Court Opinion

ID: 9676947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:39:24.627685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:52.561810
License: Public Domain

John Mauzy Pittman, Judge, dissenting. I dissent. The Commission’s opinion does not explain the action it has taken sufficiently to allow meaningful review, and we should therefore remand for the Commission to make specific findings as required by Wright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986). The appellee in this workers’ compensation case sustained an admittedly compensable back injury while lifting plywood in the course of his employment with appellant construction company on November 3, 1998. Appellee never worked for appellant or any other employer after that incident. An MR.I examination conducted on November 6, 1998, revealed mild degenerative disc disease at L1-L2 and L5-S1, but no evidence of acute injury or disc rupture. Appellee was treated conservatively without notable improvement. He continued to complain of pain, stating that his back hurt terribly after he tried to pick up a gas can. A repeat MRI was performed on July 28, 1999. It showed a new disc protrusion at L5-S1. Appellee ultimately agreed to have decompression surgery. He filed a claim seeking additional temporary total disability benefits and additional medical treatment in the form of the recommended surgery. In an opinion quoting appellee’s physician’s statement that it was impossible to state with any reasonable degree of medical certainty that the herniation was related to his work-related back injury, the Commission awarded these benefits, and this appeal followed. For reversal, appellant contends that the Commission erred in finding that appellee was entitled to surgical treatment and in awarding additional temporary total disability benefits. I would reverse and remand for further consistent proceedings. The Commission’s opinion does not contain findings adequate to support the award of benefits. The general rule with regard to the compensability of subsequent injuries was stated in Guidry v. J & R Eads Construction Co., 11 Ark. App. 219, 222, 669 S.W.2d 483, 485 (1984): When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence- or misconduct. In the present case, there was nothing stated in the Commission’s opinion to support a finding that appellee’s disc herniation was a “natural consequence” of his work-related injury. The extent of the Commission’s findings and reasoning on this issue is, essentially, that the herniation must have been a natural consequence of the work-related injury because there is no evidence of appellee having sustained any prior or subsequent back injury. This would be a rational conclusion, perhaps, if one assumed that disc hernia-tions are caused only by trauma. However, there is no such evidence in the record. Furthermore, appellee’s own physician stated that it was impossible to say with any reasonable degree of medical certainty that the herniation flowed from appellee’s work-related injury. In this context, our supreme court has held that, where the only evidence of a causal connection is a speculative and indefinite medical opinion, it is insufficient to meet the claimant’s burden of proving causation. Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000). The Commission was not bound to believe the medical testimony regarding causation. However, although the Commission found this medical testimony to be significant enough to include in its opinion, it failed to reconcile that testimony with its finding that appellee’s herniation was in fact caused by his work. In the absence of any explanation for rejecting this testimony, it appears that the Commission rejected it arbitrarily, and it is well-settled that the Commission may not arbitrarily disregard medical testimony. Hill v. Baptist Medical Center, 74 Ark. App. 250, 48 S.W.3d 544 (2001); Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998); Foxx v. American Transp., 54 Ark. App. 115, 924 S.W.2d 814 (1996); Crow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 46 Ark. App. 295, 880 S.W.2d 320 (1994); Reeder v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 38 Ark. App. 248, 832 S.W.2d 505 (1992). In the absence of an explanation for the Commission’s rejection of the physician’s testimony and finding that the herniation was the natural consequence of appellee’s compensable injury, the opinion is inadequate to permit any meaningful review, and I believe we should remand for satisfactory and specific findings as required by Wright v. American Transportation, supra. I respectfully dissent.