Court Opinion

ID: 9474969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:13:36.055557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:25.792428
License: Public Domain

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur because, and only because we are bound by our own precedent in United States v. Creamer Industries, Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.1965). I concur specially to note that I am in full accord with Judge Brown’s dissent in Creamer: “The Federal Statute creates a lien only ‘upon all property and rights to property ... belonging to such person [taxpayer].’ Unless there is property belonging to the taxpayer, the government’s lien is nonexistent.” 349 F.2d at 629.
Here, pursuant to the divorce decree, the property was transferred from the taxpayer to his wife in a final judgment on October 9, 1982. From that point forward, the taxpayer had no interest or right whatsoever, legal or equitable, in this property. On December 15, 1982, a federal tax lien against the taxpayer attached “all property and rights to property whether real or personal” belonging to the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 6321. Whatever the lien attached to, it did not attach to this property because it in no way, shape or form belonged to the taxpayer.
Nevertheless, the majority is clearly correct in holding that Creamer controls and the majority is correct in its analysis and application of the relevant Texas statutes that support its holding, and I therefore concur.