Court Opinion

ID: 9662082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:59:08.656409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:36.774749
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice,
dissenting,
joined by HIGHTOWER and HECHT, Justices.
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree that state law tort claims based on the failure to install a propeller guard are not expressly preempted by the Federal Boat Safety Act, I believe that they are impliedly preempted. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Because state jury damage awards can have an indirect regulatory effect, we must examine whether Moore’s claim that the boat was defectively designed because it lacked a propeller guard is nevertheless impliedly preempted because it conflicts with the purposes of the Act and its regulatory scheme. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2620, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (“[Rjegulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of *253governing conduct and controlling policy.” (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959))). Moore concedes that judicial imposition of liability for failing to install propeller guards may force manufacturers to install such guards. She candidly concedes as well that the decision to install guards may also expose manufacturers to liability. Either consequence is merely “what we have juries for,” she contends; since the Coast Guard has not passed a regulation on the subject of propeller guards, there is no conflict with federal law.
To me, this argument does not accord proper significance to the Coast Guard’s affirmative decision to leave this area unregulated. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left un regulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate.” Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Senice Commission, 461 U.S. 375, 384, 103 S.Ct. 1905, 1912, 76 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (emphasis in original); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Board, 474 U.S. 409, 422, 106 S.Ct. 709, 716, 88 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986); Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503, 108 S.Ct. 1350, 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 582 (1988); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151-52, 109 S.Ct. 971, 977-78, 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989); see also Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 621-22 (2d Cir.1992); Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Oberly, 837 F.2d 108, 115 (3d Cir.1988).
This principle applies here because the Coast Guard made a policy decision that a regulation mandating propeller guards is not warranted at this time. See Puerto Rico, 485 U.S. at 503-04, 108 S.Ct. at 1355 (explaining that the quoted language is not meant in an unqualified sense, but rather only applies where a “comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls”) (emphasis added); cf. Arkansas Electric, 461 U.S. at 384, 103 S.Ct. at 1912 (holding that this principle did not apply on the facts because the federal agency did not determine “as a matter of policy” that the given area should be left unregulated); Toy Manufacturers, 986 F.2d at 622 (denying preemptive effect to a federal decision not to regulate warning labels, where the agency had made no judgment about the efficacy of or need for a warning label requirement). In this case, the Coast Guard, in addition to adopting the Subcommittee’s recommendation that it take “no regulatory action to require propeller guards,”1 specifically stated that propeller guards should not be mandated because of the lack of a feasible universal propeller guard and the economic costs that would attend any such requirement. Letter from Robert T. Nelson, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway Services to Mr. A. Newell Garden, Chairman, NBSAC, at 1 (February 1, 1990). Allowing a jury to impose damages on a manufacturer in this context would in effect create a safety standard in direct conflict with the Coast Guard’s determination that manufacturers should not be required to install propeller guards2 and *254with the Act’s goal of uniformity of safety standards. Thus, while Moore’s claims are not expressly preempted by § 4306, they are impliedly preempted based on the specific policy decision of the Coast Guard and the policy of uniformity embraced by the Act.
The language of the savings clause complicates, but does not alter, this conclusion. Under implied preemption review, courts do not apply the same presumption against preemption as under express preemption review. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988) (“ ‘[T]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law,’ for ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’ ” (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962))); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 826 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990) (“[I]n contrast to the strong presumption against preemption that we apply in determining whether the language of a federal statute or regulation expressly preempts state law, no such presumption is applicable in deciding whether state law conflicts with federal law, even where the subject of the state law is a matter traditionally regarded as properly within the scope of the states’ rights.”). In such circumstances, federal courts have not read a savings clause to eviscerate the federal statute. In International Paper Company v. Ouellette, the Supreme Court declined to presume that Congress intended to undermine its own statute through a general savings clause. 479 U.S. 481, 494, 107 S.Ct. 805, 813, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987); see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (“As in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, ‘we do not believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general saving clause.’” (citation omitted)); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1443 n. 11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 291, 126 L.Ed.2d 240 (1993) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has limited a savings clause if it presents ‘an irreconcilable conflict between the statutory scheme and the persistence of common-law remedies,’ ... or if it would ‘undermine [a] carefully drawn statute.’” (citations omitted)); Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 780-81 n. 6 (3d Cir.1992) (“A savings clause ... does not preserve state common law actions that subvert federal law.”) (citing Ouellette); Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1125 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 111 S.Ct. 147, 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990) (“[I]t is well-established that a savings clause ... does not ‘save’ common law actions that would subvert a federal statutory or regulatory scheme.”); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 416 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990) (“Ouellette beliefs] the supposed principle that a general savings clause precludes a court from looking into implied preemption.”); see also Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 328-31, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1135-37, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981) (where state common-law action was plainly contrary to the purposes of the federal statute, Court was “not free to assume” that such action had been preserved). Nothing in the legislative history of the Act evinces any intent to allow state law claims that clash with the purposes of the Act and its regulatory scheme.3
Implied preemption review is foreclosed only where an express preemption clause “provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority.’ ” Cipollone, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2618 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)); see Toy Manufacturers, 986 *255F.2d at 623-24; Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 517 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 300, 126 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); Gills v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F.Supp. 894, 897-98 (W.D.Ky.1993); Covey v. Surgidev Corp., 815 F.Supp. 1089, 1094 (N.D.Ohio 1993); Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F.Supp. 1128, 1139-40 (E.D.N.Y.1992); Marrs v. Ford Motor Co., 852 S.W.2d 570, 575-76 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Boyle v. Chrysler Corp., 177 Wis.2d 207, 501 N.W.2d 865, 870-71 (Ct.App.1993). But see Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 86, 126 L.Ed.2d 54 (1993) (holding that existence of express preemption clause precludes reliance on implied preemption doctrine, without determining whether provision constituted a “reliable indicium of congressional intent”); American Agriculture Movement, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 977 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir.1992) (“Only if a statute is devoid of explicit preemptive language may we resort to either variant of implied preemption.”).4 I find no such intent here.
For example, courts have construed a very similar statutory scheme under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. [“NTMVSA”], as effecting preemption. Section 1392(d) of that Act, entitled “Supremacy of federal standards,” provides:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this sub-chapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.
Section 1397(k), entitled “Continuation of common law liability,” provides:
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.
Four circuit courts have considered the preemptive effect of NTMVSA on state common-law suits against auto manufacturers for failing to install air bags. See Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777 (3d Cir.1992); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 111 S.Ct. 147, 112 L.Ed.2d 113 (1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065, 110 S.Ct. 1781, 108 L.Ed.2d 782 (1990). As did the Coast Guard with respect to propeller guards, Congress and the Secretary of Transportation made a conscious decision not to mandate air bags at the time of these cases. Thus, under the regulations manufacturers were given the choice to install either air bags or seat belts. See Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123; Wood, 865 F.2d at 399. After determining under an express preemption review that § 1392(d) and § 1397(k), taken together, did not indicate an unmistakable intent to preempt state tort claims, see Wood, 865 F.2d at 401; Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121; Taylor, 875 F.2d at 825; Kitts, 875 F.2d at 789, these courts all held the Act to be facially ambiguous as to whether Congress meant to preserve state tort claims that had the effect of conflicting with the *256regulatory scheme. See Wood, 865 F.2d at 401 (“The difficulty arises because section 1392(d) (the preemption clause) and section 1397(c) (the savings clause) send conflicting messages in these particular circumstances.”).5 Therefore, they proceeded to an implied preemption review,6 and determined that damage awards based on a failure to install air bags would actually conflict with the Act because they had the effect of creating an air bag requirement, in contravention of the federal desire not to prematurely mandate air bags.7
A similar conclusion is warranted in this case. State court damage awards would effectively require boat manufacturers to install propeller guards, in direct contravention of the expressed federal policy against mandating such devices.8 As the Court concedes, a finding of implied preemption essentially comports with the holdings of the few courts that have decided this precise issue, although some of these courts appear to have arrived at a determination of preemption using an express preemption analysis. See Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F.Supp. 81, 84 (D.Conn.1993); Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F.Supp. 1579, 1581 (M.D.Ga.1991); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F.Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D.Ohio 1991); Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 239 Ill.App.3d 885, 180 Ill. Dec. 493, 498, 607 N.E.2d 562, 567 (1992); see also Toy Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 806 F.Supp. 336, 345-46 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 986 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.1992) (expressing agreement, in dicta, with the holding of Mowery); Thomas A. Russell & Mitchell F. Ducey, Current Topics in the Law of Recreational Boating, 5 U.S.F.Mae.L.J. 107, 119 (1992) (“As the *257Shields court indicated, it is essential for the sake of uniformity of decision in this area that all courts, federal and state, apply federal law to cases of injuries resulting from propellers.”).9
Concluding that Moore’s claims are impliedly preempted does not leave her without any possibility of recovery. Persons in Moore’s situation would still be free to sue the owners and operators of the boat for negligence. See S.Rep. No. 248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1383, 1341 (“Th[is] section [on federal preemption] does not preempt state law or regulation directed at safe boat operation and use, which was felt to be appropriately within the purview of state or local concern.”). Even without a propeller guard, persons are unlikely to suffer serious injuries in the absence of some negligent conduct, either by themselves or someone else. See NBSAC, Report of the Propeller Guard Subcommittee, at 23 (Nov. 7, 1989) (“Operator error is clearly a significant factor in the vast majority of underwater impacts which result in injuries/fatalities.”).
I believe Moore’s claims that the boat was defective because it lacked a propeller guard are impliedly preempted by the Federal Boat Safety Act. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

. The Subcommittee concluded that (1) current propeller guards can be "counter-productive and can create new hazards of equal or greater consequence,” (2) no universal design is presently available, making the cost of retrofitting the millions of boats in this country prohibitive, and (3) the "boating public must not be misled into thinking there is a 'safe' device which would eliminate or significantly reduce such injuries or fatalities." See National Boating Safety Advisory Council [NBSAC], Report of the Propeller Guard Subcommittee, at 22-24 (Nov. 7, 1989). In a section of the report entitled "Key Points Covered by Verbal Input and Written Materials," the Subcommittee notes that a number of lawsuits have been filed against manufacturers for failure to install propeller guards. Id. at 4. However, the Subcommittee expresses no opinion on the viability of such suits, and the Coast Guard letter adopting the Subcommittee’s recommendations does not refer to such litigation.

. Moore argues that the Subcommittee’s investigation, while extensive, was not exhaustive, and implies that some of the evidence and expert testimony considered by the Subcommittee actually militated against preemption. Moore contends that a "fact issue” exists concerning the feasibility of propeller guards. However, for purposes of ascertaining the preemptive effect of the Coast Guard’s determination that a propeller guard requirement would not be desirable, this Court’s estimation of the wisdom of such a decision is irrelevant.

. Thus this case is distinguishable from Silkwood v. Keir-McGee Corporation, 464 U.S. 238, 256, 104 S.Ct. 615, 625, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), where the Court held that state tort damages for nuclear safety violations did not conflict with laws vesting the federal government with the exclusive authority to regulate nuclear safety. The Court found direct evidence in the legislative history of Congress’ intent to allow the "tension" between these two principles. It did not lay down a general rule that general savings clauses reflect a congressional sanction of the tension between federal regulation and clashing state products liability law. See Wood, 865 F.2d at 413.

. This language in Cipollone reaffirms the standard principle that "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 128, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 1163, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)); see also Gills, 829 F.Supp. at 897 (“The Supreme Court [in Cipollone] broke no new ground with that discussion.”). It is axiomatic that Congress may fail to clearly and unambiguously express its intent in a preemption clause.

. Section 1397(c) was redesignated as § 1397(k) in a 1988 amendment to the NTMVSA.

. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit recently reexamined the preemption analysis it employed in Taylor, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone. See Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.1994). The court held that under Taylor, the NTMVSA did not expressly preempt a state tort law action alleging that a tractor-trailer was negligently designed because it lacked anti-lock brakes. Id. at 1521. In a 2 to 1 decision, the court declined to engage in implied preemption analysis on the grounds that §§ 1392(d) and 1397(k) provided a reliable indi-cium of congressional intent. Id. at 1525.

. In her brief and at oral argument, Moore repeatedly relies on Dorsey v. Honda Motor Company, 655 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 177, 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982), as holding that air bag cases are not preempted under federal law. However, Moore misconstrues Dorsey. Dorsey did not involve a failure to install air bags. Moreover, the court’s discussion focused on whether under Florida law compliance with federal regulations precluded a finding of recklessness justifying an award of punitive damages, not whether compliance meant such claim was preempted. Id. at 656-57. The Fifth Circuit has expressly recognized that the exact issue posed in Wood et al. remains undecided by that court. See Peny v. Mercedes Benz of North America, Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir.1992).
While some lower court cases hold that air bag or other passive restraint tort claims are not preempted, see, for example, Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407, 412 (D.Md.1987); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 650 F.Supp. 922, 929 (E.D.N.Y.1987); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Anto Union, 389 Pa.Super. 328, 567 A.2d 312, 315 (1989), the clear weight of authority supports the opposite position. See Gardner v. Honda Motor Co., 145 A.D.2d 41, 536 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304, 304 n. 2 (1988) (pointing to the "great weight of judicial authority upholding a finding of preemption” in this context); Gingold, 567 A.2d at 315 (acknowledging that its holding places it in the minority of courts regarding this issue); Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Federal Pre-Emption of State Common-Law Products Liability Claims Pertaining to Motor Vehicles, 97 A.L.R.Fed. 853 § 5 (1990 & 1993 Supp.).

. I reject Moore’s assertion that these cases are distinguishable because they involved an actual federal regulation that placed an affirmative obligation on manufacturers. As discussed above, a federal decision to forgo regulation can have as much preemptive effect as a federal regulation. See Arkansas Electric, 461 U.S. at 384, 103 S.Ct. at 1912. Moreover, these cases focused on the fact that the motor vehicle regulations were meant to provide manufacturers with a "choice." See Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827. The Coast Guard’s decision not to mandate propeller guards reflects a similar desire to provide manufacturers with a choice in this area. See Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F.Supp. 1012, 1016 (N.D.Ohio 1991).
I acknowledge that § 1392(d) is arguably less broad than § 4306, because § 1392(d) expressly leaves open to state regulation those areas of motor safety not actually regulated by the federal government. However, such a distinction does not affect the validity of the analogy between the issue in the instant case and the issue involved in Wood et ah, since those cases did not concern areas unregulated by the federal government.

. Alabama courts have applied state products liability law to suits based on the failure to install propeller guards. See Veal v. Teleflex, Inc., 586 So.2d 188, 191 (Ala.1991) (holding that under Alabama tort law there is no cause of action for failure to install propeller guards on pleasure boat outboard motors); Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So.2d 447, 450 (Ala.1991) (same); Elliott v. Brunswick Corp., 903 F.2d 1505, 1510 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048, 111 S.Ct. 756, 112 L.Ed.2d 776 (1991) (in a diversity suit, holding that the defendant was not liable under Alabama law for failing to install a propeller guard). However, none of these cases considered the preemption issue, and I would therefore decline to follow them.