Court Opinion

ID: 9773058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:35:37.37499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.801211
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I join Judge Campbell’s dissent and further disagree with the majority opinion’s handling of appellant’s final argument by stating:
“Even if the rising requirement created a burden on applicants’ religious freedom, Judge Floyd removed the burden by giving them the option of remaining outside until after court convened.”
At 151. I would reach the merits of applicant Krupps’ complaint about burdening his religious freedom and, under these facts, decide against him.
It occurs to me that the majority’s reasoning concerning alternative choice as a substitute for the exercise of a constitutional right suffers from the same flaw as “separate but equal” thinking or providing that certain people can ride the bus but only if they sit in the back (I’m not going to even mention the “moment of silence” as an alternative to school prayer controversy). Granted, we are talking about the balance of least intrusive means of infringing on a constitutional right in favor of courtroom decorum and the relationship of that balance to the concept of direct contempt, not just the right to exercise the constitutional right. Still the two are so intertwined that the mere fact that an alternative was given in this case does not justify the majority’s cursory dismissal of applicant’s claim that the balance of right versus decorum should be tipped in his favor.
I dissent.