Court Opinion

ID: 9727885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:51:59.282274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:44.116725
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting in part: The classification of cocaine as a narcotic under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56½, par. 1100 et seq.) is unreasonable in light of the current medical and pharmacological knowledge and thus deprives defendant of equal protection. On this basis, I dissent. As recognized in State v. Erickson (Alas. 1978), 574 P.2d 1, it is undisputed that cocaine is not a narcotic under the pharmacological definition of the term. The harsh penalties imposed under the Act for cocaine violations result from its classification as a narcotic drug. Such a legislative classification has no rational basis and should not be upheld against the constitutional challenge presented. Because there is a conflict of opinion concerning the effects of cocaine use, the majority concludes that defendant’s constitutional challenge to the classification of cocaine must be rejected. There is, however, no conflict of opinion on whether or not cocaine is a narcotic. It undisputably is not. Research reveals that cocaine was misclassified as a narcotic in the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 (ch. 1, 38 stat. 785 (1914)) and has been so classified ever since. See E. Brecher and Consumer Reports, Licit and Illicit Drugs 271 (1972), and G. McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 537 (1973). This case presents the same problem with the classification of cocaine as People v. McCabe (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 338, 341, 275 N.E.2d 407, 409, presented with the classification of marijuana: “Appropriate respect should be given to the fact of a legislative classification, but there is a judicial obligation to insure that the power to classify has not been exercised arbitrarily and, if it has been, the legislation cannot be justified under the label of ‘classification.’ ” Here, a nonnarcotic is classified as a narcotic. There is a judicial obligation to state that such an Orwellian classification cannot be justified. Both cocaine and amphetamines are classified as Schedule II drugs under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56½, par. 1206.) Cocaine, however, is classified as a narcotic whereas the amphetamines are not. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56½, par. 1102(aa)(4).) Under sections 401(a) and 402(a) of the Act, possession of only 30 grams of cocaine is penalized as a Class I felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56½, pars. 1401(a) and 1402(a).) In contrast, possession of 200 grams of amphetamines is required before it is penalized as a Class I felony. Furthermore, in section 401(b), the delivery of any lesser amount of a narcotic drug is a Class 2 felony, whereas in section 401(c) the delivery of any lesser amount of a nonnarcotic drug is a Class 3 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56½, pars. 1401(b), 1401(c).) Clearly, the legislative intent is to penalize the narcotic violations more severely than those violations involving nonnarcotics. Although cocaine may be classified and penalized as a nonnarcotic controlled substance, there is no rational basis for the classification of cocaine as a narcotic drug. The legislative classification fails under the equal protection provision of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2.