Court Opinion

ID: 9909997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 18:01:01.514138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:25.526558
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 14 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELBA ESTELA CASTRO DE                           No. 22-1283
ESPANA; GERSON OMAR DE ESPANA                   Agency Nos.
CASTRO; CORINA CECIBEL DE                       A208-745-411
ESPANA CASTRO; HELEN ELIZABETH                  A208-745-414
DE ESPANA CASTRO,
                                                A208-745-412
                                                A208-745-413
             Petitioners,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted December 12, 2023**
                                Pasadena, California

Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Elba Estela Castro de Espana and her three children are natives

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and citizens of El Salvador. They timely petition for review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding an immigration judge’s (“IJ”)

denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We review the BIA’s decision and, to the extent the BIA

relied on the IJ’s decision, we review it as well. Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826,

830 (9th Cir. 2014). The agency’s findings of fact are “conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021). We deny the

petition.

      1. With respect to asylum and withholding of removal, the BIA ruled, first,

that Petitioner failed to show that the Salvadoran government was unable or

unwilling to protect her from harm at the hands of private actors whom she fears.

Petitioner suffered harm when members of the MS-13 gang extorted money from

her, attempted a sexual assault, and threatened her. Nonetheless we are not

compelled to find that the BIA’s factual conclusion is wrong. The IJ appropriately

1
  The children are derivative beneficiaries only of the asylum claim. See
Sumolang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (no derivative relief for
statutory withholding of removal); Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir.
2005) (no derivative relief for CAT protection). We refer to the lead petitioner as
“Petitioner.”

                                        2                                  22-1283
considered the fact that Petitioner did not report any of those incidents to the police

and the record does not demonstrate that it would have been futile or dangerous to

do so. See Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Where the

persecutor is not a state actor, we consider whether an applicant reported the

incidents to police[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated

on other grounds by Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069–70 (9th

Cir. 2017) (en banc); Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 n.1 (9th Cir.

2020) (applicant can explain a failure to report by showing that reporting would be

futile or dangerous). Although the country conditions evidence on which the IJ

and BIA relied identifies ways in which the authorities in El Salvador fail to

protect women from violent crimes, it also notes the country’s efforts to address

such violence. Accordingly, we cannot say that the record compels a conclusion

contrary to the agency’s.

      As an independent ground for denial of relief, the BIA ruled that neither of

Petitioner’s proposed particular social groups (“mothers living in El Salvador

while husbands live in the United States” and “women living alone in El Salvador

with teenage daughters”) is socially distinct. The BIA’s conclusion is supported by

substantial evidence. See Conde-Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir.

2020) (holding that social distinction is a question of fact).

                                         3                                   22-1283
      2. With respect to CAT protection, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s

affirmance of the IJ’s finding that Petitioner failed to show that any torture she

might suffer in the future would be perpetrated by or with the consent or

acquiescence of a government actor. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2), 208.18(a). As

noted, Petitioner did not seek assistance from the government when she suffered

harm from private actors and thus did not show government acquiescence in the

past. And documents in the record support the BIA’s observation that the

Salvadoran government is attempting to curb violence against women.

      3. We may not, and do not, consider Petitioner’s additional arguments

concerning issues on which the BIA expressly declined to rule or rely. See

Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (observing that

we may consider only the grounds on which the BIA relied).

      PETITION DENIED.

                                         4                                   22-1283