Court Opinion

ID: 9896614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 21:05:09.299064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.979441
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION FOUR

 NELSON CHAVEZ ZEPEDA,
        Petitioner,
 v.
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE                   A166159
 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
 FRANCISCO,                                  (City & County of San Francisco
                                             Super. Ct. No. 21001875)
        Respondent;

 THE PEOPLE,
        Real Party in Interest.

       This case presents several questions about Senate Bill No. 567 (2020–
2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567). Senate Bill 567 amended Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) (section 1170(b)(2)) 1 to provide that, when a
statute specifies three possible terms of imprisonment, the trial court cannot
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless it finds that a longer
sentence is justified by “circumstances in aggravation of the crime” and “the
facts underlying those circumstances” have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury at
trial. Before Senate Bill 567, under the sentencing scheme in place
since 2007, trial judges had the discretion to impose the lower, middle, or

       1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
upper term of imprisonment based on their own assessment of which term
best served the interests of justice, without making any factual findings. We
are asked to decide the following issues:
      First, does the phrase “circumstances in aggravation” in
section 1170(b)(2) refer to the factors listed in California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421 (rule 4.421), promulgated by the Judicial Council? Put another
way, did the Legislature intend to delegate authority to the Judicial Council
to define what constitutes circumstances in aggravation for the purpose of the
jury’s consideration under section 1170(b)(2)?
      Second, if the Legislature did so intend, does such a delegation of
authority violate the separation of powers or the nondelegation doctrine?
      Third, are the aggravating circumstances in rule 4.421
unconstitutionally vague for use by a jury because they contain undefined
qualitative terms like “particularly vulnerable,” or “serious danger to society”
(see rule 4.421(a)(3), (b)(1)) and require the jury to determine whether such
an aggravating circumstance makes the commission of the offense
“ ‘distinctively worse than the ordinary’ ”? (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th
799, 817 (Black).)
      Fourth, must the factual allegations supporting the aggravating
circumstances be supported by evidence at the preliminary hearing, and if so,
were they supported by the evidence here?
      We conclude that the phrase “circumstances in aggravation” does refer
to the factors listed in rule 4.421, and that the Legislature has not violated
the separation of powers by doing so. With respect to vagueness, although we
reject the People’s argument that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not
apply to aggravating circumstances, we find that the use of qualitative terms
and the requirement that an aggravating circumstance make the commission

                                        2
of the offense distinctively worse does not render the factors in rule 4.421
unconstitutionally vague. Finally, we conclude that the factual allegations
supporting the aggravating circumstances do not need to be supported by
evidence at the preliminary hearing.

                                   BACKGROUND
      Petitioner Nelson Chavez Zepeda was charged in a felony complaint
with the following five counts: (1) meeting a minor for lewd purposes
(§ 288.4, subd. (b)); (2) arranging a meeting with a minor for lewd purposes
(§ 288.4, subd. (a)(1)); (3) sending harmful matter to a minor (§ 288.2,
subd. (a)(2)); (4) contacting a minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense
(§ 288.3, subd. (a)); and (5) committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288,
subd. (a)). Chavez Zepeda is the minor’s uncle.
      On June 16, 2021, the trial court held a preliminary hearing.
Following testimony and evidence, the court dismissed count 5 and held
Chavez Zepeda to answer on the remaining four counts. An information was
thereafter filed on these four counts. On January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 567’s
amendments to section 1170(b)(2) took effect.
      In response to amended section 1170(b)(2), the prosecution filed a
motion to amend the information to allege various aggravating factors listed
in rule 4.421. Those factors were that: (1) the victim was particularly
vulnerable; (2) Chavez Zepeda was convicted of other crimes for which
consecutive sentences could have been imposed but for which concurrent
sentences are being imposed; (3) the manner in which the crime was carried
out indicates planning, sophistication, or professionalism; (4) Chavez Zepeda
took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense; and
(5) Chavez Zepeda has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society. (Rule 4.421(a)(3), (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(11), (b)(1).)

                                          3
Chavez Zepeda opposed and the trial court granted the motion. At the
hearing on the motion, the court noted that “[n]othing in this decision
deprives the defendant from bringing a 995 motion.” Chavez Zepeda waived
arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and denied the allegations in the
amended information.
      On August 1, 2022, Chavez Zepeda filed a motion to set aside the
aggravating factors under section 995. The motion argued that aggravating
factors must be supported by evidence at a preliminary hearing and were not
supported by sufficient evidence in this case. The motion further argued that
borrowing aggravating factors from rule 4.421 violates the separation of
powers clause under the California Constitution because they were drafted by
the Judicial Council for use by trial judges and were not meant for use by
juries. The motion included a brief argument that Chavez Zepeda was also
demurring to the aggravating factors “on the ground that they do not state a
public offense” as the factors under rule 4.421 were not authorized by statute.
      The prosecution opposed the motion on the grounds that
(1) aggravating factors are not required to be proved at a preliminary
hearing; (2) sufficient evidence supported the aggravating factors at issue
here in any event; and (3) use of rule 4.421 by a jury does not violate the
separation of powers.
      Following oral argument, the trial court denied Chavez Zepeda’s
motion and overruled his demurrer. The court was persuaded by the holding
in Barragan v. Superior Court (2017) 148 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1485 (Barragan),
which concluded that aggravating factors did not need to be supported by
evidence at a preliminary hearing because they were not equivalent to
statutory enhancements. The court further held that even if it was incorrect

                                       4
on this point, the aggravating factors were supported by the evidence at the
preliminary hearing here.
      Chavez Zepeda filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition to
direct the trial court to set aside its order and issue a new order granting his
motion and sustaining the demurrer, or to refrain from further proceedings
against Chavez Zepeda with respect to the charged aggravating factors. We
issued an order for the People to show cause why the relief requested should
not be granted.
                                  DISCUSSION
      I.    Standard of Review
      “Penal Code section 995 allows a defendant to challenge an information
based on the sufficiency of the record made before the magistrate at the
preliminary hearing. [Citation.] In reviewing the denial of a Penal Code
section 995 motion to set aside an information, we ‘in effect disregard[] the
ruling of the superior court and directly review[] the determination of the
magistrate holding the defendant to answer.’ ” (Lexin v. Superior Court
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1071–1072 (Lexin).) Where the issue raised in the
petition presents a pure question of law, our review is de novo. (People v.
Superior Court (Ferguson) (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1529.)
      “Insofar as [the motion] rests on consideration of the evidence adduced,
we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the information [citations]
and decide whether there is probable cause to hold the defendants to answer,
i.e., whether the evidence is such that ‘a reasonable person could harbor a
strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Lexin, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 1072.)

                                        5
      II.   History of Section 1170 — Three Sentencing Schemes
      In evaluating the arguments in this case, it will be helpful to bear in
mind three distinct phases in the evolution of section 1170. The first began
in 1977 when the determinate sentencing law (§ 1170 et seq.) (DSL) went into
effect, replacing California’s system of indeterminate sentences with “a
system of specification of three possible terms of imprisonment for each
offense.” (People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 709 (Wright).) To
implement this system, section 1170, subdivision (b) provided that “ ‘the court
shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.’ ” (Ibid. [quoting former § 1170,
subd. (b)].) Under this version of section 1170, the trial court was to
determine aggravating and mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of
the evidence. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 836 (Sandoval).)
The DSL directed the Judicial Council to “seek to promote uniformity in
sentencing” by “[t]he adoption of rules providing criteria for the consideration
of the trial judge at the time of sentencing regarding the court’s decision to
. . . [¶] (2) Impose the lower, middle, or upper prison term.” (§ 1170.3,
subdivision (a); see Wright, at p. 709.) Among the results of that delegation
of authority was what is now rule 4.421, entitled “Circumstances in
aggravation.” Rule 4.421(a) lists “[f]actors relating to the crime”;
rule 4.421(b) lists “[f]actors relating to the defendant,” and rule 4.421(c)
provides for consideration of “[a]ny other factors statutorily declared to be
circumstances in aggravation or which reasonably relate to the defendant or
the circumstances under which the crime was committed.”
      In 2007, the United States Supreme Court found this sentencing
scheme unconstitutional on the ground that “under the Sixth Amendment,
any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be

                                        6
found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not
merely by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Cunningham v. California
(2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281 (Cunningham).) The Legislature responded by
amending section 1170 to give “trial judges broad discretion in selecting a
term within a statutory range, thereby eliminating the requirement of a
judge-found factual finding to impose an upper term. [Citations.] SB 40
amended section 1170 so that (1) the middle term is no longer the
presumptive term absent aggravating or mitigating facts found by the trial
judge; and (2) a trial judge has the discretion to impose an upper, middle or
lower term based on reasons he or she states.” (People v. Wilson (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 988, 992.) Under section 1170, subdivision (b) as amended,
sentencing courts were to determine which of the three possible terms of
imprisonment “ ‘best serve[d] the interests of justice.’ ” (Wilson, at p. 992.)
      Most recently, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to
make the middle term the maximum that may be imposed absent additional
findings. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) To comply with Cunningham,
section 1170(b)(2) now provides that a court may impose the upper term only
if “there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” In its analysis of Senate Bill 567, the
Senate Committee on Public Safety noted that the bill’s proponents “argue
that this change is necessary to ensure that harsher sentences receive the
greatest scrutiny and justification before they are imposed,” and that “[b]y
allowing aggravating factors to be submitted to the factfinder, defendants
will be better able to dispute the information on the record that may not be

                                        7
true.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) Apr. 13, 2021, p. 4 (Sen. Com. Analysis).) 2
      III.   Separation of Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine
      Chavez Zepeda’s argument based on the separation of powers and the
nondelegation doctrine raises a threshold question about how to interpret the
phrase “circumstances in aggravation” in section 1170(b)(2)—specifically,
whether it refers to the aggravating factors listed in rule 4.421(a) and (b). He
contends that our interpretation of the statute should be guided by the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which provides that “a statute should
not be construed to violate the Constitution ‘ “ ‘if any other possible
construction remains available.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792,
804.) Arguing that it would raise serious separation-of-powers concerns if
section 1170(b)(2) referred to the factors in rule 4.421, Chavez Zepeda points
out that “the Legislature has enacted dozens of statutory aggravating factors,
some tied to individual offenses, and some with much wider applicability,”
many of which use the phrase “circumstance in aggravation” and refer
expressly to subdivision (b) of section 1170. These statutory aggravating
factors present no separation-of-powers problem because the Legislature

      2 After Cunningham was decided, our state Supreme Court held that

the jury need find only one aggravating circumstance true in order to
authorize imposition of the upper term, at which point the sentencing court
was free to make additional factual determinations concerning aggravating
circumstances in the exercise of its discretion in selecting the appropriate
term from among those authorized. (Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 815–
816.) Senate Bill 567, however, effectively prohibits the court from relying on
any aggravating circumstance that has not been found true by the jury,
unless it falls within the exception in section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), which
allows the court to “consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury.”

                                        8
itself has enacted them, so Chavez Zepeda argues that we should construe
the phrase “circumstances in aggravation” to refer only to statutory
aggravators and not to the additional factors listed in rule 4.421.
      We do not find it appropriate to resolve the issue this way. As
discussed below, the Legislature clearly intended to refer to the aggravating
factors listed in rule 4.421 by the phrase “circumstances in aggravation,” and
it did not violate the separation of powers or the nondelegation doctrine by
doing so. Because we see no ambiguity in the statute, we likewise reject the
suggestion by Chavez Zepeda’s amici that we should adopt Chavez Zepeda’s
construction under the rule of lenity, which “ ‘ “generally requires that
‘ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving
the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of
interpretation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972, 989.)

         A. Section 1170 Refers to Rule 4.421’s Aggravating Factors
      “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental
task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them
a plain and commonsense meaning.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
136, 142.) “If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for
construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the
Legislature.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) However,
“[t]he meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or
sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to
the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.
[Citation.] Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the
legislative intent apparent in the statute. The intent prevails over the letter,
and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the

                                         9
act.” (Ibid.)
      Rule 4.421 (formerly rule 421) has been in place since 1977. Its title is
“Circumstances in aggravation.” It would be remarkable for the Legislature
to use the phrase “circumstances in aggravation” in section 1170(b)(2),
without further elaboration, if it did not intend to include the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in rule 4.421. We presume that the Legislature
acts against the backdrop of all governing law, and in using the identical
phrasing that the Judicial Council did when addressing same topic, we do not
believe it is reasonable to view the Legislature’s choice of phrasing as a
coincidence. While Chavez Zepeda is correct that there are also many
statutory aggravating factors to which section 1170(b)(2) refers, he identifies
no basis to conclude that the Legislature determined when it enacted Senate
Bill 567 that those statutory aggravating factors alone were adequate to
achieve the goal of uniformity in sentencing or that judicial consideration of
the aggravating circumstances in rule 4.421 was no longer warranted.
      Undermining any such hypothesis is the fact that Senate Bill 567 left
in place the language in section 1170, subdivision (a)(3), which tells courts to
apply the factors in rule 4.421. That subdivision requires courts to sentence
the defendant to “one of the terms of imprisonment specified” when the
statute specifies “three time periods,” i.e., a lower, middle, and upper term.
(§ 1170, subd. (a)(3).) The next sentence reads: “In sentencing the convicted
person, the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council.”
(Id., italics added.) Chavez Zepeda does not dispute that the italicized phrase
includes the aggravating factors in rule 4.421, but argues that this language
falls short of an express legislative authorization for the Judicial Council to
come up with factors for use by juries.
      Accepting Chavez Zepeda’s argument, however, would effectively

                                       10
nullify the provision that courts must apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council. Under the amendments to section 1170(b)(2), sentencing
courts cannot apply rule 4.421’s aggravating factors unless the jury has first
made findings with respect to them. Chavez Zepeda argues that the factors
in rule 4.421 may still be relied on in a court trial, or in sentencing on a
guilty plea if the defendant has stipulated to them, and that they merely
“have no applicability to jury trials.” But this construction is inconsistent
with the statutory text because there is no carveout in section 1170,
subdivision (a)(3) for jury trials. Reading subdivision (a)(3) together with
subdivision (b)(2) compels the conclusion that the Legislature intended that
juries would now make findings on the aggravating circumstances in
rule 4.421.
       The legislative history of Senate Bill 567 further supports this
conclusion. The report by the Senate Committee on Public Safety explained
that the California Rules of Court provide a “non-exhaustive list of
circumstances in aggravation and mitigation for purposes of sentencing,” and
quoted all the factors enumerated in rule 4.421. (Sen. Com. Analysis, pp. 5–
6.) The fact that the report expressly referred to rule 4.421 is strong evidence
that the Legislature had that rule in mind when it referred to “circumstances
in aggravation.”
      Chavez Zepeda points out that Senate Bill 567 left unchanged the
original grant of authority in section 1170.3, subdivision (a), which says that
“[t]he Judicial Council shall seek to promote uniformity in sentencing” by
“[t]he adoption of rules providing criteria for the consideration of the trial
judge at the time of sentencing.” (Italics added.) But for the reasons
discussed above, we find that section 1170(b)(2) unambiguously conveys the
Legislature’s intent to have the jury make findings about the truth of

                                        11
aggravating factors in rule 4.421, and it necessarily follows from that intent
that the Legislature also intended to provide the Judicial Council with the
authority to promulgate aggravating factors that the jury would be asked to
consider. The statute thus provides the necessary “indication” that the
Legislature intended to delegate authority for that purpose. (See People v.
Figueroa (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415 (Figueroa); cf. Coastside Fishing
Club v. California Resources Agency (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1205
[Legislature may lay down test or standard for the exercise of delegated
authority “expressly or by implication”].) Moreover, rule 4.421 still does
provide “criteria for the consideration of the trial judge at the time of
sentencing,” and the legislative history discussed above indicates that the
Legislature saw the jury’s findings as a way to improve the reliability of the
court’s sentencing decisions.
      Lastly, Chavez Zepeda invokes Sandoval’s observation that the factors
in rule 4.421 “were drafted for the purpose of guiding judicial discretion and
not for the purpose of requiring factual findings by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 849.) The court’s
account of the genesis of the rule, however, does not call into question our
conclusion about the Legislature’s intent in Senate Bill 567. When Sandoval
was decided, the Legislature had just amended its sentencing scheme in
response to Cunningham to give trial judges the discretion to impose the
lower, middle, or upper term without having to make factual findings.
(Sandoval, at pp. 843–844.) The question before the court was what remedy
to apply to a sentence imposed in violation of Cunningham in a case on direct
appeal when it was unclear whether the Legislature intended the new
scheme to apply to resentencing hearings. (Id. at p. 845.) In explaining why
it selected the alternative that the Legislature itself had just chosen, the

                                        12
court observed that “engrafting a jury trial onto the sentencing process
established in the former DSL would significantly complicate and distort the
sentencing scheme.” (Id. at p. 848.) Sandoval did not hold, however, that the
more complicated alternative of having the jury make findings about
aggravating circumstances would be impermissible, and indeed, it observed
that “such a process would comply with the constitutional requirements of
Cunningham.” (Ibid.) After roughly a decade and a half of permitting courts
to exercise their discretion to choose any of the three sentencing terms, the
Legislature opted, as described by Senate Bill 567’s proponents, “to ensure
that harsher sentences receive the greatest scrutiny and justification before
they are imposed,” requiring jury findings of aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Sen. Com. Analysis, p. 4.) Notwithstanding the
concerns Sandoval expressed regarding this then-hypothetical scheme, in
Senate Bill 567 the Legislature chose to have juries consider the aggravating
circumstances in rule 4.421.

         B. The Jury’s Consideration of the Aggravating
            Circumstances in Rule 4.421 Does Not Violate the
            Separation of Powers or the Nondelegation Doctrine

      Having concluded that the phrase “circumstances in aggravation” in
section 1170(b)(2) includes the factors listed in rule 4.421, we now consider
whether it violates the separation of powers or the nondelegation doctrine.
“The California Constitution establishes a system of state government in
which power is divided among three coequal branches (Cal. Const., art. IV,
§ 1 [legislative power]; Cal. Const., art. V, § 1 [executive power]; Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 1 [judicial power]), and further states that those charged with the
exercise of one power may not exercise any other (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3).”
(People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 14.) Though the branches share “a
certain degree of mutual oversight and influence,” they are vested “with

                                        13
certain ‘core’ [citation] or ‘essential’ [citation] functions that may not be
usurped by another branch.” (Ibid.) As relevant here, “[t]he legislative
branch defines those crimes that can be charged, the executive branch
decides what crimes to charge, and the judicial branch decides whether to
sustain those charges.” (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537,
592 (Manduley).) The power to “ ‘fix penalties’ ” is also “ ‘vested exclusively in
the legislative branch.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497, 516.)
        “The legislative branch of government, although it is charged with the
formulation of policy, properly may delegate some quasi-legislative or
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies.” (Carmel Valley Fire
Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 299.) While the
Legislature may not “confer[] upon an administrative agency unrestricted
authority to make fundamental policy decisions,” the nondelegation doctrine
“does not invalidate reasonable grants of power to an administrative agency,
when suitable safeguards are established to guide the power’s use and to
protect against misuse. [Citations.] The Legislature must make the
fundamental policy determinations, but after declaring the legislative goals
and establishing a yardstick guiding the administrator, it may authorize the
administrator to adopt rules and regulations to promote the purposes of the
legislation and to carry it into effect.” (Wright, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 712–
713.)
        Chavez Zepeda argues that the use of non-statutory aggravating factors
by a jury violates the separation of powers doctrine because only the
Legislature and not the Judicial Council may decide what facts trigger an
upper term sentence. He also argues that interpreting section 1170(b)(2) to
include non-statutory aggravating factors would “give prosecutors the

                                        14
unchecked power to draft aggravating factors,” especially given rule 4.421(c)’s
residual clause, which provides for the consideration of “[a]ny other factors
. . . that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which
the crime was committed.” We have no occasion to consider the second
argument here, however, because in this case the People did not use the
residual clause to propose aggravating factors beyond those specifically
enumerated in the rule. Accordingly, we do not address whether the residual
clause presents any separation-of-powers or nondelegation problem.
      In deciding whether the Legislature’s delegation of authority to the
Judicial Council to draft the aggravating factors that appear in rule 4.421 is
improper, we do not write on a clean slate. In Wright, the California
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Judicial Council’s adoption of
rule 4.421 represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It
first pointed to the language in Article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution that the Judicial Council may “perform other functions
prescribed by statute.” (Wright, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 711, italics omitted.)
The court then held that in enacting the DSL, “the Legislature made the
fundamental policy decision that terms were to be fixed by choosing one of
the alternatives on the basis of circumstances relating to the crime and to the
defendant. [Citations.] The Legislature directed the Judicial Council to
adopt rules establishing criteria for imposing the upper or lower terms in
order to promote uniformity.” (Id. at p. 713.) In the court’s view, the Judicial
Council was permissibly implementing legislative policy. (Ibid.)
      Our Supreme Court decided Wright in 1982, when trial courts were
required to impose the middle term unless they found circumstances either in
mitigation or aggravation of the crime. (Wright, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 709,
713–714.) The question, then, is whether requiring the jury to find

                                       15
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt changes the analysis. Certain
arguments can be rejected at the outset because they are not implicated by
the additional role assigned to the jury. The People argue, for example, that
the nondelegation doctrine does not apply because the Judicial Council is not
an administrative agency, but this argument is inconsistent with Wright,
which found that rule 4.421 was a permissible delegation of authority under
the law pertaining to administrative agencies. (Id. at p. 712.) Chavez
Zepeda, for his part, argues that we cannot avoid the nondelegation problem
by finding that section 1170 incorporates by reference the existing factors in
rule 4.421 because the Judicial Council may amend it, conceivably adding
new factors or revising existing ones. We agree that any nondelegation
problem cannot be avoided in that way, but note that the fact that rule 4.421
is potentially subject to revision was also true when Wright was decided.
      Chavez Zepeda’s first argument for distinguishing Wright is one we
have already rejected. While the Supreme Court relied on the language in
Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution granting the Judicial
Council authority to “perform other functions prescribed by statute,” and
found that condition satisfied by section 1170.3, subdivision (a)(2) (Wright,
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 713), Chavez Zepeda argues that there is no statute
granting the Judicial Council authority to adopt aggravating factors for
consideration by the jury as opposed to by the court at sentencing. As
discussed above, reading section 1170(b)(2) together with section 1170.3,
subdivision (a)(2), we find the grant of authority to the Judicial Council in the
new sentencing scheme sufficiently clear.
      Second, Chavez Zepeda and his amici argue that such a statutory
delegation is impermissible because “ ‘ “the power to define crimes and fix
penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.” ’ ” (Manduley,

                                       16
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 552; see also Figueroa, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1415 [“Only the Legislature, not an administrative body, may determine
what conduct is unlawful and the penalty for the unlawful conduct”].) “The
underpinnings of this nondelegation rule include the constitutional provision
vesting legislative power in the Legislature, which requires the Legislature to
make fundamental policy decisions.” (Figueroa, at p. 1415.) Although Wright
did not expressly consider an argument that the aggravating factors in
rule 4.421 fixed penalties, it held that in “[c]hanging from the system of
indeterminate sentences to determinate sentences and fixing the alternative
terms, the Legislature made the fundamental policy decision that terms were
to be fixed by choosing one of the alternatives on the basis of circumstances
relating to the crime and to the defendant.” (Wright, supra, 30 Cal.3d at
p. 713.) After doing so, the Legislature properly delegated authority to the
Judicial Council “to adopt rules establishing criteria for imposing the upper
or lower terms in order to promote uniformity,” and established a “standard”
by “providing that the criteria be based on the absence or presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” (Ibid.) The court also noted that
the membership of the Judicial Council, which includes “justices and judges
who have extensive experience in determining sentences” and who are
“uniquely situated to implement the legislative policy,” constitutes a “suitable
safeguard[]” to protect against misuse. (Id. at pp. 712–713.)
      In our view, Wright’s analysis is not altered by the new requirement
under section 1170(b)(2) that the jury find an aggravating factor true beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Legislature “fixes penalties” within the meaning of
the nondelegation doctrine by establishing the lower, middle, and upper
terms for a given offense, and still makes the fundamental policy decision
that a term among the triad is to be selected “on the basis of circumstances

                                       17
relating to the crime and to the defendant.” While a finding of aggravating
factors is necessary before a court may exceed the middle term, that feature
of the sentencing scheme was also present when Wright was decided,
although the factfinding role was allocated to the court. From the perspective
of the separation of powers, we do not see that it makes a difference whether
the finder of fact is the court or the jury. Either way, the finder of fact is
considering factors established by the Judicial Council. We are therefore
unable to conclude that Wright’s holding has been undermined by the
allocation of the factfinding function to the jury.
      IV.    Due Process — Vagueness
      In his writ petition, Chavez Zepeda asserts, albeit in connection with
his separation-of-powers claim, that rule 4.421’s factors are too amorphous
for use by a jury, quoting the California Supreme Court’s observation that,
because they provide criteria intended to be applied to a broad spectrum of
offenses, they “necessarily ‘partake of a certain amount of vagueness which
would be impermissible if those standards were attempting to define specific
criminal offenses.’ ” (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840 [quoting People v.
Thomas (1979) 87 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1024 (Thomas)].) In his reply brief, he
argues at greater length that the factors in rule 4.421 are too vague for use in
jury trials, and two amici briefs contend that they are unconstitutionally
vague in violation of due process because they fail to provide fair notice of
prohibited conduct and invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
      “Courts generally do not consider new issues raised in amicus briefs.
Instead, ‘[i]t is a general rule that an amicus curiae accepts a case as he or
she finds it,’ and ‘amicus curiae may not “launch out upon a juridical
expedition of its own unrelated to the actual appellate record.” ’ ” (People v.
Hannon (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 94, 105.) “However, the rule is not absolute.

                                        18
An appellate court has discretion to consider new issues raised by an
amicus.” (Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 496, 503.)
This is especially the case when the new issue raises a pure question of law
and involves important questions of public policy. (Ibid.)
      Because those considerations apply here and the amicus briefs
elaborate on arguments in Chavez Zepeda’s own briefing—and because the
prohibition against vague laws “rests on the twin constitutional pillars of due
process and separation of powers” (United States v. Davis (2019) __ U.S. __,
__ [139 S.Ct. 2319, 2325] (Davis))—we exercise our discretion to address
whether the factors in rule 4.421 are unconstitutionally vague if considered
by a jury.
      A. No Categorical Exemption for Aggravating Circumstances
      The government violates the due process clause “by taking away
someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails
to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement. [Citation.] The
prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
settled rules of law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of
due process.’ [Citation.] These principles apply not only to statutes defining
elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.” (Johnson v. United
States (2015) 576 U.S. 591, 595–596.)
      Sentencing rules, however, do not necessarily “fix sentences” for the
purpose of triggering the protections of the due process clause. Although it
predates Johnson, in Thomas, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at page 1023, the court
found that the aggravating factors in the predecessor to rule 4.421 were not
subject to a vagueness challenge because they were “not intended to give
people advance warning of prohibited activities” but instead “to provide

                                         19
guidance to sentencing judges.” Similarly, in Beckles v. United States (2017)
580 U.S. 256, 265 (Beckles), the Supreme Court held that the federal
sentencing guidelines, which the court had previously construed as advisory
(see United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 245 (Booker)), were not
subject to a vagueness challenge because they did not implicate the twin
concerns of notice and arbitrariness. With respect to notice, “even perfectly
clear Guidelines could not provide notice to a person who seeks to regulate
his conduct so as to avoid particular penalties within the statutory range”
because the judge retains the discretion to impose an enhanced sentence
notwithstanding a guideline recommendation to the contrary. (Beckles, at
p. 265.) And the Court explained that, while an unconstitutionally vague law
invites arbitrary enforcement if it permits judges and jurors “to prescribe the
sentences or sentencing range available,” the guidelines do not present that
concern because they only “advise sentencing courts how to exercise their
discretion within the bounds established by Congress.” (Id. at p. 266.)
Relying on Thomas and Beckles, the People argue that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine categorically does not apply to the aggravating circumstances in
rule 4.421.
      What makes rule 4.421 different in its present context both from the
predecessor rule considered in Thomas and from the advisory guidelines
considered in Beckles is that a court has no authority to impose an upper
term sentence unless a jury has found one or more aggravating factors true
beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, the constitutional requirement of a jury
finding was established in Cunningham, which applied to California’s
sentencing scheme the rule originally announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey
(2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi) that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

                                      20
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (See Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 282.) 3
Because a judge could not impose an upper-term sentence in the absence of
an aggravating factor (under the pre-Cunningham rules), “the middle term
prescribed in California’s statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant
statutory maximum.” (Id. at p. 288.)
      The People argue that, because section 1170(b)(2) adds due process
protections for the defendant that did not exist under the preceding system of
unfettered judicial discretion, the new sentencing scheme cannot have a due
process problem when the prior system did not. While this argument might
seem plausible at first blush, it does not withstand scrutiny, as the
Apprendi/Blakely/Cunningham line of cases illustrates. (See Blakely, supra,
542 U.S. at p. 308 [rejecting the dissent’s argument that the constitutionality
of indeterminate sentencing schemes implies the constitutionality of

      3 Apprendi located its rule both in the Sixth Amendment and in the due

process clause. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 476–477; see also People v.
Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 131 [Apprendi’s rule “is compelled by the
federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial, made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment”].) By contrast, in Cunningham and other post-
Apprendi cases, the Supreme Court focused on the Sixth Amendment without
mentioning due process. (See Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 274; Ring v.
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 588; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296,
298 (Blakely); Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 226; see also Chiesa, When an
Offense Is Not an Offense: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Reasonable Doubt
Jurisprudence (2011) 44 Creighton L.Rev. 647, 691 & fn. 242.) Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has not repudiated due process as a foundation, which is
the jurisprudential source of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, as distinct from the requirement of a jury determination. (See
In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364; United States v. C.T.H. (6th Cir.
2012) 685 F.3d 560, 562–563; see also Stith, Apprendi’s Two Constitutional
Rights (2021) 99 N.C. L.Rev. 1299, 1306–1307.)

                                       21
determinate sentencing schemes].) Those cases establish that the addition of
some process (the requirement of an aggravating factor) makes
constitutionally necessary the addition of more process (jury findings beyond
a reasonable doubt). To say that the middle term is “the relevant statutory
maximum” (Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 288) is to say, in effect, that
the Legislature has created a liberty interest in a sentence that does not
exceed the middle term (Blakely, at pp. 309, 313; Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S.
at pp. 484–485, 495). Liberty interests, once created, are subject to the
requirements of the due process clause. (See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin (2005)
545 U.S. 209, 221 (Austin); Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216, 220.)
And regardless, it is difficult to see how the right to jury findings beyond a
reasonable doubt is meaningfully protected if the aggravating factors are so
vague that jurors cannot plausibly be expected to make sense of them or to
render a non-arbitrary determination.
      Courts in other jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions when
considering whether aggravating factors in a post-Apprendi sentencing
regime are subject to a constitutional vagueness challenge. Arizona’s high
court invalidated as unconstitutionally vague the state’s “catch-all
aggravator,” defined as “ ‘any other factors which the court may deem
appropriate to the ends of justice,’ ” when it was used to increase the
statutory maximum sentence and no clearly enumerated aggravator was
found consistently with Apprendi. (State v. Schmidt (2009) 220 Ariz. 563,
565–566; see State v. Bonfiglio (2013) 231 Ariz. 371, 373 & fn. 1 [same result
with amended catch-all aggravator that permits the trier of fact to consider
“ ‘[a]ny other factor that the state alleges is relevant to the defendant’s
character or background or to the nature or circumstances of the crime’ ”].)
And while Minnesota’s high court held that a vagueness challenge did not lie

                                        22
to the state’s “particular cruelty” aggravating factor, it reached that result by
concluding that “particular cruelty” is not a “fact” that must be found by the
jury, but rather a “reason” the court may use to impose a sentence outside the
presumptive range based on additional facts the jury found beyond those
established by the guilty verdict, such as that the defendant “sprayed the
handcuffed victims with chemicals.” (State v. Rourke (Minn. 2009)
773 N.W.2d 913, 919–922.) While we will not adopt that approach to the
question here, 4 the Minnesota court’s reasoning at least implicitly accepts
that a vagueness challenge would lie to anything Apprendi requires the jury
to find beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, intermediate appellate courts
in Washington have held that the requirement of jury findings does not make
aggravating factors susceptible to a vagueness challenge, reasoning that
those factors do not establish the statutory maximum and courts are not

      4 The text of section 1170(b)(2) arguably allows for a distinction to be

drawn between “circumstances in aggravation” that can justify the imposition
of the upper term and “the facts underlying those circumstances” that the
jury must find true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Italics added.) But no party
has argued that we should attach any significance to the difference between
those phrases. Consistent with the parties’ approach, we therefore treat
aggravating circumstances considered by the sentencing judge as identical to
what the jury must find true beyond a reasonable doubt. Notwithstanding
the court’s reasoning in Rourke, the parties’ approach here reflects what
seems to us the practical reality that the line between “circumstances” and
“facts underlying” them would often be difficult to draw, risking a violation of
the defendant’s rights under Cunningham as well as potentially undermining
the Legislature’s purpose in enacting Senate Bill 567. (See Sen. Com.
Analysis, pp. 3–4.) Moreover, while rule 4.421 now refers to “factors” rather
than “facts,” Cunningham expressly rejected the dissent’s argument that
“ ‘circumstances in aggravation’ ” were not necessarily “facts.” (Cunningham,
supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 279–280; cf. Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 814, fn. 4
[while the jury must find facts, “[t]he trial court’s evaluation of the relative
weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not equivalent to a
factual finding”].)

                                       23
required to impose an exceptional sentence based on the jury’s finding. (See,
e.g., State v. Brush (2018) 5 Wn.App.2d 40, 61–63; State v. DeVore (2018)
2 Wn.App.2d 651, 660–665; State v. Burrus (2021) 17 Wn.App.2d 162, 175–
177.)
        While the Washington courts identify relevant considerations, we are
not persuaded that they justify a decision to afford no due process
significance to the Supreme Court’s holding that “the relevant ‘statutory
maximum’ ” in the state’s scheme, as in California’s, is the maximum the
judge “may impose without any additional findings.” (Blakeley, supra,
542 U.S. at pp. 303–304.) The relevant liberty interest exists if an
aggravating factor “exposes” the defendant to a greater penalty. (Apprendi,
supra, 530 U.S. at p. 483.) Beckles held that notice was not implicated
because the judge had the discretion to impose the statutory maximum even
in the absence of an aggravating factor—the feature that is missing from
both California’s and Washington’s sentencing schemes. (Beckles, supra,
580 U.S at p. 265.) But perhaps more importantly, as we have noted, the
right to jury findings of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt would be of questionable value if what the jury was asked to find was
so vague as to be beyond its ability meaningfully to consider. At that point,
the risk of arbitrariness becomes unacceptably high. We therefore decline to
hold that aggravating factors are categorically exempt from a constitutional
vagueness challenge.

        B. Chavez Zepeda Does Not Establish That the Aggravating
           Circumstances Are Unconstitutionally Vague

        At the same time, it is important to recall the Supreme Court’s
admonition that “the requirements of due process are ‘flexible and cal[l] for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” (Austin,

                                       24
supra, 545 U.S. at p. 224.) Although a judge lacks the authority to impose an
upper-term sentence in the absence of a jury finding of one or more
aggravating factors, the government’s purpose in specifying those factors is to
establish bounds for the exercise of sentencing discretion rather than to
“regulate the public” (Beckles, supra, 580 U.S. at p. 266), and the public has
notice that the presence of an aggravating circumstance may subject a
defendant to the upper term the Legislature has specified. Moreover, the
judge’s discretion not to impose a greater sentence based on the jury’s finding,
if insufficient to alleviate all potential due process concerns, nonetheless
offers some protection against “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the
defendant’s liberty] interest” (Austin, at pp. 225–226) that might attend an
imprecise definition of an aggravating factor. By contrast, where a court is
required to impose a greater sentence based on the jury’s finding, the amount
of precision due process requires is undoubtedly greater, equivalent to that
demanded for statutes specifying offenses. (See, e.g., Davis, supra, 139 S.Ct.
at p. 2324; Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 593; People v. Superior Court
(Engert) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 803.) 5

      5 In Engert, the California Supreme Court found unconstitutionally

vague a special circumstance that the murder was “especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.” (Engert, supra,
31 Cal.3d at pp. 801–803.) In so holding, the court rejected “the People’s
argument that when the jury is determining the truth of the charged special
circumstances, it is exercising a sentencing function and that, therefore, the
requirements of due process for narrowness and clarity are lessened.” (Id. at
p. 803.) However, as the court explained, a special circumstance finding
“changes the crime from one punishable by imprisonment of 25 years to life to
one which must be punished either by death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole.” (Ibid.) It thus requires the imposition of a greater
sentence. That is the context in which we understand the court’s statement
that “[t]he fact or set of facts to be found in regard to the special circumstance

                                         25
      For these reasons, our conclusion that the factors in rule 4.421 are
subject to some constitutional vagueness standards does not mean they are
condemned by Sandoval’s observation, whether or not considered as dicta,
that they “necessarily ‘partake of a certain amount of vagueness which would
be impermissible if those standards were attempting to define specific
criminal offenses.’ ” (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840.) The factors do
not attempt to define specific criminal offenses, and the sentencing judge’s
ultimate discretion remains a meaningful safeguard. Moreover, the
Sandoval court made this statement in the context of its harmless error
analysis, explaining why, when an aggravating circumstance “rests on a
somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing
court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the
jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the
trial court.” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, in applying harmless error analysis to the
facts of the case, the court did not cite the vagueness of any aggravating
circumstance when it explained why it was not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the aggravating
circumstances true, instead relying on the principal issues in dispute at trial
and the jury’s rejection of murder in favor of voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at
pp. 841–843.)
      We also do not think the factors in rule 4.421 must be invalidated
under Johnson. In that case, “the United States Supreme Court considered
the ‘residual clause’ of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) . . . ,

is no less crucial to the potential for deprivation of liberty on the part of the
accused than are the elements of the underlying crime,” and thus that “there
is no reason why due process should not require the same specificity in
defining the special circumstance that it requires in the definition of the
crime itself.” (Ibid.)

                                       26
which imposes increased penalties for the federal crime of felon in possession
of a firearm if the defendant has three or more prior convictions for a violent
felony.” (People v. Ledesma (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 830, 837.) The residual
clause defined a “violent felony,” as one, inter alia, that “(ii) is burglary,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” (Johnson,
supra, 576 U.S. at pp. 593–594 [quoting ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)].)
The court had previously held that the term must be construed under the
“categorical approach,” in which “a court assesses whether a crime qualifies
as a violent felony ‘in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in
terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular
occasion.’ [Citation.] [¶] Deciding whether the residual clause covers a crime
thus requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in
‘the ordinary case,’ and to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury.” (Id. at p. 596.)
      It was the combination of these two features that led the court to
conclude that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. First, the
court saw no meaningful way for a judge to decide what kind of conduct the
“ordinary case” of a crime involves, divorced from “real-world facts or
statutory elements,” particularly when the judge must imagine not only the
criminal’s own behavior but also how “the crime subsequently plays out,” for
example with bystanders who may respond to it. (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S.
at p. 597.) In other words, in determining whether the defendant was
previously convicted of a “violent offense,” the court was to consider neither
the statutory elements of the offense nor the way in which the defendant
committed it, but was simply to imagine what an “ordinary case” of that
offense looks like. Second, the difficulty in selecting the “ordinary case” was

                                         27
then exacerbated by the uncertainty “about how much risk it takes for the
crime to qualify as a violent felony,” especially because the degree of risk
posed by the four enumerated crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes
using explosives—was itself unclear. (Id. at p. 598.) The court concluded
that it is not possible to say whether an “ordinary case” of a crime like
burglary or extortion presents “a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another” both because the crimes can be committed in different ways that
involve different levels of risk—a burglar might “invade an occupied home by
night or an unoccupied home by day,” and an extortionist might “threaten his
victim in person with the use of force, or . . . by mail with the revelation of
embarrassing personal information”—and because it was not clear how much
risk was necessary to render the imagined “ordinary case” of the offense
violent. (Ibid.)
      Johnson provides no basis to conclude that aggravating factors are
constitutionally objectionable simply because they use qualitative standards
like “great violence,” “high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness,”
“particularly vulnerable,” or “serious danger.” (See rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3),
(b)(1).) As the court noted, in general the application of such standards to
“real-world conduct,” as opposed to an imagined “ordinary case,” does not
raise a constitutional concern. (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 604; see Welch
v. United States (2016) 578 U.S. 120, 124 [“The Court’s analysis in Johnson
thus cast no doubt on the many laws that ‘require gauging the riskiness of
conduct in which an individual defendant engages on a particular
occasion.’ ”]; People v. Ledesma, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 838.) To survive
a vagueness challenge, “[i]t is not . . . necessary that a term be defined by
statute, or even that it have a precise dictionary definition.” (People v.
Borrelli (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 703, 721.) “ ‘[W]here the statute involves some

                                        28
matters of degree as to which individuals and even jurors might reasonably
disagree in their judgment, the statute will not for that reason alone be
invalidated.’ ” (People v. Poulin (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 54, 60; see Walker v.
Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 142.) Imprecise standards can be
fleshed out by judicial construction (People v. Superior Court (J.C. Penney
Corp., Inc.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 376, 407; Walker, at p. 143; Borrelli, at
p. 721), as many of the factors in rule 4.421 have been (see, e.g., People v.
DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 154; People v. Esquibel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th
539, 558; People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1262; People v. Reed
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 489, 492; People v. Gonzales (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d
1170, 1172).
      Chavez Zepeda and his amici focus on the requirement under
California law that an aggravating circumstance must “make[] the offense
‘distinctively worse than the ordinary.’ ” (Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 817
[quoting People v. Moreno (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 103, 110].) They argue that
this requirement, when coupled with a qualitative or subjective standard in
the aggravating circumstance itself, creates the same dual vagueness
problem that gave rise to the court’s holding in Johnson. But we think the
abstraction of the “ordinary case” that troubled the court in Johnson is not
equivalent to the “distinctively worse than the ordinary” standard under
California law. Courts applying that standard have not imagined an
abstract, “ordinary case” to determine whether a finding of an aggravating
circumstances is warranted by the facts of the case. Rather, they have
considered whether the manner of the crime’s commission was distinctively
worse “when compared to other ways in which such a crime could be
committed.” (People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 117 [considering
“viciousness and callousness”]; accord, People v. Charron (1987)

                                       29
193 Cal.App.3d 981, 994 [“planning and sophistication”]; see also People v.
Lincoln (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 196, 204 [“ ‘A fact is aggravating if it makes
defendant’s conduct distinctively worse than it would otherwise have been.’ ”]
[quoting People v. Zamarron (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 865, 872]; People v. Leung
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 482, 504 [“the court must decide whether the particular
circumstance at issue renders the collective group of offenses distinctively
worse than the group of offenses would be were that circumstance not
present”].) These various phrases—“distinctively worse than the ordinary,”
“when compared to other ways in which such a crime could be committed,”
“distinctively worse than it would otherwise have been”—are different ways
of expressing the same concept, and we do not see any indication that our
Supreme Court’s use of the first phrase in Black was intended to endorse one
formulation over others expressed in the caselaw or to impose a requirement
of imagining an abstraction akin to what was at issue in Johnson.
      When appellate courts have reversed an upper-term sentence on the
ground that the cited aggravating circumstance did not make the commission
of the crime distinctively worse, they have generally concluded that the
circumstance at issue was likely to be present in most any instance of the
offense or added little to the wrongfulness already inherent in its
commission. For example, in People v. Piceno (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1353,
1357, the court rejected the finding that the victim of vehicular manslaughter
was “ ‘particularly vulnerable’ ” because his vulnerability could not be
“distinguished from that of all other victims killed by drunk drivers.” Since
“all victims of vehicular manslaughter” are vulnerable by being “in the wrong
place at the wrong time,” the court reasoned, “[t]he element of vulnerability is
inherent in the very crime of vehicular manslaughter caused by a driver
under the influence of alcohol, and to use that factor to aggravate the term is

                                      30
improper, absent ‘extraordinary’ circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1358.) Similarly,
in People v. Fernandez (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 669, 682–683, the court rejected
as aggravating circumstances that the defendant’s behavior “shows an
inability or refusal to ‘conform to the mores of society’ ” or is “ ‘beyond all
acceptable norms of society that we live in today’ ” because they “describe and
apply to all persons convicted” of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child.
And in People v. Rodriguez (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 241–242, the court
concluded that the defendant’s “act of ‘reracking’ his pistol to correct a
misfire” did not make his use of a firearm “worse than the ordinary” because
“the act was nothing more than preparatory to carrying out the intent to
shoot.” (See also, e.g., People v. McNiece (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1061 [in
a case of vehicular manslaughter, “[a]lthough [the victim’s] death was most
tragic, cruelty, viciousness, or callousness on appellant’s part beyond the
occurrence of the accident was not shown”], overruled on other grounds in
People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470; People v. Young (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d
729, 734 [“To say an assault with a deadly weapon is an extremely serious
offense merely states the obvious and does not have an effect of making the
offense distinctly worse”]; People v. Moreno, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 110
[no basis to conclude that knives are “distinctively worse than other types of
weapons”; “use of a deadly weapon is an element of the crime and the fact
that the defendant must pick one of several instruments does not change the
result”].)
      Comparing the defendant’s commission of the offense with other ways
in which the same offense has been or may be committed does not require the
decisionmaker to define a single, imaginary fact pattern as the “ordinary”
way of committing the offense, as the Supreme Court deemed necessary to
determine whether it is a “violent felony” within the meaning of the ACCA’s

                                         31
residual clause. The difficulty the Johnson court perceived in identifying the
“ordinary case” had nothing to do with the relative experience of juries and
judges; indeed, the determination whether the residual clause applied was
made by the sentencing judge. (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 595.) By
contrast, the court’s concern in Sandoval was with “imprecise terms that
implicitly require comparison of the particular crime at issue to other
violations of the same statute, a task a jury is not well suited to perform.”
(Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 849, italics added.) We understand this
statement to mean that a judge is likely to have seen many occurrences of the
same offense, and is therefore in a better position than a jury to evaluate
whether its commission in a particular case is distinctively worse.
      Notwithstanding the additional perspective that a judge who has
sentenced many defendants may possess, we do not find the requirement that
an aggravating circumstance make the commission of the offense
distinctively worse “when compared to other ways in which such a crime
could be committed” (People v. Harvey, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 117) so
vague as to place the task beyond any jury’s competence and thereby to give
rise to unacceptable arbitrariness. We note that jurors can be (and we expect
that they will be) given additional guidance and explanation, both in the
meaning of qualitative terms, which have been defined in the caselaw over
the years, and in the meaning of the requirement that the aggravating
circumstance make the commission of the offense distinctively worse. Indeed,
while this appeal was being briefed, the Judicial Council developed jury
instructions for 11 of the aggravating factors in rule 4.421. (See CALCRIM

                                       32
Nos. 3224–3234.) 6 Moreover, given the purpose of aggravating circumstances
and the court’s discretion to decline to impose the upper term, we conclude
that due process notice requirements are satisfied by notice of the upper term
and of the fact that wrongfulness beyond that inherent in the commission of
the offense, and along the dimensions identified in rule 4.421(a) and (b), may
subject a person to it.
      In sum, we do not find that the individual factors listed in rule 4.421
are invalid simply because they use qualitative terms that may not be
defined before the jury is instructed, or because they are subject to the
requirement that an aggravating circumstance must make the commission of
the offense “distinctively worse than the ordinary.” We note, however, that
nothing in the foregoing discussion precludes a conclusion that a particular
aggravating circumstance may be unconstitutionally vague for reasons that
have not been raised here. Similarly, because the People in this case did not

      6 The parties have not addressed the substance of those instructions in

their briefs, and we do not consider them here except to make one
observation based on the discussion above. Each of the instructions includes
a provision that reads: “You may not find the allegation true unless all of you
agree that the People have proved that the defendant’s conduct was
distinctively worse than an ordinary commission of the underlying crime.”
(CALCRIM Nos. 3224–3234.) As Chavez Zepeda points out, the commentary
in each case states: “The committee is aware of Johnson v. United States
(2015) 576 U.S. 591, 597–598 . . . in which the United States Supreme Court
held that determining what constitutes an ‘ordinary’ violation of a criminal
statute may create a constitutional vagueness problem.” As previously
discussed, we do not see an equivalence between the abstract “ordinary case”
in Johnson and California’s requirement that an aggravating circumstance
make the commission of the offense “distinctively worse than the ordinary.”
We are not called upon to decide whether the phrase “distinctively worse
than an ordinary commission of the underlying crime” in the instructions
accurately articulates that requirement as applied in the caselaw or is
consistent with constitutional vagueness standards.

                                       33
propose their own aggravating circumstances in reliance on the residual
clause in rule 4.421(c)—“Any other factors . . . which reasonably relate to the
defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed”—we
do not decide whether that provision is unconstitutionally vague under the
principles we have articulated.

      V.    Preliminary Hearings and Aggravating Factors

      Lastly, Chavez Zepeda argues that the aggravating factors found
against him must be set aside because they were not supported by evidence
at the preliminary hearing. Citing People v. Superior Court (Mendella) (1983)
33 Cal.3d 754 (Mendella) and Huynh v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th
891 (Huynh), he contends that “[w]hen the Legislature makes increased
punishment hinge on a charged factual allegation to be proved to the jury,
whatever formal label it uses, courts presume that it intended for the
allegation to be supported by evidence at the preliminary hearing and subject
to review under section 995.” In light of Senate Bill 567’s amendments to
section 1170(b)(2), he asks us to apply that presumption here and find that
aggravating factors are now subject to the same requirement, i.e., that they
must be supported by probable cause.
      As Chavez Zepeda acknowledges, there is no express statement in
section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill 567 that circumstances in
aggravation must be supported by probable cause at the preliminary hearing.
Pointing out that some enhancement statutes do not refer to preliminary
hearings (e.g., §§ 12022, 12022.5, 12022.7), he argues instead that the right
to a preliminary hearing is a “background rule” that does not need to be
repeated in every new enactment, and that the Legislature expressly carves
out enhancements from the preliminary hearing requirement when it intends
to do so (e.g., § 12022.1, subd. (c)). When Senate Bill 567 was enacted,

                                       34
however, there was already appellate authority noting that “neither the
Legislature nor the courts have ever deemed aggravating facts used to
impose the upper term as being equivalent to statutory sentencing
‘enhancements’ . . . that must be alleged in the accusatory pleading and
proved at the preliminary hearing.” (Barragan, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1485.) 7 And Sandoval pointed out that “[s]ome aggravating factors may
not be identifiable until after the trial, such as whether the defendant
‘unlawfully prevented or dissuaded witnesses from testifying . . . or in any
other way illegally interfered with the judicial process.’ ” (Sandoval, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 849 [quoting rule 4.421(a)(6)].) “The Legislature is presumed
to be aware of ‘ “judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted
or amended a statute in light thereof.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007)

      7 Chavez Zepeda points out that Barragan arose in the immediate

aftermath of Cunningham, and considered whether, in a case in which trial
had already begun and the prosecution had not alleged aggravating
circumstances, the prosecution could amend the information to allege them
notwithstanding that they had not been presented at the preliminary
hearing. The parties and the court assumed that, without such an ability,
Cunningham would preclude the trial court from imposing an upper-term
sentence even though the prosecution had followed the rules as they were
understood at the time. (Barragan, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485.) The
court thus focused on avoiding unfairness to the prosecution and frustration
of the Legislature’s intent to allow for imposition of the upper term to protect
public safety—considerations that do not apply here. (See ibid.) Chavez
Zepeda is correct that Barragan’s legal significance was short-lived; two days
after it was decided, the Legislature amended section 1170 to allow judges to
impose the upper term without any findings of aggravating circumstances
(Stats. 2007, ch. 3 (Sen. Bill No. 40) [eff. Mar. 30, 2007]), and within a few
months the California Supreme Court in Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th 825,
applied the same rule to resentencing hearings. Neither of these
developments, however, nullified Barragan’s observation that there was no
history of treating aggravating circumstances similarly to enhancements by
requiring them to be pled and proved at the preliminary hearing.

                                       35
42 Cal.4th 644, 659.) Moreover, in several places in sections 1170
and 1170.1, the Legislature preserved “the distinction between sentencing
factors and ‘enhancements.’ ” (People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 932,
939 (Pantaleon) [citing § 1170, subds. (b)(3), (b)(5) and § 1170.1, subds. (d)(1),
(d)(2)].) In light of the Legislature’s awareness of the distinction, we cannot
presume that it intended silently to create a requirement that aggravating
circumstances be supported by probable cause at a preliminary hearing.
      Mendella considered caselaw holding that only “offenses,” and not
provisions relating to the penalty to be imposed, were subject to review by a
motion to dismiss under section 995, ultimately rejecting the distinction and
concluding that statutory enhancements were subject to dismissal if not
supported by sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing. (Mendella,
supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 763.) The court pointed out that the preliminary
hearing and section 995 “operate as a judicial check on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion,” not only in screening out groundless prosecutions,
but also in preventing overcharging—a consideration that applies as much to
enhancements as to offenses given their “significant impact on the number of
years to which a defendant may ultimately be sentenced.” (Id. at pp. 759–
760.) As a result, enhancement allegations “ ‘may constitute powerful
bargaining tools for the prosecutor.’ ” (Id. at p. 760.) The court also
expressed concern that, if enhancement allegations were unreviewable, the
defendant could be prejudiced at trial by the introduction of evidence on an
enhancement issue that is irrelevant to guilt of the substantive offense, or
could be asked to defend against allegations the proof for which was withheld
at the preliminary hearing. (Id. at pp. 760–761.) Finally, the court noted
that before the DSL was enacted, “certain enhancement provisions were
contained in the statutory definitions of the particular offenses,” and at that

                                        36
time were subject to review by a section 995 motion. (Id. at p. 762.) “With
the advent of the DSL, the provisions for such allegations were deleted from
the definitions of the substantive offenses, were placed in distinct sections,
and are now known as ‘enhancements.’ ” (Id. at p. 763.) The court concluded,
however, that “[n]othing in its history or form intimates that the Legislature
intended by reorganizing the Penal Code to deprive the defendant of any
procedural rights that he possessed prior to the new law.” (Ibid.)
      In Huynh, the court held that penalty provisions, like enhancements,
“require proof at the preliminary hearing and review under section 995.”
(Huynh, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 895.) At issue was section 664,
subdivision (a), which provides that the punishment for attempted murder is
life with the possibility of parole if the attempted murder was “willful,
deliberate, and premeditated.” The court acknowledged that enhancements
and penalty provisions are different in that an enhancement adds a separate
term to the base term, whereas a penalty provision specifies a greater base
term. (Huynh, at p. 895.) But it concluded that it was “a distinction without
a difference” in this context because, “[l]ike an enhancement, and unlike the
greater and lesser degrees of certain offenses, ‘a penalty provision prescribes
an added penalty to be imposed when the offense is committed under
specified circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.) The court also noted that the statute
requires that the allegation that the murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated “be pleaded and admitted or found true by the trier of fact,”
which is “language the Legislature habitually uses when defining
enhancements.” (Ibid.; cf. Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 939–940
[no statutory requirement that aggravating circumstances be pleaded].)
      Unlike penalty provisions and enhancements, the finding of an
aggravating factor by a jury does not require or prescribe an added penalty; it

                                       37
merely authorizes the sentencing court to impose the upper term. With
respect to enhancements, Chavez Zepeda argues that the distinction is not
significant because, except where the Legislature has clearly and mistakenly
said otherwise, courts have the discretion to strike enhancements or not to
impose the penalty associated with them. (See § 1385; People v. Jones (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378–1379.) Such discretion was not discussed in
Mendella, however, and Chavez Zepeda does not address how or to what
extent the considerations a court may apply in deciding whether to strike an
enhancement differ from those it applies in deciding whether to impose the
upper term based on an aggravating circumstance. (See, e.g., Nazir v.
Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 491–495 [discussing factors
governing the exercise of discretion to dismiss an enhancement].) But
regardless, the Legislature’s recognition of the structural difference between
enhancements and aggravating circumstances militates against a
presumption that, without saying so, it intended to create a new right to a
preliminary hearing for aggravating circumstances based on what might be
characterized as a functional similarity between the two in practice.
      With respect to penalty provisions, Chavez Zepeda argues that in
De La Cerda v. Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 40, 59, the court held
that section 311.11, subdivision (c) was a penalty provision, and points out
that it authorizes the court to impose a greater sentence for possession of
child pornography under certain circumstances but does not require that it do
so. But the question in that case, which postdated the enactment of Senate
Bill 567, was whether section 311.11, subdivision (c) defined substantive
offenses, and nothing in the opinion sheds light on the Legislature’s intent
with respect to preliminary hearings when it enacted Senate Bill 567 months
earlier. Moreover, when Huynh determined that penalty provisions should

                                      38
be treated the same way as enhancements for the purpose of preliminary
hearings, the premise of its decision was that both of them prescribed an
added penalty to be imposed. (Huynh, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 895.) The
argument that there may be exceptions to Huynh’s characterization of
penalty provisions as requiring the imposition of a greater penalty is not a
reason to extend its holding to findings that never require a greater penalty.
      We do not doubt that allegations of aggravating circumstances, like
enhancements, are powerful bargaining tools for the prosecutor, and we
consider the overcharging of such allegations to gain unfair leverage in plea
negotiations as objectionable as the overcharging of enhancements
disapproved of in Mendella. At oral argument, the People emphasized that a
preliminary hearing and motion under section 995 are not the only
opportunities for a trial court to prevent improper or inadequately supported
aggravating circumstances from going to the jury. They stated that a court
can dismiss an aggravating circumstance under section 1385 8 or can reject it

      8 While both the People and Chavez Zepeda agreed that section 1385

was available, neither cited In re Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, in which the
California Supreme Court held that a trial court may not use section 1385 to
disregard a “sentencing factor,” defined as “ ‘ a circumstance, which may be
either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific
sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s finding that the defendant
is guilty of a particular offense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1134–1135 & fn. 3 [quoting
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19].) After Cunningham, an
aggravating circumstance no longer satisfies this definition and must be
submitted to the jury unless it falls within Apprendi’s exception for prior
convictions. (See Varnell, at p. 1142; Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 941.) Pantaleon held that, at least as to aggravating circumstances based
on prior convictions, there has been no change in law that would alter
Varnell’s conclusion that due process does not impose a pleading requirement
for aggravating circumstances. (Pantaleon, at p. 941.) The parties have not
addressed the question left open by Pantaleon—whether, in light of

                                      39
as inadequately supported after a hearing under Evidence Code section 402. 9
After the presentation of evidence, it can also direct the entry of a verdict in
the defendant’s favor under section 1118.1. Although the same procedural
mechanisms are also available for enhancements, we accept the People’s
concession that a trial court is empowered to reject aggravating
circumstances before it is called upon at sentencing to decide whether they
warrant the imposition of the upper term.
      While these mechanisms may be less effective in checking the
overcharging of aggravating circumstances, the unfairness that results from
such an abuse of prosecutorial discretion was only one of numerous
considerations that led to the court’s decision in Mendella. The court’s
concern there that the defendant could be prejudiced at trial by the
introduction of evidence on an enhancement issue that is irrelevant to guilt of
the underlying offense (Mendella, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 760) does not arise
here because section 1170(b)(2) provides for bifurcated trials of allegations of

Cunningham, due process requires notice in an accusatory pleading of
aggravating circumstances that do not fall within Apprendi’s exception for
prior convictions. Chavez Zepeda contends that there is a statutory pleading
requirement imposed by section 1170(b)(2) itself, because it provides that
“upon request of a defendant, trial on the circumstances in aggravation
alleged in the indictment or information shall be bifurcated from the trial of
charges and enhancements.” While this language contemplates that
aggravating circumstances may be charged in the accusatory pleading,
Pantaleon held that it does not go so far as to impose a pleading requirement.
(Pantaleon, at p. 940.) With respect to the preliminary hearing, as noted
below we find that Chavez Zepeda did not develop an argument that state
due process requires proof of aggravating circumstances, which is an issue we
therefore do not decide.
      9 The People also acknowledged that the prosecution has discovery

obligations that require it to disclose in advance any evidence it intends to
offer in support of an aggravating circumstance, minimizing the potential for
surprise at trial.

                                       40
aggravating circumstances. Moreover, unlike enhancements, aggravating
factors were not historically part of the definition of substantive offenses, so
there was no tradition of considering them at a preliminary hearing. (See
Mendella, at pp. 762–763; Barragan, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485.)
Allowing for consideration of aggravating factors at a preliminary hearing
may be advisable as a policy matter to prevent overcharging and to promote
fairness, but the novelty of the circumstances and the well-recognized
distinction between aggravating factors and enhancements or penalty
provisions prevent us from simply presuming that the Legislature intended
to create a right to a probable cause determination for aggravating factors.
      Finally, while Chavez Zepeda contends that he has a state due process
right to a preliminary hearing on aggravating circumstances, he offers no
argument or authority in support of that contention apart from his citations
to Mendella and Huynh. 10 Due process is not mentioned in Huynh, and while
Mendella stated in passing that the defendant has a “due process right to a
pretrial determination of probable cause” (Mendella, supra, 33 Cal.3d at
p. 759), it did not cast its decision about enhancements as a constitutional
requirement—which would be inconsistent with Chavez Zepeda’s argument
elsewhere that the Legislature may specify when an enhancement is not
subject to a probable cause requirement. Mendella also did not consider more
generally for what kinds of allegations due process requires a probable cause
determination. Because Chavez Zepeda has not otherwise developed the
argument, we do not consider it. (Cf. Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at

      10 Chavez Zepeda expressly disavowed any claim under federal due

process in light of the California Supreme Court’s holding that there is no
federal due process right to a preliminary hearing beyond a probable cause
hearing held to justify continued detention of the accused. (Whitman v.
Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1078–1079.)

                                       41
p. 941 [rejecting contention that due process requires the prosecution to plead
prior convictions used as a basis to impose upper-term sentences, but
declining to decide whether due process requires other aggravating factors to
be pleaded].)
      Because we hold that aggravating circumstances need not be supported
by evidence at the preliminary hearing, we do not reach Chavez Zepeda’s
arguments that the evidence here did not support them.
                                   DISPOSITION
      The petition is denied. 11
                                            GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.

      11 We deny the People’s request for judicial notice. The request does
not attach any specific documents and the People do not appear to rely on any
documents in their briefing that are not already included in the exhibits to
the petition. Moreover, the request was not made by separate motion as
required under California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).

                                       42
Trial Court:                        Superior Court of the City and County of
                                    San Francisco

Trial Judge:                        Honorable Eric R. Fleming

Counsel for Defendant and           Manohar Raju, Public Defender
Petitioner:                         Matt Gonzalez, Chief Attorney
                                    Eric Quandt
                                    Oliver Kroll

Counsel for Real Party in Interest: Brooke Jenkins
                                    District Attorney
                                    Brian Bringardner
                                    Assistant District Attorney

Counsel for Amici Curiae            Ricardo D. Garcia
California Public Defender’s        Public Defender
Association and Los Angeles         Albert J. Menaster
County Public Defender’s Office     Head Deputy
                                    Nick Stewart-Oaten

Counsel for Amicus Curiae           Emi Young
American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California

                                    43