Court Opinion

ID: 9881333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-30 21:00:30.374368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:20.971284
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4285

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        SANDRO CUEVAS, JR.,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00194-FL-1)

        Submitted: August 30, 2023                                  Decided: September 29, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan Dubois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, K. Paige
        O’Hale, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Sandro Cuevas, Jr. pleaded guilty, without a written plea agreement, to conspiracy

        to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21

        U.S.C. § 846, and aiding and abetting the distribution and possession with intent to

        distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of

        methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court

        sentenced Cuevas to 360 months’ imprisonment. In a prior appeal, we remanded the

        sentence in light of United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021), for the

        district court to conduct a new sentencing hearing. United States v. Cuevas, No. 21-4023

        (4th Cir. June 3, 2021) (unpublished order).

               On remand, the district court sentenced Cuevas to 295 months’ imprisonment.

        Cuevas again appeals, arguing that the district court erred in calculating the drug weight

        attributed to him at sentencing and in applying a sentencing enhancement for being the

        leader or organizer of a criminal organization under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

        § 3B1.1(a) (2021). Cuevas further asserts that the district court abused its discretion by

        imposing three unreasonable conditions of supervised release and did not sufficiently

        explain why the conditions were appropriate.

               First, the Government contends that Cuevas may not bring his challenges to the

        Sentencing Guidelines calculations on appeal now, as he did not raise them in the first

        appeal, and instead sought a remand and new sentencing hearing pursuant to Singletary.

        However, we have held that when “the appellate court had ‘set aside [the defendant’s]

        entire sentence and remanded for a de novo resentencing,’ the remand order had

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        ‘effectively wiped the slate clean.’” United States v. Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 680 (4th Cir.

        2013) (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011)). As we vacated Cuevas’

        entire sentence under Singletary, the district court was permitted to conduct a full de novo

        resentencing on remand. Accordingly, we will consider Cuevas’ arguments regarding the

        Guidelines calculations in the current appeal.

               “As a general matter, in reviewing any sentence ‘whether inside, just outside, or

        significantly outside the Guidelines range,’ we apply a ‘deferential abuse-of-discretion

        standard.’” United States v. McDonald, 850 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gall

        v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). Under this standard, we review the district

        court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.

        Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 911 (4th Cir. 2017). “We first review for procedural errors; ‘[i]f and

        only if,’ we find no such procedural errors may we assess the substantive reasonableness

        of a sentence.” Id. (quoting McDonald, 850 F.3d at 643). In evaluating the procedural

        reasonableness of a sentence, we assess whether the district court improperly calculated

        the Guidelines range, failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or failed to

        adequately explain the chosen sentence. United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th

        Cir. 2020).

               “It is well established[, however,] that we will not vacate a sentence if we determine

        that the district court’s improper calculation of the Guidelines advisory sentencing range

        was harmless.” United States v. Mills, 917 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019). As the

        Government suggests, we need not resolve Cuevas’s challenges to the district court’s

        Guidelines ruling but may instead “proceed directly to an assumed error harmlessness

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        inquiry.” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). A sentencing error is harmless if: “(1) the district court would

        have reached the same result even if it had decided the Guidelines issue the other way, and

        (2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the Guidelines issue had been decided in the

        defendant’s favor.” Mills, 917 F.3d at 330 (cleaned up). Here, the first prong of the inquiry

        is met. The district court explicitly stated that even if it miscalculated the drug weight or

        erred in assessing Cuevas’ scope of involvement in the criminal enterprise, it would still

        determine that a sentence of 295 months’ imprisonment is sufficient but not greater than

        necessary.

               “We therefore proceed to the second prong of the inquiry, whether the district

        court’s sentence [is] substantively reasonable.” Id. at 331 (internal quotation marks

        omitted). In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a variant sentence, we “consider

        whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose

        such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”

        United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). Although a district court’s “explanation for the sentence must support the degree

        of the variance, . . . it need not find extraordinary circumstances to justify a deviation from

        the Guidelines.” United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Because our review is ultimately for an abuse of discretion, we

        accord “due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,

        justify the extent of the variance.” United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).
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                  Applying these principles, we conclude that Cuevas’ 295-month prison term does

        not amount to an abuse of discretion under the totality of the circumstances, even if the

        district court had sustained Cuevas’ objections to the drug weight and role enhancement.

        The district court provided a sufficiently detailed explanation of the § 3553(a) factors

        motivating its chosen sentence. The court focused on the nature of the crime including the

        length of the operation, the large amount of drugs trafficked, and the international

        transportation of the drugs. The district court further considered the need to protect the

        public and to deter this kind of criminal behavior.

                  In light of the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude

        that Cuevas’ upward variant sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v.

        Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that substantive

        reasonableness review requires an examination of “the totality of the circumstances to see

        whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose

        satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a)”). Consequently, we find that the alleged

        miscalculation of Cuevas’ Guidelines range would be harmless. See McDonald, 850 F.3d

        at 645.

                  Finally, Cuevas argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing three

        unreasonable special conditions of supervised release that involve a greater deprivation of

        liberty than necessary, and did not sufficiently explain the reasons that the conditions were

        appropriate for him. Specifically, Cuevas challenges the conditions that he disclose

        financial information to his probation officer when requested, seek permission from his

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        probation officer before opening any new lines of credit, and submit to warrantless searches

        of his person, car, home, computer, and cell phone.

               We review “conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion, recognizing

        that district courts have broad latitude in this space.” United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d

        413, 419 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The court may impose any

        special condition that is reasonably related to the statutory sentencing factors.” United

        States v. Douglas, 850 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted);

        see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). “[A] sentencing court’s duty to provide an explanation for the

        sentence imposed also requires that the court explain any special conditions of supervised

        release.” United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 676 (4th Cir. 2020).

               This duty arises from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which requires that special
               conditions of supervised release be: (1) reasonably related to the statutory
               goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation; (2) no greater
               a deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve those
               statutory goals; and (3) consistent with any relevant policy statements issued
               by the Sentencing Commission.

        Id. (cleaned up). “Unless a court adequately explains its reasons for imposing certain

        conditions, we can’t judge whether the § 3583(d) factors have been met.” United States v.

        Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2021).

               We conclude that the district court sufficiently explained the reasons for the

        challenged conditions of supervised release and that those conditions are substantively

        reasonable. Regarding the financial conditions, the district court explained that Cuevas has

        several dependent children to support, which is another condition of his supervised release.

        The court stated that providing financial information and seeking the probation officer’s

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        approval prior to opening new lines of credit would help Cuevas work toward the goals of

        supporting his children and living within his means. Considering Cuevas’s admission that

        selling drugs was partially motivated by providing for his family, we find that the district

        court adequately explained the reason for these conditions. Similarly, the district court

        explained that the warrantless search provision was necessary and appropriate in light of

        the nature of Cuevas’ offenses, which involved selling drugs and possessing firearms, and

        the need to effectively supervise Cuevas. Finally, we conclude that the conditions do not

        impose a greater restriction on liberty than reasonably necessary to achieve the sentencing

        goals.

                 Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

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