Court Opinion

ID: 9833092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:26:42.77904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:59.477786
License: Public Domain

*493On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant insists that the record discloses fundamental error, the contention being that upon the death of the original beneficiaries named in the certificate issued to Franlrie ■Copeland, she had the lawful power to adopt, as she did, Mariah King as her daughter and •designate such adopted daughter as beneficiary in her certificate, and hence that Mariah King secured a vested interest, in the proceeds of the certificate which could not be assailed in any form by the appellees.
It is to be observed, however, that in the absence of a statement of facts we must imply from the court’s judgment and from .the allegations of plaintiff’s petition that Mariah King was not legally appointed as an adopted daughter of Frankie Copeland, and there is nothing in the record' which indicates that the society had any by-law or •other provision authorizing the appointment by Frankie Copeland as beneficiary, a per.son wholly unrelated to her. Hence, we think that upon the death of Frankie Copeland in ¿February, 1927, the proceeds of the certificate was payable according to the terms •of article 4831, Rev. Statutes of 1925 (see Acts 1923, p. 116). That article reads in part: “If a member shall die without designating ¡a beneficiary, or if at the death of the member the beneficiary designated is dead or has no insurable interest in the life of the member, the benefits payable under the certificate ■shall not be forfeited but shall be paid to •the persons named in this article.”
The order of payment designated in the .article is to the wife, husband, relative by blood to the fourth degree, children by legal .adoption, etc. It is suggested that this article was not in force at the date of Mariah King’s designation. It was in force, however, ■at the date of the death of Frankie Copeland, and it then appearing that Mariah King Rad not been legally adopted as a daughter, the proceeds of the certificate was properly payable according to the terms of the article of the statute which, was followed by the court in its judgment. It appearing- that Mariah King, under whose right appellant ■defends, not having been a legally adopted child of Frankie Copeland and not being related to her by blood or marriage in any •degree, the court rendered, we think, the only judgment that could have been legally ren•dered. To hold otherwise and now reverse the judgment of the trial court and uphold .appellant’s claim would be out of harmony with a long-standing rule of public policy in this state which precludes one without .an insurable interest of all benefit of insurance on the life of one to whom he or she is in no way related by blood, marriage or adoption. See Price v. Knights of Honor, 68 Tex. 361, 4 S. W. 633; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Hazlewood, 75 Tex. 338, 12 S. W. 621, 7 L. R. A. 217, 16 Am. St. Rep. 893; Cheeves v. Anders, Adm’r, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274, 47 Am. St. Rep. 107.
We conclude that the motion for rehearing should be overruled.