Court Opinion

ID: 9628853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:33:17.46241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:12.565999
License: Public Domain

Justice KOURLIS
dissenting:
Because I believe that the Board of County Commissioners of Pueblo County (BOCC) is acting here under its express and distinct statutory authority to manage and budget the affairs of Pueblo County, and not in its role as agent for the State Department of Social Services, I conclude that the County has standing to sue in this case and I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
Any analysis of this area of the law rightfully begins with the general proposition that a subordinate county agency has no standing or legal authority to question or obtain judicial review of an action taken by a superior state agency. See Lamm v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511, 519, 565 P.2d 538, 544 (1977). In Lamm, this court stated that a subordinate county official “had no more standing to question the validity of the action of the Board [of Assessment Appeals] than a lower court has to question the validity of the mandate of the reviewing court. [The official] was obligated to carry out the mandate of the Board. There is no legal justification for his defiance_” Id. at 520, 565 P.2d at 544 (quoting People ex rel. State Bd. of *580Equalization v. Hively, 139 Colo. 49, 74, 336 P.2d 721, 735 (1959)).
That concept has its roots in the general notion that a subordinate agency may not challenge the principal’s policies by way of court process. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has held that policy matters between or inside governmental agencies should not be resolved by the courts. See Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 127, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 1284, 131 L.Ed.2d 160 (1995).
Boards of county commissioners serve a variety of functions, and are certainly not limited to acting as subordinate agencies. One discrete function involves the duties prescribed under the Human Services Code, to wit: “the county departments or other state designated agencies, where applicable, shall serve as agents of the state department and shall be charged with the administration of public assistance and welfare and related activities in the respective counties in accordance with the rules and regulations of the state department.” § 16-1-118(1), 6 C.R.S. (1997). However, and much more broadly, boards of county commissioners have the authority to levy taxes, make assessments, and operate county government. See § 30-11-107, 9 C.R.S. (1997). Although the authority delegated to county commissioners stems from the state, see Board of County Comm’rs of Douglas County, Colo. v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 699 (Colo.1996), such boards cannot be said to be acting as agents of the state for all purposes. Indeed, the General Assembly has directed that “[t]he County shall perform its public assistance and welfare duties, responsibilities, and activities separate and apart from the duties and responsibilities of the Board of County Commissioners.” § 26-1-116(3), 8 C.R.S. (1997).
Hence, in my view the appropriate inquiry in this case is whether the BOCC was, indeed, acting in its agency capacity in the context of this lawsuit. I conclude that it was not.
A.
The BOCC was acting in its capacity as a spending and taxing authority, not in its capacity as agent for the State Department of Social Services, when it brought this action.1 It was attempting to protect its taxpayers from an increase in property tax rates that could be occasioned by a deficit. This activity falls within the broad powers granted to boards of county commissioners set forth in section 30-11-107, not within the discrete subordinate functions found in section 16-1-118(1).
In Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County v. Merit System Council, 662 P.2d 1093 (Colo.App.1982), the court of appeals addressed a circumstance in which a board of county commissioners sought judicial review of an order entered by the Merit System Council reinstating a terminated employee. The court of appeals held that “the standing of the Board of County Commissioners depends upon the standing of the County Board and the County Department of Social Services to maintain an action for judicial review. We conclude that neither ... has standing to seek judicial review under the circumstances here.” Id. at 1094. Certainly it is good law that the County Board of Social Services and the County Department of Social Services do not have standing to sue the State Department of Social Services. The former are the agents of the latter, and are empowered to act upon the State policies — not to challenge them.
A basic principle of the law of standing is that a representative entity has standing to seek relief only if the party on whose behalf that entity is acting would also have standing in its own right. See Denver Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 738 P.2d 414, 415 (Colo.App.1987) (finding standing where members of the association would have standing to sue in their own right under facts alleged). Thus, if the Board of County Commissioners is acting in lieu of the County Department of Social Services or *581County Board of Social Services, it would not have standing. The court of appeals’ holding in Merit System Council falls within this general precept.
However, I find a critical distinction in the case currently at issue. Here, the BOCC is not acting as the Board of Social Services challenging an internal policy decision; rather the BOCC is acting as a separate and distinct entity whose budgetary responsibilities are directly and disproportionately impacted by the subject matter of the lawsuit. The authority to levy and assess taxes and manage the whole county budget cannot come from the Colorado Board of Human Services because that board has no such power and an agent can have no greater power than its principal. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 12 cmt. a (1958). Rather, the BOCC’s powers in this context derive directly from the Colorado Constitution, Article XIV and from sections 30-11-101 and -107, 9 C.R.S. (1997). The BOCC' here is seeking to vindicate its duty to manage the county budget, which duty is not undertaken as an agent of the Board of Human Services, but rather as an independent governmental body.
B.
I turn then to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), because the action sought to be redressed is an agency action. Section 24-4-106(4) of the APA provides that: “Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court within thirty days after such agency action becomes effective....” § 24-4-106(4) 7 C.R.S. (1997).
The General Assembly has defined a county as a “person” and not as an “agency” for purposes of the APA See §§ 24-4-102(12); 24-4-102(3), 7 C.R.S. (1997). See also Douglas County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo.1992). Hence, there is a basis for asserting standing by the BOCC under the Act.2
The next inquiry then, is whether the BOCC is adversely affected or an aggrieved party within the meaning of section 24-4-106 of the APA. This analysis parallels the general inquiry under the law of standing: whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected right. See Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977).
The county’s injury in fact is clearly the $1,612,187 deficit alleged in the pleadings. Whether the injury is protected at law is less clear, but in my view the question should be answered in the affirmative at this stage of the proceedings.
Determining whether the asserted injury is one protected by law comes perilously close to deciding the merits of the lawsuit rather than the right of the county to maintain the lawsuit. This case is before us at the starting gate, and we are called upon to determine whether the parties may run the race — not who will win. The case was dismissed by the trial court on summary judgment. Pursuant to the standards applicable to a summary judgment motion, all doubts legitimately raised by any evidence or pleadings before the court must be resolved against the moving party. See Smith v. Boyett, 908 P.2d 508, 514 (Colo.1995).
The BOCC seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under the terms of sections 26-1-121(1)(e), -122(5) and -126(5). Subsection - 126(5) contains the provisions regarding the reduction of expenditures to match available funding. The subsection was a part of House Bill No. 1376, enacted on June 11,1985. See ch. 58, sec. 2, § 26-1-126(5), 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 289, 290. House Bill 1376 was drafted in reaction to this court’s decision in Colorar do Department of Social Services v. Board of County Commissioners, 697 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1985), holding that the General Assembly was required to fund the Contingency Fund in a sufficient amount to fulfill the justifiable claims of counties eligible for such assistance.
*582Soon after our decision in Colorado Department of Social Services, the General Assembly noted its disagreement with the court’s conclusion by enacting legislation which provides that: (1) legislation passed by one session of the General Assembly cannot bind future legislative sessions to appropriate any sums of money, see § 2-4-215, 1 C.R.S. (1997); (2) the General Assembly has absolute discretion to “determine annually the level of funding” in the Contingency Fund, and the existence of the Contingency Fund does not “result in any state liability for amounts not appropriated” to that fund, see § 26-1-126.5, 8 C.R.S. (1997); and (3) the appropriate response to a shortage of funds in the Contingency Fund is a reduction in the rate of state social services expenditures to be implemented by the executive director of the department. See § 26-1-126(5).
House Bill 1376, as enacted, satisfies the requirement that the harm suffered be to a legally protected interest. The County’s interests are specifically protected by the language of the statute, and the statute was designed to address the very injury that has occurred. See Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317 (Colo.1989).3
II.
I would thus affirm the court of appeals’ conclusion that the BOCC has met the requirements necessary to maintain an action in court and would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

. Prior to the trial court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties entered a stipulation of facts. As part of the stipulation, the parties agreed that the BOCC was bringing this action in its capacity as the Board of County Commissioners of Pueblo County. See Board of County Comm’rs of County of Pueblo v. Romer, 931 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo.App.1996).

. Because I conclude that the BOCC was acting in its capacity as spending and taxing authority, rather than its capacity as a subordinate agent for the State Department of Social Services, the express statutory right requirement set forth in Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Colo. 1989), is inapposite.

. The BOCC also has asserted a claim for money damages associated with the failure of the State Director to undertake the subsection (5) adjustment. Availability of money damages as a remedy under the APA is arguable. Because I would permit standing to pursue the requests for in-junctive and declaratory relief, and because the issue is not formally presented at this early stage, I would not reach the question of whether damages may be available.