Court Opinion

ID: 9959779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:10:33.608036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:53.244269
License: Public Domain

J-S06032-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                   :
                v.                                 :
                                                   :
                                                   :
  ARTHUR HUMPHRIES                                 :
                                                   :
                       Appellant                   :   No. 2952 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 4, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002654-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                                    FILED APRIL 12, 2024

       Arthur Humphries (“Humphries”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence    imposed      following    his      convictions   for   third-degree   murder,

possessing instruments of crime, two counts of violating the Uniform Firearms

Act, and persons not to possess firearms.1 We affirm.

       The trial court provided the following summary of the evidence:

             Tressa Lancaster testified that she was in a relationship with
       [Terrell Washington (“Washington”)]. At the time of Washington’s
       death, Lancaster lived with her daughter and Washington . . . in
       Philadelphia. On May 31, 2020, Lancaster went to the lobby of
       her apartment building to receive a food delivery order. In the
       lobby, Lancaster saw [Humphries], Diamond Knight [“Knight”],
       and Knight’s mother. Knight’s mother got on the elevator, but
       [Humphries] and Knight did not. [Humphries] and Knight instead
       got on the elevator when Lancaster went back up to her
       apartment. In the elevator, Knight asked Lancaster if she knew
       [Humphries]. [Humphries] did not say anything but laughed.
       Lancaster testified that she had never spoken to Knight or
____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 907, 6106, 6108, 6105.
J-S06032-24

     [Humphries] before that date. Lancaster got off the elevator and
     walked up the steps to her apartment.

             On June 1, 2020, Lancaster . . . went into the building's
     mailroom . . .. [Lancaster] was on a FaceTime with Washington,
     who was in their apartment. When Lancaster left the mailroom,
     [Humphries] and Knight were behind her. Knight asked Lancaster
     about their conversation the previous night . . .. The two women
     then began fighting in front of the elevators, causing Lancaster’s
     phone to fall to the floor. Washington subsequently came down .
     . . to the lobby. [Humphries] walked over to Knight and Lancaster,
     who were still fighting, and touched Lancaster. In response,
     Washington moved [Humphries’s] hand. [Humphries] then lifted
     his shirt up and Lancaster saw that [Humphries] had a silver gun.

           Washington hit [Humphries] and the two started fighting.
     Lancaster then heard several gunshots go off. Because she could
     hear Washington asking for help, Lancaster ran up the stairs and
     knocked on her neighbor's door and asked for help. The neighbor
     called 9-1-1 while Lancaster returned to the lobby and found no
     one there other than Washington.        Lancaster later gave a
     statement to detectives in which she identified [Humphries].
     Lancaster also pointed [Humphries] out on the street while talking
     to a detective. [Humphries] then ran away and the police went
     looking for him.

            Philadelphia Police Officer Ashley Krause testified that she
     was on duty with two . . . other officers on June 1, 2020, when
     they received a dispatch call . . . that two . . . women were
     fighting and that a man had been shot . . . . [O]fficer Krause went
     to [Washington’s] apartment complex . . .. Officer Krause saw a
     man, later identified as [Washington], face down on the ground,
     saturated with blood, with his head toward the elevator. Officer
     Krause carried Washington to medics who had arrived at the
     apartment complex, then rode with him in an ambulance to
     Lankenau Hospital. In the ambulance, Officer Krause . . .
     searched Washington, finding no weapons on his person and only
     a cell phone in his left pocket.

           Philadelphia Police Detective Frank Mullen testified that he
     prepared a compilation video with authenticated footage
     recovered from the apartment complex . . .. Detective Mullen
     narrated the compilation video as it was shown to the jury.
     Detective Mullen testified that the video showed a woman walking

                                    -2-
J-S06032-24

     into the main lobby of the apartment complex and then getting
     involved in a physical altercation. [Washington] could then be
     seen picking up a cell phone off the floor and putting it in his
     pocket. The two men in the video could then be seen talking to
     one another before also engaging in a physical altercation. Finally,
     the video showed [Humphries] shooting Washington multiple
     times, then walking away.

           Tressa Lancaster was shown the compilation video during
     her testimony. She identified herself, [Washington], [Knight], and
     [Humphries] as the individuals seen in the video. Lancaster noted
     that [Humphries] was not present when the fight between her and
     Knight began, but that he later entered the building while carrying
     bags. Lancaster also testified that Washington picked up her
     phone when he came to the ground floor. Lancaster further
     described the events depicted in the video, identifying when she
     told Washington to get Knight off her hair.         At this point,
     [Humphries] came over and touched Lancaster’s back.
     Washington then smacked [Humphries’s] hand down and
     [Humphries] lifted his shirt up.

            Philadelphia Police Detective Robert Conway testified that
     he was the assigned detective for the shooting . . .. Detective
     Conway went to the apartment lobby that day, where he took
     photographs . . . recovered seven cartridge casings, four bullet
     fragments, and one projectile. Once [Washington] was declared
     dead . . . the case was transferred to the [H]omicide [U]nit.
     Philadelphia Police Officer Lawrence Flagler, who was assigned to
     the Firearms Identification Unit, testified as an expert in the field
     of firearms and tool mark examination.

           Officer Flagler testified that he was able to conclude that the
     seven cartridge casings all originated from the same firearm and
     that two of the bullet jacket fragments also originated from the
     same firearm.

           Dr. Khalil Wardak, a medical examiner in the Philadelphia
     Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that he performed an autopsy
     of [Washington] . . .. Dr. Wardak found that Washington's cause
     of death was multiple gunshot wounds, and the manner of his
     death was homicide. Dr. Wardak determined that there were six
     gunshot wounds to Washington’s body. As a result of these
     gunshots, Washington suffered injuries to his liver, stomach,
     pancreas, clavicle, left lung, diaphragm, left arm, right arm, and

                                     -3-
J-S06032-24

     left thigh. Dr. Wardak determined that three of the gunshots were
     to the torso and three were to the limbs and concluded that the
     gunshots to the torso were fatal. Dr. Wardak was unable to
     determine the order in which the gunshots were fired.

            Dr. Wardak . . . explained that when someone is punched in
     the head with significant force, their brain hits the interior of the
     skull, which can injure the brain.        This can also result in
     disorientation and affect the individual’s thought processes. Dr.
     Wardak testified that he watched the video of Washington
     punching [Humphries] and observed that the punch was not
     effective to cause [Humphries] to fall or render him unconscious.
     Additionally, Dr. Wardak did not observe any physical injuries on
     [Humphries’] face, such as laceration or tearing of the skin, after
     he was struck. Dr. Wardak noted that he did not himself examine
     or question [Humphries] after he was punched.

            Philadelphia Police Detective James Burke testified that he .
     . . . was unable to locate Knight after traveling to four different
     addresses on five different occasions. Furthermore, Detective
     Burke never became aware of her whereabouts.

            Philadelphia Police Detective Timothy Bass, who was
     assigned to the fugitive squad, testified that he was tasked with
     locating [Humphries]. . .. On June 19, 2020, Detective Bass went
     to the residence of Michelle Hill, where he finally located
     [Humphries] . . . and arrested him.

                                  *****

           There was a stipulation between the Commonwealth and
     [Humphries’s] counsel that [Humphries] did not have a license to
     carry a firearm on June 1, 2020. There was also a stipulation
     between the Commonwealth and [Humphries’s] counsel regarding
     a certificate of non-licensure for [Humphries].

See Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/23, at 1-7 (record citations and numerals

omitted).

     In May 2022, the jury convicted Humphries of the above-listed offenses.

The trial court then convicted him of persons not to possess firearms.       In

                                     -4-
J-S06032-24

November 2022, the court sentenced Humphries, who had a prior record score

of “5,” to an aggregate term of imprisonment of twenty-five to fifty years.

Humphries filed a timely post-sentence motion which the trial court denied.

Humphries appealed, and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

     On appeal, Humphries raises the following issues for our review:

     I. Whether [Humphries’s] conviction for murder was based upon
     insufficient evidence where the Commonwealth did not prove
     beyond a reasonable doubt that [Humphries] possessed the
     necessary malice for murder?

     II. Whether [Humphries’s] conviction for murder was against the
     weight of the evidence and shock’s one’s sense of justice where
     [Washington] attacked [Humphries], striking him in the head
     repeatedly with fists, and where [Humphries] was dazed and
     acted out of fear and rage and the mistaken belief that he was
     justified in using lethal force?

     III. Whether the court abused its discretion at sentencing:

           (a) Where it imposed a consecutive term of
           imprisonment     where     there   were      mitigating
           circumstances and the imposition . . . a consecutive
           sentence presents a substantial question that the
           sentence is inappropriate because it is contrary to the
           norms underlying the Sentencing Code, and

           (b) Where the court imposed the maximum sentence
           permitted for third degree murder because of the
           existence of mitigation and provocation by
           [Washington] warranted a sentence below the
           maximum sentence of 20-40 years for murder and the
           imposition of a maximum sentence is excessive and
           presents a substantial question that the sentence is
           inappropriate because it is contrary to the norms
           underlying the sentencing code?

Humphries’s Brief at 6 (issue reordered, unnecessary capitalization omitted).

                                    -5-
J-S06032-24

     Humphries’s first issue implicates the sufficiency of the evidence of

third-degree murder.

     This Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence under the following

standard:

     A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
     law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
     when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
     and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
     doubt. . .. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court
     is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable
     to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of
     all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 175 A.3d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some

emphasis removed). In reviewing a sufficiency claim, this Court will not:

     weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
     []finder . . .. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
     proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
     means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
     the above test, the entire record must be evaluated[,] and all
     evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder
     of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
     weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
     of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).   A reviewing court “evaluate[s] the entire trial record and all

evidence actually received, in the aggregate and not as fragments isolated

from the totality of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Nixon, 801 A.2d 1241,

1243 (Pa. Super. 2002).

                                     -6-
J-S06032-24

        To convict a defendant of third-degree murder, the Commonwealth

must show he committed the killing with “malice aforethought,” i.e., “a class

of wanton and reckless conduct [that] manifests . . . an extreme indifference

to the value of human life but does not necessarily . . . an intent to kill.”

Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 364 (Pa. 2005).                     See

Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 632 (Pa. 2005) (stating “malice”

includes evidence of particular ill-will, a wickedness of disposition, hardness

of heart, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty);

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1196, 1191 (Pa. 2013) (holding malice

can be inferred and found from the attending circumstances, even without the

intent to cause death).

        Humphries asserts he reacted to unwarranted provocation and was

disoriented and not thinking clearly when he repeatedly shot Washington. He

also claims he believed he faced imminent death or serious bodily injury. See

Humphries’s Brief at 17-19.

        The trial court found Humphries’s initiation of a confrontation with

Washington by displaying his gun, his firing of multiple shots, three of which

struck Washington’s torso, even after Washington crawled away, and medical

evidence undermining Humphries’s assertion of disorientation sufficient to

prove malice and third-degree murder. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/23, at

9-12.

                                     -7-
J-S06032-24

       The trial court did not err.   Humphries’s act of shooting Washington

three times in the torso and three additional times manifested extreme

indifference to human life, “recklessness of consequences, and a mind

regardless of social duty.” Santos, 876 A.2d at 364; Ludwig, 874 A.2d at

632.     Moreover, the     Commonwealth       presented evidence      discrediting

Humphries’s assertion that disorientation caused his actions. Thus, the claim

merits no relief.

       Humphries’s second issue implicates the weight of the evidence.

       When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court’s

standard of review is as follows:

       The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie
       in ensuring that the trial court’s decision has record support.
       Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial
       court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

       A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
       the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
       trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
       conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
       would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
       the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding the facts,
       certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
       or give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

       An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
       weight of the evidence challenge is distinct from the standard of
       review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight
       claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not the underlying
       question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
       evidence.

Commonwealth v. Muci, 143 A.3d 399, 410-11 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).   To prevail on a weight challenge, a defendant must prove the

                                       -8-
J-S06032-24

evidence is “so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the

conscience of the court.” See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795,

806 (Pa. Super. 2003).

      Humphries contends the verdict was against the weight of the evidence

because he was an innocent bystander to the original violence, brandished his

weapon only in warning, had his rational thought process interrupted by

Washington’s repeated punches, and believed Washington had murderous

intent. See Humphries’s Brief at 15-16.

      The trial court found the jury’s verdict did not shock the court’s

conscience. It noted Washington was unarmed, his punch lacked the power

to cause Humphries to fall or lose consciousness, and Humphries continued to

shoot Washington even as he crawled away.           See Trial Court Opinion,

5/22/23, at 14-15.

      We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination.

The jury saw video evidence and heard direct testimony establishing

Humphries escalated a confrontation by displaying a gun and, after

Washington punched him, shot Washington seven times even as Washington

crawled away, wounded, and further, that Washington’s punch had not been

forceful enough to alter Humphries’s consciousness. Humphries thus fails to

demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion by denying his weight claims.

See Muci, 143 A.3d at 410-11; Sullivan, 820 A.2d at 806 (Pa. Super. 2003).

                                     -9-
J-S06032-24

      Humphries’s final two issues implicate the discretionary aspects of

sentence.

      A discretionary aspects of sentence claim is not appealable as of right;

an appellant must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test.

This Court must determine:

      (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has
      a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is
      a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
      9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal

citations and brackets omitted).    A defendant waives any claim he fails to

include in his Rule 2119(f) statement. See Commonwealth v. Karns, 50

A.3d 158, 166 (Pa. Super. 2012).

      Although Humphries’s statement of questions presented lists two

sentencing claims, he asserts only one:            his sentence is manifestly

unreasonable, and the court failed to give proper weight to mitigating factors.

That claim has been held to present a substantial question.                  See

Commonwealth v. Pisarchuk, 306 A.3d 872, 879 (Pa. Super. 2023). We

                                     - 10 -
J-S06032-24

therefore grant review of the discretionary aspects of Humphries’s sentence

on its merits.2

       Humphries contends the court failed to weigh the provocation he faced

and his difficult childhood, including childhood abuse, foster care, and DHS

supervision. See Humphries’s Brief at 20-21.

       Our standard of review for a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a

sentence is as follows:

       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
       sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
       absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
       of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
       the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
       sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
       judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
       arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(internal citations omitted).

       A court must state on the record at sentencing the reasons for the

sentence it imposes. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620-

21 (Pa. 2002). The court satisfies that requirement by stating it has been

informed     by   the    post-sentence         investigation   report   (“PSI”).   See

____________________________________________

2 We do not, however, review Humphries’s stated question that the court erred

in imposing consecutive sentences because he did not assert that claim in his
Rule 2119(f) statement, see Karns, 50 A.3d at 166, and does not address
that claim in his argument, Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 785
(Pa. 2009). Furthermore, a challenge to the imposition of consecutive
sentences does not raise a substantial question, see Commonwealth v.
Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014).

                                          - 11 -
J-S06032-24

Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 536 (Pa. Super. 2022).                  An

appellate   court   accords   great   deference   to   the   sentencing   court’s

determination because the trial court is in the best position to assess a

defendant’s character, display of remorse, and the overall effect and nature

of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Salter, 290 A.3d 741, 749 (Pa. Super.

2023).

       At both the sentencing hearing and in its Opinion, the court stated it

considered the presentence report, the sentencing guidelines, the sentencing

code, the facts and circumstances of the case, Humphries’s prior record, and

his mental health evaluation.     See N.T., 11/4/22, at 12-14; Trial Court

Opinion, 5/22/23, at 19-20.     The court explained it based its sentence on

Humphries’s escalation of a fist fight and his shooting of Washington multiple

times as he crawled away, under circumstances that would have supported a

conviction of first-degree murder. See N.T., 11/4/22, at 12-13.

       The record demonstrates the trial court examined the PSI, creating the

inference it considered the proper sentencing factors, including the mitigating

factors Humphries asserts. See Miller, 275 A.3d at 536. That the court did

not assign the weight to the mitigating factors Humphries believes appropriate

does not establish the court did not consider them. Humphries has not proved

the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing. See Salter, 290 A.3d at

749.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

                                      - 12 -
J-S06032-24

Date: 4/12/2024

                  - 13 -