Court Opinion

ID: 9643698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:37:56.347136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:17.388373
License: Public Domain

Underwood, J.,
concurring. I agree with that portion of the majority opinion holding that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded because the trial judge gave serious consideration to only one of the several Gardner criteria. I disagree, however, with that portion of the majority opinion which implies that if the trial judge had remained silent or given no reasons to explain why he ruled in the manner in which he did, that we would assume that he had complied with the Gardner standard.
As a result of our holding in State v. Gardner, 139 Vt. 456, 458, 433 A.2d 249, 250 (1981), interpreting 12 V.S.A. § 1608, all trial judges must exercise their discretion before permitting the credibility of a witness to be impeached by admitting evidence of conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude within fifteen years. In exercising this discretion we demand that the trial judge consider such factors as: (1) the nature of the proceeding, that is, whether it is civil or criminal; (2) whether the witness is or is not the defendant; (3) the nature of the crime to be used for impeachment; (4) the length of defendant’s criminal record; (5) the length of time since the conviction; and (6) the relative importance of the defendant’s own testimony. Id. at 460-61, 433 A.2d at 251.
But how can we know from a silent record if the trial judge has considered these factors, or has abused his discretion, or exercised it for clearly untenable reasons? The majority blithely declare:
*195If the record were silent, we could assume such compliance with a well-established and clearly stated standard, since there would be no showing that it had withheld discretion or exercised it for clearly untenable reasons or to an extent clearly untenable.
They then go on to state that the burden of proof is on the party alleging abuse of discretion to prove it. With this, I agree. However, I cannot agree to a holding which makes it potentially impossible to meet this burden. This is exactly what the majority opinion does by encouraging trial judges to maintain a silent record as to the basis for their decision to admit or exclude certain convictions.
It would not be too onerous a task for the trial judge to file written findings, or place its oral findings upon the record, so that the litigants, their counsel, and this Court would know the basis for the judge’s ruling. A record which is silent as to the judge’s findings may protect the trial judge’s batting average on appeal, but it is manifestly unfair to the litigant who feels compelled to object to the admission of the criminal record. Moreover, it puts this Court in an impossible position to read the trial judge’s mind.
I would require the judge to either file written findings of fact, or to put oral findings of fact upon the record, whenever called upon to make a discretionary ruling under 12 V.S.A. § 1608. V.R.Cr.P. 12(d) mandates “[w]here factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the record.” Justice Larrow, commenting on V.R.Cr.P. 12 in his opinion for the Court in State v. Murray, 134 Vt. 115, 116, 353 A.2d 351, 353 (1976), stated:
Although less rigorous than the requirement of V.R.Cr.P. 23(c) for findings of fact where a case is tried by court, it is intended to insure a record on appeal which delineates the factual basis on which the ruling of the court was made.
We should require no less here.
Chief Justice Billings joins in this concurrence.