Court Opinion

ID: 9586701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:14:08.437079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:48.012340
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge:
This appeal is from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, made on the 10th day of December, 1959, which affirmed an order of the State Compensation Commissioner made on the 15th day of July, 1959. The order of the commissioner which is affirmed attempted to set aside, vacate and annul an order made by the commissioner on the 14th day of May, 1959, from which order no appeal was sought.
Claimant, Harry T. Cottrell, suffered a compensable injury on January 6,1954, for which he was ultimately paid a twenty five per cent permanent partial disability, the last payment therefor having been made January 22, 1956. More than a year later, February 4, 1957, claimant suffered a second injury, somewhat in the nature of the first, and his claim for compensation therefor was timely filed. In the second claim the commissioner first held the injury not compensable, but the injury was ultimately held compensable and the claimant was, by the commissioner, referred to a physician for an examination, who recommended “an award of 10% permanent partial disability for this man’s injury of February 4, 1957”. Claimant, on motion of the employer, was then by the commissioner referred to three physicians for further examination.
One of the three physicians, after mentioning in his report the effects of each injury, was of the ‘ ‘ opinion the permanent partial disability is 35 per cent”, but did not indicate what percentage of the disability resulted from the second injury. Another of the physicians, to whom claimant was referred on motion of *338the employer, recommended “an award for 10% permanent partial disability attributable to this injury”, meaning the second injury. The other physician gave an opinion that “in addition to the 25% p.p.d. already granted this claimant has an additional 10% p.p.d. and I attribute this to aggravation that has occurred since his original injury”. The claimant offered no evidence, but agreed that the matter be submitted on the evidence detailed.
The commissioner then entered the order of May 14, 1959, which granted claimant a “35% permanent partial disability award, less any compensation heretofore paid”. The self insured employer did not object to the entry of the order but, after having been directed by the commissioner to pay the thirty five per cent award, and after the expiration of thirty days from the entry of the order, objected to making the payment, contending that the intention of the order of May 14, 1959, was that the amount of the twenty five per cent award for which payment had theretofore been made should be deducted from the amount of the thirty five per cent award. The commissioner, without any notice to claimant, reconsidered the matter and entered the order of July 15,1959, which reads: “This claim came on again to be considered this 15th day of July, 1959, upon the entire record, particularly upon the Commissioner’s ruling of May 14,1959; upon consideration of all of which, it is hereby ordered and directed that the aforesaid ruling of May 14, 1959, be and the same is hereby set aside, vacated and annulled, it appearing that the aforesaid ruling of May 14, 1959, was inadvertently entered; it is further ordered and directed that the Commissioner’s ruling of October 21, 1958, granting the claimant a 10% permanent partial disability award, be and the same is hereby affirmed; all of which is accordingly so ordered.”
Two questions are posed. Did the commissioner have jurisdiction to vacate or set aside the order of May 14, 1959, or to enter the order of July 15, 1959, and, if not, should the order of May 14,1959, be interpreted *339in accordance with, the proof before the commissioner, to the effect that claimant was granted only a ten per cent award for the second injury?
In considering the question relating to the power of the commissioner to vacate the order of May 14, 1959, it should he noticed that the power of the commissioner to reopen, or to further consider, a claim, pursuant to provisions of Code, 23-4-16, as amended, or Code, 23-5-1a, 1b or 1c, as amended, is not involved. There is involved here only the power of the commissioner to vacate, modify or annul an order entered by him, without further notice or hearing, after such an order has become final. Code, 23-5-1, as amended, provides that ‘ ‘ The commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions within his jurisdiction * * * and such action of the commissioner shall be final unless the employer, employee, claimant or dependent shall, within thirty days * * * object in writing, to sueh finding”. If such an objection is made, “After final hearing the commissioner shall * * * render his decision affirming, reversing or modifying, his former action, which shall be final”. The section further provides for a review by the appeal board of such final action if petition therefor be filed “within thirty days of receipt of notice of the com-misioner’s final action”. The language quoted seems to mate it clear that once an order entered by the commissioner has become final he has no longer any power or authority to change, vacate or modify it, except in certain circumstances not applicable here. To hold otherwise or to give the language any other meaning would, in effect, deny finality to such orders, and leave all parties uncertain as to what their rights and duties under any order might be. The conclusion is in accord with the decisions relating to compensation cases and, as well, to court orders generally. See Blosser v. State Compensation Commission, 132 W. Va. 112, 51 S. E. 2d 71; Blevins v. State Compensation Commissioner, 127 W. Va. 481, 33 S. E. 2d 408; Madden v. State Compensation Commissioner, 113 W. Va. 576, 169 S. E. 170; *340Butch v. State Compensation Commissioner, 112 W. Va. 493, 165 S. E. 672; Yacomolish v. State Compensation Commissioner, 110 W. Va. 79, 157 S. E. 45.
The evidence on which the order of May 14, 1959, was based, detailed above, clearly indicates, perhaps conclusively demonstrates, that the only order which the commissioner should have entered was one for a ten per cent permanent partial disability for the second injury. It is contended that the order of May 14, 1959, has that effect, since it requires the payment of the thirty five per cent award, “less any compensation heretofore paid”. If we can examine the evidence in support of the claim made as to the second injury in applying or interpreting that order, clearly it must he given that effect. If we look to that language, the phrase “less any compensation heretofore paid” becomes meaningless unless the percentage of disability paid as to the first claim is deducted from the thirty five per cent award for, admittedly, no “prior” payments were made as to the second injury.
We think, however, the authorities are clear, even where such an order is entered by a court having jurisdiction, that such a final ambiguous order may be interpreted and applied in the light of pertinent evidence in the case. In Laing v. Price, 75 W. Va. 192, 83 S. E. 497, it is held: “3. Ambiguity in a decree as to the ground of the decision authorizes resort to the record of the cause for solution thereof.” See Tressler Coal Mining Co. v. Klefeld, 125 W. Va. 301, 24 S. E. 2d 98; Farmers of Greenbrier Co. v. County Court of Greenbrier Co., 105 W. Va. 567, 143 S. E. 347; Dudley v. Browning, 79 W. Va. 331, 90 S. E. 878; Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W. Va. 608, 46 S. E. 603.
In 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 436b, we find this statement: “In case of doubt or ambiguity a judgment may be construed in the light of the entire judgment roll or record.” In 30A Am. Jur., Judgments, Section 69, we find this statement: “The judgment may be read in connection with the entire record and construed *341accordingly, at least where there is uncertainty and ambiguity”.
The true intent of the order of May 14, 1959, therefore, was to grant to claimant a ten per cent permanent partial disability. The order must be so interpreted and applied. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board must be affirmed.

Affirmed.