Court Opinion

ID: 9956193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 14:07:26.752145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:40.724646
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0600-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GABRIEL MERCADO,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted February 28, 2024 – Decided April 1, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier, Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 19-01-0101.

                   Jennifer Nicole Seletti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Stephen William Kirsch, Designated
                   Counsel, on the brief).

                   Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
                   respondent (Deepa S. Y. Jacobs, Assistant Prosecutor,
                   of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
    Defendant Gabriel Mercado appeals his jury trial convictions for attempted

murder, aggravated assaults, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a

weapon for an unlawful purpose, hindering, and stalking.          The jury found

defendant guilty after a lengthy trial at which he asserted an insanity defense.

Defendant contends the trial court gave contradictory jury instructions and

committed plain error in handling issues involving jurors.        Defendant also

contends his sentence is excessive. After carefully considering defendant's

contentions in light of the record and governing legal principles, we affirm his

convictions. With respect to the decision to impose consecutive sentences, the

State concedes the trial court did not explain the overall fairness of the sentence

as required in State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 270 (2021). Accordingly, we

remand for the trial judge make a finding concerning the overall fairness of the

sentence.

                                        I.

    Because defendant relied on an insanity defense, there were no significant

disputes at trial concerning the criminal acts he committed. We therefore need

only briefly summarize the pertinent facts adduced at trial.

    Defendant knew the victim through work, followed her on social media, and

developed a romantic obsession with her. She rejected his advances. He sent

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her a message on social media expressing thoughts of self-harm and insecurities

linked to a troubled home life and an incident concerning his hair. At this point,

the victim blocked defendant on her social media accounts. Defendant found

other methods to surveil the victim's movements, both in person and online. In

the early hours of October 15, 2018, defendant attacked the victim outside her

family home, stabbing her with a knife approximately ten times. Defendant fled

when the victim's father came out of the house. The victim suffered fractures

on both sides of her cervical spine, fractures to her right vertebral artery, and

severe lacerations on her face, tongue, hands, and wrist.

      A significant amount of testimony was presented concerning defendant's

mental state at the time of the attack.       Expert Dr. Eleanor Vo, a forensic

psychiatrist, testified for the defense. Vo opined that, on the date of the incident,

defendant was exhibiting "major depressive disorder with psychotic features."

She noted the victim characterized defendant's messages as "insane." Vo also

testified about defendant's "history" of becoming "obsessed with following on

social media and trying to continually stalk" people who have rejected him.

    The State's expert, Dr. Steven Simring, a psychiatrist, agreed defendant had

depression. However, he rejected Vo's conclusion that defendant's thoughts

were disordered, pointing to defendant's actions after the attack.          Despite

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                                         3
defendant's compromised mental state, Simring opined defendant "has always

been grounded in reality" and was aware of his conduct and its consequences

during the commission of the crime. Defendant told Simring he started stalking

the victim around September or October 2018.

                                      II.

      On January 10, 2019, defendant was charged by indictment with

first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3 (count one);

second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-l(b)(l) (count two);

fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count

three); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(d) (count four); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-l(b)(2)

(count five); third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1)

(count six); and fourth-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) (count seven).

      After a jury trial from June through August 2021, defendant was convicted

of all counts. He was sentenced on October 1, 2021. 1 The trial court merged

counts two, three, four, and five into count one and sentenced defendant on the

attempted-murder conviction to a twenty-year prison term subject to the No

1
   On October 19, 2021, the trial court issued an amended judgment of
conviction.
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                                       4
Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court sentenced defendant

on the hindering conviction to a five-year prison term with a two-and-a-half-year

period of parole ineligibility, and on the stalking conviction to an eighteen -

month prison term. The sentences for hindering and stalking were ordered to be

served consecutively to the sentence imposed on the attempted murder

conviction.

    This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contentions for our

consideration:

              POINT I

              OVER DEFENSE OBJECTION, THE JURY
              INSTRUCTIONS    TOLD   THE JURY      TWO
              COMPLETELY CONTRADICTORY THINGS: (1)
              OVER AND OVER, THAT THE JURY SHOULD
              CONVICT DEFENDANT IF THE STATE SIMPLY
              PROVED ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A GIVEN
              CRIME AGAINST HIM, WITH NO REFERENCE TO
              THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE INSANITY
              DEFENSE, AND (2) TWICE, THAT IF THE JURY
              BELIEVED THE STATE HAD PROVED ALL THE
              ELEMENTS OF A CRIME, THE JURY SHOULD
              THEN CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
              FOR THAT CRIME. WITH NO WAY TO
              DETERMINE WHICH OF THOSE INSTRUCTIONS
              WAS    FOLLOWED,     THE    DEFENDANT'S
              CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE
              MATTER REMANDED FOR RETRIAL.

              POINT II

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                                       5
THE JUDGE'S RESPONSE TO A JUROR WHO
ASKED ON THE DAY THAT DELIBERATIONS
BEGAN WHETHER HE COULD BE EXCUSED
FROM JURY SERVICE IN ORDER TO CATCH A
PLANE THE NEXT DAY WAS UNDULY
COERCIVE OF A VERDICT.    (NOT RAISED
BELOW).

POINT III

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
AND AN IMPARTIAL JURY WERE VIOLATED
WHEN AN EMPLOYEE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE OVERHEARD ONE JUROR SAY TO TWO
OTHERS, ABOUT DEFENDANT, "HE HAS BIGGER
PROBLEMS THAN HIS HAIR," AND THE JUDGE
REFUSED TO VOIR DIRE THE JURORS IN
QUESTION WITH ANY SPECIFIC[I]TY ABOUT
THE REMARK—CHOOSING INSTEAD MERELY
TO ASK THEM IF THEY HAD DISCUSSED ANY
"TESTIMONY."   (RAISED BY PROSECUTOR
BELOW; NOT RAISED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL
BELOW).

POINT IV

THE CONVICTION FOR FOURTH-DEGREE
STALKING SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE.

POINT V

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE.

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                                       III.

      We first address defendant's contention the jury charge was contradictory,

making it impossible to determine whether the jury considered the defense of

insanity. Defendant does not challenge the substance of the judge's insanity

defense instructions.    Rather, he challenges the sequencing of the jury

instructions in which the court explained the elements of each offense before

addressing the elements of the insanity affirmative defense. Defendant contends

"the jury was told over and over to convict defendant if the State merely proved

all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, with no mention at that

point of the need to deliberate on insanity before rendering a verdict."

      We are unpersuaded by defendant's sequencing argument.               Nothing

precludes a trial judge from instructing the jury on the alleged offenses before

instructing it on a defendant's proffered affirmative defense. Reading the charge

as a whole—as we must, Berberian v. Lynn, 355 N.J. Super. 210, 219 (App. Div.

2002)—we are satisfied the jury instructions relating to the insanity defense

augmented the instructions on the substantive offenses that were given first, and

did not, as defendant claims, contradict them.

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the governing legal principles.

"'An essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and

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                                        7
understandable instructions.'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015)

(quoting State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997)). Contradictory jury charges

generally constitute reversible error, because when a jury is given contradictory

instructions, the court cannot determine which of the competing instructions the

jury applied. See State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 530 (1991) (citing State v.

Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 433 (1991)). Importantly, for purposes of this appeal,

when determining whether a charge is ambiguous or misleading, the reviewing

court should read the charge in its entirety. See State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 324

(2005) (quoting State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 317 (1960)). As our Supreme

Court emphasized in State v. Jordan, "all that is necessary is that the charge as

a whole be accurate." 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997) (emphasis added) (citing Largey

v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 206 (1988)).

      We note that early in the jury charge the trial court addressed the concept

of diminished capacity. 2    The trial court explained the jury must consider

2
  "[D]iminished capacity refers to evidence that can negate the presence of an
essential mental element of the crime. . . ." State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 98
(1997) (citing State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 600-01 (1987)). "A jury
considers evidence of diminished capacity in relation to the State's burden to
prove the essential elements of the crime." Ibid. (citing State v. Harris, 141 N.J.
525, 555 (1995)). "Insanity, by contrast, is an affirmative defense that a
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 99 (citing
Harris, 141 N.J. at 552).
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                                        8
"[e]vidence alleging that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or

defect." The court continued:

            In considering the State's burden of proof, which is to
            prove every element of the charged offense beyond a
            reasonable doubt, you must consider and weigh all of
            the evidence of defendant's mental state, including that
            offered as evidence of mental disease or defect, in
            determining whether or not the State has proven beyond
            a reasonable doubt that [defendant] acted with the
            requisite state of mind forming any element of the
            offenses charged in the indictment.

            In making this decision, you must give the defendant
            the benefit of any reasonable doubt about whether his
            mental function was such as to render him incapable of
            acting with the required state of mind or about whether
            he did, in fact, act with the required state of mind.

            In other words, you must determine whether, despite
            the evidence of mental disease or defect, the State has
            proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
            acted with the requisite state of mind forming any
            element of the offenses charged in the indictment.

      After discussing diminished capacity, the court addressed each crime

charged in the indictment, along with their relevant lesser-included offenses. At

the end of the instruction on each offense, the court repeated an instruction

identical to or to the same effect as the following:

            If you find that the State has proven each element
            beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
            defendant guilty. If you find that the State has failed to
            prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you

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                                        9
             must find defendant not guilty of the charge of
             aggravated assault by causing or attempting to cause
             bodily injury with a deadly weapon.

      The gravamen of defendant's contention on appeal is the trial court

repeatedly instructed the jurors that they "must find defendant guilty" without

regard to the insanity defense. But that argument isolates portions of the final

jury instructions. After instructing the jury on the elements of each applicable

offense, the trial court proceeded to instruct on the insanity defense, explaining

in pertinent part: 3

             If you find that the State has proved all the elements of
             the crime and the defendant's participation therein
             beyond a reasonable doubt, and if you also find that the
             defendant has established the defense of insanity by a
             preponderance of the credible evidence, your verdict
             must be not guilty by reason of insanity, and you shall
             so report and declare your verdict.

                       ....

             Again, you may return one of three verdicts: [n]ot
             guilty, guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity.

3
   As noted, defendant does not challenge the substance of the trial court's
instructions regarding the insanity defense, which followed the Model Jury
Charge. We therefore need not reproduce the entirety of the insanity -defense
instructions that were given to the jury.

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                                       10
      We presume the jury listened to and followed all instructions before

reaching a verdict on any of the charged offenses. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295,

390 (1996); State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 271 (1969). Indeed, at the risk of

stating the obvious, there was no opportunity for the jury to deliberate before

the court completed its final instructions. 4 It follows the jury was at no time

deliberating without having been fully instructed on the insanity defense.

      In sum, we reject defendant's contention the jury instructions were

"contradictory" making it unclear which "set" of directions the jury was to

follow. There was only one set of instructions, covering the gamut of relevant

issues pertaining to the substantive offenses and the insanity defense.

4
   We add the jury was instructed not to deliberate or render any decision until
it had received its final instructions. The judge instructed the jury:

                   Following summations you will receive your
            final instructions on the law from me and you will then
            retire to consider your verdict.

                   You are not to form or express an opinion on this
            case, but are to keep an open mind until you've heard
            all of the testimony, have heard summations, have had
            the benefit of my instructions as to the applicable law,
            and have been instructed to begin your deliberations.
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                                      11
                                        IV.

      We next address defendant's contention—raised for the first time on

appeal—the trial court impermissibly pressured a juror into delivering a verdict.

At the charge conference, the court and counsel were advised juror number four

asked court staff whether the trial would conclude in time for him to make a

scheduled flight for a vacation. During voir dire, the juror brought his scheduled

vacation to the court's attention, at which time the court informed him he would

not be excused. Both parties agreed at the charge conference the court should

address the juror's timing question to guard against the possibility he might

simply leave for vacation. The court brought the juror into the courtroom and

informed him: "you're not going to be excused. If deliberations are done by—

before the time your flight leaves, then you're fine. If they're not done, you're

going to have to cancel that flight, you're going to miss it."

      Juror number four was the only juror in the courtroom.            No such

instruction was included in the final jury charge. Defense counsel did not object

to the way the trial court handled the situation.

      The jury deliberated for approximately two and a half hours that day. Late

in the day, it sent a note to the court asking to review medical records and

testimony transcripts. The court informed the jury no transcripts were available.

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                                       12
Instead, they would have to re-listen to the testimony. The court instructed the

jury to renew their request in the morning if they wanted to hear the playback

testimony. The next day, the jury deliberated for approximately three and a half

hours before delivering its verdict. It did not renew its request for playback

testimony.

      The law is well-settled a trial court should not put undue pressure on a

jury to return a verdict. State v. Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219, 238-43 (2007); State v.

Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 397-403 (1980) (discontinuing the use of "Allen5

charge[s]," finding them "inherently coercive" because they "usually admonish[]

specifically and pointedly only those [jurors] in the minority to reconsider their

beliefs in light of the adverse position held by the majority"). Defendant's

reliance on Figueroa, however, is misplaced, as the circumstances in that case

are starkly different from the present circumstances.

      In Figueroa, "shortly before 2:25 p.m., the jury sent the court a note

advising that 'we cannot unanimously agree on the verdict.'" Id. at 226. In

response, the court gave a supplemental instruction that included the following

admonition: "I got to be here tomorrow, I got to be here Friday. I got nothing

5
   As set forth in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), an Allen charge
is a supplement charge given to a deadlocked jury to encourage a final verdict.
                                                                            A-0600-21
                                       13
going on Saturday, and Giants are playing away on Sunday, so we will be here

as long as it takes you to go through this process." Id. at 227. Defense counsel

immediately objected to the instruction. Ibid.

      The Supreme Court concluded the supplemental charge was unduly

coercive for failing to "remind[] the jurors 'not [to] surrender your honest

conviction as to the weight or effect on the evidence solely because of the

opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.'"

Id. at 240 (second alteration in original) (quoting Model Jury Charges

(Criminal), "Further Jury Deliberations" (1994)). The Court also held "[t]he

reference to the possibility that deliberations might continue th rough the

remainder of the week and into the weekend had the capacity to coerce the jury

into reaching a verdict that it might not otherwise have reached." Id. at 242.

The Court concluded that, "in light of the language the [trial] court chose and

the context in which the comments were made, it is likely that the jury did not

understand the comment about weekend deliberations in the manner in which

the court intended" and as a consequence the trial court "impermissibly coerced

the dissenting juror or jurors into reaching a verdict with which he or she did

not honestly agree." Id. at 242-43.

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                                      14
      In the matter before us, there was no supplemental instruction given to all

jurors. The colloquy, which occurred before the jury was charged and began its

deliberations, was with a single juror about a matter of trial administration.

Moreover, defense counsel did not object to the colloquy. We are satisfied the

manner in which the court addressed juror number four does not constitute error,

much less plain error "of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.

                                       V.

      We turn next to defendant's contention the trial court erred by conducting

an inadequate voir dire after some jurors were alleged to have commented on

testimony outside the courtroom. On the ninth day of trial, a prosecutor's office

employee claimed to have overheard juror number nine say "[defendant] has

bigger problems than his hair" 6 to jurors number three and eight after the court

had adjourned for the day. The court took testimony about the incident from the

employee and watched the security camera footage allegedly showing a portion

of the encounter. The court then explained to counsel that it would bring in juror

6
  During testimony that day, a witness described messages he received from
defendant, including defendant's own references to insecurity about his hair.
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                                       15
number nine "to ask her whether or not she's formed an opinion about the guilt

or innocence of the defendant."

      The court asked juror number nine, "[o]n Thursday afternoon, July 1st,

when you were leaving the courthouse at the end of the day, did you make any

comments to any of the other jurors about any of the testimony that you heard

during the trial?" She replied "[n]o." When asked if she was sure of her answer,

she responded "I'm pretty sure." However, she recalled a comment she made to

another juror about a different juror's impatience. The State argued the trial

court's voir dire was insufficient because of the possibility juror number nine

did not perceive that a statement about defendant's problems was a "comment

on the testimony." Defendant took no position. The trial court stated,

            if I have all three jurors, including the allegedly
            offending juror saying that nothing was discussed,
            denying it, well then how do I make a determination
            here? Do I excuse all three based upon what someone
            may have overheard and may have seen? I don't know
            if I'm going to do that.

      The trial court next called juror number eight into the courtroom. When

asked whether any juror commented on testimony on July 1, juror number eight

said "[n]o, Your Honor." The court asked juror number three the same question

and he gave the same answer: "[n]o." After juror number three was excused

from the courtroom, the State renewed its argument that the court's questioning

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                                      16
was insufficient. The court declined to take any further action, noting that while

it did not question the credibility of the employee who reported the incident, a

review of the surveillance video revealed minor inconsistencies in her

recollection. The court explained:

            [F]or me to probe [j]uror [n]umber [nine] deeper is to
            take the risk of triggering exactly what we're trying to
            avoid, subjecting [j]uror [n]umber [nine] to an
            interrogation as to what she may have said or not said,
            and actually asking her specifically did you make a
            comment to the effect of the defendant in this case has
            bigger problems than his hair, when we don't know
            exactly what was said.

      On appeal, defendant contends the voir dire of the jurors falls short of the

"specific" and "searching" inquiry that is required under State v. R.D., 169 N.J.

551, 560 (2001). We disagree. In R.D., our Supreme Court addressed when and

how a trial court must conduct "voir dire of a juror allegedly in possession of

extraneous information mid-trial." Ibid. The Court explained a trial judge

            should inquire into the specific nature of the extraneous
            information, and whether the juror intentionally or
            inadvertently has imparted any of that information to
            other jurors. Depending on the juror's answers to
            searching questions by the court, the court must then
            determine whether it is necessary to voir dire
            individually other jurors to ensure the impartiality of
            the jury.

            [Ibid.]

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                                       17
      Our Supreme Court cautioned "[i]n some instances . . . it would be more

harmful to voir dire the remaining jurors because, in asking questions,

inappropriate information could be imparted." Id. at 561. The Court added that

to "facilitate appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard," the trial

court should explain its determination on the record. Id. at 560-61.

      Here, the trial court individually questioned the jurors involved and

explained why it did not conduct the additional voir dire requested by the State.

The court concluded more direct questioning on whether juror number nine

commented on defendant's concern about his hair would "risk [] triggering

exactly what we're trying to avoid." We are satisfied the trial court adequately

explained why it carefully limited the questions it posed to the jurors. In these

circumstances, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion, especially

considering that defense counsel did not request additional voir dire of any of

the jurors and did not move to excuse them from the panel.

                                       VI.

      Defendant next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

judgment of acquittal on the stalking charge. After the State rested its case, but

before Vo's testimony and Simring's rebuttal testimony, defendant moved for

acquittal, arguing the State "failed to make out a prima facie case for each of the

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                                       18
charges brought." Regarding the stalking count, counsel argued defendant could

not be convicted merely for following and messaging another person on social

media, as he was "quasi invited" to view the victim's social media by her

acceptance of his "friend request." Defendant also asserted the victim was

unaware of his physical stalking attempts. Therefore, defendant argued, the

State failed to prove the victim was reasonably "fearful because none of the

conversations . . . ever talked about harm, hurt, ill wishes, or anything."

      Looking at the "totality of the evidence," the trial court determined there

was sufficient evidence to support the stalking charge. It found defendant's

messages "demonstrate[d] an alarming disturbing infatuation at the very least

with [the victim] . . . that goes beyond simply expressing a romantic interest, or

expressing disappointment in being rejected."

      Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion for acquittal is de novo.

State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 593-94 (2014). "We must determine whether,

based on the entirety of the evidence and after giving the State the benefit of all

its favorable testimony and all the favorable inferences drawn from that

testimony, a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at

594 (citing State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967)).

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                                       19
        Our own review of the record confirms the State presented evidence that

defendant was obsessed with the victim; co-workers knew about this obsession

and discussed it with defendant; defendant attempted to contact the victim

through third parties; and defendant visited the victim's neighborhood twice in

the late hours of the night or early hours of the morning. Giving the State the

benefit of favorable inferences, this evidence was more than sufficient to prove

defendant engaged in a course of conduct that would concern a reasonable

person.

        Nor are we persuaded by defendant's contention "a 'reasonable person'

would not fear what they do not know exists." 7 In H.E.S. v. J.C.S., we ruled that

"in order to determine that a defendant is guilty of stalking, it is irrelevant

whether the target is aware of the conduct as it occurs or whether it is discovered

after the fact." 349 N.J. Super. 332, 351 (App. Div. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in

7
    The stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b), provides:

              A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth
              degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a
              course of conduct directed at a specific person that
              would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety
              or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional
              distress.

              [(Emphasis added).]
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                                        20
part on other grounds, 175 N.J. 309 (2003)). The Supreme Court affirmed,

holding "[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is whether a reasonable person in [the

victim's] situation, knowing what [she] knew about [the defendant] under the

totality of the circumstances, would have feared bodily injury as a result of his

alleged speech and conduct." Id. at 330. We are satisfied the evidence the State

presented before defendant's motion for acquittal meets that test.

                                       VII.

    Finally, we address defendant's sentencing contentions. Defendant argues,

"[t]here is no doubt that this was a serious case, but defendant was entitled to be

sentenced in accordance with the law, not be given a mechanistically-applied

aggregate sentence full of consecutive, maximum terms and which functionally

ignores the existence of two compelling mitigating factors."

    The scope of our review is limited. State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228

(2014). "[A]ppellate courts should not 'substitute their judgment for those of

our sentencing courts. . . .'" State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 347 (2019) (quoting

State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)). It is well-settled that "[o]nly when the

facts and law show 'such a clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial

conscience' should a sentence be modified on appeal." State v. Roach, 146 N.J.

208, 230 (1996) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-64 (1984)).

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                                       21
    When addressing a claim that the trial court abused its discretion in

weighing the relevant sentencing factors, we "assess the aggravating and

mitigating factors to determine whether they 'were based upon competent

credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010)

(quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65). "An appellate court is not to substitute its

assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors for that of the trial court." Ibid.

(citing State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989)). Furthermore, "[o]ur

decisions do not require . . . that the trial court explicitly reject each and every

mitigating factor argued by a defendant." Id. at 609 (citing State v. Pillot, 115

N.J. 558, 565-66 (1989)).

        Here, the trial court found four aggravating factors and two mitigating

factors applied.      The court found aggravating factors one, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(1) (the nature and circumstances of the crime); two, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(2) (the gravity and seriousness of the crime); three, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(3) (the risk of re-offense); and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (the

need for deterrence).    The court highlighted defendant's admission that he

stalked other women in the past, and a statement defendant made in a recorded

jail call, in which he intimated it would have been "better" if the victim was

dead.

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                                        22
    The court then discussed the mitigating factors proffered by defendant, but

gave weight to only two of them, factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) (the

defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity) and factor

fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) (the defendant was under twenty-six years of

age at the time of the commission of the offense). 8 The court afforded "some

weight to mitigating factor seven" because defendant had no criminal history.

The court placed "minimal" weight on the fact that defendant was under

twenty-six years old, explaining:

            As this [c]ourt has already stated and outlined, the facts
            and circumstances of this case involve a [twenty-two]-
            year[]-old man, a high school graduate and a college
            student, gainfully employed who carefully stalked the
            victim using different methods, planned his ambush of
            the victim, and then took steps to dispose of his weapon
            and hinder his apprehension.

                  His conduct was planned, calculated, and
            deliberate.   These were truly premeditated and
            malevolent acts that cannot be attributed to youth. This
            [c]ourt gives minimal weight to [mitigating] factor
            [fourteen].

8
  We note the original and corrected judgments of conviction fail to memorialize
the court found these mitigating factors. We glean the relevant information from
the sentencing hearing transcript. See Bieniek, 200 N.J. at 607 (noting the
appellate panel reviewed the trial court's decision based on the "sentencing
transcript"). On remand, the court should revise the judgment of conviction
accordingly.
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      The trial court afforded no weight to mitigating factors two, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(2) (the defendant did not contemplate his conduct would cause

serious harm); four, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4) (substantial grounds excusing or

justifying the defendant's conduct); eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) (the

defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur); and nine,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9) (the defendant's character and attitude indicate he is

unlikely to commit another offense).         The court explained defendant's

depression did not mitigate his conduct, noting "he knew exactly what he was

doing" and that the court had already determined defendant posed "an extremely

high risk" of re-offense.

    The    court   concluded   the   aggravating   factors   "substantially     and

overwhelmingly outweigh[ed] the qualitative weight of mitigating factors seven

and [fourteen]." We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's findings

concerning the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.

    Defendant further argues the case must be remanded because the trial court

did not make a separate statement explaining why the overall length of the

sentence imposed is warranted, pursuant to Torres, 246 N.J. at 270. The State

concedes Torres requires the trial court to provide an explicit statement

supporting the need for defendant's overall sentence. Accordingly, we remand

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for the limited purpose of having the trial court consider the fairness of the

overall length of defendant's prison sentence. On remand, the court shall also

amend the judgment of conviction to reflect the aggravating and mitigating

factors found by the sentencing judge. See supra note 10.

    Affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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