Court Opinion

ID: 9898422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:36.31806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:06.263899
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                              No. 83507-6-I
                           Respondent,
                                                              DIVISION ONE
                  v.
                                                              UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 IAN EUGENE FLAHERTY,

                           Appellant.

        MANN, J. — Ian Flaherty was found guilty of murder in the first degree with

deliberate cruelty for the murder of his housemate. While Flaherty ultimately admitted

to the murder, he argued that it was not premediated or intentional because his actions

resulted from his autism spectrum disorder and his impulsive response to the victim

unexpectedly biting his fingers.

        Flaherty argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his

prior engagement in BDSM 1 activities because it was not relevant and was improper

propensity evidence, and the trial court failed to give a limiting instruction. Alternatively,

        1 BDSM stands for “bondage, discipline, sadism, masochism” and is understood as “sexual

activity involving such practices as the use of physical restraints, the granting and relinquishing of control,
and the infliction of pain.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/BDSM (last visited Feb. 16, 2023).
No. 83507-6-I/2

Flaherty contends his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the trial court

that his sensitivity to touch was only triggered by unexpected touch unlike the expected

touch during BDSM.

       We affirm.

                                              I.

                                             A.

       In mid-August 2017, Flaherty moved from Wenatchee to Seattle and sublet a

room in Lalita Byrnes’s apartment. On March 11, 2018, Byrnes asked, and Flaherty

agreed, to sign a note committing to move out within 30 days. The next day Byrnes’s

friend found her dead in her bedroom. Byrnes suffered 96 stab wounds to her head,

face, neck, chest, back, and several defensive wounds to her hands and arms. She

also had blunt force injuries and signs of strangulation. The medical examiner

concluded that most of Byrnes’s injuries were inflicted while she was alive.

       Flaherty’s DNA 2 was found under Byrnes’s fingernails and on the handle of the

murder weapon. Flaherty denied his involvement in Byrnes’s death for over a year and

a half, telling a complex story that included a fictitious third person. Flaherty eventually

confessed to killing Byrnes, but said that he was instructed to do so by voices in his

head. He claimed that he went to Byrnes’s room intending to scare her into giving back

the note in which he agreed to move out of the apartment. Flaherty claimed he took a

kitchen knife and woke Byrnes up by covering her mouth with his hand. Flaherty

claimed that Byrnes struggled and bit his fingers. He told the defense forensic

       2 Deoxyribonucleic acid.

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No. 83507-6-I/3

psychologist, Dr. Delton Young, that he stabbed Byrnes’s neck and grabbed her throat

to stop her from screaming. He failed to explain the other 90-plus wounds and told the

defense neuropsychologist, Dr. Marnee Milner, that he had no recollection of the killing.

       Flaherty was arrested in 2018 and charged with murder in the first degree for the

premeditated murder of Byrnes while armed with a deadly weapon. The information

was later amended to allege that he committed the crime with deliberate cruelty.

                                           B.

       Flaherty was referred for evaluation by Dr. Young to determine whether he

suffered a mental health disorder, and if so, whether that disorder may have played a

role in his judgment and actions at the time of the murder. Dr. Young explained that

Flaherty had experienced “a wide range of severe, even disabling psychiatric symptoms

over the years. These have included, most prominently, extreme hypersensitivities and

reactivity beginning in preschool years; considerable impaired emotional modulation

and control wherein he would reactively lash out when frustrated.” Dr. Young

diagnosed Flaherty with level 1 autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Dr. Young explained

that at the time of the murder:

       In his deteriorated mental state of severe depression, anxiety, and
       auditory hallucinations, Mr. Flaherty was at the mercy of a lifelong
       deficiency in emotional constraint: The normal moment of cognitive
       mediation between strong emotion (pain, anger) and violent action was
       missing. Strong emotions at that moment drove violent actions without
       thought, planning or judgment. This was a reflexive reaction to pain in his
       fingers and the voice, made possible by a long-standing impairment in
       emotional control.

                                         -3-
No. 83507-6-I/4

       Flaherty also underwent a neuropsychological evaluation by Dr. Milner. Dr.

Milner evaluated Flaherty on the “limited issue of premeditation and impulsivity.” Like

Dr. Young, Dr. Milner concluded:

       Mr. Flaherty has and continues to exhibit increased sensitivity to changes
       in routine or structure and increased sensitivities to unexpected noises,
       verbal stimuli and unexpected physical touch. More specifically, Mr.
       Flaherty has difficulty responding favorably when touched unexpectedly by
       others and he has felt increasingly severe levels of pain from such touch.

Dr. Milner explained that at the time of the murder:

       It is quite possible in accord with Mr. Flaherty’s chronic rigidity of thinking
       and inability to shift focus, his chronic impulsivity and innate sensory
       response (i.e. defense) system (all of which is heightened when
       emotionally charged or triggered), that when Ms. Byrnes bit Mr. Flaherty’s
       fingers, he reacted impulsively and defensively to the perceived severity of
       the sensory insult and this triggered the killing in that moment without
       forethought.

       In their expert reports, both Dr. Young and Dr. Milner discussed Flaherty’s

involvement in BDSM activities. According to Dr. Young, Flaherty explained that he had

begun participating in BDSM while living in Olympia and then later Seattle. Flaherty

admitted during his evaluation by Dr. Young to engaging in BDSM with prior girlfriends.

He stated, “I enjoyed the biting . . . [w]e would bite and flog and sometimes use food

items. I was fine with it.” For several months while he was living in Seattle he engaged

in BDSM meet-ups where there were between 7 and 30 people engaging in various sex

acts. Flaherty also stated he attended about 12 BDSM meet-ups from January to

February 2018, but that he mostly observed. According to Dr. Milner’s report, “While

living in Olympia and Seattle, Mr. Flaherty participated in BDSM . . . events.”

                                           -4-
No. 83507-6-I/5

                                              C.

       Expecting that the State would seek to cross-examine Dr. Milner and Dr. Young

on Flaherty’s BDSM activities, Flaherty moved pretrial to exclude evidence of his

participation in BDSM. Flaherty argued that there was no indication that the stabbing of

Byrnes was sexually motivated and that his participation in BDSM was irrelevant and

more prejudicial than probative. The State objected, arguing that it was relevant to

Flaherty’s claim that he stabbed Byrnes only after she bit his hand because of his

“overly sensitive” response to touch.

       The trial court denied the motion to exclude, finding the evidence to be highly

relevant to the credibility of the expert opinions and to rebut the defense claim that he

“reacted to touch.” The court also determined “there’s no unfair prejudice to Mr.

Flaherty and the probative value far outweighs any prejudice.” In its written order on

pretrial motions, the court also explained:

       Given the defense claim[s], and the defense experts anticipated testimony
       regarding Mr. Flaherty’s alleged sensory disorder and autism disorder,
       attendance at BDSM events close in time is relevant under 401 and 402
       (Flaherty’s defense experts will opine that Flaherty reacted to touch). This
       testimony is also admissible as it is relevant because it goes to the weight
       and credibility of the expert opinion. The probative value of this testimony
       far outweighs any prejudice, and the Court finds no unfair prejudice.

                                              D.

       At trial, Flaherty accepted responsibility for murdering Byrnes, but argued that the

murder was not premeditated and did not involve deliberate cruelty. Instead, he argued

that the murder resulted from an impulsive response to Byrnes unexpectedly biting his

hand. As defense counsel explained, “when Ms. Byrnes bit down, it was like a match

was thrown at Mr. Flaherty, and he exploded, he became instantly enraged, unable to

                                          -5-
No. 83507-6-I/6

control his reflexive reaction, and he strangled Ms. Byrnes, and he stabbed her nearly

100 times, killing her.”

       The defense was the first to introduce evidence of Flaherty’s engagement in

BDSM during the direct examination of Dr. Young:

       Q. You also, in your report, mention that he participated in his BDSM
       events.

       A. Right.

       Q. Can you talk—do you have an opinion about whether that
       participation—what does that say about his tactile defensiveness?

       A. I actually don’t know what to make of it. He explained that he attended
       a lot of BDSM events on his own and with a friend in December, January,
       February, February 20—

       Q. ‘18?

       A. —18. He said he was an observer and didn’t participate. On the other
       hand, he also explained that earlier he had engaged in BDSM sexual
       contact with a girlfriend.

       Q. But in the winter of ‘18, it was more observing?

       A. Yes. That was his account, yes.

       Q. Would you expect to see a difference between expected touch and
       unexpected touch in the context of BDSM events?

       A. Well, in general, unexpected touch is more likely to be problematic.
       That’s about all I can say about it.

       During cross-examination by the State, Dr. Young agreed that Flaherty told him

that his encounters included biting and flogging, and that he was fine with it. And

despite knowing this, Dr. Young did not ask Flaherty, or his girlfriends about the details

of the activities or how they related to Flaherty’s sensory disorder. Dr. Young instead

assumed that Flaherty was more sensitive when he was not expecting to be touched.

                                          -6-
No. 83507-6-I/7

Similarly, during the State’s cross-examination of Dr. Milner, she admitted that she did

not ask Flaherty how his participation in BDSM played into his sensitivity to touch.

Instead, she assumed based on literature, that Flaherty only reacted to unexpected

touch.

         The jury found Flaherty guilty as charged. Flaherty was sentenced to 584

months of confinement.

         Flaherty appeals.

                                                II.

         Flaherty argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his engagement

in BDSM activities because it was not relevant, was improper propensity evidence, and

the court failed to give a limiting instruction. We review the trial court’s evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615

(1995). A trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling was based on untenable

grounds or untenable reasons. Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 258.

                                               A.

         Flaherty argues first that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to

exclude testimony of Flaherty’s engagement in BDSM under ER 401, 402, and 403

because it was irrelevant to the issue of unexpected touch and otherwise unfairly

prejudicial. We disagree.

         Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. ER 402. Relevant evidence is

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence

to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.” ER 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative

                                             -7-
No. 83507-6-I/8

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” ER 403.

        This is not a case about whether Flaherty was motivated to commit murder

because of his participation in BDSM activities. Instead, the question is whether

Flaherty’s participation in BDSM activities was relevant to the credibility of the defense

experts’ testimony. This is particularly true as the defense experts failed to ask Flaherty

details about his participation in BDSM and his response to touch. Because these are

unknown—most critically any exploration of the interplay between Flaherty’s sensory

disorder and his particular approach to BDSM practices--the evidence is highly relevant

as to impeachment of Flaherty’s expert witnesses.

        Again, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a determinative fact

any more or less probable. This evidence is relevant because it tends to make the

existence of a material fact, that Flaherty’s actions were motivated by an unexpected

bite, less probable. State v. Wilson, 60 Wn. App. 887, 889 n.3, 808 P.2d 754 (1991).

Thus, the court did not err in concluding that the evidence of Flaherty’s participation in

BDSM activities was relevant under ER 401.

        The State specifically argues that the evidence was admissible under ER 611(b)

and ER 705. We agree. ER 611(b) allows cross-examination of any witness into

matters that affect the witness’s credibility. 3 State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 92, 882

P.2d 747 (1994). Cross-examination going to credibility is considered a matter of right,

        3 ER 611(b) states, “Cross examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct

examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.” (Emphasis added).

                                                 -8-
No. 83507-6-I/9

but the scope may be limited within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Roberts, 25

Wn. App. 830, 834, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980). The court may limit the scope of cross-

examination where the evidence only remotely shows bias or prejudice of the witness, is

vague, or is merely argumentative and speculative. State v. Jones, 67 Wn.2d 506, 512,

408 P.2d 247 (1965). An opposing party may cross-examine an opponent’s expert

witness by inquiring into the facts in which the expert relied on. ER 705.

         The State sought to question Flaherty’s expert witnesses on facts known to them

but not adequately explored or considered. Flaherty’s participation in BDSM was a

proper subject for cross-examination because it affected the credibility of the defense

experts’ opinions. The expert witnesses knew that Flaherty engaged in BDSM while

contending that Flaherty’s rage was incited by Byrnes unexpectedly biting him. On

cross-examination, the State asked the experts how much they knew about Flaherty’s

history participating in BDSM, what they asked Flaherty, and how much that was

relevant to his ASD. The BDSM evidence was admissible under ER 611(b) and ER

705. 4

                                                   III.

         Flaherty argues alternatively, that his trial counsel was ineffective because

counsel failed to make clear to the court during pretrial motions that it was only

unexpected touch that triggered a violent response. We agree that counsel was

deficient, but the argument fails because Flaherty cannot show prejudice.

         4 Flaherty also contends that the trial court erred in not properly evaluating the BDSM evidence

under ER 404(b) as propensity evidence and for not giving a limiting instruction informing the jury of the
limited purpose for its admission. We share the trial court’s concern over whether the evidence was
propensity evidence under ER 404(b). More importantly, because the evidence was admissible under ER
611(b) and ER 705 for impeachment purposes, we do not reach Flaherty’s ER 404(b) arguments.

                                                 -9-
No. 83507-6-I/10

       Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel.

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; W ASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 684-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). To establish ineffective

assistance, Flaherty bears the burden to show (1) “defense counsel’s conduct was

deficient, i.e., that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “the

deficient performance resulted in prejudice, i.e., that there is a reasonable possibility

that, but for the deficient conduct, the outcome of the proceeding would have differed.”

State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). Counsel’s

representation is not deficient if it “can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or

tactics.” State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 863, 215 P.3d 177 (2009). Failure to meet

either prong of the ineffective assistance test is dispositive of a claim on appeal. State

v. Sosa, 198 Wn. App. 176, 185, 393 P.3d 796 (2017).

       We agree that Flaherty prevails on the first prong. While defense counsel moved

to exclude evidence of Flaherty’s participation in BDSM activities, counsel failed to

address the critical difference between expected touch and unexpected touch which

went to the core of his defense. Counsel argued only that BDSM activities were

irrelevant because there was no evidence the murder was sexually motivated:

       Flaherty’s participation in BDSM clubs did not inform Dr. Young or Dr.
       Milner’s opinion and the State should be excluded from inquiring about it
       because the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value. There
       is no evidence that this charge is sexually motivated, and the State is not
       calling any expert or witness who can establish any relevance to Mr.
       Flaherty’s sexual history.

                                           -10-
No. 83507-6-I/11

Because the defense theory was that Flaherty reacted to Byrnes’s unexpected bite of

his fingers, it was deficient performance to fail to raise this with the trial court or

otherwise educate the court about the nuance of the defense.

       But Flaherty fails to show prejudice. Even if defense counsel had more zealously

argued the difference between expected and unexpected touch, the evidence of BDSM

activities would most likely still have come in on cross-examination. The State would

have been able to use the evidence to explore the facts and assumptions underlying the

expert testimony under ER 705. Moreover, even if the evidence of BDSM activities had

been excluded, there was more than sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conviction.

Flaherty fails to effectively demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability of a

different outcome.

                                               IV.

       In his statement of additional grounds, Flaherty argues that the prosecutor

committed misconduct by violating rules of evidence, burden shifting, and inserting

personal opinion. We disagree.

       Improper arguments made by prosecutors may deprive the defendant of a fair

trial. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 703-04, 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

To prove prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that

the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and prejudicial. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741,

756, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). We review comments made in closing argument within “the

context of the prosecutor’s entire argument, the issues in the case, the evidence

discussed in the argument, and the jury instructions.” State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d

559, 578, 79 P.3d 432 (2003).

                                            -11-
No. 83507-6-I/12

       To establish the first prong, the defendant must show that it is “clear and

unmistakable” that counsel committed misconduct. State v. Sargent, 40 Wn. App. 340,

344, 698 P.2d 598 (1985). “A prosecutor acts improperly by seeking a conviction based

upon emotion rather than reason.” State v. Craven, 15 Wn. App. 2d 380, 385, 475 P.3d

1038 (2020). To establish the second prong, the defendant must show a “substantial

likelihood the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict.” State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668,

718-19, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.

Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 766.

       Flaherty moved for a mistrial because of the number of sustained objections

during closing arguments. Flaherty argued that a curative instruction was insufficient to

cure the prejudice. Flaherty noted “either five or six sustained objections, including

inserting personal opinion, burden-shifting, et cetera.” The court denied the motion,

explaining that the court asked the jury to disregard the sustained objections, and that

the jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions.

       Flaherty fails to demonstrate clear and unmistakable misconduct. While the trial

court sustained several objections during closing argument, Flaherty fails to explain why

the curative instructions were insufficient. The jury is presumed to follow the court’s

orders. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 766. Flaherty also fails to provide specific statements of

misconduct, or explain the alleged misconduct other than the number of sustained

objections.

       Nor does Flaherty demonstrate prejudice. It is the defendant’s burden to

demonstrate a “substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict.”

Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 718-19. Flaherty argues that the prosecutor inserted his

                                          -12-
No. 83507-6-I/13

personal opinion, improperly burden shifted multiple times, and violated the rules of

evidence. Because “this was done deliberately, in violation of the core tenant of a

prosecuting attorney” there was prejudice. Flaherty fails to identify the resulting

prejudice or provide evidence of specific misconduct. The court need not search the

record to complete Flaherty’s argument. In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wn.2d 518, 532, 957

P.2d 755 (1998).

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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