Court Opinion

ID: 9898871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:01:12.49041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:35.914089
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 23-1253
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                               Juan Dontae Shelton

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
                                  ____________

                           Submitted: October 18, 2023
                            Filed: November 15, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

      In June 2021, the Davenport Police Department dispatch informed Officer
Bryant Wayland of a hit-and-run accident. Witnesses to the accident provided a
physical description of the suspect, along with the make and model of the suspect’s
car. One witness stated that the suspect possessed a firearm.
       Officer Wayland found and stopped the car. He commanded the driver to step
out of the car with his hands on top of his head and to walk backwards towards him.
The driver, Juan Shelton, exited the car but did not comply with Officer Wayland’s
other commands. For example, Shelton was holding his cellphone and dropped his
hands from his head to look at it. After Shelton was detained, Officer Wayland
searched the car. He found multiple firearms and a bag containing marijuana,
methamphetamine, and drug packaging material. Various items were seized,
including Shelton’s cellphone.

       The investigation of this incident was assigned to Detective Daniel Reeves.
Detective Reeves obtained a search warrant from a state judge in Scott County, Iowa
to search Shelton’s cellphone for “evidence of illegal narcotics and firearm
possession/sales.” In the affidavit in support of the warrant application, Detective
Reeves detailed the events of the traffic stop, including that “[w]hen Shelton exited
the vehicle[,] he possess[ed] and look[ed] at [his] cellphone.” He stated that he
believed there was “probable cause to search [Shelton’s] phone for evidence relating
to the illegal possession of a firearm by a felon to include photos, videos, text
messages, and communication via social media applications like Facebook,
Snapchat and other text messaging applications on the device.” He believed that
“the contents of the phone [would] assist in the investigation and prosecution of
Shelton . . . and identify other co-conspirators to include the marijuana and
methamphetamine source of supply.” After Detective Reeves received the warrant
from the state judge, he reviewed text messages, photographs, and videos on
Shelton’s cellphone and found evidence of drug dealing, photographs of the firearms
that had been seized, and photographs and videos of child pornography.

      Shelton was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), production of child pornography, id. § 2251(a), and
possession of child pornography, id. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2). He moved to suppress
evidence from the traffic stop, including the evidence from his cellphone. The

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district court1 denied the motion. A jury then found Shelton guilty of all charges,
and the district court sentenced him to 330 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
Shelton asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
evidence from his cellphone.

       When evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Amendment
provides that “no Warrant[] shall issue, but upon probable cause.” However, even
when a search warrant is not supported by probable cause, evidence seized pursuant
to the warrant is admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
if “it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing [the] search warrant to
have relied in good faith on the judge’s determination that there was probable cause
to issue the warrant.” United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 2007). “In
assessing whether the officer relied in good faith on the validity of a warrant, we
consider the totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the
officer but not included in the affidavit.” Id. An officer’s reliance on a search
warrant is unreasonable when (1) “the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was
misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth,” (2) “the issuing
magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role,” (3) the affidavit was “so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable,” or (4) the warrant was “so facially deficient” that the executing
officer could not reasonably presume the warrant to be valid. United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).

       Here, Shelton argues only that Detective Reeves’s affidavit was so lacking in
indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer would have relied upon a warrant

      1
        The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendation of the
Honorable Stephen B. Jackson, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern
District of Iowa.
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that was issued based on it. Even assuming there was not probable cause to search
Shelton’s cellphone, it was objectively reasonable for Detective Reeves to rely in
good faith on the state judge’s determination that there was probable cause to issue
the warrant to search Shelton’s cellphone. The affidavit in support of the warrant
detailed the events of the traffic stop, including that Shelton held and looked at his
cellphone while exiting the car. It noted that drugs were found in the car and that
the contents of Shelton’s cellphone could help officers identify co-conspirators in
illegal drug sales. See United States v. Eggerson, 999 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir.
2021) (determining that if firearms are “tools of the drug trade,” then “there is little
reason to believe that cell phones are not”). The warrant was limited in scope,
authorizing officers to search Shelton’s cellphone only for “evidence of illegal
narcotics and firearm possession/sales.” See id. at 1126 (concluding that the good-
faith exception applied because, among other things, the search warrant was limited
in scope). Even though the affidavit arguably was conclusory with regard to the
connection between Shelton’s cellphone and criminal activity, it was not so lacking
in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer would have relied upon it.

      Shelton argues that the affidavit in support of the search warrant is similar to
the defective affidavits in United States v. Herron, 215 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2000),
United States v. Oglesby, No. 4:18-CR-0626, 2019 WL 1877228 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26,
2019), and United States v. Ramirez, 180 F. Supp. 3d 491 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
Shelton’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. The affidavits in these three cases
did not connect the defendants’ property to any criminal activity. See Herron, 215
F.3d at 814-15 (concluding that the good-faith exception did not apply when the
affidavits in support of the search warrants provided no evidence that the defendant
was connected to illegal activity); Oglesby, 2019 WL 1877228, at *4, *6 (rejecting
an affidavit that failed to “even specify the offense of which the cell phone was
alleged to contain evidence”); Ramirez, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 495 (finding that the
good-faith exception did not apply when the only particularized facts in the affidavit
included a description of the phone, the fact that the defendant’s phone was with him
when he was arrested for a drug-related conspiracy, and that the affiant had served
for three years in the police department). Here, Detective Reeves’s affidavit
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connected Shelton’s cellphone with potential criminal activity. For example,
Shelton’s behavior of actively looking at his cellphone, in contravention of Officer
Wayland’s commands, suggested a nexus between the cellphone and criminal
activity. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Shelton’s motion to suppress.

       Because we find the good-faith exception applicable, we need not reach the
issue of whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. See United States v.
Williams, 976 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Before reviewing the existence of
probable cause, this court may consider the applicability of the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule, which permits evidence obtained in reliance on an
objectively reasonable warrant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

      Accordingly, we affirm.
                     ______________________________

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