Court Opinion

ID: 9593222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:38.960987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.901512
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring in result).
I would not reach Issues I or II. I would decide this case on Issue III only. The Board is correct that the method of service was defective and deprived the courts of jurisdiction. See Hardy v. West Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 49-7, 478 N.W.2d 832 (S.D.1991); Reif v. Avon Sch. Dist. No. 4-1, 458 N.W.2d 358 (S.D.1990); Middle Creek Sch. *625Dist. No. 18 v. Butte Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 83 S.D. 107, 155 N.W.2d 450 (1968).
SDCL 13-46-3 provides:
Such appeal shall be taken by serving a notice of appeal upon the school board or special committee or any member thereof[.]
SDCL 15 — 6—4(d)(4) provides in part:
The summons shall be served by delivering a copy thereof. Service in the following manner shall constitute personal service:
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(4) If the action be against a public corporation within this state, service may be made as follows:
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(v) Upon any school district by serving upon any member of the school board or board of education[.] (Emphasis added.)
These statutes make it clear that service on the Defendant School District requires service on a school board member. Apparently, Maasjo convinces the majority that SDCL 15-6-4(e), which provides a method of substituted personal service, is controlling in this case. It is clear, however, that SDCL 15-6-4(e) does not apply at all. It provides in part:
... If the defendant cannot be found conveniently, service may be made by leaving a copy at his dwelling house in the presence of a member of his family over the age of fourteen years[.]
Maasjo and the majority wholly overlook the fact that the defendant in this case is the School District, not Wallace Schott, the Board member. A review of the statute supports this theory. While SDCL 15-6-4(e) provides a specific method of substituted personal service for an individual and for a defendant who is a private corporation, the statute fails to similarly provide for a defendant who is a public corporation. Even then, the substituted personal service provided in SDCL 15-6-4(e) for a private corporation does not include service on a family member at a residence but only “at the place of business of such qualified person with any officer or employee over-fourteen years of age.” (Emphasis added.) It is evident that the drafters of this statute knew how to provide for substituted personal service of corporations, and chose to do so for private corporations only.
Therefore, substituted personal service does not apply and it cannot be made on the School District. The circuit court had no jurisdiction and neither do we. See also my dissent in State v. Lykken, 484 N.W.2d 869, 883 (S.D.1992).