Court Opinion

ID: 9772699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:27:03.281652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:47.084654
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the respondent’s order improperly infringes upon both the work product privilege and the consulting expert exemption.
The work product privilege found in Rule 166b of the Rules of Civil Procedure protects from discovery the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and theories held or considered by counsel in his preparation for trial. Owens v. Wallace, 821 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1992, orig. proceeding). Here, the real parties in interest contend the privilege is not violated by the respondent’s order because they seek only to observe “neutral facts and testing.” They argue that their presence will compromise no mental impressions or strategy of counsel. By its very nature, however, crash testing will disclose the relator’s theory of the accident.
In the formulation of its defense, the relator will undoubtedly seek explanations for the plaintiffs injuries that relieve or lessen its own liability. Was the occupant of the vehicle wearing a seat belt? Was the belt properly adjusted to remove excess slack? Was the shoulder belt properly placed across the chest? At what speed did the accident occur? Were there secondary collisions? If *232the seat belt failed, are the occupant’s injuries specifically attributable to this defect? Answers to these questions may come, in part, from the results of crash tests. The tests, therefore, may help validate the relator’s factual theory of the case. Observation of the test parameters will necessarily reveal the relator’s defensive theory to some extent.
The proposed crash test contemplated here is in preparation for litigation. As a work product, it should be exempt from discovery. Keene Corp. v. Caldwell, 840 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). Mandamus is available to prevent the disclosure of a privileged work product. GAF Corp. v. Caldwell, 839 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], orig. proceeding); Menton v. Lattimore, 667 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth, 1984, orig. proceeding). Because the respondent’s order infringes upon the work product privilege, I believe it should be set aside.
For reasons that are well stated by the majority, I also believe the respondent’s order improperly abrogates the consulting expert exemption. The majority concludes that the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal. To pursue its appellate remedy, however, the relator must defy the respondent’s order and conduct a crash test in private, knowing in advance that it will attempt to call a testifying expert to explain any favorable data or evidence generated by the test. Unless the relator is willing to bear the cost of conducting an “inadmissible” crash test that will serve no purpose apart from its inclusion in a bill of exception, nothing will be preserved for review. Because I do not believe the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, I respectfully dissent.