Court Opinion

ID: 9371878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 00:02:48.526542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.887930
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/23 P. v. Ruiz-Lopez CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084207
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 16CR-04656)
                    v.

    GERARDO OSCAR RUIZ-LOPEZ,                                                             OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Ronald W.
Hansen, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Merced Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
         Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Levy, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
       Appellant Gerardo Oscar Ruiz-Lopez’s second appeal is pending before us,
following a remand in Ruiz-Lopez I pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s then-
recent decision in People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624–625 (Frahs), which held
that Penal Code section 1001.361 is retroactive.2 Appellant’s counsel asked this court to
review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People
v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant was advised of the right to file a
supplemental brief, but he did not file a response.
       We find no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues, and we affirm the
judgment.
                               PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       After appellant repeatedly texted and called his ex-girlfriend throughout the day,
appellant called and told her that he and their young daughter were dead. Appellant’s ex-
girlfriend called police. Appellant and his daughter, who was alive but unresponsive,
were located in a bedroom closet with two leaking propane tanks.
       Appellant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. During the guilt
phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury convicted appellant of attempted premeditated
murder (§§ 664/187/189; count 1), and child abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or
death (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 2).3 During the second trial phase, the jury found that
appellant was legally sane at the time he committed the crimes. (§ 1026, subd. (a).) The
trial court imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for attempted

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      We take judicial notice of our prior nonpublished opinion and the record in People v.
Ruiz-Lopez (Sept. 25, 2020, F077922) (Ruiz-Lopez I). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
3       The jury found the sentence enhancement allegations for personal infliction of great
bodily injury on a child under the age of five years, attached to counts 1 and 2, not true.
(§ 12022.7, subd. (d).)

                                                2.
premeditated murder and the upper term of six years for child abuse, stayed under
section 654.
       In his first appeal, appellant requested remand for a hearing on his eligibility for
mental health pretrial diversion under section 1001.36, added to the Penal Code effective
June 27, 2018. (Assem. Bill No. 1810 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).) Appellant also claimed
that the trial court committed error under state law when it instructed the jury during the
guilt phase that he was presumed sane, in contravention of People v. Mills (2012) 55
Cal.4th 663, and that the erroneous instruction violated his federal constitutional rights by
shifting the prosecutor’s burden of proof. Finally, appellant claimed that the trial court
erred in limiting the scope of his expert witnesses’ testimony about mental illness, in
violation of his rights under state and federal law, and that cumulatively these errors
violated his right to due process and a fair trial.
       The People disputed appellant’s entitlement to any relief on his claims.
       After briefing was complete in this case, the California Supreme Court held in
Frahs that section 1001.36 is retroactive. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 624–625.) We
concluded that in light of evidence in the record that appellant suffers from a qualifying
mental disorder, he was entitled under Frahs to a conditional limited remand to determine
whether he was eligible for pretrial diversion. (Id. at pp. 624–625.) We rejected
appellant’s other claims for relief, however.
       Following remand, the trial court held a diversion hearing on April 7, 2022, which
included defense testimony by Evelyn Machado, owner of a private business that assesses
and recommends alternative sentencing choices, and Dr. Richard Blak, a forensic
psychologist. After the conclusion of testimony and argument by the parties, the trial
court denied appellant’s request for diversion.
       On April 14, 2022, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                                3.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Pursuant to section 1001.36, subdivision (a), as amended by Senate Bill No. 1223
(Reg. Sess. 2021–2022) (Senate Bill 1223 or Sen. Bill 1223), effective January 1, 2023,
“the court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and
prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant pursuant to this section if the
defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in
subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion
under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” Relevant to the trial court’s determination
in this case, if the defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion, in determining whether the
defendant is suitable for diversion, the court must find “[t]he defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in
the community. The court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense,
or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the
defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other
factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
       A trial court’s factual findings under section 1001.36 must be supported by
substantial evidence (Negron v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1016;
People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 589), and the court’s ultimate decision
whether to grant mental health diversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (People v.
Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080). “‘A court abuses its discretion when it
makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.’” (Ibid.)
       The trial court denied appellant’s request for diversion on April 7, 2022.
Section 1001.36 was subsequently amended, effective June 30, 2022, and then again,
effective January 1, 2023. (Senate Bill No. 184 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) [eff. June 30,
2022]; Sen. Bill 1223 [eff. Jan. 1, 2023].) Senate Bill 1223 “change[d] the eligibility

                                               4.
criteria to include a diagnosis of a mental disorder instead of the court finding the
defendant suffers from a mental disorder and would require that the diagnosis or
treatment for a diagnosed mental disorder be within the last 5 years,” and “require[s] the
court, if a defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, to find that the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of a charged
offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor,
causal factor, or contributing factor to the alleged offense.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen.
Bill 1223, Summary Dig., p. 1.)
       “Newly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or reducing criminal
liability presumptively applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at the time of the
legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 852, citing In re
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745; accord, People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th
671, 673, 675–676.) “This presumption ‘rests on an inference that, in the absence of
contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the
criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between
sentences that are final and sentences that are not.’” (People v. Gentile, supra, at p. 852;
accord, People v. Esquivel, supra, at p. 675.) We presume, for the purpose of
independently reviewing the record and resolving this appeal, that the changes to
section 1001.36 apply retroactively under Estrada.
       In this case, the trial court’s denial of diversion was grounded in the finding that
appellant does not meet the suitability criteria under subdivision (c)(4), formerly
subdivision (b)(1)(F), of section 1001.36: “The defendant will not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” An “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an unreasonable
risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of
clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667”
(§ 1170.18, subd. (c)), which includes attempted murder.

                                              5.
       Neither appellate counsel nor appellant identified any arguable issues and, having
undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel or any other arguable error that would result in a disposition more
favorable to appellant. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                            6.