Court Opinion

ID: 9518551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:55:43.826722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:32.630703
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that it was proper to convict Lyles on both the confinement and the battery charges. The facts before us establish that the confinement while armed with a deadly weapon did not last any longer than was necessary to commit the battery by slashing the victim with the knife. See Ryle v. State (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 81. See also Wethington v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 496.
The majority states there is a conflict between the districts of this court on the issue of double jeopardy which prompted them to look to our supreme court for guidance. However, the majority has overlooked Wethington, in which our supreme court held that, when the force used to accomplish a crime such as robbery is coextensive with alleged acts that violate the confinement statute, conviction on both counts would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Wetkington, supra. In Wethington, our supreme court adopted the reasoning of Ryle and cited it extensively.
In Ryle, Judge Shields explained that when a robbery is committed by force or a threat of force, confinement also occurs by virtue of the use of force because the force or threat of force needed for the robbery inherently causes a substantial interference with the victim's liberty (which is required for confinement). The confinement statute will only be violated when the confinement of the victim continues beyond that inherent in the force necessary to effectuate the robbery. Ryle, supra. Judge Shields reasoned that the same is true of forcible rape which "necessarily includes an interference with the victim's liberty in order to achieve non-consensual penetration. ..." Id. at 85, n. 7.
The same reasoning applies here. By using force, Lyles confined Gray while cutting her with the knife. Gray was confined throughout the incident; however, the confinement while armed with a deadly weapon (which was the offense charged) did not begin until Lyles grabbed Gray an instant before he began cutting her with the knife.1
*1354'There is no evidence that the confinement while armed with a deadly weapon continued beyond that which was necessary to effectuate the battery with a deadly weapon. Therefore, a separate violation of the confinement statute did not occur and I would vacate Lyles' conviction and sentence for confinement, Class B felony.

. There was a moment between the time the confinement while armed began, and the time that the battery was committed using the knife. However, I cannot say that such a short time is sufficient to allow a conviction on both charges. The majority's affirmance of the conviction on both charges, in effect, means that the use of the knife on the upswing constituted the offense of confinement while armed and the knifing on the downswing constituted the separate offense *1354of battery with a deadly weapon. I respectfully suggest that such is an untenable position.
As noted earlier, the merger problems between confinement and battery are similar to those between confinement and rape. In crimes such as rape, confinement is necessary to effectuate the offense and the confinement necessarily begins shortly before the target offense. However, these actions are not severable and the confinement is no more than is necessary to commit the target offense. See Ryle v. State (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 81. Therefore, under the facts of this case, Lyles cannot be convicted of both confinement while armed with a deadly weapon and battery committed by means of a deadly weapon.