Court Opinion

ID: 9668427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:12:44.656626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.387887
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to reverse and remand in this case. I would hold that appellees were entitled to receive summary judgment in their favor. The majority focuses its deci*798sion on what it believes to be the right of Dr. Litton to control Herman Ratcliff in his position as anesthesiologist under a vicarious liability theory. Appellants allege that the trial court wrongfully granted summary judgment in appellee’s favor because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Dr. Litton was vicariously liable. However, the appellant’s Fourth Amended Original Petition failed to allege vicarious liability as a cause of action.
Summary judgment in favor of the defendant that disposes of the entire case is proper only if the plaintiff cannot succeed as a matter of law on any of the theories pleaded. See, e.g., Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex.1983); Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The last amended petition supersedes all previous pleadings and thereby displaces the pleading which it amended. Tex.R.Civ.P. 65. See also Johnson v. Coca Cola Co., 727 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Since the last amended petition supplants the instrument that it amends, the amended instrument is no longer considered as part of the pleadings for the case. Tex. R.Civ.P. 65. See also Dolenz v. All Saints Episcopal Hosp., 638 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Appellant’s Fourth Amended Original Petition constituted the only viable pleading before the trial court at the time of the summary judgment hearing. ' In their Fourth Amended Original Petition, appellants did not plead a vicarious liability cause of action against Dr. Litton. Since the appellant’s vicarious liability claim was not properly before the court at the time of the summary judgment hearing, this court need not consider whether Dr. Litton had established his entitlement to summary judgment under a theory of recovery not included in the pleadings. See Nicholson v. Memorial Hosp. System, 722 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Appellants argue they were not required to plead a cause of action for vicarious liability to refute a motion for summary judgment so long as the theory was raised in their summary judgment response. In support of this contention, the appellants mistakenly rely on Womack v. Allstate Insurance Co. 156 Tex. 467, 296 S.W.2d 233 (1956). In Womack, the plaintiff brought suit against Allstate insurance company. Id. 296 S.W.2d at 234. Allstate moved for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s failure to comply with an insurance policy provision that required notice of filing suit. Id. at 236-37. In its summary judgment response rather than in its pleadings, Womack asserted that Allstate had waived compliance with the notice provision. Id. at 237.
The Texas Supreme Court ultimately determined that despite Womack’s failure to affirmatively plead waiver, the summary judgment should be denied where the summary judgment evidence discloses facts that render the moving party’s position untenable regardless of pleading defects. Id. The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the Womack scenario; there is no pleading defect but rather a failure to plead an entire cause of action. Under the present circumstances, the Womack rationale is clearly inapplicable.
Appellants allege appellees were under an affirmative duty to file special exceptions pointing out their failure to plead a cause of action. A defendant does have a duty to specially except to a pleading’s defect where the plaintiff has omitted an element of a cause of action or has failed to state the cause of action with sufficient clarity to inform the defendant of the nature of the suit. See Crabtree v. Ray Richey & Co., 682 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ). Where a plaintiff utterly fails to plead a viable cause of action the defendant is not required to file special exceptions that would suggest to the plaintiff all possible causes of action that could be filed against the defendant. See, e.g., Chambers v. Huggins, 709 S.W.2d 219, 224-25 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Crabtree v. Ray Richey & Co., 682 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ). Here, the appellant failed to allege a vica*799rious liability cause of action in its Fourth Amended Original Petition. This is an omission in the pleadings rather than a pleading defect; therefore, appellee was under no duty to specially except. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in this case where there was no cause of action upon which appellants could succeed against appellee as a matter of law.
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent. I would not sustain the appellants’ point of error but rather would affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding summary judgment to appellee.