Court Opinion

ID: 9730520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:14:43.502297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.137590
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that People v. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000), adopted both parts of the speedy-trial rule for late-filed charges as set forth in People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1981), and that the appellate court was therefore bound to follow Williams. I believe the majority wrongly reverses defendant’s conviction for the murder of Patterson, holding that delay attributable to defendant on the contributing charge in connection with the murder of Patterson was not likewise attributable to defendant on the Patterson murder charge. I also believe that the State’s failure to perfect its impeachment of defendant by calling Everage as a witness to testify about defendant’s bribery scheme was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not amount to plain error. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The speedy-trial statute provides that every person in custody in this state for an alleged offense shall be tried within 120 days from the date he is taken into custody, unless delay is occasioned by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103 — 5 (West 2000). The right to a speedy trial is a shield to protect an accused from unjust and prejudicial delays occasioned by the State, not a sword to be used to cut a defendant loose from legitimate criminal charges. People v. Tetter, 42 Ill. 2d 569, 576 (1969); People v. Majors, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1028-29 (1999). In Williams, the appellate court held the following: “Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts ***, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges. Continuances obtained in connection with the trial of the original charges cannot be attributed to defendants with respect to the new and additional charges because these new and additional charges were not before the court when those continuances were obtained.” Williams, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 248-49. In People v. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1998), however, the appellate court refused to follow the second sentence of the above-quoted holding from Williams: “[I]t is illogical to hold that continuances which are attributable to the original charges are not attributable to the later-filed charges on the basis that those charges are not before the court. The defendant cannot have it both ways. He cannot seek continuances that benefit him and enable him to better prepare for trial on the charges and then seek the dismissal of a later-filed charge on the basis that 120 days had elapsed since he was brought into custody.” Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 210. On appeal from the appellate court’s ruling, this court affirmed the result reached by the appellate court, but on different grounds. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d at 222. This court found that the later-filed charges were not subject to compulsory joinder. The State, therefore, could bring the later-filed charges at its choosing, and the speedy-trial clock did not begin to run on the later-filed charges until the date they were filed. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d at 221-22. In dicta, this court stated that, if the new charges had been subject to mandatory joinder, “[t]he later date could not be used by the State to ‘restart’ the speedy-trial period, and any delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d at 222. Gooden did not specifically address the concern in this case — whether delay attributed on the earlier charges would be attributed on the later charges. Instead it merely noted two general principles: (1) the date of the later filing cannot be used to “ ‘restart’ ” the speedy-trial period; and (2) any delay occasioned by the late filing would not be attributable to defendant. Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d 209. The majority accuses the appellate court here of refusing to follow this court’s dicta in Gooden, stating that when we said “ ‘any delay’ ” would not be attributable to defendant, “we meant just that.” 204 Ill. 2d at 207. The majority’s criticism, however, ignores that the key phrase from Gooden actually reads “any delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the defendant.” Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d at 222. The appellate court grappled with our dicta in Gooden and found that the “statement merely indicated that any delay occasioned by such late filing would not be attributable to the defendant.” It then found that “this reasonably could refer to any future delay on account of the late filing of the new and additional charges, and not necessarily to delay that had already occurred.” Under these circumstances, it is clear that the appellate court attempted to follow our dicta, not reject it as the majority posits. Taking the phrase about delay in context, I would conclude that when this court said “delay occasioned by such a late filing” (Gooden, 189 Ill. 2d at 222), it meant any future delay caused by the filing of the late charges. I think it obvious that the continuances defendant sought to better prepare for trial on the contributing charge cannot be deemed “delay occasioned by the late filing.” Moreover, common sense indicates that previous delay attributable to defendant on the earlier charge should also be attributable to defendant with respect to the later-filed charges. Otherwise, a defendant receives a windfall — the State is required to join all charges in a single prosecution with the speedy-trial clock beginning to run with the first-filed charge and continuances granted at a defendant’s request only toll the clock with respect to the first charge, not the later charges. I believe that the appellate court’s interpretation better comports with logic and the limited nature of the language used by this court in Gooden. It would also prevent the improper use of the speedy-trial statute as a sword instead of a shield. See, e.g., State v. DeSantiago, 108 Wash. App. 855, 874-75, 33 E3d 394, 402-03 (2001) (speedy-trial period begins to run with the earliest-filed charge in a compulsory-joinder setting and delays attributable to defendant on the earliest charge are attributable to defendant on the later charges, but continuances necessary to prepare defendant for later-filed charges do not toll speedy trial clock). The majority struggles to find some kind of harm that would be caused by the appellate court’s interpretation, and states as follows: “When the State filed the more serious charges, the defendant would face a Hobson’s choice between a trial without adequate preparation and further pretrial detention to prepare for trial.” 204 Ill. 2d at 207. I believe the majority’s concern is unfounded, as it again ignores the clear language of Gooden that any future delay occasioned by the late filing is attributable to the State. If the State subsequently files additional charges, a defendant would be entitled to a continuance to prepare for those charges provided additional preparation was reasonably needed. The dicta in Gooden specifically indicates that this delay would be chargeable to the State. Under the appellate court’s interpretation, then, defendant would be assured of adequate trial preparation and would not be subject to one second more detention time than is allowed by the speedy-trial statute. Yet, he would not receive a windfall in the form of having his delay on the earlier charges transferred to the State on the later charges. Here, defendant sought and was granted continuances to prepare for trial and develop a defense in connection with the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. The same factual elements used to convict him of the contributing charge were used to convict him of the Patterson murder charge. By allowing defendant to successfully assert the speedy-trial statute as a bar to his prosecution of the murder charge under these circumstances, the majority has opened a new procedural loophole that can be used to obstruct the ends of justice. For the reasons stated, I would affirm defendant’s conviction for the murder of Patterson. I also disagree with the majority’s reversal of the remainder of defendant’s convictions. I believe that the appellate court correctly found that the State’s failure to perfect its impeachment of defendant by presenting the testimony of Everage was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. By failing to raise a specific objection at trial and mention it again in a posttrial motion, defendant waived the issue of whether the State erroneously insinuated during cross-examination that defendant had attempted to bribe Everage. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Plain error is a limited and narrow exception to the general waiver rule, to be invoked only where the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error is so substantial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 128 (2001). The second part of the plain error doctrine applies only where the claimed error is so grave that its consideration is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process, thereby preventing the denial of a fair trial. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d at 128. In that regard, the incomplete impeachment of a witness only rises to the level of reversible error where the allegedly unfounded insinuation is substantial, repeated, and prejudicial because of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Amos, 204 Ill. App. 3d 75, 82 (1990). In other words, such evidence deprives the defendant of a fair trial only when it constitutes a material factor in the defendant’s conviction so that, without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been different. People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 285 (1998). Here, the majority as much as acknowledges that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was not closely balanced, noting that the State presented “strong” evidence of defendant’s guilt. 204 Ill. 2d at 213-14. Moreover, the number of insinuations were not substantial; the State did not even mention, let alone emphasize, the Everage bribery attempt in its closing argument. Given that the evidence against the defendant was not closely balanced, I believe that any error was harmless, as it does not appear that, without the evidence, the verdict would likely have been different (Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d at 285). For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.