Court Opinion

ID: 9890747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-15 07:15:10.171901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:12.186341
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 10, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-22-00632-CR

                    WAYLAND RAY GRIGGS, Appellant

                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 149th District Court
                          Brazoria County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 90607-CR

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Wayland Ray Griggs appeals his convictions on two counts of
aggravated sexual assault of a minor. A jury convicted appellant and assessed his
punishment at 10 years in prison and a $5000 fine for each count. In a single issue
on appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the
convictions. We affirm.
                                  Governing Law

      As stated, in his sole issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we view all the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict
and determine, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom,
whether any rational factfinder could have found the elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). We do not sit as a
thirteenth juror and may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by
reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d
633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Rather, we defer to the factfinder to fairly
resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences
from basic to ultimate facts. Id. This standard applies equally to both
circumstantial and direct evidence. Id. Each fact need not point directly and
independently to the appellant’s guilt so long as the cumulative effect of all
incriminating facts is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

      Appellant was tried for four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child
under the age of 14 for allegedly causing the sexual organ of complainant C.C. to
contact appellant’s mouth. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a). The only difference in
the four charges was the alleged date of the offenses, each alleging an offense
occurred “on or about” a specific date in June 2020. A jury found appellant guilty
on two of the four charges.

                                   The Evidence

      Evidence at trial indicated that at the time of the alleged offenses, appellant
was living in an apartment with C.C., C.C.’s mother, and C.C.’s younger brother.
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Appellant was the father of C.C.’s older two siblings. C.C. testified that appellant
would watch her and her brother at the apartment while their mother was at work.
According to C.C., appellant told her at one point when she was ten years old that
he had arranged a race between C.C. and the daughter of a friend of his. Appellant
further said that to prepare for the race, C.C. needed to stretch, and he offered to
help her stretch. He called her out of the room she shared with her brother, took her
to the room appellant shared with C.C.’s mother, and instructed her to remove her
pants and underwear. Appellant then told her to lie on the bed, and he placed a
pillow on her stomach. According to C.C., while massaging her legs, appellant
then licked her vagina. C.C. further stated that appellant did this behavior on at
least four separate days. C.C. testified that not long afterwards, when her family
went to see her grandparents for Father’s Day, she sent a message on a messenger
app telling her mother what had happened. This would place the timing of the
offenses in June 2019.

      In her testimony, C.C.’s mother confirmed details regarding C.C.’s outcry
statement and also noted that during the time of the alleged assaults, C.C.’s
demeanor had changed; she cried a lot, was withdrawn, did not want to be hugged,
and said she “felt yucky.” Mother also noted that she remembered seeing the
pillows on her bed being out of place on days during that time period. And she
asserted that when she confronted appellant about the allegations, he seemed to
know what the allegations were before she told him. After C.C.’s mother reported
the allegations to the police, she was instructed to take C.C. to a hospital. The
nurse who examined C.C. at the hospital testified regarding the description of the
assaults that C.C. provided during the examination. C.C.’s earlier description of the
assaults closely matched her testimony at trial.

      Appellant also testified at trial. He denied sexually assaulting C.C. and

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explained that he had gotten into an argument with C.C.’s mother on Father’s Day
of that year. He suggested that C.C.’s mother may have manufactured the
allegations against him because she was angry with him.

                                    Discussion

      In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant expressly
acknowledges several well-established legal precepts. First, the uncorroborated
testimony of a child seventeen years of age or younger is sufficient to support a
conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. art.
38.07; Bautista v. State, 619 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2021, no pet.). Second, “outcry testimony alone can be sufficient to sustain a
conviction for aggravated sexual assault.” Rodriguez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 871,
873–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ryder v. State, 514 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. ref’d). Third, an intent to commit an offense can be
inferred from a defendant’s conduct. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004); Lewis v. State, 672 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.). And fourth, the “on or about” date alleged in an
indictment is an approximation that allows the State to prosecute a defendant for
acts occurring anterior to the presentment of the indictment and within the
limitations period. See Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997); Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Hendrix v.
State, 150 S.W.3d 839, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d).

      Here, we have detailed testimony regarding the assaults by the victim, C.C.;
detailed outcry testimony from C.C.’s mother; and additional corroborative
testimony from the nurse who examined C.C. Moreover, although the indictments
alleged the offenses occurred “on or about” dates in June 2020, the evidence
strongly supported the conclusion that the offenses occurred in June 2019.

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      Appellant nonetheless argues that the evidence was “simply inconsistent”
and that C.C. was led by the prosecutor into testifying about certain specifics,
offered insufficient details, and failed to adequately communicate that contact
occurred. We disagree. Regarding the fact the prosecutor used some leading
questions in examining C.C., we note that the rules of evidence do not forbid the
use of leading questions on direct examination. See Tex. R. Evid. 611(c) (“Leading
questions should not be used on direct examination except as necessary to develop
the witness’s testimony.”); Torres v. State, 424 S.W.3d 245, 253 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). At trial, defense counsel appeared to
recognize the need for the prosecution to use limited leading questions to develop
C.C.’s testimony. At the time of trial, C.C. was 13 and testifying regarding
traumatic events. The record does not suggest that the prosecutor’s questions
supplied C.C. with false memories. See Torres, 424 S.W.3d at 253 n.1.

      Appellant does not identify what he contends was “simply inconsistent”
about C.C.’s testimony, but we note that her testimony appears largely internally
consistent and consistent with what she told her mother and the nurse who
examined her at the hospital. We also conclude that C.C.’s testimony was
sufficiently detailed and adequately communicated that touching occurred in the
manner charged. See generally Bautista v. State, 619 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Courts liberally construe the
testimony of child sexual abuse victims.”).

      The evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions. Accordingly,
we overrule his sole issue.

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      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                              /s/ Frances Bourliot
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Poissant.
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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