Court Opinion

ID: 9839938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 18:01:11.135096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:44.268199
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETR VASILYEVICH                         No. 21-1098
RUDNITSKYY,
                                          Agency No.
                Petitioner,              A094-534-740

 v.
                                          OPINION
MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

       On Petition for Review of an Order of the
           Board of Immigration Appeals

       Argued and Submitted August 21, 2023
                 Portland, Oregon

              Filed September 14, 2023

Before: Mark J. Bennett, Lawrence VanDyke, and Holly
             A. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

             Opinion by Judge VanDyke
2                    RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

                          SUMMARY*

                          Immigration

    The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of an appeal by petitioner
Petr Vasilyevich Rudnitskyy of an immigration judge’s
denial of cancellation of removal, holding that the agency
did not err in concluding that the stop-time rule set forth in
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B), which terminates accrual of the
requisite seven years of continuous physical presence, is
calculated from the date a petitioner committed the criminal
offense that rendered him removable, rather than the date he
was convicted.
    A lawful permanent resident becomes removable once
he is convicted of a qualifying offense, and if the offense is
committed within seven years of being admitted into the
United States, the Attorney General lacks discretion to
cancel removal. Here, petitioner committed the offense a
few months shy of satisfying the seven-year continuous
residence requirement, but the conviction became final
outside the statutory seven-year period.
    The panel held that the agency did not err in deciding
that the stop-time rule is calculated from the date petitioner
committed the criminal offense that rendered him
removable, rather than the date he was convicted. The panel
explained that: (i) the text of the stop-time rule set forth in
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) provides that once a conviction

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                     3

renders a noncitizen removable, the commission of the
underlying offense is deemed to terminate the seven years of
continuous residence required to be eligible for cancellation
of removal; (ii) the Supreme Court adopted this
interpretation in Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020)
(abrogating this court’s decision in Nguyen v. Sessions,
901 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2018)); and (iii) every other circuit
to decide the question, as well as the BIA, agrees with this
conclusion. Accordingly, the panel held that the agency did
not err in holding that petitioner is statutorily ineligible for
cancellation of removal because his offense occurred within
the seven-year period.

                         COUNSEL

Brian P. Conry (argued), Brian Patrick Conry PC, Portland,
Oregon, for Petitioner.
Katie E. Rourke (argued), Corey L. Farrell, and Colin J.
Tucker, Trial Attorneys; Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant Director;
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
Respondent.
4                  RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

                         OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

    Petitioner has been a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of
the United States since 2003. Since that time, he has been
convicted of various crimes, including theft, criminal
trespass, a DUI, and, as relevant here, possession of heroin
in violation of Oregon law. After he received a notice to
appear (NTA) initiating removal proceedings, Petitioner
applied for cancellation of removal. Such discretionary
relief is available to noncitizens who establish a continuous
residence in the United States for seven years, subject to a
“stop-time rule.” This case turns on the interpretation of the
stop-time rule because Petitioner committed the heroin
offense within the seven-year period but was convicted after
the period ended.
     We conclude that the agency did not err in deciding that
the stop-time rule is calculated from the date Petitioner
committed a criminal offense that rendered him removable,
rather than the date he was convicted. We do so because:
(i) the text of the stop-time rule set forth in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(d)(1)(B) provides that once a conviction renders a
noncitizen removable, the commission of an underlying
offense is deemed to terminate the seven years of continuous
residence required to be eligible for cancellation of removal;
(ii) the Supreme Court adopted this interpretation in Barton
v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1449–50 (2020); and (iii) every
other circuit to decide the question (as well as the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA)) agrees.
                   RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                     5

                              I.
    Due to the statutory complexities at issue in this case, we
begin with a brief summary of the relevant Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) provisions that govern the application
of the stop-time rule. We then turn to the factual and
procedural background.
                              A.
    In general, an inadmissible or deportable LPR may
qualify for discretionary cancellation of removal if he has
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for at least
five years and has resided in the United States continuously
for seven years without being convicted of an aggravated
felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
    That period of continuous residence is subject to the
stop-time rule. Specifically,

       any period of continuous residence or
       continuous physical presence in the United
       States shall be deemed to end (A) … when
       the alien is served a[n] [NTA] … or (B) when
       the alien has committed an offense referred to
       in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders
       the alien inadmissible to the United States
       under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or
       removable from the United States under
       section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title,
       whichever is earliest.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (emphases added).
    In other words, where a noncitizen has become
removable due to a conviction, the stop-time rule
retroactively cuts off the continuous residence period as of
6                     RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

the date an offense is committed. But removability itself
turns on the fact of conviction, because a noncitizen is
“removable” if he is “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182
or “deportable” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227, and those provisions
turn on a conviction. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2).1 Thus, a
conviction rendering a noncitizen removable will refer back
to a date of commission to determine whether the stop-time
rule applies.
    As relevant here, then, an LPR becomes removable once
he is convicted of a qualifying offense, and if the LPR had
committed an act in violation of a state’s drug statute or
regulation within seven years of being admitted, the
Attorney General lacks discretion to cancel the LPR’s
removal.
                                  B.
    Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ukraine who entered
the United States as a refugee in 2003. Two years later, his
status was adjusted to that of an LPR. In 2007, Petitioner
began to develop a substantial criminal record in Oregon,
resulting in convictions for criminal trespass, theft, and DUI.
As relevant here, moreover, Petitioner possessed heroin
unlawfully on October 14, 2009, just months shy of
satisfying the INA’s seven-year continuous residence
requirement. On November 2, 2009, he was charged with
heroin possession in violation of Oregon Revised Statute

1
  “[A]ny alien convicted of … acts which constitute the essential
elements of … a violation of … any law or regulation of a State …
relating to a controlled substance … is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). And “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission
has been convicted of a violation of … any law or regulation of a State
… relating to a controlled substance … is deportable.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
                   RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                     7

section 475.854, a “Class B Felony,” and on January 20,
2011, after the seven-year period had ended, Petitioner was
convicted.
    Shortly after the conviction, Petitioner was served an
NTA, and the agency initiated removal proceedings.
Petitioner successfully moved to terminate the proceedings
pending the appeal of his conviction. His conviction was
affirmed in October 2014. State v. Rudnitskyy, 338 P.3d 742,
746 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). A new NTA was served on
Petitioner in August 2015.
    In late 2015, Petitioner appeared before the Immigration
Judge (IJ) with counsel and conceded removability, but he
twice obtained a continuance pending his efforts to obtain
post-conviction relief. In July 2016, Petitioner appeared
again before the IJ, this time with applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). In November 2016, he also applied
for cancellation of removal. In August 2018, Petitioner
moved for (and was denied) termination of removal
proceedings under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105
(2018), on the theory that his NTA was defective and
incomplete, and thereby deprived the agency of jurisdiction.
     In September 2018, Petitioner moved to continue the
removal proceedings to appeal the denial of post-conviction
relief, but the IJ denied the continuance motion for failure to
show good cause and pretermitted his application for
cancellation of removal. The IJ specifically held that
Petitioner failed to assert more than a speculative claim that
he was likely to receive post-conviction relief. And, in any
event, Petitioner did not show how post-conviction relief
would materially affect the removal proceedings, given that
(i) as a result of Petitioner’s conviction, he was statutorily
8                  RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

ineligible for cancellation of removal because the
commission of the offense he was later convicted of
terminated the continuous residence period, (ii) Petitioner
did not challenge the date of the commission of the offense,
(iii) Petitioner conceded that the conviction rendered him
removable, and (iv) Petitioner did not show that post-
conviction relief would expunge the conviction from his
indisputably “long criminal record.” In applying the stop-
time rule, the IJ concluded that:

       [O]nly six years, six months, and 24 days
       have lapsed between his admission to the
       United States and his commission of a crime
       that … renders him removable under … [the
       INA]. That is approximately five months
       short of the seven-year [continuous]
       residence requirement.

    Finally, in November 2018, Petitioner appeared before
the IJ for his merits hearing and withdrew his applications
for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT relief, and
cancellation of removal, resulting in the IJ’s denial of those
applications.    The IJ’s summary order directed that
Petitioner be removed to Ukraine and indicated that all his
applications for relief were withdrawn.
    Before the BIA, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s denial of his
motions to terminate and to continue the proceedings. He
argued that the IJ erred in holding that the stop-time rule
terminates a convicted alien’s continuous residence period
as measured from the date an offense is committed rather
than the date of the conviction (i.e., the date the alien
                      RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                           9

becomes removable).2         Petitioner also argued that
deportation would constitute a cruel and unusual punishment
(or an “unconstitutionally disproportionate penalty”) in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the IJ erred in
denying his jurisdictional Pereira challenge to the
completeness of the NTA.
    The BIA dismissed the appeal in October 2021. The BIA
cited Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA
1994), and specifically agreed with the IJ that (i) Petitioner
became deportable once he was convicted of the controlled
substance offense and that, because the offense was
committed within seven years of Petitioner’s admission as
an LPR, the stop-time rule rendered him ineligible for
cancellation of removal; (ii) Petitioner’s Pereira argument
fails under controlling case law; and (iii) orders of removal
do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. With
respect to the stop-time rule, the BIA specifically held that
“the date of the commission of the offense rather than the
date of conviction is dispositive for the purpose of
establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.”
    The instant petition for review was filed together with a
motion for stay of removal. The petition is focused solely
on the stop-time rule issue. Petitioner’s opening brief argues
that Petitioner never admitted he committed the underlying
offense, that he was not statutorily “rendered” deportable
until his conviction was final (after appeals had been
exhausted), and that therefore the stop-time rule is
measurable from the date of his conviction—which falls

2
  On this issue, Petitioner also argued cancellation of removal was
appropriate in light of changed circumstances, particularly Petitioner’s
completion of a drug rehabilitation program.
10                     RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

outside the statutory seven-year window—and not the date
of his offense.3
    Petitioner also appears to suggest that the term
“whichever is earliest” in the stop-time rule provision means
that LPRs are generally only subject to inadmissibility if
they leave the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13), and
that therefore the earliest date he could be rendered
inadmissible would have to be the date on which he leaves
the United States, which he has not yet done.
    Petitioner acknowledges the Supreme Court’s recent
Barton decision, which held that the commission of a section
1182(a)(2) offense triggers the stop-time rule, but argues that
Barton is distinguishable for two reasons. 140 S. Ct. at
1445–46 & n.1. First, the petitioner in Barton presented
different arguments: the petitioner in Barton argued that the
inadmissibility consequences of his conviction did not apply
to him because he had not left the United States, whereas,
here, Petitioner argues that the earliest event from which he
could be rendered inadmissible is the date of his conviction.
Second, the petitioner’s counsel in Barton admitted before
the agency that the petitioner had been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, whereas, here, Petitioner never
admitted to committing the controlled substance offense.
Accordingly, Petitioner seeks another chance to show
entitlement to cancellation of removal and asks that the court
“remand the case for a cancellation of removal hearing.”
    We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where, as
here, the BIA cites Burbano and also provides its own

3
  To the extent Petitioner now argues for the first time in his reply that
the rule of lenity should apply, that argument is waived. See Alcaraz v.
I.N.S., 384 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004).
                  RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                  11

review of the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and
the BIA’s decisions.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028
(9th Cir. 2011). We “review questions of law de novo” and
the agency’s “factual findings for substantial
evidence.” Chavez-Garcia v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 991, 995
(9th Cir. 2017).
    In determining whether the agency properly interpreted
8 U.S.C. § 1229b, “we employ the analysis set forth ... in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984), as further explained in
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).” Gonzalez-Gonzalez
v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted). But when binding precedent and the statutory
language dictate the result, this court has simply looked to
precedent and the statutory text without engaging in a
detailed Chevron analysis. See Vasquez-Hernandez v.
Holder, 590 F.3d 1053, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2010).
                            II.
    The agency correctly held that the stop-time rule is
calculated from the date Petitioner committed a felony that
rendered him inadmissible or removable upon his later
conviction, rather than the conviction date. The agency’s
determination is supported by (i) the statutory text and
purpose of the stop-time rule; (ii) the Supreme Court’s
Barton decision (which abrogated our decision in Nguyen v.
Sessions, 901 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2018)); and (iii) the
decisions of the BIA and all sister circuits to decide the
question.
12                 RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

                             A.
     As explained above, two events are relevant to this case,
but for different purposes. First, the time at which an
offender admits to or is convicted of an underlying offense
is relevant for the purpose of determining inadmissibility or
removability.         See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A),
1227(a)(2)(A), 1229a(e)(2). If an offender neither admits to
nor is convicted of an offense under sections 1182(a)(2),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4), the inadmissibility or
removability provisions of those sections do not apply, and
the stop-time rule is irrelevant.
     Second, once a noncitizen has been rendered
inadmissible or removable under those provisions, the stop-
time rule applies and “any period of continuous residence …
shall be deemed to end … when” the noncitizen has either
(i) been served an NTA, or (ii) “committed” an offense
referred to in section 1182(a)(2), “whichever is earliest.” 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). Following a conviction, then, the
continuous residence clock is deemed to have stopped back
“when the alien … committed an offense” under section
1182(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B). Moreover, the
surrounding text indicates that the phrase “whichever is
earliest” refers to the two possible triggering events: (i)
service of the NTA, and (ii) commission of the offense.
Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, it does not refer generally
to whatever events may implicate removability elsewhere in
the INA.
     This plain reading also comports with common sense.
The purpose of the stop-time rule would be disserved and the
rule would be subject to abuse if it were possible to commit
a crime within the statutory seven-year period and then
utilize every possible litigation strategy to ensure that
                   RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                   13

whatever conviction may result (or is finalized after the
appellate process has been exhausted) occurs after the
statutory period. To interpret the stop-time rule differently
would also improperly incentivize prolonging removal
proceedings. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2119 (“Congress
enacted the stop-time rule to prevent noncitizens from
exploiting administrative delays to ‘buy time’ during which
they accumulate periods of continuous presence.”). The
statutory text and purpose of the stop-time rule therefore
support the agency’s determination.
                             B.
    In Barton, the Supreme Court read the stop-time rule as
precluding an LPR’s cancellation of removal if he “has
committed an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) during the initial
seven years of residence.” Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1445–46
(emphasis added).        Barton, moreover, abrogated our
decision in Nguyen, the case on which Petitioner relies. In
Nguyen, the parties agreed that the stop-time rule can be
triggered by two events: either the commission of an offense
or that offense’s subsequent effect of rendering the offender
inadmissible or removable. Nguyen, 901 F.3d at 1096. That
Nguyen possessed cocaine in violation of the law was
undisputed. Id. But the Nguyen panel concluded that (i) an
LPR already admitted to the United States could not be
“rendered” inadmissible because the provisions governing
inadmissibility generally only apply to those seeking
admission, whereas LPRs are only subject to removal
provisions, id. at 1095–97; and (ii) if the “commi[ssion of]
an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2)” always “renders
the alien inadmissible … or removable,” then the clause
“that renders the alien inadmissible … or removable” would
be superfluous and unnecessary, and so to prevent that
reading the stop-time rule only applies where the offense
14                   RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

committed is the ground for being found removable, id. at
1097–98.4 Since Nguyen was already an LPR, the court
concluded he could not be “rendered” inadmissible under
section 1182(a)(2). See id. at 1097.
    The Supreme Court rejected Nguyen’s rationale in
Barton, a case involving an LPR who had committed an
offense listed in section 1182(a)(2) shortly before his seven-
year period of continuous residence had ended, and who
committed other offenses that formed the basis of his
removal. 140 S. Ct. at 1447. Barton abrogated Nguyen in
three key respects.
    First, while it is true that the stop-time rule does not
apply unless a noncitizen is also rendered inadmissible or
removable (such as through a felony conviction), the Court
rejected the notion that the stop-time rule is measured from
both the commission of an offense and some later event. The
Court held that “[i]f a lawful permanent resident has …
committed an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) during the initial
seven years of residence, that criminal record will preclude
cancellation of removal.” Id. at 1445–46. The Court
rejected the argument Petitioner now raises: “the text of the
cancellation-of-removal statute does not simply say that
cancellation of removal is precluded when, during the initial
seven years of residence, the noncitizen was convicted of an
offense referred to in § 1182(a)(2).” Id. at 1449. Rather, the
date of commission is the relevant date for computing when
the stop-time rule applies after a conviction has rendered a
noncitizen removable.

4
  The Supreme Court in Barton specifically addressed and rejected the
superfluity argument. See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1453.
                       RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                            15

    Second, Barton rejected Nguyen’s hard distinction
between provisions governing inadmissibility and those
governing removability, including the argument that an LPR
generally cannot be rendered “inadmissible.” Echoing
Nguyen, Barton argued that an LPR “usually cannot be
removed from the United States on the basis of
inadmissibility.” Id. at 1451. But as the Court explained,
“the argument fails because it disregards the statutory text,
which employs the term ‘inadmissibility’ as a status that can
result from … a noncitizen’s (including a lawfully admitted
noncitizen’s) commission of certain offenses listed in
§ 1182(a)(2).” Id. at 1451. In other words, committing an
offense that would render a noncitizen inadmissible under
section 1182(a)(2) attaches the status of inadmissibility to a
noncitizen, regardless of residency. The statute “do[es] not
say that a noncitizen will become inadmissible if the
noncitizen is found inadmissible in a subsequent
immigration removal proceeding” but rather that “the
noncitizen ‘is inadmissible.’” Id. at 1452.
    Third, the Court rejected Nguyen’s textual argument that
unless the ground for finding a noncitizen removable is the
same as an offense that occurred within the seven-year
period, the stop-time rule does not apply. Id. at 1450–51. In
Barton, the Court held that once a conviction renders a
noncitizen removable, the measuring date for the stop-time
rule will be the commission of an offense under section
1182(a)(2).5     Id. at 1449–50.      True, “committing a

5
  To be clear, once a conviction makes a noncitizen inadmissible or
removable, the stop-time rule is backdated to when an offense was
committed. Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1446 & n.1. As such, the offense
committed within the seven-year period need not even be the same
offense for which a noncitizen is found removable, and it is precisely that
16                    RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

§ 1182(a)(2) offense precludes cancellation of removal only
if the offense also ‘renders’ the noncitizen inadmissible,”
and for some offenses (like the one in this case), “the
noncitizen must also have been convicted of or admitted the
offense” to be inadmissible. Id. at 1446 n.1. Thus, once a
conviction renders a noncitizen inadmissible or removable,
the relevant question for determining whether the noncitizen
is eligible for cancellation of removal is the date a section
1182(a)(2) offense was committed:

        First, cancellation of removal is precluded if
        a noncitizen committed a § 1182(a)(2)
        offense during the initial seven years of
        residence, even if … the conviction occurred
        after the seven years elapsed. In other words,
        … the date of commission of the offense is
        the key date for purposes of calculating
        whether the noncitizen committed a
        § 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven
        years of residence.
        Second, the text of the law requires that the
        noncitizen be rendered “inadmissible” as a
        result of the offense. For crimes [listed in
        section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)], § 1182(a)(2)
        provides that a noncitizen is rendered

linkage in Nguyen’s holding that Barton singled out for repudiation. Id.
at 1448–49.
                       RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                          17

         “inadmissible” when he is convicted of or
         admits the offense.

Id. at 1449–50 (citations omitted). Thus, at every turn,
Barton contradicted the rationale of Nguyen.6
                                   C.
    As the Supreme Court observed in Barton, Nguyen was
an anomaly compared to the decisions of the BIA and the
other circuit courts to decide the same issue. See Barton,
140 S. Ct. at 1446, 1448, 1450.
    In 1999, an en banc panel of the BIA interpreted the stop-
time rule in Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689 (BIA 1999).
The BIA held that, “under the natural and straightforward
reading of [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)], time ceases to accrue
on the date an offense is committed.” Id. at 692 (emphasis
omitted). The BIA continued:

         The date that criminal misconduct is
         committed is the critical point in time when
         calculating the statutorily required period of
         time under [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)]. The
         subsequent “renders” clause does not impose
         a separate temporal requirement. Rather, it is
         a restrictive clause which … implicitly
         requires that the steps necessary to “render”
         an alien inadmissible or removable shall have

6
  It is unnecessary for us to consider how Chevron deference applies in
this case, because the statute is clear and Supreme Court precedent binds
the court. See Vasquez-Hernandez, 590 F.3d at 1056–57.
18                 RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND

       occurred before the offense qualifies for [8
       U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)] purposes.

Id. at 693. The Supreme Court in Barton favorably cited to
Matter of Perez when it identified the commission date as
key to the stop-time rule. 140 S. Ct. at 1449–50.
    Besides the Ninth Circuit, every circuit that has
considered the issue has agreed that the relevant date for the
stop-time rule is the date a qualifying offense is committed.
Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1446. These include the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See Heredia
v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 60, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[A]s long
as a qualifying offense later does render the non-citizen
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), the date of the
commission of the offense governs the computation of a
lawful permanent resident’s continuous residency in the
United States.”); Khan v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 979 F.3d
193, 200 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[T]he stop-time rule’s requirement
that a noncitizen ‘has committed an offense referred to in
section 1182(a)(2),’ 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), pegs the date to
the offense conduct—a matter of historical fact that is
unaltered by the noncitizen’s conviction ….”); Argueta v.
Barr, 970 F.3d 532, 533–34 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Because
Argueta committed … an offense [under section 1182(a)(2)]
during his initial seven years of residence after admission to
the United States, and was later convicted of that offense, he
is ineligible for cancellation of removal.”); Calix v. Lynch,
784 F.3d 1000, 1012 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Once [the noncitizen]
was convicted of the offense, he was rendered inadmissible
to the United States. His accrual of continuous residence
was halted as of the date he committed that offense.”); Jeudy
v. Holder, 768 F.3d 595, 598 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
stop-time rule operates based on the date the offense is
                        RUDNITSKYY V. GARLAND                              19

committed. The date of a resulting conviction … does not
matter.”); Barton v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 904 F.3d 1294,
1300–01 (11th Cir. 2018); Rendon v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,
972 F.3d 1252, 1257 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Qualifying
criminal offenses only trigger the stop-time rule once the
noncitizen is convicted of or admits to committing a
qualifying crime. After a conviction or admission, the stop-
time date is then back-dated to the day the offense was
committed.” (citations omitted)).7
                                    III.
    We hold that, as a consequence of Barton’s abrogation
of Nguyen, the stop-time rule refers to the date a section
1182(a)(2) offense is committed and not a later event. The
agency did not err in holding that Petitioner is statutorily
ineligible for cancellation of removal because Petitioner’s
offense occurred within the INA’s seven-year period.
    The petition is DENIED.8

7
  Petitioner argues that, in most of the other circuits’ cases, either (i) the
noncitizen was convicted within the seven-year period, (ii) other legal
grounds were involved, or (iii) the procedural posture was
distinguishable. But that does not change that all these circuits interpret
the stop-time rule as applying on the date a crime is committed.
8
  Petitioner’s motion for a stay of removal pending the adjudication of
his petition for review is denied as moot.