Court Opinion

ID: 9599060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:14:13.146423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:32.030788
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Justice:
Respondents commenced these wrongful death and personal injury actions against petitioner Kendall Company (Kendall) and City of Camden (City) to recover for damages allegedly sustained when the Kendall Lake dam broke. The trial judge granted Kendall summary judgment on the ground Kendall owed respondents no duty of care. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Kendall owed a duty of care as a matter of law by virtue of its control of the dam and its voluntary *313undertaking to monitor the lake for the safety of others. Miller v. City of Camden, 317 S.C. 28, 451 S.E.2d 401 (1994). We conclude it is for the jury to determine if Kendall owed respondents a duty of care as a volunteer and, accordingly, affirm as modified.
FACTS
Kendall Lake is a forty-one acre reservoir built by Kendall to aid production at its adjacent textile plant. In 1961, Kendall conveyed the lake, the dam, and the adjoining woods to City.1 City uses water from the lake to supplement its water supply. By agreement, Kendall retained the right to draw water from the lake for production purposes, providing it does not lower the surface level of the lake more than one foot below spillway level. In return, City agreed to maintain the level of the lake at approximate spillway level, absent some repair or weather emergency.
Kendall judges water level to be too high for production if the plant boiler room begins to flood. Water level is controlled by two sluice gates which are kept locked. Kendall has had no keys to the sluice gates since at least 1984. When the boiler room floods, Kendall contacts City to open the sluice gates on the dam to lower the level of the lake.
In 1979, the Army Corps of Engineers inspected the dam and found it unsafe. Kendall received a copy of the report requiring that certain repairs be made. Kendall contacted the South Carolina Land Resources Commission (Land Resources) to advise that it was not the owner of the dam. Both Kendall and City employees subsequently attended a meeting requested by Land Resources to discuss the inspection report. At this meeting, an emergency plan was formulated for notification of the appropriate officials in the event of an imminent dam failure. Along with City employees, Kendall employees were listed on Land Resource’s emergency notification forms as personnel assigned to monitor the dam.
*314On October 10, 1990, heavy rainfall caused the lake to overtop the dam causing its breach. Respondents subsequently commenced these actions for injuries sustained in the flood.
DISCUSSION
The Court of Appeals held Kendall owed respondents a duty of care because Kendall controlled the dam by virtue of its contract with City. Kendall asserts this was error. We agree.
One who controls the use of property has a duty of care not to harm others by its use. Dunbar v. Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co., 211 S.C. 209, 44 S.E.2d 314 (1947); Peden v. Furman University, 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930). Conversely, one who has no control owes no duty. Clark v. Greenville County, 313 S.C. 205, 437 S.E.2d 117 (1993). Here, Kendall’s contractual right of control was limited to maintaining a certain normal water level for production purposes. The contract between Kendall and City specifically reserved to City complete control of the dam and water level in the event of a weather emergency. Kendall had no physical control of the sluice gates and no contractual right to control them in this situation. Accordingly, we conclude Kendall owed no duty of care to respondents based on its contractual right of control.
The Court of Appeals also found Kendall owed respondents a duty as a matter of law because it voluntarily undertook to monitor the lake for the benefit of others.
The common law ordinarily imposes no duty on a person to act. If an act is voluntarily undertaken, however, the actor assumes the duty to use due care. Russell v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 86, 406 S.E.2d 338 (1991). While the law imposes this duty on a volunteer, the question whether such a duty arises in a given case may depend on the existence of particular facts. Carson v. Adgar, 326 S.C. 212, 486 S.E.2d 3 (1997). Where there are factual issues regarding whether the defendant was in fact a volunteer, the existence of a duty becomes a mixed question of law and fact to be resolved by the fact-finder. Id.; accord Jefferson County School Dist. v. *315Justus, 725 P.2d 767 (Colo.1986); Culver-Union Township Ambulance Service v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698 (Ind.App. 1993) (expressly adopted and incorporated by reference 629 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind.Sup.Ct.1994)); R.A. Peck, Inc. v. Liberty Fed. Sav. Bank, 108 N.M. 84, 766 P.2d 928 (Ct.App.1988); Chiplock v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 134 A.D.2d 96, 523 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1988); Mozingo v. Pitt County Mem. Hosp., 101 N.CApp. 578, 400 S.E.2d 747 (1991) aff’d on other grounds 331 N.C. 182, 415 S.E.2d 341 (1992).
In this case, there is a factual issue regarding Kendall’s status as a volunteer. The facts indicate a Kendall employee was listed on the Land Resources emergency notification form and Kendall had an employee present at the meeting during which an emergency plan was formulated. Summary judgment should be denied if more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence. Koester v. Carolina Rental Center, Inc., 313 S.C. 490, 443 S.E.2d 392 (1994). We find more than one inference can be drawn from this evidence. Whether these facts establish that Kendall volunteered to monitor the lake level for the benefit of third parties2 or was simply facilitating its own arrangement with City is an issue that should be resolved by the jury. See S.C. Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171, 348 S.E.2d 617 (Ct.App.1986) (a cause of action for negligence requires a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff).
Accordingly, we reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for the case to be submitted to the jury for it to determine whether Kendall volunteered to monitor the lake level for the benefit of third parties. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
FINNEY, C.J., and WALLER, J., concur.
TOAL, J., dissenting and concurring in separate opinion.
BURNETT, J., dissenting in separate opinion.

. Kendall inadvertently retained several feet of property upon which a portion of the foot of the dam rests. The Court of Appeals found no duty arose from this incidental ownership and that ruling is not before us on appeal.

. We decline to adopt the expanded liability of Restatement 2d of Torts § 324A (1965). This section imposes a duty on "one who undertakes ... to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person” and requires no actual volunteer relationship between the defendant and the third party.