Court Opinion

ID: 9697242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:09:20.517947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:30.071593
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, J.
(concurring). I concur with Judge BATZER’s opinion. I write separately to address briefly the dissent.
The dissent contends that “the trial court should have considered accessory after the fact as a cognate lesser included offense under the facts of this case because that offense is related to the arson murder offenses and of the same class or category as those *546offenses . . . Post, p 547. In support of the conclusion that accessory activities are of the same class or category as arson and murder, the dissent asserts: “The purpose of making accessory activities a crime is to prevent the underlying crime itself by facilitating its detection and prosecution. Prohibitions against both accessory activities and underlying crimes fulfill the same social objective, i.e., preventing the underlying criminal activity . . . .” Post, p 547, n 1.
I respectfully disagree. As explained by our Supreme Court in People v Lucas, 402 Mich 302, 304; 262 NW2d 662 (1978), quoting Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), p 667, an accessory after the fact is “one who, with knowledge of the other’s guilt, renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial or punishment.” An accessory after the fact is punished because he obstructs the path of justice, rendering societal retribution less assured. An accessory is not punished in a misguided effort to deter another individual, the perpetrator of the underlying crime, from committing the crime.