Court Opinion

ID: 9744916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:22:56.003874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:53.402928
License: Public Domain

O’LEARY, Acting P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
Citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] (Aguilar), the majority sets forth the principles of summary judgment review. I agree with these well-settled principles. I also note the Supreme Court in Aguilar instructs us to consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the *216motion. (Id. at p. 843.) It is well established that when reviewing a summary judgment motion, “the court may not weigh the plaintiff’s evidence or inferences against the defendants’ as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 856.) But, the court “must nevertheless determine what any evidence or inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.” (Ibid.)
These rules implicitly recognize that reasonable triers of fact often can read the evidence differently and draw different inferences. As I will explain anon, I conclude from the record before us that Shane Lachtman established disputed issues of material facts as to his claims regarding due process (fourth cause of action). I concur in the majority’s reversal of the summary adjudication of the sixth and seventh causes of action regarding the fellowship award. I would affirm the summary adjudication of the remaining causes of action.
With respect to the due process claim, the majority summarily states the evidence regarding Lachtman’s dismissal from the Ph.D. program as follows: “After his first year, Lachtman was informed of deficiencies in his academic performance and of certain requirements, including improvement in his writing, he needed to meet to advance to the Ph.D. program. In February 2003, three professors in the History Department evaluated Lachtman’s writing, determined it had not improved and was not good enough for the Ph.D. program, and concluded Lachtman displayed limited interest in essential areas outside of his narrow field of academic interest. As a result, the History Department denied . . . Lachtman advancement to the department’s Ph.D. program, and he ultimately received a master’s degree.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 191.) Upon these facts, the majority concludes, “the University satisfied procedural due process by informing Lachtman of the deficiencies of his performance and the consequences they posed to his advancement, and by making a considered, deliberate decision.” (Id. at p. 201.)
Based on the majority’s recitation of the facts, its conclusion the University of California, Irvine’s (University) dismissal of Lachtman comported with due process requirements is not unreasonable. However, the facts I glean from the record are not so straightforward. I conclude Lachtman established the existence of triable issues of material facts, and I would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment as it pertains to the due process cause of action.
It is important to recognize from the outset that Lachtman was subjected to two separate evaluations. The first evaluation occurred at the end of Lachtman’s first year. Lachtman received a June 2002 letter stating his academic progress was unsatisfactory and notifying him it was recommended he not continue in *217the graduate program. He was provided no specifics as to deficiencies and no opportunity to improve. The letter was from the chair of the history department (History Department), Kenneth Pomeranz, and stated, “The faculty members who taught you in courses during 2001-2002 in the History Department met this week to conduct our review of your academic performance during your first year. Based on our overall assessment of your performance in your first-year classes, we see little prospect of [you] successfully completing the doctoral program, and thus we do not recommend your continuation in the program.”
As the majority indicates, “Lachtman disputed the first-year review committee’s decision.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 202.) They characterize his argument as being focused on the “factual dispute over who served on the first-year review committee, arguing professors holding favorable opinions of him were excluded from it.” (Ibid.) The majority concludes this factual dispute, if real, is immaterial because the History Department granted Lachtman an opportunity after his first-year review to advance to the Ph.D. program by fulfilling certain requirements.
Unlike the majority, I view the disputes regarding the first-year review to be an integral part of the due process analysis and the facts involved in that dispute material to the ultimate decision as to whether Lachtman was afforded due process before his termination from the Ph.D. program. Lachtman’s dispute with the first-year review is more complex than being about who participated in the review.
Lachtman asserts it was a written complaint he lodged against one of his first-year professors that was the real impetus for his dismissal, not poor academic performance. The composition of the first-year committee denied him a fair review and the committee was preordained to dismiss him for reasons unrelated to his academic performance. It is reasonable to infer that if, in fact, the first-year review resulted from animus against Lachtman rather than an honest and objective assessment of his performance, or violated his due process rights for other reasons, he was then unfairly subjected to further critical review. Rather than eradicating any errors in the first review, improperly subjecting Lachtman to a second review would only have compounded the problems from the first review and given greater credence to Lachtman’s claim he was wrongly dismissed. Thus, while some may view any deficiencies in the first-year review as immaterial to the due process claim, I conclude a reasonable trier of fact may agree with Lachtman’s assertion it was merely the starting point for his due process claim.
Lachtman argues his problems with the History Department, and dismissal from the program, all stem from a clash he had with Professor Sharon Block.
*218He asserts the criticism he leveled against Block (while attempting to substitute her class with another) ruined his reputation among the History Department’s faculty and was the actual basis for his dismissal. If the facts were found to be as Lachtman portrays them, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude Lachtman’s ultimate exclusion from the Ph.D. program was the result of bad faith and not the result of a careful and deliberate examination of his graduate work.
There is no dispute Lachtman enrolled in a required course taught by Block during his first quarter at the University, or that he only attended two class sessions before dropping it. After dropping the class, Lachtman petitioned to substitute a class in the place of the dropped class. In his petition, Lachtman explained his request “is necessitated by the unfortunate and irreparable damage done to the faculty-student relationship between . . . Block and me, which forced me to drop the class in Fall 2001.” He claimed the damage occurred “because during a meeting . . . Block expressed negative opinions about me as a person that were unrelated to academic criticism or feedback.” He opined, “important professional boundaries had been dramatically violated.” Lachtman stated he respected Block’s right to privacy and, therefore, he would “not presents specific statements, facts, occurrences, conversations, etc., however important, because . . . Block is not formally included in this process.” Lachtman filed his inflammatory petition criticizing Block on March 30, 2002, approximately two months before receiving his first-year review in early June.
This petition was reviewed by the graduate program committee (GPC), which was comprised of three History Department faculty members: Jon Wiener, Dickson Bruce, and Carolyn Boyd. Immediately after filing his petition, Lachtman claims he experienced retaliation from Block’s colleagues. First, Boyd wrote a letter on behalf of the GPC, chastising Lachtman for the contents of his petition and calling into question his personal ethics. She told Lachtman the GPC could not consider his petition, and he must resubmit one to (1) “state clearly the reasons for an exemption from departmental requirements”; (2) remove references to the sexual harassment portion of the University’s policies and procedures unless he is charging Block with sexual harassment; and (3) state which course he proposes to substitute for the required course. Boyd concluded by stating Carol Sokolov, in the office of research and graduate studies, had indicated Lachtman had complained the GPC had denied his petition “when in fact [he] had not yet even submitted a petition .... Please make an effort, as you rewrite your petition, to be as truthful and as accurate in your statements as possible, and please observe the established departmental procedures for handling student requests.” Lachtman read this to mean the GPC members thought he was lying.
*219At the time he filed his petition, Lachtman was taking a class from Wiener. He asserts that within a few days after filing the petition, he experienced retaliation from Wiener. Lachtman indicates Wiener told him to leave the program because his interests and passions were too narrow for the program. Wiener explained Lachtman’s interest was racism in baseball and he had not “shown much interest in the broader concerns of our program. So I told him it would be better for him to transfer to another University that had a . . . sociology program in sports or history of sports program[s].”
Lachtman claims Wiener’s comment suggesting his interests were too narrow surprised him because it was the first time he had heard this criticism. Lachtman claims he had not yet chosen a thesis topic or specific area of scholarship because normally this is not done until the third year of graduate school. Moreover, Wiener had previously approved Lachtman’s baseball/race writing focus in his own courses and for Lachtman’s admission to the History Department’s graduate program.
Wiener admitted in his deposition that he urged Lachtman to leave the program, and offered to help him apply, “not because he lacked ability but because . . . there were other programs where he could thrive and that would appreciate him.” Wiener also admitted in his deposition that Lachtman’s petition criticizing Block affected his evaluation of him. He thought Lachtman’s “reasoning was very unclear, his reference to right of privacy and his invocation of sexual harassment language seemed wrong and inappropriate to me.” Lachtman points out Wiener served on every committee that evaluated him in the months to come, and voted against him every time.
There is a factual dispute as to whether Block participated in Lachtman’s first-year review. Both Davis and Wiener testified Block actively participated on the first-year review committee. Wiener recalled Block telling everyone Lachtman’s “work was not adequate and he should not continue in the program.” The University indicated in discovery responses that Block did not participate in any way. It is undisputed Lachtman brutally criticized Block in his petition to substitute her class. And, it is also undisputed Block was Lachtman’s instructor for only a very limited period of time, only three hours before he dropped her course. The participation of Block is a material fact because a determination Block took part in the review would be relevant and probative on the issue of the History Department’s alleged bad faith.
In addition to questions surrounding Block’s participation, the parties do not agree on whether Pomeranz, Mike Davis, Yong Chen, or some of the other professors who taught Lachtman were involved in the decisionmaking process. The inclusion or exclusion of certain faculty members is material because it bears directly on the University’s intent. Did the first-year review *220comport with accepted academic norms? If the deck was stacked against Lachtman because of his nasty attack on Block, a reasonable person would not find the decision to be a conscientious, careful, and deliberate exercise of professional judgment.
Lachtman maintains the review should have been conducted by all the faculty members who had taught him during the year and the most weight should have been given to the opinions of professors who shared his interests (Professors Davis and Chen). Pomeranz, in his deposition, agreed that usually the review is attended by “everybody who has taught the student.” Wiener concurred, “It’s a standard procedure that everybody who taught a student would be scheduled to participate in the evaluation of that student.”
Wiener testified Davis was a part of the first-year review committee. Davis, however, testified he played no part in that committee’s decisionmaking. Davis remembered being called in by the first-year review committee to give it his impression of Lachtman. Davis recounted, “I said something to the effect that maybe he just—you know, there was unfortunate chemistry in the choice of who he was working with. ... I told my colleagues I thought we probably could work well together.” Davis stated he was “then confronted by it seemed to be overwhelming opinion from the other faculty about [Lachtman’s] performance ... in their seminars. And these are situations very different from the guided research he was doing with me.” Davis had two classes (both entitled “Directed Readings”) with Lachtman and gave him two “A” grades (spring 2002 and fall 2002). It is also unclear whether Chen was part of the first-year review committee. Wiener recalled he was part of the meeting, but did not remember how he voted. Lachtman argued Chen was excluded.
Two material issues arise out of the dispute as to whether Davis and Chen were included in the first-year review committee. Did the University depart from its usual practice of including everybody who had taught Lachtman in the review? Were professors holding a favorable opinion of Lachtman’s academic progress excluded from the committee? Both determinations are material in determining whether the procedures used to dismiss Lachtman departed from accepted academic norms. If Chen was excluded it would be evidence of a substantial departure from the academic norm because Chen was slated to be Lachtman’s adviser.
Whether Pomeranz served on the first-year review committee was also disputed. Davis recalled he was there. But, Pomeranz stated in his deposition he did not teach Lachtman during the first year of study and he was not part of the review. This dispute is material because the inclusion of faculty who had no personal knowledge of the student’s performance would be outside the normal practice of the University as described by Wiener.
*221In addition to the uncertainty of the committee’s makeup, there are significant questions regarding the criteria utilized in conducting the review. For example, Lachtman’s evidence concerning Professor Alice Fahs’s involvement on the first-year review committee supports a reasonable inference Lachtman was really disqualified for nonacademic reasons. It is undisputed Professor Fahs participated in the first-year review. Fahs gave Lachtman an “A-” in History 260C, but Wiener recalled, “I think after hearing the opinions—the judgments, the evaluations, of the other faculty members, [Fahs] was part of the consensus that he hadn’t performed the required level and, therefore, he should not be advanced in the program.” The grade Fahs gave Lachtman and her previous written evaluation of his work raise a question as to whether Fahs exercised her professional judgment or was pressured into agreeing Lachtman should be dismissed. Fahs’s written evaluation did not reflect the opinion Lachtman should not continue. She commended Lachtman “for improvement of his essays (seven in all) over the quarter. While his first essay was not focused enough and he received a ‘B,’ he quickly improved his essays to the point of receiving the grade of ‘A-’ on most of them.” She also indicated there were areas for improvement, stating Lachtman could “open up his analysis” and speak more often in class. Fahs noted, “The contributions [he] did make to class were always of interest.” These facts raise the question of whether the committee exercised professional judgment or was predetermined to fail Lachtman.
Lachtman’s school transcript shows he took a total of nine courses before the first-year review. Wiener taught two of the courses, but that likely left seven professors who taught Lachtman and should have participated in the first-year review. The record contains written evaluations from Professors Mark Poster, “D. Bruce,” and “Tinsman.” The written opinions were positive about Lachtman’s analysis and research skills, and all commented he had improved, and should continue to work on his writing skills. There was no suggestion he was academically unfit for the Ph.D. graduate program. The record does not reflect if any of these professors participated in the first-year review committee’s final decision. If professors holding positive views of Lachtman’s work were intentionally excluded from the first-year review committee, any reasonable person would question the fairness of the process.
I recognize it is not for this court to decide what constitutes acceptable graduate writing skills, or the appropriate level of class engagement by a student, because a court cannot substitute its judgment for a university’s judgment on academic matters. (See Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225 [88 L.Ed.2d 523, 106 S.Ct. 507]; Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 110].) But, this court can decide if triable issues of fact exist as to whether *222Lachtman’s dismissal was the result of professional judgment by the University, whether the procedures employed substantially departed from academic norms, and whether the dismissal was prompted by an impermissible motivation.
Turning now to the “second chance” Lachtman was given, the majority summarizes the record by stating the History Department presented their terms for reconsidering Lachtman for the Ph.D. program in a letter dated October 2002, after Lachtman’s “appeal.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 203.) They conclude the procedural due process elements were satisfied because that letter “informed” Lachtman of the requirements he had to meet to advance to the Ph.D. program, and because faculty from the History Department “evaluated” Lachtman’s writing before reaffirming his termination from the program. (Ibid.) The majority also concludes there was no evidence Lachtman’s substantive due process rights were violated because the History Department’s faculty cited valid academic reasons for its decision.
Lachtman claimed the History Department’s offer to give him a second chance was in fact illusory. He was given only one additional quarter to make up alleged academic deficiencies, and the History Department imposed impermissibly high and arbitrary standards for him to meet. Lachtman maintains there is evidence the faculty utilized arbitrary, coercive, and bad faith tactics to intimidate and coerce him to discontinue the program and accept a terminal master’s degree. Applying our standard of review, and resolving all evidentiary doubts and credibility determinations in favor of Lachtman, I conclude a reasonable trier of fact could find for Lachtman on these claims.
To begin with, I found Lachtman presented evidence reasonably suggesting flaws in the dismissal process utilized by the History Department that could establish a due process violation. Lachtman alleges the procedures followed in his dismissal did not conform to those established by the University. But, because those procedures are lengthy and involved, I highlight only a few aspects of the procedures.
It was undisputed Lachtman’s “second chance” to remain in the program came after he involved the University’s ombudsman. Arguably, the History Department’s agreement to give Lachtman a do-over was precipitated, in whole or in part, by the intervention of the ombudsman. In a September 15, 2002 e-mail the ombudsman posed a number of specific questions to Pomeranz, “meant to revisit the decision in the interest of procedural fairness [regarding] first-year review and not the substance of the discussion leading to the outcome during the first-year review.” Essentially, the ombudsman made clear he was questioning the process, and was not attempting to *223second-guess the academic decisions of the faculty. Many of the questions were focused on whether students were being given adequate notice of what was expected, and given the earliest possible notice of deficiencies. In his reply e-mail, Pomeranz indicated he felt there was nothing wrong with the process, but conceded posting the required higher history graduate grade point average on the Web site was a good idea. He also admitted that although quarterly progress reports were required from the student’s professors, they were not always timely submitted. He concluded by stating that if Lachtman “wants to ask GPC to reconsider, that’s out of my hands. I doubt he would persuade them, but he’s certainly free to try.”
In October 2002, the matter apparently landed back in Pomeranz’s hands when he wrote Lachtman the letter outlining the terms under which he could seek to be readmitted to the graduate history program. Lachtman included in the record various e-mails between University administration members and faculty members regarding the Lachtman dismissal. These e-mails are susceptible to various interpretations. Lachtman would argue they were conspiratorial discussions about how to ensure his final dismissal. The University would argue they simply represent an effort to provide Lachtman with due process.
Of significance to Lachtman’s claims are comments in an October 20 e-mail from Pomeranz regarding an upcoming meeting. He stated, “Here’s another piece of business we need to discuss—it turns out that the procedure we’ve been using to handle removing students from the program since god-knows-when (certainly before I came here in ’88) is not what RGS [Office of Research and Graduate Studies] wants to see—so we’ll have to go through some additional hoops with respect to Shane.” Arguably, these comments are consistent with Lachtman’s claim his second chance was nothing more than the faculty going through the motions to appease the administration, and was never intended to be a good faith review.
Lachtman presented evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred some of the faculty members were not pleased their decision was overturned. Lachtman asserted he discovered the entire History Department had essentially turned against him when he returned to school for the second year, including his previously strongest supporter, Davis.
For example, in October 2002, Lachtman learned during a telephone conversation with Professor Ellen Burt, associate dean of humanities graduate studies, that he should leave the University because by going back into the graduate program, he would “then be faced with a faculty who [he] alienated.” She explained the faculty would be angry, and “would not be appreciative if their opinions [were] reversed.” Lachtman claims Burt told him to “go find something else” and “get out of Irvine,” because he would lose time *224fighting his case with the department. She also said, “The [history] department will be engaged in the process, however slowly.”
The History Department selected only three faculty members to decide Lachtman’s fate: Professors Wiener, Bruce, and Davis. The University maintains these three professors were chosen because they were the professors most likely to work with Lachtman. But, Lachtman argues these were professors who were already biased against him and would be unable to fairly evaluate his writing. Wiener had already told Lachtman he should leave the program, and neither he nor Bruce shared Lachtman’s academic interests or were going to work with him. Wiener and Bruce had a history with Lachtman dating back to their review of Lachtman’s class substitution petition in which he made disparaging remarks about Block.
Davis was not a colonial historian like Lachtman and, more importantly, was angry at him for causing so much trouble in the History Department. Davis recounted he told Lachtman people in the department were talking about him, explaining, “There was a kind of office gossip about him, a depiction of him being kind of a perpetual annoyance. He was seen as litigious and annoying to some people in the office.”
Davis testified in his deposition in hindsight it “was probably wrong to be so angry at [Lachtman.]” He added, “I don’t think that my conduct in the course of all this met the standards that you would expect from a tenured senior professor. At some point I wanted to wash my hands of it. . . .” He also admitted, “[I]n retrospect ... I cannot in good faith tell you—I cannot honestly tell you that the student was incapable of doing Ph.D. work. I think he was. And I’m sorry that I didn’t retain the courage of my earlier convictions . . . .”
Facts related to the motivation for the selection of the “second chance” review committee and any bias on the part of those members are relevant to prove the second review was not a fair hearing, raise considerable doubt about the fairness of the first-year review, and if it departed substantially from accepted academic norms. Moreover, the fact the University clearly points out Lachtman was involved in an appellate process indicates how inextricably the second-review process was linked to the first-year review.
I end as I began, with a restatement of our rules of review. In performing our independent review, it is well-settled law we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party, liberally construing their evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing the moving party’s showing and resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in the losing party’s favor. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768-769 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, *22523 P.3d 1143].) We must resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 88 P.3d 517].) The parties’ factual disputes relating to the propriety of Lachtman’s dismissal are numerous. Because they bear on the fundamental fairness of the process, they are material on the issue of due process. The resolution of those disputes requires credibility determinations, the drawing of inferences, and the weighing of evidence—all tasks we are precluded from performing. Considering the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to Lachtman, I find summary adjudication on the due process claim was erroneously granted.