Court Opinion

ID: 9582975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:33:22.825978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:50.660841
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(concurring specially).
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in measuring the change in circumstances under Minn.Stat. § 518.64 (1984) from 1980 instead of from the time of the last support modification in 1974. However, because it is apparent that in measuring the change from the year 1980, the trial court invoked the doctrine enunciated in Kiesow v. Kiesow, 270 Minn. 374, 133 N.W.2d 652 (1965), I believe further discussion about why that doctrine is inapplicable here is necessary.
In Kiesow, the mother brought a motion in 1957 for increased child support and for an amendment of the original dissolution decree with respect to the title to some real estate owned by the parties. These motions were denied. The mother once again brought a motion for increased child support and a change in title in 1962 and once again her motion was denied. Finally the mother brought a third motion in 1963 for increased child support and alimony and a change in title. The trial court found a substantial change in circumstances and granted the mother’s motion increasing child support and alimony obligations.
The supreme court held that the change in circumstances should be measured from the time of the 1962 order, by applying the rule that:
An order denying a motion to increase or reduce alimony or support money or granting it is an appealable order. The order, being appealable, becomes final upon the expiration of the time for appeal, and the facts litigated and determined therein, after a hearing, are not open to relitigation on a subsequent motion, at least in the absence of fraud or some exceptional circumstance.
Id. at 380-81, 133 N.W.2d at 658 (footnotes omitted).
The supreme court noted that application of this rule to motions for increased support and alimony meant that:
“Where there have been one or more previous decisions on motions for modification of a decree, the question whether there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties is determined with respect to the period commencing with the date of the most recent order on a motion for a modification and not with respect to the time since the original decree was entered.”
Id. at 382, 133 N.W.2d at 659 (quoting Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 10, 18-19 (1951)). This approach to successive motions for increased support and alimony was intended to promote the policy that:
Parties should not be subject to harassment, at the whim of a divorced spouse, by successive motions involving fact issues once determined. When fact issues are fully and fairly determined at a hearing where both parties have had their *383day in court, the determination should be final.
Id. at 383, 133 N.W.2d at 659.
In the present case, a motion for increased support was brought in September 1978. In an October 1978 order, the court itself mandated respondent’s reappearance in March 1979. In April 1979 the court again ordered respondent to reappear in April 1980. The 1978-80 appearances resulted in a denial of the motion for increased support.1 Also, the county attorney represented appellant in the 1978-80 hearings, and it is not clear from the record whether that appearance was on behalf of appellant personally or on behalf of the welfare authority. Finally, it is not clear from the record whether the motion for increased support was litigated during the 1978-80 hearings. Therefore, under the facts of this case it would be improper for the trial court to limit its consideration of whether there had been a sufficient change in circumstances to that period of time after 1980.
Even though the Kiesow rationale is inapplicable in this case, a troubling question still remains. Does Kiesow have any continued validity in view of the ruling in Wiese v. Wiese, 295 N.W.2d 371 (Minn.1980), cited by the majority?
In Wiese both parties brought post-decree motions for modification over a period of time. In reversing a trial court’s award of increased alimony the supreme court observed that:
[A]n award is to be modified only upon clear proof of facts showing a substantial change of circumstances from those existing at the time of the dissolution or * * * at the time the award was last modified.
Id. at 372. Kiesow is not cited by the Wiese court. It may be argued that because both parties in Wiese brought motions after their marriage dissolution, the Kiesow policy discouraging harassment by one party was inapplicable.
The best interests of children in receiving increased support would be served by permitting a trial court to measure a change in circumstances from the date of the last modification (Wiese) rather than from the date the issue was last before the court, whether or not a modification resulted (Kiesow). The Wiese rationale permits children to benefit from several incremental changes, any one of which upon motion was found insufficient to increase support, but the cumulative effect of which may indeed be substantial. Ultimately, however, despite reservations about the policy set forth in Kiesow, I am not certain but that there could be fact situations in which the Kiesow rationale would still apply.

. In 1978 the trial court altered respondent’s payment schedule from $95 per month to $45 every other week. The dollar modification was, of course, extremely minor.