Court Opinion

ID: 9524307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:51:41.585872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:30.162777
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I believe the majority discussion of the standard of review (376 Ill. App. 3d at 471-73) is selective and misleading. The trial court and the prosecution are left in the dark as to how the majority reasoned its way to a reversal within analytical guidelines established by our supreme court. Compare the majority traversal of the standard of review with the following: “The defendant challenges the propriety of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Traditionally, this court has stated that when a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence involves factual determinations and credibility assessments, the ultimate ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. See People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204[, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999)]; People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12[, 704 N.E.2d 375 (1998)]. This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the trial court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of witnesses, observe the witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in the witnesses’ testimony. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 412. Most recently, however, this court has applied the de novo standard of review to the ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996). See In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 46-50[, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000)]. In Ornelas, the Court held that when an appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress involving a question of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the reviewing court should review de novo the ultimate finding with respect to probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court cautioned, however, that findings of historical fact should be reviewed only for clear error and that reviewing courts must give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by the fact finder. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663; In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 47-48[, 727 N.E.2d 1003]. Accordingly, we will accord great deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, we will review de novo the ultimate question of the defendant’s legal challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50[, 727 N.E.2d 1003].” People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 430-31, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001). I suppose the majority would argue that what it has written is an accurate paraphrase of Sorenson. I strongly disagree. Absent from the paraphrase is a requirement that trial court findings of historical fact are to be reviewed only for clear error. Absent as well is the supreme court’s choice of words: “great deference” and “due weight to inferences.” I come away from this opinion with the definite impression that the majority has reweighed the historical facts de novo. There is nothing in this opinion that speaks to what factual findings of the trial court were clearly in error or against the manifest weight of the evidence. I am also troubled by the footnotes and to what end they have been inserted. The first, ruminating on the word “loitering,” announces it will be taken as simply “descriptive of [the group’s] activity.” 376 Ill. App. 3d at 469 n.1. Since no one has suggested a darker meaning, I do not see the point of the observation. The second is more troublesome. It states that the majority “wonders” whether the radio call that prompted the police investigation was motivated by someone’s desire to “extract” young men from a place where they were not wanted. 376 Ill. App. 3d at 474 n.2. I am baffled by this gratuitous “wondering” when there is nothing in the record to suggest a darker meaning for the radio call. I suppose one could go on wondering de hors the record: that the complaint that led to the radio dispatch was from a resident weary of young men going floor to floor in the building, selling cocaine. Footnotes 3 and 4 (376 Ill. App. 3d at 475 nn.3, 4) are interesting commentaries on small corners of our fourth amendment jurisprudence, but if they are relevant to the majority analysis, the majority should say so, rather than leaving us to wonder. Footnote 4 ends with a clue: “Officer Hickey did not testify to anything the respondent did to arouse her suspicion, except perhaps being present on the second floor.” 376 Ill. App. 3d at 475 n.4. The problem with this clue is that Officer Hickey had sped to the second floor in response to a radio call that there was a crime in progress and that the defendant was at the scene. Finally, the amendment to our fourth amendment jurisprudence announced by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), was prompted in no small measure by a recognition that our law enforcement officers do their work in an increasingly dangerous and violent world: “The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden’s taking steps to investigate petitioner’s suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden’s invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives. In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 907-08, 88 S. Ct. at 1881. The majority here spends some little time suggesting that the trial judge in ruling from the bench was wrong in the way she articulated the steps to be undertaken in a Terry analysis. This is partly true, but the majority is holding the trial judge to an unrealistic standard of precision when ruling in real time on a motion to suppress. The trial judge got the historical facts right and concluded: “I believe it was a limited search based on the officer’s reasonable belief that [she] could be in danger.” The majority discounts the officer’s statement that she believed herself to be in danger because the predicate for that belief is not fleshed out to this court’s satisfaction. But the trial court was satisfied based on the historical facts, and under a proper standard of review, so should we be. Based on the record, I believe that a prudent police officer would and should have done exactly what Officer Hickey did. I would affirm the trial court.