Court Opinion

ID: 9833186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:31:10.392222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:00.422373
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We have concluded that we went too far in our statement that “A person’s driving while intoxicated simply cannot be the proximate cause of an injury.” We think there is good authority, principally from foreign jurisdictions, for this statement. In St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 281, it is stated: That an automobile driver approaching a crossing was under the influence of intoxicants would be a fact the jury had a right to consider in determining whether he was guilty of contributory negligence, but it would not of itself convict him of such negligence.
In Yates v. Brazelton, 108 Cal.App. 533, 291 P. 695, 697, it is said:
“While it is true, as appellant points out, that driving an automobile on a public highway while intoxicated is unlawful and constitutes negligence per se, it is also true that, unlesss such negligence in some manner contributes to the injury complained o'f, it is neither actionable when sued upon, nor does it constitute a defense under a plea of contributory negligence.”
In Heald v. Milburn, 7 Cir., 125 F.2d 8, 11, it is said:
“There was substantial evidence that immediately thereafter appellant was in such an intoxicated condition as to be unable to talk or act intelligently. * * * The jury was warranted in finding that the drinks caused him to lose control of his car and swerve over into that of appellees. While intoxication in and of itself does not constitute negligence, nevertheless it is a material element in the issue of negligence.”
In Allen v. Pearson, 89 Conn. 401, 94 A. 277, at page 278, it is stated:
“If Pearson was operating his motorcycle on the highway while under the influence o'f intoxicating liquor at the time of his injury, he 'was violating chapter 85, Public Acts of 1911, but that fact would not be enough to change the result of the former trial.' The plaintiff would be required to go further, and introduce evidence to show that such violation of the statute was a proximate cause of Pearson’s injuries. Farrington v. Cheponis, 84 Conn. 1, 8, 78 A. 652. The statute imposes a penalty for such violation, but it does not provide that the violation shall prevent a recovery of damages for injuries inflicted upon the offender by a third person where the violation - of the statute was not a cause of such injuries. The petition does not allege that the plaintiff has new evidence to establish this fact, the evidence on the former trial does not establish it, and it would be useless to have a new trial without evidence to show that the defendant’s injuries were caused in whole or in part by his intoxication.”
In Labrecque v. Donham, 236 Mass. 10, 127 N.E. 537, 539, it is said:
“If the plaintiff’s intestate was intoxicated at the time of the accident, this alone does not prevent her maintaining this action and the jury were so instructed; but if his intoxication contributed to the injury in-any degree, she cannot recover.”
See also: Sugar v. Hafele, 179 Md. 75, 17 A.2d 118; Bright v. Stettenbauer, 339 Pa. 545, 15 A.2d 676.
However, these authorities are in conflict with Peveto v. Smith, 134 Tex. 308, 133 S.W.2d 572, affirming Tex.Civ.App., 113 S.W.2d 216, and McCluskey v. McGregor, Tex.Civ.App., 208 S.W.2d 688, so we retract that statement which was unnecessary *301to the decision. This does not change our holding that the issues submitted and the jury’s answers thereto do not support the judgment of the trial court.
We have decided that the ends of justice will be better served by reversing and remanding rather than reversing and rendering this cause. Jackson v. Hall, Tex.Sup., 214 S.W.2d 458.
Appellees’ motion for a rehearing will be granted to the extent that this cause will be remanded for a new trial rather than ordered transferred to Kendall County.
Accordingly, our judgment heretofore rendered on November 10, 1948, will be set aside to the extent that this cause will be remanded for a new trial and not ordered transferred to Kendall County.