Court Opinion

ID: 9915565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 19:00:41.665262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:36.650640
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60322        Document: 00517023040             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/05/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 23-60322
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                                January 5, 2024
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Terrance Chandler,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 1:20-CR-59-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Terrance Chandler appeals the 240-month below guidelines sentence
   that the district court imposed after Chandler pled guilty to conspiring to
   distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and
   (b)(1)(D), and to money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
   § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). In particular, Chandler challenges the district court’s

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-60322      Document: 00517023040           Page: 2     Date Filed: 01/05/2024

                                     No. 23-60322

   decision to hold him accountable, under relevant conduct principles, for
   methamphetamine (actual) found in his vehicle during a traffic stop.
          In determining a defendant’s base offense level at sentencing, “the
   district court may consider other offenses in addition to the acts underlying
   the offense of conviction, as long as those offenses constitute ‘relevant
   conduct’ as defined in the Guidelines.” United States v. Rhine, 583 F.3d 878,
   885 (5th Cir. 2009). As Chandler preserved his challenge to the district
   court’s relevant conduct determination, we review the district court’s
   application of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
   United States v. Suchowolski, 838 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 2016). The “district
   court’s determination of what constitutes relevant conduct for purposes of
   sentencing is a factual finding that is reviewed for clear error.” United States
   v. Barfield, 941 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and
   citations omitted). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible
   in light of the record as a whole.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted). “Relevant conduct attributed to a defendant under the sentencing
   guidelines . . . does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, only a
   preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Johnson, 14 F.4th 342, 347
   (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
          In this case, Chandler argues there was insufficient evidence to
   establish that he constructively possessed the methamphetamine (actual),
   given that it was found in a vehicle jointly occupied by Chandler, who had
   been driving, as well as a passenger. In support, Chandler relies on the
   passenger’s testimony at the sentencing hearing that the drugs belonged to
   the passenger and that Chandler had no knowledge of it.
          “Possession may be actual or constructive, may be joint among several
   defendants, and may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” United
   States v. Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 2008). Constructive

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                                    No. 23-60322

   possession consists of either the ownership, dominion, or control over the
   contraband itself or dominion or control over the premises in which the
   contraband is found. United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir.
   1999). However, mere ownership or control over a premises in which
   contraband is found is insufficient to prove constructive possession in a
   jointly occupied location. United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir.
   1993). When a premises is jointly occupied, the Government “must present
   additional evidence of the defendant’s knowing dominion or control of the
   contraband, besides the mere joint occupancy of the premises, in order to
   prove the defendant’s constructive possession.” United States v. Moreland,
   665 F.3d 137, 150 (5th Cir. 2011). In other words, when an individual who
   has ownership or control over a premises is also in joint occupancy of that
   premises, there must be “something else,” that is, “some circumstantial
   indicium of possession” that supports a “plausible inference” that the
   defendant had knowledge of and access to the contraband. Id. (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Here, the conclusion that Chandler constructively possessed the
   methamphetamine (actual) did not rest solely on his ownership and control
   of a jointly occupied premises.      First, as part of a drug investigation,
   investigators had received information that Chandler had just secured a new
   source of methamphetamine. Second, during the surveillance of Chandler
   that occurred on the day of the traffic stop, Chandler was observed stopping
   at a known drug area. Third, an agent with the Mississippi Bureau of
   Narcotics testified that he had received information that the purpose of the
   meeting that day in an area reputed for drug activity was to split up a drug
   shipment that had arrived. Fourth, according to the trooper’s testimony, the
   drugs found in the backseat of Chandler’s vehicle were “sitting in plain
   sight,” although a jacket partially covered some of the methamphetamine. In
   light of this evidence, the district court did not clearly err in inferring that

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                                     No. 23-60322

   Chandler constructively possessed the drugs. See Moreland, 665 F.3d at 150;
   see also United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2012).
          To be sure, the vehicle passenger testified that the methamphetamine
   (actual) belonged to him, and that Chandler had no knowledge of it.
   However, the passenger’s claim of ownership at the sentencing hearing was
   inconsistent with his denial of ownership during the traffic stop itself (as
   shown in the dash cam footage). Citing, inter alia, that inconsistency and the
   passenger’s demeanor while testifying, the district court found that the
   passenger’s testimony lacked credibility. “Credibility determinations in
   sentencing hearings are peculiarly within the province of the trier-of-fact.”
   United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 799 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). As a result, we “will not disturb a district
   court’s credibility determination made at sentencing.” United States v.
   Goncalves, 613 F.3d 601, 609 (5th Cir. 2010). Thus, contrary to Chandler’s
   assertions, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the passenger’s
   testimony was not credible.
          Finally, Chandler argues that, in connection with the relevant conduct
   determination, the district court failed to make a specific finding as to the
   scope of the criminal activity that Chandler agreed to undertake jointly. This
   argument pertains to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), which provides that, in the
   case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, relevant conduct includes “acts
   and omissions of others” that were “within the scope of the jointly
   undertaken criminal activity,” in furtherance of that activity, and reasonably
   foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see
   United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1235 (5th Cir. 1994). However, the
   limitations governing that definition are not present in the definition of
   relevant conduct set forth in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), which concerns the “acts and
   omissions committed, aided, abetted, . . . or willfully caused by the
   defendant.” § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A); see Carreon, 11 F.3d at 1237.

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                                   No. 23-60322

         In this case, it is apparent from the record that the district court’s
   relevant conduct determination was based on Chandler’s own act of
   constructively possessing the methamphetamine (actual). Accordingly, the
   district court’s determination relied on the relevant conduct definition in
   § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), not the one in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). As a result, the district
   court did not need to make any findings as to § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). See § 1B1.3,
   comment. (n.2); Carreon, 11 F.3d at 1237.
         Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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