Court Opinion

ID: 9655606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:17:39.170386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:20.600962
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe the privilege against self-incrimination was intended to apply to the situation presented here. The defendant is a parolee who would be serving a prison sentence but for that fact. One of the conditions of his parole is to meet periodically with a probation agent. The probation officer’s function is to work towards rehabilitating the parolee while protecting the public interest. State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn.1980). To do this job, the agent must be aware of all of the parolee’s problems, both past and present. It is entirely reasonable for the agent to ask a parolee if he has had prior problems with the law. If the agent in this case had gone first to the police before talking with the defendant, she would have destroyed her credibility and severely impaired her ability to assist the defendant.
We have held in State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn.1980), that a parolee has a duty to cooperate with his agent and that an agent can search a parolee’s apartment without a search warrant if the agent has probable cause to believe the parolee has violated the terms of parole. As we noted there, because of the special relationship between a probation officer and his client, the law relating to probationary searches cannot be strictly governed by automatic reference to ordinary search and seizure rules. Id. at 368; see Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975) *346(parole rather than probation situation). Thus, I would hold this is not an ordinary custodial situation to which the privilege should apply. Even if it is held to be custodial, I would hold that this parolee’s situation is an exception to the rule and that the privilege does not apply.