Court Opinion

ID: 9961559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 13:02:40.743508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:58.388995
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

         EMILY YEDERLINIC, as personal representative of the
        Estate of Rose Castillo, and DON BURLESON-CASTILLO,

                               Appellants,

                                    v.

     HEATHER HILL NURSING CENTER, LLC; HEALTH SERVICES
     MANAGEMENT, INC.; HEALTH SERVICES MANAGEMENT OF
          FLORIDA, LLC; SHELBY SCOTT JACKSON; and
                    CHRISTINA BRANCATO,

                                Appellees.

                            No. 2D2023-1570

                              April 19, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Pasco
County; Declan P. Mansfield, Judge.

Megan M. Hunter, Rainey C. Booth, Jr., and Joanna Greber Dettloff of
Mendes, Reins & Wilander, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellants.

Brandon C. Szymula, James J. Maskowitz, and Kathryn Dunnam
Harden of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Tampa, for Appellees.

SILBERMAN, Judge.
     In this nonfinal appeal, Emily Yederlinic, as personal representative
of the Estate of Rose Castillo, and Don Burleson-Castillo (together, the
Estate) appeal the trial court's order granting motions to compel
arbitration and to stay proceedings filed by Heather Hill Nursing Center,
LLC; Health Services Management, Inc.; Health Services Management of
Florida, LLC; Shelby Scott Jackson; and Christina Brancato (collectively
the Defendants). Because Burleson-Castillo signed Heather Hill's
admission agreement as Rose's health care surrogate (HCS) and not as
her attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney (DPOA), the
arbitration provision contained in the admission agreement is not
enforceable. Thus, we reverse the trial court's order compelling
arbitration of the Estate's claims against the Defendants and staying the
proceedings.
     Rose was admitted to Heather Hill after Burleson-Castillo signed
the Heather Hill admission agreement on her behalf. Burleson-Castillo
was Rose's attorney-in-fact pursuant to a DPOA, and he was her
designated HCS pursuant to a separate document. The voluntary
dispute resolution procedure portion of the agreement was
unambiguously signed by Burleson-Castillo on behalf of Rose in his
capacity as her HCS. The admission agreement contained spaces in
several areas requiring a signature by the resident or the resident's legal
representative. However, the agreement also contained a preselected,
printed designation of "HCS" adjacent to the words "Relationship to
Resident." It was undisputed that the designation of "DPOA" could have
been inserted rather than the designation "HCS." Burleson-Castillo
signed as Rose's authorized representative, and nothing on the form
reflected that he was signing pursuant to the authority granted him in
the DPOA. Notably, the HCS document did not grant any authority to
Burleson-Castillo to enter into an agreement providing for binding
arbitration and waiving Rose's rights to a jury or nonjury trial.
     Sometime after Rose's admission to Heather Hill, the Estate filed a
lawsuit against the Defendants alleging nursing home negligence during

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Rose's residency. After the lawsuit was initiated, the Defendants filed
motions to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings arguing that
Burleson-Castillo signed the admission agreement on behalf of Rose as
her attorney-in-fact pursuant to the DPOA. The trial court granted the
Defendants' motions.
     The Defendants ask us to ignore the HCS designation specifically
listed throughout the admission agreement and insist that Burleson-
Castillo signed the agreement as Rose's attorney-in-fact. We reject this
argument.
     Orders compelling arbitration are reviewed de novo. Dea v. PH Fort
Myers, LLC, 208 So. 3d 1204, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). "Although
arbitration is a preferred method of dispute resolution, '[t]he general rule
favoring arbitration does not support forcing a party into arbitration
when that party did not agree to arbitrate.' " Moen v. Bradenton Council
on Aging, LLC, 210 So. 3d 213, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (alteration in
original) (quoting Nestler-Poletto Realty, Inc. v. Kassin, 730 So. 2d 324,
326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
     While arbitration agreements generally bind only those parties that
enter it, nonsignatories may "be bound by an arbitration agreement if
dictated by ordinary principles of contract law and agency." Id. at 215-
16 (quoting Stalley v. Transitional Hosps. Corp. of Tampa, 44 So. 3d 627,
630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)). Though DPOAs may confer broad grants of
authority to enter arbitration agreements on behalf of a principal, see
Etheridge v. Palm Garden of Winter Haven, LLC, 359 So. 3d 1202, 1205
(Fla. 2d DCA 2022), health care proxies do not "have authority to waive
the right to a jury trial and bind a nursing home patient to arbitrate
claims because [that] is not a health care decision," Moen, 210 So. 3d at
216 (citing Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 297,

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300-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (en banc)). An agreement to arbitrate
executed on behalf of a nursing home resident is unenforceable when the
signor does not sign in his or her capacity as attorney-in-fact pursuant
to a DPOA. Etheridge, 359 So. 3d at 1203, 1205-06.
      Here, the signatory designation pertaining to the arbitration
provision in the Heather Hill admission agreement is explicit. Burleson-
Castillo signed the document in his capacity as HCS as indicated by the
"HCS" designation appearing throughout the admission agreement.
Although the agreement has preprinted language indicating that it is
being signed by a "legal representative," that term is not defined within
the document and does not alter the fact that the agreement specifically
reflects Burleson-Castillo's status as Rose's HCS. Further, nothing in
the admission agreement references that Burleson-Castillo was Rose's
attorney-in-fact under a DPOA or that he signed in that capacity. Under
these circumstances, we reject the Defendants' contention that Burleson-
Castillo necessarily signed the document as Rose's attorney-in-fact
pursuant to the DPOA.
      Because Burleson-Castillo was acting in his capacity as HCS when
he signed the Heather Hill admission agreement, the trial court erred
when it compelled arbitration and stayed the proceedings. Therefore, we
reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.
      Reversed and remanded.

MORRIS and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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