Court Opinion

ID: 9466946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:33:31.118284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:03.667227
License: Public Domain

*1184TATE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority’s excellent and scholarly opinion insofar as it holds that the defendant’s utilization of the plaintiff’s copyrighted cover was authorized by the fair use doctrine. Therefore, as the majority correctly notes, proper application of the fair use principle avoids most First Amendment conflicts that might arise.
Nevertheless, in view of the observations contained in the partial dissent, it may be appropriate to note my own view that the idea-expression test should not be the sole basis for resolving any potential copyright-First Amendment conflict. In my view, under limited circumstances, a First Amendment privilege may, and should exist where utilization of the copyrighted expression is necessary for the purpose of conveying thoughts or expressions. See discussions in: Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 Calif.L.Rev. 283 (1979); Note, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 320 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law — Commercial Speech — Copyright and the First Amendment, 1979 Wisc.L.Rev. 242 (1979); Note, Copyright and the First Amendment, 33 Univ. of Miami L.Rev. 207 (1978).
Admittedly, with proper application of the fair use principle, it is difficult to visualize the rare occasions when the First Amendment may entitle quotation from or reproduction of copyrighted material not otherwise available through fair use. I am, for instance, inclined to agree that, in the case before us, because fair use adequately served the interests of free expression, no additional First Amendment protection of expression extended to reproduction of the graphic illustration before us. However, to illustrate my difference with the dissent on this issue, if fair use did not protect the defendant’s use of the copyrighted cover, then I would agree completely with the district court, for the reasons expressed in its opinion, that the First Amendment prevented the plaintiff from enjoining reproduction of the cover. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F.Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
In summary, I agree that we should not now decide that the idea-expression dichotomy is the sole touchstone for applying the sensitive and fundamental First Amendment values so as to permit use of copyrighted material in public discussion and expression of thoughts. Instead, I would wait until squarely faced with the attempted prohibition of a use of copyrighted expression not protected by fair use but necessary for the adequate expression of thought. In such a case, the proposed use might, as in the instant case, neither reduce the value of the plaintiff’s copyright nor exploit his expression (the values sought to be advanced by copyright protection), and it would then be appropriate to consider this factor in weighing this sensitive First Amendment issue concerning fundamental values of a free society. That conflict is not presently before us, and we properly did not reach it in our panel opinion.