Court Opinion

ID: 9854162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:02:09.13025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:57.728208
License: Public Domain

RANSOM, Justice (specially concurring). I concur that a new trial should be denied and that the judgment and sentence of the trial court should be affirmed. I wish, however, to express my view of a distinction to be made when jury selection is implicated and when it is not implicated in a defendant’s claim that a juror has been disqualified by bias or otherwise, or that deliberations have been tainted. Jury selection implicated. In general, if a defendant makes a prima facie showing that a juror misrepresented a material fact during voir dire, then the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether the juror did, indeed, expressly or tacitly misrepresent a material fact.1 If the juror did not do so, then defendant is entitled to no new trial and the inquiry is at an end, unless, alternatively, as I believe to be the case at hand, there also is a claim of disqualification in which voir dire is not implicated. If the juror did expressly or tacitly misrepresent a material fact, then the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether the misrepresentation was dishonest or simply an inadvertent mistake. If the answer was a dishonest one, then a new trial is required under the sixth amendment to the Constitution.2 If the answer was not dishonest, the defendant yet is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether a disqualification (related to the misrepresentation) is actually or presumptively present, i.e., its disclosure on voir dire would have required excusal.3 If so, then a new trial is required. If not, then no new trial is required. Jury selection not implicated. Evidence Rule 11-606(B), like its federal counterpart, provides that jurors are incompetent to testify about their deliberations, emotions, or the effect of anything on their state of mind while deliberating, except that jurors may testify concerning extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence.4 This rule does not apply, however, to the above-discussed question of dishonesty or bias connected with misrepresentations on voir dire.5  While misrepresentations made on voir dire may indicate sixth amendment constitutional defects in the jury selection process, the express exceptions to Rule 606(B) allow a defendant to raise a fifth amendment due process challenge to alleged taints in the jury deliberation process.6 If the claim is not within the Rule 11-606(B) extraneous information or outside influence exceptions, some courts, ours among them, hold the defendant still is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, at least when the offer of proof constitutes a clear, strong showing that a juror’s disqualifying state, of mind resulted in a deprivation of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.7 If such a showing is made, then the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether a disqualification is actually or presumptively present.8 Arguably, that was the state of things here. It is only the due process inquiry, under the express exceptions to Rule 606(b), that turns on whether there was prejudice to the defendant. If a defendant makes a preliminary showing of the existence of extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence that implicates a due process violation, the court must conduct a hearing to determine the existence of a taint on the jury deliberation process.9 The introduction of extraneous prejudicial information or the presence of improper outside influence creates a presumption of prejudice.10 If, at the hearing, the trial court finds a reasonable possibility of prejudice, a new trial should be granted.11  Juror not shown to have answered question dishonestly, nor shown to have been actually or presumptively biased. On her claim that voir dire was implicated, defendant here received an evidentiary hearing as to whether juror Griego expressly or tacitly misrepresented a material fact. I am satisfied there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court that Griego did not misrepresent a material fact. Even were I to conclude otherwise, the evidence did not show that Griego’s answers were dishonest, nor does the mere fact of Griego’s prior psychological counselling establish actual or presumptive bias such as would have required his excusal. Consequently, no new trial was required based on misrepresentations during voir dire. However, because of the showing made, Justice Montgomery posits in his dissent that the issue of bias (unrelated to the voir dire) was before the court on juror Griego's testimony concerning his “special insight” into defendant’s character. The court made no finding one way or the other on the question of bias. After finding no misrepresentation of material fact, the trial court noted that defendant had failed to establish actual prejudice flowing from Griego’s having been seated as a juror. As discussed above, there was here no issue of prejudice to defendant regardless of whether voir dire was implicated. Taint in the deliberation process was not the question, and no Rule 11-606(B) objection was made; I, therefore, agree with the dissent that the pertinent inquiry at this point was one of bias, not prejudice. If the judge who presided at trial had not since retired from the bench, it would be appropriate for us to remand for the trial court to decide whether such bias was actually or presumptively present. However, since the judge has retired from the bench, I believe it comports better with justice for this Court to review the record to determine whether bias actually or presumptively was present. From my review of the record, I am satisfied that it was not. The evidence reasonably may be read to indicate, as suggested by Justice Montgomery’s description in his dissenting opinion, that Griego’s testimony revealed deep-seated attitudes about mental illness, and that these attitudes made him an unsuitable juror. I agree that such a finding would require the grant of a new trial. However, as noted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a related context: Jurors are expected to bring commonly known facts and their experiences to bear in arriving at their verdict. We cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions of the jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies. These involve the very human elements that constitute one of the strengths of our jury system. Shillcut v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting State v. Poh, 116 Wis.2d 510, 518, 343 N.W.2d 108, 113 (1984)). It follows that jurors may bring to bear somewhat eccentric beliefs in arriving at their conclusions without those beliefs necessarily amounting to bias that would violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Here, I read the evidence to indicate that Griego took with him to the jury box the store of his past experience and certain religious and attitudinal dispositions; that these characteristics did not amount to bias against the defendant or her insanity defense; that these characteristics nevertheless led Griego to make a preliminary judgment on Pierce’s defense theory; and that this judgment was confirmed for Griego by the weight of the evidence. Griego stated that he had known mentally ill persons in the past, and the newspaper reporter testified that Griego had expressed some sympathy for the defendant. Moreover, the reporter testified that Griégo’s comments showed his familiarity with the evidence presented at trial. Griego explained how he viewed the case thus: [T]aking an apple apart, when you see why its wormed — why the apple is wormed, why it is rotting inside. It looks so pretty, and you can take that apart, like we took Darci Pierce apart. This evidence supports my interpretation that Griego was not biased against the insanity defense, but that, in his judgment, the defense was not proved in this case. I note that no evidence was presented to indicate a belief by Griego that all mentally ill persons were possessed by the devil, or that mentally ill persons always should be held accountable for their actions. For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.  . See Mares v. State, 83 N.M. 225, 490 P.2d 667 (1971) (right to impartial jury implicated when juror has mistakenly or willfully misrepresented material fact during voir dire); United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.1984) (defendant entitled to evidentiary hearing upon making prima facie showing that juror misrepresentation during voir dire deprived defendant of right to impartial jury).   . McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984).   . Id. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850 (Justice Blackmun concurring, joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor); see generally Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (O’Connor, Justice, concurring) (no finding of bias necessary when presumed or implied bias exists because, e.g., a juror is employed by the district attorney’s office, is a close relative to one of the participants, is a witness, or is involved in some manner in the criminal transaction at issue).   . See United States v. Tanner, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987) (discussing Rule in detail, but concluding that allegations of alcohol and drug use by jurors did not constitute allegation of external influence).   . State v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 595, 566 P.2d 843 (Ct.App.1977); Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 853 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 872, 106 S.Ct. 194, 88 L.Ed.2d 163 (1985); see generally 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 606[04], at 606-33 (1989).   . State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 590-92, 762 P.2d 250, 252-54 (1988) (extraneous information created a presumption of prejudice that the trial court reasonably found to have been overcome); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) (right to fair trial required evidentiary hearing and determination of prejudice). Extraneous prejudicial information and outside influence also may implicate the defendant’s sixth amendment right to confront evidence. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364, 87 S.Ct. 468, 470, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966) (prejudicial remarks by bailiff to jurors). The • Parker Court noted that the bailiffs unauthorized conduct also "involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.” Id. at 365, 87 S.Ct. at 471 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1637-38, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965)).   .Sacoman, 107 N.M. at 590-93, 762 P.2d at 252-55. One of the claims of extraneous prejudicial information in Sacoman involved a story fabricated by one of the jurors on the final day of deliberations that tended to undermine the defendant's alibi defense. We analyzed this claim first in terms of its prejudicial impact on the verdict. Id. at 592, 762 P.2d at 254. We also addressed the defendant’s claim that the juror’s misconduct in fabricating the story and in perjuring herself when initially asked about the incident by the trial court established a disqualification of the juror for dishonesty and bias. Under the circumstances, we concluded that the juror’s misconduct reasonably could be found to have been motivated only by her appraisal of the evidence heard .at trial and her desire for peer recognition, and therefore affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Id. at 593, 762 P.2d at 255. See also Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d at 853-54 (further inquiry not warranted by unnotorized juror statement that, after trial, she found herself unable to return verdict of other than guilty given extent of pretrial publicity in case, notwithstanding her good faith answer to question on voir dire that she could be impartial); King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir.) (weakly authenticated, vague, and speculative material attributed to juror was not a clear, strong showing that warranted further inquiry), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850, 99 S.Ct. 155, 58 L.Ed.2d 154 (1978); United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1974) (allegation of juror incompetence), cited with approval in United States v. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125, 107 S.Ct. at 2750. Some courts have suggested that Rule 606(B) creates an absolute bar to post-verdict testimony of this sort. See, e.g., United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 101 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed.2d 471 (1980). In Shilcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (1987), by contrast, the court limited itself to consideration of whether a racially biased remark prejudicially affected the verdict. 827 F.2d at 1159. Cf. Wright v. United States, 559 F.Supp. 1139, 1151-52 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (allegation that juror was racially biased should be considered on case-by-case basis to avoid trampling the sixth amendment guarantee to a fair trial and impartial jury), aff’d, 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 779, 83 L.Ed.2d 774 (1985).   . If either a sixth amendment disqualification or a fifth amendment taint is present, it must be determined whether actual or constructive notice of the disqualification or taint was had by the defendant before the verdict was rendered. If not, then a new trial is required. If notice of disqualification or taint was had prior to verdict, then it must be determined whether the defendant preserved error. If he did, then a new trial is required. If error was not preserved, then defendant would be entitled to a new trial only upon a finding of fundamental error. See State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 760 P.2d 1276 (1988) (even when defendant did not move for mistrial until after verdict, trial court had duty to make record and rule on any fundamental error regarding whether one juror did not understand English and regarding communications about that subject between court and jury outside defendant’s presence).   . Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30, 74 S.Ct. at 451-52.   . Id. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451 (any direct or indirect private communication, contact, or tampering with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the court is deemed presumptively prejudicial if not made pursuant to known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court during trial, and with the full knowledge of the parties); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (while Rule 606(B) effectively precludes defendant from showing the affect on verdict of improper communication to jury, presumption that improper communication amounts to prejudice satisfies the requirements of due process); cf. Lacy v. Gabriel, 567 F.Supp. 467, 469 (D.Mass.1985) (allegations that juror’s unmasking of excluded portion of photographic evidence deprived defendant of the right to confront the evidence against him analyzed in terms of the impact of the evidence on an "average” or "reasonable" juror, rather than in terms of its actual effect on the jurors involved).   . State v. Jane Doe, 101 N.M. 363, 683 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1983).