Court Opinion

ID: 9731106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:33:38.046162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:13.378307
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Staton, P.J.
I dissent. The persistent dwelling upon Zamarripa’s guilty plea in a separate action by the prosecutor was flagrant prejudicial abuse. The repetitive references to Zamarripa’s guilty plea and offense in the presence of the jury by the prosecutor denied Gordon and Brian Bement and Dennis Zarnik a fair trial and due process of law. I would reverse with instructions to grant the motion for a mistrial and to grant Bements and Zarnik a new trial.* 1
In the presence of the jury, Zamarripa’s guilty plea and his offense were referred to approximately thirty times. Jones v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 447, 355 N.E.2d 402. Zamarripa, a co-defendant, had entered his plea in a separate action. The obvious effect of the repetitive references to Zamarripa’s guilty plea was to place Bements and Zarnik in a shroud of guilt and to obscure any palatable defense they might offer. The prosecutor did not need to place Zamarripa on the witness stand to prove that Bements and Zarnik were with Zamarripa in the car when it was stopped by the police.
*606The mixture of repeated reference to Zamarripa’s guilty plea in a separate action with Zamarippa’s exculpatory remarks as to Bements’ and Zamik’s involvement only served to further prejudice Bements and Zarnik since the trial judge’s later remarks confirmed the guilty plea and the offense of Zamarripa. This abusive magnification of guilt by association and Zamarripa’s clumsy denial of Bements’ and Zarnik’s participation in the offense assured a verdict of guilty.
This impression is easily gleaned from the record:
“Q. Mr. Zamarripa, directly your attention to January 10, 1975, did you have occasion to be in this Court room on that date, for the purpose of entering a plea.
“BY MR. ROTENBERG:
Objection Your Honor, immaterial.
“BY THE COURT:
I’ll overrule the objection at this time.
“BY MR. MARLOWE:
“Q. Were you here, Mr. Zamarripa?
“A. I can’t remember.
“Q. Mr. Zamarripa, did you enter a plea?
“A. Yes, I have, yes.
“Q. What plea did you enter?
“A. Guilty.
“Q. To what offense?
“A. Entering with intention to commit a Felony.
“Q. Entering with intent to commit a Felony, is that correct?
“A. Correct.
“Q. Did you make that plea in this Court room?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Was that in connection with Cause No. CR274-489, wherein you were a defendant of Burglary First Degree?
“A. Yes.
N4 H4 H4
*607“Q. Did you not plead guilty to a charge concerning a break-in ?
“A. Yes, I did.
“BY MR. ROTENBERG:
Your Honor, he has already answered that, he is attempting to impeach his own witness.
“BY THE COURT:
I’m sure we are talking about the same address. He’s indicated a plea of guilty.
* * *
“BY THE COURT:
Would you read back the last question?
“FROM THE RECORD ABOVE, THE REPORTER READ BACK THE FOLLOWING TO THE COURT AND THE JURY:
Did you not plead guilty to a charge concerning a break-in ?
❖ * *
“BY THE COURT:
He’s already indicated that he entered a plea of guilty to Breaking and Entering on that date. . . .
* * *
“Q. Mr. Zamarripa, directing your attention to August 5, 1974 at approximately midnight, did you have occasion to enter a home located at 6825 Leland Street, Hammond[,] Lake County, Indiana?
“A. No.
“Q. Did you not plead guilty to Entering with Intent to Commit a Felony at that same home on that same date.
“BY MR. ROTENBERG:
Objection, Your Honor, he’s asked that three (3) times.
“BY THE COURT:
He’s answered yes, overruled, he did.” [sic]
“BY MR. MARLOWE:
“Q. And in your plea of guilty to Entering with Intent to Commit a Felony, which was intended to have been committed ?
“A. Pardon.
*608“Q. What Felony was intended to have been committed in your plea of guilty?
“A. First Degree Burglary.
“BY MR. ROTENBERG:
Your Honor, the pleadings speak for themselves, he does not practice law and cannot state a legal conclusion.
“BY THE COURT:
Well, he’s entered a plea of guilty, he may tell what he intended to do. I will allow him to answer. What Felony did you intend to commit.
“BY MR. GRECO:
Your Honor, he’s also testified that he didn’t go in the house.
“BY THE COURT:
That wasn’t the question. The question was, what Felony did he intend to commit in his plea.
“BY MR. MARLOWE:
Your Honor, at this point again the answers to my questions are becoming more and more non-responsive and inconsistent to the plea of guilty of entering.
“BY MR. ROTENBERG:
Your Honor, I object to this type of argument in front of the Jury. The answers are responsive, further there has not been any questions that the answer has not been responsive. This is just a situation where the Prosecutor is not getting the answer he wants. This witness is under oath and he also is telling the truth.
“BY THE COURT:
Well, without the opinion, that’s for the Jury to determine, whether he is telling the truth or not. He stated that he was arrested that night, that he plead guilty to the offense of Entering with Intent to Commit a Felony of Burglary.
❖ ❖ ❖
“BY MR. MARLOWE:
“Q. Did you agree to testify for the State in this case as a part of your plea bargain agreement? . . .
*609“BY THE COURT:
. . . I’ll overrule the objection, and you can ask him why he plead guilty. . . .
“Q. Did you agree to testify for the State in this case as a part of your plea bargain agreement?”
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed, but this late instruction did not cure the prejudice. The intervening evidence had been received by the jury in the light of the guilty plea exchange between Zamarripa and the prosecutor. The undiminished “guilty too” impression prevailed.2 As Justice Prentice observed in White v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 64, 69, 272 N.E.2d 312, 314,
“ ‘It is true that erroneous and extraneous matters sometimes get into a law suit through the zeal of counsel, and, if checked at once by the trial court and the jury is instructed, this may be cured; but one party may not be permitted to get the other into a dying condition and then expect the court to revive him by instructions.’ ” (Quoting from Martin v. Lilly [1919], 188 Ind. 139, 121 N.E. 443.) (Original emphasis.)
Zamarripa’s testimony was not material. There was other evidence to prove the same fact — that Bements and Zarnik were in the car with Zamarripa when the arrest was made. The repetitious references to Zamarripa’s guilty plea and offense by the prosecutor created an impasse to a fair trial which could never be removed. Lincoln v. State (1911), 191 Ind. 426, 133 N.E. 351.
The flagrant misconduct of the prosecutor can not be swept away as a harmless error. The impression of Bements’ and Zarnik’s guilt by association with codefendant Zamarripa for entering “. . . a home located at 6825 Leland Street, . . .” was cast into a concrete mold before the eyes and in the minds of the jury. There was no action taken to diminish the devastating effect of this impression upon the jury. Later, evidence *610was received by the jury with this concrete impression well in mind. The weight given the evidence by the jury had to be heavily weighted in favor of the State and against Bements and Zamik. A guilty verdict was assured.
The instruction given by the trial court at the conclusion of the trial came too late. It was ineffective to counter the devastating impression which was retained by the jury as it heard additional evidence. Any hope of diminishing the effect of the “guilty too” impression was lost at the end of the trial. The instruction had to be given immediately if it was to have any diminishing effect upon the impression which was repeatedly reinforced by the prosecutor when he questioned Zamarripa.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court with instructions to grant the motion for a mistrial and to grant Bements and Zarnik a new trial.
Note. — Reported at 361 N.E.2d 202.

. In addition to the prejudice of the guilty plea discussed herein, I note that the admission of the testimony of Zamarripa was questionable in and of itself due to the fact that (1) there had been granted a defense motion to separate witnesses; (2) Zamarripa remained in the court room even though the State was aware he would be a witness; (3) Zamarripa was also in the court room during the motion to suppress; and (4) Zamarripa’s testimony was a surprise to the defense since his name was not supplied by the State as a witness. The trial court overruled the defense’s objection to Zamarripa’s testimony.

. See Sims v. State (1977), 265 Ind. 647, 358 N.E.2d 746, where the Indiana Supreme Court discusses the highly prejudicial inferences likely to he drawn by the jury where reference is made to a codefendant’s confession.