Court Opinion

ID: 9541285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:24:10.355897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:42.234803
License: Public Domain

Manoukian, C. J.,
dissenting:
The majority reverses Standen’s conviction of first degree murder, based solely on his contention that he did not understand the nature of the offense to which he pled guilty. I respectfully dissent.
There can be no dispute that in order for a defendant’s plea of guilty to be freely and voluntarily given, he must understand the nature of the charge. See Higby v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 774, 476 P.2d 959 (1970); NRS 174.035(1). The majority fails to recognize, however, that the voluntariness of a plea is to be determined from all of the circumstances surrounding entry of that plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
In Hanley v. State, 97 Nev. 130, 625 P.2d 1387 (1981), cited for support by the majority, this court relied on Henderson v. *81Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), primarily on the concurring opinion of Justice White. Justice White noted:
In those cases in which the indictment is read to the defendant by the court at arraignment or at the time of his plea, his plea of guilty may well be deemed a factual admission that he did what he is charged with doing so that a judgment of conviction may validly be entered against him.
Id. at 650, n. 2 (White, J., concurring).
In the instant case, the trial court, in part, based its determination on the fact that the information, containing the elements of the crime charged, was read to appellant at the arraignment. Furthermore, the lower court noted that at the evidentiary hearing for post-conviction relief, Standen confirmed what he had stated at the plea hearing: that, indeed, he did understand the nature of the charge when he entered the guilty plea.1 Moreover, during the post-conviction hearing, the state introduced copies of six prior convictions, involving Standen’s guilty pleas to unrelated offenses as evidence of his familiarity with plea bargaining and criminal proceedings.
The record must affirmatively show that the defendant understood the nature of the charge or that he made factual statements to the court which constituted an admission to the offense. Hanley, 97 Nev. at 133, 624 P.2d at 1389. Nevertheless, I believe it is unnecessarily restrictive to construe that pronouncement to mean that the trial court (and this court) can only consider the record concerning statements made at the entry of plea. I find no constitutional or statutory requirement for the majority’s ruling, nor do I find, on the basis of all the circumstances surrounding Standen’s plea, that he was denied “common fairness.”

This case, then, is materially different from Henderson, in which the trial court found, as a specific fact, that the elements had never been explained to the respondent. The Supreme Court found that fact to pose a unique situation:
Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense had been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit. This case is unique because the trial judge found as a fact that the element of intent was not explained to respondent.
426 U.S. at 647.