Court Opinion

ID: 9568260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:01:54.912794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:31.266868
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, Presiding Judge.
Defendant-appellant Cecil Kevin Connelly appeals from his conviction in a second trial of second-degree sexual abuse. He claims double jeopardy barred his retrial and his trial counsel was not effective. We affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and preserve his claim of ineffective assistance for postconviction proceedings.
The first time defendant was tried on these same charges, the jury began deliberations at approximately 1:30 p.m. on October 12, 1994. The jury was discharged for the day between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m. The jury reconvened deliberations the next morning at 8:30 a.m. About one-half hour later, the jury sent the judge two questions:
Number 1: What is reasonable doubt in layman’s terms?
Number 2: Are we correct in assuming that our job in determining a verdict we are supposed to first, one, look at the evidence and if we aren’t in agreement at that point then, two, consider testimony, character, common sense and experience?
The judge, in the presence of attorneys for defendant and the State and the defendant, said he would respond by referring the ju*331rors to the specific instructions they had been given. Defendant’s attorney agreed to the judge’s response.
Around 10:30 a.m., the jury told the court attendant it was deadlocked. The judge, with attorneys for defendant and the State and the defendant, asked the foreperson if further deliberations would be fruitless. The foreperson responded yes. The judge asked the jurors if they all held that belief. The record shows the jury was polled and all replied in the affirmative. The court, without further inquiry, discharged the jury and announced he would contact the court administrator for a retrial date.
Prior to retrial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing double jeopardy barred his being tried again on the same charge. A hearing was held and the motion was denied.
Defendant, on appeal, contends the trial judge abused his discretion when he overruled his motion to dismiss. We review for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Nelson, 234 N.W.2d 368, 375 (Iowa 1975).
Defendant contends the judge at his first trial acted prematurely in dismissing the jury-in that the jury deliberated for less than five hours and in not advising counsel of his intention and providing them with an opportunity to respond.
A trial court has discretion to discharge jurors if they have deliberated and it appears they cannot agree, see Iowa R.Crim. P. 18(6) (a), though the court’s discretion is limited by constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Nelson, 234 N.W.2d at 374. Therefore, when a trial court declares a mistrial, whether the retrial violates double jeopr ardy principles turns on the propriety of the court’s declaration of a mistrial. State v. Dixon, 534 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Iowa 1995).
A retrial after a jury in a prior trial has been unable to agree generally does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3085, 82 L.Ed.2d 242, 250 (1984); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087, 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 (1982); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509, 98 S.Ct. 824, 832, 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 730 (1978); see also Nelson, 234 N.W.2d at 375, and State v. White, 209 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa 1973).
Defendant claims his case is distinguishable because the trial judge declared a mistrial on his own motion before advising defendant and his attorney and the attorney for the State and before affording them an opportunity to object. We agree with defendant the trial judge should not have declared a mistrial without allowing defendant an opportunity to object or offer any input. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487, 91 S.Ct. 547, 558, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 558 (1971); Dixon, 534 N.W.2d at 441-42. However, this fact alone is not dispositive. See United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 15, 97 S.Ct. 20, 21, 50 L.Ed.2d 17, 19 (1976), and Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 297-98, 12 S.Ct. 617, 628, 36 L.Ed. 429, 441 (1892).
Defendant argues the court acted prematurely in discharging the jury and in not considering alternatives to a mistrial. A trial judge is allowed to exercise broad discretion in deciding whether or not to allow a jury to deliberate longer. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509-10, 98 S.Ct. at 832, 54 L.Ed.2d at 730-31. If the jury is discharged when further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, the defendant is deprived of his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Id. Yet, the failure to discharge a jury unable to reach a verdict after protracted deliberations presents a risk a verdict may be the result from pressures inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of all the jurors. Id.
The jury in this case deliberated five hours and sent two questions to the judge pertaining to the definition of reasonable doubt and how to consider evidence, character, common sense, and experience in reaching a verdict. Shortly after being directed by the court to refer back' to specific jury instructions, the jury, on its own initiative, informed the court attendant it would not be able to reach a verdict.
The trial judge should have solicited the input of trial counsel and defendant. Trial counsel and defendant, though present, made no effort to challenge the trial court’s *332actions. We cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in declaring a mistrial. He was in the best position to assess the nature of the case and the eonclusiveness of the jury’s deadlock. The hung jury constituted a “manifest necessity” for a mistrial and defendant’s claim the double jeopardy provision of the constitution barred a retrial is without merit.
Defendant claims his trial counsel was not effective because he placed defendant’s character in evidence and opened the door to the admission of rebuttal testimony concerning prior incidents of child abuse by defendant. Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are preserved for post-conviction proceedings. See State v. Mulder, 313 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Iowa 1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 841, 103 S.Ct. 90, 74 L.Ed.2d 83 (1982); State v. Nebinger, 412 N.W.2d 180, 191-92 (Iowa App.1987). Preserving the matter for posteonviction relief allows the facts to be developed and gives the allegedly ineffective attorney an opportunity to explain his or her conduct, strategies, and tactical decisions. See State v. Coil, 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978).
Trial counsel may have had a strategic reason for introducing testimony of defendant’s character and qualities as a parent. Improvident trial strategy, miscalculated tactics, or mistakes in judgment do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance. Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 413 (Iowa 1982). We conclude the record is not sufficient to address this claim and reserve it for posteonviction proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
CADY, J., concurs.
HABHAB, J., specially concurs.