Court Opinion

ID: 9948423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 23:03:00.448407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:34.338953
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/6/24 Peoples Homeless Task Force Orange County v. City of Anaheim CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 PEOPLES HOMELESS TASK FORCE
 ORANGE COUNTY,
                                                                       G061422
      Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                       (Super. Ct. Nos. 30-2020-01135406,
           v.                                                           30-2020-01174133)

 CITY OF ANAHEIM,                                                      OPINION

      Defendant and Respondent.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David A.
Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
                   Law Offices of Kelly A. Aviles, Kelly A. Aviles and Shaila Nathu, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
                   Robert Fabela, City Attorney, and Gregg M. Audet, Assistant City Attorney
for, Defendant and Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
              This appeal is from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate that sought
injunctive relief arising from alleged violations of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code,
§ 54950 et seq.; Brown Act) by the City of Anaheim (Anaheim) in connection with the
                                                                     1
since-aborted sale of Angel Stadium of Anaheim (Angel Stadium). Plaintiff Peoples
Homeless Task Force Orange County, which opposed the sale, is an advocacy group on
behalf of unhoused people. Plaintiff contends Anaheim violated the Brown Act in
several ways, with the result that the decision to sell Angel Stadium was arrived at behind
closed doors, rather than in the public forum required by the Brown Act. Plaintiff raises
five issues asserting various Brown Act violations, the first and primary being that the
Anaheim City Council (City Council) deliberated about whether to sell versus lease
Angel Stadium in closed sessions, which, in plaintiff’s view, violated the Brown Act’s
requirement that deliberations occur in public. The trial court rejected all five of
plaintiff’s arguments, concluding no violations of the Brown Act occurred. Of the five
issues plaintiff raises, we affirm as to four. However, we agree Anaheim improperly
restricted public comment to e-mails at two meetings during 2020, and thus we reverse
that aspect of the judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.

                                           FACTS
              Beginning in 1996, Anaheim leased what the parties refer to as the Stadium
Site to the Angels Baseball Club (the Angels). The Stadium Site consists of
approximately 150 acres, including Angel Stadium, the Grove of Anaheim, and related
properties (such as parking). The lease permitted either party to terminate it upon 12
months written notice, a right the Angels exercised in October 2018.
              This kicked off a series of negotiations between Anaheim and the Angels
concerning what would become of the Stadium Site. The person leading the negotiations
              1
                  All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise
stated.

                                              2
on behalf of Anaheim was its City Manager Chris Zapata. In February 2019, at a public
meeting, Anaheim retained the services of Norris Realty Advisers to perform an appraisal
of the Stadium Site.
              During 2019, Anaheim held a series of meetings regarding the negotiations,
some of which were closed, others public. The relevant details of the meetings are
addressed in the discussion section below.
              On November 15, 2019, the Angels presented a proposal to Anaheim to
purchase the Stadium Site. On December 6, Anaheim published notice of an upcoming
meeting (on Dec. 20) at which Anaheim would consider the proposal to sell the Stadium
Site to SRB Management Company, LLC (SRB), an entity that had just been formed by
the Angels for the purpose of the sale.
              On December 20, 2019, the City Council held a public meeting. After a
lengthy period of public comment and deliberation by the City Council, it voted to
approve the proposal to sell the Stadium Site. Following this approval, plaintiff filed its
first petition for a writ of mandate seeking declaratory relief and nullification of the
approval under the Brown Act.
              On September 29, 2020, the City Council held another public meeting to
consider a restated purchase proposal (which expressly superseded the first agreement)
and related development agreement. This meeting was pre-publicized as the first one had
been. In reliance on Governor Newsom’s Covid-19 related Executive Order No. N-29-
20, Anaheim held the meeting by teleconference, accessible to the public electronically
and on cable television. The public was permitted to submit comments to the City
Council via e-mail only. After extensive deliberations and a meeting lasting
approximately six hours, the City Council approved the amended agreement. Because
the development agreement required approval by ordinance, the City Council approved
the first reading of such ordinance at the September 29, 2020 meeting and the second
reading at a public meeting on October 6, 2020, which was likewise held by

                                              3
teleconference. At the October 6 meeting, the public was again invited to submit
comments via e-mail, which were forwarded to the City Council. At neither of these
meetings were members of the public allowed to speak.
              Following the approval of the restated agreement, plaintiff filed a second
petition for writ of mandate because the restated agreement mooted any objection to the
approval of the original agreement. After a period of discovery, plaintiff filed a motion
for writ of mandate and declaratory relief regarding its Brown Act claims. Although the
parties were given the option of presenting live testimony, both parties elected to submit
the matter on declarations and documentary evidence.
              While much of the evidence was undisputed, there was a key conflict in the
testimony between, on the one hand, City Manager Chris Zapata and Councilmember Dr.
Jose Moreno, and, on the other, City Attorney Robert Fabela. These two sides disagreed
on whether the City Council made a decision to sell versus lease the Stadium Site while
in closed session.
              Zapata declared that on August 13, 2019, “‘the City Councilmembers
discussed whether to sell or continue the lease during the closed session and made the
decision to sell the property to Angels Baseball during that closed session.’” At a
September 24, 2019 closed session meeting, Zapata further declared, “‘The City Council
discussed and deliberated on the information provided in the updated appraisal, provided
approval to sell the property to Angels Baseball, and authorized the City’s Negotiating
Team to conduct further negotiations consistent with the City Council’s decision to sell
the property.’”
              Councilmember Moreno declared that in the August 13 closed session
meeting, “Councilmembers discussed whether to sell or continue the lease during the
closed session and, in expressing strong interest in selling the property to Angels
Baseball, discussed the value of the then current appraisal to determine the value of the
property in a for sale transaction.” As for the September 24 closed session meeting,

                                             4
Moreno declared, “‘The City Council discussed and deliberated on the information
provided in the updated appraisal, provided approval to sell the property to Angels
Baseball, and authorized the City’s Negotiating Team to conduct further negotiations
consistent with City Council’s decision to sell the property.’”
              Those declarations were countered by City Attorney Fabela, who was
present at both closed meetings and declared, “‘There was no discussion of the merits
between a sale or a lease transaction, or any “decision” or vote on what the ultimate form
of the transaction would be. Indeed, the value of the property was still being evaluated,
there was no proposal on the table from the Angels at that time, and the City would not
receive any such proposal until November of 2019. Both before and after the meetings of
August 13 and September 24, 2019, both a sale and a lease (or something else) were still
potential options, with the ultimate form of the transaction still unknown.’” He further
declared that “‘the purpose of the August 13 and September 24, 2019, closed sessions
was to discuss the appraisal of the property with the City’s appraiser (Steve Norris), and
to receive any direction regarding price and terms of payment.’”
              The court ultimately concluded that Anaheim had not violated the Brown
Act and denied plaintiff’s petition. The court found that the Zapata and Moreno
declarations were not credible on the sell versus lease issue. It found those declarations
inconsistent with comments Councilmember Moreno made at the public meeting on
December 20, 2019, in which Moreno claimed the City Council had never discussed
whether to sell or lease. We address those comments in detail below. On the other hand,
the court found the Fabela declaration to be credible, describing it as “extensive,
comprehensive, densely detailed, and supported by other evidence in this case.”
Moreover, the court reasoned, “[E]ven if the Zapata and Moreno declarations were
credible, the court finds the discussions allowable because the price of a sale and the
basic property right being sold are inextricably interrelated — a legislative body cannot
coherently discuss one without discussing the other.”

                                             5
               The court rejected plaintiff’s remaining contentions, which we discuss in
detail below, and entered judgment in favor of Anaheim. Plaintiff timely appealed.

                                       DISCUSSION
               Plaintiff argues the trial court made several errors in resolving the Brown
Act claims. We address each in turn.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Conclusion That There Were No Improper
Discussions of Sale Verses Lease in Closed Sessions
               Plaintiff’s first contention is the evidence established that Anaheim violated
the Brown Act by holding discussions, in closed session, regarding whether to sell versus
lease the Stadium Site. The trial court concluded no such discussions took place, but
even if they had, they would not violate the Brown Act. We review the former factual
finding for substantial evidence and conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s
conclusion that no discussions of sell versus lease took place in closed sessions. We
therefore do not reach the issue of whether such discussions would have been
permissible.
               We begin with the legal context of the Brown Act. “The Brown Act is
designed to encourage public participation in government decisionmaking by requiring
that public agencies take action and conduct deliberations openly.” (Coalition of Labor,
Agriculture & Business v. County of Santa Barbara Bd. of Supervisors (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 205, 208; see § 54950 [“It is the intent of the law that [legislative bodies’]
actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly”].)
               However, the Brown Act contains exceptions to this public-deliberation
requirement. The exception relevant to this case states, “Notwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter, a legislative body of a local agency may hold a closed session
with its negotiator prior to the purchase, sale, exchange, or lease of real property by or for

                                              6
the local agency to grant authority to its negotiator regarding the price and terms of
payment for the purchase, sale, exchange, or lease.” (§ 54956.8.) The issue in this case
is whether the City Council decided in closed session to sell, rather than lease, the
Stadium Site, and, if so, whether that decision exceeded the discussion of “price and
terms of payment” permitted in closed sessions by section 54956.8.
              We conclude plaintiff has forfeited any substantial evidence challenge to
the trial court’s conclusion that no discussion of sale versus lease took place in closed
session. In its opening brief, plaintiff devotes seven pages of argument to the proposition
that the decision to sell versus lease exceeds the limited scope of “price and terms of
payment” in the Brown Act—i.e., the trial court’s secondary rationale. These seven
pages present a legal argument that the decision to sell versus lease is not encompassed in
the “terms of payment” as a matter of law.
              Plaintiff’s only partial recognition of a substantial evidence issue is a single
paragraph at the end of that section, where plaintiff states, “Moreover, despite the fact
that throughout the City made inconsistent arguments regarding whether discussing the
merits of a sale versus lease in closed session occurred, the trial court embraced the City
Attorney’s declaration and shunned the declarations of former City Manager Zapata and
Councilmember Moreno as ‘not credible’ and relied solely on the Declaration from City
Attorney Fabela, who was and still is employed by the City. [Citation.] Yet, such a
ruling was not supported by any evidence. Moreover, it ignores that a defendant’s
employees are not ‘disinterested witnesses.’”
              Naturally, Anaheim pointed out in its respondent’s brief that plaintiff’s
argument “completely disregard[ed] the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
finding” and “essentially fail[ed] to even address the trial court’s adverse factual findings
and assessment of witness credibility. . . .” In its reply brief, plaintiff sets forth five pages
of detailed arguments concerning why the court’s credibility findings were not based on
substantial evidence.

                                               7
              Plaintiff’s tactic of barely mentioning substantial evidence in the opening
brief, and instead reserving detailed arguments for the reply brief, results in a forfeiture
for multiple reasons.
              As a general matter, arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are
forfeited. “‘Obvious considerations of fairness in argument demand that the appellant
present all of his points in the opening brief. To withhold a point until the closing brief
would deprive the respondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the effort and
delay of an additional brief by permission. Hence the rule is that points raised in the
reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for
failure to present them before.’” (Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217
Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.)
              While it is true plaintiff made an oblique reference to the conflict in the
evidence in its opening brief, that is not sufficient to raise a substantial evidence
argument for our consideration. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)-(C)
requires each brief to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading
summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation
of authority; and (C) [s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (Italics added.)
“Appropriate headings require litigants to ‘“present their cause systematically and so
arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to apply
may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being
compelled to extricate it from the mass.”’” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies,
LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) “Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues
that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.” (Pizarro v.
Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.)
              Here, not only did plaintiff fail to include a heading dedicated to a
substantial evidence argument, but the passing argument it made did not develop the

                                               8
argument with citations to the record or to authority and instead simply made conclusory
statements. There was no good cause for this blatant omission. The court’s primary
rationale on this issue was that discussions of sell versus lease did not occur in closed
session. That is a factual issue. The court explained its reasoning at some length in its
statement of decision, so this could not have been overlooked by plaintiff. Moreover, the
fact that plaintiff presented detailed arguments on the substantial evidence question in its
reply brief shows that it had such arguments to make, but simply reserved them, raising
serious questions about gamesmanship and significantly prejudicing Anaheim’s ability to
respond, and, by extension, our ability to properly analyze the issue. Accordingly, the
issue is forfeited.
               In any event, there was ample substantial evidence to support the court’s
conclusion. We start with the obvious: Fabela attested that he was present in all of the
closed sessions, and the decision whether to sell versus lease was not discussed in any of
them. Fabela explained that he was careful to instruct the City Council on the limitations
of what they could discuss at the meetings—price and terms of payment. Further, he
explained that the sell versus lease issue was not a live issue at that point because the
closed sessions occurred before the Angels made their offer to purchase the Stadium Site.
The trial court credited this testimony.
               “‘A single witness’s testimony may constitute substantial evidence to
support a finding. [Citation.] It is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the
evidence or to assess witness credibility.’” (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 150, 162.) In its reply brief, plaintiff makes various arguments to attack the
credibility of Fabela. However, the Court of Appeal is not a forum for resolving factual
disputes. The weight and credibility to be given to Fabela’s declaration was solely the
province of the trial court: “We do not judge credibility on appeal.” (In re Marriage of
Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175.) There was nothing inherently incredible
about Fabela’s testimony.

                                              9
              Fabela’s testimony was consistent with Councilmember Moreno’s
comments at a public meeting on December 20, 2019, which was after the closed sessions
at issue. During that public meeting, Councilmember Moreno stated (contrary to his later
declaration) it was the first time the City Council had discussed the decision of whether
to sell or lease the Stadium Site. Moreno stated, “This is the first public discussion—the
first discussion I should say—that the City Council has actually had on the actual deal
points. Because in closed session the City Attorney [i.e., Fabela] was very good in
making sure we focused on the price and terms of payment per the Brown Act. So this is
the first time we’ve had a chance to discuss, deliberate, understand fully together in
public—actually just with each other—the major deal points here.” Plaintiff emphasizes
the word “public”—but Councilmember Moreno corrected himself after using that word.
In essence, he said it was the first public discussion—nay, the first discussion at all—of
the deal points. The trial court was free to adopt this interpretation, which furnishes
substantial evidence that the sell versus lease discussion did not occur in closed session.
              Since we conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that no discussion of sale versus lease occurred in closed session, we need not address
whether such discussions would have violated the limited scope of permissible
deliberations in closed session.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Conclusion That No Negotiating Team Was
Formed
              Plaintiff’s second contention is that Anaheim formed a negotiating team
that itself constituted a public body subject to the Brown Act and that violated the Brown
Act by operating behind closed doors. The trial court concluded no such team was
created. We find substantial evidence supports that conclusion.
              The Brown Act applies to “legislative bod[ies],” which means “[t]he
governing body of a local agency or any other local body created by state or federal

                                             10
statute.” (§ 54952, subd. (a).) That definition extends to any “decisionmaking or
advisory” committees formally created by a legislative body. This makes sense: a
legislative body cannot evade the Brown Act with the simple expedient of creating a
subcommittee. Specifically, the Brown Act applies to: “A commission, committee,
board, or other body of a local agency, whether permanent or temporary, decisionmaking
or advisory, created by charter, ordinance, resolution, or formal action of a legislative
body.” (Id., subd. (b).)
              The factual context of this issue is as follows: Prior to June 2019, City
Manager Zapata had spearheaded discussions with the Angels, bringing in other Anaheim
staff as necessary. At a public City Council meeting on June 4, 2019, Zapata provided a
report on the status of those discussions. After Zapata’s report, Mayor Harry Sidhu
stated: “[W]e are still in early stage talks about the future of baseball in Anaheim, but it is
critical for us to see progress this year. When discussion[s] begin, we must be ready, so I
am establishing a lead negotiating team for the City. It will be including myself as a
Council representative. I am pleased to have our City Manager Chris Zapata and City
Attorney Rob Fabela join me on behalf of the City administration. We go into this with
one goal: an agreement that is good for the resident[s] first, and that also works for the
team.”
              Notwithstanding the mayor’s public remarks, the City Council took no
action regarding the creation of an alleged “team” at the meeting on June 4, 2019. The
matter was further discussed at the City Council meeting on June 18, 2019, where two
dissenting councilmembers (including Moreno) decided to “self-appoint” to the
negotiating team, stating that if Mayor Sidhu could do so, they could too. But again, no
formal action was taken.
              At the City Council meeting on July 16, 2019, the issue of appointing a
councilmember to participate in negotiations was formally placed on the agenda for the
first time as follows: “Select a member of the City Council to work in conjunction with

                                              11
City staff as the exclusive Council representative for negotiations . . . .” At that meeting,
the City Council voted to appoint Mayor Sidhu in that capacity. Zapata
contemporaneously described the effect of this appointment as follows: “Although the
designated City Council representative will work closely with the City Manager and the
executive staff on negotiations, and will be the exclusive representative of the City
Council in negotiations, the entire City Council, as well as the public, will continue to
receive briefings and updates from the City Manager on the negotiations as appropriate.
Furthermore, any final outcomes or agreements will need to be brought forward and
considered by the full City Council at future City Council meetings.”
              The question before us is whether this action created a legislative body.
We agree with the trial court that it did not. Notwithstanding Mayor Sidhu’s earlier
ineffectual pronouncement about a “negotiating team,” the actual resolution adopted by
the City Council simply made an individual appointment of Mayor Sidhu to represent the
City Council in any future meetings with the Angels, and also to work with unspecified
Anaheim staff in the course of the negotiations. It did not create a “commission,
committee, board, or other body” under section 54952, subdivision (b). Mayor Sidhu
was not delegated any decision-making powers, nor was he given any particular advisory
task. He was simply a representative, not a legislative body. Accordingly, his
interactions with Anaheim staff were not subject to the Brown Act.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Conclusion that No Improper Serial
Communications Took Place
              The Brown Act, which generally requires the public’s business to be
conducted in public, prohibits evading its requirements by utilizing a series of private
individual conversations to deliberate. Section 54952.2, subdivision (b)(1), provides, “A
majority of the members of a legislative body shall not, outside a meeting authorized by
this chapter, use a series of communications of any kind, directly or through

                                             12
intermediaries, to discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item of business that is within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body.” However, the statute immediately
goes on in subdivision (b)(2) to provide a clarification: “Paragraph (1) shall not be
construed as preventing an employee or official of a local agency, from engaging in
separate conversations or communications outside of a meeting authorized by this chapter
with members of a legislative body in order to answer questions or provide information
regarding a matter that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the local agency, if that
person does not communicate to members of the legislative body the comments or
position of any other member or members of the legislative body.”
                  Plaintiff contends the City Council violated these rules. The principal
evidence supporting this contention is the declaration of Zapata, which, as discussed
above, the court found not credible. Zapata attested, “During my tenure as City Manager,
the City of Anaheim had a consistent practice of conducting briefings on City business
with Councilmembers. These briefings were sometimes offered by staff, and at times
were by Councilmember request. . . . During these briefings, councilmembers received
factual updates and information regarding specific issues. Councilmembers could also
ask questions about items on the agenda or items of business before the City and staff
would provide information and answers to those questions.” “Councilmembers received
such briefing(s) during late 2018 and 2019 regarding the Angels Stadium negotiations. I
specifically recall meeting with Councilmembers Stephen Faessel, Jose Moreno, and
Jordan Brandman to discuss aspects of the stadium negotiations. During these meetings,
in addition to receiving information, the Councilmembers provided information on
aspects of the Stadium negotiations that they wanted to see included in the final
              2
agreement.”

                  2
                 Councilmember Moreno provided a declaration that contained similar,
albeit less detailed, information.

                                                13
                 The trial court found this evidence did not establish that unlawful serial
communications took place. It reasoned, “To the extent the vague declarations of Zapata
and Moreno indicate there were discussions of the stadium site, they clearly fall within
the Section 54952.2[, subdivision] (b)(2) exception for individual briefings. Both
declarations describe staff as answering questions and providing information and neither
says anything about communicating ‘to members of the legislative body the comments or
position of any other member or members of the legislative body.’ Thus it appears that
any discussions that did occur, were, at most, part of the ordinary give-and-take of
council work and not a prohibited attempt to circumvent open meeting laws.” The court
also noted Zapata’s declaration did not establish communications with a majority of the
City Council, which is what section 54952.2, subdivision (b)(1) prohibits.
                 The court’s interpretation of Zapata’s declaration was well reasoned and
grounded in its own credibility determinations. This was, again, ultimately a factual
issue, and we must defer to the trial court’s reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence, as well as its conclusion that the declarations were vague and thus accorded
little weight.
                 Plaintiff responds that there is a dearth of evidence in the record of the City
Council discussing certain deal points, “for example, how long the Angels would commit
to playing in Anaheim, how many home games the Angels would commit to playing at
the Stadium (which would lead to tax revenue for the City), the geographical boundaries
of the Stadium Site, what developments (e.g., affordable housing, public parks) what, if
any, rights, the City would retain with regard to the Stadium Site, and how the City
would be protected if any aspect of the deal fell through.” Plaintiff goes on, “But if these
discussions never took place in closed session and never took place in open session, a
logical question is whether they occurred in a series of communications between
individual councilmembers and City staff.”

                                                14
              That question may have been an interesting one at trial, but on appeal, in
the face of a substantial evidence standard, plaintiff must do far more than raise
questions. We presume the judgment to be correct and it is the appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error. (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935.)
Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence that would compel the trial court to find that
improper serial communications occurred as a matter of law. Accordingly, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the court’s determination.

The Agenda Descriptions for the Closed Sessions Complied with the Brown Act

              Next, plaintiff contends the agendas for closed sessions held on August 13,
September 24, November 19, and December 3, 2019, contained inadequate and
inaccurate information. We disagree.
              Under the Brown Act the public is entitled to advance notice of the issues
to be discussed or acted upon at a city council meeting, and it receives this notice through
a pre-posted agenda. The agenda must provide a general description of the topics to be
addressed. (§ 54954.2, subd. (a)(1) [“A brief general description of an item generally
need not exceed 20 words”].) It must be posted at least 72 hours in advance (ibid.), and,
with few exceptions, “[n]o action or discussion shall be undertaken on any item not
appearing on the posted agenda” (id., subd. (a)(3)).
              Section 54954.5, subdivision (b), provides a template for an agenda
description of a closed session to discuss price and terms of payment with a negotiator
regarding a real estate transaction: “CONFERENCE WITH REAL PROPERTY
NEGOTIATORS [¶] Property: (Specify street address, or if no street address, the parcel
number or other unique reference, of the real property under negotiation) [¶] Agency
negotiator: (Specify names of negotiators attending the closed session) (If circumstances
necessitate the absence of a specified negotiator, an agent or designee may participate in
place of the absent negotiator so long as the name of the agent or designee is announced

                                             15
at an open session held prior to the closed session.) [¶] Negotiating parties: (Specify
name of party (not agent)) [¶] Under negotiation: (Specify whether instruction to
negotiator will concern price, terms of payment, or both).” (§ 54954.5, 5, subd. (b).)
              Anaheim’s agenda for its closed sessions closely tracked that template:
“CONFERENCE WITH REAL PROPERTY NEGOTIATORS [¶] (Section 54956.8 of
California Government Code) [¶] Property: 2000 E. Gene Autry Way and 2200 E.
Katella Ave., Anaheim, CA 92806; [¶] APN Nos. 232-011-02, -06, -35, -36, -37, -38, -
39, -40, -41, -42, -43, -44, -47, -48, -50 [¶] Agency Negotiatior: Chris Zapata, City
Manager [¶] Negotiating Parties: Angels Baseball, LP; City of Anaheim
Under Negotiation: Price and Terms of Payment.” (Boldface omitted.)
              Plaintiff has two critiques of this agenda. First, it did not identify the
“negotiating team.” However, as we discussed above, the court’s finding that there was
no negotiating team was supported by substantial evidence. Second, in identifying the
negotiating parties, the agenda lists Angels Baseball, LP, rather than SRB, the special
purpose entity the Angels created for this transaction.
              We note at the outset that SRB was not even created until November 20,
2019, and thus, at most, plaintiff’s argument applies solely to the December 3, 2019,
meeting. With regard to that meeting, the trial court held the agenda was “practically
correct because all the negotiations involved the same people, whether called SRB or the
Angels.” “Here, the agendas describing the Angels (a far more descriptive term than
SRB) as the negotiating party . . . easily meet the substantial compliance standard.”
              “The law disregards trifles.” (Civ. Code, § 3533.) Failing to identify SRB,
rather than the Angels, is not only a trivial defect, but it would have been
counterproductive to identify SRB, as most residents know the Angels, but could not be
expected to know who SRB was at the time. Moreover, even if SRB was going to be the
legal rights holder, the actual negotiating party (and real party in interest) was, in fact, the

                                              16
Angels. Accordingly, by listing the Angels as the negotiating party, Anaheim fully
                                                                      3
complied with its duties under section 54954.5, subdivision (b).

Restricting Public Input to E-mail Violated the Brown Act
               Plaintiff’s final contention is that Anaheim improperly restricted public
comment to e-mails at the public meetings on September 29 and October 6, 2020. We
agree.
               The Brown Act requires public bodies to meet and conduct their business in
public. At public meetings, a legislative body must “provide an opportunity for members
of the public to directly address the legislative body on any item of interest to the
public . . . that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body . . . .”
(§ 54954.3, subd. (a), italics added.)
               In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 17, 2020, Governor
Gavin Newsom issued Executive Order No. N-29-20 (Executive Order). The Executive
Order authorized legislative bodies “to hold public meetings via teleconferencing and to
make public meetings accessible telephonically or otherwise electronically to all
members of the public seeking to observe and to address the” body and waived “[a]ll
requirements in . . . the Brown Act expressly or impliedly requiring the physical presence
of members, the clerk or other personnel of the body, or of the public as a condition of
participation in or quorum for a public meeting . . . .” “A local legislative body or state
body that holds a meeting via teleconferencing and allows members of the public to
observe and address the meeting telephonically or otherwise electronically, consistent
with the notice and accessibility requirements set forth below, shall have satisfied any

               3
              Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court applying a substantial-compliance
standard. We need not address that issue, however, as we conclude Anaheim fully
complied with its obligations regarding the agenda.

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requirement that the body allow members of the public to attend the meeting and offer
public comment.” (Italics added.)
              In response to the Executive Order, Anaheim held teleconferenced public
meetings on September 29 and October 6, 2020. The meetings were accessible to the
public via cable television or the Internet. With regard to the public’s ability to directly
address the City Council, Anaheim set up an e-mail address where the public could
submit written comments, and the comments were forwarded to the entire City Council
by e-mail. At the September 29 meeting, 274 comments were received and forwarded.
At the October 6 meeting, 369 comments were received and forwarded. So far as the
record reveals, these comments were not read aloud during the meeting.
              Plaintiff contends this procedure did not comply with the requirement to
permit the public to directly address the City Council. Anaheim contends its procedure
was permissible under the Executive Order, which only required a procedure whereby the
public could address the City Council “telephonically or otherwise electronically . . . .”
In Anaheim’s view, e-mail satisfies the “otherwise electronically” prong. The trial court
agreed with Anaheim.
              We agree with plaintiff. The Executive Order did not suspend the
requirement that the public have the opportunity to directly address the City Council. To
the contrary, the Executive Order preserves this requirement by acknowledging a
legislative body’s obligation to allow members of the public to “address the meeting” and
“offer public comment.” The expression “otherwise electronically” has to be read in the
context of the statutory opportunity to directly address the City Council, and that phrase
must be read in its entirety: “telephonically or otherwise electronically . . . .” (Italics
added.) In other words, the public had to be permitted to call in or use an electronic
means of similarly addressing the meeting to offer public comment.

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              The e-mail procedure Anaheim employed did not satisfy this requirement.
Under even the most generous interpretation, an e-mail sent ahead of the meeting and
forwarded to the City Council outside of the meeting does not constitute addressing the
meeting. Moreover, e-mail simply does not capture the essence of directly addressing a
city council. As most everyone has experienced at this point, e-mail is easily and often
ignored. Indeed, given the large quantity of e-mail comments received at the meetings in
this instance, the temptation to ignore some of these comments may well have been
strong. By contrast, when a member of the public approaches the microphone at a city
council meeting, looks the councilmembers in the eye, and makes a statement to a captive
audience, there is no question that the city council hears the comment. The technology to
implement such a system electronically was readily available at that time via Internet
teleconferencing. Indeed, it is now legally required that, where teleconferencing is used,
“The legislative body shall not require public comments to be submitted in advance of the
meeting and must provide an opportunity for the public to address the legislative body
and offer comment in real time.” (§ 54953, subd. (e)(2)(C).) While that law was not yet
in place when the meetings at issue here were held, we believe it expresses the correct
interpretation of the Brown Act as modified by the Executive Order in 2020.
Accordingly, we reverse the aspect of the judgment finding no Brown Act violation in the
e-mail procedure.

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                                      DISPOSITION
              The judgment is reversed to the extent it found no Brown Act violation
occurred when Anaheim restricted public comment to e-mails for the public meetings on
September 29 and October 6, 2020. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

                                                     SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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