Court Opinion

ID: 9694378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:39:35.398539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:08.514724
License: Public Domain

*310CATHELL, Judge.
As early as 1892, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 12 S.Ct. 292, 294, 35 L.Ed. 1077 (1892), reversed a criminal conviction because evidence of other crimes had been admitted improperly. The Supreme Court stated:
The principal assignments of error relate to the admission, against the objection of the defendants, of evidence as to several robberies committed prior to the day when Dansby was shot, and which, or some of which at least, had no necessary connection with, and did not in the slightest degree elucidate, the issue before the jury, namely, whether the defendants murdered John Dansby on the occasion of the conflict at the ferry . . . . In relation to these matters the witnesses went into details as fully as if the defendants had been upon trial for the robberies.... It is said ... that the facts connected with the robbery ... tended not only to identify Standley and Boyd, but to show that they came to the ferry for the same purpose with which they went to Rigsby’s house, namely, to rob and plunder for their joint benefit; and, consequently, that each defendant was responsible for Dansby’s death, if it resulted from the prosecution of their felonious purpose to rob.
Id. at 454, 12 S.Ct. at 294, 35 L.Ed. 1077. The Supreme Court then quoted the trial court’s charge to the jury concerning “other crimes” evidence:
Now, it becomes necessary for the court to remind you of what figure these other crimes that have been proven cut in the case. This crime of the robbery of Rigsby may be taken into consideration by you in passing upon the question of the identity of the defendants. It is a competent fact for that purpose . . . . You are not to consider these other crimes as make-weight against the defendants alone. That is to say, you are not to convict the defendants because of the commission of these other crimes.... They are not to influence your minds so as to induce you to more readily convict them than you would convict them if the crimes had not been proven against him.
*311Id. at 456, 12 S.Ct. at 294-95, 35 L.Ed. 1077. The Supreme Court, in recognizing the harm to the defendants from the introduction of other crimes evidence, held:
If the evidence as to [other] crimes ... had been limited to the robberies of Rigsby and Taylor, it may be, in view of the peculiar circumstances ... and the specific directions by the court ... that the judgment would not be disturbed, although that proof ... went beyond the objects for which it was allowed by the court. But we are constrained to hold that the evidence as to the Brinson, Mode, and Hall robberies was inadmissible for the identification of the defendants, or for any other purpose whatever, and that the injury done the defendants ... was not cured by anything contained in the charge. Whether Standley robbed Brinson and Mode, and whether he and Boyd robbed Hall, were matters wholly apart from the inquiry as to the murder of Dansby. They were collateral to the issue to be tried . . . . Proof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no value to the community, and who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the trial of human beings charged with crime involving the punishment of death . . . . [W]e are constrained to hold that ... those rules were not observed at the trial below. However depraved in character, and however full of crime their past lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried upon competent evidence, and only for the offense charged.
Id. at 457-58, 12 S.Ct. at 295, 35 L.Ed. 1077.
The early pronouncements of the Supreme Court and other courts have become refined and known as the other crimes evidence rule. In Maryland, it is a rule of exclusion that recognizes the general exclusion of other crimes evidence with a group of stated, but not exhaustive, exceptions.1 Over time *312the other crimes evidence rule has become embodied in the federal rules and the rules of many states and the case law of the respective jurisdictions.
In our jurisdiction, it is found in Maryland Rule 5-404(b), which excludes from introduction at trial evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts to prove the character of the defendant in order to show that he or she acted in conformity with that character with regard to the offense with which he or she is charged. There are, however, exceptions to this general rule of exclusion. Evidence of other crimes or bad acts may be admitted for other purposes, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Md. Rule 5-404(b). In this opinion, we shall address whether during a housebreaking and theft trial, the introduction of evidence that the defendant committed another housebreaking and theft came within the absence of mistake exception to the general rule prohibiting the introduction of “other crimes” evidence.
L
James Othel Wynn, petitioner, was charged in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County with two counts of first degree burglary, nine counts of daytime housebreaking, and twelve counts of theft. The State declined to prosecute a number of these charges. The charges and counts that went to trial were as follows: (1) Count I, first degree burglary as to the dwelling of Donovan Picard; (2) Count II, theft of property belonging to Donovan Picard; (3) Count III, first degree burglary as to the dwelling of James Smith; (4) Count IV, theft of property belonging to James Smith; (5) Count V, daytime housebreaking as to the dwelling of Michael Quigley; (6) Count VI, theft of property belonging to Michael Quigley; *313(7) Count VII, daytime housebreaking as to the dwelling of Houston Maples; (8) Count VIII, theft of property belonging to Houston Maples; (9) Count IX, daytime housebreaking as to the dwelling of Charles Garrison; and (10) Count X, theft of property belonging to Charles Garrison.
Petitioner was tried on counts one through four, the Picard and Smith charges, on April 29-30, 1996, and May 1, 1996. The State did not present “other crimes” evidence in this trial under the “absence of mistake” exception, and petitioner was acquitted of these charges. Petitioner was tried on counts seven through ten, the Maples and Garrison charges, on May 29-31, 1996. According to statements made by the trial judge in the instant case, but not otherwise supported by the record before us, the State was permitted to present “other crimes” evidence in this second trial under the “absence of mistake” exception. The State apparently presented evidence that petitioner committed a housebreaking of the Quigley home in order to counter testimony or other evidence that petitioner had been seen at a flea market, the same reason the State later proffered for the admission of similar other crimes evidence in the instant case. Petitioner was convicted of the Maples and Garrison charges, although these convictions later were reversed by the Court of Special Appeals.
On September 23-26, 1996, petitioner was tried on counts five and six, the Quigley charges. Consistent with its actions in the second trial, the trial court permitted the State, over objection, to present “other crimes” evidence in this third trial. Again, petitioner was convicted of these charges. In other words, when “other crimes” evidence was not introduced, petitioner was acquitted. When it was admitted, he was convicted. Only the trial on the Quigley charges is relevant to this appeal.
Prior to trial on the Quigley charges, petitioner moved in limine to exclude evidence concerning the housebreakings of the Maples and Garrison residences. Before petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present argument in support of his motion, the trial court called upon the State to present its *314reasons for admissibility of the other crimes evidence. The State proffered only that this evidence was admissible because it came within an exception to the general rule of exclusion of evidence of other crimes because it was “relevant to the issue of the absence of mistake.” The State asserted that the evidence was admissible under the absence of mistake exception because “the issue of innocent possession of these items ... has been generated.” Petitioner argued that the evidence of the housebreakings of the Maples and Garrison residences was not admissible because it did not come within the absence of mistake exception.
The trial court, commenting that “absence of mistake really is a key issue in this case,” ruled that the State could admit the evidence of housebreaking of the Garrison residence, but not the Maples residence. In clarifying its ruling, the court stated: “I think what the other crimes evidence is that ... there was a break-in, these things were taken, they were found at his place. That I will allow.”2
At the Quigley trial, Charles Garrison was called to testify for the State regarding the housebreaking and theft that took place at his home. At this point, no defense had yet been presented by Wynn and thus there was nothing to rebut. Before Mr. Garrison described that housebreaking and theft, petitioner’s counsel objected. The court, overruling the objection, again noted that the evidence concerning the housebreaking and theft was admissible because it showed, in the trial court’s view, an absence of mistake. It then gave the jury a cautionary instruction in which the trial court stated that the evidence was being admitted only to show an absence of mistake.3
*315Petitioner appealed his convictions of the Maples and Garrison charges as well as the Quigley charges to the Court of Special Appeals. That court reversed the convictions as to the Maples and Garrison charges in Wynn v. State, 117 Md.App. 133, 147, 699 A.2d 512, 518-19 (1997), holding that the trial court erred in joining the Maples and Garrison offenses for trial. As to the introduction of the evidence of the Garrison housebreaking and theft at the Quigley trial, the Court of Special Appeals held that the evidence fell within the absence of mistake exception provided in Maryland Rule 5-404(b). It stated:
In the trial in the instant case, appellant [Wynn] argued that he came into possession of that stolen merchandise by mistake; he claimed to have innocently purchased it at a flea market. Carvelas Sellers, a defense witness, testified that she saw appellant at a flea market with several bags of merchandise. Furthermore, appellant extensively questioned Garrison and Maples as to whether the items taken from their houses were unique or simply mass produced. Finally, during closing arguments, appellant argued that he innocently purchased at a flea market the items that were seized from his house. Because appellant argued a defense of mistake or accident, evidence of prior similar acts was admissible to show lack of mistake or accident.
Id, at 150, 699 A.2d at 520.4
We granted a writ of certiorari to address whether “the Court of Special Appeals misconstrued the ‘absence of mis*316take’ exception in upholding the admission of ‘other crimes evidence^]’ ” Under the circumstances here present, we hold that the evidence of the other housebreaking and theft was not admissible under the absence of mistake exception found in Maryland Rule 5-404(b).
II.
Maryland Rule 5-404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
We have said that this rule means that evidence that the defendant committed other crimes or bad acts is not admissible unless it has special relevance—that it “is substantially relevant to some contested issue and is not offered simply to prove criminal character.” State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363, 368, 701 A.2d 389, 392 (1997).5 Evidence has special relevance if it shows notice, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Other *317crimes evidence also may be admitted “if the crimes are so linked together in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other.” Taylor, 347 Md. at 369, 701 A.2d at 392 (citing Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 586, 115 A.2d 502, 511 (1955)). This list of exceptions to the general rule of exclusion of other crimes evidence, however, is not exhaustive. Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 501, 597 A.2d 956, 962 (1991).
The rationale underlying the exclusion of other crimes evidence is that a jury, confronted with evidence that a defendant committed another crime, may utilize improperly the evidence to conclude that the defendant is a “bad person” and, therefore, should be convicted of the charges for which he is on trial. Taylor, 347 Md. at 369, 701 A.2d at 392; Harris, 324 Md. at 496, 597 A.2d at 960; Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976). In State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634-35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989), we set forth the three-step analysis a trial court must undertake to determine whether the admission of evidence of another crime is appropriate. We stated:
[The trial court] first determines whether the evidence fits within one or more of the Ross exceptions [, essentially the exceptions now found in Rule 5-404(b) ]. That is a legal determination and does not involve any exercise of discretion.
If one or more of the exceptions applies, the next step is to decide whether the accused’s involvement in the other crimes is established by clear and convincing evidence. [The appellate court] will review this decision to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial judge’s finding.
If this requirement is met, the trial court proceeds to the final step. The necessity for and probative value of the “other crimes” evidence is to be carefully weighed against any undue prejudice likely to result from its admission. This segment of the analysis implicates the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
*318Id. (citations omitted); see also Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 550-51, 693 A.2d 781, 793 (1997).
In other crimes evidence issues, as to whether a matter fits within an exception in the first instance, we extend no deference to a trial court’s decision. Initially, courts should exclude other crimes evidence. Only if it fits within an exception will this type of evidence be admissible and, even then, the defendant’s involvement must be established by clear and convincing evidence and the probative value and prejudicial effect balanced.6
III.
Petitioner attacks all three of the Faulker determinations made by the trial court below. He asserts the evidentiary ruling on the other crimes evidence was in error “because the evidence did not fit within the “absence of mistake” exception or any other exception, ... [his] involvement was not established by clear and convincing evidence, and the probative value, if any, of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”
The State contends evidence of the other burglaries was relevant to the trial below to show absence of mistake. Specifically, the State argues that “the central issue in the case is *319whether [petitioner was] in possession of the stolen property because he was the thief or [was] in possession of the stolen property because he ‘accidentally’ or ‘mistakenly’ purchased stolen property at a flea market.” The State goes on: “Clearly, then, [petitioner’s] possession of stolen property from a totally separate break-in is relevant in determining whether he stole the property from the residences and did, therefore, intentionally possess it with knowledge of its stolen character rather than innocently acquired stolen property from the flea market.” (Emphasis added.)
The State also argues that the evidence was admissible to show intent or some other issue substantially relevant to this case. Because, however, the State only asserted at trial that the other crimes evidence was admissible to show absence of mistake, the trial court based its ruling upon that exception and the absence of mistake exception is the only exception discussed in Wynn’s petition for writ of certiorari, we need not determine whether any other exception is applicable. See Md. Rule 8-131(b).7
We noted the nature of our certiorari jurisdiction, distinguishing it from direct appeal jurisdiction, in Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 501-03, 403 A.2d 1221, 1222-24 (1979), where we stated:
The defendant petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, raising solely the question of whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his pre-arrest silence. The *320State filed an answer and conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that certiorari should be denied because the testimony was clearly admissible and, even if not admissible, the error was harmless. The State requested that, if the defendant’s petition were granted, we should grant the State’s conditional cross-petition to consider the harmless error question. The defendant then filed a motion ne recipiatur, requesting that we not receive that portion of the State’s response constituting a conditional cross-petition raising the issue of harmless error. The defendant pointed out that neither side had raised the harmless error issue in the Court of Special Appeals and that court had not considered the issue sua sponte. The defendant contended that it would be improper for this Court on certiorari to consider a question that had never previously been raised in a case. We granted both the petition and the conditional cross-petition, and we deferred ruling on the motion ne recipiatur.
We recognize that this Court will not ordinarily consider an issue which was not raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari, in a cross-petition or in the Court’s order granting certiorari. Moreover, in some of these cases, we applied this principle and refused to consider an argument that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed on a ground not raised in the petition, a cross-petition or the Court’s order granting certiorari. And with respect to the question of harmless error specifically, we stated in Coleman v. State, supra, 281 Md. at 547[, 380 A.2d at 55]: “The State did not, however, file a cross-petition for certiorari raising the harmless error issue, and we therefore will not consider it.”
In arguing that we should not consider the matter of harmless error in the present case, the defendant relies upon several of the above-cited cases. Nevertheless, such reliance is obviously misplaced. In all of those cases, there was a failure to raise the issue in the petition for certiorari or in the cross-petition. In the case at bar, the State did' *321raise the harmless error question in a conditional cross-petition, and we granted the cross-petition.
The principle that a court exercising discretionary certiorari jurisdiction will ordinarily consider only those issues presented in the certiorari petition, a cross-petition or the court’s order granting certiorari, is based upon the nature of such discretionary jurisdiction. As observed in Walston v. Sun Cab Co., supra, 267 Md. at 569[, 298 A.2d at 397], “the statute [delineating this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction] contemplated that the desirability and public interest involved in granting certiorari are shown to us by petition and the matters presented to us by petition should logically be those considered by us unless we limit those matters for consideration in our order granting certiorari.” However, as further pointed out in Walston, id. at 567-568, [298 A.2d at 396]: “In short, we have treated the [certiorari] procedure as affording a discretionary appeal; and when the discretion to grant the petition is exercised, the case is treated like every other appeal.” Since the State presented the harmless error issue to us in a cross-petition, and as we exercised our discretion to grant the cross-petition, with regard to that issue “the case is treated like every other appeal.” [Some emphasis added; some brackets in original.]
In State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 402 n. 12, 631 A.2d at 453, 462 n. 12 (1993), this Court again noted the applicability of the Robeson line of cases in instances of direct appeals as opposed to the this Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, as occurred in the case at bar:
[The] dissent, in footnote 2, asserts that, in affirming the trial judge, this “Court should not be limited solely to the reasons argued by the State,” citing Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 403 A.2d 1221 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021, 100 S.Ct. 680, 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). This assertion would be accurate with respect to a case not decided by an intermediate appellate court. In a direct appeal, an appellate court will affirm the trial court’s decision on a ground adequately supported by the record although the ground was not relied upon by the trial court or the parties. See, *322e.g., Offutt v. Montgomery Co[unty] Bd. of Ed[uc.], 285 Md. 557, 563 n. 3, 404 A.2d 281, 285 n. 3 (1979); Robeson v. State, supra. Nevertheless, as pointed out in both the Offutt and the Robeson opinions, there is a distinction between a direct appeal and a second discretionary appeal with regard to the principle relied on . . . . In a case before us which has been decided by the Court of Special Appeals, the principle that a trial court will be affirmed for any reason adequately shown by the record is applicable only if the ground was presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari, in a cross-petition, or in this Court’s order granting certiorari. See, e.g., Robeson v. State, supra, 285 Md. at 502, 403 A.2d at 1223-1224; Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 562-563, 625 A.2d 914, 925 (1993); Maryland Rule 8-131(b). None of the three arguments made in the' dissenting opinions was raised in the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari or in our order granting the petition.
In a more recent case, State v. Broberg, 342 Md. 544, 677 A.2d 602 (1996), there was a point of disagreement between the majority and the dissenting opinions with respect to whether an issue had been presented sufficiently in either the petition for certiorari, any cross-petition, or in our grant of certiorari. There was, however, no dispute as to the scope of our certiorari jurisdiction. The dissent in that case stated the applicable scope of review when a court is exercising certiorari jurisdiction.
[I]n criminal cases decided by the Court of Special Appeals, where an issue has been put forth as an alternative basis for upholding the conviction, this Court has consistently refused to consider that issue if it was not raised in a certiorari petition, a cross-petition, or the order of this Court granting the petition....
Rule 8-131(b) does state that this Court “ordinarily” will consider only an issue raised in a certiorari petition, a cross-petition, or an order of this Court. The word “ordinarily” does indicate that there are exceptions. Nevertheless, neither the use of the word “ordinarily” in Rule 8-131(b) nor *323the principle embodied in the rule, has been treated as granting a general discretion to reach an issue whenever the Court so desires in the interests of “fairness.” If it did, the amendment to Rule 8-131(b), adopting an express exception for the “harmless error” issue, would have been unnecessary. Instead, we have held that the “exceptions” to the principle embodied in Rule 8-131(b) are limited to “extraordinary circumstances.” Mazor v. State Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 370-371 n. 8, 369 A.2d 82, 92 n. 8 (1977); Dempsey v. State, supra, 277 Md. at 142, 355 A.2d at 459[;] Walston v. Sun Cab Co., supra, 267 Md. at 569, 298 A.2d at 397.
Broberg, 342 Md. at 573, 677 A.2d at 616 (dissent)(footnotes omitted).
In the case sub judice, the only question presented in Wynn’s petition for certiorari was narrow: “Did the Court of Special Appeals misconstrue the ‘absence of mistake’ exception in upholding the admission of ‘other crimes’ evidence?” The State did not file a cross-appeal. Moreover, in its response, the State acknowledged the limitations of the question presented, by stating:
The fact, however, that Wynn did not testify and thus did not expressly assert a defense of mistake or accident should not prevent the use of the “other crimes” evidence. Whether Wynn was mistakenly or accidentally in possession of stolen property from which it was inferred that he burglarized certain homes was a central issue in this case. Thus, the use of the “other crimes” evidence was substantially relevant to demonstrate an absence of mistake. [Citation omitted.]
At no prior point in this ease, either before the trial court, in response to Wynn’s petition, or in any cross-petition to this Court did the State present the “intent” exception. Moreover, the State at trial did not proffer that its purpose in offering the testimony of Garrison as to the housebreaking at his residence and the theft of his property was to address Wynn’s state of mind. Its purpose in presenting the testimony in its *324case in chief, prior to any defense being offered, was to establish where Wynn obtained the property, not his state of mind when he obtained it. Additionally, the State did not, in any forum, present the “doctrine of chances” relied upon extensively in the dissent.8 We considered the petition, the State’s limited response, and granted the writ as presented. In the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction, we do not perceive any extraordinary facet of this case that leads us to consider an issue not properly presented.
The dissent would put this Court, under the circumstances here present, in the shoes of the trial judge, making for him or her after-the-fact evidentiary rulings on grounds never presented to him or her or relied upon by him or her, because of the better position we are in whenever an appellate court exercises the awesome power of hindsight. In this case, for all of the reasons we have stated, we disagree with the dissent that it is appropriate to do so.
As we have indicated, supra, if the other crimes evidence does not fit into the absence of mistake exception, the first step of the Faulkner analysis is not satisfied. Because the State limited its argument to the absence of mistake exception at trial and because the absence of mistake exception was the only exception discussed in the petition and response to the petition for certiorari, it is that exception with which we are concerned. Furthermore, it is only in consideration of the expressed reason given by the State, “absence of mistake,” that the trial court could have conducted the third step of the Faulkner analysis—the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. The trial court could not possibly have made a correct balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect based upon the reason given in the dissent as that reason appears there for the first time. Nor could petitioner have argued properly the third step of the Faulkner analysis at the trial court level because the reason now relied upon by *325the dissent had not then been presented. Had the State proffered at trial the reason now relied upon by the dissent and the trial court had denied Wynn any opportunity to respond to it, we would no doubt have considered it to have been fundamentally unfair. It would be, in our view, equally unfair for this Court to do as the dissent suggests, ie., rely on a Faulkner first-prong exception never presented below and then balance its probative with its prejudicial effect, without affording any opportunity to the defendant to be heard on that specific exception.9 We shall, therefore, limit our determination to whether the absence of mistake exception applies under the circumstances of this case.
Commentators and case law generally recognize different factual scenarios within the absence of mistake exception. The case sub judice involves a situation in which evidence of other crimes is alleged to be admissible to show that the defendant did not commit the act for which he or she is on trial mistakenly or accidentally. Professor Lynn McLain explains:
If the defendant admits[10] that he or she took an action, but claims to have done so unintentionally or by mistake, so that allegations of, for example, forgery, fraud, embezzlement, or malice are unfounded, the prosecution may offer evidence of his or her similar prior wrongs, acts, or crimes. This use of the evidence as proof of absence of mistake is merely the obverse of proof of intent.
5 Lynn McLain, Maryland Practice § 404.12 (footnotes omitted). The rule allows the introduction of other crimes evidence “[t]o show, by similar acts or incidents, that the act in question was not performed inadvertently, accidentally, involuntarily, or without guilty knowledge.” John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 190 at 804 (4th ed.1994).
*326Another factual scenario involves a situation in which the defendant asserts he or she was not responsible for the act causing the injury and instead claims that the resultant injury was caused by an independent accident. Professor McLain again explains:
Similarly, the defendant may claim the harm he or she is alleged to have caused was not at his or her hands, but was the result of an independent accident. Evidence of prior similar acts is then admissible to show lack of mistake or accident. For example, if a defendant charged with child abuse contends that the child’s injuries were caused by an accidental fall, evidence of prior beatings of the child by the defendant will be admissible.
5 Lynn McLain, Maryland Practice § 404.12 (footnote omitted).
Examples of the proper application of the absence of mistake exception demonstrate its non-applicability under the facts of this case. We found limited illustrations of the applicability of the absence of mistake exception in the appellate courts of this State. We shall examine those cases addressing the absence of mistake or accident exception along with the cases of other jurisdictions to illustrate the proper application of this exception.
Hoes v. State, 35 Md.App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080, cert. denied, 280 Md. 731 (1977), primarily involved the “common plan or scheme” exception. The Court of Special Appeals also examined, however, the absence of mistake or accident exception, because Hoes argued facts that could have constituted a mistake. Hoes admitted “that he had ‘throwed up the [shot] gun,’ and that ‘the gun went off,’ but denied ‘that he had intended to shoot [the victim].’ ” Id. at 62, 368 A.2d at 1082. In the case sub judice, however, we note petitioner never claimed to have entered the Quigley house mistakenly or on purpose. He has always maintained that he did not enter it at all.
Hoes was charged with assault with intent to maim. At his trial, the State elicited testimony from the victim that the *327defendant shot her twice in the side four or five years prior to the shooting for which the defendant was on trial. Holding that the evidence was admissible other crimes evidence, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned:
The relevance of the prior conduct rests upon two things: the similarity of the method of assault and the fact that it was upon the same victim. That he had shot her before in like manner is inferentially relevant to his intent to do so this time, especially in light of his admission that he had discharged the firearm. As the State pointed out, the fact that appellant had shot [the victim] a few years earlier makes it less likely that shooting her this time was an accident or mistake.
Id. at 69, 368 A.2d at 1085 (footnote omitted).
A Maryland case demonstrating the non-applicability of the absence of mistake exception is Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585, 647 A.2d 1243, cert. denied, 337 Md. 90, 651 A.2d 855 (1995). In that case, the defendants were charged with drug kingpin conspiracy and other related offenses. At trial, a co-conspirator testified regarding various instances of drug activity involving himself and the defendants over the seventeen-month period during which the defendants were being investigated by the Anne Arundel County Police Department. In addition, the co-conspirator testified regarding other uncharged drug-related activities that spanned over twenty years.
On appeal, the defendants contended that the testimony regarding the uncharged drug activity should have been excluded. Holding that the evidence failed to pass the first prong of the Faulkner analysis, the Court of Special Appeals stated relative to the absence of mistake exception: “The [defendants] never argued that their apparent involvement with marijuana was somehow an inadvertent and bizarre mistake. There was, therefore, no claim, proffer, or theory of mistake that needed to be negated.” Id. at 608, 647 A.2d at 1255.
*328The Court of Special Appeals in McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111, 124, 570 A.2d 360, 366 (1990), considering the absence of mistake or accident exception with respect to a joinder issue, said:
“[T]he State seized on the absence of mistake ‘exception’ as justification for the joinder. In so doing, it relies on appellant’s rather ambiguous response to a question . . . . ” McKinney had been asked whether he had intentionally improperly touched certain areas of several young girls’ bodies. He responded that he had not. He was then asked whether he may have accidently or incidentally touched the girls. He responded: “It’s possible. It was very crowded.... There were numbers of people standing in line....”
Id., 570 A.2d at 367. From that testimony, the State fashioned an argument on appeal that McKinney had asserted a defense of accident or accidental touching.
The Court of Special Appeals, in determining whether the evidence of touching of the girls initially would be admissible correctly held: “The combined testimony of the three alleged victims might very well have tended to disprove any defense based on accident or mistake, but since no such defense was asserted, there was no material fact to be established by the other crimes evidence.” Id. at 125, 570 A.2d at 367.
Jurisdictions outside of Maryland have had the opportunity to address the absence of mistake exception. The case of State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156, 900 P.2d 284 (1995), decided by the Supreme Court of Montana, exemplifies the proper application of the absence of mistake exception. There, the defendant, Brogan, was the operator of a game farm. A state statute made it a crime to possess wild animals. State officials discovered that the defendant’s farm had ten more elk than he had reported on the most recent report to the department. The department then conducted an investigation of the farm, during which the defendant admitted that excess elk were on his farm and that those excess elk were wild. He asserted, however, that the elk must have entered his farm by *329mistake when he left the gate of the fence surrounding his farm open in order to lure other wild elk off his farm.
At trial, the state sought to introduce evidence that the defendant had been convicted previously of similar charges. The defendant moved in limine to exclude this evidence, but the trial court denied his motion. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the lower court’s ruling. It stated: “The State’s purpose in introducing the evidence was to establish absence of mistake or accident.... Under the circumstances of this case, the prior acts were relevant to the stated purpose for admitting the evidence.” Id. at 167, 900 P.2d at 291.
In Margetts v. State, 107 Nev. 616, 818 P.2d 392 (1991), the defendant and the victim were both coin dealers attending a coin show. The defendant agreed to purchase coins from the victim with the understanding that the defendant would pay the victim at the end of the show. At the end of the show, the defendant tendered a bad check to the victim. After the defendant failed to pay the debt, he was charged with one count of swindling and one count of obtaining money by false pretenses.
At his trial, the defendant testified, stating that he tendered the bad check by mistake. Another dealer also testified. He stated that he had previously transacted business with the defendant. In that transaction, the defendant bought numerous coins from that dealer and also failed to tender a good check.
Addressing whether the other dealer’s testimony came within the absence of mistake exception, the Supreme Court of Nevada stated: “At trial, Margetts testified that he had no intention to swindle Hendrickson, and that he tendered the bad check by mistake. Therefore, he placed his intent at issue, making prior bad act evidence admissible to prove intent, or absence of mistake.” Id. at 619, 818 P.2d at 394.
In State v. Crawford, 329 N.C. 466, 406 S.E.2d 579 (1991), the defendant was charged with various crimes arising out of the death of a six-year-old child. The child, whose mother was dating the defendant, died of “water intoxication” after the *330defendant gave him large amounts of water to “flush out [his] system.” Id. at 475, 406 S.E.2d at 584.
The defendant testified at trial that he gave the child water in order to treat him for what the defendant thought was food poisoning. He stated that on the previous day, the child had eaten sorbet, which the defendant thought resulted in food poisoning. The defendant testified that the purpose of giving the child large amounts of water was not to punish the child but was a “ ‘mistaken effort to treat him.’ ” Id.
The trial court found that testimony regarding previous instances of the defendant’s maltreatment of the child relevant. In particular, the court found testimony regarding prior instances of the defendant’s discipline of the child admissible. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the testimony came within the absence of mistake exception. See also People v. Woltz, 228 Ill.App.3d 670, 170 Ill.Dec. 502, 592 N.E.2d 1182, cert. denied, 146 Ill.2d 650, 176 Ill.Dec. 820, 602 N.E.2d 474 (1992) (holding that testimony of a prior victim of sexual abuse was not admissible under the absence of mistake exception when the defendant never claimed that he performed the act for which he was on trial mistakenly, but denied committing it altogether); State v. Farrell, 242 Neb. 877, 497 N.W.2d 17 (1993) (holding that in a trial for possession of methamphetamines, evidence that narcotics were discovered in a home owned by the defendant but not resided in with his wife was admissible when he claimed that the shorts he was wearing and in which the methamphetamines were found were also worn by his wife); State v. Lesnick, 141 N.H. 121, 677 A.2d 686, 690 (N.H.1996) (admitting evidence that the defendant had stabbed her husband two months prior to the stabbing for which she was on trial to “refute the defendant’s claim of mistake or accident as a defense”).
Our examination of the commentators and the case law both in Maryland and in other jurisdictions that we have discussed reveals a general prerequisite to the application of the absence of mistake exception. In order for the exception to apply, the defendant generally must make some assertion *331or put on a defense that he or she committed the act for which he or she is on trial, but did so by mistake. In those cases noted above in which the exception was found not to apply, the defendant made no assertion or put forward no defense that he or she mistakenly committed the act for which he or she was on trial. As we have noted, the State sought to introduce the “other crimes” evidence here at issue to prove not that petitioner had received stolen property, but that he had burglarized the Quigley residence.
Under the circumstances of the case at hand, the absence of mistake exception is not applicable for two reasons. First, petitioner never asserted that he entered the house mistakenly or that the housebreaking was a mistake. To illustrate, petitioner did not assert that he mistakenly entered the Quigley residence and took the items at issue believing that he had a right to do so. Petitioner did not assert that he had stumbled mistakenly into the Quigley premises. Rather, petitioner asserted that he did not commit the acts with which he was charged.
The sole issue in the case was whether petitioner was guilty of stealing property during the course of a housebreaking at the Quigley residence; there was no charge of receiving stolen property, and there was no possibility that whoever broke into the house mistakenly stole the property. In order to admit the other crimes evidence the State may have been creating a straw person by inferring that petitioner claimed he purchased the property at a flea market and that claim was a “mistake.” The jury had to determine whether petitioner stole the property or purchased the property not whether, if he purchased the property, he was mistaken in doing so in that it was stolen property. Even had petitioner testified that he purchased the property not having any reason to believe it was stolen or even believing it was stolen, which he did not, the State’s theory, as clearly expressed below, was not that he was a receiver of stolen property, but the housebreaker. Under these circumstances, where there is no defense of mistake in reference to the housebreaking and no suggestion that the property might have been mistakenly stolen, believing *332he had a right to take it, absence of mistake is irrelevant. It is clear that the only possible inference the jury could have drawn from the other crimes evidence was that if petitioner had property from separate housebreakings, he must have been the housebreaker.
Second, in order for the exception to apply, the crime or bad act allegedly committed by mistake must be the same crime or bad act for which the defendant is on trial. As to the absence of mistake exception, McCormick on Evidence states that other crimes evidence is admissible “[t]o show, by similar acts or incidents, that the act in question was not performed inadvertently, accidentally, involuntarily, or without guilty knowledge.” Even if we were to characterize the State’s position as an assertion that petitioner acted mistakenly in purchasing the property at a flea market, this mistake was not the same act for which petitioner was on trial. In the case sub judice, the acts for which petitioner was on trial, the housebreaking and theft from the Quigley home, were not the same as the act allegedly done by mistake, the purchase of the property at a flea market.
If petitioner had asserted as a defense that he had permission to enter a house adjacent to the Quigley house in order to remove items therefrom and claimed to have made a mistake in that he entered the wrong house, the State might have been able to introduce evidence that petitioner committed other housebreakings in the same manner to show that petitioner did not act mistakenly by entering, and thus housebreaking, the Quigley house. Under this type of factual scenario, the act alleged by petitioner to have been done mistakenly, the housebreaking, would have been the same as the act for which petitioner was on trial.
As we perceive it, the State’s argument is that any time a defendant is found in possession of stolen items and denies that he committed the housebreaking during which the items were stolen, further asserting that he did not know property in his possession was stolen, the State can produce evidence of other housebreakings committed by the defendant under the *333absence of mistake exception to the other crimes evidence exclusionary rule. Under this argument, the exception would swallow the rule because virtually any defendant who pleads not guilty to a theft, burglary, or housebreaking charge would be subject to the admission of other crimes evidence under the absence of -mistake exception. The exception, under the State’s theory, would permit the introduction of other crimes evidence any time allegedly-stolen property is found in a defendant’s possession and the defendant asserts his or her right to plead not guilty to the offenses with which he or she is charged. We do not believe that, under any reasonable interpretation of the absence of mistake exception, the exception goes so far.
The other crimes evidence in this case was introduced by the State in its case in chief, prior to the presentation of any defense, to show that petitioner must have been the person who committed the housebreaking and theft in question because he was the person who committed another housebreaking and theft. In other words, petitioner committed the housebreaking and theft because he had a propensity to commit housebreakings and thefts. We have stated on numerous occasions that other crimes evidence may not be introduced for this purpose.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AS TO THE QUIGLEY COUNTS AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THOSE COUNTS; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY.
RAKER, J., dissents.

. In Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 494-95, 597 A.2d 956, 959 (1991), ‘‘[w]e ... re-examined the principles governing admissibility of evi*312dence of other bad acts and ... considered the current legal literature discussing the ‘inclusionary’ and ‘exclusionary’ approaches to the problem. ... [W]e concludefd] that continued adherence to the ‘exclusionary’ approach is appropriate.”

. The dissent in footnote eight describes the instructions the trial court furnished the jury in respect to the testimony of Garrison. This was during the State’s case in chief prior to the presentation of the defense.

. When the State presented the other crimes evidence, no defense had been presented. The State and the trial court relied upon the defense asserted in the other trials. In other words, the State presented *315absence of mistake evidence prior to any assertion of mistake by petitioner in the Quigley trial.

. The Court of Special Appeals discussed at length the case of Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585, 647 A.2d 1243 (1994), cert. denied, 337 Md. 90, 651 A.2d 855 (1995). Emory relied in part on Anaweck v. State, 63 Md.App. 239, 492 A.2d 658, cert. denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985). In Anaweck, the Court of Special Appeals held that under the absence of mistake exception, evidence of other crimes could be introduced against a defendant in order to show that the State did not make a mistake in charging the defendant. It stated: “Without [the evidence], a mistake could conceivably have been made in charging *316Edward Anaweck....” Id. at 258, 492 A.2d at 668. To the extent Anaweck ’s discussion of the absence of mistake exception conflicts with the holding in this case, it is overruled.

. Taylor, a child abuse case, primarily involved the malice and intent exceptions to rule 5-404(b). On occasion, the word 'mistake was mentioned in the majority opinion: once, as an assertion made by the State, and twice it was mentioned by the Court apparently because of its presentation in the State’s brief. The majority opinion clearly was based primarily on intent and malice. We said initially, "several of our prior cases ... have recognized the relevance of intent and malice in child abuse cases. Intent and malice can be critical in distinguishing permissible parental corporal punishment from criminal child abuse.” Taylor, 347 Md. at 370, 701 A.2d at 392. Later, we noted, "[l]ack of intent or malice was a contention of the defense in the instant case.” Id. at 372, 701 A.2d at 394. "Intent to cause physical injury and malice were important elements of the State’s case.” Id. at 372-73, 701 A.2d at 394. We affirmed the allowance of other crimes evidence in Taylor under the intent and malice exceptions.

. The dissent relies in part, as we view it, on the third step of the Faulkner analysis. The dissent states: "Even if I agreed ... that evidence of Wynn’s guilt with respect to the break-in at the Garrison home was not admissible under the "absence of mistake” exception ..., I would nonetheless conclude that the evidence was admissible because of its strong probative value in rebutting Wynn’s claim that he innocently acquired the goods stolen from the Quigley home.” Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 335, 718 A.2d 588, 602 (1998)(dissent). As we understand it, if "other crimes” evidence is offered under the absence of mistake exception and is found to be inadmissible, the matter is over; a probative value assessment is not made. Maryland Rule 5-404(b) almost always relates to evidence believed to be relevant and probative by the party offering it. If it were not relevant or probative, it would be inadmissible for that reason alone. See Md. Rule 5-402. The dissent’s reliance on relevance as a direct exception to the rule, rather than as the third step in the analysis, emasculates the rule.

. As we have stated, this was the third of Wynn’s trials presided over by the same trial judge. The first, without the admission of other crimes evidence, resulted in an acquittal. The second, with other crimes evidence admitted, resulted in a conviction, but in a subsequent reversal by the Court of Special Appeals. The dissent relies in large part on what the trial judge discovered from the two prior trials of petitioner. We note, as we indicate elsewhere, that at the inception of the motion in limine hearing, the trial court turned first to the State and received from the State its averment that the evidence was admissible under the "absence of mistake” exception. At that time, petitioner did not present that it was going to assert such a defense. The trial court made its decision to admit the evidence based upon what had taken place in the prior cases.

. This Court has not yet been presented with a "doctrine of chances” case. Because of the limitations of our certiorari jurisdiction, the issue is not properly now before us.

. Wore we to address the intent exception, our decision would be unchanged. We do not perceive this to be a proper case for the intent exception to the exclusion of other crimes evidence.

. Petitioner did not testify at trial.