Court Opinion

ID: 9519109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:09:06.32563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:45.379815
License: Public Domain

Irwin, Judge,
concurring.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mitzi’s parental rights to Jonathan, Jasmine, and Devon were improperly terminated. Based upon a plain and ordinary reading of Nebraska statutes relating to the termination of parental rights, it seems clear that it is not necessary to adjudicate a juvenile prior to termination of parental rights under subsections (1) through (5) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Cum. Supp. 1996). However, as I recognize that In re Interest of Joelyann H., 6 Neb. App. 472, 574 N.W.2d 185 (1998), is binding authority, see, also, Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 2E(5) (rev. 1996), I must concur. I set forth the reasons for my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion and the conclusion in In re Interest of Joelyann H., supra.
In holding that a previous adjudication is necessary prior to the termination of parental rights, the majority relies on In re Interest of Joelyann H., supra, which in turn relies on comments made by a state senator during the floor debate for recodification of the juvenile code. The majority also relies on *882Nebraska Supreme Court cases that the majority contends require an adjudication prior to termination of parental rights, regardless of the statutory basis for the termination.
The Supreme Court cases on which the court relied in In re Interest of Joelyann H., supra, cannot be read to stand for the proposition that an adjudication is required in all cases prior to termination of parental rights. In In re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992), the court held that a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to terminate parental rights if the pleadings and evidence at the adjudication hearing do not justify a juvenile court’s acquirement of jurisdiction of a child. In that case, the child was adjudicated prior to the termination proceeding. In In re Interest of K.M.S., 236 Neb. 665, 463 N.W.2d 586 (1990), a petition was filed against a father, alleging that the child was within the definition of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 1993) and § 43-292(1) in that the child had been abandoned. The court held that the father had been accorded due process because the “adjudication and the dispositional hearing were combined as permitted by statute ....” In re Interest of K.M.S., 236 Neb. at 669, 463 N.W.2d at 590. In these cases, the court was not presented with and did not address the issue before us, namely, whether parental rights may be terminated in an original juvenile action.
I would conclude that the issue before us must be determined based upon the language in the termination statutes, in particular, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-291 (Reissue 1993) and § 43-292. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision reached by the court below. In re Interest of Michael M., 6 Neb. App. 560, 574 N.W.2d 774 (1998); In re Interest of Laura O. & Joshua O., 6 Neb. App. 554, 574 N.W.2d 776 (1998). In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Popple v. Rose, 254 Neb. 1, 573 N.W.2d 765 (1998); McAllister v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 253 Neb. 910, 573 N.W.2d 143 (1998).
*883Section 43-291 provides in part: “Facts may also be set forth in the original petition, a supplemental petition, or motion filed with the court alleging that grounds exist for the termination of parental rights.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under this section, a termination proceeding may be commenced by filing an “original petition.” Such language is inconsistent with the majority’s holding that parental rights may be terminated only when a juvenile action has been previously commenced in which a child has been adjudicated a juvenile within the meaning of § 43-247. To hold that termination of parental rights may occur only following an adjudication renders the “original petition” language in § 43-291 meaningless. It is well established that in construing a statute, a court must attempt to give effect to all of its parts, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless; it is not within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. SID No. 1 v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 253 Neb. 917, 573 N.W.2d 460 (1998); Omaha World-Herald. v. Dernier, 253 Neb. 215, 570 N.W.2d 508 (1997).
Section 43-292 sets forth the grounds for termination. It states that parental rights may be terminated when the court finds such action is in the best interests of the juvenile and one of the following conditions exists:
(1) The parents have abandoned the juvenile for six months or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition;
(2) The parents have substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected the juvenile and refused to give the juvenile necessary parental care and protection;
(3) The parents, being financially able, have willfully neglected to provide the juvenile with the necessary subsistence, education, or other care necessary for his or her health, morals, or welfare or have neglected to pay for such subsistence, education, or other care when legal custody of the juvenile is lodged with others and such payment ordered by the court;
(4) The parents are unfit by reason of debauchery, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or repeated *884lewd and lascivious behavior, which conduct is found by the court to be seriously detrimental to the health, morals, or well-being of the juvenile;
(5) The parents are unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness or mental deficiency and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period;
(6) Following a determination that the juvenile is one as described in subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determination; or
(7) The juvenile has been in an out-of-home placement for eighteen or more consecutive months and the parents have failed to correct the conditions leading to the juvenile’s out-of-home placement in spite of reasonable efforts and services to the parents ordered by the court or offered by the Department of Health and Human Services or other designated agency.
Only subsections (6) and, arguably, (7) appear to require a prior determination under § 43-247. Subsection (6) explicitly requires a prior adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a) prior to termination for failure to correct the conditions leading to such an adjudication. Subsection (7) implicitly seems to require a prior adjudication based on the language regarding court-ordered services being provided to the parents. In contrast, subsections (1) through (5) do not refer, explicitly or implicitly, to the necessity of a prior adjudication.
As the meaning of the above statutes is unambiguous, we may not resort to statutory interpretation which would include a review of legislative history. The language of the unambiguous statute is controlling.
I do not believe that Nebraska statutes require an adjudication prior to the termination of parental rights under subsections (1) through (5) of § 43-292. Other states with similar statutes have held that an adjudication is not necessary in all cases prior to termination of parental rights. See, e.g., Matter of R.J.W., 789 P.2d 233 (Okla. 1990); State, Dept. of Human Services v. Ousley, 102 N.M. 656, 699 P.2d 129 (N.M. App. 1985). There are situations, such as the one before us, where it is needless to *885require that a juvenile be adjudicated prior to the termination of parental rights. It must be remembered that the paramount concern in this case is the best interests of the children. The requirement of a prior adjudication is a procedural hurdle not required by statute that forces the children to linger in the juvenile system for longer than is necessary.
In the case before us, I would conclude that regarding Jonathan, Jasmine, and Devon, the commencement of termination proceedings by the filing of an original petition seeking termination of parental rights under § 43-292(2) and (4) was proper. I would also conclude that there was sufficient evidence to terminate Mitzi’s parental rights regarding Jonathan, Jasmine, and Devon pursuant to § 43-292(2) for the same reasons justifying the termination of parental rights as to Joshua, as set forth in the majority opinion. Mitzi’s pattern of conduct is relevant as to all four children, although Jonathan and Jasmine were not in the juvenile system for the entire time and Devon was not bom until August 16, 1996. See In re Interest of Theodore W., 4 Neb. App. 428, 545 N.W.2d 119 (1996). There is no dispute that Mitzi’s conduct justifies termination of her parental rights. The majority’s holding merely delays the inevitable.
Absent the prior holding of this court in In re Interest of Joelyann H., 6 Neb. App. 472, 574 N.W.2d 185 (1998), I would conclude that an adjudication was not necessary prior to the termination of Mitzi’s parental rights pursuant to § 43-292(2). However, given the holding in In re Interest of Joelyann H., supra, I must concur.