Court Opinion

ID: 9377161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 01:00:16.298134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.357724
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30385        Document: 00516667439             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/06/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                                 March 6, 2023
                                       No. 22-30385                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   Vincent Williams,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   State of Louisiana, on behalf of Department of Public
   Safety and Corrections, on behalf of David Wade
   Correctional Center,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 5:21-cv-441

   Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Vincent Williams, an African American correctional officer at the
   David Wade Correctional Center (“DWCC”), brought suit against the State
   of Louisiana claiming that the DWCC’s alleged policy of not promoting
   union members disproportionately affects African Americans. The district

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-30385

   court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. For essentially the same reasons,
   we AFFIRM.
                                   I. Background
          Vincent Williams has more than 24 years of experience working in
   correctional facilities. He has attained the rank of Captain, but “cannot attain
   a promotion to that of Major.” He claims that his “union membership is the
   deciding factor” as “[i]t is common knowledge that upper management does
   not like the union.” Since “the promotion process favors non-union
   members,” Williams claims that it “disproportionally affects African
   American[s].” After the state filed a motion to dismiss but before it was ruled
   on, Williams amended his complaint to, inter alia, add an allegation that the
   DWCC also discriminates against those above the age of 40. Williams also
   added information about a select sample of upper management, recently
   promoted officers, and the promotion selection committee, including the
   race of each individual and, for some, whether they were younger and/or less
   experienced than Williams.
          After Williams’ amendment, the State filed a second motion to
   dismiss. The district court granted the motion with prejudice on the grounds
   that Williams had failed to state “a viable disparate-impact claim for racial
   discrimination under Title VII.” “In short,” the memorandum opinion
   concluded, “Williams’s complaint alleges neither facts which lead to a
   justifiable inference that there is a statistically significant impact upon
   employees of one race as compared to similarly situated employees of a
   different race, nor that filtering employees for promotion based on union
   membership or age is causally connected to any such discrepancy if one

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                                          No. 22-30385

   exists.” 1 Williams subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the
   judgment, which the district court denied as having shown no manifest errors
   of law in the initial decision. This appeal followed.
                                    II. Law and Analysis
           We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See
   Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2019). “To
   survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
   matter which, when taken as true, states ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on
   its face.’” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P’ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
   Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
   Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
   plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
   inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
   Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “does not need detailed factual
   allegations,” but the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a right to relief
   above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
           At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “[a] district court … errs by requiring
   ‘a showing of each prong of the prima facie test for disparate treatment.’”
   Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766 (quoting Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331
   (5th Cir. 2013)). However, though plaintiffs need not “submit evidence to
   establish a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage, [they must] plead
   sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim

           1
             Relying on sovereign immunity, the district court also dismissed any potential
   claims of discrimination based on union affiliation under the National Labor Relations Act
   of 1935 or claims of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
   of 1967. Neither law was expressly raised in the complaint, and Title VII, on which the
   claims purport to rely, provides no support for either. As Williams fails to contest on appeal
   any of these claims, we leave this part of the district court’s reasoning undisturbed. See
   Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2003).

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   to make [their] case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d
   467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016). We have held that those ultimate elements are “(1)
   an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her
   protected status.’” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767 (emphasis in original) (quoting
   Raj, 714 F.3d at 331). “Failure to promote is clearly an adverse employment
   action,” Haire v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d
   356, 364 (5th Cir. 2013), so Williams has adequately pleaded the first
   element.
          As to the latter, however, Williams has provided no more than
   conclusory allegations, which we need not accept as true. See BRFHH
   Shreveport, LLC v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 49 F.4th 520, 525 (5th Cir.
   2022). Certainly, a plaintiff does not need to provide a detailed statistical
   analysis at the pleading stage, but the evidence must demonstrate some
   causal relationship – some “because” – between the protected status and the
   adverse employment action.
          Here, the complaint fails to demonstrate that African Americans are
   disproportionately affected by the alleged anti-union policy. The amended
   complaint attempts to make examples of two individuals who were promoted
   despite having less experience than Williams. But as both of those individuals
   are African Americans, these examples do nothing for Williams’ disparate
   impact claim. Williams also lists five Captains (that is, individuals currently
   holding the same title as Williams) who outrank Williams despite having less
   work experience – and two of those five are African Americans. Finally,
   Williams lists the six members of “the advancement committee,” of which
   three are African Americans. As the complaint lacks all but the barest of
   context, it is impossible to say whether these numbers demonstrate bias.
   There is no allegation, for example, that the union is comprised of solely or
   even mostly African Americans, or that more African Americans at DWCC
   are union members than non-union members, or that African Americans at

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   DWCC are more likely to be union members than are Caucasians. Nor does
   the complaint give any sense as to the general racial breakdown of DWCC
   employees – for example, whether most employees are African American or
   whether most of the members of management are Caucasian. Nothing in the
   complaint gives a court the ability to make a causal connection between
   Williams’ race and the failure to promote him.
           Williams’ complaint might sufficiently allege an anti-union bias, but
   Title VII provides no protection on that basis. Nor does Title VII provide
   protection for employment decisions based on age – and even if it did (or
   Williams provided a separate statutory hook), Williams has shown no age-
   based discrimination. Vague statements that certain individuals are “younger
   than plaintiff” or that others “have less work experience than plaintiff” are
   not allegations that management favors individuals under 40 – on the face of
   the complaint, the individuals listed could be 70 or could be 20. In sum,
   Williams’ pleadings are insufficient. 2
                                       III. Conclusion
           Williams fails to plead even the basic elements of a disparate treatment
   claim. The district court was therefore correct to dismiss the claim. We
   AFFIRM.

           2
             In one sentence, and without directly challenging the district court’s decision to
   dismiss with prejudice, Williams raises the prospect of further amendment after discovery.
   However, “[a] party that asserts an argument on appeal, but fails to adequately brief it, is
   deemed to have waived it. . . . We have often stated that a party must ‘press’ its claims.”
   United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations and quotation
   marks omitted). Williams has thus waived any challenge to the “with prejudice” element
   of his dismissal.

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