Court Opinion

ID: 9760835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:18:52.227417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:17.673692
License: Public Domain

*61Shea, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that the findings related to the earning capacity of the defendant wife and her opportunities for future acquisition of capital assets are adequately supported by the evidence.
The inappropriateness of the hyperbole, “nationally celebrated harpist,” as applied to the defendant or any other virtuoso of that instrument of recent memory is of small concern. Of more serious import is the assumption of the majority that after twenty years of inactivity as a professional musician during the marriage the defendant has a realistic prospect of supporting herself in a changed musical world where a harp has become a curiosity. In Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184,190, 429 A.2d 470 (1980), we held that evidence of the specific amount of income which could be earned was necessary in order to support an award of alimony and support based upon a husband’s earning capacity as a commodities broker. The record in this case is wholly devoid of any evidence of the potential earnings of the defendant if she were to “carry on with her music.” The attempt by the majority to distinguish Schmidt on the ground that there the husband had been ordered to pay fixed weekly amounts seems to imply that speculation rather than the normal standard of proof is permissible when our only concern is with the ability of a wife to meet her living expenses.
The conclusion of the majority that the finding of a “possibility of future acquisition of capital assets” by the wife can be based upon contributions of her mother and her brother to her support is also at variance with our precedents. In Schmidt v. Schmidt, supra, 188, we held that gratuities received in the past did not constitute a dependable source of funds upon which the court could rely. In Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 365, 387 A.2d 548 (1978), evidence of the potential inheri*62tance of a wife was ruled inadmissible because such an expectancy is merely a “bare hope” having “no attribute of property.” Since evidence of former gratuities is an even flimsier basis for finding a likelihood of the future acquisition of capital assets than proof of an expectancy, the distinction drawn by the majority between the two situations is wholly formalistic.
The fact that the judgment awarded the defendant 60 percent of the net proceeds of the sale of the residence, as compared with 40 percent to her husband, indicates that the trial court may not have relied greatly upon the findings which I regard as erroneous. The difference in the respective shares which the parties are to receive upon sale of the property would be at least $20,000 according to the finding of the trial court that their joint equity exceeded $100,000. This disparity may well have been intended as a substitute for periodic alimony to the wife during the remaining working life of the husband, who was sixty-eight at the time of trial and earned $262 per week after deductions. As such it seems quite reasonable under the circumstances. Nevertheless, it is not possible to ignore erroneous findings made by a trial court which may have influenced the final result. See McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 177, 440 A.2d 274 (1982). We cannot be certain that the award would not have been more generous to the defendant in the absence of these disputed findings. Accordingly, I would find error and order a new trial.