Court Opinion

ID: 9827650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:44:02.695375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:36.718966
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant in its motion for rehearing strenuously insists that there is fundamental error apparent of record because the judgment of the trial court is not a final judgment, in that it fails to specifically dispose of its cross-action against its codefendant, E. W. Jarman. The record in this case reveals that appellee Johnston brought this suit against appellant and against E. W. Jarman, L. A. Smith, W. C. Guyler, H. H. Groneman, and O. A. Groneman for $308. None of the defendants except appellee were, served with citation. E. W. Jarman waived the issuance of citation, and entered his appearance, but made no further answer. Appellant by' an amended pleading denied liability, and by way of cross-action alleged that, if it were liable to appellee Johnston, it was entitled to judgment over against all of its codefendants for any sum that it might be required to pay ap-pellee on his claim because it had paid the money to H. H. and O. A. Groneman on the order of- the other named defendants. Ap-pellee Johnston, by amended pleading, dismissed all of the defendants, except appellant and E. W. Jarman, alleging, as a reason therefor, that all the defendants were nonresidents of Texas, and were totally insolvent, and that no service had been had upon any of them except E. W. Jarman, who' had waived same. The cause was tried to the court, and judgment was entered for Johnston against appellant and E. W. Jar-man, jointly and severally. The judgment *839does not mention the cross-action of appellant against its codefendants.
A large number of the authorities cited by appellant in support of its contention were discussed, and either specifically or by implication overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Trammell v. Rosen, 106 Tex. 132, 157 S. W. 1161. Prior t o the opinion in the Trammell v. Rosen Case, there were two distinct lines of authorities in this state, one termed by the Supreme Court in said opinion as the stricter rule of construction of judgments, and the other as the liberal rule with reference to whether the judgment of the trial court had by implication disposed of all the parties and issues. The Supreme Court adopted the liberal rule of construction, and held in said ease that, if by any reasonable implication it could be said that the judgment of the trial court had disposed of the issues and parties, the appeal would, not be dismissed because of lack of finality of the judgment rendered. This opinion has been cited many times, and followed by an unbroken line of authorities It does not appear from the record in this case that appellant objected to the judgment of the trial court because it did not specifically dispose of its cross-action against its codefendant, and there is nothing in the record which indicates that the appellant in any way called its cross-action to the attention of the trial court or invoked any ruling thereon.
Appellant did not ask for the cause to be continued to get service on its cross-action, and no objection on its part is shown by the record to the action of the trial court in dismissing from the case its codefendants Grone-mans, to whom appellant alleged it had paid the money. Appellant appealed from the judgment of the trial court as a final judgment, and did not assign error to the action of the trial court in failing to render judgment on its cross-action. Under facts very similar to these, it has been held that it will be presumed in support of the judgment that the defendant waived or abandoned its cross-action against its eodefendant, and that the judgment was a final judgment, although the cross-action was not mentioned. Burton-Lingo Co. v. First Baptist Church of Abilene (Tex. Com. App.) 222 S. W. 203; Kirk v. City of Gorman (Tex. Civ. App.) 283 S. W. 188; Ellis v. Harrison (Tex. Civ. App.) 52 S. W. 581 (error refused). Among other numerous authorities that might be cited, holding in effect that a cross-action not specifically disposed of by the judgment of the trial court is disposed of by implication, we cite: Southern Pacific Co. v. Ulmer (Tex. Com. App.) 286 S. W. 193; Tennison v. Donigan (Tex. Com. App.) 237 S. W. 229; Phillips v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 283 S. W. 298; Mathis v. Overland Auto Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 265 S. W. 1069; Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 14 S. W. 285; Varrs v. Faulkner (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 789; Porter v. P. & N. T. Ry. Co., 56 Tex. Civ. App. 479, 121 S. W. 897; Wilson v. Smith, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 188, 43 S. W. 1086; Houston Oil Co. v. Village Mills Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 241 S. W. 122. In this case appellee’s cause of action was not in any way dependent upon the cross-action filed by appellant against its codefendants, and could not in any way affect same. The record failing to show that appellant called its cross-action against its eo defendants to the attention of the trial court, or that it excepted to the action of the court in failing to specifically dispose thereof, or that it assigned error thereto, and there being no contention on its part that it has been in any way injured thereby, same does not present such fundamental error which requires a dismissal of the appeal.
We have carefully examined appellant’s motion for rehearing, and same is overruled.