Court Opinion

ID: 9745042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:30:02.111658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:31.853514
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hunter, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority position in regard to the admissibility of the testimony of appellant’s daughter concerning a prior incestuous relationship between appellant and his daughter.
The majority correctly states that evidence of prior criminal acts may sometimes be admitted to show motive. However, in this instance, I believe this Court is in error. Professor McCormick cautions us to be aware of mechanically finding a situation in which an exception exists and blindly applying it:
“Most of the opinions ignore the problem and proceed on the assumption that the decision turns solely upon the ascertainment and application of a rule. If the situation fits one of the classes wherein the evidence has been recognized as having independent relevancy, then the evidence is received and otherwise not. . . . But problems of lessening the dangers of prejudice without too much sacrifice of relevant evidence can seldom if ever be satisfactorily solved by mechanical rules. And so here there is danger that if the judges, trial and appellate, content themselves with merely determining whether the particular evidence of other crimes does or does not fit in one of the approved classes, they may lose sight of the underlying policy protecting the accused against unfair prejudice. McCormick on Evidence, § 190 at 453 (2d edition, 1972) [emphasis added.]
From the fact that the father raped his daughter, the majority would have us infer that he then intentionally shot his wife six months later. Had the father been on trial for *549the murder of his daughter, my resolution of the question would be different. However, in the ease before us, the remoteness of the incestuous relationship, both in time and in relevance to the crime charged, and the potential of the evidence to inflame the jurors in a wave of hostility so as to prevent them from a rational decision concerning appellant’s guilt or innocence of the crime on trial, preclude its admission. Again quoting from Professor McCormick:
“The leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite direction, empowering the judge to exclude the other-crimes evidence, even when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial.”

Id.

For the above reasons, I dissent with the majority opinion and would reverse the appellant’s conviction and remand for new trial.
Note. — Reported at 356 N.E.2d 1186.