Court Opinion

ID: 9797917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:32:15.81986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:43.416594
License: Public Domain

BOLGER, Judge,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the result of the lead opinion because I agree that this case should be remanded for further findings. I write separately because my view of the record diverges from my colleagues' on certain key issues.
The lead opinion suggests that the police continued to hold Skjervem in custody after they learned that there was no burglary and before they discovered the drug paraphernalia in Skjervem's car. But the trial court's decision strongly implies that Sergeant Paiz discovered the drug paraphernalia in Skjer-vem's vehicle before the officer was aware that the owner of the residence arrived at the scene. Indeed, there is substantial evidence in the record supporting this implication of the trial court's ruling when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to that decision.1
Paiz testified that there were already a number of officers present when he arrived at the residence around 5:15 p.m. He noticed a tan Ford vehicle in the parking space directly in front of the residence. Paiz initially tried to question the woman who had been taken into custody, but she was too agitated to respond in a rational manner. He then went into the residence with several other officers to make sure that there was no one else inside.
The officers finished "clearing" the residence at about 5:80 p.m. At that point, Paiz went to look at the tan vehicle parked in front of the residence. This was when he observed the drug paraphernalia in the front seat and directed another officer to bring Skjervem to the vehicle. It was then that *1112Skjervem agreed to let the police search the vehicle.
Additionally, Paiz was familiar with the owner of the residence, Steve Grizzell. On cross examination, Paiz was questioned about whether Grizzell was in the car with Skjer-vem when the police first arrived, or whether Grizzell was in a patrol car after Paiz cleared the residence. Paiz's responses suggested that Grizzell was not present. There was nothing in his report to indicate exactly when Grizzell arrived. But Paiz did recall that the burglary investigation was underway when he walked out of the residence, and that it was still underway shortly thereafter when he had Skjervem brought over to the vehicle.
Paiz's description of this part of the investigation is supported by the testimony of Officer Arthur Anderson, the officer who actually spoke with Grizzell. Anderson was one of the first officers to arrive at the residence after receiving a dispatch call for a burglary in progress. He assisted in detaining the woman who was putting a screen back on one of the windows and observed other officers detaining Skjervem and his car's passenger in the driveway. Grizzell did not arrive until after the officers had cleared the residence-when they were at the "end 7 stages" of "clearing everything up Anderson spoke with Grizzell, who confirmed that the two people the police had detained at the residence had his permission to be there.
The lead opinion relies on Officer Blanton's testimony suggesting that the owner of the house arrived and talked with Paiz while Blanton was waiting in his patrol car with Skjervem. But Blanton's testimony on this point is not based on his personal observations. At first, Blanton said that Paiz had talked with Grizzell, but that he did not know what they discussed. Blanton then clarified that he only assumed that Paiz had talked with Grizzell because of a radio transmission stating that the house's owner had arrived. Blanton was unsure about the time frame, but it made sense to him that the owner arrived before Blanton brought Skjervem over to the vehicle to talk with Paiz.
In my opinion, the description by Anderson and Paiz about the sequence of events is more convincing than Blanton's recollection, which was based on speculation from a radio transmission. The testimony by Anderson and Paiz supports the judge's conclusion that Paiz had discovered the paraphernalia in Skjervem's vehicle before Griz-zell arrived, and that this discovery allowed the police to detain Skjervem even after Grizzell told them that no burglary had occurred.
The majority opinion also questions Judge Volland's finding that Paiz saw the crack pipe and other drug paraphernalia before he asked Skjervem for his consent to search the vehicle. However, there is substantial support in the record for the judge's finding that "Paiz observed not only a 'stash box," but a backpack, two lighters, a wallet, a green crack pipe, and a pushrod when he first looked into the window of Skjervem's vehicle."
As noted above, Paiz testified on direct examination that after the officers made sure that no one was inside the residence, he came outside and went over to look at the tan car in front of the residence. When he looked through the car's window, he saw a small round canister (which he called a "stash box"). He could also see a backpack, a green crack pipe, two plastic lighters, a wallet, and a push rod (a type of rod used to smoke crack cocaine). Only then did Paiz ask to have the driver, Skjervem, brought over to talk to him. Paiz asked Skjervem if the police could search his car, and Skjervem said that they could.
After Paiz obtained Skjervem's permission, he opened the driver's side door and looked into the vehicle. On cross-examination, Paiz initially asserted that, at that point, he could see the backpack, wallet, stash box, and crack pipe. He said that the backpack was positioned to the right side of the steering wheel, and that the other items were behind this backpack.
Paiz then clarified that he would not have seen the other items at that point if he had not moved the backpack. Shortly after-wards, however, he confirmed his prior recollection that all of the items were on top of the front seat. No one asked Paiz to clarify *1113the exact position of the drug paraphernalia. In particular, no one ever asked him whether he had actually seen the drug paraphernalia when he first looked into the car before he talked to Skjervem. Paiz did not concede that he had only observed the gold canister at the time he began interrogating Skjervem and that he discovered the other items only after he searched the vehicle.
The lead opinion suggests that Paiz told Blanton that he did not discover the crack pipe, the push rod, or the other drug paraphernalia until he actually searched Skjer-vem's vehicle. But Blanton's testimony implies that Paiz stated that he had discovered the drug paraphernalia in Skjervem's vehicle while Blanton was still sitting in his patrol car. This suggests that Paiz discovered the drug paraphernalia in Skjervem's vehicle before Paiz had Blanton bring Skjervem over to the vehicle.
Consequently, I conclude that Paiz's direct examination constitutes substantial evidence supporting Judge Volland's finding that "Paiz observed not only a 'stash box,' but a backpack, two lighters, a wallet, a green crack pipe, and a pushrod when he first looked into the window of Skjervem's vehicle." It appears to me that Judge Volland did not discuss the implications of this finding because his decision also rested on an independent basis for Skjervem's detention: that Skjer-vem was still detained for the burglary investigation when Paiz asked to search the car.
I agree with the decision to remand this case because the proper result may hinge on these two disputed evidentiary issues. If Paiz saw all of the drug paraphernalia, including the crack pipe and stash box on the seat, before he talked to Skjervem, then Paiz would arguably have had probable cause to arrest Skjervem and to search him incident to that arrest.2 Moreover, if Skjervem was legally detained for the burglary investigation when Paiz asked to search Skjervem's car, then his consent was not tainted by an illegal detention.3

. See Crawford v. State, 138 P.3d 254, 258 (Alaska 2006); State v. Campbell, 198 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Alaska App.2008) (holding that the record should be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party when reviewing a trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress).

. See Dollison v. State, 5 P.3d 244, 246-47 (Alaska App.2000); Snider v. State, 958 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Alaska App.1998).

. See Hubert v. State, 638 P.2d 677, 688 & n. 9 (Alaska App.1981).