Court Opinion

ID: 9439096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:21:11.004033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:09.110686
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
concurring
specially:
Judge Randolph raises questions in his concurrence about the legitimacy of considering “the public benefit derived from the ease” in deciding when to award attorneys’ fees in a FOIA case. I write briefly in reply.
It is reasonable for the court to consider the public benefit arising from the plaintiffs FOIA request in deciding whether to grant attorney’s fees precisely because under the statute a plaintiff need not demonstrate any public benefit to obtain information through FOIA. In LaSalle Extension University v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481 (D.C.Cir.1980), we explained that “parties ... who have a sufficient private interest in the requested information do not need the additional incentive of recovering their fees and costs to induce them to pursue their request in the courts.” Id. at 484. That, of course, includes those who have commercial interests in the information sought. On the other hand, someone seeking information from the government may need at least the potential to cover costs if he acts as, in effect, “a private attorney general.” See S.Rep. No. 93-854 (1974).
Judge Randolph asserts that judges cannot evaluate public benefit “objectively.” But we make this kind of determination under other fee-shifting statutes all the time. See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C.Cir.1981) (explaining that under the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Air Act, courts are empowered to award fees “whenever such an award was deemed to be ‘in the public interest’ ”); Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1108 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115, 116 S.Ct. 916, 133 L.Ed.2d 847 (1996) (explaining that under the fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), when an attorney requests rates that are greater than those they normally charge, “the attorney must show that his or her custom of charging reduced rates is in fact attributable to ‘public spiritedness’”); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2133, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (explaining that an exception to the so-called “American Rule” prohibiting fee-shifting in most cases is the “common fund exception,” which “allows a court to award attorney’s fees to a party whose litigation efforts directly benefit others”). In fact, the public interest inquiry is usually relatively simple. See, e.g., LaSalle Extension University v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481, 484 (D.C.Cir.1980) (“One goal [of the FOIA fee-shifting provision] ... is to encourage Freedom of Information Act suits that benefit the public interest. This objective is not furthered here ....”); see also Summers v. DOJ, 140 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C.Cir.1998) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“There can be no doubt that these documents as a group are of the very highest public interest.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, it is not so readily apparent that the “substantial justification” test of EAJA that Judge Randolph espouses is that much more “objective” than the “public interest” test of FOIA.1
*1293Judge Randolph also claims that “making the eligibility for a fee award turn on ‘public benefit’ ... is not tied to any language or policy of FOIA.” Congress and every circuit to consider the issue would disagree. The requirement that the petitioner show some public benefit to obtain attorney’s fees is deeply rooted in the legislative history of FOIA. The “multi-factor, no weights assigned, test” appeared in the original Senate version of FOIA. See S. 2543, 93rd Cong. (1974); S.Rep. No. 93-854 (1974). Although the conference committee later eliminated the test’s four criteria from the statute, the conference report indicates that Congress intended courts to consider such factors in exercising their discretion to award attorney’s fees. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6288; Majority Opinion at 1288. Consistent with this congressional intent, we have for decades used them as guides to determining when attorney’s fees are warranted. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 11 F.3d 211, 216 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 315, 130 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994); Tax Analysts v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092, 1093 (D.C.Cir.1992); Weisherg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1498 (D.C.Cir.1984). Other circuits have done the same. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93 (6th Cir.1996); Cazatas v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.1983); Aviation Data Serv. v. FAA, 687 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir.1982); Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.1976). Absent some affirmative change of heart on the part of Congress or directive from the Supreme Court, I see no authority or reason for us to change course.

. Moreover, the purposes of the fee-shifting provisions of EAJA and of FOIA are different; "[s]imply put, the EAJA is not a broadly written fee-shifting statute which encourages meritorious *1293litigation.” Synar v. United States, 670 F.Supp. 410, 416 (D.D.C.1987). As we noted in Battles Farm Co. v. Fierce, 806 F.2d 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 2176, 95 L.Ed.2d 832 (1987), "unlike other fee-shifting statutes that are designed solely to encourage private ‘attorneys general' to bring meritorious litigation in the public interest ... the EAJA's purpose is somewhat different. It is designed to encourage small private plaintiffs and defendants to persevere against or resist the U.S. government if the government takes an unjustified litigating position.” Id. at 1101.