Court Opinion

ID: 9388470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 17:00:47.743218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.495314
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         APR 20 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 Adriana Yadira Cuevas Nunez,                   No. 21-134

               Petitioner,                      Agency No.       A202-180-514

   v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
 Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
 General,

               Respondent.

                    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

                      Argued and Submitted March 15, 2023
                              Pasadena, California

Before: TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

        Adriana Yadira Cuevas Nunez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an

immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition in part and deny it in

part.

        *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      Where, as here, the Board “expressed agreement with the reasoning of the

[immigration judge],” we review both decisions. Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d

993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). We review the agency’s findings of fact for substantial

evidence. Id. We review claims of due process violations de novo. Grigoryan v.

Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).

      1. Cuevas Nunez claims that her due process rights were violated because

the immigration judge displayed bias by misstating the record, so she did not

have a neutral factfinder. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.

2000). The misstatements consisted mostly of clerical errors, or permissible

interpretations of ambiguous testimony, which do not demonstrate bias.

Although the immigration judge incorrectly stated that Cuevas Nunez did not

provide evidence of her rape, Cuevas Nunez does not show how that statement

caused prejudice. See Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th

Cir. 2006) (to establish a due process violation, the petitioner must

“demonstrate[] prejudice, ‘which means that the outcome of the proceeding may

have been affected by the alleged violation’” (quoting Platero-Cortez v. INS,

804 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1986))). The Board expressly rejected the

immigration judge’s statements about the lack of evidence of rape, and it did not

rely on the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding. See Arrey v. Barr,

916 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding no prejudice when “although the

[immigration judge] made a questionable adverse credibility finding . . . , any

prejudice from that was cured by the Board’s subsequent decision assuming the

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credibility of [the petitioner’s] testimony in full”). We therefore deny the

petition for review insofar as it asserts a due process claim.

      2. Cuevas Nunez argues that she is eligible for asylum and withholding of

removal because she faces persecution on account of her membership in certain

particular social groups and on account of her imputed political opinion. Her

proposed particular social groups are related to her family and her actions

assisting the prosecution of her rapists. Her proposed imputed political opinion

also relates to her actions assisting the prosecution of her rapists. The Board

rejected Cuevas Nunez’s asylum and withholding claims because, it said, she

had failed to raise any protected ground in front of the immigration judge, and

because she failed to establish any nexus between her claimed grounds and her

feared harm. Neither rationale survives review.

       The Board erred in stating that Cuevas Nunez raised her particular social

 groups and imputed political opinion for the first time on appeal. In her asylum

 application and before the immigration judge, she argued that her family

 relationships and her actions assisting the prosecution of her rapists had a

 nexus to her past persecution and feared future persecution, and she did so

 clearly enough that the immigration judge in fact addressed her claims on those

 grounds.

       Indeed, the Board went on to say that it agreed with what it

 characterized as the immigration judge’s statements addressing those grounds

 and finding no nexus to her past or feared harm. The Board was correct that

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 Cuevas Nunez did not establish that her rape had any nexus to a protected

 ground. But substantial evidence does not support the Board’s conclusion that

 Cuevas Nunez’s asserted grounds were not “one central reason” or “a reason”

 for the harm she faced after reporting her rape. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846

 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).

      To start, the existence of personal retribution as a motive for the harm

Cuevas Nunez suffered does not negate her claims. Membership in a particular

social group or a political opinion can be “one central reason” or “a reason” for

persecution even if personal retribution is also a reason. See, e.g., Madrigal v.

Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013); Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136,

1145 (9th Cir. 2021); Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000).

      Assuming that Cuevas Nunez’s family is a cognizable particular social

group, the record contains significant evidence of harassment targeting the

family based on this ground. After one of Cuevas Nunez’s assailants was

arrested, the family discovered that the cables on their car had been cut and that

the vandals had left a note referring specifically to Cuevas Nunez. Cartel

members shot at her father’s house. A policeman threatened her father, saying

that “wherever . . . [the family members] were found or [Cuevas Nunez] was

found, [they would] be killed.” Her mother also received threats that mentioned

the entire family.

      Similarly, assuming that Cuevas Nunez’s actions related to the rape

prosecution establish a valid protected ground, the record contains significant

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evidence of nexus between those actions and actual and threatened harm.

Cuevas Nunez testified that after the arrest of one of her assailants, unidentified

people tried to run her over with a car and shouted, “That’s what you get for

whistle blowing.” The sister of one of her assailants threatened her “that if she

continued with this,” meaning assisting with the prosecution of her rapists, “she

would be killed.” In addition, Cuevas Nunez received an anonymous threat that

again referenced her rape prosecution.

      The Board cited Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242–43 (9th

Cir. 2020), which held that “people who report the criminal activity of gangs to

police” did not constitute a socially distinct group in Guatemala. But “[t]o make

the social-distinction determination . . . . the inquiry is necessarily conducted

case-by-case.” Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2020). Cuevas

Nunez proposed a differently defined group and is coming from a different

country. The cognizability of her proposed particular social groups therefore

requires an individualized analysis, which the agency did not conduct.

Moreover, Cuevas Nunez did more than “report the criminal activity of gangs”;

she also testified publicly against one of her assailants. See Henriquez-Rivas v.

Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013); In re H-L-S-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec.

228, 236–37 (B.I.A. 2021).

      We grant the petition for review and remand for further consideration of

the asylum and withholding claims.

                                         5                                     21-134
      3. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Cuevas

Nunez is not more likely than not to be tortured with government acquiescence

if she is returned to Mexico. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183

(9th Cir. 2020). The past harm that Cuevas Nunez suffered was from private

actors, as is the future harm that she fears. Cuevas Nunez alleges that the police

were involved in her harassment. But the police investigated and arrested one of

her assailants, who was ultimately convicted. That the police failed to follow up

on her reports of harassment by the cartel does not “raise an inference that

public officials are likely to acquiesce in torture.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755

F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). The immigration judge permissibly discounted

the threat by a police officer to Cuevas Nunez’s father because the judge

determined that “there is no relationship [between] any identifiable people and

what happened to her father.” In any event, in light of the other evidence in the

record, that incident alone does not compel a finding that the Mexican

government would be more likely than not to acquiesce in any torture. We deny

the petition for review insofar as it challenges the denial of the CAT claim.

      The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) is denied as moot. Each

party shall bear its own costs.

      PETITION GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; REMANDED.

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