Court Opinion

ID: 9961504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 21:07:51.893049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:50.128502
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                CITY OF LAS VEGAS, A POLITICAL                       No. 84345
                SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
                NEVADA,
                Appellant,                                                   P7, 1

                vs.
                180 LAND CO., LLC, A NEVADA                             APR 18 2021i
                LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND                         ELI    TH A. BRO
                                                                    CLE           AVIE
                FORE STARS, LTD.,
                                                                    BY_
                Respondents.                                           C i EF DEPUTY CLERK

                180 LAND CO., LLC, A NEVADA                          No. 84640
                LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND
                FORE STARS, LTD., A NEVADA
                LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
                Appellants/Cross-Respondents,
                vs.
                CITY OF LAS VEGAS, A POLITICAL
                SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
                NEVADA,
                Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

                           Consolidated appeals and cross-appeal from a district court
                judgment and post-judgment order in an inverse condemnation action.
                Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge.
                           Affirmed.

                Leonard Law, PC, and Debbie A. Leonard, Reno; Jeffry M. Dorocak, City
                Attorney, and Jeffrey L. Galliher and Rebecca L. Wolfson, Deputy City
                Attorneys, Las Vegas; McDonald Carano LLP and George F. Ogilvie, III,
                Amanda C. Yen, and Christopher Molina, Las Vegas; Shute, Mihaly &
                Weinberger, LLP, and Andrew W. Schwartz and Lauren M. Tarpey, San
                Francisco, California,
                for City of Las Vegas.
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                Law Offices of Kermitt L. Waters and Kermitt L. Waters, James J. Leavitt,
                Michael A. Schneider, and Autumn L. Waters, Las Vegas; Claggett & Sykes
                Law Firm and Micah S. Echols, Las Vegas,
                for 180 Land Co., LLC, and Fore Stars, Ltd.

                Davison Van Cleve, PC, and Robert D. Sweetin, Las Vegas; Matthew Leo
                Cahoon, Las Vegas,
                for Amicus Curiae Nevada League of Cities.

                Goicoechea, Di Grazia, Coyle & Stanton, Ltd., and Nancy Porter and Lauren
                A. Landa, Elko,
                for Amicus Curiae City of West Wendover.

                Nicholas G. Vaskov, City Attorney, and Amanda Kern and Brandon P.
                Kemble, Assistant City Attorneys, Henderson,
                for Amicus Curiae City of Henderson.

                Nossaman, LLP, and Steven M. Silva, Reno; Karl Hall, City Attorney, and
                Jonathan Shipman, Assistant City Attorney, Reno: Micaela Moore, City
                Attorney, North Las Vegas,
                for Amici Curiae City of Reno, City of North Las Vegas, and :International
                Municipal Lawyer's Association.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.'

                      'The Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, and the Honorable
                Patricia Lee, Justice, voluntarily recused themselves from participation in
                the decision of this matter. The Honorable Abbi Silver, Senior Justice, and
                the Honorable Egan Walker, District Judge, respectively, were appointed
                by the court to sit in their places. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 19; SCR 10.
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                                                 OPINION

                By the Court, HERNDON, J.:
                            Our constitutional takings jurisprudence has long recognized
                that regulatory agency decisions that deprive a landowner of all
                economically beneficial use of their property—a per se regulatory taking—
                require just compensation to the landowner under both the Fifth
                Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 8(3) of the
                Nevada Constitution. In this matter, the City of Las Vegas challenges the
                district court's determination that a per se regulatory taking occurred and
                its $48 million award to the landowner, 180 Land Co., LLC. In its separate
                appeal, 180 Land challenges the district court's award of prejudgment
                interest.
                            The totality of the circumstances surrounding the City's
                handling of 180 Land's attempts to develop the 35 acres at issue,
                demonstrated through 180 Land's applications to develop the property, the
                official actions of the city council, and statements and actions of City
                representatives and employees, evinces the futility of 180 Land's past and
                future development efforts on the property. With any efforts to develop the
                property rendered futile, the district court did not err in determining that a
                per se regulatory taking occurred. The district court also did not err in
                relying on 180 Land's expert's valuation of the property to determine just
                compensation, especially as the City neither challenged the valuation nor
                provided alternative valuations. Finally, both parties' challenges to other

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                aspects of the district court's damages award fail to present a basis for
                reversal. Accordingly, we wholly affirm the district court.2
                                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                Development of the golf course
                            In 1981, the City adopted a Generalized Land Use Plan to

                reclassify 2,200 acres of land, called Peccole Ranch, to allow for "residential
                densities" that would align with the City's General Plan. In 1986, the City
                preliminarily approved, subject to a resolution of intent, a request to zone
                the proposed golf course within Peccole Ranch for residential planned-unit
                development, or R-PD.3 Other conditions having been met, a revised master
                plan, the Peccole Ranch Master Development Plan, was fully approved in
                1990, with the golf course acreage zoned as R-PD7.

                            The golf course was developed between 1992 and 1996. In 1992,
                the City adopted a new Las Vegas General Plan classifying the golf course
                acreage as "Parks/Schools/Recreation/Open Space" (PR-OS). However, the
                land was not rezoned; rather, the 1992 ordinance adopting the General Plan
                stated that it "shall not be deemed to modify or invalidate any . . . zoning
                designation." In line with that ordinance, the City confirmed to the golf
                course acreage's owner in a 1996 letter that the zoning remained R-PD7 for
                the golf course.   The golf course acreage also retained the PR-OS land

                      2 In light of this opinion, we vacate the stay ordered by this court on
                May 9, 2022.

                      3R-PD zoning was established in 1972 "to allow a maximum flexibility
                for imaginative residential design and land utilization in accordance with
                the General Plan" and "to promote an enhancement of residential amenities
                by means of an efficient consolidation and utilization of open space,
                separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic and a homogeneity of use
                patterns."
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                designation in subsequent iterations of the General Plan through 2018. In
                2001, the City adopted another ordinance regarding the golf course acreage
                that formally rezoned it to R-PD7 on the Official Zoning Map Atlas, and
                repealed any previous conflicting ordinances.      Zoning Bill No. Z-2001,
                Ordinance 5353. In 2015, the operator of the golf course informed the then-
                landowners, Fore Stars, Ltd., that it could no longer make a profit operating
                the golf course and thereafter terminated its lease in 2016.
                180 Land purchases and seeks to develop the golf course acreage
                          180 Land eventually came to hold all of the ownership interest
                in Fore Stars, which included the golf course acreage and Fore Stars'
                business assets, with the acquisition being finalized in or around 2016.
                According to a manager of 180 Land, Yohan Lowie, in 2001 he began
                negotiating a "handshake deal" with the former landowners of Peccole
                Ranch to partner with them to purchase certain properties, and in
                exchange, Lowie would have the right of first refusal if the golf course
                acreage ever went up for sale. When the Peccole Ranch landowners started
                to have financial and legal struggles regarding their various properties,
                including the golf course, Lowie was able to negotiate an agreement that, in
                relevant part, provided him, or entities he owned or managed, ownership of
                the golf course acreage at a purported cost of $30 million. The 2005 meeting
                rninutes from the board of directors for the Peccole-Nevada Corporation
                show that the board adopted a resolution "to reserve . . . approximately $30
                million to pay off the current loan in full with Nevada State Bank related
                to the purchase of the leasehold interest of the . . . Golf Course when such
                loan can be paid." A separate 2014 contract, however, showed a purchase
                price of $7.5 million for the ownership interest in Fore Stars, which included
                the golf course acreage.
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                            Although the golf course acreage contained nine parcels, 180
                Land segmented it into four areas for development purposes: (1) the 35-acre
                site at issue in these appeals, (2) a 17-acre site, (3) a 65-acre site, and (4) a
                133-acre site. 180 Land first sought development by way of an application

                to develop the 17-acre site filed in November 2015, which the City approved

                in February 2017.      That approval, however, was met with significant
                opposition from a group of homeowners. In 2020, following litigation
                instituted by the hoineowners, the City notified 180 Land of its entitlement
                to move forward to develop 435 multifamily housing units on the 17-acre
                parcel, with such approvals remaining valid for two years.4       This included
                changing the PR-OS designation to high-density residential and rezoning
                the site from R-PD7 to medium-density residential (R-3).

                             180 Land first sought to develop the 35-acre site in December
                2016, filing (1) a General Plan Amendment as to the golf course acreage to

                change the designation from PR-OS to low-density residential, and,
                specifically as to the 35-acre site contained therein, (2) a site development
                review for 61 lots, (3) a Tentative Map Plan application, and (4) a waiver on
                the size of private streets. City planning staff recommended approving the
                applications.
                             In May 2017, while the foregoing applications regarding the 35
                acres were still pending, 180 Land also applied for a new, comprehensive
                Master Development Agreement for the entire golf course acreage. City

                      4The district court granted the homeowners' petition for judicial
                review, but this court reversed the district court on appeal such that the
                City's approval of the development application was reinstated. See Seventy
                Acres, LLC v. Binion, No. 75481, 2020 WL 1076065 (Nev. Mar. 5, 2020)
                (Order of Reversal).
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                planning   staff   recommended     approving   the   Master    Development

                Agreement application as well. Indeed, 180 Land had collaborated on this
                application with the City's planning staff for more than two years, requiring
                numerous meetings and revisions to the proposed application.
                            In March 2017, the homeowner group filed its challenge to the
                to the City's approval of the 17-acre application. While that case was being
                litigated, the proposed development of the 35 acres was discussed at a
                contentious City Council hearing in June 2017, with strong public
                opposition to 180 Land's applications.     The City ultimately denied the
                applications despite the City's planning staff having recommended
                approval. The City's final decision stated that the denials were "due to
                significant public opposition to the proposed development, concerns over the
                impact of the proposed development on surrounding residents, and concerns
                on piecemeal development of the Master Development Plan area rather
                than a cohesive plan for the entire area." Despite rejecting the 35-acre
                application, in part because of concerns over "piecemeal development," the
                City also rejected the comprehensive Master Development application in
                August 2017, two months after rejecting the 35-acre application. Also in
                August 2017, the City rejected applications from 180 Land pending since
                2016 for three access points to the golf course acreage from neighboring
                public streets and to install fencing around two water features on the
                acreage. The City stated it denied the applications because of "the various
                public hearings and subsequent debates concerning the development on the
                subject site" and instructed 180 Land to file an application for a "Major
                Review" under the City's municipal code. 180 Land did not file any Major
                Review applications. The City also denied 180 Land's application for a

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                technical drainage study, though Las Vegas Municipal Code (LVMC)
                19.16.105 requires such a study before residential development is allowed.
                City employees and representatives respond to 180 Land's residential
                development proposals
                            Although the City rejected 180 Land's development proposals,
                its representatives had previously recognized the site's ability to be
                developed residentially. At a 2016 Special Planning Commission Meeting,
                an attorney for the City, along with a public works employee, confirmed that
                the area was "hard zon[ed]" R-PD7: "[T]he Council gave hard zoning to this
                golf course, R-PD7, which allows somebody to come in and develop." The
                same attorney for the City confirmed this again before the City Council in
                2017 when it was considering whether to amend the master plan, stating
                that "[i]f you do not grant the general plan amendment tonight, you will
                merely leave in place a general plan that's inconsistent with the zoning, and
                the zoning trumps, in my opinion." A year later at another City Council
                meeting, the same city attorney and a member of the City's planning staff
                reconfirmed the R-PD7 zoning and told the City that "the [master plan] was
                changed after the zoning was in place." A planning director for the City
                testified in a 2016 deposition regarding development of the golf course
                acreage that "[i]f the land use and the zoning aren't in conformance, then
                the zoning would be a higher order entitlement." And in 2019, when
                responding to a discovery request, the City stated that it "does not dispute
                that the [35 acres] is zoned R-PD7."
                            Members of the City Council also cornmented regarding 180
                Land's development proposals.          While seeking election, former City
                Councilperson Steve Seroka stated in a news interview that the City would
                have the golf course acreage turned over to it in a land swap. Forrner
                Councilperson Bob Coffin also said, in a group text, that he was looking for
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                  "intel on the scum behind the [golf course] takeover. Dirt will be handy if
                  need to get rough." Councilperson Coffin further directed others to use their
                  personal emails to discuss the golf course development issue and not to use
                  the name of the golf course to avoid the communications being subject to
                  disclosure under a previously issued subpoena. In an email, Councilperson
                  Coffin referred to someone from 180 Land, presumably Lowie, as a
                  "motherfucker," "son-of-a-bitch," and "[a]sshole."
                  180 Land successfully sues for inverse condemnation
                              After the denial of its applications, 180 Land sued the City for
                  inverse condemnation.5     The district court entered numerous orders to
                  resolve 180 Land's claims after taking evidence and holding multiple
                  hearings. It first found that the hard zoning for the site was R-PD7 and
                  that such zoning permitted, as a right, single-family and rnultiresidential
                  development. It also granted summary judgment on all four theories of
                  takings claims raised by 180 Land. In the just compensation portion of the
                  proceedings, the district court ultimately adopted 180 Land's expert's
                  valuation of the land, $34,135,000, noting that the City did not present any
                  contrary valuations or any other rebuttal evidence and did not depose 180
                  Land's expert. The district court also granted 180 Land's requests for
                  reimbursement of its property taxes, prejudgment interest, and attorney
                  fees. In doing so, the district court rejected 180 Land's request for a 23-
                  percent prejudgment interest rate, calculating its prejudgment interest

                        5  180 Land also sought judicial review of the City's decisions. The
                  district court denied judicial review but severed the inverse condemnation
                  claims and allowed 180 Land to proceed on those claims. As no party
                  appealed the district court's order denying judicial review, that order is not
                  before us, and we do not address it in this opinion.
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        . •   •                                               er.17:t7                   17;Z:r1   "'VW
                award using a prime plus 2-percent rate. The final judgment in favor of 180
                Land totaled $48,114,039.30.
                            Both parties now appeal.      The City challenges the district
                court's finding that a taking occurred, the just compensation award, and the
                other monetary awards made to 180 Land. 180 Land challenges only the
                amount of the prejudgment interest award.
                                                 DISCUSSION
                            We first address the parties' arguments regarding the
                interaction between the PR-OS designation on the 35-acres and its R-PD7
                zoning. We then address whether the district court properly determined
                that a taking occurred. Finally, we resolve the City's challenges to the just
                compensation award and the parties' challenges to the other damages
                awarded by the district court.
                Land designation and zoning
                            An overarching issue in this case is whether the site's R-PD7
                residential zoning or its PR-OS land designation governed 180 Land's
                ability to develop the property and/or conferred certain rights on 180 Land.
                The City argues that the district court erred in rejecting the PR-OS land
                designation in the Peccole Ranch Master Plan, especially because that
                designation predated 180 Land's purchase of the land at issue. The City
                acknowledges the R-PD7 zoning but asserts that zoning must comply with
                the general plan. Based on these assertions, and because it claims the
                discretion to deny any development applications, the City argues that the
                district court also erred in concluding that the R-PD7 zoning conferred a
                vested right on 180 Land to develop the land residentially. The a mici briefs
                received by this court also argue that the PR-OS designation bars any
                finding that 180 Land had a right to develop the property residentially,

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                foreclosing any takings clairns.6     180 Land responds that zoning is the
                appropriate basis to deterrnine any rights it may have to develop the
                property, noting that the City confirmed the RPD-7 zoning before 180 Land

                carne to own the property and that this creates a "vested right to use the 35
                Acre Property for single-family and multi-family residential, as a matter of
                law."
                               A master or general plan is a "comprehensive, long-term
                general plan for the physical development of the city." NRS 278.150(1).
                Nevada law authorizes a city to create zoning districts wherein "it may
                regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration,
                repair or use of buildings, structures or land." NRS 278.250(1). Such zoning
                regulations must, among other things, "be adopted in accordance with the
                master plan for land use." NRS 278.250(2). When exercising zoning powers,
                a city "may use any controls relating to land use or principles of zoning that
                the governing body determines to be appropriate." NRS 278.250(4).
                               We have previously held that zoning enactments are "entitled
                to a presumption of validity" and that, while a master or general plan "is a
                standard that commands deference," "it is not a legislative mandate from
                which no leave can be taken."       Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm. v.
                Jumpers, LLC, 122 Nev. 53, 64, 128 P.3d 452, 460 (2006). We have further
                held that "a zoning ordinance need not be in perfect conformity with every
                master plan policy." Id. at 64-65, 128 P.3d at 461. In tandern with these
                holdings, we have recognized that "zoning regulations shall be adopted in
                accordance with the master plan for land use," referring to this as a

                           cities of Reno, Henderson, North Las Vegas, and West
                        6The

                Wendover, along with the International Municipal Lawyer's Association
                and Nevada League of Cities, filed arnici briefs.
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                                                                                  ‘.1g,''.1- • 4-, -   *6
                                                                         4
                .4
                     consistency requirement." Id. at 64, 128 P.3d at 460 (quoting Nova Horizon
                v. City Council, Reno, 105 Nev. 92, 96, 769 P.2d 721, 723 (1989)).
                                The problem with applying the consistency requirement in this

                case is that substantial evidence demonstrates that the R-PD7 zoning
                predated the PR-OS land designation. Thus, the zoning had already been
                adopted at the time the land was designated as PR-OS in the master plan.
                The record shows that, as early as 1986, the City had preliminarily
                approved zoning the golf course acreage as residential, albeit subject to a
                later-satisfied resolution of intent. The PR-OS designation, on the other
                hand, was first imposed on the subject acreage in 1992 when the City
                adopted a new Las Vegas General Plan. Also detriniental to the City's
                argurnent, the ordinance adopting the PR-OS designation explicitly stated
                that it did not "modify or invalidate any... zoning designation, or
                development approval that occurred before the adoption of the Plan."
                Indeed, in line with that ordinance, the City confirmed to the golf course
                acreage's owner in a 1996 letter that the zoning remained R-PD7.
                                Ample authority supports our conclusion that the zoning
                ordinance trumps the designation on the master plan. NRS 278.349(3)(e)
                provides that when deciding whether to approve a tentative rnap to
                subdivide property, the governing body rnust consider whether the
                subdivision conforms with "zoning ordinances and [the] master plan,
                except . . . if any existing zoning ordinance is inconsistent with the master
                plan, the zoning ordinance takes precedence." See also Op. Att'y Gen. 84-6
                (1984) (concluding that amending the land use Master Plan "does not
                require immediate amendment of pre-existing zoning ordinances that are
                not in strict compliance with the amended plan" and noting that "the
                Nevada Legislature expressly declared its intention [in the statute that

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                                                                                            fgve.'nr" PO.
                                                                                        _
                   eventually became NRS 278.349(3)(e)] that zoning ordinances take
                   precedence over provisions contained in a master plan"); Clark Cnty. Off. of
                   the Coroner/Med. Exam'r u. Las Vegas Reu.-J., 136 Nev. 44, 57 11.5, 458 P.3d

                   1048, 1058 n.5 (2020) (explaining that "while Attorney General opinions are

                   not binding legal authority, they are of persuasive legal significance").
                               Further, the record includes admissions by the City's attorney
                   that he could not determine how the PR-OS designation was placed on the
                   land and that zoning would trump any inconsistent land use designation in
                   the master plan. Indeed, the City's own "land use hierarchy" places zoning
                   designation at the pinnacle.7 Although the City now claims that this means
                   that a zoning designation is inferior to a land use designation, it stated the
                   opposite in its briefing in the case involving the 17-acre site:
                               In the hierarchy, the land use designation is
                               subordinate to the zoning designation, for example,
                               because land use designations indicate the
                               intended use and development density for a
                               particular    use,   while   zoning   designations
                               specifically define allowable uses and contain the
                               design and development guidelines for those
                               intended uses.

                         7According to the City's "Land Use & Rural Neighborhoods
                   Preservation Element" (adopted Sept. 2, 2009), the hierarchy "is designed
                   to progress from broad to specific," with the master plan at the bottom,
                   followed by the land use element, the land use designation, the master
                   development plans/special area plans and, finally, the zoning designation
                   at the top of the hierarchy.
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                   Thus, we reject any assertion that the PR-OS land designation overrides
                   the R-PD7 zoning.8
                                  The City's assertions that the district court committed

                   reversible error in finding that 180 Land had a vested right to develop the
                   35 acres because the City retains discretion to reject any application, even
                   where it complies with applicable zoning, are likewise unavailing. Rather
                   than considering if 180 Land had vested rights to development, this case
                   requires us to determine whether the City's actions destroyed the economic
                   value of the land such that it amounts to a taking, which could still occur
                   under the City's discretionary authority. See Boulder City u. Cinnamon
                   Hills Assocs., 110 Nev. 238, 245-46, 871 P.2d 320, 324-25 (1994) (rejecting a

                   takings claim where the government's use of its discretionary authority to
                   reject "a perrnit to build living quarters for the elderly did not destroy all
                   viable economic value of the prospective property").
                   The takings claim
                                 "Whether the government has inversely condemned private
                   property is a question of law that we review de novo."        McCarran Int'l
                   Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 661, 137 P.3c1 1110, 1121 (2006). 180 Land
                   asserted four theories in support of its takings claim below: (1) a Penn
                   Central9 taking alleging that the City's actions destroyed nearly all the
                   economic value of the 35 acres; (2) a per se regulatory taking alleging that

                         8We further note that other documents, including governmental
                   records, recognized the 35 acres as being residential. For instance, 180
                   Land's 2017-18 statement of the taxable value of its land lists the 35 acres
                   as residential, and the Clark County Assessor's valuation stated that the
                   parcel was zoned as R-PD7 and that its "probable use" is "residential."

                         9   Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
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                the City's actions destroyed all of the site's economic value: (3) a per se
                regulatory physical taking alleging that the City granted the public access
                to the site, ousting 180 Land frorn the site; and (4) a nonregulatory de facto
                taking alleging that the City obstructed its right to residentially develop the
                property such that it became valueless. Because we ultimately conclude

                that a per se regulatory taking occurred, we need not address the three
                other theories.
                            "The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
                States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
                Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property for
                public use without just compensation." Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 661-62, 137
                P.3d at 1121 (footnote omitted).       The Nevada Constitution similarly
                provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without
                just compensation having been first made, or secured." Nev. Const. art. 1,

                § 8(3). Courts initially viewed these provisions as protecting only against
                an owner's ouster from possession but later recognized "that state
                regulation of property may also require just compensation." Sisolak, 122
                Nev. at 662, 137 P.3d at 1121 (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
                415 (1922)). This occurs when government regulation is "so onerous that
                its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster." Id. at 662, 137
                P.3d at 1121-22. "[S]uch 'regulatory takings' may be compensable under
                the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 662, 137 P.3d at 1122 (quoting Lingle v.
                Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)).
                      Initial considerations
                            Property interest
                            "An individual must have a property interest in order to support

                a takings claim." Id. at 658, 137 P.3d at 1119. Thus, when considering

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                inverse condemnation claims, a "court must first determine 'whether the
                plaintiff possesses a valid interest in the property affected by the
                governmental action." Id. (quoting Karuk Tribe of Cal. u. Ammon, 209 F.3d
                1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Stated another way, a court must ensure that

                "'the plaintiff possesse[s] a stick in the bundle of property rights,' before
                proceeding to determine whether the governmental action at issue
                constitute[s] a taking."   Id. (quoting Karuk Tribe, 209 F.3d at 1374).
                Property rights include the rights to possess, use, and enjoy the property.
                Id. There is no question that 180 Land, the owner of the 35 acres, has a
                valid interest in the property to support a takings claim.
                            The property at i.ssue
                            Pertinent to our takings analysis is a determination of the
                property at issue. The City contends that, rather than considering the 35-
                acre site individually, the entire 250 acres comprising the golf course must
                be considered together to determine if a complete loss of economic value
                occurred.   "'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
                discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
                segment have been entirely abrogated."          Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130.
                Instead, we focus "both on the character of the action and on the nature and
                extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." Id. at 130-
                31.
                            Because the test for a per se regulatory taking requires
                "compar[ing] the value that has been taken from the property with the value
                that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is determining
                how to define the unit of property whose value is to furnish the denominator
                of the fraction."   Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 395 (2017) (quoting
                Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n u. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)).

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                                                            •
                Indeed, "[t]o the extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is
                always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the
                property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question."         Id.
                (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr.
                for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993)).
                             We recognize that "no single consideration can supply the
                exclusive test for determining the denominator" in a takings action. Id. at

                397.      Instead, we must attempt to "determine whether reasonable
                expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to
                anticipate that [their] holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead,
                as separate tracts." Id. Factors to consider include "the treatment of the
                land under state and local law; the physical characteristics of the land; and
                the prospective value of the regulated land." Id. As to the first factor, the
                court should give substantial weight to how the state measures metes and
                bounds and divides the land. Id. at 398.
                             Turning to the property's physical characteristics, we must
                consider "the physical relationship of any distinguishable tracts, the
                parcel's   topography,    and     the   surrounding   human      and   ecological

                environment." Id.      The City asserts that the entirety of the golf course

                acreage had related topography and thus should be considered the relevant
                parcel for 180 Land's takings claim. But we see no such unique concerns
                regarding the golf course acreage, which the record demonstrates is in a
                suburban area surrounded by residential and commercial development,
                that might require treating the entirety of the golf course acreage as a single
                parcel.    Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992)
                (Kennedy,     J.,   concurring)    (noting   that   "[c]oastal   property    may

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                                                                                       NV.
                present . . . unique concerns for a fragile land system") (cited with approval
                by Murr, 582 U.S. at 398).
                            As to the prospective value of the regulated land, "courts should
                assess the value of the property under the challenged [governmental
                action], with special attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of
                other holdings." Murr, 582 U.S. at 398; see id. at 398-99 (providing an
                example of where a restriction on one property's use may increase another
                property's value "by increasing privacy, expanding recreational space, or
                preserving surrounding beauty"). We recognize that the City's approval of
                development on the 17-acre parcel would likely derive value that would
                have to be considered in resolving 180 Land's takings claim if we considered
                the golf course acreage to be the denominator acreage in this case.1°
                            Applying these principles here demonstrates that treating the
                35 acres as the denominator parcel of land for 180 Land's takings claim is
                appropriate. It is a single parcel with an individual parcel number and was
                treated as an individual parcel throughout the entirety of 180 Land's
                attempts to obtain the City's approval to develop it, even when 180 Land
                submitted applications regarding the entire 250 acres. And that the City
                approved development on the 17-acre parcel, but not on the 35-acre parcel,
                further demonstrates the 35 acres' separate nature. While the 35 acres used
                to be part of the 250 acres making up a golf course, there are no ecological
                or other physical aspects of the land that warrant us treating the 250 acres

                      1°To the extent 180 Land argues that the City has since acted in a
                manner that prohibits development on the 17-acre parcel, that issue was
                not before the district court, and we therefore do not consider it. See FDIC
                v. Rhodes, 130 Nev. 893, 897, 336 P.3d 961, 964 (2014) (providing that this
                court generally does not consider issues not raised before the district court
                when it rendered its decision).
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                        as the whole parcel in this case, The approval of' development on the 17
                        acres adding value to the entire 250 acres does not outweigh these other
                        considerations.
                                     Ripeness
                                     We next address the City's assertion that 180 Land's takings
                        claim was not ripe, such that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by
                        allowing the claim to proceed. "[A]n essential prerequisite to [the] assertion
                        [of a regulatory takings claim] is a final and authoritative determination of
                        the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject
                        property." MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348
                        (1986); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001) ("[O]nce
                        it becomes clear that . . . the perrnissible uses of the property are known to
                        a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened.");
                        Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Plan. Cornm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
                        473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) ("[A] claim that the application of government
                        regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the
                        government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached
                        a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property
                        at issue."). This is so the court can understand the "nature and extent of
                        permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the
                        [government actions] that purport to limit it." Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 664, 137
                        P.3d at 1123 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011). Otherwise, "it is impossible
                        to tell whether the land retain[s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether
                        [existing] expectation interests ha[ve] been destroyed." MacDonald, 477
                        U.S. at 349 (alternations in original) (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at
                        190 n.11).

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                            Finality is normally achieved by exhausting administrative
                remedies, Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 664. 137 P.3d at 1123, but -[w]hen
                exhausting available adrninistrative remedies ... is futile, a matter is
                deemed ripe for review," State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist.
                Ct. (Ad Arn.), 131 Nev. 411, 418, 351 P.3d 736, 742 (2015). Futility occurs
                when "the state agency charged with enforcing a challenged land-use
                regulation entertains an application from an owner and its denial of the

                application rnakes clear the extent of development permitted, and neither
                the agency nor a reviewing state court has cited noncompliance with
                reasonable state-law exhaustion or pre-permit processes." Palazzolo, 533
                U.S. at 625-26; see also id. at 626 (concluding that, under such facts, "federal
                ripeness rules do not require the submission of further and futile
                applications with other agencies").
                            The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has further commented on
                ripeness and futility as they apply to regulatory takings claims in Del Monte
                Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. u. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990).
                That court held that a landowner "must submit one formal development
                plan and seek a variance from any regulations barring the development
                proposed in the plan [and] a landowner may need to resubmit modified
                development proposals that satisfy the local government's objections to the
                development as initially proposed."     Id. at 1501. But the Ninth Circuit
                recognized that further applications would be futile if they required the
                landowner to apply "through piecemeal litigation or unfair procedures." Id.
                Whether a takings claim is ripe is a question of law reviewed de novo. MHC
                Fin. Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013).

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                            The City and the amici argue that 180 Land submitted only one
                development application for the 35-acre site before filing suit and that
                neither the City's denial of the master plan amendment for the entire 250-
                acre site, nor its rejection of two other nondevelopment applications, nor the
                City's other actions constituted a final decision ripening 180 Land's per se
                regulatory takings claim.     180 Land argues that its per se regulatory
                takings claim is ripe because it exhausted its administrative remedies or,
                alternatively, that such efforts would have been futile.il-
                            Considering the totality of the City's actions, we conclude that
                any further attempts to apply for development by 180 Land would have
                been futile, such that its takings claim was ripe. While the City is correct
                that 180 Land submitted only one application specifically regarding
                residential development to the 35 acres, the City's denial of that application
                failed to provide 180 Land with any basis for the denial that would allow it
                to "seek a variance" or "satisfy the [City]'s objections to the development as
                initially proposed." Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1501. The City merely
                stated that it was concerned with piecemeal development and there was
                public opposition to 180 Land's request to develop. Regarding the alleged

                      11 We reject 180 Land's argument that the ripeness requirement does
                not apply to per se regulatory takings claims. We have previously held that
                .4
                 courts only consider ripe regulatory takings claims, and 'a claim that the
                application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest
                is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the
                regulations has reached a final decision regarding application of the
                regulations to the property at issue." Ad Am., 131 Nev. at 419, 351 P.3d at
                742 (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186). As both per se regulatory
                and Penn Central takings claims analyze whether regulations caused a loss
                of property value, either totally (per se) or nearly totally (Penn Central), it
                follows that the City's decision of how to apply the regulations must be final,
                or further efforts must be futile, for such claims to be ripe.
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                                                                 7-rtt, r1
                                                                              p   ire44'
                                                                                       4,
                concern over piecemeal development, the City had already approved
                piecemeal development when it approved the development of the 17-acre
                site. And although the City stated in its denial that it wanted to see a
                cohesive plan for the entire area," referring to all of the golf course acreage,
                the City also denied 180 Land's Master Development application. This
                latter denial occurred despite City planning staff collaborating with 180

                Land on the application for more than two years and recommending that
                the City approve it. While the Master Development application does not
                constitute a formal request for a variance, we conclude that it satisfies the
                mandate that the landowner attempt to comply with the bases for denial by
                submitting an amended or second development proposal to the requisite
                governmental agency because it aligned with the City's stated desire for a
                cohesive development plan regarding all of the golf course acreage.

                            As to public opposition, the City provided 180 Land with no
                indication of what request for a variance or modified development
                application 180 Land could submit in the future that would avoid another
                denial due to public opposition. The comprehensive Master Development
                application was started, in part, because 180 Land was told by the City that
                a Master Development application was the only development request that
                would be considered due to the public opposition voiced by neighboring
                property owners. The Master Development application was then denied,
                and it is unclear from the record what, if any, specific issues were raised by
                the public opposition that the City concluded warranted denying 180 Land's
                applications. Without any insight into why the City concluded that the
                public's opposition was a valid basis to deny 180 Land's development
                applications, further applications attempting to resolve the unspecified
                concerns would be futile.

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                              Other evidence also supports our conclusion that any further
                submissions by 180 Land to residentially develop the 35 acres would have
                been futile because the City showed a general hostility to allowing any
                development on the site. The City stated it denied 180 Land's basic requests
                for additional access points and to place fencing around water features
                because such requests had to be made via a "Major Modification" application
                under LVMC 19.16.100(G)(1). But that ordinance provides that such an
                application is only necessary when "through prior action, [the City] has
                determined that the proposed project or improvement shall be processed as
                a Major Review; or [it is] determine[d] that the proposed development could
                significantly impact the land uses on the site or surrounding properties."
                LVMC 19.16.100(G)(1). It does not appear that access points to vacant land
                or fences around water features would meet the standards for this more
                rigorous application process, which requires a pre-application conference,
                drawings and plans, and notice and a hearing, among other items or actions
                not   required for a     minor   review   under subsection   (F).    LVMC

                19.16.100(G)(2).    Indeed, the City's denials did not rely on LVMC
                19.16.100(G)(1) but instead stated that it required a "Major Review"
                because of the pressure from the public debates over the land's
                development.     See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1501 (stating that a
                governmental agency subjecting a landowner to "unfair procedures"
                supports a finding of futility). The statements of City representatives in
                relation to 180 Land's attempts to develop the land bolster our futility
                conclusion.    Indeed, the emails and text messages from councilpersons
                demonstrated a general hostility towards 180 Land's attempts to develop

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                                                                                               17;4'
                     its land.12    See Ad Am., 131 at 420, 351 P.3d at 742 (considering the
                     statement of a councilperson when resolving an allegation of futility in a
                     takings case). Having determined 180 Land's property rights, ascertained
                     the relevant scope of the property at issue, and deemed the takings claim
                     ripe, we now address the district court's conclusion that a taking occurred.
                           Per se regulatory taking
                                   A per se regulatory taking occurs when government regulation
                     "completely deprives an owner of all economical beneficial use of [the]
                     property." Sisalak, 122 Nev. at 662, 137 P.3d at 1122; see also Boulder City
                     v. Cinnamon Hills Assocs., 110 Nev. 238, 245-46, 871 P.2d 320, 324-35
                     (1994) (finding no violation of the Fifth Amendment where the denial of a
                     permit to develop senior citizen housing "did not destroy all viable economic
                     value of the prospective development property").        When resolving this
                     variant of a takings claim, there is no need to "inquir[e] into the public
                     interest advanced in support of the restraint." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
                     That is because "the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation
                     'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
                     economically viable use of his land." Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of
                     Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Moreover, when governmental actions
                     deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of their property, "it is
                     less realistic to indulge [the Court's] usual assumption that the

                            •' 2To the extent the City argues that we cannot consider such
                     statements in a futility analysis, we reject that argument. In Ad America,
                     we considered a councilperson's statement that the developer offered as
                     evidence of futility without stating it was improper, instead concluding that
                     the statement from "only one of seven City Council members" was
                     insufficient to demonstrate futility in light of the contrary evidence. 131 at
                     420, 351 P.3d at 742.
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                         [governmental body] is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of
                         economic life' in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage'
                         to everyone concerned." Id. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
                         124, and Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
                                     The City's denials of 180 Land's applications and the discussion
                         of those applications at various city council meetings show no meaningful
                         indication that the City would allow any development on the 35 acres. As
                         noted above, the City's denials stated it was rejecting the applications based
                         on strong public opposition and that 180 Land had not provided a cohesive
                         plan for the entire golf course acreage. But the City provided no regulatory
                         basis for the denials13 that would allow 180 Land to seek a variance or
                         subrnit an amended application that would resolve any such issues. The
                         City similarly rejected 180 Land's Master Plan application that provided a
                         cohesive plan for the golf course acreage. That these denials occurred
                         despite the City's planning office working with 180 Land on at least one of
                         the proposals and repeatedly recommending that the City approve the
                         applications underscores an unwillingness to allow any development. And
                         the City did not provide 180 Land with any viable alternatives for it to reap
                         economic benefit from the 35 acres when denying its applications. In short,
                         the City's actions demonstrate that it would not approve any development
                         on the 35 acres. Further, we discern no error in the district court adopting
                         180 Land's expert's opinion that, without the ability to develop the 35 acres,

                               13This is especially true considering our conclusion that the    PR-OS
                         land designation does not trump the R-PD7 zoning.
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                      it had no economic value." See Waldman v. Maini, 124 Nev. 1121, 1129,
                      195 P.3d 850, 856 (2008) (providing that a court will only disturb factual
                      findings if they are not supported by substantial evidence). We therefore
                      agree with the district court that a taking occurred because the City's
                      actions deprived 180 Land of all of the economic value of the 35 acres at
                      issue in this case.
                            Just compensation
                                   Having determined that a taking occurred, we turn to the just

                      compensation owed for that taking. Before addressing the amount of the
                      award entered by the district court, we address the City's assertions that
                      the district court improperly excluded evidence and used the wrong date of
                      valuation.
                                   Exclusion of evidence
                                   The City challenges the district court's exclusion of the PR-OS

                      designation and the $7.5 million purchase contract regarding the
                      acquisition of Fore Stars and its assets from the just compensation trial.
                      Reviewing these decisions for an abuse of discretion, we find none. See Cox
                      v. Copperfield, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 507 P.3d 1216, 1222 (2022) (reviewing
                      the exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion).       As to evidence
                      regarding the PR-OS designation or any general/master plans showing such
                      a land use designation for the 35 acres at issue, the district court had
                      already concluded, in the first phase of the trial, that R-PD7 zoning trumped
                      the PR-OS designation. As we agree with that conclusion, we necessarily

                           "This included evidence that continuing to operate a golf course
                      would result in an economic loss rather than provide economic value.
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                find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude that
                evidence from the just compensation portion of the trial.
                            As to the purchase contract, the district court noted that the
                City failed to provide an expert to contravene 180 Land's expert's opinion
                that it was irrelevant. The court found that the transaction was for much
                more than the 35 acres and that the 2005 start date of that transaction was
                too remote to aid in properly determining the property's value. Moreover,
                as discussed more in the damages analysis below, just compensation is
                determined by looking at a property's value at its "highest and best use."
                Nev. Const. art. 1, § 22(3); see also Clark County v. Alper, 100 Nev. 382, 391,
                685 P.2d 943, 949 (1984) ("Inverse condemnation proceedings are the
                constitutional equivalent to eminent domain actions and are governed by
                the same rules and principles that are applied to formal condemnation
                proceedings."). As the contract did not identify what portion of the purchase
                price was attributable to the 35 acres, and because the City failed to show
                how the purchase price was relevant to determining the 35 acres' value at
                its highest and best use, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
                its discretion in excluding this evidence.
                            Date of value
                            The district court set the "date of value" for the property's
                valuation as September 14, 2017, the day of the issuance of the first
                summons in the underlying matter. The court relied on NRS 37.120(1),
                which addresses eminent domain and provides that "the date of the first
                service of the summons is the date of valuation," unless the matter is not
                taken to trial in two years. The City argues that NRS 37.120 only applies
                in eminent domain actions and that the district court's ruling was otherwise
                arbitrary because the City denied the application regarding the 35 acres on
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                June 21, 2017, not September 14. It asserts that the fact that the district
                court used a different date from which to calculate the property tax and
                prejudgment interest award (August 2, 2017) further shows the arbitrary
                nature of using September 14, 2017, as the date of value.15
                              We have previously rejected the argument that NRS 37.120
                does not apply in inverse condemnation proceedings. In Alper, an inverse
                condemnation case, we held that NRS 37.120 provided the date of value and
                rejected the County's argument that the statute was "applicable only to
                eminent domain proceedings brought by the condemnor under the authority
                of NRS Chapter 37 and [was] not applicable to inverse condemnation suits."
                100 Nev. at 391, 685 P.2d at 949. Deeming no error in the district court's
                application of NRS 37.120 to find the September 14, 2017, valuation date,
                we necessarily decline to impose a different date.
                      Amount awarded for just compensation
                              "The landowner . . . has the burden of establishing the value of
                the land . . . taken." City of Las Vegas v. Bustos, 119 Nev. 360, 362, 75 P.3d
                351, 352 (2003).       The appropriate value for just compensation "is
                determined by the property's market value 'by reference to the highest and
                best use for which the land is available and for which it is plainly
                adaptable." Id. (quoting Alper, 100 Nev. at 386-87, 685 P.2d at 946). The
                highest and best use must still, however, "be reasonably probable." Id.
                              Here, 180 Land met its burden by providing an expert to opine
                on the land's value at its highest and best use. The expert submitted a
                detailed report that stated a golf course was no longer profitable and that

                      15The City does not present an alternative date of value for our
                consideration.
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                                                                                                 ,
                the highest and best use for the land was residential development, making
                comparisons to five similar vacant properties sold between 2015 and 2017.
                The expert report also provided detailed analyses supporting the opinions
                contained therein, citing relevant literature and attaching exhibits in
                support. The City presented no contrary evidence, did not depose the
                expert, and made no attempt to rebut the expert report. Instead, the City
                noted that, given the district court's rulings on the motions in limine that
                barred the City from presenting certain evidence, it had "no evidence to
                adrnit at the bench trial in rebuttal of [180 Land's expert's] valuation." In
                light of 180 Land's uncontradicted evidence, we find no error in the district
                court adopting 180 Land's expert's determination that the value of the 35
                acres at its highest and best use was $34,135,000.
                Additional awards of darnages
                            The City's final arguments challenge the district court's award
                of property taxes and attorney fees to 180 Land. We also consider 180
                Land's challenge to the district court's prejudgment interest award.
                      Property taxes
                            The district court ordered the City to reimburse 180 Land for
                its property taxes on the 35 acres starting from the date the court found the
                City had dispossessed 180 Land of the property, August 2, 2017, totaling
                $976,889.38.16 The City argues that the caselaw relied on by the district
                court does not apply because it involved eminent domain rather than
                inverse condemnation action. It claims that it did not physically dispossess

                      16We reject the City's argurnent that 180 Land caused the increased
                taxes by not appealing the assessor's conclusion that the land was
                residential rather than open space.
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                the property from 180 Land and that the just compensation award already
                made 180 Land whole.
                             Our caselaw recognizes that "[a]n owner who is dispossessed
                from [their] land when it is taken for public use is no longer obligated to pay
                taxes." Alper, 100 Nev. at 395, 685 P.2d at 951. As noted, Alper also holds
                that   inverse   condemnation    and    eminent   domain    proceedings    are
                "constitutional equivalents." Id. at 391, 685 P.2d at 949. Thus, the district
                court did not err in ordering reimbursement to 180 Land for the taxes it
                paid. And we decline to consider the City's challenge to the date the district
                court used, as the date was reasonable and the City provides no alternative
                date for this court to evaluate. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122
                Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (holding that the court
                need not consider arguments that a party does not argue cogently or support
                with relevant authority).

                       Attorney fees
                             The City next challenges the district court's award of
                $2,468,751.50 in attorney fees to 180 Land. The district court may only
                award attorney fees where a statute, rule, or contract allows it, and we
                review such an award for an abuse of discretion. Albios v. Horizon Cmtys.,
                Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 417, 132 P.3d 1022, 1027-28 (2006). The district court
                concluded an award was proper under (1) the federal Uniform Relocation
                Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act, per NRS 342.105; (2) Article
                1, Section 22(4), of the Nevada Constitution; and (3) NRS 18.010(2)(b).
                             We conclude that an award was proper under NRS 342.105.
                NRS 342.105(1) makes any "political subdivision of the State" subject to the
                Relocation Act's regulations, and 49 C.F.R. § 24.107(c) provides:
                             The owner of the real property [whose property is
                             taken] shall be reimbursed for any reasonable
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                            expenses, including reasonable attorney . . . fees,
                            which the owner actually incurred because of a
                            condemnation proceeding, if . . . [t]he court having
                            jurisdiction renders a judgment in favor of the
                            owner in an inverse condemnation proceeding . . . .
                And we have already held that the Relocation Act's "plain terms" support
                such an award when "a property owner . . . was successful in [their] inverse
                condemnation action."7 Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 675, 137 P.3d at 1130.
                            The City's final argument is a single sentence that the fee
                amount was not supported by billing statements and, without such
                statements, the district court cannot find the fees to be reasonable. But the
                City fails to cite the record or to salient authority and does not make any
                further argument; therefore, we need not consider it. See Edwards, 122
                Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38; NRCP 54(d)(2)(A) (setting out the
                procedure to seek attorney fees). Based on the foregoing, we will not disturb
                the district court's attorney fees award.
                      Prejudgment interest
                            Below, 180 Land requested a prejudgment interest rate of 23-
                percent per year for the period bookended by the taking and the entry of the
                prejudgment interest award, approximately 4.5 years. 180 Land based this
                request on two experts who calculated the rate of return on vacant
                residential properties in Las Vegas between 2017 and 2021. The district
                court rejected 180 Land's request and set the prejudgment interest rate at
                prime plus 2 percent, for a total of $10,258,953.30. We review a district

                      17Because we conclude that the award of fees was proper under the
                Relocation Act, we need not consider whether an award was proper under
                the Nevada Constitution or NRS 18.010(2)(b).
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                      court's ruling on prejudgment interest for an abuse of discretion. Sisolak,
                      122 Nev. at 675, 137 P.3d at 1130.

                                  The district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the
                      prejudgment interest rate at prime plus 2 percent.          "The purpose of
                      awarding interest is to compensate the landowner for the delay in the

                      monetary payment that occurred after the property had been taken." Alper,
                      100 Nev. at 392, 685 P.2d at 950 (citing Refining Co. v. Dir. of Pub. Works,
                      244 A.2d 853, 855 (R.I. 1968)). And "Nile statutory interest rate establishes
                      at least a prima facie basis for determining a fair rate." Id. at 394, 685 P.2d
                      at 951. Here, rather than seeking compensation for the delay in payment.
                      180 Land seeks an interest rate that would reimburse it for the purported
                      profit it lost had it been able to develop the land. This is not the purpose of
                      a prejudgment interest award. See Interest, Black's Law Dictionary (11th
                      ed. 2019) (defining "interest" as "Nile compensation . . . allowed by law for
                      the use or detention of money, or for the loss of money by one who is entitled
                      to its use").    We therefore decline to overturn the district court's
                      prejudgment interest award.
                                                     CONCLUSION
                                  When a governmental agency acts in a manner that removes all
                      the economic value from privately owned land, just compensation must be
                      paid.   Here, the City's actions demonstrated a refusal to allow any
                      development on the 35-acre parcel owned by 180 Land such that the parcel
                      no longer had any economic value. The district court therefore did not err
                      in finding that a taking occurred. Nor did the district court err in its just
                      compensation award, as it based that decision on uncontroverted evidence
                      from a duly admitted expert witness. Finally, because we find no error in

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                   the district court's other awards, we affirm the orders appealed in both
                   Docket Nos. 84345 and 84640 in their entirety.lg

                                                                               , J.
                                                       Herndon

                   We concur:

                                              ,   C.J.
                   Cadish

                                                  j.
                   Stighch

                   Bell

                    1   /41L,62,ce,,D             Sr. J.
                   Silver

                                                  D.J.
                   Walker

                         wRecognizing that the parcels making up the remainder of the golf
                   course acreage are, or may become, the subject of similar litigation, we
                   emphasize that our decision here is based only on the specific facts and
                   circumstances surrounding 180 Land's attempts to develop the 35-acre
                   parcel.
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