Court Opinion

ID: 9638989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:00:55.99345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:11.246269
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
This case involves an appeal by the Commonwealth from an Order of the court below by Bernstein, J. suppressing evidence consisting of approximately two and one-half pounds of cocaine and drug paraphernalia seized by the police.1
A warrant was issued by a bail commissioner based on an affidavit which did not set forth probable cause for issuance of the warrant as it did not state the time in which the informant observed drugs in possession of the persons whose home was to be searched.2 As the warrant did not *75set forth probable cause, and there was nothing before the issuing authority to indicate probable cause when the warrant was issued, I dissent and would affirm the order of the court below.
The majority opinion does not support the admission on the basis of the good faith exception adopted by the Supreme Court, but instead has determined that the affidavit when read in a non technical way “leads to the conclusion [that] the informant reported what he had just seen.” 3 Looking at the four corners of the affidavit there is clearly no indication when the informant observed the contraband. All that the affidavit states is that the informant notified a police officer, Sergeant Perez, that he had occasion to be inside a house located at a specific address and he observed a Mr. Rivera in possession of a white substance which Rivera referred to as cocaine and Rivera had in his possession plastic bags and two scales. Also, Rivera stated he was going to start bagging the cocaine for sale. Clearly the informant observed drug related activities, but the essential element missing is when did this observation take place.
The majority states at page 5, slip opinion.
We find that upon reading the affidavit from the point of view not of judges applying a critical legalistic eye, but of officers and magistrates working under the limits and urgency to proceed expeditiously, the only inference which can be drawn from the affidavit as written is that drug activity was currently in progress. (Emphasis added.)
In my opinion, there is no such inference at all and the majority opinion finds the inference so that the search *76warrant will prevail notwithstanding its lack of specificity as to when the contraband was observed.4
The majority opinion posits at page-a situation that did not exist in this case when it states:
Where the police are not chargeable with any midconduct and in all respects their procedures have been in compliance with the law in pursuit of a search warrant, the mere inadvertence of those involved in preparing an affidavit, in failing to provide a fact which was known to the officials involved, should not result in the nullification of that effort. (Emphasis added)
The flaw is that while the police were aware when the informant observed the drugs, the issuing authority was not provided with a factual basis as to when the observations occurred. The knowledge must be conveyed to the impartial arbiter issuing the search warrant and that is what is lacking in this case. The police and the magistrate do not work as a unit. The magistrate is an independent arbiter who must determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of a search based on information supplied to him prior to the issuance of the warrant.
A search warrant is defective if the magistrate is not furnished a time frame upon which to ascertain when the affiant obtained his information from the informant and when the informant himself obtained the information he allegedly had. Commonwealth v. Conner, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A.2d 341 (1973). Stale information cannot supply the probable cause necessary to support issuance of a search warrant. Commonwealth v. Samuels, 326 Pa.Super. 561, 474 A.2d 632 (1984). For a search warrant to be constitutionally valid, the issuing authority must decide that probable *77cause exists at the time the warrant is issued. Commonwealth v. Carelli, 308 Pa.Super. 522, 454 A.2d 1020 (1982). The determination that probable cause exists must be made before the search and not subsequent to it. Commonwealth v. Chandler, 505 Pa. 113, 477 A.2d 851 (1984). Finally, the determination of probable cause for issuance of the warrant must be based on facts described within the four corners of the supporting affidavit. Commonwealth v. Way, 342 Pa.Super. 341, 492 A.2d 1151 (1985).
In the case before us, after the search warrant was issued and the evidence seized, the defendants below filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that the search warrant was invalid. At argument, the Commonwealth conceded that the search warrant was defective on its face since it did not allege the date or time when the informant observed drugs and drug paraphernalia at 2549 N. Mascher Street in Philadelphia. The Commonwealth argued that the police officer in preparing the affidavit inadvertently omitted that the informant observed the drugs on the premises to be searched on August 20, 1987, the date of the affidavit.5 The court below determined that there was no probable cause for issuance of the warrant and suppressed the evidence as a result of an illegal search and seizure.
There is a fundamental right under both the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Pennsylvania to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. See Commonwealth v. Chandler, 505 Pa. 113, 477 A.2d 851 (1984). Before a search warrant may be issued sufficient information must be presented to a magistrate to enable him to determine probable cause and his action cannot be a mere ratification of the conclusions of *78another. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).6 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gives its citizens protection against unreasonable search in Article I, Section 8 which states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
When evidence is seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it must be suppressed in state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The Commonwealth argues that Pennsylvania has adopted a good faith exception to the rule that excludes evidence seized pursuant to an improperly issued search warrant.7 In Commonwealth v. Melilli, 361 Pa.Super. 429, 522 A.2d 1107 (1987) the court below suppressed evidence obtained by the Commonwealth from pen registers and telephone interceptions because a magistrate had not determined that there was probable cause for the use of a pen register. When the Municipal Court judge issued the order authorizing the use of the pen register, he believed that a warrant *79based upon probable cause was not a necessary condition for the use of a pen register and accordingly, he did not consider whether probable cause existed. We relied on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) which established a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and reversed the court below. We determined that the evidence was not subject to suppression as the law enforcement officials had acted in reasonable, good faith reliance upon authorization of a neutral magistrate, although the authorization was defective because unsupported by probable cause.8 Our decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 555 A.2d 1254 (1989) and the evidence was suppressed. The Supreme Court rejected the good faith exception as applied by the Superior Court in Melilli, stating at 521 Pa. 415, 555 A.2d at 1259: “Unfortunately, the present Superior Court simply misreads Justice Byron White’s language in those cases [United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984).] and the doctrine as applied here must be rejected on review.” The Supreme Court expressly stated that it would leave for another day and different facts to determine if a good faith exception would be read into the law of Pennsylvania.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Melilli, supra, the Commonwealth contends that two other cases on which it relies remain intact and support its position. In Commonwealth v. Morris, 368 Pa.Super. 237, 533 A.2d 1042 (1987) a state police officer verbally related facts to a magistrate which clearly supported a determination of probable cause. An affidavit was typed with the assistance of the magistrate’s secretary but *80the relevant facts were not included in the affidavit of probable cause. When the application for the search warrant was presented to the magistrate, she merely glanced at it before signing it. We held that under Leon and this court’s decision in Melilli, that the police acted in good faith in relying on the magistrate’s certification of probable cause. Our case is readily distinguishable as in Morris there was probable cause to issue the search warrant presented to the magistrate before the warrant was issued. In the instant case, there was nothing presented to the issuing authority on which it could base its determination that probable cause was present.
The Commonwealth’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 373 Pa.Super. 384, 541 A.2d 368 (1988), appeal granted by Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 520 Pa. 595, 552 A.2d 250 (1988), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the affidavit did not contain facts from which the date of the informant’s observation of marijuana could be ascertained. However, information concerning the date of the observation had been communicated to the issuing authority, but had been omitted inadvertently from the affidavit when it was prepared in the magistrate’s office. We held that the evidence would not be suppressed as the police acted reasonably in relying on the warrant issued by the magistrate, stating at 373 Pa.Super. 384, 541 A.2d at 373 (1988):
The suppression court’s determination comported with the decision in Commonwealth v. Morris, 368 Pa.Super. 237, 533 A.2d 1042 (1987), where a panel of this Court held that a good faith exception would be applied to a situation in which facts sufficient to establish probable cause were known to the officer and issuing authority but were inadvertently omitted from the affidavit. (Emphasis added.)
The Commonwealth would have us grant a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule where the issuing authority did not have before it sufficient facts to constitute probable cause, on the basis that the police acted in good *81faith in executing the search warrant. We should not do this, especially in view of our Supreme Court’s admonition that it will determine in the future whether Pennsylvania should recognize a good faith exception at all.
In Commonwealth v. Chandler, supra, our Supreme Court stated:
The people of this state and nation are constitutionally entitled to an independent judicial determination of probable cause before they must open to the policeman’s knock at the door in the night.
The issuing judicial authority, in this case a District Justice, has the authority and obligation to draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him by police applying for a warrant and to make a finding on the issue of probable cause. Moreover, the magistrate is free to exact such assurances as he deems necessary to insure that the information on which probable cause is based has been obtained in a reliable way from a credible person. Illinois vs. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 at 240, 103 S.Ct. 2317 at 2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 at 549 (1983).
The magistrate’s function is more than the ministerial one of administering an oath to an officer who has set forth facts the officer believes constitute probable cause. The magistrate must make a judicial determination, albeit a non-technical, common sense judgment, see Gates, as to whether probable cause exists. (Emphasis added.)
505 Pa. at 121-123, 477 A.2d at 854-856.
A magistrate need not apply a highly technical reading to an application for a search warrant but where, as in this case, the application irrefragably fails to set forth probable cause, and the magistrate is not given any facts prior to the issuance of the warrant to establish probable cause, the search warrant may not serve as the basis for a valid search and seizure. This comports with the requirements *82of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d at 699 wherein the Court stated:
Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
In my opinion warrant in this case was fatally defective for failing to set forth the date or dates on which the informant observed the presence of drugs and drug paraphernalia at the premises to be searched. The error could not be corrected by testimony after the seizure of evidence was completed to the effect that the objects to be seized were observed on the date the affidavit was taken, when this fact was not communicated to the magistrate prior to the issuance of the search warrant.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. The Commonwealth appeals on the basis of Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985) as suppression of the evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia effectively terminated the prosecution.

. The probable cause section of the search warrant and affidavit stated:
On Thursday 8-20-87 in the early evening hours Sgt. M. PEREZ #428 Narcotics unit received information from a proven reliable informant, who within the past (5) days provided information to Sgt. M. PEREZ resulting in the arrest of (1) person and the confiscation of an amount of cocaine and heroin. This informant went on to state to PEREZ that he/she had occasion to be inside 2549 N. Mascher St., Phila. Pa. in the company of a H/M known to him/her as Jose RIVERA who also uses the name BRIAN, and while there the informant states he/she did observe RIVERA/BRIAN in possession of several large blocks of a white chunky substance which RIVERA did refer to as cocaine, the informant states that RIVERA also had in his possession several empty clear plastic baggies and (2) scales. The informant went on to state that he/she did hear a conversation between RIVERA and another unidentified H/M, and RIVERA did state to this H/M that he was going to start bagging up the cocaine so it could be picked up by his workers who would transport the cocaine go different locations for the purpose of selling it.

. The Commonwealth does not contend that the affidavit set forth probable cause. At the hearing in the court below, the following took place:
THE COURT: If I’m understanding the basis of your argument, the Commonwealth is conceding that the warrant is deficient on its face.
MR. BASEWITZ: [Assistant District Attorney] I didn’t want to, but I guess I have to, yes, Your Honor.

. The majority states at page 1271:
An inadvertant error in processing a search warrant should not result in the dismissal of charges against alleged drug dealers. (Emphasis added.)
If the error results in a deprivation of constitutional rights, the fact that an alleged drug dealer is involved is of no legal significance. The Constitution applies to all those charged with crime, notwithstanding the seriousness of the alleged offense.

. Officer Snead, who prepared the search warrant, testified that:
I then went from my headquarters to the Roundhouse, to the District Attorney’s trailer; and I had the warrant reviewed and approved. From that point on, I went over to the arraignment court and I had the warrant signed by a bail commissioner.
Q. When you say you want to the D.A.’s Charging Unit and had it approved, in what capacity was the person from the D.A.’s office that reviewed it, if you know?
A. Assistant District Attorney.

. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) set forth a two pronged test which must be met to show probable cause, i.e., establishment of (1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge and (2) the reliability or veracity of the informant. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) the two pronged test was replaced with a totality of the circumstances analysis in determining the existence of probable cause. See also, United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250 (2nd Cir.1988). Pennsylvania adopted the totality of the circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, supra, in Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985).

. The majority opinion bases its opinion on the theory that the affidavit was not deficient, but nevertheless reaches the conclusion that it also falls within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. It seems to me that the majority position is inconsistent. If the affidavit formed a valid basis for issuing the search warrant, there would be no need to find a good faith exception. The Commonwealth argument is consistent and it does not contend that the affidavit was sufficient.

. The Supreme Court in Melilli noted at 521 Pa. 414-415, 555 A.2d at 1259:
That decision [of the Superior Court in Melilli ] represents the only instance in our state jurisprudence so far to have attempted to read our State Constitution according to the Leon or Sheppard rationale.