Court Opinion

ID: 9697440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:16:42.162233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.445964
License: Public Domain

SHEA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The clearest expression of intent in Mrs. Beck’s will, defining the nature of the estate she intended to leave Horace P. Beck, Jr., is contained in the language that devised “Bateman Farm” to Horace “absolutely and in fee simple.” In view of this clear expression of intent, I cannot join in the majority’s conclusion that the testatrix did not intend to leave her son a fee simple absolute.
The later language in the will, purporting to devise a life interest to Robert Adams Chile upon the occurrence of a condition precedent is completely at odds with the devise to Horace. Faced with such a contradiction, this court should apply in such cases our well-settled rule of testamentary construction which provides that when a testator has made a gift of land in fee simple absolute, a subsequent provision inconsistent with the absolute nature of that gift is held to be a repugnant provision and is treated as void in law. E.g., Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v. City of Woonsocket, 48 R.I. 345, 137 A. 411 (1927).
To promote stability in the law, courts generally have adopted a policy of leaving settled rules of law undisturbed. Adherence to this policy is particularly essential in the area of will and trust law where individuals rely on established legal guidelines to draft accurately instruments that will effectively dispose of their estate at a time when they will no longer be present to speak their desires.
This need for providing certainty in such an important area of law is more compelling than is satisfying what we now suspect to be the testatrix’s desire when that desire is expressed in a way that is unenforceable according to settled law. For these reasons, prior opinions of this court have adhered to the settled principles of testamentary construction when reaching a decision in this type of case.
In the case of Re Will of Henry C. Kimball, 20 R.I. 619, 40 A. 847 (1898), a gift of the residuary estate was made to the testator’s daughters absolutely but subject to a later provision that the daughters should only receive income during their minority. The court found that an absolute power of disposition was in the daughters and therefore the subsequent limitations were rendered repugnant and void. In Wood for an Opinion, 28 R.I. 290, 67 A. 8 (1907), the testatrix left her residuary estate to her husband “unconditionally,” with any remainder after his death to the testatrix’s sisters. Again the court held that the first clause created a fee simple absolute and voided the second clause for repugnancy.
In In re Petition of William C. Howard for an Opinion, 52 R.I. 170, 159 A. 143 (1932); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 48 R.I. 345, 137 A. 411 (1927), and Cahill v. Tanner, 43 R.I. 403, 113 A. 289 (1921), the testators left the residue of their estates to named individuals “for*631ever,” which language was followed by clauses attempting either to give away the remainder upon the beneficiary’s death or to establish a trust if the beneficiary had not yet attained the age of twenty-one. In each of these cases the court found that the language in the first clause clearly indicated that the testator intended to devise a fee simple absolute interest. Because the subsequent language was repugnant to the absolute nature of the first gift, it was treated as void.
The above cases, and this devise to Horace Beck, contain clear and unequivocal language in the first clause indicating the absolute nature of the gift. The use of the words “absolutely,” “unconditionally,” “forever,” and “absolutely and in fee simple” has always been sufficient to accomplish this.
In each of the cases in which this court has found less than an absolute gift in the first clause, it was not clear from the language used whether the testator intended an absolute gift. This failure to employ language sufficient to create an absolute gift permitted the implementation of the second gift. For example, in Billings v. Gladding, 58 R.I. 218, 220, 192 A. 216, 217 (1937), the will'stated, “I give devise and bequeath to my husband * * * all of my real estate * * * and after his decease, the remainder to my niece * * *.” In this instance the court held that the language did not unequivocally create a fee simple. Instead, the court looked to the use of the term “remainder” to indicate an intention to limit the nature of the gift. In Lux v. Lux, 109 R.I. 592, 288 A.2d 701 (1972), the testator left the residue of his estate “to my grandchildren, share and share alike.” This was followed by a provision indicating that any real estate included in the residue could not be sold until the youngest grandchild reached the age twenty-one. This court found that when the residuary clause was viewed in its entirety, it was clear that the testator did not intend the grandchildren to take the property in fee simple. The distinguishing feature between these two cases and those discussed earlier is the absence of language indicating a clear intention to make the gift absolute.
Mr. Chile and the majority place great reliance on Washington Trust Co. v. Arnold, 69 R.I. 121, 31 A.2d 420 (1943), because it is the only case cited in this jurisdiction that does not fit neatly into one or the other part of the above dichotomy. In Arnold the testator left the residue of his estate to his wife “forever, subject to the following conditions.” The court noted that whereas the use of the term “forever” is ordinarily adequate to vest the gift in fee simple absolute, the language, which was contained in the same sentence, taken in its entirety manifested a contrary intention. That contrary intention was to annex certain specified conditions and qualifications to the gift. Id. at 124, 31 A.2d at 421-22. However, this holding, as I read it, is not controlling in the present case. In Arnold, to find the testator’s dominant intent, the court reasoned as follows:
“Immediately following and clearly qualifying the words ‘to her, her heirs and assigns, forever’, he used the significant language, ‘subject to the following conditions’; and then he continued by enumerating certain conditions and powers that plainly qualify the gift.” Id. at 125, 31 A.2d at 422.
The court stressed its reliance on the proximity to the gift itself of the language annexing conditions when it distinguished eases that found an absolute fee voiding the subsequent language.
“[T]he first gift was actually intended and made subject to express conditions or qualifications that appear in the same sentence, and * * * the absolute and unrestricted right to dispose of the property was not given to the first taker, expressly or by implication.” Id. at 127, 31 A.2d at 423.
That is not the case with Dorothy Bateman Beck’s will. There is no language immediately annexing express conditions to the gift to Horace Beck “absolutely and in fee simple.” Therefore, the attempted gift to Mr. Chile contained in the subsequent language should fail because it is entirely re*632pugnant to the absolute nature of the devise to Horace Beck. Under prior decisions of this court, the language purportedly creating the life estate is void in law. Consequently, Mr. Chile, in my opinion, did not acquire any interest in Resurrection Piece.
Finally, it is clear from the record that Mrs. Beck intended her son to have the ultimate exclusive control of the farm. She so provided in her will by language devising Bateman Farm to Horace “absolutely and in fee simple.” The majority has apparently accepted this interpretation. They state that Robert Chile did not receive a right to continue to live on the premises once Dorothy Bateman Beck died, and only “if and when this farm is sold” would he be entitled to occupy Resurrection Piece. Their determination that this devise becomes operative only in the event the farm is sold is troublesome because, in effect, it validates a restraint upon alienation of the Bateman Farm. It is generally held that any provision in a legal instrument which would tend to impair the marketability of property is a restraint upon alienation. Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 1111 (2d ed. 1956). Also, it is quite well established that restraints on the alienation of realty that is the subject of a devise are generally disfavored at law. This court has construed such a restraining condition void as against public policy. See Goffe v. Karanyianopoulos, 53 R.I. 313, 166 A. 547 (1933); Perry v. Brown, 45 R.I. 210, 121 A. 209 (1923); Manierre v. Welling, 32 R.I. 104, 78 A. 507 (1911). Here, Horace, although given all the incidents of ownership of the Bateman Farm, in effect is precluded from selling the property free and clear since any subsequent owner would be required by the majority’s decision to allow Robert Chile to live on the premises.
Although this restraint may be of limited duration — at most, the remaining years of Mr. Chile’s life — this court has indicated that a limitation in duration does not itself make a restraint valid if it otherwise is so general in scope or effect as to operate as a substantial restraint. Manierre v. Welling, 32 R.I. at 115, 78 A. at 512. The restraint in this case although not absolute, is still substantial, for even though it is arguably possible to find an individual willing to purchase the farm under this condition, it is practically an improbable result. The law is concerned primarily with practical aliena-bility, not with a theoretical power of alienation. The rules in this area tend primarily to further practical alienability. Simes and Smith, supra, at § 1115. Therefore, to give effect to this provision in Dorothy Bateman Beck’s will, as the majority has done, is to impose a substantial restraint on alienation of the Bateman Farm. Such a result is inconsistent with our prior case law as well as with the generally established legal doctrine in this area.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment entered in the Superior Court.