Court Opinion

ID: 993179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:03:42.678393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:43.790379
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                   No. 96-4865
MICHAEL HILL, a/k/a Saleet, a/k/a
Steve Philip, a/k/a Junito Tomilson,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
James C. Fox, Chief District Judge.
(CR-96-42)

Submitted: September 9, 1997

Decided: September 29, 1997

Before ERVIN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Dean R. Davis, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice
McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant
United States Attorney, John S. Bowler, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael Hill appeals the 234-month sentence imposed by the dis-
trict court upon his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). Hill claims that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for produc-
tion of the presentence reports (PSRs) of certain government wit-
nesses. Hill also claims that the district court erred by counting a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in determining his criminal his-
tory score and in its determination of the amount of crack cocaine for
which he was responsible. Finding these claims to be without merit,
we affirm.

Hill entered into a plea agreement with the government in which
he admitted that, between January 1, 1991, and May 28, 1996, he had
conspired with others to traffic in crack cocaine in North Carolina.
After Hill signed the plea agreement, he filed a motion to release the
PSRs of ten named government witnesses "for use in cross-
examination of them at sentencing," claiming that the reports "un-
doubtably contain impeachment evidence." The district court denied
Hill's motion.

This court has held that "[t]he district court is under no duty to con-
duct an in camera examination of a requested PSR unless the accused
has first clearly specified the information contained in the report that
he expects will reveal exculpatory or impeachment evidence." United
States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 1996). The defendant
must "plainly articulate how the information contained in the PSR
will be both material and favorable to his defense." Id. at 192-93.
Hill's motion failed to identify any specific information which would
be either material or favorable to his defense. Moreover, prior to the
entry of his plea, he was afforded "open file" discovery which would
have revealed the very information he sought through the PSRs.

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Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Hill's motion.

Hill next maintains that the district court erroneously included a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in calculating his criminal
history score. The Supreme Court has held that prior uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions may be considered by a sentencing court in
sentencing a defendant for a subsequent offense so long as the previ-
ous conviction did not result in a sentence of imprisonment. See
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994). Hill pled guilty
in 1993 to driving on a revoked license--a misdemeanor--for which
he was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Accordingly, as Hill
concedes in his brief, this claim is foreclosed by Nichols.

Finally, Hill claims that the district court clearly erred by attribut-
ing 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine to him for purposes of sentencing
under the guidelines.* Specifically, Hill maintains that the district
court improperly relied upon the "hearsay testimony" of "biased wit-
nesses." This court reviews the district court's findings on drug
amounts only for clear error. See 18 U.S.C.§ 3742(e) (1994); United
States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 65 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-9447). The gov-
ernment need only prove drug quantities by a preponderance of the
evidence, see United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1444 (4th Cir.
1990), and the district court may consider hearsay testimony in mak-
ing its determination. See United States v. Bowman, 926 F.2d 380,
381 (4th Cir. 1991). The burden is upon the defendant to show that
the information contained in the PSR is inaccurate. See United States
v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, the district court
adopted the findings in the PSR which were based upon interviews
with witnesses who had prior drug dealings with Hill. Hill presented
no evidence at the sentencing hearing to refute the government's evi-
dence. Therefore, we find that the district court did not clearly err in
this determination.

Accordingly, we affirm Hill's sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
_________________________________________________________________

*U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (1995).

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ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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