Court Opinion

ID: 9753842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:32:35.434306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:43.823763
License: Public Domain

Powers, J.,

concurring:

I concur in the opinion written for the Court by Judge Davidson, and in the result as expressed in our mandate. However, I wish to emphasize the reason why I do not consider the decision of the Court of Appeals in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 297 A. 2d 235 (1972) controlling here.
As one of the majority of this Court whose opinion in Owens v. Creaser, 14 Md. App. 593, 288 A. 2d 394 (1972) was reversed, I had felt that prior cases left open the possibility of an exception to the strict application of the boulevard rule, and I felt that if there were any exception, the facts of that case would fall within it.
The Court of Appeals, in a firm and clear opinion written by Judge Digges, dispelled any lingering thought of an exception to the boulevard rule. It said, at 244:
“It is firmly established in this State that when the ‘boulevard rule’ is applicable the unfavored driver is negligent as a matter of law when sued or contributorily negligent as a matter of law when suing. This does not automatically mean that the unfavored driver will be liable for damages in a case he is defending or unable to recover in a case in which he is the plaintiff, but then, in order to prevail, other factors must be present — either he must be able to establish that the favored driver was contributorily negligent or his claim must be *558rescued by the doctrine of last clear chance. Of course, once the unfavored driver has entered the flow of favored traffic he is entitled to the same rights and subject to the same duties as other drivers on the highway. Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 157, 205 A. 2d 260 (1964). However, until he attains that status, neither excessive speed by the favored driver nor the obstructed vision of the unfavored driver will be heard as an excuse for his failure to yield the right of way.” (Citations omitted).
The Court went on to say, at 245-46:
“Though this law is exacting and sometimes may seem harsh, its purpose is manifest.”
Certainty in the law has its own virtue, which ordinarily transcends in importance the occasional injustice which may result from unwavering application of a law which is both certain and strict. One whose duty is clear and certain, though it may be harsh, is better able to conform to it than one who understands it only vaguely.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in Creaser v. Owens, supra, makes the boulevard rule serve well the fundamental purpose of all law — to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number of people the greatest part of the time.
A further reference to Creaser v. Owens, supra, is necessary to point up what I consider to be the proper guide to decision in the case before us. The Court said, at 246-47:
“Appellee recognizes, as well she should, the stringent requirements of the ‘boulevard rule,’ but urges us to affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals primarily in reliance upon the holdings of this Court in Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A. 2d 888 (1939) and Nicholson v. Page, 255 Md. 659, 259 A. 2d 319 (1969). Mrs. Owens can take no solace from the result reached in Nicholson as we explicitly stated that under the peculiar circumstances present there, the boulevard law was *559not applicable. And, it was expressly stated that nothing in that decision was intended as a departure from the prior boulevard cases of this Court. Likewise, Greenfeld and the subsequent cases which relied on it do not permit an interpretation that could rescue appellee’s claim. That case recognized that it was possible to utilize the doctrine of last clear chance in boulevard cases so as to permit a recovery by an unfavored driver despite his initial negligence in entering the boulevard. But, in Greenfeld there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury, under proper instruction, to justify application of that doctrine. Here, no such evidence is advanced.”
The Court pointed out, at 248, that the hint in Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A. 2d 888 (1939), that another exception may be carved out in boulevard cases had been so whittled away by later cases that it could no longer be considered viable.
Whenever evidence before the court shows conduct by a party which is claimed to be negligent, we judge that conduct in the light of the duty which the law imposes upon the party under the circumstances. But first we determine if there is or could be a proximate causal relationship between the conduct and the alleged breach of duty. If such a proximate relationship does not exist, then we must look to other facts, and to other principles of law, to decide whether there has been a breach of duty.
I need not repeat what Judge Davidson’s opinion for this Court said about Nicholson v. Page, 255 Md. 659, 259 A. 2d 319 (1969). Although the collision in that case occurred in a boulevard intersection, the unfavored driver sued and recovered. The Court held that the boulevard rule was not applicable. It said, referring to the favored driver’s conduct, at 667:
“This unforeseeable and negligent act by the defendant was, as we have already indicated, the proximate cause of the collision and not the lawful *560passage of the plaintiffs vehicle across Carey Street.”
It could not fairly be said that in Nicholson the Court of Appeals was merely making an expedient end run around the boulevard rule. It was clearly stating a rule which is not only consistent with the basic principles of negligence law, but which is required by justice and fairness. There is no difficulty in understanding that the law to be applied in any case is the law governing the conduct which proximately caused the harm.
In Creaser v. Owens, supra, the Court’s discussion of the law followed this premise: “ * * * when the ‘boulevard rule’ is applicable * * It pointed out, citing Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 205 A. 2d 260 (1964), that the rule is not applicable when the unfavored driver has entered the flow of favored traffic. Obviously, that status may or may not exist, depending upon resolution by the jury of disputed facts relating to position, speed, and other circumstances. Certainly not always, and probably rarely, could a trial judge rule as a matter of law that the unfavored driver had or had not entered the flow of favored traffic. The question, then, would be for the jury, whose precise inquiry would be, “Was the proximate cause of the harm the unfavored driver’s breach of his duty under the boulevard rule, or was it the favored driver’s breach of some other duty?”
When the boulevard rule is applicable, it is virtually absolute, but, accepting the efficacy of that view, we still may not hold it applicable to every collision that happens in the intersection of a favored and an unfavored highway. The key is proximate cause. If the harm was proximately caused by breach of the duty imposed by the boulevard rule, then the rule must be strictly applied. But if the proximate cause was the breach, by either party, of some other duty, then the boulevard rule is not applicable.
To postulate an extreme example, if the unfavored driver, stopped and dutifully waiting for favored traffic to pass, is struck from the rear and propelled into the path of a favored vehicle, the unfavored driver has breached no duty — the *561proximate cause of that collision lies elsewhere. I see no difference in principle when the favored driver is proceeding in the dark without lights and is thus invisible. Such conduct on the part of that favored driver is no less unforeseeable than the conduct of the favored driver in Nicholson v. Page, supra.
It is significant that in every boulevard case that might be considered strict or harsh, conditions that contributed to the accident were observed or observable by the unfavored driver, and rather than excusing his failure to obey his rigorous duty, probably dictated greater caution.
Of course, we do not resolve disputed facts. Nor, in a jury case, does the trial judge. Beckward, and other witnesses presented in his case, testified that the Hensel car had no lights burning, and in the darkness was not visible until it was too late to avoid the collision. Hensel, and other witnesses for him, testified directly or gave evidence tending to show that his lights were on. I think Beckward was entitled to have the jury find the true facts, and from them determine the proximate cause of the collision.