Court Opinion

ID: 9385101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 21:01:00.691533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.758581
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 22-4001

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                    Plaintiff – Appellee,

       v.

       SONYA SKINNER,

                    Defendant – Appellant.

                                                No. 22-4013

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                    Plaintiff – Appellee,

       v.

       SONYA SKINNER,

                    Defendant – Appellant.

       Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
       Roderick Charles Young, District Judge. (2:16-cr-00017-RCY-LRL-1; 2:21-cr- 00062-RCY-
       RJK-1)

       Submitted: February 17, 2023                                        Decided: April 4, 2023
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       Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
       Judge.

       Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

       ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Rodolfo Cejas, II, Assistant
       Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
       DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney,
       Richmond, Virginia, Joseph Kosky, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
       Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

       Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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       PER CURIAM:
              Sonya Skinner appeals from her convictions for four counts of bankruptcy fraud

       following a bench trial and her resulting 12-month within-Guidelines sentence. She also

       appeals the 18-month upward variance sentence imposed for violation of her supervised

       release. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of her specific intent and

       the district court’s explanation for her aggregate sentence. We vacate Skinner’s revocation

       sentence and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the remainder of the district court’s

       judgments.

              Skinner first argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence of her

       specific intent. While Skinner moved for a judgment of acquittal after the close of the

       Government’s case raising this issue, she did not renew her motion after trial. Accordingly,

       this argument is forfeited absent a manifest miscarriage of justice. United States v.

       Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 n.2 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 374

       (4th Cir. 2020). “[T]he ‘manifest miscarriage’ language [is] simply a formulation of the

       plain-error test’s application to insufficiency claims.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d

       320, 331 n.9 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also United States v. Norris, 21 F.4th 188, 199

       (1st Cir. 2021) (when insufficient evidence claim was not raised in Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 motion,

       claim is reviewed for plain error); United States v. Chaparro, 956 F.3d 462, 468 (7th Cir.

       2020)(explaining that, because defendant did not renew Rule 29 motion, he “forfeited his

       sufficiency challenge,” and court “reviews for a manifest miscarriage of justice” or “plain

       error” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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              For a defendant to prevail under the plain-error standard, we must find that: “(1) an

       error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error

       seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United

       States v. Comer, 5 F.4th 535, 548 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n

       appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record—not just the

       record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred.” Greer v. United States,

       141 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2021) (emphasis in the original).

              Bankruptcy fraud involves filing a bankruptcy petition with an intent to execute,

       conceal, or attempt to execute or conceal “a scheme or artifice to defraud.” 18 U.S.C.

       § 157. To obtain a conviction on this offense, the Government must prove that Skinner acted

       with the specific intent to defraud. See United States v. Yurek, 925 F.3d 423, 439 (10th Cir.

       2019). Specific intent to defraud requires the intent “to deprive one of something of value

       through a misrepresentation or other similar dishonest method, which indeed would cause

       him harm.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (mail/wire fraud).

       Therefore, “to convict a person of defrauding another, more must be shown than simply an

       intent to lie to the victim or to make a false statement to him.” Id. As the Supreme Court

       has explained, a scheme to defraud “must be one to deceive the [victim] and deprive [him

       or her] of something of value.” Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63, 72 (2016) (bank fraud)

       (emphasis in original). However, specific intent may be “inferred from the totality of the

       circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.” United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d

       659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001).

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              Skinner avers that her false statements on various documents in her bankruptcy

       petition were due to misunderstandings and that the lack of motive evidence boosted the

       credibility of her testimony. This argument heavily relies upon Skinner’s testimony that she

       did not understand the scope of the questions in the bankruptcy petition and made reasonable

       mistakes therein. However, the district court did not find Skinner to be a credible witness

       and, in fact, imposed an obstruction of justice enhancement based on her perjured testimony.

       Credibility determinations made by the district court are rarely reviewable on appeal. United

       States v. Cates, 613 F.3d 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Witness credibility is quintessentially a

       judgment call and virtually unassailable on appeal.”); United States v. Oquendo-Rivera, 586

       F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he reviewing court must interpret the evidence in the light

       most favorable to the government, . . . and credibility is largely a matter for the fact-finder.”).

       We afford the district court’s credibility finding great deference and, thus, determine that

       Skinner has failed to show error, much less plain error.

              Moreover, Skinner does not dispute that plain error is the appropriate standard of

       review, and yet she fails to address the plain error standard. Our review of the record does

       not reveal any plain error with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we

       affirm Skinner’s convictions.

              Turning to Skinner’s sentence, for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “a

       district court must conduct an individualized assessment of the facts and arguments

       presented.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

       marks omitted). A “district court’s sentencing explanation need not be exhaustive or

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       robotically tick through [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors. But the court’s explanation must be

       sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that the district court has considered the parties’

       arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.”

       United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 142 S.

       Ct. 724 (2021). “The explanation is sufficient if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the

       defendant’s particular history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but

       as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in response to defense counsel’s arguments

       . . . .” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 782 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

       omitted).

              While “it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale from the

       context surrounding its decision,” we “may not guess at the district court’s rationale,

       searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other

       clues that might explain a sentence.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 745 (4th Cir.

       2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “in a routine case, where the district

       court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the explanation need not be elaborate or

       lengthy.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

       marks omitted). Ultimately, “[t]he adequacy of the sentencing court’s explanation depends

       on the complexity of each case and the facts and arguments presented.” United States v.

       Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

              We find that the district court’s explanation for Skinner’s bankruptcy fraud

       within-Guidelines sentence sufficiently demonstrated that it considered the parties’

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        arguments and the relevant statutory factors. The court explicitly stated that it considered

        the parties’ positions on sentencing and the arguments of counsel and noted that counsel

        contended that Skinner was not a danger to the community. The court expressed concern

        about the serious nature of Skinner’s bankruptcy fraud, especially in light of prior court

        orders limiting Skinner’s ability to file bankruptcy petitions. The court noted Skinner’s

        normal childhood and considered that she had a master’s degree and no history of drug

        abuse or mental health issues. The court further determined that Skinner’s conduct was

        repetitive, even after prior punishments, and showed a “blatant disregard” for the court

        system. The court explicitly listed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors that it considered and found

        both an upward and a downward variance inappropriate. We hold that the court’s

        explanation of Skinner’s within-Guidelines sentence was sufficient and that Skinner’s 12-

        month sentence was procedurally reasonable.

               Skinner also argues that her sentence imposed upon the revocation of her supervised

        release was procedurally unreasonable due to the lack of a sufficient explanation by the

        district court. Skinner’s revocation Guidelines range was 4 to 10 months, and she was

        sentenced to an upward variance sentence of 18 months. “A district court has broad

        discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States

        v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We “will affirm a revocation sentence if it is

        within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy,

        872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining

        whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether the

        sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. Only if we find the sentence
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        procedurally and or substantively unreasonable, must we decide whether it is “plainly” so.

        United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that a plainly

        unreasonable sentence is one in which the error is clear and obvious). In doing so, this court is

        guided by “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide [its] review of

        original sentences,” but it takes “a more deferential appellate posture than [it] do[es] when

        reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015)

        (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

               “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

        explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

        Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United

        States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

        18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing sentencing factors applicable to revocation proceedings). “[A]

        revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of the

        circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant

        should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               “A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as

        it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement

        of reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th

        Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). An explanation is adequate if it permits this

        Court to determine “that the sentencing court considered the applicable sentencing factors

        with regard to the particular defendant before it and also considered any potentially

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        meritorious arguments raised by the parties with regard to sentencing.” United States v.

        Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

               Here, Skinner adopted the arguments made at her sentencing for her fraud

        convictions, which was held the same day. There, she argued that she was not a risk to

        society and that, despite her lapses in judgment, she corrected her errors when they were

        pointed out. These were certainly not extensive arguments, and the district court stated that

        it considered the arguments of counsel and the relevant statutory factors.

               However, the only individualized statement made by the district court in its

        explanation for the revocation sentence was factually incorrect. The court stated that

        Skinner filed “four fraudulent bankruptcy petitions while on a term of supervised release

        for filing fraudulent bankruptcy petitions.” J.A. 95. However, Skinner was not on

        supervised release for filing fraudulent bankruptcy petitions; instead, she was on

        supervised release for convictions arising from her charging customers for bankruptcy

        petition preparation and legal advice, despite being enjoined by the court from doing so.

        Moreover, Skinner did not file four fraudulent bankruptcy petitions while on the instant

        supervised release; she only filed one, even though four charges arose from that filing.

               Also, the district court did not address the upward variance or why the Guidelines

        range was insufficient. Given the court’s failure to explain its sentence and its reliance on

        incorrect facts, we find that Skinner’s revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable.

               Accordingly, we vacate Skinner’s revocation sentence and remand for resentencing.

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        We affirm Skinner’s bankruptcy fraud convictions and resulting sentence. * We dispense

        with oral argument because the facts and contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                        AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                           VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED

               *
                 We decline to address the additional claims raised in Skinner’s pro se supplemental
        briefs. While counsel originally filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
        (1967), counsel has now filed a merits brief. See United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d
        566, 569 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011) (denying motion to file pro se supplemental brief because
        defendant was represented by counsel).

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