Court Opinion

ID: 9733970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:21:45.50773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.775037
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority, in this case of court-ordered, substituted service, refuses to accept the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the lawsuit against her as adequate excuse for failing to respond thereto and, accordingly, refuses to open a default judgment to allow the presentation of a valid defense. Because this is contrary to the equitable principles which are applicable to petitions to open default judgments, I dissent.
On April 26, 1980, an automobile owned by Theresa Looks and operated by Sherry Rose allegedly collided with another vehicle in which Joseph Romeo was riding as a passenger. An action was commenced by Romeo against Looks and Rose in Cumberland County by praecipe for writ of sum*628mons. The summons was issued, but it was not served on Theresa Looks. Instead, it was served on her mother, Charlotte Looks, by deputized service in York County. Theresa Looks did not live with her mother. A complaint in the action was subsequently filed on August 9, 1982, but all attempts to effect personal service on Theresa Looks in York and Snyder Counties were unsuccessful. When Looks could not be found for more than a year thereafter, Romeo petitioned the trial court in Cumberland County for leave to serve Looks by substituted service under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a)(5). The court granted the petition and directed that service be made by serving (1) the Secretary of the Commonwealth; (2) the Department of Motor Vehicles; (3) Charlotte Looks, the defendant’s mother; (4) the defendant’s insurance carrier, Federal Kemper Insurance Co., and its adjustor, J.T. Tomalty; and (5) G. Thomas Miller, Esquire, counsel for the insurance company.1 Romeo was also ordered to publish notice of the action in newspapers of general circulation in the areas of York, Pennsylvania and East Rutherford, New Jersey. Service was effected by Romeo as ordered by the court. The same persons were later served with notice of intent to enter default judgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.1, and the notice of intent was also advertised in the areas of York, Pennsylvania and East Rutherford, New Jersey. A default judgment was subsequently entered against Looks on November 5, 1984. Less than a week later, an investigator employed by the law firm of McNees, Wallace & Nurick, which represented Federal Kemper, was able to make contact with Looks in Florida. By telephone he told her of the lawsuit and the judgment which had been entered against her.
On November 21, 1984, Looks filed a petition to open the-default judgment. She alleged that she had not received notice of the action and, therefore, had been unable to respond to it. She also alleged that she had a defense to the action in that she had not been driving her car and had *629not been present at the time of the accident. Finally, she alleged that Sherry Rose, the driver, had been on her own business and had not been acting as Looks’s agent. Depositions were taken in which Looks testified that she had not received actual notice of the Romeo action and had had no knowledge thereof until after judgment had been entered. The trial court found the following facts:
Looks is a horse groom. Because of the peripatetic nature of her employment, she is rarely in one location for more than a few months at a time, though for the past ten years Florida has been her home base.
On April 27, 1980, the day of the accident, Looks’ father died. Tensions in the Looks family grew, and Looks left home. Looks was unable to be located until 1984 when the combined efforts of a private investigator, Looks’ friends in the horse racing industry, and Looks’ mother induced her to contact her attorneys. By this time, however, a default judgment had been entered against her.
The trial court refused to accept Looks’s testimony that she had had no knowledge of the pending action and found, instead, that she should have received actual notice of the suit. Therefore, the court concluded, her default was unreasonable and could not be excused. Looks appealed.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the substituted service ordered by the trial court was reasonably calculated to give actual notice to Looks, the defendant named in the action. The service of the complaint upon Looks, therefore, was valid. Noetzel v. Glasgow, Inc., 338 Pa.Super. 458, 469, 487 A.2d 1372, 1377-1378 (1985). See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a). See also: Stateside Machinery Co., Ltd. v. Alperin, 591 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir.1979). The validity of the substituted service was not impaired by Looks’s failure to receive actual notice of the pending litigation. See: Noetzel v. Glasgow, Inc., supra 338 Pa.Super. at 469, 487 A.2d at 1377-1378; Action Industries, Inc. v. Wiedeman, 236 Pa.Super. 447, 458 n. 11, 346 A.2d 798, 804 n. 11 (1975). See also: Stateside Machinery Co., Ltd. v. Alperin, supra *630at 241; McCully-Smith Associates, Inc. v. Armour and Co., 358 F.Supp. 331, 333 (W.D.Pa.1973). Whether or not Looks received actual notice of the pending litigation, therefore, the default judgment was valid and was not subject to being stricken.
The fact that the substituted service directed by the court was reasonably calculated to give notice of the pending litigation, however, did not render the judgment immune from a petition to open the default judgment. Valid service does not conclusively show, without more, that the defendant had actual knowledge of the suit. See: Provident Credit Corp. v. Young, 300 Pa.Super. 117, 125, 446 A.2d 257, 261 (1982). Thus, “even where proper service is found, a reasonable excuse for the default may still exist and ... that determination must be made in conjunction with an examination of the other requirements of the tripartite test.” American Express Co. v. Burgis, 328 Pa.Super. 167, 181, 476 A.2d 944, 951 (1984) (Brosky, J. Concurring).
A petition to open a default judgment is addressed to the equitable powers of the court and is a matter of judicial discretion. Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 505 Pa. 90, 93, 477 A.2d 471, 472 (1984). Ordinarily, three factors must coalesce before a default judgment can be opened: “(1) the petition to open must be promptly filed; (2) the failure to appear or file a timely answer must be excused; and (3) the party seeking to open the judgment must show a meritorious defense.” McCoy v. Public Acceptance Corp., 451 Pa. 495, 498, 305 A.2d 698, 700 (1973). However,
a court should not blinder itself and examine each part [of the tripartite test] as though it were a water-tight compartment, to be evaluated in isolation from other aspects of the case. Instead the court should consider each part in light of all the circumstances and equities of the case. Only in that way can a chancellor act as a court of conscience.
Provident Credit Corp. v. Young, supra 300 Pa.Super. at 131, 446 A.2d at 264. Moreover, the rules authorizing a default judgment were not meant to allow a plaintiff to *631secure a judgment without the attendant difficulties of litigation, but rather were aimed at preventing a dilatory defendant from impeding the plaintiffs efforts to establish a claim. Raymond J. Brusco Funeral Home v. Sicilia, 277 Pa.Super. 115, 123, 419 A.2d 688, 692 (1980). Nevertheless, a trial court’s refusal to open a default judgment will not be reversed absent an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse of discretion. Balk v. Ford Motor Co., 446 Pa. 137, 140, 285 A.2d 128, 131 (1971).
That Looks’s petition to open the judgment was promptly filed is without question in this appeal. The petition was filed only sixteen days after the default judgment had been entered, and ten days after appellant was contacted by the law firm’s investigator. Appellant has also alleged the rather compelling defense, if proved, that her car was being driven by another person, not her agent, at the time of the accident. The remaining issue and the one causing the controversy in the trial court is whether appellant offered a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear and file a timely answer to the complaint.
The law is clear in this and other jurisdictions that “although service of process may be good, nevertheless, a person may assert lack of knowledge of the suit for reasons other than improper service in seeking to have a default judgment opened.” Donatucci v. Utterback, 264 Pa.Super. 49, 52, 398 A.2d 1051, 1052 (1979). See also: Brown v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 314 Pa.Super. 78, 81, 460 A.2d 773, 775 (1983) (absence of actual notice that a complaint has been filed sufficient to require the opening of default judgment); Provident Credit Corp. v. Young, supra, 300 Pa.Super. at 125, 446 A.2d at 261 (valid return of service does not invariably demonstrate actual knowledge of suit); Maurice Goldstein Co., Inc. v. Margolin, 248 Pa.Super. 162, 165, 374 A.2d 1369, 1371 (1977) (proof of service does not preclude a defendant from proving lack of notice).
In Donatucci v. Utterback, supra, a default judgment was entered against defendants who had failed to respond *632to the plaintiffs complaint. The defendants filed a petition to open the judgment, arguing that although “the sheriffs return of service of the complaint was regular on its face,” they “had no notice of the action until they were advised by their attorney that judgment had been entered against them.” Id.., 249 Pa.Superior Ct. at 51, 398 A.2d at 1052. Because the defendants admitted the validity of the service, the trial court found that the default could not be excused by a failure to receive actual notice and denied the requested relief. On appeal, this Court reversed. Because the trial court had decided the case “solely on the basis that good service was admitted,” the Superior Court remanded to afford the defendants “an opportunity to offer evidence of lack of knowledge of the suit in order to establish the reason for their failure to file an answer to the complaint within the period of time allowed for that purpose.” Id. 264 Pa.Super. at 52, 398 A.2d at 1052. Although Donatucci came before the Superior Court in a slightly different procedural posture than the instant case, the import of the Donatucci decision is clear. , Even though service is valid, the failure to receive actual knowledge of the suit is an adequate excuse for the default.
Other jurisdictions adhere to the same principle. See, e.g., Rossten v. Wolf, 14 Ill.App.2d 322, 144 N.E.2d 757 (1957) (defendants’ lack of knowledge of suit may excuse default, notwithstanding valid.substituted service); Fitzgerald v. Brown, 168 Ind.App. 586, 344 N.E.2d 309 (1976) (lack of actual notice of the proceedings is sufficient to justify opening default judgment); National Car Rental v. S & D Leasing, Inc., 89 Mich.App. 364, 280 N.W.2d 529 (1979) (lack of actual notice of counterclaim is sufficient to set aside default judgment entered thereon); Graybar Electric Co., Inc. v. Rice, 287 S.C. 518, 339 S.E.2d 883 (1986) (defendant’s lack of actual knowledge of lawsuit excused default, notwithstanding valid service of process); Plumley v. May, 140 W.Va. 889, 87 S.E.2d 282 (1955) (Florida resident’s lack of actual knowledge of lawsuit excused default, notwithstanding valid service of process made pursuant to West Virginia non-resident motorist statute).
*633The critical issue in the analysis, then, is whether Theresa Looks had actual knowledge of the suit commenced against her by Joseph Romeo. There is in this record no evidence whatsoever that appellant had knowledge of the litigation pending against her. She testified in depositions regarding her nomadic existence as a horse groom and said that she had not received actual notice of the suit and did not learn of it until after a default judgment had been entered against her. She said that she and her mother had had some differences and were not close, that her mother did not know where to reach her, and that, on the several occasions when she had called her mother, she was not told that a suit was pending against her.2 Representatives of Federal Kemper also testified that appellant’s whereabouts were unknown to them and that they were unable to find or contact her until after a default judgment had been entered against her. This evidence was uncontradicted. The trial court nevertheless rejected appellant’s testimony and determined, without any evidence to support its finding, that appellant had had actual knowledge because her mother must have told her of the pending litigation. This finding was wholly speculative and was unsupported by any evidence. It was, in my judgment, an abuse of discretion. All the testimony was that Looks did not have actual notice or knowledge of the Romeo action. There was not one iota of evidence to the contrary.3
*634The trial court’s determination that appellant’s testimony was not credible was based upon an examination of her deposition testimony. The court did not have the opportunity to observe Looks as she testified, and its review of her testimony was limited to a review of the same typewritten transcript which is now before this Court. “Although a determination of credibility is in the first instance within the prerogative of the trial court, even when based upon deposition evidence, this does not foreclose an appellate court from scrutinizing the identical evidence to determine if the ruling entered is supported by the record.” American Express Co. v. Burgis, supra 328 Pa.Super. at 172, 476 A.2d at 947. Appellate courts are not bound by findings of a trial court which are wholly lacking in evidence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 215, 469 A.2d 137, 139 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482, 486, 380 A.2d 1238, 1240 (1977).
Because the record in the instant case contains no evidence that Looks had actual knowledge of the Romeo lawsuit, I would hold that her default was adequately explained and that the trial court, by refusing nevertheless to excuse it, committed an abuse of discretion. Because Looks also has a compelling defense to appellee’s action and acted promptly to open the default judgment after learning of it, I would reverse the trial court and order the judgment opened to allow her to present a defense to the cause of action stated against her by Romeo.
In reaching this conclusion, I am guided in part by the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s observations in Kraynick v. *635Hertz, 443 Pa. 105, 277 A.2d 144 (1971), where the Court said:
In determining whether a default judgment is to be opened and a defendant let into a defense, we bear in mind two principles of the law: (a) that the entry of a judgment by default finds its authority in the law (Pa.R. C.P. §§ 1037, 1047, 1511), 12 P.S. Appendix and (b) that, even though authorized by the law, such judgments are subject to opening if equitable considerations so demand. In determining whether a judgment by default should be opened, we must ascertain whether there are present any equitable considerations in the factual posture of the case which require that we grant to a defendant against whom the judgment has been entered an opportunity to have his [or her] “day in court” and to have the cause decided upon the merits. In so doing, we act as a court of conscience.
Id., 443 Pa. at 111, 277 A.2d at 147. And again:
“The true purpose of the entry of a default is to speed the cause thereby preventing a dilatory or procrastinating defendant from impeding the plaintiff in the establishment of his claim. It is not procedure intended to furnish an advantage to the plaintiff so that a defense may be defeated or a judgment reached without the difficulty that arises from a contest by the defendant.”
Id., 443 Pa. at 111, 277 A.2d at 147, quoting Coggin v. Barfield, 150 Fla. 551, 554, 8 So.2d 9, 11 (1942).
A court of conscience, as this Court is called upon now to act, should most certainly open the default judgment in this case. The default judgment was entered against the owner of a vehicle which was alleged to have been involved in a collision at a time when the owner was not present and while her vehicle was being operated by another person for such other person’s purposes. The litigation was undefended, thereby resulting in a default judgment, because the owner of the vehicle was unaware that an action had been commenced against her. I cannot imagine any scenario *636more compelling of equitable relief than the scenario presented by the instant case.
Therefore, I dissent. I would reverse, order the default judgment opened, and remand for further proceedings.
McEWEN, J., joins.

. The order was subsequently amended to remove the requirement of service upon G. Thomas Miller, Esquire.

. Looks also testified that Sherry Rose had had permission to use her car whenever Rose wanted it, that Rose did not tell her that the car had been in an accident, that the car had not been damaged, that she learned of a possible accident when a policeman asked to see her car, and that the policeman, after examining her car, told her that he didn’t believe the car had been in an accident. Shortly thereafter, she and Sherry Rose lost touch with each other, and Looks forgot about the incident. Even if, as the trial court found, appellant knew or should have known that her car had been in an accident, it cannot be inferred therefrom that she also had knowledge that she had been sued by Romeo, whom she had never met and who was a total stranger to her.

. The majority, in its zeal to sustain this default judgment, has conjured up various possibilities by which the defendant might have obtained such knowledge. In fact, however, the majority has been unable to point to any evidence whatsoever to show that appellant had *634actual notice of the litigation or that she acquired knowledge thereof at any time prior to the entry of judgment. The entire premise for denying to appellant an opportunity to defend this action, therefore, is the majority's speculation that (1) because she knew there had been an accident; and (2) because she was able to be found after a default judgment had been entered, she must have learned of the Romeo action prior to the entry of the default judgment. This reasoning, in my judgment, is not only specious but entirely speculative. It is a wholly inadequate reason for denying to appellant an opportunity to defend the action which was brought against her as a sequel to an accident in which her vehicle was involved while being operated, in her absence, by another person.