Court Opinion

ID: 9958636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 18:08:23.511957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:31.910270
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Millhouse, 2024-Ohio-1187.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      ROSS COUNTY

                                                :

IN THE MATTER OF THE                                 :      Case No. 23CA31

     NAME CHANGE OF:                                        :

     JUSTIN D. MILLHOUSE, II                         :     DECISION & JUDGMENT
                                                     ENTRY

________________________________________________________________

                                             APPEARANCES:

Justin D. Millhouse, II, Chillicothe, Ohio, pro se.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, PROBATE DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:3-26-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}    This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas

Court, Probate Division, judgment that denied an application for

change of name filed by Justin D. Millhouse, II, appellant

herein.

        {¶2}    Appellant assigns the following errors for review:

                FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT BASED THE
                DENIAL ON ORC 2717.01 APPELLANT CANNOT
                LEGALLY COMPLETE THE CHANGE OF NAME
                APPLICATION WITHOUT COMMITTING PERJURY. THE
                APPLICATION ASK THAT THE APPLICANT ADMIT SHE
                DOESN’T HAVE A DUTY TO REGISTER WHEN IN FACT
                SHE DOES UPON RELEASE FROM PRISON. FACT IS
                APPELLANT ISN’T ASKING FOR A CHANGE OF NAME
BUT AN ADDITION TO HER IDENTITY DOCUMENT
UNDER HER COMMON LAW NAME OF ALEXIS SZANDORA
MILLHOUSE, OHIO DOES HAVE AN OPTION FOR A
COMMON LAW NAME CHANGE. ‘AT COMMON LAW A
PERSON CAN CHANGE HER NAME AT WILL [ONLY] IF
THERE IS NO INTENT TO DECEIVE OR DEFRAUD.’”
[sic]

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DIDN’T ATTEMPT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS WASN’T A
NAME CHANGE PURSUANT TO 2717.01 BUT A COMMON
LAW NAME ADDITION TO HER IDENTIFICATION
DOCUMENTS SO HER NAME IS CONGRUENT WITH HER
LEGAL GENDER. THE APPELLANT IS LEGALLY
FEMALE WITH A MALE NAME AND UPON RELEASE
FROM PRISON WILL BE SUBJECTED TO MANY
INSTANCES WHERE HER GENDER AND NAME WILL BE
BROUGHT UP AND IF HER GENDER WASN’T A
PROBLEM TO BE CORRECTED WHY SHOULDN’T HER
NAME ALSO BE CONGRUENT TO AVOID
DISCRIMINATION?” [SIC]

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT STATED THEY DON’T
HAVE JURISDICTION FOR THIS MATTER. THE
PROBATE COURT HAS ALSO STATED ‘IN ANY EVENT
R.C. 2101.24 DOES NOT GRANT PROBATE COURT
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER A ‘MOTION FOR
COMMON LAW NAME CHANGE RECOGNITION.’ THE
PROBLEM WITH THIS IS 2717.04 SAYS ‘A PERSON
DESIRING TO CONFORM THE PERSON’S LEGAL NAME
ON AN OFFICIAL IDENTITY DOCUMENT MAY FILE AN
APPLICATION IN THE PROBATE COURT OF THE
COUNTY IN WHICH THE PERSON RESIDES.’ SO
APPELLANT WOULD STATE THAT THE PROBATE COURT
OF ROSS COUNTY DOES HAVE JURISDICTION
BECAUSE CHILLICOTHE OF ROSS COUNTY IS WHERE
THE APPELLANT HAS RESIDED FOR THE LAST 7
YEARS.” [SIC]
                                                                     3
ROSS, 23CA31

     {¶3}   On November 20, 2023, appellant filed an application

to change his name in the probate court.     Subsequently, the

court denied appellant’s application.     In its judgment entry,

the court pointed out that (1) appellant failed to follow the

applicable statutory procedure set forth in the Ohio Revised

Code; (2) R.C. 2101.24 does not give a probate court the

authority to consider a request for change of name pursuant to

“common law”; and (3) appellant is not, at the present time,

eligible for a change of name in view of the rationale set forth

in In re Blevins, 4th Dist. Ross No. 22CA7, 2022-Ohio-4812.

     {¶4}   Because appellant’s assignments of error raise related

issues, we will consider them together.     Appellant appears to

acknowledge that the application asks the applicant to “admit

that she doesn’t have a duty to register when in fact she does

upon release from prison.”    Appellant also maintains that she

does not seek a R.C. 2717.01 change of name, but rather a

“common law name addition to her identification documents so her

name is congruent with her legal gender.”     Appellant also

appears to argue that the trial court denied appellant’s

application due to a residency issue.

     {¶5}   For decisions that involve applications to change a

name, reviewing courts will not generally disturb a trial
                                                                     4
ROSS, 23CA31

court’s decision to deny or to grant a name change absent an

abuse of discretion.   In re Hall, 135 Ohio App.3d 1, 3, 732

N.E.2d 1004 (4th Dist.1999).   “‘[A]buse of discretion’ [means]

an ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of

discretion, or * * * a view or action that no conscientious

judge could honestly have taken.’”     State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio

St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 67.     “An abuse of

discretion includes a situation in which a trial court did not

engage in a ‘“sound reasoning process.”’”     AAAA Ents., Inc. v.

River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d

157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).     The abuse of discretion

standard is a deferential standard and does not permit an

appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that of

the trial court.

    {¶6}   This court has previously addressed change of name

cases.   In Blevins, at ¶ 10 and 11, this court wrote:

    With respect to a change of name, a court may order the
    change “upon proof that the facts set forth in the
    application show reasonable and proper cause for
    changing the name of the applicant.” R.C. 2717.09; In
    re Willhite, 85 Ohio St.3d 28, 30, 706 N.E.2d 778 (1999).
    As a general matter, changing an applicant’s name is
    reasonable and proper “if the request is not intended to
    interfere with the rights of others, nor to confuse or
    mislead the public.” In re Name Change of Handley, 107
    Ohio Misc.2d 24, 27, 736 N.E.2d 125 (P.C.2000), citing
    Marshall   v.    Florida,   301   So.2d    477,   477-478
    (Fla.App.1974).    “Furthermore, an application will be
                                                                  5
ROSS, 23CA31

    deemed reasonable and proper if the application does not
    violate    any    other   overriding    public    policy
    considerations.”    Id., citing In re Application of
    Novogorodskaya, 104 Misc.2d 1006, 1007, 429 N.Y.S.2d 387
    (1980).     Courts also should consider whether an
    applicant’s name change will carry a “potential for
    fraud, particularly where it could lead to financial
    abuse or misrepresentation in society.” In re Change of
    Name of DeWeese, 148 Ohio App.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-2867,
    772 N.E.2d 692, ¶ 8 (3rd Dist.).
         In the case sub judice, after our review we do not
    believe that the trial court’s judgment to overrule
    appellant’s application to change his name constitutes
    an abuse of discretion. Here, the trial court reasonably
    could have determined that changing appellant’s name,
    while he remains imprisoned with a possibility of parole
    in 2023, would adversely affect the rights of others.
    In particular, the court reasoned that the change of
    appellant’s name would adversely affect the rights of
    the victim’s family and friends and would adversely
    affect the Adult Parole Authority’s ability to monitor
    appellant upon his release from prison. The court also
    believed that a grant of appellant’s application would
    contravene the state’s public policy interest to protect
    and promote victim’s rights.    We find nothing in the
    trial court’s decision to suggest that its decision is
    unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Rather, the
    court considered the pertinent facts and circumstances
    and determined that to allow appellant to change his
    name would be inconsistent with the state’s public
    policy interests. See In re Whitacre, 11th Dist. Portage
    No. 2003-P-0051, 2004-Ohio-2926, ¶ 17 (“granting a name
    change to Whitacre could frustrate the purposes of the
    sexual oriented offender registration requirement” and
    “Whitacre’s stated purpose intimates his intention to
    avoid being identified with his past criminal history”).

    {¶7}   In the case sub judice, it appears that appellant is

currently serving a lengthy prison sentence for multiple felony

criminal convictions in a state penal institution.   We observe

that the probate court did not deny appellant’s application due
                                                                      6
ROSS, 23CA31

to any question about the county of appellant’s residence, but,

instead the court denied appellant’s application because of the

authority set forth in Blevins and because appellant did not

comply with the applicable statutory procedure.

    {¶8}   In Ohio, R.C. 2717.01 et seq. sets forth the procedure

to use when a person desires to change their name.   The statutes

provide that a person may file an application in the probate

court of the county of their residence.   Appellant asserts,

however, he cannot use this procedure because, inter alia, the

registration requirement applies to offenders who have committed

certain felony offenses.   Thus, appellant argues that the

probate court should instead grant his application under

principles of “common law.”

    {¶9}   In general, our common law system, based upon the

development in the courts of England from the middle ages, uses

generally accepted customs and principles and relies on the body

of prior judicial decisions for precedents to guide the

adjudication of controversies with a similar subject.     Statutory

law, on the other hand, relies on the legislative process when

elected representatives speak to specific topics.    When statutes

and case law conflict, courts should generally follow the

language of a statute.
                                                                        7
ROSS, 23CA31

    {¶10} In Ohio, many areas of common law are recognized.       One

area of common law formerly recognized involved common law

marriage.   Until 1991, with the enactment of R.C. 3105.12, Ohio

fully recognized the marriage between two parties who simply

held themselves out in the community as married.    Consequently,

the state did not require a licensing component, a solemnization

component or a registration requirement.   However, in 1991 the

General Assembly abolished common law marriage for any

relationship entered into after October 10, 1991.     From that

date forward, Ohio marriages must comply with the applicable

Revised Code provisions.   Examples of other areas of common law

include, inter alia, the evolution of the law of negligence and

various real and personal property concepts.

    {¶11} With regard to name changes, some Ohio case authority

does provide that an Ohio resident may change their name without

availing oneself of the statutory procedure if the change is not

done so for a fraudulent purpose and does not infringe on the

rights of others.   The Third District wrote in In Re DeWeese,

148 Ohio App.3d 201, 2002-Ohio-2867 at paragraph 2:

    “Ohio has traditionally recognized two ways in which a
    person may accomplish a name change. First, absent an
    intent to commit fraud, a person may change his name at
    common law by simply adopting another name. Pierce v.
    Brushart (1950), 153 Ohio St. 372; Dennis v. Ford Motor
    Co. (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 318. Second, a person may
                                                                   8
ROSS, 23CA31

    obtain a statutory name change pursuant to R.C. 2717.01.
    At least one appellate court has held that the statutory
    name change procedures are in addition to the common-
    law method and do not abrogate it.        State ex rel.
    Robinson v. Clark (1994), 91 Ohio App.3d 627, 629.”

    {¶12} Nevertheless, to invoke the authority of a probate

court an applicant must comply with all requirements set forth

in the Ohio Revised Code.   Here, a probate court does not

possess the ability or the authority to wander beyond the

statutory provisions to create the type of relief that appellant

seeks.   Thus, in the case sub judice, the probate court’s

judgment does not constitute an abuse of discretion and the

court properly denied appellant’s application.

    {¶13} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s assignments of error and affirm the probate

court’s judgment.

                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
                                                                   9
ROSS, 23CA31

                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

    It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellant

pay the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this

appeal.

    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this

Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court, Probate

Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                              For the Court

    BY:_______________________________
                                Peter B. Abele, Judge
                                                                  10
ROSS, 23CA31

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.