Court Opinion

ID: 9707468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:12:40.148029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:33.397824
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion holds the “tacking” of unrestricted authorities is illegal and in violation of the intent of the Commission in granting the original certificates. It also states: “If the right to tack is not specifically granted, it does not exist.” There is no authority for those statements and they are flatly contradicted by repeated holdings of the Interstate Commerce Commission and federal courts as applied to interstate carriers.
In Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., Interpretation of Certificate, 48 M. C. C. 610 (1948), the Interstate Commerce Commission said: “The right of the motor common carrier to tack separate grants of unrestricted authorities is well settled regardless of whether the authorities involve regular routes, irregular routes, or" a combination of both.” To the same effect, see M. I. O’Boyle & Son, Inc. v. E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 81 M. C. C. 201 (1959). As to the type of situation involved here, see Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 946 (1952), affirmed, Per Curiam, 344 U. S. 925, 73 S. Ct. 497, 97 L. Ed. 712 (1953).
It should be noted also the evidence discloses that *235from the very beginning of motor carrier regulation in Nebraska, tacking of regular and irregular route segments of authority, as well as tacking of two irregular route segments, was permitted except where specifically prohibited. Until 1966, the Commission had no rule or regulation prohibiting .or limiting carriers’ right to- tack generally and there had never been any statutory prohibition against operations involving tacking of any kind. The record here does not show any specific findings of fact which will support the Commission’s general prohibitory order applied retroactively as it was. The findings' constitute statements of opinion of the Commission, reflecting the policy decision involved without the requisite factual support for such retroactive effect.
In addition to the overall issues involved in the general order prohibiting tacking, the majority opinion here affirms the order of the Commission denying the application of Seward Motor Freight, Inc., for the right to tack its own specific certificates. The only evidence in the record demonstrated that its services involving tacking on its own routes is needed by many shippers and some entire communities who would otherwise have no service or very inadequate service. There is no evidence that any other existing carrier could serve the need as well as the applicant. No carriers opposed the application. The evidence was clear that the operations provided by the tacking of authorities by Seward Motor Freight, Inc., and covered by the application had been conducted over a long period of time under color of authority. The test in such circumstances was set down in Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 174 Neb. 425, 118 N. W. 2d 498. The .test is (1) whether the operation will serve some useful purpose responsive to a public demand or need; (2) whether the purpose can or will be served as well by existing carriers: and (3) whether it can be served by applicant without endangering or impairing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest.
*236Even if it be conceded that the Commission had authority to determine a general tacking policy, at least prospectively, there are no specific findings of fact to support the general order prohibiting tacking conducted over a period of years under color of authority and with the full knowledge and tacit consent of the Commission. Neither is there evidence in the record to support the specific denial of the application of Seward Motor Freight, Inc. The action of the Commission in both instances was arbitrary and unreasonable and should have been set aside.