Court Opinion

ID: 9378798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 17:01:23.272727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.531111
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BOGDAN RADU,                             No. 22-16316

             Petitioner-Appellee,          D.C. No.
                                        4:20-cv-00246-
 v.                                           RM

PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON,
                                          OPINION
             Respondent-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Arizona
      Rosemary Márquez, District Judge, Presiding

       Argued and Submitted November 21, 2022
               San Francisco, California

                 Filed March 13, 2023

  Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Ryan D.
    Nelson and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

            Opinion by Judge R. Nelson;
         Concurrence by Chief Judge Murguia
2                          RADU V. SHON

                          SUMMARY *

                       Hague Convention

   The panel affirmed the district court’s order granting, on
a second remand, Bogdan Radu’s petition against
Persephone Johnson Shon for the return, pursuant to the
Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany.
    The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted
Radu’s petition. The district court found a grave risk of
psychological harm if the children were returned to Germany
in the custody of Radu, but it determined that those risks
would be mitigated if the children returned in Shon’s
temporary custody. The district court ordered Shon to return
with the children and retain full custody until the German
courts resolved the merits of the parties’ custody
dispute. On appeal, in Radu I, the panel vacated and
remanded for the district court to determine whether the
sole-custody measure would be enforceable in Germany.
    On remand, the district court held a second hearing. In a
second return order, the district court concluded that the
enforceability of the sole-custody remedy was uncertain but
was no longer necessary. Based on new evidence that a
German court would take months to resolve custody, the
district court held that ordering Shon to return with the
children to Germany, where the default rule was joint
custody, sufficiently ameliorated the risk of psychological
harm. Shon again appealed. The panel remanded for

*
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         RADU V. SHON                        3

reconsideration in light of Golan v. Saada, 142 S. Ct. 1880
(2022), which clarified that, where there is a grave risk that
a child’s return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm, consideration of ameliorative measures
is discretionary rather than mandatory.
    On remand, the district court ordered return based on the
existing record. Following Golan, the district court
exercised discretion to consider ameliorative measures. The
district court again stated that ordering Shon to return to
Germany with the children would ameliorate the risk of
psychological harm. Shon filed the current appeal. On a
limited remand, the district court issued a clarifying order.
    Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases
governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has
discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing
following remand and must exercise that discretion
consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the
second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the
factual record was fully developed.
    The panel held that, in making determinations about
German procedural issues, the district court neither abused
its discretion nor violated Shon’s due process rights by
communicating with the State Department and, through it,
the German Central Authority. The panel further held that
the Federal Rules of Evidence and its hearsay rules do not
apply to foreign law materials.
    Finally, the panel held that the record provided adequate
support for the district court’s fact findings underlying its
clarified return order, and the law-of-the-case doctrine did
not prevent the district court from revisiting its prior ruling
on grave risk. The panel therefore affirmed the district
4                        RADU V. SHON

court’s grant of the petition for the children’s return with the
ameliorative measures ordered by the district court.
    Concurring, Chief Judge Murguia wrote that she
concurred fully in the principal opinion. She wrote
separately to express her view that, in Radu I, the panel
should not have declined to allocate a burden of proof on the
reasonableness of an ameliorative measure. Chief Judge
Murguia wrote that a future panel should follow other
circuits and hold that, when a petitioner proffers a measure
to ameliorate the grave risk of harm, it is the petitioner’s
burden to establish that the measure is reasonably
appropriate and effective.

                         COUNSEL

Kelly A. Powers (argued) and Stephen J. Cullen, Miles &
Stockbridge PC, Washington, D.C.; Shaun P. Kenney, The
Kenney Law Firm PC, Tucson, Arizona; for Respondent-
Appellant.
Michelle E. Irwin (argued), Fenwick & West LLP, Seattle,
Washington; Rina Plotkin and Todd R. Gregorian, Fenwick
& West LLP, San Francisco, California; for Petitioner-
Appellee.
                        RADU V. SHON                        5

                         OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

    This is the third appeal in an international child custody
dispute between Persephone Johnson Shon and Bogdan
Radu over their minor children. While the family was
residing in Germany, Shon took the children to the United
States and has refused to return them. The Hague
Convention generally requires children to be returned to the
state of habitual residence so that country’s courts may
adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. We
previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first
order to return the children to Germany. See Radu v. Shon,
11 F.4th 1080 (9th Cir. 2021) [Radu I], vacated, 142 S. Ct.
2861 (2022), in light of Golan v. Saada, 142 S. Ct. 1880
(2022). Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Golan while we were considering Shon’s appeal of the
second return order, we also remanded that order for the
district court’s reconsideration. The district court then
granted the petition a third time. We now affirm.
                              I
                              A
    The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (Convention), Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, “address[es] ‘the problem of
international child abductions during domestic disputes.’”
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 4 (2014) (quoting
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010)). It aims “to secure
the prompt return of children wrongfully removed” and
“ensure that rights of custody and of access” are respected
across Contracting States. Convention Art. 1. All
6                       RADU V. SHON

signatories must “use the most expeditious procedures
available” to implement these goals. Convention Art. 2.
Contracting States must also create Central Authorities to
facilitate cooperation.        Convention Art. 6 & 7.
Domestically, the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (ICARA) implements the Convention’s rules, creates
the United States Central Authority, and gives our courts
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes under the Convention. 22
U.S.C. § 9001 et seq.
    “The Convention’s central operating feature is the return
remedy.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 9. This remedy is
“provisional” because it merely “fixes the forum for custody
proceedings” and leaves the merits to the country of habitual
residence. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the
Convention, courts “shall order the return” of “a child [who]
has been wrongfully removed or retained.” Convention Art.
12. Article 13 provides exceptions. Relevant here, the court
“is not bound to order the return” of a child if the party
opposing return establishes that “there is a grave risk that
[the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm.” Convention Art. 13(b). Under Article
13(b), courts have “the discretion to grant or deny return.”
Golan v. Saada, 142 S. Ct. 1880, 1892 (2022). That
discretion allows for the consideration of measures that
would ameliorate the grave risk. See id. at 1893.
                             B
    Radu and Shon married in 2011 in the United States.
Their older child, O.S.R., was born in the United States in
2013, and their younger child, M.S.R., was born in Germany
in 2016. Both children are citizens of the United States but
not Germany. From 2016 to 2019, Radu, Shon, and their
                        RADU V. SHON                        7

children lived in Germany. Shon took O.S.R. and M.S.R.
from Germany to the United States in June 2019. Shon and
the children have since lived with Shon’s parents in Arizona,
despite Radu’s wishes for the children to be brought back to
Germany.
                              1
    Radu petitioned for the children to be returned to
Germany in federal district court in Arizona in June 2020.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted
Radu’s petition.     The court found a grave risk of
psychological harm if the children were returned to Germany
in the custody of Radu. The court determined, however, that
those risks would be mitigated if the children returned to
Germany in Shon’s temporary custody. So the court ordered
Shon to return with the children and retain full custody until
the German courts resolved the merits of the custody dispute.
At that time, Gaudin v. Remis made the consideration of
ameliorative measures mandatory. See 415 F.3d 1028, 1035
(9th Cir. 2005) (“Courts applying ICARA have consistently
held that, before denying the return of a child because of a
grave risk of harm, a court must consider alternative
remedies that would allow both the return of the children to
their home country and their protection from harm.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    Shon appealed. We vacated and remanded for the
district court to determine whether the sole-custody measure
would be enforceable in Germany. See Radu I, 11 F.4th at
1089–90.
                              2
   On remand, the district court held a second hearing at
which Shon presented expert testimony and the parties
8                       RADU V. SHON

testified. Shon’s expert, a Germany-licensed attorney, stated
that the temporary sole-custody order would not be
enforceable because Germany does not recognize
ameliorative measures. He also testified that a German court
may take up to six months to decide custody because the
children would not be considered habitually resident in
Germany until then. Furthermore, because the children are
not German citizens, he testified that neither Shon nor Radu
could initiate German custody proceedings or obtain
protective measures from abroad.
    Shon testified that her savings would not cover travel or
living expenses in Germany but conceded that her parents,
who had assisted her financially during this case, had paid
for her plane tickets for her previous return from Germany.
She was also afraid of being arrested upon returning to
Germany but did not know of any pending legal matters at
that time. Radu testified that he would pay for airfare and
housing for Shon and their children pending the custody
determination.     He promised to maintain a separate
household and to cooperate with Shon. He also testified that
Germany has a child-protection agency that could ensure the
children’s safety if Shon became unavailable.
    The district court then contacted the State Department,
Office of Children’s Issues’ country officer for Germany,
who contacted the German Central Authority for the court.
The court did not receive a binding statement on the time
needed for a German court to determine custody. But the
German Central Authority cited Section 155 of the Act on
Proceedings in Family Matters and Matters of Non-
Contentious Jurisdiction, which provides for handling of
custody issues “in an expedited manner.” The German
Central Authority also confirmed that Germany has youth
                         RADU V. SHON                        9

welfare offices that may conduct home visits or take custody
of children if necessary.
    In a second return order, the district court concluded that
the enforceability of the sole-custody remedy was uncertain.
But that was no longer necessary because the district court
had considered the risk of psychological harm over too long
of a time period. Based on the new evidence that a German
court would take months to resolve custody, the court held
that ordering Shon to return with the children to Germany—
where the default rule was joint custody—sufficiently
ameliorated the risk of psychological harm.
    Shon again appealed. We stayed the appeal pending the
Supreme Court’s resolution of Golan and eventually
remanded for reconsideration in light of Golan’s
clarification that consideration of ameliorative measures is
discretionary rather than mandatory. See 142 S. Ct. at 1892–
93.
                              3
    The district court did not hold another hearing on the
second remand but ordered return based on the existing
record. Following Golan, the district court exercised
discretion to consider ameliorative measures. Relying on the
second return order’s analysis, the district court again stated
that ordering Shon to return to Germany with the children
would ameliorate the risk of psychological harm. It denied
Shon’s request for a new evidentiary hearing, partially
because there was no new evidence about Radu’s
interactions with the children and partially because a hearing
would contravene the Convention’s directive for expeditious
resolution.
10                      RADU V. SHON

    The present appeal arises from the third return order.
Given the parties’ uncertainty about aspects of the ordered
remedy, and unresolved logistical issues, we ordered a
limited remand while retaining jurisdiction to avoid further
delay. See Friery v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 1146,
1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (ordering “a limited remand to the
district court”).
    We directed the district court to clarify (1) its current
Article 13(b) grave-risk finding and ameliorative measure(s)
ordered, (2) whether Radu must pay for airfare, (3) whether
Radu must pay for separate living arrangements, (4) the
custody arrangements (sole or joint) while Shon was
temporarily residing in Germany, (5) the custody
arrangements if Shon is no longer able to legally reside in
Germany before a German court decides custody, (6) the
need to notify German child protective services upon the
children’s arrival, and (7) whether, if necessary, German
child protective services have jurisdiction to oversee the
children’s wellbeing.
    The district court answered those questions. First, it
explained that the grave risk of psychological harm arose
only if the children remained in Radu’s sole custody for a
longer time, and that no harm would arise if Shon and Radu
had joint custody or if Radu had sole custody for a limited
duration. Radu v. Shon, No. CV-20-00246-TUC-RM, 2023
WL 142908, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2023). Second, Shon
must pay for her and the children’s airfare back to Germany.
Id. at *3. Third, Radu must pay for separate living
arrangements because Shon would take unpaid leave and
could not work in Germany. Id. Fourth, the parties would
have joint custody, as German law provides, pending a final
custody determination. Id. Fifth, in the event Shon could
not remain until the merits decision, the children would enter
                        RADU V. SHON                       11

Radu’s physical custody. Id. Sixth, the court determined
that notifying German child protective services was
unnecessary. Id. Seventh, the court judicially noticed the
existence of jugendamt, the German child protective services
agency, and explained that the record suggests that the
agency would have authority over the children once they
arrive in Germany. Id.
    We asked for supplemental briefs about the clarification
order’s effect. The issues currently before us are whether the
district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing
during the second remand or the limited remand, refrained
from contacting the State Department, or ultimately
determined that the record supported its ameliorative
measure.
                              II
    The Convention is in force between the United States
and Germany. See Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 859 (9th
Cir. 2002). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and “review the district court’s factual determinations for
clear error, and the district court’s application of the
Convention to those facts de novo.” Flores Castro v.
Hernandez Renteria, 971 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2020).
                             III
                              A
    Shon contends that the district court should have held a
new evidentiary hearing during the second remand or the
limited remand. She relies on Gaudin’s instruction that
“[t]he questions before the district court on remand will be
whether a grave risk of harm now exists, and if so, whether
that risk can be minimized through an alternative remedy,”
12                      RADU V. SHON

415 F.3d at 1036, for her position that a new hearing is
necessary to determine the current conditions.
    Neither ICARA nor the Convention specify when a court
must hold an evidentiary hearing. ICARA instructs courts
to “decide the case in accordance with the Convention.” 22
U.S.C. § 9003(d). And the Convention directs courts to “act
expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.”
Convention Art. 11. It also permits a court to “order the
return of the child at any time” notwithstanding the other
provisions. Convention Art. 18 (emphasis added). We
accordingly review the district court’s decision not to hold a
new evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Under that
standard, we affirm the district court unless it commits a
legal error in interpreting the Convention, or clearly errs in
determining the facts from the record. See United States v.
Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1259 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
    Any categorical rule requiring new hearings would
contravene the Convention’s directive for expeditious
resolution. The district court is far better situated to
determine the exact procedures necessary—whether a
hearing or supplemental briefing, for example—to aid its
resolution of the case. A per se rule would impede that
flexibility with minimal upside. Under some circumstances,
a refusal to hold a new hearing could constitute an abuse of
discretion. But the district court here declined a third
evidentiary hearing because the evidence of Radu’s
treatment of the children—on which the court based its
ameliorative measure and grave-risk finding—had not
changed; Radu had not had contact with the children since
the earlier hearings. Under these circumstances, another
                             RADU V. SHON                               13

hearing would add little to a well-developed record and
needlessly delay proceedings. 1
    Our sister circuits agree. In March v. Levine, the
question presented was whether the district court improperly
granted summary judgment to a father petitioning for his
children’s return without allowing discovery or a hearing on
the merits. See 249 F.3d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth
Circuit affirmed. Recognizing that Convention cases are
unique, the court explained that “neither [the Convention nor
ICARA] expressly requires a hearing or discovery”; instead
they require “expeditious action.” Id. at 474. The court also
found persuasive that “courts in other Contracting States to
the treaty have also upheld summary proceedings on
review.”      Id. at 475 (discussing Australian court
proceedings).
    The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion in West
v. Dobrev, reasoning that Article 18’s permission to order
return at any time provides trial courts “a substantial degree
of discretion in determining the procedures necessary to
resolve a petition filed pursuant to the Convention and
ICARA.” 735 F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2013).
    We find these decisions persuasive and conclude that
Gaudin does not require otherwise. There, we said that the
lapse of time made it “unnecessary for us to evaluate the
merits of the district court’s finding that a grave risk of
psychological harm” existed five years ago. Gaudin, 415
F.3d at 1036. This was because the court should “consider

1
  Shon asserts that she would have presented a child psychology expert
at the new hearing. When Shon previously tried to introduce that expert
at the second hearing, she did not object to the district court’s exclusion
of the expert.
14                           RADU V. SHON

the effect of any possible remedies in light of circumstances
as they exist in the present.” Id. We did not, however,
specify the way the district court should consider present
circumstances or mandate a new evidentiary hearing upon
every remand.
    We now hold that, in cases governed by the Convention,
the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an
evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that
discretion consistent with the Convention. 2 The district
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third
evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully
developed.
                                    B
    Shon next asserts that the district court’s
communications with the State Department and the German
Central Authority were ex parte, resulted in hearsay
evidence, and violated Shon’s due process rights.
    We once “treat[ed] questions of foreign law as questions
of fact to be pleaded and proved.” de Fontbrune v. Wofsy,
838 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 2016). But Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 44.1 clarified that an interpretation of foreign law
“must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”
Accordingly, like any legal issue, “the court may consider
any relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the

2
  Contrary to Shon’s argument, we did not direct the district court to hold
a hearing on the limited remand. Even if the district court wrongly
interpreted our order as forbidding an evidentiary hearing, we did not
require one. Nor was one needed when the existing evidence already
sufficiently addressed the factual issues identified in our limited remand
order. Thus, any error would have been harmless.
                         RADU V. SHON                       15

Federal Rules of Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. Moreover,
“the court is not limited by material presented by the parties;
it may engage in its own research and consider any relevant
material thus found.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory
committee’s note to 1966 amendment. That said, “expert
testimony accompanied by extracts from foreign legal
materials has been and will likely continue to be the basic
mode of proving foreign law.” Universe Sales Co., Ltd. v.
Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999).
    Courts nonetheless have an “independent obligation to
adequately ascertain relevant foreign law, even if the parties’
submissions are lacking.” de Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 997.
Though international comity requires American courts to
“carefully consider a foreign state’s views about the meaning
of its own laws,” that deference has its limits. Animal Sci.
Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865,
1873 (2018). “The appropriate weight in each case . . . will
depend upon the circumstances; a federal court is neither
bound to adopt the foreign government’s characterization
nor required to ignore other relevant materials.” Id.
    Understanding the laws and procedures of another
country can be difficult—especially when trying to make
such determinations expediently, as the Convention directs.
And the State Department and foreign Central Authorities
are proper and useful resources when evaluating a foreign
legal landscape. See Convention Art. 7. A sister circuit, for
instance, has directed a district court “to make any
appropriate or necessary inquiries of the [foreign
government] . . . and to do so, inter alia, by requesting the
aid of the United States Department of State, which can
communicate directly with that foreign government.”
Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1999).
Indeed, we contemplated the district court’s ability to seek
16                       RADU V. SHON

assistance from the State Department when we remanded the
first return order. See Radu I, 11 F.4th at 1090–91.
     Shon does not contest any foreign legal conclusion but
challenges the methods the court used to determine German
procedural issues. Though a legal conclusion on foreign law
is reviewed de novo, see de Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 1000, we
have indicated that a district court’s selection of methods to
evaluate foreign law is discretionary. See Tobar v. United
States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
district court could “inquire further into the content of
Ecuadorian law” “in its discretion”). Accordingly, we
review the district court’s methods of foreign law research
for abuse of discretion. This deferential standard is
necessary to preserve the flexibility that Rule 44.1 affords
courts to research foreign law. And our de novo review of
the ultimate legal conclusion ensures that foreign legal issues
are treated like domestic ones.
    The district court neither abused its discretion nor
violated Shon’s due process rights by communicating with
the State Department and, through it, the German Central
Authority. “[I]ndependent judicial research” on a legal
question “does not implicate the judicial notice and ex parte
issues spawned by independent factual research.” de
Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 999; see also G&G Prods. LLC v.
Rusic, 902 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2018) (“formal notice” of
court’s intent to research foreign law not required). Nor do
the Federal Rules of Evidence and its hearsay rules apply to
foreign law materials, much as legal research on domestic
law cannot trigger evidentiary objections. See de Fontbrune,
838 F.3d at 999.
    Of course, “both trial and appellate courts are urged to
research and analyze foreign law independently,” Twohy v.
                         RADU V. SHON                       17

First Nat. Bank of Chi., 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1985);
see also de Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 997, and with due
consideration for the parties’ submissions. But here, the
district court did not view itself bound by information
received from the State Department; it properly considered
and weighed that information alongside the testimony of the
parties and Shon’s expert. Shon—who does not challenge
any of the legal conclusions that the district court reached—
fails to persuade that the district court abused its discretion
in the way it reached them.
                              C
    Finally, Shon challenged several factual findings
underlying the district court’s third return order and asserted
that the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibited the court from
revisiting its grave-risk finding. We review factual findings
for clear error, which occurs if “the finding is illogical,
implausible, or without support in inferences that may be
drawn from the facts in the record.” Doe v. Snyder, 28 F.4th
103, 106 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “While a district court has no obligation
under the Convention to consider ameliorative measures that
have not been raised by the parties, it ordinarily should
address ameliorative measures raised by the parties or
obviously suggested by the circumstances of the case . . . .”
Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1893.
    On remand, the district court clarified that the minor
children would be at a grave risk of psychological harm only
if they returned to Germany and remained in Radu’s sole
custody for years due to the cumulative nature of
psychological harm. Radu, 2023 WL 142908, at *2. If Shon
could not remain in Germany past the expiration of her
tourist visa (around ninety days), then the court found no
18                      RADU V. SHON

issue with Radu taking physical custody of the children for
a short time until the final custody determination is made by
German authorities. Id. Because no exception to return
would apply under those circumstances, the court ordered
the children’s return.
    Many of the specific findings that Shon first
challenged—such as the enforceability of sole custody as an
ameliorative measure and her parents’ willingness to travel
to Germany—are immaterial under the clarified return order,
which does not rely on these facts. As to the findings that
remain at issue, the record provides adequate support. See
Landis v. Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium Pub.
Facilities Dist., 11 F.4th 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2021) (“This
is deferential review; we reverse only if we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
    First, the record supports the district court’s
determination that the time frame in which a German court
would determine custody would be a few months rather than
years. The district court found that a merits decision would
be made within months. Radu, 2023 WL 142908, at *2.
Shon’s German law expert’s testimony supports this finding.
He testified that a German court would likely require the
children to live in Germany for up to six months before
determining custody but that the court would also have
discretion to make an earlier decision. And the district court
cited a German statute providing that the determination of
custody issues “shall have priority” and “shall be handled in
an expedited manner.” That the waiting period is likely to
be months instead of years is supported by the record.
                         RADU V. SHON                        19

    Second, the hearing testimony supports the court’s
determination that Shon could return with the children.
When asked during the hearing if she would accompany the
children, Shon answered, “Of course.” She also said that she
could take humanitarian leave of up to six months from her
job with her manager’s approval. Although Shon expressed
some financial concerns, the district court relied on other
evidence, such as her employment, lifestyle, and ability to
obtain her parents’ financial support. That the district court
ordered Radu to pay for a separate household for Shon and
the children, Radu, 2023 WL 142908, at *3, further
minimizes these concerns. Shon’s ability to remain in
Germany until the final custody decision is no longer
relevant: The district court clarified that no grave risk arises
if the children enter Radu’s physical custody for the
remaining time.
    Third, based on the lack of any evidence or testimony
about pending criminal charges in Germany, the court drew
the supported inference that none existed.
    Finally, the law-of-the-case doctrine did not prevent the
district court from revisiting its prior ruling on grave risk.
“[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine ‘merely expresses the
practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been
decided, not a limit to their power.’” Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (quoting
Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)). It
“applies most clearly where an issue has been decided by a
higher court.” Askins v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 899
F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2018). We did not decide the
grave-risk issue in the first appeal because Radu did not
challenge the district court’s finding, but we noted that “the
facts here do seem to be a borderline case whether an Article
13(b) finding is warranted.” Radu I, 11 F.4th at 1089. Even
20                             RADU V. SHON

though the district court found grave risk in its first return
order, it was free to revisit this ruling based on updated
evidence about the likely time frame for German courts to
decide the merits of the custody dispute. See Radu, 2023
WL 142908, at *2. As we have discussed, Gaudin instructs
district courts to decide whether grave risk exists based on
the current circumstances. 415 F.3d at 1036.
                                    IV
    The district court did not err in refusing to hold a new
evidentiary hearing or in consulting the State Department.
Adequate evidence supports the factual findings that Shon
challenges. We thus affirm the district court’s grant of the
petition for the children’s return with the ameliorative
measures ordered by the district court. 3
       AFFIRMED.

3
    Shon’s motion to stay the lower court action is denied as moot.
                         RADU V. SHON                        21

MURGUIA, Chief Judge, concurring:

    I concur fully in the principal opinion. I write separately
to express my view that, in Radu I, we should not have
“decline[d] to allocate a burden of proof on the
reasonableness of” an ameliorative measure. Radu v. Shon,
11 F.4th 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2021) [Radu I], cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 142 S. Ct. 2861 (2022). When we did so,
we noted: “Congress is capable of assigning burdens of
proof and has already done so under [the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”)]. We need not add
judicial constraints absent from ICARA or the [Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (“Convention”)].” Id. (citation omitted).
    It is true that the Convention and ICARA provide that
the petitioner has the burden to establish a prima facie case
of wrongful removal. See Golan v. Saada, 142 S. Ct. 1880,
1888–89 (2022). And both the Convention and ICARA then
shift the burden onto the respondent to prove that, if
returned, the removed children would be subject to a grave
risk of physical or psychological harm. See id. But neither
the Convention nor ICARA mentions measures that could
ameliorate such a grave risk. Id. at 1892. Rather,
ameliorative measures are a “judicial construct.” Danaipour
v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
    After further consideration, I now believe that when a
petitioner proffers a measure to ameliorate the grave risk of
harm, it should be the petitioner’s burden to establish that the
measure is reasonably appropriate and effective. Three of
our sister circuits have adopted this view, and we should
have adopted it in Radu I. See Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d
594, 611 (6th Cir. 2007); Acosta v. Acosta, 725 F.3d 868,
877 (8th Cir. 2013); Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 21. Placing this
22                     RADU V. SHON

burden on the petitioner does not preclude district courts
from considering, on their own, potential ameliorative
measures not raised by the parties that are “obviously
suggested by the circumstances of the case.” Golan, 142 S.
Ct. at 1893. It only assists district courts’ decisionmaking
and guides their discretion as to the measures raised by a
petitioner seeking to mitigate a grave risk of harm.
   This issue is no longer squarely presented in this case,
and accordingly, we cannot resolve it. But because the
Supreme Court vacated Radu I in light of Golan, a future
panel may—and, in my view, should—properly allocate the
burden of proof in an appropriate case.