Court Opinion

ID: 9839311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 20:04:36.543101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:47.709206
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                     )
                                      )
  v.                                  )     Case Nos.:    2102001459
                                      )                   2301009216
CEDRIC SAYLOR,                        )
                                      )
            Defendant.                )

                            OPINION AND ORDER

         Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Joinder:

                                    DENIED

                         SUBMITTED: September 11, 2023
                          DECIDED: September 12, 2023

Diana A. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, of THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.

Ashley Callaway, Esquire, and Erika LaCon, Esquire, of THE DELAWARE OFFICE OF
DEFENSE SERVICES, Wilmington, Delaware, for Cedric Saylor.

JONES, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       This motion for relief from joinder brought by Defendant Cedric Saylor requires the

Court to perform an analysis to determine if separate Sexual Abuse charges involving two

minors should be separately tried together. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that

the “common scheme or plan” requirement for a proper joinder of offenses under Superior

Court Criminal Rule 8(a) has been met in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Saylor’s motion

must be DENIED.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
       Cedric Saylor (“Defendant”) has been indicted by a Grand Jury in a single

indictment for multiple sex crimes against two different victims, both of which are his

minor daughters. Defendant has moved to sever Counts I through IX from Counts X

through VII. Counts I through IX involve J.S., with a date of birth of February 20, 2010.

The charges for Counts I through IX are First Degree Rape, Second Degree Rape,

Attempted Rape First Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact, Sexual Abuse of a Child by a

Person in a Position of Trust, Authority, or Supervision, and Continuous Sexual Abuse of

a Child Over a Period of Time from 2014 to 2022. Counts X through XII involve A.S.,

with a date of birth of November 19, 2006, and involve one incident alleged to have

occurred sometime between July 6, 2019, and July 9, 2019. The charges for Counts X

though XII are Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree and Sexual Abuse of a Child by a

Person in a Position of Trust, Authority, or Supervision.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) provides that two or more offenses may be

                                             2
charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the

offenses charged are of the same or similar character.1 The purpose of this rule is to

promote judicial economy and efficiency.2 The defendant bears the burden of

demonstrating substantial injustice and unfair prejudice from a denial of a motion to

sever.3 Mere hypothetical prejudice from denial is not sufficient.4 The plain fact that the

crimes were separate and were committed against different individuals, with a lapse of

time between them, does not require severance.5 Ultimately, the Court must balance the

rights of the accused against the legitimate concern for judicial economy.6

        In Weist v. State, 542 A.2d 1193 (Del. 1988), the Delaware Supreme Court

identified three forms of prejudice that a criminal defendant may suffer as a result of

improper joinder of offenses: (1) the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various

crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not so find; (2) the

jury may use evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the

defendant in order to find guilt of the other crime or crimes; and (3) the defendant may be

subject to embarrassment or confusion in presenting different and separate defenses to

different charges.7

                                                  ANALYSIS
        Defendant claims that he will suffer the second type of prejudice if the counts are

1
  Del.Super.Ct. Crim.R., Rule 8(a).
2
  Mayer v. State, 320 A.2nd 713 (Del. 1974); State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629 (Del. Super. 2023).
3
  Bates v State, 386 A.2nd 1139, 1141 (Del. 1978); Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785 (Del. 1983); State v. Allen,
2003 WL 2327795 (Del. Super. 2003).
4
  Bates v. State, 386 A.2d at 1142; Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546 (Del. 1985).
5
  Skinner v State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Del. 1990).
6
  Mayer v State, 320 A.2nd 713, 717 (Del. 1974).
7
  Wiest v. State, 542 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Del. 1988).

                                                         3
not severed; namely that the jury may use evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general

criminal disposition of the Defendant in order to find guilt.

        In responding to the Defendant’s request to sever, the State maintains that all the

offenses are of the same general character, involved a similar course of conduct, and

occurred at the same location. The State also maintains that the offenses are “inextricably

intertwined.”8

        The multiple offenses allege similar sexual acts committed by Defendant against his

minor daughters. The state has proffered that both victims and a third witness would testify

at each trial, even if the cases were severed. The proffer is that the abuse is alleged to have

occurred at the Defendant’s resident where all three girls would visit and spend the night

regularly. Each will testify about the defendant’s actions against them. The investigations

as to each victim involve significant overlap as it is alleged all of the children were present

in the home together when some of the offenses would have occurred. Additionally, the

offenses span a time frame that overlap. The multiple offenses charged in this

indictment “are of the same general character and involve a similar course of conduct such

that is it proper to try them together.9

        Additional consideration must be given to the fact that these are cases involving

allegations of late reported child sexual abuse. This Court has considered this factor in

deciding similar motions. In State v. Boughner, the defendant was charged with committing

various sexual acts against four minors.10 During the investigation, one of the victims

8
  State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629.
9
  State v. Ferinden, 2018 WL 2684069 (Del. Super. 2018); State v. Rosario, 2023 WL 2609629.
10
   1995 WL 19200095 (Del. Super. 1995).

                                                      4
identified another potential victim.11 The defendant moved to sever, arguing that the jury

would cumulate the evidence and infer a general criminal disposition to find guilt. In

Boughner, the Court talked about the challenges of a late reported sexual abuse case which

lacked physical evidence. This Court denied severance in Boughner where the crimes

against each child were so inextricably intertwined as to make the proof of one crime

impossible without proof of the other.12

          In State v. Ferinden, this Court recognized that the credibility of the witnesses

becomes paramount in a late reported minor abuse case, elevating the State’s need to

present as to how the investigations unfolded and how one victim identified another.13

There, the Superior Court denied Defendant’s motion for relief from joinder because both

offenses, although different victims, were of the “same general character, involving a

similar course of conduct and taking place within a relatively brief span of time.”14

          This is a late reported child abuse case. The facts presented in both Boughner and

Ferinden are present in instant case. As in Boughner, this is a late reported sexual abuse

case where there is a lack of physical evidence, and the credibility of the victims is essential

to the determination of guilty. Similarly to Ferinden, in the instant case, the affidavit of

probable cause makes it clear that police learned of the actions against J.S. during the

course of the investigation of the matters involving A.S. These cases are inextricably

intertwined and should be tried by one jury.

11
   Id. at 2.
12
   Id. at 4.
13
   Id.
14
   Id. at 5.

                                               5
           Defendant maintains that application of the factors in Getz v. State require

severance.15 This court disagrees. The evidence of the various incidents is material in

showing intent, modus operandi, opportunity, and identity. The evidence is material to the

issues in the case; the evidence is introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b)

(Intent, modus operandi, opportunity, and intent); the evidence will be proved by plain,

clear and conclusive proof; the acts are not too remote in time; and the probative value of

the evidence outweighs the prejudice. With respect to this last factor, the evidence is

disputed; the proof of the prior conduct is adequate; the probative force of the evidence is

obvious; the state needs the evidence to explain the late reporting and the course of the

investigation; there is no other available proof; there is similarity of the prior wrong to the

charged offense; and an appropriate limiting instruction will be given.

                                                CONCLUSION

           The Court is satisfied that the common scheme or plan requirement for a proper

joinder of offenses under Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) has been met in this case.

Further, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced by such

joinder.16 The counts have independent logical relevance on the issue of intent, modus

operandi, opportunity, and identity. The probative value of trying these counts together is

not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court will instruct the

jury that it may not infer a general criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from

the multiple charges and that the jury is not to accumulate evidence present on these

15
     Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988).
16
     Super.Ct. Crim.R., Rule 14.

                                                    6
offenses in order to justify a finding of guilt as to the particular offenses.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                             /s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
                                                           Francis J. Jones Jr., Judge

Original to Prothonotary

                                               7