Court Opinion

ID: 9391421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 13:03:36.232579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.120994
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: May 2, 2023

               S23A0022, S23A0023. SESSION v. THE STATE.

         PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

        In these companion appeals, Derrick Session challenges his

convictions for failure to register as a sex offender in Georgia based

on a conviction he received in Louisiana. He argues that the

evidence was insufficient to support his Georgia convictions. He also

argues that the Georgia registration statute as applied to him

violates his federal rights to travel and equal protection, and he

raises a facial challenge to the registration statute under the

Georgia constitutional prohibition against legislation regarding the

social status of citizens.

        After thorough consideration, we reject those arguments. First,

Session has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to support

his convictions, because he has conceded that the only argument as
to sufficiency that he made in his primary appellate brief — that the

convictions violated ex post facto principles — is at odds with

controlling case law. Next, his arguments that the registration

statute violated his federal rights to travel and to equal protection

fail because they are based on the unduly speculative assumption

that if he had committed the underlying sexual offense in Georgia,

he would have been convicted of only a misdemeanor and thus not

subject to registration. And finally, although Session makes an

interesting argument that Georgia’s constitutional prohibition

against legislation regarding citizens’ social status must mean

something different than the repugnantly racist — and patently

unconstitutional — meaning that this Court ascribed to it shortly

after its first adoption in 1868, he has not shown that any different

meaning that provision has today is inconsistent with the

requirements of the Georgia sexual offender registry. We therefore

affirm.

     1.   Background.

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence

                                 2
admitted at trial — much of which came from Louisiana court

documents or stipulated facts — was as follows. In May 1994,

Session was indicted in Louisiana for the aggravated rape of a four-

year-old child. Session was 15 years old at the time of the alleged

offense. On May 18, 1995, Session entered a plea of guilty to an

amended charge of sexual battery. The Louisiana trial court

accepted that plea and, at a hearing on August 15, 1995, sentenced

Session to ten years to serve at hard labor. In 2004, after completing

his sentence, Session received a first-offender pardon pursuant to

Louisiana R.S. 15:572.

     At some point, Session moved to Texas. Session later moved to

Paulding County and registered on the Georgia sex offender registry

(“the Registry”) with the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office in April

2017. In March 2019, a detective conducted a residence check at a

Dallas, Georgia, address that Session had provided to the Paulding

County Sheriff’s Office, and was told that Session was not living

there. Session, who was living in Kennesaw at the time, was

arrested for failure to register. He appeared at the Paulding County

                                  3
Sheriff’s Office in March 2020 to update his registration; he

apparently was arrested while completing his paperwork.

     On October 28, 2020, a Paulding County grand jury returned

two separate indictments against Session, each charging him with

two counts of failure to register as a sex offender under OCGA § 42-

1-12, with one indictment alleging violations in March 2019 and the

other alleging violations in February and/or March 2020. Session

filed an identical general demurrer and plea in bar in each case. In

those filings, Session demurred generally to all counts in the

indictments as failing to charge him with a crime and argued that

his prior first-offender pardon barred the Paulding County

prosecution. 1 He also “demur[red] to the Registry as-applied to his

case” on three federal constitutional grounds. First, he argued that

the Registry violated his fundamental right to travel under the

Privileges and Immunities Clause by treating him worse than a

native Georgian, because the conduct that was the basis for his

     1 On appeal, Session does not rely on the first-offender pardon received
from Louisiana in seeking reversal of his Georgia convictions.
                                     4
underlying offense would have constituted a misdemeanor not

subject to registration if committed in Georgia. Second, he argued

that the application of the Registry to him violated the Equal

Protection Clause by distinguishing between in-state and out-of-

state convictions. Third, he argued that his due process rights had

been violated by lack of notice that he would have to register, given

that he was a minor at the time of the offense, was convicted of

something that would be a misdemeanor in Georgia, and was

pardoned by Louisiana. Apart from his as-applied federal

constitutional challenges, Session also raised facial and as-applied

challenges to the Registry under Paragraph XXV of the Georgia Bill

of Rights, which provides, “The social status of a citizen shall never

be the subject of legislation.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par.

XXV.

     The case proceeded to a bench trial of both cases in July 2022;

the trial court received both stipulated facts and evidence. In his

closing argument, Session argued that OCGA § 42-1-12 violated the

United States Constitution, as applied to him, and the Georgia

                                   5
Constitution, both facially and as applied. The trial court orally

denied Session’s demurrer and plea in bar in each case and

adjudicated him guilty on all counts (except for one count that the

State nolle prossed). The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 20

years, to serve five in confinement, with the incarceration time to be

suspended, conditioned upon Session paying $6,000 in fines within

six months and fully complying with the registration requirements

of the sex offender statute. Session filed timely notices of appeal.

    2.    Session has not shown that the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions.

     Because “[w]e do not unnecessarily decide the constitutionality

of statutes,” In the Interest of C.C., 314 Ga.446, 451 (2) (a) (877 SE2d

555) (2022), we consider first Session’s argument that the evidence

was insufficient to support his convictions. We conclude that Session

has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions.

     When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
                                   6
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d

560) (1979) (emphasis omitted).

     Similar to appeals from a jury trial resulting in a criminal
     conviction, on appeal from a bench trial, we view all
     evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
     verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the
     presumption of innocence. We do not re-weigh testimony,
     determine witness credibility, or address assertions of
     conflicting evidence.

Jones v. State, 307 Ga. 505, 506 (1) (837 SE2d 288) (2019) (citation

and punctuation omitted). “On appeal, it is the defendant’s burden

to show that the trial evidence was insufficient as a matter of

constitutional due process to support his convictions.” Charles v.

State, 315 Ga. 651, 653 (2) (884 SE2d 363) (2023); see also Davis v.

State, 312 Ga. 870, 873 (1) n.2 (866 SE2d 390) (2021) (affirming a

defendant’s convictions where his “only” sufficiency argument

lacked merit and he “ha[d] not otherwise shown that the evidence

supporting the child cruelty convictions was insufficient as a matter

of constitutional due process”).

      [T]he provisions of OCGA § 42-1-12 require that

                                   7
     convicted sex offenders falling within its purview provide
     a substantial amount of personal information, including
     name, social security number, age, detailed physical
     description, fingerprints, photograph, date and place of
     employment, and vehicle identification, to the sheriff of
     the county of his residence. OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (16); (f)
     (2). After initially registering in person, the offender must
     renew registration in person once a year, OCGA § 42-1-12
     (f) (4), and update the sheriff within 72 hours of any
     change to the required information. OCGA § 42-1-12 (f)
     (5). These requirements must be complied with until
     death, except for periods of subsequent incarceration.
     OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (6). This information is maintained
     and made accessible to the public by the Georgia Bureau
     of Investigation and the relevant county sheriff, OCGA §
     42-1-12 (h), (i), and submitted to “each school in this
     state.” OCGA § 42-1-12 (l). And violation of the
     requirements of this Code section constitutes a felony
     punishable by up to 30 years imprisonment. OCGA § 42-
     1-12 (n) (1).

State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684, 690 (2) (814 SE2d 701) (2018).

     The State in this case charged Session with failing to register

in violation of OCGA § 42-1-12 (n). The indictments of Session

alleged that he was required to register “pursuant to the provisions

of OCGA 42-1-12 (e) by virtue of having previously been convicted of

the offense of Sexual Battery on August 15, 1995 in the Parish of

Franklin, Louisiana, said offense being a criminal offense against a

victim who is a minor and having been placed on supervised release
                                  8
on August 15, 1995[.]” OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) lists several categories of

persons for whom registration is required. The State provides two

alternative bases on which Session was required to register: the

registration requirement for any individual who “[h]as previously

been convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor

and may be released from prison or placed on parole, supervised

release, or probation on or after July 1, 1996[,]” OCGA § 42-1-12 (e)

(3), and the registration requirement for any individual who “is a

nonresident who changes residence from another state . . . to Georgia

who is required to register as a sexual offender under the laws of

another state or territory[,]” OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6). Whether or not

the evidence supports a conclusion that Session was required to

register pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (3), we conclude that

Session has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to support

a conclusion that he was required to register pursuant to OCGA §

42-1-12 (e) (6).

     Louisiana law requires (and required at the time that Session

allegedly failed to register in Georgia, as well as at the time of

                                 9
Session’s underlying offense) registration by any adult residing in

the state who had been convicted of a “sex offense.” La. R.S. 15:542

(A) (1) (a); La. R.S. 15:542 (A) (1992). The statute explicitly defines

“sex offense” as including the crime of sexual battery, and it did so

at the time that Session allegedly failed to register in Georgia. See

La. R.S. 15:541 (24) (a) (2018). The crime of sexual battery also fell

within the Louisiana registration statute’s definition of a “sex

offense” at the time of the underlying crime and at the time of

sentencing for sexual battery in Louisiana. See La. R.S. 15:542 (E)

(1995); La. R.S. 15:544 (E) (1992). At the time of Session’s

underlying offense, as well as when he was sentenced for sexual

battery, the Louisiana registration statute required those subject to

the statute to register for ten years after their release from prison.

See La. R.S. 15:544 (A) (1995); La. R.S. 15:544 (A) (1992). The

Louisiana legislature in 2007 extended that requirement to 15

years, with a 25-year registration requirement for those “convicted

of a sexual offense of a victim who is a minor” and a lifetime

registration requirement for certain other offenders. See 2007 La.

                                  10
Acts, No. 460, § 2 (effective Jan. 1, 2008). Under this amendment,

sexual battery was (and is) generally included in the definition of

“sexual offense against a victim who is a minor” when the victim is

under the age of 18. See id.; see also La. R.S. 15:541 (25) (a). The

State takes the position here that because Louisiana required

Session to register for 25 years, he thus has been required to register

in Louisiana (were he to move back to that state) since the time that

he moved to Georgia, and so he has been required to register in

Georgia pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6).

     On appeal, Session argues that he was not required to register

pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6) because extending his Louisiana

registration requirement via an enactment after the commission of

his underlying offense would constitute an impermissible ex post

facto law. But the Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected the notion

that lengthening a registrant’s registration period violates ex post

facto principles as a matter of both federal and Louisiana

constitutional law, at least where the change was made during the

registrant’s original reporting period. See Smith v. State, 84 S3d

                                  11
487, 497-499 (La. 2012); see also State v. Clark, 117 S3d 1246, 1248

(La. 2013) (noting Section 6 of 2007 La. Acts 460 specifically

provided that “[t]he provisions of this Act shall apply to all persons

convicted of a sex offense or a criminal offense against a victim who

is a minor . . . regardless of the date of conviction, with the exception

of those persons required to register under previous provisions of

law whose obligations to register have been fulfilled and

extinguished by operation of law”). This is consistent with similar

rulings by this Court and the United States Supreme Court. See

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-106 (123 SCt 1140, 155 LE2d 164)

(2003) (statutory requirement for retroactive registration of sex

offenders was “nonpunitive” and did not itself constitute an ex post

facto law); Frazier v. State, 284 Ga. 638, 640 (1) (668 SE2d 646)

(2008) (rejecting argument that sexual offender registration

requirement in conjunction with criminal penalty provision enacted

after appellant’s underlying conviction violates state and federal

prohibitions of ex post facto laws). Session’s counsel conceded at oral

argument that Session’s ex post facto argument cannot succeed.

                                   12
     Except to say that he could not alternatively be required to

register in Georgia by virtue of a requirement that he register in

Texas, this ex post facto argument about the Louisiana statutory

change was the only argument that Session raised in his primary

appellate brief as to why the State had not shown that he was

required to register under OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6). And the only

argument that Session made as to why the evidence was insufficient

to support his failure-to-register convictions was that the State had

not shown that he was required to register under either OCGA § 42-

1-12 (e) (3) or OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6).

     At oral argument before this Court, Session tried to pivot to an

argument different from that which he made in his brief, arguing

that the State had not presented sufficient evidence that he was still

required to register in Louisiana when he moved to Georgia, even

assuming that the 2007 legislative change could apply to him

consistent with ex post facto principles. Session expounds on that

argument in a supplemental brief filed after oral argument. But this

argument is nowhere contained in Session’s primary brief before

                                  13
this Court. And “[i]t is improper to use a supplemental brief to

expand upon the issues to be decided by this Court.” Saint v.

Williams, 287 Ga. 746, 747 (2) (699 SE2d 312) (2010).

     And even if the tack that Session took at oral argument and

the brief that followed is theoretically within the bounds of the

(rather broad) enumeration of error stated in his brief — “The Trial

Court Erred in Convicting Session because the Registry Statute did

not Apply to Him” — it is not reasonably so. The argument Session

made at oral argument as to why the State had not proven that he

was required to register under OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6) raises at least

one question (whether his Louisiana conviction constitutes a “sexual

offense against a victim who is a minor” triggering Louisiana’s 25-

year registration term) that is nowhere addressed in Session’s

primary appellate brief. We require appellants to file a principal

brief by a certain date, and we dismiss appeals of appellants who fail

to file briefs. See Supreme Court Rule 10. And we require all

enumerated errors to be supported by argument or citation of

authority; otherwise, the enumeration will be deemed abandoned.

                                 14
See Supreme Court Rule 22.

      Here, Session timely filed a brief containing enumerations of

error supported by argument and citation of authorities. But his

brief contained no argument or citation of authority in support of the

argument that he makes now. To consider this completely different

issue, raised at oral argument for the first time, would render our

rules a dead letter, and we will not allow that. Cf. Cox v. U.S.

Markets, Inc., 278 Ga. App. 287, 291 (4) (628 SE2d 701) (2006) (“One

cannot expand the scope of review or supply additional issues

through a process of switching, shifting, and mending your hold.”

(citation and punctuation omitted)). 2 Having conceded the only basis

on which he made a claim supported by argument and citation of

authority in his primary appellate brief as to why he did not need to

register pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6), Session has not shown

that the evidence was insufficient to support his Georgia

convictions.

      2 Apparently, the phrase “mend the hold” is a nineteenth-century
wrestling term, meaning to get a better grip on one’s opponent. See Harbor Ins.
Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1990).
                                      15
     3.    Session has not shown that requiring him to register
violates his federal rights to travel and equal protection.

     Session raises two federal constitutional arguments, arguing

that applying the registration requirement to him violates his right

to travel and his equal protection rights. We conclude that Session

has not shown a violation of these federal rights.

     (a)   Right to travel.

     The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment protects the right to travel, which includes “the right of

a citizen of one State to enter and leave another State . . . , and, for

those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right

to be treated like other citizens of that State.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S.

489, 500-504 (119 SCt 1518, 143 LE2d 689) (1999).

     Session argues that requiring him to register violates his right

to travel because he is being treated differently than he would be

had the underlying crime in question been committed in Georgia, as

he would not have been required to register had he been convicted

of sexual battery in Georgia. The Registry statute exempts “a

conviction for a misdemeanor” from the definition of “a criminal
                                  16
offense against a victim who is a minor.” OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (9) (C).

The Louisiana offense of which Session was convicted, sexual

battery, is a felony. See La. R.S. 14:43.1 (C) (1991); see also La. R.S.

14:2 (4) (1992) (defining “felony” as “any crime for which an offender

may be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor”). But at

the time that Session committed his underlying offense in

Louisiana, Georgia treated sexual battery as a misdemeanor. See

OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (c) (1990).3

      None of the United States Supreme Court decisions on which

Session relies for his right-to-travel claim involved an argument

that a new state resident’s right to travel is being burdened by a sex

offender registration requirement on the basis that, if he had

committed the crime in his new state, he would have been treated

differently in the underlying criminal case, and thereby not be

required to register. Rather, these cases involved public benefits

schemes that allocated benefits differently depending on how long a

      3 Today, by contrast, the statute provides that a person convicted of the
offense of sexual battery of a child under the age of 16 years is guilty of a felony.
See OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (d).
                                         17
person had been residing in the state. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-

507 (state statute limiting welfare benefits through recipient’s first

year of residency to the amount payable by the State of the

recipient’s prior residence violated Fourteenth Amendment right to

travel); Hooper v. Bernalilo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 n.6,

622-623 (105 SCt 2862, 86 LE2d 487) (1985) (applying equal-

protection analysis to conclude that state statute that granted tax

exemption limited to those Vietnam veterans who resided in the

state before a certain date violated newer residents’ right to travel);

see also Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (105 SCt 2465, 86

LE2d 11) (1985) (finding it unnecessary to consider appellants’

arguments based on right to travel).

     Here, the Registry does distinguish between “residents” and

“nonresidents.” See OCGA § 42-1-12 (e). It treats persons with

foreign convictions differently depending on whether the convict is

a Georgia resident, a new resident, or a nonresident who enters the

state for significant periods of time for employment, schooling, or

other purposes. See id. In particular, the statute requires

                                  18
registration by those convicted of certain crimes on or after July 1,

1996, or those who are convicted of such crimes and who “may be

released from prison or placed on parole, supervised release, or

probation on or after July 1, 1996.” OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (1)-(4). A

resident of Georgia convicted of certain crimes under the laws of

another jurisdiction on or after certain dates is required to register.

See OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (5). On the other hand, a nonresident who

moves to Georgia who is required to register in another jurisdiction,

as well as “a nonresident sexual offender” who visits the state for

certain purposes for certain lengths of time, may be required to

register, irrespective of when the underlying conviction was entered,

or when the person was released or placed on parole, supervised

release, or probation. See OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6)-(8). 4

      4 The statute requires registration by a resident of Georgia “who intends
to reside in this state” if that person “is convicted under the laws of another
state or the United States, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or in a
tribal court of a sexually violent offense, a criminal offense against a victim
who is a minor on or after July 1, 1999, or a dangerous sexual offense on or
after July 1, 1996[.]” OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (5). For a nonresident who moves to
Georgia, registration is required if the person “is required to register as a
sexual offender under federal law, military law, tribal law, or the laws of
another state or territory or who has been convicted in this state of a criminal

                                      19
      But Session does not ground his right-to-travel claim in the

Registry’s different treatment of residents, new residents, and

nonresidents generally. His as-applied right-to-travel challenge to

the statute is very specific to him. He claims that “the Registry

imposes disabilities on Session for a conviction that, if occurring

simultaneously in Georgia, would not require registration[,]” with

“[t]he only reason for the differential treatment” being that

“Louisiana punished Session for a felony, even though the same

crime in Georgia at the time was only a high and aggravated

misdemeanor.” This, Session argues, quoting a separate writing in

Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dept. of Corr., 9 F4th 513 (7th Cir. 2021) (en

banc), amounts to “assign[ing] different obligations to Georgians

‘based not on what they have done but where they have been. It is

relying on another state’s handling of a particular criminal history

offense against a victim who is a minor or any dangerous sexual offense.”
OCGA § 42-1-12 (e) (6). Nonresidents who enter the state for schooling or some
purpose such as employment for a period exceeding 14 consecutive days or an
aggregate of 30 days during any calendar year must register if they fit the
definition of a “sexual offender” — defined as anyone who “is convicted of a
criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or any dangerous sexual
offense” or who is otherwise required to register under the statute. OCGA § 42-
1-12 (a) (20), (e) (7)-(8).
                                      20
to determine how that individual will be treated in’ Georgia.” Id. at

536 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

     But this argument depends on the highly speculative

assumption that if Session had engaged in the underlying conduct

in Georgia, he would be have been convicted of a mere misdemeanor

and thus not required to register. The Louisiana sexual battery

crime of which Session was convicted and the Georgia crime of

sexual battery that existed in 1994 are not identical. The Louisiana

sexual battery statute under which Session was convicted defined

the offense as follows:

     Sexual battery is the intentional engaging in any of the
     following acts with another person, who is not the spouse
     of the offender, where the offender acts without the
     consent of the victim, or where the other person has not
     yet attained fifteen years of age and is at least three years
     younger than the offender:

          (1) The touching of the anus or genitals of the victim
     by the offender using any instrumentality or any part of
     the body of the offender; or

          (2) The touching of the anus or genitals of the
     offender by the victim using any instrumentality or any
     part of the body of the victim.

La. R.S. 14:43.1 (A) (1991). At the time of Session’s Louisiana

                                  21
offense, Georgia’s crime of sexual battery was defined as

“intentionally mak[ing] physical contact with the intimate body

parts of the body of another person without the consent of that

person.” OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b). Perhaps most notably, the range of

body parts the touching of which could bring an action within the

ambit of the offense was broader in the Georgia offense; the Georgia

statute defined “intimate parts” as “the primary genital area, anus,

groin, inner thighs, or buttocks of a male or female and the breasts

of a female.” OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (a) (1990). 5

     But apart from any particular differences, it is pure

speculation to say of what particular crime Session would have been

convicted, let alone to say that it would have been a misdemeanor,

had he engaged in the same conduct in Georgia. Session’s argument

assumes that, notwithstanding the differences in the elements and

punishment accompanying the Louisiana and Georgia sexual

battery offenses at the time, a Georgia prosecutor would have offered

     5  These definitions remain the same under the current Code. See OCGA
§ 16-6-22.1.
                                   22
a plea deal in which Session would have pleaded guilty to a

misdemeanor sexual battery offense, and the trial court would have

accepted such a bargain. The limited factual record regarding the

underlying crime makes engaging in such speculation particularly

difficult. And such a speculative argument is not nearly as strong as

the argument rejected by the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc in

Hope; in that case, all of the plaintiffs committed their crimes before

Indiana enacted its registration statute, such that registration for

any in-state offense was prohibited under the Indiana Supreme

Court’s interpretation of the state’s own ex post facto clause. See 9

F4th at 522, 525-526; see also Hope, 9 F4th at 538 (Rovner, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is also no stronger than

other right-to-travel challenges to other sex offender statutes that

appellate courts have rejected. See Doe v. Peterson, 43 F4th 838, 841-

842 (8th Cir. 2022) (rejecting federal right-to-travel challenge to

Nebraska sex offender law that required registration by those

obligated to register in another state, even if the offense was

committed as a juvenile, but did not require registration for those

                                  23
who committed offenses in Nebraska as juveniles); State v. Yeoman,

236 P3d 1265, 1268-1269 (Idaho 2010) (rejecting federal right-to-

travel challenge to Idaho sex offender statute that required

registration for out-of-state convictions regardless of when they

occurred, but only those in-state convictions that occurred after a

certain date, given that registration based on out-of-state

convictions also depended upon being required to register in the

state of conviction at the time of relocation to Idaho).6 Session has

not shown that requiring him to register violated his right to travel

under the federal Constitution.

      (b)   Equal protection.

      Similarly, Session’s equal-protection argument is based on the

assumption that if he had committed the same underlying offense in

      6  We observe that the Idaho Supreme Court has reversed on federal
right-to-travel grounds a conviction under a prior Idaho sex offender
registration law that provided that a longer-term resident with a pre-1993
conviction from Idaho or elsewhere did not have to register, while a person with
such a conviction who moved to Idaho after June 1993 was required to do so,
no matter how old the conviction. See State v. Dickerson, 129 P3d 1263, 1266-
1271 (Idaho 2006). Nothing in the Georgia registry statute makes such a
distinction, and the sort of distinctions between residents and non-residents
discussed above are, again, not the basis for Session’s argument.
                                      24
Georgia, he would have been convicted of only a misdemeanor.

     “[A]n equal protection challenge to a criminal statute is

examined under the rational basis test unless the statute

discriminates on racial grounds or against a suspect class.” State v.

Holland, 308 Ga. 412, 415 (2) (841 SE2d 723) (2020). “An equal

protection claimant must establish that he is similarly situated to

members of the class who are treated differently from him” and that

“there is no rational basis for such different treatment.” Id. at 415-

416 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In general, for equal

protection purposes, criminal defendants are similarly situated if

they are charged with the same crime.” Id. at 416 (2) (citation,

punctuation, and emphasis omitted).

     Session argues that requiring him to register based on his

Louisiana conviction violates his right to equal protection because

such a requirement distinguishes between persons with a foreign

sexual battery conviction and similarly-situated persons convicted

of sexual battery in Georgia, a distinction that he contends is not

rationally related to achieving the Registry’s (admittedly) legitimate

                                 25
purposes. But, as discussed above, Georgia’s definition of the crime

of sexual battery was similar to, but not the same as, Louisiana’s

definition at the time of the underlying offense. And to the extent

that the underlying substantive Georgia criminal law treats certain

conduct differently than another state does, this is not the sort of

explicit distinction between in-state and out-of-state offenders by a

sex offender registry scheme that other courts have found runs afoul

of the Equal Protection Clause. Compare Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Probation

& Parole, 513 F3d 95, 98, 112 (3d Cir. 2008) (equal protection

violation where state law automatically subjected out-of-state sex

offenders to community notification, while an individual convicted

of same offense in Pennsylvania would be subject to notification only

if particular designation were made after a civil hearing); ACLU of

N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P3d 1215, 1226-1227 (N.M. Ct.

App. 2006) (equal protection violation where city’s sex offender law

required registration for those with out-of-state convictions who

were in city only three consecutive days, but not for those with in-

state convictions who were in the city much more often); and

                                 26
Hendricks v. Jones ex rel. State, 349 P3d 531, 536 (Okla. 2013) (equal

protection violation where state’s registration requirement applied

to out-of-state offenders convicted prior to statue’s enactment, but

limiting registration for in-state offenders to those whose conviction

occurred after statute’s effective date); with Morales-Frometa v.

Attorney General United States, 812 Fed. Appx. 95, 99 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“courts have repeatedly recognized the equal protection does not

require uniformity” among jurisdictions); United States v. Titley,

770 F3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting equal protection

challenge to Armed Career Criminal Act designation based on two

state drug convictions that the appellant argued “would not qualify

had the predicate offenses been committed in 19 other states or the

District of Columbia”); United States v. Fink, 499 F3d 81, 87 (1st Cir.

2007) (rejecting claim that statutory enhancement dependent upon

states’ variable treatment of drug possession violated right to equal

protection). Session has not shown that requiring him to register in

Georgia violated his federal equal protection rights.

     4.   Session has not shown that the Georgia Registry violates

                                  27
the Georgia Constitution’s Social Status Provision.

     Finally, Session argues that the Georgia Registry is

unconstitutional on its face because it violates the Georgia

Constitution’s Social Status Provision. We reject this claim.

     As noted above, Paragraph XXV of the Georgia Bill of Rights

provides that “[t]he social status of a citizen shall never be the

subject of legislation.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXV

(the “Provision”). This Provision has been construed only rarely by

Georgia’s appellate courts, and most of those cases have involved the

patently racist applications of the Provision in the decades following

its adoption into the Georgia Constitution in 1868. In those cases,

we apparently held that the Provision prohibited any attempts by

the General Assembly to remove barriers to racial integration.

Session argues that the Provision cannot have that meaning

anymore, that it nevertheless must still have some meaning, and

thus this provision now “prohibits the State from creating favored

or disfavored classes of citizens.” He argues that the Registry

therefore violates this Provision because it “serves to create a lower-

                                  28
tier citizen[.]” As we explain below, regardless of whether Session is

correct that the Provision must mean something different than the

meaning this Court initially ascribed to it, his claim ultimately fails

because he has offered no proposed meaning of the Provision that

forecloses requiring him to register.

     Session’s burden on this claim is a difficult one.

     We presume that statutes are constitutional, and before
     an act of the General Assembly can be declared
     unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the
     fundamental law must be clear and palpable and this
     Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality.
     Because all presumptions are in favor of the
     constitutionality of a statute, the burden is on the party
     claiming that is the law is unconstitutional to prove it.
     And [Session]’s task is made all the more difficult
     because, to make this argument, [he] is asserting a novel
     and quite expansive construction of a provision of the
     Georgia Constitution that has received little attention
     since it was enacted.

Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 163 (3) (880 SE3d 544) (2022)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

     It is well established that “we interpret the Georgia

Constitution according to its original public meaning.” Elliott v.

State, 305 Ga. 179, 181 (II) (824 SE2d 265) (2019). “And, of course,

                                  29
the Georgia Constitution that we interpret today is the Constitution

of 1983; the original public meaning of that Constitution is the

public meaning that it had at the time of its ratification in 1982.” Id.

And when a provision has been “retained from a previous

constitution without material change,” we generally presume that

the provision “has retained the original public meaning that

provision had at the time it first entered a Georgia Constitution,

absent some indication to the contrary.” Id. at 183 (II) (A). In

addition, “[a] constitutional clause that is readopted into a new

constitution and that has received a consistent and definitive

construction is presumed to carry the same meaning as that

consistent construction.” Id. at 184 (II) (B).

     The Provision first entered the Georgia Constitution in 1868,

part of the new constitution ratified by Georgians to satisfy the

conditions set by Congress for readmission to the Union. See Ga.

Const. of 1868, Art. I, Sec. XI (“The social status of the citizen shall

never be the subject of legislation.”); see also Ammons, 315 Ga. at

164-165 (3) (discussing context of ratification of 1868 Constitution).

                                   30
That text has remained materially unchanged since its adoption.

See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXV (changing “the

citizen” to “a citizen”); Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXII;

Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII; Ga. Const. of 1877, Art.

I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII.

     The 1868 Constitutional Convention’s charge was in part to

advance racial equality. See Ammons, 315 Ga. at 165 (3) (citing First

Reconstruction Act of 1867, § 5 (1867), to note that Congress directed

that Georgia’s 1868 Constitution had to both “conform[] with the

Constitution of the United States in all respects” and ensure “that

the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all persons [male and at

least 21 years old] of whatever race, color, or previous condition”).

But almost immediately, Georgia courts began interpreting the

Provision in a very different way. The year after the Provision was

ratified, a black woman criminally charged for cohabitating with a

white man argued that the statutory prohibition on interracial

marriage violated the Provision. This Court vehemently rejected

that argument:

                                  31
     [T]he very reverse is true. That section of the Constitution
     forever prohibits legislation of any character regulating
     or interfering with the social status. It leaves social rights
     and status where it finds them. It prohibits the
     Legislature from repealing any laws in existence, which
     protects persons in the free regulation among themselves
     of matters properly termed social, and it also prohibits the
     enactment of any new laws on that subject in the future.

Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (2) (1869). Noting the various forms

of segregation in effect at the time of the adoption of the new

Constitution, the Court continued: “In all of this they were protected

by the common law of this State. The new Constitution forever

guarantees this protection, by denying to the Legislature the power

to pass any law withdrawing it or regulating the social status in such

assemblages.” Id.

     The Georgia Court of Appeals later said that the Provision did

not constrain the judicial branch’s ability to “take judicial notice of

an intrinsic difference between the two races[,]” when it employed

the Provision to allow a white railroad passenger to seek damages

from a railroad company whose conductor mistakenly referred to the

passenger as black:

     Our Constitution . . . declares that the social status of the
                                  32
     citizen shall never be the subject-matter of legislation. It
     has been said that this language was used for the express
     purpose of leaving the social status open to judicial
     determination. We, however, shall not take any such
     fanciful position; for it can not properly be said that that
     which can not be the subject-matter of legislation can be
     judicially administered. This, however, does not affect the
     subject of judicial notice of matters of history, common
     knowledge, etc. The sounder view is, that neither
     Legislatures nor courts shall grade the citizen according
     to this social status, and yet that the courts can and must
     notice the meaning of words of opprobrium, as well as the
     connection in which these words are used.

See Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Electric Co., 2 Ga. App. 499, 504-506 (3) (58

SE 899) (1907). This Court later held that evidence about the race

of a bottling company’s inspectors was not admissible to show the

inspectors’ relative efficiency. See Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.

Shipp, 170 Ga. 817, 820 (2) (154 SE 243) (1930). But the Chief

Justice felt compelled in his concurrence to distinguish the case from

the Court of Appeals’ prior ruling in Wolfe, which he characterized

as remaining good law. See id. at 824 (Russell, C.J., concurring).

     So what to make of such a provision now? Cases like this serve

as a reminder that we focus on history not because it is always good,

but because the rule of law requires it. To discern the meaning of

                                 33
legal text, we must determine its original public meaning — what

the language meant at the time and place in history when it was

enacted. Original public meaning is an interpretive methodology

that promotes the rule of law by, among other things, constraining

judges. By its application, we limit ourselves to only those

interpretations of legal text that can be supported by text, history,

and context. The meaning produced by those interpretations can

only be as good as our history.

      And there is much in our history that is shameful. The racist

history of this Court’s interpretation of the Provision reminds us of

this truth once again. But a proper application of our interpretive

methodology requires honest grappling with that history; we cannot

wish it away. 7

      7 The drafters of the 1983 Constitution appear not to have grappled with
the history of the Provision. See Committee to Revise Article I, Subcommittee
to Revise Section I, Oct. 4, 1979, meeting, at pp. 120-121; Committee to Revise
Article I, Subcommittee on Rights of Persons, Oct. 25, 1979, meeting, at pp.
109-111. Justice Jesse Bowles informed confused committee members that this
provision meant that the legislature could not create formal classes of persons:
“They can’t name you a king or a queen to the exclusion of your neighbor or a
prince or a lord.” Committee to Revise Article I, Subcommittee to Revise
Section I, Oct. 4, 1979, meeting, at pp. 120; see also Committee to Revise Article

                                       34
      Here, however, that shameful history is just that — history. To

the extent that the Provision’s language prohibiting legislation with

respect to “social status” was thinly veiled code for preserving racial

discrimination, including segregation, any such application of the

Provision squarely violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1

(87 SCt 1817, 18 LE2d 1010) (1967); Brown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483 (74 SCt 686, 98 LE 873) (1954). Any such meaning thus

has no effect whatsoever.

      Session thus argues that the Provision must mean something

else today, and that such an alternative meaning renders the

Registry unconstitutional. Whether or not the Provision has an

alternative meaning is a question we need not decide today,8

I, Subcommittee on Rights of Persons, Oct. 25, 1979, meeting, at pp. 109
(Justice Bowles: “It has to do with classes of individuals. You can’t be a lord or
a duke or earl or duchess.”).
       8 So far as we can tell, other than in Scott, we have referenced this

Provision explicitly in only three other majority opinions throughout our
history, and each of those only in passing. See Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 598
(IV) & n.57 (544 SE2d 99) (2001) (citing the Provision without analysis as a
“see also” in a footnote in support of the textual statement that by harm to a
child for purposes of application of the best-interest-of-the-child standard, “we

                                       35
because Session does not show that he would prevail under any such

meaning.

      As alluded to above, Session contends that the Provision now

“can be interpreted as barring the legislature from creating

preferred or reviled classes of citizens.” Session says that “society”

aims “visceral animus” toward sex offenders and that “[e]ven other

prisoners loathe” them. But Session fails to show how the

registration requirement and related provisions, rather than the

fact of being convicted of a sex offense, “created” a particular class of

citizens — people convicted of sex offenses — or caused “society” to

mean either physical harm or significant, long-term emotional harm; we do not
mean merely social or economic disadvantages”); Livingston v. State, 264 Ga.
402, 404 & n.5 (444 SE2d 748) (1994) (citing the Provision as a “see also” in
support of the phrase “we have held that it would be constitutionally
impermissible for a jury to base its death penalty recommendation on the
victim’s class or wealth”; a footnote stated that the Provision “was added to the
Georgia Constitution in 1868 to promote equality in the eyes of the law
amongst people of all races and classes” and that the principle underlying the
Provision was “that an individual’s social status is not relevant to the
evenhanded administration of justice,” a proposition for which we inexplicably
cited Scott); State ex rel. Waring v. Ga. Med. Soc’y, 38 Ga. 608, 627-630 (1869)
(leaving unaddressed argument that corporate bylaw adopted under a
legislatively approved corporate charter and prohibiting “ungentlemanly
conduct” violated the Provision, given there was no evidence of ungentlemanly
conduct).
                                       36
treat that class of persons differently. And Session has offered no

proposed plausible construction of the Provision that would prohibit

criminalizing certain types of conduct on the theory that it would

create a disfavored class comprising those convicted of such crimes.

Accordingly, Session’s argument fails.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                37