Court Opinion

ID: 9409514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 15:08:59.736431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.973751
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                            No. 04-22-00243-CR

                                       Emery Jay MENCHACA, Jr.,
                                                Appellant

                                                       v.

                                           The STATE of Texas,
                                                 Appellee

                   From the 218th Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas
                                 Trial Court No. 20-06-0138-CRA
                             Honorable Lynn Ellison, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:      Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:         Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                 Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
                 Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1

Delivered and Filed: July 5, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Appellant, Emery Jay Menchaca, Jr., was charged with entering a habitation and

committing or attempting to commit a felony—aggravated assault and assault family violence

(strangulation).    A jury found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to seventy years’

confinement. In twelve issues on appeal, Menchaca challenges various evidentiary rulings by the

trial court. We affirm.

1
  The Honorable Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) of the Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of
the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
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                                               BACKGROUND 2

         Menchaca’s wife (“Brooke”) testified she has dated Menchaca over the past twelve years

and their relationship has been “toxic.” She first met Menchaca when they were both in middle

school and they dated “on and off again” through high school. She stated she has three children

aged twelve, eight, and six years old. She gave birth to her first child when she was a sixteen-

year-old sophomore in high school, and another young man is the child’s father. Menchaca is the

father of Brooke’s two youngest children, both sons. Menchaca and Brooke married in March

2018. That same year, the couple discussed getting a divorce. Brooke filed for divorce in August

2018. Toward the end of December 2020, Brooke began dating AJ Cordova. She said Menchaca

was “not happy” that she was dating AJ. However, she admitted there were times she and

Menchaca talked about getting back together.

         On April 17, 2020, Brooke left her place of employment at around 5:00 p.m. and went to

AJ’s house. She said Menchaca had called her throughout the day at her workplace and after work.

At the time, he had their sons with him. She said when she returned Menchaca’s calls, he yelled

at her and told her she needed to go home and “if [she] wasn’t going to go home on [her] own, he

was going to come get [her.]” He also told her that he would come get her and take her and the

kids “where no one would find us.” She interpreted Menchaca’s statement to mean he was going

to do something to hurt her or the children. Because she felt threatened, she called the sheriff’s

office for a welfare check on her children.

         When she was at AJ’s house, she called 911 but ended the call when Menchaca arrived.

She described what happened on the evening of April 17th as follows:

2
 Several witnesses testified during the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial. However, Menchaca’s issues
on appeal all relate to evidentiary rulings. None relate to the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, this Background
section is provided only to give context to some of those rulings and the arguments made on appeal.

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A. I was in [AJ’s] living room and I heard [Menchaca’s] truck. It’s a very loud
truck. And I ran into the bedroom. I looked out the window and I saw his truck
parked at the cemetery, and then I saw him running down the driveway, down the
road.
Q. I mean, were you able to see him clearly? Can you say for sure it was
[Menchaca]?
A. Yes.
Q. When you saw him coming down the driveway and you ended that 911 call,
what happened next?
A. I – I saw him running around the house to the front door and the back door.
And it was dark. All the lights were out in the house. Me and AJ were standing
next to the bed, and I just heard – I thought the window was shot out, but I guess a
hammer went through it. And as soon as I heard the glass break, I took out running
– took off running out the front door.
Q. Let’s talk about when you saw him running around the house. You say he went
to the front door and back door. How do you know that? Did you hear anything?
A. I saw him through the windows.
Q. Okay. When you said you thought it was a gunshot, why – why was that?
A. Just because it was so loud.
Q. What was going through your head at that moment?
A. That if I didn’t get away he was going to kill AJ.
Q. So you were worried about AJ at that point?
A. (Nodding.)
Q. And so what did you do?
A. I took off running out of the bedroom and out the front door, down the street,
thinking that the cops would be there.
Q. Were you able to get all the way down the road?
A. No.
Q. What happened next?
A. I don’t know if [Menchaca] pulled me down. I don’t know how. I just
remember being on the ground and being striked [sic] multiple times.
Q. Can you tell the jury what he was doing exactly, what you – to the best that you
can remember?
A. I just remember being punched in the head and the face consistently.
Q. What happened next?
A. Somehow I got from the street in between the window where he’d broke it out.
I just remember laying on glass and [Menchaca] was leaning over me and looking
in his eyes. I couldn’t feel anything. Like, he had his fingers down my throat and
he was biting me.
Q. When he had his fingers down your throat, can you describe that for the jury?
A. I just felt his hand down my throat with – like he had gloves on or something.
Q. What do you remember about the gloves?
A. They just felt like a fabric, cloth.
Q. And you said he was biting you. Was that while he had his hands down your
throat?
A. Yes.

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       Q. With his hands down your throat, were you able to breathe?
       A. No.

       Somehow, Brooke was not sure how, she and Menchaca ended up at the back of AJ’s house

where Menchaca continued to beat her, telling her “I’m not going to stop. You’re going to die

tonight.” “He said me and my kids.” At some point, Menchaca ran away. Brooke said Menchaca

must have entered AJ’s house for him to have chased her out the front door.

       The jury found Menchaca guilty of “intentionally and knowingly enter[ing] a habitation,

without the effective consent of . . . the owner thereof, and attempt[ting] to commit or committed

the felony offense of Aggravated Assault and Assault Family Violence by Impeding Breath.” On

appeal, Menchaca raises twelve issues complaining of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of

discretion standard. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A trial court

abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id.

An appellate court must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the evidence

and is correct under any applicable theory of law. See Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002).

                                            HEARSAY

       In his first, second, and third issues, Menchaca asserts the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting hearsay evidence of alleged extraneous offenses. In his sixth issue, Menchaca asserts

the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony about a conversation between Brooke and

defense counsel.

       Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by statute or the rules of evidence. See TEX.

R. EVID. 802. Hearsay is defined as an oral or written “statement that (1) the declarant does not

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make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Id. 801(d). “Matter asserted” means “(1) any matter

a declarant expressly asserts; and (2) any matter implied by a statement, if the probative value of

the statement as offered flows from the declarant’s belief about the matter.” Id. 801(c). “It is well

settled that an out-of-court ‘statement’ need not be directly quoted in order to run afoul of the

hearsay rules.” Head v. State, 4 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

A.     Screenshot of a Text Message

       In his first issue, Menchaca complains about the admission of an exhibit containing a

screenshot of a text message from Menchaca to his brother that was proffered during Brooke’s

testimony. On appeal, Menchaca asserts the hearsay went directly to whether he was abusive. The

State responds that the statements in the text message were admissible under the admissions by a

party opponent exception to the hearsay rule.

       Statements that constitute admissions by a party opponent, including a party’s own

statement, are not hearsay. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2)(A). On appeal, Menchaca does not dispute

that the text message was written by him to his brother. His sole argument is that the screenshot

of the text should not have been admitted because the statements contained in the text message

were of a highly prejudicial nature that cannot be considered to “not influence or had only a slight

influence” in deciding the jury’s verdict. We agree with the State that the statements made by

Menchaca in the text message were admissions by a party opponent, and, therefore, not hearsay.

       Menchaca also contends the screenshot was prejudicial. Even if prejudicial, we conclude

the screenshot was not unfairly prejudicial. Under Rule of Evidence 403, a trial court “may

exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. “Rule 403 does not require

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exclusion of evidence simply because it creates prejudice; the prejudice must be ‘unfair.’”

Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Assuming without deciding that

the screenshot was prejudicial to Menchaca, we hold it was not unfairly prejudicial.

       “The danger of unfair prejudice exists only when the evidence has the ‘potential to impress

the jury in an irrational way.’” Id. (citation omitted). That was not the case here. During the guilt-

innocence phase, the jury heard evidence about Menchaca’s and Brooke’s abusive relationship and

about the violent nature of the assault committed by Menchaca on the night of the incident. The

State did not mention the screenshot in its closing argument. Id. (“Although the State elicited the

information from Burch, it was never mentioned again and was not relied upon by the State during

its closing argument.”). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

allowing the screenshot into evidence. We overrule Menchaca’s first issue.

B.     Menchaca’s Alleged Sexual Assault of Brooke

       In his second and third issues, Menchaca complains about the admission into evidence of

an extraneous offense. Specifically, Brooke’s testimony regarding Menchaca’s alleged sexual

assault of her and the testimony of Brooke’s mother (“Christie”) regarding the reaction of Brooke’s

two young sons to what happened.

       To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a

timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from

the context, for the desired ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d

819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). To avoid waiving a complaint on appeal, the party must “let the

trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for

the judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in a position to do something about it.’”

Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citation omitted). “This gives the

trial judge and the opposing party the opportunity to correct the error.” Montelongo, 623 S.W.3d

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at 822. Further, the party must obtain an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or object to

the trial court’s refusal to rule. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2); Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216,

223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). In both instances here, defense counsel’s objection came after several

questions had been asked and responses had been elicited during Brooke’s and Christie’s

testimony. Therefore, Menchaca’s second and third issues are waived and present nothing for

review.

C.        Brooke’s Conversation with Defense Counsel

          In his sixth issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

Brooke’s testimony about a conversation she had with defense counsel because the testimony

constituted hearsay evidence that was irrelevant.

          During the State’s direct examination of Brooke, she admitted there was a time when she

did not want to proceed with the case against Menchaca and she asked the State not to prosecute

him. She admitted she had contacted the defense attorney wanting to help with Menchaca’s case.

During cross-examination, the following questions were asked of Brooke by defense counsel:

          Q. And, you know, the – Mr. Thornton [the prosecutor] asked you earlier if you
          spoke to me about this –
          A. Yes.
          Q. – right?
          Do you remember talking to me?
          A. Yes.
          Q. Do you remember telling me that you were under so many drugs and
          medications that you didn’t know whether it was AJ that attacked you? Didn’t you
          tell me that?
          A. I’ve had a lot of mixed emotions. I know AJ did not do this.
          Q. But didn’t you tell me that you weren’t sure whether it was AJ that attacked you
          or not? You told me that, didn’t you?
          A. I feel like I was being pressured into saying certain things.
          Q. You feel you were being pressured into saying that AJ –
          A. I didn’t say that AJ did this to me. I don’t remember saying that.
          Q. You don’t remember telling me that you didn’t know who did it to you and that
          it could have been AJ?
          A. Don’t remember saying that.
          ...

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       Later, on re-direct by the State, Brooke was asked the following:

       Q. The defense attorney also asked you some questions about the – the things you
       told him on the phone. Do you remember when he was asking you about that?
       A. Uh-huh. Yes.
       Q. And how you said that you can’t say for sure it was [Menchaca] or AJ.
       A. Yes.
       Q. You – you told the jury that you felt like you were being pressured. Can you
       describe what you mean by that to the jury?
       A. Just some of the things that was [sic] said to me that – about avoiding getting
       served so I didn’t have to testify.
       Q. And who told you that?
       A. [Menchaca’s] attorney.
       Q. So the man who was asking you questions?

       On appeal, Menchaca asserts Brooke’s conversation with defense counsel amounted to

hearsay and was not relevant to the elements of the case against him. Menchaca does not explain

what “truth” Brooke’s statements were meant to “prove” or how he may have been harmed if the

court erred by allowing the testimony. And we will not speculate. Menchaca’s brief does not

include any substantive analysis applying Rule 801 to the facts of the case or explain why Rule

802 required the exclusion of the evidence. Accordingly, this complaint is inadequately briefed

and presents nothing for our review. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 100 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003) (holding failure to adequately brief issue waives any error).

                                      AUTHENTICATION

       At trial, “[t]he court must decide any preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is

admissible.” TEX. R. EVID. 104(a). A “condition of admissibility of evidence in any legal contest

is its relevance to an issue in the case—that is to say, its tendency to make a fact of consequence

to determination of the action more or less probable.” Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012). “Evidence has no relevance if it is not authentically what its proponent claims

it to be.” Id. “In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”

Id.

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        Rule 901 provides that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is[, including] evidence that satisfies the

[following] requirement: [a]ny method of authentication or identification allowed by a statute or

other rule prescribed under statutory authority.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a),(b)(10). Among the

methods of authentication is self-authentication as provided under Rule of Evidence 902, which

states that certain “items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of

authenticity in order to be admitted[, including] [a] copy of an official record—or a copy of a

document that was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law—if the copy is certified

as correct by: (A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the certification; or (B) a

certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), a statute, or a rule prescribed under statutory

authority.” Id. 902(4).

        “Whether the proponent has crossed [the] threshold . . . required by Rule 901 is one of the

preliminary questions of admissibility contemplated by Rule 104(a).” Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638.

“The trial court should admit proffered evidence ‘upon, or subject to the introduction of evidence

sufficient to support a finding of’ authenticity.” Id. The ultimate question whether an item of

evidence is what its proponent claims is a question for the jury in a jury trial. Id. “The preliminary

question for the trial court to decide is simply whether the proponent of the evidence has supplied

facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence he has

proffered is authentic.” Id. The trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence

where it reasonably believes a reasonable juror could find that the evidence has been authenticated

or identified. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

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A.     Brooke’s Social Media Posts

       In his fourth issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court erred by admitting into evidence two

photographs that Brooke posted on social media on the ground that the photographs were not

properly authenticated. The photographs were of AJ and her son.

       On appeal, Menchaca merely contends “insufficient specificity was provided for a trier of

fact to authenticate the photographs.” We disagree. The testimony of a witness with knowledge

“that an item is what it is claimed to be” is sufficient to authenticate an item. TEX. R. EVID.

901(b)(1); see Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 640 (a witness might have “knowledge” of the authorship of

a text message for a number of reasons, one being that the witness is the actual author of the text

message). Brooke testified she took the photographs in question and she posted them to Facebook.

We conclude it was reasonable for the trial court to believe that a reasonable juror could find that

the exhibits were what the State purported them to be—photographs of Brooke’s boyfriend and

her son. The photographs were properly authenticated, and the trial court’s decision to admit them

was not an abuse of discretion. We overrule Menchaca’s fourth issue.

B.     Photographs of Menchaca’s Truck’s Vehicle Registration

       In his eighth issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a

photograph of a Texas Department of Motor Vehicles registration on the ground that it was not

self-authenticating. At trial, the State attempted to admit into evidence the registration for the

purpose of showing Menchaca owned the named vehicle, a truck. Defense counsel objected that

the exhibit was not properly authenticated.

       In addition to the rules cited above, as to proof of the contents of a writing, apart from its

authentication, Rule of Evidence 1005 provides as follows:

           The proponent may use a copy to prove the content of an official record—or of
       a document that was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law—if
       these conditions are met: the record or document is otherwise admissible; and the

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         copy is certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902(4) or is testified to be
         correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If no such copy can be
         obtained by reasonable diligence, then the proponent may use other evidence to
         prove the content.

TEX. R. EVID. 1005 (emphasis added).

         Here, the first page of the exhibit, entitled “Certified Motor Vehicle Record Request

Response,” identifies Menchaca as the vehicle’s owner. At the bottom of this page, a box is

checked next to the following language:

         Certification:
         [x] The data included in this document represents the current duly recorded
         information regarding this motor vehicle at the time of inquiry. This is to certify
         that this document contains true and correct information as shown by the Vehicle
         Titles & Registration Division of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles.

         The second page of the exhibit is a form signed by Frances Alvarado, Custodian of

Records, Texas Department of Motor Vehicles, which states, “I, Frances Alvarado, do hereby

certify that I am a Custodian of Records for the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles and that the

information shown on the attached:”

         [x] Title History produced from our current files:
         Document/Title Number 01501141802122731 Pages 1 Through 13 . . .
         is, to the best of my knowledge, a true and correct copy of records on file with this
         department.

         The next thirteen pages of the exhibit all demonstrate Menchaca’s ownership of the vehicle.

We conclude the State’s exhibit was self-authenticating under the requirement of Rule 902(4) and

thus the requirements of Rules 901 and 1005 were satisfied. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.

Guajardo, 970 S.W.2d 602, 608-09 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (concluding

certification satisfied the requirement of Rule 902(4) and thus the requirements of Rules 901 and

1005).

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                        PHOTOGRAPHS OF BROOKE’S INJURIES

       Seventeen photographs were introduced during Brooke’s testimony about injuries she

sustained when Menchaca assaulted her the evening of April 17th. In his fifth issue, Menchaca

asserts the trial court erred by admitting the photographs into evidence. On appeal, Menchaca

argues the photographs are cumulative of Brooke’s testimony and have no probative value. He

contends the photographs were introduced by the State for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury.

       “The admissibility of a photograph is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Gallo

v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Generally, a photograph is admissible if

verbal testimony as to matters depicted in the photographs is also admissible. Id. “In other words,

if verbal testimony is relevant, photographs of the same are also relevant.” Id. “Evidence is

relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without

the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401.

“A visual image of the injuries appellant inflicted on the victim is evidence that is relevant to the

jury’s determination.” Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 762. “The fact that the jury also heard testimony

regarding the injuries depicted does not reduce the relevance of the visual depiction.” Id.

       Rule of Evidence 403, on the other hand, allows for the exclusion of otherwise relevant

evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. “Rule 403 favors the admission of

relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than

prejudicial.” Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 762. “A court may consider several factors in determining

whether the probative value of photographs is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, including, “but are not limited to: the number of exhibits offered, their gruesomeness,

their detail, their size, whether they are black and white or color, whether they are close-up, and

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whether the body depicted is naked or clothed.” Id. “The availability of other means of proof and

the circumstances unique to each individual case must also be considered.” Id.

        Menchaca was alleged to have caused Brooke serious bodily injury by striking her, putting

his hand in her mouth, pushing her, throwing her to the ground, and choking her. The photographs

are of Brooke in a hospital bed wearing a hospital gown and depict bruises, cuts, and scrapes to

her face, arms, and legs. Some of the photographs are close-ups of an injury, others are from a

distance, all are average in size and in color, and none are gruesome. We conclude the probative

value of the exhibits was not substantially outweighed by any cumulative effect or by the danger

of unfair prejudice. See Smith v. State, No. AP-75,793, 2010 WL 3787576, at *18 (Tex. Crim.

App. Sept. 29, 2010) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (holding probative value of

photos depicting victim’s injuries was not substantially outweighed by any cumulative effect when

they aided theories relevant to the State’s case); Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 692 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009) (holding photographs had probative value when they depicted the victim’s

injuries).   Because we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining the

photographs were genuinely helpful in determining Brooke’s injuries, or that their probative value

outweighed their prejudicial effect, we overrule Menchaca’s fifth issue.

             PHOTOGRAPHS OF MENCHACA’S TRUCK AND ITS CONTENTS

        In his seventh issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court erred by admitting into evidence

fifteen photographs of a truck and its contents.

        At trial, the State called Steven Faz, a former Atascosa County Sheriff’s Deputy, to testify

about the night Brooke was assaulted. Faz said he assisted in a search of the area after Brooke told

him Menchaca had run away into the woods behind AJ’s house. Driving around the area, he later

found a black Dodge truck parked in a vacant lot or field. The truck matched the description

Brooke gave of Menchaca’s truck. No one was in the truck, but Menchaca’s brother, Devyn

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Menchaca, was found hiding nearby. When the State attempted to introduce Faz’s body camera

footage from the night he found the truck and Devyn, defense counsel objected to the relevancy of

anything involving Devyn’s arrest. The trial court sustained the objection with regard to Devyn’s

arrest, informing the prosecutor, “[y]ou can prove to the jury that [Menchaca’s] brother was out

there with the truck waiting for him, but the arrest of his brother is not relevant to this prosecution.”

        The State later called Mari Kaufman, a lieutenant with the Jourdanton Police Department,

to testify about her going to the scene of the assault. She explained, “I arrived and met with Officer

Rios. I asked him what happened again. He told me that there had been a break-in into the house

and that the victim [Brooke] had stated that Emery Menchaca broke into the house, chased her out

of the house and assaulted her on the street but he was still at large.”

        The State then attempted to introduce into evidence the photographs taken by Kaufman the

next day during daylight hours of the truck and the scene where the truck was found. Defense

counsel objected as follows:

        Counsel: This evidence of this – these pictures of the truck certainly is [sic]
        cumulative, repetitive. They’ve already had testimony that the truck was found, the
        description of the truck. This is the vehicle that was seized as part of the arrest of
        Devyn.
            Again, this is involving the arrest of – Devyn’s arrest and the truck that he was
        found with, which they’ve already testified to at this point. I’m concerned about
        the cumulative effect of this. It’s probative and prejudicial. It’s far more prejudicial
        and [sic] probative, as the evidence of the vehicle has already been introduced.
            And I certainly don’t want to be opening doors as to what was in this vehicle
        involving the crime or the arrest of Devyn, which we’ve already kept out. And
        they’ve already testified about this truck.

        Court: So your objection is based on relevancy? Is that what it is?

        Counsel: Relevance. It’s cumulative. It’s more prejudicial than probative. They
        already have evidence, by testimony, of this vehicle. And it’s also part of the arrest
        of Devyn and the seizure of the vehicle, the result of Devyn. And this involves an
        extraneous offense of the potential of maybe a co-defendant, I guess.
            But it’s far more prejudicial than probative. It’s cumulative and involves
        extraneous offense, and they’ve already introduced this evidence.

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       Court: I overrule your objection based upon cumulative and the fact that the
       prejudicial effect would outweigh the probative value.
           What about relevance, Mr. Thornton [prosecutor]?

       Prosecutor: Judge, I could go over each of the photographs if you like, but the
       witness testimony is about the type of the truck. Some of the pictures show that.
           The identification of the truck is going to be corroborated with a certified
       registration I’m about to offer to show that it belonged to [Menchaca]. That’s also
       the purpose of the picture showing the insurance card.
           There’s also photographs in there showing mud and it was muddy that night
       and them going through the – going through the mud to get there and then hiding
       in the truck. It corroborates that.
           There’s also a photo –

       Court: How does she [Kaufman] know where the truck was parked in the field?
       Did she go to the scene?

       Prosecutor: She did go to scene, Judge, yes.
           And so there’s also photographs of a bloody cloth and a bloody glove that were
       tested. The glove was tested for DNA, which we’re going to present evidence it
       came back to both [Menchaca] and [Brooke] in the case. So those photographs are
       relevant to place [Menchaca] in the truck and then also to – to show that he was
       present at the scene when the – when he assaulted her and got the blood on those
       two items.
           So that’s the purpose of each one of those photos, Judge.

       Court: I’m not sure what the registration sticker has to do with anything, but unless
       you’re going to – no. It doesn’t have the VIN on it.
           But, you know, there’s enough evidence – for instance, the truck; he had a big
       truck, it made a lot of noise, it was jacked up and had this and that on it. So, I mean,
       this is just – that’s the description, and then these photos show that’s what the truck
       looked like that was in the field.
           So I don’t think it’s cumulative. I mean, it’s not cumulative. I think it’s all
       relevant, so I’m going to overrule your objection to Exhibits 63 through 77.
       They’re admitted into evidence.

       On appeal, Menchaca asserts the photographs (1) allude to extraneous offenses allegedly

committed by him and (2) are not relevant. We do not address the merits of either complaint for

two reasons. First, at trial, defense counsel did not raise an objection regarding possible extraneous

offenses committed by Menchaca. He only objected to “an extraneous offense of the potential of

maybe [Devyn] a co-defendant, I guess.” Menchaca’s second complaint on appeal is that because

the photographs “went to extraneous offenses [allegedly committed by Devyn] that had already

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been kept out of the jury’s view given their extraneous nature, and they were not relevant to any

element of the crime for which [Menchaca] was on trial . . . they contained no probative value,

while painting [Menchaca] as a violent criminal.” However, the only relevancy objection raised

at trial was regarding Devyn’s alleged extraneous offenses. Defense counsel did not object that

the photographs were not relevant to Menchaca’s alleged offenses.

       To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court

a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they

are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion.             TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(1)(A); Montelongo, 623 S.W.3d at 822. If the complaint made on appeal does not comport

with the complaint made in the trial court, the complaint is not preserved for consideration on

appeal. See Gibson v. State, 541 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Heidelberg v. State,

144 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Gonzalez-Gallegos v. State, No. 04-19-00835-CR,

2021 WL 799892, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). Menchaca’s complaints on appeal do not comport with his objections at trial;

therefore, he did not preserve his seventh issue on appeal.

                           TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC ANALYST

       In his ninth issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court erred by admitting into evidence an

exhibit and the testimony of Jennifer Trevino, a forensic analyst from the Texas Department of

Public Safety Crime Laboratory (“DPS”) in Corpus Christi. During her testimony, the State

offered into evidence the forensic report Trevino prepared regarding her DNA analysis of blood

samples. Defense counsel objected to Trevino’s qualifications and the State asked her several

questions about her background and training. Defense counsel again objected that “the testimony

of this witness has [not] shown that she is an expert and competent to interpret this data.” The trial

court overruled the objections. On appeal, Menchaca argues Trevino was not qualified to

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“interpret” the exhibit with DNA results, and she should not have been allowed to give an expert

opinion at trial.

        “The Texas Rules of Evidence set out three separate conditions regarding admissibility of

expert testimony.” Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). First, Rule 104(a)

requires the court to “decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a

privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.” TEX. R EVID. 104(a). Second, Rule 702 states: “A

witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may

testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact

in issue.” Id. 702. Third, Rule 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency

to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of

consequence in determining the action.” Id. 401.

        “These rules require a trial judge to make three separate inquiries, which must all be met

before admitting expert testimony: ‘(1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of [her]

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is an

appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist

the fact-finder in deciding the case.’” Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131 (citation omitted). “These

conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance.” Id.

Only the first condition is at issue in this appeal. On appeal, Menchaca does not explain his basis

for contending Trevino was not qualified.

        Trevino testified she had worked as a forensic analyst for the past five years at DPS. She

has a bachelor-of-science degree from Texas A&M University Corpus Christi with an emphasis in

forensic science. She had undergone additional DNA analysis training with DPS, and completed

eight hours of continuing education annually. At the time of trial, she had been doing DNA

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analysis for two years.      She was a member of the Association of Forensic Analysts and

Administrators. When asked about specific training she received to be able to interpret data for

DNA analysis, she replied:

       So I underwent an in-house, modular-based training on all the sections of DNA
       analysis, including serology, DNA testing and interpretation. Each module
       consisted of readings, tests, competency tests, practice sets and independent
       exercises before I could move on to the next section.
       ...
       So on the specific DNA testing, I do have training in DNA testing. Also, in
       interpretation, I went through the same modular-based training as I did in the other
       sections of DNA comparisons.

       When asked whether she had any training that enabled her to analyze the data presented to

her, she replied:

       Yes, I did. . . . So with those, I was presented mock cases. I was presented mock
       profiles so that I was able to see different profiles, see different ways of doing
       interpretation. I was also given a mock trial to also ensure that I was competent.

       In her five years with DPS, she testified as a DNA analyst expert “a few times.” She stated

the lab where she works is accredited by the American National Standards Institute National

Accreditation Board, and to be an analyst at the lab, she must take a proficiency test biannually,

which is peer-reviewed. She explained that a “proficiency test is just to ensure that the analyst is

competent in the methods used in our laboratory.” In her career, she has tested over 500 DNA

samples for analysis, done interpretation on over 100 cases, and testified as an expert in two cases.

       The mere fact that a witness—such as Trevino—possesses knowledge and skill not

possessed by people generally does not in and of itself mean that such expertise will assist the trier

of fact regarding the issue before the court. See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131. A witness will not

always qualify as an expert merely by virtue of a general background.             Id.    Accordingly,

qualification is a two-step inquiry: (1) a witness must first have a sufficient background in a

particular field, but (2) a trial judge must then determine whether that background goes to the very

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matter on which the witness is to give an opinion. Id. The focus, then, is on the “fit” between the

subject matter at issue and the expert’s familiarity therewith. Id. at 133. Just as the subject matter

of an expert’s testimony should be tailored to the facts of a case, the expert’s background must be

tailored to the specific area in which the expert desires to testify. Id. Here, the State established

that Trevino’s education, training, and work experience qualified her to testify reliably about DNA

testing and analysis. See id. at 131. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err by overruling

Menchaca’s objection to Trevino’s testimony. Accordingly, we overrule Menchaca’s ninth issue.

                         TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER FERNANDEZ

       In his tenth issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the

testimony of Jennifer Fernandez, Executive Director of the Guadalupe Family Violence Shelter.

The State asked the following question:

       Q. In a relationship that involves this cycle of violence, if the victim decided to
       leave that relationship and – and began – begun going through a divorce, does
       research, in your experience, show that that’s a particularly dangerous time?
       A. Yes.
       Q. And why is that?
       A. The time that a victim is attempting to leave and –

       Defense counsel raised the following objection: “Again, Your Honor, I’m going to re-urge

this objection as it relates to pure speculation on hypothetical scenarios that are not connected to

the facts of this case whatsoever.” [Emphasis added.] The trial court overruled the objection.

       On appeal, relying on the caselaw he cited in issue nine, Menchaca complains “Fernandez

was not qualified to testify as to her speculative opinion as to the cycle of violence . . . and she

should not have been permitted to [provide] speculative opinion at this stage of trial.” [Emphasis

added.] Menchaca also asserts her testimony was not reliable. Menchaca’s complaints on appeal

do not comport with his objection at trial; therefore, he did not preserve his tenth issue on appeal.

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            TESTIMONY REGARDING THE MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS
                         OF MENCHACA’S MOTHER

       In his eleventh issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court erred by allowing the State to

introduce evidence, during the punishment phase of trial, regarding his mother’s misdemeanor

convictions. Defense counsel called Menchaca’s mother, Michelle Ortiz, to testify. She described

her son as a good father, and she asked the jury to give her son an opportunity to return to his

children, to live a functional life, and for her to help him. She said she herself had been a victim

and she did not “condone it.” On cross-examination, the State asked her whether she believed in

violence:

       Q. Okay. Do you recall the conversation you had with Brooke where you told her
       that you have been a victim of abuse in your relationship?
       A. She knows I have.
       Q. Right, and did you also tell her that sometimes when you love a man, that it’s
       your responsibility to take it?
       A. No. I’ve never had that conversation with her. Absolutely not.
       Q. And that that’s a woman’s duty in a relationship?
       A. That’s a hear – no. No, sir. I don’t believe in that.
       Q. Okay.
       A. I would never ask her – I would never talk to her about something like that.
       Q. You don’t believe in violence is what you said?
       A. No, I don’t. I would never – I would never condone for her to be hit or anybody
       hit, not even myself.

       The State then asked to introduce evidence that Ortiz had twice previously pled guilty to

family violence misdemeanors, one in 2002 and another in 2019. Defense counsel objected that

the two convictions were too far out-of-date and more prejudicial than probative. The State

contended it wanted to introduce the misdemeanors because they were crimes of moral turpitude

and to impeach Ortiz (“It’s an impeachment not with a conviction but with proof of the opposite

of what she’s testified to.”). The trial court overruled the objections. The State asked Ortiz about

the two misdemeanors and she explained the circumstances.           Neither party referred to the

misdemeanors in closing arguments.

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                                                                                       04-22-00243-CR

       On appeal, Menchaca asserts the misdemeanors were used as evidence of Ortiz’s bad

character and were more prejudicial than probative. Menchaca does not contend, much less

explain, how he was harmed. Assuming without deciding that it was error to admit the testimony,

we hold the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. When a trial court commits non-constitutional

error, we ask whether the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b)

(“Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be

disregarded.”); Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (same).                In

determining whether the defendant’s substantial rights were harmed, we look at the entire record,

including all testimony and physical evidence, the character of the error and how the jury might

have taken it in light of the other evidence, jury instructions, the State’s theory and arguments, and

any defensive theories. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355-56.

       During the guilt-innocence phase, the jury heard evidence about Menchaca’s and Brooke’s

abusive relationship and about the violent nature of the assault committed by Menchaca on the

night of the incident. During the punishment phase, the State spent little time on the two

misdemeanors and Ortiz was allowed to explain. The State did not mention the misdemeanors in

its closing argument. In light of the entire record and the substantial evidence against Menchaca,

we have a fair assurance that the complained-of error did not have a substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s decision regarding punishment. Therefore, we overrule his

eleventh issue.

                  PREJUDICAL NATURE OF TESTIMONY REGARDING
                       MENCHACA’S EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES

       In his twelfth and final issue, Menchaca asserts the trial court erred by admitting into

evidence, during the punishment phase of trial, hearsay testimony regarding his alleged extraneous

offenses. During the State’s cross-examination of Ortiz, the following exchange occurred:

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                                                                                     04-22-00243-CR

       Q. And in fact you’ve been witness numerous times to violence that [Menchaca]
       has committed against other people, have you not?
       A. No, sir.
       Q. Okay. Just a second.
       What – do you ever – did you ever live on Denado Road?
       A. Yes, sir.
       Q. Do you recall the police coming out to an incident where Morgan and
       [Menchaca] beat up your boyfriend?

       [defense objection overruled]

       Q. Just one moment, Your Honor.
       Well, let’s – let’s talk about the one incident where you called or where you spoke
       to the police about Morgan and [Menchaca] fighting each other over a pool game
       in Poteet. Do you remember that?

       [defense objection overruled]

       ...

       Q. Now, do you recall an incident in 2016 where Devyn, [Menchaca], and Morgan
       attacked Brian, your – Brian Escalante I think was your boyfriend at the time?
       A. Yes.
       Q. And you told the officer that all three of your boys attacked Brian. Right?
       [defense objection overruled]
       Q. Did – did – did you ever say that your three boys attacked Brian?

       [defense objection overruled]

       Q. Did you ever say that?
       A. Yes, sir. He was – because Brian was beating me up.

       On appeal, Menchaca asserts the hearsay evidence of his alleged extraneous offenses was

highly prejudicial because it went directly to allegations that he was abusive and assaultive.

       Assuming without deciding that it was error to admit the testimony, we hold the evidence

was not unfairly prejudicial for the same reasons as above in issue eleven. In light of the entire

record and the substantial evidence against Menchaca, we have a fair assurance that the

complained-of error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s decision regarding punishment. Therefore, we overrule his twelfth issue.

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                                                                                04-22-00243-CR

                                       CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Do not publish

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