Court Opinion

ID: 9457725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:31:02.149502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:28.896231
License: Public Domain

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the affidavit was sufficient to justify the issuance of the arrest warrant. Accordingly, the argument that the search of Simpson’s wallet was invalid because he was unlawfully arrested is without merit. My problem with this case is that I find nothing in the record which would justify the conclusion that the search of Simpson’s wallet was reasonable.
I recognize that under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) it is reasonable for the arresting officer as an incident to a lawful arrest to search the person thus arrested for weapons with which the arrest might be resisted and also to search his person for evidence which might be concealed or destroyed. However, Chi-mel recognized that there are Fourth Amendment limitations even on a search incident to a lawful arrest and in so doing the Court reemphasized the language from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), that the scope of such search must be *1032“strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Terry in turn noted that a search which is reasonable in its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its “intolerable intensity and scope.” And it is the scope of the present search which gives me concern.
See also in this regard, United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969), where we reviewed many of the pre-Chimel cases bearing on this matter and concluded as follows:
“. . . [I] t is clear that the scope of a search contemporaneous with a legal arrest must have a reasonable relationship to the protection of the officer or the crime for which the accused was arrested . . .
I do not view our pronouncement in Humphrey to be in any manner at odds with Chimel and, on the contrary, believe Humphrey to be in accord with the rationale of Chimel. And the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, at page 482, 91 S.Ct. 2022, at page 2046, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, made reference to Chimel as follows:
“To begin with, in Chimel v. California, supra, we held that a search of the person of an arrestee and of the area under his immediate control could be carried out without a warrant. We did not indicate there, and do not suggest here, that the police must obtain ■ a warrant if they anticipate that they will find specific evidence during the course of such a search.” (Emphasis added.)
As indicated, I am unable to determine from the record before us what prompted the arresting officer to search Simpson’s wallet. Certainly there is nothing in the record to indicate that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds, as he must have under the Fourth Amendment, to believe that either a weapon was concealed in the wallet or that the wallet contained evidence pertaining to the crime for which Simpson was being arrested, namely, the unlawful possession, some two weeks prior to his arrest, of dynamite, in violation of Kansas law. Such may conceivably be the case, but there is nothing before us to indicate that it was one or both of those reasons that prompted the arresting officer to thumb through the identification cards in Simpson’s wallet.
I recognize that at the hearing on the motion to suppress neither the Government nor Simpson put on any evidence to develop the facts and circumstances surrounding the search. Rather, the argument in the trial court centered on the sufficiency of the affidavit which formed the basis for the issuance of the arrest warrant. Simpson, however, also contended that even though the arrest be deemed lawful, the ensuing search of his wallet was not. In this regard, the trial court indicated that the search of the wallet was perhaps a reasonable effort to identify the person arrested. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that there was any identification problem.
In any event, I would remand the matter to the trial court with directions that it hold, even at this late date, a full-scale hearing on the motion to suppress, permitting the parties to call such witnesses as each desires. If, after such hearing, the trial court be of the view that the motion to suppress was properly denied, then the judgment and sentence should be permitted to stand, subject to our right to review on the record as thus made the propriety of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. If, however, after such hearing the trial court concludes that the motion to suppress should have been granted, then the judgment and sentence should be vacated and the case dismissed, as it is difficult to fathom how the Government could prosecute the ease without the use of the Selective Service card belonging to Loveless but found in Simpson’s wallet.