Court Opinion

ID: 9957887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 16:01:33.62773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:36.084184
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADREE EDMO, AKA Mason Edmo,                No. 22-35876

               Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
                                          1:17-cv-00151-
 v.                                            BLW

CORIZON, INC.; SCOTT ELIASON;
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF                          OPINION
CORRECTION; HENRY ATENCIO;
JEFF ZUMDA; HOWARD KEITH
YORDY; RICHARD CRAIG; RONA
SIEGERT,

               Defendants-Appellants,

and

MURRAY YOUNG; CATHERINE
WHINNERY,

               Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the District of Idaho
      B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
2                      EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

             Argued and Submitted March 5, 2024
                     Seattle, Washington

                       Filed April 5, 2024

     Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould,
      Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik,* District Judge.

                    Opinion by Judge Gould

                          SUMMARY**

            Prisoner Civil Rights/Attorneys’ Fees

    The panel reversed in part, affirmed in part, and vacated
in part the district court’s award of $2,586,048.80 in
attorneys’ fees to plaintiff Adree Edmo, and remanded, in an
action in which Edmo obtained an injunction requiring
defendants the State of Idaho, private prison company
Corizon, and individual Idaho prison officials to provide her
with adequate medical care, including gender-confirmation
surgery.
    The panel held that Edmo was entitled under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 to fees incurred litigating her successful Eighth
Amendment claim. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), however, the district court erred in

*
 The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.                 3

calculating the lodestar amount to include fees incurred
litigating unsuccessful claims advanced in the complaint,
even if those claims were premised on the same facts that
supported Edmo’s Eighth Amendment claim. Similarly,
Edmo should not have been awarded fees on the Eighth
Amendment claim against individual defendants who were
dismissed from the action in a prior appeal. The panel
vacated the district court’s fee award and remanded for
recalculation of the lodestar amount to include only fees
incurred litigating Edmo’s successful claim against the
defendants who remained in the case.
    The panel held that the district court did not err by
applying an enhancement to the lodestar amount given that
Edmo’s counsel operated under extraordinary time pressure
and that the customary fee for counsel’s services is well
above the PLRA cap. The district court also reasonably
found that Edmo’s counsel achieved excellent results in what
may properly be viewed as a landmark case. Because the
panel vacated the underlying lodestar amount, however, the
panel deferred ruling on whether the district court’s use of
1.7 and 2.0 multipliers to enhance the lodestar was proper.
The panel instructed the district court to reconsider on
remand the amount of the enhancement after it recalculates
the lodestar amount.
4                    EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

                         COUNSEL

Lori Rifkin (argued), Rifkin Law Office PC, Oakland,
California; Dan Stormer, Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP,
Pasadena, California; Craig Durham and Deborah Ferguson,
Ferguson Durham PLLC, Boise, Idaho; Amy Whelan,
National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco,
California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Joshua N. Turner (argued), Deputy Solicitor General;
Gregory E. Woodard and Andrea H. Nielsen, Deputy
Attorneys General; James E.M. Craig, Deputy Division
Chief; Raul L. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General; Idaho
Attorney General’s Office, Boise, Idaho; Bradley S.
Richardson and Robert R. Gates, Garrett Richardson PLLC,
Eagle, Idaho; Steven R. Kraft, Moore Baskin and Elia LLP,
Boise, Idaho; Peter E. Thomas, Moore Elia & Kraft LLP,
Boise, Idaho; for Defendants-Appellants.

                          OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

     Defendants the State of Idaho, private prison company
Corizon, and individual prison officials in this appeal
challenge the district court’s award of $2,586,048.80 in
attorneys’ fees to plaintiff Adree Edmo for time spent
litigating this civil rights action. Defendants contend that the
district court erred in both its calculation of the lodestar
amount and its subsequent enhancement of the amount. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse in
part, affirm in part, and vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
                     EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.                   5

                     BACKGROUND
    Edmo filed this action while incarcerated at an Idaho
prison in 2017. Edmo alleged violations of the Eighth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and negligence under Idaho
law. The district court initially granted in part and denied in
part Defendants’ motion for dispositive relief, with the
denial in part being on exhaustion grounds. While the
district court was considering the motion for dispositive
relief, Edmo moved for a preliminary injunction based on
three of her claims: the Eighth Amendment denial of medical
care, the Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination, and the
ACA sex discrimination. Edmo sought an injunctive order
requiring Defendants to provide Edmo gender-affirming
medical care, including gender-confirmation surgery,
hormone treatment, and gender-appropriate clothing and
personal items. The motion also sought to prohibit
Defendants from implementing the prison’s gender
dysphoria policy and from retaliating against Edmo because
of her gender identity.
    The district court ordered expedited discovery and
conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing. After that
hearing, the district court granted an injunction on Edmo’s
Eighth Amendment claim and ordered Defendants to
“provide Edmo with adequate medical care, including
gender-confirmation surgery.” Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of
Correction, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1129 (D. Idaho 2018).
The district court made findings of fact, and its injunction
was effectively permanent. Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of
Correction, No. 1:17-CV-00151-BLW, 2019 WL 2319527,
at *1-2 (D. Idaho May 31, 2019). The district court denied
preliminary injunctive relief on Edmo’s Fourteenth
6                       EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

Amendment and ACA claims because the record had not
been sufficiently developed. Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1128-
29. The district court did not rule on the other remedies that
Edmo had sought.1 Id. at 1129.
     Defendants appealed, and the injunction was stayed. We
initially ordered a limited remand instructing the district
court to clarify issues of mootness. See Case No. 19-35019,
Dkt. 92. When the appeal returned and was considered on
the merits, we affirmed the district court’s decision except as
it applied to five defendants in their individual capacities.
Case No. 19-35017, Dkt. 96. Defendants petitioned for en
banc review, which was denied. Id., Dkt. 105. We partially
lifted the stay of the injunction, and Edmo received gender-
confirmation surgery in July 2020, even as Defendants
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Id.,
Dkts. 113-114. After a writ was denied, the parties engaged
in settlement negotiations that led to Edmo voluntarily
dismissing the remainder of her claims.
    The district court awarded Edmo $2,586,048.80 for
attorneys’ fees incurred up until the injunction became
permanent and all appeals were resolved. The figure was
based on the lodestar and a subsequent enhancement, for
which the district court used 1.7 and 2.0 multipliers for local
and out-of-state counsel, respectively. Defendants appeal
the award, claiming that the lodestar, the application of an

1
   The district court deferred ruling on Edmo’s request to enjoin
enforcement of the prison’s gender dysphoria policy because the prison
had revised the policy after Edmo filed her motion. Edmo, 358 F. Supp.
3d at 1129. Because the new policy appeared to allow Edmo access to
gender-appropriate clothing and personal items, the court also deferred
ruling on those remedies. Id. The district court did not expressly rule on
the other remedies sought by Edmo, such as hormone treatment and
retaliation.
                     EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.                   7

enhancement, and the amount of the enhancement were
erroneous.
                  LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Attorneys’ Fees Generally
   A. Standard of Review
    The district court has broad discretion in calculating
attorneys’ fees. A.D. v. California Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d
446, 450 (9th Cir. 2013). We review fee awards for abuse
of discretion and “affirm unless the district court applied the
wrong legal standard or its findings were illogical,
implausible, or without support in the record.” Gonzalez v.
City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2013)
(internal alteration and quotations omitted). The district
court also must “fully explain[] its reasoning in making an
award.” McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102
(9th Cir. 2009).
   B. Lodestar and Enhancement
    To calculate attorneys’ fees, courts in the Ninth Circuit
use the two-step “lodestar method.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at
1202. The first step is to determine the presumptive lodestar
figure. Id. The court begins by tallying the number of hours
an attorney reasonably expended on the prevailing party’s
case. Id. The court then multiplies the number of hours by
a reasonable hourly rate, based on evidence of the market
rate for the services provided. See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987
F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992). The result of this
equation is the lodestar figure, which is treated as a
presumptively reasonable award.
     After calculating the lodestar figure, the court proceeds
to the second step: considering whether to enhance the award
8                   EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

based on the factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild,
Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). These factors are:

       (1) the time and labor required, (2) the
       novelty and difficulty of the questions
       involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the
       legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of
       other employment by the attorney due to
       acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee,
       (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent,
       (7) time limitations imposed by the client or
       the circumstances, (8) the amount involved
       and the results obtained, (9) the experience,
       reputation, and ability of the attorneys,
       (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the
       nature and length of the professional
       relationship with the client, and (12) awards
       in similar cases.

Id. The lodestar is presumed to include (or “subsume”) at
least some of these factors, and an enhancement can be
justified only in “rare” and “exceptional” cases where the
presumption is overcome. See Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d
1085, 1103 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A., 559
U.S. 542, 553-54 (2010)); see also Morales v. City of San
Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996) (enumerating
factors presumptively subsumed in lodestar).
    C. Multiplier
    If an enhancement is justified, then the court “may adjust
the lodestar upward . . . using a ‘multiplier.’” Van Gerwen
v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
2000). A multiplier must be supported by “specific
evidence” of the typical hourly rate for comparable services
                     EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.                    9

in the relevant forum. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del.
Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565
(1986)). Specific evidence is often provided by expert
testimony. E.g., Trulsson v. Cnty of San Joaquin Dist.
Attorney’s Office, 2014 WL 5472787, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct.
28, 2014); Leuzinger v. Cnty of Lake, 2009 WL 839056, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009); Steward v. Cnty of Santa
Clara, 2022 WL 94911, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2022).
“[T]he general rule is that the rates of attorneys practicing in
the forum district . . . are used” unless the moving party
presents evidence that a different rate should apply. See
Gates, 987 F.2d 1405.
II. Attorneys’ Fees in Prisoner Civil Rights Cases
     The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976
(“§ 1988”) allows attorneys’ fees to be awarded to a plaintiff
who prevails in a civil rights action brought under § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1988. The scope of most § 1983 fee awards is
guided by the Supreme Court’s Hensley decision, in which
the Court created a two-step analysis for assessing fees in
cases involving both successful and unsuccessful claims.
See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-40 (1983);
Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003). Under
Hensley, when a case involves claims based on “different
facts and legal theories,” id. at 434-35, the plaintiff is not
entitled to fees for an unsuccessful claim “that is distinct in
all respects from his successful claims,” id. at 440. In sharp
contrast, if a lawsuit consists of related claims—with similar
legal theories or a “common core of facts”—then the court
proceeds to the second step, where the “most critical factor
is the degree of success obtained.” Id. at 435, 440. The
measure of success is the “overall relief obtained,” not the
success of individual claims. Id. at 435. If the plaintiff
achieves a high degree of success, then under the Hensley
10                   EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

rule, time spent on unsuccessful claims may be included in
the lodestar calculation. Id. at 440.
    Although Hensley remains good law and is controlling
in most § 1983 cases, the enactment of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) displaced Hensley in actions brought
by prisoners. As we have explained, “[i]n actions by
prisoners, it is not enough that fees are authorized under
[§ 1988]” because the PLRA explicitly limits awards to fees
“directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual
violation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d
910, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d)(1)(A)); see also Kelly, 822 F.3d at 1103 (“The
PLRA alters the lodestar method in prisoner civil rights
cases . . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 104-21 at 28 (Feb. 6, 1995)
(expressing Congress’s intent to “narrow[] the judicially
created view of a ‘prevailing party’” in prisoner cases).
    Under the PLRA, only fees incurred litigating successful
claims are compensable, and time attorneys spend on
unsuccessful claims must be excluded from the lodestar
calculation. Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1075
(9th Cir. 2003). Unlike Hensley, the PLRA excludes
unsuccessful claims even if they are based on related legal
theories or share a “common core of facts” with a successful
claim. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-21 at 28 (noting the PLRA’s
“[n]arrowing the definition of ‘prevailing party’ will
eliminate . . . attorney fees incurred in litigating unsuccessful
claims, regardless of whether they are related to meritorious
claims”).
    Although the PLRA alters the lodestar in prisoner civil
rights cases, the standard broadly governing when to give
enhancements under § 1988 (discussed supra) applies
equally to PLRA cases, notwithstanding the PLRA’s cap on
                     EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.                  11

the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Kelly, 822
F.3d at 1103; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (requiring
that hourly rate be capped at 150% of rate used for appointed
counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).
The PLRA rate is treated as presumptively reasonable but
may be enhanced under appropriate circumstances. Kelly,
822 F.3d at 1103.
                       DISCUSSION
I. Lodestar
    The district court’s lodestar calculation here included
time Edmo’s attorneys spent on both successful and
unsuccessful claims. Although the district court cited both
Hensley and the PLRA, its determination that unsuccessful
claims were compensable because they shared a “common
core of facts” with the successful Eighth Amendment claim
was a rationale clearly rooted in the theory and language of
Hensley.
    The district court erred by including in the lodestar time
that Edmo’s attorneys spent on unsuccessful claims. The
district court’s reasoning, as we see it, was inconsistent with
the limiting language of the PLRA. The district court’s error
may in part have been caused by a failure of our court to be
explicit enough about how the PLRA had limited and
modified the general rules derived from Hensley and normal
civil rights practice, in cases brought by prisoners. We hold
that Edmo is fully entitled to fees incurred litigating her
successful Eighth Amendment claim. But we also hold that
Edmo is not entitled to fees incurred litigating the
unsuccessful claims advanced in her complaint, even if those
claims are premised on the same facts that supported her
Eighth Amendment claim.
12                        EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

    Similarly, Dannenberg holds that Edmo also should not
be awarded fees on the Eighth Amendment claim she
brought against several individual defendants who were
dismissed from the action on appeal.2 Dannenberg, 338 F.3d
at 1075. We hold that the district court must recalculate the
lodestar to include only fees incurred litigating Edmo’s
successful claim against the defendants who remained in the
case. We therefore vacate the district court’s attorneys’ fees
award and remand for recalculation of the lodestar.
II. Enhancement
    The district court applied an enhancement to the lodestar
based on the following Kerr factors: “the customary fee”
charged by similar attorneys in the market, “time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances,” “the amount
involved and the results obtained,” and “awards in similar
cases.” Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70.
    The district court did not err in applying an enhancement.
As an initial matter, Defendants do not contest that Edmo’s
counsel operated under extraordinary time pressure and that
the customary rate for counsel’s services is well above the
PLRA cap. The district court reasonably applied these
factors, which were supported in part by uncontested expert
testimony.
   The district court also reasonably found that Edmo’s
counsel achieved excellent results in what may properly be
viewed as a landmark case. Edmo was the first person to

2
 To the extent it is difficult or impossible for the district court to identify
fees specifically related to certain claims or defendants, it is within the
district court’s discretion to apply a percentage reduction based on the
district court’s reasonable estimate of the time spent on unsuccessful
claims or dismissed parties.
                    EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.                 13

obtain a court order compelling a prison to provide gender-
confirmation surgery.        Edmo’s counsel successfully
defended this ruling through several appeals. Defendants
attempt to downplay this success and incorrectly assert that
the district court’s order compelling this relief (along with
our published opinion affirming) “did not create binding
precedent.”
    The district court also properly considered awards in
similar cases to determine whether an enhancement was
justified. The degree of success Edmo achieved is no less
than that achieved in other cases in which enhancements
were granted based on the same Kerr factors. E.g., Kelly,
822 F.3d at 1103 (affirming enhancement where counsel
“obtained a contempt finding and secured significant
remedies for their clients”); Balla, 2016 WL 6762651, at *11
(applying enhancement where attorneys conducted effective
discovery on short notice). Defendants cite other district
court cases in which enhancements were denied, but the
existence of contrary persuasive authority does not render
the district court’s determination an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination
that there should be an enhancement to Edmo’s fee award.
III. Multiplier
    As to the precise amount of the enhancement, we defer
ruling on whether the district court’s use of 1.7 and 2.0
multipliers to local and out-of-state counsel, respectively,
was proper in light of our decision to vacate the underlying
lodestar amount. As a general rule, a multiplier is normally
selected after the lodestar amount is correctly determined.
See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202. We hold that the district
court here should reconsider the amount of the enhancement
after it recalculates the lodestar.
14                    EDMO V. CORIZON, INC.

                       CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part as to the
district court’s calculation of the lodestar, affirm in part as to
the application of an enhancement, and we do not consider
the amount of the enhancement. We vacate the district
court’s attorneys’ fees order and remand for recalculation of
the lodestar and reconsideration of the amount of the
enhancement. To the extent that litigation costs apart from
fees are impacted by our ruling, the district court is
instructed to reconsider that portion of its award as well.