Court Opinion

ID: 9828545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:28:58.438866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:50.268501
License: Public Domain

Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.
In the original opinion herein we reversed and remanded the judgment of the trial court as to the alleged parties to the guaranty contract sued on, and as to C. H. Millican, wife of E. E. Millican, against whom judgment foreclosing attachment lien was rendered, and affirmed said judgment as to the other defendants in the suit, they not having appealed. The grounds of reversal as to said parties, other than the Millicans, was supposed error in refusing to submit a special issue, and in permitting certain testimony to be given to the jury, as set forth in the sixth and ninth' subdivisions of said opinion. For reasons set out in the opinion herein on appellees’ motion for a rehearing, we granted said motion, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court .except as to the Mil-licans.
[14] Now come appellants in their motion for a rehearing, and insist that a reversal of this case as to E. H. Millican necessitates a reversal as to all of the appellants. The decisions upon this issue are in confusion, if not in actual conflict. ' As tending to support the affirmative, see Willie v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 175; McRea v. McWilliams, 58 Tex. 328; Washington v. Johnson, 34 S. W. 1041; Nasworthy v. Draper, 29 S. W. 557; Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565-567, 11 S. W. 549; McIlhenny v. Lee, 43 Tex. 216; and Acklin v. Paschal, 48 Tex. 147. As tending to support the opposite view, see Boone v. Hulsey, 71 Tex. 183-185, 9 S. W. 531; Mills v. Paul, 30 S. W. 245; Railway Co. v. Enos, 92 Tex. 577, 50 S. W. 928; Giddings v. Baker, 80 Tex. 312, 16 S. W. 33; Houston v. Ward, 8 Tex. 124; and Wimple v. Patterson, 117 S. W. 1037. We have examined many other cases pro and con as to this issue, but these will suffice to show the unsettled condition of the decisions of this state in reference to a reversal of a joint judgment as to one party, when no reversible error is shown as to others. We shall not attempt to differentiate these decisions, nor to reconcile them, but shall rest our decision herein on the language of the statutes as we understand them.
Article 1997, R. S. 1911 (1337, 1895), reads as follows: “Only one final judgment shall be rendered in any cause, except where it is otherwise provided by law.” This provision of our statute seems to have been adopted for the first time in the enactment of the Revised Statutes of 1879. Prior to that time it had been held in this, state that more than one judgment could be rendered in a cause.’ Burleson v. Henderson, 4 Tex. 49; Hopson v. Murphy, 4 Tex. 248; Burke v. Cruger, 8 Tex. *30274, 58 Am. Dec. 102; Cartwright v. Cartwright, 18 Tex. 644. It would seem that the purpose of this statute was to change this rule in this state.
[15] This statute entails unnecessary delays and expense, but it is not for us to consider the wisdom or folly of a statute. That is for the Legislature. Our only province is to declare the law as it is written. Here the language is plain and unambiguous. “Our statute provides that there shall be but one final judgment in any case. It follows from this that, if there be several defendants to a suit, no final judgment can be rendered against one until it is rendered against all, however independent of each other their respective defenses may be.” Wootters v. Kauffman, 67 Tex. 496, 3 S. W. 465. A final judgment is one that determines the rights of all the parties to a suit, and disposes of all of the issues involved. Linn v. Arambould, 55 Tex. 624. There has been one judgment of the district court in this case. If we make that judgment final as to some of the parties who have appealed and send it back for a new trial as to another of such parties, 'there will be another final judgment of the district court as to that party; but neither of such judgments will be final within the proper meaning of that term. “To be final, it is well settled that the judgment must dispose of all parties to the suit.” Railway Co. v. Smith, 99 S. W. 172. It is well settled that, where the district court grants a new trial as to one party or one issue, this will operate as a new trial as to all parties and all issues. Hume v. Schintz, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 512, 40 S. W. 1070, and authorities there cited. Railway Co. v. Smith, 99 S. W. 172. If such is the effect of the voluntary action of the district court, why is it not the same when that court is required to take such action by the mandate of a superior court? To reverse and remand a case as to a party to a suit is but to instruct the trial court to grant such party a new trial.
The apparent exception as to the effect of a new trial granted to one party by the district court is where the causes of action are severable, and there has in effect been a severance. Boone v. Hulsey, supra; Parker v. Stevens, 48 S. W. 880. Article 1626, R. S. 1911 (art. 1027, R. S. 1895), reads as follows: “When the judgment or decree of the court below has been reversed, the court shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered,” etc. This was the law as to the Supreme Court prior to the creation of the Courts of Civil Appeals. See section 3, act 1846, p. 374. What judgment should the court below have rendered? “The judgment of the court shall conform to the * * * verdict” (article 1994, R. S. 1911; article 1335, R. S. 1895), “whether it be correct or not, and whether the verdict, if there be any, arose from the erroneous instructions or rulings of the court, or from a misinterpretation of the evidence by the jury.” Railway Co. v. Strycharski, 92 Tex. 1, 37 S. W. 417. The judgment in this case followed the verdict, which was against all of the alleged signors of the contract sued on. We hold that the judgment of the trial court on the motion for a new trial should have been to grant a new trial to Millican, the effect of which would have been to grant a new trial to all of said parties, and the statute above quoted requires us to enter such judgment here. It seems to be the general practice in the courts of civil appeals in this state, where the cause of action is severable and some of the parties have not appealed, to affirm the judgment as against the parties not appealing. In this ease the Robert Lee Mercantile Company and M. E. Trimble have not appealed from the judgment against them, and the Walker-Smith Company has not appealed from the judgment in favor of E. H. Winans, Bat Austin, and D. C. Landers, for which reason they will be treated as having acquiesced in said judgment, and the judgment as to them will be treated as a voluntary severance and affirmed, the parties appealing not complaining of the judgment as against said parties.
[16] We also sustain appellants’ assignment of error that the charge of the court hereinafter set- out was upon the weight of. the evidence. Appellant read the contract sued upon to the jury, and proved by one witness that the name E. E. Millican appearing thereon appeared to be the genuine signature of said Millican, and by another witness that Millican had admitted to him that he signed said instrument. The appellants in rebuttal of this evidence, and as tending to sustain their contention that said alleged contract was a forgery proved by said Millican that he did not sign said contract. The court charged the jury as follows: “You will fine that E. E. Millican signed his name to the contract of guaranty sued on.”
[17] We do not think that the charge of the court as to the effect of signing the instrument sued on under the belief that they were signing some other instrument would have required a reversal of this case, but, as the case is to be reversed upon other points, we take occasion to say that this charge should not have been given, for the reason that no such issue was raised by either the pleadings or the evidence.
For the reasons above stated, appellant’s-motion for a rehearing is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded as to A. J. Danner, A. K. Landers, H. W. Walton, W. B. Harrison, John J. Fry, J. A. Jenkins, M. B. Patterson, Eli Austin, E. E. Millican, and his wife, C. H. Millican, and affirmed as to all other defendants.
Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and. remanded.