Court Opinion

ID: 9584078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:44:26.824938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:31.715058
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice:
The Utah Department of Public Safety revoked plaintiff William Colman’s driver’s license because of his failure to submit to a breathalyzer test pursuant to Utah’s implied consent statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10. The district court upheld that decision; plaintiff appeals. We reverse.
Near midnight on May 29, 1981, plaintiff was stopped by the Highway Patrol because of his erratic driving behavior, including allowing his vehicle to drift over the center line several times. When plaintiff rolled down his window to speak to the officer, the officer detected an odor of alcohol and asked plaintiff to exit his vehicle. Plaintiff did so, stumbling after exiting and *30leaning against the car to talk to the officer. The patrolman then asked plaintiff to submit to a field sobriety test; plaintiff refused. Based on plaintiffs driving, subsequent behavior and the odor of alcohol, the patrolman concluded that the plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him. The patrolman then requested plaintiff to submit to a breathalyzer test, warning him of the consequences imposed by the implied consent statute if he failed to do so. Plaintiff refused to take the test.
At the jail, the patrolman filled out a form affidavit provided by the Highway Patrol which states that the plaintiff refused to submit to a chemical test after having been arrested for driving under the influence and after having been informed of the consequences of refusal.
Below the signature of the arresting officer, the affidavit recites that it was “Subscribed and sworn to before me this ... day.” Space for the signature and seal of a notary public then follows.
The patrolman did not sign the affidavit form at that time. Approximately three months later, on August 19, 1981, the patrolman took the affidavit to the Wasatch County Treasurer, a notary, and signed in his presence. There was no conversation between the patrolman and the notary with one exception: the notary requested the patrolman’s driver’s license for identification. There was no affirmative act of swearing by the officer.
On January 29, 1982, a hearing was held before the Department of Public Safety and plaintiff’s driver’s license was suspended. The plaintiff appealed to the district court de novo. The court found that the plaintiff had refused to submit to a chemical test (breath) and ordered revocation of his license for one year. Plaintiff appeals from that decision, claiming that the revocation proceeding was invalid because the arresting officer failed to submit a “sworn report” as required by § 41-6-44.10(b) and because the officer was guilty of laches in failing to submit the report until three months after the incident.
Section 41-6-44.10(b) in pertinent part reads:
If [a person who a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect has been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs] has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests provided for in subsection (a) of this section and refuses to submit to such chemical test or tests, such person shall be warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless such person immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall submit a sworn report that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth in subsection (a) of this section. Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a peace officer to the effect that such person has refused a chemical test or tests the department shall notify such person of a hearing before the department.
(Emphasis added.)
This Court in Helsten v. Schwendiman1 held that the sworn report required by the statute is essential to the validity of the revocation proceedings and that “where the report is not in fact sworn to, the subsequent proceedings are void.”2 In Helsten, *31the reports were not signed in the presence of a notary. The Court held that they were thus not validly sworn to and the license revocations were a legal nullity.
In this case, the officer did sign the affidavit in the presence of a notary. He did not, however, affirmatively swear to that report.
Some courts have held that signing an affidavit in the presence of a notary is sufficient to constitute the taking of an oath.3 However, this Court has not followed that view. In Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake County,4 we said that to constitute the taking of an oath:
There must be definite evidence that affi-ant was conscious that he was taking an oath; that is, there must be not only the consciousness of affiant that he was taking an oath, but there must be some outward act from which that consciousness can be definitely inferred. That cannot be done from the mere signature to a printed form of an oath.5
In McKnight v. State Land Board,6 the Court cited Spangler with approval and further set out the essentials of an oath:
1. A solemn declaration.
2. Manifestation of an intent to be bound by the statement.
3. Signature of declarer.
4. Acknowledgment by an authorized person that oath was taken.7
The foregoing precedents set by this Court require a formal verbal affirmation in order for a statement to be validly sworn to.8 We thus conclude that since the patrolman failed to verbally affirm or swear9 to the validity of the contents of the report, the report was not validly sworn to. In light of the holding in Hel-sten, the revocation proceedings therefore were a legal nullity.
In light of this holding, we need not reach the issue of laches. The judgment of the district court is reversed.
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

. Utah, 668 P.2d 509 (1983), a case consolidated with Stevens v. Schwendiman. Notwithstanding my dissent in those cases, I recognize that the decision reached by the Court now constitutes the law in this jurisdiction.

. Id. at 512.

. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Motor Vehicles Div., 33 Or.App. 397, 576 P.2d 1267 (1978); State v. Lewis, 85 Wash.2d 769, 539 P.2d 677 (1975).

. 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943).

. Id. at 758.

. 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 (1963).

. Id. at 734.

. See also Wilcox v. Billings, 200 Kan. 654, 438 P.2d 108 (1968) (failure of police officer to formally swear rendered proceedings invalid); Dawson v. Austin, 44 Mich.App. 390, 205 N.W.2d 299 (1973) (failure to raise right hand and swear to authenticity of information in report rendered revocation proceedings invalid).

. See U.C.A., 1953, § 68-3-12(2).