Court Opinion

ID: 9672255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:51:37.322337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:37.238887
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
concurring in results only.
Respectfully, I concur in results only.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals on the issue as to whether the statutes of limitations in KRS 304.39-230 applies to this case. A reasonable interpretation of KRS 304.39-230 implies that subsection (6), which states “[a]n action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060” shall have a two year statute of limitations, covers contract liability when the underlying basis for the contract claim is the tort liability of an uninsured or underinsured motorist.
I agree with the Court of Appeals’ statement:
“Even though we have before us an action brought in contract, we would have no action whatsoever absent the personal injuries arising out of a tortious act, so we do not find it illogical to apply KRS 304.39-230(6) to an uninsured motorist claim under these circumstances.”
Nevertheless, I would reverse the Court of Appeals because the language of KRS 304.39-230(1) and (2) also applies to this case. This means that, if on remand the evidence presented shows that no-fault benefits were paid, limitations would be extended by the payment of no-fault benefits up to “two (2) years after the last payment of benefits,” but “not later than four (4) years after the accident, whichever is earlier.”
Payment of no-fault benefits would mean the carrier had subrogation rights and, in addition, adequate notice of the underlying claim to which it is subrogated. The carrier knows better than the insured of its potential liability under its UM and UIM coverage.
Thus, if no-fault benefits were paid, it would extend the statute of limitations in this case.
I agree with the Majority Opinion on the notice issue. The appellant’s brief states: “In the case at bar, the Appellee had actual notice of the claim at least as early as the spring of 1991,” which would have been ade*334quate. The insurer does not deny actual notice but relies on the demand for written notice. The insurer concedes:
“In Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., Ky., 821 S.W.2d 798 (1991), this Court imposed upon insurers the burden of showing that it is ‘reasonably probable that the insurance carrier suffered substantial prejudice from the delay in notice.’ ”
Under this standard I see no reason why, notwithstanding policy language, the insurer should be permitted to sit back and wait for formal written notice. No doubt the insurer, more than the insured, knew of its potential liability, and of the need to investigate, at the point it receives actual notice.
More evidence is needed before this Court should ñnd, as a matter of law, as did the trial court, “a sufficient demonstration that Farm Bureau has been prejudiced by the late notice.”