Court Opinion

ID: 9755645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:45:21.642147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:09.991718
License: Public Domain

RAKER, J., dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction based on the *509doctrine of transferred intent.1 The majority, in my view, is misguided in its approach in embracing the legal fiction of “concurrent intent” but in rejecting the common law doctrine of “transferred intent” to the circumstances of this case.
I.
This is a “bad aim” case, where the intended victim was not harmed, and the unintended victim was injured, but did not die. Petitioner’s intent to kill the intended victim should be “transferred” to the unintended victim, thereby holding petitioner accountable for the crime he committed against Mr. Cook, the unintended victim.
Petitioner was convicted of attempted second degree murder of James Cook, and a handgun violation. It is not disputed that petitioner fired six shots from his .38 caliber handgun at a person known as Valentine, missed him and instead struck a bystander, James Cook. Attempted second degree murder requires that petitioner had a specific intent to kill. Although petitioner did not in fact have a specific intent to kill Cook, the State did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a specific intent to kill Valentine. I believe that intent is “transferred” to Cook, and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict under the doctrine of transferred intent.
*510In my view, the doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to attempted murder cases where the unintended victim is injured.2 See Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501 (1996), (Raker, J. concurring) (maintaining that transferred intent is applicable to attempted murder). See also, People v. Valentin, 347 Ill.App.3d 946, 283 Ill.Dec. 768, 808 N.E.2d 1056 (2004) (holding that transferred intent applies to attempted murder cases where the unintended victim is not killed); People v. Ephraim, 323 Ill.App.3d 1097, 257 Ill.Dec. 291, 753 N.E.2d 486, 496-97 (2001) (explicitly rejecting Harvey v. State, 111 Md.App. 401, 681 A.2d 628 (1996), and holding that transferred intent is applicable in attempted second degree murder cases where the unintended victim is injured); Ochoa v. State, 115 Nev. 194, 981 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (holding that “the doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to all crimes where an unintended victim is harmed as a result of the specific intent to harm an intended victim whether or not the intended victim is injured”); Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709 (Ind.1998) (attempted murder); State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales, 164 Ariz. 1, 790 P.2d 287 (1990) (attempted first-degree murder); State v. Gillette, 102 N.M. 695, 699 P.2d 626 (1985) (attempted first-degree murder); State v. Alford, 260 Iowa 939, 151 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 1967) (assault with intent to commit murder), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bester, 167 N.W.2d 705 (Iowa 1969); State v. Thomas, 127 La. 576, 53 So. 868 (1910) (willfully shooting at another with intent to commit murder). As these cases reason, so long as there is evidence of an intent to kill, it makes no difference that someone other than the intended victim was killed or injured.
The majority employs the lack of necessity argument in rejecting the doctrine of transferred intent in the context of an *511attempt, stating that “[t]he most compelling reason why we reject the doctrine of transferred intent as applied to crimes of attempt is that it is not necessary to make ‘a whole crime out of two halves by joining the intent as to one victim with the harm caused to another victim.’ ” Maj. op. at 508 (citations omitted). The majority reasons that “[w]hen the unintended victim has not suffered a fatal injury, the defendant already has committed a completed crime against the intended victim, and the seriousness of that crime is as great as if the intent were transferred to the unintended victim.” Id. at 508. In addition, rationalizing that there is little utility in “extending” the doctrine of transferred intent, the majority concludes that although not in this case, “concurrent intent” rather than transferred intent will apply to defendants who commit crimes against unintended victims. See id.
The majority’s reasoning is incomplete and flawed. First, the majority adds an artificial requirement of death of the unintended victim to the transferred intent doctrine.3 Second, Maryland has repudiated the reasoning that simply because the defendant has committed a completed crime against the intended victim the doctrine does not apply.4 Finally, the notion that the doctrine is unnecessary because concurrent intent or other crimes are available to the State is wrong, *512particularly in this case. Most likely, because concurrent intent was not applicable, and transferred intent does not apply, petitioner will escape punishment for the harm he inflicted upon Mr. Cook.5 This is evident in the mandate, as the current case was not remanded for a new trial.
II.
Transferred intent is a common law doctrine which has long been a part of the law in Maryland. See State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988); Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 330 A.2d 176 (1974). The classic application, or the so-called standard application, of transferred intent is where the defendant, A intends to kill B, shoots but misses, and kills C. In that situation, “the state of mind which one has when about to commit a crime upon one person is considered by law to exist and to be equally applicable although the intended act affects another person.” Gladden, 273 Md. at 404, 330 A.2d at 188. Judge O’Donnell, writing for the Court in Gladden, explained further that “if one intends injury to the person of another under circumstances in which such a mental element consti*513tutes mens rea, and in the effort to accomplish this end he inflicts harm upon a person other than the one intended, he is guilty of the same kind of crime as if his aim had been more accurate.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 3.12(d) (1986, 2003 Supp.) (explaining transferred intent to mean that “where A aims at B but misses, hitting C — it is the view of the criminal law that A is just as guilty as if his aim had been accurate. Thus where A aims at B with a murderous intent to kill, but because of a bad aim he hits and kills C, A is uniformly held guilty of the murder of C ”).
After today’s decision, the doctrine of transferred intent will still be a part of Maryland law, albeit more limited in its application. The question arises in this case as to whether transferred intent is applicable when C does not die but is injured. There is an ongoing debate around the country, within the courts and commentators, as to the applicability of the doctrine of transferred intent. Commentators and courts have described the doctrine as “defective,” a “curious survival of the antique law,” and one having no proper place in the criminal law. See Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of Criminal Culpability, 1 Buff.Crim. L.Rev. 501, 502-03 (1998). Despite the views of detractors, a “roughly equal number of commentators ... have approved of the doctrine and its result.” Id. In my view, the doctrine of transferred intent should apply to the crime of attempted murder, for example, when a person, A intentionally shoots a gun at B, intending to kill B, and because of bad aim or luck, hits but does not kill, or even misses, B, and strikes and injures C. See Poe, 341 Md. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker J., concurring, joined by Rodowsky and Karwacki, J.J.). A should not escape punishment for the act committed against C simply because that person had bad aim or good luck. See id.
This Court addressed the question of whether transferred intent applies to attempted murder in State v. Wilson, and, noting specifically the split in jurisdictions around the country as to the applicability of transferred intent, we “align[ed] ourselves with the numerous jurisdictions which have applied *514the transferred intent doctrine to specific intent crimes including attempted murder.” 313 Md. at 607, 546 A.2d at 1044. In Wilson, the intended target, Brown, was not harmed physically, and the unintended victim, Kent, was struck with the bullets but did not die. See id. at 601-02, 546 A.2d at 1042. The defendant was charged with attempted murder of both the intended target and the unintended target. See id. at 602, 546 A.2d at 1042. We made clear that the doctrine of “transferred intent” was not limited to homicide cases but extends to all situations where a defendant’s intended act “ ‘affects’ or ‘inflicts harm upon’ an unintended victim.” Id. at 604, 546 A.2d at 1043 (citations omitted). The Court reasoned that a necessary element of murder is malice and that inasmuch as the State proved the malice element by establishing Wilson’s specific intent to kill Brown, Wilson would have been guilty of premeditated murder had the unintended victim Kent died. See id. Accordingly, the elements of attempted murder were satisfied when Kent survived. Wilson, in my view, was decided and reasoned correctly.
Subsequent to Wilson, the doctrine of transferred intent took a sharp and sudden turn, beginning with the dicta in Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 625 A.2d 984 (1993), and resulting in the conclusion today. The majority attempts to recount the life and limitations of the doctrine of transferred intent in Maryland, but does so in a selective manner. The Court omits the shift in reasoning from Ford to Poe, a change which has been described as “result-oriented.” See Note, Confusing the Doctrine of Transferred Intent, 56 Md. L.Rev. 744, 744 (1997). See also, Mitchell Keiter, With Malice Toward All: The Increased Lethality of Violence Reshapes Transferred Intent and Attempted Murder Law, 38 U.S.F. L.Rev. 261, 280 (2004) (discussing Ford, noting that “[t]he Ford court faced the dual task of repudiating the reasoning of a precedent that had authorized replicated intent for attempted murder, while preserving that case’s result of multiple attempted murder convictions”).
The doctrine of transferred intent in Maryland was set out, and judicially embraced, in Gladden. The Court looked at the *515“classic” doctrine of transferred intent, and held that when an individual Mils one person but actually intended to Mil another, transferred intent applies. The Gladden Court pointed out that under the common law, the doctrine was as follows:
“Sir William Blackstone, in 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England (Cooley, 3d ed., 1884), at 201 stated the common law rule to be:
‘Thus if one shoots at A and misses him, but Mils B, this is murder; because of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other. The same is the case where one lays poison for A; and B, against whom the prisoner had no malicious intent, takes it, and it kills him; this is likewise murder.’ ”
273 Md. at 391-92, 330 A.2d at 181. The Court continued:
“In Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes § 10.06 (6th ed., 1958), at 578, the rule is stated as follows:
‘Whenever an accountable man kills another intentionally, he is guilty of murder with express malice unless the Mlling is justifiable or excusable, or unless there are such circumstances of provocation as will reduce the homicide to manslaughter. This principle is applied when a man kills one person when he intended to kill another. For example, if a man shoots at one person with intent to kill him, and unintentionally kills another, or sets poison for one person and another drinks it and dies, it is murder with express malice of the person killed, though he is a friend.’
Although admittedly the doctrine is of ‘ancient vintage,’ we do not agree with the petitioner’s contention that under modern statutory classifications it is a ‘curious survival of the antique law’ requiring its rejection. It has lost none of its patina by its application over the centuries down unto modern times; its viability is recognized by its current acceptance and application.”
Id. at 392, 330 A.2d at 181.
State v. Wilson followed, and applied Gladden. The Wilson Court determined that the doctrine of transferred intent was *516not limited solely to completed homicides. Following a review of public policy, history, and the applicability of stare decisis, the Court held that transferred intent applies to the crime of attempted murder. See Wilson, 313 Md. at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045.
Next came Ford, the basis of the majority’s holding. In my view, the Ford opinion, as it relates to transferred intent, is no longer, if it ever was, of persuasive value. In that case, a bare majority of the Court, in pure dicta, and in what the Court conceded was a “somewhat collateral issue,” Ford v. State, 330 Md. at 708, 625 A.2d at 996, announced that “[wjhere the crime intended has actually been committed against the intended victim, transferred intent is unnecessary and should not be applied to acts against unintended victims.” Id. at 712, 625 A.2d at 998 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that transferred intent did not apply to attempted murder, noting, however, that the conclusion was at odds with the recent holding of State v. Wilson. See id. at 713, 625 A.2d at 999.
Notably, Judge Chasanow, writing for the majority, did not limit the gratuitous discussion to the applicability of transferred intent to completed homicides, but went on to state that transferred intent did not apply where the crime against the intended victim was “complete.” The Court stated as follows:
“The underlying rationale for the doctrine also suggests that transferred intent should apply only when, without the doctrine, the defendant could not be convicted of the crime at issue because the mental and physical elements do not concur as to either the intended or the actual victim.”
Id. at 711, 625 A.2d at 998.
Three judges of the Court disagreed with this reasoning. Judge McAuliffe, joined by Judges Rodowsky and Karwaeki, concurred in the result, yet declined to join the court’s dicta pertaining to transferred intent. In particular, Judge McAuliffe, characterizing the Court’s limitation of the doctrine as unnecessary and ill-advised, rejected the majority’s statement that the doctrine of transferred intent could not be applied, *517“where the crime intended has actually been committed against the intended victim.” Id. at 724, 625 A.2d at 1004.
Under the Ford rationale, where the intended and unintended victims died, the doctrine of transferred intent is not applicable because the intended crime was completed. Ford relied heavily on People v. Birreuta, 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 (1984), the California intermediate appellate court opinion which has since been repudiated in California, as well as every other court in the country considering the issue. See People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107, 1113-1115 (2002) (noting that the conclusion in Birreuta was incorrect, disapproving People v. Birreuta to the extent it holds that intent to kill does not transfer to an unintended homicide victim even if the intended target is killed, and holding that intent to kill transfers to an unintended homicide victim even if the intended person is killed); State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 630 A.2d 593, 598-599 (1993) (expressly disagreeing with Birreuta). Even Maryland has since rejected this limitation on the doctrine. Compare Ford with Poe.
The next significant case in Maryland to address transferred intent was Poe v. State. Again, in pure dicta, rejecting transferred intent to attempted murder, Judge Chasanow, writing for the majority, explained, and without admitting as much, backpedaled from the Ford rationale that transferred intent would apply only to cases where the intended crime was not completed. Instead, calling Poe “a classic case of transferred intent,” 341 Md. at 529, 671 A.2d at 503, the majority somehow reasoned that the doctrine did apply, even though the crime of attempted murder was complete when Poe fired the gun at Ms. Poe, hitting, but failing to kill her. See id. at 528-29, 671 A.2d at 503. Thus, when a defendant, intending to kill one person, shoots and wounds that person, but the bullet passes through the intended victim and kills an unintended victim, the doctrine is applicable.
In a student note, Poe v. State: The Court of Appeals of Maryland Limits the Applicability of the Doctrine of Trans*518ferred Intent, 27 U. Balt. L.Rev. 167 (1997), the author, Daniel J. Curry, traces the doctrine of transferred intent in Maryland. He concludes that “a defendant who attempts to kill their intended victim but instead injures an unintended victim should be held liable under transferred intent for attempted murder of the unintended, injured victim.” Id. at 182. Discussing the majority and concurring opinions in Poe, the perceptive author concluded that “Judge Raker’s reasoning is more sound than the majority’s because it does not preclude the use of the doctrine in attempted murder prosecutions. Judge Raker’s clarification was in tune with the elements of the doctrine as it is commonly applied.” Id. at 186.
I reiterate my predication in Poe:
“If the majority’s opinion is interpreted to preclude any use of the doctrine of transferred intent in attempted murder prosecutions, the effect of the decision will be to substantially increase the difficulty of prosecuting criminals for the harm inflicted on innocent bystanders. ... Without transferred intent, the State will be required to offer separate proof of intent for each victim, e.g., by demonstrating ‘depraved heart [or concurrent intent].’ While firing a ‘hail of bullets’ at a person on a busy street may be prima facie evidence of a depraved heart, numerous factual situations may arise where it will be difficult to demonstrate recklessness.”
341 Md. at 539-40, 671 A.2d at 509. The instant case demonstrates just such a situation. Today’s ruling has rewarded petitioner for his bad aim, and will likely result in similar rewards for others in the future.

. The theory underlying the doctrine of transferred intent was well stated in the case of People v. Scott, 14 Cal.4th 544, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288 (1996), explaining that intent is not actually transferred. The California Supreme Court explained as follows:
"The legal fiction of transferring a defendant’s intent helps illustrate why, as a theoretical matter, a defendant can be convicted of murder when she did not intend to kill the person actually killed. The transferred intent doctrine does not, however, denote an actual ‘transfer’ of ‘intent’ from the intended victim to the unintended victim. Rather, as applied here, it connotes a policy — that a defendant who shoots at an intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark. It is the policy underlying the doctrine, rather than its literal meaning, that compels the conclusion that a transferred intent instruction was properly given in this case.”
Id. at 292 (citations omitted).

. Today the Court criticizes the use of transferred intent in attempted murder by stating that the charge does not require the victim to suffer physical injury, and thus, the doctrine could result in an endless number of attempted murder charges against a defendant. See maj. op. at 507-08. This is not a necessary conclusion. As I have previously noted, "the correct interpretation is that transferred intent should not apply to attempted murder if no one is injured.” Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 535, 671 A.2d 501, 507 (1996) (Raker, J., concurring).

. The doctrine of transferred intent is not limited to killings. See e.g., State v. Thomas, 127 La. 576, 53 So. 868, 871 (1910) (citing The Queen v. Latimer, 17 Q.B.D. 359 (1886)); Anthony M. Dillof, 'Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of Criminal Culpability, 1 Buff.Crim. L.Rev. 501, 504 (1998). It is instead "a general principle which permits liability for any crime involving a mens rea of intent — be it arson, assault, theft or trespass — where the actual object of the crime is not the intended object.” Id. Neither history nor policy supports a limitation of the transferred intent doctrine to cases resulting in death. See Poe, 341 Md. at 537-39, 671 A.2d at 508 (Raker, J., concurring, noting that American courts, following the English precedents, have applied transferred intent to cases where the unintended victim was injured but not killed).

. Almost every jurisdiction has rejected the Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 625 A.2d 984 (1993) opinion reasoning that transferred intent is not applicable where the crime has been “completed” with the death of the intended victim but an unintended victim also dies. See e.g., State v. *512Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 630 A.2d 593, 599 (1993) (noting that "we reject defendant’s argument that the successful killing of the intended victim prevents the transfer of that intent to an unintended victim” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).

. The doctrine of transferred intent is one form of imputed liability. Professor Paul H. Robinson, in his law review article, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 609 (1984), explains as follows:
"The definition of an offense describes the elements normally required to hold an actor liable for the offense; it is that offense's paradigm for liability. Despite the absence of required elements of the definition, an actor may be held liable for the offense if a doctrine serves to impute the absent elements. Such a doctrine does not alter the definition of an offense but rather provides an alternative means of establishing the required elements, or at least an alternative means of treating the defendant as if the required elements were satisfied. For the most part, the principles underlying imputation reflect concerns beyond those of the offense at hand. A single doctrine of imputation may apply to a range of offenses or to all offenses. As a group, instances of imputed liability play as significant a role in criminal law theory as do general defenses.”
Id. at 675.