Court Opinion

ID: 9948745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:00:54.354665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.987991
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14136   Document: 46-1    Date Filed: 03/07/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                          [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-14136
                         ____________________

       AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY,
       AMERISURE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
                             Plaintiﬀs-Counter Defendants-Appellees,
       versus
       THE AUCHTER COMPANY, et al.,

                                                          Defendants,

       LANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                Defendant-Cross Claimant-Appellant.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14136     Document: 46-1     Date Filed: 03/07/2024   Page: 2 of 8

       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-14136

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cv-00407-BJD-LLL
                          ____________________

       Before BRANCH, LUCK, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
              This appeal involves an insurance dispute concerning
       coverage for defects and delays in the construction of an office
       building in Jacksonville, Florida. After reviewing the record and
       with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that we lack
       jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
                                I.     Background
              Riverside Avenue Partners, Ltd. (“RAP”) contracted with
       the Auchter Company to build a 13-story office building. Plagued
       by delays and water intrusion, RAP eventually filed a lawsuit in
       Florida state court. RAP sought a declaratory judgment
       establishing Auchter’s liability (as well as that of Arch Insurance
       Company, Auchter’s surety), and sought damages for breach of
       the contract and performance bond.
             Arch filed a counterclaim against RAP, seeking payment of
       the construction contract balance and for approved change orders,
       as well as for payment of additional disputed charges and delay
       damages. Arch and Auchter also filed a third-party complaint
       against TSG Industries, Inc., the window subcontractor, and other
       subcontractors as third-party defendants for contractual indemnity
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       22-14136                  Opinion of the Court                               3

       and breach of contract, alleging that RAP’s claims implicated their
       scope of work on subcontracts.
             Landmark American Insurance Company, TSG’s insurer,
       acknowledged Auchter as an additional insured under TSG’s
       contractually-mandated policy, but ultimately refused to defend
       Auchter. As a result, Amerisure, 1 Auchter’s primary insurance
       provider, defended Auchter under a reservation of rights.
             After a trial, the state court entered judgment (1) in favor of
       RAP against Auchter and Arch; (2) in favor of Arch against TSG;
       and (3) in favor of Auchter and Arch against B&B of Duval
       Companies, Inc., the subcontractor responsible for curbs, storm
       drainage, and landscaping.
              After the state court judgment was entered, Amerisure filed
       this lawsuit in federal court. Amerisure sued Landmark, Auchter,
       Arch, RAP, TSG, and B&B, seeking a declaration that it owed no
       duty to indemnify Auchter and Arch, and demanding
       reimbursement from Landmark for the cost of defending Auchter.
       The parties asserted numerous crossclaims and counterclaims,2

       1 The pleadings refer to Amerisure Insurance Company and Amerisure Mutual

       Insurance Company collectively as “Amerisure,” so we do the same.
       2 Specifically,

           •   Arch filed a counterclaim against Amerisure, seeking a declaration that
               Amerisure had a duty to indemnify Arch as an assignee and/or
               subrogee of Auchter in connection with the underlying state court
               lawsuit;
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                     22-14136

       notably including Landmark’s crossclaim against TSG, seeking a
       declaration that, under TSG’s policy with Landmark, Landmark
       had no duty to defend or to indemnify TSG in connection with the
       underlying state court lawsuit.
               Years later, after numerous summary judgment motions
       and orders, and following a settlement between Arch and
       Amerisure, the district court granted Amerisure’s motion for entry
       of final judgment against Landmark—and only Landmark—finding

           •   Arch, as an assignee and/or subrogee of Auchter, also asserted a
               breach of contract counterclaim against Amerisure for the settlement
               amounts paid in satisfaction of the underlying state court final
               judgment;
           •   Arch, as assignee and/or subrogee of Auchter, filed a crossclaim
               against Landmark, seeking a declaration that Arch is entitled to
               indemnity and to damages for breach of contract as a third-party
               beneficiary;
           •   Landmark asserted crossclaims against Auchter, Arch, and TSG
               seeking a declaration that Landmark had no duty to defend or to
               indemnify them in connection with the underlying lawsuit; and,
               finally,
           •   Landmark brought a counterclaim against Amerisure, seeking a
               declaration that it owed no payment to Amerisure relating to the
               underlying state court lawsuit and Auchter’s defense costs.
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       22-14136                  Opinion of the Court                              5

       that Amerisure was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. 3 The
       district court purported to enter a final judgment in the case. 4
              This appeal followed.
                               II.     Standard of Review
           When appropriate, we review a district court’s ruling on a
       motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and
       drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
       non-moving party. Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d
       1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014). But we also have an independent
       obligation to determine whether appellate jurisdiction exists in
       each case, regardless of whether the parties raised that issue. Reaves
       v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 717 F.3d 886, 905 (11th Cir. 2013).

       3 The district court also granted a motion to substitute Amerisure in place of

       Arch following a settlement and assignment of claims and dismissed Arch
       from the action.
       4 Before oral argument, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs

       addressing whether the district court had entered a final, appealable order—
       including whether all claims against Auchter, TSG, and B&B had been
       resolved. The parties responded jointly, arguing that appellate jurisdiction
       exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because TSG and B&B are merely “nominal
       parties to be bound” since, “in the Underlying Action, they were found to be
       liable to Arch and Auchter[.]” The parties further submit that there are no
       remaining claims against Auchter because it assigned away its rights to Arch,
       who later assigned them to Amerisure, who then took Arch’s place in the
       lawsuit, and then won the judgment it sought in this case.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14136

                                  III.   Discussion
              “Federal appeals courts have jurisdiction over final decisions
       of the district courts.” Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689
       F.3d 1244, 1245 (11th Cir. 2012). The statute conferring that
       jurisdiction provides that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have
       jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
       of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had
       in the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “There are [some]
       exceptions to the final judgment rule,” but the parties here “do[ ]
       not argue . . . that any of the exceptions apply.” Supreme Fuels, 689
       F.3d at 1245 n.1 (citing Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1101
       n.5 (11th Cir. 1995)).
               “A ‘final decision’ generally is one which ends the litigation
       on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
       the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
       “‘[A]n order adjudicating fewer than all the claims in a suit . . . is
       not a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken,’ unless
       ‘the district court properly certifies as “final” under Rule 54(b), a
       judgment on fewer than all claims or parties.’” Supreme Fuels, 689
       F.3d at 1246 (alteration in original) (quoting Lloyd Noland Found.,
       Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007));
       see also Fed R. Civ. P. 54.
              The purported final judgment here does not dispose of all
       claims against all parties, so it is not final. “We have repeatedly
       held that the entry of judgment is not enough to supply
       jurisdiction—even when that judgment is labeled a ‘final’
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       22-14136                  Opinion of the Court                              7

       judgment—where a district court failed to dispose of all claims.”
       Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Glassco, Inc., 58 F.4th 1338, 1345 (11th Cir.
       2023). Landmark asserted, in its crossclaim against TSG, that it had
       no duty to defend or indemnify TSG in the underlying action. The
       various summary judgment orders do not dispense with that claim.
       The purported final judgment contains no disposition of that claim.
       Id. at 1346 (“Looking to the substance,” there is “no final order
       here.”). And, despite the absence of any disposition on this claim,
       there is no Rule 54(b) order authorizing an appeal. See Supreme
       Fuels, 689 F.3d at 1246.
              Amerisure suggests, in post-argument briefing, that the
       declaratory judgments issued below fully answered any questions
       relating to Landmark’s obligations to TSG. But even if Landmark’s
       duty to indemnify other parties effectively answered the question of
       its duty to indemnify TSG—a premise Amerisure has not
       explained—its reasoning still confuses resolving abstract issues with
       tangible claims. See id. (An order is not a final judgment if it
       “adjudicat[es] fewer than all the claims in a suit[.]” (emphasis
       added)). 5 Thus, the claims against TSG remain pending.

       5 Amerisure further contends that any deficiency was cured at oral argument

       in this court, on appeal, when Landmark represented that it would abandon
       its claim against TSG. We disagree. We have never held that a promise at
       oral argument to abandon a claim can finalize an order that was not final when
       the appeal was taken. But even if we could credit Landmark’s purported
       abandonment of its claim against TSG at oral argument, see Tiernan v. Devoe,
       923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that the court had jurisdiction
       following the plaintiffs’ intention to renounce any further action against a
       defendant, even though “at the time [the] appeal was filed, jurisdiction under
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       8                           Opinion of the Court                          22-14136

              “With claims outstanding, we lack jurisdiction” and must
       dismiss. See Id. at 1246. 6
               APPEAL DISMISSED.

       28 U.S.C. § 1291 was lacking”), “[w]e are not bound by [Landmark’s]
       concession, and we [would] decline to accept it.” United States v. Colston, 4
       F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th Cir. 2021). “[I]t is well settled in this Circuit that parties
       to a suit cannot agree to grant this Court appellate jurisdiction.” State Treasurer
       of Mich. v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Constr. Aggregates, Ltd. v.
       Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir.1998)).
       And, to the extent that the parties are suggesting that Landmark somehow
       abandoned its claim against TSG below, “abandonment” is not the way to
       dismiss a party from an action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) is the
       proper vehicle to dismiss “all of [a plaintiff’s] claims against a particular
       defendant.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir.
       2004); Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2023). The plaintiff
       can do so in one of three ways: (1) by filing “a notice of dismissal before the
       opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment,”
       (2) by filing “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
       appeared,” or (3) by obtaining a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). Landmark
       did not do any of these things.
       6 Though Landmark’s pending claim against TSG suffices to resolve this case,

       we note that there is also no disposition on the record as to Auchter and B&B.
       The Clerk entered a default against Auchter and TSG, but not B&B, and
       default judgment was not entered against any of them. Arango v. Guzman
       Travel Advisors, 761 F.2d 1527, 1530–31 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that a
       clerk’s entry of default is not a final judgment and is not the same as the entry
       of a default judgment). The parties suggest that B&B is merely a “nominal
       part[y] to be bound,” and that there are no substantive claims pending against
       Auchter, see supra, note 4. We express no opinion on the merits of those
       arguments, but instead commend them to the district court’s attention on
       remand.