Court Opinion

ID: 9368070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 18:08:01.55397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.366363
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Gardner, 2023-Ohio-307.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 111506
                 v.                                :

TIFFANY GARDNER,                                   :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 2, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-21-658922-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Andrew F. Rogalski and Caroline Nelson,
                 Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

                 Kelley & Ferraro, L.L.P., and Carl W. Sullivan, for
                 appellant.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

            Defendant-appellant Tiffany Gardner appeals from her judgment of

conviction, which was rendered after a jury trial. After a thorough review of the facts

and pertinent law, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

             In May 2021, Gardner was charged in a seven-count indictment with

two counts of aggravated murder, three counts of murder, and one count each of

aggravated robbery and felonious assault.

             Prior to trial, plaintiff-appellee the state of Ohio dismissed the two

counts of aggravated murder and one of the murder counts, all of which included

“purposely” as an element of the crimes. The counts that remained for trial were

two counts murder, unclassified felonies, one a violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and the

other a violation of R.C. 2903.02(B); aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree

in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3); and felonious assault, a felony of the second

degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).

             The charges resulted from the April 14, 2021 fatal beating by two

unknown male assailants of the victim, 70-year-old Leonard Craddock. The state’s

theory of the case was that Gardner was an aider and abettor to the crimes. The

following facts were established by the state’s witnesses at trial.

             On the day of the incident, Gardner was shopping at the Family Dollar

on Euclid Avenue in East Cleveland. The store had surveillance cameras that

captured some of the ensuing incident.
             Gardner had a see-through plastic pouch with, by her count,

$10,ooo cash in it. She placed the pouch of cash in the child seat section of a

shopping cart. After making her purchases, she retrieved her bags of purchased

items but absentmindedly left her pouch of cash in the cart, which she returned to

the walkway in front of the store.

             Shortly after Gardner left, Craddock approached the Family Dollar,

retrieved the shopping cart used by Gardner, saw the pouch of cash in the cart, and

put it in his waistband. Craddock then shopped in the store.

             Meanwhile, Gardner apparently realized that she left her cash and went

back into Family Dollar, where she spoke with the store manager. The store

manager viewed footage of a security video, on which she saw Craddock put the

pouch of cash in his waistband. The manager told Gardner what she saw on the

video.

             More video surveillance showed Gardner confront Craddock. Gardner

was able to get her pouch of cash back from Craddock. After that confrontation,

Craddock began walking across the street toward another store, AutoZone.

According to the Family Dollar manager, Gardner was “screaming” and “hollering”

as she got in her car and “sped off.” A witness testified that he saw Gardner on her

cell phone and heard her “ranting” about someone taking her money.

              Gardner drove to the AutoZone, where Craddock was, and video

recorded herself confronting Craddock outside of the store. The video shows

Gardner exiting her vehicle, approaching Craddock, and repeatedly questioning him
as to why he tried to “rob” her. During this confrontation, Gardner was hitting

Craddock with a wrist wallet. Craddock apologized to her. Gardner was yelling

profanities at Craddock, including threats such as “b**** I’ll f*** your ass up out

here, b****.”

                Craddock entered the AutoZone and Gardner followed him. Witnesses

inside AutoZone testified that Gardner was “angry,” “chasing [Craddock]

aggressively,” “hitting him on the head” with the wrist wallet and yelling at him

about stealing from her. Meanwhile, according to the witnesses, Craddock was

“trying to get away from [Gardner],” and was not fighting back. One witness

described Craddock as “crunched over” as Gardner hit him. Gardner was heard

saying, “[I]f I was a man I would do some real damage.”

                The AutoZone employees told both Gardner and Craddock to leave the

store. Gardner initially left, but Craddock remained, as one witness described, “to

catch his breath.” Gardner re-entered the store twice. A witness testified that “[i]t

was like she was making sure he was still in the store.” According to the witness,

when Gardner came back into the store Craddock would start hyperventilating.

                Outside video surveillance showed a car drive onto the AutoZone

parking lot and two men exiting the car. Gardner walked by the two men and then

turned around and started talking to them. After their conversation, Gardner and

the two men went into the AutoZone. According to one witness in the store, the men

referred to Gardner as “auntie” and made a comment about her “yelling and ranting”
about something that was going on. The witness testified that the men inquired

about oil for their car and then left the store.

              The AutoZone witnesses testified that within a few minutes the two

men came back into the store with Gardner. One witness testified that Gardner

looked directly at Craddock and then left the store. The men then went straight to

Craddock and repeatedly demanded that he come outside with them. Craddock

refused. Eventually, the two men “grabbed” and “dragged” Craddock out of the

store.

              The witnesses testified that once the two men had Craddock outside,

they brutally attacked him. They described the men as kicking, punching, and

stomping Craddock. One witness testified that “there was no match, it was like [they

were] beating a tiny baby.”

              After the attack, Craddock attempted to stand but collapsed to the

ground. Emergency personnel were called. When they arrived, they pronounced

Craddock dead at the scene.

              The video surveillance demonstrated that Gardner remained at the

scene for 12 minutes, the time it took the two men to confront and attack Craddock.

Gardner left the scene at the same time the two men left.

              An autopsy was performed on Craddock and revealed that he had

seven rib fractures, some of which were displaced fractures. The medical examiner

determined that the fractures punctured Craddock’s right lung. As the air built up

in Craddock’s cavity, it exerted pressure around the lung, making breathing
progressively more difficult. Further, blood outside of the lung increased the

pressure. The pressure continued to build until Craddock went into shock, lost

consciousness, and died. The medical examiner determined that Craddock’s cause

of death was blunt force injury, and his manner of death was homicide.

              Gardner was subsequently arrested. She maintained that she did not

know or have any relationship with the two men who beat Craddock. The state

presented some of Gardner’s jail calls to dispute her contention.

              During the calls, Gardner stated that an individual she referred to as

“Apple Head” better help pay her bond or she was going to “sing like a bird.”

Gardner learned that “Apple Head” was complaining about paying $5,000 or

$10,000 for her bond, to which she responded, “once it hits, it’s a million dollars for

both of them.” Gardner also stated that she was not going “to do life” for anybody,

and if “push come[s] to shove,” she would “make sure they pop up.” Further,

Gardner was recorded saying that Craddock “caused his own s***, he took s*** from

me.”

              Law enforcement obtained a buccal swab from Gardner. They were

unable to link Gardner’s DNA to Craddock’s body or the crime scene.

              The defense did not present any witnesses and at the close of the

state’s case made a Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court

denied the motion. The court instructed the jury, including an instruction on

complicity without objection from the defense.
              On the evidence presented, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of one

count of murder and guilty of the sole felonious assault count. The jury found

Gardner not guilty of the other murder count and not guilty of the sole aggravated

robbery count.

              The trial court merged the murder and felonious assault counts for the

purpose of sentencing and the state elected to proceed on the murder count. The

trial court sentenced Gardner to life with the possibility of parole after 15 years.

              Gardner presents the following assignments of error for our review:

          1. Appellant’s conviction is not sustained by sufficient evidence.

          2. The jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the
             evidence.

          3. Appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of
             improper and irrelevant evidence.

          4. Appellant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s ineffective assistance
             of counsel.

Law and Analysis

Evidence Sufficient to Support Conviction; Conviction not Against
Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              In her first assignment of error, Gardner contends that the evidence

was insufficient to support the conviction. In her second assignment of error, she

contends that the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We

combine these assignments of error because they are interrelated.

              “A claim of insufficient evidence raises the question whether the

evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.”
State v. Parker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110716, 2022-Ohio-1237, ¶ 7, citing State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The relevant inquiry in

a sufficiency challenge is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime existed beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. When making a

sufficiency determination, an appellate court does not review whether the state’s

evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted at trial

supports the conviction. State v. Starks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91682, 2009-Ohio-

3375, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins at id. Under a sufficiency challenge, witness credibility

is immaterial; the appellate court must defer to credibility determinations of the

trier of fact and only review issues of law. Parker at ¶ 7.

              A manifest weight challenge and a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge are two distinct challenges to the evidence presented. State v. Miree,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110749, 2022-Ohio-3664, ¶ 30, citing State v. Wilson, 113

Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25. A challenge to the

manifest weight of the evidence “‘involves the inclination of the greater amount of

credible evidence.’” State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109060, 2021-Ohio-

856, ¶ 32, quoting Thompkins at id.         Weight of the evidence examines “‘the

evidence’s effect of inducing belief.’” Harris at id., quoting Wilson at id., citing

Thompkins at 386-387. In reviewing a manifest-weight claim, the court must

consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences drawn from it, and
the credibility of the witnesses to determine “‘whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage

of justice * * *.’” Harris at id., quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,

20 Ohio App.3d 172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). The discretionary power to

grant a new trial should be reserved for exceptional cases where “‘the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at id., quoting Martin at 175.

              Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a

finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence

necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency. State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11, citing State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15. “[T]hus, a determination that a conviction is

supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of

sufficiency.” Id. Manifest weight of the evidence is dispositive here.

              Gardner was convicted of felony murder under R.C. 2903.02(B),

which provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall cause the death of another as

a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit an offense

of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree * * *.” The underlying felony

Gardner was convicted of was felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). That

section provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause

serious physical harm to another * * *.”
             Gardner was convicted of the crimes as an aider and abettor to the two

males who assaulted Craddock. R.C. 2923.03(A), governing complicity provides in

relevant part that “[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the

commission of an offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet another in committing the

offense.”

              To establish that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the evidence

must prove that the defendant “supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with,

advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the

defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.”          State v. Johnson,

93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. “Thus, the state must prove

two criminal intents for the accomplice: first that the accomplice had the same

criminal intent as the principal offender and, second, that the accomplice also

intended to help the principal commit the offense.”            State v. Middleton,

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1162, 2006-Ohio-6634, ¶ 14, citing State v. Mendoza,

137 Ohio App.3d 336, 343, 738 N.E.2d 822 (3d Dist.2000). In Mendoza, the Third

District interpreted the terms “aid” and “abet” as requiring a showing that the

defendant directed his or her conduct toward the goal of the principal’s criminal

offense. Id. at 344-345.

              This court has held that “[t]o be convicted as an aider and abettor such

person must: (1) engage in an overt act ‘with a view’ towards producing the result

for which he [or she] is held; and (2) such person must himself [or herself] possess

the felonious intent that the principal possesses.”              State v. Boigner,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 34514, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 7630, *3 (Mar. 25, 1976),

citing Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 288, 34 N.E. 352 (1893). “It is not

necessary that the accused be in a position to foresee the precise consequence of his

[or her] conduct; only that the consequence be foreseeable in the sense that what

actually transpired was natural and logical in that it was within the scope of the risk

created by his [or her] conduct.” State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 95-96,

491 N.E.2d 379 (10th Dist.1985).

              Ohio law is well-settled that, to convict an offender of complicity, the

state need not establish the principal’s identity. Rather, R.C. 2923.03(C) only

requires that the state prove that a principal committed the offense.

State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14, 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), paragraph four of the

syllabus, vacated on other grounds, sub nom. Strodes v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911,

98 S.Ct. 3136, 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978). Thus, conviction of the principal offender is

not a prerequisite to finding a defendant guilty of complicity. See R.C. 2923.03(B)

(“It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the

accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.”).

              Gardner contends that “[t]his is a mere presence case, end of story.”

It is true that mere presence at the crime scene is insufficient to convict a defendant

under a complicity theory. State v. High, 2018-Ohio-2236, 115 N.E.3d 702, ¶ 23

(8th Dist.). However, “‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from

presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’”

State v. Cartellone, 3 Ohio App.3d 145, 150, 444 N.E.2d 68 (8th Dist.1981), quoting
State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 273 N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971); High at id.

In other words, the evidence must establish that Gardner was more than a mere

bystander.1 Aiding and abetting may be shown by both direct and circumstantial

evidence. High at id.

               There is nothing incredible about the jury’s finding that Gardner was

complicitous in the assault and murder of Craddock. Gardner’s contention that all

the evidence showed was that she was upset about her money being taken is belied

by the record. Rather, the record demonstrates that, as the state maintains, Gardner

“was at the center of the conflict from the start to finish.”

               After Gardner confronted Craddock at Family Dollar and got her

pouch of money back, she followed him to AutoZone where she confronted him

again and assaulted him herself, albeit not to the extent that the two males did. She

was overheard telling Craddock that “if I was a man I would do some real damage.”

Gardner was also seen talking on her cell phone and overheard “ranting” during the

call about someone stealing her money.

               Shortly thereafter, the two males arrived and Gardner talked to them

before all three of them went into the AutoZone where Craddock was. A witness in

the store testified as to what could reasonably be construed as Gardner identifying

Craddock to the two men. There was also witness testimony that the men referred

to Gardner as “auntie,” which further demonstrated that Gardner and the men knew

       1 The trial court here instructed the jury that “[t]he mere presence of the defendant
at the scene of the offense is not sufficient to prove in and of itself the defendant was an
aider or abettor.”
each other. Gardner remained on the scene while the two men beat Craddock and

left with them when the beating was over.

              After her arrest, Gardner was recorded on jail calls saying that she was

going to “sing like a bird” and it was going to be “a million dollars for both of them”

if a particular individual did not help with her bond money. A reasonable inference

could be made from this evidence that Gardner knew who the assailants were.

A reasonable inference that Gardner possessed the intent of the assailants could be

made from Gardner’s statement on the calls that Craddock “caused his own s***, he

took s*** from me.”

              The evidence the state presented was compelling and was not

lessened, as Gardner contends, by the lack of Gardner’s DNA at the crime scene or

forensic evidence from her phone showing who she was talking to when she was

overheard complaining about her money being stolen.

              This is not the exceptional case where the jury lost its way. Rather, the

weight of the evidence supports the conviction. Because the weight of the evidence

supports the conviction, the evidence was necessarily sufficient. The first and

second assignments of error are therefore overruled.

No Plain Error in Admission of Jail Calls

              In her third assignment of error, Gardner contends that the probative

value of the jail calls was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. No objection to the

calls was made at trial, and therefore we review for plain error.
              The failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial waives all but

plain error on appeal.     See Crim.R. 30(A); State v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-5594,

92 N.E.3d 1283, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). “Notice of plain error * * * is to be taken with the

utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978),

paragraph three of the syllabus. To prevail on a claim that the trial court committed

plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that an error constitutes an obvious

defect in the trial proceedings and demonstrate that the error affected the outcome

of the trial. State v. Gordon, 152 Ohio St.3d 528, 2018-Ohio-259, 98 N.E.3d 251,

¶ 23.

              Trial courts have a duty “to determine whether testimony is relevant

and to balance its potential probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice.”

State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95928, 2011-Ohio-4109, ¶ 32. Evid.R. 402

allows the admission of any relevant evidence so long as the probative value of that

evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and it does not confuse the issue

or mislead the jury. Evid.R. 403(A).

              Statements made during jail calls can be deemed nonhearsay

admissions by a party-opponent under Evid.R. 801(D)(2). See, e.g., State v. Gerde,

12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-11-077, 2017-Ohio-7464, ¶ 9.                      Under

Evid.R. 801(D)(2), a statement is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against a

party and is * * * the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a

representative capacity[.]” Gardner contends that the statements made during the
calls did not fall under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) because she did not admit to the crime or

intending to hurt Craddock during the calls.

              Although the term “admission” appears to imply that an out-of-court

statement must be a confession or statement against interest, “‘in actuality, any prior

statement of a party is admissible providing it is offered against the party at trial.’”

State v. Baker, 137 Ohio App.3d 628, 652, 739 N.E.2d 819 (12th Dist.2000), quoting

Weissenberger’s Ohio Evidence 367, Section 801.33 (1998). Thus, there was no

requirement that Gardner had to make an admission during the calls for them to be

admitted under Evid.R. 801(D)(2).

               The state offered the calls as evidence to refute Gardner’s contention

that she had no connection to the two men who beat Craddock. Gardner was

recorded on the calls saying that if an individual did not help with her bail money

she was going to “sing like a bird” and it would be “a million for both of them.” These

statements were properly admitted under Evid.R. 801(D)(2) — there was no error,

plain or otherwise, in their admission. The third assignment of error is therefore

overruled.

No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

              For her final assignment of error, Gardner contends that she was

denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. According to Gardner, “[h]ad [the]

jail calls not been in evidence, the jury would not have come back with a guilty

verdict on any of these counts.” We disagree.
              To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Gardner must

show that her trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to

demonstrate prejudice, Gardner must establish that, but for counsel’s errors, there

is a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have been different.

State v. Burke, 97 Ohio St.3d 55, 2002-Ohio-5310, 776 N.E.2d 79, ¶ 6. The failure

to make an adequate showing on either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. Strickland at 697.

              As discussed, the jail calls were properly admitted under

Evid.R. 801(D)(2), but even if they had been excluded, the other evidence presented

overwhelmingly supports the conviction. The outcome of the trial would not have

been different without the calls. Thus, Gardner has failed on both prongs of an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The fourth assignment of error is therefore

overruled.

Conclusion

              The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and the

conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence — it demonstrated

that Gardner was complicitous in the assault and murder of Craddock. Recordings

of Gardner’s jail calls were properly admitted under Evid.R. 801(D)(2), and trial

counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to their admission.

              Judgment affirmed.
      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR