Court Opinion

ID: 9694524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:45:07.929299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:02.834537
License: Public Domain

BYER, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I join the majority’s opinion to the extent it holds that plaintiff’s action is not barred by sovereign immunity. However, I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the summary judgment on the basis of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, because this issue is not properly before us.
Although defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of both sovereign immunity and exclusivity of remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (296a), the trial court entered summary judgment solely on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court’s opinion contains no discussion of the defendant’s alternative argument under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, so we have no idea whether the trial court would find the existence of a “genuine issue as to any material fact” relevant to this legal question. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b).
Defendant’s brief in this court does not argue the Workmen’s Compensation Act question. Instead, defendant’s brief argues only the sovereign immunity question, and notes expressly that defendant’s argument on sovereign immunity assumes “arguendo that plaintiff has pleaded a cause of action which is not barred by the Workmen’s Compensation Act____” Brief of Appellee, 10. Indeed, defendant’s Counter-Statement of Questions Involved in its brief does not raise any question relating to the exclusivity of the Workmen’s Compensation remedy. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“ordinarily no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of questions involved or suggested thereby.”)
Although we may affirm a decision based upon grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court, see, e.g., Karl Smith Development Co. v. Borough of Aspinwall, 125 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 687, 695 n. 6, 558 A.2d 181, 185 n. 6 (1989), app. den., 525 Pa. 614, 577 A.2d 545 (1990), I *666am unaware of any case in which we have done so under the circumstances of this case. Although the question does involve subject matter jurisdiction, resolution of that question in this case depends upon the determination of basic facts, a function which should be within the exclusive province of the trial court.
Plaintiffs brief in this court does discuss the question of whether the Workmen’s Compensation Act would preclude plaintiff’s action. However, this was in obvious anticipation of an argument which appellee decided not to make in this court. We do not have an argument by defendant-appellee on this point except the “argument” made in the majority opinion. Because defendant’s brief does not discuss the point, plaintiff-appellant did not discuss the issue in any reply brief under Pa.R.A.P. 2113. Thus, the majority’s raising this issue on behalf of defendant-appellee deprives plaintiff-appellant of any opportunity to file a reply brief answering the argument which the majority asserts on behalf of appellee.
Furthermore, we do not have the benefit of any trial court review of the record to determine whether the record presents, with respect to Workmen’s Compensation Act question, a “genuine issue as to any material fact____” Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b). Such a review is essential to the proper exercise of our appellate function in this case.
The pivotal issue with respect to the Workmen’s Compensation Act question in this case is whether the perpetrator of this brutal attack acted for personal reasons and not because of plaintiff’s employment. Workmen’s Compensation Act, § 301(c), 77 P.S. § 411(1). This manifestly is a factually intensive determination. Because the trial court limited its determination to the sovereign immunity question, I cannot determine whether plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity in the trial court to establish the facts relevant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act question nor whether the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to show a “genuine issue as to any material fact” relevant to determi*667nation of this question so as to preclude summary judgment under Pa.R.C.P. 1035 and require a jury trial.
We do not properly exercise our appellate review function by reaching to decide a case on a fact-based issue which the party benefited by our ruling has chosen not to raise on appeal. Likewise, it is not our function to comb through the record to determine whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” for purposes of Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b) without the benefit of a trial judge’s evaluation of the record, particularly where we deprive appellant of any opportunity to dispute the argument we make on behalf of appellee.
I cannot agree to take away plaintiff’s right to a jury trial under these circumstances. I believe the majority has strayed beyond our function of appellate review and has done so in a fundamentally unfair manner.
Therefore, I most respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the order granting summary judgment on a basis which is not before us. I would vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings, including consideration of that aspect of defendant’s motion for summary judgment which the trial court did not reach because of its decision on sovereign immunity.