Court Opinion

ID: 9550598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:37:53.381593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:55.696774
License: Public Domain

McGHEE, Justice (dissenting in part). I concur in the foregoing opinion except the part holding the statements or confessions were voluntary and admissible in evidence. The law relating to the admission of confessions has been stated many times by this court, and, with one exception, the cases are essentially in agreement, until today. We need go no further back than State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 214 P. 583, 584, where in an opinion by Mr. Justice Bratton it was stated: “ * * * It has been many times declared by this court that confessions which are made without being induced by threats, duress, coercion, fear, hope, promise of reward or immunity, but from the voluntary volition of the accused, become admissible, and the fact that appellants were under arrest or were not represented by counsel is immaterial. The two leading principles of exclusion applicable to confessions were fully and thoroughly discussed in Territory v. Emilio, 14 N.M. 147, 89 P. 239, wherein Justice Parker announced the first to be that, when such confessions are induced by promises or threats, hope or fear, the temptation to speak falsely is so great as to render the statements so made entirely untrustworthy, and the second being that that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provided that 'no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’ excluded involuntary confession, but when they are freely and voluntarily made, without being induced by promises or threats, hope or fear, duress or coercion, both doctrines of exclusion are met and overcome, and they are then admissible. ‡ ‡ ‡ If In the Dena case the defendants, who were Indians, had been told by a deputy sheriff if they told the truth they would not be hurt. They then confessed they had committed the crime for which they had been arrested, but this court held such confessions inadmissible in evidence because of such statement by the deputy and granted them a new trial. In the case of State v. Woo Dak San, 35 N.M. 105, 290 P. 322, this court affirmed the judgment of conviction but refused to modify its former holdings on the admission of confessions which, it said, were quite strict. The question was next before this court in State v. Wickman, 39 N.M. 198, 43 P.2d 933, in which this court in a rather labored opinion held the confession admissible, and, it might well be said, modified or clouded the former opinions on the subject. I do not wonder the trial judge was confused by certain parts of the opinion. This court, however, in the later case of State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P.2d 80, reviewed the older cases, as well as the Wickman case, and approved the Emilio and Dena cases. The admission of the confession in the Lord case was affirmed, but apparently only because the facts were not fully developed. Stress is laid upon the responsibility of the trial judge in the admission of confessions and his duty to see that the facts in connection with their procurement be fully developed, to the end that a confession improperly obtained shall not be admitted in evidence. Then the opinion quotes from State v. Foster, 25 N.M. 361, 183 P. 397, 398, 7 A.L.R. 417 and approves the following statement there made: "There is no more convincing evidence to the ordinary man than a confession of guilt, and where a confession is admitted, under an instruction to the jury to determine whether it is voluntary or involuntary, and to consider it in the former case, or in the latter case to reject it, the probabilities are, unless the confession was extorted under circumstances calculated to arouse sympathy for the defendant, that the average jury will consume but little time in determining the question of whether the confession was voluntary or involuntary, but will in the great majority of cases say the prisoner has confessed, and therefore is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” In this latter case an inspector of the Cattle Sanitary Board admitted he had promised the defendant if he would confess and clear up the theft he would not be prosecuted, and yet, although the inspector’s statement was not denied and there was no testimony connecting the defendant with the theft except his own confession and the disappearance of the cattle from their accustomed range, the jury disregarded the instruction of the court on the subject and promptly returned a verdict of guilty, which this court reversed. At the time I submitted an opinion in the present case holding the trial court erred in admitting the confessions, the latest applicable case from the Supreme Court of the United States was Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 1348, 1357, 93 L.Ed. 1801, wherein it was said: “On review here of State convictions, all those matters which are usually termed issues of fact are for conclusive determination by the State courts and are not open for reconsideration by this Court. Observance of this restriction in our review of State courts calls.for the utmost scruple. But ‘issue of fact’ is a coat of many colors. It does not cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happenings, when that conclusion incorporates standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are decisive of constitutional rights. Such standards and criteria, measured against the requirements drawn from constitutional provisions, and their proper applications, are issues for this Court’s adjudication. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 659, 65 S.Ct. 870, 89 L.Ed. 1252 [1260], and cases cited. Especially in cases arising under the Due Process Clause is it important to distinguish between issues of fact that are here foreclosed and issues which, though cast in the form of determinations of fact, are the very issues to review which this Court sits. (Citing cases.) “In the application of so embracing a constitutional 'concept as ‘due process,’ it would be idle to expect at all times unanimity of views. Nevertheless, in all the cases that have come here during the last decade from the courts of the various States in which it was claimed that the admission of coerced confessions vitiated convictions for murder, there has been complete agreement that any conflict in testimony as to what actually led to a contested confession is not this Court’s concern. * * * Therefore only those elements of the events and circumstances in which a confession was involved that are unquestioned in the States’s version of what happened are relevant to the constitutional issue here. But if force has been applied, this Court does not leave to local determination whether or not the confession was voluntary. There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force. And there comes a point where this Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men. See Taft, C. J., in the Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S.Ct 449, 450, 451, 66 L.Ed. 817 [819] 21 A.L.R. 1432.” This case was decided June 27, 1949, and it may be it was so old when the Alaska and Nebraska cases cited in the majority opinion were filed that it was ripe for reversal, but I consider its holding sound. But, disregarding the Watts case, I believe our own cases require a holding the confessions were inadmissible under the admissions wrung from Deputy Hay during an exceedingly long cross-examination. I quote therefrom in part: “Q. Didn’t you cite numerous cases to him where you had gotten people off with light sentences because they cooperated and done what you told them ? A. I didn’t tell him anything about a murder case, getting anybody off. “Q. Did you tell him about any other case? A. I might have told him about some other cases, yes, sir. “Q. Where you had got them off with a light sentence where they cooperated? A. Not where they cooperated, where they went before the judge and told the truth, they got leniency. “Q. You told him about that? A. Yes, sir. # * * * * * “Q. But did you tell him about cases where people had gotten off easy by talking, and coming in and telling the court the truth, isn’t that right? A. They always get off easier if they tell the truth and go before the judge. “Q. You told him about that? A. Yes, sir. ^ H» «I» sfc í|» “Q. * * * You once stated you did discuss with him, and did tell him about cases where he makes a confession and went up before the judge and got off easier? A. We talked about a lot of cases, but not murder cases. “Q. You told him about armed robbery? A. Yes, that is right. “Q. And how they come up and confessed before the judge and got off with a lighter sentence? A. Yes, sir. “Q. Or maybe say a misdemeanor, a liquor violation, you go up before the judge and confess and get off easy? A. Sometimes the judge is -lenient. “Q. You told him about those various kinds of things? A. Yes, sir. “Q. Did you tell him about the Benevides case? A. I don’t believe I did. I don’t recall. Slaughterback might have told him something about it, but I don’t remember telling him about it. I told him we worked the case. “Q. Did you tell him what Benevides got? A. I believe we did. I think he got seventeen to thirty-five years. “Q. Did you tell him what crime Benevides was involved in? A. I told him, yes. “Q. Do you recall what the crime is now? A. Well, he was charged with — he pled guilty to second degree murder, I believe. “Q. Did you show him a magazine article concerning the Benevides case? A. No, he asked for it and we didn’t give it to him.” After the court announced 'the statements would be admitted, the jury was brought into the court and the witness again examined regarding the confession. We quote further from his cross-examination: “Q. Don’t .you recall telling him . about different cases in which people have- come in and confessed to crimes and got off with light sentences? A. Yes. “Q. You told him about those? A. Some of them. ^ íjí íJí iji * :}i ‡ “Q. You were a little more definite this afternoon about the cases you told him about where people got off with light sentences by coming before the judge and pleading guilty? A. No. I told you this afternoon I talked to him -some about it. I don’t know what all, I haven’t got a memory that long. * * * * * * “Q. Now, Mr. Hay, I would like to again, in connection with the discussions and conversations you had with Mr. Lindemuth, again refer to the testimony concerning discussions of cases where shorter prison terms were obtained by confession. As I recall there is some inconsistency as to the testimony on yesterday afternoon and last night. Do you recall ever having discussed cases of that type with the defendant, Franklin Lester Lindemuth.? A. We discussed several cases, I wouldn’t say how many. Charlie talked to him a while and I talked to him. I don’t know what Charlie talked about, all I can tell is what I talked about. “Q. Your testimony oif last night that you do not recall having discussed them is corrected now? A. I said last night that I don’t recall the different cases we brought up; that we talked about some of them. “Q. And do you now recall specifically discussing the Benevides case? A. It was brought up, but to what extent, I don’t know exactly what was said.” Notwithstanding the statement in the majority opinion that it would have been error had the trial court excluded the confessions, I feel they have, perhaps unconsciously given too much weight to the finding of the trial court that such confessions were voluntary. I feel its action in that regard was controlled by its erroneous view of the Wickman case. I admit certain of its language might lead a trial judge astray. He should, however, have followed the later case of State v. Lord and the Emilio and Dena cases therein approved. The trial judge could only find the confessions voluntary or involuntary, -and feeling the Wickman case required him to find an innocent man had confessed in order to find the confessions were involuntary (in this instance 'by hope of leniency induced by the statements of the officers), he concluded the defendant had not shown himself innocent and therefore the confessions were voluntary. I base this statement on the following excerpts from the transcript of testimony, all taken out of the hearing of the jurors: “The Court: I have read these statements in full. I would like to ask the defense counsel if they contend that State’s Exhibit 28 is in substance untrue? “Mr. Nohl: Yes, sir. “Mr. Murphy: We contend that it is untrue in many respects, if the Court please, some of which were brought out on cross examination of the state’s witness. “Mr. Brown: No, it wasn’t. “The Court: Say that again, Mr. Murphy; don’t 'interrupt. “Mr. Murphy: with reference to registering- under the name of Lucille Ramirez. “The Court: What about the substance, except for that mistake in the first name of the registration ‘Teco’? “Mr. Murphy: That is generally untrue. “The Court: You contend it is generally untrue? “Mr. Murphy: 29 and 30 we contend are admittedly untrue, almost exclusively. “The Court: You contend 29 is untrue and admit 28 is true, do you? “Mr. Nohl: No, sir. “Mr. Murphy: Not necessarily, if the Court please. “The Court: What about State’s Exhibit 30? “Mr. Murphy: That is generally untrue. “The Court: 'There is nothing in the testimony here from this witness about the untruth of any of this except minor details, except as to- State’s Exhibit 29; the witness says 28 and 30 are substantially the truth, as stated in.the testimony you have offered here. “Mr. Murphy: No, if the Court please, I am sure I asked him if the facts contained there were true, if the reporter could find that. “The Court: As to some minor points. You have pointed out the word ‘Lucille’ was used in place of the word ‘Teco,’ and some other minor points. “Mr. Murphy: The effect of his testimony, I asked him (the defendant) if the statement was generally true, and he said no. I didn’t feel like taking every item on the 37 page document, and questioning him as to its truth or accuracy. If the Court so desires I will proceed in that manner. But we would point out the fact that would indicate that they were not the words of the witness in fact, but the words of the examiner. “The Court: No, I don’t think I want to hear any more evidence on this. I am not denying you the right to' produce any further evidence, but I thought you have rested. Do you have anything besides the testimony of Mr. Lindemuth that you want to offer ? “Mr. Nohl: No, sir. “Mr. Murphy: If the Court please, in order that the record may 'be clear on that statement, I would like your permission to ask about three more questions. “The Court: All right. “By Mr. Murphy': “Q. Mr. Lindemuth, are the statements contained in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 28, dated August 28th, substantially and generally correct? A. No, sir. “The Court: Well, let him explain that further. “Mr. Murphy: I just want to make that clear. I might be in error in the record not containing that. “Q. Is the information contained in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 29, dated on Sunday, August 29th, at ten thirty P.M., generally true ? A. No, sir. “Q. In detail, in reference to State’s Exhibit 29, have you at any time since — did you have with you a gun, while on the bus enroute to Harrisburg' from Albuquerque? A. No, sir. “The Court: That is in State’s Exhibit 30. “Mr. Murphy: That is correct. “(Then followed testimony in which the witness disputed the correctness and truth of all three exhibits.) “Q. What was your motive for signing these papers? A. From everything I heard, it seemed to me-I could save myself from going to the chair. “Q. You felt you would avoid the chair'by signing the papers ? A. Yes, sir. “Q. Did the magazine story concerning the Benevides case affect you in any manner? A. Well, from the way they said, he would have got the chair if he had pled not guilty, but they said, Mr. Hay, he talked to 'his mother and father and the lawyers, and got 'him to plead guilty, and that when you plead guilty you couldn’t go to the electric chair. “Mr. Murphy: You may question. “The Court: The state will waive the right to question, on instructions from the bench. You may be excused, Mr. Witness. “Witness Excused. “The Court: Does the defense have-anything else? “Mr. Murphy: Nothing else. “The Court: I will hear you briefly on your argument. “Whereupon the Court heard the argument of counsel on said matter, after which the following proceedings were had, still out of the hearing of the jury: “The Court: I am not willing to decide at this time whether the state has proved a corpus delicti independent o-f any alleged confessions. I don’t think that is- before the Court. I will hear counsel on that point again, and let defense counsel raise it at the time the state rests. But since the law of New Mexico is that the order of proof is discretionary with the trial court, I see no prejudice to the defendant even were I prepared to admit that the corpus delicti has not been proved here. “Now the situation given me by counsel is the one I was hunting for out of the Wickman case. Our Supreme ■Court said the duty of the trial judge, under the situation faced by the court here, ‘The question for the judge here is whether, under all the circumstances, the influence was strong enough to cause an innocent man to confess falsely.’ The influence being the duress or the hope of reward. “The question as to the admissibility of the confessions is, was such force used as to -cause an innocent man to confess falsely. The three confessions, or alleged confessions, offered in evidence here, State’s Exhibits 28, 29 and 30, in each one of them the defendant confesses his guilt to a major crime. In one he appears to be only the accessory, and in the other appears to be a principal, but in all, the result of the testimony as taken on the voir dire here today, the defendant or his counsel have not at one single point protested his innocence. “They have pointed out discrepancies, they have denied things were true in general, but not once has it been urged upon the court that an innocent man has been forced or urged to confess falsely. “According to the present state of the record the court is prepared to admit State’s Exhibits 28, 29 and 30 when they are introduced, after proper foundation is laid before the jury. “Mr. Murphy: If the Court please, I would like to call to your attention that a plea of not guilty has been entered. “The Court: I appreciate that. “Mr. Murphy: The admission of the statements are excepted to by the defense. “(The jury was reconvened and then recessed. After they retired the following proceedings were had:) “The Court: The court further finds that no undue influence was used upon the defendant; that no duress was used; that he was advised of his constitutional rights 'before he made a statement, and that he was warned, before he signed any statement, that the statement would be used against him. “Accordingly the court concludes from the facts and the law that the three alleged confessions, State’s Exhibits 28, 29 and 30 are admissible. “The court has heretofore expressed in open court to counsel for the defendant the opinion that the defense has every right to produce testimony concerning the taking of these alleged confessions, and testimony concerning any alleged duress or alleged undue influence, and that the question of the truth of the matters in the alleged confessions will be a question for the jury, under proper instructions from this court.” At the risk of unduly lengthening this dissenting opinion, heavy quotation has been made from the record in the belief of the writer that the nature and extent of the trial court’s error of law is best shown in context. As the proceedings just quoted were had while the jurors were absent from the courtroom they, of course, had no effect on them; but, as stated 'by this court in the Foster case, there was little hope the jurors would waste time considering whether such confessions were voluntary. The question of the weight to be given the findings of fact of a trial judge who has been influenced in making them by an erroneous view of the law has been considered by other courts. It is stated in 3 Am.Jur. (Appeal and error) Sec. 904, p. 472: “The rule that an appellate court will not disturb the findings of fact made by the trial judge unless they are manifestly against the weight of the testimony, does not apply if he committed an error of law which manifestly influenced or controlled his conclusions of fact, as where he makes a mistake as to the onus probandi or commits an error in the exclusion of evidence. The appellate court will always review the findings of the trial judge when they were manifestly controlled or influenced by error of law. It is not bound 'by the finding of the trial court on oral evidence based upon an erroneous view of the law as applied to the facts. A finding of facts which is contrary to a conclusion of law resulting from other facts found must be disregarded.” In the following cases cited in support of the above text, findings of- fact were overturned although there was testimony to support them, because an erroneous view of law influenced or controlled the conclusion of the trial court: Wheeler v. McKeon, 137 Minn. 92, 162 N.W. 1070, 1 A.L.R. 1514; Hall v. Hall, 41 S.C. 163, 19 S.E. 305, 44 Am.St.Rep. 696; Chase v. Woodruff, 133 Wis. 555, 113 N.W. 973, 126 Am. St.Rep. 972; Boardman v. Lorentzen, 155 Wis. 566, 145 N.W. 750, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 476; Truelsch v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Wis. 239, 202 N.W. 352, 38 A.L.R. 914. I am convinced the statements of defendant were induced by statements of the deputies of light punishment given defendants in other cases where they had confessed, with the hope and expectation he would likewise receive a light sentence. I am further convinced the finding of the trial judge that such was not the case, in effect, and that the statements were voluntary was because of his belief that only an innocent man could object to the admission of a confession,.and that the. defendant was required to prove his innocence before invoking a ruling of the trial court thereon. We know, as a matter of fact, these confessions are nearly always offered by the state in its case in chief, and the defendant is only required to come forward with his evidence on 'the admissibility of -the confession when it is offered, leaving ■ him free to introduce his evidence by which he attempts to establish his innocence when the state has rested. Like my brethren who compose the majority, I do not want to hamper the officers of the law in bringing criminals to justice, but I feel they, like all others, should work within constitutional limitations and the laws of our state and nation. The defendant should be granted a new trial. For the reason stated, I dissent in part. LUJAN, C. J., concurs.