Court Opinion

ID: 9402932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 15:08:16.817717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.573577
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued June 15, 2023

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                             NO. 01-22-00680-CV
                          ———————————
       HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant
                                       V.
                    JOHNYALE MCDANIEL, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 164th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 2020-17330

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Appellee Johnyale McDaniel sued her former employer, appellant Houston

Independent School District (“HISD”) for sex and race discrimination and

retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”).1 HISD

1
     See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 21.051, 21.055.
brings this interlocutory appeal,2 challenging the trial court’s denial of its plea to

the jurisdiction. We reverse and render a take-nothing judgment in favor of HISD.

                                    Background

      This case concerns McDaniel’s employment as a police officer with HISD.

McDaniel was terminated by HISD in November 2016. In March 2018, as part of a

mediated settlement, McDaniel was reinstated as a police officer with seniority as

of the date of her termination. She was assigned to Waltrip High School as a police

officer. In fall 2018, McDaniel filed a TCHRA complaint with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Texas Workforce

Commission (“TWC”) alleging retaliation by a coworker against whom she had

filed a separate complaint before her reinstatement. She amended the complaint to

include additional retaliatory allegations in May 2019. In March 2020, she sued

HISD. Her live petition, amended after her termination from HISD in May 2020,

alleges claims for retaliation and discrimination based on her race and sex in

violation of the TCHRA. HISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction requesting dismissal

of McDaniel’s claims for want of jurisdiction. HISD argued that its immunity is

not waived. McDaniel did not respond to the plea.

2
      See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).
                                          2
A.    McDaniel’s Employment with HISD

      McDaniel’s discrimination and retaliation claims concern her employment

between 2018 and 2020 with HISD.

      1.    Attendance issues

      Beginning in July 2018, a police captain informed HISD Assistant Police

Chief L. Rogers that McDaniel was tardy and left early from work. Due to the

nature of the allegations, Assistant Chief Rogers contacted Chief P. Cordova who

requested that the Internal Affairs Department (“IAD”) investigate. In December

2018, the IAD investigation report found that McDaniel was excessively tardy

without notifying her supervisor and did not record her time off. The report also

found that she reported overtime in May 2018 when she was not working.

Concluding that McDaniel violated HISD police department directives, a letter of

reprimand was placed in McDaniel’s personnel file in May 2019.

      2.    Body camera privacy

      In September 2018, an HISD police officer filed a complaint with the

Employee Relations Department alleging she was subjected to a hostile work

environment by McDaniel and another officer. The same day, McDaniel reported

that the police officer who made the report had tampered with McDaniel’s body

camera, violating her privacy. After an investigation, HISD concluded that

McDaniel’s claim was unfounded.

                                       3
      3.    McDaniel’s assignment to Cullen Middle School and subsequent
            attendance issues

      A few months later, McDaniel was reassigned from Waltrip High School to

Cullen Middle School. McDaniel’s supervisor notified her that the change was to

ensure adequate campus coverage. In January 2019, McDaniel’s supervisor,

Sergeant Grant, issued an attendance notification to her, noting concern for her

attendance and requesting doctor’s documentation for her absences. One month

later, he issued McDaniel a memorandum noting concerns for her lack of presence

on campus and her lack of response to dispatch calls. McDaniel filed a workplace

bullying complaint against Sergeant Grant. She alleged that Sergeant Grant denied

her permission to attend a training class, changed her work hours, and issued a

memo regarding her attendance.

      An HISD employee relations investigative committee found that Sergeant

Grant did not bully McDaniel because as a manager, he could deny her request to

attend training and the request was denied due to staffing issues. The committee

also found that McDaniel missed 50 days of work in the second half of 2018 and

that her supervisor could change her work schedule to fit the needs of the

department and the school.

      4.    McDaniel’s termination

      In December 2020, HISD was notified by HPD of a sexual assault case

involving a student at Paul Revere Middle School. The forensic investigation

                                       4
found that McDaniel, who was the campus police officer, had been aware that the

student reported being sexually assaulted by her father. The investigation found

that McDaniel released the child from school to the alleged suspect, her father,

who then sexually assaulted the child again later the same day. The investigator

also reported to HISD that McDaniel did not contact child protective services or

local law enforcement before releasing the child.

      HISD initiated another IAD investigation against McDaniel. During the

investigation, HISD Captain Barbosa directed McDaniel not to have contact with

her immediate supervisor and instead to report to Captain Barbosa directly. While

the investigation was ongoing, McDaniel was first transferred to a different middle

school and later assigned to administrative duties pending the outcome of the

investigation.

      Sergeant Royal issued an IAD investigative report, which was reviewed by

Captain Barbosa. Captain Barbosa concluded that McDaniel used improper police

procedures by neglecting to ensure the safety and well-being of the outcry victim

and failing to forward a report to HPD, which delayed a response from both child

protective services and HPD.

      In May 2021, the IAD Disciplinary review committee reviewed both the

investigation and Captain Barbosa’s conclusions and recommended McDaniel’s

                                         5
termination. The committee consisted of seven individuals. Chief Lopez then made

the decision to terminate McDaniel.

      Captain Barbosa informed McDaniel that she violated HISD police

department directives because she failed to exercise authority and used poor

judgment, neglected to perform her duties, and failed to uphold her oath of office.

He further stated that she violated policy by not activating her body camera on at

least one occasion when it was required. Given her multiple violations, she was

terminated and not eligible for rehire, effective May 10, 2021.

B.    McDaniel’s EEOC/TWC complaint and lawsuit

      In October 2018, McDaniel alleged in a EEOC and TWC complaint that a

coworker retaliated against her. McDaniel had filed a previous EEOC complaint

against the coworker regarding issues prior to McDaniel’s March 2018

reinstatement. She amended her retaliation complaint in May 2019. She stated that

an officer retaliated against her by filing a complaint stating that McDaniel created

a hostile work environment. McDaniel alleged that as a result of the complaint, she

was reassigned to Cullen Middle School. She also alleged that because she filed a

bullying complaint against Sergeant Grant, she was written up for violation of

HISD attendance policy.

      In March 2020, McDaniel sued HISD. Her live petition alleges that the

HISD police department discriminated against her because of her race and gender

                                         6
and retaliated against her in violation of the TCHRA. This interlocutory appeal

concerns the denial of HISD’s plea to the jurisdiction.3 HISD argued that its

immunity is not waived and that McDaniel cannot establish essential elements of

her claim. Along with documentary evidence, HISD attached McDaniel’s

deposition testimony, affidavits from Assistant Chief Rogers and Chief Lopez, and

deposition testimony from Sergeant Alexander and another police officer.

McDaniel did not respond. The court denied the plea, and HISD appealed.

                             Plea to the Jurisdiction

      HISD argues that the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction

because the evidence establishes that McDaniel did not exhaust her administrative

remedies by timely filing a TWC/EEOC complaint for her discrimination claims

and did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. HISD asserts its immunity is

not waived, and the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over McDaniel’s

claims.

A.    Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Texas

Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

Governmental units enjoy sovereign immunity from lawsuits except where the

3
      During the litigation, the court granted a prior plea to the jurisdiction as to
      McDaniel’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and denied
      McDaniel’s motions for temporary restraining order and temporary injunctive
      relief. McDaniel’s live petition includes discrimination and retaliation claims.
                                          7
Legislature waives immunity. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354

S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011). For purposes of sovereign immunity, school

districts, like HISD, are political subdivisions of the State. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 101.001(3)(B). Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject-

matter jurisdiction. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629,

636 (Tex. 2012). The Legislature has provided a limited waiver of immunity for

claims brought against governmental units alleging violations of the TCHRA as

found in the Texas Labor Code Chapter 21. Id. at 636–37. The waiver extends only

to suits in which the pleadings state a prima facie claim for a TCHRA violation,

otherwise the governmental unit retains immunity from suit. Id. at 636.

      The governmental entity may challenge subject-matter jurisdiction through a

plea to the jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26. The plea can attack both

the facts as pleaded as well as the existence of jurisdictional facts by attaching

evidence to the plea. Id. at 226–27. When the defendant challenges the existence of

jurisdictional facts with supporting evidence, the court must move beyond the

pleadings and consider the evidence. Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d

46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (citing Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d

755, 770 (Tex. 2018)). In such cases, the standard of review mirrors that of

summary judgments. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771. If the defendant

challenges the plaintiff’s factual allegations “with supporting evidence necessary to

                                         8
the consideration of the plea to the jurisdiction, to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff[]

must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the

trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. In determining whether a material fact

issue exists, we take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging ever

reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. (citing

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225–26). At the same time, we cannot disregard evidence

and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff if reasonable jurors could not. Id.

B.    The TCHRA

      The TCHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against employees

based on “race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age[.]” TEX. LAB.

CODE § 21.051. Similarly, the TCHRA protects employees from retaliation by their

employer for, among other things, reporting discrimination, including filing a

TCHRA complaint. Id. § 21.055(1)–(3). In adopting the TCHRA, the Legislature

“intended to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination

cases”; accordingly, we may look to federal law to interpret its provisions.

AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (internal

quotation and citation removed).

                                          9
C.    Analysis

      1.    McDaniel failed to file a timely administrative complaint
            regarding discrimination.

      HISD argues that the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction

regarding McDaniel’s race and gender discrimination claims. HISD asserts that the

trial court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because

McDaniel failed to comply with mandatory, jurisdictional statutory prerequisites.

Thus, its immunity is not waived.

      To bring suit for unlawful employment practices, a plaintiff must first have

filed an administrative complaint with the EEOC or TWC “not later than the 180th

day after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” See TEX.

LAB. CODE § 21.202(a). In a suit against a governmental entity, such as HISD, the

filing requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. Prairie View A&M Univ. v.

Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 503, 510–14 (Tex. 2012) (holding that 180-day limit is

jurisdictional under section 311.034 of the Texas Government Code). The period

begins when the employee is informed of the allegedly discriminatory employment

decision, not when that decision comes to fruition. Id. at 516 (quoting Specialty

Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. 1996)).

      The uncontroverted evidence shows that when McDaniel initially filed her

administrative complaint, she alleged only retaliation, and not discrimination.

While she amended her complaint, she did so only to complain of “numerous

                                        10
retaliatory conduct” from management officials. In her live petition, she alleges

that HISD discriminated against her based on her race and gender. McDaniel’s

termination occurred on May 10, 2021. She never filed an administrative complaint

of discrimination, nor did she amend her then-pending complaint within the

timeframe to include discrimination. Therefore, she did not exhaust her

administrative remedies. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.202 (providing discrimination

complaint asserting violation of Chapter 21 must be filed within 180 days of the

date the discriminatory employment practice occurred). Because she failed to file a

complaint alleging discrimination, she did not exhaust her administrative remedies

for this claim. HISD’s governmental immunity is not waived, and the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over her discrimination claims. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at

503, 510–14.

      2.    McDaniel did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

      HISD argues that the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction

because McDaniel did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. In

determining whether a plaintiff has a valid TCHRA claim, Texas courts recognize

two alternative methods of proof. Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 634. First, a

plaintiff may prove unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory intent via direct

evidence. Id. Because it is difficult to prove discriminatory animus through direct

evidence, courts recognize a second method to establish a claim of either

                                        11
discrimination or retaliation, known as the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework, which allows a plaintiff to rely on circumstantial evidence to establish

his claims. Id.; see also Texas Tech Univ. Health Sci. Ctr.-El Paso v. Flores, 612

S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2020) (recognizing that direct evidence of discriminatory

intent is typically hard to come by); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 804–05 (1973).

       Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a

prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, which creates a presumption of a

TCHRA violation. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 782. The burden then shifts to

the   defendant   to   rebut   that   presumption     by   producing    a   legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. In a retaliation

case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether his protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse employment

action. Id.

       To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation sufficient to waive

immunity, the employee must show: (1) she engaged in an activity protected by the

TCHRA; (2) she experienced a material adverse employment action; and (3) a

casual link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Id.

Relevant here, protected activities include opposing a discriminatory practice and

filing a complaint. TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.055(1), (3); Chandler v. CSC Applied

                                          12
Techs., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.

denied) (listing protected activities).

      In the retaliation context, the adverse employment action is not limited to

conduct that constitutes “ultimate employment decisions.” Burlington N. & Santa

Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (internal quotation and citation

removed). The retaliation provision only protects an individual from actions that a

reasonable employee would have found materially adverse. Id. at 67–68.

“Material” actions are those “that are likely ‘to deter victims of discrimination

from complaining to the EEOC,’ the courts, and their employers.” Id. at 68

(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). “[N]ormally, petty

slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create such

deterrence.” Id. This objective standard is applied to a fact-specific inquiry

“because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the

particular circumstances. Context matters.” Id. at 69.

      Once the plaintiff establishes its prima facie case, an employer can then

defeat the presumption of retaliation by “producing evidence of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed employment action.” Alamo Heights,

544 S.W.3d at 782. The burden then shifts back to the employee to provide

evidence that the adverse action would not have occurred when it did but for the

protected activity. Id.

                                          13
      In Alamo Heights, the court identified a series of factors that are useful in

analyzing the causal link in a retaliation case:

      In evaluating but-for causation evidence in retaliation cases, we
      examine all of the circumstances, including temporal proximity
      between the protected activity and the adverse action, knowledge of
      the protected activity, expression of a negative attitude toward the
      employee’s protected activity, failure to adhere to relevant established
      company policies, discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly
      situated employees, and evidence the employer’s stated reason is
      false.

544 S.W.3d at 790. The Texas Supreme Court also emphasized that these factors

may be relevant in some, but not all situations, and should not be considered a

replacement for the but-for-causation standard. Apache Corp. v. Davis, 627 S.W.3d

324, 336 (Tex. 2021) (recognizing that these “factors may be more helpful in some

cases and less in others” and that “[s]ome of the factors may actually be a

distraction.”). Accordingly, it recognized that “determining but-for causation

cannot be a matter of weighing—or worse, counting—factors that may be helpful

in analyzing circumstantial evidence in some situations.” Id. at 337.

      McDaniel contends that: her privacy was invaded when a fellow officer

tampered with her body camera; she was reassigned to a different school upon

returning from leave; her work hours changed; she was denied an opportunity to

attend a training; she was written up for attendance issues and policy infractions;

and she was subject of multiple internal investigations, one of which served as the

basis for her termination in May 2021. HISD argues that McDaniel failed to

                                          14
establish a causal link between any protected activity and the separation from her

employment, and it attached evidence to prove the same. McDaniel did not

respond to HISD’s plea to the jurisdiction.

      McDaniel has not alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to create a fact issue

regarding the existence of a causal link between her filing a TWC complaint and

her termination. Relatedly, she has not established that but for filing the complaint,

the adverse action would not have occurred when it did. Alamo Heights, 544

S.W.3d at 782.

      The record does not reflect that HISD employees knew of McDaniel’s TWC

complaint when terminating her employment. McDaniel’s petition asserts that

Assistant Chief Rogers was the “impetus behind” HISD’s discriminatory action

against her. She did not provide facts to support this allegation, and she did not

respond to the plea to the jurisdiction. HISD’s uncontroverted jurisdictional

evidence demonstrates that Assistant Chief Rogers did not make the decision to

terminate McDaniel. Instead, Chief Lopez, after reviewing independent

investigation reports and the review of a disciplinary committee, made the decision

to terminate McDaniel due to multiple policy violations. Chief Lopez testified that

he did not know that McDaniel had previously complained of discrimination, and

that, even if he had known, he would have made the decision to terminate

McDaniel because she violated HISD police department directives. Where a

                                         15
decision maker is unaware of an employee’s protected conduct at the time of the

decision, the decision maker “plainly could not have retaliated against the

employee based on that conduct.” Cnty. of El Paso v. Aguilar, 600 S.W.3d 62, 93

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.) (quoting Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility

Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 1999)). McDaniel also testified that she

did not know the names of any HISD employees who were aware that she had filed

a complaint of retaliation. McDaniel has not created a fact issue as to the

connection between any retaliatory conduct and her termination.

      Furthermore, McDaniel has not presented evidence that she received

discriminatory treatment compared to any similarly situated employee. See Alamo

Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 790. Employees are similarly situated if their

circumstances are comparable in all material respects, including similar standards,

supervisors, and conduct. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 584

(Tex. 2017). Notably, “[t]he situations and conduct of the employees in question

must be nearly identical.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

“Employees with different responsibilities, supervisors, capabilities, work rule

violations, or disciplinary records are not considered to be nearly identical.”

AutoZone, 272 S.W.3d at 594 (internal quotations omitted). McDaniel did not

allege that she received less favorable treatment than any similarly situated

employee.

                                        16
      After reviewing the record, we conclude that HISD’s uncontested evidence

shows that McDaniel’s termination was not causally related to her filing an

administrative complaint.      Having concluded that the jurisdictional evidence

negates the causation element of McDaniel’s retaliation claim, we conclude that

HISD retains immunity, and the trial court erred in denying HISD’s plea to the

jurisdiction related to this claim.

                                      Conclusion

      We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying the plea to the jurisdiction and

render judgment dismissing McDaniel’s claims for lack of jurisdiction.

                                               Peter Kelly
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.

                                          17