Court Opinion

ID: 9692278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:49:36.870115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.839040
License: Public Domain

RICHARD H. EDELMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority opinion except with regard to overruling Superior’s first issue, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that Superior should have discovered Formica’s fraud by August 17, 1990. In particular, I differ with the majority’s statement that “for limitations purposes, Superior’s injury was suffered as soon as it made any investment in reliance on Formica’s false promise [the “promise”] that the distributorship would not be terminated without good cause.” Where, as in this case, an alleged fraudulent inducement consists of making a contractual promise with no intent to perform it, I do not agree that an injury is suffered before an actual failure or refusal to perform is manifested.
In this case, from 1990 to 1994, the period in which the majority holds that the limitations period on the fraud claim was running, and for two years thereafter, the parties were in an active contractual relationship in which Formica neither breached nor threatened to breach the promise. During that period, Superior was in no worse position economically than if the alleged fraud had not occurred and, importantly, might never be. That is, whatever Formica’s intent might have been in entering into the contract, that intent might never have resulted in an actual breach. Instead, the contract might have continued indefinitely or have been terminated for reasons unrelated to Formica’s alleged intent not to perform. In that event, Superior’s investment in reliance on Formica’s false promise would never have been an injury, and can only be argued now to have been an injury then by hindsight based on facts occurring six years after the date the majority concludes that the limitations period began to run.
Moreover, what useful purpose is served by compelling a party to a productive contractual arrangement to sue the other for entering into the contract without an intent to perform while the other party is, in fact, performing satisfactorily? In addition to straining the parties’ ability to continue their dealings, how can liability be found or damages be calculated where a plaintiff has been receiving everything it bargained for? And if a breach does later occur, does it promote judicial economy to potentially require two lawsuits over largely the same facts? Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Superi- or suffered an injury at the time it made an investment in reliance on Formica’s allegedly false promise, I would sustain Superior’s first issue and reverse the corresponding portion of the trial court’s judgment.