Court Opinion

ID: 9718603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:50.806208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.642503
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice.
Juvenile defendant, C. W. S., petitions this court for a writ of prohibition ordering the State of Minnesota to refrain from the pursuit of its appeal of the findings and recommendations of the juvenile court referee and restraining the juvenile court judge, the Honorable Lindsay G. Arthur, from granting the state a hearing on its purported appeal. The writ shall issue.
On May 5,1977, the state petitioned Hen-nepin County District Court, Juvenile Division, for an order declaring C. W. S. delinquent, alleging that on or about April 21, 1977, C. W. S. had entered certain described premises with intent to commit theft. Trial was held on July 11, 1977, before the Honorable Robert W. Martin, a referee and member of the bar.1 Referee Martin’s recommendation at the conclusion of the trial was that the state’s petition be dismissed.2 On July 15, 1977, the state filed a notice of appeal3 to the juvenile court, requesting that Judge Arthur review the findings and conclusions of the referee prior to his entry of the final order. The juvenile defendant’s motion to dismiss the state’s appeal was denied on August 16, 1977, and the petition to this court followed.
This court has power to issue writs where “necessary to the execution of the laws and the furtherance of justice.” Minn.St. 480.04. Writs of prohibition are issued to restrain action by a lower court “where it appears that the court is about to exceed its jurisdiction or where it appears the action of the court relates to a matter *498that is decisive of the case * * Thermorama, Inc. v. Schiller, 271 Minn. 79, 84, 135 N.W.2d 43, 46 (1965). Petitioner C. W. S. contends that the state’s appeal to Judge Arthur lacks necessary statutory authority and, further, that such review violates the double jeopardy protections announced in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). Because we conclude that the state has failed to demonstrate necessary statutory authority for its review request, we need not reach the constitutional issue.
The legislature, in establishing the juvenile court, acted in accordance with the philosophy that the separate treatment of children is a viable ideal. We recognize and strongly support the proposition that the juvenile court’s assumed ability to function in a unique manner means that adult criminal prosecutions and juvenile delinquency proceedings will not be equated for every purpose. We have no inclination to thus encourage the remanding of the disposition of children charged with crime to the criminal courts of this state. Nonetheless, in recent years the decisions of the United States Supreme Court4 and this court5 have recognized the relevance of constitutional guarantees and criminal procedural regularities in the juvenile court context.
It is axiomatic that the right of the state to appeal in criminal proceedings is contrary to common law and therefore must be expressly conferred by statute or must arise by necessary implication. State ex rel. King v. Ruegemer, 238 Minn. 440, 57 N.W.2d 153 (1953). The state’s special obligation in the context of juvenile proceedings to proceed in the best interest of the juvenile as well as society does not compel a relaxation of that standard. “[T]he admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1054, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94 (1966). Our decisions have consistently recognized the necessity of statutory authority for juvenile appellate procedure. See, In re Welfare of Fields, 285 Minn. 184, 172 N.W.2d 322 (1969); State v. Zenzen, 178 Minn. 394, 227 N.W. 356 (1929).. Considerations of “fundamental fairness,” at the least, compel us to require the state to demonstrate statutory authority for the course of action it proposes. This the state has failed to do. Rule 7.11, Hennepin County Juvenile Court Rules, permitting the state to “appeal” the decisions of a referee, is insufficient. While the juvenile court judge is authorized to promulgate court rules, no authority is given by Minn.St. 480.055, subd. 1, to set up rules in contravention of statute. The state is conspicuously absent from the list of parties specifically authorized by Minn.St. 260.031, subd. 4, to demand that the juvenile court judge review the findings and recommendations of the referee prior to entry of the final order.6 The omission is significant, given the specific authorization for the state in similar provisions in other jurisdictions,7 *499and the more general provision allowing “persons aggrieved” to appeal the final orders to this court.8 That phrase, of course, includes the state. In re Welfare of I. Q. S., 309 Minn. 78, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976). Thus, we conclude that the state is without authority to request the juvenile court judge to review the referee’s findings and recommendations. This holding does not affect the duty of the trial judge to review the referee’s determination and exercise his judgment to confirm or reject it in whole or in part. Petitioner’s request for a writ of prohibition is granted.
The petition is granted.

. The juvenile court judge is authorized to appoint suitable persons, qualified by training and experience, to serve as referees, Minn.St. 260.-031, subd. 1, and may direct them to initially hear any case or class of cases. Minn.St. 260.-031, subd. 2.
Adjudicatory proceedings upon a delinquency petition may be handled by a referee. Rule 43, Hennepin County Juvenile Court Rules; Rule 6.1, Hennepin County Juvenile Court Rules, effective July, 1977.

. Recommendations by the referee-are subject to final confirmation by the juvenile court judge. Minn.St. 260.031, subd. 3
Written findings and recommendations, required by Minn.St. 260.031, subd. 3, were not provided by the referee; however, the bases for dismissal are evident from the grounds asserted in the state’s notice of appeal to the juvenile court:
“1. That the Court erred in finding that there was no Probable Cause to arrest the Respondent.
“2. That the Court erred in suppressing the statement obtained from the Respondent.
“3. That the Court erred in suppressing evidence seized from the automobile in which the Respondent was stopped.
“4. That the Court erred in holding that the testimony of an accomplice implicating the Respondent in the burglary was uncorroborated.”

.The term “notice of appeal” was the caption originally used by the state. The state now prefers to refer to it as a “request for review,” noting that the Interim Commission Comment (1959), 17 M.S.A. p. 557, accompanying § 260.-031, subd. 4, states the “hearing [on the referee’s findings] before the judge is not in the nature of an appeal, as it is in the Standard [Juvenile Court] Act.” That comment, however, refers to the standard of review applicable — L.1959, c. 685, § 5, deleted portions of L.1957, c. 742, § 4, subd. 3, which made the referee’s findings “prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein” upon rehearing before '• the juvenile court judge.
Our primary concern is the practical effect and operation of the state’s request, not the particular label applied.

. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (notice of charges; right to counsel; right of confrontation and cross-examination; privilege against self-incrimination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (double jeopardy). But, see, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (denial of trial by jury did not offend “fundamental fairness” under the due process standard in juvenile court context).

. In re Welfare of Raino v. State, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 398 (1977) (notice of charges); In re Welfare of T. D. F., Minn., 258 N.W.2d 774 (1977) (right to effective counsel): But, see, In re Welfare of Spencer, 288 Minn. 119, 179 N.W.2d 95 (1970) (pretrial hearing to determine admissibility of evidence not mandatory).

. Minn.St. 260.031, subd. 4, provides: “The minor and his parents, guardians, or custodians are entitled to a hearing by the judge of the juvenile court if, within three days after receiving notice of the findings of the referee, they file a request with the court for a hearing. The court may allow such a hearing at any time.”

. Brady v. Swisher, 436 F.Supp. 1361 (D.Md.1977); Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F.Supp. 1161 (D.Md.1975); Jesse W. v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.App.3d 408, 133 Cal.Rptr. 870 (1976); and Matter of Maricopa County, 26 Ariz.App. 518, 549 P.2d 613 (1976) (reached the double jeopardy issue only after noting explicit statutory authority for the state’s request to the juvenile *499court judge for review of the referee’s findings).

. Minn.St. 260.291, subd. 1, states: “An appeal may be taken by the aggrieved person from a final order affecting a substantial right of the aggrieved person, including but not limited to an order adjudging a child to be dependent, neglected, delinquent, or a juvenile traffic offender. * * * ”