Court Opinion

ID: 9943394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 15:16:39.839815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:56.340057
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                  SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                  APPELLATE DIVISION
                                  DOCKET NO. A-3844-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                     APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v.
                                            February 23, 2024

LADOHN E. COURTNEY,                      APPELLATE DIVISION
ERIADNA V. MENTOR, and
TOMMIE S. NEWSOME,

     Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________

           Argued January 24, 2024 – Decided February 23, 2024

           Before Judges Currier, Susswein and Vanek.

           On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
           Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County,
           Indictment Nos. 23-02-0084, 23-02-0085, 23-02-0086
           and 23-02-0087.

           Milton Samuel Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
           the cause for appellant (William A. Daniel, Union
           County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton Samuel Leibowitz,
           of counsel and on the brief).

           Peter Thomas Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
           argued the cause for respondent Ladohn E. Courtney
           (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter
           Thomas Blum, of counsel and on the brief).
            Ruth Elizabeth Hunter, Designated Counsel, argued the
            cause for respondent Eriadna V. Mentor (Joseph E.
            Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ruth Elizabeth
            Hunter, on the brief).

            Ehrlich, Petriello, Gudin, Plaza & Reed, PC, attorneys
            for respondent Tommie S. Newsome, join in the briefs
            of respondents Ladohn E. Courtney and Eriadna V.
            Mentor.

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUSSWEIN, J.A.D.

      Under Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution—our State's

counterpart to the Fourth Amendment—police cannot conduct a search pursuant

to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement once a vehicle has been

towed away and impounded. State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 448-49 (2015). This

appeal requires us to probe the scope and rationale of that restriction, presenting

the novel question of whether police may conduct a search under the automobile

exception when they are required to impound a vehicle pursuant to John's Law, 1

but the vehicle has yet to be removed from the scene of the stop.

1
   John's Law, codified in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.22 and -50.23, generally requires
police to impound a vehicle for at least twelve hours when the driver is arrested
for driving while intoxicated (DWI) or refuses to submit to a chemical breath
test.
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      By leave granted, the State appeals from a June 29, 2023 Law Division

order suppressing a loaded handgun found during a warrantless, non-consensual

search of a vehicle that was pulled over for multiple traffic violations and erratic

driving. The driver was arrested for DWI. The trial court ruled that because the

vehicle was required to be impounded under John's Law, "[t]here was no

additional emergency or exigent circumstances that would have required a

search on the side of the road." The trial court thus concluded the officers were

required to obtain a search warrant even though the search occurred roadside.

      After carefully reviewing the record in light of the plain language and

underlying rationale of our Supreme Court's pivotal decision in Witt, we reverse

the suppression order. So long as police satisfy the foundational requirements

of probable cause, spontaneity, and unforeseeability, the authority to conduct an

automobile-exception search lapses only after the vehicle has been removed to

a secure location, not in anticipation of such removal. We decline defendants'

request to create a new bright-line rule making vehicles subject to John's Law

categorically ineligible for an on-scene search under the automobile exception.

                                         I.

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        We discern the pertinent facts from the suppression hearing record. 2 On

the night of September 20, 2022, Cranford Police Officer Antonio Bellomo

observed a white Dodge Durango travelling westbound on North Avenue

towards the northbound ramp of the Garden State Parkway. The vehicle swerved

from the northernmost lane that accesses the ramp and came to an abrupt stop in

the right lane. The vehicle then crossed over the solid, white line and began

heading towards the southbound ramp of the Parkway. Before the vehicle

entered the ramp, Bellomo saw it swerving within the right lane of travel.

Bellomo initiated a motor vehicle stop. The vehicle travelled slowly on the

shoulder before coming to a complete stop.

        Bellomo exited his patrol car and approached the passenger side of the

Durango. He smelled alcohol emanating from the vehicle's cabin. Bellomo

asked the driver, Tommie S. Newsome, 3 for his driver's license, registration, and

proof of insurance. Newsome provided his license and proof he rented the car

at Newark airport.

2
   For purposes of determining the lawfulness of the warrantless search, the
relevant facts are not disputed in this appeal.
3
    Newsome submitted a letter brief but did not participate in oral argument.
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      While speaking to Newsome, Bellomo saw a half-empty bottle of cognac

on the passenger-side floor. He ordered Newsome out of the car and asked him

if he had anything to drink. Newsome said he had a drink at a restaurant.

Bellomo smelled alcohol on Newsome's breath. He administered sobriety tests,

which Newsome failed. Bellomo arrested Newsome for DWI.

      Ladohn E. Courtney was in the rear passenger-side seat. Patrol Officer

Folinusz, who came to provide backup, saw Courtney was not wearing a

seatbelt. Folinusz ordered Courtney to present his driver's license. A warrant

check revealed an outstanding municipal court warrant. Courtney was placed

under arrest and issued a summons for not wearing a seatbelt.

      Bellomo ordered the front-seat passenger, Eriadna V. Mentor, to step out

of the vehicle because it needed to be towed pursuant to John's Law. Bellomo

searched the vehicle while it was still on the side of the road and found a

handgun loaded with six rounds under the front passenger seat. After securing

the handgun, Bellomo continued searching the vehicle and found another open

bottle of cognac.

      Courtney, Newsome, and Mentor were charged by indictment with

unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).

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They were also charged with certain persons not to have a firearm based on prior

convictions, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).

      Newsome filed a motion to suppress the handgun, which Courtney and

Mentor joined. Following a suppression hearing, supplemental briefing, and

oral argument, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The court issued

an oral ruling, concluding:

            The [c]ourt believes that based on this … particular set
            of factual circumstances that has been presented, from
            the moment that Mr. Newsome was being arrested for
            [DWI] John's Law kicked in, and as a result of John's
            Law kicking in, [t]he [c]ourt reads [State v. Witt] to
            include when vehicles are towed and impounded. So it
            was immediately apparent at that moment, upon his
            removal from the vehicle, the smell of alcoholic
            beverages emanating from … Mr. Newsome, that was
            detected, his failure of the … balancing test, and then
            his subsequent [.18 blood alcohol test level] when taken
            to the station, when he was arrested for [DWI,] at that
            point John's Law was triggered …. [I]t is the opinion of
            [t]he [c]ourt that because John's Law was triggered
            [and] when vehicles are towed and impounded—and
            I'm expanding upon [Witt] in this respect, by just
            adding the following—when you know a vehicle is
            going to be towed and impounded, absent some
            exigency, a warrant must be secured …. I don't even
            need to get there. When vehicles are towed and
            impounded that should have flipped the switch that
            required a warrant to be obtained for the search of
            anything else. It does not matter to [t]he [c]ourt where
            the vehicle was at this point, whether it was on the side
            of the Parkway, whether it was on the side of a
            residential street, whether it was anywhere. What is of

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            import to [t]he [c]ourt is the fact that [Witt] specifically
            says towed and impounded vehicles must be searched
            only when a warrant [is] secured. This would be an
            entirely different conversation if this was not a situation
            where John's Law came into play. But I read these
            statutes in pari materia and I find that they are, for the
            purposes of this motion—again, a very fact-specific set
            of circumstances—are to be read together.

      The trial court added:

            [The officers] did not have the discretion to decide
            whether to impound and tow the vehicle. Rather, the
            vehicle was being towed as a matter of law. There was
            no additional emergency or exigent circumstances that
            would have required a search on the side of the road. It
            is the opinion of [t]he [c]ourt that based on the totality
            of the circumstances presented, in this particular
            matter, that the officers should have obtained a warrant
            for the search.

      We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. The State raises the

following contention for our consideration:

            THE TRIAL COURT ORDER GRANTING
            DEFENDANT[S'] MOTION TO SUPPRESS MUST
            BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT IS BASED UPON AN
            INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF [Witt].

                                        II.

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. As a general matter, "[o]ur standard of review on a motion to

suppress is deferential." State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022). "[A]n

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appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings

underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609

(2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243

(2007)).   We "defer[ ] to those findings in recognition of the trial court's

'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case,

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting Elders,

192 N.J. at 244); see also State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 318-19 (2023).

      In contrast to the deference owed to a trial court's factual and credibility

findings, we review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. State v. S.S., 229

N.J. 360, 380 (2017).     We regard the trial court's interpretation of Witt's

on-scene search requirement to be a legal conclusion to which we owe no special

deference. Accordingly, we review the contours of the automobile-exception

reform announced in Witt with a fresh set of eyes. See ibid.

      Turning to substantive legal principles, the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey

Constitution "protect against unreasonable searches and seizures."        State v.

Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164 (2023) (quoting Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527). Importantly

for purposes of this appeal, "[o]ur jurisprudence under both constitutional

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provisions expresses a preference that police officers secure a warrant before

they execute a search." Witt, 223 N.J. at 422 (citing State v. Frankel, 179 N.J.

586, 597-98 (2004)). That preference finds expression in the bedrock principle

that warrantless seizures are presumptively invalid. See State v. Goldsmith, 251

N.J. 384, 398 (2022); see State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004). "To justify a

warrantless search or seizure, 'the State bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or seizure falls

within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'"

State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied,

255 N.J. 506 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J.

530, 546 (2019)). The automobile exception is one such exception. Witt, 223

N.J. at 422.

      That doctrine has undergone significant changes since it was first

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132 (1925). Its episodic evolution under both the New Jersey and United

States Constitutions is recounted in detail in Witt and Smart. See Witt, 223 N.J.

at 422-40; Smart, 253 N.J. at 164-71. We need not reproduce our Supreme

Court's scholarly historical analysis. It is sufficient for present purposes to note

the New Jersey Supreme Court has charted its own course, relying on the

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principle that our State Constitution can provide greater protections against

unreasonable searches and seizures than are afforded under the United States

Constitution. Smart, 253 N.J. at 165.

      In a nutshell, the divergence between the New Jersey and federal

automobile exceptions focuses on whether and how law enforcement must prove

exigent circumstances to excuse the warrant requirement. In Carroll, the United

States Supreme Court found a "vehicle's inherent mobility provided the

exigency rationale for the exception to the warrant requirement." Witt, 223 N.J.

at 423 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153). The United States Supreme Court does

not require the prosecutor to prove case-specific exigency. As our Supreme

Court noted in Witt:

            Under federal law, probable cause to search a vehicle
            "alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth
            Amendment's warrant requirement." Maryland v.
            Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999). The federal
            automobile exception does not require "a separate
            finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable
            cause," ibid., as is the case in New Jersey, Pena-Flores,
            198 N.J. at 28.

            [Witt, 223 N.J. at 422.]

      New Jersey's automobile-exception jurisprudence, in contrast, has always

accounted for case-specific exigency, not just "inherent" exigency. However,

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the methodology for determining whether there is sufficient exigency to justify

a warrantless automobile search has changed significantly over the years.

      In Witt, the Court definitively rejected as "unsound in principle and

unworkable in practice" the multi-factor exigency test the Court used in State v.

Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), and amplified in Pena-Flores. Witt, 223 N.J. at

447. Witt jettisoned that exigency test, which featured "a dizzying number of

factors," replacing it with a much simpler, more predictable test to be applied

prospectively. Id. at 444.

      Although Witt substantially overhauled the material elements of the

automobile exception, it by no means abandoned our State's steadfast adherence

to a case-sensitive exigency analysis.      And although Witt discarded the

Pena-Flores exigency test, it did not invent a new exigency formulation to

replace it. Rather, the Court resurrected the exigency test it developed decades

earlier in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981). The restored Alston test requires

the State to prove that probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband

or other evidence of unlawful activity arose spontaneously and unforeseeably.

Witt, 223 N.J. at 446-48; cf. Smart, 253 N.J. at 171-74 (explaining foreseeability

and spontaneity as analytically distinct concepts and recognizing probable cause

can arise spontaneously yet foreseeably, as when police investigate information

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                                       11
provided by a confidential informant that is corroborated during a motor vehicle

stop).

         Besides requiring proof of spontaneity and unforeseeability, Witt imposed

another precondition—this one based on the "inherent" exigency arising during

roadside encounters. Justice Albin, writing for the majority, explained:

               We also part from federal jurisprudence that allows a
               police officer to conduct a warrantless search at
               headquarters merely because he could have done so on
               the side of the road. See Chambers [v. Maroney], supra,
               399 U.S. [42,] 52 [(1970)]. "Whatever inherent
               exigency justifies a warrantless search at the scene
               under the automobile exception certainly cannot justify
               the failure to secure a warrant after towing and
               impounding the car" at headquarters when it is
               practicable to do so. Pena-Flores, supra, 198 N.J. at 39
               n.1 (Albin, J., dissenting). Warrantless searches should
               not be based on fake exigencies. Therefore, under
               Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution,
               we limit the automobile exception to on-scene
               warrantless searches.

               [Witt, 223 N.J. at 448-49 (emphasis added).]

         Justice Albin succinctly summarized the location restriction, stating:

"[g]oing forward, searches on the roadway based on probable cause arising from

unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances are permissible. However, when

vehicles are towed and impounded, absent some exigency, a warrant must be

secured." Id. at 450.

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      In sum, under the Witt reformation of the New Jersey automobile

exception, exigency is accounted for in two distinct ways, applying two distinct

features.   First, the State must prove that probable cause to search arose

spontaneously and unforeseeably.       Witt, 223 N.J. at 446-48. This type of

exigency analysis is case-sensitive and depends on the particular facts leading

up to and during the police-citizen encounter.

      Second, the search must be conducted while the vehicle is still at the scene

of the stop. Id. at 449. This requirement, which we refer to as the location

restriction, is a per se bright-line rule based on the inherent exigency associated

with roadside stops.

                                        III.

      This is not our first occasion to interpret Witt's location restriction. In

State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 15 (App. Div. 2019), the trial court

suppressed marijuana and other incriminating evidence police found inside a

vehicle stopped for traffic violations. The trial court "construed Witt to disallow

a warrantless on-the-spot roadside search where police at the scene have

sufficient grounds to have the vehicle towed away and impounded." Ibid. We

reversed the suppression order, holding the "officers were not required to

impound [the] defendant's vehicle in order to search it . . . . The officers had the

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discretion to proceed instead with a warrantless roadside search, because the two

critical elements of Witt . . . were satisfied." Ibid.

      The defendant in that case argued "once the basis to impound a vehicle

becomes clear, police officers have no right to proceed with an on-the-spot

roadside search, even if the officers have probable cause of criminality that arose

spontaneously." Id. at 22-23. We rejected that argument, explaining:

             We respectfully do not construe Witt to convey such a
             limitation upon the automobile exception. Nothing in
             Witt states that a roadside search of a vehicle based
             upon probable cause cannot be performed if the vehicle
             is going to be impounded. We instead read Witt as
             affording police officers at the scene the discretion to
             choose between searching the vehicle immediately if
             they spontaneously have probable cause to do so, or to
             have the vehicle removed and impounded and seek a
             search warrant later.

             [Id. at 23.]

We added, "[t]he whole tenor of the Witt opinion is to eliminate the need for

police to establish 'exigencies' at the roadside to proceed with a warrantless

search." Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).

      In the matter before us, defendants urge us to part company with

Rodriguez, or at least distinguish it. Courtney argues "[i]n short, different

Appellate Division panels may disagree with each other, and the present

occasion seems ripe for disagreement with Rodriguez’s reasoning."               We

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                                        14
respectfully disagree with Courtney and wholeheartedly embrace our colleagues'

interpretation in Rodriquez that Witt permits a roadside search even "if the

vehicle is going to be impounded." Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Although we

had no occasion in Rodriguez to consider whether the result would be different

if police have no discretion on whether to impound a vehicle, 4 the careful and

well-supported analysis in Rodriguez provides a solid foundation upon which to

address the specific question raised in this matter.

                                       IV.

      On appeal, defendants do not dispute police had probable cause to search

the vehicle for open containers of alcohol, during which the handgun was

discovered under the front passenger seat. Nor do they dispute probable cause

to search arose spontaneously and unforeseeably during the traffic stop. This

matter hinges solely on whether the police violated the Witt location restriction.

4
  We note it is not entirely accurate to suggest John's Law invariably requires
police to impound a vehicle operated by an arrested drunk driver. As the State
correctly notes, in accordance with instruction in an Attorney General Law
Enforcement Directive, John's Law "does not negate the [c]onstitutional right of
the arrested person to make other arrangements for the removal of the vehicle
by another person who is present at the scene of the arrest." Off. of the Att'y
Gen., Law Enf't Directive No. 2004-1, Appendix B, Guidelines Mandatory 12-
Hour Impoundment of Motor Vehicles (Feb. 20, 2004). Thus, impoundment is
not automatically required in all DWI cases.
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      The gravamen of the defense argument is when a stopped vehicle must be

towed as a matter of law, so that police have no discretion on whether to remove

it from the scene, there invariably will be an opportunity to apply for a search

warrant once the vehicle is safely secured. In those circumstances, defendants

contend, the general preference for a search warrant becomes paramount,

outweighing the rationale for the automobile exception.

      That argument is supported by neither the plain language of Witt nor the

reasons that prompted the Court to reform the automobile exception. We look

first to the text of Witt that explains when the authority to conduct an

automobile-exception search lapses. The Witt Court explicitly referred to "'the

failure to secure a warrant after towing and impounding the car.'" Witt, 223 N.J.

at 449 (quoting Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. at 39 n.1) (emphasis added).             As

previously noted, Rodriguez correctly rejected the notion the Witt location rule

applies to impoundments that will be effectuated in the future.

      We can scarcely imagine a more clearly stated rule than "we limit the

automobile exception to on-scene warrantless searches." Ibid. And lest there

be any doubt as to what the Witt Court intended, Justice Albin succinctly

summarized the new rule, stating unambiguously, "[g]oing forward, searches on

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the roadway based on probable cause arising from unforeseeable and

spontaneous circumstances are permissible." Id. at 450 (emphasis added).

      We reject     the notion that      authority   to   conduct   an   on-scene

automobile-exception search depends on the reason why the vehicle will

eventually be towed. The purpose of a John's Law impoundment is not to

facilitate a police investigation or preserve evidence, but rather to prevent a

drunk driver from regaining possession of the vehicle while still intoxicated.

John's Law makes no mention of searches and thus neither authorizes nor

precludes a probable cause search of an impounded vehicle. 5 Nor does the fact

a vehicle will be towed/impounded pursuant to John's Law affect the inherent

exigencies that exist while it is still at the scene of the stop. See infra Section

V.

5
  The record before us does not indicate whether vehicles impounded pursuant
to John's Law are typically taken to different impound facilities than are used to
store vehicles that are instrumentalities of criminal conduct or are believed to
contain physical evidence of criminal activity. As noted, vehicles are
impounded under John's Law to dissociate them from intoxicated drivers, not to
safeguard concealed evidence pending a warrant search. Vehicles seized for
evidentiary purposes would presumably require more security to protect
evidence from theft and preclude claims that evidence was planted or ot herwise
tampered with during the towing process or at the impound facility. Police and
prosecutors have a practical interest in conducting prompt roadside searches to
simplify the proofs relating to the chain of custody.
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      Moreover, John's Law is by no means the only basis for impounding

vehicles. We presume there are countless occasions when impoundment is all

but certain, such as when the vehicle is suspected to be an instrumentality and

thus itself is evidence of a crime. If on-scene searches were categorically

precluded when a vehicle is destined to be impounded, that rule might swallow

the automobile exception. For purposes of implementing the Witt location

restriction, therefore, we deem the critical determinant is not the likelihood—or

inevitability—of impoundment, nor the reason for the decision to impound the

vehicle. Rather, the clearly-articulated test is whether the vehicle was actually

removed from the scene of the stop before the search was executed.

                                        V.

      We next turn our attention to the reasons that undergird the location

restriction and how Witt addresses "inherent" exigency, that is, exigency that is

essentially presumed and need not be specified and proved on a case-by-case

basis. As we noted in Rodriguez, "[t]he whole tenor of the Witt opinion is to

eliminate the need for police to establish 'exigencies' at the roadside to proceed

with a warrantless search." 459 N.J. Super. at 24 (emphasis in original). We

reaffirm that insightful observation.

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        Importantly, by overturning the Pena-Flores multi-factor exigency test,

Witt stressed that police no longer need to estimate the probability of harm

facing officers and motorists accounting for criteria such as traffic volume,

lighting and weather conditions, and the nature of the neighborhood. Indeed,

the whole point of the Witt reform is to obviate the need for officers to make

subjective assessments about the level of exigency needed to excuse the warrant

requirement. Instead, for purposes of the location restriction, the various risks

posed to officers and motorists, and to unsecured evidence, are now incorporated

within the concept of inherent exigency that arises intrinsically during a traffic

stop.

        The critical point is these inherent exigencies continue to exist so long as

the detained vehicle remains on the roadside. They only dissipate and become

"fake," to use the Witt Court's characterization, once the vehicle is removed to

a secure location. We conclude the Witt Court did not mean to categorically

foreclose an automobile-exception search while those exigencies still exist.

        Rather, the point at which the location restriction is triggered is shown by

Witt's clear explanation of when inherent exigency becomes so attenuated as to

no longer excuse the warrant requirement notwithstanding probable cause had

arisen spontaneously and unforeseeably.            We reiterate Justice Albin's

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admonition, "'[w]hatever inherent exigency justifies a warrantless search at the

scene under the automobile exception certainly cannot justify the failure to

secure a warrant after towing and impounding the car' …. Warrantless searches

should not be based on fake exigencies." Witt, 223 N.J. at 448-49 (quoting

Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. at 39 n.1) (emphasis added). The reference to "fake"

exigencies signals the Court will not presume an impounded vehicle presents

the same risks that exist out on the road; once the vehicle has been taken to a

police-controlled impound facility, any such exigencies must be identified and

proved by the State. Articulated another way, to conduct a warrantless probable

cause search at the impound facility, police cannot rely on inherent exigency,

but must instead show "true" exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant

requirement. Witt, 223 N.J. at 449 n.9. Viewed in context, the Court's reference

to "fake" exigencies after a vehicle has been towed/impounded signals the

exigencies extant before towing/impoundment are not fake.

      For the foregoing reasons, we read Witt to establish a simple binary test

for determining where an automobile-exception search can be executed:

provided the State has proved probable cause arose spontaneously and

unforeseeably, searches conducted on-scene are permitted; searches conducted

off-scene are not. Under this simple location-based paradigm, the question of

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officer intent or discretion is irrelevant. All that matters is where the vehicle

was located when it was searched.

                                      VI.

      The defense argument proceeds from the premise that the automobile

exception should be construed narrowly in accordance with the general

preference for search warrants. As noted, the warrant preference is a bedrock

principle of our search-and-seizure jurisprudence, as is the corollary principle

that warrant exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn." Jones v. United

States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); see also State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1,

25 (App. Div. 2023) ("we must strictly enforce the material elements" of a

warrant exception).

      But the automobile exception is a perfectly valid doctrine that balances

competing constitutional interests—especially given the added protections

afforded to motorists under our State Constitution—and serves a salutary

purpose.   Accordingly, the location restriction adopted in Witt must be

interpreted and applied in light of the Court's explicit acknowledgment of the

constitutional benefits of a contemporaneous on-the-spot warrantless search as

compared to a delayed search conducted after the vehicle has been impounded

and a search warrant obtained. The Witt Court explained:

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            The third rationale [for the automobile exception], [6]
            and in many ways the most compelling one, is that, for
            Fourth Amendment purposes, an immediate search of a
            vehicle may represent a lesser intrusion than
            impounding the vehicle and detaining its occupants
            while the police secure a warrant. See Chambers, …
            399 U.S. at 51-52. In Chambers, Justice White, writing
            for the Court, mused that it was "debatable" whether
            "the immobilization" of a motor vehicle while the
            police secured a warrant was a "lesser" or "greater"
            intrusion than an immediate warrantless search
            premised on probable cause. Ibid. He concluded that
            either "seizing and holding a car before presenting the
            probable cause issue to a magistrate" or "carrying out
            an immediate search without a warrant" based on
            probable cause were both "reasonable" courses under
            the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 52.

            Across the Supreme Court's jurisprudential spectrum,
            Justices have hewed to this viewpoint.            Justice
            Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, wrote
            that "the warrantless search [of an automobile] is
            permissible because a warrant requirement would not
            provide significant protection of the defendant's Fourth
            Amendment interests." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
            798, 831 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
            Marshall observed that the process of seizing a car and
            detaining the driver while securing a search warrant
            "would be more intrusive than the actual search itself."
            Ibid. He therefore adhered to the position that "even
            where police can bring both the defendant and the
            automobile to the station safely and can house the car
            while they seek a warrant, the police are permitted to

6
  The Court was referring to the three rationales identified by the United States
Supreme Court for the automobile exception, the first being the inherent
mobility of the vehicle and the second being the lesser expectation of privacy in
an automobile compared to a home. Witt, 223 N.J. at 422-23.
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            decide whether instead to conduct an immediate search
            of the car." Ibid. (emphasis omitted).

            [Witt, 223 N.J. at 424.]

      Witt clearly expressed the New Jersey Supreme Court's present view on

the subject, explaining:

            The current [Pena-Flores] approach to roadside
            searches premised on probable cause—"get a
            warrant"—places significant burdens on law
            enforcement. On the other side of the ledger, we do not
            perceive any real benefit to our citizenry by the warrant
            requirement     in    such     cases—no       discernible
            advancement of their liberty or privacy interests.

            [Id. at 446 (emphasis added).]

      In a like vein, in Rodriguez, we commented:

            [A]n immediate search will not necessarily lead to
            greater infringements upon the personal liberty of all
            motorists. For example, in some instances (albeit not
            this particular case), an on-the-spot search will turn up
            nothing, and the stopped motorist may be free to drive
            away with only a traffic citation. [7] An inflexible rule
            of mandatory impoundment could impose greater
            inconvenience upon motorists, particularly if the
            vehicle's owner, a relative, or a friend of the motorist is

7
  We add that even when an on-scene search reveals a weapon, contraband, or
other evidence leading to an occupant's custodial arrest, the arrestee might be
charged and promptly released from the police station on recognizance or release
conditions. But if police cannot conduct an on-the-spot search, the filing of a
complaint-summons or a complaint-warrant application may be delayed pending
the application for a search warrant and ensuing search of an impounded vehicle,
ultimately delaying the suspect's release from custody.
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                                       23
            nearby and able to come and remove the vehicle from
            the scene. [Witt, 223 N.J.] at 415 (noting that if a
            vehicle is impounded, the period of detention of its
            occupants "will be extended").

            [Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. at 24-25.]

      Lastly, we must not forget the Witt Court deemed it necessary to overhaul

the automobile exception in part because the predecessor exigency formulation

led to a surge of consent searches. As Justice Albin explained:

            The dramatic increase in the number of consent
            searches since Pena-Flores is apparently an unintended
            consequence of that decision. With hindsight, the
            explanation becomes clearer. Consent searches avoid
            the dangers of protracted roadway stops while search
            warrants are procured, and they remove the legal
            unpredictability surrounding a warrantless search based
            on the complex of factors detailed in Pena-Flores.

                  ....

            To be sure, consent searches are permissible if not
            abused. Nevertheless, when it decided Pena-Flores, the
            Court did not expect that the rejection of the automobile
            exception would lead to police dependency on consent
            searches.

            [Witt, 223 N.J. at 442-44.]

      Accordingly, in interpreting and applying Witt's location restriction, we

must be careful not to inadvertently create practical incentives for police to

resort again to the consent doctrine to justify on-the-spot searches. See supra

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                                      24
note 5 (discussing the practical incentive for police and prosecutors to simplify

the chain of custody of seized evidence).

                                      VII.

      In the final analysis, we decline to adopt an additional restriction not

articulated by the Witt Court. As we acknowledged in Rodriguez, "it is not our

role as an intermediate appellate court to engraft upon Witt an exception that

was not expressed in the Court's detailed majority opinion." 459 N.J . Super. at

25.   We therefore conclude the on-scene search in this case was lawfully

conducted under the New Jersey automobile exception as reformulated in Witt.

      Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.         We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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