Court Opinion

ID: 9381198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 13:06:32.957655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.674674
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2023-Ohio-844.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                            :       APPEAL NO. C-220007
                                                   TRIAL NO. B-2002096
           Plaintiff-Appellee,             :

     vs.                                   :

 MICHAEL JONES,                            :           O P I N I O N.

           Defendant-Appellant.            :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Case Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 17, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David H. Hoffmann,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Michael Jones challenges his convictions for drug

possession and drug trafficking in four assignments of error. Finding merit to his first

assignment of error, we hold that Jones received unconstitutionally ineffective

assistance from his trial counsel at the suppression hearing. We therefore order a

limited remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

and stay our consideration of the remainder of Jones’s assignments of error.

                              I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   In 2020, the Cincinnati Police Department received anonymous

complaints of drug activity occurring at 787 Clinton Springs Avenue in Cincinnati,

Ohio. During the weeks of surveillance, police watched Jones come and go from the

house. One morning, Officers Mark Bode and Tom Weigand watched Jones exit from

the house and enter the passenger seat of a black van. Police followed and watched as

the van stopped beside a parked car and exchanged something through the passenger-

side window. At a nearby gas station, police arrested Jones and found cash, a scale, a

wallet, keys, cell phones, and what appeared to be a small amount of drugs. Police took

Jones to the Hamilton County Justice Center.

       {¶3}   With Jones in jail and his keys in hand, a group of officers led by

Sergeant James Davis returned to 787 Clinton Springs Avenue. At the house, officers

opened the front door and announced their presence. William Gaston came to the door

and told the officers that there was no one in the house. Davis informed Gaston that

they were there “doing a search warrant” and placed Gaston in handcuffs on the porch

before officers performed a protective sweep of the house. During the sweep, officers

took note of a small safe in Jones’s third-floor room and found another person,

Matthew Allwood, on the second floor of the house.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶4}   Two hours after their arrival, officers removed Gaston’s handcuffs for

him to sign a consent-to-search form. Officers took the safe to the police station and,

based on information from the sweep, obtained a search warrant to open the safe.

Relevant here, officers found cash, four digital scales coated in a cocaine and

methamphetamine residue, a heroin-fentanyl mixture, methamphetamine, fentanyl,

methadone, and flualprazolam.

       {¶5}   Based on items found in the safe, the state indicted Jones on a total of

ten charges, including drug trafficking, aggravated drug trafficking, drug possession,

and aggravated drug possession. Before trial, Jones moved to suppress the evidence

seized from the safe, arguing that Gaston lacked authority to consent to a search of 787

Clinton Springs Avenue and that the information provided to the magistrate in the

affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient. The evidence at the hearing consisted

of body-camera footage and testimony from the homeowner, Jones, Gaston, Officer

Bode, and Officer Wiegand. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. After a two-

day trial, the jury convicted Jones of all charges. The trial court imposed an aggregate

22-to-24-year-and-6-month sentence.

       {¶6}   On appeal, Jones raises four assignments of error concerning the

suppression of evidence, the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence, and the

constitutionality of his sentence.

                                II. Law and Analysis

       {¶7}   Jones maintains that he received unconstitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Jones argues that

counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the evidence from the safe as a product

of coercion and a protective sweep in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

   Defendants Have a Constitutional Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶8}   The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused person the right to

counsel, requiring the effective assistance of an attorney “who plays the role necessary

to ensure that the trial is fair.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). That is so because “it is through counsel that the accused

secures his other rights.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377, 106 S.Ct. 2574,

91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). But trial counsel is not per se ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress or omitting arguments in support of suppression. State v.

Spaulding, 151 Ohio St.3d 378, 2016-Ohio-8126, 89 N.E.3d 554, ¶ 94. Rather, to

succeed on a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones must show that his

counsel’s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice because of that

deficient performance. Strickland at 687.

       {¶9}   Legal representation is constitutionally deficient when it falls “below an

objective standard of reasonableness” according to “prevailing professional norms.”

Id. at 687-688. In other words, a “court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of

professional competent assistance.” Id. at 688. Counsel’s incompetence must

“undermine[] the proper functioning of the adversarial process” and cast doubt on the

notion that the trial court “produced a just result.” Id. at 686. When reviewing

counsel’s assistance, we “must indulge a strong presumption” that the act or omission

in question was sound trial strategy, and that all significant decisions were made “in

the exercise of reasonable professional judgement.” Id. at 687-688.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶10} When arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate a

suppression issue, a defendant must prove that the omitted challenge had arguable

merit. See State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 65;

see also State v. Payton, 119 Ohio App.3d 694, 704, 696 N.E.2d 240 (11th Dist.1997)

(“Where there exist reasonable grounds for filing a motion to suppress, counsel’s

failure to file the motion may constitute ineffective assistance and warrant reversal.”).

With that in mind, we begin with Jones’s arguments concerning the consent given to

police and the protective sweep.

                     Gaston’s Consent to Search Was Involuntary

       {¶11} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects

“[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” A warrantless search of a home is presumptively

unconstitutional unless an exception applies. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,

586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Relevant here, a warrantless search of a

home may be constitutional when officers obtain consent to search the home from a

person with authority over the premises. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-

Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 98, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,

249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). To justify a search as consensual, the Fourth

Amendment requires that “consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” Bumper

v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Whether

consent was voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

consent. State v. Sieng, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-39, 2018-Ohio-5103, ¶ 38, citing

Roberts at ¶ 99, and Schneckloth at 227.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶12} The body-camera footage in the record shows that officers opened the

front door of 787 Clinton Springs Avenue and announced their presence. Gaston

approached the door and stepped onto the porch, where he began speaking with

Sergeant Davis. As Gaston complied with Davis’s instructions to sit in a chair on the

porch, Davis stated, “We’ve got—we’re going to be doing a search warrant here.” After

Gaston repeatedly indicated that he was alone in the house, officers entered the home

and announced, “POLICE DEPARTMENT, SEARCH WARRANT.” The officers

conducted a sweep of the home. Two hours later, Gaston is seen on the porch in

handcuffs surrounded by officers, with several officers lingering inside of the home.

Gaston was handed a consent-to-search form and informed by police that “it will speed

up our process.” Moments later, officers can be heard discussing the safe.

       {¶13} The totality of the circumstances show that the signed consent-to-

search form was not a product of consent, but an acquiescence to a claim of lawful

authority. “[T]here can be no consent” when the consent “had been given only after

the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant.” Bumper

at 548. When officers identify a warrant as the basis of authority for searching a home,

they communicate “that the occupant has no right to resist the search.” Id. These

instances are “instinct with coercion” and “[w]here there is coercion[,] there cannot be

consent.” Id. at 549. Indeed, “[t]he result can be no different when it turns out that the

State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to show

that there was, in fact, any warrant at all.” Id. at 549-550.

       {¶14} Gaston signed the consent-to-search form after he was made to believe

that the officers were at the home to execute a search warrant, and after a team of

officers swept through the house with Gaston on the porch in handcuffs. At that point,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

arguably, Gaston had no choice but to cooperate. Therefore, Jones’s trial counsel had

a reasonable basis to challenge Gaston’s consent as coerced and involuntary.

                         Protective Sweeps Must Be Justified

       {¶15} As Jones points out, officers discovered the safe during a protective

sweep of the home. Under the Fourth Amendment, protective sweeps are

constitutional for the narrow purpose of ensuring the safety of officers who are lawfully

present in a home. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d

276 (1990) (describing the “interest of the officers in taking steps to assure themselves

that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring

other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack.”).

This principle has been extended to situations where no arrest is made, provided that

the circumstances warrant a protective sweep and “the officers entered the residence

lawfully.” State v. Nelson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150650, 2016-Ohio-5344, ¶ 17; see

State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 189, citing

United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513-514 (6th Cir.2001).

       {¶16} To justify a protective sweep, there must be “ ‘ “ ‘specific and articulable

facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably

warrant’ the officer in believing,” that the area swept harbor[s] an individual posing a

danger to the officer or others.’ ” Nelson at ¶ 17, quoting Buie at 337, quoting Michigan

v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-1050, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), quoting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This requires

“ ‘more than ignorance or a constant assumption that more than one person is present

in a residence.’ ” State v. Byrd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27340, 2017-Ohio-6903,

¶ 32, quoting United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 300 (6th Cir.2009). For

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

instance, the unconstitutional sweep in Byrd was “more consistent with conducting a

protective sweep as a matter of course rather than doing so due to any heightened

safety concerns derived from particular observations or information the officers

obtained after arriving” at the house. Id.

       {¶17} Based on the body-camera footage and officer testimony, there was a

reasonable basis to challenge the constitutionality of the protective sweep. Nothing in

the body-camera footage or officer testimony gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of

danger in the house warranting a sweep. There is no indication that officers heard any

sounds, or saw any movement, coming from inside of the house. In the footage, Gaston

repeatedly stated that he was the only person in the house. Bode testified at the

suppression hearing that he had no reason to believe there was anyone inside the

house other than Gaston. There is nothing to explain why the officers conducted the

protective sweep, other than a routine practice of conducting protective sweeps.

       {¶18} Moreover, the officers finding Allwood on the second floor of the house

did not justify the sweep. A court determining whether a protective sweep is justified

must limit its examination to “the events which occurred leading up to [the sweep].”

See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

Indeed, the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is “whether these historical

facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount

to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.” Id. In other words, anything found

during the sweep is irrelevant to whether the sweep was justified.

       {¶19} Therefore, Jones’s trial counsel had a reasonable basis to challenge the

protective sweep as unconstitutional.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                     Trial Counsel’s Assistance Must Be Effective

       {¶20} Turning to deficiency, “[t]rial counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable

investigation to determine possible defenses or to make a reasonable decision that a

particular investigation is unnecessary.” State v. Moon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

101972, 2015-Ohio-1550, ¶ 31. Yet, even if some evidence in the record supports

suppression, “ ‘counsel is still considered effective if counsel could reasonably have

decided that filing a motion to suppress would have been a futile act.’ ” Id. at ¶ 28,

quoting State v. Suarez, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-02-035, 2015-Ohio-64, ¶ 13.

       {¶21} The record indicates that trial counsel was aware that suppressing the

evidence recovered from the safe was critical, and we discern nothing to suggest that

raising these arguments was futile. Counsel either failed to investigate these issues or

disregarded the claims in spite of the clear application of North Carolina v. Bumper

and Maryland v. Buie to the facts of this case. Regardless, omitting these challenges

from the motion to suppress fell outside the scope of competent assistance. Absent

that deficient assistance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial

would have been different. Officers relied on the information gathered during the

sweep to secure a search warrant. At trial, Davis and Bode testified about the recovery

of the safe, and both the drugs and lab reports were entered into evidence. Therefore,

we hold that Jones suffered prejudice from the deficient performance.

       {¶22} The state maintains that we are ill-equipped, based on the record, to

review Jones’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct review. Specifically,

the state relies on State v. Gervin, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-15-51, 2016-Ohio-5670, to

question the adequacy of the record. The record in Gervin was inadequate to

determine whether the police complied with Ohio’s knock-and-announce statute and

lawfully entered Gervin’s home. Id. at ¶ 19. That was so because the only evidence of
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the manner and mode of entry into the home was a testifying officer’s cursory account

of using a battering ram to enter the home. Id. at ¶ 21. But here, the record includes

the body-camera footage played at both the suppression hearing and the trial. The

circumstances surrounding Gaston’s consent and the protective sweep are preserved

in that footage. The record here is distinguishable from the record in Gervin, which

lacked evidence of what occurred as the officers entered the home. See id. at ¶ 22.

                           Inevitable-Discovery Exception

       {¶23} The state contends that the discovery of the safe and its contents was

inevitable. Typically, the exclusionary rule “precludes the use in a criminal proceeding

of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, ‘to “compel respect for

the constitutional guaranty.” ’ ” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-

Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 25, quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236, 131

S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217,

80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). But one exception to the exclusionary rule

provides that “illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in a proceeding once the

state establishes that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered in the course

of a lawful investigation.” Id. at ¶ 27. Under the inevitable-discovery exception, the

state must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a reasonable probability that the

evidence would have been discovered apart from the constitutional violation. Id.

       {¶24} The state maintains that recovering the safe was inevitable because the

police would have procured a search warrant of the house based on the facts known to

them before the protective sweep. The state argues that the anonymous complaints,

police observations, arrest, and the items found on Jones provided the requisite

probable cause to secure a warrant before the sweep. While informant tips may

establish probable cause considering the totality of the circumstances, an anonymous
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

informant is “comparatively unreliable” and requires independent corroboration.

State v. Campbell, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140372, 2015-Ohio-1464, ¶ 14, quoting

Maumee v. Wiesner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 300, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), citing Alabama

v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Indeed, “[c]ourts

must be wary of anonymous tips.” State v. Smith, 163 Ohio App.3d 567, 2005-Ohio-

5204, 839 N.E.2d 451, ¶ 1 (1st Dist.). Despite weeks of surveillance, the record shows

that officers did not observe any drug-related activity at the house.

       {¶25} More to the point, the state’s argument is too speculative. The Fourth

Amendment demands that inevitability must be couched in terms of a probability

rather than a possibility. State v. Taylor, 138 Ohio App.3d 139, 151, 740 N.E.2d 704

(2d Dist.2000). The inevitable-discovery exception does not apply merely when

officers “could have obtained a warrant, intended to obtain a warrant, or later obtained

a warrant.” State v. Foster, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-14-54, 2015-Ohio-3401, ¶ 15. Rather,

“investigative procedures independent of the illegal conduct that would have

ultimately led to the inevitable discovery of the evidence must be in place and

implemented prior to the discovery of the evidence by illegal means.” State v. Porter,

178 Ohio App.3d 304, 2008-Ohio-4627, 897 N.E.2d 1149, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.). The

inevitable-discovery exception “may not be used however, to rehabilitate evidence

seized without a warrant.” Foster at ¶ 9. When we review the record, there must be

some evidence “that would indicate that []steps were taken to obtain a warrant.” State

v. Hatcher, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-0100, 2004-Ohio-2451, ¶ 23. In Hatcher,

the court rejected the application of the exception despite the arguable presence of

probable cause to obtain a search warrant “because there were no steps taken in an

attempt to do so.” Id. At the other end of the spectrum, the application of the

inevitable-discovery exception is clear when officers secured a search warrant for the
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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

defendant’s home before the constitutional violation. State v. Riffle, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 107352, 2019-Ohio-3271, ¶ 17 (“no question the marijuana located

inside and outside the home would have been located and seized pursuant to the

search warrant, regardless of Riffle’s comments including ‘there is weed

downstairs.’ ”).

       {¶26} In its current form, the record is more consistent with Hatcher and lacks

any indication that the officers were securing a warrant. To hold otherwise “ ‘would

essentially eliminate the warrant requirement and encourage police to proceed

without a neutral and detached magistrate’s probable cause determination.’ ” State v.

Alihassan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-578, 2012-Ohio-825, ¶ 30, quoting State v.

Coyle, 4th Dist. Ross No. 99 CA 2480, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1079 (Mar. 15, 2000).

Application of the inevitable-discovery exception is improper in situations that

“encourage police to engage in their own Fourth Amendment speculation without a

prior probable cause determination by a court and foster a ‘search-first’ mentality that

disregards constitutional safeguards.” Id. at ¶ 30. Like most Ohio courts, we reject an

application of the exception that would swallow the rule and demote the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement where “a court later determines that the police, in

fact, had probable cause to perform the warrantless search.” Id.1

       {¶27} Therefore, we sustain Jones’s first assignment of error. Trial counsel

was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge both the protective sweep of the

home and the consent given to the officers to search the home. The ineffective

assistance of trial counsel deprived Jones of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

1But see State v. Farrey, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26703, 2013-Ohio-4263, ¶ 17 (applying inevitable-
discovery to money found on Farrey during a Terry search because officers had probable cause to
arrest Farrey and “would have discovered the cash during a search incident to arrest.”).
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶28} While we hold that Jones’s trial counsel was unconstitutionally

ineffective, we recognize that trial counsel’s ineffective assistance prevented the state

from fully developing the facts surrounding the protective sweep, the search, and

inevitable discovery. Nothing in this opinion prevents the parties from developing

these arguments on remand. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for the

limited purpose of permitting Jones’s counsel to submit a new motion to suppress that

raises the constitutional issues omitted by his previous counsel, and for the trial court

to hold a new suppression hearing to determine whether the evidence from the safe

should be suppressed. At the hearing, the parties are entitled to raise arguments and

present evidence for or against the suppression of the evidence. The trial court must

analyze the suppression of the evidence in a manner consistent with this opinion.

       {¶29} In his remaining assignments of error, Jones challenges the denial of

his motion to suppress, the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence produced

at trial, and the constitutionality of Ohio’s Reagan Tokes Law. We stay consideration

of the remainder of Jones’s assignments of error until the trial court determines

whether the evidence from the safe should be suppressed.

                                       III. Conclusion

       {¶30} We sustain Jones’s first assignment of error and order a limited remand

of this matter to the trial court for further proceedings to consider the evidence at the

suppression hearing and make a legal determination consistent with this opinion. We

stay our consideration of Jones’s remaining assignments of error.

                                                                        Case remanded.

BERGERON, P.J., concurs.
WINKLER, J., dissents.
WINKLER, J., dissenting.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶31} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion holding that Jones was

denied the effective assistance of counsel. I would overrule Jones’s four assignments

of error, and I would affirm his convictions.

       {¶32} The defendant bears the burden to show ineffective assistance of

counsel. State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 155-156, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988); State

v. McCrary, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-080860, 2009-Ohio-4390, ¶ 12. Prejudice from

defective representation sufficient to justify reversal of a conviction exists only where

the result of the proceeding was unreliable or fundamentally unfair because of

counsel’s performance. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-370, 113 S.Ct. 838,

122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965

(1995); State v. Hackney, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150375, 2016-Ohio-4609, ¶ 38. I

do not believe that his trial counsel’s alleged defective performance rendered the result

of the proceeding unreliable or fundamentally unfair.

       {¶33} As a preliminary matter, a review of Jones’s trial testimony leads me to

question whether Jones had standing to contest the search of the safe. At the hearing

on the motion to suppress, trial counsel successfully limited the scope of Jones’s

testimony in order to establish standing to contest the protective sweep of the house

and discovery of the safe. Jones’s limited testimony established that his cousin’s father

owned the house, that he grew up there, and that he stayed there overnight on

occasion. He estimated that in April 2020, he stayed there three to four times. He

also stated that he was always welcome there. I do not believe that this testimony was

sufficient to establish standing, and the issue is further undermined by Jones’s trial

testimony that he had never lived in the house, that he had never spent more than one

night there, that he had no access to the locked third floor where the safe was found,

and that he knew nothing about the safe. See State v. Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

C-120327, 2013-Ohio-2720, ¶ 11-14; State v. Draper, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-04-026,

2005-Ohio-920, ¶ 9-16. “[A]n overnight guest may claim the protection of the Fourth

Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may

not.” Brown at ¶ 12, quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142

L.Ed.2d 373 (1998).

       {¶34} Further, many of the issues Jones raises were not fully developed in the

trial court because he failed to raise them. The defendant must specifically raise the

grounds upon which the validity of the search or seizure is challenged to give the

prosecutor notice of the basis of the challenge. Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216,

219, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988); State v. Billings, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200245 and

C-200246, 2021-Ohio-2194, ¶ 15-16. The prosecutor is not required to anticipate the

specific legal and factual grounds for a defendant’s challenge to a warrantless search

or seizure. The defendant must clarify the legal and factual grounds upon which the

defendant challenges the evidence so that the prosecutor may adequately prepare for

the suppression hearing. Xenia at 218. Failure of the defendant to adequately raise

the basis of his challenge constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal that may only be

reversed upon a showing of plain error. Billings at ¶ 17; State v. Thomas, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, ¶ 33-35. The only issues raised in the

motion to suppress were Jones’s claims that Gaston did not have authority to consent

to the search because he was not the owner of the property and the validity of the

search warrant for the safe.

       {¶35} Courts have held that the record at trial is generally inadequate to

determine the validity of a suppression argument on appeal. See State v. Gervin, 3d

Dist. Marion No. 9-15-51, 2016-Ohio-5670, ¶ 23; State v. Rivera, 12th Dist. Butler No.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CA2011-10-194, 2012-Ohio-3755, ¶ 14; State v. Siders, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 07CA10,

2008-Ohio-2712, ¶ 11. But if the defendant can meet his or her burden to show

ineffective assistance of counsel through the trial testimony, the defendant can prevail

on a claim that defense counsel did not provide effective assistance by failing to raise

an issue in the trial court. See Rivera at ¶ 14; Siders at ¶ 11. Jones has not met that

burden.

       {¶36} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Gaston’s consent to the

search was involuntary because the police officers told him that they had a search

warrant before he consented to the search. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.

543, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Nevertheless, despite our limited

record, considering the state was under no obligation to elicit testimony in support of

the protective sweep, I believe the protective sweep was justified. Even if it was not,

the safe would have inevitably been discovered. Consequently, the trial court properly

denied Jones’s motion to suppress, and his counsel was not ineffective for failing to

raise the issue.

       {¶37} “A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises,

conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to

a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person may be hiding.”

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). There

must be articulable facts, which, taken together with the reasonable inferences from

those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be

swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Id.

       {¶38} In this case, the police officers were investigating neighborhood

complaints that Jones was engaged in drug trafficking at 787 Clinton Springs Avenue.

They conducted surveillance for two weeks, and they saw activity indicative of drug

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

trafficking. They knew that Jones had an open felony warrant, and they saw a hand-

to-hand transfer between the van in which Jones was a passenger and a parked car.

Jones was searched, and the officers found the working tools of a drug dealer, a digital

scale with cocaine residue, $1,000 cash, three cell phones, and a baggie containing a

powdery substance, which was later found not to be a drug. Jones denied any

connection to the house on Clinton Springs Avenue, though officers had seen him leave

the house and he had a key that fit into the lock.

       {¶39} When investigating drug activity, police officers have a legitimate

concern for their own safety due to the “nexus between drugs and guns.” State v.

Thompson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-050400, 2006-Ohio-4285, ¶ 11. “The nature of

narcotics trafficking today reasonably warrants the conclusion that a suspected dealer

may be armed and dangerous.” State v. McQuitty, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2004-09-

113, 2005-Ohio-5905, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-

6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 12.

       {¶40} Further, the risk of danger inherent in the confines of a home or

otherwise on an “adversary’s turf” is greater than in an on-the-street encounter.

Therefore, the officers may take reasonable steps to ensure their own safety. State v.

Brewster, 157 Ohio App.3d 342, 2004-Ohio-2722, 811 N.E.2d 162 (1st Dist.2004),

citing Buie, 494 U.S. at 333-334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276. “An ambush in a

confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more

familiar surroundings.” Buie at 333.

       {¶41} The officers had probable cause for a warrant to search the residence at

787 Clinton Springs Avenue, and they would have obtained one had they not been

mistaken that Gaston’s consent was voluntary. They would have been justified in

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

securing the premises until they obtained that warrant. Even though Gaston had

claimed that he was the only person present in the residence, the officers were justified

in doubting his credibility, and they did not have to risk their safety and the safety of

others, based on that claim. Gaston’s claim of being the only person at the house was

untrue because during the protective sweep, the officers found Allwood, who had open

warrants, hiding on the second floor. The officers had articulable facts, which, taken

together with the reasonable inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably

prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbored an individual posing a

danger to those at the scene. Therefore, the protective sweep was justified.

       {¶42} The “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’

Where concerns of officer safety are present, the United States Supreme Court has

measured reasonableness by balancing the need for the search against the invasion the

search entails.” State v. Nelson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150650, 2016-Ohio-5344, ¶

17, citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650

(2006), and Buie at 332. The invasion of the protective sweep was minimal compared

to the need to protect officer safety, and the search was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. See Nelson at ¶ 17-18.

       {¶43} Additionally, the protective sweep was properly limited in scope. It

consisted of a cursory inspection of the rooms in the house where an individual could

hide. When the officers discovered the safe on the third floor of the house, they asked

Gaston and Jones if they had a key, and both said that the safe was not theirs and they

did not have a key. The officers then prepared an affidavit for a search warrant and

did not open the safe until they had obtained that warrant. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-

356, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed. 276; Brewster, 157 Ohio App.3d 342, 2004-Ohio-2722,

811 N.E.2d 162, at ¶ 30.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶44} Further, admission of the evidence found during the search of the

residence can be justified under the inevitable-discovery exception to the warrant

requirement. Under that exception, illegally obtained evidence is admissible at trial if

it is established that the evidence would have ultimately or inevitably been discovered

during a lawful investigation. State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St.3d 193, 480 N.E.2d 763

(1985), syllabus; State v. Pippin, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-160380 and C-160381,

2017-Ohio-6970, ¶ 19.     The state has the burden to show within a reasonable

probability that police officers would have discovered the evidence by lawful means.

Perkins at 196; Pippin at ¶ 19. The exception applies when evidence discovered during

an illegal search would have been discovered during a later legal search and the second

search inevitably would have occurred in the absence of the first. United States v.

Keszthelyi, 308 F.3d 557, 574 (6th Cir.2002).

       {¶45} The rationale for the inevitable-discovery exception is that the

prosecution should not be placed in a worse position at trial because of some earlier

police misconduct when the evidence gained would ultimately have been found in the

absence of that misconduct. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-444, 104 S.Ct. 2501,

81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); Perkins at 195-196. “While the Exclusionary Rule is used to

deny the admission of evidence unlawfully gained, and thereby to put the state in the

same position it would have been absent evidence seized, the rule should not be used

to put the state in a worse position by refusing evidence that would have subsequently

been discovered by lawful means.” Perkins at 196.

       {¶46} Even if the protective sweep was improper, the discovery of the safe was

inevitable given the facts and circumstances known to police before they entered the

residence. The police officers could have frozen the scene to prevent any destruction

or spoilage of evidence while they waited for a warrant to search the house. The facts

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

known by the officers would have provided sufficient probable cause to allow the

officers to obtain a warrant.

       {¶47} Under this assignment of error, Jones also argues that counsel was

ineffective for failing to argue that Gaston did not have the actual or apparent authority

to consent to the search of the third floor of the house. Gaston told the police officers

that although he was not the owner of the house, he was its sole resident. The lawful

tenant occupying the premises may consent to a search of the premises. State v. Hill,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-830716, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 10776, 11 (Sept. 26, 1984),

citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), and

State v. Carder, 9 Ohio St.2d 1, 222 N.E.2d 620 (1966). Thus, Gaston had authority

to consent to a search of the entire premises. Further, Jones denied that he lived on

the third floor and that the safe was his. Consequently, counsel’s failure to raise that

issue did not prejudice Jones.

       {¶48} In sum, Jones has not demonstrated that but for counsel’s deficient

performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different or that the result

of the proceeding was unreliable or fundamentally unfair. Consequently, he failed to

meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel, and I would overrule his

first assignment of error.

       {¶49} In his second assignment of error, Jones contends that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress. Because I would hold that the safe would have

been inevitably discovered, that the warrant was supported by probable cause, and

that the police officer’s mistaken statement that Gaston was the owner of the property

did not affect the validity of the warrant, I would overrule Jones’s second assignment

of error. See State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989); State v.

Martin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200067, 2021-Ohio-2599, ¶ 11; State v. Taylor, 174

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Ohio App.3d 477, 2007-Ohio-7066, 882 N.E.2d 945, ¶ 15-17 (1st Dist.); State v.

Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060336, 2007-Ohio-3449, ¶ 9.

       {¶50} In his third assignment of error, Jones contends that his convictions

were not supported by sufficient evidence. Jones’s arguments require his testimony

to be believed. But in deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve

evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses.       Thomas, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, at ¶ 45. My review of the record shows that

a rationale trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, could have found that the state proved all the elements of the offenses of

which Jones was charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would hold that the

evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. See State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Hackney, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-150375, 2016-Ohio-4609, ¶ 29.

       {¶51} Jones also contends that his convictions were against the manifest

weight of the evidence. After reviewing the record, we cannot hold that the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse

Jones’s convictions and order a new trial. Therefore, we cannot hold that they are

against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); Thomas at ¶ 48. Again, Jones’s arguments require

that his testimony be believed, but matters as to the credibility of evidence are for the

trier of fact to decide. State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d

433, ¶ 116; Thomas at ¶ 48. Consequently, I would overrule Jones’s third assignment

of error.

       {¶52} Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, Jones contends that the trial

court erred in sentencing him to an indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes

Law. In State v. Guyton, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190657, 2022-Ohio-2962, appeal

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

allowed 168 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2202-Ohio-3752, 196 N.E.3d 850, this court rejected the

same arguments Jones now raises and held the Reagan Tokes Law to be constitutional.

Consequently, I would overrule Jones’s fourth assignment of error.

       {¶53} In sum, I see no merit in Jones’s arguments. I would overrule his four

assignments of error and affirm his convictions in all respects. Further, even though

I disagree with majority’s conclusion that trial counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient, the proper remedy for a constitutional violation is not a

remand to the trial court for further proceedings on a motion to suppress, but rather

vacating Jones’s convictions and ordering new trial. See State v. Velez, 9th Dist.

Lorain No. 13CA010413, 2014-Ohio-4328, ¶ 17; State v. Conkright, 6th Dist. Lucas No.

L-06-1107, 2007-Ohio-5315, ¶ 20.

Please note:

               The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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