Court Opinion

ID: 9463343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:03:34.717158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:02.407496
License: Public Domain

*1379BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur in the majority opinion except for its rejection of the variance provision which is found in 40 C.F.R. § 423.12(a) and which applies to the limitations set for the 1977 step in the “Generating Unit Subcategory.”
Section 423.12(a) is virtually identical to the variance provisions for the 1977 step found in the regulations for the “Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source category.” See e. g. § 415.62. Our decision in DuPont v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, Nos. 74-1261, etc., dealt with the Inorganic Chemicals Category, recognized the regulatory variance applicable to the 1977 step and the statutory variance applicable to the 1983 step, and then said, p. 1028:
“The administration of these provisions in practice is a matter of speculation at the present. The question will arise when a claim for a variance is made in a permit application.”
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 537 F.2d 642, the Second Circuit rejected an attack on the variance clause pertaining to the 1977 step and followed our decision in DuPont v. Train. See p. 646. In so doing the Second Circuit said, p. 647:
“It would be premature at this point to consider whether the variance clause will be interpreted with sufficient liberality to accommodate all legitimate demands for flexibility. Such questions should await the disclosure and development of concrete factual controversies involving a single point source and its permit.”
In providing for a permissible variance in the 1977 step, EPA was properly exercising its § 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a), power “to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his [the Administrator’s] functions under this Act.” The statute, § 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c), provides a variance procedure pertaining to the 1983 step and refers to the “economic capability” to comply with the requirements of § 301(b)(2)(A). I agree that a regulatory variance applicable to 1977 should not be more stringent than the statutory variance provided for 1983. Properly construed and applied § 423.12(a) is not more stringent.
The regulation begins by saying in its first sentence that EPA in establishing limitations took into consideration specified factors, including “age and size of plant, utilization of facilities, * * * control and treatment technology available, energy requirements and costs.” The third sentence says that a discharger may submit evidence:
“[T]hat factors relating to the equipment or facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such dis-charger are fundamentally different from the factors considered in the establishment of the guidelines.”
The fourth sentence says that the permit issuer “will make a written finding that such factors are or are not fundamentally different.”
The majority opinion construes the phrase “such factors” to apply only to “technical and engineering factors.” The majority’s attempt, fn. 22, to distinguish this case from DuPont v. Train does not convince me. The EPA interpretation mentioned in fn. 22 was before us when we decided DuPont v. Train. A reasonable interpretation of § 423.12(a) is to apply the word “such”, as used in the third and fourth sentences, to the factors mentioned in the first sentence. That interpretation makes the regulatory variance for 1977 substantially conform with the statutory variance for 1983.
In any event I would not vacate and remand § 423.12(a) on the assumption that on a claim for variance EPA will give consideration only to “technical and engineering factors,” and will ignore economic capability. The language of the regulation is “equipment or facilities involved.” The regulation does not foreclose consideration of all the factors mentioned in the first sentence. If assumptions are to be made, I would assume that EPA would not apply the regulatory 1977 variance more stringently than the statutory variance for 1983. *1380The statute, § 301(c), mandates consideration of “economic capability.”
I agree with the Second Circuit that the question should await “concrete factual controversies.” My dissent is confined to the action of the court in setting aside and remanding § 423.12(a).
ORDER ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND MODIFICATION
We have considered the petitioners’ motion for clarification and modification of our opinion in these cases decided July 16, 1976, and the respondent’s opposition thereto.
It is accordingly ADJUDGED and ORDERED as follows:
I (Variance Clause)
A. Page 1378 is amended as follows: “40 CFR § 423.12(a)” shall be changed to read “40 CFR §§ 423.12(a), 423.22(a), and 423.32(a), (§ 423.42(a) having been set aside on other grounds).” See footnote 86.
B. We are of opinion that the 1977 and new source standards should not be more stringently applied than the 1983 standards, see duPont, No. 74-1261, 541 F.2d 1018, pp. 1028, 1031-1032, and that reference to the 1983 standards is necessary to determine whether or not the standards for 1977 and new sources have been more stringently applied. Accordingly the opinion, p. 1359, supra, column 2 line 33 is amended to add a comma following 304(b) (1)(B), delete the word “and”, delete period at the end of line and add the following: “and § 304(b)(2)(B).”
We are further of opinion, however, that § 301(c) of the statute itself contains a variance clause for 1983 standards. No regulations issued under that section have been complained of. So far as we are advised, the administrator has not refused to issue regulations to give effect to § 301(c), and no variance applied for has been refused. So far as we are told, the administrator has taken no action under that section of the statute. Accordingly, we deny the motion to require EPA to insert a specific variance clause in the 1983 standards. At such time as the administrator acts or refuses to act under § 301(c), his action or non-action will be subject to review.
II (Sea Water Cooling Towers)
We are now asked by the parties to consider whether or not 40 CFR §§ 423.15(1) and 423.25(1) are valid regulations with respect to new sources using sea water cooling.
As those sections have previously been set aside on other grounds p. 1370, we direct that these sections, as well as § 423.-13(1), be reconsidered in accordance with the directions in our opinion at page 1371.
Ill (Credit for the Intake of Pollutants)
The motion to amend part (k) of our opinion, pp. 1377-1378, is- denied.
With the concurrence of Judge Rives, Judge Breitenstein concurring and dissenting in part in a separate opinion filed herewith.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting in part):
I concur in the order disposing of petitioners’ motion for clarification and modification of opinion except for those provisions of the order which set aside and remand for further consideration the variance clauses contained in 40 C.F.R. §§ 423.12(a), 423.-22(a), 423.32(a) and 423.42. In my opinion the Administrator of the Environmental Agency acted within the authority delegated by § 501(a) of the Act when he promulgated these regulations. They apply only to the 1977 step. They violate no provision of the Act. We are concerned with informal rule-making, not with adjudication. The construction and effect of these regulations should await determination in some case presenting specific facts. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2 Cir., 537 F.2d 642, 647, and American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 10 *1381Cir., 540 F.2d 1023, opinion filed August 11, 1976.