Court Opinion

ID: 9701495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:21:10.000497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:24.137629
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree that § 46b-66 of the General Statutes creates any new substantive rights or that this statute is limited to prospective application only.
Section 46b-66 merely provides that a separation agreement which is in writing and which provides for the education and support of a child beyond the age of eighteen may be incorporated into the decree of the court and that such provisions shall thereafter be enforceable to the same extent as any other provision of the court’s decree, notwithstanding the provisions of § 1-ld (the minority statute).1 The purpose and effect of this statute is simply to provide that certain contractual rights, rights created by the parties themselves, are now enforceable by contempt proceedings.
In this ease, for example, it is undisputed that the agreement of the parties was incorporated by the court into its decree. We are thus dealing only with rights created by the parties themselves and which have been incorporated by the court into its order. Those contractual rights have neither been changed nor affected in any manner by the provisions of § 46b-66. To the contrary, this statute affects merely the remedy, i.e., the manner in which those substantive rights may be enforced. The legislature by enacting § 46b-66 has expressly provided *334that those rights may now be enforced by contempt proceedings. That the above wias the intent of the legislature cannot seriously be disputed.2
Since the instant statute involves only matters of procedure or remedy, I see no reason for not giving full effect to the statute as enacted. It is well settled that the rule of prospective application of statutes does not apply to legislation which is general in its terms and which affects only matters of procedure. Such legislation is presumed to have been intended to be applicable to all actions, whether pending or not, in the absence of an expressed intent to the contrary. E. M. Loew’s Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance, 127 Conn. 415, 418, 17 A.2d 525; Lavieri v. Ulysses, 149 Conn. 396, 401, 180 A.2d 632.
In my view § 46b-66 is procedural in nature and therefore applies to all actions whether pending or not. Schurgast v. Schumann, 156 Conn. 471, 487, 242 A.2d 695.

 See footnote 2 of the majority opinion, supra.

 “So what this bill would simply state is that where there is an agreement in writing by the parties and the court enters it is [sic] part of the judgment, that then there is authority by the court to enter orders.” Bemarks of Bepresentative John A. Berman, 20 H. B. Proc., Pt. 8, 1977 Sess., p. 3024.
And in the Senate, Senator George G. Guidera remarked: “In effeet, what we have today is that when the father agrees to educate the ehild over the age of 18 it’s really a contractual matter and it’s sometimes not worth the paper it’s written on.” 20 S. Proe., Pt. 8, 1977 Sess., p. 3014.