Court Opinion

ID: 9961929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-21 07:20:26.870565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:20.713251
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 16, 2024.

                                     In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-23-00323-CV

               ALBERT AUSTIN, D/B/A J. BRIDAL, Appellant

                                        V.
    AMERICAN MATAR INTERNATIONAL INC., D/B/A STATEWIDE
          COMMERCIAL INSURANCE BROKER, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 189th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 2015-65356

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Albert Austin d/b/a J. Bridal (“Austin”) appeals from a final
summary judgment on limitations grounds in favor of appellee American Matar
International Inc. d/b/a Statewide Commercial Insurance Broker (“Statewide”).
Because Statewide established its limitations defense as a matter of law and Austin
did not meet his burden to prove timely and diligent service or otherwise establish
reversible error, we affirm.
                                   Background

      Austin purchased a commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policy for
his bridal shop in July 2013. The insurance was provided by Mount Vernon Fire
Insurance Company. Statewide was the broker/agency that represented Austin in
acquiring the policy. Austin wrote to Statewide in August 2013, objecting to CGL
coverage and requesting a policy with business property coverage, but he never
submitted an application for business property coverage.

      A fire occurred at Austin’s bridal shop in November 2013. Mount Vernon
denied Austin’s claim on April 4, 2014. Austin sued Statewide, Mount Vernon, and
others for promissory estoppel, negligence, breach of warranty, fraud, and breach of
contract. All the defendants except Statewide were properly served with process and
appeared.

      Austin attempted to serve Statewide at its corporate office through the
Commissioner of Insurance. Austin directed the commissioner to serve Statewide
at 2500 West Colorado Blvd. in Pasadena, California, but this was an incorrect
address. Statewide’s correct address was 2500 East Colorado Blvd. The attempted
service through the commissioner was returned as undeliverable, and, on July 22,
2016, the commissioner issued a certification of service stating, “Documents were
returned undeliverable on March 14, 2016.”

      On July 15, 2016, the trial court signed a default judgment in Austin’s favor
against Statewide. On March 15, 2019, Statewide challenged the default judgment
by bill of review, contending that the judgment was void because Statewide had
never been served with process. Statewide obtained a summary judgment vacating
the default judgment on July 19, 2021, which was affirmed by this court. See Austin

                                         2
v. Am. Matar Int’l, Inc., No. 14-21-00477-CV, 2023 WL 2034244, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).1

       Meanwhile, Statewide filed its original answer on September 2, 2022,
asserting the affirmative defense of limitations. Statewide then sought summary
judgment on its limitations defense on March 29, 2023. The trial court signed a final
summary judgment in Statewide’s favor on April 21, 2023. Austin appeals this
judgment.

                                           Analysis

       Austin presents five issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it granted summary judgment to a non-party (Medical Service Association);
(2) whether the trial court erred in granting Statewide summary judgment on
limitations grounds when discovery and a motion to compel were pending in the
case; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Statewide summary
judgment when Statewide fraudulently concealed its parent entity, American Matar
International Inc.; (4) whether the trial court erred in granting Statewide summary
judgment when the court compelled Statewide to answer; and (5) whether the trial
court erred in granting Statewide summary judgment because Austin had previously
obtained a default judgment against Statewide.

A.     Summary Judgment on Limitations

       Although Austin designates his first issue as a complaint about granting
summary judgment on limitations grounds to a non-party, Medical Service

       1
          In this court’s February 16, 2023 opinion, we noted that Austin’s April 2016 attempts to
serve Statewide directly through certified mail were ineffective because, as a party, he was not
authorized to effect service. See id. at *5 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 103; Worldwide Autotainment,
Inc. v. Galloway, No. 14-17-00761-CV, 2019 WL 386056, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Jan. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

                                                3
Association, Inc.,2 the substantive arguments he makes in support of this issue
concern whether Statewide established as a matter of law when Austin’s claims
accrued. Accordingly, we construe Austin’s first issue as a complaint that Statewide
failed to prove its limitations defense because it did not conclusively establish the
accrual date of Austin’s causes of action.3

       We review summary judgments de novo. Tran v. Trejos, No. 14-17-00998-
CV, 2019 WL 962605, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2019, no
pet.) (mem. op.). In the traditional summary-judgment context, the movant has the
burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Tran, 2019 WL
962605, at *2. A defendant seeking summary judgment based on an affirmative
defense such as limitations bears the burden to conclusively establish every element
of that defense, including the accrual date of the cause of action. Diversicare Gen.
Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005); see also Sharp v. Kroger

       2
          Medical Service Association, Inc., was never named as a defendant and is mentioned for
the first and only time in the style of the judgment. The judgment does not purport to grant any
relief to, or impose any obligations on, Medical Service Association, Inc. To the extent Austin
complains about the addition of that entity to the case style, he has not provided any argument or
authority to support of such a complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Harrison v. Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc., No. 14-21-00425-CV, 2022 WL 17038537, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Nov. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (overruling issue based on inadequate briefing); Karaali
v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 14-16-00118-CV, 2017 WL 1334589, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Apr. 11, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928,
931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
       3
          Austin is representing himself and his arguments frequently lack clarity. Self-represented
litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable
rules of procedure, including the obligation to state a “clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(i); Reule v. M & T Mortg., 483 S.W.3d 600, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet.
denied); see also Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014) (explaining that courts
may not stray from procedural rules simply because litigant represents self.). Nonetheless, we
construe Austin’s brief liberally to reach his appellate issues on the merits when possible. Harrison
v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (citing Weeks
Marine, Inc. v. Garza, 371 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. 2012)).

                                                 4
Tex. L.P., 500 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must present evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact on at least one of the elements of the affirmative
defense. See Diversicare Gen. Partner, 185 S.W.3d at 846.

       In his live pleading, Austin alleged that Statewide was negligent and grossly
negligent. Negligence claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a). Generally, a cause of action accrues and
limitations begin to run when facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek
a judicial remedy. Provident Life & Accident Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221
(Tex. 2003). A claim that an insurance agent negligently failed to obtain coverage
accrues when coverage is denied because that is when the claimant sustains the
injury. Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807,
815 n.16 (Tex. 2021) (citing Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy,
Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 514 (Tex. 1998)).

       Mount Vernon denied Austin’s claim on April 4, 2014.4 Thus, Austin’s
negligence claims accrued on this date, and limitations expired for Austin’s
negligence claims on April 4, 2016.

       4
           This letter indicates that Mount Vernon wrote to Austin on December 18, 2013 and
January 31, 2014, explaining “that the insurance policy at issue did not provide property insurance
coverage for damage to [his] own property, but only liability coverage for damage to another
party’s property for which [he] may be ‘legally obligated to pay.’” On appeal, Austin states, “The
cause of action accrued on/or about December 18, 2013 or January 31, 2014, when Mount Vernon
denied J. Bridal’s claim; and Plaintiff filed this law suit on October 15, 2015. Statewide pleaded
in [its] summary judgment that Statewide denied J. Bridal’s coverage on April 4, 2014 which is
not true, and unfounded liar [sic], and how can agent who is not an insurer den[y] coverage.” In
effect, Austin suggests an earlier accrual date for his claims in making this argument. Statewide,
however, did not attach copies of these earlier letters to its summary-judgment motion, so we
reference the date of the denial letter (April 4, 2014) that Statewide attached to its motion, which
is also the most favorable accrual date for Austin.

                                                 5
       Austin also asserted claims for promissory estoppel, breach of express and
implied warranties, fraud, and breach of contract. These claims are governed by a
four-year statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 16.004(a)
(fraud, breach of contract), 16.051 (promissory estoppel); Cleveland Reg’l Med.
Ctr., L.P. v. Celtic Props., L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322, 353 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010,
pet. denied) (“Actions for breach of express or implied warranties are governed by
the four-year statute of limitations . . . .”).

       Contract and promissory estoppel claims accrue when the contract or promise
is breached. Carl M. Archer Tr. No. 3 v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Tex. 2018)
(contract); Prestige Ford Garland Ltd. P’ship v. Morales, 336 S.W.3d 833, 837
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (promissory estoppel).                   Fraud or
misrepresentation claims accrue when the false representation is made, or, if the
fraud is concealed, at the time it is discovered or could have been discovered by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Jones v. Markel, No. 14-14-00216-CV, 2015 WL
3878261, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 23, 2015, pet. denied) (mem.
op.). Breach of warranty claims generally accrue when the breach occurs. See B.
Mahler Ints., L.P. v. DMAC Constr., Inc., 503 S.W.3d 43, 50 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

       In its motion for summary judgment, Statewide asserted that these claims, like
Austin’s negligence claims, accrued when Mount Vernon denied coverage on April
4, 2014. Accordingly, limitations expired on April 4, 2018 for Austin’s promissory
estoppel, contract, fraud, and breach of warranty claims.

       Austin filed his claims against Statewide on October 30, 2015, which was
within the applicable limitation periods for all claims. However, he did not achieve
service on Statewide before obtaining the default judgment against it on July 15,
2016, as this court previously explained. See Austin, 2023 WL 2034244, at *5

                                              6
(holding that trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Statewide because Austin
failed to properly serve it prior to obtaining default judgment). Further, nothing in
our record indicates that Statewide has been served with this lawsuit since July 15,
2016.5 Thus, Statewide conclusively established every element of its limitations
defense, including the accrual date. See, e.g., Diversicare Gen. Partner, 185 S.W.3d
at 846; Sharp, 500 S.W.3d at 119.

       When, as here, a defendant affirmatively pleads a limitations defense and
shows that service was not achieved within the applicable limitations period, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove diligence in attempting service. Draughon v.
Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 93-94 (Tex. 2021); Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 216
(Tex. 2007); Sharp, 500 S.W.3d at 119. To show diligence, the plaintiff must present
evidence of the efforts made to serve the defendant and explain every lapse in effort
or period of delay. Sharp, 500 S.W.3d at 119; see Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 94 (“To
avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer evidence creating a fact issue
regarding that reason.”). If one or more lapses between service are unexplained or
patently unreasonable, then the plaintiff has failed to show diligence as a matter of
law, and the defendant will bear no further burden at all. See Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at
216. Although diligence is generally a fact question, if a plaintiff offers no excuse

       5
          We may take judicial notice of our own records in cases involving the same subject matter
and the same or nearly the same parties. See, e.g., In re Brooks, No. 14-20-00182-CV, 2020 WL
5791980, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 29, 2020, orig. proceeding) (citing
Hernandez v. Sommers, 587 S.W.3d 461, 471 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied); Douglas v.
Am. Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 878 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)). We do
so in this case. In the previous appeal involving Statewide’s bill of review, Statewide presented
an affidavit from its president stating that it did not learn about the default judgment until January
31, 2019. Even if we presume that Statewide was notified of Austin’s claims on this date and that
such notification was sufficient for limitations purposes, this date was after limitations expired for
all of Austin’s claims. And Statewide’s petition for bill of review was filed on March 15, 2019,
see Austin, 2023 WL 2034244, at *2, which likewise was after limitations had expired for all of
Austin’s claims.

                                                  7
for a delay in service or if the lapse of time and the plaintiff’s acts conclusively
negate diligence, then courts will find diligence lacking as a matter of law. Sharp,
500 S.W.3d at 120.

       Austin presented no evidence of the efforts he made to achieve service on
Statewide, nor any explanation for any lapses in efforts or periods of delay. On the
record before us, we conclude that Austin failed to exercise due diligence as a matter
of law. See, e.g., Ashley v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175, 180-81 (Tex. 2009) (“We
agree with the trial court and hold that, as a matter of law, Hawkins’ responses do
not create a fact issue as to diligence, as this eight-month gap in time is left
unexplained.”); Webster v. Thomas, 5 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding no due diligence as a matter of law when evidence
showed plaintiff’s actions over four months were not designed to procure the
issuance and service of citation); Butler v. Ross, 836 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (holding five-and-a-half months of inactivity and
no service efforts between failed attempts at the wrong address and proper service
at the correct address constituted a lack of due diligence); Hansler v. Mainka, 807
S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1991, no writ) (stating that
request for service five months after suit was filed affirmatively demonstrated lack
of due diligence). As such, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment
on limitations in Statewide’s favor.

       We overrule Austin’s first issue.

B.     Austin’s Remaining Issues Lack Merit

       The remainder of Austin’s appellate arguments relate little to his stated issues6

       6
          See Karaali, 2017 WL 1334589, at *1 (explaining that mere mention of issue, without
substantive argument and authority to support it, does not comply with Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 and
results in waiver for inadequate briefing).

                                              8
and are largely repetitive of his mistaken belief that because he filed suit in October
2015, the limitations periods for his claims have not expired. However, to the extent
that he presents argument in support of these issues, he has not presented any
reversible error.

      1. Discovery dispute

      In his second issue, Austin asserts that the trial court violated his due process
rights by granting summary judgment without considering his pending motion to
compel discovery. But he does not identify any pending discovery pertinent to
Statewide’s limitations defense, nor has he presented any authority suggesting that
a discovery dispute interrupts the running of limitations. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
We also note that he did not file a motion for continuance in the trial court or claim
that he required additional discovery to adequately respond. Indeed, the bulk of his
argument in this issue is related to the application of the discovery rule to Statewide’s
limitations defense. But Austin did not plead the discovery rule; thus, Statewide was
not required to negate it. See Erikson v. Renda, 590 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2019).

      We overrule Austin’s second issue.

      2. Fraudulent concealment

      In his third issue, Austin contends the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because Statewide “fraudulently concealed” its “parent entity,” American
Matar International. However, concealment of identity does not toll limitations
when, regardless of the defendant’s identity, the plaintiff knows (or reasonably
should know) he has a cause of action. Baxter v. Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, 182
S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). In other words, the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment will not toll limitations unless the wrongdoer fraudulent
conceals the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. Here, Austin knew of his causes of

                                           9
action at the latest on April 4, 2014. And Austin knew the defendant’s trade name
and correct business address at the time suit was filed. Thus, fraudulent concealment
does not apply. See id.

      Moreover, he did not present any summary-judgment proof in support of this
fraudulent concealment claim, which is fatal. See Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 92-93
(explaining that, when limitations is established by the record as a matter of law and
a plaintiff relies on fraudulent concealment to avoid that defense, it is the plaintiff’s
burden to come forward with proof raising a fact issue with respect to each element
of fraudulent concealment); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin.
Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 749-50 (Tex. 1999) (affirming summary judgment on
limitations grounds in part because plaintiff “did not carry its burden to both plead
the [fraudulent concealment] defense and support it with summary judgment
evidence”).

      We overrule Austin’s third issue.

      3. Statewide’s answer

      In his fourth issue, Austin contends the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because Statewide answered the 2015 lawsuit.7                          As noted above,

      7
          Austin’s entire argument in support of this issue is the following:
      The question is whether Statewide and its parent entity really wanted to respond
      and answer the 2015 law suit after she was told by Judge Dollinger during the
      hearing of Statewide Bill of Review, and motion for summary judgment filed on
      July 19, 2021. The judge told them to “engage, file an[] answer and engage the
      case.” (See page 20 RR-15-25). Again, on 2022 law suit filed by J. Bridal at 157th
      Judicial District, Statewide filed a Motion to Plea in abatement and motion to
      dismiss; Judge Garrison gave [S]tatewide a mandatory condition that [S]tatewide
      to file an answer in the 2015 lawsuit. The applicable limitations period, that
      Plaintiff must file a suit within that period and use diligence to serve the defendant
      with process is four-year. J. Bridal filed its 2015 law suit, nine months after the
      cause . . . accrued; and attempted service of process, therefore, Statewide’s
                                                 10
limitations on Austin’s negligence and gross negligence claims expired on January
31, 2016; and limitations on his remaining claims expired, at the latest, on January
31, 2018. Despite never being served with this lawsuit, Statewide answered Austin’s
lawsuit on September 2, 2022.             Contrary to Austin’s apparent assumption, a
defendant does not waive its statute of limitations defense by appearing and filing
an answer after limitations has expired. E.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 94 (explaining that
limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in an answer).

       We overrule Austin’s fourth issue.

       4. Default judgment

       In his fifth issue, Austin seeks to revisit the default judgment that was declared
void through the bill-of-review proceedings:

       All requirements needed to grant default judgment on the law suit filed
       by J. Bridal on Oct, 30, 2015 was established on the record even though
       the Fourteenth Court of Appeals and 189th Judicial District overruled
       Plaintiff’s evidence. J. Bridal filed its Motion for Default Judgment
       just after the process server returned service and filed with court. The
       Process server hired by J. Bridal was Duces Tecum Inc., a private server
       to serve Statewide with the process in California; Duces Tecum Inc.
       served the process to the Commissioner of Insurance by certified mail
       return receipt requested.

       As can be seen from this excerpt, Austin provides no citations to authorities
or the record. Thus, he has waived this issue by inadequately briefing it. See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(i); Jones-Hospod v. Hospod, 676 S.W.3d 709, 717 (Tex. App.—El

       affirmative defense on [s]tatute of limitation fails, and this court must dismiss and
       vacate the trial court’s judgment.
        Thus, it appears that the thrust of Austin’s argument in this portion of his brief is, once
again, his mistaken belief that because he timely filed his lawsuit and attempted (unsuccessfully)
to serve Statewide, limitations has not expired.

                                                11
Paso 2023, no pet.); Harrison, 2022 WL 17038537, at *2; Canton-Carter, 271
S.W.3d at 931.

       Moreover, as explained, the trial court in the bill-of-review proceeding held
that the default judgment should not have been rendered because Statewide had
never been served. This court affirmed that holding. See Austin, 2023 WL 2034244,
at *1, 5.

       Under these circumstances, we overrule Austin’s fifth and final issue.

                                     Conclusion

       Having overruled each of Austin’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                       /s/     Kevin Jewell
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell.

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