Court Opinion

ID: 9482466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:51:31.050194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:01.210464
License: Public Domain

MINER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. It seems to me that no punishment of any kind is imposed by the Supplementary Extradition Treaty and that the Treaty therefore cannot be classified as a bill of attainder. The constitutional provision upon which this case turns prohibits the national legislature from passing any laws, “no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.” United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1079, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946) (emphasis supplied). Requiring a person to submit to a proceeding to determine whether he should be extradited to another country to face charges at a trial which may result in punishment can hardly be considered punishment without trial in this country. It is notable that in this case the extradition proceeding would be surrounded by the usual panoply of due process protections, including a hearing, and that in the event of extradition the demanding country would provide a trial (and punishment, if warranted) in the common law tradition from which our own criminal justice system is derived.
My distinguished colleagues apply the prescribed tests to determine whether the Supplementary Treaty punishes Mr. McMullen for bill of attainder purposes and come up with a conclusion somewhat different from mine. We agree that there is no punishment in terms of the “historic” test — “punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause,” Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 475, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2806, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977). Included in the “traditional” category are the legislative penalties of “imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign.” Id. at 474, 97 S.Ct. at 2806. To this list have been added more modern forms of punishment by legislation: “enactments] barring designated individuals ... from participation in specified employments or vocations.” Id. See, e.g., Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (preventing payment of salaries to three federal employees believed to be subversive); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) (denying labor union employment to members of Communist party).
The Treaty does not impose punishment under the “functional” test either. This test calls for an “analysis of] whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-76, 97 S.Ct. at 2806-07. It is therefore necessary to identify legitimate legislative purposes in order to avoid a conclusion “that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of the decisionmakers.” Id. at 476, 97 S.Ct. at 2807. The original decisionmaker here, of course, was the President of the United States, who concluded the Supplementary Treaty in the performance of his constitutional treaty making powers. It seems clear that his purpose was to strengthen relations with an important ally and to fur*770ther the United States policy of combatting international terrorism. According to the State Department, the wisdom of narrowing the political offense exception found in the earlier treaty was underscored by recent events involving American victims of terrorist acts. Although the names of McMullen and others were mentioned during the Senate ratification debate, can there be any doubt that the Senate’s purpose was the same as the President’s?
My colleagues "do not dispute that the general purpose of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty was non-punitive.” Slip op. at 767. However, they find that the Senate had an “ulterior motive” to punish McMullen, that the burdens imposed on McMullen outweighed the non-punitive purpose and that “aiding Great Britain in reaching its goal of punishing McMullen would be punitive.” Id. at 767. It is difficult to understand how the ulterior motive supposedly expressed by the Senate during the ratification debate can be attributed to the President who negotiated the treaty. In any event, it seems certain that the principal purpose of both the President and the Senate was to effect non-punitive foreign relations policy. That an incidental by-product of this purpose ultimately may be the punishment of McMullen should not convert the Treaty into a bill of attainder. It is a simple fact that the Treaty imposes no penalty or punishment but merely provides a mechanism for the transfer of McMullen to Great Britain for trial.
The third test of punishment “inquir[es] whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish” and therefore is denominated the “motivational” test. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478, 97 S.Ct. at 2808. As to this test, first of all, it seems to me that an inquiry must be made as to Presidential motivation as well as to Senatorial motivation, because the Treaty here is a joint product of the exercise of the constitutional powers of both the executive and legislative branches of government. Certainly, there is no evidence whatsoever that there was any Presidential intent to punish McMullen. Nor can there be discerned a congressional intent to punish in the remarks of but one Senator who discussed the Treaty’s application to McMul-len and two others. Even if it were assumed that Senator Lugar spoke for the entire Senate when he said of the Treaty that “[i]ts purpose is to reverse the three cases where extradition was denied,” the ratification did not express an intent to punish but rather an intent to extradite the three individuals.
Although punishment may follow extradition, extradition never has been classified as punishment. United States v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 769, 47 S.Ct. 572, 71 L.Ed. 883 (1927). The role of the extradition judge is “to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial.” Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S.Ct. 469, 472, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922). At issue in the proceeding “is not punishability but prosecutability.” Bas-siouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 524 (1974). If on a hearing the extradition judge deems the evidence sufficient under the Treaty, he is required to so certify to the Secretary of State, “that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of [the] foreign government, for the surrender of [the] person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention.” 18 U.S.C. § 3184. McMullen has not as yet had his extradition hearing under the Supplementary Treaty. There are a number of issues that he is entitled to raise at the hearing, including whether the “request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.” Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Art. 3(a). Even if he is unsuccessful in any of the defenses that he may raise to extradition, McMullen will not be subject to punishment until he is tried and convicted in Great Britain after his surrender. Because this is so, the Treaty cannot be a bill of attainder, and I am compelled to dissent from any opinion that says it is.