Court Opinion

ID: 9794590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:18.16934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.665239
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the result reached by the majority, though I consider unnecessarily confusing its discussion of the appearance of fairness doctrine as separate from the requirements of due process. As I have stated elsewhere (see Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn.2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983)), I think the appearance of fairness doctrine should consist of no more than importing procedural due process safeguards into quasi-judicial proceedings of legislative bodies. Here, the medical disciplinary board is unquestionably a body created for adjudicatory purposes. Its decisions must be measured against the requirements of *484due process.
The majority structures its argument as if there were a difference between the appearance of fairness and due process. However, its analysis of the appearance of fairness doctrine merely reiterates the requirements of due process. The conclusion is proper but involves no more than the requirements of due process. I therefore concur.
The requirement that a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer should be able to conclude all parties obtained a fair, impartial and neutral hearing is a fundamental tenet of due process. The majority examines two possible violations of the appearance of fairness doctrine under this standard: (1) the combination of adjudicative and investigative functions, and (2) the assignment of an assistant attorney general as the board's legal advisor and as the prosecutor. The majority's analysis begins with the presumption that board members performed their adjudicative functions properly and legally "until the contrary is shown." Majority opinion, at 479. Such is the presumption accorded all judicial officers. As to the first potential violation, the majority finds "no inherent unfairness in the mere combination of investigative and adjudicative functions, without more", to prompt application of the appearance of fairness doctrine. (Italics mine.) Majority opinion, at 479. As to the second possible violation, the majority concedes the potential for a conflict of interest in the dual role of the assistant attorney general, but declines to apply the appearance of fairness doctrine since "no actual prejudice has been demonstrated in the present case ..." (Italics mine.) Majority opinion, at 481. The majority's discussion is simply one of due process; its analysis regarding the appearance of fairness is almost verbatim that in Withrow u. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 95 S. Ct. 1456 (1975), a case analyzing the requirements of due process.
This is not to say due process involves only a concern for whether actual wrongs have occurred. Due process also concerns protecting against even "the probability of unfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 99 L. Ed. 942, 75 *485S. Ct. 623 (1955). A new hearing is required in certain situations, such as where an adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome because the individual "poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented." Withrow v. Larkin, supra at 47. No such situation is presented here. Without more, "The processes utilized by the Board ... do not in themselves contain an unacceptable risk of bias." Withrow v. Larkin, supra at 54.
To label what are really due process concerns as the appearance of fairness doctrine is unnecessarily confusing to lawyers who must attempt in some way to give meaning to an unfathomable phrase. If we wish to maintain the continuing vitality of concerns over procedural due process, its constitutional basis and scope must be acknowledged.
Dolliver and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Utter, J.