Court Opinion

ID: 9808001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:24:14.494084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:10.505336
License: Public Domain

Stacy', C. J.,
dissenting: The petitioners here seek, by writ of cer-tiorari, to review, as upon appeal, the action of the State Board of Elections in denying to their nominees for President and Vice-President a place on the official ballot to be used in the general election on 2 November, 1948; and, by writ of mandamus, to compel the defendant to comply with the prayer of their petition.
The Board of Elections denied the privilege sought on the ground that the petitioners had not complied “with the law and rules and regulations adopted by the State Board of Elections” for all petitioners desiring to form a new political party and to have the names of its candidates placed on the official ballot. The petitioners freely concede that they have not complied with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board, and assert that they are under no obligation to do so.
The trial court held that the State Board of Elections was authorized by law to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of primaries and elections, struck down two of its regulatory requirements as unreasonable and, without further inquiry, ordered that the writ of mandamus issue according to the prayer of the petition.
It is provided by G. S., 163-1, that any group of voters may organize a new state political party by filing with the State Board of Elections, “at least ninety days before a general state election, a petition signed by ten thousand qualified voters, declaring their intention of organizing a state political party, . . . and also declaring their intention of participating in the next succeeding election.” The State Board of Elections— the agency charged Yvith responsibility in the matter and clothed with authority to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of primaries and elections (G. S., 163-10; 163-183)—promulgated certain rules and regulations requiring, inter alia, that such petitions be accompanied by certificates from the chairman of the county boards of elec*193tions, certifying (1) that the names of the voters appearing on the petition from their respective counties were duly qualified voters and registered on the general election registration hooks in the precincts indicated on the petition; and (2) that none of the electors who signed the petition “voted in the primary election of any political party during the year in which the petition is filed.”
At the last moment, on 3 August, 1948, the petitioners filed with the State Board of Elections a number of petitions hearing more than 18,000 names, which were unaccompanied by any certificates to show that the signers were qualified voters.
What was the State Board of Elections to do with these petitions? Obviously the petitioners had failed to make manifest their right to the privilege sought. Ingle v. Board of Elections, 226 N. C., 454, 38 S. E. (2d), 566. After due consideration, the petitions were denied.
Thereafter, the petitioners asked the State Board of Elections to assist them in ascertaining from the county chairmen whether the petitions contained the names of the requisite number of qualified voters— without reference to whether they voted in the primary election of any political party during the current year—and stated in their request “that it will be understood that the action of the State Board in transmitting the petitions to the respective counties, as herein requested, will be without prejudice to any legal rights of the State Board of Elections with respect to the position which it has taken or may take in connection with these matters, and will not be considered as any waiver of any rules and regulations adopted by your Board or any action heretofore taken by your Board.”
Why make this request and why show to the Superior Court the number of qualified voters on the petitions—unless regarded as necessary and reasonable—when no such showing had been made before the State Board of Elections? Certiorari is supposed to bring up the record as it appeared before the hearing body. Furthermore, mandamus lies only to enforce a present, clear legal right. “It confers no new authority. The party seeking the writ must have a clear legal right to demand it, and the party to be coerced must be under a legal obligation to perform the act sought to be enforced.” Person v. Doughton, 186 N. C., 723, 120 S. E., 481; Hayes v. Benton, 193 N. C., 379, 137 S. E., 169. Had the matter been heard in the Superior Court on the record as it appeared before the State Board of Elections undoubtedly the results would have been the same rather than opposite. Notwithstanding the alleged unreasonableness of the rule, when the petitioners came to make out their case in court they offered the identical proof which the rule requires.
It is specious reasoning to say that the State Board of Elections must either deny the sufficiency of the petitions or else accept them at their *194face value. No such obligation rests upon the Board. It is not a giver of gifts, but a protector of rights, and those who claim rights before it must establish them. There is nothing unreasonable in this requirement. How else could the Board proceed with assurance or safety? The General Assembly did not intend to open wide the door with no supervision or protection of any kind. Yet, this is the effect of today’s decision. The terms under which the delayed proof was secured appear in the record, and conjure with them as we may, the fact remains that on the showing before the State Board of Elections no case for mandamus is made out. Take away this subsequent proof, which comes too late and was never before the Board, and what have we ? It is no solution to strike down the rules. This leads to greater embarrassment. See Britt v. Board of Canvassers, 172 N. C., 797, 90 S. E., 1005; Johnston v. Board of Elections, 172 N. C., 162, 90 S. E., 143. The burden was on the petitioners to establish their right before the State Board of Elections. Umstead v. Board of Elections, 192 N. C., 139, 134 S. E., 409. They contented themselves by simply filing their unsupported petitions at a late hour on the last day.
It is further nominated in the regulation of the State Board of Elections that a petition to create a new political party must be signed by the requisite number of qualified voters, “none of whom voted in the primary election of any political party during the year in which the petition is filed.”
No effort was made to comply with this provision of the rule in the instant case, and it was held by the trial court to be unreasonable; hence properly disregarded. The basis of the requirement is, that the law as it pertains to primaries, contemplates that no voter who participates in the primary of the political party with which he affiliates should be permitted to take part in the nomination of candidates of another and different party who are to be voted on in the same election. G. S., 163-123; 163-126; Rowland v. Board of Elections, 184 N. C., 78, 113 S. E., 629; Brown v. Costen, 176 N. C., 63, 96 S. E., 659; 18 Am. Jur., 282.
It is provided by G. S., 163-183, that the State Board of Elections shall have general supervision over “the primaries and elections provided for herein . . . and in case where sufficient provision may not appear to have been made herein may make such regulations and provisions as it may deem necessary; Provided, none of the same shall be in conflict with any of the provisions of this article.” Thus the Board is supported by ample statutory authority for the regulation in question. Burgin v. Board of Elections, 214 N. C., 140, 198 S. E., 592; 18 Am. Jur., 290.
*195The claim of unreasonableness in respect of this requirement is predicated on the provisions of G. S., 163-1, without reference to other cognate provisions of the primary and election laws. Even if this position be sound, which the respondent does not concede, the requirement in respect of accompanying the petitions with certificates from the chairmen of the county boards of elections would still stand and quite suffice to render the present proceeding inapposite.
The court below held that the State Board of Elections was authorized to make reasonable rules and regulations and its judgment in this respect is unchallenged. It is not enough to point out imperfections in the rules or how they might have been better. They are valid if reasonable and not in conflict with any statutory provision. Eeasonableness is the test, not perfection nor even wisdom.
This general supervision over primaries and elections has been given to the Board with no right of appeal to the courts from its decisions. 18 Am. Jur., 273; 29 C. J. S., 178. For this reason, no doubt, the General Assembly fixed the time limit for filing the new political party petition at the short space of “ninety days before a general state election.” Manifestly no court action was contemplated during this period, as the present proceeding clearly demonstrates. Nevertheless, the petitioners win their objective, not on the showing made before the State Board of Elections, but on the showing later made in court, and then only by disregarding one of the rules and belatedly complying with the other—thus making manifest its practicality and reasonableness. “The function of the writ (mandamus) is to compel performance of a ministerial duty—not to establish a legal right, but to enforce one which has been established. The right sought to be enforced must be clear and complete.” Wilkinson v. Board of Education, 199 N. C., 669, 155 S. E., 562. “Mandamus lies only to compel a party to do that which it is his duty to do without it.” White v. Comers. of Johnston, 217 N. C., 329, 7 S. E. (2d), 825.
It is rarely, if ever, permissible to award a mandamus when it can be done only by annulling an unconstitutional Act of Assembly or by avoiding administrative rules of procedure. Person v. Doughton, supra. The writ is never appropriate to enforce a doubtful right. Mears v. Board of Education, 214 N. C., 89, 197 S. E., 752; Barham v. Sawyer, 201 N. C., 498, 160 S. E., 582. When did the right here asserted lose its opaqueness and become luminous? Certainly not while it was before the State Board of Elections where the petitioners were required to make it shine. Its clarity was not then apparent and to some it has not yet been made to appear. To hold that a later initial showing in court suffices on mandamus is to take over the functions of the Board and allow the petitioners another opportunity to establish their claim. *196A similar situation in principle appeared in the case of Barham v. Sawyer, supra, where mandamus was denied.
It should be kept steadily in mind that no one’s right to vote in the general election is challenged or at issue in this proceeding. It is freely conceded that every registered elector or qualified voter is at liberty to cast his ballot in the general election for the candidate of his choice, subject to the limitation in respect of candidates in primaries. Here, however, an alleged new political party is seeking to place its nominees for President and Vice-President on the official ballot in the forthcoming general election. Having been denied this privilege by the State Board of Elections—the agency charged with responsibility in the matter—for failure to comply “with the law and rules” applicable, the petitioners sue out a writ of mandamus to compel compliance. If the writ be apposite, then much of the writing on the subject in our Reports becomes apocrypha. The petitioners are not asking to have the State Board of Elections carry out one of its determinations, but to reverse a determination already made. “The writ (mandamus) issues to compel action— not to direct a reversal of action.” Pue v. Hood, 222 N. C., 310, 22 S. E. (2d), 896. It may be stated as a general rule that where an official board is required to examine evidence, and form its judgment before it acts, and whenever this is to be done, it is not a case for mandamus. United States v. Seaman, 58 U. S., 226, 17 How., 225. The writ is available, not to establish a right, but to enforce a right already established.
My vote is to reverse the judgment and dismiss the proceeding.