Court Opinion

ID: 9624864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:20:01.530869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:55.936776
License: Public Domain

BARRETT, Circuit Judge
(specially concurring in the result):
I specially concur in the result relating to the specific relief afforded in my Brother Kerr’s opinion. I have no personal philosophical disagreement with the reasons stated by Judge Kerr for application of the abstention doctrine. I firmly and personally believe that state courts should not only construe and interpret state statutes and regulations, if necessary, but further that they should, as a matter of comity in recognition of good federal-state relationships, first pass upon all constitutional issues raised in relation to their state statutes and regulations and the actions of state officials taken thereunder. However, I do not believe that the present state of federal law permits us to abstain unless the statute requires construction and/or in*565terpretation. Such does not appear to be the case in relation to the Wyoming barber registration statute at issue here,
Neither of the parties contend that the challenged state barber registration statute is ambiguous or uncertain. It is not. Plainly, it is mandatory that the Wyoming State Board of Barber Examiners refuse to renew the barber license of one convicted of a felony. Accordingly, there can be no question, in my opinion, that the constitutional issues raised by Alcala are substantial and are not frivolous. They do involve important state functions and considerations. We must bear in mind that the action before us is brought under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act for declaratory judgment, to-wit, that the state statute is unconstitutional. If no question of Alcala’s standing to sue concerned me, I would be hard pressed to hold, lacking ambiguity in the challenged statute, that there is not concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts involving the federal constitutional issue adjudication. However, it is fundamental — as pointed out in Judge Kerr’s opinion — that one seeking declaratory judgment relief must allege and prove that the harm he is suffering from the alleged unconstitutional deprivation is both immediate and irreparable. Alcala has not established such proof in the case at bar. There can be no question from this record that: (1) Alcala is presently on the “work release” program, although not “working” in his capacity as a barber; (2) Alcala is in every sense of the word a prisoner of the Wyoming State Penitentiary notwithstanding the fact that he is on the “work release” program, and that he is serving his sentence; (3) the “work release” program in effect at the Wyoming State Penitentiary has no statutory or regulatory genesis and is “operated’ at the sole discretion of the Warden, who may grant or revoke the “work release” status at will; and (4) those on the “work release” program are neither on probation nor parole and, accordingly, are not entitled to any notice or hearing should they be withdrawn from the program for whatever reason by the Warden.'
Neither party has seen fit to enlighten this court with respect to the origin, basis, authorization or operation of the “work release” program beyond the fact that such a program exists and that those inmates selected by the Warden to participate in it are at all times, while so participating, prisoners serving their sentences as if actually incarcerated in the penitentiary at Rawlins, Wyoming, and that their status may be withdrawn as participants at the sole will or whim of the Warden. Given this background —and nothing more — by the parties, it means nothing to me that the Warden in particular and apparently the Attorney General would readily place Alcala in a barbering position on “work release” were it not for the prohibition contained in the barbering statute denying such action because Alcala is a convicted felon. I doubt that either the Warden or the Attorney General would appreciate it should a federal court issue a mandamus order directing that the Warden place Alcala on the “work release” program as a barber. Such an order would, of course, directly smack against the discretionary authority vested in the Warden in the operation of the program. From what little enlightenment I can obtain from this record, the “work release” program just is. I suspect — and this is beyond the record — that the program came into being upon application by the Warden and subsequent approval thereof under the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968. There is no reason this court should be guessing. Having so stated, I observe that the “work release” program may not involve anything more than a “favor” or “indulgence” granted by the Warden to those inmates he selects at his discretion to work thereon. It thus appears to be entirely an act of grace on the part of the Warden whether a prisoner is to be placed on the ill-explained “work release” program and, conversely, when his placement is to be terminated. See *566Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 55 S.Ct. 818, 79 L.Ed.. 1566 (1935). We have no evidence before us defining what, if any, standards an inmate must achieve in order to qualify for the program or to retain his status once placed thereon. Accordingly, I am unsure of the prisoner’s “standing” before us in this suit. Because of my doubt, I am unwilling to concede his standing for purposes of deciding the constitutional contentions raised. I am not unmindful that the United States Supreme Court has heretofore rejected the concept that a constitutional right turns on whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege”. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). I press the point again that any inmate serving on the “work release” program is, according to both parties before us, a “prisoner” serving his sentence. He is thus apparently not in the position of one released from incarceration on probation or parole, both of which have statutory life blood. Those in the latter categories would be entitled to notice and hearing prior to denial of their probationary or parolee status. Gagnon, Warden v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, supra,. Because “work release” apparently has no statutory or regulatory authorization, a strong argument prevails, in my judgment, that “work release” status is one of grace only, and that the due process rights of notice and hearing do not apply thereto. I find no statutory or regulatory authorization in the record before us relating to the “work release” program; probation and parole both have statutory bases. While -it does seem obvious that “work release” is intended to meet the “correctional device” features of parole in terms of rehabilitation outside of the confines of the penal institution, still parole conditions are express and one charged with violation thereof may not be returned to the penal institution until he has been accorded a revocation due process notice of violation and hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 479-480 of 408 U.S., 92 S.Ct. 2593. The parties have not enlightened me that the “work release” program can be equated with the due process rights attaching to revocation of parole. I therefore- simply cannot assume that Alcala has standing here to pursue this suit. For reasons hereinafter set forth I am confident that Alcala —regardless of his status as a felon prisoner — has (or had unless intentionally waived) standing to raise the challenge before Wyoming authorities, administrative and judicial, and to pursue same to a final and definitive decision.
Section 33-96, Wyoming Statutes, 1957, specifically provides that the Wyoming Board of Barber Examiners shall not refuse to renew a certificate of registration of a barber prior to notice and opportunity to be heard. While it may be that Alcala is correct in his assessment that a hearing before the Board would prove to be futile in light of the mandatory aspects of non-renewal upon “conviction of a felony”, still I believe that it is both unwise, improper and violative of proper state-federal relations for this court to accept jurisdiction on the assumption that the Wyoming Board of Barber Examiners, upon such a hearing, shall declare the “conviction of a felony” proviso contained in § 33-95, supra, constitutional and, further, that the Board’s determination will be upheld by the Wyoming state courts. It is abundantly clear to me that had the Board conducted a hearing on Alcala’s request as provided under § 33-96, supra, and had the Board determined that the “conviction of a felony” proviso passed constitutional muster, that Alcala, even though a prisoner of the Wyoming penitentiary, would have had unquestionable standing to appeal the Board’s denial of his application for renewal of his barber registration under the provisions o/ §§ 9-276.31 and 9-276.82 of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act to the Wyoming State Courts.