Court Opinion

ID: 9957335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 14:07:39.541781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:16.634581
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                 APPELLATE DIVISION
                                 DOCKET NOS. A-2054-22
                                              A-2412-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
                                        APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
     Plaintiff-Respondent,                      April 4, 2024
                                           APPELLATE DIVISION
v.

WONGYU JANG,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SASHA QUASHIE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

          Submitted March 4, 2024 – Decided April 4, 2024

          Before Judges Sabatino, Chase, and Vinci.

          On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
          Law Division, Essex County, Docket Nos.
          MA-2022-006 and MA-2022-016.

          RWKD Law, attorneys for appellants (Tamra Dawn
          Katcher, of counsel and on the briefs).
              Stephen Anton Pogany, Assistant Prosecutor, attorney
              for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex
              County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephen Anton Pogany,
              on the briefs).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

VINCI, J.S.C., (temporarily assigned).

      Following a municipal court appeal to the Law Division, defendant

Wongyu Jang appeals from a March 2, 2023 conviction for driving while

intoxicated ("DWI"), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; refusal to submit to a breath test,

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, -50.4a; and careless driving (agricultural or recreational

property damage), N.J.S.A. 39:4-97a.         Defendant Sasha Quashie similarly

appeals from a March 31, 2023 conviction for DWI; careless driving, N.J.S.A.

39:4-97; and failure to maintain lamps, N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, following a

municipal court appeal.

      The Law Division did not conduct hearings in these cases in violation of

the Rules of Court. We are, therefore, required to reverse their convictions

and remand to the Law Division to conduct the appeals in accordance with the

Rules of Court and permit the parties a fair opportunity to have the required

trial de novo on the merits. Because these matters share common issues of fact

and law, we consolidate them solely for the purpose of issuing a single

opinion.   On remand to the Law Division, the appeals shall be conducted

separately.

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                                         2
      Jang was convicted and sentenced in Bloomfield Municipal Court. On

October 13, 2022, Jang filed a notice of appeal to the Law Division. On

March 2, 2023, the court issued an order denying Jang's appeal supported by a

written opinion.1 The court did not schedule or conduct a hearing and did not

offer Jang the opportunity to submit a brief in support of the appeal. The court

noted it "reviewed the municipal court record and determined no briefs were

required." The court based its decision solely on its review of the municipal

court transcripts and the police body camera video admitted as evidence in the

municipal court trial.

      The court "impose[d] the same sentence as the municipal court," but also

found "the defendant is entitled to be present and to make a statement before

sentence is announced." It continued, "[i]f the defendant wishes to be heard on

sentencing . . . he is directed to contact this court by March 15, 2023, to

schedule. Otherwise, the accompanying [o]rder shall become final."

      On March 7, 2023, Jang filed a motion for a stay pending appeal,

arguing the court's failure to conduct a hearing deprived him of his rights to

due process and counsel. On March 14, Jang filed a notice of appeal. On

April 2, Jang filed a motion for a stay before us, which we granted.

1
  On March 3, 2023, the court issued an amended opinion to correct certain
non-substantive matters.

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                                       3
      On April 13, 2023, the Law Division entered an order denying Jang's

motion for a stay supported by a written statement of reasons in which the

court addressed the motion and Jang's "claims that [his] due process rights

were violated on trial de novo because the court did not hear oral argument

before rendering a decision." The court reasoned, "[t]he [n]otice of [a]ppeal

makes no request for briefing or oral argument nor asserts any ground for why

briefing would be needed." It further noted, "[h]ad argument and briefing been

requested, this court would have permitted argument as it always does on

request, and if convinced by some showing that a question of law was

involved, perhaps briefing."

      The court continued:

            [T]he court has wide discretion over the de novo trial
            and counsel should not expect to brief or argue as a
            matter of course. . . . It is incumbent upon counsel to
            make the request and tell the court why briefing is
            necessary and to request argument if they want it. Of
            course, even in the absence of such a request, the court
            may always ask for briefing or argument under the
            [R]ule. The reverse is not true. Counsel should not
            expect the court to solicit briefing and argument as a
            matter of course without some indication from counsel
            that either or both are sought. If that were the
            expectation, the Supreme Court would have worded
            the [R]ule to reflect that.

Jang rejected the court's invitation to be heard on sentencing.

                                                                       A-2054-22
                                        4
      Quashie was also convicted and sentenced in Bloomfield Municipal

Court. On June 8, 2022, Quashie filed a notice of appeal to the Law Division.

On March 31, 2023, the court issued an order denying Quashie's appeal

supported by a written opinion.      The court did not schedule or conduct a

hearing and did not offer Quashie the opportunity to submit a brief in support

of the appeal. Again, the court based its decision solely on its review of the

municipal court transcripts and the police body camera video admitted as

evidence in the municipal court trial. The court "impose[d] the same sentence

as the municipal court" and offered Quashie the opportunity "to be heard on

sentencing" if she contacted the court by April 14, 2023.

      On April 2, 2023, Quashie filed a motion for a stay pending appeal,

arguing the court's failure to conduct a hearing deprived her of her rights to

due process and counsel. On April 6, the court contacted defense counsel and

offered to hear argument on the stay motion "as well as the trial de novo . . . ."

Defense counsel declined that invitation because "the court . . . already

rendered a decision without defendant's being represented by counsel . . . ."

On April 13, the court entered an order denying Quashie's motion for a stay

supported by a statement of reasons substantially identical to that appended to

the order denying Jang's motion. This appeal followed.

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                                        5
      On April 28, 2023, the court submitted amplification letters in both cases

forwarding the April 13 orders and adding in each case "when counsel

objected to the court's decision, the [defendant] was offered argument and

declined."

      On appeal, Jang raises the following point for our consideration:

             POINT I

             THE COURT BELOW VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S
             CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY ENTERING A
             SUA      SPONTE     ORDER   WITHOUT
             PARTICIPATION OF DEFENDANT, DEFENSE
             COUNSEL, OR THE STATE.

      Quashie raises the following points for our consideration:

             POINT I

             THE COURT BELOW VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S
             CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY ENTERING A
             SUA      SPONTE     ORDER   WITHOUT
             PARTICIPATION OF DEFENDANT, DEFENSE
             COUNSEL, OR THE STATE.

             POINT II

             THE BREATH TEST READINGS WERE NOT
             PERFORMED     CONSISTENT   WITH   THE
             MANDATES OF STATE V. CHUN, 194 N.J. 54
             (2008) AND THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
             SUPPRESSED.

                   A. THE STATE FAILED TO COMPLY
                      WITH    THE     TWENTY-MINUTE
                      OBSERVATION PERIOD.

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                                       6
                     B. THE STATE FAILED TO REMOVE ALL
                        ELECTRONIC DEVICES FROM THE
                        ALCOTEST    ROOM     PRIOR   TO
                        ADMINISTERING     THE    BREATH
                        TESTING SEQUENCE.

        We review trial court rulings regarding the applicability, validity, or

interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules de novo. State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J.

2, 17 (2018). "[W]e are not bound by the trial court's application of the law,

even on questions involving interpretation of court rules." State v. Bradley,

420 N.J. Super. 138, 141 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Wash. Commons, LLC v.

City of Jersey City, 416 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2010)).

        A defendant convicted in municipal court "may appeal . . . to the Law

Division and is entitled to a trial de novo." State v. Roberston, 228 N.J. 138,

147 (2017) (citing R. 3:23-1 to -9). Although technically designated as an

appeal, the de novo proceeding in the Law Division is more akin to a trial than

an appeal. "At a trial de novo, the court makes its own findings of fact and

conclusions of law but defers to the municipal court's credibility findings."

Ibid.    "[T]he trial judge giv[es] due, although not necessarily controlling,

regard to the opportunity of the municipal court judge to assess the credibility

of the witnesses."     Id. at 148 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original).

"Once again, the State must carry the burden of proof . . . beyond a reasonable

doubt." Ibid. If the court finds the defendant guilty, the court must, as part of

                                                                          A-2054-22
                                        7
the trial de novo, sentence the defendant anew as provided by law

unconstrained by the sentence imposed in the municipal court. 2 R. 3:23-8(e).

      Rules 3:23-1 to -9 govern municipal court appeals to the Law Division

and unambiguously mandate the court schedule and conduct a hearing.

Rule 3:23-4(b), "Docketing; Hearing Date[,]" requires:

            [u]pon the filing of a copy of the notice of appeal, . . .
            the criminal division manager's office shall docket the
            appeal and shall . . . fix a date for the hearing of the
            appeal and mail written notice thereof to the
            prosecuting attorney and the appellant, or, if the
            appellant is represented, the appellant's attorney.

            (emphasis added).

      Rule 3:23-8, "Hearing on Appeal[,]" provides "[b]riefs shall be required

only if questions of law are involved on the appeal or if ordered by the court

and shall be filed and served prior to the date fixed for hearing . . . ." R. 3:23-

8(b) (emphasis added). Rule 3:23-8(c) provides the "court may, during or

before the hearing of the appeal, amend the complaint . . . ."           (emphasis

added). Rule 3:23-8(f) instructs "[t]he prosecuting attorney shall appear and

2
   The Law Division did not address defendants' convictions for careless
driving and Quashie's conviction for failure to maintain lamps because the
municipal court judge merged those charges with defendants' DWI convictions
and Jang's conviction for refusal to submit to a breath test. Merger is a
function of sentencing following conviction. On remand, the court must
determine whether the State proved defendants committed each of the charged
offenses and, when imposing sentence, determine if any of the offenses should
merge.

                                                                            A-2054-22
                                        8
act on behalf of the respondent at the hearing." (emphasis added). To date,

there are no published opinions construing these Rule provisions.

         In these consolidated cases, the court did not schedule and conduct

hearings, as required by the Rules. The court erred by finding it is incumbent

on counsel to request argument. Likewise, the court incorrectly determined it

is not expected to solicit argument as a matter of course. That is precisely

what the Rules require. The Rules provide, without exception, that upon the

proper filing of a notice of municipal appeal, the criminal division manager

shall fix a date for the hearing of the appeal and mail written notice thereof to

the parties. R. 3:23-4(b). There is no requirement that counsel request a

hearing. The court erred by failing to schedule and conduct hearing s in these

cases.

         We are not persuaded by the court's contention that defendants were

offered a hearing on the trial de novo after the court ruled on their appeals. It

was entirely reasonable for defendants to reject that offer under the facts and

circumstances of these cases. Although a trial de novo is based primarily on

the municipal court record, the Law Division is required to decide the case

completely anew, determine whether the State proved its case beyond a

reasonable doubt, and impose sentence. The defendants are entitled to a trial

de novo conducted by a judge who has not already decided the case.

                                                                          A-2054-22
                                       9
      The court is, of course, vested with great discretion to exercise control

over the proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 125 N.J. Super. 218, 219

(App. Div. 1973) (concluding it was not an abuse of discretion to limit

argument to fifteen minutes per party); see also N.J.R.E. 611(a). However,

"[t]hat discretion . . . includes the obligation to ensure a litigant's point of view

is heard." State v. Finneman, 458 N.J. Super. 383, 390 (App. Div. 2019).

Failing "to allow defendant the opportunity to be heard about the merits of

[the] case" represents "a mistaken application of a judge's discretion to control

[the] courtroom." Ibid. In these cases, the court precluded defendants from

arguing the merits of their cases and thereby deprived them of any meaningful

opportunity to be heard. The court misapplied its discretion by doing so.

      We also conclude, if the court again determines briefs are not required,

the court should nonetheless permit the parties to file briefs setting forth their

positions on appeal. Rule 3:23-8(b) provides "[b]riefs shall be required only if

questions of law are involved on the appeal or if ordered by the court . . . ."

The Rule addresses when briefs are required; it does not prohibit the filing of

briefs absent a court order. Based on the arguments raised before us in these

consolidated appeals, it would be appropriate to permit, if not require, the

parties to file briefs prior to the hearing date.

                                                                              A-2054-22
                                         10
      Because we are remanding these cases for trial de novo, we do not

address Quashie's remaining arguments. By doing so, we do not express any

opinion on the merits of those arguments.

      Considering the history of these cases, the Presiding Judge of the

Criminal Part shall assign these municipal appeals to a different judge for

disposition to avoid any appearance of bias or prejudice.     See Entress v.

Entress, 376 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div. 2005).

      Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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