Court Opinion

ID: 3515952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 22:27:13.439661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:11.947779
License: Public Domain

The general statement of the case is contained in Hartford Accident  Indemnity Company v. Delta  Pine Land Company,169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205, Miss., 188 So. 539, and in 292 U.S. 143, 54 S.Ct. 634, 78 L.Ed. 1178, 92 A.L.R. 928. The case as originally decided in these former hearings, except as reported in 188 So. 539, proceeded to hearing on a demurrer challenging a sufficiency of the appellant's plea, setting up that the case was controlled by the Laws of Tennessee, and that under the laws of that state the giving of the notice within the fifteen months was a condition precedent to liability on the policy. A demurrer raised the legal sufficiency of the declaration, and the full contest over what law controlled and what the effect of the law of Tennessee was, if it controlled, was presented there for decision. Our Court held that the demurrer to the defendant's plea was good, but based its holding upon the opinion that the Mississippi Law controlled rather than the Tennessee Law. This issue as to which law controlled and the effect in law of the plea in defense of the action was necessarily before the Court for a decision, and the decision was announced in plain terms that if the Tennessee Law controlled, the plea presented a defense. The briefs in the case were addressed largely to the question of which law applied, and it did not dispute the proposition that if the Laws of Tennessee controlled, the plea presented a complete defense. This is clear from the following language used in 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205, 206, in deciding the case: "It is to be conceded that under the adjudicated decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, cited in the plea, the provision for notice of fifteen months is a limitation of liability and not a limitation of action. The *Page 525 
converse is true in Mississippi, and the provision is a limitation of the action in this case; our statute of limitation being for six years. Section 2292, Code 1930; Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., v. Miller, 125 Miss. 502, 87 So. 892; Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Broom, 111 Miss. 409, 71 So. 653 [and other cases]. The cases of Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 165 Miss. 405,142 So. 445, 145 So. 887, and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 122 Miss. 813, 85 So. 93, 15 A.L.R. 314, are clearly differentiated from the others cited above, and in the case of Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., supra, it is pointed out that the limitation there under review was a condition precedent to the liability imposed upon the insurance company, and not a limitation upon the time in which the action should be brought."
On the appeal from this Court to the U.S. Supreme Court, the matter was also before that Court for decision upon the sufficiency of the demurrer to answer the plea of the defendant. If the plea presented no defense, and if the Laws of Mississippi and Tennessee lead to the same result, the case should not have been reversed, but the decision should have pointed out that the theory under which the Mississippi Supreme Court proceeded was erroneous but that its judgment was correct because the result would be the same — applying either law. It was the duty of the Delta  Pine Land Company, on the hearing of the first appeal in the Supreme Court of this State, to point out that the Laws of Tennessee, properly understood, would lead to the same result, and that consequently the judgment of the Court should have been affirmed because it would be immaterial as to what reason the court below in its holding sustained the demurrer to the plea of the defendant. It was also its duty to point this out to the U.S. Supreme Court because a litigant should not be permitted to argue one ground of demurrer without arguing other grounds or reasons at the same time. In other words, it should not protract litigation by presenting one ground on one appeal and reserve other *Page 526 
grounds for argument on a second appeal. When the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to this Court for further proceeding, not inconsistent with its opinion, it was then the duty of the Delta  Pine Land Company to present to this Court for decision at that time its present contention that the Laws of Tennessee, if applied, would lead to the same result, but it failed so to do and permitted a remand to the court below without raising this contention, acquiescing up to this time in the contention of the Hartford Accident  Indemnity Company that the Laws of Tennessee, if applied, presented a complete defense to the suit. It, on the remand, again contended that the Mississippi Laws still applied on another theory set forth in its first three replications to the defendant's plea. Its first three replications were filed on October 4, 1934, whereas, the fourth, so called, replication was filed March 23, 1938, during the progress of the trial of the case. This fourth replication is not in fact a legal replication at all, but is a mere legal conclusion filed as a plea, without any facts upon which issue could be properly taken which would constitute an issue of fact rather than an issue of law. The plea reads, as follows: "And for another and further replication, leave to file which having been first obtained, plaintiff says that the contract of suretyship herein sued upon did not make it a condition precedent to liability on the part of the defendant that any claim thereunder must be duly made upon the defendant, the surety, within fifteen months after the termination of the suretyship for the defaulting employee, and said contract of suretyship did not provide that the same should be forfeited in the event said claim should not be made upon the defendant, the surety, within said period of time, and therefore plaintiff should not be precluded from having and maintaining said suit herein."
The contract upon which the declaration was founded contained all of the stipulations with reference to the notice to be given of default within fifteen months after *Page 527 
the termination of the policy of indemnity or insurance. A legal effect of the contract, of course, was presented for decision in the plea to the declaration, and the demurrer to the plea of the defendant and the fourth so called replication at most could only be given the effect of a demurrer to the plea of the defendant. It presents nothing new. The issue it undertakes to present now was squarely on the face of the record when the demurrer to the plea of the defendant was originally filed and sustained. It seems to me to be an intolerable condition to allow a demurrer to a plea to be dealt with as to the sufficiency of the plea by piecemeal. The whole question presented by the demurrer and the plea should have been presented on the former hearing. Furthermore, I think that the U.S. Supreme Court, in its decision, supra, considered the Laws of Tennessee applied to and controlled the policy stipulations. The Court, in discussing the case, at page 149 of 292 U.S., at page 636 of 54 S.Ct., at page 1181 of 78 L.Ed., 92 A.L.R. 928, said:
"A state may limit or prohibit the making of certain contracts within its own territory (Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 [5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610] Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 565, 566, 19 S.Ct. 281, 43 L.Ed. 552 [555, 556]; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 398, 399, 20 S.Ct. 962, 44 L.Ed. 1116 [1123, 1124]); but it cannot extend the effect of its laws beyond its borders so as to destroy or impair the right of citizens of other states to make a contract not operative within its jurisdiction, and lawful where made (New York L. Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 34 S.Ct. 879, 58 L.Ed. 1259; Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 399, 45 S.Ct. 129, 69 L.Ed. 342 [349]). Nor may it in an action based upon such a contract enlarge the obligations of the parties to accord with every local statutory policy solely upon the ground that one of the parties is its own citizen. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407, 408, 50 S.Ct. 338, 74 L.Ed. 926 [933, 934], 74 A.L.R. 701. *Page 528 
"It is urged, however, that in this case the interest insured was in Mississippi when the obligation to indemnify the appellee matured, and it was appellant's duty to make payment there; and these facts justify the state in enlarging the appellant's obligation beyond that stipulated in the bond, to accord with local public policy. The liability was for the payment of money only, and was conditioned upon three events, loss under the policy, notice to the appellant at its home office, and presentation of claim within fifteen months of the termination of the suretyship. All of these conditions were of substantial importance, all were lawful in Tennessee, and all go to the obligation of the contract. It is true the bond contemplated that the employee whose faithfulness was guaranteed might be in any state. He was in fact in Mississippi at the date of loss, as were both obligor and obligee. The contract being a Tennessee contract and lawful in that state, could Mississippi, without deprivation of due process, enlarge the appellant's obligations by reason of the state's alleged interest in the transaction? We think not. . . ."
It is perfectly clear from this language that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed its mind to the contract and determined that it was controlled by the Laws of Tennessee, that it was lawful in Tennessee; and that the controlling stipulation, with reference to the giving of the notice within fifteen months after the termination of the suretyship guaranteeing the fidelity of the employee were of substantial importance under the Laws of Tennessee. The parties presented their contention to the Supreme Court of the United States, as it did to the Supreme Court of this State, upon the theory that if the Tennessee Laws controlled, the plea of the defendant presented a complete defense to the action. Therefore the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and our Court constitutes the law of the case and should be applied regardless of whether it was technically correct or not, because, when the Court has once heard parties in the *Page 529 
same cause of action, and solemnly decided the controversy, it should not, without the gravest necessity, change the rule announced in a former decision. It is true that neither the Laws of the United States nor of Mississippi deprive the Court of the power to change its decisions if it is fundamentally wrong and results in great mischief, but it will not ordinarily reexamine what has once been solemnly decided. See Brewer et al. v. Browning et al., 115 Miss. 358, 76 So. 267, L.R.A. 1918F, 1185, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1013, so holding; and suggestion of error overruled in Id., 115 Miss. 358, 70 So. 519, L.R.A. 1918F, 1185, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1013; and Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 24 S.Ct. 538, 48 L.Ed. 788. The doctrine of the law of the case is not treated as a limit on the powers of the Court to overrule a former decision in the same case, but that as a matter of practice and policy, it will not ordinarily do so. See Remington v. Central Pacific Railroad Company, 198 U.S. 95, 25 S.Ct. 577, 49 L.Ed. 959; also, 22 Harvard Law Review 438; 34 L.R.A. 321; Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1013.
I therefore think that the law of the case should be applied and judgment of the court below reversed and dismissed. However, the Laws of Tennessee, properly understood, in my opinion, make the failure to give notice under the contract within the stipulated time after the termination of the policy a complete defense to an action brought thereafter; where, as in the present case, there is no contrary provision in the stipulations of the policy calling for specific provisions or making the specific provision by a contract that failure to give one notice would forfeit, and a failure to give notice under another provision of the same policy no stipulation of forfeiture was stipulated. The decisions in Guthrie v. Indemnity Association, 101 Tenn. 643, 49 S.W. 829; Phoenix Cotton Oil Company v. Royal Indemnity Company,140 Tenn. 438, 205 S.W. 128; City of Bristol et al. v. Bostwick et al., 146 Tenn. 205, 240 S.W. 774, hold that such conditions or limitations in such contracts are valid and binding, and *Page 530 
the said contract of suretyship contained in the present insurance contract makes the giving of the notice within fifteen months a condition precedent to liability. The policy here involved had its own provision about the time within which suit should be brought after notice was given; and that, of course, is a contract limitation on the time in which suit may be brought. The provision for giving the notice of the default within fifteen months from the termination of the employment, the fidelity of which was insured by the contract, is a contract limitation on liability, and is founded in good reason, and is lawful in Tennessee. It is stated in the case of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. England, 171 Tenn. 104, 100 S.W.2d 982, 983, decided in 1937, that the furnishing of such information is a condition precedent to liability. The object and purpose of the two provisions in the present contract are different, and were embraced in the policy for different purposes. The object of the giving of the notice of the default within fifteen months of termination of the insurance contract was to enable the insurance company to have the opportunity to make an investigation while the facts were obtainable and to take appropriate action to protect its interest, and to recover from the employee insured, if possible, the amount it would lose by its fidelity policy. It is said in the case of Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Company v. England, supra:
"`The object of the notice is to acquaint the company with the occurrence of the loss, so that it may make proper investigation and take such action as may be necessary to protect its interests.' 33 C.J. 16.
"`The object of the proofs is to furnish the company with the particulars of the loss and all data necessary to determine its liability and the amount thereof.' 33 C.J. 17.
"With hundreds of claims coming in daily, a large insurance company would have a considerable portion of its income expended in court costs and attorney's fees *Page 531 
if a claimant could institute suit against it without giving it an opportunity to investigate and determine its liability, and the parties have contracted that the insurer shall have such privilege before suit is begun."
The apparent conflict in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is due to the difference in verbiage of contracts. In some of the cases, a contract of insurance specifically declared a forfeiture and non-liability if proof was not furnished within the time specified in such provision; while in other conditions in the same policy, there was no such stipulation of forfeiture for non-compliance. Of course, where a policy contains such provisions with different verbiage, it would be held, as was held in Tennessee, that, stipulating forfeiture in a particular provision while not stipulating forfeiture in a similar provision or condition, it was not the intention of the parties to forfeit for non-compliance in conditions where no provision for forfeiture was contained in the policy. The Court also said, in the case of Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Company v. England, supra, that the furnishing of such proof is a condition precedent. In some of them a condition precedent to bringing suit, in others a condition precedent to liability. When the language of the contract here involved is set down, it is manifest that it was the intention of the policy to require the notice of the default within the period stipulated, as a condition precedent to liability, and not as a condition for bringing suit. The purpose of such a provision plainly is that the insurance company may have an opportunity to investigate promptly the facts while they are obtainable and while witnesses are available. It is a reasonable stipulation — conducive to fair dealing — and is not prohibited by any Statute of Tennessee.
I do not deem it necessary to take up and analyze the various cases cited in the majority opinion, for, in my opinion, when all of them are examined, and the facts distinguished, all are consistent with the theory that the *Page 532 
stipulation for giving notice was a condition precedent to liability. In the case at bar, the facts could have easily been discovered had the books and records of the Delta  Pine Land Company been audited and the vouchers examined in the offices of the company, and at the bank where its deposits were made. I think, therefore, that judgment should be reversed and the suit dismissed.
As said in the headnote of the case of Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Company, supra, the "Court will enforce insurance contracts according to their terms, if not prohibited by law or public policy." In the opinion, the Court said: "The life insurance business has become one of the most extensive businesses in the country, and such business depends almost entirely upon contracts. The power to make such contracts as the parties desire to make, when not prohibited by law or public policy, is a fundamental principle of the life insurance business, and is essential to its successful conduct." Of course, the same can be said of all kinds of insurance contracts. The State, under its police power, has extensive authority to regulate insurance and insurance contracts and may prohibit certain types of stipulations in policy contracts, but where there is no prohibition, the parties are free to make their own contracts. The liberty of contract is one of the most important and most essential of all the rights of citizenship. Under the law, as it now exists, corporations have the right to make contracts when not prohibited by law; and, the courts are bound by the contract of the parties where the law has not prohibited or regulated them so as to destroy or mitigate certain types of contracts. The courts must enforce the law as they find it and not as the exigencies of particular cases may seem to make desirable from any standpoint of personal conceptions of justice. Courts are not law-makers and have no right to invade the rights of the citizenship except as authorized by law. *Page 533