Court Opinion

ID: 9479627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:23:51.374356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:10.000194
License: Public Domain

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The sole question presented to us in Jones v. Lujan, 883 F.2d 1031 (D.C.Cir.1989) (“Jones /”), was “whether attorney fees are available to a prevailing party who has proceeded pro se against the Government under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) when the pro se party is, by profession, an attorney himself.” Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1032. And our holding in that case was that an attorney is not barred from recovering attorney fees under EAJA on the ground that he represents himself. See Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1036. We did not, in Jones I, consider whether the government was “substantially justified” in prosecuting its appeal. That issue was not before us. See Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1033 n. 3. Indeed, the district court never considered whether the government’s contention that a pro se attorney could not recover fees under EAJA was “substantially justified.”1 But see Maj. op. at 1098. Yet the majority now grants Jones attorney fees incurred in the course of defending against the government’s appeal, stating that “[i]n Jones I, we held that fees were due the appellee because the Government’s litigating position [the government’s contention that a pro se attorney cannot recover attorney fees under EAJA] ... [was] not ‘substantially justified’ under section 2412(d)(1)(A) of EAJA.” Maj. op. at 1097. Because I *1102believe that the majority incorrectly characterizes its holding in Jones I and because I find that the government’s position on appeal in the case was “substantially justified,” I dissent.
In Jones I we were presented with the question of whether the district court was to be affirmed under Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C.Cir.1977), which held that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982), entitles a lawyer acting pro se to reasonable attorney fees, and Cox v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 601 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1979), which extended that holding to lay persons acting pro se. I saw no principled distinction between the term “reasonable attorney fees” in FOIA and “reasonable attorney fees” in EAJA and concurred in the majority’s judgment on this ground. But the majority did not view these cases as dictating the outcome in Jones I. Instead, the majority rested its holding on its reading of EAJA: “[A]s written, Jones is entitled to fees under EAJA because he was represented by an attorney and he was the prevailing party.” Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1035. Thus, according to the majority, its holding in Jones I was not compelled by this circuit’s precedent.
Moreover, as I pointed out in Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1033 (Silberman, J., concurring), other circuits are hopelessly divided over whether a lawyer pro se litigant is entitled to attorney fees under EAJA. Courts of appeals that have considered the availability of attorney fees to pro se litigants under EAJA have done so with reference only to lay pro se litigants and have held these litigants ineligible for fees. See Naekel v. Dept. of Transportation, 845 F.2d 976, 981 (Fed.Cir.1988); Merrell v. Block, 809 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir.1987); Crooker v. EPA, 763 F.2d 16, 16 (1st Cir.1985). In cases involving other, similar statutes, certain courts of appeals have deemed lawyer pro se litigants ineligible for fees, see, e.g., Aronson v. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 866 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1985); Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 1689, 80 L.Ed.2d 162 (1986), while others have rejected that position, see, e.g., Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508, 1511-15 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129, 106 S.Ct. 1659, 90 L.Ed.2d 201 (1986); Cazatas v. Dep’t of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir.1983).
The Supreme Court has said that the government is “substantially justified” in its appeal if it is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). Given the unavailability of precedent in this circuit squarely on point and the division of opinion among our sister circuits, the government’s position on appeal was certainly reasonable. The majority points to language in Jones I stating that EAJA “clearly allows for the granting of reasonable attorney fees [for] ... a pro se attorney,” Maj. op. at 1098 n. 3 (quoting Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1036 (emphasis added)), to support the proposition that “the Government’s litigation position could not be substantially justified.” Id.; see also Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1034 (“the literal language of EAJA covers an award of fees for services performed by Jones”); id. at 1034 (EAJA is “facially clear regarding Jones’ entitlement to fees”). Neither I nor a number of other judges who have examined the word “attorney” have thought the plain language supports the majority’s interpretation. See Jones I, 883 F.2d at 1032 (Silberman, J., concurring). Therefore, no recourse now to “literal,” “facially,” “clearly,” or any other adjectives or adverbs can suffice to make a close issue seem foreordained and therefore the government’s litigating position unreasonable.
Even had the district court held that the government’s position that a pro se attorney cannot recover attorney fees under EAJA was not “substantially justified,” it does not follow that the resolution of this issue would have to be the same in this court. Under the peculiar regime established by the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood, which clarified that the government’s position need only be reasonable to be substantially justified, a district judge’s determination as to reasonableness may not be disturbed unless it is an abuse of discretion. See Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S.Ct. at 2547. Under this limited scope of review, different judges can with impu*1103nity impose widely varying views as to the reasonableness of the government’s position in any case.
We have the power, then, but I do not think we are correct to say that the government’s appeal of the district court decision was unreasonable.2 In no other area of the law would a court describe such an action as unreasonable. But we deal here with attorney fees, and judges are drawn from the ranks of attorneys. It is perhaps psychologically easier for us to award fees to the attorneys for prevailing parties than to deny them — particularly when the cost is diffused among millions of American taxpayers. But, whoever bears the cost, I do not see by what standard the majority concludes the government’s appeal was unreasonable. I think the majority in effect reads out of the statute the phrase “substantially justified” and converts EAJA into a statute that automatically promises fees to the prevailing party against the government.

. Jones brought an action in the district court seeking attorney fees and costs under EAJA for compelling the Secretary of the Interior to comply with the Department’s grievance procedures. The government defended on the grounds that, as a pro se litigant, Jones was ineligible for fees and costs under the Act, that Jones had not prevailed on review of the grievance examiner’s report, and that the government’s position at the agency level — the Department's application of its grievance procedures — was “substantially justified." The district court considered the substantial justification only of the government’s position in the underlying grievance procedure. It did not consider the separate question of whether the government was "substantially justified” in arguing that an attorney pro se litigant cannot recover fees under EAJA, a negative finding which would have entitled Jones to attorney fees incurred in claiming fees in the district court ("fees on fees”). Instead, the district court seems to have applied a per se rule that the government pays fees for EAJA litigation whenever it defends an EAJA suit on the basis that its position in the action on the merits was substantially justified and loses. See Jones v. Hodel, 685 F.Supp. 4, 8 (D.D.C.1988). We have not accepted such a rule. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 211, 213 (D.C.Cir.1986).

. The reasonableness of the appeal is determined, of course, by the reasonableness of the litigation position on appeal. I do not understand the majority’s distinction between the two. See Maj. op. at 1100.