Court Opinion

ID: 9676880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:36:50.81003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:52.063212
License: Public Domain

KOEHLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. All of Cooper’s defensive pleadings were to the effect that though he was not disputing items in the account itself, he did not owe the amount claimed by Scott for the reason that the materials and workmanship were defective. Cooper’s assertions3 were affirmative defenses since, if supported by evidence, they would establish independent reasons why Scott should not recover rather than tend to rebut the factual propositions asserted in Scott’s claim. An affirmative defense usually accepts the existence at one time or another of a prima fade case but alleges propositions which, if established, would defeat the claim. 2 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 7.34.1 (1982). See Bracton Corporation v. Evans Construction Company, 784 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ); W.R. Grace Company v. Scotch Corporation, Inc., 753 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex.App. — Austin 1988, writ denied).
Although a defendant who fails to file a sworn denial that meets the requirements of Rule 185 is not permitted to dispute the receipt of the items or the services, or the correctness of the charges stated in the account, he is not prevented from defend*748ing on other grounds raised by his pleadings. Rizk v. Financial Guardian Insurance Agency, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex.1979); Wauson and Williams, Architects, Inc. v. Reeder Development Corporation, 572 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Airborne Freight Corporation v. CRB Marketing, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex.1978); DeWees v. Alsip, 546 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1977, no writ); 2 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 7.31 (1982). Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court was correct in finding that Scott had established a prima facie case on its sworn account, it erred by granting the summary judgment on the whole case, thus denying Cooper the right to a trial on his defensive theories.4
Accordingly, I would reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause for trial on the merits of Cooper’s affirmative defenses for a reconsideration of the attorney’s fees, if any, to be awarded to Scott.

. Cooper’s defensive pleadings are similar in effect to a plea of partial failure of consideration or a plea of confession and avoidance. They could well have been pled as counterclaims rather than as affirmative defenses.

. We agree with the logic of Chief Justice Osborn’s reasoning in his opinion, to the effect that if the goods or services were defective at the time they were sold or delivered, then a defendant must attack the sworn account itself by filing an appropriate sworn denial. A plain reading of Rule 185 would seem to support this result. A plaintiff in a sworn account suit swears that the claim is "just and true, that it is due, and that all just and lawful offsets, payments and credits have been allowed...." When an answering defendant pleads an affirmative defense such as accord and satisfaction, failure of consideration, limitations or any other matter constituting an avoidance (Rule 94), he may not be contesting the accuracy of the account or the receipt of the items or services, but he is certainly saying the account is either not just or true or that it is not due. Yet, the courts in the cases cited in both the opinion and dissent have held that defenses such as accord and satisfaction, faitee of consideration, payment and limitations can be raised in spite of the failure of the defendant to file a proper sworn denial. Cooper’s defenses of breach of warranty and negligence are similar to defenses of failure of consideration or confession and avoidance.