Court Opinion

ID: 9950448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 23:03:11.284061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:09.549198
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 In re J.W. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re J.W., a Person Coming                                  B327965
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No.
                                                              23CCJP00424)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 STEPHANIE M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
      William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Erica Edelman-Benadon, Senior
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  __________________________

       Stephanie M. (Mother) appeals from a jurisdiction finding
and disposition order declaring her son, J.W., a dependent of the
juvenile court after the court sustained a petition pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(1).1 Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to
support the court’s jurisdiction finding that the domestic violence
between Mother and her ex-boyfriend, Jose C., placed J.W. at
substantial risk of harm. Mother also argues the court abused its
discretion by ordering her to attend a domestic violence support
group for victims. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Referral and Investigation
       On February 1, 2023 the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral
stating Mother had been arrested for inflicting corporal injury on
10-year-old J.W. During an interview with a Department social
worker the night of the incident, J.W. explained he had been
sitting in the back seat of Mother’s car while she was driving
when Mother received a text message from J.W.’s teacher.

1    Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                 2
Mother became angry, yelled at J.W., and called him names. She
then stopped the car, turned around to the back seat, and hit
J.W. with a phone charger two or three times on his arms, legs,
and hand. Mother then grabbed her cell phone and hit J.W. twice
on the head with the phone. J.W. got out of the car and ran into
a store for help, at which point the police were called. J.W. had
red marks on his arms and legs that were consistent with being
hit with a phone charger. J.W. told the social worker there had
been previous incidents when Mother hit him with a phone
charger and a wooden spatula. J.W. was scared of Mother. J.W.
also reported Mother had a boyfriend but she had instructed him
not to say anything about the boyfriend.
      The social worker interviewed Mother while she was in
custody. Mother admitted she had gotten angry after receiving a
text message from J.W.’s teacher and yelled at J.W. But Mother
claimed J.W. was lying about the incident, and the red marks on
his arms and legs were from playing with his friends. Mother
disciplined J.W. by spanking him, but she denied ever hitting
him with an object.

B.     The Petition and Detention
       On February 3, 2023 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), asserting identical
allegations that Mother had physically abused J.W. on more than
one occasion, including hitting him with the phone charger and
phone. The petition alleged the excessive physical abuse
endangered J.W.’s physical health and safety, placed him at risk
of serious physical harm, and caused unreasonable pain and
suffering. In addition, J.W. was afraid of Mother.

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      J.W. was detained from Mother.2 The juvenile court
ordered monitored visitation for Mother for a minimum of four
hours per week.

C.     The Jurisdiction and Disposition Report
       The March 2, 2023 jurisdiction and disposition report
summarized additional interviews with Mother and J.W. J.W.’s
account of the February 1 incident remained substantially
unchanged, but he now denied Mother had ever hit him before
that night. He also stated Mother no longer had a boyfriend.
       Mother no longer denied hitting J.W. on February 1, but
she claimed she had spanked him with an open hand and did not
realize she was holding her phone and charger. Mother
continued to downplay the incident by stating J.W. had a habit of
lying.
       Mother told the social worker she had been in an abusive
relationship with Jose that ended a few years earlier. She was
evasive about the details and claimed she was no longer in
contact with Jose. An addendum report provided additional
details regarding a September 2020 domestic violence incident
between Mother and Jose. According to the police report, Jose
and Mother got into an argument because Jose had not been
paying rent for the apartment they shared. Jose punched Mother
twice in the head and choked her until she lost consciousness.
When she woke up, J.W. was staring at her from his bedroom.
Mother called the police, and Jose was arrested.

2     The juvenile court found Jeffrey W. was the alleged father
of J.W. The Department conducted due diligence to locate Jeffrey
but was unable to find him.

                                4
       J.W. told the responding police officers that he had been
asleep and did not see the fight. However, he heard Mother
shouting “move out” and “call the cops.”
       Mother refused an emergency protective order, stating she
would go to court if she needed one. She told the responding
police officers Jose had been arrested for domestic violence earlier
that year and she had been given a domestic violence resource
pamphlet, but Jose had thrown it away.
       Jose was convicted of misdemeanor battery of a spouse or
significant other (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)).3 The criminal
court issued a protective order prohibiting Jose from having any
contact with Mother or coming within 100 yards of her. The
protective order expires in July 2024.
       When the Department social worker asked Mother about
the 2020 domestic violence incident, she denied that J.W. had
been present. She stated Jose had been a good father figure to
J.W. but they were not still in contact. Mother believed the
restraining order had expired.
       J.W. appeared hesitant to talk about Jose with the social
worker, stating he did not want to get Mother into trouble. When
asked about the restraining order, J.W. said he believed it
expired later in 2023, at which point Mother and Jose could get
back together.
       Jose told the social worker he was still in contact with
Mother but they were no longer in a relationship. He continued
to see J.W., but not often.

3     As part of his sentence, Jose was ordered to complete a 52-
week domestic violence treatment program. The record does not
indicate whether he did.

                                 5
      During the investigation, the social worker interviewed the
principal at J.W.’s school. The principal stated that J.W.’s
“stepdad” had picked J.W. up from school a couple of times and
one time had a “pretty heated” confrontation with J.W.’s teacher,
Ms. Esparza, after which the teacher was “pretty shaken up.”
      In a subsequent interview with the social worker, Esparza
explained she had seen Jose at school approximately three
times.4 The last time she had seen him, in October 2022, he was
picking up J.W. from school. Esparza asked J.W. to wait with her
at dismissal so she could speak with his mother. However,
instead of Mother, Jose arrived to pick up J.W. Jose began
calling for J.W. to come to the car. Jose “was very upset yelling
at the top of his lungs from his car for [J.W.] to come.” Esparza
asked another teacher to walk with her to the car because Jose
appeared to be aggressive. When Esparza attempted to speak
with Jose, Jose yelled, “I don’t care” and “Talk to his mom.”
Esparza was uncomfortable and did not speak to him further.
The next day Mother came to the school and apologized to
Esparza.
      When the social worker asked J.W. about the October 2022
incident, J.W. said Jose “was only mad that one time when he
picked me up.” Mother denied Jose had picked J.W. up from
school. She insisted it had been another friend of hers who yelled
at the teacher. Mother added that she had been in the car at the
time.

4     The Department social worker showed Esparza a picture of
Jose, and Esparza stated he “looks like” the individual who had
picked J.W. up from school.

                                6
D.     The First Amended Petition
       On March 13, 2023 the Department filed a first amended
petition containing the allegations from the initial petition and
adding allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(1), that J.W. had been exposed to domestic violence between
Mother and Jose in September 2020 and Mother had allowed
Jose to have contact with J.W. despite Jose’s criminal conviction
and the restraining order. The first amended petition alleged
Mother had failed to protect J.W. by allowing Jose to have
contact with him, which placed J.W. at risk of physical and
emotional harm.

E.    The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
      At the March 14, 2023 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court struck the allegation brought under
section 300, subdivision (a), with respect to the September 2020
incident and sustained the remaining allegations.5 The court
declared J.W. a dependent of the court and removed him from
Mother’s custody. The court ordered monitored visitation for
Mother. The court required Mother to attend parenting classes,
individual counseling, conjoint counseling if recommended by
J.W.’s therapist, and a domestic violence support group for
victims. The court also ordered J.W. to have no contact with
Jose. Mother timely appealed.

5      The juvenile court also amended the petition by
interlineation to remove references to Mother’s arrest after the
February 2023 physical abuse incident.

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                          DISCUSSION

A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
      Section 300, subdivision (a), provides that jurisdiction may
be assumed if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.”
“Nonaccidental” generally means a parent or guardian “acted
intentionally or willfully.” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629
(R.T.).)
      As relevant here, section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes
the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction when “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the
following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child. [¶] (B)
The willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian
to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of
the custodian with whom the child has been left.”6
      “A jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
requires the Department to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s
or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect

6      Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(C) and (D), also provides for
jurisdiction when there is a substantial risk the child will suffer
serious physical harm or illness as a result of “[t]he willful or
negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment” or
“[t]he inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care
for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.”

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the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness
or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re
Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601 (Cole L.); accord, In re
L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848; see R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 624 [“section 300(b)(1) authorizes dependency jurisdiction
without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her
failure or inability to supervise or protect her child”].)
       “Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to
the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing
[citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary
to protect the child.” (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 601-
602; accord, In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238 [“‘Although
there must be a present risk of harm to the minor, the juvenile
court may consider past events to determine whether the child is
presently in need of juvenile court protection.’”].) “A parent’s
‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is
reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’” (Cole L., at
p. 602; accord, In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.)
       Upon finding a child is a dependent of the juvenile court,
the court “may direct any reasonable orders to the parents . . . as
the court deems necessary and proper,” including requiring
participation in counseling, education and treatment programs.
(§ 362, subd. (d); see In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297,
311 [“‘[t]he juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what
would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a
dispositional order accordingly’”]; In re Daniel B. (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 633, 673 [same].)
       We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for
substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (In re I.C.

                                 9
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892; R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633 [“‘In
reviewing the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we look to
see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them.’”].) Substantial evidence is “evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (In re I.C., at p. 892;
accord, Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.) “‘[W]e draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’” (R.T., at p. 633; accord, In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773; Cole L., at p. 602 [“while substantial evidence may consist of
inferences, any inferences must rest on the evidence; inferences
based on speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding”].)
“The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of
a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or
orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206; accord, In re
D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328-329.)
       We review the juvenile court’s disposition orders, including
those directing a parent to participate in counseling, education
and treatment programs, for an abuse of discretion. (In re K.T.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25; In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1071; In re Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311.)

B.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Domestic Violence
      Finding Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)(1)
      Exposure to domestic violence, even absent the threat of
nonaccidental injury, may serve as the basis for dependency
jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See In re
T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [“[e]ven though [the child]

                                 10
had not been physically harmed, the cycle of violence between the
parents constituted a failure to protect her”]; In re R.C. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 930, 942 [“‘“Both common sense and expert
opinion indicate spousal abuse is detrimental to children.”’”]; In
re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 460-461 [“‘domestic violence
in the same household where children are living is neglect; it is a
failure to protect [them] from the substantial risk of encountering
the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from
it’”].)
        Mother does not deny she was the victim of Jose’s domestic
violence in September 2020. Nonetheless, Mother argues the
evidence did not establish J.W. was at current risk of harm at the
time of the jurisdiction hearing because the domestic violence
incident occurred more than two years earlier, she was no longer
in a relationship with Jose, she had appropriately protected J.W.
after the incident, and she had been “honest and insightful” with
the Department.7 The evidence, construed in a light most

7     Mother acknowledges that the unchallenged jurisdiction
findings regarding her physical abuse of J.W. provide
independent bases for affirming dependency jurisdiction over
J.W. regardless of any alleged error in the finding of domestic
violence. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284 [“where
there are multiple findings against one parent[,] the validity of
one finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge
the others”]; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 [“As a
general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by
substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and
render moot a challenge to the other findings.”].) As the Supreme
Court recently held in In re D.P., at page 283, “where a
jurisdictional finding ‘serves as the basis for dispositional orders
that are also challenged on appeal’ [citation], the appeal is not
moot.” Because the jurisdiction finding of domestic violence

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favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations (see R.T., supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 633), does not support Mother’s contentions.
       While it is true the domestic violence incident occurred
more than two years before the jurisdiction hearing, it was a
significant incident that happened while J.W. was in the home
and resulted in Mother’s loss of consciousness and Jose’s arrest
and criminal conviction. Rather than take appropriate steps to
protect J.W. after the incident, Mother refused an emergency
protective order—in fact, the current protective order was not
sought by Mother but was entered as a result of Jose’s criminal
conviction. Mother assisted Jose in violating the protective order
by maintaining contact with him. Further, Mother fails to
acknowledge Jose’s more recent aggressive behavior in which he
yelled at J.W.’s teacher in front of J.W. Finally, Mother has not
been “honest and insightful” with the Department; to the
contrary, she denied J.W. was present for the 2020 domestic
violence incident, denied Jose picked up J.W. from school in
October 2022 and yelled at the teacher, gave conflicting
information regarding her physical abuse of J.W., and accused
J.W. of lying. Mother also stated she did not need domestic
violence counseling and could protect J.W., prompting the social
worker to conclude Mother did not understand the impact of
allowing Jose to have contact with J.W. and she had “very little
insight into her protective capacities.”
       Based on the totality of the circumstances, substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion J.W. was at risk

serves, at least in part, as the basis of the disposition order
requiring Mother to attend domestic violence counseling, her
challenge to the findings is not moot. We therefore consider the
merits of Mother’s appeal.

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of continued exposure to domestic violence. (See In re J.K. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439-1440 [father’s physical abuse
occurring two years before jurisdiction hearing was “not so
remote that it can be ignored” where father had taken no steps to
address behavior, incident was severe, and mother repeatedly
failed to protect child from father]; see also In re Gabriel K.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a problem
one fails to acknowledge”].)

C.     The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
       Requiring Mother To Attend a Domestic Violence Support
       Group
       Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering her to attend a domestic violence support group because
J.W. was not at risk of harm due to domestic violence and the
requirement will make it more difficult for Mother to reunify with
J.W. The court did not abuse its discretion.
       “Juvenile courts should be mindful of the burdens their
disposition orders impose on parents already grappling with
difficult conditions and circumstances. However, the paramount
concern always must be the child’s best interests, and we cannot
reverse a disposition order reasonably fashioned to eliminate the
conditions that led to dependency jurisdiction, no matter how
burdensome its requirements may seem from the parent’s
perspective.” (In re D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071-
1072.)
       As discussed, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that J.W. was at substantial risk of harm based on
the domestic violence between Mother and Jose. Accordingly,
requiring attendance in a domestic violence support group was a
reasonable requirement to protect J.W., especially considering

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Mother’s failure to comprehend the detriment that exposure to
Jose and any further domestic violence could have on J.W.

                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding and disposition
order are affirmed.

                                           FEUER, J.

We concur:

             SEGAL, Acting P. J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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