Court Opinion

ID: 9945931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 20:02:50.99683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:11.312711
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 Webtoon Entertainment v. Rocketship Entertainment CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 WEBTOON ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,                                               B319331
 et al.,
                                                                           (Los Angeles County
      Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and                                     Super. Ct. No. 19TRCV01062)
 Respondents,

           v.

 ROCKETSHIP ENTERTAINMENT,
 LLC,

      Defendant, Cross-complainant
 and Appellant.

     APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Deirdre Hill, Judge. Dismissed.
     Berstein Law, David A. Berstein and J.R. Dimuzio for
Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Appellant.
     Rutan & Tucker, Michael D. Adams, Gerard M. Mooney,
and Meredith L. Williams for Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants, and
Respondents.
                ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       Rocketship Entertainment, LLC (Rocketship) appeals from
trial court orders resolving its cross-claims against Webtoon
Entertainment, Inc. (Webtoon) and Webtoon’s parent company,
Webtoon Naver (Naver). We dismiss both appeals for lack of an
appealable order or judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In November 2019, Webtoon and Quanquan Han filed a
complaint against Rocketship and its principal, Thomas Akel, for
tortious interference with contract and similar claims. The
complaint alleges Webtoon and Han entered a contract that
granted Webtoon joint ownership and management rights to a
comic series that Han created. It further alleges that Akel later
convinced Han to enter a publishing agreement with Rocketship
which, unbeknownst to Han, violated her contract with Webtoon.
The action remains pending in the trial court.
       In November 2020, Rocketship filed a cross-complaint
against Webtoon, Han, and Naver, also for tortious interference
with contract and related causes of action. The cross-complaint
alleges Webtoon sent Rocketship a letter asserting that
Rocketship’s publishing agreement with Han was “null and void,
non-binding, and unenforceable,” and thereby interfered with
Rocketship’s contract and relationship with Han. In addition, the
cross-complaint alleges Han breached the publishing agreement
by failing to provide Rocketship with a graphic novel for

                               2
publication. The operative pleading is the second amended cross-
complaint.1
       In November 2021, the trial court granted summary
adjudication for Webtoon on three of the four claims asserted
against it in Rocketship’s cross-complaint (MSA Order). Among
other things, the court determined Webtoon could not be held
liable for tortious interference with contract.2
       In February 2022, the trial court sustained Naver’s
demurrer to Rocketship’s cross-complaint, without leave to
amend (Demurrer Order). With respect to the cross-claim for
tortious interference with contract, the court determined the
cross-complaint did not allege any wrongdoing by Naver. The
court further concluded Naver could not be liable for Webtoon’s
actions under an agency or alter ego theory, since the court had
already determined in ruling on the summary adjudication
motion that the tortious interference claim against Webtoon
failed. The court also granted Webtoon’s motion for judgment on

1     The second amended cross-complaint alleges six causes of
action: (1) Breach of Contract against Han; (2) Fraud against
Webtoon, Naver, and Han; (3) Intentional Interference with an
Existing Contract against Webtoon and Naver; (4) Intentional
Interference with Business Relations against Webtoon and
Naver; (5) Violation of Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq. against Webtoon, Naver, and Han; and
(6) Indemnification against Han.

2    This ruling is the only portion of the MSA Order
Rocketship seeks to challenge on appeal.

                               3
the pleadings as to the fourth and final cross-claim against it.3
Rocketship’s cross-claims against Han remain pending.
       In March 2022, Rocketship filed a notice of appeal
challenging the Demurrer Order. Around one week later, it filed
a second notice of appeal challenging the MSA Order. The clerk
of this court asked Rocketship to provide final appealable
judgments for both orders. Rocketship did not submit a judgment
related to either order. Instead, it argued the orders are
appealable because they resolved all claims involving Naver and
all cross-claims against Webtoon. Having now considered the
parties’ arguments with the benefit of a complete record, we
reject Rocketship’s argument and dismiss the appeals as taken
from nonappealable orders.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Both Appeals Were Taken From Nonappealable
       Orders
       “A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only
when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable
judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 688, 696 (Griset).) “A reviewing court lacks jurisdiction
to consider appeals from a nonappealable order, and has the duty
to dismiss such appeals.” (In re Javier G. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th
1195, 1201 (Javier G.).)
       “A trial court’s order is appealable when it is made so by
statute.” (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 696.) An order granting
summary adjudication is not appealable, nor is an order
sustaining a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a);

3     We refer to the court’s order sustaining Naver’s demurrer
and the order granting Webtoon’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings collectively as the “Demurrer Order.”

                                 4
Jacobs-Zorne v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1070;
Beazell v. Schrader (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 673, 674 (Beazell).) An
order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is also
nonappealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); Ellerbee v.
County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212.) Any
appeal contesting a nonappealable order must be taken from the
judgment entered thereafter (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 437c,
subd. (m)(1), 904.1, subd. (a)(1)), or, in the case of a sustained
demurrer, the dismissal order. (Beazell, at p. 674.) Here, the
orders Rocketship identified in its notices of appeal are
nonappealable.4
      This court has discretion to treat a premature notice of
appeal as taken from a subsequent order of dismissal or
judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); Sanchez v.
Westlake Services, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1105.)
Similarly, “when the trial court has sustained a demurrer to all of
the complaint’s causes of action, appellate courts may deem the
order to incorporate a judgment of dismissal, since all that is left
to make the order appealable is the formality of the entry of a
dismissal order or judgment.” (Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc.
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1396.) However, we decline to
exercise our discretion to save Webtoon’s appeals because the
underlying orders are not appealable for the substantive reasons
discussed below.

4     After Rocketship filed the notices of appeal, the trial court
entered an order dismissing the cross-complaint with prejudice as
to Naver.

                                 5
II.    The MSA Order is Not Appealable Under the One
       Final Judgment Rule Because Webtoon’s Claims
       Against Rocketship Remain Pending
       Rocketship contends the MSA Order is appealable because,
together with the subsequent Demurrer Order, it resolved all
cross-claims against Webtoon. The one final judgment rule
nonetheless precludes our review.
       The one final judgment rule is “a fundamental principle of
appellate practice that prohibits review of intermediate rulings
by appeal until final resolution of the case. ‘The theory is that
piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action
would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate
rulings should await the final disposition of the case.’ [Citation.]”
(Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 697.) “ ‘[E]xceptions to the one
final judgment rule should not be allowed unless clearly
mandated.’ [Citation.]” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51
Cal.4th 751, 757 (Baycol Cases).)
       Pursuant to the one final judgment rule, “[w]here a
complaint and cross-complaint involving the same parties have
been filed, there is no final, appealable judgment until both have
been resolved.” (ECC Construction, Inc. v. Oak Park Calabasas
Homeowners Assn. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 994, 1002.) Here,
Webtoon’s claims against Rocketship remain pending. The
orders resolving the cross-complaint as to Webtoon are therefore
not appealable.
       Rocketship argues the MSA Order is nonetheless
appealable because the trial court resolved all claims involving
Webtoon “in its capacity as a ‘cross-defendant . . . .’ ” But “cross-
defendant” is not Webtoon’s legal capacity—that is merely its
party designation. Webtoon has participated in the entire

                                  6
lawsuit in a single corporate capacity, on behalf of only its own
corporate interests. The authority Rocketship cites to support its
contention is therefore inapposite. In Dominguez v. City of
Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237 (Dominguez), the court
permitted a widow to appeal an order resolving her claims in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate, even while her
individual claims continued. (Id. at p. 241.) In First Security
Bank of California v. Paquet (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 468 (Paquet),
a judgment dismissing a cross-complaint against individual
shareholders was appealable even though the shareholders’
derivative action, brought in their representative capacity to
enforce the rights of a corporation, remained pending. (Id. at
p. 475.) Unlike the appealing parties in Dominguez and Paquet,
Webtoon has not appeared in the litigation in multiple capacities.
       Rocketship alternatively argues we should exercise our
discretion to treat its appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ
relief. Yet, Rocketship has not identified any “unusual
circumstances” that would warrant our exercise of that
discretion. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 (Olson)
[court should not exercise power to treat appeal from
nonappealable order as writ “except under unusual
circumstances”].) The MSA Order is plainly not appealable for
the reasons discussed above, numerous issues remain pending in
the trial court, and respondents urge dismissal. (Compare Olson,
at p. 401 [appeal treated as writ where appealability was unclear
in advance, appeal concerned sole remaining issue to be resolved
in the matter, and all parties desired immediate review].)
Further, the appeal does not involve issues of “statewide
importance.” (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7
Cal.4th 725, 732, 745.)

                                 7
       Rocketship contends we should treat its appeal as a
petition for extraordinary writ because it has no adequate
remedy at law. Yet, it concedes that it may appeal the MSA
Order after the court enters a final judgment. Rocketship also
argues it will suffer “irreparable harm” because, if a court later
reverses the MSA Order, it may be subject to a second trial.
However, “[a] trial does not generally meet the definition of
‘irreparable injury,’ being at most an irreparable inconvenience.”
(Ordway v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 98, 101, fn. 1.)
Rocketship cites cases granting a petition for extraordinary writ
based on the risk of a second trial, but these involved special
circumstances that are not at issue here. (Coulter v. Superior
Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144, 148 [writ of mandate issued because
“the trial court [had] deprived a party of an opportunity to plead
his cause of action or defense”]; Noe v. Superior Court (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 316, 325 [writ review appropriate where petition
presented “ ‘a significant issue of first impression’ ”].)
       We deny the request to treat Rocketship’s improper appeal
from the MSA Order as a petition for extraordinary writ.5
III. The One Final Judgment Rule Bars an Appeal of the
       Demurrer Order
       Rocketship also contends the Demurrer Order is appealable
because it resolved all claims involving Naver. We disagree.
Even were we inclined to deem the appeal to have been taken
from the subsequently entered order of dismissal, the one final
judgment rule would also prohibit our review of the trial court’s
demurrer ruling. (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 697.)

5     Because we conclude the MSA Order is not appealable, we
need not address the timeliness of the appeal.

                                8
       Rocketship relies on the rule that “ ‘in a case involving
multiple parties, a judgment is final and appealable when it
leaves no issues to be determined as to one party.’ [Citations.]”
(Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984, 991; Baycol
Cases, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 759.) However, this exception to
the one final judgment rule applies only where “the interests of
the otherwise uninvolved party are separate and distinct from
the interests of parties whose rights have not been finally
determined.” (Fleuret v. Hale Construction Co. (1970) 12
Cal.App.3d 227, 230; cf. Howe v. Key System Transit Co. (1926)
198 Cal. 525, 533 [judgment appealable where issues were
“entirely severable” from the remaining issues in the case].)
Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, on which Rocketship
heavily relies, is in accord. There, our Supreme Court concluded
that a judgment was appealable where it resolved all claims
involving certain plaintiffs. (Id. at pp. 567–568.) But the court
clarified that ongoing proceedings involving other plaintiffs were
“of no further concern” to the appellants, thus indicating that
their interests were separable. (Id. at p. 568.)
       Here, Naver’s interests are not separate and distinct from
those of Webtoon. Rocketship alleged and argued in opposition to
the demurrer that Naver was liable for Webtoon’s tortious
conduct because of a principal-agency relationship between the
two entities, or on an alter ego theory. As a result, the trial court
concluded the summary adjudication of Rocketship’s tortious
interference claim against Webtoon foreclosed the agency theory
of liability against Naver. As Rocketship argues, review of the
Demurrer Order would necessarily require that we also
determine whether the trial court correctly decided the summary
adjudication motion. According to Rocketship, this overlap

                                  9
underscores the need for immediate appellate review of both
orders. Yet, even if we construed the Demurrer Order as
appealable based on the subsequent dismissal order, the MSA
Order clearly is not appealable. That the former relies on the
latter does not require or allow us to exercise jurisdiction over a
nonappealable order. (Javier G., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1201.) It instead reinforces that neither is appealable until
after a final judgment is entered. (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 697.)
       The court addressed a similar situation in C3
Entertainment, Inc. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 1022 (C3 Entertainment). There, the plaintiff sued
its insurer (Hartford) and its insurance agent (Gallagher) after
Hartford refused to defend the plaintiff in a separate lawsuit.
(Id. at p. 1024.) The sole cause of action against Gallagher
alleged that if Hartford had no duty to defend, Gallagher had
negligently failed to obtain proper insurance coverage for the
plaintiff. (Ibid.) The trial court found Hartford had a duty to
defend and entered summary adjudication, but did not enter
judgment because other issues involving Hartford remained
pending. Gallagher then moved for summary judgment. It
argued that since the court had concluded Hartford had a duty to
defend, this necessarily established Gallagher was not negligent.
The trial court agreed, and entered summary judgment in favor
of Gallagher. (Ibid.)
       On appeal, the Court of Appeal recognized that the
judgment in favor of Gallagher was “intertwined with, and
dependent on, the earlier, nonfinal, ruling against Hartford.” (C3
Entertainment, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.) Therefore,
the court reasoned: “We cannot decide whether the ruling in favor

                                10
of Gallagher was error without deciding whether the ruling
against Hartford was error, and we cannot look at the ruling
against Hartford” because that ruling was not appealable. (Ibid.)
The court recognized this situation “demonstrates the wisdom” of
the one final judgment rule: to ensure related decisions are
appealed and resolved together, instead of in piecemeal fashion.
(Id. at pp. 1025, 1026.) It dismissed the appeal as premature.
(Id. at pp. 1026–1027.)
       We agree with the C3 Entertainment court’s reasoning and
find it equally applicable here. The Demurrer Order is
“intertwined with, and dependent on” the MSA Order. (C3
Entertainment, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.) But the MSA
Order is not appealable and we have no jurisdiction to review it.
We dismiss the appeal from the Demurrer Order as premature.
(Ibid.)

                               11
                        DISPOSITION
      The appeals are dismissed. Respondents to recover their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                        ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 EDMON, P. J.

                 LAVIN, J.

                              12