Court Opinion

ID: 9772962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:34:04.020626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.246826
License: Public Domain

DRAUGHN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of gross negligence.
Before proceeding with my analysis of the law on this point, I find it necessary to more fully develop the facts. The majority’s opinion implies that the jury’s finding that appellee Dyson failed to keep a proper lookout indicates that he failed to even see the cherrypicker in time to avoid it. However, I do not believe this to be the case. Dyson testified that he saw the cherrypicker soon after he rounded the curve but did not realize that it was a stationary object until he was approximately fifty yards from it. He had approximately five seconds in which to react and decided to pass the cherrypicker. Just as he began to pá'ss, he saw a van rapidly approaching his vehicle from the opposite direction. He had not seen the van when he first considered passing the cherrypicker because it was in a dip in the road. Dyson re-entered his own lane in order to avoid a head-on collision. As he did, he collided with a leg steadying the cherrypicker which extended nearly to the middle of the road. Thus, there is evidence that but for the leg of the cherrypicker he could have completed his maneuver safely.
I do not argue with the jury’s determination that Dyson was 25% comparatively negligent, for obviously an appellate court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the jury if the evidence supports its findings. See Missouri Valley, Inc. v. Putman, 627 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, no writ). I do, however, disagree with the use the majority apparently makes of this finding.
The majority incorrectly views the question of gross negligence from the standpoint of Dyson’s conduct rather than from the mental state of appellant as mandated by the supreme court in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.1981). The standard for determining the existence of *660gross negligence was clearly explained therein:
What lifts ordinary negligence into gross negligence is the mental attitude of the defendant; that is what justifies the penal nature of the imposition of exemplary damages. The plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously, i.e., knowingly, indifferent to his rights, welfare and safety. In other words the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrated that he didn’t care. Such conduct can be active or passive in nature.
Id. at 922 (emphasis in original). In other words, the mental attitude of the defendant is the key distinguishing factor between ordinary and gross negligence. Neither Burk Royalty nor its predecessors mention the plaintiffs comparative fault as a viable factor in this determination. Further, the majority cited no case, and I have been able to find none, sanctioning such an approach. I would add it is clear that the jury is entitled to infer from the circumstances or the defendant’s actions that a state of mind existed which amounted to a conscious indifference on the part of the defendant. See id. However, as previously stated, an appellate court is not entitled to simply substitute its inferences for those of the jury if the evidence supports the jury’s findings. See Missouri Valley, Inc. v. Putnam, 627 S.W.2d at 833.
The majority, in overruling appellant’s “no evidence” point on gross negligence, “infers” that appellant had knowledge of the peril created by the obstructing cher-rypicker because such peril would be recognized by a reasonably prudent person. They concluded that, although this was some evidence of gross negligence, it was not sufficient evidence.
On this latter point, the majority concludes, after considering and weighing all the evidence, that the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. The basis for this conclusion is that the intruding cherrypicker was parked in broad daylight, in plain view, on a completely straight road with the exception of a curve 100 yards from the cherrypicker. After considering these factors, the majority determines that a driver keeping a proper lookout could have seen the “cherrypicker in time to stop or safely maneuver around it.” They find this conclusion consistent with the jury finding that Dyson failed to keep a proper lookout. Coupling this chain of circumstances with the fact that appellant had parked the cherrypicker in an unguarded manner for several years without mishap, the majority reaches their ultimate conclusion that appellant did not know that parking the cherrypicker in such a manner created a peril. Thus, since knowledge of the peril is an essential element of gross negligence they conclude that the jury’s finding thereof, under these circumstances, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
Summarized, the majority seems to say: (1) that the cherrypicker, while intruding half-way into a public street without warning equipment or flagmen, was parked under otherwise reasonably obvious and safe circumstances, and Dyson should have been able to avoid it; and (2) that the finding of improper lookout on Dyson’s part and the fact that no accident had occurred for several years proved that there was no knowledge on appellant’s part and, therefore, no gross negligence existed.
First, I suggest that the finding of improper lookout on Dyson’s part is immaterial to the existence or non-existence of appellant’s gross negligence. Second, the circumstances of the case from which the majority infers a lack of knowledge on the part of appellant are equally, if not more, susceptible to an inference on the part of the jury that the appellant knew of the peril, and just did not care. Finally, the fact that the concerned conduct had not resulted in any collision for several years is in no way determinative of the defendant’s knowledge of the peril. I cannot believe that the result in Burk Royalty would have been any different if the tragic occurrence had happened several years later *661without any intervening tragedies. It follows that the litmus test for grossly negligent conduct cannot be the length of time required for it to result in harm.
In any event, this court is not at liberty to substitute its inferences for those of the jury. I find the jury had sufficient evidence on which to base its finding of gross negligence. It viewed all of the evidence, as did we, and concluded that appellant was grossly negligent because it left a large, stationary piece of machinery on a public road but failed to give any warnings of its presence. As previously noted, appellant had but seconds to react after realizing the cherrypicker was stationary. Certainly, the jury was justified in answering the special issues in the manner in which it did. Even though a majority of this panel might wish to substitute its judgment for that of the jury, we simply are not at liberty to do that. I would affirm the judgment with regard to the findings of gross negligence.
I do, however, agree with my brethren that the trial court erred in not reducing Dyson’s actual damages by 25%, the percentage of his comparative negligence. I would, on the other hand, affirm the full amount of the exemplary damages awarded notwithstanding a contrary holding in Pedernales Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Schulz, 583 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Peder-nales, the court held that both actual and punitive damages should be reduced by the percentage of the plaintiff’s comparative negligence. Id. at 885. The court grounded its opinion on the wording of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984). I do not read art. 2212a to require such a reduction in punitive damages. The purpose of such damages is to punish and deter grossly negligent conduct. To allow a reduction of such damages based on a plaintiff’s simple negligent conduct would, in my opinion, dilute the deterrent effect of exemplary damages.
The judgment should be reversed and rendered for appellee Dyson in the amount of $12,303.13 actual damages and affirmed in all other respects.