Court Opinion

ID: 9611950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:01:40.519005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:18.245913
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because I cannot accept the majority’s unsupported conclusion that Steven Robert Schrader committed an act of moral turpitude when he neglected to seek pro hac vice status in New York before filing a petition to probate a will, I dissent to the imposition of a one-year suspension.
Schrader is an attorney licensed to practice law in Georgia. The State of New York prosecuted Schrader for filing a false document and for the misdemeanor of practicing law without a license1 when it discovered that he had filed a petition to probate a will without seeking pro hac vice status. New York dismissed the charge of filing a false document and Schrader pled guilty to practicing law without a license. The State Bar of Georgia initiated disciplinary proceedings against Schrader and sought his disbarment, contending that he had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.
In determining whether a misdemeanor conviction involves *603moral turpitude in the context of State Bar Rule 4-106 and Standard 66 of State Bar Rule 4-102 (d), this Court has previously examined the circumstances of the conviction and has not relied solely upon the elements of the crime charged. For example in In the Matter of Williams,2 the Court held that the misdemeanor of public indecency is not per se one involving moral turpitude for bar disciplinary purposes. Additionally, in In the Matter of Nicholson,3 this Court relied on the factual showing that the lawyer repeatedly failed to file returns for years in which taxes were due and stood to gain a monetary benefit from his conduct in order to conclude that his conviction for wilful failure to file tax returns was a crime involving moral turpitude. In Nicholson, the Court specifically declined to consider whether a single act of wilful failure to file returns where no tax obligation existed would constitute a crime of moral turpitude.4 These precedents dictate that we examine the circumstances of the present case before determining that Schrader’s misdemeanor conviction for practicing law without a license is a crime of moral turpitude.5
The evidence showed that Schrader moved to New York in 1996 and began teaching full-time at a private high school. He began the process of admission to the New York bar through reciprocity with the District of Columbia Bar. He also received information that he could practice in New York pending admission to the New York bar if he associated himself with a New York lawyer, informed his clients of his status, and sought admission pro hac vice when he appeared in court. He represented clients in several criminal matters on a pro hac vice basis. He obtained a listing in the Suffolk County Bar Directory as an attorney not licensed in New York. He also had a listing in a church directory as an attorney, but that listing did not specify that he was licensed only in Georgia. When he filed the petition to probate he believed he could seek pro hac vice status when he appeared before a judge on the probate matter. There was no evidence that Schrader’s actions harmed his client or others. Indeed, his client in the probate matter had no complaints against Schrader, believed that he had served her well while he was representing her, and believed the criminal proceedings resulted from a misunderstanding. Finally, as the special master concluded, the crime to which Schrader pled guilty requires no element of wrongful intent to harm, deceive, or defraud. New York dismissed the charge against Schrader that did *604require as an element proof of an intent to deceive.6
Decided November 1, 1999.
William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, E. Duane Cooper, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
Considering all these circumstances, I agree with the special master’s conclusion that Schrader’s conviction does not involve moral turpitude and that no discipline is warranted under Bar Rule 4-106 and Standard 66.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears and Justice Hunstein join in this dissent.

 N.Y. Judiciary Law § 478 (“It shall be unlawful for any natural person to practice or appear as an attomey-at-law . . . for a person other than himself in a court of record in this state . . . without having first been duly and regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this state . . . .”).

 266 Ga. 132 (464 SE2d 816) (1996).

 243 Ga. 803 (257 SE2d 195) (1979).

 Id. at 807.

 See also In the Matter of Brooks, 264 Ga. 583 (449 SE2d 87) (1994) (Sears, J., concurring) (Court “required to sit as a court of law and soberly determine the appropriate punishment based, not just on the nature of the offenses, but also on the particular facts of the case and the character and circumstances of the admitted perpetrator.”).

 N.Y. Penal Law § 175.35.