Court Opinion

ID: 9916881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 20:02:37.318253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:05.484614
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/10/24 P. v. Jackson CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C097977

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
                                                                                       2019-0000342)
           v.

    TAVARES DESHAWN JACKSON,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2021, defendant Tavares Deshawn Jackson pleaded no contest to attempted
murder and admitted to the enhancement allegations that he personally inflicted great
bodily injury on the victim and personally used a firearm. In 2022, defendant petitioned
for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied the

1       Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant petitioned for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature
renumbered former section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 without substantive changes.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

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petition at the prima facie stage, concluding defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter
of law because the preliminary hearing transcript established he was the actual shooter.
       On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly relied on the
preliminary hearing transcript to find him ineligible for resentencing, (2) the trial court
erroneously engaged in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion at the prima facie stage, and (3) cumulative prejudicial error warrants reversal.
We conclude the trial court erred in relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to deny
defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage. Because nothing else in the record
establishes defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law, we will remand
for the trial court to issue an order to show cause.
                                      BACKGROUND
       An information charged defendant with two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2), being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and being a prohibited person in possession of
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 4). In connection with counts 1 and 2, the
information alleged defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), personally inflicted great bodily injury
causing the victim to become comatose due to brain injury or to suffer paralysis
(§ 12022.7, subd. (b)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The information also alleged defendant had a prior strike. (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12,
subd. (b).) The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to amend the information to
add an enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a).)
       In April 2021, defendant pleaded no contest to count 2, attempted murder (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a)) with no willful, deliberate, and premeditated allegation, and admitted the
enhancement allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)) and personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The parties stipulated the

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preliminary hearing transcript provided the factual basis for the plea. The trial court
dismissed the remaining counts and struck the remaining enhancement allegations. The
trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate determinate prison term of 16 years
consisting of the upper term of nine years on count 2, three years for the great bodily
injury enhancement, and the middle term of four years on the firearm enhancement.
       Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 775), defendant filed a petition to have his conviction vacated and for
resentencing. He asserted (1) a complaint was filed against him allowing the prosecution
to proceed under a theory of attempted murder, (2) he was convicted of attempted murder
pursuant to a plea, and (3) based on changes made to sections 188 and 189, he could not
presently be convicted of attempted murder. He claimed the prosecution proceeded
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court ordered a hearing
and appointed counsel.
       At the prima facie hearing, defendant’s attorney argued the charges did not
exclude defendant from eligibility and stated, “he certainly could have been prosecuted
under a theory of aiding and abetting under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” He further argued defendant’s stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript
as the factual basis for the plea was not an admission to the truth of the factual basis, but
only permitted the court to conclude that a factual basis for the charges existed. Any
factual dispute, defendant’s attorney asserted, had to be resolved at an evidentiary
hearing.
       The trial court denied defendant’s petition, concluding he did not establish his
prima facie entitlement to relief. The court stated: “The preliminary hearing established
that the defendant was the actual shooter. He pled to attempted murder with the use of a
gun and personal infliction of great bodily injury. And People v. Nguyen [(2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 1154 (Nguyen)] and [People v.] Lewis [(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis)]
say that the court can take into consideration facts that were established at the preliminary

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hearing. I don’t think I am doing any fact finding or weighing of credibility, it’s just the
clear theory of [defendant’s] case was that he was the direct shooter. [¶] So I’m going to
find that [defendant] has not made a prima facie case for relief under . . . section 1172.6.”
                                        DISCUSSION
                                                I
                                 Applicable Legal Principles
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) amended “the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) Senate Bill No. 1437 achieved this by amending sections 188 and 189.
       Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now provides: “Except as stated in subdivision (e)
of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.”
       Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 189 to limit felony murder liability to:
(1) the actual killer; (2) a person who was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) a person
who was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference
to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for
individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. And, effective
January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 to expand its coverage
beyond those convicted of murder to include individuals convicted of “attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter . . . .” (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 2; § 1172.6, subd. (a).)

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       Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides: “A person convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the
petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶]
(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed
the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in
lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
       If a defendant submits a facially sufficient petition, “the court shall hold a hearing
to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to
show cause. (Ibid.)
       The prima facie bar under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “ ‘very low’ ” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), and the inquiry at the prima facie stage is “limited” (id. at
p. 971). “ ‘ “[T]he court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) To determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing, the trial court may examine the record of conviction.
(Id. at pp. 970-971.) The record of conviction will assist the court in distinguishing

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“petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.) “ ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court
is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 971.) We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima
facie stage. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
                                              II
                     Consideration of Preliminary Hearing Transcript
       Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in relying on the preliminary hearing
transcript at the prima facie stage to conclude he was ineligible for resentencing. He
asserts his stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual basis for his plea
was not a binding admission for all purposes. We agree.
       The parties generally stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript provided
the factual basis for defendant’s no contest plea. Defendant did not, however, admit to
any specific facts at the plea proceedings. The courts are split on the extent to which they
may rely on preliminary hearing transcripts at the prima facie stage.
       In Nguyen, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, the parties agreed in the trial court as well
as on appeal that trial courts at the prima facie stage may consider transcripts from
preliminary hearings and plea proceedings as they are part of the record of conviction.
(Id. at pp. 1162, fn. 8, 1166.) The Nguyen court concluded the transcripts from the
preliminary hearing and plea hearing established the defendant was not entitled to relief
as a matter of law because they established he was convicted of second degree murder as
a direct aider and abettor, the only theory advanced by the prosecutor. (Id. at p. 1166.)
       In People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217 (Rivera), by contrast, the appellate
court held that the defendant’s stipulation to the grand jury transcript as the factual basis

                                               6
for his plea did not constitute an admission that he acted with actual malice. (Id. at
p. 235.) The court noted that “[u]nder section 1192.5, a trial court taking a plea must
make ‘an inquiry . . . of the defendant to satisfy itself . . . that there is a factual basis for
the plea.’ ‘The factual basis required by section 1192.5 does not require more than
establishing a prima facie factual basis for the charges.’ ” (Rivera, at p. 235.) “[A]bsent
an indication that a defendant admitted the truth of particular facts, the stipulation to a
factual basis for the plea does not ‘constitute[] a binding admission for all purposes.’
[Citations.] For our purposes, this means that [the defendant] did not admit to the truth of
any of the evidence presented to the grand jury, and that evidence therefore cannot be
used to demonstrate that he admitted to acting with actual malice.” (Ibid.)
       In People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, the court rejected the defendant’s
contention that the preliminary hearing transcript cannot be considered at the prima facie
stage because it is not part of the record of conviction. (Id. at p. 989, fn. 11.) However,
consistent with Rivera, the court concluded the preliminary hearing transcript did not
establish the defendant’s ineligibility as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 991.) Although the
parties stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript, as well as police reports,
provided the factual basis for the plea (id. at p. 982), the defendant did not admit the truth
of the relevant testimony from the preliminary hearing (id. at p. 991). Echoing Rivera,
the Flores court stated the defendant’s stipulation was “not a ‘ “binding admission for all
purposes.” ’ ” (Flores, at p. 991.) However, the court went on to determine that, even if
it was, the preliminary hearing testimony did not establish the defendant’s ineligibility as
a matter of law. (Id. at pp. 991-992.)
       Conversely, in People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted
June 28, 2023, S279670, the trial court relied on uncontroverted preliminary hearing
testimony that the defendant approached the victim and fired several shots at him, and
that the defendant was the sole perpetrator. (Id. at p. 657.) The court concluded that, as
the sole perpetrator of the attempted murder, the defendant was ineligible for

                                                 7
resentencing. (Ibid.) The court rejected the defendant’s contention that the trial court
engaged in impermissible factfinding at the prima facie stage, noting that the evidence
was uncontroverted, and thus no factfinding, weighing of the evidence, or credibility
determinations were required. (Id. at p. 658.)
       The California Supreme Court granted review in Patton to consider whether the
trial court engaged in impermissible judicial factfinding by relying on the preliminary
hearing transcript to deny the defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage, and thus will
resolve the issue. (People v. Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted.) In the
meantime, we conclude that the trial court in this case erred in relying on the preliminary
hearing testimony at the prima facie stage to determine defendant was ineligible for
relief, as this amounted to impermissible factfinding.
       Defendant submitted a facially sufficient petition. As for the record of conviction,
at the plea proceedings, he stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript provided the
factual basis for his plea. However, we agree that a general stipulation to the preliminary
hearing transcript as providing a factual basis for the plea does not constitute an
admission to the truth of all testimony at that hearing for all purposes. (Rivera, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 235; People v. Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) Defendant,
at the plea proceedings, did not expressly admit to any specific facts, either himself or
through counsel, as defendants sometimes do at such proceedings. (See, e.g., People v.
Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1028 [the defendant, the only person charged,
admitted at the plea proceeding that he entered an apartment, shot and killed victims in
two counts, and shot and injured a victim in a third count; trial court properly relied on
plea colloquy in making credibility determination adverse to the defendant and denying
petition].)
       Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that reliance on the preliminary
hearing testimony to determine whether defendant is eligible for relief as a matter of law
would result in judicial factfinding which is impermissible at the prima facie stage.

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(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-972.) Doing so would require the court to determine
whether the account of the shooting offered by the one percipient nonhearsay witness was
true and established ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. In other words, it would
require “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,’ ”
which is impermissible at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 972.)
                                               III
                    Factfinding at the Prima Facie Stage and Prejudice
       Defendant asserts the trial court erred in engaging in factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion at the prima facie stage. Given that the
trial court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript as the basis for its determination,
our discussion in part II of the Discussion largely resolves this issue.
       Defendant filed a facially sufficient petition for resentencing. The information
generically charged attempted murder. (See Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 233
[generic manner in which murder was charged did not limit the People to prosecuting the
defendant on any particular theories].) Defendant did not make any factual admissions at
the plea proceeding. We have concluded the trial court erroneously relied on the
preliminary hearing transcript to conclude defendant was ineligible for relief.
Additionally, defendant’s admission to the enhancement allegations that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) did not establish his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law (cf.
People v. Cooper (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 106, 125 [personal use of a deadly weapon and
personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement allegations do not necessarily
prevent the prosecution from trying the defendant on a theory of felony murder or natural
and probable consequences]). There is nothing else in the record establishing defendant’s
ineligibility for relief as a matter of law.
       In the absence of any permissible basis on which to conclude defendant is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we cannot conclude the trial court’s error in

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considering the preliminary hearing testimony was harmless; it is reasonably probable
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. (See People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [state law harmless error standard]; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 972-974 [applying Watson to error at § 1172.6 prima facie stage].)
Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for the trial court to issue an order to show
cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d).) In light of our determination, we need not address
defendant’s cumulative error argument.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed.
The case is remanded to the trial court for issuance of an order to show cause.

                                                      \s\
                                                 Krause, J.

We concur:

     \s\
Duarte, Acting P. J.

     \s\
Renner, J.

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