Court Opinion

ID: 9668150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:03:55.221728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.446885
License: Public Domain

*417STEINMETZ, J.
The issues presented in this case are:
(1) Is the rule of announcement a constitutional requirement?
(2) Is a search of a residence for drugs, pursuant to a warrant, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the police do not comply with the rule of announcement but provide the following facts in the affidavit in support of the warrant: first, drugs that are easily disposed of are in the residence to be searched; second, drugs have been sold from the residence; and third, drug dealers are often armed?
(3) Did the police violate the defendant's Miranda rights by asking him questions concerning his name and place of residence before informing the defendant of his Miranda rights? Or, should this court adopt the "routine booking questions" exception to the Miranda requirements and apply the exception in this case?
On December 19, 1991, the Brown County Multi-Jurisdictional Group executed a search warrant for drugs and drug paraphernalia at 416 Mather Street in Green Bay. Based on evidence found during the search, the district attorney charged Bruce M. Stevens, the defendant, with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of secs. 161.01(4), 161.16(2)(b)l and 161.41(lm)(c), Stats.
The court bound the defendant over for trial following a preliminary hearing. The defendant then moved to exclude evidence on the ground that the search warrant was executed illegally. The defendant also moved to suppress statements he made when the warrant was executed on the ground that he made the statements prior to being advised of his Miranda rights.
*418Following the suppression hearing, the Brown county circuit court, the Honorable Peter J. Naze, granted the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence seized in the search and to suppress the statements the defendant made while the police were in his residence executing the warrant. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the Brown county circuit court in State v. Stevens, 173 Wis. 2d 290, 496 N.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1992).
We reverse the court of appeals in part and find that the search was reasonable and the circuit court should not have excluded the physical evidence discovered during the search. We also affirm the court of appeals in part and find that the circuit court properly suppressed the statements made by the defendant before the police read him his Miranda warnings.
Several members of the Green Bay Police Department executed a search warrant at the defendant's home. The police did not request no-knock authorization in the warrant; therefore, the warrant did not authorize a no-knock entry. As planned, one of the officers, dressed as a pizza delivery man, drove into the driveway of the home and knocked on the door. No one answered. After knocking a second time, he said, "Domino's pizza. Got a pizza delivery." Someone inside responded, "We didn't order any pizza," or something to that effect, and later added, "Get real."
The officer again announced the pizza delivery but heard no response. When the police officers realized they were not going to gain entry as a result of this ruse, they proceeded to execute a dynamic entry. They first yelled, "Police, search warrant," then paused, forced the door open and entered. One officer estimated that it was four to five seconds from the time the police announced their identity and purpose until they *419rammed the door open. The police officers secured the house in seven to ten seconds. The person inside the house who was closest to the door claimed she did not hear anyone yell, "Police, search warrant," or anything to that effect.
A lieutenant of the police department arrived shortly after the entry to find the defendant handcuffed and sitting on the floor. The lieutenant asked the defendant if he lived there and the defendant stated that he did. When the lieutenant next asked the defendant his name, the defendant at first responded, "Zeke," and then changed his answer to, "Bruce Stevens."
The lieutenant searched the house and discovered white powder that looked like cocaine along with drug paraphernalia in the bedroom. Upon returning to the dining area, the lieutenant told the defendant he was under arrest and asked the defendant if he had any controlled substances on him. The defendant said that he did in his left front pants pocket. The lieutenant reached in the pocket and pulled out four bindles.
The lieutenant also found shells in the defendant's pocket. When the lieutenant asked if he had a gun to go with the shells, the defendant said it was some place in the house. Then, the lieutenant advised the defendant of his Miranda rights for the first time. The defendant responded that he wanted an attorney.
After the defendant received his Miranda warnings, another police officer found .32 caliber bullets on the defendant. The police also seized a 20 gauge shotgun from the bedroom and a .32 caliber handgun along with five shells found elsewhere in the house.
At the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the police knocked the door down two to six seconds after announcing, "Police, search warrant." *420The court granted the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence, stating that the pause between announcement and entry, two to six seconds, was very brief. Because a purpose of the rule of announcement is to give the owner a chance to respond and allow the officers to enter, the police had violated the rule. The court found that suppression of the evidence was the proper remedy for this violation of the rule of announcement.
The police lieutenant in charge of executing the warrant stated that due to the nature of the drug trade, the court should excuse the police from complying with the rule of announcement in such cases. In particular, he testified that he had executed approximately 90 search warrants in drug houses. In 85 to 90 percent of those houses, he had found weapons — sometimes assault weapons. The trial court refused to follow this "drug house" exception to the rule of announcement.
The court next addressed the admissibility of the statements the defendant made prior to receiving his Miranda warnings. The prosecutor conceded that the defendant's statements about having drugs in his pocket and a gun in his house were inadmissible. However, he argued that asking the defendant who he was and where he lived were booking questions that elicited admissible answers even though the lieutenant asked them before he read the defendant his Miranda warnings. The court rejected this argument and suppressed all of the defendant's pr e-Miranda warning statements.
The ultimate question concerning the search of any residence is whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has also held that *421the method of entry when executing a search warrant must be reasonable. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963).
The Supreme Court has not, however, determined whether the rule of announcement is a constitutional requirement. This court has acknowledged that some commentators believe that Ker gave the rule a constitutional dimension.1 On the contrary, only four justices in Ker, in fact, believed that compliance with the rule is a constitutional requirement. In dissenting in part, Justice Brennan stated:
The protections of individual freedom carried into the Fourth Amendment . . . undoubtedly included this firmly established requirement of an announcement by police officers of purpose and authority before breaking into an individual's house.
Id. at 49.
The other five justices did not join Justice Brennan in his belief that the rule of announcement was a con*422stitutional requirement. In the Court's plurality opinion, Justice Clark, joined by three other justices, considered whether police entry, under a common law exception to California's statutory rule of announcement, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The four justices concluded that the method of entry was reasonable. These justices did not examine whether a failure to comply with the rule of announcement would constitute an unreasonable entry under the Fourth Amendment. The ninth justice, Justice Harlan, concurred with Justice Clark's result, but relied on the fundamental fairness requirement from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.
In light of this split in the opinions, it is not accurate to say that in Ker the Supreme Court recognized that the rule of announcement is a constitutional requirement. As noted above, only four justices reached that result. In fact, since Ker, several courts have explicitly held that the rule is not a requirement of the federal Constitution. See United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 601-02 (3rd Cir. 1983); People v. Saechao, 544 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ill. 1989); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 556 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Mass. 1990).
Whether or not the rule of announcement is constitutionally mandated, it has been a common law requirement in Wisconsin.2 See Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 622-23; State v. Moss, 172 Wis. 2d 110, 115, 492 N.W.2d 627 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1428 (1993). The rule has three primary justifications. State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 981-82, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992). *423First, it serves to protect the safety of police officers and others by warning the occupants of the officers' entrance. Second, it protects the occupants' limited privacy interests when the police already have a warrant. Third, it helps prevent the physical destruction of property.3
In Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 622, this court explained that the rule of announcement requires "that police officers seeking to enter a dwelling in execution of a warrant must announce their presence (identity) and purpose and allow time for the door to be opened ...." In essence, the rule requires the police to do three things before forcibly entering a home to execute a search warrant: 1) announce their identity; 2) announce their purpose; and 3) wait for either the occupants to refuse their admittance or, in the absence of an express refusal, allow the occupants time to open the door.
This court also recognized that under certain circumstances a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even if the police dispense with the rule of announcement and execute a no-knock entry. Two such circumstances are when the police have a reasonable belief that announcement of police presence would endanger the safety of the police or others and when the police have a reasonable belief that unannounced *424entry is required to prevent the destruction of evidence. See id. at 628, 631.
Cleveland required that in order to justify a no-knock entry, the police must be able to set forth the exigent circumstances with sufficient particularity to show reasonable cause to believe that the exigent circumstances exist. To justify no-knock entry to prevent the destruction of evidence under Cleveland, the police cannot rely on a "blanket" rule that no-knock entry is justified in all drug cases solely because narcotics, by their very nature, are easily destroyed. More information is needed. The officers must have particular grounds to provide them with reasonable cause to believe that in the specific case at hand, drugs will be destroyed. This court stated that an allegation that drugs had been sold on the premises is inadequate to provide reason to believe that the evidence will be destroyed if the police announce their presence prior to the search. Id. at 629-30.
Cleveland also stands for the proposition that the police cannot justify a no-knock entry by merely alleging that drug dealers are often armed, and hence, no-knock is necessary to protect the police and others. Id. at 631, n.16. Subsequently, in Williams, 168 Wis. 2d at 985, this court stated that the police have reasonable cause to make a no-knock entry when they have particular information that a person likely to be at the residence to be searched possesses firearms and a large quantity of drugs.
We now reexamine our holdings in Cleveland and Williams. We hold that when the police have a search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver drugs (evidence of *425drug dealing), they necessarily have reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist.4 Thus, in all such searches the police are justified in dispensing with the rule of announcement and making a no-knock entry.
In Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 628, this court stated that "[t]he mere fact that drugs fall into a general category of materials that are by their nature capable of destruction does not justify unannounced entry to execute a search warrant." We now reject that holding. As we stated in Cleveland, drugs may be destroyed easily. Several jurisdictions have acknowledged that most drugs are easily disposed of using standard plumbing. See United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1102 (1991); Henson v. State, 204 A.2d 516, 519 (Md. 1964); State v. Meyer, 311 N.W.2d 520, 522-24 (Neb. 1981); State v. Johnson, 230 A.2d 831, 836-37 (R.I. 1967); sec also Garcia, The Knock And Announce Rule: A New Approach To The Destruction-Of-Evidence Exception, 93 Colum. L. Rev. at 699. We now overrule Cleveland and find that the easily disposable nature of narcotics provides police with evidence sufficient to form a reasonable belief that no-knock entry is necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence.
In this case, the affidavit submitted to obtain the search warrant demonstrated that the police had probable cause to believe that cocaine would be found in the residence. The affidavit also showed probable cause to believe that the cocaine would be packaged in small, *426salable amounts that could be destroyed easily. The police had previously observed a supplier going to the residence, delivering bindles of cocaine to a police informant. Furthermore, the affidavit showed that approximately two ounces of cocaine were to be delivered to the residence on the day the police submitted the affidavit and executed the search.
The court of appeals in this case found that there were no exigent circumstances to allow a no-knock entry because nothing in the record indicated that the police had a particular reason to believe the drugs were about to be destroyed. Stevens, 173 Wis. 2d at 299. We reverse and hold that, due to the destructibility of the evidence, a no-knock search is reasonable any time the police have a warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a residence for "evidence of drug dealing". Under these circumstances, the police may dispense with the rule of announcement. At least six other courts have adopted such a "blanket" exception to the rule of announcement. See People v. Lujan, 484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 1971); Henson, 204 A.2d at 519-20; People v. De Lago, 213 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966); Meyer, 311 N.W.2d at 524; State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973); State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 1974).
Some courts have limited this no-knock exception to cases in which the police are searching for drugs kept in small quantities. These courts believe that packaging the narcotics in small amounts increases the likelihood that the occupants will be able to destroy the drugs if the police announce their entry. See State v. Thomas, 604 So. 2d 1277, 1278-79 (Fla. App. 1992); Armenteros v. State, 554 So. 2d 574, 75 (Fla. App. *4271989); State v. Matos, 605 A.2d 223, 224-25 (N.H. 1992); State v. Stalbert, 783 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Or. 1989). We reject this limitation to our newly adopted "blanket" exception to the rule of announcement. To allow the method of entry to be based on the packaging of the drugs would create a test without certainty.
This court, in a footnote in Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 631, n.16, also found that the police did not demonstrate exigent circumstances with sufficient particularity to justify an unannounced entry when they could only show that drug dealers are often armed. The court stated: "The fact that a person is a member of a class of persons more likely to resist search is not sufficient to justify unannounced entry." Id; see also Williams, 168 Wis. 2d at 982. We now reject that holding.
Historically, the primary purpose of the rule of announcement was to decrease the potential for violence when the police execute a search warrant. Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock And Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 St. John's L. Rev. at 647. The common belief has always been that the occupants of a home are less likely to react violently towards an intruder if the occupants are forewarned that the intruder is a police officer with a judicially issued warrant. See State v. Carufel, 314 A.2d 144, 147 (R.I. 1974); People v. Dumas, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Cal. 1973). On the other hand, if the police break into a home unannounced, the occupants are more likely to assume the intruder is a criminal — in which case the occupants may be justified in confronting the intruder with a weapon. See id. In that case, the police are in turn more likely to respond with force against the occupants.
*428This rule of announcement rationale, on which the concurrence places great emphasis, is no longer valid in today's drug culture. In fact, by announcing their presence, police may actually increase the likelihood for violence. "[T]he law has 'uniformly . . . recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that such weapons are as much tools of the trade as more commonly recognized drug paraphernalia.'" United States v. Bonner, 874 F.2d 822, 824 (D.C. 1989) (quoting United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. 1986)).5 "To avoid being arrested and punished for trafficking, drug dealers commit violent crimes against police . . .." Bureau of Justice Statistics, A National Report: Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System, at 5 (Dec. 1992). "Violence is [also] used to protect or expand markets, intimidate competitors, and retaliate against sellers or buyers who are suspected of cheating." Id. "The violence associated with drug trafficking today places law enforcement officers in extreme danger." Williams, 168 Wis. 2d at 984. Due to this "systemic" violence aimed at the police and rival drug dealers, when the police execute a search warrant, they may be putting themselves in more danger, rather than less, by announcing their presence before they enter.
Contrary to the historical notion that following the rule of announcement is more likely to prevent violence than executing a no-knock search, the opposite is more likely true. Police departments and commentators have determined that the police can decrease the possibility for violence during a search by taking control of the situation quickly. See Donald B. Allegro, Note, *429Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock Warrant Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 552, 556-57, n.29 (1989). This can best be accomplished using an unannounced, dynamic entry. "The element of surprise attending an unannounced entry allows the officers to enter and secure the premises before the suspect is able to gather his or her thoughts and possibly gun down the officers as they attempt to identify their presence and purpose." Williams, 168 Wis. 2d at 985-86.
The concurring opinion points out that neither violence towards police officers nor the disposability of drugs has increased since this court rejected a "blanket" exception to the rule of announcement in Cleveland and Williams. Accordingly, the concurring opinion argues that the court has no reason to overrule this precedent now. The concurrence fails to point out, however, that this court was not asked to adopt a "blanket" exception to the announcement rule in either Cleveland or Williams. In fact, the author of the concurring opinion acknowledged as much in Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 628, stating: "Moreover, neither the defendant nor the state in this case asks this court to adopt a "blanket" rule . . .." In Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, the state argued successfully that particularized exigent circumstances existed and hence this court did not need to adopt a "blanket" rule in order to find the no-knock entry reasonable. In this case, for the first time, the state has explicitly asked that this court examine the underlying rationale for the rule of announcement and find that no-knock entry is reasonable any time the police execute a warrant to search for "evidence of drug dealing". After carefully analyzing the state's argument, we have decided to adopt this "blanket" rule.
*430In cases like this, where the police have a valid warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a home for "evidence of drug dealing", the officers executing the warrant have the incentive to choose the safest method of entry. Hence, in such cases, we will yield to the police officers' discretion in choosing whether or not to follow the rule of announcement. We overrule Cleveland and Williams6 and hold that when the police request a warrant to search for "evidence of drug dealing", due to the inherent violence associated with drug dealing, the police need not offer particularized evidence of weapons to demonstrate that exigent circumstances exist justifying a no-knock search.7
We therefore reverse the court of appeals and find that in this case a no-knock entry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court should not have granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found during the search. In searches for "evidence of drug dealing", we reject any requirement that the police wait a given amount of time before entering a residence. We advise, but do not *431require, that the police announce their identity and purpose contemporaneously with their entry. While this practice is not necessary in such searches, it may help insure the safety of the police and others.
In this case, the police had sufficient knowledge to secure a no-knock warrant. The police intended to search for cocaine — an easily destructible drug. The police had information showing that the occupants of the residence were expecting to receive two ounces of cocaine. A police informant had purchased street quantities of cocaine from a supplier who went to the residence in question to obtain the drugs for the informant. Also, the police lieutenant knew from experience that the vast majority of drug houses contain weapons. In cases like this, when the police have probable cause to search a residence for "evidence of drug dealing", the warrant the police obtain carries with it no-knock authority.
Even in these cases, in which exigent circumstances to allow no-knock entry are present, the police must still obtain a search warrant unless additional "emergency" or exigent circumstances justifying a war-rantless search exist. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973); see also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). If the police enter a residence without a warrant, they will have to demonstrate to a judge at a suppression hearing, without the benefit of the deference given to a magistrate's pre-search determination, the following: 1) probable cause to search; and 2) emergency circumstances justifying a warrantless search.
The concurring opinion stresses that " [p]rivacy interests in a home are fundamental to our society's *432understanding of human dignity." We share these sentiments. However, where the police have a warrant to search the property, the residents retain only a very limited interest in privacy. The warrant authorizes the police to enter the residence and search for evidence pursuant to the search warrant. See Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 St. John's L. Rev. at 647. Even under the rule of announcement, after the police have announced their identity and purpose, the occupants must let them in within a reasonable time or the police may force their way in. The occupants' privacy interests are limited to knowing the police are entering and perhaps effecting the method of entry. The occupants do not have the right to refuse entry.
We balance this limited privacy interest against two other interests — the public's substantial interest in stopping or at least curtailing the drug trade and its related crimes, and the police officers' interest in protecting themselves and others from harm. When the police execute a search warrant for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver, there is reasonable cause to believe both that the drugs will be destroyed and evidence lost and that the occupants of the residence will be armed. Assuming the police announce their identity and purpose simultaneously with their entrance, the occupants' privacy interests are infringed only to the extent that the occupants are not given the opportunity to open the door. Even when the police dispense with the entire knock and announcement, the societal interest in stopping the drug trade, combined with the police officers' safety interest, outweigh the occupants' limited privacy interests.
*433We now turn to the statements the defendant made to the police before receiving his Miranda warnings. The trial court suppressed several statements made by the defendant before the police apprised him of his Miranda rights. The state only challenges the court's determination regarding the defendant's responses to questions concerning his name and place of residence. For purposes of this opinion, we will assume that the defendant was in custody when these statements were made.8
Four justices of the United States Supreme Court recognized that questions directed to the defendant about biographical data, such as the defendant's name and address, that are not intended to elicit incriminating responses, may be considered routine booking questions that are exempted from the coverage of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Based on this "routine booking questions" exception, the Court found several of the defendant's statements regarding biographical data admissible even though the defendant made the statements before being apprised of his Miranda rights.9 Several courts have adopted a similar exception to the *434Miranda rule. See United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181, n.2 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 378-79 (11th Cir. 1983); United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 (2nd Cir. 1975); United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
We adopt the "routine booking questions" exception to the Miranda rule. We next determine whether the defendant's statements, in this case, fall within the exception. We hold that they do not. The defendant made the statements regarding his name and residence during the arrest, not during the booking process. Although at least one court has applied the exception to statements made by a defendant while he was in a police car on his way to the police station, LaVallee, 521 F.2d at 1113, this court will not extend the exception to incriminating questions asked at the time of the arrest.
Furthermore, while it is impossible to determine the officer's intent from the record, it appears that the questions at issue may have been intended to elicit incriminating responses. Although the question concerning the defendant's name seems innocuous, it may actually have been incriminating. The affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant referred to one of the suspected drug dealers only as "Zeke.” As a result, the defendant's answer to the question about his name, "Zeke" and then "Bruce Stevens," identified the defendant as the alleged drug dealer discussed in the affidavit.
In addition, by acknowledging that he lived at the house being searched, the defendant admitted that he lived at a residence where the police found drugs and weapons. In essence, his answer provided the police *435evidence of his possession of drugs. See Disla, 805 F.2d at 1347. Finally, these two biographical questions may be viewed as part of a line of questioning that eventually led to inadmissible statements about the whereabouts of drugs and guns. Hence, we affirm the court of appeals' holding that the defendant's statements about his name and residence, made before he received his Miranda warnings, are inadmissible.10
We overrule Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, and Moss, 172 Wis. 2d 110, and hold that when the police have probable cause through a warrant to search a residence for evidence of delivery of drugs or evidence of possession with intent to deliver drugs, exigent circumstances exist to allow the police to ignore the rule of announcement and execute a no-knock search. We reverse the court of appeals and find that the police officers' method of entry was reasonable. It is advisable, but not required, that the police announce their identity and purpose simultaneously with the entry for their own safety and the safety of others. In addition, we adopt the "routine booking question" exception to the Miranda rule, but do not apply it in this case. Because the defendant made the statements at issue prior to the booking process, and because the questions may have been intended to elicit incriminating responses, we affirm the court of appeals and find that the statements were properly suppressed.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

 See State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 623, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984) "In addition to its common law heritage, the rule of announcement is generally viewed as one of federal constitutional dimension. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), is regarded as authority for the proposition that 'the rule of announcement is a constitutional requirement implicit in the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" (quoting Michael R. Sonnenreich and Stanley Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 626,643 (1970)). See also Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock And Announce Rule: A New Approach To The Destruction-Of-Evidence Exception, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 685, 685 (1993) "The United States Supreme Court elevated this rule to a constitutional right thirty years ago in Ker v. California.".

 No statute in Wisconsin requires police to follow the rule of announcement.

 The concurring opinion acknowledges these three justifications for the rule of announcement, along with a fourth — to provide an opportunity for the resident to indicate that the premises are mistakenly described in the warrant. However, the concurring opinion fails to defend these justifications. As this opinion later points out, in today's drug culture, these justifications are, for the most part, indefensible.

 Evidence of prior sales, information from a police informant, or evidence of large quantities of drugs may lead to a presumption that a residence contains "evidence of drug dealing".

 See Payne, 805 F.2d at 1065-66 for a list of many other cases in which courts have taken notice that drug dealers are often armed.

 In Williams, 168 Wis. 2d at 985, this court found a no-knock search reasonable based on particularized exigent circumstances. Thus, we only overrule Williams to the extent that Williams rejected the "blanket" approach to finding exigent circumstances in searches for "evidence of drug dealing".

In State v. Moss, 172 Wis. 2d at 121, this court found an entry by means of a ruse valid. However, this court implicitly held that absent the use of a ruse and absent particularized exigent circumstances, a no-knock entry would not be reasonable. Thus, our holding today also overrules Moss to the extent that Moss generally reaffirmed the rule of announcement in searches for "evidence of drug dealing".

 Before the trial court, the prosecutor conceded that the questions directed to the defendant would normally be covered by Miranda. Because Miranda only applies to statements made while in custody, this admission amounts to a concession that the defendant was in custody at the time he made the statements in question.

 Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result. However, he did not apply the "routine booking questions" exception. Rather, he determined that the questions at issue were not testimonial and hence, the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 608.

 The police would certainly have been able to obtain this information from the defendant during the booking process at the police station.