Court Opinion

ID: 9492051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:30:58.874623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:04.947105
License: Public Domain

WEINER, District Judge,
concurring:
I concur with Judge Canby’s decision that the protections of ADA §§ 12112(d)(2)—(4) are not limited to only “qualified individuals] with a disability.” I also agree that the conflicting opinions about Fredenburg’s ability to work created a genuine dispute as to whether she could do her job. Judge Kozinski also appears to agree with these propositions. Finally, I agree with Judge Canby that Freden-burg was not playing fast and loose with the court when she asserted inconsistent positions when attempting to first keep her job, then keep her disability benefits, and then attempt to regain her job, a decision with which Judge Kozinski disagrees. Faced with different definitions of disability in qualifying for state disability benefits and maintaining an ADA claim, the elements of judicial estoppel have not been satisfied on the record before us and thus the entry of summary judgment on that basis was improper. I write separately only to stress that, upon remand, the district court is at liberty to determine in the first regard whether, under a straightforward summary judgment analysis, Freden-burg’s claims fail a matter of law.
As the court stated in Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir.1998), a “plaintiffs prior representations may be so strong and definitive that they will defeat the plaintiffs prima facie case on traditional summary judgment grounds.” While judicial estoppel applies only to a “knowing misrepresentation to or even a fraud on the court,” the holding of Johnson distinguishes chicanery from inadvertence or *1184mistake. Id. Here we seem to confront a situation somewhere in the middle. Appellant appears to have simultaneously insisted to the state disability agency that she continued to be disabled when it sought to cut off her benefits, while seeking to maintain an ADA claim without requesting any specific accommodation. Adding further to the confusion, Freden-burg also claims discrimination based on her initial removal from work, arguing presumably that the County’s claim that she suffered from paranoia was pretextual. While these inconsistent claims regarding her ability to work, return to work and inability to return to work might be satisfactorily explained, for example, by the nature of her psychological impairment, or the passage of time, on remand the district court is free to consider all this evidence in determining whether Appellant’s claim can survive summary judgment or upon reaching the ultimate merits of her claims.