Court Opinion

ID: 9757164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:21:59.726957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:35.513051
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, J.
I respectfully dissent. I do not quarrel with the Majority with respect to: (1) its reasoning and conclusion extending to juvenile proceedings in Maryland constitutional due process speedy trial protection (Maj. op. at 57-72); (2) its reasoning and conclusion that the Barker v. Wingo1 factors supply the appropriate analytical paradigm for consideration of a speedy trial issue in the juvenile proceeding context (Maj. op. at 70-73); or, indeed, (3) much of the Majority’s weighing of the Barker v. Wingo factors on the record of the present case (for example, the “length of delay” (Maj. op. at 73) and “assertion of the right” (Maj. op. at 76) factors). I part company with the Majority, however, in its weighing and analysis of the remaining Barker v. Wingo factors and its resultant conclusion based on the record of this case.
The Majority’s conclusion as to the weight to be accorded the facts under the “reason for delay” factor, although better sifted than in the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion (which concluded that they should be weighted “heavily in Thomas’s favor,” 132 Md.App. at 404, 752 A.2d 699), should have resulted in a neutral conclusion, rather than one weighed against the State, “albeit less heavily” (Maj. op. at 76). In my view, both the State and Thomas J. shared equally the blame for the delay, to such an extent that I would not weigh this factor against either party.
*82At the 20 May 1999 hearing on Thomas J.’s motion to dismiss, no witnesses testified. The “facts” were proffered by Thomas J.’s attorney and the prosecutor and, without objection, accepted by the Court for purposes of the motion. No documentary exhibits were introduced or formally received in evidence, although the transcript reflects that the judge and counsel at times reviewed documents either in the court file or a party’s file.2
The proffer by Thomas J.’s counsel was to the effect that Thomas and his mother moved from their residence on 23rd Parkway in Forest Heights to “another location within Prince George’s County’ three weeks after the offense was alleged to have been committed on 18 January 1996. As a consequence of the move, Thomas changed schools from Benjamin Stoddert Middle School to Andrew Jackson Middle School in Prince George’s County. His mother, the judge was informed, would have claimed to have supplied her work telephone number to the police detective “in the case.”3 She also would have testified that she provided a change of address to the Post Office.4’5
Notwithstanding that Thomas J.’s mother wholly failed to notify the court directly of the change of residence address, as it appears she had agreed on 18 January 1996 to do, Respon*83dent argues that it was entirely the State’s fault that he was not located until 2 April 1999. He ventures that the State’s Attorney failed to contact the police detective “in the case” to learn of the mother’s work telephone number and failed to assign an investigator to check the County school system to find him. Indeed, the State may be -faulted for merely sticking to routine gestures and “paper-pushing” in its efforts to bring Thomas J. to a prompt adjudication.
By the same token, Thomas J. and his mother were not models of civic responsibility. The Majority blesses the mother’s efforts in “reasonably” keeping in contact with the proper authorities. Maj. op. at 76. The record does not support this characterization. The proffer to the juvenile court judge did not include when she notified the unnamed detective “in the case” or when she notified the Post Office of her change of address. Absent this chronological information, I fail to see how the label of reasonableness is so quickly bestowed. Of greater moment, however, is the question of whether the mother notified the Post Office of the address change at all. The return of the 28 May 1996 summons could be viewed as contradicting that assertion. If one assumed Thomas J.’s mother informed the Post Office on or about of the date of the move (some three weeks after 18 January 1996, or approximately 8 February 1996) and gave no instruction for a longer forwarding period, it could be inferred reasonably that the Post Office would forward her or Thomas J.’s mail through at least August 1996. See n. 5, supra. Yet, the Post Office returned the 28 May 1996 summons marked “unable to forward.” Finally, common sense compels me to question whether a reasonable person, knowing that her child was subject to juvenile proceedings, would move and fail to notify the court of her new address (and her son’s).
I do not purport to engage in fact finding regarding potentially disputed facts or inferences. My point is only that the weighing of the “reason for delay” factor should result in no prejudice to either party. There is more than enough blame on this score to share proportionately.
*84I also quarrel with the Majority’s analysis of the “prejudice to the accused” factor (Maj. op. at 76-81), to the extent it posits some unexplained degree of weight against the State based on presumed prejudice to Thomas J. I agree that the record reflects no pre-adjudication incarceration, no anxiety or concern claimed by Thomas J., and no evidence that his defense was impaired by the delay. Nonetheless, the Majority apparently weighs this factor against the State solely on the ephemeral concept of presumed prejudice, which, on the record of this case, is a form without substance. The Majority leaps from legal abstracts (Maj. op. at 76-81) identifying the cases and courts that recognize the existence of this presumption to a conclusion that it exists in this case, premised solely on the duration of the delay. Even assuming this presumption applies here, largely because Thomas J. lost the potential benefits of a disposition under our juvenile system of justice when he was 14 years old (at the time of the misconduct) rather than at 17 when he was located and his case tried, I fail to see how the Majority, in a most conclusory fashion, races from there to- the result of a constitutional violation (Maj. op. at 79-81).
According to my Barker v. Wingo “score card,” Thomas J. has the better of the threshold “length of delay” and marginally the “prejudice” factors; however, the important “reason for délay” factor is a “push.” The “assertion of the right” factor is concededly of no significance. Oh so thin a weighing, I would not find that his right to a speedy trial was abridged. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

. In addition to the court form signed by Thomas J.'s mother on 18 January 1996 when he was released to her custody, reference was made to a summons mailed to the address given the court by Thomas J. and his mother on 18 January 1996. That summons was mailed on 28 May 1996 and returned by the Post Office with the notation "moved left no address; unable to forward.”

. The proffer did not include when she did this.

. Again, the proffer was silent as to when the Post Office was so notified.

. It is worth taking judicial notice that, at the pertinent times in this case, the U.S. Postal regulations provided that, unless requested otherwise, the Post Office forwards mail for 6 months to a change of address after notification. See 39 C.F.R. § 111.5 (Domestic Mail Manual, F020, § 1.1, Issue 55, 10 January 2000). If requested, the Post Office will forward mail up to 18 months after notice.