Court Opinion

ID: 9751820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:07:38.713269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:00.085843
License: Public Domain

BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the appellant’s convictions for felony threats arising out of the events on October 13, 2004. However, I write separately to note my view that the trial court improperly excluded the evidence appellant sought to introduce regarding Mr. Moul-ing’s conviction for armed drug trafficking with a Ruger P90 semi-automatic pistol.1 *1166Instead, I conclude that the evidence should have been admitted as relevant and probative because the evidence created doubt that Mr. Hunter could have possessed the gun, which was found hidden inside a makeup case, inside a closet with Mr. Mouling’s belongings, in an apartment in which Mr. Mouling resided prior to his conviction.2 Therefore, exclusion of the evidence was not harmless.
In my view, exclusion of the evidence was not harmless because the ability to present exculpatory evidence that someone other than Mr. Hunter owned the gun went “to the heart of the defense theory.”3 See Battle v. United States, 754 A.2d 312, 318 (D.C.2000); McCoy v. United States, 760 A.2d 164, 175 (D.C.2000); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 258 (D.C.1997) (“Newman I”). The government must demonstrate “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error ... did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Battle, supra, 754 A.2d at 318 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). In this instance, the government has not met this burden. The government asserts that the error was harmless because Mr. Hunter was not precluded from eliciting facts for the jury to consider regarding the possibility that the gun belonged to Mr. Mouling. For example, evidence was admitted that Mr. Moul-ing had access to the closet and that he carried a gun. But, Mr. Hunter was not able to introduce evidence showing that the gun Mr. Mouling was convicted of possessing was the same make as the gun found in the closet — a fact that would weigh in favor of showing that the gun in the closet belonged to Mr. Mouling. The government also points out that, in closing argument, Mr. Hunter emphasized that Mr. Mouling had been “locked up,” and possessed a gun in the past. However, when Mr. Hunter attempted to argue that these facts made it more likely that Mr. Mouling possessed two guns, the government objected and the trial court sustained the objection.
The government contends that the only excluded evidence from appellant’s third-party-perpetrator defense was the nature of Mr. Mouling’s prior convictions, and therefore there was no harm in excluding the evidence. This contention fails to take into account that it is precisely the nature of those convictions that would have shown that it was more likely that the gun in the closet belonged to Mr. Mouling and not Mr. Hunter. The fact that the trial court would have permitted testimony from *1167someone who had seen Mr. Mouling with the gun found in the closet falls short of what allowing evidence of the convictions would have achieved — showing why it is more likely than not that the gun belonged to Mr. Mouling. Nor did the trial judge’s willingness to allow testimony from someone who saw Mr. Mouling with the gun render the exclusion of the evidence harmless. While it may have been a reasonable alternative if prejudice were a concern, there was no such issue at stake here where Mr. Mouling was not the person on trial.
The only evidence that supported the unlawful firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition charge was LaTonya’s testimony4 that she saw Mr. Hunter shoot a gun at the van on October 6, 2004, and the discovery of a loaded gun in Ms. Cash-well’s apartment, where Mr. Hunter was staying. Lynette directly contradicted her sister’s testimony and admitted that she and her sister had fabricated the story about Mr. Hunter having a gun on October 6th in an effort to get back at him for leaving her for another woman. No other witness claimed to have seen Mr. Hunter with a gun, no other witness heard a gun fired, and there were no fingerprints or any other physical evidence to link Mr. Hunter to the gun or ammunition. Further, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that either Ms. Cashwell or Lynette 5 showed Mr. Hunter the gun or even told him about it.
Establishing Mr. Mouling’s ownership of and secret storage of the gun was critical to corroborating the defense’s theory that Mr. Hunter did not have knowledge of the gun and therefore could not have possessed it on October 6th. Possessing a gun and/or ammunition requires knowledge and intent. See Inyamah v. United States, 956 A.2d 58, 62 n. 5 (D.C.2008) (noting that to establish Possession of an Unregistered Firearm, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed a firearm knowingly and intentionally, and that the firearm had not been registered to the defendant as required by District of Columbia law); see Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 491 (D.C.1997) (stating that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed ammunition, and did so knowingly and intentionally, to establish Unlawful Possession of Ammunition). While ownership of the gun by someone else does not entirely negate appellant’s ability to have possessed the gun, it does lend support to appellant’s claim that he lacked knowledge of the gun in the closet and therefore could not have possessed that gun. This made the evidence of Mr. Mouling’s ownership of the gun more probative to show whether or not Mr. Hunter in fact could have possessed it on the night of October 6th, particularly in light of appellant’s contention that he never had any gun on October 6th.
Appellant points to his acquittal of the CPWL charges to bolster his argument that he did not have a gun on the night of October 6th. The government and Mr. Hunter have differing views regarding the meaning of the jury’s failure to convict him for CPWL. The government contends that the verdict represents a compromise, and *1168that although the jury acquitted Mr. Hunter of CPWL on October 6th, it nonetheless convicted him of UF and UA for having possession of the firearm in the street on the same day. Mr. Hunter contends that, because the jury acquitted him of CPWL, the jury more likely concluded that he possessed the gun found in the hallway closet, on October 21st.
We have declined to second guess jury verdicts even in cases where the verdicts are inconsistent with one another. McClain v. United States, 871 A.2d 1185, 1193 (2005). But while even an obvious inconsistency in the jury verdicts may not be a basis for reversing judgment, it may be used to illustrate the point that each piece of evidence relied upon by the parties was critical to their arguments, thereby making admission of Mr. Mouling’s conviction more probative and relevant, and not harmless. See id. at 1191 (citation omitted).
Here, the government relied on the gun recovered from within the closet specifically to bolster their contention that the appellant had a gun on October 6th — and not just that he had a gun, but that he had this gun. Without giving the appellant every opportunity to show why the government’s theory was flawed because appellant did not own or know about the gun the government introduced into evidence, appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to put on a full defense. Even if the probative value of this evidence was, as the government stated, “marginal,” which I do not concede, the prejudice to appellant’s constitutional right to put forth a full defense weighs strongly in favor of admission. See, e.g., Newman II, 810 A.2d 918, 924 (D.C.2002)(stating “the trial court must evaluate potential prejudice resulting from jury confusion against [the] ‘strong constitutional interest in a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense[.]’ ’’Xquoting Newman I, 705 A.2d at 260); see also Newman II, 810 A.2d at 923 (stating “the concern about potential jury confusion is ‘subordinate to the defendant’s constitutional right to mount a complete defense.’ ” (citation omitted)).
Mr. Hunter attempted to introduce Mr. Mouling’s conviction for drug trafficking while armed with a Ruger P90 to prove that Mr. Mouling had the motive to possess a similar gun — a Ruger P89 — hidden in the hallway closet where he resided until his conviction sent him to jail. Mr. Hunter asserts that “drug trafficking is a dangerous trade, drug dealers have a natural incentive to possess guns for protection, and the fact that Mr. Mouling was an armed drug dealer in March 2004 showed that he had a motive to keep guns in Ms. Cashwell’s apartment, where he resided at the time.” Mr. Mouling’s prior conviction for drug trafficking with a similar Ruger semiautomatic gun, demonstrating his motive to possess a Ruger because of his drug trafficking activity, was probative of his ownership of the Ruger P89 in Ms. Cash-well’s closet, because it cast some doubt that Mr. Hunter even knew about the gun hidden inside the closet and inside the green makeup case with Mr. Mouling’s other belongings in Ms. Cashwell’s apartment.6
*1169The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrated that the gun found in Ms. Cashwell’s closet more likely belonged to Mr. Mouling instead of Mr. Hunter and therefore was probative of Mr. Hunter’s ability to possess the gun. See e.g., McCoy v. United States, 760 A.2d 164, 175 (D.C.2000) (stating that the totality of the circumstances were a basis for admission of the evidence and noting that when the question of admissibility is close, admission rather than exclusion should be favored). The evidence Mr. Hunter was permitted to introduce at trial arguably only went so far as to demonstrate Mr. Mouling’s opportunity to hide the gun in the closet, not his motive.7 The defense’s ability to fully demonstrate to the jury the likelihood that the gun belonged to someone other than the appellant was impeded by the trial judge’s decision not to admit this evidence. Thus, Mr. Mouling’s prior conviction was probative and relevant and should have been admitted. See Johnson v. United States, supra, 552 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) (proffered evidence only needs to create a possibility that someone other than the defendant committed the charged crime to be admissible). Similarly, Mr. Hunter was thwarted from putting forth his full defense when the trial court sustained objections by the government when Mr. Hunter attempted to link the gun found in the closet to Mr. Mouling.8
The majority concedes that this evidence was relevant and probative to showing that “Hunter did not know about the gun or have ready access to it.” The government introduced into evidence the silver and black Ruger P89 for the express purpose of proving that it was the gun that Mr. Hunter was accused of possessing on October 6th. In its opening statement the government stated “you will learn that when the defendant was arrested on October 21st at the apartment he shared with [Ms. Cashwell] the police found a loaded .9mm handgun that was silver and black, consistent with the gun witnesses saw him having on October 6th.” The government elicited from LaTonya, appellant’s sister-in-law, details about a silver and black gun. The government also questioned an officer about his familiarity with a shell casing of a bullet from a ,9mm gun. In closing arguments the government reminded the jury that witnesses had identified Mr. Hunter as having a silver and black gun consistent with the one found in Ms. Cash-well’s closet. Clearly, central to the gov*1170ernment’s presentation of its case to the jury was the implication that the gun the police found in the closet on October 21st was the gun Mr. Hunter possessed on October 6th. This is why appellant’s theory at trial focused on Mr. Hunter having no knowledge that the gun was in the closet and denying that he possessed it on October 6th. In opening statements the defense posited:
The government wants you to believe that just because they found a gun in Cashwell’s apartment, Mr. Hunter had something to do with this. That’s just not the case. And you’ll hear that the gun belonged to someone else. .You’ll hear that the gun was in Ms. Cashwell’s apartment well before Mr. Hunter ever moved in, and you’ll hear that Mr. Hunter knew nothing about that gun.
In addition, the defense elicited testimony from Lynette Parker, the ex-wife of Mr. Hunter, that she made up the story that Mr. Hunter brandished a gun or shot at the van. She testified that on the way home she and her sister LaTonya planned to “get Mr. Hunter in trouble” by accusing him of shooting at their vehicle. She knew the police would find the black and silver gun in Ms. Cashwell’s apartment. Lynette knew that Mr. Hunter was staying with Ms. Cashwell, who had previously shown Lynette a black and silver gun that was in her closet months before Mr. Hunter moved in with Ms. Cashwell. Given the specific facts of this case and the defense’s theory that the facts were fabricated to get Mr. Hunter in trouble, the evidence regarding who owned the gun was very relevant. Ownership by Mr. Mouling of the gun recovered on October 21st, on the facts of this case, was probative of Mr. Hunter’s ability to possess the gun. Thus, Mr. Hunter’s ability to put forth a full defense was stymied by the court’s disal-lowance of Mr. Mouling’s prior conviction for armed drug trafficking into evidence.
“[T]he trial court must resolve close questions of admissibility in this setting in favor of inclusion, not exclusion [because] a defendant’s constitutional right to ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense’ ” is implicated. Winfield, supra, 676 A.2d at 6-7 (quoting in part Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)). Even though this evidence is not directly within the ambit of reverse-Drew or Winfield evidence, its exclusion impeded appellant’s Sixth Amendment right. This case, in my view, was a “close one” and under this principle, the evidence should have been admitted. I conclude that the erroneously excluded evidence contributed to the verdict obtained for the UF and UA convictions and therefore, it was not a harmless error.
For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Mr. Mouling was the prior boyfriend of appellant's girlfriend, who resided in the apartment and stored his belongings in the closet where the gun was found.

. The majority contends, and I agree, that this evidence does not fit squarely within the ambit of reverse-Drew or Winfield evidence because Mr. Hunter is not being charged with a crime related to the discovery of the gun in the closet on October 21, 2004. However, while evidence of Mr. Mouling's convictions would not have been introduced to exonerate Mr. Hunter of the ADW charge for October 6th, and therefore was not technically reverse-Drew or Winfield evidence, Mr. Moul-ing's convictions tend to make it less likely that Hunter had a gun on October 6th. Thus, the evidence should have been admitted based on the same principle underlying admission of reverse-Drew or Winfield evidence — a defendant's constitutional right to mount a complete defense. See, e.g., Battle v. United States, 754 A.2d 312, 318 (D.C.2000).

. The majority asserts that because this evidence did not go to the heart of the defense’s theory, and further that it was not reverse-Drew evidence, the Kotteakos non-constitutional harmless error standard applies. Although I concede that this is not reverse-Drew evidence per se, because, in my view, the proffered evidence goes to the heart of the defense theory, I review under the more stringent Chapman constitutional harmless error standard. See Newman I, supra, 705 A.2d at 257-58 (holding that the error of excluding the extrinsic evidence was of "constitutional magnitude violating [appellant’s] Sixth Amendment right” because the evidence went "to the core of the defense”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

. A reasonable juror could have questioned LaTonya’s credibility if he credited Lynette’s recantation of her testimony that she saw Mr. Hunter fire the gun on October 6, 2004.

. Lynette testified that Ms. Cashwell had shown her a gun in the closet of Ms. Cash-well's apartment. The jury was presented with that evidence and could have drawn the inference that Lynette may have told Mr. Hunter about it. Nevertheless, it is speculative to assume that Ms. Cashwell or Lynette did tell Mr. Hunter about the gun where there is no evidence on the record to support the contention.

. See Reed v. United States, 828 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C.2003) (recognizing relationship between drugs and weapons); Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1321 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (observing drugs and weapons often go together); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 31 (D.C.1989) (stating connection between drugs and guns was helpful to a jury); see also United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065, (D.C.Cir.1986) (citations omitted) (noting that drug dealers possess firearms and "that such weapons are as much tools of the trade as more commonly recognized drug paraphernalia”). Furthermore, we have allowed evidence of possession of drug money to be admitted to show a defendant’s motive to possess a gun. Bigelow v. United States, 498 A.2d 210, 213-*116914 (D.C.1985). It was also undisputed at trial that Mr. Mouling lived with Ms. Cashwell prior to his incarceration and that he had access to the hallway closet and stored his belongings there, which provided him with "the practical opportunity to commit the crime.” McCoy, supra, 760 A.2d at 173 (quoting Winfield., supra, 676 A.2d at 5).

. This type of evidence "may, but does not necessarily, reflect that someone other than the defendant had committed another crime like the one before the court; but even when a prior crime is not involved, the evidence can be admissible because the proffered motive and opportunity to commit the crime are probative of criminality in the way that Drew or 'reverse’ Drew evidence is probative.” Newman I, supra note 3, 705 A.2d at 254. (emphasis added). To be admissible, the crimes do not need to be identical so long as the "the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a reasonable probability that the [third party committed both crimes].” McCoy, supra, 760 A.2d at 175 (D.C.2000) (quoting Newman I, supra, 705 A.2d at 257)). Again, while I acknowledge that evidence of Mr. Mouling's convictions is not reverse-Drew or Winfield evidence per se, a defendant’s constitutional right to mount a complete defense is the paramount principle which warrants admission.

. For example, Mr. Hunter was allowed to argue that Mr. Mouling was "locked up” and had a gun in the past, but when he attempted to argue that there was a possibility that these facts made it more likely that Mr. Mouling possessed two guns, the government objected and the trial court sustained the objection.