Court Opinion

ID: 9667408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:44:53.173498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.708891
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that we have no jurisdiction over the direct appeal of the biennial review order. The statute provides that the trial judge shall conduct “a biennial review of the status of the committed person.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.102(a) (Vernon 2003). The rules of appeal for civil cases generally govern a civil commitment proceeding under the statute. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.146(b) (Vernon Supp.2006). Chapter 841 contemplates possible appeals in sexually violent predator commitment proceedings. See generally § 841.146(b). The biennial judicial review hearing under section 841.102(e) is a civil commitment proceeding. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.102(c) (Vernon 2003). Generally, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001). The order in question appears to dispose of the issues presented at the biennial review. The fact that the order can be modified following notice and another hearing should not make the biennial review order non-appealable. See generally Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.082(e) (Vernon Supp.2006) (modification after notice and hearing). Otherwise, no order setting commitment requirements would be appealable, because the requirements are always subject to modification after notice and a hearing. See id.
I do not believe the supervision and treatment requirements permitted under Chapter 841 are the proper subject of a habeas corpus proceeding under the circumstances here. Appellant does not challenge the legality of the underlying civil commitment. His remedy should be by direct appeal of the order setting the requirements, not by a habeas corpus proceeding. “The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ, and neither a trial court nor an appellate court, either in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction, should entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus where there is an adequate remedy at law.” Ex parte Benavides, 801 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.1978)). In my view, the majority’s approach unnecessarily complicates the review process for commitment orders and makes the extraordinary habeas remedy the ordinary method for challenging commitment requirements.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that the trial court did not err. I concur with the majority’s substantive rulings concerning the commitment requirements.