Court Opinion

ID: 9711491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:33:04.818553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.507654
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I join in the majority’s affirmance of the defendant’s conviction. However, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s death sentence, because I believe that the facts of this case and our factual knowledge of this defendant simply do not warrant imposition of the death penalty. It is this court’s “responsibility in every death penalty case to carefully consider the character of the defendant and the circumstances of his crime before we sanction the termination of his life.” People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1990) (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fulfilling this responsibility, we are “guided by the recognition that ‘each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty.’ [Citation.]” People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 98 (1997). It is this court’s duty to vacate a death sentence “where such an extreme penalty [is] found to be inappropriate, in light of any relevant mitigating factors.” Smith, 177 Ill. 2d at 98, citing People v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338 (1996); People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355 (1992); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986); People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980). After careful consideration, I conclude that the facts of this crime do not mandate imposing the death penalty. Anytime a human being unjustifiably takes the life of another, a civilized society should be horrified. “[C]apital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 880, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Nevertheless, our society and laws do not sanction the death penalty for all crimes which may shock a civilized society. Instead, we reserve it for those “crimes [which] are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 881, 96 S. Ct. at 2930 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The mechanism by which we narrow the universe of convicted murderers to those who are eligible for the death penalty is contained in the group of statutory aggravating factors. One of those aggravating factors is the commission of a murder in the course of another felony. There is no dispute that defendant in this case falls within the broad sweep of the felony murder aggravating factor. However, the felony murder aggravating factor has swept too far in the case at bar, because defendant’s crime does not fall within that special class of murder cases which so shock the conscience of a society that execution of defendant is “the only adequate response.” Like most, or perhaps all murders, this murder was senseless, tragic, and unnecessary. However, the murder was not notably brutal or heinous. The victim was not beaten or tortured. There was no evidence that he suffered prior to his death. It appears that the victim died almost immediately after he was shot. The murder was not the product of premeditation or planning. It was a single murder, not part of any murderous spree. The murder was an act of aberrant behavior occasioned by defendant complying with a cohort’s direction to the defendant to shoot the victim. For these reasons, I do not believe that the circumstances of this crime are such that the imposition of the death penalty is “the only adequate response.” In addition, there is little in defendant’s character and background which indicates that the ultimate sanction of death is appropriate. The aggravating evidence introduced by the State consisted of victim impact statements by the victim’s surviving relatives; evidence that defendant had committed two other carjackings in the four days preceding the murder; evidence that defendant had been involved in two small drug transactions in 1992; evidence that defendant had committed several rules infractions while incarcerated for the murder; evidence that defendant had not exhibited remorse after the murders; and evidence that defendant was a member of a street gang. The aggravation evidence does not definitively or adequately demonstrate that defendant is a person “with a malignant heart who must be permanently eliminated from society.” People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 590 (1980). The only violent crimes included in the aggravation evidence were two armed caijackings by defendant. No one was injured in either of those carjackings. One of these incidents occurred four days before the murder of Clifford Chase, the other occurred two days before the murder. The origin of defendant’s apparently sudden interest in carjacking is not a mystery: the majority notes that defendant and his cohorts had recently seen a film about carjacking. The sequence of events here is clear. Defendant and his young friends saw a film which glamorized carjacking. They talked about carjacking on more than one occasion. While committing the carjacking in this case, one of defendant’s companions encountered the noncompliant victim, and told defendant to shoot the victim. Defendant complied. This sequence of events shows that defendant was not only violent, but also that he was susceptible to a cohort’s influence, that he was immature, impressionable, and reckless. It does not show that defendant is a hardened criminal. The death penalty should be reserved for the most dangerous and incorrigible criminals — the “worst” criminals. Foolishness, susceptibility to peer influence, immaturity, impressionability, and recklessness by an 18-year-old, taken individually or collectively, should not render a defendant one of society’s “worst” criminals, for whom the death penalty is appropriate. The deterrent and retributive purposes of the death penalty are not served by its imposition in this case. Defendant’s youth is a particularly important consideration in this case. The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s youth is an important consideration in determining whether sentencing him to death would serve the deterrent and retributive purposes of the death penalty. “[YJouth must be considered a relevant mitigating factor. *** [It] is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence ***.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982). The Court elsewhere has noted that a younger defendant is less able to control his conduct and appreciate the consequences of that conduct than is an older defendant, and that, for this reason, youth is a “special mitigating force.” Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834-35, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702, 718-19, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698-99 (1988) (plurality opinion). Defendant was 18 years and 8 months old at the time of the offense. The death penalty statute provides that a defendant must be 18 years old in order to be eligible for the death penalty. See 720 ILCS 5/9— 1(b) (West 1994). Thus, defendant was eligible for the death penalty by being only 8 months older than the statutory eligibility age. I do not deprecate or minimize the loss defendant has inflicted on the family and friends of Clifford Chase. Indeed, the egregiousness of defendant’s conduct is accentuated by the fact that defendant has shown little or no remorse since the murder, and that the victim was 71 years of age and totally innocent. But the pain caused by this senseless murder will not be mitigated or alleviated by taking defendant’s life for an impulsive act he committed when he was 18 years old, and which he committed at the instigation of a friend after seeing a film glamorizing carjacking. The deterrence and retributive functions owed society would be served in the facts of this case if defendant were imprisoned for the rest of his natural life. All murders are tragic; all murderers deserve societal reprobation and retribution. This case is no exception. However, as previously stated, the death penalty is not sanctioned as appropriate for all murders. The circumstances of a given crime and the character of a given offender are to be examined, and the death penalty is to be reserved for the “worst” murders and the most hardened and depraved murderers. Neither this crime nor this defendant falls within these categories. For this reason, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the death sentence. I also write separately for another reason. The majority concludes that defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because of defense counsel’s failure to offer any mitigation evidence and counsel’s admitted failure to investigate the existence of mitigation evidence, must fail. My colleagues’ conclusion is based on the fact that, in this appeal, defendant has not shown that there existed any mitigation evidence which defense counsel could have introduced if he had conducted an investigation. Thus, the majority concludes, defendant has not shown prejudice as a result of the failure to investigate, and, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), defendant is unable to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The majority’s conclusion is correct if the Strickland standard is applied strictly. This court has a duty to ensure that only those who are most deserving of the death penalty actually receive that sentence. This task is made difficult when defense counsel offers no mitigation evidence whatsoever. Ordinarily, we would be justified in assuming that no mitigating evidence was introduced either because counsel investigated whether such evidence existed and found none, or because he made a strategic decision not to offer the evidence. However, in cases where the defense counsel admits that he made no investigation to determine if mitigation evidence existed, the picture of defendant which has been presented to this court may be incomplete. We do not know whether this lack of evidence is a result of the fact that none existed or the fact that counsel simply did not know of any mitigating evidence because of his failure to investigate. In such cases, it is extremely difficult to fulfill our constitutional duty and make an informed decision as to whether this defendant is a person “with a malignant heart who must be permanently eliminated from society.” Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d at 590. In view of the fact that the ultimate and irreversible sanction has been imposed on defendant, I would remand this case for a new sentencing hearing. In the alternative, based on the facts of this murder, I would vacate defendant’s death sentence and sentence him to imprisonment for his natural life.