Court Opinion

ID: 9475338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:24:15.621034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:39.366761
License: Public Domain

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, with whom BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and McMILLIAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc.
I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing.
Ordinarily, I would be content with the dissenting opinion previously filed by Judge Bright, in which Judge McMillian and I joined. The Court en banc has ruled, after full consideration, and there is not much point in pursuing the matter further in this Court (though the Supreme Court may find the case interesting, and I hope it does). I write separately at this time simply to take note of the point made in the petition for rehearing: that McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985), establishes that “whenever the right to petition is exercised, that right is afforded the protection of the actual malice standard; the nature of the communication and not the status of the defamation plaintiff is the touchstone.” This summary of McDonald, which I have quoted from page 1 of the petition for rehearing, is, in my view, correct.
In other words, whether the plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure or not, the statements by defendant on which he sues were contained in a petition to Congress for redress of grievances, and they should therefore be protected by the First Amendment to the extent indicated in McDonald. At the new trial, plaintiff should not be allowed to recover damages unless he proves actual malice.