Court Opinion

ID: 9629570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:45:04.189196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:21.156119
License: Public Domain

*982BROSKY, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
¶ 1 I agree with the majority, and the trial court, that appellee Bonavita was an indispensable party to the action below. However, unlike the majority and the trial court, I believe that appellant is correct that appellee should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. In my opinion, two factors argue for this conclusion — first the fact that appellee never recorded the agreement for sale of the subject premises with the recorder of deeds and, second, the insurance adjuster’s failure to alert appellant or her attorney regarding the misapprehension that Appel-lee Greenwalds were the true owners in interest.
¶ 2 In discussing the indispensable party issue, the trial court goes to great lengths to argue that the party with the substantial interest in the subject real estate was Bonavita. The court comments that the Greenwalds “merely retain legal title ... and Bonavita has a substantial equitable interest.” Moreover, the court correctly recognizes that the Greenwalds were essentially mortgagees of Bonavita. This begs the question; if Bonavita’s interest was so substantial, and if Greenwalds were acting as mortgagees, why weren’t these important interests recorded with the recorder of deeds? As appellant asserts in her brief, “[t]he primary purpose of recording deeds ... is to give notice in whom title resides so that no one may be defrauded by deceptious appearances of title.” Mancine v. Concord-Liberty S & L Association, 299 Pa.Super. 260, 445 A.2d 744 (1982). By simple deduction then, the failure to record the sales agreement acts to promote a deceptive appearance of title whether or not that was the intent of the parties.
¶ 3 Secondly, appellant’s counsel indicated in correspondence with the claims adjuster that he was operating under the assumption that the owners of record were the Greenwalds. Despite this commentary and despite the fact that the adjuster could have easily clarified the confusion, the adjuster failed to correct the misconception. As the adjuster was operating on Mr. Bo-navita’s behalf and, in essence, representing him, I believe the adjuster’s failure to respond to Appellant’s statement can be imputed to Mr. Bonavita for the purposes of determining estoppel.
¶ 4 A party may be estopped from raising the bar of the statute of limitations where “through fraud or concealment, the Defendant causes the Plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry, ... ” Carlin v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 363 Pa. 543, 70 A.2d 349 (1950). Although the above excerpt has an ominous tone, later cases have not indicated an extremely stringent standard. For instance, in Molineux v. Reed, 516 Pa. 398, 532 A.2d 792 (1987), the court elaborated that the “conduct need not rise to fraud or concealment in the strictest sense, that is, with the intent to deceive; unintentional fraud or concealment is sufficient.” Id. at 794. In the present case, Appellees’ actions, or, more correctly, inaction, may not have been intended to purposely deceive the public as to the true ownership of the establishment, but it had the same effect in any event. Consequently, I believe Ap-pellee Bonavita should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.
¶ 5 The trial court states that there is no evidence of active concealment of Bonavi-ta’s interest, as if suggesting that intent to conceal is necessary. Consistent with the above, I believe this viewpoint is misguided. The question here is one of equitable estoppel. Equity is tantamount to fairness. Regardless of the intent, or lack of intent, behind failing to put the public on record notice of his ownership interest, the effect was the same. The failure to do so hid Appellee’s interest from the public. As such, Appellee Bonavita’s interest was hidden from a person taking the ordinary steps that are reasonably calculated to discern ownership. Stated alternatively, while it is fair to allow a potential defendant to demand that an action be brought within two years of its accrual, it is not fair *983to allow a potential defendant to make the same demand when he/she/it does not go through the relatively simple task of recording his interest at the courthouse for all interested parties to discover through normal means.
¶ 6 The trial court suggests that Appellant could or should have taken other steps to determine true ownership. But why should a member of the public not be justified in relying upon the appearance of ownership the parties chose to create or leave? More importantly, it is easy to view this case in retrospect, knowing that the Greenwalds were not the true owners, and say appellant should have done this or that to discover that fact; but such a stance ignores the viewpoint of Appellant or any other stranger to the business. A party, having checked the recorded deeds, having indicated her belief to the insurance adjuster regarding property ownership, and having invited a correction of her belief, would have no reason to think her belief was incorrect — that is, of course, unless she assumed that someone was hiding behind record ownership.
¶ 7 If someone were hiding behind record ownership, regardless of intent, he should not be free to assert the statute of limitations. In other words, I do not think the law requires a party to assume the true owners of property are hiding behind another’s record ownership. Nor do I think it makes good policy to allow a party to hide behind record ownership and then surprise a litigant with the statute of limitations.4 Whether or not that was the intent here, such a practice could easily be utilized by the less scrupulous. We are not fostering justice by assisting the practice.

. The trial court further comments that Appellant deprived herself of an opportunity to discern the true ownership through discovery by waiting until the last day to file the subject action. However, such a stance, should it be adopted, overrides the legislature’s actions in establishing a two-year statute of limitations period and effectively shortens it.
The statute of limitations is, in essence, a grace period designed to serve both a party's need to be free from stale actions and a potential litigant’s need of time to recover from injury, investigate and assess the potential legal responsibility and prepare to file an action against responsible parties. By asserting that a party should file an action early in order to ensure that the plaintiff will discover information necessary for the filing of a lawsuit, while perhaps strategically sound advice, would work to effectively shorten the statutory period which the legislature has arrived at by balancing the competing interests mentioned above.
In other words, if one needs to file an action early to protect himselfdierself from the pitfalls of hidden information and/or identities and interests, he/she is not truly given two years in which to file an action, but something less — perhaps, considerably less. While in many cases there is no reason that an action cannot be commenced within two years, that fact is immaterial. The legislature has granted litigants two years in which to file suits for personal injury. By, in essence, requiring parties to file early to protect themselves against necessary information that is not readily available, the judiciary is invading the realm of the legislature and effectively shortening the statute of limitations.