Court Opinion

ID: 9781084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:06:30.825993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:46.798188
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1902
                             Filed August 30, 2023

JERRIN MICHAEL CROWELL,
     Petitioner-Appellee,

vs.

MELISSA LEILANI BONILLA,
     Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price, Judge.

      A mother appeals the district court’s award of physical care of her child to

the father. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO DETERMINE

ATTORNEY FEES.

      Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West

Des Moines, for appellant.

      Jamie Hunter of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for

appellee.

      Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       Melissa Bonilla appeals a district court order placing physical care of her

child, L.E.B., with the child’s father, Jerrin Crowell. We affirm the district court,

relying in part on the adverse credibility findings made against Melissa by multiple

judicial officers in Iowa and California, and remand for the limited purpose of the

district court ordering Melissa to pay Jerrin’s reasonable appellate attorney fees,

not to exceed $5000.

       I.     Background Facts & Proceedings

       Jerrin and Melissa met in California around 2017 or 2018 and moved to

Iowa just before the birth of the child in 2020, to reside with Jerrin’s family. There

is some dispute as to what happened immediately before the child’s birth, but the

record establishes Melissa flew back to California days before giving birth, the child

was born in California, and then both Melissa and the child returned to Iowa for

several weeks after. Melissa then returned to California on her own initiative, and

Jerrin filed a petition in Iowa for custody, visitation, and support.

       Jerrin and his family primarily live in Iowa, while Melissa and her family

primarily live in California. At the time of trial, Jerrin was attending barber school

and resided alone in a home owned by his mother. Melissa was employed at a

furniture and decorations store and also lived in her mother’s home.

       A jurisdictional hearing was held on Jerrin’s petition to resolve a dispute

over whether the action belonged in Iowa or California. After that hearing, the Iowa

district court expressly found Melissa “fail[ed] to serve as a credible witness,” in

part due to concerns she forged documents or otherwise perpetrated fraud while

applying for public benefits.
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       A subsequent temporary-matters order granted joint legal custody and

provided for alternating three-week periods of parenting time. When Melissa

exercised parenting time, she did not involve Jerrin in parenting decisions or

activities, like medical check-ups. When Jerrin exercised parenting time, Melissa

repeatedly called for welfare checks and made unsubstantiated allegations of child

abuse. Melissa expressed concerns about Jerrin’s family, opining she did not want

her child around “those type of people.”

       While the temporary-matters order was in effect, Melissa and Jerrin stayed

together at a hotel in California where, at one point, Jerrin was taken by ambulance

to a hospital. The parties dispute what happened before the ambulance arrived:

Melissa claims Jerrin overdosed on drugs, while Jerrin claims he passed out from

a pill that Melissa gave him. In any event, Jerrin left the hospital without receiving

treatment.   Melissa reported to authorities that Jerrin had overdosed, which

prompted a child-welfare proceeding in California, a temporary stay of the Iowa

proceedings, and a temporary reduction in Jerrin’s parenting time. The California

court found there was “absolutely nothing before the court” to prove Jerrin was

abusing drugs, and the court ordered the parties to follow the three-week rotating

schedule of parenting time set by the Iowa court.

       Next, Melissa petitioned for a protective order in California, citing Jerrin’s

alleged drug overdose and making new allegations of domestic abuse. Melissa

attempted to include the child in the scope of the protective order and asked for a

five-year term. The California court denied the petition after a contested hearing,

specifically finding Jerrin “credible” and Melissa “not credible.”
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       A contested custody trial was held in Iowa. Melissa represented herself.

After hearing witness testimony, the district court granted the parties joint legal

custody and granted physical care to Jerrin with parenting time for Melissa. The

ruling repeatedly cited Melissa’s lack of credibility in its rationale, noting even

Melissa’s own exhibits could not corroborate her version of the facts on key events

like a recent disputed custody exchange. Melissa appeals.

       II.    Standard of Review

       Our review of matters involving child custody and care is de novo. Thorpe

v. Hostetler, 949 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). “We review the entire record

and decide anew the factual and legal issues preserved and presented for review.”

Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). While we are not

bound by the fact-findings of the district court, we give them weight, especially to

credibility determinations. Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 5.

       III.   Discussion

       Melissa argues the district court should have placed the child in her physical

care rather than Jerrin’s. She emphasizes her version of events regarding drug

use and domestic violence and that she was the primary historical caregiver for

the child. Alternatively, Melissa requests an increase in parenting time from the

district court’s order, returning to the three-week alternating schedule.

       In deciding an issue of child custody and care under chapter 600B, the

controlling consideration is the best interests of the child. Hensch, 902 N.W.2d at

824; Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o); see also In re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d

611, 614 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). In determining physical care, this court considers

several factors, including those set out in Iowa Code section 598.41(3) and In re
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Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974).               See Iowa Code

§ 600B.40(1) (providing “section 598.41 shall apply” to chapter 600B proceedings);

Stanley v. Winters, No. 22-1552, 2023 WL 2396539, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8,

2023). The overall objective in determining physical care is to promote the child’s

physical health, mental health, and social maturity. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733

N.W.2d 683, 700 (Iowa 2007). “The critical issue is which parent will do better in

raising the child.” In re Marriage of Burkle, 525 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Iowa Ct. App.

1994).

         Taking into account these objectives and considerations, we affirm the

placement of physical care with Jerrin. We agree with the rationales expressed by

the district court’s ruling, which emphasized which parent would support the child’s

relationship with the other and which parent could best support the child’s

development.     Throughout the lifetime of this case, Melissa repeatedly made

unsubstantiated accusations against Jerrin. This behavior, coupled with Melissa’s

refusal to include Jerrin in parenting decisions and the difficulties she caused at

parenting-time exchanges, speaks loudly to her unwillingness to co-parent. See

Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(e). In contrast, the district court found (based in part on

credibility findings) that Jerrin “is willing and able to foster a positive relationship

between L.E.B. and her mother and extended family.” We respect and defer to

that finding. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 703. We also agree with the district court

that Jerrin would be more likely to provide a stable home for the child and that his

extended family will help nurture and support the child’s development. See id. at

700; Winter, 223 N.W.2d at 166.
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        As to Melissa’s argument that she should receive physical care based on

her allegations of Jerrin’s drug abuse and domestic violence, these allegations rest

almost entirely on testimony from Melissa’s trial witnesses—in other words, from

Melissa herself and, to a lesser extent, from her relatives. As the district court

noted, even before the custody trial, two different judges (one in Iowa and one in

California) and one commissioner (in California) found Melissa was not credible.

A fourth judge found her not credible in the ruling that led to this appeal. We defer

to these findings, particularly given that Melissa’s apparent dishonesty has

stretched across multiple case types and jurisdictions. See Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d

at 5.

        The record generally supports Melissa’s contention that she was the

primary caregiver for the child, but we recognize this was largely a consequence

of Melissa taking the child back to California on her own initiative. While we afford

some weight to the parent who historically acted as the child’s primary caregiver,

this factor is not dispositive. See Eviglo v. Bedia, No. 22-2108, 2023 WL 4530263,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 13, 2023); Flick v. Stoneburner, No. 15-1930, 2016 WL

2743449, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016). We agree with the district court that

other factors outweigh Melissa’s historical caregiving, and we affirm.

        Having rejected Melissa’s request to overturn the physical-care ruling, we

turn to her request to return to an alternating three-week schedule for parenting

time. We agree with the district court that the distance between Iowa and California

renders this schedule unworkable in the long-term, and we find it would be

detrimental to the child’s physical health, mental health, and social maturity—

particularly as the child nears school age. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 700; see
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also Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(h). We affirm the parenting plan adopted by the district

court.

         Last, Jerrin contends he should be awarded appellate attorney fees. An

award of appellate attorney fees in favor of the prevailing parting is within our

discretion, see Iowa Code § 600B.26, and “we consider the needs of the party

making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party

making the request was obligated to defend the decision of the trial court on

appeal.” Hensch, 902 N.W.2d at 827. Jerrin has accumulated a large bill for two

years of litigation, was obligated to defend the district court’s ruling, and has

prevailed over all issues raised in this appeal. On the other hand, Melissa’s income

appears to be relatively limited, though we credit Jerrin’s argument Melissa may

have recently received a cash settlement and has been generally dishonest

(including about her earning capacity). Weighing these competing interests, we

believe Melissa should be required to pay some amount toward Jerrin’s appellate

attorney fees. Unfortunately, Jerrin’s appellate attorney has not filed a fee affidavit

with our court, which frustrates our ability to award fees without additional litigation

on remand.

         We urge that, in future cases, parties seeking appellate attorney fees should

timely file itemized fee affidavits that allow us to exercise our discretion without

requiring an additional remand to the district court. Because no appellate-attorney

fee affidavit is before us, we remand to the district court for the limited purpose of

determining reasonable appellate attorney fees, not to exceed $5000, as

determined by the district court following a hearing or review of filed fee affidavits.
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       IV.    Disposition

       We affirm the physical-care ruling and remand with directions for the district

court to order Melissa to pay Jerrin’s reasonable appellate attorney fees, not to

exceed $5000, following a hearing or review of filed fee affidavits.

       AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO DETERMINE

ATTORNEY FEES.