Court Opinion

ID: 9897967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:26.55665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:49.829407
License: Public Domain

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                                                                                                    Filed
                                                                                              Washington State
                                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Division Two

                                                                                                June 21, 2023

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                DIVISION II
           WERNER KLEE, a single man,                                       No. 56232-4-II

                                       Respondent,

                 v.

           ERIC SNOW, a single man; and all Occupants,                 PUBLISHED OPINION

                                       Appellant.

                CRUSER, A.C.J. ⎯ Eric Snow was renting a home from Werner Klee. Klee decided to sell

       the property and served Snow with a 90-day notice of termination of Snow’s tenancy pursuant to

       a recently enacted statute in the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act.1 When Snow did not vacate the

       home after 90 days, Klee filed an unlawful detainer action seeking to evict Snow. Snow argued to

       the trial court that the statute required Klee to make reasonable attempts to sell or advertise the

       property before Snow vacated the home. The trial court disagreed and granted a writ of restitution

       to Klee. Snow appeals the court’s order granting a writ of restitution.

                We hold that RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) requires an owner to make reasonable attempts to sell

       or advertise the residence within 30 days after the tenant has vacated, but not before the tenant

       vacates. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting a writ of restitution to Klee. In

       1
           Ch. 59.18 RCW.
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       No. 56232-4-II

       addition, we award attorney fees on appeal to Klee in an amount to be determined by the court

       commissioner.

                                                       FACTS

                Snow began renting a home in Chehalis, Washington, in July 2019 with his wife and six

       children. Klee is both the owner and landlord of the residence.

                Klee owns several other properties on the same road in Chehalis. Because Klee is in his

       late 90s, he decided to sell most of the property he owns. To that end, Snow was served a 90-day

       notice to vacate at the beginning of November 2021, indicating that Klee intended to sell the

       property. The notice stated that Snow’s tenancy would terminate on January 31, 2022.

                By the end of February 2022, Snow and his family still had not vacated the residence. Klee

       filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and moved for an order to show cause.2 Klee’s materials

       included a declaration from Ursula Klee, Klee’s daughter and power of attorney, stating that she

       intended to sell the residence at issue and had been in contact with an individual regarding the

       listing of the property.

                In response, Snow argued that Klee had not satisfied the requirements of the statute at issue,

       which allows a landlord to evict a tenant when the tenant remains in possession of the residence

       after the owner “elects to sell” the residence and the tenant has been provided a 90-day notice of

       termination of the tenancy. CP at 18. The statute specifies that an owner “elects to sell” when they

       make reasonable attempts to sell or advertise the property “within 30 days after the tenant has

       vacated.” RCW 59.18.650(2)(e).

       2
           See RCW 59.18.370, .380.
                                                          2
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       No. 56232-4-II

              Snow claimed that a reasonable interpretation of the statute would require the owner to

       make reasonable attempts to sell the property before the tenant may be evicted because the landlord

       does not have cause for eviction unless the owner satisfies the elects to sell requirement in the

       statute. Snow provided a declaration stating that no one had informed him that Klee intended to

       sell the property aside from the 90-day notice to vacate. Klee’s reply materials consisted of another

       declaration from his daughter claiming that Snow had “taken active steps to prevent” agents from

       visiting the property to conduct an inspection. Clerk’s Papers at 30.

              Following the show cause hearing, the trial court granted a writ of restitution to Klee “based

       on the court’s finding that the Plaintiff named in the eviction order has provided a 90 Day Notice

       to Vacate and Written Notice to Sell property.” Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted). The writ was issued

       the same day, restoring possession of the property to Klee.

              Snow appeals the trial court’s order granting a writ of restitution.

                                                 DISCUSSION

                                              I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

              Snow argues that the trial court erred by granting a writ of restitution because the relevant

       statute required Klee to make reasonable attempts to sell the property prior to initiating eviction

       proceedings. Klee argues that he complied with the statute because it only requires an owner to

       make reasonable attempts to sell the property after the tenant has vacated the premises pursuant to

       a 90-day notice of termination of the tenancy. We agree with Klee.

                                                        3
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       No. 56232-4-II

       A. EVICTION FOR CAUSE

              The Washington State Legislature enacted RCW 59.18.650 in 2021. See LAWS OF 2021,

       ch. 212, § 2. “Under the statute, generally, landlords are not permitted to evict a tenant, refuse to

       continue a tenancy, or end a periodic tenancy without cause.” Brewer v. Hill, __ Wn. App. __, 525

       P.3d 987, 993 (2023); RCW 59.18.650(1)(b).

              Relevant here, the statute indicates that a landlord has cause to evict a tenant when “[t]he

       tenant continues in possession after the owner elects to sell a single-family residence and the

       landlord has provided at least 90 days’ advance written notice of the date the tenant’s possession

       is to end.” RCW 59.18.650(2)(e).

              For the purposes of this subsection (2)(e), an owner “elects to sell” when the owner
              makes reasonable attempts to sell the dwelling within 30 days after the tenant has
              vacated, including, at a minimum, listing it for sale at a reasonable price with a
              realty agency or advertising it for sale at a reasonable price by listing it on the real
              estate multiple listing service.

       Id. There is a rebuttable presumption that the owner did not elect to sell if (1) within 30 days after

       the tenant has vacated the residence, the owner does not list or advertise the residence for sale at a

       reasonable price, or (2) within 90 days after the tenant has vacated the residence, or the date the

       residence was listed for sale, if later, the owner withdraws the residence from the market, rents to

       someone else, or “otherwise indicates that the owner does not intend to sell the unit.” RCW

       59.18.650(2)(e)(i)-(ii).

       B. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

              The parties dispute the meaning of elects to sell, which is defined in the statute as outlined

       above. RCW 59.18.650(2)(e).

                                                         4
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       No. 56232-4-II

              Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v.

       Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Our “objective is to ascertain and

       carry out the [l]egislature’s intent.” Id. “[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face,” we “must

       give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. at 9-10. We are to

       discern plain meaning “ ‘from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the

       statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ ”

       State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wn.2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010) (quoting State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d

       572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009)).

              A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation after

       a review of the plain meaning. Id. “[B]ut ‘a statute is not ambiguous merely because different

       interpretations are conceivable.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Est. of

       Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 489, 498, 210 P.3d 308 (2009)). If a statute

       is ambiguous, we may look to the legislative history and relevant case law to discern legislative

       intent. Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014).

                                                   II. ANALYSIS

              Snow argues that the statute is ambiguous because the language provides that the owner

       does not have to make reasonable attempts to sell the residence until after the tenant has vacated,

       but it also provides that the landlord does not have cause to evict a tenant unless the owner has

       made reasonable attempts to sell the residence.

              To Snow’s point, the statute states that there is cause to evict a tenant that remains in

       possession of a residence “after the owner elects to sell” the residence. RCW 59.18.650(2)(e)

       (emphasis added). But the definition of elects to sell states that the owner must make reasonable

                                                         5
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       No. 56232-4-II

       attempts to sell or advertise the property “within 30 days after the tenant has vacated.” Id. Although

       this definition plainly means that the owner is not required to make reasonable attempts to sell or

       advertise the property before the tenant has vacated, it is unclear, then, how a landlord would have

       cause to evict a tenant that “continues in possession after the owner elects to sell” when the owner

       does not prove that they have elected to sell the residence until after the tenant has vacated. Id.

              However, this does not necessarily render the statute ambiguous because, when discerning

       the plain meaning of a statute, we review not only the meaning of the language at issue, but also

       the context of the statute, related statutory provisions, and the entire statutory scheme. Gonzalez,

       168 Wn.2d at 263. “An act must be construed as a whole, considering all provisions in relation to

       one another and harmonizing all rather than rendering any superfluous.” State v. George, 160

       Wn.2d 727, 738, 158 P.3d 1169 (2007).

              The provision at issue also provides a rebuttable presumption that the owner did not intend

       to sell given certain events within either 30 or 90 days after the tenant has vacated. RCW

       59.18.650(2)(e)(i)-(ii). Furthermore, under a different subsection of the statute, “[a] landlord who

       removes a tenant or causes a tenant to be removed from a dwelling in any way in violation of this

       section is liable to the tenant for wrongful eviction,” and the tenant is entitled to damages. RCW

       59.18.650(4).

              If we were to interpret RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) as requiring an owner to make reasonable

       attempts to sell the property before a landlord may evict a tenant, this interpretation would render

       the rebuttable presumption portion of that statutory provision superfluous. But, harmonizing this

       provision with the remainder of the statute, the rebuttable presumption portion appears to favor

       the tenant only in the context of a wrongful eviction action. This is because if the tenant has already

                                                         6
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       No. 56232-4-II

       vacated the residence, there would be no basis for the landlord to pursue an unlawful detainer

       action against the tenant. See RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) (providing cause to evict when “[t]he tenant

       continues in possession”). Accordingly, based on our review of the plain meaning, we hold that

       RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) requires an owner to make reasonable attempts to sell or advertise the

       residence “within 30 days after the tenant has vacated,” as provided in the definition of elects to

       sell. RCW 59.18.650(2)(e).3

               Snow argues that the legislative history of the statute supports his interpretation because

       the statute was enacted with the goal of protecting residential tenants following the eviction

       moratorium proclaimed during the COVID-19 pandemic. But this legislative history is only

       relevant to determining the intent behind the statute if the statute is ambiguous, which, as described

       above, it is not. Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. And, even if the legislative history was relevant to

       our analysis, the requirements placed upon landlords under the statute—namely, that a tenant can

       only be evicted for one of the causes enumerated in the statute—and the relief for tenants in the

       form of a wrongful eviction lawsuit if these requirements are not followed achieves the

       legislature’s goal of “protecting residential tenants . . . by . . . limiting the reasons for eviction,

       refusal to continue, and termination” of tenancies. LAWS OF 2021, ch. 212, § 2. But this does not

       lead us to conclude that a property owner must list or advertise a residence for sale while a tenant

       is still residing on the premises.

       3
        It is also worth noting the practicalities of this interpretation. As evidenced by this record, an
       owner may face difficulties attempting to sell or advertise a property when a tenant is still in
       possession of the residence.
                                                         7
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       No. 56232-4-II

               Because RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) requires an owner to make reasonable attempts to sell or

       advertise the residence within 30 days after the tenant has vacated, but not before the tenant has

       vacated, we affirm the trial court’s order granting a writ of restitution to Klee.

                                                ATTORNEY FEES

               Klee requests attorney fees under RAP 18.1, RCW 59.18.290(2), and the terms of the

       parties’ lease.

               RAP 18.1(a) allows a party to request reasonable attorney fees if applicable law provides

       for the recovery of fees. RCW 59.18.290(2) states:

               It is unlawful for the tenant to hold over in the premises or exclude the landlord
               therefrom after the termination of the rental agreement except under a valid court
               order so authorizing. Any landlord so deprived of possession of premises in
               violation of this section may recover possession of the property and damages
               sustained by him or her, and the prevailing party may recover his or her costs of
               suit or arbitration and reasonable attorneys’ fees subject to subsections (3) and (4)
               of this section.

       Under RCW 59.18.290(3), “[w]here the court has entered a judgment in favor of the landlord

       restoring possession of the property to the landlord, the court may award reasonable attorneys’

       fees to the landlord.”

               Klee is the prevailing party in this appeal. Although our record does not reflect that the trial

       court entered a judgment in Klee’s favor, the trial court restored possession of the property to Klee

       by issuing a writ of restitution and, therefore, there are no further proceedings on the merits to be

       held in the trial court. We award attorney fees on appeal to Klee in an amount to be determined by

       the court commissioner.

                                                          8
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       No. 56232-4-II

                                                 CONCLUSION

              We hold that RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) requires an owner to make reasonable attempts to sell

       or advertise the residence within 30 days after the tenant has vacated and affirm the trial court’s

       order granting a writ of restitution to Klee.

                                                           CRUSER, A.C.J.
        We concur:

        LEE, J.

        VELJACIC, J.

                                                       9