Court Opinion

ID: 9911727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 18:09:34.623866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:56.134083
License: Public Domain

J-S41035-23

                                   2023 PA Super 270

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANTHONY FLETCHER                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 144 WDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0004877-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                        FILED: December 20, 2023

       Anthony Fletcher appeals from the January 6, 2023 aggregate judgment

of sentence of 50 to 100 years’ imprisonment, to be followed by 85 years’

probation, imposed after he was found guilty of 174 counts related to the

prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter and his possession of child

pornography. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case, as gleaned from

the certified record, are as follows: On April 20, 2021, the Pennsylvania State

Police executed a search warrant at Appellant’s home after the National Center

for Missing and Exploited Children received a report in February 2021 that an

image of child pornography had been uploaded at the IP address associated

with the residence. A subsequent search of the electronic devices found in

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41035-23

Appellant’s home yielded a litany of images of child pornography as well as

multiple videos of Appellant having sex with an unconscious minor. Further

investigation revealed that Appellant had drugged and sexually assaulted his

stepdaughter on multiple occasions between 2013 and 2021.

       On July 7, 2021, Appellant was charged with 219 offenses, including

multiple counts of rape of an unconscious person.1            On March 3, 2022,

Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence obtained

from the search of his residence.              The trial court denied Appellant’s

suppression motion on July 20, 2022. That same day, Appellant waived his

right to a jury and proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Jill E.

Rangos.

       Following a one-day bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of the

following 174 charges: 25 counts of rape of an unconscious person; 15 counts

of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with an unconscious person; 27

counts of sexual assault; 6 counts of aggravated indecent assault of an

unconscious person; 24 counts of indecent assault of an unconscious person;

8 counts of endangering welfare of children; 7 counts of corruption of minors;

16 counts of photographing, videotaping, depicting on computer or filming

sexual acts; 8 counts of possession of child pornography; 8 counts of unlawful

____________________________________________

1 45 counts were later withdrawn.

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contact with a minor; and 30 counts of invasion of privacy.2 On January 6,

2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 50 to 100

years’ imprisonment, to be followed by 85 years’ probation. This timely appeal

followed on February 1, 2023.3

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              1.     Whether the trial court erred when it denied
                     [Appellant’s] pretrial motion to suppress
                     evidence when the Commonwealth failed to
                     demonstrate that the search warrant contained
                     sufficient probable cause?

              2.     Whether the trial court erred in denying
                     [Appellant’s] request for a Franks[4] hearing?

              3.     Whether the [trial court] erred in denying
                     [Appellant’s] motion to recuse?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

I. Probable Cause to Support the Search Warrant

       Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the evidence found in his residence because the search warrant was

not supported by the requisite level of probable cause.         Id. at 11.   We

disagree.

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(3), 3123(a)(3), 3124.1, 3125(a)(4), 3126(a)(4),

4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i), 6312(b)(1) and (2), 6312(d), 6318(a)(1), and
7507.1(a)(1), respectively.

3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

4 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

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      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a denial of a

suppression motion is well settled.

            [Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to
            the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
            determining whether the suppression court’s factual
            findings are supported by the record and whether the
            legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
            Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
            suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
            of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
            for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
            in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
            suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
            the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
            findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
            conclusions are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016).

      “Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual’s

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”          Commonwealth v.

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009); see also U.S.

Const. amend. IV.

            Under the federal and state constitutional prohibitions
            of unreasonable searches and seizures, both the
            United States Supreme Court and this Court have
            consistently held that, subject to certain exceptions, a
            search is constitutionally invalid unless it is conducted
            pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and
            detached magistrate and supported by probable
            cause. Probable cause exists where, based upon a
            totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit

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            of probable cause, including the reliability and veracity
            of hearsay statements included therein, there is a fair
            probability that ... evidence of a crime will be found in
            a particular place. In reviewing an issuing authority’s
            decision to issue a warrant, a suppression court must
            affirm unless the issuing authority had no substantial
            basis for its decision. On appeal, this Court affirms
            the decision of the suppression court unless it
            commits an error of law or makes a factual finding
            without record support.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1063–1064 (Pa. 2013) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 (2014).

      In Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 499 (Pa.Super 2019),

this Court “emphasize[d] that ‘the totality of the circumstances’ set forth in

the affidavit must be considered when examining whether probable cause

supports the issuance of the search warrant.” Id. at 505. The Harlan Court

noted:

            [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for
            the issuance of a search warrant must be answered
            according to the totality of the circumstances test
            articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [503 A.2d
            921 (Pa. 1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which
            incorporates the reasoning of the United States
            Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, [462 U.S. 213
            (1983)]…. The task of the magistrate acting as the
            issuing authority is to make a practical, common
            sense assessment of whether, given all the
            circumstances set forth in the affidavit, a fair
            probability exists that contraband or evidence of a
            crime will be found in a particular place. A search
            warrant is defective if the issuing authority has not
            been supplied with the necessary information. The
            chronology established by the affidavit of probable
            cause must be evaluated according to a common
            sense determination.

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            Further, probable cause is based on a finding of the
            probability, not a prima facie showing, of criminal
            activity, and deference is to be accorded a
            magistrate’s finding of probable cause. We must limit
            our inquiry to the information within the four corners
            of the affidavit submitted in support of probable cause
            when determining whether the warrant was issued
            upon probable cause.

Harlan, 208 A.3d at 505 (internal citation formatting amended; some

citations omitted).

      In both his March 3, 2022 suppression motion and subsequent Rule

1925(b) statement, Appellant detailed his claim of error relating to the

insufficiency of the application for the search warrant.       See Motion to

Suppress, 3/3/22 at ¶¶ 12(a)-(c); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement,

2/21/23 at 2-3. The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim of error in its May

18, 2023 opinion, rejecting his assertion that the time between the upload of

the child pornography image and the search of his residence was too far apart

for the warrant to be supported by probable cause.

      The trial court noted that the affidavit of probable cause included a

nauseatingly-detailed description of the child pornography image uploaded

from a specific IP address, along with verification from Verizon that this IP

address was assigned to Appellant’s home. The trial court stated:

            [T]he warrant in question indicated that Microsoft
            reported an image of child pornography to the
            National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
            which was uploaded from a specific IP address on
            February 2, 2021. The file was a photograph of a nude
            female approximately 5-8 years old, being penetrated
            by two adult males. A second nude female child,

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            approximately 3-5 years old, appears in the
            background of the same photo. The IP address is
            assigned to Verizon. On March 12, 2021, Verizon
            identified the subscriber as Appellant, and the physical
            address corresponding to the IP address as
            [redacted], an address confirmed to be that of
            Appellant. The affidavit of probable cause further
            states that, based upon the officer’s experience and
            training, one image of child pornography is typically
            indicative of a larger collection, which is often secreted
            in a secure and private location, and may be contained
            in devices as small as a micro-SD card. The affiant
            signed the affidavit on April 19, 2021, a period of
            approximately two-and one-half months from the date
            the image was uploaded.

Trial court opinion, 5/18/23 at 3-4.

      The    court then concluded that unlike in drug possession cases,

“[i]mages of child pornography … are rarely disposed and often retained on

computers or other storage devices for prolonged periods of time.           Thus,

evidence of child pornography sent nine and a half months earlier supported

a search of a residence.” Id. at 4. Based on our review, we find the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the record and its legal conclusions

are free of error. Therefore, we shall not disturb the trial court’s ruling.

II. Franks Hearing

      Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request

for a Franks hearing, based upon his assertion that “[t]he affiant intentionally

included a characterization of the internet user [at his residence] as a collector

of child pornography[,]” despite having no evidence of such. Appellant’s brief

at 30-31. This claim is belied by the record.

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      As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized in Commonwealth v.

Iannoccio, 480 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1984):

            [Franks] held that, where a defendant makes a
            substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
            was knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless
            disregard for the truth, included by an affiant in his
            application for a search warrant and where the alleged
            false statement was necessary to a finding of probable
            cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing
            be held at defendant’s request so that he might
            challenge the veracity and integrity of the warrant.

Id. at 974 n.4. In Franks, the United States Supreme Court further held

that, “[t]o mandate an evidentiary hearing … [t]here must be

allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the

truth[.]” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added).

      Following our independent review of the record, we agree with the trial

court’s determination that a Franks hearing was not warranted in this matter.

See trial court opinion, 5/18/23 at 4-5.      The record establishes that the

affidavit in question does not contain a material misstatement of fact, let alone

a knowingly false statement. On the contrary, the affidavit makes a general

statement based on the experience and training of the affiant, Trooper Thomas

J. Maloney, regarding the typical behavior of individuals who possess child

pornography. Namely, Trooper Maloney noted that it is often the case that

someone who has uploaded one image of child pornography will typically have

additional images of child pornography in their possession, which are often

secured in private location or on a micro-SD card. See Application for Search

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Warrant - Affidavit of Probable Cause, 4/19/21 at 7-8.               Accordingly,

Appellant’s second claim of trial court error must fail.

III. Motion to Recuse

      In his final claim, Appellant argues that the Honorable Jill E. Rangos was

biased against him and erred by denying his motion that she recuse herself.

Appellant’s brief at 32. For the reasons that follow, we find that Appellant has

waived this claim.

            Our standard of review of a trial court’s determination
            not to recuse from hearing a case is exceptionally
            deferential. We recognize that our trial judges are
            honorable, fair and competent, and although we
            employ an abuse of discretion standard, we do so
            recognizing that the judge himself is best qualified to
            gauge his ability to preside impartially.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d 387, 391–392 (Pa.Super. 2009)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

      It is well settled that “[j]udicial bias may not be raised for the first time

during post-trial proceedings.” Crawford v. Crawford, 633 A.2d 155, 160

(Pa.Super. 1993) (citation omitted). On the contrary, a party seeking recusal

or disqualification on the basis of judicial bias or impartiality “must raise the

objection at the earliest possible moment, or that party will suffer the

consequence of being time barred.” Commonwealth v. Stafford, 749 A.2d

489, 501 (Pa.Super. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

appeal denied, 795 A.2d 975 (Pa. 2000). The failure to timely move for a

judge’s recusal after the facts allegedly establishing bias come to a

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defendant’s   attention   renders   the   judicial   bias   claim   waived.   See

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 790 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal

denied, 739 A.2d 1056 (Pa. 1999).

      Instantly, we find that Appellant failed to raise his claim of judicial bias

at the earliest possible opportunity.     The record reflects that Appellant’s

counsel made an oral recusal motion on Appellant’s behalf on January 6, 2023,

the date of the sentencing hearing, and Appellant filed a pro se “Petition for

Disqualification (Recusal) of Judge [Rangos]” the prior day. Both of these

motions were made over a year after Judge Rangos entered her first order in

this matter, and nearly 6 months after the conclusion of Appellant’s non-jury

trial, on July 20, 2022. Accordingly, Appellant’s recusal claim was clearly time-

barred and its denial by the trial court was warranted.

      For all the forgoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s January 6, 2023

judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

12/20/2023

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