Court Opinion

ID: 9950511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 14:10:04.737113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:20.791675
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3876-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FENTON J. CARSTARPHEN, a/k/a
FENTON JU CARSTARPHEN,
FENTON J. CARSTARPHEN, JR.,
GERALD CARSTARPHEN,
MICHAEL WATERS, MIKE
FINNEY, FENNY
HOLLINGSWORTH, and
FINNY HOLLINGSWORTH,

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

                   Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided March 14, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 16-04-1087.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Susan Brody, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).
            Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor,
            attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant
            Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Fenton Carstarphen appeals from the August 11, 2022, Law

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

      Following a 2016 jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree

attempted murder, second- and third-degree aggravated assault, second-degree

burglary, and related weapons offenses stemming from his brutal attack of his

estranged wife. He was sentenced to an aggregate extended term of fifty years'

imprisonment, subject to the eighty-five percent parole ineligibility provisions

of the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In an unpublished

decision, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, and the Supreme

Court subsequently denied certification. State v. Carstarphen, No. A-2950-16

(App. Div. Mar. 11, 2019) (slip op. at 20, 22), certif. denied, 239 N.J. 393

(2019).

      In our unpublished opinion, we stressed that "the evidence adduced at the

trial . . . demonstrate[d] overwhelming proof of guilt." Id. at 4. We recounted

the pertinent facts as follows:

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                                       2
            On the morning of December 11, 2014, the victim
            opened the door to the mudroom attached to her house
            when she unexpectedly saw defendant standing there
            with a meat cleaver in his hand. He said to her, "[o]h,
            so you want a divorce?" The victim attempted to go to
            the back door, but she felt "heavy blows" to the back of
            her head, and fell to the ground. She was able to get
            outside to the backyard where she screamed for help.
            As the attack continued outside, defendant put the meat
            cle[a]ver in his pocket and took out a folding knife and
            cut the victim's thigh and attempted to cut her calf.
            Defendant told the victim they had to go back inside the
            house; the victim said she could not move, and as
            defendant went toward her, pretending to help her, he
            reached down and slit her throat and continued up her
            face, cutting her lip, nose, and across her left eye.

                   The victim's neighbor heard the screams, saw the
            attack, and called 9-1-1. Police arrived and found
            defendant standing over the victim, who was yelling for
            help with her hands up and blood coming down her
            face. The police detained defendant and found the meat
            cleaver and folding knife. They found a glove and wet
            pajamas near where the victim was on the ground; the
            wet pajamas had the odor of lighter fluid. When the
            police entered the victim's house, they detected the odor
            of flammable gas, and they noticed it was most potent
            in the mudroom.

            [Id. at 4-5 (first alteration in original).]

      Defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition, which was later

supplemented by counsel. In his submissions, among other things, defendant

asserted his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to the admission

of N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence and failing to request a limiting instruction once the

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                                          3
evidence was admitted. Defendant also asserted that counsel's cumulative errors

prejudiced him.     The evidence at issue were three statements attributed to

defendant by the victim. The statements provided background information

about the parties' tumultuous relationship and defendant's prior threats.

Specifically, the victim testified that defendant had stated: (1) he would burn

the house down if he was not living in it; (2) he would assault her if she rejected

his 2012 marriage proposal; and (3) he would kick her down a flight of steps.

        On the State's pre-trial motion, the trial judge had admitted the prior

threats as intrinsic evidence. 1 In his direct appeal, defendant had "assert[ed] that

the prior threats were not intrinsic to the crime of attempted murder, and thus,

the judge should have undertaken a Cofield[2] analysis and should have provided

a limit[ing] instruction."   Carstarphen, slip op. at 13. In our decision, we

"perform[ed] a Cofield analysis de novo" and concluded that the evidence was

admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Carstarphen, slip op. at 14, 20.

        We explained:

              The evidence provided "background" and helped to
              "complete[] the story" between the victim and
              defendant. See [State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 180

1
  The judge had barred the admission of other evidence, including defendant's
prior physical assaults of the victim.
2
    State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992).
                                                                              A-3876-21
                                         4
            (2011)] (quoting [United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233,
            248-49 (3d Cir. 2010)]) (concluding that these are other
            proper purposes for admitting evidence of other prior
            bad acts under Rule 404(b)). Defendant's threat to burn
            the house down was especially relevant in light of the
            lighter fluid-doused pajamas that defendant threw on
            the victim and the odor of lighter fluid in the house
            noted by the police officers. Moreover, these threats
            help prove defendant's motive and intent in attempting
            to murder the victim.

            [Carstarphen, slip op. at 16 (first alteration in original).]

      As to the judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction, we noted "[e]ven

if the past threats were not intrinsic, they would have been admissible under a

Cofield analysis, to which defense counsel consented to their admissibility

without the need for a limiting instruction." Carstarphen, slip op. at 20. Thus,

we determined there was

            no plain error. We reach that conclusion especially
            because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. See
            State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 571-72 (2018) (holding that
            defendant's convictions would be affirmed despite
            absence of limiting instruction, use of bad act evidence
            during summations, and admission of hearsay because
            errors "were not capable of producing an unjust result
            because of the overwhelming weight and quality of the
            evidence against defendant").

            [Carstarphen, slip op. at 20.]

      Following oral argument, the PCR judge entered an order on August 11,

2022, denying defendant's petition. In a supporting oral decision placed on the

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                                         5
record on the same date, the judge reviewed the factual background and

procedural history of the case, applied the governing legal principles, and

concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel (IAC). The judge also determined defendant was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

            POINT I

            [DEFENDANT]    IS   ENTITLED  TO   AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
            HIS    TRIAL     ATTORNEY    RENDERED
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
            FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF
            HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS MADE
            BY HIM ON PRIOR OCCASIONS.

            POINT II

            [DEFENDANT]    IS  ENTITLED    TO   AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
            TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST A
            LIMITING INSTRUCTION AS TO EVIDENCE OF
            HIS PRIOR INCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS
            CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
            COUNSEL.

            POINT III

            [DEFENDANT]   IS  ENTITLED    TO   AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
            THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO ERRORS
            COMPLAINED OF IN POINTS ONE AND TWO

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                                       6
            CREATED       CUMULATIVE       ERROR
            CONSTITUTING INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL
            COUNSEL.

      We begin by setting out some guideposts that inform our review. "We

review the legal conclusions of a PCR judge de novo." State v. Reevey, 417

N.J. Super. 134, 146 (App. Div. 2010). "[W]e review under the abuse of

discretion standard the PCR court's determination to proceed without an

evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div.

2013). "If the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid

the court's analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an

evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158

(1997) (citations omitted). "[W]here . . . no evidentiary hearing was conducted,"

as here, "we may review the factual inferences the [trial] court has drawn from

the documentary record de novo." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294

(App. Div. 2016) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)).

      An evidentiary hearing is only required when (1) a defendant establishes

"a prima facie case in support of [PCR]," (2) the court determines that there are

"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the

existing record," and (3) the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

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                                       7
(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)); see R. 3:22-10(e)(2)

(providing "[a] court shall not grant an evidentiary hearing . . . if the defendant's

allegations are too vague, conclusory or speculative"). "To establish a prima

facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her

claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will

ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-10(b).

      To establish a prima facie IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate "by

a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357

(2009), that his or her attorney's performance fell below the objective standard

of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58 (1987), and that the

outcome would have been different without the purported deficient

performance. Stated differently, a defendant must show that: (1) counsel's

performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

      To satisfy the first prong, a defendant must "show[] that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and "that counsel's representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

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"[I]n making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance . . . ."   Id. at 689.   As such, a defendant "must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be

considered sound trial strategy.'" Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.

91, 101 (1955)).

      To satisfy the prejudice prong, "[t]he error committed must be so serious

as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached."

State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

This prong generally requires that a defendant establish a "reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

      Failure to meet either prong of the two-pronged Strickland/Fritz test

results in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280

(2012) (citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway

to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not,

to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation

omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

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                                        9
      Applying these principles, we reject defendant's contentions based solely

on defendant's inability to establish the prejudice prong. We therefore dismiss

defendant's claims "without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient" in any respect. Ibid. As the PCR judge aptly stated:

            [E]ven if trial counsel objected to the introduction of
            evidence, as [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) evidence and not
            intrinsic evidence, or sought [a ]limiting instruction,
            viewing the case under the harmful error standard, the
            overwhelming evidence against . . . defendant would
            still have resulted in his conviction, i.e., there is no
            reasonable probability that but for counsel's purported
            unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would
            have been different; therefore, trial counsel was not
            ineffective for failing to object or otherwise request a
            limiting instruction under the Strickland standard . . . .

      Indeed, the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test "is an exacting

standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the

court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro,

193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187

N.J. 293, 315 (2006)). No such showing has been made here.

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                                       10
      To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because

either our disposition makes it unnecessary, or the argument was without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).3

      Affirmed.

3
  Because we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by any of his attorney's
purported deficiencies, his cumulative error argument also fails.

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