Court Opinion

ID: 9534177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:23.150763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:31.935342
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C. J.
(concurring). I concur with Judge Burns’ well-reasoned opinion, but write separately to note two additional factors that enter into my decision.
First, it is clear that MCLA 257.675a; MSA 9.2375(1) was designed1 to deprive the magistrate *40of any discretion whatsoever in determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of an arrest warrant. I agree that this is an impermissible legislative intrusion upon the judicial function. In view of the Legislature’s plainly mandatory intent ("shall be accepted by the court as establishing probable cause for the issuance of a warrant”), it would be inappropriate to save the statute by giving it a permissive reading. Cf. People ex rel Attorney General v Holschuh, 235 Mich 272; 209 NW 158 (1926).
Secondly, no claim of abuse of discretion was raised in this appeal. Thus we are not asked to determine whether, apart from the statute, the district judge abused his discretion in refusing to issue an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case, which include an uncontested parking violation, uncontested verification of defendant’s sole ownership of the vehicle, and no allegation that defendant was not, in fact, the operator of the vehicle at the time and place of the alleged violation. Were the question of abuse of discretion before us for decision, I would vote to reverse under the circumstances of this case.

 Counsel for the City of Birmingham represented to this Court during oral argument that the statute was a legislative response to a recurring dispute between the parties to this appeal concerning the proper basis for issuing arrest warrants. He stated that the statute *40was enacted "at our request”, that "we wrote it”, and that "our local representative introduced it”.