Court Opinion

ID: 9748636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:08:38.212185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:37.887905
License: Public Domain

SCHRODER, J.,
Concurring In Result only:
As the author of the original Opinion of the Court in the case, rendered August 26, 2010, which upheld the Judicial Conduct Commission’s imposition of a 45-day suspension and public reprimand for Judge Gormle/s violations of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, I concur in result with the majority opinion as modified, because it upholds the sanctions as well. I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision to modify the previously rendered Opinion. CR 76.32(l)(b) requires that a petition for rehearing be granted only when it appears the court has overlooked a material fact in the record, or a controlling statute or decision, or has misconceived the issues presented on the appeal or the law applicable thereto. The majority agrees that there should be no rehearing.
CR 76.32(l)(c) allows a modification or extension, but it is only to be used to simply point out and have inaccuracies corrected, or to have the opinion extended to address matters that were in issue but not discussed. Neither party requested modification or extension, and no basis for modification exists. Nevertheless, the Court, on its own motion, proceeds to modify the opinion to rewrüe the opinion. The new opinion muddles the distinction between misconduct in general (sanctionable conduct per SCR 4.020(l)(b)) and sanctionable “legal errors” per SCR 4.020(2); misinterprets the Hinton holding; and eliminates language from the original Opinion, which the majority decided was too harsh for a fellow judge.
Judge Gormley argues in her petition for rehearing that Hinton v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, 854 S.W.2d 756 (Ky.1993), requires a pattern of misconduct before she may be subject to sanctions. The majority misreads Hinton to say it “suggests” such a requirement and then announces that
we refuse to continue to adhere to an inflexible rule that a judge must have engaged in a pattern of misconduct before being subjected to sanctions. Instead, although a judge may properly be sanctioned for engaging in a pattern of misconduct, we now affirmatively hold that even one egregious or bad faith incident of judicial misconduct may properly subject a judge to discipline.
This paragraph contains a number of errors. First, this Court has never had a rule that a judge must have engaged in a pattern of misconduct before being subjected to sanctions. See SCR 4.020(l)(b). The majority’s holding that it now takes one egregious or bad faith incident to be subject to discipline is actually a limitation on SCR 4.020(l)(b), which has no such requirement.
*732Judge Gormley, and the majority, are misreading Hinton. The Hinton Court discussed two issues: whether or not Judge Hinton was guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct; and, if guilty, whether a public reprimand (the sanction imposed by the Judicial Conduct Commission) was appropriate where there was not a pattern of misconduct. After reversing the Judicial Conduct Commission and opining that Judge Hinton was “not guilty” of misconduct,35 the Court added, in dicta, that had Judge Hinton been found guilty, a public reprimand would be too harsh a sanction for the isolated incident at issue, without a pattern of misconduct. The majority for gets that there are sanctions below a public reprimand (a private reprimand or an admonition), and the Hinton Court did not say there can be no sanctions unless there is a pattern of misconduct. The dicta regarding the pattern of conduct was in the context of addressing the severity of the sanction.
To understand the errors in the majority opinion, one must refer back to SCR 4.020, which is divided into two sections. SCR 4.020(l)(b) defines a sanction to be an “admonition, private reprimand, public reprimand or censure” all the way up to “suspension without pay or removal or retirement from judicial office.” SCR 4.020(l)(b) gives the Judicial Conduct Commission authority to sanction judges and justices for the following conduct:
(i) Misconduct in office.
(ii) Persistent failure to perform his duties.
(iii) Incompetence.
(iv) Habitual intemperance.
(v) Violation of The Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.300.
(vi) Any willful refusal or persistent failure to conform to official policies and directives....
(vii) Conviction of a crime punishable as a felony.
Subsections (i) and (v), the first part of subsection (vi), and subsection (vii), all require but a single incident or infraction to merit a sanction. The presence of a pattern of misconduct may be considered in determining the appropriate sanction, but has never been a requirement for finding guilt and grounds for sanctions. Nor is bad faith a requirement In this regard, the majority’s reading of Hinton is in error. Subsections (ii), (iii), (iv), and the second part of subsection (vi), require persistent or habitual conduct to merit a sanction.
SCR 4.020(2) covers erroneous rulings made by a judge and exempts from sanctions those erroneous decisions or rulings made in good faith. SCR 4.020(2) does not distinguish between single or multiple instances of erroneous legal rulings (hereinafter referred to as legal errors). A single legal error made not in good faith may subject a judge to sanctions. A pattern of legal errors (good faith notwithstanding) may also subject a judge to sanctions.36 By substituting the general term “pattern of misconduct” for “pattern of legal errors” throughout the opinion, the majority creates a murky rule. The original Opinion concluded that Judge Gormley’s legal errors were not made in good faith.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s omission of language in the original Opinion which it believed was too harsh on *733Judge Gormley. Modifications are not for writing style and the language was appropriate for the conduct involved.
SCOTT, J., joins.

. The Hinton Court deemed the judge's action in jailing an attorney for contempt in that case appropriate and held that the judge did not violate any standards of judicial conduct.

. SCR 4.020(1 )(b)(iii) sanctions incompetence. Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission, 573 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ky.1978), recognizes a pattern of legal errors as incompetence.