Court Opinion

ID: 9353007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 18:03:04.916498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:30.255129
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/23 Sparks v. Scully CA4/2

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION TWO

 SMOKEY SPARKS,

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E074779

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1614646)

 HEYSHIN KIM SCULLY, Individually                                         OPINION
 and as Trustee, etc. et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn M. Poncin,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Smokey Sparks, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

         Diana J. Carloni for Defendants and Respondents.

                                                              1
       Plaintiff and appellant Smokey Sparks (Plaintiff) sued defendants and

respondents Heyshin Kim Scully (Heyshin)1 , James Scully (James), and the Scully Joint

Living Trust. The causes of action included breach of contract, breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The trial court

found Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof and entered judgment in favor of the

defendants. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred because she met her burden of proof.

We affirm the judgment.

                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.      EVIDENCE

               1.     BACKGROUND

       In July 2014, Wayne Hindman (Hindman) leased a commercial space (the

Property), in Apple Valley (the City), from Heyshin and James (collectively, the

Scullys). The lease was for three years, expiring in June 2017. Hindman leased the

Property for the purpose of opening a videogame arcade.

       Hindman had an agreement with Bounce Village regarding the arcade business:

Hindman would manage the business, and Bounce Village would provide and maintain

the videogame machines. Further, Hindman agreed to “provide any licensing or

conditional use permit required by the city.” Hindman and Bounce Village would each

take half of the revenue from the arcade business. Bounce Village was owned by

       1   We use first names for the sake of clarity; no disrespect is intended.

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Plaintiff and Brian Toupal.2 Bounce Village moved 105 videogame machines (the

machines) into the Property.

       Hindman applied to the City for a conditional use permit. The City would not

issue the permit until the restroom at the Property met the requirements of the

Americans with Disabilities Act. Hindman spoke with Heyshin about the Scullys

sharing in the cost of renovating the restroom, which required moving a structural wall

and rerouting plumbing. Heyshin declined to share in the costs. Hindman told Heyshin

that because he was unable to open the arcade due the restroom, he would stop paying

rent. Hindman stopped paying rent in October 2014.

               2.     OPTION AGREEMENT

       Plaintiff told Heyshin that she was interested in continuing with the arcade

business at the Property. On January 1, 2015, Heyshin met with Brian Toupal of

Bounce Village. Plaintiff did not attend the meeting. The meeting resulted in an option

agreement for Plaintiff to lease the Property, in the event Hindman was evicted.

       The option agreement read in relevant part, “Since October 2014, [Hindman] has

not paid rent on the premises. Eviction notices ha[ve] been posted and [Hindman] has

hired a lawyer in defense. [¶] In the event that [Hindman] is evicted, Heyshin would

like to continue to open the arcade. Heyshin gives [the] option for [Plaintiff] to

continue to develop and open the arcade in the case that [Hindman] is evicted. [¶]

Heyshin and [Plaintiff] will settle the operation terms of the arcade in this case. After

       2   In the record, Toupal is also spelled Toepel. It is unclear which spelling is
correct.

                                              3
the point of eviction Heyshin will provide keys and access until terms are settled.”

Heyshin orally agreed that Bounce Village could store the machines at the Property.

              3.     ORAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

                     a.     Heyshin’s Understanding

       Separate from the option agreement, when speaking with one another on January

30, 2015, Heyshin and Plaintiff orally agreed to a 50-50 partnership agreement.

Heyshin thought the partnership agreement meant Plaintiff would pay half the cost of

the restroom renovation because Heyshin could not afford to pay for the entirety of the

renovation.

                     b.     Plaintiff’s Understanding

       Plaintiff thought the oral partnership agreement meant Heyshin would pay for the

entirety of the restroom renovation, and then share 50-50 in the revenue from the

videogame machines, i.e., the same agreement Bounce Village had with Hindman.

Plaintiff thought Heyshin “had promised to keep [the machines] safe when [sic] she was

ready to get that bathroom renovated.” Plaintiff believed that, because she and Heyshin

would share in the revenue, a lease for the Property was not necessary and the machines

could be stored rent-free at the Property until the restroom renovation was completed.

              4.     AFTER HINDMAN’S EVICTION

                     a.     Eviction

       In March 2015, Hindman and the Scullys settled the unlawful detainer case

initiated by the Scullys. Specifically, they agreed that the lease would be terminated

and that Hindman would remove his belongings from the Property within seven days.

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Hindman did not tell Plaintiff to remove the machines from the Property because he

believed Plaintiff and Heyshin had “come to some sort of arrangement” in regard to

having an arcade at the Property.

                      b.     Heyshin’s Version of Events

       According to Heyshin, Plaintiff “disappeared” or was “hiding” after Hindman’s

eviction. Plaintiff did not pay rent to the Scullys. Heyshin called Plaintiff, but Plaintiff

did not answer or respond to Heyshin’s voicemails. Heyshin went to Plaintiff’s house,

but Plaintiff did not answer the door. After the Scullys were unable to locate Plaintiff,

they hired a lawyer to assist in removing the machines from the Property.

       On April 22 and June 10, 2015, Heyshin mailed Plaintiff notices of abandonment

reflecting the machines would be publicly auctioned. The notices were returned as

undeliverable, despite being addressed to Plaintiff’s home, because Plaintiff has a post

office box; Plaintiff never told Heyshin about the post office box. Heyshin tried to

personally deliver the notice to Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s house “a few times,” but Plaintiff

did not answer the door. On August 14 and 21, 2015, in the Apple Valley News,

Heyshin published a notice of public auction of the abandoned machines.

                      c.     Plaintiff’s Version of Events

       Plaintiff denied that she had “disappeared.” Plaintiff’s daughter became ill and

was in the intensive care unit in February 2015. As a result, Plaintiff was often at home

caring for her daughter, rather than at the Property maintaining the machines. Plaintiff

did not open the door at her house for Heyshin because Plaintiff “didn’t even know

                                              5
[Heyshin] was at [Plaintiff’s] house.” Plaintiff did not see the notice in the Apple Valley

News because she lives in Hesperia, not Apple Valley.

       Plaintiff asserted that she communicated with Heyshin by telephone and text

message from March 2015 through July 2015, but Heyshin did not demand rent or

removal of the machines or otherwise indicate a problem with the machines being at the

Property. Thus, Plaintiff was unaware that Heyshin intended to sell the machines.

              5.     SALE OF THE MACHINES

       On September 6, 2015, Heyshin held a public auction for the machines, but no

one attended the auction. In December 2015, Heyshin told a family friend (Friend) to

sell the machines, and Friend listed the machines for sale online.

       On August 22, 2016, Plaintiff saw the machines listed for sale online and called

the phone number listed in the advertisement. During the phone call, Plaintiff advised

Friend that Plaintiff owned the machines and they were being wrongfully sold. On

August 25, 2016, Plaintiff went to the Property and saw that some of the machines were

missing and others appeared to have been stripped for parts. Plaintiff also saw that the

restroom had not been renovated. Heyshin had Plaintiff arrested for trespassing. James

testified that four of the machines were sold. The remaining machines were still at the

Property at the time of trial, in September 2019.

       B.     LAWSUIT

       Plaintiff filed her lawsuit on September 6, 2016. In the complaint, Plaintiff

alleged, “Heyshin . . . orally promised Plaintiff that she would not have to pay rent at

the [Property], in exchange for [Heyshin] being able to continue to open the arcade at

                                             6
[the Property], using Plaintiff’s machines. Plaintiff agreed to operate the arcade under

this oral promise. The Parties agreed to split any revenue from the arcade on a 50-50

basis. [¶] . . . Heyshin . . . assured Plaintiff that the arcade machines would be safe at

the [Property] and that she would develop the [P]roperty in order to make sure that it

would be able to be used for arcade purposes.” Plaintiff asserted, “Heyshin . . . orally

promised Plaintiff that she would take care of the repairs and renovation of the

bathroom so that the arcade could be opened.”

       In the breach of contract cause of action, Plaintiff alleged, “[Heyshin] has not

renovated the bathroom so that the arcade could open, and [the Scullys] are now selling

Plaintiff’s property without her consent or a Court order.” Plaintiff alleged the same

actions and failures constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. In regard to fraud, Plaintiff alleged, “Heyshin . . . made a false promise to

Plaintiff, namely that she could operate the arcade on the premises without paying rent,

and that [the Scullys] would take care of all permits including renovating the bathroom,

without any intention of perform[ing] such acts.”

       As to the unjust enrichment claim, Plaintiff alleged the Scullys “have illegally

confiscated the machines and have received an undeserved ‘windfall’ in the sale of the

[machines] and the retention of the remaining machines. [¶] The foregoing has resulted

in the [Scullys] being unjustly enriched by the selling of said machines.” Plaintiff

sought the imposition of a constructive trust, a declaration that the machines are

Plaintiff’s property, an injunction restraining the Scullys from selling the machines,

actual damages, and punitive damages.

                                             7
       C.     JUDGMENT

       The trial court issued a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision,

which became the final findings and ruling. As to the contract causes of action, the trial

court wrote: “The court found the [Scullys] to be more credible. While [Plaintiff] may

truly believe there was a contract, the evidence clearly indicates otherwise. [Plaintiff]

also was unable to provide evidence that terms were agreed to by each party other than

some vague agreement to split proceeds 50-50 with one another.” The trial court

concluded that “Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof that a contract, either oral or

written, was entered into between the parties.”

       As to the fraud cause of action, the trial court found that the Scullys did not

promise to store the machines until the Scullys renovated the restroom. The trial court

explained that it “did not find [Plaintiff] to be credible when she testified that [Heyshin]

promised to keep the arcade machines safe.”

       For the unjust enrichment cause of action, the trial court found that (1) Plaintiff

failed to prove she was the sole owner of the machines because the evidence indicated

that Brian Toupal also owned the machines; (2) “there was certainly no evidence

presented as to the value of the arcade machines themselves”; (3) there was no evidence

of what, if any, money the Scullys received for the four machines that were sold ; and

(4) “[i]f anyone has been unjustly enriched, it would be [Plaintiff.] Her arcade

machines, if they are in fact hers, have been stored in the [Property] since 2015 and she

hasn’t paid any rent or storage fees. On the other hand, the [Scullys] have had to hire an

attorney, proceed by way of publication and trying to give notice that the [machines

                                             8
were] abandoned so that they could see about having the machines removed, and yet

they are still there. The [Scullys] have not been able to rent their property and they have

obtained nothing from the Plaintiff by way of storage fees.”

                                      DISCUSSION

       Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding she did not meet her burden of

proof because the evidence reflects she had an oral agreement for the Scullys to store

the machines until the restroom was renovated.

       Plaintiff bore the burden of proof in the trial court. (Key v. Tyler (2019) 34

Cal.App.5th 505, 528.) Therefore, the question on appeal is “ ‘whether the evidence

compels a finding in favor of [Plaintiff] as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically,

the question [is] whether [Plaintiff’s] evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and

unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial

determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Dreyer’s Grand Ice

Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.) “ ‘ “We have no

power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” ’ ”

(Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067.)

       Heyshin testified that she agreed to store the machines at the Property. Thus,

there is no dispute that Heyshin agreed to store the machines. The dispute is whether

Heyshin agreed to store the machines until Hindman’s eviction was complete, until

Plaintiff signed a lease/Plaintiff’s option for a lease ended, or until the restroom

renovation was complete.

                                              9
       Plaintiff testified, “[Heyshin] proposed while she was evicting [Hindman] to

keep the [machines] safe.” The foregoing evidence indicates that Heyshin was willing

to store the machines until Hindman’s eviction was complete.

       The written option agreement provides, “After the point of [Hindman’s] eviction

Heyshin will provide keys and access until terms are settled.” One could infer from that

sentence that Heyshin agreed to store the machines until Plaintiff signed a lease or the

option for a lease ended because it implies that Heyshin permitted plaintiff to have

rights to the Property after Hindman’s eviction and through the signing of the lease.

       The foregoing evidence indicates that Heyshin agreed to store the machines until

Hindman’s eviction was completed, until Plaintiff signed a lease, or until the option for

a lease expired. There is not credible evidence of Heyshin agreeing to store the

machines until the restroom renovation was completed. However, to the extent there

were credible evidence of such, it would be contradicted by the foregoing evidence.

       Heyshin testified, in regard to the oral partnership agreement, “It’s my building,

but I didn’t have no money to do improvement. [Plaintiff] come with the half, I come

with the half, we do make the arcade happening in there.” She further testified, “I ask

[Plaintiff] to come half and then [Plaintiff] disappeared after that.” When asked, “I

believe you did mention that you would finish taking care of the bathroom?” Heyshin

replied, “No. Absolutely no.”

                                            10
       Heyshin did not testify that the terms of the oral partnership agreement included

free storage of the machines. Rather, Heyshin testified that the oral partnership

agreement required Plaintiff to pay for half of the restroom renovation, which Plaintiff

failed to pay. Thus, the credible evidence of the oral partnership agreement does not

support a finding that, as a term of the agreement, Heyshin would store the machines

rent-free until the Scullys paid for the restroom renovation.

       Plaintiff testified that Heyshin “had promised to keep [the machines] safe when

[sic] she was ready to get that bathroom renovated.” The trial court “did not find

[Plaintiff] to be credible when she testified that [Heyshin] promised to keep the arcade

machines safe.” We must abide by the trial court’s credibility finding, therefore, we do

not rely upon that portion of Plaintiff’s testimony. (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc.,

supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.)

       In sum, there was no consensus among the parties concerning the time limit for

storing the machines. The credible evidence reflects the Scullys may have agreed to

store the machines only until Hindman’s eviction was completed, until Plaintiff signed a

lease, or until Plaintiff’s lease option ended. Thus, the evidence concerning the length

of the storage agreement was not of such character and weight that the trial court had to

find that there was an agreement or promise for the Scullys to store the machines until

the Scully’s paid for the restroom renovation. The trial court did not err.

                                            11
                                          DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                        MILLER
                                                                                    J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                               P. J.

RAPHAEL
                                     J.

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