Court Opinion

ID: 9363036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 16:06:10.821217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:27.870220
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 124,383

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                           JASON A. JONES,
                                              Appellant,

                                                    v.

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Opinion filed December 2,
2022. Affirmed.

        Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.

        Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before GARDNER, P.J., WARNER and COBLE, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: Jason Jones appeals the district court's denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507
motion, claiming the court erred when it denied his motion without first holding an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm the district court's decision.

                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        Jones was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and
aggravated kidnapping in 2014. His convictions arose from a series of horrific events that
occurred on January 11, 2013, which are discussed more fully in the Kansas Supreme

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Court's opinion in Jones' direct appeal. See State v. Jones, 306 Kan. 948, 398 P.3d 856
(2017). Because the issue raised in Jones' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion requires an
examination of the evidence at his trial, we summarize those facts here.

The Evidence at Trial

        In January 2013, Jones worked at an auto shop owned by Dang Sean. Shawn
Lindsey had been Sean's business partner at the shop until 2012, and Lindsey owed Sean
money. Sean directed another man to pick up Lindsey and bring him to the shop to
discuss the debt.

        Jones and others were at the shop when the man arrived with Lindsey. Sean and
Lindsey began discussing Lindsey's debt, but Sean soon began punching and kicking
Lindsey. Jones, who was present during the beating, then drove with Lindsey and a few
other men to look for Lindsey's truck, so it could be used as collateral for the debt. When
they returned to the shop, Lindsey's torture continued, with Jones taking a more direct
role.

        After Lindsey's legs were zip-tied together, Jones poured methamphetamine into a
spoon while Sean was holding a syringe and needle. Sean injected Lindsey with the
methamphetamine. Jones then wrapped Lindsey in an electric fence; he gave a car battery
starter to another man at the shop who connected it to the fence but did not start it. Sean
began shooting Lindsey with an airsoft gun, and Lindsey began shaking violently. The
fence was removed after Sean shot airsoft pellets at the battery starter to try to turn it on.

        At this point, someone said Lindsey was almost dead, so Sean told Anthony Garza
(the man who had originally retrieved Lindsey from his home) to cut the zip-ties on
Lindsey's legs so he could be taken to the hospital. Jones and Sean put Lindsey in a black
Silverado, where he "started to fade out and die." Sean then told Garza to leave, and

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Jones texted Garza, instructing him not to say anything. Jones and another person later
picked up Garza and brought him back to the shop, where Sean told Garza that he would
kill him if Garza said anything.

       Lindsey's body was discovered in a field, with a nearby security camera showing
that it had been dumped out of a vehicle (which the State identified as the black
Silverado). A toxicology report showed high levels of methamphetamine in Lindsey's
blood. The coroner determined that the cause of death was methamphetamine toxicity,
and that the manner of death was homicide.

       Garza and other eyewitnesses testified in detail about these events at Jones' trial.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree
premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated kidnapping, along with the lesser
included offenses of intentional and reckless second-degree murder, involuntary
manslaughter, kidnapping, and criminal restraint. The court also instructed the jury on the
intent needed to convict Jones of these crimes under an aiding-and-abetting theory,
stating in Instruction 18:

               "A person is criminally responsible for a crime if the person, either before or
       during its commission, and with the mental culpability required to commit the crime
       intentionally aids another to commit the crime.
               "The person is also responsible for any other crime committed in carrying out or
       attempting to carry out the intended crime, if the person could reasonably foresee the
       other crime as a probable consequence of the committing or attempting to commit the
       intended crime."

        The jury found Jones guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder,
and aggravated kidnapping. Jones was sentenced to life without parole for 25 years on the
first-degree murder conviction (what Kansas courts call a hard-25 sentence) and 165

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months in prison on the kidnapping conviction, to be served consecutively. The Kansas
Supreme Court affirmed Jones' convictions. 306 Kan. at 962.

K.S.A. 60-1507 Motion

       Following his direct appeal, Jones filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion raising
nine claims. Relevant to our discussion here, he argued that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the language in the second paragraph of Instruction 18
based on State v. Overstreet, 288 Kan. 1, 11, 200 P.3d 427 (2009), which clarified that
the Kansas pattern jury instructions' foreseeability instruction for aiding and abetting—
the same as Instruction 18—should not be used for crimes that require a specific intent.
After reviewing Jones' motion, the district court appointed counsel to represent him.

       The State agreed with Jones that the trial court should have clarified that the
foreseeability language in Instruction 18 did not apply to the specific-intent crimes of
aggravated kidnapping and first-degree murder, as Overstreet instructs. The State also
agreed that Jones' counsel was deficient for failing to recognize and object to this
instructional error. But the State argued that Jones had not shown that this deficiency
affected the outcome of his trial, given the extent and nature of the evidence showing
Jones' direct participation in Lindsey's kidnapping and murder.

       The district court held a nonevidentiary hearing on Jones' motion. Jones' counsel
argued that an evidentiary hearing was warranted to assess whether the erroneous
instruction affected the outcome of Jones' trial. But the district court ultimately disagreed
and denied Jones' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The
court found that though Jones had showed his attorney's representation was deficient, he
had not offered any explanation of how that deficiency prejudiced him, given the
evidence presented at trial.

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                                        DISCUSSION

       Jones asserts that the district court erred when it denied his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
without holding an evidentiary hearing. He points out that an evidentiary hearing would
have given him an opportunity to show how the foreseeability instruction affected his
trial. But he does not offer any explanation of what evidence he may have offered at that
hearing—he merely asserts that such a hearing would have given him the chance "to
present evidence, including testimony, going to the prejudicial nature of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness." We do not find this conclusory assertion persuasive.

       The district court found that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to resolve
Jones' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Appellate courts exercise unlimited review over a K.S.A.
60-1507 motion that was dismissed or denied without an evidentiary hearing. Bellamy v.
State, 285 Kan. 346, 354, 172 P.3d 10 (2007). On appeal, we—like the district court—
must determine whether "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that [Jones] is entitled to no relief." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1507(b); see Beauclair v.
State, 308 Kan. 284, 293, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018).

       To warrant an evidentiary hearing, a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must allege
something more than conclusory claims. Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, 131-32, 200 P.3d
1236 (2009). An evidentiary hearing is not merely a vehicle for a movant to embark on a
fishing expedition so that he or she "might catch a fact that could lead to something
favorable." Stewart v. State, 310 Kan. 39, 54, 444 P.3d 955 (2019). Instead, "it is
incumbent upon the movant to show that a triable issue of fact already exists and is
identifiable at the time of the motion." 310 Kan. at 54-55. Such information may include
further factual development and background, names of witnesses and the nature of their
testimony, or other details showing the movant is entitled to relief. Swenson v. State, 284
Kan. 931, 938, 169 P.3d 298 (2007).

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       With these principles in mind, we turn to Jones' claims alleging the ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants the effective assistance of an attorney. See U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984). A person asserting the denial of that right must show that his or her
attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced
the person so as to deprive him or her of a fair trial. 466 U.S. at 687; Chamberlain v.
State, 236 Kan. 650, 656-57, 694 P.2d 468 (1985) (adopting the Strickland approach in
Kansas). Put another way, this prejudice inquiry requires a person to show "'a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.'" Edgar v. State, 294 Kan. 828, 838, 283 P.3d 152 (2012).

       Jones' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion raised nine claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. On appeal, he has abandoned all but one: that his attorney was ineffective for not
objecting to the foreseeability instruction. We thus limit our review to that question. See
State v. Arnett, 307 Kan. 648, 650, 413 P.3d 787 (2018) (issues not briefed are deemed
abandoned); see also State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 1183, 1231, 427 P.3d 865 (2018) (issues
only incidentally mentioned are not preserved for consideration on appeal).

       As a starting point, we agree with both parties that Jones' trial counsel should have
recognized and objected to the error in Instruction 18. Overstreet was decided about five
years before Jones' trial and held that the exact foreseeability language used in this case—
when given without additional clarification—was clearly erroneous in a case involving
first-degree murder because it misled the jury about the specific intent required to prove
that offense. See 288 Kan. at 11 (foreseeability language, combined with prosecutor's
emphasis on that language during closing argument, was clearly erroneous in a case
involving a charge of first-degree murder). Since Jones' trial, our Supreme Court has
applied the Overstreet analysis in a case involving aggravated kidnapping, which is also a
specific-intent crime. See State v. Mattox, 305 Kan. 1015, 1025, 390 P.3d 514 (2017).

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       We recognize that the trial court in this case instructed the jury on lesser included
offenses that did not require a finding of specific intent. But this situation requires, at a
minimum, clarification as to which charges the foreseeability instruction applied and
which charges it did not. See Overstreet, 288 Kan. at 14. And though the absence of an
objection did not prevent Jones from raising this issue on direct appeal, his attorney
nevertheless should have been aware of this principle and objected to the instruction as
given. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3414(3); Edgar, 294 Kan. at 838. We therefore
presume that Jones demonstrated that his trial counsel provided deficient representation
under Strickland.

       The parties disagree, however, as to whether an evidentiary hearing was required
to determine if Jones was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. Jones
essentially argues that his attorney's defective representation was enough, standing alone,
to warrant an evidentiary hearing to assess the effect of that error. The State asserts, as it
did before the district court, that Jones still has the burden to show that an evidentiary
hearing is needed to resolve his claim.

       The State is correct. To make the threshold showing necessary to warrant an
evidentiary hearing under K.S.A. 60-1507, a movant cannot simply make conclusory
statements. Instead, the movant must provide an evidentiary basis for his or her
assertions. See Swenson, 284 Kan. at 938. Jones' motion lacks details regarding what
should be developed during an evidentiary hearing as to how the foreseeability language
in Instruction 18 affected the outcome of Jones' trial. This deficiency is particularly
glaring given the overwhelming evidence presented against him.

       In State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 132, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005), our Supreme
Court faced this same instructional error during a direct appeal of a first-degree murder
conviction. Though the court found the instruction deficient, it ultimately held the error

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was harmless because "overwhelming evidence . . . demonstrated that Engelhardt was
guilty of either intentionally murdering the victim or aiding and abetting the intentional
murder." 280 Kan. at 133-34. In reaching this conclusion, the Engelhardt court noted the
victim was stabbed 55 times and the evidence showed that Engelhardt was involved.
Thus, the court reasoned, correcting the instructional error would not have affected
Engelhardt's conviction. 280 Kan. at 134.

       We reach the same conclusion here. In Jones' criminal case, the State presented
evidence that Jones was directly involved in Lindsey's aggravated kidnapping and
murder; the State also argued that he could be convicted as an aider and abettor of those
crimes. As in Engelhardt, the evidence—consisting largely of eyewitness testimony—
showing Jones' direct participation in the kidnapping and murder, and his specific intent
required to commit those crimes, was overwhelming:

   • For the kidnapping charge, witnesses testified that Jones held Lindsey in the shop,
       drove Lindsey around in an attempt to locate Lindsey's truck as collateral for the
       debt he owed, and told others at the shop to make sure that Lindsey did not leave.
       And the witnesses testified that Jones did these things with the specific intent to
       terrorize Lindsey and to inflict serious bodily harm, eventually resulting in his
       death.

   • For the first-degree murder charges, witnesses testified that Jones knowingly and
       directly participated in Lindsey's premeditated killing. Jones wrapped an electrical
       fence around Lindsey which was hooked to a car battery starter. Jones poured
       methamphetamine into a syringe, knowing it was going to be injected into the
       Lindsey's arm—the ultimate cause of Lindsey's death. Jones then loaded Lindsey
       into a truck, seeing Lindsey had "started to fade out and die." Lindsey's body was
       eventually dumped from that truck in a field.

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       As this discussion demonstrates, the evidence at trial was overwhelming as to
Jones' direct participation in and specific intent to commit both crimes. This rendered the
foreseeability instruction, when combined with the rest of the aiding-and-abetting
instruction, superfluous. And unlike in Overstreet, the prosecutor in Jones' criminal case
did not emphasize the potentially confusing foreseeability instruction during closing
argument. Instead, the prosecutor focused on the overwhelming evidence demonstrating
Jones' direct involvement in Lindsey's kidnapping and murder. Jones has not pointed to
any facts that would be developed at an evidentiary hearing to undermine this conclusion.

       After reviewing Jones' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, along with the files and records in
this case, we agree with the district court that Jones has not shown an evidentiary hearing
was warranted to assess the prejudice of his trial counsel's failure to object to the
foreseeability instruction. The evidence before the jury was overwhelming and
overshadows any potential harm that could have resulted from his attorney's error.

       The district court did not err when it denied Jones' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without
an evidentiary hearing.

       Affirmed.

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