Court Opinion

ID: 9655051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:58:57.335673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:15.788389
License: Public Domain

JOHN B. ROBBINS, Chief Judge, concurring. The process afforded workers’ compensation claimants in Arkansas appears to ensure due process under the Arkansas and United States Constitutions. While I agree with the result reached in this case, I write separately to discuss the standard of review articulated in appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Commission. A conclusion on witness credibility is a finding of fact. See 8 Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 130.05[1][b] (2000). Thus, there must be substantial evidence to support this factual finding like any other finding of fact. Some Arkansas cases, however, fail to accurately articulate, or at least completely articulate, the proper standard of review and instead summarily state that the appellate courts are bound by any credibility determination made by the Commission, leaving no room for reversal of the Commission’s credibility determinations. To the contrary, Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-711 (Repl. 1996), which governs our standard of review of the Commission’s decisions, expressly authorizes this court to reverse findings of fact that are not supported by substantial evidence. This statute states in pertinent part: (b) Award or Order of Commission — Appeal. (1) A compensation order or award of the commission shall become final unless a party to the dispute shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt by him of the order or award, file notice of appeal to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which is designated as the forum for judicial review of those orders and awards. (2) Appeals from the commission to the court shall be allowed as in other civil actions and shall take precedence over all other civil cases appealed to the court. (3) (A) Upon appeal to the court, no additional evidence shall be heard. (B)In the absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the commission, within its powers, shall be conclusive and binding upon the court and shall be given the same force and effect as in cases heretofore decided by the Supreme Court, except subject to review as in subdivision (b)(4) of this section. (4) The court shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the order or award, upon any of the following grounds, and no other: (A) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (B) That the order was procured by fraud; (C) That the facts found by the commission do not support the order or award; or (D) That the order or award was not supported by substantial evidence of record. (Emphasis added.) Subsections (b)(4)(C) and (b)(4)(D) clearly mandate that in reviewing the questions of law, if the facts do not support the decision, or if there is not substantial evidence to support the decision, then we must reverse. These are simply two avenues with a common destination — that is, to perform a review that has some meaning by reviewing the facts upon which a decision is made. The standard of review is reflected in case law as well. We will affirm the Commission if its findings are supported by substantial evidence. Burlington Indus. v. Pickett, 336 Ark. 515, 988 S.W.2d 3 (1999). Substantial evidence is that evidence a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries, 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). A decision of the Commission will not be reversed unless it is determined that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusions if presented with the same facts. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999). Moreover, both the supreme court and our court have said that the determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimonies are matters exclusively within the province of the Commission. See, e.g, Ester v. Nat’l Home Centers, Inc., 335 Ark. 356, 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998); Continental Express v. Harris, 61 Ark. App. 198, 965 S.W.2d 811 (1998). However, this does not mean that the Commission’s decisions are totally insulated from judicial review. Jordan v. J. C. Penney Co., 57 Ark. App. 174, 944 S.W.2d 547 (1997). Nor does it mean that the Commission may arbitrarily disregard the testimony of any witness. Boyd v. Dana Corp., 62 Ark. App. 78, 966 S.W.2d 946 (1998). Thus, given that a credibility determination is a finding of fact that must be supported by substantial evidence, there appears to be an inherent contradiction in the authorities governing review of the Commission’s credibility determinations. This contradiction is readily resolved by simply clarifying that the substantial evidence standard of review, as authorized in section 11 -9-711 (b)(4)(C) and (D), includes credibility determinations made by the Commission. If we are prepared to stand behind the constitutionality of the Commission’s ability to discern credibility on a “cold record,” then we should be equally prepared to apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the Commission’s finding of fact on credibility of witnesses, instead of simply declaring that we are “bound” by it, as we did in Daniels v. Affiliated Foods Southwest, 70 Ark. App. 319, 17 S.W.3d 817 (2000), Ford v. Chemipulp Process, Inc., 63 Ark. App. 260, 977 S.W.2d 5 (1998), Express Human Resources III v. Terry, 61 Ark. App. 258, 968 S.W.2d 630 (1998), and Linthicum v. Mar-Bax Shirt Co., 23 Ark. App. 26, 741 S.W.2d 275 (1987), to name a few. What is missing from these cases is a statement of the statutory authorization providing for appellate review of the facts supporting the Commission’s decision, which we recognized in Boyd v. Dana Corp., supra. What is also missing from these cases is the statement that we are bound by the Commission’s credibility determinations only where they are supported by substantial evidence. Other factors, such as plausibility of the witness’s testimony, the consistency of the testimony with the other evidence, the interest of the witness in the outcome of the case, and the bias, prejudice, or motives of the witness, must play a part in the Commission’s analysis. See Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Observations of demeanor or appearance are often denoted as “testimonial inferences,” whereas those inferences drawn from the substance of the testimony or the evidence are often called “derivative inferences.” See Kroger Co. v. Morris, 415 S.E.2d 879 (Va. 1992). Our supreme court has recognized that the Commission may rely on the administrative law judge’s observations and comments concerning the claimant’s demeanor, conduct, appearance, or reactions at the hearing. See Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh’s, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989). The appellate courts can likewise take into consideration those same factors and infer-enees, when reflected in the record, in determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding on credibility. We should restate this standard of review to more accurately describe the review we are required to give, and to ensure a common-sense, fair, and even-handed application of it. In this case, the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the conclusion on credibility, and the majority opinion reflects consideration of the relevant factors bearing on that factual conclusion, and therefore I concur. I am authorized to state that Judge GRIFFEN joins in this concurrence.