Court Opinion

ID: 9647332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:32:24.985109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:48.051115
License: Public Domain

*137NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
A careful reading of this record indicates that counsel did not seek to introduce as an issue for the jury’s consideration the defense of duress as defined under 18 Pa.C.S. § 309(a). To the contrary, his efforts were directed towards showing the absence of an intent to defraud. As the majority concedes “[i]t is well established that, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4105, supra, the legislature intended to denominate the passing of a check for which there are insufficient funds, where the insufficiency is within the knowledge of the issuer, as a crime regardless of whether the issuer possessed a specific intent to defraud.” Thus, since this request for a point for charge was offered to dispute an element not required by the crime charged, the trial court properly refused that request. See Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179, 415 A.2d 399 (1980); Commonwealth v. Tervalon, 463 Pa. 581, 345 A.2d 671 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 409 Pa. 492, 187 A.2d 563 (1963).
The question of the defense of duress was first injected in this matter as a result of the opinion of the dissenting member of the three-judge Superior Court panel. Commonwealth v. Kyslinger, 305 Pa.Super. 626, 450 A.2d 1066 (1982) (Beck, J., memorandum dissenting statement). Even before this Court, in his brief, appellant entitles this assignment of error: “The Court’s charge to the jury was inadequate and improper as it omitted [an instruction on] ... the defense of duress.” Following this caption he immediately proceeds to argue: “The Court improperly instructed the jury as to the elements of the offense as it omitted the element of consideration.” Brief for Appellant at 21.
While this series of events may suggest some basis for a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel, that issue is not presently before this Court. The only question presented is whether the Court correctly refused a point of charge where the reason offered for its approval was clearly erroneous. In such a setting, the trial judge must be affirmed and the majority’s failure to do so occasions my dissent.