Court Opinion

ID: 9571397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:31:28.808372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:24.229278
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice GRAY,
concurring.
I concur in the result. Inasmuch as subsequent legislation now specifically prescribes a special mode of procedure for perfecting liens on motor vehicles, little would seem to be gained by expressing my views in the matter before us. However, I am not in accord with the pronouncements of the opinion concerning the matter of constructive notice to appellee; and because of the possibility that other claims under the former statutes might be affected, I desire briefly to comment upon the circumstances of this case.
At the time the mortgages of appellant were filed, §§ 34-247 and 34-248, W.S. 1957, relating generally to the perfecting of chattel mortgage liens, were in full force and effect. Under § 34-248 a mortgage in proper form when filed with the county clerk would “take effect and be in force from and after the time of delivering the same to the clerk for filing and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, and mortgagees in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice * * * ” Whether we say a mortgage so filed constitutes constructive notice or voids the lien of subsequent mortgagees is of little significance. The results 'are the same. Here the mortgages of appellant were in proper form and were entitled to be filed and were so filed. The burden was on appellee to show that its subsequent mortgages were entitled to protection under the statutes. C. I. T. Corporation v. Francis, 54 Wyo. 421, 93 P.2d 507, 508. The opinion of Justice McIntyre holds that this burden was met when appellee proved that the lien of appellant’s mortgage was not shown on the certificates of title.
My disagreement with such a holding is twofold. First, it is contrary to a previous holding of this court in Barber v. Reina Nash Motor Co., 72 Wyo. 65, 260 P.2d 928. It was there held that a late filed chattel mortgage covering a motor vehicle would be enforced from the date of filing against subsequent lien creditors, among others, even though the encumbrance was not noted on the certificate of title at the time the mortgage was filed. Secondly, the construction that the plain provisions of perfecting a chattel mortgage lien on chattels generally under § 34-248 were not effective and self-sufficient in the event the chattel was a motor vehicle is unwarranted in my opinion. Fogle v. General Credit, 74 App.D.C. 208, 122 F.2d 45, 49, 136 A.L.R. 814, and Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash.2d 46, 102 P.2d 227, 229, Section 31—37(f), W.S.1957, or any other provision of the Title Certificate Act did not so state. I would agree that in the year 1960 it might well have been advanced that the legislature intended § 31-37 (f) to supersede § 34 — 248 in this respect, but that construction no longer seems tenable. Section 31-37(f) has since been repealed by Ch. 185, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1963, and although all of the former provisions of § 31 — 37(f) were substantially re-enacted, it is significant to note that those provisions have been augmented by the following important language:
“Section 2. That Section 9-302(4) Chapter 219, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1961, be amended and re-enacted as follows:
“(4) Two steps are required for perfection of a security interest in a mo- • tor vehicle required to be licensed.
*938“(a) A financing statement or security agreement must be filed in the office of thé county clerk of the county in which said vehicle is located; - and
"(b) A notation of the security interest . must be endorsed on the certificate of title to such motor vehicle, such endorsement to be made concurrently with the filing of the financing statement or security agreement.
“ * * * Every financing statement 'or security agreement when filed pursuant to the provisions of the herein Section 9-302(4) shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of filing and not before, as to all creditors, subsequent purchasers, and holders' of security interest in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice.”
The change in description of the lien instrument from encumbrance to security interest, etc., to conform to the Uniform Commercial Code will of course be noted, but the. effect of the changes made in § 31-37 (■f) is clear. For the first time the legislature Has said that an encumbrance on a motor vehicle was not perfected against subsequent lienholders “in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice” unless notation thereof appears on the certificate of title. The result is that the legislature itself has construed former § 31-37 (f)' as not imposing compliance therewith as' a prerequisite to perfecting an encumbrance on a motor vehicle, and while such fact is not binding on us, I think we should not' here speculate “upon legislative intent where the Legislature has put its own construction on its prior enactments.” Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States v. Thulemeyer, 49 Wyo. 63, 52 P.2d 1223, 1234, rehearing denied 54 P.2d 896, appeal dismissed Ham v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 299 U.S. 505, 57 S.Ct. 24, 81 L.Ed. 375. See also Wyman, Partridge & Co. v. Tierney, 42 Wyo. 321, 294 P. 781, 784, 75 A.L.R. 667. Consequently, I would hold that constructive- notice Was imputed to appellee and it has not met its burden on this score.
Nevertheless, I agree with the holding that the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. Statutory benefits conferred on a mortgagee by filing the encumbrance may be lost or nullified by other conduct in connection with the transaction. It is a familiar rule often applied in motor vehicle financing “that where one of two innocent parties must suffer through the wrongful act of a third party, he who made possible the wrongful act must be the one to bear the burden.” General Credit Corporation v. First National Bank of Cody, 74 Wyo. 1, 283 P.2d 1009, 1022.
There is ample in the record to show that inattention and carelessness on the part of appellant brought about the present difficulty. Most obvious was its failure to see that title was transferred to Bryan and its encumbrance noted on the certificate. Had that been done, O’Dell would not have been clothed with indicia of clear title which wholly misled appellee. Add to this the arrangement between Bryan and O’Dell whereby O’Dell Motor Company retained possession of the trucks ostensibly as a part of its stock in trade, and the entrapment of appellee was complete. To overcome this aspect of the matter appellant, of course, argues that it had no knowledge of the O’Dell-Bryan arrangement. Assuming this to be true, the plain fact is that despite the large amount of money involved it made no effort to ascertain the facts concerning title or possession and was content simply to rely upon the representations of both Bryan and O’Dell. In doing this it took the risk that the transaction was genuine and consequently was required to carry the burden of that risk when appellee became involved. General Credit Corporation v. Kapun, 237 App.Div. 694, 262 N.Y.S. 421, 423. It would have been a relatively easy matter for appellant to have ascertained that as represented, Bryan had possession at premises other than those of O’Dell Motor Company. Further than this, it is clear that Bryan, having agreed with O’Dell at *939the time the mortgage was executed that O’Dell Motor Company would retain possession of the trucks and the certificates of title, would be estopped to advance any claim against appellee. See Annotation 18 A.L.R.2d 816. Appellant claims through Bryan, and as a result must likewise be held to be estopped to advance its claim against appellee. Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J.Eq. 406, 9 A.2d 311, 325; Trolan v. Rogers, 88 Hun. 422, 34 N.Y.S. 836, 838; and 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 160.