Court Opinion

ID: 9653210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:41:17.953047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.075285
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the holding of the majority that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s granting of the temporary injunction herein.
First, let us place this case in the setting in which it was tried in the trial court.
*688On November 6, 1967, when the hearing was had as to whether or not the temporary restraining order would be continued as a temporary injunction and combined with the hearing on the order to Mr. Sartin to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for violation of the restraining order, the defendant Millwrights had filed no answer to either of these matters. When court convened for the hearing, counsel for Millwrights stated that he had filed no answer but that he wished permission to state Millwrights’ position “at this time” and that “I would like to do so so that we can get it in the record as our answer in this case.” He then proceeded to state his client’s contentions and argue same. Such part of this statement and argument as Millwrights’ counsel desired was filed as the answer of defendants herein and was sworn to by Millwrights’ counsel and by him ordered included in the transcript on appeal. The main content of this answer was a plea by Millwrights that the state court had no jurisdiction of the case, but that Congress, by passing the Labor Management Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Griffin-Landrum Act, had pre-empted this field to federal jurisdiction to the exclusion of the state courts. The burden was on defendant to establish its plea to the jurisdiction. This possibly explains why Millwrights’ counsel asked to be heard first. In this case the validity of the plea was determined as a matter of law, based on the allegations of Rust’s petition. Also, for the purpose of disposing of the plea to the jurisdiction, the allegations of Rust’s petition must be accepted as true. Lacour v. Devers Canal Co. (Tex.Civ.App., 1959), 319 S.W.2d 951, 953, writ refused, n. r. e.
It is too elementary to require any citation of authority that when an adverse party pleads facts necessary to be established by the other party, the other party then has no further burden to establish these facts.
I will now quote from the record in this cause to show that plaintiff’s required facts to be proved were admitted in the defendant’s answer or were proved by witnesses heard at the hearing.
(1) As to the establishment of the picket line by Millwrights: “Now, we submit that this has not been the case. There has been no more picketing. There has only been two pickets properly picketing.” Upon getting the temporary restraining order served on Mr. Sartin, “He came to my office and I advised him * * * that he should go and have withdrawn any Millwright pickets that were up. I am informed by him and by the steward on the job that this was done. * * * After the picket was placed up and the picket sign read ‘unfair, District Council of Carpenters,’ or words to that effect; after the picket was put up, then the employees of Rust refused to cross the picket line.” All of the above quotes are from the verified answer filed by defendant, which is a part of this record. These same statements are also found in the statement of facts.
In addition to the answer, the following testimony was given in open court at the hearing and prior to the time the trial court judge announced his decision to grant this temporary restraining order.
Mr. Sartin, the business agent for Millwrights, was placed on the witness stand by Millwrights’ attorney and testified in part at follows: “I told three or four Millwrights that were there at the time — one of them was on the picket line walking the picket.” On cross-examination, Mr. Sar-tin testified in answer to a question as to when the picketing actually started that the picketing began Thursday afternoon late around 11:00 or 11:30, or perhaps 10:00 o’clock; that the pickets were set up under his direction; that the District Council authorized the picketing; that he went out to the job site around 5:00 or 5:30 and took all the Millwright pickets off. Other parts of the record show that Mr. Sartin was referring to Friday, November 3, 1967, as the afternoon the Mill*689wright pickets were removed. “I told them that we had been served with a restraining order and I, as agent, had to notify them to cease picketing. * * * I told them we had to cease picketing according to the court.”
Mr. Sumrall, a witness from the audience at the hearing, being duly sworn, testified: “There was a Millwright carrying it” (the picket sign on the picket line).
The quoted admissions in the answer, as well as the testimony of the two witnesses, establish as an uncontroverted fact that prior to the issuance of the temporary restraining order Millwrights had established a picket line and were actively engaged in picketing. It also establishes beyond contradiction that Rust employees refused to cross the picket line, and this of course, interfered with the construction job.
(2) As to the existence of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between Rust and Millwrights that there would be no strikes or work stoppage until the dispute had been referred to the International Office of the Union and the Home Office Representative of the employer:
Rust pleaded such provision of the contract. Also, Rust pleaded the provision in the local contract between “CASA”, representing Rust, and the Carpenters’ District Council, representing Millwrights et al.
In its answer, Millwrights pleaded that there was a contract entered into on the international level by the International Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners and Rust engineers. Millwrights, in its answer, pleaded among other provisions of this contract the identical clause regarding lockouts, work stoppage or strikes as that pleaded by Rust in its petition. The answer also says that Millwrights’ counsel does not know whether or not this contract is still in existence, but that he has no knowledge that it is not. The answer further alleges that Millwrights’ counsel will be glad to present this contract to the court for more careful study and reading.
The answer also pleads the same identical provision of the CASA contract with the Sabine Area Construction Committee as representatives of Rust; and the Carpenters’ District Council, representing Millwrights. The answer also pleads there is no dispute over this agreement and there is no request that it be changed, and they know of no attack made on the validity of this contract; and also “we didn’t violate the contract, we are not seeking to set aside the contract, we are only trying to uphold the contract.” Rust’s counsel, at the request of the court during the hearing and prior to the court’s order granting the temporary injunction, furnished a copy of the contract to the court.
There is in the record a supplemental transcript of the proceedings in this case, filed six days after the filing of the original transcript in the Court of Civil Appeals. This supplemental transcript was prepared by the district clerk in response to a letter from the trial judge, stating that the instruments contained therein were ones tendered to him during the hearing and were considered by him. Among the instruments contained therein was the contract between National Constructors Association and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America and Rust Engineering Company. It also contains the agreement between the Carpenters District Council of the Sabine Valley Area and Vicinity and Sabine Area Construction Committee. This contract binds Millwrights and Rust. The two “nonstrike” clauses referred to above are contained in these two instruments.
In view of the sworn answer and the contracts in the record, I am unable to say that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s action.
It is established beyond dispute:
(1) That Rust and Millwrights had two contracts governing their relations that prevented work stoppages, lock-outs or strikes.
*690(2) It is further conclusively established that Millwrights had established a picket line in violation of each of these contracts.
(3) It is further conclusively established that when the picket line was established, other Rust employees refused to cross the picket line, thus causing a cessation or slowing down of work on the construction contract. Should the picketing continue, the job would be shut down.
(4) From all these facts, the trial court had a right to find that Rust was damaged by the picket line and that Rust had a probable right to a permanent injunction on final hearing of the cause.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in granting the temporary injunction.
There is much evidence to support the trial court’s order. The allegations of Rust’s sworn petition are not all the evidence supporting the trial court’s order. In fact, this record shows other and additional proof and admissions present.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals herein.