Court Opinion

ID: 9850873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:54.598408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.938242
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
We are asked to determine, first, whether plaintiff Detroit Fire Fighters Association and its named member-officers have standing to challenge an alleged violation of the Detroit City Charter and, second, whether the executive branch of Detroit city government may unilaterally impound budget monies. We would hold that the collective bargaining unit of fire fighters does not *632have a sufficiently real and adverse interest separate from the general public to confer standing in this action. On the basis of our finding of lack of standing, we would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the second issue, and affirm with respect to the standing issue.
i
In 1989, Mayor Coleman Young submitted a written budget proposal to the Detroit City Council. The city council amended the budget to include $750,000 for a new fire department squad, whose purpose was to provide reserve manpower and to engage in certain specialized functions, such as rescue, extrication, and transport. The city council passed the amended budget, but the mayor vetoed $500,000 of the $750,000 appropriated. By a vote of eight to one the council overrode the mayoral veto, reinstating the original $750,000 appropriation. The mayor never authorized the use of the appropriation.
A number of demands were made by plaintiffs that the appropriated funds be spent, but the demands were ignored. Plaintiffs filed suit in circuit court, originally seeking injunctive relief, but later requesting a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to spend the money. During the parties’ hearing on cross motions for summary disposition, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had standing, but that the defendants were entitled to summary disposition because the mayor was not required to consult with the city council before deciding not to spend appropriated funds.1_
*633Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the issue of standing, finding that plaintiffs did not assert particularized injuries to distinguish them from the general public to such a degree that standing would be conferred against a public body and public officials. 199 Mich App 129; 501 NW2d 202 (1993). The Court of Appeals then addressed the substantive issues, stating in a footnote that "although they are now moot, . . . they are of public significance and are likely to reoccur,” id. at 131, n 1, affirming the trial court ruling that the mayor was "not required to spend the money appropriated for hiring additional fire fighters.” Id. at 133. We then granted leave to appeal.2
ii
Standing is a legal concept that focuses on whether the litigant’s interest will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. Simply demonstrating an ability to vigorously advocate does not confer standing. Rather, demonstration that a substantial interest of the litigant will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the public at large must be shown. Alexander v Norton Shores, 106 Mich App 287, 288; 307 NW2d 476 (1981). Standing does not address the ultimate merits of the substantive claims of the parties.3
There appears no quarrel that plaintiffs would have vigorously and sincerely advocated their *634cause, and the record would support that position. Where the parties disagree is on plaintiffs’ claim of standing based on membership in the fire fighters union, and in plaintiffs’ reliance on the ruling iri Muskegon Bldg & Construction Trades v Muskegon Area Intermediate School Dist, 130 Mich App 420; 343 NW2d 579 (1983).
The five individually named plaintiffs also claim residency in the City of Detroit, in addition to their union membership and status as employees of the city. However, plaintiffs’ status as city employees or Detroit residents provides them with no greater interest in these proceedings than the thousands of other city employees or millions of city residents. It is well settled that all disgruntled citizens do not automatically have standing to sue a public body. "Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where he is not hurt in any manner differently than the citizenry at large.” Waterford School Dist v State Bd of Ed, 98 Mich App 658, 662; 296 NW2d 328 (1980).
Likewise, plaintiffs’ membership in the fire fighters union does not singularly anoint them with standing to sue the defendant. Obviously the fire fighters union would like to see additional members added to their rosters, as undoubtedly would the police union, the clerical union, and the maintenance workers union, but this is not a sufficient interest to confer standing. In Saginaw Fire Fighters Ass’n Local No 422 v Police & Fire Dep’t Civil Service Comm, 71 Mich App 240; 247 NW2d 365 (1976), the Saginaw fire fighters union and the union president filed suit against the Saginaw Police and Fire Department Civil Service Commission seeking an injunction, preventing the commission from exercising a waiver-of-residency requirement for new recruits that would have given *635nonresidents an equal chance for the limited job opportunities. The Court held that the union demonstrated no special injury to its current membership and could not claim standing on the basis of speculative harm to future members. Id. at 244. In this case, none of the current Detroit fire fighters members lost their jobs as a result of the budget impoundment.
Plaintiff Detroit Fire Fighters Association alleged an increased risk of injury, emotional distress, and loss of morale and efficiency as a direct result of defendants’ impoundment of budgeted monies. These allegations were supported by expert testimony offered by plaintiffs in an arbitration hearing, and offered as an appendix to plaintiffs’ pleadings in these various proceedings.4 It is these general, "inter alia” allegations on which plaintiffs rely to demonstrate that they will be detrimentally harmed in a manner different from the citizenry at large.5 These general allegations of harm, coupled with their membership in a trade organization, cause plaintiffs to believe they are *636entitled to standing under Muskegon Bldg & Construction Trades v Muskegon Area Intermediate School Dist, supra. Plaintiffs’ belief is misplaced.
In Muskegon Trades, the plaintiffs were an association of trade organizations who filed suit to prevent the defendant school district from receiving bids or awarding contracts that did not require payment in conformity with the prevailing wage act. The plaintiffs argued that although their members did hot have a right to be awarded the bids or contracts, substantial numbers of these workers would be affected differently than the general public in that many would receive jobs on the school project, and would be paid at less than prevailing wages. The defendant school district impliedly conceded that the plaintiffs would be harmed in a manner different from the general public when it did not raise the argument as an issue to standing.6 Instead, the school district raised three other arguments against plaintiffs having standing: that as an association of trade organizations plaintiffs were incapable of being employed,7 that the associations’ statements of corporate purpose did not indicate they were formed to act as class representatives in litigation,8 and that none of the individual members of the organizations had a right to a job on the defen*637dant’s project.9 The Court in Muskegon found none of the school district’s arguments persuasive, and held that the trade organization did demonstrate an adverse effect, separate from the general public, specifically, if the prevailing wage act was upheld, substantial numbers of the association’s members would receive jobs on the school district building project. This was distinctly and wholly separate from any interest of the general public.
Defendants, on the other hand, believe the appellate decision in Rayford v Detroit, 132 Mich App 248; 347 NW2d 210 (1984) is controlling. In Rayford, plaintiff police officers attempted to bring suit under the ubaa after they lost their jobs as a result of a budget cutback instituted by the mayor without prior city council approval. The Court held that the purpose of the ubaa was "to promote uniform budgets and avoid deficit spending, not to afford security of employment,” id. at 257, and found that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under the ubaa. Though this reasoning is persuasive, it is not controlling. Factually the cases are dissimilar in that the instant case involves the Detroit City Charter, not the ubaa. Where the ubaa was designed exclusively to aid municipalities in their accounting, the Detroit City Charter is a very broad document, favoring a "strong mayor” form of government, and encompassing the "comprehensive home rule power conferred upon it by the Michigan Constitution . . . .” Detroit Charter, art 1, § 1-102. The potential areas of conflict that could arise under the charter, and that could conceivably injure a private individual in a manner different from the general public are not so remote as to *638be easily disposed of by this Court. The key inquiry should be whether the individual can show injury distinct from the general citizenry.
Contrast the harm suffered by plaintiffs in Muskegon Trades with one presently before the Court. Plaintiff fire fighters allege that they will suffer increased risk of death and risk of serious physical injury.10 As the Court of Appeals noted:
[T]his increased likelihood of physical injury is not unlike the general public’s increased likelihood of physical injury due to the lack of fire fighters. That is, it is more likely that a fire fighter who fights two hundred fires annually will be hurt than the same fire fighter who fights one hundred fires annually if only because that fire fighter is more often put at risk. But people occupying buildings that catch on fire are more likely to be injured when there are fewer fire fighters available to put out the fires. Both segments of society are at greater risk when there is a dearth of fire fighters. [199 Mich App 132-133.]
Though plaintiffs protest to this Court that the appellate ruling is an "extraordinary assertion” of probabilities, it is a logical one. We find that the harm claimed by plaintiffs is no different than that to be suffered by the general public.
hi
Although the plaintiffs have no standing to bring this action, we choose to address the substantive issue presented because it is significant to the public and likely to reoccur. In re Ford, 187 *639Mich App 452, 454; 468 NW2d 260 (1991). Therefore, we will consider whether the executive branch of the Detroit city government may unilaterally impound $750,000 appropriated by the Detroit City Council for an additional fire squad.
Generally, a mayor has only that authority which is expressly or impliedly conferred upon him by charter or by the council acting within the scope of the charter. 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed rev), § 12.43, p 249. Neither the Detroit City Charter nor the ubaa grant the mayor express authority to refuse to spend monies appropriated by the city council for a specific purpose. "[T]he common council of the city of Detroit [and likewise the mayor] must act strictly within the powers granted to it in the charter.” Thompson Scenic R Co v McCabe, 211 Mich 133, 139; 178 NW 662 (1920).
Appropriations generally cannot be diverted to any other purpose except as provided by statute or charter. 15 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed rev), § 39.69, p 233. The Detroit City Charter permits two methods by which to amend the budget after its adoption, neither of which were complied with here. Detroit City Council v Stecher, 430 Mich 74, 83; 421 NW2d 544 (1988). Section 8-210 addresses amendments made because of surpluses in revenues or public emergency.11 Section *6408-211 concerns transfers of appropriations that may be made by the council upon written request of the mayor.12 To amend the budget, the mayor must invoke either of these sections, both of which require the joint action of the mayor and the Detroit City Council.13
Thus, the Detroit City Charter contemplates a separation of powers between the executive branch —the mayor — and the legislative branch — the city council — in addressing budgetary concerns. In Stecher, supra, the Court recognized the separation of powers set forth in the charter as not being inconsistent with the ubaa and precluded the city council from unilaterally amending the mayor’s proposals to effectuate a balanced budget. Stecher, supra at 90. Just as the city council cannot make unilateral changes in the budget, the mayor cannot single-handedly alter the city council’s appropriations. To allow the mayor such power would provide a means for circumventing the legislative branch and essentially render meaningless the powers and duties granted to the city council by charter.
Additionally, although- the executive branch is granted some discretion in the expenditure of appropriated funds, it possesses no inherent constitutional power to refuse to spend in the face of clear legislative intent and statutory directive. Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agri*641cultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Local 6000 v Michigan, 194 Mich App 489, 501; 491 NW2d 855 (1992).14 Here, the ' city council clearly earmarked $750,000 of the appropriation to be used to fund an additional fire squad.15 Thus, the mayor may not use discretion as a guise for frustrating this intention. Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with regard to the issue of standing and would reverse and remand on the substantive issue.

 The trial court stated, "it seems to me that the Mayor and the City are not acting outside their authority in administering the budget as they do and I do not believe that they need to go back to Council to have Council concur when they do not spend the money.” *633Regarding the issue of standing, the trial court ruled, "I believe that the plaintiffs have the right to standing to bring this lawsuit, but I don’t believe the lawsuit itself is entitled to succeed.”

 447 Mich 987 (1994).

 Standing is a jurisdictional issue that concerns the power of a court to hear and decide a case and does not concern the ultimate merits of the underlying substantive issues of the action. Weiner v Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F Supp 684, 695 (ED Pa, 1973).

 Plaintiffs’ expert, John Devine, is a former fire fighter and officer in the Washington D.C. Fire Department. Mr. Devine based a number of his statements on his perusal of a bulletin prepared in 1971 by the Detroit Fire Commission which recommended "squad companies,” such as those included in the budgeted monies at issue in the instant case. Mr. Devine agreed with the statement from the Fire Commission bulletin that adding squad companies, i.e. adding additional fire fighters, “would reduce the workload on the fire fighters.”

 Plaintiffs’ alleged in their complaint that they would suffer "irreparable injury including, inter alia, increased risk of death and risk of serious physical injury; risk of serious emotional distress; and harm to morale and efficiency of plaintiff dffa’s members . . . .” See Kaminskas v Detroit, 68 Mich App 499; 243 NW2d 25 (1976), in which the Court held that broad-gauge, conclusory, "inter alia” allegations, without particularized assertions injuries in fact are not sufficient to confer standing in an action against public bodies and public officials. See also Menendez v Detroit, 337 Mich 476; 60 NW2d 319 (1953), in which the Court held that mere allegations of injury without specific facts showing actual injury or damage will not confer standing.

 MCR 2.111(F)(2). Defenses must be pleaded.

 Defendant relied on White Lake Improvement Ass’n v City of Whitehall, 22 Mich App 262, 271-274; 177 NW2d 473 (1970), in which the Court of Appeals held that although the association itself owned no property that was affected by the alleged nuisance, the sole purpose of the association was to represent the interests of its members, many of whom were riparian landowners on the subject lake.

 Defendant school district cited Michigan Licensed Beverage Ass’n v Behnan Hall, Inc, 82 Mich App 319; 266 NW2d 808 (1978), in which the Court of Appeals found that the association’s statement of corporate purpose did not indicate that it was formed to act as a class representative in litigation, and thus could not assume that role.

 Defendant school district’s authority was Kaminskas v Detroit, supra, in which associations representing city employees sought an injunction to prevent the city from hiring provisional employees, allegedly in violation of the city charter. The Court held that the associations failed to allege a specific injury to any of their members.

 Interestingly, none of the pleadings indicate any specific instances of increased death, injury, emotional distress or loss of morale and efficiency, despite the passage of almost one year from the time the monies were impounded and the plaintiff's’ motion for summary disposition was heard by the trial court. The pleadings were amended once, in the interim, but not to include additional allegations of harm.

 Sec. 8-210. Amendments after adoption.
1. If during the fiscal year the mayor advises the city council that there are available for appropriation revenues in excess of those estimated in the budget, the city council may make supplemental appropriations for the year up to the amount of the excess.
2. To meet a public emergency affecting life, health, property or the public peace, the city council may make emergency appropriations. To the extent that there are no available unappropriated revenues to meet those appropriations, the city council may authorize the issuance of emergency notes as provided by law, this charter or ordinance.

 Sec. 8-211. Transfer of appropriations.
At any time during the fiscal year upon written request by the mayor, the city council may, by resolution, transfer all or part of any unencumbered appropriation balance among the programs, services or activities within an agency or from one agency to another.

 Even if amending the budget for deficit reduction purposes, the mayor must still seek council approval under the city charter as well as the ubaa. Detroit City Council v Detroit Mayor, 202 Mich App 353, 355; 509 NW2d 797 (1993).

 In Int’l Union, the Court of Appeals held that the Governor could not refuse to spend funds that had been specifically appropriated to the Department of Mental Health for Lafayette Clinic. Id. at 501-502.

 Defendant argues that when the city council reorganized all appropriations to the fire department and renumbered the appropriation entitled "Fire Fighting Division Operations,” it failed to earmark any part of the appropriation as designated for an additional fire squad. The city council, however, never changed the amount allocated to "Fire Fighting Division Operations”; it only changed the number given to the appropriation from 0064 to 0718. Thus, it remains clear that the council intended $750,000 of the appropriation to be used for an additional fire squad.