Court Opinion

ID: 9861683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:19:23.872958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:49.396157
License: Public Domain

CuRRie, J.
(dissenting). Sec. 102.57, Stats., provides in part as follows:
“Where injury is caused by the failure of the employer to comply with any statute or any lawful order of the commission, compensation and death benefits as provided in this chapter shall be increased 15 per cent.” (Italics supplied.)
In imposing the 15 per cent penalty upon the employer, the commission based the same upon two grounds: (1) That the employer failed to comply with the provisions of sec. 101.06, Stats, (the safe-place statute) ; and (2) that the employer violated Safety Order No. 34 (a). In the action *302for review in the circuit court, that court determined that there was credible evidence to sustain the commission’s finding of a violation of the safe-place statute making it unnecessary to consider the application of Safety Order No. 34 (a), or the validity of it. I am in full accord with such determination reached in the circuit court and would affirm the judgment below.
In our decision in Hipke v. Industrial Comm. (1952), 261 Wis. 226, 231, 52 N. W. (2d) 401, we stated:
“We have held that in the trial of a civil action for recovery on account of violation of the safe-place statute the question whether there has been a violation is for the jury. Heiden v. Milwaukee (1937), 226 Wis. 92, 275 N. W. 922. The same rule is applicable when the issue is presented to the Industrial Commission — its action is the determination of an issue of fact, as it is also when the violation of its safety orders is charged.”
The test of whether there has been a compliance with the safe-place statute was set forth in Haefner v. Batz Seed Farms, Inc. (1949), 255 Wis. 438, 441, 39 N. W. (2d) 386, as follows:
“Under the safe-place statute an employer must furnish a place of work which is as free from danger as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit, and not merely a ‘reasonably’ safe place, as at common law.” (Emphasis supplied. )
In the instant case the commission found that the employer failed in two respects to properly guard against the heavy counterweight falling from the ceiling upon the employee. In the first place no cotter pin was inserted through the upper end of the eyebolt above the nut which would have prevented the nut from unscrewing thereby causing the eye-bolt to drop through the ceiling. Secondly, the safety cable should not have been fastened to the eyebolt but should have been separately secured to the ceiling. An issue of fact was *303presented as to whether the failure to employ these two safety measures would have rendered the place of employment as “free from danger as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit.” Such issue of fact was determined adversely to the employer and this court should not disturb such finding.
If it had been a frequenter instead of an employee, who had been hit and injured by the falling counterweight, and he had sued the employer for damages alleging a cause of action based upon violation of the statute, and the jury had made the same finding in its special verdict that the commission did here, it is difficult for me to envisage this court setting aside the verdict and ordering dismissal of the action. The commission’s finding in the instant case is entitled to the same weight as a jury’s verdict.