Court Opinion

ID: 9479692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:25:51.161635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:12.559298
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The “steady drumbeat” of political discrimination cases which the majority finds in consonance with Greek music, ante at 315,12 I find more akin to Greek tragedy. *325But more than music, or drama, the facts of this case remind me of the fictional fantasy depicted in Catch 22. The government retroactively applies standards to low level employees — standards that do not even exist. These employees, obviously unable to meet the mythical “standards,” face the only consequence: they lose their jobs.
I
I cannot quarrel with Part II of the opinion as this result is mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988). This hypertechnical outcome in part avoids, for our Court, the embarrassment of ruling that public employees satisfactorily working in the capacity of drivers, messengers, typists and warehouse workers, for up to nine years, lack any interest protectible by the Due Process Clause. The majority cannot, however, totally sidestep the issue. There remains one plaintiff who cannot be so easily deprived of the protection afforded by Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).
In Loudermill, the Cleveland Board of Education hired the plaintiff as a security guard. On his job application he stated that he had never been convicted of a felony, when in fact he had been convicted of grand larceny. After eleven months, the Board discovered this falsity and summarily discharged him for dishonesty without affording him the opportunity to respond to the charge or to challenge his dismissal. The Board claimed that Loudermill had no property right under state law because he fraudulently obtained his appointment. It also alleged that they would not have hired Loudermill to begin with if he had answered truthfully. Therefore, the Board argued, he lacked a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the position under state law, a prerequisite to his due process claim. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-2710, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The Court rejected this argument, among other reasons because it had not been raised below, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 539 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. at 1491 n. 5, but also because:
[T]he argument relies on a retrospective fiction inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Loudermill was hired and did hold the security guard job. The Board cannot escape its constitutional obligations by rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why Loudermill should not have been hired in the first place.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
In the present controversy, Miguel A. Rosario Torres’ case13 is even stronger than Loudermill’s because of his total lack of culpability in the hiring process. Rosario Torres began working in the Office of the Governor on February 16, 1979 as an administrative clerk. He rose through various positions until July 1, 1982 when he was transferred into the career service as an “Executive Officer III,” a low echelon supervisor of service and maintenance employees. Two years later, on July 15, 1985, after the change in political administration resulting from the 1984 elections, Rosario Torres was fired allegedly because he had been hired to the career position without complying with the regulations promoted pursuant to the Puerto Rico Personnel Law. See 3 L.P.R.A. § 1347 (Supp.1989). These internal regulations, which are exempt from general Puerto Rican law requiring the publication of government regulations,14 establish that the government fill job vacancies from a register of eligible applicants who have passed written, oral, physical, or performance examinations, and who meet specified educational and/or work experience requirements.
The district court after hearing extensive evidence separated fact from fiction and uncontrovertedly found that the require*326ments of the unpublished regulations were, in practice, nonexistent. Rosario Torres v. Hernández Colón, 672 F.Supp. 639, 651-52 (D.C.P.R.1987). No register of eligibles, no examination, and no formal requirements were ever instituted for any employee hired in the Office of the Governor. Furthermore, the government failed to comply with these “requirements” with regard to the employee that replaced Rosario Torres.15 Thus, even if Rosario Torres had known about the unpublished regulations there was no test he could have taken, no register for which he could have qualified, and no requirements which he could have met before he was hired. The district court concluded that Rosario Torres was unaware of the alleged illegality of his appointment until he was notified of the possibility of his discharge. Id. at 651. The court ruled that this lack of knowledge rendered his appointment legal under Puer-to Rican law. Id. at 652.
This lack of knowledge clearly distinguishes the present appeal from Kauffman v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.1988), a case in which we make much of being “ ‘reluctant to interfere with a reasonable construction of state law made by a district judge, sitting in a state who is familiar with that state’s law and practices.’ ” Id. at 1173 (citing Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Education, 679 F.2d 279, 281 (1st Cir.1982). Certainly, an employee’s lack of conscious participation in an illegal action by his employer is relevant to the determination of whether the employee’s action is void ab initio, as the majority holds today. Because of lack of complicity by the employee in this case, there is doubt that he has breached any state law that would make his employment void ab initio. But the cut runs deeper.
This Court misses the point in its holdings in both Kauffman and the present case. Once hired, Puerto Rican law establishes that a career employee cannot be discharged except “for cause.” 3 L.P.R.A. § 1336(4) (Supp.1987). At that point the employee acquires a constitutionally protected interest. Like in Loudermill, the undisputed facts are that Rosario Torres was hired and did hold the job from which he was fired. He performed the work for two years, was paid for this work and was otherwise held out to be the legitimate holder of his position. It is fantasy to pretend that all of this did not happen or that it has no legal significance. Cf. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 539 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. at 1491 n. 5. By its ruling, the majority is applying retroactive fiction inconsistent with those undisputed facts. Id. Defendants “[should] not escape [their] constitutional obligations by rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why [Rosario Torres] should not have been hired in the first place.” Id. Today’s holding allows defendants to rewrite history. Irrespective of how he got there, Rosario Torres was there, and was entitled to due process before he was removed. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1977). It is the height of audacity for defendants to interpose a nonexistent procedure from an unpublished regulation as justification for the commission of a gross constitutional violation. This court should not be taken in by such an argument.
Nor should we be taken in by pious protestations to the effect that federal courts cannot cause the violation of valid state laws. Federal courts have the power to suspend even actively enforced state laws when such suspension is required to correct civil rights violations. Furthermore, this circuit has not been at the sidelines in the exercise of this power.
In Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965, 975 (1st Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 461 U.S. 477, 103 S.Ct. 2076, 76 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983), we held that the Massachusetts seniority system enacted by statute, and fully in place, must be subjugated to a district court order requiring discriminated minorities to be hired without regard to the seniority rights of other employees. We ruled, in accord with *327what is now settled federal constitutional law, that
[R]emedies to right the wrong of past discriminations may suspend valid state law.
Although we cannot rashly thrash about suspending state laws, neither should we shy away from this remedy when appropriate.
The necessity for action in this case goes beyond the realm of what is appropriate. Political discrimination against public employees in Puerto Rico is so endemic that even this Court can take judicial notice of the deplorable situation. Taking notice, however, is not enough. To allow a subterfuge such as is claimed by defendants, particularly when it is done at the pinnacle of local government, is only to compound the deleterious impact of this unhealthy practice. To correct this problem requires a vigorous and effective remedy, as provided in Beecher. Which leads me to the next point of disagreement with the majority— the district court’s refusal to order Rosario Torres’ reinstatement, and the majority’s approval of this action.
II
Our holding on the reinstatement issue sends the wrong signals by placing the presumption in the wrong place. Although I cannot quarrel with the concept that the trial court should have some discretion in ordering reinstatement, ante at 321, I disagree with the conclusion denying reinstatement the status of a presumptive right which should be enforced by the district court absent exigent circumstances. To repeat Judge Atkin’s excellent exposition of the issue, in the panel opinion of this appeal:16
Unconstitutionally discharged employees are presumptively entitled to reinstatement. See In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 630 (6th Cir.1988); Banks v. Burkich, 788 F.2d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir.1986) (discharge impermissibly based on employee's exercise of first amendment rights); Professional Association of College Educators v. El Paso County Community School District, 730 F.2d 258, 268 (5th Cir.1984) (same); Allen, 685 F.2d at 1305 (same); see also Santiago-Negrón, 865 F.2d at 437 (reinstatement is “[o]ne of the remedies available for a political discharge in violation of first amendment rights”). The reasons for this rule are evident. First, reinstatement best serves the important policy of make-whole relief. Cf. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 [95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280] (1975) (discussing policy in Title VII context). Along these lines, the Eleventh Circuit has observed that “[w]hen a person loses his job, it is at best disingenuous to say that money damages can suffice to make that person whole. The psychological benefits of work are intangible, yet they are real and cannot be ignored.” Allen, 685 F.2d at 1306. In addition, presumptive reinstatement helps to deter future violations. Employers contemplating unconstitutional employment decisions will be discouraged if their victims are promptly reinstated. See id. Such deterrence will be particularly welcome where, as here, the results of an election may tempt an employer to “clean house” in violation of the Constitution.
The courts, well aware of the value of these benefits, have markedly circumscribed the grounds upon which reinstatement can be refused. Reinstatement can be refused only in extraordinary cases — it cannot be refused merely because it would “revive old antagonisms,” Lewis, 845 F.2d at 630, and it cannot be refused because the positions once held by the wrongfully discharged employees have been filled. Banks, 788 F.2d at 1165. To provide otherwise would ignore the sound maxim that “[rjelief is not limited to that which will be pleasing and free of irritation.” Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School District, 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.1974), cited with approval in Allen, 685 F.2d at 1305.
*328In Puerto Rico the official unemployment rate is nearly 16%.17 Further, the government is the largest single employer.18 In view of these two facts, reinstatement not only is appropriate, but is required. Without reinstatement to his government employment Rosario Torres has a much higher chance of remaining unemployed for a longer period of time than elsewhere in United States. Thus, reinstatement is imperative in political discrimination cases arising in Puerto Rico. Clearly, the district court should reconsider granting the reinstatement remedy on remand.
Ill
Can Rosario Torres, free from fault but egregiously harmed by a blatant First Amendment violation, have less protection than Loudermill — the liar? No, this cannot be the law. Can defendants merely by paying money, repair such a brazen transgression, leaving this man to face unemployment limbo ad infinitum? No, this cannot be the law either.
I dissent from all but Part II of the majority opinion.

. “Diapason” is defined as "the interval or consonance of the octave in Greek music.” Web*325ster's Third New International Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Company, Springfield, Mass., p. 624.

. And for that matter, the cases of those whose appeal we have dismissed as well.

. See 3 L.P.R.A. § 1046 (Supp.1989). See also Oppenheimer Méndez v. Acevedo, 388 F.Supp. 326 (D.C.P.R.1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir.1975).

. This, of course, is equally applicable to the other plaintiffs whose appeal we dismiss on technical grounds. See Rosario Torres, supra, at 651-52.

. The panel opinion was withdrawn, and is unpublished.

. For the fiscal year 1988-89, the unemployment rate in Puerto Rico stood at 15.9%. Puer-to Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources, Bureau of Statistics.

. During the fiscal year 1988-89, 23% of Puer-to Rico’s active labor force were government employees. Id.