Court Opinion

ID: 9860018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:07:18.713556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:12:58.323461
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, C.J.
I am unable to agree with the reasoning expressed in the majority opinion.
On February 26, 1969, a large group of students, including appellants, gathered in the office of Mr. Merrill, Dean of Men, at Shortridge High School in the City of Indianapolis, to discuss the previous day’s occurrence in the school cafeteria. They demanded the right to hold a meeting in the school auditorium during the 4th period. Mr. Lloyd Green, the vice-principal, told them that they could not use the auditorium at the time requested, but that it would be available for their proposed use at 3:15 p.m, that day. At the beginning of the 4th period, between 10:30 and 10:40 a.m., the group nevertheless went to the auditorium. The doors of the auditorium were open, but it was unlighted. The students went in and attempted to entice other students to join in the forbidden meeting. The students were told to return to their classes, but that there would be a meeting at 3:15 p.m. There is evidence in the record that Mr. Green was pushed and shoved while in the auditorium. At the beginning of the 5th period *604the students went down the hall to the cafeteria singing “We will overcome.” In the cafeteria they talked with other students for approximately ten minutes and then proceeded into the west corridor with a group of students. As they reached a point north of the library door they began to sing. At about 3:15 p.m. that same afternoon the appellants and a number of other students went to the auditorium and held the permitted meeting.
On February 27, 1969, the students again went to Mr. Merrill’s office before 8:00 a.m. At that time, they were requested to proceed to their classes. During a performance of the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra in the auditorium, the students stood up, proceeded to the nearest aisle, and walked out. They were accompanied out of the auditorium and into the cafeteria where they were told by three vice-principals that they were suspended from school for three days. The appellants then proceeded to the front of the school building and sat on the steps near the flag pole where they began a loud prolonged chant. Mr. Green asked them to leave and go home because they were disturbing the school and cautioned them that if they did not leave, the matter would be turned over to the police. There were several police officers present, and Inspector Klein addressed the appellants telling them that if they did not leave the premises promptly they would be subject to arrest. The students did not leave. Instead, they locked arms and continued to chant, whereupon they were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. IC 1971, 25-27-2-1, Burns’ Ind. Stab. Ann. § 10-1510 (1972 Supp.) provides:
“Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultous or offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars [$500] to which *605may be added imprisonment for not to exceed one hundred eighty [180] days.”
This case is now here a second time. The appellants, Rod-man Atkins, James R. Edmondson, Karen Lewis, Van Marshall, Darrick Holt, Derrick Yowell, and Jerome K. Brown, and 23 other students were indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury. The indictments were filed in Division I of Marion County Criminal Court and the judge transferred each case to juvenile court immediately. On March 5, 1969, the juvenile court noted the transfer and ordered a case filed against each defendant. On March 7, 1969, the prosecuting attorney of the 19th Judicial Circuit of Indiana, filed a petition for Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction in each case and the Court ordered a hearing on the petition for March 12, 1969. Each appellant then sought a Writ of Prohibition in this Court seeking to prohibit the Juvenile Court from acting on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. In that case, we granted the writ by a divided court. State ex rel. Rodman Atkins v. Juvenile Court of Marion Co. (1969), 252 Ind. 237, 247 N.E. 2d 53. It should be noted that our decision in Atkins, supra, was handed down on May 6, 1969. Judge Fields, who presided during the proceedings below, had dismissed each of the cases on April 5, 1969, agreeing with the contention that juvenile jurisdiction was imperfectly obtained.
On June 13, 1969, new petitions were filed in the Juvenile Court of Marion County against the appellants and others, and the Prosecuting Attorney immediately filed petitions for waiver of jurisdiction. On June 14, 1969, the hearing was continued after the appellants and their attorneys appeared, and appellants were ordered released to their parents. On July 2, summons were issued to the appellants and their parents to appear on July 17. On October 19, the cause was set for hearing on the petition for waiver. At that time, counsel for appellants and the State stipulated in open court *606that the record as it stood from the proceedings of March 12, 1969 and thereafter would be the record in its entirety for the present hearing and proceedings. The stipulation was accepted by the Court and entered of record. The cause was reset for oral argument and the defendant-appellants were again released to the custody of their parents. On October 20, the hearing on petition for waiver of jurisdiction was held, and the proceedings of March 12, 1969, to March 19, 1969, which was the initial waiver hearing on the charges brought by indictment, were stipulated into the present record. The former hearing had lasted seven days during which time some 40 witnesses were called by the parties, and approximately 46 exhibits were offered. On November 8, 1969, the petition for waiver was granted by the Juvenile Court and an order to that effect was entered.
The Honorable Harold N. Fields, Judge of the Marion County Juvenile Court rendered the following Orders of Waiver of Jurisdiction, omitting purely formal parts (the Orders being identical as to each appellant except where noted otherwise) :
“(Judge Harold N. Fields) CONDUCTED a full investigation of the matter and now finds:
1. The child is (was) over fifteen (15) years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age to wit: 17 years, at the time of the charged offense.
2. The offense charged would be a crime if committed by an adult, to wit: DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
3. The matter has specific prosecutive merit in the opinion of the Prosecutor if waived to a court of adult criminal jurisdiction.
4. That if the matter were to be retained in the juvenile jurisdiction and child adjudged to be delinquent, no disposition available to the Juvenile Court is reasonably calculated to effect rehabilitation in that: The case cannot be heard in Juvenile Court and disposition made until after the child has reached the age of eighteen (18) years, thus precluding commitment to a state institution.
(Additionally as to appellants Brown and Edmondson)
*607The offense charged is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses, to wit:
(As to Jerome K. Brown)
11-21-65 O.A.P.A. Theft
11-18-68 Robbery (Waived to Criminal Court)
(As to James R. Edmondson)
5-31-65 ROBBERY
AND THE COURT: NOW ORDERS
1. That the Court waive jurisdiction and order said child held for trial under regular procedures of the Criminal Court of Marion County on a charge that-(name)—— is hereby alleged to be a delinquent child in this to wit: On or about February 27, 1969, at and in the County of Marion, State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully act in a loud, boisterous, and disorderly manner, so as to disturb the peace and quiet of a certain neighborhood, to wit: Shortridge High School, and 34th and Meridian Streets at Shortridge High School, by loud and unusual noise, then and there being contrary to the form of the Statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
2. That pending trial on said charge in the Criminal Court of Marion County, that said child be:
Released to his parents.
(or in the case of Jerome K. Brown)
Remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Marion County with bond set in the amount of $500.00.”
In the case at bar, it is clear that a full and adequate hearing was held on the question of waiver of jurisdiction, and that the trial judge did more than just recite his conclusions or state of mind in the waiver orders. Our concern in Summers v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 551, 230 N. E. 2d 320, was to insure that the waiver determination would be made on the basis of a full and adequate hearing. We did not mean to limit the trial judge’s discretion except to the extent that a statement of reasons is required to permit a meaningful review. The requirements set out in Summers were followed by the trial judge here. The appellants were all very close to the age of *608eighteen at the time of these proceedings. The offense for which they were charged would be a crime if committed by an adult, i.e. disorderly conduct. The trial judge found that the matter had specific prosecutive merit in the opinion of the prosecutor. In addition, the judge found that there was no disposition reasonably calculated to effect rehabilitation in these cases since the appellants were so close to the age of eighteen years, and by the time of trial they would be over eighteen years of age and not subject to commitment to any juvenile institution. He was obviously of the belief that the dispositions available to the Juvenile Court were not adequate in these cases. We see no justification for disturbing that judgment. We find nothing to indicate that Judge Fields abused his discretion or acted in an arbitrary manner with respect to these appellants. The waiver order contains ample reasons to support waiver of jurisdiction as to these appellants. Thus, the procedures used here are fully consistent with the guidelines we set out in Summers, supra, and the orders of waiver as to these appellants are not contrary to law.
The substance of the majority opinion requires a full-fledged hearing on a mere waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal court, in order to determine the possible punishments under each set of circumstances; If it is conceivably possible to use the remedies of the juvenile system, then the trial court has no right to waive to a criminal court. The trial court, however, must guess, since the majority suggests that the Supreme Court decides whether or not the remedies are adequate within the juvenile process. All of this comes prior to the trial of the meritorious issues, thus creating two full trials and a change of judge. I further point out that a juvenile proceeding is not supposed to be a criminal proceeding, although I realize that the United States Supreme Court, in the cases of In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 84, 86 S. Ct. 1045 and Kent v. U.S. (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 96 S. Ct. 1045, has played havoc with our juvenile pro*609ceedings by imposing almost all the procedural requirements of the criminal process upon the juvenile system.
The majority speculates on situations in which juveniles are charged with conduct that does not constitute a crime for an adult. We do not have that situation here, since the so-called juveniles who now are more than 18 years of age are alleged to have committed a crime, although the majority opinion denominates their acts as “certain peaceful but disruptive protests” and “completely non-violent demonstrations against the school for felt grievances.” As I read the record, disorderly conduct, when it takes the form of loud noises, running, blocking, singing and includes pushing and shoving, does violence to the rights of others who desire peace and quiet in order to pursue the legitimate goal of receiving an education. The crime for which the appellants are charged involves the infringement of important rights belonging to their fellow students by disrupting the educational processes at Shortridge High School. It is well settled that conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the operation of the public educational system may be prohibited even though expressive activity is involved. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731. The appellants seek to assert rights under our Juvenile Code when, at the same time, they were unwilling to recognize and honor the rights of their classmates. We think the trial judge, considering their age, could reasonably refuse to treat such individuals as children under our statutes.
The appellants are all now over 18 years of age, and considering the slow progress that this case is making, having been before us twice and sent back for a rehearing, these appellants will be full grown men and women, still subject to the juvenile process as a result of the majority opinion. The purposes for which our juvenile system was created are lost in the jungle of court proceedings that the majority opinion *610compels in this case. We must have discipline in schools if we are going to have any success in meeting our educational goals. Schools should have the power to enforce discipline. What this Court is doing here by not supporting the trial court and the school authorities results in nothing but chaos in the school systems. In my opinion, Judge Fields explicitly stated, and with good cause, the reason why the juvenile court should not retain jurisdiction for these 18-year-old appellants who have the right to vote and who should be tried as adults for their crime in a criminal court.
Givan, J., concurs.
NOTE.—Reported in 290 N. E. 2d 441.