Court Opinion

ID: 9941987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:02:33.079843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:34.719922
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: February 20, 2024

                  S23A0821. WOODS et al. v. BARNES et al.
                 S23A0822. BEARDEN et al. v. BARNES et al.

        COLVIN, Justice.

        The Fair Dismissal Act (“FDA”), codified within Title 20 of the

Georgia Code, affords public school teachers who have “accept[ed] a

school year contract for the fourth consecutive school year from the

same local board of education” certain protections against demotion

and the nonrenewal of their contracts. OCGA § 20-2-942 (b) (1).

Among other things, the FDA provides that such a teacher “may be

demoted or the teacher’s contract may not be renewed only for those

reasons set forth in [OCGA § 20-2-940 (a)],” id., including

“[i]ncompetency,” “[i]nsubordination,” and “[w]illful neglect of

duties,” OCGA § 20-2-940 (a), and that, prior to the demotion or

nonrenewal of such a teacher’s contract, the teacher is entitled to
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, see OCGA § 20-2-942 (b) (2).

     The Charter Schools Act of 1993, however, included a waiver

provision that relieved public schools that had converted into public

charter schools of the obligation to comply with Title 20. See Ga. L.

1993, p. 1440, § 1. And that Title 20 waiver remains part of Georgia’s

statutory scheme today under the Charter Schools Act of 1998, see

Ga. L. 1998, pp. 1082, 1086, § 3, as amended by the Charter Systems

Act of 2007, see Ga. L. 2007, pp. 185, 191, § 8. Specifically, as

amended by the Charter Systems Act, the Charter Schools Act’s

waiver provision states that “a charter school, or for charter

systems, each school within the system, shall not be subject to the

provisions of [Title 20 of the Georgia Code],” and that “[a] waiver

granted pursuant to this Code section for a charter system shall

apply to each system charter school within the system.” OCGA § 20-

2-2065 (a).

     This case involves challenges to the Charter Schools Act’s

waiver provision, as amended by the Charter Systems Act, under

the Georgia Constitution’s Impairments Clause, which prohibits

                                  2
retroactive laws and laws that impair the obligation of contracts. See

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. X (providing that “[n]o . . .

retroactive law, or laws impairing the obligation of contract . . . shall

be passed”). Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the amended version

of the waiver provision, as applied to Fannin County School System

(“FCSS”) educators who earned FDA protections after the

enactment of the first Charter Schools Act in 1993 but before the

FCSS    converted    into   a   charter    school   system    in   2015,

unconstitutionally impaired such teachers’ vested property rights

and contract rights under the FDA.

     We hold that, as presented, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims fail

as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily presume that the

grant of a Title 20 waiver to charter schools within the FCSS

pursuant to the 2007 Charter Systems Act prevented FCSS

educators who had earned FDA rights between the enactment date

of the 1993 Charter Schools Act and the date that the FCSS

converted into a charter system in 2015 from enforcing those rights

                                   3
against    the   FCSS. 1    Assuming      without     deciding    that    this

presumption is true, a grant of a Title 20 waiver for the FCSS did

not impair any rights belonging to such teachers. As explained

below, when the General Assembly first authorized the creation of

public charter schools through the Charter Schools Act of 1993, it

granted charter schools a waiver from their obligation to comply

with Title 20. That waiver qualified any rights teachers could

subsequently earn under Title 20, clarifying that any such rights

were not enforceable against charter schools. And later versions of,

and amendments to, the Charter Schools Act, including the Charter

Schools Act of 1998, as amended by the Charter Systems Act of 2007,

have not materially changed the waiver provision. Thus, to the

extent that Georgia statutory law imposed limitations on teachers’

      1  Plaintiffs’ Impairment Clause claims—that a “retroactive law” or a
“law[ ] impairing the obligation of contract” was “passed,” Ga. Const. of 1983,
Art. I, Sec. I, Par. X (emphasis supplied)—are necessarily premised on the
assumption that the Charter Systems Act’s waiver provision granting a Title
20 waiver to charter schools within a charter system (the law at issue) waives
the obligation of a charter system, which employs teachers, to abide by the
FDA. Absent such an assumption, Plaintiffs could not point to a law that
impaired FCSS teachers’ rights. Because we can resolve the issues on appeal
without resolving whether the necessary assumption underlying Plaintiffs’
claims is correct, we express no view on that matter.
                                      4
FDA rights, it was the 1993 Charter Schools Act that imposed those

limitations, not, as Plaintiffs claim, the 2007 Charter Systems Act.

Because we conclude that Plaintiffs’ Impairment Clause claims fail

as a matter of law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

     In reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion as to

whether the waiver provisions of the 1993 Charter Schools Act, the

1998 Charter Schools Act, or the 2007 Charter Systems Act violate

the Georgia Constitution’s Impairment Clause as applied to

teachers who earned FDA protections before the enactment of the

1993 Charter Schools Act. This is because the record on appeal does

not show that the class of teachers employed by the FCSS on whose

behalf the Georgia Association of Educators sued in this case

includes any such teachers; Plaintiffs have not raised any

arguments specific to any such teachers; and, despite State

Defendants conceding that “it is at least conceivable that a teacher

who gained Fair Dismissal Act protections prior to 1993 could have

mounted a retroactivity challenge to the original Charter Schools

Act,” Plaintiffs have insisted that they are not claiming that the

                                  5
Charter Schools Acts of 1993 or 1998 unconstitutionally impaired

FCSS teachers’ FDA rights. 2

     1.    In 2018, public school teacher Rebecca Barnes and the

Georgia Association of Educators (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against

state and local education officials in their individual capacities

(“State Defendants” and “Local Defendants,” respectively). In their

amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Barnes accepted a fourth

consecutive contract of employment with the Fannin County Board

of Education at the beginning of the 2003-2004 school year and

worked for the FCSS through the 2016-2017 school year; the FCSS

converted into a charter school system with the approval of the local

and state boards of education in 2015; the charter agreement

governing the FCSS granted the FCSS “the maximum flexibility

     2  Specifically, Plaintiffs state that: “the relevant law—the law that
purportedly authorized the stripping of [plaintiff-teacher] Barnes’s FDA
rights—is the Charter Systems Act of 2007”; “the relevant statutory provisions
here—the ones against which Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge is directed—are
(and have been throughout this litigation) those of the Charter Systems Act of
2007, and never the 1993 iteration of the Charter Schools Act”; and “State
Defendants erroneously suggest that the law at issue here is the Charter
Schools Act, first piloted in 1993 and then comprehensively revamped in 1998.”
(Emphasis in original.)
                                      6
allowed by state law from the provisions of Title 20” pursuant to the

Charter Systems Act of 2007; the FCSS notified Barnes in May 2017

that her contract of employment would not be renewed for the 2017-

2018 school year; the notice did not provide the reasons for the

nonrenewal of Barnes’s contract or an opportunity for a hearing, as

required by the FDA; and Barnes’s employment terminated at the

end of the 2016-2017 school year. Plaintiffs asserted that, by

terminating Barnes without honoring the FDA rights she had

earned prior to the FCSS’s conversion into a charter system in 2015,

the FCSS, acting pursuant to its charter with the State Board of

Education, “inflicted injurious retroactive effects on Barnes’s vested

rights” and “impaired Barnes’s contractual rights” in violation of the

Georgia Constitution’s Impairment Clause. As relief, Plaintiffs

sought declarations that Barnes’s termination and the FCSS’s

operation as a charter school system without preserving previously-

earned FDA rights violated the Georgia Constitution’s Impairment

Clause, an injunction compelling the FCSS to reinstate Barnes with

backpay and to honor her FDA rights, and an order enjoining the

                                  7
FCSS and the State Board of Education from denying FDA rights to

educators employed by the FCSS who had earned FDA protections

before the FCSS’s conversion into a charter school system.3

     Following an appeal to the Court of Appeals and a remand, see

generally Barnes v. Bearden, 357 Ga. App. 99 (850 SE2d 181) (2020),

State Defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, and

Local Defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment. On

February 1, 2023, the trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs and

against Defendants, denying State Defendants’ renewed motion to

dismiss, granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and

denying Local Defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment. In

short, the trial court concluded that the FDA afforded Barnes and

similarly situated FCSS teachers certain property and contractual

rights that vested before the FCSS converted into a charter system

in 2015; that, as applied to those teachers, the 2007 Charter Systems

     3 The Georgia Association of Educators sued on behalf of their members

working at FCSS schools who were “similarly situated” to Barnes.
                                     8
Act’s waiver provision impaired those FDA rights; and that, by

waiving FDA rights, the Charter Systems Act violated the Georgia

Constitution’s prohibition on the passage of retroactive laws and

laws impairing contracts. Consistent with these rulings, the trial

court declared the Charter Systems Act’s waiver provision

unconstitutional as applied to FCSS educators who had earned FDA

rights prior to FCSS’s conversion into a charter school system,

permanently enjoined Defendants from enforcing the Charter

Systems Act’s FDA-waiver provision against Barnes and educators

employed by FCSS who had earned protections of the FDA prior to

the FCSS’s conversion into a charter school system, and ordered

Defendants to reinstate Barnes’s employment. State and Local

Defendants each appealed from the trial court’s order, and their

appeals have been docketed as Case Nos. S23A0821 and S23A0822,

respectively.

     2.    The Georgia Constitution’s Impairment Clause provides

that “[n]o . . . retroactive law, or laws impairing the obligation of

contract . . . shall be passed.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par.

                                   9
X. This Clause “forbids statutes that apply retroactively so as to

injuriously affect the vested rights of citizens.” Deal v. Coleman, 294

Ga. 170, 175 (2) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and punctuation

omitted). “Establishing a violation of Georgia’s impairment clause,

under either a theory of contractual impairment or a theory of

retroactivity, requires the complaining party to show that a vested

right is at stake.” Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners Assn., Inc.

v. Cunard, 306 Ga. 788, 793 (2) (b) (833 SE2d 505) (2019). “To

determine whether there has been a violation of Georgia’s

impairment clause, courts in this state will consider whether a

vested right exists and then whether that vested right has been

injuriously affected by the law in question.” Id. at 793-794 (2) (b)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, as presented, Plaintiffs’ Impairment Clause claims fail

as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

The problem with Plaintiffs’ claims is that they rely on the FDA as

the source of the rights that they assert were impaired by the

Charter Systems Act, but, as explained below, Plaintiffs ignore the

                                  10
FDA’s statutory and historical context in construing the nature of

the rights afforded by the FDA. And that context shows that the

passage of the Charter Schools Act of 1993 qualified any rights

earned between that Act’s enactment date and the FCSS’s

conversion into a charter system.

     As we have explained, when interpreting a statutory provision,

“[w]e must give the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,

. . . reading it in its most natural and reasonable way.” In the Interest

of T. B., 313 Ga. 846, 850 (3) (874 SE2d 101) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted). To that end, and because “the primary

determinant of a text’s meaning is its context,” Camp v. Williams,

314 Ga. 699, 703 (2) (b) (879 SE2d 88) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted), we interpret statutory text “in the context in

which it appears,” including “the structure and history of the whole

statute, and the other law—constitutional, statutory, and common

law alike—that forms the legal background of the statutory

provision in question.” Ford Motor Co. v. Cosper, 317 Ga. 356, 359

(2) (893 SE2d 106) (2023) (citations and punctuation omitted). And

                                   11
we seek to “construe[ ] together and harmonize[ ]” the statute in

question with other “statutes relating to the same subject matter.”

T. B., 313 Ga. at 853 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     As explained below, applying these principles, we conclude

that, even assuming that FCSS teachers like Barnes earned FDA

rights after the enactment of the 1993 Charter Schools Act that

vested before FCSS’s conversion into a charter system in 2015, the

Charter Systems Act did not injuriously affect those rights. This is

because the 1993 Charter Schools Act waived any obligation that

charter schools otherwise would have had to comply with the FDA,

clarifying that teachers could subsequently earn at most qualified

FDA rights that were not enforceable against charter schools. And

the Charter Systems Act did not materially change the Charter

Schools Act’s waiver provision. Thus, assuming without deciding

that, as Plaintiffs presume, the Charter Systems Act’s provision

granting a Title 20 waiver to charter schools within a charter system

relieves the school system of the obligation to comply with the FDA,

the Charter Systems Act did not impair any FDA rights belonging

                                 12
to such teachers.

     (a)   In determining what rights the FDA affords teachers, we

begin with the language of the FDA itself. See State v. Henry, 312

Ga. 632, 636 (3) (a) (864 SE2d 415) (2021) (“[W]e look first to the

plain language of the statute . . . .”). The relevant provisions of the

FDA state that: “[a] teacher who accepts a school year contract for

the fourth consecutive school year from the same local board of

education may be demoted or the teacher’s contract may not be

renewed only for those reasons set forth in subsection (a) of Code

Section 20-2-940”; that, “[i]n order to demote or fail to renew the

contract of a teacher who accepts a school year contract for the

fourth or subsequent consecutive school year from the same local

board of education, the teacher must be given written notice of the

intention to demote or not renew the contract of the teacher”; and

that, before a teacher who has accepted a fourth or subsequent

school year contract from the same local board of education can “be

demoted or [have] his or her contract . . . not be renewed,” the

teacher “has the right to the procedures set forth in subsections (b)

                                  13
through (f) of Code Section 20-2-940,” including an opportunity for a

hearing. OCGA § 20-2-942 (b) (1), (2).

     As these provisions illustrate, the FDA speaks in general terms

about employment protections enjoyed by teachers who accept a

fourth consecutive school year contract from the same local school

board. As a result, reading these provisions in isolation might lead

one to conclude that the FDA affords such teachers unqualified

rights.

     However, “as we have said many times before when

interpreting legal text, we do not read [that text] in isolation, but

rather in context.” Camp, 314 Ga. at 703 (2) (b) (citation and

punctuation omitted). And as explained below, reading the FDA in

its historical context, alongside the development of the Charter

Schools Act, reveals that the Charter Schools Act of 1993 qualified

any rights teachers could subsequently earn under the FDA.

     The FDA was enacted in 1975 to, among other things, “define

the grounds for termination of the contracts of [public-school]

teachers . . . having a contract for a definite term.” Ga. L. 1975, p.

                                 14
360. Specifically, Section 1 (a) of the FDA provided that “[t]he

contract of employment of a teacher . . . having a contract for a

definite term may be terminated or suspended” only for certain

enumerated reasons, including, for example, “[i]ncompetency,”

“[i]nsubordination,” or “[w]illful neglect of duties.” Ga. L. 1975, p.

360, § 1 (emphasis supplied).4

      In 1982, the FDA was amended to afford additional protections

to teachers who accepted a fourth consecutive school year contract

from the same local school board. As amended in 1982, the FDA

provided that the enumerated grounds for terminating or

suspending a teacher were also the sole grounds on which such a

teacher could be demoted or the teacher’s contract could not be

renewed for a subsequent school year. See Ga. L. 1982, pp. 2188,

2190, § 1 (“A teacher who accepts a school year contract for the

fourth consecutive school year from the same local board of

education may be demoted or the teacher’s contract may not be

      4 This provision is currently codified at OCGA § 20-2-940 (a) with minor

alterations not relevant here.
                                     15
renewed only for those reasons set forth in subsection (a) of Section

1 of this Act.”). As noted above, this provision of Title 20 is now

codified at OCGA § 20-2-942 (b) (1) with minor alterations not

relevant here.

     The 1982 amendment also afforded teachers who accepted a

fourth consecutive school year contract from the same local board

certain rights to notice and a hearing before being demoted or not

having their contracts renewed for a subsequent school year. See Ga.

L. 1982, pp. 2188, 2190, § 1 (“A teacher who accepts a school year

contract for the fourth consecutive school year from the same local

board of education and who is notified that he or she is to be demoted

or that his or her contract will not be renewed has the right to the

procedures set forth in subsections (b) through (f) of Section 1 of this

Act before the intended action is taken.”). While this provision has

been amended over the years, the current version of the FDA

continues to afford teachers these general rights, as noted above. See

OCGA § 20-2-942 (b) (2).

     In 1993, the General Assembly enacted the first Charter

                                  16
Schools Act, a statutory scheme within Title 20 of the Georgia Code

that authorized the creation of public charter schools governed by “a

binding performance based contract approved by both state and local

boards of education, called a charter.” Ga. L. 1993, pp. 1440-1441,

§ 1. The Charter Schools Act of 1993 permitted individual public

schools to convert into public charter schools and waived the

requirement    that   charter    schools   comply    with   Title   20’s

requirements, providing that “[e]ach performance based contract

will exempt a school from state and local rules, regulations, policies,

and procedures and from the provisions of this title according to the

terms of the contract.” Id. Thus, under the plain terms of the 1993

Charter Schools Act, charter schools were not required to comply

with the provisions of Title 20, including the FDA. See id. See also

Ga. L. 1993, pp. 1440, 1445 § 3 (“All laws and parts of laws in conflict

with this Act are repealed.”).

     The Charter Schools Act of 1998 repealed and replaced the

1993 law. See Ga. L. 1998, pp. 1080, 1082, §§ 1, 3. Like the 1993 law,

however, the 1998 law authorized individual public schools to

                                  17
convert into public charter schools governed by a “performance

based [charter] contract approved by both state and local boards of

education.” Ga. L. 1998, p. 1082, § 3. And like the 1993 law, the 1998

Charter Schools Act waived the requirement that charter schools

comply with Title 20’s requirements, providing that, “[e]xcept as

provided in this article and in the charter, a charter school shall not

be subject to the provisions of this title.” Ga. L. 1998, p. 1086, § 3

        Although the language of the Charter Schools Act’s waiver

provision was amended in 2002 and again in 2005, the Charter

Schools Act continued to grant charter schools a waiver from Title

20’s provisions, including the provisions of the FDA. See Ga. L. 2002,

pp. 388, 391, § 1 (providing that the local and state boards could

“waive, as sought by the petitioner, specifically identified state and

local rules, regulations, policies, and procedures, and provisions of

this title other than the provisions of this article”); Ga. L. 2005, pp.

798, 808, § 12 (“Except as provided in this article or in a charter, a

charter school shall not be subject to the provisions of this title

. . . .”).

                                   18
     Then, in 2007, the General Assembly passed the Charter

Systems Act, which amended the Charter Schools Act to provide

that local public school systems could convert into public charter

systems, meaning that charter conversion was available for entire

systems of schools and was no longer limited to individual schools.

See Ga. L. 2007, pp. 185, 188, § 5. The Charter Systems Act also

amended the Charter Schools Act to clarify that the waiver of Title

20 requirements applied not only to individual charter schools that

had converted from public schools but also to each individual charter

school within a school system that had converted into a charter

school system. See Ga. L. 2007, p. 191, § 8 (“Except as provided in

this article or in a charter, a charter school, or for charter systems,

each school within the system, shall not be subject to the provisions

of this title . . . . A waiver granted pursuant to this Code section for

a charter system shall apply to each system charter school within

the system.”); OCGA § 20-2-2065 (a) (same).

     As this statutory history reveals, when the General Assembly

first authorized the creation of charter schools with the enactment

                                  19
of the 1993 Charter Schools Act, it clarified that charter schools were

exempt from Title 20’s requirements, including any requirements

that might otherwise be imposed on public schools by the FDA.

Thus, even assuming that the FDA granted teachers who accepted

a fourth consecutive school year contract from the same local board

unqualified rights to the employment protections specified in the

FDA before the 1993 Act’s passage, that was no longer the case after

the 1993 Act’s passage. Cf. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta

Botanical Garden, Inc., 306 Ga. 829, 835 (3) (834 SE2d 27) (2019)

(noting that a 2014 amendment to OCGA § 16-11-127 (c) “limited

the [statutory] right to exclude the carrying of firearms to only those

who own or lease ‘private property,’” although “that [statutory] right

was not always thus limited”). Teachers who earned FDA rights by

accepting a fourth consecutive school year contract from the same

local board after the 1993 Charter Schools Act was enacted earned

at most qualified rights—rights that were not enforceable against

charter schools. And Georgia law has remained consistent on this

point since 1993, preserving charter schools’ waiver from Title 20

                                  20
requirements in the Charter Schools Act of 1998, which repealed

and replaced the 1993 law, as well as in all subsequent amendments

to the Charter Schools Act of 1998, including the Charter Systems

Act of 2007.5

      (b)   Plaintiffs argue that the Charter Schools Acts of 1993 and

1998 are irrelevant to their Impairment Clause claims because it

was the 2007 Charter Systems Act, not the 1993 or 1998 laws, that

      5 The FDA’s reference to a right to “continued employment” does not

undermine the conclusion that the FDA has allowed teachers to earn only
qualified rights since the enactment of the 1993 Charter Schools Act. By way
of background, in 2000, the FDA was amended to state that “[a] person who
first becomes a teacher on or after July 1, 2000, shall not acquire any rights
under this Code section to continued employment with respect to any position
as a teacher.” Ga. L. 2000, pp. 618, 720, § 72 (emphasis supplied). In 2003,
however, this provision of the FDA was amended to provide that “[a] person
who first became a teacher on or after July 1, 2000, shall acquire rights under
this Code section and Code Section 20-2-941 to continued employment as a
teacher.” Ga. L. 2003, p. 896, § 2 (emphasis supplied). This provision is now
codified at OCGA § 20-2-942 (d) (“A person who first became a teacher on or
after July 1, 2000, shall acquire rights under this Code section to continued
employment as a teacher.”). As the language of these different versions of this
statutory provision shows, any right to “continued employment” afforded by
the FDA is at most a right to continued employment specified “under this Code
section.” And determining what rights to continued employment a teacher
earns “under this Code section” requires us to read the provisions of the FDA
in their statutory and historical context, as we have done above. Because the
1993 Charter Schools Act qualified any rights teachers might have otherwise
been able to earn under the FDA, as described above, any right to “continued
employment” afforded by the FDA would be similarly qualified.

                                      21
“authorized the stripping of Barnes’s FDA rights.” But although

Plaintiffs assert that the Charter Systems Act of 2007 “operate[s]

differently” than the Charter Schools Acts, they fail to explain why

the waiver provision of the 2007 law operates differently than its

statutory predecessors, such that it further limits the already

qualified FDA rights teachers have earned since the 1993 Charter

Schools Act’s passage.

        The only argument Plaintiffs raise that is specific to this point

is that “a teacher earns [FDA] rights system-wide,” and a waiver of

Title     20   requirements     under    the   Charter    Systems    Act

“extinguish[es]” FDA rights “as to all schools in the system,”

whereas, after a teacher’s individual school converts into a charter

school and obtains a Title 20 waiver under the Charter Schools Act,

the teacher could still enforce his or her FDA rights against non-

charter schools within the teacher’s school system. This argument,

however, rests on the erroneous assumption that the FDA affords

teachers a right to work in a school district that includes at least one

non-charter school, against which their earned FDA rights are

                                    22
enforceable. There is no support for that assumption. Indeed,

Georgia law has permitted public school systems to be composed

entirely of charter schools since 1993, as neither the 1993 Charter

Schools Act nor the 1998 Charter Schools Act imposed any limits on

the number of individual schools within a school district that could

undergo charter-school conversion. See Ga. L. 1993, pp. 1440, 1442,

§ 1 (“Any local school may petition the state board for charter school

status . . . .”); Ga. L. 1998, pp. 1080, 1085 § 3 (addressing the

conditions under which “[t]he state board may grant a charter to a

charter petitioner,” none of which concerned the number of charter

or non-charter schools in the school system). Thus, even assuming

that teachers could have earned a right under the FDA to work in a

district with at least one non-charter public school before the

Charter Schools Act of 1993 was enacted, that right would have been

“extinguished” by the 1993 Act, not the Charter Systems Act of 2007.

See Ga. L. 1993, pp. 1440, 1445 § 3 (“All laws and parts of laws in

conflict with this Act are repealed.”).

     Plaintiffs’ other arguments fail to explain why the Charter

                                  23
Systems Act’s waiver provision limits teachers’ earned FDA rights

more than the Charter Schools Act’s waiver provision. For example,

Plaintiffs highlight differences in how the charter-conversion

process works under the Charter Schools Act and the Charter

Systems Act, arguing that “the Charter Schools Act authorizes start-

up and conversion charter schools,” whereas “[t]he Charter Systems

Act . . . authorizes public school systems to become ‘charter

systems.’” (Emphasis in original.) They also argue that there are

differences in how charter schools and charter systems are “operated

and managed,” stating that a charter school authorized by the

Charter Schools Act “is operated by a private non-profit corporation

and is under the supervision and direction of that corporation’s

board of directors,” whereas a charter system authorized by the

Charter Systems Act “is a public school system that remains

operated and managed by its elected board of education.”

     These arguments, however, do not show that the Charter

Systems Act of 2007 changed the nature or operation of the statutory

waiver previously granted by the Charter Schools Acts of 1993 and

                                24
1998. As noted above, the Charter Systems Act was not a standalone

piece of legislation, but rather an amendment to the Charter Schools

Act of 1998. See Ga. L. 2007, p. 185 (noting that the Charter Systems

Act was an act “[t]o amend Article 31 of Chapter 2 of Title 20 of the

Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to charter schools”).

And the Charter Systems Act did not modify the Charter Schools

Act’s grant of a waiver to individual charter schools, amending the

language of the waiver provision only to account for the new system-

conversion procedure created by the Act and to clarify that

individual charter schools would remain exempt from Title 20’s

requirements regardless of how they became charter schools.

Specifically, before the Charter Systems Act authorized the

conversion of entire school systems into charter systems, the

Charter Schools Act granted a waiver to individual charter schools,

stating that “a charter school shall not be subject to the provisions

of this title.” Ga. L. 2005, p. 808, § 12 (emphasis supplied). And the

Charter Systems Act retained that waiver for individual charter

schools, including those that obtained charter-school status through

                                 25
the new system-conversion procedure created by the Act, stating

that “a charter school, or for charter systems, each school within the

system, shall not be subject to the provisions of this title,” and that

“[a] waiver granted pursuant to this Code section for a charter

system shall apply to each system charter school within the system.”

Ga. L. 2007, p. 191, § 8 (emphasis supplied).

     3.   Because both the Charter Schools Act and the Charter

Systems Act granted charter schools a waiver from Title 20’s

requirements, and because the Charter Systems Act simply revised

the language of the waiver provision to account for the existence of

charter schools that had obtained their charter status through the

new system-conversion procedure authorized by the Act, the

Charter Systems Act did not materially change the nature or

operation of the waiver. And because, as explained above, the 1993

Charter Schools Act clarified that the FDA did not afford teachers

who accepted a fourth consecutive school year contract from the

same local board any rights to FDA protections that were

enforceable against charter schools, the Charter Systems Act’s

                                  26
retention of an FDA exemption for charter schools did not impair

any right afforded to teachers who earned FDA rights after the

enactment of the 1993 Charter Schools Act.

     The trial court therefore erred in denying State Defendants’

renewed motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, granting

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and denying Local

Defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment.

     Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Pinson, J.,
disqualified.

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