Court Opinion

ID: 9380633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 19:00:23.14257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.510430
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0138n.06

                                           No. 22-5252

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                Mar 20, 2023
                                                         )                  DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                         )
               Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                         )   ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v.                                                       )   STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                                                         )   THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
KEDRICK ROSS,                                            )   TENNESSEE
               Defendant-Appellant.                      )
                                                         )                               OPINION

Before: SILER, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

       SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant Kedrick Ross pleaded guilty to eleven federal charges.

Prior to sentencing, which occurred a year after he pleaded guilty, he moved to withdraw his guilty

plea. The district court denied his motion to withdraw. Because the district court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Ross’s motion to withdraw, we AFFIRM.

                                         I. Background

       In November 2020, Ross pleaded guilty to eleven charges related to the use and sale of

drugs, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and witness tampering. At his guilty plea hearing,

Ross told the court that he understood the charges against him, the elements required to prove the

charges, and the penalties associated with the charges. Ross also communicated that he was

satisfied with his representation by his appointed attorney, David Baker. The court then requested

the government provide the factual basis for Ross’s plea. Before the government could establish

the factual basis for Ross’s guilt, Baker requested a recess, during which he told Ross that a key

witness had recently died of a drug overdose. Baker still advised Ross to plead guilty because

Ross was a career offender so if he were found guilty of just one of the four charges for possession
No. 22-5252, United States v. Ross

of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, he faced a guideline sentence of 360 months

to life. After the recess, the government read the statement of facts, and Ross pleaded guilty.

       In October 2021, after multiple continuances of Ross’s sentencing hearing, Baker filed a

motion to withdraw as Ross’s counsel. The court granted the motion and appointed Ross a new

attorney. The next month, a year after he pleaded guilty, Ross moved to withdraw his guilty plea.

At the hearing on the motion, Ross alleged that Baker coerced him into pleading guilty. Ross

stated that he was unsure of the consequences of pleading guilty in an “open plea” and became

angry when Baker advised him to plead guilty even though a key witness recently died.

       However, Ross made clear that when he pleaded guilty, he understood the offenses he was

charged with, he was pleading without a plea agreement, and his crimes carried a mandatory

minimum 16-year sentence. Ross also agreed in court that Baker continued the sentencing hearing

multiple times so that he could acquire mitigating evidence and negotiate a lower sentence, and

that Baker advised Ross during that time. Baker denied coercing Ross to plead guilty, explained

that he met with Ross on multiple occasions regarding his sentencing argument, hired an expert to

help with sentencing mitigation, and simultaneously negotiated with the government for a lower

sentence.

       The district court denied Ross’s motion because six of the seven factors considered in

deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea weighed against Ross. The court sentenced Ross to

concurrent 24-month sentences on Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11, to be followed by three

consecutive 60-month terms on Counts 2, 5, and 8. Ross appealed.

                                     II. Standard of Review

       We review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Goddard, 638 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2011). “A district court abuses

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its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law or

uses an erroneous legal standard.” Id. (quotations omitted).

                                          III. Analysis

       A criminal defendant may withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing when he “can show

a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The goal of

the rule is “to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone,

not to allow a defendant to make a tactical decision to enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then

obtain a withdrawal if he believes he made a bad choice in pleading guilty.” United States v.

Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). Moreover, “it is well settled

that the movant has the burden of establishing that his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty

plea should be granted.” United States v. Triplett, 828 F.2d 1195, 1197 (6th Cir. 1987). In deciding

whether a guilty plea withdrawal should be granted, we consider seven factors:

       (1) the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to withdraw it;
       (2) the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to move for withdrawal
       earlier in the proceedings; (3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his
       innocence; (4) the circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the
       defendant’s nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had
       prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the
       government if the motion to withdraw is granted.

Goddard, 638 F.3d at 494. These factors are a non-exclusive list, and no one factor is controlling.

Id. (citing United States v. Bazzi, 94 F.3d 1025, 1027 (6th Cir. 1996)).

           1. The district court acted within its discretion

       Ross first argues that the district court erred in its analysis of the length of delay between

Ross’s guilty plea and motion to withdraw because the court only compared the length of time

Ross waited to raise this issue with cases from this court where the district court’s denial was

affirmed, and the length of delay was far shorter. Without citation to any case, Ross says this was

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No. 22-5252, United States v. Ross

“improper” because there were extenuating circumstances that resulted in his waiting a year to

seek withdrawal of his guilty plea.

       Ross’s argument is wanting. The district court was within its discretion to look to our prior

caselaw as benchmarks for what length of delay weighs in favor of granting versus denying a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea. It cited fives cases where the length of delay was far shorter

than the one-year delay here. In each of those cases, we affirmed the denial of a plea withdrawal.

See United States v. Baez, 87 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 1996) (67 days); United States v. Goldberg,

862 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1988) (55 days); United States v. Watkins, No. 21-1241, 2022 WL

43291, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (71 days); United States v. Williams, 852 F. App’x 992, 996,

(6th Cir. 2021) (“over four months”); United States v. Cinnamon, 112 F. App’x 415, 418–19 (6th

Cir. 2004) (90 days).

       Ross next argues that the district court erred in not accounting for his alleged reasons for

delay in filing the motion to withdraw. The district court found this factor weighed strongly in

favor of denying the motion to withdraw the plea because (1) Ross provided minimal explanation

as to why he waited a full year to seek withdrawal, and (2) he worked with his attorney, who he

stated coerced him into pleading guilty, on sentencing for over six months. Ross argues that he

only waited to request withdrawal of his guilty plea because he was unaware he could do so until

speaking with a fellow inmate while he was waiting to be sentenced. He also argues that although

he continued working with counsel on his sentencing case, he was hesitant to plead guilty, as

shown by his request for a recess during the guilty plea hearing.

       Ross requests that we reweigh the facts already considered by the district court. The district

court considered both the argument that Ross allegedly waited to move for withdrawal of his guilty

plea because he did not know he could do so and because (Ross alleges) he and his counsel had a

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No. 22-5252, United States v. Ross

fractured relationship. The court found both arguments unpersuasive. Nothing in the record leads

us to believe this was erroneous.

       The third factor, whether Ross maintained his innocence, is the one factor the district court

said was arguably neutral. As the district court explained, at the hearing on his motion to withdraw,

Ross claimed that he was innocent of some charges, but then reversed course and said he was

innocent of separate charges. The district court found it notable that Ross did not maintain his

innocence throughout the proceeding. Ross was read the government’s statement of facts and he

told the court that they were true. Ross argues that the district court erred in weighing this factor

as either neutral or in favor of denying the motion. He claims that he asserted his innocence at the

withdrawal hearing regarding the incident from December 2018 and that any apparent

contradiction was illusory. Because of this, he argues, the district court abused its discretion.

       Ross’s argument is flawed for two main reasons. First, although he said he was innocent

of the December 2018 incident during the withdrawal hearing, he also said he wanted to plead

guilty to that incident but withdraw his pleas as to other charges. This cuts against his argument

that he maintained innocence for at least one charge throughout the proceedings. Second, the

subsequent claim of innocence does not negate that he admitted to all of the facts during the initial

plea hearing and admitted that he was guilty of the charged conduct.

       As to the fourth factor, the circumstances underlying the plea, Ross claims that he did not

knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea because he did not understand what entering an “open

plea” meant. But as the district court explained when denying Ross’s motion:

       [Ross] stated that he had discussed the plea agreement with his attorney, that he
       understood the charges against him, that he understood the mandatory and potential
       sentence. During the plea hearing, he stated that no one had put pressure on him to
       plead guilty, the guilty plea was not due to any force or threats or promises, his
       mind was clear, he understood what he was doing and the plea was voluntary.

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No. 22-5252, United States v. Ross

The district court then explained that after Ross and his counsel took a recess to discuss his case,

Ross again affirmed his desire to plead guilty. These circumstances, which indicate that counsel

was competent and the plea was knowing and voluntary, support the district court’s decision. See

United States v. Ellis, 470 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2006). Ross does not articulate any facts or

legal standard that the district erroneously relied upon.

       The same is true regarding the fifth factor, defendant’s background. Ross argues that the

district court erred in only accounting for his education level and not his alleged background of

mental health issues and familial drug history. But we have made clear that the question regarding

a defendant’s background is whether he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and give a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligible plea. See United States v. Martin, 668 F.3d 787, 796–97 (6th

Cir. 2012) (“Although elements of [the defendant’s] background were difficult, his circumstances

do not suggest an inability to understand the proceedings.”). As in Martin, Ross had a high school

education, speaks English, and “over the course of a lengthy colloquy regularly affirmed his

understanding of the proceedings.” Id.

       The district court found the sixth factor, defendant’s prior record, weighed against Ross

because he previously pleaded guilty to state charges on multiple occasions. Ross argues that the

“open plea” in this case confused him and should neutralize any weight given based on his prior

experience in the criminal justice system. We disagree. The point of this factor is to weigh whether

an appellant had enough previous “sufficient contact with the criminal justice system to fully

understand his rights and the process.” Goddard, 638 F.3d at 495. Ross’s argument has no bearing

on this question.

       Finally, regarding the last factor, whether the withdrawal would prejudice the government,

the district court concluded that it need not decide whether the government would be prejudiced if

the plea were withdrawn because Ross did not establish a fair and just reason for allowing the
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No. 22-5252, United States v. Ross

withdrawal based on the first six factors. Ellis, 470 F.3d at 286 (holding that the government need

not establish prejudice “unless and until the defendant advances and establishes a fair and just

reason for allowing withdrawal”) (citation omitted). We agree. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in any of its findings.

        AFFIRMED.

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