Court Opinion

ID: 9516340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:40:50.218248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:24.356613
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE ALLOY dissenting: I do not agree with the conclusion in the majority opinion that the assessment in the instant case is unconstitutional. It is clear that the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 120, par. 499) itself was not determined to be unconstitutional as indicated in the course of the majority opinion. Also, as indicated in the majority opinion, the evidence in this case does not show that the Board of Review knew of individuals other than estates who omitted intangible personal property from the tax assessment schedules. There is no evidence of discrimination against other persons similarly situated since estates have been uniformly assessed pursuant to procedure outlined in section 589(3). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 120 § 589(3).) I do not believe that the majority opinion is sustained by the record in the conclusion that the evidence established that the La Salle County Board of Review had a deliberate and intentional policy which showed favoritism, fraud or intentional misconduct. It could be concluded from the record that personal property which is inventoried in estates was clearly available for the local assessor and that a consequent assessment under the Act was made. Nothing similar could be said about living persons or corporations since the record showed that while a total of all deposits in La Salle County was available, there was no fist of individual owners or accounts or the respective amounts which might be taxable. Although a theoretical knowledge may have existed that there were such funds, the Attorney General points out that the La Salle County Board of Review lacked specific information on the ownership of any such funds. This observation is sustained by the record. So far as the record is concerned it appears that where detailed information of the existence of intangible personal property, such as in estates, was available, the Board of Review did not fail to assess such intangible personal property of any person, corporation or estate. It was directed to our attention on review that the lack of specific knowledge as to other persons and corporations owning intangible personal property created a regrettable situation perhaps where individuals and corporations were apparently able to violate the law without penalty. It was pointed out that this problem was met in the current Illinois Constitution of 1970, in which it is provided that the General Assembly abolish all ad valorem personal property taxes. 1970 Illinois Constitution, Art. IX, § 5(c). It has been the policy of this State to sustain enactments relating to assessment of property even though the assessing officers have been derelict in making assessments or otherwise operated improperly. (Merritt v. Farriss, 22 Ill. 303, 311-312.) It is pointed out that the officers may be made amenable to the law for misconduct in office but that the assessments if properly made are nevertheless valid, even if other assessments had been improper. (Merritt v. Farriss, 22 Ill. 303; Dunham v. City of Chicago, 55 Ill. 357.) It is clear, therefore, that unless there is a clear discriminatory assessment as against taxpayers, particularly those similarly situated, the circumstance that some other taxpayer may not be assessed at all or not properly assessed, does not relieve an objecting taxpayer of his obligation. Nowhere in the decisions rendered in this State has there been announced a conclusion that a failure to assess certain categories of property not specifically directed to the attention of the assessor, could result in relieving a properly assessed taxpayer of his obligation, for constitutional reasons, as contended in the majority opinion. As a consequence, I do not believe that the judgment of the trial court was proper. As a matter of fact, I believe that the record requires reversal in this cause, and that any other conclusion could lead to serious unanticipated consequences extending far beyond the particular issue involved in the cause before us. For the reasons stated, I conclude that the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County should be reversed.