Court Opinion

ID: 9648681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:32:16.959409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:04.363340
License: Public Domain

COMBS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the Court of Appeals.
The venireman’s silence when questioned by the court implied an assertion that he did not know the defendant. If the Commonwealth’s Attorney had contradictory information from a “source,” he had every opportunity on voir dire to confront Clark directly with that information, and to insist on a sworn response. Instead, the prosecutor relied exclusively on the wwsworn statement of an informant, whom moreover he failed to name.
According to the majority: “Whether the information is true or false is not the test. The test is whether the prosecutor had a good-faith belief in the information and whether he can articulate the reason to the trial court in a race-neutral manner_” Ante at 179. I am not convinced that the test is so categorical. Surely the degree of credibility of the information affects the question of whether the prosecutor’s acceptance of it is, in the Batson context, in good-faith. The posture of the matter when the trial court ruled was this: 1) the venireman had represented to the court, under oath, that he did not know the defendant; 2) the prosecutor had failed to examine the venireman concerning his silence; 3) the prosecutor had failed to identify his source of information or to give any indication that the source was reliable.
In my view, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s explanation was race-neutral, eschewing further inquiry which was clearly in order. Why did the prosecutor not question the prospective juror on voir dire? Who was the prosecutor’s “source,” and why did the prosecutor believe his/her unverified statements, and by implication believe that the (black) venireman had concealed the truth while under oath? (It merely begs the question to re*181ply that Clark had motive to lie if he knew the defendant.)
While it is true that “[tjhere will seldom be much evidence bearing on [the] issue” (ante at 179), much more evidence was readily available in this case, and it ought to have been explored. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s precipitous ruling was clearly erroneous.