Court Opinion

ID: 9600918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:33:14.521024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:16.272095
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(dissenting).
*300I do not agree that the Shulman Company has an adequate remedy at law under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 84-4502. That section was formerly section 2269, R. C. M. 1935. Section 2270, R. C. M. 1935, was designed to' offer the taxpayer a remedy for overvaluation of his property by paying the tax under protest and suing to recover it back. It has specific reference to property overvalued for tax purposes. But it applied only to such taxpayers who deliver to the assessor a sworn statement of their property, giving the estimated value thereof. Here it is alleged in the petition of relators that the Shulman Company did not furnish such statement. It is in no position to take advantage of section 2270, R. C. M. 1935.
Furthermore, this court in International Business Machine Corp. v. Lewis and Clark County, 111 Mont. 384, 112 Pac. (2d) 477, held that part of the statute unconstitutional and the unconstitutional part of the statute was omitted when the section was incorporated into the 1947 Codes, sec. 84-4503.
Section 2269 does not apply when the only grievance of the taxpayer is that his property has been overvalued for assessment purposes. If it did then there was no purpose in enacting section 2270. Likewise if section 2269 does apply to overvaluation of property then it is unconstitutional for the same reasons which nullified that part of section 2270 so providing.
It cannot be said that section 2269 affords a remedy unless the court has the right to fix the value of the property in case it finds it has been overvalued. But this would make of the court an assessing tribunal which it repeatedly has asserted may not be done.
Johnson v. Johnson, 92 Mont. 512, 15 Pac. (2d) 842, 845, is relied on as authority supporting the view that a taxpayer may sue to recover taxes paid under protest when the excessive tax is alleged to have been exacted because of overvaluation. But in that case there were allegations of improper classification of the lands in question. The court was careful to point out that “Mere overvaluation of the property, if shown, is not enough to overthrow the order of the board.”
*301Investors Security Co. v. Moore, 113 Mont. 400, 127 Pac. (2d) 225, is also relied on as sustaining the view that there is an adequate remedy in an action to recover the tax paid under protest. That case does leave such an inference. The point however was not considered since it was held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the action of the board. The court did not indicate what the result would have been had the evidence not sustained the action of the board. Unless the court could then resolve itself into an assessing tribunal and fix the value of the property, plaintiff would not have an adequate remedy under section 2269.
A mere cursory reading of R. C. M. 1947, sec. 84-4505, will show that it has no application to a tax claimed to be excessive on account of overvaluation. If the courts are to be thrown open to fix valuations of property for tax purposes either under section 84-4502 or 8.4-4505, then the Constitution which imposes upon the state board of equalization the duty to “equalize the valuation of taxable property among the several counties, and the different classes of taxable property in any county and in the several counties and between individual taxpayers,” will be meaningless. Mont. Const., Art. XII, see. 15.
I think the opinion in the case of Corcoran v. State Board of Equalization, 116 Mont. 499, 154 Pac. (2d) 795, was proper and should not be overruled. But if it is thought to be erroneous, still a number of other opinions will have to be overruled before the way is cleared for every taxpayer who thinks his property has been overvalued for tax purposes to pay under protest and then sue to recover that part which he thinks is excessive.
I think the writ applied for here should be denied.
I have considered the ease on the merits, but it is my further opinion that this court was not justified in taking jurisdiction of the case at this time. I think the board’s application was premature. Respondent court has yet taken no action affecting the rights of either party. All it did was to set the matter for hearing by issuing an alternative writ. I think respondent court not only had the right but that it was duty bound to set the *302matter for hearing. Respondent’s decision after hearing may have been entirely satisfactory to the relator.