Court Opinion

ID: 9674394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:28:12.848222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:27.450626
License: Public Domain

JUNELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. In my opinion the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment because of the state’s failure to comply with the Texas Speedy Trial Act.
The parties stipulated that the criminal action in Harris County was commenced on January 20, 1981, the date of the filing of the complaint. The state announced ready for trial 181 days later, on July 20, 1981. In this case whether the state complied with the Speedy Trial Act depends on whether, in computing the time by which the state must be ready for trial, there should be excluded 61 days as a reasonable *161period of delay resulting from other proceedings involving appellant, including but not limited to proceedings for the determination of his competence to stand trial, hearing on pre-trial motions, appeals, and trials of other charges. Art. 32A.02 Sec. 4(1). If the evidence was sufficient to justify the exclusion of 61 days, the state complied with the Speedy Trial Act and the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to dismiss the indictment.
The evidence is summarized as follows: On December 31, 1980, appellant was arrested and placed in the Cleveland City jail in connection with the robbery of a Tenne-co service station and the murder of the service station attendant. Appellant was transferred to the Liberty County jail on January 2, 1981. On January 14, 1981, he was indicted for capital murder in Liberty County. Two attorneys were appointed to represent him in the Liberty County case. On February 11, 1981, he was sent to the Texas Mental Hospital at Rusk for evaluation of his mental competence to stand trial. On February 19, 1981, he was returned from Rusk to the Liberty County jail. While in jail in Liberty County, he was in court on a fairly regular basis for various hearings, for arraignment, for docket call and things of that nature. Also during his confinement in the Liberty County jail, he made several trips to Con-roe to see a doctor because of some kind of problem with one of his hands. All the time appellant was in jail in Liberty County, the authorities there continued to work on the capital murder case and Deputy Sheriff Larry Allen, who testified at the Speedy Trial hearing, spent considerable time investigating the case.
I think the above evidence is sufficient to prove that in computing the 120 days time by which the state must be ready for trial, at least 61 days should be excluded as “a reasonable period of delay resulting from” the Liberty County proceedings against appellant.
I believe the position I express in this dissent is supported by the case of Parish v. State, 632 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1982, no pet.). In that case, on October 31, 1978, Parish was indicted in Tarrant County for theft of a motor vehicle. The state announced ready seven months later on May 31,1979. On October 31, 1978 Parish was in jail in Dallas County charged with three felony offenses alleged to have occurred on separate dates. For the next seven months Parish remained in the Dallas County jail pending trial on the Dallas charges. During this period attorneys were appointed for Parish on the Dallas charges and in those cases numerous pre-trial motions were filed. The Dallas cases were set for trial many times and were still pending at the time of the state’s announcement of ready in the Tarrant County case on May 31, 1979. The trial court ruled that the period of time of Parish’s incarceration in Dallas County should be excluded as a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings involving Parish. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, stating specifically that the three-month delay was not unreasonable under the facts of that case.
In my opinion, the 61 day delay was not unreasonable on the facts of this case; therefore, I dissent.