Court Opinion

ID: 9727598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:44:30.717864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:40.577385
License: Public Domain

SPENCER, P. J.
I respectfully dissent. It is well established that a statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of *1002which it is a part in order to harmonize and give effect to the entirety. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 43, 53 [152 Cal.Rptr. 153]; Tidewater Oil Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 950, 956 [137 Cal.Rptr. 36].) Accordingly, this court should look to the entire body of law dealing with dismissals and rights of appeal—not only those Penal Code sections enacted and amended per Assembly Bill No. 2383, but the interrelation of those sections with section 1538.5.
Penal Code section 1538.5 was originally enacted in 1967. (Stats. 1967, ch. 1537, § 1, p. 3652.) Subdivision (m) provides that, “[t]he proceedings provided for in this section, Section 995, Section 1238, and Section 1466 shall constitute the sole and exclusive remedies prior to conviction to test the unreasonableness of a search or seizure ....” No subdivision of section 1538.5 gives the People a right to appeal a magistrate’s order suppressing evidence. Instead, subdivision (j) states that if the defendant thereafter is not held to answer, “the people may file a new complaint or seek an indictment after the preliminary hearing, and the ruling at the prior hearing shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding . ...” In contrast, subdivision (j) grants the People the right to appeal an order granting a suppression motion in a misdemeanor matter and subdivision (/) permits appeal pursuant to section 1238 from a dismissal under section 1385 following the granting of a motion to suppress at a special hearing in the superior court. These subdivisions remain unchanged since the original enactment of section 1538.5.
Simultaneously with the enactment of section 1538.5, the Legislature added subdivision (a) 7 to section 1238 (Stats. 1967, ch. 1537, § 3, p. 3657), which accorded the People the right to appeal “[.f]rom an order" dismissing a case prior to trial made upon motion of the court pursuant to Section 1385 whenever such order is based upon an order granting defendant’s motion to .. . suppress property or evidence made at a special hearing as provided in this code.” In 1970, the Legislature added subdivision (c) to section 1238 (Stats. 1970, ch. 1289, § 1, p. 2380), providing that, in the above circumstances, “the court may review the order granting defendant’s motion to . .. suppress evidence ....”; thus reinforcing the exclusivity of section 1538.5.
Thereafter, Cash v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 226 [110 Cal.Rptr. 612] affirmed the exclusive operation of section 1538.5, hold*1003ing that the People could not circumvent the limitations of section 1538.5 by invoking section 1466 to seek review of a magistrate’s order granting a defendant’s suppression motion in the appellate department of the superior court. (Id., at p. 232; see also People v. Belknap (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1025 [116 Cal.Rptr. 664]; People v. Randall (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 972, 977 [111 Cal.Rptr. 590].) The Cash court recognized the multiple-appeal effect of permitting the People to appeal a magistrate’s suppression order, an effect which remains operative today. If a magistrate denies a suppression motion in a felony matter, the defendant may renew the motion at a special hearing in the superior court (§ 1538.5, subd. (i)); therefore, were the People to be accorded the right to appeal to the superior court an order granting the motion, either under section 871.5 or section 1466, a decision overruling the order of the magistrate would be effectively nullified in any instance where the defendant invoked subdivision (i). (35 Cal.App.3d at p. 230.) Hence Cash concluded that “[i]n the absence of express statutory authority, . .. the Legislature did not intend to twice give the People the benefit of appellate review of a pretrial motion in the same case. We think the Legislature recognized that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be wasteful of judicial time as well as costly and oppressive to a defendant.” (Id., at p. 231.)
The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing judicial decisions and to have amended and enacted statutes in light thereof. (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 839 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874]; People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691, 705 [51 Cal.Rptr. 417, 414 P.2d 633].) Neither section 871.5 nor section 1466 nor section 1538.5 contain express authority for the multiple-appeal process which would result from the People’s right to challenge a magistrate’s order granting a suppression motion. To infer such authority ignores a consistent course of legislative response to decisional law and effectively renders subdivision (m) of section 1538.5 a nullity. Such a construction of section 871.5, where an alternative construction is available, is to be avoided. (See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 43, 53.) Moreover, section 871.5 is very limited in scope—far more so than the general appeal statutes, sections 1466 and 1238; the superior court’s scope of review is limited to a determination of the validity, as a matter of law, of the magistrate’s ground for dismissal. An order granting a suppression motion may give rise to a ground for dismissal but will never, in itself, constitute a ground for dismissal. Accordingly, the majority’s construction of section *1004871.5 represents an expansion of the statute more properly left to the Legislature.1
Petitioners’ application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 22, 1982. Bird, C. J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.

I note with interest that Judge Leetham had the authority to reinstate the complaint apart from review of the motion to suppress evidence. There is authority for the proposition that a dismissal pursuant to Penal Code section 871 is not an available remedy where proofs have not been offered. (Coleman v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 431 [172 Cal.Rptr. 135]; Simmons v. Municipal Court (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 15 [167 Cal.Rptr. 608], However, in view of section 871.5’s language allowing the defendant to be restored to the status quo, the unavailability of section 1538.5 review would result in a pro forma reinstatement, simply allowing the magistrate to properly dismiss pursuant to section 1385.