Court Opinion

ID: 9805541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 18:00:57.499486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:45:52.427987
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11556    Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023   Page: 1 of 27

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11556
                           ____________________

        ISAAC PAYNE,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        SAVANNAH COLLEGE OF ART AND DESIGN, INC.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-05000-JPB
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11556

        Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and BERGER, District
        Judge. ∗
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               Isaac Payne sued The Savannah College of Art and Design,
        Inc. (“SCAD”) for race discrimination and retaliation after he was
        ﬁred from his job as Head Fishing Coach. As part of his
        employment onboarding, however, Payne signed a document
        agreeing to arbitrate—not litigate—all legal disputes that arose
        between him and SCAD. Accordingly, SCAD moved to dismiss and
        compel arbitration. The district court, approving and adopting the
        magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”),
        granted SCAD’s motion.
                On appeal, Payne argues that the district court erred by
        ignoring that his agreement with SCAD was unconscionable and
        that SCAD waived its right to arbitrate. He also argues that the
        district court abused its discretion in rejecting his early discovery
        request. SCAD counters that (1) Payne freely agreed to a
        substantively fair arbitration provision, (2) SCAD never waived its
        right to arbitrate, and (3) the district court correctly denied Payne’s
        discovery request. After careful review, and with the beneﬁt of oral
        argument, we aﬃrm the district court’s order granting SCAD’s
        motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.

        ∗
         The Honorable Wendy Berger, United States District Judge for the Middle
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-11556                  Opinion of the Court                               3

                                   I.      Background
               A.      Facts
               The factual details of Payne’s ﬁring do not aﬀect this appeal. 1
        Instead, we focus on the facts surrounding his hiring and
        onboarding, particularly the details of his arbitration agreement
        with SCAD.
              After accepting the Head Fishing Coach position in August
        2015, Payne attended a new hire orientation. At the orientation,
        Payne signed numerous employment documents, including the
        Staﬀ Handbook Acknowledgement. 2
               The Staﬀ Handbook Acknowledgment provided: “I . . .
        acknowledge that I understand that the Staﬀ Handbook contains
        current policies of SCAD, and I agree to read and comply with the
        policies contained in the handbook, including the Alternative
        Dispute Resolution Policy and Agreement . . . .”             The

        1 Payne, a black man, alleged that he was fired because of his race and because

        he reported race-based abuse and threats by white student-athletes to SCAD
        leadership. Payne further alleged that when he reported these incidents,
        parents of the student-athletes campaigned to have him fired and SCAD
        complied. SCAD, in part through a declaration from its Executive Director of
        Human Resources, countered that Payne was fired for numerous non-race-
        related reasons. Because we ultimately affirm the district court’s approval of
        SCAD’s motion to dismiss and compel, the factual details of Payne’s firing are
        best considered during arbitration.
        2 Payne declared that he “do[es] not remember exactly what [he] signed”

        because he was “rushed,” but he admitted that it was his signature on the Staff
        Handbook Acknowledgment.
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        4                    Opinion of the Court                  22-11556

        Acknowledgment further referred to the Alternative Dispute
        Resolution Policy and Agreement (“ADRPA”) as “binding on SCAD
        and [SCAD’s employee] as written, unless revised following the
        procedures set out in the ADRPA.”
              The ADRPA was included in the sixty-four-page Staﬀ
        Handbook. The ADRPA began with a bolded title and spanned
        three double-columned pages. In pertinent part, the ADRPA
        provided:
              •     “[The ADRPA] involves an internal review,
                    mediation and binding arbitration to resolve all
                    legal disputes that may arise between SCAD
                    and an employee.”
              •     “The term ‘Dispute’ as used in this ADRPA
                    encompasses and includes all legal claims or
                    controversies between SCAD and any
                    employee . . . including, but not limited to,
                    claims arising in contract, tort, fraud, property,
                    statutory or common law claims, or equitable
                    claims.”
              •     “If the parties are unable to resolve the Dispute
                    through [internal review and then] mediation,
                    then such Dispute may be submitted to
                    arbitration at the election of either the
                    [e]mployee or SCAD . . . .”
              •     “The parties agree that the arbitration shall be
                    conducted in accordance with and subject to,
                    the rules and procedures set forth in the
                    Arbitration Procedures.”
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        22-11556                  Opinion of the Court                             5

                •       “The parties will mutually agree on an
                        arbitrator, who must be a retired federal judge
                        unless a retired federal judge is not available to
                        hear the dispute in a timely manner. The
                        selected arbitrator must have a minimum of 5
                        years[’] experience in the substantive practice
                        area of the Dispute or in arbitrating similar
                        types of Disputes.”
                •       “In making his/her award, the arbitrator shall
                        require the non-prevailing party to bear the
                        cost of the arbitrator’s fees, provided however,
                        that SCAD will advance the cost of the
                        arbitrator’s fees at the initiation of the
                        arbitration, subject to reimbursement by the
                        employee following arbitration if the
                        employee does not prevail.”
              The ADRPA also included an electronic link (as well as
        information on where physical copies could be obtained) to the
        second important document in this case, the Arbitration
        Procedures. 3 The Arbitration Procedures supplemented the
        ADRPA by providing additional details about the arbitration
        process. 4

        3 The ADRPA also allowed the losing party to appeal the arbitrator’s decision

        to a second arbitrator.
        4 The ADRPA and Arbitration Procedures work hand-in-hand and, for the

        most part, supply the same provisions. On one issue, the location of the
        arbitration, the magistrate judge determined that the ADRPA and Arbitration
        Procedures contradicted one another. Accordingly, the magistrate judge
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11556

               We next outline Payne’s pertinent factual allegations.
               Payne declares that, in the event he would lose at arbitration,
        he could not aﬀord to pay the arbitrator’s fees. To supplement this
        contention, Payne provides declarations from Professor Imre
        Szalai, who declares that an arbitrator’s fees in a case such as
        Payne’s could range from $9,000 to $39,600, with the caveat that
        “[a] retired federal judge’s rates may be higher,” and Darnell
        Holcomb, who declares that he was ﬁred from SCAD and the risk
        of paying signiﬁcant arbitration costs discouraged him from
        continuing his discrimination case against SCAD.
               Payne, as relevant to his waiver argument considered below,
        also emphasizes the details of SCAD’s dealings with Noah
        Pescitelli, a scholarship-receiving member of the ﬁshing team, who
        resigned from the team after Payne was ﬁred. Pescitelli had
        allegedly complained to SCAD leadership “about some of the same
        issues [Payne] had sought SCAD leadership’s help in resolving.”
        After his resignation, “SCAD approached [Pescitelli] to ask if he and
        his family would sign a ‘Conﬁdential Settlement Agreement’ in
        exchange for a scholarship of $36,630.” 5 Pescitelli did not sign the
        agreement.

        severed the provision that was more favorable to SCAD, making the provision
        more favorable to Payne the operative provision.
        5 SCAD argued below that Payne’s statements about the negotiations between

        SCAD and Pescitelli were hearsay. SCAD also contended that Payne had the
        facts wrong and that the confidentiality agreement offered to Pescitelli was in
        no way related to Payne or his potential legal action against SCAD. As
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        22-11556                    Opinion of the Court                                   7

                B.      Procedural History
                Before ﬁling this lawsuit, Payne sent SCAD a demand letter
        providing that he was “prepared to ﬁle litigation in federal court”
        if SCAD was not willing to settle for a certain amount. SCAD’s
        initial response referenced Payne’s “binding arbitration agreement
        with SCAD.” SCAD later provided a copy of Payne’s “signed
        agreement to be bound by SCAD’s [arbitration] policy and
        procedures, as well as a copy of the [arbitration] procedures
        manual.” Despite SCAD reiterating that Payne had previously
        agreed to arbitration, Payne ﬁled suit in the Northern District of
        Georgia.
              After a series of motions and orders, 6 SCAD ﬁled its Motion
        to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration (“MTD/MCA”). Payne then
        ﬁled a Motion to Take Limited Early Discovery on Issues of
        Arbitrability (“Discovery Motion”). The magistrate judge’s R & R

        support, SCAD provided a declaration from Dr. Phil Aletto, SCAD’s Senior
        Vice President for Admission and Student Success, that discussed SCAD’s
        process of disbanding the fishing teams. Aletto declared that “all then-current
        members of the Fishing Teams” were offered “to maintain and continue
        [their] athletic scholarships,” but such an offer did not extend to Pescitelli
        because “he had already quit the Fishing Teams.” Accordingly, when
        Pescitelli threatened legal action against SCAD, “SCAD offered to reinstate
        [Pescitelli’s] athletic scholarship . . . in exchange for a general release of claims
        reflected in a proposed settlement agreement” that included “a standard
        confidentiality clause.”
        6 The procedural complexities preceding the magistrate judge’s R & R are not

        important to this appeal.
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        8                            Opinion of the Court                     22-11556

        recommended that SCAD’s MTD/MCA be granted, and Payne’s
        Discovery Motion be denied.
                The district court adopted the R & R, noting that the R & R
        was “thorough” and “carefully addressed each of the parties’
        contentions.” In pertinent part, the district court agreed that
        (1) the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, 7
        (2) SCAD—by oﬀering a settlement agreement to Pescitelli—did
        not waive its rights to arbitrate its dispute with Payne, and
        (3) Payne’s Discovery Motion should be denied. 8 Accordingly, the
        district court ordered Payne to submit his dispute to arbitration.
                Payne appeals.
                               II.      Standard of Review
                “We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss a
        complaint and compel arbitration.” Young v. Grand Canyon Univ.,
        Inc., 980 F.3d 814, 818 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020).
              “We review the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s ruling on discovery
        matters only for abuse of discretion.” Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

        7 Payne’s unconscionability argument was multi-faceted.      He argued that the
        ADRPA was unconscionable because (1) its cost-shifting provision carried
        potentially significant costs that inhibited his ability to vindicate his rights,
        (2) its arbitrator-selection provision limited the pool of arbitrators to two
        white men, (3) it contained a confidentiality provision, and (4) it included
        provisions that were indefinite, non-conspicuous, and non-mutual.
        8 The R & R concluded that “[t]here [was] not good cause for allowing

        [Payne’s] discovery [requests]” because his “waiver arguments to which [his]
        discovery requests relate[d] unequivocally fail[ed].” The district court agreed.
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        22-11556                 Opinion of the Court                             9

        Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1125 (11th Cir. 2021). “District judges are
        accorded wide discretion in ruling upon discovery motions, and
        appellate review is accordingly deferential.” Harris v. Chapman, 97
        F.3d 499, 506 (11th Cir. 1996).
                                  III.    Discussion 9
               Payne brings four arguments on appeal. First, Payne
        contends that the district court erred in determining that the
        ADRPA is not unconscionable. Second, and relatedly, Payne argues
        that the agreement’s unconscionable provisions should not be
        severed from the agreement; rather, he contends that the entire
        agreement is unenforceable. Third, Payne argues that the district
        court erred in determining that SCAD did not waive its right to
        arbitrate. Fourth, Payne argues that the district court erred in not
        permitting him to take early discovery on issues of arbitrability. We
        address each argument in turn.
               A.     Unconscionability
               Payne argues that the arbitration agreement is
        unconscionable for a number of reasons. First, Payne argues that
        the cost-shifting provision is substantively unconscionable because
        the risk of having to pay the arbitrator’s fees will force him to
        abandon his claim; thus, the provision prevents him from
        vindicating his rights. Second, Payne argues that the arbitrator-

        9 The parties’ 2015 agreement is the operative arbitration agreement.
                                                                            The
        ADRPA allowed SCAD to modify the agreement as long as it provided 30
        days’ written notice to its employee. SCAD’s attempted amendment in 2019
        failed because it did not provide Payne the required notice.
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11556

        selection provision is substantively unconscionable because it limits
        the pool of arbitrators to two white men, which he argues
        undermines the neutrality of any potential proceeding. Third,
        Payne argues that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable as
        evidenced by a number of provisions that are either indeﬁnite or
        non-mutual.
              The unconscionability standard is hard to satisfy under
        Georgia law. 10 The Supreme Court of Georgia has described an
        unconscionable contract as “one that no sane man not acting under
        a delusion would make and that no honest man would take
        advantage of, one that is abhorrent to good morals and conscience,
        and one where one of the parties takes a fraudulent advantage of
        another.” Innovative Images, LLC v. Summerville, 848 S.E.2d 75, 83
        (Ga. 2020) (quotations omitted); see also BMW Fin. Servs. N.A., Inc.
        v. Smoke Rise Corp., 486 S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
        (concluding that a contract provision was not unconscionable
        because it did not “shock the conscience,” among other
        considerations).         “Under     Georgia    law,     procedural
        unconscionability addresses the process of making the contract,

        10 The parties agree that Georgia law governs but disagree over the proper

        Georgia law standard for unconscionability. Whereas SCAD contends that
        “Georgia law requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability for
        a contract to be struck down as unconscionable,” Payne argues that “both
        need not be present in the same quantum to render a contract
        unconscionable.” Because we ultimately conclude that the arbitration
        agreement is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, we need
        not resolve this dispute over Georgia law because Payne fails to prove
        unconscionability under either standard.
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        22-11556               Opinion of the Court                       11

        while substantive unconscionability looks to the contractual terms
        themselves.” Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1377
        (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration adopted and quotation omitted).
               As for procedural unconscionability, well-established
        Georgia law provides that “the mere existence of an arbitration
        clause does not amount to unconscionability.” Saturna v. Bickley
        Constr. Co., 555 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (quotation
        omitted). Rather, “where . . . a binding arbitration agreement is
        bargained for and signed by the parties, it is the complaining party
        that bears the burden of proving that it was essentially defrauded
        in entering the agreement.” Innovative Images, 848 S.E.2d at 83.
        Factors that play a role in the procedural unconscionability
        determination include the “age, education, intelligence, business
        acumen and experience of the parties, their relative bargaining
        power, the conspicuousness and comprehensibility of the contract
        language, the oppressiveness of the terms, and the presence or
        absence of a meaningful choice.” NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478
        S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1996).
               “As to the substantive element of unconscionability, courts
        have focused on matters such as the commercial reasonableness of
        the contract terms, the purpose and eﬀect of the terms, the
        allocation of risks between the parties, and similar public policy
        concerns.” Id.
              With this legal framework in mind, we address Payne’s
        various unconscionability arguments.
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        12                       Opinion of the Court              22-11556

                     i.     Substantive Unconscionability
              We start with substantive unconscionability.
                            a.      Cost-Shifting Provision
              The ADRPA’s cost-shifting provision provides:
              In making his/her award, the arbitrator shall require
              the non-prevailing party to bear the cost of the
              arbitrator’s fees, provided however, that SCAD will
              advance the cost of the arbitrator’s fees at the
              initiation of       the arbitration, subject to
              reimbursement by the employee following
              arbitration if the employee does not prevail.

        Payne alleges that this provision is substantively unconscionable
        because it “serves no purpose other than . . . dissuad[ing] potential
        claimants from pursuing their rights under the law.” Payne’s
        evidence included a law professor’s declaration that calculated the
        likely costs of arbitrating Payne’s claims, Payne’s own declaration
        about the eﬀect that the costs would have on his family, and the
        declaration of another employee who arbitrated against SCAD but
        withdrew his arbitration allegedly due to the risk of incurring
        signiﬁcant costs if he lost. SCAD counters that the district court
        correctly determined that “Payne’s evidence is [too] speculative at
        this stage of the litigation” (i.e., Payne may win in arbitration and
        would not be required to pay anything) such that his substantive
        unconscionability argument must fail under our precedents.
               We start with Payne’s argument that our case that rejected a
        similar argument against cost-shifting provisions, Musnick v. King
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        22-11556               Opinion of the Court                       13

        Motor Company of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003), has
        been abrogated in relevant part by the Supreme Court’s holding in
        Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
                In Musnick, we analyzed an arbitration agreement’s “loser
        pays” provision that Musnick challenged on the ground that “the
        provision . . . awarding costs and fees to the prevailing party
        rendered it unenforceable.” 325 F.3d at 1257. We concluded that
        Musnick’s challenge failed for the following reasons. To start, we
        set out the proper standard: “The party seeking to avoid
        arbitration . . . has the burden of establishing that enforcement of
        the agreement would preclude him from eﬀectively vindicating
        [his] federal statutory right in the arbitral forum.” Id. at 1259
        (quotations omitted). Then, we determined that Musnick’s
        evidence was “too speculative” to render his agreement
        unenforceable because he had not shown that he was likely to lose
        his arbitration. Id. at 1260. Stated diﬀerently: “Whether Musnick
        [would], in fact, incur attorneys’ fees . . . depend[ed] entirely on
        whether he prevail[ed] in arbitration. If he [did], he [would] incur
        no fees . . . [and would] not have been deprived of any statutory
        right or remedy . . . .” Id. at 1261. Next, we also noted that
        Musnick’s evidence, which was merely a statement that he feared
        he would be unable to pay an award of attorneys’ fees against him,
        was “wholly inadequate to establish” that he was inhibited from
        vindicating his rights. Id. at 1260. Finally, we buttressed our
        analysis by stating that Musnick, if he were to lose, would have the
        ability to challenge the arbitrator’s award of attorneys’ fees in
        federal court. Id. at 1261 (explaining that “arbitration awards may
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        14                       Opinion of the Court                       22-11556

        be vacated if they are in manifest disregard of the law” (quotation
        omitted)).
               Payne argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street
        abrogated Musnick “in relevant part” by “severely limit[ing] any
        right of appeal to a court.” See Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 590. While
        he accurately characterizes Hall Street’s eﬀect on Musnick’s third
        point (regarding the losing party’s ability to challenge an arbitral
        award in federal court), he is incorrect that Hall Street should end
        our reliance on Musnick. 325 F.3d at 1261. In Hall Steet, the
        Supreme Court simply limited review of arbitration awards under
        the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to the Act’s textually-provided
        avenues—thereby limiting the amorphous “manifest disregard of
        the law” category that had developed in prior caselaw. 11 Hall Street,

        11 Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA provide for limited review of an arbitration

        award. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11. For example, Section 10 provides the following
        four avenues for challenging an arbitration award:
               (a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and
               for the district wherein the award was made may make an
               order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
               the arbitration—
                   (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
                       or undue means;
                   (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
                       arbitrators, or either of them;
                   (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
                       refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
                       shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
                       material to the controversy; or of any other
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        22-11556                    Opinion of the Court                           15

        552 U.S. at 585, 590. Following Hall Street, in Frazier v. CitiFinancial
        Corp., LLC, we followed suit, foreclosing wide-ranging challenges
        to arbitration awards: “We hold that our judicially-created bases for
        vacatur are no longer valid in light of Hall Street.” 604 F.3d 1313,
        1324 (11th Cir. 2010). See also White Springs Agric. Chems., Inc. v.
        Glawson Invs. Corp., 660 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2011)
        (declining to review a challenge to an arbitration award because
        “[e]ven though [appellant] presents its argument in terms of the
        FAA, [appellant] asks us to do what we may not—look to the legal
        merits of the underlying award”).
               But the linchpin of Musnick—which was unaﬀected by Hall
        Street—is the requirement that appellants demonstrate that they
        are likely to bear prohibitive costs (i.e., that their costs are not
        merely speculative). Musnick, 325 F.3d at 1261. We have
        emphasized this point in our more recent case law. For example, in
        Escobar v. Celebration Cruises Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th
        Cir. 2015), we interpreted Musnick to mean that a plaintiﬀ’s
        “[s]peculative fear of high fees” would be insuﬃcient to satisfy his
        burden to “prove the likelihood of prohibitive costs.” Thus, post-

                          misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
                          been prejudiced; or
                       (4) where the arbitrators exceed their powers, or so
                           imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
                           definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
                           not made.
        Id. § 10(a).
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11556

        Hall Street we have explicitly stated that the likely-to-bear-
        prohibitive-costs prong is still intact such that Musnick remains
        good law. See, e.g., United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th
        Cir. 2009) (“In addition to being squarely on point, the doctrine of
        adherence to prior precedent also mandates that the intervening
        Supreme Court case actually abrogate or directly conﬂict with, as
        opposed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.” (emphasis
        added)).
                Putting it all together, for Payne to prove that his arbitration
        agreement with SCAD is unconscionable because of the
        agreement’s cost-shifting provision, he must provide evidence of
        “(1) the amount of fees he is likely to incur and (2) his inability to
        pay those fees.” Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 554
        (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Escobar, 805 F.3d at 1291 (internal
        quotations omitted)). He cannot satisfy the ﬁrst step. The
        “problem” for Payne is that he might win. And if he were to
        prevail, SCAD would be required to pay for the arbitration. Thus,
        Payne has not shown that he is “likely to incur” any costs
        whatsoever and cannot prevail under the standards we have set
        forth. 12 See Musnick, 325 F.3d at 1261.
              Our conclusion             is    further     supported       by     other
        considerations.

        12 Payne’s request that we ignore our binding precedent in favor of the law

        recited in an out-of-Circuit, district court case, Crespo v. Kapnisis, No. 21-cv-
        6963, 2022 WL 2916033 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2022), necessarily fails.
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        22-11556                 Opinion of the Court                             17

               First, we have recognized that an appellant’s rights are less
        threatened when an appellant is not required to pay the arbitration
        costs up front. See Escobar, 805 F.3d at 1292 (emphasizing that
        appellant’s challenge was “premature” because the “cost-splitting
        clause state[d] that [appellee] will pay ‘the initial cost of
        arbitration’”). Such is the case here where SCAD is advancing the
        costs of arbitration. 13 That is, Payne will not be excluded from the
        arbitral forum, and he will have the ability to vindicate his rights
        through the arbitration process to which he agreed.
               Second, Payne’s instant appeal is even more speculative
        because of a unique feature of the Arbitration Procedures which
        provides for an appeal to a second arbitrator: “The awards and
        orders of the Arbitrator shall be ﬁnal and binding unless, within
        thirty (30) days of service of the Arbitrator’s ﬁnal award, a party
        serves notice to the other parties of the arbitration of intent to
        appeal the Arbitrator’s awards and orders to a second Arbitrator.”
        Thus, Payne’s appeal is especially speculative in the sense that (1) he
        has brought his case before arbitration can determine the winner
        and loser, and (2) even the result of the ﬁrst arbitration could be
        appealed to a second arbitrator. Payne contends that this provision
        cuts in his favor because the additional costs of a second arbitration
        would further increase the ADRPA’s deterrent eﬀect. But that

        13 The ADRPA provided that “[i]n making his/her award, the arbitrator shall

        require the non-prevailing party to bear the cost of the arbitrator’s fees,
        provided however, that SCAD will advance the cost of the arbitrator’s fees at
        the initiation of the arbitration . . . .”
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                        22-11556

        argument ignores that the second appeal is optional. We look to
        this provision only to emphasize the exceptionally speculative
        nature of Payne’s complaint at the current stage.
               Third, Payne argues that because he provided evidence
        extensively detailing the potential costs of arbitration, and the
        eﬀect that those costs would have on his livelihood, his claim is less
        “speculative” than the generalized grievance in Musnick. 325 F.3d
        at 1260 (ﬁnding Musnick’s mere recitation that he “genuinely
        fear[ed] the imposition of attorney’s fees” because he would be
        “unable to pay” “wholly inadequate to establish that the arbitration
        would result in prohibitive costs that [would] force him to
        relinquish his claim”). True. Payne’s evidence included a law
        professor’s declaration that calculated the likely costs of arbitrating
        Payne’s claims, Payne’s declaration about the eﬀect the costs would
        have on his family, and the declaration of another employee who
        withdrew his arbitration claim against SCAD allegedly out of fear
        of incurring signiﬁcant costs if he lost. But Payne conﬂates the
        likelihood that there will be arbitration costs (not a factor under
        our precedent) with the likelihood that he will incur those costs (the
        touchstone of our analysis). 14 Thus, while he must bring evidence

        14 Payne also argues that “the cost-shifting is not speculative, as the ADRPA

        shifts the arbitrator’s fees . . . to the non-prevailing party, and this is a non-
        discretionary contractual obligation.” This argument suffers from the same
        conflation. Our precedent is not concerned with whether fees themselves are
        “speculative,” but with whether it is “speculative” that the party challenging
        the arbitration agreement will be the party that has to pay those fees. Musnick,
        325 F.3d at 1261 (“Whether Musnick will, in fact, incur attorneys’ fees in this
        matter depends entirely on whether he prevails in arbitration.”) Payne
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        22-11556                     Opinion of the Court                             19

        of his potential costs (and he has), such a showing is insuﬃcient
        when Payne has not satisﬁed our primary consideration—showing
        that he is “likely” to incur those costs.
               Finally, we reemphasize that these terms are part of an
        agreement into which Payne voluntarily entered. As such, he has
        the burden of establishing that the agreement is substantively
        unfair. For the reasons above, Payne has not satisﬁed his burden,
        and we conclude that the cost-shifting provision is not substantively
        unconscionable. See Innovative Images, 848 S.E.2d at 83–84.
                                b.      Arbitrator Selection Provision
               Payne also contends that the ADRPA is substantively
        unconscionable because the arbitrator-selection provision would
        “eﬀectively limit the pool of arbitrators to two White men.” Aside
        from the fact that Payne’s estimation is questionable, he has cited
        absolutely no authority for his contention that it would be
        unconscionable for Payne’s arbitration to be conducted by a white
        arbitrator. Thus, he has not carried his burden on this point. 15

        counters that employees often lose employment arbitration disputes, but that
        argument is also speculative because generalized statistics do not account for
        the individual facts of his case. Indeed, if Payne did not believe his claim was
        meritorious, then he would have had little reason to initiate this lawsuit.
        15 Payne also argues that “[t]he ADRPA is unconscionable because its method

        of selecting arbitrators gives SCAD unilateral control to select the arbitrator.”
        The ADRPA, however, provides that “[t]he parties will mutually agree on an
        arbitrator,” and this understanding is confirmed in the Arbitration Procedures
        that give each party equal rights on proposing and striking potential
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        20                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11556

                        ii.    Procedural Unconscionability
                 Turning to Payne’s arguments as to procedural
        unconscionability, he argues that various terms in the ADRPA and
        Arbitration Procedures are either indeﬁnite (i.e., the court is left to
        ascertain the intention of the parties by conjecture) or non-mutual
        (i.e., the agreement confers certain rights on SCAD but not Payne)
        such that the arbitration agreement is procedurally
        unconscionable. We disagree, especially in light of the demanding
        standard for satisfying procedural unconscionability which requires
        “the complaining party” to prove “that it was essentially defrauded
        in entering the agreement.” Innovative Images, 848 S.E.2d at 83.
               “The law does not favor destruction of contracts on grounds
        of uncertainty.” Kitchen v. Insuramerica Corp., 675 S.E.2d 598, 601
        (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4) (“The construction
        which will uphold a contract in whole and in every part is to be
        preferred, and the whole contract should be looked to in arriving
        at the construction of any part[.]”). With that said, “indeﬁniteness
        in subject matter so extreme as not to present anything upon which
        the contract may operate in a deﬁnite manner renders the contract
        void.” Fay v. Custom One Homes, LLC, 622 S.E.2d 870, 872–73 (Ga.
        Ct. App. 2005) (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). And
        “[a] contract cannot be enforced if its terms are incomplete, vague,

        arbitrators. Thus, Payne’s argument fails because it is directly contrary to the
        terms of the agreement.
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        22-11556                    Opinion of the Court                           21

        indeﬁnite[,] or uncertain.” Aukerman v. Witmer, 568 S.E.2d 123, 126
        (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (quotation omitted).
               “Georgia law provides that an arbitration provision is not
        unconscionable because it lacks mutuality of remedy.” Caley, 428
        F.3d at 1378 (alterations adopted and quotation omitted); see also
        Saturna, 555 S.E.2d at 827 (“[T]he fact that [one party] had
        additional means of redress available [that were not available to the
        other party] did not render the contract unenforceable due to
        unconscionability.”). The lack of mutuality is not detrimental
        because arbitration is intended to oﬀer “simplicity, informality, and
        expedition.” Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
        U.S. 20, 31 (1991)).
                               a.      Indeﬁniteness
              Payne argues that three terms in the ADRPA and Arbitration
        Procedures are either ambiguous or contradictory and, therefore,
        indeﬁnite.
              First, Payne argues that the terms in the respective
        agreements governing the selection of an arbitrator are
        contradictory. 16 Speciﬁcally, he points to the Arbitration

        16 The terms that Payne points to provide the following:

               [ADRPA]: The parties will mutually agree on an arbitrator,
               who must be a retired federal judge unless a retired federal
               judge is not available to hear the dispute in a timely manner.
               The selected arbitrator must have a minimum of 5 years[’]
               experience in the substantive practice area of the Dispute or in
               arbitrating similar types of Disputes.
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        22                       Opinion of the Court                       22-11556

        Procedures’ use of the term “mediator” (rather than arbitrator) in
        one instance as proof that the ADRPA and Arbitration Procedures
        contradict one another. However, we ﬁnd the language concerning
        arbitration to be clear. That the document may also provide for a
        mediator or may include a scrivener’s error does not change our
        conclusion. In any event, this small discrepancy is nowhere near
        enough to clear the high bar for proving unconscionability under
        Georgia law. Innovative Images, 848 S.E.2d at 83; see also O.C.G.A.
        § 13-2-2(4) (“The construction which will uphold a contract in
        whole and in every part is to be preferred, and the whole contract
        should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part[.]”).
              Second, Payne argues that the ADRPA and Arbitration
        Procedures are contradictory because the ADRPA requires an
        employee seeking to initiate the dispute resolution process to
        “mak[e] a written request to the vice president for human

              [Arbitration Procedures]: Within a reasonable time after
              receiving the Request for Arbitration, the Vice President of
              Human Resources or a designated representative, and the
              employee or his/her designated representative, shall each
              submit to the other a list of four (4) proposed Arbitrators. The
              arbitrator will be selected by mutual agreement of the parties.
              When submitting the list of proposed arbitrators, each party
              agrees that all proposed arbitrators shall have a minimum of
              five (5) years of previous experience or background in the
              subject matter of the arbitration. In addition, the parties agree
              that the proposed mediators shall include as many retired
              federal judges as possible who are available to hear the dispute
              in [a] timely manner.
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        22-11556                 Opinion of the Court                      23

        resources,” while the Arbitration Procedures require “[a] party
        who desires to submit a legal claim to arbitration [to] submit a
        completed Request for Arbitration to the College’s Vice President
        of Human Resources.” We agree with the magistrate judge’s
        analysis that these terms are “not contradictory” because although
        “[t]he terms may be worded slightly diﬀerent[,] . . . they clearly are
        referencing the same step in the alternative dispute resolution
        process.” This miniscule diﬀerence is certainly not “extreme”
        enough for Payne’s challenge to prevail. Fay, 622 S.E.2d at 872.
               Third, Payne argues that the ADRPA’s “in eﬀect” provision
        is ambiguous because it does not specify which agreement will
        govern a dispute: “SCAD retains the right to modify or terminate
        this ADRPA and the Arbitration Procedures on thirty days’ written
        notice. The policy, if any, in eﬀect at the time a request for
        mediation and/or arbitration is initiated, will govern the process
        by which the Dispute is resolved.” This provision is not ambiguous
        in any way; the policy “in eﬀect” was the policy that both parties
        agreed to—the 2015 ADRPA and the related Arbitration
        Procedures. As stated previously, we agree with the district court
        that because SCAD’s attempted amendment in 2019 failed for lack
        of notice, the parties’ 2015 agreement is the operative one.
                            b.      Mutuality
               Payne also argues that “[t]he ADRPA and [the Arbitration
        Procedures] have a number of non-mutual provisions that make
        them procedurally unconscionable.” Payne’s main focus is a
        provision allowing SCAD (but not its employees) to bypass internal
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        24                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11556

        review and mediation and fast-forward the dispute resolution
        process to arbitration: “At its option, SCAD may elect to bypass one
        or more steps prior to arbitration for Disputes with the employee.”
        Although Payne contends that there are “numerous” non-mutual
        provisions, he cites only two and his second argument merely
        repackages his ﬁrst. 17
               Payne’s argument simply cannot survive because although
        he indicates that at least one provision (allowing SCAD to bypass
        certain dispute resolution steps) provides SCAD a right that is not
        also bestowed on him, the cited provision is minor, and similar non-
        mutual provisions have passed muster under Georgia law. See
        Saturna, 555 S.E.2d at 826–27 (determining that a contract that
        provided “additional means of redress” to one party did not render
        the contract unconscionable for being non-mutual). We conclude
        that the non-mutual provisions are not detrimental to the contract
        and Payne was not “essentially defrauded” in entering this
        arbitration agreement. Innovative Images, 848 S.E.2d at 83.
                                 *     *      *
              Simply stated, we agree with the district court’s ﬁnding that
        Payne’s arguments on this small subset of provisions “do not put

        17 We note that Payne does not complain about the non-mutual provision that

        requires SCAD to advance the costs of the arbitration (i.e., a non-mutual
        provision that benefits Payne).
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        22-11556                 Opinion of the Court                            25

        the agreement over the very high bar for ﬁnding unconscionability
        under Georgia law.” 18 See Innovative Images, 848 S.E.2d at 83.
               B.      Waiver
               Payne argues that SCAD—by asking Pescitelli (a former
        member of the ﬁshing team) to sign a conﬁdentiality agreement
        when attempting to resolve a lawsuit threatened by Pescitelli
        roughly a year before Payne’s legal action—has somehow waived
        its right to arbitrate Payne’s claim. Payne contends that, by
        entering or attempting to enter into conﬁdentiality agreements
        with student-athletes 19 who could participate or provide
        information related to Payne’s claims, SCAD has cut Payne oﬀ
        from eﬀective pre-hearing discovery from third parties. Such
        preclusive eﬀorts, in Payne’s view, constitute interference with
        third-party litigation and result in waiver of arbitrability.
               Our waiver doctrine is typically implicated when parties
        have “invoked the litigation machinery” before reversing course
        and claiming that arbitration was the proper avenue all along.
        Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 889 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018)

        18 Because we conclude that there are no unconscionable provisions in the

        ADRPA or the Arbitration Procedures, we need not address Payne’s argument
        regarding severability.
        19 Payne tries to broaden the scope beyond Pescitelli by arguing that “[t]he

        question of whether SCAD entered into confidential settlement agreements
        with other former Fishing Team members . . . could only be answered
        through discovery.” We do not bite at this last-ditch argument because
        Payne’s waiver argument is altogether meritless.
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        26                         Opinion of the Court                  22-11556

        (alteration adopted and quotation omitted); see also Morgan v.
        Sundance, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1708, 1711 (2022) (“Sometimes,
        [defendants] engage in months, or even years, of litigation—ﬁling
        motions to dismiss, answering complaints, and discussing
        settlement—before deciding they would fare better in arbitration.
        When that happens, the court faces a question: Has the defendant’s
        request to switch to arbitration come too late?”).
               As an initial matter, Payne asks us to apply our waiver
        doctrine in a novel manner. 20 We have never held that a party
        waives its right to arbitrate based on its actions taken in a previous
        legal action—especially when that party did not bring the lawsuit
        at bar and has repeatedly insisted that arbitration is the proper
        dispute resolution channel. And we decline to do so now. Rather,
        because SCAD (1) has not engaged in extensive use of the litigation
        process, (2) alerted Payne before he ﬁled suit that his dispute must
        be arbitrated, and (3) promptly ﬁled its MTD/MCA, we hold that
        SCAD has not waived its ability to insist on arbitrating Payne’s
        claim per their agreement.
               C.      Early Discovery
               Payne’s ﬁnal challenge on appeal is that the district court
        “erred in not permitting [him] to take limited early discovery on
        issues of arbitrability.” In particular, Payne sought SCAD’s
        communications with “prospective witnesses” such as Pescitelli

        20 Payne admits as much.    He characterizes his wavier argument as one that
        “appears to be of first impression.”
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        22-11556              Opinion of the Court                       27

        and details of “SCAD’s past arbitrations with employees and
        former employees.” The district court determined that because
        each of Payne’s arguments failed, “there [was] no reason to allow
        discovery regarding the validity and enforceability of the
        arbitration agreement.” We conclude that the district court’s
        analysis of the underlying arbitration agreement was sound.
        Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        overruling Payne’s unnecessary discovery request. Harris, 97 F.3d
        at 506 (“District judges are accorded wide discretion in ruling upon
        discovery motions, and appellate review is accordingly
        deferential.”).
                                IV.    Conclusion
               Payne agreed to arbitrate his legal disputes against SCAD.
        Attempting to evade his agreement, Payne searches for a legal hook
        that will catch him a break. He has not found it; rather, we
        conclude that his arbitration agreement is neither substantively nor
        procedurally unconscionable, that SCAD did not waive its right to
        enforce arbitration, and that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in overruling Payne’s request for early discovery. In
        short, we conclude that Payne is bound by his agreement to
        arbitrate his legal claims against SCAD.
              AFFIRMED.