Court Opinion

ID: 9951063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 15:24:20.813781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:14.867798
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M & D Properties, Inc.,                  :
                          Appellant      :
                                         :
                   v.                    :   No. 578 C.D. 2021
                                         :   Argued: February 6, 2024
Board of Commissioners of the            :
Township of Upper St. Clair              :

BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
            HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER               FILED: March 15, 2024

      M & D Properties, Inc. (M & D) appeals from an Order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County (common pleas) filed April 29, 2021, which
affirmed a decision by the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Township of
Upper St. Clair (Township) denying M & D’s Application for Preliminary and Final
Subdivision Approval for a two-lot plan. Contending unique topography, such as
wetlands and steep slopes, rendered it economically not feasible to strictly comply
with the Township’s Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance (SALDO), M
& D sought consolidation of five existing vacant lots and modifications from certain
SALDO provisions, which the Board denied, concluding M & D had not
demonstrated undue hardship. Without taking additional evidence, common pleas
affirmed. On appeal, M & D argues it could support its request for modifications by
showing either undue hardship or unreasonableness, which M & D asserts it did
through uncontroverted evidence, and it was error or an abuse of discretion to deny
the modifications based on what M & D asserts were general, speculative concerns
of neighbors of alleged adverse impacts of development.1 Upon review, while we
agree that undue hardship or unreasonableness may be a basis to seek modification
of a SALDO provision, here, M & D only pursued modification as an undue hardship
and, thus, cannot now assert for the first time on appeal that the Board erred2 in
failing to consider whether strict compliance with the SALDO was unreasonable.
Even if the issue was not waived, we conclude there was no error as M & D’s undue
hardship and unreasonableness arguments are both premised on it not being
economically feasible to develop the subject property (Property) except as proposed,
evidence of which the Board rejected. Because the Board did not credit M & D’s
evidence that it was cost prohibitive to develop the Property in compliance with the
SALDO, particularly where there was no evidence of the value of the Property, M
& D did not meet its burden of showing that the Board erred by denying the
modifications. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.     BACKGROUND
       M & D acquired the Property in the Township in 1989 and has previously
sought to develop it but no development has occurred and the Property remains
vacant. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 49a.) In 2005, M & D filed an application

       1
         We have combined M & D’s arguments for ease of discussion.
       2
          M & D asserts in its brief that common pleas erred or abused its discretion by not
considering unreasonableness. (M & D’s Brief (Br.) at 14.) However, as common pleas did not
take additional evidence, we review the governing body’s decision, here the Board’s, for errors of
law or abuses of discretion. Miravich v. Township of Exeter, Berks County, 54 A.3d 106, 110 n.4
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

                                                2
with the Board seeking approval of a six-lot plan, but the Board only approved a
four-lot plan, which M & D did not pursue, citing costs associated with the
Property’s topography. (Id. at 80a-81a.) The Property is described as undeveloped
with a stream bisecting it, has wetlands that would need to be mitigated, and is
situated on a steep hillside with a 35-degree grade change. (Id. at 46a.)
      In May 2020, M & D filed an application seeking to consolidate the vacant
lots with an adjacent lot it recently purchased, on which a single-family residence is
situated. From seven lots, M & D proposed to create two new lots: one with the
existing residence (Lot 1), and one approximately 10 acres in size on which a new
single-family residence would be constructed (Lot 2). M & D proposed Lot 2 would
be what is known as a flag lot, with a long driveway accessing Locust Lane, as
depicted on the plan below.

(R.R. at 180a.)

                                          3
       M & D maintained accessing Lot 2 via Quigg Drive was not economically
feasible due to the topographic conditions. M & D also sought modification of
certain provisions of the Township’s SALDO, namely:

       • Section 114.41.2 Building lines. The front building line and
       perimeter setback line as required in the zoning code shall be
       considered a minimum and shall be adhered to unless variances are
       granted by the Zoning Hearing Board or modifications by the
       Board. . . .

       • Section 114.41.3. Side lot lines. Side lot lines shall be substantially
       at right angles or radial to streets. . . .

       • Section 114.41.6. Double frontage lots.[3] Double frontage lots shall
       be avoided except where essential to provide separation of residential
       development from traffic arteries or to overcome specific disadvantages
       of topography and orientation.

(UPPER ST. CLAIR SUBDIVISION & LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Code), §§ 114.41.2,
114.41.3, 114.41.6 (1991), R.R. at 245a-46a (unnecessary capitalization removed).)4
       Upon review, the Township Planning Commission recommended the Board
deny the application. A public hearing was scheduled before the Board. At the July
6, 2020 hearing, David Lucci, a registered landscape architect with Victor-Wetzel
Associates (Expert), and David Steinbach, a principal of M & D (Principal),

       3
          A double frontage lot is defined as “a lot having lot lines which extend along two non-
intersecting streets.” (UPPER ST. CLAIR SUBDIVISION & LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Code)
§ 114.10.27 (1991).) Excerpts of the Code are found in the Reproduced Record, but the entire
Code is available in the original record at Item number 8.
        4
          M & D originally sought modifications related to the side lot line and double frontage
lots, but at the end of the first public hearing, a question was raised as to whether the third
modification was required. Because the SALDO required modification requests to be made in
writing, the plan was tabled to allow M & D to supplement its request, which it did. (R.R. at 64a-
67a.)

                                                4
testified.5 Expert described the topographical conditions of the Property and what
would be required to access Lot 2 via Quigg Drive. Expert testified that 15,000
cubic yards of fill, which is the equivalent of 500 truckloads, and 225 lineal feet of
culvert would be needed, along with joint permitting from the Army Corps of
Engineers (Army Corps) and Department of Environmental Protection (DEP),
sewage pipes would need to be enclosed in concrete, and approximately one-third of
an acre of wetlands would need mitigated, at a combined cost of $330,000.6 (R.R.
at 46a-48a.) Principal described the efforts M & D made since purchasing the
Property in 1989 to develop the Property and that costs prevented it from developing
the four lots previously approved. (Id. at 49a-50a.) Principal explained M & D
purchased Lot 1 when the owner was selling specifically to provide a driveway to
access Lot 2. (Id. at 50a-51a.)
       At a second public hearing on the plan, held on August 3, 2020, Expert and
Principal again testified, and several members of the public also commented on the
plan.7 Expert testified his firm did the cost estimate for development of the Property
in 2004-05, as well as at least three other times, and advised against developing the
Property each time due to costs. (R.R. at 80a-81a.) Expert testified again as to the
$330,000 estimate to get access to the site via Quigg Drive and the components of
that cost. (Id. at 83a-87a.) Expert testified that permitting requirements are more
stringent now than they were in 2005 so the likelihood of obtaining a joint permit
from DEP and the Army Corps was less now, but M & D’s counsel explained

       5
         The transcript of the July 6, 2020 hearing is in the Reproduced Record at pages 35a
through 69a.
       6
         This is comprised of $150,000 for fill, $115,000 for the culvert, $10,000 for the concrete
encasing, $10,000 for wetlands mitigation, and $45,000 for permitting. (R.R. at 48a.)
       7
         The transcript of the August 3, 2020 hearing is in the Reproduced Record at pages 70a
through 169a.

                                                5
permitting was not part of M & D’s hardship request. (Id. at 86a-87a, 101a.) Rather,
M & D’s counsel stated, “We are trying to make the legal case for a hardship.” (Id.
at 102a.) When asked about the value of a 10-acre lot in this area, such as Lot 2,
Expert did not respond with a specific value except to say it was less than what
residents who were opposed to the plan were suggesting the Property was worth due
to the topography. (Id. at 92a-93a.) Principal testified that based on the costs, it did
not make sense to develop the four lots that were previously approved or M & D
would have done so. (Id. at 121a.) Several residents who were opposed to the plan
also questioned M & D’s witnesses and testified about concerns of water runoff and
safety due to traffic. (Id. at 128a-63a.)
       Following written submission by M & D and any interested residents, the
Board held a third public hearing on September 8, 2020,8 at which it enacted an
ordinance denying the application (Ordinance). The Board found M & D “failed to
show by reason of exceptional topographic or other physical conditions[] that strict
compliance with the . . . SALDO would cause practical difficulty or exceptional and
undue hardship.” (Ordinance § 3.)9 With relation to the side lot line and double
frontage provisions, the Board found as follows:

       [M & D] claimed that it would be difficult if not impossible to utilize
       the access from the abutting Quigg Drive because it would be costly to
       access the [P]roperty from Quigg Drive due to topography. [M & D]
       claimed through [] [E]xpert that the costs would be high, but did not
       explain what the sale point of the lot would be nor did [it] disclose the
       profit margin to be made on the sale of the lot. The Board also took
       note [M & D] purchased the adjoining lot . . . for $518,000 for the
       purpose of access. This is a good indication that the value of the
       development was very high. Further there was no explanation as to

       8
         The transcript of the September 8, 2020 hearing is in the Reproduced Record at pages
170a through 177a.
       9
         The Ordinance is in the Reproduced Record at pages 272a through 274a.

                                             6
      why an alternative layout creating more lots would still be cost
      prohibitive. The only statement from the developer was that the best
      proof of the cost prohibitive nature of the higher density development
      was the fact that it did not happen. This is not sufficient in that there
      could be any number of other reasons why it was not developed
      including but not limited to lack of financing or lack of desire to
      develop by the owner or speculation that the land would go up in value.

(Id. §§ 3.1-3.2.)
      The Board further found that the modifications would be “directly opposed to
the spirit and letter of the Township Code” and “would negatively impact the
peaceful enjoyment of property of the neighboring property owners.” (Id. § 3.3.)
Moreover, the Board found “[t]he creation of a massive flag lot with an exceptionally
long driveway will create traffic that will severely change the nature and character
of the neighborhood and would create safety hazards by creating a driveway to
bifurcate [] residential lots.” (Id.) The Board concluded that granting M & D the
“modifications would not further the interests of the Township and that literal
enforcement of the SALDO will not exact undue hardship on [M & D].” (Id. § 4.)
Rather, the Board found doing so “would be contrary to the public interest and would
impair the intent and purpose of the SALDO and the desirable general development
of the neighborhood and the community.” (Id.)
      M & D appealed to common pleas. Following briefing and oral argument,
common pleas issued its April 29, 2021 Opinion and Order, affirming the Board’s
decision and denying and dismissing M & D’s appeal. M & D thereafter filed a
timely Notice of Appeal.

                                         7
II.    PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
       Before this Court, M & D argues common pleas10 erred or abused its discretion
because the SALDO and the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)11
allow modifications by demonstrating either undue hardship or unreasonableness and
only undue hardship was considered. M & D argues it is unreasonable to develop the
Property with access via Quigg Drive for anything less than six lots. M & D also
argues it is per se unreasonable to deny modifications to construction of a single-family
dwelling on a 10-acre lot. It asserts it established it is entitled to the modifications
since access via Quigg Drive is not feasible due to the unique site conditions, which
result in extraordinary site costs. It argues the proposed access via Locust Lane is the
only feasible access, is not contrary to the public interest, and is the minimum relief
needed. M & D contends that if access via Quigg Drive was feasible, it would have
developed the Property long ago when it was approved for the four-lot plan and the
best evidence of it being cost prohibitive is that the Property was never developed. As
for the Board’s finding that there was no evidence of the Property’s value, M & D
argues that is irrelevant since it is proposing the minimum development. M & D argues
developing the Property is cost prohibitive regardless of regulatory approval,
especially when the highest density the Board will allow is four lots, which is not
economically feasible. M & D further argues its Expert did testify as to the cost
associated with developing the Property. So long as an applicant meets the criteria for
a modification in Section 503(8) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10503(8),12 which M & D

       10
           Although M & D frames its questions presented as common pleas erring or abusing its
discretion, as stated in note 2, supra, since common pleas did not accept new evidence, we review
the Board’s decision for error or abuse of discretion.
        11
           Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202.
        12
           Section 503(8) provides:

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                               8
contends it did here, the modification may be granted, unless the municipality
establishes the modification is contrary to the public interest, which M & D says did
not occur here. Finally, M & D argues that the Board’s findings that the plan would
negatively impact the peaceful enjoyment of neighbors or be contrary to the public
interest is not supported by substantial evidence as the residents objecting to the plan
only testified as to generalized, speculative concerns about traffic.
        The Board responds M & D only argued undue hardship before it and common
pleas and, therefore, its argument that the Board should have considered
unreasonableness is waived. Even if the argument is not waived, the Board argues
M & D has the burden, as the applicant, to meet the criteria for a modification, and it
has not shown unreasonableness. According to the Board, as long as one reason for
denial is supported by record evidence,13 the decision should stand, and M & D cites
no cases where a decision was reversed on unreasonableness grounds. The Board
argues it was not required to accept Expert’s testimony concerning it being

        The subdivision and land development ordinance may include, but need not be
        limited to:

        ....

        (8) Provisions for administering waivers or modifications to the minimum
        standards of the ordinance in accordance with [S]ection 512.1, [added by Section
        40 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10512.1,] when the literal
        compliance with mandatory provisions is shown to the satisfaction of the governing
        body or planning agency, where applicable, to be unreasonable, to cause undue
        hardship, or when an alternative standard can be demonstrated to provide equal or
        better results.

53 P.S. § 10503(8).
        13
           The Board acknowledges that “if an applicant, unlike here, presents credible evidence
that establishes all of the criteria for a modification, a [b]oard would abuse its discretion if it denied
a modification. That is, a [b]oard or court is not permitted to deny a waiver on arbitrary grounds
not supported by the record.” (Board’s Suppl. Br. at 12 (emphasis in original).)

                                                    9
economically unfeasible to access the Property via Quigg Drive when there was no
evidence of the sales price or expected profits. The Board points out it can reject even
uncontradicted testimony. Further, the Board asserts economic hardship alone is
insufficient to justify modification of the SALDO. Finally, the Board argues that even
if there was an undue hardship, it was appropriate to deny the requested modifications
because they were contrary to the public interest, another criterion for which M & D
bore the burden, which it acknowledged at the hearing, but still presented no evidence
to support. According to the Board, only if an applicant meets all the criteria for a
modification may the Board grant the modification. Because M & D did not do so
here, the Board contends it was within its discretion to deny the request.

III.   DISCUSSION
       Both the MPC and SALDO permit the Board to grant modifications.
Specifically, Section 512.1(a) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10512.1(a), provides:

       The governing body or the planning agency, if authorized to approve
       applications within the [SALDO], may grant a modification of the
       requirements of one or more provisions if the literal enforcement will
       exact undue hardship because of peculiar conditions pertaining to the
       land in question, provided that such modification will not be contrary
       to the public interest and that the purpose and intent of the ordinance is
       observed.

Id.
       Township’s SALDO further provides, in relevant part:

       In any particular case where the developer can show by plan and written
       statement that, by reason of exceptional topographic or other physical
       conditions, strict compliance with any requirement of this chapter
       would cause practical difficulty or exceptional and undue hardship, the
       Board . . . may relax such requirements to the extent deemed just and
       proper, so as to relieve such difficulty or hardship provided that such
       relief may be granted without detriment to the public good and without

                                          10
       impairing the intent and purpose of this chapter or the desirable general
       development of the neighborhood and the community in accordance
       with any comprehensive plan. . . .

(Code § 114.14.2, R.R. at 244a (unnecessary capitalization removed).)
       In addition, the SALDO provides:

       When, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of this chapter
       would result in unnecessary hardship, the Board . . . may make such
       reasonable exceptions thereto as will not be contrary to the public
       interest and may permit the sale of a lot, issuance of a permit or erection
       of a building, subject to conditions necessary to assure adequate public
       and private improvements.

(Id. § 114.14.3, R.R. at 244a (unnecessary capitalization removed).) The applicant
bears the burden of providing grounds for a modification of the SALDO
requirements. Appeal of Cornell Homes from the Decision of the Upper Darby
Council Dated Oct. 17, 2012 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1050 C.D. 2013, filed Jan. 17, 2014),
slip op. at 3.14 The burden of proof for seeking modifications of a SALDO
requirement is less rigorous than the burden for obtaining a variance from a zoning
requirement. Telvil Constr. Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of E. Pikeland Twp., 896
A.2d 651, 656 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Furthermore, while Section 512.1(a) of the MPC
grants the governing body discretion in whether to grant a modification, our court
has said that discretion is not unfettered. “A governing body may have abused its
discretion in refusing to grant waivers where the denial is contrary to the
recommendations of its experts or officials and literal enforcement of the SALDO
requirements will frustrate the effect of the improvements designed to implement
other requirements.” CGR Real Est., LLC v. Borough Council of The Borough of

       14
         Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and
Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a), an
unreported opinion of this Court, while not binding, may be cited for its persuasive value.

                                            11
Franklin Park (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 780, 971, 972 C.D. 2016, filed Jan. 26, 2017), slip
op. at 10 (citing Ruf v. Buckingham Township, 765 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2001)).
      Under both the MPC and SALDO, requests for modifications must be in
writing, and “[t]he request shall state in full the grounds and facts of
unreasonableness or hardship on[15] which the request is based, the provision or
provisions of the ordinance involved and the minimum modification necessary.” 53
P.S. § 10512.1(b) (emphasis added). (See also Code § 114.14.4, R.R. at 244a.) In
Valenti v. Washington Township, 737 A.2d 346 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), owners of a
property adjacent to a proposed development appealed a township board of
supervisors’ decision approving a 14-lot residential subdivision. The court of
common pleas affirmed that board’s decision concluding that the ordinance at issue
required either unreasonableness or hardship be shown and the developer “set forth
in writing the requests for waivers and the grounds and facts of unreasonableness
upon which the requests were based.” Id. at 347. On appeal to this Court, the
adjacent property owners argued the developer had to establish undue hardship
based on the language of the ordinance. Id. We construed two similar provisions to
those here – one which discussed only hardship and another that provided the written
request should state the grounds and facts of unreasonableness or hardship – together
and held that a landowner could seek modification under either basis. See also In
Re: Appeal of the J.W. McGrath Org. from Denial of the Council for the Twp. of
Bristol (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2119 C.D. 2009, filed Dec. 1, 2010), slip op. at 7-10
(holding same). Given the similarity in provisions here, we discern no reason that

      15
           The SALDO uses “upon” instead of “on.” (Code § 114.14.4, R.R. at 244a.)

                                              12
an applicant could not seek modification under the Township’s SALDO for either
unreasonableness or undue hardship.
      In its Revised Requests for Modifications, dated July 27, 2020, M & D stated,
“[s]et forth below are the grounds for the requested modifications, the facts of
unreasonableness or hardship on which the requests are based, the provisions of
the ordinance involved and the minimum modifications necessary.” (R.R. at 213a
(emphasis added).) M & D also recognizes the general legal principle from Valenti
that “[a] waiver of a [SALDO] requirement can be granted on a showing of
unreasonableness or undue hardship.” (Id. at 217a (emphasis added).) Yet, in
the same request, M & D stated, “[t]here are peculiar physical conditions pertaining
to the land in question that exact[] undue hardship on the applicant,” “[t]he inability
to reasonably access Quigg Drive creates the unnecessary hardship that warrants
the granting of the requested modifications,” and “[t]he peculiar circumstances
associated with this site constitute a classic hardship that warrants approval of the
requested modifications.” (Id. at 214a-15a (emphasis added).) M & D made
numerous other representations to the Board that it was pursuing its modification
requests on the basis of hardship, not unreasonableness. (See, e.g., M & D’s
Memorandum in Support of Requested Modifications for Proposed Two-Lot
Subdivision, R.R. at 29a-30a (asserting “[l]iteral enforcement of [the] SALDO . . .
will exact undue hardship. . .” and “strict compliance . . . will cause practical
difficulty and exceptional and undue hardship” such that modification was
necessary “to relieve the hardship”) (emphasis added); Aug. 3, 2020 Hr’g Tr. at 33,
R.R. at 102a (M & D’s counsel stating: “We are trying to make the legal case for a
hardship.”) (emphasis added).) While under Valenti, a landowner could seek a
modification for either undue hardship or unreasonableness, here, M & D plainly

                                          13
sought modification only on the basis of undue hardship. Thus, we cannot
conclude the Board erred in evaluating M & D’s application for relief on the basis
that M & D itself identified – undue hardship. Nor can we conclude the Board
abused its discretion in failing to consider unreasonableness when M & D did not
seek modification on that basis. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the governing
body’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” In re: Appeal of Provco
Pinegood Sumneytown, LLC, 216 A.3d 512, 517 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). As the
above-cited record evidence reflects, M & D asserted only undue hardship as a basis
for its requested modifications.
       Notwithstanding, even if the Board had an obligation to consider the requested
modifications on the basis that strict compliance with the SALDO was unreasonable,
we discern no error because M & D’s unreasonableness and undue hardship
arguments are both premised on it not being economically feasible to develop the
Property with access via Quigg Drive, evidence of which the Board did not credit.16
As common pleas explained:

       16
         Although the Board did not make specific findings of fact related to unreasonableness, a
remand is not necessary because it did make factual determinations as to the credibility of M & D’s
witnesses. In Melwood Corporation v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, we
stated:

       There is authority . . . for the proposition that where the fact-finder has failed to
       make necessary findings on a specific issue essential to the determination of a case,
       and where the record as a matter of law would support only one legal conclusion
       with respect to that issue, rather than uselessly delaying the case by remanding, we
       will resolve the issue on appeal.

528 A.2d 668, 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
        Here, the Board, as fact-finder, did make factual determinations and specifically rejected
M & D’s evidence related to alternative development plans not being economically feasible, as
aptly summarized by common pleas in the above excerpt of its opinion. Therefore, a remand for
factual determinations about whether it is unreasonable to require strict compliance with the
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                               14
      Although the Board does not dispute that there are some developmental
      constraints on the Property, it found that M & D failed to provide
      sufficient evidence to meet the criteria for a modification of Section
      114.14 of the SALDO. M & D relied on the alleged economic
      infeasibility of developing the Property using the available Quigg Drive
      access and instead insisted on needing the unpermitted flag lot with
      double frontage and access via Locust Lane. M & D claims that it
      would be a hardship to utilize the access from Quigg Drive because of
      the stream and wetlands which would require approval from [DEP] and
      the Army Corps. . . . [The Board] . . . noted that M & D failed to
      explain why an alternative layout of the Property would still be cost
      prohibitive. [Expert] testified that it would cost $330,000 to develop
      the Property via Quigg Drive but did not provide testimony or evidence
      that the number was cost prohibitive or created a hardship. . . . [t]he
      Board found that [Expert]’s testimony did not provide sufficient
      evidence of hardship. There was no evidence that established what the
      post-development value of the Property would be and therefore that the
      costs incurred[] would make it economically infeasible. . . . After being
      questioned by an [o]bjector at the hearing about viability and selling
      price, [Expert] stated that the four lots back in 2005/2006 were not
      viable so a single lot will not be viable either. However, [Expert] failed
      to give his opinion on a potential selling price for the as-developed
      Property and only would deny that it was worth $190,000. . . . Section
      [512.1] of the . . . []MPC[] permits a governing body to “grant a
      modification of the requirements of one or more provisions if the literal
      enforcement will exact undue hardship because of peculiar conditions
      pertaining to the land in question, provided that such modification will
      not be contrary to the public interest and that the purpose and intent of
      the ordinance is observed.” [53 P.S. § 10512.1.] The Commonwealth
      Court has held that “where literal enforcement of a requirement under
      the [SALDO] will frustrate the effect of the improvements designed to
      implement other requirements, grant of a waiver is proper.” Ruf
      . . . ,765 A.2d [at] 1169. . . . Here, however, [Expert] failed to establish
      hardship except for a reduced profit margin and the topography of the
      Property. . . .
(Op. at 4-5.)

SALDO because it is not economically feasible to develop the Property with access via Quigg
Drive, when the Board already answered that question, would accomplish nothing.

                                            15
       We agree with this reasoning by the Honorable Joseph M. James of common
pleas and would add that “[i]n a land use proceeding, the [B]oard is the ultimate fact-
finder and the exclusive arbiter of credibility and evidentiary weight.” Joseph v. N.
Whitehall Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 16 A.3d 1209, 1218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citation
omitted). Furthermore, “[a]s the fact[-]finder, the Board has the power to reject even
uncontradicted testimony if the Board finds the testimony to be lacking in
credibility.” Heritage Bldg. Grp., Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 742
A.2d 708, 710 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).             Although Expert testified as to the cost
associated with providing access via Quigg Drive, there was no testimony as to what
the Property might be worth. Without such evidence, the Board could not compare
the costs to determine whether it is truly cost prohibitive. Thus, we cannot agree
with M & D that price is irrelevant.
       M & D also argues the Board had evidence that the Property was never
developed and that this alone was sufficient to establish it was economically not
feasible to develop the Property with access via Quigg Drive. Essentially, M & D is
asking the Board to credit M & D’s witnesses’ uncontroverted testimony, which, as
fact-finder, it is not required to do. Id. (holding a zoning board has the authority to
reject even uncontradicted testimony). M & D argues the Court in Ruf determined
that the estimated $45,000 it would cost to widen a street to comply with the
municipality’s SALDO was unreasonable and created an undue hardship.17
However, notably, in Ruf, the municipality which denied the request for modification
disregarded the recommendations of its own civil engineer and public works director

       17
          While M & D agrees with the conclusion in Ruf as being “consistent with the intent of
the MPC,” it asserts the holding is contrary to the MPC because it places the burden on the
applicant to establish the purpose of the SALDO would be served and development would not be
contrary to the public’s interest. (M & D’s Suppl. Memo. of Law at 16-17.)

                                              16
as to the topographical features of the property and the costs associated with
complying with the SALDO. 765 A.2d at 1169. Furthermore, the Court reasoned
that the undisputed evidence showed that it was impossible to comply with the
SALDO’s requirements as to the road width and stormwater controls without
violating the natural resource protection standards set forth in the zoning ordinance.
Id. Ruf is distinguishable, as these are not the facts present here.
       Based upon the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Board did not err or abuse
its discretion in denying M & D’s application. Accordingly, we affirm common
pleas’ order dismissing M & D’s appeal and affirming the Board’s decision.18

                                            __________________________________________
                                            RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

       18
           Because M & D did not meet its burden of showing either unreasonableness or hardship,
we need not address whether the Board erred in concluding the modifications “would be contrary
to the public interest and would impair the intent and purpose of the SALDO, or the desirable
general development of the neighborhood and the community.” (Ordinance § 3.) See Kassouf v.
Township of Scott, 883 A.2d 463, 473 (Pa. 2005) (holding “a denial of approval for a plan can
stand if supported by any one of the reasons set forth for denial”).

                                              17
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M & D Properties, Inc.,                  :
                          Appellant      :
                                         :
                  v.                     :   No. 578 C.D. 2021
                                         :
Board of Commissioners of the            :
Township of Upper St. Clair              :

                                      ORDER

      NOW, March 15, 2024, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County, filed April 29, 2021, is AFFIRMED.

                                       __________________________________________
                                       RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge