Court Opinion

ID: 9692868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:09:38.703665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:37.563370
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s construction of the term “operation” as contained in the motor vehicle exception to immunity from tort liability of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541(b)(1). I agree that exceptions to governmental immunity under the Act are to be “narrowly interpreted,” Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 361, 523 A.2d 1118, 1123 (1987). However, I do not believe that the legislature intended so narrow a construction as to permit avoidance of responsibility for the negligent conduct of the operator of a City vehicle where the conduct was within the course and scope *377of the operator’s employment and, in my view, constituted operation of the vehicle. The majority, in the name of strict construction, has arrived at a result which is contrary to law, logic and fundamental justice.
Under the majority’s interpretation, one can only be operating a vehicle if he actually puts it in motion or drives it. If the legislature so intended, I am sure it is capable of making such a distinction by using the appropriate language. The legislature used the term operation of a vehicle and this includes conduct which is generally within the intended use of the vehicle and entails the use of the vehicle’s appurtenant parts. In construing the term operation for purposes of the drunk driving statute, it has been held that: “[a] driver may be in ‘actual physical control’ of his car and therefore ‘operating’ it while it is parked or merely standing still ‘so long as [the driver is] keeping the car in restraint or is in a position to regulate its movements.’ ” Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa.Superior Ct. 563, 327 A.2d 375 (1974) (allocatur denied February 3, 1975).
Moreover, the term operation cannot be construed without regard to the facts of this case and the duties of the operator with respect to the vehicle and the Appellant. The operator was responsible not only for the transportation of Catherine Love to and from the Mann Adult Center, but also to help her in getting in and out of the van with the assistance of a stool that was to be used at all times. The operator also testified that it was his duty to deliver her safely on to the walk. In light of the fact that Mrs. Love was found in the street approximately three feet from the curb line with her back approximately two feet from the stool, it becomes clear that the operator did not get her safely to the sidewalk. The trial court found that Mrs. Love’s injuries were incurred while alighting from the vehicle, that alighting from the vehicle is an adjunct of the operation of the vehicle since a stool was used to assist with the ingress and egress of the passenger. The court also found that the stool was an appendage of the vehicle and a necessary and indispensable component of the operation of *378the vehicle as it related to the transportation of Mrs. Love, and that alighting from the van by the use of the stool is an indivisible aspect of the operation of the vehicle.
I agree with the trial court conclusion and would, for the reasons stated, reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.