Court Opinion

ID: 9916706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 15:07:57.630864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:50.892026
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-3842-21

IN THE MATTER OF
THE ESTATE OF
BRIAN G. PETRONACI.
_______________________

                Submitted October 3, 2023 – Decided January 10, 2024

                Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                Chancery Division, Sussex County, Docket No.
                P-000687-19.

                Jardim, Meisner & Susser, PC, attorneys for appellant
                Laurie Voigt (Dennis Francis Gleason, of counsel;
                Richard S. Meisner and Alexa Foster, on the brief).

                Respondents have not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

       In this one-sided appeal, defendant Laurie Voigt appeals from the July 14,

2022, Chancery Division order granting summary judgment to plaintiffs Glen

and Pamela Petronaci, co-administrators of the estate of Brian Petronaci, Voigt's

ex-husband and the co-administrators' son, and requiring Voigt to surrender all
proceeds she received from decedent's 401(k) retirement plan account. We

affirm.

       Voigt and Brian 1 were married from 2008 to 2015. Brian worked for

CompuCom Systems, Inc. (CompuCom), a technology consulting company,

from 2004 until 2009. During his employment with CompuCom, he contributed

to a 401(k) Matched Retirement Savings Plan and listed defendant as his

beneficiary.

       When the parties divorced in 2015, they entered into a marital settlement

agreement (MSA) that addressed the division of their assets, among other things.

The MSA was drafted and executed without the assistance of counsel. The MSA

was later incorporated into their final judgment of divorce.

       Section 9 of the MSA, entitled "WAIVER OF EMPLOYEE AND/OR

MILITARY RETAINER OR RETIREMENT BENEFITS," provided that:

                      Both parties agree to waive any rights, interests,
               or claims, that either may now have or in the future to
               receive employee and/or military retainer or retirement
               benefits resulting from the past, present or future
               employment and/or service of the other party in the
               Armed Forces of the United States [2] except as

1
  Because of the common surname, we use first names to refer to the parties and
intend no disrespect.
2
    Neither Voigt nor Brian was in the Armed Forces.
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            otherwise provided for this Agreement. Both parties
            understand the full import of this provision.

      Section 2.2 of the MSA stated that "[e]xcept for the enforcement of rights

hereunder, each spouse hereby relinquishes and waives any right and/or interest

which he or she may have in the estate of the other spouse unless under a Will

executed subsequent to the effective date thereof . . . ." Further, the MSA's

integration clause, memorialized in section 2.5, stated:

            This Agreement embodies in its entirety the agreements
            of the parties concerning the disposition of their
            property and their property rights; provisions for
            children, if applicable; maintenance of the spouse, if
            applicable; and all other issues between them. There
            are no other agreements existing between the parties
            with reference to such matters.

      Approximately three years after the divorce, Brian died intestate in a fatal

accident on January 7, 2018. At the time of Brian's death, Voigt was still listed

as the beneficiary on the CompuCom 401(k) retirement account. As a result,

the plan administrator distributed the account proceeds to her. In 2019, after

Voigt received payment from the plan, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint and

sought issuance of an order to show cause against Voigt to enforce the MSA's

waiver provision and recover the plan proceeds, which they alleged amounted

to $116,198.03. See R. 4:83-1 ("[A]ll actions in the Superior Court, Chancery

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                                        3
Division, Probate Part, shall be brought in a summary manner by the filing of a

complaint and issuance of an order to show cause pursuant to [Rule] 4:67.").

       In response, Voigt filed a contesting answer with affirmative defenses. In

her answer, Voigt admitted that the approximate value of the 401(k) account

was $116,000 but asserted that "the value [was] stated on a 'pre-tax' (i.e.[] not

yet taxed by any government entity upon distribution from the trust)." Voigt

further asserted that "[p]ursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act ('ERISA')[3] and under the doctrine of federal preemption," she was "the sole

person . . . entitled to proceeds of the 401(k) account" as "the only named

beneficiary." Additionally, in her answer, Voigt stated that because Brian had

"never changed [her] as the sole beneficiary" and the couple "were in the process

of reconciliation[,] Brian intended that [she] remain the sole beneficiary of the

401(k) account."

       Voigt also submitted a January 8, 2020, certification opposing plaintiffs'

request for summary disposition. Voigt certified that the waiver in section 9 of

the MSA only applied to "[her] defined pension plan" and that the couple never

intended that section 9 would "apply to [their] respective 401(k) accounts."

Voigt further asserted that "for several months before [Brian's] death," the

3
    29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
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couple had had "multiple conversations regarding reconciling," and "[i]n at least

one of those [reconciliation] conversations in 2017, . . . Brian told [her] that he

did not remove [her] name as beneficiary on his 401(k) account. He further told

[her] that he wanted [her] to be the beneficiary."

      Following the submission of briefs and oral argument, the judge entered

an order on July 14, 2022, granting plaintiffs summary judgment and or dering

Voigt to "surrender any and all proceeds obtained by her from the CompuCom

Systems, Inc. 401(k) Matched Retirement Savings Plan within sixty (60) days."

In an accompanying written statement of reasons, the judge discussed the

judicial preference for enforcing settlement agreements, noting that absent

"fraud or other compelling circumstances," a court generally will not disturb a

contract where the parties have negotiated and agreed on essential terms

(quoting Hannigan v. Twp. of Old Bridge, 288 N.J. Super. 313, 319 (App. Div.

1996) (quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1983))).

According to the judge, where contract terms are "'clear and unambiguous, there

is no room for construction and the court must enforce those terms as written,'"

(quoting Watson v. City of E. Orange, 175 N.J. 442, 447 (2003)), "giving them

'their plain, ordinary meaning'" (quoting Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J.

251, 270 (2008)).

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                                        5
        Applying those principles, the judge concluded that the "plain ordinary

meaning" of section 9 of the MSA "clearly defined forfeiture of rights to

employee and/or military retirement benefits in consideration of the MSA" and

the "court [would] not make a better agreement . . . than what the parties

intended for themselves." The judge reasoned "[t]he fact [that Brian] never

changed the beneficiary designation [after the divorce was] of no moment"

because both parties "concede[d] the designation precede[d] the MSA." The

judge explained that "[Brian] did not have to change the beneficiary

designation" because Voigt had already "forfeited 'any right' to receive it." As

to Voigt's claims of reconciliation and Brian's intent for her to remain a

beneficiary, the judge found that such evidence would be inadmissible at trial

because "'the parol evidence rule operates to prohibit the introduction of oral

promises to alter or vary an integrated written instrument'" (quoting Filmlife,

Inc. v. Mal "z" Ena, 251 N.J. Super. 570, 573 (1991) (quoting Ocean Cape Hotel

Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super 369, 378 (App. Div. 1960))).

        Finally, the judge addressed New Jersey's "revocation on divorce" statute,

N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14(a),4 which provides in relevant part:

                   Except as provided by the express terms of a
              governing instrument, a court order, or a contract

4
    The judge noted that neither party had addressed the statute.
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                                         6
             relating to the division of the marital estate made
             between the divorced individuals before or after the
             marriage, divorce or annulment, a divorce or
             annulment:

             (1) revokes any revocable:

                     (a)    dispositions or appointment of property
                            made by a divorced individual to his
                            former     spouse   in   a    governing
                            instrument . . . ;

                     ....

             (2) . . . .

                   In the event of a divorce . . . provisions of a
             governing instrument are given effect as if the former
             spouse . . . disclaimed all provisions revoked by this
             section . . . .

N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1 defines a "[g]overning instrument" as including a "retirement

or similar benefit plan."

      In applying N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14(a) to the case, the judge noted that where

New Jersey courts have applied this statute to life insurance beneficiary

designations, "a decedent's failure to change the beneficiary designation

following a divorce is irrelevant and revocation is implied."         The judge

concluded:

                   There is no room for construction here; [Voigt]
             and [Brian] forfeited their rights to each other's
             retirement benefits when they executed the MSA. The

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                                          7
            revocation upon divorce statute is applicable to non-
            probate assets. Given the clear language of the MSA,
            the matter is ripe for summary disposition.
            Accordingly, plaintiff[s'] motion is [granted].

In ordering Voigt to surrender the plan proceeds, the judge noted that "the value

of the account" was "$119,269.98" "at the time of [Brian's] passing." This

appeal followed.

      On appeal, Voigt raises the following points for our consideration:

            I.  THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF
            MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE JUDGMENT
            ON A SUMMARY PROCEEDING.

            II. RELIANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
            REVOCATION BY DIVORCE STATUTE IS
            MISPLACED (NOT RAISED BELOW).

            III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO STATE
            WITH   SPECIFICITY  THE  AMOUNT   OF
            JUDGMENT (NOT RAISED BELOW).

      "[W]e review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under

the same standard as the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). That standard is

well-settled.

            [I]f the evidence of record—the pleadings, depositions,
            answers to interrogatories, and affidavits—"together
            with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the
            non-moving party, would require submission of the
            issue to the trier of fact," then the trial court must deny

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                                        8
            the motion. On the other hand, when no genuine issue
            of material fact is at issue and the moving party is
            entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
            judgment must be granted.

            [Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344,
            366 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).]

      Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists depends on "whether the

competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary

standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged

disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we

must then 'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'"

DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super.

325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J.

Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). "We review issues of law de novo and

accord no deference to the trial judge's [legal] conclusions . . . ." MTK Food

Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 307, 312 (App. Div. 2018).

      The "[i]nterpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law for

the court subject to de novo review." Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,

309 N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Bradford v. Kupper Assocs.,

                                                                           A-3842-21
                                       9
283 N.J. Super. 556, 583 (App. Div. 1995)). "The law grants particular leniency

to agreements made in the domestic arena," thus allowing "judges greater

discretion when interpreting such agreements." Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253

N.J. Super. 531, 542 (App. Div. 1992) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23).

      Our goal in contract interpretation is governed by familiar rules:

            "It is well-settled that '[c]ourts enforce contracts "based
            on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the
            contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying
            purpose of the contract."'" [In re Cnty. of Atl., 230 N.J.
            237, 254 (2017)] (alteration in original) (quoting
            Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118
            (2014)). The plain language of the contract is the
            cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry; "when the intent
            of the parties is plain and the language is clear and
            unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as
            written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result."
            Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016).

                   If we conclude that a contractual term is
            ambiguous, we "consider the parties' practical
            construction of the contract as evidence of their
            intention and as controlling weight in determining a
            contract's interpretation." [Cnty. of Atl.], 230 N.J. at
            255 (quoting Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80,
            103 (1998)). "In a word, the judicial interpretive
            function is to consider what was written in the context
            of the circumstances under which it was written, and
            accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping
            with the express general purpose." [Owens v. Press
            Publ'g Co., 20 N.J. 537, 543 (1956)].

            [Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595,
            615-16 (2020).]

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                                       10
      Thus, "[t]he judicial task is simply interpretative; it is not to rewrite a

contract for the parties better than or different from the one they wrote for

themselves." Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011). That said, "[w]hen

presented with an unambiguous contract, the court should not look outside the

'four corners' of the contract to determine the parties' intent, and parol evidence

should not be used to alter the plain meaning of the contract." Namerow v.

PediatriCare Assocs., LLC, 461 N.J. Super. 133, 140 (Ch. Div. 2018); see also

Filmlife, Inc., 251 N.J. Super. at 573 ("[T]he parol evidence rule operates to

prohibit the introduction of oral promises to alter or vary an integrated written

instrument. . . .") (quoting Ocean Cape Hotel Corp., 63 N.J. Super. at 378).

      Applying these principles, we are satisfied that there are no material facts

in dispute, and we agree with the judge that plaintiffs are entitled to summary

judgment. Critically, the MSA's waiver clause is clear and unambiguous, and

Voigt has presented no credible evidence within the four corners of the MSA to

support her contention that the waiver clause did not apply to Brian's 401(k).

The plain meaning of section 9 of the MSA supports the interpretation that the

couple intended to waive their rights to each other's retirement benefits. Thus,

the waiver is valid and enforceable as a matter of law.

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                                       11
      In essence, Voigt is asking this court to look past the plain meaning of the

MSA and consider extrinsic evidence of Brian's intent based on her assertions

of the couple's reconciliation conversations. However, the "actual intent of the

parties is ineffective unless made known in some way in the writing. It is not

the real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing that controls."

Newark Publishers' Ass'n v. Newark Typographical Union, 22 N.J. 419, 427

(1956). Further, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence which "is offered for

the purpose of 'varying or contradicting' the terms of an 'integrated' contra ct."

Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302 (1953) (quoting Corbin

on Contracts §§ 536, 543 (1951 ed.)). Here, the couple's intent as expressed in

the waiver, along with the MSA's integration clause, bar Voigt from introducing

evidence of any contradictory intent.

      To further support her argument, Voigt relies on ERISA, asserting that

"ERISA preempts any application of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14(a)" and arguing that the

judge erroneously applied "New Jersey state law" because Brian's retirement

account is an ERISA-governed 401(k) account. See St. Peter's Univ. Hosp. v.

N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Welfare Fund, 431 N.J. Super. 446, 454 (App.

Div. 2013) ("ERISA governs private employee benefit plans, and sets forth

requirements, uniform standards, fiduciary responsibilities, and penalties.").

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                                        12
We acknowledge that ERISA preempts "all State laws insofar as they may now

or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141

(2001), the United States Supreme Court held that a Washington state statute,

which provided that "the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a

nonprobate asset [was] revoked automatically upon divorce," was "expressly

pre-empted by ERISA" because the statute directly conflicted with ERISA's

requirements that the plans be administered according to plan documents. Id. at

143, 146. Like the Washington statute, New Jersey's "revocation on divorce"

statute, N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14(a), is subject to preemption. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S.

at 143, 146.

      Nonetheless, the fact that the plan is governed by ERISA only affects the

plan administrator's duty to release funds to the designated beneficiary and has

no bearing on the validity of the MSA's waiver. To that point, in Kennedy v.

Plan Administrator for Dupont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009),

the Court held that an ERISA plan administrator properly disbursed a decedent's

funds to his ex-wife, notwithstanding the fact that the ex-wife had renounced

any interest in her ex-husband's pension benefit plan in a common law waiver

                                                                          A-3842-21
                                      13
incorporated into their divorce decree, but nonetheless remained as the

beneficiary at the time of her ex-husband's death. Id. at 299-300.

      There, the decedent enrolled in an employee pension benefit plan

governed by ERISA and designated his wife as his sole beneficiary. Id. at 288-

89. Just as in this case, the couple subsequently divorced and as part of the

divorce decree, the ex-wife waived her interest in her ex-husband's pension plan.

Id. at 289. When the ex-husband died without removing his ex-wife as the

designated beneficiary and the plan administrator paid the funds to the ex-wife,

his estate sued the administrator, arguing that the ex-wife had waived her

interest. Id. at 289-90.

      Importantly, the Supreme Court held that the ex-wife's waiver "did not

constitute an assignment or alienation rendered void [by ERISA's anti-alienation

provision]," id. at 297, which states that "benefits provided under the plan may

not be assigned or alienated," 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).5 However, in the interest

of streamlining the administration of ERISA plans, the Court concluded that an

administrator is "obliged to act 'in accordance with the documents and

instruments governing the plan,'" and that "ERISA provides no exemption from

5
  ERISA's anti-alienation provision does not apply to a certain class of orders
known as "qualified domestic relations orders," which is not implicated here.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).
                                                                           A-3842-21
                                      14
this duty when it comes time to pay benefits." Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D)).

      Thus, although the ex-wife had waived her right to the pension, the Court

declared that the plan administrator "did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the

benefits to [the ex-wife] in conformity with the plan documents." Id. at 299-

300. Significantly, the Court explicitly declined to address the question of

whether the estate could have sued the ex-wife to recover the plan proceeds after

she received them, noting "[n]or do we express any view as to whether the

[e]state could have brought an action in state or federal court against [the ex -

wife] to obtain the benefits after they were distributed." Id. at 299 n.10.

      The Third Circuit subsequently addressed the open question in Estate of

Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 674 F.3d 131 (2012), where, once again, an ex-

wife received ERISA plan benefits when the ex-husband never changed the

beneficiary designation after their divorce and prior to his death , even though

the ex-wife had waived her right to the proceeds through their divorce decree.

Id. at 132. Instead of going after the plan administrator, an action now barred

by Kennedy, the decedent's estate sued the ex-wife to enforce her waiver and

recover the plan proceeds. Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 132.

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                                       15
      In upholding the estate's right to sue the ex-wife to enforce contractual

rights and recover the benefits, the Third Circuit reasoned that the goal of

Kennedy was to ensure the "expeditious distribution of funds from plan

administrators, not to [create] some sort of rule providing continued shelter from

contractual liability to beneficiaries who have already received plan proceeds."

Kensinger, 674 F.3d at 136 (emphasis omitted). To that end, the court held that

"[i]f, after distribution, [the ex-spouse's] right to these funds is challenged

because of her common law waiver, that challenge will be litigated as an

ordinary contract dispute." Ibid.      Accordingly, "permitting suits against

beneficiaries after benefits have been paid does not implicate any concerns of

expeditious payment or undermine any core objective of ERISA." Id. at 137

(emphasis omitted). Therefore, Voigt's reliance on ERISA to bar the estate's

lawsuit to enforce her contractual waiver is misplaced.

      In the alternative, Voigt asserts that the matter should be remanded

nonetheless to determine the "precise amount of the judgment." Although the

judge ordered Voigt to "surrender any and all proceeds obtained," Voigt argues

that because "she paid taxes" on the proceeds, "[a]ny money judgment should

not require her to pay the entire amount of the 401(k) account." However,

Voigt's recourse is to file an amended income tax return.

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Affirmed.

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            17