Court Opinion

ID: 9627463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:44:07.752962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:13.180104
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority in this case is in effect ruling that Utah Power & Light’s only recourse from an adverse PUC order, which denies them the right to collect fees to which they are entitled and thus confiscates their property, is for Utah Power & Light to request a stay of the order pending appeal and post a bond. The Court holds that if Utah Power & Light fails to post such a bond pending appeal, then even though the utility’s property has been effectively confiscated there is no hope of recovery because of the failure to file such an appeal bond. By denying the utility a right to impose a surcharge, the majority makes the filing of a bond mandatory. This Court-imposed requirement of a mandatory bond pending appeal is both contrary to the statute, which uses the permissive word “may”, not the mandatory word “shall”, and is in conflict with this Court’s recent opinion in Frizzell v. Swafford, 104 Idaho 823, 663 P.2d 1125 (1983). In that case we struck down the requirement that a party file an appeal bond, saying that the requirement of such a bond is a violation of due process.
*60In Frizzell we noted that “[ajppellant contended the execution procedure and the requirements of I.R.C.P. 81(1) and I.C. §§ 1-2311 through -2313, which condition a right to appeal on payment of fees and a bond, were an unconstitutional taking of property without due process.” In this case the majority upholds a mandatorily required appeal bond, seemingly ignoring its opinion in Frizzell. The majority in Frizzell noted the mandatory nature of the bond, stating:
“A party in a small claims action may appeal a judgment by filing a notice of appeal within thirty days. According to I.R.C.P. 81(m), the party appealing may prevent execution on the judgment against him by filing a bond in the amount of the judgment at the time of filing a notice of appeal. However, contrary to the implication of I.R.C.P. 81(m), the bond to secure payment of judgment (supersedeas bond) is not optional (to prevent execution pending appeal) but mandatory.” Id. at 826, 663 P.2d 1125 (footnotes omitted).
In the present case the majority has ruled that the payment of a bond to “secure payment of judgment” (secure repayment of rates) is not optional, but mandatory, and the only way a party (public utility) appealing may prevent “execution on the judgment against him” is by the filing of a bond in the amount of the “judgment.” In Frizzell we ruled that this procedure was a violation of due process. The majority is inconsistent in upholding the bond procedure in this case, while striking it down in Frizzell.
Treating the appellant in this case, a public utility, differently from a small claims appellant merely because of its status, or the size of its assets, or the nature of the appeal, is a violation of equal protection. There is no indication of a rational basis for the different treatment of these two appellants. Thus, the majority is doubly incorrect in first refusing to acknowledge that the legislature did not intend the bond procedure to be mandatory and, secondly, by refusing to apply the same due process standard to that mandatory bond requirement as it did in the Frizzell case.