Court Opinion

ID: 9682725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:15:29.553379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.311754
License: Public Domain

On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing
Appellants distinguish the authority upon which we principally relied in our original opinion, Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works v. Lipscomb, on the ground that there the action of the Commissioners’ Court was void and that the nature of the claim asserted was one which required approval by the Auditor before it could be allowed by the Commissioners’ Court.
They cite as controlling Chrestman v. Tompkins, Tex.Civ.App., 5 S.W.2d 257, 262, Dallas Civil Appeals, writ refused. This was a mandamus proceeding by Chrestman against the Auditor of the City of Dallas to compel him to countersign a warrant for $500 to be paid him on the order of the Board of Education of the city for legal services rendered by him under employment by the Board. The Auditor had de-*23dined to countersign the warrant solely on the ground that the Board could not legally employ counsel. Disagreeing with this the Court held his duty to countersign the warrant was ministerial in nature saying:
“In this situation it is not necessary for us to determine the scope of the discretion committed to the auditor; it being only necessary for our present purpose to decide whether or not he was empowered to exercise the discretion attempted. In regard to this, we are of the opinion that he was not given, under any provision of the city charter, the right to veto 'the action of the board of education. The duty he was called upon to perform under the circumstances was purely ministerial, and, as the claim was acknowledged, the amount thereof definitely ascertained and certain, it was his plain duty to countersign the warrant authorizing its payment.”
The Court went on to hold that the legal remedy was inadequate saying:
“As heretofore shown, there was no controversy over any matter except as to the legal authority of the:board of education to incur the indebtedness and pay for same out of the general school fund of the city. Relator’s fee had been earned, it wás then due, the board of education was willing to pay, and for that purpose had authorized the issuance of the warrant. Relator was, entitled to have his fee paid at once without being forced to pursue the circuitous route of a suit in court to establish the claim, with the expense and delay necessarily incident to such a course.
“If the auditor, for the reason stated, is permitted to refuse approval of this claim, clothed as it is with indisputable evidence of validity and correctness, and thus compel the institution of a suit for its establishment by judgment before meriting his approval, he could, if in an arbitrary mood, likewise withhold approval from every warrant issued by authority of the board of education for the payment of salaries of officers, teachers, and employees, to the utter demoralization' of the school system of the city.”
Also cited by appellants is the case of Guerra v. Weatherly, Tex.Civ.App., 291 S.W.2d 493, Waco Civil Appeals. This was a suit to compel the County Auditor to countersign warrants issued to pay attorneys fees as authorized by order of the Commissioners’ Court. A summary judgment was rendered .and in affirming such judgment the Court held the order was valid and that there was no genuine issue of fact presented. Under such circumstances the Court held mandamus to be a proper remedy citing in addition to Chrestman, supra, Ham v. Garvey, Tex.Civ.App., 155 S.W.2d 976, San Antonio Civil Appeals. This was a suit to compel the County Auditor to countersign a warrant drawn on the Road and Bridge Fund of the county. The Court said:
“The controlling question under the facts of this case.is one of the jurisdiction of the Commissioners’' Court. If said Court, in 'ordering the payment of $425 to appellant, acted'within its constitutional or statutory jurisdiction, the act of the Auditor in countersigning the warrant is purely ministerial, although required by the provisions of 'Article 1661, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats.”
Upon deciding the jurisdictional issue adversely to the Auditor the Court ordered issuance of the writ of mandamus against him.
In addition to the requirement of Art. 1661 making it the' duty of the Auditor to countersign certain warrants, Art. 1666, V. A.C.S., requires the County Auditor to perform certain duties regarding the County Budget including the duty to “ * * * carefully keep an, oversight of same to see that the expenses of any department do *24not exceed said budget appropriations * * *1.
We quote from appellee’s sworn answer, upon which his motion for summary judgment was based:
“Respondent says that on April 22, 1957, the date of the purported order of the Commissioners Court of Houston County, Texas, (quoted in paragraph II of Relator’s original petition) amending the budget of Houston County, Texas, for the year 1957, has the effect of budgeting 1957 expenditures from the officers salary fund of Houston County, Texas, which total expenditures as budgeted by such amendment exceeds the budgeted income for such period for such fund and because of this the Commissioners Court of Houston County, Texas, has no jurisdiction to amend the 1957 budget of said county so as to increase the 1957 expenditures from such fund without first providing additional income for such fund sufficient to bring the income from such fund up to and equal to the' expenditures therefrom. In this connection, Respondent says that there are no funds in said fund in excess of those contained in the original 1957 budget and that Houston County does not have in its possession, nor can it be reasonably calculated to have within its possession during the year 1957 funds in its officers salary fund sufficient to meet the expenditures budgeted therefrom in the original 1957 budget, and for these reasons Respondent has heretofore and does now respectfully refuse to approve the May 1957 salary voucher of Kenneth Davis which is attached to Relator’s Original Petition, because should Respondent approve same he would be violating both Constitutional and Statutory provisions forbidding deficit spending.”
Considering these sworn allegations and the duty enjoined ttpon appellee by Art. 1666 respecting the budget which provoke questions of law and fact as well as other questions of fact and law referred to in our original opinion we adhere to our conclusion that in this case the County Auditor had more than a ministerial duty to perform in countersigning the warrants in question.
The motion is overruled.
Motion overruled.

. Art. 1666a, Y.A.O.S., applicable to Audi-tors in counties of over 225,000 population provides that valid contracts for services or materials
“* ⅜ ⅝ shall nevertheless not become effective and binding unless and until there has been issued in connection with such item the certificate of said County Auditor that ample budget provision has been made in the budget therefor and funds are, or will be, on hand to pay the obligation of the county or officer when due.”
See an excellent article appearing in the Port Worth Star Telegram, 6-1-5S, “Auditor is Watchdog of Tarrant Treasury” by Harley Pershing.