Court Opinion

ID: 9721078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:48:02.955253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.319432
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the court’s judgment affirming the defendant’s convictions for murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Unlike the majority, however, I do not believe that a new capital sentencing hearing is necessary in this case, and therefore I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion vacating the defendant’s death sentence and remanding the cause for a new sentencing hearing. The majority believes the trial judge, in a bench proceeding, improperly relied on certain victim impact information in sentencing the defendant to death. The evidence at issue consists of a typewritten victim impact statement prepared by the victim’s mother, Markeeter Hampton, and Hampton’s testimony at the sentencing hearing. In both her written statement and live testimony, Mrs. Hampton described how her child’s murder had affected her, and she asked the judge to sentence the defendant to death for the offense. The State does not dispute that admission of the victim impact evidence would have been barred by the subsequent decision in Booth v. Maryland (1987), 482 U.S. 496, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2529, as a violation of the eighth amendment. Notwithstanding the trial judge’s later statement that he would have sentenced the defendant to death even in the absence of the prohibited victim impact information, the majority holds that the Booth error was not harmless and that a new sentencing hearing must therefore be conducted. I respectfully disagree. As the majority opinion correctly recognizes, not every instance of Federal constitutional error in a capital sentencing hearing necessitates a new proceeding. (See Satterwhite v. Texas (1988), 486 U.S. 249, 258-59, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284, 295, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (harmless error rule applicable to erroneous introduction, at capital sentencing hearing, of evidence taken in violation of defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel); People v. Crews (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 266, 286-88 (Booth error); People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 259, 277-78 (Miller, J., specially concurring) (Booth error).) With respect to those categoties of Federal constitutional error that may be deemed harmless in an appropriate case, a new sentencing hearing is not required if the State satisfies the standard expressed in Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, and establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not affect, or contribute to, the sentencing authority’s decision. (Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 249, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 295, 108 S. Ct. at 1798; Crews, 122 Ill. 2d at 288; Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 276.) Contrary to the majority’s holding, I would conclude that the State has met that burden in the present case. Defense counsel did not object at the sentencing hearing to the introduction of the victim impact evidence, but counsel did raise the issue during the hearing on the defendant’s post-sentencing motion. At the latter hearing the following colloquy ensued: “MR. EPOCH [assistant State’s Attorney]: Judge Suria, having said those things, would it be your finding of fact at this time if Marquita [sic] Hampton had not testified in aggravation your sentence, in fact, would have been the same? THE COURT: As I have indicated before, without that testimony and without the testimony of the two prior convictions I would have still sentenced Drew Terrell to the sentence of death.” In my view, the statement made by the trial judge provides unassailable proof that the victim impact evidence did not contribute to his decision to sentence the defendant to death. Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the remarks do not show merely that the judge believed that the remaining evidence was sufficient to sustain the death penalty. Rather, the judge clearly stated that his sentencing decision would have been the same “without *** [the victim impact] testimony.” Although the judge did not expressly disclaim reliance on Mrs. Hampton’s typewritten victim impact statement, as distinguished from her victim impact testimony, substantially identical information was presented in both formats, and the defendant makes no contention that the judge’s comments may not be interpreted as applying to both. In sum, the trial judge clearly stated that the victim impact information had no effect on his decision to impose the death penalty in the present case. Applying the Chapman harmless error standard, I would conclude that the Booth violation did not contribute to the sentencing decision. The majority refuses to, accept the trial judge’s declaration that the victim impact information played no part in his decision to sentence, the defendant to death, relying instead on comments made by the judge during the sentencing hearing. Before imposing sentence the trial judge stated: “The court has reviewed all the evidence, all of the competent evidence, presented both at the trial and the death penalty hearing. I have considered the presentence investigation, the victim impact statement, the arguments of counsel, the statement of the defendant, and the exhibits, which were offered and both received during the course of the trial and during the course of the hearing.” The majority believes that the trial judge’s remarks demonstrate that the victim impact evidence did in fact contribute to the decision to impose the death penalty. I do not agree. Treating “consider” as a synonym for “rely” the majority concludes that the judge’s consideration of the victim impact information necessarily meant that the evidence affected or contributed to the sentencing decision. The remaining comments made by the judge refute such an interpretation, however. The judge also said that he had considered the arguments of counsel and the defendant’s own statement in allocution. That statement does not show what weight, if any, he assigned to the arguments, or allocution, or any of the other things cited. It is apparent that the judge meant only to express his awareness of the matters presented by the parties, and I would not construe his comments as indicating the effect that the victim impact evidence had on his decision. (Cf. People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 259 (new sentencing hearing ordered in light of statement by trial judge acknowledging that he had accorded some weight to victim impact evidence in deciding to impose the death penalty).) Contrary to the majority’s understanding, the remarks made by the judge at the sentencing hearing do not impeach his later declaration concerning the effect of the victim impact evidence. The trial judge’s statement at the post-sentencing hearing demonstrates convincingly that the victim impact evidence did not contribute to his decision to impose the death penalty in the present case. I would conclude that any error occurring in the introduction of the victim impact evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I do not believe that a new sentencing hearing is required in the present case, and I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority decision vacating the defendant’s death sentence and remanding the cause for another hearing. JUSTICE STAMOS joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.