Court Opinion

ID: 9894039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 15:03:57.358392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:02.937343
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

                                          )
HERBIE DAVIS,                             )
    Plaintiff,                            )
                                          )
            v.                            )     C.A. NO. N22C-07-055 DJB
                                          )
STEVENSON WAYNE CROSSE,                   )
and ROSEMARIE BAIN-CROSSE,                )
              Defendants.                 )

                        Date Submitted: July 31, 2023
                       Date Decided: October 31, 2023

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

  On Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Experts – GRANTED in part,
                             DENIED in part;
On Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Punitive Damages – DENIED;
 On Defendant’s Motion to Preclude Personal Property Damages – DENIED.

Bayard Marin, Esquire, and Daulton Gregory, Esquire Law office of Bayard
Marin, Wilmington, Delaware; for Plaintiffs.

Kenneth M. Doss, Esquire, Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Doss, P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware; for Defendants.

BRENNAN, J.

                                      1
I.     INTRODUCTION

       This civil action stems from an apartment fire at 821 N. Lombard Street,
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 (the “Apartment”).            Plaintiff Herbie Davis
(“Plaintiff”) leased the Apartment from Defendants Stevenson Wayne-Crosse and
Rosemarie Bain-Crosse (collectively “Defendnats”). Plaintiff filed a three-count
Complaint alleging a claim of negligence and two statutory claims under Delaware’s
Landlord-Tenant Code all based upon the theory that the water heater was defective
in that there was an exposed pilot light flame.
       Before the Court are three motions: (1) Defendants’ Daubert Motion to
Preclude Plaintiff’s Liability Experts;1 (2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment on Claim for Punitive Damages; 2 and (3) Defendants’ Motion to Preclude
Plaintiff’s Personal Property Damages.3
       For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part Defendants’ Daubert Motion to Preclude Plaintiff’s Liability Experts.
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and to Preclude Plaintiff’s Personal
Property Damages are both DENIED.
II.    BACKGROUND

       Plaintiff leased the Apartment from Defendants beginning in September 2013.
On February 17, 2022, Plaintiff’s spouse, Tomora Davis, was cooking at the
Apartment while Plaintiff was not home. Ms. Davis entered the pantry, which
contained the Apartment’s water heater, and reached to grab a box from the pantry
shelf. At that moment, Ms. Davis felt something fall and immediately heard a
hissing sound emanating from the water heater. The water heater then exploded,

1
  D.I. 27.
2
  D.I. 26.
3
  D.I. 28.
                                          2
knocking Ms. Davis backwards. Flames and black smoke quickly engulfed the
pantry. Unable to operate the fire extinguisher, Ms. Davis left the Apartment, while
a friend called 911. The fire and smoke damaged much of Plaintiff’s personal
property.4
         In the months leading up to the fire, the pilot light on the Apartment’s water
heater had gone out twice. Plaintiff avers the water heater did not have a pilot light
cover, and as a result, the pilot light’s flame was exposed to open air. Plaintiff further
avers that prior to the fire, Defendants had been notified of the missing pilot light
cover.
         Plaintiff alleges that the missing pilot light cover caused the fire and that
Defendants were negligent in failing to inspect, warn, or repair the allegedly unsafe
condition.5 Relevant to the pending motions, Plaintiff seeks to admit the testimony
of two liability experts: David Brinton and Richard Cole, and recover punitive and
lost personal property damages.
III.     DISCUSSION

         A. Defendants’ Daubert Motion to Preclude Plaintiff’s Liability Experts

         Defendants move to exclude Plaintiff’s liability experts, David Brinton and
Richard Cole, under D.R.E. 702. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s liability experts
are not qualified to offer an opinion as to the cause of the fire. Defendants further
contend that Plaintiff’s experts’ opinions rest on an unreliable foundation and
methodology.
         In opposition, Plaintiff contends that both liability experts are qualified, and
their testimony is admissible at trial. Plaintiff neglects to address any arguments
concerning the reliability of the liability experts.

4
    D.I. 1.
5
    Compl. ¶¶ 9-16, July 7, 2022 (D.I. 1).
                                             3
      Delaware Rule of Evidence 702, which is substantially similar to Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, governs the admissibility of expert testimony:
         A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
         experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
         opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or
         other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
         understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the
         testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
         the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
         has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
         case.6

      “The trial judge acts as the gatekeeper in deciding whether an expert’s
testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant
discipline.”7 Consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,8 Delaware courts “apply a five-step test to
determine the admissibility of scientific or technical expert testimony.”9 The Court
must ensure:
         (1) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
             experience, training, or education;
         (2) the evidence is relevant;
         (3) the expert’s opinion is based upon information reasonably
             relied upon by experts in the particular field;
         (4) the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand
             the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and
         (5) the expert testimony will not create unfair prejudice or
             confuse or mislead the jury.10

6
  D.R.E. 702.
7
  Bowen v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 906 A.2d 787, 794 (Del. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
8
  509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9
  Bowen, 906 A.2d at 795.
10
   Id.
                                          4
      In determining the reliability of expert testimony, trial courts consider a list
of non-exhaustive factors, which include: “(1) whether the expert opinion testimony
can be (and has been) tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication, (3) its known or potential error rate, and (4) whether it has attracted
widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community.”11 The touchstone
of a reliability inquiry under Daubert centers on the “principles and methodology
used in formulating an expert’s testimony, not on the expert’s resultant
conclusions.”12 These factors are not definitive and are to be applied in “a flexible
manner that takes into account the particular specialty of the expert under review
and the particular facts of the underlying case.”13 Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the admissibility of the proffered expert’s testimony by a preponderance
of the evidence.14

      1. DAVID BRINTON
      David Brinton is a licensed plumber who has worked with water tanks for
thirty years.15   In generating his liability opinion, Brinton consulted multiple
Wilmington Fire Department documents related to the fire, Plaintiff’s expert report
on lost personal property damages, and two sworn affidavits. Brinton was not
deposed.
      Brinton opined that a missing pilot light cover is unsafe and “could” cause a
fire.16 Notably, Brinton does not offer an opinion that the missing pilot light cover

11
   Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Del. 2013)
(internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580).
12
   Bowen, 906 A.2d at 794 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
13
   In re Asbestos Litigation, 911 A.2d 1176, 1198 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (internal
citations omitted).
14
   Id. at 795 (citing Minner v. Am. Mortg. & Guar. Co., 791 A.2d 826, 843 (Del.
Super. 2000)).
15
   Defs.’ Daubert Mot., Ex. C, May 5, 2023 (D.I. 27).
16
   Id.
                                          5
at issue here caused the fire. Brinton’s expert report consists of mostly one-word
responses to a series of questions not tailored to the specific facts of this case.
Brinton neither explains his answers nor elaborates on how he reached his
conclusions.
       In evaluating the reliability of an expert opinion, this Court’s examination
“must be solely [focused] on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
that they generate.”17 Brinton’s report solely consists of conclusory determinations,
lacking any mention of the principles and methodology used. Given the particular
factual circumstances of this case, Brinton does have the experience and a basis of
knowledge necessary to provide an opinion. However, this report does not articulate
the basis for his opinions, nor does it do much more than simply answering the series
of questions posed. Though this Court is afforded broad latitude in determining
reliability,18 the proffered opinion here offers no discernable basis from which to
weigh its reliability.
       Due to these facts, the Court will treat the report as an expert disclosure as
allowed by the Trial Scheduling Order in this case, as well as permitted under
Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(4).        Prior to making a final ruling on the
admissibility of Brinton’s opinion before a jury, voir dire will be permitted outside
the presence of the jury to further explore the basis of his opinions. At that time, the
Court will make a final determination of the admissibility of the proffered opinion.

17
   Tumlinson, 81 A.3d at 1269-70 (alterations in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 595).
18
   Perry v. Berkley, 996 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Del. 2010).
                                           6
      2. RICHARD COLE
      Richard Cole worked for Philadelphia Gas Works’ field service department
for thirty years, which involved work with water heaters.19 Cole reviewed photos of
the property, sworn affidavits, Wilmington Fire Department documents, and the
reports of Plaintiff’s other experts. Unlike Brinton, Cole opines that the “missing
fire doors are what caused the fire.”20 Like Brinton, Cole offers no explanation as
to how he reached this conclusion.21
      Cole, however, was deposed. In his deposition, Cole testified that he either
relied on the findings of the Wilmington Fire Department’s report or Plaintiff’s
affidavit - he could not recall which.22 Neither document, however, supports his
view as to the cause of the fire. In fact, the Wilmington Fire Department’s report
concluded that the cause of the fire was undetermined.23 At one point during his
deposition, Cole agreed with the fire marshal’s opinion, conceding that the fire’s
cause is unknown.24
      While Cole’s one page report is slightly more informative that Brinton’s, it
will nonetheless be treated as a disclosure pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule
26(b)(4) given the fact that it is lacking in support for its conclusions. No further
voir dire is necessary for Cole, however, since the basis for his opinion and his

19
   Defs.’ Daubert Mot., Ex. D. Exhibit D to Defendants’ Daubert Motion contains
both Cole’s deposition testimony and his expert report.
20
   Id.
21
   Id.
22
   Id., Dep. Tr. at 24:8-24.
23
   Id. Ex. 2 to Cole’s Expert Report.
24
   Id. at 27:2-12 (“Q: I am asking you if you agree or disagree with the fire marshal’s
opinion that the cause of this fire was undetermined? A: I agree with it, I guess. I
mean, he is the expert in the field.”).
                                          7
experience were explored during his deposition.25 Like Brinton, given the particular
factual circumstances of this case, Cole has the experience and a basis of knowledge
necessary to provide an opinion on the topic of whether a gas heater is unsafe if
missing a pilot light cover.
      That said, Cole has not provided any basis to support his opinion that “[i]f the
water heater had the proper doors or coverings, the fire would not have occurred.”26
Cole’s statement that “[a]ll David Briton’s [sic] opinions and answers to the
questions provided are true and I agree with all the conclusions in that report” 27is
unable to be evaluated at this time. Whether Brinton’s opinion and conclusions are
admissible is yet to be decided and a proper determination cannot be made until
Brinton is presented for voir dire.
      Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’
Daubert Motion. Brinton may not testify until the Court find he has a sufficient
basis upon which his testimony can be given after voir dire. And if allowed, neither
proffered expert may testify to the cause of the fire.
      B. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM FOR
         PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
      Defendants move for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for
punitive damages. Superior Court Civil Rule 56 dictates that the moving party bears
the initial burden to demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”28 If the

25
   The Court will allow the late disclosed supplemental discovery regarding the
alleged violations of the International Code Council (“ICC”). While it is not looked
upon highly to provide expert discovery outside the time prescribed to in the Trial
Scheduling Order, there is seemingly no prejudice here as neither expert is able to
testify to the causation of the fire at issue here.
26
   D.I. 27, Ex. D, p. 203 (Exhibit 1 to Cole Depo.).
27
   Id.
28
   Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
                                           8
moving party makes such a showing, “the burden shifts to [the] non-moving party
to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact.”29 Summary judgment is not
appropriate when the record evinces a “reasonable indication a material fact is in
dispute.”30 In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court is to construe
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.31
      Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to establish that the alleged conduct at
issue - failure to inspect and replace a missing pilot light cover - warrants the
imposition of punitive damages.        Defendants challenge that even accepting
Plaintiff’s account of events, the evidence does not support submitting the question
of punitive damages to the jury. Plaintiff contends that multiple disputed facts
warrant the denial of summary judgment here, relying most heavily upon their
argument that Defendants’ failure to replace the pilot light cover reflects a conscious
indifference to his rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that the issue of punitive
damages should be decided by the jury.
      Under Delaware law, the question of punitive damages is “ordinarily for the
trier of fact.”32 However, “summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence permits
no reasonable inference that defendant’s conduct was sufficiently reprehensible” to
justify a punitive damages award to plaintiff.33

29
   Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 681 (Del. 1979) (citing Hurtt v. Goleburn, 330
A.2d 134, 135 (Del. 1974).
30
   JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Hopkins, 2013 WL 5200520, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.
12, 2013) (citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. 1962)).
31
   Heasley v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2022 WL 951261, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.
Mar. 28, 2022).
32
   Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 527 (Del. 1987).
33
   Ellis v. Tri State Realty Assocs. LP, 2015 WL 993438, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb.
27, 2015).
                                          9
      Punitive damages serve a dual purpose, “to punish the person doing the
wrongful act and to deter him, as well as others, from similar conduct in the future.”34
Considering this dual purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court held that such damages
may be imposed “only after a close examination of whether the defendant’s conduct
is outrageous, because of evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of
others.”35   Under this framework, “[m]ere inadvertence, mistake, or errors of
judgment are insufficient to sustain punitive damages.”36 As a result, conduct
exhibiting negligence, and even gross negligence, will not justify the imposition of
punitive damages.37
      As an initial matter, the parties dispute multiple facts relevant to this litigation.
Notably, Defendants, in their opening and reply brief, challenge whether the
evidence establishes that they had notice of the missing pilot light cover.38 Notice
of the missing pilot light cover is probative of whether Defendants’ conduct amounts
to reckless indifference, and thus, is material to Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.39

34
   Naples v. Miller, 2009 WL 1163504, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009) (quoting
Ringgold v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 3842142, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec.
21, 2006)).
35
   Jardel, 523 A.2d at 529 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
36
   Naples, 2009 WL 1163504, at *4 (citing id. at 530).
37
   Ellis, 2015 WL 993438, at *9 (citing Jardel, 523 A.2d at 529-30).
38
   Defs.’ Sum. J. Br. at 5, May 5, 2023 (D.I. 26) (“Plaintiff’s evidence only reveals
that there may have been a pilot light cover missing on the water heater before the
fire. However, with regard to [Defendants’] knowledge of the missing pilot light
cover, he offers only his own testimony that he orally notified Defendant Wayne
Crosse, an allegation adverse to Defendants’ interrogatory answers[.]”); Defs.’
Reply Br. at 2, June 13, 2023 (D.I. 34) (“The defendants were not on notice of any
missing pilot light cover or defect in the water heater before the fire.” (emphasis in
original)).
39
   Bobcat N. Am., LLC v. Inland Waste Holdings, LLC, 2019 WL 1877400, at *4
(Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2019) (“A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of
the pled claim under the law governing such a claim.”).
                                           10
Accordingly, Defendants’ own argument highlights genuine issues of material fact,
rendering a grant of summary judgment inappropriate.
      The inquiry here is limited to whether Defendants acted with reckless
indifference to Plaintiff’s rights, as there is no evidence presented on the record, nor
has there been argument that judgment remains unwarranted here. Neither the
evidence nor the briefs suggest that Defendants acted with evil motive, that is,
maliciously or intentionally. Recklessness is present upon a showing that the
“defendant acted negligently and had a reckless state of mind, such that he must have
foreseen or should have foreseen the risk of harm that his conduct would create.”40
When the allegedly reckless conduct stems from an error of judgment, a plaintiff
must show that “the precise harm which eventuated must have been reasonably
apparent but consciously ignored in the formulation of the judgment.”41
      Viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendants
had notice that the Apartment’s water heater did not have a pilot light cover.42
According to Plaintiff, the pilot light cover had been missing since he first leased the
Apartment in 2013.43 Under these facts, it is reasonable to infer that a risk of fire
was “reasonably apparent but consciously ignored” by Defendants.44 Therefore, the
question of punitive damages here will be presented to the trier of fact and
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for Punitive Damages is
DENIED.

40
   Naples, 2009 WL 1163504, at *4.
41
   Jardel, 523 A.2d at 531.
42
   Defs.’ Summ. J. Mot., Ex. B at 22:7-18.
43
   Id.
44
   Jardel, 523 A.2d at 531.
                                          11
      C. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION            TO      PRECLUDE    PLAINTIFF’S     PERSONAL
         PROPERTY DAMAGES
      Plaintiff requests damages for personal property that he lost in the Apartment
fire. To support this claim, Plaintiff seeks to testify as to the pre-fire value of his
personal property “based off his familiarity and knowledge of the worth of the
items[.]”45 Plaintiff additionally seeks to admit the opinion of Sean Mehan, a fire
damage restoration expert, on the salvage value of his property after the fire.46
      Defendants move to preclude all evidence related to Plaintiff’s property
damages claim.47 Defendants contend that a claim of personal property damages
requires evidence of the pre- and post-incident value of Plaintiff’s personal property.
Defendants further maintain that both the before and after value of the personal
property must be supported by competent expert testimony.
      Plaintiff does not contest the before and after framework proposed by
Defendants. Plaintiff, however, contends that expert testimony is not required to
support the pre-fire valuation. In Plaintiff’s view, an owner of property may testify
as to its “before” value.
      Defendants rely heavily upon Storey v. Castner48 to support their view that:
(1) personal property damages should be calculated by using the before-and-after
formula; and (2) expert evidence is necessary to support estimates of both the pre-
and post-incident value. As relevant here, Storey dealt with the valuation of an
automobile after an accident. The Delaware Supreme Court held that “when it is not
feasible to repair a damaged automobile, as is the case under the instant facts, the

45
   Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3, May 31, 2023 (D.I. 31).
46
   Id., Ex. 2.
47
   Though Defendants state they are moving for summary judgment, this Motion is
truly stylized as a motion in limine to preclude Plaintiff from admitting evidence of
damages. Accordingly, the Court should treat it as such.
48
   314 A.2d 187 (Del. 1973).
                                          12
measure of damages is the value of the car just before the accident and its salvage
value immediately after the accident.”49       The Storey Court explained that
“[e]stimates of such values must necessarily be produced directly from an expert
witness.”50
       There are two issues with Defendants’ reliance on Storey. First, Delaware
case law contradicts Storey’s holding that expert evidence is necessary to support a
“before” valuation. Storey cites Stuart v. Rizzo51 to support its assertion, yet the
Stuart Court makes clear that “[a]n owner may testify as to the value of his vehicle
before the accident—this on the theory that, being familiar with his property, he is
presumed to know its worth in a general way.”52 In Bozievich v. Moreau,53 this Court
squarely addressed this contradiction. The Bozievich Court, relying on Delaware
cases both before and after Storey, determined that an owner of an automobile may
testify as to its “before” value.54
       Second, Delaware authority makes clear that the valuation of damages in cases
involving personal property differs from automobiles.55 In cases involving the total
loss of personal property, Delaware courts have taken the replacement value of the

49
   Id. at 191-92.
50
   Id. at 192.
51
   242 A.2d 477 (Del. 1968).
52
   Id. at 480.
53
   2019 WL 4962694 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2019).
54
   Id. at *1, n. 6, 7.
55
   Chancy v. Ward, 1996 WL 110529, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1996) (“Damage
considerations for personal and household goods are distinctly different than those
for other goods such as automobiles.”); Estate of Corrin, 1993 WL 1500677, at *3
(Del. Ch. July 30, 1993) (“Storey holds that the measure of damages is value of the
good immediately before damage less the value immediately afterwards. In an
automobile case, this may be an appropriate, if harsh, way to render justice, but it
hardly applies here.”).
                                         13
property and applied a discount to account for depreciation and other factors.56 The
amount to discount is subject to evidence provided by the parties.57
      Accordingly, in following this line of cases, a discounted replacement value
calculation will be used to measure Plaintiff’s lost property damages. Plaintiff and
his wife, as owners of the personal property, may testify the property value before
the fire. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Plaintiff’s Personal Property
Damages is DENIED.

IV.   CONCLUSION

      For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part Defendants’ Daubert Motion to Preclude Plaintiff’s Liability Experts.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim for Punitive Damages and
Defendants’ Motion to Preclude Plaintiff’s Personal Property Damages is DENIED.

56
   Rafal v. Rafal, 198 A.2d 177, 179 (Del. Ch. 1964); see also Chancy, 1996 WL
110529, at *2-3 (affirming trial judge’s decision to take plaintiff’s valuation of
personal property and reduce it by roughly fifty percent to award damages); Corrin,
1993 WL 1500677, at *3 (“…I think the better way to handle this situation is for the
executor to locate new mirrors similar to the ones that are missing, for the Corrins
to inspect them to assure themselves of the similarity, and then for the offering price
of the mirrors to be discounted by one-third[.]”); Phillips v. Del. Power & Light Co.,
201 A.2d 160 (Del. Super. 1964) (“One rule as to the measure of damages for such
loss is the replacement value of the clothing and household articles adjusted to reflect
actual value based on existing conditions. This method does not entitle plaintiffs to
the value of new goods and articles, but takes into consideration the same kind of
merchandise that had been in use for the same length of time and in the same
condition.”). In Dippold Marble & Granite, Inc. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Company, this Court cited the discounted replacement value theory of damages
favorably but concluded it did not apply because a contractual provision controlled
the calculation of damages. Dippold Marble & Granite, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut.
Ins. Co., 2014 WL 3587261, at *2-3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 21, 2014).
57
   See Rafal, 198 A.2d at 179 (“Unless the parties want to offer additional evidence
directed to the discount factor, the foregoing approach will be adopted by the
court.”).
                                          14
Given these rulings, the Court will hold a conference to discuss the status of this case
going forward. Parties are to reach out to Chambers for scheduling.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                               ____________________________
                                               Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

      Cc: All parties via File&Serve Express

                                          15