Court Opinion

ID: 9796263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:53:06.05172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:24.756529
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(concurring in result):
16 I respectfully disagree with the reasoning relied upon by my colleagues. I do, however, concur in the result. My disagreement is based upon the following: (1) I do not believe that by virtue of constructing the modular home in question, defendant is precluded from relying upon the licensing exemption found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-55 305(6) (1997); and (2) I believe the modular homes constructed by defendant are personal property until affixed to real property, and thus may qualify as exempt under section 58-55-305(6). As such, in my view, defendant satisfies the first two requirements of section 58-55-305(6). Nevertheless, I would affirm defendant's conviction because he failed to show that he sold the modular home in question to a licensed contractor for installation.
I agree that, absent an exemption,1 defendant must comply with the construction trade licensing requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-801(1)(a) (1997), when he sells modular homes. I believe section 58-55-3805 is just such an exemption. In pertinent part, section 58-55-805(6) provides that the construction trade licensing requirements do not apply to
a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property that by its design or manufacture may be attached, installed, or otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted with a person, firm, or corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix or attach that property.
Id. at § 58-55-805(6) (emphasis added).
[ 18 Based on the language of section 58-55-305(6), the majority concludes
*518the licensing exemption in section 58-55-805(6) applies only to "the sale or merchandising of personal property." There is no dispute that in addition to selling and merchandising modular homes, [defendant] also constructs them. No language in section 58-55-805(6) exempts the construction of buildings from the licensing requirements.
(Emphasis in original.)
{19 The rules of statutory interpretation mandate that we look "first to the plain language of the statute ... and to assume{[ ] that each term was used advisedly by the [Llegislature." Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,114, 998 P.2d 875. By virtue of specific inclusion in the construction trades licensing chapter, persons engaged in these "trades" are bound by the licensing requirements of the code unless exempted. It makes no sense to interpret the exemption provision in section 58-55-305(6) as exempting only salespersons from the licensing requirements, when section 58-55-801 does not require such persons be licensed in the first place. Furthermore, precluding those persons the chapter actualty requires to be licensed from using the section 58-55-805(6) exemption flies in the face of common sense and renders the statutory exemption nugatory. Accordingly, I would conclude that being a "constructor/builder" does not preclude a person from utilizing the exemption.
4 20 To benefit from the exemption, defendant's modular homes must first qualify as personal property. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-805(6) (stating "a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property"). Accordingly, we must decide whether defendant's modular homes are personal property or real property. The majority opinion, I believe, fails to adequately resolve this question.
121 The majority relies upon John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1128, 1127-30 (Utah Ct.App.1990), concluding that
In Hercules, we held that the plain meaning of the word "building," as used in Utah's Payment Bond Statute, includes modular office complexes.... We follow Hercules to the extent that the plain meaning of the word "building," as used in [Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-801(a) ], includes the modular home at issue in this case.
Indeed, in Hercules we stated that " 'Twlhat is a building must always be a question of degree; but ordinarily the word refers to a structure enclosing a space within walls and roof?" Hercules, 797 P.2d at 1128 (quoting 12 C.J.S. Building (1980)).
122 Clearly, the modular home at issue here is a building. However, the issue in Hercules was whether modular buildings constructed on-site and secured to the land by gravity constituted realty. There, we addressed this issue, stating " 'it is settled ... that a building need not be physically anchored to the land to be considered realty. It may be found to be a fixture though it is secured to the realty by force of gravity alone'" Id. (quoting Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal.2d 276, 309 P.2d 451, 458 (1957). Obviously, Hercules is distinguishable, because here defendant's modular home has neither been transported to its site nor has it been attached, anchored by gravity, or otherwise affixed to the land.
123 Furthermore, both case law and legal treatises have uniformly identified modular homes as personal property because these units are " 'movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale' and hence are 'goods.'" Burnham v. Mark IV Homes, Inc., 387 Mass. 575, 441 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (1982) (quoting Fugua Homes, Inc. v. Evans-ton Bldg. & Loan Co., 52 Ohio App.2d 399, 370 N.E.2d 780 (1977));, see, e.g., Little v. Grizzly Mfg., 195 Mont. 419, 686 P.2d 839, 842 (1981) (citing and agreeing with Stephenson v. Frazier, 399 N.E.2d 794 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) and Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 591 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.1979) that modular homes are goods); see also 67 Am.Jur.2d Sales § 61 (1999) ("Prefabricated modular homes are also "goods" when movable at time of identification to the contract for sale. When a modular home is already situated on the lot at the time of sale the transaction is one in real estate...." (Citations omitted.)); Black's Law Dictionary 1218 (6th ed.1990) (defining real property as "Jand, and gener*519ally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land").
124 In the present matter, defendant's modular home was not yet affixed to land, and hence, was movable, making it "goods" or personal property. See Burnham, 441 N.E.2d at 1081. Accordingly, defendant's building satisfies the "personal property" prong of section 58-55-805(6), until such time as it is "affixed."
11 25 Finally, to qualify for the section 58-55-305(6) exemption, defendant is required to "contract[ 1 with a person, firm, or corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix, or attach that property." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(6) (1997). My review of the parties' stipulated facts, which were presented to the trial court, as well as their responses concerning this subject during oral argument, reveal that the question of whether the recipient of defendant's modular home was licensed under section 55-58-801 was not answered.
126 A person claiming a statutory exemption has the burden of producing sufficient facts to qualify for the exemption. See Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) (stating "statutes which provide for exemptions should be strictly construed and one who so claims has the burden of showing his entitlement to the exemption" (footnotes omitted)). Had the record revealed that defendant had transferred the personal property to a licensed individual, firm, or company, as required by section 58-55-805(6), I would vacate the conviction. But, in light of the absence of sufficient facts demonstrating that defendant contracted to sell the modular home to a licensed person or firm, I concur in the majority's result.

. Section 58-55-301(1)(a), in relevant part, provides that "[alny person engaged in the construction trades ... shall become licensed ... unless specifically exempted from licensure under Section 58-55-305." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301(1)(a) (1997).