Court Opinion

ID: 9373840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:08:52.188095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:49.154238
License: Public Domain

21-6131
     Kazol v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Douchy, IJ
                                                                           A206 913 600

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 22nd day of February, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 9            MICHAEL H. PARK,
10            ALISON J. NATHAN,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   SANAULLAH KAZOL,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                       21-6131
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                     Thomas V. Massucci, Esq., New
25                                       York, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Acting
28                                       Assistant Attorney General;
 1                                  Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant
 2                                  Director; Katie E. Rourke, Trial
 3                                  Attorney, Office of Immigration
 4                                  Litigation, United States
 5                                  Department of Justice,
 6                                  Washington, DC.
 7
 8         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DENIED.

12         Petitioner Sanaullah Kazol, a native and citizen of

13   Bangladesh, seeks review of a February 26, 2021 decision of

14   the   BIA   affirming   an    October       2,    2018    decision   of    an

15   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

16   withholding   of   removal,    and       relief   under    the   Convention

17   Against Torture (“CAT”).      In re Sanaullah Kazol, No. A206 913

18   600 (B.I.A. Feb. 26, 2021), aff’g No. A206 913 600 (Immig.

19   Ct. N.Y.C. Oct. 2, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity

20   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

21         We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions.                  See

22   Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005).

23   We review an adverse credibility determination “under the

24   substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

25   F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings

26   of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

                                          2
 1   would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

 2   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3       “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

 4   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

 5   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

 6   the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the

 7   applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the

 8   applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,

 9   the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the

10   consistency of such statements with other evidence of record

11   . . .    ,    without   regard   to     whether   an   inconsistency,

12   inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

13   claim,       or   any    other        relevant    factor.”       Id.

14   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).     “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility

15   determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,

16   it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

17   adverse credibility ruling.”           Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534

18   F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d

19   at 76.   Kazol alleged that members of the Awami League came

20   to his shop and assaulted him on account of his support for

21   the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) and beat and killed a

                                       3
 1   friend who was with him.         Substantial evidence supports the

 2   agency’s adverse credibility determination.

 3       The     only   exhausted    issue,      and    thus   the   only   issue

 4   properly before us, is Kazol’s challenge to the inconsistency

 5   as to what happened to the customers in his store when the

 6   members of the Awami League arrived.              Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d

 7   75, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (“To preserve a claim, we require

 8   petitioner to raise issues to the BIA in order to preserve

 9   them for judicial review.” (quotation marks and brackets

10   omitted)); accord Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 116

11   (2d Cir. 2022).     However, even if Kazol had exhausted all his

12   arguments,     substantial      evidence      supports      the    adverse

13   credibility determination.

14       The IJ reasonably relied on Kazol’s demeanor, noting that

15   his testimony was frequently non-responsive and vague, and

16   that many of his answers were confusing.                    See 8 U.S.C.

17   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).         We give “particular weight” to this

18   finding because “the IJ has the unique advantage . . . of

19   having    heard    directly    from   the    applicant.”        Majidi   v.

20   Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks

21   omitted).    The IJ was not compelled to assume that Kazol’s

22   lack of responsiveness was attributable to something other

                                           4
 1   than a lack of truthfulness, particularly as Kazol confirmed

 2   that he understood the questions.       See Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d

 3   137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that an IJ’s observation “that

 4   [the petitioner] was sometimes ‘non-responsive’ to questions

 5   . . . can raise concerns that a witness's testimony is based

 6   more on a script than on actual experience”).

 7         The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies in

 8   Kazol’s statements and between his statements and supporting

 9   documents.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).      The record

10   reflects inconsistencies as to (1) what happened to the

11   customers in his store when the Awami League attacked; (2)

12   the   medical    attention   Kazol   received   for   his   injuries

13   following the alleged attack; and (3) what happened to the

14   body of his friend whom he alleged was killed by the Awami

15   League.   The IJ was not compelled to credit his explanations

16   for these inconsistencies, see Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (“A

17   petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

18   for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

19   demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

20   to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)), and the

21   agency may rely on minor or tangential inconsistencies so

22   long as the totality of the circumstances supports the adverse

                                      5
 1   credibility determination, Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“Even

 2   where an IJ relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken

 3   separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the

 4   claim,   the    cumulative   effect     may    nevertheless     be    deemed

 5   consequential     by   the   fact-finder.”         (quotation   marks    and

 6   brackets omitted)).

 7         The agency also reasonably relied on a lack of reliable

 8   corroboration.     See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273

 9   (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or

10   her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

11   corroboration     in   general    makes       an   applicant    unable    to

12   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

13   question.”).     Kazol did not provide letters from the doctor

14   who treated him initially or from the family members or

15   friends who allegedly brought him to the hospital.                   And the

16   corroboration he did provide—an article and a letter from

17   another doctor—was inconsistent with his testimony.

18         In sum, the IJ’s demeanor finding, the inconsistencies,

19   and the lack of reliable corroboration constitute substantial

20   evidence for the adverse credibility determination.                   See 8

21   U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

22   The   adverse    credibility     determination       is   dispositive     of

                                         6
 1   asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief because all

 2   three   forms    of   relief   were   based   on   the   same   factual

 3   predicate.      See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d

 4   Cir. 2006).

 5       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 6   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

 7   stays VACATED.

 8                                    FOR THE COURT:
 9                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
10                                    Clerk of Court

                                       7