Court Opinion

ID: 9587130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:17.788534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:02.963984
License: Public Domain

Legge, Justice
(dissenting).
Being convinced that the record in this case discloses a total failure of proof of negligence on the part of the defendant, I must respectfully dissent.
The only witness offered by the plaintiff in her attempt to prove negligence was the conductor. He testified that he was standing on the rear end of the caboose, with his lighted electric lantern in one hand and his other hand on the air-brake valve, as the train, consisting of thirteen cars and the caboose, was backing around a curve at about 10 miles an hour; that he and the flagman were observing the track ahead of them and he was blowing the air whistle, and that the bell on the locomotive was ringing; that instantly upon perceiving an object on the rail he applied the brakes in emergency; and that the train was brought to a stop as quickly *591as possible. This testimony was without contradiction and was corroborated by the flagman, a Witness for the defendant, who was standing with the conductor on the end of the caboose, also holding a lighted electric lantern; and, with respect to the blowing of the whistle, the ringing of the bell, the application of the brakes and the stopping of the train as quickly as it could be stopped in emergency, it was further corroborated by the engineer and the fireman, who were in the cab of the engine at the other end of the train.
I cannot find in the record any evidence warranting inference that the train could have been stopped more quickly. Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 225 S. C. 217, 81 S. E. (2d) 335, is inapplicable here, because in that case there was expert testimony to that effect.
Nor can I perceive any substance in the suggestion that the testimony here warrants the inference that the railroad company was negligent in not having a headlight on the caboose. The only allegations of negligence in this respect are those of paragraph 8(a) and (j) of the complaint, of which (a) charges that the rear car was not equipped “with proper headlight, as required by the statutes of this State”, and (j), that there was not “on said freight car any equipment that would aid or assist a watchman or flagman in detecting plaintiff’s intestate upon the track in time to stop said train before injuring him”. No statute or regulation has been called to our attention, nor do we know of any, that requires a headlight on the rear of a backing train. But construing the allegations above quoted as charging negligence at common law in not having sufficient lights on the rear of the backing train, I can find no evidence in the record that the two electric lanterns were not being properly used at the time of the accident, or that they did not adequately illuminate the track. That the jury had the right to reject the es-timony of the conductor and the flagman on that issue is beside the point; its verdict required a finding of negligence, and cannot be justified in the absence of evidence of negligence.
*592Nor is there any evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that if there had been a headlight on the rear of the caboose plaintiff's intestate could have been seen at any greater distance. The leading opinion correctly states that “it would have made no difference had the engine .with its headlight been in the front of the train, rather than backing, as the light would haye shone straight ahead”. But it seems to me that there is no justification, under the evidence, for the conclusion that a finding of negligence was warranted because the conductor “was not sure as to what effect it (a headlight) would have had on the position where deceased was lying.” The full text of the record of the conductor’s testimony in that regard was as follows:
“Q. How far can you see with a headlight? A. In perfect weather conditions at least 800 or 1,000 feet, at least.
Q. The weather on this night was clear, was it not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Tedards, if you had a light on the back of that caboose — I don’t mean a lantern, I mean a light — if it had been equipped with a light, you’d have seen this man in time to stop and avoid running over him, wouldn’t you? A. I don’t know that I would have.
Q. How far is 800 feet in car lengths? A. Twenty cars, I guess.
Q. Twenty cars? A. 18 to 20.
Q. So every night now, six nights a week, knowing you were going through this same procedure, no one on the railroad took the concern of equipping that caboose with a proper light to see? A. No, sir, a light wouldn’t have shined on this object until across Hance Street. I saw the object around the same time. It’s a curve and a light wouldn’t have shined around a curve.
Q. A light would have made it a lot clearer? A. I don’t know whether it would on the spot of the accident.
*593Q. So then by reasonable deduction, Mr. Tedards, if you had a normal headlight on the back of that train — you say you can see how far, eight hundred or a thousand feet? A In a line of sight, yes, sir.
Q. You wouldn’t have run over the man if you had had one you could see at all with, would you ? A. I can’t say that is a true statement.
Q. What is a true statement? If you had had a headlight back there, could you see any farther with it than you do with these electric lanterns ? A. I could have seen further, but I don’t know whether I could have seen further in the direction of the individual lying on the track.”
The factual situation here, with respect to lights, distinguishes this case from Carter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 114 S. C. 517, 104 S. E. 186 (where, so far as the report shows, there were no lights at all), and from Browder v. Southern R. Co., 226 S. C. 26, 83 S. E. (2d) 455 (where the only lights on the lead car of the backing train were lanterns held by employees on top of the car, giving little or no illumination to the track).
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment in favor of appellant.
Oxner, J., concurs.