Court Opinion

ID: 9960944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:11:06.665984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:05.030586
License: Public Domain

No. 237                 April 17, 2024                        67

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
               JEROME EMERSON WICKS,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
                Linn County Circuit Court
                  19CR62792; A178918

   Thomas McHill, Judge.
   Submitted March 14, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Kate E. Morrow, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
   TOOKEY, P. J.
   Affirmed.
68                                              State v. Wicks

        TOOKEY, P. J.
         Defendant appeals his conviction for unlawful pos-
session of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894. In a motion
to suppress, defendant argued that a state trooper lacked
reasonable suspicion to expand the subject matter of a traf-
fic stop by asking questions related to an investigation for
driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). In his sole
assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred
in denying that motion. We affirm.
         We review for legal error but are “bound by the trial
court’s factual findings if there is any constitutionally suffi-
cient evidence to support them.” State v. Krieger, 318 Or App
441, 442, 508 P3d 62 (2022). We summarize the facts consis-
tent with that standard of review.
         At about 4:30 p.m., Oregon State Trooper Andrews
was driving north on a rural road, when he saw the nose of
defendant’s truck sticking out into the southbound lane. The
rear tires of defendant’s truck were stuck in a small road-
side ditch, unable to get traction. There was a gravel apron
beside defendant’s truck, which allowed for farm equipment
to access an adjacent cornfield. At the time, that field was
dry and contained only stubble. Andrews believed that a
driver could safely turn around in the cornfield.
         Moments after Andrews came upon defendant,
defendant got free of the ditch and drove away in the direc-
tion that Andrews had been heading. Andrews followed
defendant for about half a mile. During that time, defendant
did not engage in any unsafe or otherwise improper driving.
But, due to defendant’s initial position in the ditch, Andrews
initiated a traffic stop for the infractions of stopping on a
highway and failing to maintain a lane. Defendant pulled
over properly and safely.
         When Andrews walked up to defendant’s window,
defendant immediately said, “That was the wrong place to
turn around.” Andrews noticed that defendant had decayed
or missing teeth, a tense or rigid face, and a choppy or grav-
elly voice. He also saw that defendant’s “entire body was
Cite as 332 Or App 67 (2024)                                                   69

shaking.”1 He associated those observations with drug use.
He asked defendant, “[W]hen was the last time you used?”
        In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that
the question was unrelated to the purposes of the traffic
stop and not justified by reasonable suspicion of a DUII.
Consequently, he argued that the question was unlawful
and that all subsequently discovered evidence is presumed
to be tainted by that illegality and subject to suppression.
The trial court disagreed, ruling that Andrews had rea-
sonable suspicion to initiate a DUII investigation because
defendant had been stuck in a ditch and displayed physical
symptoms of drug intoxication.
          Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, pro-
tects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or
seizure.” A traffic stop is a “seizure” that requires a consti-
tutional justification. State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or 610,
621-24, 227 P3d 695 (2010). An officer’s investigative activity
during a traffic stop is subject to both durational and subject-
matter limitations. State v. Arreola-Botello, 365 Or 695, 712,
451 P3d 939 (2019) (“[A]n officer is limited to investigatory
inquiries that are reasonably related to the purpose of the
traffic stop or that have an independent constitutional justi-
fication.”). Officers investigating a traffic infraction cannot
engage in “investigative activities, including investigative
inquiries” that are unrelated to that infraction, unless those
activities have an “independent constitutional justification,”
such as reasonable suspicion of another crime. Id. In this
case, the question is whether Andrews had reasonable sus-
picion of DUII when he asked defendant about drug use.
        Reasonable suspicion exists “when an officer can
point to specific and articulable facts that give rise to a
reasonable inference that the defendant committed or was
about to commit a specific crime or type of crime.” State
    1
      Defendant notes that the interaction was recorded on Andrews’s body cam-
era and argues that that video “at most shows an occasional, minor quiver in
defendant’s neck or cheek during the first 54 seconds of the interaction—far from
what Andrews described in his testimony.” However, as defendant acknowledges,
only a portion of defendant’s body is visible in the video; everything below defen-
dant’s chest was obscured by the car door.
70                                                            State v. Wicks

v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 163, 165, 389 P3d 1121 (2017).
That inference must be “objectively reasonable in light of
the totality of circumstances known to the officer.”2 State
v. Bradley, 329 Or App 736, 741, 542 P3d 56 (2023). Again,
the trial court’s ruling in this case was premised on two
specific and articulable facts: (1) defendant got stuck in a
ditch, and (2) defendant’s physical characteristics suggested
recent drug use. We address both in turn.
          First, the trial court found that defendant being
stuck in the ditch in close proximity to the gravel apron
supported reasonable suspicion of DUII. Defendant argues
that no reasonable inferences about impairment can be
drawn from the failure to use the nearby gravel apron to
turn around, because there was no evidence that it was big
enough to allow defendant to turn around without entering
a cornfield. And he argues that a reasonable driver would
likely avoid entering a farmer’s field at all. We agree with
defendant on that point. However, the fact that defendant
got his truck stuck in a ditch while trying to turn around is
still sufficient on its own—irrespective of the gravel apron—
to infer that defendant made a poor choice while driving,
at least to some degree.3 Although getting stuck in a ditch
may not be sufficient, in these circumstances, to provide
reasonable suspicion of DUII—it is still one factor in the
calculation.
        Second, the trial court relied on the facts relating
to defendant’s physical characteristics to conclude there was
reasonable suspicion of DUII. Defendant argues that his
decayed or missing teeth and gravelly voice are not evidence
    2
      Put another way, reasonable suspicion has both “an objective and a subjec-
tive component.” State v. Wampler, 325 Or App 722, 727, 530 P3d 133, rev den,
371 Or 477 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). At issue in this case is the
objective component, because defendant does not dispute that Andrews subjec-
tively believed that defendant had committed DUII. See id. (the subjective com-
ponent is satisfied when officer subjectively believes that a person has committed
a crime).
    3
      Although defendant notes that a “practically infinite number of circum-
stances could explain why a driver pulled to the side of a road[, and] sometimes
drivers get stuck,” defendant also acknowledges that he told Andrews that he
chose the “wrong place to turn around.” Therefore, for purposes of the reasonable-
suspicion analysis, Andrews would have known that defendant got stuck as a
consequence of defendant’s attempt to turn around and not an emergency of some
sort.
Cite as 332 Or App 67 (2024)                              71

of present intoxication and, thus, do not add anything to the
analysis. And, on that point, we agree. However, Andrews
testified that defendant’s body was shaking, which he iden-
tified as a symptom of present intoxication. Again, such
shaking may have many non-drug-related causes and may
not be sufficient on its own to provide reasonable suspicion
of DUII. But it is a factor in the calculation.
         Here, there are two “specific and articulable facts”
that support reasonable suspicion: (1) that defendant got
his truck stuck in a ditch while attempting to turn around,
and (2) that he displayed shaking, which could be a physical
symptom of present intoxication. Although those facts could
have multiple explanations, together they allow for an objec-
tively reasonable inference that defendant may have been
driving while impaired by an intoxicant and, therefore, sup-
port reasonable suspicion. For that reason, we conclude that
Andrews did not unlawfully expand the subject-matter lim-
itations of defendant’s stop when he asked defendant about
drug use.
        Affirmed.