Court Opinion

ID: 9411973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:03:57.452003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:21.831163
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60669        Document: 00516837756             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/28/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                FILED
                                                                             July 28, 2023
                                      No. 22-60669                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                             Clerk
                                    ____________

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Dylan Cole Bloodsworth,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 1:20-CR-30-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Dylan Cole Bloodsworth was convicted in 2011 for sexual abuse of a
   child and enticement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(a), 2422(b). He was
   released on supervision in January 2020. His supervision was revoked after
   he violated its terms, and he was sentenced in March 2021 to additional
   imprisonment.        He was again released on supervision in July 2022.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60669      Document: 00516837756          Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/28/2023

                                    No. 22-60669

   Revocation proceedings commenced once more in November 2022, and
   Bloodsworth admitted the allegations in the revocation petition.
          He appeals the 24-month aggregate term of imprisonment imposed
   upon that second revocation, maintaining the above-policy-statement
   sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court treated
   the seriousness of his underlying offense and need for rehabilitation as
   dominant factors in determining the length of his sentence. He further claims
   the special condition of supervised release requiring his participation in a
   community-corrections program is not reasonably related to the 18 U.S.C.
   § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
          We assume, without deciding, that Bloodsworth’s substantive-
   reasonableness challenge was preserved.         Accordingly, we review his
   sentence to determine whether it is “plainly unreasonable”. United States v.
   Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011). A revocation sentence is plainly
   unreasonable “if it (1) does not account for a factor that should have received
   significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper
   factor, or (3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing
   factors”. United States v. Cano, 981 F.3d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation
   omitted).
          When imposing a revocation sentence, the court may not consider the
   factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A), including the need for the sentence to
   reflect the seriousness of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Cano, 981 F.3d at
   425–26.     Nor should it consider the need to promote an offender’s
   rehabilitation. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 321, 334–35 (2011);
   United States v. Walker, 742 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2014). A court’s
   considering an improper factor, however, does not automatically require
   reversal.   Rather, “a sentencing error occurs when an impermissible
   consideration is a dominant factor in the court’s revocation sentence, but not

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Case: 22-60669      Document: 00516837756          Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/28/2023

                                    No. 22-60669

   when it is merely a secondary concern or an additional justification for the
   sentence”. United States v. Rivera, 784 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 2015).
          The district court considered the nature and circumstances of
   Bloodsworth’s offense and revocation violations and expressly stated it
   imposed the 24-month sentence to deter criminal conduct and protect the
   public, both permissible considerations. See § 3583(e); § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C).
   Although in making these findings the court referenced the facts of the
   underlying offense and noted Bloodsworth failed to avail himself of
   opportunities to obtain needed treatment, the record does not reflect the
   court based the sentence on the seriousness of the offense or Bloodsworth’s
   rehabilitative needs, much less that either consideration was a dominant
   factor in determining the sentence. See United States v. Sanchez, 900 F.3d
   678, 683–85 (5th Cir. 2018); Rivera, 784 F.3d at 1017; Walker, 742 F.3d at
   616. Bloodsworth fails to show his sentence was plainly unreasonable. See
   Miller, 634 F.3d at 843.
          Bloodsworth’s challenge to the community-corrections special
   condition is reviewed only for plain error because he did not object to the
   condition when the court orally pronounced it, see United States v. Alvarez,
   880 F.3d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 2018), and his contentions in district court failed
   to “reasonably inform[]” it of the legal error he asserts on appeal, United
   States v. Zarco-Beiza, 24 F.4th 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
          Under § 3583(d), conditions of supervised release must be
   “reasonably related” to one of the appropriate factors set forth in § 3553(a).
   § 3583(d)(1); see § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D). The court errs by imposing a
   special condition without explaining its reasons where there is no evidence in
   the record supporting the need for the condition. See, e.g., Alvarez, 880 F.3d
   at 239; United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2015).

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Case: 22-60669      Document: 00516837756          Page: 4    Date Filed: 07/28/2023

                                    No. 22-60669

            The court explained that it imposed the community-corrections
   condition to afford Bloodsworth “the opportunity to reside in a stable and
   drug-free environment with the opportunity for steady employment and
   intensive supervision as a transition from incarceration to his term of
   supervision in the community”. Contrary to Bloodsworth’s assertions, his
   history of substance abuse and his difficulty securing long-term employment
   during a prior period of supervision supported the court’s reasoning.
   Moreover, Bloodsworth’s behavior during his release period demonstrated
   he: had difficulty complying with his supervised release conditions; and
   could pose a danger to society. Further, Bloodsworth and his counsel
   stressed to the court he needed counseling and therapy; and there is no
   indication the community-corrections program would be unable to facilitate
   such treatment. Bloodsworth fails to show that the imposition of the
   community-corrections special condition was, under the plain-error standard
   of review, a requisite clear-or-obvious error. See Puckett v. United States, 556
   U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Daniel, 933 F.3d 370, 383–84 (5th Cir.
   2019).
            AFFIRMED.

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