Court Opinion

ID: 9548789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:44.045338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:25.640927
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
(concurring).
I concur in the majority opinion, at least as I understand its scope. I write separately to explain that understanding. As I read the majority opinion, the rules articulated today require only that in the usual case not fitting within one of the exceptions spelled out by Justice Howe, property acquired by one spouse during the marriage through gift or inheritance should be awarded to that spouse upon divorce. I take this to be nothing more than a variation on the analogous rule applicable to property brought into the marriage by one party: in the usual case, that property is returned to that party at divorce, absent exigent circumstances. Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982). I certainly do not read the majority opinion as creating an exalted status for inherited or donated property that would effectively entail it or its value beyond the reach of a trial court fashioning a divorce decree.
The overarching general rule remains the same in any divorce case: to provide adequate support for the children of the marriage, Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987), and to divide the economic assets and income stream of the parties so as to permit both to maintain themselves after the marriage as nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. See, e.g., Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). That standard ultimately determines how property and income should be allocated by the trial court in making property division, alimony, and child support orders. Where possible, interests of parties in their separate property, such as those described by Justice Howe, should be honored. For this reason, the rules articulated today, like those generally applicable to separate pre-marital property, may limit somewhat the trial court’s initial flexibility to allocate property of a marriage in a fashion so as to provide an entirely equitable portion to each party. But if, after an attempt is made to pay due deference to each party’s claim to particular pieces of property by reason of their source, the court finds that it is unable to fashion a division of assets and awards of alimony and child support that will be just and equitable for both parties and the children, then it is free to ignore those claims in the greater interest in a just and equitable decree.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.