Court Opinion

ID: 9838491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:05:40.250896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:35.604513
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
                                       Docket No. 49385

KRISTINE MCCREERY,                       )
                                         )
   Plaintiff-Appellant,                  )
                                         )
v.                                       )            Boise, May 2023 Term
                                         )
JENNIFER KING, M.D., in her              )            Opinion Filed: September 6, 2023
individual and official capacity; AMY    )
BARTON, M.D., in her individual and      )            Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
official capacity, TERESA TORRES,        )
in her individual and official capacity, )
ERIN PON, in her individual and          )
official capacity, and SHARI DODGE,      )
in her individual and official capacity, )
                                         )
   Defendants-Respondents.               )
____________________________________)

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
       Ada County, Jonathan Medema. District Judge.

       The district court judgment is affirmed.

       Olsen Taggart PLLC, Idaho Falls, attorneys for Appellant. Nathan M. Olsen argued.

       Duke Evett, PLLC, Boise, attorneys for Respondent Jennifer King, M.D. Keely E.
       Duke argued.

       Gjording Fouser, PLLC, Boise, attorneys for Respondent Amy Barton, M.D. Taylor
       H.M. Fouser argued.

       Moore Elia & Kraft, LLP, Boise, attorneys for Respondents Erin Pon and Shari
       Dodge. Peter E. Thomas argued.

       Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent Teresa Torres.
       Brian V. Church argued.

                            _________________________________
BEVAN, Chief Justice.
       This lawsuit arises from an investigation into whether Appellant Kristine McCreery abused
or neglected her fifteen-year-old son, B.M. McCreery filed a complaint against two physicians
                                                  1
who reported the alleged abuse, the detective who investigated the reports, the deputy prosecutor
who filed the Child Protection Act (“CPA”) action, and the social worker for the Idaho Department
of Health and Welfare who submitted an investigatory report and testified in the CPA case
(collectively “defendants” or “Respondents”), alleging they had violated her constitutional rights
and Idaho’s false reporting statutes when they took actions to separate her from B.M. for over
fifteen months. The district court dismissed McCreery’s claims with prejudice after finding
Respondents were immune from liability and that the allegations in McCreery’s complaint failed
to state any valid claim upon which relief could be granted. McCreery filed a motion to amend her
complaint, which the district court denied. McCreery timely appealed to this Court, arguing that
the district court erroneously dismissed her claims. We affirm.
                                I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
           A CPA action was initiated after two physicians, Dr. Jennifer King and Dr. Amy Barton,
raised concerns that B.M. was being abused and/or neglected by his mother due to his low weight
and some troubling blood tests. The following facts are taken from McCreery’s third amended
complaint.1 On October 9, 2018, B.M. was five foot two-and-a-half inches tall2 and weighed 82.8
pounds. A few weeks later, on October 23, 2018, McCreery took B.M. to the emergency room for
abdominal pain. B.M. weighed 83 pounds and had a Body Mass Index (“BMI”) of 16.7.
           On December 17, 2018, B.M. was examined by his primary care physician for a persistent
cough and on that date, he weighed 85 pounds and had a recorded BMI of 15.33. B.M.’s cough
did not improve, and McCreery took him to Saint Alphonsus urgent care the next day. B.M.
weighed 83.4 pounds and had a recorded BMI of 15.01. B.M.’s cough continued to worsen, and
on January 6, he went to the emergency room, where he tested positive for influenza. B.M. weighed
70 pounds 8.64 ounces and had a recorded BMI of 13.9. B.M. returned to the emergency room on
January 9 and 10 because his symptoms were not resolving. On January 10, B.M. was admitted to
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise. B.M. self-reported to be 5 feet tall, he weighed
74 pounds, and his BMI was 13.6.

1
  McCreery’s complaint was dismissed on Respondents’ motions to dismiss. “In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the
district court is to consider only the facts set forth in the pleadings.” Williamson v. Ada Cnty., 170 Idaho 204, 207,
n.1, 509 P.3d 1133, 1136, n.1 (2022) (quoting Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 574, 401 P.3d 148, 152 (2017)). “These
facts must be taken as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, Inc. v.
State, 154 Idaho 716, 720, 302 P.3d 341, 345 (2012)).
2
    B.M.’s recorded height varied between 4’ 11” to 5’ 2.5” from October 9, 2018, to January 16, 2019.
                                                           2
       Between January 11, and January 16, B.M.’s activity levels were recorded by care
providers, and his activity varied from walking to the bathroom and back to bed, to doing 3 laps
around the unit. Prior to January 12, 2019, B.M. could not shower independently. During this
timeframe B.M. was screened by nurses and a psychologist for abuse and neglect, but those
providers did not report suspected abuse at that time.
       Dr. King first saw B.M. at Saint Alphonsus on January 16, 2019. After Dr. King examined
B.M., interviewed McCreery, and reviewed B.M.’s medical records, she reported suspected child
abuse to Detective Erin Pon. Dr. King reported “[B.M.] was ‘severely malnourished’ and if his
nutrition isn’t turned around within 6 months, the [sic] he will be at risk of death.” Dr. King also
reported that B.M. had neutropenia (an unusually low count of white blood cells), low platelets,
low alkaline, and low electrolytes. In making these findings, Dr. King did not inform Detective
Pon that B.M.’s other medical providers had developed a care plan and were working with
McCreery to address B.M.’s weight management. The plan had always been that B.M. would be
discharged to his mother’s care. Dr. King also failed to report that the hospitalist who had been
treating B.M. since his in-patient admission noted that the low counts were “possibly due to viral
suppression but improving” and that “WBC and ANC have both improved and uric acid and LDH
were reassuring.”
       After Dr. King’s initial report of child abuse, B.M. was seen by Dr. Barton as part of St.
Luke’s Children at Risk Evaluation Services (“CARES”) program. Before B.M. was removed from
McCreery’s custody, Dr. Barton spoke with Detective Pon and shared her medical observations of
B.M. McCreery alleges that Dr. Barton deliberately misrepresented B.M.’s medical condition
during this discussion. According to the allegations, Detective Pon accepted any information
provided by Dr. Barton as true without conducting more investigation. Detective Pon then made
the discretionary determination that “reasonable cause existed” to believe B.M. was in imminent
danger of serious bodily injury. Therefore, B.M. was temporarily removed from McCreery’s
custody.
       Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney Shari Dodge then signed a petition as required by
Idaho Code section 16-1610(1), that required McCreery to take part in a CPA case. The petition
claimed “[B.M.] was ‘severely malnourished’ and if his nutrition [was not] turned around within
6 months, the [sic] he will be at risk of death and, further, that Dr. Barton expressed deep concern
that [B.M.] would continue to decline and possibly die if sent home with [McCreery].” The
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magistrate court in the CPA case determined there was sufficient evidence that McCreery had
abused B.M. for the court to take jurisdiction over the child.
        During the CPA case, Teresa Torres, a social worker with the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare, testified that B.M. was “doing very well” in the State’s custody, and “gaining weight,
appropriately,” based on a visit she had with B.M. in February 2019. Torres also testified B.M.’s
medical records evidenced a consistent concern with his weight and nourishment. McCreery
alleged Torres deceived the court with this testimony because she omitted facts that would have
supported her claim that B.M.’s low weight resulted from an acute illness, not because McCreery
was not feeding him.
        McCreery later pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of injury to a child.3 As a result of
the CPA case, McCreery alleges “she was separated from her son for approximately 18 months
and was placed on the Idaho Child Protection Central Registry as a Level Two offender.”
        On January 15, 2021, McCreery initiated this lawsuit against Dr. King, Dr. Barton,
Detective Pon, prosecutor Dodge, and social worker Torres, alleging violations of her civil rights
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and state law bad faith reporting
claims against Dr. King and Dr. Barton. McCreery filed her initial complaint, an amended
complaint, and a second amended complaint in short succession. Defendants Torres, Dodge, Pon,
and Dr. Barton filed motions to dismiss McCreery’s second amended complaint. Before the district
court ruled on defendants’ motions to dismiss, and with consent from defendants, McCreery filed
a third amended complaint on March 19, 2021. Immediately thereafter, Dr. King filed her own
motion to dismiss.
        McCreery’s third amended complaint asserted five causes of action:
        COUNT I (Dr. King): Bad Faith, Oppressive Reporting or Allegation of Child
        Abuse, Abandonment or Neglect in violation of Idaho Code section 16-1607;
        COUNT II (Dr. Barton): Bad Faith, Oppressive Reporting or Allegation of Child
        Abuse, Abandonment or Neglect in violation of Idaho Code section 16-1607;

3
 McCreery asks this Court to take judicial notice that on December 7, 2021, the criminal charges against her in Idaho
State District Court Canyon County Case No. CR14-19-11336 pertaining to her alleged abuse and neglect of B.M.
were dismissed by the court. However, McCreery’s criminal charges have not been dismissed; rather, McCreery’s
criminal case was dismissed because her probation has been terminated and criminal proceedings have closed.
McCreery pleaded guilty to child abuse on December 19, 2019, and later made a “motion to set aside guilty plea” on
December 7, 2021. The criminal court denied McCreery’s motion to set aside her guilty plea, so her judgment of
conviction remains.
                                                         4
         COUNT III (Dr. King, Dr. Barton, and Detective Pon): Wrongful Interference with
         Fourteenth Amendment Right to Family Relationships by Removing Child from
         Parent absent Imminent Danger and without a Court Order;
         COUNT IV (prosecutor Dodge): Fourteenth Amendment Right to be Free from
         Deception in the Presentation of Evidence in a CPS Case;
         COUNT V (Dr. King, Dr. Barton, Teresa Torres): Fourteenth Amendment Right to
         be Free from Deception in the Presentation of Evidence in a CPS Case.
In general, McCreery alleged defendants failed to report alternative reasons for B.M.’s low weight,
and failed to disclose positive interactions other doctors described having with B.M.
         On July 14, 2021, the district court entered a memorandum decision on defendants’
motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed all of McCreery’s claims with prejudice after
concluding defendants were immune from liability and that the allegations in McCreery’s
complaint failed to state any valid claim upon which relief could be granted.4 That said, because
McCreery “argue[d] she intended to bring a different claim against Ms. Torres,” the court allowed
her 14 days to file a motion to amend. The court required McCreery to “include a proposed
amended pleading that include[d] a short and plain statement of the claim against Ms. Torres with
her motion if she wishe[d] to assert a different claim for why Ms. Torres should be liable to
Plaintiff for the judge’s decision to deprive Plaintiff of custody of Plaintiff’s son.”
         On July 28, 2021, McCreery filed the motion to amend, requesting leave to file a fourth
amended complaint. On September 15, 2021, she filed a “corrected” motion to amend, omitting
the pro hac vice attorneys who were previously representing her. Both the motion to amend and
corrected motion to amend were filed with McCreery’s proposed fourth amended complaint
attached. The fourth amended complaint: (1) reasserted counts against defendants that had been
dismissed with prejudice; (2) alleged additional facts; (3) added another claim alleging a
Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Fabrication of Evidence claim against Dr. King, Dr. Barton,

4
  We note that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure require courts to treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a Rule
56 motion for summary judgment when they consider matters outside the pleadings. Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist.,
162 Idaho 866, 870, 406 P.3d 878, 882 (2017) (citing I.R.C.P. 12(d); McCann v. McCann, 152 Idaho 809, 814, 275
P.3d 824, 829 (2012)). Here, the district court erred in considering the defendants’ affirmative defenses without
converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motions to a summary judgment standard. Ordinarily, where a Rule 12(b)(6) standard is
inappropriate, as it was here, this Court can review the record presented on a summary judgment basis de novo. Paslay,
162 Idaho at 870, 406 P.3d at 882. However, as explained in more detail in this opinion, the way McCreery has
presented her arguments on appeal prevents this Court from conducting such a review.
                                                          5
Torres, and Detective Pon; and (4) attempted to add two more parties—St. Luke’s Regional
Medical Center and the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare.
       Torres opposed the motion to amend, arguing the new claim was invalid. The other
defendants also opposed McCreery’s motion, citing the fact they had already been dismissed from
the case with prejudice; thus, any motion to amend would be futile. On October 22, 2021, the
district court entered a memorandum decision denying McCreery’s motion to amend. The court
then entered a final judgment dismissing McCreery’s complaint(s) with prejudice as to all
defendants. McCreery timely appealed, arguing the district court erred in dismissing her claims.
                                   II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.     Motion to Dismiss
       Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). A district court’s
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc.,
171 Idaho 296, 520 P.3d 708, 712 (2022) (citing Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist., 162 Idaho 866,
868, 406 P.3d 878, 880 (2017)).
       A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for
       relief has been stated. On review of a dismissal, this Court determines whether the
       non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which if true, would
       entitle him to relief. In doing so, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor
       of the non-moving party.
Id. (quoting Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 572, 401 P.3d 148, 150 (2017)). “[C]ourts are not
required, however, to deem legal conclusions as admitted merely because they were plead [sic] as
factual allegations.” CMJ Properties, LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 162 Idaho 861, 863,
406 P.3d 873, 875 (2017) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
B.     Motion to Amend
       “The Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend for abuse
of discretion.” DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 753, 331 P.3d 491, 495
(2014) (quoting Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho
171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991)).
       When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the sequence
       of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1)
       correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
       boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards

                                                 6
       applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
       exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) (emphasis in original).
       The boundaries of that discretion require that “[t]he court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2). Further, that discretion permits the trial court to consider
“whether the amended pleading sets out a valid claim, whether the opposing party would be
prejudiced by any undue delay, or whether the opposing party has an available defense to the newly
added claim. The court may not, however, weigh the sufficiency of the evidence related to the
additional claim.” Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 115, 138 P.3d 310, 315 (2006) (quoting Spur
Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 122 P.3d 300, 303 (2005)).
                                           III. ANALYSIS
A.     McCreery failed to preserve her arguments for appeal.
       McCreery summarizes her appeal as addressing “whether the trial court properly dismissed
all of plaintiff/respondents’ [sic] claims under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).” Then, in arguing that the district
court erred in granting defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, McCreery relies on facts and
claims alleged in her proposed fourth amended complaint. Critically, the motions to dismiss were
based on McCreery’s third amended complaint. In its memorandum decision on defendants’ Rule
12(b)(6) motions, the district court dismissed all claims against Dr. King, Dr. Barton, Detective
Pon, and prosecutor Dodge with prejudice. The court also dismissed the claim pleaded against
Torres in the third amended complaint with prejudice but allowed McCreery the opportunity to
amend the complaint to add a new claim against Torres.
       McCreery filed a motion to amend the third amended complaint (later filing a corrected
motion to amend with a proposed fourth amended complaint attached as an exhibit) under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) and (d). The motion (1) reasserted counts against defendants that
had been dismissed with prejudice; (2) alleged additional facts; (3) added another claim alleging a
Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Fabrication of Evidence against Dr. King, Dr. Barton, Torres,
and Detective Pon; and (4) attempted to add two more parties: St. Luke’s Regional Medical Center
and the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. The district court denied McCreery’s motion.
       An issue identified on appeal by McCreery states:

                                                  7
        Did the district court incorrectly apply the appropriate standard for assessing the
        facts and claims of the Appellant/Plaintiff under a I.R.C.P §§ 12(b)(6) Motion to
        Dismiss and 15(b)(2)5 Motion to Amend?
Later, in support of her argument that the district court erred in granting defendants’ motions to
dismiss, which were based on the third amended complaint, McCreery fatally relies exclusively
on the facts and allegations in the fourth amended complaint:
        At issue on appeal is whether McCreery had sufficiently plead[ed] facts in support
        of her claims against the respective defendants/respondents. Because McCreery’s
        proposed Fourth Amended Complaint was denied on the merits, this final attempt
        at a modified complaint becomes the operative document for this Court’s review
        on appeal. The defendants/respondents[’] respective Rule 12(b)(6) motions set
        forth several basis [sic] and affirmative defenses for dismissing appellant[’]s
        complaints. However, the district court addressed and ruled on some of the
        defendants/respondents’ various basis [sic], but not others. As such, this appeal
        only addresses the issues ruled on by the district court.
        McCreery’s analysis created significant confusion for Respondents and this Court, as
different standards of review apply to a motion to dismiss and a motion to amend. A district court’s
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure “shall be
reviewed de novo.” Fulfer, 171 Idaho at 300, 520 P.3d at 712. On the other hand, “the denial of a
plaintiff’s motion to amend a complaint to add another cause of action is governed by an abuse of
discretion standard of review.” Est. of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623, 628
(2004) (quoting Thomas v. Medical Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 557, 567
(2002)). A court may consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a
valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint. Id.
        Although McCreery would have to argue the viability of any new allegations in the fourth
amended complaint to argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to
amend, she failed to follow this procedure. Instead, McCreery focuses on the facts and causes of
action alleged in the fourth amended complaint as if the motion to amend had been granted and
the complaint actually filed, claiming it is the operative document for this Court’s review on
appeal. McCreery’s reliance on allegations presented in her fourth amended complaint, while
disputing the district court’s dismissal of claims raised in her third amended complaint,

5
  Rule 15(b)(2) pertains to “Amendments During and After Trial.” The subsection cited by McCreery allows
amendment “For Issues Tried by Consent.” I.R.C.P. 15(b)(2). There was no trial in this case, and thus subsection
(b)(2) is not applicable. Below, McCreery indicated her motion to amend was based on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(2) and (d).
                                                        8
complicates this Court’s ability to resolve what arguments have been preserved for review and is
a fatal defect.
        For example, at several points on appeal McCreery alleges that Dr. King acted under color
of state law because she is a CARES investigator:
            •     Dr. King is “a physician in Ada County who treated B.M., acting under color of
                  state law as a “Children at Risk Evaluation Services” (CARES) investigator)”;
            •     “Dr. King[’s] and Dr. Barton’s involvement as CARES evaluation [sic] with
                  immediate consequences, i.e. being separated from her son and the seizure of
                  medical information by law enforcement officers without a warrant.”
        However, the allegation that Dr. King was “acting under color of state law” in her capacity
as a CARES worker is notably absent from the third amended complaint. McCreery’s third
amended complaint acknowledged that Dr. King saw B.M. at Saint Alphonsus, not St. Luke’s, and
that Dr. King is not a CARES worker. See State v. Christensen, 166 Idaho 373, 375, 458 P.3d 951,
953 (2006) (explaining that St. Luke’s Children and Evaluation Services seeks to provide
evaluation and treatment of abused and neglected children) (emphasis added).
        Another example arises when McCreery attempts to argue Dr. Barton and Dr. King are
“quite clearly state actors” based on two CARES documents attached to her fourth amended
complaint. In making these arguments, McCreery does not acknowledge that those exhibits were
not presented to or reviewed by the district court when it ruled on defendants’ motions to dismiss
the third amended complaint. Similarly, McCreery cites allegations made in the fourth amended
complaint to argue that she sufficiently alleged a claim of conspiracy that should have survived
Dr. Barton’s motion to dismiss:
        In particular, [McCreery] describes a very specific scheme deployed by CARES
        and the employer entities of the respondents to subvert or bypass parental rights, as
        well as to shield themselves from accountability and scrutiny in the process. Again,
        all of these allegations must be considered true for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6)
        and this appeal.
McCreery’s reliance on these allegations is misplaced. Because the proposed fourth amended
complaint contained new allegations that were not in the third amended complaint, the district
court’s dismissal was not, and could not have been, based on those allegations.
        In an effort to salvage her appeal, McCreery suggests that Idaho’s liberal notice pleading
standards allow this Court to review these matters de novo. In support, McCreery cites this Court’s

                                                  9
prior recognition that “the amendment of the complaint supersedes the original complaint and all
subsequent proceedings are based upon the amended complaint.” Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570,
573, 401 P.3d 148, 151 (2017) (quoting Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149
Idaho 299, 330, 233 P.3d 1221, 1252 (2010)). “[T]he general rule is that ‘the amended complaint
supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” Id. (quoting Forsyth v.
Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir.1997)). McCreery overlooks the fact that her motion
to amend the third amended complaint was not granted. Accordingly, the fourth amended
complaint never superseded the third amended complaint, and the district court could not have
denied amendment of the third amended complaint “purely on the merits” despite McCreery’s
suggestions otherwise.
        McCreery may not merge the allegations and argument of two distinct and separate motions
on appeal. If McCreery intended to utilize the allegations raised in the fourth amended complaint,
she was obligated to analyze whether the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion
to amend. She has not done so. “Failing to demonstrate that an abuse of discretion occurred under
any part of the test . . . is fatal to [an] argument that the [trial] court abused its discretion.” Gilbert
v. Radnovich, 171 Idaho 566, 524 P.3d 397, 413 (2023) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 167 Idaho 568,
584, 473 P.3d 837, 853 (2020)). Other than identifying that Rule 15 motions to amend are reviewed
for an abuse of discretion in her standard of review, McCreery does not attempt to argue that the
district court abused its discretion.
        Ultimately, the appellant bears the burden of proving error on appeal. Dorr v. Idaho Dep’t
of Lab., 171 Idaho 306, 520 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2022) (citing Allen v. Campbell, 169 Idaho 125,
129–30, 492 P.3d 1084, 1088–89 (2021)). Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires an appellant’s
argument be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record
relied on. McCreery’s sole reliance on facts and allegations in the fourth amended complaint
operates as a complete waiver of review of the trial court’s dismissal of the third amended
complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing McCreery’s claims
against all Respondents.
B.      Dr. King, Dr. Barton, and Torres are awarded attorney fees on appeal.
        Dr. King, Dr. Barton, and Torres request attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121.
Dr. Barton and Torres also request attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988. Section 12-121
provides, “[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing

                                                    10
party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.” Such fees are awarded where arguments do not meaningfully
apply existing precedent or are implausible. Asher v. McMillan, 169 Idaho 701, 711, 503 P.3d 172,
182 (2021). This Court has also found fees under section 12-121 to be appropriate when there is
no argument as to how the trial court abused its discretion. Hunt v. Hunt, 137 Idaho 18, 23, 43 P.3d
777, 782 (2002) (“Where issues of discretion are involved, an award of attorney fees is proper if
the appellant fails to make a cogent challenge to the judge’s exercise of discretion.”). Similar to
Idaho Code section 12-121, a prevailing defendant under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 may be awarded
attorney fees if the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Nation v.
State, Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007).
        By claiming the fourth amended complaint is the operative document on appeal,
McCreery’s arguments should have detailed how the district court abused its discretion in denying
her motion to amend. McCreery included no discussion of the abuse of discretion standard. Instead,
McCreery focuses on the merits of the district court’s dismissal of her third amended complaint,
using claims and documents in her fourth amended complaint. McCreery may not merge the
allegations and argument of two distinct and separate motions on appeal. Thus, the foundation of
her appeal was fatally flawed from the beginning. Accordingly, we conclude that McCreery’s
arguments are frivolous and without foundation. As a result, we award attorney fees under Idaho
Code section 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. section 1988 to Dr. King, Dr. Barton, and Torres.
                                          IV. CONCLUSION
        We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing claims against Respondents with
prejudice. We award attorney fees and costs on appeal to Dr. King, Dr. Barton, and Torres under
Idaho Code section 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. section 1988. Pon and Dodge, who did not seek attorney
fees on appeal, are entitled to costs as a matter of right as prevailing parties.

        JUSTICES BRODY, STEGNER, MOELLER, and JUDGE MELANSON, pro tem,
CONCUR.

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