Court Opinion

ID: 9797393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:19:29.324507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:51.791004
License: Public Domain

*982BRYNER, Justice,
with whom CARPENETI, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from the decision requiring Bar-nica to assert his discrimination claim through binding arbitration under his Collective Bargaining Agreement. Because this court is evenly divided on this issue, the plurality opinion will affirm the superior court's ruling but will have no precedential effect.1 I nevertheless think it important to explain my reasons for dissenting. In my view, the plurality's decision misinterprets federal case law, underestimates our own precedent, and reaches a conclusion at odds with the likely intent of the CBA's arbitration clause.
To help resolve new questions concerning the scope and effect of Alaska's Public Employment Relations Act,2 this court has commonly looked to relevant federal case law for guidance.3 Today's plurality opinion breaks with this tradition by following a federal ruling that happens to agree with the plurality's policy views but does not apply in the present procedural setting; at the same time, the plurality all but ignores a more recent Supreme Court ruling that is squarely relevant and directly contradicts the plurality's position.
Almost three decades ago in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the United States Supreme Court categorically held that a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause cannot defeat a union worker's right to pursue a private, statutory cause of action in court.4 Seventeen years later, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court reached the opposite result in a non-union setting, ruling that a private employment contract's arbitration clause may be presumed to have waived an employee's right to pursue potentially arbitrable, employment-related, statutory judicial remedies " 'unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver[.]) "5 Although this court has previously recognized and applied the rule articulated in Gardner-Denver,6 today's plurality decision discards that rule as outmoded, opting instead for the Gilmer rule, which, it asserts, "more accurately reflects Alaska policy favoring arbitration."7
But in its eagerness to embrace what it sees as Gilmer's more contemporary policies, the plurality shortchanges the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.8 In Wright, an opinion issued just four years ago, the Supreme Court granted review of a ruling by the fourth circuit invoking the Gilmer rule to bar a longshore worker from pursuing a claim in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act.9 In reaching its decision, the fourth circuit tacitly reasoned, in keeping with its carlier decision in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,10 that the Supreme Court had effectively overruled Gardner-Denver in Gilmer and that, under Gilmer, the worker's statutory claim had to be arbitrated under his CBA.11
*983In arguing this decision before the Supreme Court, the parties and the amici curiae concentrated on what they saw as the crucial question: whether the fourth cireuit correctly decided that Gilmer had superced-ed Gardner-Denver's unequivocal holding that an arbitration clause in a CBA could not collectively bargain away a worker's individual right to a statutory judicial remedy.12 But the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to answer this question, ruling instead that even if Gilmer might require arbitration in some collective bargaining situations, Gardner Denver nonetheless governed the case at issue, since the generalized arbitration clause of the CBA in Wright did not incorporate a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of the statutory remedy.13
Specifically, Wright emphasized, the rule of waiver that it articulated in Gilmer depends largely on the presumption of arbitra-bility; but in the collective bargaining context, this presumption extends only as far as "the: reach of the principal rationale that justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret the terms of a CBA." 14 Wright further concluded that neither the underlying rationale nor the presumption of arbitrability applies when a union worker seeks to assert a statutory remedy, since, when a claim arising under a statutory remedy also might be covered by the general terms of a CBA arbitration clause, the claim's resolution "ultimately concerns not the application or interpretation of any CBA, but the meaning of a federal statute." 15 In the absence of the presumption of arbitrability, then, Wright decided to apply a strict rule disfavoring implied contractual waiver of statutory rights: "[We will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is explicitly stated."16
Hence, although the Supreme Court's opinion in Wright does not definitively resolve the tension between Gilmer and Gard-mer-Denver, it reconfirms that Gardner-Denver survived Gilmer and remains a vital precedent, at least to the extent that Gardner-Denwver continues to preclude a union from collectively bargaining away a worker's individual right to a statutory judicial remedy unless the CBA incorporates a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of the statutory claim."17
Despite this unequivocal ruling, today's plurality decision all but dismisses Wright, quoting only a snippet from that decision for the proposition "that 'whether or not Gard-mer-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employee's federal forum rights survives Gilmer' is an open question." 18 But while this narrow proposition is technically true, it veils Wright's broader significance: the plurality divorcees the quoted snippet of language from its contextual setting, inaccurately suggesting that Wright does nothing more than leave an open question. What Wright actually says in the passage that embodies the quoted language is this:
We think the same ["clear and unmistakable waiver") standard applicable to a union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination. Although that is not a substantive right, and whether or not Gardner-Denwver's seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer, Gardner-Denwer at least stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA.[19]
*984Wright goes on to disapprove of the fourth circuit's invocation of Gilmer in unmistakable terms:
The Fourth Cireuit relied upon the fact that the equivalently broad arbitration clause in ilmer-applying to "any dispute, claim or controversy"-was held to embrace federal statutory claims. But Gil-mer involved an individual's waiver of his own rights, rather than a union's waiver of the rights of represented employees and hence the "clear and unmistakable" standard was not applicable.[20]
As these passages make clear, then, the Court in Wright pointedly refused to declare Gardner-Denver dead and, instead, explicitly confirmed that, despite Gilmer, Gardner-Denver remains vital in a way that is crucially relevant here.
Post-Wright federal cireuit opinions under-seore that Wright's requirement for waiver of a judicial remedy is not easily met: these opinions generally recognize that a CBA will be construed to incorporate a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of a statutory antidis-crimination claim only if it contains an arbitration clause that explicitly agrees "to submit all federal causes of action arising out of . employment to arbitration" 21 or, in the event of a more general arbitration clause, only if the CBA contains an additional provision that includes an "explicit incorporation of the statutory anti-discrimination requirements."22
Barnica's CBA fails to meet these federal criteria for a "clear and unmistakable" waiver: its arbitration clause does not explicitly require submission of statutory claims to arbitration; and while the CBA does include general antidiserimination language, that language does not explicitly incorporate any statutory antidiscrimination requirements. In similar cases, including Wright, federal courts have found CBA grievance provisions to be too general to meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard.23 Indeed, of all federal cireuit cases that have addressed: the issue since Wright-including three from the fourth cireuit-apparently none has yet found a CBA that satisfies Wright's "clear and unmistakable" waiver standard.24
Contrary to the plurality opinion's suggestion, then, federal law unequivocally points to the conclusion that Barnica's CBA cannot properly be construed to have waived his right to pursue an independent court action on his statutory claim. Here, as in Wright, the arbitration clause is "very general," and "could be understood to mean matters in dispute under the contract"; moreover, "the remainder of the contract contains no explicit incorporation of the statutory antidiscrimi-*985nation requirements."25 Just as in Wright, then, "the CBA in this case does not meet [the] standard." 26
To be sure, the plurality opinion correctly observes that Barnica's case presents "a question of state law on "which [federal authorities do not] supply binding precedent." 27 Hence we consider the Gilmer/Gardner-Denver/Wright line of cases only 'because those cases are helpful. Yet as I emphasized earlier, this court usually regards federal precedent in this field as highly persuasive. Furthermore, the federal cases cited here have applied the "clear and unmistakable" waiver standard to a wide range of antidis-crimination statutes, both state and federal.28 I see no sound reason, then, to deviate from the federal cases.
Indeed, if any good reasons exist to distinguish Barnica's case from Wright and its progeny, they seem to favor adopting an even more stringent state waiver requirement. First, as the plurality's decision correctly points out, CBAs that fall within the coverage of Alaska's Public Employment Relations Act must incorporate binding arbitration as a final step of the grievance procedure.29 Realistically, then, there seems little reason to presume that a general arbitration clause will reflect anything more than the parties "clear and unmistakable" intent to comply with the statutory mandate to arbitrate those disputes that arise exclusively under, and consequently depend upon an interpretation of, the CBA.
A separate and equally compelling reason to enforce a stringent state rule against waiver of statutory claims is that our own precedent strongly counsels against allowing employers and unions to collectively bargain for such waivers. In Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, we unequivocally held that public employees working under a CBA could not be required to prospectively bargain away their right to sue under Alaska's Landlord Tenant Act.30 And more recently, in Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, we broadly emphasized that "[t]he right to a non-discriminatory workplace conferred by AS 18.80.220 could not be waived by any contrary contractual provision. Because it is a non-waivable state law right, no need exists to consult the CBA to determine its meaning." 31
The plurality tries to distance itself from these precedents. But its attempts are unpersuasive.32 True, neither PSEA nor Nor-*986con directly controls the outcome here; yet the plurality's retreat from their deliberately broad language hardly seems consonant with their intent and spirit-particularly when one considers that the plurality proposes to replace this broad language discouraging waiver with a strong presumption of waiver that originates in a federal judicial rule that federal courts themselves would decline to apply to these facts.
In short, given our own case law and the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Wright, I would hold that the CBA does not extinguish Barnica's right to a cause of action under the Human Rights Act and that Barnica should remain free to pursue his superior court action.

. Our case law establishes that "[a] decision by an evenly divided court results in an affirmance." Ward v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America, Inc., 963 P.2d 1031, 1037 n. 11 (Alaska 1998) (quoting Thoma v. Hickel, 947 P.2d 816, 824 (Alaska 1997)). Moreover, "an affir-mance by an equally divided court is not precedent." City of Kenai v. Burnett, 860 P.2d 1233, 1239 n. 11, 1246 (Alaska 1993) (Compton, J., concurring).

. AS 23.40.070-.260.

. See, e.g., Pub. Safety Employees Ass'n v. State, 658 P.2d 769, 775 (Alaska 1983).

. 415 U.S. 36, 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974).

. 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)).

. See Pub. Safety Employees Ass'n, 658 P.2d at 775.

. Op. at 980-81.

. 525 U.S. 70, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998).

. Id. at 72, 75, 119 S.Ct. 391.

. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.1996).

. Wright, 525 U.S. at 75-76, 119 S.Ct. 391 (describing fourth circuit's unpublished opinion in Wright v. Universal Maritime Servs. Corp., 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir.1997)).

. Id. at 76-77, 119 Silt. 391.

. Id. at 77, 80-81, 119 S.Ct. 391.

. Id. at 78, 119 S.Ct. 391;

. Id. at 78-79, 119 S.Ct. 391.

. Id. at 80, 119 S.Ct. 391 (quoting Metro Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708, 103 S.Ct. 1467, 75 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted).

. Id. at 80-81, 119 S.Ct. 391.

. Op. at -- (quoting Wright, 525 U.S. at 80, 119 S.Ct. 391).

. Id. at 80, 119 S.Ct. 391 (citations omitted).

. Id. at 80-81, 119 S.Ct. 391.

. Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir.2000); accord Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir.1999).

. Rogers, 220 F.3d at 76 (emphasis added); accord Carson, 175 F.3d at 332. Hence, even when other sections of the CBA prohibit discrimination in terms similar to the statutory protection, the waiver of a judicial remedy requires explicit mention of the statute incorporated, See Rogers at 76 (stating that "[clourts agree that specific incorporation requires identifying the anti-discrimination statutes by name or citation"); Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 654 (6th Cir.2000) (disapproving of a non-discrimination clause that failed to mention the ADA by name); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir.1999) (ruling that since antidiscrimi-nation provision was in separate section of CBA from grievance procedure, it did not require arbitration of such claims).

. Compare CBA Article 35 ("A 'grievance' shall mean a claim by a grievant that there has been an alleged violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of the Agreement, or a violation of official Board policy."), with Wright, 525 U.S. at 73, 119 S.Ct. 391 ("Any dispute concerning or arising out of the terms and/or conditions of this Agreement, or dispute involving the interpretation or application of this Agreement, or dispute arising out of any rule adopted for its implementation, shall be referred to [arbitration]"); Kennedy, 215 F.3d at 654 ("any controversy or dispute arising from the interpretation and/or application of the terms and work conditions under this labor agreement"); Bratten, 185 F.3d at 631 ("[a]nuy grievance arising under the terms of this contract or an alleged violation thereof"); Rogers, 220 F.3d at 76 ("[alny dispute concerning the interpretation, application, or claimed violation of a specific term or provision of this Agreement").

. See Robinson v. Healthtex, Inc., 215 F.3d 1321 (4th Cir.2000); Carson, 175 F.3d at 332; Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir.1999).

. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80, 119 S.Ct. 391 (emphasis added).

. Id. at 80, 119 S.Ct. 391.

. Op. at 980.

. See Wright, 525 U.S. at 76, 119 S.Ct. 391 (citing cases considering, among others, claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); see also, e.g., Rogers, 220 F.3d at 74, 76 (considering claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, and state and local human rights laws).

. See AS 23.40.210(a):,
(a) Upon the completion of negotiations between an organization and a public employer, if a settlement is reached, the employer shall reduce it to writing in the form of an agreement.... The agreement shall include a grievance procedure which shall have binding arbitration as its final step. Either party to the agreement has a right of action to enforce the agreement by petition to the labor relations agency.

. 658 P.2d 769, 770, 774-75 (Alaska 1983).

. 971 P.2d 158, 165 (Alaska 1999).

. The plurality distinguishes Public Safety Employees Ass'n v. State by noting that, unlike the Human Rights Act at issue here, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act at issue in PSEA contained an express provision against waiver of judicial remedies. Op.at 978-79. But this was only one of several factors that we mentioned in deciding PSEA. Notably, another factor we considered was the existence of a body of federal decisions-among them, Gardner-Denver-which we described as holding that, "(in circumstances involving coincident arbitral and statutory avenues of relief, ... arbitration does not afford an exclusive remedy." PSEA, 658 P.2d at 774-75. Our express reliance on Gardner-Denver and other analogous federal cases establishes that PSEA's broad language was not exclusively based on the URLTA's express anti-waiver provision.
The plurality also attempts to explain Norcon as simply a federal preemption case. Op. at 980-81. But Norcon's discussion of federal preemption cannot account for its broad and categorical language holding that Kotowski's rights under AS 18.80.220 "could not be waived by any contractual provision" and that AS 18.80.220 was "a non-waivable state law right." Norcon, 971 P.2d at 165. Strictly speaking, of course, these statements are dicta. But they certainly do *986not deal with preemption. Nor can Norcon's focus on preemption explain its citation to PSEA (which had nothing to do with federal preemption) as "a similar situation" in which we established that "the existence of the arbitration remedy did not preclude the exercise of the statutory remedy." Norcon, 971 P.2d at. 165. And finally, while the plurality correctly observes that the test for preemption at issue in Norcon differs from the Gilmer test that it proposes to adopt as the law of Alaska, Op. at 981, this observation begs the threshold question whether Gilmer properly applies to the facts in Barnica's case. By glossing over this preliminary question, the plurality overlooks that Wright's test for determining whether the presumption of arbitrability attaches in a given case-the very determination that, according to Wright, justifies substituting the mer analysis for Gardner-Derwver's "clear and unmistakable" waiver requirement-is exactly the same as the test for federal preemption: whether the dispute at issue necessarily hinges on an interpretation of the CBA. Compare Norcon, 971 P.2d at 164-65 with Wright, 525 U.S. at 77-79, 119 S.Ct. 391. Norcon's preemption analysis thus accords with the prescribed analysis in Wright and strongly counsels against reliance on Gilmer.