Court Opinion

ID: 9604473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:22:29.385565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:11.680107
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
In Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964), this court reiterated the holding of Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932), that the gist of a malpractice action is negligence, not contract, fraud or mistake. In the Trimming case it was also recognized that the applicable statutes of limitation are I.C. § 5-210 and § 5-219(4), and held that the cause of action arose at the time of the negligent act. This case has not been reversed. The Billings case dealt exclusively with the facts then before the court, which involved a situation where a foreign object had been left in the plaintiff’s body during surgery. This object was not discovered until a subsequent operation was performed some five years subsequent to the first operation. This court in the majority opinion stated:
“We will, therefore, adhere to the following rule: where a foreign object is negligently left in a patient’s body by a surgeon and the patient is in ignorance of the fact, and consequently of his right of action for malpractice, the cause of action does not accrue until the patient learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned of the presence of such foreign object in his body. Seitz v. Jones, supra. [370 P.2d 300 (Okl. 1961)].”
In Seitz v. Jones, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had before it a case wherein a hypodermic needle was left in a patient’s body during an operation performed on January 13, 1952. The patient was not advised of the object’s presence until she was informed by one of the defendants in September 1953 that it was revealed in an X-ray taken by the defendant in June 1953. That court held the two year statute of limitations commenced to run in September 1953.
In the Billings case, this court quoted from Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961), as follows:
“It must be borne in mind that Mrs. Fernandi’s claim does not raise questions as to her credibility nor does is rest on matters of professional diagnosis, judgment or discretion. It rests on the presence of a foreign object within her abdomen following an operation performed upon her by the defendant-doctors. Here the lapse of time does not entail the danger of a false or frivolous claim nor the danger of a speculative or uncertain claim. The circumstances do not permit the suggestion that Mrs. Fernandi may have knowingly slept on her rights but, on the contrary, establish that the cause of action was unknown and unknowable to her until shortly before she instituted suit. Justice cries out that she fairly be afforded a day in court and it appears evident to us that this may be done, at least in this highly confined type of case, without any undue impairment of the two-year limitation or the considerations of repose which underlie it.” 173 A.2d at 286. (Emphasis supplied.)
I am constrained to agree with the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1967), when it stated:
“Had the Idaho Supreme Court not harbored the intent to limit sharply the application of the discovery rule in malpractice cases, it would have been unnecessary for it to emphasize that the purpose of statutes of limitations ‘is to prevent fraudulent and stale actions from springing up after a great lapse of time * * *.’ It employed language which must be significant and clearly implies a limitation, namely, ‘These considerations are not present in a foreign object case.’ 389 P.2d at 231 (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, as we have seen, the Idaho court chose, in supporting its decision in *842Billings, to quote language from a New Jersey opinion, wherein the court, concerned with a situation involving surgical malpractice of the ‘foreign object’ variety, carefully distinguished such a case from one which would ‘raise questions as to * * * credibility [or] rest on matters of professional diagnosis, judgment, or discretion. * * *.’ 173 A.2d at 286 .(Emphasis supplied.) . The New. Jersey court limited its holding expressly, as the Idaho court is believed by us to have done impliedly, to ‘this - [foreign object] highly confined type of case.’ Ibid.” 380 F.2d at 315.
In dismissing the instant action the trial court considered, in my opinion quite properly so, that the holding in Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, supra, was limited to a foreign object situation. The rationale for the Billings case was that the claim was based on the discovery of a foreign object left in the patient’s body during an operation. The time of such negligence was established by the time of the operation, and there can be no doubt as to the negligence. There is no .issue presented as to professional standards or diagnosis. Lapse of time would present no difficulty in establishing' that negligence nor would the lapse of time be indicative of any frivolous or false claim. Fernandi v. Strully, supra. The same cannot he said however, in a Case involving a claim of malpractice based on misdiagnosis, or improper diagnosis, of a patient’s ailments.
It is my firm conviction that the so-called “discovery rule” should not be employed to toll the running of the statute of limitations, I.C. § 5-219(4), which the legislature enacted, as is being done in the majority opinion in this case. There is nothing to be gained by belaboring the reader with the purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitation and the objects to be resolved by such legislative enactments. Suffice it to say that every time a doctor now diagnoses for his patient, his contingent exposure to a claim of malpractice for misdiagnosis or improper diagnosis is unlimited as to time.
The same “discovery rule” logically could be applied to the professional decisions made by engineers, architects, dentists, attorneys and other professions. Presently, at least insofar as attorneys are concerned, it is generally held that in the absence of fraudulent concealment, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the neglect or misconduct and not from the time when the wrong is discovered or the consequential damages are felt. Annot: 118 A.L.R. 215.
Any expansion of liability should properly be reserved for legislative action, not accomplished by judicial fiat. See dissent in Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 505, 389 P.2d 224. See also Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969).
The judgment of dismissal of the trial court should be affirmed.
DONALDSON, J., concurs herein.
On Rehearing.
SHEPARD and McQUADE, JJ., adhere to the original opinion.
DONALDSON, J., concurs and specially concurs.
McFADDEN, C. J., dissents and SPEAR, J., concurs in the dissent.