Court Opinion

ID: 9716102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:27:00.177936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:41.770761
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
President Judge COLINS.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s thoughtful analysis of this novel issue. I believe that the Department’s decision constitutes a hyper-technical interpretation of its bidding requirements, exulting form over substance, and resulting in an unnecessary additional burden on taxpayers in the amount of $432,626.
At the outset, I question whether Glasgow’s submission was deficient. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Glasgow faded to “submit” the necessary DBE information on time, and I question the majority’s acceptance of the Department’s factual and legal characterizations of Glasgow’s submission. Op. p. 1017.
The Department recognized Glasgow as the apparent lowest qualified bidder following the completion and submission of bids by Glasgow and its competitors. All that remained was for Glasgow to submit information concerning its proposed DBE subcontractors by the deadline in the manner required by the bidding instructions. Glasgow placed the information on the Department’s website. Thus, the Department had the DBE information available for viewing by the submission dates and time. This information exceeded the Department’s requirements. The DBE subcontractors acknowledged their selection via the website. The only missing element was the scrolling down of the web page and the clicking on the submit button found there. Both parties acknowledge that Glasgow’s failure to do so was simply an oversight.
Further, it is well established that the submission of a bid constitutes an “offer” and becomes a binding contract when the bid is accepted by the agency. Muncy Area School District v. Gardner, 91 Pa. Cmwlth. 406, 497 A.2d 683 (1985). Glasgow, therefore, would have no grounds to assert that its DBE subcontractor information was not binding upon it had the Department gone forward with the contract. Moreover, the Department has the right to monitor, with appropriate enforcement mechanisms, the construction project to ensure that its DBE requirements are being met. Therefore, the “practical” implications of Glasgow failing to hit the “submit” button, as described by the Department, are a non-issue.
Even if Glasgow’s submission was defective, I would reverse the Secretary’s decision. Our Supreme Court has held that a governmental body may waive bid defects where the noncompliance (1) does not deprive the agency of the assurance that the contract will be entered into and performed and (2) does not confer a competitive advantage on the bidder. Gaeta v. Ridley School District, 567 Pa. 500, 508-9, 788 A.2d 363, 368 (2002). As discussed above, the Department had definite assurance of Glasgow’s performance. Further, the competitive bidding process had already run its course by the time Glasgow was requested to set forth its DBE subcontractor information, because the Department had named Glasgow lowest responsible bidder. Thus, the failure to hit the submit button in no way conferred upon Glasgow a competitive advantage necessitating the rejection of its bid.
*1020Despite the deference courts generally afford governmental agencies in reviewing discretionary actions, and the rule that specifications in a bidding document are generally mandatory and must be strictly followed, see Shaeffer v. City of Lancaster, 754 A.2d 719 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), I would temper our review of the issues by recognizing that, when circumstances warrant, we may disturb an agency’s discretionary award of a public contract. In McCloskey v. Independence Cablevision Corp., 74 Pa. Cmwlth. 435, 460 A.2d 1205, 1207 (1983) (citation omitted), we stated:
Laws requiring the competitive bidding of public contracts serve “the purpose of inviting competition, to guard against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption in awarding of municipal contracts.... ” On the other hand, if the public wealth is to be expended prudently and honestly, and if the integrity of the bidding process is to be maintained, the bidders must be treated fairly and cannot be excluded unduly from participation. Although guided by well-entrenched legal and public-policy tenets, a court must avoid the mechanical application of these principles without close reference to the underlying facts and applicable legislation, and without balancing the harm of excluding the bidder against the effects of permitting his continued participation.
Further, in Gaeta, our Supreme Court, quoting American Totalisator Co. v. Seligman, 489 Pa. 568, 576, 414 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1980), has noted that “When competitive bidding is used and the procedures followed emasculate the benefits of such bidding, we believe judicial intervention is proper.” 567 Pa. at 507, 788 A.2d at 367. In such cases, we should strike a balance between the harm that arises when an agency excludes a bidder and the effect of interceding with the agency’s discretion by permitting the bidder’s continued participation.
Clearly, the Department’s rejection of Glasgow for the sole reason of its mistake in operating the computer screen “emasculated” the competitive bidding process that had already proceeded. Furthermore, the Department’s rejection of Glasgow’s bid based on its seemingly inconsequential mistake results in an imprudent use of the public wealth as well as unfairness to an otherwise qualified bidder. See McClos-key. For these reasons, I would reverse the Secretary’s decision.
Judge SMITH-RIBNER and Judge FRIEDMAN join in this dissent.