Court Opinion

ID: 9587576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:51.316718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:09.392669
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
This matter comes to us on plaintiffs appeal after the trial court granted defendants’ ORCP 21A(8) motions dismissing plaintiffs claims on the basis that they alleged insufficient facts to constitute claims. The majority holds that plaintiffs complaint states sufficient facts in the first and second claims to constitute a claim, but that the third claim does not. I agree with the majority’s holding regarding the first and second claims, but disagree with its holding concerning the third claim.
The majority correctly recites the rule that, in reviewing a judgment dismissing a claim for failure to state sufficient facts under ORCP 21A(8), we assume the truth of all allegations as well as any inferences that may be drawn from them, and view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. However, the majority fails to apply the rule correctly. Its reasoning rests on the omission of a paragraph alleged in plaintiffs first claim, but not realleged in the third claim. That paragraph says:
“7.
“On or about July 2, 1992, Natkin contacted Defendant Fowler, as agent for Couch, regarding the exceptions noted on the quote which had been provided as alleged in paragraph 6, whereupon, Fowler, as agent for Couch, informed Natkin that the Horizontal Axial Flow Pumps which it was offering, as agent for Couch, would meet all of the contract specifications for the Horizontal Axial Flow Pumps required for the DWWTP project, notwithstanding the exceptions noted on the written offer to Natkin.”
However, in the third claim for relief, plaintiff alleges:
“24.
“On or about July 2, 1992, Fowler personally, and not acting as Agent for Couch, orally guaranteed to Natkin that *320Fowler would see to it that the pumps which were to be supplied by Couch, would meet all of the contract specifications, notwithstanding the exceptions noted on Fowler’s offer, as agent for Couch. Further, Fowler guaranteed that the pumps would have no problems meeting the contract specifications. ’ ’
When paragraph 24 is read with the remaining paragraphs of the third claim and all reasonable inferences are made in favor of plaintiff, the third claim states facts sufficient to constitute a claim for breach of guaranty, as will be demonstrated below.
This case concerns allegations about two offers made by Couch through its agent Fowler. According to plaintiffs pleading, the first offer was made on July 1,1991. That offer contained two exceptions to the specifications for pumps that plaintiff was required to install as part of its bid on work to be done on a waste water treatment plant. The second offer was a modified offer, which deleted the exceptions. The majority holds that there is no allegation in the third claim that Couch made the modified offer. Thus, the majority concludes that, in the absence of an allegation about the modified offer, there can be no enforceable guaranty by Fowler that the pumps would meet all of the contract specifications.
With that background, I turn to the allegations in the third claim. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 6 and 11 through 15 in its third claim. Paragraph 5 says: “On or about July 1,1991, Defendant Fowler, as agent for Couch, submitted a written quote to Natkin’s offices * * * for the pumps * * Paragraph 6 alleges: “The quote submitted by Defendant Fowler contained two exceptions * * Paragraph 24 alleges that Fowler guaranteed to plaintiff that “Fowler would see to it that the pumps which were to be supplied by Couch, would meet all of the contract specifications, notwithstanding the exceptions noted on Fowler’s offer.” (Emphasis supplied.) The second sentence in paragraph 24 alleges that “Fowler guaranteed that the pumps would have no problems meeting the contract specifications.” The effect of paragraph 24 is to allege a guaranty of a promise different than the promise to supply the pumps subject to the exceptions.
The remainder of the allegations allege facts from which an inference can be drawn that Fowler, on behalf of *321Couch, promised to provide pumps that would meet all of the specifications. Paragraph 15 alleges, in pertinent part:
“Despite Natkin’s demand that Couch perform according to its offer, Couch has failed and refused to enter into a contract with Natkin for the * * * pumps which it promised to provide to Natkin * * * and has failed to supply plaintiff with * * * pumps which complied with the contract specifications.” (Emphasis supplied.)
That allegation alleges the promise and the breach of the promise by Couch to supply pumps that complied with the contract specifications. That promise necessarily constitutes a modified promise, because the initial promise contained exceptions.
Moreover, the remainder of the third claim for relief contains facts from which the same inferences can be drawn. Paragraph 25 alleges:
“At the time of making the guaranty, Fowler reasonably expected that its promise that the pumps would meet the contract specifications would result in Natkin taking action * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraph 27 alleges:
“Couch failed and refused, despite Natkin’s demand, to provide * * * pumps for the DWWTP project which would meet all contract specifications.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Paragraph 28 alleges:
“As a result of Couch’s failure to perform, Natkin demanded that Fowler perform, in accordance with its guaranty. Fowler failed and refused to perform. As a result, Natkin was required to reprocure * * * pumps which would meet the contract specifications, from another supplier * * (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be that the pleading of the third claim is not artful. However, that is not a reason to dismiss it under ORCP 21A(8). When all of the allegations in the third claim are read in context, it is apparent that plaintiff alleges a promise by Couch to furnish pumps that would meet all the contract specifications. Necessarily, that promise is a different promise than the promise alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 to furnish pumps that had two “exceptions” to the specifications. Notwithstanding the omission of paragraph 7, the *322majority’s conclusion is wrong in the light of the context of all the allegations in the third claim. When all inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff are drawn, it is apparent that the third claim alleges a promise by Couch and a guaranty of the promise by Fowler.
I dissent as to the majority’s holding about the third claim.