Court Opinion

ID: 9855446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:24:58.173969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:32.779997
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
In reviewing this case, it appears to me that Blue Thunder did not receive a fair trial. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Although Blue Thunder asked for an attorney, the law enforcement officials absolutely denied him that right. Nine times he asked to contact his attorney and nine times it was denied. Clearly, this is prejudicial error. State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815 (S.D.1987). In point of fact, it was approximately three hours before his lawyer was called, after the focus of the investigation was upon him, and he was in *622custody (handcuffed in patrol car). Certainly, containing him in this patrol car, while he was drunk, while he was asking for a lawyer, and while he was pleading the Fifth Amendment, was the functional equivalent of interrogation. In my opinion, the court’s finding on this matter was clearly erroneous. State v. Hall, 353 N.W.2d 37 (S.D.1984). In this case, the State’s Attorney excused two Indian prospective jurors by peremptory challenge. Blue Thunder is an American Indian. I do not assign this as reversible error per se, but recite it to reflect the flavor of the fairness of this trial.
Further, for 45 minutes he was held by law enforcement officers, in a police car, with a tape recorder on, while he was handcuffed. Five separate times, while he was in the police car, he exercised his right to remain silent by taking the Fifth Amendment. While he was in this police car, and when he asked to talk to his lawyer, the officer told him “Leo, I can’t do that.” Yet, they persisted in extensive questioning. This was contrary to the holding in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981). This was a violation of his right to remain silent. Considering this, and the fact that his blood test reflected a .30 percent blood alcohol level, he was simply dead drunk. The statements which he made, under the totality of these circumstances, were not voluntary, in that the statements were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Apparently, having totally decried the violation of Blue Thunder’s constitutional rights, the majority opinion takes the position that the error was not “so egregious as to have denied Blue Thunder a fair trial.” I cannot accept this leap of logic and that is where I part company with the majority opinion. Having made that leap of logic, to which I disagree, the majority opinion then rests its opinion on the harmless error rule, i.e., Blue Thunder would have been convicted of First Degree Murder due to the conclusion that, absent these admissions we, as an appellate court, can declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty. In my opinion, the testimony did not attain, absent these constitutional violations, such a degree of proof. As we have acknowledged before, “the harmless error rule ought never be used to justify unfairness at trial.” State v. Webb, 251 N.W.2d 687 (S.D.1977).
“Egregious” is not the standard. Recently, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review a state court’s determination that constitutional law prohibits a consideration of the harmless error rule when the issue involves a confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment. State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 778 P.2d 602, 627 (1988), (citation omitted) cert. granted, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1522, 108 L.Ed.2d 762, and cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1528, 108 L.Ed.2d 768 (1990).
The majority opinion again condemns the jury panel as being “loaded” with potential law enforcement bias against this defendant. I agree. I do not believe that it was fair to place these people on this panel, thereby absolutely necessitating the removal of these prospective jurors from trying the case. I am astounded, bluntly, that these prospective jurors were not excused for cause at the outset. Unfortunately, they were not and Blue Thunder was required to exercise four peremptory challenges including, mind you, the wife of the Attorney General of this state. Rol Ke-bach was in criminal law enforcement in this state for approximately 30 years in the Department of Criminal Investigation, which has its headquarters in Pierre where this case was tried. The Department of Criminal Investigation building is named in his honor. I find it almost unbelievable that Mrs. Schweigert was not excused for cause when she related that her son was a member of the Pierre Police Department and was expected to testify at trial. In point of fact, he did testify at trial for the State. Kebach, it should be noted, was involved in the selection process to hire witness Ily Zeldes. Defense counsel repeatedly attempted to have Kebach exempted for cause but it was all denied. *623Kebaeh, it should further be noted, spoke at Criminal Investigation Agent Gromer’s retirement party. Also, the Attorney General’s wife was called as a potential juror. I note that Mrs. Tellinghuisen testified that she and her husband visited about cases that he was working on; the Attorney General and his wife lived in Pierre, the situs of these alleged crimes was the City of Pierre. She advised the court that if she was charged with murder she would not want 12 jurors married to the Attorney General sitting on her case. Notwithstanding all of these comments, repeated motions to have her excused from the jury were denied. Grant Gormley was formerly the chief prosecutor for the Attorney General’s office. State’s Attorney Moreno, who was prosecuting this case, knew the Gormleys very well and visited with them socially. Recently, Mrs. Gormley had gone to the prosecutor’s home and delivered a gift in honor of a new child born unto Mr. and Mrs. Moreno. The trial judge refused a challenge to have Mrs. Gormley removed for implied bias.
As a result of this refusal, defense counsel had to remove these prospective jurors by peremptory challenge. Defense counsel moved his Honor’s judgment for additional peremptory challenges but this was denied. As was stated in State v. Meyers, 190 Neb. 466, 209 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1973):
It is the duty of a trial court to see that Defendants in criminal cases are tried by a jury such that not even the suspicion of bias (leaning) or prejudice (prejudgment) can attach to any member thereof. Unless the jury be absolutely impartial, the jury system becomes an awkward instrument of justice and the Constitutional guaranty that every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state ... shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury ... is worthless.
It is understandable why defense counsel did not choose to exercise his last peremptory challenge. Having been stricken with unfavorable rulings and what appears to be legitimate requests for striking a juror for cause, defense counsel was afraid to roll the dice on his last peremptory challenge, believing that Blue Thunder might end up with another juror who, once again, could preclude him from having a fair trial. Thus, he did not exercise the last peremptory challenge. Under this factual scenario, it was a valid trial technique. I would carve out an exception to the State v. Connor, 86 S.D. 578, 199 N.W.2d 695 (1972) and its successor State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d 121, 127 (S.D.1984) that the defendant was not required to exercise his final peremptory challenge because he had been forced to exercise four peremptory challenges due to the trial court’s patently incorrect rulings. Simply put, it goes to the fairness of this particular jury trial.
It is fundamental we, at the appellate level, insure the integrity of the jury system. I refuse to be bound by a technical formula which strips the spirit of fairness from a jury trial. As the jury panel was “loaded” against Blue Thunder (per the majority opinion’s characterization), it cast a pall of unfairness on all of the proceedings below at trial. I would grant a retrial so that this pretense of a fairly selected jury panel would be obliterated, thus casting aside the appearance of bias and impropriety in the judicial branch of the State of South Dakota.