Court Opinion

ID: 9669294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:48:32.79057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:55.225702
License: Public Domain

TAURO, District Judge, dissenting.
The basic issue before this court involves a request by plaintiff’s counsel to file a brief and make oral argument to the effect that the Massachusetts Veterans Preference Act (The Act) is unconstitutional as being violative of his client’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. I would grant plaintiff’s counsel’s request for two reasons. In the first place, I know of no authority, and the majority cites none on point, which would permit a trial court to refuse to consider and decide a legal issue adequately pleaded.1 Second, it makes sense as a matter of efficient and responsible judicial administration for this court to decide the remaining issue in this case, rather than leave that task to another forum. I will treat these points seriatim.
I.
Plaintiff’s complaint embodies both equal protection and due process challenges to the Act. The majority of this court twice opined that the Act did not afford plaintiff equal protection of the law and, therefore, was unconstitutional. We made no judgment with respect to any possible due process claim pleaded by the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court remanded our first opinion for reconsideration. The Court later reversed our second opinion and remanded for “proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,-U.S. at-, *11399 S.Ct. at 2297 (U.S.1979). In reversing us, the Court specifically limited its holding to an analysis of plaintiff’s equal protection claim. Any due process claims were left open.2
In my view, the Court’s mandate for “proceedings consistent with this opinion” requires that we reconvene to consider and decide any and all remaining theories for relief pleaded in plaintiff’s complaint. The prime issue left unresolved by both this court and the Supreme Court is whether the Act serves to deprive the plaintiff of Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees. The due process issue has two related, but independent theories. The first revolves around plaintiff’s status as a woman non-veteran. The second embodies a broader challenge based on plaintiff’s status as a non-veteran, without reference to sex as a pivotal factor.
My colleagues now join in a new majority, expressing the thought that the Supreme Court’s decision on the plaintiff’s equal protection claim would be dispositive of any due process claim based on sex. On that premise they dispose of plaintiff’s sex based due process theory in one sentence,3 without even affording plaintiff the opportunity to be heard on the subject. While I am usually among the first to applaud expeditious resolution of litigation, I feel compelled to disassociate myself from such summary disposition of a properly pleaded constitutional issue.
Notwithstanding that holding by the majority, the circumstances of this case compel further consideration of plaintiff’s complaint by this court. Even if it is conceded that the Court’s equal protection opinion would be controlling, as opposed to persuasive, precedent to a due process challenge by plaintiff based on sex, there remains open the broader question as to whether the Act deprives non-veterans, males and females alike, of due process. The majority apparently concedes that this broader issue was adequately pleaded by the plaintiff,4 though not argued to date. In our prior opinions, however, we did not foreclose plaintiff’s due process claims. Rather, we merely determined that it was not necessary to reach due process issues in view of our disposition of the equal protection claim. We have since’ been reversed and mandated to take action consistent with the Court’s opinion. We, therefore, must now do that which we thought unnecessary in our prior opinions, that is address the due process issues.
The fact that to do so now may amount to piecemeal review of the complaint is not the fault of the plaintiff. Indeed, it is not the fault of this court. We thought, incorrectly, that by focusing on the single issue of equal protection, the question of the Act’s constitutionality would be resolved. The fact that, in good faith, we have spent several years wandering down the wrong path does not mitigate our responsibility to *114now decide the remaining constitutional challenge raised by plaintiff in her complaint. In short, we have no power to refuse to decide.5
II.
Even assuming we have some discretion with respect to what issues we will or will not decide, common sense demands that we address the one issue remaining in this case — that of due process. The majority’s position basically is that it is too late in the game for us to take up a due process issue not yet briefed or argued. It believes the resolution of that issue is better left to another day before another forum. Such an approach is inconsistent with all accepted concepts of efficient judicial administration. If, while this case was pending, the plaintiff had filed an independent due process challenge in this District, that case would have been assigned to this forum as a “related case” under Local Rule 8. We have such a rule because we seek to avoid imposing any unnecessary duplication of effort on the busy judges of this court.
The record in this case is complete. There is no need for further evidence. We are familiar with the facts and the general positions of the parties. All that remains is for plaintiff’s counsel to have the opportunity to brief and argue the due process issue. Counsel represented to us that his brief could be filed within a few weeks. Oral argument could be limited by us to an hour or so, if indeed we thought argument was necessary. The entire matter could be concluded by late fall.
What the majority has said, however, is that we will not even hear the plaintiff’s theory and that final resolution of the long pending Veterans Preference saga must be postponed until some indefinite time in the future. I feel the more responsible approach would be to hear the parties now and then decide the issue. I see no justification for imposing this responsibility on some other forum.

. Plaintiffs complaint must be read as encompassing a broad Fourteenth Amendment attack on the constitutionality of the Act, as well as a narrow challenge on a theory of sex discrimination. Paragraph six of the complaint states:
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief . commenced to redress the deprivation, . . of rights of the plaintiff secured to her by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Paragraph seven states:
There exists an actual controversy between the plaintiff and defendants as to the constitutionality of the hiring practice, . . ., which gives to qualified candidates for permanent positions in the Classified Civil Service who are veterans a preference in rank over non-veteran qualified candidates on the eligible lists from which certifications to permanent positions in the Classified Civil Service are made.
Certainly, the complaint would survive a motion to dismiss based on a theory that it failed to allege a due process deprivation based on veteran — non-veteran status.

. “The sole question for decision on this appeal is whether Massachusetts, in granting an absolute lifetime preference to veterans, has discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Feeney, supra, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. at 2292 (emphasis supplied).

. “We therefore hold against plaintiff on these originally stated due process claims at this time, believing that any further argument to us concerning them would serve no purpose, and would furthermore be inappropriate as it would needlessly delay entry of judgment and unfairly affect those who stand to benefit from the Massachusetts Veterans Preference law.” Majority Opinion at page 111.

. The majority opinion states at page 110, ‘[A] violation of due process as well as of equal protection was alleged in the complaint, . . A later comment by the majority in the succeeding paragraph makes its position less certain. “We do not believe, however, that the due process issues that were pleaded and previously addressed in the parties’ briefs and arguments encompassed the principal contention plaintiff now seeks additional time to brief and argue.”
In any event, it has long been settled that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is only required to contain a short and plain statement of facts demonstrating that the pleader is entitled to relief. “It is not necessary to set out the legal theory on which the claim is based.” Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1955) (J. Harlan) (emphasis added). See also 2A Moore’s Federal Practice section 8.14.

. The majority presumes it has the discretion to refuse to decide an issue adequately pleaded. The cases it cites in support of such a proposition are clearly inapposite. Each deals with an attempt by a party to inject a new issue after a hearing on the merits. The plaintiff here, however, has never had a hearing on the merits of her remaining due process claims. See Majority Opinion at pages 111 and 112.