the costs are still there.
*61Of course, Nebraska’s earlier “zone of danger” rule was arbitrary, but the “bystander recovery” rule is no less so. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm — A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 477 (1982). The “zone of danger” rule at least had the virtue of being susceptible to more objective proof.
That observation leads to another concern. The dispersive nature of the majority opinion, and the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion, leaves me with no clear notion of what the majority envisions the limits of the rule to be. I recognize that the opinion must be read in the context of the facts pled in this case, but I respectfully suggest that the matter would have been left in a less confusing state if the majority opinion had limited itself to a consideration of those facts.
I would have affirmed the district court’s order of dismissal.
Boslaugh and Hastings, JJ., join in this dissent.