Court Opinion

ID: 9772582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:23:16.632146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:45.901193
License: Public Domain

CORNYN, Justice,
joined by PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, GAMMAGE and ENOCH, Justices,
dissenting.
To be entitled to the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus, a party must show two things: that the trial court abused its discretion and that ordinary appeal would not be an adequate remedy. Failure to show that an appeal would cause more than ordinary *777expense and delay is not enough. That was the reason we denied mandamus relief in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1994), and that is the reason we should deny mandamus relief in this case. Regardless of whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining jurisdiction, NISA has failed to show that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
In Wittig, the Court specifically held that a challenge to personal jurisdiction “may ordinarily be adequately reviewed on appeal.” 876 S.W.2d at 307. We noted at least two possible situations in which an appeal might be inadequate, eases implicating the parent-child relationship and cases implicating comity in foreign affairs. Id. at 307. We also stated:
We do not foreclose the possibility that a trial court, in denying a special appearance, may act with such disregard for guiding principles of law that the harm to the defendant becomes irreparable, exceeding mere increased cost and delay. In such a situation, a defendant’s remedy by appeal may be inadequate and mandamus may therefore be appropriate.
Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added). This language, relied on by the Court to effect review of this ease, does not in any way dispense with the required showing of inadequate appellate remedy. Neither NISA nor the Court even offers an argument that an appeal in this case will be inadequate. NISA makes no argument that it will suffer any particular harm as a result of being put to an appeal other than that being put to trial will violate its right to due process. This Court rejected that very argument in Wittig, based on a unanimous opinion from the United States Supreme Court holding that ordinary appeal from an order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was adequate “[bjecause the right not to be subject to a binding judgment may be effectively vindicated following final judgment.” Id. at 307-08 (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 617, 526-27, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 1951-52, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988)).
Despite our recent reaffirmation that an inadequate appellate remedy is a “fundamental tenet” of mandamus practice, Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex.1992), the Court proceeds without distinguishing this case from Wittig or explaining how NISA’s appellate remedy is inadequate. If the Court is free to ignore that tenet in this ease, it may as well begin issuing extraordinary writs to correct denials of summary judgments.