Court Opinion

ID: 9681774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:56:23.170108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:35.829684
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees urge in their motion for rehearing that we erred in striking from the judgment statutory penalty and attorney’s fees and in holding that their exhibits one and two were reports rather than demands for payment. Each of the exhibits was composed of two sheets of paper, one designated “Report on Hospital Services” and the other, “Attending Physician’s Report.” The sheets were in the nature of printed forms, the blanks of which had been filled in, giving designated information. Each of the reports was addressed to Preferred Life Insurance Company, Dallas, Texas, gave the patient’s name, her insurance policy number, the name of the hospital, the attending physician, a diagnosis of the patient’s illness, the treatment administered, the date of the report, the period of time covered by the report, and under the heading “Hospital Charges” listed an itemized statement of services performed and charges therefor. At the bottom of each sheet of the report was printed the following :
“This blank can be utilized for both ‘First’' or ‘Preliminary’ report and for ‘Final’ Report. Any questions not answered on first occasion will be completed on the -final report. These reports will be amplified by reports by letter when requested. On certain occasions authorization will be requested by wire for clients. This form advocated by The Texas Hospital Association and the Private Clinic and Hos- • pital Association of Texas for use of their members.”
On the back of the sheet designated “Report on Hospital Services” was set out the “Authorization for Release to Hospital and to Physician and Surgeon,” as heretofore shown in our main opinion. The first report (Exhibit One) was dated and sent by the secretary of the hospital to appellant insurance- company on April 17, 1952 and purported to cover the period from the date of the patient’9 admission to the hospital to the date of the report. The authorization on the back of the sheet designated “Report on Hospital Services” purported to be signed by the patient on February 16, 1952, the date of her admission to the hospital.
The authorization, in our opinion, does not amount to a demand when considered in connection with the remaining portion of Exhibit One of which it is a part. The patient did authorize the company to pay the hospital or the doctor any benefits which might be due the patient but there was no demand or request for payment. Both sheets of the Exhibit are designated and referred to by the language used therein as Reports. It is specifically stated that the blanks may be used as either “first” or “preliminary” reports and also as a “final” report. Exhibit One does not indicate whether it was preliminary or final,, but does show that the patient was still in the hospital. On the basis of the authorities cited in our original opinion which hold that the statute is penal and to be strictly construed, we conclude that Exhibit One, when considered as a whole, does not constitute a demand.
The second report (Exhibit Two) dated May 15, 1952, covered the period intervening between the first report and the death, of the patient on May 15, 1952. It was in form and substance similar to Exhibit One except that the second, report had typed thereon the following notation': “Claim filed earlier covering period from *10122-16-52 to 3-29-52.” It is urged by ap-pellees that this notation demonstrates- that such report was presented as a claim. Even if it should be held that the above described notation considered in connection with the remaining portion of Exhibit Two was sufficient to constitute a demand for payment, there was still no proper demand. The second report was made-by the Secretary of the Hospital after the death of the patient. Considered in its most favorable light-to appellees, the “authorization and release to Hospital and to Physician and Surgeon” could be no more than a power of attorney, and not an assignment, and it expired at the. death of the patient. The hospital and the doctor had no right or power to make a demand upon the insurance company after the death of the patient because the claim then belonged to the surviving heirs at law of the deceased.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.