Court Opinion

ID: 9913799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 20:02:17.102585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:54.649668
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/28/23 P. v. Booker CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B322598

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. GA099455)
         v.

DONALD EARL BOOKER,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed.
      Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A.
Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                    I.    INTRODUCTION

      A jury convicted defendant Donald Earl Booker of assault
with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)1), attempted
murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and mayhem (§ 203). As to each
offense, the jury found true the allegation that defendant
personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
The trial court found that defendant had two prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subd. (d) and 1170.12, subd. (b)) and section 667.5, and that he
had served six prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court
sentenced defendant to 45 years to life in state prison.
       Defendant appealed from his conviction. We conditionally
reversed the judgment and remanded to the trial court for it to
conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing under
section 1001.36. If the court reinstated the judgment, it was to
consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike the section
667, subdivision (a) enhancements. (People v. Booker (May 10,
2019, B286842 [nonpub. opn.] (Booker I).)
       On remand, the trial court found defendant ineligible and
unsuitable for section 1001.36 mental health diversion. It
sentenced defendant to 35 years to life in state prison. Defendant
again appeals, contending the court erred in finding him
competent to proceed with the hearings on remand, denying
mental health diversion, and failing to consider new laws—
Assembly Bill No. 518 (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1, (AB 518)) and
Senate Bill No. 81 (Stats.2021, ch. 721, § 1, (SB 81))—in making
its sentencing choices. We affirm.

1    All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.

                                2
                       II.   BACKGROUND

A.    Trial Evidence

      The following background is taken from the unpublished
opinion in defendant’s prior appeal in this case, Booker I, supra,
B286842:
      “Dale Ross had known and been friends with defendant and
Treopia Ross for about 20 years.2 He testified that at around
9:00 a.m. on August 11, 2016, he and Treopia drank beer and
smoked crystal methamphetamine at his house.
       “After smoking methamphetamine for about an hour, Dale
and Treopia went to the Sparr liquor store. Defendant was at the
parking lot. Defendant and Treopia spoke. Dale was close by.
He did not remember hearing defendant tell Treopia that he was
going to kill her.
       “At some point, Dale saw defendant take a swing at
Treopia. Dale though[t] they were playing, ‘like sand boxing or
something.’ Defendant and Treopia struggled for about 20 or 30
seconds. They were swinging at each other—Treopia threw
punches.
       “During the altercation, Dale did not see either defendant
or Treopia in possession of a box cutter. He had previously seen
Treopia with knives—‘everybody around there carries knives and
stuff.’ He saw her with a knife earlier that day.
       “At about 8:46 a.m. on August 11, 2016, Deciderio Flores
was driving on Huntington Drive in Duarte. He saw defendant
chasing Treopia. When defendant got close to Treopia he would

“2     Because Dale Ross and Treopia Ross share a last name, we
will refer to them by their first names for clarity.

                                3
‘swing[] on’ her. He did not see Treopia swing at defendant. It
appeared that defendant had something that looked like a knife
in his hand. Treopia screamed for help. Flores believed that
Treopia was going to be hurt and called the police.
       “Flores testified that Treopia and defendant ran into a
liquor store. At some point, defendant came out and walked
swiftly to a Carl’s Jr. across the street.
       “Treopia testified that she had been convicted of
misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon in 2006 and felony
forgery in February 2007. She had felony charges pending for
allegedly striking and pepper spraying her 70-year-old father.
       “At about 8:40 a.m. on August 11, 2016, Treopia was at the
Sparr liquor store in Duarte. Defendant was in the parking lot
when she arrived. Treopia called Dale, who she knew was at the
Carl’s Jr. At some point, Treopia approached Dale because she
wanted to go to his house to dye her hair—she was homeless at
the time.
       “As Treopia and Dale spoke, defendant said, ‘Hey, Dale,’
and motioned to Dale to come over. Dale went to defendant to
see what he wanted. Treopia went into the liquor store and
spoke to a store employee for 10 or 15 minutes.
       “Treopia then left the store and asked Dale, ‘“Dale, you
ready?”’ Dale appeared not to hear Treopia and so approached
her. Defendant remained behind. Defendant then asked, ‘“What
you doing talking about me?”’ Dale walked back and forth
between Treopia and defendant. At some point, defendant
walked with Dale to Treopia.
       “Defendant ‘was looking [Treopia] up and down.’ She asked
him, ‘“Why are you maddogging me, looking me up and down like
that?”’ Defendant said, in a normal tone of voice, ‘Bitch, shut up.

                                4
I’m going to kill you.’ Defendant then swung at Treopia and she
put her hand up so he would not hit her in the face. Treopia had
not threatened defendant or swung at him.
      “Defendant’s blow, with a box cutter, made contact with the
palm of Treopia’s right hand and cut her. Defendant then tried
to pull Treopia’s hair back and cut her throat. To defend herself,
Treopia put her ‘hands up, like to square off with him’ in a
fighting position. Defendant then cut Treopia’s left hand, cutting
her to the bone.
      “Treopia ran into the street and screamed for help and for
someone to call the police. Defendant pursued and tried to catch
her. Treopia ran inside the Sparr liquor store. Defendant
followed her. Treopia asked the liquor store employee to call the
police.
      “Treopia was taken to the hospital where she had surgery
on her hands that lasted five or six hours. She had casts on her
hands for two weeks and could not use them. Treopia was in a lot
of pain when she left the hospital. She suffered lasting
impairment to one of her hands that prevented her from
continuing her employment braiding hair.
      “Deputy Sheriff Brendon Jackson responded to the Sparr
liquor store. There, he spoke with Dale. Dale said he was
standing with Treopia in a dirt lot when defendant approached.
Treopia asked defendant, ‘Why you looking me up and down?’
Defendant responded, ‘Shut up, bitch; I’ll kill you.’” (Booker I,
supra, B286842.)

                                5
B.    Remand Proceedings

      On September 14, 2021, Dr. Haig Kojian evaluated
defendant for section 1001.363 mental health diversion. Dr.
Kojian had previously evaluated defendant and was appointed at
defense counsel’s request. Prior to the evaluation, defendant
stated that he “understood the scope and intent of testing and
volunteered to be interviewed.” Dr. Kojian prepared a mental
health diversion report for the court in which he concluded that
defendant met one of the six criteria for mental health diversion
(all criteria had to be met to qualify for mental health diversion
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1) [“Pretrial diversion may be granted
pursuant to this section if all of the following criteria are met”]
(italics added)).
       In his report, Dr. Kojian opined that defendant met the
first diversion criterion—whether he suffered from a qualifying
mental disorder. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Defendant had a
significant history of mental illness including a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, treatment with numerous psychiatric medications,
and multiple psychiatric hospitalizations. In September 2015,
defendant was “considered to be incompetent to stand trial.” The
doctor also noted that defendant had a significant history of
methamphetamine use. During the course of the interview,
defendant “ma[d]e a number of strange comments such as that he

3      Between the time Dr. Kojian made his mental health
diversion evaluation and the trial court made its diversion ruling,
former section 1001.36 was amended in a way not relevant to this
appeal. (Compare former versions of section 1001.36 at Stats.
2019, ch. 497, § 203, eff. Jan. 1, 2020 and Stats. 2022, ch. 47, § 38,
eff. June 30, 2022.)

                                  6
is ‘33 degrees Fahrenheit,’—a reference to 33 degree Free Mason,
that he walks in the light, and that he follows the light like the
Illuminati.” Dr. Kojian diagnosed defendant with
“Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type” and “Stimulant Use
Disorder—Amphetamine Type.”
        Dr. Kojian concluded that defendant did not meet the
second diversion criterion—whether his mental disorder played a
significant role in the commission of the charged offense.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B).) Defendant denied committing the
charged offenses and stated that “he was not impaired on the
date of the incident . . . and that he knew ‘exactly’ what was going
on . . . [and] wasn’t mentally compromised . . . .” Dr. Kojian
opined it was “possible that [defendant] may have been under the
influence of a psychoactive substance such as methamphetamine
which could have caused him to either be delusional or paranoid,
and it is also possible that he may have been delusional and
paranoid as a result of mental illness but this is only conjecture.”
        Dr. Kojian believed that defendant did not meet the third
diversion criterion—whether his symptoms would respond to
mental health treatment. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Dr. Kojian
stated, “It’s not clear if [defendant’s] symptoms would be
responsive to treatment. He is, currently, under psychiatric care
with Effexor but he continues to demonstrate delusional
thinking. It is likely his illness is quite refractory.”
        Dr. Kojian concluded that defendant did not meet the
fourth diversion criterion—whether he consented to diversion
and waived his speedy trial right.4 (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(D).)
According to Dr. Kojian, “[Defendant] reported he is willing to

4    Dr. Kojian labeled this criterion, “Is [defendant] amenable
to mental health treatment?”

                                 7
participate in treatment, however, he has, historically, struggled
with medication and treatment noncompliance. In addition, I
suspect he will be at a very high risk for continuing to use illegal
substances which can exacerbate and also cause underlying
mental conditions of a psychotic nature. I do believe he is at high
risk for both.”
       Dr. Kojian opined that defendant did not meet the fifth
diversion criterion—whether he agreed to comply with
treatment.5 (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(E).) Dr. Kojian observed, “I
believe [defendant] requires ongoing treatment in a
confined/closed environment such as prison.”
      Finally, Dr. Kojian did not believe that defendant met the
sixth diversion criterion—whether he posed an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety if treated in the community—i.e., an
unreasonable risk of committing a super strike.6 (§ 1001.36,

5    Dr. Kojian labeled this criterion, “What form of treatment
would be most appropriate?”

6      A “super-strike” under section 1170.18, subdivision (c)
includes: a sexually violent offense (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600,
subd. (b)), oral copulation with a child under 14 years of age and
more than 10 years younger than the defendant (§ 288a), sodomy
with another person under 14 years of age and more than 10
years younger than the defendant (§ 286), sexual penetration
with another person under 14 years of age and more than 10
years younger than the defendant (§ 289), a lewd or lascivious act
involving a child under 14 years of age (§ 288), any homicide or
attempted homicide (§§ 187–191.5), solicitation to commit murder
(§ 653f), assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or
firefighter (§ 245, subd. (d)(3)), possession of a weapon of mass
destruction (§ 11418, subd. (a)(1)), and any serious or violent

                                 8
subd. (b)(1)(F).) According to Dr. Kojian, “Given current findings,
[defendant’s] presentation, and given his risk profile including
severely impaired insight and judgment, ongoing delusional
mentation despite being psychiatrically treated, and propensity
toward being medically non-compliant I don’t believe that
[defendant] can be safely treated in the community.”
      Having received Dr. Kojian’s mental health diversion
report, the trial court held a hearing on October 14, 2021. The
court stated Dr. Kojian had prepared a “pretty thorough analysis”
that did not look “too favorable.” Defense counsel responded that
he had requested Dr. Kojian be appointed based on Dr. Kojian’s
prior experience with and evaluation of defendant. Defense
counsel conceded that Dr. Kojian’s report was “obviously . . .
unfavorable to [defendant] in a number of regards” and asked the
court to appoint a different doctor to assess whether there was a
suitable program for defendant. The court denied the request,
finding it unnecessary, in part because Dr. Kojian’s report “does
provide a significant analysis of [defendant’s] situation, his
mental health disease. It’s clear that he is suffering from mental
health disorders.” The court set the matter for a future hearing
and resentencing.
      At a hearing on February 18, 2022, the trial court asked
defendant, “[D]o you know why you’re here today?” Defendant
responded, “Yes, I know why I’m here. [¶] . . . [¶] For mental
health diversion and resentencing. I talked to George Gascon,
the head District Attorney. He said for you guys to take off the
prison priors and the prison enhancements.” Defendant made
other assertions about his case and his mental health.

felony punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.
(§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).)

                                9
       The trial court then said to defendant, “Okay, so I think
you pretty much understand as far as why you’re here. The court
is obligated to consider mental health diversion for you. That
was, when the case went up on appeal, your case went up on
appeal, that court directed us to consider you for mental health
diversion. So you understand that, right?” Defendant responded,
“Yes, sir.”
       The trial court then asked defense counsel if he was raising
a doubt about defendant’s competence. Defense counsel
responded that he did have a doubt about defendant’s competence
because when he visited defendant earlier in the week on the
mental health floor of the jail, defendant seemed very agitated
and said he had personally spoken to George Gascon twice about
his case. Defendant said, “Exactly.” Later, defendant claimed to
have spoken with Kamala Harris about his case.
       Defense counsel stated that defendant told him that he did
not trust him because he was conspiring with the prosecutor.
Defendant said, “You were.”
       Defense counsel added that defendant believed he had been
sent to prison for a crime his uncle committed. Defendant denied
saying that and added seemingly rambling statements about his
case before stating, “He called himself getting retaliation for
what my uncle did by punishing me for what my uncle did. When
I was a little boy whatever my uncle did, my uncle was
responsible for what he did, not me.”
       In sum, defense counsel stated, it was difficult for him to
communicate with defendant about anything substantive.
Defendant responded that he did not want to communicate with
defense counsel because defense counsel undermined his
character and spoke to him as if he was trash.

                                10
       The trial court said to defendant, “So let me just ask you
this, we need to go forward. We would like to go forward, but I—”
       Defendant interjected, “We can go forward. I have no
problem with abiding by anything that you set forth any type of
guideline. All I’m asking, you know, to give me an opportunity to
prove myself.”
       The trial court stated, “Okay, all right. So this is a tough
call because it seems to me that [defendant] does understand the
proceedings. He knows exactly what’s going on.” The court was
inclined to believe defendant was competent but decided, “in the
abundance of caution,” to declare a doubt as to defendant’s
competence and have Dr. Kojian examine him. Such an
examination could be done expeditiously as Dr. Kojian was
thoroughly familiar with defendant. The court set the matter for
a later competence hearing.
       On March 8, 2022, Dr. Kojian evaluated defendant to
determine if he was “competent to stand trial.” Prior to the
evaluation, defendant stated that he “understood the scope and
intent of testing and volunteered to be interviewed.”
       In his competence report, Dr. Kojian reported that
defendant stated he was in prison but had been brought to county
jail for resentencing and consideration for mental health
diversion. After complaining about his attorney and asserting
that he did not want to be considered for transfer to Patton State
Hospital, defendant said he was not facing a mental health
diversion hearing but a resentencing hearing.
       Defendant subsequently “went on a tangential rant about
his uncle” and his uncle’s supposed crimes and claimed his
(defendant’s) prosecution was “the system taking revenge on
him.” Defendant believed the District Attorney, trial court, and

                                11
his attorney conspired to put him in prison. When asked the
basis of the resentencing, defendant responded that he wanted
the case dismissed because of a lack of evidence and prosecutorial
misconduct.
       When Dr. Kojian tried to ask defendant competence-related
questions, defendant “became quite tangential and started
talking about the [I]lluminati and the Knights Templar as he had
in the past. He made unrelated and nonsensical statements
about his ‘lodge’ being in the Milky Way which is also his ‘base
station’ and the ‘pillars of Hercules beyond Olympus abided by
Apollo the sun god.’” “[I]t was because of the [I]lluminati that
Jackie Lacey was recalled and Gascon took office, and . . . the
[I]lluminati [would] get him out.”
       Dr. Kojian referred to his past discussions with defendant
and stated he had previously noted, among other things,
defendant’s significant mental illness history, treatment with
numerous drugs, and multiple hospitalizations. In September
2015, defendant was considered incompetent to stand trial.
       Dr. Kojian opined that defendant’s mental state had not
improved since the last time he interviewed defendant “some
time ago”—presumably the September 14, 2021, interview for the
mental health diversion report—and the doctor believed
defendant continued to struggle from grandiose and persecutory
delusions. Dr. Kojian did not believe defendant could
“meaningfully or rationally cooperate with his attorney in the
current matter.” Accordingly, he opined that defendant “should
be considered incompetent to proceed to trial/resentencing at this
time.”
       Having received Dr. Kojian’s competence report, the trial
court held a competence hearing on July 21, 2022. The court

                               12
stated, “I think it’s fair to say that . . . defendant does have a
mental disorder” and a “significant history of mental illness.”
       The trial court noted that defendant had been diagnosed
with schizophrenia for which he had been prescribed numerous
psychiatric medications and that defendant had a significant
history of methamphetamine use. It further noted that Dr.
Kojian described defendant talking about “things that [were]
somewhat delusional.” The court recalled from defendant’s trial
defendant “talking about several things.” Lately, defendant had
been talking about the Knights Templar and the Illuminati.
       Nevertheless, the trial court found, “[F]rom the beginning,
and even to this date, [defendant] does understand the court
process. He knows more or less why he’s here. He knows he’s
here for a mental health diversion issue that’s still pending. He
knows there’s a sentencing issue, and he obviously knows about
the competency issue here today. And all of these issues that he’s
well aware of, he’s well aware of who the district attorney is. He
knows his counsel. He knows who I am, the judge, and the
function that I’m performing here today and that we’re all
performing.”
       Defendant asked to say something, and the trial court
allowed him to do so. Defendant said, “Okay, tell me if this make
sense. I been traveling through every degree of the pyramid until
I rest the cast stone. Which, by me doing so, I became
illuminated. I came all the way from the pyramids of Egypt with
my camel and my staff. My journey has been long and I am
weary, but I know who the father is and who’s son. Tell me does
that make sense?”
       The trial court responded, “I understand what you’re
saying as far as some of the things you believe are real to you.

                               13
But you also know why we are here. You know this is a
courtroom.” Defendant replied, “Your Honor, I know exactly why
I’m here.”
      As to whether defendant would be able to assist defense
counsel, the trial court disagreed with Dr. Kojian. The court
explained, “I think it’s partly because Dr. Kojian, when he does
these reports, it’s usually done for pretrial before there’s a trial.
And he’s thinking with the mind whether . . . defendant can
assist in the defense for trial. And I think that’s a big difference
then [sic] where we are at at this stage. [¶] We’re at the stage
where the defendant has already had his trial. He’s already been
convicted, and now we have these other things that are on the
table which is the issue of the mental health diversion and also
sentencing issues that were raised.”
      The trial court believed there was “not really much” for
defendant to assist counsel with and the mental health diversion
decision would be made primarily based on Dr. Kojian’s reports
and “on our interactions with . . . defendant.” Although
defendant would have an opportunity to be heard, the court
believed it could make the diversion decision without very much
input from him.
      The trial court stated that defendant could inform defense
counsel if there was any “new information” the court should
consider and thought it was “clear” that defendant could assist
defense counsel “to the extent he’s needed for any competency
hearing.”7 Further, the sentencing issues were “pretty straight
forward as well”—the court only had to decide whether to strike

7     As the court was conducting a competency hearing, it is
unclear what it was referencing.

                                 14
the section 667, subdivision (a) priors as it was going to strike the
section 667.5, subdivision (b) priors “automatic[ally].”
       The trial court found defendant to be competent. The court
stated that based on the information in Dr. Kojian’s report and on
the court’s opportunity to observe defendant “from the very
beginning during pretrials and during the entire trial,” it
believed that defendant was “still at a level” where he was “aware
of the proceedings.” The court stated further, “He understands
what’s going on here, and he’s had the ability to assist counsel,
and he, I believe, he still has the ability to assist counsel to the
extent that it’s going to be necessary.”
       The trial court then addressed mental health diversion and
found defendant did not qualify and was unsuitable. The court
agreed with Dr. Kojian that because defendant suffered from
schizophrenia and stimulant use disorder, he satisfied the first
diversion criterion. The court disagreed with Dr. Kojian’s opinion
that defendant did not satisfy the second diversion criterion,
finding that defendant’s mental disorder probably “was a
significant factor in the attack on the victim.”
       As to the third diversion criterion, the trial court agreed
with Dr. Kojian that defendant’s symptoms motivating the
criminal behavior likely would not respond to mental health
treatment. The court observed that defendant had “struggled
with medication and treatment and has been noncompliant in the
past.” Moreover, defendant “continues to self-medicate with the
use of methamphetamine, and he doesn’t take his prescriptions.
And even when he is taking his medication, he[] still has
exhibited these, this mental disorder. In other words, he’s still
under the—he’s still acting schizophrenic and still having the
high-psychotic episodes including what happened in this

                                 15
particular case. So I think that’s something that I’m not sure
that he would respond to mental health treatment.”
        Defense counsel objected to the trial court’s finding on the
third diversion criterion, arguing that defendant should not be
responsible for the medical community’s inability to come up with
an effective regimen or treatment. The court explained that the
issue was whether defendant would be able to undergo treatment
in the community that would be effective enough to keep him
from re-offending or committing violent acts against himself or
others.
        The trial court found defendant met the fourth diversion
criterion. It noted this criterion was whether defendant
consented to diversion and waived his right to a speedy trial.
Although a speedy trial was “not on the table,” the court
nevertheless found this criterion met “in the sense that
[defendant] would be willing to participate in mental health
treatment and diversion.”
        As to the fifth diversion criterion, the trial court was
equivocal. It stated, “Whether . . . defendant agrees to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion; that’s the issue. Even
though he may want to comply, whether he would be able to
comply is another question.”
        Finally, as to the sixth diversion criterion—whether
defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if
treated in the community—the trial court stated, “This was a
vicious attack on the victim, and the victim suffered extensive
injuries. The attack on her where she raised her arms to prevent
. . . defendant from slicing her face or her neck; that was the
testimony. And as a result, her hand almost got completely

                                16
severed off from the box cutter. And she had and required
extensive surgery.”
       The trial court believed this was a “very serious case”
because defendant had been convicted of attempted murder and
other charges. “[T]he problem” the court saw was that although
defendant might want to comply with treatment, it was not
convinced he was capable of complying. The court believed that
“if [defendant] was released [to] the community, he would once
again resort to the ways that he’s known while he’s been out in
the community, and that is the heavy use of methamphetamine
to self-medicate. And that use just aggravates his mental health
illness. And it leads to these types of episodes that occurred in
this case. And the court’s fear is that it would occur again.”
       The trial court found that defendant did not qualify for
mental health diversion. It also found defendant was not
suitable for diversion because it believed, based on the severity of
his mental health issues, he would not be able to be treated in the
community.

                       III.   DISCUSSION

A.    Competence

      Defendant argues insufficient evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that, contrary to Dr. Kojian’s opinion, he was
competent to proceed with the hearings on remand. We assume
for argument’s sake that the law on competency to stand trial
applies at a post-trial hearing to consider a defendant’s eligibility
for mental health diversion and resentencing. Sufficient evidence
supports the court’s finding.

                                 17
       “‘The criminal trial of a mentally incompetent person
violates due process. [Citation.] However, a defendant is not
incompetent if he can understand the nature of the legal
proceedings and assist counsel in conducting a defense in a
rational manner. ([Citation]; § 1367.)’ [Citation.] A defendant is
presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence by the party contending he or she
is incompetent. [Citing, inter alia, § 1369, subd. (f) & Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.130(e)(2).]” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th
769, 797 (Blacksher).) A trial court may rely on its own
observations of the defendant in finding that he or she did not
rebut the presumption of competence. (People v. Kirvin (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1514.) “In reviewing on appeal a finding of
competency, ‘an appellate court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the verdict and uphold the verdict if it is
supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Blacksher,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 797.)
       In finding defendant competent, the trial court stated, “I
have had the benefit of observing [defendant] from the very
beginning during pretrials and during the entire trial, and he is
still at a level where I believe he is aware of the proceedings. He
understands what’s going on here, and he’s had the ability to
assist counsel, and he, I believe, he still has the ability to assist
counsel to the extent that it’s going to be necessary.” Substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding.
       At the February 18, 2022, hearing at which the trial court
ordered defendant to undergo a competency evaluation,
defendant demonstrated that he understood the nature of the
proceedings. The court asked defendant, “[D]o you know why

                                 18
you’re here today?” Defendant responded, “Yes, I know why I’m
here. [¶] . . . [¶] For mental health diversion and resentencing.”
       Later, in that hearing, the trial court said to defendant,
“Okay, so I think you pretty much understand as far as why
you’re here. The court is obligated to consider mental health
diversion for you. That was, when the case went up on appeal,
your case went up on appeal, that court directed us to consider
you for mental health diversion. So you understand that, right?”
Defendant responded, “Yes, sir.”
       Defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the proceedings was
further demonstrated when the trial court told him that it would
like the proceedings to go forward and defendant interjected
stating, “We can go forward. I have no problem with abiding by
anything that you set forth any type of guideline. All I’m asking,
you know, to give me an opportunity to prove myself.”
       Defendant’s statement, reported in Dr. Kojian’s competence
report, that he was in prison but had been brought to county jail
for resentencing and consideration for mental health diversion
further supports the trial court’s conclusion that defendant
understood the nature of the proceedings. Similarly, the colloquy
between the trial court and defendant at the post-report
competence hearing also supports the court’s conclusion. When
court said that defendant knew why they were “there” and knew
they were in a courtroom, defendant replied, “Your Honor, I know
exactly why I’m here.”
       Finally, as for defense counsel’s assertion that it was
difficult for him to communicate with defendant about
substantive matters, defendant explained that he did not want to
communicate with defense counsel because defense counsel
undermined his character and spoke to him as if he was trash.

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“‘[T]he test, in a section 1368 proceeding, is competency to
cooperate, not cooperation.’” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th
856, 893, quoting People v. Superior Court (Campbell) (1975) 51
Cal.App.3d 459, 464.)

B.    Section 1001.36 Mental Health Diversion

       Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied mental health diversion. The court did not err.
       Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether
a defendant is a good candidate for mental health diversion.
(People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448 (Moine).) We
review a court’s decision to deny mental health diversion for an
abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) “A court abuses its discretion when it
makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong
legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or
implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence [citation].” (Id. at p. 449.)
       In June 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and
1001.36, creating a procedure by which trial courts have
discretion to grant pretrial diversion to certain defendants with
mental health disorders. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618,
624, 626.) “As originally enacted, section 1001.36 provided that a
trial court may grant pretrial diversion if it finds all of the
following: (1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental
disorder; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the
commission of the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms
will respond to mental health treatment; (4) the defendant
consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right;
(5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the

                                20
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety if treated in the community. (Former § 1001.36, subd[s].
(b)(1)–(6)[; current subds. (b)(1)(A)–(F)][8].) . . . [¶] If the
defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or she meets all
of the threshold eligibility requirements and the defendant and
the offense are suitable for diversion, and the trial court is
satisfied that the recommended program of mental health
treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment
needs of the defendant, then the court may grant pretrial
diversion. (§ 1001.36, subds. (a), (b)(3) & (c)(1).)” (Id. at pp. 626–
627.)
       The trial court denied mental health diversion because it
found that defendant’s symptoms would not respond to mental
health treatment and defendant posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community. For its
finding that defendant’s symptoms would not respond to mental
health treatment, the court relied on Dr. Kojian’s report. Based
on that report, the court found that defendant struggled with
medication and treatment, had been noncompliant with
treatment, and continued to self-medicate with
methamphetamine. Moreover, even when defendant took his
medication, he still exhibited schizophrenic behavior. Dr.
Kojian’s report is substantial evidence supporting the court’s
finding, and the court did not abuse its discretion.
       For its finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety if treated in the community, the trial

8    At the time the trial court denied diversion, section 1001.36
had been further amended, but retained these six factors.
(Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)–(F); Stats. 2022, ch. 38, eff.
June 30, 2022.)

                                  21
court relied on the evidence adduced at defendant’s trial for
attempted murder and Dr. Kojian’s report. (§ 1001.36, subd.
(b)(1)(F) [in considering the risk of danger posed, “[t]he court may
consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a
qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the
current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate”].) According to the court, defendant attacked
Treopia viciously and almost cut off her hand, causing Treopia to
have extensive surgery. The court believed that if defendant was
released to the community, he would continue his heavy use of
methamphetamine to self-medicate which would aggravate his
mental health illness and lead to the “types of episodes that
occurred in this case. And the court’s fear is that it would occur
again.” That is, the court was concerned that defendant would
commit another attempted murder—i.e., a “super strike.”
(Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449 [attempted murder is a
“super strike”].) The evidence adduced at defendant’s trial and
Dr. Kojian’s report are substantial evidence supporting the
court’s finding, and the court did not abuse its discretion.

                                22
C.    AB 518 and SB 81

      Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to consider AB 5189 and SB 81,10 which became effective
on January 1, 2022, at his July 21, 2022, resentencing hearing.
He concludes the court failed to consider these bills because
neither the court nor the parties mentioned them at
resentencing.
       “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial
court knew and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) We do not consider the court’s
silence as reflecting that it did not understand the law.

9     Effective January 1, 2022, AB 518 amended section 654 by
removing the requirement that a defendant be punished under
the provision providing for the longest term of imprisonment, and
granting trial courts the discretion to impose punishment under
any applicable provision. (People v. Fugit (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
981, 995.)

10    Effective January 1, 2022, SB 81 amended section 1385 to
specify factors that trial courts must consider when deciding
whether to strike an enhancement from a defendant’s sentence in
the interest of justice. (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657,
674.) Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 further
amended section 1385 in ways not relevant here. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 15.)

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                      IV.   DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     KIM, J.

We concur:

             BAKER, Acting P. J.

             MOOR, J.

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