Court Opinion

ID: 9571507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:17.072364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:30.864105
License: Public Domain

Toal, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
While I concur in part with the majority’s opinion, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the chain of custody. The majority mechanically applies State v. Williams, 301 S.C. 369, 392 S.E. (2d) 181 (1990), without regard to the facts of this case. To provide consistency with our earlier decisions, I would accord a far greater deference to the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence. I would, therefore, affirm.
Ordinarily the trial court has discretion to allow evidence in or to exclude it. Until today, this evidentiary discretion would not be disturbed unless there was an abuse of discretion, or a legal error, which prejudiced the appellant. State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98,16 S.E. (2d) 532 (1941); See also State v. Sosebee, 284 S.C. 411, 326 S.E. (2d) 654 (1985); State v. Sullivan, 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E. (2d) 838 (1981). This rule is now in doubt be*525cause the majority would reverse on an evidentiary issue, where the record shows that there was no abuse of discretion, or any error of law, which prejudiced the appellant.
The facts of this case are specific and can be distinguished from the facts in State v. Williams, 301 S.C. 369, 392 S.E. (2d) 181 (1990). In Williams, the blood was taken on a busy night in a major metropolitan trauma center, and a question existed as to the identification of the sample’s donor. In the present case, only one blood sample was drawn the entire evening, and there was little question that it did belong to the appellant. The facts show that the testing was done at Georgetown Memorial Hospital, where the sample was taken, without being sent to any outside testing facility, and that there was no misidentification of the sample. The majority relies solely on the lack of testimony about which person marked the sample, not that there was any error as to the sample’s origin. There can be no question that an outline of the underlying facts in both cases clearly distinguish the two.
Once State v. Williams is distinguished, then it becomes necessary to examine the chain of custody under a “practicable” test. This test requires that a complete chain of custody be established “at least as far as practicable.” State v. Williams, 297 S.C. 290, 293, 376 S.E. (2d) 773, 774 (1989); State v. Kahan, 268 S.C. 240, 233 S.E. (2d) 293 (1977); State v. Pollard, 261 S.C. 389, 200 S.E. (2d) 233 (1973); Benton v. Pellum, 232 S.C. 26, 100 S.E. (2d) 534 (1957).
Interestingly enough, we dealt with the reverse issue in a very recent decision. In Raino v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., — S.C. —, 422 S.E. (2d) 98 (1992), this Court held that a judge’s exclusion of evidence, based on a chain of custody similar to the one presented here, was within his sound discretion. The only real distinction with Raino and the case at bar is that here the trial judge chose to admit the evidence.
The facts of this case clearly support the judge’s decision to admit the blood alcohol evidence. There was evidence in the record which, when considered against the “practicable” test, established the State went as far as they could to establish the chain of custody. The judge exercised his discretion and the record supports his decision. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent, and would affirm the trial judge consistent with our decision in Raino.