Court Opinion

ID: 9458448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:52:12.477437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:46.064984
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
This case started its long journey through the judicial system in January of 1969, when appellant, Thomas Lee Matthews, filed a petition for habeas corpus. At that time appellant was serving part of a jail sentence which was imposed by the Municipal Court of Dade County, Florida, for traffic violations. In December of 1968 and January of 1969, appellant was convicted of three traffic offenses,1 and sentenced to a jail term of 60 days, to fines totaling $520.00, to court costs of $50.00, and to additional jail time of 58 days if the fines were not paid. It is undisputed that appellant was indigent at the time of his conviction, that he was not advised of his right to counsel, and that counsel was not provided for him.
Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus alleged that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to advice of counsel because counsel had not been appointed in his misdemeanor or petty offense trials, which carried the threat of and eventually resulted in a jail sentence. The district judge denied appellant’s writ, and this court remanded for clarification of some apparent inconsistencies in the record regarding the maximum penalty that Matthews could expect. Matthews v. State of Florida, 5 Cir. 1970, 422 F.2d 1046. In February of 1970, after appellant filed his petition in January of 1969, the municipal court judge released appellant from custody, apparently after he had served only about 34 days of his sentence. Appellant paid all of his fines before he was released. Pursuant to the remand by this court the district court held an evidentiary hearing in order to clarify the inconsistencies and contradictions in the previous record on appeal. The district court then dismissed appellant’s petition on two grounds: (1) that he was not entitled to counsel in a misdemeanor or petty offense case that could involve jail time, and (2) that the case had been *681mooted by appellant’s release from prison and payment of his fines. This court held appellant’s appeal from the denial of his petition, pending decision of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 1972, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530, by the Supreme Court. Argersinger concluded that the failure to grant counsel to Matthews was constitutional error, and this appeal concerns only the question of whether or not Matthews’ case is now moot.
We conclude that appellant’s case is not moot, and that the order denying his petition for habeas corpus must be vacated and remanded. The question of mootness in a habeas corpus situation turns on the substantiality of any “collateral consequences” that may have befallen the appellant during the time in which his or her appeal was pending. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 1968, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554. While Carafas involved a convicted felon, we conclude that the rationale of Argersinger requires that Carafas apply to a situation in which a jail term was levied and served and fines were assessed and paid:
“We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial. . . .We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here, petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail. And, as we said in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. [66], at 73 [90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437]: ‘[T]he prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or “petty” matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.’ ”
Argersinger v. Florida, 92 S.Ct. at 2012. In the instant case Matthews paid almost $600.00, served about one month in jail, and lost “points” on his driver’s license. In addition to the actual financial loss and the precarious position in which his driver’s license has now been placed, Matthews may very well have sustained the same “repercussions affecting his career and his reputation” that compelled the Supreme Court to reach its conclusions in Argersinger.2 Therefore, the district court’s order must be vacated, with directions to ascertain whether or not appellant’s failure to obtain counsel was the result of a voluntary waiver, Argersinger v. Florida, supra.
Vacated and remanded.

. Twice for driving without a valid driver’s license and once for making an improper start.

. Westberry v. Keith, 5 Cir. 1971, 434 F.2d 623, is inapposite. In a pre-Argersinger situation, this court concluded in Westberry that appellant, who had been deprived of her driver’s license and forced to pay several fines for various traffic violations, was not entitled to bring a petition for habeas corpus. However, the rationale of that decision was simply that appellant was not “in custody” at the time of the filing, and that the “collateral consequences” analysis of Carafas v. LaVallee, supra, did not create the requisite “custody” to maintain appellant’s habeas corpus petition. In the instant case Matthews was indisputably “in custody” at the time his petition was filed.