Court Opinion

ID: 9458706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:59:47.492645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:52.133863
License: Public Domain

WEICK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
It was not controverted that Huffman did indeed write and mail the letters to the President and Vice President of the United States, threatening to kill them and the President’s daughter, and threatening to have killed the Secretaries of State and Interior and J. Edgar Hoover, and making demands for the payment of large sums of money.
Huffman's only defense was insanity, and the proof on this issue was sharply in dispute. A psychologist testified for Huffman, and a psychiatrist testified for the Government. Huffman was an admitted homosexual and had a criminal record, but this does not constitute proof of insanity. The District Court properly submitted to the jury the issue of insanity. The jury was not impressed with Huffman’s insanity defense, and found him guilty on all three counts of the indictment. The Court does not question that the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Huffman had been convicted previously and had served a prison sentence for threatening the life of the President of the United States.
This Court nevertheless is reversing the judgment of conviction and is granting a new trial on two grounds, each of which, as I will point out, is purely technical and has no substance.
First, the majority opinion states:
“ . . . [T]he court did not give counsel an opportunity to object to its instructions after they had been given and before the jury had begun its deliberations as required by Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” 1
*196This claim is refuted by the record from which the Court quotes in its opinion:
“In this case the following proceedings occurred after the court delivered its instructions:
By the Court:
Now, any — any request for any further instructions ?
All of the jury must agree — any objections or exceptions?
Mr. Warner [defense counsel]: May I approach the bench? I’ve got one or two points. Are we going to argue that now ?
By the Court: We can go ahead and take them up while they’re out.
Mr. Warner: All right.”
It thus appears that counsel for defendant did ask the Court for permission to approach the bench, stating that he had one or two points. He further asked, “Are we going to argue that now?” The Court replied, “We can go ahead and take them up while they’re out.” Defendant’s counsel agreed by stating, “All right.” He made no objection to that procedure, but on the contrary agreed to it.
Rule 51 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a party make “known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefor . . . .” McNeely v. United States, 353 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1965); Petro v. United States, 210 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 978, 74 S.Ct. 790, 98 L.Ed. 1116 (1964).
Counsel did make known to the Court his acquiescence in and agreement with the action which the Court was taking by replying, “All right.” He never made an objection thereto.
The second alleged error is that the Court in giving an otherwise perfect instruction on insanity under the ALI rule adopted by a panel of this Court in United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968), instructed the jury further as follows:
“As used in these instructions, the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.”
This instruction correctly embodied Section 4.01(2) of the Official Draft of the ALI Model Penal Code, (1962). However, in Smith, after adopting the Code, the panel in footnote 8 stated:
“8 We do not, however, adopt the following additional definition endorsed by the ALI: ‘As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.’ Model Penal Code § 4.01(2) (Official Draft, 1962). The purpose of this definitional sentence was obviously to exclude from the definition of insanity ‘psychopathic personalities’ who demonstrate mental abnormality principally by habitual violation of the law. The ALI commentators argue that to date mental health facilities in this nation offer little hope for curative treatment of these persons, and that mental health facilities are already overburdened by patients as to whom the prospects for successful treatment are considerably brighter. There is, however, great dispute over the psychiatric soundness of section 4.01(2). See Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiatrist’s Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J. 527, 530 (1962), Diamond, From M’Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 Calif.L.Rev. 189, 193-94 (1962).” (Id. at 727).
The defendant did not call to the attention of the District Court at any time the fact that footnote 8 of Smith did not adopt Section 4.01(2) of the ALI Model *197Penal Code, and the Court was given no opportunity to correct the instruction which he had given to the jury.
Rule 30 is clear that—
“No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.”
Defendant made no such objection, either before or after the jury returned to conduct its deliberations.
While the jury was still deliberating, the following did take place, as quoted in the Court’s opinion:
“Mr. Warner: Judge, I’ve got one —two specific objections to the instructions as given.
The other objection I have, sir, is again based on our discussion in chambers previously that I don’t feel that the instructions which were given relative to the mental issue adequately covered the related issue of diminished capacity. I think there is too much in there about sanity and insanity, and I feel that we were entitled, or we are entitled, to have the jury instructed specifically on that issue as tendered in my instructions.”
It is clear that these objections did not call to the Court’s attention anything concerning the instruction on Section 4.01(2) of the ALI Model Penal Code. Defendant was complaining only that the Court did not give his special requests, and he was asking the Court to give them. The Court previously had refused to give such requests in the language employed by defendant, although part of them were given in the general charge. These requests are contained in footnote 2.2
*198In his brief, counsel for appellant 'states:
“Finally, while the Court discussed both sets of tendered instructions with counsel during a recess in the trial before the jury was instructed, and indicated that the defendant’s instructions, as tendered, were to be rejected, counsel for defendant was given no opportunity to state or argue his objections to the instructions as actually given by the Court, before the jury began its deliberations, as required by Rule 30, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [T. of E., pp. 208-210].” (Brief, p. 17).
It is clear from this statement that counsel was fully advised by the Court that his requests for instructions were rejected, but he is now complaining that he was given no opportunity to again argue thém before the jury began its deliberations. As I have previously pointed out, he consented to argue the matter after submission. None of the requests dealt with Section 4.01(2) of the Model Code.
In his brief, in stating the issues presented for review as required by Rule 28(a)(2) Federal R.App.P., appellant stated:
“I. Did the trial court err in failing and refusing to give an instruction with respect to specific intent as requested by the defendant-appellant?
“II. Did the trial court err in failing and refusing to give an instruction with respect to diminished capacity or irresistible impulse as requested by the defendant-appellant ?
“III. Was the evidence presented to the jury sufficient, as a matter of law, to permit the jury reasonably to have found the defendant-appellant criminally responsible ?”
It is submitted that none of these issues relate to Section 4.01(2) of the Model Code and the defendant made no such claim in his brief as ground for reversal.
A brief comment on footnote 8 in Smith. The footnote states: “There is, however, a great dispute over the psychiatric soundness of section 4.01(2).” In support of this statement two articles by psychiatrists are cited. No legal authority is cited holding that this ALI section is not a sound statement of the law.
I hope the day has not yet arrived when any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct will be considered as a mental disease or defect, proof of which will be a defense to a criminal charge. *199If such were ever permitted, a rapist, a burglar, robber, thief, molester of children, and a murderer would have a complete defense merely by proving that he committed such antisocial acts in the past to establish his insanity.
Footnote 8 in Smith does not hold that it is prejudicial error for a Court to charge on Section 4.01(2).
In my opinion, it was proper and was not plain error to charge on Section 4.-01(2). The rule which permits but does not require the Court to notice plain errors not brought to the attention of the District Court, was not intended to destroy Rule 30. United States v. Graydon, 429 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1970).
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

. Rule 30, Fed.R.Crim.P. provides:
“At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to adverse parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after tire arguments are completed. No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless lie objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Oppor-*196timity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury.” As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.

. Comes now the Defendant, Marvin Ray Huffman, by his counsel, and, pursuant to Rule 30, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requests tlie Court to instruct the jury on the law in this ease as follows :
1. “To constitute the crime charged in the indictment, there must be a joint operation of two essential elements, an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.
“Before Defendant may be found guilty of a crime the prosecution must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that under the Statute described in these instructions, Defendant was forbidden to do the act charged in the indictment, and that he intentionally committed the act.
“The crime charged in this case is a serious ci'ime which requires proof of specific intent before the Defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent, the Government must prove that Defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposefully intending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
“An act or a failure to act is ‘knowingly’ done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of some other reason.
“If the evidence in the case should leave you with a reasonable doubt, whether at the time and idace of the alleged offense, the accused acted, or failed to act, was forced, in effect, to commit the crime charged in the indictment by coercion or compulsion, then you should acquit the accused.
2. “Under the Defendant’s plea of ‘not guilty’ there is an issue as to his sanity at the time of the alleged offense. The law does not hold a person criminally accountable for his conduct while insane, since an insane person is not capable of forming the intent essential to the commission of a crime.
“The sanity of the Defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses, is an element of the crime charged and must be established by the Government beyond reasonable doubt, just as it must establish every other element of the offense charged.
“A Defendant is insane within the meaning of these instructions, if, at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the lawfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
“Notwithstanding the fact that one accused of committing a crime may have been able to comprehend the nature and *198consequenees of his act, and to know that it was wrong, nevertheless, if he was forced to its execution by an impulse which he was powerless to control, in consequence of a mental disease or defect, he will be acquitted.
“A person accused of a crime is not responsible unless he had sufficient will power to control his impulse to commit the act charged.
“For the purpose of throwing light upon the mental condition of the accused at the time of the alleged offense, the Jury may consider evidence of his mental state both before and after the time. The material issue, however, is whether the Defendant was sane or insane at the time of the alleged criminal conduct.
“Temporary insanity, as well as insanity of longer duration, is recognized by the law.
“If the evidence in the case leaves you with a reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendant was sane at the time of alleged offense, you will find him not guilty, even though it may appear that he was sane at earlier and later times.
3. “Where a Defendant has raised the issue of his insanity, and the jury finds from the evidence in the case beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not insane at the time of the alleged offense, it is still the duty of the jury to consider all the evidence in the case which may aid determination of state of mind, including all evidence offered on the issue as to insanity, in order to determine whether the Defendant acted or failed to act with specific intent, as charged.
“If the evidence in the case leaves the jury with a reasonable doubt whether the mind of the accused was capable of forming, or did form, specific intent to commit the crime charged, the jury should acquit the accused.”