Court Opinion

ID: 9726694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:04:14.686365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.801760
License: Public Domain

ROUSE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms defendant’s conviction of first degree murder, rape and conspiracy to commit credit card forgery. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s order remanding this case to the trial court *459so that it may be determined whether there is a basis for dismissing a finding of special circumstances.
Unlike the facts which constituted the basis for a similar order of remand by the California Supreme Court in People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470 [179 Cal.Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029], I find nothing in the record before us which suggests that the trial court expressed any doubt or reluctance about the propriety of imposing a life sentence without possibility of parole upon this defendant.1 Certainly, the facts of this brutal crime fully warrant the imposition of such a penalty.
Notwithstanding the majority’s statement of neutrality on the question, I firmly believe that, under the circumstances, a trial court will interpret the order of remand, coming from a higher court, as a strong suggestion that it should reduce the penalty by striking the jury’s finding of special circumstances. In my opinion, such an order, in this instance, is highly inappropriate.
I would affirm the judgment and sentence in its entirety.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 5, 1982, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 22, 1982.

Reporter’s Note: For Supreme Court opinion see 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862],

In People v. Williams, supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 477, the court pointed out that “At the sentencing hearing, the court stated its opinion that life imprisonment without possibility of parole was appropriate for Eddie Palmer because he had armed himself and stabbed the victim. (See fn. 4, ante, [majority opn., p. 453].) The court continued, ‘Insofar as this defendant is concerned, the evidence appears that she was one of the persons who planned the operation, she was the person who applied one ligature to the mouth of the victim and behind the neck, [f] Now, by the testimony of the doctor it appears because of the age of the victim and the fragility of the neck bones that the application caused a fracture in one of the processes of the neck which, in turn, put pressure on the spinal cord, [f] This doctor without dispute said that as to cause of death, without medical intervention either the stab wound and/or the application of ligature and fracture with the pressure on the spinal cord together or separately would ultimately have brought the death of the lady, [f] But on a scaling, I feel that on culpability this defendant was much less culpable than the defendant Eddie Palmer.
“ ‘My desire legally would be to sentence this lady and eliminate by staying the execution of the special circumstances and eliminate the without possibility of parole. I do not believe that looking at the Penal Code and the intent of the Legislature and as interpreted by the Appellate Courts, I do not believe I have that power. So I will have to sentence as I did with Eddie Palmer. ’ The court thereupon sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.