Court Opinion

ID: 9797346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:47.183643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:28.697014
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING {121} Motions for rehearing having been filed in this ease together with briefs submitted by the parties and the Court being fully advised: The motions for rehearing hereby are denied. {122} In order to clarify one portion of the opinion, however, we have opted to do so by this separate published Order. See State v. Gonzales, 1999 NMSC-033, ¶ 32, 128 N.M. 44, 989 P.2d 419.  {123} The question arises whether the State may be permitted to set aside default judgments it has obtained in pending cases so that it may proceed with criminal prosecutions which would otherwise constitute double jeopardy. Rule 1-055(C) NMRA 2000 provides: “For good cause shown, the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 1-060.” In general, “because default judgments are disfavored and causes generally should be tried on their merits, we have counseled trial courts to be liberal in determining the existence of grounds that satisfy Rule 60(B).” Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque v. Rodriguez, 108 N.M. 211, 213, 770 P.2d 533, 535 (1989). “A trial court has abused its discretion in setting aside a default judgment if its decision constituted arbitrary or unreasonable action.” Id. ‘When there are no intervening inequities, any doubt should, as a general proposition, be resolved in favor of the movant to the end of securing a trial upon the merits.” Springer Corp. v. Herrera, 85 N.M. 201, 203, 510 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1973). {124} There are a number of authorities for the proposition that any party obtaining a default may move to have it set aside. 10 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 55.50[2][f] (3rd ed.1999); Ferraro v. Arthur M. Rosenberg Co., 156 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir.1946); Gray v. John Jovino Co., 84 F.R.D. 46, 47 (E.D.Tenn.1979) (“And, as was stated by a panel, [in Ferraro ] upon which sat the late Judge Learned Hand, even where it is the plaintiff who seeks to set aside the defendant’s default judgment, ‘... whoever makes the motion must show an adequate basis for it ...’ ”). The issue was also considered in School City of Gary v. Continental Elec. Co., 158 Ind.App. 132, 301 N.E.2d 803, 810 (1973), in which Justice Black in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1948) is quoted: “In simple English, the language of the ‘other reason’ clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” See also William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes ‘Good Cause’ Allowing Federal Court to Relieve Party of His Default Under Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 7 (1976) (“While it is usually the party suffering the default entry who moves to set it aside, Rule 55(e) does not preclude the party who obtained the default from doing so.”) {125} We, therefore, hold that it is appropriate, to accomplish justice, to allow the State to move to set aside default forfeiture judgments already obtained in pending cases and to proceed in one bifurcated criminal prosecution in the manner set out in the filed opinion. {126} Justices Baca and Serna dissent from the original opinion. {127} IT IS SO ORDERED. /S/ PAMELA B. MINZNER PAMELA B. MINZNER, Chief Justice /S/ JOSEPH F. BACA JOSEPH F. BACA Justice /S/ GENE E. FRANCHINI GENE E. FRANCHINI, Justice /S/ PATRICIO M. SERNA PATRICIO M. SERNA Justice /S/ PETRA JIMENEZ MAES PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice