Court Opinion

ID: 9892382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 18:01:02.564652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:51.837726
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 23 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ATISHMA KANT; MARLENE                           No.    22-55904
HERNANDEZ, individuals,
                                                D.C. No.
                Plaintiffs-Appellants,          5:21-cv-01153-FMO-SHK

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 721, a
labor organization; ROB BONTA, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of
California,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                   Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted October 19, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
      After they resigned their union membership, Atishma Kant and Marlene

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Hernandez (plaintiffs) sued their former union Service Employees International

Union Local 721 (SEIU) and Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California. They

alleged that—under laws enforced by Attorney General Bonta—their employer, the

Superior Court of California, continued deducting union dues from their wages and

giving those dues to SEIU in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights under Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal

Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). They also raised state contract-law

claims. The district court dismissed their claims, and they appealed. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo. Wright v. SEIU Loc. 503,

48 F.4th 1112, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir. 2022) (subsequent history omitted). We affirm.

      1. Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief are moot because defendants have

refunded the money at issue. Article III jurisdiction extends only to live cases and

controversies. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013). But voluntary

cessation only moots a claim if the defendant carries the “formidable burden of

showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not

reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).

      SEIU and the Attorney General have carried that “formidable” burden. After

this case was filed, SEIU told the Superior Court to stop deducting plaintiffs’ wages

and reimbursed the union dues that the Superior Court took after plaintiffs withdrew

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from union membership. Under California Government Code section 1157.12, the

Superior Court can only make deductions for union dues if SEIU certifies that

plaintiffs authorized such deductions. Plaintiffs are unlikely to authorize such

deductions again, and the deductions are therefore unlikely ever to resume. Attorney

General Bonta is entitled to a presumption of regularity and there is no evidence that

he would violate California law by certifying to the Superior Court that plaintiffs

reauthorized deductions. See United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–

15 (1926). Even if plaintiffs did reauthorize deductions at some future point, the

task of telling the Superior Court to resume those deductions falls to SEIU, not the

Attorney General.

      2. Plaintiffs cannot bring retrospective section 1983 claims against SEIU.

SEIU did not act as a state actor when it relied on plaintiffs’ authorizations to deduct

union dues from their wages. Section 1983 liability attaches to private action if the

private conduct was “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). That requirement is not met here. See Belgau v. Inslee,

975 F.3d 940, 946–47 (9th Cir. 2020).

      Belgau is not distinguishable because plaintiffs are challenging the Superior

Court’s decision to enter the memorandum of understanding with SEIU. When

plaintiffs joined SEIU, they agreed to be “bound by the Constitution and Bylaws of

the Union and by any contracts that may be in existence at the time of application or

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that may be negotiated by the Union.” While California contract law might address

the legality of such a contract, a union entering into a contract with a government

employer does not engage in state action.

      3. Sovereign immunity bars the retroactive claims for nominal and

compensatory damages against Attorney General Bonta. Parties can sue state

officers with “some connection with the enforcement of” a challenged law for

prospective and declaratory relief. Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir.

1998). However, “state sovereign immunity protects state officer defendants sued

in federal court in their official capacities from liability in damages, including

nominal damages.” Platt v. Moore, 15 F.4th 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs do

not argue that sovereign immunity has been waived or abrogated. The Eleventh

Amendment thus bars their claims for damages against the Attorney General.

      4. The district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

and dismissed the state contract-law claims without prejudice after it dismissed the

federal claims against SEIU and Attorney General Bonta. See Wade v. Reg’l Credit

Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996).

      AFFIRMED.

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