Court Opinion

ID: 9569531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:40.897561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:23.677362
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case, but not in all of its reasoning in reaching that result.
The problem presented in this case is how best to assure the reasonable expectations of a wife to continued monthly income in the event of the death or business failure of her husband, without imposing unreasonable restrictions upon him in the operation of a wheat farm, a family corporation which is the principal asset of the parties. The majority states near the beginning of its opinion that its responsibility in reviewing the decision by the Court of Appeals in this case is to “articulate certain equitable principles” for application in such cases.
In Grove and Grove, 280 Or 341, 347-354, 571 P2d 477 (1977), this court also undertook to state “guidelines” or “principles” for application by trial courts in making awards of spousal support in marriage dissolution cases. In that case, however, this court undertook that task only after a request to the parties prior to oral argument for their views upon the question whether “this court [can] provide a guideline for consistent application of the statutory criteria” provided by ORS 107.105(1)(c).
In this case, however, the question of what should be the “guidelines” or “equitable principles” for application by trial courts in cases such as this has not been addressed by the parties either in their briefs in the Court of Appeals *215or in response to any questions by this court prior to oral argument. In any event, upon a reading of the majority opinion, I am unable to find any clearly recognizable statements of any such “guidelines” or “equitable principles” in accordance with the announced purpose by the majority, other than perhaps its quotation from a decision by the Court of Appeals in Slauson and Slauson, 29 Or App 177, 183-184, 562 P2d 604 (1977). Instead, I read its opinion as little more than a decision which attempts to do “equity” under the facts of this particular case in accordance with the provisions of ORS 107.105(1)(e), to the effect that in a suit for dissolution of a marriage, the court shall have the power to make such a division or other disposition of property “as may be just and proper in all circumstances.”
In addition, I would note that the majority states, at the beginning of its opinion, that “the threshold question is the proper scope of appellate review for application in domestic relations cases,” with the implicit promise that in the course of its lengthy, nine-page discussion of this question the majority will either make some new law or clarify the existing law on this question, which was not raised by either party in this case. Instead, this discussion does little more than restate the law as previously set forth by the decisions which are cited and quoted by the majority in the course of its discussion of that question.
For these reasons, I cannot concur in the reasoning by the majority in its decision of this case, although I concur in the result reached by the majority.