Court Opinion

ID: 9492699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:47:45.179183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:26.446744
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
with whom ILANA DIAMOND ROYNER and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting.
Clarence Gardner — at the time of the crime sixteen years old and with no criminal record — was convicted of first-degree murder on a theory of legal accountability. He did not pull the trigger; he did not supply the gun; nor did he bring the shooter to the scene of the crime. There is no evidence of any pre-arrangement to *922commit murder or evidence that the shooting could have been foretold by Gardner. The entire case is based on the theory, in the closing words of the prosecutor to the jury, that Gardner was the “guy in charge ... the one giving the orders ... the one that everyone [was] following.” Comparing Gardner’s position of command with that of Adolph Hitler, the prosecution noted that “Hitler never murdered anybody, never placed anybody inside those ovens” but “he was the one who gave the order.”
To prove its case in the context of over seventy youths embroiled in a furious melee (R. vol. 4 at 63, 72; R. vol. 5 at 64 — 65),1 the State produced three witnesses to testify that Gardner shouted “bust them folks” three or four times as the shooter and the man who supplied the gun (both of whom were noticeably older than Gardner (R. vol. 4 at 80-81)) approached the tumultuous scene, and the driver emerged from a blue car. The only witness the defense was able to present was a police detective who testified that, when the three gave statements to the police on the day of the shooting, nothing was said about Gardner as the source of the “bust era’s.” (R. vol. 5 at 117-19).
The witness, Luther Donald, that the defense was not allowed to present was not Gardner’s friend. In fact, he was a member of the football team and a Mend of the murdered youth, Joe Waites. (R. vol. 4 at 52, 77-78). But he had been interviewed by defense counsel and was prepared to testify that the “bust ern’s” shouted at the onset of the altercation came from inside the blue car (R. vol. 5 at 145-47), where Gardner never was at any time. (R. vol. 4 at 61, 74, 95, 116). The only people inside the blue car were the shooter and the man who supplied the gun (R. vol. 4 at 60-61; R. vol. 5 at 58, 63-64, 66), people who might very well have shouted their violent intentions. Luther Donald’s testimony, therefore, would have been eminently credible and in stark contradiction of the State’s witnesses. There would have been nothing cumulative about Donald’s testimony, and it likely would have given the jury an entirely different slant on the murderous incident.
But the trial judge did not let Donald testify. Apparently, the fact that the issue arose on a Friday afternoon was decisive. The trial judge said, “If it were just for one day, tomorrow, that wouldn’t be so bad.” . The trial court noted that there were “five jury trials” scheduled for the following court day (Tuesday), and the courthouse was “four judges short.” For this reason, it denied the continuance permitting Donald’s testimony. The Illinois Appellate Court expressed its “uneasiness with the trial court’s excessive concern about the next week’s schedule in the criminal court.” People v. Gardner, 282 Ill.App.3d 209, 215-16, 217 Ill.Dec. 940, 668 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist.1996). But uneasiness is not enough when the right to a fair trial is at stake. The denial of a continuance in these circumstances surely offends due process. In this first-degree murder case involving a sixteen-year-old defendant with no prior criminal convictions, refusing a defendant to bring to court his most critical witness, and basing that refusal on “scheduling” considerations is both shocking and unconstitutional. See Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). Such “myopic insistence upon expeditiousness” cannot be tolerated, Ungar, supra at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841 (citing Chandler, supra), and the Courts of Appeals are in total agreement on this point.2
*923Donald’s testimony was crucial because the source of the “bust em’s” shouted at the beginning of the altercation, when the blue car arrived and the driver got out and started the confrontation, is pivotal in determining whether Gardner was a commander ordering an execution — as the State charges. Later, while the football players were fleeing, the shooter (who had apparently remained in the ear) emerged, charged out of the automobile, cocked his gun and shouted at Gardner and the others to “move” because he was “fixing to bust” Joe Waites. (R. vol. 5 at 66-67). Another gang member, Buckeye Lee, chimed in, telling the shooter to “take care of his business.” (Id. at 67). It was at this later point that Gardner admitted to saying “bust him” as he fled the scene and the shooter fired the fatal shots. (Id. at 67-68). But there is nothing to suggest that this later “bust him” was a command; it might have been posed as a question or blurted out in dismay. It was uttered only after the shooter had announced his intentions and had almost finished the business of killing Waites. (Id. at 66-68). That Gardner apparently echoed the shooter’s words as he fled would hardly make him a commander in the field or lend substance to the Hitler analogy.
Of course, neither Donald nor the State’s three witnesses would have had anything to say about this later stage of the confrontation. In fact, by that time, all four of them had moved on from the side of the fallen Waites. (R. vol. 4 at 77-78, 80, 111, 127-28). It was the earlier “bust em” shouts to which the State pointed as commands and that Donald would have ascribed to persons other than Gardner. (R. vol. 5 at 146^47). Donald was present at that crucial time, and his testimony, rather than being cumulative, could have provided a complete picture for the jury. See Enoch v. Hartigan, 768 F.2d 161, 162-4 (7th Cir.1985) (affirming grant of habeas petition in part because testimony that would have provided an alternative explanation to the prosecution’s theory of the case was found not to be cumulative). The refusal to hear him therefore offended due process and precluded a fair trial.
With respect to the voir dire, it is important to understand how pervasively the case was presented as a singular exhibition of gang violence. From start to finish, the prosecution emphasized the case’s immersion in gang lore. The jury was told about Gardner’s membership in the Gangster Disciples, his association with other gang members on the day of the shooting, the provocative “trash-talking” of the gang members and the gang-motivated confrontation, beating and eventual murder. The prosecution called for a veritable jihad against street gangs and hammered this theme home in rebuttal argument on closing:
This case is about the stupidity of street gangs in Chicago. You have seen first hand why this country looks at Chicago with such disgust and disdain. It is because of GD’s, because of folks like this seated right here.
Some people have asked what can we do about this senseless violence, about these innocent victims that will die. There was an innocent victim in this case. He did nothing, nothing, nothing *924deserving to die. My God, we have to do something about that. Well today as jurors you have the rare privilege of being in a position to actually do something about gang violence in Chicago.
With this as the context, it is difficult to understand why the only question that the trial court agreed to was “Have you or any member of your immediate family ever had any direct involvement with a street gang?” The trial court refused to ask four other questions, including “Would you be able to put aside any feeling you might have about gangs, and give the defendant a fair trial based on the evidence?” The reason given for the refusal was “I don’t think it’s relevant.”
Perhaps the judge had in mind those unidentified sectors of suburbia to which the majority opinion disingenuously points as being back in the era of “Hail, hail, the gang’s all here.” We are confident, however, that, with heavy media emphasis over many years, no place in America is so insulated as not to have heard of gangs in their most ominous sense. In fact, gangs themselves have now penetrated to the most protected corners of suburbia.
Contrary to Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), and Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981), the trial court failed to conduct voir dire sufficient to identify jurors entertaining a bias against gangs and to provide enough information to enable the defense to use its peremptory challenges. See also Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931). Gang issues were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial, indeed exacerbated by the prosecution’s trial strategy, and in such circumstances, a trial judge should specifically inquire into possible bias against gangs in order to insure an impartial jury. See Ristaino, supra at 596, 96 S.Ct. 1017; Ham, supra. Under the standards first announced in Aldridge, supra at 310, 51 S.Ct. 470, and most recently reiterated in Morgan, supra at 730, 112 S.Ct. 2222, the trial court failed to meet the “essential demands of fairness.”
Though not controlling, it is of some interest that another panel of the Illinois Appellate Court, of the same district that reviewed the Gardner case, has, on the voir dire point, cited and quoted with approval our panel opinion (subsequently vacated) which found the voir dire in Gardner to be constitutionally inadequate. See State v. Strain, 306 Ill.App.3d 328, 335-36, 239 Ill.Dec. 516, 714 N.E.2d 74 (1st Dist.1999). Thus, in another gang case, the Strain court said:
We conclude the procedure employed to test juror impartiality in the case at bar would not have revealed prejudice against gang members since the prospective jurors were asked only whether they or members of their families had ever had any involvement with street gangs.... A question should not depend upon the prospective juror to volunteer information that does not fall within the question’s scope.
Id. at 336, 239 Ill.Dec. 516, 714 N.E.2d 74. Thus, the very same analysis suggested by Morgan and Rosales-Lopez as matters of federal constitutional law has been adopted by Illinois.
Finally, I do not quarrel with the proposition that to merit habeas relief, Gardner must establish that the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See also Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).
Here, the refusal of the trial court to hear from Luther Donald, the defendant’s only fact witness, whose testimony would *925have flatly contradicted the State’s key witnesses, unreasonably applied the dictates of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), Chandler v. Fretag, supra, and Ungar v. Sarafite, supra, and denied a fair trial. The refusal to conduct an adequate voir dire on the issue of bias related to gangs was an unreasonable application of the requirements of Morgan v. Illinois, supra, and Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. I cite to the trial transcript in the record on appeal as (R. vol. [volume number] at [page number]).

. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 898 F.2d 819, 821 (1st Cir.1990) (ordering a new trial “where defendant has been deprived of his only witness” due to denial of continuance); United States v. Clinger, 681 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir.1982) (reversing denial of continuance sought by prosecution, emphasizing "the higher priority we place upon justice as opposed to judicial expediency”); Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.*9231981) (affirming habeas relief because "the right of petitioner to present the witness outweighed any inconvenience that would have been caused by extending the trial by a few hours”); Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772, 776 (6th Cir.1986) (granting habeas petition based on trial court’s denial of an overnight continuance); Enoch v. Hartigan, 768 F.2d 161, 162-64 (7th Cir.1985) (granting habeas petition where trial court denied amendment to witness list to present exculpatory testimony from newly-discovered witness); United States v. Pruett, 788 F.2d 1395, 1397 (8th Cir.1986) (reversing weapons conviction where defendant was denied continuance to secure attendance of material witness who had left town to attend funeral); United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1361-62 (9th Cir.1985) (finding reversible error to deny defendant continuance to procure expert testimony); Manlove v. Tansy, 981 F.2d 473, 479 (10th Cir.1992) (affirming grant of habeas petition where defense was denied continuance to produce unavailable witness).