Court Opinion

ID: 9833518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:47:08.710182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:03.849153
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In view of appellants’ requests for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, we have decided to comment further upon the issues'involved
While appellants were not residents of Dallas County at any time during the pend-ency of the suit to foreclose the paving assessment liens, and though the Realty Trust Company dismissed as to them, we have concluded that they were bound by the judgment of foreclosure. Mrs. Forman represented and was authorized to act for *831both appellants. She employed counsel and caused an answer to be filed in behalf of Tucker. She took complete control of Tucker’s defense. In fact appellants were the only ones who could be benefited by defeating the claim of the Realty Trust Company in that suit. They owned the so-called “equity of redemption,” as well as the vendor’s lien. Bomar v. Fort Worth Bldg. Ass’n, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 603, 49 S.W. 914; Elliott v. Morris, 43 Tex.Civ.App. 482, 98 S.W. 220; Marshall v. Stubbs, 48 Tex.Civ.App. 158, 106 S.W. 435; Cleveland v. Heidenbeimer, Tex.Civ.App., 44 S.W. 551; Bonner v. Green, 6 Tex.Civ. 96, 24 S.W. 835.
The last of said vendor’s lien notes originally given by Tucker matured more than four years prior to the filing of this action. Defendants pleaded the four year statute of .limitation, Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St. art. 5520. That plea should have been and now is sustained as to appellants’ attempt to recover by virtue of the superior title retained in Scharbauer’s deed. In part consideration of the deed from Tucker to appellant Clara Forman, which obviated the foreclosure proceedings and consequent expense, and was received for the benefit of appellants’ community estate, the grantee therein assumed all “legal claims” against the property. The contract paving,lien was a legal claim, and when assumed became prior to. the vendor’s lien. This was sufficient to defeat recovery. The assumption may not be repudiated while the benefit received is claimed.
The evidence warranted a finding that Mr. Ulmer purchased without notice of the deed from Tucker to Mrs. Forman. Mrs. Forman had written plaintiff in execution disclaiming any interest in the property, except the vendor’s lien. It is not to be presumed that she would have made a contradictory statement had Mr. Ulmer inquired directly of her.
Appellants insist that the paving assessment was invalid upon the theory that the property was Tucker’s homestead at the time the assessment was levied by the City Council of Midland. We think this immaterial in view of our holdings as to the effect of the Dallas judgment and the assumption clause in the deed from Tucker to Mrs. Forman. However, we think the evidence in favor of appellant’s homestead theory was not sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption, in favor of the court’s judgment, if indulging such presumption be necessary to sustain the judgment. Mr. Tucker testified that he “took possession” of the property just after title-deed and the transfer of notes were made;, that he rented the lower floor, and “used”' the upper floor “as a hotel” rooming house.. He did not say what his “calling” or “business” was or that he had an office on the-upper floor or that his family lived there,, unless this last be inferred from a negative reply to the question, “You never did' live on this property after you went awaj’’ did you?” He did not testify that he was-living upon the property in question at the-time the special assessment lien was fixed' by ordinance or at the time the contract lien was executed. The court did not err in denying a recovery on account of the-alleged invalidity of the paving liens.
We are convinced that our original holding was correct. The motion for rehearing is overruled.