Court Opinion

ID: 9654556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:25:52.803032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:10.548087
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 61. {concurring). I write separately because the majority's smuggled legislation analysis of an item of general legislation gives legitimacy to a meritless argument and in the process confuses our law.
¶ 62. The majority goes to great lengths to respond to what it views as an alternative argument by Flynn. The majority surmises that Flynn argues that while 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253, is not a private or local *557bill, pursuant to Wis. Const, art. IV, § 18, the court should engage in a parallel "smuggled legislation" analysis to determine if the legislation deserves a presumption of constitutionality.
¶ 63. In doing so, the majority first analyzes the preservation of public notice purpose of Wis. Const, art. IV, § 18. The majority then parses our previous anti-smuggling case law to determine the number of sponsors, supporters, and amount of public hearing time necessary to defeat an assertion of smuggled legislation for private or local law purposes. Finally, the majority applies its interpretation of our art. IV, § 18 smuggling framework to the case at hand and determines that the legislation was not smuggled through the legislature. The majority finds dispositive the fact that § 9253 was not single subject legislation and that considerable attention was given to the bill by the Joint Finance Committee which considered four alternative proposals relating to the lapsed funds. In the majority's view, the legislature "intelligently participated" in considering the bill.
¶ 64. The majority's extensive engagement of this elusive and unsupported argument confuses the law and threatens to open new avenues of attack on legislation. Prior to Flynn, this court accorded legislation that was not a private, local, or special bill a presumption of constitutionality that had to be overcome by the challenging party. See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982); ABC Auto Sales v. Marcus, 255 Wis. 325, 330, 38 N.W.2d 708 (1949). However, the majority's failure to reject out-of-hand the perceived smuggling analysis in this case opens all legislation to threshold allegations that the legislation was smuggled through the legislature and an accompa*558nying legal skirmish between the parties over the proper presumption of constitutionality to be applied.
¶ 65. A review of our precedent demonstrates that the smuggling of legislation argument has never been, is not, and never should be an independent basis to attack the general presumption of constitutionality of legislation. The smuggling analysis has been confined to attacks on legislation based on the terms of art. IV, § 18.
¶ 66. In Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 N.W. 131 (1901), we noted that "[t]he framers of the constitution, in adopting sec. 18, art. IV, intended to guard against the danger of legislation, affecting private or local interests, being smuggled through the legislature. . . ."In subsequent cases wherein a party has alleged a § 18 violation, we have conducted a smuggled legislation analysis. See, e.g., Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992) (finding no evidence that program was smuggled through the legislature in violation of § 18); Milwaukee Brewers v. Department of Health & Social Services, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 107-08, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986) (holding legislation not smuggled in violation of § 18); City of Oak Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 424, 518 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding statute not entitled to presumption of constitutionality as a private or local bill under § 18). However, we have never before conducted such an inquiry in the absence of a § 18 constitutional objection. This fact and the majority's failure to provide an alternative substantive basis requiring such a test for legislation indicates that absent a § 18 allegation, a smuggling claim should not lie.'
¶ 67. By opening the door to plaintiffs eager to attack legislation with the complexities of the smug*559gling analysis, the majority forces courts to forego the previous presumption of constitutionality and determine the circumstances in which a piece of legislation will not pass the smuggling test. How many sponsors must a bill have? How many citizens must attend a public hearing on a bill? How many minutes of consideration in committee or before the Assembly and Senate must a bill receive? How much attention must be drawn to each specific provision of a bill?
¶ 68. These are questions that courts will be forced to consider because of the majority's damaging legitimatization of an argument that the majority is not even sure that Flynn raises before this court. Therefore, while I agree with the majority's holding that the legislature did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by lapsing the CCAP funds, I do not subscribe to the smuggling analysis in which the majority engages.
¶ 69. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.