Court Opinion

ID: 9726811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:09:33.583233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.029642
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
(concurring). Plaintiff brought this suit in equity, seeking injunctive relief and damages based on alleged wrongful conduct on the part of ■defendants. The bill of complaint alleged that plaintiff was a contractor engaged in building houses in Saginaw county, that as such he had a number of •employees, and that the defendants engaged in a ■conspiracy to interfere with plaintiff’s business, and with his employees, for the attainment of an unlawful labor objective. The conduct of which plaintiff complained was set forth in detail in his pleading. The defendants filed their answers thereto, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, "Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 486, and defendant Dalton joining in a ■pleading that denied some of plaintiff’s allegations, pleaded lack of information as to others, and asserted by way of affirmative defense that the exclusive jurisdiction with reference to the plaintiff’s alleged ■cause of action was vested in the national labor relations board. The answers filed on behalf of other defendants are not material in the instant controversy.
On behalf of plaintiff a motion was submitted to ■strike the answer filed on behalf of Teamsters Union and Dalton, its local representative, on the ground that its averments were evasive and not in compliance with the requirements of Michigan Court Rules *278Nos 17 and 23 (1945). * Plaintiff asked that the' answer either be stricken or that said defendants be required to file an answer in accordance with the rules and practice of the court. Following a hearing, on said motion the circuit judge entered an order requiring that an amended answer be filed within 15 days thereafter, and that in default thereof the answer as filed be stricken from the cause. No amended answer was filed and approximately 4 weeks after the order was entered counsel for plaintiff filed a motion and order for default of said defendants,. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,. Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 486, and Neil Dalton, Jr.
No attempt was made to have the default referred' to set aside. Several months later the case was set for trial on October 21, 1958. Counsel representing” the plaintiff, and also counsel representing defendants other than the Teamsters Union and Dalton, were present and announced themselves ready for trial. In a colloquy between the court and counsel appearing in the case reference was made to the fact that the 2 defendants named were not present or represented although notice of trial had been sent to them by the clerk of the court, as specifically requested by counsel for the plaintiff. It is not disputed that the notice was received, and it further appears from the record before us that said defendants, the appellants in the case, were also notified by counsel representing another defendant that the case would be brought on for trial on October 21, 1958. It is not disputed that the following letter was written by general counsel for the Teamsters Union, who also represented defendant Dalton:
*279“October 16,1958
“Mr. Gerry Mcllvain Teamsters Local 486 229 North Jefferson Street Saginaw, Michigan “Dear Gerry:
“We received notice from William L. Hellerman that the Haenlein case was set for trial on October 21,1958. We understand that the teamsters have no interest in the Haenlein Company and do not desire -to litigate the issues involved in that case. We suggest that your local attorney inform the court and the plaintiff’s counsel of this fact with the view in mind of having the teamsters dismissed as a party by stipulation.
“Please advise if there is anything further we can ■do on this case.
“Yours very‘truly,
“Padway, Goldberg & Previant,
By David Leo Helmen
•“DLU*ED
“cc Mr. William L. Hellerman Attorney at Law Shearer Building Bay City, Michigan”
The trial judge proceeded to hear testimony in the ■case, and concluded that the charges made in the bill •of complaint had been sustained by the evidence. A decree was accordingly entered granting against the defendants an injunction as sought by plaintiff, and also providing as follows:
“It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that -the defendants, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-men & Helpers of America, Union No. 486, American Federation of Labor, and Neil Dalton, jointly and severally pay to the plaintiff Andrew J. Haenlein, his damages sustained by reason of the illegal and unlawful primary and secondary boycott which the court finds and assesses at $20,000, and that plaintiff may have execution therefor.”
*280On being advised of the entry of the decree the defendants against whom damages were assessed, as indicated in the provision above quoted, made a motion for a rehearing, to which motion counsel for plaintiff filed objections. The trial judge denied the application to set aside the decree and grant the rehearing sought, and said defendants, the Teamsters Union and Dalton, have appealed.
The decree entered in circuit court made no reference to the order of default entered by counsel for plaintiff against appellants. It did, however, recite that appellants had regularly appeared in the case,, that they had received notice of the date and place of trial, and that neither said defendants, nor either of them, nor their counsel, had appeared in court. It thus appears that the circuit judge determined that under the circumstances he was justified in proeeed-ing in accordance with the notice of trial, and in permitting the introduction of proofs offered on behalf of the parties to the case who were represented. It further appears that the decree was based on the proofs taken in open court. No claim is made that appellants sought, or desired, a continuance for any reason. It is a matter of inference only that they believed that plaintiff’s alleged cause of action could not be maintained as against them. Whatever the reason for the failure to appear or to take possible action to bring about a postponement of the trial, the fact remains that defendants elected to take no further part in the proceeding. Under the admitted facts we think the trial judge did not abuse his authority in proceeding with the trial, or in denying appellants’ motion to set aside the decree and grant a rehearing.
On behalf of appellants it is claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction on the theory that the ■ national labor relations board was vested with sole .and exclusive authority in the premises. However, *281the hill of complaint does not indicate that plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce in connection with his building operations, and the statement in the answer filed to the effect that such business “affects interstate commerce within the meaning of the national labor relations act, 29 USCA, § 151 et seq.” was a mere conclusion unsupported by factual averments. In any event appellants did not appear at the trial for the purpose of offering proof in support of their claim in such respect.
On the record before us the situation is analogous to that in Way Baking Company v. Teamsters & Truck Drivers Local No. 164, American Federation of Labor, 335 Mich 478. In that case the claim of the defendant that the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce was an issue of fact in the trial court, was determined adversely to defendant, and this Court on appeal concluded that the record supported such finding. It may not be assumed that plaintiff in the case at bar was engaged in interstate commerce, and appellants did not avail themselves of their right to offer proofs in support of their pleaded affirmative defense with reference thereto. The claim now made that the trial court lacked jurisdiction is without merit. For the reasons indicated we concur in affirmance of the decree entered.
Every controversy of this nature must be determined in accordance with the facts involved. Mr. Justice Black has referred in his opinion to Moody v. Carnegie, 356 Mich 434, in which this Court, on equal division, affirmed an order of the circuit court of Wayne county granting a rehearing in an equity case. The fact there was that the plaintiff, an elderly widow, who was a necessary witness in her own behalf, was not given notice that her case had been set for trial at a certain time. As a result she was not present when the case was called and the hearing proceeded without her. Her attorney, who was in *282court, apparently made no explanation to the trial judge nor did he seek a continuance, or the opportunity to advise plaintiff that her case was being heard. The result was a decree adverse to her. Subsequently she learned what had occurred, obtained other counsel, and filed a petition to set aside the decree and to grant a rehearing. This was after the time fixed by rule for making such a petition, other than on the basis of fraud. The circuit judge presiding at the hearing of the application concluded that in the interest of justice plaintiff should be granted her right to her day in court and ordered a rehearing. The result was a decree in plaintiff’s favor. On appeal the action taken was approved as indicated, the facts disclosing that plaintiff had been improperly deprived of her right to appear and testify when the case was first called for hearing. Such deprivation amounted to fraud. The case now before us does not present a like situation. No claim is made that appellants were wrongfully deprived of their right to appear at the trial and present their proofs.
Dethmers, 0. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.

 See amendment to Court Rule No 17, § 9, in 335 Midi lxii.—Reporter.