Court Opinion

ID: 9550261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:32:56.700419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:48.218217
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(dissenting).
Appellant was convicted of a violation of I.C. § 67-2927 set out verbatim in the majority opinion. By the complaint he was charged as follows:
“That Richard Hahn * * * on the 31st day of March, 1965, at 10:50 a. m., in the County of Madison and State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there wilfully, intentionally, and unlawfully refuse to submit the truck he was driving to weight inspection as required by I.C. 67-2927, to-wit: the defendant was driving a Ford truck loaded with propane gas * * * approximately 2 miles West of Teton City, Idaho in Madison County at which point the Port of Entry of the State of Idaho established a temporary weighing station and said defendant having been stopped by authorities of the Port of Entry refused to submit the said truck loaded with propane gas to weight inspection to determine whether the said truck loaded with propane gas was within the weight limitations set forth in I.C. 49-901 or 49-906 by then and there wilfully, intentionally and unlawfully refusing to drive the said truck, after having been requested to do so by the attending officers, on temporary weighing scales which had been set up for that purpose.”
I.C. § 67-2927 was enacted at the extraordinary session of the legislature of 1950, as a part of chapter 15 of that special session. S.L.1950 (E.S.), ch. 15, § 2, p. 26. That chapter authorized the establishment of ports of entry or checking stations by the commissioner of law enforcement. The purpose of the chapter is set out in Section 1 thereof in the following terms:
“To augment and help make more efficient and effective the enforcement of certain laws of the State of Idaho, the Commissioner of Law Enforcement is hereby authorized and directed to establish from time to time temporary or permanent ports of entry or checking stations upon any highways in the State of Idaho, at such places as the Commissioner of Law Enforcement shall deem necessary and advisable.” I.C. § 67-2926 (a).
Section 4 of the act states:
“The Commissioner of Law Enforcement is hereby directed, in the administration of this act [S.L.1950 (E.S.) Ch. 15.], to cooperate with the other departments and agencies of the State of Idaho which have the responsibility of enforcing licensing, taxing and inspection laws.”
The underlying purpose of this legislative enactment is clear — to authorize the inspection of transported merchandise, products and commodities to determine “compliance with the laws of the state of Idaho.” I.C. § 67-2927.
The department of law enforcement has power “to enforce all of the penal and regulatory laws of the state.” I.C. § 67— 2901. The department of law enforcement is also vested with the power and the duty to enforce obedience on the part of all motor carriers to all statutes of the state of Idaho applicable to such carriers. I.C. § 61-810. By the terms of I.C. § 61-801, which is a part of the motor carrier act (Ch. 8 of Title 61, I.C.), a “motor carrier” *270is defined to mean “common carrier, contract carrier or private carrier.” The department of law enforcement is intimately connected with the laws pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles, motor carriers, trucks and the enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 9, Title 49, I.C., dealing with weight, speed and tire regulations of motor vehicles in this state.
Consideration of a statute and its purposes and scope must be given not “in vacuo,” but in light of other existing legislation. Certainly, it cannot be said that the department of law enforcement is not within the scope of its authority and duty in the establishment of either temporary or permanent ports of entry; and it cannot be doubted that the department of law enforcement in operation of these ports of entry can “inspect” transported merchandise. Under the view of the majority opinion it would seem that the only inspection that can be made at such a port of entry is of the merchandise itself. However, it must be pointed out that I.C. § 67-2927 deals only.with transported “merchandise, products or commodity” and any inspection of a “transported commodity” of necessity encompasses the means by which such commodity is being transported.
The complaint in this appeal alleges that appellant did “wilfully, intentionally, and unlawfully refuse to submit the truck he was- driving to weight inspection * * * ” and then particularly alleges the facts establishing the commission of the charged crime, including the allegation that appellant “refused to submit the said truck loaded with propane gas to weight inspection * * *.” I.C. § 49-901, which is particularly mentioned in the complaint, pertains to allowable weights of vehicles “with the load thereon * * *.” Here again the criteria involves not the truck alone, or the load alone, but the combination of both. The same is true with the basic concept of I.C. § 67-2927, which deals with “merchandise, product or commodity being transported within the state * * One cannot, in construing this latter statute, divorce the load from the means of transporting it.
The term “inspection” as used in I.C. § 67-2927 encompasses more than a visual inspection of a load of merchandise, product or commodity — it must be read in conjunction with the fact that the merchandise, product or commodity is being transported. That section requires that when the transported merchandise, product or commodity is subject to inspection by any department or agency of the state, the owner or operator of the motor vehicle transporting the merchandise, product or commodity is required to stop and submit to inspection. In other words the owner or operator of the vehicle is required to stop and submit to inspection for compliance with the laws of the state of Idaho. The gravamen of this crime is the failure of the owner or operator of the vehicle transporting the commodity which is subj ect to an inspection to stop and to submit to an inspection to-determine whether there is compliance with the laws of the state.
The “inspection” contemplated by the-statute is not merely visual inspection; when the inspection is to establish compliance with the laws of the state of Idaho-it can encompass a determination of the physical characteristics of the load, i. e., size, weight, height, length (I.C. §§ 49-901,. 49-815, 49-913, 49-916), all of which become involved when one is -dealing with “compliance with the laws of Idaho.” Examples of other laws for which inspections may be required are I.C. §§ 25-1510, 25— 214, 39-3007 and 39-3017, all of which contemplate an inspection of one sort or another. The determination of the weight of a loaded vehicle, of necessity requires the-weighing of a vehicle with its load thereon, and the transported load is being sub--, jected to an inspection for “compliance-with the laws of Idaho.”
*271The-term “inspect” is defined in Webster, 3d Int. Dictionary (1961) as “1: to view closely and critically * * *; examine with care: 2: to view and examine officially.” The word “examine” is defined, “1: to test by an appropriate method.” “Weigh” is defined as “1: To examine by a balance.” Thus, when one "weighs” an article, he “examines” it with respect to its weight, and when one inspects an article, he “examines” it. The conclusion is inescapable to me that “inspection” is a broader term than the majority opinion indicates. “Inspection” must be taken to include a weight inspection. Kucker v. Sunlight Oil & Gasoline Co., 230 Pa. 528, 79 A. 747 (1911); McCanless v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 178 Tenn. 614, 162 S.W.2d 370 (1942).
The majority opinion states that if other laws were violated, the complaint should charge such. However, appellant violated only one law, that of I.C. § 67-2927, by failing to submit to an inspection. It could not be determined whether appellant violated the weight limit law until a weight inspection could be made.
It is my view that we must contrue I.C. § 67-2927 in a reasonable manner to effectuate the purpose of the legislature (see City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 303 P.2d 680 (1956); State v. Groseclose, 67 Idaho 71, 171 P.2d 863 (1946); State v. Bowman, 40 Idaho 470, 235 P. 577 (1925); State v. Cosgrove, 36 Idaho 278, 210 P. 393 (1922); State v. Omaechevviaria, 27 Idaho 797, 152 P. 280 (1915)), and that such construction would have “inspection” include an inspection for weight.
It is my conclusion that the complaint was not subject to demurrer. The facts alleged, stipulated to by the parties, established a violation of the provisions of I.C. § 67-2927. The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.