Court Opinion

ID: 9660745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:19:55.310062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.723120
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring and dissenting). Safety in the schools is a matter of utmost concern and growing urgency. The facts of this case illustrate the very real dangers to which modern-day students are exposed and the serious obstacles school officials confront in keeping school environments safe and conducive to learning. Because the threat of imminent violence presented an exigent circumstance in this case, I conclude that a reasonably conducted search of lockers would not have violated the fourth amendment.
I am not persuaded by this record, however, that the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. I would therefore remand the cause to the circuit court for further findings on the manner in which the search was conducted.
Finally, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Milwaukee School District's policy of reserving the right to search lockers made unreasonable any expectation of privacy the students possessed in the contents of their lockers. Students, like other members of our society, possess a fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1984). In T.L.O. the United States Supreme Court concluded that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. This easing of restrictions does *652not, however, completely eliminate a student's protection against unreasonable searches. I agree with the circuit court's conclusion that students have "a valid, though limited, expectation of privacy as to the contents of lockers they are assigned . .. regardless of the school policy suggesting a right to randomly inspect." (R.31:13)1
HH
The United States Supreme Court has declared to date that either probable cause or individualized suspicion must exist to justify a warrantless search in a school setting.2 Neither individualized suspicion of the *653defendant nor probable cause to search the defendant's locker existed in this case.
The search in this case was, however, conducted in response to the threat of imminent violence in the school. The situation confronting Madison High School on November 19,1990, was grave. There was evidence that guns had been fired on school property during the preceding weekend. Students, faculty and parents apparently believed that weapons were being brought into the school, that a shootout was imminent, and that the school was unsafe. The threat of imminent violence was disrupting school attendance and the educational process. Thus, the search in this case was conducted in response to an identified, specific danger which could not be dealt with by following the traditional probable cause or reasonable suspicion standards.
I conclude that this threat of imminent violence constituted an exigent circumstance. I further conclude that it would be unrealistic and inimical to the school's goal of preventing imminent violence in this case to require a showing of individualized suspicion or probable cause. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1966) (reasonableness of administrative search is determined by balancing the need to search against the invasion the search entails).
II.
Even if a search is constitutional in its inception, it will not pass muster under the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted in a reasonable manner. A search conducted under exigent circumstances must be con*654ducted in a manner reasonably related in scope to the exigent circumstances which justified the interference. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Thus, the search of school lockers in this case must be tailored to the public interest which compelled the search.
In this case, the search was for the purpose of finding weapons to prevent imminent violence and to ensure school safety. Accordingly, while the exigent circumstances present in this case may have authorized school officials to search lockers for weapons, these exigent circumstances would not justify use of a search to punish or harass disfavored students or to look for evidence unrelated to the exigency.
The record indicates that the school officials' search may not have been reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference. When asked the purpose of the search, the searcher said: "To uncover anything unusual."3 The circuit court made no finding about the relationship of the scope of the search to the exigency which compelled it.
Furthermore, when exigent circumstances preclude insistence on probable cause or individualized suspicion, the search must be conducted in a manner that "safeguard [s] the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. ..." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1978); see also T.L.O., 469 *655U.S. at 342 n.8. The search should be conducted so that "the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1978); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).4 A random search can achieve these goals. The dictionary definition of random is without a plan or pattern. Random sampling is a statistical technique which ensures that any member of a population has an equal chance of inclusion in a sample for study.5 Because a *656random search is non-accusatory in nature, the degree of insult to an individual’s dignity and thus the extent of the invasion are reduced.
The circuit court found that the search in this case was conducted at random. The circuit court found the search to be random even though it conceded that the Madison High School principal "did indicate that the search was not entirely random" and that "the testimony in the record was extremely vague " (Majority op. at 643). I read the record as contradicting the circuit court's finding that the search was random.6
School safety officer Nathan Shoate testified that he searched lockers "randomly." However, when asked to explain what "randomly" meant in this case he stated:
A. At that time we immediately randomly searched lockers. We didn't — We wanted to — We started on the lower level checking lockers where we knew there was a crowd.
Q. When you say randomly searched lockers, how did you pick a locker to search?
A. Basically we can tell where the kids' lockers, where the problem students would be at, you know, problem students' lockers. And we went to that locker. It's — we checked lockers where most of the crowds were formed. But there is five to six people at one locker we'll make sure that we get to that locker to check. R.19:38.7
*657Thus the record shows that school officials selected at least some of the lockers they would search; they selected lockers where students congregated and lockers used by so-called "problem students." This was clearly not a random search.
TTie record is silent on how the school officials determined that a search of these selected lockers was reasonably related to the exigency which compelled the search. The school official did not explain, for example, the connection between lockers where crowds gathered and the exigent circumstances justifying the search. Nor does the record explain what is meant by a "problem student." That description may have been based on the student's class attendance, dress, mode of speaking, grade point average or any number of factors unrelated to the possession of weapons.
I would remand the case to the circuit court for further inquiry into whether the search was reasonably tailored to the circumstances which compelled it and whether the search was conducted in a manner that safeguarded the privacy of students against arbitrary invasions.
*658f-H l-H
The majority concludes that Isiah's fourth amendment rights were not violated because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker. The majority bases this conclusion on the school district policy reserving the right to conduct a general search of student lockers. I disagree with this conclusion.
The right to be free from unreasonable searches is constitutional in nature and dimension. While notice that a locker may be searched might diminish the reasonableness of a student's expectation that items stored there will be kept secret, numerous courts have repeatedly stated that a government proclamation cannot eradicate Fourth Amendment rights. "The government could not avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by notifying the public that all telephone lines would be tapped, or that all homes would be searched."8 The school's ownership or partial control of the lockers cannot negate the students' expectation of privacy in the contents of the lockers. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967), "[w]hat a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area *659accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Finally, it appears that the search as conducted violated the school policy about locker searches upon which the majority relies. The school policy states that "[p]eriodic general inspections of lockers may be conducted by school authorities for any reason at any time. ..." (emphasis added). General means applicable to the whole, rather than to a limited part. The search in this case was not a general search; the searcher intentionally selected and searched some lockers using non-neutral criteria.
IV.
The majority justifies its abnegation of students' rights by claiming that the situation in the schools has taken on the dimensions of a crisis. This crisis, the majority appears to believe, requires us to modify our constitutional standards. We must never forget, the majority urges, "that it is a constitution we are expounding," "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1942) (emphasis in original).
The Hirabayshi case illustrates the weakness of the majority's position. For me, the Hirabayshi case is a lesson in what can happen if we do not abide by our constitutional principles when adapting the constitution to crises. The Hirabayshi Court upheld the conviction of an individual charged with violating curfews imposed under authority of Executive Order No. 9066, requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry to be "within their places of residence between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m." In a concurrence, Justice Murphy *660wrote that this was the first time the Court had "sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or ancestry." 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring). It was not the last. The Court cited Hirabayshi two years later in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), upholding regulations adopted pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066 which required citizens of Japanese ancestry to be relocated in camps.
I agree with Justice Scalia who wrote that the Constitution "is meant to protect against, rather than conform to, current 'widespread belief.'" Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting). A court's function is to safeguard our constitutional principles and, at the same time, to ensure that the judicial system is sensitive to the needs of crime victims and to society's need to protect individuals from crime and the fear of crime.
For the reasons set forth, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for further factfinding.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice NATHAN S. HEFFERNAN joins this opinion.

A law review commentator concludes that "every post-T.L.O. court that has confronted this issue [of locker searches] has concluded that the T.L.O. decision to permit warrantless searches based only on reasonable suspicion is appropriate in locker-search cases as well. In so concluding, these courts consistently have found that a student maintains some reasonable expectation of privacy in her locker." Berman, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1077, 1103-04 (1991). See, e.g., In Interest of Dumas, 515 A.2d 984, 986 (Pa. Super. 1986); State v. Michael G., 748 P.2d 17, 19 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Mass. 1992); S.C. v. State, 583 So. 2d 188, 191-92 (Miss. 1991).
As a Pennsylvania court stated: "We are unable to conclude that a student would have an expectation of privacy in a purse or jacket which the student takes to school but would lose that expectation of privacy merely by placing the purse or jacket in [the] school locker provided to the student for storage of personal items." In Interest of Dumas, 357 Pa. Super. 294, 515 A.2d 984, 985 (1986).

 To determine the reasonableness of a search, a two-fold inquiry is required: Was the search justified at its inception (e.g., probable cause; individualized suspicion)? Was the search *653as conducted reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place? T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.

 The full questioning was as follows:
Q. What was the purpose of this particular search?
A. To uncover anything unusual. There was reports that weapons were in the school so we were looking for anything unusual.
Q. Anything unusual. That might mean not necessarily guns specifically?
A. Yeah. Well, anything whenever we're searching lockers we're looking for something that doesn't belong in the school.

 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 (search unaccompanied by individualized suspicion must be undertaken according to "previously specified 'neutral criteria.'"); Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990) (linking constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint stop to use of standardized procedures which eliminated police discretion); Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1977) (linking constitutionality of workplace safety searches to use of neutral, administrative procedures in selecting sites to be searched).
Defense counsel argues that the school officials' discretion should be circumscribed by written guidelines. I conclude that the search should be conducted according to procedures, preferably in writing, which safeguard against arbitrary or harassing searches. I do not conclude that searches are constitutional only when the procedures are in writing.

 A random locker search could be conducted by placing all the locker numbers in a hat and drawing out a pre-determined quantity. Only those lockers corresponding to the numbers drawn would then be searched. It would also be possible to quickly obtain a random sample of locker numbers to search by using a random number table, or by using computer capabilities already in place in many school systems.
Although not a random search, a search of every second, third or tenth locker would have been a search according to neutral criteria. In fact, considering the dangers presented, officials might have searched every locker. That, however, is not what they did.

 "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. ..." Section 805.17(2), Stats. 1991-92.

 The dialogue continues as follows:
Q. In the process of searching how many lockers were searched to your knowledge, estimating?
A. 70,75,100 maybe; I don't know.
Q. Do you have any idea how many lockers there are in the school?
*657A. No, I don't.
Q. Why did you search his [Isiah B.'s] locker?
A. It wasn't his locker. It was a random check. Isiah's locker was — it could have been missed. It — If it was just — I just checked his locker.
Q. Did you know it was Isiah's locker when you opened it?
A. No I didn't.
Q. Did you know it was a locker of somebody suspicious or did you have any suggestions that anything suspicious was in that locker?
A. Like I say it was a random check. It was a random check so I just went to the locker and-. R. 19:38-42.

 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Jeffers v. Heavrin, 701 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (W.D. Ky. 1988) ("mere knowledge that one may be subject to search does not render one without any reasonable expectation of privacy"); Jones v. Latexco Ind. School District, 499 F. Supp. 223, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1980) ("mere announcement by officials that individual rights are about to be infringed upon cannot justify the subsequent infringement...."); Chenkin v. Bellvue Hosp. Cntr., 479 F. Supp. 207, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiffs expectation of privacy in his bag was not rendered unreasonable by his employer's announced policy of searching employees' bags).