Court Opinion

ID: 9950087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:04:36.430364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:34.310642
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed March 13, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                       Nos. 3D22-1292, 3D23-0311
                       Lower Tribunal No. 18-16016

         North Bay Green Investments, LLC, etc., et al.,
                        Appellants/Cross Appellees,
                                      vs.

          Cold Pressed Raw Holdings, LLC, etc., et al.,
                        Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alan Fine,
Judge.

      Alvarez, Feltman, Da Silva & Costa, PL and Paul B. Feltman; AM Law,
LLC., and Gary M. Murphree, for appellants/cross-appellees.

     Rosenthal Rosenthal Rasco LLC, Eduardo I. Rasco, and Steve M.
Bimston (Aventura), for appellees/cross-appellants.

Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.

     FERNANDEZ, J.
       In Case Number 3D22-1292, defendants North Bay Green

Investments, LLC (“North Bay”) and Green Holdings, LLC (collectively,

“appellants”) appeal the trial court’s Final Judgment entered in favor of

plaintiff Cold Pressed Raw Holdings, LLC (“CPR Holdings”). CPR Holdings

and Alberto Peisach (“Mr. Peisach”), former counterclaim defendant/cross-

appellant, cross-appeal the same Final Judgment. In Case Number 3D23-

0311, the same appellants appeal the trial court’s Final Judgment Awarding

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs to the same appellees. The two cases were

consolidated for purposes of traveling together before the same panel.

     With respect to Case Number 3D22-1292, we affirm the Final

Judgment in all respects on the main appeal. As to the cross-appeal, we

reverse the Final Judgment in part and remand for judgment to be entered

in favor of CPR Holdings and against defendant Mr. Federico Intriago

individually on Count I of CPR Holdings’s complaint and for judgment to be

entered in favor of Mr. Peisach and against appellants on Count VI of

appellants’ third amended counterclaim as well as the “related separate

pending Complaint” referenced in the Final Judgment. As to Case Number

3D23-0311, we affirm the Final Judgment on attorneys’ fees and costs.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                    2
       On November 13, 2015, CPR Holdings and North Bay entered into the

Operating Agreement of Green Holdings, LLC (“Operating Agreement”).

Federico Intriago (“Mr. Intriago”) owned North Bay. Tatiana Peisach (“Ms.

Peisach”) and her father, Alberto Peisach (“Mr. Peisach”), owned CPR

Holdings. Green Holdings, LLC (“Green Holdings”) was a holding company

created for the parties’ joint venture operating a business that manufactured

organic juices using a special “Hiperbaric 55” machine owned by Green

Plant. Green Holdings was owned 50% by CPR Holdings and 50% by North

Bay.

       The Operating Agreement lists the respective contributions of

subsidiary companies by CPR Holdings and North Bay into Green Holdings.

It further indicated that as of November 13, 2015, CPR Holdings contributed

Cold Pressed Raw Beverages, LLC (“CPR Beverages”) and CPR IP Assets,

LLC. North Bay contributed Green Plant, LLC (“Green Plant”). CPR Holdings

and North Bay warranted to each other the amount of assets held by each

subsidiary that were being contributed to Green Holdings, as outlined in

Schedules 1a and 1b attached to the Operating Agreement.

       The Operating Agreement also limited the parties’ abilities to

unilaterally dispose of any subsidiary or its assets without formal approval by

Green Holdings. Section 2.8(b) expressly granted Mr. Intriago with authority

                                      3
as a signatory with full access to all the bank accounts of each subsidiary.

   Section 2.2(a) designated Mr. Intriago as the North Bay director. The

Operating Agreement also discussed how Green Holdings would sell the

assets of any of its subsidiaries and how the proceeds would be distributed.

   Thereafter, the parties mutually agreed to end the joint venture and to

  separate each of their businesses. To that end, on August 10, 2017, a

 Settlement Agreement was executed by Green Holdings, CPR Holdings,

North Bay, Ms. Peisach, Miguel Robledo, and Mr. Intriago. The Settlement

  Agreement attaches supplemental documents which, together with the

agreement, govern the parties’ rights and obligations, including a Promissory

 Note, Security Agreement (Chattel Mortgage), and Continuing Guaranty.

The Settlement Agreement indicated a transfer by CPR Holdings of its 50%

ownership interest in Green Holdings to North Bay. In exchange, North Bay

  would pay CPR Holdings $200,000.00. Section 2(a) of the Agreement

indicates that the purchase price was “to be paid by Intriago, as follows” and

subsections 2(a)(i) and (ii) indicate that North Bay was required to pay the

$200,000 by making quarterly payments of $25,000.00 each pursuant to a

promissory note. The sum of $25,000 was due at closing with the remaining

$175,000 balance payable in seven quarterly installments of $25,000 each.

                                      4
Subsection 2(b)(i) outlined the documents that CPR Holdings was obligated

to deliver at closing.

      Subsection 4(g) of the Settlement Agreement outlines CPR Holdings

and Ms. Peisach’s representations that there were no currently outstanding

liabilities of CPR Beverages arising before closing of the Agreement, except

for liabilities to Peisach family members, for which they were responsible.

The Settlement Agreement does not refer to CPR Beverages or its assets

anywhere else in the agreement.

      In addition, the Settlement Agreement required Green Plant to execute

a security agreement in favor of CPR Holdings encumbering Green Plant’s

“Hiperbaric 55” machine as collateral to secure North Bay’s obligation to

repay the Promissory Note. Section 9 states that the Settlement Agreement

binds and benefits the named parties as well as “their respective

predecessors, successors, administrators, representatives, agents, officers,

directors, assigns, general partners, limited partners, members, managing

members, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates and insurers.” In Section 14, the

parties agree that as sophisticated businessmen, they were signing the

Agreement voluntarily and without coercion. They represented that even if

the facts that they relied upon in executing the agreement turn out to be

different, the Settlement Agreement will remain in full force and effect. The

                                     5
Settlement Agreement also contained an express jury trial waiver.

Furthermore, Section 16 of the Settlement Agreement provides for attorneys’

fees to the prevailing party in any action to enforce the terms and provisions

of the Settlement Agreement.

      Attached to the Settlement Agreement is a Mutual Release that waives

all claims relating to the operation and management of Green Holdings and

its subsidiaries and the business relationships between one another. The

Release incorporates the Settlement Agreement terms. The Release further

outlines representations made by the parties that there was no

understanding for any future or further consideration either implied and/or

expected. The parties confirmed under penalty of perjury that the

representations of the Release and Settlement Agreement were true and

correct. Mr. Intriago signed the Release individually and on behalf of Green

Holdings and North Bay.

      Thereafter, on August 11, 2017, CPR Holdings transferred its 50%

ownership interest in Green Holdings to North Bay. Mr. Intriago remitted the

first $25,000 payment to CPR Holdings on August 17, 2017. He then

executed the Note as manager on North Bay’s behalf. North Bay’s first

quarterly payment of $25,000 under the Promissory Note was due in

November 2017, but it never made the payment.

                                     6
      CPR Holdings then filed the underlying lawsuit against North Bay,

Green Holdings, Green Plant, and Mr. Intriago in May 2018 for breach of the

Settlement Agreement. The complaint alleged Count I for breach of the

Settlement Agreement against North Bay and Mr. Intriago; Count II for

breach of the Promissory Note against North Bay; Count III for foreclosure

of a security interest against Green Plant; and Count IV for breach of a

continuing guaranty against Green Holdings. CPR Holdings did not demand

a jury trial. Appellants moved to dismiss the action, which the trial court

denied.

      Appellants filed their Answer, as well as initial counterclaims, first

amended counterclaims, and second amended counterclaims. Appellants

demanded a jury trial in their counterclaims and did not seek relief regarding

CPR Beverages’s assets. The trial court dismissed each iteration of the

counterclaims.

      Thereafter, appellants filed a third amended counterclaim alleging one

count of fraudulent inducement and two breach of contract claims (Count II

for breach of the Settlement Agreement against CPR Holdings and Ms.

Peisach and Count III for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

against CPR Holdings and Ms. Peisach). In the breach of contract counts,

appellants agreed that the Settlement Agreement was a valid and

                                      7
enforceable contract, thus they sought damages for its alleged breach.

Appellants alleged that the Settlement Agreement required CPR Holdings

and Ms. Peisach to transfer the assets of CPR Beverages to North Bay. In

Count IV, appellants sued to set aside the Settlement Agreement and Mutual

Release as voidable due to duress and coercion. Count V alleged appellants’

rescission counterclaim. Count VI alleged fraudulent inducement into the

Green Joint Venture against Mr. Peisach. Count VII alleged fraudulent

inducement into the Green Joint Venture against Ms. Peisach. Then for the

first time, appellants included a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Ms.

Peisach in Count VIII. Appellants again did not allege that prompt notice of

their belief that the Settlement Agreement was unenforceable was given to

CPR Holdings. Appellants again demanded a jury trial. Appellees moved to

dismiss the counterclaims and third-party claims with prejudice.

      After a hearing on this latest motion, the trial court granted it in part.

The court allowed Counts IV and V to set aside the Settlement Agreement

and for rescission to remain pending. It then severed Counts II and III for the

breach of contract counterclaims and stayed them, pending resolution of the

rescission claims in Counts IV and V. The trial court dismissed Counts I, VI,

VII, and VIII without prejudice pending resolutions of Counts IV and V.

                                      8
Appellants filed a motion for rehearing, which the trial court denied.

Appellants did not appeal the dismissal of Count VI.1

      Mr. Intriago then filed a motion for summary judgment as to Count I of

CPR Holdings complaint. He contended that the Settlement Agreement

section regarding the purchase price to be paid by him was contradicted by

subsequent provisions requiring North Bay to pay under the Promissory Note

and Green Holdings under the Continuing Guaranty. CPR Holdings

responded that Mr. Intriago executed the Settlement Agreement in his

individual capacity and that his payment of the initial $25,000.00 due under

the Settlement Agreement in his individual capacity was undisputed.

Appellees further argued that section 9 of the Settlement Agreement made

the provisions of the agreement binding on the agents, representatives, and

managing members of the corporate parties.

      1
        North Bay and Mr. Intriago then filed a separate lawsuit on August 4,
2020 (trial court case no. 20-016471-CA-01 (02)) against Mr. Peisach and
alleged the same fraudulent inducement claim based on the same
allegations made in Count VI of appellants’ third amended counterclaim. This
is the “related separate pending Complaint” the trial court referenced in the
Final Judgment. After Mr. Peisach’s motion filed in the related case, the trial
court entered an order in November 2020 in which the court: a) granted
consolidation of the related case with the case below; b) stayed and/or
abated the related case “pending resolution of counts 4 and 5 of the
Defendants’ third amended counterclaim” filed below; and c) acknowledged
that the related case will be dismissed with prejudice if the trial court denied
appellants’ rescission counterclaims in the case below.

                                      9
     After the trial court’s hearing on the summary judgment motion, the trial

court granted Mr. Intriago’s motion as to Count I of appellees’ complaint. The

trial court denied CPR Holdings’s motion for reconsideration.

     On September 16, 2020, CPR Holdings filed its summary judgment

motion regarding all counts of its complaint and Counts IV and V of

appellants’ third amended counterclaim. The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of CPR Holdings on Count V of the third amended

counterclaim due to appellants’ failure to provide prompt notice to appellees

of appellant’s intention to rescind the Settlement Agreement. It deferred

ruling on all counts of CPR Holdings’s complaint. It also denied CPR

Holdings’s summary judgment motion as to Count IV (to set aside the

Settlement Agreement) of the third amended counterclaim.

     At the bench trial scheduled for May 2021, the parties agreed to try

Counts I-IV of CPR Holdings’s complaint and Count IV of appellants’ third

amended counterclaim. In addition, they agreed to try Counts II and III of the

third amended counterclaim (for damages for breach of the Settlement

Agreement and damages for breach of implied covenant of good faith).

     Ms. Peisach was the only witness to testify for CPR Holdings’s case in

chief. She testified that during the time of the parties’ joint venture, Mr.

Intriago was responsible for handling the accounting for the Green Holding

                                     10
subsidiaries. Ms. Peisach testified that he had access to CPR Beverages’s

bank account and books/records.

      Appellants then called Mr. Intriago to testify for their affirmative

defenses to CPR Holdings’s claims and appellants’ main case regarding

Counts II, III, and IV of the third amended counterclaim. Mr. Intriago testified

to the following: Ms. Peisach was in control of CPR Beverages’s assets,

accounting books, and records. Nobody from Green Plant entered any

accounting data into CPR Beverages’s books. The parties shared

accounting information during the joint venture. At the time he executed the

Settlement Agreement, Mr. Intriago was not concerned with CPR

Beverages’s assets. He received a balance sheet for CPR Beverages in

September 2018 after the lower court case was pending. Mr. Intriago testified

that he transferred assets formerly belonging to CPR Beverages back to the

Peisaches after CPR Holdings transferred its 50% interest in Green Holdings

back to North Bay. He further testified that the Peisaches had possession of

all the assets. However, after the trial court requested clarification about the

specific assets of CPR Beverages that Mr. Intriago was referencing, Mr.

Intriago testified that appellants never received any of the items listed.

      Mr. Intriago stated that he moved Green Plant’s operation into CPR

Beverages’s warehouse in September 2016. He used supplies located there

                                      11
even though those supplies belonged to CPR Beverages. After the joint

venture ended, Mr. Intriago only removed supplies that he knew belonged to

Green Plant. Nobody from CPR Holdings told him that he was not allowed to

take certain items.

      On cross-examination, Mr. Intriago confirmed that Green Holdings

became the owner of CPR Beverages and all its assets when the Operating

Agreement was executed in November 2015. His attorney, Mr. Murphree,

handled the negotiations beginning in early 2017 that led to the Settlement

Agreement, and Mr. Kerry Rosenthal was the attorney handling the

negotiations on behalf of appellees. Mr. Intriago’s understanding was that

because Green Holdings already owned CPR Beverages and its assets at

the point the Settlement Agreement was executed in August 2017, there was

no need to include provisions in the Settlement Agreement dealing with a

transfer of those assets. The trial court took judicial notice that the Settlement

Agreement did not specifically address any provisions requiring that the

assets of CPR Beverages be transferred to Green Holdings.

      Mr. Intriago admitted that each of the deliverables listed in the

Settlement Agreement for which CPR Holdings was responsible was

delivered to appellants and received by them. He never informed the

Peisaches that he was not going to abide by the Settlement Agreement

                                       12
because he was allegedly coerced into it. Mr. Intriago intended to abide by

the agreement when he signed it and intended to pay the $175,000.

      Mr. Intriago testified that his goal in entering the Settlement Agreement

was to gain control over CPR Beverages to resolve an issue with the United

States Department of Agriculture over CPR Beverages’s organic

certification. He admitted that he never took any action to pursue collection

of the assets listed on CPR Beverages’s balance sheet at any time.

      Thereafter, CPR Holdings called Ms. Peisach to testify again when it

presented its defenses to appellants’ third amended counterclaim. Ms.

Peisach testified to the following: throughout the parties’ joint venture, Mr.

Intriago retained possession of all of CPR Beverages’s equipment because

Green Plant was handling the juice production. Regarding physical

equipment listed on CPR Beverages’s balance sheet, at the end of the joint

venture, Mr. Intriago was able to take anything he wanted from CPR

Beverages’s warehouse, including juicing equipment and refrigerators. The

leasehold improvements to CPR Beverages’s warehouse listed on CPR

Beverages’s balance sheet consisted of plumbing improvements attached to

the real property that could not be removed when CPR Beverages’s

warehouse lease expired. Throughout the entire venture, Mr. Intriago

retained full authority on all bank accounts.

                                      13
      CPR Holdings then called Kerry Rosenthal, Esq. as its final witness to

testify at trial. He testified he was retained by the Peisaches to help resolve

a corporate dispute involving the joint venture. He drafted the Settlement

Agreement at issue and was involved in the negotiations with Mr. Murphree

that led to the parties’ execution of the Settlement Agreement. He testified

that the negotiations between the parties was a collaborative effort, and

several drafts of the Settlement Agreement were drawn up so various

requests the parties had for inclusion or exclusion of certain terms could be

accommodated. He did not recall any of the requests being rejected.

      Mr. Rosenthal explained that Mr. Intriago requested access to CPR

Beverages’s books and records during the settlement negotiations to ensure

there were no liabilities that he would be responsible for after North Bay

became the sole owner of Green Holdings. He testified that after confirming

that the Peisaches agreed to be responsible for those liabilities, Mr. Intriago

made no further requests to inspect CPR Beverages’s books and records.

Mr. Rosenthal then sought Mr. Murphree’s approval as of August 25, 2017

to disburse the first $25,000 installment payment after the Settlement

Agreement was executed and that Mr. Murphree expressly authorized such

disbursement. Thereafter, Mr. Rosenthal emailed Mr. Murphree on

                                      14
November 20, 2017 to advise that the second installment payment was

overdue. Mr. Murphree never responded.

      Appellants then made their closing arguments, and CPR Holdings

followed with its closing. CPR Holdings’s counsel then told the trial court that

appellants were required to elect between the inconsistent remedies of

rescission of the Settlement Agreement or, in the alternative, damages for

breach of the Settlement Agreement, as Florida law required the election to

be made before the entry of final judgment. The trial court instructed the

parties to submit memoranda of law regarding the election of remedies

doctrine, which the parties did.

      Appellants argued that, in actuality, they were seeking rescission of the

Settlement Agreement in Counts II and III of their third amended

counterclaim, and thus, the election of remedies doctrine was inapplicable.

They argued that although the three remedies in counterclaim Counts II, III,

and IV were distinct legal theories, the remedies sought in each count were

the same, that is, a determination the settlement agreement and related

documents were voidable and unenforceable. In contrast, CPR Holdings

contended in its memorandum that Counts II and III of appellants’ third

amended counterclaim were really damages claims because appellants

were confirming in those counterclaims the validity of the Settlement

                                      15
Agreement, which precluded rescission of the Settlement Agreement as

matter of law. In their May 27, 2021 memorandum, appellants elected the

remedy of rescission.

     On December 30, 2021, the trial court circulated its proposed Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the parties and asked them to let the court

know if any proposed findings “should be corrected before the order is

finalized.” In the Proposed Findings, the trial court rejected appellants’

rescission claim in Count IV of the third amended counterclaim and awarded

damages to appellants on their contractual claims in Counts II and III.

     On January 3, 2022, CPR Holdings’s counsel reminded the court that

appellants’ May 27, 2021 election of rescission as their remedy precluded a

damage award. In response, appellants filed a memorandum with the trial

court on April 15, 2022, where they argued that they had sought damages

via their contractual claims and because the Proposed Findings rejected

their rescission counterclaim, they were thus awarded “a single remedy” so

that the election of remedies doctrine was inapplicable. Appellants also filed

a motion asking the trial court to “conform the pleadings” to the evidence

adduced at trial. They argued they had a “minor pleading inconsistency” in

Counts II and III of the third amended counterclaim, which outlined damages

                                     16
claims while at the same time requested rescission of the Settlement

Agreement in the “wherefore” clauses of Counts II and III.

      On June 23, 2022, the trial court entered its Final Judgment. The trial

court found that 1) appellants failed to establish duress or coercion as a

reason to rescind the Settlement Agreement, thus the agreement was valid

and enforceable; 2) CPR Holdings had no contractual obligation under the

Settlement Agreement to transfer CPR Beverages’s assets; and 3) because

CPR Holdings had no obligation to transfer the assets of CPR Beverages,

CPR Holdings’s failure to do so was not a basis for voiding the Settlement

Agreement. Thus, the trial court entered judgment in favor of appellees on

Count I through IV of their complaint.

      With respect to appellants’ counterclaims, the court stated that

appellants elected to proceed on their rescission claim and waived their claim

for damages. Thus, judgment in favor of appellees was entered on Counts I,

III, IV, VII, and VIII of the counterclaims. In addition, the trial court reserved

jurisdiction “over Count VI of the Counterclaim and the related separate

pending     Complaint    against    Defendant     Alberto    Peisach     pending

determination of whether the General Release attached to the Settlement

agreement released Alberto Peisach from the stayed fraud in the inducement

counts; . . .”

                                       17
      CPR Holdings moved for rehearing regarding the trial court’s

reservation of jurisdiction decision regarding Mr. Peisach. The trial court

denied the rehearing, and this appeal and cross-appeal followed.

      In reference to case number 3D23-0311, because the trial court

entering final judgment in appellees’ favor and the Settlement Agreement’s

provision for prevailing party attorneys’ fees, the trial court entered its Final

Judgment Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Costs to appellees. Appellants now

appeal this final judgment, as well.

      Appellants raise various arguments on appeal. They argue that the trial

court misapplied the doctrine of election of remedies to deny them any

remedy. They further contend that the trial court erred in holding that CPR

Holdings was not obligated to turn over the underlying assets simultaneously

with its assignment of all right, title, and interest in the green joint venture;

and that the implied covenant of good faith obligates CPR Holdings to deliver

the assets of CPR Beverages upon transfer of its interest.

      On cross appeal, CPR Holdings contends that the trial court improperly

granted Mr. Intriago’s summary judgment as to Count I of CPR Holdings’s

complaint for breach of the Settlement Agreement because Mr. Intriago is

individually liable under the Settlement Agreement. It further contends that

the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Peisach as a party to North Bay’s third

                                       18
amended counterclaim was res judicata, thus precluding the reservation of

jurisdiction within the Final Judgment over Count VI of the related case.

                                DISCUSSION

                                Direct Appeal

1.    Election of Remedies

      The Florida Supreme Court has stated:

      The election of remedies doctrine is an application of the doctrine
      of estoppel and operates on the theory that a party electing one
      course of action should not later be allowed to avail himself of an
      incompatible course. The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a
      double recovery for the same wrong. Under Florida law,
      however, the election of remedies doctrine applies only where
      the remedies in question are coexistent and inconsistent. . . .
      [F]or one remedy to bar another remedy on grounds of
      inconsistency they must procced from opposite and
      irreconcilable claims of right and must be so inconsistent that
      party could not logically follow one without renouncing the other.

Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So. 2d 1331, 1332-33 (Fla. 1987) (internal citations

omitted). In addition, for remedies to be coexistent, the issue is whether they

arise out of the same set of facts. Goldstein v. Serio, 566 So. 2d 1338, 1340

(Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Thus, if the coexistent remedies are inconsistent, a

party’s election of one remedy prevents the party’s pursuit of the other

remedy. “An election between legally inconsistent remedies can be made at

any time prior to the entry of judgment.” Barbe, 505 So. 2d at 1333. However,

importantly, “[i]f the remedies are deemed to be consistent, only satisfaction

                                      19
of the claim precludes resort to the alternative remedy, whereas if they are

inconsistent, the event which operates as an election is entry of the

final judgment.” Villeneuve v. Atlas Yacht Sales, Inc., 483 So. 2d 67, 70

(Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (italics in original and emphasis supplied). Courts in

Florida recognize that the remedies of rescission and damages are

coexistent and inconsistent because rescission is premised upon a

disavowal of the contract, while a claim for damages is based upon the

affirmance of the contract. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc. v. Malley, 364 So. 2d

65, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Hustad v. Edwin K. Williams & Co. E., 321 So.

2d 601, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

      Moreover, “[a] plaintiff is not guaranteed success in the choice of

remedies, only an opportunity to proceed under a theory which has been

pled.” Feinberg v. Naile, 561 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Thus,

in Florida, an election is binding and irrevocable even under circumstances

where the chosen remedy is improper or nonexistent. Barbe, 505 So. 2d at

1334; Flinn v. Doty, 275 So. 3d 671, 673 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); United Cos.

Fin. Corp. v. Bergelson, 573 So. 2d 887, 888-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

      Based on this foregoing case law, the election of remedies doctrine

was applicable to appellants’ counterclaims for rescission and damages.

Appellants argue that it is error for the trial court to require a premature

                                       20
election. However, appellants’ argument is inapplicable here because

appellants are relying on cases dealing with the election of remedies doctrine

that applies in the context of a jury trial. In a jury trial, the plaintiff is required

to choose a remedy after the end of the trial and after the jury has had the

chance to resolve any factual issues in dispute. First Nat. Bank of Lake Park

v. Gay, 694 So. 2d 784, 786-87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). In contrast, the case

before us involved a bench trial. Thus, there was no verdict to be returned

so that appellants could wait and then elect their remedy.

      Appellants’ contention that an election would be required “only if the

trial court had found for Appellants on both the recission [sic] and breach of

contract counts” is meritless. Awarding both rescission and damages to

appellants is the double recovery that the election of remedies doctrine is

intended to prevent. Barbe, 505 So. 2d at 1332.

2.   Breach of the Settlement Agreement or of the implied covenant of
     good faith and fair dealing.

     Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in holding that CPR

Holdings had no contractual obligation to transfer the assets of CPR

Beverages under the Settlement Agreement. We disagree.

     In Florida, the trial court cannot make a new contract for the parties.

“Where a contract is simply silent as to a particular matter, courts should not,

                                          21
under the guise of construction, impose on the parties[’] contractual rights

and duties which they themselves omitted.” S. Crane Rentals, Inc. v. City of

Gainesville, 429 So. 2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In the case before us,

the Settlement Agreement does not contain any provisions requiring CPR

Holdings and Ms. Peisach to turn over to North Bay assets of CPR

Beverages in connection with CPR Holdings’s transfer of its 50% interest in

Green Holdings to North Bay. Paragraph 2(a) and (b)(i) of the Settlement

Agreement outlines what CPR Holdings was required to give to North Bay

under the agreement. CPR Beverages’s assets are not mentioned there or

in any other section of the Settlement Agreement.

     Moreover, the November 15 Operating Agreement obligated the parties

to each contribute the subsidiary entities and their assets to Green Holdings

at the beginning of the joint venture when it began. Thus, pursuant to the

Operating Agreement, CPR Beverages’s assets had already been conveyed

to Green Holdings. Accordingly, Green Holdings already owned all of CPR

Beverages and its assets. When the Settlement Agreement was executed in

August 2017, CPR Holdings transferred its 50% interest in Green Holdings

to North Bay. North Bay then owned 100% of Green Holdings and,

consequently, 100% of CPR Beverages and its assets.

                                     22
     North Bay argues that the implied covenant of good faith obligated CPR

Holdings to deliver the assets of CPR Beverages upon transfer of its interest.

However, like in breach of contract actions, Florida law prevents reliance on

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to change the express

terms of a binding contract. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp., v. Interval Intern.,

Inc., 28 So. 3d 915, 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Thus, the implied covenant of

good faith cannot be relied upon by appellants to impose new obligations

that are not already expressly included in the Settlement Agreement.

     Moreover, Mr. Intriago testified at trial that he was not concerned with

CPR Beverages’s assets when he executed the Settlement Agreement. He

also admitted that there was no need for a provision in the Settlement

Agreement for CPR Holdings to transfer CPR Beverages’s assets because

the assets were already owned by Green Holdings as a result of the

Operating Agreement. He testified at trial that in entering the Settlement

Agreement, his aim was to gain control over CPR Beverages to resolve the

organic certification issue with the USDA. The trial court questioned him

during the trial, and Mr. Intriago admitted he never pursued collection of the

assets of CPR Beverages.

     In addition, Attorney Kerry Rosenthal testified at trial regarding the

negotiations during the drafting of the Settlement Agreement. He stated that

                                     23
several drafts were drawn up and that no requests from appellants relating

to any edits were rejected by appellees. He further testified that after Mr.

Intriago’s worry regarding CPR Beverages’s potential liabilities was resolved,

he did not raise any other concerns about CPR Beverages’s books and

records. In sum, the trial court correctly ruled on appellant’s contractual

claims in Counts II and III of their counterclaims.

                                Cross-Appeal

      On their first cross-appeal issue, appellees contend that the trial court

improperly granted Mr. Intriago’s summary judgment as to Count I of CPR

Holding’s complaint for breach of the Settlement Agreement because Mr.

Intriago is individually liable under the Settlement Agreement. In Florida,

execution of an agreement by a party as corporate officers and individually

indicates an intent to be bound individually. Agia v. Ossi, 249 So. 3d 672,

674 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). Here, Mr. Intriago signed the Settlement Agreement

in his individual capacity and on behalf of Green Holdings and North Bay.

Furthermore, Section 2(a) of the Settlement Agreement provides that the

$200,000 purchase price is to be paid by Mr. Intriago.

      In addition, Section 9 of the Settlement Agreement makes Mr. Intriago

individually liable for the purchase price. The provision in Section 9 states

that all terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement are “binding upon

                                      24
. . . the Parties hereto, and their respective predecessors, successors,

administrators, representatives, agents, officers, directors, assigns, general

partners, limited partners, members, managing members, parents,

subsidiaries, affiliates and insurers.” Mr. Intriago executed the Settlement

Agreement in his capacity as North Bay’s manager, thus he is North Bay’s

representative, agent, and managing member. Because North Bay is liable

for the purchase price, which the parties do not dispute, Mr. Intriago is

individually liable for the purchase price, and the trial court erred in entering

summary judgment in favor of Mr. Intriago on Count I of CPR Holdings

complaint.

      As to appellees’ second issue on cross-appeal, they contend the trial

court’s dismissal of Mr. Peisach as a party to North Bay’s third amended

counterclaim was res judicata, thus precluding the reservation of jurisdiction

within the Final Judgment over Count VI of the related case. They are

correct.

      On May 3, 2020, the trial court entered its order dismissing Count VI of

the amended counterclaim. Thus, no other claims were pending against Mr.

Peisach. Appellants moved for rehearing, which the trial court denied on

June 3, 2020. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(k),

appellants had thirty days to appeal the dismissal of Mr. Peisach. They did

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not. Thus, the dismissal of Mr. Peisach from the litigation in the trial court

became final and is res judicata. Falkner v. Amerifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 467 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (“Since the dismissal of the

complaint constituted a final judgment in the cause [ ] and the plaintiffs did

not timely move for rehearing – seeking leave to amend or otherwise – or

appeal, the trial court had no choice but to enter the judgment of dismissal

now before us on res judicata grounds.”); Carnival Corp. v. Sargeant, 690

So. 2d 660, 661-62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

      Moreover, because the trial court’s June 3, 2020 order denying

rehearing was final when appellants did not appeal it within thirty days,

appellants’ subsequently filed related case is barred by res judicata. It

involves the exact same parties and cause of action arising out of the same

set of facts as the facts alleged in Count VI of appellants’ third amended

counterclaim. Maison Grande Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dorten, Inc., 621 So. 2d

762, 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

                                CONCLUSION

      For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm the Final

Judgment in all respects as to the main appeal in Case Number 3D22-1292.

On cross-appeal in that case, the Final Judgment is reversed in part, and we

remand the case for judgment to be entered in favor of CPR Holdings and

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against Mr. Federico Intriago individually as to Count I of CPR Holdings’s

complaint; and for judgment to be entered in favor of Mr. Alberto Peisach

and against appellants as to Count VI of appellants’ third amended

counterclaim, as well as to the “related separate pending Complaint” referred

to by the trial court in the Final Judgment (which has been consolidated at

the trial court level with the underlying case). In Case Number 3D23-0311,

we affirm the trial court’s Final Judgment on attorneys’ fees without further

discussion.

     Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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