Court Opinion

ID: 9572500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:14.565626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:16.301411
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting:
The language of 17 O.S. 1971, § 184, that states that a public utility “may, when authorized by order of the Commission, not otherwise, issue securities when necessary ”, clearly was intended to give the Commission the authority to decide on the necessity for the issuance of securities, i.e., the reasonableness of a proposed project as it relates to and affects rights of the public.
The cardinal rule for construction of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, and there is no room for statutory construction when intent of the Legislature is plainly expressed in an enactment.1 Statutes are to be construed by reading their provisions with the ordinary and common definitions of the words used, and we must assume that the law-making authority intended for them to have the same meaning as that attributed to them in ordinary and usual parlance.2 The plain and obvious meaning of the above quoted language and the intent of the Legislature is that the Commission is to determine the necessity of the underlying purpose for the issuance of securities. The Legislature obviously felt that it would be better to determine the need for the proposed project before construction, rather than after completion of a proposed project or at the time the utility wishes such expenditures included in its rate base. Said authority of the Commission comports with its power to supervise and regulate the public duties and obligations of public utilities.3
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice HODGES, Justice SIMMS and Justice HARGRAVE join me in this Dissent.

. Udall v. Udall, 613 P.2d 742 (1980); Johnson v. Ward, 541 P.2d 182 (1975).

. Riffe Petroleum Co. v. Great Nat. Corp., Inc., 614 P.2d 576 (1980).

.Okla. Gas & Electric Co. v. Corporation Com’n., 543 P.2d 546 (1975).