Court Opinion

ID: 9367297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 15:07:04.544975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.937595
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Chartier v. Rice Drilling D., L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-272.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   BELMONT COUNTY

                                   JOHN A. CHARTIER ET AL.,

                                          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

                                                        v.

                                 RICE DRILLING D LLC ET AL.,

                                       Defendants-Appellants.

                         OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                          Case No. 21 BE 0046

                                     Civil Appeal from the
                         Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
                                     Case No. 19 CV 340

                                          BEFORE:
                   Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

                                                JUDGMENT:
                                                  Affirmed.

Atty. Todd M. Kildow, Atty. Heidi R. Kemp, Emens, Wolper, Jacobs & Jasin Law Firm,
250 West Main Street, Suite A, St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950, for Plaintiffs-Appellees and

Atty. David K. Schaffner, Schaffner Law Offices, Co., LPA, 132 Fair Avenue NW, New
Philadelphia, Ohio 44663, for Defendants-Appellants.

                                                 Dated:
                                             January 23, 2023
                                                                                    –2–

Donofrio, J.

      {¶1}     Defendants-Appellants are David L. Cook, Virginia Cook, Hubert L. Cook,
Tony L. Hutchinson, Lisa Adamik, and David Cook (heirs of Barbara Cook, now
deceased), Estate of Rico A. Caruso, Michael Caruso, Karen L. Stryker, Alan Lindsley,
Mark Lindsley, Charles Battista, Cindy Eggert (Trustee of Tracy N. Hupp and Iva Lou
Hupp Revocable Trust), Carol Fitz, Charles Kevin Grimm, Raymond Grimm, Travis Xavier
Grimm, Regina Grimm now known as (nka) Regina Denoni, Marilyn Murphy, Toni Fugate,
Margaret Grimm Rohner, Patricia Taylor Cook, Yvonne M. Rinehart, Matthew L. Lee,
Jeannie Marie Lee, Tracy N. Hupp, Charles William Milligan, Shirley Taylor, Karen Cook,
Charles Grimm, and Verna Grimm (appellants). Appellants are heirs or potential heirs of
Anna Carpenter, Bessie Cook, and/or Charles R. Grimm.
      {¶2}     Appellants appeal an October 14, 2021 Belmont County Common Pleas
Court judgment and November 10, 2021 findings of fact and conclusions of law granting
summary judgment to plaintiffs-appellees, John A. Chartier and Jennifer A. Chartier,
(appellees) on three of their claims. Those claims were: Count 1 under the Dormant
Minerals Act (DMA); Count 5 under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA); and Count 8
under the Marketable Title Act (MTA). The court quieted title to appellees of 100% of the
oil and gas rights underlying 135.771 acres of property in Belmont County.
      {¶3}     The parties agree that on August 17, 1940, Anna Carpenter executed deeds
conveying 135.771 acres of land in Wayne Township, Belmont County (Property) and oil
and gas interests underlying the Property. She conveyed a “one-half interest in the oil,
gas and royalties underlying the Property” to her son, Charles R. Grimm, in a warranty
deed filed on February 5, 1944 and recorded on February 9, 1944 (Grimm Deed). On the
same date, Anna Carpenter executed a warranty deed to the “premises” to her daughter,
Bessie Cook, and Bessie’s heirs (Cook Deed). The Cook Deed identified eight tracts of
land, but stated: “ALSO EXCEPTING AND RESERVING to the GRANTOR, herein, her
heirs and assigns, one-half of all oil, gas, and royalties under the premises described
herein.” The Cook Deed was filed for record on February 10, 1944 and recorded on
February 11, 1944.

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        {¶4}     On May 15, 1943, Bessie Cook and Charles R. Grimm, and their respective
spouses, Wylie Cook and Verna Grimm, entered into an oil and gas lease with Tri-State
Oil & Gas Company. Anna Carpenter was not a party to this lease, but the lease identified
the oil and gas under the Property. It was recorded on March 4, 1944.
        {¶5}     Anna Carpenter died intestate on February 16, 1946.
        {¶6}     On March 31, 1948, Bessie and Wylie Cook executed a warranty deed
conveying all of their interest in the Property to Dale Doak and William Doak. This deed
was recorded on April 9, 1948. (Doak Deed). It contained no exceptions or reservations.
        {¶7}     On February 25, 1950, Bessie and Wylie Cook executed a second warranty
deed to Dale Doak and William Doak, “to correct a deed made March 31, 1948.” (Doak II
Deed). This deed added the following:

                 Excepting and reserving all the Pittsburgh #8 vein of coal and ½ of all oil
                 and gas royalties under said lands together with mining rights and
                 reservations made in the deed conveying said lands from Annie E.
                 Carpenter to Bessie Cook.

        {¶8}     On June 29, 1951, William Doak and his wife, Juanita, executed a quitclaim
deed to Dale Doak for all of the Property conveyed to William and Dale in the Doak II
Deed (Dale Deed). The Dale Deed contained the same exception and reservation
language as the Doak II Deed.
        {¶9}     On October 14, 1976, Dale Doak conveyed the Property by warranty deed
to Mark and Diana Whaley (Whaley Deed). The Whaley Deed contained the same one-
half oil and gas royalties exception language as the Dale Deed and Doak II Deed1.

1
 It is noted that we made factual findings relevant to the instant case in Whaley v. Schaffner Law Offices, L.P.A.,
7th Dist. Belmont No.14 BE 0056, 2017-Ohio-7698. There, we found:
          In a deed dated August 17, 1940 and filed February 5, 1944, conveying the Property [8.8738 acres of land
          in Belmont County] as part of a larger tract of land, grantor Anna Carpenter conveyed a one-half interest
          in the oil and gas underlying the property in tracts one through six to Charles Grimm. Carpenter reserved
          all of the oil and gas underlying tract eight.

        Carpenter conveyed the surface to Bessie Cook by deed recorded February 10, 1944, reserving a one-half
        interest in the oil and gas underlying tract one through six to Charles Grimm. Carpenter again reserved all
        of the oil and gas underlying tract eight.

Case No. 21 BE 0046
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       {¶10} On May 23, 2002, Mark and Diana Whaley executed a general warranty
deed to appellees. The deed identified the Property and stated that it was “[s]ubject to all
legal roads, right of ways, easements, leases, restrictions, reservations, exceptions or
other encumbrances that may be found in a title search.” (Chartier Deed).
       {¶11} On February 29, 2012, appellees published a Notice of Abandonment
Pursuant to the DMA with the Times Leader, a Belmont County newspaper. The Notice
was published pursuant to R.C. 5301.56 and it specifically noticed Charles R. Grimm,
Verna Grimm, Anna E. Carpenter, and their unknown heirs, assigns, devisees, executors,
administrators, and next of kin.
       {¶12} On April 30, 2012, appellees filed a Notice of Abandonment and Affidavit
Vesting Mineral Interest in Surface Owner under R.C. 5301.56(H) in the Belmont County
Recorder’s Office. The Affidavit stated that Anna had conveyed one-half interest to the oil
and gas under the Property to Charles R. Grimm in the Grimm Deed, and conveyed the
Property to Bessie in the Cook Deed, but reserved one-half interest in the oil and gas.
       {¶13} The affidavit further stated that the Notice of Abandonment was served by
publication on all interested parties, 60 days had passed since the publication, and no
owners of the oil and gas interest under the Property had come forward with a claim to
preserve the interest. Appellees’ counsel attested that those with rights to claim interests
did not file claims to preserve those interests in the 40 years subsequent to the filing of
the severance deeds. Appellees further stated that notice was provided that the mineral
interest was deemed abandoned and vested in them. They requested that the Belmont
County Recorder make a notation in the deed records that the mineral interest was
abandoned pursuant to the Affidavit of Abandonment. The Belmont County Recorder
made the notation.
       {¶14} On November 10, 2012, appellees entered into a lease agreement with Rice
D Drilling, LLC. (Rice) for the oil and gas under the Property. The agreement provided
that Rice would conduct due diligence in determining defensible title to the oil and gas
interests. Appellees were paid in full for a 100% ownership of the mineral interest under
that contract, plus a signing bonus.
       {¶15} On July 8, 2013, Bessie and Wylie Cook, through Attorney Schaffner, filed
an “Affidavit Notice of Claim to Preserve Mineral Interest in Land (ORC 5301.49 et seq.).”

Case No. 21 BE 0046
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Attorney Schaffner stated in the affidavit that he represented Patricia Cook Taylor, David
L. Cook, Hubert Cook, Bruce A. Cook, Barbara Cook, Rico A. Caruso, Michael Caruso,
Karen L. Stryker, Robert Edwin Milligan, and Tony L. Hutchinson, who were grandchildren
and heirs at law to Bessie and Wylie Cook, and great grandchildren to Anna Carpenter.
He attested that he had knowledge of the facts in the affidavit and he was competent to
testify about them. He stated that the heirs had no intent to abandon the mineral interests
in the Property and they were giving notice that they wished to preserve all rights and title
to the interests.
       {¶16} Contained in the lease between appellees and Rice was an option to
extend the primary contract term by five years if Rice provided notice to appellees and an
extension bonus payment. Rice provided the notice and credited appellees with only 50%
of the mineral interest, claiming that appellees did not own the entire interest.
       {¶17} On September 13, 2019, appellees filed a complaint against appellants to
quiet title to the oil and gas interests. They filed a second amended complaint on June 8,
2020, alleging in Count 1 that under the DMA, they provided Notice of Abandonment by
publication on February 29, 2012 to “Charles R. Grimm, Verna Grimm and Anna E.
Carpenter, a/k/a Annie E. Carpenter, and their unknown heirs, devisees, executors,
administrators, relicts, next of kin and assigns.”
       {¶18} Appellees explained that they served the Notice of Abandonment by
publication under R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) because “there was no record of any heirs, holders,
or transferees in the Belmont County Public Records providing names or addresses of
persons to serve with notice by certified mail.” They alleged that that there were no
transfers of record concerning the oil and gas interests after February 10, 1944 and there
were no probate estates of record for Anna E. Carpenter, Charles R. Grimm, or Verna
Grimm. They stated that they acted with due diligence in searching for holders to serve
with the Notice of Abandonment.
       {¶19} Appellees alleged that appellants filed their claims to preserve their
interests on July 8, 2013, which was more than 60 days after the date when the Notice of
Abandonment was published. They requested that the court declare that: the oil and gas
reservation vested in them on April 30, 2012; the record of the reservation no longer serve
as notice to the public of the existence of the interest; and the record of the interest no

Case No. 21 BE 0046
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longer    be   used   as   evidence   in   any   Ohio   court   by   the   former   holders’
successors/assignees against surface landowners formerly subject to the interest.
         {¶20} In Count 2, appellees alleged slander of title and fraud against Potomac,
Robert and Wanda Milligan, and David and Virginia Cook, for recording their leases of
the oil and gas interests while knowing that appellees owned all of those interests. They
alleged the same against Attorney Schaffner as to his affidavit, which they averred was
intentionally filed knowing it would cause Rice to withhold payments from appellees.
         {¶21} Appellees alleged in Count 3 that Rice, Gulfport, and EQT Productions
breached their oil and gas lease. Count 4 requested specific performance by Rice of its
oil and gas lease with appellees and the payment of bonus and royalties.
         {¶22} In Count 5, appellees requested a declaratory judgment that they
completed the Notice of Abandonment process and were 100% owners of the oil and gas
interests under the Property. They also requested that the court declare that no notice of
record existed that appellants ever held interests under the Property and appellants must
honor their lease and execute a deed to convey the interests.
         {¶23} Count 6 stated claims for conversion, fraud and liquidated damages against
some appellants. Count 7 requested injunctive relief and a constructive trust against Rice
and Gulfport for withholding full payment of the bonus and royalties per the lease.
         {¶24} Count 8 alleged MTA claims under R.C. 5301.47, et seq. Appellees averred
that the severed minerals were vested in an unbroken chain of title for more than 40 years
with a root deed filed for record on July 5, 1951 and the severed minerals and all royalty
interests were extinguished and vested in appellees under R.C. 5301.47.
         {¶25} Appellants filed an answer and a counterclaim. The heirs of Bessie Cook
and Charles R. Grimm claimed that appellees published the Notice of Abandonment
without including them, even though Charles R. Grimm’s heirs were listed in his estate
and identifiable in Belmont County records, which showed estates for the son of Charles
R. Grimm, Charles W. Grimm, and his wife. They asserted that they were unaware of the
Notice of Abandonment publication until 2013, and they immediately took action to
preserve their interests. They requested that the court: quiet title to the oil and gas
interests in their names; award damages for slander of title; issue an injunction barring

Case No. 21 BE 0046
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appellees from leasing, conveying, or transferring rights to the oil and gas interests; find
that appellees’ claims were frivolous; and award attorney fees.
       {¶26} On August 5, 2020, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for default
judgment against appellants Jeannie Marie Lee and L. Matthew Lee, and Yvonne M.
Rinehart. On November 9, 2020, after a pretrial conference and agreement of the parties,
the trial court entered default judgment against Robert A. Chaitlain, George Bolt, Betsy
Jane Bolt, and the unknown heirs, administrators, next of kin, executors, successors, or
assigns of Anna Carpenter, Charles R. Grimm, and Verna Grimm.
       {¶27} On November 25, 2020, Gulfport filed a suggestion of bankruptcy and
request for an automatic stay. The parties in this case agreed to the automatic stay due
to the bankruptcy filing and later agreed that litigation in the instant case could proceed
as provided in the court’s entry regarding the stay.
       {¶28} On July 23, 2021, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.
Appellants filed an opposition brief and filed for summary judgment on their
counterclaims. After a hearing, the court granted in part and reversed in part appellees’
summary judgment motion on October 14, 2021. The court granted summary judgment
in favor of appellees on: Count 1 DMA claim; Count 5 declaratory judgment; and Count 8
MTA claim. The court sustained appellees’ motion “as to the fifty-percent (50%)
ownership and quieting title to one hundred percent (100%) of the oil and gas rights.” The
court denied the remainder of appellees’ summary judgment motion and denied
appellants’ summary judgment motion.
       {¶29} The court held a hearing on a proposed judgment entry and issued its
journal entry with findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 10, 2021.
       {¶30} On November 12, 2021, appellants filed their notice of appeal. They allege
two assignments of error challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of appellees under the DMA and the MTA.

                      Summary Judgment Standard of Review

       {¶31} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment ruling de novo. Comer v.
Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8. Thus, we apply the
same test as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper.

Case No. 21 BE 0046
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       {¶32} A court may grant summary judgment only when (1) no genuine issue of
material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and
(3) the evidence can only produce a finding that is contrary to the non-moving party.
Mercer v. Halmbacher, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27799, 2015-Ohio-4167, ¶ 8; Civ.R. 56(C).
The initial burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential elements of the case with
evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662
N.E.2d 264 (1996). A “material fact” depends on the substantive law of the claim being
litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088
(8th Dist.1995), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
       {¶33} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court
of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's
claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). The trial court's
decision must be based upon “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if
any, timely filed in the action.” Civ.R. 56(C).
       {¶34} If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party to set forth facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; Civ.R.
56(E). “Trial courts should award summary judgment with caution, being careful to resolve
doubts and construe evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.” Welco Industries, Inc. v.
Applied Cos., 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 617 N.E.2d 1129 (1993).
       {¶35} In that appellants’ second assignment of error is dispositive, we shall
address it first. In their second assignment of error, appellants assert:
                 The trial court erred when it denied Appellants’ motion for
                 summary judgment and granted Appellee’s[sic] motion
                 finding that the oil and gas interests were extinguished
                 pursuant to the Marketable Title Act.

Case No. 21 BE 0046
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       {¶36} Appellants contend that appellees do not have a root deed which conveyed
the oil and gas interests to them. They assert that when the root of title contains language
that, on its face, excepts or reserves the oil and gas from the conveyance, it does not
convey oil and gas interests and there is no marketable title to that interest. They submit
that the MTA extinguishes severed mineral interests created before a surface owner’s
root of title to the property if the surface owner has a chain of title for 40 years or more
after the prior mineral interest was created and there are no specific references to the
prior interest in the surface owner’s chain of title. They posit that if a specific reference to
the mineral interest appears in the surface owner’s chain of title, then those references
are sufficient to preserve the prior interest.
       {¶37} Appellants quote the Ohio Supreme Court’s three-part test in Blackstone v.
Moore, 155 Ohio St. 3d 448, 2018-Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132, ¶ 12, for determining
whether a mineral interest was preserved. The Court found that the following three-step
inquiry is necessary to determine the preservation: “(1) Is there an interest described
within the chain of title? (2) If so, is the reference to that interest a “general reference”?
(3) If the answers to the first two questions are yes, does the general reference contain a
specific identification of a recorded title transaction?” Id. The Court held that if the
reference to the interest is general, it is insufficient to preserve a mineral rights
reservation. Id.
       {¶38} Applying Blackstone to the instant case, appellants assert that appellees’
root of title is the 1976 Whaley Deed and it describes an interest in the chain of title as it
states “[e]xcepting and reserving all the Pittsburgh #8 vein of coal and ½ of all oil and gas
royalties under said lands together with mining rights and reservations made in the deed
conveying said lands from Annie E. Carpenter to Bessie Cook.” Appellants contend that
the answer to the first question in the Blackstone query is therefore yes.
       {¶39} Appellants assert that the answer to the second question of the Blackstone
query is also yes because the reference in the 1976 Whaley Deed is specific as to the
type of interest and who originally reserved the interest. Since the interest is specific,
appellants submit that the exception and reservation preserved their oil and gas interest.
       {¶40} Although they assert that they need not proceed to the third Blackstone
query, appellants contend that appellees’ root of title would fail here as well. Appellants

Case No. 21 BE 0046
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submit that the Whaley Deed specifically refers to a recorded title transaction, which is
the “deed conveying said lands from Annie E. Carpenter to Bessie Cook.” Appellants
argue that appellees lack a clean root of title granting them an interest in the oil and gas
because an abstractor would be directed by specific volume and page number first to
565/355, which is the Whaley Deed, the root of title deed, and it contains the reference to
the Cook Deed. Appellants contend that the abstractor would then use the
Grantor/Grantee (Direct/Indirect) indexes to find the reservation deed at 344/215, and
then be directed to 344/208, which is the Grimm Deed.
       {¶41} As to determining that the 1976 Whaley Deed is the root of title, appellants
cite David v. Paulsen, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-18-032, 2019-Ohio-2146, ¶ 20, and assert
that the time when marketability is being determined is “the date a purportedly superior
right in the property is sought to be enforced.” They posit that this is the date that an
action is filed for litigation purposes. Appellants state that the time period to apply the 40-
year unbroken chain of title period begins with the root of title and ends at the time when
marketability is being determined. Appellants calculate that the time of marketability is
September 13, 2019, when appellees filed their complaint, so the root of title is the first
deed prior to September 13, 1979. They submit that this is the 1976 Whaley Deed, which
contains the oil and gas reservation. Appellants concede that even using appellees’ filing
of the Notice of Abandonment as the root of title (February 29, 2012), the root of title
would be the first deed prior to April 17, 1972, which is the 1951 Dale Deed that contained
the same reservation of oil and gas royalties as in the Whaley Deed.
       {¶42} Appellants note that several title transactions occurred subsequent to the
root of title, including the estates of Charles W. Grimm, Charlotte Grimm (Charles W.
Grimm’s wife), and Edith Cook (wife of Lowell Cook, who was the son of Bessie and Wiley
Cook), whose heirs were transferred their real and personal property. Appellants also
contend that the affidavits of preservation filed by their attorney under the DMA preserved
their oil and gas interests under the MTA.
       {¶43} Appellees contend that the root of title is the 1951 Dale Deed and the MTA
extinguished any severed mineral interest 40 years after that Deed was received for
record on July 5, 1951 since no claims were filed. They assert that Charles R. Grimm died
on June 4, 1969 and did not hold his oil and gas interest for 40 years, and no successor

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in interest filed evidence of a transfer or preservation of a claim to this interest. Appellees
note that the successor in interest to Charles R. Grimm’s interests was Mary Nelle
Lindsley, who was appointed as Trustee for Charles R. Grimm’s estate, and his estate
was administered in Florida.
       {¶44} Appellees also contend that even if Bessie Cook maintained a reservation,
she conveyed her oil and gas interests away in the 1948 Doak Deed because she
conveyed the Property without the reservation language that was present in the Cook
Deed. They posit that Bessie could not re-reserve her oil and gas interest by filing the
1950 Doak II Deed as a corrective deed since she had already conveyed the land without
the reservation and exception and the “corrective” deed was not signed by all of the
parties to the Deed. Appellees contend that the root of title did not include the oil and gas
interest since the interest was conveyed with the Property and appellees now own the
Property.
       {¶45} The MTA provides that “[a] person has such an unbroken chain of title when
the official public records disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, of record not
less than forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined, which said
conveyance or other title transaction purports to create such interest” in the person or one
of his predecessors in title “with nothing appearing of record to divest” him of the purported
interest. R.C. 5301.48. A marketable record title “operates to extinguish” all interests
existing prior to the root of title. R.C. 5301.47(A), citing R.C. 5301.50.
       {¶46} The root of title is the “conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of
title of a person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, upon which he
relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be
recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined.”
R.C. 5301.47(E). Pursuant to R.C. 5301.50, and subject to R.C 5301.49, the record
marketable title shall be held free and clear of all interests which depend upon events
occurring prior to the effective date of the root of title.
       {¶47} The exception and reservation language in both the 1951 Dale Deed and
the 1976 Whaley Deed come from the 1950 Doak II Deed. The 1950 Doak II Deed was
filed by Bessie and Wylie Cook “to correct” the 1948 Doak Deed, which conveyed the
Property, but omitted the exception and reservation language from the Cook Deed.

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       {¶48} We find that the 1950 Doak II Deed could not “correct” the 1948 Doak Deed
by adding the exception and reservation language concerning the oil and gas interests.
The oil and gas interests that Bessie and Wylie Cook tried to re-reserve in 1950 had
already been conveyed with the Property in 1948 to Dale and William Doak. Further, the
1950 Doak II Deed was signed by only Bessie and Wylie Cook. Thus, Bessie Cook’s oil
and gas interests were conveyed with the Property.
       {¶49} Moreover, the exception and reservation language contained in both the
1951 Dale Deed and 1976 Whaley Deed is not the same as that contained in the Cook
Deed or the Grimm Deed, although it is more consistent with the oil and gas interests
excepted in the Grimm Deed. The Cook Deed stated that Anna Carpenter was
“EXCEPTING AND RESERVING to the Grantor, herein, * * * one-half of all oil, gas, and
royalties under the premises.” In the Grimm Deed, Anna Carpenter conveyed a “one-half
interest in the oil, gas and royalties underlying the Property” to Charles R. Grimm. The
language in the Dale and the Whaley Deeds contained the same language as the 1950
Doak II Deed of “excepting and reserving all the Pittsburgh #8 vein of coal and ½ of oil
and gas royalties under said lands together with mining rights and reservations made in
the deed conveying said lands from Annie E. Carpenter to Bessie Cook.” This language
does not except and/or reserve the oil and gas interests, but rather excepts and/or
reserves royalties from the oil and gas interests.
       {¶50} In addition, the three-step inquiry in Blackstone, 155 Ohio St.3d 448, 2018-
Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132, ¶ 12, leads us to find that the references to the oil and gas
interests are general and therefore not preserved for appellants.
       {¶51} The parties agree to the first prong of the Blackstone query that oil and gas
interests were described in the chain of title.
       {¶52} However, we answer the second Blackstone query in the negative because
the references to the oil and gas interests are ambiguous and therefore general
references. Again, the exception and reservation language in the 1951 Dale Deed and
the 1976 Whaley Deed pertain to oil and gas royalties and not to the oil and gas interests
themselves as stated in the Cook Deed. Further, the latter part of the exception and
reservation language in both Deeds is ambiguous. The latter part of the 1951 Dale Deed
and 1976 Whaley Deed excepts and reserves “mining rights and reservations made in

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the deed conveying said lands from Annie E. Carpenter to Bessie Cook.” This language
could apply to mining rights and mining reservations, or mining rights and all of the other
reservations made in the Cook Deed. Anna Carpenter included other exceptions and
reservations in the Cook Deed that confirm this ambiguity. For example, Anna Carpenter
excepted and reserved “all the Pittsburgh or No. eight seam of coal, together with the
mining rights and privileges as heretofore conveyed” by prior grantors to a grantee in a
deed dated July 16, 1906. Anna Carpenter also included language “further reserving from
the operation” of a prior conveyance “all the oil, gas, or other minerals in or underlying”
the Eighth Tract of land, “together with the right to operate the same, or to lease to others
to operate for oil, gas or other minerals.” Thus, the language used in the 1951 Dale Deed
and the 1976 Whaley Deed, which refer to Anna’s reservation in the Cook Deed, are
ambiguous. Ambiguity is also supported by the fact that the parties in this case differ in
their interpretation of the Cook Deed as to whether Anna conveyed the oil and gas to
Bessie with the Property. "[T]he mere fact that the reference is susceptible to more than
one interpretation is further evidence that the reference is general not specific." See
O'Kelley v. Rothenbuhler, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 20 MO 0009, 2021-Ohio-1167, ¶47.
Accordingly, we answer the second inquiry under Blackstone in the negative and find that
the general references do not preserve appellants’ interests.
       {¶53} The MTA additionally extinguished oil and gas interests for the Grimm heirs
because Charles R. Grimm died in 1969 and therefore did not maintain his oil and gas
interests for 40 years. Further, neither the 1951 Dale Deed nor the Cook Deed referred
to this interest and Charles R. Grimm’s estate was administered in Florida, as both parties
acknowledge. See Lucas v. Whyte, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 19 MO 0022, 2021-Ohio-222, ¶
38 (“[w]ithout notice in the county in which the property is located, a title examiner would
struggle with where to search for possible title transactions affecting the record chain of
title. A probate certificate of transfer or an ancillary estate recorded in the county in which
the property is located, for example, would put a title examiner on notice that there may
be a title transaction in another county or another state that could affect the record chain
of title.”). And even if his interest was part of his estate, which was to be administered by
Mary Nelle Lindsley as Trustee, it appears that she died on November 7, 2003 and no
further information as to her estate distribution was offered. Further, neither Mary Nelle

Case No. 21 BE 0046
                                                                                      – 14 –

Lindsley nor any representative are included in the claims in this case and default
judgment was rendered against all unknown heirs on November 9, 2020.
        {¶54} Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that the MTA
extinguished all of the oil and gas interests claimed by appellants.
        {¶55} Accordingly, appellants’ second assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled.
        {¶56} In their first assignment of error, appellants assert:
                The trial court erred when it denied Appellants’ motion for
                 summary judgment and granted Appellee’s[sic] motion
                finding that the oil and gas interests were abandoned
                pursuant to the Dormant Minerals Act.
        {¶57} In that we find that the MTA extinguished all of appellants’ interests, we
need not decide their issues relating to the DMA. See Pernick v. Dallas, 7th Dist.
Jefferson No. 21 JE 0011, 2021-Ohio-4635, ¶ 52-53 (“[T]he trial court's decision regarding
the MTA was correct. This means the DMA issues are moot and this court will not address
them.”).
        {¶58} Accordingly, appellants’ assignment of error number one is overruled as
moot.
        {¶59} For the reasons stated herein, the trial courts judgment is affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.
Robb, J., concurs

Case No. 21 BE 0046
[Cite as Chartier v. Rice Drilling D., L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-272.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against
the Appellants.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.