Court Opinion

ID: 9455640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:28:18.787712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:40.379473
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before RIVES, GOLDBERG and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This Court in its original opinion noted Diamond’s complaint that the district court erred in entering judgment for a lump sum without allocating specific amounts to the various elements which the court considered. Specifically, Diamond objects to the court’s finding that,
“As a direct and proximate result of his injury plaintiff has suffered a loss *491of physical capacity, other than his capacity to earn wages, which will in all reasonable medical probability continue to the end of his life.”
The award of damages for “a loss of physical capacity other than his capacity to earn wages,” Diamond insists, allows a double recovery in that it overlaps with the award of damages for lost wages and earning capacity and/or past and future physical pain and mental anguish.
Diamond also objects to the district court’s findings on damages in that: (1) In its findings that Neill would suffer future lost wages and earning capacity, the court did not consider actual earning capacity but calculated damages on Neill’s inability to engage in oilfield work; (2) the court erred in not specifying the percentage of discount to reduce future earnings to present value.
These errors, Diamond contends, cannot be adequately reviewed by this Court until the district court specifies the exact amount for each element of damages and the factual basis for computing each amount.
On the basis of Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ. P., numerous courts have remanded with direction that the district court specify separately the amount of damages awarded for each of the several items held recoverable.1 Although several of these decisions are distinguishable in that they were also remanded on the question of liability,2 the remaining cases were remanded on the sole question of specificity of the damage award.
In contrast to the above cases, other cases have held that, under the circumstances, remand for further findings as to the damage award was not necessary.3 The “special circumstances” which alleviated the necessity for remand were: (1) The findings of the district court were adequate for purposes of review;4 (2) no objection or doubt was raised at the appellate level as to the excessiveness or composition of the lump sum award; 5 or (3) no exception was made at the trial as to the form of the district court’s findings.6
 From the contrast between the above two groups of cases, it seems clear that appellate courts, in examining a “lump sum” damage award, should not adopt a per se rule that all eases must be remanded for compliance with Rule 52(a). While an award of damages with specification of the particular elements and the amounts for each and how they were computed is desirable for purposes of appellate review,7 adequate review of an award can often be accomplished even though the award is in “lump sum” form. A remand for further findings under Rule 52(a) is necessary only when *492an appellate court cannot adequately review the “lump sum” award in light of the objections raised as to the validity of the award.
Cases in which courts have remanded for further findings are illustrative of situations where further specificity may be required. Pierce v. New York Central R. R. Co., supra (whether loss of future earnings was reduced to present worth; needed breakdown on past and future increments of each element of damages); Carpenters Local 1273 v. Hill, supra (whether damages awarded were based on accrual or cash basis method of accounting); Daido Line v. Gonzalez, supra (whether impermissible damages were awarded); United States v. Horsfall, supra (whether two specific elements overlapped and thus resulted in double compensation); Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., supra (whether injured party was over-compensated for lost wages).
In the present case, upon reconsideration, we have decided to remand for additional findings in the light of certain objections raised by Diamond to the present findings of fact and conclusions of law. These objections are: (1) It appears that in awarding damages for lost wages and earning capacity, the court did not consider actual earning capacity but calculated damages on Neill’s inability to engage in oilfield work (and thus that damages for this particular element are excessive); and (2) the award of damages for “loss of physical capacity other than his capacity to earn wages” overlaps with damages for lost wages and earning capacity and/or past and future physical pain and mental anguish. Further findings to enable this Court to review these objections would include: (1) factors considered in awarding damages for lost wages and earning capacity, (2) the amount of damages for lost wages and earning capacity, (3) factors considered and the nature of the injury for “loss of physical capacity other than capacity to earn wages,” and (4) the amount of damages for this element.
The district court may, of course, make such further findings and conclusions as it may see fit, and may, in its discretion, take further evidence as to damages, or base its findings and conclusions upon the record already made.
Following the practice of the Second Circuit in Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., supra, 261 F.2d at 191, we conclude :
“Although there is no error in the trial court’s finding as to liability, the judgment appealed from is vacated and the case is remanded for findings as to damages and the entry or reentry of such appropriate judgment as may be justified by the facts and the law.”
Vacated and remanded.

. Lettsome v. United States, 411 F.2d 917, 923 (5 Cir. 1969) ; Pierce v. New York Central R. R. Co., 409 F.2d 1392, 1399 (6 Cir. 1969) ; Penn Tanker Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 514, 520-521 (5 Cir. 1969) ; Carpenters Local 1273 v. Hill, 398 F.2d 360, 363 (9 Cir. 1968); Traylor v. United States, 396 F.2d 837, 839 (6 Cir. 1968); Daido Line v. Gonzalez, 299 F.2d 669, 676-677 (9 Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Horsfall, 270 F.2d 107 (10 Cir. 1959) ; Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187, 190-191 (2 Cir. 1958) ; Major Appliance Co. v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales Corp., 254 F.2d 497, 502 (5 Cir. 1958).

. Lettsome v. United States, supra; Penn Tanker Co. v. United States, supra; Major Appliance Co. v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales Corp., supra.

. Pritchett v. United States, 425 F.2d 663 (5 Cir. 1970); Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502, 505 (5 Cir. 1964) : United States v. Jacobs, 308 F.2d 900 (5 Cir. 1962) ; George v. United States. 295 F.2d 310 (7 Cir. 1961) ; Dwyer v. Socony-Vaeuum Oil Co., 276 F.2d 653, 654 (2 Cir. 1960); United States v. Pendergrast, 241 F.2d 687 (4 Cir. 1957) ; see Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481, 489 (5 Cir. 1969) (dictum).

. Henderson v. United States, supra; United States v. Jacobs, supra; George v. United Staes, supra-, United States v. Pendergrast, supra.

. Henderson v. United States, supra; Dwyer v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra.

. United States v. Jacobs, supra; United States v. Pendergrast, supra.

. Traylor v. United States, supra-, Dwyer v. Soeony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra.