Court Opinion

ID: 9946911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 18:03:19.472737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:43.004566
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24 In re L.M. CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re L.M. et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
 OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,                                              E081532

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. INJ014547)

 v.                                                                      OPINION

 L.D.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mona M. Nemat, Judge.

Dismissed.

         Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                             I.

                                    INTRODUCTION

       L.D. was the prospective adoptive mother of six-year-old Le.M. (Le.) and five-

year-old La.M. (La.). The children were detained from L.D. after the Riverside County

Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) discovered L.D.’s husband had sexually

molested his niece and a female child of the couple’s daycare. L.D. appeals from the

juvenile court’s order removing the girls from her custody.1 On appeal, L.D. argues that

the juvenile court erred and denied her due process rights when it proceeded with the

evidentiary hearing without allowing her trial counsel to obtain the delivered services

logs. L.D. also asserts that her claim is cognizable on appeal because the juvenile court

advised her to appeal by filing a notice of appeal within 60 days, rather than advising her

of the appellate extraordinary writ rights. For the reasons explained, we dismiss the

appeal.

                                             II.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Le. and La. were detained from their mother’s custody in May 2022, after then

four-year-old Le. was found wandering 100 yards from her home. Law enforcement

located then three-year-old La. alone inside the home, which was less than 150 yards

from the Salton Sea. It was not known how long the girls had been alone in the home.

The girls were placed in protective custody based on exigent circumstances. Le. was

       1 The biological parents of the girls are not parties to this appeal. The biological
father had been deceased since September 2021.

                                             2
severely dehydrated, unable to keep food or water down, and had to be hospitalized. The

treating doctor opined Le. likely had not had water for approximately two days. The

girls’ mother had lost custody of her other children.

       The juvenile court took jurisdiction of the instant matter on July 27, 2022. The

girls were declared dependents of the court and removed from their mother’s physical

custody. Reunification services were denied to the mother.

       On May 19, 2022, the girls were placed in L.D.’s home with two of their older half

siblings who had previously been adopted by L.D. The biological parents’ rights were

terminated on November 14, 2022. L.D. was designated as the girls’ prospective

adoptive parent; her husband was an approved adult living in the home.

       In January 2023, DPSS received information that L.D.’s husband had sexually

abused their niece G.N. when she was 12 or 13 years old. G.N. reported that L.D.’s

husband had touched her private parts and inappropriately kissed her when she lived in

their home. When L.D.’s husband told L.D. about G.N.’s allegations, L.D. fainted and he

denied the allegations. L.D. and her husband had six children in their home and operated

a daycare from the home.

       G.N.’s mother is L.D.’s sister. G.N.’s mother contacted L.D.’s husband by

telephone with law enforcement present. L.D.’s husband apologized to her and stated

that he touched G.N. but not in a sexual manner. G.N. explained that the abuse began

with a kiss and one day, L.D.’s husband told G.N. to get undressed. He then put his

                                             3
fingers in her vagina and repeatedly kissed her on the mouth. This occurred multiple

times while L.D. and G.N.’s mother were not home.

       DPSS interviewed L.D. L.D. explained that she had her husband leave the

residence as soon as she heard about the allegations. She noted that the daycare income

was her primary source of income and that she lived in the home with her mother, her

biological son, three adopted children, and the girls. Two of her adopted children were

the girls’ biological half siblings. L.D. stated that since learning of the allegations, her

husband lived at his parents’ home, and that she had closed the daycare and notified the

licensing board. When she asked the girls if her husband ever touched them, they stated

that he had not. L.D. initially had difficulty believing the allegations because her

husband was a quadriplegic and had limited mobility. She noted that her husband’s

fingers did not work and described them as curled up but reported that his thumbs worked

for various tasks. L.D. further asserted that at the time of the alleged abuse, 13 people

lived in the home, and she could not understand how this occurred with so many

individuals under the same roof.

       The girls and L.D.’s other children denied any sexual abuse or inappropriate

touching. One of L.D.’s children reported that L.D. said her husband had to move out

of the home because G.N. told a lie and made the allegation to get attention. On

February 10, 2023, law enforcement informed DPSS that L.D.’s husband had been

arrested and that a new victim from their daycare had reported sexual abuse by the

husband.

                                               4
       On March 3, 2023, DPSS learned that V.O.’s nine-year-old daughter had attended

L.D.’s daycare since she was a baby and that on December 20, 2022, V.O.’s daughter

informed her mother that L.D.’s husband had touched her buttocks and underneath her

shirt approximately two to three times. When V.O. called L.D. to report her daughter’s

allegations, L.D. questioned how that could be possible as her husband was paralyzed.

L.D. and V.O. agreed that this could have been an accident due to L.D.’s husband’s

disability and that moving forward, L.D.’s husband would no longer hug any of the

children.

       V.O. further informed DPSS that on January 25, 2023, she had contact with L.D.

L.D. informed V.O. and V.O.’s husband that she had closed her daycare on January 23,

2023, because her husband had been accused of sexually abusing G.N. L.D. told them

that she could lose her license because she did not report the daycare incident regarding

their daughter in December 2022 and asked them if they could report it, but requested to

use the date of January 25, 2023, as the incident date. V.O. agreed, empathizing with

L.D.’s fear of losing her children. L.D. reached out to V.O. again on January 27, 2023,

and informed V.O. that the daycare was going to reopen. L.D. again shared everything

that occurred pertaining to G.N., and stated that she needed to get a written statement that

G.N. had something mentally wrong with her. L.D. noted that G.N. was always hugging

her husband and telling him she loved him, but then “‘all of a sudden she says something

like this.’” V.O. also noted that L.D. was gathering her husband’s medical documents to

prove he could not move. V.O. expressed concern to the social worker that L.D. was in

                                             5
denial, especially over her stating that G.N. had something mentally wrong with her and

because L.D. had excused away her daughter’s disclosure as well.

          The social worker visited L.D. at her home on March 8, 2023. L.D. stated that she

believed that her husband was innocent of the charges. DPSS was concerned that L.D.

continued to defend her husband regardless of the accusations against him. L.D.’s

husband blamed G.N. by claiming she kissed him and exposed herself to him, despite

acknowledging he failed to report her alleged conduct to L.D. or G.N.’s mother. It

appeared that both L.D. and her husband utilized his medical condition to enable his

behavior. DPSS was concerned that if L.D.’s husband was granted bail or released from

custody that he would likely have access to the children, which posed a credible safety

threat.

          A notice of intent to remove the children (JV-323 Judicial Council form) was filed

on March 13, 2023, alleging DPSS had received a referral that L.D.’s husband was

accused of inappropriately touching two minors and that L.D. did not report the acts to

law enforcement despite being aware of the information. It was alleged that L.D. had

attempted to conceal the disclosures and that due to their ages and developmental needs,

the girls were at risk of being sexually abused.

          L.D. filed an objection to the girls’ removal on March 15, 2023. She claimed that

the girls should not be removed from her care because she loved and cared for the girls,

and they had academically, socially, and emotionally made improvements and

accomplishments while in her care. L.D. explained that the girls were traumatized in the

                                               6
beginning with lots of health and personal problems and in the 10 months that they were

in her home they had strongly bonded. L.D. had adopted the girls’ half siblings and the

girls were loved by their sisters and brother and they felt like they belonged to a family.

       The girls were detained from L.D. on March 15, 2023, and placed in a foster

home. They were adapting to the home’s routine and were sleeping and eating well.

However, the girls were observed to respond negatively to the foster parent’s husband.

When he would attempt to speak to the girls, they would physically attempt to shield one

another’s bodies from him. This behavior subsided after the first week.

       On April 7, 2023, L.D.’s trial counsel filed a petition for access to juvenile case

file (JV-570 Judicial Council form). Counsel requested a delivered services log

pertaining to the time the girls were placed with L.D. This was approximately a 12-

month period, and the services log would allow counsel to prepare for the evidentiary

hearing on the removal petition. The petition noted the records were necessary because

they would provide insight as to the history of the girls being in L.D.’s care, the nature of

the relationship the girls had with L.D., the nature of the relationship between the girls

and L.D.’s other children, and the efforts made by L.D. which resulted in the designation

as a prospective adoptive parent.

       DPSS recommended that the girls be removed from L.D.’s care and that she no

longer be designated as the prospective adoptive parent for them. DPSS clarified that

only L.D. had been approved as the primary caretaker of the girls and not her husband.

L.D.’s husband was merely an approved adult in the home. DPSS requested that the girls

                                              7
be placed in a different prospective adoptive home. The girls visited with their half

siblings on a weekly basis with the exception of two missed visits. The siblings were

observed to be well-bonded and affectionate with one another. Visitation was

appropriate and beneficial for all the children.

        At a continued hearing on April 11, 2023, L.D.’s counsel explained that he had not

received the delivered services log and requested that the contested hearing on the

objection to removal be continued. The juvenile court continued the hearing to May 11,

2023.

        At the continued May 11, 2023, evidentiary hearing on the objection to removal,

L.D.’s counsel informed the juvenile court that he had not yet received the 12-month

delivered services log he had requested. Counsel stated that he believed the services logs

were probative “of what is going to transpire here as far as the objection to removal.”

L.D. was present and assisted by a Spanish language interpreter. The juvenile court

responded that it was not aware of the status of the request, that there was no guarantee

the request would have been granted, and that under the law it needed to proceed with the

hearing. The court thereafter heard testimony from the social worker and L.D.

        In relevant part, the social worker testified that there were no concerns regarding

L.D.’s care of the girls, the girls appeared to be closely bonded to L.D., and the girls

called L.D. “mom.” The social worker was aware that L.D.’s husband had moved out of

L.D.’s home in January 2023, and that he had been out of the home for six or seven

weeks when the notice of intent to remove was filed in March 2023. The social worker

                                              8
was not aware of any evidence that the girls or L.D.’s other children had been

inappropriately touched by L.D.’s husband. The girls’ current caretakers were still

deciding whether they wanted to adopt the girls. The social worker continued to

recommend that the girls be removed from L.D. due to their young ages, lack of verbal

skills, and their inability to advocate for themselves. The social worker did not believe

L.D. would take protective measures and that it was not in the girls’ best interest to be

placed back in L.D.’s care due to safety issues. The social worker explained that L.D.

had a pattern of not believing the allegations made by other children. If the juvenile court

allowed the girls to return to L.D., the social worker would want to ensure that L.D.’s

husband would not be allowed into the home or have contact with the girls. This could

be accomplished by implementing a restraining order which the social worker believed

would be enforced by L.D. The social worker was aware that L.D.’s husband was facing

serious criminal charges and that he was out on bail.

       L.D. testified that she had been operating the daycare for 14 years and notified the

licensing board of the disclosure by her niece “the same day.” The daycare was closed

from January 23 to January 30, 2023, and L.D. was allowed to reopen the daycare, but an

investigation was ongoing. She was still married, but her husband had not been allowed

back in the home since January 2023 and would not be allowed in her home. She was

receiving services to have her children returned to her care and was taking a class and

engaged in individual therapy. L.D. explained that a report concerning V.O.’s daughter

was not made because everyone believed it to be an accident and V.O. said not to report

                                             9
the allegations as V.O.’s children loved L.D.’s husband. L.D. remained on good terms

with V.O. L.D. explained that V.O.’s parents were the ones who wanted to change the

date of their daughter’s disclosure.

       L.D. did not report V.O.’s daughter’s December 2022 allegations to the licensing

board until the second allegation was received. She later sent a letter to the board that she

“did wrong.” L.D. denied asking V.O. for a written statement that G.N. had mental

health issues or telling her children that the allegations were not true. When L.D. learned

of the sexual abuse allegations, she contacted DPSS, the licensing board, and the parents

of the children attending her daycare. L.D. was willing to obtain a restraining order

against her husband and include the girls as protected persons on the order.

       L.D. testified that she did not know whether the allegations of inappropriate

touching by her husband were true. When the court inquired as to the allegations made

by G.N., L.D. did believe her niece, but she was waiting for the court’s ruling. L.D.

noted that her husband can move his arms one at a time and was able to put on a headset

with both hands if he was in a wheelchair.

       On May 15, 2023, following closing arguments, the juvenile court ordered the

girls removed from L.D.’s care. L.D. was no longer designated as the prospective

adoptive parent for the girls. The juvenile court determined that L.D. was not very

credible in her testimony. The court explained: “I don’t fault [L.D.] for wanting to

believe her husband, but I find that she was not very credible and forthcoming when

asked about the reporting, when she knew about the incident and the December incident

                                             10
and in her own investigation as to the December incident. And I found her being very

hesitant on the stand to actually take whatever position she wanted to take. The Court got

the impression she was trying to figure out what the right thing to say was as opposed to

what the true⸺her true statements were going to be. [¶] . . . [L.D.] was actually on notice

of impropriety in December when the parent of the child from daycare informed her.

Rather than taking any protective actions at that time, she had a phone call in which [her

husband] was involved. And it was apparently decided that it was an accident. She had a

duty to report. She did not report.” The court noted that L.D. attempted to conceal

reporting until she “basically had no choice” and believed L.D. would stand by her

husband. The court noted that it’s “concern is the safety and protection of the minors and

what’s in their best interest” and found that L.D. was not protective of the children. The

court explained that the girls lacked adequate verbal skills and they needed more

protection than the average child in foster care. The court had serious doubts that L.D.

would have had her husband move out had she not had the daycare. The court stated that

this was not about protecting her children and instead it was about protecting her

business. Accordingly, the court removed the girls from L.D.’s care and authorized one

supervised visit between the girls and L.D.

       L.D.’s counsel asked for a stay of proceedings so that L.D. could be apprised of

her appellate rights. The juvenile court advised the parties present of the right to appeal

the court’s order by filing a notice of appeal within 60 days of the date of the hearing.

                                              11
       On May 30, 2023, the juvenile court denied the petition for access to the juvenile

case file as to the girls. The court noted that the evidentiary hearing on the objection to

removal had already been conducted.

       On June 15, 2023, L.D.’s counsel filed a notice of appeal, indicating the appeal

was from the May 15, 2023, order on the objection to removal.

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       L.D. argues that the juvenile court erred when it proceeded with the contested

hearing to remove the girls from her home without allowing her attorney to obtain the

requested delivered services log and that she was denied her due process right to

adequately present evidence. She also asserts that her claims on appeal are cognizable on

appeal due to receiving inadequate instructions by the juvenile court and good cause

exists as to why she did not timely file a writ petition. DPSS responds that the appeal

should be dismissed because L.D. never filed a writ petition to challenge the order

removing the girls from her care. Alternatively, DPSS argues the juvenile court correctly

determined it was in the girls’ best interest to remove them from L.D.

       Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 366.26 generally provides for a hearing to

determine whether parental rights to a dependent child should be terminated.

Section 366.26, subdivision (n), provides that “at or after a hearing is held under

section 366.26, the juvenile court may, if specified conditions are met, designate the

       2 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise stated.

                                             12
child’s caretaker as a ‘prospective adoptive parent’. . . . [¶] Subdivision (n) further

provides that a [prospective adoptive parent] must be given notice and an opportunity to

object to any decision by a social services agency to remove a child from [their] home.

The [prospective adoptive parent] may then object to removal of the child from his or her

care. Upon receiving an objection from a [prospective adoptive parent], the juvenile

court must conduct a hearing and determine whether removal of the child from the

[prospective adoptive parent’s] home is in the best interest of the child.” (Wayne F. v.

Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1334.)

       A. Appealability

       We first examine whether the juvenile court’s order removing the girls from

L.D.’s custody is an appealable order. An order by the court issued after a hearing

pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (n), is not appealable except as provided in

subdivision (b) of section 366.28. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(5).) After parental rights have

been terminated, an order by the court that a dependent child is to be removed from a

specific placement is not appealable “unless all of the following apply: [¶] (A) A petition

for extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely manner. [¶] (B) The petition

substantively addressed the specific issues to be challenged and supported that challenge

by an adequate record. [¶] (C) The petition was summarily denied or otherwise not

decided on the merits.” (§ 366.28, subd. (b)(1).) The restrictions on appealability set

forth in section 366.28, subdivision (b), were prompted in part by the case of In re Harry

N. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1378, where the appeal took 18 months to resolve, at the end of

                                              13
which the child was removed from foster parents and placed with relatives, denying the

child the security of a permanent placement for over a year. (A.M. v. Superior Court

(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 506, 513 (A.M.), citing Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of

Sen. Bill No. 59 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2003, p. 1.)

       A party seeking writ relief must file a notice of intent to file a writ petition

within seven days after the post-termination placement order. (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 8.454(e)(4).) Because L.D. did not seek writ review within the period specified by

the rules of court, she is precluded from appealing the order removing the children.

(§ 366.28, subd. (b)(2).)

       We do have limited discretion to treat an unauthorized appeal as an extraordinary

writ. (A.M., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 515, citing Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390,

401 (Olson).) “Where all the conditions necessary for issuing a writ of mandate are

present, and a refusal to decide the issues raised by an improvident appeal would result in

unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous litigation, the court has the power to treat the appeal

as a petition for writ of mandate. [Citation.]” (In re Albert B. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d

361, 372-373, quoting Olson, at p. 401; see In re Ricky H. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 552,

563-564 [declining to treat defective appeal as a writ petition].)

       Applying the reasoning of Olson, in A.M., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th 506, this court

noted that the notice of appeal under consideration had been filed within the time limit

for filing a notice of intent to file a writ petition, that the record was adequate for

purposes of writ review, and the social services agency had responded on the merits

                                               14
without arguing for dismissal of the appeal. (Id. at pp. 515-516.) Thus, filing of the

notice of appeal within the time limit to file a notice of intent to file a writ petition and

acquiescence by the agency were factors taken into consideration.

         Here, unlike A.M., however, all of the conditions necessary for issuing a writ of

mandate are not present. L.D. was present at the hearing under section 366.26,

subdivision (n), so the time to file her notice of intent to file a writ petition was limited to

seven days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.454(e)(4).) Instead, the notice of appeal was

filed 31 days after the court made its removal order. Also, rather than acquiescing to

have the appeal treated as a petition for writ relief, DPSS has argued in its respondent’s

brief that the appeal should be dismissed because it seeks to challenge a non-appealable

order.

         Responding to L.D.’s argument and citing to In re Cathina W. (1998) 68

Cal.App.4th 716 (Cathina W.), DPSS further asserts that L.D. has provided no authority

that the current matter should be treated similarly to the situation where a parent is not

provided with notice of their right to file a writ petition to challenge an order setting a

section 366.26 hearing. In Cathina W., the Court of Appeal concluded the mother was

entitled to review of the juvenile court’s order setting the 366.26 hearing on appeal from

the subsequent order terminating her parental rights because the mother was not given an

oral or written writ advisement. (Cathina W., at pp. 722-725.) In that case, the mother

did not attend the hearing where the court set the 366.26 hearing. (Cathina W., at

pp. 722-723.) The court clerk belatedly mailed the advisement to the mother four days

                                               15
after the order setting the section 366.26 hearing and misstated the date of that order by

months, which effectively misinformed her of the deadline for filing the required notice

of intent to file a writ. (Cathina W., at pp. 722-723.) In addition, the written writ

advisement was returned to the court as undelivered with the mother’s new address and

the court clerk did not remail the notice to the mother at the new address. (Ibid.) The

court found that “the juvenile court, through no fault of the mother, failed to discharge its

duty to give her timely, correct notice, as required by [former] California Rules of Court,

rule 1462(c)(3)(I),” and under those circumstances, held relief was warranted. (Cathina

W., at p. 722.)

       The good cause argument does not aid L.D. Neither section 366.28 nor the

California Rules of Court implementing section 366.28 contain any mandate that the

juvenile court expressly advise the parties of the writ petition requirement. Therefore,

noncompliance with the section 366.28 writ requirement is not excused by the juvenile

court’s failure to give L.D. and her counsel such an advisement. (A.M., supra, 237

Cal.App.4th at pp. 514-515.) The fact that the juvenile court did not give writ notice

requirements to L.D. following the removal order at the May 15, 2023, hearing does not

constitute good cause for her failure to file a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition.

Because L.D. has not shown extraordinary circumstances warranting treating her

purported appeal as a petition for writ relief, her appeal must be dismissed.

                                               16
       B. Merits of L.D.’s Appeal

       Even if we were to reach the merits of L.D.’s arguments on appeal, she has not

shown the court’s decision to remove the girls from L.D.’s custody was an abuse of

discretion.

       As previously noted, section 366.26, subdivision (n), “provides for a hearing to

review an agency’s decision to remove a child from the home of a prospective adoptive

parent.” (State Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 273,

284.) If the removal is undertaken under emergency circumstances, to alleviate an

immediate risk of physical or emotional harm, the agency may remove the children prior

to holding the hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(4).) “The juvenile court has the authority

and responsibility to determine whether removal from the home of a prospective adoptive

parent is in the child’s best interests. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).) If a prospective

adoptive parent objects to the child’s removal from the home, [DPSS] must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that removal from the prospective adoptive parent is in the

child’s best interests. This standard applies whether [DPSS] has filed a notice of intent to

remove the child under section 366.26, subdivision (n)(3), and the child is still in the

home of the prospective adoptive parent, or [DPSS] has removed the child from the home

on an emergency basis under 366.26, subdivision (n)(4), as here. Under either

circumstance, the juvenile court determines whether the proposed removal of the child

from the home is in the child’s best interests, and the child may not be removed from the

                                             17
home unless the court makes that finding. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).)” (T.W. v.

Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 30, 45, italics omitted.)

       We review the juvenile court’s determination of the children’s best interest for

abuse of discretion, meaning we will not disturb the court’s ruling unless its decision is

arbitrary or capricious. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) A due

process claim is a legal question to be reviewed de novo. (In re A.B. (2014) 230

Cal.App.4th 1420, 1434.)

       Here, the juvenile court made an express finding based on the totality of the

information that it was not in the girls’ best interest to remain in the custody of L.D.

L.D. argues that due process required the juvenile court to permit her an opportunity to

present evidence, such as the delivered service logs, regarding the social worker’s

investigation and rebut the social worker’s testimony.

       “The essential characteristic of due process in the statutory dependency scheme is

fairness in the procedure employed by the state to adjudicate a parent’s rights.” (In re

James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255, 265.) “Due process guarantees ‘“notice and

opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”’” (In re Jesusa V. (2004)

32 Cal.4th 588, 601, italics omitted.) “But due process also is a flexible concept, whose

application depends on the circumstances and the balancing of various factors.” (Ingrid

E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 757.) Further, the “due process right to

present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue

before the court.” (In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 (Jeanette V.).)

                                             18
       According to L.D.’s petition for access to the juvenile case file, L.D.’s counsel

requested the delivered services log to show evidence of L.D.’s relationship and bond

with the girls, as well as the bonds formed between the girls and L.D.’s children. Despite

not having the delivered services log, the record shows that L.D. presented this type of

evidence at the contested removal hearing. Evidence of the girls’ relationship with L.D.

and her children was presented at the hearing. There was no dispute concerning L.D.’s

bond with the girls and the girls’ bond with L.D.’s children. There was also no dispute as

to L.D.’s care of the girls and their developmental and emotional progress while in L.D.’s

custody. Hence, the juvenile court did not deny L.D. due process by proceeding with the

removal hearing without the delivered services log because it did not rob the court of

“relevant evidence of significant probative value.” (Jeanette V., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at

p. 817.) In other words, there was no prejudice to L.D. in proceeding with the hearing

without the delivered services log or not providing the services log because evidence of

the relationship L.D. and her children had with the girls was entered into evidence.

       We reject L.D.’s claims on appeal that the delivered services log would provide

necessary information pertaining to the investigation, that the court’s finding that she was

not protective of the girls was not based on complete information, and that she was

prevented from presenting evidence regarding the social worker’s investigation and the

ability to rebut the social worker’s testimony. These reasons were not stated in her

petition for access to the juvenile case file or during the removal hearing. “A party may

not assert theories on appeal which were not raised in the trial court. [Citation.]” (In re

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Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222.) Furthermore, the fact that the social

worker who testified was not the social worker who investigated the allegations does not

mean an error occurred. The social worker who testified was the social worker L.D.’s

attorney called as a witness. L.D.’s counsel did not call as a witness the social worker

who conducted the investigation. Her attorney was not denied the opportunity to call

another social worker as a witness or precluded from calling the investigating social

worker as a witness. Moreover, evidence from the investigating social worker is in the

record.

       More importantly, the record shows that removing the girls from L.D.’s custody

was in their best interest. The social worker testified that she did not believe L.D. would

take protective measures and that L.D. had a pattern of not believing allegations made by

the other children. After G.N. made her disclosure, L.D. believed that something was

mentally wrong with G.N. and she did not believe the allegations against her husband.

She also excused away V.O.’s daughter’s disclosure by noting her husband’s medical

condition as a reason that it was just a misunderstanding or an accident. L.D. had also

discussed her husband’s criminal charges with her children and led them to believe that

the allegations were a lie. Furthermore, L.D. did not report the December 2022

allegations made by V.O.’s daughter until she “basically had no choice,” as noted by the

juvenile court. In addition, L.D.’s husband was released on bail and there were concerns

that L.D. would allow unmonitored access to the children without DPSS’s intervention.

The totality of the circumstances demonstrated that there were safety concerns for the

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girls and that it was not in their best interest to remain in L.D.’s custody. On this record,

if we were not dismissing the appeal, we would affirm because the court’s removal order

was not an abuse of discretion and there was no due process violation by proceeding with

the removal hearing without the delivered services log.

                                             IV.

                                       DISPOSITION

       The appeal is dismissed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                 CODRINGTON
                                                                                            J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.

FIELDS
                           J.

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