Court Opinion

ID: 9828643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:35:15.986266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:43.925360
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
[10] Counsel for appellant, in motion for rehearing, ask us to squarely decide the question whether the failure to assign error, in the motion for new trial or on appeal, complaining of the excessiveness of the verdict, would cut appellant off from relying upon misconduct of the jury to vitiate the verdict. In the original opinion, we declined to decide that .question, because deemed unnecessary. We did indicate our view that this was a matter proper for the trial court to consider, in the exercise of his discretion, in determining whether material injury had been done.. Tbe effect of our holding is that we did not sustain appellee’s contention that appellant was precluded from complaining of the alleged misconduct of the jury, because it bad no assignment of the character under discussion. This court simply declining to pass upon the question. Inasmuch as this matter was presented defensively on appeal by tbe appellee, we do not see how appellant *640could complain of our refusal to decide what we deem an unnecessary question; therefore, we leave this matter as originally determined.
[11] Counsel also insist that this court has, in effect, decided that there was misconduct, although not directly so deciding; and that, if misconduct has been shown or found by the trial court, there is no place for discretion on the part of the trial judge. We cannot assent to this view. The terms of the statute itself seem to furnish a refutation of the argument. Article 2021, Revised Statutes, which controls, provides for an inquiry by the court, whether the ground of the motion is misconduct of the jury or other similar reasons, but concludes with this significant language:
“If the misconduct proven, or the testimony received, or the communication made be material, a new trial may, in the discretion of the court, be granted.”
Here is expressly statutory recognition of the fact that, even if misconduct be proven, there is vested in the trial court a sound discretion to determine whether such misconduct is material and, as such, requires the setting aside of the verdict. We think we correctly stated the law when we said that this discretion is not an arbitrary one, hut is subject to review above, and will be revised only when shown to have been abused.
[12] We are asked to make certain additional findings of fact, with which we will, to some extent, comply. As to the conduct of the juror who visited the scene of the accident during the trial, we think our findings on this question are already sufficiently full, but, in deference to counsel, we will make these specific findings: (a) One of the ju-ors, during the trial of the case, visited the scene of the accident to see what the place looked like and to satisfy himself to some degree; (b) that the said juror concluded that, if the motorman had been running his car at a reasonable rate of speed, he could have seen the plaintiff in time to have stopped the car and prevented the collision. We decline to make the finding that this juror was probably influenced by the observations thus made; but, on the contrary, in view of the evidence, we conclude that he probably was not influenced by such observations., These findings are in addition to those stated in the opinion.
[13] We further find that the juror Moore, before the mention or discussion of attorney’s fees occurred, had made up his mind to give $7,500 damages, and so voted; that when the question of attorney’s fees< arose, this was the first time Moore had thought of it. The next day he agreed to a verdict for $13,550. The mention or discussion of attorney’s fees was an impropriety and may be regarded as improper conduct, but was not material within the meaning of the statute. As to the juror Moore, we further find that he did not testify directly that the reference to attorney’s fees did or did not influence him in reference to returning a verdict. The substance of his testimony on this matter is stated in the original opinion correctly.
[14] We further find that four days after the return of the verdict, the juror Moore furnished the attorneys for the traction company with an affidavit, which was attached to the motion for a new trial, in which he stated that except for the fact that he wanted to provide for Mr. Wilson’s attorney’s fees and other expenses, so as to give him about $7,500, he would not have consented to a verdict for more than that sum. As heretofore found, however, this affidavit was substantially repudiated and contradicted by the juror on the stand, and was not considered as evidence, although it was read by the trial judge. The affidavit states that Mr. Moore was influenced in agreeing to a verdict for more than $7,500, by reason of the discussion of attorney’s fees, but his testimony was sufficient to justify a contrary finding. We do not deem it necessary to make any more specific findings on this matter, as his testimony fully appears in the bill of exception.
Believing that the motion for rehearing presents no ground warranting us in receding from the original opinion, it is overruled.
Motion overruled.