Court Opinion

ID: 9746543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:21:37.922579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:14.616346
License: Public Domain

POLLAK, J.
I concur in the thorough and thoughtful majority opinion, but wish to express a single caveat, with respect to the reason for which the decision of the Appellate Division of the Alameda County Superior Court in the prior unlawful detainer action is not conclusive in this litigation. The majority undoubtedly is correct that, under current authority, the voluntary dismissal of that case deprived the decision of the appellate division of finality for the purpose of applying collateral estoppel. Yet, in my view, *892there is much to be said for the sentiment expressed in Justice Haerle’s concurrence in Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656, 676 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 691], suggesting the appropriateness of expanding the concept of judicial finality to encompass situations that come within the spirit, if not the current letter, of this concept. Had the appellate division rendered a decision unequivocally determining the legal consequences of the deemed rejection of the “Master Lease” to the parties in this case, there would be good reason to conclude that the Port of Oakland did not preserve the ability to relitigate this issue in another case by the expedient of dismissing the unlawful detainer action before there was an opportunity to enter a final judgment. But in my view, the decision of. the appellate division did not constitute such an unequivocal determination. All that the appellate division decided was that the consequences of the deemed rejection could not be summarily adjudicated because there were several triable issues of material fact, including “[w]hether contractual privity arose between the Port and Syufy based upon the intent of the parties as reflected in the terms of the Sublease and Fifth Amendment to the Master Lease.” Because the appellate division decided only that factual issues remained for resolution, the decision cannot form the basis for a collateral estoppel predicated on the manner in which those issues would have been resolved if the litigation had proceeded to its conclusion.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 21, 2003, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 19, 2003.