Court Opinion

ID: 9793576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:50:12.965781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:06.649927
License: Public Domain

*773Stafford, J.
I dissent. I strongly disagree with the 1-year suspension meted out by the majority. Such a suspension is wholly insufficient.
It must not be forgotten that in 1966 this respondent was reprimanded for neglect and delay of a case and for misrepresentations to clients. In 1967 he was censured for neglect and delay of two cases, for misrepresentations to clients, and for failure to cooperate with the investigation of the Local Administrative Committee of the bar. In 1970 Mr. Yates again was disciplined by the bar for the neglect of legal matters, which resulted in a 45-day suspension from the practice of law.
Today's case is a repeat of the same problems: neglect of legal matters entrusted to him; intentional failure to carry out a contract of employment for professional services; failure to cooperate with state bar counsel in the investigation of complaints against him; and a demonstrated unfitness to practice by reason of his repeated violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although both the Hearing Panel and the Disciplinary Board of the Washington State Bar Association ultimately recommended a 2-year suspension from the practice of law, this court has reduced it to a mere 1-year suspension. I do not question the court's power in this regard. I question the wisdom of the reduced penalty.
This court has broad discretion in determining what action should be taken against an attorney who violates the Code of Professional Responsibility. Nevertheless, in exercising that discretion we should consider: (1) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (2) whether the punishment will be sufficient to prevent a recurrence; (3) whether the penalty will be sufficient to deter other practitioners from engaging in similar conduct; (4) whether the court's action is sufficient to restore and maintain respect for the honor and dignity of the profession; and (5) whether those who seek the services of lawyers will be assured that the penalties for unprofessional conduct will be strictly enforced. In re Nelson, 87 Wn.2d 77, 549 P.2d 21 (1976); In *774re Kennedy, 80 Wn.2d 222, 492 P.2d 1364 (1972); In re Pennington, 73 Wn.2d 601, 440 P.2d 175 (1968).
The decision of the majority fails on all grounds, particularly on grounds (1), (2), (4) and (5) enumerated above. Both the serious nature of the latest violations and the fact of similar past violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by respondent are circumstances demanding a more strict punishment than that meted out by the majority. The fact that respondent again is being disciplined within a relatively short period of time clearly indicates that past discipline failed to make any impression whatsoever. As a result the public has continued to be mistreated by this member of the bar. There is a grave question whether the action of the majority will provide the public with any assurance that the court will deal strictly with lawyers who handle their affairs unprofessionally. How can we hope to restore and maintain respect for the honor and dignity of the profession when we hesitate to give stronger discipline on the ground that it might put respondent out of touch with his profession? It seems to me that he is already so far out of touch with the basic tenets of the legal profession that we now should consider the public served by the profession if we hope to retain its respect. At a minimum respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.
Wright, C.J., and Hamilton and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Stafford, J.