Court Opinion

ID: 9897341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:23.076298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.285777
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              Jul 17 2023, 8:56 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                 Court of Appeals
                                                                                   and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Andrew J. Baldwin                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Baldwin Perry & Kamish, P.C.                                Attorney General of Indiana
Franklin, Indiana                                           J.T. Whitehead
Michael R. Auger                                            Steven J. Hosler
Franklin, Indiana                                           Deputy Attorneys General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darius Jordan Birk,                                         July 17, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-1133
        v.                                                  Appeal from the
                                                            Johnson Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Peter D. Nugent, Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            41D02-2104-F3-27

                                   Opinion by Judge Foley
                                Judges Bailey and May concur.

Foley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023                            Page 1 of 17
[1]   Darius Jordan Birk (“Birk”) appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, of Level 3

      felony aggravated battery causing serious permanent disfigurement, 1 Level 6

      felony pointing a firearm at another, 2 Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun

      without a license,3 and Level 1 felony attempted murder. 4 Birk raises two issues

      for our review: (1) whether the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right

      to confront and cross-examine certain witnesses; and (2) whether the trial

      court’s jury instruction regarding “intent” was misleading, prejudicial, and

      impermissibly relieved the State from its burden of proof. Finding no Sixth

      Amendment violation and the jury instruction proper, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History 5
[2]   Sabrina Reynolds (“Reynolds”)—along with her two children—lived in a

      townhouse provided to her by her father, Mark Reynolds (“Mark”). 6 For years,

      Reynolds was in an on-again and off-again relationship with Jason Monroe

      (“Monroe”), the de facto father of both of her children. 7 Around Christmas

      time in 2020, Reynolds met Birk through mutual friends, and the two became

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5(1).
      2
          I.C. § 35-47-4-3(b).
      3
          I.C. § 35-47-2-1(a)(2017), amended by Pub. L. No. 175-2022, § 8 (eff. July 1, 2022).
      4
          I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1.
      5
        We held an oral argument on May 18, 2023, at Martinsville High School. We thank the parties and the
      school for their participation.
      6
       Sabrina and Mark share the same last name: Reynolds. To avoid confusion, we identify Mark by his first
      name.
      7
          Monroe is the biological father of Reynolds’s youngest child.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023                            Page 2 of 17
      friends then started dating. Shortly thereafter, Birk moved his clothes and other

      belongings into the townhouse. On March 13, 2021, Birk and Reynolds got

      into an argument about Reynolds’s stimulus money. Birk wanted to use the

      money to purchase a gun. Reynolds wanted to use the money for the

      downpayment on her own apartment so that she could move out of Mark’s

      townhouse.

[3]   The argument progressed, and Reynolds decided to take Birk to his mother’s

      (“Sheila”) house.8 Reynolds drove her van, and Birk sat in the front passenger

      seat. The argument escalated. As Reynolds entered Sheila’s neighborhood,

      Reynolds screamed for Birk to “get the fuck out of [her] car[,]” but Birk refused

      to do so. Tr. Vol. 4 pp. 30–31. Birk then pulled his gun out, cocked it, and

      pointed it at Reynolds, telling her “I should shoot you[.]” Id. at 33, 37.

      Reynolds replied: “[T]hen fucking shoot me.” Id. Birk then shot Reynolds in

      the face. Reynolds got out of the van, and Birk ran after her, grabbed her, and

      put her in the backseat of the van while calling her a “stupid bitch.” Id. at 38.

      A bystander testified that Birk stated “I’m sorry, baby, I’m sorry” when he

      grabbed Reynolds and put her back in the van. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 194. Another

      bystander testified that when Birk got out of the van, she heard Birk screaming

      “call [ ] 911.” Id. at 181. Once Birk put Reynolds in the van, he quickly drove

      8
          Darius and Sheila share the same last name: Birk. To avoid confusion, we identify Sheila by her first name.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023                                  Page 3 of 17
      Reynolds to the hospital. When they arrived at the hospital, Birk ran inside,

      screaming “I need help.” Tr. Vol. 4 p. 60.

[4]   As a result of being shot, Reynolds suffered a fractured jaw and “a laceration to

      the tip of her tongue.” Id. at 185. She also lost some of her teeth and a

      significant amount of blood. Reynolds underwent three surgeries, and she was

      in the hospital for two-and-a-half weeks. While still in the hospital, and four

      days after the shooting, Reynolds remained unable to speak. When the police

      spoke with her, she wrote a note to Detective Rick Saltsgaver (“Detective

      Saltsgaver”) stating “[Birk] didn’t mean to do it.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 137. 9 After

      Reynolds was discharged from the hospital, she was under Mark’s care while

      Monroe took care of her children for six days before she next spoke to Detective

      Saltsgaver to tell him that Birk “mean[t] to [shoot her].” Id. at 49.

[5]   On April 1, 2021, the State charged Birk with: Count 1, aggravated battery

      causing serious permanent disfigurement as a Level 3 felony; Count 2, pointing

      a firearm at another as a Level 6 felony; and Count 3, carrying a handgun

      without a license as a Class A misdemeanor. On September 17, 2021, the State

      amended the information to add Count 4, attempted murder as a Level 1

      felony. From February 28 to March 7 of 2022, a jury trial was held.

      9
        State’s Exhibit 113 is a note written by Reynolds stating that Birk “didn’t mean to.” Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 78–79.
      The exhibit in the record only contains a cover page stating, “STATE’S EXHIBIT 113 — EVIDENCE BAG
      – NOTE FROM [REYNOLDS][,]” but does not contain the note. Despite the absence of the note in the
      record, the parties do not dispute what the note says.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023                                Page 4 of 17
[6]   Birk sought to introduce testimony regarding Mark’s and Monroe’s use of the

      word “n***er” in reference to Birk and their racial animus towards Birk.

      Neither Mark nor Monroe testified at trial, but they did testify outside the

      presence of the jury during an offer of proof. Both Mark and Monroe denied

      using the word “n***er in reference to Birk.” See Tr. Vol. 6 pp. 36, 43. Mark

      also stated that Reynolds had told him that Monroe used the word “n***er” in

      reference to Birk. Reynolds stated that Mark had never used the word “n***er”

      when referring to Birk, but that Monroe had “called [ ] Birk a [n***er]” before.

      Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 221–22. Birk also called Kyle Smith (“Smith”) and Sheila to

      testify during the offer of proof. Smith stated that Reynolds had told him that

      Mark “referred to [Birk] as a n***er” and when Smith ran into Mark on the

      date of the shooting, but after the shooting had occurred, Mark asked Smith:

      “why would you ever be friends with a [n***er] that [sic] would do something

      this awful to my daughter [Reynolds?]” Tr. Vol. 6 p. 96. Sheila stated that

      Reynolds had told her that Mark “said he didn’t want that [n***er] in his

      house. And that if messing with a [n***er] is what [Reynolds] chose to do,

      then, he was willing to put her and her kids out of the townhouse.” Id. at 100.

      Sheila also testified that while Reynolds was on the phone with Monroe, she

      overheard Monroe say: “I done told you [sic] about driving by my house with

      that fucking [n***er] boyfriend of yours in the car.” Id. at 103.

[7]   Ultimately, the trial court denied Birk’s request to introduce evidence regarding

      Mark’s and Monroe’s racial animus towards Birk, ruling that such evidence was

      “collateral.” See Tr. Vol. 3 p. 120; Tr. Vol. 5 p. 226; Tr. Vol. 6 p. 52–53.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023         Page 5 of 17
[8]   During preliminary jury instructions and again during the final jury

      instructions, Birk objected to the State’s jury instruction regarding intent,

      alleging that the instruction was “misleading if it [was] stated that way” and

      asked for the instruction to be reworded. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 102. The trial court

      denied the request both times. Birk was found guilty on all four counts. Birk

      now appeals.

      Discussion and Decision
      I.      Exclusion of Evidence of Racial Bias

[9]   Birk argues that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of the racial

      animus of Mark and Monroe because it curtailed his right to confront and

      cross-examine them under the Sixth Amendment. “[W]hen a constitutional

      violation is alleged, ‘the proper standard of appellate review is de novo.’”

      Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 177 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Speers v. State, 999

      N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013)). The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause

      provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

      enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S.

      CONST. amend. VI. However, “it does not provide for cross-examination that

      is effective in whatever way, and whatever extent, that a defendant might

      wish.” Watson v. State, 134 N.E.3d 1038, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) “[T]he

      accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of

      procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the

      ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1132

      (Ind. 2001).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023          Page 6 of 17
[10]   Birk wanted to elicit testimony from Reynolds, Mark, Monroe, Smith, and

       Sheila that Mark and Monroe had referred to Birk by the racial slur “n***er.”

       Birk argued that Mark’s and Monroe’s racial animus towards Birk provided, at

       least in part, Reynolds’s motive for changing her characterization of the

       shooting from an accident to an intentional act. 10 Indiana Evidence Rules 401

       and 403 set the framework for our analysis. First, we must determine whether

       the excluded evidence was relevant. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any

       tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

       evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind.

       Evidence Rule 401. The evidence, if probative, must be excluded if the

       prejudicial nature of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.

       See Ind. Evidence Rule 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its

       probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the

       following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue

       delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). “When determining the

       likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury

       will (1) substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or (2) that the

       evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Carter

       v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002) (citing Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877,

       880 (Ind. 1994)).

       10
         Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility. Ind. Evidence
       Rule 607.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023                                 Page 7 of 17
[11]   First, we must consider whether the excluded testimony is relevant. Birk’s

       theory is not that Reynolds harbored racial animus towards Birk, but that the

       racial animus of Mark and Monroe influenced Reynolds to testify at trial that

       Birk shot her intentionally, in apparent contradiction to her hospital note stating

       that Birk “didn’t mean to do it.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 137. When Reynolds next spoke

       to Detective Saltsgaver to tell him that Birk meant to shoot her, she had been in

       Mark’s care for six days while Monroe took “care of the kids.” Id. at 49.

       During Reynolds’s recovery from her injuries, she relied heavily on both Mark

       and Monroe to provide her housing and assistance with her children. Birk’s

       theory is that Reynolds changed her story about whether the shooting was

       intentional due to her financial and emotional reliance upon Mark and Monroe,

       not because she shared their racist views or disliked Birk due to his race. The

       probative value of the evidence of the racial animus of Mark and Monroe to

       explain Reynolds’s motive changing her story from “[Birk] didn’t mean to do

       it” to “[Birk] did mean to do it[,]” id., was minimal, at best.

[12]   We next consider whether the evidence was prejudicial, and if so, whether the

       prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. Birk relies on both

       Tompkins v. State, 669 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996) and Kimble v. State, 659 N.E.2d

       182 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In each case, it was determined that the prejudicial

       nature of the testimony did not substantially outweigh the probative value of

       the evidence, and therefore, the evidence was admissible.

[13]   In Tompkins, the defendant shot an African American five times in the head.

       The trial court admitted evidence that the defendant used the phrase “no n***er

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023        Page 8 of 17
       lane” to refer to the road leading to his lake property and evidence from three

       witnesses regarding the defendant’s racial bias to support its theory that the

       murder was racially motivated. Id. at 396–97. The defendant claimed that the

       trial court erred in admitting the evidence because the evidence was irrelevant.

       Id. at 396. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence of defendant’s racial bias

       was relevant and created an inference of defendant’s motive for the murder. Id.

       at 397. Additionally, the Court noted that even if the trial court had found that

       the probative value and danger of unfair prejudice of this evidence to be of

       approximately equal weight, it must be excluded because the rule requires that

       the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweigh the probative value. Id. at

       398; see also Ind. Evidence Rule 403. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion in admitting the evidence. Id.

[14]   In Kimble, Kimble was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and felony

       murder. Id. at 183. The trial court admitted testimony regarding Kimble’s

       membership in the White Brotherhood, a racially biased organization. Id. at

       184. The defendant argued that the trial court erred when it admitted that

       evidence. Id. This court concluded that the trial court did not err because

       Kimble and his cohorts specifically chose the victim because she was a black

       prostitute and that Kimble stated that he considered himself an “official”

       member of the organization because he has committed a crime against the black

       race. Id. at 185. This court held that the evidence was highly probative of his

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023        Page 9 of 17
       motive for participation in the victim’s murder and was not substantially

       outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.

[15]   Birk points to Tompkins and Kimble as instances where “the Indiana Supreme

       Court and the Court of Appeals have determined the racial bias evidence to be

       relevant and admissible in spite of its potential for unfair prejudice to the

       defendant.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 8; Ind. Evid. Rule 404(b). Birk’s reliance

       on Tompkins and Kimble is misplaced because, in both cases, evidence of the

       defendants’ own racial bias was used to demonstrate the motive behind their

       crimes. Here, Birk attempted to present evidence that was not in any way

       linked to the motive behind his crime. Neither Mark nor Monroe was present

       when Birk shot Reynolds and some of the statements that Birk wanted to

       question both Mark and Monroe about occurred weeks before the shooting. See

       Tr. Vol. 6 pp. 34–35, 103. Evidence of Mark’s and Monroe’s racial animus

       towards Birk would have exposed the two men as racially biased, but fails to

       explain Reynolds’s motive for changing her story or disliking Birk.

[16]   There is no question that the introduction of the racially charged testimony

       posed a substantial risk that the jury may attribute the racist views of Mark or

       Monroe to Reynolds, thus leading to unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

       or misleading the jury. The risk of unfair prejudice is even more acute where

       Reynolds is the sole eye-witness to testify regarding the shooting and the events

       immediately preceding the shooting. As Birk argued in his brief, the

       introduction of such evidence would have aroused the passions of the jury since

       racial bias and prejudice is one of the most prototypical forms of bias and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023         Page 10 of 17
       prejudice known today. See Appellant’s Br. p. 30. Therefore, the prejudicial

       effect of the excluded testimony was significant.

[17]   We conclude that the prejudicial effect of the testimony substantially

       outweighed its probative value. Birk’s goal was to challenge Reynolds’s

       credibility and reveal her motives for inconsistencies in her version of events.

       Evidence of racist remarks that were uttered by Mark and Monroe, who were

       not present when the shooting occurred, was too remote and unfairly

       prejudicial to aid Birk in accomplishing his goal. The trial court did not err in

       excluding the testimony.

[18]   Even if the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence was error, any error was

       harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273

       (Ind. 2010) (“Violations of the right of cross-examination do not require

       reversal if the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

       contribute to the verdict”); see also Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 468 (Ind. App.

       Ct. 2015) (“A court determining whether an error is harmless beyond a

       reasonable doubt must do so on review of the whole record.”). The correct

       inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-

       examination was fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that

       the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. McCarthy v. State, 749

       N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2001) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684

       (1986)). Generally, errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded

       unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Montgomery v. State, 694

       N.E.2d 1137, 1140 (Ind. 1998). In viewing the effect of the evidentiary ruling

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023        Page 11 of 17
       on a defendant's substantial rights, we look to the probable impact on the fact

       finder. Id.

[19]   Despite the excluded evidence, Birk was able to impeach Reynolds and attack

       her credibility. For instance, Birk elicited testimony that Reynolds referred to

       the shooting as an accident. See Tr. Vol. 5 p. 79 (Detective Saltsgaver agreed

       that “[t]he fact that [Reynolds] call[ed the shooting] an accident could be

       evidence that [it was] an accident.”). At trial, Birk highlighted inconsistencies

       in Reynolds’s narrative of what happened on the day of the shooting. See id. at

       79–86 (Birk argued that for the first time during her testimony, Reynolds

       testified that she: (1) slammed the brakes twice not once; (2) stopped three times

       during the drive; (3) was in the driver’s seat screaming and rocking; and (4)

       slammed on the brakes so hard that Birk flew into the windshield). In all those

       instances, Birk was able to demonstrate the various ways Reynolds’s narrative

       changed. Birk was afforded the ability to attack Reynolds’s credibility with

       respect to her contradictory statements as to whether the shooting was

       intentional or accidental.

[20]   Birk was also able to argue to the jury that Reynolds’s financial and emotional

       reliance upon Mark and Monroe was her motive for changing her story.

       During his closing, Birk specifically argued that Reynolds’s motive for changing

       her story was so that she could continue to receive assistance from Mark and

       Monroe while she recovered from her injuries. Moreover, the State presented

       ample evidence to support their theory that Birk intentionally shot Reynolds,

       namely:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023        Page 12 of 17
               The State proved [Birk] announced his intention to shoot
               [Sabrina] before doing so. [Tr. Vol. 4 pp. 33, 37]. The State
               proved [Birk] had both emotional and financial motives for
               wanting [Sabrina] dead, as she was preventing him from using
               her stimulus money for either a new gun, or for drugs. [Tr. Vol.
               4 pp. 23–30; Tr. Vol. 5 165–66]. [Birk] was about to lose access
               to her money.

       Appellee’s Br. p. 28–29. See Standifer v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ind.

       1999) (denial of opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness was harmless

       beyond a reasonable doubt given the ample evidence introduced to support the

       convictions). Accordingly, any error on the trial court’s part was harmless

       beyond a reasonable doubt.

       II.     Jury Instruction

[21]   Birk next claims that the trial court erred in issuing the jury instruction

       regarding intent. “The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the

       law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to

       comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.”

       Munford v. State, 923 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “The manner of

       instructing a jury lies largely within the discretion of the trial court and we will

       reverse only for an abuse of discretion.” Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 25 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision

       is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Fansler v.

       State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). When reviewing a challenge to a jury

       instruction, we consider: “(1) whether the instruction correctly states the law;

       (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023          Page 13 of 17
       instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered

       by other instructions which are given.” Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 408

       (Ind. 2000). For a trial court to have abused its discretion, “the instructions

       given must be erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole must misstate

       the law or otherwise mislead the jury.” Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 679

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[22]   The trial court gave the following instruction over Birk’s objection:

                  Intent to kill can be found from acts, declarations, and the
                  conduct of the defendant at or just immediately before the
                  commission of the offense, from the character of the weapon
                  used and from the part of the body on which the wound was
                  inflicted.[ 11]

       Tr. Vol. 3 p. 134. Birk argued that the instruction was “confusing, misleading,

       relieved the State of its burden of proof and presented inculpatory inferences but

       omitted the converse aspects which would have benefited the jury in its

       deliberations.” Appellant’s Br. p. 34. Birk asked for the instruction to be

       reworded to:

                  Intent to kill can be found from acts, declarations, the conduct of
                  the defendant at, just immediately before, or after the commission of
                  the alleged offense, from the character of the weapon used on the
                  part of the body on which the wound was inflicted.

       11
            The instruction was given as both a preliminary and final jury instruction.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023                  Page 14 of 17
       Tr. Vol. 6 p. 157 (emphasis added). The trial court denied the request, stating

       that the proposed instruction “was not a correct statement of law. . . [and] that

       [the instruction given] is the correct statement of law.” Id.

[23]   Birk argues that the given instruction improperly confined the jury’s

       consideration of evidence of intent to those acts and circumstances at or

       immediately preceding the shooting and excluded those acts or circumstances

       that occurred immediately after the shooting. However, the given instruction

       was a correct statement of law. See Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ind.

       1995) (“We have repeatedly held that the intent to kill may be inferred from the

       use of a deadly weapon; the nature, duration, or brutality of the attack; and the

       circumstances surrounding the crime.”). 12 Furthermore, the given instruction

       was supported by the following evidence: (1) Birk pulled out his gun, cocked it,

       and pointed it at Reynolds; 13 (2) firing Birk’s weapon required 5.25 pounds of

       pressure on the trigger; 14 (3) Birk said “I should shoot you” to Reynolds right

       before doing so;15 and (4) Birk shot Reynolds in the face from close range. 16 See

       Humphrey v. Tuck, 151 N.E.3d 1203, 1207 (Ind. 2020) (“A trial court may refuse

       a jury instruction only when ‘[n]one of the facts’ in the record would support

       12
         We also note that Birk does not direct us to any case law that supports his proposed instruction, nor does
       he claim that the given instruction was an incorrect statement of the law.
       13
            Tr. Vol. 4 pp. 33, 37.
       14
            Tr. Vol. 5 p. 140.
       15
            Tr. Vol. 4 pp. 33, 37.
       16
            Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023                               Page 15 of 17
       the legal theory offered in the instruction.”). The evidence presented at trial

       supported the given instruction.

[24]   Birk contends the instruction improperly instructed the jury to not consider any

       acts and circumstances that may have occurred immediately after the shooting.

       We disagree. The jury heard evidence of Birk’s acts, declarations, and conduct

       that occurred immediately before, at the time of, and immediately after the

       shooting. For instance, Birk presented evidence that he: (1) asked witnesses to

       call 911; (2) apologized to Reynolds after shooting her; (3) drove Reynolds to

       the hospital; and (4) asked for help when he got to the hospital. This is all

       evidence that occurred immediately after the shooting and in support of Birk’s

       theory that the shooting was accidental. During his closing argument, Birk

       argued that his actions after the shooting demonstrate that he did not

       intentionally shoot Reynolds. See Tr. Vol. VI p. 191–92 (Birk emphasized that

       he immediately picked Reynolds up, shoved her into the van, and drove “like

       crazy” in order to get her to the hospital for treatment). The jury was instructed

       to “consider the instructions as a whole[,]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 182, and

       that “[a] person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the

       conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 13.

       The jury not only heard evidence that supported Birk’s theory of an accidental

       shooting, but, considering the instructions as a whole, was not prevented from

       considering Birk’s post-shooting actions in its determination of intent. See

       Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002) (A conviction will not be

       reversed for an instruction unless, “considering the instructions as a whole and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023        Page 16 of 17
       in reference to each other . . . the instructions as a whole mislead the jury as to

       the law in the case.”). The instruction given by the trial court was a correct

       statement of the law, was supported by the evidence, and when considered

       among the other thirty-one instructions provided to the jury, did not unfairly

       limit the jury’s consideration of relevant facts. The trial court did not abuse its

       discretion in giving the challenged instruction and refusing Birk’s proposed

       instruction.

       Conclusion
[25]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was no Sixth Amendment

       violation and that the jury instruction was proper. We affirm Birk’s conviction

       of Level 3 felony aggravated battery causing serious permanent disfigurement,

       Level 6 felony pointing a firearm at another, Class A misdemeanor carrying a

       handgun without a license, and Level 1 felony attempted murder.

[26]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1133 | July 17, 2023         Page 17 of 17