Court Opinion

ID: 9569877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:18:14.733461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:11.651252
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully and completely in Divisions 2 through 6, but because I think the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to decide Vinnie Holcomb’s intentional emotional distress claim, I must dissent to Division 1.
While this court must decide as a matter of law “[wjhether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,” Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706 (2) (409 SE2d 835) (1991), once we have determined that the claim meets that level, we must affirm the denial of motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial on this ground if any evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Ferman v. Bailey, 292 Ga. App. 288, 290 (2) (664 SE2d 285) (2008). In this case, Holcomb presented evidence that Norton’s intentional conduct was completely outrageous and caused her severe emotional distress which was sufficient to allow the claim to go to the jury and to sustain its verdict.
In addition to the requisite elements of (1) intentional conduct (2) that was extreme and outrageous, causing (3) emotional distress which was (4) severe, a plaintiff seeking to recover for emotional distress must show that, in the absence of a physical impact to her person, the conduct in question was directed at her. Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828 (412 SE2d 826) (1992). Emotional distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, *214disappointment, worry, and nausea. Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 230 (335 SE2d 445) (1985). Further, evidence of a defendant’s wanton disregard of a plaintiffs rights may be considered in evaluating whether or not the objected-to behavior can reasonably be characterized as outrageous or egregious. Gordon v. Frost, 193 Ga. App. 517, 521 (388 SE2d 362) (1989).
The majority concludes that Holcomb failed to present evidence showing Norton’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous” or that her emotional distress was severe. Evidence of Norton’s intentional trespass following his repeated unsuccessful attempts to buy or trade for the portion of Holcomb’s property and repeatedly being told that Holcomb was sentimentally attached to the land should constitute sufficient evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct to allow a jury to consider the issue. Holcomb testified that when she declined to trade or sell her property to Norton so he could put in a road, Norton “came down with his fist,” said he wanted the property, and said he could go right through the middle of it with a bulldozer. Although at one point she testified that she only talked to Norton once about selling the property, at another point she testified that Norton “came back” to try to trade with her for other property. He contacted Holcomb’s family, who spoke for Holcomb, repeatedly about the issue; he was told to stop harassing Holcomb about it, he knew she was emotionally attached to the land, he knew he had legal options he could pursue, and despite knowing Holcomb did not want him to “mess with” her land, Norton bulldozed a path through her property anyway.
Merely to threaten and harass an 81-year-old woman in obviously frail health with such an intentional trespass is arguably extreme and outrageous conduct; to actually commit such a trespass is certainly extreme and outrageous. Holcomb’s daughter testified that she thought Norton believed Holcomb would die before she ever got to court and that he would get away with bulldozing a road through her mother’s property.
In determining whether a defendant could be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the extreme and outrageous character of the conduct “may arise from the actor’s knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know.”
Gordon v. Frost, supra, 193 Ga. App. at 521, quoting Comment f, § 46 *215(1) of the Restatement (Second). Norton knew that Holcomb was an elderly woman and in the face of her outright refusal to trade him property he resorted to bulldozing her land without her permission. His action gave rise to natural feelings of distress and vulnerability when Holcomb saw that Norton had altered her land despite her objections. Based on the facts stated above, a jury could reasonably find that the defendant’s behavior was extreme and outrageous. “Once the evidence shows that reasonable persons might find the presence of extreme or outrageous conduct, the jury must find the facts and make its own characterization.” Id.
As to the requirement that Holcomb present evidence that her emotional distress over Norton’s actions was severe, her daughter testified that Holcomb cried when she saw the devastation and that the impact on her emotionally had been terrible, both her daughter and son-in-law testified that Holcomb was “extremely upset” about the damage, and Holcomb testified that Norton’s actions made her feel terrible all the time, had affected her physically, and that she worried about it and wondered why he did it. The effect on her was “not a good one,” she said, and although she had medical problems beforehand they were not as bad as afterward.
This evidence of Holcomb’s emotional distress over Norton’s bulldozing her forest property was sufficient to authorize the jury to consider Holcomb’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Blockum v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 275 Ga. 798, 801 (3) (573 SE2d 36) (2002) (plaintiffs reports to physician of symptoms resulting from defendant’s intentional outrageous conduct constituted sufficient evidence of causation).
Further, while we have held that a defendant’s outrageous conduct must be directed toward the plaintiff before she may recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, we have explained that
[w]here the mental pain and anguish result from a wanton and wilful wrong which is a violation of a legal right or duty owed to the plaintiff although unaccompanied by a physical injury or monetary loss, recovery can be had for mental pain and anguish; but, if the mental pain and anguish result from mere violation of a mere moral obligation, there can be no recovery.
Sanders v. Brown, 178 Ga. App. 447, 450-451 (343 SE2d 722) (1986). Norton’s wanton and wilful wrong in this case was not the “mere violation of a mere moral obligation”; it was a violation of Holcomb’s legal right to enjoy her property unmolested. OCGA § 51-9-1. Norton knew that cutting the trees on Holcomb’s ancestral land *216would devastate her emotionally, but he did it anyway.
Decided July 16, 2009
William A. Neel, Jr., for appellant.
Downey & Cleveland, George L. Welborn, Mary E. Priest, for appellee.
Because the trial court did not err in denying Norton’s motion for a directed verdict and post-trial motions on Holcomb’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Miller and Judge Ellington join in this opinion.