Court Opinion

ID: 9658040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:45:03.054796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:50.761810
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot forgo the opportunity to state my observations of what might have happened at the trial court level. It might well be an example of that old adage that he “who lives by the sword dies by the sword.” As the majority opinion notes, the Albrechts never denied receiving the notice of motion and motion for summary judgment, the affidavit of proof, and the affidavit of identity and non-military service. Rather, in the “Motion to Vacate Memo of Summary Judgment,” the Albrechts stated they had “not received a brief which needed an answer ...” [Emphasis mine.] Technically, that was true under Rule 3.2, N.D.R.O.C. They received a brief in support of motion for default judgment rather than a brief in support of the motion for summary judgment. No mention is made of any need to respond to the motion for summary judgment, brief or no brief. Just as technically, the trial court, in denying the Albrechts’ motion, stated that a “motion to vacate memo of summary judgment is not a permissible motion under NDRCivP. North Dakota does not recognize a motion to vacate a summary judgment memo.”
Although it is obvious to me that the Albrechts rely on a technicality to excuse their failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment, the majority opinion excuses the Albrechts from several “technicalities” in arriving at its conclusion to vacate the summary judgment, to wit: permitting an appeal from a “decision” [which appeal was filed prior to our decision in Olson v. Job Service North Dakota, 379 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1985), and therefore was not appealable under the previous decisions *270of this court]; construing a motion to vacate a memo of summary judgment as one to vacate the summary judgment; and permitting a general denial rather than a showing of a meritorious defense as a basis for the motion. Of course, parties who choose to represent themselves will not be allowed any more nor any less consideration than parties represented by counsel. Lang v. Basin Elec. Power Co-Op., 274 N.W.2d 253 (N.D.1979).
However, I am most concerned about the lack of meritorious defenses. Although we pressed at oral argument for those defenses we were given nothing specific by the Albrechts. I admit I am particularly concerned because these are the same Al-brechts as those in Albrecht v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 372 N.W.2d 893 (N.D.1985), who, in a matter involving a mortgage, contended that of a $40,000 loan only $2,000 was in legal tender and the remaining $38,000 was invalid and unlawful “credit or checkbook money.” In that case we held that the Albrechts’ contention was “patently frivolous and devoid of any possible claim upon which relief could be granted.” 372 N.W.2d at 895. We there approved the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal with prejudice of the Albrechts’ complaint. Here, we asked Mr. Albrecht at oral argument whether or not the defenses were similar to the allegations made by the Albrechts in Albrecht v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, supra. We have yet to be informed of the meritorious defenses of the Albrechts and I am concerned that on remand they may assert the same or equally frivolous defenses.
Although I concede that the brief need not have been answered because it was not a brief in support of the motion for summary judgment, I do not agree that the motion for summary judgment could be ignored. An allegation of a meritorious defense should be a condition precedent to vacating the judgment, and, because no such allegation has been put forth, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.