Court Opinion

ID: 9828039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:02:18.875496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:42.091422
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
Our statement that “at one time Williams and his family lived in this house (at 1114 Preusser Street, Lot 4) and used the garage and driveway,” is attacked as being inaccurate. The statement is not controlling, if inaccurate, on the question of what. property Williams and wife intended -to convey as their homestead. Their homestead designation in the deed of trust securing the debt of Dr. Keyes described it as “Lots 2 and 3 only, in Block 2, P. A. Williams Addition.” This homestead designation was prior to the conveyance of the homestead to -the daughter. Shortly after the conveyance of the homestead to- the daughter, which described it as being “known and described as Lots 2 and 3, in Block 2, Williams Addition,” Williams conveyed, among others, “all of Lot 4” in said Addition -to Keyes in satisfaction of the debt due him under the deed of trust, referring in the deed to the homestead designation of “Lots 2 and 3 only, in Block 2, P. A. Williams Addition.” Thus Williams and wife were estopped to claim a part of Lot 4 as their homestead; and their daughter acquired under her deed from the parents only the property which her parents could claim as their homestead, or the title to-Lots 2 and 3 only, in Block 2, Williams Addition. Schwarzer v. Calcasieu Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., 176 S.W.2d 597, 599, wherein this court held that “the principle which controls the issue of estoppel (independently of the issue of abandonment in fact) may be thus briefly stated: where the physical facts are such as to warrant a conclusion that the property in issue is not the homestead of the mortgagor, the mortgagee, :in making the loan, may rely upon the representations (made for that purpose) of the mortgagor (here both the husband and wife), that the mortgaged property is not homestead, and the mortgagor will be thereby estopped from asserting its homestead character in derogation of the mortgage. There are many Texas adjudications supporting this principle. We cite only two of them from this court which cite a number among the many which might be cited. Llewellyn v. First Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 265 S.W. 222, and Wootton v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 286 S.W. 680. A review of the decisions upon a principle so well established as to be now elementary in Texas jurisprudence, we think unnecessary.”
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.