Court Opinion

ID: 9956838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 23:02:08.601828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:55.659425
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/2/24 P. v. Mou CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                B326010

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Los Angeles County
                                                                            Super. Ct. No. NA116646)
           v.

 LEMOL MOU,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
      R. Chris Lim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt Bloomfield and Stefanie Yee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

      Defendant Lemol Mou pleaded no contest to two counts of
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Mou
argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence discovered during a search of the vehicle Mou was
driving. We affirm the judgment.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
      One evening in March 2021, Long Beach Police Department
(the department) Officer Chad Manis was stopped at an
intersection in his patrol car. Mou was driving a van and had
stopped at the same intersection. Manis saw that Mou was not
wearing a seat belt. Manis turned his patrol car around, caught
up to Mou, and activated his lights and siren. Mou pulled into a
Pizza Hut parking lot and stopped.
      Manis approached Mou’s vehicle. At this time, Mou was
wearing a seat belt. Manis asked for Mou’s driver’s license. Mou
stated that he did not have a driver’s license, and instead
produced an identification card. Mou also told Manis that the
vehicle was registered to his friend. Manis confirmed with the
department that Mou had a suspended license. He then “pulled”
Mou out of the vehicle and escorted him to the front of the patrol
car.
      Manis decided the vehicle needed to be towed. The vehicle
was illegally parked in the Pizza Hut parking lot, and would
“impede traffic for the business” and “obstruct the business and
be a nuisance.” In addition, the vehicle was parked in a high

1     Mou pleaded no contest before trial. These facts are
primarily taken from the testimony presented at the preliminary
hearing.

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crime area. Manis testified that the department had a
“standardized policy” requiring vehicles to be towed under such
circumstances. He called a tow company around this time, but he
did not recall whether he called the tow company before or after
he searched the vehicle.
       Manis also testified that department policy required
officers to conduct an inventory search of any vehicle being
towed. According to Manis, this is a “systematic search” to
document valuable items inside the vehicle before it is taken to
the tow yard. Officers determine what items to catalog on a case-
by-case basis, guided by their opinion of what is valuable. Two
officers would each search one side of the vehicle and discuss
their findings after the search was completed. As part of the
inventory search, officers would make a list of valuable items on
an “FI card” or “tow sheet, if it’s available at the time.”
Otherwise, the officers would “take a mental note and write it
down on the tow sheet at a later time.”
       Manis and the assisting officer, Officer Payan, began an
inventory search of the vehicle Mou was driving. Manis searched
the driver’s side of the vehicle, and Payan searched the
passenger’s side and center console. Neither officer kept a
contemporaneous record of valuable items identified during the
search. Manis later noted in his police report that “ ‘Mou’s access
card and $100’ ” were found in the center console. The record
does not include an FI card or tow sheet.
       During the search, Payan found a loaded firearm under the
front passenger seat. The officers handcuffed Mou and placed
him in the back of their patrol car.
       At the preliminary hearing, Manis testified to the above
facts. Mou moved to suppress evidence recovered during the

                                3
search of the vehicle under Penal Code section 1538.5,
subdivision (a).2 Mou argued that the officers’ decision to tow the
vehicle was not reasonable because they could have instead
moved it to a legal parking spot or contacted the registered
owner. Mou also argued that the search was not a proper
inventory search. Mou asserted the officers’ actions reflected an
investigative search seeking contraband.
       The magistrate found Manis credible. Based on the totality
of the circumstances, the magistrate concluded the officers “had
authorization to, A, have the car towed; and B, conduct some
limited search of the vehicle, which I believe they did in this
case.” The magistrate reasoned that the search was proper
because it did not reach “the trunk or the backseats,” and was
instead restricted to “the front of the car, by the console and
underneath the seats.” The magistrate denied Mou’s motion to
suppress.
       Mou renewed his motion to suppress in the trial court. The
court denied the motion.
       Mou pleaded no contest to two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and
admitted the aggravating factor of having served a prior sentence
in state prison or county jail (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(3)).3 The court imposed a suspended sentence of
three years and eight months, placed Mou on probation for two

2     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3     After Mou was arrested, he told officers there was a gun in
the home at which he was staying. Officers obtained a search
warrant for the home and found a gun. The second charge was
based on the later discovered firearm.

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years, and ordered him to complete 200 hours of community
service. Mou timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures.4 A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the
basis that it was obtained through an unreasonable search or
seizure. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a).)
       “When a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in
conjunction with a preliminary hearing, as in this case, the
magistrate tries the facts, resolving credibility issues and
conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing
appropriate inferences.” (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th
931, 941 (Romeo).)
       On appeal, “we in effect disregard the ruling of the superior
court and directly review the determination of the magistrate. In
doing so we draw all presumptions in favor of the magistrate’s
express or implied factual determinations and must uphold them
if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Shafrir
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244–1245 (Shafrir).) We defer to
the magistrate’s credibility findings, “because only the magistrate
heard the evidence, saw the demeanor of witnesses and was in a
position to judge credibility.” (People v. Woods (1993) 12
Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147 (Woods).)
       Next, “we independently apply the law to the factual
findings [citations], determining de novo whether the factual

4     California courts apply federal constitutional exclusionary
principles. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879.)

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record supports the magistrate’s conclusion that the challenged
search met the constitutional standard of reasonableness
[citations].” (Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 942.)
II.    The Magistrate Did Not Err in Denying Mou’s Motion
       to Suppress
       Mou argues that the decision to impound the vehicle was
unreasonable. He also contends there was insufficient evidence
that the officers’ search was a proper inventory search based on
department policy rather than a pretextual investigatory search.
We disagree.
       A.    The magistrate properly concluded the decision
             to impound was reasonable
       “In the interests of public safety and as part of what the
Court has called ‘community caretaking functions,’ [citation]”
police may impound “automobiles which violate parking
ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety
and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” (South Dakota v.
Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 368, 369 (Opperman).) “Whether
an impoundment is warranted under this community caretaking
doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police
officers’ duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers
or being a target for vandalism or theft.” (Miranda v. City of
Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 864.)
       Here, Manis testified that the vehicle was illegally parked
in a Pizza Hut parking lot. It was positioned in such a way that
it would obstruct the business and cause a nuisance. Mou did not
have a valid driver’s license, so he could not lawfully move the
vehicle. The decision to tow and impound the vehicle was
reasonable under these circumstances. (Halajian v. D & B
Towing (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1, 6, 15 [reasonable to impound

                                 6
where the driver was unlicensed and the vehicle was in a private
parking lot].) Manis also testified that the vehicle was in a high
crime area, which further supports the decision to impound.
(Shafrir, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248 [impoundment was
reasonable “to avoid leaving a new luxury car in a known high-
crime area”]; Ramirez v. City of Buena Park (9th Cir. 2009) 560
F.3d 1012, 1025 [reasonable to impound vehicle from drugstore
parking lot due to risk of vandalism or theft].) The magistrate
found Manis credible, and we defer to that finding. (Woods,
supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147.) Based on this evidence, the
decision to impound was reasonable.
       Mou argues the impoundment was unreasonable because
the officers did not attempt to move the vehicle to a legal parking
spot or contact its owner. Yet, “[t]he fact that there may be less
intrusive means of protecting a vehicle and its contents does not
render the decision to impound unreasonable.” (People v. Steeley
(1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 892 (Steeley), citing Colorado v.
Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 374–375 (Bertine).)
       B.    The magistrate correctly determined the
             inventory search was reasonable
       “When vehicles are impounded, local police departments
generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying
the automobiles’ contents. These procedures developed in
response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s
property while it remains in police custody, [citation]; the
protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or
stolen property, [citation]; and the protection of the police from
potential danger, [citation].” (Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at
p. 369.) These “inventory searches are now a well-defined
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”

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(Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 371.) However, “a valid inventory
search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice.” (People v.
Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 138 (Williams).) “ ‘[A]n
inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in
order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice
governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an
inventory.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 126.)
       Here, substantial evidence supported the magistrate’s
finding that the search was conducted according to department
policy and intended to produce an inventory. Manis testified that
department policy required officers to conduct an inventory
search of any vehicle before impoundment. He explained that the
purpose of an inventory search is to identify and document items
of value. Two officers conduct a “systematic search” of the
vehicle, with one officer taking each side. Officers identify items
to be inventoried based on a “case by case” determination of each
item’s value. They record valuable items on an FI card or tow
sheet during or after the search, if available. Although general,
these parameters are sufficient to establish the existence of a
policy. (Steeley, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 892 [inventory
search was reasonable based on officer’s testimony that it was
“standard procedure” to “ ‘make sure what property is in the
vehicle’ ” and prepare an inventory report].) In addition, nothing
in the record suggests the officers were seeking evidence of
criminality. The evidence supported the conclusion that the
officers adhered to a “preexisting policy or practice” aimed at
producing an inventory of valuable items in the vehicle.
(Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 126, 138.)
       Mou contends there was insufficient evidence of any
department policy guiding inventory searches, as required under

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Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at page 138. However, this
contention ignores Manis’s testimony, in which he generally
described the procedures used in inventory searches. Although
Manis did not expressly state that these were department
procedures, he testified that the “standardized policy for [the]
department” required him to tow the vehicle and conduct an
inventory search, and he detailed the process of a typical
inventory search. This was sufficient. Indeed, courts have found
far more limited testimony may establish the existence of a
department policy. For example, in People v. Green (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 367 at page 374, the officer merely testified: “ ‘It was
an inventory search since we were impounding his vehicle.’ ” The
court reasoned that although the officer “did not use the magic
words ‘standard procedure,’ her matter-of-fact response indicates
that an inventory search following impound of the vehicle is
standard department procedure,” and concluded the search was
reasonable. (Id. at p. 375.)
      Mou also asserts the evidence was insufficient to establish
an inventory search because the officers did not fill out an FI card
or tow sheet. However, failure to “complete the inventory list
that ordinarily would be completed as part of a department
inventory search is not, on its own, a material deviation from
policy” and “does not invalidate an inventory search.” (United
States v. Garay (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 1108, 1112 (Garay);
United States v. Trullo (1st Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 205, 206.)
Although Manis did not fill out the proper form, he created an
inventory by logging the items of value in his police report, and
otherwise “complied with the department’s inventory-search
policy in material respects.” (Garay, at p. 1112.)

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       Mou further claims the officers “ignored several items” in
the center console and trunk, thus suggesting they were not
genuinely conducting an inventory. Yet, Manis testified the
inventory search procedure was only to note items of “major
value.” Manis indicated he did not recall locating any valuable
items in the vehicle aside from the two he logged in his police
report, and there is no evidence the officers overlooked anything
of value. Moreover, even if other items should have been logged,
this error or administrative shortfall alone does not render the
search invalid as an inventory search. (Garay, supra, 938 F.3d at
p. 1111 [inventory search not invalid because “officers listed only
some property in the Vehicle Report” but “booked additional
property as evidence”].)
       Finally, Mou argues the officers’ conduct suggests the
search was investigative. For example, Mou asserts the officers
checked under the seats because that is a location where
contraband is likely to be found. Yet, an inventory search may
normally “ ‘extend[ ] to the open areas of the vehicle, including
such areas under seats . . . .’ ” (People v. Zabala (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 335, 343; United States v. Edwards (5th Cir. 1978)
577 F.2d 883, 894 [“the police, in conducting an inventory search,
may ordinarily inspect . . . under the front seats”]; United States
v. Hernandez-Albino (1st Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 33, 42 [affirming
denial of motion to suppress gun found under passenger seat
during inventory search]; United States v. Richardson (7th Cir.
1997) 121 F.3d 1051, 1053, 1059 [same].) Indeed, as the
magistrate recognized, the reasonableness of the search was
supported by the fact that the officers only targeted the front
seats, console, and glovebox, and did not search the trunk or back
seats. Under the circumstances of this case, the search under the

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front seats did not suggest the officers were merely rummaging
for evidence of criminal activity. (Compare People v. Lee (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 853, 869 [affirming order finding no valid
inventory search where the officer “admitted that he searched
underneath the backseat because it is a common place to hide
illegal items”]; People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 789
[inventory search was pretext for investigatory search where
officer testified it was conducted per narcotics officers’ request
and intended to locate evidence of drug activity].)
       Mou’s reliance on People v. Wallace (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
82 (Wallace) is misplaced. In Wallace, the court concluded that a
search of a vehicle was not a proper inventory search based on
multiple factors, only one of which was the absence of evidence of
the requisite inventory form. (Id. at p. 92.) There was no
evidence that any officer decided the vehicle needed to be
impounded, a necessary precondition to a valid inventory search.
(Ibid.) The officer who searched the vehicle testified that he was
there to arrest the driver on a domestic violence charge unrelated
to the traffic stop, not to coordinate the towing or inventory of the
vehicle. (Id. at p. 86.) He further testified that his search of the
vehicle was, in part, incident to that arrest. (Ibid.) The officer
“did not respond directly” when asked if the department’s policy
on inventory searches applied to the search he conducted. (Id. at
p. 92, fn.2.)
       In contrast, here, Manis decided to have the vehicle towed
and impounded before searching it. He testified clearly that the
department required an inventory search in this situation, and
that the search he conducted was an inventory search. The
magistrate credited this testimony, and we defer to that finding.
(Woods, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147.) Nothing in the record

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suggests, as in Wallace, that the officers searched the car for
reasons unrelated to impounding it to fulfill a community
caretaking function. Sufficient evidence supported the
magistrate’s findings and we conclude the search and seizure of
evidence from the car was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                         ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                 EGERTON, J.

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