Court Opinion

ID: 9380158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 15:09:09.862538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.975681
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Stephen L. Leonardo,                            :
                  Petitioner                    :
                                                :
               v.                               :
                                                :
Pa. Board of Probation and Parole,              :
Josh Shapiro, Pennsylvania Attorney             :
General, Office of Chief Counsel,               :
Pennsylvania Department of                      :
Corrections,                                    :   No. 156 M.D. 2021
                   Respondents                  :   Submitted: October 21, 2022

BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                  FILED: March 17, 2023

               Before this Court are the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s (Board),1
Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro’s,2 and the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections Office of Chief Counsel’s (collectively, Respondents) preliminary
objections (Preliminary Objections) to Stephen L. Leonardo’s (Leonardo) pro se
petition for review in the nature of a complaint in mandamus (Complaint) filed in

       1
           Effective February 18, 2020, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole was
renamed the Pennsylvania Parole Board. See Sections 15, 16, and 16.1 of the Act of December
18, 2019, P.L. 776, No. 115; see also Sections 6101 and 6111(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code,
61 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101, 6111(a).
       2
          On January 17, 2023, former Attorney General Josh Shapiro was sworn in as
Pennsylvania’s Governor. On March 8, 2023, Michelle A. Henry was sworn in as Pennsylvania’s
Attorney General. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 502(c), when a public officer
named in an appeal ceases to hold office, “his successor is automatically substituted as a party.”
Pa.R.A.P. 502(c).
this Court’s original jurisdiction. After review, this Court sustains the Preliminary
Objections and dismisses the Complaint.

                                          Background3
               Leonardo is currently serving a 14- to 29-year sentence for rape and
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse convictions at the State Correctional
Institution at Rockview. See Complaint at 7.4 After reaching his parole eligibility
minimum sentence date in 2018, Leonardo applied to the Board for parole
consideration. See id. On April 26, 2018, the Board denied Leonardo parole.5 See
Complaint at 7, 18-19. The Board also denied him parole on November 15, 2019.6
See Complaint at 7, 20-21. In response to Leonardo’s January 25, 2021 parole
application, by January 28, 2021 letter, the Board informed him:

               The [] Board is not required to consider an application for
               parole by an inmate or his/her attorney submitted within
               three years from the date a Board [a]ction was recorded
               after a parole interview or hearing, per Title 61 [of the]
               (Prisons and Parole [Code (Parole Code)]) as amended in
               2020. Therefore, your request for review is denied.

       3
           The facts are as Leonardo alleged in the Complaint.
       4
           Because the Complaint pages are not numbered, and the Complaint is divided into
separate sections with duplicative paragraph numbers, the page numbers referenced in this Opinion
reflect the Court’s electronic pagination.
         5
           The Board’s reasons for denying Leonardo parole in April 2018 were: his risk assessment
reflected that he posed a risk to the community; his “failure to demonstrate motivation for success”;
his “denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) [he] committed”; his “refusal to accept
responsibility for the offense(s) [he] committed”; his “lack of remorse for the offense(s) [he]
committed”; his “negative interest in parole”; and he “remain[ed] a danger to the public.”
Complaint at 18.
         6
           The Board’s reasons for denying Leonardo parole in November 2019 were: his risk
assessment reflected that he posed a risk to the community; his “failure to demonstrate motivation
for success”; his “minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) [he]
committed”; his “refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) [he] committed”; and his “lack
of remorse for the offense(s) [he] committed.” Complaint at 20.
                                                 2
                   [Three-year review crimes include: murder,
                   voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, trafficking in
                   individuals, involuntary servitude, rape, statutory
                   sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual
                   intercourse, sexual assault, aggravated indecent
                   assault, indecent assault, incest and individuals
                   designated as a sexually violent predator under 42
                   Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Subch[s]. H (sex offender
                   registration) or I (continued sex offender
                   registration).]

Complaint Ex. A-3 at 1. Because the General Assembly’s only Parole Code
amendment effective in 2020 that referenced a three-year parole review waiting
period was its addition of subsection (3.3) (imposing a three-year parole application
review for those charged with rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) and
subsection (3.4) (imposing a three-year parole application review for sexually
violent predators or registered sex offenders) to Section 6139(a) of the Parole Code,
the only Parole Code amendment to which the Board could be referring was Section
6139(a) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6139(a)(3.3)-(3.4), effective November 25,
2020.7 See Complaint at 7, Ex. A-3 at 1.
               On May 13, 2021, Leonardo filed the Complaint, alleging therein that
the Board arbitrarily denied his parole without due process despite that he had
successfully completed all of his required programs, see Complaint at 6-7, 11, and
the Board’s application of Section 6139(a)(3.3) of the Parole Code violated his right
to due process and the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. See
Complaint at 5-8, 11.         Leonardo seeks an order from this Court compelling
Respondents to vacate the Board’s prior parole decisions and “grant [him] a [p]arole
date . . . .” Complaint at 11.

       7
         See Section 1 of the Act of November 25, 2020, P.L. 1219. Despite that Leonardo
repeatedly refers in his pleadings to the November 25, 2021 Parole Code amendment, and the
General Assembly’s only subsequent amendment to Section 6139 of the Parole Code was effective
June 30, 2021, see Section 21.1 of the Act of June 30, 2021, P.L. 260, it is clear from the context
that he meant the November 25, 2020 amendment.
                                                3
             On December 15, 2021, Leonardo filed a supplemental amended
petition for review in the nature of a complaint in mandamus, consisting of five
paragraphs, wherein he alleged additional facts, i.e., he had obtained
recommendations for parole in August 2021, and the Board interviewed him on
October 6, 2021, but again denied him parole on October 25, 2021. See Amended
Petition at 2, 4-5. On December 28, 2021, this Court ordered Respondents to file a
responsive pleading within 30 days. Thereafter, Respondents requested an extension
to file a response, which the Court granted until February 28, 2022.
             On February 28, 2022, Respondents filed the Preliminary Objections,
asserting therein that the Complaint should be dismissed because it: (1) fails to
comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1513(c) (First
Preliminary Objection); and (2) fails to state a mandamus action upon which relief
may be granted (demurrer) (Second Preliminary Objection).
             On March 31, 2022, Leonardo opposed the Preliminary Objections, but
also filed a second supplemental amended petition for review in the nature of a
complaint in mandamus (Second Supplement), wherein he again asked this Court to
“grant [him] a [p]arole date . . . .” Second Supplement at 1; see also Second
Supplement at 6. In the Second Supplement, Leonardo added paragraph numbers,
but omitted the previously included procedural history necessary to explain the
nature of Leonardo’s incarceration, and that the Board previously denied his parole
applications and refused to consider his January 2021 parole application based on
the November 2020 Parole Code amendment (and, hence, how and why he would
be harmed by the Board’s application of Section 6139(a)(3.3) of the Parole Code).8
Without those specific allegations, the Second Supplement merely presented legal
argument without alleging material facts that would entitle him to any relief.

      8
        Leonardo did not incorporate his Complaint’s factual allegations in the Second
Supplement.
                                          4
Because the Second Supplement did not correct or add facts or add new causes of
action, it did not constitute an amended complaint.9
               By April 8, 2022 Order, this Court directed the parties to file their
respective briefs, and declared that it would decide the Preliminary Objections based
thereon without oral argument. On May 10, 2022, Respondents filed their brief
supporting the Preliminary Objections. On June 27, 2022, Leonardo filed his brief
in opposition to the Preliminary Objections.

                                            Discussion
               Initially, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1516(b) authorizes
the filing of preliminary objections to an original jurisdiction petition for review.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1516(b).

               In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true
               all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
               review [in the nature of a complaint], as well as all
               inferences reasonably deduced therefrom. The Court need
               not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted
               inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or
               expressions of opinion. In order to sustain preliminary
       9
            “Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state . . . .” Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. Rossi, 275 A.3d
1117, 1128 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Accordingly, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule)
1019(a), relating to contents of pleadings, mandates: “The material facts on which a cause of action
. . . is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(a).
               Specifically, a petitioner is required “to plead all the facts that he
               must prove in order to achieve recovery on the alleged cause of
               action.” Commonwealth ex rel. Pappert v. TAP Pharm[.] Prod[s.],
               Inc., 868 A.2d 624, 636 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Legal conclusions and
               general allegations of wrongdoing, without the requisite specific
               factual averments or support, fail to meet the pleading standard. See
               Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1235-36 (Pa. Super. 2008). Under
               the system of fact pleading, every act or performance essential to
               that end must be set forth in the complaint.
Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 275 A.3d at 1128. Civil Rule 1019(a) applies to both complaints and
amended complaints. See Bouchon v. Citizen Care, Inc., 176 A.3d 244 (Pa. Super. 2017).

                                                   5
             objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will
             not permit recovery, and any doubt should be resolved by
             a refusal to sustain them.
             A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
             every well-pleaded fact in the complaint and all inferences
             reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal
             sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be
             sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed
             to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
             ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to
             the complaint.

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citations omitted).
Nonetheless, “[c]ourts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the
facts pled in the complaint, but also any documents or exhibits attached to it.” Foxe
v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308, 310 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Allen v.
Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)).
             Because it is dispositive, this Court will first address Respondents’
Second Preliminary Objection.       Relative to Respondents’ Second Preliminary
Objection, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(4) authorizes Respondents
to object to the Complaint on grounds that it fails to state a cause of action upon
which relief may be granted (i.e., demurrer).           See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4).
Respondents argue that Leonardo failed to state a valid mandamus action because
his allegations “do not point to a specific law or policy that has changed the
requirement for parole consideration[,]” Respondents’ Br. at 7, and the Board’s
discretion in parole matters is not subject to judicial review.
             Leonardo acknowledged in his Complaint, and the law is well settled:

                    The common law writ of mandamus lies to
                    compel an official’s performance of a
                    ministerial act or a mandatory duty. McGill
                    v. P[a.] Dep[’]t of Health, Off[.] of Drug [&]
                    Alcohol Programs, 758 A.2d 268, 270 (Pa.
                    Cmwlth. 2000). ‘The burden of proof falls
                    upon the party seeking this extraordinary
                                           6
                   remedy to establish his legal right to such
                   relief.’ Werner v. Zazyczny, . . . 681 A.2d
                   1331, 1335 ([Pa.] 1996). Mandamus requires
                   ‘[1] a clear legal right in the [petitioner], [2]
                   a corresponding duty in the [respondent], and
                   [3] a lack of any other adequate and
                   appropriate remedy at law.’ Crozer Chester
                   Med[.] C[tr.] v. . . . Bureau of Workers’
                   Comp[.], Health Care Serv[s.] Rev[.]
                   Div[.], . . . 22 A.3d 189, 193 ([Pa.] 2011)
                   (citations omitted).       Mandamus is not
                   available to establish legal rights but only to
                   enforce rights that have been established.
             Sinkiewicz v. Susquehanna Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 131
             A.3d 541, 546 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “Mandamus is not
             used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion of
             an official in a particular way.” Clark v. Beard, 918
             A.2d 155, 159 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (emphasis added).
             Further, “[i]n the context of a discretionary act, a court can
             issue such a writ to mandate the exercise of [its] discretion
             in some fashion, but not to require that it be exercised in a
             particular manner.” Sever v. Dep’t of Env[’t] Res., . . . 514
             A.2d 656, 660 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1986) (quoting U.S. Steel
             Corp. v. Papadakos, . . . 437 A.2d 1044, 1046 ([Pa.
             Cmwlth.] 1981)).

Stodghill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 150 A.3d 547, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 77
A.3d 182 (Pa. 2018).
             Relevant to this case, the law is well established: “[A] parole eligibility
date, usually set at the expiration of the prisoner’s minimum sentence, does not vest
any right to a grant of parole upon reaching that date.” Weaver v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

             Parole is nothing more than a possibility, and, when
             granted, it is nothing more than a favor granted upon a
             prisoner by the state as a matter of grace and mercy shown
             by the Commonwealth to a convict who has demonstrated
             a probability of his ability to function as a law abiding
             citizen in society.

Id. Therefore,
                                           7
             parole is not a right in Pennsylvania, but a matter of grace.
             Commonwealth v. Brittingham, . . . 275 A.2d 83 ([Pa.]
             1971); Reider v. P[a.] B[d.] of Prob[.] [&] Parole, . . . 514
             A.2d 967 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1986). The Board has been
             granted broad discretion in parole matters and what the
             Board decides, and why, being wholly a matter of the
             Board’s discretion, is simply not subject to judicial review.
             [Id.] . . . [at] 971-72 . . . . It is for the Board alone to
             determine whether or not a prisoner is sufficiently
             rehabilitated to serve the remainder of his sentence outside
             the confines of prison. Id. As a result, decisions to grant
             or deny parole are generally not appealable except to the
             extent that a constitutional or statutory violation has
             occurred.

Myers v. Ridge, 712 A.2d 791, 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Thus, although a prisoner
has no liberty interest in parole, he does have a substantive due process right “in
making sure the Board followed the minimum duties required by the law.” Homa v.
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 192 A.3d 329, 334 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Due process
challenges are among those that “may be raised in a mandamus action.” Toland v.
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 263 A.3d 1220, 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
             However, Leonardo appears to argue that the Board denied him due
process in denying his parole because it focused on the nature of his criminal conduct
without considering the other factors that weighed in favor of granting him parole.
See Complaint at 6, 8, 11. Section 6139(a)(2) of the Parole Code mandates that
“[t]he [B]oard shall consider applications for parole by an offender . . . .” 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 6139(a)(2). Section 6139(a)(5) of the Parole Code also specifies that the Board
must file of record “a brief statement of the reasons” if it denies parole. 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 6139(a)(5). According to the allegations in the Complaint, when the Board denied
Leonardo’s parole, it detailed its reasons for doing so. See Complaint at 18, 20. This
Court has ruled that, because “the Board is specifically given discretion to determine
whether [a prisoner] poses a risk to society and in the factors it considers relevant
for doing so[,]” Homa, 192 A.3d 334, “mandamus cannot be used to dispute the

                                           8
weight the Board gave to the factors for parole.” Id. at 332; see also Weaver, 688
A.2d at 777 (“Mandamus cannot be used to say that an agency considered improper
factors, that its findings of fact were wrong, or that the reasons set forth in its
decision are a pretense.”).
                Because Leonardo did not and cannot sufficiently plead that “the Board
[failed to] follow[] the minimum duties required by the law” in considering his
parole factors, Homa, 192 A.3d at 334, he failed to state a viable mandamus claim
against Respondents on the basis that the Board violated his due process rights.
                Next, notwithstanding Respondents’ claim that Leonardo’s allegations
“do not point to a specific law or policy that has changed the requirement for parole
consideration[,]” Respondents’ Br. at 7, based on this Court’s review of the
Complaint, and the Board’s January 28, 2022 letter attached to the Complaint,
Leonardo challenges the Board’s application of the November 25, 2020 amendment
to Section 6139(a)(3.3) of the Parole Code, which delays parole consideration for
three years, because it violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws by prolonging his incarceration. See Complaint at 10-11, 22.
                “Where . . . the actions of the [B]oard taken pursuant to changed
statutory requirements are being challenged, an action for mandamus remains viable
as a means for examining whether statutory requirements have been altered in a
manner that violates the ex post facto clause.” Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 290
(Pa. 2001)10 (footnote omitted); see also Toland, 263 A.3d at 1233 (Ex post facto
claims “may be raised in a mandamus action.”).

                Section 9 of Article I of the United States [(U.S.)]
                Constitution provides that “[n]o . . . ex post facto [l]aw
                shall be passed.” U.S. CONST. [a]rt. I, § 9. Section 17 of
                article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that “[n]o

      10
           Opinion after certified question answered, 251 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2001).
                                                9
             ex post facto law . . . shall be passed.” PA. CONST. art. I, §
             17.
Toland, 263 A.3d at 1224 n.3. The Toland Court explained:
             The ex post facto prohibition bars enactments by the
             [s]tates “which, by retroactive operation, increase the
             punishment for a crime after its commission.” Garner [v.
             Jones], 529 U.S. [244,] 249 . . . [(2000)] (citing Collins v.
             Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 . . . (1990)). “Retroactive
             changes in laws governing parole of prisoners, in some
             instances may be violative of this precept.” Id. (citing
             Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 . . . (1981); [Cal. Dep’t
             of Corr. v.] Morales, 514 U.S. [499,] 508-09 . . . [(1995)]).
             Our [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court has recognized the
             potential of an ex post facto violation by a change in a
             parole law under the Pennsylvania and [U.S.]
             Constitutions. Coady, 770 A.2d at 290. “Two critical
             elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be
             violative of the ex post facto clause: ‘It must be
             retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring
             before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the
             offender affected by it.’” Cimaszewski [v. Pa. Bd. of
             Prob. & Parole], 868 A.2d [416,] 423 [(Pa. 2005)]
             (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 . . . ).

Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
             Until November 25, 2020, in all cases, Section 6139(a)(3) of the Parole
Code declared that “the [B]oard shall not be required to consider nor dispose of an
application by an offender . . . where a parole decision has been issued by the [B]oard
on that case within one year of the date of the current application for parole.” 61
Pa.C.S. § 6139(a)(3).     However, effective November 25, 2020, the General
Assembly added Section 6139(a)(3.3) to the Parole Code, which states, in pertinent
part:

             [I]f a parole decision has been issued by the [B]oard within
             three years of the date of the current application, the
             [B]oard shall not be required to consider nor dispose of an

                                          10
               application by an offender . . . sentenced under any of the
               following provisions of [the Crimes Code]:[11]
               ....
               Section 3121 [of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121]
               (relating to rape).
               ....
               Section 3123 [of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123]
               (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).

61 Pa.C.S. § 6139(a)(3.3).
               Because Leonardo was convicted of rape and involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse before the General Assembly enacted the 2020 Parole Code
amendment, the Board’s declaration that it would not consider his January 2021
parole application until three years had elapsed from Leonardo’s last parole denial
constituted retroactive application of Section 6139(a)(3.3) of the Parole Code. “We
must, therefore, examine whether [Leonardo] has sufficiently pled that the
application of the [2020 a]mendment has disadvantaged [him] such that it violates
the ex post facto prohibition.” Toland, 263 A.3d at 1235.
               Leonardo’s claimed disadvantage is that the Board’s application of
Section 6139(a)(3.3) of the Parole Code extended his incarceration. Indeed, “[a]
state law violates the ex post facto clause if it was adopted after the complaining
party committed the criminal acts and ‘inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed.’” Sherwood v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 268 A.3d
528, 548-49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wall, 867 A.2d 578,
580 (Pa. Super. 2005)). However, that is not the case here.
               Like Section 6139(a)(3.1) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. §
6139(a)(3.1), Section 6139(a)(3.3)(ii) of the Parole Code warns that the three-year

      11
           18 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9546.
                                           11
consideration postponement “under [Section 6139(a)(3.3)] of the Parole Code shall
[not] be interpreted as granting a right to be paroled to any person[.]” 61 Pa.C.S. §
6139(a)(3.3)(ii).    Therefore, Leonardo had no guaranteed right to be paroled.
Moreover, although a prisoner’s “minimum sentence [] sets the time after which he
is eligible to serve the remainder of his sentence on parole[,]” his “actual
sentence . . . is his maximum sentence[.]” Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 204
A.3d 392, 396 (Pa. 2019) (emphasis added). “[T]he prisoner on parole is still in the
legal custody of the state . . . , and is under the control of the warden and of other
agents of the Commonwealth until expiration of the [maximum] term of his
sentence.” Id. (quoting Brittingham, 275 A.2d at 85). “A grant of parole does not
eliminate a prisoner’s sentence, but instead, the prisoner continues to serve his
sentence . . . .” Weaver, 688 A.2d at 769. Correspondingly, denial of parole does
not extend a prisoner’s sentence, but requires him to continue to serve his maximum
sentence. Therefore, in denying Leonardo’s parole, or delaying its consideration of
his parole application, the Board did not inflict a new or greater punishment than he
was originally given.
               In Morales, the prisoner challenged, on ex post facto grounds, a statute
that similarly extended the period between parole considerations from one to three
years for prisoners convicted of the most serious offenses. In reversing the lower
court’s determination that the change violated the ex post facto clause, the U.S.
Supreme Court observed: “The amendment [] left unchanged the substantive
formula for securing any reductions to this sentencing range. . . . The amendment
had no effect on the standards for fixing a prisoner’s initial date of ‘eligibility’ for
parole [(i.e., the date on which he could first be considered for parole)], . . . or for
determining his ‘suitability’ for parole and setting his release date[.]” Morales, 514
U.S. at 507.

                                           12
               Likewise, here, the Board’s postponement of Leonardo’s parole
consideration pursuant to Section 6139(a)(3.3) of the Parole Code “had no effect on
the standards for fixing [Leonardo’s minimum sentence date],[12] . . . or for
determining his ‘suitability’ for parole and setting his [maximum sentence] release
date[.]” Morales, 514 U.S. at 507. In addition, as the Complaint reflects, the Board’s
conclusions that Leonardo should not be paroled were based on its observations that
he posed a risk to the community, he lacked motivation for success, he minimized
and/or denied the nature of his offenses, and he did not accept responsibility or
demonstrate remorse for his offenses. See Complaint at 18, 20. In light of those
circumstances, the Board did not extend Leonardo’s incarceration, but required him
to continue to serve the term the sentencing court originally imposed pending the
Board’s next review.
               Because Leonardo did not and cannot sufficiently plead that the
Board’s application of the November 25, 2020 amendment to Section 6139(a)(3.3)
of the Parole Code inflicted a new or greater punishment by prolonging his
incarceration, he failed to state a viable mandamus claim against Respondents on the
basis that the Parole Code’s “statutory requirements have been altered in a manner
that violates the ex post facto clause.” Coady, 770 A.2d at 290. Moreover, even if
this Court determined that Leonardo was entitled to mandamus relief, because the
Court cannot order the Board to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, see
Stodghill, this Court cannot, as Leonardo requests, order the Board to grant him a
parole date.13 See Complaint at 11.

       12
           “Under Pennsylvania law, the minimum term imposed on a prison sentence [] sets the
date prior to which a prisoner may not be paroled.” Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d
319, 321 n.2 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted). A prisoner may apply to the Board for parole
consideration at the expiration of his minimum term, see id., which is what Leonardo did in this
case. See Complaint at 7.
        13
           In light of this Court’s disposition of Respondents’ Second Preliminary Objection, this
Court need not address Respondents’ First Preliminary Objection.
                                               13
                                  Conclusion
            Accepting all of the pleaded facts as true, as this Court must,
Leonardo’s Complaint failed to state a mandamus claim for which relief may be
granted. Thus, this Court sustains Respondents’ Second Preliminary Objection and
dismisses Leonardo’s Complaint.

                                    _________________________________
                                    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

                                      14
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Stephen L. Leonardo,                    :
                  Petitioner            :
                                        :
            v.                          :
                                        :
Pa. Board of Probation and Parole,      :
Josh Shapiro, Pennsylvania Attorney     :
General, Office of Chief Counsel,       :
Pennsylvania Department of              :
Corrections,                            :   No. 156 M.D. 2021
                   Respondents          :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2023, the Pennsylvania Parole
Board’s, Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro’s, and the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections Office of Chief Counsel’s second preliminary objection
to Stephen L. Leonardo’s pro se petition for review in the nature of a complaint in
mandamus (Complaint) is SUSTAINED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED.

                                      _________________________________
                                      ANNE E. COVEY, Judge