Court Opinion

ID: 9777564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:15:17.744611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:56.250046
License: Public Domain

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the error in this case was clearly harmless, so I respectfully dissent to the reversal. Using the tests for harmless error set out in the majority opinion, I make these observations:
• The integrity of the process was not compromised. The communication between the juror and the bailiff was not about the merits of the case or about any ultimate or critical issue. The bailiff did not attempt to answer the juror’s question. Nor did the prosecutor attempt to communicate with the juror; he simply tried to clarify the testimony of an officer who had previously testified about the presence of a nonessential witness at the crime scene.
• The source and nature of the error were innocuous. The juror and the bailiff acted in good faith, and there was no attempt on anyone’s part, including the prosecutor, to contaminate the jury deliberations with any interference or extraneous evidence.
• The State did not emphasize the error. In fact, this criterion is not even applicable to a harmless error analysis for the kind of error involved in this ease. The error was the bailiff’s communication with a juror. Certainly, no one emphasized, or even mentioned, that event to the jury. All the State did was to produce additional evidence on a minor point to clarify previous testimony, and that testimony was not emphasized.
• Declaring this error harmless would certainly not encourage the State to repeat it. Indeed, the actual error assigned in this case is the juror’s communication with the bailiff and the bailiff’s relay of the communication to the prosecutor — not the prosecutor’s attempt to clarify the previous testimony. Obviously, the State cannot repeat this error because it did not commit it in the first place.
• The error could not have had an impact on the jury in any material way, because no *770extraneous evidence or influence was brought to bear on the jury, and the clarification evidence was completely immaterial to the issues of the case. The overwhelming evidence clearly dissipates any effect on the jury’s function of determining the facts, and the error did not contribute to the verdict. The prosecutor merely had Sergeant Jackson clarify what Ronnie Dean had told him about who was present at the scene. Jackson testified that when he said in his earlier testimony that Ronnie Dean told him that his (Dean’s) daughter was present, he meant to say that Dean told him Alexander’s daughter was present. Alexander is the appellant. His daughter, Tatiana Alexander, testified fully at the trial. She said she did not remember any of the events that occurred at the shooting. She said she only remembered her father had a barbecue one day early in 1992, that Robbins (the victim) and Ronnie Dean were there, and that her father had a glass-topped coffee table. All of this testimony related to matters that were undisputed, and the testimony added nothing to the case.
As the error was clearly harmless, I would affirm the conviction.