Court Opinion

ID: 9728764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:16:00.155268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:51.825430
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and write further only to emphasize that the majority’s views are totally consistent with those expressed by the Court in Commonwealth v. Fowler, 451 Pa. 505, 304 A.2d 124 (1973). (Plurality opinion).
In Fowler, the petitioner was convinced by a jury of first degree murder1 and robbery. While his motion for a new *149trial and motion in arrest of judgment were pending, petitioner filed an application for bail. The lower court denied petitioner’s bail application and he applied to this Court for bail.
The issue before this Court was whether an individual convicted of first degree murder and facing a mandatory life sentence has a right to bail pending the disposition of post trial motions. The applicable law in effect at the time provided: Pa.R.Crim.P. 4004
(a) “After a verdict of guilty and before sentence is imposed, a defendant shall have the same right to bail as he had before trial.
(b) After sentence, bail may be allowed in such amount as shall be fixed by the trial judge conditioned upon the defendant perfecting an appeal within twenty days. If an appeal is perfected, such bail shall be effective until final determination of the appeal.”
Although this rule vested absolute discretion in granting bail to the trial judge, we stated that “[i]n the exercise of our supervisory capacity we hold that bail should not be granted to one convicted of murder in the first degree between the entry of the verdict and the imposition of formal sentence.” Id., 451 Pa. at 515, 304 A.2d at 129.
In order to insure a prompt determination of post verdict motions and to avoid the possibility of persons languishing in jail, we added that
*150. if post-trial proceedings in a case of first degree murder are not disposed of and the defendant is not sentenced within the stated four-month period, he may then apply for bail. If the trial judge is convinced at that juncture that the defendant neither caused nor consented to the delay, and is provided reasonable assurance against flight, bail may be granted.” (emphasis added) Id., 451 Pa. at 517, 304 A.2d at 130.
Thus, Fowler restricted the discretion of the trial court in granting bail in first degree murder convictions, prohibiting bail in the first four months preceding conviction, and permitting the trial judge to grant bail in his discretion after the four months had elapsed.
Subsequent to our decision in Fowler, we codified its mandate in Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010 A(l). The rule adopted July 23, 1973, replaced former Rule 4004 and now provides:
(1) Capital and Life Imprisonment Cases. The defendant shall not be released on bail upon a finding of guilty of an offense which is punishable by death or life imprisonment. However, if post-verdict motions are not disposed of within a reasonable period of time thereafter, the judge may in his discretion allow bail.
Rule 4010 prevents the trial judge from immediately releasing on bail those defendants subject to life imprisonment or death sentences. A trial judge’s discretion to grant bail vests only after an unreasonable delay in the disposition of post-verdict motions.
In conclusion, the majority correctly recognized that pursuant to Fowler and Rule 4010, a two-month delay between the verdict and the disposition of post-verdict motions was not sufficient to vest the trial judge with discretion to grant bail.
KAUFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion.

. At the time of Fowler’s conviction, the Pa.Crimes Code divided the crime of murder into two degrees, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a) and (b):
(a) Murder of the first degree. — A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree if the actor is engaged in or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, or kidnapping.
(b) Murder of the second degree. — All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the second degree. Murder of the second degree is a felony of the first degree.
Under the Act of December 6, 1972, a person who had been convicted of a murder of the first degree was sentenced to death or life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102. Under the amended current Crimes Code, Act of March 26, 1974, P.L. 213, No. 46, § 4, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502, the offense of murder is divided into three degrees:
*149(a) Murder of the first degree. — A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.
(b) Murder of the second degree. — A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.
(c) Murder of the third degree. — All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a felony of the first degree.
The current Crimes Code also provides that a
. person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment and a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.