Court Opinion

ID: 9559109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:22:44.441101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:48.814798
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
In my judgment, the majority opinion in this case overlooks the admitted facts ánd misapplies the law applicable thereto.
The land on which the baseball diamond was located belonged to the City of Guy-mon. It was never maintained as a city park. The baseball diamond was not laid out by the City of Guymon. The bleachers were not built by agents of the city nor placed on the field by the city. The public was not invited by the city to use the property as a park. There was no park equipment to attract people to the park. The town baseball team which had no connection with the city government had laid out the baseball diamond and moved the bleachers to the diamond. The city authorities had not given them any authority to use the land or place bleachers thereon.
The majority relies on the case of City of Sapulpa v. Young, 147 Okl. 179, 296 P. 418, 438. In fact, this is the only authority cited in the entire opinion. The facts in that case are so different from those in the case at bar there is no similarity except that cities were defendants in each case. In the Sa-pulpa case, the city had maintained the park as a municipal park and the public was invited to use the same for recreation and pleasure and for a long time prior to the accident out of which the action arose had been used by individuals, families, schools and civic clubs for such purposes. The city maintained, and not private individuals, a golf course, a baseball diamond and playground equipment. The party injured-was a child of fourteen years and was injured while using a swing. In the case at bar, we have an adult injured by the fall of bleachers in which he could discover defects as readily as the city employees. There was no showing that Guymon had a park department or any person whose business it was to take care of that type of property.
Guymon is clearly not liable in this case for the reason that it was not shown that the bleachers were defective prior to the accident or that the defective condition had existed for a sufficient length of time to put the city on notice of such condition. The plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the rule laid down in City of Sapulpa v. Young, supra, from which I quote:
“The city is not liable for damages occasioned by the dangerous condition of its parks until notice of such dangerous condition is brought home to it, or such condition has existed for such a length of time that it is chargeable with notice of the unsafe condition, the same as it is liable for defective streets and sidewalks.”
The majority opinion says, “There inheres in the verdict of the jury a finding of notice, actual or constructive, to the city and that likewise is reasonably supported by the testimony.” I do not think the record will bear out the correctness of this statement. There is no evidence of notice to the city of any. defect in these bleachers nor was there any evidence that such defective condition had existed for a sufficient length of time to put the city on notice of the defect.
Clearly this stand did not become dangerous until one of the braces was kicked loose. Until that happened, the bleachers were safe to sit upon. The city had no opportunity to make repairs between that happening and the collapsing of the bleachers. Since we have followed the liberal view, which is the minority view in the United States, 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 907 a & b, in allowing recovery in cases arising from personal injuries in city parks saying that the maintenance of parks is a proprietary rather than a governmental function, we *709should at least require the plaintiffs to show that the city had notice of the defective condition or that it had existed long enough to put the city on notice which was not done in this case.
The majority opinion puts an undue burden on the small municipalities not justified by our previous decisions or sound legal principles.
I dissent.