Court Opinion

ID: 9790585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:55:28.113625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.382050
License: Public Domain

Donworth,
J. (dissenting) — The majority have concluded that RCW 69.33.380(1) (d) merely augments RCW 69.33.300, relating to records to be kept in receiving and dispensing narcotics. Because of the reasons expressed in this opinion, I am compelled to reach a different conclusion.
RCW 69.33.380(1) (d) was enacted by our legislature when it adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act recommended by the commissioners on uniform state laws. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 9B U.L.A., pp. 275-332, is divided into several sections. Section 9 is entitled “Record to be Kept.” Part of this section is quoted in the majority opinion and is found in RCW 69.33.300. Section 17 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act is entitled “Fraud or Deceit.” This section is codified as RCW 69.33.380.
RCW 69.33.380(1) reads as follows:
“No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain a narcotic drug, or procure or attempt to procure the administration of a narcotic drug, (a) by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge; or (b) by the forgery or alteration of a prescription or of any written order; or (c) by the concealment of a material fact; or (d) by the use of a false name or the giving of a false address.”
The majority have isolated part (d) of subsection (1) from parts (a), (b) and (c), concluding that it is only a supplement to the recording provisions of RCW 69.33.300. Therefore, under the rationale of the majority, a violator is not to be punished for obtaining a narcotic drug by any surreptitious means, but rather the punishment is to be imposed for hindering a doctor or pharmacist in his record keeping.
In transposing this provision from the fraud and deceit section to that concerning record keeping, the majority *235cite People v. Oviedo, 106 Cal. App. (2d) 690, 235 P. (2d) 612 (1951). The statute under consideration by the California court was not copied from the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.
The majority conclude that the California statute is indistinguishable in effect from the one under consideration in the instant case, stating that
“ . . . the statute was a prohibition against the giving, rather than the use of a false name. We find this distinction to be without merit.”
In my opinion, the wrong portions of the two statutes have been emphasized.
The California statute provides:
“ ‘No person shall, in connection with the prescribing, . . . or dispensing of any narcotic drug . . . give a false name or address.’ ”
The prohibition is directly against giving a false name, in connection with prescribing or dispensing a narcotic drug.
RCW 69.33.380(1) (d) provides:
“No person shall obtain ... a narcotic drug . . . by the use of a false name or the giving of a false address.”
Here, the prohibition is directly against obtaining narcotic drugs in an illegal manner.
In each of the four subdivisions of RCW 69.33.380(1), the phrase obtain by introduces an illegal means of procuring narcotic drugs. Unless there is some causal connection between the activity enumerated in these subdivisions and the obtaining of a narcotic drug, the activity cannot be the means by which the drug is obtained.
The dismissal of the charge by the trial court was based upon the trial judge’s conclusion that the state had failed to prove that the narcotics were “obtained by the use of a false name or the giving of a false address,” in the sense that the false name or address was relied upon by the doctor and the pharmacist and could be said to have enabled respondent to obtain the narcotics. The issue (as framed by the briefs of both appellant and respondent) is whether reliance by the physician prescribing, or the phar*236macist dispensing, a narcotic drug, on the use of a false name or address given by respondent is a necessary element to be proved by the state in order to constitute a violation of ROW 69.33.380(1) (d). In other words, did the use of the false name and address cause respondent to obtain the narcotic drug?
At the trial on cross-examination of Dr. Pyfer by respondent’s counsel, the following testimony was elicited:
“Now your diagnosis, then, and your ultimate prescription of this drug, was to curb whatever pain he did have? If he was to be believed, at least, it was for the pain? A. That is correct, from his history of pain from the injury, the recent injury of that morning. . . . Q. It is not true, Doctor, that you did not prescribe this demerol because Mr. Lee gave you a false name and address? That was not the reason you prescribed the drug, was it? A. No, it was not.”
The deputy prosecutor, in presenting his case, did elicit from Dr. Pyfer testimony that the narcotic prescription would not have been given had he known respondent’s true name. However, I think this testimony was adequately explained when Dr. Pyfer was called by defense counsel and testified as follows:
“Q. Dr. Pyfer, yesterday a question was given you by the prosecutor asking if you would have given the defendant Lee the Prescription if you had known his real name. Do you recall that question? A. Yes, I do. Q. My question to you at this time is: why would you not have given him the prescription had you known his real name? A. In his chart we have records of non-payment of bills, and for this reason I would not have taken care of him.”
Clearly, this testimony could only mean that the doctor, if he had been informed as to the patient’s true name, would not have rendered any further service for respondent because he still owed the doctor for services previously rendered.
State v. Powell, 212 Ore. 684, 321 P. (2d) 333 (1958), interpreted a statute which is identical to that under which respondent was charged. The Oregon court held that reliance on the false name or address is an element that must *237be present in order to constitute a violation of the statute. The court said:
“The evidence in this case discloses that the doctor in prescribing the narcotic to the defendant on the 20th and 23rd of July put no reliance in the name or address of the defendant whatsoever but relied solely upon the defendant’s representations of her physical condition and his own examination of her condition. When she returned on the 25th of July, the doctor did not refuse her a prescription because of her name or the address, but because he had already prescribed more than was proper or necessary in the treatment of her condition. In other words, the defendant as a person and not because of name or address received the very narcotics intended by the doctor. Thus the false name or address was immaterial.”
The majority, in support of their position that no reliance is required, cite two cases also construing statutes indentical to the one before us. However, Geurin v. Nevada, 73 Nev. 233, 315 P. (2d) 965 (1957), only held that the false name and address need not be the sole motive and cause in the delivery of narcotics. State v. Newstead, 280 S. W. (2d) 6 (Mo. 1955), held that no causal connection was necessary when the defendant admitted the use of the false name for the purpose of obtaining a narcotic drug and actually obtained a narcotic drug. Whereas I agree that a defendant must intend to obtain a narcotic drug, I disagree with the Newstead case to the extent that it holds that no reliance on the false name by the person dispensing the narcotic drug is necessary.
The fact that both parties cite authority in support of their interpretation of this uniform statute indicates that there is a latent ambiguity in the statute. In such a situation, I cannot agree that a criminal statute can be properly construed in favor of appellant. As this court has had occasion to say in the past:
“ . . . Laws are interpreted in favor of liberty, and if a statute is capable of two constructions, one of which makes a given act criminal and the other innocent, the statute will be given the construction which favors innocence.” State v. Anderson, 61 Wash. 674, 676, 112 Pac. 931 (1911).
*238Accord: State v. Hardwick, 63 Wash. 35, 114 Pac. 873 (1911); State ex rel. Dorrien v. Hazeltine, 82 Wash. 81, 143 Pac. 436 (1914); State v. Furth, 82 Wash. 665, 144 Pac. 907 (1914); Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523 (1915); State v. Eden, 92 Wash. 1, 158 Pac. 967, 159 Pac. 700 (1916); State v. Levy, 8 Wn. (2d) 630, 113 P. (2d) 306 (1941).
In State v. Levy, supra, we said:
“Conceding, however, for the sake of argument, that the sections of the statute above referred to might, according to the interpretation placed upon them by the trial court, be applicable to the instant situation, the result would simply be that a question of statutory construction would be presented concerning which judicial minds might radically, yet reasonably, differ. In such event, we are faced with the principle, universally recognized, that, in a criminal case, reasonable doubts upon questions of law, as well as upon questions of fact, must be resolved in favor of the accused. . . .”
I would adopt the reasoning of the trial court that the statutory provision here in question requires reliance on a false name or address. The provision does not prohibit everyone from obtaining narcotics. It is designed to prevent those who are not justifiably entitled to receive narcotics from obtaining them by surreptitious means.
The trial judge gave this example of the type of situation which he considered that the particular subsection before us was intended to cover:
“Let us take an example. Let us assume that the doctor has in his files a history that one Charles Allen requires demerol, and he had previously given a prescription to Charles Allen for the demerol, and Charles Allen calls and wants that prescription refilled, and Charles Lee goes in and represents himself as Charles Allen and the prescription is filled by the physician. This is what I think the statute contemplates.”
Under this interpretation of subsection (d), only those persons who actually obtain a narcotic drug by the means forbidden therein are violators. This interpretation is consistent with RCW 69.33.380(1), read in its entirety.
*239In the case at bar, Dr. Pyfer, when asked, would not testify that respondent requested a narcotic drug. He did say that he prescribed the drug because of his own examination of respondent and the latter’s history of pain. There is no evidence to support a jury finding that Dr. Pyfer in any way relied upon the false name and address in prescribing the drug.
In my opinion, the state failed to prove an essential element of the crime charged in this case, to wit, reliance upon a false name or address. Without such reliance, the false name and address were immaterial. It was not the means by which the drug was obtained.
I would affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal.
Weaver, Rosellini, and Hamilton, JJ., concur with Donworth, J.