Court Opinion

ID: 9651520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:23:09.702546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:13.907985
License: Public Domain

Singley, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Barnes, J., dissents. Dissenting opinion at page 90 infra.
In 1948, Crown Central Petroleum Corporation (Crown Central) erected a gasoline filling station at Park Heights and Rogers Avenues in Baltimore. It chose for a site an historic battleground where William T. Biermann had lost his fight to build a filling station in January of 1947. The administrative denial of his application had been reversed by the Baltimore City Court but his hopes were scuttled by Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514, 50 A. 2d 804 (1947), in which our predecessors reversed the order of the Baltimore City Court.
The bare record before us does not disclose how or why Crown Central was able to build its station, when Biermann was not. But the facts which were before us in 1947, and the law which we then applied have retained surprising vitality and relevance after the passage of 23 years.
The present controversy commenced in February of *841969, when Crown Central filed an application for a permit to reconstruct and enlarge its filling station with Baltimore’s Department of Housing and Community Development.
Crown Central proposed to' expand its original site, which in Biermann had fronted some 99 feet on Park Heights Avenue and some 116 feet on Rogers Avenue, by adding about 50 feet along the southeast boundary of the site, thus increasing the Park Heights frontage to about 150 feet. The number of gasoline pumps would be increased from two to 10, and the plans also included the installation of a one-bay coin operated car wash.
Because the Zoning Ordinance (the Ordinance), Baltimore City Code (Everstine Ed. 1866) Art. 30 §§ 41 (2) and (5) confers on the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals (the Board) original jurisdiction over applications for filling stations and for car washes, “where automobile washing is the prime use of the lot,” and because the front yard requirements imposed by § 32 of the Ordinance were not met, the Zoning Commissioner disapproved the application. On the same day, Crown Central appealed to the Board.
The Board posted the property, inspected the premises, held a hearing, and issued an order granting the application for the reconstruction of the filling station, but denying the application for authority to install the car wash. Crown Central appealed to the Baltimore City Court. From an order of that court affirming the Board and entering judgment in favor of the City, this appeal has been taken.
Crown Central would have us overturn the judgment for two reasons: (i) the denial of the application for the car wash was without any reasonable evidentiary basis and is therefore arbitrary, capricious and illegal; and, (ii) the trial court erred when it held there was a reasonable basis to support the Board’s refusal to allow the car wash as an exercise of the police power. Since the contentions are but two facets of the same proposition, we shall consider them together.
*85This Court, in Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Biermann, supra, 187 Md. 514, had before it not only the same property, but the same contention. In Biermann, Judge (later Chief Judge) Henderson, speaking for the Court, discussed the standard to be applied in cases where the Board exercises original jurisdiction:
“Considering the action of the Board as an exercise of delegated legislative, or quasi legislative, power, the scope of review is different and in some respects more limited than where the action is quasi judicial; e.g., the court must find that the result of the action is beyond the police power and deprives the applicant of property without due process of law. On this question the property owner has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality of legislative action, even if the legislative body acted without evidence at all.” 187 Md. at 523. (Emphasis supplied).
Biermann was followed by Adler v. Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore, 220 Md. 623, 155 A. 2d 504 (1959), another gasoline filling station case. There, the Court, speaking through Judge (now Chief Judge) Hammond, said at 628:
“* * * Governmental determination of proper locations for filling stations has been a problem since zoning began. In Baltimore approval of the legislative body, the City Council, was required until 1937, and since then the approval of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals, exercising the delegated legislative authority, has been a prerequisite. Whether the approval needed was that of the Council or the Board, this Court consistently has held that the test of the validity of the refusal to allow a filling station at a given site is not whether the action is supported by substantial evidence, and not *86whether the court agrees with the findings, or the result, but rather whether there was a reasonable basis to support the refusal as an exercise of the police power. To state it conversely, the court will not upset the refusal unless the bounds of the police power have been exceeded and the applicant deprived of his property without due process of law (citing cases).”
This language was most recently quoted by Judge Barnes, speaking for the Court in another gasoline station case, Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Muller, 242 Md. 269, 219 A. 2d 91 (1966).
Crown Central makes much of the fact that when the Board, as required by § 43 of the Ordinance, submitted the application to the Board of Fire Commissioners, the Commissioner of Health, and the Department of Transit and Traffic for recommendation and report, the several agencies interposed no objection. Similarly, the Department of Planning approved the application submitted to it under §41 (6) (4), which requires applications for car washes to be submitted.
The same contention was made and disposed of in Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Muller, supra; Shell Oil Co. v. Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore, 225 Md. 463, 171 A. 2d 234 (1961) ; Adler v. Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore, supra, and in Hoffman v. Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore, 187 Md. 593, 51 A. 2d 269 (1947). Adler adopted the language of Hoffman, where we said:
“* * * We might comment here that the recommendation of one or more of these city officials would not preclude the Board or the court on review of the Board’s action from considering other matters contained in the record. If this were not so, then a permit would be automatically issued upon the recommendation of these officials. Of course, this is not so. The Board of Zoning Appeals is the lawful agency to pass upon an application for a permit to erect a gaso*87line station, and the recommendation of these city officials was not intended to prevent the Board from either granting or refusing a permit. The recommendation of these officials is to be given consideration by the Board, in connection with the other facts in the case, and if the Board, based on evidence to the contrary, does not agree with the recommendation of these officials it is not required to follow their recommendation. * * *” 187 Md. at 597-98.
The only testimony at the hearing before the Board was that of G. Kenneth Holmes, Crown Central’s real estate representative. He explained that Crown Central’s proposal envisaged the installation of a one-bay coin operated car wash, which was entirely automatic; that a car could be washed in five minutes, or six cars in a half hour; that the entrance to the car wash would be from Park Heights Avenue; and that 10 spaces for automobiles waiting to use the car wash would be provided, as required by § 41 of the Ordinance. The revelant colloquy followed :
“(The Chairman) What happens if you get an overflow of customers?
“ (Mr. Holmes) There will be an attendant to direct traffic off the road. To date, we haven’t had any overflow at any of our locations.
“ (The Chairman) That [Park Heights Avenue] is a heavy traffic artery, as you well know.
“(Mr. Holmes) Most of them are, Mr. Ricciuti [the Chairman]. We are directing the attendant to make sure the road is clear along here.
“(Mr. Murphy) [counsel for Crown Central] I think, sir, the present People’s location on Ritchie Highway at Church Street just south of the City is closest to this of any in the immediate area.
“(Mr. Holmes) Correct.
“ (Mr. Murphy) And in heavy traffic, too.
“(Mr. Holmes) Right, terrific.”
*88Several days after the hearing, the Board filed its order. After reciting that the Board had inspected the premises and had made a study of the neighborhood, as it is required to do in cases of original jurisdiction by § 44 of the Ordinance, the order concluded:
“The Board is of the opinion that the reconstruction of the gasoline service station would not be detrimental to the neighborhood nor would it have an adverse effect upon the area, but it is the Board’s opinion that a car wash bay at the corner of the heavily traveled Park Heights Avenue and Rogers Avenue would be dangerous at this intersection and would cause motor vehicles to stand on the street creating a very hazardous situation. The Board finds no justification for permitting the car wash bay to be added at this location.
“With due consideration to the guides and standards set forth in Section 44 of the Zoning Ordinance and to the reports of the several City departments as required by the Zoning Ordinance, the Board finds that the proposed reconstruction of the service station would not menace the public health, safety, security or morals, but denies the permission to operate the coin operated car wash.
“In accordance with above facts and findings the Board approves the reconstruction of the service station but disapproves the one-bay, coin operated car wash.”
Crown Central argues that even in the exercise of the Board’s original jurisdiction there must be evidence adduced at the hearing sufficiently substantial for it reasonably to conclude that the application should be denied, and that the knowledge or opinion of the members of the Board cannot serve as a basis for the conclusion it reached. That this principle is applicable when the Board acts in a quasi judicial capacity is not open to question. *89Board, of County Comm’rs v. Ziegler, 244 Md. 224, 223 A. 2d 255 (1966) ; Hedin v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 209 Md. 224, 120 A. 2d 663 (1956); Temmink v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 205 Md. 489, 109 A. 2d 85 (1954) ; American Oil Co. v. Miller, 204 Md. 32, 102 A. 2d 727 (1954), all relied on by Crown Central.
This argument misses the point, however. When the Board is exercising its original jurisdiction, it is acting in a legislative or quasi legislative capacity, and as we have endeavored to indicate, the test is not whether the result which it reached is supported by substantial evidence, or even by any evidence, but whether there was a reasonable basis in fact to support the refusal as an exercise of the police power, Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Muller, supra, 242 Md. 269; Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Biermann, supra,, 187 Md. 514, 522; Ellicott v. Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A. 2d 649 (1942) ; Kramer v. Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore, 166 Md. 324, 171 A. 70 (1933) ; Pocomoke City v. Standard Oil Co., 162 Md. 368, 159 A. 902 (1932).
The Board is specifically charged by § 44 with the power “to approve or disapprove the issuance of the permit for the proposed use in accordance with the evidence adduced before it and from its own investigation as to whether or not such proposed use would menace the public health, safety, security or morals.” There follow in § 44 the separate guides and standards to be considered by the Board in original jurisdiction cases, among them traffic problems, incorporated by reference to § 2 of the Ordinance.
For Crown Central to prevail, it must meet the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative action, even if the legislative body acted without any evidence at all, Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Biermann, supra, 187 Md. at 523. The lower court commented that the Board’s findings based on viewing and study were not as specific as they might have been, see Mayor & C.C. of Baltimore v. Mutter, supra, 242 Md. at 280 and Hoffman v. Mayor & C.C. of Balti*90more, supra, 187 Md. at 601-02, where similar findings were held adequate, but the lower court found legally sufficient the conclusion that a car wash at a busy intersection would create a hazardous situation.
The court below concluded that there was a reasonable basis to support the Board’s disapproval of the application as an exercise of the police power and that the refusal was neither arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or a denial of due process. On the record before us, we cannot say that the Board did not have reasonable support for its denial of the application or that the presumption of the constitutionality of the Board’s action was rebutted.
The Board and the court below must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, costs to be paid by appellcmt.