Court Opinion

ID: 9401030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 19:10:30.305801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.241016
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Sears, 2023-Ohio-1925.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     OTTAWA COUNTY

State of Ohio                                   Court of Appeals No. OT-22-048

        Appellee                                Trial Court No. 21 CR 236

v.

Jason Sears                                     DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                               Decided: June 9, 2023

                                            *****

        James J. VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney and
        Thomas A. Matuszak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        W. Alex Smith, for appellant.

                                            *****

        MAYLE, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jason Sears, appeals the August 4, 2022 judgment of

the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of aggravated possession of

drugs and sentencing him to 36 months in prison. For the reasons that follow, we reverse

the trial court judgment.
                                      I. Background

       {¶ 2} Jason Sears was indicted on three counts: (1) aggravated trafficking in

drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(c), a third-degree felony (Count 1);

(2) aggravated possession of drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(b), a third-

degree felony (Count 2); and (3) possession of heroin, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and

(C)(6)(a), a fifth-degree felony (Count 3). Sears entered a plea of guilty to Count 2 and

the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court found that Sears was not amenable

to community control and sentenced him to a prison term of 36 months. Sears’s

conviction and sentence were memorialized in a judgment entered on August 4, 2022.

Sears appealed. He assigns one error for our review:

              The Court erred by imposing a sentence contrary to law.

                                  II. Law and Analysis

       {¶ 3} In his sole assignment of error, Sears argues that his sentence is contrary to

law because in fashioning his sentence, the trial judge considered information outside of

R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a). Specifically, Sears complains that the judge considered and relied

upon input from the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) and the Sandusky County Probation

Department and did not limit its consideration to the record, the presentence investigation

report, victim impact statements, and information presented in person at the sentencing

hearing. He claims that the trial judge compounded this error by failing to inform him of

what information he received from the APA and Sandusky County, and by proceeding to

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sentence him without allowing him to respond to the information they provided. Sears

maintains that the court violated his Crim.R. 32(A)(1) right of allocution.

       {¶ 4} We review a challenge to a felony sentence under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify

a sentence or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for

resentencing if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

              (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings

       under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of

       section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,

       whichever, if any, is relevant;

              (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

       {¶ 5} Sears does not complain that his sentence violated R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a); he

argues that his sentence was “otherwise contrary to law” under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that a sentence is “otherwise contrary to law” if it

is “in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.” (Internal quotations

omitted.) State v. Bryant, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22, quoting State v.

Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990).

       {¶ 6} Here, Sears argues that his sentence was contrary to law for two reasons: (1)

the trial judge considered information outside what he was permitted to consider under

R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a); and (2) he violated his right of allocution under Crim.R. 32(A)(1)

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by failing to allow him to address new information before imposing his sentence. We

begin by addressing R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a).

       {¶ 7} Under R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a), when sentencing an offender, a trial court

must consider the following information at the sentencing hearing: (1) the record; (2) any

information presented at the hearing by the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim

or the victim’s representative, and any other person approved by the trial court; (3) the

presentence investigation report; and (4) any victim impact statement. In State v. Fowler,

6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-21-031, 2022-Ohio-3499, ¶ 15, we recognized that a sentence

may be “contrary to law” where the trial court relies on information from a source outside

of those authorized by R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a). Other Ohio courts have explained that

“[w]hatever the court considers for sentencing should be either part of the presentence

investigation or ‘presented’ at the sentencing hearing before allocution.” State v. Yates,

195 Ohio App.3d 33, 2011-Ohio-3619, 958 N.E.2d 640, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.); State v. Light,

11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-0055, 2023-Ohio-1187, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).

       {¶ 8} At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge indicated that he had considered

the PSI submitted by the Ottawa County Probation Department, but he also revealed that

the probation department had communicated with the APA and had spoken with the

probation department in Sandusky County, where Sears was facing other criminal

charges. The court told Sears that Sandusky County, the APA, and the Ottawa County

probation department all agreed that he is not amenable to community control. “So,” the

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court told Sears, “I will find that you’re not amenable to community control.” It

immediately proceeded to sentence Sears.

       {¶ 9} The PSI is part of the record on appeal here, as is the transcript of the

sentencing hearing. No one spoke at the hearing concerning any conversation with

Sandusky County or the APA, and the PSI does not document any such conversations.

The state appears to concede that there is no writing reflecting either the judge’s

conversation with the probation officer or the probation officer’s conversations with

Sandusky County or the APA. It argues instead that “[n]othing in R.C. 2929.19(A)

requires that information presented by any other person that is relevant to the imposition

of sentence must be presented in writing prior to sentencing.” (Emphasis in original.)

It insists that “a trial court must be permitted to communicate verbally with its own Adult

Probation Department; otherwise, the dilatory drudge of reducing all communications to

writing would frustrate effective communications between a trial court and its own Adult

Probation Department.”

       {¶ 10} R.C. 2929.19(A) says that a trial court shall hold a sentencing hearing at

which “the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim or the victim’s representative *

* *, and, with the approval of the court, any other person may present information

relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a) further states

that “[a]t the sentencing hearing, the court, before imposing sentence, shall * * *

[c]onsider the record, any information presented at the hearing by any person pursuant to

division (A) of this section, and, if one was prepared, the presentence investigation report

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made pursuant to section 2951.03 of the Revised Code or Criminal Rule 32.2, and any

victim impact statement made pursuant to section 2947.051 of the Revised Code.”

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 11} R.C. 2929.19(A) and (B)(1)(a) are clear and unambiguous, therefore, we

must assume that they mean what they say. See Hakim v. Kosydar, 49 Ohio St.2d 161,

164, 359 N.E.2d 1371 (1977), citing Chope v. Collins, 48 Ohio St.2d 297, 300, 358

N.E.2d 573, fn. 2 (1976) (“An unambiguous statute means what it says.”). By their plain

language, R.C. 2929.19(A) and (B)(1)(a) do not permit a trial judge who is sentencing a

defendant to rely on oral statements that are not presented in court or otherwise included

in the record or PSI. See also State v. Hale, 2014-Ohio-262, 7 N.E.3d 643, ¶ 30 (3d

Dist.) (Rogers, J., concurring) (“[T]he trial court must only consider what is properly on

the record at sentencing, and cannot rely on information outside of the record.”).

Accordingly, we are forced to conclude that the trial court violated R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a)

when it imposed a sentence after considering information of the type not enumerated in

the statute.

       {¶ 12} The dissent contends that the oral communication the trial judge received

from the probation department introduced “nothing intrinsically new,” was not a

“surprise” to Sears, and “was presented by the trial court itself at sentencing.” It

characterizes our application of the plain language of the statute as producing an “absurd

and unnecessary” result.

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       {¶ 13} First, the Ohio Supreme Court cautioned (in the same case cited by the

dissent), that “all courts should exercise restraint in the application of the absurd-result

exception [to the plain-meaning rule of construction], employing it in only those cases in

which the plain language of a statute results in an obviously unintended result.” State ex

rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Med. Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-

8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, ¶ 26, citing Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 239 (2012). Applying the plain language of R.C. 2929.19(B) to limit the

court’s consideration to information contained in the record, presented at the hearing by

certain enumerated witnesses, or included in the written PSI does not lead to “an

obviously unintended result.”

       {¶ 14} Second, R.C. 2919.19A(A) does not list the trial judge among the people

who can present information at the hearing. It lists (1) the offender, (2) the prosecuting

attorney, (3) the victim or the victim’s representative, and (4) “with the approval of the

court, any other person.” Id. It would be absurd to interpret “with the approval of the

court, any other person” to include the trial judge himself when the legislature could just

have easily specified the trial judge among the people authorized to present information

at sentencing. Moreover, it is not implied anywhere that the trial judge may act as the

mouthpiece for the probation department. To the contrary, R.C. 2951.03(A) explicitly

requires the probation officer to generate “a written presentence investigation report”

reflecting the results of his or her investigation; there is no provision permitting just an

oral, off-the-record report. And despite the suggestion in the dissent to the contrary, there

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is no exception permitting the trial court to consider information not specified in R.C.

2919.19(B) so long as it is “not intrinsically new” or is not a “surprise.”

       {¶ 15} Turning to Crim.R. 32(A)(1), “[a]t the time of imposing sentence, the court

shall * * * [a]fford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and

address the defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes to make a statement in his or

her own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment.”

       {¶ 16} Sears complains here that the trial court referenced information previously

not disclosed to him, then immediately proceeded to sentencing without providing him

the opportunity to address this new information. The state does not directly dispute this

contention. Rather, it argues that “it would be incongruous for this court to tell the trial

court and its own Adult Probation Department that they collectively satisfied their

statutory obligations but nonetheless violated the Appellant’s right of allocution because

they satisfied their statutory obligations.” The state’s response ignores the fact that it is

possible (and expected) that the court and probation department can (and usually do)

satisfy their statutory obligations without violating a defendant’s right of allocution. All

a court must do to avoid violating the right of allocution is to provide an opportunity for

the defendant to address all information offered against him before imposing a sentence.

       {¶ 17} In Yates, 195 Ohio App.3d 33, 2011-Ohio-3619, 958 N.E.2d 640, for

example, the trial court informed Yates that it had a report from his bail bondsperson

indicating that Yates had been transporting drugs interstate while out on bond. After the

court told Yates about the information received from the bondsperson, Yates raised his

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hand, requesting to speak. The trial court cut him off, allowed no more discussion, then

sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Yates argued, among other

things, that the trial court violated his right of allocution. The Second District Court of

Appeals agreed.

       {¶ 18} The court recognized that the “‘Crim.R. 32 inquiry * * * represents a

defendant’s last opportunity to plead his case or express remorse.’” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting

State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 359-360, 738 N.E.2d 1208 (2000). It observed that a

defendant’s right of allocution is fulfilled “when the court’s conduct clearly shows the

defendant and his counsel that each has a right to make a statement before sentence is

imposed.” Id., citing Defiance v. Cannon, 70 Ohio App.3d 821, 828, 592 N.E.2d 884 (3d

Dist.1990). The court explained that “[a] trial court errs when it does not let the

defendant address new information introduced and considered by the trial court at

sentencing,” and such “error is presumed prejudicial because the defendant is prevented

from speaking at the appropriate time.” Id. at ¶ 21.

       {¶ 19} The court emphasized that although the trial judge let Yates and his counsel

speak at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, he did not let Yates speak again

between discussing the bondsperson’s report and imposing the sentence. It found that the

report constituted new information, and it was unknown whether defense counsel had

been made aware of the report before the hearing. Moreover, it was unclear whether the

trial judge had relied on the report in imposing the sentence. The court, therefore,

reversed and remanded for resentencing. It clarified that on remand, the trial court should

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determine whether it considered the bond report for purposes of sentencing. Id. at ¶ 26.

It instructed that “[i]If the bond report was considered for sentencing, then the trial court

should determine whether Yates or his counsel was apprised of the bond-report

information before their opportunity for allocution”; “[i]f not, then Yates should be given

an opportunity to respond to the bond-report information before he is resentenced.”

       {¶ 20} Finally, the court was concerned that the report of the bail bondsperson was

not part of the record on appeal. It cautioned that “[i]n reviewing the propriety of a trial

court’s sentencing decision, an appellate court must have before it the evidence and other

information upon which the trial court relied in making its sentencing decision.” The

court held that “if the trial court wishes to take the report of the bail bondsperson into

consideration in determining a proper sentence, it should append it to, and preserve it

with, the presentence-investigation report.” Id. at ¶ 27.

       {¶ 21} Similarly, in Fowler, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-21-031, 2022-Ohio-3499,

involving an aggravated-vehicular homicide conviction that arose from a motorcycle

accident, the trial judge informed Fowler that he lives very close to the site of the

accident, and his wife had told him “that she could hear [the] motorcycle leaving town

and knew by the pitch of the engine and how quickly it was moving up the road that there

would be an accident.” Id. at ¶ 9. The court told Fowler that his wife “knew that from a

half a mile, a mile away, so it was predictable not only, it was probable” that an accident

would occur. Id. After saying this, the trial judge did not give Fowler or his attorney an

opportunity to respond to this information before announcing his sentence.

10.
       {¶ 22} We found, first, that the trial court erred by considering information other

than that permitted by R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a). And, like the Yates court, we also found

that the trial judge violated the defendant’s right of allocution by not allowing him to

respond to the new information that he obtained from his wife. We observed that

“[w]hen the court (as opposed to the state or a third party) introduces the new

information, there is a higher likelihood that the court actually considered the new

information in arriving at its sentence, and, consequently, a higher likelihood of prejudice

to the defendant.” Fowler at ¶ 17.

       {¶ 23} Here, as in Yates and Fowler, the trial judge did not allow Sears an

opportunity to respond to the new information before proceeding to sentence him.

Sears’s Crim.R. 32(A)(1) right of allocution was, therefore, violated.

       {¶ 24} Having found that the trial court violated R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a) and

Crim.R. 32(A)(1), we must next determine whether these errors constitute reversible

error. The state emphasizes that Sears did not object when the trial court disclosed that it

had information that had come from Sandusky County and the APA. It maintains,

therefore, that this court should employ a plain-error standard of review under Crim.R. 52

and find that the lower court did not commit plain error. It argues secondarily that if we

find that the trial court committed error, we should find that any such error was harmless.

       {¶ 25} Harmless error is “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does

not affect substantial rights * * *.” Crim.R. 52(A). Plain error is error that affects

substantial rights. Crim.R. 52(B). An “error that affects substantial rights” is one that

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affects the outcome. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d

860, ¶ 22. To show that an error affected substantial rights, the defendant must

demonstrate that there was a “reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice.”

(Emphasis in original.) Id.

       {¶ 26} Ohio courts have recognized that when a trial court imposes a sentence that

is contrary to law, the sentencing errors affect the defendant’s substantial rights. State v.

Masciarelli, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 15 BE 0016, 2017-Ohio-170, ¶ 26; State v. Walters,

4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1009, 2016-Ohio-5783, ¶ 25. But more specific to this case,

courts have found prejudice where these particular errors—violations of R.C.

2929.19(B)(1)(a) and Crim.R. 32(A)(1)—occurred.

       {¶ 27} In Fowler, we found that because the trial judge’s comments demonstrated

that he took new, outside information into consideration and relied on it when deciding

on a sentence, the error was not harmless. See Fowler at ¶ 18. Additionally, the Yates

court explained that when a trial court does not allow the defendant to address new

information introduced and considered by the trial court at sentencing, “error is presumed

prejudicial because the defendant is prevented from speaking at the appropriate time.”

Yates at ¶ 21. We emphasized in Fowler that when it is the court—as opposed to the

state or a third party—that introduces the new information, “there is a higher likelihood

that the court actually considered the new information in arriving at its sentence, and,

consequently, a higher likelihood of prejudice to the defendant.” Fowler at ¶ 17. See

also Light, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-0055, 2023-Ohio-1187, at ¶ 27-28 (finding

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that despite his failure to object, defendant suffered prejudice when court relied on “new

information” that was “not otherwise part of the record,” then proceeded to sentencing

without allowing defendant to respond); State v. Castle, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 03CA24,

2004-Ohio-1992, ¶ 9 (“The failure to grant allocution is not harmless error when a

defendant is denied the opportunity to address evidence introduced and considered by the

trial court at sentencing.”).

       {¶ 28} Here, there is no question that the trial court considered and relied on

information that was not contained in the record, presented at the sentencing hearing, or

included in the PSI. There is also no question that this information was relayed without

giving Sears an opportunity to respond. Specifically, the court said that Sandusky

County, the APA, and the Ottawa County probation department all agreed that he is not

amenable to community control. “So,” the court told Sears, “I will find that you’re not

amenable to community control.” (Emphasis added.) Because it is clear that the court

relied on information outside R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a) that was not presented at the

sentencing hearing before allocution, in violation of Crim.R. 32(A)(1), we conclude that

Sears’s sentence was contrary to law and the trial court’s errors were not harmless.

       {¶ 29} The dissent contends that any error here was harmless because there is no

suggestion that Sears was taken by surprise by information coming from the APA or the

Sandusky County probation department. But that puts this court in the position of

deeming what is or is not surprising to a person being sentenced. If the information was

properly offered before allocution—i.e., because it was (1) contained in the record; (2)

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presented at the hearing by the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim or the

victim’s representative, and any other person approved by the trial court before

allocution; (3) included in the presentence investigation report; or (4) referenced in any

victim impact statement and presented before allocution—we would not be forced to

make such an assessment. But it was not, and according to Ohio case law, we presume

Sears was prejudiced.

       {¶ 30} We find Sears’s sole assignment of error well-taken.

                                     III. Conclusion

       {¶ 31} The trial judge considered and relied on information of a type not

enumerated in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(a), which it introduced without providing Sears an

opportunity to respond, also violating his right of allocution under Crim.R. 32(A)(1).

These errors were not harmless. As such, Sears’s sentence was contrary to law. We find

his sole assignment of error well-taken, reverse the August 4, 2022 judgment of the

Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, and remand to the trial court for resentencing.

The state is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment reversed
                                                                             and remanded.

14.
                                                                             State of Ohio v.
                                                                                 Jason Sears
                                                                        C.A. No. OT-22-048

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                             ____________________________
                                                           JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J.
CONCUR.                                            ____________________________
                                                           JUDGE

Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
DISSENTS AND WRITES
SEPARATELY.

       DUHART, P.J., dissenting.

       {¶ 32} I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a sentencing judge may not

rely on previously disclosed oral communications from the judge’s own probation

department, especially where, as here, the communication has introduced nothing

intrinsically new to the sentencing calculation.

       {¶ 33} In the instant case, the trial court, addressing Sears’ amenability to

community control, stated simply:

       I’ve certainly considered the Presentence Report that I received from the

       [Ottawa County] Probation Department who attempted to do the most

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       thorough job they could without your participation in at least parts of it.

       They have spoken with Sandusky County and with, they’ve had

       communication with the Adult Parole Authority, all of whom it is their

       opinion that you’re not amenable to community control. And it is the

       opinion of [the Ottawa County] Probation Department that, again, you’re

       not amenable to community control. So I will find that you are not

       amenable to community control.

       {¶ 34} With this statement, the trial court merely disclosed that it had

considered both the recommendation of its own probation department, over whose

work the trial court has supervisory power, and the reasons and underlying support

for that recommendation. See R.C. 2301.27(A)(1)(a) (providing that the court shall

supervise the work of its probation officers).

       {¶ 35} The majority’s interpretation of R.C. 2929.19(A) and (B)(1)(a) renders

unlawful the trial court’s objectively reasonable action in this case. “‘[I]t is the duty of

the courts, if the language of a statute fairly permits * * * so to construe the statute as to

avoid [an unreasonable or absurd] result.’” State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga County

Medical Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.Ed.3d 498, ¶ 24,

citing State ex rel. Cooper v. Savord, 153 Ohio St.367, 92 N.E.2d 390 (1950), paragraph

one of the syllabus. In my opinion, the majority’s interpretation of R.C. 2929.19(A) and

(B)(1)(a) yields an absurd and unnecessary result in that it prevents a trial judge from

relying on communications from his or her own probation department.

16.
       {¶ 36} As indicated above, R.C. 2929.19(A) provides that a trial court shall hold a

sentencing hearing at which “the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim or the

victim’s representative * * * and, with the approval of the court, any other person may

present information relevant to the imposition of sentence in this case.” And R.C.

2929.19(B)(1) states that “[a]t the sentencing hearing the court, before imposing

sentence, shall * * * [c]onsider the record,” including “any information presented at the

hearing by any person pursuant to division (A) of this section.” Although the statute does

not specify trial judges among the people authorized to present information at sentencing,

it also makes no exclusions for them. To the contrary, it allows any person having the

court’s approval to present information relevant to the imposition of sentence.

       {¶ 37} I reject the majority’s suggestion that this interpretation of the law would

render a trial judge a “mouthpiece” for the probation department. Instead, it would permit

a trial court to consider and to put on the record relevant information that had already

been relayed to it by that department.

       {¶ 38} By contrast, the majority’s interpretation of the law, when taken to its

logical conclusion, would compel the absurd result that a trial court would have to

disregard oral communications received from the very probation department over whose

work the trial court has supervisory authority. See R.C. 2301.(A)(1)(a) (providing that the

trial court shall supervise the work of its probation department).

       {¶ 39} For all of the foregoing reasons, I would find that the trial court lawfully

considered information concerning Sears’ amenability to community control that was

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obtained through the trial court’s own probation department and, thereafter, was

presented by the trial court itself at sentencing. In this way, the trial court’s action is

easily and fairly viewed as conforming with the plain language of the applicable statutes.

         {¶ 40} Regarding the alleged violation of Crim.R. 32(A)(1), Sear’s right of

allocution, I would note that at the time of sentencing in this case, Sears was on parole

and was actively involved with the Sandusky County probation department. Any

suggestion that he was taken by surprise by information coming from the APA or the

Sandusky County probation department concerning his amenability to community control

defies credibility. In this way, Sears’ case is materially distinguishable from Fowler,

where the trial judge’s wife was the source of new and outside information that was

relied upon by the trial court but could not have been known by the defendant to exist.

Sears’ case is also distinguishable from Yates, where the trial judge prevented the

defendant from speaking after the defendant had raised his hand, indicating his desire to

do so. In the instant case, Sears, upon hearing of the recommendations of the other

correctional authorities, made absolutely no attempt to challenge or to otherwise address

them. Nor did his counsel make any attempt to object. Under the circumstances, I, unlike

the majority, would find that any violation of Crim.R. 32(A)(1) was, at most, harmless

error.

         {¶ 41} In sum, because the trial court in this case candidly disclosed that it had

relied upon a relevant and proper communication from its probation department, and

because the communication in question addressed nothing intrinsically new or surprising

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to the defendant that would result in any unfair prejudice, I respectfully dissent and

would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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