Court Opinion

ID: 9855645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:28:42.016124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:17.008863
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
I would hold that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine his co-indictee about the co-indictee’s plea of guilty. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with Division 2 of the majority opinion.
1. The exclusion of testimony about a co-indictee’s guilty plea runs afoul of a defendant’s right of confrontation. This Court is *295required to scrutinize carefully the rationale behind an exclusionary evidentiary rule and weigh it against a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.4 The stated rationale for the proscription against cross-examining a witness about a prior conviction is that the mere questioning of a witness about a prior conviction “can be prejudicial even though a negative answer be truthful.”5 Any logic in this rationale vanishes when applied to a defendant’s cross-examination of a co-indictee testifying for the prosecution.6 Furthermore, the State’s interest in not prejudicing its own case by keeping highly relevant, truthful information from the jury does not outweigh the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers, especially in light of the available alternatives to ameliorate any unfair prejudice. For example, cautionary instructions are often used to cure the improper introduction of prejudicial testimony, and the trial court’s contempt power is available when a lawyer has no legitimate basis for asking about a conviction. Furthermore, a witness’s admission on the stand that he stood before a judge and acknowledged his guilt may be more effective than the introduction into evidence of the bland plea agreement.
Decided October 1, 2001.
Jimmy D. Plunkett, for appellant.
2. Even if the majority’s opinion did not raise Sixth Amendment concerns, I would still hold that questioning a co-indictee about his guilty plea or conviction was not subject to a best evidence objection. By questioning Butler about his plea of guilty to Johnson’s murder, Castleberry sought to establish that Butler was solely responsible for the murder. Castleberry was not attempting to impeach Butler’s credibility by showing that Butler had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Therefore, the general principle that a witness may be impeached with a prior conviction only by introducing a certified copy of the conviction is inapplicable here.
Nevertheless, the evidence, including Castleberry’s own statements to police, was overwhelming, and I concur in the affirmance of the conviction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Car-ley join in Division 2 of this special concurrence.
*296Dennis C. Sanders, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Ruth M. Bebko, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (93 SC 1038, 35 LE2d 297) (1973).

 See Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 499 (271 SE2d 792) (1980).

 The logic of the rule is weak in any instance. See Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1924) (canvassing rationales and rejecting rule and noting majority rule permits questioning witness on cross-examination about a prior felony conviction); Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 14.4, n.ll (1995) (noting that the rule has been abandoned in most jurisdictions).