Court Opinion

ID: 9756850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:04:10.994576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.210794
License: Public Domain

GRACI, J,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 I must respectfully dissent, as I would affirm the trial court’s finding that appellant is now precluded from denying paternity under the doctrine of res judica-ta.
¶ 2 As the majority points out,
a support order necessarily determines the issue of paternity. To challenge paternity, an appeal must be taken directly from the support order itself. Absent any appeal, the issue of paternity is established as a matter of law. “( [A]) relevant fact necessarily determined as a prerequisite to the entry of an original support order may not, under the doctrine of res judicata, be challenged or put at issue in any subsequent proceeding.”
Manze v. Manze, 362 Pa.Super. 153, 523 A.2d 821, 824 (1987) (citations omitted).
¶ 3 In the instant case, the parties voluntarily entered into a post-nuptial agreement in January, 1992, which provided for the payment of child support for the parties’ minor children, including Deanna. A support order was also entered directing appellant to pay child support, thereby establishing the issue of Deanna’s paternity as a matter of law. At the time of these events, appellant was well aware that he was not Deanna’s biological father. Appel-lee had repeatedly informed him of that fact and, additionally, appellant had undergone a vasectomy four years before Deanna was born. Appellant executed the post-nuptial agreement under these circumstances, failed to pursue an appeal from the subsequent support order, and then abided by the terms of that order for more than a decade. Under the doctrine of res judicata, he may not now challenge paternity.1
*44¶ 4 “Allegations of fraud or mutual mistake [ ] provide the only bases upon which a court [can] review” a final support order. R.J.K. v. B.L., 279 Pa.Super. 71, 420 A.2d 749, 751 (1980). See also Gardner v. Gardner, 371 Pa.Super. 256, 538 A.2d 4, 9 (1988), reargument denied. Appellant’s petitions to modify the support order alleged neither fraud nor mutual mistake. Instead, appellant argued that he agreed to the 1992 support order based upon misrepresentations made by employees of the Berks County Domestic Relations Office (“DRO”) and appellee’s attorney. It is doubtful in the first instance that these alleged misrepresentations rise to the level of fraud or mutual mistake.
¶ 5 “The test for fraud is: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance, (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby [be] induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the recipient as a proximate result.” Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405, 411 n. 7 (Pa.Super.2000) (citation omitted). In contract law, a mutual mistake exists where “ ‘both parties to a contract [are] mistaken as to existing facts at the time of execution.’ ... If a mistake is not mutual but unilateral and is not due to the fault of the party not mistaken, but to the negligence of the one who acted under the mistake, it affords no basis for relief in rescinding the contract-release.” Smith v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 424 Pa.Super. 41, 621 A.2d 1030, 1032 (1993), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 638, 631 A.2d 1009 (1993) (citations omitted).
¶ 6 On this limited record, I fail to see how the misrepresentations of which appellant complains could be construed as the result of fraud or mutual mistake. There is no evidence that the DRO officials or appellee’s attorney made misrepresentations or fraudulent utterances to appellant concerning the law of paternity as it stood in 1992. Nor has appellant demonstrated his justified reliance upon those statements. In fact, under the definition of unilateral mistake set forth above, there is a strong argument that appellant, who chose to execute the support agreement without representation of counsel, did so negligently. At the very least appellant did so voluntarily, and with full knowledge of Deanna’s paternity. Moreover, cases involving fraud or mistake concern the actions of the parties to an agreement — in this context, the biological and putative parents. In this case, it is undisputed that one of those parties, appellee, has been forthright about Deanna’s paternity since her birth. Appellant would have us extend privity of the parties’ support agreement to include third-party public employees and appellees’ attorney, and I find no basis for doing so.
¶ 7 Assuming arguendo that the misrepresentations alleged here can somehow be construed as fraud or the result of a mutual mistake between the parties, it is well settled that a party asserting either type of claim must offer “evidence that is clear, precise and convincing.” Sekol, 763 A.2d at 411 n. 7 (discussing burden on party alleging fraud or intent to defraud); Smith, 621 A.2d at 1032 (discussing burden on party claiming mutual mistake). Appellant has fallen far short of this burden since he has failed to offer any evidence, except for his own recollections of meetings that occurred a decade ago, to sup*45port what are essentially bald, self-serving allegations.2
¶ 8 For the reasons set forth above, I would affirm the order of the trial court dismissing appellant’s exceptions.

. It is of no consequence that the parties entered into a support agreement without a *44formal judicial proceeding. When presented with a similar factual scenario, this Court has held, "[t]he fact that both support orders were consensual and not the result of a full eviden-tiary hearing makes them no less final and no more subject to challenge.” R.J.K. v. B.L., 279 Pa.Super. 71, 420 A.2d 749, 751 (1980).

. The same burden of proof would apply to appellant's argument against application of paternity by estoppel. Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405, 410 (Pa.Super.2000) ("since Appellant is seeking to inject elements of fraud and/or misrepresentation pertaining to alleged conduct of both mother and Appellee [], that this evidence must be considered by the trial court in whether to apply paternity by estoppel."). See also Kohler v. Bleem, 439 Pa.Super. 385, 654 A.2d 569 (1995). In Sekol, this Court determined that there was insufficient evidence before the trial court to support a finding that paternity by estoppel was applicable in that case. Sekol, 763 A.2d at 411. We remanded for an evidentiary hearing "giving due consideration to the claims of estoppel and the interplay of the alleged fraud/misrepresentation[.]” Id.