Court Opinion

ID: 9629774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:49:01.822669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:26.624000
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully in the holdings of the opinion of the court that: (1) “the common law rule that the release of an employee automatically releases the employer from vicarious liability has been abrogated in Hawaii by the adoption of our versión of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act [i.e., HRS §§ 663-11 through 663-17 (1985 & Supp.1992) ],” opinion of the court at 4, 889 P.2d at 688; and (2) the general release agreement (the Release) surrendering all claims that Saranillio had against the Silvas and GEICO arising from the motor vehicle accident involving Saranillio and Silva, Jr. “does not extend to Jolly Roger”—Silva, Jr.’s employer. Id. at 4, 889 P.2d at 688. I write separately, however, in order to “expand the *17majority’s reasoning” on three points for th.e purpose of “driv[ing] home [the] point[s] to the bar [and] the trial courts.” F. Coffin, On Appeal 227 (1994) (emphasis deleted).
Observing that “[a]n employer held liable under respondeat superior is entitled to indemnification from its employee,” the opinion of the court notes that some courts have argued that
if the release of the employee does not release the employer, an employee could not completely buy his/her peace by settling with the plaintiff because he/she would remain subject to a claim for indemnification. Because the employee’s incentive to settle is diminished, a primary purpose of the UCATA is frustrated.
Opinion of the court at 13, 889 P.2d at 697 (citations omitted). The opinion of the court then counters that the
argument, however, ignores the other half of the settlement equation—the plaintiffs willingness to settle. If UCATA’s release provision does not apply to vicariously liable parties, it stands to reason that at least some injured parties would be reluctant to settle with the servant or agent, and thereby extinguish his or her cause of action against the master or principal, unless he or she could settle with the servant or agent for full satisfaction (in which case the effect of the common law rule would be irrelevant).
Id. at 13-14, 889 P.2d at 697-98 (citation omitted) (brackets and quotation marks deleted).
The argument ignores more, however, than “the other half of the equation—the plaintiffs willingness to settle.” It ignores the equally important fact that HRS § 663-14 (Supp.1992) expressly permits a release to “provide” for the release of any enumerated joint tortfeasor, including a vicariously liable employer. Thus, in instances where plaintiffs, for any number of possible reasons, are “willing” to do so, they may contract selectively for the release of their claims against some joint tortfeasors and the retention of their claims against others.
In light of the foregoing, the suggestion of the opinion of the court, at 14, 889 P.2d at 698, that the abrogation of the common law release rule “would seem to discourage negligent employees from settling but to encourage plaintiffs,” while no doubt accurate in some cases, is often insignificant. An insured but otherwise impecunious defendant-employee may have no reluctance to enter into a joint tortfeasor release that preserves, subject to the constraints of the Hawaii UCATA, the plaintiffs claims against his or her vicariously liable employer. The matter before us is a perfect illustration. The record reflects that both Saranillio (the plaintiff) and Silva, Jr. (the settling joint tortfeasor)— through Magda—fully intended that Jolly Roger (the allegedly vicariously liable employer) not be released; had they intended the contrary, HRS § 663-14 would have permitted them expressly to release Jolly Roger. Thus, the abrogation of the common law release rule by the Hawai'i UCATA need not discourage negligent employees from settling tort claims against them.
Finally, the opinion of the court, at 14, 889 P.2d at 698, correctly notes that pursuant to HRS § 663-16 (1985), which provides that the Hawai'i UCATA “does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law,” the employer “retains the right to seek indemnification from its employee.” In this connection, the opinion of the court suggests philosophically that “[although some courts argue that requiring the employer to seek indemnification from the employee results in an unnecessary ‘circularity of action,’ we believe that the remedial nature of HRS § 663-14— to encourage settlement and assure full compensation to the plaintiff for injuries—takes precedence over possible indemnity problems.” Id. at 14 n. 7, 889 P.2d at 698 n. 7 (citations omitted) (brackets and internal quotation marks deleted).
It is my experience that the “circularity of action” problem is more theoretical than real. After all, HRS § 663-14 provides in relevant part that a
release by the injured person of joint tort-feasors or one joint tortfeasor ... reduces the [plaintiffs] claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consider*18ation paid for the releases or release, or in any amount or proportion by which the releases or release provide that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, if, by agreement of the parties, a release reduces the plaintiffs claim against all unreleased joint tortfeasors by the greater of the amount of the consideration paid by the released tortfeasor or the released tortfeasor’s proportionate responsibility for the plaintiffs total claim, then, by definition, there is no possibility that an unreleased tortfeasor could have a claim for indemnification against the settling released tortfeasor. This is the case because, by virtue of the contractual and proportionate reduction of the plaintiffs claim, an unreleased tortfeasor can never be liable to the plaintiff for any damages appor-tionable to the released tortfeasor. Obviously, a potentially settling tortfeasor always has the option of insisting on the full protections of HRS § 663-14. Whether a defendant-tortfeasor will choose to negotiate for these protections is a matter of his or her own cost-benefit analysis, although it is probably the rare defendant-tortfeasor who will not.
I recognize that, in the context of a vicariously liable employer—whose liability is of necessity coextensive with that of its tortfea-sor-employee—a UCATA release that reduces the plaintiffs claims against all unreleased tortfeasors by the greater of the consideration paid by the released tortfeasor (i. e., the settling employee) or the released tortfeasor’s proportionate responsibility for the plaintiffs total claims will effectively eliminate any exposure to the plaintiff on the employer’s part. But such would be the case under either the Hawaii UCATA or the common law release rule.