Court Opinion

ID: 9659826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:55:38.937689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.906421
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion, in my view, fails to focus upon the nature of the damages sustained by the plaintiff, for decision in this case must turn upon whether the damages sustained are general or special in character.
General damages, according to the principles established in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), and adopted in this state, Liljengren Furniture & Lbr. Co. v. Mead, 42 Minn. 420, 44 N. W. 306 (1890), are those which are reasonably foreseeable as a result of the breach of contract. They are deemed to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was formed, irrespective of whether or not they were actually within the contemplation of the parties. See, *300also, 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, § 57; 5B Durmell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 2559, and cases cited.
Special damages, in contrast, are those which the law will not charge a defendant with having foreseen and which, accordingly, are recoverable only if the defendant was advised of special circumstances which put him on notice that such damages would result in the event of breach. Liljengren Furniture & Lbr. Co. v. Mead, supra; Scheppel v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 117 Ill. App. 2d 60, 254 N. E. 2d 280 (1969); Alton R. Co. v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. 190 Okla. 216, 122 P. 2d 152 (1942); Conditioned Air Corp. v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co. 253 Iowa 961, 114 N. W. 2d 304 (1962).
The damages which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant-carrier are special damages. The complaint expressly demanded the cost of alternative truck transportation of the materials as “special damages resulting from the excessive delay in delivery.”1 Plaintiff’s own characterization of the damages is consistent with the allegation in its complaint that to have waited for defendant to deliver the misrouted goods would have forced plaintiff to close down its plant for lack of these goods. Similar claims for the cost of maintaining an idle factory, wages paid to idle employees, loss of use of goods, or lost profits as the result of delay in transportation of goods, have consistently been held to be claims for special damages. See, e. g., Alton R. Co. v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. supra; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hopkinsville Canning Co. 132 Ky. 578, 116 S. W. 758 (1909). See, generally, Annotation, 166 A. L. R. 1034, 1056; 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers, §§ 377 to 379. The gravamen of these cases is that a carrier will not be held to have foreseen that failure to promptly deliver goods to be used in manufacturing would result in a plant shutdown.
*301It is clear from the stipulation of the parties that plaintiff gave defendant no notice that the delay in delivery of its goods would result in such damages. If lost profits are not recoverable in such a case, it follows that plaintiff may not recover costs incurred to avoid lost profits. The failure of plaintiff to notify defendant that prompt delivery was dictated by special circumstances should relieve defendant of liability for these special damages. I accordingly dissent and would reverse, ordering summary judgment for defendant.
Otis, Justice
(dissenting).
I join the dissent of Mr. Justice Peterson.
Rogosheske, Justice
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Peterson.

 Defendant’s breach was one of delay rather than a refusal to perform. It is not claimed that defendant was unable or unwilling to complete performance. Plaintiff’s unilateral undertaking to use substitute transportation prevented defendant from completion Of the contract.