Court Opinion

ID: 9833606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:52:25.143033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:01.162282
License: Public Domain

On Further Motion for Rehearing.
Blalock Lumber Company has filed a further motion for rehearing, insisting that the cause should be rendered in their favor instead of remanded upon the ground that the eighth finding of fact is merely a conclusion of the court from other findings, and is therefore not a finding of fact against the existence of actionable fraud in conflict with the specific findings of fact which we held to embrace all of the elements of actionable fraud. A number of cases are cited, and it is urged that Brewster v. Forney, which we held controlling, is not in point.
In order to make our position clear, we hold that the decision in Brewster v. Forney is controlling, and we are bound by it, regardless of the force of the argument in support of the Blalock Company’s above contention. It is apparent from the opinion of Judge Kittrell, in the Brewster Case, that the Commission of Appeals took the same view that is now taken by the Blalock Company, and the same arguments were advanced. The question presented there was the con*801struction of a special issue verdict. The suit was for damages for the creation and maintenance of a nuisance.' The jury found generally that the erection and operation of the plant complained of was not a nuisance. This finding was based upon an erroneous definition of “nuisance.” Under other findings the jury found specifically every fact essential to constitute the operation of the plant a nuisance. The question presented, therefore, was in every essential particular the same as that presented here. We quote from Judge Kittrell’s opinion:
“In thus stating our conception of the law, we have not lost sight of the answer of the jury to the fourteenth special issue, to the effect that they did not believe the construction and operation of the plant constituted a nuisance.
“That question was immaterial, because answers to the preceding questions would have been, as they proved to be, all-sufficient as a basis for judicial action.
“While the jury in duty bound answered the question, their answer became of no value in view of preceding and succeeding questions, and should have been ignored. It was not a finding of fact, but an expression of opinion on the legal effect of the facts found.
“When the law, as old as the hornbooks, is applied to a number of the other answers above summarized, it is manifest that the plant as it was constructed and operated was, as regarded plaintiff, a nuisance, and no single contradictory answer, or any number of such answers, could lessen the force or change the legal effect of the previous findings.
“The situation is exactly the same as if a court were permitted to, and did, ask a jury if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in pursuance of a deliberately conceived design, and under such circumstances and in such a state of mind as to constitute ‘express malice,’ killed the deceased, and the jury were to answer in the affirmative, and were then, in response to the question whether they found the killing was murder in the first degree, to answer, ‘We believe not.’
“Under such circumstances, the latter inquiry would be immaterial and useless and the answer have no legal value.
“The answers preceding that made to the fourteenth issue made it clear as a matter of law that the acts complained of were a nuisance, and the court should have ignored all other issues and answers, and have so declared.”
In returning the case to the Commission, the Supreme Court wrote:
“Under the contradictory findings of the jury there was no warrant for rendering judgment against the plaintiff in the trial court. But this same condition, we think, precludes the rendition of judgment in his favor here. The jury found such facts as would constitute the operation of the defendant’s plant a nuisance. At the same time, however, under an incorrect definition in the court’s charge of a nuisance, it found its operation not to be a nuisance.
“Since it was essential to the plaintiff’s ease that the operation constitute a nuisance, with these contradictory findings on the question, we believe it best that the case be remanded for another trial according to the rules laid down in Sherman Gas & Electric Co. v. Belden, 103 Tex. 59,123 S. W. 119, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 237.”
The notation of the Supreme Court in disposing of the case is as follows:
“The judgments of the district court and Court of Civil Appeals are reversed for the reasons stated by us in our returning the case to the Commission of Appeals on its original report and quoted in the foregoing opinion. The case is remanded for further trial in accordance with the rules announced in Sherman Gas & Electric Co. v. Belden, 103 Tex. 59, 123 S. W. 119, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 237.”
It is manifest that the Supreme Court intended to lay down the definite rule that, where there is a general finding of fact though in the form of a conclusion, which would deny liability, it cannot be disregarded, although there are specific findings of fact which, taken together, conclusively establish liability.
The fact that in the Brewster Case the court had for construction jury findings, and in the present case we have findings by the trial court, it seems to us could make no material difference. The purpose of fact findings by the trial court and fact findings by the jury is the same, and we can see no valid reason why different principles should be applied in construing their meaning.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.