Court Opinion

ID: 9897782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:25:03.623239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.306144
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton
              Argued at Lexington, Virginia

              AMANDA MARIE SPRINKLE
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 1273-22-3                                   JUDGE JUNIUS P. FULTON, III
                                                                                SEPTEMBER 26, 2023
              ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT
               OF SOCIAL SERVICES

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
                                                Onzlee Ware, Judge

                               John S. Koehler (The Law Office of James Steele, PLLC, on briefs),
                               for appellant.

                               Jennifer L. Crook, Assistant City Attorney (Timothy R. Spencer,
                               City Attorney; Sarah Jane Newton, Guardian ad litem for the minor
                               children, on brief), for appellee.

                      Amanda Marie Sprinkle (“mother”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental

              rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) and -283(C)(2). Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding

              there was sufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights because “[m]other had complied with

              all requirements of [the Roanoke City Department of Social Services] to complete the goal of

              returning the children to her custody and the testimony of Dr. Debra Marks established that Sprinkle

              was capable of parenting the children.” On brief, mother further argues that Edwards v. Arlington

              County, 5 Va. App. 294, 312 (1987), requires that the trial court make an affirmative finding that no

              “less drastic” alternative exists and that the “only viable result” from the evidence is termination of

              parental rights. We find no error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                          BACKGROUND1

       “On appeal from the termination of parental rights, this Court is required to review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the circuit court.” Yafi v. Stafford

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 539, 550-51 (2018) (quoting Thach v. Arlington Cnty. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 168 (2014)). Here, the Roanoke City Department of Social

Services (“the Department”) was the prevailing party, so we recite the evidence, and the

inferences flowing from it, in the light most favorable to the Department.

       Mother is the biological parent to B.M., P.M., and L.M.,2 the subjects of this appeal. In

October 2020, mother and her three children lived with the children’s father, Brandon Milliner.3

The children were placed in foster care after the Roanoke City Police Department and the

Department of Social Services searched the family’s home on October 29, 2020, as part of a

separate investigation and determined the conditions of the home to be unsafe for the children.

The search revealed drug paraphernalia throughout the home, open liquor bottles in reach of the

children, and holes in the walls due to domestic violence in the home. The children were

removed from the home, and upon a petition by the Department, the Roanoke City Juvenile and

Domestic Relations District Court (“the JDR court”) adjudicated that all three children were

       1
         The record in this case was sealed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing
relevant portions of the record to resolve the issues mother has raised. Evidence and factual
findings below that are necessary to address the assignments of error are included in this opinion.
Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the sealed record, we
unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder
of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1
(2017).
       2
           The children were ages five, four, and two respectively at the time of trial.
       3
         Milliner initially “expressed interest in participating in the foster care case,” but
ultimately was not “an active participant in the foster care case” and later signed an entrustment
agreement surrendering custody of the children.
                                                 -2-
abused and neglected and entered dispositional orders. Mother did not appeal the dispositional

orders.

          The Department initially pursued a foster care goal of return home. In the months

following the children’s placement in foster care, mother underwent a psychological examination

and received “one-on-one parenting lessons,” as well as counseling for mental health and

substance abuse. The Department ultimately changed its goal to adoption on the basis that

although mother had “made progress in her outpatient mental health and substance abuse

treatment, . . . there continue[d] to be overarching concerns [for] her parental capacity and her

ability to care for her children.” The JDR court subsequently entered orders terminating

mother’s parental rights to the children and approving the foster care goal of adoption. Mother

appealed those orders to the circuit court.

          The circuit court held a hearing on June 7, 2022. At the hearing, the Department

introduced testimony from several witnesses including, among others, a licensed clinical

psychologist, Dr. Klaire Mundy, who had conducted a psychological evaluation of mother in

March 2021. Before the evaluation began, Dr. Mundy testified that it took mother thirty to

forty-five minutes to understand that the evaluation had to be completed independently and that

mother’s sister could not be present. During the forensic interview portion of the evaluation,

mother self-reported that: (1) she tested positive for cocaine, (2) she was only attending the

various services the Department had provided to her because they were requested, not because

she felt like she needed them, and (3) she and Mr. Milliner had a lot of violence and aggression

in their relationship.

          Dr. Mundy further testified that, in her professional opinion, mother: (1) “had very

limited insight [and] had a hard time identifying what the concerns and problems were that got

her to the office,” (2) “got cognitively stuck significantly during the administration of the tools

                                                 -3-
that were provided to her. She required a lot of feedback. She . . . became kind of overwhelmed

and frustrated and required the evaluator to give her support and on-going feedback,” (3) “didn’t

appear to have any kind of awareness about what her strengths and weaknesses were,” (4) had

“difficulty with taking any information and putting it into action,” and (5) “struggles with

processing information.” Dr. Mundy testified that:

               When we translate that into parenting and we look at having three
               children of which are high needs, trying to manage that in a way
               that’s going to keep the children safe is potentially very
               problematic for her. . . . [O]nce she got off track, she was unable
               to get back on track, which is another concerning thing . . . so it’s
               not even about giving her a minute to try and pull herself back
               together, it’s similar to what I saw in the waiting room with her
               sister. It took an extraordinary amount of time for her to get back
               on track, to be able to focus and move forward in the evaluation.

Dr. Mundy testified when mother becomes cognitively stuck it is a problem in child-rearing

because mother cannot move forward to solve a problem, so “then the kids have to start solving

. . . problems themselves . . . and depending on the age of the child, that may or may not be

problematic.” Dr. Mundy noted mother’s auditory processing disorder and frontal lobe issues

would affect mother’s ability to anticipate needs, follow up with doctors, plan, problem-solve,

and organize her thoughts.

       Dr. Mundy also noted that she would be extremely concerned if mother wanted to

homeschool her children because mother’s intellectual functioning ranges between the below

average and the impaired region. In addition, Dr. Mundy opined that mother’s “verbal

comprehension was the lowest of all the indexes and that’s one of the things that are relied on

most heavily when it comes to homeschooling children.”4 Specifically, Dr. Mundy noted that

“No matter how much she wants to help the children, no matter how hard she tries to help the

       4
          As will be further developed below, mother testified that if her children were returned to
her, she intended to homeschool them.
                                               -4-
children, she doesn’t have the intellectual capacity to do what they need for her to do to get them

to a point where they can successfully meet the criteria for academics.”

       Finally, Dr. Mundy testified about how mother’s intellectual deficiencies and dependency

on others impact her ability to parent. Dr. Mundy testified that “[i]t impacts her interpersonal

choices leading her to engage in relationships with others who have substance abuse issues, and

there is domestic violence involved.” Dr. Mundy further stated that mother tends to “place her

relationships with others primary to the safety of her children.” Dr. Mundy ultimately opined

that mother “did not appear to possess the cognitive or interpersonal skills and development that

is really necessary in order to engage in the least level that the American Psychological

Association says is a good enough parent.”

       Maggie Evans, mother’s parent aid, testified that she would monitor mother’s family time

visitation at the Department. Ms. Evans noted that when the children would run out of the room

or jump on the table during family time visitation, mother would freeze and would not know

what to do to redirect the children. Ms. Evans testified that as time went on, mother’s family

time visitations were more uncontrolled. Ms. Evans stated that during the seven months she

worked with mother, there was no improvement in mother’s family time visitation or parenting

skills. Ms. Evans testified that the children would not be safe in mother’s sole full-time care.

       Alaney Kulenek, the foster care worker for B.M., P.M., and L.M. testified that the

children came into care on October 29, 2020, due to “abuse and neglect.” Ms. Kulenek noted the

goal for the children at the initial foster care hearing was return home. Ms. Kulenek stated the

responsibilities for mother included: (1) completing a psychological and parental capacity

evaluation, (2) complying with random drug screens, (3) completing substance abuse treatment,

mental health treatment, and “specifically counseling focused on domestic violence,”

(4) complying with parenting classes and refraining from contact with Mr. Milliner due to “their

                                                -5-
history of severe domestic violence,” and (5) and providing proof of stable housing and stable

income. On cross-examination, Ms. Kulenek acknowledged that mother “completed the services

that were on her service plan” and ultimately “completed everything that she was asked to do.”

        Ms. Kulenek testified in detail about the developmental challenges that each child faced.

B.M. was not toilet trained, he had been diagnosed with developmental delays, speech delays,

and an attachment disorder called disinhibited social engagement disorder. Ms. Kulenek also

reported that B.M. struggled with “oppositional behaviors,” struggled to get along with his

brother, and at times can be aggressive. Further, B.M. did not know any typical pre-school skills

such as colors or numbers. P.M. similarly was not toilet trained and also had been diagnosed

with a developmental delay, a speech delay, and the same attachment disorder that B.M. was

diagnosed with. Ms. Kulenek testified that P.M. “has frequent outbursts[,] difficulty regulating

his emotions[, and was] physically aggressive towards adults and peers.” L.M. did not engage in

eye contact when she was first brought into the foster care system, and it took her several months

to start doing so. Further, she demonstrated “some signs that she may . . . [have] experienced

food insecurity.” However, Ms. Kulenek also reported that, since going into foster care, each

child has shown a marked improvement in their development. Notwithstanding their progress

since going into foster care, however, Ms. Kulenek testified that mother still intended to

homeschool her children because she felt that the only thing her children needed was “to be with

her.”

        Ms. Kulenek testified that even though the children have been in foster care since late

2020, and even though mother has been working with the Department to improve her parenting

skills since that time, there continue to be overarching concerns regarding mother’s parenting

capacity. Ms. Kulenek stated that mother “has been unable to demonstrate that she can master

even basic parenting techniques such as timeouts, consequence.” Ms. Kulenek testified that

                                               -6-
mother has been unable to remedy the concerns that brought the children into foster care and

mother has not been able to demonstrate that she’s a safe and reliable caregiver for the children.

       Mother introduced testimony from witnesses including, among others, the counselors and

clinicians with whom she worked to improve her parenting skills after the children were placed

into foster care. This included a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Marks, who conducted a

psychological evaluation of mother in January 2022.

       Dr. Marks testified that she evaluated mother’s parenting skills through an extensive

clinical interview. Dr. Marks’s evaluation took place ten months after Dr. Mundy evaluated

mother, and Dr. Marks testified that mother’s results from the latter evaluation showed

improvement from the prior evaluation. Dr. Marks opined that although mother still showed the

need for improvement in her decision-making skills, time management and emotional security,

she demonstrated that she could continue to improve with proper counseling and therapy. In her

view, Dr. Marks opined that mother “deserve[d] a chance” to be reunited with her children.

Dr. Marks recommended a gradual reunification process to give mother time to develop the

appropriate responses to the children’s needs.

       Mother also presented testimony from John Holm, a substance abuse counselor, Katelyn

Carter, a licensed professional counselor, and Tahriana Kasey, a skill building clinician, each of

whom had provided counseling and drug testing services to mother upon referral by the

Department. Mother had passed all her drug screens since April 15, 2021. Mother was

cooperative in her treatment and showed beneficial progress according to all three counselors.

Her treatment included addressing her substance abuse issues, her trauma from domestic

violence, and emotional processing. Kasey testified that mother was maintaining her home in

good order, stating that it is clean and organized. She also provided mother with counseling on

                                                 -7-
improving her parenting skills and finding community resources, stating that she has shown

continuing, gradual improvement in these areas.

       Mother testified on her own behalf. Through her testimony the trial court received into

evidence photographs of the home where she resided with her fiancé (now husband) which

showed she had prepared the home to provide a safe and suitable environment for the children

should the goal of return to family continue to be the overarching goal. She also testified that

she had obtained employment and was seeking other opportunities for better wages. Mother

conceded that she had difficulty managing the three children during visitation. However, she had

improved her ability to discipline them appropriately. Mother stated that she wished to continue

working toward regaining custody of her children.

       After hearing all the evidence, the trial court allowed the parties to submit written closing

arguments and subsequently issued a letter opinion, finding there was sufficient evidence to

terminate mother’s parental rights to all three children under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2).

The trial court found that mother “has cognitive impairments and mental health concerns that

continually prevent her from addressing the needs of her three children,” and “[a]ttempts to

improve [mother’s] parenting abilities to ensure the health, safety, and developmental needs of

the children have been unsuccessful and show no indication that they may someday become

successful.” The trial court further found that mother had “failed to secure a safe home, to

demonstrate the ability to provide for three children, and voluntarily engaged with [father]

despite repeated instances of domestic violence between the two.” Finally, the trial court noted

that, “[a]lthough the Department provided numerous services to [mother], including seven

months of one-on-one parenting support, she failed to demonstrate meaningful gain in her

parenting ability, in part, because of her cognitive limitations.” On July 27, 2022, the trial court

                                                -8-
entered an order terminating mother’s parental rights to the children and approving the foster

care goal of adoption. This appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

       On appeal, mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

decision to terminate her parental rights. Specifically, she puts forth two arguments to support

her contention that the trial court erred: (1) the evidence received by the trial court, specifically

Dr. Marks’s testimony, illustrated that she was, in fact, a “good enough” parent and (2) there

were alternative remedies less drastic than termination of parental rights that would have enabled

mother to regain custody of her children.

       “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence,

considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best

interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun Cnty. Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018)

(alteration in original) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Dev., 13 Va. App. 123,

128 (1991)). “The circuit court has ‘broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard

and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Eaton v. Washington Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 66

Va. App. 317, 324 (2016). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is

entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without

evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190

(2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20 (1986)).

       The trial court terminated mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B)

and -283(C)(2). Code § 16.1-283(B) authorizes the court to terminate a parent’s parental rights

to a child if the child has been previously abused or neglected, and:

               1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious
               and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and
               2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in
               such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated
                                                 -9-
               so as to allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents within
               a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the
               court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate
               the parent or parents by any public or private social, medical,
               mental health or other rehabilitative agencies prior to the child’s
               initial placement in foster care.

       It is clear, from the evidence recited above and received by the trial court, that a

reasonable fact finder could have found that the evidence was sufficient to terminate mother’s

residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B).5 First, mother does not challenge the prior

adjudication of abuse and neglect, nor could she, as she did not appeal that decision. Second,

mother does not challenge the trial court’s finding as to the first subsection of Code

§ 16.1-283(B), that that abuse or neglect “presented a serious and substantial threat to [the

children’s] life, health or development.” Mother’s appeal challenges only the trial court’s

findings as to the second subsection of Code § 16.1-283(B). However, the Department

introduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to make the required findings and

conclusions contained in subsection (2). Code § 16.1-283(B) provides three circumstances that

constitute “prima facie evidence of the conditions set forth in subdivision (B)(2),” the first of

which being:

               The parent or parents have a mental or emotional illness or
               intellectual disability of such severity that there is no reasonable
               expectation that such parent will be able to undertake
               responsibility for the care needed by the child in accordance with
               his age and stage of development[.]

Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a).

       5
          We do not address any arguments related to the trial court’s parallel findings under
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), as “[w]hen a lower court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, this
Court need only determine whether any of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment.”
Castillo, 68 Va. App. at 574 n.9. Terminations under Code § 16.1-283(B) and -283(C)(2)
provide distinct, “individual bases upon which a petitioner may seek to terminate residual
parental rights.” City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 563
(2003).
                                              - 10 -
       The trial court, in its letter opinion, expressly found that “[mother] has cognitive

impairments and mental health concerns that continually prevent her from addressing the needs

of her three children, as evidenced by Dr. Mundy’s report and the supervised visitation report of

Alaney Kulenek.” Further, the trial court found that “[a]ttempts to improve [mother’s] parenting

abilities to ensure the health, safety, and developmental needs of the children have been

unsuccessful and show no indication that they may someday become successful.” Therefore, the

trial court held that “[The Department] ha[d] carried its burden as to Va. Code § 16.1-283(B).”

The trial court’s findings in this regard are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Code

§ 16.1-283(B)(2)(a), and we cannot say that these findings constitute clear error.

       On brief, mother points to the testimony of Dr. Marks, arguing that “[b]oth Dr. Mundy

and Dr. Marks agreed that [mother] was not yet ready to parent the children on her own, with the

only difference being that Dr. Marks . . . gave a more positive assessment of [mother’s] ability to

continue toward that goal.” Further, mother argues that “[w]hile the evidence also established

that [mother] required additional counseling and assistance to improve her parenting skills,

Dr. Marks believed that this could be achieved through a staged reintegration of the family, with

Dr. Mundy concurring that [mother] could develop adequate parenting skills if given appropriate

co-parenting assistance.” To the extent that mother contends that Dr. Marks and Dr. Mundy

were in agreement regarding mother’s ability to parent the children if given appropriate

resources and assistance, this contention mischaracterizes the record. Dr. Mundy did not concur

in Dr. Marks’s conclusion that mother could develop adequate parenting skills if given

appropriate co-parenting assistance. This assertion is based upon a portion of Dr. Mundy’s

testimony where she qualified her “recommendation” by stating that “should” the trial court

decide not to terminate mother’s parental rights, then Dr. Mundy would suggest some sort of

“co-parenting” system be administered in partnership with the Department. This testimony was

                                                - 11 -
not an endorsement of such a co-parenting system; instead, it simply reflects the fact that

Dr. Mundy was hedging against the possibility that the trial court ultimately may have decided

not to terminate mother’s parental rights, notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Mundy adamantly

believed that mother was not capable of parenting her children. Dr. Mundy’s testimony was

clear however, that she did not believe that mother could meet the standard of being a “good

enough parent.” Dr. Mundy testified that this standard included the ability to make decisions

concerning the safety of her children, something mother was demonstrably not able to do, based

on her mental deficiencies. In contrast to mother’s characterization, the two clinical

psychologists actually disagreed as to the best course of action, with Dr. Marks taking the

position that mother could, in fact, succeed as a parent at some point in the future, if given the

appropriate assistance.

       The trial court was entitled to accept Dr. Mundy’s conclusion and reject Dr. Marks’s

conclusion, to the extent that it diverged from Dr. Mundy’s. See Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. at 190

(A trial court’s “finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” (quoting Martin, 3 Va. App. at 20)); see also

Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128 (“[T]he evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party below and its evidence is afforded all reasonable inferences fairly deducible

therefrom.”). On review, we presume that the trial court thoroughly weighed the evidence in

front of it, considering the best interests of the three children. See Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128.

“The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on

appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. (quoting Peple v. Peple, 5

Va. App. 414, 422 (1988)). We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding the

evidence sufficient to terminate mother’s residual parental rights.

                                                - 12 -
        Further, we note that mother’s argument also relies on the mere possibility that at some

future date, mother might be able to meet the standard of a “good enough” parent and adequately

care for her children. This argument ignores Virginia precedent that places the best interests of

the children ahead of mother’s interests as the parent. See Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990) (“It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to

spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of

resuming his responsibilities.”). Here, the children were initially removed from mother’s

custody on October 30, 2020, nearly three years ago. Since then, mother has participated in

various programs offered by the Department and has spent time visiting with her children, and

yet she still shows little if any development in her ability to adequately care for her children. “In

matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions

necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328

(1990) (citing Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 2 Va. App. 409, 412 (1986)).

        To the extent that mother argues on brief that Code § 16.1-283 “contemplates the use,

where possible, of alternatives less drastic than termination of parental rights” and that the

Department was required to prove that “termination of [mother’s] residual parental rights was the

only available remedy for the [trial] court,”6 mother did not raise that argument at trial in either

her closing argument or a motion to strike, and therefore it is waived. “No ruling of the trial court

. . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty

at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of

        6
        In making this argument, mother cites to Knox v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs., 223 Va.
213 (1982), and Edwards, 5 Va. App. 294.
                                            - 13 -
justice.”7 Rule 5A:18. “This contemporaneous-objection requirement affords ‘the trial court a fair

opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appeals and retrials.’”

Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 236 (2022) (quoting Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64

Va. App. 185, 195 (2015)).

                                           CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating

mother’s parental rights. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

        Mother does not invoke the “good cause” or “ends of justice” exceptions in Rule 5A:18,
        7

and “we will not sua sponte raise them on [her] behalf.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74
Va. App. 225, 236 (2022) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29, 39 n.5 (2017)).
                                              - 14 -