Court Opinion

ID: 9757638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:50:40.32496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:41.826284
License: Public Domain

(O’Connor, J.
concurring).
In short, the “by reason of’ language of RICO entails an inquiry into whether a defendant’s action can be said to have proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. If the plaintiff is harmed in only an indirect way, the plaintiff does not have standing to pursue a RICO claim. Specific detrimental reliance is a sufficient but not necessary element of a RICO cause of action.
Moreover, looking secondarily to the underlying predicate acts to inform the “proximate cause” analysis, in mail and wire fraud prosecutions, the government simply need not prove actual detrimental reliance. Thus, the proximate cause analysis should not be modified to take into account any peculiar “reliance” characteristics of the underlying acts.
In determining what proximate causation means in the context of mail and wire fraud, though, it is helpful, as Justice Sealia pointed out in Holmes, to refer to the nature of the underlying act. This is a case of fraud. And “the general rule in fraud cases ... is that you are liable only to an intended victim.” Matter of EDC, 930 F.2d 1275, 1279 (7th Cir.1991). The victim need not be the primary victim, only an intended victim. Id. at 1279.4
However, assuming that the defendants have committed the acts alleged, it is for a jury to decide, applying the law of proximate cause generally, whether the plaintiffs were in the zone of foreseeable plaintiffs and whether their actions were a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’ harm. I cannot rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs were outside this zone. To the contrary, if Prudential’s theory of the case is to be believed, Prudential was certainly an intended victim of the fraud. Prudential alleges that defendants made affirmative misrepresentations about the safety of asbestos to architects, contractors and installers of buildings that it subsequently acquired. Moreover, Prudential alleges that defendants made affirmative misrepresentatives in *297Sweet’s publication for the purpose of convincing potential plaintiffs to ignore knowledge defendants had about the dangers of asbestos. If Prudential is correct on the facts, the fraud scheme directly targeted entities like Prudential, for the fraud would not have been worth it if large real estate dealers did not continue to buy such buildings. It is true that to some extent, the target class of plaintiffs was the American public at large. But this larger class surely might include Prudential, who stood to keep the defendants’ products valuable by continuing to buy buildings containing defendants’ products.
Thus, since defendant’s motion is based on their proposition that Prudential has not specifically and detrimentally relied upon particular representations of the defendants, the motion must be denied.
I next address Prudential’s motion to strike defendants’ statute of limitations defenses on the grounds of equitable estoppel.

B. Prudential’s motion to strike defendants’ statute of limitations defenses

With this motion, Prudential asks this court to strike the defendants’ statute of limitations defenses, based on various equitable doctrines. More specifically, Prudential’s argument is that the defendants should be estopped from arguing that Prudential should have known about its cause of action prior to the beginning date of the limitations period. As Prudential sums up its argument: “Prudential did not know of its injury prior to 1984. It is not necessary for this Court to resolve whether Prudential should have discovered its injury at an earlier time. As a matter of equity and as a matter of sound public policy, on that issue defendants’ conduct, not plaintiffs, should be determinative.” Plaintiffs brief at 2.
The defendants’ primary argument in response is that Prudential actually knew about its injury prior to six years before the suit was filed. They also argue, though, that Prudential’s arguments about the operation of the various doctrines are incorrect, and that the defendants are entitled to argue to a jury that Prudential should have known of its injury prior to 1984.
Although motions to strike are generally decided on the pleadings alone, see Total 3 Containment, Inc. v. Environ Products, Inc., 1992 WL 208981 (E.D.Pa.) (Gawthrop, D.J.), this motion comes in a different posture. Prudential is making fact-based arguments grounded in equity, and I will consider whether the law and the undisputed facts entitled it to relief.
I will deny Prudential’s motion on two essential grounds: (1) there are disputed issues of fact as to whether Prudential actually knew of its injury prior to 1984; and (2) the defendants are entitled to argue to a jury that Prudential should have known of its injury prior to 1984. I reject Prudential’s argument that the nature of defendants’ conduct, and the public policies involved, entitles it to a striking of the defenses as a matter of law.
The parties apparently agree that, since there is no conflict among the various states, and since in the absence of conflict the law of the forum state applies, New Jersey law governs the instant motion.

1. Statutes of limitations generally

Statutes of limitations embody particular policy concerns for fairness to defendants. They recognize that it is generally unfair to compel a defendant to defend actions “long after the alleged injury has occurred, when memories have faded, witnesses have died and evidence has been lost.” Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (1973) (citing Developments in the Law— Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950)). Since the statutes themselves embody concerns of fairness and equity generally, courts have recognized that these policies are not furthered by strict adherence to the time period. Thus, in certain circumstances, New Jersey — as well as other states — applies various tolling and equitable doctrines. Prudential relies, alternatively, on three New Jersey doctrines: (1) the discovery rule; (2) fraudulent concealment; and (3) equitable estoppel.
I will address these arguments in turn.

2. The Discovery Rule

In most cases, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the *298accrual of the cause of action. However, because application of the general rule works inequities in certain circumstances, New Jersey has adopted an exception to this rule. The discovery rule — which was formulated in the context of medical malpractice cases, see Lopez, at 274, 300 A.2d 563; Bernstein v. Cheslock, 171 N.J.Super. 566, 410 A.2d 271 (App.Div.1979) — provides that “in an appropriate ease a cause of action will be held not to accrue until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he [or she] may have a basis for an actionable claim.” Lopez at 272, 300 A.2d 563. The question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of the discovery rule is for the trial judge. Lopez at 272, 300 A.2d 563.
While the discovery rule was formulated in the context of medical malpractice claims, see Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961), it has been extended to other areas as well, in fact, to areas apposite to this case. See, e.g., New Market Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 633 (1968), in which the Court held that a plaintiffs cause of action against a professional engineer and land surveyor, arising from the defendant’s miscalculation of acreage, accrued only when the damage was discovered.
This is a prototypical case for application of the discovery rule. When plaintiffs first began purchasing buildings with asbestos, there was no way they could have known about any potential problems with in-place asbestos. Thus, if the discovery rule, or any relevant equitable doctrine, was held inapplicable, this case would be one where “an injured person, unaware that he has a cause of action, should be denied his day in court solely because of his ignorance.” Lopez at 274, 300 A.2d 563.
However, in its discovery rule argument, Prudential asks this court to modify and extend New Jersey law. While the discovery rule normally tolls the limitations period until a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury5, Prudential asks this court to find that, in appropriate circumstances — particularly the circumstances of this case — the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff actually discovers the injury. In other words, under the proposed Prudential extension, application of the discovery rule would mean that defendants could not argue that Prudential should have known about its cause of action by a particular date.
I decline to adopt Prudential’s argument and change New Jersey law.
First, Prudential’s argument runs counter to the policies underlying the discovery rule. The justification for the discovery rule lies in equity. The purpose is to ensure that a party is not barred from pursuing an action before he or she has a reasonable basis for believing he or she actually has a claim. Once the party has a reasonable basis for believing he or she has a claim, the justification for the discovery rule ceases. There is no equitable reason to toll the statute of limitations for a party who reasonably should know that a claim exists.
Illustrative is the case of Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 115 N.J. 256, 558 A.2d 463 (1989). In that case, the plaintiff had ingested Arm & Hammer baking soda after suffering from mild indigestion. He immediately experienced pain, collapsed on the floor and was taken to a hospital. Doctors discovered a stomach rupture and performed emergency life-saving surgery. While medical reports reported that the stomach rupture was secondary to the ingestion of baking soda, no physician associated with Mr. Graves’ care believed that the condition was in fact causally traceable to the ingestion of baking soda. Not until a television program aired detailing the possible causal relationship did the plaintiff give credence to any relationship between the two events.
Relying on the discovery rule, Justice O’Hern wrote that “[t]o suggest that the plaintiff should have known that the baking soda could cause a stomach rupture would attribute to him knowledge superior to that of all the physicians who treated him.” *299Graves at 262, 558 A.2d 468 (O’Hern, J. concurring). Thus, the court held that there was no reasonable basis for Mr. Graves to believe he had a claim (until the problem was aired in a television program and until he was contacted by an attorney for another plaintiff). While Prudential argues that this case looked primarily to the actions of defendants, the Court in fact looked at the actions and state of mind of all the relevant parties, to determine the reasonableness of imputing knowledge to the plaintiff.
Second, there is no basis for believing that the New Jersey courts would so extend the discovery rule. As the Third Circuit recently held in another context, “we may not significantly expand state law without a clear indication that the [state] Supreme Court would do the same.” City of Philadelphia v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir.1993). There is no question that the Prudential doctrine would significantly expand state law. After all, most statute of limitations questions involve questions about what the defendant should have known. It is frequently uncertain when actual knowledge occurred. Thus, abolishing the reasonably diligent inquiry often would make it impossible for a defendant to plead the statute of limitations in discovery rule cases.
Thus, under the discovery rule doctrine, I find that the defendants are entitled to argue to a jury that Prudential should have known of its causes of action prior to the relevant time period.6
At any rate, the defendants argue that Prudential had actual notice of its claims before the longest statute of limitations began to run. Their argument is strong enough to create a disputed issue of material fact which would defeat Prudential’s motion to strike.
As one strong example, defendant has submitted an affidavit from a former employee of Prudential, Donald H. Holick, Jr., who was Prudential’s Director of Architecture at its real estate investment department in Houston, Texas from 1979 to 1984. According to his affidavit, Mr. Holick was one of three “troubleshooters” responsible for overseeing Prudential’s $11 billion real estate investment portfolio in its southern and western regions, an area encompassing twenty-two states. Mr. Holick writes in his affidavit that by 1979 Prudential architects and engineers knew that the presence of asbestos-containing materials in its buildings constituted a potential health hazard to building occupants. He further writes:
By 1980, in response to company-wide concern that asbestos-containing materials present in buildings owned by Prudential could pose a health risk to building occupants, tenants and maintenance workers, Prudential had requested a meeting with KRC Research Corporation to discuss the current state of the art concerning asbestos containment and removal programs.
Mr. Holick goes on to describe the meeting with KRC, and Prudential’s concerns about the asbestos problem. He concludes:
Due to the great expense that Prudential believed was required to alleviate the asbestos problem in its buildings, the alarm among tenants and unfavorable publicity that Prudential believed would result from immobilizing asbestos-containing materials present in its buildings, Prudential decided to keep the asbestos issue confidential. Prudential also decided to discuss the asbestos issue with tenants on an individual basis, and then only if they complained about the presence of asbestos in their space, rather than convey uniform information about the issue to all tenants throughout its real estate portfolio.
If Mr. Holick’s testimony is to be believed, then it would appear that Prudential knew about its causes of action based on in-place asbestos and yet decided to solve the asbestos problem by keeping mum rather than by diligently investigating and pursuing remedies to the problem.
Prudential makes several arguments in response to the Holick affidavit. First, it terms the statements conelusory. But they are not; to the contrary, they present a chronology of Prudential’s alleged recognition of a problem and specific steps taken in *300response. Second, Prudential argues that Mr. Holiek never informed anyone at Prudential of the views expressed in his affidavit. But in his affidavit, Mr. Holiek narrates what he ostensibly believes to have been the general tenor of views at Prudential. He does not simply say that he believed in-place asbestos was a problem.
Third, Prudential states that Mr. Holick’s statement is inconsistent with Prudential’s actions in investing billions of dollars in real estate between 1979 and 1984, without ever inquiring about or accounting for the possible presence of asbestos-containing material. But it is not outside the range of possibilities that Prudential ignored the concerns of its southern office.
Fourth, Prudential points out that other statements in the record contradict Mr. Holick’s recollections, including his statement of his supervisory responsibilities. Therefore, Prudential argues, Mr. Holick’s statements cannot be imputed to Prudential. All Prudential has done, with this argument, though, is point to a potential factual dispute. If Mr. Holiek is believed, Prudential has actual knowledge. If not, the factfinder may well find the statute of limitations tolled. This is not a question appropriately resolved on this motion.
Thus I cannot grant Prudential’s motion to strike the defendants’ statute of limitations claims based on the discovery rule doctrine.

S. Fraudulent concealment

Prudential next argues that the fraudulent concealment doctrine applies to bar the defendants from making a statute of limitations argument.
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment also tolls the statute of limitations, and avoids giving “a wrongdoer the advantage and benefit of his fraudulent concealment of a cause of action until the statute of limitations has run.” Cheshire Medical Center v. W.R. Grace & Co., 764 F.Supp. 213, 217 (D.N.H.1991) (Devine, C.J.) (citing Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123, 126 (1959)). Fraudulent concealment “tolls the running of the statue until plaintiff discovers the cause of action or discovers facts that reasonably put him on notice of it.” Plain v. Flicker, 645 F.Supp. 898 (D.N.J.1986). There are two types of fraudulent concealment — self-executing concealment, where an initial wrong is itself fraudulently concealing and where the defendant undertakes no other efforts to conceal; and affirmative concealment, where the defendants have committed a fraud or a wrong and have then undertaken subsequent affirmative acts to conceal that fraud or wrong. Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir.1975). Prudential appears to be alleging that the defendants engaged in the second type of fraud.
As with the discovery rule issue discussed above, this court is again faced with the question of whether the fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations period until plaintiff actually discovers the fraud or whether the doctrine places some reasonable responsibility upon the plaintiffs.
It does not appear that New Jersey state courts have addressed the question of whether the “due diligence” requirement applies to cases where the defendant has committed affirmative acts to conceal a fraud. However, the view adopted by the majority of courts is that due diligence is required. See Plain at 902 (citing cases). Moreover, the two district courts interpreting New Jersey’s law both have adopted the majority view, that “the statute is tolled until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraud.” Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F.Supp. 351, 397 (D.N.J.1983); Plain at 902.
I agree with this interpretation. As Judge Lacey pointed out, in citing a Sixth Circuit case,
the important public policies behind statutes of limitations are not best served if tolled indefinitely, while evidence stales, memories fade and courts and adversaries wait, until the plaintiff at his leisure alleges actual discovery, despite the avalanche of evidence that would put all but the most indiligent plaintiffs on notice of a cause of action.
Hauptmann at 398 n. 48 (quoting Campbell v. Upjohn, 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1982)).
*301Moreover, in construing Pennsylvania’s fraudulent concealment rule, the Third Circuit reasoned that the policy of the rule does not necessitate a finding that the fraud always negates the statute of limitations. Rather, even the effects of fraud can be cured — when the effects of the fraud are nullified by knowledge or imputable knowledge to the plaintiff. Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 822 F.2d 1268, 1273 (3d Cir.1987). The emphasis under Pennsylvania law, the Court said, is on when the effects of fraud have been nullified, and the Court of Appeals held that “the limitations period does not commence in cases of fraudulent concealment until the time of discovery or the date when with reasonable diligence one would have been led to the discovery.” Urland at 1274 (quoting Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d Cir.1979)) (emphasis in original).
Thus, if a defendant fraudulently conceals information from the plaintiff, the limitations period is tolled, and will begin running from the time the cause of action is discovered or might have been discovered after reasonably diligent inquiry.
Even under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, then, defendants are entitled to argue that Prudential did not act with reasonable diligence when it was placed on notice of facts creating a diligence requirement.
Moreover, in order to prevail on its fraudulent concealment defense to the statue of limitations, a plaintiff must prove fraudulent concealment. This in turn requires proof of an intent to deceive and reliance on upon the representations. At least for purposes of this motion, though, Prudential does not wish to prove this. Instead, it argues in its brief:
Prudential recognizes that proof of actual fraud will involve disputed issues of intent not normally susceptible to adjudication by summary judgment. However, the Court need not consider defendants’ intent, or even the truth or falsity of their statements, in order to equitably estop defendants from asserting statutes of limitations defenses. Without regard to intent, and without regard to truth, defendants said what they said and did what they did.
Plaintiffs brief in support at 29. In light of this, it is difficult to know how Prudential can claim its right to relief under the fraudulent concealment doctrine.
At any rate, the cases cited by Prudential are-inapposite to the issue at hand. First, it cites a number of cases for the proposition that courts have held that asbestos company defendants fraudulently concealed information and therefore tolled the statute of limitations. With the exception of one of these cases7, though, the courts only held that the fraudulent concealment doctrine was plead adequately enough to avoid dismissing the complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) statute of limitations motion. For example, in Town of Hooksett School District v. W.R. Grace Co., 617 F.Supp. 126 (D.N.H.1984), Judge Loughlin addressed the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ asbestos claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court, while recognizing the fraudulent concealment theory, ruled only that “Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to toll the limitations period under both the ‘discovery rule’ and the doctrine of ‘fraudulent concealment.’ ” Hooksett at 129 (emphasis added).8 Similarly, in City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Company, 637 F.Supp. *302646, 653 (D.R.I.1986), the court again relied on the plaintiffs allegations in applying the tolling principles of fraudulent concealment. Id. at 653 (“On a motion to dismiss, the allegation of fraudulent concealment in the complaint is ... sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations”); see also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 89-3022, slip op. at 4 (C.D.Ill.) (Mills, D.J.) (“Taking as it must all well plead facts in the complaint as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled its entitlement to [the fraudulent concealment doctrine under Illinois law]”) (attached as Exhibit B to defendant’s brief in opposition to plaintiffs motion).
Second, Prudential cites a number of cases for the proposition that the fraudulent concealment doctrine bars manufacturers from taking advantage of the statute of limitations when the manufacturer has made false or misleading statements concerning the safety of its product. But in Allen v. A.H. Robins Co., 752 F.2d 1365, 1376 (9th Cir.1985), the Ninth Circuit only held that the district wrongfully granted summary judgment to defendants on statute of limitations ground when there were disputed factual issues as to whether fraudulent concealment existed. And in Knaysi v. A.H. Robins Co., 679 F.2d 1366, (11th Cir.1982), rehearing denied, 688 F.2d 852 (1982), the Eleventh Circuit ruled that “the facts alleged could, if proved, estop Robins from pleading the bar of the statute of limitations [and] there are obvious questions of fact regarding the alleged misrepresentations made by Robins.” Id. at 1370.
Finally, as the analysis above demonstrates about the discovery rule, defendants have presented sufficient disputed facts about whether plaintiff had actual knowledge of its claims. Actual knowledge by Prudential would defeat its fraudulent concealment argument as well.
Therefore, plaintiffs motion to strike based on the fraudulent concealment doctrine must be denied.
. J. Equitable Estoppel ■
Third, plaintiff argues that with or without fraud, this court should equitably estop defendants from pleading defenses based on statute of limitations grounds.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that the principle of equitable estoppel can be used to “prevent a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations when the defendant engages in conduct calculated to mislead plaintiff into believing that it is unnecessary to seek civil redress.” Kaprow v. Board of Education of Berkeley Township, 131 N.J. 572, 622 A.2d 237 (1993). Because the imposition of the equitable estoppel doctrine means that a party is precluded from “asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed”, see Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339, 403 A.2d 880, 882 (1979), the “requirements of equitable estoppel are quite exacting.” W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation, 116 N.J. 543, 553, 562 A.2d 222, 227 (1989). Despite the “exacting requirements”, though, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that where “the [statute of limitations] bar is used primarily as a sword rather than a shield and by one who has been responsible to disclose the actionable essentials in the face of a duty to speak, factors of vicarious enrichment become a dominant consideration which we are prone to remedy in equity and good conscience.” State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 358-59, 126 A.2d 168, 178 (1956).
Thus, in United States Steel, equitable estoppel prevented defendants from raising a statute of limitations defense when it failed to fulfill a legal duty to notify the State of escheatable property within its possession. And in Peloso v. Hartford Insurance Company, 56 N.J. 514, 267 A.2d 498 (1970), the Court applied the doctrine when the defendant used settlement negotiations to lull plaintiff into delaying the filing of the action.
The case of Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 440 A.2d 1329 (1982), is illustrative. In that case the plaintiffs first filed a timely complaint. The complaint was dismissed by the court for plaintiffs failure to answer interrogatories. Yet seventeen months passed while the case remained on the docket, and discovery continually was adjourned. Finally plaintiffs moved to restore the case to the trial calender and defendants objected. Af*303ter the case was finally dismissed, plaintiffs filed a new complaint, and defendants raised a statute of limitations defense. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that even though plaintiffs attorney was culpable, “[s]ince defendants’ counsel knew that the [first] case remained on the docket, rightly or wrongfully, they had an obligation to notify the court of the fact that the case had been dismissed.” Id. at 259, 440 A.2d 1329. Thus, defendant was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations.
But while New Jersey courts have a “long history of instances where equity has interposed to bar the statute of limitations where some conduct on the part of the defendant has rendered it inequitable that he be allowed to avail himself of this defense”, see Deluxe Sales v. Hyundai Engineering, 254 N.J.Super. 370, 378, 603 A.2d 552 (App.Div. 1992) (citing Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 275 n. 2, 300 A.2d 563, 567 n. 2 (1973)), certain principles can be discerned as to when the doctrine is applied.
First, the doctrine is generally applied when a defendant’s actions directly impacted plaintiffs decision on whether to file suit, such as when “a defendant has lulled a plaintiff into a false sense of security by representing that a claim will be amicably settled without the necessity for litigation,” see Knight v. Brown Transport Corporation, 806 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir.1986). Examples include false assurances during settlement negotiations, and, as in Zaccardi, failure to notify the court of knowledge of a case.
Second, where the basis for application of the doctrine is the defendant’s misrepresentations or failures to adhere to a legal duty to disclose, the plaintiff must have relied upon defendants’ actions in not filing suit earlier. See Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 590, 622 A.2d 237 (claim for equitable estoppel fails because the defendant’s actions “did not induce [plaintiffs] reasonable reliance.”); see also Knight at 487 (equitable estoppel will not be applied “where no fraudulent or deceitful misrepresentations precluded suit”). Finally, irregardless of defendant’s conduct, plaintiff is still obligated to act with diligence, see Knight at 487 (doctrine will not be invoked “when plaintiff has been less than diligent in pursuing and pressing his claims”). Under this rule, plaintiffs actions can counter defendant’s actions. Of course, plaintiff’s actual knowledge of its cause of action would preclude application of the equitable estoppel doctrine.
In fact, defendants’ primary argument against application of plaintiffs estoppel claim is that Prudential’s actual knowledge of its cause of action defeats any actions taken by defendants allegedly to deter Prudential from filing suit. And, as noted above in the discovery rule discussion of Donald Holick’s affidavit, a review of the record persuades me that plaintiffs motion must be denied. Defendants’ facts, if proven, could show that plaintiff had actual knowledge of its claims, sufficient to preclude application of equitable estoppel principles at this time.
Prudential then argues that defendants should be equitably estopped from arguing that Prudential should have known of its cause of action prior to when it actually knew of it.
In this regard, Prudential relies primarily on the nature of the defendants’ acts, at issue in this case. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that asbestos cases are unique and require particular rules.
Prudential points to language in a New Jersey Supreme Court opinion involving liability of cigarette manufacturers for harms allegedly caused by their products. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990). In Dewey, the defendant cigarette manufacturer argued that “as a matter of public policy this Court should immunize cigarette manufacturers from liability for the harm caused by their products by finding that no duty exists.” Dewey at 99, 577 A.2d 1239. Responding, Justice Clifford wrote that:
Defendants’ argument completely ignores the extensive efforts of the tobacco manufacturers to saturate the public with information regarding the benefits of cigarette smoking, the aim of which is to rebut the assertions of public-health advocates and the Surgeon General____ We are unable, therefore, to decide that as a matter of public policy, manufacturers of cigarettes *304should be immunized from liability for the harms caused by their products.
Dewey at 100, 577 A.2d 1239. The Court further noted that its decision “is consistent with the general policy in New Jersey of ‘liberally favoring jury resolution of defectiveness issues ... in products liability cases.’ ” Dewey at 100, 577 A.2d 1239 (quoting Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736 (3d Cir.1976)).
Dewey is inapplicable to the present ease. That case was addressing an argument that for public policy reasons a manufacturer of a particular product is immune from liability. The court in no way addressed the question of whether the defendant could put forward a statute of limitations defense. The court refused to create a right; it did not grant a request to strike a right.
While plaintiffs cite a number of cases that have pointed to the unique nature of asbestos cases, I remain unconvinced of the proposition that the defendants should be precluded from raising the statute of limitations defenses. First of all, despite the harms caused by asbestos, and despite the defendants’ alleged actions, the motion still involves competing policy considerations. First is the policy behind statute of limitations generally. Second is the policy against fraud and inequitable conduct. But even when there is inequitable conduct, it is not too much to ask a plaintiff to act reasonably diligently in appropriate conditions. If defendants did in fact act as atrociously as Prudential says they did, then a jury will be convinced that a duty to act with reasonable diligence never arose. If a duty did arise, though, it is not fair to deny that defense to the defendants. In short, then, I am finding that the policies behind and doctrines of the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment adequately protect Prudential’s concerns.
I am unwilling to go any farther than those doctrines already go.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Prudential’s RICO claim is denied. Prudential’s motion to strike defendants’ statute of limitations defenses on the grounds of equitable estoppel is also denied.

. In that case, Judge Posner illustrated this principle with the following hypothetical:
Suppose you blow up a plane carrying X and Y in order to kill X. If both die in the explosion, you are just as much Y's murderer as X’s, not because of the fiction of transferred intent but because you knew that Y (or any other person who might be a passenger on the plane) would die if your plot against X succeeded. It is not a transferred-intent case because nothing went wrong with your plan; it is a case of extreme recklessness, equated to deliberateness.... You killed Y for an ulterior motive, it is true, but most murders have ulterior motives.
Matter of EDC at 1279 (citations omitted).

. It appears that the doctrines of "constructive knowledge” and "reasonable diligence” are used interchangeably, to mean that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows of or has reason to know of his or her cause of action.

. Prudential's discovery rule argument ends here: it does not argue that this court should find as a matter of law that it should not have known about their cause of action.

. In Cheshire Medical Center v. W.R. Grace & Co., 764 F.Supp. 213 (D.N.H.1991), when faced with a summary judgment motion by defendant, the Court presented plaintiff’s argument and then noted:
The defendants’ discovery-rule argument ... makes no reference to when or whether ... the proper plaintiff in this action had any knowledge or should have discovered, the presence or danger of asbestos....
Nor do defendants discuss the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.... Here, plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment argument is supported by evidence which indicates defendants' knowledge of the hazards of asbestos long before the use by the Hospital.
Id. at 217. In other words, defendants in that case failed to produce any evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s showing. The court was compelled, then, to accept plaintiff’s supported facts as proven.

. Incidentally, the Hooksett court held that in cases of fraudulent concealment, the statute is tolled only until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fraud.