Court Opinion

ID: 9752687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:28:49.739777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:20.964376
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I would affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the indictment on Fifth Amendment grounds. The murder which is the subject of that indictment occurred on October 27, 1974. Judge Revercomb, in a careful due process analysis, made almost six years thereafter, concluded that appellant could not get a fair trial. I agree.
The trial court correctly noted that the focal point in analyzing a Fifth Amendment due process claim is “whether the delay in bringing the defendant to trial impermissi-bly denies him the opportunity to have a fair trial. That is to say, to what extent has the defendant been prejudiced by the delay.” The court then reasoned that, from *59a due process perspective, the three primary ways in which a defendant may be prejudiced by lengthy delays are by 1) oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) exacerbation of anxiety and concern; and 3) impairment of the development of a full defense to the charges. The court concluded that appellant had been prejudiced under these standards, but it continued its analysis by discussing other concerns which were not “directly implicated.” Because I do not read Judge Revercomb’s oral opinion as does my brother Nebeker, I am reproducing as an appendix to this dissent the pertinent part of the transcript upon which I rely as providing sound support for affirmance.
Fortunately, only Judge Nebeker suggests that before a defendant in these circumstances can maintain a due process claim, he must demonstrate not only substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial but also that the delay was an intentional device employed by the government to gain a tactical advantage over him, citing cases dealing with pre-arrest delay or delay preceding indictment. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 414 A.2d 1189 (1980); Shreeves v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 774 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943, 99 S.Ct. 2161, 60 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1979); Tolliver v. United States, D.C.App., 378 A.2d 679 (1977). In addition, Judge Nebeker would not take into consideration, in evaluating appellant’s due process claims, the entire period of time which has elapsed since the date of the offense, suggesting instead that “absent a showing of substantial or severe prejudice, a pre-arrest delay which satisfies due process cannot be amalgamated to later delays in order to base a Fifth Amendment violation.” Ante at 57. I find his reasoning troubling.
As a starting point, Judge Nebeker would place the task (well-nigh impossible, and involving a matter only peripherally relevant to the measurement of prejudice) on a defendant of proving deliberate and unfair conduct by the government. Yet, even in the context of due process challenges based solely on pre-indictment or pre-arrest delay, the courts have not uniformly held that unfair conduct must be established; the reason for the delay rather has been considered as a factor which may strengthen or weaken a claim of prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Costanza, 549 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1977) (balancing reasonableness of delay against resulting prejudice to the defendant); United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1130, 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977) (while applicable statute of limitations provides primary defense to stale criminal charges, indictment may be dismissed on Fifth Amendment due process grounds upon showing that delay was product of deliberate government action or that prejudice was so substantial that a fair trial was no longer possible); United States v. Librach, 520 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939, 97 S.Ct. 354, 50 L.Ed.2d 308 (1976) (in analyzing Fifth Amendment due process claim arising from pre-indictment delay court must balance reasonableness of the delay against prejudice to the accused); United States v. Giacalone, Mil F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1973) (absent showing of intentional government delay defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice to sustain due process claim); Commonwealth v. Rounds, 490 Pa. 621, 630 n.11, 417 A.2d 597, 601 n.11 (1980) (dicta suggesting that same considerations applicable to speedy trial claims apply to due process violation claim based on delays in proceedings). There is even less reason, in a case such as this, in which appellant’s due process claims are far from “speculative and premature,” United States v. Marion, supra 404 U.S. at 326, 92 S.Ct. at 466, and where prejudice resulted from the lapse of time between the commission of an offense and the date of retrial, to require a defendant to establish unfair conduct on the part of the government.
At the same time, Judge Nebeker would place upon a trial court the well-nigh impossible task of assessing prejudice during specific segments of delay. Theoretically, *60he is correct in observing that United States v. Alston, D.C.App., 412 A.2d 351 (1980) (en banc) does not govern our evaluation of appellant’s due process claims since that case turned on appellate delay. However, the approach to due process claims espoused in the dissent in Alston is of equal relevance to an evaluation of the delay which occurred in the instant ease:
I do not see how prejudice to a defendant or a defense can be evaluated without reference to the lapse of time between the [commission of the offense] ... and the date of the new trial. Simply stated, the problem with the majority’s analysis is that its preoccupation with segmented time periods clouds the ultimate question — is the retrial fundamentally unfair because of the cumulative effect of all the delays . .. ? ... In a due process analysis, unlike a speedy trial analysis, the question is not whether there was legitimate reason for the delay, or to whom it is assigned, but whether the overall impact of that delay, coupled with other delays, is to deny the defendant a fair trial after remand. [Id. at 363 (Mack, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).]
We are sending this case back for trial eight years after the commission of an offense, and almost two years after specific findings by a trial judge that appellant could not receive a fair trial. I question the propriety of supplanting the analysis of the trial court, which stands in a better position to judge whether a defendant can receive a fair trial, with a de novo evaluation from the more remote vantage point of an appellate court. Cf. Reid v. United States, D.C.App., 402 A.2d 835 (1979) (trial court’s post-verdict findings concerning speedy trial claims provide appellate court with most useful perspective and basis for evaluating speedy trial claim on appeal); Coleman v. United States, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 710 (1977) (trial court stands in best position to evaluate claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel). I would afford the trial court’s finding in the instant case the type of deference which we have afforded trial court findings in other, similar contexts.
I respectfully dissent.
APPENDIX
[ReveRcomb, J.]
I am denying the motion to dismiss under the Sixth Amendment and proceeding to the analysis of the denial of a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment, the due process clause of the Constitution.
While under the Sixth Amendment, the right to a speedy trial does not attach until the defendant is arrested or arraigned, United States v. Marion, under the Fifth Amendment, the right to a fair trial attaches from the date of the alleged offense. The different triggering date accrues because the focus under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is different. Under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the focus is whether the delay in bringing the defendant to trial impermissibly denies him the opportunity to have a fair trial. That is to say, to what extent has the defendant been prejudiced by the delay. Under the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, the focus is whether the delay in bringing the defendant to trial impermissi-bly denies him a speedy adjudication. That is to say, to what extent has the defendant been unlawfully denied repose. Since the concern under the due process clause is substantial justice and fair play, time having run because of appellate review is also a part of the calculus. United States v. Alston. It is irrelevant that the appeal was taken by the defendant.
From a due process perspective, the one indispensable concern during an appeal period is prejudice, since the focus shifts from a speedy to a fair trial. The three primary ways in which a defendant may be prejudiced by lengthy delays are: One, by oppressive pretrial incarceration; two, by exacerbating anxiety and concern of the accused; and three, by impairing the development of a full defense to the charges. Again, Barker v. Wingo. Although these factors are suggested under Sixth Amendment analysis, it appears that similar concerns are appropriate under the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals in *61United States v. Alston prescribed the procedure for determining whether a retrial would violate due process. This process is said in Alston to only apply to delay caused by lengthy appellate review. However, since Alston is so clearly analogous to the instant situation, its method of due process analysis is followed here.
The first inquiry the trial court must make is whether the defendant has in fact been prejudiced by Governmental delay. The trial court must evaluate the impact of the appeal period on the appellant. It is clear that the defendant has been prejudiced by delay at both the trial and appellate levels. While oppressive pretrial incarceration and exacerbation of anxiety have not been, thus far, accorded Fifth Amendment significance, these concerns implicate due process concerns. In this case, the defendant appears to have been incarcerated for almost two years and ten months, roughly the same amount of time served by two co-defendants who pled to lesser included offenses.
Clearly, the basis of actual prejudice in this matter is that the defendant’s incarceration prohibited him from developing a full defense to the indictment. Before the first trial in this matter, the defendant sent a letter to the court, requesting the removal of counsel of record on the grounds that counsel had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation in the case. The court construed the letter as a pro se motion, and it was filed as such.
Soon thereafter, on a date that remains unknown, the defendant, defense counsel, and Government counsel appeared before the Court to discuss the pro se motion. Although it is likely that the discussion was stenographically recorded, nothing in the records indicates that the transcription was ever found. The court summarily denied two requests for new counsel, one on November 5, 1976, and one on May 10, 1977, and never conducted an inquiry into the basis of defendant’s request.
The primary basis for defendant’s request for new counsel was, according to defendant’s testimony, defense counsel’s reluctance to interview alibi witnesses. The Court did not make a requisite inquiry into the basis for the defendant’s demand, although the Court did arrange a witness interview schedule with defense counsel and the alibi witness. The Court believes that this action was in violation of Monroe v. United States and Farrell v. United States. Although these two cases were decided subsequent to the episode, the Court of Appeals has indicated nothing to the contrary in according these decisions full retroactive effect.
Once the witnesses were interviewed by defense counsel, they could no longer clearly remember the date in question; too much time had passed. As a result the defendant’s theory of the case was an uncorroborated alibi involving his family. It appears that defense counsel’s and the Court’s conduct blotted out a substantial defense to the charge, at least one that the defendant attempted to raise. Because the defendant was incarcerated throughout this period, he was unable to assist in finding witnesses for the defense.
Although not directly implicated because of defendant’s incarceration, other concerns in this matter must be incorporated into the actual prejudice calculus:
First, this case is basically a one-witness identification case, perhaps a two-witness identification case. In the first trial, only one witness, Robert Smith, specifically testified that the defendant committed the slaying. Mr. Smith, however, at the time of the slaying was a heroin addict and had on that day consumed a half-pint of alcohol. Mr. Smith, a convicted felon, also admitted that his testimony at trial conflicted with that before the grand jury, where he stated that he neither saw the defendant wielding a knife nor stab the victim. Most of the other witnesses to the incident were also drug addicts and convicted felons.
Second, the delay between the alleged slaying and the defendant’s arrest is attributable to the Government’s choice in prosecuting the wrong individuals. On January 4, 1976 (sic), seven months before Mr. Donaldson was arrested, Harry and David Neal, *62now Government witnesses, were tried for murder in this matter. Only after the superseding indictment and arrest of Joseph Donaldson was the conviction of David Neal by a jury overturned by the Court.
Third, while not implicating due process, an important factor in measuring the prejudice to the defendant is the jury’s resolution of the case. In the first trial, the jury deliberated an entire day before sending a note to the Court stating that it was hopelessly deadlocked. The Court did not appear to “Winterize” the jury, but it did instruct it to keep trying to reach a verdict. An hour-and-a-half later the jury returned a guilty verdict. Obviously, the jury considered the case as a close one. Given the great amount of time that had passed, no significant alibi defense was made. Even a minimal amount of corroboration may have resulted in an acquittal or a mistrial.
Under United States v. Alston, it appears that the total delay in this matter has been prejudicial. The remaining questions for the trial court to decide are whether the relationship between (a) the nature and the severity of the prejudice and (b) the Government’s alleged responsibility for the delay warrants dismissal of the indictment. Of course, this is a judgment call in a case of this type. But it appears that the nature of the prejudice, blotting out a substantial defense, and its inherent severity is attributable to the Government and is a result of the summary disposal of the defendant’s request for new counsel. In addition, many additional related concerns, the delay prior to arrest, the questionable case at some point against the defendant, although it is represented to the Court now that the case is stronger, the total length of time necessary to bring the defendant to trial causes the Court to believe that all these factors indeed contribute to a due process violation.
I have concluded that the indictment in this matter should be dismissed because a retrial of the defendant would violate his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment.