Court Opinion

ID: 9580026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:01:06.598137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:58.860182
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
It has long been the law of Georgia, in keeping with that of other United States jurisdictions, that the attorney-client privilege “includes, by necessity, the network of agents and employees of both the attorney and client, acting under the direction of their respective principals, to facilitate the legal representation.”1 I do not read anything in Division 6 of the majority opinion to signal a retreat from *351this principle.2 With that understanding, I join the Court’s opinion in full.
Decided April 28, 2009.
Brian Steel, Garland, Samuel & Loeb, Donald F. Samuel, Firestone & Morris, Bruce H. Morris, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Christopher R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 21.3 (2d ed.). See Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 692-693 (177 SE 582) (1934); Fire Assn, of Philadelphia v. Fleming, 78 Ga. 733, 738 (3 SE 420) (1887). See also 1 Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 5:5 (2d ed.) (“Both the attorney and the client can be represented by third parties .who serve as their agents. Communications from these individuals are afforded the same protection as communications from the individuals they represent or assist.”) (citation omitted).

 See majority opinion at 347, observing that “[i]n the instant case, the three letters did not involve any communications between Davis and his attorneys,” but instead “were all communications between the private investigator and the attorneys.”