Court Opinion

ID: 9819037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:04.805142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:28.941273
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting: This court has no jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal. This appeal should therefore be dismissed, and the cause should be transferred to the appellate court. In Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504, 508-09 (1992), this court noted that a circuit court order holding only that a statute is unconstitutional “as applied” in a particular case is not directly appealable to this court under Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1). This statement was derived from Rule 302(a)(1)’s plain language, which states that this court has direct appellate jurisdiction over those cases in which a circuit court has declared a statute “invalid.” We explained that if a statute has truly been held unconstitutional only “as ap- • plied” to a single litigant, then the statute remains valid as to all others. Rule 302(a)(1) is therefore not implicated. In Rehg, the circuit court’s order declared that “the Tax Act as applied to the plaintiff Timothy Rehg violates the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 10 of the Illinois Constitution.” See Rehg, 152 Ill. 2d at 508-09. We found, however, that a close reading of the circuit court’s order revealed that the circuit court also declared the statute unconstitutional on its face, and that jurisdiction in this court was therefore proper under Rule 302(a)(1). Rehg, 152 Ill. 2d at 509. Subsequently, in In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414, 420-22 (1997), this court explained that Rehg is subject to an important qualification. At issue in Lappe were certain provisions of the Public Aid Code that allowed the Illinois Department of Public Aid to provide child support enforcement services to individuals who were not recipients of public financial aid. See 305 ILCS 5/10— 1, 10—10 (West 1994). The circuit court found that the father in the case, the proposed recipient of the child support enforcement services, made $40,000 per year and was capable of pursuing such services without public financial assistance. The circuit court declared that the statutory provisions “would lead to an unconstitutional result in the instant case,” in that the provisions violated the Illinois Constitution’s requirement that public funds be used only for public purposes (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 1). See Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 419. According to the circuit court, no public purpose justified the use of state funds to provide a lawyer for a parent who makes $40,000 a year. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 419. This court in Lappe determined that it had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Rule 302(a)(1), notwithstanding the circuit court’s “as applied” language. We explained that our precedent has established that this court has the responsibility to look to the effect of the circuit court’s order to determine whether the order actually declared the statutory provisions unconstitutional on their face. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 420, citing Doe v. Gainer, 162 Ill. 2d 15 (1994). This, of course, is a difficult task in light of the cursory nature of such an order. Nevertheless, because this court has a limited amount of time and resources, we must be able to decline to hear those rulings that are not publicly significant. If the effect of the circuit court’s order is to declare the statute unconstitutional on its face, thereby raising an issue of pressing public importance, then this court’s direct appellate review should be invoked. In contrast, a circuit court order which holds a statute unconstitutional as applied only to a single litigant does not warrant bypassing the normal appellate process. In Lappe, this court observed that the circuit court had ruled the statutory provisions unconstitutional because the proposed recipient of the child enforcement services had the financial ability to pursue enforcement without public financial assistance. Accordingly, the circuit court effectively declared the provisions unconstitutional not only as applied to the father in the case, but also as applied to an entire group of individuals, i.e., those who are financially capable of pursuing child support on their own. Thus, the circuit court effectively declared the provisions unconstitutional on their face, and this court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Rule 302(a)(1). Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 421-22. Here, the record reveals that the circuit court truly held section 4—103(a)(6) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutional only “as applied” to this defendant. Therefore, in accordance with Rehg, the circuit court’s order is not directly appealable to this court. In contrast to Lappe, nothing in the record of this case suggests that the circuit court in effect held the false report of a vehicle theft statute unconstitutional on its face. The circuit court’s order is thus not directly appealable pursuant to the qualification set forth in Lappe. Today, instead of applying this court’s precedent, the majority holds that “to the extent that Rehg would preclude our assumption of jurisdiction in this case, that decision is overruled.” In doing so, the majority has ignored the doctrine of stare decisis. Once a majority of this court has established a principle of law, stare decisis dictates that the principle should not be disregarded simply because some members of the court disagree or have changed their minds. “The doctrine of stare decisis is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. Stare decisis permits society to presume that fundamental principles are established in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.” Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). The majority’s decision fails to honor the principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis. I would adhere to Rehg and Lappe and hold that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.