Court Opinion

ID: 9845467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:22:36.533916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:08.582162
License: Public Domain

WALTERS, Chief Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Based on mixed and contradictory findings of fact and conclusions of law, denominated “findings,” the trial court concluded that Phillip Dibble was an independent contractor hired by J.J. & L., and therefore ineligible for workmen’s compensation benefits. The facts in this case are not unusual. Phillip Dibble and a framing crew he gathered together at the request of defendant Stright, J.J. & L.’s “agent” and “framing subcontractor” (Finding 4), was hired by Stright to do framing work at the rate of approximately eighty cents per square foot. J.J. & L. carried workmen’s compensation coverage. Stright supervised the framing work, paid Dibble and his crew from a personal account because he was unable “to get hold of” J.J. & L.’s principal on payday, and paid for the entire amount of framing done by the crew in one check. The amount of the check was divided among the crew. On the third day of work, plaintiff Dibble suffered an accidental injury on the job and was refused workmen’s compensation benefits by Stright and J.J. & L. At trial Dibble claimed he was an employee; Stright and J.J. & L. contended he was a subcontractor and, therefore, an independent contractor who was not entitled to workmen’s compensation coverage. The trial court concluded that Dibble was an independent contractor and dismissed his complaint. The relationship of parties in a workmen’s compensation proceeding is not to be determined from the name attached by them to the relationship, but from the consequences which the law imputes to their agreement, to prevent evasion of obligations which the Workmen’s Compensation Act imposes on employers. Yerbich v. Heald, 89 N.M. 67, 547 P.2d 72 (Ct.App.1976). The basic purpose of the Act is to insure that industry carry the burden of personal injuries suffered by workmen in the course of their employment. Yerbich, supra. In determining whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor, the principal factor to be considered is the right to control. Burruss v. B. M. C. Logging Co., 38 N.M. 254, 31 P.2d 263 (1934). The right to control can be inferred by the type of authority exercised by the employer. In Burruss, supra, the court said: The employee renders personal service. The independent contractor may or may not. In both cases, the employer exercises authority. Beyond doubt the character of such authority or control is the usual and generally accepted test. The result to be achieved by the independent contractor is controlled by the employer. But, when the control descends to the details or to the means and methods of performance, we have a servant or employee. This general test we find variously stated. “The chief consideration which determines one to be an independent contractor is the fact that the employer has no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.” [Citation omitted.] [A]ll agree, in statement if not in application, that it is the right to control, not the exercise of it, that furnishes the test. The cases on this question of control agree that facts showing control are (1) control respecting the manner in which the details of the work are to be executed; (2) the right to discharge; and (3) the method of payment. Yerbich, Burruss, supra. In addition to control, a second influencing “ultimate” factor, stated in Shipman v. Macco Corp., 74 N.M. 174, 392 P.2d 9 (1964), is: Whose is the work being done? The court in Shipman, supra, quoted from Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1937): In determining whose work is being done, the question of power to control the work is of great importance, but is not conclusive. [Citations omitted.] The indentity of the person who, in fact, directs the details of the work and gives the immediate instructions to the workmen is of comparatively small importance, the power of control referred to being the power to control the undertaking as a whole. . . . A third inquiry was made in Burton v. Crawford & Co., 89 N.M. 436, 553 P.2d 716 (Ct.App.1976): What is the relative nature of the work? It was suggested there that the considerations necessary to answer that question are: (1) the degree of skill involved; (2) the degree to which it is a separate calling or business; and (3) the extent to which it [claimant’s work] can be expected to carry its own accident burden. No findings of fact were made on the latter two questions. I am unable to agree with the majority reason for the following reasons: 1. Findings 2 and 6 concerning the relationship between J.J. & L. and Dibble are conclusions of law. Creley v. Western Constructors, Inc., 79 N.M. 727, 449 P.2d 329 (1969); Latta v. Harvey, 67 N.M. 72, 352 P.2d 649 (1960). The remaining “findings” are inadequate to support such a conclusion. Board of County Comm’rs of Dona Ana Cty. v. Little, 74 N.M. 605, 396 P.2d 591 (1964). 2. Power to discharge is a determinative factor, according to Burruss, supra. Although there is no finding regarding Stright’s power to discharge Dibble, the evidence in the record is that Stright had the power to discharge not only Dibble, but also the members of the crew. 3. Dibble’s relationship to other members of the crew is not determinative of Dibble’s relationship to J.J. & L. See Latta v. Harvey, supra, where the claimant who provided a crew, material, and equipment for well drilling was held to be an employee, not an independent contractor. 4. The trial court and the majority opinion disregard the analysis of Justice Moise in Shipman v. Macco Corp., supra, and particularly do they disregard Shipman’s significant reliance on the manner in which defendant Maceo handled employment arrangements with other entities and employees, as opposed to Shipman, as affecting the result reached in that case. 5. The evidence in this case discloses that defendants’ arrangement with claimant Dibble was no different from the arrangements with the claimants in Burruss and Shipman, supra, and the authority of Stright was no different from that retained by the logging company in Burruss, supra, or the construction company in Shipman, supra.