Court Opinion

ID: 9833425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:41:45.740943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:02.463409
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellants in the kindest terms, for which we thank them, call our attention to several minor inaccuracies in our original opinion that were overlooked in its final reading. Specifically stated, line 20 from the top of page 2 of the opinion reads that “ap*129pellants” cite article 2097, Yernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, and Daniels v. Larendon, 49 Tex. 216, as sustaining the contention that Loughry was not a qualified surety, etc. It should read that “appellees” cite, etc. The case of Trammell v. Trammell is referred to on line 2, page 3, of the opinion as in 75 Texas. It should be in 15 Texas. The “1” in the name Walkins, line 2, page 4, should be “t,” so as to read Watkins v. Junker, 90 Tex. 584, 40 S. W. 11, etc. While the inaccuracies complained of are not thought to be material in the disposition of the question discussed, the original opinion will be corrected as indicated.
As supporting a vigorous contention that we were in error in holding that the “interest” to which appellees were entitled must be considered as “damages” and not as “interest eo nomine,” appellants cite and stress the eases of Railway Co. v. Perkins (Tex. Civ. App.) 184 S. W. 725; Moser v. Tucker (Tex. Civ. App.) 195 S. W. 259; and McNeill v. Casey (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 1130. While the cases referred to seem to sustain appellant’s contention, a contrary effect, we think, must be given to the decision of this court in Bank v. Little, 168 S. W. 55, and to the case of Insurance Co. v. Kriton, 112 Tex. 532, 249 S. W. 193, by section'A of our Commission of Appeals, both of which are cited in our original opinion. In the opinion by the Commission, written by Judge German, various decisions of our Courts of Civil Appeals are cited and discussed, among them being Moser v. Tucker and McNeill v. Casey, supra, so strongly urged in behalf of appellants, and the conclusion reached was, as we think, in harmony with our original opinion, relating to the same subject. The contract in the pres-, ent case is, we think, one “ascertaining the sum payable” when construed in the light of Judge German’s opinion, and hence the “interest” to which appellees were entitled is that which the statute provides for, and not recoverable as “damages” in the sense of such cases as Baker v. Smelzer, 88 Tex. 28, 29 S. W. 377, 33 L. R. A. 163.
It is urged that appellees, in the justice court, pleaded for a recovery in excess of $100. Appellee’s prayer was for the recovery of the $100 in controversy and for interest and attorney’s fees in the sum of $10. But no fact is alleged in the pleading that shows a right to attorney’s fees or to damages as distinguished from legal interest, and the prayer cannot enlarge the cause of action. Wilks v. Kreis, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 527, 134 S. W. 838, and cases therein cited. Furthermore, the prayer for attorney’s fees seems to have been abandoned in both the justice and county courts, neither testimony nor action relating to the subject appearing in the proceedings of either court. The real amount in controversy, therefore, was $100. This amount was, in the language of Judge German, “definitely ascertained” in both courts below, and as long as the same remained unpaid there was a “detention of money,” and the statute attached to the obligation the condition that it should bear the legal rate of interest. The opinion in the case of Insurance Co. v. Kriton, supra, seems to have been written with a view of settling the question presented in the conflicting views of. Courts of Civil Appeals, was approved by the Supreme Court, and must be followed.
What was said in our original opinion relating to the merits was mere obiter and not intended to form the bases of our conclusion to dismiss the appeal, yet, in deference to appellants’ extended discussion and contention that the evidence shows that appellants’ title was in fact good, we will add that the contract of Mrs. Martin was to furnish an “abstract showing a good title.” Appellees, therefore, were not required to accept title based on affidavits tending to show title by limitation, waivers of unquestioned defects appearing on the face of the abstract. See authorities cited in our original opinion.
We conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled.