Court Opinion

ID: 9394986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 19:01:09.074329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.493170
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12408    Document: 15-1     Date Filed: 05/16/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12408
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       QUEEN'PRINYAH GODIAH NMIAA PA EL-BEY,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       SOCIAL 2700 STUDENT SPACES,
       TRINITY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
       ERIKA GROVIER,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-12408

                       D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00451-WS-MJF
                             ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Plaintiff Queen ‘Prinyah Godia Nmiaa Payne’s El-Bey, pro-
       ceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal
       without prejudice 2 of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint. No reversible
       error has been shown; we affirm.
               Plaintiff filed this civil action in the district court in Novem-
       ber 2021. Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s complaint purports to as-
       sert claims for disability discrimination against an apartment com-
       plex, a property management company, and a former roommate.3
       Plaintiff’s complaint stems from alleged injuries Plaintiff sustained
       in August 2021.

       1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518
       F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
       2 Generally speaking, an involuntary dismissal without prejudice constitutes a
       final order for purposes of appeal. See Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474,
       1481 (11th Cir. 1993).
       3 On the pre-printed civil complaint form, Plaintiff listed -- without elabora-
       tion -- three statutes as being at issue in her case: the Americans with Disabili-
       ties Act (“ADA”), the Fair Housing Act, and Fla. Stat. § 112.042 (a statute pro-
       hibiting discrimination in county and municipal employment).
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       22-12408                Opinion of the Court                         3

              A magistrate judge issued an order instructing Plaintiff ei-
       ther to pay the court filing fee or to move for leave to proceed in
       forma pauperis (“IFP”). The magistrate judge also advised Plaintiff
       that she was required to notify the district court within seven days
       of any change in address and that failure to do so could result in
       dismissal of her action.
              On 27 January 2022 -- after granting Plaintiff leave to pro-
       ceed IFP -- the magistrate judge conducted a frivolity review pur-
       suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The magistrate judge deter-
       mined that Plaintiff’s complaint was deficient for several reasons,
       including for failure to comply with the pleading rules set forth in
       Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and 10(b) and the district court’s local rules.
       The magistrate judge ordered Plaintiff to file an amended com-
       plaint correcting the deficiencies (or to file a notice of voluntary
       dismissal) on or before 28 February 2022. The magistrate judge
       cautioned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the court’s order
       “likely will result in dismissal of this action for failure to comply
       with an order of this court, failure to comply with the Federal Rules
       of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules, and failure to prosecute.”
       The magistrate judge also advised Plaintiff again of her responsibil-
       ity to notify the district court within seven days of a change in ad-
       dress. Plaintiff filed no response to the 27 January order.
             On 9 March 2022, the magistrate judge ordered Plaintiff to
       show cause -- on or before 30 March -- why she failed to comply
       with the court’s 27 January order. The magistrate judge warned
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12408

       that failure to comply with the order would likely result in dismis-
       sal of the action. Once again, Plaintiff filed no response.
               On 5 April 2022, the magistrate judge issued a report and
       recommendation (“R&R”). The magistrate judge recommended
       that the district court dismiss Plaintiff’s action without prejudice
       for failure to comply with court orders and for failure to prosecute.
       Plaintiff filed no objections to the R&R. In June 2022, the district
       court adopted the R&R and dismissed the case without prejudice.
               Plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal. In her notice, Plaintiff
       said she had not received the pertinent court orders. Plaintiff said
       she moved on 1 March 2022 and only received mail from the dis-
       trict court after filing a change-of-address notice.
              We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to comply
       with court rules or for failure to prosecute under an abuse-of-dis-
       cretion standard. See Betty K. Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432
       F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). Although we construe liberally
       pro se pleadings, pro se litigants must still conform to procedural
       rules. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
               “The court’s power to dismiss a cause is an inherent aspect
       of its authority to enforce its orders and insure prompt disposition
       of law suits.” Dynes v. Army Air Force Exch. Serv., 720 F.2d 1495,
       1499 (11th Cir. 1983) (quotation omitted). The district court has
       the authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to obey a
       court order or for lack of prosecution. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd.,
       432 F.3d at 1337.
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       22-12408                Opinion of the Court                         5

               Generally speaking, a dismissal made without prejudice con-
       stitutes no abuse of discretion because the affected party may refile
       his civil action. See Dynes, 720 F.2d at 1499 (concluding that -- be-
       cause the case was dismissed without prejudice -- the district court
       abused no discretion by dismissing for failure to file a court-ordered
       brief). Unlike a dismissal with prejudice, dismissal without preju-
       dice requires no showing of willful noncompliance with court or-
       ders or a determination that a lesser sanction would not suffice.
       Compare Betty K Agencies, Ltd., 432 F.3d at 1337-38 (describing a
       dismissal with prejudice as “an extreme sanction” requiring precise
       findings by the district court of a clear pattern of delay or willful-
       ness), with Dynes, 720 F.2d at 1499 (concluding that a dismissal
       without prejudice constituted no abuse of discretion even in re-
       sponse to a single violation).
                The district court abused no discretion in dismissing Plain-
       tiff’s case without prejudice. At the time of dismissal, Plaintiff had
       failed to comply with both the 27 January order to file an amended
       complaint and the 9 March show-cause order. Both orders warned
       Plaintiff expressly that failure to comply would likely result in dis-
       missal of her action. Nor did Plaintiff object to the magistrate
       judge’s recommendation that her case be dismissed for failure to
       comply with court orders and for failure to prosecute. Given Plain-
       tiff’s silence in response to the district court’s orders, the district
       court acted within its authority to dismiss sua sponte Plaintiff’s ac-
       tion for failure to comply with court orders and for failure to pros-
       ecute.
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                    22-12408

              On appeal, Plaintiff argues chiefly that she never received
       the district court’s orders. Plaintiff contends that the district court
       erred by mailing the orders to her old address. We disagree.
               Plaintiff filed two notices of a change of address with the dis-
       trict court: (1) a notice dated 24 January 2022 notifying the district
       court of Plaintiff’s move from New York to Florida on 13 Decem-
       ber 2021; and (2) a notice dated 25 April 2022 notifying the district
       court of Plaintiff’s move from Florida to Texas (a move Plaintiff
       says occurred on 1 March 2022). 4 The record demonstrates that
       each of the district court’s orders was mailed to Plaintiff at the cur-
       rent address then on record as provided by Plaintiff.
              The record also seems to indicate, however, that two enve-
       lopes sent by the district court to Plaintiff at her Florida address --
       envelopes with post-mark dates corresponding to the district
       court’s 27 January and 9 March orders -- were not delivered. Each
       of the envelopes was stamped by the post office on 25 October 2022
       (well after the dismissal order) as “Return to Sender, No Such
       Number, Unable to Forward.” The returned envelopes were en-
       tered on the district court’s docket on 1 November 2022.
              Even to the extent that Plaintiff never received the district
       court’s 27 January and 9 March orders, Plaintiff has shown no abuse
       of discretion. Nothing evidences that the district court knew -- at

       4 We note that both change-of-address notices were filed well outside of the
       7-day period established by the district court.
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       22-12408                    Opinion of the Court                                  7

       the time of dismissal in June 2022 -- that Plaintiff had not received
       the district court’s orders or that the Florida address provided by
       Plaintiff was invalid. That the post office was apparently unable to
       deliver mail to the address provided by Plaintiff does not render the
       district court’s dismissal an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff had the
       ongoing duty to provide the district court with a current and
       proper address.
               Based on the record that was before the district court at the
       pertinent time, we cannot conclude that the district court abused
       its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice. 5
               AFFIRMED.

       5 Plaintiff does not contend -- nor can we conclude -- that Plaintiff would now
       be barred from refiling her claims by the applicable statutes of limitations. Cf.
       Mickles v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Where a
       dismissal without prejudice has the effect of precluding a plaintiff from refiling
       his claim due to the running of the statute of limitations, the dismissal is ‘tan-
       tamount to a dismissal with prejudice . . ..’”). When the district court dis-
       missed Plaintiff’s complaint in June 2022, nothing suggested that Plaintiff’s
       claims (arising from an August 2021 incident) were already time-barred. See
       42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (establishing a two-year limitations period for claims
       under the Fair Housing Act); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(f) (providing a four-year
       statute of limitations for actions founded on statutory liability); Silva v. Baptist
       Health S. Fla., Inc., 856 F.3d 824, 841 (11th Cir. 2017) (applying a four-year
       statute of limitations to ADA claims in Florida).