Court Opinion

ID: 9757987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:06:54.429222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:41.243244
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/28/23 P. v. Guzman CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E078441

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. FWV21000856)

 ARTURO COLON GUZMAN,                                                    OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid A. Uhler,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, Warren

Williams, and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                              I.

                                    INTRODUCTION

       Defendant and appellant Arturo C. Guzman stabbed his son and his son’s

girlfriend with a large kitchen knife in an unprovoked attack. A jury convicted him of

two counts of attempted murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and the

trial court sentenced him to 12 years eight months in prison.

       Defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel admitted

defendant’s guilt in violation of McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1500 (McCoy),

failed to object to the trial court’s use of an improper circumstance in aggravation and

failed to request a mental health diversion. He also argues the matter must be remanded

for resentencing under recently enacted legislation. We affirm.

                                              II.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Defendant lived in an apartment in Fontana with his son, Horacio, his two

daughters, and Horacio’s girlfriend, Daisy.

       One evening, Horacio and Daisy came home from work and found defendant

drinking beer and listening to loud music in the kitchen. Horacio briefly talked with

defendant before going to his bedroom, where he and Daisy got ready to go to the gym.

       About 30 minutes later, Horacio and Daisy suddenly heard loud banging sounds

outside their bedroom and heard defendant mumbling to himself. Daisy heard defendant

saying, “‘I don’t care what happens to me.’”

                                               2
       Horacio opened the bedroom door and saw defendant standing less than two feet

away, holding one or two knives. Daisy remembered defendant holding two “really big

kitchen knives.” Defendant immediately charged at Horacio with the knives while

Horacio screamed for defendant to stop. As defendant swung the knives around trying to

stab Horacio and Daisy, Horacio felt a knife pierce his chest.

       Horacio ran around defendant towards the living room. Daisy ran after Horacio

and tried to go out through the front door, but it was barricaded with a kitchen chair.

Defendant followed them into the living room. Horacio told Daisy to run as defendant

started swinging the knives at both of them again, stabbing Horacio in his head, back, and

neck, and slashing Daisy on the head.

       Horacio managed to move the chair and unlock the front door, and he and Daisy

ran to get help while Horacio screamed for someone to call 911. Within minutes,

Horacio saw defendant leave the apartment, go downstairs, and walk to the back of the

apartment complex. A neighbor, who heard someone screaming, went outside and saw

Horacio and Daisy bleeding with a trail of blood behind them. The neighbor followed

defendant, who got into a car and attempted to hit the neighbor and others with the car

while fleeing.

       Defendant was charged with two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
                                                                                1
attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2), and two

counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 3 & 4). The

       1
           All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                               3
information alleged that as to counts one and two, defendant personally used a deadly and

dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that as to all four counts, he inflicted great

bodily injury on the victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).

       A jury convicted defendant on all counts and found the personal use of a deadly

weapon enhancements true on counts one and two. The jury found the willful, deliberate,

and premeditated allegation not true as to both attempted murder counts, and the great

bodily injury allegation not true as to all four counts. The trial court sentenced defendant

to a total term of 12 years eight months, which included a nine-year upper term on count

1 plus a one-year consecutive enhancement for the personal use of deadly weapon

finding.

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       A. McCoy Error

       Horacio testified that defendant was a heavy drinker and was drinking beer in the

kitchen when he and Daisy came home from work shortly before the attack. Defendant,

on the other hand, testified that he was watching a movie, not drinking.

       At defense counsel’s request, the trial court instructed the jury on voluntary

intoxication as a defense to attempted murder but not to assault. The instruction

explained that the jury could consider whether defendant was voluntarily intoxicated “in

deciding whether [he] acted with an intent to kill or . . . with deliberation and

premeditation.”

                                              4
       While the court was instructing the jury, defendant asked, “Why don’t you tell the

jury that there was alcohol in my son’s blood. You didn’t tell that to the jury.” Outside

the jury’s presence, the court admonished defendant and asked counsel to speak with

him.

       After doing so, counsel told the court: “I think that the disagreement here really

falls under perhaps the parameter of McCoy. I’m not sure. He doesn’t want me to talk

about the [v]oluntary intoxication to vitiate the intent of the premeditated murder . . . and

get it down to a 245. I’m trying to talk to him about the fact that if he were to be

convicted 245 . . . then the sentence wouldn’t be that much more than [the] offer was at

the time. [B]ut he doesn’t want me to talk about . . . him drinking. I feel compelled I

have to talk about the 245’s.”

       Shortly after, defendant interjected: “I don’t want the record to state that I’m an

alcoholic. I was drinking. I don’t drink alcohol at all in my life. Okay. I come from an

alcoholic father. I don’t drink alcohol. Okay. For me to be portrayed as an alcoholic,

like, is wrong.” During the brief colloquy with the court that followed, defendant

repeatedly emphasized that he did not want counsel to argue that defendant was drunk

during the attack.

       The trial court then brought the jury back into the courtroom and asked the

prosecutor to begin closing argument. As to voluntary intoxication, the prosecutor

argued that it was no defense because “defendant knew what he was doing,” even if he

was drunk at the time.

                                              5
       Toward the end of his closing argument, defense counsel responded to the

prosecutor’s argument on voluntary intoxication: “One other issue, though. It’s

[v]oluntary intoxication. Look, [Horacio] said when they walked in, he just wasn’t

drinking beer, but he was drunk. And he seen [sic] him drunk before. He knows the way

he appears. If somebody becomes voluntarily intoxicated, then that gets rid of or

eviscerates the willful, deliberate, premeditation of murder. Gets rid of it. That doesn’t

mean that it’s all over. Because that is not a defense to assault with a deadly weapon, just

to murder. So if you believe that the complaining witness says that [appellant] was

drunk, then that eviscerates—gets rid of intent to murder. It’s not the intent. It’s a

different type of intent for 245 or as you’ll see, assault with a deadly weapon

now. . . . ¶ . . . So they have to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt—any reasonable

doubt—that [defendant] is guilty of either the murder or of the assault with a deadly

weapon. Given the involuntarily [sic] intoxication, they have [to] prove that to you.”

       At sentencing, defense counsel explained: “With respect to the defense of an

involuntary intoxication, which would initiate [sic] the intent for attempted murder and to

just reduce that down to the assault with a deadly weapon, I would only say that but for

the McCoy case, we didn’t proffer that defense. I was instructed not to.”

       In McCoy, the defendant “vociferously insisted on his innocence and adamantly

objected to any admission of guilt,” yet the trial court allowed his counsel to concede the

defendant committed three murders. (McCoy, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1503.) The high

court held this violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, reasoning that

                                              6
“it is the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his defense:

to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his

innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p.

1505.)

         There was no McCoy error here. Defense counsel never conceded defendant’s

guilt, but instead argued that defendant was innocent and urged the jury to acquit him of

all charges. In doing so, defense counsel emphasized that defendant’s version of

events—including that he was not drunk and did not stab either victim—was correct

while Horacio’s testimony was not credible. Defense counsel also went through various

purported problems with the prosecution’s evidence while repeatedly stating the

prosecution had failed to meet its burden. As counsel put it, “There’s a hole in this case.

We’re not the ones who have to shovel it in. The prosecution does.” Defense counsel’s

statements throughout closing argument made clear that defendant’s position was that he

was entirely innocent.

         Defense counsel’s argument about voluntary intoxication did not undermine

defendant’s position that he was innocent of all charges. Nor did it suggest, contrary to

defendant’s wishes, that defendant was drunk during the incident. Instead, defense

counsel was only responding to the prosecutor’s closing argument that although the jury

should believe Horacio’s account that defendant was drunk, voluntary intoxication was

not a valid defense. As defense counsel explained to the jury, “if you believe” Horacio’s

testimony that defendant was drunk, “then that eviscerates—gets rid of intent to murder.”

                                              7
(Italics added.) Counsel then reminded the jury that the prosecution had the burden of

proof as to all elements of the offenses, including the issue of voluntary intoxication.

       Thus, when viewed in context of the parties’ closing arguments, defense counsel

never argued that defendant was drunk during the incident. Instead, counsel argued that

if the jury found that defendant was in fact drunk at the time, then the prosecution had to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his intoxication did not negate his intent to murder.

Throughout defense counsel’s closing argument, he maintained that defendant was

innocent of all charges because he did not stab the victims. We, therefore, conclude there

was no McCoy error here.

       B. Remand for Resentencing

       When stating its sentence, the trial court recognized that the middle term was the

presumptive sentence under recently amended section 1170, subdivision (b) and that it

could impose the upper term only as prescribed by section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). The

court also noted it could rely on a certified record of defendant’s prior conviction to

impose an upper term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). The court found that

defendant had previously been convicted of felony domestic violence (§ 273.5), and

“us[ed] this prior conviction as the aggravating factor to impose the upper term of nine

years in this matter,” because the “fact that the defendant suffered this prior conviction

indicates that his present convictions are of increasing seriousness.” The court continued:

“In addition, the fact that the jury found true that the defendant used a deadly weapon

supports the imposition of the aggravated term.”

                                              8
       Defendant contends the trial court improperly relied on his prior conviction and

the jury’s deadly weapon true finding to impose an upper term on count 1. The People

argue the trial court properly relied on the prior conviction, which defendant admitted,

and concede that the court should not have relied on the deadly weapon finding, but argue

the error was harmless. We agree with the People in all respects.

       “‘Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1170, subdivision

(b), making the middle term of imprisonment the presumptive sentence. (§ 1170, subd.

(b)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1, effective Jan. 1, 2022.) A trial court may impose an

upper term sentence only where there are aggravating circumstances in the crime and the

defendant has either stipulated to the facts underlying those circumstances or they have

been found true beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2).)’” (People v.

Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1130 (Lewis), rev. granted S279147, May 17, 2023.)

Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), “the court may consider the defendant’s prior

convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without

submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” However, “[t]he court may not impose an

upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under

any provision of law.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5).) All of these provisions applied at the time

of defendant’s sentencing, which occurred after section 1170 was amended.

       We first reject defendant’s argument that he did not admit that he had previously

been convicted of felony domestic violence. Although he initially testified that he could

not remember if he had been convicted of that offense, he later admitted that he had been

                                             9
convicted of the offense, explaining that he “was [a] little confused” when first asked

about the conviction. Later, when asked who was with him when he went to the hospital

for a stroke, he replied, “Prison officials because of the domestic violence as you talked

about that I had.” Without any objection from defendant, the trial court later instructed

the jury that they had “heard the defendant was convicted of a felony domestic violence

charge.” Then, during closing argument, defense counsel stated that it was “true” that

defendant had been convicted of domestic violence, but that “he took responsibility for

it” and “went off to the jail.”

       Because defendant admitted to the conviction, the trial court properly relied on it

as an aggravating circumstance to impose an upper term on count 1 under section 1170,

subdivision (b)(2). (See People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 404.) And because

we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant was previously convicted of felony domestic violence,

the trial court’s reliance on defendant’s prior conviction satisfied the Sixth Amendment.

(See People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1111.)

       But defendant argues, the People concede, and we agree that the trial court

erroneously relied on the jury’s personal use of a deadly weapon true finding to impose

the upper term. As section 1170, subdivision (b)(5) unambiguously states, “[t]he court

may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which

sentence is imposed under any provision of law.”

                                            10
       Defendant argues we assess the error under People v. Lopez (2022) 78

Cal.App.5th 459, while the People urge us to apply this court’s test in Lewis, supra, 88

Cal.App.5th at p. 1131. But those cases apply when a trial court relies on circumstances

in aggravation to impose an upper term when the facts underlying the circumstances have

not been stipulated to by the defendant and have not been found true beyond a reasonable

doubt by a jury. (People v. Lopez, supra, at pp. 467, 467, fn. 11; Lewis, supra, at p.

1131.) Here, however, the trial court permissibly relied on defendant’s prior conviction

but impermissibly relied in part on the jury’s true finding on the personal use of a deadly

weapon to impose an upper term. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(5) prohibited the trial

court from doing so, regardless of what defendant stipulated to or what the jury found.

(§ 1170, subd. (b)(5) [“The court may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any

enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any provision of law.”].)

       We need not decide which standard of prejudice applies because the error was

harmless under any standard. The trial court had the discretion to impose an upper term

on count 1 based on defendant’s uncontested prior felony domestic abuse conviction,

which was less serious than his current convictions for attempted murder. (See California

Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2); § 1170, subd. (b)(3) [“[T]he court may consider the

defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing.) The court explained that it was

imposing the upper term for that reason alone, stating: “I’m using this prior conviction as

the aggravating factor to impose the upper term of nine years in this matter. The fact that

the defendant suffered this prior conviction indicates that his present convictions are of

                                             11
increasing seriousness.” (Italics added.) The court then explained that “in addition” to

this aggravated circumstance, defendant’s use of a deadly weapon also “support[ed] the

imposition of the aggravated term.”

       In our view, these comments make clear that the trial court would have imposed

the upper term on count 1 even if it did not consider the jury’s true finding on the deadly

weapon enhancement allegation. The court’s reliance on that finding was therefore

harmless under any standard. As a result, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing

to object to the court’s consideration of the finding when imposing the upper term.

       C. Mental Health Diversion

       Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mental

health diversion under section 1001.36. We disagree.

       To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, the defendant must

show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was

prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result

would have been more favorable to the defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466

U.S. 668, 688, 694; accord, People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 979-980; see

People v. Mbaabu (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148.) A “‘“reasonable probability”’”

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

(People v. Mbaabu, supra, at p. 1149; Strickland v. Washington, supra, at p. 697.) The

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that

                                               12
defense counsel’s performance was deficient and it resulted in prejudice. (People v.

Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674.)

       “[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”

(People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.) If the record sheds no light on

counsel’s actions, the claim must be rejected unless no satisfactory explanation exists or

counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one. (People v. Mendoza

Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) We will not find ineffective assistance of counsel

“unless there could be no conceivable reasonable for counsel’s acts or omissions.”

(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926.)

       A trial court may grant pretrial diversion to a defendant who meets all six elements

outlined in section 1001.36, subdivisions (b) and (c). (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) These

elements are: (1) the court is satisfied that the defendant suffers from a mental disorder

identified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; (2) the court is

satisfied the “defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of

the charged offense”; (3) a qualified mental health expert opines “the defendant’s

symptoms of the mental disorder . . . motivating the criminal behavior would respond to

mental health treatment”; (4) the defendant “consents to diversion and waives [his or her]

right to a speedy trial”; (5) the defendant “agrees to comply with treatment as a condition

of diversion”; and (6) the court is satisfied “the defendant will not pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to public safety, as defined in [s]ection 1170.18, if treated in the

community.” (§ 1001.36, subds. (b), (c).)

                                              13
       Defense counsel had several conceivable tactical reasons for not requesting a

mental health diversion. First and foremost, defendant consistently denied he had any

mental health issues and consistently refused mental health treatment. When defense

counsel declared a doubt as to defendant’s capacity before trial, defendant claimed

counsel was “malicious.” During those competency proceedings, a psychiatrist reported

that defendant “viewed the idea of being considered incompetent insulting.” Defendant

repeatedly told evaluating medical professionals that he did not have any mental health

problems and refused medication and further treatment.

       Second, defense counsel may have reasonably thought that a request for a mental

health diversion would have been fruitless. After defendant was evaluated as part of the

competency proceedings, it was reported that he had “current symptoms of mental illness

or developmental disability,” and that he was competent in all 14 areas assessed during

testing.

       Third and relatedly, because defendant was deemed competent, defense counsel

may have reasonably concluded that defendant’s potential mental health issues were not

“a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.”

       Finally, defense counsel may not have requested a mental health diversion because

he reasonably believed that the court would not find that defendant did not pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) As the court stated

at sentencing, the court declined to strike the personal use of a deadly weapon sentence

                                            14
enhancement because doing so would “place the victims in further serious danger of

physical injury as evidenced by the defendant’s conduct.”

       In short, defense counsel had sufficient tactical reasons not to request a mental

health diversion. We therefore reject defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for

not requesting a diversion.

                                            IV.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                CODRINGTON
                                                                          Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER
                          J.

FIELDS
                          J.

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