Court Opinion

ID: 9861830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:42:14.577241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:09.745282
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DUNN, specially concurring: I write separately solely to express my agreement with the trial court’s ruling barring the testimony of Warren Hunter because Continental did not disclose Hunter as an expert witness within the deadlines set forth in Supreme Court Rule 220(b)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 220(b)(1)). I agree with the conclusions and reasoning of the majority with respect to all other issues. In concluding that the disclosure requirements of Rule 220(b)(1) did not apply to Hunter, the majority relies upon appellate court cases which have extended the supreme court’s holding in Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 226, to expert witnesses other than treating physicians. One of the factors cited by the Tzystuck court in support of this holding is that a defendant can easily discover the identities and opinions of a plaintiff’s treating physicians through the use of general discovery procedures; therefore, a defendant should not be surprised by the medical testimony of a treating physician at trial. Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 238. This same logic does not necessarily apply to other types of expert witnesses who originally gained knowledge about the subject matter of the case for some purpose other than to testify at trial. Here, Warren Hunter was asked by Laura Fischer, who was not a party to this case, to look at the car. Thus, neither party to this action would have been aware of his identity at the time the instant lawsuit was filed. Continental did disclose Hunter’s identity to the Totzes well in advance of trial but not as an expert witness. Under the majority’s holding and the other cases extending Tzystuck to expert witnesses other than treating physicians, Continental could have called Hunter as an expert witness even if it had not disclosed his identity as an expert witness until the eve of trial. This is completely unfair and subverts the intent of Rule 220. The primary purpose of Rule 220 is to prevent surprise opinion testimony. (Wakeford v. Rodehouse Restaurants of Missouri, Inc. (1991), 223 Ill. App. 3d 31, 40.) Extending Tzystuck to expert witnesses other than treating physicians facilitates the use of surprise opinion testimony. The potential impact upon an unwary adversary of testimony from an undisclosed expert can be devastating. (Wakeford, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 40.) Therefore, I do not believe that Tzystuck should be applied to expert witnesses other than treating physicians. Furthermore, Rule 220 is designed to ensure that the parties and their attorneys are “adequately advised regarding the critical opinions which may be offered in support of their opponent’s claims or defenses.” (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 220, Committee Comments, at 438 (Smith-Hurd 1985), quoted in Oldenburg v. Hagemann (1991), 207 Ill. App. 3d 315, 326.) Although Continental made the Totzes aware of Hunter’s identity, it did not make them aware until the eve of trial that Hunter’s opinion would be offered in support of Continental’s position at trial that the car was not defective. Revealing the identity of an expert is not sufficient to comply with Rule 220; the party must also reveal his or her intention to call that expert as a witness. (Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. West Suburban Bank (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 923, 926; Oldenburg, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 327.) This minimizes the necessity for guessing about matters such as whether an adversary will call a potential expert witness, whether it is necessary to take that potential expert’s deposition, and whether contrary expert testimony should be sought. The cases extending Tzystuck to expert witnesses other than treating physicians fail to address this concern. For the above reasons, I would conclude, as the trial judge did, that Continental was required to disclose Hunter as an expert witness within the deadlines set forth in Rule 220(b)(1).