Court Opinion

ID: 9844932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:11:49.711557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:47.439566
License: Public Domain

PARKER, J.,
dissenting. At the very beginning of a consideration of this appeal we are met by a question of jurisdiction of which we must take judicial notice ex mero motu. Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, 237 N.C. 307, 74 S.E. 2d 723; Shepard v. Leonard, 223 N.C. 110, 25 S.E. 2d 445.
According to the complaint, plaintiff resides in Pitt County, and the defendant resides in Nash County. They were married in Johnston County. There is no averment in the complaint that either party ever resided in Wilson County, or ever bad a domicil in Wilson County. The subject of the action •— the marital status of the parties — is not located in Wilson County.
With regard to the matter of jurisdiction over a divorce action, it is now the generally settled rule, that the right to decree a divorce is *242founded on domicil, which alone gives jurisdiction. Note in 76 Am. Dec. 672. “Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce — jurisdiction, .strictly speaking — is founded on domicil. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 45 L. Ed 804, 21 S. Ct. 551; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 47 L. Ed 366, 23 S. Ct. 237. The framers of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, .and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking world has questioned it.” Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 89 L. Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366, reh. den. 325 U.S. 895, 89 L. Ed. 2006.
Plaintiff instituted his action for divorce in the General County Court of Wilson County. The statute providing for the establishment of General County Courts was enacted by the General Assembly of 1923, Public Laws 1923, Chapter 216, of which a part is now G.S. 7-265. Section 1 of this statute provides that the General County Count "shall -have jurisdiction over the entire county in which said court may be established.” Section 13 of this statute provides that the General County Court shall have “jurisdiction in criminal actions within the county” in a limited class of 'cases. Section 14 of the act reads:
“The jurisdiction of tire General County Court in civil actions .shall be -as follows:
“1. Jurisdiction concurrent with that of the justices of the peace of the county;
“2. Jurisdiction concurrent with the Superior Count in all actions founded on contract;
“3. Jurisdiction concurrent with the Superior Court in all actions not founded upon contract;
“4. Jurisdiction .concurrent with the Superior Court in all actions to try title .to lands and to prevent trespass thereon and to restrain waste thereof;
“5. Jurisdiction concurrent with the Superior Court in all, actions pending in said court to issue and grant temporary and permanent restraining orders and injunctions.”
It will be noted that jurisdiction was not given over divorce actions.
The General County Court of Wilson County, established for Wilson County by virtue of -this statute, is a statutory court inferior to the Superior Court, with limited jurisdiction in Wilson County-, and has no extra-territorial jurisdiction, except what is expressly given it in the statute -creating it, and then subject to 'constitutional limitations. Investment Co. v. Pickelsimer, 210 N.C. 541, 187 S.E. 813.
This Court -said in Waters v. McBee, 244 N.C. 540, 94 S.E. 2d 640: *243“The phrase ‘shall have jurisdiction over the entire county in which said court may be established’ (G.S. 7-265) does .not have reference to the kind or character of action of which the court may take jurisdiction nor of the parties who may be subject to its jurisdiction. It merely fixes the territorial limits within which the count may act. A court has no power or .authority to hear and determine matters in controversy beyond its territorial limits.” In the Waters case instituted in the General County Court of Buncombe Gounty, .plaintiff resided in Buncombe County. In the instant case -neither -party resides, or ever has resided, in Wilson County.
The General Assembly of 1931, Public Lawis 1931, Chapter 61, amended Chapter' 216 of .the Public Laws of 1923 as it relates to the General County Court of Wilson County, -and in Section 1(h) of Chapter 61 provided that the General County Oou-rt in Wilson County “shall have jurisdiction to try actions for divorces, -according to the course of practice of the Superior Court -in such actions.”
The General Assembly of 1935, Public Laws 1935, Chapter 171, ■amended the statute .as to General County Courts as follows: “6. Jurisdiction ’concurrent with the Superior Oourt of ¡all .actions ¡and proceedings for divorce and .alimony, or either.” This now appears in G.S. 7-279.
A Preliminary Report on the Structure -and Jurisdiction of the Courts of North Carolina Prepared in 1957 by the Institute of Government for a Subcommittee of the North Carolina Bar Association Committee on Improving and Expediting the Administration of Justice in North Carolina, page 11, states that of the 100 -counties in North Oarol-ina 5 counties have General County Courts.
“The powers of a oou-rt -of limited jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by -implication. Thompson v. Cox, 53 N.C. 311; Evans v. Singletary, 63 N.C. 205.” Greensboro v. Black, 232 N.C. 154, 59 S.E. 2d 621.
This Court said in In re Hickerson, 235 N.C. 716, 71 S.E. 2d 129: “If the meaning of a .statute be in ¡doubt, reference may be had to the title and context as legislative -declarations of the -purpose of the act.”
Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, supra, was a divorce -action. Both plaintiff -and defendant -resided in Edgecombe County. Plaintiff instituted •the ¡action in the Recorder’s Oourt of Nash County. Chapter 768, Section 1(e), -of 1943 Session Laws of North Carolina provides -that the Recorder’s Court of Nash shall have “concurrent, -original and final jurisdiction with the Superior Courts of ¡all actions for divorce.” On motion of defendant, and with the -consent ¡of the plaintiff, the action was removed from the Recorder’s Oourt -of Nash Gounty to the Recorder’s Oourt of Edgecombe County. Defendant in her answer *244pleads 'a cross-action for divorce a mensa, and prays an allowance of alimony and .counsel fees pendente lite. At the trial in the Recorder’s Court of Edgecombe County the jury answered the issues both on plaintiff’s cause of action and defendant’® cross-action in favor of defendant. The Recorder ¡bad .theretofore .allowed alimony pendente lite from which defendant had appealed. At the October Term 1952 Edge-combe Superior Court, on motion of defendant for alimony and counsel fees pendente lite, the court found the essential facts and entered an order allowing alimony, etc. Plaintiff appealed. This Court held that the Recorder’s Court of Nash 'County had no jurisdiction to order the .action transferred to the Recorder’s Court of Edgecombe County for trial, that the proceedings had and the orders entered in the Recorder’s Court and in the Superior Court of Edgecombe County -are without force or effect, and that the action is still pending in (the Recorder’s Court of Nash County. The Court said: “The parties live in Edgecombe County. The subject of the action — the marital status of the parties — is of necessity located in that county. Therefore we do not mean to .say that defendant may be compelled to defend the action pending in the recorder’s court of Nasb. She has a remedy, but -it is not our custom to chart future proceedings in ■a cause not finally disposed of by us on 'appeal.”
The jurisdiction of a court is a matter of substance and not of form, -a limitation which is fundamental .and not merely theoretical. It is manifest from a study of the statute of 1923 creating General County Courts, and the subsequent amendments thereto, that a General ■ County Court created by virtue of that Act has concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court over divorce actions, when one or both of the parties to the divorce .action is or are domiciled in the county where tire General County Court sits. When both parties are not domiciled in the county where the General County Court sits, such count has no jurisdiction of a divorce -action between them. In other words, a person 'domiciled -in North Carolina for the requisite time has the .choice of bringing an action for divorce in tire General Oounty Court of his domicile, if there is one, or in the General County Court of his wife’s domicile, if there is one, or in the Superior Court. Anything said to the contrary in McLean v. McLean, 233 N.C. 139, 63 S.E. 2d 138, I would overrule.
The majority opinion quotas from the McLean case as follows: “The mere fact of instituting .suit for divorce in a county other than that of plaintiff’s residence would not be regarded as affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the action on proper service, but rather as affecting only the question of venue.” That statement is correct *245when the divorce «lotion is instituted in the Superior Court, because the Superior Court, different from General County Courts, is one court having 'statewide jurisdiction. Article IV, Sec. 2, North Carolina Constitution; S. v. Pender, 66 N.C. 313; Rhyne v. Lipscombe, 122 N.C. 650, 29 S.E. 57; Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, supra. Both eases cited in the McLean case to .sustain the above quoted statement are divorce actions instituted -in the Superior Court.
It is elementary learning that a court cannot obtain jurisdiction by consent of the parties, waiver or estoppel. Hart v. Motors, 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E. 2d 673.
The jurisdiction of the Superior Court on 'appeal in this case is derivative only. Barham v. Perry, 205 N.C. 428, 171 S.E. 614; S. v. White, 246 N.C. 587, 99 S.E. 2d 772.
“There is a general rule, frequently approved in our decisions, that if an inferior court -or tribunal has no jurisdiction of a cause, an appeal from its decision confers no jurisdiction upon the appellate court.” Hall v. Artis, 186 N.C. 105, 118 S.E. 901.
The jurisdiction of this Court is derivative. Since the court below had no authority to enter ,the 'order from which defendant appealed, we have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal on its merits. Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, supra; Stafford v. Wood, 234 N.C. 622, 68 S.E. 2d 268.
The instant that a count perceives that it is exercising, or is about to exercise, -a forbidden or ungranted power, it ought to stay or dismiss a legal proceeding of its own motion; .and, if it does not, such action is, in law, a nullity. Stafford v. Wood, supra; Shepard v. Leonard, supra; Henderson County v. Smyth, 216 N.C. 421, 5 S.E. 2d 136; Miller v. Roberts, 212 N.C. 126, 193 S.E. 286; Nelson v. Relief Department, 147 N.C. 103, 60 S.E. 724; Burroughs v. McNeill, 22 N.C. 297.
Any act by the General County Court of Wilson County to exercise, or to attempt to exercise, jurisdiction over 'the divorce .action here, when plaintiff is diomiciled in Pitt County 'and defendant is domiciled in Nash County, is, in my opinion, a usurpation of authority, land all judicial proceedings in virtue thereof in this case by such General County Court, and by the Superior Court on appeal, are utterly void for lack of jurisdiction.
I vote to remand the action to the Superior Court with >a direction that it issue an order commanding the General County Court of Wilson County to dismiss the case from its docket for lack of jurisdiction.
I am authorized to state that Higgins and Moore, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.