Court Opinion

ID: 9918635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 13:05:42.543049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:14.271969
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA23-338

                               Filed 16 January 2024

Buncombe County, Nos. 21-CRS-82197-99

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

CORY MICAH FORNEY

      Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 8 July 2022 by Judge R. Gregory

Horne in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14

November 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General J.D.
      Prather, for the State.

      Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel
      Shatz, for defendant-appellant.

      THOMPSON, Judge.

      In this appeal from defendant’s conviction on a charge of impaired driving,

among other offenses, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting the results of

a chemical analysis of defendant’s breath. While we agree that the evidence in

question should not have been admitted at trial, we conclude that the error was not

prejudicial to defendant. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction on a charge of impaired

driving must be upheld.

                  I.   Factual Background and Procedural History
                                        STATE V. FORNEY

                                        Opinion of the Court

        The evidence introduced at defendant’s trial tended to show the following: On

9 March 2021, Officer Samuel DeGrave, of the Asheville Police Department, was on

traffic enforcement duty observing a stop sign located in East Asheville. Just after

10:00 p.m., a red Dodge minivan being operated by defendant1 failed to stop at the

stop sign, and DeGrave initiated a traffic stop. At the beginning of their interaction,

DeGrave explained the reason for the traffic stop and defendant informed DeGrave

that defendant had no driver’s license. DeGrave detected an odor of alcohol

emanating from the vehicle and noticed that the odor was stronger when defendant

spoke. DeGrave further observed that defendant’s speech was slow and slurred and

his eyes were red and glassy; DeGrave’s suspicion that defendant had consumed

alcohol was also raised when he saw defendant put a piece of mint gum into his mouth

while DeGrave was verifying defendant’s identity and that of the female passenger

in the vehicle.

        After completing that process, DeGrave returned to the minivan and informed

defendant that DeGrave was going to conduct three standardized field sobriety tests,

which the officer was certified to perform. He thereafter performed three such tests

on defendant. On the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test—about which DeGrave

was allowed to testify as an expert—DeGrave noted six of six possible indications of

impairment. DeGrave noted two of eight possible indications of impairment on the

        1 The vehicle’s occupants also included a female passenger in the passenger seat and a child

in the back seat.

                                               -2-
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

walk-and-turn test and three of four indications of impairment on the one-leg-stand

test. DeGrave testified that a research study of these results created a 91% likelihood

that defendant was appreciably impaired. Based upon his observations and the test

results, DeGrave formed the opinion that defendant had consumed a sufficient

quantity of alcohol to appreciably impair his faculties and arrested him.

      At the Buncombe County Jail, Officer Kenneth Merritt of the Biltmore Forest

Police Department, a certified chemical analyst, was called in to perform a breath

analysis of defendant using an “EC/IR II Intoximeter.” After advising defendant of

his implied consent rights, Merritt began a fifteen-minute “observation period”

designed to ensure that the individual does not eat food, consume alcohol, regurgitate,

or smoke prior to testing, primarily to ensure the presence of no “mouth alcohol” that

might affect the accuracy of the blood alcohol reading. Merritt administered a breath

test at 12:05 a.m. which resulted in a 0.11 blood alcohol concentration (BAC) reading.

When Merritt then noticed that defendant had chewing gum in his mouth, he had

defendant spit out the gum and then administered a second breath test at 12:07 a.m.,

which again resulted in a 0.11 BAC reading.

      Defendant was later charged with driving while impaired, driving while

impaired with three prior convictions of driving while impaired within 10 years of the

date of the offense, driving while license revoked, and failure to stop for a stop sign.

The case came on for hearing before Judge Gregory Horne at the 5 July 2022 session

of Superior Court, Buncombe County. Defendant filed several pretrial motions,

                                          -3-
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

including a motion in limine which sought to exclude the results of the EC/IR II

breath testing on the basis that Merritt failed to follow the required observation

protocol before administering the second breath test. That motion was denied

following an evidentiary hearing. Defendant then pled guilty to the offenses of driving

while impaired with three prior convictions of driving while impaired within 10 years

of the date of the offense and driving while license revoked, not guilty to driving while

impaired, and not responsible for the stop sign violation.

      The other matters proceeded to trial before a jury, and when Merritt was asked

to describe the step of the Intoximeter procedure known as the “observation period,”

he testified that “the observation period is a 15-minute period that I’m looking for

regurgitation, or as bad as it sounds, throw up, eating food, consuming alcohol, or

smoking cigarettes. It is mainly to detect for mouth alcohol.” (Emphasis added.)

Merritt also stated that he did not see defendant “put anything in his mouth or . . .

see any signs of him regurgitating or drinking or anything like that.” Nevertheless,

Merritt testified that after he then collected a first breath sample from defendant,

Merritt “was notified that [defendant] had gum in his mouth.” Merritt had defendant

spit out the gum and collected the second breath sample required under the pertinent

procedures two minutes later. Defendant renewed his objection to the admission of

the Intoximeter results, and the trial court overruled those objections and allowed

the results to be published to the jury.

                                           -4-
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

      On cross examination, defendant’s trial counsel discussed the waiting period

with Merritt:

             Q. And the reason that we need an observation period is to
             make sure that there’s nothing going on internally for the
             subject of the test that could skew the results of the test,
             correct?

             A. For the most part, yes, sir. My understanding is to allow
             for deterioration of mouth alcohol.

Merritt acknowledged that “the reason for the rules and regulations, again, is to

assure us of the accuracy and reliability of the results that the [Intoximeter] provides”

and also agreed that “for best practices” he should have restarted the observation

period after having defendant spit out the gum. However, Merritt repeatedly stated

that he did not believe the rules had been violated because they only explicitly ask

the analyst “to look for consuming alcohol, smoking, eating, and regurgitating” and

do not address chewing gum.

      The State then called Daniel Cutler, an employee of the North Carolina

Forensic Tests for Alcohol Branch of the Division of Public Health within DHHS, who

was then acting as a Drug and Alcohol Impaired Driving Regional Coordinator

supervising the affairs of the Forensic Tests for Alcohol Branch within the western

18 counties of the State, and Cutler was admitted as an expert in the EC/IR II breath

testing instrument and its procedures without objection. Cutler testified that “[g]um

in the mouth will not, and by all indications, looking at the test record, did not affect

the results of the breath sample,” citing two published studies. Cutler explained that

                                          -5-
                                    STATE V. FORNEY

                                    Opinion of the Court

one of those studies indicated that chewing “sugar-free gum, which is a salivary flow

promoter” for five minutes led to lower BAC results as compared to the control

situation in which no gum was chewed. The first study was conducted using “an

Intoxilyzer 5000C,” the testing instrument used in North Carolina prior to our State’s

adoption of the Intoximeter Model EC/IR II. The second study cited involved testing

with “75 different brands of chewing gum” and indicated that one brand of gum,

“Trident Splash Strawberry with Kiwi” caused elevated BAC results, but the

remaining varieties of gum did not. The testing instruments used in that study were

“the Alco-Sensor IV DWF, and Alcotest 7410 GLC.”

         Dr. Andy Ewans, a forensic toxicologist, testified for the defense as an expert

in toxicology and agreed that “in general” gum in a test subject’s mouth would not

affect chemical analysis results. He further noted, however, Cutler’s own reference to

a study indicating an impact on BAC results from at least some types of gum and also

emphasized that regardless, “the protocol established by statute was not followed by

Sergeant Merritt

         On 8 July 2022, the jury found defendant guilty of the impaired driving charge

and responsible for the stop sign violation. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open

court.

                                     II.    Analysis

         Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court committed error

in denying his motion to exclude the results of the Intoximeter’s chemical analysis

                                           -6-
                                  STATE V. FORNEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

and in overruling defendant’s objections to the admission of that evidence when it

was introduced at trial. Specifically, defendant argues that after having defendant

remove the gum from his mouth, Merritt’s failure to conduct a new observation period

rendered the Intoximeter results inadmissible under the relevant provision of the

North Carolina General Statutes and related Department of Health and Human

Services rules. We agree. However, because defendant has failed to show “a

reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different

result would have been reached at the trial,” N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-1443(a) (2021), we

hold that he has not demonstrated prejudice.

      A. Error in admission of chemical analysis results

      The primary issue before us in this appeal, which appears to be a matter of

first impression, is one of statutory and regulatory interpretation. Such questions are

reviewed de novo. Sound Rivers Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 271 N.C. App.

674, 727, 845 S.E.2d 802, 834 (2020), affirmed in part and disc. review allowed in

part, ___ N.C. ___, 891 S.E.2d 83 (2023).

             An appeal de novo is one in which the appellate court uses
             the trial court’s record but reviews the evidence and law
             without deference to the trial court’s rulings. Under a de
             novo review, the court considers the matter anew and
             freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial
             court.

In re K.S., 380 N.C. 60, 64, 868 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2022) (citations, quotation marks, and

brackets omitted).

                                            -7-
                                        STATE V. FORNEY

                                        Opinion of the Court

       The provisions at the heart of this appeal concern the admissibility of breath

test results obtained by means of chemical analysis. “A chemical analysis of the

breath . . . is admissible in any court . . . if it . . . is performed in accordance with the

rules of the Department of Health and Human Services.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §20-

139.1(b)(1) (2021).2 See also State v. Davis, 208 N.C. App. 26, 34, 702 S.E.2d 507, 513

(2010). The pertinent Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) rules are

found in Chapter 10A, Subchapter 41B of the North Carolina Administrative Code,

titled “Injury Control.” The testing procedure for the type of Intoximeter employed

for the chemical analysis of defendant’s breath—the EC/IR II—is found in 10A NCAC

41B.0322 and provides that “when administering a test using the Intoximeters,” a

chemical analyst must, inter alia, “[e]nsure [that] observation period requirements

have been met” before collecting two breath samples for analysis. 10A NCAC

41B.0322(2), (6), (7); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(b)(1), (b3). The “observation

period,” in turn, is defined as

               a period during which a chemical analyst observes the
               person or persons to be tested to determine that the person
               or persons has not ingested alcohol or other fluids,
               regurgitated, vomited, eaten, or smoked in the 15 minutes
               immediately prior to the collection of a breath specimen.
               The chemical analyst may observe while conducting the
               operational procedures in using a breath testing
               instrument. Dental devices or oral jewelry need not be

       2 This statute also requires that “[t]he person performing the analysis ha[ve] . . . a current
permit . . . to perform a test of the breath using the type of instrument employed.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
20-139.1(b)(1). Merritt’s certification to perform the chemical analysis here is not disputed.

                                                -8-
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

             removed.

10A NCAC 41B.0101(6) (emphases added). As the proponent of breath test evidence

in an impaired driving case, “the State bears the burden of proving compliance with

the ‘observation period’ requirement set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1.” State v.

Roberts, 237 N.C. App. 551, 560, 767 S.E.2d 543, 550 (2014), disc. review denied, 368

N.C. 258, 771 S.E.2d 324 (2015).

      The basis of defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the chemical analysis

results was that, while Merritt conducted an observation period before obtaining the

first breath sample from defendant, after determining that defendant had gum in his

mouth and having defendant spit out the gum, Merritt did not conduct an additional

observation period and then began the testing process again. At the hearing on the

motion, the State contended that Merritt did not violate the statutory mandate or the

DHHS rules “because chewing gum is not eating,” further emphasizing that “it would

be different if [defendant] had actually taken the gum and put it in his mouth during

the observation period, but there’s nothing in this observation period definition that

required the officer to actually check the person’s mouth.” Rather, the State argued

that an analyst need only “make sure [test subjects] don’t eat, drink, regurgitate,

anything like that.” Defendant, in contrast, argued that the determination of whether

a violation occurred centered on whether “[t]here’s a foreign substance in his mouth

. . . . We did not have a second observation period after the foreign substance was

found. Therefore, we do not have the proper procedure.”

                                          -9-
                                       STATE V. FORNEY

                                       Opinion of the Court

       In explaining the decision to deny defendant’s motion to exclude, the trial court

appears to have adopted the State’s, rather than defendant’s, framing of the question

and therefore focused on whether “chewing gum” was an activity covered by the plain

language of 10A NCAC 41B.0101(6). In so doing, the trial court found “that there is

no evidence that [defendant] ingested alcohol or other fluids, that he regurgitated,

vomited or smoked during the 15 minutes. Therefore, the issue is . . . whether or not

chewing gum equates to eating or having eaten within the 15-minute period.”

(Emphasis added.) After noting that “eaten” is not defined in the pertinent portion of

the Administrative Code, the trial court consulted an online dictionary and found that

a definition for “eat” is “to take in through the mouth as food, ingest, chew and

swallow in turn.”3 The trial court then held that because “chewing gum does not equal

having eaten something[,]” Merritt’s failure to conduct a second observation period

after having defendant spit out his gum was in “technical compliance with the rules

and regulations.” While it may be the case that “chewing gum does not equal having

eaten something[,]” upon our de novo consideration, we agree with defendant’s

appellate assertions that “the trial court was wrong in following the State’s

suggestion that the issue boiled down to “whether or not chewing gum constitutes

eating” and that instead, the DHHS rules here must be “interpreted to contain an

       3 Consulting a dictionary to determine the plain meaning of a word not defined in a statute is

entirely appropriate. Wing v. Goldman Sachs Trust Co., N.A., 382 N.C. 288, 298, 876 S.E.2d 390, 398
(2022).

                                               - 10 -
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

implicit requirement that foreign objects must generally be removed from the test

subject’s mouth during the observation period.”

      As our Supreme Court has recently emphasized:

             “The primary rule of construction of a statute is to
             ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such
             intention to the fullest extent.” Burgess v. Your House of
             Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
             Although the first step in determining legislative intent
             involves an examination of the “plain words of the statute,”
             Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C.
             651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291 (1991), “[l]egislative intent can be
             ascertained not only from the phraseology of the statute but
             also from the nature and purpose of the act and the
             consequences which would follow its construction one way
             or the other,” Sutton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259,
             265, 382 S.E.2d 759 (1989) (citations omitted).

State v. Alexander, 380 N.C. 572, 587, 869 S.E.2d 215, 227 (2022) (emphases added).

Thus, in attempting to ascertain the legislative intent behind a statute or rule, “strict

literalism [should] not be applied to the point of producing ‘absurd results.’ ” Proposed

Assessments of Additional Sales & Use Tax v. Jefferson-Pilot Ins. Co., 161 N.C. App.

558, 560, 589 S.E.2d 179, 181 (2003) (quoting Taylor v. Crisp, 286 N.C. 488, 496, 212

S.E.2d 381, 386 (1975)). See also Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491

U.S. 440, 470, (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Where the plain language of the

statute would lead to patently absurd consequences that [the legislature] could not

possibly have intended, [courts] need not apply the language in such a fashion.”)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) and Commissioner of Ins. v.

Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 68, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978) (holding that a

                                          - 11 -
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

reviewing court must avoid reading the plain language of a statute or rule in a

manner that leads to absurd or bizarre consequences).

      Here, the plain language of the rule defining the observation period—the

individual words themselves—may appear to be clear and unambiguous, providing a

specific list of actions that an analyst must determine the person to be tested has not

engaged in for the fifteen minutes prior to the sample being taken: “ingested alcohol

or other fluids, regurgitated, vomited, eaten, or smoked,” with “chewed” or “chewed

gum” not appearing in the list. 10A NCAC 41B.0106(6). In addition, DHHS elected

not to end the list in this rule with a catch-all term such as “or had other substances

or foreign objects in the mouth.” Nevertheless, the intent of subsection N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 20-139.1(b)(1), titled “Approval of Valid Test Methods; Licensing Chemical

Analysts,” is also plain and unambiguous: to ensure that chemical analysis results

are sufficiently valid that they may be admitted “in any court or administrative

hearing or proceeding” as evidence of impairment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-

139.1(b)(1). In an effort to achieve that end, the legislature has delegated to DHHS—

an agency undoubtedly more expert than the General Assembly regarding BAC

measurement, chemical analysis, and the procedures appropriate to maximize

scientific reliability and validity—the task of rulemaking regarding breath testing

via Intoximeters. In turn, DHHS has set forth various relevant definitions in 10A

NCAC 41B.0106(6) and a specific procedure for the Intoximeter employed here in 10A

NCAC 41B.0322.

                                          - 12 -
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

      In sum, we believe the intent of both the legislature and DHHS in the

provisions pertinent here is clear: to ensure that the chemical analysis of a subject’s

breath is accurate in measuring BAC and not tainted by the presence of substances

in the mouth during testing. And in our view, to adopt the State’s position that the

observation period requirement is not violated when a subject “chews” something

during the period would lead to absurd results and have bizarre consequences

because it would mean, for example, that a subject could engage in the following

activities not listed in 10A NCAC 41B.0106(6) moments before the taking of breath

samples: chewing gum—presumably including nicotine gum—or tobacco or food that

is spit out before swallowing, dipping snuff, sucking on a medicated throat lozenge or

a hard candy, using an inhaler, and swallowing a pill. Surely if “ingest[ing] . . . other

fluids,” which would include ordinary tap water, is considered a potential problem in

ensuring an admissible chemical analysis of a breath sample, the examples just

stated would likewise be problematic. This assumption aligns with the testimony

from Merritt, a certified chemical analyst, that the purpose of the observation period

“is to allow for deterioration of mouth alcohol” before taking breath samples.

      We acknowledge the testimony at trial from the State’s expert witness Cutler

but note that one of the studies he cited used only sugar-free gum and the other did

find an increased BAC reading after one type of gum was tested. Here, there was no

evidence presented about the specific type or brand of gum in defendant’s mouth

during the observation period and testing and DeGrave’s observation of defendant

                                          - 13 -
                                  STATE V. FORNEY

                                  Opinion of the Court

putting a piece of “mint gum” in his mouth occurred some two hours before the

chemical analysis. Further, while defendant’s chemical analysis was conducted using

the Intox EC/IR II, the two studies Cutler cited regarding the effect of chewing gum

were conducted using other testing instruments, one of which was previously used in

North Carolina, but which has since been replaced by the Intoximeter EC/ER II. In

any event, the procedures promulgated by DHHS in 10A NCAC 41B.0322 are

specified to “be followed when administering a test using the Intoximeters, Model

Intox EC/IR II and Model Intox EC/IR II (Enhanced with serial number 10,000 or

higher)” and Cutler himself testified that “over the years there have been many

different technologies for breath testing,” presumably with different procedures for

their use.

      We also reject the State’s contention that chewing gum would actually make

the chemical analysis “more accurate,” citing Cutler’s testimony that chewing gum

might reduce the “mouth alcohol effect” by 85%. We disagree that the reduction of the

“mouth alcohol effect” would make the test more accurate, even if chewing gum could

have some effect, potentially beneficial to a test subject, on the chemical analysis

results. More importantly, as Cutler testified, the Intoximeter estimates alcohol in

the blood (BAC) based on a measurement of alcohol in the breath—a ratio which in

reality varies amongst different people—by using a single specific ratio to standardize

the testing of all test subjects. Test results for breath samples taken from persons

chewing gum, even under Cutler’s testimony, would likely differ from those where a

                                         - 14 -
                                        STATE V. FORNEY

                                        Opinion of the Court

test subject did not have foreign substances in his or her mouth during the

observation period (and while giving a breath sample). This circumstance undercuts

the efforts indicated by the DHHS rules to standardize chemical analysis by

Intoximeter and frustrates the intent of the General Assembly to automatically

permit the admission of such evidence in any court.

       In this appeal, we need only address an asserted violation of the requirements

for automatic admissibility of chemical analysis of the breath on the facts before us:

that defendant had gum of an unknown sort4 in his mouth during the observation

period and during the taking of the first breath sample. For the reasons discussed

above, we hold that the DHHS observation provisions were violated in defendant’s

case and that Merritt should have conducted a new fifteen-minute observation period

after having defendant spit out his gum and before taking breath samples.

       B. Prejudicial impact of error

       Having concluded that the trial court erred in allowing the chemical analysis

results to be admitted in this case, we must now determine whether this error

prejudiced defendant.

               A defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights

       4  At trial, DeGrave testified that he saw defendant “putting mint gum in his mouth” as
DeGrave was walking back to defendant’s vehicle after returning to his patrol car where he had
attempted to check defendant’s identification materials and that of the passenger in the car. DeGrave
did not testify about whether he was able to assess whether the gum was ordinary chewing gum,
nicotine gum, or some other type of gum. In addition, the traffic stop was several hours prior to the
chemical analysis, and nothing in the record establishes whether the gum in defendant’s mouth during
the observation period and the taking of the first breath sample was the same gum which DeGrave
witnessed defendant putting into his mouth.

                                               - 15 -
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

             arising other than under the Constitution of the United
             States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the
             error in question not been committed, a different result
             would have been reached at the trial out of which the
             appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under
             this subsection is upon the defendant.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2021).

      In accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1(a)(1) and (2), the jury in this

trial was instructed that the State could establish the impairment element of driving

while impaired either by establishing that defendant (1) drove while his mental and

physical faculties were substantially impaired by the consumption of alcohol, or (2)

drove after he had consumed sufficient alcohol that he “had an alcohol concentration

of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.” Regarding the latter option

of proving impairment, the jury was further instructed that “[t]he results of a

chemical analysis are deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person’s alcohol

concentration.” In light of our holding above, the question is whether “there is a

reasonable possibility that” the erroneous admission of evidence of defendant’s BAC

impacted the jury’s verdict.

      The arresting officer in this matter testified that running a stop sign is not,

standing alone, evidence of impairment, and that he did not witness any other illegal

or unsafe driving by defendant. Defendant was at all times during the traffic stop,

arrest, and detention able to: respond almost immediately when DeGrave turned on

the blue lights in his vehicle; pull off onto a less-traveled side street, which DeGrave

                                          - 16 -
                                    STATE V. FORNEY

                                   Opinion of the Court

“appreciate[d]”; appear not disheveled; have already removed the keys from his

vehicle’s ignition and placed them on the dashboard, which DeGrave again

“appreciated”; be “polite and cooperative”; understand and follow directions; engage

in conversation; inform DeGrave that he had “blades” on his person and arrange with

the officer to place them on the roof of the vehicle; place the blades on the roof without

difficulty or fumbling; and maintain his balance.

      However, when DeGrave conducted standardized field sobriety tests on

defendant, he observed six out of six possible clues of impairment on the horizontal

nystagmus gaze test, two out of eight clues of impairment on the walk-and-turn test,

and two out of four clues of impairment on the one-leg-stand test. DeGrave testified

that these results taken together suggested “a 91 percent case that” defendant was

appreciably impaired. In light of this evidence and DeGrave’s testimony about

defendant’s red glassy eyes, slurred speech, and strong odor of alcohol, we conclude

that there is not a reasonable possibility that the jury would have returned a verdict

of not guilty in the absence of the erroneously admitted chemical analysis evidence.

                                  III.   Conclusion

      The trial court in this matter should have excluded the State’s chemical

analysis evidence due to the analyst’s failure to conduct a proper observation period

after defendant removed gum from his mouth. Nevertheless, because defendant has

failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s error, his conviction must

be upheld. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a).

                                          - 17 -
                        STATE V. FORNEY

                        Opinion of the Court

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Judge ARROWOOD concurs in result only.

Judge WOOD concurs by separate opinion.

                               - 18 -
 No. COA23-338 – State v. Forney

      WOOD, Judge, concurring in the result only.

      Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I would hold the trial

court’s admission of the breath chemical analysis results was not error. The majority

holds the admission of the breath chemical analysis results was error but not

prejudicial error.

      As the majority recognizes, “[t]he primary rule of construction of a statute is to

ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest

extent.” Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134,

137 (1990) (citation omitted). Thus, “[t]he best indicia of that intent are the [plain]

language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to

accomplish.” Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 299 N.C. 620, 629,

265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1980) (citations omitted). However, “if the statutory language

is clear and unambiguous, then the statutory analysis ends, and the court gives the

words in the statute their plain and definite meaning.” State v. Lemus, 273 N.C. App.

155, 159, 848 S.E.2d 239, 242 (2020) (cleaned up).

      As discussed by the majority, the statutory and regulatory provisions in this

case address the admissibility of breath tests results obtained by means of chemical

analysis. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(b) provides in pertinent part:

             A chemical analysis of the breath . . . is admissible in any
             court . . . if it meets both of the following requirements:

             (1) It is performed in accordance with the rules of the
             Department of Health and Human Services.
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                             WOOD, J., concurring in result.

             (2) The person performing the analysis had . . . a current
             permit . . . to perform a test of the breath using the type of
             instrument employed.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(b) (2021).

The pertinent DHHS regulations are found at 10A NCAC 41B.0322 and 10A NCAC

41B.0101(6) of the North Carolina Administrative Code.           10A NCAC 41B.0322

provides that when administering a test using the Intoximeter, such as the one used

in the present case, a chemical analyst must “[e]nsure [that] observation period

requirements have been met” before collecting two breath samples for analysis. In

turn, 10A NCAC 41B.0101(6) defines “observation period” as:

             a period during which a chemical analyst observes the
             person or persons to be tested to determine that the person
             or persons has not ingested alcohol or other fluids,
             regurgitated, vomited, eaten, or smoked in the 15 minutes
             immediately prior to the collection of a breath specimen.
             The chemical analyst may observe while conducting the
             operational procedures in using a breath testing
             instrument. Dental devices or oral jewelry need not be
             removed[.]

10A NCAC 41B.0101(6).

      Here, the DHHS regulations do not explicitly list chewing gum or having gum

in one’s mouth under 10A NCAC 41B.0101(6)’s definition of “observation period.”

After hearing the evidence presented during Defendant’s motion in limine, the trial

court determined the issue regarding adherence to the regulatory procedures during

the observation period concerned whether the act of chewing gum constitutes eating.

As the trial court noted, there is nothing in the Administrative Code which offers a

                                           2
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                              WOOD, J., concurring in result.

definition of “eaten” as the term is used in 10A NCAC 41B.0101(6). Therefore, this

word “must be given [its] common and ordinary meaning.” Lemus, 273 N.C. App. at

159, 848 S.E.2d at 242 (citation omitted).

      Consequently, the trial court consulted a Merriam-Webster dictionary to

determine that the definition of “eat” is “to take in through the mouth as food, ingest,

chew and swallow in turn.” Based upon the ordinary understanding of the word

“eaten” in the context of the DHHS regulations, the trial court held that the officer

complied with the regulatory requirements for the observation period. Applying the

plain and unambiguous language of the statutory and regulatory provisions, the trial

court determined no evidence was presented that anything had been eaten by

Defendant during the fifteen minutes of Officer Merritt’s observations.

      Although “best practice” operating procedures might have prompted Officer

Merritt to restart the observation period after having Defendant spit out the gum,

this “best practice” is not controlling.         Instead, the statutory and regulatory

provisions control.

      While the majority suggests we should depart from the plain language of the

DHHS regulations to avoid “absurd results” in the future, it is this Court’s role to

“interpret statutes as they are written; we do not rewrite statutes to ensure they

achieve what we believe is the legislative intent.” C Invs. 2, LLC v. Auger, 277 N.C.

App. 420, 422, 860 S.E.2d 295, 298 (2021), aff’d, 383 N.C. 1, 881 S.E.2d 270 (2022).

Thus, if “our interpretation of the plain language of a statute yields unintended

                                             3
                                   STATE V. FORNEY

                              WOOD, J., concurring in result.

results, the General Assembly can amend the statute to ensure it achieves the intent

of the legislative branch of our government.” Id. Because the trial court made its

determination based on the plain reading of the statute and DHHS regulations, I

would find no error. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the result only.

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