Court Opinion

ID: 9859694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:24:55.660533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:14.060138
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur that this case carries no cogent reason to change the measure of a landlord’s duty of care. But, that should not make the landlord-tenant classification inflexible. Ordinarily, tort liability of a landlord has little to do with the contract of tenancy. Generally, a landlord should be liable for lack of ordinary care, the standard of conduct for “everyone.” NDCC 9-10-06.
I also concur that there is no material issue of fact about whether this grain bin was a product or an improvement to real property. See Pacific Indemnity Company v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.1977). But, in reality, that difference shouldn’t be significant in assessing the constitutionality of statutes of repose. Statutes of repose are alike in arbitrarily barring claims before they accrue and in disregarding fault or wrongdoing. Statutes of repose should be scrutinized similarly, not differently.
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that NDCC 28-01-44 is constitutional. In my view, this statute is hardly distinguishable from the one invalidated in Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986).
The majority opinion has inverted the analytical instruments for examining such a statute, diminishing the importance of human life and safety and enlarging an unarticulated need for financial tranquility among designers and builders. Hanson began the inspection with a clearer focal point:
“While there are economic consequences ... underlying the legislation in question, we believe our focus must be on the individuals affected. We are unwilling to view human life and safety as simply a matter of economics. Therefore, we agree ... that the right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right, [citation omit*743ted.] We conclude that the appropriate standard of review to be applied ... is the intermediate standard or the close correspondence test.” Hanson, supra, 389 N.W.2d at 325.
In Hanson, we could not discern a close correspondence between the statutory classification created for makers of products and the stated legislative goals that would justify unequal treatment of some carelessly injured. Accordingly, we concluded that statute of repose violated Art. I, § 21 of our N.D. Constitution.
Today, the majority opinion professes to begin with an intermediate standard of review requiring a close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals. But, while Hanson rejected a stated legislative goal of affordable liability insurance for those who make products, the majority accepts an unstated legislative intention of limiting financial liability of those who make improvements to real property. The difference in legislative goals is hardly perceptible; the difference in judicial approach is palpable.
In marking a schizophrenic difference between a statute of repose for makers of improvements and one for makers of products, today’s majority opinion draws heavily on Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo.1982). Justice Gierke pointed out in Hanson, supra, 389 N.W.2d at 323, footnote 10, that the Colorado court used a rational basis test to scrutinize their statute of repose. Similarly, O’Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980), quoted by the majority to rationalize today’s decision, used a rational basis test, not a close correspondence one. Today’s use of Yarbro and O’Brien belies an intermediate or close correspondence scrutiny.
I agree that a reasonable classification does not violate Art. IV, § 43 and § 44, N.D.Constitution. I cannot approve this classification treating designers and contractors differently than materialmen. Like the differentiation between products and improvements, the difference between materialmen and makers is more whim than whit. Such undifferentiated particularity in limiting civil actions (subsection 10) and granting special immunities (subsection 20) is precisely the thing prohibited. See Pacific Indemnity Company v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.1977).
Following Hanson v. Williams County, supra, I would conclude that NDCC 28-01-44 is unconstitutional. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.