Court Opinion

ID: 9371151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 16:10:04.918323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.694926
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                         In The Supreme Court

            Jerry Buck Inman, a/k/a Jerry Buck Inmon, Respondent-
            Petitioner,

            v.

            State of South Carolina, Petitioner-Respondent.

            Appellate Case No. 2020-000881

                         Appeal From Pickens County
                   Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge

                              Opinion No. 28135
              Submitted January 26, 2023 – Filed February 15, 2023

                       REVERSED AND REMANDED

            Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
            Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
            Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown,
            of Columbia, for Petitioner-Respondent.

            E. Charles Grose, Jr., of Grose Law Firm LLC, of
            Greenwood; Diana L. Holt, of Diana Holt LLC, of
            Columbia, for Respondent-Petitioner.

PER CURIAM: Both parties appeal from an order of the post-conviction relief
(PCR) court granting PCR to Respondent-Petitioner Jerry Buck Inman. The PCR
court ruled upon only one issue raised by Inman—that section 16-3-20(B) of the
South Carolina Code (2015) is unconstitutional. The PCR court ruled it was
unconstitutional. We reverse the order of the PCR court on that issue and remand
for the PCR court to address Inman's remaining issues, as required by S.C. Code
Ann. § 17-27-80 (2014).

Inman pled guilty to murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC), and kidnapping. In electing to plead guilty, Inman waived his
right to a jury trial and to have a jury hear his case in sentencing. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-20(B) ("If trial by jury has been waived by the defendant and the
State, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding must be
conducted before the judge." (emphasis added)). The plea court sentenced Inman
to death for murder and two consecutive sentences of thirty years' imprisonment
for first-degree burglary and first-degree CSC. 1 This Court affirmed Inman's guilty
pleas and sentences, and the United States Supreme Court denied Inman's request
for a writ of certiorari. State v. Inman, 395 S.C. 539, 720 S.E.2d 31 (2011), cert.
denied sub nom. Inman v. South Carolina, 568 U.S. 863 (2012).

In his PCR application, Inman asserted a number of claims. However, the PCR
court addressed only one: whether section 16-3-20(B) was constitutional.2 The
PCR court found section 16-3-20(B) unconstitutional pursuant to Hurst v. Florida,
577 U.S. 92 (2016). In Hurst, the United State Supreme Court considered a
Florida statute under which a jury in a capital trial rendered an advisory sentence,
but the trial judge sentenced the defendant notwithstanding the recommendation of
the jury, even in cases where the defendant exercised the right to a jury trial. Id. at
95–96. The Supreme Court held this scheme violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at
99.

We recently addressed the application of Hurst to section 16-3-20(B) in State v.
Jenkins, 436 S.C. 362, 872 S.E.2d 620 (2022). In Jenkins, we noted that we have
repeatedly addressed the argument that section 16-3-20(B) is unconstitutional and
have held the statute constitutional on each occasion. Id. at 372, 872 S.E.2d at 625.
We further held Hurst is distinguishable from cases involving section 16-3-20(B)
because the Florida sentencing procedure at issue applied even in cases where the
defendant exercised the right to a trial by jury. Id. at 373, 872 S.E.2d at 626.

1
 The plea court did not impose a sentence for kidnapping as Inman was sentenced
for the related murder charge. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-910 (2015) (providing a
mandatory minimum sentence for kidnapping unless the defendant was sentenced
for murder).
2
 Both Inman and the State filed Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motions, which the PCR
court denied.
Section 16-3-20(B) applies only after a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily
waived the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Therefore, we reiterate what we
have held on many prior occasions—section 16-3-20(B) is constitutional. Id. ("We
once more affirm the constitutionality of the subsection 16-3-20(B) requirement
that a capital defendant who pleads guilty to murder must be sentenced by the trial
court."). The PCR court erred in finding section 16-3-20(B) unconstitutional and
in granting Inman PCR as to this issue. Accordingly, we reverse the PCR court's
ruling on that issue.
We further hold the PCR court erred in failing to address Inman's remaining PCR
claims as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (providing the PCR court must
make specific findings of fact and state expressly its conclusions of law relating to
each issue presented). See Simmons v. State, 416 S.C. 584, 592–93, 788 S.E.2d
220, 225 (2016) (holding the PCR court erred in failing to make specific findings
of fact and rulings of law on each issue raised by the petitioner despite granting
PCR on one issue).

                                III. CONCLUSION

Because we hold section 16-3-20(B) is constitutional, we grant both petitions for
writs of certiorari, dispense with further briefing, reverse the PCR court's decision
granting Inman PCR relief, and remand the case for an order that complies with
section 17-27-80 as to Inman's remaining issues.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, and JAMES, JJ., concur. FEW, J.,
not participating.