Court Opinion

ID: 9534045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:30.81769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:23.306398
License: Public Domain

*522CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the decision of the Majority for the following reasons. Initially, for all the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion as well as the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Zappala in Commonwealth v. Cohen, 529 Pa. 552, 605 A.2d 1212 (1992), I disagree with the Majority’s continued adherence to the notion that the Commonwealth has an absolute right of appeal from an adverse pretrial ruling excluding certain evidence favorable to the Commonwealth. Further, even assuming that the Commonwealth is permitted such interlocutory appeals, I do not believe that, on the facts presented here, the Majority should have reached the issue regarding the admissibility of the other crimes evidence.
I continue to be concerned with the adverse effect that decisions such as that espoused by the Majority here -will have on a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. As I noted in my concurring opinion in Cohen:
The majority opinion [which allows the Commonwealth an absolute right of appeal from an adverse ruling on a motion in limine ] fails to take into account the right of a defendant to a speedy trial, instead focusing only on the right of the prosecution to present all its evidence. Rather than look only to the fact that the Commonwealth may be precluded from presenting all its available evidence, we should employ a balancing test in which a court, as opposed to the prosecution making an unilateral decision, will weigh the severity of the harm to the prosecution against the right of the defendant to have a speedy trial. The procedure currently in effect whereby the trial court may certify for appeal an order involving a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion where an immediate appeal of that order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the matter, addresses both concerns. 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). To allow the Commonwealth the absolute right to appeal an order granting or denying a motion in limine will provide the prosecution a license to delay the case to the prejudice of the defendant *523even where the evidence excluded may not be relevant to the prosecution.
Id. at 569, 605 A.2d at 1221.
Moreover, as I also noted in my concurring opinion in Cohen, albeit in much greater detail, I believe that the distinctions between a motion in limine and a suppression motion are significant and dictate that rulings thereon be treated differently with respect to their appealability. A motion in limine deals with the relevancy, probativeness and prejudice of a piece of evidence, a determination of which can rarely be gleaned outside the purview of the actual case. Most often, a motion in limine requires a preliminary ruling which is subject to change during the course of trial should the balance tip in favor of admission. Thus, most orders disposing of a motion in limine are not “final.”
A suppression motion, on the other hand, is in no way dependent upon the relevancy of the subject evidence. Indeed, the evidence being suppressed has, in effect, already been deemed to be relevant. As such, absent the ability to immediately appeal a suppression ruling, the Commonwealth would be deprived of any meaningful appellate review of the validity of a ruling that excluded clearly relevant, and most likely crucial, evidence. Suppression orders then are clearly “final” for purposes of appeal because of the practical effects that an order suppressing relevant evidence has on a prosecution.
The Majority here employs a balancing test of sorts wherein it weighs the interest of the defendant in a speedy trial against the Commonwealth’s interest in having a “fair opportunity to put on its best case,” concluding that the harm suffered by the Commonwealth in precluding immediate review of adverse pretrial rulings “far outweighs” the concomitant benefit that a defendant may gain from such a practice. Majority op. at p. 518. The Majority goes on to conclude that “fairness to the Commonwealth requires the right to appeal adverse pretrial rulings which exclude evidence the Commonwealth deems crucial to its case.” Majority op. at 519. While *524I acknowledge the practical effect that a decision to the contrary may have insofar as it is possible that the Commonwealth may never receive appellate review of an adverse evidentiary ruling rendered during trial, I remain unpersuaded that “fairness to the Commonwealth” should be the polestar. The objective in a criminal trial is not to permit admission of all of the evidence the Commonwealth so desires, but rather to provide a fair trial. In order to achieve a fair trial, it is the trial court’s duty to assure that only relevant and admissible evidence is presented to the fact finder.
Additionally, I wish to re-emphasize a point made by both myself and Mr. Justice Zappala in our respective concurring opinions in Cohen. There, we both mused over the issue of whether, in light of the fact that preliminary evidentiary rulings were henceforth subject to an absolute right of interlocutory appeal, any sane defense counsel would ever again seek preliminary rulings on evidentiary issues by filing such motions in limine. The case sub judice exemplifies Mr. Justice Zappala’s and my concern, and serves as a beacon to the defense bar.
Moreover, notwithstanding my disapproval of the proposition that the Commonwealth can appeal as of right any pretrial evidentiary ruling which is adverse to its prosecution, I believe that, on the facts presented in the case sub judice, the Commonwealth’s motion was not even properly before the trial court and, as such, should not be considered by this Court on appeal. Contrary to the trial court’s initial order regarding Appellant’s pre-trial motion in limine, wherein the court specifically noted that if at trial the Commonwealth could show common scheme, plan or design, it would accept an offer of proof at such time and determine whether the probative value of such testimony outweighed the prejudicial impact of such testimony upon Appellant, the Commonwealth presented a motion, pre-trial, entitled “Motion for Allowance of Testimony” requesting that the Court reconsider its previous ruling regarding suppression of this evidence. The Commonwealth’s motion was, thus, filed in complete disregard for the trial court’s earlier ruling. In addition, it was filed on the very eve of trial and was, in effect, nothing more than a request to the *525trial court to reconsider its earlier order; an order which had been entered more than thirty days earlier and one from which no appeal had been filed.
Additionally, given the evidence sought to be admitted, I find the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine to be eminently reasonable. Unlike in Cohen where the evidentiary issues could be decided on the facts of record, a determination of whether the evidence of other crimes sought to be admitted by the Commonwealth in the instant matter was relevant and not unduly prejudicial is dependent upon additional evidence which may ultimately be presented at trial. In my opinion, the Majority’s holding to the contrary is in error.
The Majority here determines that on the facts of this case, the evidence of other crimes is not unduly prejudicial since it is required for the Commonwealth’s case and, thus, deems it admissible. I am at a loss to discern how the Majority can even propose to make such a determination at this stage of the proceedings. Such unbridled speculation is not only illusory, but sets a dangerous precedent. In my opinion, the Commonwealth’s “need” for this challenged evidence cannot be ascertained until the trial commences.
To reiterate, in my view, evidentiary rulings are best left to the trial court’s discretion which can render such rulings utilizing the full context of what has and will occur at trial. The balancing test set forth by the Majority herein is simply an inadequate substitution for the well founded and legally sound historical approach which placed the burden of such decisions on the learned trial judges. Here, the trial judge properly reserved final decision on the evidentiary issue for the time of trial. He afforded the Commonwealth the opportunity of establishing a competent record at that time. Given this record, there is absolutely no need for premature appellate intervention which only serves to delay trial.
Accordingly, based upon my concurring opinion in Cohen, as well as that of Mr. Justice Zappala, and for all the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.
ZAPPALA and NIGRO, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.