Court Opinion

ID: 9300629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:07:04.493652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:40.330426
License: Public Domain

McKENNAN, Circuit Judge.
The court below permitted the United States to prove, by the officers who made the seizure, upon what previous information they acted and from whom that information was derived, and also by their informant, what he had told them, touching the proposed illegal importation of the goods. The conversations offered to be proved occurred in the absence of the claimant, and were objected to as hearsay, and it is now urged that the proof of them ought to have been excluded upon that ground. If the claimant were the subject against which the proceeding was directed and was. therefore, necessarily a party to it, there might be force in the objection, as the reason of the rule which excludes hearsay evidence might be invoked in his favor. But he was a voluntary inter-vener, the goods themselves being the defendant and offender, if there was any of-fence, and subject to the punitive consequences of a violation of the law committed by any person in reference to them. In U. S. v. 0G1 Bales of Tobacco [Case No. 1G.297], Judge Blatchford said: “If any person does so and so, in regard to goods, they are forfeited. In all the statutes the merchandise is personated, the merchandise is called the offender; and if any person does in regard to that merchandise.—and, for the purposes of this case. I will limit it to any person lawfully connected with the merchandise,— if any person does the forbidden acts, the merchandise is forfeited. It is not like an indictment, in a criminal case, where personal guilt must be brought home to the individual, and where 'he is not responsible criminally for the acts of another; but in this case, and in all cases of this kind, the merchandise is responsible for the forbidden act of any person connected with it.” So also, said Mr. Justice Strong, in his opinion in this case: “This is not a proceeding against the importers. It is against the goods imported. They are treated as guilty.”
It is plain, therefore, that if the communications to the revenue officers, proposed to be proved, were relevant to the inquiry in hand, they were not objectionable because they were made in the absence of the claimant. There was evidence to show that the goods were imported, and were removed from the vessel in violation of law, and it was necessary to determine whether a violation of law was actually intended. Was it not then pertinent to show, that what was done in reference to the goods was in pursuance of a prearranged plan; that the fact of an intended illegal importation was known to the officers before hand? And if the subsequent mode of dealing with them by the person in whose control they were accorded with the information given to the officers, as to what was proposed to be done, may not the essential illegal intent be impressed upon the goods? If an illegal act is committed, may not information communicated to an officer, within the scope of his duty, of a purpose to commit it and of the manner of committing it, although not derived directly from the wrong doer, be considered to characterize the intent with which the act was committed ? Indeed, I think,' where a seizure has been made, and the question is whether it was warrantable, information of a purpose to do an act, touching the subject of it, which is verified by the commission of the act, may properly be regarded as so connected with the act itself, as to constitute part of the res gestae, and is provable as such, in proceedings of this kind. Evidence of a kindred character was allowed in the case of U. S. v. 661 Bales of Tobacco, supra, the judge saying, “It was admissible under the decisions of the supreme court, not for the purpose of proving the body of the offence, but for the purpose of characterizing the intent with which a given act may have been done.”
I do not understand the court below as having unqualifiedly instructed the jury that the burden of proof, as to fraudulent intent, was upon the claimant. The language of the judge was: “You must commence your inquiry with this proposition, that the importation of the goods was contrary to law. That much has been settled in the case in the previous trial. Then, if you are of the opinion, from the tacts shown, that Mr. Bean knew that his method of bringing in the mercandise was unlawful, the burden rests upon him to satisfy you by affirmative proof, that he did noc adopt this method for the purpose of evading the payment of duties, but for some ofher and lawful purpose, as, for instance, to save freight, or to save time in the matter of transportation. But, if you are of opinion, that he was not aware that such a mode of bringing in or unloading of the goods was contrary to law; then the government is obliged to establish by positive proof to your satisfaction, that all the steps taken by him, in the direction *167of their transportation, were taken with a fraudulent intent, to wit, for the purpose of getting the merchandise into the country without the paying of duties.” There is no error in this. Its obvious import is, that, if the claimant knew he was violating the law, an intent to evade the duties might fairly be imputed to him by the jury, and that hence it devolved upon him to present satisfactory counter proof that he was actuated by a lawful purpose In other words, that the presumption of fraudulent intent arising from wilful violation of the law, shifted upon the claimant the burden of proving the absence of sucn intent. This does not confound guilty knowledge with fraudulent intent, but correctly states, that an intent to evade the payment of duties and thus to defraud the government, may properly be inferred from an overt wilful violation of law, and that the duty of disproving this unfavorable inference devolved upon the claimant.
No special, notice of the other errors assigned seems to me to be necessary. It is sufficient to say, that I do not think they are sustained. The judgment is affirmed.