Court Opinion

ID: 9819557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:27:42.068242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:05.108747
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of section l(D)(m) of the Adoption Act to the extent that it interprets the nine-month time period as applicable to the “reasonable efforts” ground of parental unfitness. In interpreting the statute otherwise, I believe that the record supports the trial court’s finding that Teresa was an unfit parent. This dissent is guided by the cardinal rule of statutory construction, which is to give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. See In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418 (2001). When determining legislative intent, the starting point is always the language of the statute because the language is the most reliable indicator of the legislature’s objectives in enacting the particular law. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419. With that in mind, section 1(D) (m) of the Adoption Act, which was amended effective January 1, 2000, states that the following are grounds for parental unfitness: “(m) Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent, or (ii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent within 9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor ***, or (iii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period after the end of the initial 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor ***.” 750 ILCS 50/ 1(D)(m) (West 2000). Clearly, this current version of the statute sets forth three separate and distinct grounds upon which parental rights may be terminated. The second and the third grounds specify a time period. Notably, the first ground, the reasonable efforts ground, does not. It follows then that there is no set time limitation that is applicable to this ground. Rather, the time period for the reasonable efforts ground is that which is reasonable to correct the conditions that were the basis for the minor’s removal. In this case, the record reveals that Teresa did not make reasonable efforts within a reasonable time to correct the conditions that were the basis of Jacien’s removal. Indeed, after Jacien was removed from her custody, Teresa continued to use, sell, and manufacture drugs for over six months until she was finally incarcerated. Accordingly, I do not believe that the trial court erred in finding Teresa an unfit parent. The majority’s reliance on In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1 (2000), is unpersuasive. As the majority points out, in D.L., the supreme court interpreted the 1994 version of section 1(D) (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m) (West 1994)). In doing so, the D.L. court held that the time limitation period in section 1(D) (m) was applicable to both the reasonable efforts and reasonable progress grounds. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10. However, the legislature’s recent amendment substanlively changed the language interpreted by the supreme court. Specifically, the legislature changed the time limitation from 12 months to 9, added a third ground of unfitness with its own time limitation period, and added roman numerals to separate each ground. See 750 ILCS 50/ 1(D)(m) (West 2000). Additionally, the majority’s interpretation runs afoul of several well-established rules of statutory construction. Particularly, the majority’s interpretation seemingly ignores the roman numerals that the legislature added to separate each ground of unfitness. Statutes should be read so as to yield logical and meaningful results and to avoid constructions that render specific language meaningless surplus-age. McNamee v. Federated Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1998). The majority’s interpretation also stands in contravention of the last antecedent rule. The last antecedent rule of statutory construction requires that relative or qualifying words, phrases, or clauses are to be applied to the words immediately preceding and do not modify words which are more remote. Swank v. Department of Revenue, 336 Ill. App. 3d 851, 857 (2003). Under this rule, the phrase “within 9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor” is applicable to the immediately preceding reasonable progress ground and not the more remote reasonable efforts ground. Accordingly, for the above reasons, I believe that the trial court properly found Teresa an unfit parent. I therefore would affirm the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to Jacien.