Court Opinion

ID: 9659288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:38:00.22076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:05.833146
License: Public Domain

Gerrard, J.,
concurring.
I concur in all respects with the result reached by the majority, but write separately regarding the issue of payment of attorney fees. I agree that attorney fees of $3,904, which represented all attorney time and paralegal time spent in prosecuting the entire case, is not a “reasonable attorney’s fee” for the collection of the $165 medical bill. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-125 (Reissue 1998). Even though the trial judge properly determined that the employer failed to pay the expense of Dr. Daniel Noble at Lincoln Orthopedic & Sports Medicine Clinic in the amount of $165 within 30 days after notice of the obligation for payment of that account, it is quite apparent from a review of the record that collection of this medical bill was incidental to the filing of Harmon’s claim for permanent total disability benefits.
However, I would not hesitate to assess an entire attorney fee in those cases where one of the underlying reasons for the filing of the workers’ compensation claim is to establish compensability for a delinquent medical bill. In such cases, of course, a workers’ compensation claimant must prove all elements of compensability in order to successfully obtain an award on the medical payment. See § 48-125. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-101 (Reissue 1998).
The purpose of the provision for attorney fees in § 48-125 is to encourage prompt payment by making delay costly if an employer neglects to pay medical payments after 30 days’ notice has been given of the obligation for the medical payments. Nonpayment of medical bills can have an extremely deleterious result for an injured worker. Necessary medical care may be delayed for months pending litigation, which in itself may cause more severe permanent injury. See Ihm v. Crawford & Co., 254 Neb. 818, 580 N.W.2d 115 (1998). To limit the award of attorney fees in every case to only the amount of time expended in *432recovering a specific, unpaid medical bill would (in the words of dissenting Workers’ Compensation Court Judge Ronald L. Brown) effectively transform § 48-125 into nothing but “an annoying, yippy little porch dog of no real consequence.” The payment of attorney fees provision in § 48-125 should not be given such a narrow interpretation.
Litigants should be on notice that in those cases in which one of the underlying reasons for the filing of the workers’ compensation claim is to establish compensability for a delinquent medical bill, the assessment of an entire attorney fee is entirely appropriate and in keeping with the purpose of § 48-125. The circumstances of this particular case do not warrant such a result, and I, therefore, concur in the result reached by the majority.
McCormack, J., joins in this concurrence.