Court Opinion

ID: 9569811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:17:42.421735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:04.256916
License: Public Domain

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword before the king. And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one, and half to the other. 1 Kings 3:24-25.
We face a situation at least as old as the one faced by King Solomon, and one requiring his wisdom: what to do when two parents claim a child. I am no Solomon, and neither is the majority. I do not know the right answer, if there is one, and neither do my able colleagues. It is not the job of the federal courts to make that choice or to second-guess the decision of those to whom the heavy responsibility is given.
For two reasons, I respectfully dissent. First, the majority fundamentally misunderstands sovereign immunity and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), falling for the alluring but empty belief that if something really unfortunate occurs, someone always must pay. Prodded by that misunderstanding, the majority eviscerates much of the discretionary function exception, holding that whenever a Border Patrol officer violates the Constitution — even if he has no reason to know he is doing so — he necessarily acts beyond his discretion. The majority’s approach subjects the United States to substantial liability that is neither authorized by statute nor compelled by precedent. Second, even under *393the majority’s misguided theory, the United States should not be liable, because, under Castro’s complaint, the Border Patrol agents did not violate R.M.G.’s constitutional rights or otherwise exceed their lawful authority.
I. The Majority Misunderstands Sovereign Immunity.
Because of sovereign immunity, matters of the federal físc are left to the political branches unless the government has explicitly waived its immunity. See Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir.1994). Under the FTCA, the United States has consented to certain types of suits, 28 U.S.C. § 1846(b), but the waiver of immunity is far from complete, and there are a number of exceptions, including the discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which denies subject-matter jurisdiction to the federal courts over a great deal of potentially unlawful conduct.1 Likewise, consistently with the purposes and history of sovereign immunity, “the exceptions that do appear in the FTCA must be strictly construed in favor of the government.” Truman, 26 F.3d at 594 (citing Atorie Air, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 942 F.2d 954, 958 (5th Cir.1991)). These basic principles of sovereign immunity are not contested.
The majority nonetheless cites dictum from Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir.1987), and opinions from other circuits, for the astoundingly broad proposition that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception does not apply whenever a federal official — even without good reason to know — violates someone’s constitutional rights. Nothing in Sutton, however, turned on whether a constitutional right was violated; the defendants did not plead any such violation. See id. at 1291. Rather, the case concerned the interplay between the discretionary function exception and the intentional tort exception’s “law enforcement proviso,”2 with the entire matter remanded “because [the district court] decided [it] on inadequate factual allegations which prevented] us from evaluating the appellants’ cause of action in light of the differing statutory policies” of the two exceptions. Id. at 1292.
Thus, until now, Sutton’s outlier and truncated musing that constitutional rights are somehow categorically outside of the discretionary function exception has not been the law of the Fifth Circuit. It is, first and foremost, irreconcilably inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. For instance, it contravenes United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991), which holds that the discretionary function bars federal jurisdiction to review a federal officer’s conduct unless “a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribe[d] a course of action,” provided that the decision was of the type that ought not be “second-guess[ed]” because it is “grounded in social, economic, and political policy....” The omission of “Constitution” from the Court’s explicit list of sources that can create a “mandate” that nullifies the discretionary function exception should be dispositive here.
This obvious reading of Gaubert finds additional support in FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), which says that “the United States simply has not rendered itself liable *394under § 1346(b) [i.e., the FTCA] for constitutional tort claims.” If all violations of the federal constitution render the discretionary function exception inapt, Meyer is effectively voided. In sum, the majority’s strained attempt to “eclipse the district court’s analysis under the Gaubert framework” utterly fails.
It is difficult to conceive of a violation of a constitutional right that does not also give rise to a state cause of action. For instance, many violations of the Eighth Amendment by prison officials likely also constitute negligence under state law. Unconstitutional searches theoretically can be cognizable as trespass. Violations of the Third Amendment can be characterized as a trespass or an invasion of privacy. Until now, under Meyer, we lacked jurisdiction to consider these “constitutional tort claims.”
Under the majority’s framework, by a plaintiffs artful pleading, the United States can be liable whenever the Constitution is violated even though, under Meyer, the sovereign is not subject to liability for constitutional torts. The majority’s two-step rubric would go like this: First, allege a constitutional violation, thereby avoiding the discretionary function exception. Second, plead a state cause of action that overlaps with that constitutional violation, then seek damages under that state cause of action. Voila! No more sovereign immunity.
Properly understood, however, federal sovereign immunity is more robust than that. In Santos v. United States, — Fed.Appx. —, No. 05-60237, 2006 WL 1050512 (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished), we affirmed the dismissal of a prisoner’s state law negligence claim that overlapped with his contention that the Eighth Amendment had been violated. The plaintiff argued that his negligence claims should go forward, despite the discretionary function exception, because “no one has discretion to violate another’s constitutional rights.” Id. at —, *3. We promptly rejected that argument, holding that
an inmate “may bring a[n] ... action [under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 40[3] U.S. 388[, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619] (1971),] against individual officers for a[n] alleged constitutional violation, but he may not bring an action against the United States, the [Bureau of Prisons, or its] officers in their official capacities as such claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”
Id. (some alterations in original) (internal quotation omitted). Contrary to the reasoning in Santos, the majority’s wholehearted invocation of Sutton’s dictum reads much of the discretionary function exception out of the federal code.
Under the majority’s view, the United States may be liable for conduct even where its officers cannot be. This turns Bivens on its head. In Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485, 114 S.Ct. 996, the Court explained that it had “implied a cause of action against federal officials in Bivens in part because a direct action against the Government was not available.” In light of Meyer, it makes no sense to treat FTCA claims against the United States more liberally than we treat Bivens actions against individual federal officers, but that is exactly what the majority’s holding means: Because of qualified immunity, Bivens at least requires that constitutional rights be “clearly established” before liability ensues against federal officers, see, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), but the majority’s novel liability scheme against the United States apparently does not so require, because it reverses the district court *395without even pointing to what dearly established rights could have been violated under the facts Castro pleaded.3
Even if the Border Patrol violated R.M.G.’s constitutional rights, it did not violate any clearly established right.4 Thus, even assuming that we should narrow the scope of the discretionary function exception so that it does not apply where the Constitution has been violated — a holding that would allow nearly every Bivens action also to be an action against the United States, contrary to Meyer — there has to be a limit. Before subjecting the United States to suit, at a minimum we ought to require that the constitutional “mandate” be clearly established with particularity, something that cannot be shown here.5
II. No Constitutional or Statutory Rights Were Violated.
Even if one accepts the majority’s erroneous understanding of sovereign immunity, the district court was correct to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because no constitutional rights were violated. The notion that the Border Patrol agents unconstitutionally “placed in custody” or “detained” R.M.G., a baby less than one year old, is false on its face. We routinely allow parents to make decisions that affect their children’s constitutional rights,6 and it is not contested that Gallar-do consented to R.M.G.’s being taken with him to the Border Patrol station, just as he consented to the baby’s going with him to Mexico. This explicit parental consent means that R.M.G.’s constitutional rights were not violated.7 Make no mistake, she *396was not arrested, detained, held in custody, or deported — she was with her father and with his consent.
Castro also claims the agents acted beyond their statutory powers because the Border Patrol was never affirmatively authorized to allow non-citizen parents to consent to bringing their citizen children with them to detention centers and other countries by means of government deportation vehicles. This is equally unavailing, because the power to allow parents to consent to take their children with them is ancillary to the government’s power to detain and deport.8
To make the matter straightforward, what if both of R.M.G.’s parents were illegal aliens? Would the Border Patrol be forbidden, by a statute or the Constitution, from allowing her parents to consent to take her to the detention center while they waited to be deported? Would the agents be forbidden to allow them to consent to carry her with them on the government transport vehicle to Mexico? To ask these questions is to answer them. Does anyone doubt that the Border Patrol is authorized, as part of its discretionary authority, to allow families to stay together while it detains and deports?
The question of what to do with a child who is an American citizen, when one or both parents are not, is part of how the Border Patrol implements our immigration regime’s “general provisions,” and such difficult decisions are exactly the type that “involv[e] the necessary element of choice and [are] grounded in the social, economic, or political goals of the statute” that the discretionary function exception protects. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323, 111 S.Ct. 1267. It seems that under the majority’s view, the Border Patrol violates both constitutional and statutory law when it “detains” a citizen child along with the child’s Mexican-national parents, especially when it permits the child’s parents to take him with them to Mexico.
Likewise, if we accept the proposition that if Border Patrol agents make a custody determination, they act beyond their statutory authority, Castro’s claim should still be dismissed, because the agents did not make a custody determination. Instead, they elected not to interfere with the status quo as R.M.G.’s parents had left it. If the government had forcibly taken R.M.G. and given her to Castro, that would be picking Castro over Gallardo; if Castro had R.M.G., and the government physically took R.M.G. and gave her to Gallardo, that would be picking him over Castro. Preserving the status quo, however, was not making a custody determination, but instead was merely respecting the parents’ private ordering.9
In fact, it is the majority that now makes an ex post custody determination by establishing the rule that custody of a child born to an American citizen and an illegal alien is presumptively granted to the American-citizen parent. That may be a fine default rule, but it is not for a federal court of appeals to delve into family law, traditionally the exclusive province of the states.10
*397Furthermore, because this new custody-rule does not actually affect Castro but will affect prospective custody determinations, it is more akin to a policy. And when state custody law is silent, the relevant state agency says it will not get involved, and the Border Patrol is confronted with a custody matter and decides to retain the status quo as the parents left it, it is not the role of the federal courts to second-guess and decide which policy is best. Castro alleges the Border Patrol acted without authority and rendered a de facto custody determination, but in fact it is the majority that acts without authority and announces a de jure custody policy.
The agents were faced with the following unfortunate situation: Gallardo was detained; Castro had left the home days before; R.M.G., a baby, could not be left alone; Gallardo wanted R.M.G. to go with Mm; Gallardo had legal right to R.M.G., and no court order had deprived Gallardo of that right; Castro also wanted to take the child, but she had no court order and thus no superior right; Texas officials expressly said that the state would not take R.M.G., because she was not being abused; Texas law is opaque on what to do when two parents with equal right disagree about where a child should live, but the better reading of Texas law is that the parent with possession is authorized to choose11; Gallardo had actual possession of R.M.G., and he wanted her to go with him to Mexico.
In this difficult dilemma, the agents did the best that they could, and the choice they made was the one that least enmeshed the federal government in state custody issues. It is hard to imagine a more appropriate case for invoking the discretionary function exception;
III. Conclusion.
No one is pleased that Castro did not see her daughter for three years,12 but as a legal matter, the discretionary function exception applies. The first prong of Gau-bert was satisfied, because the Border Patrol agents’ decisions were “the product of judgment or choice.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267. The choices made, moreover, were constitutional, because R.M.G. was neither unlawfully detained nor deported, but instead was properly held by her father’s consent. The second prong of Gaubert was also satisfied, because the agents’ decisions were not of the sort that should be “second-guess[ed],” id. *398at 323, 111 S.Ct. 1267, given that the question of what to do with a citizen child when the parent with possession is deported, and state and federal law are silent, is a policy matter best left to the agency. Faced with a bad situation, the agents decided to retain the status quo as between the parents.
Because the district court was correct to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the discretionary function exception, I respectfully dissent.

. The discretionary function exception bars "[a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Castro does not allege that § 2680(h) has any bearing on this case.

. The majority is confused on this point. Quoting a district court, it states that the constitutional mandate must be "specific and intelligible.” It then summarily states that "[w]e hold that Castro’s complaint does sufficiently allege that the Border Patrol Agents' actions exceeded the scope of their authority." The majority does not explain, however, how a reasonable agent could have known that his conduct was violating a "specific and intelligible” constitutional mandate when he was exercising his discretion.

. Castro alleges that R.M.G.’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated, but it is not clearly established that leaving a minor with his parent, in the absence of any court order dictating otherwise, is an unreasonable seizure.

. The concern that constitutional rights at least be clearly established before the United States can be liable is in line with the direction taken in Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000), which expressly reserved the issue: "[W]e do not make any decision regarding the level of specificity with which a constitutional proscription must be articulated in order to remove the discretion of a federal actor.”

. Indeed, parents can consent to conduct that would otherwise constitute a violation of a child's core Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407-08 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that a social worker must demonstrate probable cause and obtain a court order, obtain parental consent, or act under exigent circumstances to justify the visual body cavity search of a juvenile in the residence); Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1207 (10th Cir.2003) (stating, in deciding whether a government program that gave children physical exams, which included blood tests and examination of genitalia, violated the Constitution, that "if the trier of fact concluded that the parents in this case, on behalf of their minor children, actually consented to the examinations, there would be no Fourth Amendment violation”).

.The majority accurately quotes paragraph 36 of the First Amended Complaint, but that paragraph says nothing to explain what alleged actions were taken in supposed violation of the Constitution. Accordingly, the issue is waived and was properly dismissed. See Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctrs., Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316-17 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered).

. Castro acknowledges some ancillary powers, such as the power to take R.M.G. to the station in a Border Patrol vehicle.

. Nor did the government make a de facto custody determination, a doctrine recognized in another context in Suboh v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81 (1st Cir.2002). The agents had to do something with R.M.G.; they called the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, which responded that it "would not get involved,” because R.M.G. was not being abused. The majority acknowledges the dilemma the agents faced.

.See Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of *397husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.”): see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) ("We conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber [v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 21 How. 582, 16 L.Ed. 226 (1858)], divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”).

. Castro repeatedly refers to Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1976), which states the factors that Texas courts consider in deciding custody and which does not expressly include, as a factor, which parent has actual possession. From this Castro argues that possession does not matter under Texas law.
This misses something important. Without first obtaining a court order, the parent seeking custody cannot call the police and require them to transfer possession of the child. In other words, in the absence of an order, Texas does recognize the status quo, at least as to whether the formal power of the state will be exercised.

. If the Border Patrol agents had taken possession from Gallardo, the facts would have been hard, too; it is unfair to a father to say that he must leave his daughter merely because his wife is a citizen and he is not. Faced with a Solomon-splitting-the-baby situation, the agents decided to leave matters as the parents had left them.