Court Opinion

ID: 9588457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:37.604081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.940064
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
1. In its decision, the majority announces new appellate rules in the State of Georgia: neither the “harmless error” rule nor the “right for any reason” rule is applicable in cases where the judgment entered is the result of the grant of a motion for directed verdict. In the past, this court has held that “while some of the court’s reasons for directing the verdict as to this issue were incorrect, nevertheless if the court is right for any reason it will be affirmed.” Paul v. Jones, 160 Ga. App. 671, 673 (288 SE2d 13) (1981). (Emphasis supplied.) In Dalton &c. Truck Stop v. ADBE Distrib. Co., 146 Ga. App. 8 (1) (245 SE2d 346) (1978), the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the *302plaintiff prior to the introduction of any evidence by the defendant. Noting that the trial court had no authority to direct a verdict for the plaintiff prior to the presentation of the defendant’s evidence, this court stated that, nevertheless, “if the judgment be right for any reason, it will be affirmed.” In Cordell Ford Co. v. Mullis, 121 Ga. App. 123 (6) (173 SE2d 120) (1970), this court labelled the direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant as “a case where the right result has been reached for the wrong reasons” and proceeded to affirm the judgment. See also Gleaton v. Atlanta, 131 Ga. App. 399 (3) (206 SE2d 46) (1974): “If a judgment excepted to [the grant of a directed verdict] is right for any reason, it will be affirmed by the appellate courts.” In Green v. Knight, 153 Ga. App. 183 (1) (264 SE2d 657) (1980), a party had made a motion for directed verdict, but had failed to specify the grounds upon which the motion was premised. Nevertheless, the trial court directed the verdict. This court, concluding that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, cited the doctrine of harmless error and affirmed the judgment entered on the grant of a directed verdict. Since both the doctrine of harmless error and the right for any reason rule have been applied by this court to cases in which an appeal was brought from the grant of a directed verdict, those rules should be applied to the case at bar, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed. While Wright & Miller may, in their tome on federal practice and procedure, espouse the principle put forth by the majority, the precedential value of Georgia case law should outweigh a treatise on federal practice.
By means of reviewing the record in the present case, I have ascertained that appellants believe appellee is potentially liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the alleged malpractice of the radiologist involved. However, appellants presented no evidence of the relationship, if any, between the radiologist and appellee, and there was no evidence that appellee was involved with the diagnosis and care of appellants’ decedent or that appellee was in any way negligent towards appellee’s decedent. In the absence of proof of a relationship between appellee and appellants’ decedent, or appellee and the radiologist who treated appellants’ decedent, appellee could not be held liable for negligent treatment of the decedent. Clanton v. Von Haam, 177 Ga. App. 694 (2) (340 SE2d 627) (1986); Strickland v. ITT Rayonier, 162 Ga. App. 317 (1) (291 SE2d 396) (1982).
Appellants point to several places in the transcript where, they maintain, there exists proof of the employer-employee relationship between appellee and the radiologist. However, in each instance, the “proof’ consists of a hypothetical question in which an expert was asked to assume that the radiologist was an employee of appellee and had done some act. The fact was never proved by competent evidence. The assumption of an unproven fact in a hypothetical question *303does not constitute proof of that fact, and appellee’s failure to object to the hypothetical question in which such a fact was assumed is a waiver only of the hypothetical and not a waiver of the questioner’s burden of proving the facts upon which the hypothetical question is based. It does not give probative value to the unproven assumptions made therein. In the absence of proof of appellee’s role vis-a-vis appellants’ decedent, proof of negligence on the part of appellee, or proof that appellee was responsible for the actions of anyone allegedly negligent, I believe the trial court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for directed verdict.
Decided December 1, 1986
Rehearing denied December 18, 1986
B. Seth Harp, Jr., J. Roxanne Mincey, for appellants.
2. Although Division 1 of the majority opinion is mere dicta, I am compelled to point out that the trial court’s oral pronouncement of the directed verdict precluded the filing of a voluntary dismissal of the case against appellee. “[T]he announcement by a trial judge of a decision that will terminate a civil case, though that decision has not been formally reduced to writing and entered, will preclude the filing of a voluntary dismissal after the announcement but before the judgment is actually entered by the trial judge. [Cits.]” Bytell v. Paul, 173 Ga. App. 83, 84 (325 SE2d 451) (1984). See also Mixon v. Trinity Svcs., 176 Ga. App. 679 (1) (337 SE2d 362) (1985). Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the filing of appellant’s voluntary dismissal prior to the filing of the order granting the directed verdict in favor of appellee would not have rendered the latter a nullity since the oral pronouncement of the intent to direct a verdict preceded the filing of the voluntary dismissal.
3. Finally, I differ with the majority as to factual matters contained in the main opinion. Contrary to the assertion contained in the majority opinion, Dr. Taylor, the alleged employee of appellee, was a defendant in the lawsuit. While the record before us does not contain Dr. Taylor’s answer, that is because appellants did not designate that pleading for inclusion in the appellate record. See OCGA § 5-6-43. Appellee Radiology went through the trial because it was also named a defendant in the complaint, and I can find nowhere in the record or transcript anything from which the conclusion may be drawn that Taylor was represented at trial by Radiology Associates.
Because I believe the trial court was correct when it directed a verdict in favor of appellee, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.
*304Ray L. Allison, Richard Y. Bradley, for appellee.