Court Opinion

ID: 9712967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:04:06.041152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.506168
License: Public Domain

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE ENGLISH delivered the opinion of the court. Action was brought by plaintiff, as Administrator of the Estate of Geraldine Bernier, his wife, who died as a. result of injuries sustained when the automobile in which she was riding as a guest collided with a guardrail or bridge abutment situated adjacent to the street on which the vehicle was being driven by defendant. At the close of plaintiff’s case, the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant. Motions by plaintiff for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied. The only point raised on appeal is that it was error for the court to have directed the verdict. On the issue of liability there were only three witnesses: a service station attendant, a State Trooper, and defendant (called as a witness under section 60 of the Civil Practice Act). There follows their testimony: Defendant, Barbara Skripek Deceased arrived at defendant’s home in the late afternoon on September 21,1957. At approximately 5:30 p. m., deceased, defendant, and defendant’s brother, William, left the Skripek home in Roseland and rode with William in his 1956 Pontiac to the home of his friend located at 88th Street and Cottage Grove. At that point William left the car and defendant moved into the driver’s seat. The girls planned to visit defendant’s sister who lived at 4501 West 180th Street. They arrived there at about 7:30 p. m., had coffee and cake, and stayed until 10:45 p. m. Defendant and deceased then left in the Pontiac for the long ride home, with defendant driving. Defendant was familiar with the car, having driven it two or three times a week during the six or eight months her brother had owned it. The evening was dark, but clear. Defendant had driven home from her sister’s house on six or seven prior occasions, and had been in the habit of taking Cicero Avenue north to 127th Street and then going east on 127th Street to State Street which ran close to her residence in Rose-land. On the evening of the occurrence, however, defendant changed her route and proceeded east on 180th Street until she came to a dead end. She then turned right and proceeded south to 187th Street where she again turned right and headed west. By this time defendant had completely lost her bearings. She had never driven in the area into which her new route took her, and to add further to her confusion the streets in the neighborhood turned and wound around. All prior visits to her sister’s home had been in the daytime and she had never driven home from there at night. Another right turn headed defendant in a northerly direction until she arrived at an intersection where there was a gas station. Defendant drove into the gas station and asked the attendant for directions back to Roseland. He informed her that she was then on the southeast corner of 127th Street and Harlem, a substantial distance west of her home. When defendant pulled out of the gas station, she turned east on 127th Street, accelerating the car gradually. She did not try to get speed quickly. The two girls were conversing and the car radio was turned on. The headlights were functioning normally at low beam and defendant could see a distance of fifty to seventy-five feet ahead. The highway was unlighted. Defendant drove in the center lane of the two eastbound lanes after leaving the gas station, with her left wheels either on or “very slightly over” the center line of the road. Being unfamiliar with the road, she felt safer in that lane. There was no traffic in front of or behind defendant’s car and nothing obstructed her view of the road, which was made of concrete. Defendant was not confused after learning the way at the gas station, although she had been confused prior to that time. She had been driving with the headlights on high beam but lowered them on entering the gas station and did not raise them again. She was not late for anything, and was in no hurry to get home. She had her hands on the wheel at all times after leaving the gas station until hitting the guardrail. At no time did she lose control of the vehicle. She was looking straight ahead after leaving the gas station and never took her eyes off the road. She was not distracted by anything. She could see the right-hand edge of the pavement, but did not observe that the highway narrowed. She saw no traffic signs. Deceased asked defendant to move from the center lane “over closer to the right-hand side of the road, because she would feel safer and more comfortable” if she did so. To satisfy deceased, defendant moved the car to the right, but she did not swerve the wheel very quickly or suddenly. The impact with the guardrail occurred a split second thereafter. At the time of impact, defendant’s car was proceeding at a speed between 25 and 35 miles per hour. Defendant had her foot on the accelerator continuously, and never applied the brake after leaving the gas station, although she could not recall whether her foot was on the accelerator at the time of the impact. She never saw the guardrail. Gerald Grosskwrth, an Illinois State Trooper He arrived at the accident scene shortly after the occurrence. Both girls were still in the Pontiac and both were injured. The car was a few feet from a guardrail protecting a culvert about a block east of Harlem on 127th Street. The right front fender of the car had collided with the guardrail. The car was facing in a southeasterly direction. He did not see any skid marks. As 127th Street moves east from Harlem, it narrows down at this culvert or guardrail. West of the culvert it is four lanes wide. East of the culvert it is two lanes wide. “The place where the highway narrows down from four lanes to two lanes is right up close to the culvert. As you are eastbound, the road narrows immediately in front of the culvert. Anyone driving in the outside lane, that is, the lane closest to the edge of the road, as they approach from the west going east — approach the culvert and guardrail — would have to move to the left or smash right into the guard rail.” There was no obstruction to the center lane. There were no street lights. There were no signs from Harlem to the culvert, such as “Pavement Narrows,” “Road Merges,” or the like. There was a center line down the middle of the road. Photographs in evidence (defendant’s exhibits 1 and 2, admitted by stipulation), show a series of four posts with metal diagonally-striped warning-type signs along the south side of the road west of the guardrail. Those signs were not there on the night of the accident. The concrete base of the guardrail is off the edge of the pavement, maybe two feet. Testifying as to a conversation with the defendant shortly after and at the scene of the occurrence, this witness said that she was obviously injured and “disoriented” ; and that with regard to the occurrence she told him she was confused and didn’t know what happened. An ambulance came within five minutes, taking defendant and deceased to the hospital. On cross-examination Grosskurth said that defendant “admittedly was confused,” although he did not recall “if she specifically used ‘confused’ or whether she substituted another word.” He also did not recall if she said “whether she was confused at the time of the accident or confused earlier, such as being lost.” Thomas J. Crawford On the night of the accident, he was helping his son operate a gas station on the southeast corner of 127 Street and Harlem Avenue. The first he knew of the accident was when he heard a big noise and crash. He then saw that a car had crashed the railing of the bridge. The distance from the gas station driveway to the guardrail was approximately 300 feet — not a full block — and the lights from the station shone out almost to the bridge railing. 127th Street is four lanes wide east of Harlem. The wide pavement stops “just to the west of the bridge, right near the bridge.” It is a two-lane road all the way through, only at the intersection of Harlem it is four lanes. “After you get down about 100 yards, you come to the guardrail and the road narrows before it hits the bridge. After you cross the bridge it is then two lanes wide. When I looked down there that evening I didn’t see any lights or reflectors.” The car had moved from a brightly lighted area into the darkness of night. (This witness testified on direct examination that he had determined from the sound of the motor as defendant’s car had pulled out of the station that it was going fast. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had heard motors roar when the cars weren’t even moving “so that the sound of the motor does not tell me how fast the car is going.” He also admitted that he had not seen the car leave, stating, “I did not watch it going down the road, so I have no idea how fast it went.” On motion of defendant, the court then struck all this witness’ remarks on speed, and instructed the jury to disregard them.)  A cause of action against an automobile driver accrues to a guest occupant only if the guest sustains injuries caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver. Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 95%, § 9-201. The statute, however, does not define the term “wilful and wanton misconduct.” Most opinions dealing with this subject contain a statement similar to the one found in Bering v. Hilton, 12 Ill2d 559, 562, 147 NE2d 311, where the court said, “Wilful and wanton misconduct has been defined in myriads of cases, each one reiterating or embellishing the phraseology of its predecessors.” Customarily there then follows a definition of the term with more or less restrained reiteration or embellishment. We shall refrain altogether from drafting our own definition, partly because we have nothing new to offer in such a delineation, but, more importantly, because the skilled draftsmen of the committee which prepared IPX collected and studied the “myriads of cases” and distilled their language into a terse, but all-inclusive definition which we are happy to adopt. We consider it particularly appropriate in the instant case, because the IPX definition instruction would undoubtedly have been given to the jury and would have governed its deliberation if the court had not directed a verdict.  Tailoring the IPX definition to fit the case before us by eliminating the clause covering intentional injury, the instruction (14.01) reads: When I use the expression “wilful and wanton conduct” I mean a course of action which shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for a person’s own safety and the safety of others.  Our task, therefore, is to examine the proof in comparison with this standard; and, in so doing, we have no difficulty concluding that plaintiff’s proof falls way short of the stated requirement, and that the trial judge performed his duty correctly in directing a verdict for defendant. Far from acting with “utter indifference to” or “consciom disregard for” the safety of her passenger, defendant was attempting to move one-car width to the adjoining lane, at the request of her passenger, and for the express purpose of enhancing the latter’s feeling of safety. She had moved to the right less than a car width, in fact only a few feet, when the collision occurred. Ironically, if defendant had continued to drive in the lane which she herself had originally selected, this tragic occurrence would never have taken place. Attempting to comply with her friend’s suggestion, however, she steered the car, without swerving .quickly or suddenly, and without losing control of the car, into what she, and obviously her passenger also, expected would be the outside lane of the highway. Their expectations were not reckless or thoughtless, because defendant could see the right-hand edge of the pavement and there were no signs or markers indicating that they were about to come to an abrupt narrowing of the road. Nor did the bridge abutment bear any lights, or even reflectors, to indicate in the dark night the deadly obstruction which lay ahead and which defendant never saw. Speed is not a factor in this case, since the statements of the gas station attendant on this subject were all stricken, and an uncontradicted speed of 25 to 35 miles per hour under the circumstances is not evidence of wilful and wanton misconduct. It was truly a horrible coincidence that at the very moment when defendant moved the car the short distance to the right to get into the adjoining lane, this lane of pavement, without warning of any kind, ceased to exist. The evidence is uncontroverted that the outside lane terminated directly in front of the culvert or bridge, and that a car moving in that lane at that point would “smash right into the guardrail.” Unfortunately, that is precisely what happened in this case under circumstances which we believe make it very doubtful that there is any proof of ordinary negligence on the part of the driver, let alone wilful and wanton misconduct.  The correctness of the trial judge’s decision in directing the verdict — and ours in agreeing that he was right in doing so — must be gauged by the rule recently declared by the Supreme Court in Pedrick v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 37Ill2d 494, 229 NE2d 504. There, the court said that a verdict should be directed if “all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” Strictly construed, this might still leave the question open as to when - a verdict will be permitted to stand. Considering the nature of the court’s opinion, however, we believe that the pronouncement as made was intended to contain within itself the standard for solution to the entire problem. Consequently, we conclude that a verdict in favor of one party cannot stand when the evidence, viewed in its aspect most favorable to such party, overwhelmingly favors the other party. Such a verdict would therefore be set aside by judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, if the question were to be presented in advance, by directed verdict. Applying this test (or any of the tests set forth in the Illinois cases prior to Pedrick), we find that all the evidence on liability, which we have outlined above, when considered in its aspect most favorable to plaintiff, overwhelmingly demonstrates that defendant was not guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct. In this circumstance, it was not merely a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion, but, rather, its duty to withdraw the case from the jury’s consideration. Fosdick v. Servis, 40 Ill App2d 363, 367, 189 NE2d 538. Because of the variety in the factual situations of cases approving or rejecting findings of wilful and wanton conduct, the authorities cited to us are of less than ordinary value. This is no doubt due to the infrequency with which cases involving wilful and wanton conduct reach the courts, in comparison with cases charging negligence. Cases which were concerned with single vehicles striking obstructions (trees, posts, guardrails, embankment, etc.) off the side of the road include Pritchett v. Rich, 14 Ill App2d 215, 144 NE2d 173; Joiner v. Birch, 21 Ill App2d 249, 157 NE2d 676; Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill 564, 52 NE2d 229; Fosdick v. Servis, 40 Ill App2d 363, 189 NE2d 538; Bartolucci v. Falleti, 382 Ill 168, 46 NE 2d 980. Also, see Ficht v. Niedert Motor Service, Inc., 34 Ill App2d 360, 181 NE2d 386, which involved the collision of two moving vehicles. In each of these cases there were factors involved which would seem to weigh much more heavily on the plaintiff’s side of the case than anything to be found in the case at bar (e. g., speeds up to 55 miles per hour, icy road conditions, familiarity with the road, loss of control of the car, rain, and wet pavement), yet all the decisions held that the trial court properly had, or should have, taken the case from the jury. As precedents, these are all a fortiori situations, and yet all the reviewing courts concluded that there was a fatal lack of proof that the defendant had been conscious that his conduct would probably result in injury to anyone, or that he had exhibited a conscious or reckless indifference to consequences. On the other hand, the cases cited to us which do find wilful and wanton conduct are all based upon much stronger facts. The defendant in Myers v. Krajefska, 8 Ill2d 322, 134 NE2d 277, had been drinking; he drove in mist and rain on a slick pavement, at 50 to 60 miles per hour; he saw signs and flares along the side of the road indicating a detour ahead; and he skidded nine-car lengths through a barricade into a gravel hopper. In Robinson v. Workman, 9 Ill2d 420, 137 NE2d 804, there was evidence that defendant was driving at 45 to 50 miles per hour and weaving from one side of the road to the other just before his car crashed in a head-on collision. Hatfield v. Noble, 41 Ill App2d 112, 190 NE2d 391, concerned a defendant who drive 80 miles per hour on a misty, rainy night over a road which he knew had many curves. He had also consumed twelve glasses of beer. Smith v. Polukey, 22 Ill App2d 238, 160 NE2d 508, is another two-car intersection collision case in which the defendant saw the other car 200 feet away, was warned by the plaintiff’s screams, and yet continued to accelerate to 60 miles per hour (in a 40-mile zone) prior to impact. In Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, 394 Ill 569, 69 NE2d 293, the defendant also had knowledge of impending danger before driving a bus through a red light at an intersection. Willmann v. Jargon, 37 Ill App2d 380, 185 NE2d 702, was a case in which the defendant attempted to pass the vehicle ahead of him, even though he had a clear view of the road and knew he was approaching a curve. In Bering v. Hilton, 12 Ill2d 559, 147 NE2d 311, the defendant, driving a dump truck on a side road, stopped at a traffic sign upon reaching a through highway. He saw plaintiff’s car approaching, but looked no more in that direction, judging that he could complete his cross ahead of it. He failed to do so, and a collision resulted. Gaiennie v. Fringer, 5 Ill App2d 403, 5 NE2d 38, also involved a defendant who stopped at a stop sign and then, without looking in either direction, drove onto the preferential highway. Rosbottom v. Hensley, 61 Ill App2d 198, 209 NE2d 655, was a case in which the defendant driver turned her head around to talk to a friend in the back seat, lost control of the car, and drove off the road into a tree. The facts in all these cases are, in our opinion, so different from those in the case before us that they are of no weight whatsoever in plaintiff’s favor.  In conclusion, we deem it important to restate that “wilful and wanton misconduct is a more serious transgression than is negligence, and that an important distinction is in the mental attitude. Often negligence may consist of a mere inadvertence, or a momentary lapse from that degree of attentiveness required by due care. On the other hand, it is frequently said that a wanton act involves a conscious indifference to a known danger. It is based on the concept that, under the known or plainly observable circumstances, the doing or failing to do something will naturally and probably result in injury to another, and the defendant must have been aware of that situation, and ignored it.” Martin v. Cline, 15 Ill App2d 269, 273, 145 NE2d 505. If we were to hold that the evidence in the instant case was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of wilful and wanton misconduct, we would be eliminating the very real difference between such conduct and ordinary negligence, thus merging the two concepts into one. And to do that would defeat the obvious legislative purpose of the guest statute. Todd v. Borowski, 25 Ill App2d 367, 375, 166 NE2d 296. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Affirmed. DRUCKER, J., concurs.