Court Opinion

ID: 9530427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:46.037386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:06.815688
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would hold that section 115 — 10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 — 10 (West 2002)) is unconstitutional in its entirety and reverse and remand for a new trial. L.H.’s statements to the police officers were clearly “testimonial.” See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194 n.4, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4 (“structured police questioning”). One of the officers testified that his role was to assess what evidence was needed. To carry out that role, he conducted a second interview with L.H. at the Children’s Advocacy Center, with no one else present, an interview that was not taped. It seems clear that these statements contributed to the conviction. No argument is made that any error was harmless. The bulk of section 115 — 10 has been held unconstitutional on its face. If the child does not testify at the trial, there is no set of circumstances under which the hearsay testimony may be admitted. It is not necessary for a trial court to hear evidence or make findings to reach that conclusion. In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 268, 817 N.E.2d 500, 508-09 (2004). We accordingly are not dealing with a statute that is unconstitutional only as applied. The basic purpose of section 115 — 10 was to allow the child’s hearsay statements into evidence even though the child was unable to testify, was unable to relate the details of the incident at trial. People v. Holloway, 177 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10, 682 N.E.2d 59, 63 (1997) (children’s testimony in these cases is often inadequate). That basic purpose has now been thwarted. Is there another purpose? Was it the legislature’s purpose to admit children’s hearsay when the child is fully able to testify? Admission of hearsay is, of course, unnecessary when the child is able to testify. There are also problems with admitting hearsay when the child is able to testify. Inadmissible hearsay gives the State the advantage of having the victim testify twice and serves to unfairly add heft to the State’s case. People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103, 126-30, 699 N.E.2d 577, 589-91 (1998) (McMorrow, J., dissenting). True, section 115 — 10 was written in broad terms. Section 115 — 10 was not limited to cases where the child was unable to testify. It appears the legislature wanted the hearsay admitted, whether or not the child testified, to avoid controversy over whether the child had “testified.” We would not want defense counsel to make the argument that the witness had spoken a few words on the stand; therefore, she had testified and the hearsay statements could not be used. Interestingly, that same argument is now made in reverse. We have held that the child has “appeared” for cross-examination at trial, and, therefore, Crawford does not apply, if the child is simply placed in the witness chair, unable to answer a single question. People v. Sharp, 355 Ill. App. 3d 786, 792-96, 825 N.E.2d 706, 710-13 (2005). The question here is not whether we should interpret section 115 — 10 so as to uphold its constitutionality if reasonably possible. The basic provision of section 115 — 10 is clearly unconstitutional. If part of a statute is unconstitutional, the question becomes whether the legislature would have passed the valid portions of the statute absent the invalid portions. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 372, 671 N.E.2d 700, 712 (1996). Would the legislature have allowed cumulative testimonial evidence when that evidence was unnecessary because the child was able to testify? Would the legislature really enact a new section 115 — 10 that is only a shell of its former self, a section that allows the admission of children’s hearsay only where it is unnecessary and unfair? We should not make that assumption.