Court Opinion

ID: 9674029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:21:57.804252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.265034
License: Public Domain

Connolly, J.,
dissenting.
The assumption of risk doctrine applies a subjective standard, geared to the individual plaintiff and his or her actual comprehension and appreciation of the danger he or she confronts.1 The assumption of risk defense requires that (1) Nickolas J. Hughes knew of and understood the specific danger; (2) Hughes voluntarily exposed himself to the danger; and (3) Hughes’ injury or death occurred from his exposure to the danger.2
The majority decision defines the “specific danger” as the danger that at least one of the conduits in the excavation contained electricity sufficient to cause injury or death. I would define the specific danger confronting Hughes differently than *38the majority. I believe the specific danger was that Hughes could be electrocuted or killed if he cut one of the four unidentified conduits in the 120th Street excavation. I disagree that Hughes must have known there would actually be electricity in a conduit to have assumed the risk of electrocution or death. I believe Hughes could assume the risk of being electrocuted simply by knowing that any conduit at that particular site, if cut, could be deadly. Further, the evidence shows that Hughes knew of the specific danger involved in cutting the exposed conduit at the 120th Street jobsite and assumed the risk of his actions.
In concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Hughes knew of the risk posed by the electrical line, the majority opinion discusses the deposition testimony of Hughes’ colleagues. As the majority opinion acknowledges, Patrick Morse’s testimony supports an inference that Hughes was aware of the specific danger. Morse testified that the day before the accident, he warned Hughes not to cut into any line until it had been identified. The morning of the accident, he again warned Hughes not to cut into anything. The record shows the following exchange:
[Counsel for Neb Com:] Did you tell him not to cut into anything or do anything else until after the utilities specifically identified which line was which?
[Morse:] Correct.
Q. He responded by saying I won’t do that or what did he say?
A. Yes, I would use them words, yes, he did, he said okay, I won’t.
Q. All right.
A. I was pretty adamant about it.
Q. So you believe you made it crystal clear to him that -he absolutely should not do that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any question in your mind that he understood what you were telling him?
A. There is no question in my mind. He understood what I told him.
*39More important, Morse testified that during his conversations with Hughes, they discussed that they would not cut into the lines before they were identified because they would not “want to get killed” and that one “could be electrocuted.”
I believe the warnings Hughes received established that he knew of the specific dangers of electrocution or death associated with cutting an unidentified conduit at the 120th Street jobsite. Although the majority opinion suggests that Morse’s warning about electrocution could be viewed as a reference to the general risk of working around unmarked utilities, I disagree. The conversations that took place show that Morse’s warnings undoubtedly focused on the specific danger at the 120th Street jobsite.
Further, other evidence the majority opinion cites regarding Hughes’ knowledge is irrelevant. The majority opinion reasons that because one of the other employees present when the accident occurred did not know that cutting a conduit could be dangerous, a jury might infer that Hughes also did not know of the danger. Another person’s knowledge or lack thereof, however, has no bearing on what Hughes knew. Whether the employees discussed the risk among themselves before the accident also does not show what Hughes knew. Hughes’ remark that the line he was about to cut could be a water line demonstrates that despite Morse’s warnings, Hughes had decided to cut into a line that he had not positively identified. This does not support an inference that he either did or did not understand the risk associated with his decision.
I believe that the evidence concerning Hughes knowledge of the risk he encountered shows that he knew and understood that cutting a conduit before identifying it could have fatal consequences. And the evidence the majority opinion cites to oppose this view is not germane to whether Hughes subjectively appreciated the danger. I would affirm the district court’s decision that Hughes assumed the risk of his actions.
Heavican, C J., joins in this dissent.

 Burke v. McKay, 268 Neb. 14, 679 N.W.2d 418 (2004). See Pleiss v. Barnes, 260 Neb. 770, 619 N.W.2d 825 (2000).

 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185.12 (Reissue 1995). See, also, Burke v. McKay, supra note 1.