Court Opinion

ID: 9942523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:06:35.081361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:11.707156
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13422

                COMMONWEALTH    vs.   WILLIAM J. CAMUTI.

         Middlesex.      November 3, 2023. – February 21, 2024.

Present (Sitting at Lowell): Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker,
                   Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.1

Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Practice, Criminal, Postconviction
     relief, Assistance of counsel. Evidence, Scientific test.
     Homicide.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on October 3 and November 15, 2013.

     A postconviction motion for forensic testing, filed on
April 16, 2021, was heard by Christopher K. Barry-Smith, J., and
a motion for reconsideration was considered by him.

     Dana J. Gravina for the defendant.
     Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorney, for
the Commonwealth.

     GEORGES, J.      In 2013, the defendant, William J. Camuti,

killed his long-time friend and business associate, Stephen

     1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case
prior to his retirement.
                                                                    2

Rakes, by poisoning him with potassium cyanide, and then

disposed of the victim's body in a wooded area and lied to the

police about the events surrounding the victim's death.     A

Middlesex County jury subsequently convicted the defendant of,

among other charges, murder in the first degree.

    Several years later, the defendant filed a motion for

forensic testing under G. L. c. 278A, seeking an order

authorizing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of the shirt

that the victim was wearing when his body was discovered.       After

a nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the

motion, finding that the defendant had failed to meet his burden

under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), to establish that a reasonably

effective defense attorney would have sought to test the

victim's shirt for DNA.   We affirm.

    1.   Background.   "We summarize the facts presented at the

hearing on the motion for forensic testing, which included

relevant trial transcripts and exhibits."     Commonwealth v.

Linton, 483 Mass. 227, 229 (2019).

    a.   The police investigation.     On July 17, 2013, a jogger

discovered the victim's body in the woods near a State highway

in Lincoln.   A forensic pathologist with the office of the chief

medical examiner later determined that the cause of death was

acute cyanide toxicity.
                                                                     3

    On the side of the road where the victim's body was found,

Lincoln police officers discovered what appeared to be drag

marks of perhaps heels "striking and pulling on the ground."

The victim's shirt had been pulled up in the areas near the

victim's shoulders, neck, and armpits, and there was mud on the

back of his heel.   Although a photograph of the victim's body

was presented to the jury to show the areas where the shirt was

pulled up, the shirt itself was never admitted in evidence at

trial.

    The police later learned that, at the time of his death,

the victim was involved as a potential witness in a Federal

trial against James "Whitey" Bulger.     Additionally, the victim

had a civil judgment against Bulger, and was looking to sell the

judgment and the rights to his story involving the matter.     The

defendant was a long-time friend of the victim; the two were

also business collaborators, having been involved in several

real estate deals together.   Due to their business dealings, the

defendant owed the victim $100,000.    The defendant had also been

helping the victim market the movie rights to the victim's

involvement with Bulger.

    After determining that the defendant was the last person

the victim had called, investigators proceeded to interview him

multiple times.   The defendant's account of his last day with

the victim varied with each interview.    The police first spoke
                                                                   4

with the defendant at his home on July 18, 2013.    During the

interview, the defendant told the police that, on July 16, 2013,

at approximately 1:30 P.M., he met the victim at a fast-food

restaurant in Waltham to discuss a real estate venture in the

Dorchester section of Boston.    Upon arrival, the defendant

purchased two iced coffees and met with the victim inside the

restaurant.   The defendant claimed that, at the conclusion of

their meeting, which lasted about fifteen minutes, he left while

the victim remained inside the restaurant.    The defendant also

told the police that the victim was not feeling well on the day

of the meeting.

    After the initial interview, the police went to the

restaurant, where they discovered the victim's car, still parked

in the front parking lot.   The police called the defendant and

interviewed him a second time.   During this interview, the

police informed the defendant that there were cameras at the

restaurant and asked him if he had taken the victim anywhere

after their meeting.   In response, the defendant's memory of the

meeting had changed.   This time, the defendant told the police

that, although he and the victim arrived at the restaurant at

the same time, the defendant had already gone inside and

purchased two iced coffees, which they consumed inside the

defendant's vehicle during the course of their meeting.    The

defendant's account of what happened after the meeting had also
                                                                     5

changed.   He now asserted that, after their meeting at the

restaurant, the defendant proceeded to drive the victim to an

office supply store in Waltham; however, the victim ended the

ride abruptly, indicating that he had another meeting.   The

defendant claimed to have then dropped the victim off by the

side of the fast-food restaurant.

      On July 19, 2013, the police executed a warrant to search

the defendant's residence.    During the search, the police

officers discovered business documents linking the victim to the

defendant, as well as a receipt from the fast-food restaurant,

dated July 16, 2013, at 1:07 P.M., for two iced coffees.      The

police also discovered an e-mail printout titled "Gmail RE:

Response for offer potassium cyanide," in which a seller

provided a quote for potassium cyanide products.    Another e-mail

printout seized by the police indicated that the prospective

buyer was a "Jewelry lab working with precious metals and

required a very small amount of potassium cyanide."    The contact

information that was listed for the "[j]ewelry lab" was the

defendant's cell phone number.   A search of the defendant's

laptop computer also revealed two Internet address links

referencing potassium cyanide.   One of those addresses led to a

webpage where the following question was posted:    "Can I mix

potassium or potassium cyanide in hot coffee or tea and drink

it?   Will it work?"   A response posted on the webpage said,
                                                                    6

"Only if you have a death wish.   Even a small amount of cyanide

is fatal."2

     The police also searched the defendant's vehicle pursuant

to a warrant.   Neither the victim's latent fingerprints nor

blood was found.   The car, however, had a global positioning

system (GPS) device that tracked its movements on July 16, 2013.

The data from the GPS device showed that at 12:02 P.M., the

defendant's car left his residence in Sudbury.   At 12:28 P.M.,

the vehicle stopped at a supermarket in Waltham.3   At 1 P.M., the

vehicle arrived at the fast-food restaurant in Waltham.   At 1:12

P.M., the vehicle was driven around the block before it returned

to the restaurant at approximately 1:20 P.M., where it remained

stationary for about thirty minutes.    At approximately 2:07

P.M., the vehicle arrived at a movie theater in Woburn, where it

remained stationary until 2:46 P.M.    After that, the defendant

drove around, stopping at various locations, including an 8:50

P.M. stop at the location where the victim's body was found.

After that stop, the vehicle was driven to the defendant's

Sudbury home.

     2 Another response also discussed ways to mask the bitter
taste of cyanide with sugar, stated that a lethal dose varies
depending on a person's body weight, and provided the range of
what would be considered lethal doses.

     3 The police located a receipt from the supermarket dated
July 16, 2013, at 12:31 P.M., for the purchase of latex gloves.
                                                                    7

     While the search warrant was being executed at his house,

the defendant was interviewed for the third time at the Lincoln

police department.   Initially, when asked what happened on July

16, he recounted the events of that day just as he had during

the second interview.   However, when questioned further by the

police, the defendant claimed that, following the meeting with

the victim at the fast-food restaurant, he drove the victim to a

movie theater parking lot in Woburn.   The police told the

defendant that they did not believe his account of the events

and asked him whether he had ever purchased or researched

potassium cyanide.   The defendant initially denied purchasing

potassium cyanide, but later admitted that he had done so.     He

also said he did not know whether he had researched potassium

cyanide.

     A day later, on July 20, 2013, the defendant was

hospitalized after attempting suicide.4   The police interviewed

the defendant on July 21 and July 23, 2013, while he was

recovering at the hospital.   The defendant had been administered

various medications, including a morphine drip, fentanyl,

gabapentin, hydromorphone, and oxycodone.   During the hospital

interviews, the defendant confessed to killing the victim by

     4 While the defendant was hospitalized, the police executed
a warrant to search his storage locker in Waltham. The police
located additional documents related to the victim.
                                                                     8

placing potassium cyanide in his coffee.    The defendant also

told the police that he drove around with the victim in his car

while waiting for the potassium cyanide to take effect before

stopping and dragging the victim's body from the car once it was

dark outside and leaving it in the same location where the

victim's body was found.

    b.   The trial.   i.   Theories of defense.   At trial, the

defendant pressed three defenses:   (1) the defendant's

confession at the hospital was not voluntary based on his

medical condition at the time; (2) there was no proof that the

victim was deliberately poisoned by potassium cyanide; and (3)

there was no forensic or DNA evidence connecting the defendant

to the murder.

    With respect to the voluntariness of the defendant's

confession, on cross-examination, the police officers who had

interviewed the defendant when he was in the hospital conceded

that the defendant never said that he killed the victim during

his interviews prior to being hospitalized.    The police officers

also acknowledged that the defendant only admitted to killing

the victim once he was hospitalized in the intensive care unit

with serious injury. The arresting officers also testified that

once the defendant had been arrested, he requested an attorney

and did not make any more statements.    Additionally, defense
                                                                   9

counsel offered expert psychiatric testimony about the supposed

involuntariness of the defendant's confession.

     Next, as for the cause of the victim's death, a forensic

pathologist from the office of the chief medical examiner

testified that she performed an autopsy on the victim and

determined that the cause of death was acute cyanide toxicity.

She further testified on cross-examination that no medical

history confirmed whether the victim had been exposed to other

possible sources that could cause cyanide poisoning, such as

fires or metal working, and that persons receiving certain blood

pressure medications can have elevated blood levels of

potassium.   Defense counsel also elicited testimony that while

the amount of cyanide present in the victim's blood was toxic,

whether it was lethal varied by individual, and argued that the

Commonwealth had not proved that the victim ingested a lethal

dose.

     Finally, regarding the forensic connection between the

defendant and the murder, a State police trooper, who conducted

the trace evidence examination of the victim's body, testified

at trial.    On cross-examination, the trooper admitted that he

was unaware of what, if any, trace evidence was recovered from

the body, because the information was sent out for forensic

testing, and he was unaware of the results.    Defense counsel

also elicited testimony from the police that there was no blood
                                                                   10

or DNA from the victim in the defendant's storage facility,

home, or car.

    For its part, the Commonwealth offered expert testimony

regarding the collection and analysis of DNA evidence from a

crime scene specialist who worked for the State police crime

laboratory, but who did not personally perform any DNA testing

in this case.   While the crime scene specialist testified that

DNA might be collected from the armpit of a shirt depending on

the circumstances, he also testified that the outside of a

shirt, again depending on the circumstances, is not a "pristine"

source for collecting a DNA sample.   The crime scene specialist

explained that although it would be possible to obtain DNA from

a shirt if someone "shed[ded] a considerable amount," DNA would

not necessarily be present just because someone had touched the

shirt.

    On cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether skin

cells can be transferred from one person to another, and the

crime scene specialist answered affirmatively.   Defense counsel

also confirmed that the crime scene specialist never looked for

potential DNA samples on the victim's body for analysis.

    ii.   Defense counsel's closing argument.    In his closing,

defense counsel argued that the Commonwealth introduced largely

circumstantial evidence that did not make up for the lack of

direct evidence establishing that the defendant murdered the
                                                                   11

victim and disposed of his body.   Defense counsel strenuously

emphasized that there was "zero trace evidence" connecting the

defendant to the crime scene or the victim's body, whether

"biological, DNA, fingerprint, or of another nature."    Lastly,

defense counsel pointed out that the "[forensic pathologist]

could not on cross-examination . . . tell you if the amount of

cyanide found in [the victim's] femoral blood samples or gastric

sample was lethal or fatal in the case."

     c.   Procedural history.   On October 3, 2013, a Middlesex

grand jury returned four indictments against the defendant,

charging attempted murder, G. L. c. 265, § 16; unlawful

disposition of a human body, G. L. c. 114, § 43M; and two counts

of willfully misleading a police officer in a criminal

investigation, G. L. c 268, § 13B.5   A fifth indictment, for

murder, G. L. c. 265, § 1, was returned on November 15, 2013.

The jury trial commenced on April 3, 2017, and after seventeen

days of trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in

the first degree based on deliberate premeditation, unlawful

disposition of a human body, and both counts of willfully

misleading a police officer in a criminal investigation.     The

     5 On April 25, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a notice of
nolle prosequi as to the charge of attempted murder.
                                                                       12

defendant appealed from his convictions on May 1, 2017.       His

direct appeal has yet to be docketed.

    On April 16, 2021, the defendant filed a motion under G. L.

c. 278A, § 3 (§ 3), seeking DNA testing of the victim's shirt.

On September 17, 2021, a Superior Court judge, who did not

preside at the defendant's trial, ruled that the defendant had

met the requirements of § 3 and could proceed to a hearing under

G. L. c. 278A, § 7.     Following a nonevidentiary hearing, the

judge issued an order denying the defendant's motion.      The

defendant filed a notice of appeal and a motion for

reconsideration of the denial of his motion for postconviction

DNA testing.   On January 3, 2023, his motion for reconsideration

was denied.    This appeal ensued.

    2.    Discussion.    a.   Statutory framework.   The Legislature

enacted G. L. c. 278A "as a means to permit prompt access to

scientific and forensic testing in order to remedy wrongful

convictions" (citation omitted).     Linton, 483 Mass. at 234.

General Laws c. 278A involves a two-step procedure for

requesting postconviction forensic testing.     See Commonwealth v.

Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 501 (2014) (Wade II), S.C., 475 Mass. 54

(2016).   First, a court must determine whether a party's motion

for postconviction forensic testing meets preliminary criteria
                                                                   13

set forth in G. L. c. 278A, § 3.6    See id.   If the motion for

forensic testing has satisfied these preliminary requirements, a

judge "shall order a hearing on the motion."      G. L. c. 278A,

§ 6 (a).

     Second, the moving party has the burden to demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence each of six factors set forth in

G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).7    The third factor, § 7 (b) (3), which is

     6   The motion must include the following:

     "(1) the name and a description of the requested forensic
     or scientific analysis; (2) information demonstrating that
     the requested analysis is admissible as evidence in courts
     of the commonwealth; (3) a description of the evidence or
     biological material that the moving party seeks to have
     analyzed or tested, including its location and chain of
     custody if known; (4) information demonstrating that the
     analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is
     material to the moving party's identification as the
     perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case; and (5)
     information demonstrating that the evidence or biological
     material has not been subjected to the requested analysis
     because [of one of five reasons enumerated in G. L.
     c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5)]."

G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b).

     7   The moving party has the burden to establish:

     "(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; (2)
     that the evidence or biological material has been subject
     to a chain of custody that is sufficient to establish that
     it has not deteriorated, been substituted, tampered with,
     replaced, handled or altered such that the results of the
     requested analysis would lack any probative value; (3) that
     the evidence or biological material has not been subjected
     to the requested analysis for any of the reasons in clauses
     (i) to (v), inclusive, of paragraph (5) of subsection (b)
     of [§] 3; (4) that the requested analysis has the potential
     to result in evidence that is material to the moving
                                                                  14

the center of the dispute in this case, requires the moving

party to show that the requested test has not been performed on

the evidence or biological material at issue for one of the

following five reasons:

    "(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at
    the time of the conviction;

    "(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not
    admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of
    the conviction;

    "(iii) the moving party and the moving party's attorney
    were not aware of and did not have reasons to be aware of
    the existence of the evidence or biological material at the
    time of the underlying case and conviction;

    "(iv) the moving party's attorney in the underlying case
    was aware at the time of the conviction of the existence of
    the evidence or biological material, the results of the
    requested analysis were admissible as evidence in courts of
    the commonwealth, a reasonably effective attorney would
    have sought the analysis and either the moving party's
    attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge denied
    the request; or

    "(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise
    unavailable at the time of the conviction."

G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5).   See G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3).

    Here, the defendant relies on § 3 (b) (5) (iv); thus, the

defendant as the moving party was required to demonstrate by a

    party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime in
    the underlying case; (5) that the purpose of the motion is
    not the obstruction of justice or delay; and (6) that the
    results of the particular type of analysis being requested
    have been found to be admissible in courts of the
    commonwealth."

G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b).
                                                                   15

preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably effective

attorney would have sought DNA testing of the shirt but failed

to do so.

    b.   Standard of review.   Where, as here, the motion judge

was not the trial judge, and the record purely is documentary,

we regard ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to

assess the trial record.   See Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass.

292, 298 (2017), S.C., 486 Mass. 193 (2020).   Because the motion

judge was not required to make credibility determinations or

consider the relative weight of the evidence or the strength of

the case presented against the moving party, we stand in the

same position as the motion judge in determining whether the

defendant demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a

reasonably effective attorney would have sought DNA testing of

the victim's shirt.   See Linton, 483 Mass. at 233-234.

Accordingly, we review the denial of the defendant's motion

pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7, de novo.   See id.

    c.   Application.   The defendant asserts on appeal that a

reasonably effective attorney would have sought a DNA analysis

of the victim's shirt, and that his attorney failed to do so.

The Commonwealth contends that the lack of trace evidence

connecting the defendant to the scene where the victim's body

was found coupled with the Commonwealth's purported failure to

conduct available forensic analysis played a pivotal role in the
                                                                      16

defendant's strategy at trial.    As such, the Commonwealth

asserts that a reasonably effective attorney would not have

sought the DNA testing of the victim's shirt because DNA

evidence from the shirt could have further inculpated the

defendant and, thus, undermined this important defense.       Under

the circumstances of this case, we agree with the Commonwealth.

    The inquiry under § 3 (b) (5) (iv) whether a reasonably

effective attorney would have sought the requested testing is

objective.   See Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Mass. 54, 63 (2016).

As we have previously explained, unlike in a motion for a new

trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass.

1501 (2001), the reasonably effective attorney prong of G. L.

c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (iv), does not require the defendant to

establish that trial counsel's strategic decision to forgo

forensic testing was manifestly unreasonable.     See Linton, 483

Mass. at 237.    Rather, the statute requires a showing only that

a reasonably effective attorney would have sought the requested

analysis, not that every reasonably effective attorney would

have done so.    See Wade II, 467 Mass. at 511.   Therefore, the

defendant here would be entitled to postconviction forensic

testing of the victim's shirt if he, by a preponderance of the

evidence, has shown that "a" hypothetical reasonably effective

attorney would have chosen to undertake testing in these

circumstances.    See Linton, supra at 238.
                                                                       17

    That is not to say that the permissive standard under

§ 3 (b) (5) (iv) is without limits.       See Linton, 483 Mass. at

237-238.    In Linton, the defendant sought postconviction

forensic testing of a "questioned hair."       See id. at 237.   The

precise source of the hair, and whether it came from the victim,

or an extraneous source, was unknown.      See id.   Like the shirt

in this case, the hair was never tested or introduced at trial.

See id.    Nevertheless, the absence of testing was a prominent

aspect of Linton's defense.    See id. at 238.    In his closing,

Linton's trial counsel relied "on the uncertainties concerning

the hair to argue that [the] police were deliberately not

testing evidence in an effort to locate other suspects because

they had focused improperly upon the defendant as the only

suspect."   Id.   There was other inculpatory evidence in Linton,

such as a test result showing that the defendant was a possible

contributor to the DNA found under the victim's fingernails.

See id.    In isolation, both the DNA found under the victim's

fingernails and the hair could have been easily explained by the

victim's marriage to Linton.    See id.    However, considering both

the test result showing that Linton was a possible contributor

to the DNA found under the victim's fingernails and the trial

counsel's emphasis on the absence of information concerning the

hair, we could not conclude that a reasonably effective attorney
                                                                  18

would have tested the hair, and accordingly affirmed the order

denying Linton's motion for postconviction testing.   See id.

    Here, the defendant argues that while the absence of trace

evidence played a minimal role in his defense, the fact that the

victim's shirt was not tested played no role at all in his trial

defense strategy.   To be clear, the defendant does not dispute

that his trial counsel emphasized the lack of trace evidence

linking him to the crime scene.   Instead, he makes a nuanced

distinction that, in referring to a lack of trace evidence, his

trial counsel was not referencing the absence of DNA testing of

the victim's shirt, but rather the absence of footprints and

tire impressions where the victim's body was discovered, as well

as the absence of the victim's DNA in the defendant's vehicle,

home, and storage unit.   This distinction is not meaningful in

any sense.

    The general lack of trace evidence, including forensic

evidence on any object or in any location linking the defendant

to the victim's death, was a prominent theory of his defense.

First, throughout the trial, defense counsel repeatedly focused

on the purported weaknesses in the police investigation,

emphasizing that the police could have collected DNA or other

trace evidence but failed to do so.   Second, as the defendant

himself points out in his argument, defense counsel elicited

testimony from the police that there was no blood or DNA from
                                                                   19

the victim found in the defendant's car, storage unit, or home.

Indeed, the defendant's trial counsel consistently focused on

the theory that nothing directly linked the defendant to the

victim's body or the crime scene.   Thus, had the victim's shirt

been tested, and if the results came back showing that the

defendant's DNA was present on the shirt, the defendant's theory

that the Commonwealth's case was entirely circumstantial and

unsupported by physical evidence would have been torpedoed.

    On the other hand, had the test been ordered and the

results came back positive for a third party's DNA, the

potentially exculpatory value of this evidence would have been

marginal at best.   While searching the defendant's car, the

police discovered a receipt, dated July 16, 2013, at 12:31 P.M.,

for the purchase of latex gloves.   An absence of the defendant's

DNA on the victim's shirt could have easily been explained by

the reasonable inference that the defendant was wearing latex

gloves while disposing of the victim's body.   Moreover,

considering that, as stated by the State police crime scene

specialist at trial, clothing seldomly provides a "pristine" DNA

sample and that there are inherent difficulties interpreting

such results, coupled with the fact that no theory of a third-

party culprit was sufficiently developed at trial, any presence

of a third party's DNA would have had minimal exculpatory value.
                                                                  20

     Under these circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonably

effective attorney would have risked undermining the defendant's

strongest defense in favor of throwing a "Hail Mary"8 by

requesting a DNA test on the victim's shirt.   Accordingly, the

defendant has not met his burden to show that a reasonably

effective attorney would have sought such testing at the time of

his trial.

     The order denying the motion for postconviction testing is

affirmed.

                                   So ordered.

     8 In football, a "Hail Mary" is a long pass made in
desperation into the end zone with little time remaining and
with only a small chance of success. Although the chance of
success is grim, it is not zero. Doug Flutie did, after all,
complete arguably the most famous Hail Mary to secure a victory
for Boston College over the University of Miami in 1984. See
Commonwealth v. Lys, 481 Mass. 1, 11 n.8 (2018).