Court Opinion

ID: 9368367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 21:03:03.696267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.398440
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/3/23 Tyler C. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re TYLER C. et al., Persons                                  B316341
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.                                                            Los Angeles County
_______________________________                                 Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00613

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

T.C.,
         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael C. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.
     Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Mother T.C. appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights to her children. She does not challenge the
merits of the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her rights.
Mother’s contention is that the Los Angeles Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its
initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code 1
section 224.2, subdivision (b) in that DCFS failed to ask available
maternal extended family members about Indian ancestry within
the meaning of section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
       We find DCFS erred in failing to question Mother’s family
despite having contact with many of her relatives, including her
own parents, sisters, grandparents, and aunts. (No fathers or
paternal relatives were involved in this case as the whereabouts
of the fathers were unknown.) Although Mother stated she had
no Indian ancestry, we find the juvenile court erred in not
personally inquiring of the numerous maternal relatives about
their ancestry. However, we conclude, as explained below, the
error was harmless because the children’s designated adoptive
parent was their maternal step-grandmother and the record
otherwise reveals no reason to know that the children may have
Indian ancestry.
                         BACKGROUND
       On September 17, 2018, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging Mother had “brandished” a gun in the presence of two of
her three children, threatened a family member, and broke the
living room window causing glass to shatter. The petition alleged

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
the children (a nine-year-old boy and twin seven-year-old girls)
were at risk of abuse or neglect as a result of the incident with
the gun. The second count under section 300, subdivision (b)
alleged Mother had a history of substance abuse and was
currently using marijuana, such that she was unable to supervise
and care for her children. On October 16, 2018, DCFS filed an
amended petition which modified the (b) count. The petition
alleged Mother had emotional issues stemming from childhood
trauma which manifested in assaultive behavior and anger
management issues. As a result, Mother allegedly self-medicated
with non-prescribed substances.
      At adjudication on October 16, 2018, the court struck the
count involving the gun incident and found true the allegations
involving substance abuse and childhood trauma. The juvenile
court removed the children from Mother and ordered
reunification services and suitable placement. On October 18,
2019, DCFS filed a second petition with new allegations which
the court sustained on December 20, 2019. In January 2021, over
two years since the initial petition had been filed, the court ended
Mother’s reunification services. On November 12, 2021, the court
terminated Mother’s parental rights, found the children
adoptable, and ruled the parent-child bond exception to
termination of parental rights did not apply. The children’s
maternal step-grandmother Rosalyn C. was designated their
prospective adoptive parent.
      As for Indian ancestry, at the detention hearing on
September 17, 2018, Mother filed an ICWA-020 form, checked the
box stating, “I may have Indian ancestry,” and handwrote “Tribe
unknown.” At the hearing, Mother stated “My grandmother was
mixed with Indian.” The court asked her if there was someone

                                 3
else who would have information about this ancestry and Mother
said no. Maternal grandfather and maternal great aunt were
both present at the hearing and the court did not ask either of
them about Mother’s claims of possible Indian ancestry. Mother
also stated she did not believe either of the alleged fathers had
Indian ancestry. The court found ICWA did not apply.
       On October 5, 2018, Mother definitively told DCFS she did
not have Indian ancestry and she stated that to the court as well
on October 16, 2018. Local maternal relatives contacted by DCFS
and listed in its reports include maternal great aunt A.H. (with
whom the children were initially placed after removal from
Mother); maternal great aunt T.J.); maternal grandfather K.C.;
maternal grandmother T.T.; maternal step-grandmother Rosalyn
C. (with whom the children stayed to give a break to caretaker
step-great-grandmother S.S.); maternal aunt T.C.; maternal
great grandmother Phyllis; maternal step great grandmother S.S.
(with whom the children were placed). Maternal grandfather and
a maternal aunt attended the detention hearing. Maternal
grandfather also testified at the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing.
       None of these family members was ever asked about Indian
ancestry. Based only on Mother’s incomplete knowledge of
Indian ancestry as stated on her September 17, 2018 ICWA-020
Form and on Mother’s later denial of both maternal ancestry and
paternal Indian ancestry as to both fathers, the court found no
reason to believe the children had Indian ancestry. This appeal
followed.

                               4
                         DISCUSSION
        Mother contends the order terminating parental rights
should be reversed because DCFS did not inquire of her extended
family members about the children’s possible Indian ancestry.
       In enacting ICWA, Congress found “that an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal,
often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and
adoptive homes and institutions.” (25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).) ICWA
reflects the intent of Congress “to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and
by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of
child and family service programs.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The
court is obligated to ask each “participant” in the proceedings
whether they have reason to believe the child is an Indian child
and to instruct the parties to inform the court if they
subsequently receive information that provides a reason to know
the child is an Indian child. (In re Austin J. (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882–883.)
       As our Supreme Court has recognized, “Congress enacted
ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising concern in the mid-1970’s
over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and
Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in
the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their
families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement,

                                5
usually in non-Indian homes.’ ” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1, 7.) In enacting these provisions, “ ‘Congress was concerned not
solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also
about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of
Indian children adopted by non-Indians.’ ” (Id. at p. 9.)
       The concern about separating Indian children from their
Indian families, heritage and culture was the topic of extensive
Congressional hearings when ICWA was enacted. As one
commentator wrote, the “ ‘wholesale separation of Indian
children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and
destructive aspect of American Indian life today.’ ” (Atwood,
Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance (2002) 51 Emory L.J.
587, 601, cited in In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1014.)
       ICWA authorizes states to provide even more protection
than the federal statute provides. In 2006, the California
legislature enacted parallel statutes to affirm ICWA’s purposes
and mandate compliance with ICWA in all Indian child custody
proceedings. (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706, fn. 3.)
In California, the child protection agency is obligated to ask “the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The child protection agency,
in this case DCFS, must complete the Indian Child Inquiry
Attachment form ICWA-010(A) and attach it to the petition.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)

                                 6
       Here DCFS did not fulfill its duties under section 224.2 as
it did not ask extended maternal family members about Indian
ancestry, despite having contact information for and extensive
discussions with several relatives. The next question is whether
the error was prejudicial. A prerequisite to reversal of a trial
court’s decision under California law is s showing of a
miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
       We find no miscarriage of miscarriage of justice. ICWA
itself sets out placement priorities. Section 1915 of title 25 of the
United States Code provides that in any adoptive placement of an
Indian child under state law, “a preference shall be given, in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with [¶]
(1) a member of the child’s extended family; [¶] (2) other members
of the Indian child’s tribe; or [¶] (3) other Indian families.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1915(a); In re J.W. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 384, 391.)
The term “extended family” has been defined as including the
child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).) California has adopted the
same definition. (§ 224.1, subd. (c).)
       In this case the children’s maternal step-grandmother,
Rosalyn C., whom DCFS describes as a “Relative,” has been
designated their prospective adoptive parent. According to
DCFS, Rosalyn C. “has maintained a relationship with the
children since they were born [and] the children appear to have
developed a secure attachment to the prospective adoptive
applicant.” DCFS went on: “The children appear to be thriving
in the home of the prospective adoptive applicant. [Rosalyn C.]
has demonstrated that she is capable of meeting the needs of the
children and has been diligent and consistent in assuring the

                                 7
children continue to have all of their needs met.” When asked, all
the children reported they wanted to live with Rosalyn C.
       Although the statutes do not address “step-grandparents”
per se, we conclude the statute would include such relatives in its
scope under the circumstances of this case. Here the juvenile
court designated the children as adoptable by their maternal step
grandmother, who “has been a part of their lives since they were
small.” The adoptive parent was also familiar with the children
because her own mother, S.S., had been acting as their caregiver
during part of the lives and during part of the proceedings, with
Rosalyn C. substituting as caregiver when necessary. DCFS
reported the children are “thriving” in Rosalyn C.’s home.
Perhaps the Legislature did not conceive of a step grandparent,
as opposed to a step parent, having a lifelong connection to
children in dependency proceedings, but here the record is replete
with evidence of the close physical and emotional connection
maintained with the children by multiple generations of Mother’s
family. As a result of this unusual family configuration and
because of the juvenile court’s finding that adoption by Rosalyn
C. would be in the children’s best interest, they are not in danger
of being separated from maternal relatives they have known their
whole lives, an evil ICWA was enacted to prevent.
       Mother does not argue that her children’s proposed
adoption by their maternal step grandmother is contrary to their
best interest or lacks good cause. The juvenile court’s proposed
adoption plan for the children belies a finding of prejudice under
ICWA. The abuses ICWA was enacted to prevent are not in play
here.

                                8
       Alternatively, applying the rule for assessing prejudice as
set forth in In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review
granted September 21, 2022, S275578, we find nothing in the
record to indicate Mother’s denial of Indian ancestry was ill-
informed, unfounded, or incorrect. Mother was raised by her
mother and father and denied experiencing abuse or neglect.
During the proceedings, she was living with extended family
members, many of whom were contacted about the dependency
case, including her own father, her sisters, her aunts and her own
grandparents and step grandparents. Indeed, DCFS reported,
“The family has a very strong support system and maternal
grandparents are willing to do all it takes to have the children
remain together and well cared for.” Family members were close
enough to Mother, who suffered seizures, to be concerned that
her behavior was the result of undiagnosed multiple sclerosis,
which had caused Mother’s grandmother’s death. Mother’s
familiarity with and continuous contacts with her own biological
family distinguish this case from In re A.C., where the mother
was isolated from her biological family at a young age. We find
no miscarriage of justice.

                                9
                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                             STRATTON, P. J.

I concur:

                                *
            HARUTUNIAN, J.

*     Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

                                    10
WILEY, J., Dissenting.
      The miscarriage of justice is cutting tribes out of the child
placement process.
      Tribes asked our Legislature to require agencies like the
Department to ask extended family members about a child’s
possible Indian ancestry.
      Tribes identified the problem. Questioning only the parents
about Indian ancestry was not enough. “[T]here are a variety of
reasons why relying on the parents does not necessarily protect
the child’s best interests, or the rights of the tribe. Parents may
simply not have that information, or may possess only vague or
ambiguous information.” (California ICWA Compliance Task
Force, Report to the California Attorney General’s Bureau of
Children’s Justice, 2017, p. 28  [as of Feb. 1, 2023], archived at  (Tribal Report).) Parents “may be fearful to self-identify”
or may “wish to avoid the tribe’s participation or assumption of
jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
      Acting on the basis of the Tribal Report, the Legislature
unanimously passed the 2018 amendment requiring agencies like
the Department to ask extended family members about a child’s
possible Indian ancestry. (See, e.g., Cal. Health and Human
Services Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3176
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Brown (Aug. 31,
2018 & Sept. 4, 2018) pp. 5-6.)
      The Legislature enacted this amendment to help tribes get
information that would enable them better to preserve their
cultures. In light of the last 500 years of history, denying tribes
the benefit of this information is a miscarriage of justice.

                                1
       Placement with maternal family members does not prove
harmlessness. (In re Oscar H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 933, 938–
940 [portion of opn. not joined by a second justice].) Placement
with a relative can still mean harm to tribes, particularly where
(as here) the relative does not acknowledge any tribe. If the
relative does not acknowledge this heritage, how is it carried
forward?
       “A tribe’s rights are independent of the rights of other
parties.” (Tribal Report, supra, p. 71.) A parent cannot waive the
tribes’ rights. (Ibid.) The injustice inherent in tribes not being
fairly included in state court can be overcome only by ensuring
tribal participation. (Id. at p. 94.)
       This is my 17th dissent on this topic. The persistence of
this issue is remarkable. The Department could eliminate this
issue by complying with the 2018 amendment.

                                          WILEY, J.

                                2