Court Opinion

ID: 9582554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:28:37.758616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:57.474209
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. The words alleged to have been spoken by the defendant’s agent raised the question whether the plaintiff issued and cashed a check without having sufficient funds in the bank to pay the check upon presentation. The words obviously imply that somebody cashed the check at the defendant’s store on a certain date; that the plaintiff was in the store on that day; that the check had been presented to the bank for payment and that payment had been refused. The words alleged to have been used did not specifically charge the plaintiff with the crime of cashing a check without funds in the bank to cover it but they raised this question in the minds of those loho heard it, and after stating a case against the plaintiff *162by way of questions pointing toward the conclusion that she was in the store the day the check was cashed and that she signed the check, closed his case against the plaintiff by saying that he would compare the signature on the check with the plaintiff’s signature at the bank. This was in the presence of third persons, which was not at all necessary. A private conversation would have sufficed. In such a situation, those hearing the conversation would never know whether the plaintiff was guilty of giving a bad check or not as they would not likely follow up the investigation. If the plaintiff was innocent of giving a bad check, as she alleges she was, the conduct of the agent violated the duty of the defendant not to insult her as an invited customer while on the defendant’s premises. It is the duty of a railroad company to protect its passengers against insults from the company’s employees. Southern R. Co. v. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404 (4) (55 SE 37); Hillman v. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co., 126 Ga. 814 (56 SE 68); Cole v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co., 102 Ga. 474 (31 SE 107); Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Jefferson, 89 Ga. 554 (16 SE 69, 17 LRA 571, 32 ASR 87). The case of Moone v. Smith, 6 Ga. App. 649 (65 SE 712) held that this same duty is owed by proprietors of other businesses to invited customers on their premises, the only difference being that the rule of diligence is the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, rather than the extraordinary care required of carriers. This principle has been applied in subsequent cases to recognize a right of action for breach of this duty. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Keys, 70 Ga. App. 473 (28 SE2d 581); Sims v. Miller’s, Inc., 50 Ga. App. 640 (179 SE 423); Lemaster v. Millers, 33 Ga. App. 451 (126 SE 875); Hazelrigs v. High Company, 49 Ga. App. 866 (176 SE 814); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Coker, 74 Ga. App. 264 (39 SE2d 429). The case of McKown v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 99 Ga. App. 120 (107 SE2d 883) is distinguishable as to the corporation because the conduct of the corporation’s agent was not on the premises of the corporation. We find no cases exactly in point on the question involved but we think the case is controlled by the principle that an invitee in such a case as this is protected from insult and injury by the imposition of a duty of the invitar to protect the invitee from such conduct.
*163There is a line of cases, many of which cite Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763 (15 SE 901, 17 LRA 430, 30 ASR 183), which hold that there can be no recovery in Georgia for mere mental pain and anguish alone. The Chapman case, however, involved a situation where the causative act was one of mere negligence, rather than a wilful or wanton tort, such as is involved in the instant- case. Furthermore, the Chapman case recognized that Code § 3067 (the present § 105-2003), by not enumerating all of the class of torts in which “the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff,” obviously does not mean to Greate new torts, or change the law of damages, but only to declare the pre-existing law. Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., p. 775, supra, and citations. The preexisting law—the common law rule which is still in effect in this State—is well stated in Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845 (3) (59 SE 189), as follows: “While mental suffering, unaccompanied by injury to purse or person, affords no basis for an action predicated upon wrongful acts merely negligent, yet such damages may be recovered in those cases where the plaintiff has suffered at the hands of the defendant a wanton, voluntary, or intentional wrong the natural result of which is the causation of mental suffering and wounded feelings.” See also Young v. Western A. R., 39 Ga. App. 761 (148 SE 414); Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778 (171 SE 470); Anderson v. Buice, 69 Ga. App. 265 (25 SE2d 96) (reversed in Buice v. C. & S. Nat. Bank, 71 Ga. App. 563, 31 SE2d 414, on the grounds of insufficient proof). In Miller v. Friedman’s Jewelers, 107 Ga. App. 841 (131 SE2d 663), it was not alleged that the acts complained of were the proximate cause of the dizziness, weakness and fear of another heart attack. The profanity and boisterous language cases are not in the category of the instant case but even they have a very tenuous validity, especially those involving situations in which such language is directed at the complaining parties and not merely in- their presence.
The questioning of the integrity of the invitee under the facts alleged was a tort from which the law was designed to protect the plaintiff, and as against a general demurrer the petition stated a cause of action for the alleged wrong set forth above.
*164The majority is in error in holding as a matter of law: (1) that the allegations of the petition show that plaintiff was not insulted; (2) that there was no allegation of physical consequence of the conduct of the employee (it was alleged that it made her sick); (3) that the action is based on negligence. Every allegation of misconduct is one of wilfulness, in which case no allegation of physical injury is necessary. For all of these reasons I dissent from the judgment of the majority.