Court Opinion

ID: 9564839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:08:51.553529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:42.506299
License: Public Domain

*614aBuchanan, J.,
dissenting.
The opinion of the court in this case, as I believe, extends the doctrine of res judicata farther than has been done before and farther than should be done now. According to the opinion the unsuccessful effort of Patterson at a former time to obtain a temporary injunction to keep Gray and King from cutting timber on. land claimed by Patterson, and which Patterson sought to have surveyed, has resulted in his losing all title he then had or may thereafter have acquired and in establishing that title in a person who was not even a party to that suit. This, it is said, is brought about by the record in the injunction suit, consisting of a bill in chancery, an answer and a decree.
The bill, which was field by Patterson on October 22, 1946, contained these, and only these, allegations:
That Gray and King “have cut and are cutting 800,000 feet of heavy timber more or less on that portion of my land in the Wythe District of Elizabeth City County containing 60 acres and bounded as follows:
“On the North by the main road, on the East by Renick and Wilford, on the South by the heirs of Francis and on the West by the Warwick County line and that portion of the land lying in the Newport District of Warwick County, Virginia.”
That Gray and King “have eut and are cutting all the logs in the Virginia Electric and Power Co. Right-of-Way, which I was saving as evidence in the condemnation case now pending-before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.”
That “All of the above lands together with a small jib of land on the North side of main County Road” is known as the Rose Cottage Farm, referred to in a deed for 200 acres more or less from Thornton F. Jones to Joseph C. Hart and Lucy Page Hart, and being the same land that was conveyed to Patterson by John Weymouth, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the estate of Louis Heffelfinger, dated June 1,1935, and recorded in Elizabeth City and Warwick Counties.
The bill concludes with a petition to the court for an injunction to restrain Gray and King and their employees “from cutting timber and trees on my above said land, situated in the Wythe District of Elizabeth City County, Virginia and also'to restrain you from trespassing on my said land in any manner whatsoever;” and a further petition that the county surveyor make a complete survey “of all the said land.”
*614bOn tbe day the bill was filed, October 22,1946, Gray and King-filed their answer in these words: “Your respondents, J. B. Gray and O. M. King, for answer to a bill of complaint filed against them by Charles C. Patterson, deny each and every allegation contained in the Bill of Complaint.”
On the same day, October 22, 1946, the court entered the decree quoted in the opinion. A reading of that decree discloses that the court “having heard the evidence” (with nothing in the record to show what evidence was heard) was of opinion:
(1) That the complainant, Patterson, had failed to establish his ownership of the property;
(2) That he had failed to prove that either of the defendants had cut any timber from the complainant’s land; and
(3) That the complainant was not entitled to any of the relief prayed for.
The adjudication, and the only adjudication, was “that the complainant’s petition for a temporary injunction be and the same is hereby denied and this cause is dismissed and stricken from the docket of this Court at the cost of the complainant, * * *.”
That is all there is on which to base the present ruling* that Patterson is now barred from maintaining his present motion for judgment against Lillie M. Saunders, Gray, King and Canton Lumber Company, Inc. That motion for judgment, as amended, charges that during the months of October and November, 1946, and prior thereto, Patterson owned and still does own a tract of land in Elizabeth City county containing 60 acres more or less, bounded “on the north by the main road, on the east by Kenick and Wilford, on the south by the heirs of Francis and on the west by the Warwick County Line; ’ ’ and which was at that time posted and fenced by Patterson; that Lillie M. Saunders wthout any right, title or interest in said property, had sold the timber thereon ,to Gray, King and Canton Lumber Company, Inc., and had wrongfully persuaded and allowed them to cut and remove one million feet of timber from said tract of land “belonging to the undersigned” and had received large amounts of money therefrom, which wrongful acts were committed during the months of September, October and November, 1946, and thereafter.
The pleas of res judicata which were sustained by the trial court and now sustained by this court say, as they must *614csay in order effectively to allege an estoppel, “that the subject matter of all things alleged in said notice of motion for judgment have (sic) heretofore been finally adjudicated” and a final decree heretofore rendered “concerning the merits of this controversy, to-wit: the ownership of said real estate.”
But what did the decree adjudicate as to the ownership? Not that the ownership was in the present defendants, Lille M. Saunders or Canton Lumber Company, Inc. There was no adjudication of any right in either of them. They were not even made parties to the suit.
Neither did the decree adjudicate the ownership to be in Gray or King. They set up no claim to the land. Their answer merely denied generally the allegations of the bill.
Nor yet did the decree adjudicate that Patterson had no title. The decree recited that he had “failed to establish his ownership” and “failed to prove that either of the defendants have cut any timber from the complainant’s land.” The failure of the complainant that resulted in the denial of his requested relief was a failure to introduce evidence sufficient to support his allegations. There were only two things alleged— one that he owned the land, the other that Gray and King were cutting his timber. There is nothing to show what evidence he introduced or why the court held it insufficient. He had not asked the court to adjudicate that he had the true title against all other persons. He merely asked for a temporary injunction to restrain trespassers. Had the relief he asked been granted, it would not have established his title against the defendants in the present motion for judgment. Certainly the denial of the relief he sought did not establish title in any of these defendants, none of whom submitted any claim of title for adjudication in the chancery suit. If the present defendants would not have been barred in the present suit by the granting of an injunction in the chancery suit, then the plaintiff in the present action ought not to be barred by his failure to obtain an injunction in the chancery suit.
The question of the ownership of the title was not put in issue by any pleading in the chancery suit; both the necessity and the propriety of there deciding that issue were absent, and no such issue was there decided, as the decree itself shows.
“The general rule is that a judgment is not conclusive in regard to a question which, from the nature' of the case, may *614dnot be adjudicated in tbe action in which it is rendered. On the ground that a judgment rendered by a court on matters outside the issue submitted for its determination stands upon the same footing as one dealing with a subject matter entirely foreign to its jurisdiction, it has been held that the doctrine of res judicata operates only as to questions within the issues as they were made or tendered by the pleadings, and does not extend to matters which might have been litigated under issues formed by additional pleadings.” 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 182, pp. 927-28.
"'* * * In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action; not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.’ ” Kemp v. Miller, 166 Va. 661, 675, 186 S. E. 99, 104.
“ * * * jf; however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.” 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 174, p. 918.
On the pleadings in the chancery suit it is at least extremely doubtful that the court had jurisdiction to settle a dispute as to the title and boundaries of the land claimed by the complainant in that suit. This because of the general rule stated in Cumbee v. Ritter, 123 Va. 448, 451, 96 S. E. 747, 748, “that in the absence of some peculiar equity arising out of the conduct, situation or relation of the parties, courts of equity are without jurisdiction to settle disputes as to title and boundaries of land.”
But concerning’ that if Gray and King had asserted an adverse title in their answer and the court had upheld their claim, Patterson would not be estopped, still the decisive fact here is that no such defense was made and no such adjudication had.
I would reverse the judgment below and let the outcome of the present action be determined by proof of true ownership.
Miller, and Whittle, JJ., concur in this dissent.