Court Opinion

ID: 9531495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:12:13.37056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:29.535501
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Whether or not defendants intended to discriminate on the basis of race in exercising peremptory challenges is a question of fact. Because there is seldom much evidence on this issue, the trial court’s determination rests largely on the demeanor and credibility of the attorney exercising the challenge, the tenor of the voir dire, and the behavior of the prospective jurors. Therefore, we must determine, by examining the record, whether the trial court’s determination on a Batson challenge was clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 409, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991). Under this standard of review, we grant the trial court deference and only overturn its determination if left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948). Where two “plausible” views of the evidence have been presented, the trial court’s choice of one cannot be clearly erroneous and a court of review may not reverse even if convinced it would have weighed the evidence differently. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518, 528, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985). Our supreme court has affirmed the holding that the exclusion of a minority venireperson based on a certain characteristic while accepting a white venireperson who shares the same characteristic does not, in and of itself, invalidate a party’s explanation as pretextual. People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 245 (2004). The Williams court continued to highlight that peremptory challenges are based on a combination of traits. The possession of one additional nondiscriminatory negative trait over another allows for proper use of a peremptory challenge. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 245-46, citing People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 282-83 (1995). Demeanor alone as a race-neutral reason may be sufficient, but must be closely scrutinized. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 247. Therefore, the trial judge must weigh the demeanor, context and atmosphere of the participants and the courtroom to best determine the credibility of the proffered reason. The inherent difficulty in an appellate analysis of this issue is that the record does not, and cannot, provide a full report of nonverbal cues. Although we carefully scrutinize the reasoning of the party, second-guessing a determination that is so reliant on subjective and nonverbal expressions must not be done lightly. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267-73, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196, 230-35, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-45 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343, 163 L. Ed. 2d 824, 834-35, 126 S. Ct. 969, 976-77 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Souter, J.). The obvious social and constitutional import of this subject, the difficulty of the subject, and the deference and trust we must place in the trial court to properly determine a just result are in serious tension. Determining and articulating the motivation and reason for an instinctive decision to exercise a peremptory challenge may be impossible for the attorney utilizing the challenge, much less a reviewing court. Subconscious factors that may rest upon impermissible racial, religious, ethnic or gender-based stereotypes may be unknowingly at play. The result is a very challenging analysis utilizing competing standards of review to determine something that may be impossible to truly accomplish in person, much less via a cold record. In any event, in this case, I first agree with Justice Quinn that defendants’ challenge of venireperson Norma Collins was not pretextual. Defendants challenged Collins on the basis of her having filed a worker’s compensation claim and their belief that her demeanor exhibited a favorable attitude toward litigation damages. This combination of traits set Collins apart from the venire and was sufficient to withstand the Batson challenge. The trial court’s denial of this challenge was not clearly erroneous. With respect to Orlassia Sims and Larry Stewart, the record indicates generally that jurors nodded, laughed and raised their hands in response to certain questions. Justice Neville highlights that the consequence of all potential jurors answering in the same fashion did not distinguish Sims and Stewart from their white counterparts. I do not disagree with his finding that a fair reading of the record indicates that all members of the group responded in the same fashion. However, the challenges of Sims and Stewart specifically highlighted the body language and way in which each answered the questions. Defendants were wary of Stewart’s body language, which they felt indicated a strong support for large damage claims. As for Sims, defendants believed that she acted disinterested and would not be a good, active juror. I agree with Justice Quinn that the trial court’s statement “I’m not going to question the veracity here of the attorneys,” is a concern. However, I do not believe this may be interpreted to overcome the deference we must pay the trial court on issues so dependent on evaluations of the participants’ demeanor and credibility. I believe that the trial court’s comment was a slip of the tongue — an oversimplification of its finding that defendants’ stated reasons were plausible and credible. Although many race-neutral answers may be stock answers that attorneys use over and over, thereby making the Batson process a “charade,” they nonetheless have been accepted as proper race-neutral reasons. See People v. Randall, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1025-26 (1996). The trial court found the reasons to be properly race neutral and most importantly that defendants’ belief in them was credible. The facts of this case have not left me with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court. The cold record cannot overcome the credibility determination made by the trial court. We have no way of knowing the manner in which the participants nodded their heads or raised their hands. From the record, we do not know if they were slouching or looking around bored or excitedly supporting the idea of large damages. We do know that defendants felt that both Stewart’s and Sims’ demeanor and body language indicated a mindset they did not find favorable to their clients. We do know that defendants also felt that Sims’ body language and demeanor indicated a general disinterest in the proceedings. The trial court was able to observe the attorneys and the venire. The trial court concluded that the defendants’ race-neutral explanations were credible. These explanations are plausible. Therefore, I would find the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs Batson challenge was not clearly erroneous. Until such time as the court picks the jury or until there are no juries in civil cases, there will likely be conflict in resolving questions of prejudice in jury selection. I do not know if Justice Breyer’s assertions that peremptory challenges are unworkable merit abandoning the current system — that is another question for another place — but, while the present system remains, I agree with Justice Gallagher’s conclusion in Randall, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 1030-31 (Gallagher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): the trial court should not face the unenviable burden of second-guessing an attorney’s use of peremptory challenges when a facially valid reason for exclusion has been exercised in a credible fashion.