Court Opinion

ID: 9407704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-08 06:00:16.001655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.765624
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     REBECCA STANISLAW,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CB-7121-23-0001-V-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: July 7, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Nicole M. Ferree, Esquire, Las Vegas, Nevada, for the appellant.

           Arnulfo Urias, Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                           ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a request for review of an arbitration decision that
     sustained the agency’s decision to remove her for unacceptable performance
     under chapter 43. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the request for

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     review under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), VACATE the arbitration decision, and
     FORWARD the matter to the Western Regional Office for further adjudication.

                                         ANALYSIS
     The Board has jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s request for review.
¶2         The Board has jurisdiction to review an arbitrator’s decision under 5 U.S.C.
     § 7121(d) when the following conditions are met: (1) the subject matter of the
     grievance is one over which the Board has jurisdictio n; (2) the appellant either
     (i) raised a claim of discrimination under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) with the
     arbitrator in connection with the underlying action or (ii) raises a claim of
     discrimination in connection with the underlying action under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(1) for the first time with the Board if such allegations could not be
     raised in the negotiated grievance procedure; and (3) a final decision has been
     issued.   Jones v. Department of Energy, 120 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 8 (2013), aff’d,
     589 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.155(a)(1), (c).
¶3         Here, we find that all of these conditions have been met.        First, it is
     undisputed that the appellant’s grievance concerned her removal for unacceptable
     performance under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43, a subject matter over which the Board
     has jurisdiction.    See 5 U.S.C. § 4303(e); Galloway v. Social Security
     Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 78, ¶ 11 (2009).        Second, the appellant alleged
     before the arbitrator that the agency’s action was precipitated by disability
     discrimination. E.g., Request for Review (RFR) File, Tab 1 at 86. Finally, the
     arbitrator has issued a final decision. Id. at 51-66. Consequently, we find that
     the Board has jurisdiction to review the arbitration decision.

     The standard of review for an arbitration decision is limited.
¶4         The standard of the Board’s review of an arbitrator’ s award is limited;
     indeed, such awards are entitled to a greater degree of deference than initial
     decisions issued by the Board’s administrative judges. Sadiq v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 450, ¶ 5 (2013). The Board will modify or set
                                                                                       3

     aside such an award only when the arbitrator has erred as a matter of law in
     interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation.    Id.   Even if the Board
     disagrees with an arbitrator’s decision, absent legal error, the Board cannot
     substitute its conclusions for those of the arbitrator. Id. Thus, the arbitrator’s
     factual determinations are entitled to deference unless the arbitrator erred in his
     legal analysis, for example, by misallocating the burdens of proof or employing
     the wrong analytical framework. Id. Nevertheless, the Board can defer to the
     arbitrator’s findings and conclusions only if the arbitrator makes specific findings
     on the issues in question. Id. Further, the Board may make its own findings
     when the arbitrator failed to cite any legal standard or employ any analytical
     framework for his evaluation of the evidence. Id.

     We vacate the arbitrator’s conclusion that the agency proved its charge of
     unacceptable performance and forward the matter to the regional office.
¶5        To defend an action under chapter 43, the agency must prove the following
     by substantial evidence: 2 (1) the Office of Personnel Management approved its
     performance appraisal system and any significant changes thereto; (2) the agency
     communicated to the appellant the performance standards and critical elements of
     her position; (3) the appellant’s performance standards are valid under 5 U.S.C.
     § 4302(c)(1); (4) the appellant’s performance during the appraisal period was
     unacceptable in one or more critical elements; (5) the agency warned the
     appellant of the inadequacies in her performance during the appraisal period and
     gave her an adequate opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance; and
     (6) after an adequate improvement period, the appellant’s performance remained
     unacceptable in at least one critical element.      Lee v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 15.

     2
       Substantial evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
     even though other reasonable persons might disagree. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p).
                                                                                           4

¶6         Here, the arbitration decision did not set forth the above analytical
     framework for chapter 43 performance-based actions; indeed, it is unclear from
     the decision what legal standard the arbitrator employed in finding that the
     agency proved its charge of unacceptable performance .             Additionally, it is
     difficult to distill from the decision the arbitrator’s specific findings on the issues
     in question, if any. 3 Although the arbitrator ultimately stated that he “firmly
     believe[d] that the [a]gency met the substantial burden of proof of showing that
     the removal based on [the appellant’s] substandard performance was reasonable,”
     RFR File, Tab 1 at 66, this statement does not equate to a finding that the agency
     proved the six elements of a chapter 43 performance-based action by substantial
     evidence, see Hollingsworth v. Department of Commerce, 115 M.S.P.R. 636,
     ¶¶ 7-8 (2011) (explaining that an arbitrator’s decision is not en titled to deference
     when the arbitrator decides an issue without making specific findings on the
     issues in question, citing the correct legal standard, or employing the proper
     analytical framework).     Moreover, as discussed herein, we find that further
     adjudication   is   warranted   regarding    the   appellant’s   discrimination-based
     affirmative defenses.    These claims, if proven, are relevant as to whether the
     agency proved its charge; indeed, the appellant argued that the agency’s
     discriminatory actions deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
     successful performance. RFR File, Tab 1 at 73; see Viana v. Department of the
     Treasury, 114 M.S.P.R. 659, ¶¶ 1, 8 (2010) (vacating an administrative judge’s
     finding that the agency proved its charge when the appeal was remanded for
     further adjudication of the appellant’s affirmative defense of discrimination).
     Accordingly, we vacate the arbitrator’s conclusion that the agency proved its
     charge of unacceptable performance and forward th e matter to the regional office
     for adjudication.

     3
      It was often unclear whether the arbitrator intended to make findings of fact or merely
     summarize the evidence in the record. E.g., RFR File, Tab 1 at 58.
                                                                                        5

     We vacate the arbitrator’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove her failure
     to accommodate disability discrimination claim.
¶7        An agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known
     physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
     disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue
     hardship on its business operations.        Miller v. Department of the Army,
     121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13 (2014);          29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a).          Reasonable
     accommodation includes modifications to the manner in which a position is
     customarily performed in order to enable a qualified individual with a disability
     to perform the essential job functions. Miller, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13. In order
     to establish disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate,
     an employee must show the following: (1) she is an individual with a disability,
     as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a qualified individual with a
     disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to
     provide a reasonable accommodation. Id.
¶8        Here, although the arbitrator concluded that the appellant did not prove her
     failure to accommodate disability discrimination claim, RFR File, Tab 1 at 65, it
     is unclear what analytical framework he employed in reaching this conclusion .
     To this end, although he summarized the appellant’s arguments regarding her
     medical condition, id. at 53, the arbitrator did not discernably issue a finding
     regarding whether she is a qualified individual with a disability under 29 C.F.R.
     § 1630.2(m), or whether she is an individual with a disability under 29 C.F.R.
     § 1630.2(g).   Moreover, in analyzing the appellant’s failure to accommodate
     claim, the arbitrator stated as follows: “The arbitrator clearly believes that t he
     [a]gency was doing everything within their control and ability to operate
     efficiently in granting the accommodations.” Id. at 65. This statement seemingly
     invokes the concept of undue hardship; however, undue hardship excuses
     an agency from providing an accommodation, and the arbitrator seemingly found
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     that     the   agency    had    granted       the   appellant’s   accommodation       requests. 4
     Id. at 65-66. Accordingly, because it is unclear what legal standard the arbitrator
     used, we vacate the arbitrator’s findings and forward the appellant’s failure to
     accommodate          disability discrimination         claim to the regional office for
     adjudication.        See Brookens v. Department of Labor, 120 M.S.P.R. 678, ¶ 15
     (2014) (forwarding the appellant’s claims of discrimination to the regional office
     for further adjudication because the arbitrator did not set forth any analytical
     framework for his determinations); see also Pace v. Department of the Treasury,
     118 M.S.P.R. 542, ¶ 9 (2012) (declining to defer to the arbitrator’s decision
     regarding the appellant’s discrimination claims when the arbitrator failed to
     analyze the claims under any recognizable legal standard or framework) .

     The arbitration decision did not address the appellant’s claim that the agency
     engaged in equal employment opportunity (EEO) reprisal; accordingly, we
     forward this claim for adjudication.
¶9           In her request for review, the appellant asserts that the arbitrator failed to
     consider       her    claim    that   the     agency     engaged    in   disability    reprisal.
     RFR File, Tab 1 at 5-10.         We interpret this assertion as an argument that the
     arbitrator failed to consider her claim of EEO reprisal . 5 E.g., id. at 2, 92. Of

     4
         The arbitrator later stated as follows:
                In the arbitrator’s opinion the [a]gency bent over backwards to
                accommodate [the appellant] and help her with her performance. It
                appeared that the [appellant] was unable to perform the essential
                functions of her job even though she was provided accommodations to
                do that.
     RFR File, Tab 1 at 66.
     Although this statement raises the specter of a dispositive finding that the appellant
     failed to show that she is a qualified individual with a disability, see Haas v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28, given the arbitrator’s failure to
     discernably identify the applicable legal framework or burden of proof for this claim
     and his statement regarding operational efficiency, we conclude that further
     adjudication is warranted.
     5
       The appellant also argues that the arbitrator failed to consider her claims of “per se
     violations” of antidiscrimination law. RFR File, Tab 1 at 5. The appellant’s claims in
                                                                                         7

      note, shortly before the issuance of the arbitration decision, the Board clarified
      that a “but-for” standard is applicable to retaliation claims under the Americans
      with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008. Pridgen v. Office of Management
      and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 43-47. Accordingly, we forward this claim to the
      regional office for adjudication.

      We clarify that the appellant’s due process claim constitute s a claim of harmful
      procedural error and find that the appellant failed to prove this claim.
¶10         The appellant argued before the arbitrator that the agency had violated her
      due process rights. RFR File, Tab 1 at 83-85. Specifically, she contended that
      the agency violated a provision of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement
      (CBA) pertaining to the timeframe within which she could respond to the
      agency’s notice of proposed removal. Id. at 84-85. In his decision, the arbitrator
      first summarized this purported due process claim, id. at 51-52, and thereafter
      stated that “there [did] not appear to be any type of violation when the [a]gency
      failed to extend the [response] time period” for the appellant, id. at 66.
¶11         We clarify that allegations of agency error in applying CBA provisions in
      chapter 43 actions constitute claims of procedural error. See Slavich v. Social
      Security Administration, 102 M.S.P.R. 171, ¶ 8 (2006) (indicating that allegations
      of agency error in applying CBA provisions in chapter 43 actions are treated as
      claims of procedural error); DeSousa v. Agency for International Development,
      38 M.S.P.R. 522, 526 (1988) (same). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A), the
      Board will not sustain an agency’s decision if the appellant “shows harmful error
      in the application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at such decision.” A
      procedural error is harmful when the record shows that an error by the agency
      was likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one
      it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error.              Pumphrey v.
      Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 10 (2015); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).

      this regard appear to be tethered to her claims of failure to accommo date disability
      discrimination and EEO reprisal.
                                                                                        8

      Here, because the arbitrator found that the agency had not, as alleged, violated the
      CBA, the appellant failed to identify any procedural error; thus, she necessarily
      failed to prove the affirmative defense of harmful procedural error. RFR File,
      Tab 1 at 66; see Sadiq, 119 M.S.P.R. 450, ¶ 7 (explaining that an arbitrator is
      uniquely qualified to interpret a CBA, which is the source of the arbitrator’s
      authority).

                                           ORDER
¶12         For the reasons set forth above, we forward this matter to the Western
      Regional Office for further adjudication. The administrative judge assigned to
      the matter shall conduct further proceedings as necessary, consistent with this
      Order. After the administrative judge issues the recommended decision, the case
      will be forwarded back to the Board.      The parties may file exceptions to the
      administrative judge’s recommended decision with the Clerk of the Board within
      20 days of the date of the recommended decision. The parties may respond to any
      submission by the other party within 15 days of the date of such submission. The
      Board will subsequently issue a final decision on the merits of the appellant’s
      request for review.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.