Court Opinion

ID: 9949715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 14:16:37.757778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:32.749945
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Ortiz, Lorish and Senior Judge Petty
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Lexington, Virginia

            SHANTA ORLANDO HUBBARD, A/K/A
             SHAWN HUBBARD
                                                                                  OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0795-23-3                                       JUDGE LISA M. LORISH
                                                                                 MARCH 12, 2024
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                            FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
                                              F. Patrick Yeatts, Judge

                           W. Cameron Warren (M. Pack Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.

                           J. Brady Hess, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                           Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   During a traffic-related stop, officers searched Shanta Orlando Hubbard on the side of the

            road. An officer patted down Hubbard, examined his pockets, put his hand between Hubbard’s

            shorts and underwear and “swiped” his buttocks, all while Hubbard stood by the side of the road.

            After feeling a hard object in his bottom, the officer struggled to remove the item as Hubbard

            resisted by clenching his posterior. During this engagement, the officer looked and reached inside

            Hubbard’s underwear. Hubbard’s shorts (though not his underwear) dropped to the ground.

            Officers gave up after more than a minute and a half of trying to remove the item and decided to

            take Hubbard to the jail for further processing. After a pause, the search resumed, and an officer

            again reached inside Hubbard’s underwear, proclaiming that he could feel the item but could not

            remove it because Hubbard was clenching his bottom together. Ultimately, the officer extracted a

            plastic bag filled with smaller plastic bags containing crack and powder cocaine.
        The standard for assessing the constitutionality of warrantless intrusive bodily searches

under the Fourth Amendment is higher than it is for other types of warrantless searches. First, the

officer conducting the search must have a clear indication that the concealed object is present.

Second, exigent circumstances must justify the search. Finally, the search must be conducted in a

reasonable manner, consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Applying the test for intrusive searches

here, we agree with the trial court that officers had a clear indication that drugs were likely present

in Hubbard’s bottom. But we disagree with the trial court that exigent circumstances existed based

on the mere speculation that the concealed item could have contained fentanyl. We cannot find

support in the record for any other exigent circumstances without the development of other facts—a

task we cannot take up on appeal. Finally, while Hubbard waived his right against warrantless

searches of his person in a prior plea agreement, we have already held that a general consent to a

warrantless search does not include an intrusive search of private areas. Thus, the Fourth

Amendment requires reversal.

                                          BACKGROUND1

        In June 2020, City of Lynchburg Police Officer Waterman stopped Shanta Hubbard’s

truck for a suspected traffic infraction. As he approached the truck, Officer Waterman smelled

“the odor of marijuana.” After identifying Hubbard as the driver, Officer Waterman ran his

license through a database to determine whether Hubbard had any active warrants. The officer

learned that Hubbard had an active Fourth Amendment rights waiver from a 2012 plea agreement

in which Hubbard waived his Fourth Amendment rights and consented to warrantless searches of

his person and property for ten years. Based on the smell of marijuana and the rights waiver,

Officer Waterman ordered Hubbard and his passenger out of the truck and began to search it.

        1
         “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Poole v. Commonwealth,
73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)).
                                                -2-
Officer Waterman found green plant material on the floorboards as well as bags of white and brown

powders that were “knotted up” in a manner consistent with the appearance and packaging of illegal

drugs.

         Officer Waterman then began to search Hubbard, while another officer searched the

passenger. Officer Waterman found about $2,000 in Hubbard’s pockets, and then told Hubbard that

he would unbutton his shorts to check his “groin area.” Officer Waterman put his hand “inside of”

Hubbard’s shorts to “swipe” his buttocks over the outside of Hubbard’s underwear. He “felt a large

rock-like object” consistent with a controlled substance. At that point, Hubbard clenched his

buttocks together and tried to reach inside his shorts with his hands that were handcuffed behind his

back. Another officer came to assist Officer Waterman during the search by holding Hubbard’s

wrists to prevent him from reaching down.

         Officer Waterman then pulled back Hubbard’s boxer shorts and looked inside as his body

camera confirms. Officer Waterman said he was “trying to see where it went,” and the

Commonwealth later introduced stills from the body camera footage of the view inside Hubbard’s

boxer shorts as exhibits at trial. While looking inside, Officer Waterman also reached inside and

tried to retrieve the hard object, but struggled with Hubbard, who was clamping his buttocks

together tightly. During this struggle, the officers lost their grip on Hubbard’s outer shorts, which

fell down to his ankles for a few seconds before the officers could pull them back up again. After

about two minutes, officers paused the search and decided to “try and get it out at the jail.”

Testifying at the later motion to suppress hearing, an officer explained this was because “you know,

we’re sitting here reaching in the back of his shorts [and] [h]e’s not letting us get it” and “we

understand the dynamics of it and how it looks when we’re trying to retrieve this item.”

         While two of the officers focused on securing the truck’s other passenger, a third officer

remained next to Hubbard. The officer saw Hubbard shaking his leg and reaching toward the back

                                                  -3-
of his shorts. While Hubbard’s arms remained handcuffed together behind his back, the officer

believed Hubbard was trying to remove the item from his shorts. The officer feared that Hubbard

would shake out the item and then “kick it, stomp it out” or “destroy it.” Officer Waterman testified

that his concern was that if the drugs in Hubbard’s buttocks were “fentanyl and he had stomped it

out and a gust of wind would have came by, it could have killed all of us.”

        Thus, officers resumed the search, again reaching into Hubbard’s boxers. It took about a

minute for them to extract the object, as Hubbard was again tightly clenching his buttocks to prevent

the removal. Officer Waterman testified that the item was “partially clenched between his buttocks

and then it was laid up against his boxer shorts” when they finally removed it. The item was

packaged in a plastic bag containing 87 smaller bags of crack and powder cocaine, later confirmed

through lab testing.

        Before trial, Hubbard moved to suppress all the evidence obtained because of the search.

Hubbard conceded that the Fourth Amendment waiver he agreed to in a previous plea agreement

was valid but argued that “a warrantless body cavity search is peculiarly intrusive and does not fall

within the scope and consent of the waiver.”

        The trial court found that it was objectively reasonable for the police to believe they had

consent to remove the item from Hubbard’s buttocks, considering Hubbard’s agreement to

warrantless searches in his prior plea agreement, but ultimately finding that the officers had a clear

indication that Hubbard was concealing drugs and that there were exigent circumstances.

Emphasizing the wide-spread presence and dangerousness of fentanyl (and noting that it would be a

“closer call” in a pre-fentanyl era), the trial court found that the possibility that the drugs were

fentanyl created an exigent circumstance justifying the police reaching into Hubbard’s underwear

and retrieving the item from his buttocks. This was necessary to ensure the item was transported

                                                   -4-
“safely and securely” without exposing “other individuals to a harmful substance.” Thus, the trial

court denied the motion to suppress.

       Following the jury’s finding of guilt, the trial court convicted Hubbard of possession with

intent to distribute. Hubbard appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Hubbard challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. He argues that

Officer Waterman publicly strip searched him without sufficient justification and that this

warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment2 right against unreasonable searches and

seizures. On brief, the Commonwealth argues that the search was constitutional because

Hubbard consented to warrantless searches in his prior plea agreement, and, alternatively,

because the officers met the criteria to carry out a valid public strip search—the officer had a

clear indication that drugs were present, and there were exigent circumstances.

       In evaluating a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must

give deference to the factual findings of the [trial] court and give due weight to the inferences

drawn from those factual findings; however, the appellate court must determine independently

whether the manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 30, 36 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Robertson, 275 Va. 559, 563 (2008)). Because the officers searched Hubbard without a warrant,

“the Commonwealth ha[d] the burden of proving the legitimacy of [the] warrantless search and

seizure.” Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 235-36 (2000) (quoting Simmons v.

Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204 (1989)). On appeal, Hubbard “bears the burden of

       2
         In only relying on the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Hubbard
has not claimed that the Virginia Constitution provides him different or broader rights.
                                               -5-
establishing that reversible error occurred.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 474

(2020).

          We begin by reviewing our caselaw with respect to Fourth Amendment waivers, and we

ultimately agree with the position the Commonwealth conceded was correct at oral argument—

that consent to warrantless searches in a plea agreement does not include consent to intrusive

searches of private areas. Then we consider whether the warrantless search of Hubbard’s person

was constitutional in light of the heightened standard that applies to intrusive bodily searches and

find that the evidence presented below failed to clear this high hurdle.

     A. Consent to warrantless searches of a person in general, even when provided pursuant to
        plea agreement, does not include consent to intrusive searches of private areas in or on
        the body.

          The Fourth Amendment provides that

                 [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
                 papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
                 shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
                 probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
                 describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
                 seized.

“[W]arrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and

well-delineated exceptions.” Megel v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 534 (2001). The “number

of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement” make the question of whether a

search is reasonable or not “exceedingly difficult.” Parady v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 18,

30 (2023). One such exception is consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)

(explaining that it is “well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the

requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to

consent”).

          Our Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant may consent to warrantless searches

and seizures as part of a plea agreement, subject to the traditional rules about waivers of rights.
                                                 -6-
In general, “[t]o justify a search on the basis of a waiver, the Fourth Amendment requires the

Commonwealth to show that the waiver was given voluntarily and did not result from coercion.”

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 580, 584 (1998); cf. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 5

Va. App. 389, 396 (1987) (A “waiver of any constitutional right must be knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made.”). Thus, a challenge to an agreed-upon provision in a plea

agreement is generally an argument that the defendant did not do so voluntarily, knowingly, or

consensually. Anderson, 256 Va. at 584.3

       Here, however, Hubbard does not argue that his waiver of rights in his prior plea

agreement was involuntary or unknowing; instead, he challenges the scope and meaning of the

waiver. Our Court treats plea agreements as contracts between a defendant and the

Commonwealth. Griffin v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 714, 718 (2016) (stating that “[o]nce

accepted, courts generally treat plea agreements as binding contracts . . . []subject to

constitutional considerations”). According to Hubbard, he did not consent to, or waive his right

against, intrusive bodily searches under the contract.

       Hubbard’s October 12, 2012 plea agreement stated:

               As a condition of this plea agreement the defendant specifically
               agrees to waive his Fourth Amendment right against a warrantless
               search for a period of TEN (10) years from the date of sentencing.
               The defendant agrees to consent and voluntarily submit to a
               warrantless search of his person, place of residence or any vehicle
               he is occupying, at any time of the day or night by any law

       3
         In contrast, Fourth Amendment waivers imposed as court-ordered conditions of
probation are analyzed for reasonableness, consistent with this Court’s review of all conditions
of supervision. Murry v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 117, 122 (2014). “Probation conditions must
be reasonable in light of the nature of the offense, the defendant’s background, and the
surrounding circumstances.” Id. For this reason, our Supreme Court found unreasonable a
condition subjecting a probationer to “searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at
any time by any probation or law enforcement officer” without a warrant or “even reasonable
cause” for “both probation and investigative purposes” because it effectively “extinguishe[d]”
the probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights, and “[n]othing in the record establishe[d] that a
complete waiver” was “necessary to facilitate his rehabilitation and protect the public.” Id. at
126-28.
                                                 -7-
               enforcement officer during this period. The defendant further
               agrees that any evidence seized from such search shall be
               admissible in any hearing or trial resulting therefrom.

We interpret the terms of the plea agreement using contractual principles that are tempered by

the “constitutional considerations” surrounding consent in the Fourth Amendment context.

Griffin, 65 Va. App. at 718.

       There is no question that Hubbard generally consented to warrantless searches of his

person, place of residence, or any vehicle he is occupying, at any time, by any law enforcement

officer. But we have previously held that general “consent to search [one’s] person would not,

without more, justify a strip search or a body cavity search.” Moss v. Commonwealth, 30

Va. App. 219, 224 (1999). Instead, “strip searches require special justification since they are

peculiarly intrusive.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 638, 642 (1998). We applied this

same basic principle in Hughes v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 456 (2000) (en banc),

explaining that the defendant “unquestionably consented” to officers “searching his person,” but

that “having Hughes cough in order to visually inspect the anus and the manual body cavity

search of removing the plastic bag from Hughes’ anal cavity exceeded the scope of Hughes’

consent to search his person.” Thus, our Court has understood that a defendant’s consent to

search her person does not include consent to an intrusive search of the body. And while the

consent in Moss and Hughes was verbal, we see no reason why the same logic would not apply

to written consent like we consider here.

       In fact, the conclusion that consent to a search of one’s person is not consent to a search

of the private parts of the body might be even stronger in the contractual context of a plea

agreement. Typically, terms in a contract are given their “ordinary significance.” Dowling v.

Rowan, 270 Va. 510, 516 (2005). As we have already noted, our Court interprets general

consent to a search of one’s person not to include consent to intrusive bodily searches. This

                                               -8-
tracks a “common sense” understanding of what a search of one’s person entails—criminal

defendants would probably not have agreed to searches of their person if they understood that

such consent would grant access to the most private parts of their body for no reason whatsoever.

Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“[C]ommon

rules” incorporated into a contract are determined by “common sense,” and are those “the parties

probably would have [worked out] if they had spoken about the matter.”). A contractual consent

to warrantless searches of the person carries with it an inherent presumption that intrusive

searches of private areas are not included. Cf. Mills v. Mills, 77 Va. App. 543, 566 n.7 (2023)

(interpreting a contract awarding “all attorney fees” to “contain an inherent presumption that the

fee award will be reasonable, unless the parties clearly and expressly intend otherwise,” because

a presumption of reasonableness would be the “‘ordinary significance’ assigned to a provision

addressing attorney fees”).

       Thus, we agree with the legal position the Commonwealth adopted at oral argument—

that the mere fact that Hubbard consented to warrantless searches of his person in his plea

agreement did not authorize officers to conduct an intrusive bodily search. Our next task is to

determine whether the warrantless and intrusive search of Hubbard’s person was constitutional.

    B. All intrusive bodily searches are subject to a heightened standard under the Fourth
       Amendment.

       The United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 769-70

(1966),4 explained that “[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth

       4
          Explaining why bodily intrusive searches are different, other courts “have recognized
that strip and visual body cavity searches impinge seriously upon the values that the Fourth
Amendment was meant to protect.” Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997). Indeed, “[a]
strip search is ‘viewed as an extraordinary invasion of privacy.’” Cotto v. City of Middletown,
158 F. Supp. 3d 67, 78 (D. Conn. 2016) (quoting Bolden v. Vill. of Monticello, 344 F. Supp. 2d
407, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). “Strip searches are different in nature, quality, and intrusiveness
from full searches of a person’s body.” People v. King, 292 P.3d 959, 961 (Colo. App. 2011).

                                               -9-
Amendment protects forbid any such [bodily] intrusions on the mere chance that desired

evidence might be obtained.” Instead, a “clear indication that in fact such evidence will be

found” is necessary, the “means and procedures” must “respect[] relevant Fourth Amendment

standards of reasonableness,” and the circumstances must suggest an “emergency.” Id. at 768,

770-71. Relying on Schmerber, we held that “a warrantless search involving a bodily intrusion,

even though conducted incident to a lawful arrest, violates the Fourth Amendment unless” three

criteria are met: (1) “the police have a ‘clear indication’ that evidence is located within a

suspect’s body,” (2) “the police face exigent circumstances,” and (3) “the means and procedures

employed by the authorities to conduct a search involving an intrusion into the body . . . satisfy

‘relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.’” Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 27

Va. App. 320, 330-31 (1998) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768).

       Since setting out this three-part test, we have issued a string of other opinions dividing

the concept of bodily intrusive searches into three subcategories: strip searches, visual body

cavity searches, and manual body cavity searches. In Hughes, we explained that a “search of the

person may range from a Terry-type pat-down to a generalized search of the person to the more

intrusive strip search or body cavity search.” 31 Va. App. at 455. We suggested that a strip

search “generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of his body

cavities,” whereas a “visual body cavity search extends to a visual inspection of the anal and

genital areas.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 708 N.E.2d 669, 672 n.4 (Mass. 1999)).

Finally, “[a] ‘manual body cavity search’ includes some degree of touching or probing of body

cavities.” Id. (quoting Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 444-45 n.5 (1st Cir. 1991)). But while

Similarly, “strip searches involving the visual inspection of the anal and genital areas” are
recognized as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant,
embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission,” Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723
F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Wis.
1979)), and “more intrusive” than other searches, id. at 1274.
                                                - 10 -
Hughes adopted these three categories of invasive searches into our caselaw, it did not say if, or

how these distinctions mattered in applying the Gilmore test.

       Indeed, after setting out the categories in Hughes, we held only that the defendant “was

subjected to all three—a strip search, a visual body cavity search, and a manual body cavity

search” and that his consent did not extend to visual or manual searches of his body cavity. 31

Va. App. at 455. Therefore, we looked to whether the Commonwealth established that police

had a “clear indication” that evidence was located within the suspect’s body, and whether the

police faced exigent circumstances. Id. Because there was no “clear indication,” we never

considered the remaining parts of the Gilmore analysis.

       Subsequent caselaw, and the rationale of Gilmore, indicate that Gilmore’s three-part test

applies equally to all types of body cavity searches.5 Indeed, “[s]trip searches require special

justification since they are peculiarly intrusive”6 and each category is a “‘warrantless search[]

involving a bodily intrusion.’” Moss, 30 Va. App. at 224 (quoting Gilmore, 27 Va. App. at 330).

It is also clear that strip searches are the cut off for when the heightened test applies. In other

       5
         The only exception is searches of pretrial detainees in the jailhouse setting due to the
unique governmental concerns in such an environment. Winston v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App.
74, 81 (2007) (applying the holding from Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979)).
       6
          Other jurisdictions likewise apply similar requirements to roadside strip searches. See,
e.g., Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that without “clear justification
or exigent circumstances, an officer is not allowed to strip an arrestee on a public street pursuant
to a search incident to an arrest”); State v. Robinson, 727 S.E.2d 712, 720 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(“A valid search incident to arrest . . . will not normally permit a law enforcement officer to
conduct a roadside strip search.” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Fowler, 725 S.E.2d 624,
628 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012))). Instead, “there must be both probable cause and exigent
circumstances that show some significant government or public interest would be endangered
were the police to wait until they could conduct the search in a more discreet location.” Id.;
Cotto, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (“A strip search in a public place, even if justified by reasonable
suspicion, has been uniformly subject to close scrutiny, and has generally required a clear
showing of exigent circumstances to justify such an extreme invasion of privacy.”);
Commonwealth v. Jeannis, 122 N.E.3d 496, 502 (Mass. 2019) (“[T]he same constitutional
standards apply to both strip searches and visual body cavity searches.”).
                                                  - 11 -
words, if a search falls short of being a strip search, then the heightened test does not apply at all.

McCloud v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 276, 283-84 (2001) (concluding that a search was not a

strip search because “appellant’s clothing was not removed,” the “genital area was not exposed”

and “officers made no visual inspection of appellant’s genitals” or “touched” the same, so no

heightened test applied).

       When drawing the line between the three subcategories of peculiarly intrusive bodily

searches—and explaining why those lines matter—our caselaw has been less clear. For

example, in Kidd v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 433, 446 (2002), we said that “[l]ooking

into . . . underwear for drugs was a strip search.” But in Hughes we suggested that a strip search

only entailed a general “inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of his body

cavities,” whereas a “visual body cavity search extends to a visual inspection of the anal and

genital areas.” 31 Va. App. at 455 (quoting Thomas, 708 N.E.2d at 672 n.4). Of course, the

subcategory of search did not end up mattering in either case because the defendant in Kidd

specifically consented to the intrusive search, 38 Va. App. at 447, and we concluded that officers

had no clear indication drugs were present to justify the intrusive search in Hughes (which we

determined was made up of all three types of intrusive searches), 31 Va. App. at 455. Nor did

the distinction matter in King v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 717, 724, 726 (2007), where we

classified a defendant being “required to bend over and spread his buttock cheeks” as a “visual

body cavity search,” because this search also failed under the first prong of Gilmore given that

there was no “clear indication” that drugs were present.

       We clarify here that whether a search is a strip search, a visual cavity search, or a manual

cavity search, all such searches are peculiarly intrusive and law enforcement must have a “clear

indication” that evidence is concealed, that there are exigent circumstances, and the means and

procedures used to obtain the item must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Gilmore,

                                                - 12 -
27 Va. App. at 330. The subcategory of intrusive search does not determine whether the

Gilmore test applies; instead, it impacts the application of the second and third prongs of that

test. Manual cavity searches are necessarily more intrusive than visual body cavity searches,

which are in turn, more intrusive than strip searches. As the level of intrusiveness increases, the

greater the grounds must be to justify that action.7

       1. We must apply Gilmore to the search here.

       Turning to this case, both Hubbard and the Commonwealth describe the search that took

place as a “strip search.”8 The search began after Officer Waterman smelled marijuana in the

truck Hubbard was driving and ran his license only to learn that Hubbard had an operative Fourth

Amendment waiver in a prior plea agreement. Officers searched Hubbard’s truck and found

bags full of powder that appeared to be controlled substances, as well as other physical evidence

of marijuana use. After searching Hubbard’s truck, Officer Waterman began to search

Hubbard’s person, including his pockets. Because Hubbard was wearing baggy shorts, Officer

Waterman put his hand between Hubbard’s shorts and his underwear, and “swiped” Hubbard’s

       7
          Indeed, other courts “considering the strip search issue have also recognized that the
more intrusive a search is upon personal rights, the more the government must demonstrate
justification for conducting the search.” Justice v. Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 192 (11th Cir.
1992). See, e.g., Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82 v. Carey, 737
F.2d 187, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that “the governmental interests vis-à-vis visual
body-cavity searches are diminished severely” because “the extent of the[] intrusion is much
greater” and “basic concepts of human dignity dictate a course of the utmost caution before an
intrusion into the most private parts of the human body is allowed”); M.M. by C.M. v. Anker, 607
F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[A]s the intrusiveness of the search intensifies, the standard of
Fourth Amendment ‘reasonableness’ approaches probable cause.”); United States v. Love, 413 F.
Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Tex) (“[T]he greater the intrusion, the greater must be the reason for
conducting a search that results in such invasion.”), aff’d, 538 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1976).
       8
         Whether the search was a strip search is a mixed question of fact and law. While we
accept factual concessions from parties as true, we are not bound by their concessions of law.
Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 395 (2020) (“We do not permit litigants ‘to define
Virginia law by their concessions.’” (quoting Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 447,
454 n.6 (2013))).
                                               - 13 -
buttocks, through his underwear, to search Hubbard’s “groin area.” Officer Waterman

immediately felt a “hard object” in Hubbard’s bottom. Officer Waterman explained that he has

made “a tremendous amount of arrests from people who have concealed an illegal narcotic in the

area of their buttocks or down in their groin” and that concealing drugs in that area “was actually

the most common way narcotics made their way into the jail.”

       Everything up to this point in the search was independently supported by the suspected

drugs found in Hubbard’s truck.9 But then, officers looked into Hubbard’s underwear.

According to Kidd, “[l]ooking into . . . underwear for drugs” is at least a strip search. 38

Va. App. at 446. And, while looking into Hubbard’s underwear, officers also visually inspected

his anal area, and touched and probed his buttocks while trying to remove the item. See Hughes,

31 Va. App. at 455 (a “visual body cavity search extends to a visual inspection of the anal and

genital areas,” and a “‘manual body cavity search’ includes some degree of touching or probing

of body cavities”). Under Gilmore, to continue the search by looking into Hubbard’s underwear

and attempting to remove the item, officers needed a “clear indication” that evidence was located

within a suspect’s body, and exigent circumstances must have existed. Gilmore, 27 Va. App. at

330-31. If these threshold criteria were met, we must consider whether the means and

procedures used were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. But we need not resolve

whether a body “cavity” includes the area between a clamped-together posterior because whether

the search was a strip search or something more intrusive, it needed to be supported by exigent

       9
         Because we find the search to this point was supported by the suspected drugs found in
Hubbard’s vehicle, we do not consider whether a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights in a plea
agreement alone would permit an officer to unbutton a person’s shorts and swipe his buttocks
through his underwear. See Butcher, 298 Va. at 396 (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates
that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting Commonwealth v.
White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))).
                                              - 14 -
circumstances, and the facts developed below did not support any subcategory of invasive

search.

          2. Officers had a clear indication that drugs were present.

          We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that officers had a “clear indication” that the

hard object in Hubbard’s bottom contained illegal drugs. Before searching Hubbard, officers

found bags of white and brown powders that were “knotted up” and appeared to contain illegal

drugs. The car also smelled of marijuana, and there was visible marijuana shake in the vehicle.10

While searching Hubbard, officers found about $2,000 in Hubbard’s pockets. In combination,

these factors clear this first hurdle.

          3. There were no exigent circumstances given the evidence presented below.

          Next, we must consider whether exigent circumstances existed to permit the invasive

search to take place. Officer Waterman testified that Hubbard (who was handcuffed with his

hands behind his back) was “trying to reach down into the back of his shorts, making it obvious

that he’s trying to get the item out of his shorts.” He said his “main concern is that somebody

could get hurt having an item down near their butt. He could shake it out of his shorts’ pant leg

at any time. He could stomp it out. He could kick it.” Indeed, during the pause in the search, an

officer saw Hubbard shake his leg as if he were trying to remove the item. Officer Waterman

testified that he was concerned that the drugs in Hubbard’s buttocks could have been fentanyl

and if “he had stomped it out and a gust of wind would have came by, it could have killed all of

us.” He explained that widespread concerns about fentanyl led to a new internal policy that they

were no longer to “open up bags of white powder for the purposes of a field test” because

“[f]entanyl has become so dangerous in today’s time that a simple poof of that powder that could

          10
           The search occurred in June 2020 prior to the enactment of Code § 4.1-1302, which
states that no officer may search any person “solely on the basis of the odor of marijuana.”
                                               - 15 -
reach our nostrils could kill us.” Defense counsel argued below that there was no concern about

destruction of evidence because “[h]e’s surrounded by people” and “[i]f he wiggles it out of his

pant leg,” the officers “are watching him the entire time . . . [w]here is it going to go?”

        The trial court concluded exigent circumstances were present because of the fear of

fentanyl. Finding that “with fentanyl being the dangerous and harmful substance that it is, not

only to those that are using it and transporting it without a license to do so, it certainly is

dangerous to any officer that is exposed to it in any sort of manner” and “[t]hat, in and of itself,

constitutes an [exigent] circumstance.”

        We start by noting that “[t]he burden of justifying the warrantless search below was the

Commonwealth’s.” Parady, 78 Va. App. at 37. “[A] finding of exigency must arise from the

evidence/information possessed by the officers and not mere speculation based on what may be

theoretically possible.” White v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 535, 556 (2021). Indeed,

“[b]ehind every closed door exists the theoretical possibility of an exigent circumstance” but “to

find that such speculation could establish exigency effectively would, for the most part, read the

warrant requirement out of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. For this reason, “a finding of exigency

must be tied to actual information about present circumstances and not mere theorizing.” Id.

        That officers had a clear indication Hubbard may have drugs concealed in his bottom

does not lead to the inference that the specific substance was fentanyl. On this record, there is no

“actual information” in the testimony or body camera footage that ties the hard object in

Hubbard’s buttocks to something more than a “theoretical possibility” about fentanyl. See

White, 73 Va. App. at 556. Nor could anecdotal evidence that there is a lot of fentanyl in

circulation amount to “actual information” creating an exigent circumstance. Thus, while

                                                 - 16 -
fentanyl may be dangerous, harmful, and more present than it used to be, the mere chance that

fentanyl could be lurking around the corner is not an exigent circumstance.11

        In reaching this conclusion, we reject only the trial court’s conclusion that the theoretical

possibility that a dangerous drug like fentanyl is present is “in and of itself” an exigent

circumstance that constitutes a per se exception to the warrant requirement. Here, we are

bolstered by the Supreme Court’s rejection of a similar categorical rule that the natural

dissipation of a blood alcohol level in a person’s blood stream automatically created exigent

circumstances justifying a warrantless blood test. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 152

(2013). While the Court acknowledged that “some circumstances will make obtaining a warrant

impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an exigency

justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test,” it nevertheless concluded that a “careful

case-by-case assessment of exigency” was required to avoid the “‘considerable

overgeneralization’ that a per se rule would reflect.” Id. at 152-53 (quoting Richards v.

Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997)). Thus, we underscore that while there may be future cases

where a specific concern about the presence of fentanyl could create an exigent circumstance

justifying an intrusive search, the Commonwealth did not put on sufficient evidence to suggest

that this was a risk in this specific case.

        11
          Other courts that have faced this question have reached the same conclusion. See
United States v. Fisher, No. CR 23-01-M-DLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95924, at *23-24 (D.
Mont. June 1, 2023) (holding that the government failed to meet its “burden of showing specific
and articulable facts” supporting exigent circumstances even if it was “objectively reasonable to
have serious safety concerns about fentanyl, a particularly deadly drug even in small doses, being
present in a house with young children”); United States v. Marion, No. 8:19-cr-555, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 176384, at *13-14 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2021) (While testimony established that
“fentanyl is highly lethal even in small doses,” that the officer suspected a given powder was
fentanyl, and that “the quantity of fentanyl found in Defendant’s shopping bag presented a
danger of harm to the public if it fell into the hands of a third party,” the government failed to
show exigent circumstances without testimony “that the officers were unable to safeguard the
shopping bag while seeking a search warrant.”).
                                                  - 17 -
       While the trial court focused only on the danger of fentanyl in its ruling, the

Commonwealth also argued below that exigency was supported by a more general concern that

Hubbard might shake out and destroy the evidence. Indeed, Officer Waterman presented a buffet

of hypothetical exigencies such that Hubbard could “get hurt having an item down near [his]

butt,” or that he could “shake it out of his shorts’ pant leg at any time” and “kick it,” as well as

the risk that might befall the officer if fentanyl was involved. If the facts support a finding of

exigency based on these other theories, we may affirm the trial court’s result, even though we

disagree with the finding of exigency based on the danger of fentanyl. We are mindful, however,

that we can only “apply the ‘right result for the wrong reason doctrine’ if ‘evidence in the record’

supports a different argument on appeal and ‘the development of additional facts is not

necessary.’” Parady, 78 Va. App. at 37 (quoting Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 579

(2010)).

       It is true that we have recognized an “emergency aid exception” to warrantless searches

of a home, permitting an officer to enter and investigate contingent on “an [officer having an]

objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone in the residence needs immediate aid.”

McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 630, 642 (2021) (citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S.

45, 47 (2009) (per curiam)). Perhaps this doctrine could be logically extended to apply if an

object lodged inside a person presented a serious risk to the person’s health and safety. Even if

so, there was not enough evidence presented here, however, to allow us to conclude that a

reasonable officer would be concerned for Hubbard’s health and safety. The evidence shows

that Hubbard was standing by his vehicle, not in any physical distress. And Officer Waterman

repeatedly testified that the object was between Hubbard’s clenched buttocks and not further up

inside his body. Because additional facts would need to have been developed below to support a

theory of emergency aid, we cannot apply the right result wrong reason doctrine.

                                                - 18 -
       The same is true of the evidence-destruction concern. While “[n]o fixed legal definition

fully captures the meaning of exigent circumstances,” Evans v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 277,

283 (2015), we have relied on “a non-exhaustive list of considerations to inform a reviewing

court’s analysis of whether exigent circumstances are present,” White, 73 Va. App. at 554. A

reviewing court should consider:

               (1) the degree of urgency involved and the time required to get a
               warrant; (2) the officers’ reasonable belief that contraband is about
               to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to others,
               including police officers left to guard the site; (4) information that
               the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police may be
               on their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or involves
               violence; (6) whether officers reasonably believe the suspects are
               armed; (7) whether there is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of
               probable cause; (8) whether the officers have strong reason to
               believe the suspects are actually present in the premises; (9) the
               likelihood of escape if the suspects are not swiftly apprehended;
               and (10) the suspects’ recent entry into the premises after hot
               pursuit.

Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410-11 (1985).12

       Here, we can start to review these factors but ultimately cannot complete the analysis

without additional facts that were not presented or developed below. For example, we have

testimony that officers believed Hubbard was trying to shake out the hard object that was in his

bottom. At this point, Hubbard was already handcuffed and the rest of his body and vehicle had

been searched. His companion was also handcuffed. Neither was armed, and, given their close

proximity to the three police officers at the scene, neither could flee. Putting aside the general

fear of fentanyl addressed above, no testimony or evidence suggests why—if Hubbard

       12
           While these factors were first identified as relevant to exigent circumstances justifying
a warrantless entry into a home, we have relied on them to review the existence of exigent
circumstances more broadly. See, e.g., Moreno v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 267, 276 (2021)
(applying the factors to conclude that exigent circumstances existed to justify obtaining cell site
location information from a phone); Moore, 69 Va. App. at 37, 40-41 (applying the factors to
find that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless seizure of a firearm in plain
view inside a vehicle).
                                                 - 19 -
successfully shook the hard object out of his shorts—one of the three officers on the scene could

not have grabbed it. Indeed, as Hubbard’s attorney argued below, “[h]e’s surrounded by people”

and even “[i]f he wiggles it out of his pant leg,” the officers “are watching him the entire time

. . . [w]here is it going to go?”

        More critically, there was no evidence about the time it would have taken for officers to

get a warrant. Addressing the concerns posed by the “degree of urgency involved and the time

required to get a warrant” factor from Verez, we have said that “[p]roperly understood, the

urgency inquiry is focused on whether there is an emergency situation, such as . . . the

destruction of evidence, that likely will worsen if the officers take the time necessary to get a

warrant.” White, 73 Va. App. at 556. “To the extent it appears that there is no imminent change

to the circumstances about to occur and that the status quo largely can be maintained while the

officers seek a warrant, the situation is not ‘urgent’ for the purposes of an exigency analysis.” Id.

at 556-57. See also McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 (“In those drunk-driving investigations where

police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without

significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they

do so.”). Without any evidence about how long it would have taken to get a warrant, or why

officers could not maintain the status quo in that interim period,13 we cannot affirm the trial court

for this different reason.

        Ultimately, we are constrained to hold that the Commonwealth did not present enough

evidence below to establish that the invasive search was justified by exigent circumstances, thus

satisfying the heightened Fourth Amendment standard. Because we find that this second prong

of the Gilmore test was not met, we need not decide whether the third requirement—that the

        13
         Demonstrating that warrants can often be obtained quickly and by telephone, the trial
court even remarked, “I certainly have been the recipient of phone calls for search warrants in
the middle of the night for things being introduced to people’s body cavities.”
                                               - 20 -
means and procedures used to obtain the item were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment—

was satisfied here.

                                        CONCLUSION

       For these reasons, we hold that the evidence should have been suppressed. Because we

reverse the trial court’s judgment on this basis, we do not consider Hubbard’s other assignment

of error about the chain of custody for the drug evidence admitted at trial. We vacate Hubbard’s

conviction and remand the case for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.

                                                                          Reversed and remanded.

                                             - 21 -