Court Opinion

ID: 9892209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 23:01:06.07476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:47.496310
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAAD USMAN LODHI,                             )
                                              )
               Plaintiff,                     )
                                              )
       v.                                     )       Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02351 (UNA)
                                              )
KIMBERLY HOBSON, et al.,                      )
                                              )
                                              )
                Defendants.                   )

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Currently before the court is Plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and application for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained below, the court

will grant the Plaintiff’s IFP application, and will dismiss this matter without prejudice.

       Plaintiff sues the Virginia Department of Corrections (“DOC”), and from what can be

discerned, he also sues two individuals affiliated with the Virginia DOC, and perhaps, the Fairfax

County Tax Force, the Fairfax County Sherriff’s Office, and additional named and unnamed

individuals affiliated with those entities. The intended defendants are difficult to discern because

the complaint fails to properly list the defendants, or their given contact information, in

contravention of D.C. Local Civil Rule 5.1(c)(1). Moreover, Plaintiff may not sue John or Jane

Doe Defendants. See id.

       The complaint also fails to formally comply with Federal Rule 10(b) and D.C. Local Civil

Rules 5.1(d), (g), and the allegations themselves are largely incomprehensible. Plaintiff alleges

that (1) his laptop was improperly confiscated pursuant to a 2013 arrest in Virginia for a written

threat to do bodily injury and harm, (2) that his email accounts and and records at Frostburg State

University were hacked and breached, and that (3) a conspiracy involving “directed energy

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weapons,” “pulsar,” and “electromagnetic field force” was perpetuated in committing these alleged

bad acts against him. As a result, he contends that his medical research has been hindered and he

demands nearly $26 million in damages.

       In addition to the above-noted defects, the complaint also fails to comply with Federal Rule

8, which requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the

court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky

v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that Defendants

receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an

adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano,

75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that

are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions,

sharp harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts

v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017

WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and

conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr.

Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The instant complaint falls squarely within this category.

       Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to establish venue in this District. Venue in a civil action

is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same

state in which the district is located, (2) in a district in which a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or a substantial part of the property that is the subject

of the action is situated), or (3) in a district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no

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district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406(a) (providing dismissal for improper venue). None of the parties are located here and none

of the acts or omissions giving rise to this case, as far as they can even be understood, occurred in

this District.

        As a result, Plaintiff’s IFP application is granted, and this matter is dismissed without

prejudice. Plaintiff’s pending motion to issue subpoenas, ECF No. 3, is denied as moot. A separate

order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: October 19, 2023                        ___________________________
                                                      JIA M. COBB
                                                 United States District Judge

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