Court Opinion

ID: 9698553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:53:11.2087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.840951
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with most of the majority opinion, and especially with the majority’s rejection of Tyll v. Keller, 94 N.J.Eq. 426 *514(E & A 1923). The rule that unclean hands is a per se bar to an action for annulment should be discarded, leaving discretion with the courts to apply the doctrine only in appropriate cases. I disagree, however, with the way the majority exercises discretion under the facts of this case and with the result it ultimately reaches.
In pursuing its commendable desire to be sympathetic to this plaintiff, the majority has created a precedent that will do mischief when applied to other annulment cases. In addition, the majority has inadvertently confused the matter of determining the legal status of a ceremonial marriage where grounds for annulment may be present. Perhaps the majority’s disposition of this case is a consequence of its failure to articulate standards for guiding trial courts in the proper exercise of discretion. Accordingly, I state briefly what I believe those standards should be.
In determining whether unclean hands should bar an action for annulment, a trial court should consider three overlapping areas of equitable considerations: the interests of the parties, the interests of the public, and the integrity of our courts. Besides annulment of the marriage, the parties’ interests include obtaining a judicial record of their marital status and dissolving the relationship with fairness to each party, especially where property rights are at issue, see, e.g., Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85 (1979). The interests of the public for the most part concern clarification of the parties’ marital status. Legality of future marriages, interests in property, rights to intestate succession, and calculation of tax obligations, among other questions, can all depend on the status of prior marriages. Thus the public has a strong interest in judicial clarification of uncertain marital status. In addition, the public has interests in allowing dead marriages to be terminated, Divorce Law Study Commission, Final Report to the Governor and the Legislature 1-7, 72 (May 11, 1970), and in preserving the solemnity of marriage relationships. Finally, the need to maintain the integrity of our courts mandates that they not be used in ways that engender public *515cynicism or contempt. Our courts should not unquestioningly nullify a marriage at the request of the parties where annulment would further the parties’ illegal schemes.
In some cases one of the interests will far outweigh the others and require a judgment of annulment despite opposing considerations. For example, where the ground of a bigamous marriage under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-l(a) has been proved and no property rights are at issue, the public’s interest in clarifying the marital status of the parties will normally outweigh any other considerations. See Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 145, 16 So.2d 401 (1944); Anderson v. Anderson, 27 Conn.Sup. 342, 238 A.2d 45 (Superior Ct. 1967); Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill.App. 152, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937). Potential future spouses, heirs, governments and other all have a strong interest in official and definitive clarification of the marital status. In contrast, where a marriage involves important economic interests in distribution of property, the public’s interest in clarification of marital status may be outweighed by the parties’ interests in an economically fair dissolution of the marriage. Cf. Kazin v. Kazin, supra (husband in divorce action who previously helped obtain illegal divorce for wife estopped from denying validity of bigamous marriage in order to avoid financial obligations).
The public interest in clarification will be strongest where the marriage is void from its inception and technically does not exist under law. See Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 461 (1971). However, despite its recognition of this interest, ante at 513, the majority obscures the question of how the legal status of ceremonial marriages can be determined prior to a judicial ruling, where grounds for annulment may be present. It concedes that persons participating in a marriage ceremony “for the sole purpose of obtaining some tax advantage or other benefit,” where the ground of lack of mutual assent under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-l(d) can presumably be shown, “may well be considered as legally married.” Ante at 513. But by contrasting such marriages with the one in this case, the majority also suggests that a marriage may have no legal existence where, as here, the *516same lack of mutual assent is present but circumstances happen to be more sympathetic. I fear that this reliance on how sympathetic the immediate circumstances of a case are to determine the legal status of a ceremonial marriage will add further confusion to this already uncertain and problematic area of the law. Instead, I would rely on the provisions of the annulment statute itself, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-1, and determine the legal status of a marriage on the basis of whether it was void from inception or merely voidable by judicial action. See Flaxman, supra.
The clearest example of a marriage void from its inception is a bigamous one, which cannot subsequently be ratified by the parties. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-l(a). In contrast, marriages, such as the one in this case, that can be ratified or confirmed by the parties, see N.J.S.A. 2A:34-l(c)-{e), are not void from their inception but require judicial action to be terminated. Denial of annulment of such voidable marriages will not create uncertainty about the parties’ marital status; they will be married until proper grounds for judicial dissolution have been proved in court under our matrimonial laws. Therefore, the public interest in clarification will not be as important as where the marriage was void from inception.
Turning to this case, plaintiff cannot allege that her marriage to defendant was void from its inception. Although the parties never intended to enter any kind of marital relationship, thus making lack of mutual assent a proper ground for annulment under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-l(d), the marriage could have been ratified by the parties. Consequently, the existence of the marriage is not presently in doubt; judicial action is necessary to terminate it. Each of the above equitable considerations must therefore be weighed by the Court.
The interest of the parties in dissolving a dead marriage is not an overriding consideration here because of the availability of the “no-fault” ground for divorce based on 18 months’ separation, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(d). Judicial denial of annulment will not permanently lock the parties into a marriage dead in all respects *517except its legal status. Plaintiff can still obtain a divorce and thus extricate herself from some of the troubles created by her efforts to gain permanent resident status in the United States.
A more important consideration in this case is the public’s interest in preserving the solemnity of the institution of marriage. This interest requires that the law not accommodate sham marriages entered into with the sole intent of effectuating a temporary illegal purpose, especially where, as here, the Legislature has already provided another means for terminating dead marriages by enacting the no-fault ground for divorce. But the no-fault ground requires a waiting period before dissolution of the marriage, which serves the salutary purpose of reflecting the careful thought that must accompany any decision to dissolve a marriage. Divorce Law Study Commission, supra, at 114, 128, and indirectly the solemnity that must accompany any decision to marry.
Finally, another consideration not addressed by the majority is the adverse effect that facilitating annulment in this case will have on judicial integrity. Plaintiff knowingly engaged in a scheme to violate federal immigration laws through a sham marriage ceremony. While it should not be the aim of our matrimonial courts to punish her for violations of federal law, our courts should not make their powers readily available to those who would use them to further illegal schemes. The knowledge that courts may not be willing to nullify sham marriages at the behest of the parties may serve to deter such marriages and to preserve both the integrity of our courts and the solemnity of marriage relationships.
While in many other factual situations unclean hands should not bar annulment, the balance of equitable considerations in this case weighs against plaintiff. Judicial discretion would be better exercised by denying this application for annulment.
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
*518For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SULLIVAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK — 6.
For affirmance —Justice PASHMAN — 1.