Court Opinion

ID: 9909559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 18:02:31.071354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:59.681104
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 P. v. Plascencia CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097265

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 21FE020019)

           v.

 ROBERT PLASCENCIA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         One November morning, a masked individual fired several shots at a dark sedan
near the intersection of Del Paso Boulevard and Plaza Avenue in Sacramento. A jury
found defendant Robert Plascencia guilty of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor
vehicle, discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, and being a felon in
possession of a firearm.
         On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
into evidence a photograph from an Instagram account without proper authentication,

                                                             1
and, if he forfeited this contention, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel,
(2) insufficient evidence supported his convictions because there was not substantial
evidence the shooter possessed and discharged a “firearm,” and (3) the conviction of
discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner must be reversed as a lesser included
offense of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle. The People concede the
third point, and further assert the matter must be remanded for resentencing so the trial
court can either strike a prior serious felony conviction enhancement or impose a five-
year term on that enhancement.
       We will reverse the discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner
conviction, vacate the sentence imposed on that count, and remand for the trial court to
strike the prior serious felony conviction enhancement or impose the enhancement’s five-
year term.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
       In an amended information, the prosecution charged defendant with discharging a
firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246; count one; statutory section
citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated), discharging a
firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3; count two), and being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count three). The information further
alleged defendant had sustained a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a
prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).

       The Prosecution Case

       On the morning of November 10, 2021, someone called 911 to report a shooting in
the area of Del Paso Boulevard and Plaza Avenue in Sacramento. The caller described
the shooter as a male wearing a balaclava mask, a red hoodie with an emblem on the
front, and light colored pants.

                                              2
       Around the same time, Officer Robert Mueller responded to a ShotSpotter
notification, a system that detects gunfire in areas of Sacramento, indicating five gunshots
were detected in the area of 2421 Del Paso Boulevard near an auto parts store and a donut
shop. Mueller spoke to witnesses and looked for surveillance recordings. He found two
surveillance videos taken in the vicinity, both of which were played for the jury. The two
surveillance videos were on a DVD admitted as People’s exhibit 2. We have
independently reviewed the recordings.
       The first video on People’s exhibit 2, “Plascencia surveillance one,” showed a
parking lot and the intersection of Plaza Avenue and Del Paso Boulevard. Four
individuals can be seen at a distance standing near a parked car. A dark sedan drives by
on Del Paso Boulevard. This sedan captures the attention of one of the four individuals.
He watches the sedan go by and then turn right. The individual walks, and then runs,
through the parking lot in the direction the sedan has traveled. This individual is wearing
a dark-colored ski mask obscuring all of his face except for his eyes and the bridge of his
nose, a red hoodie with a San Francisco 49ers “SF” logo in the middle of a shield design,
light-colored jeans with narrow red and white piping or striping down the sides, and dark
shoes. Hands in his pockets, he runs out of the frame. Seconds later, the individual’s
companions and other bystanders can be seen looking in the direction the individual ran.
       The second video on People’s exhibit 2, “Plascencia surveillance two,” depicted
Plaza Avenue looking to the west from the back of the donut shop. As the video begins,
a dark sedan consistent with the sedan in “Plascencia surveillance one” can be seen in the
distance slowing at a stop sign and beginning to turn left. As the sedan turns left and
proceeds, in the lower left corner of the frame, an individual with a dark ski mask, a red
hoodie, light-colored jeans with narrow red and white piping or striping down the sides,
and dark shoes can be seen entering the frame. The individual is holding what appears to
be a handgun in both hands, pointing it in the direction of the sedan. The individual
begins to fire the gun, as is evidenced both by the appearance of smoke coming out of the

                                             3
barrel and the clear sound of shots being fired. He fires shots while holding the gun with
both hands and then begins to run back in the other direction, from the grass next to the
sidewalk into the street, continuing to fire the gun with just his right hand. Five discrete
shots can be heard on the audio. As the last of the shots can be heard, the individual
moves out of the lower left side of the frame. The dark sedan continues driving away.
       People’s exhibit 3 consisted of 18 still photographs captured from “Plascencia
surveillance one.” Exhibits 15 through 18 were stills from the surveillance video that had
been blown up.
       Officer Mueller searched the area of the shooting and found two .380-caliber
cartridge casings. He did not discover any damage to vehicles or buildings in the area.
No one ever called 911 to report being a victim of this shooting.
       Officer Lorenzo Vidales testified that he went to talk with Marissa R. who had a
relationship with defendant, after defendant became a suspect in the shooting. Vidales’s
body-worn camera recorded the interaction, and the video was played for the jury.
       On the recording, People’s exhibit 4, (“Plascencia [Marissa R.] Statement”)
Marissa R. tells officers that defendant’s mother worked at a laundromat near the location
depicted in one photograph, which was the parking lot in front of the donut shop on Plaza
Avenue and Del Paso Boulevard. Marissa R. stated the individual pictured in another
photograph looked like defendant. When Vidales asked how she could tell it was
defendant with his face covered, Marissa R. said, “That looks like [defendant], because I
kind of- I know his eyes. I’m really familiar with his eyes, and that sweater is really
familiar, as well as those pants, and the last time I saw him he was wearing these,”
indicating the subject’s shoes. Striping or piping down the side of the pants could not be
seen in the photograph Vidales showed Marissa R. However, when Vidales said the
pants had red or black stripes going down both sides, Marissa R. responded that the pants
had a red stripe and a skinny white stripe down each side. She said she had seen

                                              4
defendant in the same sweatshirt. She said, “yeah that definitely looks like [defendant]. I
know him from top to bottom.”
       At trial, Marissa R., who shared a son with defendant and had known him for
many years, testified under subpoena. She did not want to testify. According to
Marissa R., when a police officer contacted her, he lied to her, telling her he wanted to
talk to her about her child. However, when he came to her house, he showed her two
photographs, People’s exhibits 15 and 16, stills from “Plascencia surveillance one.”
Marissa R. testified at trial she did not recall whether she told the officer that she knew
the person in the photograph. She testified she did not recognize the person’s features or
clothing. Regarding what she may have told police earlier, she testified she felt “like
there was a way that they were trying to tell me it was him,” that they were trying to
suggest to her what to say.
       As we will discuss in further detail in part I, section A. of the Discussion, post, the
prosecutor asked to publish People’s exhibit 5, a photograph taken from an Instagram
account, and the court granted permission. According to Officer Vidales, the photograph
shows defendant wearing the same shirt and similar pants and shoes as the shooter. The
post was dated less than a month and a half before the shooting.
       When police arrested defendant, Officer Kyle Stackhouse found a black ski mask
in defendant’s pocket. Stackhouse testified this mask appeared to be similar to the mask
worn by the shooter.
       Police discovered two addresses associated with defendant, apartments on Darina
Avenue where he stayed. People’s exhibit 7, an overhead map, showed the area,
including the location of the Darina Avenue addresses and, a few blocks away, the
location of the shooting. In a search of the two apartments, officers found another ski
mask, although it did not appear to be the mask worn by the shooter. Officers did not
locate a firearm, bullets, a red sweatshirt with a 49ers “SF” logo, or light-colored jeans
with a red stripe on the side.

                                              5
       Officer Ruvim Tsverov testified about another occasion, in September 2021, when
he contacted defendant in the parking lot near Del Paso Boulevard and Plaza Avenue near
the donut shop and laundromat.

       Verdict and Sentencing

       The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial
court found true the prior serious felony conviction allegations.
       The trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior strike conviction. (See
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) The court sentenced
defendant to the low term of three years on count one, doubled to six years for the prior
strike conviction, the low term of 16 months on count two doubled to two years eight
months with that sentence stayed pursuant to section 654, and a concurrent low term of
16 months on count three doubled to two years eight months.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

                           Admission of Instagram Photograph

       A. Additional Background

       Prior to publishing People’s exhibit 5, the Instagram photograph, Officer Vidales
testified he found an Instagram profile he believed to be defendant’s. Defense counsel
objected based on lack of foundation and the court overruled the objection. Vidales
testified he reviewed photographs posted on that account and believed they depicted
defendant. The prosecutor showed Vidales People’s exhibit 5 and Vidales testified it was
a photograph of defendant from the Instagram account. Defense counsel objected “as to
lack of foundation as to being his account,” which the trial court sustained, instructing the
prosecutor to lay a foundation. The court then asked, “how do you know it’s his
account,” a question the prosecutor posed to Vidales. Vidales responded, “[b]ecause of

                                             6
various photos of him on the account. Also, in my training and experience, knowing that
Instagram accounts of people, primarily are the posts – post photos of themselves.”
Vidales testified the account had various photos of just defendant. The prosecutor asked
if there were captions “with words made kind of in first person,” and, after the trial court
overruled defense counsel’s hearsay objection, Vidales responded that there were.
       On cross-examination, Vidales acknowledged he never asked defendant if the
Instagram account was his or otherwise sought to confirm it was defendant’s account. He
acknowledged he was speculating that it was defendant’s account. He also
acknowledged it is not uncommon for people to post photographs of others on their
Instagram accounts. Thus, Vidales acknowledged it could be someone else’s Instagram
account with a photograph of defendant.
       Defense counsel did not object to publication or admission of People’s exhibit 5.

       B. Defendant’s Contentions

       Defendant asserts the trial court erred in admitting the Instagram photograph
because it was not properly authenticated. He asserts there was no evidence to connect
defendant to the Instagram account. The People respond that defendant forfeited his
contention because trial counsel’s objections to the foundation of the Instagram account
did not preserve defendant’s challenge to the authentication of the specific photograph,
People’s exhibit 5.

       C. Forfeiture

       Defense counsel objected to testimony about what Vidales concluded to be
defendant’s Instagram account based on lack of foundation, to lack of foundation for the
conclusion that the account was defendant’s, and to captions based on hearsay. Defense
counsel did not object to publication or admission of People’s exhibit 5, based on lack of
authentication or otherwise.

                                              7
       “A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: [¶]
(a) [t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the
evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the
objection or motion . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) “The requirement that an
objection to evidence be timely made is important because it ‘allows the court to remedy
the situation before any prejudice accrues.’ ” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381,
424.) A “ ‘ “defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection” on the ground
asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.’ ” (People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) Having failed to raise a timely and specific objection to the
photograph based on lack of authentication, defendant has forfeited his contention.

       D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Defendant asserts that, if he forfeited his contention, he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial.
       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692 (Strickland); People v. Ledesma
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217 (Ledesma).) “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address
both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.
In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient
before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice . . . , that course should be followed.” (Strickland, at p. 697.)

                                               8
       We thus turn directly to prejudice. To establish prejudice, defendant must show a
reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable result had counsel’s
performance not been deficient. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694; Ledesma,
supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.) We conclude that, even if counsel should have
objected to the Instagram photograph for lack of authentication, counsel’s failure did not
prejudice defendant.
       The relevance of the Instagram photograph was specific and limited. It showed
defendant dressed in what appears to be the same sweatshirt the shooter is wearing in the
surveillance video and still photographs derived from that video. He is also wearing
pants and shoes similar to those worn by the shooter. Particularly with reference to the
sweatshirt, this photograph was relevant because it had some tendency in reason to prove
defendant was, in fact, the shooter. (Evid. Code, § 210 [relevant evidence is evidence
“having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action”].) However, in addition to other
evidence tending to prove defendant was the shooter, there was also other evidence that
defendant had the same sweatshirt as the one worn by the shooter.
       Marissa R. had a relationship with defendant, shared a son with him, and had
known him for many years. She was familiar with the location of the shooting and told
Officer Vidales that defendant’s mother worked nearby. She stated the individual
pictured in a photograph taken from the surveillance video looked like defendant. When
Vidales asked how she could tell it was defendant with his face covered, Marissa R. said,
“That looks like [defendant], because . . . I know his eyes. I’m really familiar with his
eyes, and that sweater is really familiar, as well as those pants, and the last time I saw
him he was wearing these,” indicating the person’s shoes. She said she had seen
defendant in the same sweatshirt. Striping or piping down the side of the pants could not
be seen in the photograph, but, when Vidales said to Marissa R. the pants had red or
black stripes, Marissa R. responded that they had a red stripe and a skinny white stripe

                                              9
down each side. In both surveillance videos, red and white piping or striping can be seen
running down the sides of the shooter’s pants. Referring to the photograph, Marissa R.
told Vidales, “yeah that definitely looks like [defendant]. I know him from top to
bottom.”
       Marissa R.’s trial testimony was markedly different. She acknowledged she did
not want to testify, said that police lied to her, testified she did not recall whether she told
police she knew the person in the photograph, testified she did not recognize the person’s
features or clothing, and testified police suggested the answers they were looking for.
However, it appears the trier of fact resolved these conflicts by crediting Marissa R.’s
statements to Vidales. Notably, Marissa R.’s statements to Vidales were video recorded,
and jurors watched the recorded interview for themselves, weighing Marissa R.’s prior
statements against her contrary trial testimony.
       Moreover, when police arrested defendant, Officer Stackhouse found a black ski
mask in defendant’s pocket which appeared to be similar to the mask worn by the
shooter. Additionally, Officer Tsverov testified about an occasion in September 2021
when he encountered defendant in the parking lot at Del Paso Boulevard and Plaza
Avenue near the donut shop and laundromat, indicating he spent time in the area, which
was blocks from the apartments where he stayed.
       We conclude that, even if counsel performed deficiently for failing to object to the
admission of the Instagram photograph based on lack of authentication, it is not
reasonably probable defendant would have received a more favorable result had counsel
raised that objection. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694; Ledesma, supra,
43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.) Because defendant cannot establish prejudice, his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails.
       We briefly note that, even if defendant’s claim was not forfeited, the result would
be the same. The Watson standard for harmless error (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836), which defendant agrees would apply to any state law error in admitting the

                                              10
photograph, is substantially the same as the prejudice prong of Strickland. (People v.
Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407, fn. 4.) Even if we concluded defendant
did not forfeit his contention, and even if we concluded the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the photograph, under Watson, we would conclude defendant was
not prejudiced as a result.

                                             II

                                   Substantial Evidence

       Defendant asserts insufficient evidence supports his convictions. Each count
involved either possession or discharge of a firearm, and, according to defendant, there
was not substantial evidence the weapon used qualified as a firearm. We are not
persuaded.
       “In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence
proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the evidence nor
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence.
[Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th
616, 638-639.)
       The Penal Code defines a firearm as “a device, designed to be used as a weapon,
from which is expelled through a barrel, a projectile by the force of an explosion or other

                                             11
form of combustion.” (§ 16520, subd. (a).) The trial court instructed the jury with this
language. (CALCRIM No. 965.)
       As another panel of this court observed, firearms involved in crimes are often not
recovered and circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to prove the object used was a
firearm. (People v. Monjaras (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436.) In the context of
robbery, that court stated, “when as here a defendant commits a robbery by displaying an
object that looks like a gun, the object’s appearance and the defendant’s conduct and
words in using it may constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding
that it was a firearm . . . .” (Id. at p. 1437.)
       Two sources initiated police involvement in the shooting here. An individual
called 911 to report “a shooting.” The other source was a notification from ShotSpotter,
a system that detects “gunfire.” In one of the surveillance videos on People’s exhibit 2,
“Plascencia surveillance two,” the shooter can be seen firing what looks like a firearm
five times, accompanied by the loud sounds of the shots fired. Officer Mueller searched
the area of the shooting and found two .380-caliber cartridge casings.
       We conclude the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
determination that defendant had in his possession and fired a firearm at the dark sedan,
rather than, for example, a BB gun or pellet gun. (See People v. Monjaras, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435 [discussing why pellet guns and BB guns do not qualify as
“firearms”].) Defendant fired five shots, and police only found two cartridge casings.
However, defendant fired at least some of the shots while he was running in the street.
This was the street the dark sedan had just driven on and which was obviously open to
vehicular traffic, potentially displacing other cartridge casings, even though police
arrived shortly after the shooting. We cannot agree with defendant’s characterization that
it was “nonsensical that if the weapon used was a firearm, only two bullets could be
found in that small area.” In fact, it may more reasonably be characterized as nonsensical
that any cartridge casings were found if the weapon used was not a firearm. That Officer

                                                   12
Mueller did not discover any damage to vehicles or buildings in the area and that no one
reported being a victim of this shooting does not undermine our conclusion.
       Defendant asserts there was no evidence tying the two .380-caliber cartridge
casings to a firearm. We disagree. Officer Mueller searched “the area where the
shooting occurred,” where he found the two cartridge casings.
       Additionally, inasmuch as defendant’s conduct may constitute circumstantial
evidence to support a finding that he used a firearm (People v. Monjaras, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437), we note defendant hurriedly chased after the dark sedan,
fired five shots at it from a significant distance in quick succession, and ran off. This
conduct would seem to be more consistent with someone using a firearm than someone
with a pellet gun or starter pistol as defendant implies may have been the case. In any
event, at the least, we can say this conduct is consistent with use of a firearm, which
further supports our conclusion.
       We conclude substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination that
defendant possessed and discharged a “firearm.” (§ 16520, subd. (a).)

                                             III

                                   Lesser Included Offense

       Defendant asserts his conviction of discharging a firearm with gross negligence
(§ 246.3, subd. (a)) must be reversed as a lesser included offense of shooting at an
occupied vehicle (§ 246). The People concede the point, and we agree.
       It “is generally permissible to convict a defendant of multiple charges arising from
a single act or course of conduct.” (People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736, italics
omitted, citing § 954.) “However, a ‘judicially created exception to this rule prohibits
multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] [¶]
When a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included
offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the evidence supports the

                                             13
verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is controlling, and the conviction of the
lesser offense must be reversed.” (Sanders, at p. 736.)
       In People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, the California Supreme Court
“conclude[d] that section 246.3[, subdivision ](a) is a necessarily included lesser offense
of section 246. . . . All the elements of section 246.3[, subdivision ](a) are necessarily
included in the more stringent requirements of section 246.” (Id. at p. 990.)
       We shall reverse defendant’s conviction on count two as a lesser included offense.
                                              IV
                         Section 667, Subdivision (a) Enhancement
       The People assert the matter must be remanded for resentencing because the trial
court failed to either impose a five-year term for the section 667, subdivision (a) prior
serious felony enhancement or strike that enhancement. Defendant did not respond to
this contention in his reply brief.
       Before affording the parties the opportunity to be heard at sentencing, the trial
court said it was “inclined to not use the [prior] strike conviction also for the five year
[section 667, subdivision (a)] nickel prior. So I’m inclined to dismiss that nickel prior.”
When the trial court later imposed sentence, it did not mention the section 667,
subdivision (a) enhancement.
       “The failure to impose or strike an enhancement is a legally unauthorized sentence
subject to correction for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Bradley (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 386, 391; accord, In re Renfrow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1254.) It
certainly may be that the trial court intended to sentence defendant in accordance with its
tentative determination, and simply omitted stating that it was striking the section 667,
subdivision (a) enhancement. However, because the enhancement must be imposed or
stricken, we remand to the trial court for resentencing for this purpose.

                                              14
                                       DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s conviction for discharging a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3,
subd. (a)) on count two is reversed and the sentence imposed on that count is vacated.
The matter is remanded for resentencing for the trial court to exercise its discretion to
strike the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement or impose the five-year term on that
enhancement. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Upon resentencing, the
clerk shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                                  HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RENNER, J.

KEITHLEY, J.

 Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                             15