Court Opinion

ID: 9717309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:01:18.232878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.430244
License: Public Domain

MURRAY, Justice,
concurring.
I fully concur in today’s result that § 9-l-31(a) excludes reimbursement of legal expenses for criminal charges. Section 9-l-31(a) expressly excludes reimbursement for legal defense costs for acts that are “wanton, reckless, malicious, or grossly negligent.” G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-l-31(a). The rationale behind this exclusion is to prevent reimbursement of legal fees accrued in defending against charges that attribute blameworthy behavior to a defendant. It is desirable to protect teachers, supervisors, and administrators from the defense costs of actions delineated by the statute and not protect such personnel where they have intentionally acted wrongfully.
My concern, however, is that the statute in its present form, fails to articulate a provision for reimbursement of legal expenses when frivolous criminal charges are leveled. Frivolous charges are those which are found to be without basis. A teacher should not be made to bear legal defense costs in such a case. However, a teacher would have to pay such costs under the present narrow wording of § 9-l-31(a).
It is the historical practice of the American legal system that each party to a legal action pays its own expenses. 1 Speiser, Attorneys’ Fees, § 12:3 at 463-67 (Law. Co-op.1973). However, the English practice is just the opposite as it is now customary in England to determine the appropriateness and size of an award of counsel fees after litigation of substantive claims has terminated. Id. § 12:7 at 479. There is precedent for the award of counsel fees to the prevailing party in American law. Such allowance of attorneys’ fees is in the discretion of a Federal District Court sitting in equity where exceptional circumstances call for the allowance. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5, 93 S.Ct.1943, 1945-46, 36 L.Ed.2d 702, 707 (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718-19, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 18 L.Ed.2d 475, 479 (1967).
Modern legislation has increasingly provided for the reimbursement of attorneys’ *641fees. Our § 9-l-31(a) providing for the indemnification of public school teachers, supervisors, and administrators is but one example of this trend. Provision for attorneys’ fees can be found in many federal statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act,1 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 and title II,3 title III,4 and title VII5 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, attorneys’ fees have been awarded to a prevailing defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff had acted maliciously and in bad faith. Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044, 100 S.Ct. 730, 62 L.Ed.2d 729 (1980). In Copeland, the plaintiff brought suit charging that she was denied promotions, training, and was harassed because of her race and sex. 603 F.2d at 983. After a trial, the District Court found that the plaintiff had “failed to establish even a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. The appellate court held that attorneys’ fees were properly awarded to the defendant federal government under title VII. Id. at 991. Title VII has also been construed to permit an award of attorneys’ fees to a private-employer defendant upon a finding that the suit was frivolous. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648, 656 (1978).
While it is true that the violation of a party’s civil rights and a criminal accusation against a school teacher are different topics, it is my belief that the Copeland case is illustrative for purposes of an expansion and revision of § 9-l-31(a). For example, consider the hypothetical case of a public school teacher who is charged with committing a crime against one of his or her students. The charges are found to be completely without basis. The school teacher is innocent but has incurred substantial legal bills. This scenario raises the question of whether it is just that the school teacher should have to pay for his or her defense costs in the above-described circumstances.
The policy behind § 9-l-31(a) is indispensable to excellent public education. As the duties of our public school teachers and other school personnel require wide student contact, persons so employed are particularly vulnerable to suit. In enacting § 9-l-31(a), the Legislature wished to eliminate this vulnerability. However, as the statute now reads, reimbursement for defense costs against frivolous criminal charges is prohibited. It is my belief that this prohibition is not in accord with the purpose of § 9-l-31(a). It seems appropriate that the Legislature reexamine the statute as presently drafted, since the policy underlying it goes partially unfulfilled.

. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 1965).

. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (West 1981).

. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(b) (West 1981).

. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000b-l.

. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).