Court Opinion

ID: 7805874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-02 07:11:05.101304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:07.009426
License: Public Domain

In The

                            Court of Appeals

                 Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                           __________________

                          NO. 09-20-00254-CR
                           __________________

               RANDY LYNN RASPBERRY, Appellant

                                    V.

                   THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 359th District Court
                  Montgomery County, Texas
                 Trial Cause No. 90-06-00640-CR
__________________________________________________________________

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

     In 1991, pursuant to a plea agreement, the then presiding judge of

the 359th District Court found Randy Lynn Raspberry guilty of sexual

assault, a second-degree felony. 1 Around nineteen-years later, Raspberry

filed a petition seeking an exemption in that same court from the sex

offender registration requirements of Articles 62.251 and 62.301 of the

     1Tex.   Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(f).
                                    1
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 2 We dismiss the appeal because we

lack jurisdiction over the appeal.

     In a criminal case, the right to appeal is a statutory right that may

not be enlarged by the courts. 3 Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a

“a defendant in any criminal action has the right to appeal under the

rules hereinafter prescribed.” 4 Generally, defendants have the right to

appeal from final judgments. 5 Here, Raspberry appeals from a ruling

denying his petition asking for an exemption from the registration

requirements applicable to convicted sex offenders; he has not appealed

from a final judgment. But absent a statute authorizing a defendant to

appeal from an order denying a petition seeking an exemption like the

exemption Raspberry wanted, there is no legislative grant to the

appellate courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over the ruling from which

Raspberry appeals. 6

     2Tex.   Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.251, 62.301.
       3Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
       4Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02.
       5State v. Sellers, 790 S.W.2d 316, 321 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990);

Wright v. State, 969 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.).
       6Dewalt v. State, 417 S.W.3d 678, 686 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet.

ref’d); Ex parte McGregor, 145 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004);
Phillips v. State, No. 09-04-414-CR, 2005 WL 857034, at *1 (Tex. App.—
                                     2
     Because no statute provides appellate courts with jurisdiction over

the ruling Raspberry appeals, we hold that we lack subject-matter

jurisdiction over the trial court’s ruling. The appeal is

     DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

                                                     PER CURIAM

Submitted on March 2, 2022
Opinion Delivered August 31, 2022
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

Beaumont Apr. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem op., not designated for
publication).
                             3