Court Opinion

ID: 9463716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:14:09.370125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:14.947674
License: Public Domain

SWYGÉRT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion -that it was, permissible to show the jury the portions of the grand jury transcript revealing that Kopel consulted his attorney before answering incriminating questions. I would vacate Kopel’s perjury convictions under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and find the majority’s position to be in conflict with that decision.
In Doyle, the defendants were accused of selling marijuana to a local narcotics bu*1277reau informant. The basis of their defense at trial was that although they had met with the informant, as the Government claimed, their intent at the meeting was to buy marijuana rather than to sell it. The prosecutor attempted to impeach this theory by asking the defendants why, if they had not been selling marijuana, they had failed to explain this fact to the officer who arrested them. The defendants’ attorney objected to this line of questioning, contending that, since the defendants had been given Miranda warnings upon being arrested, no inference could be drawn from their silence. The defendants were convicted by a jury.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that it was a violation of due process for the state to first advise the defendants that they had the right to remain silent and then attempt to use that silence to impeach the defendants’ testimony at trial. The Court stated that postarrest silence is “insolubly ambiguous” because it might be nothing more than an arrestee’s exercise of Miranda rights. The Court further pointed out that “while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.” 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245.
The grand jury testimony issue in this case is controlled by Doyle. Kopel was advised that he had the right to leave the grand jury room and consult his attorney before answering any questions. He exercised that right in reliance on this advice, and the Government should not be permittéd to “sandbag” him by using the fact that he consulted his attorney against him. Like the postarrest silence of the defendants in Doyle, Kopel’s conduct is “insolubly ambiguous.” He may have wanted to check with his attorney to refresh his memory as to whether he had received money from tavern owners or liquor distributors for noncriminal purposes which nonetheless fell outside the categories enumerated by the United States Attorney. Alternatively, he may have decided before the questioning began that he would automatically consult his attorney as a precaution before answering any potentially incriminating questions.
The majority reasons that Kopel’s argument must fail because the fact that he left the room to consult with his attorney was relevant to the issue of whether’ he committed perjury. I agree that this fact is relevant and tends to show that Kopel was guilty. If it were not, the action of the trial judge in permitting it to go to the jury could be no more than harmless error. But this does not end the analysis. The postarrest silence of the defendants in Doyle was certainly relevant to whether-.their theory of the case was -true. The prosecutor was correct in suggesting that the typical person who was arrested and charged with a crime he did not commit would be likely to immediately protest his innocence. Thus, the defendants’ silence after arrest was probative evidence that their story at trial was a fabrication. What the Court held in Doyle — and what should be dispositive in this case — is that it is unfair to advise a criminal defendant .that he has certain rights and then use the exercise of those rights against him, even if that fact is relevant to the outcome at trial.