Court Opinion

ID: 9951651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 17:04:19.089403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:54.023266
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 P. v. Davis CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D082556

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. FVI700493-2)

KENNETH LAMONT DAVIS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernadino County,
John P. Vander Feer, Judge. Affirmed.
         Kenneth Lamont Davis, in pro. per.; and Marta I. Stanton, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant Kenneth Lamont Davis appeals from the superior court’s
denial of his postconviction petition seeking resentencing pursuant to Penal

Code1 section 1172.62 following an evidentiary hearing. Appointed counsel
filed a brief in accordance with the procedures outlined in People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738
(Anders), and Davis submitted a letter raising arguments for this court’s
consideration.
      Finding no arguable issues, we affirm the superior court’s order.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 2011, a jury convicted Davis of multiple crimes committed in 2007:
first degree murder of David Bruce Van Fleet (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a),
count 1); first degree burglary (§ 459, count 2); and first degree robbery
(§ 211, count 3). The jury also found Davis committed all three crimes with
the knowledge that another principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022,
subd. (d)) and found true three special circumstances: “[t]he murder was
intentional and carried out for financial gain” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)); Davis
“intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait” (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(15)); and “[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted
commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to
commit . . . [r]obbery” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)).

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was recodified without
substantive change in section 1172.6, pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 200
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the
current codification throughout this opinion.
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      Davis was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus a
consecutive term of three years on count 1 for being vicariously armed with a
firearm, and a consecutive term of six years on count 2. The court stayed the
sentence on count 3 and the firearm enhancement as to counts 2 and 3. In an
unpublished opinion (People v. Davis (March 28, 2013, D061059) [nonpub.
opn.]), this court affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment to correct
the sentence by striking the erroneous three-year sentencing enhancement
and replacing it with the one-year penalty under section 12022,
subdivision (a). The superior court resentenced Davis accordingly.
      In March 2019, Davis filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6. After appointment of counsel and briefing by the parties, the court
found Davis made a prima facie showing of eligibility and issued an order to
show cause.
      Following multiple continuances and additional briefing, an evidentiary
hearing was ultimately held in May 2023. The People submitted the record
of the underlying trial court proceedings, which was admitted into evidence.
Defense counsel called developmental psychologist Dr. Elizabeth Cauffman ,
who testified regarding adolescent development. After admitting copies of
Dr. Cauffman’s power point slides into evidence and hearing counsels’
arguments, the court took the matter under submission.
      Three months later, the court delivered a detailed oral ruling denying
the resentencing petition. The court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Davis was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard for human
life. As an additional basis for its denial, it also determined that Davis was a
direct aider and abettor of the murder. Davis filed a timely appeal.
      Appellate counsel identified no arguable issues for reversal on appeal
and asks this court to conduct an independent review of the record in

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accordance with Wende and Anders.3 To assist the court in its review of the
record for error, and in compliance with Anders, counsel identified two issues
considered during the evaluation of the potential merits of this appeal:
(1) whether the superior court followed the proper procedures when it denied
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing; and
(2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings.
      We notified Davis of his right to file his own brief on appeal. He
responded by filing a two-page hand-written letter (supplemental brief).
                                  DISCUSSION
      Davis’s supplemental brief offers two arguments. He claims: (1) the
court should have taken his youth into account when considering whether he
acted with reckless indifference to human life; and (2) there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s conclusion he aided and abetted the murder

because he did not intend to kill the victim.4
      Resentencing relief under section 1176.2 is unavailable if the defendant
was the actual killer, a direct aider and abettor, or “was a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,
as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subds. (e)(1)-(3);

3     Appellate counsel argues the more limited procedures prescribed in
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) do not apply because,
unlike Delgadillo, the superior court in this case denied the petition after
issuing an order to show cause. (Id. at p. 228.) Because the superior court
conducted an evidentiary hearing at which it heard testimony and considered
the record of the underlying trial court proceedings, we exercise our
discretion to conduct an independent review of the record in this case. (Id. at
p. 232.) We need not weigh in on counsel’s broader due process arguments.

4       Davis also indicates he would “like to file” other postconviction motions.
We express no opinion on whether he is entitled to any other postconviction
relief.
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§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “Under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), the superior
court acts as an independent fact finder and determines whether the People
have met their burden in proving the defendant guilty of murder under the
revised felony-murder law.” (People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 737.)
As we discuss below, the court properly considered Davis’s youth when
determining he acted with reckless indifference to human life, and its
conclusions that Davis acted with reckless disregard for human life and was
a direct aider and abettor of the murder are supported by substantial
evidence.
1.    Reckless indifference to human life
      When the Legislature amended section 189 to incorporate a defendant
who was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human
life within the resentencing framework, “it codified the understanding of th[e]
requirements elucidated in [People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks)] and [People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark)].” (People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.) However, “‘[n]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ”
(Clark, at p. 618, quoting Banks, at p. 803.) “Since Clark, courts have
discerned an additional factor that may be relevant to the reckless
indifference analysis—the defendant’s youth.” (People v. Keel (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558.)
      After meticulously reviewing its analysis of the Banks and Clark
factors (see Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 615), the superior court in this case concluded the evidence established,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Davis was a major participant in the robbery
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Contrary to Davis’s
contention, the court did, indeed, consider his youth in its reckless

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indifference analysis. In addition to hearing Dr. Elizabeth Cauffman’s
testimony and viewing her power point slides concerning adolescent brain
development and the associated difficulties with impulse control and
cognition, the court specifically addressed Davis’s age and his level of
maturity and awareness. It took care to explain why it believed Davis was
“not intellectually disabled.” In the court’s view, he was “not unduly
pressured . . . [into] making a snap decision.”
      Davis cites to People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, in which
the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying a petition for
resentencing, in part, because petitioner’s “youth at the time of the shooting
greatly diminishe[d] any inference he acted with reckless disregard for
human life.” (Id. at p. 990.) The appellate court noted that Ramirez, who
was only 15 years old, “may well have lacked the experience and maturity to
appreciate the risk that the attempted carjacking would escalate into a
shooting and death, and he was more susceptible to pressure from his fellow
gang members to participate in the carjacking.” (Id. at p. 975.) Ramirez was
not aware that the shooter had a “propensity for violence” (id. at p. 988); the
shooting occurred quickly without Ramirez having a meaningful opportunity
to intervene (id. at p. 989); and there was no evidence Ramirez had an
opportunity to help the victim after he was shot, or that he knew the victim
was wounded by the gunfire (ibid.).
      Unlike Ramirez, Davis was 19 years old at the time of the murder, and
the court could reasonably infer he did have the experience and the maturity
to appreciate the risk of death. He was uniquely aware of the significant
possibility of violence after learning that Jones had previously “off’d [a] guy”
and intended to murder Van Fleet, yet he voluntarily accompanied Jones to
Van Fleet’s house. During the almost four hours between their arrival and

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the shooting, Davis did nothing to intervene or interfere with Van Fleet’s
expressed intention.
2.    Direct aiding and abetting
      After finding defendant ineligible for resentencing relief because he
was a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference
to human life, the court went on to conclude, as an alternative basis for the
denial of defendant’s motion, that Davis directly aided and abetted the
murder of Van Fleet. Without citation to legal authority, Davis argues there
was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding because he did not
intend to kill Van Fleet. He asserts he did not threaten Van Fleet, trap him,
“render[ ] him prone, or otherwise maneuver[ ] him into a position of
vulnerability” and suggests he lacked the requisite malice based on the fact
that he “declined” when Jones attempted to hand him a gun to kill Van
Fleet.”
      Substantial evidence fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Davis was a direct aider and abettor of the murder who harbored the
necessary mental state (mens rea). “The mens rea, which must be personally
harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission
of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
689, 713; see also People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
485, 501.) Davis’s argument is based on a selective presentation of the facts.
      The court recognized that although Davis “declined” to act as the
shooter, Davis returned the loaded firearm to Jones knowing that he planned
to kill Van Fleet. Forensic pathologist Dr. Steven Trenkle testified he did not
expect a wound like Van Fleet’s would be immediately fatal and could be

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survivable with medical treatment. After coming into Van Fleet’s room
immediately after hearing the shot, Davis heard Van Fleet snoring but did
not render any assistance to the victim. Instead, he proceeded to assist Jones
in wrapping Van Fleet up in bedding and placing him in a trash can. The
court reasonably inferred that Van Fleet was still alive when Davis assisted
Jones and that his actions “seal[ed] the fate of Van Fleet.” (See People v.
Sinclair (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 891, 898–899 [reasonable inferences may be
drawn from circumstantial evidence].) Even if the circumstances might also
be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding, there is no basis for
reversal. (See People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11).
3.    Independent review of the record
      Our review of the record as mandated by Wende and Anders, including
the considerations noted by appellate counsel, has not disclosed any
reasonably arguable appellate issues. The superior court followed the proper
procedures, and its order denying defendant’s 1172.6 petition after the
evidentiary hearing is supported by substantial evidence.
      Competent counsel represented Davis on this appeal.

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                               DISPOSITION
      The order denying Davis’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                                          DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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