Court Opinion

ID: 9409192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 08:08:22.096895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.414681
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00174-CR
     ___________________________

    RONALD CARL LEE, Appellant

                     V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 355th District Court
          Hood County, Texas
        Trial Court No. CR15019

    Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Ronald Carl Lee appeals his conviction for indecency with a child, a second-

degree-felony offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1), (d). Lee entered a guilty

plea without the benefit of either a charge bargain or a sentencing bargain and elected

to have his punishment assessed by the trial judge. Following a sentencing hearing, the

trial court sentenced Lee to 20 years’ incarceration. Lee filed a motion for new trial,

which the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, Lee’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief reflecting that counsel has determined, after

examining the appellate record, that no arguable grounds for appeal exist. 1 See Anders

      1
        In her brief, Lee’s counsel points out that the trial court failed to comply with
all the requirements of Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure when
accepting Lee’s guilty plea but opines that the errors were minor and do not constitute
grounds for reversal. We agree. First, the trial court failed to “inquire as to whether a
victim impact statement ha[d] been returned to the attorney representing the state” as
required by Article 26.13(e). Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(e). But because the
statute specifically provides that failure to comply with Article 26.13(e) “is not
grounds for the defendant to set aside the conviction, sentence, or plea,” this is not
reversible error. See id. art. 26.13(f). Second, while Lee was admonished in writing that
his guilty plea could result in his being deported, excluded from admission to this
country, or denied naturalization if he is not a United States citizen, the trial court did
not also verbally admonish him of this fact as required by Article 26.13(d-1). See id. art.
26.13(a)(4), (d-1). But because the record includes Lee’s social security number—
which strongly suggests that he is a United States citizen—and contains no evidence
indicating that he lacks United States citizenship, any failure to admonish him about
the immigration consequences of his guilty plea is harmless error. See VanNortrick v.
State, 227 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“[W]hen the record shows a
defendant to be a United States citizen, the trial court’s failure to admonish him on
the immigration consequences of his guilty plea is harmless error.”); see also Fakeye v.
State, 227 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that direct evidence is not

                                            2
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and

motion meet the requirements of Anders, which requires presenting a professional

evaluation of the entire record in the case demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. Id., 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Although provided the opportunity to seek a

copy of the appellate record and file a pro se response, Lee declined to do so.2

Likewise, the State did not file a response to the Anders brief.

      We have independently examined the record, as is our duty upon the filing of

an Anders brief. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see

required to support an inference regarding a defendant’s citizenship status for
purposes of an Article 26.13(a)(4) harm analysis).
      2
        In compliance with the Anders requirements, Lee’s appellate counsel originally
sent Lee a letter on December 16, 2022, enclosing a copy of her Anders brief and her
motion to withdraw, notifying him of his right to file a pro se response, and informing
him of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In addition, on
December 20, 2022, we mailed Lee written notice that his appellate counsel had filed
an Anders brief and that he could obtain a copy of the appellate record and file a pro
se response. These notices were mailed to Lee’s address at the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice’s Beto Unit in Tennessee Colony, Texas. At our direction, Lee’s
appellate counsel mailed Lee a second letter on March 24, 2023, at his new address in
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Holliday Unit in Huntsville, Texas,
highlighting his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review if we affirmed
his conviction. Finally, on April 6, 2023, we sent another written notice to Lee at his
latest address in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Byrd Unit in Huntsville,
Texas. Neither of the notices we sent were returned as undeliverable, nor has
appellate counsel informed us that her letters were returned, so we presume that Lee
received them. Cf. Cooper v. Hall, 489 S.W.2d 409, 412–13, 415 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting the presumption of receipt that arises when the
evidence shows that a letter “was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed to [the
recipient] at his correct address and placed in the United States mails and not returned
to [the sender] by the postal authorities”).

                                            3
also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). After carefully

reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that this appeal is

wholly frivolous and without merit. Our independent review of the record reveals

nothing further that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d

824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684,

685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw

and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                      Elizabeth Kerr
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 13, 2023

                                           4