Court Opinion

ID: 9908515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 23:02:14.045941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:13.298731
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

             IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

                 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF FRESNO

THE PEOPLE,                     )        Sup. Ct. Appeal No. 0003066
                                )
          Plaintiff/Respondent, )        Sup. Ct. Case No. M21910977
                                )
    v.                          )        OPINION
                                )
RIGOBERTO IGNACIO VERA,         )
                                )
          Defendant/Appellant. )
                                )
                                )

     APPEAL from a pretrial order of the Superior Court of Fresno

County, Hon. Elizabeth Egan, J., denying a motion to suppress
evidence     obtained   during   a   warrantless     search    and   seizure.

Affirmed.1

     Attorneys and Law Firms

     Robert L.S. Angres, attorney for defendant/appellant

Rigoberto Ignacio Vera.
1 This opinion was originally issued by the court on November 8, 2023. It was
certified for publication on November 14, 2023, which is within the time that
the appellate division retained jurisdiction. This opinion has been certified
for publication in the Official Reports. It is being sent to the Fifth District
Court of Appeal to assist the Court of Appeal in deciding whether to order the
case transferred to the court on the court’s own motion under Rules 8-1000 –
8.1018.
       Neda Shahrestani, attorney for plaintiff/respondent Fresno

County District Attorney’s Office.

       Opinion

       Hon. F. Brian Alvarez, Presiding Judge of the Appellate

Division of the Fresno Superior Court.

                                       I.

                                 INTRODUCTION

        By way of pretrial appeal, defendant Rigoberto Vera (Vera)

challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in his

ongoing criminal prosecution. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd.(j).) 2

Citing to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and

People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appointed appellate

counsel asked us to independently review the record for any arguable

issue that could be raised.        Vera, represented by the Fresno County

Public Defender in the trial court, has yet to be arraigned on the

criminal complaint.

       We requested supplemental briefing as to: (1) whether this

pretrial appeal was timely sought under section 1510; and (2)

whether the procedures under Anders and Wende apply on pretrial

appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in a misdemeanor

case.     We conclude that this appeal was not timely sought and the

procedures     under   Anders    and   Wende   are   not      required.   Because

respondent urges us to review the matter, we elect to do so. However,

we employ the procedure set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14

Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo).

2   Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                       -2-
                                         II.

                                    BACKGROUND

        The circumstances surrounding Vera’s arrest for driving under

the influence (DUI) are not detailed here because they are not

salient to the issues raised on appeal.             Suffice to say that Vera

was arrested for DUI on June 6, 2021, after colliding into a city

streetlamp, injuring himself.            A warrantless blood draw confirmed

he drove a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.

        On August 12, 2021, respondent filed a misdemeanor complaint

charging Vera with DUI (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (b) & (b)), and

driving without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)).

        On   September   26,     2022,   Vera   initially    appeared     for   his

arraignment hearing.           With counsel, Vera waived statutory time for

arraignment and moved to continue his arraignment hearing to a later

date.    The trial court granted his motion and scheduled the hearing

for October 17, 2022.

        On October 17, 2022, Vera appeared for the scheduled hearing.

With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for arraignment and

moved for another continuance.           The trial court granted his motion

and set the case for a hearing on December 12, 2022.

        On   December    12,    2022,    Vera   appeared    for    his   scheduled

arraignment.      With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for

arraignment and moved for another continuance.                    The trial court

granted his motion and set the matter for a hearing on January 19,

2023.

        On January 19, 2023, Vera appeared again for his scheduled

arraignment.      With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for

arraignment and sought a further continuance.                     The trial court

                                         -3-
granted his motion and set the matter for a hearing on February 2,

2023.

     On February 1, 2023, Vera filed a motion to suppress evidence

under section 1538.5.       He argued that his blood draw violated his

rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

     On February 2, 2023, Vera again appeared at his scheduled

arraignment, and again waived statutory time for his arraignment.

The trial court set the matter for a suppression hearing to be heard

on March 16, 2023.

     On March 9, 2023, respondent filed an opposition to Vera’s

motion to suppress.

     On March 16, 2023, the trial court heard and denied Vera’s

motion    to   suppress.    At    the   same   hearing,    Vera     again    waived

statutory time for arraignment and sought another continuance of

his arraignment hearing.         The trial court granted his request.

     On March 23, 2023, the Fresno County Public Defender filed

Vera’s pretrial notice of appeal challenging the denial of his

motion to suppress, and requesting we appoint appellate counsel.

(§ 1538.5, subd. (j).)      Thereafter, we appointed appellate counsel.

     On July 25, 2023, appellate counsel filed an opening brief

pursuant to Anders and Wende, noting three potential issues that

counsel did not believe had a reasonable chance of success.

     On    September   6,   2023,    we   asked   the     parties    to     provide

supplemental briefing addressing: (1) whether Vera timely filed this

pretrial appeal from the denial of his suppression motion where it

appeared that he had not yet been formally arraigned on the criminal

complaint, and (2) whether the procedures of Anders and Wende apply

                                        -4-
to pretrial appeals from the denial of motions to suppress evidence

in misdemeanor cases.     (See Gov. Code, § 68081.)

     Both parties have now filed supplemental briefs addressing

these issues.

                                      III.

                                   DISCUSSION

     A.     This Pretrial Appeal is Untimely Under Section 1510

     Vera has never been arraigned on the criminal complaint.             We

have repeatedly seen this procedural anomaly in pretrial appeals in

other cases, where the Fresno County Public Defender is the attorney

of record in the trial court. Initially, we questioned whether

pretrial appellate review was timely sought in light of section

1510. We now conclude that this appeal is untimely under that

statute.

     Vera argues that the plain language of section 1510 provides

that the time requirements of the statute are not triggered until

a defendant has actually been arraigned. Because he has not been

arraigned, Vera maintains pretrial review is timely.             Respondent

argues that Vera should have been arraigned before the hearing on

the motion to suppress. Respondent adds that section 1510 renders

this appeal untimely because pretrial review had not been sought

within     45   days   following     Vera’s     arraignment.   Nevertheless,

respondent urges us to independently review the record.

     Section 1510 provides, in salient part, that “[t]he denial of

a motion made pursuant to ... section 1538.5 may be reviewed prior

to trial only if the motion was made by the defendant in the trial

court not later than 45 days following defendant’s arraignment on

the complaint if a misdemeanor...unless within these time limits

                                      -5-
the defendant was unaware of the issue or had no opportunity to

raise the issue.”      Our inquiry requires us to interpret statutory

language, which we do de novo. (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc.

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.)

      In this endeavor, “[o]ur task is to discern the Legislature’s

intent.    The   statutory    language      itself   is   the    most   reliable

indicator, so we start with the statute’s words, assigning them

their usual meanings, and construing them in context. If the words

themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what

it said, and the statute’s plain language governs.” (Wells v.

One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.)               “If the

language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning

unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences

the Legislature did not intend.”              (People v. Sanchez (2021)66

Cal.App.5th 14, 18 (Sanchez.)

      Section 988 requires that “[t]he arraignment must be made by

the court, or by the clerk or prosecuting attorney under its

direction, and consists in reading the accusatory pleading to the

defendant and delivering to the defendant a true copy thereof, and

of   the   endorsements    thereon,    if    any,    including    the   list   of

witnesses, and asking the defendant whether the defendant pleads

guilty or not guilty to the accusatory pleading; provided, that

where the accusatory pleading is a complaint charging a misdemeanor,

a copy of the same need not be delivered to any defendant unless

requested by the defendant.”3       (§ 988.)    At the arraignment hearing,

3 We note there is a long-standing split of authority about whether a completed
arraignment includes entering a defendant’s plea. (Compare Simpson v. Municipal
Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 112, 114 [includes entering a plea]; People v. Terry
(1970) 14 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [same]; with Chartruck v. Municipal Court (1975)
50 Cal.App.3d 931, 936-937 [entry of plea not required] People v. Cruz (1980)
                                      -6-
a defendant must be allowed a “reasonable time to answer,” which is

“not more than seven days in a misdemeanor or infraction case.” (§

990.) “If the defendant refuses to answer the accusatory pleading

by demurrer or plea, a plea of not guilty must be entered.” (§

1024.)

       Section 1510 allows pretrial review “only if the motion was

made by the defendant in the trial court not later than 45 days

following defendant’s arraignment on the complaint if a misdemeanor

. . ..” (Italics added.)          By its plain language, we believe the

statute requires there be an arraignment, then a motion to suppress

made   not   later   than   45   days     following    that    arraignment.      The

Legislature’s     choice    of   words    is   clear   on     this   point   –   any

suppression motion must follow an arraignment and must do so within

45 days.     Without a misdemeanor arraignment, there can be no timely

pretrial appeal under the statute.              Thus, giving the statutory

language a “plain” and “commonsense” meaning (Sanchez, supra, 66

Cal.App.5th at p. 18), we conclude that pretrial appellate review

here is untimely under section 1510.            If pretrial review could be

timely sought under section 1510 by repeatedly waiving the statutory

time for arraignment (without actually waiving formal arraignment),

the statutory deadline would effectively be evaded by a simple

strategy of indefinitely postponing the formal arraignment hearing

without actually waiving the right to a formal arraignment, as

occurred here.

       “The spirit and purpose” of section 1510 “is to require a

defendant to raise the issue of suppression and have it determined

109 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18, 21 [same].) We need not weigh into this split because
Vera has never been arraigned under either definition.
                                         -7-
prior to trial, without any needless postponement of the trial

date.”   (People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 484.)       As such,

the limitation of pretrial appellate review to those defendants who

have brought their motions to suppress within 45 days following the

arraignment tracks the outer limit with which misdemeanor defendants

must be brought to trial.     (See § 1382, subd. (a)(3).)     Interpreting

section 1510 to allow pretrial appellate review indefinitely when

a defendant continually waives the statutory time for arraignment

throughout the criminal proceeding would circumvent the purpose of

the statute. Because Vera has neither been formally arraigned nor

waived formal arraignment, and there is no applicable exception,

pretrial appellate review of the denial of his motion is untimely

under the plain language of section 1510.

     Appellate counsel nevertheless contends that pretrial review

is timely in the absence of Vera’s arraignment because the motion

to suppress was filed “not later than 45 days following defendant’s

arraignment.”     (§ 1510.)   In other words, since Vera has never been

arraigned, appellate counsel maintains that the motion was brought

not later than 45 days following the defendant’s arraignment.

However,   this     interpretation    renders   the    word    “following”

surplusage in the statute. We must interpret statutes giving effect

to all words used and avoid an interpretation that renders words

nugatory. (People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67.)          Again, we

believe the Legislature’s use of the word “following” requires an

arraignment to precede any motion to suppress.

     Notwithstanding the applicability of section 1510, respondent

urges us to independently review the record.          Appellate courts do

generally retain the authority to exercise discretion to address

                                     -8-
issues      that     are     properly    barred       from     appellate      review     under

traditional rules of procedure.                 (Cf. People v. Williams (1998) 17

Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6; People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786,

794.)       “Appellate        courts     have        fundamental          inherent     equity,

supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power

to control litigation before them.”                       (People v. Flores (2020) 54

Cal.App.5th 266, 273 (Flores).)

       As respondent notes in supplemental briefing, it is only when

the prosecution raises noncompliance with section 1510 that a

defendant bears the burden of showing an applicable exception to

the statute’s requirements. (See Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1988)

199 Cal.App.3d 1453, 1460.)               Because respondent did not raise non-

compliance with section 1510 prior to our request for supplemental

briefing, and because both parties ask us to independently review

the    record,       we    exercise     our discretion         to    excuse     Vera’s    non-

compliance with section 1510.

      B.     Anders/Wende Review Is Not Required On Pretrial Appeal

       We    must     next    address    whether       Anders       and    Wende    review   is

mandated, discretionary, or unavailable on pretrial appeal from the

denial      of   a   motion     to    suppress       in    a   misdemeanor         proceeding.

Appellate counsel contends that the Anders/Wende procedures should

apply to a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress

in a misdemeanor case because it is a “first appeal as a matter of

right” and that, even if Anders/Wende review is not mandated, we

should exercise our discretion to independently review the record.

We take a different approach.

       As a general matter, where appointed appellate counsel is

unable      to   find      viable     issues    to    raise     on    appeal,      Fourteenth

                                               -9-
Amendment principles of due process and equal protection require

reviewing   courts   to   independently   examine    the   record     for   any

arguable issue on appeal from a defendant’s “first appeal as a

matter of right.”    (Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 743-745; Wende,

supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.) Reviewing courts must include “a

brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case,

the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment

imposed.”   (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110.)              “[A]ny

other information from the record that they anticipate will be

relevant in further challenges to the judgment” should also be

included in opinions resolving appeals filed in such cases. (Ibid.)

Anders and Wende review applies to misdemeanor appeals from a final

judgment.   (In re Olsen (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 386, 389–392.)

      But this “prophylactic” procedure is required only when there

is a previously established right to counsel.         (Delgadillo, supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 224.)      Wende review is thus limited to a criminal

defendant’s “first appeal as a matter of right,” meaning, an appeal

from a final judgment in a criminal case.       (People v. Griffin (2022)

85 Cal.App.5th 329, 333.) Wende procedures do not extend to all

appeals in criminal matters.      (See e.g., People v. Serrano (2012)

211   Cal.App.4th    496,   501   (Serrano).)    Consistent    with     these

principles, the California Supreme Court recently explained in

Delgadillo that a state-created statutory right to the appointment

of    counsel   in   postconviction    proceedings     does    not     invoke

Anders/Wende procedures because there is “no constitutional right

to the effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction

proceedings.”    (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.         224.)

                                   -10-
        Anders/Wende review has been found inapplicable in contexts

including conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris

Short Act (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 537);

civil commitment proceedings under the Mentally Disordered Offender

Act (People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.4th 304, 309); proceedings for

restoration of sanity under section 1026.2 (People v. Dobson (2008)

161 Cal.4th 1422, 1425), and to indigent parent's appeals from

rulings adversely affecting child custody status (In re Sade C.

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 952).           Because Anders/Wende review serves to

protect an indigent appellant’s rights, it is also unavailable to

those    represented     by   privately   retained    counsel.      (People   v.

Placencia (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 422, 424.)

        Review under Anders/Wende does not generally extend to pending

trial     court   proceedings.       In   People     v.   Thurman   (2007)    157

Cal.App.4th 36 (Thurman), the defendant argued that his attorney

provided constitutionally deficient representation by failing to

file a brief under Anders and Wende after finding no valid grounds

to bring a motion for a new trial in an ongoing criminal proceeding.

(Id. at pp. 44-45.)           Rejecting that argument, Thurman explained

that “[t]he purpose of the Anders/Wende procedure is to ensure that

attorneys who are appointed to represent indigent defendants...

conscientiously scrutinize the record and actively assert those

issues which may, in the attorney’s professional judgment, result

in a reversal of the judgment or in a reduction of the defendant’s

sentence.”     (Ibid.)

        Thurman explained that “[n]o court, as far as we are aware,

has extended these procedures to trial court proceedings, and we

see no reason to do so.”          (Thurman, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p.

                                      -11-
45.)    This is because “[d]ue process does not require extending

those procedures beyond the first appeal of right in a criminal

prosecution unless, among other considerations, their absence would

significantly increase the risk of erroneous appellate resolution.

(Ibid.)     “Procedures that are practically ‘unproductive’ ... need

not be put into place, no matter how many and how weighty the

interests that theoretically support their use.”               (Id. at p. 46.)

“Any of the grounds for a new trial, whether or not they were

presented in a new trial motion, can also be raised on appeal, if

they appear on the face of the record and are sufficiently developed

to permit appellate review.”          (Ibid.)

       Recently, the California Supreme Court stressed in Delgadillo,

supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, that the procedures in Anders and Wende are

“relevant       when,   and   only   when,    a   litigant   has   a   previously

established constitutional right to counsel.”            (Id. at p. 224.)       Our

Supreme   Court     addressed    a   defendant’s     constitutional     right   to

counsel when the prosecution appeals from the grant of a motion to

suppress evidence in a misdemeanor case in Gardner v. Appellate

Division of Superior Court (2019) 6 Cal.5th 998.                   Gardner found

that a criminal defendant facing misdemeanor charges has the right

to appointed counsel to defend against the prosecution’s appeal

from the grant of a motion to suppress.              (Id. at p. 1001.)       While

finding it unnecessary to address whether the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution afforded that right, Gardner found

that article I, section 15 of the California Constitution did

require     a    court-appointed     attorney.       (Ibid.)       Gardner    thus

establishes that there exists a state constitutional right to

                                       -12-
counsel in appellate proceedings following the grant of a motion to

suppress in a misdemeanor case.

         But Gardner expressly declined to address whether a criminal

defendant like Vera has a corresponding state constitutional right

to counsel following the denial of a motion to suppress.                   (Gardner,

supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 1008–1009, fn. 8 [“[t]his case, of course,

concerns the right to appointed counsel for purposes of responding

to   a    pretrial    prosecution     appeal   of    a    favorable      suppression

ruling... [w]e express no opinion about a defendant’s right to

appointed counsel for purposes of bringing a pretrial appeal of an

adverse suppression ruling.”].) It is likewise unsettled whether

the Anders/Wende procedures are required in such cases. While

Gardner leaves open the possibility of a state constitutional right

to appellate counsel on appeal from the denial of a motion to

suppress, review under Anders/Wende is required only if there is

both a constitutionally mandated right to counsel on appeal and

principles of equal protection and/or due process require such

review.     (See e.g., Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at

p.   541     [finding     Anders/Wende      procedures        do   not    apply    to

conservatorship proceedings even though a proposed conservatee is

entitled to counsel in conservatorship proceedings and on appeal

from conservatorship proceedings].)

         To assess whether these concerns support Anders/Wende review,

courts examine: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the state’s

interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the

procedures in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of the

appeal.      (See    In   re   Sade   C.,   supra,       13   Cal.4th    952,     987;

Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540.)                     In the

                                       -13-
context of pretrial appeals from the denial of suppression motions,

the private interests at stake are the defendant’s liberty interest

which must be considered alongside state interests that include

ensuring   there   was    a   correct   ruling,   judicial    economy,   and

administrative costs.     (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 229;

Flores, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 274.)         As explained in Flores,

“[t]he risk of an erroneous ruling is present if appointed counsel

failed to identify a meritorious (reversible) issue on appeal, and

the appellate court also failed to identify that issue by failing

to conduct an independent review.”         (Id. at p. 274.)      Delgadillo

instructs that “[u]ltimately, the salient question... is whether

the absence of the Anders/Wende procedures significantly increases

the risk of erroneous resolutions.”       (Delgadillo, supra, 19 Cal.5th

at p. 229.)

     Because a criminal defendant has the right to challenge the

denial of a motion to suppress following judgment in all misdemeanor

cases, pretrial review under Anders/Wende does not significantly

reduce the risk of erroneous appellate rulings.              In misdemeanor

cases, appellate review of suppression motions is available both

pretrial and postconviction.      Under section 1538.5, both the People

and the defendant, in a misdemeanor case, are entitled to appeal

any decision on a motion to suppress to the appellate division.          (§

1538.5, subd. (j).)      But, as discussed, pretrial appellate review

is limited to those defendants who bring a motion to suppress within

45 days following the arraignment.        (§ 1510.)   If the defendant is

ultimately convicted, appellate review is available to challenge

the suppression ruling whether the defendant was convicted by a

jury trial or plea.      (§§ 1538.5, subd. (m); 1466, subd. (b)(1).)

                                   -14-
     Under this framework, a misdemeanor defendant who brings a

suppression motion within 45 days following the arraignment has the

opportunity for appellate review of the denial of a suppress motion

twice if they are ultimately convicted: once pretrial and once

postjudgment.   (§ 1538.5, subds. (j), (m).)         If appellate counsel

is unable to find an arguable issue, review under Anders/Wende could

potentially be required both times.

     If Anders/Wende review is required pretrial, any appellate

ruling on the merits of the pretrial denial would likely be binding

in subsequent appellate proceedings.      If the suppression ruling is

challenged twice, the law of the case doctrine would likely prevent

any reconsideration after judgment of a decision already made on

pretrial review.   “The law of the case doctrine holds that when an

appellate opinion states a principle or rule of law necessary to

the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case

and must be adhered to through its subsequent progress in the lower

court and upon subsequent appeal.”          (People v. Superior Court

(Plascencia) (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 409, 432.) Because Anders/Wende

review will always be available postjudgment, and there can only be

a single appellate ruling on the same suppression issue, pretrial

review appears to offer only the minimal theoretical benefit of the

possibility of an erroneous ruling being discovered on independent

review earlier rather than later.

     An additional layer of Anders/Wende review will provide a very

minimal   and   theoretical   extra     protection    to   a   misdemeanor

defendant’s liberty interest in the sense that an erroneous ruling

may be discovered earlier.    But “[p]rocedures that are practically

‘unproductive’ ... need not be put into place, no matter how many

                                 -15-
and how weighty the interests that theoretically support their use.”

(Thurman, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.)         Due process does not

mandate Anders/Wende review beyond the first appeal of right in a

criminal   prosecution   unless,   among   other    considerations,    its

“absence   would   significantly   increase   the    risk   of   erroneous

appellate resolution.”   (Ibid.)    Here, there is no net reduction in

the risk of erroneous rulings because Anders/Wende review will be

available postjudgment on the same suppression issue.

     In supplemental briefing, appellate counsel contends that the

Anders/Wende procedures do apply because a pretrial appeal from the

denial of a suppression motion is a “first appeal as a matter of

right” in a criminal prosecution. Contrary to appellate counsel’s

contention, a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to

suppress is not a “first appeal as a matter of right” because it is

not an appeal from a judgment imposed after a criminal conviction.

(Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 356 [“[w]e are dealing

only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich

and poor alike ... from a criminal conviction”]; Anders, supra, 386

U.S. at p. 739 [“[w]e are here concerned with the extent of the

duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first

appeal from a criminal conviction”]; Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th

at p. 501 [“[t]he appeal before us, although originating in a

criminal context, is not a first appeal of right from a criminal

prosecution, because it is not an appeal from the judgment of

conviction.”].)    And although a criminal defendant has a statutory

right to file a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to

suppress in an ongoing misdemeanor case, the “matter of right” that

requires review under Anders/Wende is a matter of constitutional

                                   -16-
right under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a statutory right

imposed by state law.      (See Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 741.)      As

discussed above, the Anders/Wende procedures that are required by

the due process and equal protection principles embodied in the

Fourteenth Amendment do not generally extend to ongoing trial court

proceedings.     (Thurman, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.)

        On balance, we conclude that review under Anders and Wende is

not constitutionally required on pretrial appeal from the denial of

a suppression motion in a misdemeanor case.        “Independent review in

Wende      appeals    consumes     substantial     judicial    resources.”

(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 229.)        Our appellate division,

like most others, is comprised of busy trial court judges tasked

with the additional duty of reviewing certain appellate and writ

matters. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 77.)             The expedited nature of

pretrial review stretches thin judicial resources thinner yet.

Given    this   reality,   we   believe the   proper   “framework”   is the

procedure set forth in Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216: “When

appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to be presented on

appeal: (1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that

determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing

on the denial of the [motion]; and (2) the court should send, with

a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the

defendant of the right file a supplemental letter brief or brief

and that if no letter brief or brief is filed within 30 days, the

court may dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.)

                                     -17-
                               IV.

                           DISPOSITION

    The court clerk is directed to send Vera and trial counsel a

copy of appellant’s brief along with notice informing them of the

right to file a supplemental letter brief or brief within 30 days,

otherwise the court may dismiss this matter.

    IT IS SO ORDERED.

    Dated this ___ day of November, 2023

                         _____________________________________
                         Hon. F. Brian Alvarez
                         Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division
                         of the Fresno County Superior Court
WE CONCUR:

                         _____________________________________
                         Hon. D. Tyler Tharpe
                         Assistant Presiding Judge of the
                         Appellate Division of the Fresno County
                         Superior Court

                         ________________________________________
                         Hon. Robert G. Mangano
                         Judge of the Appellate Division of the
                         Fresno County Superior Court

                               -18-