Court Opinion

ID: 9455680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:29:27.942421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:41.389791
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
I would remand this case for'a new trial. The convictions here all arise out of six sales of narcotics to the same police undercover agent. The defense at trial was mistaken identity; appellant’s counsel made much of discrepancies between the agent’s description of the man who had sold him narcotics and appellant’s actual appearance.1 Appellant himself took the stand and denied having made the sales, but disclaimed any memory of his whereabouts at the times involved. After trial but before sentencing, he moved for a mental examination on the grounds of his 15-year addiction to narcotics;2 the day following denial of that motion, he moved for a new trial, offering evidence to show that he was in Baltimore during the period in which three of the six sales were said to have occurred.3 He explained his failure to have remembered this information before as a consequence of his add*1221iction,4 and stated that he had been taking narcotics regularly following his arrest and throughout his trial.5 The government opposed the motion, primarily on the ground that appellant had not shown due diligence in searching out the information, and it was denied.
I believe this case is controlled by Hansford v. United States.6 We there held that, even though the defendant had previously been found competent to stand trial after a psychiatric examination, the trial court was required sua sponte to make a proper redetermination of his competence when it learned that he was taking narcotics during trial.7 I can see no escape from Hansford in this case;8 upon learning that appellant had been taking drugs during his trial, the District Court was under a duty to order an examination of his mental condition 9 so that a prompt determination of his competence could be made.10 At this late date, a nunc pro tunc determination of competence is no longer feasible;11 we should therefore reverse and remand this case for a new trial, rather than requiring an unrepresented defendant to start up the hill once more by filing a § 2255 motion from jail.

. Appellant at the time of trial was 44 years old and wore a black moustache; ■ the agent’s initial report had stated that he had purchased narcotics from a man 32 to 34 years old with a “grayish” moustache. The jury was obviously troubled about the question of identity, and at one point sent in a note requesting more information.

. Appellant had been twice previously convicted of narcotics offenses and his habit required 10 to 15 capsules of heroin per day.

. Appellant offered to support his story with testimony from his probation officer, his wife, and a number of relatives and friends whom he had visited while in Baltimore; he also produced a telephone bill showing calls said by his wife to have been made by her to appellant at his aunt’s home in Baltimore during the period in question. His attorney had contacted several of the persons concerned and confirmed their testimony; he also suggested that others, known to appellant only by their first names and by sight, might be located if he were released in order to find them.
That the proffered alibi was for less than all of the six sales in question does not seem particularly relevant. All of the sales were made to the same agent; and *1221it seems likely that if the jury accepted the claim of mistaken identity as to one or more of the sales, they would accept it as to all.

. In Hansford v. United States, 124 U.S. App.D.C. 387, 389, 365 F.2d 920, 922 (1966), we noted:
Current medical knowledge indicates that use of narcotics often produces a psychological and physiological reaction known as an acute brain syndrome, which is a “basic mental condition characteristic of diffuse impairment of brain tissue function.” The characteristic symptoms of the syndrome are impairment of orientation; impairment of memory; impairment of all intellectual functions including comprehension, calculation, knowledge and learning; impairment of judgment; and lability and shallowness of affect.
(citations omitted).

. Appellant was on bail from the day following his arrest through his conviction.

. 124 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 365 F.2d 920 (1966).

. Id. at 388-390, 365 F.2d at 921-923.

. The majority refuses to consider this point because it believes that “[a]t no time before the trial court or this court has appellant argued that he was incompetent to stand trial.” Of course, this was precisely the situation in Hansford, where we dealt with the issue and remanded the case for a new trial. But in any event, appellant’s post-trial motion for a mental examination stated counsel’s belief that his client was “presently suffering from a mental illness,” and the trial court apparently felt that this was intended to raise the issue of competence to stand trial: its order denying the motion specifically recited that “The Court * * * had the opportunity to observe the defendant throughout the trial in the course of which the defendant took the stand in his own defense, and * * observed no evidence of incompetency. * ”

. This need not, of course, cause undue delay. As we noted in Hansford “the trial court could have ordered a mental examination of appellant by the Legal Psychiatric Services that night with a report to be filed the next morning.” 124 U.S.App.D.C. at 392 n. 15, 365 F.2d at 925 n. 15.

. Of course a determination based solely upon observation of the defendant during trial was insufficient. As the Supreme Court said in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), “While [the defendant’s] demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue.”

. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) ; see Hansford v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 392-393 and n. 16, 365 F.2d 920, 925-926 and n. 16 (1966), and cases cited.