Court Opinion

ID: 9832310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:48:01.519609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:45.418823
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon further consideration of this case we have concluded that we erred in holding that this suit was barred by limitation. The Louisiana statute previously quoted creates two distinct rights of action: one in favor of an injured party for the mental and physical suffering endured, and another in favor of the wife and children for the death of the injured party. The statute also provides that the cause of action in favor of the injured party shall, in the event of his death, survive for one year in favor of his widow and children. It is clear from the reading of this statute that the limitation of one year only applies to the cause of action which “survives.” Hence, even under the rule applied in the original opinion, only that portion of this suit which “survives” would be barred under the Louisiana statute. The cause of action based upon the death of Gant is controlled by some other law of limitation. In the present state of the record we must apply the laws of this state. If that be done, that portion of the suit resulting from the death of Gant was not barred at the time the last amendment was filed by the plaintiff in the court below.
 We are also of the opinion that even the cause of action which “survived” to the widow and children should not in this proceeding be subjected to the limitation invoked by the appellant. In the original petition, filed before (he expiration of the year following the death of Gant, the plaintiff pleaded "negligence generally on the part of the Director General and his Agent, and also specifically alleged substantially the following facts: That the agents, servants, and employees of the Director General placed or caused to be placed upon one of the tracks of the railway company in .the yards at Shreveport, La., a car, and negligently failed to place thht ear at a safe distance from another track on which other cars were being moved; that while Gant was discharging his duties in switching and placing other cars on this other track his body came in contact with the standing car above referred to, and he was knocked off and fatally injured. While the law of Louisiana was not specifically pleaded, the facts were so stated as to show that the injury occurred within that state, and the inference would arise that either the laws of that state or the laws of the United States would be applied in determining the question of liability. In the last amended petition substantially the same facts were repeated with reference to the location of the standing car with which Gant collided. It is also alleged that there was a low joint in the track of the roadbed at that particular point, which caused the car on, which Gant was riding to sway towards the standing car, and thus bring about the collision complained of. The averments as to the circumstances under which the injury occurred are practically the same, except those relating to the low joint The appellant answered generally and specially to the merits, without suggesting the defense of limitation. It was shown upon the trial that Gant was injured under substantially the same circumstances as those alleged in the last amended petition. He was hanging on the side of a moving car while engaged *580in doing some switching. When that car reached a point" opposite the standing car, the low joint caused the car on which he was riding to sway towards the latter, thus causing the collision between that car and Gant’s body. In the trial below limitation was not urged in any form, nor was it presented in the motion for a new trial. It is raised for the first time in this appeal.' Article 5706 of our Revised Civil Statutes provides that the laws of limitation of this state shall not be made available! to any person in any suit in any of the courts of this state unless it be specially set forth as a defense in his answer. While that statute was intended to apply to the laws of limitation of this state, we see no reason why our courts should be less exacting in requiring the pleading of the same defense when bas'ed upon similar laws of another state. Clearly, the Louisiana statute invoked in this instance is one of limitation. The fact that it is incorporated in the body of the act which creates the liability does not relieve it of that character. Under the facts of this case we do not think the appellant is entitled to present that defense, even if it be available, for the ffirst time on appeal.
Moreover, upon further consideration we have concluded that the cause of action was not so materially changed in the last amended original petition as to present one entirely new. It is true that in the first original petition the. plaintiff relied solely upon the dangerous proximity of the box ear to the track on which Gant was doing the switching as the sole proximate cause of the injury. Rut the facts show that the injury resulted from the concurrence of two conditions for which the railway company might be-- responsible:' (1) The proximity of the standing car, and (2) the low joint. The low joint alone was not enough to cause any injury had there been no other cause. If the car had not been left standing too near that point, no accident would have occurred, even though the moving car on which Gant was riding did sway to one side. The low joint was a fixed or permanent condition. The location of the car was a temporary or transitory situation, and one which evidently occurred after the joint became abnormally -low. Hence the proximity of the standing car was, at least, one of the proximate causes of the injury. The appellant alleged that this car was placed there by order of Gant himself, but of that averment the record contains no proof. The agreed statement of facts does not show who was responsible for the car being in that position. There is no complaint in this appeal that the evidence did not support the verdict of the jury, nor is there any question raised as to what was the real proximate cause of the injury. However, we refer to that situation only as evidence of. the identity of the. real cause of the injury carried through the different amendments.
Appellant contends that Mrs. Gant and her children are not entitled to recover in the courts of this state damages foy the mental and physical suffering endured by Gant prior to his death as allowed under the laws of Louisiana.- That contention is, we think, untenable. While our statute does not authorize a recovery of such.damages when the injury occurs in this state, article 7730½, as contained in Complete Texas Statutes of 1920, permits such a recovery when authorized by the laws of another state where the injury occurs.
The judgment heretofore rendered in this ease will be set aside, and the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.