Court Opinion

ID: 9845750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:21.235708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:20.984626
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
dissenting.
In State v. Florance, 270 Or 169, 527 P2d 1202 (1974), the court decided that, for the sake of simplicity, Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution should be interpreted in the same way that the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In that case, it adopted the rule enunciated in United States v. Robinson, 414 US 218, 94 S Ct 467, 38 L Ed 2d 427 (1973), relating to searches incident to arrest. The court held:
“[U]nder the Robinson rule the items which may properly be seized upon the making of a search as an incident to a lawful custodial arrest include not only weapons and other articles which may be used to either threaten the life of the arresting officer or to effect an escape, and ‘instrumentalities’ of the crime for which the person was arrested and evidence of that crime, but also contraband evidence of other crimes.” 270 Or at 185.
In State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 653 P2d 942 (1982), the court overruled the holding in State v. Florence, supra, that the Oregon courts must follow the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in search and seizure cases. The court said:
“One of the protections derived from the Oregon Constitution includes a recognition that a valid custodial arrest does not alone give rise to a unique right to search.” 293 Or at 756.
The court reiterated the Oregon rule in State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 201, 729 P2d 524 (1986):
“[The Robinson] federal rule permitted full searches of the person incident to any lawful custodial arrest, based upon the rationale that the right to search flowed automatically from a lawful custodial arrest because the arrest itself had so thoroughly involved the arrested person’s privacy that further intrusions had no independent constitutional significance. Our decision in Caraher made it clear that, under the Oregon Constitution, the fact of arrest does not grant an unqualified right to search an arrestee’s person for crime evidence.”
*120If the present majority is correct, the Supreme Court accomplished nothing in Caraher, because the majority resurrects the rule laid down in United States v. Robinson, supra, by permitting a full search of an arrestee’s person and all items immediately associated with his person incidental to an arrest. It would also overrule our very recent decisions in State v. Baker, 100 Or App 31, 784 P2d 446 (1989), and State v. Boyd, 101 Or App 649, 792 P2d 462 (1990), although it attempts, unsuccessfully, to distinguish them. 103 Or App at 118, n 4.
In denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court held that Donaca, incident to defendant’s arrest, was entitled to “thoroughly search the defendant’s person for items which could be used to harm the officer, or to aid the defendant in an escape” and, “upon discovering any item on the defendant’s person, the officer was entitled to examine the item and to make a determination of whether the item could be used to cause harm to the officer or to aid the defendant in an escape.” It justified the search of the pack on defendant’s bicycle, either because defendant had consented and had not revoked his consent or because the search was incident to defendant’s arrest for possession of hashish.
The trial court overstated the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest, apparently applying the federal law as Oregon courts had been applying it before State v. Caraher, supra, was decided. The majority agrees. It is clear from both Caraher and Owens that a search incident to arrest is limited to a search for evidence of the crime for which the person was arrested and to “a pat-down or limited search for weapons to protect the officer or to prevent escape * * State v. Owens, supra, 302 Or at 200. (Emphasis supplied.) That is to say that a pat-down or limited search is permissible for weapons that could be used against the officer or in effectuating an escape; that search is only for weapons, not for a handcuff key, a paper clip, a fish hook or a piece of wire.
If the trial court’s and the majority’s understanding of the rule is correct, the limits imposed by Caraher or Owens have no meaning, because any time that a person has been *121arrested, the officer could make a full search of the person.1 That rule was expressly rejected in Caraher. In fact, in order to search for crime evidence, the search must be limited to a search for evidence of a crime for which the arrestee is arrested and, as pointed out in Owens, if the person is arrested for a crime that ordinarily has neither instrumentalities nor fruits that reasonably could be concealed on the arrestee’s person, no warrantless search for evidence of that crime would be authorized incident to that arrest. 302 Or at 200. In Car-aher, the court approved the test applied in State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259, 373 P2d 392 (1962), that a search incident to arrest must not only be close in time and space, but its intensity must be “commensurate both with the crime and what was known of the criminal[.]” 231 Or at 273.
Here, the officer did not even pretend that he was searching for evidence of the crime for which defendant was arrested, and there is no evidence that the search was necessary to prevent destruction of evidence. Neither is there evidence that the officer believed defendant to be armed or an escape threat or that the officer felt threatened. The officer’s search, not only for weapons, but for any item that might aid defendant in picking the lock on the handcuffs is not within the permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest. The majority apparently believes that the scope of the search is extended automatically if, but only if, the officer states that he is looking for paper clips or fishhooks. Compare State v. Jones, 103 Or App 123, 796 P2d 670 (1990). That is an unusual talismanic quirk. To the contrary, under Caraher and Owens, Donaca was entitled to make a limited pat-down for weapons. However, he did not even feel the “small and lumpy” object in defendant’s pocket during the pat-down, so he had no authority to reach into the pocket; when he did feel it after reaching inside the pocket, he did not say that he thought that it was a weapon. Accordingly, he had no authority to remove it. State v. Baker, supra. Evidence seized from defendant’s person must be suppressed.
If that evidence had been lawfully obtained, the *122search of the pack on defendant’s bicycle might have been justified, if Donaca had reasonably believed that it also contained hashish. State v. Caraher, supra. Because the first search was unlawful, the subsequent search cannot be justified as incident to defendant’s arrest for possession of hashish.2
The question remains whether defendant’s earlier “consent” survived the intervening events that resulted in his arrest pursuant to the two outstanding warrants. Passing the question of whether the officer, after making a valid stop of defendant for a traffic infraction3 and obtaining his identification, which the officer did not question, had any authority to use the occasion to ask defendant’s consent to search his small bike pack, there is no evidence that the consent was a continuing one. In response to the officer’s question, defendant unzipped the pack, pulled out a poncho and a paper bag and then said, “See, that’s it.” That was the scope of both the consent and the search. Any further search by the officer, given the intervening events, required a new consent. None was requested or given, because Donaca justified that search as incident to defendant’s arrest and for the officer’s safety.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.
Joseph, C. J., and Warren and Newman, JJ., join in this dissent.

 The search of the defendant’s person in Caraher was not challenged; clearly, it was for evidence of the crime for which the defendant had been arrested. The dispute was over authority to search her purse, an item in her immediate possession, for evidence of that crime.

 Although defendant had not been arrested for possession of hashish, Donaca had probable cause to arrest him for that crime (were it not for the unlawful search) and, after searching the pack, advised defendant that he was under arrest for unlawful possession of drugs.

 ORS 810.410(3)(a) and (b) provide:
“(3) A police officer:
“(a) Shall not arrest a person for a traffic infraction.
“(b) May stop and detain a person for a traffic infraction for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of citation.”
Defendant does not contend that the officer did not have authority to ask his consent.