Court Opinion

ID: 9949467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 19:02:40.761614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:26.608308
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                             162 T.C. No. 5

                    PAUL ANDREW FRUTIGER,
                           Petitioner

                                    v.

           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                       Respondent

                               —————

Docket No. 31153-21.                               Filed March 11, 2024.

                               —————

             R issued a Notice of Determination to P denying his
      claim for innocent spouse relief. P filed an untimely
      Petition with the Tax Court seeking review of R’s
      determination. R asks the Court to dismiss this case for
      lack of jurisdiction. P argues that the deadline to file a
      petition from a denial of innocent spouse relief is not
      jurisdictional and asks that the Court hear his case on
      equitable grounds.

             A filing deadline is jurisdictional if Congress clearly
      states that it is.

            Held:      The 90-day filing deadline in I.R.C.
      § 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

            Held, further, because P failed to file his Petition
      within the 90-day deadline, we do not have jurisdiction to
      hear his case.

                               —————

                           Served 03/11/24
                                         2

Paul Andrew Frutiger, pro se. 1

Michael S. Hensley and Julia Kapchinskiy, for respondent.

                                    OPINION

      BUCH, Judge: Paul Frutiger filed an untimely Petition for review
of the Commissioner’s final determination denying Mr. Frutiger
innocent spouse relief. The Commissioner asserts that this case should
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, while Mr. Frutiger asserts that the
Tax Court should hear his case on equitable grounds.

       The Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear cases only to the extent
provided by Congress. Although filing deadlines are presumptively not
jurisdictional, Congress can make a filing deadline jurisdictional by
making a clear statement that it intended for the filing deadline to be
jurisdictional.

       Congress clearly stated that the 90-day filing deadline of section
6015(e)(1)(A) 2 is jurisdictional. Because Mr. Frutiger failed to file a
petition with the Tax Court within the 90-day deadline, the Tax Court
does not have jurisdiction to hear his case.

                                   Background

       On June 16, 2021, the Commissioner issued separate notices of
determination to Paola Frutiger and Paul Frutiger, denying each of
their requests for innocent spouse relief for 2018. Within 90 days of
when the Commissioner issued the notice to her, Ms. Frutiger filed a
timely petition seeking review of the notice of determination. See
Frutiger v. Commissioner, No. 25835-21 (T.C. filed July 13, 2021). While
residing in California, Mr. Frutiger mailed a Petition seeking review of
his Notice of Determination 92 days after the Commissioner issued that
notice. The Court received the Petition 96 days after the Commissioner
issued the Notice of Determination to Mr. Frutiger. The Court
consolidated the Frutigers’ cases.

       1 Brief amicus curiae was filed by Mandi L. Matlock and T. Keith Fogg as

counsel for the Center for Taxpayer Rights.
       2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times.
                                    3

        The Court issued an order requesting that Mr. Frutiger and the
Commissioner address whether Mr. Frutiger’s Petition was timely, and
if not, the consequences of filing an untimely petition in an innocent
spouse case. In response, the Commissioner argues that Mr. Frutiger’s
Petition was untimely and that the Court should dismiss his case for
lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Frutiger acknowledges that his Petition was
untimely but argues that the Court should hear his case on equitable
grounds. The Center for Taxpayers Rights, as amicus curiae, submitted
a brief in support of Mr. Frutiger arguing that the 90-day deadline for
filing a petition under section 6015(e)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional.

                               Discussion

        We must decide whether we have jurisdiction over Mr. Frutiger’s
Petition challenging the Commissioner’s determination denying him
innocent spouse relief for 2018. To answer this question, we must decide
whether Congress clearly stated that the section 6015(e)(1)(A) deadline
of 90 days within which to file a petition from a denial of innocent spouse
relief is jurisdictional.

I.    Background on the Tax Court’s Jurisdiction

       Like other federal courts, the Tax Court is a court of limited
jurisdiction and can exercise its jurisdiction only to the extent provided
by Congress. I.R.C. § 7442; Judge v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175,
1180–81 (1987). And of course, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to
determine whether it has jurisdiction. Bongam v. Commissioner, 146
T.C. 52, 54 (2016); Kluger v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 309, 314 (1984).
Section 6015(e)(1)(A) confers jurisdiction on this Court to review a
petition for innocent spouse relief if the taxpayer files that petition not
later than 90 days after the Commissioner issues a final determination
denying relief. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(ii); Sutherland v. Commissioner,
155 T.C. 95, 99 (2020). We must determine whether Congress authorized
us to exercise jurisdiction over petitions for innocent spouse relief when
the petition is not filed within the time limits prescribed by section
6015(e)(1)(A).

       We have previously held that the 90-day deadline set forth in
section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. See Pollock v. Commissioner, 132
T.C. 21 (2009). In Pollock, 132 T.C. at 30–31, we focused principally on
the words of the statute in finding the petition deadline jurisdictional,
noting that section 6015(e)(1)(A) specifically uses the word
“jurisdiction.” We also noted the similarity between section 6015(e)(1)(A)
                                     4

and section 6330(d)(1), which we had previously held created a
jurisdictional deadline for filing a petition to challenge a collection
determination. Pollock, 132 T.C. at 31 (citing Boyd v. Commissioner, 124
T.C. 296, 303 (2005), aff’d, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006)).

        But on April 21, 2022, the Supreme Court decided Boechler, P.C.
v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022), holding that “[s]ection
6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection
due process determination is an ordinary, nonjurisdictional deadline
subject to equitable tolling.” Id. at 1501. The statute at issue in Boechler
provided: “The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this
section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the
Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” I.R.C.
§ 6330(d)(1). The Supreme Court found the 30-day deadline
nonjurisdictional because (1) the term “such matter” in the jurisdictional
parenthetical lacked a clear antecedent thus creating many plausible
interpretations for what it referred to; and (2) there are similar
provisions in the Code that more clearly link a jurisdictional grant to a
filing deadline. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1497–99.

       In the light of new precedent, we must revisit our holding in
Pollock. To the extent Pollock rested on our prior conclusion that
section 6330(d)(1) sets forth a jurisdictional deadline, Pollock no longer
rests on a sure foundation; that foundation was eroded by Boechler.

II.   Whether Section 6015(e)(1)(A) Is Jurisdictional

       The Supreme Court has characterized filing deadlines as
“quintessential claim-processing rules.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v.
Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011). Claim-processing rules are those
that “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that
the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” and
courts generally do not treat them as jurisdictional. Id. However, this
treatment is not absolute and can be rebutted. If Congress clearly states
that a filing deadline is jurisdictional, then we must treat it as such. See
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). Even so, in
applying the clear statement rule, it has been “made plain that most
time bars are nonjurisdictional.” United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402,
410 (2015).

       Under the clear statement rule, Courts cannot find a rule to be
jurisdictional unless Congress made a clear statement that the “rule is
jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, . . . ‘courts should treat the
                                    5

restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.’” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516).
To make a clear statement, Congress “need not use magic words.”
Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436. “But traditional tools of statutory
construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar
with jurisdictional consequences.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Essentially,
“the statement must indeed be clear; it is insufficient that a
jurisdictional reading is ‘plausible,’ or even ‘better,’ than
nonjurisdictional alternatives.” MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform
Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 298 (2023) (quoting Boechler, P.C. v.
Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1499).

       To determine whether Congress made the necessary clear
statement, we examine the “text, context, and relevant historical
treatment” of the provision at issue. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559
U.S. 154, 166 (2010). However, the text is the most important factor. See
Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Commissioner, No. 381-22L, 161 T.C.,
slip op. at 15 (Sept. 27, 2023) (citing Wong, 575 U.S. at 410).

      A.     Summary of the Parties’ Arguments

       The Commissioner argues that the 90-day filing deadline of
section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional because Congress clearly stated
that it was and the Supreme Court’s decision in Boechler, in addition to
numerous appellate cases, supports this argument. He further argues
that Pollock should be upheld.

       Mr. Frutiger and the amicus disagree, arguing that Congress
failed to clearly state that the 90-day filing deadline is jurisdictional.
Mr. Frutiger specifically argues that, as in Boechler, “[t]here is no clear
statement that missing a filing deadline in as short as a few days defines
[sic] the Tax Court cannot hear [his] case.” Moreover, the amicus
specifically argues that Congress failed to clearly state that the section
6015(e)(1)(A) deadline is jurisdictional because (1) there are multiple
plausible interpretations of what the jurisdictional parenthetical in the
provision could refer to; (2) the provision’s statutory context suggests
that the 90-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional; (3) the reasoning
underlying our conclusion in Pollock in finding the provision
jurisdictional does not hold up in the light of recent Supreme Court
decisions, primarily Boechler; and (4) the three appellate opinions
holding the section 6015(e)(1)(A) filing deadline jurisdictional are no
longer good law after Boechler. For purposes of the pending Motion, we
                                    6

will accept these latter two propositions and revisit the question of
whether the section 6015(e)(1)(A) deadline is jurisdictional.

      B.     Applying the Clear Statement Rule

        We must determine whether Congress clearly stated that the
90-day filing deadline of 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. When
determining whether Congress has made a clear statement, we examine
the “text, context, and relevant historical treatment” of the provision at
issue. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 166. After reviewing the text and
statutory context of section 6015(e)(1)(A), we conclude that the 90-day
filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

             1.     The Text

      We will begin our analysis with the text of the provision. Section
6015(e) provides:

             (1) In general.—In the case of an individual against
      whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to
      have subsection (b) or (c) apply, or in the case of an
      individual who requests equitable relief under
      subsection (f)—
                    (A) In general.—In addition to any other
             remedy provided by law, the individual may petition
             the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have
             jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief
             available to the individual under this section if such
             petition is filed—
                            (i) at any time after the earlier of—
                                    (I) the date the Secretary mails,
                            by certified or registered mail to the
                            taxpayer’s last known address, notice
                            of the Secretary’s final determination
                            of relief available to the individual, or
                                    (II) the date which is 6 months
                            after the date such election is filed or
                            request is made with the Secretary,
                            and
                            (ii) not later than the close of the 90th
                    day after the date described in clause (i)(I).

        “Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the statute
itself.” Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 653 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th
                                       7

Cir. 2011). If the text is unambiguous, the statute must be enforced in
accordance to its plain meaning. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486
(2015); Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1983).
“[W]hen deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words
‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.’” King, 576 U.S. at 486 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).

        When we examine the text, it is apparent that Congress clearly
stated that the 90-day filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is
jurisdictional. It provides that a “[taxpayer] may petition the Tax Court
(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate
relief . . . if such petition is filed . . . not later than the close of the 90th
day after the date described in clause (i)(I).” I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)
(emphasis added). Section 6015(e)(1)(A) expressly provides
“jurisdiction” with respect to the Tax Court’s power to hear innocent
spouse cases. And while this alone is not enough, see Boechler, P.C. v.
Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493, there is a clear link between the
parenthetical that contains the jurisdictional text and the 90-day filing
deadline; the filing deadline reads as a prerequisite to the Tax Court’s
jurisdiction.

        Mr. Frutiger and the amicus argue to the contrary, but their
arguments are unpersuasive. First, they both assert that it is not clear
what the jurisdictional parenthetical modifies and cite Boechler as
support. Mr. Frutiger contends that we should follow the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Boechler because the jurisdictional parenthetical
analyzed in Boechler is similar to the section 6015(e)(1)(A) jurisdictional
parenthetical. The amicus contends that we should follow the ruling in
Boechler because, in the amicus’ view, the jurisdictional grant can be
interpreted to modify many parts of the provision and not specifically
the filing deadline. The amicus continues that, when there is ambiguity
as to whether a filing deadline is jurisdictional, the clear statement rule
is not satisfied.

       While we agree that Boechler is relevant to our analysis, it is
distinguishable from this case. In Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner,
142 S. Ct. at 1497, the Supreme Court’s determination whether the
statute at issue contained a clear statement focused on ambiguity in the
reference intended by the phrase “such matter.” Because the term was
ambiguous, and there were multiple plausible interpretations of what
Congress intended, the Supreme Court found that Congress did not
clearly state that the filing deadline was jurisdictional. Id. at 1498. But
                                            8

that is not the case here. On the basis of statutory interpretation
principles, the jurisdictional parenthetical in section 6015(e)(1)(A) is
unambiguous. 3 It does not contain any ambiguous terms such as “such
matter,” and there is a clear link between the jurisdictional
parenthetical and the filing deadline. Specifically, section 6015(e)(1)(A)
is a provision that solely sets forth deadlines. Reduced to its essential
terms, it provides that an “individual may petition the Tax Court (and
the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) if such petition is filed” by a
specified deadline.

       The Supreme Court’s opinion in Boechler expressly differentiated
section 6015(e)(1)(A) from section 6330(d)(1). The Supreme Court
specifically stated that section 6015(e)(1)(A) more clearly linked the
jurisdictional grant to the filing deadline than did section 6330(d)(1).
Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498–99. This statement
supports a holding that Boechler is distinguishable and that section
6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. The amicus asserts that we cannot rely
on the Supreme Court’s comments regarding section 6015(e). While we
cannot rely solely on the Supreme Court’s statement in Boechler, it is
relevant and can be given weight in analyzing issues. See United States
v. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Supreme Court dicta ‘have a weight that is greater than ordinary
judicial dicta as prophecy of what that Court might hold’; accordingly,
we do ‘not blandly shrug them off because they were not a holding.’”
(quoting Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part))). Like the Supreme Court, we
view section 6330(d)(1) and the ultimate holding in Boechler as
distinguishable from this case.

       Second, the amicus asserts that a jurisdictional interpretation of
the section 6015(e)(1)(A) filing deadline conflicts with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Auburn. In Auburn, 568 U.S. at 152, the Supreme
Court had to determine whether a 180-day deadline to request a hearing
with a review board to challenge reimbursement amounts under
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3) was jurisdictional. It found the filing deadline
to be nonjurisdictional because it did not speak in jurisdictional terms

        3 In this instance, we do not place any interpretive weight of Congress’s placing

the jurisdictional grant in a parenthetical. In Boechler, the Supreme Court noted that
a parenthetical “is typically used to convey an ‘aside’ or ‘afterthought.’” Boechler, P.C.
v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498 (citing Bryan A. Garner, Modern English Usage
1020 (4th ed. 2016)). But in the immediately subsequent paragraph, the Supreme
Court cited the parenthetical of section 6015(e)(1)(A) for its relative clarity. Boechler,
P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498–99.
                                    9

and it had even less of a jurisdictional tone than other provisions found
to be nonjurisdictional. Auburn, 568 U.S. at 154. Additionally, in
concluding that the provision was nonjurisdictional, the Supreme Court
rejected a proximity-based argument. It found the filing deadline
provision nonjurisdictional even though there were other conditions
listed in the subsections of the same provision under consideration that
it considered to be jurisdictional. Id. at 155.

       The amicus argues that section 6015(e)(1)(A) is very similar to the
provision the Supreme Court analyzed in Auburn. The amicus contends
that the provisions are similar because both provisions “set out
authority for a court to rule on certain issues if certain conditions are
met.” We disagree.

        First, unlike the provision in Auburn, section 6015(e)(1)(A)
speaks in jurisdictional terms and expressly refers to this Court’s
jurisdiction. Second, unlike the provision in Auburn, there is only one
condition the taxpayer must satisfy in section 6015(e)(1)(A), which is the
filing deadline. There are no conditions other than the filing deadline to
which the jurisdictional text could refer. In contrast, the provision
analyzed in Auburn had three conditions and there was ambiguity as to
whether Congress intended the filing deadline to be amongst the
conditions that were jurisdictional. That ambiguity led the Supreme
Court to hold that the filing deadline was not jurisdictional. See Auburn,
568 U.S. at 155. Unlike the provision at issue in Auburn, Congress
clearly stated that it intended for the section 6015(e)(1)(A) filing
deadline to be jurisdictional.

       The amicus also points to two other cases to support its argument
that interpreting section 6015(e)(1)(A) as jurisdictional conflicts with
court rulings. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Mangum v.
Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009). The amicus
points to these two cases to make the unremarkable point that the
proximity in the statute between a deadline and the jurisdictional grant
is not dispositive. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 763–64; Mangum, 575 F.3d
at 939–40; see also Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1499
(“Rather than proximity, the important feature is the one that is missing
here: a clear tie between the deadline and the jurisdictional grant.”).
Likewise, our conclusion that section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional is
predicated on the structure and text of the provision; namely whether
there was a clear link between the filing deadline and the jurisdictional
parenthetical. Our focus is not on the proximity between the
jurisdictional parenthetical and the filing deadline.
                                    10

       The arguments put forth by Mr. Frutiger and the amicus are
unpersuasive and do not alter our conclusion in finding the 90-day filing
deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) jurisdictional. A plain reading of the
text shows that there is a clear link between the jurisdictional
parenthetical and the 90-day filing deadline. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court’s statement in Boechler providing that section 6015(e)(1)(A) more
clearly links the jurisdictional grant to the deadline supports our
conclusion.

             2.     Analyzing the Statutory Context

       While we could end our analysis with the plain reading of the text,
we will address the amicus’ statutory context argument. The amicus
argues that the statutory context suggests that the filing deadline of
section 6015(e)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional because “(1) it is contained
within a largely equitable innocent spouse relief scheme, (2) it is
contained within a scheme that is unusually protective of taxpayers
(who often have been victims of spousal abuse), and (3) it is, unusually,
a deadline to file for review of an administrative determination in an
Article I court.” Although we agree with some of these points, they are
not sufficient to overcome the clear statutory text of section
6015(e)(1)(A).

       First, it is unclear what weight, if any, we should give to the
equitable nature of section 6015. Relief under section 6015(f) is
equitable. And section 6015(b) certainly contains an equitable
component, in that relief is available for an understatement if “taking
into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
[innocent spouse] liable.” I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(D). But this is merely one
of several requirements to obtain relief under section 6015(b). And relief
under section 6015(c) and (d) contains no equitable component; relief is
based solely on detailed rules. The partial equitable nature of section
6015 is not enough to overcome the clear statutory text.

       Second, it is likewise unclear what weight we should give the
legislation surrounding the enactment of section 6015. The amicus cites
Henderson as support for its argument that we should look to the
protective nature of the enacting legislation. In Henderson, 562 U.S.
at 441, the Supreme Court found a filing deadline nonjurisdictional in
part because the provision “was enacted as part of the [Veterans’
Judicial Review Act], and that legislation was decidedly favorable to
veterans.” Section 6015 was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA), Pub. L. No. 105-
                                     11

206, 112 Stat. 685, as part of Title III of that act, labeled “Taxpayer
Protection and Rights.” Like Henderson, section 6015 was part of
legislation that had taxpayer-favorable aspects to it. But just because
section 6015 was enacted under taxpayer-favorable legislation does not
mean that Congress intended for the filing deadline of section
6015(e)(1)(A) to be nonjurisdictional. As we have stated, section 6015
contains both equitable and nonequitable components. It being enacted
under taxpayer-favorable legislation does not make every part of it
equitable. Concluding that the filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is
nonjurisdictional because it was enacted under RRA Title III would
require us to go against the clear statutory text and make statutory
context the deciding factor. We decline to do so. Notably, the Supreme
Court in Boechler did not put any weight on the fact that section
6330(d)(1) was enacted as part of RRA Title III in concluding that the
30-day filing deadline was nonjurisdictional. See Boechler, P.C. v.
Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493. Thus, we give little weight to this
argument and find it unpersuasive.

       Lastly, the amicus argues that because section 6015(e)(1)(A) is
“part of an Article I court’s review of an administrative determination
that is ‘unusually protective’ of the individuals seeking its benefits,” that
context indicates that the filing deadline should be held
nonjurisdictional. Again, the amicus cites Henderson as support. In
Henderson, the Supreme Court also looked to the “characteristics of the
review scheme that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans’
benefits claims” to help determine whether Congress intended for the
filing deadline to be jurisdictional. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440. In
examining the review scheme, the Supreme Court noted stark
differences between ordinary civil litigation and the system Congress
created to adjudicate veterans’ benefits claims, stating that unlike
ordinary civil litigation,

      a veteran seeking benefits need not file an initial claim
      within any fixed period after the alleged onset of disability
      or separation from service. When a claim is filed,
      proceedings before the VA are informal and
      nonadversarial. The VA is charged with the responsibility
      of assisting veterans in developing evidence that supports
      their claims, and in evaluating that evidence, the VA must
      give the veteran the benefit of any doubt. If a veteran is
      unsuccessful before a regional office, the veteran may
      obtain de novo review before the Board, and if the veteran
      loses before the Board, the veteran can obtain further
                                      12

       review in the Veterans Court. A Board decision in the
       veteran’s favor, on the other hand, is final. And even if a
       veteran is denied benefits after exhausting all avenues of
       administrative and judicial review, a veteran may reopen
       a claim simply by presenting “new and material evidence.”

Id. at 440–41. On the basis of this review scheme, the Supreme Court
concluded that “[r]igid jurisdictional treatment of the . . . period for filing
a notice of appeal in the Veterans Court would clash sharply with this
[pro-veteran] scheme” and thus found the filing deadline
nonjurisdictional. Id. at 441.

       The amicus contends that the review schemes for innocent spouse
and veteran benefit claims are similar in that “rigid treatment of the
90-day innocent spouse judicial review filing deadline would also clash
sharply with the administrative scheme for applying for § 6015 relief”
and, therefore, should be treated similarly by finding this filing deadline
nonjurisdictional. But we disagree. While there are a few similarities in
the schemes, overall they are different. The process for receiving
innocent spouse relief is not informal and has rigid steps. Therefore,
finding the filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) jurisdictional does not
clash sharply with the innocent spouse relief process created by
Congress. We find this argument unpersuasive.

       The amicus’ statutory context arguments are not strong enough
to overcome the statutory text. We thus conclude that the filing deadline
of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

III.   Conclusion

       The 90-day filing deadline of section 6015(e)(1)(A) is
jurisdictional. Because Mr. Frutiger failed to file his Petition within
90 days of his Notice of Determination, his Petition is untimely and we
do not have jurisdiction to hear his case.

       To reflect the foregoing,

       An appropriate order will be issued.