Court Opinion

ID: 9848600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:23:19.945591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:29.116718
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court properly admitted the prior bad acts at issue. Accordingly, I would affirm Petitioner’s conviction and sentence.
Although evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible for purposes of proving that the defendant possesses a criminal character or has a propensity to commit the charged crime, such evidence may be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent. Rule 404(b), SCRE. To be admissible, a prior bad act must logically relate to the ciime with which the defendant has been charged. State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 211, 631 S.E.2d 262, 267 (2006). *27If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing. Id. Prior bad acts may also be admissible under the res gestae doctrine. Under this doctrine, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible where such evidence constitutes an integral part of the crime with which the defendant is charged or is needed to aid the fact finder in understanding the context in which the crime occurred. State v. King, 334 S.C. 504, 512, 514 S.E.2d 578, 582 (1999).
Child abuse differs from other types of crimes in several respects. Specifically, the crime of child abuse often occurs in secret, typically in the privacy of one’s home. The abusive conduct is not usually confined to a single instance, but rather is a systematic pattern of violence progressively escalating and worsening over time. Child victims are often completely dependent upon the abuser, unable to defend themselves, and often too young to alert anyone to their horrendous plight or ask for help. It is also not uncommon for child abuse victims to be so young that they are incapable of offering testimony against the abuser. For these reasons, proving the crime of child abuse is extremely difficult.
In light of the insidious nature of this crime, our Legislature created a separate homicide statute related to child abuse. That statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of homicide by child abuse if the person: causes the death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-85(A)(l) (2006). The Legislature has defined “child abuse or neglect” as “an act or omission by any person which causes harm to the child’s physical health or welfare.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-85(B)(1) (2006). Thus, the homicide by child abuse statute criminalizes the specific infliction of abuse as well as the failure to protect a child from abuse which results in the death of that child while exhibiting an extreme indifference to human life. In this way, the statute incorporates more than just the act that causes the death — it criminalizes the course of conduct which results in the death of a child. In my view, this statute is grounded in the public policy that an adult is not only prohibited from physically abusing a child, but also is *28prohibited from deliberately sitting by and allowing a child’s life to be threatened by the abuse of another.
In my opinion, the majority’s view of the prior bad acts in the instant case as it relates to the crime of homicide by child abuse is far too narrow. Because the statute specifically prohibits not just acts resulting in death to a child, but also omissions, I believe that it is irrelevant whether Petitioner was the one to actually handcuff the infant victim to the bed and to place him in the attic, or whether he was aware of the abusive incidents that occurred in his home and failed to act to protect the child from the abuse. Pursuant to the statute, the jury was free to return a guilty verdict if it found that Petitioner failed to act in the face of patently dangerous conditions in which the victim was placed.
The evidence at trial showed that Petitioner and the infant victim’s mother began a relationship in March 2000. In August 2000, several weeks prior to the victim’s death, the victim’s mother along with the victim and her other child began living at Petitioner’s house with Petitioner. Although Petitioner testified that he did not spend every night at the house, he testified that he observed the victim’s mother beat the victim and saw her wrap the victim in a blanket and get on top of him. Petitioner admitted that he would “play fight” with the victim, and in his statement to police, he stated that he had hit the victim several times with his elbow and twice with his fists, pinched him, and put his weight on him, but that he did not mean to hurt the victim.5
The State presented evidence that the infant victim suffered severe internal injuries, multiple rib fractures, ruptured bowels which caused infection and sepsis, internal bleeding, abdominal infections, and dying organs, all of which ultimately culminated in his death. Doctors testified that these injuries occurred at different times and that the newer fractures were between several hours to three days old, while the older fractures were likely two weeks old. Additionally, doctors testified that the victim’s injuries resulted from multiple and *29repeated blows and were not consistent with a single blow. The record contains no evidence that the victim died accidentally, and I believe that the extensive evidence of repeated brutal physical abuse leads only to the conclusion that the victim died an agonizing, prolonged death by torture at the hands of an adult. Petitioner’s friend’s testimony showed, at a minimum, that Petitioner deliberately failed to come to the victim’s aid while the victim was living in Petitioner home and that Petitioner exhibited extreme indifference to human life, resulting in harm to the victim’s safety and welfare.6 Thus, under statute, this evidence was clearly relevant to Petitioner’s guilt of the crime of homicide by child abuse.
Considering the evidence presented in this case, I would hold that the friend’s testimony was admissible under the res gestae doctrine. I believe that the testimony showed a course of conduct and established an integral part of the crime of homicide by child abuse because it is evidence that Petitioner abused and neglected the victim just weeks before his death. In light of the temporal proximity to victim’s death and considering the nature of child abuse, I believe that Petitioner’s friend’s testimony was necessary to a full presentation of the crime. See State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 122, 470 S.E.2d 366, 370 (1996) (quoting United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir.1980)) (holding that evidence of prior bad acts is admissible under the res gestae doctrine where such evidence “furnishes part of the context of the crime or is necessary to a full presentation of the case.”).
I would also hold that the testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) to show a common scheme or plan, because I believe that the prior bad acts bore a close degree of similarity and were sufficiently connected to the victim’s death. In my view, Petitioner’s friend’s testimony was evidence of a pattern of abuse towards the victim shortly before his death in Petitioner’s own home. These acts were committed against the same victim, close in time to the victim’s death, *30and showed escalating abuse over a narrow and specific time period. In this way, this case is distinguishable from other cases in which we have found prior bad act evidence inadmissible under 404(b) as a common scheme or plan. See State v. Smith, 322 S.C. 107, 110, 470 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1996) (holding prior bad acts against girlfriends son would not have been admissible in defendants trial for the death of girlfriends daughter where there was no evidence defendant previously abused the daughter and where the prior acts of abuse were not sufficiently similar); State v. Pierce, 326 S.C. 176, 179, 485 S.E.2d 913, 914 (1997) (holding evidence of prior bad act was inadmissible under the common scheme or plan exception where the acts were not sufficiently similar and where the acts occurred more than a year apart).7
Furthermore, I would hold that this evidence is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) to prove intent and absence of mistake or accident. In order to prove its case, the State was required to prove that Petitioner exhibited an extreme indifference to human life. In my view, these prior bad acts showed that Petitioner exhibited extreme and deliberate indifference and conscious disregard towards the victim’s life just weeks prior to his death. See State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 645, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173 (2003) (noting that in reckless homicide cases, reckless disregard for the safety of others signifies an indifference to the consequences of one’s acts or a conscious indifference to the safety of others); State v. Jarrell, 350 S.C. 90, 97, 564 S.E.2d 362, 366 (Ct.App.2002) (holding that “in the context of homicide by abuse statutes, extreme indifference is a mental state akin to intent characterized by a deliberate act culminating in death.”). Moreover, I believe that this testimony is evidence that the victim’s death was not *31the result of the victim accidentally falling off of the bed, as Petitioner claimed. See State v. Smith, 337 S.C. 27, 33, 522 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1999) (holding that the trial court properly admitted the defendants previous domestic violence convictions to show intent and absence of mistake or accident where he claimed the shooting was an accident).
In the homicide by child abuse statute, the Legislature drafted a criminal offense that recognizes and criminalizes both the acts and the omissions that typify the situation in which a helpless child perishes as a result of an adult’s actions or criminal ambivalence. In my view, this evidence was not admitted as character or propensity evidence. Rather, I believe that the evidence showed a common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, and intent, and that it was necessary for a full presentation of the State’s case. For these reasons, I would affirm Petitioner’s conviction and sentence.

. At trial, the police officer testified that Petitioner had shown him how he placed his weight on the victim, which the officer demonstrated to the jury. The officer also testified that Petitioner weighed approximately 220 pounds at the time of his arrest, and another witness described Petitioner as "really, really big.”

. I reach this conclusion viewing tire prior bad act in the light most favorable to Petitioner, for there is evidence in the record that Petitioner himself committed the acts of abuse. Specifically, the record includes testimony that the handcuffs were Petitioner’s; that Petitioner giggled after the friend removed the handcuffs; and that Petitioner told the friend "to mind his own business.”

. In my view, the majority in Pierce did not hold that prior bad acts are never admissible to establish a pattern of child abuse, but rather, that testimony from medical personnel regarding injuries to the child was inadmissible to show a pattern of child abuse because there was no evidence the defendant committed the abuse causing the injuries. Additionally, the majority held that evidence of the defendant’s “rough treatment’’ of the child a year prior to his death did not bear a close similarity or connection. Contrary to the testimony sought to be admitted in Pierce, Petitioner's friend's testimony provides an eyewitness account of the manner in which Petitioner treated Jacquan shortly before his death.