Court Opinion

ID: 9819472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:26:07.465119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:28.183327
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The Planning Act does not clearly preempt the plaintiffs’ private right of action. The Planning Act creates a specific right for the Planning Board or agency to seek an injunction prohibiting modification without a permit, but also specifically recognizes the existence or pursuit of other remedies: “Notwithstanding the existence or pursuit of any other remedy, the State Board or the Agency may, in the manner provided by law, upon the advice of the Attorney General who shall represent the State Board or the Agency in the proceedings, maintain an action in the name of the State for injunction or other process against any person or governmental unit to restrain or prevent the acquisition of major medical equipment, or the establishment, construction[,] or modification of a health[-]care facility without the required permit, or to restrain or prevent the occupancy or utilization of the equipment acquired or facility which was constructed or modified without the required permit.” 20 ILCS 3960/15 (West 2000). The Planning Act concededly declares the powers and functions exercised and performed by the State to be exclusive to the State and specifically prohibits home-rule units from exercising those powers and functions: “It is hereby specifically declared that the powers and functions exercised and performed by the State pursuant to this [Planning] Act are exclusive to the State of Illinois and that these powers and functions shall not be exercised, either independently or concurrently, by any home[-]rule unit.” 20 ILCS 3960/17 (West 2000). However, nowhere does the Act prevent anyone, even a home-rule unit, from maintaining an action for injunction to require compliance with the Planning Act. This section merely limits the use of the Planning Act’s regulatory powers to the State, not home-rule units. Clearly, section 17 creates exclusivity of the Planning Board’s and Illinois Department of Public Health’s powers and duties as set forth in section 12 (powers and duties of the Planning Board) and section 12.2 (powers of the agency). In other words, the City of Lincoln cannot regulate health-care facilities in the manner set forth in the Planning Act. But, certainly, any individuals harmed by a failure to comply with the Planning Act may sue for an injunction and compliance with the Planning Act. The Planning Act obviously contemplated a private right of action for individuals adversely affected by decisions of the Planning Board: “Any person who is adversely affected by a final decision of the [Planning] Board may have such decision judicially reviewed. The provisions of the Administrative Review Law, as now or hereafter amended, and the rules adopted pursuant thereto shall apply to and govern all proceedings for the judicial review of final administrative decisions of the [Planning] Board. The term ‘administrative decisions’ is as defined in Section 3 — 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 20 ILCS 3960/11 (West 2000). Surely, if a prisoner can sue for mandamus to ensure the Department of Corrections’ (DOC’s) compliance with DOC administrative rules governing grievance procedures, the guardians of residents at the Lincoln Developmental Center can sue for compliance with the closure proceedings set forth in the Planning Act. Moreover, since plaintiffs here are seeking to force public officials to comply with the law and are not seeking tort damages they are, therefore, entitled to request injunctive relief. Reversal is, therefore, not warranted, because the plaintiffs clearly have a private right of action. See Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 688 N.E.2d 81 (1997) (Plaintiffs seeking to force the public officials to do what the law requires may proceed by mandamus to compel them to do so). As quoted above, the Planning Act creates public rights which may be enforced by those affected by its decisions. 20 ILCS 3960/11 (West 2000). Additionally, the purpose of the Planning Act is to “improve the financial ability of the public to obtain necessary health services, and to establish an orderly and comprehensive health[-]care delivery system which will guarantee the availability of quality health care to the general public.” 20 ILCS 3960/2 (West 2000). The public is the stated intended beneficiary of the Planning Act, and clearly the plaintiffs here have standing to sue. As members of the public, these plaintiffs have a protectible interest in ensuring that public officials follow the requirements of public statutes. Local 1894 v. Holsapple, 201 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1049, 559 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1990); Hill v. Butler, 107 Ill. App. 3d 721, 724-25, 437 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (1982) (citizens have right to bring mandamus action to enforce public rights set forth in statute). Moreover, these guardians of residents and employees of the facility clearly have standing to sue for the defendants’ alleged contravention of a clearly mandated public policy and statutory procedure. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing this injunction. I would affirm and remand.