Court Opinion

ID: 9684334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:54:04.792286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:55.046411
License: Public Domain

ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. A finding of plain error is appropriate in this case where defendant, prior to trial, made an agreement not to introduce any reference to plaintiffs medical insurance as a collateral source and then twice showed an exhibit containing insurance information. I agree with the majority that plain error is sparingly granted in civil cases. However, this does not mean plain error may never be granted. This court is to consider plain error affecting substantial rights even though the error had not been preserved for review, when the court finds that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom. Rule 84.13(c). Plain error is reserved for situations where the error complained of has engendered hatred, passion, or prejudice. Robertson v. Cameron Mutual Ins. Co., 855 S.W.2d 442, 447 (Mo.App. W.D.1993). I believe this case rises to that level.
Errors in admitting evidence of payments of benefits from a collateral source are presumed prejudicial. Duckett v. Troester, 996 S.W.2d 641, 648 (Mo.App. W.D.1999). Moreover, the presumption of prejudice was not rebutted. The exhibit in question was a 30-inch x 40-inch blowup of a medical record. On the top right across from plaintiffs name and address was a line with the word “Insurance” followed by “Blue Choice.” Before trial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine to bar any reference to a collateral source, and defendant, acknowledging its prejudice, agreed not to present any. Again, before closing argument, defendant agreed that they were not offering the medical records in their entirety, but only the portions read to the jury and that the medical records would not be passed to the jury. Despite these agreements, defendant twice displayed the 30-inch x 40-inch exhibit in plain view to the jury and failed to redact the insurance information. When an exhibit is shown to a jury, we assume they saw it. There is no doubt the reference to Blue Choice insurance coverage was displayed to the jury, they saw it, and they were capable of understanding its import. As a result, the jury was left with the impression plaintiff was trying to recover for medical bills that insurance had paid, an impression that was left without further explanation. The resulting verdict is consistent with the jury taking into account plaintiffs medical coverage.1 Plaintiff was not only prejudiced specifically with regard to the information concerning her medical insurance, but very well “may have been prejudiced generally in the eyes of the jury,” affecting their view of her overall credibility and the entire case. See Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo.1960).
The majority states the presumption was rebutted because both plaintiff and defendant made reference to the exhibit. Plaintiff did make use of the exhibit at trial by reading a relevant portion of the record, but there is no evidence that plaintiff ever showed the exhibit to the jury. *578The mere reading from the exhibit was not an acquiescence to show the jury the exhibit containing a reference to insurance. Plaintiff was not surprised by the use of the relevant portions of the exhibit. The surprise, however, came when defendant showed the exhibit containing the reference to plaintiffs medical insurance on two occasions at trial after there was an agreement that no such evidence would be introduced at trial. Here, plaintiffs failure to object was directly due to his justifiable reliance on defendant’s agreement. As a result of this agreement, plaintiff was entitled to expect that all such evidence of insurance as a collateral source would not be shown to the jury.
The error in allowing the collateral source information to be presented to the jury engendered prejudice, which affected the verdict to plaintiffs detriment, and thereby resulted in manifest injustice. Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

. We agree with the majority that the affidavit may not be used to impeach the jury verdict. We do not rely on the affidavit, however, in order to show plaintiff was prejudiced by the jury’s improper exposure to the collateral source evidence.