Court Opinion

ID: 9590492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:55:26.026638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:17.697040
License: Public Domain

Justice Frye
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the continuing course of treatment doctrine applies to hospitals for the reasons set forth by the majority. However, I dissent from the portion of the Court’s opinion which concludes that the trial court properly granted defendant Hospital’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint.
After determining that the continuous course of treatment doctrine is the law in this jurisdiction and that it applies to hospitals, the remaining issue in this case is whether the statute of limitations expired three years from the date of the corrective surgery on the plaintiff or three years from the date of plaintiff’s discharge from the hospital. The majority concludes that the continuing course of treatment doctrine operated to toll the statute of limitations only from the time of the original negligence on 15-16 November 1990 until the per*141formance of the corrective surgery on 20 November 1990 because the plaintiff failed to allege that defendant Hospital should have taken further action to remedy the damage occasioned by its original negligence. I disagree.
This issue is one of first impression for this Court. I conclude that in Stallings v. Gunter, 99 N.C. App. 710, 394 S.E.2d 212, disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 638, 399 S.E.2d 125 (1990), our Court of Appeals correctly stated:
It is not necessary under this doctrine that the treatment rendered subsequent to the negligent act itself be negligent, if the physician continued to treat the patient for the particular disease or condition created by the original act of negligence. Callahan v. Rogers, 89 N.C. App. 250, 255, 365 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988) (treatment “after” the negligent act is within the ‘continuing course of treatment’ doctrine); see Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 613, 369 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1988) (plaintiff could wait until the end of treatment “to complain of any negligence which occurred during that treatment”) (emphasis in original); see also Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 ([N.D.N.Y.] 1977) (the ‘continuing course of treatment’ doctrine is applicable “even if there are no further acts of malpractice in the continued treatment”)[.]
Id. at 714-15, 394 S.E.2d at 215-16. Consistent with the majority’s opinion, the statute is tolled until the conclusion of the physician’s treatment of the patient, so long as the patient has remained under the continuous treatment of the physician for the injuries which gave rise to the cause of action.
In the instant case, applying these same rules to defendant Hospital, as a result of the alleged negligence of the hospital’s nursing staff, plaintiff sufficiently alleged in her “More Definite Statement” ordered by the trial court:
Failure of the nursing staff to not perceive that the plaintiff was not voiding and allowing her bladder to remain distended for a period of over 24 hours resulted in (i) plaintiff’s second surgery and the complications associated therewith, (ii) plaintiff’s extended hospital stay up through December 6, 1990, at which time she was discharged with the Foley catheter still in place, (iii) many complications thereafter as a result of the problems with her bladder, (iv) breathing problems from fluid overload and *142mild Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome, wound infection[,] and urinary tract infection.
Under our notice pleading, these allegations are sufficient to show that plaintiffs hospital treatment for the injuries which gave rise to the cause of action continued until 6 December 1990, the date of her discharge from the hospital, thus satisfying the continuous course of-treatment pleading requirements. Thus, as to defendant Hospital, the continuing course of treatment doctrine operates to toll the statute of limitations from the time of the original negligence on 15-16 November 1990 until her discharge from the hospital on 6 December 1990. Therefore, I would hold that plaintiffs action was not time barred by the statute of limitations and would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision.
Chief Justice Mitchell and Justice Lake join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.