Court Opinion

ID: 9764264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:17:11.728254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:27.961676
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
Appellant was indicted for murder but convicted by a jury of the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Among other things, appellant complains on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he “caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause”, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.04(a). The majority opinion disposes of appellant’s complaint by saying that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder and since there is in this case sufficient evidence of murder and since proof of a greater offense will sustain a conviction of a lesser included offense, then appellant’s ground of error is without merit. While I agree with the result reached, I take a different path to reach the result, a path that should have been taken years ago. The first step on this journey involves a serious reevaluation of the relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter as contained in the “new" Penal Code, V.T.C.A. Penal Code (1974).
The precursors to the present offenses of murder and voluntary manslaughter were, under Vernon’s Annotated Penal Code of 1925 as amended by the Murder Act of 1927, murder with malice and murder without malice.1 In 1974, when the new Penal *397Code repealed Art. 1257c, murder without malice, and enacted § 19.04(a), voluntary manslaughter, the Legislature carried forward the identical wording that murder without malice/voluntary manslaughter is murder committed “under the immediate influence of [a] sudden passion arising from an adequate cause”. Although this Court had rendered many decisions on the relationship of murder without malice and with malice under the old Penal Code, it was not until 1978 that we took our first (and last) close analytical look at the legal relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter. This occurred in Braudrick v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
Braudrick held that under the new Penal Code:
1. Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.
2. “Sudden passion”2 is akin to a defense as provided in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 2.03;
3. “Sudden passion” is not an element of voluntary manslaughter but if raised by the evidence its negative, that is the absence of “sudden passion”, becomes akin to an element of the offense of murder;
4. The doctrine of sufficiency of the evidence applies to “sudden passion”.
The Braudrick holdings, being an early attempt to interpret a complex area of the new and vastly complicated Penal Code, certainly accomplished several desired results. First, since voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of murder, then a defendant could raise the issue of “sudden passion” and receive a charge though the indictment only contained a murder count. To say voluntary manslaughter was not a lesser included offense but rather was a totally different offense would have put the State to the peril of double jeopardy in every murder case since they would seldom know until trial that the issue of sudden passion was involved in the case. Secondly, since sudden passion is akin to a defense and is neither an element nor akin to an exception under § 2.02 of the Penal Code, the State need not negate “sudden passion” in the indictment. At the same time, the State is left with the burden of disproving “sudden passion” beyond a reasonable doubt as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).3 Thirdly, since the sufficiency of the evidence doctrine applies to “sudden passion”, then all is in harmony with the doctrine that a verdict of guilty, for voluntary manslaughter or any other crime, must be supported by sufficient evidence. Art. 40.03(9), V.A.C.C.P. All in all, Braudrick must have seemed like the proverbial good idea at the time, but if the holdings in Braudrick are good law, one would expect that the doctrines of lesser included offense, burden of proof, and sufficiency of the evidence would apply to voluntary manslaughter in the same way that they apply to every other crime in the Penal Code. There should be no need to invent extra or special rules to accommodate only voluntary manslaughter. Unfortunately, under the reasoning of Braudrick, this is not the case. The holdings of Braudrick should be overruled.
Voluntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of murder because it contains, as does murder without malice, an extra factor. Voluntary manslaughter is murder plus the presence of “sudden passion.” It simply does not fit the require*398ments of a lesser included offense as provided for in Art. 37.09, V.A.C.C.P. Since lesser included offenses are strictly creatures of statute, it therefore should not be called a lesser included offense. However, our desired result is to be able to include voluntary manslaughter in the court’s charge where “sudden passion” is raised in a murder trial. We therefore try to make voluntary manslaughter work as a lesser included offense by inventing the extra rule that “sudden passion” is akin to a defense and, when raised, its negative (lack of sudden passion) becomes akin to an element of murder. Therefore voluntary manslaughter “sort of” fits Art. 37.09(1)4 since it now contains “less than all the facts necessary” to prove murder. As discussed in the next paragraph, we also must fit voluntary manslaughter into Art. 37.-09(1) in order to make it fit into Art. 40.-03(9), V.A.C.C.P., as a lesser included offense.
The sufficiency of the evidence doctrine cannot apply to “sudden passion” because if there is ample evidence to support a murder conviction but no evidence to support “sudden passion” (even though a charge on voluntary manslaughter had been erroneously given by the trial judge and the jury has returned a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter), then the appellate courts could be put in the ludicrous position of acquitting a defendant when there is sufficient evidence in the record that he is guilty of murder.5 We, of course, nonetheless make the doctrine of sufficiency of the evidence apply because the concept that a verdict need not be supported by the evidence is foreign to us; all the while we are comfortable in the knowledge that since we call this a lesser included offense (see discussion in previous paragraph), Art. 40.03(9) mandates an affirmance.6 Curtis v. State, 573 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
Only a slightly more elaborate analysis is required to show that the traditional burden of proof rules cannot apply to “sudden passion.” We begin with the premise that the wording of the burden of proof in the application paragraph of a court’s charge should be the same whether the particular crime is the primary offense in the indictment or a lesser included offense, i.e., the application paragraph concerning assault is identical in wording whether assault be the primary offense charged or the lesser included offense (of aggravated assault, for instance). The same is true all throughout the Penal Code except with the offense of voluntary manslaughter. When voluntary manslaughter is charged as a “lesser included offense”, the charge states, in substance,
“If you believe that the defendant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted under the immediate influence of a sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, then you will find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.” Braudrick, at 710-711. (emphasis supplied)
*399Every other crime in the Penal Code would carry an instruction that the jury was to acquit the defendant if they had a reasonable doubt about an affirmative fact necessary to be proven in order to convict the defendant of that crime. Yet we sanction this wording because to do otherwise would lead to a court’s charge that required a jury that believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of murder to: (1) convict him of murder if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act under “sudden passion”; (2) convict him of voluntary manslaughter if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he did act under “sudden passion”; but to (3) acquit him if they weren’t sure about the “sudden passion” issue even though they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant otherwise committed murder.7
Braudrick, a panel opinion with one judge concurring in the result and no motion for rehearing en banc filed, has lead to massive exercises in legal contortion, which were thought at the time to be necessary to achieve the desired results. What is forgotten is the fact that these battles were fought and won under the old Penal Code of 1925. It is forgotten that this Court had solved the riddle of the relationship between murder with and murder without malice (now murder/voluntary manslaughter) by relegating the lack of malice (the presence of “sudden passion”) to the status of a mitigating factor.
Murder without malice (voluntary manslaughter) is not a lesser included offense of murder under the old Penal Code of 1925. Galloway v. State, 420 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Cr.App.1967, opinion by Presiding Judge Onion). Murder with and murder without malice (murder/voluntary manslaughter) were not two offenses, rather they were one offense with two different punishment ranges. Galloway, supra. The presence or absence of malice was a question of punishment. Foster v. State, 493 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). In Foster, the Court strongly implied that had the defendant requested a charge on murder without malice at the punishment stage, it *400would Rave been proper for the trial judge to so charge the jury.
“There was no request to charge on murder without malice in the punishment phase of the trial. Since degrees of murder no longer exist, all voluntary killings being murder, the presence or absence of malice relates only to the punishment.” (Citations omitted) Foster, supra at 813.
Finally, in Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), the Court put the matter to rest, stating:
“Moreover, appellant requested the charge at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial but did not reurge at the punishment stage. At the time of this trial [pre-1914 Penal Code], the lack of malice did not affect the question of guilt, but only that of punishment. Thus, the proper time to have requested a charge on murier without malice was at the punishment stage.” (Citations omitted) (emphasis supplied)
This Court has previously held that cases interpreting former Arts. 1256 and 1257c, murder with and murder without malice, are instructive in deciding present Penal Code cases involving §§ 19.02 and 19.04, Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter. See McCartney v. State, 542 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Such instruction would well serve the Court here.
We should therefore hold that, just as under the old Penal Code of 1925, the issue of sudden passion is one of punishment and where raised and requested should be submitted to a jury atthe punishment phase of the trial. It should be submitted in the negative, that is, phased so that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under the influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause just as was done under the old Penal Code. The burden of proof would thus be placed upon the State to disprove “sudden passion” beyond a reasonable doubt. Sufficiency of the evidence would only be a concern in determining if there was evidence that the defendant did not act under the influence of “sudden passion”. The gymnastics of the lesser included offense doctrine could be abandoned and the issue of voluntary manslaughter could still be submitted to the jury if raised. We would accomplish all of the desired results sought in Braudrick in a fashion that comports with our treatment of all other crimes in the Penal Code.
Returning to the case at bar, just as in Foster, supra; Braudrick, supra; and Brazile v. State, 497 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), there was no objection to the Court’s charging on the issue “sudden passion” at the guilt stage of the trial. Although the issue would have been more properly submitted at the punishment stage of the trial,8 since it was at least submitted to the jury, the defendant cannot complain that he was denied any fundamental rights. In the absence of an objection at trial, no error is presented.
As to appellant’s complaint that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding of sudden passion, said complaint is without merit. The doctrine of sufficiency of the evidence should only apply to a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act under sudden passion.9
Accordingly, I concur in the result.

. Act 1927, 40th Leg., p. 412, Ch. 274, § 1 & § 3b. Art. 1256, V.A.P.C. (1925), "Murder”, provides:
“Whoever shall voluntarily kill any person within this State shall be guilty of murder. Murder shall be distinguished from every other species of homicide by the absence of circumstances which reduce the offense of negligent homicide or which excuse or justify the killing.”
Art. 1257c, V.A.P.C. (1925), “Instructions on issue of murder without malice”, provides:
“In all cases tried under the provisions of this Act it shall be the duty of the Court, where the facts present the issue of murder without malice, to instruct the jury that murder without malice is a voluntary homicide committed without justification or excuse under the immediate influence of a sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, by which it is meant such cause as would commonly produce a *397degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection, and in appropriate terms in the charge to apply the law to the facts as developed from the evidence.” (emphasis supplied)

. Hereinafter in this opinion the words “sudden passion” will be used as shorthand for the phrase "under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause”, as contained in Art. 1257c, V.A.P.C. (1925) and also V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 19.04(a) (1974).

. Of course, legislative enactment making “sudden passion” an affirmative defense has been sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977).

. Art. 37.09, V.A.C.C.P., provides that, "An offense is a lesser included offense if: (1) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged_”

. Braudrick perhaps sub silentio recognized this problem when addressing the following appellant’s ground of error: "Specifically, he argues there is no evidence that he was acting under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.” The Court, unable to directly answer the ground of error was forced to construe it as a complaint that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that they had a reasonable doubt that the murder was not committed under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.

.Art. 40.03(9) states:
"New trials, in cases of felony, shall be granted the defendant for the following causes, and for no other:
******
“(9) Where the verdict is contrary to law and evidence. A verdict is not contrary to the law and evidence, within the meaning of this provision, where the defendant is found guilty of an offense of inferior grade to, but of the same nature as, the offense proved.”

. Jury Charges for Texas Criminal Practice by Paul J. McClung revised edition, 1983, at page 48 contains one solution to this quandary in the following instruction:
"If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either murder or voluntary manslaughter, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which offense he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in defendant’s favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense, voluntary manslaughter.”
This is, of course, an additional instruction not required in any other lesser included offense situation involving any other crime in the Penal Code and is but another example of the special rules that have had to be created to accommodate this Court's past treatment of murder/voluntary manslaughter. In the instant case, the application paragraphs of the court’s charge were as follows:
“Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Larry Ray Daniel, did, in Fisher County, Texas, on or about the 4th day of March, 1979, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, to wit: Celestina Sanchez, by shooting him with a gun, and you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time the death was caused, the defendant was not acting under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, you will find the defendant guilty of murder as charged in Count 2 of the indictment. If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will next consider whether the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
"If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the said Celestina Sanchez by shooting him with a gun, but you further believe, or you have a reasonable doubt thereof, that the defendant caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause, you will find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
“If you do not so believe, or you have a reasonable doubt thereof, that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the said Celestina Sanchez by shooting him with a gun, you will find the defendant not guilty.
“If you should find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either murder or voluntary manslaughter, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which offense he is guilty, then you should resolve the doubt in defendant’s favor, and find him guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.”

. Art. 37.07, V.A.C.C.P. (1965).

. Under pre-1925 Penal Code cases, an appellant convicted of voluntary manslaughter was not allowed to raise the issue of sufficiency of evidence concerning “sudden passion" where there was sufficient evidence of all the elements of murder. High v. State, 54 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 112 S.W. 939 (1908); Barbee v. State, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 129, 124 S.W. 961 (1910). After enactment of Art. 37.07, V.A.C.C.P. (1965), providing for bifurcated trial and after, the Hanks decision providing for the charging of "sudden passion” in the punishment phase of the trial, the issue of sufficiency of the evidence would be similarly limited in application under the 1925 Penal Code concepts of murder with and murder without malice.