Court Opinion

ID: 9707721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:19:30.088648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:50.738202
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting).
Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. . . . [TJhose who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.
Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 Res Judicatae 224, 228 (1952), quoted in Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L J. 645, 645 (1977) (hereinafter State Supervention of Parental Autonomy).
*566The defendant caseworkers became convinced that J.T.'s interests could best be served by termination of Deegan's parental rights and adoption of J.T. by foster parents. To accomplish this well-meaning objective, the case workers (according to the complaint) deliberately denied Deegan and J.T. services and made visitation as difficult as possible.
The majority has detailed the facts of this case from the standpoint of the defendant social workers. I will set forth the facts as alleged by Deegan and J.T. I believe a jury could find that the facts are as Deegan recites them but could also find that the facts are as detailed by the majority. The defendants, who have moved for summary judgment, bear the burden of showing the absence of a genuine, that is, disputed, issue as to any material fact. Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1980).
A summary judgment should not be granted unless the moving party demonstrates a right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy; some courts have said that summary judgment must be denied unless the moving party demonstrates his entitlement to it beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. Any inference to be drawn from the underlying facts as shown in the party's proof is to be drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 339, 294 N.W.2d at 477.
If Deegan and J.T.'s complaint can survive the first step of summary judgment methodology — whether the complaint states a claim — they are entitled to a trial of the disputed issues of material fact.
The majority concludes that Deegan and her son do not state a claim because: (1) there is no cause of *567action against a person who interferes with "family unity"; and (2) the caseworkers are immune from liability because all actions which they took were discretionary and within the scope of their public employment.
Perhaps Deegan and J.T. should have used words more familiar than "family unity" to express familial rights: for example, "the integrity of the family unit," "parental autonomy," "parental rights," or "protection of the family relationship from state intrusion." We should not be put off by Deegan and J.T.'s use of a term less descriptive than some others; we should examine the nature of the relationship and the claimed right, whatever label is given to it.
The decisions which protect the family relationship from state intrusion are legion. See, e.g., State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. at 646 n.5. Not only is the family protected from unwarranted state intrusion under the federal constitution, it is protected by common law tort law. The "familial bond" of the parent-child relationship is a "reciprocal right." See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647, 652 (1972).
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," "basic civil rights of man," and "[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights," .... The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.
Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
"The right to family privacy and parental autonomy, as well as the reciprocal liberty interest of parent *568and child in the familial bond between them, need no greater justification than that they comport with each state's fundamental constitutional commitment to individual freedom and human dignity." State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. at 649 (citing Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226, 266-67 (1975)).
The entitlement of natural parents and their children to each other is an interest which rests on the fact of biological reproduction and arises when the child is bom. Id. at 649 n.12. However, the right of parents and children to each other is not an unconditional right. Circumstances may require that the state intrude in the family. However, the law does require that the state's intrusion be as limited as possible. Even where a parent cannot or will not provide a traditional home for a child because of personal circumstances, that does not give the state the right to rearrange the family relationship simply because the state concludes that it is better equipped to decide what is in the child's best interest than the natural parents. There are cases where that may be true; this is not one of those cases.
While Deegan did not do all that she could to bond with J.T. and keep that bond fresh, throughout she was unwavering in her commitment to J.T., including her commitment that he be properly cared for.
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.
*569Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
The only fair inference which may be drawn from the record is that the defendant caseworkers believed that it was in J.T.'s best interest to terminate his mother's parental rights and place him with adoptive parents. A jury could readily infer that once the caseworkers became so convinced, they abandoned any attempt to reunite Deegan and her son and worked to terminate Deegan's parental rights and place J.T. with foster or adoptive parents. What happened in this case is exactly what the United States Supreme Court warned against in Santosky v. Kramer, where the court said: "Indeed, because the child is already in agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the historical events that form the basis for termination." Id. at 763.
A jury could infer from the evidence that the caseworkers attempted to shape the historical events to provide a basis for termination of Deegan's parental rights. Deegan is entitled to a trial on that issue.
Finally, respondents argue that "even if the facts supported the plaintiffs allegations, the defendants would be entitled to summary judgment in their favor as a result of their statutory governmental immunity." I assume they intend to refer to the general rule, now codified in § 893.80(4), Stats., that a public officer is not personally liable to one injured as the result of an act performed within the scope of his or her official authority and in the line of his or her official duty. Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300, 240 N.W.2d 610, 621 (1976). As the court said therein, "the most generally favored principle is that public officers are immune from liability for damages resulting from their negligence or unintentional fault in the performance of discretionary functions." Id. at 301, 240 N.W.2d *570at 622 (emphasis added). Public officers are, however, personally liable for "intentional misconduct." See id. at 302, 240 N.W.2d at 622. The court dismissed Lister's complaint because it did not contain an allegation of malicious or intentional misconduct on the part of the University Registrar. "Otherwise stated, there is no substantive liability for damages resulting from mistakes in judgment where the officer is specifically empowered to exercise such judgment." Id. at 301-02, 240 N.W.2d at 622.
An exception to public officer immunity exists when the act of the officer is intentional. There is no immunity for the public officer who does not exercise his or her discretion in good faith but intentionally fails to perform his or her duties to accomplish a purpose falling outside the employee's scope of employment.
In this case, the trial court found that the defendant caseworkers had not carried out the court's dispositional order of April 30, 1991. The court found that defendant Keren Pomp had not complied with the court's order in a number of respects. For example, the court concluded that she and the department made Deegan's visitation with J.T. difficult. This case is not unlike Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Probation Department, 690 P.2d 38 (Ariz. 1984), where probation officers acted contrary to a court order. The court said that the probation officers could not invoke judicial immunity when they acted contrary to the court's directive. Id. at 41.
We must accept the allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of determining whether Deegan and J.T. state a claim. The majority does not follow summary judgment methodology and does not consider whether Deegan and her son state a claim when the allegations of their complaint are accepted as true. The *571majority simply concludes that defendants are protected by the immunity afforded to public officials acting in the course of their employment. The trial court also skipped the first step of summary judgment methodology. The court proceeded directly to the parties' proofs and concluded that the affidavits filed by Deegan were conclusory in nature and failed to state a prima facie case in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment. The trial court erred in this respect in that Deegan was not required to state a prima facie case; that was the burden of the defendants. I believe what the trial court intended to say was that Deegan's and J.T.'s affidavits failed to rebut defendants' prima facie case.
We apply the same methodology to summary judgment as does the trial court. Biggart v. Barstad, 182 Wis. 2d 421, 427-28, 513 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, we must look first to Deegan and J.T.'s complaint to determine whether they state a claim. See Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 116, 334 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Ct. App. 1983). We must accept the facts alleged as admitted. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 683, 271 N.W.2d 368, 372 (1978). The complaint contains 136 allegations. I have reviewed those allegations and conclude that if they are taken as admitted, they state a claim that the caseworkers intentionally engaged in a course of conduct, plan and campaign to remove J.T. from his mother; to terminate Deegan's parental rights to J.T.; and to have J.T. adopted by other persons. I conclude that Deegan and J.T.'s complaint states a claim.
The majority concludes, however, that defendants' proof establishes a prima facie defense to Deegan and J.T.'s complaint. The majority concludes that Deegan's affidavits show nothing more than that the *572caseworkers did not perform the tasks required of them under ch. 48, STATS., and the juvenile court's disposi-tional orders, and further, that the caseworkers were attempting to seek permanent out-of-home placement for J.T. rather than restoring him to Deegan's custody. Maj. Op. at 562. The majority also concludes that the caseworkers' attempts to terminate Deegan's parental rights and have J.T. adopted are "appropriate acts of discretion." Id. at 563. This conclusion wholly ignores the trial court's findings that caseworker Pomp did not comply with the juvenile court's dispositional order. Immunity disappears when a caseworker operating under a court order deliberately violates the court order to achieve an objective not contemplated by the juvenile court.
In any event, the submissions of the parties raise genuine issues of material facts which must be tried. In conclusion, I set forth those facts.
J.T. was born April 13, 1989, when his mother, Barbara Deegan, was seventeen years' old. On August 9, 1989, when Deegan was in foster care, the department persuaded her to sign an informal disposition agreement. The agreement was reached after Deegan ran away from her foster home with her son. On November 24,1989, the juvenile court entered a dispo-sitional order for J.T. in response to Deegan's petition. The court ordered counseling for her and supervision of J.T. by the department. On February 10,1990, Deegan left J.T. at her mother's home. She left a note saying she would return in three days. When she did not, Deegan's mother delivered J.T. to the department and left him in its custody.
The department filed an emergency notice of change in placement, seeking to place J.T. in a foster home. On February 14, 1990, J.T. was placed in tempo*573rary physical custody of foster parents. On February 19, 1990, Deegan learned that J.T. had been taken to the department. Initially, Deegan received a great deal of help from the department. Apparently, she established a good relationship with the caseworker.
The November 24,1989 dispositional order placed J.T. with his mother under supervision of the department. The order required the department to provide Deegan and J.T. with a number of services, including a parent aide, respite and community support. However, the defendant social workers did not provide Deegan and J.T. with these services.
Between the entry of this order and February 10, 1990, Deegan lived in several different places. Although she cared for J.T. during this period, she was unable to arrange a long-term, stable place to live and a supportive environment. On December 15,1989, defendant Kathie Gerber became Deegan's case manager and counselor. Gerber left on maternity leave and returned to work January. 8 or 9,1990. In January and February 1990, Gerber made no effort to obtain necessary or desired services for Deegan and J.T. or to investigate and develop resources toward that end.
On February 1, 1990, an authorization for out-of-home placement of J.T. was pre-approved by the department's Alternate Care Supervisor.
Sometime after February 14, 1990, Gerber completed a "Request for Alternate Care Placement/Permanency Plan" which did not state that its goal was to keep Deegan and J.T. together and contained no services to meet Deegan's needs. The plan did not contain a time table for reuniting Deegan and J.T. On or about February 20, 1990, Gerber discussed termination of Deegan's parental rights and adoption of J.T' with a relative of Deegan's step-father.
*574On March 6,1990, Gerber filed a petition to revise the dispositional order to add ten requirements which Deegan would have to satisfy to regain custody of J.T. On March 12,1990, Gerber again spoke to the relative who was interested in adopting J.T. Gerber expressed the opinion that it was probably Deegan's "best bet" to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to J.T. and allow him to be adopted. On March 19, Gerber gave the relative and her parents permission to visit J.T. at the foster home. Between January 1990 and May 1990, Gerber did not provide Deegan with housing or employment services.
In March 1990, Deegan moved to Neenah, and on March 26, she called Gerber to ask about J.T. and told her that she wanted him back. However, Gerber did not tell Deegan where J.T. had been placed and did not prepare a permanency plan to reunite Deegan with her son. On April 3,1990, Deegan arranged for a friend to drive her to Jefferson to speak with Gerber and to visit J.T. At that time, Gerber discussed with Deegan the possibility of terminating her parental rights. Deegan said that she was not interested and wanted to work on keeping her son. Despite Deegan's rejection of Gerber's proposal, on April 6, 1990, the department asked the state adoption agency to get involved, suggesting that this was "a possible TPR case."
On April 10, 1990, the date of the hearing on Gerber's petition, Deegan arranged to be driven from Neenah to visit J.T. under supervised visitation. At that time, Gerber induced Deegan to sign an authorization to release information to the relative interested in adopting J.T. Gerber failed to inform Deegan that the purpose of this information was to further Gerber's plan to pursue TPR and adoption.
*575On April 12, 1990, the juvenile court entered an order revising the previous dispositional order and imposing conditions on Deegan for the return of J.T. The court transferred legal custody of J.T. to the department.
On April 16,23, and 30, Deegan again arranged for a friend to drive her from Neenah to Jefferson to visit J.T. Gerber did not offer to place J.T. in the Neenah area so that he could be closer to Deegan. Gerber did not offer to help Deegan obtain transportation to visit J.T. nor did she offer housing or employment services.
On May 4, 1990, Deegan accepted employment with a midway operating out of Oshkosh. On May 7, she informed Gerber of this proposed employment and that she would try to let Gerber know where she was and would try to schedule visitations when she was available. Gerber did not offer to help Deegan obtain other employment or job training; she told Deegan that "it didn't sound like J.T. was her first priority."
As of May 7, Gerber knew that Deegan would not reside in Neenah after May 13. Nonetheless, on May 17, and June 11,1990, Gerber addressed letters to Dee-gan at her former address in Neenah, encouraging her to receive services and visit J.T.
In mid-July 1990, Deegan was in Jefferson County working at her job. She telephoned Gerber to arrange visitation with J.T. but Gerber was not available. Gerber had, however, informed Deegan that visitation could be arranged only through her. About a week later, Deegan was in Beaver Dam and twice called Gerber to arrange visitation with J.T. but Gerber was not available.
On July 26,1990, Gerber was contacted by another person interested in adopting J.T. In August 1990, with the assistance of the state adoption agency, Gerber *576selected new foster parents for J.T.; they also wished to adopt him. On August 10, Gerber prepared a "Plan/Prescription Review" in which she described the "Goals of Service" as "work toward TPR unless mother shows some interest/cooperation." On the same day, Gerber prepared another "Plan/Prescription Review" for J.T., in which she entered as an "Objective! 1 with Expected Achievement Dates": "[c]hange [placement to a permanent foster home."
Gerber never developed, in any plan, a goal or objective of reuniting J.T. with his mother. On August 15, 1990, Gerber changed J.T.'s placement from one foster home to another; her purpose was to have the new foster parents adopt J.T. On August 13, without a release, Gerber told the new foster parents about Dee-gan's background.
On September 11, 1990, Deegan's grandmother asked to visit J.T.; Gerber refused, stating she was postponing extended family visits "until [Deegan] becomes reinvolved in our system."
In September 1990, defendant Keren Pomp became Deegan and J.T.'s case manager. On October 1, Gerber, Pomp and the proposed adoptive mother attended an administrative review of J.T. and Deegan's case at which they decided to pursue termination of Deegan's parental rights.
On October 2,1990, Pomp refused to discuss Dee-gan and J.T.'s situation with Deegan's grandmother, who had been J.T.'s principal caregiver in 1989. Pomp told her that the department was not at liberty to discuss the case without a release.
On October 16, 1990, when her job terminated, Deegan moved to Watertown, and the next day called the department and left a number where she could be reached. On October 22, Pomp and Deegan arranged to *577meet on October 24. Before that meeting, Pomp told the prospective adoptive parents that she intended to terminate Deegan's right to visit J.T. On October 24, Deegan met with Pomp and another worker and informed them that she wanted J.T. back. On October 29, 1990, Deegan called Pomp to arrange visitation with J.T. However, on that date, Pomp petitioned the circuit court to extend and revise the dispositional order to prohibit visitation between Deegan and J.T. for at least two months. Pomp scheduled counseling with Deegan on November 1.
On October 30, Pomp completed a "Plan/Prescription Review," stating that the department's objectives were to "[p]ursue TPR as soon as possible and/or work with mother towards reunification." This plan failed to meet state requirements for a permanency plan and contained inherently contradictory objectives, which could not be pursued at the same time.
On November 6, 1990, Deegan visited J.T. under supervision. At this time, Deegan told Pomp that she was depressed over her situation, she was broke, she was unable to find work due to her pregnancy, and she didn't want AFDC. However, Pomp did not offer her any assistance to resolve these problems.
In November, Deegan obtained representation from the state public defender. On November 13, she filed a motion with the juvenile court to delete from the dispositional order the requirement that she obtain an AODA assessment and psychological evaluation. She also requested that the cut-off of her visitation with J.T. be deleted. On December 7, the juvenile court issued its order granting Deegan's motion.
On November 28, Pomp pursued with the state adoption worker the possible termination of Deegan's *578parental rights and adoption of J.T. On November 30 and Décember 7, Deegan arranged transportation from Watertown so that she could keep her supervised visits with J.T. The visits were cancelled because J.T. became frightened and distraught. During her supervised visits, Pomp had another social worker sit behind a two-way mirror to observe the visitation.
During December 1990, Deegan was getting pressure from Pomp to voluntarily terminate her parental rights. Pomp asked Deegan whether she wanted a different counselor and she said that she did. On January 2, 1991, at Pomp's request, Deegan met with the prospective adoptive parents, the state adoption worker and Pomp to discuss termination of her parental rights and adoption of J.T. Deegan met with her new counselor on January 11, for the first and only time. The new worker did not develop a plan for Deegan and J.T. but transferred her case two weeks later.
On January 18, 1991, Deegan again visited J.T. under supervision. The observing social worker was joined behind the two-way mirror by a psychiatrist whose purpose was to document the "cruelty" to J.T. of having to see his mother. Pomp scheduled visits with J.T. far from Deegan's home and during J.T.'s nap time. Deegan visited J.T. at the department on February 1, February 7, March 1, and March 22,1991. Pomp did not bring J.T. to visit Deegan at her home and did not attempt to provide transportation for Deegan from Watertown to Jefferson.
On February 7, 1991, Pomp completed a further "Plan/Prescription Review," the objective of which was to "work with [the] mother towards" reunification if the. mother cooperated, otherwise, termination of her parental rights. This plan did not meet state law requirements for a permanency plan, and did not pro*579vide for Deegan's needs or contemplate reasonable efforts to reunify J.T. with his mother. On March 1, 1991, Pomp asked Deegan to stop seeing J.T. and threatened to petition the juvenile court for a revision of the dispositional order if Deegan did not agree. Dee-gan did not. Therefore, on March 4, Pomp petitioned the court to cut off Deegan's visitation with J.T. until she and the psychiatrist "deemed it appropriate." Her petition was supported by the psychiatrist's letter opining that continued visits were "cruel and punitive to the child." On March 22, Deegan visited J.T. On March 25, she filed a motion to terminate the dispositional order, or in the alternative, for a change in placement or to establish a permanency plan to reunify J.T. with her within two months.
On March 26 and 28, Deegan called Pomp to request the assistance of a parent aide. Pomp did not comply with her request.
On April 2, 1991, the juvenile court, after a hearing, revised the dispositional order to allow visitation other than at the department's offices. The order also increased Deegan's visitations to at least two times per week for more than one hour each, and not during J.T.'s normal nap time. The order required Pomp to prepare a needs assessment to be included in a permanency plan designed for reunification. The court also ordered that a counselor be appointed for Deegan and that the department be removed as protective payee for her. The court ordered that the ultimate objective in the matter was the return of J.T. to his mother.
On April 3,1991, the department held an administrative review of Deegan and J.T.'s case which did not comply with § 48.38, Stats. On April 9, Pomp prepared a "Needs Assessment and Services Available" which included as "services available," the videotaping of visi*580tation sessions "if deemed necessary by the parent aide and/or case manager as a learning tool." The assessment also contained the conditions that Deegan remain where she was residing and be engaged to Michael Deegan for at least six months. On April 18, Deegan's attorneys objected to the assessment on several grounds.
Pomp continued to fail to provide transportation to Deegan for visitation or to arrange for visitation with J.T. in Deegan's home.
On April 5, 1991, the juvenile court assigned a parent aide to Deegan. She attended Deegan's visits with J.T. on April 12, 18, 22, 24, and May 2, and met with Deegan on May 7,13, and 20. Deegan also visited with J.T., without the aide, on May 6, 9, 13, and 23, 1991.
On April 17, 1992, Pomp filed a petition with the court to extend the dispositional order to keep J.T. in the foster home until November 27,1991. She stated in the petition that visitations had gone poorly, that mother/child bonding had not occurred, and that the "mother has not yet completed conditions for return."
On May 3, Deegan's attorney asked Pomp to end the two-way mirror supervision of Deegan's visits with her son. He also asked that, to enhance the bonding between Deegan and J.T., future visits not take place at the department. Pomp refused these requests.
On May 8, Deegan's attorney asked Pomp to instruct the foster parents not to mislead J.T. as to who his parents, grandparents and other relatives were.
The needs assessment was revised when the district attorney, the guardian ad litem and Deegan's attorneys agreed that it was insufficient. On May 16, 1991, Pomp revised the needs assessment to recognize and provide for Deegan's needs. The revised assess*581ment identified parenting skills and visitation transportation as needs. The other needs identified were stability in terms of residence and significant others for six months. The department offered counseling and case management, as requested, Other needs identified were stable income, housing, and adequate day care.
Deegan moved the court to dismiss Pomp's petition and to terminate the dispositional order. On May 23, 1991, after a hearing, the juvenile court ordered that the April 30, 1991 dispositional order terminate on May 27,1991, and not be extended.
The court also ordered Pomp and the department to return J.T. to his mother no later than 3:00 p.m. on May 27,1991. Pomp refused to comply with this order or to help Deegan with the return. Pomp told Deegan that she was not working on May 27, so Deegan would have to pick up J.T. herself. Deegan had to arrange transportation to Beloit to pick up J.T.
In its May 24, 1991 order requiring the department to return J.T. to his mother, the court made the following findings:
1. The court report contained no information as to how the dispositional order of April 30, 1991, had been meeting the objectives of any "Plan" for J.T.'s care and treatment.
2. There is no "plan" against which the court's order can be measured.
3. The report does not contain any evaluation of J.T.'s adjustment to his placement.
4. The report does not discuss J.T.'s visitation with his mother and his progress toward reunification with her, two major elements of J.T.'s placement under the court's April 30,1991 dispositional order.
*5825. The report contains no suggestions for amendment of any permanency plan.
6. The report does not describe the department's efforts to return J.T. to his home.
7. The petitioner Pomp recommends continued placement of J.T. outside his mother's home.
8. The report contains no explanation of why returning J.T. to his mother is not feasible; it does not explain why J.T. should be kept in a foster home and away from his mother.
9. Petitioner does not explain whether all visitations have gone poorly, whether more recent visitations have improved, which conditions Deegan has not complied with or why those conditions compel J.T. to remain in foster care.
10. Petitioner Pomp "has not complied with this Court's April 30,1991 Dispositional Order in the following respects":
(a) Deegan's need for transportation, income, housing or day care are not addressed.
(b) Petitioner and the department have not developed a permanency plan as required.
(c) Petitioner and the department have failed to determine "achievable dates" by which the objective of the permanency plan may be satisfied.
(d) Petitioner and the department have made visitations difficult for Deegan.
The court also found that Deegan had attended all of the visits with J.T. which the petitioner and the department scheduled. Deegan's counselor met with her only once since April 1991.
The court made conclusions of law that the department "has failed to make reasonable efforts to make it possible for [J.T.] to return to his home with [Deegan]"; that there is no basis under § 48.365, STATS., for *583extending the court's dispositional order; and that, pursuant to § 48.365(lm), the dispositional order of April 30,1991, may not be extended.
I infer from these facts that the department and the caseworkers believed in good faith that J.T.'s best interest lay in severing all relations between J.T. and his mother. The defendants may have exercised the awesome power of the state over Deegan and J.T. with the "approval of their own conscience." A jury may, however, infer that they abused the power of the state in the process and damaged J.T. and Deegan. These questions cannot be answered as a mattér of law. Summary judgment was inappropriate. I dissent.