Court Opinion

ID: 9703648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:03:18.822953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:50.812803
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LORENZ, specially concurring: I concur with the well-reasoned opinion authored by Justice Sullivan. I fear that our colleague’s dissent adopts an analysis which jeopardizes the primary authority of the trial court as the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. Our dissenting colleague appears to be substituting his judgment for that of the trial court concerning the credibility of witnesses as affected by minor discrepancies in the description of the defendant. Yet this substitution of judgment is accomplished without the benefit of personal observation uniquely available to the trial court. This is not our function and I fear that silence on this issue would encourage this inappropriate practice in this court of review. The dissent would have the majority reject the trial court’s finding that the State’s eyewitness was credible and that the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But to do so in this case would require that we discard well-established precedent which holds that minor discrepancies in descriptions of facial hair, scars, height, clothing and weight are primarily matters to be factored into credibility evaluation by the trier of fact and not matters to be reweighed by a reviewing court. (People v. Danis (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 664, 472 N.E.2d 1194; People v. Smith (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 583, 367 N.E.2d 756.) Furthermore, as these cases expressly recognize, identifications are ordinarily based upon the total impression received by the witness rather than upon isolated features. I believe that the defendant’s guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. This court is not a proper forum for a trial de novo. We have no opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses. We have not had the trier of fact’s view of the defendant so as to determine what facial features may or may not have been readily apparent. The trial court, not this court, had a basis for determining the accuracy of the assistant State’s Attorney’s characterization of the defendant’s scars as not very visible. The trial court, not this court, could observe the defendant and determine whether alleged height or weight discrepancies were so evident as to reflect on the complainant’s credibility. As a reviewing court we have a solemn obligation not to substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Novotny (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 401, 244 N.E.2d 182.) We are not a court of retrial; the trier of fact has already weighed the evidence and evaluated the credibility of all the witnesses that the parties chose to present. We are now bound to consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and then to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.) In light of these principles, I specially concur with Justice Sullivan and affirm the convictions.