Court Opinion

ID: 9764002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:06:49.832203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:52.263658
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
Contrary to the majority opinion, I do not believe that this case is controlled by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). Although the case clearly involves the alleged defamation of a public official, and although I am well aware that Times v. Sullivan requires such a plaintiff to prove that the libel was perpetrated with actual malice (i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not), nevertheless I wish to make it quite clear that Times v. Sullivan made no change in our substantive law as to what statements constitute libel, but was merely directed to the plaintiff’s burden of proof in cases involving alleged defamation of a public official. Since the present appeal comes to us from the lower court’s sustaining of defendant’s preliminary objections, we must accept, as true, all the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint. Paragraph 14 of that complaint recites: “14. All charges made by the Defendants in and by said writing made against the Plaintiff are false and all Defendants well knew said charges to he untrue when made.” (Emphasis supplied.) Without question, *297this allegation, if proven at trial, would satisfy the Times v. Sullivan requirement of actual malice as the Supreme Court of the United States has defined the term.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that the lower court properly sustained these preliminary objections, but I do so on the sole ground that the defendant’s article is not libelous as a matter of law. As this Court said in Bausewine v. Norristown Herald, 351 Pa. 634, 643, 41 A. 2d 736, 741 (1945) : “It [is] for the court to say, as a matter of law, whether the writings in suit [are] capable of a libelous meaning. If they [are], it then [becomes] the jury’s duty to determine whether they [have] such meaning in fact.” The Restatement of Torts also recites that “[t]he court determines whether a communication is capable of a defamatory meaning.” Restatement, Torts, §614(1).
The most precise statement of Pennsylvania’s law on the issue of when a remark directed toward a public officer can be libelous is found in Judge Biggs’ opinion in Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record Co., 126 F. 2d 53 (3d Cir. 1942). In that diversity action plaintiff based his complaint on a newspaper article which charged that plaintiff, an Ohio Congressman, had been leading a campaign to prevent a certain individual’s appointment to the federal bench because the prospective jurist was “a Jew and one not born in the United States.” In affirming the trial court’s sustaining of defendant’s demurrer, Judge Biggs said: “In short under the law of Pennsylvania in order to constitute libel per se the misconduct asserted in the published matter must be of a criminal nature or at least such as would warrant the removal of the public officer from his office or render him an improper person to hold public office. The misconduct alleged by the libel must really be in derogation of the oath of office taken by the public officer.” 126 F. 2d at 54-55. This test, especially *298when considered in conjunction with those cases finding a statement capable of being libelous, convinces me that the article here challenged cannot support this lawsuit. Compare Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A. 2d 42 (1964) (statement that senator’s voting record had Communist tendencies held not libelous) and Weiscarger v. Wilkes-Barre Independent Co., 75 Pa. D. & C. 481 (Luzerne County C.P. 1950) (statement that plaintiff-city controller had threatened that “city hall would keep a watchful eye on the business” if X-businesswoman did not fire Y, plaintiff’s political adversary, held not libelous), with Thompson v. Farley, 35 Pa. D. & C. 2d 157 (Bucks County C.P. 1964) (statement accusing plaintiff of bribery and extortion found capable of being libelous), Turner v. Intelligencer Co., 17 Pa. D. & C. 2d 236 (Montgomery County C.P. 1959) (facts similar to Thompson, supra), and Battles v. Record Publishing Co., 40 Erie Cty. L.J. 132 (C.P. 1956) (Laub, J.) (newspaper article charging plaintiff-policeman with drinking beer in a speakeasy during duty hours held capable of a defamatory meaning).
In the present case, the newspaper article alleged to be libelous is nothing more than an accusation that plaintiff is over-zealous, over-suspicious, and is thus wasting taxpayers’ money by stirring up needless investigations. The article is critical, but it does not even come close to charging plaintiff with such acts as would lead to her removal from office. As this Court said in Bogash v. Elkins, 405 Pa. 437, 440, 176 A. 2d 677, 679 (1962) : “Statements which represent differences of opinion or are annoying or embarrassing, are, without more, not libelous.” Plaintiff, however, alleges that there is “more” here. Her complaint invokes the theory of innuendo whereby a seemingly innocuous remark can become libelous because of certain inferences that the public would naturally draw from it. Specifically, she claims that a reader of this article would as*299sume that the criticism was actually directed against her performance as a township auditor, rather than against her over-suspicious nature. I cannot agree that such an inference is reasonable. Even a cursory reading of this article would convince any reader that the attack was not aimed at plaintiff’s performance of her official duties as auditor. An innuendo must be warranted, justified and supported by the publication. Bogash v. Elkins, supra; Sarkees v. Warner-West Corp., 349 Pa. 365, 37 A. 2d 544 (1944). This one is not.
As Mr. Chief Justice Maxey said in McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A. 2d 780 (1950), “[n]ot every lie is a libel.” With this artfully turned phrase I heartily concur.