Court Opinion

ID: 9900523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:02:24.412379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:07.145077
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                 Before
                       KISOR, COGLEY, and DALY
                        Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                      v.

                         Craig R. BECKER
                      Lieutenant (O-3), U.S. Navy
                              Appellant

                             No. 202200212

                        _________________________

                        Decided: 11 September 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                            Military Judges:
                Aaron C. Rugh (arraignment and motions)
                        Stephen F. Keane (trial)

 Sentence adjudged 30 April 2022 by a general court-martial convened
 at Mons, Belgium, consisting of officer members. Sentence in the Entry
 of Judgment: confinement for life with the possibility of parole and a
 dismissal. 1

                              For Appellant:
                       Major Joshua P. Keefe, USMC
                            Mr. David Sheldon

 1 Appellant was credited with having served 831 days of pretrial confinement.
               United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                            Opinion of the Court

                               For Appellee:
                       Major Candace G. White, USMC
            Lieutenant Commander Paul S. LaPlante, JAGC, USN

   Senior Judge KISOR delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge
   COGLEY and Judge DALY joined.

                          _________________________

                 PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT

                          _________________________

KISOR, Senior Judge:
    Before the Court are nine pending motions including: (1) Appellant’s Mo-
tion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery dated 9 August 2023, as amended on 21
August (and Appellee’s Opposition dated 14 August 2023); (2) Appellee’s Mo-
tion to Strike Appellant’s Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery dated 11 Au-
gust 2023; (3) Appellant’s Motion to Exceed Word Count Limitation dated 15
August 2023; (4) Appellant’s Motion for Tenth Enlargement of Time dated 16
August 2023; (5) Appellant’s First and (6) Second Motions to Attach Docu-
ments, both dated 21 August 2023 (and Appellee’s Oppositions to each, both
dated 28 August 2023); (7) Appellant’s Second Motion to Compel Post-Trial
Discovery, dated 21 August 2023 (and Appellee’s Opposition dated 28 August
2023); (8) Appellant’s Third Motion to Attach, filed after oral argument, dated
30 August 2023; and (9) Appellee’s Motion to Stay Ruling on Appellant’s Sec-
ond Motion to Compel dated 7 September 2023.
   The Court now GRANTS Appellant’s Motion for an Overlength Brief up to
double the word count limit specified in Rule 17.3 of this Court. This Court also
GRANTS Appellant’s Motion for Tenth Enlargement of Time. 2 The Court DE-
NIES all of the remaining motions.

                               I. BACKGROUND

   A general court-martial convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of the
premeditated murder of his wife and related offenses that occurred in Mons,
Belgium, in October 2015, and sentenced him to life imprisonment with the

   2 The Government withdrew its opposition to Appellant’s Motion for Tenth En-

largement of Time, and did not oppose the Motion to Exceed Word Count Limitation.

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               United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                            Opinion of the Court

possibility of parole. 3 The death occurred off base, and was investigated pri-
marily by the Belgian Federal Police who, in March 2016, arrested and de-
tained Appellant as a suspect in the murder of his wife. Although the United
States Navy had concurrent jurisdiction over Appellant and over the alleged
offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Navy did not invoke
primary jurisdiction until the Belgian Federal Police completed its investiga-
tion. This occurred on 2 January 2018 after the Secretary of Defense denied
the Navy’s request to cede primary jurisdiction to Belgian authorities.
    Appellant’s appeal was docketed with this Court on 21 September 2022.
The case has a trial transcript of 4,055 pages and a total Record of Trial of
approximately 8,507 pages. On 17 November 2022, the Court held a chambers
conference with the parties to discuss the timeline for the filing of Appellant’s
brief. Counsel for Appellant advised this Court they anticipated filing a brief
by April 2023.
   Sometime in December 2022, Civilian Appellate Defense Counsel filed nu-
merous Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], 5 U.S.C. § 552, requests with var-
ious entities within the Department of Defense and the Department of the
Navy.
    On 23 March 2023, following the filing of Appellant’s Motion for a Fifth
Enlargement of Time, the Court held a second chambers conference to discuss
the progress of this case. Notwithstanding that Civilian Appellate Defense
Counsel had not received the documents he requested under FOIA, Counsel
for Appellant advised this Court they expected to file a completed brief with
assignments of error by June 2023.
    On 24 July 2023, the Court held a third chambers conference to discuss
Appellant’s Motion for Ninth Enlargement of Time. That Motion stated August
2023 was “a hard deadline and no further enlargements will be sought beyond
August 2023.” 4 During that chambers conference, Civilian Appellate Defense
Counsel stated he had “low-to-medium confidence” the brief would actually be
filed by the end of August (as noted in their Eighth Motion for Enlargement of
Time). The “hard deadline” language in the motion was explained as a cut-and-
paste error. Military Appellate Defense Counsel also conceded that Appellant,
who is in confinement, is being prejudiced by the delay. (Appellant did never-
theless consent to his counsel’s enlargement of time requests.) This was also
the first motion in which Counsel for Appellant indicated to this Court that

   3 The charge sheet, dated 29 January 2019; Entry of Judgment.

   4 Appellant’s Motion for Ninth Enlargement of Time, dated 19 July 2023, at 4.

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                United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                             Opinion of the Court

part of the need for additional time to finalize their brief was related to (un-
specified) pending FOIA requests. Counsel for Appellant verbally provided
September 2023 as a more likely time for when they expected to file a com-
pleted brief.
    From 9 to 21 August 2023, this Court received four interrelated motions.
Appellant requests this Court grant: (1) post-trial discovery into any applica-
tions for post-retirement employment of the military judge; (2) post-trial dis-
covery, related to FOIA requests concerning communications among U.S. Gov-
ernment officials preceding the Secretary of Defense’s denial of the Navy’s re-
quest to cede jurisdiction to Belgian authorities; (3) more time to file their brief;
(4) to attach certain documents related to post-trial discovery motions; (5) an
overlength brief. The Government, for its part, filed a motion to strike Appel-
lant’s motion for post-trial discovery for procedural noncompliance, and further
filed an opposition to each of the discovery motions.
    On 16 August 2023, we issued an Order Directing Oral Argument on the
pending Motions before the Court (which we amended on 23 August, to account
for later filings). Then on 21 August 2023, Appellee filed a motion to reconsider
that Order, withdrawing the previously opposed Motion for a Tenth Enlarge-
ment of Time and indicating its non-opposition to an overlength brief. On 29
August we held an oral argument on the pending motions. On 30 August Ap-
pellant filed his Third Motion to Attach certain documents that were produced
to him via FOIA request, which were discussed at the oral argument the pre-
vious day. Then on 7 September, Appellee filed a Motion to Stay Ruling on
Appellant’s Second Motion to Compel.

                                 II. DISCUSSION

    Notwithstanding the Government’s withdrawing its opposition to Appel-
lant’s Motion for Tenth Enlargement of Time (having opposed the eighth and
ninth such motions) this Court has an independent duty to ensure the timely
processing of appeals before this Court. 5 Central to the resolution of all of the
pending motions are the merits of Appellant’s interrelated motions for post-
trial discovery and to attach various documents.
   A. Post-trial discovery into Col Keane’s employment application(s)
and post-trial discovery of various documents also requested under
the Freedom of Information Act.
   1. Standards of review and applicable law.

   5 See United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

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               United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                            Opinion of the Court

   a. Disqualification of a military judge generally.
    Rule for Courts-Martial 902(a) states that a military judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in any proceeding in which the military judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. To be disqualifying, the bias must be “per-
sonal, not judicial, in nature.” 6 There are two types of bias: actual bias and
appearance of bias. The test for identifying an appearance of bias is “whether
a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances” would conclude that the
military judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 7 Rule for Courts-
Martial 902(b) then states several specific grounds for which a military judge
shall recuse himself or herself.
   b. Post-trial discovery.
    As discussed below, this Court has a limited ability to order discovery or to
consider matters outside the record of trial. If an appellant seeks post-trial
discovery, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has set forth the following
(nonexclusive) list of factors for a service court criminal appeals to consider in
determining whether the appellant has met his or her burden of demonstrating
that some measure of appellate inquiry is warranted:
          (1) Whether the defense has made a colorable showing that
       the evidence or information exists;
          (2) Whether the evidence of information sought was previ-
       ously discoverable with due diligence;
          (3) Whether the putative information is relevant to Appel-
       lant’s asserted claim or defense;
           (4) Whether there is a reasonable probability that the result
       of the proceeding would have been different if the putative infor-
       mation had been disclosed. 8
   c. Motions to attach.
    As a threshold observation, Article 66, UCMJ, governs the scope of this
Court’s review of findings and sentences. We may act only with respect to the
findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority. We may affirm
only such findings of guilty and the sentence or such part or amount of the

   6 United Sates v. Burton, 52 M.J. 223, 226 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

   7 United States v. Uribe, 80 M.J. 442, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citations omitted).

   8 United States v. Campbell, 57 M.J. 134, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

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                   United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                                Opinion of the Court

sentence, as we find are correct in law and fact and determine, on the basis of
the entire record, should be approved. 9
    In United States v. Jessie, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ex-
plained what constitutes the “entire record” and what types of supplemental
materials may be properly attached to the record. 10 The court found that while
the UCMJ does not provide a statutory right for an accused and his counsel to
supplement the “record” after the convening authority has acted, there are a
few circumstances in which a court of criminal appeals may supplement the
record, including: (1) when reviewing prison conditions under Article 66(c),
UCMJ, if the record contains information about those conditions; (2) when ex-
tra-record fact determinations are necessary predicates to resolving appellate
questions for issues raised by the record, but not fully resolvable by the mate-
rials in the record; and (3) when considering allegations concerning violations
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, as
well as violations of an appellant’s rights under Article 55, UCMJ. 11
  2. Discovery into Colonel Keane’s applications for post-retirement employ-
ment.
    In his (Amended) Motion, Appellant requests this Court order the produc-
tion “of all materials relating to any federal job application Colonel (Col) Ste-
phen Keane’s [sic] USMC (ret.) submitted while serving as trial judge in the
instant case, including all materials related to his current job as a Veterans
Law Judge with the Department of Veterans Affairs.” 12
    Col Keane invited voir dire on two occasions, stating at a 39(a) session that
“I’m not aware of any matter that I believe may be grounds for challenge
against me” 13 and on the first day of the trial “I have not acted in any manner
that might tend to disqualify me.” 14 Trial defense counsel did not conduct voir

   9 United States v. Stocton, No. ACM S32443, 2018 CCA LEXIS 290, at *4 (A.F. Ct.

Crim. App. June 6, 2018).
   10 United States v. Doyle, No. 201900190R, 2022 CCA LEXIS 458, at *7 (N-M. Ct.

Crim. App. July 28, 2022 (citing United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437, 438 (C.A.A.F.
2020). Procedurally, motions to attach documents are governed by the United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 6.1
and 23.4.
   11 Id.

   12 Appellant’s Amended Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery at 1.

   13 R. at 628.

   14 R. at 884.

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                United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                             Opinion of the Court

dire of the military judge. The (Amended) Motion and Appellant’s oral argu-
ment before this Court contend that because Col Keane became a Veterans
Law Judge within a short time after taking the final action in this case, Col
Keane must have applied for the position while serving as military judge. Ac-
cording to Appellant, this raises a potential bias that Col Keane should have
disclosed at trial and invited further voir dire on the issue.
    Appellant attached to his Motion for post-trial discovery certain docu-
ments, which are unaccompanied by any sort of declaration as to their authen-
ticity or explanation as to their origin. Appellate Defense Counsel informs the
Court that the undated first document contains “Screen shots of Stephen
Keane’s LinkedIn Account” indicating that Stephen Keane has an entry for
“Veterans Law Judge” from November 2022-present. 15 The second document
is a fiscal year 2022 annual report from the Department of Veterans Affairs
listing the names of the veterans law judges, including Stephen Keane. The
Government, for its part, implicitly challenges the authenticity of these docu-
ments, stating “without his enclosures, Appellant is unable to make a colorable
showing that Col Keane is employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs,
let alone that the requested documents exist.” 16
    Certainly this Court may resolve this particular dispute by taking judicial
notice that Col Keane was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs as
a Veterans Law Judge at some point in 2022. Without question appellate
courts may take judicial notice of facts that are not reasonably subject to dis-
pute. 17 In a case with a similar issue to this, the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals recently took judicial notice that a military judge who was a reservist
was employed as an Assistant United States Attorney because that was a fact
not reasonably subject to dispute. 18 We will take judicial notice of Col Keane’s
post-retirement employment with the Department of Veterans Affairs, based
on the publicly available annual report from the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs. 19

   15 Appellant’s Amended Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery at 3, encl. 1.

   16 Appellee’s Opposition to Appellant’s Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery at 4.

   17 Mil. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

   18 United States v. Rodriguez, No. ACM 40217, 2023 CCA LEXIS 125 (A.F. Ct.

Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2023).
   19 We pause to note that the issue of military judge’s applications for post-retire-

ment employment is an important one, and we observe that military judges have an
obligation to disclose any grounds for challenge against them, which unquestionably
includes when a military judge is seeking future employment with one of the parties

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                     United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                                  Opinion of the Court

    With respect to the Campbell factors, we will assume (without deciding)
that while presiding over this court-martial, Col Keane was seeking, or had
been offered, employment with the Department of Veterans Affairs effective
upon his retirement from the Marine Corps. However, we can see no nexus
between that application and his duties in this case. We can see no reasonable
possibility that Col Keane could have either developed an actual bias, or cre-
ated the appearance of bias, related to either a pending or an approved appli-
cation for employment with the Department of Veterans Affairs. Thus, this
case is readily distinguishable from In re Al-Nashiri, United States v. Armen-
dariz, and Bergdahl v. United States. In each of those cases there was a clear
and direct nexus between the case the military judge was presiding over and
the prospective employment of that military judge. In the cases of In re Al-
Nashiri and United States v. Armendariz, the prospective employment was
with one of the parties to the court-martial, making a direct nexus between the
military judge’s prospective employment and the pending cases.
    In Bergdahl, the former President (while he was still a presidential candi-
date) and a then-sitting U.S. Senator, both commented on the court-martial
case while it was in a pretrial posture, and the former President also made
certain public comments after becoming President. 20 Although the agency to
which the military judge applied was not a party to the Bergdahl case, both
the former President and the U.S. Senator vilified Bergdahl and publicly called
for his harsh punishment. The former President noted that “deserters used to
be shot,” and the U.S. Senator threatened to convene hearings in the Senate
Armed Services Committee if Bergdahl did not receive a punishment. 21 There
were two particularly important factors in the District Court for the District of
Columbia’s analysis of the nexus between the military judge’s job application

to the case. See United States v. Armendariz, 82 M.J. 712, 724 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
2022) (holding that a military judge who was presiding over the case was seeking em-
ployment with the prosecution office in that Circuit should have disclosed that con-
flict); In re Al-Nashiri, 932 F. 3d 224 (D.C. Circuit 2019) (granting a writ of mandamus
because the military judge (of the military commissions) was seeking employment with
the United States Department Of Justice, which was participating in the military com-
mission prosecution over which he was presiding); see generally ABD Al Hadi Al-Iraqi
v. United States, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1273, (C.M.C.R. 2020) (stating that a Military Com-
mission Judge’s application for a position within the Department of Justice as an im-
migration judge disqualified him from serving as a presiding judge on the military
commission).
    20 Bergdahl v. United States, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127510 (D.D.C. July 25, 2023).

    21 Id. at *64.

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                United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                             Opinion of the Court

and his role in the Bergdahl case. They were (i) that the former President was
the Chief of the Executive Branch; and (ii) that the military judge used as a
writing sample an order he wrote denying relief on one of Bergdahl’s motions
on unlawful command influence resulting from the former President’s com-
ments. 22 These factors are not present in this case.
    The District Court observed that a reasonable person, knowing all of the
facts in that case, might believe the military judge had the former President’s
desires in mind and acted in the hope of improving his chances at being hired. 23
Based on those factors, the respective courts in Al-Nashiri, Armendariz, and
Bergdahl, concluded that a reasonable person, knowing all of the facts, could
believe that the military judge’s impartiality in each of those cases was subject
to question.
    However, at oral argument in this case, Appellate Defense counsel was un-
able to articulate any nexus between Col Keane’s employment application and
any actual or appearance of bias that it could have shown. Appellate Defense
Counsel clarified that Appellant is not alleging actual bias and that the motion
for post-trial discovery is based on a theory of appearance of bias—that an ap-
plication for any federal employment post-retirement creates a conflict of in-
terest for a military judge. However, at oral argument, Appellate Defense
Counsel readily conceded: (1) the Department of Veterans Affairs was not a
party to this case at trial; (2) that Appellate Defense Counsel had no evidence
that anyone at the Department of Veterans Affairs had any interest in this
case; and (3) that Appellate Defense Counsel had no evidence that the Presi-
dent or Vice President of the United States had made any statements at all
about this case.
    Appellant has therefore not met his burden under Campbell to show that
appellate inquiry is warranted. Appellant posits that “had Col Keane divulged
the status of his application process within the executive branch, trial defense
counsel would have had the opportunity to voir dire him to ensure his impar-
tiality . . . and if necessary make a challenge for cause.” 24 We are simply not
persuaded that that this argument has any merit. Employment with the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs, without more, is simply too attenuated from the
parties or any other identified issues in this particular case. Unlike Bergdahl,

   22 Id. at *90-93.

   23 Id.

   24 Appellant’s Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery at 6.

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                    United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                                 Opinion of the Court

there is no allegation that the current President or any other leader with po-
tential hiring influence over Veterans Law Judges at the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs has made any public comments about Appellant. Appellant’s the-
ory of appearance of bias is dubious at best, and does not justify the fishing
expedition into Col Keane’s job applications that Appellant now seeks. Accord-
ingly, under Campbell, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different if any existing post-retirement employ-
ment application to that agency had been disclosed. 25
    We therefore deny the motion for post-trial discovery. The issue of any ap-
plication to the Department of Veterans Affairs for post-retirement employ-
ment without more does not come close to implicating an appearance of bias.
We are not convinced that that a reasonable person knowing all the circum-
stances would conclude that the military judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. 26 We likewise deny Appellant’s motion to attach LinkedIn doc-
uments related to Col Keane’s employment as moot by taking judicial notice of
his employment with the Department of Veterans Affairs, as indicated in the
publicly available Annual Report.
    With respect to any applications elsewhere within the federal government,
Appellant fails to show that such information exists or that it would be relevant
to a claim or defense, or that it could have affected the outcome of this case. 27
Moreover, at oral argument Appellate Defense Counsel conceded that their be-
lief that Col Keane had applied for other federal jobs was speculation. With
respect to whether any of this could have been discovered with due diligence
at trial, trial defense counsel did not vior dire the military judge on this issue, 28
and we will not speculate on what the questions or answers would have been
at this appellate stage of the proceeding.

    25 United States v. Campbell, 57 M.J. 134, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

    26 See R.C.M. 902(b); United States v. Uribe, 80 M.J. 442, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (ci-

tations omitted).
    27 United States v. Campbell, 57 M.J. 134, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2002). We also note that

Appellant’s motion for “all materials related to any federal job application” is facially
overbroad. We cannot see how a law school transcript, for example, would have any
relevance at all. At oral argument appellate defense counsel conceded this larger point,
but argued that a writing sample, if it was required and came from Col Keane’s in-
volvement in this case, would be relevant.
    28 R. at 628.

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                United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                             Opinion of the Court

   3. Post-trial discovery related to documents sought in pending FOIA re-
quests.
   Appellant also requests this Court order post-trial discovery “for the pro-
duction of all materials related to the decision by the Navy to recommend that
the United States cede jurisdiction over Appellant to Belgium.” 29 As evidence,
Appellant concomitantly moves to attach to the record certain responses to the
FOIA requests (some of which are redacted), correspondence related to them,
and certain documents which were apparently produced.
    Appellant states that he “will assert that the Navy committed unlawful
command influence in attempting to cede jurisdiction to the Belgians” and that
“his constitutional rights were violated by the United States’ lengthy delay in
asserting jurisdiction.” 30 Appellate discovery is manifestly unnecessary here as
the timeline and the machinations of the decision-making in this case between
October 2015 and January 2018, the reasons behind that Department of the
Navy’s request not to assert primary jurisdiction, and the Secretary of De-
fense’s denial of that request on 2 January 2018, are comprehensively ex-
plained in a lengthy document already contained in the Record. 31
    We are unpersuaded that post-trial discovery into internal communications
regarding when, or whether, to cede jurisdiction over Appellant to the Kingdom
of Belgium would provide a reasonable probability that the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different if additional information had been disclosed.
Certainly, if Appellant chooses to re-raise a deprivation of his right to a speedy
trial, and/or make a claim of unlawful command influence as an Assignment of
Error in his upcoming brief, we believe that those issues will be fully resolvable
on the existing Record, especially given the extensive litigation of the speedy
trial issue at trial and the documents contained in the Record. 32
    We are mindful that in a well-reasoned opinion in United States v.
Tucker, the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals has observed that
claims of unlawful command influence implicate the fairness, integrity, or

    29 Appellant’s Second Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery at 1.

    30 Appellant’s Second Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery at 12.

    31 App. Ex. V, Attachment W. The United States unquestionably had jurisdiction,

at all stages of this case, over Appellant and over the offenses charged.31 Moreover,
there is no statute of limitations applicable to Article 118, UCMJ.
    32 See App. Exs. V, LXXXVI. Of course, we retain the authority to order affidavits,

a Dubay hearing or otherwise revisit this ruling after reading Appellant’s brief and the
Government’s Answer.

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                United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                             Opinion of the Court

public reputation of the proceedings themselves. 33 Appellate courts have,
accordingly, considered evidence of them without regard to whether they
were previously raised in the record. 34
    But we can readily distinguish the CGCCA’s opinion in Tucker, as the Ap-
pellant here failed to provide any evidence of actual or apparent UCI in his
attachments. 35 Further, the substance of the communications contained in the
documents he does attach are already completely addressed within the existing
record of trial. 36 Accordingly, we deny Appellant’s Second and Third Motions
for Post-Trial Discovery and the related Motions to Attach.
   B. Motion for Tenth Enlargement of Time
   In Appellant’s Motion for Tenth Enlargement of Time, he states “[i]f this
tenth enlargement is granted, Appellate Defense Counsel are committed to fil-
ing a completed brief no later than the end of September 2023, and will not
require any enlargements that go beyond 30 September 2023. 37 This request is
unopposed by the Government. We therefore grant the motion.
   C. Motion for Overlength Brief
   Appellant also brings a Motion to Exceed Word Count Limitation, which
the Government does not oppose. Rule 17.3 of this Court’s Rules of Practice
and Procedure provides that principal briefs shall not contain more than
15,000 words. In this case, Appellant correctly states that the Record contains
over 8,400 total pages (4,055 of trial transcript), and that he is serving a life
sentence for a conviction for premeditated murder. In his motion, Appellant
does not specify how many extra words he desires, but we see good cause to
double the word count. Accordingly, Appellant may file a brief of up to 30,000
words along with a certification of the word count.

   33 United States v. Tucker, 82 M.J. 533, 565 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2022).

   34 Id.

   35 There is a certain circularity to Appellant’s argument that he needs post-trial

discovery into government officials’ communications about when and whether the
United States should assert primary jurisdiction over Appellant’s case in order to be
able to identify the nature of the alleged unlawful command influence.
   36 App. Ex. V.

   37 Appellant’s Motion for a Tenth Enlargement of Time at 7.

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               United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                            Opinion of the Court

   D. Government’s Motion to Strike
   The Amended Motion to Attach moots the Government Motion to Strike, as
conceded by Government Counsel at oral argument. Accordingly, the Govern-
ment’s motion is denied as moot.

                               III. CONCLUSION

   Having reviewed the underlying motions and responses, and considered the
oral arguments of counsel on 29 August 2023, it is, on this 11th day of Septem-
ber 2023,
   ORDERED:
   1. That Appellant’s (Amended) Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery
dated 21 August 2023 is DENIED.
   2. That Appellant’s Second Motion to Compel Post-Trial Discovery dated
21 August 2023 is DENIED.
   3. That Appellee’s Motion to Strike Appellant’s Motion to Compel Post-
Trial Discovery dated 11 August 2023 is DENIED AS MOOT.
  4. That Appellee’s Motion to Stay Ruling on Appellant’s Second Motion to
Compel dated 7 September 2023 is DENIED AS MOOT.
   5. That Appellant’s Motion to Exceed Word Count Limitation dated 15
August 2023 is GRANTED UP TO 30,000 WORDS. 38
   6. That Appellant’s First Motion to Attach is DENIED AS MOOT.
   7. That Appellant’s Second Motion to Attach is DENIED.
   8. That Appellant’s Third Motion to Attach is DENIED.
   9. That Appellant’s Motion for Tenth Enlargement of Time dated 16 Au-
gust 2023 is GRANTED. Appellate defense counsel shall file Appellant’s brief
and assignment of errors, containing no more than 30,000 words, no later than
September 30, 2023.

   38 N-M. Ct. Crim. App. R. 17.3.

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             United States v. Becker, NMCCA No. 202200212
                          Opinion of the Court

                             FOR THE COURT:

                             MARK K. JAMISON
                             Clerk of Court

Copy to:
45 (Maj Keefe);
46 (Maj White; LCDR LaPlante);
02;
Mr. Sheldon

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