Court Opinion

ID: 9954003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 15:01:13.830565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:10:59.421939
License: Public Domain

22-1645
Harvey v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone
to the United Nations

                                  In the
           United States Court of Appeals
                      For the Second Circuit

                            August Term, 2022
                              No. 22-1645

                     JANET HARVEY, JOSEPH HARVEY,
                           Plaintiffs-Appellees,

                                      v.

   PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE TO THE
                      UNITED NATIONS,
             Defendant-Cross Defendant-Appellant,

  JULES DAVIS, FAIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES, LLC, EMPIRE
                GROUP NYC, LLC, DAVID I. MONTESI,
           Defendants-Cross Claimants-Cross Defendants.

  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
                      District of New York

                         ARGUED: JUNE 1, 2023
                        DECIDED: MARCH 25, 2024

          Before: NARDINI, PÉREZ, and KAHN, Circuit Judges.
       Plaintiffs-Appellees Janet and Joseph Harvey brought several
common law tort claims against Defendant-Cross Defendant-
Appellant the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to
the United Nations, alleging they were harmed by faulty renovations
at the Mission’s headquarters, which is located next door to the
Harveys’ home in Manhattan. The Mission moved to dismiss the
Harveys’ complaint, arguing that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York (Edgardo Ramos, District Judge)
denied the Mission’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that two exceptions to the Mission’s immunity
applied: the commercial activity exception, id. § 1605(a)(2), and the
tortious activity exception, id. § 1605(a)(5). The Mission filed this
interlocutory appeal. We hold that the commercial activity exception
applies because the Harveys’ claims are based upon the Mission’s
allegedly faulty contractual renovations, and renovating a building is
something that a private party can, and often does, do. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM.

                         ANA JARA (Rachel Maimin, on the brief),
                         Lowenstein Sandler LLP, New York, NY, for
                         Plaintiffs-Appellees.

                         NICHOLAS M. RENZLER (Andrew B.
                         Loewenstein and Christina G. Hioureas, on
                         the brief), Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, MA and
                         New York, NY, for Defendant-Cross
                         Defendant-Appellant.

                                  2
WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judge:

      Plaintiffs-Appellees Janet and Joseph Harvey brought several

common law tort claims against Defendant-Cross Defendant-

Appellant the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to

the United Nations, Empire Group NYC, LLC (“Empire”), David I.

Montesi, Fairfield Construction Associates, LLC (“Fairfield”), and

Jules Davis (collectively, “Defendants”), 1 alleging that faulty

renovations at the Mission’s headquarters, which is located next door

to the Harveys’ home in Manhattan, “significantly harmed” them. J.

App’x at 101, ¶ 1.    The Mission moved to dismiss the Harveys’

complaint, arguing, among other things, that the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. The parties do not dispute that

the Mission is an embodiment of the foreign state of Sierra Leone and

is therefore entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA unless an

      1 Empire, Montesi, Fairfield, and Davis are more fully described as
Defendants-Cross Claimants-Cross Defendants.

                                     3
exception to that immunity applies. By order dated July 1, 2022, the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Edgardo Ramos, District Judge) denied the Mission’s motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that two

exceptions to the Mission’s immunity applied: the commercial

activity exception, id. § 1605(a)(2), and the tortious activity exception,

id. § 1605(a)(5). See Harvey v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra

Leone to the United Nations, No. 21-cv-4368 (ER), 2022 WL 2392101, at

*3–4, 6-9 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2022).

      The Mission filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing that neither

exception should apply to abrogate its immunity. We hold that the

Harveys’ claims fall within the commercial activity exception, and

therefore AFFIRM the order of the district court to the extent it denied

the Mission’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

                                     4
I.    Background

      A. Factual Background

      The following facts are drawn from the allegations in the

Harveys’ amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint”), which we

must accept as true for purposes of evaluating the Mission’s motion

to dismiss. Kolbasyuk v. Cap. Mgmt. Servs., LP, 918 F.3d 236, 238 n.1

(2d Cir. 2019) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

      The Harveys live in a townhouse located at 243 East 49th Street,

New York, NY. The Mission’s headquarters is a townhouse located

directly next door, at 245 East 49th Street, and the two townhouses

share a party wall. Since 2019, and “with no end in sight,” the Mission

has been renovating its headquarters to “among other things . . . build

two additional floors.” J. App’x at 106, ¶ 23. The Mission hired a

general contractor, which in turn hired a subcontractor, to build out

the construction.      Fairfield is the “general contractor for the

renovations.” Id. at 105, ¶ 14. Davis (together with Fairfield, the

“General Contractor Defendants”) “leads Fairfield’s work” at the

                                     5
Mission’s headquarters. Id. at 107, ¶ 25. The General Contractor

Defendants “have held themselves out as agents acting on behalf of

the Mission.”   Id.   Empire is Fairfield’s subcontractor who has

“performed substantially all of the renovations” at the Mission’s

headquarters during the relevant time. Id. at 104, ¶ 13. Montesi

(together with Empire, the “Subcontractor Defendants”) “leads

Empire’s work” at the Mission’s headquarters and obtained “most of

the active” construction permits from the New York City Department

of Buildings (“DOB”) on behalf of Empire. Id. at 104–05, ¶ 13.

      The incomplete renovations at the Mission’s headquarters have

created a number of dangerous conditions in the Harveys’ home.

Among other things, the Harveys allege that (1) the renovations have

resulted in the presence of heavy debris, some of which is flammable,

throughout the Mission’s headquarters; (2) Defendants have failed to

extend the Harveys’ chimney above the two new floors that the

Mission is adding to its headquarters, “creating the potential for the

                                  6
backdraft of products of combustion,” such as “lethal carbon

monoxide,” into the Harveys’ home, id. at 109, ¶ 29; (3) Defendants,

without permission, placed heavy equipment and scaffolding on the

Harveys’ roof, and have failed to properly secure that heavy

equipment and scaffolding; (4) the renovations have left unfilled gaps

in the party wall that the Harveys’ home shares with the Mission’s

headquarters, threatening the “structural integrity” of the Harveys’

home, id. at 112, ¶ 40; and (5) Defendants have failed to adequately

waterproof various parts of the Mission’s headquarters, including the

roof and party wall, resulting in mold throughout the Mission’s

headquarters, which “threatens to compound the mold problem” in

the Harveys’ home, id. at 113, ¶ 49.

      The Harveys sought help from the DOB, but despite the DOB’s

many efforts to “cure the dangers posed by the renovations,” the

issues remain. Id. at 115, ¶ 55. Since 2019, the DOB has received

twenty-one complaints concerning the renovations at the Mission’s

                                   7
headquarters, two of which resulted in a partial stop work order and

one of which resulted in a full stop work order. The second partial

stop work order, from April 2021, remains pending, requiring

Defendants to secure the Harveys’ roof.           Although the DOB

conducted two follow-up inspections to ensure compliance with the

partial stop work order, “no steps” were taken by Defendants to

secure the Harveys’ roof, resulting in a fine of at least $2,500. Id. at

103, ¶ 8. There are also “seven open Environmental Control Board

violations” related to the renovations, two of which have resulted in

fines for $25,000 each. Id. at 115, ¶ 55. Moreover, the DOB has fined

Montesi at least $61,865 for New York City Construction Code

violations at the Mission’s headquarters. None of the fines have been

paid.

        B. Procedural Background

        On May 14, 2021, the Harveys sued the Subcontractor

Defendants and the Mission, asserting claims for negligence, private

                                   8
nuisance, trespass, and res ipsa loquitur. On June 7, 2021, the district

court entered a consent order (the “Consent Order”) “directing the

[Subcontractor Defendants] to work with the Harveys to remedy

certain of the alleged deficiencies with the renovation,” including

requiring the Subcontractor Defendants “to create and apply for

approval for plans for a temporary chimney extension to be installed

on the Harveys’ home, to remove certain debris inside the Mission

property, to ensure entry and egress from the street, and to enclose

elevator shaft openings.” Harvey, 2022 WL 2392101, at *2 (footnote

omitted).

      On October 22, 2021, the Harveys filed the Amended

Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this case.           The

Amended Complaint added the General Contractor Defendants as

defendants and, mirroring the original complaint, asserted claims for

negligence, private nuisance, trespass, and res ipsa loquitur against all

defendants. The Amended Complaint demanded monetary damages

                                   9
“in an amount in excess of $155,020.00, together with pre-judgment

and post-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees,” punitive damages

against the General Contractor and Subcontractor Defendants “for

their egregious disregard of the Harveys’ safety, wellbeing, and

ability to live in their own home,” and injunctive relief against all

Defendants. J. App’x at 129.

      On December 14, 2021, the Mission moved to dismiss the

Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim, respectively.

That same day, the Harveys moved for contempt and sanctions

against the Subcontractor Defendants for alleged violations of the

Consent Order, and a preliminary injunction against all Defendants.

      On July 1, 2022, the district court entered an omnibus opinion

and order resolving these motions. See generally Harvey, 2022 WL

2392101. Regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the district court held

                                   10
that the commercial activity and tortious activity exceptions, but not

the immoveable property exception, applied to strip the Mission of its

immunity under the FSIA.               See id. at *3–9.        Regarding personal

jurisdiction, the district court held that the “FSIA also confers

personal jurisdiction.” Id. at *3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (b)). And,

regarding the Mission’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

the district court held that the Harveys had “stated a claim as to

negligence and nuisance, but not trespass,” and therefore dismissed

the Harveys’ trespass claim. 2 Id. at *9 (footnotes omitted).

        The district court denied the Harveys’ motion for contempt and

sanctions, declining to hold the Subcontractor Defendants in

contempt for failing to comply with the Consent Order. See id. at *12.

The district court found that the Harveys had not presented “clear

        2 The district court did not address the Harveys’ res ipsa loquitur claim, and
the parties do not address that claim in their briefs before this Court. We assume
this is because “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not constitute a separate cause
of action.” USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Permanent Mission of Republic of Namibia, 681 F.3d
103, 105 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Frew v. Hosp. of Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. Div. of
Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 428 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (2d Dep’t 1980)).

                                           11
and convincing evidence” of noncompliance with respect to the

portions of the Consent Order requiring debris removal, ensuring

proper entry and egress, and enclosing openings in the elevator shaft,

and although the Harveys did present clear and convincing evidence

of noncompliance regarding the chimney extension plans, the district

court found “that the Harveys [had] assumed responsibility” for that

part of the Consent Order. Id. at *10–12. The district court also

declined to impose sanctions on the Subcontractor Defendants but

“admonished [them] that any future failure to timely comply with

court orders could” result in sanctions. Id. at *12. Finally, the district

court denied the Harveys’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the

basis that the Harveys had not demonstrated irreparable harm. Id. at

*13–14.

II.   Discussion

      On appeal, the Mission challenges the district court’s holding

that it was stripped of its sovereign immunity under the FSIA based

on the commercial activity exception and the tortious activity

                                   12
exception. The Mission argues that the commercial activity exception

does not apply because the Harveys’ suit is based on the sovereign

activity of running a mission to the United Nations, and in the

alternative, any commercial activity that might have occurred

through the renovations was carried out by the General Contractor

and Subcontractor Defendants and cannot be imputed to the Mission.

Further, the Mission argues that the tortious activity exception does

not apply because the Harveys did not plead all the elements of any

alleged tort by the Mission. For the reasons below, we conclude that

the commercial activity exception applies.

      A. Standard of Review

      This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the

district court’s order denying immunity under the FSIA is

immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Rogers v.

Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2012). “[W]e review

de novo the district court’s conclusions of law regarding jurisdiction

                                   13
under the FSIA.” City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the

United Nations, 446 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2006).

       B. The FSIA

       “[T]he FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction

over a foreign state in the courts of this country.” Argentine Republic

v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). Under the

FSIA, “a foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction

of United States courts” and “unless a specified exception applies, a

federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a

foreign state.” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993). In

relevant part, there are exceptions for commercial activity and

tortious activity that occurs in the United States.            See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1605(a)(2), (5). 3 “A foreign state’s permanent mission to the United

Nations is indisputably the ‘embodiment’ of that state.” USAA Cas.

       3Though not at issue in this case, there are also exceptions for waiver;
expropriation; succession; arbitration; maritime liens; terrorism; and
counterclaims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), (3), (4), (6), 1605(b), 1605A, 1607.

                                      14
Ins. Co. v. Permanent Mission of Republic of Namibia, 681 F.3d 103, 107

(2d Cir. 2012). Therefore, as the parties agree, the Mission is entitled

to immunity unless an exception to the FSIA applies.

             1. Commercial Activity Exception

      In relevant part, the commercial activity exception provides

that “[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of

courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the

action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United

States by the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).

             2. Tortious Activity Exception

      The tortious activity exception provides that a foreign state is

not immune from suit in any case “not otherwise encompassed [by

the commercial activity exception], in which money damages are

sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage

to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by

the tortious act or omission of that foreign state . . . .” 28 U.S.C.

                                    15
§ 1605(a)(5). That the tortious activity exception can apply only to

cases “not otherwise encompassed” by the commercial activity

exception suggests that the commercial activity exception and the

tortious activity exception are “mutually exclusive.” De Letelier v.

Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1984). In other words,

activity that is found to be commercial cannot also be found to be

tortious, and vice versa. See id. (“If [a court in another Circuit] lifted

jurisdictional immunity based on its finding that the activities

complained of were tortious, not commercial, it is inconsistent for this

court to lift execution immunity based on a finding that the activities

were commercial.”); accord Republic of Namibia, 681 F.3d at 107–08

(declining to address the commercial activity or the immovable

property exception because it determined that the tortious activity

exception applied); Joseph v. Off. of Consulate General of Nigeria, 830

F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).

                                   16
       C. Application

       We hold that the district court correctly concluded that the

Mission’s conduct underlying the Harveys’ suit qualifies as

“commercial activity.” Because the commercial activity exception

applies, we decline to address the applicability of the tortious activity

exception.

      To invoke the commercial activity exception, the Harveys

“must establish that (1) [the Mission] engaged in ‘a commercial

activity,’ (2) ‘the [legal] action is based upon’ that activity, and (3) that

activity ‘cause[d] a direct effect in the United States.’” Daou v. BLC

Bank, S.A.L., 42 F.4th 120, 134 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(2)). The third prong of this test is undisputed in this case,

which exclusively involves a construction project in Manhattan.

Therefore, our inquiry revolves around the first two prongs,

prompting the following questions: (1) what specific conduct by the

Mission serves as the basis of the Harveys’ lawsuit, and (2) whether

that conduct is commercial activity.

                                     17
             1. The Gravamen of the Harveys’ Suit

      Beginning with the first question, under § 1605(a)(2), “an action

is ‘based upon’ the ‘particular conduct’ that constitutes the

‘gravamen’ of the suit.” OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27,

35 (2015) (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356–57).         Identifying the

gravamen requires “zero[ing] in on the core of [the plaintiffs’] suit” to

determine the “acts that actually injured them.” Id. This is the

“threshold step” for determining whether the commercial activity

exception applies. Chettri v. Nepal Rastra Bank, 834 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir.

2016) (quoting Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 586 (2d Cir.

2006)).

      The Mission attempts to construe the gravamen of the Harveys’

suit as being based on the sovereign activity of “running the Mission.”

Appellant’s Br. at 31 (emphasis omitted) (quoting J. App’x at 105, ¶ 18

(“[A] foreign state is not immune in a case as this one where the action

is based on a ‘commercial activity carried on in the United States by

                                   18
the foreign state’ namely, as here, running the Mission” (quoting 28

U.S.C.   § 1605(a)(2)))).     Although      the   Amended       Complaint

purportedly identifies “running the Mission” as the activity upon

which the action is based, J. App’x at 105, ¶ 18, such a construction of

the Harveys’ suit is, in the words of the district court, “too restrictive,”

Harvey, 2022 WL 2392101, at *4.          We are bound to evaluate the

substance of the challenged conduct, not the labels any party might

place on that conduct. See Criales v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 105 F.3d 93, 97

(2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e [do] not permit the choice of labels to distort

substance, especially where the consequences would be so drastic as

to deprive a party of the opportunity to be heard.”). Broadly, the

Amended Complaint identifies three categories of conduct stemming

directly from the renovation activity, relating to: (1) the shared party

wall, (2) the Harveys’ roof, and (3) the Harveys’ chimney. As the

Amended Complaint describes in detail, it is this commercial

construction work that has allegedly injured the Harveys and which

                                    19
therefore forms the basis for the Harveys’ claims. See Sachs, 577 U.S.

at 33 (explaining that a court should identify the “particular conduct”

on which an action is based “by looking to the ‘basis’ or ‘foundation’

for a claim” (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357)).

      As such, the Mission’s reliance on MacArthur Area Citizens Ass’n

v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1987), is misplaced. In that

case, a neighborhood association sued Peru after Peru purchased a

property in an area zoned for residential occupancy and converted

that property into a chancery for its Naval Attaché.         Id. at 919.

Although the association complained, in part, about alterations Peru

made to the property that stripped it of its residential qualities, the

association also complained about “congestion from an increased

number of chancery cars vying for [parking spaces].” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). The sum of the complaint was that Peru

“was causing denigration and depreciation of the value of its

members’ residences nearby.” Id. Recognizing that the central issue

                                   20
in the complaint was the existence of the chancery in a residential

neighborhood, the D.C. Circuit held that “operation of a chancery is,

by its nature governmental, not commercial,” and therefore the

commercial activity exception did not apply. Id. at 920 (citation

omitted). Here, in contrast, the Harveys do not take issue with the

mere fact that the Mission is their neighbor or that the Mission

conducts sovereign business from their headquarters; instead, they

“take issue with the Mission’s contractual renovations that are

damaging [their] home.” Appellees’ Br. at 36; see also J. App’x at 101,

¶ 1 (“This action arises from the Defendants’ unlawful and

incompetent efforts to renovate and expand the Mission’s

headquarters.”). Therefore, MacArthur’s analysis has no bearing on

the case at hand.

      In sum, we find the gravamen of the Harveys’ suit to be the

Mission’s allegedly faulty construction work at its headquarters,

which it has hired a general contractor to perform.

                                  21
              2. Whether the Gravamen of the Harveys’ Suit Is

                  “Commercial Activity”

       The next question is whether the Mission’s conduct related to

its renovation efforts qualifies as “commercial activity.” The FSIA

defines “commercial activity” as “either a regular course of

commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.” 28

U.S.C. § 1603(d). The statute further states that “[t]he commercial

character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature

of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than

by reference to its purpose.” 4 Id. “‘[P]urpose’ is ‘the reason why the

foreign state engages in the activity’ and ‘nature’ is ‘the outward form

of the conduct that the foreign state performs or agrees to perform.’”

Pablo Star Ltd. v. Welsh Gov’t, 961 F.3d 555, 561 (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 361).

       4 As the Supreme Court has noted, this definition “leaves the critical term
‘commercial’ largely undefined.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S.
607, 612 (1992).

                                       22
      “[I]n applying the nature-versus-purpose analysis, ‘the

question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit

motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign

objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the

foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type

of actions by which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or

commerce.’” Id. (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504

U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).    Put simply, “a foreign state engages in

commercial activity ‘where it exercises only those powers that can

also be exercised by private citizens, as distinct from those powers

peculiar to sovereigns.’” Id. (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360 (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

      All of the conduct related to the Mission’s renovation efforts are

commercial acts because having a contractor renovate a building is

something that a private party can—and often does—do. See, e.g.,

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976) (in the legislative history of the

                                  23
FSIA, explaining that “a contract by a foreign government . . . to

construct a government building” or “a contract to make repairs on

an embassy building” “constitutes a commercial activity”).

Regardless of the reason the Mission decided to renovate its

headquarters, by engaging a contractor to carry out construction

work, the Mission was acting “‘in the manner of a private player

within’ the market.” Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360 (quoting Weltover, 504

U.S. at 614).

      The Mission argues that even if renovating a building is

commercial activity, the Mission itself did not engage in that activity,

but rather it, at most, entered into a contract for the renovations that

the General Contractor and Subcontractor Defendants performed.

The Mission claims that the commercial activity exception is thus

inapplicable because the conduct of the contractors cannot be

imputed to the Mission.

                                  24
      But this is a question of substantive liability stemming from the

Mission’s contractual renovations, not one of construing the FSIA.

The overall activity at issue—the construction work—is being

conducted as a result of a routine commercial transaction between the

Mission and a general contractor.         Whether the Mission could

successfully resist liability on the ground that any fault lies solely with

the contractor is a merits question, not one that goes to the

applicability of the commercial activity exception.         Nevertheless,

because we recognize that the Mission may renew its imputation

argument in the district court, in the interest of judicial efficiency we

explain why it fails.

      Upon beginning the renovations, the Mission acquired certain

nondelegable duties, and consequently, it is responsible for the

conduct resulting from the renovations. “The New York Court of

Appeals has repeatedly held that statutes and regulations that

address specific types of safety hazards create nondelegable duties of

                                    25
care.” Republic of Namibia, 681 F.3d at 110. Under New York law, “a

regulation will generally create a nondelegable duty where it contains

a ‘specific positive command,’ but not where it merely incorporates

‘the ordinary tort duty of care,’ using terms like ‘adequate,’ ‘effective,’

or ‘suitable.’” Id. at 110–11 (quoting Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 9

N.Y.3d 47, 50 (2007)). The New York City Construction Codes, which

include   the   Building    Code    and Mechanical Code, impose

nondelegable duties relating to the aspects of the renovations

identified in the Amended Complaint—the shared party wall, the

Harveys’ roof, and the Harveys’ chimney.

      Specifically, Building Code § 3309.8 provides that “[w]hen any

construction or demolition operation exposes or breaches an

adjoining wall, including . . . party walls . . . , the person causing the

construction” must, among other things, “[m]aintain the structural

integrity of such walls and adjoining structure.” Accord Republic of

Namibia, 681 F.3d at 111 (stating, in the context of holding that the

                                    26
tortious activity exception applied, that Building Code § 3309.8 levies

a nondelegable duty because it “imposes upon the ‘person causing’

the construction the duty to, under specific circumstances, perform a

specific task” (quoting Building Code § 3309.8)). Similarly, Building

Code § 3309.10 imposes upon the “person causing” the construction

the duty to, among other things, protect the roof of an adjoining

building. And Mechanical Code §§ 801.1.1.1–801.1.1.3 impose upon

“the owner” of a building that has increased in height the duty to,

among other things, alter the chimney of a neighboring, shorter

building and obtain consent from the owner of the shorter building to

do the necessary work. Based on these nondelegable duties, the

Mission is responsible for the “commercial activity”—the conduct

related to its renovation efforts—upon which the Harveys’ suit is

based.

III.   Conclusion

       In sum, we hold as follows:

                                  27
          1. The gravamen of the Harveys’ suit is based upon the
             allegedly faulty contractual renovations at the Mission’s
             headquarters;

          2. All of the complained-of conduct related to the Mission’s
             contractual renovation efforts involve commercial
             activity because the Mission is exercising only those
             powers that can also be exercised by private citizens (i.e.,
             hiring a contractor to renovate a building, which is
             something that a private party can—and often does—
             do); and

           3. The Mission is responsible for the conduct related to its
              renovation efforts based on the nondelegable duties it
              acquired upon beginning the renovations.

        Therefore, the commercial activity exception applies in this

case,   abrogating   the   Mission’s    immunity    under    the   FSIA.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order to the extent it

denied the Mission’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

                                   28