Court Opinion

ID: 9673904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:20:20.956238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.688519
License: Public Domain

Bronson, P.J.
(concurring). With reluctance, I concur in the decision. I do so not because I agree with the policy announced in the opinion, but because I feel that the Supreme Court of this state has not yet embraced a position which would allow the decision to go the other way. It is for this reason that I write separately.
Plaintiff police officer was horribly injured while engaging in a police training exercise when an*372other officer fired a rice pellet loaded shotgun directly into his face at a distance of about three feet. As a result of the blast plaintiff suffered total and permanent blindness and severe facial disfigurement. Due to the present state of the law, however, plaintiff is left without a suitable remedy. The reason for this is the rigid application of the doctrine of governmental immunity, a concept which as presently interpreted has outlived its usefulness.1
The doctrine of „ governmental immunity is a carryover from days when it was thought that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience”. Russell v Men of Devon, 2 Durnford & East Term Rep 667, 673; 100 Eng Rep 359, 362 (1788). One can state with assuredness that such an idea is not the prevailing mood today. The social climate which fostered the creation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity "has long since been tempered with the warm winds of humanitarianism and individual freedom[2] * * * [and a concept which imposes] the entire burden of government’s wrongful acts on the single injured individual is abhorrent to our social philosophy”. Brown v Wichita State University, 219 Kan 2, 39-40; 547 P2d 1015, 1043 (1976) (Fatzer, C.J., concurring and dissenting), appeal dismissed 429 US 806; 97 S Ct 41; 50 L Ed 2d 67 (1976).
*373This change in social climate from the time when sovereign immunity was established should also cause a change in the way courts perceive the doctrine.3 In striking the balance between the rights of the society and the rights of the individual, we no longer automatically view society as the superior and the individual necessarily as the inferior. Instead the rights of the individual are considered paramount, and government must be able to justify interfering with tfrose rights.
This same balance should ^so be struck in examining the doctrine of governmental immunity. Governmental immunity should be the exception not the norm. Immunity should not be invoked merely because a government official or agency performed the activity which caused the injury, but only when there are sound policy reasons behind exempting the government from liability. See Cooperrider, The Court, the Legislature and Governmental Tort Immunity in Michigan, 72 Mich L Rev 187, 282-283 (1973).
Government activities can generally be divided into two categories, policy making and policy implementing. Policy making activities are uniquely governmental in nature and have no counterpart in the private sector. An individual or corporation may make decisions which affect themselves or affect others but they are not entrusted with the *374authority to weigh various policy considerations and public concerns in order to formulate public policy which is applicable to all members of the society. This latter function is solely governmental, and there are strong policy reasons for insulating this type of activity from liability.
Government by its very nature must address and attempt to resolve complex policy questions. Moreover, the resolution of policy questions must, on occasion, injure certain individuals or groups in society. If every such decision subjected the government to potential liability to people allegedly injured by the chosen policy, there could be no government. These decisions are the essence of government and as Justice Jackson stated, "it is not a tort for government to govern”, Dalehite v United States, 346 US 15, 57; 73 S Ct 956, 979; 97 L Ed 1427 (1953) (dissenting opinion). These decisions must be insulated from liability for society to function so there is justification for invoking the doctrine of governmental immunity in these instances.
Policy implementing activities, however, are an entirely different matter. Although there is something uniquely governmental in the decision on the need for and the location of a school or a road, there is nothing uniquely governmental about the construction of the building or the laying of the pavement. See Pichette v Manistique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268; 269 NW2d 143 (1978) (Fitzgerald, J., with Kavanagh, C.J., and Levin, J., concurring). These latter activities have numerous counterparts in the private sector, and there is no justifiable reason in denying recovery to persons injured during the course of these activities merely because they were unfortunate enough to be injured by a negligent government official instead of *375his counterpart in the private sector. Since there is no justification for invoking the doctrine in these situations, governmental immunity should not be available as a defense.
Application of this policy making/policy implementing test4 to the present case would call for a rejection of the defense of governmental immunity. The decision to conduct a police training exercise was clearly a policy decision which would not subject the various governmental bodies to liability. However, the actual shooting of plaintiff was simply the negligent act of a government official. He was in no way making a policy decision. There was no balancing of policy considerations and public concerns; it was merely the negligent implementation or operation of a previously determined policy decision. As such there should be no defense of governmental immunity.5
*376But should be and is are not the same. I am not writing on a clean slate, and a majority of the Supreme Court6 has, as yet, not embraced this position. Except for this fact, I would willingly join in the decision7 reached by my learned brother Thomas Burns, but as matters now stand I feel constrained to concur in Judge Allen’s decision.

 On this point one legal commentator has stated:
"The continuation of plaintiff 'sacrifices’ offered in the name of governmental immunity is without a doubt the most deplorable circumstance in Michigan jurisprudence * * * . As a legal policy, governmental immunity from tort liability is immoral and legally unjustifiable. In a purportedly enlightened society that requires its citizens to pay lawful judgments or, within ordinary prudence, requires them to insure against unreasonable risks of harm to others, governmental immunity is an embarrassing anomaly.” Littlejohn, Torts, 1974 Annual Survey of Mich Law, 21 Wayne L Rev 665-666 (1975).

 Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich L Rev 41, 48 (1949).

 By statute, government agencies are only immune from suit when "engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function”, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). Since this phrase was not assigned a legislative definition, it is "presumably subject to judicial refinement”. Thomas v Dept of State Highways, 398 Mich 1, 18; 247 NW2d 530 (1976) (Kavanagh, C.J., Fitzgerald, J., and Levin, J., dissenting), quoting Cooperrider, The Court, the Legislature and Governmental Tort Immunity in Michigan, 72 Mich L Rev 187, 282 (1973). As described more fully further on in this opinion, I would define governmental functions as those activities in which the government officials or agencies are involved in policy making or planning functions.

 This policy making/policy implementing test has been adopted under various names in numerous jurisdictions. See, e.g., Driscoll v United States, 525 F2d 136 (CA 9, 1975), construing 28 USC 2680 (planning/operational), Johnson v State, 69 Cal 2d 782; 73 Cal Rptr 240; 447 P2d 352 (1968) (discretionary/ministerial) and seems to be the test preferred by legal commentators. See, e.g., Littlejohn and Kotch, Torts, 1977 Annual Survey of Mich Law, 24 Wayne L Rev 655, 676-680 (1978), Restatement of Torts 2d, § 895, B & C, Tentative Draft No 19, 1973.

 At footnote 4 and the accompanying text of the majority opinion, Judge Allen contends that the policy making/policy implementing test espoused here and previously adopted by Chief Justice Kavanagh and Justices Fitzgerald and Levin would still permit the defense of governmental immunity in the present case. I do not agree. In Thomas v Dept of State Highways, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976) (Kavanagh, C.J., Fitzgerald, J., and Levin, J., dissenting), the justices cited the case of Downs v United States, 522 F2d 990 (CA 6, 1975), which held that governmental immunity was not applicable to a case where the actions of the F.B.I. "allegedly caused a highjacker to shoot several hostages”. Thomas, supra, at 22, fn 12. The citation of this case demonstrates that the justices did not regard the performance of an ordinary police function as an activity which would trigger the application of the defense of governmental immunity. The majority opinion also recognized this fact. Thomas, supra, at 13-14. Cf. Armstrong v Ross Township, 82 Mich App 77; 266 NW2d 674 (1978).
Since the activity complained of in the present case was an ordi*376nary police function, the defense of governmental immunity would not be applicable under the above-mentioned test.

 See Pichette v Manistique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268; 269 NW2d 143 (1978), Thomas v Dept of State Highways, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976).

 Although the test espoused by my learned colleague Thomas Burns would most likely yield the same results as the test adopted here, it is my opinion that the terminology of the policy making/ policy implementing test is preferable. Under Judge Burns’ test, the doctrine of governmental immunity is accepted in theory, but eliminated in practice. This is so because the specific activity complained of is always negligence, and negligence is never a governmental function. Therefore there is never a defense of governmental immunity. The test adopted here, however, acknowledges that there is a legitimate sphere in which the doctrine is applicable and then specifically limits the doctrine to that sphere.