Court Opinion

ID: 9845769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:59.45461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.407917
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge,
dissenting.
The State failed to assign error to the trial court’s findings of fact and those findings are binding upon appeal. The trial court’s order should be affirmed. The majority’s opinion erroneously reverses the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. I respectfully dissent.
I. Standard of Review
A trial court’s findings of fact are binding upon this Court if supported by any competent evidence. State v. Elliot, 360 N.C. 400, 417, 628 S.E.2d 735, 747 (2006); see State v. Pendleton, 339 N.C. 379, 389, 451 S.E.2d 274, 280 (1994) (The State failed to object to the foregoing findings and did not take exception to them on appeal.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1121, 132 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1995).
II. Double Jeopardy
On 11 June 2004, defendant’s conditional release was revoked and he was re-incarcerated on the conviction that originally imposed a duty to register his residence with the Sheriff. On 2 August 2004, *50defendant was indicted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.11(a)(2), which states: “[a] person required by this Article to register who does any of the following is guilty of a Class F felony ... (2) Fails to notify the last registering sheriff of a change of address.” Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.9(a) (2005), “[i]f a person required to register changes address, the person shall provide written notice of the new address not later than the tenth day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.”
The State appeals from the 24 October 2005 trial court’s order. The trial court found as fact:
10. That the actions of the defendant, of allegedly leaving his residence at 780 3rd Ave. Place S.E., Hickory, North Carolina, and not making his whereabouts known are the basis for the pending criminal charges in Catawba County file # 04-CRS-11042 and were also part of the basis for the violation report which was drafted by the Defendant’s probation officer to terminate his post-release supervision.
13. That the parole document which terminated/revoked the Defendants’ post-release supervision is non-specific as to the reason the Defendant’s post-release supervision was terminated/ revoked. The Court further finds that one of the allegations for the hearing was that the Defendant had moved from his residence, and that to prosecute the Defendant for moving from his residence without notifying the sheriff in 04-CRS-11042 would place the Defendant in jeopardy twice for the same behavior.
(Emphasis supplied). The State failed to assign error to either findings of fact numbered 10 and 13, and they are binding on appeal. N-C.R. App. P. 10 (a) (2006) (“[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal[.]”); Schloss v. Jamison, 258 N.C. 271, 275, 128 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1962) (“Where no [assignment of error] is taken to a finding of fact such findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.”).
The trial court’s order conclusively states defendant’s actions of (1) “leaving his residence” and (2) “not making his whereabouts known” are the basis for both defendant’s revocation of his post-release supervision and re-incarceration and his subsequent criminal indictment. The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact state this *51indictment would place defendant in “jeopardy twice.” Once defendant was returned to prison for this violation, the trial court concluded he could not be punished again for the same violation.
The State would not be required to prove any other element to prosecute defendant under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.11 (a)(2). See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556, 568 (1993) (The same-elements test, sometimes referred to as the ‘Blockburger’ test, inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.”). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.11(a)(2), the State was required to prove defendant: (1) left his residence and (2) failed to make his whereabouts known. The trial court found the State was required to prove these two elements in order to revoke defendant’s conditional release and re-incarcerate him for the remainder of his sentence for the crime that originally imposed on him the requirement to initially register with the Sheriff under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.11(a)(2).
Accepting the State’s argument that defendant’s indictment does not punish him twice for the same offense would allow the State to also indict defendant for failure to re-register after he was re-incarcerated with his new address in prison. The State would not be required to prove any additional element to re-incarcerate defendant and convict him under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.11(a)(2). The State’s argument ignores any circumstances that required defendant to leave his residence.
The trial court’s unchallenged and binding finding of fact shows defendant was indicted after the State proved the same elements that caused his re-incarceration. These findings of fact are conclusive and binding on appeal. The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
III. Conclusion
The trial court’s unchallenged and binding finding of fact numbered 10 states that “the actions of the defendant, of allegedly leaving his residence . . . and not making his whereabouts known are the basis for the pending criminal charges in Catawba County file # 04-CRS-11042 and were also part of the basis for the violation report[.]" The trial court properly concluded that “to prosecute the Defendant for the offense alleged in the [indictment] would place the Defendant in jeopardy twice for the same behavior.” The Fifth *52Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution bar the State from seeking to impose “multiple punishments for the same offense.” See State v. Monk, 132 N.C. App. 248, 252, 511 S.E.2d 332, 334, disc. rev. denied, 350 N.C. 845, 539 S.E.2d 1 (1999). I vote to affirm the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. I respectfully dissent.