Court Opinion

ID: 9907490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:07:00.196793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:13.518068
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0550
                             Filed December 6, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LAURIE A. BITTNER
AND JOSEPH G. BITTNER

Upon the Petition of
LAURIE A. BITTNER, n/k/a LAURIE WAGNER REBER,
      Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
JOSEPH G. BITTNER,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Margaret

Reyes, Judge.

       A former spouse appeals the district court’s dissolution decree regarding

property disposition and spousal support. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

       P. Shawn McCann of McGinn, Springer & Noethe, P.L.C., Council Bluffs,

for appellant.

       Stephen Babe of Cordell Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellee.

       Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Blane, S.J.*

       *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                          2

BLANE, Senior Judge.

       Laurie Bittner (now Laurie Wagner Reber) appeals the dissolution decree

that ended her marriage to Joseph Bittner (Joe). Laurie argues that the trial court

failed to include in the calculation of marital assets Joe’s “cash bankroll” that she

claims he kept in the house safe for gambling purposes. She also contests the

court’s failure to find Joe dissipated assets after she filed the dissolution petition

by his continued gambling as well as excessive spending as shown by his credit

card use. Finally, she contests the court’s failure to award her transitional spousal

support. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the district court as to the “cash

bankroll,” dissipation of assets by excessive credit card spending, and denial of

transitional spousal support, but we modify the decree as to the dissipation of

assets by Joe’s gambling. We also deny Joe’s request for appellate attorney fees.

   I. Background facts and proceedings.

       Laurie and Joe married on September 10, 2011, when Laurie was

approximately forty-four years old and Joe was about thirty-one years old. The

marriage was Laurie’s second and Joe’s third. They each had children by their

prior marriages, none being minors at the time of the dissolution trial. Laurie is a

high school graduate and works as a customer service supervisor earning $26.10

per hour or approximately $54,000 per year. She has emphysema for which she

uses an inhaler and some depression, but her health issues do not affect her work

ability. Joe has an eleventh-grade education and is a general manager for a

trucking company with an annual salary of $72,800. He also works as a freight

broker for a logistics company where he makes about $400,000 a year. His gross

income in 2020 was $461,414. He was earning $9300 a week in 2021 at the time
                                          3

of trial. Joe suffers from anxiety and takes medication to control his high blood

pressure but is otherwise active.

        Starting around 2015, Joe began gambling. It was a social activity for both

Joe and Laurie.     Both would go to casinos. Joe would have relatively large

gambling “swings” of $10,000 in wins and losses and was characterized as a “high

roller.” Laurie would gamble much smaller amounts or watch Joe playing.

        The parties separated in July 2020. Laurie filed her petition for dissolution

in August 2020. She alleged dissipation of marital assets and requested equitable

distribution of marital assets and debts, spousal support, and an award of attorney

fees.   Joe filed his answer and countercomplaint, in which he admitted the

breakdown of the marriage but denied the allegations regarding dissipation of

marital assets and attorney fees. The answer did not respond to the spousal

support request.

        The dissolution trial was held on August 21, 2021. The trial court filed the

dissolution decree in November. Pertinent here, the court determined Laurie’s

evidence did not establish Joe had a $25,000 “cash bankroll” in the safe at the

house or that Joe dissipated assets, as his gambling and spending continued in

the same manner as it had during the marriage. The court also denied the request

for transitional spousal support.      The court ordered Joe to pay Laurie an

equalization payment of $92,684.07.

        Laurie filed a motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend. The motion re-

asserted the claim of dissipation of marital assets by gambling and excessive

spending, as well as challenging the court’s failure to find the existence of the “cash
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bankroll.”   It also asserted the court used an incorrect calculation for Joe’s

equalization payment to Laurie and failed to award spousal support. Joe resisted.

       On February 25, 2022, the court filed its order on the motion. It modified

the decree as to the excessive spending, finding Joe had spent $12,416.47 on his

paramour, and that amount along with several other adjustments would be

included in the equalization payment, which was increased to $155,327.51. The

court denied the motion as to the dissipation of assets by gambling and excessive

credit card purchases, the “cash bankroll,” and the spousal support.             Laurie

appeals.

   II. Standard of review.

       “Marriage dissolution proceedings are equitable proceedings.”              In re

Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). “Thus, the standard of

review is de novo.” Id.; accord Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. “Although we give weight

to the factual findings of the district court, we are not bound by them.” Mauer, 874

N.W.2d at 106; accord Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). “But we will disturb a district

court determination only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Mauer, 874

N.W.2d at 106.

   III. Discussion.1

       Generally, marital property that exists at the time of the divorce other than

gifts and inheritances to one spouse is divisible property.         In re Marriage of

1 We note initially that Joe argues in his appeal brief that Laurie’s brief fails to set

out preservation of error on the issues for review and for this reason we should
find the issues have been waived. We elect to address the merits despite any
shortcomings in the briefing. See State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2013).
                                          5

Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006). The court must consider the factors

set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21(5) (2020) when dividing the parties’ assets

and debts. Under our statutory distribution scheme, the first task in dividing

property is to determine the property subject to division. The second task is to

divide this property in an equitable manner according to the factors enumerated in

section 598.21(5), as well as other relevant factors determined by the court in a

particular case. In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 2005).

      A. “Cash bankroll”

      Laurie listed in her affidavit of financial status that Joe retained $25,000

cash at his home. At trial, she testified that during the marriage Joe kept between

$20,000 and $30,000 cash in the home safe to have available when he went

gambling. Laurie acknowledged that she had not been in the marital home for over

a year, that the amount varied over time, and that she used the $25,000 figure as

an average.

      Another witness, Tiffany Baker, dated Joe from July 2020 to March 2021.

During that time, she spent time with Joe and in his home. She testified Joe kept

quite a lot of cash around the house, but not $25,000. She observed he kept cash

in the safe. On one occasion, he had $25,000 in the safe, which was winnings

from a night of gambling, but he then deposited it in the bank.

      Joe testified at trial that he usually kept no more than $3000 to $4000 at

home, that he usually deposited large sums of cash in the bank, and there was

presently no cash in the home safe. He admitted that one time he did win $25,000

that he placed temporarily in the safe but then deposited that in the bank.

      In its decree, the district court found
                                           6

       Laurie argues that Joseph regularly kept $25,000 in cash in a home
       safe to support his gambling. She requests the parties share the
       “bankroll” equally. Joseph denies this and states that while he might
       have maintained a few thousand dollars at home, any significant
       winnings would have deposited into the bank. The court finds that
       the evidence was insufficient to establish that the $25,000 bankroll
       exists.

Following Laurie’s motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend, the court further found

       [A]t trial Joseph disputed that he maintained a $25,000 bankroll at
       the house and testified that he would have deposited such large
       gambling winnings into [a TS Bank account] in the fall of 2020. The
       court found Joseph’s testimony credible and corroborated by the
       testimony of [Baker] who testified that Joseph told her at the time that
       he deposited the cash. In addition, [an exhibit] shows several
       deposits of approximately $20,000 between October 2020 and
       February 2021. . . . As set out in the Decree, the court finds that the
       evidence was insufficient to establish that Joseph maintained a
       $25,000 bankroll at home at the time of trial.

Accordingly, the court denied Laurie’s motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend.

On appeal, Laurie modifies her argument and requests the court award her half of

somewhere between the $3000 and $25,000.

       “Although our review of the trial court’s award is de novo, we accord the trial

court considerable latitude in making this determination and will disturb the ruling

only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Schriner, 695 N.W.2d at 495–96

(quoting In re Marriage of Romanelli, 570 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Iowa 1997)). Marital

property typically is valued as of the date of the dissolution trial. In re Marriage of

Thatcher, 864 N.W.2d 533, 545 (Iowa 2015) (citing In re Marriage of Keener, 728

N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007) (“The assets should then be given their value as of

the date of trial.”)). In addition, cash is a liquid asset. In re Marriage of McDermott,

827 N.W.2d 671, 682–83 (Iowa 2013). As such, the exact amount held by the

parties as of the date of the dissolution trial is subject to wide fluctuation and can
                                          7

be difficult to determine. The general legal principle is that the “burden of proof in

an action ordinarily rests with the party who is seeking recovery.” In re Marriage

of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 418 (Iowa 2015).

       The court found Joe’s testimony that he did not keep that sum of cash in the

home credible and found bank records corroborated his statements. We defer to

those credibility findings and, on our review, we also find the evidence of the

amount of cash being held by Joe in his home at the time of trial too speculative to

include the suggested amount in the marital assets to be distributed.

       B. Dissipation of assets.

       i. Gambling.

       Laurie contends that the district court failed to include in the marital assets

an amount that Joe dissipated in his continued gambling between their separation

and trial. Dissipation of assets is a proper consideration when dividing marital

property. In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2005).

       In determining whether dissipation has occurred, courts must decide
       (1) whether the alleged purpose of the expenditure is supported by
       the evidence, and if so, (2) whether that purpose amounts to
       dissipation under the circumstances. The second issue requires the
       consideration of many factors, including (1) the proximity of the
       expenditure to the parties’ separation, (2) whether the expenditure
       was typical of expenditures made by the parties prior to the
       breakdown of the marriage, (3) whether the expenditure benefited
       the ‘joint’ marital enterprise or was for the benefit of one spouse to
       the exclusion of the other, and (4) the need for, and the amount of,
       the expenditure.

In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 104–05 (Iowa 2007) (cleaned up for

readability).

       In the decree, the district court found Laurie’s evidence showed that Joe’s

gambling expenses in 2018 and 2019 were consistent with those following
                                           8

separation up to the time of trial. The court concluded that since Joe’s gambling

continued after the separation the same as before, this did not constitute

dissipation of marital assets. In her motion to amend, Laurie was more specific

and requested the court assign Joe $171,359.55 in gambling expenses. The court

analyzed the evidence and stated: “When taken together with Joseph’s monthly

expenses the figures far exceed Joseph’s gross earnings. Laurie’s request for

reconsideration of Joseph’s dissipation of marital assets based on his gambling is

denied.”

       We find the district court’s analysis faulty in several regards. First, it does

not appear the court applied the four-factors in Fennelly. Rather, the court appears

to have applied only the second factor—whether the expenditure was typical of

expenditures made by the parties prior to the breakdown of the marriage.

Analyzing the four factors, first, Joe continued gambling significant amounts

following the parties’ separation until the dissolution trial. The purpose of gambling

was purely entertainment and hardly a necessity. As to the second factor, we have

already indicated Joe’s gambling continued to much the same degree as before

the separation. The third factor weighs significantly in favor of finding dissipation,

as the expenditure did not benefit the ‘joint’ marital enterprise but was for the

benefit of Joe to the exclusion of Laurie. The fourth factor—the need for, and the

amount of, the expenditure—also weighs in favor of dissipation, as there was no

need for the gambling, and while the amount may have seemed insignificant to

Joe, it is not insignificant in the distribution of marital assets. Further, the critical

question is “whether the payment of the obligation was a reasonable and expected

aspect of the particular marriage.” In re Marriage of Burgess, 568 N.W.2d 827,
                                          9

829 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). It was not. Our courts may also consider “‘[w]hether

the dissipating party intended to hide, deplete, or divert the marital asset.’”

Breckenfelder, 737 N.W.2d 105 (citation omitted). Joe did not hide his gambling,

but this does not offset the other factors. When all these factors are considered,

we find that Joe’s continued gambling of a significant sum constitutes dissipation

of marital assets.

       We find this conclusion is supported by two of our earlier cases. In In re

Marriage of Bell, 576 N.W.2d 618, 624–25 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), abrogated on

other grounds by In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998),

our court held: “We find the amounts of money [husband] spent on gambling after

the initiation of the dissolution proceedings to be wasteful of marital assets and we

consider this in our distribution.”    We also found excessive gambling to be

dissipation of assets in In re Marriage of Martens, No. 03-0549, 2004 WL 358889,

at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2004) (“We, like the district court, find that [wife’s]

testimony is more credible than [husband’s] regarding the considerable assets

expended by the couple on gambling. Although the record is clear that both parties

gambled a great deal, it is also clear that [husband] dissipated much more of the

parties’ property than [wife] and did so in a secretive way.”).

       As with the cash bankroll, how much Joe dissipated by gambling is a difficult

number to grasp. Laurie testified she personally reviewed various financial records

produced by Joe through discovery and created Exhibit 45 which summarized that

between their separation and the dissolution trial Joe had gambled at least
                                          10

$171,359.95.2 This amount is supported by documents from the various gambling

venues and was not seriously challenged during cross-examination. We find this

amount reasonably verified from those records. Laurie is entitled to one-half the

amount dissipated by gambling, which is $85,679.77. This amount is to be added

to the equalization payment Joe is to pay to Laurie.

       ii. Excessive credit-card spending on non-marital purposes.

       Laurie further claims Joe dissipated an additional $186,138.21 by excessive

credit card spending for non-marital purposes during the thirteen months between

their separation and the dissolution trial. The evidence consists of Laurie’s Exhibit

45, her calculations based upon analysis of financial records and her testimony.

As we pointed out above, the burden is upon Laurie to prove the amount of

dissipation. Here, as did the trial court, we find the evidence on credit card

expenditures not as thorough or convincing as that supporting the gambling

dissipation.

       The district court in its ruling on the rule 1.904(2) motion held:

       As set out above, the court finds that Laurie’s evidence does not
       sufficiently support her allegations that Joseph dissipated an
       additional $186,138.21 on credit cards after payment of his taxes and
       monthly household expenses listed on his financial affidavit.
       Because Joseph is assessed all marital credit card debt, Laurie’s
       request for reconsideration of dissipation of marital assets based
       upon Joseph’s excess credit card spending is therefore denied.

On appeal, Laurie describes her evidence to support the credit card dissipation:

       Regarding the excessive spending, Laurie explained Exhibit 45 with
       a spending number of $186,138.21 which was an analysis of Exhibit
       G where she went through each of Joseph’s credit card accounts.
       Taking the beginning balance and the ending balance to calculate

2 Laurie testified these amounts did not include amounts for gambling put on credit

cards or cash.
                                         11

       what was paid on the cards. She calculated the extra credit card
       spending to be $186,138.21.

We find this conclusory analysis inadequate. It only gave Joe credit for credit card

debt at the time of separation, payments on vehicle loans, and thirteen months of

what she classified as “household bills.”      This does not include credit card

expenditures that Joe would likely have made as regular living expenses. Joe did

not account for where much of his significant income went during the separation

until the dissolution trial, but it was not his burden to refute dissipation. We

conclude Laurie’s evidence was insufficient to prove dissipation in a specific

amount of credit card purchases.3

       C. Spousal support.

       Laurie appeals the district court denial of her request for an award of

transitional spousal support of 20% of Joe’s income. Our supreme court for the

first time formally recognized transitional spousal support in In re Marriage of

Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 541 (Iowa 2022) as amended (Apr. 6, 2022), reh’g

denied (Apr. 6, 2022). Both the decree and order on the motion to amend pre-

dated Pazhoor, so the trial court did not have the benefit of that opinion, although

some prior court of appeals cases had awarded what was called transitional

alimony. In Pazhoor, the court stated several general concepts when considering

spousal support:

              The question of whether to award alimony is a matter of
       discretion and not a matter of right. The decision to award alimony
       depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
       The legislature has not authorized Iowa courts to employ any fixed

3 Laurie does not appeal the dissipation claim regarding expenditures made by Joe

on his paramour after separation. The district court in its rule 1.904(2) order found
an additional $12,416.47 for “mistress gifts.”
                                         12

      or mathematical formula in applying spousal support. Instead, courts
      are instructed to equitably award spousal support by considering the
      criteria listed in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1).

Id. at 537–38 (cleaned up for readability). Additionally, when addressing spousal

support, we are mindful:

              Although our review is de novo, we allow the district court
      considerable latitude in awarding spousal support. Because the
      district court is in a better position to balance the parties’ needs, we
      should intervene on appeal only when there is a failure to do equity.
      We accord the trial court considerable latitude in making the
      determination of spousal support and will disturb the ruling only when
      there has been a failure to do equity.

In re Marriage of Stenzel, 908 N.W.2d 524, 531 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (cleaned up

for readability). We apply the criteria set out in Iowa Code section 598.21A in

determining spousal support. In re Marriage of Eastman, No. 20-1677, 2021

WL 5106074, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App., Nov. 3, 2021).

      More specifically, as to transitional spousal support, the supreme court

informed:

              We conclude that formal recognition of transitional alimony
      will assist the bench and bar. There are inequities in dissolution
      beyond a spouse’s economic sacrifices that directly enhanced the
      future earning capacity of the other, a spouse’s need for education
      or retraining to become self-sufficient, or a spouse’s responsibility to
      support the other so long as a dependent spouse is incapable of self-
      support. There may be a need for short-term support in some cases
      to help transition from married life to single life. Transitional alimony
      can ameliorate inequity unaddressed by the other recognized
      categories of support. Divorcing spouses must adjust to single life.
      If one is better equipped for that adjustment and the other will face
      hardship, then transitional alimony can be awarded to address that
      inequity and bridge the gap. We now formally recognize transitional
      alimony as another tool to do equity.

Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 541–42 (cleaned up for readability).
                                          13

       We find that the factors here do not support an award of transitional alimony.

This was a relatively short marriage, and the parties are relatively young, still

working, and in reasonably good health. Their earning capacity is starkly different

but, given the large property division, it is feasible for Laurie to maintain herself at

a standard of living comparable to that she enjoyed during the marriage.

       Most significantly, we find under the facts here that Iowa Code

section 598.21A(1)(c) makes transitional spousal support unnecessary.              That

subsection requires us to consider “The distribution of property made pursuant to

section 598.21.” The district court rule 1.904(2) order required Joe to make an

equalization payment to Laurie of $155,327.51. In this opinion, we have increased

that amount by $85,679.77 due to gambling dissipation.                This brings the

equalization payment to $241,007.28, which supplants the need for transitional

alimony.

       D. Appellate attorney fees.4

       Joe requests an award of appellate attorney fees. His counsel submitted

an attorney fee affidavit requesting $11,006.50.

       Appellate attorney fees in a dissolution-of-marriage action are not awarded

as a matter of right but rather rest in our discretion.        Factors to consider in

determining whether to award appellate attorney fees include “the needs of the

party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits

of the appeal.” McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 687.

4 The supreme court ordered the issue of appellate attorney fees be submitted for

our consideration with the appeal.
                                       14

      Considering these factors, Joe is more capable of paying his attorney fees

than Laurie, and both parties achieved some success in this appeal. For these

reasons, we decline to award Joe appellate attorney fees.

      E. Conclusion.

      We affirm the district court decree as to the “cash bankroll,” dissipation of

assets by excessive credit card spending, and denial of transitional spousal

support, but we modify the decree as to the dissipation of assets by Joe’s

gambling. We also deny Joe’s request for appellate attorney fees.

      AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.