Court Opinion

ID: 9692271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:49:25.571407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.757115
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND ' MOTION FOR TRANSFER

PER CURIAM.
Lessor filed a “Motion For Rehearing Or, In The Alternative, For Transfer To The Missouri Supreme Court.” In that motion, Lessor contends, inter alia, that, although we correctly determined that the term “similar type and size business” in the Inducement paragraph of the Lease was ambiguous, we proceeded to weigh and determine the credibility of the evidence when that function should only be performed by the trial court. Lessor argues that the case should have been remanded to the trial court for that purpose and, in support, cites cases such as Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Gaebler, 956 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.App. W.D.1997), and Baker v. Whitaker, 887 S.W.2d 664 (Mo.App. W.D.1994). In Specialty Restaurants, the *786court remanded the case to the trial court, saying that while the trial court had received evidence regarding the parties’ intent, it presumably had not considered it because of its conclusion that the document in question was “clear and unambiguous.” Id. at 394. On remand, the trial court was directed to glean the parties’ intent from the extrinsic evidence in the record. Id. at 395-96. In Baker, the trial court apparently made no determination about the meaning of the phrase found to be ambiguous, and on remand was directed to do so. Id. 670-71.
In the instant case, the trial court made findings relating to the intent of the parties, in addition to its finding that the contract was “an integrated unambiguous written contract.” The trial court, in its Findings of Fact said:
6. It is unlikely [Lessee] would have executed the lease and located its ladies apparel store in a shopping center anchored by a hardware store so that [Lessor’s] interpretation of [the Inducement paragraph] is unusual, inequitable and unlikely.
7. [Sutherland’s] and [Consumers] are not similar type businesses in the fair and ordinary sense of their operations, one being a hardware store and the other a grocery store, so that [Sutherland’s] is not a suitable replacement tenant for [Consumers].
Contrary to Specialty Restaurants and Baker, the trial court in this case obviously considered, and made findings concerning, the evidence of what was the intent of the parties in entering into the Lease, and particularly the Inducement paragraph thereof. Lessor’s interpretation of the Inducement paragraph, set out in our opinion, was found by the trial court to be “unusual, inequitable and unlikely.” This finding was made after hearing the evidence presented by the parties, including the evidence that a court is to consider in determining the intent of the parties after an ambiguity is found in a document. Those factors are set out in Royal Banks of Missouri v. Fridkin, 819 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo. banc 1991), cited in our opinion. Even though the trial court found that the Lease was unambiguous, it also made findings concerning the factors that are to be considered in determining the intent of the parties when a document is found to be ambiguous.
In Rouggly v. Whitman, 592 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.App. E.D.1979), cited in our opinion, the court considered the evidence that had been before the trial court in a case where, as here, the trial court had improperly concluded that a document was unambiguous. There, unlike this case, the conclusion that the document was unambiguous had apparently resulted in no findings relating to factual issues. Nevertheless, the court said that “we will review the entire record of the proceedings below, and, if the evidence is sufficient to enable us to do so, enter such judgment as should have been entered below.” Id. at 519. As in Royal Banks, the court in Rouggly said that in construing ambiguous contracts, the courts consider “the entire contract, subsidiary agreements, the relationship of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, the practical construction the parties themselves have placed on the contract by their acts and deeds, and other external circumstances which cast fight on the intent of the parties.” 592 S.W.2d at 519-20. The court also said that “[t]he more probable and reasonable of two available constructions should be utilized to the exclusion of one which produces a ‘redundant, illusory, absurd, and therefore unreasonable’ result.” Id. at 521 (internal citations omitted). After doing so, the court in Rouggly *787concluded, as we have here, that there was no need to resort to the artificial rule of construction whereby courts construe ambiguous language against the party responsible for its use. Id. at 528. Accordingly, this argument in Lessor’s motion is not well taken.
Lessor also states that we “overlooked facts in finding that the ‘only testimony’ on the subject of the parties [sic] intent were the declarations of lessee or its agent,” because Mrs. Rathbun testified extensively about her understanding of the meaning of the lease terms. Lessor misinterprets our opinion. In our discussion of Lessor’s second point on appeal, we said that “[according to the only testimony on the subject, Lessee wants to be in shopping centers that have grocery stores and discount or major department stores because those types of businesses attract female shoppers.” In that statement, we were alluding to the evidence concerning Lessee’s criteria and intent in selecting sites for its businesses. We did not purport to say, as Lessor suggests, that there was no other evidence concerning the intent of the parties concerning the terms of the Lease. In fact, as we said in our opinion, Lessor’s agent agreed that the intent of the parties was that Wal-Mart and Consumers were to be the major anchor tenants and no others.
One other matter raised by Lessor in its motion deserves discussion. This relates to the trial court’s finding that the Lease is an integrated “unambiguous” written contract. Lessor points out that in our opinion, we concluded that the phrase “similar type and size business” is ambiguous, but that we remanded the case to the trial court to correct its judgment only to the extent that it used the term “hereafter” in describing the rent obligations under the Lease. Lessor’s argument that we should not permit the judgment to stand with a finding that the Lease is unambiguous when we have found that a part of it is, in fact, ambiguous, is well taken. On remand, the trial court is directed to delete its finding that the Lease is unambiguous, and, in addition to deleting the term “hereafter” discussed in the opinion, to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion and this addendum.
Other issues raised in Lessor’s motion require no further discussion. Except as described above, the motion is denied.