Court Opinion

ID: 9570168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:40.241249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:04.701450
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
¶ 30. {concurring). While I agree with the majority's conclusion that State v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998), did not establish a two-part test which boards of adjustment must use in deciding whether to grant or deny a request for a variance, I am convinced that Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Board of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976), did establish this test in certain circumstances and Kenosha County merely followed Snyder. Thus, I disagree with the majority's view that there is not a two-part test in Wisconsin. However, I am satisfied, from my reading of the record, that while the Washington County Board of Adjustment was required to use a two-part test under the circumstances that it had before it, it did so. For this reason, I ultimately concur with the result reached by the majority.
¶ 31. Justice N. Patrick Crooks nicely summed up the law in his concurring opinion in State v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶¶ 71-81, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376 (Crooks, J., concurring). Before Snyder, whether to use the "unnecessary hardship" standard or the less demanding "practical difficulties" test depended upon whether the landowner's request was for an area variance or a use variance. Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78 at ¶ 72 (Crooks, J., concurring). As Justice Crooks explained, area variances "apparently were granted based upon a showing of 'practical difficulties' which was 'something much less severe than unnecessary hardship.' Use variances, in contrast, were granted upon a showing of 'unnecessary hardship.'" Id.
*337¶ 32. As Justice Crooks clarified, the Snyder court considered the dichotomy to be unhelpful, especially in so far as shoreland zoning ordinances were concerned. See Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78 at ¶ 72 (Crooks, J., concurring). Instead, the Snyder court determined that the granting of a variance, whether it is an area variance or a use variance, should be dependent upon whether the requested variance is contrary to the purpose of the zoning ordinance. Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78 at ¶ 72 (Crooks, J., concurring).
¶ 33. Thus, a new paradigm was created. First, the zoning authority must decide whether the requested variance conflicts with the purpose of the statute. Whether it is an area variance or a use variance is only a factor in determining whether the request strikes at the purpose of the ordinance, nothing more. If the request strikes at the veiy purpose of the zoning ordinance, the landowner must then meet a very strict definition of the unnecessary hardship standard — that no reasonable use can be made of the property in the absence of a variance. The second part of the test is for the zoning adjustment board to apply this strict definition and determine whether the requester can make reasonable use of the property without the variance.
¶ 34. Conversely, if the request does not conflict with the purpose of the ordinance, then there is no reason why the request should not be granted and the requester need not jump through any further hoop. Thus, if the variance request is not at odds with the purpose of the ordinance, there is no second part of the test. The variance may be granted because, to not do so, would be to force an unnecessary restriction on a request that does not violate the spirit of the zoning ordinance.
¶ 35. As Justice Crooks explained:
*338Kenosha County, like Snyder, reiterated that "whether a particular hardship is unnecessary or unreasonable is judged against the purpose of the zoning law." Within this general parameter, county boards of adjustment have some very real flexibility in granting variances. The boards can determine, by looking to the purpose underlying the ordinance at issue, what rear sonably constitutes an unnecessary hardship. Implicit in considering the variance request in relation to the ordinance's purpose is consideration of the nature of the restriction in the ordinance. That is, boards of adjustment should also consider whether the restriction involves, for example, "setbacks, frontage, height, bulk or density," or whatever restriction is at issue. Consideration of a variance request as it relates to the purpose of the zoning ordinance, along with review of the specific restriction at issue, must necessarily take into account the differences resulting from the granting of an area or use variance. Indeed, "because area variances do not involve great changes in the character of the neighborhoods as do use variances," the purpose of the zoning ordinance may not be so likely undermined by an area variance as it might be by a use variance.
Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78 at ¶ 74 (Crooks, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
¶ 36. I understand Justice Crooks to say that the job of the zoning board is to first determine the purpose of the ordinance. Then, the next step is to look at the variance request and see whether it violates the purpose. If it does, then the hardship in not granting the variance depends on whether the requester can show that he or she will have no reasonable use of the property without the variance. If the purpose is not violated, then it would be unreasonable to enforce the ordinance in that situation.
*339¶ 37. Thus, even to decide whether the requester can make reasonable use of his or her property absent a variance will depend, first and foremost, on whether the request violates the purpose of the ordinance. If it does, the burden is on the landowner to prove no reasonable use. If it does not, then there is no such burden.
¶ 38. For instance, a zoning ordinance may seek to regulate density in residential neighborhoods and a request for a one-foot variance to a front setback requirement might be granted because it does not increase density; therefore, it does not conflict with the purpose. Why then would the board need to impose a requirement that the landowner prove that no reasonable use of the land could be made without the granting of the variance? It would make no sense.
¶ 39. On the other hand, suppose that the request is to encroach upon the lake in building an addition to a riparian home. The purpose of the shoreland zoning ordinance is to prevent encroachment for ecological and aesthetic reasons. Thus, the landowner should have to prove that, without the variance, no reasonable use of the property could be had. It is my belief that this is the law as set forth by Snyder and Kenosha County and as recounted by Justice Crooks in his concurrence.
¶ 40. Justice Crooks' concurrence teaches that there is no reason to hold on to the artificial distinctions of "area variances" and "use variances" and of "unnecessary hardship" versus "practical difficulties." Justice Crooks related that, in Kenosha County, the court simply followed Snyder. And like Snyder, the Kenosha County court refused to be drawn into a battle over the artificial definitions of "area variances" and "use variances." Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78 at ¶ 73 (Crooks, J., concurring). Instead, the court looked to the purpose *340of the shoreland zoning regulation at issue. Id. It then decided that because the purpose of the shoreland zoning ordinance was being invaded by the requested variance, the "no reasonable use" definition of unnecessary hardship should adhere. Id. The court then determined (the second part of the test) that since the landowner would still have reasonable use of her property, were the variance not granted, the request should fail. Thus, Justice Crooks' concurring opinion accurately states the law in Wisconsin — which is that there is a two-part test when the purpose of .the ordinance would be violated by the requested variance. I will now apply this law to the case at hand.
¶ 41. One of Ziervogel and McGinnity's arguments is that the Board did not first decide the purpose of the ordinance before deciding to deny the variance and that the case must be reversed for this reason. A review of the record, however, reveals that they are wrong. The Board had before it the knowledge that the ordinance was a new one, effective June 1, 2001. The Board also knew that a vast majority of public response at the hearing and informational meetings supported preventing expansion of nonconforming structures within fifty feet of the ordinary high watermark. The Board therefore knew that the purpose of the ordinance was to prevent expansion of nonconforming structures within fifty feet of the shore. The obvious purpose was to limit nonconforming buildings that violate the buffer between the lake and its riparian owners.
¶ 42. Having determined the purpose of the ordinance, the Board then stacked up Ziervogel and McGinnity's proposal against the purpose of the ordinance. Ziervogel and McGinnity wanted to build a new story to their one-bedroom, raised ranch vacation home so that they could make it a year-around home. They *341wanted to build two more bedrooms and an office. But the existing home is a mere twenty-six feet from the ordinary high watermark of Big Cedar Lake. It is a nonconforming use, built before the shoreland zoning ordinance took effect. The request thus came smack up against the purpose of the ordinance, which was to prevent expansion of nonconforming uses that already violated the fifty-foot buffer. Thus, the zoning authority shouldered Ziervogel and McGinnity with the burden of proving that, without the granting of the variance, they could have no reasonable use of the property.
¶ 43. Ziervogel and McGinnity appear to assert that if the Board did consider the purpose of the ordinance and did consider that their request violated the purpose of the ordinance, the Board was wrong. They argue that their proposed addition is not contrary to the purpose of the ordinance. They submit that if the purpose of the ordinance is to prohibit encroachments toward the lake, their request complies with that purpose because the addition would not further encroach one iota. The house would still be the same distance from the lake as before. No dirt would be upended. Thus, the ecological system would not be harmed. The view of the lake by the public would not be damaged because local foliage prevents it anyway. Moreover, the ordinance permits a thirty-five foot high structure and the proposed addition would be thirty-five feet high. Thus, the proposed addition does not violate the height portion of the ordinance. Therefore, because there would be no expansion toward the lake, no ecological upheaval, no height concerns and no aesthetic concerns, they posit that their request does not conflict with the purpose of the ordinance.
¶ 44. What we cannot forget, however, is that the house is nonconforming to begin with. The spirit of *342zoning is to restrict a nonconforming use and eliminate such use as quickly as possible. Waukesha County v. Seitz, 140 Wis. 2d 111, 116, 409 N.W.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1987). Nonconforming uses are anomalies. They are suspect and therefore circumscribed. If the owner of the nonconforming use expands or enlarges the use, it should be the owner's burden to prove that the noncon-' forming use is still valid. Waukesha County v. Pewaukee Marina, Inc., 187 Wis. 2d 18, 29, 522 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1994). Nonconforming uses are not to be enlarged in derogation of the general scheme. Id. at 24. It is quite obvious that Washington county's citizens, while having to tolerate nonconforming uses that violate shoreland setbacks, do not want to see expansion of those properties. The citizens have therefore voiced their support for circumscribing such expansions. Ziervogel and McGinnity say that the purpose is to prevent encroachment to the lake. That is not so. The purpose of the ordinance is to prevent any kind of expansion of riparian property that violates the setback requirements of the county's shoreland zoning ordinance. The house sits perilously close to the lake as it is. The idea is to prevent any improvement that would expand the use of the house. The request violates the purpose of the ordinance. Thus, for Ziervogel and McGinnity to prevail, they had to convince the Board that, without the variance, they could not reasonably use the property. That is the second part of the test. They lose here too. They can still make use of their home the way it is.
¶ 45. Having written about what I believe the law is in Wisconsin and how it applies to this case, I want to use the vehicle of a concurring opinion to make a couple of observations about what I perceive to be a misunderstanding about the law in this field.
*343¶ 46. First, a word about "use variances" and "area variances" and the accompanying differentiation between "unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficulty." The distinction between "area variances" and "use variances," and the imposition of separate requirements for the granting of each type, are inventions of the courts. 3 Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 20.06, at 424 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th ed. 1996). According to the Anderson treatise, the "no reasonable use" standard was used as early as 1927 by Judge Cardozo in People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh, 155 N.E. 575 (N.Y. 1927). 3 Anderson's, supra, § 20.16, at 452-53. Other states simply followed the New York model. Id. at 453. It was also apparently the New York courts that developed a separate rule for "area variances." 3 Anderson's, supra, § 20.48, at 579-80. Classification was apparently undertaken to permit the granting of variances regarded as trivial, without the establishment of the elements of unnecessary hardship. See id. at 580-81. Thus, area variances were seen as more easily obtained because all that need be shown is that the ordinance is wrought with "practical difficulty" to the property owner, while a use variance retained a much stricter standard of no reasonable use. See 3 Anderson's, supra, § 20.49, at 582-83.
¶ 47. Second, it is evident from reading Snyder and Kenosha County that the court believed these distinctions to be unworkable, especially when it came to the shoreland zoning ordinance cases. The court obviously saw that while area variances were created by the courts to deal with "trivial" adjustments to the ordinance, requests for area variances concerning land coming within a shoreland zoning ordinance could hardly be said to be "trivial." Such matters as setback lines, frontage requirements, height limitations and lot *344size restrictions are serious matters where our lakes, streams and rivers are concerned. These vital natural resources are not limitless and are not indestructible. Particularly as the ordinances relate to setbacks, Wisconsin has had a long history. As stated by The Wisconsin Association of Lakes, Inc., in its amicus curiae brief to the supreme court in Kenosha County.
For more than 30 years, the 75 foot building setback standard has been widely accepted and generally adhered to by owners of rural riparian property. During that time, the shores of Wisconsin's 15,057 inland lakes have witnessed extensive development and redevelopment.
Thousands of property owners have abided by the setback standards during these three decades and constructed beyond the established setback. The investments of these property owners would be jeopardized by lakeward expansion of existing buildings under the expansive standard for hardship under the Court of Appeals decision. More importantly, the interests of the public in establishing a buffer zone around public waters to protect their biologically vital near shore areas would be compromised.
Brief of Amici Curiae The Wisconsin Association of Lakes, Inc. at 2, State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998) (No. 96-1235).
¶ 48. Thus, the new paradigm set forth in Snyder, and nicely explained by Justice Crooks in the Outag-amie County concurrence, was designed — in my view — to delineate a difference between shoreland zoning ordinances and other zoning ordinances. By first divining the purpose, a zoning authority could then decide whether it was necessary to shoulder the land*345owner with the burden of proving that no reasonable use could be made of the property absent the granting of the variance.
¶ 49. We see that a requested variance in a shore-land zoning case, whether it is perfunctorily denominated by the landowner as an "area variance" or a "use variance," nevertheless can defeat the whole purpose of the ordinance if granted. Thus, employment of the strict "no reasonable use" standard is logically and environmentally correct where the shoreland zoning ordinance is concerned.
¶ 50. There appears to be a misconception on the part of some that Kenosha County departed from Snyder and announced a stringent "no reasonable use" standard for every kind of variance request. In other words, some believe that Kenosha County imposes this stringent test on even the most trivial of zoning requests and makes it all but impossible to ever obtain a variance and to ever allow local citizen hoards to grant relief from a zoning ordinance. One need look no further than the lead opinion in Outagamie County, 2001 WI 78 at ¶¶ 41, 42, the majority opinion in this case, and the concurring opinion in the court of appeals decision, State ex rel. Spinner v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment, 223 Wis. 2d 99, 588 N.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1998), to show that this misconception persists.
¶ 51. In truth, the requirement that the zoning board first look to the purpose of the ordinance belies the notion that boards have no authority to depart from the strict "no reasonable use" definition. If the purpose of the ordinance is not hampered and the requested variance is truly trivial, then of course the zoning boards retain the power to grant the request without *346the landowner having to prove unnecessary hardship and, indeed, should do so under the law of Snyder and Kenosha County.
¶ 52. With the two-part test in place, where the "purpose" of the ordinance takes on paramount importance, I cannot understand the view that the law now requires the strict definition of unnecessary hardship— the "no reasonable use" definition — in every case. Thus, I see no need to go back to the formulistic "area variance/use variance" distinctions the New York courts fashioned in matters unrelated to shoreland zoning three-quarters of a century ago. To do so would be contrary to Wisconsin's storied history of upholding the public trust doctrine.
¶ 53. And Wisconsin's courts do have a long history regarding our waters. It dates from 1972 when our supreme court released Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). There, the court was faced with a challenge to a shoreland zoning ordinance, which required the landowner to get a permit before filling or grading in a wetland area. Id. at 11-14. The landowners were halted from their filling activities because they did not have a permit. Id. at 14. They brought an action contending that the shoreland zoning ordinance was a regulatory taking. Id.
¶ 54. The Just court asked: "Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that man can change its nature to suit any of his purposes?" Id. at 17. The court answered the question by writing: "An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others." Id.
¶ 55. With this question and answer, our supreme court established itself at the center of a new way of *347thinking about property rights where riparian property was concerned. No longer did humans have an inherent right to alter or develop environmentally sensitive land. The court in Just recognized that while judgments had been made solely on economic feasibility in the past, they now had to include an environmental incompatibility test. Further, environmental compatibility was determined to, at times, outweigh the economic interests of the landowner. The court stated that "[t]he changing of wetlands and swamps to the damage of the general public by upsetting the natural environment and the natural relationship is not a reasonable use of that land . .. ." Id. at 17-18.
¶ 56. I agree with James L. Karp in his comment, James L. Karp, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic: Is an Ecological Conscience Evolving in Land Development Law? 19 Envtl. L. 737, 751 (1989), that Leopold's ethic had developed some roots in Just. As Karp noted, Just rooted its decision in two bases now familiar to shoreline zoning cases: the public trust doctrine and a type of harm/benefit analysis. Karp, supra, at 751. As Karp explained: "Generally, this analysis holds that regulations trying to confer a public benefit must be justly compensated, but that regulations attempting to prevent public harm can be imposed without compensation." Id. The court in Just concluded that it was preventing harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses. Karp, supra, at 751.
¶ 57. In Karp's view, our supreme court was of the opinion that if environmental compatibility is recognized as a legitimate public interest, then prevention of environmental destruction will be an adequate basis for regulating. Id.
¶ 58. It is evident that, dating from the release of Just, our supreme court established itself at the fore*348front in the development of a land ethic where our shorelands were no longer treated solely as an economic commodity, but as a natural resource. It is my opinion that the vast majority of riparian landowners agree. Most are, as Leopold hoped, "ecologically minded [and] proud to be the custodian" of at least part of the land to support the public trust. A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 249 (1966). This is reflected in the fact that the will of the citizenry has resulted in the passing of legislation designed to protect our shorelands from encroachment and runaway expansion. If Washington county can pass, with favorable support, an ordinance preventing nonconforming structures within fifty feet of the ordinary high watermark from expanding, that legislation shows a commitment to a land ethic.
¶ 59. Thus, most riparian owners understand that with the rights to riparian ownership comes the responsibility to help conserve the shoreland. I believe that the court in Snyder and Kenosha County merely built upon the cornerstone laid down in Just, the cornerstone being that the right to own riparian property brings with it a duty of restraint unless there can be "no reasonable use" of the property without granting a variance.