Court Opinion

ID: 9449874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:26:18.067715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:02.055912
License: Public Domain

KILEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The petitioner contended before the Trial Examiner that the walkout was unprotected because it was “in protest against a change in supervision” which “had no direct impact on the employees’ job security or work performance.” This contention was rejected by the Examiner after referring to the Board’s decision in Dobbs Houses, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 885 (1962).1 The Examiner then proceeded to his ultimate finding of fact that while the change in foremen “set in motion” the chain of events which resulted in the strike or walkout, “the strike or walkout itself was over terms and conditions of employment for the mutual aid and protection of the employees.” From this finding the Examiner concluded that the employees were engaging in a “protected economic strike or activity within the meaning of Section 7” of the National Labor Relations Act.
, The Board adopted the “findings, conclusions and recommendations” made by the Trial Examiner.
There is no dispute about the relevant facts: Until the morning of September 20, 1962, when Stuard’s removal came to the notice of the employees, there had been no discussion of a walkout, although during Stuard’s hospitalization some employees had objected to Schell’s “pushing” for greater production. The employee dissension began with the change in foremen, when they began talking about a walkout because of the change. The dissension fomented complaints about working conditions, and about being paid the same “peanuts” as the year before. After the morning coffee break Songer expressed some doubt about the legality of a walkout merely because of a change in foremen, and it was agreed among some of the employees that they would *92not walk out until they met for further discussion during the lunch hour.
At 11:50 a. m., ten minutes before the lunch hour, Sheads, the assistant plant superintendent, called the department employees together and told them Stuard was being replaced by Schell, and called for the employees’ cooperation. Songer interrupted and said the employees should be paid more, since Schell was making them produce more. Several of the men present spoke up and said Songer was speaking for them, and Sheads understood Songer was speaking as spokesman for the group. He did not respond with respect to wages, but said the change was better for the employees and the company. Songer then stated that if that was the way it was going to be, the men were going to walk out. Sheads told the group the door was open for those who did not want to work, and he left the meeting as the men punched out for lunch.
Some of the men at this time thought that the walkout, if there was one, was going to be out of sympathy for Stuard. There had been no walkout at this time. At 12:45 p. m. the men gathered in the company parking lot and discussed working conditions and wages. The meeting resulted in an agreement that no one would return to work for less than a 25 cent an hour wage increase. They decided to wait, if necessary, until 1:45 p. m. for a company representative to approach them, and then to go to the State Division of Labor for guidance. The walkout began at 1:00 p. m. with their failure to return to work.
A little after 1:00 p. m. Sheads, seeing the men had not returned to work, told the company president that the men had walked out “because of the change of foremen.” The president thereupon ordered the men discharged. About 1:15 or 1:20 p. m., Sheads and Sandoe, a company officer, came out into the parking lot and stood about 150 feet away from the men. They did not approach the men. The men did not approach them. At this time the men were already discharged. Later on they were denied return to their work.
It is my opinion that the Board, on the evidence, and in light of the whole record, could reasonably infer, as it did, that the employees were engaged in a walkout over terms and conditions of employment, a protected, concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, and that their discharge was an unlawful violation of § 8(a) (1) of the Act.
The Board’s decision, before us, was substantially the same as that in the first issue reached in Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963), involving the Board’s determination “that the employee walkout was motivated by economic considerations and was hence protected.” 325 F.2d at 532. On this issue the Fifth Circuit in Dobbs was “convinced that we cannot sustain the Board’s rejection of the Examiner’s credibility findings * *
The remaining issue is whether the discharge was not an unfair labor practice because the petitioner did not know and had no means of knowing that the employees were engaged in a protected activity; and that, in fact, petitioner in good faith believed that they had walked out because of the change in foremen. For this contention petitioner relies principally on N. L. R. B. v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958).
The Examiner found that Sheads “was made aware” by the employees of their demand for more money and of their intention to walk out if their claim was ignored. This finding is supported by substantial evidence, and distinguishes Ford Radio & Mica Corp. There the employer had no knowledge of the protected character of the walkout. Here the company, through Sheads, knew or should have known that the walkout was a protected activity, and therefore petitioner’s contention cannot be sustained. It does not matter that the protected character of the walkout was not reported to the company president, who was told only that the walkout was “because of the change in *93foremen.” I agree with the Examiner in his citation of Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. N. L. R. B., 312 F.2d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 1963), “To rule otherwise would provide a simple means for evading the Act by a division of corporate personnel functions.”
I have discussed the only issues I consider relevant. There is therefore no necessity for me to discuss the second issue in the Dobbs opinion in which the court reversed the Board’s “alternative holding” that the walkout over the discharge of a supervisor was a protected activity, nor to discuss Cleaver-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 264 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817, 80 S.Ct. 58, 4 L.Ed.2d 63, N. L. R. B. v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 6 A.L.R.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845, 69 S.Ct. 68, 93 L.Ed. 395, and N. L. R. B. v. Reynolds International Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947).
I would deny the petition and enforce the order.

. Reversed, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963).