Court Opinion

ID: 9370131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 21:02:00.753402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.672662
License: Public Domain

Rel: February 10, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                                          CR-18-1211
                                   _________________________

                                         Nathaniel Dennis

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama.

                         Appeal from Houston Circuit Court
                                    (CC-12-163)

                                 On Application for Rehearing

COLE, Judge.

        APPLICATION OVERRULED.

     Windom, P.J., and Kellum, J., concur. McCool, J., concurs specially,
with opinion, which Minor, J., joins.
CR-18-1211

McCOOL, Judge, concurring specially.

     I adhere to my vote concurring in the result on original submission.

Dennis v. State, [Ms. CR-18-1211, July 8, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim.

App. 2022).    Although I agree that, based on binding precedent,

Nathaniel Dennis was entitled to relief on his speedy-trial claim, I do not

agree with all the analysis in the main opinion on original submission.

Further, I do not believe that the State's application for rehearing sets

forth any points of law or facts that this Court overlooked or

misapprehended; thus, I concur in overruling the application for

rehearing. Rule 40, Ala. R. App. P. I write specially to explain my reasons

for concurring in the result on original submission.

     As set forth in the main opinion on original submission, the offense

in question occurred in 1981, but Dennis was not developed as a suspect

until 2010 or 2011, when hairs that had been obtained from the crime

scene were tested for DNA and were submitted to a national database,

which resulted in a "match" to Dennis. Based on that evidence, Dennis

was indicted on two counts of capital murder in May 2011. At the time

of his indictment, Dennis was in prison in Virginia serving a life sentence

for an unrelated charge.    The case proceeded to trial in June 2019.

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CR-18-1211

Dennis was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed

during a burglary, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without

the possibility of parole. On appeal of that conviction, Dennis argued,

among other things, that he was denied his right to a speedy trial in

violation of the Sixth Amendment.

     The United States Supreme Court has identified four factors courts

should assess in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of

his or her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial: "Length of delay, the

reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice

to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Those

factors constitute "[a] balancing test [that] necessarily compels courts to

approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis." Id.

     "The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.

Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no

necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance."

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. In the present case, it is undisputed that the

post-accusation delay of a little over eight years was sufficient to trigger

the assessment of the other three factors.

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CR-18-1211

     Concerning the reason for the delay, "Barker recognizes three

categories of reasons for delay: (1) deliberate delay, (2) negligent delay,

and (3) justified delay." Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 265 (Ala. 2005).

In the present case, I agree that much of the delay was negligent delay,

which is weighted against the State but is "weighted less heavily against

the State than is deliberate delay." Id.

     Concerning the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial,

I agree that Dennis sufficiently asserted his right in the present case.

Therefore, this factor weighs in his favor.

     Lastly, I consider prejudice to Dennis. In Barker, the United States

Supreme Court stated:

           "Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of
     the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was
     designed to protect. This Court has identified three such
     interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii)
     to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to
     limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of
     these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
     defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness
     of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a
     delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if
     defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the
     distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected
     in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be
     shown."

407 U.S. at 532 (footnote omitted).

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CR-18-1211

     In the present case, I agree with the main opinion that Dennis has

not demonstrated actual prejudice.       There has been no "oppressive

pretrial incarceration," because Dennis has been – and would still be,

regardless of whether Alabama ever charged him with a crime –

incarcerated in Virginia on other charges. Likewise, any "anxiety and

concern" would be minimal; although the outcome of the Alabama case

could have been a more severe sentence, incarceration in Alabama or

Virginia would be a "six of one, half a dozen of the other" scenario.

     This brings us to the third prong of prejudice analysis:           "the

possibility that the defense will be impaired."             The death or

disappearance of witnesses, the failure of witnesses to recall facts clearly,

and/or the inability to locate key witnesses are, indeed, the most serious

of the three concerns. In this case, the fact that 30 years had already

passed between the time of the crime and the time Dennis was indicted

greatly minimizes the likelihood of this kind of prejudice occurring

between indictment and trial. While normally this analysis includes the

presumption that excessive delay "compounds" over time the longer the

delay continues, see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992),

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CR-18-1211

I find this presumption to be of little value in the fact scenario presented

by this case, for reasons I will discuss below.

     Before proceeding to a more complete discussion of the facts and

circumstances of this case, we must look at the current state of the law

regarding speedy-trial claims as handed down by the United States

Supreme Court. This brings us to a discussion of Doggett. In Doggett,

the United States Supreme Court stated that "affirmative proof of

particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim." 505

U.S. at 655. See also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) ("Barker v.

Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of

prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a

speedy trial"). Instead, the Court has recognized that "excessive delay

presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither

party can prove or, for that matter, identify." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655

(emphasis added).

     I want to point out, however, that there is one big factual difference

between the present case and Doggett. In Doggett, unlike the present

case, there was not a 30-year delay between the time of the crime and the

eight-year post-accusation delay.        The Doggett Court reached its

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CR-18-1211

conclusion about presumed prejudice based on its determination that

"such is the nature of the prejudice presumed that the weight we assign

to official negligence compounds over time as the presumption of

evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus, our toleration of such negligence

varies inversely with its protractedness, cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488

U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988), and its consequent

threat to the fairness of the accused's trial." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.

Thus, the Court held that the weight assigned to negligent delay

compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows.

     However, as I mentioned above, I question the logic of compounding

the weight of a negligent post-accusation delay when there has already

been a 30-year pre-accusation delay. Although I agree that evidentiary

prejudice would increase for some time after the crime was committed,

at some point, that increase would either cease or become minimal. In

the situation at hand, a 30-year pre-accusation delay would logically

seem to be much more prejudicial than an additional 8 ½ year post-

accusation delay. To put it another way, it would seem logical to assume

that most, if any, actual prejudice would have already occurred before

indictment in this case, and that the additional delay would not

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CR-18-1211

compound that prejudice as it might had the indictment come

immediately after the commission of the crime.

     Moreover, under the facts of this case, I question whether any

actual prejudice could be proven based upon the evidence presented at

trial. At trial, Dennis's defense was that he was not at the crime scene.

He produced witnesses who testified that that they worked with Dennis

at a nightclub, that it would be unusual for employees of the club to leave

during their shift, and that they did not recall Dennis leaving work on

the night of the crime. However, the DNA evidence specifically placed

him at the crime scene. There is no indication that the trial would have

proceeded differently without the post-accusation delay, and I note that

the conclusive nature of the DNA evidence contradicting Dennis’s alibi

defense weighs strongly against any claim of actual prejudice in this case.

     Had the reason for the delay been a deliberate attempt by the State

to gain some impermissible advantage, I would feel differently. However,

there is no dispute that the only delay in this case was negligent, which

would only be outweighed by some demonstrated actual prejudice, which

does not exist in this case.

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CR-18-1211

     Thus, I believe that, in this case, the complete lack of proof of any

actual prejudice to the defendant weighs so heavily against the defendant

that he should not prevail on a constitutional speedy-trial claim.

However, while Dennis has not demonstrated actual prejudice, it appears

that United States Supreme Court precedent requires that prejudice

should be presumed under the limited facts of this particular case. Of

course, I am referring back to Doggett, discussed earlier. In substance,

the present situation is almost indistinguishable from the situation in

Doggett. In Doggett, like the present case, the post-accusation delay was

a little over eight years; thus, it triggered the speedy-trial inquiry. In

Doggett, like the present case, the reason for the post-accusation delay

was negligence by the government. In Doggett, like the present case, the

defendant asserted in due course his right to a speedy trial. Also, like

the present case, the defendant in Doggett failed to demonstrate any

actual prejudice. However, because the post-accusation delay was eight

and a half years, the Doggett Court determined that prejudice was

presumed. The Court then weighed that presumed prejudice along with

the other Barker factors and decided that, under the circumstances of

that particular case, "when the presumption of prejudice, albeit

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CR-18-1211

unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence,

e.g., [Barker,] 407 U.S., at 534-536, 92 S. Ct., at 2194-2195, nor

persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief." Doggett, 505

U.S. at 658 (footnotes omitted).

     There is one last point that I want to make regarding Doggett: I

note that Doggett was a 5-4 decision and that the Barker "balancing test

necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc

basis" or a very fact-specific basis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. I agree with

the following from Justice Thomas's dissent in Doggett:

           "Just as 'bad facts make bad law,' so too odd facts make
     odd law. Doggett's 8½-year odyssey from youthful drug
     dealing in the tobacco country of North Carolina, through
     stints in a Panamanian jail and in Colombia, to life as a
     computer operations manager, homeowner, and registered
     voter in suburban Virginia is extraordinary. But even more
     extraordinary is the Court's conclusion that the Government
     denied Doggett his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
     despite the fact that he has suffered none of the harms that
     the right was designed to prevent."

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 659 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

     Although I encourage the Supreme Court to revisit Doggett's

speedy-trial holding, I cannot sufficiently distinguish Doggett from the

present case, and, of course, this Court is bound by Doggett. Therefore,

I concur that Dennis was entitled to relief on his speedy-trial claim.

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CR-18-1211

    Minor, J., concurs.

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