Court Opinion

ID: 9841119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 14:04:19.235773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:39:51.218425
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                        Docket No. 49949

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                )
                                                )        Filed: September 21, 2023
        Plaintiff-Respondent,                   )
                                                )        Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 v.                                             )
                                                )        THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
 DAVID WILLIAM WARD,                            )        OPINION AND SHALL NOT
                                                )        BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
        Defendant-Appellant.                    )
                                                )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
       County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge.

       Judgment of conviction for misdemeanor second degree stalking, affirmed.

       Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
       Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

       Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
       General, Boise, for respondent.
                 ________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
       David William Ward appeals from his judgment of conviction for misdemeanor second
degree stalking, Idaho Code § 18-7906. Ward argues the district court abused its discretion by
admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence of a jail call he made to his ex-wife. Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, Ward’s judgment of conviction and
sentence are affirmed.
                                                    I.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       An investigation began after the victim, S.P., contacted police to report concerns that Ward
repeatedly made unwanted attempts to contact her. S.P. was a former co-worker and friend of
Ward who did not return the romantic feelings he had for her. After receiving this report, an officer
called Ward and told him to cease all contact with S.P. In response to the officer’s order, Ward

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stated: “I can’t really agree, I’m sorry.” After S.P. reported another incident the next day, the
officer again contacted Ward and told Ward to cease all contact and communications with S.P.
Nonetheless, over the next couple of months, Ward continued to contact S.P.: he left unwanted
voicemails; once, he waited by S.P.’s car late at night after she finished her work shift; he left a
gift, flower, and note on her car on another occasion; and he followed her home from work another
day. Ward also attempted to contact S.P. at her home multiple times and was told by her stepfather
that Ward could not see S.P., S.P. did not want to see Ward, Ward was stalking S.P. and that
behavior “was not right,” and at least twice, to stay away from S.P. and leave her alone.
       Because of these incidents, S.P. again contacted the police, prompting an officer to park
near S.P.’s residence to watch for Ward. As he surveilled S.P.’s residence, the officer saw Ward
drive up and park near S.P.’s home, approach the back door with a small box, and return to his
vehicle without the box. After arresting Ward for stalking, officers searched Ward’s vehicle and
seized a baseball bat, a machete-style knife with a nine-inch blade, and a bag containing handcuffs
and a mask. Ward was ultimately charged with first degree stalking while possessing a deadly
weapon, I.C. § 18-7905(1)(d).
       Before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of several excerpts from
recorded jail calls that Ward made to his ex-wife. The State contended the calls generally
contained discussions of Ward telling his ex-wife to claim ownership of the items in the car; to
bail him out of jail so he could take care of the situation; and other statements that showed
consciousness of guilt. As relevant to this appeal, in one excerpt of a call, designated as Exhibit
16a, Ward states, “I need you to get me out of here so I can square this away the right way. I’m
not taking the fall for some twerp,” and “I need you to get me out of here so I can take care of this
the right way. Thank you. Love you. Bye.”
       At trial, the State argued Ward’s statements during that call were admissible because the
statements were relevant to Ward’s consciousness of guilt under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b).
In response, Ward argued the statement was unfairly prejudicial pursuant to I.R.E. 403. The
district court overruled Ward’s objection and admitted Exhibit 16a. The jury convicted Ward of
misdemeanor second degree stalking. Ward timely appealed.

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                                                 II.
                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
       A lower court’s determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991);
State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989). When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable
to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
                                                III.
                                           ANALYSIS
       Ward argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting relevant but unfairly
prejudicial evidence because the excerpt of the jail call contained in Exhibit 16a is inherently and
highly inflammatory, which would invite the jury to reach its decision on an improper basis. The
State argues the jail call is not unfairly prejudicial because the only prejudice Ward identified is
the evidence’s probative value, which is prejudicial but not unfairly prejudicial.
       Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with his character but permits the admission of evidence of other acts to show
knowledge or consciousness of guilt. State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413
(Ct. App. 2010). When determining the admissibility of evidence to which a Rule 404(b) objection
has been made, the trial court must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence of the other
acts such that a reasonable jury could conclude the conduct actually occurred. If so, then the court
must consider: (1) whether the other acts are relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning
the crime charged, other than propensity; and (2) whether the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185,
1188 (2009); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214, 207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2009).
       Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides the court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly

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presenting cumulative evidence. In determining unfair prejudice, the proper focus of the trial court
is whether the fact to be shown by the evidence justifies the tendency of the evidence to persuade
by illegitimate means.     State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604, 809 P.2d 455, 465 (1991).
Illegitimate means includes when evidence invites inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside
of the evidence or emotions which are irrelevant to the decision-making process. Id. Although
most evidence offered to prove a defendant’s guilt is inherently prejudicial. State v. Rawlings,
159 Idaho 498, 506, 363 P.3d 339, 347 (2015). Evidence is not unduly prejudicial simply because
it is damaging to a defendant’s case. State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct.
App. 2011). Thus, evidence is only unfairly prejudicial if it suggests a decision on an improper
basis. Id.
       Evidence of a defendant’s efforts to influence or affect evidence, such as intimidating a
witness, offering to compensate a witness, and fabrication, destruction, or concealment of evidence
may be relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 463, 235 P.3d at
413. Such evidence is admissible because a defendant’s effort to influence evidence suggests an
attempt to evade justice, and hence, implicates consciousness of guilt. State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho
900, 917, 354 P.3d 462, 479 (2015).
       In this case, the district court found Exhibit 16a was relevant to show Ward’s consciousness
of guilt. On appeal, Ward acknowledges Exhibit 16a was relevant for this purpose. The district
court also held the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. Ward argues the district court erred in
this regard because Exhibit 16a invited the jury to convict him because of an inference that he was
violent and dangerous. However, Exhibit 16a does not include any explicit threats by Ward; he
made the statements in a brief, calm nature; and he did not explicitly indicate he had violent or
dangerous intentions. As Ward acknowledges, the language he used could be interpreted as
reflecting his desire to address the criminal charges in a legal manner, such as meeting with his
attorney and establishing a defense to the charges. Thus, the language Ward used in State’s Exhibit
16a did not create a danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
       Further, Exhibit 16a did not cause undue delay or waste time; it was not needlessly
cumulative of other evidence presented; it did not appeal to the passions of the jury; and it did not
invite the jury to base its decision on an improper basis. The only prejudice identified was that
Exhibit 16a demonstrated Ward’s consciousness of guilt, which does not, in and of itself, make
the statements contained in the exhibit so prejudicial that it precludes the admission of the exhibit.

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Nothing about the statements in Exhibit 16a, specifically, or the record more broadly, indicate the
jury’s guilty verdict was based on being improperly influenced by the excerpt of the jail call.
       As further evidence of the unfairly prejudicial nature of the statements, Ward argues that
his statements evidencing consciousness of guilt were “far more distressing than any of the stalking
conduct presented at trial.” We disagree. Ward was explicitly told by law enforcement to stay
away from S.P., and Ward’s response was that “I can’t really agree, I’m sorry,” indicating an intent
to disregard S.P.’s requests and law enforcement’s advisement. After additional unwanted contact,
Ward was again told to cease all contact and communication with S.P., which Ward again ignored.
Ward followed S.P. late at night, went to her home, ignored S.P.’s stepfather telling Ward his
behavior was problematic, and left unwanted telephone messages and gifts for S.P. Nothing about
the excerpt from the jail call is “far more distressing” than Ward’s willingness to disregard requests
from both law enforcement and S.P.’s family and his documented behavior of unwanted and
unceasing contact with S.P.
       The district court did not err in concluding the probative value of the statements was not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Having found the district court did not err, we need
not address the State’s argument regarding harmless error.
                                                 IV.
                                          CONCLUSION
       The district court did not err by admitting the jail call because the district court reasonably
concluded the excerpt of the jail call was not unduly prejudicial in relation to its probative value
showing consciousness of guilt. Ward’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.
       Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.

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