Court Opinion

ID: 9770689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:16.365782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:19.892442
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Judge,
dissenting and concurring.
I join in the dissent of Judge Roberts, infra. The failure to comply with Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., a mandatory statute, renders the plea of guilty void. The Legislature, via Article 26.13, has imposed minimum guidelines for assuring the voluntariness of guilty pleas in the State of Texas. Brady v. U. S., 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747; Cruz v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 530 S.W.2d 817.
This admonishment omission renders the conviction void, thus relegating the punishment issue decided by the majority secondary. The proper disposition is to reverse the judgment and remand the cause.
Although secondary, I concur in the reasoning of the majority on the question of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The appellant was originally indicted for robbery by assault, second offender. Articles 1408 and 62, V.A.P.C. (1925). The enhancement allegation was waived and, upon entry and acceptance of a guilty plea, appellant was sentenced to 10 years confinement. This conviction was reversed on direct appeal. Bouie v. State, 528 S.W.2d 587. At the May term, 1975, appellant was indicted for robbery by firearms, second offender. Articles 1408 and 62, V.A.P.C. (1925). This indictment alleges use of a firearm whereas the original indictment alleged only violence. The prior conviction alleged for enhancement was the same in both indictments. A superceding indictment was returned in the November term of 1975 alleging robbery by firearms and two prior convictions for enhancement.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the robbery by firearms indictment and not true to the allegation of two prior convictions. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment upon the trial court’s finding that the allegations of two prior convictions were true. Article 63, V.A.P.C. (1925).
Here the appellant pled guilty on remand to the substantive offense of robbery. The only reasonable conclusion to be reached on the history and facts of this case is that the prosecutor retaliated against appellant for his originally successful appeal. It is this Court’s solemn responsibility to assure that the right of criminal defendants to appeal and contest their convictions is not impaired by the “apprehension” of retaliation. *556North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628; Article 1, Sec. 19, Article 5, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution; Articles 1.04 and 44.-02,1 Y.A.C.C.P. Cf. Alvarez v. State, 536 S.W.2d 357.
The State’s reliance on Alvarez, supra, is misplaced. There the defendant was rein-dicted as originally indicted. The repudiation of the original plea bargain by way of successful appeal and the plea of not guilty on remand deprived Alvarez of the benefits originally negotiated for on the premise of a guilty plea. Here, however, the State “ups the ante” by invoking Article 63, V.A. P.C. (1925), on remand and by refusing to waive the enhancement allegations when appellant persisted in his plea of guilty.
While dissenting to the disposition of this cause, I concur in the majority’s reasoning on the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

. Cf. Article 44.02, V.A.C.C.P., as amended in the Acts of 1977, 65th Leg., P. 940, Ch. 351, Sec. 1, effective August 29, 1977.