Court Opinion

ID: 9625464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:41:54.457166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:33.433806
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring, with whom RAPER, Chief Justice, joins.
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, and accept the rationale *395presented there so far as it goes. It seems, however, in the context of the facts set forth, there are implicit in these circumstances other representations as to past or existing facts which the jury well could have found to have been false when made.
By his conduct and statements at the time, Driver represented to Briggs that he was seeking a loan for Driver-Robins, Inc.; that he had authority to obtain the loan for the business; and that Driver-Robins, Inc., had made a business decision to borrow funds which would be utilized in obtaining an insurance bond. Because of Robins’ lack of knowledge of any such loan, and the prompt manner in which Driver converted the money to his own dominion and control, the jury well could have found that those representations were false at the time they were made. Insofar as Driver’s status and authority are concerned, these would constitute false representations of past or existing facts. State v. Deschambault, 159 Me. 223, 191 A.2d 114 (1963); State v. Handke, 185 Kan. 38, 340 P.2d 877 (1959); Commonwealth v. Feldman, 243 Pa.Super. 408, 365 A.2d 1289 (1976).
While he was not asked the question directly, in view of the history of his relationship with Driver-Robins, Inc., the jury certainly could adopt the obvious inference that Briggs was caused to believe in and rely upon the fact that the $50,000 was to be placed in the coffers of Driver-Robins, Inc., for use by that business, and a specific use actually was suggested to him. Similar misrepresentations have been held to violate the provisions of false pretenses statutes. Skantze v. United States, 110 U.S. App.D.C. 14, 288 F.2d 416 (1961), cert. den. 366 U.S. 972, 81 S.Ct. 1938, 6 L.Ed.2d 1261, cert. den. 371 U.S. 843, 83 S.Ct. 72, 9 L.Ed.2d 78; Peiffer v. People, 106 Colo. 533, 107 P.2d 799 (1940); State v. Nichols, 1 Houst.Cr.Cas. 114 (Del.Ct. Gen.Sess. of the Peace and Jail Delivery, 1862); Finlay v. State, 152 Fla. 396,12 So.2d 112, 145 A.L.R. 299 (1943); Commonwealth v. Walker, 108 Mass. 309 (1871); State v. Barnes, Mo.App., 517 S.W.2d 155 (1974).
As the Supreme Court of Colorado stated in Peiffer v. People, supra, 107 P.2d at 802:
“ * * * These were not even promises of future action, they were representations of present plans, and they were false when made for the entire evidence forces the conclusion that his then present scheme was to appropriate the stock to his own use and his present method of business was a plain swindle. * $ * 7f
In affirming this conviction I would rely upon these misrepresentations which are implicit in the factual circumstances in addition to those set forth in the majority opinion.