Court Opinion

ID: 9461583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:18:20.854732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:08.733221
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge
(concurring in result):
I concur fully in Part II of the court’s opinion. As' to Part I, I agree with the result reached but am unable to agree with the analysis of the due process requirements laid down by In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. I cannot agree that the failure to give notice to the parents may be viewed a mere technical violation of a prophylactic safeguard, and not a constitutional infringement.
The Supreme Court spoke in plain terms of the due process requirements involved in Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1446, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. The Court recognized the requirements that:
the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described — that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. (Emphasis added).
*10Again, as to the nature of the requirement of parental notice, the Court made it unmistakably clear that “ . the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the child anil his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel . . . ” Id. at 41, 87 S.Ct. at 1451.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 532, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1980, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, the plurality opinion reaffirmed the constitutional stature of the notice requirements spelled out by Gault, stating that “Due Process, in that proceeding, was held to embrace adequate written notice. . . . ”
In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1190, 14 L.Ed.2d 62, the Court had earlier stressed the fundamental nature of the due process requirement of notice:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.1
Moreover, as the majority opinion in the instant case notes, n. 1, the Congress recognized that the 1974 amendment to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act prescribing notice to the parents was necessary “to guarantee certain basic procedural and constitutional protections to juveniles under Federal jurisdiction,” Senate Report No. 93-1011, 1974 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, p. 4264. The Report stated that the Act had not been changed since Gault “ . . . to reflect those due process rights.” Id.
Thus, we are not dealing here with a procedural gloss, but with the essence of due process. Due process consists, in large part, of procedure.
Moreover the notice to the parents, along with other essentials, is not merely for protection of their right to custody, see Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at 34, 87 S.Ct. 1428, but is notice required for the juvenile’s benefit to insure that the parents may have a reasonable opportunity to participate in preparing and presenting the juvenile’s case. Cf. Brown v. Cox, 467 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir.). Such notice therefore is an essential ingredient of due process guaranteed for the juvenile’s protection, and the failure to afford it was a constitutional infringement of his rights.
Recognizing that a constitutional error was involved, there remains the question whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. I feel the omission must be viewed under this test, applied in light of the purpose of the parental notice requirement.
The record does not show whether the parents were able to give assistance in the preparation of the juvenile’s case before trial. However the case was not complicated. It is clear that the defendant had the assistance of retained counsel at the arraignment on March 22, 1974, when the delinquency proceeding was commenced with defendant’s consent, and at trial on April 10, 1974. Further, the defendant was 17% years of age 2 and had the ability and opportunity to discuss preparation with trial counsel.
Moreover at the trial, both the defendant’s mother and stepfather3 partici*11pated in the presentation of defendant’s case at trial by giving testimony tending to support the position of self-defense developed by the defendant and his counsel. The mother brought to the trial parts of a broken bottle said to have been used by the deceased brother in the fight between him and defendant Watts.
On consideration of the record as a whole, I conclude that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and agree that the trial court’s determination should be affirmed.

. The Court restated this proposition from Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865.

. Of course, this age factor cannot excuse the lack of the required notices but, in a proper case, I feel it may be considered as a relevant factor in determining whether such a constitutional error was harmless.

. The stepfather lived in Buena Vista and the mother at Towaoc at the time of trial. While the record does not show the facts, defendant’s brief states that his natural father lives on the Ute Reservation in Southwest Colorado. Brief of Appellant, p. 4. The defendant testified he had lived with his stepfather in the summer of 1973, after getting out of school in Albuquerque and that he lived with his grand*11mother at Towaoc from September, 1973, through January, 1974.
The trial court determined at the time of arraignment on March 22, 1974, that defendant should be released on his own recognizance on the condition he not leave the near vicinity of the stepfather in Buena Vista. Thus, the stepfather and the mother appear to be the appropriate persons that these facts cause us to consider in connection with the parental notice requirement.