Court Opinion

ID: 9726902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:11:56.114787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.847649
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, C. J.
(dissenting) — Following the sound principle that an ounce of prevention is more valuable than a pound of cure, the courts long ago adopted and have consistently adhered to the rule that the power to revoke a license necessarily implies the power to deny it in the first instance. A search of the majority and specially concurring opinions herein (except for the attempt made-in the concurring opinion of Judge Smith, written after the point was raised by this dissent) - fails to disclose any answer to the pertinent question as to why the rule does not govern the case at bar. In fact, neither opinion so much as recognizes it. But the principle is present, is applicable, and cannot be avoided by ignoring its existence. Because'it is controlling in this case I am unable to agree with the majority.
I. It is apparently the holding of the majority and specially concurring opinions that the state permit board has only reviewing powers; that is, it cannot act until the city or town council or board of supervisors, as the ease may be, has either refused to revoke or has failed to take any action. The majority opinion holds that the state permit board has no discretion in issuing its license in the first instance, but must perforce grant the permit as a matter of course when it is advised that the council or the supervisors has granted a license to the applicant. In the absence of legislative action, this will be the law in Iowa upon the filing of the majority opinion herein. This result is not in accordance with well-considered and long-established legal principles, and ends in absurdity.
The duties and powers of the state permit board are defined in section 124.4 of the Code of 1950. The material parts of this statute are set out in the majority opinion. It is necessary only *1160to call attention to two provisions of tbis section to demonstrate the applicability of the rule of law above-cited.
After providing for a review of the action of any council or board of supervisors (referred to hereinafter for brevity as “The lower boards”), section 124.4 says if “such governing bodies have failed to take action, the state permit board shall thereupon ñx a date for the hearing * * This hearing is thus initiated by the state permit board upon its own motion. It has the power, in a proper case, to revoke the license, although the majority here holds that it has no right to deny it in the first instance.
Again the intent of the legislature to authorize the state board to initiate and carry through proceedings for the revocation of class “B” and “C” permits is shown in the final paragraph of the section referred to. This provides that when a petition for revocation has been filed with the lower board by ten or more citizens, or “where the state permit board from its investigation asks that a hearing be had on the revocation of a permit,” if the lower board refuses to hold such hearing the state permit board may upon its own motion conduct such hearing and may revoke the permit. Again the process may be initiated and carried through by the state board. We are asked to accept an interpretation that the state board must issue the permit in the first instance, but may at once commence proceedings to revoke it.
The principle that the power to revoke a license implies the power to deny in the first instance is in accord with common sense and simple logic, and has been followed in Iowa and elsewhere, without deviation or criticism so far as a search of the authorities reveals. In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Alexander, 242 Iowa 364, 375, 45 N.W.2d 258, 265, this court said:
“If the commissioner has power to revoke plaintiff’s license upon the ground asserted by him, he may refuse to issue a license upon such ground. His power to refuse a license is coextensive with his' power, of revocation. It would of course be useless to compel issuance of a license which might at once be revoked.”
The question was directly before the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 182 Okla. 103, 105, *116177 P.2d 26, 28. Tbe Oklahoma statute gave the insurance commissioner the right to “revoke or suspend all certificates of authority” granted to a foreign insurance company if he found such company to be in an unsound condition. No specific statute gave him power to deny the certificate in the first instance. This point was raised by counsel for the insurance company. But the Oklahoma Supreme Court said:
“If a company presented its application with all the forms prescribed by statute, and if the insurance commissioner, after investigation, should be of the opinion that said company was in an unsound condition, or that its condition was such as to render its proceedings hazardous to the public, and if despite his opinion he conld not refuse to issue a license, clearly, under section 10469, supra, it would be his duty, after issuing the license, to promptly revoke the certificate of authority granted. To compel him to do that which he must promptly undo would be an absurdity.” (Italics supplied.)
Certain rules of statutory construction followed by the Oklahoma court are likewise applicable here. Thus it will be presumed that the legislature intended to give effect to all the provisions of the Act, and presumptions will -be indulged in against absurd consequences. When a definite legislative intent is manifested it will be presumed that the subsidiary provisions of the Act are in harmony therewith. See also State ex rel. National Life Assn. v. Matthews, 58 Ohio St. 1, 49 N. E. 1034, 40 L. R. A. 418.
By way of illustration of the effect of the holding of the majority herein, let ns assume that the lower board has issued a class “B” or “C” permit to an applicant not of good character. Good character is an essential requirement. Sections 124.9 and 124.10, Code of 1950. See also Curtis v. DeGood, 238 Iowa 877, 29 N.W.2d 225; Madsen v. Town of Oakland, 219 Iowa 216, 257 N.W. 549. The state permit board, although having knowledge of this lack of a necessary element, must now issue its permit without cavil or question. But it then becomes its right, in fact its duty, to proceed to revocation. The law, as interpreted by the majority, is here requiring of the state permit board a vain thing, a useless and absurd thing.
*1162II. It is suggested that, if the state board should be held to have the right to deny a permit, there is no provision for a hearing for the applicant; that his cause would be determined and his rights affected without notice to him. The short answer to this is that the statutes likewise make no provision for a hearing before the lower boards when he presents his application to them. His application ipust state his case, and if it is unjustly denied he has his recourse to the courts. No reason appears why it should be considered a graver injustice to permit the state board to pass upon his application- without a formal hearing than for the lower board so to do. When the application is filed the applicant knows it is before the governing body and will be acted upon; while he might have no knowledge of an action to revoke unless notice were provided for and a hearing set.
I see no logical escape from the conclusion that the state permit board being given the power to revoke licenses must likewise have the power to deny them originally. I would reverse the holding of the lower court.
Gareield, J., joins in this dissent.