Court Opinion

ID: 9890520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 14:07:22.826953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:23.130349
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0869-MR

GEORGE RUDY CUNDIFF                                                   APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CI-00138

DENISE JERNIGAN AND AMBER
DEARMOND                                                              APPELLEES

                                      OPINION
                                     AFFIRMING

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: George Rudy Cundiff (Rudy) appeals the Muhlenberg

Circuit Court’s order denying grandparent visitation with C.S.C. (the Child). After

careful review of the record, including the video of the hearing, and applicable

statutory and case law, we affirm.

             The Child was born in 2016 to Amber Dearmond and Seth Cundiff,

Rudy’s son. During the Child’s infancy, Seth raised him for the most part as a
single parent. Amber was not an active participant in the family.1 Seth and the

Child lived either with Rudy or in a nearby house provided by Rudy.

                 In April 2017, Seth (having received full custody) and the Child again

moved in with Rudy. Meanwhile, Seth began a relationship with Jennifer Denise

Jernigan (Denise), who worked at the Child’s daycare. Soon Denise also moved in

with Rudy. Denise would take the Child with her to work and bring him home

again in the evening. She also provided care in Rudy’s home, fixing supper for

everyone and making sure the Child was fed and bathed. By October of that year,

Seth, Denise, and the Child had moved back to the other house.

                 Denise and Seth maintained their relationship until April 2019, when

Denise moved out. Prior to the couple’s breakup, there were times that Seth would

move back in with Rudy, but the Child mostly stayed with Denise. Denise, who

was by then working elsewhere, continued to manage the Child’s care, including

driving him to and from daycare every day. Denise also claimed that Seth spent

most of his time at her new residence, and that it was Rudy who was behind her

being evicted from Seth’s house. However, the Child still spent some time at

Rudy’s home (mostly on the weekend), where the Child had his own room and

many of his belongings. But Denise insisted, when she testified at the hearing, that

1
    In fact, Amber has since consented to termination of her parental rights to the Child.

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she ensured that Rudy was never alone in caring for the Child, and that either Seth

or Loraine (Rudy’s wife) was there also.

             In September 2019, the Child stayed with Denise only, while Seth

fluctuated between her residence and his father’s. This arrangement continued

until December 2019, when Rudy shot and killed Seth in an argument at Rudy’s

home. The Child was in the home when this event occurred, although there was

conflicting testimony at the hearing concerning how much the Child actually

witnessed. Rudy was indicted and tried for Seth’s murder, but the jury ultimately

acquitted Rudy, finding that he had shot Seth in self-defense.

             Shortly after Seth’s death, by order of the Muhlenberg District Court,

Denise was given sole custody of the Child, and Rudy was prohibited from having

contact with the Child. Once acquitted, though, Rudy sought to resume his

relationship with the Child. In March 2020, Rudy filed a petition for grandparent

visitation with the Child, pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 405.021, in

Muhlenberg Circuit Court. The final hearing was held in June 2022, and the order

denying Rudy’s requested visitation was entered by the end of that month. Rudy

filed a timely notice of appeal.

             We begin by enunciating our standard of review, namely:

             [W]e will review the family court’s findings of fact under
             a clearly erroneous standard of review, giving due regard
             to the opportunity of the family court to judge the
             credibility of the witnesses. Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d

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                862, 867 (Ky. 2012) (citing CR[2] 52.01; Reichle v.
                Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986) (applying CR
                52.01 to review of child custody cases)). We review the
                interpretation of KRS 405.021 like other issues of law –
                de novo. Id. at 867; Morton v. Tipton, 569 S.W.3d 388,
                396 (Ky. 2019) (issues of law are reviewed on appeal
                under a de novo standard).
Blackaby v. Barnes, 614 S.W.3d 897, 900 (Ky. 2021). See also Goodlett v.

Brittain, 544 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Ky. App. 2018).

                KRS 405.021(1)(b) and (c), which addresses grandparent visitation

when the parent of a child is deceased, states that:

                (b) If the parent of the child who is the son or daughter
                of the grandparent is deceased, there shall be a rebuttable
                presumption that visitation with the grandparent is in the
                best interest of the child if the grandparent can prove a
                pre-existing significant and viable relationship with the
                child.

                (c) In order to prove a significant and viable relationship
                under paragraph (b) of this subsection, the grandparent
                shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

                        1. The child resided with the grandparent
                        for at least six (6) consecutive months with
                        or without the current custodian present;

                        2. The grandparent was the caregiver of the
                        child on a regular basis for at least six (6)
                        consecutive months;

                        3. The grandparent had frequent or regular
                        contact with the child for at least twelve (12)
                        consecutive months; or

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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                    4. There exist any other facts that establish
                    that the loss of the relationship between the
                    grandparent and the child is likely to harm
                    the child.
The “rebuttable presumption” section of KRS 405.021(1)(b) has been held to be

unconstitutional in Pinto v. Robison, 607 S.W.3d 669 (Ky. 2020). However, the

Pinto Court said:

                   This opinion should not be read to hold that all
            grandparent visitation statutes are unconstitutional. In
            fact, we are leaving intact KRS 405.021(1)(a) and KRS
            405.021(3) as potential avenues for a trial court to grant
            grandparent visitation so long as the trial court complies
            with Walker [v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. 2012),] in
            applying those subsections of the statute. We recognize
            the changing dynamics of families in today’s society and
            the important and influential role that extended family
            members, especially grandparents, play in raising today’s
            children.

607 S.W.3d at 677.

            Walker, supra, states that:

                   It is typical in grandparent visitation
            determinations for grandparents to present proof of the
            nature of the relationship between the grandparent and
            child. The question arises whether clear and convincing
            proof of a loving relationship alone is enough to
            overcome the parental presumption. Except in special
            circumstances, it is not enough. Kentucky courts cannot
            presume that grandparents and grandchildren will always
            benefit from contact with each other. If the only proof
            that a grandparent can present is that they spent time with
            the child and attended holidays and special occasions,
            this alone cannot overcome the presumption that the

                                          -5-
             parent is acting in the child’s best interest. The
             grandparent must show something more – that the
             grandparent and child shared such a close bond that to
             sever contact would cause distress to the child. Again,
             these determinations are fact-intensive. But we can
             imagine such a close bond, for example, in situations
             where the child and grandparent lived in the same
             household for a period of time, or where the grandparent
             regularly babysat the child. To allow visitation on a
             lesser showing would put fit grandparents on equal
             footing as fit parents, which violates the Due Process
             Clause.
Walker, 382 S.W.3d at 872 (footnote omitted).

             Here, the circuit court correctly considered these relevant factors in

determining that denying Rudy his requested visitation was in the best interests of

the Child. The circuit court carefully analyzed the facts presented before it, giving

special attention to the testimony concerning the Child’s emotional distress

stemming from the events which took place at his grandfather’s home when Seth

was killed. The court acknowledged that, while Rudy and the Child enjoyed a

close relationship in the Child’s early life, there had been no such bond for the last

two and a half years. Walker, 382 S.W.3d at 871.

             The circuit court summed up the evidence before it in these words:

“[T]his case presents tragic and challenging facts for the court to consider. In the

end, however, upon consideration of all the evidence under the standard set out in

Walker and Pinto, supra, this court is compelled to deny Rudy’s request.”

                                          -6-
             We agree that the circuit court based its decision upon the facts

presented to it, when analyzed pursuant to the statute and current case law.

             Accordingly, the order of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE DENISE
                                           JERNIGAN:
Ryan Bennett Driskill
Greenville, Kentucky                       Taylor C. Evans
                                           Madisonville, Kentucky

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