Court Opinion

ID: 9747003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:52:06.947794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.272274
License: Public Domain

ZEBROWSKI, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — How far can a new concept stretch? How should it fit with other, preexisting, concepts? These are recurrent issues, and they arise here. Here we consider the reach of the new concept embodied in the SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. As a legislative creation, its reach is defined by legislative intent. Clearly it is intended to protect the exercise of free speech rights from the burdens of unmeritorious litigation, and to do so at an early stage. The majority quite properly emphasizes this objective, and places an expansive construction on the statute. However, notwithstanding my respect .for the opinion of my colleagues and the expansive reading they give to this aspect of the Legislature’s intent, and even though the Legislature has expressly directed that the statute be construed “broadly,” I do not agree that the Legislature intended the SLAPP concept to reach quite so far as the majority holds.
Here we consider an article about a “spin doctor.” Yet at this stage of the proceedings, the record does not permit determination of who is doing the spinning. Any legal conclusions we draw must be uninfluenced by any assumption that the factual allegations in the article are true. The evidence is in conflict and, so far as we know, the factual allegations in the article could be substantially false.
*251I nevertheless agree that much of the article appears entitled to SLAPP protection. Much of it appears to be extracted from the records of the custody trial or depositions. A true report of such matters is privileged. However, it cannot be definitively determined from this record exactly what allegations are taken from court records or depositions, and what come from other sources. There are two reasons for this uncertainty. The first is the story-like manner in which the article is written. It does not directly link particular sources with particular allegations. Instead it appears to attempt to create an impression that substantiation exists even though none can be cited. The second reason for the uncertainty is that the SLAPP motion, and its ban on discovery, shortstopped development of a record which might have more clearly identified the sources for the various allegations.
Although respondents filed papers purporting to demonstrate that many of the allegedly defamatory statements in the article were taken from court records, their effort was in many instances misleading. A few examples: as a purported record source for the allegation that appellant hit his wife “in the shoulder — hard,” respondents cite only to a transcript containing the question “Have you ever seen him strike your sister Regina?” and the answer “Yes.” There is no record source cited for the embellishment, and it may be false. As a record source for the allegation that appellant “abruptly slapped [his wife] in the face in the school parking lot during [his wife’s] tenth high school reunion,” respondents cite only to a transcript containing the question “Did he ever hit you in a public place . . .” and the answer “Yes.” There is no record source for the further embellishments, and they may be false. As to many of the other allegedly defamatory statements contained in the article, there is no citation whatever to any record source. Hence uncertainty remains about the origin of many of the allegations; apparently respondents concede that many were not drawn from court records or depositions.
The rulings of the trial court and the majority suggest that my concern about sources may be unwarranted, since they find the entire article privileged. I appreciate this view, but take a different one with regard to those portions of the article which have their sources outside the court records or depositions. It is with regard to these latter allegations, not drawn from court records or depositions (the precise identity and origin of which would have to be developed by further proceedings) that I dissent.
The majority affirms with respect to allegations in the latter class on two grounds. First, the majority concludes that they do not alter the “gist and sting” of the privileged material extracted from court records and depositions (hereafter collectively referred to as “litigation records”). For two reasons, I view the “gist and sting” issue differently:
1) First, as noted above, it is not completely clear just which allegations come from clearly privileged litigation records, and which come from other *252sources. Before the “gist and sting” of the material from the litigation records can be accurately characterized, that material must first be identified, segregated from the other material, and separately evaluated. If respondents can cite no sources in the litigation records other than those cited in this record, I would find the “gist and sting” substantially altered and magnified by the article. The more graphic allegations of spousal violence which seem not to have emanated from litigation records alter the “gist and sting” in two ways. First, they magnify it by suggesting that these incidents occurred with significantly greater frequency than is reflected in the litigation records. Second, they magnify it by suggesting a higher level of severity. In considering this point, as well as the others above, we must bear in mind that, so far as we are entitled to assume on a SLAPP motion, these allegations may be false. (Cf. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 46] [on SLAPP motion, court determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented to demonstrate a prima facie case, does not weigh evidence]; Church of Scientology v. Wol-lersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 620] [test on SLAPP motion similar to that on summary judgment motion].)
2) Some unattributed allegations are particularly injurious. For example, one allegation from the article for which no source in litigation records is cited is the allegation that appellant referred to his wife as a “cunt.” This word has been in use at least since Shakespearian times, and its connotation, if not its literal meaning, may have varied over the centuries. However, given what appears to be its modem pejorative connotation, a reasonable jury could find this accusation to be of a kind different from the allegations of spousal mistreatment taken from the litigation records. It suggests not only difficulty with temper and conduct control, but also a mindset disdainful and disrespectful of women. The libelous extent of such an accusation under the circumstances presented is a jury question which I cannot answer here, but a jury might find, upon complete development of the facts, that such an accusation is even more injurious to a person in appellant’s position than the accusations which emanate from privileged sources. (Cf. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1991) 501 U.S. 496, 511 [111 S.Ct. 2419, 2430, 115 L.Ed.2d 447] [false attribution of quote “may result in injury to reputation because the manner of expression or even the fact that the statement was made indicates a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not hold”].)
The majority also affirms as to those statements not having their source in the litigation records on the second ground that appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence of constitutional malice. I concur that appellant must present evidence of malice, and also concur that the evidence presented by appellant falls short of that necessary to support a finding of *253constitutional malice by the clear and convincing standard. There are, however, a number of factors that are sufficient to support at least a reasonable suspicion of constitutional malice. Although reasonable suspicion alone will not either support a judgment or defeat a SLAPP motion, it ought to be enough to require discovery. Malice in this context would mean that respondents either subjectively doubted the veracity of some of the accusations they were publishing, or harbored a reckless lack of concern for veracity. Such a subjective state of mind is unlikely to be admitted; circumstantial evidence is the primary method of proof. Yet appellant had no opportunity to compel the production of evidence regarding the manner in which Blow conducted his investigation, possible editorial pressures to sensationalize or distort, why he omitted material which could cast doubt on the veracity of the accusations, why he omitted material favorable to appellant, the extent to which he inquired why the long dormant events chronicled in his article were not contemporaneously reported, etc. Not every case will raise the reasonable bases for suspecting constitutional malice that are reflected in this record, hence the exception in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 which allows discovery only upon a showing of good cause would not swallow the general rule of no discovery before ruling on a SLAPP motion.
The words of Lafayette Morehouse are prophetic in this connection: “We acknowledge, however, that the discovery stay and 30-day hearing requirement of section 425.16 literally applied in all cases might well adversely implicate a plaintiff’s due process rights, particularly in a libel suit against a media defendant. . . . That opportunity [for discovery] if sought is of prime import in a libel suit against a media defendant who will generally be the principal, if not the only, source of evidence concerning such matters as whether that defendant knew the statement published was false, or published the statement in reckless disregard of whether the matter was false and defamatory. ... If the plaintiff makes a timely and proper showing in response to the motion to strike, that a defendant or witness possesses evidence needed by plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must be given the reasonable opportunity to obtain that evidence through discovery before the motion to strike is adjudicated.” (Lafayette Morehouse Inc., v. Chronicle Publishing Co., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 867-868.) Appellant had no access to evidence on the ultimate issue — the respondents’ state of mind. The record does reflect that many of the accusations in the article were not drawn from litigation records. Appellant did cite Lafayette Morehouse to the trial court, but the trial court nevertheless denied any discovery. Both the trial court and the majority opinion find that appellant failed to make a sufficient showing of what additional facts he expected to discover. It seems reasonably clear from the context, however, that the issue was constitutional malice and the need was to inquire into possible circumstantial evidence of constitutional malice.
*254Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., supra, 501 U.S. 496, is also instructive. Masson was decided in 1991. It reviewed a summary judgment granted by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in a 1987 libel case. The summary judgment was granted only after “extensive discovery.” (Id. at pp. 501-502 [111 S.Ct. at p. 2425].) In Masson, the United States Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, finding evidence that the author had attributed false quotations to the plaintiff and that the evidence the plaintiff was able to present, by virtue of the “extensive discovery,” constituted substantial evidence which “would support a jury determination under a clear and convincing standard” that the author had acted with constitutional malice. (Id. at p. 521 [111 S.Ct. at p. 2435].) Masson is now the leading United States Supreme Court case on the subject of defamation and the use of quotations. However, Masson was decided in federal court and before the SLAPP statute was enacted in 1992. If the SLAPP statute had been applied to Masson, and if the majority opinion is correct and I am mistaken, we would not now have the benefit of Masson’s guidance on defamation and the use of quotations, for the Masson case would never have survived the inevitable SLAPP motion. Instead of a remand for trial, the Masson plaintiff would have obtained only a summary dismissal, coupled with an order to pay his opponent’s attorney’s fees.
Although it is common to think first of the First Amendment when thinking of defamation law, defamation is a state law tort. The First Amendment simply places constitutional limitations on the permissible extent of state law on this subject. As a state law tort, defamation is subject to structuring and limitation by state legislation. If the Legislature chose to curtail the availability of remedies for defamation under state law as severely as the majority finds, the Legislature could properly do so. The question is whether the Legislature so intended in enacting the SLAPP statute. In this connection, it may be instructive to note that by parity of reasoning with those portions of the majority opinion with which I concur, a similar article about the marital experiences of a state legislator would also be a matter of public interest. A legislator’s defamation suit would similarly be vulnerable to summary SLAPP dismissal without discovery. Appellant is alleged to be a public figure because he affects the course of law and public policy by producing advertisements. State legislators affect law and public policy much more directly, by directly enacting law and setting policy, and hence are even more clearly public figures. I doubt that the legislators who voted for the SLAPP statute intended it to permit respondents to publish an article falsely accusing a male legislator of referring to his wife as a “cunt” while, in practical effect, insulating respondents from any legal consequences and leaving the maligned legislator without recourse. Yet without the means to delve into the circumstantial evidence necessary to demonstrate respondents’ *255state of mind, which evidence would be necessary to demonstrate constitutional malice, the legislator’s defamation action would be “SLAPPed” down in short order and he would be ordered to pay respondents’ attorney’s fees. I doubt that the legislators who enacted the SLAPP statute intended it to reach so far and to constrict defamation protections so tightly.
Nor should a decision that the media may publish false reports with virtual impunity be applauded as a victory for the free press. The constitutional value of a free press is that it is free to inform, not that it is free to deliberately or recklessly misinform. As public confidence in the veracity of the press declines, so too does the constitutional value of a free press. (Cf. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., supra, 501 U.S. 496 at p. 520 [111 S.Ct. at p. 2434] [“By eliminating any method of distinguishing between the statements of the subject and the interpretation of the author, we would diminish to a great degree the trustworthiness of the printed word and eliminate the real meaning of quotations. Not only public figures but the press doubtless would suffer under such a rule. . . . We would ill serve the values of the First Amendment if we were to grant a near absolute, constitutional protection for such a practice.”].)
I concur that the Mother Jones article concerned a matter of public interest. I concur that those allegations which were extracted from the litigation records are privileged. I concur that any additional allegations which did not alter the “gist and sting” of those extracted from the litigation records are also privileged. I also concur that appellant is a public figure who must present evidence of constitutional malice by a clear and convincing standard. I further concur that respondents are entitled to the protection of the SLAPP statute. I dissent from the majority holding that the allegations drawn from sources other than the litigation records did not alter the “gist and sting” of the privileged allegations, and were hence themselves privileged. I also dissent from the majority holding that appellant was not entitled to discovery on the issue of constitutional malice. I would reverse and direct the trial court to consider respondents’ SLAPP motion anew after allowing reasonable discovery and additional briefing.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 28, 1999.