Court Opinion

ID: 9699059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:08:47.989634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.109556
License: Public Domain

Proctor, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. The majority has cited no case holding that a defendant is entitled to pretrial disclosure of testimony given by another before a grand jury. Certainly there is no such precedent in this State. Grand jury proceedings are traditionally secret. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S. 677, 78 S. Ct. 783, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1958). In United States v. Rose, 215 F. 2d 617 (3 Cir. 1954), cited approvingly in the majority opinion, the reasons for this rule of secrecy are summarized at pages 628-629:
“(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who mevy testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.” (Emphasis added)
The defendant is accused of suborning Blevins to testify falsely before the grand jury. It is likely that Blevins will be a witness for the State at the trial. In such a situation, there is particular cogency in the reason for secrecy, i. e., “to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury *226and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it.” It seems to me the majority has ignored this reason in finding “no misuse of the trial court’s discretion” in allowing pretrial inspection of Blevins’ grand jury testimony. Moreover, the trial court’s exercise of discretion was based on a faulty premise. It said, “The impeachment of the State’s principal witness on the basis of prior inconsistent or contradictory statements made under oath before a Grand Jury would have important effect on a trial. Before such a fact can be established defendant would need access to the testimony.” Of course, if defendant at the trial shows a “particularized need” for the testimony, he should have it. Cf. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U. S. 393, 79 S. Ct. 1237, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1323 (1959). And the trial should be adjourned to give him adequate time to properly examine it. See United States v. Spangelet, 258 F. 2d 338 (2 Cir. 1958). In such event, none of the reasons for secrecy set forth in Bose would apply. But to allow defendant examination of a witness’s grand jury testimony long before trial would flout the sound policy of keeping such testimony secret. See State v. Borg, 8 N. J. Misc. 349 (Sup. Ct. 1930), affirmed by court en banc, 8 N. J. Misc. 704, where Justice Parker said, at page 352 of 8 N. J. Misc.:
“It is suggested that ‘the purpose of secrecy [of grand jury testimony] has been effected’ and consequently the obligation has ceased from that time. I cannot agree that such purpose is fully effected when indictment is found. If at that juncture the grand jury proceedings are to be thrown wide open, the possible damage to the interests of the public by way of aiding the accused would be incalculable.”
Unlike the situations in United States v. Rose, supra, and United States v. Remington, 191 F. 2d 246 (2 Cir. 1951), also cited with approval by the majority, this is not a case where the defendant- asks to examine his own grand jury testimony. In each of those cases, the defendant was indicted for perjury committed before the grand *227jury; none of the quoted reasons for maintaining the secrecy of grand jury testimony were applicable. As the court in Rose said at 215 F. 2d, page 630:
“Since all the defendant desires is a transcript of his own testimony, the sanctity of that which transpired before the Grand Jury is hardly in question. In addition, such disclosure would not subvert any of the reasons traditionally given for the inviolability of Grand Jury proceedings.”
This court’s decision in State v. Mucci, 25 N. J. 423 (1957), does not support the view of the majority. There a copy of the grand jury testimony of the State’s witnesses was given defendant at the trial for the purpose of cross-examination. The dissenting opinion in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra, with which the majority apparently agrees, only recognized that access to the grand jury testimony should have been afforded the defendant at the trial. (See 3 L. Ed., pp. 1330-32.) In that case after the principal prosecuting witness testified on direct examination, defense counsel asked for the production of his relevant grand jury testimony. The trial court’s denial of the request was affirmed by the majority of the court. Justice Brennan, speaking for the four dissenters, repeats the reasons for secrecy enumerated in Rose. He concluded that at that posture of the case none of the reasons were applicable. He said:
“Certainly disclosure at this stage of the proceedings would not enable the defendants * * * to tamper with the witness who has already testified against them on direct examination.” [360 U. S. 393, 79 S. Ct. 1244.]
I have no quarrel with the views of Justice Brennan. When the reasons for cloaking grand jury testimony in secrecy have disappeared, the cloak should be lifted. As I have stated, such a disclosure of testimony might well be in order in the present case at the trial when the need for secrecy may disappear.
*228And, of course, In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 34 N. J. 378 (1961), cited by the majority, is inapplicable as there is no trial of an accused following a presentment by a grand jury without further grand jury action. And State v. Donovan, 129 N. J. L. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1943), also cited, in fact, lends weight to this dissent. There the court expressly stated the defendants were not entitled to ask for the details of the evidence given before the grand jury. 129 N. J. L., at p. 483.
1 would reverse. I am authorized to say that Justice Hall joins in this dissent.