Court Opinion

ID: 9966145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 07:10:47.514491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:28.961061
License: Public Domain

In the
                 Court of Appeals
         Second Appellate District of Texas
                  at Fort Worth
               ___________________________
                    No. 02-23-00191-CV
               ___________________________

                LOIS J. BLANTON, Appellant

                               V.

RED DESERT ENTERPRISES, LLC AND CHERYL MILES, Appellees

            On Appeal from the 48th District Court
                   Tarrant County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 048-319980-20

          Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
           Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                  I. INTRODUCTION

      In this lawsuit involving claims of adverse possession and conversion,

Appellant Lois J. Blanton appeals the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction of

Appellees Red Desert Enterprises, LLC and Cheryl Miles. In five issues, Blanton

complains that the plea to the jurisdiction should have been denied because (1) any

defect in her standing to bring her adverse possession claim was cured by the

subsequent execution of a document, (2) she raised a fact issue regarding her standing

to bring her conversion claim, (3) any defect in her standing to bring her conversion

claim was cured by the subsequent execution of a document, and (4) and (5) the trial

court abused its discretion by sustaining Appellees’ objections to certain testimony in

declarations filed in opposition to the plea to the jurisdiction. Because we find that

Blanton did not have standing to assert her adverse possession claim at the time the

lawsuit was filed but that there is a fact issue regarding standing to bring her

conversion claim, we will affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

                                   II. BACKGROUND

A. Ownership of the Contested Property, Adjacent Property, and Equipment

      This lawsuit involves two pieces of real property—the Contested Property and

the Adjacent Property—consisting of a total of approximately 3.920 acres.1 The

      1
        At various times in the record, the parties reflect slightly different numbers for
the acreage of the Contested Property and the Adjacent Property. The number 3.920
acres is taken from the metes and bounds description.
                                            2
Contested Property is commonly known as 3711 N. Grove Street, Fort Worth, Texas,

and was conveyed by the Blanton Family Partnership L.P. (BFP) to Keystone

Exploration, Ltd. in January 2008. When the Contested Property was transferred,

BFP retained ownership of 1.3972 acres of land—the Adjacent Property—commonly

referred to as 3701 N. Grove Street.

      Three days after acquiring the Contested Property, Keystone conveyed it to

XTO Energy, Inc. In August 2020, XTO sold the Contested Property to Miles, who

then transferred the property to Red Desert one month later. As to the Adjacent

Property, BFP conveyed it to Blanton on January 15, 2020, “to be effective as of”

January 1, 2020.

      On October 6, 2022—after the lawsuit was filed—two documents were signed

by BFP that purported to convey certain real and personal property to Blanton.3 In

the “Blanket Conveyance, Bill of Sale and Assignment” (Blanket Conveyance), BFP

purported to transfer to Blanton “all of the equipment it owns” located on the

Contested Property and the Adjacent Property “to be effective as of January 1, 2020.”

In a document entitled “Conveyance and Assignment” (Conveyance), BFP stated that

it “acquired ownership” of the Contested Property “on or about January 28, 2018

      2
       On appeal, all parties agree that the Adjacent Property consists of 1.397 acres.
      3
        Blanton concedes that neither document was signed until October 6, 2022.
Indeed, at her deposition, she agreed that this was the execution date. On appeal,
Blanton states “that there is no dispute that the Conveyance and Assignment
memorializing BFP’s transfer of the Contested Property (and the adverse possession
claim) to Appellant was signed on October 6, 2022 (footnote omitted).”

                                           3
through adverse possession” and “grant[ed], convey[ed] and quitclaim[ed]” the

Contested Property to Blanton “effective as of January 1, 2020.” In addition, it

conveyed to Blanton “any and all claims, including by way of example and not

limitation, claims for adverse possession” that it may have to the Contested Property.

         An industrial building occupies a portion of both properties. The northern half

is on the Contested Property, and the southern half is on the Adjacent Property.

B. The Litigation

         On September 18, 2020, Blanton sued XTO and Texas Resource and

Recycling, Inc. for declaratory relief, alleging title to the Contested Property by

adverse possession. Blanton later added Red Desert and Miles as defendants and

nonsuited the claims against XTO and Texas Resource. Red Desert and Miles were

the only defendants at the time the ninth amended petition—the live pleading—was

filed.

         In her live pleading, Blanton asserted that since Keystone’s sale of the

Contested Property to XTO, Blanton “and her predecessors in interest – principally,

[BFP] and American Commodities, Inc.” have used the Contested Property for

business purposes. Specifically, Blanton alleged that from 2001 to March of 2018,

American Commodities operated a fats and oils recycling operation on the Contested

Property. Then, in 2018, she stated that Tazer Group acquired the assets of American

Commodities and began operating on the property. According to Blanton, KFG

Financial Services, LLC operated within the office building on the Contested Property

                                            4
“from at least 2015 to 2018[,]” and Mesa Processing, Inc. “maintained a processing

area on the Contested Real Property from 2008 to 2018.” Blanton further alleged that

based on these entities’ “conduct [that] was long-continued, open, notorious,

exclusive and inconsistent with the existence of title in others[,]” as well as the

maintenance and repair made to the building and the payment of utilities, she had title

by adverse possession.     Further, she contended that Red Desert and Miles had

converted certain equipment, including “air compressors, air scrubbers, centrifuges,

evaporators, pumps and vacuum equipment, shakers, e-panels for the shakers,

variable frequency drives and platforms.”

      Red Desert and Miles answered the lawsuit, and they later moved for summary

judgment.    As part of her summary judgment response, Blanton attached the

Conveyance and Blanket Conveyance. After the motion for summary judgment was

denied, Red Desert and Miles filed their joint plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that “[a]t

the time of filing suit on September 18, 2020,” Blanton “did not even have an

arguable ‘ownership’ interest (by claimed adverse possession) in the Contested

Property.” According to the plea, it was only after suit was filed and Appellees filed

their motion for summary judgment that Blanton “realized the defect and on

October 6, 2022, [BFP] executed putative documents attempting to transfer any

interest in the Contested Property” to her. Therefore, Appellees contended that “at

the time of original filing of suit, [Blanton] lacked standing and the Court did not

acquire, and does not have, subject matter jurisdiction.”

                                            5
      Blanton filed a response to the plea, arguing that the court should deny the plea

for two reasons. First, she argued that “any defects in [her] standing to bring her

adverse possession claim that may have existed when she initially filed this action have

since been cured and the Court should take into consideration facts that develop after

the initial filing of a lawsuit to determine standing.” Second, she contended that the

trial court should not dismiss her “conversion claim because standing must be

determined separately for each cause of action in a lawsuit and [she] has presented

sufficient evidence to raise, at a minimum, a fact question that she owns the

equipment that is the subject of her conversion claim.” Attached to the response

were declarations from Blanton and her daughter, Krista Blanton-Gursky.

      The trial court held a hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction. At the hearing,

Appellees objected to parts of both of the declarations. The trial court gave Blanton

three days to file a response to the objections. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

trial court took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, Appellees filed an additional

plea to the jurisdiction that only addressed the conversion claim. The second plea to

the jurisdiction was never set for hearing.4

      4
       In her brief, Blanton states that “Appellees never obtained a hearing on their
Second Plea to the Jurisdiction and it was rendered moot when the Trial Court
granted the original Plea to the Jurisdiction.” Indeed, the record reflects a ruling on
only the first plea to the jurisdiction.

                                               6
       Later, the trial court signed orders ruling on the objections,5 granting the first

plea to the jurisdiction, and dismissing Blanton’s lawsuit without prejudice for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

                                    III. DISCUSSION

       In three of her five issues on appeal, Blanton complains about the trial court’s

order granting the plea to the jurisdiction on her adverse possession claim (first issue)

and conversion claim (second and third issues). In the fourth and fifth issues, Blanton

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining certain objections to

statements in the two declarations attached to her response to the plea to the

jurisdiction.

A. Standard of Review

       A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Suarez v. City of

Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Tex. 2015). We likewise review questions of standing

de novo. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020).

       The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s

jurisdiction.   Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).            In

assessing standing, we look primarily to the pleadings and consider relevant evidence

       Objections were sustained to four paragraphs, two of which form the basis of
       5

Blanton’s fourth and fifth issues on appeal.

                                             7
of jurisdictional facts when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). We construe the plaintiff’s

pleadings liberally, taking all assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent. Tex.

Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). If a plea to the

jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we may consider evidence

and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Id. at 227.

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant to determine

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson,

590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 221, 227–28).

B. Law Regarding Standing

       Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Vernco Constr., Inc. v.

Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015); see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d

299, 304 (Tex. 2008) (“A court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff

without standing to assert it.”); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 (“[A] court must not

proceed on the merits of a case until legitimate challenges to its jurisdiction have been

decided.”). It is a “constitutional prerequisite to suit.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150

(citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2010)).

Standing “requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the

parties that will be resolved by the court.” Id. at 154 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp.,

252 S.W.3d at 307).

                                             8
         “A court must dismiss a claim if the plaintiff lacks standing to assert it, and it

must dismiss the entire action for want of jurisdiction if the plaintiff lacks standing to

assert any of its claims.” Bray v. Fenves, No. 06-15-00075-CV, 2016 WL 3083539, at *4

(Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 24, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Heckman,

369 S.W.3d at 150–51). Standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that parties may

raise by a plea to the jurisdiction. Busbee v. Cnty. of Medina, 681 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex.

2023).

         “Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court, and

subsequent events do not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Ass’n

of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993). It must exist at the

time a plaintiff files suit and must continue to exist at every stage of the legal

proceedings, including the appeal. La Tierra de Simmons Familia, Ltd. v. Main Event Ent.,

LP, No. 03-10-00503-CV, 2012 WL 753184, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 9, 2012,

pet. denied) (mem. op.). If the plaintiff lacks standing at the time suit is filed, the case

must be dismissed, even if the plaintiff later acquires an interest sufficient to support

standing. Id. “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to

press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Andrade v. NAACP of Austin,

345 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S. Ct.

2759, 2769 (2008)).

                                             9
C. Application of Law to Facts

      1. Adverse Possession Claim

      In her live pleading, Blanton stated that she “and [h]er [a]ffliates” had occupied

the Contested Property since the sale of the property to XTO, which occurred in

January 2008. Blanton alleged that since that time, she “and her predecessors in

interest – principally, [BFP] and American Commodities, Inc.” had used the

Contested Property for business purposes. As Blanton explained,

      Multiple Blanton entities utilized the Contested Real Property prior to
      and following the conveyance from Keystone to XTO. From 2001 to
      March of 2018, American Commodities operated a fats and oils recycling
      operation on the Contested Real Property. In 2018, Tazer Group
      acquired the assets of American Commodities and began operating on
      the Contested Real Property. KFG Financial Services, LLC, which
      provided loans and refinancing, operated within the office building
      located on the Contested Real Property from at least 2015 to 2018.
      Additionally, Mesa Processing, Inc. . . . maintained a processing area on
      the Contested Real Property from 2008 to 2018. The Blanton family
      entities’ interest in the property subsequently passed to [Blanton].

According to Blanton, while the Contested Property was being used, “Blanton family

affiliates, including specifically American Commodities, have maintained, repaired,

made significant improvements to, and added on to the building located on both

properties.” She further stated that, since at least 2008, the Contested Property has

been “fenced and gated with locks for which only [Blanton], her affiliates, or their

lessee, Texas Resources and Recycling, LLC, have had keys.” Moreover, according to

Blanton, she “and her affiliates” have paid utilities on both the Contested and

                                          10
Adjacent Properties, and the use of the Contested Property “has been actual,

continuous, visible, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile.”

       In their plea to the jurisdiction, Appellees noted that while Blanton acquired

title to the Adjacent Property by deed from BFP “on or about January 15, 2020,”

Blanton had no claim by title or adverse possession to the Contested Property until

the Conveyance was executed on October 6, 2022. As explained by Appellees,

       At the time of filing suit on September 18, 2020, [Blanton] did not even
       have an arguable “ownership” interest (by claimed adverse possession) in
       the Contested Property at 3711 N. Grove St. It was only after
       [Appellees] filed motions for summary judgment that [Blanton] realized
       the defect and on October 6, 2022, [BFP] executed putative documents
       attempting to transfer any interest in the Contested Property to
       [Blanton]. . . . As a result, at the time of original filing of suit, [Blanton]
       lacked standing and the Court did not acquire, and does not have,
       subject matter jurisdiction.

While the Conveyance and Blanket Conveyance stated that they had an effective date

predating the filing of suit, Appellees noted that it was undisputed that the documents

were not executed until October 6, 2022. Therefore, according to the plea to the

jurisdiction, at the time of filing suit, Blanton lacked standing.

       Any transfer of a real property interest by Blanton’s predecessors was required

to be in writing. See Yarbrough v. Brooks, No. 14-19-00748-CV, 2021 WL 3922934, at

*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A

conveyance of an interest in real property must (1) be in writing; (2) be signed by the

grantor; and (3) be delivered to the grantee.”). Once title by limitations has matured, a

transfer of real property cannot be done orally; it can only be conveyed by an

                                             11
instrument in writing. Haby v. Howard, 757 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

1988, writ denied); see Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.021 (“A conveyance of an estate of

inheritance, a freehold, or an estate for more than one year, in land and tenements,

must be in writing and must be subscribed and delivered by the conveyor or the

conveyor’s agent authorized in writing.”); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 16.026(a) (establishing a ten-year limitations period “to recover real property held in

peaceable and adverse possession by another who cultivates, uses, or enjoys the

property”).

      While Blanton contended that execution of the Conveyance and Blanket

Conveyance cured any standing issue, Appellees argued that Texas law is to the

contrary, as set out in the case of Polk v. Seven Thirds Holdings, LLC, which addressed a

situation similar to that found here. No. 06-20-00033-CV, 2020 WL 7483955 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana Dec. 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Polk, the trial court denied

the plea to the jurisdiction where the plaintiff had no ownership interest in the

property at the time of the original filing of suit but had purportedly cured the defect

by securing a warranty deed that claimed to have an “effective date of August 1,

2017” even though it was executed on August 19, 2019. Id. at *2–3. Concluding that

plaintiff’s back-dated deed was not enough to cure the standing issue and that the trial

court was therefore without subject-matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals stated,

      The owners of Block 13 at the commencement of this lawsuit were
      Robert Clayton Allen and Edythe Allen, d/b/a STH. As such, they were
      the only persons who had standing to bring the claims asserted in the
      lawsuit. Yet, Robert Clayton Allen and Edythe Allen, d/b/a STH, were
                                           12
       never joined or named as plaintiffs in an amended petition. Rather, the
       plaintiff who intended to sue in the lawsuit was STH, LLC, which had
       no ownership interest in Block 13 at the time the lawsuit was filed and,
       consequently, had no standing to bring the lawsuit. Although it filed an
       amended petition alleging its acquisition of Block 13 months after it filed
       the lawsuit, this later-acquired title did not retroactively confer standing
       to assert the claims asserted in this lawsuit.

Id. at *7. Therefore, the court of appeals dismissed STH, LLC’s claims against Polk,

without prejudice. Id. at *8.

       Here, the Conveyance was executed on October 6, 2022, but purported to have

an effective date of January 1, 2020. Similar to Polk, this is insufficient to cure the

standing issue. See La Tierra de Simmons Familia, Ltd., 2012 WL 753184, at *4 (stating

that “[s]tanding must exist at the time a plaintiff files suit”); see also McMillan v. Aycock,

No. 03-18-00278-CV, 2019 WL 1461427, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 3, 2019, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“Pleading additional facts that describe events occurring after suit

was filed . . . would not operate to cure the jurisdictional defect. A trial court’s

jurisdiction is determined when a suit is filed; at that time the court either has

jurisdiction or it does not.”); City of Westworth Vill., Tex. v. Tex. Voices for Reason and

Justice, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, judgm’t vacated

w.r.m.) (“Standing is determined at the time suit is filed; if a plaintiff lacks standing at

the time suit is filed, the case must be dismissed, even if the plaintiff later acquires an

interest sufficient to support standing.”); Okland v. Travelocity.com, Inc., No. 2-08-260-

CV, 2009 WL 1740076, at *7 (Tex. App—Fort Worth June 18, 2009, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (“Because no named putative class representative had standing to pursue

                                             13
his or her claims against Travelocity at the time suit was filed, the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, including Rogers’s subsequently filed

claims.”); Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 205 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006,

pet. denied) (stating that because appellant “lacked standing at the time the action was

filed, the suit must be dismissed even if he later acquired an interest sufficient to

support standing”), overruled on other grounds by Revell v. Morrison Supply Co., LLC,

501 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d

749, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (“A trial court

determines its jurisdiction at the time a suit is filed. At that time, the court either has

jurisdiction or it does not. Jurisdiction cannot subsequently be acquired while the suit

is pending.”).

      Blanton asserts that the inability to “cure” standing once a lawsuit is filed

“embraces form over function” and requires her “to start the whole process over in a

new lawsuit.”6 She also points to a number of federal cases that “have rejected the

no-cure rule in favor of allowing a defect in standing to be cured based on events

subsequent to the original filing of the lawsuit.” See, e.g., Fund Liquidation Holdings

LLC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 991 F.3d 370, 391–92 (2d. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.

757 (2022); Scahill v. D.C., 909 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (D.C. Cir. 2018); U.S. ex rel Gadbois

      6
       Blanton notes that she “re-filed her adverse possession and conversion claims”
within sixty days after the trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction “out of an
abundance of caution and to avoid the expiration of the statute of limitations.” Those
claims are pending in a different trial court.

                                            14
v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2015); Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab

Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d

1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

         However, arguments of “common sense” and the requirement of a

“meaningless dismissal and subsequent refiling” have previously been rejected by our

sister court in favor of “the long-standing principle that standing must exist at the

inception of the suit.” Sw. Airlines Pilots Ass’n v. Boeing Co., No. 05-20-01067-CV,

2022 WL 951027, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 30, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.).

Moreover, we are not free to disregard decisions of our court unless they have been

superseded by the supreme court, an en banc decision of the court of appeals itself, or

an applicable legislative or constitutional provision.        See Mitschke v. Borromeo,

645 S.W.3d 251, 256–57 (Tex. 2022) (holding that “lower courts must follow the

precedents of all higher courts” and “three-judge panels must follow materially

indistinguishable decisions of earlier panels of the same court unless a higher authority

has superseded that prior decision”).

         Here, Blanton had no interest in the Contested Property at the time the lawsuit

was filed. Therefore, she had no standing to bring the suit for adverse possession,

and the trial court did not err in granting the plea to the jurisdiction on that claim

because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we overrule Blanton’s first

issue.

                                            15
      2. Conversion Claim

      Conversion is the unauthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of

dominion and control over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or

inconsistent with, the owner’s rights. Freezia v. IS Storage Venture, LLC, 474 S.W.3d

379, 386 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Waisath v. Lack’s

Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1971)). The elements of a conversion claim are:

(1) the plaintiff owned or had possession of the property or entitlement to possession;

(2) the defendant unlawfully and without authorization assumed or exercised control

over the property to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff’s rights as an

owner; (3) the plaintiff demanded return of the property; and (4) the defendant

refused to return the property.       Id. at 386–87.     Element one—ownership or

entitlement to possession—is central to the standing issue in this case.

      With regard to the conversion claim, Blanton’s pleadings alleged that she “and

her affiliates have operated continuously a large amount of equipment” in the building

which is located on the Contested Property.            “This equipment includes air

compressors, air scrubbers, boilers, tanks, centrifuges, evaporators, pumps and

vacuum equipment, as well as laboratory equipment and other equipment in the

garage, all of which cost not less than several hundred thousands of dollars.”

According to Blanton, Appellees “have wrongfully exercised dominion and control

over certain equipment and other personal property that was previously used by

Blanton-affiliated entities in the conduct of their business” on the Contested Property.

                                           16
      Appellees’ first plea to the jurisdiction failed to specifically address Blanton’s

standing to assert her conversion claim. Rather, it generally alleged that the issue was

whether “Blanton, at the time of original filing, had standing to file the suit” and

focused on the fact that Blanton “had no interest in the Contested Property at the

time the lawsuit was filed.”

      Our review is generally limited to the grounds set forth in a plea to the

jurisdiction before the trial court, City of Dall. v. Turley, 316 S.W.3d 762, 774 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied), and a court must assess standing “claim by claim,”

Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 153.          Here, the conversion claim was not specifically

addressed until the second plea to the jurisdiction, which was neither set for hearing

nor ruled upon by the trial court.

      However, even if the first plea to the jurisdiction is construed as addressing the

conversion claim, Blanton contends that the critical difference between her adverse

possession claim and her conversion claim is that “the adverse possession claim

involves real property, [but] the conversion claim involved personal property,” and a

transfer of personal property does not have to be in writing. See Cook v. Oil Capitol

Broad. Ass’n, 223 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1949, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

(“The personal property could be transferred by delivery only but the statute requires

a conveyance in writing to transfer the legal title to real estate.”). Blanton argues that

evidence in the two declarations attached to her response to the plea—even after

excluding the paragraphs to which the trial court sustained objections—raises a fact

                                           17
issue as to whether BFP made a parol transfer of the equipment to Blanton in

January 2020, and thus, gave her standing to assert the conversion claim.

      Excluding the parts of the declaration to which the trial court sustained the

objections, Blanton’s declaration provided:

      •      Blanton was a limited partner in BFP;

      •      Blanton’s CPA advised to have BFP transfer to her the Adjacent
             Property, the Contested Property, and the equipment, which Blanton
             describes as “certain equipment and other personal property that is now
             the subject of [her] conversion claims at issue in this lawsuit, which
             includes air compressors, air scrubbers, centrifuges, evaporators, pumps
             and vacuum equipment, shakers, e-panels for the shakers, variable
             frequency drives, and platforms”;

      •      Blanton and BFP considered the equipment as having been transferred
             to her since January 2020, and both have treated the equipment as if it
             had been transferred since January 2020; and

      •      BFP transferred its interest in the Contested Property and the equipment
             to Blanton at the same time that it transferred its interest in the Adjacent
             Property.
      The relevant parts of Blanton-Gursky’s declaration provided:

      •      Blanton-Gursky was the President of TBB Lemn8r, Inc., which is the
             general partner of BFP;

      •      Blanton-Gursky served as the President and CEO of American
             Commodities, Inc.;

      •      Blanton-Gursky was the President and CEO of Tazer Group, LLC;

      •      After January 28, 2008, American Commodities, which is a Blanton
             family affiliated entity, acquired certain equipment and other personal
             property at issue in this lawsuit, which included air compressors, air
             scrubbers, centrifuges, evaporators, pumps and vacuum equipment,
             shakers, e-panels for the shakers, variable frequency drives, and
             platforms;

                                          18
      •      American Commodities used the equipment in the conduct of its
             business on the Contested Property;

      •      The equipment subsequently passed to BFP on or about March 30,
             2018, when BFP acquired the equipment through the foreclosure on the
             equipment as collateral securing a note that American Commodities
             owed to BFP;

      •      Upon the advice of Blanton’s CPA, BFP transferred its interest in the
             Contested Property and the equipment to Blanton at the same time that
             BFP transferred its interest in the Adjacent Property;

      •      BFP has considered the equipment as having been transferred to
             Blanton since January 2020, and both have treated the equipment as if it
             had been transferred since January 2020; and

      •      The equipment is located on the Contested Property.
      Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Blanton, see Town of

Shady Shores, 590 S.W.3d at 550, we conclude that the statements in the two

declarations were sufficient to raise a material fact issue on Blanton’s interest in the

equipment at the time suit was filed and gave her standing to pursue the conversion

claim; thus, the trial court was required to deny Appellees’ plea as to that claim, see

Schmitz v. Denton Cnty. Cowboy Church, 550 S.W.3d 342, 362 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth,

2018, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g) (holding appellant raised a material fact issue

regarding his standing and the ripeness of his injury, which required the trial court to

deny appellee’s plea based on standing); Wolfe v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., LP,

382 S.W.3d 434, 453 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied) (holding that a statement

in an affidavit that appellant “paid for the property” along with a metes and bounds

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description of the property raised a fact issue as to appellant’s interest in the property

and, thus, his standing).

       Accordingly, we sustain Blanton’s second issue. Because we sustain her second

issue, we need not address her third issue arguing that execution of the Blanket

Conveyance cured any standing defect in her conversion claim as it is not necessary to

the disposition of the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d

723, 740 (Tex. 2018) (“Rule 47.1 requires only that the court of appeals address issues

necessary to dispose of the appeal.”).

       In her fourth and fifth issues, Blanton challenges the trial court’s order

sustaining the objections to two paragraphs in the declarations—paragraph sixteen of

Blanton-Gursky’s declaration and paragraph ten of Blanton’s declaration.            Both

paragraphs stated that Blanton “remains the owner of the [e]quipment.” While we

generally review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion, see Fleming v. Wilson, 610 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Tex. 2020), we need not decide if

the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the objections because, as stated

above, other parts of the declarations state essentially the same thing and a ruling is

not necessary to dispose of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Lance, 543 S.W.3d

at 740.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

       Having overruled the first issue, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the

plea to the jurisdiction as to the adverse possession claim. After sustaining the second

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issue and not reaching the third, fourth, and fifth issues, we reverse the trial court’s

order granting the plea to the jurisdiction as to the conversion claim and remand for

further proceedings.

                                                      /s/ Dana Womack

                                                      Dana Womack
                                                      Justice

Delivered: May 2, 2024

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