Court Opinion

ID: 9830945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:39:01.985912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:36.163798
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[7] The motion for rehearing is based upon the assumption that the testimony offered by appellant should be accepted as true and that of the appellee rejected as unworthy of belief. The jury and trial judge had the witnesses 'before them, and first the jury and then the judge, on motion for new trial, found that the testimony of the witnesses offered by appellee was entitled to credit and that of appellant was not. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters placed exclusively in the hands of juries, and appellate courts have no authority under the judicial system of. Texas to interfere with that privilege. This is a heritage from the common law, and is preserved in tne federal Constitution, and in every state by Constitution or statute.
[8] In this case Roberta Brooks, who is made a competent witness by the laws of Texas, testified that appellant cut to the left when he reached the crossing of Commerce and Mesquite streets, and struck the car in which she was riding, and injured her. The jury could have based a verdict on her testimony alone, but there was other testimony. Emmett Polk, the jitney driver, testified that he was driving on Commerce street,, and blew his horn, about 50 feet from the corner of that street and Mesquite, and the car of appellant dashecj. to its left around the corner,'and ran into his automobile, and carried it across the street car track, and that, when struck, his car was nearer the curb on the south side of Commerce street than it was to the street ear track. Wesley Jackson-testified:
That he was’ standing on the sidewalk on the south side of Commerce street, at the southeast corner of that street and Mesquite street; that he heard the horn and saw an automobile coming east on the south or right-hand side of Commerce street; “that another car burst out of Mesquite street and kind of cut the car coming on Commerce street, and threw this car upon the track, near the street car track; that the two cars had not passed the center of Mesquite street going east when the collision occurred.”
It is true that this evidence was flatly contradicted by appellant, but the jury, in the exercise of tlieir discretion, gave credit to the testimony offered by appellee. . There was nothing unreasonable in the manner in which the discretion was exercised.
[9] The trial court was not requested by appellant to submit an issue as to whether the collision occurred on the east side of Mesquite street in Commerce street through the unlawful speed of the jitney, but endeav-. ored to make an issue as to whether the car of appellant was struck on any part or Commerce street through the fast running of the jitney. If appellant ran to the left around the southwest corner of Commerce .street, that would not save appellant from the effect of his negligence in violating an ordinance of the city. It is apparent from the evidence, believed to be true by the jury, that if appellant had run on the east side of Mesquite street, across Commerce street, the collision would not have occurred, and the jury was justified in finding that the negligence of appellant caused the collision.
[10] Much of a long and emphatic, if not intemperate and vituperative, argument assails the opinion of this court on the ground that it sustains a refusal of the trial judge to give an affirmative submission of appellant’s theory of the case. Appellant seems to lose sight of the fact that this, case was submitted on special issues, and not on a general-issue, and that all the cases cited by him-have reference only to the practice when a cause is submitted on a general charge. The court submitted to the jury the question as to whether appellant turned to the left in entering Commerce street, and an answer -to-that question disposed of every question that could arise as to iow he got into or across Commerce street. Appellant, however, desired not only that the jury should be asked, Did appellant turn to the left into Commerce *687street? but-also, Did be go straight across Commerce street on the east side of Mesquite street? Special issues would be rendered farcial by such practice. If the jury answered that appellant did turn to the left, or did not turn to the left, that disposed of every issue. The matter presented by appellant is not new, and the position assumed by him has been overthrown by this and other courts. In the case of Railway v. Dawson, 201 S. W. 247, this court held, through its Associate Justice Swearingen, that the rulé as to the affirmative submission of each group of facts to the jury has no application to cases submitted on special issues. This court said:
“We think that rule has no application where the case is submitted upon special issues. In accordance with a general charge, the jury is required to find for or against one of the parties; whereas, by special issues, ‘the jury, as triers of facts solely, had nothing to do with the legal effect of their findings’ ” — citing Fain v. Nelms, 156 S. W. 281, and Railway v. Hodnett, 182 S. W. 7.
The instruction numbered 1, requested by appellant, was' in effect that, if the jury found that he turned his car to the left, they should answer that "he did so turn it, and, if they found that he, did not turn to the left, they should say he did not so turn it. We fail to see that the instruction, tended to throw any light on the subject, but would merely have tended to confuse the jury. If the jury found that appellant turned to the left at the corner of the street, it would not seem essential to have them answer that ne did not go on the right ¡side of the street across Commerce street, and yet that is what is requested by appellant, under cover of asking an affirmative presentation of a certain group of'facts. If he turned to the left, he did not keep to the right, and, if he did not turn to the left, he did keep straight forward to the right. The court tersely and clearly presented every issue in the case.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.