Court Opinion

ID: 9840973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:05:00.012504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:36:29.419516
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 Duran v. County of Los Angeles CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 JESS A. DURAN, JR.,                                                 B316064

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 18STCV08815)
          v.

 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

          Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
     Jess A. Duran, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Gutierrez, Preciado & House and Calvin House, for
Defendant and Respondent.

                          ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Plaintiff and appellant Jess A. Duran appeals from the trial
court’s judgment enforcing a settlement agreement between
Duran and defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles
(County). The primary question before the trial court was
whether the County’s delay in performing one of its obligations
under the agreement—recommending the settlement to County
authorities for approval—was a material breach of the
agreement, justifying Duran’s rescission and therefore
terminating the agreement. The trial court found no material
breach and granted the County’s motion to enforce the
settlement. We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Settlement Agreement
       Duran is a former social worker for the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In 2018,
Duran filed a lawsuit against the County. The parties attended
mediation and reached a settlement in August 2020. Under the
terms of their agreement, the County agreed to pay $246,500 to
settle all of Duran’s claims, contingent on approval by County
authorities, including the Board of Supervisors (the Board). The
parties stipulated that the agreement would be deemed “null and
void in the event the County’s approval authorities deny such
approval.” The County had five months from the date of
execution, until January 25, 2021, to recommend the settlement
to the Board for approval. The agreement allowed the parties to
“execute an addendum . . . to extend the time for presentation to
the Board of Supervisors” in case of emergency. The parties
further agreed that Duran would be placed on paid
administrative leave until the Board approved the agreement

                                2
and, upon notice of approval, Duran would resign from his
employment with the County.
The County’s Delayed Performance and Duran’s Purported
Rescission
      The County did not recommend the settlement to the Board
by January 25, 2021. On February 1, 2021, the County payroll
department emailed Duran and his supervisors to ask if his
period of administrative pay had ended. Over three weeks later,
on February 25, 2021, Duran replied, stating he would be
returning to work the following month. Duran purported to
rescind the settlement agreement by email the same day on the
basis that the County’s failure to present the settlement to the
Board for approval by January 25th rendered the agreement
“null and void.”
      On February 26, 2021, the Human Resources
Administrator for DCFS sent Duran a letter reassigning him
“home with pay,” also known as an “ordered absence.” Duran
was instructed to remain available for work assignments during
a regular work schedule but he was prohibited from entering any
DCFS office or contacting DCFS employees about the
reassignment.
      On March 15, 2021, the County presented the settlement
agreement to the Claims Board, which approved the agreement
and forwarded it to the Board of Supervisors the same day. The
County also presented the agreement “to a cluster meeting of
Board deputies on March 17, 2021.” On April 6, 2021, the Board
of Supervisors approved the agreement. The County then
transferred the settlement payment to Duran’s attorney, who
deposited the money in a trust account pending the resolution of

                               3
the parties’ dispute over the enforcement of the settlement
agreement.
The Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement
      By early May 2021, Duran had not resigned his position
despite the Board’s approval of the settlement agreement. The
County moved to enforce the settlement agreement. The County
contended Duran’s rescission due to the County’s delay did not
excuse him from his obligation to resign because the timing of the
County’s performance was not material to the settlement
agreement.
      Duran’s opposition to the motion explained that he agreed
to the five-month period for performance because it would afford
him time to look for a job with “an employer that would help
[him] complete [his] ‘supervised clinical hours’ in psychotherapy,”
and that also participated in a student loan forgiveness program.
He argued the County’s delay deprived him of these exact
benefits: he had to forgo a new employment opportunity because
he could not resign from his County position until the agreement
was approved; he could not complete the supervised clinical hours
necessary for licensure by the Board of Behavioral Sciences while
on “ordered absence;” and he was at risk of losing eligibility for
Public Service Loan Forgiveness if he did not find a position with
a qualified employer “soon.”
      The trial court granted the County’s motion. It found the
approximately two-month delay from January 25, 2021 to the
County’s presentation of the settlement agreement to the Board
in mid-March was insignificant and not a material breach.
      Duran, now self-represented, timely filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that his counsel had “omitted several
crucial facts” in the opposition to the motion to enforce the

                                4
settlement. Duran argued the County’s untimely performance
was a material breach of the agreement and his repudiation was
therefore justified under Civil Code section 1689.1 Duran also
attached the employment offer he claimed he passed up due to
the County’s delinquency, and additional emails he sent to the
County notifying it of his rescission in March 2021.
       In late July 2021, the trial court entered judgment granting
the motion to enforce the settlement and awarding the County
$600 in attorney fees. The court denied Duran’s motion for
reconsideration in September 2021, finding that Duran did not
present new facts warranting reconsideration. The trial court
also concluded the additional information in the motion did not
alter its previous ruling that time was not of the essence and the
two-month delay was not material. Duran timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court Order
       Granting the Motion to Enforce the Settlement
       Agreement
       A. Standard of review
       Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, subdivision (a)
provides, in relevant part: “If parties to pending litigation
stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence
of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case,
or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment
pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” The Legislature
enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to establish “a
summary, expedited procedure to enforce settlement agreements
when certain requirements that decrease the likelihood of

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Civil Code.

                                 5
misunderstandings are met.” (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10
Cal.4th 578, 585.)
       A trial court’s findings of fact on a motion brought pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 “are subject to limited
appellate review and will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence.” (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
779, 790 (Machado).) Substantial evidence review “ ‘ begins and
ends with the determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will
support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Overstock.Com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1079, italics
omitted.) “[W]e must consider all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of
every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of
the judgment.” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th
621, 630.) “ ‘Where different inferences may reasonably be drawn
from undisputed evidence, the conclusion of the … trial judge
must be accepted by the appellate court.’ [Citation.].” (Winograd
v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 633.)
We review the trial court’s conclusions on questions of law de
novo. (Chan v. Lund (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166.)
       Several principles of appellate review also guide our
analysis. “[A] trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be
correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial
court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) “We presume the
trial court knew and properly applied the law absent evidence to
the contrary.” (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103.)

                                 6
       B. Contract rescission: Applicable legal principles
       Rescission is a “ ‘retroactive termination’ of a contract . . . .”
(Nmsbpcsldhb v. County of Fresno (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 954,
959 (Nmsbpcsldhb).) “The consequence of rescission is not only
the termination of further liability, but also the restoration of the
parties to their former positions by requiring each to return
whatever consideration has been received.” (Imperial Casualty &
Indemnity Co. v. Sogomonian (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 169, 184.)
       A party may rescind only under the specific circumstances
set forth in section 1689. (Nmsbpcsldhb, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th
at p. 959.) Section 1689 subdivision (b)(2) and (b)(4) permit a
party to unilaterally rescind a contract “[i]f the consideration for
the obligation of the rescinding party fails, in whole or in part,
through the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds,” or “[i]f the
consideration for the obligation of the rescinding party, before it
is rendered to him, fails in a material respect from any cause.”
       “Case law has uniformly held that a failure of consideration
must be ‘material,’ or go to the ‘essence’ of the contract before
rescission is appropriate.” (Wyler v. Feuer (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d
392, 403–404 (Wyler); Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
265, 277 (Brown) [a party may be discharged from its duty to
perform if the other party’s failure to perform constitutes a
material breach].) “[T]rivial or inappreciable” breaches will not
justify rescission. (Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse
(1942) 21 Cal.2d 411, 433; Wyler, at pp. 403–404 [affirming a jury
instruction that required a claim of rescission under section 1689,
subdivision (b)(2) to arise from a material failure of
consideration].) “[A] finding that a party failed to abide by
certain settlement terms does not necessarily support a finding
the party materially breached the parties’ agreement. [Citation.]

                                   7
Only a material breach . . . would discharge [other parties] from
their duties to perform under the agreement.” (Machado, supra,
39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 796–797; Taliaferro v. Davis (1963) 216
Cal.App.2d 398, 412 [“The right of the injured to claim release
from obligations and thus elect to terminate the contract depends
. . . upon the ‘gravity of the breach.’ [Citation.]”].)
        Whether a breach of a contract is material depends on “the
importance or seriousness” of the breach and “the probability of
the injured party getting substantial performance.” (1 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 852, pp. 938–
940.) “[T]he question of whether a breach of an obligation is a
material breach, so as to excuse performance by the other party,
is a question of fact.” (Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)
        C. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
            finding that the County’s breach was not
            material
        The trial court concluded Duran was not entitled to rescind
the settlement agreement because there was no material breach
by the County. Specifically, the court found the timing of the
County’s recommendation of the settlement agreement to the
Board for approval was not “of the essence” to the agreement
such that the County’s delayed performance constituted a
material breach. Substantial evidence supported this conclusion.
        “Delay in performance is a material failure only if time is of
the essence, i.e., if prompt performance is, by the express
language of the contract or by its very nature, a vital matter.”
(Johnson v. Alexander (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 806, 813; Gold
Mining & Water Co. v. Swinerton (1943) 23 Cal.2d 19, 27
(Swinerton) [failure to timely perform constituted material
breach where time was of the essence].) “The general rule of

                                  8
equity is that time is not of the essence of the contract, unless it
clearly appear[s] from the terms of the contract, in the light of all
the circumstances, that such was the intention of the parties.”
(Henck v. Lake Hemet Water Co. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 136, 143
(Henck).) The intent to make time “of the essence” must be
“clearly, unequivocally and unmistakably shown or expressed in
the document.” (Cushing v. Levi (1931) 117 Cal.App. 94, 104
(Cushing).)
       The settlement agreement between Duran and the County
does not include an express time-is-of-the-essence clause. The
parties memorialized that the County would recommend the
agreement for Board approval within five months of the date of
execution. However, the existence of a date certain for
performance is not alone sufficient to make the timing of that
performance a material term of a contract. For instance, in
Henck, supra, 9 Cal.2d 136, the court held a date certain to remit
payment for water rights in a contract was “a means to insure
prompt payment” and not a material term of the contract. (Id. at
p. 144.) Similarly, in Cushing, supra, 117 Cal.App. 94, time was
not essential to a contract which merely prescribed the day on or
before which payment was to be made. (Id. at p. 104.)
       Courts instead look for other indications that the parties
intended a date for performance to be essential to the contract.
For example, in Swinerton, supra, 23 Cal.2d 19, the time of
performance was found essential to a lease agreement that
required removal of minerals from a property because the
contract expressly stated that the parties sought to take
advantage of the “1937–1938 water and mining season.” (Id. at
pp. 26–27.) Similarly, in Leiter v. Eltinge (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d
306, the court found time was of the essence to an escrow

                                  9
agreement where the defaulting party knew the non-breaching
party needed the funds for another time-sensitive purchase
agreement and had expressly agreed to payment by a date
certain for that reason. (Id. at pp. 312–313, 316.) Conversely,
the court in Katemis v. Westerlind (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 537,
held the timing of an escrow deposit was not material to an
escrow agreement where there was no “clear[-]cut language
manifesting an intent to make time of the essence” and the
document “patently [did] not expressly declare such to be the
intention of the parties, nor does it do so with any degree of
reasonable certainty.” (Id. at pp. 543–544.) A delayed escrow
payment was therefore not a material breach.
       Here, the settlement agreement does not contain any
“clear-cut language” that manifests the intent of the County or
Duran to elevate the January 25, 2021 deadline to a fundamental
requirement of the contract. The settlement agreement does not
state that the five-month period was intended to preserve
Duran’s future employment opportunities, ability to accrue
clinical hours, or student loan forgiveness eligibility. The parties
explicitly identified some elements of the agreement as material;
they specified in the agreement that violations of the
confidentiality provisions would constitute a material breach.
The parties did not include similar language concerning the
timing of the County’s performance. Additionally, the parties
specifically noted that a denial of approval by County authorities
was the one circumstance that would render the agreement null
and void. The clauses delineating the timing of the County’s
performance do not express any intent that delayed performance
would similarly invalidate the agreement, or otherwise indicate
the County’s rights under the contract would be forfeited “if the

                                10
terms or conditions of the contract are not complied with on the
dates specified.” (Cushing, supra, 117 Cal.App. 94 at p. 104.)
       Duran asserts the materiality of timely performance was
established during settlement negotiations, during which he
informed the County about the importance of the timing to his
clinical hours and loan forgiveness. We note, however, that the
County denies that Duran informed its representatives about the
potential consequences of untimely performance during
negotiations and Duran failed to produce evidence to substantiate
this claim. The record contains two declarations from Duran,
both of which attest only to his subjective understanding that five
months afforded him sufficient time to look for new employment,
not that this reason or any other was communicated to the
County. Based on the evidence before it, the trial court properly
concluded the parties did not make the time of performance a
material term of the agreement.
       Substantial evidence further supported the trial court’s
determination that the two-month delay in the County’s
performance was not significant enough to materially breach the
agreement. When time is not of the essence, delayed
performance may still fulfill the breaching party’s obligations if it
occurs within a reasonable time. (Becker v. Becker (1950) 36
Cal.2d 324, 326; Magic Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger Investment
Group, L.L.C. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 357, 364 (Magic Carpet
Ride) [applying substantial performance doctrine when a party
performed but missed a deadline].)
       The trial court could reasonably conclude that the County,
by completing its performance within two months, fulfilled its
obligations in a reasonable time. The County placed Duran on
paid administrative leave after execution of the settlement

                                 11
agreement, as required by its terms, and extended Duran’s
employment through an “ordered absence” to account for the
additional time it needed to complete its obligations. The County
also timely paid the full amount owed under the settlement
agreement after it was approved, even though Duran had yet to
resign. The County remedied the defects in its performance and
Duran received what the contract calls for—compensation for
dismissal of his claims against the County.
       D. Application of the Restatement factors leads to
            the same result
       Duran argues the trial court’s decision was inconsistent
with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts factors that
determine whether a failure to perform is material. We disagree.
       The Restatement factors include: “(a) the extent to which
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he
reasonably expected; [¶] (b) the extent to which the injured party
can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of
which he will be deprived; [¶] (c) the extent to which the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; [¶]
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the
circumstances including any reasonable assurances; [and] [¶]
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to
perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.” (Rest.2d Contracts, § 241.) The factor
test is flexible and intended to be applied “in such a way as to
further the purpose of securing for each party his expectation of
an exchange of performances.” (Rest.2d Contracts, § 241, com. a.)
       The first two factors concern whether Duran received the
benefit of the bargain struck by the settlement agreement. The

                                 12
benefit Duran reasonably expected from settling with the County
was compensation for dismissal of his claims, which the County
remitted to his attorney in April 2021. The parties’ intent in
entering the agreement was to resolve the underlying lawsuit in
exchange for monetary compensation, not to safeguard Duran’s
future employment prospects or professional obligations. Duran’s
alleged injuries resulting from the County’s untimely
performance are unrelated to the benefits contemplated by the
settlement agreement.
       As to the third factor, a finding of material breach would
cause the County to forfeit the resolution of Duran’s underlying
claims against it, incur expenses related to ongoing litigation,
and risk potentially losing at trial. The magnitude of the
County’s forfeiture strongly cuts against a finding of material
breach due to delay, particularly where the settlement agreement
is silent as to the materiality of timely performance and Duran
has received what he is due under the contract. (Superior Motels,
Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1051
[“ ‘[The] law [is] slow to impute’ ” materiality where the contract
is silent and “ ‘the significance of the default is grievously out of
proportion to the oppression of the forfeiture’ ”].)
       With respect to the fourth factor, Duran argues it was not
likely that the County would cure its failure because County
officials gave him no indication before the date of his purported
rescission that they intended to perform, and they subsequently
failed to provide assurances about the County’s intent to cure.
Yet, the record reflects the County’s willingness to perform.
Before missing the submission deadline, the County had already
partially performed by placing Duran on paid administrative
leave pending Board approval. One day after Duran emailed the

                                 13
County to rescind, the County reassigned Duran to work from
home with pay “pending the outcome of an administrative
review.” It is reasonable to infer that the County imposed this
“ordered absence” because it intended to cure and sought to
ensure Duran continued to be paid in the interim.
       Events occurring after breach are relevant to the likelihood
of cure. A party has an opportunity to cure its failure where time
is not of the essence. (Rest.2d Contracts, § 242, com. a.) The
County took advantage of this opportunity. It belatedly
recommended the settlement agreement to the Board, and, upon
approval, deposited the settlement funds with Duran’s attorney.
Because time was not of the essence, the trial court could
reasonably conclude that this factor weighed against a finding of
material breach. (Magic Carpet Ride, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 365–366 [delayed performance constituted cure under
Restatement test].)
       Finally, Duran did not demonstrate bad faith or unfair
dealing on behalf of the County. The County placed Duran on
paid administrative leave and a paid “ordered absence” to
account for the entirety of the period he awaited the County’s
recommendation to the Board. Duran himself states that the
County’s untimely action was a result of “clerical type error.”
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the County did
not act in bad faith.
       The trial court could reasonably conclude that the County
did not materially breach the settlement agreement under the
Restatement factors and Duran was not entitled to rescind. We

                                14
affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to enforce the
settlement.2
II.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
        Awarding Attorney Fees to the County
        Duran also challenges the trial court’s award of $600 in
attorney fees to the County. We review attorney fee awards for
abuse of discretion. (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1
Cal.5th 480, 488.) “Under this standard, we do not disturb the
award unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.” (Stratton,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 915.)
        Section 1717, subdivision (a) entitles the prevailing party
in a contract action to reasonable attorney fees when the contract
specifically provides for fees. The parties’ agreement included an
attorney fee provision. When, as here, a party obtains a
“ ‘ “simple, unqualified win” ’ ” on all contract claims in an action
and the contract provides for fees, the prevailing party “is

2      Duran also contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion for reconsideration. We disagree. The trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider Duran’s motion for reconsideration after
the court entered judgment granting the motion to enforce the
settlement. (Safeco Ins. Co. v. Architectural Facades Unlimited,
Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1482; Nave v. Taggart (1995)
34 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176–1178 [entry of subsequent judgment
is construed as “an implied denial” of a pending motion for
reconsideration].) Further, even if the court had jurisdiction, we
would conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion because Duran failed to present new facts warranting
reconsideration. (Stratton v. Beck (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 901, 916
(Stratton) [affirming denial of reconsideration motion where the
movant “did not offer any new facts or law in support of the
motion for reconsideration”].)

                                 15
entitled to attorney fees as a matter of right, eliminating the trial
court’s discretion to deny fees under section 1717.” (Silver Creek,
LLC v. BlackRock Realty Advisors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
1533, 1538, citing Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 875–876.)
       There is no basis for this court to reverse an attorney fee
award mandated by the Civil Code. The trial court’s order
awarding attorney fees is affirmed.
                           DISPOSITION
       The trial court judgment is affirmed. The County shall
recover its costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                            ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                  EDMON, P. J.

                  EGERTON, J.

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