Court Opinion

ID: 9399339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 17:05:03.733711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:05.073005
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/2/23 Breja v. Breja CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 NEHA DUA BREJA,
            Plaintiff and Appellant,                              A164778
 v.
 SIDDHARTH BREJA,                                                 (San Francisco City and County
            Defendant and Respondent.                             Super. Ct. No. FDI-21-795427)

      Neha Dua Breja appeals an order denying her requests for
a domestic violence restraining order against respondent
Siddharth Breja and sole custody of the couple’s child, S.B. She
contends the court abused its discretion in finding she failed to
establish a factual basis for a restraining order, excluding
supporting declarations, and ordering joint custody. We affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND
       In November 2021, while the couple’s divorce case was
pending, Neha1 filed a request for a domestic violence restraining
order, child custody, and spousal and child support. She alleged
two instances of abuse. The first occurred on February 29, 2020,
when Siddharth “abused” her, apparently by shouting at her
during an argument; struck his own face “till his face turned blue
and had bumps;” and held her hand tightly until she threatened
to call 911. Siddharth backed off, but continued to “abuse” Neha

        1   We will refer to the parties by their first names for clarity.
                                                1
and her parents (who were in India) in a phone call to his own
parents in India.

      The second incident occurred almost two years later, on
November 7, 2021, when Neha served Siddharth with legal
separation papers while he was visiting S.B. at her home.
According to Neha, Siddharth cursed at her and her parents,
threatened to obtain full custody, and said he would “show you
guys.” Neha maintained Siddharth had neglected S.B. since
August 2020 and “had the potential to” physically and
emotionally harm their son due to his “volatile temperament and
aggression.”

      In his opposition, Siddharth recounted that Neha had
taken S.B. to India in August 2020 without his knowledge or
consent. He followed them there in December but in July 2021
Neha returned with S.B. to San Francisco, again without
notifying Siddharth.

       Siddharth maintains that he returned to the United States
in November 2021. On November 7, the day after his return, he
visited S.B. at Neha’s home. He neither asked Neha for full
custody nor cursed at or threatened her or her parents. As he left
Neha’s house, her landlord (A.H.) served him with legal
separation papers. Siddharth asked A.H. to give him a moment
with Neha, but he did not raise his voice, the couple did not
argue, and there was no violence. The next day Siddharth met
Neha and A.H. at S.B.’s school; A.H. offered to give him a ride
back to their house.

      Siddharth denied that he ever hit himself (much less until
he turned blue and had bumps), restrained Neha by grabbing her
hand, or otherwise abused her. He had no idea how it was
possible for him to have abused Neha and her parents during a
phone call to his parents in India. He asked the court for joint
legal and physical custody and visitation.

                                2
       On November 30, 2021, a day before the scheduled hearing,
Neha filed two supplemental declarations. One, from A.H.,
reiterated Neha’s claim that Siddharth had cursed and yelled at
her when he visited S.B. on November 7. His behavior was
“forceful and insistent” when he met her and Neha at S.B.’s
school the next day. The second declaration, apparently from a
staff member at S.B.’s school, recounted that Siddharth had twice
visited the school and conversed with her. He was “cordial and
polite,” but commented that he would get full custody of S.B.
because of his wealth.

      The hearing was continued to January 26, 2022. On
January 24, Neha filed and served five additional declarations.
Four were transcriptions of telephone conversations she had with
Siddharth in 2020 and 2021. The fifth was a 12-page, single
spaced “chronological and faithful account, to the best of my
knowledge and belief, of the last 4 years of my marriage with
Siddharth Breja,” supported in part with references to the
transcriptions.

       At the outset of the hearing, the court clarified with Neha
that she had recorded the transcribed calls without Siddharth’s
knowledge. The court explained that this was illegal and struck
all five declarations. It then asked Neha whether she wanted to
add to or change anything in her original declaration. She
declined.

       The court questioned Neha at length about her basis for
seeking a restraining order. She responded that she felt isolated
in San Francisco without family, friends or resources. She feared
Siddharth because “each time when you do not comply by what
he wants, you know, he - - his way is that ‘It is my way or I force
it through anything,’ through any means - - throwing things on
me, or, you know, coming close to me. And, like, the last time he
just held my hand. I know with every passing step it was only
increasing.”

                                 3
       The court prompted Neha to describe specific occasions
when Siddharth threw things at her. Neha said that in April
2018 he had become upset during an argument and threw his
eyeglasses onto the ground or a shopping cart. In January 2019,
during another argument, he threw her phone across the room at
her. The phone landed at her feet. In February 2020, during a
dispute about her parents, Siddharth threw a dining room chair
onto the floor and broke it. A week later, he called his mother in
India and “started abusing me and my parents . . . and then he
used curse words for my parents.” A week after that, he struck
himself and then held her right hand until she said she would
call 911. Finally, that summer Siddharth “started yelling and
abusing” her in front of S.B. during an argument in a hotel lobby.

      Siddharth gave a different version of these events. He
reiterated that Neha had taken their son to India and then back
to the United States without informing him. In India they had
argued in a hotel lobby, but that was all. Siddharth never threw
a phone, a chair, or anything else at Neha; nor did he hit himself.
Neha’s allegations were intended to alienate him from S.B. and
retaliate for his filing for divorce and not giving in to her
financial demands.

       Invited by the court to respond, Neha said Siddharth had
been threatening her with divorce since S.B.’s birth and that he
tracked her phone, mail, credit cards, and social media. After she
returned from India he threatened to “ ‘make a mockery’ ” of her
and S.B. He cursed when A.H. served him with the separation
papers, and he tried to talk to S.B. at inconvenient times.
Moreover, he did not take appropriate responsibility for the
child’s schooling and insurance.

      The court stated it had reviewed all of Neha’s submissions,
including her November 30, 2021, and January 24, 2022,
declarations, but that its focus was on her live testimony. It
explained: “The [declarations] that she filed most recently are a

                                 4
violation of the rules. So I’m going to strike those that were filed
on January 24th. But the other declarations she submitted don’t
really change my mind one way or the other. It’s really her
testimony today about a number of incidents that have
happened[.]”

       The court denied the request for a restraining order. It
noted, “[i]t’s not that I don’t believe what you say happened. I’m
taking into consideration, sort of, the timing of the development
of the case. So I’m not disputing that what you say is correct.”
The court found the incidents in which Siddharth broke things or
hit himself had occurred more than a year earlier, and, more
recently, his “somewhat understandable” verbal reaction after
being served with the separation papers did not warrant a
restraining order. The court awarded joint legal and physical
custody and ordered the parties to communicate only through
text messaging except in emergencies.

                           DISCUSSION
                                  A.
      Neha contends the court abused its discretion in denying
the restraining order because she proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that Siddharth’s actions made her reasonably fear
for her safety. We do not question that, on this record, the court
could have found in her favor. (To be clear, we do not decide that
question.) The issue, however, is whether its contrary
determination exceeded the bounds of reason. (Ashby v. Ashby
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509 [restraining order]; S.Y. v.
Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 324, 333-334 [child
custody].) It did not.

      The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200
et seq. (the Act))2 permits a court to issue a protective order for
the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence upon

      2   Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
                                  5
“reasonable proof” of past abuse. (§§ 6220, 6300; Gonzalez v.
Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) “Abuse” in this context
includes intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to
cause bodily injury, placing a person in reasonable apprehension
of imminent serious bodily injury, molesting, threatening,
harassing, and disturbing the peace of the other party. (§§ 6203,
6320, subd. (a).) “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ ”
includes a pattern of behavior that unreasonably interferes with
the other person’s free will and personal liberty and which may
include controlling, regulating, or monitoring the person’s
movements, communications, daily behavior, or finances. (§
6320, subd. (c).)

     Our review is for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of
Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.)

       Neha asserts the court abused its discretion by incorrectly
evaluating the evidence. Specifically, she faults (1) its
determination that the occasions when Siddharth destroyed
things (presumably the chair) or hit himself were too far in the
past to warrant a restraining order; and (2) its failure to find
Siddharth abused her by tracking her phone, social media, and
credit cards.3 In other words, she asks us to reweigh the evidence
and resolve evidentiary conflicts differently than the trial court—
something we may not do. (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
1139, 1145; Gonzalez v. Munoz, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 420
[where two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from
the facts, appellate court has no authority to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court].)

      The other incidents Neha described largely consisted of
shouting and swearing, most frequently while the couple argued.

      3In her reply brief, Neha also asserts this was legal error.
The assertion is forfeited by her failure to argue legal error in her
opening brief. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 56.)
                                  6
The court could reasonably infer from the nature of these events
and/or their remoteness in time that they did not indicate a
likelihood of future abuse requiring a protective order. (See §§
6220, 6300, subd. (a) [statutory purpose is to prevent domestic
violence and provide parties with a cooling-off period].)

       This is so whether or not the court found any of the past
incidents—the couple’s arguments, Siddharth’s throwing the
eyeglasses, chair, or phone, hitting himself, “yelling and cursing,”
or tracking her calls and social media—were abusive within the
meaning of the Act.4 While a restraining order “may be issued” (§
6300, subd. (a), italics added) upon reasonable proof of past
abuse, the Act does not, as Neha suggests, require the court to
issue a protective order upon any showing of past abuse, no
matter how remote or insubstantial, if it is unpersuaded of a need
to prevent potential future abuse. The court’s determination that
a restraining order was unnecessary was within its discretion.

      Finally, Neha claims the court improperly ordered the
parties to restrict their communication to text messaging as a
substitute for issuing a restraining order. The claim is
contradicted by the record, which clearly shows the court imposed
the restriction after it denied the restraining order, “during the
course of the custody and visitation orders.”

                                B.

       Neha next contends the court abused its discretion in
excluding the declarations she filed two days before the hearing.
It did not. Four of those five declarations were transcriptions of
telephone calls rendered inadmissible by Family Code section
2022, subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 632, subdivision (d),
both of which proscribe the use of evidence obtained as a result of
eavesdropping upon or recording confidential communications.

      4 Neha’s claim that it is “undisputed” Siddharth isolated
her is unsupported by her citations to the record.
                                 7
      Neha is mistaken in claiming those declarations fall within
an exception for victims of domestic violence “who [are] seeking a
domestic violence restraining order from a court” and reasonably
believe a confidential communication may contain relevant
evidence. (Pen. Code, § 633.6, subd. (b).) Under those
circumstances, the victim may record a confidential
communication with the perpetrator to use in court. Neha did
not assert this exception in the trial court, so it is forfeited.
(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) In any event,
the exception is inapplicable because she recorded the calls in
July 2020 and July 2021, sixteen months and four months,
respectively, before she sought a restraining order.

       Neha contends the court abused its discretion in striking
the fifth declaration, a “chronology of events which led her to seek
a restraining order,” as it was not subject to the statutory
exclusion the court identified as the basis for its ruling.5 She
forfeited this point as well by failing to object on that ground
when the court ordered all five declarations stricken. (People v.
Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114.) Moreover, the court gave
Neha every opportunity to testify about the events she believed
supported a restraining order, and she testified to her view of the
relevant events at length and without any apparent restriction.
Accordingly, if there was an abuse of discretion, it was harmless.

                                C.

       We turn to the joint custody award. Neha asserts the court
failed to apply the rebuttable presumption in favor of sole custody
triggered by a finding a parent perpetrated domestic violence
against the other within the preceding five years. (§ 3044; see

      5We express no opinion as to whether parts of this
declaration might have properly been excluded because they
referred to and/or incorporated information from the illegal calls.
                                 8
Celia S. v. Hugo H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, 661-662.)6 The
assertion fails for the simple reason that the court made no such
finding.

      Neha disagrees, arguing the court’s comment that it did not
dispute or disbelieve her account of events was a de facto finding
of domestic violence. The argument is meritless. First, that the
court did not dispute or disbelieve Neha’s testimony does not
mean it found the events she described amounted to domestic
violence. Second, it reasonably could have found joint custody
was in S.B.’s best interest, thereby rebutting the presumption.
(Celia S. v. Hugo H., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 662.)

                          DISPOSITION
     The orders are affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)

      6 Pursuant to section 3044, subdivision (a), “Upon a finding
by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has
perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years
against the other party seeking custody of the child . . . there is a
rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or
legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic
violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child. . . . This
presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the
evidence.”
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                                         ______________________
                                         BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.

____________________________
LANGHORNE, J.*

A164778

     * Judge of the Napa County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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