Court Opinion

ID: 9581734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:18:00.301433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:12.871375
License: Public Domain

Callow, C.J.
(dissenting) — The majority misapplies the equitable principle articulated in GESA Fed. Credit Union v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 248, 713 P.2d 728 (1986). In GESA, a purchaser at an execution sale failed to file a statement of the taxes paid on the property with the *56county auditor, as required by former RCW 6.24.150. 105 Wn.2d at 250. However, because the purchaser had given the redeemer actual notice of the taxes paid, we held that the purchaser had met the purpose of the notice requirement and therefore had substantially complied with the redemption statute. 105 Wn.2d at 253, 257.
The majority correctly characterizes GESA as standing for the principle that "the right of redemption is not forfeited where the party redeeming substantially complies with the redemption statute." However, the majority then creates an exception to this equitable principle, apparently applicable only to former RCW 6.24.130, stating that that section "creates a substantive right." The majority finds that Marks' Westside violated former RCW 6.24.130 and, therefore, it holds that GESA's substantial compliance rule does not apply.
I disagree. The legislative purpose underlying former RCW 6.24.130(l)'s limitation on the right to redeem to the "judgment debtor or his successor in interest" is to restrict the right to redeem to those with a direct interest in the subject property. Marks' Westside did become a successor to the Marks' interest in this property when the Marks executed and recorded the quitclaim deed on July 18, 1984. Gray v. C.A. Harris & Son, 200 Wash. 181, 93 P.2d 385 (1939). Marks' Westside became a successor in interest before the expiration of the statutory redemption period, and thereby complied with the substantive provisions of former RCW 6.24.130.
Marks' Westside erred only because it tendered its redemption payment prematurely, a few days before it formally became a successor in interest to the property. Its early payment violated the technical redemption procedure set forth in former RCW 6.24.180.
Significantly, respondent Internal Revenue Service has never suggested that Marks' Westside's procedural default in any way actually harmed its interests. Accordingly, GESA mandates that this technical error be excused. "Where a party, in exercising its redemption right, commits *57a technical but harmless procedural error, a forfeiture requirement is not only unjust, but inconsistent with the very purpose of the statute." GESA, 105 Wn.2d at 256. The majority's forfeiture of Marks' Westside's right of redemption directly contravenes our decision in GESA.
I would hold that Marks' Westside substantially complied with the redemption statutes when it received title to the subject property by an acknowledged quitclaim deed within the redemption period. I would also hold that Marks' Westside tendered payment in the correct amount to properly redeem.
Former RCW 6.24.160 governs the amount a judgment debtor must pay in order to redeem from a redemptioner. That statute provides in relevant part:
If no redemption be made within the redemption period . . . the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a conveyance; or, if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed, and no other redemption has been made . . . and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner or his assignee is entitled to a sheriff's deed; but in all cases the judgment debtor shall have the entire redemption period ... to redeem the property. If the judgment debtor redeem he must make the same payments as are required to effect a redemption by the redemptioner.
(Italics mine.) Laws of 1961, ch. 196, § 2, p. 1896.
The IRS contends that the italicized sentence requires the judgment debtor (Marks' Westside) to tender an amount sufficient to satisfy the lien held by the last redemptioner (Whittall's estate's lien) in addition to tendering the amount paid out by the last redemptioner (Whittall's estate's redemption payment). However, the plain language of the italicized sentence indicates otherwise, for it requires the judgment debtor to pay only the amount paid by the redemptioner to redeem the property.
The use of the definite article indicates that "the redemptioner" refers to the redemptioner mentioned in the section's previous sentence — "the last redemptioner [otherwise] entitled to a sheriff's deed". "Consequently, when a *58judgment debtor redeems from the last redemptioner, he must pay whatever amount such last redemptioner paid." Prince v. Savage, 29 Wn. App. 201, 207, 627 P.2d 996 (1981). This construction works no hardship on the redemptioner; on redemption by the judgment debtor, his lien reattaches to the property. Former RCW 6.24.160; DeRoberts v. Stiles, 24 Wash. 611, 618-19, 64 P. 795 (1901).
Marks' Westside formally became a successor to the Marks' interest in the property within the redemption period, in substantial compliance with the redemption statutes. It tendered payment in the proper amount. We should not forfeit its redemption rights merely because it tendered the redemption payment a few days prematurely.
I dissent.
Utter, J., concurs with Callow, C.J.
Reconsideration denied June 14, 1989.