Court Opinion

ID: 9703098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:40:09.078684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:45.639800
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
concurring and dissenting. I concur in parts I and II of the majority opinion. Because the lease does not provide for a waiver of liability against officers or employees of Green Mountain, I dissent from the holding in part III of the majority opinion that plaintiff cannot proceed against Andrew Golbert. The majority is persuasive in its conclusion that the lease should have extended the waiver to employees and officers of the defendant, and that it will be less effective if it failed to do so. It is unpersuasive that the lease actually contains the extended waiver. It is not our role to create a better contract for a business-lessee than it failed to do for itself.
Both parts I and II of the majority opinion are grounded in our obligation to enforce the plain meaning of the language of the lease. That cardinal rule of contract construction is totally missing from part III. The parties to the Article 85 waiver of liability are “Lessor” and “Lessee,” which, by the terms of the lease, mean only Fairchild Square and Green Mountain. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. National Tea Co., 588 So. 2d 361, 363 (La. 1991) (otherwise similar waiver sentence covers “agents, successors and assigns”); Alliance Ins. Co. v. First Tape, Inc., 713 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (exculpatory provision covered “agents, officers, and employees”). Article 12(b) of the lease specifically imposes liability for any loss caused by “any negligent act by Lessee or its agents or employees.” Thus, the drafters clearly applied liability to acts of employees but failed to include employees within the waiver provision. Reinforcing that the drafter knew how to immunize employees from liability, when that result was intended, Article 21(c) immunizes the “lessor and its employees” from liability for injuries caused by disrepair of the building.
I agree with the majority that “public policy considerations support” the result it wants to reach. My view does not, however, “subvert bargained for economic efficiency and equitable allocation of risk” as claimed by the majority. It refuses to allow unbargained-for immunity to be created just because this Court likes the result. We should enforce the contract that was made, not one we wish they made. I am authorized to say that Justice Gibson joins in this dissent.