Court Opinion

ID: 9729883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:51:25.04441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.932071
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with Judge Van der Voort’s dissenting opinion and join it. However, a further comment seems warranted.
In Commonwealth v. Deren, 233 Pa.Super. 373, 337 A.2d 600 (1975), the majority of this court examined in great detail the problems presented in this area. Although the majority attempts to distinguish the Deren case (p. 524), in my opinion they have not successfully done so, and hence substantially have again handicapped the Commonwealth’s right to secure meaningful review of a lower court’s suppression order. In so doing the majority engages in surprising guesswork and speculation that does damage to a system of criminal justice that must remain viable to protect not only individual rights of defendants, but also the public interest of the Commonwealth.
In the instant prosecution it should be obvious that the identification issue is the very heart of the Commonwealth’s case, yet the majority concludes that “The lower court’s *526decision to suppress the out-of-court identifications does not so hamper the prosecution of appellee’s case that the order has the requisite attributes of finality.” (p. 524) My conclusion that identification is the critical issue in this case is, of course, also guesswork and speculation. At least I admit to the weakness while the majority does not.
In any event it was for this very problem that this court, at least in Deren, concluded that we must be willing to accept the Commonwealth's stated position that it will be substantially prejudiced by the suppression order. As we said in Deren:
“We interpret this to mean that any time the Commonwealth alleges that its case will be either terminated and concluded or substantially prejudiced by a suppression order, we must review the suppression order only on its merits. Stated another way, when the District Attorney from one of the counties of this Commonwealth directs an appeal from the suppression of evidence, we must accept such an appeal as the Commonwealth’s good faith certification that the case will be terminated or substantially prejudiced by such an order, and determine only if the suppression was proper.
To apply any other test could permanently exclude evidence even if it was improperly suppressed. Such a result is contrary to our function in this matter, which is to ascertain that all evidence received is proper and to insure that the rights of parties are protected. The District Attorney, representing the people of this Commonwealth, and he alone, has the right and duty to present the Commonwealth’s case with all the legally available evidence that he, in his judgment, believes to be substantially necessary to the case.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Rose, 211 Pa.Super. 295, 235 A.2d 462 (1967), the Commonwealth appealed a suppression order and Judge Jacobs, writing for the majority, stated: ‘[sjince appellee has not filed a motion to quash, we will assume that the suppression order will substantially handicap the Commonwealth and hear the *527appeal.’ 211 Pa.Super. at 296, 235 A.2d at 463. When we are correctly willing to assume substantial prejudice we must also be willing to accept the Commonwealth’s stated position that it will be substantially prejudiced by the suppression order.” 233 Pa.Super. at 377-78, 337 A.2d at 602.
I strongly dissent from the majority’s quashing of this appeal and on the merits of the questions presented would reverse and remand for trial.
JACOBS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.