Court Opinion

ID: 9651783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:46:53.356978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:40.228611
License: Public Domain

KLEIN, Bankruptcy Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion of the court and write separately to emphasize my understanding that the erroneous failure to afford the parties an adversary proceeding would not have been harmless if appellant had been able in this appeal to articulate prejudice tied to the procedural differences between adversary proceedings and contested matters.
Those differences, while significant, are not so great as sometimes assumed. They he chiefly in the absence of a complaint and an answer, the unavailability of counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims, and the lack of formal pretrial procedure. Contested matters are to be served in the same manner as adversary proceedings. The main difference in the taking of evidence is that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e) permits evidence to be taken on the contested matter by affidavit or deposition. The rules regarding findings of fact and conclusions of law, default and summary judgments, and judgments all apply in both adversary proceedings and contested matters.
Appellant says it was denied discovery by being forced to proceed on the basis of a contested matter. But discovery was available because Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26-37 all apply in contested matters. The difference in discovery between contested matters and adversary proceedings lies in the time ordinarily available, and there is no difference when the court exercises its discretion to prescribe a number of months in which to conduct discovery in a particular contested matter.
Here, discovery was available and was not launched. Appellant, for example, could have propounded written discovery before the hearing or noticed a deposition. It then could have used pending discovery as a basis for arguing for a continuance or, in view of the trial court’s analogy to a summary judgment, for invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), which rule also applies in contested matters.
The putative denial of discovery, moreover, is harmless because appellant has been unable to point to any fact that might be discovered in orderly discovery that could possibly change the outcome of this appeal.
Nor has the appellant pointed to any other harm that could have resulted from the failure to have required a complaint, an answer, an opportunity for counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party practice, more orderly pretrial procedure, or oral testimony in open court.
If appellant had been able to articulate prejudice resulting from any of these differences, the error would not have been harmless.