Court Opinion

ID: 9599592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:19:54.530781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:45.730141
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I would still maintain the correctness of the dissenting opinion in Bone v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 215 Ga. App. 782 (452 SE2d 523) (1994), I agree with the majority that this is not a proper case in which to overrule that case.
In Bone the majority agreed with the trial judge that proof of “actual physical contact” had to be corroborated in order to satisfy the first alternative in OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (2). They regarded the circumstantial evidence as insufficient corroboration. The dissent did not read the first statutory alternative as requiring corroborative evidence and regarded the plaintiff’s deposition testimony as sufficient circumstantial evidence of “actual physical contact” so as to survive summary judgment. All of the participating appellate judges agreed *441with the trial judge that plaintiff’s case fell short of fulfilling the second alternative because the nonparty witness was not an eyewitness and could not corroborate the claimant’s description of how the incident occurred. The majority opinion held that neither of the statutory alternatives was available in plaintiff’s situation, whereas the dissent concluded that plaintiff’s evidence satisfied the “actual physical contact” category.
In Painter’s case, the majority opinion holds that plaintiff’s direct testimony, establishing that the unknown vehicle struck the truck in which he was riding and that he felt and heard the impact and saw the car’s shadow as it went by them immediately thereafter, met the requirements of the first “actual physical impact” alternative and did not require corroboration. I agree with that.
The trial court, which erroneously referred to the passenger plaintiff as the driver and the driver-witness as the passenger when it was vice versa, committed a second error by requiring corroboration. The trial court then ruled that the non-party’s affidavit failed to corroborate the plaintiff’s evidence and that the plaintiff’s testimony constituted unexplained self-contradiction which was to be construed against him.
As demonstrated in the majority opinion, plaintiff’s own testimony supplied evidence of actual physical contact between the unidentified car and the truck in which he was riding. Not only did he describe it orally, he showed by diagram where the car “clipped,” i.e., “hit,” the truck. That satisfied the fraud-precluding requirement that “actual physical contact must have occurred between the motor vehicle owned or operated by the unknown person and the person or property of the insured.” OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (2). No corroboration was required.
Deciding this case within the frame of the first alternative requires overruling Bone. Deciding it instead upon an analysis of the second alternative’s approach does not, because the plaintiff’s testimonial description of how the unidentified motorist caused the occurrence, which amplifies the allegations in his complaint, is corroborated by eyewitness Stewart’s affidavit statement “that as their vehicle exited 1-20 and proceeded north on 1-285 an unidentified vehicle came off of the exit ramp from 1-20 West and caused their vehicle to swerve and lose control. . . [and thus] caused the accident of their vehicle.” Therefore, a consideration of Bone is not necessary to resolve this summary judgment case, and its overruling here would be improper because it would be dicta. Flournoy v. State, 266 Ga. 618, 619 (2) (469 SE2d 195) (1996); White v. State, 213 Ga. App. 429, 430 (1) (445 SE2d 309) (1994). See also Wand v. State, 230 Ga. App. 460, 465 (496 SE2d 771) (1998) (McMurray, P. J., concurring specially); Cornwell v. State, 193 Ga. App. 561, 565 (388 SE2d 353) *442(1989) (Benham, J., concurring specially).
Decided July 15, 1998.
David L. Smith, for appellant.
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Marvin D. Dikeman, Steven R. Thornton, for appellee.