Court Opinion

ID: 9778004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:29:58.361092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.055786
License: Public Domain

OPINION
JUNELL, Justice.
This negligence action comes to this Court on remand from the supreme court. It arose from the collision of Darrell Dyson’s vehicle with a parked crane (cherryp-icker) owned by Olin Corporation. The cherrypicker was supporting a section of overhead pipe that ran parallel to a two lane roadway and by necessity extended four feet into Dyson’s lane. The jury found Dyson negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout and in failing to make timely application of his brakes. Olin Corporation was found to be grossly negligent in one or more of the following acts or omissions: (1) in failing to post a flagman; (2) in failing to erect barricades; (3) in failing to provide flashing lights; and (4) in leaving the cherrypicker on the paved portion of the road.
This court issued its opinion, Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 678 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, rev’d and remanded, 692 S.W.2d 456), holding that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding of gross negligence against Olin Corporation. The Texas Supreme Court in its opinion, Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.1985), held that this court erred in interpreting the elements of gross negligence as stated in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex.1981) and remanded to this court for reconsideration of Olin’s insufficiency point. The supreme court stated that the correct definition of gross negligence was as follows:
The essence of gross negligence is not the neglect which must, of course, exist. *252What lifts ordinary negligence into gross negligence is the mental attitude of the defendant; that is what justifies the penal nature of the imposition of exemplary damages. The plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously, i.e., knowingly, indifferent to his rights, welfare and safety. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrated that he didn’t care. Such conduct can be active or passive in nature.
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex.1981). This court in its interpretation of that definition stated that to establish gross negligence “the plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) the defendant knew of the existence of an unreasonable peril and (2) the defendant’s acts or omissions demonstrated he was indifferent to the safety of the plaintiff.” We held that the evidence was insufficient to show that Olin knew that parking the cherrypicker in plain view created an unreasonable peril. Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 678 S.W.2d at 657, 658. The supreme court held this interpretation to be erroneous for the following reason:
Burk Royalty does not require a new and independent examination of the unreasonable nature of the peril. Rather the focus is on the mental attitude of the person charged and whether acts or omissions by that person display a conscious and deliberate disregard for the interest or safety of others. Burk Royalty at 922; International Armament Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex.1985). The court of appeals injected an additional element of proof by re-evaluating the reasonableness of Olin’s conduct in determining the gross negligence issue.
Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d at 457, 458. The supreme court has made it clear that the plaintiff does not have to prove the defendant knew the peril was unreasonable; the plaintiff need only show that the defendant knew of the existence of a peril.
We recognize that the supreme court’s opinion constitutes the law of this case and we are bound by it.
As we stated in our original opinion, there is ample evidence in this record to show that Olin knew that parking the cher-rypicker where it did created a peril. It partially obstructed one lane of traffic on a public road. A vehicle traveling in the lane obstructed by the cherrypicker would have to cross into the opposing lane of traffic to safely pass it.
Under the supreme court’s opinion we are not to independently examine the unreasonable nature of the peril. Therefore, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to prove the first of the two elements of gross negligence: that Olin knew of the existence of the peril. Having reached this conclusion, we next consider whether Olin’s conduct demonstrated indifference to the safety of people traveling in the Dyson vehicle. Olin did absolutely nothing about the known peril. It posted no flagman, erected no barricades, provided no flashing lights. We hold, therefore, that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury finding of gross negligence on the part of Olin.
In this court’s original opinion we held the trial court’s award to Dyson of actual damages of $16,404.17 should be reduced by twenty-five percent, the percentage of Dyson’s comparative negligence as found by the jury. That part of our decision was not affected by the supreme court decision.
In the original opinion we did not rule on the question whether the $115,-000.00 punitive damage award to Dyson should also be reduced by the twenty-five percent comparative negligence of Dyson. Olin’s seventh point of error requires us now to pass on this question. Appellant relies on Pedernales Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Schulz, 583 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.), as authority supporting its contention that the punitive damages award should be so reduced. The opinion of the Waco Court of Civil Appeals in Pedernales contains a statement supporting appellant’s conten*253tion; however, such statement was dictum in that opinion. In that personal injury case the jury had found Pedernales grossly negligent and one of the plaintiffs ordinarily negligent. Then the jury found that the occurrence made the basis of the suit was caused forty-five percent by the negligence of the plaintiff and fifty-five percent by the negligence of Pedernales. In another issue the jury awarded $100.00 exemplary damages to the negligent plaintiff. The trial court reduced the exemplary damages award by $45.00. The non-negligent plaintiff was awarded $4,900.00 exemplary damages by the jury and, of course, the trial court did not reduce that amount. Only the defendant Pedernales appealed, and the contention by Pedernales on appeal was that TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 2212a (the comparative negligence statute) has abolished gross negligence as a viable ground of recovery and has substituted therefor a comparison of negligence of all degrees between the parties. This contention by Pedernales was rejected by the Waco Court of Civil Appeals and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. In view of the fact that the jury had awarded the negligent plaintiff only $100.00 in exemplary damages, it is not surprising that he did not cross-appeal and contend that the trial court had erred in reducing the award by reason of the forty-five percent contributory negligence finding.
There is, however, a case decided since Pedernales that squarely presented the question whether an award of exemplary damages for gross negligence must be reduced by the amount of comparative negligence of the plaintiff. In that case, Anderson v. Trent, 685 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the trial court had declined to reduce the exemplary damages by reason of the thirty-five percent comparative negligence of the plaintiffs deceased wife, who died in the collision made the basis of the suit. The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed with the Waco court’s Pedernales opinion for two reasons:
First, if exemplary damages were only for compensating the plaintiff, then an argument could be made that they should be reduced by the percentage of the plaintiffs comparative negligence. However, the paramount purpose for awarding exemplary damages is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish and set an example for others. Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Shuford, 72 Tex. 165, 10 S.W. 408 (1888); see also Pedernales, 583 S.W.2d at 884-85. Consequently, it is incorrect to view the award of exemplary damages from the eyes of the recovering plaintiff; rather, the award should be viewed from the eyes of public policy. Second, if gross negligence, wanton conduct, or reckless disregard for the rights of others were a plain vanilla form of negligence, then comparative negligence would necessitate reduction in any damages. In Texas, however, while gross negligence has been defined in a myriad of ways, the distilled essence of those definitions is that ordinary negligence is not of the same ilk as gross negligence. Therefore, the two are not so analogous as to allow comparison for the purpose of reducing compensation.
Anderson, 685 S.W.2d at 714.
In Anderson the court held that the nature of gross negligence resulting in exemplary damages does not call for the imposition of the comparative negligence reduction in damages.
The decision in Anderson is supported by other jurisdictions. See Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 634 P.2d 653 (Mont.1981); Tampa Electric Co. v. Stone and Webster Engineering Corp., 367 F.Supp. 27 (M.D.Fla.1973); Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F.Supp. 1268 (W.D.Okla.1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). See also Annot., 27 A.L.R.4th 319 (an article entitled “Effect of Plaintiffs Comparative Negligence in Reducing Punitive Damages Recoverable.”)
We believe the better rule is that stated by the Dallas Court of Appeals in Anderson and in the above cited cases from other jurisdictions; therefore, we decline to re*254duce the exemplary damages award by reason of Dyson’s comparative negligence and we overrule appellant’s seventh point of error.
Since the original opinion of this court was issued, David Casas, Jr., the other appellee, has made a full settlement with Olin Corp. and is no longer a party in this case.
The judgment of the trial court in favor of Darrell Dyson and against Olin Corporation is reduced from $131,404.17 to the sum of $127,303.13. The remainder of the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.