Court Opinion

ID: 9831804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:22:05.714749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:38.087761
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
[13] In the original opinion we declined to consider the third assignment of error, for the reason that the assignment did not correctly copy the ground of error shown in the motion for new trial, and that there had been material changes and additions made. Upon reconsideration of this matter, we have concluded that this holding gave too much weight to the literal requirements of the rules. Fairly considered, the additional words contained in parentheses were merely explanatory of the meaning of certain terms used id the original ground of error, and were evidently intended to make plain the meaning of the same. Therefore we have decided to consider the assignment.
We have concluded to adhere to our former holding that the objection to the court’s charge urged in the third assignment of error pointed out a mere omission, inasmuch as the question of contributory negligence, under the facts and circumstances of this ease, was a purely defective matter. Indeed, appellant recognized that such was the case by asking a special instruction on contributory negligence to cure the alleged omission. This charge was refused, but appellant has not assigned any error upon the court’s failure to give it, and thei efore we think the supposed error, in not safeguarding this defense in the main charge, was waived.
[14,15] If we should be mistaken in this holding, there is another consideration which is deemed a complete answer to' the proposition under the third assignment. We .have examined the statement of facts, and believe that there was no evidence raising the issue of contributory negligence on the part of ap-pellee. As to the driver of the automobile, Lanham Hix, the issue of contributory negligence was substantially and seriously raised by the evidence. At the request of plaintiff, the court charged the jury that, although they might believe that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence, such negligence, if any, could not be imputed to the plaintiff. No error is assigned upon the giving of this charge, which seems to be in accord with the settled law of, this state. *831Railway Co. v. Rogers, 91 Tex. 52, 40 S. W. 956; Lyon v. Phillips, 196 S. W. 995; Railway Co. v. Gibson, 83 S. W. 862. This being the law, the negligence of Lanham Hix must be disregarded, and the question is wholly relegated to the negligent acts of appellee contributing to his injuries. We have been unable to find any evidence tending to show that he was guilty of negligence. There is affirmative evidence to the effect that when the driver of the automobile got upon the street ear track, and appellee saw the approaching street car, he immediately warned Lanham Ilix, the driver, and told him to get off the track.
For the additional reason that the evidence did not raise the issue of contributory negligence by appellee, the third assignment of error is overruled.
We have considered the other questions presented in the motion for rehearing, and are of the opinion that they are without merit. However, appellant has requested us to file our findings of fact by which negligence on the part of appellant is shown by the evidence, and has asked us to set out the evidence.
In the original opinion, we stated that the witness Lanham Hix testified that the street car was running very fast, and about 20 miles an hour, and that this was sufficient to support the inference of negligence as found by the jury. It is not deemed necessary to set out the evidence tending to support the issues of negligence, as this would entail the recital of much of the evidence showing the facts and circumstances surrounding the collision, which would be an unreasonable burden. It is sufficient to say, and we find, that there was evidence to support the findings of the jury upon these issues.
We have also been requested by appellant to show specifically from the court’s charge wherein the jury were told that “they must determine that appellant was guilty of negligence in one or more of the particulars alleged in the petition,” as was stated by us in the opinion. We did not state that the jury were expressly or in terms thus instructed. What we said was that—
“Furthermore, the jury were in effect instructed by the eleventh and twelfth paragraphs, in connection with the entire charge of the court, that before they could find for appellee they must determine that appellant was guilty of negligence in one or more of the particulars alleged in the petition, and that, as the proximate result thereof, appellee was injured.”
The basis of this statement was that the court in the first six paragraphs of the charge fully and fairly set forth the respective pleadings of the parties, and in the seventh referred the jury to the pleadings for a fuller description of the issues. This, together with the remainder of the charge, we considered, and still think, directed the jury’s attention to the particular grounds of negligence alleged by appellee, as a basis for determining the question of negligence by appellant. Motion is overruled.