Court Opinion

ID: 9580867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:47.775399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:34.563577
License: Public Domain

FITZGERALD, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority conclude they need not accept the state’s argument that Chapter 201, SLA 1972, should be sustained because its subject was simply the issuance of bonds for capital improvements. Indeed, in some jurisdictions the position taken by the state here has been upheld,1 and it was the position taken by the trial court in this case. But the generally accepted view seems to be that it is the projects to be financed which form the subject matter of the proposition.2 This seems to me to be the better rule for otherwise the Alaska constitutional limitation restricting legislative enactments to one subject would be rendered inoperative with regard to bond propositions.
In the findings of fact the trial court found that “flood control and small boat harbor projects are separate distinct activities totally unrelated.” The majority declare this finding clearly erroneous because both flood control and small boat harbors pertain to one ongoing plan for the development of water resources.
I cannot agree that a flood control project at Fairbanks, Alaska, has the same subject matter as small boat harbors for a number of the coastal towns and villages in this state. While it is true that all of the projects included in the proposition involve water, so do hydroelectric dams, bridges, ferries, sewer systems, docks and many other things.
It- is admittedly difficult to determine whether a group of projects has one subject matter but difficulty of enforcement does not discharge the duty of this court to ensure that constitutional limitations are observed. And although the judgment of the legislature is entitled to great weight on the issue, it is finally for this court to make the determination. As is accurately noted by the majority, the purpose of the one-subject requirement is to prevent logrolling, i. e., the assembling of a number of pet projects into one bill to consolidate the support for each to achieve a sufficient total. The proposition in question is a good example of what the constitutional provision sought to avoid. It is designed to gather voter support for a project in the interior of Alaska by linking it with harbor projects dear to the coastal towns and villages. This is justified, according to the majority, because federal funding is available and the projects are part of a Corps of Engineers program for the state of Alaska. I do not agree with the logic of the majority that such considerations justify the interpretation which is now to be applied, since for all practical purposes it renders the constitutional provision meaningless. I must dissent.

. E. g., Walton v. Carter, 337 S.W.2d 674 (Ky.1960); Panitz v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d 891, 897-899 (Md.1967); Mayor and Aldermen of Knoxville v. Gass, 119 Tenn. 438, 104 S.W. 1084 (1907).

. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 617 (1949).