Court Opinion

ID: 9939972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 15:13:27.003712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:09.470186
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                         San Antonio, Texas

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                             No. 04-23-00815-CV

               IN RE SPOTTED LAKES, LLC D/B/A 1845 OIL FIELD SERVICES

                                      Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

Opinion by:       Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 7, 2024

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED

           After a two-week trial, a jury awarded real party in interest Joaquin Leija $88,500.00 in

personal injury damages against relators Spotted Lakes, LLC d/b/a 1845 Oil Field Services and

Martin Perez (collectively “Spotted Lakes”). Leija moved for a new trial arguing, among other

things, that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to introduce deposition

testimony from two of Spotted Lakes’ experts during his case-in-chief. The trial court granted

Leija’s motion, ordering a new trial. In this original proceeding, Spotted Lakes contends the trial

court erred in the exercise of its discretion. We agree and conditionally grant mandamus relief.

1
 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 19-05-00119-CVK, styled Joaquin Leija v. Spotted Lakes, LLC d/b/a 1845
Oil Field Services and Martin Perez, pending in the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas, the Honorable
Russell Wilson presiding.
                                                                                       04-23-00815-CV

                                           BACKGROUND

        On October 24, 2018, a vehicle collision occurred between Leija and a Spotted Lakes

vehicle. Leija sued Spotted Lakes for negligence, asserting he sustained back and shoulder injuries

as a result of the collision. Before the collision, Leija had worked in the oilfield for nearly two

decades and earned approximately $100,000.00 a year despite only having an eighth-grade

education. After the collision, Leija avers he is not able to earn an equivalent yearly salary due to

his resulting injuries.

        During the pre-trial process, Spotted Lakes designated several expert witnesses on various

topics, including two orthopedic surgeons—Dr. Andrew Kant and Dr. Mark Maffet—and a

vocational expert, Thomas King. In general, Kant and Maffet were to testify regarding the medical

severity and recovery of Leija’s injuries, and King was to testify regarding Leija’s occupational

abilities pre and post collision.

        Leija moved to strike Kant and Maffet’s testimony arguing it was unnecessarily duplicative

and cumulative. Before Leija’s motion was heard, however, the parties reached an agreement in

which Leija agreed to withdraw claims related to his alleged shoulder injury, and Spotted Lakes

agreed to call only one of its expert orthopedic surgeons at trial. Spotted Lakes chose to keep

Maffet designated as an expert witness and de-designated Kant. Furthermore, in accordance with

the trial court’s docket control order, the parties were to designate deposition excerpts for trial use

approximately thirty days before trial. Leija designated specific excerpts from Kant’s deposition

for trial use but did not designate any excerpts from King’s deposition.

        During his case-in-chief, Leija sought to introduce portions of Kant and King’s deposition

testimony to rebut arguments made by Spotted Lakes’ counsel. Additionally, Leija’s counsel

argued he had “flipped” the experts, advising the trial court their testimony was now favorable to

him. Spotted Lakes objected to the introduction of any portion of either deposition. Regarding

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Kant, Spotted Lakes argued Leija could not introduce his testimony because they had de-

designated him in accordance with the parties’ agreement. In the alternative, Spotted Lakes

asserted that if Leija were to be allowed to enter portions of Kant’s deposition into the record in

his case-in-chief, then they be allowed to do the same. As to King, Spotted Lakes contended his

deposition testimony could not be admitted because Leija had failed to provide any notice of

deposition excerpts before trial.

        The trial court sustained Spotted Lakes’ objections but advised Leija that the rulings “may

change when it gets time for you to provide your rebuttal” evidence. The trial court also stated

Leija may make a bill of exceptions at the appropriate time. After Spotted Lakes concluded its

case-in-chief, Leija did not move to enter Kant or King’s deposition testimony into the record, nor

did he offer any other rebuttal evidence.

        The jury awarded Leija damages totaling $88,500.00 for medical expenses, past physical

pain and mental anguish, and lost wages. The jury did not award Leija any damages for future loss

of earning capacity, future medical expenses, disfigurement, or physical impairment. Leija filed a

motion for a new trial asserting, among other things, that the trial court erred by failing to allow

him to introduce portions of Kant and King’s deposition testimony. After a hearing, the trial court

granted Leija’s motion, ordering a new trial. 2

        On August 30, 2023, Spotted Lakes filed its mandamus petition arguing that the trial court

acted without reference to guiding principles of law by granting Leija’s motion for new trial. We

requested responses from the trial court and Leija, to which Leija responded.

2
  The jury trial was conducted before the Honorable Lynn Ellison. The motion for new trial was heard and granted by
the Honorable Russell Wilson.

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                                                                                        04-23-00815-CV

                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Mandamus relief is both extraordinary and discretionary. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836,

840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To be eligible for mandamus relief, a relator must

show the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion and that it has no adequate remedy by

appeal. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

The trial court’s discretion does not depend on “whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the

facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action.” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators,

Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). Rather, the abuse of discretion inquiry depends on

whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See id; Walker v.

Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Mandamus relief is warranted

“to correct a clear abuse of discretion committed by a trial court in granting a new trial.” In re

Whataburger Restaurants LP, 429 S.W.3d 597, 598 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

                                     MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

                                           Applicable Law

        “Rule 320 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure gives the trial court broad discretion in

granting new trials ‘for good cause, on motion or on the court’s own motion.’” In re Procesos

Especializados en Metal, S.A. de C.V., No. 04-14-00543-CV, 2014 WL 4347724, at *2 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Sept. 3, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 320).

While a trial court enjoys broad discretion, this discretion is not without limitation. In re

Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452, 456 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). A trial court acts within the limits

of its discretion “so long as its stated reason for granting a new trial (1) is a reason for which a new

trial is legally appropriate (such as a well-defined legal standard or a defect that probably resulted

in an improper verdict); and (2) is specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply

parrot a pro forma template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and

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                                                                                           04-23-00815-CV

circumstances of the case at hand.” In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex.

2012) (orig. proceeding). “The trial court does not need to provide a ‘detailed catalogue’ of the

relevant evidence on the issue” but “if liability turns on a specific event occurring on a specific

date, something more than a vague reference to the facts is required.” In re Vernis Hernandez, No.

04-23-00246-CV, 2023 WL 5068573, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 9, 2023, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.).

        On the other hand, a trial court acts outside its discretionary limits in ordering a new trial,

and mandamus relief may be warranted “if, among other things, the order’s stated reason:

(1) specific or not, is not one for which a new trial is legally valid; (2) plainly state[s] that the trial

court merely substituted its own judgment for the jury’s; (3) is based on discrimination or dislike

of a party’s lawyer; (4) provides little or no insight into the judge’s reasoning; (5) merely recites a

legal standard such as a statement that a finding is against the great weight and preponderance of

the evidence; (6) fails to indicate the trial court considered the specific facts and circumstances of

the case at hand; or (7) fails to explain how the evidence (or lack of evidence) undermines the

jury’s findings.” Id. (citing United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 689).

        If the new trial order is insufficient on its face, meaning one or more of the above-

enumerated factors is satisfied, mandamus relief may be warranted without further scrutiny of the

record. In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). However, if the order is

facially sufficient, “appellate courts are empowered to conduct a merits review of the bases for a

new trial order and grant mandamus relief if the record does not support the trial court’s rationale

for ordering a new trial.” Vernis Hernandez, 2023 WL 5068573, at *2 (internal quotations

omitted). “A record does not support the trial court’s rationale if it squarely conflicts with the trial

judge’s expressed reasons for granting [a] new trial.” Id.

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                                                                                      04-23-00815-CV

                                              Analysis

       Spotted Lakes argues mandamus relief is warranted because the trial court’s order granting

Leija’s motion for new trial is insufficient on its face. Because the trial court’s order is facially

insufficient, Spotted Lakes concludes a merits review by this court is unnecessary. If we are to

review the merits, Spotted Lakes avers the record does not support a conclusion that the exclusion

of Kant and King’s deposition testimony in Leija’s case-in-chief led to the rendition of an improper

jury verdict. In response, Leija argues the trial court’s order is proper because “the trial court’s

refusal to admit this evidence” in his case-in-chief or as impeachment evidence “extremely

prejudiced” his loss of earning capacity claims. Therefore, Leija concludes a new trial is warranted.

The trial court’s order granting Leija’s motion found:

               [T]he trial court abused its discretion by denying [Leija] the
               opportunity to introduce video deposition testimony of [Spotted
               Lakes’] retained medical and vocational experts, Dr. Kant, and
               Thomas King. The Motion is otherwise DENIED.

       Based on the guidance pronounced by the Texas Supreme Court, the trial court’s order is

facially insufficient because it failed to explain how the lack of evidence—Kant and King’s

deposition testimony—undermined the jury verdict. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,

Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 211–13 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); United Scaffolding, 377

S.W.3d at 689. When granting a new trial, the trial court was required to “assur[e] the parties that

the jury’s decision was set aside only after careful thought and for valid reasons.” United

Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 688; In re Orren, 533 S.W.3d 926, 931 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, orig.

proceeding). Here, however, the trial court’s order provides no explanation to support its finding

that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny Leija the opportunity to introduce the

deposition testimony. See Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; Vernis Hernandez, 2023 WL 5068573, at *2.

Accordingly, the trial court clearly abused its discretion by failing to provide the parties with “an

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                                                                                       04-23-00815-CV

understandable, reasonably specific explanation” for setting aside the jury’s verdict and granting

Leija’s motion for new trial. See Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 213.

       Additionally, Leija fails to show the basis for the new trial order is one for which a new

trial is legally valid. See United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 689. Leija contends the trial court acted

properly in granting a new trial because he was denied an opportunity to introduce the Kant and

King deposition testimony that rebutted arguments raised by Spotted Lakes’ counsel at the

beginning of trial and was favorable to him. Leija’s argument is unpersuasive here for two reasons.

       First, rebuttal evidence is proper after all parties have had an opportunity to present

evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 265(f); In re Bledsoe, 41 S.W.3d 807, 813 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001,

orig. proceeding) (“Rebuttal evidence is limited . . . and goes only to disprove facts already in

evidence by an adverse party.”). Although the trial court sustained Spotted Lakes’ objections to

the entry of the depositions during Leija’s case-in-chief, the court made clear to Leija that he would

have the opportunity to introduce the testimony as rebuttal evidence or make a bill of exceptions.

Our review of the record reveals the trial court provided Leija with an opportunity to offer rebuttal

evidence, but Leija chose not to offer any. See McGaffigan v. Mora, No. 04-03-00472-CV, 2004

WL 1159346, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 26, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding,

assuming the trial court improperly excluded evidence, the trial court did not err because it

provided the complaining party an opportunity to rebut the disputed testimony).

       Second, Leija sought to introduce Kant’s and King’s testimony to rebut arguments made

by Spotted Lakes’ counsel. Generally, the argument of counsel is not evidence. See Fallon v. MD

Anderson Physicians Network, 586 S.W.3d 58, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet.

denied) (“Motions, arguments of counsel, and bare assertions are not evidence.”). Therefore, the

trial court’s new trial order provides an invalid basis to grant a new trial.

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                                                                                     04-23-00815-CV

       In sum, the trial court’s order granting Leija’s motion for new trial is insufficient on its

face. See Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 213; United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 689; Bent, 487 S.W.3d

at 173; In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289, 299 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (noting that

an explanation for the reason a trial court grants a new trial “is the essential prerequisite for

verifying that a new-trial order does not contravene the constitutional principle that judges may

not substitute their own views for that of the jury without a valid basis.”). Accordingly, the trial

court’s order granting a new trial was a clear abuse of discretion.

                                           CONCLUSION

       We conditionally grant mandamus relief for the reasons stated in this opinion.

                                                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

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