Court Opinion

ID: 9900390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:03.690895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.106594
License: Public Domain

326                  August 9, 2023              No. 398

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

       MARIA CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ CAZUN,
                Petitioner-Appellant,
                          v.
               STATE OF OREGON,
               Defendant-Respondent.
          Clackamas County Circuit Court
                19CV22118; A176252

  Kathie F. Steele, Judge.
  Submitted April 10, 2023.
   Jedediah Peterson and O’Connor Weber LLC filed the
brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 327 Or App 326 (2023)   327
328                                            Cazun v. State of Oregon

          ORTEGA, P. J.
          Petitioner, who is not a United States citizen,
pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree theft. Seeking
post-conviction relief, she claimed that her trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective and prejudiced her by failing to
properly advise her of the immigration consequences of her
plea and that counsel’s error rendered her plea not knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent.1 In denying her claims, the post-
conviction court agreed with the state that trial counsel’s
advice that petitioner should consult an immigration attor-
ney was sufficient to meet counsel’s constitutional obliga-
tions and that petitioner had not met her burden to show
that counsel’s advice caused her prejudice. Reasserting her
arguments on appeal, petitioner asks us to reverse and
remand her case for further proceedings. Because the post-
conviction court did not err in its conclusions, we affirm its
judgment.
          We review the denial of post-conviction relief for
errors of law and are bound by the post-conviction court’s
findings of historical fact if there is evidence in the record to
support them. Madrigal-Estrella v. State of Oregon, 303 Or
App 124, 126, 463 P3d 23, rev den, 366 Or 826 (2020). With
those standards in mind, we provide the relevant, undis-
puted facts.
          Petitioner was indicted with one count each of first-
and second-degree theft, based on incidents that occurred
in August 2016. At her case management hearing, petition-
er’s trial counsel stated to the court, “I advised [petitioner]
that she needed to speak to an immigration attorney, given
the charges and her status.” Counsel also stated, “She has
not been able to do that. I have indicated to her I think it’s
vital that she do that before resolving this case.” Petitioner
did not consult an immigration attorney, and ultimately, in
May 2017, she pleaded guilty to second-degree theft in
     1
       Under both the Oregon and United States Constitutions, a criminal defen-
dant is entitled to the adequate and effective assistance of counsel. Or Const, Art
I, § 11; US Const, Amend VI. To meet this constitutional requirement, a defense
counsel must advise the defendant about the immigration consequences of the
defendant’s case, including the consequences of a guilty plea. Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 US 356, 366-69, 130 S Ct 1473, 176 L Ed 2d 284 (2010). A waiver of that
type of “constitutional right must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” State
v. Austin, 316 Or App 56, 58, 501 P3d 1136 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 675 (2022).
Cite as 327 Or App 326 (2023)                                                329

exchange for dismissal of the other theft charge. The court
accordingly entered a judgment of conviction.
         Petitioner did not file a direct appeal but timely
sought post-conviction relief, alleging in two claims that
trial counsel’s conduct amounted to a violation of her consti-
tutional rights. In her first claim, she argued that trial coun-
sel was ineffective and prejudiced her by failing to advise
her “that her ‘deportation [would be] presumptively manda-
tory’ upon conviction prior to petitioner entering pleas.” See
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 US 356, 369, 130 S Ct 1473, 176
L Ed 2d 284 (2010) (when it is “truly clear” that removal
from this country will result from a guilty plea, a trial
counsel must advise a client that “deportation [is] presump-
tively mandatory”).2 According to petitioner, a case decided
by the Board of Immigration Appeals in November 2016
required trial counsel to advise her that a guilty plea would
affect her right to seek immigration relief. See Matter of
Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I & N Dec 847, 847, 854-55 (BIA 2016)
(a theft offense involves moral turpitude). To support her
claim, petitioner introduced a declaration of an immigration
attorney, stating that second-degree theft convictions after
Diaz-Lizarraga would disqualify a defendant from obtain-
ing cancellation of removal and would trigger removal pro-
ceedings. Petitioner then asserted that trial counsel should
have advised her of Diaz-Lizarraga’s effect in relation to her
May 2017 conviction.
         In petitioner’s second claim, she argued that because
of counsel’s failure to properly advise her of the immigration
consequences of her conviction for second-degree theft, her
plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. She asserted
that she would not have entered a guilty plea waiving her
constitutional rights had she understood and appreciated
the legal consequences of doing so.
         The post-conviction court denied petitioner’s claims
for relief. In its written judgment, the court concluded,
    2
      The Oregon Supreme Court likewise has held that “if the immigration con-
sequences of pleading guilty to certain crimes are ‘truly clear,’ * * * the Sixth
Amendment requires defense counsel to advise their clients not merely that a
conviction ‘may result’ in adverse immigration consequences but that deportation
and other adverse immigration consequences will be ‘virtually inevitable’ as a
result of the plea.” Chavez v. State of Oregon,364 Or 654, 661, 438 P3d 381 (2019).
330                                 Cazun v. State of Oregon

following Ninth Circuit case law, that Diaz-Lizarraga did
not apply retroactively to petitioner’s conviction, which was
based on conduct that occurred three months before that
decision was issued, and that trial counsel “was not required
to advise [p]etitioner of Diaz-Lizarraga consequences.”
See Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F3d 1291, 1296 (9th
Cir 2018) (the extension of the moral turpitude definition
announced in Diaz-Lizarraga does not apply retroactively);
see also Romero v. Sessions, 736 Fed Appx 632 (9th Cir 2018)
(unpublished) (same).
          On appeal, petitioner argues in her first assignment
of error that the post-conviction court erred in denying her
claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. She
maintains that, under Padilla and Diaz-Lizarraga, coun-
sel’s failure to properly advise her of the immigration con-
sequences of her guilty plea was constitutionally ineffective
and prejudiced her.
         Padilla does not provide the level of protection that
petitioner understandably urges. Under Padilla, defense
counsel is constitutionally required to provide advice
regarding the risk of deportation upon a defendant’s guilty
plea “when the deportation consequence is truly clear.” 559
US at 369; see also Madrigal-Estrella, 303 Or App at 137
(the Padilla “truly clear” standard “means that any compe-
tent attorney would have been able to discern the immigra-
tion consequences of a particular plea by consulting readily
available sources of law”).
          Here, the deportation consequence of petitioner’s
plea was not that clear at the time she made her decision.
Diaz-Lizarraga was decided around three months after the
date of petitioner’s conduct and six months before her guilty
plea. The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Garcia-Martinez that
Diaz-Lizarraga did not apply retroactively was issued about
a year later—that is, after petitioner’s guilty plea. The post-
conviction court’s conclusion that it was therefore not “truly
clear” that Diaz-Lizarraga would apply to petitioner’s con-
viction was not in error. Consequently, trial counsel’s advice
to petitioner—that petitioner should consult an immigration
attorney before resolving her case—was not constitution-
ally inadequate under Padilla because, at that time, it was
Cite as 327 Or App 326 (2023)                             331

not the case that any competent attorney would have been
able to discern the immigration consequences of petitioner’s
plea. Accordingly, we agree with the post-conviction court
that trial counsel “was not required to advise [p]etitioner
of Diaz-Lizarraga consequences” and was not constitution-
ally inadequate under Padilla. We thus conclude that the
post-conviction court did not err in denying petitioner’s first
claim for relief, which obviates the need to address petition-
er’s prejudice argument.
         We turn to petitioner’s second assignment, regard-
ing whether the post-conviction court erred in denying her
claim that her plea was invalid for not being knowing, vol-
untary, and intelligent. Petitioner’s only argument is that,
because she did not receive proper advice from her trial
attorney, she could not have entered a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent plea. Our conclusion that petitioner did not
establish that trial counsel was ineffective likewise disposes
of that argument.
        Affirmed.