Court Opinion

ID: 9941915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-19 11:09:40.789154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:22.799648
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-24-00017-CV
      ___________________________

            IN RE S.N., Relator

              Original Proceeding
 324th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 324-656801-19

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                   I. Introduction

      In this original proceeding, relator S.N. (Mother)1 seeks mandamus relief from

temporary orders giving real party in interest C.C., a nonparent, equal access to seven-

year-old J.C., adopted by Mother in 2017. Because the trial court clearly abused its

discretion and because Mother lacks an adequate remedy by appeal, we conditionally

grant mandamus relief and order the trial court to vacate its December 22, 2023

temporary orders granting C.C. possession of and access to J.C.

                                   II. Background

      Mother, a licensed social worker, and C.C., a former police officer, never

married. During their relationship, C.C. adopted her biological niece and gave Mother

conservatorship rights to the child by agreement, and Mother reciprocated, adopting

J.C.’s two siblings and giving C.C. conservatorship rights by agreement. J.C. was born

in 2016 and placed with the parties during his infancy. When the parties’ relationship

ended in May 2017, they moved into separate homes and agreed to a one-week-

on/one-week-off (50/50) possession schedule of all four children. Mother, who is a

licensed foster parent, adopted J.C. in December 2017. However, she gave him C.C.’s

last name.

      1
        To protect the child’s privacy, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to the
child and his family members. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P.
9.8 cmt.
                                          2
      In 2019, C.C. sued to become J.C.’s sole managing conservator. Two years

later, while the suit remained pending, Mother decided that J.C. would no longer

follow the possession schedule, which had been formalized by court order as to the

three older children.2 Accordingly, C.C. had no contact with J.C. for 16 months—

from June 2021 to October 2023—with the exception of a disputed incident in a

doctor’s office parking lot on October 27, 2021.

      After a contentious de novo hearing on November 7, 2023, the trial court

adopted its associate judge’s order giving C.C. possession of and access to J.C. on the

same 50/50 schedule as the other children. In an email, the trial court explained that

its decision was based on the case’s “very unique factual basis” and Justice Debra

Lehrmann’s concurring opinion in In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 820–24 (Tex. 2020)

(orig. proceeding) (Lehrmann, J., concurring). In a follow-up email in response to

C.C.’s counsel, the trial court added that “under the specific facts of this case . . .

denying [C.C.] access and possession would substantially impair the emotional

development of the child.”

                                   III. Discussion

      Mother complains that the trial court abused its discretion when there was no

evidence that she was an unfit parent or, alternatively, no evidence that denying C.C.

      2
       A case involving the three older children is pending in another trial court.
                                           3
possession of and access to J.C. would significantly impair his physical or emotional

well-being.3

A. Standard of review and applicable law

      A writ of mandamus will issue if a trial court abuses its discretion and no

adequate remedy by appeal exists. C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 811. In determining whether

to grant mandamus relief, an appellate court should defer to the trial court’s factual

determinations supported by the record.        Id.   But an appellate court may grant

mandamus relief if the trial court fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, id., as it

did in In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (grandparent

access over fit parent objection), and in C.J.C. And there is no adequate appellate

remedy from a trial court’s temporary orders in a suit affecting the parent–child

relationship (SAPCR). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.001(e) (“Temporary orders

rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory appeal.”).

      Mandamus relief is available when a trial court erroneously permits a nonparent

possession of a child over a fit parent’s objection. In re B.F., No. 02-20-00283-CV,

2020 WL 6074108, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 15, 2020, orig. proceeding)

      3
        Because we conclude that there is no evidence to support a finding that
Mother was an unfit parent, we do not reach her alternative issue or C.C.’s response
in which C.C. argues that significant impairment is just one way to rebut the fit-parent
presumption and that the presumption was rebutted here such that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion. Mother points out that C.C.’s response “essentially asks this
Court to ignore its own precedent and apply the significant-impairment standard
found in . . . the grandparent-access statute,” which, she argues, “expressly applies
only to grandparents; it does not include ex-girlfriends like C.C.”
                                           4
(mem. op.) (referencing C.J.C. and Derzapf). This is because there is a presumption

that a fit parent acts in the best interest of her child. C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 807 (citing

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061 (2000)); see Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 153.002 (“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary

consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and

possession of and access to the child.”). In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court

stated that so long as a parent “adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),

there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of

the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions

concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” 530 U.S. at 68–69, 120 S. Ct. at

2061.

        A court may not infringe on a parent’s fundamental right to make child-rearing

decisions “simply because a . . . judge believes a ‘better decision’ could be made.”

C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 807 (quoting Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 333). In C.J.C., the supreme

court held that “a court must apply the presumption that a fit parent—not the

court—determines the best interest of the child in any proceeding in which a nonparent

seeks conservatorship or access over the objection of a child’s fit parent.” Id. at 817

(emphases added).

        In her concurring opinion in C.J.C., Justice Lehrmann highlighted the

unaddressed issue of how to evaluate whether the fit-parent presumption has been

overcome. Id. at 821 (Lehrmann, J., concurring). She noted that the Family Code
                                            5
provides a standard for resolving the question in proceedings between parents, e.g.,

Section 153.131 (requiring appointment of parents as managing conservators unless

appointment would not be in the child’s best interest because it would “significantly

impair the child’s physical health or emotional development”) and in grandparent-

access cases, e.g., Section 153.433(b)(2) (allowing a grandparent possession of or

access to a child over a parent’s objection when it is shown by a preponderance that

denial of possession of or access to the child would “significantly impair the child’s

physical health or emotional well-being”). Id. at 821–22.

       Justice Lehrmann also noted that the Family Code did not specifically address a

possession-or-access award to a nonparent whose standing to file suit is premised on

the “parent-like” role played in a child’s life, i.e., by sharing a principal residence with

the child, providing for the child’s daily physical and psychological needs, and

exercising guidance, governance, and direction similar to that typically exercised on a

day-to-day basis by parents with their children. Id. at 822. She referenced post-Troxel

out-of-state cases showing that

       in determining whether an award of visitation to a nonparent is in a
       child’s best interest, courts may afford the requisite deference to a fit
       parent’s decisions concerning his child while still giving due
       consideration to the effect on the child’s well-being of severing, or
       significantly curtailing, contact with a person who has served in a parent-
       like role to the child over a significant period of time.

Id. at 823.

                                             6
      We addressed that issue four months after the supreme court issued C.J.C. See

B.F., 2020 WL 6074108, at *1. In B.F., the trial court named the children’s parents

managing conservators but awarded to a nonrelative possessory conservatorship and

possession of the children during the second and fourth weeks of each month and

during certain weeks in the summer, along with video conference calls every Monday

and Wednesday evening. Id. In the subsequent original proceeding filed by the

children’s father, we noted that, in light of C.J.C. and the facts—nonparent possession

and access over a parent’s objection—“[t]he only question left to decide relate[d] to

Father’s fitness as a parent.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). The father argued that no

evidence was presented that he was anything but a fit parent, the nonparent did not

specifically argue that he was an unfit parent, and we found nothing in the record to

indicate that he was an unfit parent. Id. at *3–4. Accordingly, we held that the trial

court had abused its discretion when it named the nonparent a possessory conservator

and awarded her possession of and access to the children, and we directed the trial

court to vacate its temporary order. Id. at *4.

B. Evidence

      Three witnesses testified at the temporary-orders hearing: Jennifer Hawn, a

Family Court Services employee;4 C.C.; and Mother. We will focus only on the

testimony of Mother’s fitness as a parent.5

      4
       Mother argues that Hawn’s testimony cannot be considered as an expert
opinion. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 104.008(a) (stating that a person “may not offer
                                        7
      Hawn testified that when she evaluated the children in 2021, J.C. was four years

old. At that time, based on her interview with J.C., Hawn was concerned about

alienation of affection of C.C. by Mother.        After the associate judge ordered a

supervised visit with C.C., on October 17, 2023, Hawn observed the hour-long visit.

Hawn expressed concern during her testimony that J.C.—who, along with all three of

his siblings, was African American—would no longer have a connection to that side

of his heritage. She elaborated during redirect as follows, stating,

      What I was trying to say is that [J.C.’s] sibling group is going to have a
      mother the same skin color, that understands the trials in the world
      because of that skin color; and that J[.C.] will see that his siblings are
      getting that, and he will not be able to have that.

an expert opinion or recommendation relating to . . . possession of or access to a child
at issue . . . unless the person has conducted a child custody evaluation relating to the
child under . . . Chapter 107.”). Hawn testified that she included J.C. in her custody
evaluation of the other three children (in the parties’ separate lawsuit involving those
three children) because J.C. lived in the home with the other three and his status as a
subject child was still in dispute. But cf. id. § 107.103(b) (“The court may not appoint a
child custody evaluator in a suit involving a nonparent seeking conservatorship of a
child unless, after notice and hearing or on agreement of the parties, the court makes
a specific finding that good cause has been shown for the appointment of a child
custody evaluator.”). Because Hawn presented no evidence that Mother was an unfit
parent, we do not reach this sub-issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
      5
        The testimony at the hearing was wide-ranging, covering C.C.’s chronic pain
diagnosis caused in part during her seventeen-year career as a police officer, along
with her related medications, a recent foreclosure on her home, and some injuries that
J.C. suffered in her care, among other things. But most of this information has no
bearing on Mother’s fitness as a parent, which C.C. did not contest in her live pleading
in the SAPCR. To the contrary, although she alleged that appointing both of them as
joint managing conservators would not be in J.C.’s best interest and that appointing
her as sole managing conservator would be, C.C. requested in the alternative that she
and Mother be named the child’s joint managing conservators.
                                           8
             What I was not trying to say is that [Mother, who is Caucasian,]
      can’t do that. In fact, she had culturally appropriate dolls in the home.
      She had lotions and hair stuff that was appropriate for the children. So
      that’s what I was trying to say.

      C.C. testified that Mother had notified her in June 2021 through Our Family

Wizard that she had decided J.C. was no longer going to go to C.C.’s home. Mother

told her this the day before C.C. was to pick up all four children. Seven-year-old J.C.

now attends a different school from his siblings (who are ages 8, 10, and 12) and has a

different pediatrician. When asked more than once during cross-examination if she

thought Mother was a good mother, C.C. replied, “I can only say in regards to my

children, and I think she could do a lot better” and “I can’t answer that.” On redirect,

C.C. elaborated, stating,

      I do believe she could do better with her interactions with my children.
      I think she could do better with solidifying their sibling relationship,
      exploring their culture, being tolerant of questions and things that are
      related to who they are and how they relate to the world. I think she can
      do better in advocating for my children medically and mentally.

      C.C. also opined that Mother did not adequately care for J.C., although she

admitted that when she saw him during their October 17, 2023 visit, he appeared

healthy. Even though C.C. stated that J.C. had been “[e]motionally distant” in the

visit and that “his smile wasn’t the same, his eyes [weren’t] the same,” Hawn testified

that after the first 30 minutes of the one-hour visit, J.C. opened up. Hawn stated that

after the first 30 minutes, J.C. had been “very open, laughing, asking [C.C.] questions,

                                           9
responding with longer responses to her questions.” She noted that he also opted to

sit in C.C.’s lap.

       Mother testified that she had changed J.C.’s pediatrician after C.C. showed up

at his October 2021 doctor’s appointment, approached her vehicle, and banged on the

window, which caused J.C. to start crying. Mother said that she became “quite

nervous” and put her car in reverse and that if she had taken her foot from the brake,

she would have hit C.C.’s car. C.C. denied having parked behind Mother to prevent

her from leaving the doctor’s office and stated that Mother was able to leave. C.C.

testified that she had learned of the appointment because she had been listed as a

parent on J.C.’s medical forms at that time, that Mother rushed J.C. to the car when

she saw C.C., and that J.C. saw her and started crying. C.C. claimed that J.C. had

reacted to seeing her by “saying something to the effect of, ‘Open up the window,

Mama, Mama, Mama.’”

       Mother testified that she had chosen J.C.’s school based on the diversity of

students and teachers and the academic rigor and stated that she would have put the

other three children in that school except for the court order that designated which

school they had to attend.

       Mother described J.C. as a straight-A student, with asthma, seasonal allergies,

and a mild case of eczema. She opined that J.C. had done well since 2021, stating,

“He’s social, he’s engaging, he’s happy, he makes friends, he has neighborhood

friends, he has peer relationships at school; has peer relationships at day care, when he
                                           10
goes, during breaks,” and he was “classroom leader at the end of kindergarten, in

May.”     Various photographs of J.C. that were admitted into evidence support

Mother’s testimony about his health and well-being.

        Mother stated that J.C. was exposed to African American culture through his

siblings; his school, which was predominantly African American; participation in

school events, including Black History Month; and participation in community events,

including “[Historically Black College and University (HCBU)] step shows.” She also

testified that they had tickets to see “Michael Jackson, The Musical.” When asked

whether she noticed a change in J.C.’s behavior when the other three children went to

C.C.’s home for the week, Mother stated that he was “very excited to have one-on-

one time.” When asked about the other three children’s having a relationship with

C.C. and J.C.’s not having that relationship—“And you believe that does not have any

type of emotional impact or psychological damage on [J.C.]?”—Mother replied, “I

believe [J.C.] is perfectly healthy and is doing quite well.”

C. Analysis

        During the hearing, the trial court expressly disagreed that C.C. was not entitled

to access to and possession of J.C. unless she overcame the “fit parent” presumption.

This was error. See C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 817. And, as set out above, the record does

not reflect a finding or any evidence that Mother is an unfit parent. Because there is

no evidence or finding that Mother is unfit, it is Mother in the first instance, and not

the trial court, who is to determine whether to allow C.C. access to or possession of
                                             11
J.C. See id. at 820; see also B.F., 2020 WL 6074108, at *4 (reaching same conclusion

based on lack of evidence of unfit parent). Because the trial court did not address the

“fit parent” presumption, we do not reach the question of whether a showing of

significant impairment might be sufficient to overcome that presumption.6 See N.H.,

652 S.W.3d at 496 (interpreting C.J.C. to hold that the fit-parent presumption is

rebuttable and that, if the parent is fit, then the trial court is “required to presume that

[the parent] acted in the best interest of the [c]hild when she decided how frequently

or infrequently to allow visitation with the Ex-Girlfriend”).

       6
        We nonetheless note that, to the extent that the “significant impairment”
standard may apply in nonparent access-and-possession cases—a question that we
leave to the Legislature to resolve as it has in Family Code Sections 153.131 and
153.433(b)(2)—none of the evidence in this case meets that standard as discussed and
defined by this court in In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d 482, 491–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2015, no pet.). Acts or omissions constituting “significant impairment” include, but
are not limited to, physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse,
or immoral behavior, and evidence of past conduct may not, by itself, be sufficient to
show present unfitness. Id. at 492. Other considerations may include parental
irresponsibility, a history of mental disorders and suicidal thoughts, frequent moves,
bad judgment, and an unstable, disorganized, and chaotic lifestyle that has put and will
continue to the put the child at risk. Id. And the link between the parent’s conduct
and harm to the child may not be based on evidence that merely raises a surmise or
speculation of possible harm. Id. at 492–93; see also In re N.H., 652 S.W.3d 488, 497
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (noting that “other provisions
reflect a legislative judgment that there must be a showing of harm to the child before
any sort of nonparent can obtain court-ordered visitation” and that they “all evince a
policy judgment that the fundamental rights of parents cannot be infringed by a court
absent some compelling reason, and that reason must typically involve the health and
welfare of the child”).
                                            12
                                   IV. Conclusion

      Based on the above, we conditionally grant mandamus relief, order the trial

court to vacate its December 22, 2023 temporary orders granting C.C. possession of

and access to J.C., and release our stay of February 5, 2024.

                                                     /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                      Bonnie Sudderth
                                                      Chief Justice

Delivered: February 13, 2024

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