Court Opinion

ID: 9915313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 06:04:50.211838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:49.763035
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 4, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    Nos. 361966; 361968
                                                                     Cass Circuit Court
KEVIN LEE HANNER,                                                    LC Nos. 2021-010127-FH; 2020-
                                                                              010287-FH
               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In these consolidated appeals,1 defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of
six counts of aggravated possession of child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4)(b);
six counts of possession of child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4)(a); and three counts
of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (sexual penetration of a
victim between 13 and 16 years of age). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve life imprisonment for each count of aggravated possession
of child sexually abusive material, 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each count of possession of
child sexually abusive material, and life imprisonment for each count of CSC-III, with the
sentences to be served concurrently. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm defendant’s
convictions and sentences, but we remand for correction of ministerial errors in defendant’s
judgments of sentence.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       In 2020, defendant and the victim met through a dating app. At the time, the victim was
14 years old and defendant was 51 years old. Defendant gained the victim’s trust through text and
social media messages. The victim testified that he told defendant that he was almost 15 years
old. Eventually, defendant began meeting the victim in person, picking him up late at night from

1
 People v Hanner, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 7, 2022 (Docket
Nos. 361966 and 361968).

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a location near the victim’s home. On these occasions, defendant took the victim to defendant’s
apartment.

        The victim testified that initially, he and defendant just talked and the victim thought of
defendant as someone whom he could trust and in whom he could confide while he was going
through a difficult time. Over time, however, defendant began to sexually assault the victim. The
victim testified these incidents included multiple sexual acts involving penetration.

        One night, the victim decided to run away from home. Defendant had told the victim that
he could provide the victim with a place to stay if the victim ever wanted to run away. That night,
the victim packed his belongings, and defendant picked him up and drove him to a house that
defendant owned. Family members discovered that the victim was missing the next morning and
called the police. Officers were able to locate the victim by pinging his cell phone, and they
returned the victim to his family.

        The victim later told the police that defendant sexually assaulted him, and police officers
obtained search warrants for defendant’s apartment and defendant’s house. During their search,
officers seized various computers, phones, and other electronic devices on which they found
defendant’s messages to the victim, as well as numerous images and videos of children being
sexual abused.

      Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced as previously stated.
Defendant now appeals.

                                           II. JOINDER

        Defendant was charged in two separate cases in the Cass Circuit Court. In one case, the
prosecutor charged defendant with three counts of CSC-III for his sexual assaults of the victim. In
the other case, the prosecutor charged defendant with six counts of aggravated possession of child
sexually abusive material and six counts of possession of child sexually abusive material. The
prosecution moved to join the cases for trial, and the trial court granted the motion. Defendant
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously granted the prosecutor’s
motion to join the cases for trial.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “To determine whether joinder is permissible, a trial court must first find the relevant facts
and then must decide whether those facts constitute ‘related’ offenses for which joinder is
appropriate.” People v Williams, 483 Mich 226, 231; 769 NW2d 605 (2009). Because the question
whether joinder is appropriate presents a mixed question of law and fact, we review a trial court’s
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and we review de novo the legal question
whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied MCR 6.120, which is the relevant court
rule. Id. A trial court’s ultimate ruling on a motion under MCR 6.120 is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Girard, 269 Mich App 15, 17; 709 NW2d 229 (2005).

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                                           B. ANALYSIS

       MCR 6.120(B) addresses the permissive joinder of criminal cases after a defendant has
been charged, and it provides in relevant part as follows:

              On its own initiative, the motion of a party, or the stipulation of all parties,
       except as provided in subrule (C), the court may join offenses charged in two or
       more informations or indictments against a single defendant, or sever offenses
       charged in a single information or indictment against a single defendant, when
       appropriate to promote fairness to the parties and a fair determination of the
       defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.

               (1) Joinder is appropriate if the offenses are related. For purposes of this
       rule, offenses are related if they are based on

               (a) the same conduct or transaction, or

               (b) a series of connected acts, or

               (c) a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.

               (2) Other relevant factors include the timeliness of the motion, the drain on
       the parties’ resources, the potential for confusion or prejudice stemming from either
       the number of charges or the complexity or nature of the evidence, the potential for
       harassment, the convenience of witnesses, and the parties’ readiness for trial.

       Additionally, MCR 6.120(C) states, “On the defendant’s motion, the court must sever for
separate trials offenses that are not related as defined in subrule (B)(1).” (Emphasis added.)

        “When construing a court rule, we begin with its plain language; when that language is
unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed, without further judicial construction or
interpretation.” Williams, 483 Mich at 232. Under the plain language of MCR 6.120(B)(1), joinder
is “appropriate if the offenses are related,” meaning that the offenses are either “based on (a) the
same conduct or transaction, or (b) a series of connected acts, or (c) a series of acts constituting
parts of a single scheme or plan.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, although MCR 6.120(B)(2)
contains “[o]ther relevant factors” for the trial court to consider when deciding the issue of joinder,
those factors do not become relevant to the joinder analysis unless the offenses are related as
defined in subrule (B)(1); the plain language of the court rule is clear that it is a necessary
requirement for joinder that the offenses are “related.”

       In support of this conclusion, we first look to MCR 6.120(B)(1), which provides that
joinder “is appropriate if the offenses are related.” (Emphasis added.) The inverse of this
proposition is that if the offenses are not related, then joinder is not appropriate. Indeed, MCR
6.120(C) expressly adopts the inverse proposition of MCR 6.120(B)(1) by requiring that on “the
defendant’s motion, the court must sever for separate trials offenses that are not related as defined
in subrule (B)(1).” (Emphasis added.) A trial court may not rely on “other factors”—such as
overlapping evidence, convenience, or other factors included in MCR 6.120(B)(2)—to justify the

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joinder of charges that are not “related” as defined in MCR 6.120(B)(1). See Williams, 483 Mich
at 231 (“To determine whether joinder is permissible, a trial court must first find the relevant facts
and then must decide whether those facts constitute “related” offenses for which joinder is
appropriate.”) (emphasis added); id. at 237 (“[W]hen the joined counts are logically related, and
there is a large area of overlapping proof, joinder is appropriate.”) (quotation marks and citations
omitted; emphasis added); see also People v Breining, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
of Appeals, issued June 2, 2022 (Docket No. 357633) (LETICA, P.J., dissenting), p 9 (“[T]he proper
test for determining whether offenses may be joined for trial is whether they are related under
MCR 6.120(B)(1), not whether the evidence could be offered for a proper purpose under MRE
404(b) in a trial on the other charge.”).

        Here, defendant’s charges for CSC-III and possession of child sexually abusive material
did not fall within any of the definitions in MCR 6.120(B)(1) for offenses to be considered
“related.” The CSC-III offenses involved defendant’s sexual abuse of the victim while the child
sexually abusive material offenses involved defendant’s viewing of abuse committed against other
victims. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no evidence of any material
connection between defendant’s CSC-III offenses and his possession of child sexually abusive
material offenses other than that both offenses were committed by defendant and generally
involved the sexual abuse of underage boys.

        The fact that defendant communicated with the victim using electronic devices, and also
viewed child sexually abusive material on electronic devices, without additional facts, does not
demonstrate that these offenses were either “based on (a) the same conduct or transaction, or (b) a
series of connected acts, or (c) a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” MCR
6.120(B)(1); see also Girard, 269 Mich App at 18 (concluding that joinder of the defendant’s CSC-
I charges and the charges of possession of child sexually abusive material was not erroneous where
there was evidence that the defendant viewed child pornography while sexually abusing the
complainant); Williams, 483 Mich at 235 (stating that mere similarity in character between two
offenses does not make them “related.”).

        Here, there was no showing that defendant used the child sexually abusive material before
or during his abuse of the victim, shared the child sexually abusive photos with the victim, took
sexually abusive photos of the victim, or that there was some other connection that would
demonstrate that defendant’s sexual abuse of the victim and his possession of child sexually
abusive material were part of the same transaction, a series of connected acts, or part of a single
scheme or plan. On this record, there was no material connection between the two types of offense
conduct. Here, the trial court should have conducted a more rigorous analysis of the facts before
granting the prosecutor’s motion to join the cases, and its failure to do so led to the erroneous
conclusion that the offenses were related. Williams, 483 Mich at 231.

       However, even if a defendant shows that joinder was erroneous, reversal is not required
unless “after an examination of the entire cause, it affirmatively appears that it is more probable
than not that the error was outcome determinative” or affirmance “ ‘appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice.’ ” Williams, 483 Mich at 243 (citations omitted). It is
defendant’s burden to demonstrate the requisite prejudice. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495;
596 NW2d 607 (1999).

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         Here, defendant has not demonstrated on appeal how the outcome in the trial court would
have been different had he been tried in two separate trials because he has failed on appeal to
address the application of MCL 768.27a. That statute provides in relevant part that “in a criminal
case in which the defendant is accused of committing a listed offense against a minor, evidence
that the defendant committed another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” MCL 768.27a(1). Defendant’s
offenses are “listed offense[s]” for purposes of this statute. MCL 768.27a(2)(a); MCL 28.722(i),
(r)(i), and (v)(iv). “The admissibility of evidence in other trials is an important consideration
because ‘[j]oinder of . . . other crimes cannot prejudice the defendant more than he would have
been by the admissibility of the other evidence in a separate trial.’ ” Williams, 483 Mich at 237
(citation omitted; alteration and ellipsis in original). Defendant’s brief on appeal does not contain
any reference to MCL 768.27a or any analysis of how the evidence of his possession of child
sexually abusive material could have been excluded in a trial on his CSC-III charges, or vica versa,
had there been two separate trials. Defendant has thus failed to show prejudice, and accordingly,
reversal of his convictions is not required.

                                     III. JURY SELECTION

        Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly
denied his challenge for cause to excuse a potential juror, which forced defendant to use a
peremptory challenge to excuse the juror, and defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges
before the jury was seated.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a challenge to a juror
for cause based on juror bias. People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 521; 616 NW2d 710 (2000).
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside the range of principled
outcomes.” People v Korkigian, 334 Mich App 481, 489; 965 NW2d 222 (2020) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). However, if a defendant “shows that a prospective juror falls within the
parameters of one of the grounds enumerated in MCR 2.511(D), the trial court is without discretion
to retain that juror, who must be excused for cause.” People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379, 383;
677 NW2d 76 (2004).

                                          B. ANALYSIS

        “[A] criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury . . . .”
People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 547; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). The rules for impaneling a jury are
set forth in MCR 2.511. Challenges for cause are addressed in MCR 2.511(D), which provides in
relevant part as follows:

       The parties may challenge jurors for cause, and the court shall rule on each
       challenge. A juror challenged for cause may be directed to answer questions
       pertinent to the inquiry. It is grounds for a challenge for cause that the person:

                                               * * *

               (2) is biased for or against a party or attorney;

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                (3) shows a state of mind that will prevent the person from rendering a just
        verdict, or has formed a positive opinion on the facts of the case or on what the
        outcome should be;

                (4) has opinions or conscientious scruples that would improperly influence
        the person’s verdict[.]

        Defendant moved to excuse a juror for cause after the juror indicated that, if he were
defendant, he might not want him as a juror on his jury because he worked as a Children’s
Protective Services (CPS) investigator. However, defendant did not show that the juror was biased
or had a state of mind that would interfere with his ability to render a just verdict. The trial court
questioned the juror about his ability to be fair; the juror stated that he had no knowledge of, or
opinion about, the case or any preconceived notions about defendant; and he indicated that he
understood that he must rely on evidence presented in order to render a just and fair verdict.
Although defense counsel questioned the juror’s ability to be fair considering his answer to
whether he would want the juror on his jury as a defendant, the trial court thoroughly vetted the
question of the juror’s actual bias, and the juror assured the trial court that he could be fair and
impartial. In response to defendant’s challenge for cause, the trial court found that the juror
indicated “that he thinks he could make his decision based on the evidence” and that “he could be
a fair and impartial juror in this case.”

         “This Court defers to the trial court’s superior ability to assess from a venireman’s
demeanor whether the person would be impartial.” Williams, 241 Mich App at 522. The juror’s
job was not, by itself, a sufficient reason to excuse him for cause. See People v Walker, 162 Mich
App 60, 64-65; 412 NW2d 244 (1987) (“The fact that juror Mayotte was a police officer is not of
itself sufficient to warrant an inference of bias.”). If a juror expresses a strong opinion about a
matter at issue in a trial, as well as an expressed inability to set aside that opinion, it is a cause for
removal for reasons of bias. Poet v Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp, 433 Mich 228, 237, 238,
249-250, 252 n 20; 445 NW2d 115 (1989). Defendant has not shown that this occurred in this
case. The juror did not express strong feelings that reflected an inability to be impartial. He simply
stated that his job could create bias, but he then said that he had no bias and that he could render a
fair and impartial verdict. “A juror who expresses an opinion referring to some circumstance of
the case which is not positive in character, but swears he can render an impartial verdict, may not
be challenged for cause.” People v Roupe, 150 Mich App 469, 474; 389 NW2d 449 (1986).

        For these reasons, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s challenge for cause.
Thereafter, defense counsel was free to use a peremptory challenge to excuse the juror, which he
did, and, when his challenges were exhausted, defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the jury.
Defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

                                          IV. SENTENCING

       Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court’s upward
departure sentences of life imprisonment for the CSC-III convictions and for his six convictions
of aggravated possession of child sexually abusive material constituted an abuse of discretion.

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                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We review a departure sentence for an abuse of discretion to determine whether the
sentence was reasonable. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). We
determine whether a sentence is reasonable by taking into account the sentencing guidelines and
also determining whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the
offender. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471, 474-475; 902 NW2d 327 (2017).

                                          B. ANALYSIS

         As a fourth-offense habitual offender, defendant had to be sentenced to a minimum term
of at least 25 years in prison. A trial court is not bound to select a minimum sentence that is within
the range provided under the sentencing guidelines, and this Court’s review of a decision to depart
from the guidelines is for reasonableness. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 365. If a trial court does not
find that the sentencing guidelines are proportionate to the offense and the offender, the court must
“justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review.” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 470
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Some examples of factors to consider when “determining
whether a departure sentence is more proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines range”
include (1) “whether the guidelines accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime,” (2) “factors
not considered by the guidelines,” (3) “factors considered by the guidelines but given inadequate
weight,” (4) “the defendant’s misconduct while in custody,” (5) “the defendant’s expressions of
remorse,” and (6) “the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich
App 490, 525 & n 9; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Here, the trial court explained that the sentencing guidelines did not adequately take into
account the need to protect society from someone with defendant’s history of repeated child sexual
abuse, as well as his possession of thousands of child sexually abusive images involving children
as young as toddlers, some of which included children who were bound or unconscious. The court
further observed that defendant had shown no remorse for any of his conduct and, rather than
attempting to benefit from rehabilitation, he has instead become “treatment savvy,” so that he can
appear to comply with treatment while continuing to offend. The trial court further observed that
defendant fled to Texas while out on bond in this case and that, when he was finally located, he
was on his way to pick up a young boy from a nearby school.

        Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the trial court specifically stated the ways in which it
intended to depart from the sentencing guidelines because they failed to consider various factors
that the trial court, in its discretion, deemed important when tailoring the sentence to the
seriousness of the offenses and to this offender. The trial court thoroughly explained why the
sentencing guidelines failed to account for defendant’s past conduct, his conduct while the case
was pending, and the seriousness of the offenses in this case. The court further emphasized that
the guidelines did not adequately consider the many opportunities that defendant had for
rehabilitation but that he has chosen not to make any sincere effort to change his behaviors. For
that reason, and considering his long history of abusing children, as well as the amount and
depravity of the abusive material defendant collected over many years, the trial court expressed
that it is extremely likely that defendant will continue to victimize children in the future.
Defendant has not demonstrated on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
defendant.

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        We do hold, however, that defendant is entitled to remand for correction of his judgments
of sentence. Although the trial court stated at sentencing that it was sentencing defendant to life
imprisonment for his CSC-III convictions as well as the six convictions for aggravated possession
of child sexually abusive material, on the judgments of sentence, defendant’s sentences for these
convictions are stated as 999 years in prison. A trial court violates the indeterminate sentencing
scheme when it sentences a defendant to serve a minimum term of years that clearly exceeds the
normal human life span. People v Legree, 177 Mich App 134, 142-144; 441 NW2d 433 (1989).
Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to correct the judgments of sentence to state that
defendant’s sentence for his convictions on these counts is life imprisonment.

       Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed, but we remand for the ministerial task
of correcting the judgments of sentence and transmitting the corrected judgments to the
Department of Corrections. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                            /s/ Anica Letica
                                                            /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                            /s/ Michelle M. Rick

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