Court Opinion

ID: 9592396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:13:47.840491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:32.959721
License: Public Domain

Judge Walker
concurring.
I write separately to express my belief that our Supreme Court should reexamine its holding in State v. Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 346 S.E.2d 417 (1986).
A bill of indictment is sufficient if it charges the offense in a plain, intelligible manner, with averments sufficient to enable the court to proceed to judgment and to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E.2d 677 (1972). The purpose of the indictment is to put the defendant on notice of the offense with which he is charged and to allow him to prepare a *451defense to that charge. State v. Sumner, 232 N.C. 386, 61 S.E.2d 84 (1950). In this case, defendant was indicted on two counts of kidnapping in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39.
Specifically, each indictment alleges that defendant “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did kidnap ... by unlawfully removing . . . from one place to another, without. . . consent, and for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony, robbery with a dangerous weapon.” However, the trial court instructed not only on “removal” of the victim, but also “confinement” or “restraint” of the victim as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
Implicit in the words “kidnap” and “remove” contained in the indictment are the words “restrain” and “confine.” By alleging that the defendant has kidnapped a victim, the indictment has necessarily placed the defendant on notice that he is accused of “restraining, confining, or removing” a person. The terms “restrain,” “confine” or “remove” are related in that they all encompass an act which asserts control over the victim. These terms are not mutually exclusive. The same act could comprise both restraint and confinement as surely as restraint is a necessary part of removal. See State v. Fulcher, 34 N.C. App. 233, 237 S.E.2d 909 (1977), affirmed, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978). Allowing the jury to consider all three terms which statutorily constitute kidnapping does not necessarily allow conviction upon an “abstract theory not supported by the bill of indictment.” State v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 164, 170, 270 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1980).
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39, if the State proves that the confinement, restraint or removal is for one of four purposes, the actions amount to kidnapping. Allowing a jury to convict on the basis of a purpose not listed in the indictment would constitute such an “abstract theory.” See State v. Moore, 315 N.C. 738, 340 S.E.2d 401 (1986). Allegations that the actions occurred for the purpose of committing a felony as opposed to holding a victim for ransom are theories which would require different factual defenses. As “restrain,” “confine” and “remove” all connote a similar action by the defendant, the danger of conflicting defenses or lack of notice is not present.
Our Supreme Court, in Tucker, quoted from its prior decision in State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. 263, 237 S.E.2d 834 (1977) noting, “[h]ad the state desired to prosecute on the theory that defendant confined and restrained the victim . . ., it should have so alleged by way of an additional count in the indictment.” Id. at 273, 237 S.E.2d at 841. The *452reasoning in Dammons would seem to allow for a separate count of kidnapping for each individual act of restraint, confinement or removal such that three counts of kidnapping could arise from what would formerly be considered a single act. I do not believe this was the intent of the legislature in revising our kidnapping statute in 1975 to replace the common-law definition.