Court Opinion

ID: 9720921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:44:47.71251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.323305
License: Public Domain

WIENER, Acting P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with everything set forth in the majority opinion except that part which states “Western Sun meritlessly claims the award of $1.5 million to Kristina is so excessive as a matter of law it must be deemed the result of passion or prejudice____” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 726, italics added.) I believe the argument has merit. Accordingly, I would modify the judgment.
We are told that before we can reverse the judgment on the ground the verdict is excessive the verdict must be so large that it shocks the conscience and suggests passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury. (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 919 [114 Cal.Rptr. 622, 523 P.2d 662]; Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 64 [118 Cal.Rptr. 184, 529 P.2d 608, 65 A.L.R.3d 878].) This general statement, however, with such apparent simplistic clarity hardly serves as an objective basis for appellate action. We know that if we were to conduct a survey on the damage award in this or other cases we would receive varied responses—some judges would be outraged at the size of the verdict; others, such as the majority, would conclude the verdict is within a reasonable range. I believe the judicial process involving trial court review of allegedly excessive verdicts in new trial motions or later appellate review requires a more principled approach applying objective guidelines rather than the personal, visceral response of the individual trial judge or the collective viscera of a three-judge appellate panel.
Inherent in our notion of justice is the concept of uniformity—people in more or less similar positions should receive equal treatment. The justice system should not be viewed as a sporting venture where certain lucky ones can win the “Big Spinoff” simply because a particular jury happens to be inordinately generous with someone else’s money. Fairness requires that persons who receive certain types of injuries with resultant economic loss should be compensated in a rational manner comparable to others with similar injuries. Not only is this uniformity essential for respect for our justice system, but reasonable predictability is essential for those obligated to cover these financial risks. We expect insurers and business institutions to effectively plan for contingencies arising from loss due to injuries or death. *731Lack of uniformity can create difficult, if not impossible, problems in planning to cover these losses if the range of damages borders on the infinite governed only by the amorphous standard of conscience.
The rational source of planning should rest with the courts which have the expertise and experience to digest jury verdicts. Courts should be, and are able to extrapolate relevant data from these cases to set reasonable ranges of settlement values to assist counsel at pretrial conferences such that settlements can be reached without the need for trial. Thus because of the theoretical and practical importance of judicial control over runaway verdicts, courts must act to revise those verdicts when they are incorrect, doing so in an objective manner. When courts, including appellate courts, fail to so act they jeopardize the system creating an incentive for those with gambling instincts. When courts act in an objective manner they not only benefit the immediate parties to the case, but they supply a rational order to be applied in other cases.
I would not want these remarks to suggest I expect mathematical precision in reaching an award of damages in any tort case including those for wrongful death. “Insistence on mathematical precision would be illusory and the judge or juror must be allowed a fair latitude to make reasonable approximations guided by judgment and practical experience.” (Whitaker v. Blidberg Rothchild Company (4th Cir. 1961) 296 F.2d 554, 555 quoted in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet (1973) 414 U.S. 573, 590 [39 L.Ed.2d 9, 24, 94 S.Ct. 806].)
Using that judgment and practical experience here I believe we can and should be guided by how California law treats similar causes of action and the results reached in other cases in this and other jurisdictions.
When I say how California treats similar causes of action I refer to the fact that we do not permit a child to maintain a cause of action for loss of parental consortium resulting from wrongful injury to the parents for the negligence of a third party. (Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 441 [138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858].) Thus here, if Western Sun’s conduct had caused Kristina’s father to become a quadriplegic or to be in a coma Kristina would receive nothing even though her damages would be identical to those suffered because of her father’s wrongful death.
I do not mean that Borer, which makes clear that it does not deal with the statutorily authorized cause of action for wrongful death, should control our thinking. (Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 451-452.) I do say that the policy statements expressed in Borer must be considered in evaluating damage awards for loss of consortium arising from the *732wrongful death of a parent. “Loss of consortium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss; monetary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that upon reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of maternal guidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and women. To say that plaintiffs have been ‘compensated’ for their loss is superficial; in reality they have suffered a loss for which they can never be compensated; they have obtained, instead, a future benefit essentially unrelated to that loss.
“We cannot ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of parental consortium merely because the money to pay such awards comes initially from the ‘negligent’ defendant or his insurer. Realistically the burden of payment of awards for loss of consortium must be borne by the public generally in increased insurance premiums or, otherwise, in the enhanced danger that accrues from the greater number of people who may choose to go without any insurance. We must also take into account the cost of administration of a system to determine and pay consortium awards; since virtually every serious injury to a parent would engender a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of each of his or her children, the expense of settling or litigating such claims would be sizeable.” (Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 447.)
Borer also points out the difficulty of determining the proper amount of damages in the context of loss of parental consortium explaining, “Plaintiffs here have prayed for $100,000 each; yet by what standard could we determine that an award of $10,000 was inadequate, or one of $500,000 excessive?” (Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 448.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 377 provides that an heir is entitled to maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death and is entitled to such damages “as under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, ...” (Italics added.) Those damages include the financial support which the child would have received from the deceased and the reasonable compensation for the loss of love, companionship, comfort, affection, care, advice, guidance, education, training, protection, services, society, solace, or moral support, and any other benefits which the child has lost by reason of his or her parent’s death. In more general terms the damages are broken down into economic and noneconomic categories. In this case the economic damages of $150 monthly child support does not translate into more than $100,000. The bulk of the $1.5 million award represents noneconomic damages.
I wholeheartedly and enthusiastically agree with the majority’s statement that Kristina was particularly vulnerable to her father’s loss. Nonetheless her *733award must be evaluated in the context of other awards in California. In making this evaluation I have reviewed and considered the results of at least 50 cases in California and elsewhere involving damages for wrongful death. There is no case in which the economic losses are as small as they are here where the noneconomic loss for a single child is as large as the one which the majority has now approved.
In generalizing from these cases I believe it is fair to say that invariably the largest component of a plaintiffs award is for loss of support. Here loss of support is only about $100,000.
Another relevant factor on whether the verdict is excessive is to consider the trial record and the value placed on the case by plaintiffs counsel. If there is anyone who should have insight as to what a fair award of damages should be it is the plaintiffs lawyer who has lived with the case and appreciates its nuances and subtleties. The plaintiffs lawyer in this case is a highly respected experienced expert in aircraft litigation. He is a superb advocate who obviously has the ability to communicate his sense of compassion, fairness and sympathy to the jury.
In arguing damages to the jury plaintiffs counsel explained Kristina’s father had a life expectancy of 39.1 years. He said there was nothing stronger than the love of a parent for a child. Counsel suggested that if there were a tragic event and a parent could not live to assist his child the parent would be pleased if he or she could at least have the ability to hire somebody as a replacement to assist in doing those things that would have been done by the now deceased parent. Counsel argued, “And if one could have someone they could count on for the rest of their life,... if they could hire somebody like that at $25,000 a year in today’s purchasing power, and I’m not talking about the shrinking value of money, that would be $977,500 if you multiply it out. [IT] Now that doesn’t mean you are going to take that as the approach or the formula, but it is something that may be of guidance to you.”
Counsel legitimately left the amount of damages to the jury. His suggestion, however, as to how they should reach their conclusion is meaningful. In broad terms counsel asked the jury to return an award of a million dollars. I think it reasonable to conclude that an award is excessive when it exceeds the amount sought by plaintiffs lawyer by a factor of 50 percent; $500,000 in absolute terms.
But even if we were to adopt counsel’s argument that a fair award of $25,000 annually is appropriate, the determination of the gross amount does not equal $977,500. That amount ignores the yield on capital. If we use the present value table and the low yield of 5 percent the total amount necessary *734to produce $25,000 annually for 39 years is approximately $425,500, less than half of what counsel argued to the jury. Thus here I believe one can reasonably conclude that plaintiff’s counsel thought the case, including both economic and noneconomic loss, did not exceed $525,000.
Based upon the foregoing I conclude the amount of damages is excessive. This conclusion is based on the fact the award is disproportionate to the amounts awarded in other cases both here and in other states and substantially exceeds the amount sought by plaintiff’s counsel. The award reflects the concern expressed in Borer that Kristina has received a future benefit unrelated to her loss. (Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 447.) Consequently, I would modify the judgment.1 Because I have been unable to persuade either of my colleagues that a modification of damages is legally necessary, the specific amount of damages which I believe is proper becomes irrelevant.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 23, 1987.

A recent federal case using the same analysis as I have, reached a similar result. (See Trevino v. United States (9th Cir. 1986) 804 F.2d 1512.)