Court Opinion

ID: 9807751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:15:05.182946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:53:20.108092
License: Public Domain

*553Merrimon, C. J.
(dissenting):, The indictment charges the defendant with the crime of bigamy, as defined and forbidden by the statute (The Code, § 988). It charges that the second marriage took place in the State of South Carolina, and that shortly thereafter the defendant came into the county of Mecklenburg and there resided with the second wife. He Appeared, and moved to quash the indictment upon the ground that it appeared from it that he had committed no offence in this State. * The motion was allowed, whereupon the Solicitor for the State assigned error and appealed to this Court.
The statute,nieclares that “If any person, being married, shall marry any other-person during, the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall have taken place in the State of North Carolina or elsewhere, every such offender and every person counselling, aiding and abetting such offender, shall be guilty of felony, and imprisoned in the penitentiary or county jail for any term not less than four months nor more than ten years; and .any such offence may be dealt with, tried, determined and punished in the county where the offender shall be apprehended, or be in custody, as if the. offence had been actually committed in that county,” etc. (The Code, § 988). This enactment is not very aptly, precisely or clearly expressed, and hence its validity is seriously questioned. But it must receive such reasonable interpretation as will render it intelligible, operative and effectual, if this can be done consistently with the Constitution. .
It does not'necessarily imply or intend that the offender shall be indictable and convicted in this State for the offence of bigamy in another State; such is not its meaning. It intends that whoever shall be in' this State, being married to two living wives, or two living husbands, as the case may be (except in the cases excepted in the proviso to the statute), shall be guilty of felony, and that without regard to whether *554the second marriage took place in this State or elsewhere, and without regard to whether the second marriage constituted the offence of bigamy in the State or country where it took place. It makes the bigamist here answerable because he is here, an offence to, and an offender against this State and society here. The fact of bigamy — having two living wives or two living husbands — and the presence of the offender in this'State constitute the offence. It is not simply the second marriage that constitutes the offence — the felony— but it is the existence of that fact and the presence of the offender in this State that makes it. The statute does not treat the second marriage as the offence, nor the offence as committed elsewhere than in this State.
It is said that in such case no offence is committed in this State or against it. This is a serious misapprehension. The statute, its purpose, makes the presence of the bigamist in this State an offence — makes him here a bigamist and guilty of a felony, whether he was so where the second marriage took place or not. Suppose the statute under consideration had declared in terms that if a bigamist shall come into this State, he shall be deemed and held to be guilty of bigamy and felony here, could its validity be seriously questioned ? This is what the statute, in effect, declares.
The Legislature, in the exercise of the essential police powers of government, may, for the protection of the people, the safety and purity of society, exclude from its borders criminals of other States and countries. To that end, it may make their coming here, their presence in this State, a felony, if they were guilty of a specified offence committed by them in the State from which they came, or if they were chargeable with doing specified acts in the State from which they came, constituting no criminal offence there, but declared and deemed to be an offence here. It is their coming into this State, their presence here, and the fact that they did in the State from which they came the acts deemed and held *555to be a specified criminal offence, here, that constitutes the statutory crime and felony in this State. Such exercise of legislative power may tie unusual, and perhaps not very expedient; but the power exists, and it is not the province of Courts to determine when it shall or shall not be exercised. Criminals have no right to commit crime and go from State to State, or from one country to another, and inflict themselves upon society wherever they may be. It is the right and the duty of government to protect itself and its people against them by all manner of appropriate legislation.
It has been suggested that the exercise of such power, except to a very limited extent, is not consistent with that provision of the Constitution of the United States which confers upon Congress the power “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” To what extent and exactly in w’hat respects this provision restricts the exercise of the police power of the States, is not very definitely settled, but it is very clear that it does not inhibit the enactment of statutes like that under consideration. The right of the State to make and enforce such laws is fully recognized in City of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102. In that case the Court said: “We choose rather to plant ourselves on what we consider impregnable positions. They are these: That a State has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States. That by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a State to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends, where the power over the particular subject or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained in the manner just stated. That all these powers which relate *556to merely municipal legislation, or what may perhaps more properly be called internal police, are not surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and exclusive.”
That case is cited with approval in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540, Chief Justice TaNEY saying for the Court: “ Again, the question under this habeas corpus is in no degree connected with the power of the States to remove from their territory any person whose presence they may think dangerous to their peace, or in any way injurious to their interest. The power in that respect was fully considered by this Court and decided in the case of New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102. Undoubtedly they may remove from among them any persons guilty of or charged with crime, and may arrest and imprison them in order to effect this object. This is a part of the ordinary police powers of the States, which is necessary to their very existence, and which they have never surrendered to the general government. They may, if they think proper, in order to deter offenders in other countries from coming among them, make crimes committed elsewhere punishable in their Courts, if the guilty party shall be found within their jurisdiction. In all of these cases the State acts with a view to its own safety, and is in no degree connected with the foreign government in which the crime was committed.” The first of the cases here cited is to some extent criticised in Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. Rep., 259, and Chy Lang v. Freeman, Ibid., 275, but not in the aspect of it material here. It is difficult to see any substantial reason why the Legislature may not by proper enactment make it indictable — a misdemeanor or a felony — for persons who have done acts in one of the States deemed dangerous to its safety, or that of the morals or property or the prosperity of its people, if they be found within its limits. It maw by such means keep out of and drive beyond its borders foreign paupers, common gamblers, bigamists, and the like. It must be the *557judge of the wisdom and expediency of such legislation. Offenders against such statutes are such, wherever they may be found in the State, and hence may be tried wherever found, without invading any fundamental right secured to them. The acts forbidden having been done, the presence of the offender in the State anywhere constitutes the offence/
This case is very different from State v. Knight, 1 Taylor’s Reports, 44 (65). In that case the statute declared void, undertook to make the offence of counterfeiting in another State indictable in this State.
The indictment does not charge the defendant with bigamy committed in South Carolina; it charges him with a statutory crime (a felony) committed in this State, one of the essential acts constituting it having taken place in South Carolina. The statute does not make the second marriage the offence, it simply treats this as a fact to be taken in connection with others, all constituting the offence in this State. The offence is wholly statutory in its nature,' and must be so treated.
I think the order quashing the indictment should be reversed, and the case disposed of accordingly. ^
Per curiam. Affirmed.