Court Opinion

ID: 9906011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 19:02:31.830419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.933095
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Wright CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081979

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                         (Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                                   SCD120310/HC25932)
DELANO LARTEL WRIGHT,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert F. O’Neill, Judge. Dismissed.
         John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers, Sharon L. Rhodes, and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         Delano Lartel Wright appeals from an order granting his petition for
writ of habeas corpus and directing a correction of the abstract of judgment
for his 1997 criminal convictions for murder and other crimes, but denying
his request for a full resentencing. Wright previously challenged this same
order on the same grounds in a new petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in
this court, which we denied in a five-page order on May 18, 2023. (In re
Delano L. Wright, D081935.) We now conclude that the trial court’s order is
not appealable and therefore dismiss the appeal.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On January 30, 1997, a jury found Wright guilty of first degree murder

(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a) [count 1]), conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182,
subd. (a)(1) [count 2]), attempted first degree murder (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)
[count 3]), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b) [count 4]). The jury
also found true enhancement allegations that Wright personally used a
firearm in the commission of counts 1, 3, and 4 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and
intentionally inflicted great bodily injury or death in the commission of
count 1 (§ 12022.55). The underlying facts are not relevant to this appeal.
      On March 3, 1997, the court sentenced Wright to 25 years to life plus
29 years, consecutive to another term of life with the possibility of parole.
The original sentence included a consecutive upper term of nine years for the
assault in count 4, plus an additional consecutive term of five years for the
section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement accompanying count 4.
      On direct appeal, this court modified the judgment by (1) staying the
total term imposed for the assault in count 4 under section 654, including the
accompanying section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement, and (2) staying the
section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement for count 1 under former section
1170.1, subdivision (e). We ordered the abstract of judgment amended to

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
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reflect these modifications. As so modified, we affirmed the judgment.
Because we modified the judgment ourselves, we did not remand the case for
resentencing. (People v. Wright (Mar. 15, 1999, D028306) [nonpub. opn.]); see

§ 1260 [appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify judgment].)2
      As to count 4, we specifically stated: “The trial court imposed a
consecutive upper term of nine years on the assault charge plus five years for
the section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement found true as to that count. The
abstract of judgment is ordered amended to state that term is stayed
pursuant to section 654.” (People v. Wright, supra, D028306, italics added.)
      On June 5, 2000, the trial court issued an amended abstract of
judgment. The amended abstract of judgment correctly showed that the
section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement for count 1 and the nine-year upper
term sentence for count 4 had been stayed. However, the amended abstract
of judgment did not reflect a stay of the five-year consecutive sentence for the
section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement accompanying count 4, as our
opinion had directed.
      Twenty years later, a case records analyst for the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) wrote letters to the
trial court dated April 30 and September 10, 2020 advising that the five-year
section 12022.5 enhancement accompanying count 4 should potentially be
stayed because the sentence on the underlying count had been stayed under
section 654. The letters further stated: “Please review your file to determine

2      The parties have described this court’s opinion of March 15, 1999 in
their briefs, but it is not included in the appellate record. On our own motion,
we take judicial notice of the opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
We also grant the People’s unopposed motion for judicial notice of the record
of this court for Wright’s previously filed habeas corpus petition. (In re
Delano Wright, D081935.)
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if a correction is required.” In response to these letters, the court did not stay
the section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement accompanying count 4.
      Two years later, Wright filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
alleging that the trial court had imposed an illegal sentence and attaching
the two CDCR letters. At the court’s request, the People filed an informal
response. The People argued that the petition was untimely. In the
alternative, the People conceded that Wright was entitled to relief by way of a
nunc pro tunc correction of the sentence, but not a full resentencing hearing.
In reply, Wright argued that the delay was justifiable, the enhancement
should be stayed, and he should be fully resentenced with the benefit of any
new ameliorative laws.
      On February 6, 2023, the trial court issued an order granting the
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court noted the “established rule” that
“where a count is stayed under section 654, an enhancement relating to it
must be stayed as well.” To conform to this court’s decision on direct appeal,
the trial court found that the amended abstract of judgment should have
reflected a stay of the five-year firearm use enhancement accompanying
count 4, as we had directed. The court concluded: “Therefore, the petition is
GRANTED. The abstract of judgment shall be amended, nunc pro tunc
June 5, 2000, to reflect a stay of the five-year enhancement term imposed
under count 4 and a corresponding adjustment of the determinate portion of
the total sentence.”
      The court declined to conduct a full resentencing hearing. It reasoned:
“The court does not interpret CDCR’s correspondence as a request for a
resentencing hearing, but simply a request to review the abstract of
judgment for error. Considering the error and the circumstances, the court
finds that a resentencing hearing is not in order. The error requires the court

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to strike the enhancement term under count 4 as an unauthorized sentence
based on the appellate decision; it does not require the court to resentence
Petitioner on count 4 since that count was stayed pursuant to section 654.
The Court of Appeal did not find the entire sentence void. Thus, a nunc pro
tunc order suffices to correctly reflect the appellate decision in this case.”
      Wright filed this appeal (D081979) and a new petition for writ of
habeas corpus in this court (D081935), both challenging the trial court’s order
of February 6, 2023 and arguing that the court should have conducted a full
resentencing hearing. On May 18, 2023, we denied Wright’s new petition for
writ of habeas corpus in a five-page order. We concluded that the order
correcting the abstract of judgment was properly issued nunc pro tunc to
correct a clerical error in the amended abstract of judgment of June 5, 2000,
and that a mere correction of clerical error did not require a resentencing
hearing. Specifically, we found that “it was appropriate for the superior court
to issue a corrective nunc pro tunc order to conform the judgment with the
appellate decision as opposed to conducting a resentencing hearing.” Wright
now raises the same issue in this appeal.
                                  DISCUSSION
      The parties dispute whether the trial court’s order is appealable. The
People argue that the trial court’s order is properly viewed as one granting
habeas relief in part but denying it in part as to Wright’s request for a full
resentencing. Because an order denying habeas relief is not appealable, and
Wright made his request for full resentencing in the habeas proceedings, the
People assert that the trial court’s denial of this request is not appealable.
      Wright argues that the order is appealable for two reasons. First, he
contends that he is not appealing from the denial of habeas relief because the
trial court granted his habeas petition. We reject this argument. As the

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People argue, Wright is appealing from the denial of relief he sought in the
habeas proceedings. Although the trial court granted him partial relief by
directing that the abstract of judgment be amended to reflect a stay of the
firearm enhancement accompanying count 4, the court denied his request for
full resentencing. It would make little sense to hold that a partial denial of
habeas relief is appealable even though a complete denial of habeas relief is
not appealable. Wright cites no authority for this proposition. The denial of
relief sought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus is reviewable only by
means of a new petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the appellate court.
(People v. Garrett (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1423.) We have already denied
the new habeas petition Wright filed in this court challenging the same order
on the same grounds.
      Second, Wright contends that the court’s denial of his request for
resentencing was tantamount to an order denying a CDCR recommendation
to recall a sentence under section 1172.1 (formerly section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1)), which is appealable as an “order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b); see People v. Mendez
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 347, 353.) We again disagree. The CDCR letters did
not recommend that Wright’s sentence be recalled and did not cite the recall
statute; they merely advised the court of a potential error in the amended
abstract of judgment and stated: “Please review your file to determine if a
correction is required.” Thus, the order is not appealable on this basis.
(People v. Magana (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1126–1128 (Magana) [trial
court’s order correcting clerical error in abstract of judgment in response to
similar CDCR communication was not appealable].)
      As we concluded in our order denying Wright’s habeas petition filed in
this court, the trial court’s ruling merely corrected a clerical error in the

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amended abstract of judgment “to conform the judgment with the appellate
decision” on direct appeal. Our decision on direct appeal modified the
judgment and explicitly directed that the abstract of judgment be amended to
reflect that both the nine-year term for the assault in count 4 and the five-
year term for the accompanying firearm use enhancement were stayed under
section 654. Yet the amended abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect
our modification. Although it showed the stay of the nine-year sentence for
the assault, it did not show any stay of the five-year sentence for the
accompanying firearm use enhancement. This mismatch between the
judgment as modified by our prior opinion and the amended abstract of
judgment constitutes a clerical error. (People v. Humphrey (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 371, 379.) The trial court’s correction of this clerical error did
not affect Wright’s substantial rights because it merely conformed the
abstract of judgment to the modification we made in 1999.
      Finally, the trial court’s order is not appealable because the court
lacked jurisdiction to conduct a resentencing. (Magana, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1126–1128.) Our opinion on direct appeal modified the
judgment without ordering a resentencing. (§ 1260.) With limited
exceptions, once a judgment is final, the sentencing court is without
jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence, except under the provisions of
section 1172.1 (formerly section 1170, subdivision (d)). (People v. Fuimaono
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 134.) The trial court lacked authority to recall the
sentence under section 1172.1 because the CDCR did not recommend a recall;
the 120 days for the trial court to recall a sentence on its own motion had
long passed; and a defendant may not make a motion to recall the sentence.
(Magana, at pp. 1125–1126.) Because “the trial court had no jurisdiction to
grant defendant’s motion for a resentencing hearing,” the “order denying that

                                        7
[request] did not affect defendant’s substantial rights and was not an
appealable order.” (Id. at p. 1128; see also People v. Chlad (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1719, 1725–1726 [order denying defendant’s request for
resentencing not appealable where trial court no longer had jurisdiction to
resentence the defendant]; People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200,
1208 [same].)
                                 DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.

                                                               BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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